The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

Sidney Axinn The Logic of Hope: EXTBNSIONS OF KAHrS VlBW OF REUGlON THE LOGIC OF HOPE: Extensions of Kant's View of ...

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Sidney Axinn

The

Logic of Hope: EXTBNSIONS OF KAHrS VlBW OF REUGlON

THE LOGIC OF HOPE: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

VALUE INQUIRY BOOK SERIES

VIBS Volumr: 15

Roben Ginsbera Eucullvt Editor

AFlM:iatc Editors John M. Abbuno

Vqini.I B1act Rem B. Edwwds Richard T. Hull

Robe."" Kevdson SondttH. ....

Ruth M. Lucier

........ -

Alan Milchmln Michael H. Mitiu M"" Mou

Samuel M. Nata1e

Alan ROIetIberJ Dlniel SWn_"

THE LOGIC OF HOPE: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

Sidney Axinn

Ammrdam - Atwu., GA 199<4

This book contains mattrialll'pfillted rrom Rfttt(M Wi,Aillw Ulrtlll (Ij R _ AI",", by Immanuel Kant, lnInsialed by Tbeodore M. Oree ... aDd Ho)'l H. HIKkon , by pennission of Open Court PUblishiRJ Company, La Sallt . lUinoil . Copyriabt 19~ by The Opm Collrtl'llblishin. Company.

.....,.

C..... e. des .... by Cb ... Kok boled on a pbOlol"ph -1984 by Robert O insberJ, or SlatlUlf)' by (ju.stav VilC'laDd io IlK Fro.... r Park, Oslo,

ISBN: 96-S I B~:J-7 (CIP) -Editioll!l Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam· Atllnta . GA I ~ Printed ill 1M NttheflaDds

Lei US 001 make rub c:onjenurn aboul the grulesl thinp. Heraclitus, fragmenl 48.

If you do 001 hope. you will 001 find !hal ",bleb is DOt hoped for; &ince il is difficull 10 discover and impossible In

.twn.

Heradltus, fragment 7.

cmrrENTS

Fo reword

1

Preface

J

Pan 1: KANTS ANALYSIS OF REUGION

7

ONE. lnuoduction ... .. ....... ... . . .. ...... .. .... 9

I. H istory and a TOlith of Gossip 2. Oullinc of This Book 3. Summary 0( Kant', Book on Religion A. HulIWI Nature B. Ethical Theory C The Religion of Reason D. The RelatioD Between Historical Religions and Rational Religion E. FetishWn

9

11 15 15

16 17

19 20

'TWO. Kam', ConCCpiual Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23

I. The Nature and LimiU of Knowledge A. The Pragmatic Foundatioo of Koowledgt:

23 24

B. POISible Experience as a Necessi ty for ~d~

U

C. Spa.oc and Tune

26

D. Phenomena and Noumena

UI

E. The Antinomies F. Conclusions 2. Kant's ElhicaJ Theory 3. Kant's Philosophy of H islo!),

31 33 34 48

1HREE. IUfigion I

Puf~re

Wuhilllh~

Limits 0{ &men AIo.v . . . . .. 67 61

10 the FiBI Edjtion

2. Part One: CcmeerniDfi the lndwellin& of the Evil Principle with me Good; Ort 0J1 the R adieal Evi] in H uman Nablrl':

PART

n·

]39

APM !CAnONS OF REASON

FOIIR. AmbiVlllcDCC: The Na]urc of ]be Individual

..... . ]4]

]. liappille5ll 2 And VC]: The Amb ivalence of] M J. Ambjya]CDCC Yl. Fanaticism 4. 1lJe Requircme nlS of Logic

J ndiyj d u~]

S. The Forma! Propertie5 of a CUbe of Opposition S ] ModCls of AmbjyatCDCf;

6. 7. 8. 9.

5.2 varieties of Ambivalcnce 53 Some RCSU]t!, of This Modcl The Mo nist Tradition H istorjp ] Re]ations A D ualist Mode] of H uman Nunrc Ambival~DCf; and H ODe$ry

]41 ]42 10

145 147 148 IS4 IS6 ]51 158 1M 163

FIVE. The logic of igllOnnce

..................... 165

I. Definitions, Assumptions 2. Axioms 3. Assumptions Summariud

167 169

4 Theorem.

In 173 177 178 179

S. 6. 7. &.

Responsible Ignorance FOIJetting A Few Fnmple$ Concluding Comments

171

SIX. The Logic of Hope: Definitions of Three Types of Hope ................................. 183 I. Introduction: Kinds of Hope 2. The Presuppoiition of Ignorance, Considered Pragmati<:a!ly

183 185

SEVEN. The Logic of Hope: Continued .. ... . ........ 201

I. Schema and Image 2. Kant on POSlliblr Hopes 3. S«:ond-Order Hope 4. Hope and tbe Solution of tbe Antinomie$ 4.1 The Epicurus Analogy 4.2 The Second.()rder Hope Antinomy S. Pragmatic Synthesis 6. SUlDmary and D istinction Between Reasonable and Unrra.sonabk Hopes

20 1 205 207 209 210 213 214

218

7. Unreasonable Hopes

PART III: CONSEQUENCES OF KANTS Y1EWPOlNT

n,-

EIGHT. Kant's Use of Reasonable Hope .... .. ... ... . . 227

E. 1be Retribution Antinomy F. Active and Passive Moral Subjects

a

Conclusion 2. Hope: for Mysterious Assistance in Moral Effort

237 2J8 242

242

NINE. Mystery Versus Undecidability .••••.....•....• 247

reNo1be Moral Antinomy ••..... . •••....•••.. .. . . 263 I. A Moral Antinomy A Ob-.,vatjon< po tbe 1Msfs B. ot,mvaUom on . be A n!j!bcsi,

263

263 264

264

,

3. Nine QuestiOIl$ about Morality and Kant'li AnSW1'fS

4. Cond",jQRI

267

m

ELEVEN. The Religious Ouestion: The PhiI050Phy of Religion as the PhilO5OPhy of History ••• .. •••. . 275

NOles

293

FOREWORD Sidney Axinn has written. profound and intense study of fundamental mancl'$ touching upon our humanity. He expounds and e~ the Kantian question, "What may we hope?" 111e ~[ora·

lion is subtle and systematic; me results arc an exciting aposiliDn of the ~ry meaniq of hope. Axirm Ilpelli !he book with an utended ueg6is of Kant's fWi&inn. Willlill the Umiu of Ret1IOtI AIoM, a fascinating "WOrk. that weaves togetber major themes of Kaotian philosophy, but which has n01 received iu full due. Arinn worn out and works aver every worthwhile distinction in thaI volume, connecting i\ wilen appropriate with the corpus 0( Kant's works. This full clarification of the Kantian cJas.sic gives Minn the: terms .ud consideratioilS for pursuill8 hope 10 its lUI biding places in !he human bean. Sophisticated analytic techniques, includina symbolic logic. are put to use on the ((lDo:eptUal matrix. the logical alternatives, the propositional structure of hope. Much rums upon the traditional Square of ~itiOD (redone as a Olbe) and tbe rceenl distinctiOD benoreen us.! and mmtion . Mnn arrives an astonishing oot(:Omc in his Kantian journey; hope, whicb generally is thought to be. religiOtl5 maller, beoomes invested by the rational beings thai we are in the lI'llmformation of world society inlo • Kingdom of Ends of individuals and a peaceful Leape of Nations. Here Ax;n n, a1011j with Kant, ties together phiJosophy of hislOry and international politia with eOlia. human nature, aod the powers of reasoo. This bopefuJ romrihution 10 Kantian itudies. and 10 human siudies. is Axinnology al its

a'

b.".

Roben Ginsberg Executive Editor

PREFACE For what can a human being hope? For what can a healthy and therefore ambivalent hulIWI beiq hope? What can such a penon DOt merely mcnuon hoping for, bul rationally hope for? lbal is

the religious question, Icrording to Kam. We find his al15WCr in the book, Rdigion Within the Limiu of IWuon AlaM, his only fulllength treatment of the subject. Pan I of this study is a commentary on Kant's book. Part n develops thc logic of three of Kant'S basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope. Pan m organizes all of Ihe5c: malletS in tCrtll$ of Kant', pbilosophy of history. The first two chapters of ParI I are introductory. auuming a reader who can use. brief survey of Kant'S ronccptu.altools. The third chapler is. detailed analysis of each scction of Kant's book.. After going lbrougb Kant', work on religion, we find .everal problems lbat need more development. First. the problem of ambivalence. Kant's tbeory of human nature. Seoond, the exact analysis of ignorance. An e5SeOtiai concern of Kant's work on religion is mapping out the area of reality thai human beings can hope \0 know and thc area thai they cannot hope to know. Therefore, the nature of ignoranoe is «otta!. And it is of panicutar lignifieance in a work on religion because of the assumption !hat we can hope for 5Oml:thi"l only if we all: ignorant of ....!!ether or not it will occur. The third and basic problem that we are pressed to deal with at the 1:00 of Kanfs work is Ihe logical analysis o f bope. Kant has argued thai if we act in a fashion that is oot unworthy of bope for Rlpem&wral assistance we then have the ri&ht to weh hope. There are complicated problelll5 10 be considered in the analysis of the limilS of rational hope, in addition to the prewpposition of ignorance just mentioned. Pan II uses just a h it o f modem symbolic losie to extend these three of !CaDI'S basic ideas: ambivalence, ignorance, and hope. Each of them plays a pan in Kant's position on the philosophy of history and ethiC$, as well as religion. Each needs more develop. ment than Kant has p rovided. In separate dlaptcrs these topia

,

PREFACE

are exterv1ed in • fashion that IiWU with Kant's sugeestions but then goes on to reach condusions beyond his. Without some attention to the logic of ignoranc:e, of ambivllctlCe. and of hope the power of KanI'S analym of religion can euily be mis.5ed. Part 1lI develops the consequence.5 of combinina the UlcMiOf\li of ambivalence, ignorance, and hope with Kanl's viewpoint ill the philOliOphy of hi511H)' and religion. Kant's own conception of the li mit of reasonable hope is ooll5idcn:d in one chapler. This is followed by his analysis of the distinction berween wbat is myilcrious and what is unknowable. "'The Moral Antinomy,' Chapler X. provides a counterbalance 10 the usual individualistic and formal intctprctatioll5 of his ethical theory. Certain aspec:u of Kanl's philowphy of history and of human !I.IIUTC are cmphailicd in alln05l every ckapler. Finally, KanI'S conception of lhe rcligi0U5 question is the subject of the last chapter, his view lbal the philosophy of felipo!! is essentially the pbilOiOphy of history. Paro of a few CluiplC'lI have appeared in early formulationl. 'The material of Chapter V is taken from "'The Logic of the Ignorance Relatioos," Amt>YQII Pllilowp/!icuJ Quarterly, 13:2 (1976). 135-143, dom: jointly with David M. Axinn. I thank him as well as the editor of the journal for pe rmission to use IOII\e of it here. We we~ f~e to use symbolic losie in the journal pape r, but I have translated the ~ lcyant ideas into English for prcsent PUrpose$. Some of Otapte r IV appeared as "On the LoPe of Consent," .Atehiva lOT PhiJosoplry of Law and SociDI Plliloscphy (ARSP), Deibeft Neue Folge, NR. 12. pp. 19-32. Some of Otapter IX appeared as "Kant's Distinction De~en Mystery and Unknowability," Alam du 4. Inumationtlkn Kmu·~, Mainz. 197". Tell IU, Wallcr de Gruyter, Berlin, 197", pp. 899-905. Pan of Olapter X may be foond as "Kant and tbe Moral AntillOlll)'," Pllxudill8l 0{ 1M Ottawa Intmwtional Kmu Ccl!lerota, 1914,

University of Ottawa. Ottawa, 1976. 1 1!tank eacb editor for permission to use these materials. The point of their indusion i.5 that in tbe framework of Kant's analysis of religion the othctwise random piece:! become essential paru. of a unified viewpoint

, Once

~n

I am grateful 10 Nadia L. Kravehel\ko of Temple

University's College of Am and Sciences for her real cJpeniH and good will in doing technical work on the manusaipt. Research lime for this project was provided by several slUdy leaves from Temple URivc:nil)'. for ",hid) I am happy 10 thank the commiuecs and particularly Dean Carolyn Adams of the College of Am and Scienoes. ProfCSlOl' Robe" Ginsllelll proved 10 be . n ideal editor, forcing me to reconsider and rewrite mauen boll! substalltivc: and stylistie. There is one UDiqllc ad:nowLedgmenl that I owe. The material in the chapler on ignorance pvc me more pleulITc than the rest because of the colIabontioll with my OO-llIllIor and son. David M. A1in.n. Par~l5 and children have often been impressed by each olber's igooranc:e. As .ClIdemia, we found ourselves seneralizillJ on the mallcr of igoorance; as Ioa'cians, we looked for precisiolL The reader IIIlIY judse what we round, but can only imagine our fun in tbe findina. The problem goes beyond family dynami~ of CQUf$e, since Kant's notion of the scope and varieties of ignorance is central 10 his view of rational hope. It takes some knowtedge to formulaic, hope; it abo lakes some ignorance, betaU5e one doe.s nol hope for what is certain 10 happen. Vineyard Haven, Mau.

November 1993

Part I KANTS ANALYSIS OF RELIGION

One IN I RODUCnON I. HIIfot)' aad I Tolldl or Gossip What can I k:Dow1 What YIouId I do1 What can I hope rOf'? Immanuel Kant took thcR! three questions 10 characterize the field of philosophy.' His well·known answen 10 the r1t5\ two may be found in the Oitique of ~ Rauon and lbe Crilique of PmcticoI &asoII. respectively. Kant'. book on the third question, &fi&ioII Within 1M J..imju of Jkusott 14"-, is IIardJy known in many quarten. It appeared in 1793. when Kant was sixty-nine yean old. Why has • major ."."rk by • major modem philosopher received rueh seanl tl'CatmcO\ in the Ii!erarure? Perhaps the title of the book served 10 repel the two main cateprics of readen. The sc:icntific collllnUnity oould quickly pul it aside beause it s1.ned wi th the word "religion," and at least pan mlhe: religious rommunity c:ouid iJ.l1Ore the work on the assumption thai Yi:ry Iitde religion could be located within the limits of reason alone. An acellern. Engiish tmWaoon by Theodore M. Or_ and HO)'I H. Hudson appeared in 1934. but was 011\ of print for about twenty years precedins ill reiMue in 1960. Another reason ror bypassina the book may be the fac1 that Kant did trUI one or two major reJigiOllS questions io bi5 earlier works. His classic aoaJyses of the "proofs" of !be emtence of God are found in the CritiqIu of Pun Iwlft'''I, and moa of the commentaton on Kant, when they Ialk about his rcli&iOllS poiilion, have ronfined themselves to this book. But Kant was far (rom ipent .t the age of smy.nine. His impor· tant essay, "Perpetu.al Peace," appeared two year5 bter, and he continued his univenity ieClUTe5 up to 1796. Several major works appeared after be retired from lecturing. pattiwlarly the Metaphyjic of Moro/s, The Conflict of the FacuJtiu, and Amhropology

from Q l'IugnUltic VitllpOint.

lNTRODUcnON When textbook IlCOOIInts do mentiOfl Kant's work on rel~on, it is usually for the sake of the story about its censonhip. Under Kina Frederick William II, a narrowly onhodwt administration took ovtr the Prussian Slate', Depanment of C11urch and Schools. Books dealing with religion had to be pa55ed by a «nsor. The imprimatur was 10 be allowed only for writing that followed the doctrine of the Lutheran and Reformed OIlIfCbes.. Kant duly submiued the fint pan of his book. "On Radical Evil: and it was accepted and appeared in April, 1792, in the ~ MONlU' 1Chrift. The remainder of Kant's manUS(ript was refused by the Berlin College of Censors. Kant was able. temporarily, to avoid the Berlin iWUP by getting permi";o" to publish from a univenity (either Jena or K/lnipbera: the referell«$ differ). A :;ccond edition or the hook appeared the foLlowina year, and then the authorities acted. Wollner, Minister of Ecdesiastical Affairs. obtained an order from the King in which Kant was accused of ' Wstortilll and dearadi.n& many of the chief and fundamental docui.oes of bo1y Saipture and of O lristianity.' Kant was ordered 10 desist, and all of tbe theoJogjc:al and pbilosophical faculty of the Univenity of KtlnipbefJ were abo required to sian statements in which they acreed not 10 lecture 00 Kant', hook. R&giotI W"uhill the LiMiu of Ibm,," A~. What ~d Kant do, faced with a royal order forbidding him to publisb 01'" teach b.is own po$ition on reliJion? We have aleller from Kant 10 Moses Mendelssohn, dated 8 April 1766, in which Kant had already developed his po$ition on this kind of queslion. "Altbouah J am ab50lulcly convinced of many things Ihat I shall never have the courage 10 ny, I lhal l neve r say anythilll I do not believe." 1lti.i leiter predicted bis bduovior. Kant did IIOt chanae or rel\Ollnce a word of b.is published material on religion, but he agreed to obey the Kina and 10 neither publish nor lpeU publicly on religion. Mer the death of Frederick William 11, Kant announced that he felt free again 10 upreu himself on religion since he had qreed to silctICC only as a subject of tlult King. Kant', bebavior in this matter suggests comparison with three other mleUcctual bc:TO$: Soerates. Bruno, and Calileo. (Giordano

I~

Bruoo of Nola, an Italian philosopher or the Rell.lis$ance, was burned aliY(! in Rome in 1600 for Tdu5ing to recant "heresies" concerning the relative rotation of the sun and the earth.) Galileo won release from prison by r«anting; Kant did not recant bUI agreed 10 Itop presenting hl$ views on religion. Socrates and Bruno refused to recant or 10 Slop Iheir public presentations. and were executed (Bruno was burned at the stake). The ronl~ and penalties were different, bul a simiJa:r question of moral courage was involved in each case. Kant seems 10 have been somewhere between the opponunism of Galileo ud the strict formal ism or penonal integrity of Socrates and Bruno. For the sake of comparison, DOtC thai Bruno was not an absolu tely perfect moral hero. There was an episode in which he apparently plagiarized a book by Manilio Ficino; and once al • trial in Venice: he did recant hl$ views. We need not dwell on these tales because heroic 1d5 can be celebrated without demanding lbat the actors be angel$, but also without dcnyins Ihal there were uoberoic ICIS in their lives. For present purposu, following all these histories would take us 100 far afield and well into the

area of lossip. 1. O .Uh.e or 'I1lb Book Tbc purpose of Part I of this Ulldy is an analysis of Kanl's position in his major book on religion. TI!erefore. Chapler III, the bulk of Part l, is confined 10 this book, with an fJOOIIsional refe rence beyond it 10 Kant', o!ber work.. I wiD ignore all of Ille rich bi5lorical qu«tiOll$ wch a$ !be stale of theology al lhe lime, biographical details beyond what I have already mentioned, the religion of KanI'S parents, bis own early religious instruction, etc. I enjoy Bossip as much as the nul penon, but the danger of substituling anecdote fOT analysis warns me away. Before launehing into the detailed commentary on Kanl's text, Chapter II provides a brief w "'ey of his theory of ItnowledBe. his ethical theory, and his philosophy of history. The distinctive features of

12

INTRODUcnON

Kant's work on each of these are oombined in his analysis of religion. 1lIe major pie« of Pan l, the third cllapter. is • section-bysection commenlllf)' on Kant's book, /kligion Wu/Wr f~ Umiu of R~ AIoM. AI the rondusion of mit. study, we will hi",,, ~ered just how his elhicaltheory, wilh lIS absolute conception of right and WTOIlg. if, oombioed wilh Kant's theory of hillaI)'. Each pan of Kant's book is followed by. Gcneral ObKmnion in whid! he disawed traditional religious mallen that lie ouwde of his own $lrid LimilS of. reJi&ioo of pure reason. These four arc; Works of Orate. Mindes., Mysteries, and Means of Grace. One distinctive thing about Kant's ueallnent is lhe WlIy thai he ooll$iden eacb of lbelle without weakening any _nlial pan of the scientific: analysis of knowledge, o.r any of the fol"«' of the eale&orical imperative. While $dence and morality are absolute in their own real!!!$, there au limits 10 Wile realms.

Pan U giva funher dcw:iopaICnl to three central ideas upoll ...hid! Kant has based the entire enterprise. The fint of these is the notion of the asenliui umbivuk1lCe of the individual. The problem for interpretation is 10 undenland how an individual <:all be ambivalent, can intend to ream oppos.itcs. and still maintain some degree of rationality. Olaptcr IV develops the logic of the situ.tion, starting with Kant's view of individuals who have ;ncol1Si$tcnl natures. and gots on 10 oolliiider Klmc of the psycholop oonscquenoes. The second of Kant's i
be koown 10 be lrue or false; and (3) We may also need 10 distinauisb between whal can be menlioned and can playa role in calculations, bUI cannot be OODStruaed, and whal (1lI be so OODSltuaed. Kant's conceptiODS of God, freedom. and irnmonality require exactly ruch distinctions be",,«n kinds of ignorance. Therefore, Chapter V deve lops three kinds of ignoranec: relation!.. and. provides an instrumenl for extending Kanl's analysis. The third of the basic COnceplS in Kant'S position is the maner of the logic What (1lI and wbat cannot be I'lItionaily take n as a legitilDllte object of hope? A variety of problems arise, and Kant gave only , bare beginning 10 the subject. Can OIIC hope for, oonll'lldiaioll, for example, a square-(ircle? If one hopes for a, and if a is equivalenl 10 b, docs one hope for b (the opadly problem)? If one hope presupposes something else, is thaI other mailer included in the hope? am one hope fOl" something that cannol be named, lhal CIInnot be understood? An additional clUSler of problems concerns the rdatioll5 between hope and fear. Can one hope for something wilhoul al the same time fcaring that the desired situation may not 0CC\Ir? ls every hope correlative with some fear? Chapter VI develops the logic of the relation in which one hopes for $Ometbing. and provides, necessary ClIlension of Kant's eentral idea. The Ihree problems of Pan II are intimatcly relaled 10 each otber. In order 10 construct, hope, one musl have a balance of knowled&e and i&norance. There mUSI be 'I least some knowledge of wbat !he desired objective would be, and there must be some ignorance about whether or not the objective will be reached. Hope presupposes partial ignonnoe; one does 001 hope for a cenainly or an lmpouibilily. The further question remains: what hope can there be £01" an individual woo is ambivalent aboor ~1inI? A response 10 this is offered in terms of the dislinction between an individu&l's intentions aI a panicular moment, and the history of thaI individual. 'The chapter on ambiYlllence also pre5enl$ I classification of objcctive5 in terms of the classical square of opposition (contradictory, contraJy. subcontrary. and subaltern pairs of gnm). arwl extends this 10 a cube nf psychologi·

of..

"

II'n'RODUCT10N

cal opposites. The three concepts of this put of lhe book are nc:ceMaty to construct an answer to the question o f what a healthy a nd therefore IltIlbivalenl human can rationally hope for. Several eonseque nc;e$ Df Kant's position of religion a rc oonsidered in Pan Ill. The Io&ic of the triple. ambivalenceignorance-hope, is used In develop KanI'S oonception of reasonable hope and fealUres of his distilK'lion between whal is IIl)'$lcrious and what is u nknowable. He inmts 1'11'1 sepaT1llion between a cue in which we know wb.at UJouJd be done but not why il should, and the: case in which we know why something is needed but 110\ what it might consist of. R eligious mysteries and scientific unkoowabililia both involve ignorance, but the varieties of i£oorance must be lo&ica1ty distinguished for claril)'.

Chapler X develops the religious consequences of the moral antinomy, the is&ue between taking morality to be withi n the individual and taking ;1 10 be • feature reality. Kant', view involves. combination of the rclI5O!I and human history. FmaUy, the roncludin& chapter preK OIS Kant',

c:omplclely of external individual's

analysis of A hope is a

religion in terms of his understanding of history. ronstnlction about the future and mUSI presuppose a theOI)' of bislol)'. The ethical Idnadom of enlk. in which 00 one is used merely as a means and eaeb is treated as an end, is ronnec:ted with the religious phraseology of a Kin&dom of God on Earth. His philosophy of history is the rramewor~ that oonne.:ts Kant's relipous ideas of tbe ethical rommonwealth, the nature of mystel)' and ignoranee, the require ment of moral worthiness, and the logic of hope. This eblpler summarizes hls view of the SlaM of God and of political goals. and ronsidcrs Kant's response 10 the questions: Whit is humlnkind? What is the hope for moral prosress? What would a re liJious age be? What meanin& does human hlslOI)' have (or the individual? What is the poiot of • ronception of . God who <:an be mentioned but oot used? What is s.ac:red? Why InI5I reason?

is J.

Su~m.ry

of Kaal's Book on Rdi&lon

Since most of Put J will be • COIllIlH:OI&l}' on Kant's book on !.he 5ubjc.ct, the reao:kr may find it \J5efuJ to have a brief summary of the bask )JO$itions in • surface reading of the WOI"k. Exact details, arguments., and citations will come in Olapler III Kant holds thaI rcligioJl$ are to be classified as either ( I) efrons 10 win the favor of God, or (2) moral religions, religions of good lifeconduct. He has interest in, but only limited respect for, the rdigions in the first category, the efrons to win pcrwnal objc"ives. He annwnces immediately. in the preface 10 the finl edition. that morality iuelf is independent of religion. The principles of momity, the complete ba$is (or moral decisions, require no religion al all. But although morality doesn't n«d relipon, !tleads to religion. In his ethical theory be has already shown thai the only moral incentive is found in respect for the moral law. This IIl()ra\ law he lake:! 10 be derived from rC3$(ln, from O\IT rational nature. This view of the independence of morality from religion is perfectly classical. For example we find it in Plato's dialOfUc EulhypJrro . One unique feature of Kant'l position is that he follows this with the idea that while morality does IlOt need religion as a premise, it may have religion as a ronscquence. In the COUl'5e of his boot Kant does these five things: (1) presents \IS with a theory of buman !l.llture, (2) develops his ethkal theory, (3) offers the roncept of "a Pure Reli&ion of ReaMln, • (4) cxplaim the relationship between historical religions and the religion of reason, and (5) explains &I1d criticizes fetishism, anthropomorphism, clericalism, and a variety of superstitioll5 oonncaed with historical religions. Some intmduaory oommenlS on each of these five may be helpful A. H uman Nature

It i$ a oommoDplace of the textbooks in the history of philosophy to note that Kant was a du&lisl.· Pbto', metllod of didJ(ltomy

could hardly be taken more seriously. From dichotomy, Ka.m

16

INTRODUcnON

1OOYe5 to a dialectical ,wdy of antinomies. Kant's an.l~ of human nature is I. case in point. As we Ioball see in his philosoplly of history, I. sharp separation must be made between humanity roIkcivtly and humanity dimib~ly. Humanity a;JUec:tivety has • history thai one may vicw optimistically. As I. group. it has an objective that may be formulated consistently; I. perfectly rational world. But people taken individually have radically different propcnies. Considered one 11 a time, Kant finds us euenliaUy ambivalent, Given anyone of our ob;enives. we also have some intention for the opposite of that objective. An individual wilh ineumisleRI goals has often been called p.nhological, irrational, or lick. For Kant, il is usouiaJ for II hNbhy hlUl1an 00t!g ,hol he or w have u.consistem

n.c

iIflellliolu. A rc:volutionary rom:cpl of hulJUUI health! inconsistent goals of panicular importance for moralil)' and for religion are sel by the conflict between the IIlOOlI principle in U$, and the selfISh principle. In the fi~t pan of Kant', siudy of religion, he explains what he calls "the radical evil in human nature." His ui\lment is thaI the principle of selfWtncu is properly an innate 01' radical evil, and this principle rontinuaUy wars with the other innate principle in human nature, the moral principle. The source of evil is not to be fou oo in the sellSlJOUIi illdinations. Considered by themsclve5. lhese are a perfectly legitimate pan of human beings.. It is DOl eveD selfish behavior that Kant points 10 as the 5CIU1"ce of evil. Instead. it is the principle 01 selfishness. This principle is called radical evil bec:ause he takes il 10 be a rlXed p,an of the nature of every individual human beiD8- Tbe anumption is thai bealthy individuals must be umbivakm about the elloice between the D1OI'aI and the selfish principles. This view of human nature is developed in more derail in Otapter IV, "The Logic of Ambival ence.'

B. Ethical 1lIeory In the second pan of hi5 study, Kant analyzes what he cal l~ Ihe ronflict between the moral principle and the selrlSh principle in

17

human nature. For tbe lasl rational being in the IIo'Orld. there would be no moral problems. Morality consists in the choice of principles with which 10 deal with other ra tional being.'i; therefore, morality a)1I500 in opposing ODe', ~rsoDal selrl§hDe§l; and following. instead, the categorical imperati~. The concept of univerul reason, and i1$ impel1lUve, provide the only basis for

respectable action. In lhis book Kant goes beyond his previ0U5 work in tibia 10 gi\~ U$ some details of tbe personality that morality should !Lave, 115 wel l as the dislillCtions betwun indination, motive, desire, propell5ily. instinct, and plWion.

C The Religion of Reason In addition 10 moral

obj~ives.

are there any religious objectives? The ccmraJ c:on«pu in Kant's view of rel igion are hope and won/WIess. Kant hold$ that a person's religious objective is just and only 10 make Ihal perwn worthy of assi:nance in becoming moral. Therefore, he defines religion all the performance of .11 human duties (moral duties) as if they were divine commands.. One of the basic aswrnptions bere is Ihis: If an act can be performed by an evil penon as well as a 800d one, it pouesses no moral worth. On this basis he exclude!. a11n(l$1 all the macllinery and trappings of organized religion u beillJ behavior patterns tllat can be performed equally weD by a good or an evil irwlividual, and therefore completely irrelevant as far u pleasina God. A primal)' qUHtion for Kant is this: "511.11 we start our §)'Stem witll faith in what God iIas done on our bella If, or witll wllat we are to do 10 beanne: worthy of God's u.sistana:?" (And he adds., "whatever this may be: ) TIle answer fOT Kant is dearly the laller-wortlliness, not faitll. 'There is no vicarious atonement for an individual's immorality. Moral debts can never be di!.chataed by another penon. There is no moral marut-place to parallel the functions of an economic market·place. 11lc:re are no special duties to God, for Kant. Reliaion is to be 500gb! witllin us, using rational concepts. not outside of us in facts. This 6dudes aU of the machinery of divine worship, which lie

18

Ir-rrROOUcnON

calls ". liupemitious belief," and Kriptural learning. which is 001 required for morality. 'The principles of morality are revealed w all of iii, learned or not, in an immediate but inscrutable WIly. "To demand tbat more than this be ~aled to us is presumptuous.' 'The holiest of beinp in Ihis world is the human being. Basic is the followin~ "principle requiring no proof; whatever over and above &ood Hfe-rondud man fancies Ibl he ean do 10 beeome well pleasi ng to God is a mere religious illusion and pseudoservice 10 God," A good part of Ihis has oollSisted in complaints against claims of nwty figllfcs in the history' of religion. On the positive side.

what doeli Kant's pure rational faith consist 011 We are told that it wu Christianity's first intention 10 introduce" pure religious faith rather than an historical or ecclesiastical faith. ~ilc mili, he claims that the morally best period in the history of humanity and of any church is the prcse m period.. H is viewpoi nt is ex· plairoed in terms of the notion of humanity's becoming more and more rational, hence more and more morallhtOllgh the C(Jurw of history. By the COm't'pl of th~ OIristian faith as a purely rational faith. Kant means !he following. which he insists can be freely assented 10 by everyone: A. Each of us can convince OUBelve5 through our own rea$On of the evil which lies in human hearts and from which roo one is fre~.

B. Each nf U$ can convince ourselvcs of the impossibility of ever bolding ourselves 10 be morally juslified befor~ a God through our own life conduct. and. I I the lame lime, of Ihe necessity for hope of $\lch a jllStificalion valid in God', eyes. C. Each of lIS can convince OUBelvcs of the futility of SUbsl;\1,Iting eh\lrchly observances and pious compulilOl)' services for a righlWIIsne5S which is lacking and, over and against Ihis, of the inescapable obligalion 10 become a new penon. A complele rational reli&ion m\lst be somelhinll Ihal can be presented to all human beinp comprehensibly and convincingly 10 Iheir own reason.

19 D. The Relation Between Historical Rdigior"15 and Rational Religion The purpose of reading Scripture, and all scriptural e~egesis, is to make people belle!. Should we expound morality aoxording to the Bible or the Bible accordi ng 10 moralily? The fint, for Augustine: the second for KanL He insists thai ' revealed" doctrine must be eherished and cultivated as merely a meam. but a precious means of makillJ this doctrine wmprehensible to all. Since Kant holds thaI there is only one reliJion bu t many faiths, he bas no 'Ptrial confidence in any existing faith as it stand$.. The Christian faith is talccn to be apable of interpretation in a strictly rational and moral way if the historical clements arc o;omplclcly ignored. Tbe bare concepts of reason make up die OUlslian religion; "ram" make up tbe Christian faitb and chu rch.. Kant

le mpcramcmal trailS of various historical beliefs: (1) Judai:;m is called misanthropic because of il$ objection to intermingling with olher people. (2) ' Mol\ammcdanism' ;5 criticized for bavins arrogant pride, because of its Soal of IlUbjugalina other people. (l) The H indu f.ilh is ailed pusillanimous ~ nlions

(timid \ 0 the point of cowvdiee) because the Hindu's temper is 50 far from the Mohammedan. (4) The Ouistian faith is criticized for developina"a davish <:ast of mind" or a misconceived humility. Kant's basic complaint against 1ll()I;\ of these historical reliaiollS is that tbey substitute the doctrine ofGodline5S for the doctrine of vinue. By "Godl iness" Kanl means either fear of God or love of God. He explains that the fi~t is the altitude of a !iI.lbject, the second the duty of a son. Both involve tbe concept of a super~rful being and, therefCN'e, what Kant calls the danger of anthropomorphism. 1be doctrine of Godlineu "cannot of itself constitute the final aual of moral endeavor, il can merely serve as a means of strengthenin, tha t which &DeS to make a bener man." To 51a" wilh the conc:t:pt of Godliness is to run the danae r of dewO)'ina one's courage and of tcansformina Godlinc5S into "a fawning. davish subjection to a dCipotically collUlUlndin& mJ&ht." Both Godliness. and vinue are partS of Kant', picture. but the

20

INTRODUcnON

order in which .... e unite these is a matter of the greatest imporlance. If reverence for God is put finl and vinue subordinated, ",his objed of revercBCe becomes an kIoI." The general relationship between historical religiollli and !be religion of reason i$ Ihis: The historical fai th can be seen as "tbe symbolic presentation and !be meaIl$ or promotion of pure religious faith: He insislS thai it must !lave as I basic principle of an e~lesia$lk:al (aith thai al $Orne future lime;1 shoold be able 10 dispense completely with SllIlutory anidu in favor of "the reHgion of aood life conduct as the real life end." Alilhe sects deserve tile same respect as far as they are efforts by "poor man.1s 10 render perceptible 10 the lelUe5 tbe Kingdom of God on earth.' All of these iiCClS de5ervc "the lalTlC blame wben they lake the form of the representation of lhis idea in a vwble cliurch 10 be the Ihing itself." E. FeIWlW'n

Kant uses the word "retishWn" to refcr to "the illusion that one can Jl'O'KSii the an of bringing about a supernatural effect by a wholly natwal mclUlS." As an cxilRlple of ~ be suggests that it is fetishism to suppose Ihal one "works on God and \lSe$ him as • means; to bring ablxll a fesuh in lhe world fOf which hi~ own powen ' " would not .vail,· He adds Ihal this involves an absurdity in ilS very conception. Kant separates the nages of Ihe history of religious faith inlo (I) idol wonhip, baKd on one's fear, (2) tempLe service, the public Legaliud form of idol worship, (3) dlurcb wonhip. a rombination of moral and legal organization based on an bistorical faith, and (4) pure religious faith, All through Kanl's book, partiallarly in Part 4 on clericalism, he explains what he takes to be the examples and dangcn of fctishism, "Ocricalism' means "fetish wonhip,' Therc iii a difference in manner but rIOt in principle "between a shaman of the Tunguses and a European prelate ruling over chu rch and state alike,' This also holds "betwecn the wholly sensuous Wogulitc who, in lhe morning. places the paw of a bear

ilin upon his bead with the short prayer, 'Strike me not dead!' and the sublimated Puritan and Independent in Connecticut.' They both take worship to mmist in arbitrvy observarn:cs with no moral bellCfiL "'The intention of aU of them is to manage to thei r own advantase the invisible power which presides ove r the destiny of man; they differ merely in their mnceptions of how to undertake this fU L" All churdlly observances are effons to "as it were, conjure up divine as5istan<:e by m.agic." They fail because "between 50lely pbysicalll""'ns and morally efficacious cause.. there is no cause wbatsoevu accordina 10 any law of which reuon can oonceive." In more s~tforward (asbion, Kant is holdins here that 110 merely pbysical activity can a«ompmh a moral effea. TIierefore, with this attitude toward churchly obI.ervances, Kant bimself never voLuntarily went to church as an adult. Appare ntly the involuntaty visits were made when he bad to take part in an official univen.ity exercise. As examples of fetish-faith, we are Jiven the five STeat oomma!\ds in the Mobarnmedan belief: washing. prayins. fastins. alms siving, and pilgrimage 10 Mea:a. Kant gives no special criticism of Mohammedani$m distinct from the other typeli of faith. Kant ar&ues in iCnel'lll that there are three types of illusory faith: (I) faith in miracles, (2) faith in mysteries, and (J) fai th in means of STace. Althoush he does respect wbat he cal15 the spirit of prayer, wbich does not lICed to be clothed in words and formulas, prayins itself is a. supentitious illusion-a fetish-making-if it is thought of

the church with the fewer statutory requirements is that much

INTRODUCTION cklRr to a pure moral religion. Prtsllmably Kant ...-as familiar with so-called liberal sectS. Kant defines fanaticism as either the belief thai we can separate the effectS of pee from those of nature o r the belief that we can produce the effeas of grace in some way. We may rationally believe that there may be works of grace. but 10 claim knowledge Of "to wish to observe such heavenly influences in ourselves is a kind of madness." Kant gives special emphasis 10 four religious problems by diso'ssi", them in very Qlr:nded sectiOIlS at the end of each of the four pans of his book. The mailers especially singled out are: works of grace. miracles, mysteries. and means of grace. 'Tbcse four areas are not properly pans of a religion within the limits of reason alone. W'bcn presented as maners of knowledge rather than hope. tltey arc errors that he takes historical religions to have fallen inlO. The principle for avoiding these errors is tltis: ' It is not essential, and hence no1 flCC"Slilry. for everyone 10 know what God does or has done for his salvation; but it is essential to know what man himself mUlt do in order 10 b«cIlle ......:ItJhy of this assistance." I will close tltis summaJ}' with one of Kant's challenges. "Who, indeed, is DOW tbe unbeliever? ls it he who lrU51S, without knowing bow that for which he hopes will come 10 pass; o r he who absolutely insists on knowillJ the ~ in which mao is released from eviJ., and if he cannot know this., gives up all hope of this releaser Wbile tltis summary has Jiven the leader some notion of the ideas that are important 10 Kant's view of religion, it has not presented an integrated position. For that we $hall Study the elements more carefuUy, and then combine them with the 10gicaJ development of ambivalence, ignolllDCC. and hope. In preparation, the next chapter offers introductiollS to Kant's theory of knowledge, his ethical theory, and his philosophy of history. Readers arc invited to lkip the sections that they arc familiar with in Chapter Two.

Two

KANT'S CONCEP I'UAL TOOLS Kalil', rcJiiious position presupposes almost evcrythina mal he previOU$ly wrote. Particularly, iI require5 familiarity with his tbeoty of knowledge. c.bje.l lbeory, and philosophy of history. This dtaplcr offers an inU'Oduetion 10 eaeb of tbcse three basic 5Ubjeas. but merely a sel«tive elementary trutment. 'Those who need no introduction 10 these IIUltlCI'$ are cncoungcd to Rip ahead.

", . . Tbe hul}' appeal to the supernatural is .. couch upon whld! the Inlellect slothfully reclines,· uK! Kant near the end of his I~ Di.ssowticm. 011 first readlll& Kant KCms to give us • e1car
castigated: and we wonder immediately if some son of considered appeal caD be kept, re$Jl«U.bly. from Kant's position. To gel II this matter properly we shall look a1 parts of the theory of knowIed&e and see precisely what an lhe limits of knowledge and, separately, the limiu of thought. One may think of things thaI one canDOI know, and Kant is very particular about the line between such think;". and wbat may be properly taken as knowledge. In addilioa to the obriotu questions about knowledge and tbought, tbere is the maner of what we lIllIy and may not /lope /Ot". A$ we ~ find, the mbjCCl of religion requires that we have precise notions of what we ca.n mink, wbat we can know, whal we are iJDO"llI of, tmd wIuJt ...... ("#II tmd CII7IIJOI' ~ hope f«. In the Critique of Pwt ~. Kanl developed his powerful anaI)'Si$ of the nalure of knowtedge. For the PUrpolC:S of mis introduction I will ignore many of me $ubtletie5 and byways involved in the book

and restrict

~If

to a fairly thl.n ovtline or just a few matters.

KANl"S CONCEP'IUAL TOOLS

Kanl afIlIes Ihll !he lerm "knowledge" refen jusl and only 10 1M resuhs of experimental analysis. Thai is, we need both direct sense data and some analytic (logical) categories into which the data fit. 1be claims of the absolute empiricist and the ab50IUle ratiooalist Imitiom are bolh rejected. A The Pragmatic Fouodation of Knowledge

Mere observation&, wbat Kant called "accidental obHrvations," Jive no rational result. Knowledge does nol come by putting on a laboratory coal and wandering around the nalural world "in the character of a pupil woo listens 10 everything thai the teacher cllooses 10 Ioay." Instead, our reason must act as "an appointed judge woo c:ompel5 the witnesses to answe r questions which he has himself formullled.'" Obviously. few Kant, knowledge is DOl a matler of pusive1y receiving copies of what is outside the obHrver. Instead. it requiTe$ the activity of imposiog the observer's own dauHjcations on some outside sense intuitions. If reason gains knowledge by a combination of iu own principles and "the experiment whid! it har ~." is there any objectivity, any knowledge thai is nol merely personal bias? Yes, indeed. Even Ph)'li"" Ioa)'l Kant, owes its wa:ess "entirely 10 the happy t!Jou&ht, thai while reason muSt seek in nalure, not fictitiously ascribe 10 it ... it must adopt as its guide in so seeking, lhut which it har iudf puI into ntllUt'e." Strange, al fint beannS: in order to get objective knowledge of fact and 10 learn the laws of nature, we must put something our own mind into our view of nature. And this is sUpp!lsc,d to produce objective knowledge. not personal bias! Kant explains his strategy this way. "Hitherto il has been assumed that all OIlt knowledge must conform to objects." A fair way of describing tbe common-sense vie.... of the knowledge problem: objects emt, and we either do or don't !mow their propenies. But common scnse lias an embarra$$ing IliSIOry, placed alongside sdence. u:t', consider the po5Iiibility that instead our

or

or

knowledge tonforming to objects, "that objectS must tonfonn to our knowledge." Lest the reader panic, or laUJh, Kant notes that Copernicus tried a 5imilar strategy, with great success Having made no progre:\5 in ~lainina; astronomical movements on the ordinary llaumption that the spectator was at rest and the ita" in motion. he tried the converse ... perhaps the spectator was in motion and the stan at rest. Common sens.e preferred to understand the spectator at rest . .. but common sens.e ba5 lost to the converse assumption. 1lIe Strategy of Copernicus, the Copernican revolution (to take "revolution" in a double sense), gave Kant the confidence to uy his revolution in the relation hetween the knower and the known. What rerults from Kant'S reformulation of the old commonsense problem? Fil"lt. let's he clearer about just whal Kant', fonnulation involves.. The human faaJiIy of unde"tanding "has rules whieh I must presuppose as being in me prior 10 objects beina; given to me." Then we gel a comple:c a«:oUnt of those he "rules" thai are laken to be "in me." By calling them. "in means lhat they are not learned from sensations of lhe outside world ("intuitions,' in his vocabulary), but that we mUlit w;ume Ihal !bey are innate equipment of the individual woo has a cognitive experience. The maliC" outside the human mind (or uoderstaodina;) must fit into tbese internal rule3, or the human would have 110 way of having an experience, of knowina; thai somethina; had been observed. If there were no internal receiving apparatus, nothing ....wld be received. Pe rhaps ' received" is a misluding word, be<:ausc Kant lias il tllat the human knower doQ not merely "reeeive" what is out there, but pla)'l' an aetive part in impo$ing his or her own framework on the intuitions from outside the mind. For an analogy, an FM reeeiver hean nothing of the world of AM signals: an AM receiver hean nothing of lhe world of FM signals-the receiver imp05C5 its own inlernal filler (design) on anything hitting its input. and so it is aware of only what can be located by virtue of its internal filter.

me:

KANrS CONCEP11JAL TOOLS This Ibcory of knowledge is 10 be considered prasmatic hec:aUK of the arguments just presented: knowledge requires lbat the knower impose hill or her own classific:atioru; on pertinent sense dala. What dassific:ations are to he chosen? That depends on the purposes of the persoll seeking knowledge. That person may consider objeas from more than one point of view. For eumplc, as objeas of lbe ~ or as objects of thought alone.·

B. POSSIble Experience as a Nec:eliSity for Knowledge On Kant's basis, empiricism is riaht when it claims thai sense data are IIC'('H UY for knowledge, but is wrona if it claims that sense data are sufficient for knowledge. On the other hand, he held that rationalism is right wben it argues lbat knowIedae prewpposes some clarity of one's innate ideas, but is wrona if it claims that renection on ooncepts alone is sufficient fot any ~ of the world. C. Space and Time In the font section of [he book Kant analyzes the position of 'Pace and of time in the knowledge pr<XeliS. Space and time, the I(I(US of the objeas of kDowIedge accordina 10 empiricism, are themselves not rul entitiH. Space and time are not empirical ooncepts derived from external e.tperience; they are the forms that all phenomena of the external senses muS! have. Although one never directly obse"'es ~ce itself or time ilSel£, no object can be observed unlCIiS the obse",ations of it can be put into a space and time form (framework). Kant'l conclusion is that 5pace and time are innate, human forms; nothilli can be observed by a human being unless the sensations of it til these forms. Might there he a non-human beillll from whose viewpoint the malerial world would have a different look? Kant'l response is that ~ havc absolutely no basis for answering, thai is, for lufowi"8 the answer 10 this question lince all oor knowledge is possible only on the bud of the kind of direct sense data thlE we can fit into oor

27 innate forms. "It is, therefore. $Olely from the human slal1dpoint thai we can speak of space. Ulcnded thinp. etc. If we depan from lhc subjective condition under which alone we can have outer inluilion, namely, liability to be affected by obj«u.lhc representation of space .tands for nomlng wbatsoever. This predicate can be applied to things only in so far as they appear to us. that is, only 10 objects of 5ellSibility,"' Our knowledge depends upon the appearance pheoomena to lIS. II i5 pos.s.ible 10 have knowledge of $Omethina only if there is • p'P;ble upcricm:e of tlUII thing. No pllJ.Sibk apuima. no possible~. How about the question of .hinp by tbermelves, whether perceived by III or not. or perceived by other thinking beings? Kant responds, ·We cannot judge whether lhe intuiuCMI$ of other Ibjnkin!! beings arc IiUbjcct to tbe 5amC CODditions which determine our intuition (our awareness of sense data], and whKh for us arc generally binding." H knowledge is wbjcct 10 tbis subjective limilalion, can there be .b50lutc knowledge? Kant argues apinst the skeptical view provided we specify ollie limitation that thinp are taken as object! of our ilel\$\lOUS intuition." Is there a real world on the ba$is of such a limitation? "We maintain the empiric:al reality of space. so far as ~ry powblc eJllcmal ~rience is concerned, but at the Yme time its transcendental id<:a1ity: that is to lay, we maintain that space is DOthing. if we leave OUt of consideration the CMditioru of Q pouible eq;tritna, and aocept it as sollltthing on which things by themselves are in any way d<:pendent·· So, we never iee 'Pace itself, but anything we do lee is understood to be in space. TIle situation is similar for time. Like space, time is also a subjective condition of human 5eJISation. If space and time are "nothing btu the form of our own internal intuition,"" and objeCtli an: always somewbere in space and lime, then the knowable universe is a synthesis-. combination of sense data from oulSid<: of us and our internal categories or forms for knowledge. These internal categories an: a priori, that is, in us and available before ~rience can take place.

or

28

KANrS CONCEP11JAL TOOLS

An upMQIU, an awareness of u~tioll$ from outside of us, requites that we be able to impo5e oor internal forms of space and

lime on any such external scns.atioll5. That's whal an uperiCDCe is: an awucne5S of some U1cmal sensation fitting in lo some (internal) classification. Wilhout the ability 10 "fj[" 5ens.alion inlo some classification, we would not be awart of the sensation ... would not 'experience" iL Without the possibility of such experienee. we o:an know nothing. "11 remainr. completely unknown 10 us whll obj«u may be by themselves and .part £rom the receptivity of our senses. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving tbc:m, lb.1 manner being pecUliar 10 1.IS and nol necessarily shared in by every being tbough.. no doubt, by every human being. This is willi alone concerns U$..J! We are left willi the followina position. Knowledge is the I)'lIlhesis of two streams: ( I ) ilClmlOUS intuitions. CXIcmal stimulation received through our senseI. and (2) forms of the undcrsWldiIl8 (for instance, space and lime, and other" priori patterns). "Neither of these qualities or famlties is preferable to the other. Without sensibility objects would 00\ be given to us, wilhout understanding they would not be thought by us. TboughlS withoot contents are ~mpty. inwitions without concepts are blind .

. . . Th~ und~rstandill& cannot K~. th~ Knse5 cannot think. By their union onJy can knowledg~ be produced""

D. Phenomena and Noumena Clearly enough. for Kant knowledge requires both thooahl and sense data. Suppose thought is employed independently. Tbe unikrsWlding alone can actively produ~ arguments. The materials of logic and mathematics are examples of this. Although Kant lias already warned us that this source of analysis cannot r~pre.sent things as they are by themselve$ apat! from their consideration as phenomena. ....e would like to know what staws the operation of !be understanding alone might h.ave. We are pr~sented with the terms 'phenome na" and "ooumena" as aid!. 10 making this maner clear. 'The pileoome nal world is the

29 world of possible !.elISe experience. The ooomenal world is 10 mean It possible world-logically possible because not incoll$lstentbut a world thai could provide us with no sense data with which 10 have an experience. 'The notion of !he phenomenal ~'orld i$ obvious enough; the phruc:, "noumenal world," i$ puuJinJ. Does tbe coining of this term 'noun1ell.l" mean that Kan l hold$ thai we can in some way .brow • world of objects that we cannot experience? No: he provides no basis for knowledge beyond the phenomenal world. No pouible experience, no knowledge. However, ow C/M IQ/k abet" things lhut we CIIfIItOt.t-. Gho!its. ,obIim. anaels, and Sanla Oaw; are perfectly aettptable noull$; they may be the subjects of se,"cnce5 and the objects of ooll$iderable disawion. However, if by their very definitions we c;anllOl experience them, we cannot know of them. II by their definitions sucb entities are (1) consislent enough. yet (2) by those Arne definitions are not pouible experiences fo r UI •.• we now hive It dassifIeation term for them. Such entities may be said 10 be in the DOUJnenai world. Is there such I world, are there actually web entities as reuan may C(losislcntly describe but thai allow us no scm.e data' We can never know Ihal any $uch emt, lince we shall never liave the neeeu2'Y sense data .•. yet without that sense data we also an never know that $1,I(h entitie$ do DOt e:mL At this point the reader may well anticipate something of how Kant will deal with the DOtioo of God." We now have three divisions: ( I) the phe llOmenal world. oonta.ining objecu that are po$Sihle experiences. (2) the noomenal world, the dau of Ioaically oonsistent concepts that by their definitions cannot be poMible experiences. (3) an impossible world. oonsisting of concepts that are 001 logica1Jy oonsistent, but that may be given names. In lIl is third division we have a clauification for those emities that are conceptually impoMible. weh :1$ ilquate-cirdes. roullll· triangles., inhuman·humans, et(. Even entities wllose definitions

30

KANrS CONCEP'JUAL TOOLS

make them (OllCeJ)Iually impossible may be named. Not only named, tbey may be lovingly discu»ed for ce nlUrin. E.acb division must be dCiHl ibed with ClIft in order to avoid logical perienc:e. Kanl takes spedal pains 10 ridi(Qle tho$e who think that !hey have k1wto~ of God, freedom, or iJnmonality. Bul, if we can neither 1tJIow that such mallel'$ eml, nor know that they doft'l, i5 lhe choice merely a persorW aesthetic matter? We are 1101 left 10 complelely independent personal dtoice: Kanl's moral theory has both fixed and pragmatic requireme nts in these areas. TIle development of his morallheo!)' is Ihe busiocu of Part II of Ihis chap":r, and lhe relations 10 noumenal entities must wait for Iale r 5eCtio1l$ of this study. But one sia.nificanl question remains in the theo!), of knowledge: Are there limits to the tru51 in reason whe n ;1 deals with noumenal is5ues?

31

E. The Antinomies One of the most important pans and the mao;\ dramatic section of Kant', fim Critiq ue deals with four antinomies. These are pairs of opposed arpuncDIS. Each ugumem seCItl$ 10 be quile nicely proved true • . • ucept for the cmbatra5Slllcnt that the opposed a1JUIIleDI is also just as well proved true! The fint pair give us proofs thaI, for one, the world is finite in time and space ... and paired with this, • proof that the world is infinite in time and ~ Nothina tricky about the proou. They ~cb seem perfe<:tly reasonable. The semnd pair. the second antinomy. presents. thesis that there are ultimate simple pam (atolll$) in the world and ~rytbing is made of them. But, the antithesis to this is abo presented in a ne.1 proof. namely that tbere are 1\0 simple atoms bul that evcrythina is inflllitcly divWblc. The third antinomy ronsi5ts of • thcsi5 asserting thai in addition to c:aw.ality, we must abo assume freedom in nlltUJ'C. And, me antithesis to Ibis holds thaI there is no freedom; CYCrything in the world obeys caw.al laws of nature. The fourth antinomy oonsists of the thesis that there is lOme beina in the world tbal is absolutely necemry . .. and the antitbcsi$, of to\Ir$e, hold$ that this is false, th.1 there is 110 necessary beina in (K outside the world. What can we IWIke 0( these antinomies, these dear Slrona deductive proofs that ecru;n auumptions are true ... with tile apparent Iogkal scandal that tile opposite assumptions sum to have just as strolll! and irrefutable proofs of their views? A number of significant comments and rooousions are dra"''lI by Kant, but for our purposes we shaD limit ounelves 10 just one or twO poinu.. Fi~1, it should be obvious that none of the antinomies deals with matten of possible nperience. We don't expericllce the finite or the infinite natllre of 'Pac:e and time or the ullimate nature of maller, we don't nperience either freedom itself or the lack of it, a IIClL "I)' beina or the absence of such a nec:enary entity. Therefore. we should 001 be surprised by the conclusion "that reuon, in ill 'PC'ClIlalive empLoyment, can never .. .

32

KANrS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

transcend the field of poWhle experic oce ... outside wllich there is for us nothing but empty space."" Reason alone, reason without sense data, amnot choose between equally reasonable arguments. Kanl distinguishes between what he calls "constitutive pri ndpies.," that spedfy the absolute nature of something. and "regulative principles" that give U$ IISCful rules (hypothetical rules) for canyins 011\ an inquiry in the observable world. The dislillClion her-en ( I) the observable world and (2) a concept of an absolute world behind our ob5crvations i5 crudal. ConstiwtWc principles do !lOt apply 10 the observable world. If _ apply constitutive prinl:iples \0 the observable$, we must make erron. These few remarks on the relations between constitutive and !"eiulalive principles are intended only to direct an especially curious reader to the Joq development of these principles to be found in the Fin;t Oitique. Although they are crucial to Ihe study of the anlinomics we shall nOl continue the mattcr here. n.e antin(mlies hold many kinds of fascination. A suious anal)'$is of them 'OiOIIJd have to present the arguments in detail, and then (X)lISider a variety of imlcs thaI arise with the group as ....-ell as with each separately. Such an analysis would have to do a precise job of illustrating the difference heNo-een constitutive and regulative principles, and !ihow where in the proofs they were properly or improperly used. However, for our purpoles in preparing to nudy Kant'li work on re ligion we shall lnvc the problem of the antinomies with just three modest conclusions (but return to the malter In later chapten). (t) One conclu$ion that Kant draW$ from the ammomies is this: on the b.tii$ of reason alone ....-e would be unable to chmre between the lWQ ~des of each antinomy. b the world finite or infinite, completely determined by causal laW!; or partly free, containing anything necessary, anything not merely contingent? Rea50ll alone would leave us in "continuous vacillation." However, when we are 'wmmoned to action," we find ourselves chOO5ing "principles exdusively in accordance with practical inlere$ts.·.. That is, ,../uft .... call t
J3 (2) Another (XlllClusion, prepared earlier, is tbat "We know DOtbill& but nature, since it alone can present objects \0 us and instruct us in regard 10 !heir laws.... Speculative reason cannot produce knowledge beyond "the field of possible upcrieoce."" (3) A further eonelusion is that. certain kind o f question must be (OO5idered empty. What sort of inquiries are they Ihal lead Kant to ~ that "!be ~ itself is n«run,-f'" •A question as 10 the constitution of RHT\ething which cannot be thought through any determinate predicate-inasmuch as it is comp letely outside the sphe re of lbo!ie objects which ean be Jiven to us-is entirely null and void.... When ' questions refer 10 an oo)cct which can be found nowhere save in our thoughts ••. 50 long as we obstinately penis! in assuming that there is an actu.al object corresponding 10 the idea, the problem, &I thus viewed. allows of no solution. ....

F. Conclusions This inlrociudion to the theory of knowledge is intended to leave the reader wi lh the following propositions. in addition 10 the above Ihree results of considering tile antinomies: I. Kant takes scicoce 10 be tbe only technique fOf" acquiring knowledge. But, 1toow\edge wms out to be unable to wpply !hoe basis for all decisiollS. 2. The scientific acquisition of knowledge requires that the human mind impo$Ci its forms of thinking on the 5e1l5e intuitinll5 thaI il receiYe$. SensaOOIl5 alone Jive DO information. 3. The e.ti$teoce of knowledge presuppces the ui$tence of Q priori categories of thooght. 4. Knowledge reren only 10 the phenomenal world : there is no basis for knowledge of anything beyond the world of appearances. 5. Aoy entity thu llllIIY be meotiooed must fall into one of lhree divisioll5. Either (a) the phenomenal worLd. tM world of possib le experience, (b) the noumenal world, a world that i$ logically possible but non·expe rimental, o r

KAl'ITS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS (() an unlhinbble world. (OmJlO$ed of entitie$ that are Iogicall, inconsistent. It ~ imponant 10 liter developments to recall that we ma, conee.ive of $Orne1biol thlt canoot be known., for example noumenal entities (ghosts. loolins, San~ Claus): and we may mention thinas that cannot be col\C%ived, the so-called unthinkable entities. (If there ~ an additiOllil! QltelOl)' of unmentiollable entities, we n~d not take special care 10 avoid their mention I). Kanl hold5 it hnp056ible 10 have knowledge of God. but one may reasonably mentioo lbe term, "God." Sil\C% there is a IoaicaJly (Onsistent definition, the tenn can be employed in the whole range of ooumenal diSCUS!iioM, and serve for theoretical purposes. The term "free-wiIl" has the IaJIIC status: it cannot be located in space and time, and $0 is DOl. knowable. However, as a consistent notion, it is theoretically serviceable and can be employed in noumenal (Ontext5. But lines must be dnwn between what can be mmtionftI, what can be I~, and whal can be knoM.'tI. To deny this WOIlld be 10 lie about mal1en of the areatCSI i.n1ponance. In addition 10 !be distinctions between mention, reference. belief, and knowledge, a later chapter in this "lilly will add an analysis of "'hN CIUI WId CIUIIKIt be ~ p . Hope and moral wonhinc55 arc the IWO cenU'al religious (OnccplS. The analysis of hope requires $Orne: precision about the logic of ianorance. the lubjen of Chapter Five.

An. outline, with (Omments and texl rderences, should help the

reader keep the argument in mind. I must strW thaI lhis section presents Kant', analysis of the prindpk of morality. but not his tlpplicuJUM of the princ:iple to the hislory of humanity. This section will, therefore, have a merely formal or artificial tone; the nut section will apply the resu1ts 10 human hislory.

(a) MoroJity u a mtlIt~

of ilUmtion not of ~

Kant responds dearly to the famous problem of th.e choice between locating morality in lbe iluM1ion of an individual in performing an act, or in the com"quylCD of mch an intention. the act and its results. "Nothina in the world, or even outside of the world. can possibly be reprded as good witbout limitation ellC%pt a good will: The choice b. intentionalism. "'The good will seems 10 COfIStitute the indispensable condition even of wonhincss 10 be bappy" (393). Kant simply insists that a rational. impanial observer can feel no pleasure al the sight of worldly sumesc that is not based on a good will; but be quickly adds that by a good will be means "not a mere wish but the 5lImmoninil of aU the means in our powt:r" (394). The point is made and repeated thai the value of a good will does not consiJ,t in its efficiency in reaching an objective. or the objective itself, but il bas value merely on account of its own nature. "It is good of itself" (394). Here, then. is an ab50lutely r""ed point for the analy$is of ethical theory. Any system of values must have at least one inherent value. H all values are instrumentaJ. one races an infinite regress in the process of choosing. For Kant, the location of ab50lute value, that wbich hilS value for itself alone, is clear and repeated, It is just. certain kind of will or intention that is the only inherent value. Kant argues thai something is strange in the idea of "the ab50lute wonh of the will alone: (394) reprdJe5S of any roose· queBOe of that will, But strange or DOt, this is taken 10 be the that says that morality is 10 be view of rommon sense, the judged on the basis of an individual's intention.

mw

moral gtXJl U II _,'OIIIll...,.vl, nor ~ dluJppy...arld. Assume as an axiom that every organ found in a naruTaI being is efficiently adopted to some purpc Ie, Then, if the happineS5 of human beinp were the real end of nature:. it must have been an enormous mistake to give us reason. Ccnainly, instinn alone is more likely to make us happy then any guidance dictated by reason. As it stands, our choice of objectives is made by ill5tinct, (b)

~

KANTS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

36

but OIIr choice of means to reach the~ obj«tives is the art:a of reason. Kant insists that nature would have entrusted both the choice of means and of ends to instinct alone if the objective were to make: human beings happy. This is 1101 argued in much detail. but he docs mention the appare oUy obYiou.s c:ase in which we find Ihal "the more a cultivated rCUIID deliberately devotes iue]f 10 the enjoyment of life and happiness, lbe more the man falls shon of true oonlcntmenl" (395). Apparently the IOOTe rational an individual beromes, the less likely the JU«essful pursuit of life's enjoyment. Kant calls this • "fact" and adds lIlal in many people there arises, "if only they arc candid enough to admit it, • certain degree of misology, hatred of reason" (395). Pa rticu larly those who are most upericn«d in using reason arc apl 10 ' envy rather than d espi§e the c:ommon run of men who are better llIided by mere natural instina and who do IIOt permit their reason much influence 0f1 !heir conduct" (J96). In I' leasl one obvious area there is clear-cut support for Kanl's view. In a well-known sludy of male suual hehaviol' we find evidence for the oonclu~n lhal in the arca of 5CnIal pleasures, Kant i5 perfectly righ t. For this Cl:arnple, let us make IWO erode yet ddensible assumptions. Fir$t, ilial the higher the educational level tbe more like ly the use of reason over instinct. Second, !hal !be STealer !be number of lexua! ellperlences, tbe STeatcr the amount of happiness. Kinsey er u/.. found thaI the highest total (sexual) ouilets are found among those who go into High Sc:hooI but never beyond, Combining Ihis with otber conelusiOllS i.n !be Kinsey sludy brings us some basis for Kan,'s view that those who are lIIost "raliorcal" are _pt lO en.,. tbe ordinary person's pursui t of happinea I( one's goal i.n life were ntalimum 5«Ual activity, a college education WOIJJd be a bad choice. tn order save ourselves from the view that nature has made an enormous mistake i.n &iving us reason. Kant coneludes that human realiOn is properly intended for a much different objective ilian producing individual happi ness. What is the objeCliYe that we may call !be function of reason? Kant answefl, "Reason's proper fUllCIion muS! be to produce II will good in-it-self and not good

'0

Km/l's ConuptUDl Tools

37

merely as a means" (396), TIle function of reoon is to produec: morality! (e) MOMl wUlU rw[Uiru all iIItOlliotl to QCt purely 0Ul of fnp«r for rM moroIlaw. Any Sl!t'IIia to p6JOIUll i1Ic/iJrmiOil ~0\'eJ tM bwis

fOl' morol wonh. We certainly need more detail about this notion of a will which i$ to be called good-in-ilSel!. Kant offers the ronc:cpt of duty. For an action 10 bave any moral worth. it must be the consequence of a principle or muim based on duty ~ and be completely fr~ from personal inclination. Suppose Ihal one of us, al the seashore. sees an enremely beautiful person drowning. We bave both a duty to II)' to help and. let it be auumed, Itrong personal inclinatiollS in the same direction. If we then risk our life in an effon to save this spectacular person. v.'C can claim 00 §j)tcial moral credil because it was an act from personal indinatiollS as well il$ a sense of duty. However, &Upposc we see a powerful enemy of oors in danger of drOWflinJ. If we ignore oor own preference and perform the action of giving help purely from a sense of duty wilbool any personal inclination al all, then and only then docs the action have moral worth. (Tbis casc Wil$ stronger than neassal)'. since oor irn:linations may have been merely indifferent, not opposed to duty.) This is a severely rigOro.B basis for morality. If morality requires behavior based merely on duty. and duty lhal is chosen withoul any attention 10 personal inclination, one wonders if there have ever been moral people. Kant's answer is usually tn wggcst Ihat each individual consul t thai person's own moral hislOI)' since that is the only one the individual is in a position 10 uamine. Can we reject Q thfinition. of moral ity if il turns out that Done of uS arc moral on that basis? Cenainly not, iftbe definition is compellingly &upponed. We don', reject the definition of geometrical figures, foc example, perfect cirdes, squares., triangles., and just because they arc not readily found on tbe 5Urfaa of the eanh. Likewise. we have no feUDn 10 reject Kant's definition of morality merely

38 beca~

KANTS CONCEP11JAL TOO LS

it may tum out tha I actual human beinp are never qu ile

moral.

This notion of moral value S\rt sses three propositioll$.. The (un is that only those actions done purely from dul)' can have moral worth. The S«Ond proposition iii thaI the moral wonh of an aet ~pends 00 the principle or maxim by which it is determined. And. the thin:J is a definition of the ronccpl of duty. "Duty is tbe

necessil)' of an action uecuted from respect for law" (400). We can have no respec:t for any il1(iination. aC((lrding 10 Kant. We can approve or disapprOlle of indinatioll5, love or bale them, bu t !lOt resp«t them. However, the concept of law itself can be an object of respeel and merefore becomes a command (400). If an act of duly is conceived of as an act done in romple\e indifference to PCl'$OnaJ inclination and [0 any coll$equence of the act. "" hat then can we find as a basis for determini ng the DalUTe of duly itself? Kant holds \bat only an ab$olule law could determine the nature of duly and meet these resuietions. TIlerefore, "the preeminent good can consist only in the eon.:eplion of the law ilSe!! (which can be prese nt only in a rational being)" (401). '"The only object of re~ct is the Jaw, and indeed only the law which we impose on ounc:Jves and yet recogniu as necCMaI)' in itselr (note 401). Note well the "and yet.' This indicatcs that the combination is unexpected or surprising. Kam wists that "All respect for a person is only respect fOf the law (of righteou!i1\U\, etc.) of which lhe penon providcs an example" (401). (dJ We find ..ithin oundva twO ul/imcue principles:

~IfWInQ.f

wid

morol duty. Kanl has located morality in lhe concept of a seLf-imposed law. a law which we find Ihal we mwt impose on our selves. "All 10()called moral intcre51 consists solely in respect for the law" (40 1). And this Jaw, we are laid, "is already present in the penon" who aeu morally. However, Ihis moral principle is not lhe only principle Ihal Kant finds in the nature of the human individual. There is also the principle of egoism, of purw ing penonal happineu. "Man feels in himself. powerful OO\Inlerpoise agaill'll

J9 all rommands of duty ... this counterpoise is his n«ds and ind inatioll$, the complete satisfaction of whieh he sult15 up under the name of happine5$" (.w5). A$ Kant pictures it, reason and selftshoeu fight with each other for control over a human being. "From this a IMIlurai dialectic ~ •• ." (40S). (t) The COfIj/ict ~ the IWO Ww/c priN:iples is 1M fIOmIaJ hum/UI SiJumiOll: rM morol principle ougJu /0 dominm~ but Mlfi.JhnesJ must ai.rt for IhiJ to hllppm. This idea of an intemal "C:OUDlerpobe: or "natural dialec:Uc," is a crucial part of Kant's theory of human nature. Briefly, Kant holds thai ~ is ambiwllmllJboollM comntIIItd.r of duty and rlUl of HlfohMss. This is not a pathological $itLl.lion thai can be rC$Olved by intelligence, or by any therapy. 1\ is the constant IUUUrc: of normal human beinp. It is abo nccc!Dr)l for hUmanily'i progrcu, as .... e lhall find in his view of history. 1bcrefore, while mnsidering just wbal Kanl tates morality 10 involve. we must beat in mi nd thai the priDciple of morality is just one of the two constantly compelill8 motives within human nature. T o find the selfISh principle within us is 001 surprising: we are quile aware of our prejudice in favor of ourselves. However. to find a competing law, lhe moral law, wilbin us is a fanwlic shock. The command of morality, of duty, is by no means 10 be joi ned in bappy compromise witb peT$Onal bappines.s: ;1 is in flat compelition. '"The majesly of duly bu ootbillJ to do wilh the enjoyment of life: it bu ilS own law... ..... The concept of duly brings us to the strange situation in which we find wilhin ourselves "I. law be fore which all inclinalions au dumb ~ I~I 11u:,. >W elly work against iI.- The ordinary human situation, lhen, is one in which the individual bolh docs and docs oot want 10 be selfL&h. Pul aoother way. the individual botb docs alld don oot wan! 10 be moral. l.ogical fSpc<"IS of Ihis ambivalence are developed in Chapler IV.

wvs

KANrS CONCEPlUAL TOOLS (f) .AI l'llIional bftng can 1IrM! 1M idea of {_. We have not yet considered the detail~ of the manl law ilKlf, and for this we return to features of the cona:ption of law. ill ~ woob . : "0dide let 1nI. 0uIy I. ,......., bei"" Iw 1M upoocily oI..:1iAf; __ eli", ICtlbe """pl;'" 01 ....... let priMipica. TIIis .. ~ Is will. Slace reuooo Is rcq~ired "" lbe de i. ,;.,. oI.f MIl is -Iriat cloc I.... ptaclal ' " ' , . E~

i.e."""""""

rm.. .......

(~t2)

In this pauage. remi!ilicent of Pascal. al though oot quite the same idea, Kant bolds that the difference between a rational be ing and other beings. is not any ability to breal:: the laws of nature; it is the ability to understand them. "The cooception of la..... is the key. laws that cannot be avoided. plII'QIl elIprcued that pan in his POISh.J. #347, "if the uai~CrK werc 10 crush him, man would still be more noble tIwi that wh ich killed him. becallK he knows tbat he diC5 and the advantage which the univerK has over him; the univerK knows nothing of this. All our dignity consislS, tben. in tbought," Not any random tbou&ht. of COIlIW. but the thought or concept

of law, Kant pr ETI es for something more than Pascal did here. Kant bolds that reason can (A) understand law. as Pascal pointed oot. (B) deri~e aroom tbal would be consequences of cenain laws. and (C) will or intend jU5t those actions. Next we tum \0 11 morc detailed classification of the principles of reason. (&) Dlx;ision.·mtIJci"8 ~ ""'" and otIQo
This 'something else" is presented only hypothetically. For example. the commands of the medical doctor are hypothetical; if you W1lIlt to extend your life span. you mUSI cal a balaJl(C(j diet. The engineer. mathematician. pby5.icist. chemist. etc.. present their bJowledge as hYPOlheticai imperatives.. 11 we h;lve cen;,tin

4\

objecti\°e5 in engineerins. mathematics, physics, or chemistry. Ih~n we are liven cenain pieces of advice. Hypothetical impcralivclI are statements of the form: If you seek objective A, ' hen you ought to II5e means 8. The foree behind this ~I comes from tbe a5$umption that Jiven an objective, one wishe5 the most efficient mtaJl$ \1'1 reach il If you don't want the most efficient means, then you don't rmlJy want the objective. (Or you want more than one objective.) Howevt:r, if you do 11(11 wUh objective A. the hypothetical imperative with A as antecedent has no foree. A categorical imperative is an order in which)'Oll are presented wi th an action that must be chosen, regardless of any eonflicting objective. As examples, consider the orders of ( I ) a uaffic officer, ·Pull uvcr: (2) a military officer, "Advance upon the enemy: (3) a theologian, "Seek ye the kingdom nf beaven: In each of these

alles we are, ~licalty speaking. presented wilh categorical commands. Without any "ih: "andI.," or "bulS,: we are directed In a specific action. Suppose this command is challenged by asking for the objective that it serves. If the police officer said, "Pullover. if you wanl tn avoid furtbe r violation of the traffic ordinanees.· the o rder would have beeD reduced (rom a categorical to • tnl:re hypothetical eommand. H we do DOt wish to avoid such • legal complexity. we are under no p ressure 10 take the .dviee. H the miliwy offiee r said, 'Advance u pon the enemy. if you wi5h to avoid a coon·martial,· we agaio have \0 mal«: • decision about the hypothetical objective of avoiding. court-martial. Thirdly. if the theologian ~nds upon his Of her command by saying. "Seek ye the kirwJom of iteavc:n, if ye wish to obey God.' we are no longer siven an absolu te eomtruItId but instead. matter of choice

has bun raised. The natural QUe5tions arise: (I) are categorical imper.tives oecess"y fo r decision-making, or is. rid!. collection of hypothetical imperatives enough? (2) On what basis may categorical impe ratives be chosen? How can we cboose between conflicting categorical imperatives? ~ shalt not kill; and "'Thou shalt kill," are. grammatically s~akjng. equally good Cltegoricals. An

KANrS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS IU\§wcr to the fint question may be found if we COll$ider the ffJI/at:y of the pafal road·mop. Su~ thai one bas a perf«1 road-map; that is, one mows the mosl effiejelll mute for ruchini any objective. and. in addition, one's own location is clearly established. Knowled(IC of the ITIOiI efflcienl route to an objective is hypothetieal knowled(le. If one wishes to (10 10 A, then cboose mule X: if one wishes 10 (10 10 B. then choose mule y , etc. A rationallldion requires both Ibis kind of hypothetical infonm.tion (or command) and. beyond tbis, a specifIC deslination. Comp~te hypothetical infOl'Dlation abou t bow to ruch any objective is DOt sufficient for a dedsion. There must, in addition, be at least one piece of eale(lOrieaI Information, or a ea.le(lOrieal command such as, "Go to A, B, C. _. ' or Z" A perfect road-map, alone, doesn't supply this Clu(IOrical informalion and hence is not sufficient for a decision. Popular road_maps of the day often have a ~l reaanauJar !xu; in a comer headed. "Interesting Places 10 Visit." Not the leasl of the map's advantaiCfo, lhis prOYides us with some Rl B(lCstion of a ea.teiorical command (particularly if the places of interesl are numbered), By lhe fallacy of me perfect road·map. I mean the f.n.ey of assumini Ihat hypothetieal imperatives alone are a suffICient basis for makina a decision, A destination, or a c:ate(lOrical imperative, is a necess"y requirement The dangers of ambi8uily are equally present if we face more than one tale(lOric:al This becomes the hierarchy problem, rankin, objectives in ocder of preference. Then the lower (IoaIs are 10 be choien only if the hl&her ones have been reached ... m'kin8 the lower (lOlls hypothetica ls To make a rational decision we seem to require one, but only nne categorical. (While this is tbe ~ rational demand. the Chapten on the UlpC of ArnbMllence and the Logie of Hope will oot leave matlen the.re.) (II) A

rruiotJDI mind must intmd a OOftSUttrU ~ I f/COI/SUtMq

is~lOit.

If me positioo above is cogen\, • decision procedure for • rational being require5 one and only one cllIegorieal impel.live.

" Fonunately, laYS Kant, there is one altegorical impe rative, and he calls il the imperative of mor~ty. Kant QOmidcrs two questions in connection wilb this. FiBI, What is the moral imperative? And, 5econd. How is it pouiblc? From tile very concept of a categorical imperative, we can discover the only proposition .... hich CI.lI stand as weh a categorical. We can think of the meaning of a hypothetical imperative without knowing a $p«ific antcoedent. H owever, if we think of the meaning of a categorical impe rative we immediately discover thaI il contains only the universality of Jaw as such, to which the principle of any action should conform. Then comes the lriumphanl conclusion. "'There is Ihcrcfore only one categorical imperative. " Is: Act only according 10 thaI maxim by which you can at the urnc time will thaI it sIlould berome :I. universal law" (421). Thi$ is. rather quick maneuver {or such an important mallcr. "We imnJediatcly o;li$eoYer •• : be tells U$, This coold stand :I. bit of expansion. Let'S construct !he path of discovery mentioned. From the standpoint of Q f'CllioNll mitrd. there is one coman! presupposition to any pos,sible absolute command . . . /IIUI 1M commund be pouib~. So much Is tautological, but • significant tautology. Now, in order to be pouible, in the sense of a possible construction for a rational mind, an im.perative must corrunand a 5ituation lbat (all be tbougbt o r constructed consistently, 1be demand for consistency means that one could intend that the entire univeIK follow that command. To say thb b 10 say that one could will that the command (or maxim) become a universal la..... Presumably, we (all mentioo a self-CODtradictory command. but cannot think such a command.. In this sense. to think is 10 construct a mental entity to ....hich ceRain words refer, rather than merely me ntion thoK wor
«

KANl"S CONCEPTIJAL TOOlS

nnrumum requirement fOl' a. thinkable uniYelW. The absolute command for. rational mind is: Be oo05;$Ienl, intend only a consisuent universe. While. rational mind can assert things thai are in(:oD$isleol., it cannot undentand or <XIDltru<:t such things. As ezample consider the figure ealJed, ", square-tircle." We may easily $a)' web words., and include them in weU-forrn.ed panunati· c:al 5eDlences, However, we eantJO( imagine an entity tha, is a $(fIIue-Orde. The lasl poin11cads to .. difficult qUC$tion. Can we be in error about what we CM or tannOI consistently imagine? Kant docs I'lOl take up the nalter, and it has DOl dominaled the subsequcll1 Literature. ContemporaJ)' work in the phi\o$Ophy of mind is not decisive on mit. My view is. laken from tile fallibility position of ClIaries S. Peirce. We arc capable 0( error in anything. includilll in whal~r seems quite deaf and distinct a1 some momenL We may 10 for years telling ourselves thai we have constructed a lhouJht. only to discover that we have mentioned it 10 ourselves btu 00{ o;:omtructed ;1. Even worse, we may never make Ihal dilcoYery aDd learn our enor. Sin<:e Kant docs nol deve lop this maner, rn drop it at this stage. The command, Be mnsi..5tent, is the buis for morality, accordina: to Kant. It is !he euential idea of fairnes5 to all, one I.w holding (or everyone. Therefore, it is 00 DOYel interpretation of moTaliry, but the ordilwy ~rson'l notion of the euential point in • moral intention. The mll1lllalld docs not mme from. supernatural Mina bul is lo<:ated in the nature and meaning of reason itself. We human Mings are part ratiooal .nd pan selfish; that pat! of us that is r.tional is the pan thai can intend only • mll5isteDl and the refore moral UnivelW. The ot~r pan of us can have quite different intentioll5. But, to the merdy ration.1 pan of • human being, the only thing immoral is inconsistency. So, Kanl holds., all of the commands of duty can be derived from DOe imperative as • principle. The im~rative: Inlend a consistent univelW.

" (/) A fflIiottaI bdn& pes iadf ~ Cl')mmtlld: II!lmd Q ~ IUIiwrx. 17tU. t~ MOlal COItIInWJd. The eatepical impc~tive is tephnsed in _ral ways; for eumpJe, •An as tbougb the maxim of your action 1WC:tc by your will II) bcromoe a universal law of nature: Kant &ives _tal cumplu of uslllJ tbis p rinciple 10 determine !he moralily of • pyen action. In one _ have the case of • penon who find$ hilD$elf or henelf foreed by need to borrow mooey thaI cannot be repaid. May such. person promise to pay while knowin& it will not be done?

u.. _

t

,

01

_,...,If

w. ..... M

hi be. 'o!k , '" _ . I belicYc 10 WHy. I will bc:w . ow _ , ... po ;, : La , • ..., it.

be "" ....cI at 010- a~ I t - I .... of d-boe or 01 _ _ bad"~ ..,. ~ .... be _ ; "lh WIo W. w' • hi""" ~ bioi rIIoe qw«.... ;. A " II;. ...... He ; " , 1M prete-.... of odf· ..... ~. ' low .... """ ,... tIroo q ,';..e: H0, . ,. _ ea ' , .. _ , _ _

-=- ..... ""'-." ", ... '

,_OIl

p

", . ... .,-

•

,

.

. . . .- . . . .

-

TIle p"xedure for mati'l& IT1Of"aI decilions .bout a particular act requires that two questions be answt.red:
"

!
that il ill obeyed. 'That it is self-imposed, .lso does nol mean thaI il is aJwa~ obeyed. Theile aspects of Kant's vicw should nol diven Wi from the significa nt point thaI the principle is both universal and yel we impose it on ounelvC5. H the moral command were \0 originate from outside tbe individual, moral obedicm:e might be the obedience of a slave or the fearful rHponse of • mere IlUbject of some king. If the eoll'lmaJ1d originates within the individual. relativistic: morality miJht easily be the TeRllt. Kant lvoiib both of these familiar pitfalls by deriving the principle of moralily from the naJUre of reason, as we have IUn. Then, rational beings find thaI the Tluional part of their nature, of lheir own nature. commands them \0 obey the rational demand: Intend a consistent univelVl The wnunand is seH.imposed, and yel ;1 is me universal command of reason thaI balds for all such beinp.. Therefore, the moral amunand is individual. is wbjectivc, is • mallcr of obedience 10 onc patt of one's own nature ; yet it is !he universal common demand thaI 1IlU$\ always hold belWCe n rational beings. The romcnl of tbe moral principle eomes from the nature of reason, not from human nature (ueeP\ in pan). Human beinp. of course, are a combination of reason and selfl5hneu. The refore, the lack of hiswrical eumplu of people who were perfectly moral is 00 argumcm against this formulation of 1M Principk of morality.

(j) More than Oftl! pru.!ihk Ullivtnt mel)' be OOfISisltlllThe ctlft gorial/ imptt'oJio>t gMs 1M boundaria of morolity, wilhill whK:h i1Idi~idud st)'fm mel)' differ. The IUteriai in this section on ethics has developed Kant'l view of 1M mtalli1l& of moral ity, the line be~en what is and what is

oot to count as moral. However, 10 10 10 far with Kant il only to have a definition of morality. The question arises: For a liven problem, is there more than one response mat may be d10sen within the bounds of the categorical imperative? Are there alternative ways of satisfying the definition of monlity? The answer 10 our question is, yes. There may well be different ways of behavior that count equally IS moral. Al l JOOd

47

Kantillll$ need not do precUely the 5IllJ\e thing under the 5aIlle cirevmstance5. They can't violate the rational demand thaI the principles under which they act be principle5 thaI an be uni~rsaJ tted. Whatever tile)' do lhey must treat all human beings lI$ ultimate ends, as penons 001 as mere thinp. H~r. tile boundaries within which morality is satisfied may vary from wide 10 11&fl'OW, depending on Ihe problem-situation. And, within these boundaries, very differenl sty1cs" may be chosen. While the cates0ricaJ imperative IimilS the range of itylc~ that can be acocpled as moral, it doesn't tell us which uyle to choose on • particular occasion. It does demand thaI the style of Te5pOllSe lbal is chosen be ODe whose principle or maxim be univcrsaJizabJe. All fair interpretations musl be consistent. It must be a principle that wouJd nol be contradicted if it were a law for the univeT$e. 'The style of killing those with whom we djsagree is DOt universaJizable: \llrule A can kill B and remain alive, B can't also do the same thing. A's principle could nol be. law for the universe. A Ivge number of ql,lC$tions are DOl moral iuues.. Which shoe to put on fll'$t, ",hellier 10 daoc:e a Viennese waltz., whether to join a particular non-di5criminatory d ub or church are manen that raise no 5pCner of inconsistency. If the whole world took one Of" the other alkrnative, the principle under which we acted would face DO l(llical embarTa$lIleIlt. Likewise, there are questions to which none of the responses are acceptable under the Catetlorical Imperative. Shall I kill my captive by rut Of" slow tonure? Neither ,tyle satisfies Kant's definition of moral hehavior. The COD(lusion to be noted is lb. t the categorical imperative. the command 10 act only under principles thaI may he coiWstently univenal ized, gives atkfiniOOn of morality. Within the parameten of thaI definition, llIO!e than one style may he moral ... and more than one, immoral. Thi5 wiD give readen a depndable due to Kant'S anirude toward the different religious institutiOll5. Key matten remain of the meaning. the force, and the source of monl distinctions. Kant ~ insisted that I~ mN11in.8 of

KANIS CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS morality comeli from the meaning of reason. and 1M fon::e of morality mmes from the fact that it is Klf·imposed: that we impose it on ourselves. The ~ is the reuon that is in us. IlOl in any external entity, Kant holds tliat his position is the orditwy undentanding of morality. WhIle he USCI technical tenns, it requires no new and brilliant discovery 10 explai n moral ity. It is the common idea that a moral act is one that foll~ principles that an be followed by anyone in I limilat situation. Kant has stressed the role of law, of respect. and of duty in the mailer. This brief introduction 10 Kant's eth ical theory has hardly touched on sevent..l crucial mallen.. However, it sets the stage for timbe r developmeots in bi$ work on re ligion. The mtljcr fWw is lhal iJ lias ~ only 1M iNIMdwJ tU the subJtct of m orol (;aIqoriu, and Itus ~ 1M moJIn" oftIfOUP cr coIJ«tjw morality. Therefore, the moral antinomy of primary significa,,« for religion has not been wggutcd. For lhis we lihall wail until the lut chapten of this book. In the nezl section on lhe philO5Ophy of hislory we shall see how Kant undentands tbe moral history of something that is not JUSt an individual human being. namely, the TnOTlI.I history of Iwmonity.

J. Kul '. Phllcnopb, or "Istort' This 5edion contains an uuemely brief outline of a rather dramatic philosophy of history," We find Kant', position in its lTIO$t direct form in bi$ shon but valuable euay, ' Idea for a Universal History from • Cosmopoli\.ln Point of View.' This conception of bistory is also presented and u5ed in other parts of his work-the C~ of JudgmelU, PtrptlUill Peua, AlUhrop%IJI, etc.-but not in Ihe detail that we find here. Even in this essay, things are put in compressed slyle. After a brief introduction, the euay consists of nine "theses" with a paragraph or 10 of comment on each. The inlroduction argues that even though human individuals Kern 10 have freedom of wilL and 10 behave in 'complex and

., chaotic" ways, we may find somelhin& d ifferent if we change our viewpoint. Instead of taking the human individual as our subject. lei LIS consider "the human race as a whole." This new subject. humanily or the human nace. shows ". sleady and progreuivc though slow evolution" (17). This should not surpme us. Many lhinp seem 10 be unpredictable u individual evenlS, bul exhibit regular pallcrru; whe n cKamined in largt groups. As examples Kanl mentions thaI individual marriages. births. and deaths 5Urn \0 be unpredictable, yet the annual tables in major countries "prove" that they follow regular la-.n, considered collectively. He also mentions thaI the weather sums \0 be unpredictable day-byday, but over the 00IIn.e of the year is regular enough to maintain the growth of plants and the flow of riveTl. 1'bereforc, Ihe project of looking for a pallem in the history of the human race w u ,,11ok is quile legitimate, Jo&ically. 'The PlIllero Ihal we look for, or that we impose on the data, may be purpoi§ivc on tbe wbole, ahhough the individuals involved may be unaware of an)' IoUch pUrpoK. They might "Work tOW'J.rd funhering il. eve n if the)' would set lill ie store by it evcn if they did know it" (17). Despite the folly, vanity, and malice of iooividuals, there might be an overall rational purpose that a history of humanity exhibits. Now to his theses, or hypothese1.

R RST TIi ESIS 'All naturoI CDpucili~ of Q crcutun an dcuilled 10 evolve complac/y 10 IJ~,'" naturaJ cnd." ( 18)

We muM aRlune IOmclhins like this in o rder 10 havc a conception of a lawful rather than an .imlc!lS ·course of Il¥Iure." Kant adds thai the form and structurc of animals ronfillllli this. Orpns or arrangements that do IlOt uhievc their pIIrpoKS " .. ould be contradictions in a tcleological theory of nature. So, let us assume that everything has a purpose, and then try 10 find ... hat that PUrpo5C is.

KANT'S CONCEPTUAL TOOL'>

SECOND TIlES IS raJionai ~ on fiVliI) I/UJIf! "aJUraI cll{JQCilies wllich are diret;I"<1lo l/~ ILU of hif nasD/I are to M fullY

"I" mUll (as

~oped

t/~ ~

only iIIlh~ mee, lIot ill the illdMduaL" (IS)

The illllOCCnr soundin&: Fint Thesi$. laken sc:rioolly, forces us 10 /J1OYC our al1ell1ion away from the individualloward humanity. Since lbere are no limits 10 Ihe application of reason., and reason does not work instinctively, bUI reQuirt'S 'Iri~ practice. .nd instruction in order gradually 10 progress from one level of insighl 10 another: individual human beinp do nol live Ion&: enough to learn the fuU use of reason. However, we find naNre settin, • lillon JXriod for Individual lives, bul producin, a l.eries of senerations in which each passes its own accomplishments on to iUi ulcccssor. The only Wily to make the capability of reasoninll cons~[ent wilh lbe Fint Thesis i. [0 assume lhat ralionality is to be fully developed only in the race, not the individual. We arc tberefore forced 10 a dualism in human history: both the individu· al JXl"SOn and the human race must be studied, and lhey have Quite different historical patterns. TIlIRD TIlES IS "NoJure hat willtd I/roJ man llwu.1d, by Irirrutlf, produce everything Ihat goa Myond lire mechanical Ot"dmng of his animal ailiUlOt, and that he lIrculd ptlftau of no ()/Iu:r l,appiflaS or

petfeaicn tlrllll tlrat ... Melr Ire hirruelf, cnatw by I,is ""." rrtul>rr." (19)

inde~ndent/y

of instinct,

lUll

When we puttosether the a55umption that Nature doe. notlling in vain. and lhe notion Ihal Nature hu given us reason and free will. we ha"e whal Kant calls "a clear indication of her purlKlse" (19). No insti nct. no -ready-made knowledge" iii available for a lIuman !:teing's goab.. Any success in moving toward one's delires mUSI be due entirely to th:l.t indMdual's own efforts. Kanllis!S the

Kant', ConaplUOJ Tool.J

51

goa.Is: securing "food. sheher, safely, and defense, , . all amusement whkh can make life pleasant, insiiht and intelligence, finally even goodneSll of hean-all tOO should be wholly his own work" (19), If a human being ever does progres5\oward happines5, '." he alone should have the credit and should have only himself 10 thank , . , exactly as if she (Natute] aimed more at his rational self-e~leem than al his _U-being" (20), No god$ would deserve lhe credit; it would be complelely due to 1M wort of human beings, tbemselve5. The goal is not well_ being, but wortllinus of it. This is the same goal that is preMed tbroughout Kam's writing. As pul here, ", , , il seems not to have amcerned Nature that he should live _ll but only that he should work himself upward 50 as to make himself, through his own actions, worthy of life and of well-being" (20). This is as strong an appreciation of iNJMduaJisnI as any anarchist could want, but it is JUSt a pan of Kam', position. The other pan is his view of p«JpIe collectively: lu.unanldnd.

We then find a paragraph in which Kant mentions the "strange' pattern in whleh "earlier generations appear to earry tbrouih their toilsome labor only for the sake of the later , . , only the latest of the generations would have the good fortune to inhabit the building on whleh a klDg Hne of their ancestors had (unintentionally) labore:d without being permitted to PM\Ilke of the fortune they had prepued" (20), This strange pal1em ", , , is neC""ary if one assumes that a species of animal$ should have reason. and, as a daM of rational beings toch of whom diltt w/,ile rile sp«teJ it immortal, should develop their apacities to perfection" (20). The species has its own history: individuals die, but " T mQ)' Iwpe /IUll lilt: species is ""manal, 'The notion of immortality has a basic p;art in our thought, and ;t ;s not embarnwed by observable fact because it is not taken to be a property of individuals. NOI we but our spcdes is to be the immortal entity.

52

KANT'S CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

FOURTIi THESIS "1M means emplD')wi by Nalun! to bring abocu the d~I(J~nl of /Iff I/~ cupaciJia of mOl is rhN WIIogonism in JOCiety, !O far 4.t thU iJ, in the md, I/~ Cau.u! of Q la...ful onkr among men: (20)

In this Thesis Kalll goes far beyond ttle romantic views of human nawre and the mechanism of hislory. In his comment on this 11Iesis be first derIDeS "&ntagOnism." This is 10 mean "tIUl lUISOCial JOCidJiliry of m ..lI, i.e., their propel1$ity \0 tiller into society. bound loae1iler with 11 mutual oppoiition which connanlly

threatens 10 break up Ihe society" (20) (empllasis mine). 'The "social" pare of this is familiar enough; since Aristotle we have had the comforting notion dUll a human being is a social animal. and Deeds and Iovn other hl,lmaD bcillgli. SelfIShness has been not iced and received rommcm by earlier .Ulhol'5, hut usually 10 complain and criticize it in enspenlled IOne$. Hobbes and Adam Smith are uceplions \0 Ihis altitude. Kant follows Hobbes and Smith lief";

1101 only are human beings selftsh. hut this very selfishness is a requirement fOf" humanity', progreu. I am reminded of Adam Smi th's phrueology in his Weabh of NUlWru, ", . , it is as if man is . . . led by an invi$ible hand to promote an end whieh was no pan of his intention. Nor is it always the "'orse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own intereit he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote il. I have never known mueh good done by those who affected 10 ~ for the public good." The idea that ~Ifi$hness, the unsocial characteristic, is a _ . SilTy means for progreu is not just a lingle casual remark, It is repeated and developed. "Without those in·themselves unamiable characteristics of unsociability from whence opposition springscharacteristics each man mu.st find in his own !.elfish pretensiOO$an wlenl5 would remain hidden. unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's life ... . Men, good·n;:uured as Ihe sheep they herd, v.wld hardly reach a higher W(lrlh than thoei r beasl5 .. : (21).

53 He continues, Jbanks be 10 Nature, then, for the incompat· ibility. for heartless rompetitivc vanity, for the insatiable desire 10 possess aDd 10 rule! Without them, aU the excellent natural copacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped. Man wishes concord; but Nature knows belter what is good for the raoe ; me wills divmd" (21). So much for peace, Jove, and warm fellowship. It lakes "heartless competitive vanity" 10 drive us to serious CJlcnions of our powers. The point of thi$ The$is is 10 iosisl that ( 1) individual$ are both social and ull5Ocial, and each of these two properties is a fixed innate pan of the healthy human being; and (2) boIh of t'-e properties are required for bllmanity's progress, 1M NJ.JI'j ~1fiJh wp«I

is qbwllll,!1y asmtiaJ. EffortS to eradicate selfishness would

be quile unnarura!, quile WTOIlI- Not only an: human beings ambiYaient about morality; human progFe5Ii requires that they be ambivalent about it. We s.hall tum to the mattcr of person.aJ ambivalence in IIIOfC detail in Chapter Four.

FlF IH TIIESIS ~

f'Wllut probknI for 1M Iuumut rpce, to llu soIuliotI 0/ whkh Nunue dm>es """" if the uchk'.'cnwu of a ~ CMc wcidy which admUtist~ Ww IU'IOIII mOl." (22)

Up to this point. Kant has held that Nature has a rational goal for humanity. and that individual human beings may well be unaware of or indifferent to that loal. But, we have oot yel been given any notion of what Ihis rational end is. Now, in this Thesis and the a,lmmeOI on it. we have hi5 answer. The goal is • petfeclly jusl cMe sodely. A "weiely wi!b tbt arCatelil rrc:cdom ... wnsistcnt with the freedom of others" (22). Hnmanily'5 c:apabililies cannol be achieved by the individual living in isolalion from fenows human bein&5. Such individuals, Kant lays, are like isolated IfCQ !bat put 001 branchel a' random and "grow stunled. crooked, and twisted" (22). In a forest, eacb tree needs the others for competition, 'since each ill seekina 10

KANTS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS lake the air and wnlight (rom ot.ben must strive upward. and thereby ead! ruliU's a beautiful straight stature . . : (22). We need othen to fight with, not to love. Kant stresses the MCeSSily of ~ in producing historical progcss. The romantic desire for peace and human companionship would be a calamiry if it succeeded too lOOT\. Not the sociable, but the UNOdable tc:ndende5 of our nature are required for progress. "All culture, art which adorns mankind, and t.be finest lOCial order are fruits of unsodableues.s. whid! forces itself to discipline itself , . : (22), This achievement, I just wdery. must be lcoomplished by bumanity itself, "Like aU its olber destined pis: Therefore, no supernatural 'FD(:)' c:an ordu 01" lead us; it must all be our work. This is wbat "Nature demaMs .. : (22).

SlXTlf reFSIS "'ThU prob/mt

n/01tkiJf.d:

jj

the most dijfiaUl and 1M IlI.SI

/0

be soMd by

(23)

Why iii t.be political problem so difficult? Here is t.be argumenL FinL a human beiq is a combination of "K1rtsh animal" and "reasonable bein,," Secood, t.bis combirur.tion is eaential: the rational pan CIMOt eliminate t.be selfisb pan, as we found in the Fifth Thesis. Third. to live among olhen of its kind. "Man iii an . nim· 1 which require5 a master." While each of us rationally wishes a law to limit everyone's freedom, "his selfISh impulses tempt him, where possible, to exempt himself." 11Ierefore. individuals require a IJII5ter to force them to obey. Founh, the only pouibJe muter must, also, be a buman being. Fifth. "the mastc:r, himself, is an animal, and nuds a muter." 1berefore, "the highest master ~ld be just in himself, and )'Ct a man: That iii why the "complete solution is impossible" for the political taSk. Honest, and )'Ct a bllflWl being! A con tradiction. H a sin&Je penon t:aIlIKM be trusted to be u~msh. perhaps a lP'oup of several elecled persons can utidy the requirement. No,

" SlI)'$ KalIl., ", •• for each ofthem will always abuse his freedom if be hQ no one above him 10 Cllcrci5e force in accord with the laws' (23). Thi$ (oDUDellI applies 10 people !akcn individually. 'each will .bu5e. . . : But, it may 1101 be the case for • group of ~DOns, considered all a group. A dlecks-and-baIanee5 mechanism might IUnit the individuals' ability to "abuse: Can no one be educated to place rationality aver selfisb regard? What of the Platonic idea of philOMlphcr-kings7 Kant

will have no

IUeb

confidence in any elite:

~I

kings should

philosophize or philosopbel$ beo:>me kings is DOt 10 be upeaed. Nor is it to be wished. since I~ J'OfYrsiOtl of powtr iMvitubly /XIII'FUfJU the untrammeled judgments of reason.'" A remark that Lord Anon wu 10 repeal about one hundred years laler. Human nature, our R1fish .Dd yet ambivalent altitude 10000rd morality. IWgested the metaphor of C'OOked wood. "from such crooked wood as man is made of, no.hj". perfectly 5lraigbl can be buill" (23). 'The IOlutioo to the poJitieal probJem, the last problem thai humanity will solve, has three requirements.. Ooe, ' "correa

conception of. possible constitution"; two, "cat ~ricnce pined in many paths of life; .and three, "far beyond these... good will rudy 10 accept such • coll5lirution.· This Thesis cncb with lIle am:uneOI tbal the5e three Ibings arc bard 10 find. "and if lbcy arc ever 10 be found loaetber. il will be very Ille and after II'W!y vain allempu" (23). The ju5t Slale is an ideal that we may approach yet may DOl rcacb. This is an opeD question for hope. In a si&ni6cant footnole bcre, Kanl repclllS his Second 'J'beW, sayin,; that '"The role of man is very artificial." Perhaps on otbcr plancu.. "caeh individual can perfealy atlain his destiny in his own life. Amana II$, il is differeD!; 0tIJy the raa can hope /0 flIIain it" (my emphasis). Not juR lhe individual, bill the human lj)Ceies, now beeoma the moral actor. As """ lhaII see. the eonsequences of lhis point of view arc enormous..

KANT"S CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

SEVENTH rnESIS "The proh/t:m of atabIiJhina D paJeu rn'l(: wnsntwion u MpnuJmI upon 1M proh/ml of D ltlwfuJ mmwl rdation DIIflNI8 stales and CQllllDt ~ ~ wllhouJ a JOIWion of 1M Lmer pmbltm.·

' ''

TIle mecbanism5 that drove individual people to restrict their own freedom in the prooea of CTellitillB a commonwealth are here applied to states themselves. Kant finds thai states have in their natures "the same unsociability" thai individuals have. TIlerefore, "each of them l1\li51 expect from another precisely the evil which opprlWed the individuals and forced them to ente r ioto a lawful cMe stale' (24). Earlier be had beld laloo individual could be trusled to treal otbers jllStly: here no Slate can be trusted with complete freedom. TIle IOlutinn is clear enoup 10 reason: r/un _ I be l1li w~ ·w"wr of NlIioIu: &11 reason does not determine the aetioos of states. Sornethin& else will. Nature uses "the friction among men, the inevitable an~ n.i.!;m," as the means of forcing stales to form an intemationailegIJ arrangemenl for 5eltlill8 disputes.. Earlier, lhe Fourth Thesis held that the individual', 5eIfJSltoc:ss, vanity, greed, and competitiveness were nature', means of establishing lawful lIl'TIlIgemenlS. Here Kan. bollb thai war ill the mechanism by which Nature can produce the desimlt resulL SIf'OII8 ernpbasls is liven the power of warfare to produce inlemational law: "., . throop the taDng and never-endill8 aa:umulation of armament, tbroup the want wbieh any state, even in pelcetime, mllSl !lUffer inlernally, Nature forces Ihem 10 make a. fust ilUldcquale and tentative auempts .. : (~), So far thi5 can sound smootb and manageable, oot Kant doesn't expect that il will be. Instead, it will take "devastations, revolutions, and even complete exhaustion,' before the greal stales arrive at the stage that reason could have preseoted to them "with far less s.ad experience.· At .h~ stage they ' step from the lawless condition of UYagQ; inlo • league of nations:

If war is the mechanism for this moral goa~ is war morally desirable? Kant's view is that individual acts of war are usually immoral. but looked al in the large, the condition after a war can wmetimes be more desirable, morally, than Ihe condition before iL II

J ust wha l is the moral advantqe of a leaJUe of nations? "even the Y!1aIIest nate (:OUld expect security and justice, not from its owo power and by irs own decrees, but only from this grealleague of nations . . . from a united power actina according 10 deci5ions reached under the laws or their uniled wilr (24). Several things are 10 be noted about this lut quolation. First, Slates are taken to he entities that have a will or intention, and second, Slaies are entities 10 whom juslice or injustice may be done. In lel1ll5 of t.he well-known nominalist·reallsl contrOVersy, is Kant a realisl aboul the c.islence of enlities like Slales? Heretofore, the only entities thai mighl be taken 10 have a "wilr and to be reeipienl$ of justine or injustice have been individuak An ab5tract enlity like a nation would seem a peculiar and unlikely cntity foc- such predkation. It appean unlikely 10 a nominalist, for whom abstract cntities arc mcrely names and do not uist as rcal cntities. A brief digression on this matter may be helpful. For an object 10 be known. it must be at least a pouib1e thought. A pouiblc object or thought. Kant divides possible objccu. inlo tbose that can be mcntioned consistcntly but oot constructed in thought, and those that can be so menlioned and alw CQII ~ lhoug/tl. In order 10 think an object, therc must be matcrial, "... since without malerial nothing whaUOCYcr can be thought" (A232/B284). The "malerial" must come from experiencc. A pouib1e object of though t must be made out of pam that are poi5iblc objecu. of expericnce. Howevcr, a possiblc objcct and an actual object are not identical. An actual objcct is cxpericnced; rather, it I'M be experienced. A possible object is oonstructcd in thc mind, but conslructed out of parts that are actually expericnced. To rcpeat this conclusion, a pouible object of thought is an arrangement constructed OUI of actually cEpcricnced pat1$.

"

KANrS CONCEPllJAl TOOLS

From this pouu of view. OUT languaae iii welL-stocked with worth that can be mentioned consistently, but cannot be taken to be pos5ible objects of tboupl. Words thai Kanl dauifit'S as noumenal, "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality; arc aamples." For Kant'li comments on the relation between the possible and the actual. see the Finl Critique analysis. starting" A23O. How does this rauil about possible objects of thought affect Kant'li coll5idertltion or slales? 'The parts of. Slate are objects of pos51l1lc experience; therefore, the Slate is • proper objea of lhoop!. It can be both mentioned and used \0 refer 10 OUlllen of eJF:pericnce. We might define 11 StalC so thai it is mere ly an abstract c nlil)' thai does not refer to any experience. However. lherc is also • perfectly experimental way of defining a SlatC, and 50 Kant bas • legitimate phenomenal entity 10 analyze. (For example, the IOU-Ie can be taken 10 be the cnlil)' thai has as parts the kgislaturc, the stalC police. lbe couru. prisons. lU collector, highway department. board of heallb, etc.) Let us return 10 Kalll'l Slllcmcm aoo..n the position of lmall $la1C$ in a "great league of nations.' We found him holding Ihal staleS are entities that have will that they are moral acton and moral objects, and that they can live and receive justice 01' injustice. TIle romplt:re history of morality i$ the history of both individual and aroup morality. This distinetion between individual and collective morality pennil5 Kanl 10 make a lignilicant dicholomy. Individllals may llUlke DO ptllgreu in their own moialiry, bu.t their group. their SUte, may O!X!Isionally make real progreu in its morality. We shall f<:rum to this matter in the summary of this notion of history. The term "intention' is applied to three diffef<:nt subjeCts: (1) individual people. (2) collections of people. for instance, States. and (3) Nature. n.e fint two are usually oot IIOt alwlYS distillpished by Kant. Bill he is qllile insistent about separating the fiBt two from the intentions of what he caLIs "Nlture." 'All wan are accordingly 50 many allc mpts (1Wt in fhf' WOlfion. of m ..... but Ut lite Wf'IIliOll of Naturf') to establish new relations among StaleS and through tile destruction or at least the dismemberment of 111

so of them to create new political bodies .... (25) (my emphasis). TIle history 0( warfare, both internal and external 10 states, mi&hl finally result in • state which, "like a civic commonwealth, caD maintain iuelfaulomatically," because it has "the best JI(lUible civic constitution and common agreement .. .' (25). What are the po5Sible bases for such a desirable result? Kant wondel'$, and offers three. Perhaps. ( I) it miahl arrive by cham:e, bul be adds thai web • fortunate accident could hardly ever OCQIT. Perh.aps., (2) this ideal soaJ may never be reac hed, bul instead our nalUral discord may annjhilate "civilization and all mllUrai progress throop barbarous devastation . . ." (25). This 'is the rate we may well have 10 ruffer under the rule of blind chance ... if there is 00 !leCfCI wise guidance in Nature." Or, (3) tile hope thlt be offers: "are we not rather to suppose thaI Nature here follows • lawful rourK in gradually liftina OUI' race from the lower levels of anilTlll1ity to the highest level of humanity •• ." (25). The three alternatives above are reduced 10 one question: "Is it reasonable 10 UiUDJe a purposiveness in all the pans of nature and 10 deny it 10 the wboler (25). Prcwmably, Kant expects us to agree thai it is not reasonable to assume reasonableness in the partS bul 1)(11 in the whole. However, we cannot poOO(! thai the whole has • certain property just because the partS of that whole have t he property. That would constiMe committing the Fallacy of Composition." Kant doesn't araue for such. deduction of the property of the whole from the parts; it is left as a rhetorical question. His point in this Thesis, lest we lose it, is that "the barbaric freedom of established litates" must be replaced by "a cosmopolitan condition to 5CCIIre the external afcty of each stale' (26). This will not be achieved by sweetness of character or recognition of the moral imperative. It will be achieved simply to secure the $aCety of eacb itale. The prescnt freedom is called barbaric because:, ibrough wasting II~ ~ of the commOllwerUlhs in orrnumelllS /0 ~ used aguiJUr C'QCIi Oflier, through dcvutation brought on by war, and even more by the nettSS.ity of holding

60

KANT'S CONCEPTIJAL TOOLS

themselves in COIl5WU readiness for war, they [l£I"ueign Iilate$J stunt the full development of human nature" (26). Kant takes me oppmhion of slates to be "in irsclf healthy," and points out thaI peace between StalCS "is 1\01 unaetcndcd by the danger thaI !he vitality of mankind may (aI] asleep... ." But, the risk of "barbaric freedom" in international relations is that humaniry "nrlJht be altogether dwrO)":d." He concluded this section witb • distinction betwun rultwte (the benefiu of atl and science). cM/iulliotI (soeial JOIees and decorum). and mQITlJiry. "&crythiog good WI if; not based on a morally load disposition, however, is nothing but pn:lcnse and glitterin& misery" (26). Moralil)' requires thai the human species work ilS way out of "the chaotic conditions of its international rcations" (26).

ElGHllf ntEStS

of

~

s«"'

the mlli:aJiorf of NUlIU'e's secrd p/aII to bring /Mil Q pefoaly oorutituted $lDlC (U the 0lI/)' COIId/llote u. whicII flit cupacil/Q of IJIOIIkUuJ eM ~ fully d~/o~ rl1!d Also bri1!g /orfh thal armuU refmion IIMOtI8 "'T'htt lWlory

stDles which

numIdnd

<:all

u pof~1y udequmc to IIW Old:

iIf Iht /Q1ge,

QS

(27)

In the effort \0 reach !his goal of Nature, the ph ilosophic fkvelopmen\ of the idea of it "can help, thoug.h only from afar, to bring tbe millennium to pll55.. This reminds us 0( the view developed years laler by William James in "1be Will to Believe." James held thaI there are CII5CS, social situations., in which having an idea that iODlCthil\& will OCCIIr can help produce the future event. Kam has insisted. earlier in this eWlY, that individuals need not know the ~gn of Nature; it ....iII .... OI'"k out without their understanding, We are now told that a history of the human speciu, properly understood. can help to bring about the desired goal. This is the classical problem of goal-oricntcd interpretations of history.

61 If things are moving toward . goal. the activity of the individual an easily be taken 10 be $Uperfiuoos. What i$ the role of the

individual in

.I

determininie theory of history (for example,

MaJXism)? Kant doesn't gi~ individuals the power \0 make or bruit the rcsult. bul holds thll they CWI help the good QlUSC. H e lalcr insists thaI Ihey ought 10 act as if the whole project rested on their cHom. How ean they help? In .II leasl OIlC way, by writing and Ihinking OUI history of the human race. Beyond the mere Utopian Idea, does Nature reveal anything of a p,ath to the goal of world government? Kant wondel'$, and his an.woer is., "She reveals something. but very tittle" (27). A modC$1 claim for an issue so uIJcnL What is available as evide~ is 10 be found in the history of humanity. Two oonuneou about hunan rtalUtc in this section arc connected with Ihe historical entetprUe. Kant hold5 that "human nature is so constituted thai we CIlIlllOI be indifferent \0 tile most remote epocb our race may rome to, if ooly we may expect it with certainty" (27). Apparently, we do lake oul'Klvcs \0 be a part of humaniry, and to have IiOme concern for its future: this concerns a period long after our own death. but we are still not indifferent The remark that we need to "expect it with certainty" il a Ilip; he later i~t:I that we may hope for this goal even if it is not a cenainty. Kant adds that our intelligent action can help Ilasten the desirable future time, and tbis iocruses our interut. What evidence is there fOf" this interesting L!.5umption of concern bey
Inc

62

KANIS CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

A5 well as the obvious dangen of war, Kant mentions what he calls a new in~ntion, "an evc r-growing war debt lhat eaMO! be met" (28). Several years laler, the C:l5aY, "Perperual Peace: expanded on this idea. He took the credit system \0 be an ", .. ingenious invention of a commercial people [England) in this century . • : bul to be "dangerous because il is • w;u O'CMUfe which uceeds me treasures of all olher states; it cannot be exhausted except by default of lUes (which is ine_iable), though it can be long delayed by the stimulus 10 mule .... (345). Therefore, be considered the feasibility of forbidding the credi t system, as a preliminary artielc in the efron 10 reach perpetual peace. However, this is • minor aside in his view of human history. E5sentially we find the vicw repelillcd, in Hobbe&.ian ICnm, thaI the nata will be 'dri~n by their own danger" 10 prepafC the way for II distant international lOYemmenl for which there is no precedent in world history. '7'hi.J gives hope fowJly that .. ." the hullUlll race will be able 10 develop its o;apabilitiCli within a univen.aJ world 1I00000mmeni (28), (emphasis mine).

NINTH TlI ESIS "A PhiloJophical.AlI~mpt to wotk out a unr--sallaiJtory oo.:oniin,g to 0 notum1 p/aII directed to acIIUving th~ civic unkNc of th~ IwmtJn 'flU must ~ rqmrkd as ponibk and, iIItktd. as contribUlUtg to tllU md of NtllUre." (29) Oil lhe face of iI, a hislory of humanity Ihal lI$$umcs what will be lhe pinero of lhe future is 50 biased thai il can only be called a romance. Kant does 001 wish "to displace lhe work of practicing empirical historians with this Idea of world history ... based on an a priori principle .. ." (30). His intere$l is in looking for an organization pattern for "what would otherwise be a planle.u conglomeration of human actions" (29). What pattern can one find? "a regular progress in the constitulion of states on our oonlinent .. ." (29). "The bistOf)' of civic coMtitutions and their laws shows a pattern of "the good they

OJ contained" serving over long periods of time, and the evil destroy. ing nations. Such a hislory of world Jegalsys\ems can serve three purposes; ( 1) 'clarifying tM: confused play of things human: (2) proph~8 huer political changes, and (3) ' giving a ronwling view of the funu'c' (30). Kant is optimi5tic about humaniry'l fu ture, although not at all optimistic about individuals making mon>l A dramatic cballenge a1 the end. Our deM:endanu. will have just one liignificant question about earlier history: ' What have the I'Wious naJictu wtd ~1IU COIfJribulrd /0 the gouJ of world citizenship, und ..·hat ha>'e /hq daM /0 damuge iJ?" (my emphasis). Science and an are interesting &litter, but the basic mailer is the progress toward a moral world.. A moral world requires world citizemhip in a single governme nt for the human race.

,...,=

F ollowing the $tylc of Kant'l eMaY, we may outline his view of history in the following way. (Thi$ is presented as an OOlline of assertions that, in almost every case, have been discussed above.) (1) IIIdividuals tur monal; 1M sp«V< is immonaJ. (2) 17K prosieM of the JP«W if the subject of hiftOf'j. Many histories can be composed and justified by empirical evidence. The point here is thai the morally most siJ,Rificanl of these bimlfin is the history of the species. (3) 11w: history of /M sp«ies is a lIistory of inaMsiftg rationality. The property of rationalily is here applied to the species, and not to the individuals alive at a given moment. For example, contemporary 5OCietie$ aehieve many objcroves IOOre efficiently than earlier 50cieties did. Health case, minimum itandards of living. abolition of slavery, univerul literacy, and equal rights fOf" women, arc rational objectives that stand as exampln. However, this does DOt mean that the individual!. alive at the present are more rational than those of previous ase!.. As a corollary of thi .. (3.1) 11w: history of /he sp«ies is a history of incnasing momlity. The history of political divisions, from family sroup. to many

..

KANTS CONCEP1lJAL TOOLS

fl.lllJ.1ics, \0 vrn•• dty, and nation is a history of increasing the area over which the same set of laws pr~l. To do this is to increase the $cope of morality. (Jol) 1M hiJtory 0{ 1M sp«it< iJ Q hiJtory of 1M ~ 0{ fru:dcm. Since freedom, for Kant. is", ..• propeny of all ra tional beings,' the &rowth or rationality means the growth of frudoUL (4) The pi of 1M sp«iQ 11 a mcroJ~. This does nol mean thaI the species is conscious of sueh a goal from the start. It means that the 5pedes behaves aI if it had such a goal. Kant ilpClls OUI this goal in the conception of the kingdom of ends, the nolion of political justice, and perpetual peace (foul\(! in woru DIller than this =y on hislOry). That the world is moving toward this goal does not mean that it will be attained. (5) II is the MlIIJ'e 0{ hunum iIuJividulll.s to FJUT.fU'. cmurodiClory obj~. The "unsociallOciality" iii an example of Ihis, and Kant develop!i lIIe importance of both sides of this pair of objectives. The various plans (of other authors) for reaching "utopia" (or individuals on tanh mUSI all dul with the effects of this proposi· tion. (5. 1) lNiivjdualr WIIIIOI be ruliortul. This follows from (5) and Kant'S conception of degrees of ratiolllllity. Individuals cannot be rational on the whole, with re&pect to all their objectivel.. HOII.ever, we can IIope that the spedes becomes increasingly rational. (6) Individuob, tJioIIe, cUlVlOl be morul. 1lIc problem of morality exists only ill. a social ~luatioll.. (7) 1"he SOUf(:e of re5pea for UuJiyiduoJ.s lies Ulilleir membership in IwntQIIUy. The basis for the respect thai eacb individual must have for every other individual, and for himself or herself, is the humanity in the individual. In a 5(DSe, individuals participate in the history of their species. "The species does make progress, and individuals may gain (or claim) \I·hal might be called "re&pe<:t by association" (an obverse of guilt by IWOCliuion, and 110 bener founded). (7.1) The soura: of conlelltmellt for indi";d!wls lies in Ih~iT mrmlxrship ill ilumanity. However, to ~y that this is a ncceuary

" of contentment is rIl)I to $a)' that it is sufficient. Individuals an: I>Ot merely social They are a combination of humallily, pmotUJJiJy, and perhap5 divillity." Therefore. the only possible $OUrcc of contentment llUy still DOl be eooup 10 prod\lce it. One is 001 merely human; one is also • particu lar, unique person with contradictory objectiva that seem \0 forbid resolution. In sum, on thi5 view of bislOry. one may be ptSSimiJIic about individual moral progress. bul optimUtic .bout humanity's own $OUTte

f\lI\lTe.

Three REUGION WITIUN TIlE UMITS OF REASON ALONE' l. Prtl'Ke 10 lhe Firsl Edllion

The finl !lenience of the ,,",facc maku the point thaI moral dedsioDS must be made withoul any consideration of ends or incentives other than tbe moralla.... iuet!. The moral person rllU51 perform dutiC5 withoul concern for the idea of a superior being waiChing. Therefore. morality does DOl need religion as , premise. We expect this mueh on the hasis of Kanl'i previous work in elbia. However, he has several surprises in itore for UL Morality by itself has no need of rcliiio.o, but morality will be shown In lead 10 reLigioo! Kanl &oes 10 grelll pains 10 insist that he can never tamper wilh the indepeodeocc of morality from aoy consideration of goal$ or obje<:tivei. Afler several repetitions of this point. be takes a dramatie new Ium. "An end does arise OIIt of morality" (p. 4). Several matten prepare us for this consideration. Fint, he has mentioned thaI withoul an obje<:tive DO determlnatioo of the will can take place in ,human. Second. it is eoll$ide red reasonable for us 10 ask, What is \0 rC5ull from this moral behavior of OlIn? Third, reason cannot be iodiffereolto the problem of barmonizill3 OIIr activities wilh the end or re~uhs or moral i!)', if any. LeI us retwn 10 the question, "Suppose ....e do behave ourselves. and do SO purely 0111 of respect for Ihe moral l,w, what is 10 resWlT In TC5ponse, we fonnulate the idea of·a highest good in the world.· This idea has several properties thai must be spedfied. The highesl good has two elements: (I) happiness., the objeetive we do have; and (2) morality, the objective ....'C ought to !lave. 1bese f',I,'O elemenll must be rombined in a special way for

68

RElUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

Kant to call this the highest good: happiness must be proportioned to obedience to duty, that is., happiness must be proportioned to moral wonbi~ Kanl adm tbat t bis idea is far from empty. We bave a nalunll need 10 conceive of a s.ingle consistent objective for all our actions, and he adds that the absence of Ihis would be 'a bindrance 10 moral decisiou' (p. 5). The serious question arises, "What guarantee iii there tbat vinue will be proponionally rewarded?" At tbis point, Kant simply responds, "We must postulate a bi&her, moral, most holy. aod omnipotent beilll which alone can unite the IWO elemenl$ of this highest good" (pp. 4-5). We win hear muth more of this aflUmen!. A rational beillJ am scarcely avoid raisinglhe queslion of the kind of world Ihal he or she would creale, in which thaI creator would be willing 10 be a member. Suppose an additional restriction on lhis world: the lIUIle moral law must hold for everyone, including the pef$On who is creating tllis world . .. creating il at iul;t in thou.ghl. Now, after presenting us with this fanciful and yet obvious problem, Kant gives us six predictions: (1) such a pef$On would have to choos.e exactly the same thinll that is determiued by the moral idea of the highest &ood: (2) thai penon would also wiD thaI such a world should by aU means rome into existence; (3) thai pef$On wou ld not waiver about (2), even tbouj.b realizing that he or she, personally, might fail morally, and therefore lose in his or ber own happinCS5; (4) he or she would have tbe judgment of the degree of happiness rendered with complete impartiality, as tbou&h it were rendered by someone else; (5) and yet, the individual would have the judgment about personal happine50S also roindde ...·ilh his or her own judgment of that happiness; (6) therefore. Kant c:onduder., humans must imagine some resull$ in a universe in which they fol lowed their duty. Kant fonows this with his summary suuement, "Morality thus leads ineluctably to religion, through which it exlenm itself to the: idea of a powerful moral la.....giver, outside of mankind ..." (pp. S~). JUSI what is the nature of this moral la..... giver. _ are not told here. We must wait unti! much further aionl in the book

Rdigiolr

~itlli"

the Limiu

of fleo...., AIOII~

6~

before Kam returns to this question.. Going back oyer Kant'. hypothetical example of a penon who wonders what SOrt of a world he or lIle would create if it had to be a moral world, we are uruek by several things.. Kant's Conclusion (2) above is particularly significanL demolition of the ontological argument over the existeDCe of God is considered & classic piece of reasoning. Yet we cannot avoid rc+ thinking it when Kant 1II)'5, ""The moral law demands that the highest good possible throu&h our agency should be realized" (p.S). 1bere is a considerable difference between (\) and (2) above. Morality is IIOt u.tWied with the mere idea of tile highest good; it is "ill bener that such a " "Orld "should by all means come into existence." TIle victor over SI. Anselm's proof for tbe existence of God oomes dose to adopting the logic of his opponent! Despite the point just mentioned, the differences between Anselm's proof and Ihe moves Ihal Kant makes here are signifieanL Kant doe5 nol &ive uS a "proof" Ihal a moral world WSIIi; he merely hold5 thaI a rational bema must will, must 11Ope, that such a world can be brought about. Kant docs DOt coo11ate desire with actuality. This (2) above is merely an example of a praamatie lest of seriousness: To pursue an objective is also to pursue an c(fidcm means for that objective. To hold Ihal one wanu an obje~ and yet not show any oollCt!m about an efficient means 10 Ih.1 objective, is 10 daydream idly. Kanl foilOWli tbis with the first of Ihe many long and si&nificant footnOtes that we find all throu&h his book on rtligion. Apparently he was so anxious to avoid any delay [n publishing that he added a 101 of si&nificant malerial in lhe form of eXlended footnotes, rather tban laking the lime to ilK'Ol"pOrale this malerial inlO the tex!. 1be passage in question is devoled to an anal)'5is of a ralher dramatic proposition.. One of the most striking. original, and influential parIS of the Cril~ of Purr R~a.wn was the assertion and aoal)'$is of tbe argument thaI held that the laws of arithmetic are synlhelic a priori prOpcl§ilions. On the face of tile malter,

70

REUGION wrnflN .. . REASON ALONE

synthetic statements (stateme nts whose w bject and predicate are oot deducible from each other) must come from e.;perience. from outside the individu1oll. If such statements are d priori, they must he analytic and nol synthetic. Now, Kant wants us to consider the proposition, '"There is a God, henee there is • hi&bcst good in the world." He asserts tbat if this proposition is to arise 'from morality alone" it mmt he a synthetic u poiOfi. We are direned to both pam of the proposition, and 10 its stalUS. We tan't derive tbe prOpc:!$ition analytically from moral ity becaU5C morality contains only the formal laW5 determining the concept of duty. Kam agrees that the "bare idea of a monl law givt'r for all men is indeed idemicalto the general moral conet'pt of duty," and this much probably could be cal led analytic. Bul, shades of Anselm, " "C then read that the assertion of God'i e.ristence carries us far bc:yond the bare pouibility of such a thing. We bave a typical Kantian question: "How is such a proposition " priori pouibleT" Kant continues very modestly "ith tbe remarlr. that be will show us what he helieves to be the key to this problem but can only indicate the maile r and oot really devt'lop it here. His "key" SlatU rather familiarly. Individuals have dual objective" a subjective and an objective I:oal. The subjective goal of rational worldly beings is their 0\0"11 happineSl, and the objective end is the rational goal of respect for the moral law. He makes the point. in a parenthetical exprwion, Ihat individuals in fact have a ual\lte dependent upon s.ensuous objectives; sincc this is a mailer of t~ IIdtIU(i' of tbe5C individual$. il would be absurd to say Ihal they ' ought" to have such a nature. Presumably, there's 00 poiD! in saying W I healthy human beings ought to have two ean and one mouth; they do. Ii ~"OUld be just as absurd to say Ihal they ougbl oot to have 501t1e property lhat they anually do have, by nature. So, propositions concerning facts about the happine5ii of sensuous beings mmt be empirical and synthetie. Now, he lakes it 10 he a syntbetic practical proposition giV1:n by pure reason Ihal "everyone ought 10 make the higheslJood poi5ible in the world a final end: By "final end" he

~Iigion

Wirhin r/", Limiu

of Rf!Q.JOn Alane

71

an cnd whieh "c mbra~5 the unavoidable and at the lame time is a suffici~nt rondition of all other ~nds" Kant points out that this syntbcril:: a priori "proposition," Make the high~st good poMibl~ in the world your own final ~nd. r~fers to a oonsequ~nee that is DOt oontained in the moral laws and so c::annot be lak~n OUI or tb~m anaIyti.;ally. Why have any concern with ro~uen<:C when Kant has alr~ady established that morality should properly show no ooncern for ronsequ~nce1 Kant amwers his own question by making two points. First. that "it is one of the ine5(:3~I~ limitations of man" that for all our actions we must oollCeive of an end. And seoond, that we suk something that ..... e an I~. while the moral law alone mer~Jy arouses our respect. 1bereIor~, he puts things togelher in this ronclusion: If moral behavior is to be ronsider~d "the cause . . . of the highest good," tben sioce "human capacity does not 5IIffiee for bringing about happiness proponiol1llte to wortl1illCSl to be happy. an omnipotent moral being must be postulated as ruler of the world, IInd~r whose care tllis balance occurs. That i$, morality lead!. inevitahly to religion" (p. 7). However traditional the phraseology of lhis rondusion, it can be given a far from onhodox interpretation. Notiee thai Ka.nf's oonelllSion 51aru wilh a oondi\ional, "if: H e eondudes Ihal II moral being "mUSI be poslulated: Th is ronclusion is a hypothelical statemenl, and even within this framework we have almost no detail of the nature of this omnipotent moral being. We shall find reasons for thinking that in Kant's position a eenaln ooneeption of humanity is almost synoll)'Il'lOllS with God. BUI I must acknowledge thai this p. n ieu Jar note is altached 10 a sent~1lCe in whkh we find thai Kant has referred 10 the idea of a powerful moral lawgiver "outside of mankind." It Ulould a\$(l be mentioned Ihal afler raising the mailer of the human search for something that c:an be ~ and nol merely respected, Kanl drops the maner oomplclely al this stage. The remainder of this preface devoted 10 an analysis of all\SOrsbip. Afler mentioning the majesty tllat we find in religion, Kant abruptly adds, "But anything. even the IIlO!it subli me, 0'\CalI$

u.

n

REUGION WmUN ... REASON ALONE

dwindles under the hands of men when they rum the idea of il 10 Iheir own use" (p. 7). H is commenl on censorship begins plainly enough. Moralily docs require obedience 10 Ihe authorities. He adds. optimislkally, thai "all injunctiOIl$ or duly can be drawn into religion." However, he goes on to explain that he hu the obligation to respect not merely a lingle stale repation, bul all of the regulations taken together. ( I shall relurn to this point shortly.) On his own analysis there should be a theologian who .ppl"OYeS boob for the welfare of the sou l and also one who approves boob for Ihe welfare of the scicnces (p. 7). The rclatioll$ betwccn the5c two must be such that therc shal l be "no disturbance in the field of thc sciences." Unless the sciCnce!i arc properly protected from outside inlcrfcrcrw:e we are threatened with the rcsulls thai d_Ioped in the timc of Galilco, when theologians wanted 10 bumblc the pride of the sciences and almost arrested the endcavors of human rcason. Kant makes the poiDl that there is reaDy no danger .III all 10 Bibliat! lheology when the philosophers borrow 50mtthing from the Biblc. TIle only pouible IIli$chicf might OIXUr if thc philosophers try to import solllCthing into Biblical theology. These comments on Biblical theology concilldc with "A religion which ruhly declares war on reason will nol be able to bold out in the long TlIO apin:n it" (p. 9). LeI III relurn 10 the idea that Kam has employed 10 escape from the absolute power of the censor. He agrees that it is an injundion of duty to "Obey the authoritiesl" This Kerns as absolute as grammar can make it. HiJ, response, however, takes 1.11 on • crafty road. We must do more than simply do what _ arc lold: "obedience ... c:an be evinced not through a!lcntion merely 10 bw in the form of • single stale regulation and blindDCSli with respect 10 every other, hull)lt/y ll~, combillrd rcsp«' for IlII rPgUlatiOtU ltlkm 1~11f!t" (p. 7, cmphasis mine). 'The world of law consists of more than one rcgubtion. A proper allitude of obedience to law mllSI DOl restrict itself to jllsi one OUI of the K I of laws that may bear on tbe maile r. Where there are two

regulations, ~ may use the serond"to limil Ihc USUrpatiOOli of the finl .. .. (p. 8). The idea that one must obey Jaws collectively, IlOtjust distributively (one-al·a·time), is of coD$iderable imponance and must nOi be forgollen in imerpretina Kant', moral, ieaal, and political view5.' Even where there i.5 just one buic principle, it may THUlt in several applications or regulations, and lhese are not 10 be obeyed on a merely disln"buti...-e basis 1be regulations (I) may he consistent. (2) they may lie 011 a hlcrarchy. with one superseding the othen., (I( (3) they nay present an antinomy. In the inteTW' ins cze, the antinomy. lhere nay not be a solution that is IIltisfaaory fivrn rhe S«UfdpoinI of the itIdivitJuDh iIwol_M. As we have seen, Kant'S lhenry nf history places individuals in just lhis siNatinn. We shall de...-elop this further in the chapter on the moral antinomy. This prerate ends on a rather friendly conciliatory oote. Kant agrees lhat Biblical theology and a purely philosophical theory or reliJion (such u he presents in Ihis book) arc really rather different Ihinp. For either to be thoroughly understood lhey m WI! 1101 be mixed However, he does SUlIJC5t wt after a course in Biblicaltbeology a candidate might perhaps take • .separate course of lectures on • pbilosophical theory or reliJioD and use • book such as his, or, he adds modestly, • beller ooe of the same kind, if il can be fouod. The preface to the second edition adds DOthins of greal theorC1ical interesL Kant inviles thoIIe who are worried about the relalions berween revelation and the pure re1iaion of reason 10 think of these two as concentric circles.. Since revelation can include the pure religion of reuon, bul a purely rational position (lIMOt include what is historieal, revel.tion is the wider of the two circles. Is a circle lhal wide needed? He relUn!5 to lhis maner in the wt cbapter.

74

REUGI ON wm11N ... REASON ALON E 1. Pan OM: Concernla, tbe lad_lUa, of th~ E¥U Prindpl~ witb the Good; Or, 011 the IUdkal Erll III Human NIIII~

Kant opens this part by r~r~rring us to the optimist·pe~imist controversy. Is the history of civilization II history or a fan from the happiness of the goldeo ag~ to th~ evil days or th~ pr~sent? Or, is lhis history, instead, a (N.llem about which on~ may be optimistic, a pattern of steady progress from a painful beginning 10 th~ happier times of the day? In g~neral terms, Kant JUggests that the r~1igious views have taken the pessimi§lic side that v."e have fallen into evil recently. Some prominent philosophers. and recently those interest~d in ~ducation, have taken the optimistic view that we are improving. PTeMimably Le ibniz would be amDII& the prominent philosophers Kant h3$ in mind. And for the educa· tors, apparently it takes an optimist even to attempt to leach. Kant soon makes the question IOOfe precise. Has morality been increasing 01" decreasing through the O;OUJ1.e of human history? This question leads immediately to an analysis of, firsl, the nature of IOOrality, and thcn the nature of buman beings. Kant explains tbat evil is not a property of actions tbemselvC$, but is located in the principles or mnims by which actions lITe chosen. A maxim is defined as "a rule made by the will. . .." On what basis can we call someone evil? We obse~ actions not maxims. Hov."cver, we can infer from several actiollS the presence of a common undcrlyinJ principle or maxim. Suppose _ have found a person, perhaps your$clf, whose actions are the results of a rule made by that person's own free will, and not by an external object determining the win or by a fU:ed natural impulse. 'The nature or this rule is the targe t of a moral judgment, either good or evil. If we were compelled 10 choose this maxim by anythi ng fU:ed, either in our natute or outside of ~ there would then be no responsibility and therefore 00 baMS for moral judgment. 8 111, can we ask what determined a person to maLte just this cboice of maxim? T o this Kant ansv."CR as foLlov.,,; The ultimate ground for the choice maxims is Jocated In the individual, the individual

or

Rtligion Wlillill tM UmitJ of RMlOtI AioM

75

alone has this respo1l5ibility, and al$O too ubimatt growrd is ilucrutubk to UJ. Both parts of this answer are developed. When he says thll the ultimate ground for ehoo$ill& maxims is innate, Kant me'ns that 'man himself is it5 author: and we muu neve r blame narure or credit nature for our own use of our freedom. The inserutability of the grounds of $ODlCOne's free choice of mora1 maxims is explained in this way. We want to explain the ba$i$ upon which a rational beil13 hlUi dIosen a principle. Now this choice must itself be made on the basis of some principle Ihal has been chosen from among alternatives by a free rational being. To be rational is to act on principle. However, this choice itself is in the same predicament lIS the original choice;;t mll$t also have. as iu. basis, $Ome principle. We are faced by III infinite regress from mazim to me13-maxim, to me13- meta-maxim lUi Kant's point would be put by contemporary logicians. Since some maxim for action is apparently clIo5cn. and since the basis fOf" this choice would apparently require an infinite regreu, we are forced to Kant's eoodll$ioo that the ul timate basis for the choice of the moral maxim cannot be understood and is inscrutable. The question would be meanin&1ess if individuals were neither good nor evil. or if they were panly one and panly the other. Therefore, Kant I\ltnS to an analysis of the is$ue between ' rigonsu' and 'atitudiltal"iaM.' His point can be put this way. From the standpoint of the logic of statements, only three po!I5ible positions exist on any subject. We can call them dogmatism, skepticism, and eclecticism. The dogmatist holds that at least $Orne statement is true. The ueptic holds that no statement is true, and the eclectic useru that every statement is true. Now, while a dogmatic position. as suggested above. holds thaI al least $Orne statement is true, the dogmatist mayor may not go on 10 say thaI be or she alone knows the true statements. Looking at these three alternative position5, one must apee thaI to In)' anything ckarly OM mu.st be a dogmalisf. A brief eumination of the other IWO alternatives may be in order.

76

REUGION WITHIN ... REASON AWNE

The skeptie bu always had to face the Epimenides Paradox. What of the !tUth of skeptidsm, of the statement that "no statemeot is truer The skeptic does want to UKrt Ihe trulh of Ih is. and yet, to do 50 the skeptic must OOIIntenance the fact t hat there is al Icast one truc statement. If we have found one such &em. we lhould examine it to see if any properties exist that can be found elsewhere, and above all we must wonder how we were t;\!cr so fonunate as 10 discover this unique prize. The eclectic faces analosous problems. If every statement is true, then the eclectic must admit thaI the denial of eclectici~ is aI50 !tUe. And now we sec the real objection 10 both eclecticism and skepticism: They deny a difference betwccn true stalements and false stattmcnlS. To deny this distiDction is to give up any rational basis for preferring one position 10 another. If no basis. exists for preferring one position 10 another, all is ambiguity, nothing dear can be said. Therefore, 10 say anythill& clearly, to separate one's own position from the al ternatives, is 10 lIMUIIle that II least some state ment is !tUe. Returning to Kant's fonnulation, for his tenn rigorisl i luggest 'ab$olutw ' or ' dogmatist"; for his term fuliIuditwrilHl I $!Iuest "Telalivi$t.' He brealts latirudinarians into indifferentists and syncretists. I have called these skeptics and edectiCL Kant says that the lenn rigotist ' is intcnded to carry reproach, but ... actually praise$..' We can DOW say the ume thing about the tenn "dogmatism.' Only dogmatists can be dear enough for anyone to agree or to disqrcc wilh them. The next question 10 arise is the mailer of whether a person can be morally good in some ways and at the ume lime motalJy evil in olhers. Kanl denies this. Either olle'. maxim is univen.al or il is particular. The fint is moral, the sc:rond is DOL To be both univcrul and panicuJar in the same seru.e would be a contradiction (p. 20). Kant next rums to the ancient Greek questions: Musl vinue be learned? Is there more than one virtue? He proposes 10 anp'c r from two KpaTllte viewpoints: The finl question is equivalent 10 "is man by nature indifferent as rcgards virtue and vice'!"' From the standpoint of pure reason, Kant answen in the

Rditfton Within the Limiu of &IJSOII Alofte

T7

negative. We human belli&' do IKM learn the nature of vinue (rom anything external 10 ou r own reason. The only vinue is moralitY. However, by empirical5tandatds, judging human beinp lIS they appear in experience. thC5C qUC:Slioll5 can be amwc:red affirmatively. Human beings uppuIT 10 \cam vinuc. and they can appearvinuous in some r"peru but not OIheB. We are promised more detail in what follows. Kant concludes this early section with the idea that the qucstion of being sood or evil by nature docs not really apply 10 individuals but to "lIIe entire ra(:e" (p. 21). Otherwise, "one man COIIld be coRSidered lIS good, by nature, another as evil" (p. 21). h will tum OUI that individua\$ are, quite likely, all in the same moral predicament. AJong the way, Kanl has raised a question aboul the personali· ty or the temperament of vinue. ls a vinuous per5(lO COIII"a&eous and joyous, or fear-ridden and dejected? The fear-ridden or loIavisb frame of mind "can never occur without a hidden hatred of the law" [the moral Jawl. The self· jnflicted lorment of a repenlanl ~r Kant takcs 10 be "1IOlhing but inward regret al having infringed upon the rules of prudence: He argues that only a happy bean, only a ~ frame: of mind, is the mark of genuineness in the virtuous di-position (p. 19). Kant would apparently find lillIe moral value in publi~ confessions, in the literary genre naned by SL Augustine, in which the repentant sinner tells U5 bow bad he used to be and how &nod he now is. If, hard to reread the repentant sinners without being reminded of Kant's rellUlrk that they arc in "a very ambiguoU5 state of mind: lIS they recall the good old bad days (p. 19). Nut, Kant offers us the heading "Concerning the Origilllll Predisposition to Good in Human Nature: This is an analysis of tbosc e\cments in the fixed ro.taeter and natUfC of human beinp that have immediate reference 10 the facull)' of desire and will. Tbcsc are divided into: (1) The predisposition 10 wtimaJiry in a membe r of the speci~ taken as a living beiD&- (2) The predisposition 10 hwruvWy in someone. taken as. rational being. (3) The predisposition to pmotIaliry in an individual, taken a.o; an accou nt-

18

REUGJON wrrnlN ... REASON ALONE

able being.. We are a Hille surprised to diSOO\ler that aC«I\Jntabili· ty does DOt follow from rationality alone. Kant explains that rationality alone provides DO incentives. Reason can decide whether a maxim can be universalized, an decide on the consis· tency of a set of objtctivell, and can decide on the effimney of various means for obtaining objective ... but it cannot specify absolutely imperative moral laws as incentives. Well, then, if not from reason, where do we get OIIr moral imperative? Kant says, ·Were it not Jiven us from within, we sbould never by any ratiocination brilli il into exislence .. ." (p. 21). AI the conclusion of the Critique of PrvcticaJ ~, he had given us one of the most poetic punges in modem philOiOphy. 'Two thinp fill the mind with ever DeW and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: The starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." 1be moral law "begins at my invisible self, my perwnality." 1be pTedispos,tion to animality is put under the Jenera! heading of physical and mechanical self·love that demands no reason. This operates. (a) for self-preservation, (h) for the propag:nion of the specie5 by the sexual impulse, and (c) for community with other people, tbe social impulse. 'The predisposition 10 humanity goes beyond the ategory of self-love, which is physical. and introduces comparison with other human beiop. for which reason is required. "We jIIdge ounoelves happy 01' unhappy only by m"king (Xlmparison with oUlers" (p. 22). Kant m"ke< a comment thai sounds like. summary of Shaftcs< buty's ethKlll theory. "Out of this self·lcwe springs the inclination to acquire worth in the opinion of the othel'$,"' Animality and bll m"nity. although they are predispositiom toward good. both occa'ionally provide vices of aU kinds. Animality nay develop into the so-called beastly vices of gluttony, drunkenness. and lasciviouslIC§5. The predisposition to humanity can develop into the vices o( jealousy and rivalry. and into the vice of "seact and open animosity agaimt all whom we look upon as oot belonpg to us· (p. 22).

&figicll Wil/litlihe Umiu of &ason Alotle

79

The third predisposition, personality, is the capacity for "respect for tile moral law as in hsel f a sufficient incentive of tile will." A Iel;s tecbnical tcrm (but 1101 a Kantian term) would liimply be moral feeling. Kant adlb thaI cootrary to the predispositions 10 animality and humanity, thil; third predisposition provide$ no base al all for any vice. Along the way lie finds that personality itself is "the idea of humanity considered quite intellectually" (p. 23). Despite tile poss.ibility of vice, arising from the fin;t two. Kanl insists that all three of these predi$positions are natural in our species, original in \IIi, and do not conlr.ldict the moral law. Although one can develop vices from the fin;t two, human beiogs sbould never tty 10 ' c.rtirpate' any of them. Were any of these three missing. we would not be complcte human beings. II mUSI be remembered that these three predispos.itiollS ....ere introduced as predispositions 10 good in human nature. From animality arises tile sexual impulse, the hasis for propagating the species, for caring for the offspring. and for the social impulse. community with ocllen;. From humanity arises. the de$ire for equality. Kan['s next topic is Ihe ' Propensity" to evil in human nature. We must pay attention to a range of lerms thai he introduces. A propell5ity can be dislinguished from a predisposilion be<:a\lSe propensity can be either innate or ac:quired. His uample is the remark that Ioavage peoples !lave • propensity for intoxicants, bul no craving until lhey are sampled. He takes inclin.tion (craving) 10 prellllppose ac:quaintanoc with the object of desire and the term 'instinct" to be 'a fel l want 10 do or to enjoy something of which one has as yet no conception-such as the constructive impulse in animal", or the saua! impullie. The term pa55ion is an incli natioo that ududes mastery over ooc', Kif, and the term emotion has to do with the feeling of pleasure and pain' (p. 24). Kant presents us with three degrees of a capacity for evil. Fin;1 is the frailty of human nature seen in tile weakness in observing adopted maxims The second is called impurity, and Ihis is the prope nsity of mixing moral with other molives. The third is called wickedness.. the propensity to Adopt evil maxims. In connection

80

REUGION WTrnIN ... REASON ALONE

.... ilb the second. impurity, )(anI repeats hili familiar idea tha t the moral law alone should be the single all-sufficient itKentive fOf" moral behavior. Then Kanl add5lbat people usually, and perhaps every time, add additional incentives to the single incentive of doing what duty demands. Th is remark carries tile /mplicuJion Ihal I~ m
Rdigion Wallin 1M Umlu of &ason A/ont

81

immoral ity, .....·e can funher call it a radical innate evil in human nature, ye t nonetheleu brooght upon us by ourselves" (p. 28). Next. Kanl direc:u our .nention 10 the empirieal eumples of human corroplion. lbose philosophen (such as ROWICau) who tal.ked romantically about the natural goodl1CM of the human being in the 5()o-ca1led state of natu re, are dispatched wilh eumpln of the unprovoked auelry of natives in New Zealand, in the Navigator blands. and in repom of travclen (Kanl mentions Captain Samuel Heame) conurning the auelry of American Indians. Then Kant dares us to offer civilized people as a oounter-e.u.mple. Here, in dvilized $OCiety, we find: "Secret falsiry even in the dosest friendship: "a propensity to hate him to wborn Doe is indebted" (a point that Hobbes had developed), evidence to wpport La Rochdoucauld in his remark that "in the midonuoes of our best friends there is 50mething whkb i, IMlt altogether displeasilll to us' (Maxim No. 583). and our international situation. We find civilized nations stand toward each other "i n a state of continuous readiness for war" (p. 29). This phrase is almost identical to 1bomiU Hobbe$', description of the nature of cold v.-ar. At this point in Ihe seo:ond edition Kant adds a (OCIIlMlle Ihal rea.pitulales the leading ideas of his pllilosophy of history. He disawes 'a cenain machine-like movement of nature 'tl"'-ard ends which are nature', own rather than those of the nations: Each state 'slTive5 to attai n a world monarchy... ." ' Yet thb monster, after it has just swallowed up all ilS neighbors., finally diMolve5 of itself and through rebellion and disunion breaks up into many smaller States" (p. 29). Kam's own political proposal is toward the construction of "a league of natiom--a republic of federated free natioQi." but he is forced to agree that it scell1ll impo5llible to imagine human being:!!.. whose nature remains as it is, who mighl live in a state of perpetual peace. For his own proposals on tile maner of international relalion.\, iCC his essay, "Perpetual Pea«:: One of the points that he repealS i$ the mailer of the location of evil. "Man's !iCIISUOLlS nature and tbe natural indinalioos arising therefrom," are illl\Oeeol. Since these arc rlXed pam of our

82

REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

nature, we havt: no freedom to either have or nol ha,-e .e1l$\l0llS objectives, and therefore we ate OOt alXOUDuble for them, In fad. Kant adds that they can afford the occasion for vinue (p. 30). He also givt:s II clean bill of moral health to reason i!KIf, Can reason he malignant? Can reason ilSelf destrD7 its own authority? Here Kantatgues that II free being must he considered the cause of its own behavior and It would be a contradiction to think of this being operalin. wilhout any \aw$ or caLI5CS.. A malignant reason WO\I ld be an il'lCOnsislem cause and would leavt: U$ with the selfcontradiction of a beiDg whose operation is and is not based on la"''5. Kant oomiders the possibility of one's reason selling up opposilion 10 law, as an incenlivt:. He qui<:kly deddes that such an individual would be a devil, not a human heinS- Kant', brief entertainilli of this idea and qui<:k dispatch of it are reminisc:cm of Oe5c:aMes's similar treatment of the idea of II malicious demon. In the DiJcowu M M~hod. De_Mel forces hi~lf 10 raise the idea of whether we can troSI even dlOse of our conceptions Ihal seem ITIOIiI dear and distillct.. Suppose that a malicious demon had givt:n us just Rich ideas for the yke of fooling us. n.e prospect is unendurable for Descants; with such a premise nothilli could be trusted lIS a basis for rational decisiom.. Returning 10 Kant, after he formulates the nature of a devil, he lells us briefly Ihal this designation is not applicable 10 the human being (p. 30), If lhe source of immorality cannot be found in a human being's ""nsuou. nature Or in ralional nature, where is the culprit? "Man (evt:n the best) i. evil only in lhat he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts lhem into his muim" (p. 31). Kant insists Ih~t e,-en the mosl wicked pelSOn docs not "repudiate the moral law in the manner of I rebel re nouncing obedience to it." To be I human being one must have the categorical imperative internally. However, one natu rally finds both the moral maxim WId the wbjeClive principle of IoClf-IOYe avaflable. n.e serious distinction he~een a good penon and one who is not is lhe question of ...",ric/, incDuiw is ...lKNdi"tlud /0 the 0111.". n.e

Rdigion Wuhin 1M Limils of RetnOfI

AI~

83

propensily 10 do this, tn reverse the ethical order of the ince ntivel. is the free natural propensity of evil. Kant makes the imponant point that this evil is caUed radical be
REUGION WlTIilN ... REASON ALONE Having sellied the question of the kw:alion of evil to his s.atisfactioll, Kanl tums to lhe mailer of the origin of it. Two possibilities exisl: an origin in reason, or an origin in time. A free aet has a rational basis and therefore "to seek the temporal origin of free aCl$ as such (as though they were natural efferu) is thus a contradiction" (p. 35). A1 lhough he is shonly to make explicit use of Ihe scriptural acoou nl of the origin of evil, Kanl find5 it ne« ....uy to first Ioay lhal of all the explanations of the spread of moral evil, "the most inept is thai which de5Cribes it as descending to us as an inheritance from our first parenl5" (p. 3S). His point is that if we gOi it as an inheritance we would have no rCiponsibility for it ourselves. Every evil aelion lhould be looked at as though the individual "had faUen into it directly from a State of inno«l1Ce." Regardl~ of the early or recent moral hislory of an individual, "it is now still his duty to he ller hil1l5elf. To do 10 mUSI be within his power: Therefore, we ""vCr search for tbe temporal origin of a deed, but look only fOf" the principle or muim from wh ich it comes, its rational OrigiIL Next Kant rums to a mmpMison bet_en his accou nl of the origin of evil and the scriptural account. He avees Ihal whal he writes is nol intended 10 be scriprural exegesis. However,"it is possible to explain how an hislorical account is 10 be pul 10 a moral use without deciding whether this is the intention of lhe author, or merely our own interpretation .. ." (p. 39). His account agree.s in &Cneral terms with the manner in which the problem is presented in the scriptu res. "'1"be moral law became known 10 mankind, as it must 10 any beiol nol pure but templed by desires. in the form of a prohibition" (Genesis II, 16-17). Kanl in terprets Genesis III, 6, as humanity'li search for other incentives beyond morality. Genesis 111, S, is an eumple of inward deceit, Ihal is, a lendency to deceive one's self in the imerpretation of the moral law. 'Accordingly. the Bible (the Christian pof\ion of it) denomi· nales the author of evil (who is within us, as the liar from the beginning .. ." (oole, p. 37). This makCill clear to Kanl IlIat ....-e daily act in the same way and "in Adam all have si nned."

However, Kant imists on one radical difference betwee n our situation and that of Adam For us., "there is presupposed an innate propensity 10 tranSgression, wbereas in tbe fin;t man, [rom the point of view of time, there is presupposed DO sueb propensity but rather innocence; hence transgression DO bis pan is called a fall into sin; but with us sin i5 represented as resulting from an already innate wickednes.s in our nature.' But Kant insists that we eanoot locate the seat of evil in tbe first man, and we must DOl look fnr a point in time at which to specify Ibe origin of a moral character. He does agree that if we want In uplain I10t the formal but the empirical existence of wmethina. for example. of moral cbaracter. we find ourselves drawn to a temporal framework, and be ad~ "Pe rbaps il is for this reason that Scripture. in confnrmity with tlti5 weakness of ours, has thus pietured the temporal origin of evil' (p. 38). So. the origin of our propensity 10 evil remains inscrutable to us. AI the end of the commen!5 on G<=I'IC~ Kant holds that the Biblical narrative upre55t5 the inconceivability in this fashion. 1be nurative locates evil oot in human beings, 'but in a !>pirit of an originally loftier destiny: How evil COt into !bat spirit is lefl beyond uplanation for us, but it is made dear tbat, "mi n is represented as having fallen into evil only through seduction, and hence as beinl 001 basically corrupt .. ." (p. 39). In the lasl line of Part I Kant eoncludes, "For man, therefore, wbn despile a conupled hean ~t possesses a good will, there remains hope of a return to the good from whicb he has 5tra~d" (p. 39). At the end of Pan I. Kant has a len·page ~l'ICraI Observation on the rubject of Works of Grace. Here he develops the conception of the rnle thaI Grice pllYS in his religion. Much nf his position can be summed up in the foUowin& outline: 1. If we ought to do 5Omething. it mU5t he the case that It lies within our pov,.er. Duty demands nothing that we cannot do. 2. The demands of duty have two aspects: (a) a rtV'Dlutinn in the penon', "cast of mind,' choice of principle, and (b) a gradual reform in thai ptBOn's sensuous nature-the degree

86

REUGJON WJ11HN ... REASON ALONE

of vinue in perwtlill behavior. Q is equivalent 10 a kind of rebinh, becomina a new pel'5(ln. J. Allbaugh it is pm'ible for a person to behave morally, it mighl IIOt be possible to do so without some ' supernatural cooperatioo" (p. 40). 4 . To receive supernatural cooperation. a penon mU51 firsl be _hy of Ihis.. 11ris wonhinCS5 depends on the free choice of the individual alone. S. If a pmon Is _hy of USislanCe, thai individual can Jwpe thaI wbal is 1101 within his or her own power will be supplied by cooperation from another sou rce. 6. This cooperation, this work of Grace, is incomprehensible to us. This mW;1 be so beaiuse, on the one band. to use the idea we must understand what it is that we do to achieve il; and on the other hand, it is the meaning of a work of pee that we doo', do it, tN.t il is IlOl OUT deed but the deed of another. Eacb of tbese points is apanded in detail, and a number of additional ideas are introduced along the way. The argument thaI leads Kant from worthiness to the hope of Grace is an argumenl thaI goes beyond the limits of reason alone. However, Kanl offers the prqmatic argumenl that reason can use somethina withou l understanding it. He is quile eoncemed to se~le (tI) dogmatic faith which pre te Dds 10 knowledge and (b) reflective faith which makes fIbsolutely 110 d...uo to koowl~. Kant illSists tpin and "lin thai nothins of the supematunll. can be understood either theocetically or practically. But, if supernalural cooperatioo is incomprebeIl5ible. il is b.r from useless 10 hUJnanity. AlIOwr polot that be repetts emphfltically is that it is IIOt necessary for us to know the nature of this rooperation. "It is 1101 e~ntifll and hence not netessary for e-.·eryone 10 know what God does or has done for his salvation, bul it is essential to know what man himself must do in order to betome worthy of this aWst.a.nte" (p. 47). He adds that il is obvious that different people fit different times must form di fferent tonceptions of tbis supern.aturfll cooperation, "and

Rdigion Mthin 1M Umiu of Rea.wn AtoM

87

that with entire ~ncerity" (p. 47). However. Kant divideli religion into (1) the endeavors to win favor-mete worship-and (2) moral religions-religions of good life conduct. Those in the first category depend on the pleasanl thought thai they eM be made eternally happy without the need to become morally bener. FollCflving this Kant "Of all the public: religions which have ever eaisted, the Olristian alone is moral" (p. 47). This leaves a lo!: of territory available 10 private reliJions. Worthiness requires morality. and we are kd to the question of the emtence of moral heros, if any. Kant discusses moral education of children, and inDsts that even children can dcteCllhe smallest trace of sclrlSb motives mixed with proper ooes.. He.ods that we should ocvcr teach childfen 10 admire vinuous fictions becansc the children might fall victim to the thoughtthflt vinuous actioo was somelbing extraorciliwy instead of the Dmple duty of all people. No bero-wonhip for Kanl. No Doe has a restrictcd monopoly 00 the UodefSl&Ddioa: of morality. NOI only children bul even people "of Jl"ealest limitations" are capahle of beina impressed by "respect for an aaion conformiDJ 10 duty" (p. 44). In the disol ion of the problem of reconcilina freedom of the will with detenninism, Kant inuoduces the rather oovel concept of pre-determinism. Pre-dctcnnioism isuplained as the poiition that bold$ thai voluntary actions have their detcrminin& grounds in antecedent time. What bas already happened is no longer wi thin our power, yet, if it is taken as an element in a voluntary action, it must be within Ihe power of the subject aI the moment, Uofonuoalely, after leading us to tbinlr; that ..... e were going to be treated to an explanation, we notice that Kant has prefaced the word "predetenninism" with the remark that we wish 10 understaoo it, but we IICveT shall In OIapter IX. "MYSIery- YS. Undecidability," we $ball lind • morc 51tisfactory analysis of the limits of our uoderstandina of this and related concepts. We can IIS5IlDJe that the individual has • free_ill without understandins every aspect of the origin and nature of this notion.

.dds.

55

88

REU GION WJ11iI N ... REASON ALONE

J. Part Two: CoIl«'l1llQ tM CollftiCl of the Good with the Evil Prlftdple ror

Sove~lpty o~r

Mall

In the introduction to this part, Kant compares Iris position to the ethical theory and contributions of the Stoia. 'They are • perfectly natural grDIIP foc Kant to ronsider b«ause they .Iso hold an intention morality. 1'bey a1so took the moraJ question to be • matter of the kind of intention of the individual rather than • property of the ~e ol the act. Consequence, wbat happell$ to one·, body, property, reputation, or office, Is determined by the laws of the external world. Whetber you are 10 be emperor or slave depends on the ouUide W(lr!d and not on )'OlITR1f. However, YOUT preferences, Ihe Stoics thought, are entirely your ebooiillll. So they took virlue to consist in the kind of ehoice someone made within tbe area under personal ronITo\, tbat U, Ihe individual's own intentions. While agreeing with this much oltbe Stoic position, Kant says Ih .. t they misuoderuood lhe enemy of virlue. They tbougbt the rontest WII$ berwcen re~ and tbe natural indinatioos.. K IU\I imisl$ that "natural inclinations, coll5idered in themselves, are good, that b, DOt a matter of reproaeb" (p. SI). He a Ils it useless as well 11$ harmful and blameworthy to try to eliminate them. H uman happillC50S requires that they oper..te in harmony ralher than dashing with each otller. If the Stoics misundentood tbe moral struggle as a struggle with one's inclinations, what really is the moral struggle? As Kant has already held, genuine evi.l coll5isl$ in the fact thai one does DOt will or wi$h 10 ...~th$tand one's inclinations when they tempt uaDSgreWons. Not the Inclinations themselves, but the choice of principle that gives them full KUJte. Evi~ just as good, is to be found in principle. Kant ilIumates his point by mentioning that Cbri$tilU\ ethics has represented moral coodnes.s as differing from moral evil not in lhe way thai heaven differs from earth, but as heaven from hell. He adds thai this is philosophically correCl in meaning (p. 5)). In wpPOrl of this he quotes Ephesians VI. 12. "We wrestle not agaill$t flesh and blood, but against principalhiel\ and powers. .. ."

Rtli,gion WilIWt I~ Urn/u of Reason AtoM

89

11Ie next section anaIyus the 5O-<:alled legal daim of lhe sood principle 10 50Vtreignty OYer humanity. Kanl looks for a personifi. cation of the idea of the good principle. His philmophy of history and ethical theory have already prepared us for his answer. TIle personified idea of the sood principle is lhe monJ perfertion of humanity. The only end of creation, and the object of a divine deaee, is the oomplele moral perfection of humanity. By humanity he mtall$ rational ean.hJy existence in gcneraL 1be only world pleasing to God is a moral world. 1be ideal of moral perfertion is not only our universal duty as human beings, hut also "can give WI power" (p. 54). Kant conlinues, rather oddly, "we are nol the autbol'$ of this idea." The ideal of humanity'l moral perlertion is somebow found in us. presented to WI by reason, bul in a way that would be more appropriateJy put by Jaying that this idea has come down to us. Apin Kant holds that we cannot comprehend how human naNte itself could have produced iL We can best undCl'$tand the idea of. moral disposition by "picturing il as encompaned by obsuu:les. and yet in lite race of the fiercest onslaugbl$, victorious· (p. 55). We represent this 10 ourselves. he boltb, in the idea of a person who is willillJ not only to behavc as a perfect.ly moral human being. bul to risk the grealest of inducemenu and any affiietion 10 do 10, including "the 10051 ignominioUll death rot the sood of the world and eYen for his enemies" (p. 55). Again. Biblical symbol is interpreted in a strictly moral fashinn. J USI bow much objective reality can we give 10 this personified idea of lhe good ptiftCiple? Kanl holds that lbe idea of a penon moraUy _II pleasing 10 God is available 10 WI without any actual empirical examples. This idea is already present in our reasoning. For an individual 10 be J1.Ilded by Imitating an actual person rather than the ide. of morality itself. would be a confession of the individual's "moral unbelief" (p. 56). This would show a lack of faith in vlnue itself. If, iru;lead of virtue, a person is impressed by a claim tn havc perfonncd miracla, then thai penon is abandon· ing the essential idea of moral wonh. Kant speculate$ that if an atwa! indiYid ... al appeared on earth who had descended from heaven, 'l,Ipema\urally beaO!!en, thaI

90

REUGION WTIHIN ... REASON ALONE

person would in no way benefit us morally. The cmtence of the idea of moral behavior in the human souL 'is iuclf wfficiently incomprehensible without our adding 10 iu supernatural oripn' (p. 57). Kanl adds thaI if there were such a holy person 00 earth, 10 usc thai pel'$On a5 lID example 10 us would hirKIer rather than assisl frail human nat\lle in its pur$Uil ol moral ity. We could simply Jay that this supernalural cumple behave5 morally because II has a wiD that is 1101 templed by evil. Kanl agrees WI il is a limitation of b1!me" reason thaI we can give no moral worth 10 anything witbovt representing it in human guise. "Therefore, he lhlnks that it is perfectly acceptahle 10 think of a perfea being in human guise a5 an analogy. However, he warns, if we think that we can take our analogy and ronsidcr il as lID extension of our knowledge, we have rommiltcd the ronsidcrable errOl" of anthropomorphism. Kanl adds that anthropomorphism has ITK)5I injurious consequenCC5 10 the moral point of view in religion (note, p. 58). To arJUe by analoay is always to argue fallaciously. Reprdlcs.s of how m.any propctlics two obj«u have in common, we have no warTlIDl for boldin& Ihey must share some additional property. In the lasl two pans of the book, Kam returns again to the dangeB of anthropomorphism. Tn the IlCXI IiCction Kanl ronsiders the metter of deathbed ~n.ions 10 moral ity, and the poeral problem created by the fact that morality requires an eOOley progress and human life is finite. A SOrt of moral happillC$S would be obtained if we were sure that our disposition had reall)' changed for the better. How can thi.s disposition be judged'! T o trusl our feelings about such a matter is rather perilOU$, Kant bold$.. 'Mao is nCller more easily deceived than in what ptOlI101es his good opinion of himsclr (p. 62). The only basis for judging the reali(y of. new disposition is the Dllure of the action thai follows from il. This is the only basis thaI human beings have; a supersensible heing might be able to know directly our inner disposition. Although ~nt makes clear Ihal left 10 our "feelings' we deceive olU'selves caslly, he roncludcs

fWi&ion

Willlill

tl~

Umits 0/ &aJon AIoM

91

that "a man cannol buy his own reason." Fcelings and the rational powers. it will he recallcd, are qui te diffcrent mailers. Now, take the question, "What at Iifc', close may a man promise himself, o r wbat he has 10 fear, on the ha$is of his way of lifc: Kanl Jhinb that the aR$WCr 10 thi$ requires. judgment based on the wholc of a person's life, and not a mcre seament of il. Ccnainly DOt the very last sesment of il .lone. This question must he addrcned 10 lhe judge within a person, and I severe verdiel will be pronou ...... d on herself or himself, because, Kant thinks., one canool bnbe ooc', own loaical powers. If • person thinks !bal he or 5hc is 10 rome before an outside judge, the e:o:c:uses are immediately under preparation. There are limill 10 the degree 10 whieb we can fool OUT own reason. The remark thai "all'. . .~ ll thai ends we Ir annoys Kanl considerably if it is applied to moral history. Kant holds that inunoral .ctions cannot be wiped out by any subsequent moral crediL Moral debts cannot he handled like double-entry bookkeeping.. There is no IrlllWlli$sible liability: No one else can pay off our motal deblS, "the IOOSI penonal of all deb\$." In ronncclion with this matter, he considers the question of whether lbe punishments of hell are finite or infinite. This is called "childish,' and a dtildish qu«tion is liken 10 he one for which even an answer would leave us 00 wiser. For this qUC5tion, as for all Teligi0U5 qUC5tiom, Kant considen what affe« it might have on an individual'. morality. Turning to tbe malter of the duration of hell let's ronsider the al ternatives from Kan!'s viewpoint. If the punishments are finile they mipl DOt operate in a seri0U5 eoough fashion: if infinite lhey would either terminate hope: or raise the hope of romplete immunity. Ratber Ihan b.ave any dogma on the question, Kant prefet5 10 have an individual personally frame I concept of the future state that miahl be dC$Crved on the basis of his or her moral condition up 10 the prC$Cnt moment. He generalizes here that if we limit our judgmenl to regulative principlC5 tbat apply to morailife instead of aiming a.t ronstitutive

92

REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

principles for the knowl~dp of Mlpersel\!iibl~ objccU, we will be mucb bell~r off (p. 65). Does Ih~ auill of all human beinp mean Ihal DOlhing bin ~ndless punishmenl is befor~ us? Kanl at]UeS thaI it Ih~r~ is a genuine moral revolution wilhin the individual, if he or she really beromes a !leW penon, w~ sliIl have !he qu~slion of wh~n infliction of punishmeol I'kes place. Even if this new penon is free of pill, the old OO~, the penon b~ or she used to be, stiD deserves punishment Kant holds thai punishrnenl lakes place neither before DOT after the change of heart, hul 'We mll5l think of it as carried out dLiring the change of heart itsclr (p. 67). Surely a uniqu~ conception of divine punishment Mor~ a nominll than an adual 5Olution 10 the problem of the punishment of Ihe old person. Kanl is rather u.ncharil.lble aboul the psychology of those who. " the end of Life, have a d~rgyoun summoned. II wu already mad~ cIcar thaI !he ckrgyman can in no way remove guill for past lT~ons. If Ih~ clergyman is supposed 10 o;omfo" moral anguish, the r~proacbes of consci~nce, h~ finds rath~r awkward advice in Kan!. OIIr aUlhor holds, •AI such a time conscience should be tllher stirred up and sharpened in order that lhe dying man may not nealea 10 do whal good he liIill may" (p. n). II is immoral "10 -.dminisiU a of opium to the consci~nce" (p. 72): MI&Il~stive of the phrase thaI Manr was 10 Ust 10 describe religion (opium of the ma ...·..s). In the las! seclioo of Pan II Ka'nl relates Ihe Bible 10 !he conffiCI betwccn the sood principle and lhe evil principle. He repr~sents the sood and the evil principle as persons outside of the individual. and as penons who pit their strengths against each other. Kant desl:ribes the moral sirnalion "in the Jewish theocracy" al the time when a penon appeared among lhem proclaiming himself "as indeed truly human with resped 10 his I~achin.gs and ~Jllmpl~, y~t also as an eJl\l'Cl)' (rom Huycn who. Ihrough an original innocence, was not invoJy~d in the bargain wilh the evil principle" (p. 74). Kam traces the familiar IilOry of J esus and concludes that "the moral oulcome of th~ combat as r~gards the

50"

~

W"uhin 1M Umiu uf RmW"l AJo.te

93

hero of this "orr up to lbe time of his deatb. is really not lbe OOIIQIIerill& of the evil principle-for iu kinadom still endures, . . . but tlle breaking of iu power to hold those who had so long been iu subjects .. ." (p. TI). Kant calls the ac:aJllnt of the eUYO)' (rom Heaven a vivid mode of representation whose spirit and rational meaning are valid and binding for the whole world, once il is divesled of iu mystical veil. "Its meaning is this; Thai lbere exists absohncly 110 g}vllion for man apan from the sincerw adoption of genuinely moral principles into his dUposition; that what works agaillSt this adoplion is 001 so much the sensuous narurc, which so often receives the blame. as it is a ocrtain seif·in<:urred perversity .. . which lbe human race has brought upon itself . . ." (p. 78). Kanl c:oncludes this section with another insistence thai the only muk of the presence of goodoCS$ in an individual is the well-ordered oonduct of personal life. He summarizes the ~on as an attempt 10 discover, in scripture, Illeul one sense which harmonizes "'with Ihe most holy leaehings of reason" (p. 78). The General Observation at the end of Pan II is the place in wbich Kant deals dirca1y with the problem of miracles. ""There "Ie fmd two general objections 10 any prelended know/~ of miracles. One objection is moral and the other scientific. His moral objc<:tion is Ibis: The belief in miracles is superfluous from the standpoint ola moral religion. He defmes a moral religion as one that oonsists not in dogmas and righlS, but in the heart's dispositiOll 10 fvIfill all human dUlies as if they were divine oommands. Since morality adnowledges as completely authorita· tive the commands of duty, "Commands primordially engraved in the heart of man through rea5On,' we have Do need for any accreditation through miracles. Kant quoles John IV, 43, "Eltocpt )'t! see signs in wonders, ye will IIOt believe." From the moral viC\\-poinl il is useless 10 debale the narnllivCl or inlerpretatioru of miracles, since the moral religion, "the true religion," can maintain itself on rational grounds. Kam agrees Ihal "the penon of the teacher of lhe one and only religion, valid for all worlds, ntJy indeed be l mYSlef)': His appearance on eanh and H is

REUGIQN WJTHlN ... REASON ALONE

evenlfuJ life and His wflering may all be IIOthing but miracles .. .' (p. 79). However, in U$ing lhese historical acoounts we must never "make it a tenet of religion Ihat the knowin&, believing. and professing of them. are Ihemse lvcs means whereby we can render ourselves _11 pleasing to God" (p. SO). Kant points out the incoll5istellC)' of those who believe in ancient mirades but nol in recent ones, in UDall mirades but not large ones, in miracles described in church bl.ll nol miracles described in !be civil court 'The word "mirade" is underslood to refer to an event in Ihe world whose operating laws of its c:aU$e1i are and mUIiI remain absolutely unknown to ~ To know lhatthis is !be case we would bave to know flT5t that an event is determined by a law and IieOOnd that we CIIJ1IKM know the law that determines !be event. Both of the5e pam require an imprCMive amount of knowledge. Concerning tbe traditional idea W t at times and ciraunstaneeS God allows naNre to d<:vlatc (rom il5 own laws, ~nt is patti(\!larly sarcastic. H is point is that if _ make this assumption, we give up any hope of having even the slightest conception of • natural law determining any event. Reason would be crippled in C'Yery way. This would mean tbat tbe most 5eCUte knowledge we have of natural laws would be no belle. than the wildest fan<:)'. Essentially, Kant is saying this; Myuery,]CS; miracle, IkI. A special diseussion is devoted to so-c:alled lheistic miracles.. Tbc5e are events in which something is repre5Cnled as commanded by God although it contradicts morality or natural Idencc. Kant insi515 in the "rongest way that if a IiO-Called command of God "flatly contradicts morality. it cannot. 6cspile all appcarallCC$., be of God.' As an eumple, he gives the case in which a father mi&ht be ordered to kill his son who, so far as he knows, is perfectly innocent. Abraham was absolutely wrong 10 prefer the apparent command of God to the commands of morality. Kant's criticism of Abraham is not made lightly or casually. It appears on p. 82 and again in the final pan of this book, on p. I7S. An apparenl command from God may always tum OUI to be erTone~ We what is a direct or even an indirect have 00 buis lor

/cJw,.v.,

&/igi0ll W"Jlhill

I/~

Umil$ of RtflSOII Alotle

95

"""'lle from God. For Kam il is simply impossible to imagine Ihlt God could rommand an immom lei, and so. 10 repeal. a command thai molnldiCl$ morality cannol be I genuine command from God. The highesl allerion for any of lIS mllSl aMa)'$ be OIIr own reason. Wbal is for Judaism I profOllnd eumple of obedience to GodAbraham's response 10 the command 10 slaughler his son-is for Kanl an enmple of the immorality of reLigiOt.l5 fanalicism. Kanl follows his (:Ommen! aboul Abraham with the remark, "In the affairs of Ufe, it is impossible for us 10 count on mirades or 10 tale lhem inlo consideration al all in OIIr use of reason (and reason mUSI be used in every incidenl of Life)" (p. 82). Kanl makes eLear lhal although be can find no use at all for miracles in either moral or scientific reasoning, he Goes not dell)' !heir possibili ty or reality. He considers in some detail Ihe argumenl of those who poinl OIIt thl! scienti!ts arc. after all, ignorant of a great deal We do I'lOl know the "'''SC of Iravity, of magnetic force. etc. In his theory of knowledge. Kanl had already argued that knowledge of causal relationships requires a eombina· lion of Q priori categories and SCIISC data. and does not include knowledge of things·in-lbemsclve5. But the scriOt.l5 question for Kanl is !he qucstion of what use somethinl can be for morality. Here he finds the apparent colUislency of the scientific picture of the world of yeat relWUraDCe 10 a mind lookin, for ra tionality; the very threal of miracles he finds 10 he just the opposile. Kanl points OUllhal so-c:alled natural wonders arc exhilarating to the spiril. whereas ' the ~irit is dejected by a ... miracle' (p. 83). His explanation is that a natural wonder awakellS the hope of discovering new I.W$ of DIlUre. while the mirlcle .rouses the fear that reason shall be discovered 10 be inadequate. If reason is inadequate. our moral incentives might be II Dtnl.'ilWOrthy. llIc ignorance of the scienti!t Kantlvkcs 10 be honesl modesty. llIc assertion of • miracle would lead 10 what he calls "a be· witched world.' The real horror in such a bewitched world is Ihat we could no longer !niSI reason and therefore no longer know

96

REUGION WITItIN ... REASON ALONE

whether. without our being aware of it, our moral incentives remain consistent. Kant is careful to keep open the possibility of miracla and concerned only to deny IlK: possibility olluwwkdge of miracles. No one can claim to comprehend "whether or Dot the di rect influence of tbe creator is req\lired for ... \lie delicate beallty of color in the plant kingdom ... or the inner perfection mechanism in the animal kingdom" (my order, p. 84). "To vent\lI'C beyond tile limit" of reason is ruhness and immodesty, "although tbm e who suppon mirades frequently pretend 10 eEbibit a humble and self·rellO\lncing way of thoogbt" (p. 84).

or

... Patt TIlree: The Victory ot the Good o~er lhe E\11 Principle. a nd the Foul1dlnl of a Klncdom or God 011 Eanb In \lIis pan of his book Kant explains 1m process by which humllllli arc to combat evil. At Ihis point the distinction between the concept of humanity and the concept of the human individual becomes crucial. lbe individual alone, for example, the lasl person on earth. cartn!M be immoraL Where the re is only one individual in the universe. the principle that person follows is abo the principle that is univef1.ally foUawed by everyone, consistently. Therefore. the individual can easily convince herself or himse lf that \lie temptations to bebave immorally don't come from personal nature bul "bccaus.c: of mankind to whom he is related and bound" (p. 85). Lust, greed, etc. arise only in the company of Others.. It', not that one of these individuals is more immonl than the otber, "il wffices that they are at hand, thtthey a re men, for them mutually to corrupt each Otber's predisposiwns and malre one another evil" (p. 8S). Human society is the ijOUrcc of evil. human society alK\ is the potential means for the maintenance o f morality. From Kant's viewpoint the spread of the "5OVe re ignty of the good principle" can QCalr only in a $OCiety, in an ethical $OCiely. He then develop!i the notion of an ethical commonwealth. whose purpose would be to spread I~ws of virtue in all their srope "upon the enti re human

race" (p. 86). In .orne detail Kant presents this idea of an ethical commonwealth and its relation to the political commonwealth. Part m from this point on is divided into, first, a philO$Ophical acrount of the victory of !he good principle in the founding of a kin8dom of God on earth, and second, a historical acrount of the same victory. In the philO$Opb.ical acoount, we find Kant's interpretation of seven key notiOIl$. I will foHow Kanl's numbering. and will sununame the argument at the end of his seventh assertion. I.

•

Concemins the

Ethical State of Nature. A political state is a relationship !hat holds be~en people who are bound by laW$ of coercion. An ethical nate, or an ethical
98

REUGION WITHIN ... REASON ALONE

presupposes the freedom of its citizem, and one can'! compel people 10 freely do the right thing. The ethical arena i$ the area of human inte ntion, human disposition. and Kant adds that "the human judge cannot penetrate into the dcpltu of every man' (p. 87). We are warned that lepslatures mmt control their wish for sovereignty OYer ethics. An effort to 'utablish through force a polity directed 10 ethical ends' would achieve ju5t the opposite of an ~ thical result (p. 87). WhiI~ an ethical oommonweahh cannot be imposed by force, i! can eml simultaDeOlJsly within a political commonweal th. Immediately one wonders aboot the relationships between this ethical stale and the political Slate. Kant says that those woo freely join this ~thical lilate arc 1101 bound to accept any orden from the political powe r about Ihe ethical romtitution, but he thinb that !bey may 'agree to limitations., mainly to the condition thai this constitution shall contain nothing which contradicts the duty of its Immben as citizens of the litate." This relationship is unfortunately nol quite as dear as it seemL On the face of it, the poliTical system can give no positive orden 10 the ethical community, but il can give negative orders, limitations.. Kant mentions., as an example of a limitation, that nothing should oppose the duty of citizenship. He foU0'W5 this comment with the rather litrange remark that ......hen the ethical pledge is of the genuine $Ol1, !be political limitations need cause no amiety" (p. 88). How is anxiety relieved for a citizen who is drafted by the state fnr war yet whose ethical commonwealth forbids war? KanT'1i alTitude Toward WIIf. Toward the qUClition of whether a member of an ethical commonwealth can go to war, is a ailical maller, but I will IIOt deal with it in this book. (I have treated pans of the que5tion in other places.") The ethical and political commonwealltu have already been separated on the basis of whether their laws are free nr coercive. To this Kant adds that they are alliO distinguished because the concept of an ethical commonwealth extends to the entire human raoe, and the political commonwealth is ordinarily short of that ideal.

II. Human beings ought to leave their ethical Slate of nature in order to become members of an ethical community. 'The ethical state of nature is a situation in which the good principle found in each of us is in open conflia with the principle of evil found in us and also in everyone else. In thili situation, as Kant has already pointed out. human beings mutually corrupt each other beca ..se they lack a principle which unites them. Therefore, individuals ought 10 try to leave this ethical $late of nature as soon as poMible. Kant now has the job of explaining jU$t ..... hat kind of an ithIll people must have before themselves ;u an allernative. 1be duty of leaving the ethical state of nature is • rather UIlIISII&I duty. "We have a duty ..... hich is sui gctmU, 1101 of men toward men, OOt of lhe human rave toward itselr (p. 89). "This is a ~ficant argument. "The hiJ.best "moral good Cl,nno( be achieved merely by the uertions of lhe single individual toward his own moral perfection, but requires rather a union of Rich individuals into a whole toward !be wnc goal .• : (p. 89). This represents a rather dramatic break with wme kinds of individual· ism ... of moral individualism. The highest good is a wcial good. The buman species is seen as pursuing an essentially wcial goal. To be absorbed in one's individual moral perfection is to miss !be idea of !be highest moral good. This idea, the conception of a univen.al republic based on laws of virtue, "is an idea completely distinguished from all moral laws (which concern what we know to lie in our own power), since il involves working toward,. whole reprding which we do oot know whether, IS ruth, it lies in OIIr ~r or I1Ot" (p. 89). Therefore, Kant insists tilal this duty is distinauisbed fmm all others in several wa)'1. AI he has aIrcady said, it Is the duty of !be hunun species toward itself. II is also a duty 10 work toward wmcthing which we know we OUpl 10 work toward bol for whose SIICCCS5 we rnU$t rely on powers outside of OIIr OWl!. Tbereforc, Iwpc pIuys 0 sipifo:olll-ok. ( I develop !be analysis of hope: in rub5cquenl chapters.) Even lhoop we personally behave in. perf«tly moral fashion, !be community in which we live might well be far from the ideal of a proper elhieai eommunity. It takes more than the power of

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REUGION WJ1liJN . . . REASON ALONE

individuals.. "Sepat'l.te individuals, inwfficient in themselves. are united for a comtnOI\ end.· ~t adds that we can already fOi U thai this duly wiU requiTe the prC5UppoIition of the idea of I hipr monal bein&- Up 10 this staae In his IflUmenl Kant has derived the Idea of the iOdal goal from the idel of reuon itself: the oorw:eplion of I siDJIe mnsistent Jet of prinQpleI detenninina the behlvior of al l rational beinp In their choice of moral prinQple. "IlIe oonocpt of In ethical mmmonwealth Is the concept of I people of Cod under ethical laws. Any m~alth is a body of individuals subjen to lOme mmmotI Iqislation. In a dWinc:tive1y ethical commonwealth, the laWi must be ~ 10 promote the monaliry of actions. Monlily is -thina inner and hence cannoc be sub.jen 10 OI'dinary public law. A poUtic:al conunonweaIth mlUt and does have _ dear and obvious. 1OUra: of law. What pI~ the j)lIral1e1 role in an ethical rommonwealth? Must there be MIclJ a parallel role? TIle fallac:y of analogy tKMrs over the q\le$tion, yet Kant PI on without mll5iderin& the problem. If this were all he had 10 "yon the mnc:ept of God, his 'flUment for the role of God would he 51mply a ~ of the f,llac:y of analOi)'. This Is the fallacy of hoIdlna; that if two tbinp have lOme properties in oommon, they mUlt have others.. Kanft IlI5wer 10 the question about the parallel role is thai tomC()t'j(: must be 5p«ified as the publie law·Jiver for III ethicat c:ommoowealth. "And yet, ethical IaWli ea.nnot be t ..... 1JItt of as emanatina; Grit,intIJIy merely from the will of the superior beina" (p. 90). 1bcse laws an tbought of as duties thai bind all rational beinp bcc:IUIe their own reason commands them. At the same time these are also \0 be tbouaht of III the commands of III cthicallaw-pver. Since. iii Kanl poinl$ OUI repeatedly, the ethkal ana Is the: ana of intentions. this Beinl must be "one who knows the hean" and 10 can know the intention, the db pos!clon, of each individual. Then Kant oondudes. "But thl, ilthe concept of God as moral ru ler of the WOlJd" (p. 91). This leads Kant 10 the III.

,

Religion Wlllrin

fh~

LiMils 0/ RealOI1 AION

101

conclusion that an ethical commonwealth is a commonwealth of people under laws of vinue. and that means under divine commands as a people of God (p. 91). Since tile laws of this people of God must concern the morality and not merely the legality of aeu. we are to see this as an institution "whose laws are purely inward." Kam makes clear, in an expanded footnote, that moral duties are also to be thou",t of as divine commands. However, the converse is not the case. He does not recognize divine commands 10 be duties if they oppose "a plain duty: perhaps an ordinary civil law that is not b)' itself immoral, "Since the DOtion that it is actually a divine command can never, b)' any empirical toke n, be accredited adequately enough 10 allow an otherwise e~ilablished duty to be negleaed on its account" (p. 91). The crucial concept is the notion of, "and yet." Ethical laws must be thought of as coming from our own rational nature, and yet, at the same time, as being divine commands. IV.

The idea of a people of God can be realized only in the form of a church. '"The sublime. yet never wholly auainable, idea of an eth ical commonwealth dwindles markedly unde r men's hands" (p. 91). Altbou&h the idea is sublime, when it becoma a human ilal itution it IiCrva the conditions of human nature. Kam likens human nature 10 crooked wood., and I$ks, "How indeed can one expect something perfectly straight to be framed OUt of such crooked wood?" (p. 92). Such pessimism ruggau that it's impossible for buman beings to establish a lIlOJ'aI people of God. However, Kant insists that "Man must proceed as though evel)'lhing depended upon him." Only such responsible behavior can be a basis for I~ that higher wisdom will IS5ist humanity. Kant defines the te rm "church" as an ethical commonwealth uoder divine moral legislation. Since such a church is DOt an object of pos!Iible experience, it is called "!be church invisible." H e uses the term "visible church' 10 refer to the acrual efToN that people make to unify in a Whole thai may harmonize with the

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REUGION wrJ1il N ... REASON ALONE

ideal of the invWole c:burch. He lakes the concept of a moral kinadom of God on earth, the invisible chu«:h, to have the following four properties: (1) Universality. There must be no sectarian divisioll5; the fundamental intention must be capable of I~ding to a genenl unification in a Yngle cburch. (2) A purely moral nature. The only motivating forces must be moral, purified of "the stupidity of superstition and the madness of fanaticism" (p. 93). (3) Freedom., both internally and eJltemally. The relatioru;hips between the members of a clIurch as well as the relatioru;hip of the church 10 the politinJ system., must be the kind of relations found in a republic. This means that no hiervchical lIlTangements will do. It also means thilt no "illuminalism, which is a kind of democracy throogh special inspiraliol15," will do. This would be a situation in whieh the decisions are made by the private feelings or inspirations of individuals according to their whim. (4) The unchangeableness of il$ constitution. The true church must operale under '"primordial laws once for all laid down, as it were, OUI of a book of laWl, for guidance." Kant adds Ihal incidental regulations concerning adminimation can change according to time and circumstanCes, and arbitrary 5yJllOOls have no eMCntiai place. What has Kant really specified as the fonn of hi5 eth ical commonwealth? There is llOlhing resembling an eJlplicit political comtitutioo.. The relationship between tbe citizens of thi$ ethical commonwealth, the members of the true church, is not that of king and subjects, 11m" democratic citizens undu a law imposed by the majority. What is the relationship between members of this clIurch, and between the churcll and the seadar city'? This relationship is closest of all to thilt nf a housel"lold or family under a common. though invisible, moral fatber. In wcll a family may be a "holy KIll, knowing the father's will. and yet standing in blood relal ion with all members of the housel"lold, [wOO[ takes HiJ, place in making H is will beller known to them; these accordi ngly bonor the father in bim and 10 enter with one another inlO a voluntary, universal, and enduring union of hearts" (p. 93). Recall, Kant hu

said thl! the Biblical fanilly could ~ the best analO(lY to the relationship in an ethical common_alth. V, The constitution of every church originates aJw-J.YS in some hislOricaJ (revealed) faith which _ can call ea:le$iutia.l faith, and this is best foonded on a Holy Seriplure, Kant makes a sharp distinction belWee n a pure religious faith. and a historical faith grounded solely on fan. Thc fint can establish . universal d!urd!. whereas the historical faith ean only affect tho5e woo know ilS facts. Why ~ any!lerious attention to historical faiths? Kant holds that "a peculiar weakness of human naturc' requires more than a purely rational basi$ to establish a church. This weakness Icads peoplc to put their confidence in the observable world, and in many ways this is perfectly understandable. After all, knowledge is restricted 10 the observable world. The moral world is not observable in the ume way, and 50 people are DOl easily convinced "that 'teadfasl diligence in morally good life conduct is all that God requires of man. to be subjects in His kingdom and _ll p1easin& to Him" (p. 94), It is easy to think of lhe obligation to God as a !lervice that must be offered. "It does not enter their heads that when they fulfill tllei r dutiCli 10 men (llKmselves and othen) they arc. by thc!Ie "ery 1Icts, performing God', command$ •• ," (p. 94). "and that it is absolutely impossible 10 serve God more direffiy in any other way, . ' ." Instead of a concept of a purcly moral religion, Kant explaiJl! how the concept of a religion of divine worship can arise. His uplanation is strongly rcminiscent of SpiD02a'S explanation in thc Appendix 10 Book I of his Ethics. Human beings bow 10 our requests wilen they are given special praise and honor. When 'fte behave submissively toward them. Human be ings project Ihis pattern into tile nature of divinity and develop tbe notion of a tramaction wilh God on the samc basis. Even the most rational person finds flattery a "bewitc:hing engine: as Bernard De Mandeville pu t it! Therefore, flattery in worship is assumed 10 be the proper way to !ieI'Ve God.

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REUGION WITHIN . .. REASON ALONE

In one form the religious question is the question, "How does God wish to be hoooredr On Kant's interpretation, "tM corrupt of the ~iJy mdly ari.su sckly from COIISCiousnns of monlllaw.f ..." (p. 95, my emphasis). Therefore, "each individual can know of himself throu&h his own reasoo the will of God which lies at the basis of his reliJioo" (p. 95). Kant's concept of a divi ne will determined by pure moral laws alone, "allows us to think of only one religion which is purely moral, as it did of only one God: This is contrasted with a historieal religion whose statutory laws can be known only by a revelation. 1be religious question, "How does God wish 10 be boooredr ooght 10 be answered In a universally valid way, (or each penon. lbat is, by universally moral behavior. We mU!it also ralse the question about our obligation as citiuns of a divine state on eanh, of a church. Now the question becomes: How does God wish to be honored in a chuteh? The answer to this new quc"ion Ulkcl us outside of reason alone, and appean 10 require an ccdesiastical faith. A churdl requires a publ ic covenant. and therefore an ecclesiastical form. Should God or lhould humans found the church? Kant holds that we must lS$umc that the divine will is that we oune1ves should con$\antly try to $<:1 up a ralional commonweallh of this sort. While we try to improve lhe form of Ihis chureh we mUll do this in a way tnal is not presumplUOUIi. It would be arrogant to assume that we already bad a perfect form for tile chureb and save ourselves the effort of improving. The touchstone must always be harmony with the commands of univenal moral ily. Again, Kant mU!it cotUidcr those forces that lead 10 worship. Some quarten bold that tbe Highest Being can be given venera· tion diTCCliy, rather than indirectly by obedience to that Being's moral laws. lbe mearu for Ihis arc said to be ceremonies, confessioru of fai th in revealed laws, and observances of ordi. nances that delermine lhe form of a chureh. Kant sums the$<: up by bolding. "all the$<: ob$crvanoes arc al bottom morally indiffereDl actions; ..." (p. 97). However, Kant agrees that in hu manity's cltort to approach an ethical commonlAleahh, eede~llIlical faith is

Rdip>n W"nhin th Limits of Rmson AIM
lOS

a narural preceding step. From !his vicwpoinl, one must consider the problem of the continuation or the institution of a $larutory C«IC5iudcal faith, and thU"can hardly be provided for adequately lhroug,b tradition, but only throu&h Scripture which . . . must itself be an objcc! of esteem .. ." (p. 97). "A holy book arouses the greatest respect even among those (indeed. tnO$t of all among those) who do DOt read it . . ." (p. 98). Kant makes the assertion lhal "••• history proves thaI il bas never been possible to deslroy a faith grounded in scripture .. ." (p. 98). He then concludes that we are ClI.lremcly fortunate when we find wch a book to contain "along with iu stanues, or laW5 of failh. the purest moral doctrine of religion in iQ complctCJlC$$ ... a doctrine which can he brought into perfccr. barmoll)' with such statutes as 5Crvc as vehicles for ilS introduction' (p. 98). The key remart here involves the mailer of how 5Ucb a boot may be brought into barmony with the pure moral doctrines of religion. And Kant', nen $Cction is on the interpretation of wch a boot. Before movinJ 10 the subject of interpretation, Kant returns to consider some additional aspcetS of revealed religion. The position developed so far allows for only one true religion, and Kant would like us 10 restrict the word "reliJion" to the one and only panem of moral dispositions (hidden within each individual) that deserves the term. He, therefore, ooids that it would be more fitting 10 usc the word "faith' instead of religion in lllc differences betw«n the Jewish, actual practice. 'Mohammedan: Chmtian (Catholic, Lutheran, etc.), positions are taken to he matten of faith, and people woo hold tbo5c pos.itiOIlli should be called people of that faith ratber than that religion. Kant is usually rcspcctful and apprcQativc of the ordinary penon. He directs contempt more frequenLly at the learned than the limple. However, in this disawion of the distinction between religion and faith he allows hiJmclf to be more sa«:a.'itic than anywhere else in his wort thai I know. "One dOC$ too areat honor 10 mosl people by uying of lhcm: the)' profess !his or that religion. For the)' know none and desire none . . . statUIOf)' utJesiastieaJ failll is all 11111 lIIey understand by the word. The

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REUGION wmJIN ... REASON ALONE

so-called religious wars, which have 50 often wen the world Ind bespattered it with blood, have never been anything but wn.nglcs of ea:.1esiluical faitb ..." (p. 99). The words "Catholic" and "Proteslllnt" are inuoduced in connection witb the claims a churd! may make; tbat its ecdeslasdcal faith is universally binding. He IDCntioll$ that a Catholic church makes Ibis claim &lid that I cburch thai protesl5 against 5UclI a claim is called ProtcsWtL He add$, parenthetkally, thaI the Protestant church "often times would gladly advance similar claims itself if it oould" (p. 100). This is followed by the Rlggestion that mill)' examples aist of protestant Catholics, and of arch-catbolic Protestants. He addi that the protestant Calhol.ic is often. pel"$Oll whose easl of mind lelUb to self-apansion, and tbe arch-catbolk Protestant stands in sharp conlraSt with • arrumscribed cast of mind.

YJ.

Ecclesiastical Faith has pure religious faith as its highest interpreter. Once Kant has deeided that • "historical etdC5iastical faitb" can be • helpful vehicle in spruding interest in religious progrC$S, he has to COll!iider the problem of interpretation, His principle is that the interpretation must always agree "witb tbe uniYenal pTilctical rules of • reJigion of pure rusoo.." It may be that the only interprel.ltion of a scripturaltUl tltat Sltisfies our 100m requirements may "appear forced ... it may often really be forced; and yet if the leu can possibly suppa" il, it must be prcfelTed to • literal interpretation which either oontairu notbing II.U helpful to morality Of else actually works COUnter to moral incentive" (p. l01). As an eumplc, Kant takes tbe problem of finding a ooosistent interprellltinn of rwo pMua,grs. Finl, Psalm 59, 11-1 6, the prayer for revenge; and second, Mattbew V, 21 or 44, wbere we find, "Love your enemies, ble5S them that rune you . .. ." Kant suggests tbat we consider the possibility that the enemies refelTed 10 in the Ps.aIm arc invisible enemies and not enemies in the Oesh, tbe invisible enemies being evil inclinations which must be crushed. This is. rather forced interpretatiOll, bul if this kind of

RdigiOll Witlli1lll~ Umils of R(QS{NI AtoM

107

interprel8tion an'l be carried out, Kant suggesu that he would ... ther have it that "this passage is not to be understood in a moral sense al aJJ' (p, 101), Kant raises the general question ofwhether morality should be eJlpounded accordill& to the Bible, or whether the Bible should be «pOUnded according to morality. He takes the first al ternative to be hopeless as well as immoral, and offers his own book as an enmple of the serond. H ow can Kant avoid the eharJe of dishonesty for his forced interpretation? H is response is thai he would not iruist that his meanina is exactly what Will inlended by the H oly Books., but would simply leave this question ope n and mereJy present the pos!Iibility that the boob may be understood in this way. 'For the final PUrp<J5C, even of reading these holy scriptures, or of investi· gatillJ their conlent, is 10 make men better" (p. 102). 1bc principle 10 be used in all scriptural eJlegesis is the moral improve· ment of human beings. U a bistorical de tail is morally neu tral, Kant takes lUI cnremely casual attitude toward it and sayi, "We an do with it what we like" (p. 102). We cannot lie about it, for instanee, claim that an interpretation is 5Ometbin& el$c. Rational religion may have iu role as lUI interpreter of scripturts COIItested by three other groups. The scriptural scholv has an importanl and dignified role in Kant's system. Such authority is needed. But such a ICholar's work is put in a position that is lI igbtly subordinated 10 an inlerpretation based on reason itself. H owever, Kant supporu the value of ICholarship and of Biblical scholarship completely free from hindrance by the secular arm. H e does not wanl le&is\ators to conc:cm lhemselves with the quarrels of scriptural scholarship based on the eJI.lct analysis of ancien! llnguagcs and on historical credibility. However, we are warned . ga inst a volunteer interpreter of scriptures: '"llIc man who needs neither reason nor seholarship, bul merely an inner feeling, 10 recogniu the true meaning of Scripture . . ." cannot be truSted a t aU (p. 104). Neither knowledge of ~w nor of faet an be derived from feeling. The difficulty is thai "{edina is privale 10 every individual" and "il teaches us

108

REUGION WfTHIN ... R EASON ALONE

absolutely DOthing. but is merely the way in which the subject is affected as regards pleasure or displeasure .. ." (p. lOS). The only autbentic expositor is the pure re ligion of reuon. Scriptural $Cbolarship is merely doctrinal, and Kant enc:oorqes Ihese scbolan to 5Ubmit !beir interpretation to public examination and earn the community's confidence in this way.

The aradual transition 01 ecclesiastical fai th 10 the exclusive sovereignty of pure rcJigi0U5 failh is Ihe comin, of the Kingdom of God. When a churdl embraces the principle ofusin, its ecclesiastical faitb 115 a vehicle for continually approachina pure re ligious faill\, Kant holds that we can call this institution the true church, or the church militant. Why must ecclesiastical faith be abandoned? "Ecclesiastieal faith fancies il possible 10 become well plell5inllO God throu&h actlOI15 (01" wo~ip) which, thou&h irksome, yet r ' c" in themselves no moral worth and hence are ... merely IKIS which an evil man can also perform" (p. 106). A nIOra] God can bardly be impressed by an act wbich can be performed just as ~U by an evil person as by a good one. The COTlCepl of a llvins faith rums out to have two elements; finl, faith in an alOnemenl, reparation fOl" debt; second, faith that we can become we.U-pleasin. to God through a .ood course of life in !be furure. 1lIese IWO elemenes develop into what Kant calls a rellllfuble antinomy. Kant insuts that a reasonable person knows thai no "sis'a nce in the malICr of atonemenl is available from anyone else. lbat person knows thai fint his or her own way or life must be improved before there can be even the slig.htCSI hope of hipr moral pin. However, knowing that an individual is corrupt by IUltute, and knowing thai the individual knows this, how can we really expect such a person 10 IIIiIke himse.lf or berself into a new human being we ll-pleasill& to God? Apparently, "faith in a meril not his own .. • must precede every effort 10 good worb." H ere is !be antinomy: Do good works prect:de faith in divine alonement. or does faith in divine atonement precede good works? Kant holds that theoretically lhis antinomy cannot be rewlved. VII.

RtligiotI Within

I/~

Limits of R~ AIoM

109

But he transforms it into I practical pragmatic question mal can be resolved. "Where shall we lIart, i.e~ with a faith in what God has done on our behalt, or with what we are 10 do to become wonlty of God', asmtance (whatever this rtUIIy be)?" (p. lOS). Th is question can be answered: We must nan with wbat we 1ft to do 10 become worthy, and our source of elhics tdls us Ihis. Kant takes it that lIle history of religion shows thi$ conflict bet",.een two principles of faith to have existed througb lIle ages. The priesl$ on one side and the moralists on the other. Both sides hive offered CIpiations, and be adds that !be priem have l15UaJly complained more than the moralisu. Kant has given us a view in which "in the end religion wiD &radually be freed (rom .D empirical determining groonds and from allltalUteS which rest on history ..." (p. 112). Kant e1q)Ccts thai "lIle humiliating distinction between laity and clergy disappears, and equality arises from lI"IIe freedom .... (p. 112). This change from the visible to !be Invisihle church is supposed to be developed through ,",dually advancing reform. Revolu tioI1$ might hasten this progess, M agees. but "they rest in tM hands of providence and cannot be ushered in according to plan without damage to freedom" (p. Ill). Kant thinks thai an analogy 0CC\l1'$ between the history of political states and church history. Every single pol itical state strives to overcome every olber stale, but CIIentuaily il reacbe5 I certain size and breaks up of its own accord. In a simi lar way, individual churches pretend to become lIle church univeruJ. but iI$ 500n as lIlcy ~end themselves and Stan to rule. !.hey break up again into mall sccu. Kant IMn 5pCCUlates lIlal we might U5ume a design of providence 10 checlr. the ~ and morally harmful fusion of religioI1$. It would be harmful if it comes before human bein&:, have become morally improved. The two devices that Kant speculates may be operating here are the difference of tonguCi, and lite difference of religio11$. In bis own terms. this second difference should be called the difference of faiths.

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We DOW tum to what Kant calls the hi!torical aecount of the grlIdual e!iLlbli!hment of • sovereignty of the good principle on earth. What i! called the history of religion can be 5eelI as the constant conflict between the faith of divine worship and the moral faith of religion. Rather than. broad historical record of the different dogmas that hlive been developed, Kant propme5 to consider j\l$t that portion of church hislOf)' in which the clear be&inninas of the universal church may be foood.. He has already eqJlained that Chri5tianity has the s.eeds for the development of thi! universal faith. He m\l$t now commit himself to some relationship between the Jewish faith and Christianity. We are fIrst Jiven !.be hroad auertion that "the Jewish fai!.b stands in no essential connection Whatever. i.e~ in no unity of c:ooa:pts, with this ecclesiastical failh whose history we wish to consider .. ." (p. 116). Despite the faa that the Jewish faith immcdialely preceded the Chri5tiao church and provided the physical oocasioo for its e.slablishment, Kant fiDd$ no essential c:ooa:pt shared by both. He aTJIIe5 that J udaism is really not a rcliJion aI III, but . purely political il15urution. He offers three arguments in IlIppon of too char&e that J udaism is oot reliJious, deipite the "aristocracy of priests Of leaders, who hua!;t of instructiom imparted direetly by God." Hi! charges are these: Firs!, all of the commands "are of the kind which. political organi1lltion can insist upon and lay down as coercive laws, since: they relale merely to enema! aas." Kant does acrce that "the Ten Commandments are, to the eye of reason, valid as ethical commands. even had thCJ not been Jiven publicly . . ." (p. 116 ). His arpment here is thai the Ten Commandmcnb are directed to noq but OIlIer observance, and they make no requiremenu at all upoo the moral disposition. Second, Kant char&es thaI the rewards or punishments of (Oll(:Cm are limited to those "which can be allotted to all men in this world" (p. 111). He takes it that Judaism in iu pure form lack5 a belief in a future life and holds that lhis alone tak~ it 0111 of the category of religion since "no tel iaiOn ¢an be (Onccived of which

Rdidon Within 1M Limiu

of RftUOIf A/OM

111

involves 00 belief in a future life" (p, 117), Kant also adds that r.be rewards and p"oisbrnenU were DOl distributed ethically $inee tbey were 10 reach the posteril)' of the individual who 1001; pan in lbe deeds or mbdeeds. Kant's third point is based on the idea of a chosen people. A religion must include lIIe entile human race, and lIIe c:oncepl of a special people chosen exclusively by God is a IIOtion Ihal 'lhowed enmil)' roward all other peoples and which therefore C\IOked the enmil)' of alr (p. 117). Kant is careful 10 say lhal individual Jews may well frame $Orne sort of religious failh and combine it with Ibe legislation of Judaism. After tbese comments on !he status of J udaism. Kant tums 10 !he origin of Cbristianil)' as the beainnins of seneral church history. "Thus Cbrislianil)' IU'05C suddenly. though IIOt uppreplled f01', from Judaism' (p, 118). He traces the Oltistian narrative from Ibe poim at which the leacher of the goopel announced hilnKlf 10 be an am ...... 'OOr (rom heaven, throop the example of his own person of I genuinely good course of life, to his unmerited death. Olri.u's life is Ulken to be ' the archetype of a humanil)' alone pleasi", to God." He was able 10 say that "he ,"'QUId stilt be wilh his disciples cvcn 10 the end of the world' (Matthew XXVIII. 20) and by this Quist meant that the power of the memories of his teacIJin&. his eumple, and his real merit, would be with his disciples forcvcr. Kant sepatlte:s the Ouittlan narrative lnlo the public record of Olrisl', life, which ends with his death, and 'the more secret recon1s, added as a sequel, of his re5llrreetion and ascension, which took place before !he eyes only of his inlimales . . ," (p, 119). The fint, tbe publk record, can serve universally as an example of a worthy life, an enmple 10 be imitated Aboul the seael records of the resurrection, Kanl says thaI this "cannol be used in the interest of religion within the limiu of reason alone,' Kant holds lhal the only way 10 UIke these reamls 10 be of moral use is 10 do great violence to their historical value. This is

mentioned in passing. his more serious objectiOn is to what he

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caUs the concept of "the materialism of penonality" (p. 119). Kant lakes Ibis to be a concept that holds that a pcnonality ean exist only if it remaiN always in the same body. To this he opposes the hypllhesis of the spirituality of rational beings. the hypothesis that holds that the body ean remain de.d wlule the same penon continues 10 live. The conception of humanity a.s spiri t ~n1takes to be "more congenial to reason' for two rea5Ol15: (1) The impouihility of making comprehensible a matter which thinks, and (2) the material.ist requirement that • body be dragged along through elernity. Kant then turns to the requirement Ih.1 • hisloricaJ faith hll$ for a learned puhlie. Historical faith that ba$e$ i!$elf upon books needs for iU security. continuous tradition of scholanhip. He discusses the maner of the gap in scnotarship in the very first Christian ~neration. This question arises panicuiarly because Kant is COD5idering what effect !he teaching of Christianity had upon the morality of its .dherenu : the question of whether the very first believers were tbell15e]ves moral, 'or j~t people of • common run' (p. ]2 1). Kant makes the point that from the nap at whieb Ouistendom dcvelopc:d iu tradi tion of scho\ar$hip, we know 50Illething of tbe effed of the faitb on iu public. and he adds lIIat it "has served in 00 way tn recommend it on !he score of the magnifieelll dfed which ean jU$t1y be upeeted of. mom religion' (p. 121). Kant takes particular delight in remindina; us of the disunce from morality .t which believers have been found through the histOl)'. He notices tbat '&reat masses of people were rendered use ]eu to the world" by the a;lorification of tbe holiness of eehbacy, and tbe ueenes of Ill)'$tical fanaticism in the lives of henniu and monks. We are reminded that ' !he dreadful voiee of onbodoxy" appeared and divided the Christian world into embit· tered parties. Kant doesn't fail 10 note how ' the spiritual head ruled over and disciplined kings like children by means of a magic wand of his threatened excommunication' (p. 121), and how the: spiritual bead u ci ted tbe em""'" and other wars. He swns up these and other atrocities with the remark from Locrc:tius: "Such evil deeds could religion prompt!" He notes that none of these

Migion W"ulu"n rile Umiu of &a.sotI Alone

1 \3

faeu nor the truth of the remark of Lucretius obscures the fact thai the fint intention of Christianity was to introduce a pu.re religioU$ fai th, and this imention was diuupted and delayed by the evil propcnsitiC5 of hu man nalLITe. But the history in no way makes Kant lose his optimism about the Suoccss that Christianity is expected to have in foundina a universal world religion. Has the history of the church been a faU from a perfectly moral beginning. or a progress in il\CTCasing morality? For Kant the question is crucial, and his answer is dearly the second. He imists that the prescnt period is the best in "the enlire known history of the church" (p. 122). His optimism about the prescnt is based on the increasini deiTCC to which reason has freed itself from the weight of dogmatic faith. Kant takes it that reason is beginning to make clear the followilll tW'O principles.. Firtt, rile priJK:ipk of refJ.SOIIUbk modeJty in pronouncements abou t revelation. This means the ~ibility is recognized tl\.;lt a scriptLITe containing 50 much that is actually moral may be regarded as a genuinely divine rcvc:lllion. It is also taken to be possible, al least possihle, that a suocessful union of people into ODC true rel igion can only be brou&ht about wit h a holy book and a foundation of an ecclesiastical faith. "Hence, the most intelligent and reasonable thing to do is from now on to usc the book already at hand as the basis for ecclesiastical instruction and not lessen its value through use less or mischievous attach, yet meanwhile 001 forcin& belief in it as a requisile to y.lvation upon any man" (p. 123). 'The second principle is this: Sioce the ~(Jed narrative is used only for "the vivid presentation of in true object (virtue striving toward holiness)." Kant insists that this nt:lmIti'I>r mwt alway! M umgIu tmd ~ ill rhe im~ of morolily. It must be regularly ln$isted upon and repeated "that true religion is 10 consist not in the knowing or considering of whal God docs or has done for our salvation, bu t in what we must do 10 become worthy of il" (p. 123). Kant adds here, and whenever an nee"ion arises, that what we must do to become worthy an only be something that possesses in itself dear and absolute moral worth, and lherefore Ihis is WffiCthing aboo l whlch ",·e aD be

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certain "without any seripturai learning wruuever" (po 123). Kant insists that political rulers must neve r hi nder these two principles of reason from becoming pIlblic:. The principles are modeJ.ry and moraliry. A propell$iry !O sink !O a pusive belief is wpp
Rdition lVuhin

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present shell, which u )'<:t cannot be spared," By "its present sheU: be means the eedesiutical or historical fai th which "stands in need of a ~d book as a leadina; string fnr men" (p, 126), Try to prepare "to oonsider OUTHlves always u cho!ien citiulI5 of a divine ethieal state" (p. 126). The goal is the Kingdom of God in a visible form. At the end of tbis section Kant returns to make funber oomments about the history of the Jews. He is impres.sed by the long history through which the Jews have eontinued to mainta in themse lves, even though $C8ttered through tbe world. Does this unusua lly long history of a people seem 50 unlikely that it should be called the result of a divine purpose? Kant docs OOt think this oonclU$ion is necessarily forced. He SlJssests that tbe fact tbattbe Jews had a written religion-s.acred boob--can acoou nt for the result. Their boob kept their identity and kept them from fusing together with people possessing 110 such books hilt only rites. Kant even suggests that the J ews themselves might not have mai ntained tbeir w:red boob hilt that they may have received assistance from tbe Christian and later "Mohammedan" religions. because these positions presupposed tbe Jewish faith and the J ewish sacred boob. Kant a$IImes that in their wanderings tbe skilt in reading and the des.ire to posse55 the sacred books may have heen l05t from time to lime. He suggests that the J ews may well have spread to lands with no Christian or "Mohammedan" traditioll5 and have disappeared. This is presemed merely 3$ a speculation that the Jews themselves might not deserve the credit for preserving their sacred lituature. Kant suggests a counter example to hi.s own theory. He mentions a community of J ews that exists in China and whose attachment to scriptures would owe nothing to any ootside religioos tradition. Kalil condudes tbat the pre!iCrvation of the Jewisb people and of their religion, under circumstances thai seem so unlikely, is not a basis for "edifying remarks" (p. 127). He adds that one could interpret this either III proof of a special decision of God to save this people for 11 glorious fu ture, or one could !iCe in all of their \1oublts an example of "punitive justice vi~iled upon it because it

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stiff·ne<:!"edly sought to create. political and I10t a moral COrK:ept of the MeMiah" (p. 128). Kant', comments here about the Jews must be pu t together wi th hU othe r comments to evaluate them as

a VOOP.' The long General Observation at the end of Part 111 is devoted 10 Kant's analysis of the ooncept nf a religious mystery. He can't avoid the subject of l!I)'$lery becausc, he points out. the inner nature of every kind of religious faith leads one to a myslery. In this sense a mystery can be defined as "somelhing /zajy which may be ktwt."lf by each single individual but cannot be made ktwt.n publicly. thai is, shared univenally" (p. 129). To be calLed holy it must be moral and an object of reason; yet, if it is something l!I)'$terious, we cannot poss.ibly have a t heoretically adequate analysis of it that can be made known publicly. At a number of critical points, Kant has referred 10 maIleR Ihat are i05Cl'Ulable to us. (01apter Nine deals wilh this in more careful lemu.) He TIO'W takes special care 10 distirI&Ui.h beN.een lhose matteR that are 10 be called ifficrutablt, and those maileR Ihal are to be cal led myste ries. .A mystery if tire category lor ~t/Zif18 rlUlt wt caI/ kIww bw ",'hieh "''C CIUIIICH communiaue publM;ly. The grounds, the h
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111

We have a senuine holy mYSlery of religion when we know M'hy somelhioi is 10 oa:ur but we don'l mow wIulI il is thai oa:un.. The queslion of what God alone can do 10 assisl UI in beina moraJ is just lU(:b a mailer. We can amwer the .we)' question; Bec:ause we need assisllOCf;. We canDOI answer W whOI queslion; lUll whal can God do 10 assist us? Kanl adds. "11 may weD be upedieol for us merely 10 know and understand that there is IUd! a mystery, nol 10 comprehend il" (p. 130). This suB&dtion that it may be belief for U5 not to understand the nature of God rugests the e.nendcd argument in Kant's Critique of ProclicaJ Rt4IDiI, in whid! he oonsidered wbat would be the ease if, iostead of beini limited 10 a hope Of" an assumption thaI God aislS, we knew that God edsted. "God and eternity in their awful majesty would sland uooeasin&ly before our era .. . most actiom oonformina to the Law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, oone from duty. The moal wonh of aruODl, 00 wbid! alone the worth of me person and even of the world depends in tbe eyea of rupreme wisdom would not eu~t al all" (p. 141). Knowkdge oCGod's eilitenee is both unavailable and undesirable. Kant wiD return to some pam of this afiliment in the fuW section of the book. The idea of God as the moral lovcrnor of the world is presented 10 us by our moral reasoning. Morality explains to U5 wby we need rum a be inl; it can never uplain 10 us what God is, and therefore tbe idu of wm a being is a holy myslery. However, Kant insists that the belief that sum a God eDIts does not oontain a mystery. This belief expresses the relationship of a moral God to the human rue, and Kant takes it that this presenlll itsclf"spontlneously to buman reason everywhere and is merefore to be met with in the religion of most eivili%ed people" (p. 131). As he expands it, the belief that conforms 10 this is belief in God, (I) as the omnipotent creator ofbeaven and earth, that is, morally. as holy legisl'tor. (2) as preserver of the human raee. illl benevolent ruler and moral guardian. (3) as administrator of his own holy laws. as righteous judie (p. 131). Kant then poinlll 0111 that a greal many andeRI peoples a1w developed Ihe idea of a Ihrce·parl

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bam for the gOY(lmmcnt (or the world. He mentions the three divine persons in the religion of Zoroaster, the three persons in the reli.£ion of the Hindus, II religion in EiYPt that bad e§SentiaJIy thru supreme Gods, the Gotm, etc. Kant insists tbatth.is three.. pan anal)'5is of the supreme beina must be cleansed of "harmful anthropomorphism" (p. 132). He prefers an inte rpretation in which God will5 10 be served under three specifically differenl moral aspeCts. Kant'S emphasis, as a/wayl, is on moral ralher than physical aspeCts. Kanl IICXI tunts 10 an anaJys.iJ. of three basic mysleries.. Each of these is revealed 10 us through our reilSOn, grows OUI of II moral context, bul "taken theologically ... ulIll5amds all our concepts, is II myslery . . ." (p. 133). I . The myslery of the divine call This is the call 10 human beinp 10 become citizens of an elhical ltale. The ethical ltate requires that we see ourselves as beiDiS crealed 10 a free ~ of our powen. This, lIIYS Kant, is incomprehensible 10 rciISOn. To be crealed is nol 10 be free: 10 be free, is 10 be free of the limitations of creation. '"Ibe caJllo this end is morally quile clellr, wbile for sp«u1ation the possibilil)' of wcb II calling il an impencttable mystety" (p. 134). 2. The mystery of IItonemenl The moral value of an individ· ual's behavior musl come from him or her alone if il is 10 be called thaI person's moralil)'. Bul human beings life corrupt, and for moral llatWacUnn 10 lllke place witbout some vicarious atonement 5eefD$ almost irnpouible. From the standpoint of reason, vicarious IItonemenl is "an unfathomable myslety" (p, 134). 3, The mystery of election. That one person should receive grace, and another not, cannot be uplained in terms of. rational theory of justice, but must be comidered an .bsolute mystery. Aboul cac:b of these my5leriCl, the call, the atonement, .nd election. Kant says this: They touch the moral life·l!istory of every penon. and yet we do not and cannot undcnUlnd them. However, we do OOt need 10 understand them because the rules for oor beh.vior are adequately revealed 10 us through a reason thaI is comprehensible 10 cvcry penon.

II is prelUmplUOUlIO demand WI more be revealed 10 us than is revealed by our reuon, OUT bean, and Ollf COnscieDCe (p. 135). What is made clear 10 us from lhese sourccs is the foUO'Ning: Tbe moral law c:al.L$ a hUlJW1 being 10 wboniinale selfi5hnes.s, respeer for this law gives bope WI one may latisfy Ihe moral demand, and finally we know thai we musl constantly check ourselves, ' 11$ though summoned 10 account before a judge" (p. \35). Kanl adds thai even if a revelalion were 10 ocx:ur beyolKl these matters which reason makes dear, il cou.Id J"I(M be considered a universal need for human beinp (p. 136). If knowledge of these mysteries cannOl be obtained by reason. can another source, our feel ings, provide il for us? Kanl repeatedly says. WI 'feelings are IIOt knowledge' (p. 129). Laler he ballk thaI 'it is u nthinklhle thai God could allow Ibis knowledge In come 10 us through inspiration whenever we, on our pan, wish earnestly for iL' He argues this because of the structure of our understanding-and ill abilil)' 10 function only by presupposin, ratiooal catesories.. Up to this poinl the basic: calegories have been duly and respect, bul 1101 love. Kant's interpretation of "God is love' is developed in term5 of love of Ibe moral law. "The hipeil soaJ of moral perCection of finile creatures ... a soaI 10 which man can never complelely altain ... is love of Ibe law" (p. 136). After a brief commenl on the relation belWeeo love of God and fear of God, Kant turns 10 an analysis of the logic: of judgmenL He had held WI both the love and the fear of God are combined in the ronoeption of the Holy Gho$L Kant takes moral judilllCntto be divided into two kinds of acts: ( I) a choice between two persoos. each striving for. priu. and (2) a senlence on one and the same peT50n who is accused of a crime. Tbe first kind of decision is a judgmenl in which lbe categories are meril and laclt of meriL One individual gains lhe prize, merit, and the olher simply receives nothing. In the· judilllCnl upon the matter of guilt of an individual, Ibe categories become guilt or absellCC of au ilL Between individuals the verdier is worthy or unwonby: within an individual the verdict is sin or

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freedom from sin. Kant uses tbese distinctions between lORds of jud&ment to &ave the consistenl;)' of apparently contradictory pa·uges 50ch u "'The Son will corne agai n to judge the quid:: and the dead," II TImothy IV, 1, and "God sent nOl his Son into the world to rondemn the world ...: John III, 17. Why eve about the inamsistclK')' of saiptural p",sages if saiptures themselves are only a vehicle for moral instructioo1 For those iCriptuTal questions that concern the nature of God and other mysteries, Kant spurns. "amious IiOlicitude: H oweve r, where the question concerns the Jrind of moral judgment that an individual personally is subject to, he feels thaI the precise detennination of these concepts is of PnlcticaJ Importance (p. 137). lbe point has frequemly been made in the history of ethical theory that lllOI'a1 commands are lUually phrased as negatives, Kant holds that his key concept of worthiness "al,,'lIYS has a merely negative meaoing" (p. 137). lbe idea is not developed fun her at this stage, but the relationship between morality and wonhineu is made as close as possible. For all of Kant's analysis of scriptural passages, and his attention to the need for consistent interpreutions of them, he is .t....lIys wary about the dangers of • literal scriptural faith, • A bate literal faith in it buns rather than improves the truly religious disposition" (p. 138). 5. Part Four: Cnncemhlg.5erYke I nd PRudG.Servia Uallnlbe Sovudpuy or lbe Good Prtftdple; Or, Cnneem lnc ReUcloll li nd OerlcllUl m

It has already been argued that a special kind of duty binds human beings.. the duty to unite in an ethical rommon.... ealth. The accidental agreement of morally good individua1s is not enough. Unless ", special business be made of their union with one another," the meat important btuiness of all would be left 10 mere chance. It takes a commornr.'ealth under moral laws, .nd this is called, visible church. Kant repealS that this church iii to operate on principles that ",ill lead it to steadily approximate pu re rational

~/igiotl

IVahill

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faith, and it will be "able in time to dispense with the churchly faith" (p. 140). He bas already explained that it Med not actually dispense with tbh, but it must be $0 atfw.nc;ed morally thai il is capable of dispcming with it. He then defines pscuo:\o-$crvice as behavior that frustrates the objectives of whoever is being served. The wbject of the last pan of this book bcromcs lhe relatiomhip between religion and clcricali5m.

We nan with Kant'. well-known definition of religion: "Religion is (subjectively rcgarded) the recognition of all duties as divine commands." This definition is supposed to avoid several common errors. First, lhe definitiOil does nol rcquire that we make asscniom about God, even about thc question of God's existcnce. Morality needs only thc idea of God, and no certiflCalion of the reality of this idea. Second, this definilion avoids the mistake of tbinking of religion as a collection of special duties 10 God. Kant insists "there arc no special duties to God in the u.uvelW.l religion, for God tan rea:ive nothing from IIS." "The only duties recognized arc the civil duties of humanity-of per$On to person. Kant interprets thc statement "We oughl to obey God rather than DlCn" (Acts V, 29), 10 mean that when buman laws connie! with duties that reason promote," we must obey reason, which is the proper God. Kant insists thaI this quotation must IICVCr mean thai the statutory commands given OUI by a ebul"(:b must be obeyed in place of civil laws, and he adds, "wch • principle might easily become the war cry oftcn hcard of hypocritical and ambitious ,"Jeri", in revolt apiml their civil superion" (p. 142). He takes it that civil authorities issue commands Ihal musl be taken 10 be duty, but whethcr something is in fact a command of Gnd is alway5 higbly uncenain. After defining religion, Kant distinguishes between a natural and a revealed religion. In a natural rel igion I must know that something is my duty before I ean accept it as a divine order; in a revealed rdilion. I must fillt know that IOmethina ii a divine

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R EUG ION WITHIN , , , REASON ALONE

c.n.

order and then J ClIl discover thaI il is • duty. religion be bolh? On this Inaner Kanl holds lhal no reUpon ClIl be natural "and al the same time revealed when il is so constituted lhal men could wid ou,/Il lo " - dirroNN it of themselves merely throu&b lhe U5C of Ihelr reasom" (p. 143). II may be tbe c:a5C th.t humanity would IIOt ~ come upon • religiom as early. or in as great numbers. withoul revel.tion, but such • religion may be one lhat could. by iISC If, be caJled naturaL Kant holds that the Christian religion can be looked .1 both as • natural religion and as • learned rclipol1, lnd he gives us two len&thY sections in wbich these separate presentaliOIl$ are considered,

Kant begins by Qyin" "l..et us IWppoie that there wu a teacher , , ," who offered to the world a purely moral and uniV(:naIly undent'nd ' ble reupon. Kam maintains lh. 1 Ibis teacber mUSI be ciV(:n reverence oot as the fOlinck r of the relipon, but as the fOlinder of lhe fi151 true chu rch. The religion, he adds. is engraV(:d in all bumao hcaru. Why mUSI a church be founded if we find these principles engraved in our heans? Kanl has al ready illliislcd thaI we also find in our heans the evil principle and that the effort to ronstantly combat the evil principle requires feJlOW$hip witb olhcl5. The proecu of organizing this fellowship wilh others. this union inlo a universal and visible church, "presupposes a realm of fact and nor merely the pure concept of reason" (p. 146), 'The great preache r of conficknce in pure reason iasists here that a visible churcb is necessa,)" and for this there must be Statutes, ordinances, and the elements of arbilrarineM. As may be expected, Kant is concerned that there be no civil requirements of religious oaths OIX\Ir in connection with any church. Kant's examination of the logic of requirina: oaths is rather forcefuL If we do DOt trust someone 10 tell the truth in a solemn statelDCnt, bow can we havc any confidence in Ihat pC:l'$On's honesty simply because the individual calls down upon himself or

RrJi&ion Within 1M LimiJs of ReA.JOII AioM

123

herself me punishments "which in any event, with such I lie, he cannot escape" (p, 147)1 The technique of confirming the truth of something by requiring an oath is taken to be an absurd presumption. "the attempt to m.ke .ctual. as though with ma&ical words, whit is really not in our power: Kant al50 nw:otiOtl5 his concern that Ihe great importance connected wim teUing the truth under oath "almost 5alIClions the common lie" (p. 147). We have no more reason for UU$ling the testimony of a wiUlCS$ who has sworn on a Bible 10 tell me truth than we have confidence in the teslimony of that willlCSS wilhoul me Biblieal oalh. Kant takes Christ 10 hold I pOOtion found in Mlllhcw V, 20-48; Not the OIIter observance, but the pure moral disposition of the heir! alone, can make I person Wf:1I pleasing 10 God. Hatred of one's enemies must be wrncd 10 charity, and these pure di5po5itiollS of the heir! must be manifested in worki (Matthew VlI, 16). Kant takes all the Jpedal duties to be combined into one ~ rule-"Perform your duties for no motive olher man unconditional esteem for duty iUCIf, i.e~ love God.bove .n else.' And KCOndiy, in • panicultv rule-\oYe everyone 115 yourself, mat is, treat each penon Wf:11 frnm the motive of good wiIlrather than Kif advantage. Kant himself hll5 held that "me boliest of beings in this world" is the buman being (p. 147). But holiness al50 applies to precepts such as these two, the universal and the pankular, thai he has JUSt speciflCd. Kant takes it thaI the first teacher made clear thll good worki must be performed, that moral goodnC$5 i$ not something that can be passively awaited. lbese workille to be pcrfu""ed publicly and cheerfully and without any interest in reward. He thinks the proper altitude toward reward is exprc!oSCd in Matthew XXV, 35-40, wilcre ilclp to the needy given spontaneously is • model for those .... ho are to be thoscn for tbe Kingdom of God. What of the passages in ....hith Orisl speaks of the rewards in the world 10 come? Kant says that these Ire not 10 be Ken 115 illCCnti~ to action. bul as I rcprcsclllation of divine benevolence, and mont approval, "wheo reasoo reviews bumao destiny in ilS entirety" (p. ISO).

or

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This section concludes with tne statement that the Christian religion "is a romplete religion which can be presented to all men comprehensively and convincingly to their own reason ..." (p. ISO). This is the Christian religion looked at as a natural religion, and free of any external certification through schol.nhip or miracles.

In tbis section the Christian religion is clearly separated from the Christian faith. Kant lint reviews what ne meat\$ by religion based on the bare concepts of reason. "Everyone can convince himself, through his own reason, of tne evil wllich lies in human beans and from wllich 00 one is free; of tbe impossibility nf ever hoJding himself to be jU$tilied before Ood through his own life conduct. and. at the same time, of the necessity for such a justification valid in his eyes; of lite futility 0( wbstilUtill8 churchly observances and piOU$ compulsory servic:es for the right_SlleSS which is lacking. and over and against this of the inac:apable obligation to become a new man" (p. 151). Now, as a learned faith, Chrislian faith relies upon history, and 00 the $O-CIIled revealed doctrines. 'The revealed doctrines need inlerpretation, and the!ioe imerpreten mw.l be developed and supported. Kanl bas already made the point that these interpreters mU$t IruSI their works to public discretion and to buman reasonill8 as the final adjudicating principle. However, KalIl poinlS OU I thai even when church officials "do 001 appear in hierarchical splendor as spiri tual officen clolhed with external power ... eveD when indeed they prOIe!;1 verbally apinsl all this ... tbey yet actually wish 10 feel Ihemselves regarded as the only chosen interpreten of H Dly Scripture . . ." (p. 153). Kant lake!; the ooru.c:quences of this 10 be a transformation 'rom service: of • church into a domination of church memben. Is a Christian actuaUy a Jew wllt»e Messiah has corne? Kanl denies this, and yet mentions that Ihis would be the result of a Uleral venion of Christianity. 1£ the entire Holy Book of the Jews

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is 10 be accepted faithfully, then the answer 10 this question might perhaps be affinnative. Kant mentions an u pment Ihal Ihe Jewish philosopher. M~ Me lldelW)hn, had presented. Mende ls· sohn rejected the request that he conven 10 Christianity because, he 5aid, "if !be Jewish faith is the SlID-structure of Christianity. 10 ask that it be abandoned is equivalent to demolishing the ground nonr of a house in order 10 live on the second nory: Ka nl answeB that Meooelssohn's view has been ingeniously developed, and he takes the real intention to be this: There is no poim in exchan&illl one faith for another which also comains the yoke of outer obse/Vallccs. Throw off Ihis yoke, and whe n nolhing is left but pure moral religion, the proposal will be wonh taking uDder advisement (p. 154). For Kant. to know the Old Tcstament in translations is fIOl enough. but we must always have scholars who arc familiu ";Ib the Hebrew language. "II mUSI be regarded as not merely a conccrn of historical Kholarship in general. but one upon which hanp the lal'vation of mankind, Ihal there should be men sufficiently familiu with Hebrew to assure the Ulle reHaion for the world" (p. ISS). It seems quite un·Kantian to hold that human salvation requires scholars familiar with Hebrew, or any paniculat language. Consider, however, thai SIIch scholan assure us that Ihe lllllJU3&e will be undcBtood as a human crcalion, a human production in need of imcrpretalion, and nol the lileral words of GO< De5pite his respect and C()IICCrn for wria en tradition, Kanl add!., ·Christianity posses.ses the greal advantage over J udaism of being represented as coming from the mouth of the fiBt leacher nOI as a statutory but as a moral religion, and thus cntering inlo the closest relation with reason. . . : Kant poinu OU I lhat the fint o.rislian oommunilies were clOKly a"ached 10 the hi~tory of Judaism. but he says, "this was managed wisely in view of the si tualion at the time, and perhaps with reference 10 thai siluation alone .. . ." H",,'ever, he ls always ronttrned 10 separate essenlial ankles of faith from merely ellternal and political articles.. These connections, "cannot be avoided so long as I'oe seek re ligion

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wilhoul and nol wilhin us" (p. 155).

By the term

"'p5cudo-~rvice"

Kant means the pretended honorillj of God through activity that aCUlaily works (lOOnIer to God's gool$. The term "religious iIIusioo" means. liUlation in which one holds Ihal a uatutol)' faith is CiSCnliai 10 a servke of Cod generally, that is, a sialul0l)' faith restricted to one people, and which cannol include Ihe universal world religion. 1. Concerning the Universal Subjective Ground of the Religious

Illusion. Allhough Kant criticizes most versinns of anlhropomorphism, because we creale • God for ourselves in a fuhion in which we believe Ihal we shall be able 10 win Cod 10 our advantase, he makes an imponanl point Ihal may easi ly be overlooked here. Kant explains that, although it do6 sound "dangerous. il is in no way reprehensible 10 lolly that every man creales a Cod fOl'" himself' (p. 157). Kant's poinl is Ihal each penon must make. God for thaI person, according to moral concepts; that is, each ol us mUSI aeate the idea of such a God. 1lIcn, when • God is described or made known to us in some way, and even if such a being appean before us, each nf us mUSI first compare "this representation wilh his ideal in order to judge whether he is emitJed to regard II and to honor it as a divinity. Hence there can. be no religion springing from revelation alone" (p. 157). There mu.o;t always be an assumption of a ~pl4I" a .Jt<Jndarr1 by ..1,ic/I 10 iu4J,'I! any possible description or representalion of a God. "Without this all reverence for God WOIIld be idolatry" (p. 157). Since reason is assumed 10 be the same in aU healthy humans, the God thai reason fashions, the mDTal God, must al....ys have lbe same CiSCnlial properties. 1lIc principle upon which people uwal1y operate when they think of their relationship to God is this: If ... e behave in a manner well pleuing to God, u long as our behavior is nol

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actually immoral, we are showing our willingneu 10 serve God, and, in fact, we are serving God. The hislory of the subject shows 115 u.crifices that were thought to perform this function, feslivals, penilences, CIIliligations, pilgrimages. and tite like. '"The more useleM such self-ca.sligations are, and the less they are designed for the general moral improo;ernenl of lhe man, the holie r they !.eern 10 be; jusl because lhey are of 00 U!.e ",hal5Oever in the world, and yel COIiI gainful effort, they Kern to be directed IoOlely 10 lhe alleSlation of devolion 10 God" (page 157). All these mailers, Kanl holds, are cases in which we Ihink we can gel moral value OUI of IoOmething thaI itself has no moral value. 2. The Moral Principle of Religion Opposed 10 the Religious lUusiolL This section slam wilh a proposition thaI is taken 10 be a principle requiring no proof. ·Whatever over and above good life conduct man fancies Ihal he can do 10 become well pleasing 10 God is mere re1igi~ iIlU$ion and p$eudo-service 10 God" (p. 158). This prirKiple !.ell Ihe lone for the section 10 follow. Kanl fml makes clear Ihal his principle refers 10 wbat a person faocies he or she alone can do. II by no means denies thaI there may be a mystery through which God can do IoOmething in this area. Before he gelS down 10 e.umples of his principle, Kant poinl!i OUI that reason "does not leave us wholly without COMOlation wilh respect 10 our lack of ri~te0U5ne55 Y1Ilid before God" (p. 159). As he has frequently said, if IoOmeone has done as much as lies in Ihat person's power 10 satisfy moral obHgalio!1$, aod has al least lried to continually approach complete harmony with the moral law, such a person "may hope lhal what is 1101 in his power will be supplied by lhe supreme wisdom in IoOme way or other" (po 159). Reason allows us 10 believe that there may be IlOpe for such assislance while strictly dc:nyiOi us the slighlesl Iheorelical grasp of whl this assistance mighl be. In romparinglhis position with that of those churches which pretend 10 specify exactly wIIal manner God U!.eS 10 supply the needed grace 10 human ity, Kanl raises this qUeltion, "Who, indeed, is now the unbeliever? Is it he

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REUGiON wrnllN ... REASON A WNE

who trusts without knowing how that for whidJ he hope5 win come 10 pass: or he who absolutely insi5ts upon knowing the way in which man is releasffl from evil. and if he cannol know Ihis. gives up all hope of thili release?" (pp. 15\1-1(0). AI \lIis stage we have only a common-sense meaning for this most significant nolion. hope. 1lte logic of hope is obviously a hiWc mailer for religion. in Kant's and in anyone's position. We wll turn 10 \lie development of \lie Logic: of hope in later chapten. OI1(C an individual violates the principle wi\ll whic:h Kant stalled this section.. \lie principle of not presuming to serve God by means that are lhemselves not purely moral, no real differel1(C octIIrs among the various ways of serving God. 1lJe5e mechanical ways, says Kant, ·are all alike in wonh. or rather ...·onhlC$SJIess· (p. 160). Kant lists somethilli of the variety of mechanicalteehruques thai have been dlo$en. "Whether the devotee betake5 himself to church, undenakes a pilgrimilge 10 the sam:tuaries in Loreto, brings formulas of prilyer In heaven wilh his lips., or by means of a prayer wheel like lhe Tibetan, whatever is $ublitituted fnr moral service, is equal and equally ~leS1: These are all called "pious play things: Kant interests hims.elf in poinling OUt the psychological phenomenon, as he calls iI, whereby fnlloo,o,'ers of a denominiltion with fewer statutory requirements feel ·liOmewhat ennobled and more enlightened by virtue of this fact· (p. 16 1). Kant IUggests that lhey may look down wilh contempt from their fancied heIghts of purity, "upon their brothen in churchly illusion: PreS41mably. Ouaken, U nitarians, Reformed Jews, and others, are examples of Ihis phenomenon. His explanation is thill because of the slight difference in belief. these groups find thermelves ·a little nearer 10 pure moral religion" (p. 161). Fanaticism is defined as the feeling that we can distinguish the effects of grace from those of nalure. or that "'e can produce tbe effecu of grace within ourselves. 'To wish to observe 5Ueh heavenly influences in ourselves is it kind of madness" (p. 162). ·It is a s.uperstitious illusion 10 ..i,h 10 become " 'ell pleasing 10

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God thtougb actioll$ which anyone can perform wilhout even needing 10 be a sood man ... for example, Ihrough ronfonnity 10 churchly observance and discipUnc. etc." (p. 162). This is the basis for Kant's rejeetioo of !l105t of the paraphernalia of organized rcligiom: If an act can be perfonned jusl as ...·e ll by an evil as a good perwn. the act has 00 moral value. And if tbe act hu 00 moral value, it has no religious value. AIs an cumpJe of a fana tical religious illusion, Kant mentiom \he fceli/li of the immediatc presence of Ihe Supreme Being, and distinguishes this from other Ceelinss induding the moral f~ling. One diffieully hele is that this f~J i ng would constitutc an activity for which therc is no sensory provision in human nature. A fanatical religious illusion is cal led "the moral death of reason, for without reason, after all. 00 reUgion is possible, since like all morality in general it must be established upon basic principles" (p. 163). 3. Concerning Oericalism as a Government in the Pseudo-Service of the Good Principle. Because the word "clericalism" may easily be misundentood, Kant uplains that in his comparison of the different sects he has 00 wisb to treat any one of them with contempt as contrasted with the othen.. ' All deserve the same respect so rar as their fornu are the atlemplll of poor monals to render perceptible to the senses the Kingdom of God on earth, but also the same blame when they take Ihe form of the representation of this idea in a visible church 10 be the thing itself (p. 163). Kant poinlll to the difference in manner but not in principle "between !be Shaman of the Tungll!C$ and a European prelate ruling over church and state alike" (p. 164). NOI me rely the leaden but also tbe fol1owen of the faith are again different in manner but not in principle; for uample, "!be wholly sensuous Wogulitc who in the morning places the paw of a bear skin upon bis head, with the shon prayer, 'strike me oot dead,' and the sublimated Puritan and Independent in Connecticut" (p. 164). Both of these parties make the mistake of taking something that

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in itse lf can never make a penon better and letting it sand for worship of God. Kant Usel the ~vrd "fetishiYn" to iland for the iUusion that one can bring about a supe rnatural effc.:t. throop merely natural means.. This definition does not apply to an efton to make oneself wonhy of supernau.mll assistance thrOllgh moral activily. But if Ihe meam to be used arc tbose that can be put into practice "by the most wicked man quite as well as by the ben: then we haye fetishism. As examples of this, Kant often formulas of invocation, churchly observances, and the general term "clericalism." Wherever saNtOI)' comJIIIUK!s., rules of faith, and obseryances form the c.'iSCIIce of a cburch, Kant bolds the chu rch to be 10 the Jrip of fetish-wonhip. Oericalism Indicates the de&ree to which a church is dominated by fetjsh-~"O!"Ship. Where fetishiYn is the: major propeny, we are yery close to paganUm. Kant holds thai the evil of a fetish-faith cannot be mitigated by a democratic structure for the church. Whether the: structure is monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic, if creedal ilatu tes are takeo to be c.'iSCntial we have the rule of the cIeri)'. Kant continues that a clergy in this po$itioo will orten think it carl dispell5e wilh reuon and even finally wilh scriptural learning. When a cieri)' takc.s ilsclf to haye the aUlhorily 10 guard and interpret lhe will of an invisible lcgislator, when it has the power, it need nol convince hut merely command. All of this can follow from a fetish state. To emphasize bow absurd and \IlUleCCs.sary it is 10 require I literal faith in any narratiye, Kanl claims that the concept of God as a moral legislator "can be elicited in its compleleBc.sS from anyone without his ever haying been instructed in it" (p. 170). This suggests it learning experiment like Plato'li in the MCllo. We arc nexl led to romider the doctrine of godlineu. The quc.stion is whether the doctrine of godlinCliS or the doctrine of vinue, or both, should colI$titute the main rontent of religious teaching. Both fear of God and love of God arc aken 10 be the relationship' comprising godlinCM.. The concept of a §upersensihle being with attributes beyond the moral relation always carries with

il llle danger of anlllropomorphism. There i$ mnply 110 SOllrce of knowledge of such a being. Since lIIe doctrine of virtue can sland by iue lf, wbereu the doctrine of godlincu, of a moral God, cannot stand by iuelf. Kant thinks that the doctrine of godliness can merely seNe as a means of strellglhening \he virtuom disposition. The religious OOl1CCpl needs \0 be ralional~d inlO being by mcan5 of arguments. In distinction, the: doctrine of virtue "derives from the soul of man. He is already in full pas ... uion of it, undeveloped no doubt" (p. 171). This concepl of virtue can awaken us \0 a capacity whim otherwise we would never surmi .... "A capacity of becomins able 10 muter Ihe Featest obstacies within ourselves. in the dignity of bumanity which man mUSt respect in his own person and hUlllaD de5tiny, toward whicb be strives ... in all this there i$ something which so uallS lbe soul and so leads it 10 the very Deity who is worthy of adoration only bemuse of bi$ bolioeu as legislator for virtue ..." (p. 171). As Kant has it, the ooncepl of virtue is ennobling. bul the ooncept of a world ruler who commands is demcaninJ, since Ihis "would incur the danger of dubing man's courage which goes 10 CIlOStiClile the essence of virtuc" (p. 172). The diffcrcnce betwecn a fawning. slavish, subjcction, and "the courage 10 stand on onc's own fect," 5CCDU clear and uDavoidallle 10 Kant. "When rcvtrcncc for God is put finl ... wilh virtuc subordinalcd, this object of reve rcnce beOOIIlC$ an idol .. ." (p. 173). Kant points 011 1 thai we attribute tcmperamental traits to different people based on dtaractcristics of tbcir rcligious belicfs. The separatism of Judai$m suggestcd the charge of misanthropy. "Mohammedanism" is cbaracterized by arroganl pride hccau!iC of ilS altitude toward the subjugation of many peoples. And !he Hindu failh he takes to give its followers the maracler of pusilla· nimity. Now he comes 10 the qUc§lion oftbe character uait of thc Christian faith. Thinking about tbo5c who cmpbaskc picty and take a passive altitudc toward a godliness wh ich is \0 be awaitcd from a powcr abovc, Kant claims that thi$ sigoalius a slavish cast of mind. He calls this self·abnegation I misronecived humility. "Such men never place Iny relianc:e in themselves, but look about

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them in perpetual arWety, for supernatural assistance (p. 173).

• • •"

4. Conceminll the Guide of Conscience in Mailers of Faith. Kant defines ronsciena: as "the moral faculty of judgment, passing upon itselr (p. 114). Under this definition ronscience docs not pass judgment upon actions; instead. it is rcuon judging itse lf, to see if it has really undenaken tbe romplele appraisal of ilS actiOIa. Therefore, he roncludes, "the undel'$laDdiog. DOt roDScieoce, judges whether an action is really right or wrong" (p. 114). Frequently, " 'hen we ask if a per10n has searched his or her roDScience, we might bener ask if tbat per10n bas seardlcd his or ber understanding. Conscience judges principle; the under, laDding judlles action. Kant introduces a basic moral principle that "requires no proof, that OM ocq;ht 10 haumi nothing thal may ~ ..1I:ItIg." (From the slaDdpoinr of tbe modern theo')' of error we note thai Kant Is rerommendiog a ceruin moral style in this mailer.') H e takes this requirement to be a postulate of consciencc. This is compared witb tbe principle that Kant finds unfonunately widespread: "II is c.r;pedien t to believe 100 much rather than tOO little, on the ground tbat what we do O'VCT and above what we owe will at least do no barm and might eveD help" (p. 176). Kant takes this to be a D illusion, ..... bicb makes dishonesty in religious confessions a ba$ic principle." He is oulrlliled at the hypocrisy. the disbonC$ty, the violation of conscience involved in such a principle. He takes the lIenuine maxim eompalible with religion 10 be just the reverse. Kanl proposes a tC5t quC$uon for every one who considers the mailer of dogmas regarded as divine revelations. Do you really trust yourself 10 aMen the truth of tbe$.e dogmas in the sight of the One who knows Ihe heart and .II Ihe risk of losing all that is valuable and holy \0 you? Kant himself prefen the good will which says, "Lord. I believe; help lhou my unbelie r (Mark IX. 24). (As did AuJUStine, who giVC5 us the same quotation in his ConlesJioru.) Suppose someone aru;\l{C1'$ Kant'!, que!.lion with the reply. "Ycs,

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133

let me be damned if what' &lay is nOI l1Ue.' He responds thaI if anyone could make lUeh a dreadful declaration, "' should advise the conduct toward him suggested by the Penian proverb about the hadji: If a man hu been in Mecca once as a pilgrim. ll\OVe out of the house in which he is living; if he has been there twice. leave the street on which he is [0 be found; but if he has beeo there three limes. foruke ttl<: city or even the land which he inhabits" (p. 178). The role that Kant has given 10 conscience requires sincerity. He admits "that candor (in speaking the ",hole truth which one knows) is not 10 be found in human nalure. But we demand sincnity. {that all thai OIte sayJ' be said wilh truthfulness . . .r (po 178). This recalls his own behavior when ordered 10 Slop publie lecturing and wrilin& on reliJjOll (mentioned in Cbapter One of Ihis book). Means of Grace The Gene~l Observation anached to the final seclion deals with the subject of Means of Grace. Two points are made dear al ttl<: outset. Fint, the coneepl of supernalural assistance is a bare idea and nothing more. We can never have any experience thai can Jjve us knowledge of its reality, or of ttl<: laW5 atXOrding 10 which il mighl occur. Yet, on the otber hand, the impossibility of sud! assislance. "cannot really be proyed" (p. 179). In connection with the second poin!, Kant remilllls us Ihal freedom itsel f, although it has nothing supernatural in i1$ conceplion, is jU$! as incomprehens.ible to Uli as is a supernalural factor or entity. (Here Kant equates the unknowable witb the mysterious, a distinction on which be had earlier insisted.) Given the two assenions above. what can be done with the idea of grace? In the language of contemporary logic, Kant holds Ihat we can men(iOit but not use this idea. An idea is used, or rather the name of an idea is used. wilen it designates something other than itself. A name is mentioned when it appears in a stllttrlct but do.!:s not rder to anything beyond ilself. Perhaps I

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have been tOO stringent In interpreting Kant on this maner. He does allow one slight we of the term "Grace; the assumption that whatever it is, it may possibly affect us in wa)'$ that our nature cannol, provided we have made the maximum use of our powen. In ~ry kind of public belief, Kanl fInds thaI people have devised practices for themselves as means of grace. For example, the fIve great commands in "Mohammedanism": washing. praying. fasting. alms giving. and pilgrimage to Mecca. Kant's interest Is always in classifying these thing!! as dther virtuOUS in themselves, and so a senuine means of grace, or merely ClIamples of fetishism. Kant had alteady mentioned that the phrase, "means of grace; is internally self
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. . . 10 act as thoop our actions were being executed in this service of God .. ." (p. 1&3). Kam warns apinst any explicit effort to clothe Ihis wish in words and formulas. He separates the spirit of pr.l.yer from Ihe Illusion in this way. In the s.piril of prayer, "man KeU bill ro IO'Otk upon hu.-/ffor the quickening of his di$pOSition by means of the idea of God"; while in the fetish variety, the human being tries ro ~ upon God. In the genuine sense, a prayer can be offered with perfect sincerity because "the mao praying does DOt presume to be able to affirm tbat lhe existence of God is wholly cenain." Recall that in this cue lhe individual el>5entiaUy wants 10 work upon himself or herself. In the iCCOod variety, "115 an addreM, he supposes this supreme being 10 be present in penon." Kaot adds, dryly, complete sincerity cannot be found in the latter, verbal, prayer. To illustrate the point about the !;incerity in vermu prayer, Kant challenges us to imagine a pious and well·meaning man. "Who someooe else takes unawares. I will not say in praying aloud, bul merely in behavior iodicative of prayer. Everyone will ... expect a man thus surprised to raU inlo confusion or embamwment 115 though in a situation whereof he should be ashamed" (p. 183). Why should web a penon be ashamed? Presumably became someone caUghl talking aloud to him is llIspeeted of a slight attack of madness., for behaving while alone in a way that we would ClIpec:t only if someone else were with Ihal person. Kanl insists that the tcacher of Ihe gospel has expresscd the spirit of prayer "mosl admirably in a formula whicb bas al once rendered dispensable not only all this bill also Ihe prayer itself as a verbal utterance" (p. 183). We must 00\ request something that God in divine wisdom might refuse us., but only a wish "10 become a man well pleasing to God." How abom the wish for the means of sustaininll. our existence-·for bread? The prayer for da ily bread is a prayer for an animal n.eed nllher than a distinc:tly human wish. Kant holds that the distinc:tly human wish would be for bread for anolher day. BUI his objection involves the Idea Ihal lhe petition for daily bread is addr~d 10 someone else. "It is funher not only a preposterOUS but also a presumptuOUS illusion to try to

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divine whether Ihrough the persistent importunity of one', requcsL God cannot be divened (to our present advantage) from the plan of his wisdom. Hence, we cannot hold that any prayer which is for a oon·moral object is lure to be heard .. : (p. 184). Kant generaJiz... that any prayer for III object that is possible only through supernatural influence, for something whose OC'aIrTence wouJd DOt trouble us to make our own efforts, is outside of the area in which we can pray. "I t follows that a gih of miracles ... taken literally, is not to be thought or (p. 184). What of the mere paMive contemplation of the profound wisdom of the divine creator? To this Kant responds that such contemplation would simply "U'lIIIIipon the mind into that thinking mood ealled adoration, annihilating men. as it were. in their own eyes" (p. 1&5). Kant does bold that set fonns of prayer fot children are of moral use. Children still stand in need of the leller. and 10 in their earliest yean they must be given the proper language In which to speak inwardly and make the allempt to allune the mind to the idea of God. But it muSI be made dear that the words being U&td are oot an aid to the imagination. The actual urvice of God "never consislll io mere feelings" (I'. 186). 1. Cbun:b-Goln" This is aUo presented [n Iwt) separale waY'. If formalitics are required thai might lead to idolatry. or "sensuous then the panem is contrary to the representations of command of rell5On. Here. interestingly enough. Kant takes a command of reason 10 be, Ibou $hal t 001 make unto thee any 4. graven illlll3e... : He makes the reference to Exodus without any comment ... all about the effect that this hu had on the ceremon.ial paltelll5 of Judaism. Kant's main point under Ihis heading is that church·going is a duty for the group. when it is thought of as a ceremonial public service of God. ' Public prayer is indeed no means of grace; yet it is • moral ceremony ... embracing aU the moral concerm of men" (p. 1&5). He COIltrasu puhlic prayers with privale prayen and finds that the mor:al benefit is found in the public pattern. The public ceremony repreltnting the ,HUOn of all people in a common desire for the Kingdom of

God:

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God, "cannot be: accomplished more appropriately than by speaking to the head of the Kingdom just as thoop he were sped.ally present in tbat vel)' place" (p, 185), Public: prayer can "raise the feelings to the point or moral eultalion , , , and possess a more rational basis than does private prayer for clothi", the moral wish, ....hich constitutes the spirit of prayer, in a formal mode of address," Kant adds quickly tbat this is done ",of,IlOW piaurins Ihc Supreme Being as present, yel he bas also said in lbe remark just quoted above, lhal this may be done, "as lhoop he were present." 3. s.pU. ., "Ibis a ims at something holy (the development of a man inlo a cilizen in a divine state) but the Ict performed by othen is not in itself holy or productive of holiness." llIerefoce, Kanl takes an initiation ceremony 10 be highly significant for an individual .... ho "is in a pCIIition, hinuelf, to confess his faith,' or "upon the wimcw>e who pledge themselves 10 take care of his eduClilion," yet il is no means of grace by it5elf, The aSPJmption thai il can ....ash away si ns Kant calls "an allllOil more Ihan heathenish supentition" (p. 187), ... Co_aalo.. Here apin Kant holds that ....e have I significant ceremony, provided that we do nol assert "that God bas attached special f'V(ln to the celebration of this solemnity: '"IlIc formality of I common partaking of the same table. contains witbin itself something great, expanding the narrow, selfish. and unsociable cast of mind among men, "-'pecially in matten of religion, loward lhe idea of a cosmopolitan moral community. It is I good means of enlivening a community to tbe moral dispo$ition of brotherly love which it represents" (pp, 187-88). There could hardly be a wanner endonement, yet he WIIns thai to think of it as more than a mere churchly act .... ould be: "a religious illusion ....hicb can do cooght hut work counter to the spirit of religion," Kant concludes these comments aoo...t the so-eaJled means of grace \\l tb a dcfinitiOll of dericalism in general It is the dominion of the dergy over people's beans, by arrogating to themsclves tbe prestige Ittached to exclusive possession of means of grace

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(p. 188).

or the three divine moral altrib\lIes, Iloline5$, mercy. and

justice. "man habitually turns directly to the second in o rder tl'lus 10 avoid the forbiddilli condition of conforming to the require· menu. of the fil'$t" (p. 188). "Man busies himself with every conceivable formality designed to indicate l'Iow gready he resp«U the divine commands, in ordc r thai it may not be ne«ssary for him to obey thcm." Kant concludes with Matthew VII. 2 1, where the human heing crics "L)rd, Lord: 50 as noI to l'Iavc 10 "do the will of his H eavenly Father." The Christian concept of Ihe chosen.. those wllo "in Iheir own opinion are extrMlrdinarily favored: is a concepl that Kant treau. with contempt. If we can know people by their fruits, be con· cludes that thU$ far .... e do DOl see that the chosen ones surpass in the very leut "the naUJrally bol\C$l man who (In be relied upon in lIOCial intercourse, in busincu, or in trouble; on Ihe coniraJ)'. taken as • whole, Ihe chosen ones can s.carcely .bide comparison with him, which PTm'eS thai the righl COUT$C Is not 10 go from grace 10 vinue. but rather to progress from virtue 10 pardoning grace." No religiOU$ mystic sland$ above "men of native honesty who . .. take religion unto themselves not as a 5ubstitute for but as a funheran.ce of the vinuous d~tion. which $I\0I0.'$ itself through actiollli in a good COUT$C of life" (p. 189). 1be reader who has completed this comme ntary chapter and desires a brief in!erpretation Is advised to tum to Chaple r E1eveo of this book, "1'he R eligiOU$ Question."

Part II APPLICATIONS OF REASON

Four

AMBIVALENCE: THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL This chapter, true 10 its subject, tends 10 II"IOYe toward IWO pis. One is the effort 10 generaliu on Kant's notion of the subli me and make some features of WI into the euential pallem of human OlIIUTe. The other is the development of a formal model for dassilyiog twenty~igbt differeot types of ambivalence. The coonection between these IwO goals is lIle view WI serious attention to Kant's tbeory of human ambivalence requ ires a logically acceptable set of models for ambivalence. The formal or logical material on ambivalence is preceded by ~eraJ sections presenting Kant's views on human happiness, the idea of ambiVllknee, the n.ature of ranalicbm, and the monist and dualist traditions. The form.al material on ambivalence is followed by a section on the history of the relations between Kanl's and olber views of hwnan nature, and a 1ICCti0n on the sourcn and implications of Kant's dua.listie model Finally, comments are given 0 0 the connections between ambivalence and hoocsty. I, HapploeJil

We have already seen that Kant's dualism applie5 to individuals, and we have already considered his rejection of individual happiocu lIS a foundation (or morality. These IwO elements will continue to be basic lIS we orpnize his conception of individual human nature. Kant'. ethical theory aa~e several arguments for the rejection of happine5S as a basis for morality.' Morality apart, the very idea of bappine5S has a strange complication. 10 addition to the more famil iar points. Kant holds that "the concept of happiness is 50

1<2

TIlE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

indefinite thaI, although each person wishes \0 altain it, he can never ... Siale what it is he really wishes and willi.'" After Ihis p"sag.: follows .. formal explanation of this problem of tile inability 10 prodU(e ". definite concept" of happiness. Kant concludes that the task of determining the imperative or principle which would produce "the happiness of a rational being is completely unsolvable," Here be i5 considering the Cl
1. ...... d Vee : The AJIIbl ... lence or lIN! I.dhidual The phrase. "and yel: is used rcauJarly at critical points in Kant's work on elhics aDd religion! Und dot;h and dcch w.gIdch are liberal ly sprinkled ill almost every seeUon. Far from a stylistic

rlXity, the phrase, ' and yel.' indicated Kant's view that opp17 d principles exist wilhin the human individual. What are these principles? We have already seen them: reason and sensuousneM, the categorical imperative and personal veed, ete. Consider the .....y matten are put in several key pau.ages. Humanity, ' despite a corrupted heart yet possesses a good will" (R.digion, p. 39). uter on, "Our reuon commands us potently. yrI without maJrins either promises or w eall .... (RdigiOfl, p. «). Kant holds that the only .....y that a person can frame a concept of a moral dispoJition is by "picturing il ai encompassed by ob!iotacles. and reI. in the face of the fierceSI onslaughts, victorious •. ." (RdlgKm, p. S5). In another basic passage, "The idea of the hipest good . .. cannot be realized by man himse lf ... yet he e

~

J..cric of Ambivalence

143

disroveT5 within himstlf the duty to work (or this end" (Religion. p. 130). "And yel" OCCUT5 al doum of crilical points; il is required by the thought The thoupt in queslion is the conceplion of an ambivalent individual. 'The problem of this chapter is to develop a notion o( ambivalence that makes both logical and psy<:hological sense. Kant has KI fonh some of the require ments of Ibili conception, bul despite its importance (or bi5 whole posilion, he has left eoonnous pps in his theory of human nature. We will have to develop his d ues. To have one goal and yet have an opposite goal al the IiI1RIC lime does leave us wilh quite a (ew questionable mailers. Among the i55ues rai'ed by !he erron to have a logically consistent theory of ambivalence are these. ( I ) T o intend to reach a goal may require having an image or a model of that goal. What is the image for an ambivalent goal? (2) If a model turns OUI to be self..conlradiClOry. that indicales JOme error about lhe intention. 3) If an intended goal is not possible. it apptU'Mtly can't be actual-thai is, the intention did IlOl occur, even if the subject thoupt it did. What did oemr? Each of these malleT5 is subjed 10 debate; a OOgeDl lhemy of ambivalence mUSI clarify its stand on all of them. What follows addresses these and other problems in a fashion that is consislent with the requirements of KaDt's position and the relevant fragments 10 be found in hi5 work. 'I'hi5 chapter worb OUI a position that gives full scope to the psychological fact of ambivalence. Experimental work lies ahead on the nature of ambivaJeocc. But let us try to use what may be assumed to be the flct of ambivalence withoul sacrificin& any of the demandli of logic. Firs!, whit is the fact? Second, why respect logic?

1. Ambh-aieace .... FI.. l tklsm To Slart, I will Slate things. dogmatically, and argue laler. Here is the fact with which we shall be concerned: jnJiWfrwlr ate ure1lfiDllyambNaJent. Comider the ass.enion that individuals have

\

..

TIlE LOGIC OF AMBIVAlENCE

opposed intentions 115 • rued pan of their naturel, that they are

c§Senlia1Jy, rather than accidentally, ambivalent. For WIY of /11dr objrai»es, they hatIe at fras/ JOnIC UutrW ill lUI oppo=l objtaive. Freud has made us familiar with life and death instiru:ts and with childhood ambivalence toward parents. But these are often presenled by others either as pilthoJogicaJ or as stages in growth. Instead, suppose that we take ambivalence to be the ordinary or healthy stale of affairs.. Immediately "'Ie are «Infronted by wbat is called the "doublc-bind" theory. This rcfcl'$ 10 • kind of ambivalence in whieh .n individual is given lncoosislCni me
diffe rent. SolIN: kind. of ambivalence may well be alrable, but cenalnly 1101 every kind. This requires I .....y of classllyins kind$ of ambivalences, and this chapler provides II leasl one way. Since lOme psychialrist5 try 10 undersland ambivalence. not elimirnlle il. a way 10 classify ambivalence is Mcenaf)'. Whenever an individual bas DM objecti~, lbal penon has at least lOme ioteteSl in another objective that is opposed 10 iL Take this to be the healthy stale of affilirs. If an individual has merely a toosistent set of Boals. has no ambivalence, let us call that person f(mQ1icDJ. SeIf-impo$Cd binds are normal, not pathoJogicaL We an still distilllLlish heal thy and unhealtby ambivalences. More on this bel(J\/l. But we may assume that Q faNZtic is someone who has merely, sin&Je objecti~, or a tonsistent sct of objectivn. Such a penon thinks that his or her single objective is il. is sufficieoL This penon is DOl e~o slightly interested in an alternative to tnal aoat. For such an individual only one heaven exists, and nothing is wonh a deviation or a pause in &Ctting there. b tim an ordinary or an unusual aMumplioo7 A tontemporary reference may help. In his book on tonflict resolution, Kenneth Bouldina made a Umilar point

'I'M Logic of Ambtvaklt«

no. rnH;"·'. oSevotce, wit"' ..ly .......,liued,""' .. a ~ barpi pooiI"'" boao .....

...W'.

0I1lie

ior ...... obIc Nt"", 01

'".

tkir ......aIit_ ... llIey

~ ccuccd,

boaollK I...,. will die I"ItI!er ll!aa ~ up lloeir fa411 """ pnoct.icc. Before lloe hUlk. ordUwy reo,o"H< "'... &Ie "'!pIcM: ,bey tan be. """"'" """ lhc r..." tanllOl. II a t...p;a ir. wlOd, ~ "''''' be. . . the. f....ri<:'. ......... kw "" ",be, &Ie poo&ibIo.. WbcI!. w...ic: Itib • diff....,.. f..... k. 01 course, "" bupia tan be .,rvd II aU.'

.emu

11Iey strike each other. Bouldin, takes a fanatic to be someone who has an ' irrevocable" commitment. In OUT teons, such an individual would have no ambivalence, no interest in the opposite of her or his commitment. For BouIding. ·ordinary, reasonable men" do not have any irrevocable commitment. and 1 assume Ihis means tbat ordinal)' people do ha"e some possible interest in the opposite of their goals.. They am consider a compromise because. afler aU, they are oot perfealy consistent about their loals; they do have some opposed interest, some ambivalence concemillJ strongly held objectives. even their Havin, found wppon in someone else. a rontemponll), wriler who takes the ordinal)' penon 10 be ambivalent, "'e shall 10 on 10 coru.ider a second mailer. If ambivalence is not yel an established fact, it is at least a reasonable hypolhesis.

mos.

4. The Requ irements or Logie

Let liS now make the assumption that human heini\.' are ~liaJJy ambivalent-not accidentally, not as a stage in growth. not just when victimittd by a pathological family. eiC. 001 by their own nalUres. 11Ie problem now is 10 prodllce a theory of ambivalence !lUll does 1101 make our ordinary ambivalenl person look irnltional when compared 10 the fanal ic. Suppose an individu al has two 10als. Ind they are inconsistent. It is the fallacy of ignarotio t~neJoj to ask which thaI person would prefer if both goals could not he had. (Thi~ it. the f"llacy of Ignorance of the Point at luue. It OCCUTJ wilen lhe response 10 a question is not pertinent to Ike i55Ue at stake.) It is ignorance of the pain! at iSliue because 5uch a person wants boIlI. even if Ihey

'"

m E LOG IC OF AM BIV AU'..NCE

are il\OOlIliislenl A logical obstacle appean to the mere thought (or picture) of reaching contradictory slales of affairs. Would you like 10 draw a square-drde? One can say 50, but logic doesn't Jet Wi take the ambition seriously. If wmething is logically impo5.ii· ble, can il be psycholOj;icaUy poMible? Our problem can be solved by acknowledging that while contradictory natcme nts cannot be true al Ihe ia/TlC time. they lTIiIy hold a' different times. It is impouible 10 picture the colliradiclion of being in this room.nd 1'101 being in this room at the $;Imc time. However, one can picture such events svifJ/ly: one can constlllC! an il'lUlgc of oneself here. and afterwards outside. then again in. then 001, in, out, etc. Such images can be quickly f1ruohcd in an individual's thought. Memben of a oolltradictory pair can each be pres<=nl al slightly differenllimes.. The difference between the Ja/llC time and times thaI differ by extremely small fractions of a seeond seems psyehologieaUy trivial, Itowevt:r logically significam. Suppose three conditions to hold: (a) an individual vaciUates between losicaHy contradictory po!)iitions, (b) the interval between the alternativt:s is quile short. and (c) Ihal person is a ..... re of the rapid vacillation between the po$ition!;. An individual ""ith these three conditions is then aware of himself or herself as holding contradictOry po!)iitions at uuntial/y the ~me time. With rapid enough vacillation between tbem, one produces the psychological effect of holding contradictory po!)iitions. wilhou! any breach of logic. Ambivalence inVQl'lCli ~cillaling bet""een a1ternative5 tllat are in one or anotller 50rt of k>gieal opposition. We ""ill consider the kinds of oppo!)iition in til<: nell! section. If sevcraltimes differ only by minule fractions of a 5eC()nd. [or ll1yehological purposu Ihey are simultalK'OlJs. If an imerval is so short that it iii not significant to hisect it and n()\ice ""hich alternative came in the fil'$t and ""hieh in the second half. then those alternatives arc effectively simultaneous. When the individual is not aware of ""hich of the IWO alternatives occurred fir-a and ""hieh second. they are simultanwus, few Iilal penon.

Th~

Logic of Ambil'llknu

\ <7

.5, The Fol'IILI..I Propen ies or a Cube or Opposition T o be ronvincing, our notion of arnbivalelll:e must have a ronsistent {onnal interpretation, 'Ibis section ronsm.u:ts jusl wch an iDt~rpretalion. Our conslruction foll0W5 lhe pa ttern of Aristotle', well-known Square of Op~tion. but we shall enlarge it inlo a cube. Deftnltlnns of Some Varieties of Opposition A "square of opposition" provides a way nf classifying and showing some of the structure of four different ways thai $IatemenlS may be opposed 10 olher statements. A pair of stalements may be (a) ronlnldictoriu: that is, they can not both be true or bolh be false. If ei the r one is true, the other mmt be false. EnmpJe; "Today is Monday: and "Today is I'WlI Monday: A pair of statements are (b) WIIlrwy when they cannot both be true, but theyelUl both be faJsc. EJtample: "Today is Monday: and "Today is Tuesday." A pair that are (e) subeomroty, have a different property; they can both be true, but Clnnot both be false. Example: "Some days are sunny: and "Some days are IIOt sunny: A pair are !laid to be (d) subalItnU when they can both be true, and also they can both be false. EJtample: "Every day is sunny,' and "Some days are sunny: A fifth pattern should be IIOted, "'hen ililemenu I re (e) ~nt in truth-value. They I re held equ ivalen t in this IiCIlSe when they are either both true or both false. Statements may be equivalent in deserving the label "true" or "false" and yet have different referen(C5. Example: "Wll$hinglOn was Preside nt of the USA," and ")Cant was not P resident of the USA," Both true, but somewhat different meaniTl{:$-

148

TIlE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

5. 1 Moods of Amblnltatt

For ambivalenc:e to be displayed "''CO must have at least one individual lubject. onc goal. and one pattern of opposition. One goal will JiYC UI just the simplu\

ca.5e..

The individual, A, either

(I) accepts, or (2) reject$, or (3) neither accepts nor rejects an objective, B. To simplify still further, we will assume (uwal!y) that the third CiI5C does 1101 occur, aDd our subject either accepu or rejcru the objective, B. We now consider four po$itions thaI a subject, A, may take on the matter of rejecting 5OnlCthing, B. Likewise. oollSider four positlo11$ that A may take in the mancr of accepting B. Diagram 3 displays these eight positions on acceptil18 and rejecting as the eight comers of a cube.

Diagram 1 Square or

P~hok>pcal

Opposition roT

2

I A always rcjecu B

s

~ion

A never rejecu B

COl'ITRARIES

s

U

U

B

B

A

T

A L T

R

• R

N

N

L

•

SUBCONTRARIES A iOmelimu rejectS B

A sometimes

does nol reject B

•

J

..9 At the top left point of the 'Quare is a ~ ~ statement, and a' the top ri&J!t comer a ~ "'V;~, with the umc subject and predicate. At the \ower left corner is • pa1ficuIor affUrruuive, and at the lower ri&hl romer a particuItlr nqatm, with the same subjects and predicates as !he twO 1.II1iverwi 5Ulements. It will then be dj~red that the two diagona.ls. lines 1·3, and 24. connect pairs of Slatcmeol$ that arc contradictory. The back face of the eube-comcn 5, 6, 7, and S-Offcn four positioos involvina the aca:plin& of B.

Diagram 2 Squre of Psycbolo&leaJ Oppolltion lOr Ac«pnace

,

, A

A always accepts B ...

n~r

accepts B

CONTI
s ,--------, S U

U

A

•

•

L T E

L T E

R

R

N

N

SUBCONTRARIES A sometimes accepts B

A

A sometimes does

1101 accept B

8

7

Tbe sq\lare$ in Dlagranu I and 2 ea.n. be placed on opposite races of • cube, as in Diagram 3. We can then interpret this as a CtN of PJyclwlogiroJ. Opparition. Each line connects two

150

niE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

comers, and so each tine preenl5 one kind of ambivalence: ambivalenc'e ronsis'in& in v.emllion between tile positions It each end of the line. eaeh romer.

Diagram 3 C'llbe of Pl)'dloIo&lW Opposhkm

;'----: ' ,, ,, ,

,

,, . ---•

•

•

, ---

." - - - ••

•

TIle position at each corner is as follows:

I - A always rejects B. 2 - A never rejects B. 3 - A sometimes docs not reject B. 4 - A sometimes rejeru B. 5 - A aJwa)'5 aa:epts B.

6 - A never aecepts B. 7 _ A sometimes does not ac:eepl B.

8 - A sometimes Ic:eePI5 B.

(I) R(a,B.I) (I) · R(a.El.t) (El) ·R(a.El.t) (El) R(a,8,t) (I) A(a, B.I) (I) ·A(a,El.t) (Et) ·A(a,El.I) (EI) A(a,B.I)

17~

Logic of Ambivalclce

lSI

1lIe line between 1 and 2 represents the osciJ[ation between always rej«tinK B and never rejectill& B. An individual whose ambiYaJence consists ohacillating between Sometimes rejecting B. and Sometima 00{ rejectin& B, would bave bis or her pallern illustrated by the line between 4 and 3. The ~be has twelve edges, each consislill& of a line that presents one patlern of ambivaJence. There are six faces on the ~be, and each (ace can have a pair of diagonals connecting its cornen. These diagonal Iina are not drawn on the cube in Diagram 3, bUI may easily be specified. as [·3,2-4,2·7, 3-6, elc. Since there are We faces. there are twelve face diagonals. 10 addition, there are four interior diagonals (nol drawn on the ~be of Diagram 3), 1·7.2-8, 3-5, and 4-6. We therefore have a total of 28 lines COfIMCtMg opposiJe oorn6J of tbc cube. EDCh of these lines can ~ taken to rqJIf:SDd a ~arU:ty of am~ benVl!'" the opposite posirioru QJ W DId of the fitIe. The 28 typeS [aJ[ into rlYe logical varielies: contradiClOfy, contrary, sub
152

1HE LOGIC OF AMBIVAlENCE

equivalenl 10 nol bein& attrac!ed by B, .1.1 !hal time. Symbolically, R ( ..8,1) is equivalenl 10 -A (a.B,I). (2) 1be statemenl r.hat 5Omeone is always repelied by B is equivalenl 10 the statemenl r.hal il is false 10 say r.hat sometimes thai penon is nol repelled by B. Following the lI5UaI symbols and rules for quantification, (I) R (a,8,I) is equivalent 10 -(EI) -R(a,8,I). Another a;lfnmon rule in logic: lells us r.hat (3) If 5Ollleone is sometimes repelled by B, lhis is equivaJenlto bolding that it is false thaI our penon is never repelled by B. (Et) R(a.B,I) is equivalenllO ·(1) -R (a,.B,I). (4) By wbstiluoon of ( I) in (2), the risht band side of (I) for the equivalenl material on Ibe rishl band side of (2), and the law of double negation, we gel the auertion lbal '0 is always repelled by B," is equivalent 10 ' Q is never attracted by B: (I) R(a, B,t) is equivalenl 10 {EI) A(a,B.t). It will be convenient 10 have three more equivaleoc:esstated in this form. (5)'Q is always attracted by B: is equivaleOl to 'Q is nevt:r repelled by 8." (I) A(a,B,t) is equivalent to -(EI) R (a, B,t). (6) ' Q somelimes is repelled by B: is equivalent to'Q sometimes is not attracted by B." (EI) R(a,B,t) is equivalenl to (EI)A( ..8,I). (7) 'Sometimes D is not repelled by B; is equivalent to "sometimes 0 is attrac:ted by B: (EI) -R(a, B.t) is equivalent 10 ( Et) A(a.8,I). These assumptioO$ and consequences allow us 10 wnven any of the ' standard formulations" ot attraction and repulsion into an equivalent formulation. By these devices we quickly discover the propcnies of the twenty-ei&ht lines involved in the cube.

Propenles ot Ihe ~nl1-El"'l Unes of Opposition In the Cllbe Each venical face of the C\lbc: consists of a full traditional square of opposition, with contraries a5 the lop line, wbamtraries as r.he bonom line, subalterns as sides, and contradictories for diagonal\. 'The top face of the C\lbe, 1-5-6-2, is compo5otd of contrary lines. The hIlttam face, 4-3-7-8, is composed of subcon-

The Logic Logic of of Alnbivalence Ambivalence The

153 153

traries. The The diagonals diagonals on on the the top top face face (1-6, (1-6, and and 2-5) 2-5) and and on on the the traries. bottom face face (4-7 (4-7 and and 3-8) 3-8) tum turn out out to to connect connect equivalent equivalent positions. positions. bottom Equivalent statements statements must must be be either either both both true true or or both both false. false. Equivalent To adopt adopt one one isis equivalent equivalent in in truth-value truth-value to to adopting adopting the the other. other. To To be be equivalent equivalent in in truth-value truth-value need need not not be be the the same same as as equivaequivaTo lent in in reference. reference. The The interior interior diagonals diagonals (1-7, (1-7, 2-8, 2-8, 3-5, 3-5, and and 4-6) 4-6) lent each connect connect aa subaltern subaltern pair. pair. Notice Notice that that the the front front face face is is each couched in in terms terms of of "reject," "reject," the the rear rear face face in in terms terms of of "accept," "accept," and and couched connecting faces faces contain contain both both "reject" "reject" and and "accept." "accept." the connecting the 12 edges: edges: 12 1-2 contraries contraries 1-2 4-3 sub subcontraries 4-3 contraries 1-4 subalterns subalterns 1-4 2-3 subalterns subalterns 2-3 5-6 contraries contraries 5-6 8-7 subcontraries subcontraries 8-7 12 face face diagonals: diagonals: 12 1-3 contradictories contradictories 1-3 2-4 contradictories contradictories 2-4 5-7 contradictories 5-7 contradictories 6-8 contradictories 6-8 contradictories 1-6 equivalent 1-6 equivalent 2-5 equivalent 2-5 equivalent 44 interior diagonals: interior diagonals: 1-7 subalterns 1-7 subalterns 2-8 subalterns 2-8 subalterns 3-5 subalterns 3-5 subalterns 4-6 subalterns 4-6 subalterns SUMMARY: SUMMARY: contradictories contradictories == 88 contraries == 44 contraries subcontraries =4 subcontraries =4 subalterns =8 subal terns =8 equivalences ^ 44 equivalences 28 28

5-8 subalterns subalterns 5-8 6-7 6-7 subalterns subalterns 1-5 1-5 contraries contraries 2-6 2-6 contraries contraries 4-8 4-8 subcontraries subcontraries

3-7 3-7 subcontraries subcontraries

2-7 2-7 3-6 3-6 4-7 4-7 3-8 3-8 4-5 1-8 1-8

contradictories contradictories contradictories contradictories equivalent equivalent contradictories contradictories contradictories

IS'

11iE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

If the from face (1·2·~) is kept fmd and the rear face (5-6-78) rotated. three additional cubes et.J\ be produced. However, these new cubes make no conlnootion to our purpose of chwifying the patterns of oppo$ition. 'The!WTle lines of opposition remain. a1tbough edges beoome diagonals, elc. Now we need an interpretation of the5e patterns of opposition.

be Ulldemood as w.;illating bm._ poMOtU til I~ elfds uf any of 'he litru of t~~. TIle twenty-eight lines, or varieties of ambivalence have turned OUI \0 consist of eight contBdiaorics, four contraries., four subromraries., eight 5UballC1ll$, and four cqllivalcncics. Each of these varieties bll$ its Jo&ical structure and set of alternatives available to the ambivalent individual Amb~ CUll

1be individual who OKiU.teI betweell contradictory positions faces the most 5C\'CfC kind of "bind," For eumplc, a vacillation be~cn •A always accepts B" and •A sometimes does not accept B." These a1ternativC$ cannot both occur, simult.allcousJy; and they cannot both be .voided. simultaneously. One and only one must obtain. Formally. OM a1Id CIIJy OM of the scntences describing them can be true. However, til difft!riru lima a person ean act as if rust one and then the other sentence were true . But, since they are mntndictories, at any specified time just one of the two sentences must be true. (bJ Ambiv
ContrariH present an entirely different !let of alternatives. In thi5 case while om: cannot obtain both simultallCOUsly, thq COlI botll ~ atIOided. In an ambivalence between "A always accepts Sand "A never accepts B,· a pc'rson might behave as if one of the

The Logic The Logic of of Ambivalence Ambivalence

155 155

two were were true, true, then alternate and and take other to and two then alternate take the the other to be be true, true, and for still aa third third response, response, behave behave as as if if neither neither one one were case. for still were the the case. third response is not possible in the case case of of ambivalence ambivalence This third This response is not possible in the between contradictories. contradictories. (While (While not not logically logically possible, possible, it be between it might might be psychologically possible that one one mistakes mistakes aa pair of contradictories contradictories psychologically possible that pair of for contraries.) contraries.) for (c) Ambivalence Between Between Subcontraries (c) Ambivalence

One whose ambivalence consists consists in in vacillating vacillating between subconOne whose ambivalence between subcontraries has three alternatives. In In such such aa case, case, one one may as traries has three alternatives. may behave behave as if either either one one or or the other were the case, and thirdly if the other were to to be be the case, and thirdly as as if if both were were to to occur. occur. Consider Consider ambivalence ambivalence between between "sometimes "sometimes both rejecting B" and "sometimes "sometimes not not rejecting rejecting B." Subcontraries can Btl and B." Sub contraries can rejecting both occur occur together, together^ but but atat least least one one of of the the two two must must occur: occur: they they both cannot both both be denied. The The pattern of vacillation might be denied. pattern of vacillation here here might cannot consist in in alternating alternating between between the the choice choice of of which falsify or or which one one to to falsify consist forgo, or or it it might might depend depend on on not not realizing both may occur. forgo, realizing that that both may occur. (d) Ambivalence Between Between Subalterns (d) Ambivalence Subalterns

This pattern of ambivalence logically permits two ways of of avoiding oscillation. oscillation. The The alternatives alternatives may may both they avoiding both be be had, had, or or they may both both be be avoided. avoided. In In addition, addition, subalterns subalterns are are related so that that related so may one is is aa universal universal and and the other aa particular, particular, for for instance, instance, "A "A one the other always accepts accepts B," and "A "A sometimes sometimes accepts accepts B," universal always B," and B." If If the the universal statement is is true, true, the one must must be, particular statement the particular particular one be, but but the the particular may hold hold while while the the universal universal is is false. false. To To summarize, summarize, subalterns subalterns may allow three three patterns, (1) they they may may both be false, false, (2) (2) they both both be they may may both allow patterns, (1) be true, true, and and (3) (3) the may be be false false and and the the be t~e universal universal member member may particular member may may still still be true. particular member be true. (e) Ambivalence Equivalences (e) Ambivalence Between Between Equivalences

Even when the descriptions of two positions poSItIons are actually 'equivalent equivalent logically, that equivalence may may not be recognized.

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Consider (with our IWO-Yalued assumpUOIll) 'A alwa)'li rejects 8," and ' A never accepts B: II may take a number of complicated logical transformations and ~bstitulions 10 cstablish the equivalence. Or, emotional connections with one formulation may make i\ difficult to see the loJical relalion. Finally, vacillation may O<:eUt be~cn preferred formulations or descriptions of the same situation. But formally, if a pair of pn$itions are logically equivalent, either they may both be accepted or both rejected. They suffer or enjoy the same fale.

5.3 So_ Re ...llts of This Modtl What can now be uid ,bout tbe rationality of !he ambivalent individual? First, thai JUeh a penon has more than onc imerCSI in the world, which dislin&uishcs such. penon from Ih05e we have called fanatic. II is nol obviou~y beneT or more rational in every ca!O!: 10 seek f~T &oals. Second, patterns of ambivalence can be classified in a wide variety of ways, as our tweDty-eighl lines 00 a simple cube indicates. Among these p.IICms of ambivalence, some can be maintained easily and some not. Some can be maintained by slowly osciJlating bcrwecn alternatives, and others by rapid oscillation. Some may he "IIeallhy," and others oot. llIese matters would take us 100 Car from our objectives in this study of Kant', views. We have at least established a way of understanding a dualist model of human nature, alllsiructed without violeoce to the demands of logic. Sucb a model can lhow IIOt ollly diffe reDt logical varieties of ambivalence, as this chapter illustrates. but also degrees of ambivalence. Within each of these tweDIy-eight kinds of ambivalence may easily exist unequal interest in the particular opposites. A more clinically U$eful model might have to include a way of measurin& tlte degree of interest in each of the poles of the particular "tine" of ambivalence. Sucb developments will be ignored in tlte remainder of this chapter. We shall fUm 10 some other theories of human nature that have beeD pro~d in tlte bistory of such

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6. The The Monist Monist Tradition Tradition 6. Theories of of conflict conflict have have been been presented presented regularly regularly in in the the history history Theories of thought. thought. Before Before Plato, Plato, Heraclitus Heraclitus held held that that everything everything takes takes of place by by strife. strife. The The problem problem isis to to discriminate discriminate between between healthy healthy place and unhealthy unhealthy strife. strife. For For this this we we need need analyses analyses of of the the notions notions of of and and of of human human strife. strife. Heraclitus Heraclitus gave gave us us an an early early statement statement health and health of ambivalence. ambivalence. of Though reason reason is is common, common, most most people people live live as as Though understanding peculiar pecuHar to to themselves. themselves. With With what what understanding associate, with with this this they they are are at at variance. variance.88 associate,

though they they had had an an though they most most constantly constantly they

The history history of of thought thought since since Heraclitus Herachtus has has often often taken taken this this to to be be The an error error or or aa weakness. weakness. If If you you are are at at variance variance with with what what you you also also an take to to be be most most dear, dear, you you are are supposed supposed to to be be in in trouble. trouble. Let's Let's take call the the position position that that holds holds that that one one should should be consistent the the call be consistent monist assumption. assumption. For the monist, or healthy healthy monist For the monist, the the proper, proper, best, best, or pattern is where where all all of of the an individual pattern is the goals goals that that an individual has has are are aa consistent set. I'm has I'm assuming assuming that that monism monism (or (or rationalism, rationalism, as as it it has consistent set. sometimes sometimes been been called) called) is is Heraclitus' Heraclitus' view. view. For For him, him, you you ought ought to to have inconsistent have only only aa consistent consistent set set of of objectives; objectives; if if you you have have an an inconsistent set, are bad. bad. If If you you want want to to associate associate with with someone someone or or set, things things are something, variance. something, you you should should be be in in agreement agreement with with it, it, not not at at variance. Presumably, when Heraclitus Heraclitus says says that that most most people people live live in in this this Presumably, when strange he suggests suggests that that he he doesn't doesn't and and that that they they shouldn't. shouldn't. strange way, way, he What are the examples that he gives? Consider what or What are the examples that he gives? Consider what or who who itit is is with which people most constantly associate (his phrase). Their with which people most constantly associate (his phrase). Their parents, parents, when when young; young; family, family, friends, friends, jobs, jobs, later later on; on; and and the the "most "most constant" is yourself. yourself. So, So, Heraclitus Heraclitus assumed assumed constant" associate associate you you have have is that what we are calling essential ambivalence is bad. The that what we are calling essential ambivalence is bad. The object object of philosophy, or medicine, is to get rid of that. of philosophy, or medicine, is to get rid of that. This This monist monist tradition tradition was was also also accepted accepted by by seventeenth-century seventeenth-century rationalists. rationalists. Spinoza's Spinoza's Ethics Ethics isis the the classical classical presentation presentation of of aa monism monism so so complete complete that that itit insisted, insisted, "No "No one one can can hate hate God" God" (Proposition (Proposition XVIII, XVIII, Part Part V). V). As As aa corollary corollary to to this this proposition. proposition,

158

lHE LOGIC OF AMBIVALENCE

SpillOD aIso argued. "Love loward$ God cannot be: changed into batred." 'The monist (or rationalist) tradition thaI Heraclitus represents has had • lona and impressive grip on the history of thought. II has become familiar as "common scnse." 1l1C only trouble is that it is a theory of machines rather than human beings. Only machines or IIIMe wfferill8 serious disturbances are moniSt about their goalL This chapter is an eflon 10 preserve rationalism (ronsisumcy) in tM deJCriplion of human beinp, but 001 in the namre of the human beings described. The ambivalence in hul\Wl nature has been obYious !O many fipres in the history of thought. Ho",ever, it was frequently taken to be ", disease of the mind" as St. Augustine put il in Book VOl of his CoIffe ssUuU;

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Return for. momelll to the lWumplion that health requires I consistent set of goals. We may put this in tel1Il$ of the Socratic Ra/ioIulJisI Assumption; If an individual knew what WI$ good for him or her, it would be preferred !o anything else. Greek rationalism seems 10 have beld tbat human beings are eilSCntially monist, consistent; therefore, all problems arc problems of luIowledge. If you really knew what WI$ best for you, if you knew youneif thoroughly, and knew the environment thoroughly, then there would be no funher problems. All problems are problems of oIHainiItg knowledge. That is, the gooll an individual hl$ (r~ Good) are not in conflict. We have called this monism. If you don't take monism to be compelling. you then have the problem of dedding which kinds nf dualism are the healthy ones. Whieh

'" kind$ of ambivalence must you never II)' to cure or wipe out, and which kind of ambivalence oug}!! you to try 10 eliminate? Should a variety of ambivalence be encouraged in some situation? This chapler assumes that, under at leasl one interpretation.

Socrates is wrong. A single consistent set of objectives is nOI DOIUW for humans. You might object thai Socrates was not offerill8 the namai, but the idMi for humQII ~havior. Call Socrates' assumption, "naive optimism: This optimism has lasted a long lime, yel il has alternated with various kinds of dualism. Greal names can be dropped on each side. The problem of stating the exact po$ition thai Socrates held is rather complicated. so I iiball select iUustratiom father than claim historical complete~

In Xenopbon'l McmomliiJia of SocroteJ. we fInd "tho$e who could di$(ern tbo$e thinp (thai were honorable and good) would never prefer anything else to them ...-- People who "never prefer anything elsc' apparently have no ambivalence about the maUer. This leaves us with the question of whether people exist who actually do discern those things, although the rontut suggests that Socrate5 think$ they do. In anotber passage. after defining Envy as "a certain UDeasiness , , , at the good lUCceSS of their frielMk," Socrales is reported to have said, Ihis feeling [of Envy[ COIJld never arise in the breast of a seru;ible man, hut that the foolish were COll§tantly affected with it" " PrellUmably, only the foolish are amhivalent about their friends! We are led to believe some sensihle people exist, !hose who satisfy the ideal of complete oomisteocy about their concern for Iheir friends' successes, Exactly the same maner, consistency loward the success of one's friends, was used by Kanl 10 illumatc his oppruition to the monist conception of human nature, Earlier we found thaI Kanl quotes with agreement La Rochefoucauld', 0,

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To To the the response response of of Socrates Socrates that that this this feeling feeling would would not not arise arise "... ,. in in the the breast breast of of aa sensible sensible man," man," Kant Kant would would hold hold that that human human beings beings are are not not purely purely sensible sensible or or rational rational creatures. creatures. We We shall shall return to to Kant's Kant's position position shortly. shortly. return Suppose Suppose the the monist monist isis wrong: wrong: ambivalence ambivalence is is not not accidental-accidentaldue to to ignorance ignorance of of what what isis really really good--but good—but essential. essential. Then, Then, due won't solve solve everything everything because because the the problem problem is is not not knowledge won't knowledge merely aa lack lack of of knowledge knowledge but but the the nature nature of of the the human human subject, subject, merely the fixed fbced nature nature of of that that subject. subject. The The next next issue issue to to consider consider is is the the the matter of of what what is is fixed fixed about about the the nature nature of of humanity, humanity, and and what what is is matter not fixed. fixed. not

8, A A Dualist Dualist Model Model of of Human Human Nature Nature 8. This model model allows allows us us to to accept accept the the Aristotelian Aristotelian conception conception of of This human beings beings as as rational rational animals, animals, with with the the full full consequences consequences of of human the ambivalence ambivalence between between rational rational and and animal. animal. However, However, the the the comforting ancient ancient Greek Greek notion notion that rational part somehow comforting that the the rational part somehow should persuade or overcome overcome the the animal animal part is not not aa significant significant should persuade or part is feature of feature of the the individual. individual. Instead, Instead, Kant Kant transfers transfers the the success success of of rationality taken rationality to to the the collective collective entity, entity, humanity. humanity. Rationality Rationality is is taken to reach to be be an an ideal ideal that that humanity humanity progresses progresses toward, toward, but but does does not not reach in time. in aa finite finite time. Does on Does Kant Kant really really hold hold such such aa dualist dualist model model as as this this chapter chapter on Ambivalence Ambivalence presents? presents? We We have have already already seen seen some some of of the the "and "and yet" yet" passages passages in in which which he he presents presents aa variety variety of of central central positions. positions. We We shall shall now now consider consider aa few few places places in in which which ambivalence ambivalence is is more more clearly asserted. clearly asserted. Any Any acceptable acceptable theory theory of of human human nature nature must must have have some some equally equally acceptable acceptable theory theory of of art, art, otherwise otherwise something something crucial crucial is is omitted. omitted. When When we we look look at at Kant's Kant's analysis analysis of of art, art, his his conception conception of of the the sublime sublime is is striking. striking. The The special special factor factor is is the the role role that that oscillation oscillation plays in it. it. He He distinguishes distinguishes the the idea idea of of the the sublime sublime from from the the idea idea plays in of of beauty beauty (and (and several several other other related related matters). matters). The The experience experience of of the the sublime sublime is is taken taken to to occur occur in in aa patten patten in in which which individuals individuals are are both both attracted attracted and and terrified terrified by by some some phenomenon phenomenon or or some some

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conception. Seeina an enormOU$ narural feature like a great canyon might prodU" such an experience: an osaUI-tion may 0CQIl between wantirJ& to lean over to see more of it, and fear and dread of falling Kant praeDb this oscillation (Of vibration, in some uanslations) u the basic property of tbe experience, !be .iIMI io _ _ rely er , . , 1 by !lie ",lj-a bOIl io e>o:. beia& ell : ,. ,r!pt.1h& , ..;.tanim .. the ...bIiaotdoa • ~ , " ... ' e ... ~ .. tt<j' , ' "..tUd: ...... j T r ... 10 I:t . .' , 1 " SM;'" Ft-zp;~ (Nil''' o{J"Io>wIIIC o{J.1. ... n._1 _phzs"z) '"

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Later, we seek for a ground ", , , for the sublime merely in ouT$dvt$ and in our altitude of tboopt , , ," (C 0/ J., #23 ), Then, ", , . the redinS of the sublime brin&1l with it as ill; CMraCtemtic (eature a II'ICIWn5mt of the mind bound up witll the judgins of the object , , ," (C of 1., 114). So far we are told thai the mind is alternately attracted and repelled, and tIlat tIlis movement is cbaracteristic. Kanl adtls, ", , ,the $ublime is that, tbe mere ability to tbink whicb MIOW5 a faculty of the mind surpassin& every standard of Knse" (C of J" #2S), Since the ntltEdon:U for judginS everythiIIJ iocludinll "sense" are the IlIWIi of logic, Kant is claiming some ability DOl 10 deny logic, but to pin the feelinl of surpasMns

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Ali an eumple of that feeling, be mentions the unavoidability of Ibinkins", , . tile infinite (in the judgment of common reason) as mtirtly pm (accordina 10 i\$ lotality)" (C of1" #26), He $OOIl adds thai this. is accompli$hed, ", ' , not, of course, in a theoretical point of view and on behalf of the ropitive faculty, bUI as an «tension of tile mind wbicb feels ibeJf able from another (practical) point of view to lID beyond the limi b of KlI5ibility" (C. of I., #26), 'Ibis is a malter of feeling, DOt knowledge, ~e feeliIIJ of tile sublime is , , ' a feeling of pain, , , , 'There is al the same time a pleasure Ibm excited , , .. (C of J" #27), I leavc o ut Kant'S supponing argumenb and c.umplcs becaU5C il is the framework of tbe idea rather than the application in an to which

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Ibe mind fecit itself moved in the reprc§entalion of lhe sublime . •• This IDOYcmenl may (especially in ilS beginnings) be compared to a Vibration, i.e., 10 a quickly alternating .'traction toward, and repu.lsion from. the SilDIC object' (Co{J., 127). What this chapter here has done is 10 gen.eralize on analysis of the sublime and make his "vibration . .. quickly alternating '!lnroaD toward, and repulsion (rom. the same object . . ." into the ordirwy fixed nature of the buman individual. The dualist or oonflict model of the individual human is euctly what Kant Jives U$ in critical passases in his ethia, history. and religion. In the ethical theory we find, 'Man (eels in himself a powerful counterpoise against an commands of dul)' . . . .' ' From this a natural dialectic arises.. . . .o" In the CriJ~ of PrrxtiaJJ &wc»c we arc presented with 'man. as belonging to two worlds. .. : .. In the ana1yW of history we find lhal, "it is no! his (Man's] Darurc 10 rest and be oontented with the poswuion and enjoyment of an)thina whatewcr:" "Further, the inroniislclK')' of his own fIDJtUUJ dUpruitions drives him ;nlo self-devised torments .. .-

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(Kant's cmpha5is., C of I. , '83). Iu the mechanism at the hean of Kant', "Idea for a Uniwenal Hist ory on a Cosmopolit.an PIa.n," we have "the ull50cial liOciability of man," in the Founb 1llesis, pr~lllcd in Olaplcr II of this book. For Kant, the ambivalence of the individual is 1'101 pathological. Some kinds of ambMilellCC are morc productive of waal advan· tages than othen, lOme kinds result in paralysis of the individual, CII;. However, as a therapist, Kant would not try 10 produce a consistcnt or monist orientation in his patients. Iu claimed earlier in this chapter, for Kant, ' . . . fanaticism is annparable to monomonio • . ." (C of J., #29, Bernard trans., p. 116). The dualist pDlition did nol disappear after Kant, although it did not dominate. It is well·known thaI Scbopenhauer was suollJly inlIuenced by many aspects of Kant', ~neral position, a1thouJh he objects 10 the ethical theory. BUI on lhe malter of ambivalence. Schopenbauer was one of the most consi..slCnt followers. Iu be put it, "At times iI $CelllS as though we both wanted and did not wanl the same thing. and felt al once &lad and

163 10")' about it••.• In such eases there Ire really fWO differellt motives al work in us. .. ." Apin,"In my head tbere is • permanent oppositioo-party; and whenever I take any step or rome 10 any decision-though J may have &iYcn the maucr mature consideration-il aftc......vds attacks what I have oone... :" U ambivalence within the individual is not to be cadialcd,

what hope is there for individual happiness. or even progreM toward happine$s? What CIlIl hope mean, if ambivalence is

essential rather than acc:idcnt.al? We shall detour into several other mancrs before we rerum to Ihis, in Chapler Sill: on lhe logic

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Kant holds thaI honesty rcqllircs thaI people mUSI "not be coerced tbroup any threat .. ," (~IigUJn. p. 171). If we accept this definition, ambivalence presenlS • direct challenge 10 such hODe5Iy. Given ooe objective, bones!), iUUIS to requi re Ihal 00 conflicting objective have the i:UllC status. To be ambivalent is to have a constant threat lbal one of the goals may be subvcned by lIIe other. Honesty would require thaI the individual nol be ambivalent: that DO threat arise of losillJ one of the individual'li goals in • completed .edon. But, if this is the ease. either 00 bonest human beings exist. or Kant is quile wrong about the essential ambivalence of humans He held that we do oot know that bonC:Sl people exist. But the problem is stiD more serious than thU, Is it possible for a human being 10 be bonest? If honesry requires monilm in one's go.ls, then ansets or devils can be honest. but oot human beinl$- On Kant'S lelling. human beinss are always OIciUatinS between respect for the moral ll .... in them and feat of losing their selfish goals Should h uman beings try to be monist? Should they ~ to be monisl? We shall return 10 this question in the last chapter, Honesry mll5t consist in Idmillilll ambivalence, Idmiuing tha t every objective mll5t face 50Il'10 competition from an opposite objective, In its literal sense, "s.inoeril)'" does not a pply to healthy

164

TIlE LOG IC OF AMBIVALENCE

b1lman beings. tbough it may apply 10 fanatics. Buildings may be dedicated to a consistent goal, but not bealthy human beings.

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THE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE' A hallmark of Kant's position on religion is to insist on a definite line between the areu of illnonance and knowledge. We simply cannot know noumc:n~l entitiu. His sha~t criticism il di rected at tOOse who prete nd to have knowledge where they have only ignorance. Or, something thaI we shall call abnorance. 'Therefore, we mw;t pve a careful analym of the logical structUre of ignorance. The anal)'$is of the marks of knowLedge has been a fIXed part of philosophy in the West since the pre-Soc:ratics. The analysis of ignorance, ho...-ever. hu been slighted. Perhaps Ihis was due to an assumption that if lhe basis for knowledge was understood, ignorance would be obvious. This ehapter presents a 5emanlie conception of three IOtU of ignorance relations, WId l~ dmillCriOl1 betwten igIIDronet WId aIJnonJnu. The object is 10 develop. gene ral conslruction for analyring some of the logical features of ignorance. 'The logie of ignorance relations is as relevant 10 every subject as is the logic of knowLedge relations. Cbapler Vllt and olhers in Part III ,,~1L apply !be te5Ults of Ihis llIIiI1ysis of ignorance 10 Kam's relipous conceplS. YIM! may well ask, Why Iij>eciaL anention to ignorance when kllD"'Ledge has already been analyud? bn't ignoran« simply the absence of knowledge? Seve ral rea500S exist for a special Study of the strUcture of ignorance. Fin!, C35e$ exist in which there is no knowledge. and also no 'porance because there is IlOlhing 10 know or nothing of which to be ignonanl. So, the lack of knowl· edge is nol alwa)'$ equivalent to the presence of ignorance. Second, significant differences exist between various kinds of ignorance. We shal l conside r particularly the ignorance dilPlayed by,

166

TIlE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

These relationships each require independent analysis to be properly undentood. Various connections eris.t between these three kinds of ignorance, and that maner will also be deah with in detail. Even a strong theory of knowledge will not Jive a basis for all$wering some simple questions about ignorance relations. Examples: ( I) If sentences A and B are equivalent; if one is ignorant of A. is one ignorant of B1 Put differently, in tellll$ of tbe logical rather !han the psycholo&ica1 relations involved in these matters, does ignorance of A imply i&nonance of a Io&ieally equivalent B? (2) If sentence A implies sentence B, doeJ, ignorance of A imply ignorance of B1 Docs ignorance of B imply Ignorance of A? TIIese examples Oon', distinguish varieties of ignorunce, but they se~ 10 show that a careful treatment of the lo&ical relations between ignorance pauerns is needed. This is a semantic conception of ignorance, and, like Tarski'$ classic paper on truth,' we shall make spe<:ial use of the distinction between use and mention. Briefly, "use" means the reference of • term or • semen.:e; "mc:nti{)II" means the name of the term Of sentence-the !ellers between the qUOUItion marks. To introduce the definiti{)II used here, one might think of it 11$ I" sdwoI·fCOCh<:r's lIOfiOlf 0{ ig!totwIu. For.n individual to be ignorant. it must be the CiUC that some sentence is true, and our individual is not capable of a.ueninll it when fairly examined. A fair examiner must judge whether a ruponse is adequate or not. IgrwrtJItU ClUI be diJritrguisherl from almoro:mc£: II. case of ignorance: OCCUTli when something is accurately a.uertable; aboorance occurs in the absence ofSOffiCthing tru thfully as5enable. If we can't $ay what our weight is, we are illnoralll of the matter.

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If we can't say what oolor winSS we human beings have, we V~ abooran!. H aving no wings, we can have no true atlS'A'Cr to the question about !heir oolor. Alone poim analytic philosophy devot~d effort to th~ study of VlICUOW questions. such as the color of the wings on an individual who has none, and the truth·value of a sentence about ' he baldneu of the pr~sent (oon-e.mtent) King of France. 'The term, "aboorance" I~IS us proce~d mor~ Ioimply, and more intuitively, altbough intuitions do not all go alike.

1. Denn lllons, AHumptions

'The individuals w~ shall be concerned with ar~ those ~ntili~s capable of ~king a statemeot in IoOme languag~, witbout r~gard to whether or not th~y happen 10 be human beings. 'The act of making a statement may (:(Insist of uttering a sentence. or of any other form of oommunication; poinling. writing. cin:ling. I)'ping. elc. We 85Sume the cxisten~ of IoOtne examiner, pos$ibly but not IlC'cessarily the same as the subject. The ignonmee relations we will develop are a means for the c.uminer 10 specify the utem of !he subjec:t's iiflOlance. We shall take i,noranee to be ignorance of a sentence or set of sentences; ignorance of things. propositions., or SUltemen\5 can be expressed by wel1-cbos.en sentences about them. The ulleranee of a sentence is called a itatement, bul ulln·failure may still leave us with an objec:t of the ianorance !'Clation; a sentence need not be utte!'Cd, as Quine has argued.' In order to specify the truth of a statement asserting ignorance (or exhibiting it), we mUSI also specify th.e time al which it is ullered. For this notion of i¥noranee to emt there must exist !he sentence of which our subjec:t is ignoran!. Three special cases are of interest, as indicated above: (I) ignorance of the fact that s.ometbing is a sentence in some language, (2) ignorance of the truth-value of a sentence. and (3) ignorance of !he meaning of a senlence. Each of these relationshipti will bt exprtued as ignorarlce of the set of sentences

168

TIiE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

expressing these facts.. No objection \0 a one-member set. Knowledge will be taken \0 be the case wilen a 5.Ubjed is neither ignorant nor ahnoranl. DdinltiOIl I. Q is IONORANT OF THE FACT THAT s IS A SENTENCE-

in the case thai tI is unable to as.sen that s is such, This pte5uppoles "fair eMimmI!T who can decide whether s is a sentence. and whether II is unable \0 assert that it il. This is called ignoronce of mention. It will be cited lIS "Ignorance (of M)." iHnalcioli l .

is IGNORANT OF 11'IE TR1.J11{·VALUE OF I-in the case wat II is unable to rorrcctly cxp~ the fact that s is lrue or that it is false. This also presupposes a fair eominer woo can decide the trutb or (;Wily of s, and of ,,'s expr~on of the maner. This ignorance will be ciled as "Ignorance (of TV)." /l

J)eftnllkin J. a is IGNORANT OF mE MEAN ING (use or reference) OF SENTENCE, .1.1 time I-in the case that Q Is unable 10 lIMCn scntcnc'e S al lime t, given that s is true and its &ssenion is

appropriate. Again, this presupposes the nolion of a fair B{lI1Iiner who ean decide whether s is true (is the amwer to the questioo pow:d) and whether a is or is not able to assert J appropriately_ This is igrwtwlu of uu. to be cited as "Ignorance (of Rcf)." Dennll ion of. a is ABNORANT OF J at I-i n lhe case lhat " is unable 10 tiSen J , but J does not exist in his (or any) language. To eSlablish abnorancc requires a fair examiner whme knowledge if, so complete thaI sucb euminer can decide thai there CJtiSls no J Ihal is the true answer to the relevant question. Cite a5 "Abooranc:e."

Logic of of Ignorance The Logic Ambivalence

169

One may distinguish distinguish varieties of of abnorance, abnorance, but but we shall not not have One need for such sophistication sophistication until Chapter Chapter IX. need Definition 5. DeHnition s--just in case a is not ignorant of of s, and s is true. a KNOWS 5--just of abnorance abnorance by the specification that that s We avoid the possibility of is true. is true. What restrictions are on substitutions substitutions for a in the definitions What above? Of Of what sort of of entity may we say that it is ignorant ignorant in another of of these ways? We need no edict on the matter. one or another been taken, above, as a source of of assertions. An individual has been Such an individual may be a composite entity, a computer, a nonhuman animal, a human being, etc. human The sentence, s, is to be a declarative. However, as long as it is a sentence in a recognized language (ordinarily, the subject's language), it may declare anything, for example, a truth-value, as in Definition 2, or declare that an ignorance relation holds in a situation, situation, etc. etc. Iteration ignorant of of Iteration is available, and significant. One may be ignorant the one is be the fact fact that that one is ignorant ignorant of of aa certain certain fact. fact. Or, Or, one one may may not not be ignorant of one's on some some matter. ignorant ignorant of one's ignorance ignorance on matter. We We can can be be ignorant of our our or or someone someone else's else's ignorance. ignorance. Some Some of of this this will will be develof be developed in in aa later later section. section. Defining Defining ignorance ignorance semantically semantically allows allows us us oped to express express the the cases cases in in which which an an individual individual is is ignorant ignorant of of anything anything to from one one sentence, sentence, to several, to to aa whole whole language. language. from to several, 2. 2. Axioms Axioms

The distinction between the examiner's and the subject's language language must must always always be be kept kept in in mind, mind, although although the the two two may may overlap (e.g., (e.g., when when an an individual individual makes makes statements statements about about his his own own overlap ignorance). The ignorance ignorance relations relations are are contained contained in in the the examexamignorance ). The iner's language, language, and and are are used used to to make make statements statements about about the the iner's subject's ignorance ignorance of of sentences sentences in in his his language. language. (The (The examiner examiner subject's must have have made made an an assumption assumption specifying specifying the the language language in in which which must the subject subject is is speaking.) speaking.) For· For simplification, simplification, we we shall shall assume assume aa the

170 170

THE LOGIC LOGIC OF OF IGNORANCE AMBIVALENCE THE

two-valued universe universe of of discourse discourse for for both both languages languages (examiner'S (examiner's two-valued and sUbject's). subject's). and The following following axioms axioms present present the the minimal minimal properties properties of of the the The ignorance relation; relation; further further assumptions assumptions will will be be made made in in the the next next ignorance section. section. Axiom I.I. If If an an individual individual cannot cannot even even mention mention aa sentence, sentence, then then Axiom that individual individual cannot cannot assert assert its its truth-value truth-value or or its its reference. reference. that Axiom II. II. One One who who is is unable unable to to assert assert Axiom sentence can can not not correctly correctly use use itit to to make make aa sentence accident.) accident.)

the truth-value truth-value of of aa the reference. (Except (Except by by reference.

Axiom III. III. If If someone someone can can be be called called ignorant ignorant of of something, something, that that Axiom thing must must exist. exist. (Otherwise, (Otherwise, recall recall that that we we have have the the concept concept of of thing abnorance for for inability inability to to answer answer questions questions about about things things that that don't don't abnorance exist.) exist.) Accepting Axioms Axioms II and and II II makes makes the the properties of the the three three Accepting properties of ignorance relations relations fall fall into into aa partial Aristotelian square square of of ignorance partial Aristotelian opposition. opposition. Consider the following four four sentences: sentences: Consider the following 1. aa is 1. is ignorance ignorance of of the the mention mention of of 5, s. 2. s. 2. it it is is false false to to say say that that aa is is ignorance ignorance of of the the reference reference of of s. 3. 3. it it is is false false to to say say that that aa is is ignorance ignorance of of the the mention mention of of s. 4. 4. aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the the truth-value truth-value of of s. Follow Follow the the usual usual definitions definitions of of contrary, contrary, contradictory, contradictory, subsubcontrary, Chapter Four). Four). Then, Then, 11 and and contrary, and and subaltern subaltern (mentioned (mentioned in in Chapter 22 make #4 make aa contrary contrary pair. pair. 33 and and 44 are are sub-contraries. sub-contraries. ## 11 and and #4 are are subalterns, subalterns, as as are are 22 and and 3. 3. The The reason reason for for calling calling the the square square "partial" is that that while while 11 and and 33 are are contradictories, contradictories, 22 and and 44 are are not not "partial" is although although they they would would be be in in aa complete complete Aristotelian Aristotelian Square. Square. Other Other arrangements arrangements of of opposition opposition can can be be offered. offered. Replacing Replacing the the lower lower left Its is is ignorant ignorant of of the the reference reference of of s" sIt gives gives aa complete complete left entry entry by by "5 square, square, but but doesn't doesn't contain contain each each kind kind of of ignorance. ignorance.

171

I

2

3

3. AslumpUo .., S.mmlriud

We have already introduced definitions and some axiOIll5. A summary of the as5Umptions 10 this poilu may be helpful. 1. ifI1W'w/U is established by tbe inabiUly !O COlTenly give a certain senlence or set of sentences.. 2 Know1ed&e of iporance is relative 10 tile aomiMr. Sellexamination may occur. 3. Fol1owi1lj the usual convention, a sentence wilhout quotation marks is II$tJ 10 refer 10 5Omethill8 other man ilSell. and • senle1l<:e within quotation marks rden \0 itself. ... 'Ibere is just one language in the euminer's universe of diV'OlJrse, and it's twO-valuc4. ('Ibis simpliflCl the presenlalion, although. richer se t of alternatives can be offered.) S. Any individual can be the subjea in an igooraJl(% relation if thaI individual is an cotil)' WI ean eommuruca\e lIIe usemon of • sentence, i.e~ make a statement. We 5halI also assume a responsible 19ooramUl, as defined below. 6. Tbe subject's anguagc is the set of all the sentences that individWli can:wen. The examiner's language includes names for the sentences in the subject's Janguase-

1liE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE

172

7. A

WI/eel

twmicn of a sentence is one which latisfies the

cnmioer. Ullering may be one form of mentioniDJ: others are poi nting. writing. drding. ele. S. The igooruce relation is conrai ned in the examiner's Janau. ThaI is, the examinu is the one who can say thai tbe 5Ilbjecc is or is nol iporanl of some matter. II is called a relation because our definition of ignorance employs a two-place predicate connecting I subject and the ability to produce. certain 5eIllence. A IWO-plaoe predicate is. relation. In tbe cue of the igDOratN:e relation, a fair cumine r decides whether the subject has or has not produc:ed an acceptable answer 10 the pertinent question.

The definitions and assumptions above lead to a number of theorems, some obvious and trivial, some of significance for the analysis of ignorance and of hope. Sinc:e we UJ\ITDe • two-YaIucd luau_ge, for any true statement J. and any individual, a. Theorem (1) Eimer a is ignorant of the re ference of J, or it is fabe to say thai a is igooranl of tbe rderenee of s.

The knowledge relation has been defined as the denial of ignorance (definition S). 10 Theorem (2) If Q knows '. then s is true and it is [atH 10 say thaI a is ignorant of the refer~nce of J . The knDwIedge relation has the same domains and amditiollS on lIS variables as the ignorance relations. Axiom I Jives us Tbeor~ro

(3)

If" is ignorant of the me nlion of

I.

then

0

is

ignorant of the reference of I . By the of transpOrtation, Theorem (3) gives us a theorem Ihal rules 0111 Wtrpt'l'lwbk trull!,

"w

nu Lcgic of Igru:wtUla

173

Theorem (4) If it is false: mat s is ignorant of me reference or s, then it is fahe to uy that a is ignorant of the mention of s. 1lJ.at is.. if one knows a truth (is oot ignorant of it). one must be able to "y iL Ali well IS Theorem (3), if one is ignorant of the mention of a sentence. one Clnoot know its truth ....alue..

5. itetpolldble lpon.nee We can no 10DiCr pwtponc. consideration of a problem noted earlier in mis chapter. Whac is sometimes called tbe matter of 'opaque contexts' is Involved IS well in studies of epistemic logic. Is one ignorant of the logical consequences of his ignorance? This requi res us 10 specify the nacure of rational, responsible, or defensible ignorance. Suppo$C that (A) S' is equivalent in uuth..value to t, (B) If s' is true. men" is true. ~d

(C) 0 is ignorant of the trulb·value of S'. Doc5 0 '5 ignorance of the uutb·value of J' carry with it the u.suranoc that the individual is ignoranl of the truth valuu of and of 11 That pcl'$On may oot know (A) and (8). In either case, we musl make some a.ssumplion about the rational abilil)' and k.nowlcdJc of the ignoraol individual. The assumption we choose 10 make depends on the use 10 which we will pol the rcsultina IogiCIII machinery. For the Be neral illU5Ul1tive ptlrp!lses of this chapter, we will make the special-casc l55umption that we IIlU5t distinguish between what is available 10 the subjcet whose ignorance is beil18 sp«ified and whal is available to the constructors of the system of I155ertiOJl5 about that individual. The COJl5truetDC5 of the system, we outside observers, arc taken to have all the macbinery oflogie and the truths of science at our dispoYl. The system that we construet is • presentation that we make to each olber, oot • discourse by lbe subject. In the case above, if (C) is true. and even it (A) and (8) are talltologies. we uill may

t

'"

TIlE LOG IC O F IG NORANCE

wonde r whether our rubjcct, a, knowJ, (A) and ( B) and know$ the force of the mbstitutions suggested by them. Before choosing an assumption about the logical abilities of • subject, let us note the de(i$ions made by iOIIIe of the early writen on epistemic logic. In his presentation of the matter, D. Paul Snyder I15ed the pbrue "responsible kDOWing' for lhe case in which 'one is responsible for me logical conscquenees 0(",11" one knows," and all truths of logic are supposed 10 he known.J We shall adopt • $imilar notion of tUpOIlJib~ ~ in which one is taken In be responsible for the logical conscqucnc;e$ of his ignorance. Where the subject is 1101 ignorant of a oonKquen.ce, that can be separately staled. Thi$ notion of Te$ponsible ignorance is like the "alternative interpretation" thaI J aakko Hintikk. aJosiden but rejeas.' For our nolio n of ignorance (in all of iu varie ties). we may .ttribute to Q o r deny" whalcvt: r lagially follows from the ipunc:c of lUI I. What does follow (rom the ignorance of. sentence? A formal answer requires a careful statement of the rules for the logic 10 be used, the macltintry for the introduction and eliminatio n of seottnees. and other thinp For ou r purposes 111 simply adopt Quine's MOlMmoticaJ Logic' for the logic of the examiner's language. Let US define a re6pOnsible ignoramus (a subjeCl) U someone whose ignorance is consislenl with the results of Quine', MUlhorUllicuJ Logic or an equivalent S)'5tem of roles, Deft_lUO.. " a is a re§ponsible ignoramus if and only if the followiog is the case; is true and t is a logical consequence of s', then if Q is ignorant of" then Q is ignorant of J', For special pu.rpo!eI we might l55IJme an ignoramus with di fferent Iogieal powers and maroril)'. Our responsible ignoramus is responsible for quite a Jarge deln~e of logical power. in many appJicaliol1!l of this analysis of ignorance one might want 10 considerably weaken the \og.ical ability. In the case of our Definition 6, "Ie have a subjcCl that is not capable of knowing COlltlldidiolUc tit denying tautologiel. And, our SUbject i5

If"

The Logic Logic of of Ignorance Ambivalence The

175 175

responsible for for ignorance ignorance of of any any statement statement that that isis logically logically responsible equivalent to to an an already already established established matter matter of of his his or or her her ignoignoequivalent rance. rance. An individual individual with with the the logical logical nature nature assumed assumed above above cannot cannot An know that that contradictions contradictions are are both both true, true, or or both both false. false. Are Are such such an an know individual's possible possible patterns patterns of of ignorance ignorance equally equally restricted? restricted? individual's Theorem TT (1) (1) states states that that aa subject subject either either isis or or isis not not ignorant ignorant of of Theorem the reference reference of of sentence sentence s.5. We We can can add add some some sub-theorems, sub-theorems, the (1.1) Either Either aa isis or or isis not not ignorant ignorant of of the the mention mention of of s, 5, TT (1.1) and and (1.2) Either Either aa isis or or isis not not ignorant ignorant of of the the truth-value truth-value of of s. 5. TT (1.2) But, can can aa subject subject be be ignorant ignorant of of both both parts parts of of aa contradictory contradictory But, pair? The The answer answer to to this this question question affects affects some some versions versions of of pair? skepticism, and and of of agnosticism. agnosticism. Consider, Consider, skepticism, (D) aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the the mention mention of of s, and and aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the the (D) mention of of ss is is false. false. mention is ignorant ignorant of of the the truth truth value value of of s, 5, and and ignorant ignorant of of the the (E) aa is (E) truth value value of ot ss is is false. false, truth (F) aa is of the the (F) is ignorant ignorant of the reference reference of of 5, s, and and also also of of the reference false, reference of of ss is is false. (D) (D) is is possible, possible, since since aa rational rational ignoramus ignoramus knows knows that that any any statement one statement can can be be denied: denied: if if one one were were unable unable to to mention mention V "s" one would would be be unable unable to to mention mention "j "s is is false." false." From From either either side side of of the the conjunction conjunction we we can can infer infer the the other, other, giving, giving, T is ignorant ignorant of of the the mention mention of of 5s if if and and only only if if aa is is T (1.3) (1.3) aa is ignorant false, of the the mention mention of of 5s £y is false. ignorant of (E) (E) asserts asserts ignorance ignorance of of aa certain certain opposition. opposition. Again, Again, aa rational rational ignoramus ignoramus knows knows that that aa denial denial sign sign in in front front of of aa statement statement reverses its truth-value. So if one knew the truth-value reverses its truth-value. So if one knew the truth-value of of either either "stl or or Its is is false,'' false," one one would would know know the the other. other. To To be be ignorant ignorant of of either either one one isis to to be be ignorant ignorant of of the the other, other, giving giving TT (1.4) (1.4) ItIt is is equivalent equivalent to to say say that that aa isis ignorant ignorant of of the the truthtruthvalue value of of Js and and to to say say that that aa isis ignorant ignorant of of the the truth-value truth-value of of 5s isis false. false.. (F) (F) seems seems deviant. deviant. Where Where 5s isis aa sentence sentence asserting asserting that that fact fact that that President President Lincoln Lincoln was was assassinated, assassinated, (F) (F) asserts asserts that that aa isis

176 176

THE LOGIC LOGIC OF OF IGNORANCE AMBIVALENCE THE

ignorant of of the the fact fact that that he he was was assassinated assassinated and and ignorant ignorant of of the the ignorant fact that that he he was was not not assassinated. assassinated. This This would would be be entirely entirely too too much much fact ignorance for for aa rational rational ignoramus. ignoramus. One One and and only only one one side side of of the the ignorance conjunction can can occur, occur, as as we we understand understand the the terms terms involved. involved. conjunction Ordinary usage usage isis not not perturbed perturbed by by the the fact fact that that even even one one who who was was Ordinary assassinated must must have have had had many many unassassinated unassassinated moments. moments. If If assassinated someone, say say President President Washington, Washington, was was not not assassinated, assassinated, there there someone, can be be abnorance abnorance but but not not ignorance ignorance of of his his assassination. assassination. So, So, can differing from from (D) (D) and and (E), (E), in in (F) (F) both both sides sides of of the the conjunction conjunction differing cannot be be true. true. Here Here we we have have another another distinction distinction between between cannot of reference reference and and the the other other two two kinds kinds of of ignorance. ignorance. ignorance of ignorance There can can be be ignorance ignorance of of facts; facts; in in addition addition to to TT (1) (1) we we can can have have There T (6) (6) If If aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the the truth-value truth-value of of s, then then either either aa is is T ignorant of the reference of 5 or is ignorant of the reference of ^ ignorant of the reference of s or is ignorant of the reference of s is false with the examiner knowing that one side of the alternation is false with the examiner knowing that one side of the alternation is false. is false. Axiom III III seems seems to to permit permit an an alarming alarming result. result. This This axiom axiom gives gives Axiom the expected expected the T (7) (7) If If aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the the reference reference of of s, 5, then then s is true. But, But, T is true. by by the the law law of of transportation, transportation, applied applied too too loosely, loosely, we we might might get get (G) (G) If If 5s is is false, false, then then aa is is not not ignorant ignorant of of its its truth truth (that (that is, is, aa knows knows that that it it is is true!). true!). However, However, the the apparent apparent paradox paradox of of (G) (G) is is simply simply the the result result of of an an error error in in applying applying the the law law of of transportation transportation to to aa part part rather rather than than the the whole whole of of the the antecedent antecedent in in TT (7).' (7).8 Careful Careful attention attention to to applying applying the the law law involved involved lets lets us us obtain obtain TT (7.1) If 5 is false, then it is false (7.1) If s is false, then it is false to to say say that that aa is is ignorant ignorant of of the reference of s. the reference of s. Perfectly Perfectly acceptable, acceptable, while while (G) (G) was was not. not. We We must must distinguish distinguish between between (H) (H) ItIt isis false false to to say say that that aa isis ignorant ignorant of of j,s, and and (I) (I) aa isis not not ignorant ignorant of of5.s. What What difference difference isis there there between between (H) (H) and and (I)? (I)? (H) (H) isis clear, clear, but but (I) (J) IS is ambiguous ambiguous about about the the position position of of its its negation, negation, as as we we have have seen seen above. above. Some Some applications applications of of statement statement logic logic require require

In IiCI1Ipulous attention if we are to avoid paradoxes; 11 point Ihal many readers have known for years. AI this uage a comment sllould be: made to those readers ...110 have had some training in symbolic Josie and also have • natural bent toward i&norance. Such persons mll5t wonder hOI"' the ignorance relations behave when the laws of distribution, iteration,

quantification. elc. arc applied. Questions aim aris.e about comparisons and COntraslS with other branches of modal logic (lI5IIumina that this is one sucb branch). I suggest thaI the paper by S. Axinn and D. Mion, "NOles on the Logic of Ihc Ignorance Rclalioll5,' be ooll5UlIed; and I cnrouragc any llUeb readers to continue 10 develop the suhject themselves. The logic of ignorance has been neglected and m:CWl 10 be worked on by many people. This chapter is limited 10 just a few of the ronsequcnce5 that arc of significance in the analysis of hope, and in tile development of Kam's ideas about religion. 6. Forteuinc

In cpistcmk logic the question of forgetting has raised problems. For H inlikka, "only statements made on one and the same occasion are considered here." For Snyder, "forgelling is ROt allowed .... We may accept1WO axioms that hold that if something is known then it is known for some specific interval thereafter: and if an individual is ignorant of something. thai individual was ignoranl of it for some inleJVai preceding a specified time. Let the time elements "( and 'x" be reprCKnted by real numben.

AJdom IV. ]( u knows J at time I, lhen a knows J al time t plus x. AxIom V. If II is ignorant of s al time t, then a is ignoranl of I at

time t minus.l:. These IWO are called the elephant ariOllU, since elephants are laken to saiUfy them for large values of x.

178

THE LOGIC OF IGNORANCE 7. A. F_ Fnmples

Can one know that he or s.be i.5 ignorant of the mention of a sentence? Visitors to foreign countries are oeeasionally in the predicament of knowins thaI there is some senlcoce in the forei&n language on a particular wbjed, but they do nol have the ability to mention iUch a senlcnoe. An observer who is sufficiently knowledgeable can express the situation Ill(Irc specifically. For the Rlbject concerned, a, it would be true mal (J) There exists some sentence r in a language giving directions for reaching tbe airport, and a knows that a is ignorant of the mention of x. Can one know Ihal he or she is ignorant of a fact? From the uamplc above, we can know lilal we are i,oorant of the mention of. sentence auening a ract and of tbe truth-value of a sentence :userting a fact. But, \0 know thaI we are ignorant of a fact, we cannot auert a delloCriplion of the ract btu must instead aMen Ihal there is some sentence reponina a ract in a amain area or on a certain topic. A very poor chemisl mig.hl be the subject. a, in the following situation: (K) Q know5 both tha t there i~ wmc: x that is a scntence about the composition of the .... ater molecule, and that he, a, is ignorant of the mention of x, Socratic ignoran~e t
". !be examiners can be in urnr and take something to be aboonnce ....hen they are merely projectina their ia;norance. And they may mode!itly aMIImt ignorance wben it is • maner of

.""""""'. Di5tinguishing between kinds of ignorance can help in t'Onsidcring-dearly stati ng-the well·known logical paradOJl:cl. lei "u" be .. so-a.lled undecidable !lenience (e.g... "This sentence is false"). Then, ignorance of the mention of 'u' can occur, bu t 1101 igno-

ranee of il$ truth-value (since it has none). 1bere can be iporanee of JUSt what llappens to different assignments of trIlth-vatuc. s. Condudln& Comments To clarify the applications of the nolion of semantic ignorance,

ronsidcr some behavioral e:Jtamplc5. We rcwrn 10 O\lf poor chemist, Jones. (A) Jones is ignorant of the {act thai waler oontains omen. What (A) describes is the (:tiC in which Joneli cannol produce the senlence, "water contains. oxygen," wben aned to me nlion all the things chemically contained in waler. 1be fair euminer may grant

him

her some degree of responsible ignorance and accept dose equivalents. If Jones canool assert "waler contains oxygen." or a Of

fair equivalent, under whal we lake !O be relevanl examination oooditioos, be or sbe is apparently ignoranl of lhe sentellCC. Also, if asked a quite differenl question and be Of she asscru, "wa ter contains oxygen." then JonC5 is DOl ignorant of every aspect of the senlc:.ncc. Jones can mention it, although he 01" she may IIOt know ilS truth·value or ilS reference. likewise, if our wbject can sing a song conlaining the scnlencc, he or she has the ability to mention it, and so is not completely ignorant of it. If our J anel can physically producc, locate, or communicate tile SCnlcncc. this is IIOt a ease of ignorance of ilS menlion. We must distinguish Ihis from the case in which one mighl produce some SCnlcncc IXII DOl know that one hu made a 5talemenl, as a c:hild si nging a SOilS (Ie a bit of doggerel in a language foreign to it might take the wmds

180

TI-l E LOG IC O F IGNORANCE

\0 be merely soulllls rather than clements or sententts of a language. Suppese that Jones does have a demonstrated knowledge of the word5 "water: "conlains," and ' oxygcn," and enough grammar to ha~ made them inlO a welL-formed sentence. but never has done so. Can we hold such a person ignorant of the mention of the sentence? The issue is whether or not our subject deals wilh the words as a sentence: if under /uiruuminillUm condiTiOllS he or she fails to produce the words as a sentence. we lake Ihis eumillCC 10 be ignorant of the mention, lrulh-valuc. or reference of it. If we design fair examination rendi tions, we can decide thai Jones is or is nOI ignorant. Can we be charged wilh restricting oun.elves \0 the examined l ona., ratber than to the "real" J OllC5, 10 J ones "himself or berseLf?" Only by Iho5.c who can point out • way of tnea:;;uring the ignorance of thai otber cntil)'. One might be able 10 mention a sentence. and know its truth · value. but not know what situation is dCKribed I))' if. By carrying oot the steps of.l proof in mathematics, or I))' suMtitution and rearrangement of symbols in a branch of ~ence. one might believe thaI a senlence is \.rue bol 1'101 know to what i( referred. 1lIe history of ~ence has such eumples. The relatioll5hip between knowledge. ignorance. and abnoran« is not always obvious. There may be addil;oru; 10 one's knowledge: also there may be additions 10 one or another kind of ignoralKe. Forgetting me:ans replacing knowledge by ignorance. The increase of knowledge may di~lose problems of which one was ignorant. Thc::re may be a move from ignorance of the exUlellce of a seDleDee to ignorance of its truth-value or its reference. Whether ignorance is always bad is a moot point. There can be situations in which insignificant information can mike one inefficient (overloading with noii<: is different from overloading witlt trivia). 1l!e time: and effort needed to obtain some knowledge may not be as de.!;irable on the whole as remaining in ignorance on the mauer. In his fl1lroduaion /0 Legit, Kant distinguished between four kinds of ignorance: what we ( I )

The Logic of of Ignorance Ambivalence

181 181

cannot know, know, (2) (2) dare dare not not know, know, (3) (3) need need not not know, know, and and (4) (4) ought ought cannot not know. know. The The first first and and third third of of these these are are obvious: obvious: we we cannot cannot not know the the truth truth of of noumenal noumenai matters, matters, and and we we need need not not know know all all know kinds of of trivial trivial things. things. On On the the fourth, fourth, Kant Kant has has an an argument, argument, in in kinds the Critique Critique of of Practical Practical Reason, Reason, that that morality morality requires requires ignorance ignorance the of the the truth-value truth-value of of the the sentence, sentence, "God "God exists." exists." In In our our terms, terms, of ELant might might not not specify specify that that morality morality requires requires ignorance: ignorance: either either Kant that or or abnorance, abnorance, whatever whatever the the case case may may be. be. that What of of Kant's Kant's second second kind kind of of ignorance, ignorance, things things that that we we dare dare What not know? know? After After all, all, Kant Kant himself himself started started his his essay, essay, "What "What is is not Enlightenment," with with approval approval of of the the well-known well-known slogan, slogan, Sapere Sapere Enlightenment," aude. Dare Dare to to know! know! In In The The Metaphysical Metaphysical Principles Principles of of Virtue, Virtue, we we aude, find Kant Kant saying, saying, "Only "Only descent descent into into the the hell hell of of self-knowledge self-knowledge find tlll prepares the the way way for for godliness. godliness."" This This notion notion of of self-knowledge self-knowledge prepares is quite quite different different from from the optimism of of the the Greek Greek "Know "Know thyself." thyself." is the optimism But Kant Kant takes takes human human beings to be be essentially essentially inconsistent inconsistent in in their their But beings to objectives. It It is is part of the "hell of of self-knowledge" self-knowledge" to discover objectives. part of the "hell to discover one's insincerity, insincerity, and and therefore therefore the unsolvability of of some some probprobone's the unsolvability lems. To To try try to know yourself yourself is is to to do do aa daring daring thing, indeed. It It lems. to know thing, indeed. is far far from from obvious obvious that that if if you you knew knew yourself yourself you you would love is would love yourself; it might instead result self-hate. For For yourself; it might instead result in in the the hell hell of of self-hate. Socrates, the is not but Socrates, the unexamined unexamined life life is not worth worth living living (the (the Apology), Apology), but life life might might better better be be lived lived than than over/y-examined. overly-examined. At At what what point point is is the dare of of self-knowledge self-knowledge dangerous That the dare dangerous rather rather than than healthy? healthy? That must obvious must be be left left to to the the progress progress of of psychiatry. psychiatry. But But far far from from obvious is some ignorance Socrates is that that if if some ignorance is is bad, bad, all all ignorance ignorance is is bad. bad. Socrates himself only superiority superiority over to himself took took his his only over his his fellow fellow Athenians Athenians to consist ignorance. of ignorance. consist in in his his awareness awareness of Now truththat we we have have definitions definitions of of ignorance ignorance of of mention, mention, of of truthNow that value, are of reference, reference, and and of of the the conception conception of of abnorance, abnorance, we we are value, of almost have almost prepared prepared to to deal deal with with Kant's Kant's position position on on religion. religion. We We have the truththe truththe machinery machinery with with which which to to distinguish distinguish the the mention, mention, the value, Soul, value, and and the the reference reference of of sentences sentences dealing dealing with with God, God, the the Soul, hope, .and and Immortality. Immortality. But But first first we we need need to to analyze analyze the the logic logic of of hope, which varieties which requires requires that that we we connect connect varieties varieties of of hope hope with with the the varieties of presuppose. of ignorance ignorance that that they they presuppose.

Six THE LOGIC OF HOPE: DEFINITIONS OF THREE TYPES OF HOPE 1. Innochlctlon: Kind. or Hope

The verb "to hope" (hoIfM) plays a central pan in Kant'S analysis of a 'moral religion.' As a typical PWlie goes. " , . it is a basie principle that each must do as mueh a.s lies in his power to become a beller man. and that only [tberoJ ' , , can be hope m.t wbat is DOt within his power will be supplied through cooperation .... from 50tne other SOIIrce.' The religiOll$ question for Kant is the famou.s third qUe5tiOD of the ~ 0/ ~ RM.ron (AIIO:.'i), "What can I hoper Limits, IogicallimilS, exist to what ean be the object of oope, and to the qualifications for the subject who does the hoping. In this d1apter I analyze 50nte fonnal propenies of the relation of bopina. and in the next chapter I apply the results to positioll5 that Kant took. Kant ha.s distinguished between what we may "reuonably hope: and a siruatioo in which we "can entertain no reasonable hope' (&fitjon, p. 62). The problem of the relation between reason and hope requires logical coiWderation before we ean realize the force (and limits) of Kant's work. In the Preface to the Fint Edition of the cm~ 0/ ~ RMSM Kanl wrote. 'the chief question [about knowledge] is always simply this: what and bow much can the understanding and rcason know apart (rom all experience? not: bow is the faculty of thought itself poMible" (Axvii). We might paraphrase here and say, "the chIef question about religion is: 'What can the undcnUlnding and reason hoptl/D' apart from all ~rienc:e1' not: What can the faatlty of thought nuntiDII as if it were a wish?'

184

THE LOGIC OF HOPE

When we reach the section on Kan!'. theory of pouible hope. our rderenees will come from the Cririqru of Purt. &tuon more than

anywhe re e~ in his work. Since one of my objectives is 10 develop the logic of hope weU beyond the ~. at which Kant left it, I have no hesi tation in cmployina the lools of symbolic loPe thai are available loday. When basic choices are to be PlIIdc, I will ordinarily make them on I Kannan basis. 'The term, "hope' will be taken to be a three· place relation. An . nt, a, at a time, I, hopes for II situation described by p. SymbolicalJy, H (a,p,I). The time. I, is the lime I' whieh the .gell! is said to eDtertain the hope. not lhe time al which the situation, p , 15 to occur. The time of p is understood as a pan of p . lbe main iaues involved are those concerning the range of the first variable, a, and those involved in the ranp of lhe second variable, p . To consider me naMe of the individual and the cirmmstances under which that penon can have II hope. is to deal with the first of these, o. To ooll5ide r the propenies that a situation may nave if h is 10 serve as all objea of hope. is to analyze me $«ODd, the maltcl'$ thai can stand in the p1aee of p. We will study cuh of these in tum. I classify siq.le hopes. (1)~. in lerms o f meaD$ and ends, and (2) _icuJly. in terms of mention, usc. and trulh...:Jue. Then, (3). bolll eqlCriemiai and uanscendenlal oompowld hopes are studied. The TClatiOIl5 betwee n hope and fear are displayed 00 a square of oppositiOIl. Reilled notioJ15 will arise, 10 be consickred in tbe next dlaptCJ', well as Ihe pouib1e. sdlema and image. sccond-order hope. and properties of the antinomies. Wc must make a COnstanl effon to gain Ihe advamages of distinguishin& between use and mention. Please see T able 1.

~

Lcgic oOf HoOpe

IS'

TABLE 1 KlNDS OF HOPE I.

2

3.

Medtodok>&lc.' ctauUkatiolt (I) hope fo r success oOf means (2) hope (Of d iscovery of mea ns (3) hope for communication of JOOI Semantic CI..,Ukatknl ( I ) Type L h~ to mmIion (dusify or analyze) (2) Type n. hope toO bsow tnI1h-~ (3) Type ill Iwpe to kIww",erMa

Colllpo8od Hopes

r.xpnimtiDJ (I) Dialectical hope: that there ~ a prqnuu ic synlhesis ~tweell opJIO$Itd po$itions that are po$5Jble experiences.

(2) Second-order hope: a hope concerning a hope.

tTruISCMderuaJ (3) Antinomie hope: tha t reason ean give decisive solu tioll5 10 the antinomies (conflicu ~~ell positions thaI are nol po5Slble experiences). (") Second-ord er hope: that il is possible that something nol u nderstandable is possible.

2. The Pmiopposlilo ll of lporllace. Couldt!red Pnamllllclllly Within a p ragmatic oOrientatioOlI, an individ ual may know the goal being soua,llt. oOr DUly know the best means by which to ~lIch it, or may have various combinations of knowledge and ignorance about means and end$. I flnl consider a preliminary introduction 10 lhe malter, and lhen replace it with II more salisfactory and detailed formulation. In Table 2. K u .... ds for knowledge and G for ignorance (the firsl consonant of these words). llIe lISSum!'" tioOn is that one doe$ noOt hope fo r something known toO oeeuT, or known to be irnpouiblc: ignorance, IlOllmowledge is presupposed

for hope.

nIE LOGIC OF HOPE

186

TABLE 2

,mol

K

1. 2.

K

3.

G

•.

G

K G K

o

(hope is WperllUOllS) (hope for efficieDt D\eaIll;) (hope for desirable goal)

(hope is oon-uislcllI)

Table 2 shows four possible combinations of knowledge and ignorance with respeo:t to means and goals. For hope 10 exist there must be a combination of knowledge and ignorance. The subject. Q, bas to know either the goal 01' the means. Coll5ider case I in Table 2. If one knows both means and goal perfectly, there if. no atea for hope. As in the eump\c of Spinoza's conception of God, if an individual bas perfect knowledge of everytbina. can predi~1 evcl)1hing with ceru.inty, there is no meaning 10 the notion of a hope. Spioou:s God is hopelcs.s.. However, if our subject docs n01 know thaI he or me wan ts a particular goal (perhaps because it miglll prevent reaching another goal that is cared about). then sud! an individual doc. nol have perfect knowledgt of the goal mal is sought. CT, if a penon is leD than <:eMain that the available means will be perfectly suoceuful, tbill person again has an uca for some ignorance, and therefore some hope. Consider case 4, in Table 2. If a is ignorant of both a panicu· lIlT goal and a suooescf'JJ means of reaching it, Q can hardly prollOUllCe a hope 01 either reachina thai goo or of a particularly &ODd means to it. To simply hope for an unspecified "somethin&" i5 DOt yet 10 hope. H the "sometlling' can be given $Orne negative detail, $Orne (Xlntrast with an alternative. then we have moved to case 2 or J. Case 2 i5 the more familiar pattern in which the subject knows his OT her goal but does not have complete knowledge of a successful ~ans. Case J looks strange at fint: what would be a situation in which the subjeet knows the means that will be 115ed, but does oot know the end that it will bring?

'nle Wgic of Hope

' <7

For an uample of this, imagine a penon who has been in a shipwre<-Ii: and is alone in a life.boat wilh no means of \ocatina !he position Of calling for assistance. Our boater has no inclination to leave the Iife-boat; !he meaN to be used are ltnown, that is, remaining in the boat if po.ible. However, the individual is iprant of where the boat will drift. but knows that some de$tilLltiOIl5 are muc:b better than others, and hopes fot a de$irable goal. The desirable &oals might include reaching a comfortable island or meeting a resale ship. Table 2 and the comments 00 it are equivocaJ on one important matter. Is it lmowledge of a desired goal, or lu10wledge of the loa.! that will be reached that is referred to in the column muli:ed "goalr These may be separated, as in Table 3. 1he questions, A thro\Ip D, are to be coll5idered serially in alphabetic order; A is to be directed to the most knowledgeable oosevu of the robject. while the other questioll5 are to be answered by 1M subjtcl of the hope relation. Table 3 is 10 be read, horiwntally, u follows; as an eumple consider line J.-an oh5er.er has _ e red "yes' 10 question A, the wbjc:n docs desire a goaJ. • • . the subjen _ e n "yes' to B, the ,oa! can be mentioned, ... but ' no' 10 C, no available means is known. ... siven the iln5Wer 10 question C, question D is an empty question (indicated by ')("). TABLE 3 A

Is there a delired goo1'

,.. ,.. ,.. ,.•• '""" I.

2

3.

B

Is there a de$ired goa.! that can be mentioned?

,.. ,.. ,~

NO

,

D

C

Is an available means 10 the goaIltnown?

'u ,..

NO

,•

Is the meall5 adopted knc7.m

to brin, Sl'cce"? ,~

NO

• ,•

188 188

THE LOGIC LOGIC OF OF HOPE HOPE THE

Wherever in in Table Table 33 the the answer answer isis "N "NO" an area area in in which which to to Wherever Olt isis an hope for for aa basis basis for for changing changing to to the the affirmative. affirmative. (We (We can can hope hope hope for ignorance ignorance of of aa matter matter where where knowledge knowledge isis painful, painful, but but this this isis for actually aa means means to to the the goal goal of of lowering lowering pain.) pain.) On On line line 2, 2, aa goal goal . actually can be be mentioned, mentioned, and and aa means means of of some some probability probability isis known, known, but but can the means means isis not not known known to to have have aa probability probability of of 11 (on (on the the usual usual the scale) that that itit will will bring bring the the desired desired goal. goal. To To know know that that o0 toto 11 scale) something will will occur occur we we need need aa basis basis for for certainty, certainty, for for assigning assigning aa something probability of of 11 to to the the event's event's occurrence. occurrence. Therefore, Therefore, the the issue issue isis probability in doubt, doubt, as as Spinoza Spinoza put put itit in in his his definitions definitions of of hope hope and and of of fear.2 fear.^ in When an an issue issue is is in in doubt, doubt, following following Spinoza, Spinoza, hope hope is is the the name name When the element element of of Joy Joy in in expectation expectation of of one one of of the the possible possible for the for results; fear fear isis the the name name for for the the element element of of sorrow sorrow from from the the results; expectation of of the the other other possible possible result. result. Since Since the the issue issue is is known known expectation to be be in in doubt, doubt, one one alternates alternates between between considering considering the the pleasurable pleasurable to and the the painful painful result. result. To To concentrate concentrate on on the the pleasurable pleasurable and alternative is is to to be be hopeful; hopeful; to to be be engaged engaged with with the the painful alternative painful alternative is is to to be be mainly mainly fearful. alternative fearful. On line line 33 the area for for hope fear) concerns ignorance On the area hope ((and and fear) concerns the the ignorance of on of aa means means with with aa probability probability greater greater than than zero. zero. The The situation situation on line individual line 44 is is rather rather different different from from the the two two above above it. it. For For this this individual there there is is no no goal goal that that can can be be mentioned. mentioned. Does Does this this provide provide any any target target for for hope? hope? Only Only if if the the individual individual desires desires to to know know aa goal. goal. To To have have no no goal goal is is to to be be hopeless, hopeless, the the situation situation on on line line 5. 5. However, is aa different different context context for for the the absence absence of of hope hope from from However, this this is the the context context of of line line 1. 1. On On 1, 1, hope hope is is Superfluous superfluous since since there there is is no no alternation alternation between between thinking thinking of of each each of of several several possible possible outcomes: outcomes: the the outcome outcome is is known. known. On On line line 55 hope hope does does not not occur occur since since no no goal goal isis desired. desired. The The question question arises: arises: Can Can aa human human being being live live without without hope, hope, in in the the sense sense of of line line 5, 5, without without aa desired desired goal? goal? The The closest closest examples examples seem seem to to be be the the so-called so-called "vegetable "vegetable cases" cases" that that are are sometimes sometimes found found in in institutions institutions for for the the mentally mentally deficient. deficient. ItIt isis not not clear clear at at what stage they lose the status of being human: we say that they what stage they lose the status of being human: we say that they don't don't act act like like human human beings. beings. Apparently, Apparently, in in this this we we agree agree with with Viktor flIt isis aa peculiarity peculiarity of ofman man that that he he can can only only live live by by Viktor Frankl, Frankl, "It

1M Logic of H~ \ookillfl

• futlU'e • • • :

to the • • acfcmnGtU •••

189

(10 this Frankl added, 'sub specW

There are W1!:U-known effortS in the literature to distinguish between c:onscious and IlDOOnscious hopei. For a corucious hope, the subject answers "yes" to question B: for an unconscious hope the observer answers "yes" 10 question A, and the subject answers "no" 10 question B. This is the situation on line 4 of Table 2. The subject has a goal but CIlMOI mention it, and therefore ClInnot rommunkalc il 10 the subject or anyone clse. Howeve r, the subjcct mayor may not behave as if a means 10 reach the goal, question C. were known.. In the case of an uncomclous hope. the observer takes the subject to have a goal that the subject can not mention: the bu rden is on the ob5crver to uplain Ihe basis for that answer to question A. In addition to having a goal, there needs to be a basis for holding that the subject behaves as if he or she knew thaI the goal would bring pleasure, and that the available means bave a probability between 0 and I for sueccu. What we have here is the observer who s~ab, as il were. for the subject: the observer knows the goaJ and cxpreues the bope of succcg for the liubject. It may rum OUI that we are presented with the hope of Ihe observer and not really of the subject. There iii always Ibe possibility, particularly in the line 4 siruation, that the observer iii ...ronB about tbe subject's Boa! and concern with SI.HXCSS in reaching it. llIere is an obvious risk in reporonB a Boa] that the subject has not been able to mcmion. To summarize lhill $ection. an example of hope has to be in the form of either case 2, case 3, or case 4 of Table 3. An individual who hopes for something has some combination of knowledge and of ignorance, and the area of tha t ~non'l hope lies in the area of bis or her ignorance. This framework allows for "uncoru;dous hope: In addition to the hope for a satilifadory mcam and the hope for a satisfactory BOO (or sub-goal) we will find ourselves romidering the problem of a resolution of an antinomy. Howc"cr, Ihili third mailer is ordinarily formulated as a problem in the area

mE LOGIC OF HOPE

190

of either choo5ing means or goals. We have not yel considered the required propenies of the object of hope.

3. Hope, Fur, and the Sqaare of Opposition The conception of hope includes the knowledge thai the subject is ignoran\ of the l'e$ult. ibete is some probability that the individual will pin and some probability thai Ihis individual will DOl gain hi$ or ber dWre. The opposition between hope and fear can be exhibited on a classical square of opposition. TABLE 4 Square of Opposition for Hope and Fear

" always hopes for p . Q

always fcan

p.

'lOt

I

• Sometimes (l hopes for p. Sometimes II fcan ,,0( P.

u never fcan "'" p. Q

,

nevt:r hopes for p .

3

Sometimes Q does not hope for p. Sometimes" does not fear not p.

191

The Square in T able" b based on the following &mImplions: (A) 1. II bopes for p if and only if II fear1 l!Cl-p (fears the absence of pl. (A) 2. if II bopes for p then Q does not fear p . (A) 3. either Q hopes (Of" P or Q fan p or Q is neutral toward p. With respect W a55Umplion CA) 3, if one of the three alternatives is uue, the other two are !O be false. Thai is, when a wbject hopes for 101De1hina. then neither fear nor neutrality obtains. So mud! for lbe meanjos of hope: one may vacillate be~en hope and fear, as \he chapter on Iltnbivalence held. II may also be also be added thaI CA) 4. if /J is neutrallowardp, Q is.15o is neutral toward not-p. A variety of iS5Ue5 arise, for example, the opacity problem. If Q hopes for p, and p is equivaicm 10 q. does II hope for q? Precisely similar questions arose in deaHna with the ignoraIlCe relations. In the Square in Table 4, the upper left comer, 1. contains the sentenoes Q always bopes for p. and Q always fears not p, which are equivalent. Moving clodwise around the Square, 2 reads Q never fear5 not p. and Q never bopes for p (equivalent sentences). AI 3 we find sometimes Q docs nol hope for p , and sometimes Q does not feu nol P. again equivaJent. At 4. sometimes a hopes for P. and !iOIIletimes a fears not p. 'The arranaement in Table 4 is a traditional $lIuue of opposition because the diaaonalJi OO/UIect oontr.l.dictories., the upper horizonal OOnnet\$ contraries., the lower horiwn\al connectS subcontrary sentences, and the verticals connect wbahems. This iii simply a pattern (nr IUTIIngin& the assumptions thai we have made abo\ll the relations be~en hope. feu, and neuualiry. Attention should be drawn to U5lImption AI. the assertion that 10 hope for p is to fear Io5ingp. One occasionally finds opposition to this correlative relation be~en hope and fear. This response is apparently based on the notion that to be full of hope is a perfectly respectable condition, but to be full of fear is a lowly. cr:aven (unm.mly1 in gender terms). psychologically weak situation.

192

11fE LOGIC OF HOPE

There is said to be $Omething "positive" about havil13 a hope. and $Omething "oepti\lc" .bout havin& a fear. What can be olTered to clIplain this oommon response? Two things lIIlIIy be SUW5ICd. Fir5t, by calling attention 10 the d istinction between IwlIlIIY and unJl~hy !ma, one may peT5uade • critic that all fears should not be eliminated from matu re development. There must be heal thy and unhcahhy hopes as well, wbere there are such divisions between fears. Second, it may be remarked that in ......y the term "hope' has been the poncuion of the idealist and the religious Iraditions. While Ihe word "hope" is easily extracted from the context of "religious hope." it has received ilS ilrOog habitual and literary uses in that a1Olal. Where the regular and cen luries.()ld tiSOdations with "hope" are in rcligiOU$ hUlguage, it takes • careful conscious cW,," to construct. purely Joaical (or even a materialist) defi nition of hope. One of my goals in this chapter. beyond the Kamian a pplications, is 10 contribute to • rccoll5ideralion of the logical aspeas. $0 lhal "'hope" can have a wider extension than the wellJmoo.<.ll idealist .nd rtliJious usel. As an eumplc of the obstacles enc:oo ntered, the familiar notions of hope seem to presuppose • platonist oollCCption of poiSibility; to changc to a nominalist view of possiblc individual canics with it se rious changcs in what can be takcn for objects of hope.

To serve as a basis for hope, the i&Jiorance involved h.as 10 be knoIo.-ll ignorance. Thc subject must be ignorant ofsomcthing, and be awarc of that ignorance enough to be ablc to make a statement asserti ng it. Three different kinds of ignorance wst, semantically, as the previous ~hapter prescmed the matter, and thc5c three provide a basis for the chusifiC
"",10.

193

wUlM, of the trUth or falsity of a particular sentence, and (3) ignorance of .qav/Cc. of the situ.Oon designated by the peninenl scntence. We have already noticed the role played by ignorance in the act of bopin&- Since there IIfC three kinds of semanue ignofllO(:C, we may expect thai they each involve a different kind of hope. First we need to be: explicit about the definition of our subject. 4.1 Reqalrelllcllu

tor. Ddlnltlo. of Hope

In general. the relation of hoping has thi$ structure: (1) the subject can rncntioD • de$eription of a cenain situation, (2) the IUbject desires thaI situation, and (3) the subject does IlOl know whether me siwalion will or will 1'101 come about, and is aware of his or her ip!Orance. Fonnally: when 0 hopes for p, then a can mention "p.. desires p, and knows thai he or she is ignorant of the trUth·yalue of p. Some authors lake a variant position. holding thai the subject is IlOl merely ignorant of the uuth-Yaluc of P. but takes the probability of the situation, p, to be somewhere between 0 and 1. What cha ....... does a's hope have is amwered by • probability figure; the fear that it will 001 sua::eed is then I minus the probability of the hope. The description of the desired situation, .p: is a variable for any of the groop of acceptable equivalenl senteocu. The opacity problem generated by this is still to be considered. So far we have just a bare ootJine of the definition; funher details are needed. The desired situation, p, can be presented in terms of two schema, comparing the pruent and !he desired environment of !he subject. Or, we can consider the mailer in tentll of just one incomplete schema; in this fnllnework, the subject constructs a schema of the situation that is desired. but it is not all, or exactly what, this subject desires. It is ioromplete in al least one significanl feature. like a treasure map witb a missing piece, noc can make an adequate image of 50me but not all of what is desi red. What is desired is 1M! a certain image be

".

THE LOG IC OF HOPE

true. aetua1ly come about. Therefore, the subject needs an image of the situation de.sited. and an additional feature il to be involved; namely, thai we imqe 001 be known 10 be true. This is one incomplete future, that the image, al the hope stage. is not known 10 be true. The subject is ignorant of me truth-value of the ItIIlcnce deseribing it. DWted, yet.: but will it happen? However, the truth-1'Ubu! of the senlence describing the de5ired situation i5 an «Iemal fact about the senle nce. II is about, but oot a property 1M" inlernal feature oJ. the senlence itself. 1lIe senlence is just as clear or DOl clear, complete or not, as • description of. situ.tion, whether it is true or false. We do care 10 distingu ish between an accunlle description of IOITIelhinB that

occurs and an equally accurate description of iOme thing Ihal ~ 001 occur. The logic of names and descriptions allows \IS to describe entities independently of the question of tbeir exUlence,' It aJso allows \IS to embed I description of somethinj: in a !lemence thai may be false or true. By. technique in which the subsWltive (XltIieOI is built inlo the predicate, and pronoun variables are quantified. we can construct desaiptions lhal are pred ... and can be used for many purpo ses wilhout presupposina a decision on the existence of the entity described. 'The point just made is no IIIrprise to iCantians fresh from reading the CriJique of ~~. "In the men t,;OIIUpt of a thin& DO mark of iu existence is to be found .... Again, in a)nsider. ing the relations between a hundred real lbalers and a hundred po$Sible thalers. Kant poiou out that "the object, as it .c:tualJy exist$, is 1101 analytically a)ollined 10 my a)JlCept, but is added 10 my a)rn:epl... ... TIle meaning of . SlIlement is indepeodent of iu trutlJ..vaIue. Only after a description is available can we have a basis for deciding whether it de$Cribes a =tely. The theory of descrip. tions and reference has many serious problems, but for our purpo5e!i we will assume thl! a theory of descriptions is available along the lines suggcsted by Kant and conti nued by Quine' and many others IDOre recently. The basie form involved is:

The Logic Logic of of Hope Hope The

195 195

The one one and and only only object object X X such such that that X X has has the the property property P. P. The

Whether there there isis or or isis not not such such aa unique unique entity entity does does not not affect affect the the Whether detail or or clarity clarity of of the the description. description. Quine Quine remarked remarked that that this this detail technique "... . . supplies supplies aa strict strict technical technical meaning meaning for for Kant's Kant's vague vague technique B declaration that that 'exists' 'exists' is is not not aa predicate." predicate."^ declaration When improvements improvements are are developed developed for for descriptions, descriptions, they they may may When be expected expected to to have have at at least least the the power power of of the the early early formulations. formulations. be Therefore, II will will continue continue to to take take itit that that when when an an individual individual hopes hopes Therefore, for something, something, that that individual individual constructs constructs aa map map containing containing aa for description of of his his or or her her goal. goal. The The description description may may have have aa wide wide description range of of incompleteness; incompleteness; questions questions about about the the existence existence of of the the goal goal range described, or or the the truth-value truth-value of of aa sentence sentence containing containing the the descripdescripdescribed, tion, are are quite quite independent independent of of the the detail detail and and clarity clarity of of the the tion, description. description. One more more detour detour before before we we take take up up an an expanded expanded version version of of the the One definition of of hope. hope. Another Another incomplete incomplete feature feature that that gives the definition gives the subject anxiety anxiety is is the the relation between the the present present schema schema and the subject relation between and the desired schema. What connects and schema? desired schema. What connects and relates relates these these two two schema? If the the subject subject knows exactly what will be the If knows exactly what will be the the relation relation between between the two, hope. two, the the individual individual has has enough enough knowledge knowledge and and needs needs no no hope. What path What such such aa person person is is ignorant ignorant of of is is whether whether there there will will be be aa path to the to the the desired desired image. image. Is Is there there aa schema schema connecting connecting the the two, two, the present present and and the the desired desired future-this future~-this person's person's desired desired future? future? 5, 5.. The The Definition Definition of of Hope Hope To To desire desire something something is is to to desire desire aa means means to to obtain obtain it. it. To To hope hope for for something something is is to to be be uncertain uncertain about about the the question question of of success success in in reaching reaching one's one's goal, goal, that that is, is, to to be be ignorant ignorant of of the the schema schema that that connects connects the the present present with with the the future. future. In In view view of of the the considerations considerations above, above, we we can can expand expand the the three three properties properties of of the the hope hope relation relation to to the the following following five: five: (the (the term term "schema" "schema" is is used used as as aa map map going going from the 'from the present present to to the the desired desired future). future). (a) The subject subject can can mention mention an an image image or or construct construct aa schema schema of of (a) The the the object object of of hope. hope.

'96

1lffi LOG IC OF HOPE

(b) TIle subject i$ ~ o/a' least some part of the schema. or image. (el The subject know.r thai he or she is ignorant of some pan of the schema or image. (d) TIle subject ths~ (wants, prefcl'1) 10 complete the schema or image. (e) But the subject does 001 lmow whether the desire will be satisfied (as earlier, tbe iisue is in doubt). The subject knolOlJ thaI he or lobe is i&norwU of the result. Understandably, the ability to consllUCt a leMma for some objective carries with it the ability to mention the S(hema Ihat includes the objective. Now " it arc in position 10 compile the three semantically different patterm. Cue I below is Ihe hope 10 find an adequate anal)'liis of, or d3$Si1icatioo of, $Omething. For example, 10 have • reference and a hope to find either the or a name for it. Cue 2 is the hope to discover whether iIOme 5111telTlem is

Or fal$e. For example, if one bas a hypothesis and hopes to confirm or deny true

it. Case 3 Is the hope 10 djl(:oycr the object (or an object) to ,,'hieh some statement (or name) refen. For example, if one has an unknown name and bope$ (or a reference. Each of these: three cases provides. different Iype of hope. Type I bope is ilIusualcd by the sentence, (I) Jones hopes to be able to say the French equivalent of, "Which way to tile airponr In litis case each of the five required conditiOI15 is present. (a) Jones can construct a schema in which the English sentence of concern is equivalent in meaning to some French sentence. (b) J ones' Schema has a miMing pan: JOI16 can fill in the English pan of the schema, but not the Frencb. (e) Jones is ignorant of pan of the iiChema, and knows of that ignorance. Our traveler can tum the schema into an imaae of himself or herself "king a French penon for tbe required infonnation, but knows that mat image has a niliIiing pan. ("The French penon'5 answer, in French, English, or pantomime.) (d) Jones desires to complete the schema (or image).

197 (e) Jones does not knowwbether the miu;ng pan of the IChcma can be produced within an acceptable time-limit While slaooill8 00 the sidewalk nervously thumMng Ihroogh II FrclK'h·Engli5h dictionary, and satisfying each of the above re<;juircmeot$, J ones may properly Tepo" (to an EnlJ,lish·llpeliking companion) the hope 10 be able 10 lay the French equivalent of, "Which way to the airpon?" Our subject has II schema for II refercn<:e and hopes 10 produce II sentence Ihal mcnliom; or names the reference. Tbe first variety. Type I hope, exist!; only wben an individual thinkf, that $Ome linguistic enlily. for example, II sentence, can be uttered, bul does 001 know enough 10 be able to produce it. A funher discrimination Ihal may be made here. Knowledge i:;; II mailer of the degree of probability that one would assign. Therefore, J ones, in 1, above. may be quite «ruin thaI French oontailll such II senlcoce, or may be moderately or jusl barely confident that the French language is rich cnough to do that. Suppcse Ihal our sub~ct knows lhal the language as ordinarily used by the natives of some remole ·u ndeveloped" eowltry does not already contain a cenain familiar iCntence; our slIbject may still give some probabiliry (pealer than zero) 10 the pro~ct of inventing a s.entence that will serve the purpose. However, suppose !hal the natives in the area are reslricted 10 • language in whieb Jones knows Ihal it is impossible 10 produce 5Uch a senlence. In lhal case our J ones misbt hope to leach them a new language that is known 10 be rieb ellOlJgh to do lhe job. But if restricted 10 their !oCmanlical1y incapable language, lhere will be no hope of producing an adequate Ul\erance. Type II bope exists in Ihe situation in whieb an individual hopes 10 disooyer whether a pankular Slllemcm it. true or false . Consider the s.entence, (2) 1lIe airpon is five miles 50Ulh of the center of lhe dry. Suppose that someone has menlioned !oCntenc:e (2) to J ones, and Jones stam acting as if it is true. To hope that il is true is to IIopo! that !IOmeo~ may have knowledge of irs tnuh·vaIue and that

THE LOGIC OF HO PE value will rum OUI 10 be lrue. To hope 10 have knowledge of 115 Inuh-value, Type II hope. IfI\IOlves each of lhe five requirements., a) to e), above. Pu ttilli these requiremen15 together, we have: If Jones hopes to know the truth,value of To the n Jones can mention the sentence s, knows persorutl ignonnce of ;15 truthvalue, desires 10 know it and thinks the chances are fl . To know tha.t one is. ignoranl is 10 _me that Ihere is an aruwer. In whal situation would such a Type II hope be hopele"? Suppose that IOmeont has mentioned sentence (2) to Jones. bul Jones does 001 understand anything about the sentence, perhaps not even that it Is a well ·Cormed sentence in any laRgUage. In Ihat cue, il would be bopeless to expect Jones to discover tha.1 the sentence is either true or false. We observers of the lituation can say Ihal. while in this condilion, Jones has no hope of learning Ihat a perune nt piece of information has just been reponed. Since Jones does IIOt recognize Ihat a sentence has been heard. our Rlbject has no schema in which ~",eflu may tum ou t to be lrue or (Woe. As Kant has put il. "... without male rial IloOthing wha1SOever can be thought" (A232). So, the observe rs can say, correctly, that J ones has no hope of discovering the truth·value of senteoce (2) while not yet reoognwllIthat it is a sentence. A pos.sibility is that just as the rnltive in the situation above pronounces sentence (2), Jones has a day-dream. In this. reverie J ones thinks that it would be nice if someone such as that native explained the way \0 &0 10 the airport. Docs Jones the o hope to learn the truth·value of the sentence? No, b«ause our traveler still does not recognize that the nat;\'e's utterance is linguistic. a sentence, and does play the TOle in the 5t:hema that is. delired. So, we may say that Jones has a hope to be capable of determ ini ng as lrue some sentence relevant to the problem. but nol Ihal Jones hopes 10 learn the truth of just Ihat sentence, (2). Type III hope OCCIIrs in a si lualioo in which one is ignoranl of the reference of a sentence, and hopes 10 discover whatever Ihe sentence designates. Suppose J ones finds the following sentence on the door of his or her holel room, somewhere in Fr,mce, and takes il to be of po$Sible importance. ye t cannot understand it:

'''14

nit Logic of Hope

199

(3) Le prix de «tte chambre, nunW'fO dix-buit, e.u fid .. quaue-vingt franca pour Ie jour. If Jones hopes to understand it, theo lhe followina holds: Jones can poinl 10 it and assumes Ihal il has a reference, wat1U 10 know what it refers to, koOl\"$ penooal igooraoee of tbe refe rerK:e, and knows that there mayor may nol be suor;e55 in geltill8 the answer. When a bilingual companinn appear5, Jones can properly 5:1Y, "' hope you cao. translale those words for me: they mighl he intercstina or importanl." Suppose another ()(C&Sion on .... hich his or her room-male is asked to translale a sentence, with the same hope thai it can he done beeaU5e it may be imponaoL But iD!ilead of a sentence on the door, there appear merely a few random letters of the alphabet. "The room-rnate may properly respond, "No hope nf undentanding that, it is 1101 anythinl in French or any other language, as far as I know: A Type III hope can eWt only when the subject is aware of IoOIIIe sentence and hopes to find its refere nce. No IoC:nlence, DO Type ill hope. This hope is based on an assumption of fact, that a cenain strinl of marb is a IoC:ntence. If Ihat assumption is in error, me subject assumes whal we call a fint-order hope, but it turns out to he a IoC:roll(\-order hope. A more satidactory explanation requires the results of the neJt two 1oC:dions.. Jones may reply to the room-male, "II may be a IoC:ntenc:e in rode. Please lest that assumption and I shall hope thai you succeed in deciphering it (Type I hope), and then in undentanding its meanill& (Type III hope)." (Jones is a difficult room-male; illiterate bul persistent!) For another example of Type ID hope, hope of Jeamina the reference of something. cort$ider the followinl c;ase: (") Jones h.u rome into possession of a Treasure Map, and hopes to find the treasure al the place marked X. Joncs satisfies each of the five requiremenl1: (a) has a pattern or $oChema of the objective, including IoOIIIe nolion of whal "Irel.Sllre" might refer 10, (b) does not know whether Ihere will be an actual phr.;ical entity that is a treasure. 10 salisfy that mosl eISCntial pan of tilt idw:ma, (c) is aware of prescnt ignortnce of the mD&t

200

TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE

imercsting part of the 5Chcma, (d) does wanl to find the treuure, and, (e) assumes thaI the probability of M1~U ranges somewhe re between 0 and I. Therefore, JOntl bope!; 10 find the reference of X in a cenain semence. Ibal is. '7lIc: treasure is al X: This is a Type III hope. Our hunter also has a Type U hope. thai his oc ber favorite senlence, "The treasure is al X: is true. Suppose thaI in tbe siluation in (ot) above, all is the same e:a:eept thatlhe map has unfonunatcly been panly d~troyed, and the pan thai may have amtaioed the area showing the exact ioulion of the trea$lJtC doe.s not exist (or is not available to Jones). Now J ones has even mort: 10 hope for: the hope 10 complete the schema. figure 0\1\ where the Ilcasure is supposed \0 be, a Type I IKlpe: al50 the hope that it will be there upon arrival, a Type III

-.

Type III hopes seem to eml in two different liiluatiOJl$, when the hoper seeks /0 know 1M ,tfon;lICC of a sentence, and wbc:n the individual seeks to find (po
for cnmpie, Jones hope$ 10 pos5Cs thc Ireasure, is taken 10 be cquivalcnl 10 JODeS'S hope thai "II" minc" is truc. A Type II

-.

So far we havc introduced a definilion of hope and distinguished three variCtiC5 dcpendent on the kind of ignorance involvcd. A number of problems remain 10 be dealt with: definina sccond-ordcr hope, comidering the limits on possible hope, applyi", these mallen to hope of IoOlving the antinomies, ilDd the distinction betwecn rcasonable and unreasonable hope. To clarify Kant', work on rel.igion, we need to have each of these in hand.

Seven THE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

We now expand thc subject beyond the definitioll$ of lhe previous chaplet. What ~y RtvC as p , as a ~ption 0( the desired situation? AI fint onc may comider a range of possible dc5CJiptions: ( I) a thre~ensiona1 color picture, (2) a black and white twcHIimensionai picture (rom one viewpoint, (3) a physical model to scale. (4) a ~p to scale, (5) a formal schematic, and, (6) linguistic entities. To cvaluate the claims 0( each of t hese candidalC$ requires a wcll-llcvelopcd theory of the na ture of images in die mind. The hi5torics of philosophy and of psycholoi)' 5ltow a &nod deal of attention to this question. While die Il5t fifteen yean of work on thc philO$Opby of mind and cognitive psyehology have been interesting. dceisivc results arc still lackinJ. Therefore, I will proceed willi one of the most modest of the range of alternatives. When "rongcr theories of description and of thc nature ofmcntal images are available, they ~y aUow improvements in the fonnulation of hope. Our modest assumption is that when an individual thinks of IOmCthini such 15 a physical object, there Deed OOt be a pictorial image in mind; the individual ncelb only to have I tcchniquc for menlionins features of the objcct. For this purpose, a bare map or schematic is cnough. We do need 50me notion of the nccnsary requirements of a proper map. A helpful uudy (now dusical) of the related properties of maps and im'ics is readily at bl.nd. Kevin LyndI'l 1M 1" , . of 1M City.' Without COl'ICCrning ourselvcs widl the concept of image tllat l..ynclt uses, we can take his analysis of the

202

TIiE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

elements of an imqe as our set of requirements for the elements of a map. Following him, a map has ( I) paW, (2) boundaries, (3) nodes, (4) diitricu. and (5) landmarks.. We also WlInt the psychologieal properties of these elements so we will add the following (e.tures to bii lise (1 ) a pcuh may he understood as a _ to reach a goaL (2) /kJftkn are the limiu of fM ttality 10 be considered, whal 1000cians eall Ihe universe of discourse. Sorden cont.ain what we take 10 exist, in an are.. (3) Noda are intersections of palhs. 1hey give us the im~ion of MImIl meQIU. and. therefore. pal1ems for achieving several goals. (4) Districtl are arus of special Jignificaru:e. worth idenlifyin" (5) Landmarks are objecu of value, either in themselves Of as Iocaton 10 give sealrity about our position. Suppose that someone nopes 10 obtain a partiallar book at the library this afternoon. For this hope 10 take place, we need 10 have a ITUIJ' of lhe area from our present Iocalion to the library. A map of the library is also needed, cont.aining the palhs one ~ lake aDd nodes for changing from one path to anothe r. tbe boundariel of the building. the aJU. or lCCIion of the building in which books of that sort are kept, and the landmarks. sucb as lhe Librarians desk. tbe doorway, the card catalog or library computer, perbaps the duplicating equipmenL 'The book itself may also be mapped: il bas (1) boutIdaries. (2) paths and alternative paths tbat may be l.aken to iu contents such as skipping pagel or just reading chapler headings., (3) oodes bet'A'Cen chapters, (4) districtS such as !be first half, and perhap5 (5) landmarks such as Olapter VII, the Preface. To desire something is 10 have a map of it, although il may be an incomplete map. To hope require.s desire. 10 desire require. thought, and 10 tbi nk requires a map and the eocTCY 10 move around il that constitutes various jouT1lC)'. I assume that it is something like tbis sense of map tbat Arislotle meant by "imaae" when he said, "when lhe mind iii actively aware nf anything il is ne"'''arily aware of it along with an image. . ..oJ. We need 10 know encdy what an image is before we can look for counlerCJWIlples. For the PUrpo5C$ of this chapler we can lake a

203 strin&cnt notion of image. take it to be • map a5 defIned above. and look about for possible bopc:i that resist translation into maps. We have coll5idered !leveral propenie$ of the JUbjeCl in the hope relation: the person's desire for the object, ntirturc of knowledge or and ignorance of the derails of the scbema, and the cbances for 5U......... We have specified Ihal tbe individual is to construCt:l schema that include5 the objea of hope. bul we have not gone inlo the propenies of an adequate schema, nor into !he relation between a schema and an image. AmaRi the questions still to be analyzed is the malter of the COII$i$ICncy of the schema that is required, 1M question of ~ fOl' Ille impossibk. In the electronics field a common relationship holds between a schematic diagram and a piece of equipment. for example. a radio receiver. The schematic diagram is DOl a picture of the physical radio; it is an .mtraet Of form.al way of representing electrical features of the radio. The diagram docs 001 symbolize cvcryfeature of tbe physical radio. It might 1101 dIaw the size, the weight, the color, the price. the minimum signal that may be r«eived. the maximum volume that may be produced. It does CldIibit ccnain electrical features of thc equipment. presented in the way a map presents features of its Rlbject. We do oot set an electrical sl'lod: from tOIIchinS the schematie in the wrong plate. but we tan predict ~ U5ing the schematic whcre a sbock would be felt in the radio. In lin&uistic terms., a schematic is a way of mt'lllimlin& features of the radio without using &II image or model that physically corresponds to the radio. 1be relation between schema and object is Q limilrd Uomo,plli.sm: for some points in the object tbere are points in the Kherna, and for SOIllC relations between those points in the object there are relations between the corresponding points in the schema. 1be comments above on the relatioD between Kherna and object should DOt be considered stranSe. In these terms., language is a schema for the objects in the world as well as objects not in the world. The word, "Philadelphia: is nOi an imase of the city that it names, bul il does $tNt in schematic COntcns to give us an object of thought. For example, ' Philadelphia lies on the Dela·

204 204

THE LOGIC LOGIC OF OF HOPE: HOPE: CONTINUED CONTINUED THE

ware River, River," gives gives us us aa symbolic symbolic schema schema that that presents presents features features of of ware situation. AA suitable suitable map map may may also also do do this. this. Neither Neither the the aa situation. sentence nor nor the the map map have have all all of of the the features features that that we we see see from from an an sentence airplane over over the the city, city, or or on on aa detailed detailed scale scale model model of of the the city. city. airplane However, the the assertion assertion of of aa hope hope to to go go to to Philadelphia Philadelphia requires requires However, schematic in in mind mind that that enables enables the the person person to to construct construct merely aa schematic merely some feature feature of of the the city, city, enough enough to to connect coimect itit with with that that person's person's some present location. location. Every Every image image may may be be reduced reduced to to some some schematic schematic present construction: aa schematic schematic need need not not presuppose presuppose that that one one can can construction: construct an an image image based based on on it. it. construct A native native Philadelphian Philadelphian familiar familiar with with the the waterfront waterfront of of the the city city A may have have some some image image in in mind mind when when saying, saying, "Philadelphia "Philadelphia lies lies on on may the Delaware Delaware River." River." However, However, aa foreigner foreigner who who has has never never visited visited the the city city or or seen seen aa picture picture or or model model of of it it may may still still understand understand the the the sentence in in terms terms of of aa schema schema in in which which there there is is one one line line symbolizsymbolizsentence ing the the river river and and an an area area alongside alongside the the line line symbolizing symbolizing the the ing location of of the the city. city. The The foreigner foreigner may may also also be told that that the the river river location be told flows from from north north to to south south and and that that the the city city is side. is on on the the west west side. flows This schema with without This may may be be put put into into the the schema with suitable suitable symbols, symbols, without the the person person picturing picturing the the river, river, the the streets streets and and buildings buildings of of the the city, city, waterfront, an waterfront, etc. etc. The The question question arises, arises, Does Does the the native native have have an image image in in mind mind or or merely merely aa more more detailed detailed schema? schema? To To answer answer this this question conception question adequately adequately one one would would need need aa more more powerful powerful conception of of the the nature nature of of image image than than any any II have have found. found. For For the the purposes purposes of of the the analysis analysis of of hope, hope, we we need need to to assume assume some some schema schema that that locates locates features features of of the the object object of of hope. hope. Whether Whether or or not not images images exist purpose (and (and perhaps perhaps any any other other as as long long exist is is irrelevant irrelevant for for this this purpose as detailed schematics schematics can can be be constructed). constructed). as detailed At At this this stage stage we we may may consider consider the the matter matter of of possible possible and and impossible impossible hopes. hopes. A A hope hope requires requires aa schema schema connecting connecting subjects subjects with with their their objectives. objectives. While While itit can can have have many many blank blank sections, sections, itit provides provides the the basis basis for for the the subject subject to to answer answer the the question, question, "What "What do do you you hope hope for?" for?" A A response response can can be be made made with with aa description description of of the the goal, goal, at at least least in in schematic schematic form. form. But, But, the the schema schema has has to to be be selfselfconsistent, we will will not not know know what what we we desire. desire. IfIf more more than than one one consistent, or or we schema schema can can be be made made of of the the objective, objective, and and ififthey they are are inconsistent. inconsistent, It

1h Logic

we must choose in orde r

of HOfN:

Continued

give a sat isfactory answt!r, at ally one time, even to our5elves. Suppose tbis schema diffen from oun (we outside observen of the world)? May we hope for something in tenm or a schema that contradicts the reigning scientific schema for the matter involved? People do hope in terms of their awn schema, as long as it is self-consistent there is a dear buis for tbe expreuion of • hope. Suppose wmeone presents. schema that is discovered to be inconsistent? What about the stage before the schema was discovered 10 be raully? One of tbe risb of cognitive thought is !.bat one's symbol$ may have 00 reference: the other risk is 100 many referenccs. It is quite ealiy to me ntion a schema thaI cannot possibly be used to designate anythill&- For ClIample, "a squarecircle." Even wide social av«rncnt on a 'Chema does not cuaranlCC that it is the fII05t effident construction for specifying a certain soal. H owever, even when we do nol have a proof of the consistency and completeness of a schema. il may be usable in tbe parts that are DOt iDCOnsistenL A furlher question arises, •Are I.bcre restrictions on the clements of a 5Chema to be used as a buis for hoper What is I.bc restriction on possible hope, if any? to

2. KlInt on PoulNe Hopei

The relation ber.vcen the paiSible and the actual has been a mailer of regular interest in the history of philosophy. The common-sense a.uumption is that more paiSible entities exist than actual entities, more JlO55ible world$!.ban actu.a1 worlds.. However, Kant roues a valuable distinction between what one may "profess to think" as possible and what is objectively possible (Cril~ of Pure RmsotI, A 223). Kant (nt defines the prusibk as, '"That .... hicb agrees witb !.be formal conditions of experience. that is. with the conditiOll$ of intuition and of concepts." (In the First Critique. section on the Postulates of EmpiricaiThougbt, AlIS.) So. ' pomible' is to be used in !.be context of possible u~na! b there a seme of possible concePt tIlal is merely logical but nol

206

m E LOGIC OF HO PE: CONTINUED

a pouible experience? Kant responds, "I t is, irKIeed, a ~ logical corKIition that. concept of the pouible must not contain any contradiction; but this is not by any lnCa"s sufficient 10 detennine the objecti~ reality of the concept, that is, the pouibility of such an object as is thought through the concept" (A220). Logical consistency is necessary but not sufficient. What has to be added for sufficiency? CotlSUllClubility ill spuu und timt. Only those things are pouible that "agree with the formal corKIitions of experience": this is Kant's "po$lulate of possibili~ (A2IS), And, the formal conditions of experience require that an object of experience be constructed within the requiremcnl5 of space and time. 'Therefore. Q possible object of hcpe CUII1IOl rkfy I/~ m'/I-'irtmMl~ of Q p-I)SSI'ble u;poil!1lce, To hope for an object is 10 imagine an experience of it. Gi~n the conclusion that Kant presenl5 to us above, there are serious. r«tr1ctioos on the elemenu of a seIJena thaI can be U$(!d as a basis for hope.. 'The object nf hope is to be not merely logically consistent; it is aI50 to be conslrUctable in space and time. IUId be a possible object of uperience. In addition to such legiti mate objecu of possible hope. Kant rnentiol\l; something else. 'There are", . . arbitrary combinations of thoughts, which. al though indeed (ru (rom oonuadiction, can make DO claim to objective reality. and none. therefore. as to the pouibility of lUI object such as we here profess to think" (A223), What mighl be enmples of such "arbitrary combinations of thoughtsr Kant offers: (I) "A su.b!;tance which would be permanently present in space, but withoot filling it .. ." (2) "a special ultimate me ntal power of intuitively anticiplltin& the future. , ." (3)"a power of starKIiT\i in community nf thought with other men, however distant they may be . , ." (A223). 'The feature thaI eadl of these thru have in common is that they "are concepu the possibili ty of which is altogether aroundless, as they cannot be based on uperience and its known laws." In terms of the modem distinction between use and m~, Kant is makin& a distinction between concepu that mil)' be nwuiOllM bw lUX wed to rqer to

ptJSJibl~ tlwughu,

and concepts thai may be mentioned UIId IhUl

abo m.:Iy ~ u.W /0 d~fgrIUl~ pruJibl~ 111lJf4:I1IS. This parallels the distinction between phenomena and noumcna. In our cue we have th~ distinction between (1) concepts that may only be mentioned, and (2) concepts Ihat may be mentioned and al$o ItsCd. Ph~nom~na are possible experiences, noumena are not. Similarly, coR$tructable COIICCPU arc possibl~ hopes. unconstructable concepts are nol poMible hopes. I am assuming in this discussion thai if something is nol :II possible object, il is nol a possible object of hope. Therefore, we may _ruion whal we lake 10 be the object of a hope, and be in error because il is not a possible object of hope. (likewise. we may mention whal is taken to be an object of the undenlaOding and be in error, if it is a noumenal enlity.)

3. Second-Order Hope AI this siage in the liludy .. reader wilh a vague memory of the distinction between noumena and phenomena may raise :I question. 'Doesn't Kanl offer us. al lta$t the possibility of IIOtImcnaJ objerur The answer is No. he does not. Consider how he puts the maner: "the concept of a noumenon is problematic, lhal is, •.. we can neither SIIy that il is possible nor Ihat il is impossible .. .' (A287). Why such a sirange predicament? Kant adds, 'for 'A'C are acquainted with no kind of intuition but our own sensible !tind and no !tind of concepts but the calegories, and neither of lhese is appropriate 10 a oonsensible object. We cannot. therefore, positively extend the sphere of the objecu of OUT thought beyond the conditioR$ of OUT IICR$ibility, and as.wDlC besides appearances objects of pure thought. that is, noumena, ~nce such objectS have no &S5ignable positive meanina" (A287). He continues, ""The concept of a tIOUmenon is, therefore, nol the concept of an object, bul is a problem unavoidably bound up with the limitation of our liCosibiJity-the problem ... as 10 whether there may not be objects entirely disengaged from any such kind of intuition.·

mE LOG IC OF HOPE: CONTINUED It IiUntS that if \hi$ is COlI$idered a problem, either answer is possIble. Kant repliu, '"Ibis is a question which ClUl only be all$_red in an indeterminate manner, by U)'ina that .. ... place remains ope:n for other and different objects; and consequently that these laner must not be absolutely denied, though-liince _ are without a determinate concept o( them . .. neither can they be U!ierted as objects (or our undentandin&" (A288). 1l!e same point is made again. near the end of the section on "Concepts of ReOection": "a concept ..;tbout an object (ou mtiOtlis), like: ooumena, ""hich canDOt be reckoned among the possibilitiu, although they must DOt (or that rcawn be declared to be also impossible ... whicb though entenained in thought without sel(contradiction are ~t a\$o in our thinking unsupponed by any eumple from uperience, and are therefore not to be counted as possible" (;.291). Oearly, ooumenal entiliQ can be mentioned without inroll$istency, but they cannot be possible objects of tbought. 1l!eir status is quite different from entities whose conceptS are self-contradictory, and therefore impossible, Noumena cannot be declared possible or declared impossible. Can it be possible that they are possible? Kilnl has said (above) that this am only be answered in an indeterminate manner. Can we hope that noumena are possible? We cannot under· stand what this would mean. but since ..~ may tell oundva things that ...,. do IlOf wuk:nland, we may tefl _/lies thal ...,. IuNe .such a hope -.fIhOUl under:Jrandirrg ....-hat we "ope for. In this case, we may know ..-hy we hope:. but DOt whal we hope:, a distinction that parallels the distinction Kant makes belWeen ~tery and unknowability (see my OutpUT Nine, "On Mystery vs. Unkoowability"). We may call this Q ~·onJer Iwpe (or rrlCta-hope), Q /rope thut ;1 is pouibk IhuJ wmethirrg nc( IUfdtmundubk is possible. It is tautological to say that llUeh a second order hope is not undeT$tandable. To the tautologieal we may add the otMous: thilliS not understandahle may sometimes be useful. OM may drive an automobile without understanding the nature of its ellgine.' The serious que~tion for Kant is this: Does a secondorder hope have any use or moral danger? We will

mom

The Logic Logic of of Hope: Hope: Continued Continued The

209

postpone considering considering this this question question until until after after taking taking up up the the matter matter postpone of hope hope in in connection connection with with antinomies. antinomies. of 4. Hope Hope and and the the Solution Solution of of the the Antinomies Antinomies 4. What place place is is there there for for hope hope of of solution solution for for those those puzzles puzzles in in What which reason reason itself itself seems seems to to have have no no basis basis for for choice? choice? The The four four which antinomies that that Kant Kant offers offers in in the the Cdtique Critique of of Pure Pure Reason Reason (A426 (A426 antinomies to A453) A453) are are urgent urgent examples examples of of our our question. question. The The antinomies, antinomies, to as Kant Kant presents presents them them on on opposite opposite pages, pages, or or sides sides of of the the same same as page, are: are: page, Thesis Thesis

Antithesis Antithesis

1. The The world world has has aa beginning beginning 1. in time, time, and and is is also also limited limited as as in regards space. space. regards

1. The The world world has has no no beginbegin1. ning, and no space; ning, and no limits limits in in space; it is is infinite infinite as as regards both regards both it time and and space. space. time

2. Every composite substance substance Every composite 2. in the the world in world is is made made up up of of simple nothing simple parts, parts, and and nothing anywhere the anywhere exists exists save save the simple composed simple or or what what is is composed of simple. of the the simple.

2. the 2. No No composite composite thing thing in in the world is is made made up up of of simple world simple parts, and and there there nowhere parts, nowhere exists anything exists in in the the world world anything simple. simple.

3. accordance 3. Causality Causality in in accordance with the with laws laws of of nature nature is is not not the only only causality causality from from which which the the appearances appearances of of the the world world can can one To one and and all all be be derived. derived. To explain explain these these appearances appearances it it is is necessary necessary to to assume assume that that there there is is- also also another another causalcausality, ity, that that of of freedom. freedom.

3. 3. There There is is no no freedom; freedom; everything takes everything in in the the world world takes place accordance place solely solely in in accordance with nature. with laws laws of of nature.

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11iE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONllNUEO

4. lbere

belollgs to the world, either as iU pat! or as ilS cause. a beill& thai is absolulely II«USUI)'.

4. An absolutely ncceuary being nowhere exislS ill lhe world, nor docs il exisl outside the world as ilS cause.

lbere is no need 10 repeal )(am', lUIIIlysis of all of the fealUres of these posilions and Iheir relations to each other. For our purposes it will be enough recall that we cannot solve the problem of deciding belWecn the thesA and the antithesis in each casc. Unsolvable bcausc each position, thesis and IU1tilhesis. "is nol only in llSelf free from contradiction, bul fillds conditions of ilS neceuity in the very n.alUre of reason-only thai, unfOrlUnalely, the aucrtion of the oppo$ile has.. on ilS side, grounds that are juSt as valid and ncceuary" (8449). How do such problems arise? Kam answe", "If in employing the principles of understanding we do I10t merely apply our reil5Ol1 10 objects of experience, but venture 10 extend these principles beyond the limilS of experience, there arise pMUdo-roIiona1 doctrioes which can ru:il""" /~ fix wlllradiciion. in upcieflce nOl" fear "fu/ution. by if' (8449) (my emphasis). Here we have a problem that Kam says is lNyond hope 01" fear. Notice that it is beyond hope or fear of uperiMce. Can there be a hope or a fear thai is I10t a hope for experience or a fellf of experience' lbe sccond pat! of this question, involving fear, WlU studied in a clauic passage by Epicurus.. 4.1 The Epicun" AnalolY

Sllould we fear something which, when i1 happens. will not be an occasion for paill, and so for fear? Aocording to EpicuCU$, "he ,"'lIIi a silly mall who said that he feared death. not because it would grieve him when ;t was prescllt, but because it did grieve him while ;t was future. For it is very absurd thai thai which does not distress a man when il is presefll. should afflict him when only e.
77~

Lcgic of Hope: COtIlimmJ

211

On the same ba$i$, we may argue that it is absurd to hope for an experience of happine» from somethin&whith. should it ocrur. would not be an experience of happiness. As Kanl menlioM, "all hoping is directed to happin~" (CPR. A80S). Call ,hue be huppbtess "'i,11CUl an apt,j~~? Not in any smJ~ of Ih~ lern 11101 ..~ can imugiIte. TIle consequence of this Is that we may find ourselves facinS problems, tbe rHOlution of Ihe anlinomie$, which are beyond hope or fear. Undecidable questioni and proofs of their undWdabiliry exist. Bu t utisfaction requires. proof. And consll'Ucting a proof requires experience. (Even knowledge of a matbematical proof requi res experienee..)' There are objeaions 10 Epicurus. Epicurus bas arsued that if the fear of (leatb is taten lite rally. it is absurd; bowever. if "fear of deatb" means fear of a short rather than a 1011& interval before death. then pre5ent fear of the future event is reouonable. But this would translate the feared result into a shon experience rather tban a long experience; we still are deaHng with the expectation of one or another experience. If tile fear of death is fear of a painful last illness., we again have an experience as tile object of the fear. TIle lengtb of one's life and tbe pain before one's death are proper and understandable manea of hope and fear. BUL hope and fear tbat are not hope and fear of some experience are emp'Y ideas.. Consider one PlOte possible oounter-example 10 the broadened EpiaJrus position: tbe view Ibat there is no basis for a present hope or fear .bout.n experience unless it would be an experience of bappiness or unhappiness when it O«Ilrred. Suppose you buy a life ill5Uranee policy witb family members as the beneficiaries of a large sum of money in case of accidental dealh. In buying the policy. you hope that the insurance company will make the family wealtby in the event of your accidental death. Docs it make sense 10 say Ibat in buying the policy, you bope fo r something that will 1101 be an object of your experience? Yu. but it is an object of uperience rlK tbe family. if the insurao« company makes the payme nt.

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TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

Kanfs im;istcnce thilt all hoping is for happine~ does not seem to apply to the MJbjeet who docs the hoping in thi5 example. ( I) The subject dots hope for bappi~ althoogh it is IIOt peBanal happineu but the happiness of othen. (2) The probability of bappineu for tbe othen is a basis for peBanal happincS5 ;n the present and in the intefVill from the purchase of the insurance until death. (3) 1be insured, apparently, wouLd be happy If able to experience the reeeipi of the wealth by the family. So, the purchaser hopes for a situation Q.J if there to experience it. We avoid various subjunctive enUlnglements by noting that the subject buys the polio:y assuming thai tile company ..... pay, and the family, if they know about the situation, do lhe hoping.. 1be beneficiaries hope that the company will be IoOlvent when the time for paymenl arrives and will carry 001 the contnlC!. BUI a sense remains in which the pefloOll who purchased tbe polio:y for other beneficiaries does hope that what has been purchased will be carried OU I as agreed. This peBan's hope is chaT1lcterlzcd by the Q.J if col1$truction: but, thi5 "as if pattern of hope is a variety of Iraru;.ceooenlal second· order hope. The individual hopes for a situation which, if it were an experience, woo ld be an experience of happine~, But we cannot produce an image of ourselves both dead and also not dead and able to have the expe rience of a HviRi person. So, the buyer of such insurance hopes (or IoOmcthing thaI can be !laid but canoot be understood, referentially, in firsl·perwn

m

,,-

The eITon 10 produce an image is IoOmetimes prodigious. You can com;truct an image of yourself $landing behind a veil, w.llching through a hole in the veil as your family receives the wealth from the imuTilllCC company: an "as it' ((Instruction wilh a serious naw. The question of rClISOllilblc second-order hopes will arise again in connection with Kant's use of the conception. Rcturning 10 the antinomies, we IIOle bow Kant advises us 10 proceed. First, remind ourselves of tbe c~nlial role of pou.iblc experience.

213

PM' l " ,

H,~, ic .....

is:hal whidI ... oIc.e p.c rulity 10 ..... ......,""' ..

ill ............ ..-epe io ..... idu. wilIoouIlnlllo. :haI iI, witboooI ..IOI"'" 10 "1i~j rn. 11M: p" vU aoopirial a.cept iI:bud_tlle M'M"d b7 ...mdt we ....... jI1dp:.' icIo.o io ........ ~.-I ~_Qly. or whelbet iI finck iu obje
,·he,"

For "Ihough.-entity"

we may 5ubstitllte

~"'ionable

entily: TI!e11,

if somelhina is mentionable bul not usable. by ou r concept$, can we hope that il become usable? NOI by us., limited as we are 10 our concepts. Can we ~ thaI there may be entities that have different Q priori cateBories of uDdcrstanding and experience, and WI what is only mentionable for us is usable for them? We can SCl)' this, 001 it may be argued that we cannot understand what we are saying. The i$sue may be pul in terms of another antinomy.

""'.

We may reuoll.llbly hope thai wbat is 1101 understandable for human rcason is understandable by some other entity in the world. AnllItitlll II is DOl reuonablc 10 hope that what is DOt understandable by human beings is still undcl1'undable by non-humans..

Suppose we aecept the Thesis, above. What advantage would • human beillfl have if only some outside entity undenlood the solulion to a problem? II would nill remain a problem (or that person. SUppo5C the Thesis is rephrased in lerms of furore ulMlt ntandillJ by human beinp. But, if human beings of the fulure undentand Ihe 5Olulion to a problem, that slill docs 001 provide us with a wlulion. Suppose the 'Thesis is rephrased 50 that we ounclv« hope 10 undentand in the future something that is DOW completely beyond the meaning of our categories. ls this a reasonable hope? Again, we can say it, but we do nol /lOW know what we are u.ying. But a lt5!i desperate alternative can be oonsidered.

2\0'

lliE LOG IC OF HOPE; CONTINUED

What does Kant do with the problem of the solution to the antinomies in the Fint Cri tique? He suggests what _ may call a pragmatic response 10 predicaments of thaI type. If a question cannot be answered. attack the question and replace it by,. beller qucstion. Fint. he looks carefully a\ the "conditions" of the antinomy under diKussJon. By a <:(Illodition i$ meam a common assumption made by both \he$il and antithesis. "If twO opposed judgments presuppose an inadmissible condition, then in spi te of their opposition. ... both fall to the ground .. ." (ASOJ). The first step, then. is to analyze the alternatives 10 $Ce if we CIUI locate their rommon USlImptiom. Since tbey arc rellpOlISCS 10 the same: question, they must have SOIT>C common assumptions. 1bc 5CCOnd step consists in d«iding whether the common assumption (or tiSWnptioos) is acceptable. If nol, _ arc not <:(Impelled to .ocept either thesis or antithc5il. But suppose the assumption is acceptable, having no property thai can be rejected? Our nut move may be to employ the dualist', famous _apon; Consider the alternatives from different viewpoints. Kant docs this with the fooM antioomy, in AS6O, wrung with, "Both of the <:(Inflicting propo5itions may be 1tUC, if taken in different <:(I1llICCtions." If we take the thesis and IntlthesJ.s to be answers to different quc5lio"," we will somctimes gain the advantages of each without logical confusion. SUppo5C this technique is also unsatisfaClOry for OUT problem. There is yet another move available, the search for what we may call a praamatic synthesis.

SUJlP( Ie Ihat we are unable to c~ cither of a pai r of opppOlI$C suiiests using Kant's strateI)' in a different way. Step I, Connulate the qucstiOll (question A) to which the thesis and antitbc$i$ are UIISWttJ". Call tha.e answen position A and position -A.

The Logic Logic of of Hope: Hope: Continued Continued The

215 215

Step 2, 2, formulate formulate the the problem problem (problem (problem A) A) for for which which question question Step pertinent. Now: Now: AA isis pertinent. Step 3, 3, we we try try to to generalize generalize on on problem problem A, A, raise raise aa broader broader Step problem such such that that ifif we we solved solved this this new new problem problem we we would would no no problem longer be be concerned concerned with with problem problem A. A. We We require require aa formulation formulation longer of some some problem problem BB that that lends lends itself itself to to aa pertinent pertinent question question that that we we of can answer answer satisfactorily. satisfactorily. There There is is more more than than one one way way of of conconcan structing problem problem BB so so as as to to have have its its solution solution remove remove the the need need for for structing solving problem problem A. A. Because Because there there is is no no unique unique decision decision procedure procedure solving for stating stating problem problem B, B, dialecticians dialecticians cannot cannot compel compel agreement agreement from from for other on on the the matter matter of of the the most most efficient efficient "new "new synthesis," synthesis," or or each other each the most most fruitful fruitful generalization. generalization. The The schema schema for for this this procedure procedure is is the presented in in Table Table 5. 5. presented

TABLE 5 PRAGMATIC PRAGMATIC SYNTHESIS SYNTHESIS step 11 step

Question A position-A Question A position position A A <-> < - > position-A (thesis)

( antithesis) (antithesis)

step position-A step 22 Problem Problem A A ......Question Question A A position position A A <-> < - > position-A

step -B step 33 Problem Problem B B......Question Question B B position position B B <-> < - > position position-B

step -C step 44 Problem Problem C C ......Question Question C C position position C C <-> < - > position position-C To To illustrate illustrate aa pragmatic pragmatic synthesis, synthesis, consider consider the the following. following. Suppose Suppose we we come come upon upon two two people people who who are are arguing arguing about about the the answer answer to to the the . question. question, Where Where isis Montgomery Montgomery Street? Street? Perhaps Perhaps one one says says that that itit isis

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TIlE LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

to the !>OM while the other holds that it lies south. As. pragmalic peacemakers.. we ask why the disputants "''ant to know the location 01 Monlgomery Strut. Suppcl5e they answer, To visit Temple University. Now, if we can provide directioll$ 10 tIIat destination. even thou&h we don't know the location of Montgomery Street, we h.ave resolved the problem of the antinomy between going north and KMlIh. We might be able to point to the tallest building of the University and yet not know anything about Moolgomery Strut. The synthe5i5 (8), "Temple University lin thai way; might be neither north IlOl' south of the speakers position. However, il symhe,~ the original conflict. not by conlaining within itself bolh positions (A) and (·A). but by providing Ihe advantages of a sucressful decision procedure that solves the proble m that was the goal of each con~tanl. It may nol be addrcued 10 the precise question that separated ilJ\SWer (A) and (·A). bul il solves a problem lhal makes the original problem. (A). no longer re levanl to me concerns 0( the individuals involved. At any llep, if we find ourselves ulisficd with aoxcpting. position (A or .A, B or .8, and so on), then we need no funher slepi. We have solved the problem of finding a satisfactory posilion. If, however, we are 00( satisfied with the choice between positions al we are 10 generaliu on me problem al lhal 5tep in the any effOTt to formulate a problem that allows us 10 I.OXCpl a position that satisfies or removes the original problem. We have ooticcd Kant', point that "if two opposed judgment5 presuppose: an inadmiuible condition" (ASOJ), they lose their force. In the pragmatic search for a synthesis, if il IUrns out that two opposed posilioll!l have a commoo assumplioo that Slops any further inquiry, lhat IISSUmption needs 10 be replaced by something more efficient for the problem at hand. Kant iIlustr.l.les this pattern by an example from Zeno of Ele.. eallcd "a subtle dialectician" rather than the mischievous Sophist tllal Plato reprimanded (A502). Zeno maintained, as Kant presents it. "Ihal God (probably conoeived by blm as simply the world) is neither fmite nor infinile. neither in motion nor at rest. neither similar nor dissimilar 10 any othtr thi",&" (ASOl). 1.5 Kant uplaiN Zcno's position. it turns on

"CP.

711~

Logic of Hope: ConlinuM

217

finding that each side in the antinomy presupposes a common assumption. 1lIe two positions: that (A), the universe is similar, Ol" that (·A) it is DOl similar, to any other thing. each presuppose: that some OIlw thill& "With wruch it could be compared.: When we realize thaI the opposition between the two Yiew$ depends on making thi$ U$umption. and that we need 001, indeed. cannot, make it, then the antinomy 00 longer troubles us. Presumably we tum to other more urgent propenies of God or lbe universe. Is lhere hope for resolvins antinomies between apparently contradictory positions? We have two technique&. Firsl, we may find the C(lmIDOn assumptions that they make and di$rover Ihal .... e can avoid tbem. Second, .... e may take the pTa£lDalic rou le of generalbing on the problem thaI gave rise to the antithetical view5. When mUSt ....e face • hatd choice and pick one of lhe alternative answers, and .... hen may we hope 10 avoid either allernative by an attack on the question? This problem involves more than the mere 1000c of the situation. Surely .... e may hope (or results that we &houJd nof hope for. However urgent. moral issue, .... e may somctim<:s entenain a logically pouible hope of .voiding" dlOicc. But this is the moral problem of good and bad hopes. and oot tbe logical problem of the range of possible: hope. 1lIe point of this s.ection is to aplain the pragmatic advice that when a question does ~ permit us to choose an effidcnt answer, \herc may be • reasonable hope of finding II limO' qumion. Thcre is a limit 10 the optimistic tone of the lasl se:ntence. Therc is a reasonable hope of .voiding • cboice between contradictions if they follow the Khematic form of Kant's antinomies. Now, the feature that enables us 10 avoid etcrnal vacillation between thesis and lllItilhel.is in Kant'li antinomicli iii the fact that they involve employ· m<:nt of the categories of the understanding on som<:thill& that is DOl a po$foible experieoce. We may therefore successfully attack the question 10 which thesis and antithesis are oppo5td .nswers. Do we have hope of $IIch a stratcgy with all C(lntradictories? Only with lhose in .... hich .... e can find a critical fla .... in the question tllat gave rise: to them. Kant hIlS shown that "'·c may sometimes succeed, but it is a merely ment ioned hope until we can 5how the possibility

218 218

T H E LOGIC LOGIC OF OF HOPE: HOPE: CONTINUED CONTINUED THE

of aa refutable refutable assumption assumption in in the the question. question. Yet Yet aa mentionable mentionable hope hope of still one one variety variety of of aa hope. hope. isis still Second-order hopes hopes are are cases cases where where we we can can mention mention aa hope hope but but Second~order construct an an object object of of that that hope. hope. They They are are mentionable mentionable but but not not not construct not understandable. There There isis little little limit limit on on our our ability ability to to simply simply assert assert understandable. that we we have have aa hope, hope, whether whether or or not not it it is is reasonable reasonable or or constructconstructthat able. However, However, logic logic and and taste taste will will become become parameters. parameters. able. It has has been been argued argued (for (for example, example, by by John John Dewey) Dewey) that that the the history history It of science science is is aa history history of of better better and and better better questions questions as as well well as as better better of and better better answers. answers. Science Science does does not not always always work work doggedly doggedly until until aa and question is is answered. answered. Dewey's Dewey's remark remark is is well-based: well-based: question . . . the the conviction conviction persists--though persists-though history history shows shows itit to to be be aa hallucination--that hallucination-that ... all the the questions questions that that the the human human mind mind has has asked asked are are questions questions that that can can be be all answered in in terms terms of of the the alternatives alternatives that that the the questions questions themselves themselves present. present. answered But in in fact fact intellectual intellectual progress progress usually usually occurs occurs through through sheer sheer abandonment abandonment of of But questions together together with with both both of of the the alternatives alternatives they they assume--an assume--an abandonment abandonment questions that results results from from their their decreasing decreasing vitality vitality and and aa change change of of urgent interest. We We that urgent interest. do not not solve solve them: them: we we get get over over them. them. Old Old questions are solved by do questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, evaporating, while while new new questions questions corresponding changed disappearing, corresponding to to the the changed 6 attitude of of endeavor endeavor and and preference attitude preference take take their their place.^ place.

6. 6. Summaiy Summary and and Distinction Distinction Between Between Reasonable Reasonable and and Unreasonable Unreasonable Hopes Hopes We between We may may collect collect the the varieties varieties of of hope hope and and specify specify the the line line between what what is is and and what what is is not not hopeless. hopeless. The The. general general definition definition employed employed has has five five conditions conditions for for the the relation relation between between an an individual individual and and the the object object of of that that person's person's hope: hope: (a) (a) We We must must be be able able to to mention mention (i.e., (i.e., construct) construct) aa schema schema of of the the object, object. (b) (b) We We must must be be ignorant ignorant of of at at least least some some part part of of the the schema schema or or image, image. (c) ( c) We We are are to to know know that that we we are are ignorant ignorant of of some some part part of of the the schema schema or or image, image. (d) (d) We We are are to desire to complete the schema or image, (e) We must know that to desire to complete the schema or image. (e) We must know that we we are are ignorant ignorant of of the the result, result, the the success success or or failure, failure, of of the the desire. desir~. While While this this definition definition is is involved involved in in eveiy every example example of of hope, hope, itit lets lets us us distinguish between methodological, semantic, and compound kinds distinguish between methodological, semantic, and compound kinds of of hope. hope.

219 Please a)QSult Table I, "'Kinds of Hope: in our previous chapler, page ISS, i n roMe<1ion with the following outline. 1M _~ kinds of ~ are: (1) hope for the success of a known means, (2) hope for the discovery of an efficient means, and (3) hope for the ability 10 communicate an adequate description of a goal. 1M Mmmuic wuijkmiOlt gave us: (I) !he Type: L the hope for the ability to mention (cl~ or analyze) something, (2) Type 11, the hope to know the trutb-Yalue of. senlence. and (3) the Type 111, the hope 10 know the rdereoce of a lingui5tic e ntity. ,of wmpowuJ hope is a case in wbicb the subject deab ~ulta oeously with more than one hope. While Ihc hope for .. solution is unitary, the object of the hope may i!Kif be • hope or nuy involve more than ODe hope. We oonsidered three kinds of compound hopes: (1) the ~~. the hope thaI it is possible that IIOmething that is IlOl und: '$,lVIlfubk is still possible, (2) the hope for a 5Ohnion 10 antinomies between positions that presupprlC impouibk upoimcu, (3) the hope for a solution 10 the choice between dialectical opposi tes lIIat bold between pouibk apoitnCt!l. Of this group of compound hopes. lbe fin! two are transcendental while the third is experiential. llIis is not an exhaustive classification of the possible compound hopes.. Given any two hopes., ODC can alwa)'$ join them .nd produce a compound hope for their mutual solution. Also. aiven any hope. caU it A, one can hope that A have particular features. Such features might be that A is never realized. that A is quickly realized, thai A remain a secret from the world. and Ihal A be adopted universally. We can dU.tinguish between the object of hope A. and the relation of hoplnJ.. 'Then, in the cases jusl listed, some are flrst-order compounds that take the same object of hope; othen are second-order because they are hopes thai take hopes at part of their obj(dS. Second-order bope5 may be either transcendental or experiential. See Table 1, "Kinds of Hope."

220 220

THE LOGIC LOGIC OF OF HOPE: HOPE: CONTINUED CONTINUED THE Unreasonable Hopes Hopes 7.7. Unreasonable

Now that that we we have have completed completed our our survey survey of of the the kinds kinds of of hope, hope, we we Now can specify specifysome some of of the the unreasonable unreasonable varieties. varieties. The The methodological methodological can classification in in Table Table 33 in in our our previous previous chapter chapter suggests suggests the the classification possibility of of empty empty hopes hopes in in several several categories. categories. On On level level 2, 2, in in Table Table possibility 3, the the hope hope for for success success of of aa particular particular means means presupposes presupposes that that an an 3, available means means isis known. known. If If itit isis not, not, the the hope hope for for success success isis empty, empty, available at least least at at that that stage. stage. Likewise, Likewise, on on level level 33 the the hope hope for for an an efficient efficient at means can can be be reasonable reasonable only only if if the the answer answer to to question question B B is is means affirmative. Similarly, Similarly, on on level level 44 the the hope hope for for communication communication of of aa affirmative. goal requires requires that that there there be be aa goal, goal, that that there there be be an an affirmative affirmative goal answer to to question question A. A. Is Is an an empty empty hope hope unreasonable? unreasonable? While While it it is is answer not the the same same as as aa hope hope for for aa flat flat contradiction, contradiction, it it is is internally internally not it ignores ignores its its own own presuppositions. presuppositions. inconsistent; it inconsistent; The Semantic Semantic Classification Classification also also permits permits the the mention mention of of varieties varieties The of hope hope that that are are internally internally inconsistent. inconsistent. A A Type Type II hope that of hope requires requires that the subject subject be be able able to to construct construct aa schema schema as as aa reference for the the the reference for desire to do something, something, that to name no desire to do that is, is, to name something. something. If If one one has has no such hope such schema, schema, one one has has no no such such hope. hope. There There can can be be no no Type Type II II hope unless truth-value unless there there is is the the ability ability to to mention mention aa sentence sentence whose whose truth-value is is desired. desired. To To say say that that aa subject subject hopes hopes to to know know the the truth, truth, but but not not the truth about some sentence or sentences, is to report an empty the truth about some sentence or sentences, is to report an empty Type Type II II hope. hope. Thirdly, Thirdly, there there cannot cannot be be aa Type Type III III hope hope without without aa sentence sentence whose whose reference reference is is desired. desired. Each Each of of these these three three aberrations aberrations of semantic hopes is equivalent to hoping for the answer of semantic hopes is equivalent to hoping for the answer to to aa question but having no notion of what is the question. question but having no notion of what is the question. Presumably, Presumably, reason reason forbids forbids the the inconsistency inconsistency of of treating treating an an empty empty hope hope as as ifif itit were were not not empty, empty, as as ifif each each of of its its requirements requirements were were satisfied. The point here is not that an incomplete or empty hope satisfied. The point here is not that an incomplete or empty hope isis to to be be called called unreasonable, unreasonable, but but that that itit isis unreasonable unreasonable (inconsis(inconsistent) tent) to to take take an an incomplete incomplete hope hope to to be be complete. complete. (The (The term term "unreasonable" is used to mean that reason cannot support such "unreasonable is used to mean that reason cannot support such aa position: contradicts itself.) itself.) position: itit contradicts The The incomplete incomplete hopes hopesjust just considered considered are are rather rather obvious obvious cases cases of of error. error. AA more more serious serious because because more more easily easilyoverlooked overlooked error error consists consists ll

221 as an obJ«t of hope 50mething thai vioIatel Kant', "po5tulate of poWbility." TbiJ postulate bokb; thai for an object to be poaible II muu be tbe ob;ed. 01 • pouible experience. As phrased aboYe. in lectlon 4.1 we QlUIOt hope for an object \lnl_ ane can imqinc an uperiencc of Ihl! objca. 1bercf.m=, an ullJ"Ca$On.lble hope takes for lIS object somcthil'll Wt doc5 not atidy lbe eonc1itiooi 01. p"".jbk experience.. To hope for • ~tu.tioD that _Id violate tbe laws 01. logic is ccnainly 10 hope Cor somethina: WI caMOt be an etpetien.ee. HC/WC'IC:r. m ..dsu/ICy II noc enoup 10 ",vant« I itgitilNle hope. A Type 111 hope, • hope for. rcfere~ for • conoepl thai may be c:or.i
tUina

PG",ibility is th.l, ", .. without materi,1 nothina whatsOe~r an be thQuabt" (Al.l2). A hope requires I Ihou&hl of ill object, .nd il 'au' "material" in order 10 produce. thollj)'II, accocdinl 10 Kant. "So lona; lIS inrvition is \ackina. we do IlOl know whether throv&h the

calcaorlcl we are thinkin& I n objca, and whether ind«d there can anywhere be an objealUlled to them" (8288). The (()mpound hopei offer compound opport;Jnilic5 to phrase untc;uonable hope. The experientIal candidatel can he unreasonable on (be bui! of factual error in their assumptions, or internal inconsistency in their comtruction. With the utn$ttndental hopes we have a mou IIoerious bsue than the obvious matlel'$ of factual or Logical fwndation. EYen If web hope_ do paM formal 5mlliny on these VOUnds.. we have the question o f their pt'Ob!ematie status.. They are problernatk be<:ause they ISiUme Kherna that are OOt posfJbIe experiel\Cle$. An Impoo&nt alterJll.'lve remains to be

.........

On first consideration, there teelllli to be a cllitinction between our symboh and the objecU ~ entities that they I}'I1lbolize. In the c:aK of mathematical entitie .. we use symbolJ to refer to numbers,

equalities.. reJationshipl. that are quite distinct from the symbols themsetve5. What iJ known u platonism in mathematics iI; often I2ken for a \htofy of the olMOUl. However. there is :llJ()(her

222

TIm LOGIC OF HOPE: CONTINUED

alternative to the auumption that there are numben and mathematical truths that enst as propositi01l5 in some world of ideas.. We may lake the position that the mathematical ')'mbols IlIemselvc:, arc the subjects of mathematia.. Then. mathematieall,ws ate references to the experiential possibilities of operations carried oot on symbols. Mathematics CU1 then be uooentood as an cq)erimcnuU science. One consequence of this position is Ihe emphasis on ')'mbols themKlves as objects of ~rie1l«. We do, after all, see them: they either do or don', yield 10 certain manipulations and sUMSes Whelher they do or don't allow a particular wbslitution pauem is a matter of trial and ~rvation.. "They can do the job of 5)'1DboLizIn& something else, but they are also objects of ~rieDCe in their own right. When a colleague claims to have, proof of a previously questionable theorem, we: alik to see it. If the proof exists, we may hope to find it. This hope is an ordinary first-order hope, because it is a desi re for an ~rience in the U5Ual sense of experience. To ~y that a mathematical proof is ap>e.r.>~ in leTlll$ of symbols, but the proof iJJdf cannot be observed. i5 undent.andable. However, it is undeT5li1ndable exactly ill one may unduslilnd any distinction between phenomena and noumena. All reference to t"t!aJily it~1f, apan (rom what is a possible experience. is reference to noumena. The hope to prove a mathematical theorem Is a hope to produce symbols that arc objects in the world of experience. The colleague who claims to have a proof but cannot exhibit it is either shy or sly. The point of this digression into the matter of mathematical entities and proofs is to present the notion that ')'mbots themselves are perf«tly common obje
The The Logic Logic of of Hope: Hope: Continued Continued

223 223

schema. schema. If If we we hope hope that that we we may may have have more more satisfactory satisfactory hopes hopes in in the the future, future, this this is is aa second-order second-order hope. hope. And, And, if if by by "the "the hope" hope" we we mean mean some reality reality not not capable capable of of being being an an object object of of experience, experience, we we have have some transcendental object. object. On On the the other other hand, hand, if if by by "the "the hope" hope" we we aa transcendental mean something something that that may may be be an an object object of of experience--such experience-such as as aa mean symbol or or some some linguistic linguistic behavior--we behavior—we have have aa possible possible object. object. Such Such symbol symbolic or or linguistic linguistic object object may may be be mentioned mentioned but but not not used: used: that that aa symbolic is the the limitation limitation on on transcendental transcendental symbols. symbols. is Transcendental refer to Transcendental hopes hopes may may be be mentioned mentioned but but not not used used to to refer to possible objects other other than than symbols. symbols. The The important important thing thing is is that that they they possible objects may be be mentioned. mentioned. The The risk risk of of the the unreasonable unreasonable hopes hopes is is that that there there may is is the the danger danger that that they they may may be be treated treated as as if if they they could could be be used. used. Is Is there any point point in in mentioning mentioning them them if if they they cannot cannot be be used? used? Indeed Indeed there any there is. is. there As far as Antinomic hope is concerned, Kant has shown that there is But this this involves is sometimes sometimes aa reasonable reasonable hope hope of of solution. solution. But involves attacking the the question question rather rather than than taking taking it face value. attacking it at at face value. It It is is unreasonable to to adopt adopt one one side side of of an an antinomy antinomy without considering unreasonable without considering the claims claims of of the the other other side, side, when when neither neither is is decidable possible the decidable by by possible experience. expenence. To summarize summarize this this section, section, it it is is unreasonable unreasonable to as if an To to act act as if an incomplete in fact fact complete. complete. Also, to incomplete hope hope were were in Also, it it is is unreasonable unreasonable to act as as if of hope thinkable, act if aa merely merely mentionable mentionable object object of hope were were also also thinkable, if it satisfy the conditions of of experience. experience. Both and if it does does not not satisfy the conditions Both factual factual and logical assumptions are are involved error logical assumptions involved in in hope, hope, and and one one can can be be in in error about either either of of them. Such errors errors can hopes. about them. Such can produce produce unreasonable unreasonable hopes. The transcendental treated The transcendental hopes hopes become become unreasonable unreasonable if if they they are are treated as with as if if they they applied applied to to possible possible experiences experiences beyond beyond experiences experiences with symbols. They may may be be mentioned mentioned reasonably, reasonably, but but not not used. used. symbols. They Now and Now we we are are in in position position to to analyze analyze Kant's Kant's views views on on the the scope scope and limits hopes. limits of of various various religious religious hopes.

Part III Part III CONSEQUENCES OF CONSEQUENCES OF KANT'S VIEWPOINT KANT'S VIEWPOINT

Eight KANTS USE OF REASONABLE HOPE Now we will see how consistent Kanl hi=l( was when he cam<: to employ the idea of hope. This is a rair question 10 15k of Kant, 5ince he has informed us that, 'consistency is the highest obligation of a philmopher.• .."' He did finish thaI sentence wilh, "and ~I the most rarely found: 1be problem thaI seems 10 be solved inconsistently by Kant is the analysis of hope. How can hope be limited 10 possible experience, and also be transcendent? It is tempting to introduce lhis wilh the remark that Kam pl aced in tbe preface \0 his Critique 0{ PrrKlical RCUSM, "Now is explained 1M migma of the critical philosoph)'. whicb lies in the ract thaI we must rcl'IOUII<:C the: objective reality of the supencnsih\c usc of the categories in speculation and yet can attribute this reality to them in respect 10 the objects of pure practical reasoo" (my emphasis).' How does be solve "the enigmar A proper answer would take us far afield at this stage, but a brief rcspoll5C may be wonhwhilc. "The inc:ollSistenq vanishes because the usc which is DOW made of these oonapts is different from that required by speculative reason." One usc is in order 10 refer 10 the phenomenal world, the Olher use is in order 10 oonslruCl a oonsislenl and morally useful s.chema. Formally, one is use, and lhe olher is mmtiDrl. Wilhoot lhis distinction. KanI'S syslem islosl. He regularly explains thaI one r;an "think a supersensible being withoul II the same time meaning thereby 10 cognize il theoretically.. ..'" To lhink requires meouon (al leasl 10 oneself), 10 know (or "cogniu ") requires use in referring 10 phenomena. Now look at eumples. Section 1 will deal with retribution and Seaion 2 with myslerious lI!ISistance io moral effon.

REASONABLE HOPE I. Hope tor Ret:rihulion

Let us start wilh the section of tile Cril~ of ~ Rearon l in which Kant anaJyu.s the three W1uu quHtiol\!.. This is in "The Canon of Pure Reason," Section 2, tilled, "The Ideal of the Highest Good, as a Dc:tenruning Ground of the Ultimate End or Pure Reason" (A804-AS19). I. What can 1 know? 2. What ought I 10 do? 3. What may I hope? Oddly, Kant tells the reader Ihat the fint question is merely speculative and the second question is purely practical. However, he takes !he third question to be practical, theoretical, and speculative. He fint rephrases Ihe third question to give it a condition, "If I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?" This ronditional question about hope be proceeds 10 analyu. An honest reader is bound to wonder aboutthc alternative, "If 1 do nol do w~t I ought to do, or do precisely what I ought not; what may I hope?" Naturally we are interested in both Kant's question and ours. FiTS! we ate informed, as earlier mentioned, ll1at ", . . all hoping is directed to happiDeM.., .." ThIUl Kant sugsests a basic parallel in the logic behind each of tbe three questiolll. I. In the theory of knowledge. we conclude that if something happens then something exists. 2. In moral theory, we conclude ll1al if 50IIIething OOghllO happen then it is pouible for il to happen. 3, In !he theory of nope, we ronclude Ihat if SOme<:lnc is worthy of happiness then that person may hope to rec:cive happincss. Kant prefers 10 phrase his question in a negative form, "If I behave 50 as not to be unworthy of happiness. may I hope 10 be happy?" Before responding 10 this several intervening steps au required. For any hope, in general, 4. If it i$ rational to hope for IoOmtthing, then that thing (or situation) is pouible.

Reasonable Hopi!

Kant'li qu~tion has a moral condition, and we need snme preliminaries to reach it_ We fint apply the moral ronditionat, 2. above, to the matter of having wonhines.s to be happy actually followed by a proponional degree of happineu. 4A.. U • relltionship (in which 'NOr\hineu. il; proportiomtl to happines.s) OCIgJll to occur. then it am oecur (that is. it i~ possible). S. If it i~ possible that a relationship will occur, then I nUl)' hopt! Ihal it does OfXUr. TIle/\, we reath a moral ronditional: 6. If I relationship between wonbineu and happiness <Jll&ill to OfXUr, then I may Iwpe that it does occur. ~ntence 6 is I ronsequenl of 4A and 5, taken.as premises. 6 il; the panicuJar oonc:ern of Kant, and of the present chaple r. We return to it after a brief detour. We may wonder It this ~tage, Can there be a oondu~ion that iii morally stronger than 61 Perhaps, 7. If Klmething oughl to occur, then I IIllJtlld hope for il. Thi~ 7 presents an odd problem. Hope has dt!5ire as one of its essential clements. Can it be held that an individual should have some desire tha t the penon ~ not have? TIlere are a variety of viCW5 in the literature on this. One oontributor, J . P. Day, holds thl! -generally speaking. our oo~ de5ircs Ire not under our control . . ..'" In this IIOphisticatcd anid e, Day speaks of cases in which one mly bold that In individual should lUX have a particular desire for 50mething evil, and perhaps could have prevented himself or berself from beOOtning the KIn of penon who Oocs have thai desire. "This is ROt yet a full-blown Irgument for the view that there are desi res that one ought to have. CtInsidering (7), there may be events Wt ought to occur. but for whose occurrence my hope is vacuous. Either they "'"ill occur or they will oot, and my hoping may be quite irrelevant For another dass of events, my hope may be a decisive pan of the production of the event. William J ames has explored this al ternative in his well-known e!.Sa)', "The Will to Believe: al though to be precise one wou ld have to relate belief, will, desire, a Rd hope. I eanool leave the consideration of (7). eveR in this brief way. witlloot rnentioniRg an tum pIe thai Kant mes in the Condusion of

2JO

REASONABLE HO PE

his work on J U$tice. After a discussion of tbe prospects for perpetual peace he says. ' We must. howeve r, act a! though perpetual pe ace were a reality. which pe rhaps it is nol, by working for in establish· me nt ... ~ D if the realization of Ih~ goal of abolishing war were always 10 remai n just a pious wish ... we h.,'c a duty 10 do 110••. :' Here Kant iD$isu on I position thai has the form of (7). There is a hope. a "piou.5 wish: in which "''e do nol !\ave &rcal ronIiiknce, but we have ", duty" 10 hope for il A SliD more stringent result is to be ronsi~rcd, be fore we rt:lum 10 (6).

8. Ir somelhin& oupt to occur, then I mu.u n"C"<wriJy hope {OF il. Il (~) were the case, moral exhorul!iGn would be UrulCees.saty; we would have the hopes that we ought 10 have. Perhaps exhortation would nol be completely UMCUSiaty. since we might have ambiva· lent hopes. those that we should have and a few that we shouldn't. But there would be no ~ed 10 inspire us to have the nJh! or the good objectS of hope. There fore, the significant qucstiolUi t(locem (6) and (7). H aw can Kant argue for (6) without destroying his Jl'05ilion concerning lhe basis 01 morality? Happiness is 1101 sUppoKd 10 play a role in delerminina morality, accordi", 10 !.he Groundwork of II~ Mf!laphysjCJ of M onili. The Groundworlc was published in 1785, and the Cri~ of~ RI!
231 A. Happine5.i Proponional 10 WorthilK:u

I return to his defense of (6). He has explained thai from the standpoint of reason, happiness is not approved as a good except when it is connected wilb wortbinCM 10 be happy_ Sud! worthineu comes only from moral oondLICI. Now we have the question, Will happineu be proportioned 10 morality? Kanl's respoll$e is this: In a purely raliollili world. with rational bcinp themselves the authon of everyone', well-being, il "can be con.;:eived as ncc:e5Sary .. : Ihal happiness be proportioned 10 worthine!.S: Not only pouiblc. but ne~essaryl This is held 10 be the IIer's,?!} result in a purely rational world containing entities Ihal are ralional alone, and have 00 olber desires.. In the observable world, Kant makes no lIIeb claim. Returning 10 tbe formal assumption of a purely rational world. we see wbere Kant is \eadin&: "Morality, taken by iuelf. and ..itb it, tbe mere "'Mhi/'lal 10 be happy. is also far from being the complete good. To make the good complete, he who bchll\'cs in such a manner IIli DOl 10 be I.lnv.'On hy of happillHS mWl ~ tIbIl! 10 ~ 111m hI! wiJJ panicipau in 11Oppinas" (my emphasis, ASI3). Kant asks us to consider what distribution of happine:ss would be made by a rational being "free {rom all private purposes, , ." (ASI3). From the Slillldpoint of rell$On there is "00 limitation on happiness uve mat which ariloCs from our own immoral conduct" (A814), Therefore, a rational being would have ", , , happiness, , , in euct proportion wilh .,' mol"ollity .. ." (A81 4). Presumably, it would be II bener world if happiness were 50 proportioned than if it were DOL T don't find that Kant argues (or Ihis 50 much as he repeats several times 111:11 such II '.'orld would be lhe ralional preference, Why? It is consistent wilh our prefereocc, but ill Ihal preference rational or merely sentimenl:!" That it is possible to have h.appiness proportioned on other grounds is established by the actual world, We can imagine: II world in wbich the proportion is inverse. and yet that would be a consistent world. From the standpoinl of an (ambivalent) individual who desires both moral behavior and happiness, it "'Quld be consistent .....illl rhl! individual'l dUlli goo1s if happiness were proponioned to wonbineu. However. when Kant

232 232

REASONABLE HOPE HOPE REASONABLE

asks us us to to think think of of the the problem problem from from the the view view of, of, "the "the reason reason that that is is asks free from from all all private private purposes purposes ... . . ,If we we need need not not pay pay attention attention to to free ambivalent desire. desire. We We are are to to consider consider merely merely consistency consistency with with the the ambivalent commands of of morality. morality. commands B. Ontological Ontological Proof Proof of of the the Rational Rational Proportion Proportion B. Ironic that that the the victor victor over over the the ontological ontological proof proof of of the the existence existence Ironic lO of God God^® should should himself himself take take aa similar similar path path when when choosing choosing between between of candidates for for the the most most rational rational of of all all possible possible worlds. worlds. Kant Kant doesn't doesn't candidates raise the the question question in in precisely precisely this this way, way, but but he he suggests suggests it it in in the the raise mind of of his his reader. reader. Let Let us us construct construct it. it. mind Imagine aa perfectly perfectly rational rational world. world. If If the the beings beings in in that that world world did did Imagine not receive receive happiness happiness in in proportion proportion to to worthiness, worthiness, one one could could not immediately imagine imagine aa more more perfect perfect rational rational world world in in which which the the immediately inhabitants did did receive receive happiness happiness proportional proportional to to worthiness. worthiness. inhabitants Therefore, in in the the most most perfect perfect (most (most complete) complete) rational rational world, world, the the Therefore, magic proportion proportion would would take take place. place. magic quickly distinguishes distinguishes between between this this world, an Kant quickly Kant world, which which is is n • •. •. an intelligible world world only, only, ... . . " and and the the "sensible "sensible world" there intelligible world" in in which which there is "no "no promise that any any such such systematic systematic unity is promise that unity of of ends ends can can arise arise from from the nature of things" things" (A814). (A814). However, the the nature of However, he he insists insists that that under under the commands of of morality we are are obliged obliged to an commands morality we to place place ourselves ourselves in in such such an intelligible (7). intelligible world. world. If If we we were were obliged, obliged, then then that that is is the the should should of of (7). That "To That would would also also be be the the basis basis for for the the "must" "must" in in his his key key sentence, sentence, "To make not make the the good good complete, complete, he he who who behaves behaves in in such such aa manner manner as as not to to be be unworthy unworthy of of happiness happiness must must be be able able to to hope hope that that he he will will participate (A813). participate in in happiness" happiness" (A813). C. Hope C. Limitations Limitations on on Rational Rational Hope On On the the basis basis of of Kant's Kant's own own position, position, there there are are several several flaws flaws in in the the argument argument above. above. First, First, the the rational rational beings beings in in that that rational rational world world provide provide us us with with no no basis basis for for understanding understanding the the notion notion of of happiness. happiness. What What is is happiness happiness for for aa rational rational being? being? We We might might respond respond to to Kant Kant on . . itit is on the the model model that that he he used used to to comment comment on on Plato: Plato: "... is therefore therefore

233 quile rational to mainllln, as Plato does, IMI in a perfect SUle no punishme nts wha~r would be required" (AlI7). Similarly, in a perfeetly rational world, no rewards are requ ired; the question of

happinea • Illperfluous 10 purdy rational belnp. Sceond. even if we are coneemed witb bolh morality and happineu in ~na: • rational world; we mi&ht muimi!e nm if we separated lheir recipients.. Thlrd. we mldl! dlJtinpmh between collective and diwibutiYe propertict. as Kanl does in 1m analysis 0( history: rationalily and morality mi,l" then IUrn OUI to be properties of coIlectiYe entilia nuber than individ"ll. TMn, one mi&hl h_ • ha$is for (6) and (7). Yet il would DOt be. buis for the indMdual', hope for hit or ber own COIII()IWI(e bet'fteD wonhineu and happi-. but for the hope for. eonsonanc:e be~en IWO P"operues or • lOtial croup. And. fOllrth, the ~ of happine55 or rather retnootion in "the mmp\ele &ood" (ASU) b; rar from dear. A nf

exo.Irsioo inlo the matter may be of use.. If we are eonsldering purely n lional belnp. it Is nOI at all dear what is meant by happine .. beyond tbe achievement of consistency. U we are dealina 'lll'ith human beinp., es,sentlally ambivalent beings. • C'OTIlbination of rational and animal, one may have. DOlion of

retributive just!ee, However, the IIlOYC from retributive justice for human beings in the world 01 Clperien.ce to retriblllive justice for I1It;ol\l,l beinp In • rltion. 1 world [5 .n utl1loTC1inary jump. II IUItIS equivaJent 10 the jump that Kanl so often WImli apiTlSt:

usin& tategone.

experience 10 .pply ouuide of experience. H morality rc:quire5 that we COfWl'l/CI • 11I000.J world. we havoe 10 know _raJ p.rllmeten before we can earry ou t that task.. What d

are the IllfUreI of the memben of WI world? What II 10 be \be history of thai world? If we CIQ only mention but not comtruc:t imaps olli1e memben, we Qllnot have • dear conception of \heir hopei. Hwe eat! mention but no! construet. Kbe:ma for the history of RId! • world. we, apin. (III have no conoeption of hope for I.ll)'\hiIIa within lila! world. A world without. bistory ",ems empty, and • nrk rrI work! IUms 10 haV'C DO histOl)'. 1lIerefore. we CIQ make • Kbe:ma of definitiom and names. but nol .ll:I imlJe of •

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Reasonable Reasonable Hope Hope

235 235

12. If If one one is is unworthy unworthy (of (of happiness) happiness) one one should should receive receive unhappiunhappi12. ness. ness. Now, by by the the law law of of transposition, transposition, this this is is equivalent equivalent to to Now, 13. If If one one should should not not receive receive unhappiness, unhappiness, one one is is not not unworthy. unworthy. 13. Do we we have have aa warrant warrant for for removing removing the the double double negatives negatives on on each each Do side of of the the connective connective in in (13)? (13)? Only Only in in aa strictly strictly two-valued two-valued universe universe side for happiness happiness and and worthiness. worthiness. If If there there were were no no third third alternative alternative for between happiness happiness and and unhappiness, unhappiness, and and between between worthiness worthiness and and between unworthiness, we we would would have have unworthiness, 14. If If one one should should be be happy, happy, then then one one is is worthy. worthy. 14. However, even even (14) (14) does does not not give give us us However, 15. If If one one is is worthy, worthy, one one should should be be happy. happy. 15. To To derive derive (15) (15) from from (10) (10) requires requires aa two-valued two-valued universe universe for for should should and two two errors errors in in logic. logic. Neither Neither is is recommended. recommended. Between Between "should "should and be happy," happy," and and "should "should not not be be happy," happy," lies lies the the alternative alternative of of aa be situation in in which which neither neither moral moral imperative imperative applies. applies. The The moves moves from situation from 11 by logic 11 to to 12, 12, and and from from (14) (14) to to (15) (15) cannot cannot be be made made by logic alone. alone. While (10) (10) or or (11) (11) does does not not allow allow us us to to derive derive (15), (15), it it gives us an an While gives us analogy that that has some force. force. Now Now it it is is time time to to locate It analogy has some locate that that force. force. It is the the force force of of aa pair pair of of tautologies! tautologies! The The antecedent antecedent in (11), the the is in (11), notion of of being worthy of of unhappiness, unhappiness, contains contains the notion being worthy the consequent consequent of of (11) within it. As it, the (11) within it. As II understand understand it, the should should of of the the consequent consequent is is contained in of the antecedent. Likewise the contained in the the worthy worthy of the antecedent. Likewise in in (15), (15), the worthy of the antecedent contains worthy conception conception of the antecedent contains the the notion notion of of should should of of the sentence, the consequent consequent of of that that sentence. 16. Things things 16. Things that that are are worthy worthy and and therefore therefore should should happen happen are are things that happen. that should should happen. In In the the course course of of his his analysis analysis Kant Kant seems seems to to recognize recognize that that he he is is arguing happiarguing for for aa tautology, tautology, because because he he changes changes from from worthy worthy of of happiness to not not unworthy unworthy of of happiness. happiness. But, But, this this still still leaves leaves us us with with the the ness to third above. third alternative alternative pointed pointed out out above. There matter. There is is another another serious serious problem problem to to be be looked looked at at in in this this matter. The The case case for for retribution retribution in in the the book book on on Justice Justice is is argued argued in in terms terms of of the the relative relative treatment treatment of of the the criminal, criminal, treatment treatment relative relative to to others others of of different different class, class, or or to to those those who who have have been been harmed. harmed. Our OUf state state of of unhappiness unhappiness depends depends on on comparison comparison with with the the condition condition of of others others in in

236

REASONABLE REASONABLE HOPE HOPE

our social universe. Now, in the case of the hope for happiness in a perfectly rational world, there is no obvious basis for comparison comparison between degree of of happiness. between the the individuals individuals to to determine determine the the degree happiness. Given two two rational rational beings, beings, on on what basis may compare Given what basis may they they compare themselves their relative relative state of themselves with with each each other other to to determine determine their state of happiness? be made, made, we we have have no happiness? If If such such comparisons comparisons cannot cannot be no conception of of their their relative relative happiness. happiness. conception Another difficulty may be raised in terms of of the way Kant gives us the use if if we we put put ourselves, us the problem. problem. What What principle principle would would we we use ourselves, the place of aa being being that that had to distribute distribute all all happiness others" "in the place of had to happiness to to others" "in (A813). To To answer answer this this we we have have to to know whether aa finite (A813). know whether finite or or infinite infinite amount of of happiness happiness is is to to be be distributed. distributed. If If there shortage of amount there is is aa shortage of the commodity, commodity, we be impressed impressed by by the "worthiness" of of the the the we would would be the "worthiness" consumers. If If no no shortage, shortage, or or if if no one's happiness were by consumers. no one's·happiness were affected affected by the happiness happiness of of anyone anyone else, else, why why not simply maximize everyone's the not simply maximize everyone's happiness? Why Why punish anyone in in aa rational rational world? all, Kant Kant happiness? punish anyone world? After After all, has said, said, "That "That aa general general amnesty amnesty should should be be included peace has included in in aa peace treaty is is already already implied implied in in the the concept concept of of the However, treaty the latter."^ latter."u However, death is is not not aa peace peace treaty. treaty. death On the the matter matter of of punishment, punishment, Kant's Kant's sustained sustained argument that On argument is is that "Tbe "The law concerning punishment punishment is a categorical imperative .. . . :113 and is is not not to to be be handled handled in in terms terms of of utility utility to or the the and to the the individual individual or community. This This means that the the relation relation between and community. means that between worthiness worthiness and punishment is is understood understood to to be be specified specified by of those those punishment by the the nature nature of maxims or or principles principles that that could could be be thought thought of of as as operating universalmaxims operating universally. If If crimes crimes were were not not punished, punished, the the resulting in ly. resulting inconsistency inconsistency in behavior would would fail fail the the test test of of universality. Even if if we this behavior universality. Even we accepted accepted this line of of reasoning, reasoning, would would it it require require that that aa rational distribute rational world world distribute line worthiness and and happiness happiness as as it it distributes distributes worthiness worthiness and and punishment punishment .worthiness (unhappiness)?? (unhappiness) Can aa rational rational mind mind distribute distribute happiness happiness on basis Can on aa consistent consistent basis without taking taking worthiness worthiness into into account? account? Certainly. Certainly. One distribution without One distribution might be proportional to to weight, weight, another another might inversely be proportional might be be inversely might proportional to to weight. weight. Or, Or, considering considering worthiness, worthiness, aa consistent consistent (if proportional (if perverse) mind mind might might distribute distribute happiness happiness inversely inversely proportional to perverse) proportional to worthiness. Each Each of of these these patterns patterns would would be being be capable capable of of being worthiness. ,;

231

carried OUI oorWstently. Suppose tbe rational mind Ihal makH tbe disuibution must iuel( be included amona the individuals who are 50 treated. A purely rational mind. caring only for consistency, might still make the distribution inversely as the wonhinca of the individuals. Rc5pCct for the moral law is independent of any such eonsequence5 as the ultimate distribution of happiness. The a~ 50 far has centered on Kant's claim thaI the connection between wonhineu and lhe proponion or happillCU was • M:CUSity for a ralional world. Howe~r, Kant may have oycrnalcd the need of a necelSar)' connection for a ralional world. Even if the desired proponion is nol a neceuary properly of a rational distribu· tion, il is apoDib~ property. It is po5Sible in the sense Ihal it is not self-contradictory. and in the 50eMe thaI we can construct a detailed scheme for the distribution based on devce of worthiness. Doe5 this pouibility requi re a God, • "50Jc, alJ-perfeet, and rational primordial being" (AS! 4) to guarantee the ]1055ibilily? Not II all. since we require not me necessity, but merdy the p
If our reconsuuction (!iOftening1) of Kant's position is acceptable, we have reached a significant rewlt. The aMUmption of God's existence is DOt a requirement for rational hope in the unr.erse. Yel, if the rational hope is to sWKI on ils own., it still has to ~tWy the consequent of (4). Thc:re must be the assumption that what is hoped for is possible. However, tbe bare assumption 01 I/~ passib;1ily of a rational scbema in the universe makes a rather minimal notion of "God."

E. The Retribution Antinomy The discussion above has centered Illriely on the antecedent in (4A) and (6). the assertion mat happineu should be proportional to wonhineu. We may pul the matter in the form of an antinomy.

REASONABLE HOPE

238

m E RETRIS urION AI'\'T1NOM\, Thesis

Won hiness

be happy should, flltiona.lly, result in a proportional degree of happi~.

10

Arllilht sll

There iii no purely rational basis 10 have wonhineu to be happy re5IIil in a proponional degree of happiness.

Kant holds that the Thesis is obvio\lJ,1y the rational choice, thaI '.:e "cannot judge Otbenr.1!.e" (AS]J). Suppose that we arc equally attracted by the Antithesis. Following the pragmatic recommendation of the previQuli chapter, we uc 10 ask about the status of the question to which these opposed pmitiOIlS are answen. Wbat is the question? It is: From the standpoint of rcason alone, is !here • basis for preferring a proportional relation between wonhineu 10 be happy and happiness? This very question bas implicit lISSumplion$ thai need not be accepted. RCa50n alone is a concern for oonsistency, bul reason does not choo5.e the rules 10 be put into the consistent SCL Where more than onc collection of rules makes a collSistent set, reason has no decision principle. 'The categorical imperative does DOt make a claim for or agaill$t the Thelis here. We are dealing with the respoMe$ to a question about the preference of reason alone. If reuon h:u no prefere nce, we may apparently choose whateve r position we wish without fcar of rational contradiction. If no e;cperience can e",, ' confirm or rcfute us, and no rational :t1JlIment is decis)"" on either side, we are free to adopt whichever alternatilfe we prefer 00 independent grounds.

F. Active and Passilfe Moral SubjeCtS Kant's position can be summarized by an lIfiUment that staru with the tautology, ( I ) If one is \O'onhy of happine!i$. then one ought to obtain happiness.

Reasonable Hope Hope Reasonable

239 239

Since the the concept concept worthy worthy contains contains ought, ought, (1) (1) is is beyond beyond objection. objection. Since Then, Then, (2) If If one one ought ought to to obtain obtain happiness, happiness, then then one one can can obtain obtain it. it. (2) (3) If If one one can can obtain obtain happiness, happiness, then then one one can can hope hope to to obtain obtain it. it. (3) Therefore, from from (1), (1), (2), (2), and and (3), (3), it it follows follows that that Therefore, (4) If If one one is is worthy worthy of of happiness, happiness, then then one one can can hope hope to to obtain obtain it. it. (4) In the the argument argument above, above, (1) (1) is is aa tautology, tautology, and and (3) (3) seems seems perfectly perfectly In reasonable in in terms terms of of the the definition definition of of hope hope that that we we have have been been reasonable assuming. assumIng. Now, (2) (2) raises raises aa different different sort sort of of problem. problem. On On the the face face of of it, it, (2) (2) Now, is merely merely aa restatement restatement of of Kant's Kant's familiar familiar thesis thesis that that ought ought implies implies is can. However, However, an an equivocation equivocation in in (2) (2) goes goes beyond beyond the the familiar familiar can. thesis. The The proposition, proposition, that that ought ought implies implies can, can, is is given given to to us us in in the the thesis. form in in which which the the same same individual individual who who has has the the moral moral obligation obligation is is form the individual individual who who can can perform perform the the action. action. The The one one who who ought ought is is the one who who can. can. After After one one of of his his examples, examples, Kant Kant tells tells us that the the the one the us that individual involved involved "judges, "judges, therefore, therefore, that that he he can can do do something something individual because he he knows knows that that he he ought, ought, and and he he recognizes recognizes that that he is free. he is free. because 1.14 ,,14

•

•

•

In the the ordinary ordinary example, example, Kant Kant has has argued argued that that the individual In the same same individual who is obligated to to do do something something is is the the one one who can do do it. Now, who is obligated who can it. Now, returning (2), the antecedent makes proper the antecedent makes an an individual individual the the proper returning to to (2), recipient of happiness. someone, recipient of happiness. If If happiness happiness ought ought to to be be given given to to someone, the obligation obHgation to it does Where the to give give it does not not rest rest on on that that individual. individual. Where does it rest? does it rest? Let Let us us construct construct aa response. response. First, First, (2) (2) is is far far from from obvious the The individual individual in in the the consequent consequent is is not not the obvious as as it it stands. stands. The moral moral actor actor in in the the antecedent. antecedent, Who Who is is the the moral moral actor? actor? As As (2) (2) is is phrased, an not know know whether whether the the moral moral actor actor is is to to be be an phrased, we we do do not individual, individual; the the universe universe as as aa whole, whole, or or something something between between these these two. two. The and The situation situation does does require require aa distinction distinction between between moral moral actor actor and object. object. (2A) b. (2A) lIfi xx ought ought to to give give something something to to 6, b, thenx then x can can give give that that to to b. (2B) (2B) If If bb ought ought to to receive receive something something from from x, x, then then bb can can receive receive itit from from X. x. (2C) (2C) If If bb ought ought to to receive receive something something from from x, x, then then bb will will receive receive it it from from X. x.

,<0

REASONABLE HOPE

Before .....e consider the proper subslilUlioo for x in these three oondilionatl, we have \0 deal wilh their force. (lA) is a §lraightfor-

ward mbstiflilion in Kant ', formula !hal ought implies can. However, it merely leaves us with the conclusion thaI if IoOmc emity. x, has an obligation, then this entity has the p!:lMibility of 5(1 actin&,. If there is 110 such emity as ~ then (2A) is vacuous. But (28) gives us a different situalion. Perhaps we have $Orne rcilSOll for holding thaI b ought to receive something; this doe$ not by itself carry with it the implication thaI b can be the recipient. Suppose that a bas an obliplion 10 send a mes",c 10 h, and does so. In this cue, the mo",] actor is a , and this actor may carry OUI the action even if b does not receive the message. Suppose that b dies during a 's action. Then, a carried CM the obligation. sent the message, but b, being dead, did 1101 have the possibility of receiving it. The obligation falls on the actor, 001 the recipient. 11 is the actor who mU51 have the possibility,""bo can do what the obligatioo aIls [or. However, the &II''C.... o[ even the best intentioned action is quite another maller, and oot to be deduced from the nature of obligation. So. the antecedent io (28) is an alternative formulation an obligation of z but oot a of. 'x OII&11t to give liOmething to basis for implying the CCIIUequent in (28). If (28) does not hold up. as we have seen, (2C) has mucll leu of a claim for 5UppoM. Has the eounter-e.u.mple of the message destroyed the force of (2B)? Separate the assumption that can be made by the actor, z. and the knowledge of an outside observer. A1tbaugh an observer lIllIIy mow that the intended recipient of the meaage ba.s died, and 50 the observer may find that !be obliptkln [0 send the OIC'!l5age no longe r holds from his or her basis of information, it is quile otherwise with z. For z. the obligation does bold only if it is pos:o;ible: we may !lay that z thought that he or she was obliged. but really no longer was so. As long a5 there is an obligation, there has to be the po$5ibility of c:anying 011\ that obligation. But the obligation is • matter of intent and not of consequence. for Kant. Therefore, z must act on the basis of the intention that morality requires, tnu the .JI'crn\ lire ~ences, depmd Off lire IflWJ of

b:

tulIUtt! IIOt morality.

So: .t may nope: to carry ou t a moral obligation, and it must be possible for.t, or else we have Ioit the meaning of obligation, but the obligation consists in acting consistently with II certain intention. If one ought to do something. perhaps to send a message to b. then it must be po$Sible to send weh a meMllge: bu t b is not obliged to be alive and well enough to read weh a message. To accept this result is to deny (2C). Are we also forced to deny (2 B)? That depcnd5 on the sense of "ean,' on the meaning of possibility, involved in (2B). We may take (2B) to be equivalent to (20) If b ought to recei.'C someth ing from x. then it D possible for b to receive it from x. In out eb.:lpter on the Logic of Hope, we found that Kant refused to vant the S!.;ltUS of possibility to mere definitional coru;istency. Following the tradition, he distinguishe5 between formal Dr logical poiSibilil)', and "rear possibilil)'. For the second. "real poloSibilil)'." one bas to be able to imagi ne or construCt a map of an experience. Where "po5sibJe' mea ns "possible experience." (2D) becomes (2E) If b ought to receive something from.t, tben it is a possible experience for b 10 receive it. We have reduced the problem to twO questions. First, what arc tbe pa.ramc:len of the x in (2E)? Second, is receiving the gift a possible experience? In the conte~t of Kant's use. thex is sometimes (a) II rational unive~ (ASIl). (b) a universe that contains "Ihe supreme good" (A814), (c) a moral R uler of the world." These arc hardly synonyms. However, in each ease it ;s nol lhe knowledge of the entity.t, but !be I'Iopc thaI such an entil)' exists, that is Ihe conclusion of Kant's analysis.. Such an entity as may be wbstiluled for x in (2E) is Ihe object of second-order 1'Iopc. Ute the object of a ny seoond-order hope, il may be mentioned bul nol U$Cd 10 refer. If reason neithe r requires nor forbids its mention. the choice may be made freely. pmuided t/~ limitatioru 0/ men mention an carrfully

=-"'. The second question following (2E) iii the mailer of the ability to

receive the gifl of happiness, the oonsequent of the sentence. If the lUbject, b. is a possible individual who may have expe:rie~ then we can map or oonstruct a situation in ..... hich that person receives

REASONABLE HOPE the experience of • particular gift. If the subject i$ DOt a pos5ible individual in Kant', ntd nther than merely logical sense, the question is empty. A "soul" defined merely IS a logic:al entity would IlOl qualify for such an experience. Apparently, we can understand happine.u only in tbe context of living beings. who have desires in the real sense. So, wbere "happiness is the ytisfaction of all our desires" (A806/ B834), the hope of happine.s.s i$ the hope for a pos5ible experience.

G. Conclusion

Rational hope$ rail into two varietiu. There are those that may be merely mentioned, but oot constructed IS thooght, and those that may be both mentioned and also thought. Both varieties have practical ronsequeZlCt$. Hopes that may be stated hut are not possible uperie/ICCs arc It ill mailers of moral interest, but are quite different from hope$ for poiWble experienca. If this analY$is of hope Is no! in error, Kant has failed to provide a moral basis for the postulate of Goo's existence. What has happened Ulthe statUS of the central assertion Involving hope, the assertion that one ...·110 is not unworthy may hope for a proportional degree of happiness? We found that this cannot be understood as a first-order hope (or a possible experience. It can be asserted as a second-order hope. II can be m~lIlioned /U a I~ thai IIIe Iwpe of a raJiontd ~ is ,,'C/f./owu;kd. Unfortunately. tbe term "happiness· ha:i no reference in this COntext. 1. Hope lOr Mysterious Alislsca nce In Moral Effon

The discussion in Ih is chapter 10 rar has been concerned with the hope of happinH$ as a consequence of worthiness 10 be happy. ThaI is the qu estion pre!lented in the first Critique. In the Rdigiol!, tbe main problem is formulated in ternu of the hope of ITI)'Steri0u5 assistance in beroming a beller person if one is worthy of SIKh assistance . 'The objcrt of hope is now somethinil quite different. Kant fails 10 be pcrsUllliive about a rational world providing

RmJOtIOble

H~

'"

happiness in due proportion 10 worthil\e5li 10 be happy. lewis While Beck also takes Kanl 10 have failed on this. '1lIe truth of the mallcr is that the concept of the highest good ... is nol imponaOl in Kant'S philosophy for any practical consequcl\(C$ it might have . . . :" But. although lbe form of Ihe queuion is similar, the object is now quite different. There is one preliminary bul essential hope. (I) People must be able to Iwpt through their 01<0"" efforts to become beller human beinp. " SUppose one makes KnOUS ~ of all personal powen to become morally beller, but the5C powers are not enough. If the hope in (I) fails. is there any other? Kant's amwer is (2) Only when, person hal; done "lIS much as lies in his power to berome a better man .. . can he hope Ihal whal is not "" ilhin his power will be supplied through cooperation from above:" There is a KnOllS presupposition to the: hope in (2 ). How do we know whether we have done enough to !atisfy the requiremcnt of doing as much as lies in OIIr power? Perhap5 if we wonder about it. we have not done enoogh. If " 'e have done all thaI we po5Sibly can do, why do we need hope offunher assistance? In (1) Kant makes clellI Ihat people may havc a proper hope: thiU their own drom can do the job of makillg moral progrea If this is so, then (2) 'NOII ld Krve 10 undercul the hope in ( I). Kant illSists thaI the machinery of the "coope ration from above: or Ihe iIlpernaturalassistance is oot and CUlUlat be a matter of knowledge. We regularly find him memionillg "God's assistance ( ... hate\·er this rn.ay be):" Supernatural action is unknowoble. Hg.,.·cver, on the basis of the qualification in (2), it can be hoped for withoot being understood. When s.omething is not understood but is !;till a mailer of hope. it can only be a 5Ccond-order hope, as our "hapters on the Logic of Hope havc presenled the mailer. Therefore it is • hope that may be mentioned but no! understood. What is Ihe poinl of such a hope? What value can it ha"'e without understanding? 11Ie problem of confidence in one's moral disposition strikes Kant as a mailer of great importance. "If a man lacked all confidence in his moral dispos.ition, ooce it was acquired, he woutd IoCarcely be able to persevere steadfastly in iL" How dots one a:ain JUSt the

REASONABLE HOPE right amount of ronfideo~, without the dangers of exaggeration, since. "man is never more easily de~ived than in " 'hat promotC$ his good opinion of hims.elf."" The solution 10 this problem rons;slI in "comparing the (OlIne of his lile hitherto with the resolution which he has adopted .... Suppose that one gOC$ O\rer the hiuol)' of one's life and finds a 'steady improvement." The individllal "can still only COfIj~ (rom !.his that Ihe re has been a f1.Uldamental improvement in the essential inner dispmition. Yet !.he pelloOn has reasonable grounds for hope as well..... In this ease Ihe individual's hope is for an object of experience: lUch a pelloOn can hope that the imprO\rement conti nile "with ever-increasing courage." This is a reasonahle hope: one hopes that improvement continue to increase, a pattern that has already been experienced in the individllal's histol)'_ HOI>'Cver. Ihi5 rC
Reasonable Reasonable Hope Hope

245 245

that people people exist exist who who do do make make moral moral progress progress isis not not at at all all obvious. obvious. that The point point that that Kant Kant stresses stresses isis that that the the individual individual who who does does not not The make all all the the efforts efforts that that personally personally can can be be made made to to be be aa better better make person has has no no reasonable reasonable basis basis for for hope hope of of outside outside assistance. assistance. Why Why person not? Because Because such such aa person person would would have have to to hope hope that that the the grace grace that that not? granted assistance assistance had had no no concern concern with with the the past: past: that that person person would would granted hope that that the the consistency consistency of of aa retribution retribution principle principle might might be be broken broken hope for his his or or her her advantage. advantage. for Suppose we we agreed agreed with with Kant Kant that that we we cannot cannot hope hope for for an an Suppose inconsistent universe. universe. Can Can we we hope hope that that not not the the whole whole history history of of the the inconsistent universe, but but just just the the future future be be consistent? consistent? Can Can we we hope hope that, that, universe, despite the the apparent apparent inconsistency, inconsistency, some some divine divine grace grace will will ignore ignore despite retribution, or or replace replace it it by by love? love? (Perhaps (Perhaps Kant's Kant's God God is is more more retribution, Hebrew than than Christian.) Christian.) We We can can say say that that we we have have such such aa hope. hope. Hebrew But, if if we we are are limited limited to to reasonable reasonable hope, hope, then then the the schema schema on on which which But, it is is based based can can have have only only consistent consistent material. material. A A schema schema for for the the it universe that that allowed allowed such such inconsistent inconsistent principles principles to to govern govern would would universe not qualify qualify as as aa basis basis for for aa reasonable reasonable hope. hope. not consider the alternative of of aa system system of self-rewarding Kant does Kant does consider the alternative of self-rewarding morality (in A810) concludes, "It "It can morality (in A8I0) but but concludes, can be be counted counted upon upon only only if if aa Supreme likewise Supreme Reason, Reason, that that governs governs according according to to moral moral rule, rule, be be likewise posited sentence, posited as as underlying underlying nature nature as as its its cause." cause." A A strange strange sentence, indeed, indeed, for for Kant. Kant. First, First, we we do do not not require require aa guarantee guarantee that that "can "can be be counted possible counted upon," upon," but but only only aa basis basis for for hope. hope. Hope Hope requires requires aa possible goal, goal, not not something something that that has has the the necessity necessity of of aa basis basis that that can can be be counted counted upon. upon. If If itit can can be be relied relied on, on, itit need need not not be be hoped hoped for! for! Kant Kant says says that that the the desired desired distribution distribution "is "is possible possible only only in in the the intelligible intelligible world, under aa wise wise Author Author and and Ruler." Ruler." Is Is itit not not also also possible possible by by world, under chance? chance? The The hope hope for for aa chance chance distribution distribution would would satisfy satisfy the the moral moral requirements requirements without without the the need need for for aa "posit" "posit" of of aa wise wise ruler. ruler. In In the the Critique Critique of ofPractical Practical Reason Reason we we learn learn that that morality morality requires requires ignorance ignorance of of the the existence existence of of God. God. Knowledge Knowledge would would be be calamicalami27 tous.^^ toUS. On On aa similar similar basis, basis, we we need need no no necessary necessary postulate postulate to to assure assure the desired distribution; the'desired distribution; since since moral moral action action isis to to be be independent independent of of consequences, consequences, the the hope hope for for aa chance chance distribution distribution isis enough. enough. This This

246 246

REASONABLE HOPE HOPE REASONABLE

hope for for chance chance isis not not to to be be separated separated from from the the fear fear that that chance chance will will hope do no no such such thing. thing. do The discussion discussion in in the the chapter chapter has has so so far far centered centered on on the the answer answer The to the the third third question question in in the the form form that that Kant Kant gave gave itit in in the the first first to Critique (and (and also also in in the the introduction introduction to to his his book book on on Logic). Logic). The The Critique question, "What "What can can II hope?" hope?" takes takes the the individual, individual, the the I,/, to to be be the the question, subject of of the the hope hope relation. relation. As As we we have have seen, seen, Kant Kant distinguishes distinguishes subject sharply between between individuals individuals and and humanity. humanity. In In the the Introduction Introduction to to his his sharply Logic aa fourth fourth question question isis added added to to the the three three of of the the First First Critique, Critique, Logic 4) What What isis man? man? 4) This is is followed followed by by the the comment comment that that all all four four questions questions are are parts parts of of This anthropology, "because "because the the first first three three questions questions are are related related to to the the anthropology, 2S last."^® Apparently we we may may raise raise the the question, question, What What can can humanity humanity last." Apparently hope? In In terms terms of of humanity's humanity's collective collective hope hope we we shall shall find find aa resoluresoluhope? tion to to the the antinomy antinomy of of retribution. retribution. tion Attention should should move move from from the the individual individual to to the the social social group, group, in in Attention the analysis analysis of of rational rational hope. hope. However, However, Kant Kant leaves leaves the the subject subject of of the the individual individual with with aa challenge, challenge, "... . , who, who, indeed, the the indeed, is is now now the unbeliever? it he which unbeliever? Is Is it he who who trusts, trusts, without without knowing knowing how how that that for for which he knowing he hopes hopes will will come come to to pass; pass; or or he he who who absolutely absolutely insists insists on on knowing the man is is released released from from evil evil and, and, if if he he cannot cannot know know the way way in in which which man this, this, gives gives up up all all hope hope of of this this release?"^^ release?"29 Hope Hope is is the the measure nteasure of of aa religious religious person. person. This This hope hope concerns concerns what what is is mysterious mysterious rather rather than than what what is is unknowable. unknowable. The The next next chapter chapter develops develops this this distinction. distinction.

Nine

MYSTERY VERSUS UNDECIDABILITY I. 'The

Dip lUl.loD Bet ween Mymry and Unknowablllty

This ehapler anaIyus lhe relalimWlip between Kant's COlI«pI of mystery (GeN!:imniJ) and his COlI«pt of unkoo"'abilil)' (unnfor· JChJich, or unbq;rtiflich). EadJ ha$ a major role io bis system. Fint we need to consider the general type!. of iJllOrance, then the distinction between IU
It is a commonplace that we may separate what is presently iUIknoM7I from that which is said to be unkIIawabll!. This distinguisbes accidenta! ignorance from eMentia! ignorance. Having made this separation, some authors argue that there is no essential ignorance, there are no unamll.erable qUe5tions. One variel)' of positivism hel d that if a question seemed to he unanswerable, we were at fault for not sufficiently developing the meaning of iLl In such cases, what we face "ate no questions at alL"' For thi5 kind of positivism, then, there is accidental ignorance, but nOl essential ignorance. Withou t atguing for or against the pos.itivist claim, and before giving an interpretation of Kant on this, let us classify the apparent typeS of ignorance that are po5iiihle. Perhaps philosophic powt:r may be measured. following

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Socrates' lead, by means of Ihe types of ignorruJcc of which the philO5Ophcr i!. aware, There ate fOlir types of ignorance: two are accidental, two arc essentiaL T)pe I Ipo ... D«: Aceidcnw ignorance of fact. H cre we cannot answer a question because of the accident of oot having made cenain observations, or of not being able to make iOJnC obscr.'ations that arc, in principle, capablc of being made. MorilZ Schlick's examples of this arc: What did Plato do at eight o'clock in !he morning of hi~ fifticlh birtbday? H ow much did Homcr weigh whcn he WTOtc the fint line of the Iliad? and, b there a piece of silver to be found on the nther side of thc moon, thrcc incbes long and shaped like a fi~hr Type 2 lenOnl Dce: Anolher variety of acddenw ignorance, ignorance of law, For example, if somronc Imcrws Ihc actual measurements of tile fcatures of mall)' righHrianJlln, but doeli oot know the Pythagorean Theorem, sud! a person illustrates ignorance of law. To be aware of any type of ignorance, onc has to be able to formulate Ihe pertinent queslion. H owever, il is apparent that iOmeone may be ignorant either " 1th or without awarencss of Ibat situation. (See Plalo, lhe early dialogues, for clusica.l examples.) T)pe 3 leno ... nce: Essential ignorance of thc purpose of lOme mailer. Examples are cases where we know ..1wr happc:115, but 'lOt " 'Iry il does. It is 001 held thai every qucstion of pUrpo$e is I queslion of Ibis type. Many SIIeb questioll5 are questioll5 of fact, and ,",'C mayor may OOt avoid Type I ignorance about the mailer. But, in the special event thai we do know lhal somelhinJl happens, but/or $D>"IC ~ muon cannot know why, "'C will dusify tbi!. U Type 3 ignorance. 1)pe 4 IporaRce: &stntiaJ iJlnorance of consequences. Enmplcs are OlSel where we know why something is \0 occur, but 'lOt ..'hUJ exactly it will be. Many questions of eonscquences are matte rs of fact or law. and we mayor may not be able to avoid Type 1 or Type 2 ignorance abol.1I them. Wc reservt: this foorth

'" type (or the ease in which, for

$OnU!

OIJIIUptuaJ

n
we cannot

answer the question. We can ~mullaneously display more than one type of ignorance. We might know oolher law nor fact in some maIler; we might know neither intemion nor consequent in some case. BUI, 10 be QwtU'I! of our ignorance, we have: 10 be able 10 ask the relevant question, and the question presuppose.! features of the situation. To ask how Plato spenl his fiftieth biobday is to assume that be lived at leas! thal lnng. To ask a Type 2 question is to presuppose lhll mere may be • fized rclationdlip berween twO or more variables.. For awareness of Type 3, aswme thalliOmethlllll occurs in order to raise the question of " 'IIy. The converse holds for Type 4: here we assume some intention before ...-e can II$k what will catry 00\ IhU intention. In sumnuuy, ~a::r or ii"Orance presupposes some kind of knowledge in order 10 fonnulate the pertinent question, and what is presuppclcd is knowledt:c of the correlative area. Awareness of Type 1 liOOrance prcrupptJses some answer \0 the oolTcl.tive Type 2 matter: a question about fact presuppc scs iOIDC answer about law. And. the converse: the First Crit~ ruppons this much. We cannot ask a question about • malter of fact without presupposing IoDme laws, call$lllity, etc. Similarly, to be aware of igoorance of either Types 3 or 4 requires mat me subject matter of the omer be presupposed, B. 00 Use and Mention We have already DOted that the name of a city can be us.ed and can be mentioncd. lbc city itself can abo serve in the'IC .... a~ I I can be us.ed in many ways, for cumplc. by Ihips looking for a harbor, by tourists looking for ud tcmcnl, by airlinc pilots looking for a familiar landmark, by lcgislators looking for taxes. Whilc mention ~ems to OfXIlr usually by employing the name of IoDmething in a statement, usc can OfXIlr either linguistically, or by some activity that employs the identity in question. Let us maintain this familiar and essential distinction betwee.n U!.e and

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mention, but broaden the meaning of the terms. Take mention to be not mcrely the activity of naming something. but the activity of oommunicatinglmowledge of il Take using something to be not merely a linguistic activity. but also nonlinguislic activities (pragmatic) in which the entity may be employed. Along wilh these broadened usages, notice thai somelhing may be (I) UKd and memioned., (2) used but nOI mentioned, (3) not us.ed. but mentioned, and (04) neither used nor mentioned. lei us ~tum to the distinctions belween the third and fourth kinds of iiDOf3J1Ce. In the third type, we know what happens hul not why it does. This is a situation in ""hieb something can be mmtioMd, but in at kim otU! g~ it cannot ~!/Md. To be able 10 mention something is to be able 10 oommunicate wilh respect 10 il If we Itnow what OCCUr5, we can mention and so oommunicate Ihis. But, to the U1enl that we do nol know ..-hy it OCCUI"l, tbe~ is some limitation on our ability 10 employ the cntity in que.tion. For example, the la'" of gravitation can be both mentioned and used. However, the purpo.JI! of the law of gravitation can be memioned but not us.ed. To hold this view would be 10 hold thaI the purpose of lbe La", of Gravitation is something about which we have the Third Type of Ignorance. Or, colloquially, it would be equivalent to saying that the purpose of Ihis law is inscrutable 0.- IlJ\lmowable. To defend the view thai this is unknowable one must show thai the COncepl of this purpose is theoretically not a subject of possible knowledge. While the third Und of igno~ gives UI a classification for unkno""ability, the fourth is different. In the fourth. ,,',e know wiry something is 10 occur, or is desired, but not ..41at it may be. And our ignorance is 10 be not ac.:i(\ental, bUI essential. In such a case, we would have to know something bUI be unahle 10 communicale ii, " 'e would be able to us.e but not mention the matter. Are there examples of situations in " 'hich we can do $Omething, employ something, hul nol oommunicate or undenland it? Consider a musical genius who can perform bul cannol c1lplain (oommunicale) how il il done.' For another example, there are people who can drIve an automobile but cannol uplain what

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vtnIU Und«idability

251

makes it IIIO'VC. In the cue of the IWve driver, there is no theoretical objection to understandi"" However, ifit is imposs.!ble for someone to understand the Dature of the automobile engine. it is for that pef500 a case of the founh type of ignorance, a mystery. The ordinary term "mystery' captures one important 5e1lSe of this fourth kind of ignorance. To sununariu:: something is unknowable if it can be mentioned hut not used (the third type). Something is mysteriou.l if it can be used hut not mentioned (the fourth type of ignorance). C. Kant'S Employment of These DistinctiollS

Does Kant use the Third and Fourth Types of Ignorance, and if

so, where? The e:uct langua,ge of the original, mu<:h less of translatiolll, is not enough to determine the mailer. We are to take the euct language and interpret it in terms of the use and mention distinction. I will not give a complete catalogue of Kant's use and mention of es5enlial ignorance, hut enough to show the importance of the two types in bis system. The third type of ignorance can he illL1§trated easily from a variety of source.s. In tbe CriJiqu.e of Pwt ~ we find. 'This peculiarity of oor undentanding, that it can produce Q priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have jL1§t the5e and DO other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only fonn.s of our possihle imuition." This. is an assertion of Type 3 Ignorance; we can explain what but not why. We cannot know the answer to the question of why space and time are the only forms of ow- possible imuition. This is not a casual formulatioo; we find the same thing in mher places, for eumple. ASS7, BS8S. For another uamp1c of Type 3 Igoorance, we find in ASS6, ·We may not, therefore, ask why reUDn has not determined itself differently, hut only why it has 1101 through its causality determined the QjJpeorrutaS differently. But to this question no answer is possible .... Ocady another case of unknowability, Type 3 liJIOrnnce.

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1lie First CriliqIu separaleli I1'an5Cendentai use and mention from empirical use and menlion. A areat many mailers are discllssed in these tenm. and can ha.«lly be understood otherwise:. For uample. "TIle pure categories. ... have only transcendental meaning; nevenhel~ they may DOt be employed uansccndentally, sueb employment being in itself impossible... :' Apparently these pure calegories may be mentioned but 1101 used; there fore. they utisfy the requirement for Type III Ignorance, unknowabiHty. 10 tM sense lYe understand the unlrnowability of noumena. I.n tbe Foundoliotu of/he MeraphyJicr of Mt1t"tili ....e are reminded thaI ....-c can uplain nothing but ....hat we can reduce to laws whose object can be given in some possible upc:rience. Bul freedom is a mere idea. ... Since no example in accordance wil h any analOS)' can suppan it, it can never be comprehended or even imagine d." Which type of ignOI"lllKe is this? The same type of ignorance lutII$ up in answe r to the qUe$tion, "How is a categorical imperative pouibleT We can specify the Idea of freedom u a nel;ePary pre~uppo:iition of a <;;Itegorical imperative, "But how thi. prcsuppo:iition itself is poMible <;;In n~r be discerned by any human reason. ~ T o explain how pure reason can be practical is a problem for which "all human reason is wholly iT\("(lmpetent. . ..""" Whi~h lciod of ignorance i~ this? We get an answer in the Critique of PmcticaI Rc4fOtl. "For how a law in it5elf can be the direct determinina around of the will (which is the e~nce of morality) is an insoluble problem for the human reason. It is identical with the problem of how a free v.ill is poMible. There· fore, we shall not have to lihow a pricri why the moral law supplies an incentive but rather ",·hat it effects in the mind, $0 rar as it is an ince ntive:" This is the third type of ignorance, unknowability. Kant iO$i$ts th.at we do know ",-hal the moral law requires. thi. all of \U know, but we do not know ....~I)' there sbould be such a thing. This aspect 01. IllO«lIity is unknowable. hut not mysterioos: be will IIOt leI us get awa.y v.ith thal We find tbe ume thing earlier in this Cri/iqut! when F reedom wa$ mentioned IU $Omething unique: "We do not undemand it, but we know it as the cond]·

Mystery versus Mystery versus Undecidability Undecidability

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tion moral law we do know."12 The The Third Third Type Type of of tion of of the the moral law which which we do know."^ Ignorance makes this clear. clear. Ignorance makes this Examples Examples of of unknowability, unknowability, the the Third Third Type Type of of Ignorance, are are easily easily found found at at critical critical points points in in the the First First and and Second Second Critiques. Critiques. Where type, mystery? mystery? No Where do do we we find find Kant Kant urging urging the the fourth fourth type, No surprise Limits of of surprise that that for for this this we we turn turn to to Religion Within the Limits Reason Alone. Alone. At parts of the book, Reason At the the end end of of each each of of the the four four parts of the book, as we have as we have seen, seen, are are sections sections called called General General Observations. Observations. In In these, Kant Kant gives gives his analysis of of traditional traditional religious these, his analysis religious topics: topics: 1. 1. Works of of Grace Grace (Gnadenwirkungen), {Gnadenwirkungen), 2. 2. Miracles Miracles (Wunder), (Wiinder), 3. 3. Works Mysteries (Geheimnisse) (Geheimnisse), , and and 4. 4. Means Means of of Grace Grace (Gnadenmittel). (Gnadenmittel). Mysteries these matters matters are are not not properly within the of the the Because these Because properly within the title title of book, but but Itborder "border upon upon it," it," they they are are discussed discussed in appendages to the book, in appendages to the main parts parts of of the the work. work. The The General General Observation, Observation, after after Part main Part 3, 3, is the the section section in in which which Kant Kant defines defines mystery. mystery. In sentence is In the the first first sentence we find find that that mystery mystery is is taken taken to to be be something something holy "may we holy which which "may indeed be be known known by by each each single single individual individual but cannot be made indeed but cannot be made known pUblicly. publicly. .. .. . ,,13 This This is is Type Type 44 Ignorance, Ignorance, use not known use but but not mention. This This is is followed followed by, "Being something something holy, be mention. by, "Being holy, it it must must be moral, ... . . . and and it it must must be capable of of being being known within moral, be capable known from from within adequately for for practical use, and and yet, yet, as as something something mysterious, not adequately practical use, mysterious, not for theoretical theoretical use, use, since since in in this this case case it it would capable for would have have to to be be capable of being being shared shared with . . . and and made made known of with ... known publicly."^"^ publicly.,,14 take it it that that Kant's Kant's ''praktischer "praktischer Gebrauch" Gebrauch" may may be be understood understood II take as our our term term "use," "use," and and his his "theoretischer "theoretischer Gebrauch" Gebrauch" as as our our term term as "mention." Kant Kant is is careful careful to to repeat that the the grounds morality "mention." repeat that grounds of of morality "are inscrutable inscrutable to to us" us" but but are are not not mysteries. mysteries. The The distinction is just just distinction is "are the difference difference between between Type Type 32 and and Type Type 44 Ignorance. terms, the Ignorance. In In his his terms, "we can can thus thus classify classify [as [as mystery] mystery] only only that that which which we can know but "we we can know but which is incapable incapable of of being communicated publicly, whereas, which is being communicated publicly, whereas, though morality can indeed indeed be communicated publicly, cause though morality can be communicated publicly, its its cause remains unknown to to US.,,15 us."^^ We We may may have classification term remains unknown have aa classification term for for something yet yet not not have have anything anything that that fits fits the the classification. classification. something If way Kant anything mysterious? If thisthis- is is the the way Kant uses uses IImystery,'t "mystery," is is anything mysterious? "There can can be be no no mystery mystery with with respect to what what all duty ."There respect to all men men are are in in duty bound to to know know (Le., (i.e., what what is is moral); only with that bound moral); only with respect respect to to that

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which God God alone alone can can do do and and the the performance performance of of which which exceeds exceeds which our capacity, capacity, and and therefore therefore our our duty duty can can there there be be aa genuine, genuine, that that our is, holy holy mystery mystery of of religion; religion; and and itit may may well well be be expedient expedient for for us us is, merely to to know know and and understand understand that that there there isis suoh such aa mystery, mystery, not not merely to comprehend comprehend it.,,16 it."^^ to The previous previous statement statement leaves leaves us us with with the the question, question. Is Is there there The anything that that "God "God alone alone can can do?" do?" Here Here Kant Kant holds holds that that the the idea idea anything of the the highest highest good good involves involves more more than than the the individual individual human human being being of can realize realize can (not only only in in the the matter matter of of [individual [individual happiness], happiness], but but also also in in the the matter matter of of the the (not union of of men men necessary necessary for for the the end end in in its its entirety entirety [the [the ethical ethical commoncommonunion wealth]); yet yet he he discovers discovers within within himself himself the the duty duty to to work work for for this this end. end. wealth]); Hence he he finds fmds himself himself impelled impelled to to believe believe in in the the cooperation cooperation or or management management Hence of aa moral moral Ruler Ruler of of the the world, world, by by means means of of which which alone alone this this goal goal can can be be of reached. And And now now there there opens opens up up before before him him the the abyss abyss of of aa mystery mystery reached. regarding what what God God may may do do..... . . 17 regarding

Type 4; 4; we we can can morally morally use, but not God's Ignorance, Type Ignorance, use, but not mention, mention, God's activity. In can one one use that, activity. In what what way way can use this this activity? activity? Kant Kant holds holds that, under . . may not under certain certain circumstances, circumstances, one one "... may hope hope that that what what is is not in in his his power power will will be be supphed supplied by by the the supreme supreme Wisdom Wisdom in in some sonle way way or However, . . only or other. other. .. ... ,,18 However, "... only what what is is practical practical is is comprehensible . . we, comprehensible to to us, us, .... we, meanwhile, meanwhile, cannot cannot at at all all grasp grasp theoretically theoretically what what this this relation relation of of God God to to aa human human might might be, be, or or apply . ,,19 Apparently, apply concepts concepts to to it. it. .... Apparently, we we know know why why we we need need aa supreme supreme Wisdom, Wisdom, but but not not of of what what itit might might consist. consist. Kant Kant argues argues for for the the importance importance of of Type Type 44 ignorance ignorance when when he he explains, explains, in in the the Second Second Critique Critique (147), (147), that that aa conception conception of of aa possible God isis morally morally better better than than aa conception conception of of an an actual actual God. God. possible God If, If, instead instead of of ignorance, ignorance, we we knew knew that that God God existed, existed, morality morality "would not exist at all." Most actions would be done from "would not exist at all." Most actions would be done from fear, fear, aa few from hope, hope, "none "none from from duty."'" duty.,,2o Therefore, Therefore, he he isis impressed impressed by by few from the the wisdom wisdom of of what what isis denied denied us. us. In In this this case, case, ignorance ignorance Type Type 44 isis better better than than knowledge. knowledge. ItIt isis hardly hardly surprising surprising that that Kant Kant should should take take special special pains pains to to locate locate these these different different types types of of ignorance, ignorance, unknowability, unknowability, and and

Mystoy vema Undecidability

'"

mystery. 'The fint line of the preface to the first edition of tile First Crilique reads, "Hllman reuon has thi, pealliar fate that in one !opc:cies of its knowledge it is burde ned by questions which, as prescribed by the very nalure of reuon ilRl[, il if not able IQ igtwre, but whi<;h, as tr=nding ~I its powers, il is aoo nol able 10 answer.":' Understanding how kllO'lOo·ledge is pouible requires understandi", how ignorance is pouible, and understanding the types of ignorance. 2, Other Re11&ioU5

CoIl5eq~ncell:

1(1101"1111«, Abnonnce, Ind Undecldlbllily

Section 1 ended by <:alling aUenlion 10 the firsl line of the preface of the Crilique of ~ RmsorI. Whal are these quutions thai we cannot ig:nore and yet Clnnot answer? Several are obviOlll.. We hive found, aa:ordlng 10 Kant, thai reason compels us I(l consider the nature of the cale&orical imperative of morality, bul we cannal know why such a thing is withi n us. Reuon leads us 10 the question, What can we hope for? Yel nothing can give us lpCcifk knovo·ledge. And reawo applied to the problem of luwwiedge n;Jes the quulion of the caillre of the thing-in·ilRlr, 001 we cannot ellpc:ct to have this noomeoal qllestion amy,·ered either. We have the basic questions of the emtence of God, the future hillol)' of humanity, and the possibility of grace. For each of these, reason leads us to a que§lion lhal we apparently cannot answe r, beallse we don't have lhe required "powers." If we cannot know the answers to lhese queslions, are we ignorant, or are we abnorant? In addition I(l lhese two po5SibilIties, there is a third calegory. If "'"co cannot know whkh of the first two is lhe a.!.C, lhe queslion would appear to be und«idable. Undecidability will be introduttd more carefully, after we have considered several other mallen.. At Ihis siage of our Sludy we have a number of tools available. Chapter Five provided an analysis o( the logic of the ignorance relations, three different kinds ofscmant;<; i~ relations. and

the di§linction between ijl:norance and aboorance. In addition to

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theory of of what what ignorance ignorance means, means, there there are are questions questions about about the the aa theory historyand and the the lbnitations limitations of of the the individual individual candidate candidate for forignorance, ignorance, history abnorance, or or knowledge. knowledge. Responding Responding to to these these questions, questions, this this abnorance, chapter has has provided provided terminology terminology for for several several types types of of limitation. hmitation. chapter The individual individual can can be be ignorant ignorant either either accidentally accidentally or or essentially, essentially, The and can can be be ignorant ignorant of of means means or or of of ends. ends. and The question question arises, arises, Are Are Types Types 33 and and 44 "ignorance" "ignorance" actually actually The abnorance, in in the the terminology terminology of of Chapter Chapter Five? Five? Recall Recall that that abnorance, "abnorance" names names aa situation situation in in which which no no answer answer exists. exists. To To say say "abnorance" that there there isis no no answer answer isis to to hold hold that that the the conditions conditions for for establishestablishthat ing ignorance ignorance do do not not exis·t. exist. Those Those requirements requirements were: were: (1) (1) fair fair ing examination conditions, conditions, (2) (2) aa fair fair examiner, examiner, and and (3) (3) the the existence existence examination of an an answer answer to to the the question. question. The The third third condition condition was was defined defined in in of terms of of the the first first two; two; the the judgment judgment of of the the examiner examiner determines determines terms whether the the candidate candidate has has given given an an adequate adequate response. response whether To say say that that there there is is no no answer answer is is to to hold hold that that (1) (1) there there is is no no To fair examination, examination, (2) (2) there there is is no no qualified qualified examiner, examiner, or or possible fair possible else (3) (3) that that every every candidate candidate necessarily necessarily will will fail. fail an an else fail. One One can't can't fail examination unless one has taken it. it. And an examination unless one has taken And one one can can take take an examination examination only only if if it it is is possible possible to to do do so. so. Likewise, Likewise, one one can can satisfy satisfy an an examiner examiner only only if if there there is is an an examiner examiner who who can can distindistinguish one of correct from from an an incorrect incorrect response. response. If If any anyone of these these guish aa correct conditions is conceptually impossible, we have abnorance. conditions is conceptually impossible, we have abnorance. However, However, abnorance abnorance requires requires that that itit must must be be impossible impossible to to imagine bnagine the condition satisfied, not merely that it happens to be factually the condition satisfied, not merely that it happens to be factually unsatisfied. unsatisfied. In In view view of of these these distinctions distinctions between between ignorance ignorance and and abnorance, abnorance, what what is is the the status status of of the the questions questions in in the the Type Type 33 and and 44 categories? categories? What What are are called called Types Types of of Ignorance Ignorance in in this this chapter chapter are are classificaclassifications of the the limitations limitations of of the the candidate candidate or or subject subject who who isis either either tions of knowledgeable, knowledgeable, ignorant, ignorant, or or abnorant. abnorant. In In the the Type Type 11 case, case, the the candidate candidate does does not not happen happen to to have have the the answer answer to to some some question question of of fact, fact, and and in in Type Type 22 does does not not know know the the proper proper response response to to aa question question of of law. law. Reconsider Reconsider one one of of the the examples examples used used in in the the explanation of Type 1-Ignorance: Is there a piece of silver to be explanation of Type 1· Ignorance: Is there a piece of silver to be found on the other side of the moon, three inches long and shaped found on the other side of the moon, three inches long and shaped

like a fish? Since Moria Schlick fonnulared Ihis quntion there have beeo human beings (asuooauts) who claim to have observed partS of the other ~de of the moon. H~ver, those visitors made such hrief visiu to the area that they are not yet qual ified euminers foc out question. Although there arc no qualified examiners al prescnt, and there may never be, we can comtrun an image of a fair examiner who is qualified. The image we construct satiWes the demands of location in space and time. Therefore, we we the inability to produce a rcspome to the queslion of Ihe piece of silver 00 the moon 10 be ignorance, ~cau5e we can easily construct an image of a proper euminer and eumination. in our construction. the eu.miner has been there, thoroughly searched, and has a community o//dlow 6tlminen who can abo e»mine the conduct of the enmination and the examiner's decl!;;oo 0 0 the adequacy of the $IIbject's response. If the questioo arise$ of the qualifications of the enmlner personally, .... e need to bave recourse to other examiners, and SO a community of examin. ers is abo presupposed in the malter. This is equivaleot 10 tbe familiar distinctioo berwuo theories of puhlic and private knowledge: the questioo of whether there can be knowledge that is available to just and only one individual. In our ease it is the issue of whether ignorance can be established if there is just and only one possible examioer. Without reference to the oonsiderable litenllure of the malter, or a detout to present alllhe arguments afresh, I will limply say that 1 assnme the public knowledge view. From a Kantian PD'ilion, the history of science requires tbe rcstrinion to public knowledse, and the bistory of knowledge converges with the history of science. At any rate, the analysis of the nalure of ig.nonmce can be carried on from either positioo on this matter. If one assumes private knowledge, one may alw assume private ignorance. Public koowJedge and public ignorance require that Ihe object of knowledge as well as the knower's $IICCMS each he matters that can be communicated. With lhe~ conditions io mind, the question of the piece of silver on the moon is easily seen to be ignorance: we can construct images of each

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MYSTERY VERSUS UNDEODAB llIfY

requirement. Now we return to the leu OtMOIU matten, Type$ 3 and 4. The law of gravitation Wil$ giYeo il$ an example of Type 3 ignorance; we know whol it specifie$, but nOl why there is suth a thinl- lbe ..1ry question is the question of purpo$C. There are \1>10 forms of this question. (1) Is there .. purpc:!M: for the event W7 (2) What is the purpose for the event W? The second question presupposel an a.ffirmative 10 the tint. In one formula· tion, to u k the fint question is equivalent to asking. Am I ignorant or abnorant of the purpose? To aU the second is to as);, What is !be purpcsc, of whith I am ignorant? For our interest.$, the first is the serious problem. If people don't know whether tbey are i&flOl'lnt or abnorant, are they tbe one: or tlte other? This depends on whether there is an answer, of toone. And, to bold that there is requires at leut the construction of an image of an uaminatioo and examiners. To remain with the question of tbe purpose of the law of gravitation, what image might we offer? If there were an engineer·magician wbo had made tbe law of gravitation, ..-ho might be available for the eumilUltion, and " 'bo bew whether or DOt there was a purpcse, we toold safely pronounce our subject isnorant. But some further aspects are Involved; "oI'e Dud an Unase of this euminer, and also Deed some notion of. oommuru· ty of examinen of (equal) competence. If there is jUJI and only one sueh examiner, we can't separate knowledse from privlte fulillJ. (Kant insists that feeling. alone, is 00 source of knowl· edge.) The requirement that the uamine:r be backed·up by Q commwti· ty of t:mmi~ is a crucial pan of the history of science. There must be a community to carry-on the "oI'orir: of science from one seneration to the nen. Also there nuds to be a oommunity to receive and judse the efforts to contribu.te to iiCicntifie prosreu. Without a scientific community to carry nn communications there would be 110 way of separating private enthusiasms from publicly defe nsible contributions. If, at one stage, only one examiner "knows" the ans,,·er. we can imagine thalthi! person teaches othen

and that a community of enminen can develop. We then face the question, How many enminen are required for an effective scientific community? This problem is IlIIAlOSous to Kant's description of the esseotial political problem. Wc each necd a powerful ruler to keep U$ in check. HO\\'evcr, Kant holds that the only possible l'1.lIer is a\$O a buman heing and can he trusted to follow l'1.lIu only .... ben under the governance of a morc powerful l'1.lIer. There seelllS to he no end 10 this regress, but Kant argues that a republican balance of poIlIers can KINe the problem. While no human l'1.lIer can be tr\I$ted, po-.o'er can be exercised by a community if it is a rommunity of human beings where each is in fear of the others. Such human communities can make moral progress. despite tbe private aims of the individual citizens.. The analogous situation exisll in science. No individual can be trusted lI!I a source of knowledge: a community is required in order to make progress in producing knowledge, just ill a community is requiTed in order to make progress in morality. The point of th is digression is that the community plays a role in eSTablishing ItnoIlIledge and ignorance that is much the wne as the role !Cam gives it in morality. 10 hoth areas, the indMduu/ canDOt be truSted, but the history of hUtnOJ1ity is a record of progrus. Kant has no more confidence in scientific geniuses than in moral he~. The Kantian who emphasized this aspect of the community in the history of science was Clarlts Peirce (usually refcrred to as the founder of pragmatism, a derivation from Kant). Other similarities occur, as ....ell, between Kant's treatment of knowledge and morality. In both areas the framework of the problem comes from within the individual; it is an a priori matter that tbe individual finds within and imp0se5 on whatever is 10 be known. or judged. Space and time are "priori for knowledge; the categorical impcrativt! is a priori for morality. But the essential role of the community is of concern to us here. If there is. r:cm~pIuaJ muon thai prevents people from kn()\O,ing .... hetber tbey are ignorant or abooranl, we may aU whether it is an ullSOtvable problem concerning the object of knowledge or concerning the capacity of those subjects.

260

MYSTERY VERSUS UN DECIDAB IUTY

To answe r the question of ignorance or abnor;lIlce we have 10 know whelher an amwer aislS but our candidate has nIlt or can't reach it, or wbelher nil answer mill for any po55ible c:andidate. If we can imagine (comtruct an image 00 a future scientist producing evidence for some notion of purpose of tbe law in question, we have to admit Ihe chance Ihal our candidate has ignorance ralher than abnoranee. To be compelling requires that we produce either a proof of .booranee by virtue of tile inconceivability of the matter, or a proof of ignorance by virtue of the established existence of the eumining requiremcnu. Lackin, either of tllese, the iSiUe <:an only be laheled open or undecided. To know that we are ilflOraot or thai we are abnorant is to know a great deal. In formal studies and epistemology, what il; <;:ailed dl!ddabilily refers to the ability to determine the truth-value of well-formed sentences. In the area of rounter-epistemology (Chapter Five on the "Logic of Ignortmee"), decidabllity might refer to the matter of determining whether we are ignorant or aboorant "'11h 'Up«t 10 u pmtiadar quution.. And, as in decidability of truth-value, this de<:ision problem cannot always he solYi:d. We have well-known proofs Ihat undecidability is an inherent feature of certain systems, (or instance, the GOde] theorem concerning the consistency and complete decidability of arithmetic. Now that we ilave the GlIdel proof of tbe impossibility of constructing a complete and consistent basis for arithmetic, we know that we are abnorant of such a hasis. Before the GOde! proal, we may have assumed that we were ignount, but we did nIlt have knowledge of our ignorance. For that we would have needed a proof of tbe existence of an answer to the question. 1be bistory of the disoovery of abnorance is as much a part of the progress of s.:ience as is the diSOl.)Very of direct answers to our questions. After all, there are tWO dear ways of removing the by establishing knowledge and by suspicion of ignorance: estahlishing abnorance. (Another way of removing the suspicion is by establishing igDOrance.) To establish abnorance requirelthat we have knowledge that no answer is possible. Ltl ui ¢On!;ickr

261 the variations under whid! this ean and bas occurred. e....• will be of use.

Several

(1) There is a fraction oomposed of natural numbers that ;5 the square rool of the number two. (2) Arithmcti<: is provably consiSllcnl and rompJete. (3) The statement, '"This statement is false," is either true or

r"",. Each of tbex usertions, has played K1me pan in the history of science. At limes, each of them was taken 10 be !rue: they are now known to be falle. A candidate wllO does not know that they are false, is ignorant of the truth-value involved. However, we may raise. different question in connection with any one of them. Cons.ider the stalcmcl'II that is witllin quotation marks in 3. We do not know the lruth-value of that stalement, and we are not ignorant of iu trulh-vaIue, because we understand thaI it doc5 001 have a troth-val ue. While ...-e are abnoranl of \he trinh-value of the statement within quotation marks. we are nOl abnorant of 3. A similar pallem holds for 1 and 2. We are ulmOf'll//t of a cernu n question. hUI we are quite /au:w.~abk about the statement mentioning thaI question. 1bis. knowledge bas cost hard work in the history of the discipli ne involved, mathematics or logic, and is properly counted among the high accomplishments of the field. To prove that something cannot be decided is quite as much progress in many cases as to prove thaI something else can be decided. In cenain m.allert, the proof of undecidability hu been a m.ajor watershed in history. for instance, the GOdcI proof. GlIde] produced the "crash" of the thirties, the discovery that we cou ld nol prove that arithmetic could be trusted. that we would IlCver know that it is rorWstenl and romplete. 11Ie history of the discovery of undecidability in the foundations of mathematics is ins\J\lctive for ou r undentanding of Kant's ronception of religion. TIle laws of arithmetic are preSIJppositions for almost every other science, yet we do not need /0 Jcnow thai they CIIII he trusted. We make asliumptions about tbem and usc them regulatively lither Ihan roll5titutiYely. iI$ Kanl might $ay. What is imponanl for us as working scitntists is the efficiency of

262

MYSTERY VERSUS UND ECIDABIUTY

our hypothcse~ not a theory of the constitutive oature of the univel'5e from a noumenal perspective, Even mathematics turns out to be an uperimcntal science," If mathematics can carry On its activities without abwlute lmowIedge of the consistency and completeneS$ of i15 foundations. we have a pallem that may give us confidence in other areu. Even after the disoovery of the G6de1 theorem. most bridges built by mathematical calculatio!lli did IIOt collapse, Kanl's prqmatie position placed its confidence in testing regulative assumptions nbc<Jb<.t)r iaoioI. "" ~'" II•• way Yo ..ilid:o .... io n:1<..,..d &.,... oW P4, if be taft"'" ~ 1tW, Ji_ up.ollo.ope d I~" ",I<Met (R~, M' 1$.1(0)

In religion., as in mathematics, it is vacuous to require Ihat we Uarl with nOUlnenal knowledge.

Ten

THE MORAL ANTINOMY This chapter considers (1) a moral antinomy that fa~s any $lXial or religious theory, (2) Kan t's position on the aminomy, and (3) his answers 10 several basic questioIu about morality. In Olapter T wo we disawed bis analysis of the me:anin& of the moral law, and his ideas on the philosophy of history. We !lOW 'oIiU see how

these maltcn are 10 be combined. The ab$tract formalism of Kanl's idea of the categorical imperative has 10 be related 10 his idea of Ihe history of civilization. L. A Moral Antinomy Thesis Morality is radically individual, completely contained in the individ ual. Its scope, foundations, ilS gnals are all within the individual.

Mo rality is weia!. The moral viewpoint is the viewpoint of

wme entity ouUide of and grca le r Ihan the mere indio vidual.

A. Observatioru on the Thesis

There are bolh advamages and disadvantages 10 the Ihesi!\.. A5 an advantage ;1 satisfies our pre-s)'!iICmalic demand that Ihe ronscience of the individual 001 be violated by anytbing nlernal. l! maintains individual dignity. One disadvantage of the thesis is that ;t doesn'l seem 10 have a de~isi(m criterion. How would we fi nd the moral resolution of a conflict between individuals? Also, it seems 10 violate a pre·systematic notion that morality consists in more than doing wbllt one wishes to do, that it consists in doing

TIiE MORAL ANTINOMY

somethiJl& diffirult and oppmed 10 one's seJr.sh goals. Not aU sacrifice is moral, bu t all morality is sacrifice. acrording to a oommon underslanding of the noIion.'

B. Ob:servatiom on the Antithesis This pos.ilion abo has obvious advanlages and disadvantage$. It seems to offer a decision basis for dispules bet""un individuals. Whatever advances the moral goals of the collecti"e entity lJ1.;Iy be taken 10 be the moral course. HOWC\'Cr. il has the apparent duadvantage of supporting Ihe unwiUing sacrifice ofindividuals 10 the purpose of some entil)' external \0 tho!<: individuals.

1. KIl nt's Posilion on the Antinomy What ....,ouJd Kant's posoi tiQll be on thiS antinomy? SOme commentators., perhaps fo r introdllClory purpose$. take it 10 be the thesis. However, Kant really gi'o'Cs us Quite aoother alternati"e. Notice that these two positions are contradictory except in the ca5e where we impose on ounct..« the: content of the antithesi$. In that case, tile /orm o/Ille 'lief0 is followed. and the force of moralil)' tics within the iooi"idual, but/he rontenl of the QJI/itltesiJ rt!:WIt~. since the moral goal is something beyond the individual Form and content are oot synonynu. The formal aspeclS of Ka nt'l tbeory ha"e been the proper subject of a lot of study, and this leads us confidently to the the$is., i/ we ale asked the formal QUC!ltions. But, aMWCring QUeJotiom about the content of his position, reQuireJ. turning to the: work on the phiJosophy or history and on religion, not merely to the familiar pwages of the Foundation.! o/t/~ Ml!faphysia 0/ Morals and the Second Critique. Let uS briefly re<;onsider some of the work on history pre$Cnted earlier here in a..apter Two, and see what we find that hcat1 on morality. The idea of a kingdom of ends is foond in the familiar boob, but is offered in more detail in the historical work. Human rational ea.paei ties "arc to be fully developed only in the race, 00\

265

in the individual."' Morality presupposes rationality. and 50 rhe moral CQpacitiD Qn! abo /0 ~ fully tkwfopaJ in the humon Jp«ies, IlOl in the indMduaJ. This leads \IS 10 the answer 10 one question raised in OIIf amilhcsi5:: What is the entity, greater than the individual, whose goal is the moral goal? The answer is, humtvlil)'. And what is humanity', goal? ", .. a perfectly just civic COnstilUtion ... is the highest problem Nature assigns \0 the human race •. . ," •... a u~rsaI civic: society which administen law among men." The concept of a perfectly just society is considered again in Kam's ~/igicil WU'/WI the Umiu of RLaron Alone. Here we fmd Kan! deve loping !he idea of an ethical C()mmonwealth, and arguing thaI ' Man ought 10 leave: his Ethiea1 Stale of Nature in order to become a Member of an Ethical Commonwealth," One of the distinctive features of such a commonwealth is thai ;1 Is a goal of humanity rather man of the individual person,ptr x . AllboU&h individuab have obligations 10 work toward it, "the dulieli of virtue apply to the emire human race, the concept of an ethical rommonweaJlh is encnded ideally to the whole of mankind . ...'"

be. ;,

Now< lou.: _ luI''' • duly..ltich ;, Ali ,.."m.. _ 01 ..... I.....nl IUCII, but 01 Iloo ........ , _ ,.....anI ilKlf. For""F" ' aI , ..;.,..1 obi ",Mot,..... tbo: ide.o of ..... _ • • 6 .. for • 0DCiaI.,.., '.-01,.. tbo: pt. Nloo of II•••ichaI ... 0DCiaI pod. But boca.... 1M -fPaI ....,.. r><M~ H«:AWowl", ...1J' 111M¢" I", "'IIN~_' ·ta' '" .-.1 ~ _ '-"" ~«IioIt. /Jut " ; ,. .. NlhtF . ..~;"., .., ...cJ< ~.u ..... • Mo\olc - . J IN _ pi. . . .' I"" ..plwGl

K.a.nt then di5tinguW1es between ordinary moral laws and tbe duty to worl< toward lhi$ "highest moral good." '"Ordinary moral laws concern wbat we \mow to lie in oor own power... . •" our ability to follow the categorical imperative. "'This lipecial duty inv'Olves worlcin& toward a whole regarding v;hich we do not know whether. a$ $!leb, it lief in our power or not." We do not have the power to oompel\be freely cbo5en intentioll$ of others. Even though this ethical commonwealth is a matter of hope ratber than

knowledge, individuals have a moral obliption

to gtI

beyond their

11iE MORAL ANTINOMY

personal concerns in seeking il: 'man is not enlitled ... 10 be idle in this business II.Dd to le I Providence rule, as though each eould apply hilIl5Clf ezelU$ively to IUs 01'."11 private moral afTairs and relinquish to a higher wisdom all the affairs of the human race (as regards i!5 moral de.niny). Rather musl mao proceed as though everything depended upon him...." One more reference and we can wm up the argument for the antithesis. In the Cril~ of Judglmm (Section 83, "Of the Ultimate Purpose of Nature as a Teleological system"), Kant argucs that only in 'a civil rotnmUllity"" (his emphasis) can thc full development of humanity take place. He tak« the history of nature to be understandable as an effort 10 win individuals a...... .y from the ir own "inclinations to cnjoyment,'" and instead to work for the production nf a rational world. Kant'S view is not comple tely contained in the tbcsis: the history of civilization is a bistory of the increasing rationality and lIIcrrmittg motuU'ly of hwrnlIIily. His emphasis on humanity and on the ideal civil community mcan that he would certainly have to agree with the antith6is. as well as the thesis. Morality is 5OCial: the last person in thc ",orld .....-ould ha\'C no moral problems. For the last person, everything that individual inte nds and docs is intendcd and done universally. But, for someone in that situation, oolhing could he immoral, and therefore nothing could be moraL Kant does talk about duties to oneself, but if humanity were to disappear these duties would be vaCUO\1$." (Could it be known Ihat one is Ihe lUI person In thc world?) We find iUpport for both Ihesis and antithesis in Kant's work.. Cou ld this be consistent? The Ihesis provides the form of moral judgmen!5 and Ihe antithesis explains tbe contcnt, tbe consequences, of moral history. Each one is incomplete without the othe r. They am also be viewed as answers to different questioll5. The thesis responds 10 the question, ~re do moral commands come from?' The antithesis aoswcrs the question, "W]u,t is the moral viewpoint from which [0 understand hinory?' "Thc-refore, I take il that Kant would hold that both the theili and the antithem

The The Moral Moral Antinomy Antinomy

267 267

are true. true. It It is is this this synthesis synthesis that that underlies underlies his his concept concept of of autonautonare omy. omy. 3. 3. Nine Nine Questions Questions about about Morality Morality and and Kant's Kant's Answers Answers

What kind of of moral moral system system results results from from asserting asserting both both thesis thesis and and What kind antithesis? Let Let us us consider consider how how Kant Kant might might answer answer aa series series of of antithesis? general questions questions that that arise arise in in connection connection with with any any moral moral position. position. general

1. Does Does morality morality apply apply equally equally to to everyone? everyone? 1. Yes. Yes. It It binds binds with with equal equal force. force. The The categorical categorical imperative imperative has has the same same origin origin and and scope scope for for all all rational rational beings. beings. Political Political laws laws the may be be differential, differential, but but the the moral moral law law holds holds equally equally for for all all human human may beings, kings kings or or peasants. peasants. If If children, children, the the insane, insane, or or those those who are beings, who are ill can't can't employ employ reason, reason, they they are are not not fully fully rational and so so are not ill rational and are not fully affected. affected. Otherwise, Otherwise, no no excuses excuses can can be position, fully be provided provided by by position, wealth, ignorance ignorance (of (of the the meaning meaning of of morality), morality), education, etc. education, etc. wealth; 2. Can Can everyone everyone understand understand what what the the moral moral law law requires? requires! 2. Yes. Kant Kant held that we we find find within within ourselves ourselves the ability to make Yes. held that the ability to make moral judgments. "Do you you really require that that aa mode knowlmoral judgments. "Do really require mode of of knowledge which which concerns concerns all all men men should should transcend transcend the common the common edge understanding, and should should only philosounderstanding, and only be be revealed revealed to to you you by by philosophers? . . . in in matters concern all all men distinction phers? ... matters which which concern men without without distinction nature of any any partial in nature is is not not guilty guilty of partial distribution distribution of of her her gifts, gifts, and and in regard to the the essential essential ends of human philosoregard to ends of human nature nature the the highest highest philosophy cannot advance advance further further than than is guidance is possible possible under under the the guidance phy cannot which even upon underwhich nature nature has has bestowed bestowed even upon the the most most ordinary ordinary understanding."^'^ paragraph standing.,,14 This This passage passage was was placed placed in in the the concluding concluding paragraph of cerof aa section section in in which which he he discussed discussed moral moral belief belief and and moral moral certainty. tainty. At At first first glance glance this this is is aa weak weak argument. argument. Many Many areas areas of of knowledge knowledge concern concern all all people people and and yet yet are are "revealed" "revealed" to to us us by by specialists: mathematicians, The specialists: mathematicians, medical medical researchers, researchers, etc. etc. The "common understanding," no "common understanding," if if this this means means common common intuition, intuition, is is no match and match for for specialized specialized experimental experimental· science. science. Kant Kant knows knows and celebrates moral celebrates this this regularly. regularly. But But here here he he is is talking talking about about the the moral goals nature," goals of of humanity: humanity: these these are are the the "essential "essential ends ends of of human human nature,"

nIE MORAL ANTINOMY these are the manen that concern all of us "withou t distinction: Individuals mighl not care about the relationship hetll,een the interior angles of an equilateral IrianiIe, or aboot tomorrow's weather, or even aboll! how to extend their lives, bul they must care about the mol'1l1 imperatives. 111m is eMCntial 10 heinl human, acrording 10 Kanl. And, he says, very clearly, the commQrtl Ulldenttlildint is capable of uodenlanding the moral la ....s require· ments. 1. II it poIIibk {Of' ~ fo be moral? Yes. Kant insists that a person judges "that he can do something because he kllOW$ that he ouaht. and he recognizes that he is free . . . : " Ought implies can. Kanl offen some e.u.mples. s~_

IluII _

o.oys IMo 1..... io inoo.lslible wile, the .sc.ind at;cct and

T"'·,.

opplk ~ -betloer he _III _ COllIn>! .... if, .. froat ellhc. ............ '" Ioc c.. \.hill ...",.....1"""', • po-. ""'" _0<1 "" M;do ... -'Iddea 4eatII onleM he ....... a 'aK dep"";';'" ... j...... Iooo.afable ...... ~ tile _ueip w" t 'd 10 dau"" _ • pt...ubIo: I"
ofr., ....;"..,.

Kant takes lhis to show thaI "'C think thaI .... e are free and that it is at least powble for us to do ....hat we ought to do. "Duty demands nothing of us .... hich we cannot do:" 4. II it likely thm IlII)'O'IC will be moral? No. Not for any being ' in the world of seosc:" Instead we postulate "an endleu progress' " to complete mom fitnea. Because we have inconsistent intentiolll. both selfIsh and moral, .... e arc unlikely to act purely OUI of respect for just one of lhese innate inlenlioM. Kant takes us 10 be nsentially iIlaJtUislenr. as the earlier chapter on Ambivalence has explained.

"'9 S. Should ~~ obq rhe morul law'! ~t insists Ihal our selrLshness and mutual antagonism arc productive. They dri\'c us "from barbarbm \0 rulture. ... ·Without Ibrn.e in themselves unamiable characteristics of unsociability ... characteristics each man must find in his own selfish prelensionsall talents would remain hidden. unborn in an Arcadian shepherd's life, wilh all its concord. contentment, and mutual affection. ... ' And then, "Thanks be \0 Nature . .. for the inoompatibllity, for heartless competitive vanity. for the ill5aliabJe desire 10 posse» and to rule! Without them, all the exceUent natural capacities of

humanity would fOre'o"eT sleep. undeveloped •••...ll If Ihis is the cue, tben morof ptvgfW ~'IJUld ~ stopfNd if ~ all btJcame momll Not because: it would DO longer be needed, bul because the machinery for producing it would no longer CDst. The machinery require5 OW' se lfi5hness. 1be degree of rationality displayed by Ihe community ""'olild be limited if we settled for the pres.enl level of sciclKC. For cumple, if the wence of medicine had oot discmered how to perform an appendeC'lomy. the degree of rationality of the social group would be less than it now is, other things being equal. J take it that rationality is a function of both the ronsislency of pursuit and the power \ 0 reach a set of objectives.» The fear that moral progress will hah for !he reason that human beings have all become moral is a fear that is easily relieved: individuals sbow no sucb dangerow tendencies. (Perhaps we can separate K.an tianism and Calvinism this way. For Calvinism people must tty to behave, but are doomed to fail. For Kant, they ought \0 try, but, fortunately, will fail.) How would Kant answer this fifth question? Affirmatively. H uman beinp oupt to try. However, .... e expect that they will probahly {ail (see 4 just a!love), and from a historical vi e..-point, that has its advantagc~ !he dignity of a buman being romins in the mocall1roggle, but succcss would be quite. different malter. Angels have no dignity.

270

THE MORAL ANTINOMY

6. lJoa QII)'OtU' obrj the moroJ law? We have first-hand knowledge of only our own intentiOD$. Knowina; the seope of our selfJShnen, we know lhal ...-e are not candidates.. Only a $Ilpernatural entity could know the intentions of other human beings
quotation of Maxim S83 of La Rochfoua.u1d. How dots K;ml &lI$Wcr this sixth question? Again, an answer would presuppose knowledge of inlcnliom., and ....e arc limited 10 knowledge of our own. He cautions .piMI I. "disbonelity by wh ich "'"e humbu& oorselve5. . . ..... Thil comes from ",he puce of conscience of 50 many men ... they merely elude evil c:onsequcnces by good

fortune:

7. Hw anyc<1t eIIV b«n moron To know Ihal there bas bun an example we would have !O know the intentiOll$ of the individual. We don', know Ihe secret intentions of Christ, SocralCIo, Buddha, ConfucilA. Therefore, we do not know of any hUtorio:al example. But, Kant ;J1ijisu (in the ~Iigion), we do not need a hUtorio:al or empiri(a/ example: oo r milK! and hean tell us what morality requi res. 8. U1wr polilicuJ ~I1Ces does IhiJ CMct'pliotI of mom/ily /unIe? 1be political problem, the achievement of a moral community, "a perfectly just dvk constitution," is called "the most difficult and the lasl to be solved by mankind .... It Is to be wIved by humanity, not by human beinas distributively. The problem is Ihis. Selfish animals like us need a master 10 Iimil our abuse of other men. But the only possible supply of masters comes from the human race. H uman maslers can't be truSted, "For each of them will alwa)'li abuse his freedom if he has none above him."'" Is il possible to educate an cHIC dass of govelTlOl'S? PhilO5Opher kings? No. "That kings dlOUld philosophiu or philosophers become kingll is nol to be expec1ed. Nor is il 10 be wished, since the p"'<e.. ion of power inevitably corrupts the untrammeled

The The Moral Moral Antinomy Antinomy

271 271

judgment of of reason,,27 reason"^^ (about (about one one hundred hundred years years before before the the famous famous judgment remark by by Lord Lord Acton). Acton). If If the the relationship relationship of of king king and and subject subject remark will not not do, do, what what will? will? A A republic republic in in which which the the government government has has will the power power to to do do just just and and only only what what the the people people would would do do for for the themselves. A A system system of of checks checks and and balances balances is is required required in in which which themselves. no one, one, and and no no branch branch of of government, government, is is trusted trusted with with absolute absolute no power. Kant Kant holds holds that that this this political political problem problem can can be be solved solved power. because, "it "it does does not not require require that that we we know know how how to to attain attain the the moral moral because, improvement of of men men but but only only that that we we should should know know the the mechanism mechanism improvement of nature nature in in order order to to use use it it on on men." men." "The "The problem problem of of organising organising of state .. .. .. can can be be solved solved even even for for aa race race of of devils. devils. .. ... . "" A A aa state constitution can can be be established established in in such such aa way way that that "although "although their their constitution private intentions intentions conflict, conflict, they they check check each each other other..... . . ,,28 If If we we are are private left under under any any doubt, doubt, he he adds, adds, "A "A good good constitution constitution is is not not to to be be left expected from from morality, morality, but, but, conversely, conversely, aa good good moral condition of expected moral condition of the people people is is to to be be expected expected only only under under aa good good constitution. constitution."^^ the ,,29 In Perpetual Perpetual Peace, Peace, Kant Kant argues argues that that the the international international conseconseIn quences of of this this notion notion of of morality morality lead lead to to aa League League of of Nations, Nations, quences and to to specific specific ideas ideas about about the the conduct conduct of of war, war, etc. etc. and 9. What What position does science science have have on on this this conception conception of of morality? morality? 9. position does The level level of of social social morality morality depends depends on on the the level At The level of of science. science. At the end of of the Critique of of Practical unexpected the end the Critique Practical Reason Reason we we find find an an unexpected idea: "Science ... . . . is is the idea: "Science the narrow narrow gate gate that that leads leads to to the the doctrine doctrine of of wisdom . . . not one ought should wisdom ... not merely merely what what one ought to to do do but but what what should serve . . ,,3{) If already If the the common common person person already serve as as aa guide guide to to teachers. teachers .... has has internally internally the the ability ability to to recognize recognize moral moral choices, choices, what what is is left left to the be done done by by science? science? The The obvious obvious answer answer that that Kant Kant gives gives in in the to be same same paragraph paragraph is is that that science science will will analyze analyze this this moral moral ability. ability. In In addition moral addition to to this, this, something something else else comes comes out out of of Kant's Kant's moral position. position. The The well-known well-known formulation formulation that that "ought "ought implies implies can" can" leads leads us, us, as as aa consequence one consequence of of the the law law of of transposition, transposition, to to "if "if it it is is false false that that one can, presupposes can, then then it it is is false false that that one one ought." ought." Moral Moral behavior behavior presupposes the the power power to to accomplish accomplish moral moral goals. goals. Kant Kant is is an an intention intention moralist. moralist. But, But, where where power power to to accomplish accomplish is is absent, absent, intentions intentions are are empty. empty.

m

mE MORAL ANTINOMY

To be perfectly montl alternatives have to ensl that allow us to be perfedly ralional. To Ireal c'-cryone as an end ...-e need to know how to maximize everyone's power. as well as intt oo Ihis resull Perfect knowledge. the scientific ideal, is approached gradually through the hislOI')' of science. A5 Kant has it. the late members of humanity benefit from the scientific work of those who came earlier. The degree 10 which a nmdom member of a (Xlmmunity is ueated as an end depends on the leyel of scientifIC knowledge available iI5 ,,:ell u the narural and political re$Ollr~5 of the community. If the food supply is not adequate, it can't be distributed on a perfectly satisfactory buis; if medical knowledge is 1101 adequate, we may have to choose between uvins one peBOll al the CJpeR5e of another, etc. A!llhe power of the social group increues, it has me opportunity and obligation to increase the degree 10 which it behaves rationally, consistently. wilb respect \0 everyoDe. But individual people cannot be praised for Ihe moral level 0( the community; I own no slave" but I perKInally tMoM!l'''e r>O credil for lhal morally desirable lilualion. The average life-span of !he random individual has increased in the lasl two <:e:nturies, bIll r>O one of 1.15 deKrves moral credit for that desirable progress in human dilnity. (Otber things being equal, Ihe longer life is tbe more dignified.) I assume: that in a few yean tbe d ignity of old age will be: improved by • luaranteed annual income: this aJso will be: an improvement in the: morality of the community. but DOt in the morality of the common perKIn. From the: standpoint of individual morality. 5ciellCC may be lrivial. bul with resped to the: morality of the: community. the level of 5cience: is Ii significant presupposition. As the: range of whal we can do increases, the range of what we ought to do can aoo increase:. 4. CoaclllsloJiS

In view o f his position on the antinomy and answen 10 these nine queslioll!, where ~ Kant leave the: common person?

~

Moml Antinomy

273

Mon.lly, no one can be trusted more than the ordilllU)' individual. However, th is is weak p!'aisc. Kant is pessimi.ti~ about indi~idual moraliry, while he is optimistic about humanity's moral progre"Ind ividuah mUSI uy to be moral, they do ul'ldcntand what is at ;55ue, and they can hope to make it; bul, as II mailer of fact, they will probably not do 50. However, their contentment can come in part from their participation in humanity's progress toward a perfectly just legal system. Kant'S idea of radical evil in all people prevents him from bein, romantic about any primitive goodness in the ordinary individual or about any golden age of moraliry before civilization. 11Ie ordilllU)' penon makes .erious errors; as an uample Kant mentiOllS tbat the rommon perwn regards the ceremonies of religion as the wbole of it. Yel, there arc "men of native honesry: and 00 elite, 00 clerics., et~~ can "surpass in the very least lhe naturally bonest man, who can be relied upon in 5O(ial intercourse, io business, or in trouble; 00 the rontraJ)', taken u a whole, the chosen ooes can scarcely abide romparison with him ......... Howev~r. no 5uch "naturally bonest man" can be trusted with political power. Thue tvr no m«rIllwotS, but none are needed for moral progress IO'Nard the ethical commonwealth. 11'Iere are abo no ab$olute moral villains: the distinction between person and thing is always primary and must be respected, and anyone can hope 10 become a new person. morally. On moral malleB, U on everything el!IC, Kant is a dualist. lberefore, when moral ilSllcs arise, they are to be roI1$idered from tv..., di$tinct vicv.-points: the individual and humanity. What is desired by one is nol JIC' .... ssarily desired by tbe other. 1 have shown bow Kant handlcs this ",ithout rontradiction. While he doeso't state the moral aotinomy 11$ it is put in the fint KClion of this ~hapter, he provides all the materials. The moral judgment mUSI have I/~ form of the thesis. The judgment'S motive and machinery ha$ 10 lie rompletely within the individual. There is II ptnOflaJ dury 10 respect the idea of law, the categorical impcnllive. However, the effective ronlent or the moral judgment expresses the vieu.'POint or humanity. Kant 'S work on history, religion, and

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11-IE MORAL ANTINOMY

law gives details of thaI ronteDt. TI!e IWO sid« of tbe antinomy may be taken as answers 10 different questions. TIle the5i5 is the response to. "What is the $OUrce of moral commandsr Tlie antithesis is Kant', :uuwer 10. "If we are 10 understand moral hislOry. wbat purpose must we iI$SIlmc?" Autonomy is nfccnry but 1'101 sufficient for morality. What are the religiOO5 ronsequences of the moral antinomy? TIle antioomy iuelf requires absolutely no re ligiow assumptioll5 because it is. moral problem and, therefore, prcsuppmcs o nly the properties of reason and of human nalllTe. H owever, we an raise the religious question, and raise ;1 in two vcl'$.iol1$. From the individual viewpoint the question is. What can I hope? From the rol lectivc viewpoint is the paralle~ What can humanity hope for? The problem of individual hope wu considered in Cbaplcr Eight aboYe, in Kant', 1101;00 of reasonable hope. O\Ir new question about colicC'livc hope 5CCms a grammatical error, a misuse of languasc, when we fint come upon il. AI any ralc, nol • Kantian

question. B UI, the argument of Ihis chapter should have penuadcd the ruder that moraJiI)' i5 both social and individual, for Kant. The antithesis in the moral antinomy is quite as Kantian as !he: theMs.

The q ue5110n of rea.son.able hope ari5el only for an entil)' that is morally worthy of ou.uide or additional (()Operation. TIlat que51ion i5 just as reasonahle or unreasonable with Te5pect 10 one entil)' as ano!he:r, if thaI entil)' can fulfill the requiremenu of the definitions of hope and wonhiDeY. Can humanil)'. rollective!y, 5alidy the5e requirements? Thili chapter dealt with humanity's moral ch.aracter, while the I'\e.1t ronsiden some of its hopes., those embedded in religion.

Eleven

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY Several distinctive ideas- are pre5ent in Kant's view of relipon: the e!hical eommol1\\-ealth, the nature of m)'$tery and i&noranc:e, the requirement of moral worthintss. and lhe limi15 of hope. The problem remains of combining the5e four, and connecting them with the eXlensions that have been dcvcloped in the iotl:ic of ambivalence, of ignorance, and of hope. This chapter will prnenl the view !hat Kant's philosophy of history is the framework. that COnntcts and rel.atC$ them. Some previous emp~ will have to be repeated Of wmmariud. I . The Ethical CommonWHllh

The history of humanity, collectively, may be taken as an effort to produce a perfectly ethical commoowealth. Where pre\~om writers concern themselves wilh the lalvation of individual~. we find Kant adding to this objective the additional goal of humanity's rationality. The connection between rat ionality and morality. beN.een reason and the kingdom of ends, has already been argued in Kant's ethical "'Ork.' To take this notion of an elhical common....ealth seriously "'e have to comlder the familiar and yet elusive notion of IwnUVIity. Does humanity have reality; is there such an entity? (Does humanity have a soul7 to put the iuue in the language of a distinguished tradition.) Is humanity a proper subject for value judgmen15 and ethical discriminations? Kant's altitude on the status of humanity may be found in many place$, perhaps TI1O!It dramatically in his Introduction. /o~. [n thaI work he added a fourth question to the famous three questions

TIm REUG IOUS QUESTION

276

this book opened. 'Those three "" crc said 10 cbaracleriu the subject of philosophy: What <;an I know? What should I do? What can I hope fot?

",i lb which the introduction

Each of

to

three questions has., as an cucntial part, "'", The three arca!' of philosophy defined by these quc$liolU are directed to the probJelJl$ of the single individual. The fourth question added by Kanl is, !helle

What is Man?

Here ...·c lia"c a new subject. mankind, or humanity 10 phrase it ITK)re exactly. 1be "I" has heen dropped in favor of Ihis new topic. The fourth question designates the area of philosophical anthropology. and Kant rema rked thaI the first thr« questions properly fall under this fourth question. Apparently, llie concept of the individual is correlative with, presu~5, the concept of thc group. Individual h uman beinp arC members of a n e ntity called humanity. Humanity har had, Qnd continui!.f to /"nor, ils (>M'' ' llis/cry. Individuals ~nicipale in Ihis hi$tury, some time$ with and

Klmerime without enth\W:wrI or awarene:lS.. Hoy.ever, Kant's philosophy of hi$tOIy makes it essential to conside r separately the idea of the individual's behavior and the idea of humanity's status. Cbapter Ten has put the issue in Kant's _" teons: humanity is an Q))C rimental entity for him that has as mueh reality as a ny other object of experience. One observes (finds) it historically, over time, and OOlIStruCU the restlltant ronceplion, like Ilny othe r experimental concept. Humanity C',moot be observed in one ,lance, bul neither rould Nonh Ameria until quite recently. 11 canliOl be explained in terms of what human beings do at just one moment of time; nor can the slope of a curve be explained in terms of jtut one point on a graph. Humanity can be given it modest nominalistic definition: the entity that has as pans all human beinp; past. present. and future. 1lIe parts need not be present simultaneOUSly to define one entity: the lIO'Ies of a single piece of music are ordinarily spread fTVer rime. Suppose we grant

The Religious Religious Question Question The

277 277

that humanity humanity can can be be an an experimental experimental object; object; what what do do our our observaobservathat tions and and analysis analysis tell tell about about it? it? tions Kant reads reads the the history history of of civilization civilization as as aa pattern pattern in in which which Kant humanity gradually gradually becomes becomes more more rational. rational. To To be be rational rational is is to to humanity have the the same same set set of of consistent consistent laws laws govern govern the the entire entire universe universe of of have discourse. This This means means that that as as humanity humanity becomes becomes more more rutionul^ discourse. rational, more parts parts of of humanity humanity are are governed governed by by the the same same set set of of laws. laws. more When these these laws laws are are also also self-imposed, self-imposed, we we can can say say that that humanity humanity When becomes more more moral. moraL becomes From Kant's Kant's viewpoint, viewpoint, the the history history of of politics politics and and the the history history of of From reUgion are are converging. converging. They They converge converge on on one one special special area: area: the the religion problem of of peace. peace. They They are are never never to to be be identical identical as as long long as as one, one, problem politics, is is based based on on external external compulsion, compulsion, and and the the other, other, religion, religion, politics, internal compulsion. compulsion. F For the one, one, the the differences differences between between on internal on or the peoples are are emphasized; emphasized; for for the the other, other, the the essential essential moral moral peoples similarity between between them them is is stressed. stressed. For For some some purposes it is is most most purposes it similarity efficient to to consider consider the the differences, differences, for for some some others, others, the the similarisimilariefficient ties. Therefore, Therefore, politics pohtics and and religion religion have have separate separate scopes. scopes. But, But, ties. whatever our our political political circumstances, circumstances, no one of can avoid the no one of us us can avoid the whatever religious duty to work ethical commonwealth. commonwealth. religious duty to work for for an an ethical The duty duty to for an ethical commonwealth on The to work work for an ethical commonwealth is is unique unique on several collective several counts. counts. First, First, such such aa commonwealth commonwealth would would be be aa collective not status not aa distributive distributive achievement. achievement. It It gives gives rise rise to to the the strange strange status than of of aa collective collective duty. duty. Second, Second, it it is is aa matter matter of of hope hope rather rather than ordinary ordinary moral moral obligation obligation for for the the individual. individual. Each Each of of. these these is is worth Kant's are the the center center of of Kant's worth textual textual reference: reference: together together they they are position. position. We We may may find find the the first first property property in in Kant's Kant's view view that that with with the generis, the Ethical Ethical Commonwealth Commonwealth "we "we have have aa duty duty which which is is sui sui generis, not not of of men men toward toward men, men, but but of of the the human human race race toward toward itself." itself." Certainly one of philosophy. Certainly ·one of the the unique unique positions positions in in the the history history of of philosophy. He He turns turns to to the the second second property: property: For For the the species species of of rational rational beings beings is is objectively, objectively, in in the the idea idea of of reason, reason, destined destined for for aa social social goal, goal, namely, namely, the the promotion promotion of of the the highest highest as as aa social social good. good. But But because because the the highest highest moral moral good good cannot cannot he be achieved achieved merely merely by by the the .exertions exertions of of the the single single individual individual toward toward his his own own moral moralperfection, perfection, but but requires requires rather . . the rather aa union union of of such such individuals individuals into into aa whole whole toward toward the the same same goal goal .... the

278

ruE REUGIOUS QUESTION

idoa 01 IUd. ....... .. ;. .. idea

..,.,plelt11 disI"'*""d ,."'"

all 111"0'.01 II .... (wbido ......... wt..I_~ 10 lie ill ___ pootu); ~ it ~ --kiIIc 1-...1. wboIe nprdiat whldo _ do _ ~ 1>het1let. ulUdo, it 1ia. .. ow _ .,.. - . Hca
NOW" we can $lee some of the need to move to the fourth question. H umanity not only has an existence, it hu a duly toward i/M1f: it 1llU$\ approaeh .n ethical commonwealth. ~ • pamcl~t in this effort, each of us aJ!IO find ourselves in a unique liituation. The ordinary moral obliBation is a case in .... ruch the individual oupt to do something. and can do iL Oupl implies can. In this !leW siNation, the goal requires iOmethinllhal is not completely within tbe power of the individual; it depends on OIIuide circumSlancu, other people. II is lhe case Ihal if we oughllO try \0 reach the ethical rommon,,·eallh. ~ eM try to reach it. But Ihis goal requires more than "lhe e:tenions of the single individual." Therefore, Kant holds that each of uS I1UI$t act as though everything depended on us, but we roml al$o hope that the outside universe will eo-operale with us. This hope is a rational req\lirement Wilbout the hope, each of us would either ciw: up in discouragement Of continue in the erroneous (mad) iUSumption that "'e, individually, could produce the kingdom of ends. Since the hope dUI1 an ethical rorrunon ....ealth will rome about is sllch a central one, i\ dC$CTVe$ more 5CUtiny. 2. 'The

Ho~

or World Chlu.QSbl p

This hope is ~d on both the moral demand (the categorical impcratiw:), and tbe empirical history of civili~tion. H istori<:ally. lhere has been a movement in .... hich Ihe same set of laWl apply In wider and wider groops of people. Families have rome under vil lage and city regulatioru; cities have rome under nalional regulation; .... e may hope that rnllioru will come unde r 'a puhlic international law." These rcgulaticms !Ia"e to be self-imposed befOf'C Ihey can begin 10 haw: moral import. However, the

empirical hi5tory does allow us to select dala thai provides an uperiential schelNl for the moral hope of an ethical commonwealth. Since success in this requires more than the ability of the individual, il requires thai the individual make the utmost uenioDS, and accompany these exenions with the hope that the projea will sua:eed. Without the hope, the effon is vaaJous . . . from the rational viewpoint. This hope for moral proll"e55 is oat merely an intellecrual coll5truaioo by Wphisticated minds. is "''' "Milled tloaI _ _ !M'!! be iIIdiIf.rut 10 11000 ""'" . . . .pocII .... race .. .,. ...... ~ to, it ...1y _ .. .,. C-'J'CCI ir ...;o;~ ca1aiNy.'

•.. ~_ ......1IIt I . .

Kant usually does not add anythin& as SUOIli as the requirement that we expect il "with certainty." Perhaps this is • fJip, because the more CODliistent position is !tis view that the idea of • dis..", WOI"Id .,.......... '" .•. V- ~ (...ally ,hoot all.,. IIUII)' rd_.u.. rc-.oilll;'-' . . . . .naI .. - opolitical DDOIdit ..... wbido 1'111_ lou II ber llitilllile purpcoe. will all tIoc or.. 01 "Wieies 01. IX ~_ race ........... Iop.. (My ...ph";')

Human nature cannot be indifferent, for it is so c:onstitu ted that il mUSI hope for "'the goal of world citizenship. ...... Why do we care about history after our own death, about even "the mosl remote epoch our race may come 10"? TIlere is ambivalence on this, but tbe rational pan of the nature of the individual "is so constituted" thai we each extend our interest along lines consistent with the interest of the das5 of hunan beinp despite our penonallimited life-span. We aTe rationally a pan of humanity, even if selfIShly indifferent. Ralionally we each hope for lbe gOllI of world citizenship. At thili point Kant introduces a critical assumption behind the hope for this commonwealth. To have not merely a political but an ethical common.... ealth, we must

"""

1liE REUGIOUS QUESTION ... tloe po 'it"';';'" of ''''''W' ideA, nO--'''1, .... 01 • • it;be. lDOI"aI &i.t liu"ouP ""'- ~ u.. IQruo 01 "'paI'OI~ i.dMd.... illllIII'"ocieM ill the.....,1va, ...., uorited for ............. tad.'

."pc "';.,.

In view of his insistence that lbe question of lbe exUtenee of a higher Bein& is undecidahle, what can Kant mean by this ' presupposition: J. God u PftsuPpolltion

A p.s.,ge in Kaol'$ WQrk on Justice aplaill5 lbe Joaic of the matter quite clearly. Despite its length. it deserves repetition and <:areful study:

u __ "n_ ....,.., LMI •

cataiJo LhilII cmts, W .... It)' 10 ....,.., llr.M it doCI .......... U W I'" 'do .. ...,.,. ..ithct (as freqllClUly "'ppea). c:u aoIi: whether lie .... IIl1 iIIIen:sI ....... ptiotc. COIIje<:tur<> rbM one or "'" oOoe, ill ..... (Io)patL .jc""1) - . if io ......... A or ..., it ill. ,b .Wcai ..... pncti"',,erat. no .... rheorerical poW of¥iew, ... f.,.,. •• , i' order 10 expIaiIIl certaDt pbt _ _ (f<Jr ozampk, for .. _ _ ~" rile Fb ..c mc_ ro N ...... ·i..d micbL be the 1"CtrnIT..000. 01 !be ph ... rl). Or,'" tloe """" Ioaad, prac:rical poiM 01 \Oew, ... form • "'~;'1"'~ .. order 10 0I1ain """" .ad; IUdo .. e.d IIIIIY be ..... pr ....... ~Iy rcdfdoJ· · o,l) or 1OtJnII. U it io • ...,..ai ead, it ill .,....!lIar dllC)'l"CqIIira; ... to....". _ •••.n.. Now it ill .>'ideM (airbe' . b ..,...,. require ... 10 8dopr ... CIId _ our m";m) it oSoa _ teqIIite ... ro u>j ' a..~ (n\ I Pli''''''' femibiliIJ oltbio .... ill tloe ......... Aoido IOIdo I .....yaw. ill. purely tIoecrebcal."h!; ....... aDd • potAlk"'OIlo ___ wdL, fOf Ikre caa be ... """p;'" 10 do tloio (10 be ...... H ethinaJ.. WIIat dill)' reqllir-ea if; !hal ... ac:r ill __ hnr willi tloe Idea ollUdo IJI ead, evea if Ikre ill ...... oiipI .... rl'YeLieaI poMohiIir)'!bar it if; 10 M"" . _ ~_ ill imP'" I'it.ility CI"!!(l! be.~ eilMr.'

w

fr_.

1IIe,.

'Of...

_era(,

f,_ •

Several upects of this passage need to be ooted: (1) The atwnment of cenain moral ends ~ requi re that we form a particu lar ' conjecture,' or hypothesis.. (2) A moral requiremenr thar we adopt an end as our maxim is nol a requirement that we assume the end is feasihle,

attainable, believable. or knowable.

The Religious Question The Religious Question

281

(3) There can be no obligation to believe something true about the phenomenal world. ((4) 4) A intentions. It requires A requirement requirement of of duty duty is is aa matter matter of of intentions. requires that we we act act in in accordance accordance with with the the Idea end, that Idea of of aa certain certain end, even if if there there is is not not the the slightest slightest theoretical theoretical probability that even probability that it is is feasible, feasible, as as long long as as its its impossibility impossibility cannot cannot be demonit be demonstrated either. either. strated The first of of these points is clear enough. To reach a goal by intention requires premises; intention requires requires some some reasoning, reasoning, reason reason requires premises; therefore, premise. The therefore, aa specific specific goal goal may may require require aa particular particular premise. The second point point reminds reminds us us that that Kant Kant takes takes morality morality to matter second to be be aa matter of intentions intentions and and not not of of consequences. consequences. It It also also insists morality of insists that, that. morality does not even require require us to understand understand the the consequences, consequences, much much not even us to does less to to believe believe that that they they will will be attained. Severe" Severe intentionalism, intentionalism, less be attained. indeed. indeed. The third point is something that Kant has explained in several places. The term Itbelief' "belief is used more than one way: it can range in meaning meaning from from aa vague vague assumption assumption to to aa wish, to in wish, to to aa hope, hope, and and to report of of the the firmest firmest knowledge. knowledge. In In this this section section I'll I'll use use it it to to aa report an assertion assertion of of what what one one takes takes to to be be true, as an an assertion assertion of mean an mean true, as of knowledge. Simple Simple honesty honesty requires requires that that we to knowledge. we never never pretend pretend to believe something something true true when when we we don't don't have believe have the the knowledge knowledge that that it it is true. true. The The most most serious serious matters matters (following (following the is the epigraph epigraph by by Heraclitus quoted quoted in in this this book) book) should should be on the most Heraclitus be based based on the most scrupulous attention attention to to honesty. honesty. Knowledge conflated Knowledge should should not not be be conflated scrupulous with hope. hope. To To believe believe that that aa proposition proposition is is true strong with true is, is, in in the the strong sense, to to know know that that it it is is true. true. Since Since knowledge the sense, knowledge requires requires the well-known combination combination of of sense-data sense-data and and aa priori categories, it it well-known priori categories, makes no no sense sense to to hold hold that that one one ought ought to to know. one makes know. Perhaps Perhaps one ought to to try try to to know, know, but that is is aa different different matter. ought but that matter. Beliefs Beliefs depend on on the the cognitive cognitive elements, elements, and and they they are depend are not not established established by by intention: therefore, therefore, no no belief belief can can be be aa matter matter of of obligation obligation.. intention: .The glance. In In case case we The fourth fourth point point seems seems outrageous, outrageous, at at first first glance. we passed over over the the second second point point without without absorbing absorbing it, statement passed it, this this statement •presses the the notion notion that that we we have have no excuse for for abandoning moral 'presses no excuse abandoning aa moral requirement even even if if there there is is not not the the slightest slightest theoretical probability requirement theoretical probability

282 282

THE RELIGIOUS RELIGIOUS QUESTION QUESTION THE

that the the end end will will occur. occur. If If there there were were no no possibility possibility of of its its occuroccurthat rence we we would would be be relieved relieved of of the the duty. duty. Therefore Therefore Kant Kant does does rence have at at least least this this much much concern concern with with consequence: consequence: the the intended intended have result must must be be such such that that itit isis not not known known to to be be impossible. impossible. Why Why care care result even this this much much about about consequences? consequences? Because Because aa rational rational being being even cannot intend intend an an inconsistent inconsistent universe; universe; such such aa being being cannot cannot intend intend cannot to do do the the impossible. impossible. However, However, moral moral obligations obligations remain remain in in force force . to even when when there there isis no no knowledge knowledge of of even even the the slightest slightest probability probability even of success, success, just just 'as as long long as as there there is is no no proof proof of of formal formal impossibility. impossibility. of Kant used used the the above above quotation quotation in in connection connection with with his his comments comments Kant on the the moral moral obligation obligation to to abolish abolish war. war. This This is is aa part, part, and and aa on central part, part, of of the the question question that that we we are are considering, considering, namely, namely, the the central matter of of working working for for the the establishment establishment of of an an ethical ethical matter commonwealth. In In connection connection with with this this we we found found Kant Kant holding holding commonwealth. that one one needs needs to to "presuppose" "presuppose" aa "higher "higher moral moral Being" Being" in in order order to to that unite the the separate separate individuals. individuals. The The logical logical force force behind the notion notion unite behind the of presupposition presupposition should should be be noted. noted. Consider Consider the the following following of assertions: assertions: (5) One One is is obliged obliged to to intend intend Q. Q. (5) (6) Q Q can can be on condition assumed. (6) be intended intended only only on condition that that P P is is assumed. (7) (7) To To be be obliged obliged to to intend intend Q Q requires requires that that" one one assume assume P. P. If If (5) (5) and and (6) (6) are are accepted, accepted, (7) (7) must must hold: hold: P P must must be be assumed, assumed, or or presupposed. presupposed. So, So, if if Kant Kant is is correct correct about about the the requirement requirement of of aa higher Would higher moral moral Being, Being, such such aa being being has has to to be be presupposed. presupposed. Would this this violate violate (3) (3) above? above? Not Not as as long long as as such such aa Being Being is is defined defined so so as as to to be be outside outside of of the the phenomenal phenomenal world. world. The The status status of of aa formal formal presupposition or conjecture is quite different from a belief presupposition or conjecture is quite different from a belief about about something, phenomenal something, much much less less aa belief belief about about something something in in the the phenomenal world. world. Our OUf next next step step will will be be to to see see what what status status Kant Kant gives gives to to such such aa higher Being or God. higher Being or God. The The question question of of such such an an entity entity arises arises in in the the Critique Critique of of Pure Pure Reason, in connection connection with with an an analogous analogous matter. matter. There There itit is is not not Reason, in the the order order of of the the moral moral world world but but the the order order of of the the phenomenal phenomenal world world that that is is the the subject. subject. Near Near the the end end of of aa section section called called "The liThe Natural Natural Dialectic Dialectic of of Human Human Reason," Reason," Kant Kant considers considers whether whether there there is is

283 . .. U)tbiq; djst;...r fmao !he world., wbido DDDI.u. tile arowod '" 1.hc ordu of Llooe ......Id and ol iu mica witIo '111· ... 001 Low... . •. I. Wr. beiq .• . ,,""' ...... , 01 the J1UItoI. rea&y, ae ":y. tic. ... 'I'

m

His amwt:r. ", •. we reply that this question is entirely without meaning. oM Since this ql,le$tion concerned the reality and neceM;ty of such • substance. Kant's answer is obvious. Reality and nC«Mity are properties of • COIUfinuNe 0fIily, and we have no basis for understanding thal However, if a question arises about a rq;ulatM auun!JNion of Ihe unity of Ibe world, Ihings are quile different. We do need a regulative principle assuming the systematic unity of nature, even stronger, the "systematic and purposive unity. in lcoordaru:e with 1.IIli-.~n.allaws .. .on And tltis regulative principle may be called divine wisdom. However, Kam gives a warning .bout the reference of this phrase: •.. it "'\Ill ~ • matter of CQalpiot. iDdiffcrCKe to .... ..x. _ pt".tcMo SlId! ..uy. wIIether ..., ..y 1.Io.at Go& !he idea of .... premo i.II.UC<...., .. I ocbeme of the rqulaIiYc pri1>ciple is peciotJy IIoiop_ 1""'1, ~ . .....ic _ ~ UI1i
So. we may male. a regulat;'-. anumption, "in order to view the appearances U $)'$tematically connected. . .." Bl,lt 1I.'e are "DOt jIlstified in assuming aboYe nature a Being with those qualitiel..u The distinction between theK two conceptions is crucial. A hypothe5is, Ye5: a belief a bout reality, no. A third question, the possibility of hope. is independent of these two. To summarizc in cootemporary terms, we CQII mmtion built{)( we "God. . We can mention the term in a regulative hypotheW, but we canDOt use the tcrm 10 rcfcr to ao object in tbc rcal world. With these d istincti.o05 in miod, let U$ rct\lm to the mailer of the status ollbe "presupposition" of. bighe r being in connection with the ethical commonwealth. In ordcr to have a huis for the hope of !be ethical commonwcalth. we need wnw: schema that ma];e5 possible the cooperation ohn the members olthe commonwcalth.

TIiE REUGIOUS QUESTION To have a bopc requires Waf we have a coD$istent schema &Ii the image of our bope. Just as in the investigation of natu re, 50 in the hope of a moral world, there we mu~t presuJlPCse "a unity which our reason has required as a regulative principle. ....I< Thi5 unily i5 an essential assumption, othelWise the hope of the ethical commonweahh is inconsi5tent. However, as Kant put it in the Fir5t CriJiqut, it i5 a maner of complete indiffcrence whether "'-e eaII !his unity "God" or "nature." (A position !hat Spinoza had already developed). 'The point is that the oommonwcalth requires., by its meaning. a unity of elements; thiJ writy cUJUlOl be blown but must TemtW! III a mall6 of hCJ~. This i~ Kant's moral arJUment for the bope of God, or of the rationality or oonsistency of the universe. But 1M critical rdtltioruhip iJ 1wpe. n~ kna...faige or belief·

4.

God.cetlte~d

vs. Good·CentetN JltIiJions

We have 50 far in this chapler developed aspects of thc ootion that it is a rcligious duly to work for the e thical commonwealth. This goal is an achievement of humanity, collectively, despite the individual's ambivalence and essential selfishness.. The case is even stronger. It is not accomplished despite individual selfishne5&, but by the m«hanisn! of individual iClfuhness. The antagonism of individuals. their very nastincS&, helps produce 5O(ia1 progress because it causes society to improve and justify its accommodation pallern. However, a",'1lTCI\CU of this docs oot justify individual sclfishllC5l. The individual is still tom bet",e ... n the notion that one'. penonal acesses wiUIIO{ hano human prngrcu hislOrkal1y, and tbe IlOtion Ihal penonal eJlCCSSCS Ire WTOI'1g and a mailer of immorality. Both parts of thi5 are lrue. The individual's immoral· ities will be trivial 10 thc human ~ce in one thous.and years. but they are still immoralitie$. Even if they tum out to be of .... rvice 10 humanity in one thousand years. they are immoralities. This is the crucial "and yet" in Kant's position. The SlIme act may be trivial from olle standpoillt. and yet 5ignificam from allOther. Th is dilemma i. more apparem than actual, as we shall sec.

The role of ignorance is import&Dt here. We are not i&norant of moral demands on us. We are DOt ignorant of !be cateJOrica1 imperative. So, Kant insists, we do know what we, as individuals, ought to do and ought not do. However, we are ignorant of just what will be most efficient for the ultimate unity of humanity. To put this in the alternate phrueo]ogy, we are ignorant of nature's or God's mechanism. But, we do not need to know reality itself, in order to know out duties. 'There are no obUgations to God or the universe, beyond obUgations 10 fenow rational bein~. "The unity of !be universe is an assumption that we require. but our assumption, our own regulative principle, doe!. not make moral demands on us in return. Hence Kant's disdain for what he called the "God centered'" religions. They confuse constitutive and regulative principles, use of God with mention of "God.; and II\O$t seriously, selrlSh and moral objective,- In sum, they confuse be lief with hope. and rational with irrational hope.

So Religion as a Theol)' or Human Hlilol)'

The question may sliD remain, Does Kant have • religious position, 01'" doH he simply undentand religion as moral exhortation? I tale it that a reUgiOlis position has two essential postu· Ia,es: (I) there is one highest objective, one supreme or most si&nificant gna.! or heaven, and (2) all human beings have the same highest objective." In this sense of the term "religiO\lS," Kant's position is religiou,- The fint postulate is satisfied by his C(lOCCption of the ethical C(lmmonwealth. This is the highest objective of nature, the so-ealled "heaven," in his philosophy of history. The seoond postulate. the univers:ilist property. is also a pan of Kan t's view. He takes it that each human being (and each flItional animal) has the same moral imperative within. Therefore, the several formulations of the categorical imperative are equally binding 00 each human being. and the duty to ",uri< for the kingdom of ends, the ethical commonwealth, is an equal duty for

.,.

mE REUG IOUS QUESTION The question still may be rai5ed: What separates Kant's religion from his morality? No one could illSist more clearly that the only sacred being is the human being, and the only dutieli are the moral duties.. Funbermore, the only hasis for hope of '!.alvation· is moral worthine55. Where. then. is the sepat1l.te scope of religion? It lies in the framework of hope. Hope pre.suJllXlse!i ignorance. In order to hope for 5Ometbing, one must be ignorant of whether it will occur. Morality is not a matter of ignoran~e, for Karll. He holds that we do know in what morality consists. But the reasooahle questioo remains: SuppCle I try ali hard as I can to be moral7 What can I hope? and What can humanity hope? The responses to these questions are not matlers of morality but mailers of history. We may o;a]l them mailers of history or religion; for this pllrpoR they are synonymous. A hope is always a construction about the future. and 50 it presupposes, or is. a theory of history. A s.pecial property of the religious hope for a kingdom of ends is that it is approachable, continually, a1tOOu&h what would be meant by reaching it is unclear. To have human beings behave purely out of respect for the moral law. and yet still be human beilliSo is mystcriOUli. (In traditional language. this is the demand that we become "new persons..") Su~h a situation has the proper clements required by Kant's sense of mystcry. We know ..,IIy the kingdom of elKls is needed: no one should be used merely as a means by anyone else. H owever, we have troublc undcrstanding ",hal would be thc details of such a situation. Such a moral hea· Yen is mysterious, yet it still is an object of religious or historical hop<. 6. ReUgious

Proaress

The questions sometimes arise. Is this a rcli£jous age? Have otber ages been more religious? Kant doesn't consider exactly these formulations, but he does deal with a matter that is pre$Upposed by them. Book One of &/JgioII Wit/z;" tlte Limits of &tuOrI

AfOlle ilafU wi th the is.sue

be~en

those who hold that the history of the world iJ • moral dedine, and tho$e who hold Ihal il i, • moral pr~ Kant's answer is that "Tlte human ntce has always been in progress towards the better .nd will continue to be IiO hencefonh.· .. H owever, "No single member in aU of these generations of the hUfILUI race, but only the species. fully achieves ilS destination ...• Individuals (on the whole) ate 00 more moral in one genenttion than in another, hut also 00 less; despite th is, huma nity be(ll)lIleS more civilized, the human species makes progress in morality. The present is the IDO$t mow age so far. The hopes of individuals to be wonhy of mysterioos assistance are based on their own personal morality, and ~ have 00 reason to think that there i5 any progress or regress here. Therefore, the religious litu.tion (rom the itandpoint of the individual does oot change. However, the hope that the species will continually improve does regularly get fresh evidence. Kaoltook the pol itieal history of Europe from the ancient Greeks to his own day to show ' a regular progress in the eoru;tilUtion of states on our continenl."u So, humanity makes moral progress, and one can confidently hope that this will eontinue. Of what use is the: hope of humaniry'li progress to the individual? We have called attention 10 Kant's idea thaI individu.al$ eannDt be indifferent to the species. 10 that larger thing of which they are a pan. Bul, while they are concerned with the hopes of humanity, they are aJso concerned with their peT$On.al hopes and fean. 1bey are not merely religious. But the religion thai they do have is the: SCI of !\opes concerned with the twO postlliates: the hope of progress toward the ethical commonwealth, &nd, carried with ;1, the meta·hope that everyone will have the same hope. To answer the question about whether this is a more or less religious qe than the past, Kant might 51y that individuals are 1101 more moral, and so have 00 more religious hope than past ages. hut the class of human beings is gradually becoming more morally organized and so the religious objective is being approached mote dosely than in earlier periods.

288

ruE REUGIOUS QUES110N

1. The ReIiJiollli QuestlOIl: Wb. 1 Ca.. Be Said . bool Hope1

We. owe to Erie Frank a useful characterization of the history of the religious question in the West:" 10 the Greek period the question was,·"What is Ihe _ " " of the OOO$?" What are they made of? In the Mediev,al period _ had the question of ailtcnu. ls there a God? From the Medieval period dale the so-called "proofs" of God'ii aislcnce. The Modem period, accoTdinglo Frank, takes the question of utilily to be the principle wue. -Of what use is the be lief in God?" This is. psychological

question roneerning the effect on the believer. Kant's altitude loward these fonnuiatioll$ of the religious question should be

""""'"-

After tbe fin! Cril~. the Greek and Medieval qucltioD$ eould no longer be seriously cntcnaioed. We arc eimer ignorant or aboorant of the ess.ence and existence of God: kllOlOllcdge of l>Wm<:nal matters is. concepma/ impossibility. The Firs! Crilique r.akes lipecial paill$ to destroy any pouible ·proof" ollhe eIi$lcnee of God. Kint explains the moral argument for the regulative assumption of rationality, but this is an :wumplion not a proof. What of the status of the Modern question, the utility of beUef?

Kant's ruponse to that is disgust at the hypocrisy of pretenodilli belief when there can be no basis for il Such dishonesty, he hold!;, docs gT!:at mural harm. There can be no moral utility on such a basis, and no other utility is worth considering. If each of thcK three questiora iI eliminated, ,,·hat is the essential religious iSMIe? Kant's llrawer is quite clear. The religious question is., What can I hope? At..-ays a du;olilt, Kant ha:! two answers. From the standpoint of the individual, one can hope for happine.u, if one is n<M unworthy of il This is a second--order hope, however, and while it hu a formal (and poetic) status., it has no first--order wbstantial status (in any 1Il'-n5e of ·MlNtantiar). But Kant presents U$ with his !Iecond answer to the religious question. From the standpoint 01 humanity, we can hope fot progress toward a perfectly cthical commonwealth, and we OUght to ... lind can ... have that hopoe.

Religious Question Question The Religious

289

Does this satisfy the individual? A hope hope for a vague vague notion notion of of happiness, if if one is morally worthy; plus the hope hope that that the human toward a moral moral and and unified species will continue to make progress toward government. Kant has located located most most of of the traditional world government, noumenal world. This Christian religious vocabulary vocabulary in the noumenal Christian vocabulary can be mentioned mentioned but but not used, not not even even as the object vocabulary of second-order of aa first-order first-order hope. hope. Still, Still, there there is is the the status status of of aa second-order hope. and, hope. As As aa second-order second~order hope, hope, we we have have mentionability mentionability and, therefore, vocabulary. therefore, the the option option to to make make poetic poetic use use of of the the vocabulary. of an author The philosopher, George Santayana, is an example of poetic turn, and has treated treated religious literature who has taken this poetic as poetry, as great and valuable poetry.^® poetry.20 How How might might Kant respond to to Santayana? Santayana? Kant Kant could could have have no no objection, objection, provided respond provided the proper the attachments attachments to to poetic poetic formulations formulations never never intrude intrude on on the the proper and independent area of of morality. and independent area morality. Provided Provided that that the the poetry poetry is is enjoyed but substituted but not not believed believed or or trusted trusted .. .. .. and and is is never never substituted enjoyed for truth that can can come come only only from from science. science. Kant such Kant grants grants that that such for truth that literature lead to the purely presented can help help lead to the purely ethical ethical religion, religion, if if presented literature can with care. With With these with care. these reservations, reservations, these these warnings, warnings, enjoying enjoying religious literature as as poetry can give in poetry can give aa welcome welcome intermission intermission in religious literature the daily to do do business without the daily need need to business with with reality. reality. Can Can we we live live without poetry, with with science science alone? alone? Nietzsche's Nietzsche's challenge challenge mocks "Show poetry, mocks us, us, "Show me the the mythless mythless man!" man!" me Kant insists that even we ambivalent persons do care about the categorical imperative and the future of our species; and our serious and worldly hope is for progress toward a single ethical government for the world. Hope is the measure of of human beings, of you? means, of their their dignity dignity and and morality. morality. The The question, question. Who Who are are you? means. For what do you hope? Recall the challenge at the end of his outline of the philosophy of history: Our descendants will have just one significant significant question, question, "What "What have have the the various nations and and just one various nations goverimients contributed contributed to to the the goal goal of of world world citizenship, citizenship, and and what what governments have they they done done to to damage damage it?" it?" In In another another form form of of the the same same have question; What What are are we, we, ip.dividually, individually, doing doing to to contribute contribute to to the the question; goal of of world world citizenship, citizenship, and and what what are are we we doing doing to to damage damage it? it? goal

290

1lfE REUGJOUS QUESTlON .. Aftenhouchc: On Kalil'. Op!imilm

AI the end of his work 50mt final qucstioll$ may arise .bout the limits. basis, and che suength of Kant'S optimLsm. He is opcimislie about human beings, collectively. hut pc!oSim\s.li~ ..boo! individuals; individuals will nol reach all of their Individllals ean', hope to saw.fy all of their wants because they wanl inoonsisteoo«. 1bey wanl both the selfish and the moral principle. The conaplion of rea.~ID. 01 rationality. is central 10 both Kant's oplimi§m about humanity and peu imism abom the individual. If the individual musl try 10 overcome se lfishness in favor of reason. che hope of SUCttS5 will be small. Why lu,h ronfidenee in the reality of reason? How does Kant avoid \he ahe mative of the malicious demon lila! e\'cn • rationalisc like DeseartC$ had to mention? This is the pos.s.ibility th.t the universe, al bottom, is not Dpel1lting on a con:s.i.stent set of laW$.

goau..

The iuue bec ...."C'cn • oonsistent and an inCOll5istenl universe is synonymous. wi th cbe choice between a world produced by •

bcnevolenl deity and by a malicious demon. Pre:rumably a consistent unive rse or a benevolem deity can be trusted; an inconsistent universe would be like a malicious demon, capable or deceiving us in anything. even in what seems most certain. A pauage in Kant considel'$ DucaItes's desperate thought. and the idea disgusts him. E ... ~ ill'" ,..,·· .. ioooo 011 .... p i 01. !ob<'"h;............. re a/vo.. ~ 1<> ~&ia

;.w • '""""

wis&, .... otiU =.!d cutoin!y _ be 1- , i i , _IYU b, ""<>Pi... lile ... uino oI...,..ki>ls ' or ~ ..-ilk \lft/'C1c~li", pel'K'o'e'lIOU. Indeed, ........... dilly .<> do ....."" I<) . . . - _ 1M _ I ,.". ...:..\Po ... ".;;w d«dw .., _Id , .. tiu II) 1M """,""" _ '" a ... """ _ OIl< p
,j"

"'own

TI!ere is • sell$e of the term "sacred" in which iOmtthing is caned sacred if it canOOl be questioned. 15 reason §acred, for Kant? Why is it disgusting. in the passage above, 10 wish 10 dispense ,,"ith

'lk Religious Quesrion

'"

reason? Kant'5 reaction 10 the problem is panly similar to that of Des.canes, but Ihere are iignifJCant difference between tbem. For Kant. the tlO$CSI thing 10 a sacred being is "a human being (the holiest of beings in this world). ... Nothing else has this rank. in Kant'i view. What rank does reason have? It is the source of value. It is reason th;il makes each of us an end in OIIrselves, that raised humanity allogether above community wilh animals.." But il is reason that compels u.s to consider fellow human beings as equals. as individuals whose righu oblige us to reurain OIIr selfishness. 1lIe "restrainu are far morc cssential for thc ct.tahlWuncnt of a civil society lhan inclinalion and love ..... H umans would be disgustcd with reason if, after all the sacrifices, all the restrainu thaI il has produced in us, reason itself cannot he truSted. However, Kanl has almost no dOllht about lhe dependability of our rational awareness of the moral law within us. We find it within us and find ilto be the clearest and most compelling aspect of our universe. We are aware of IIOthilli more cogent. 1lIe use of reason in makiOJ us aware of the moral l~w is a different maner from the application of reason 10 knowledge of the external world. In the Second Thesis of Ihe "Idea fnr a Universal. HislO..,. on a Cosmopolitical Plan,' Kant held that "In man .. . those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason arc to be fully developed only in the rue, 001 in the individual." The history of science is a collccr.ive not an individual effon. Each generation "passes iu own enlightenment to iu lUl'Cessor ..... A dualisl on this as well as each of Ihe other basic conceptions, Kanl gives "reason" both individual and collective roles. Returning 10 nur filial questinn, What is Kant's ani tude toward the possibility Ihat reason is not trustworthy? Fillt, he insists that individuah are in no doubt abollt their moral rea~n, about the moral principle. 1lIere may be problems about the application of the principle. Then, he has underlined the fact that we have 110 choi~ about the bind lhat Nature has impo5Cd on us. the bind betweeo reason and selfisbness. HO'ft'ever, 10 wish to dispellSC

m

mE REUGIOUS QUESTION

with reason would be literally unnatural, and in that sense, disgusting. In the course of Ihis argument Kant betrays a bil of "misology" as he called it in the Foundations of the Mnaphyljcr of Moroh. This is Ihe hatred of reason thai may .:orne upon those who realize that tea!iOn re$lrieu their pursuit of happiness. He didn't simply say thai it is impossible 10 wish to di$pensc wilh fcason; be said il would be disgusting.. To ealI something "disgusting." one has to appreciate the desire and yel deny il ...
able to hope. in the face of aU our ambivalence, that the future will be desirable, thai humanity will make progress.. AI leasl we say thaI we hope.

Notes Notes Chapter One One Chapter 1. Critique Cn"tique of ofPure Pure Reason. Reason. A805/B833. A805/B833. See See the the Bibliography Bibliography for for the the exact exact 1. edition or or translation translation used used for for Kant's Kant's works. works. The The numbers numbers in in the the notes notes refer refer to to edition the Berlin Berlin Akademie Akademie edition, edition, the the standard standard reference reference for for Kant's Kant's texts. texts. Almost Almost all all the of the the modern modern translations translations contain contain these these reference reference numbers, numbers, and and can can be be easily easily of consulted. For For translations translations without without Berlin Berlin Akademie Akademie numbers, numbers, their their own own page page consulted. numbers will will be be given. given. numbers 2. Kant: Kant: Philosophical Philosophical Correspondence, Correspondence, 1759-99. 1759-99. Ed. Ed. and and trans. trans. Amulf Amulf Zweig Zweig 2. (Chicago: The The University University of of Chicago Chicago Press, Press, 1967), 1967), p. p. 54. 54. (Chicago: 3. Not Not only only textbook textbook authors authors writing writing introductions, introductions, but but sophisticated sophisticated scholars scholars 3. can hardly hardly avoid avoid calling calling Kant's Kant's system system "radically liradically dualistic," dualistic," as as Richard Richard Kroner Kroner put put can it, in in "The "The Truth Truth of of Faith," Faith, The The Christian Chn"stian Scholar, Scholar, 47:1 47:1 (Spring (Spring 1964), 1964), p. p. 52. 52. it, Ii

Chapter Two

1. B xiii. From the Preface to the second edition of of the Critique of of Pure Reason, Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: SL St. Martin's Press, 1929). Unless noted, all references in this section on Kant's theory of knowledge will come from from this Critique. The English translations will be Smith's. References will win follow the standard pattern of indicating the page numbers of the Berlin Berlin edition, using "A" for Kant's first edition, and "B" for his second. "A" for first edition, "B" for second. 2. 2. Ibid. Ibid. 3. 3. Ibid., Ibid., my my emphasis. emphasis. 4. 4. Ibid., Ibid., BB xvi. xvi, 5. Ibid., B xvii. 5. Ibid., B xvii. 6. 6. As As Kant Kant mentions mentions in in note note "a" "a" of of ibid., ibid.,BBxviii. xviii. 7. A26-27, B42-43. 7. A26-27, B42-43. 8. 8. A27/B43. A27/B43. 9. A27/B43. 9. p a i i m z . 10. 10. Ibid. mid. 11. A37/B54. 11. A37/B54. 12. 12. A42/B59. A42/B59. 13. A51/B75. 13. A51/B75. 14. 742/B770, and 14. Familiar Familiar places places to to find find these these arguments arguments in in brief brief are are AA742/B770, and A753/B781. A753/B781. 15.' 15. This This isis now now aa familiar familiar distinction distinction usually usually credited credited to to Gottlob Gottlob Frege. Frege. 16. 16. A702/B730. A702/B730.

294 294

NOTES NOTES

17. A475/B503. A475/B503. 17. 18. A470/B498. A470/B498. 18. 19. A702/B730. A702/B730. 19. 20. A479jB57, A479/B57, note note a. a. The The emphasis emphasis is is Kant's. Kant's. 20. 21. Ibid. Md. 21. 22. A482/B510. A482/B510. 22. 23. All All references references in in this this section section are are to to Kanrs Kant's Foundations Foundations of of the the Metaphysics Metaphysics 23. of Morals, Morals, trans. trans. Lewis Lewis W. W. Beck Beck (New (New York: York: Liberal Liberal Arts Arts Press, Press, 1959), 1959), unless unless of otherwise specified. specified. Page Page numbers numbers are are to to the the Akademie Akademie edition edition as as well well as as to to the the otherwise translation. translation. 24. Alfred Alfred C. C. Kinsey, Kinsey, Wardell Wardell B. B. Pomeroy, Pomeroy, and and Clyde Clyde E. E. Martin, Martin, Sexual Sexitai 24. Behavior in in the the Human Human Male Male (Philadelphia: (Philadelphia: Saunders Saunders and and Co., Co., 1948). 1948). Behavior 25. Critique Critique of of Practical Reason, Reason, trans. trans. Lewis W. W. Beck (New York: York: The Liberal Liberal 25. Arts Press, Press, 1956), 1956), pp. pp. 88-89. 88-89. Arts 26. Ibid., Ibid., [86]. [86]. 26. 27. For For aa more more detailed detailed presentation presentation of of the the matter matter of of style style in in this this area, area, see see my my 27. "Moral Style," Style," The The Journal Journal of of Value Value Inquiry, Inquiry, 24 24 (1990):123-133. (1990):123-133. "Moral 28. Quotations Quotations in this this section section will will be be taken taken from from Lewis Lewis W. W. Beck's Beck's expert expert 28. translation of of the the "Idea "Idea for for aa Universal Universal History History from from aa Cosmopolitan Cosmopolitan Point Point of of translation View," in in Beck's Beck's edition edition of of Kant Kant on on History History (Indianapolis: (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, Bobbs-Merrill, 1963). 1963). View," Page references, references, in in parentheses, parentheses, are are to to the the Akademie standard. Akademie edition, edition, as as is is standard. Page 29. For For aa more more complete complete analysis analysis of of his his philosophy see my Study philosophy of of history history see my A A Study 29. of Kant's of History (Ann Arbor, 1955). of Kant's Philosophy Philosophy of History (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Mich.: University University Microfilms, Microfilms, 1955). 30. Adam Smith, An into the Wealth of Adam Smith, An Inquiry Inquiry into the Nature Nature and and Causes Causes of of the the Wealth of 30. Nations, Nations, as as reprinted reprinted in in Social Social Reformers, Reformers, ed. ed. Donald Donald O. O. Wagner Wagner (New (New York: York: Macmillan 1959), p. Macmillan Co., Co., 1959), p. 20. 20. 31. emphasis. 31. "Perpetual "Perpetual Peace," Peace," 369, 369, ia in Kant, Kant, On On History, History, my my emphasis. 32. Revolution," 32. For For an an extension extension of of this, this, see see S. S. Axinn, Axinn, "Kant "Kant and and the the French French Revolution," Journal Journal of of the the History History of of Ideas, Ideas, 32:3 32:3 (1971), (1971), pp. pp. 423-432, 423-432. Also Also see see the the papers papers by by Lewis Lewis W. W. Beck, Beck, John John Atwell, Atwell, and and Charles Charles Dyke Dyke in in the the same same issue issue of of that that journal journal for for different different views views of of the the question question of of Kant's Kant's view view of of revolutions. revolutions. 33. For more consideration of Kant's nominalism see S. S. Axinn, Axinn, "Kant "Kant and and 33. For more consideration of Kant's nominalism see Goodman Goodman on on Possible Possible Individuals," Individuals," The The Monist, Monist, 1:3 1:3 (July, (July, 1978):476-482. 1978):476-482. 34. For aa discussion discussion of of the the significance significance of of the the Fallacy Fallacy of of Composition, Composition, see see S. S. 34. For Axinn, Axinn, "Kant, "Kant, Logic, Logic, and and the the Concept Concept of of Mankind," Mankind," Ethics, Ethics, 48:4 48:4 (1958):286-291. (1958):286-291. 35. In Kant's KanCs Reli^on Religion Within Within the the Limits Limits of of Reason Reason Alone, Alone, trans. trans. Theodore Theodore M. M. 35. In Greene Greene and and Hoyt Hoyt H. H. Hudson Hudson (New (New York: York: Harper Harper Bros., Bros., 1960), 1960), he he insists insists that that aa human human being being is is "the "the holiest holiest of of beings beings in in this this world." world." Note Note p. p. 147. 147.

'95

bet, Shollntw;uy &lid Kaai: wdI bdon: Kaat, SIIaI\:aI:Iui.o, A MDNI M""*'1 (Phold ;'.' ;" T _pIc U~ heu, 19!19j. oad S. AJ:imo, "KalIl. AI>II>oricy, ..... IIoc f'l'e.do ~. /"",...1 c(dv HiIWy <1/ ,_, 3l:3 (1971):.Q3.;Ill. 1. Bcrurd De N r i . :.0.'0 detipdul. AlIt bt" 'J WI> IlN 0.;,;.. '" MOIWw. 59:1 (1'l68):9-ll 7. SO< S. A>:iaD, 01 .... Sia&\o Riok,.' "'ilowplty of Sdttoa, l:U,2 (1%6); aad 'Moral StyIe,' JOfUMJ of V_ I~, N (19\IO):ID-lll. 0
Tr .

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a( IN M• •; b 0( NONJity. Sec Ik '.:1...... ethico ill CIoapIet T'Mt. 2. FA,,1ri<w11 cf lIN' MIT :F.Jo>a '" NoN., 41&. As ""'"" the c:iI.... ...... ben <de, 10 Iloc 1Icr1ioo Abdeeie ,,10.. T1rot tn",' plinoo;' by t.e.it W, lied< (New Y.,.k: ,.,.. UbenoI AfU ........ l'lSI). l. 1I>id, 419. <~

NOl<S S. FOI' ...,.., amalyiio 01 tk _y KMI .... tile pIu'-. •....:1 yd." ud ill a pplicaliou 10 hio "Olio- d .......6e: iBccresl. _ my "Aaci Yo<: A X·eti .. ~ cl "e,,' " ic lowaI; '1"'770{'1)' MId ..........'OC ' qC4J 1W .. "CJt, 25:1 (l964):lOS- lI6. 6.!'"1IS! 'ottI,,'M«I. 1 btr--.c, by C ....., BM....,. ..... Ioio Dooo D. Jodc_. Jay HMqr, ..... J ..... Wed'· ... , .. ..,....... cI.l1ocory ol~· ~ x- "'t, 1,. {l9S6'j:2'lI .264. E. !!"''''f. . QMf/kI_ Dlit.: H.....,liu•• chapla, ltd. aDd 1nDI. Mat.. c. N"" Sc' ....... FIQIft £.ty a-t 11ti!m.. ~j (N'ew York: Oofta"""

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7".

"""'"

9. T . ..... Harold C. OOfdiaer, SJ . no. c-J'.m-.. 0{ Sot A~ (N ..... Yod<: P'ockeI Boob, t-., 1952). pp. 1C-1 10. Cilco! .. Balj,omia R&IId, cd. n. 0llHklll MMIfIltt (Bao!,..: H ...,,,,,,,,

Miftlia. 1931), p. S. IL~.

1i1th .. IlvUmiarfR_ ... _,u ..... n eodore M,Gree ... ud H.". H. HIidoooo (New V....: t!at-pe. a.od BIT... · .. 19100), P. 29. U. F~ 0{ W Nd4lfAl i"' 0( Ii.... (
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L The _erial iIIlkis ....pltt is W:CII from 01' ~ "" . . . joiDt poper b, s.imlnI
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the fnIiu of thot papa wit.IoooIt 'l""botie loP1. Alfred Tonki, "l'1oc Scm.Mit O'zr-pt;<. cl Trail; f'IoJboopltJ _ 1"1... " ....",rytI lfaNrdo, 4 (Morel; 1I"W):341_3iI\. J. Abooo:w~ ;, der~ lbe Lot;., ........1 (Sdoolars wi! know tbt ill ..ithct AIICieDt ... MedievallMia did ' "'-oro' -... . Ihvid Am .... ud I odm~

m:-

" _ i o o .) 4. WolWd VIII Ornou QIlioK:, Woni _ U.;.....;,y I'rcu, 1960), P. 194.

Obj«t (O- h • • M-.: lIan>Ud

297 S. D. hul SII)det, II""'" LafIc _ III AppIicMotu
,...od""

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......, clefail. 9, Hi ... jU.. X-'"..". *114 Sditf. P. 211 10.. Saydet. Nodd lAfic, p. \(l6. IL 7Jwr "fjo1n 0( I'kwt. U'IYIL J _ EDi ..."," (bw> .. 0polia: BnI.N.·MttriII 19601), I"I~ p. lOt.

N,.),!'.,,.,. eo..

I. IIdiri- Wi_ flu! L.imiu '" Ru»tt AIoov, ........ n.c od<wt M. G _ ..... HO)'I II. Hudooa CNew York: HOIJIU pel Brolbers, i!lllO), p. • 7. 1. 51""""", EJhks, tr..... Williaa H. While., ..... JUICI Gill ...... (New Yo<\ ; Ho6Ie. l'vbIie~. A22S{Plm 6. lW4. ~/Pt6I1. 7. No ill 0..•.• AI""...".. "hi Ll>P<-. &. 1'bi4~ po lSI. ...,_01 lppUnI .. witIo I rl;""H!' ... of '"".-

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4. "L;:Utr I'Tom EpioNnIs Ie) Mcoocel&,· 11..... a .."" D. Y(IIUIJ. npriruod irrr Ikrr.juoi. RMrI, 7Jorr o,,'WM Nomau (0001"", Mim", Co. 1937).

lb.""

po III.

298 298

NOTES NOTES

5. See, See, S. S. Axinn, Axinn, "Mathematics "Mathematics as as an an Experimental Experimental Science," Science," Philosophia Philosophia 5. Mathematica, 5:1 (1968):1-10. Reprinted in Philosophy and Mathematics, ed. Mathematica, 5:1 (1968):1-10. Reprinted in Philosophy and Mathematics, ed. Robert J.J. Baum Baum (San (San Francisco: Francisco: Freeman, Freeman, Cooper Cooper and and Co., Co., 1973), 1973), pp. pp. 283-292. 283-292. Robert 6. John John Dewey, Dewey, "The "The Influence Influence of of Darwin Darwin on on Philosophy Philosophy and and Other Other Essays Essays in in 6. Contemporary Thought," Thought," reprinted reprinted in in Max Max H. H. Fisch, Fisch, ed., ed., Classic Classic American American Contemporary Philosophers (New (New York: York: Appleton Appleton Century Century Crofts, Crofts, 1951), 1951), p. p. 344. 344. Philosophers Chapter Eight Eight Chapter 1. Critique Critique of of Practical Practical Reason, Reason, trans. trans. Lewis Lewis W. W. Beck, Beck, [24] [24] (New (New York: York: The The 1. Liberal Arts Arts Press, Press, 1956), 1956), p. p. 23. 23. Liberal 2. Ibid., Ibid., [5], [5], p. p. 5. 5. 2. 3. Ibid., Ibid., p. p. 6. 6. 3. 4. Critique Critique of of Judgment, ludgnient, 91, 91, trans. trans. J. J. H. H. Bernard Bernard (New (New York: York: Hafner Hafner 4. Publishing Co., Co., 1951). 1951). Publishing 5. For For the the large large number number of of references references to to The The Critique Critique of of Pure Pure Reason Reason in in this this 5. chapter, I'll give only the A and B citations. These will be to the trans, by chapter, I'll give only the A and B citations. These will be to the trans. by Norman Kemp Kemp Smith Smith (New (New York: York: St. St. Martin's Martin's Press, Press, 1929). 1929). Norman 6. J. J. P. P. Day, Day, "Hope," "Hope," American Philosophical Philosophical Quarterly, Quarterly, 6:2 6:2 (April (April 1969), 1969), p. 97. 6. p. 97. 7. TIle The Metaphysical Metaphysical Elements Elements of of Justice, lustice, trans. trans. John John Ladd, Ladd, [355] [355] (New (New York: York: 7. Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 128. Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 128. 8. Critique Critique of of Pure [A812/B840]. 8. Pure Reason, Reasoll, [A812/B840]. 9. Ibid., [A809]. 9. Ibid., [A809]. 10. The 10. The famous famous argument, argument, "The "The Impossibility Impossibility of of an an Ontological Ontological Proof Proof of of the the Existence of God," in Critique of Pure Reason, A592-A602. Existence of God," in Critique of Pure Reason, A592-A602. 11. 11. The The Metaphysical Metaphysical Elements Elements of of Justice, Justice, p. p. 101. 101. 12. Ibid., Justice, [349], p. 122. 12. Ibid., Justice, [349], p. 122. 13. 13. Ibid., Ibid., [332], [332], p. p. 100. 100. 14. Critique of Practical 14. Critique of Practical Reason, Reason, [31], [31], p. p. 30. 30. 15. Reli^on, p. 130. 15. Religion, p. 130. 16. Reason 16. Lewis Lewis W. W. Beck, Beck, A A Commentary Commentary on on Kant's Kant's Critique Critique of of Practical Practical Reason (Chicago: (Chicago: University University of of Chicago Chicago Press, Press, 1960), 1960), pp. pp. 244-254. 244-254. Thomas Thomas Auxter Auxter also also has a strong paper on this, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," Journal has a strong paper on this, "The Unimportance of Kant's Highest Good," JOllmal of of the the History History of of Philosophy Philosophy (April (April 1979): 1979): 121-34. 121-34. 17. 17. Reli^on, Religion, p. p. 46. 46. 18. 18. Ibid., Ibid., p. p. 47. 47. 19. 19. Ibid., Ibid., p. p. 108. 108. 20. 20. Ibid,, Ibid., p. p. 62. 62. 21. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 24. Ibid.

299 2S./bid. 76.1'*.

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(lri",poIio: II<>bb&-MurilI, 1m), po 29. 29. fWiIi<>'I, pp. ~.

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1. 1Wd~ [B;II:SJ. &. Fm"iriuutJfrM N~"""yriua(MattJU, I...... Lewis W. Bccl; (New Y""k: ".. t..ibcnI Am I'1'no, I~). [7211. My .,,~,,;, 9. Il>fd.• ["611. 10. /lJid. 11. of ,.., ......0>1 _ , rn~ My CIlIph·;' 12. lINd. [4~

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20. OiriqW '" 1\ .. ';';0>1 Rt.owIo . 1141).

21. 0iIi'f"I 0( " - _ . A... My o..,pboooio.. 2l. See . , "M. d.e ......ia .... &pcr._&! &ic_: I'IoilolDp I;' millie., ~l (1968):1-10.

M._

NOTES

300

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N ....... F.a. FIc1Iao, MIl ForKUl.

Cu.bo"'s·. M ....:

~

11~","-1~

Heoedil ... ' fl, ,m' sol - . F_ EMtJ tltwit ,""II,,,,;..,, Milloa C. N. . .. New Yorl: CroI'\a aad Ca. 1917.

KiMcy. AI&ed

c.,

witIt W.-deII II. Pt

,._"'''~N_.

It.

CIyok Eo M...... J>Ioild'!r'i " s.......su.aadCa.l90C8. ,10)', ud

tcro.cr. It"' .. ."".,.".. 01 FaiIk' TM 0IrisMrI

Sr~.r

... . 7:1

aad ....

_

(Sprio&

11164).

L)'IIdl, K.c-tia. TM J-. <1{ doe 0.,. O.hi" ..... hi-.: M .I.T. Prao, I9IIQ.

Nell,

o.an. Am.., ... N

(Ahmbio 11~"'-'

' '''''' JIJo En., ...

~

Edtia. New Y""k:

197:5..

00Iiae, Wdlard V... ()ra.u.. M ....' 51"" UJpt. 11---,. "'"- 19j1.

c-br>ir, M-.:

Harvard

_. WtlfEl_ 0bjtcI. Om' ..... M-.: H..--d Ufliwasiry I'ra&, 1960.

Gon, 7JW ~ tJ(,..,. ,. New Yorl: CIw"" Sa il . .. 1905-1906; ' .... iMcoI bJ" Cd,. 1Ioob, 1962.

So" )

II,

~

Scl.fid<, Morita. ' U - . . b I t Q ' 'o.r ,t.. wed ioo f'Ir/I:"y'ly .. lIN T: ....ti"" Cr.,,')', Vol. 2, .... William Barren lad H....,. Aile .... New Yew!::: It

' _ Hoooze, 1962.

AItl:.... 'Sz..tioz _ P ' ·e •• : i:o 1lIt Eu.,.. tJ( . . . SdOIipn+"", u... T. 8. Sr:: ' h ' I. New Yewt; W:llty Book Co. S<~""''''''

SIWtabIary, nw Earl 01. JIJo 11IIJKIr1 ~ .-- .... Nm., x', ro. .... ;.".t _ 1lIt a . e' N .. 5.... .... Beaj __ Ilaa
Jr. On doe CJ :to*
N~

York: H,"'l' Holt, lID

J07

Bibliography

All ffU11ill1 ..... II\< " - _ r:.._ c( II\< W_ c( #5 t . . . . . , ... ' ..... .. io: Sori« ~"WJ, orI. I)op nl d O. W...... New yOft: ",-ma.

Sdlo, Ad

eo. "". s.y.b. D. '"001.. NtHNJ Lqic _ '2 • .

fa A•• n - .. New yert: v.. Nc:otrud.

toM, 1971.

S, · 'OM Bu h CJIJJc$, II. W"riliul H. Whft, orI. J_ HI' htr I ; i . Co., 19j1.

0 _ _ New V.,..k:

Tarski, AIfrorI. ""TIoe SnoIlPlioo 0 5; I"'" d. Trani:.: 1'Irri..... ; 'v _ "'*'tk* Ru,.d:, . (Mard: ~), PI'- ].11·376,

n....",,*

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Sidney Arinn i$ me .,tbor of.lf MoruJ Military, an analysi~ of mililal'y elbia, and over thirty-five journal articles. He has published on Kant for many years u well as on applied elhia and social philosophy. His technique is 10 apply a touch of formal logic to problcPlS sueb as me anaJysis. of error, ambivalence, ignorance, hope, law, and moral style. A Professor of Philosophy II Temple University, Philadelphia. Arlnn is aJso an Adjunct I'rofes5or in the Psychiatry Depanment of the Temple Univenity Medical SebooL A.5 well as tcacbing the range of philosophy coones in the USA. Axinn has lectured widely in East Asia-in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. He has also taught undcrgmdualts in Tokyo, psyclIi.uy residents in Philadelphia, and cadets at West Poinl He is • put-president of the American Society fot V.rue Inquiry and treasurer and BQard member of The Jowrud of r~ HislOty of Idem. orr the job ... chess, molOrcycles. and Jailing.

INDEX De

+'ie;';" r:J, 168 Abo . " , Kn'1 ;o~it'j.;';5.- of, 9j-9S Act", LanI, ~ m -00" -', ~ ~ 141·163

~hrl r ,illt,

.. 01, 103

_

oac:..tea, ~ lIlO, 191

ec-y, J ..... 21S.

298 a..fi

cIoubio-biJld, \ .... ...." dol"uotd, 18 dill)' of I K h"",.. ,Ke ._d

iloelf.

Ariola...., lO2, 7!17 a.l AlIWII, Job, 294, JOO ~ JOI L1 A .....i.., '!'!.. !1.. U2, l.SII A ......., TIM N. 2!l& aJ.6. lOl Ll """"*. O..w M~ !1. 2!16 e.l. LJ

BM..... Go ' -i, 196 8ava. Raben, 198 a...5 Ikd, r--. W~ 141, 294, 29S, l\lII Ll. a.l6 Betaatd l..!::!.. 2!111 .aA ....."finI, I n "\ I!." 1"-\45, 2III'i 8nuoG, GiordaDco, llll1 8 uddh. 2JO

•

277·l78 o,u. CUr1u, 294,

m

L!

• • n o J!bl!l

doploaal ''';'''',

m

EpiounII. 210·211

pVe enidt· panodoK, 76 r..n.., of COIIIpno;';"', ~ 294 Lli f.tllIq" of tbe petfca rotId· •• p, i2 f·.Mi6< .., clefUlOd, UB-lJO, lU-l"5 few, ud IoQpe, 1811, J
-~

CluUIiaa ' .... the cbatlCtCt trait

"m

OorisIiaaiIr.

1fI. ~ lO;t ~

!!!!.

I ll, 111. IU. In- I%5, 131. 138 ~ i1II ...... loboo. of tloe Lawa,

"'"

.-_1UIicy 01 __ iDerS.. lS'PW ""'-~

00dcI ptOOl. 2tiO-262 Good. ..... Ndoooo, 1!)7 !Q, 299 "'" Greeac, Tho"",,"c M ~ 294 L2. m

Haley, J.,., 196 "_

RolIcn. 299. a..28

Haw:6hao, 151-158, HUod ....... 13.

l\l6 ...a m

H;"ikko, loall." 114, 197 Il4 H,H La, & 62, 1n..2I

....

n.o.....

ud fUr , ]M..192

o.y, SEP, m . 298 ILfi.

. ..;_it, ttl

INDEX

'"

.... ' " • 1.12. lD II.. , -..... order ani;.

. .r.._ . I ..· '

1

•

1. l1J

.a, 22J

of, 195-1915

."'zO*' '"

..

1

M~ "

~"'~""""

_.u- __

01 0rriItia00 ""' o! ., '1. 289

_ , .. ,"tl" 2I)l..;DS H b , HOjII !!. 2!iW., :510 d . 195 "

...

i

"

iM

o.

.-

h'

j

01.

~_

U., In-Of

;'petoriw" IIoypoIMciaol, n42.

....... 1ca1. .4IY2

.",-11;'" H'J(,.\ !I!.

.

01, 116

W" W

NohIoI, Mill.. C. 196 ..., Nell, o-a. 301 L1 l'I'oem
of w.. l!8 cl il'; ~ 0I1lroo poiot If .....

oIcjje~"

_ysc..,. ... _h·

oI lMl, ~

01"

--'"

• •;" ', III

-)'IWY.

1p)r_ li. !7i.l n kiodo 01. !M.. 168

~

,,""'" ,..

.......... !H,!Iri

'Uob

" La.... " . ...

.

lJl. I2S

Mcadrh+a. M_

un : I .,'., 18!9 eepl)'. HI

,

201. ZII7 Ll

M.u.. ctydc I!., 194

2Of-lQ!I

.....

~

L,.a.

-,

. ",.r-•'"

KIM< 01 kIpc. _"od
• Ill-W

hit... ,.,: loot ~ t:z

s.. ~ U2

, ......

... '"

N

....

PIal.., U. IlO, 151, :ill.

~

S - "3' !l-9l. 111 Sri+",9!, IKIoIII. 1~116, IJI

'"

•

,- ~

"

JocI:- 0... 0 196 J_ we.., §!l tN, JIXI L1

•

. .u

".

' OJ',

"E

m..m,

_ ioiu of r.-t'"k'w" -I-"~I '"'-

"'.'''' w....

Pc

".

"

aI:JQ

8.,:510

di

.. ," N

lMd. kIoot. '298 L1

u

fI , , .

,

kIF 0/-6 I

)

' ..

l!

....

Z,

!!!.!.!? l'lD

j6:&, &l

o.;.e,

W'i8ord.

\I .. 0.. ... 1157,

lli. 1'J+.1?l. 196 So!. m

'"

~~

313

I"""

-.

, fi • ~

16. 'J4..&J, :m

"4 " • pocUJ. 289 . -...,ud witIo n!I~

Roo

:z.e.o. ZI6.lL1

faid>, 1tl'l.J()'i .j_~, 23Il

z..q, AnWf, 193

M'. &1

k ..... 8c:rttucI, '1!TI .... ~

000:. . . 28\1, JOI ii.lI:I 5-+5 ' . MOO'tr. ~ 199 a.l 50' .a.~ WoIfl,," 199 a.28

me

••

... _ _ -.nIily. ""'Dr)' a(, 18Q

m·m

».

",1I'. h "l. 16.:Il!. & it ....".bn , .... oho .. """-I ed SIo.oI'I' oI .. ,. T1Ioird EMI 01. 11. m 'h.· ·. J.~ Edpr A. 301 a.Jj

s-..... """- " s., ' . ...... SocnUoo,

~

1!!. t!.

Po 2!M In. m ILlO

lSMIiO, UII.

HI.

'" So
·1.

lsa. 2M.

' "·1 o.l Soc· - - . . I .;u, KMl, •

, ... . .

~

noIcd - . I n.

m 1"Ic ...

at Gnu,

W

_w ..;,. , ., , 6l, lM-Z!IQ, J89 _w F U oC, 6l,Q

VALUE INQUIRY BOOK SERIES

VIIS L Noel Ba1u:r, Tk H . _ lei., u ..

(,0 .....1 Tllilllr.er.

2. Archie J. a.hm. As"*,,,: TItoe SdcIKC

or V.I. n

3. H. P. P. (Hetl1lle) Utter, J ..tl« for •• UIIJUI SlKld)'.

I_

4. H. O. Cal...... )', Coaled for Mea-III, .1141 11.11&1,.: A Critical Stlld7 In PIII.....II)' of Lu....ae.

5. Be njlmin S. LlIlTIZOII. It. H. .IIIH CaN fOf' Mon.l IlIlullroli. 6. JImeS R. WIUO/I, Bdw_ A...::llwib. . .d T ... dllklon: 1"oIt-N'ef'll RtRedlolls 011 IIIe Tali of TIiIlakln,. A ~olwne in H...... &lid Ceud'" Siudles.

7. Robert S. HartmID., .... reedom to Liu: Tile Robert Hart_II StOf"J. edited by ArtIIur R. £IIi.. It. ~otume in Hart_ , ...Itille It.sioIou Stll"" .. Arc_

J. IHhm, EtllIa: "ne Sdrzee of 0.,11111 '35

9. 00;00", o.vid MiliCI", A. Idiot' .....lk t:tllia; Or. tile La.... . cll,,. Eillia. 10. Jtl upb P. DeMIKO, It. Cd Itde

TII'~

In Eillia.

11. Fran k O. Fornsl, V.lueMelrlu: Till SdenCi of Peraoaal Ilid prorculonal EtlllCl, A yo lume in HarlTUn lutltule It.:dolo&J' Stud5H.

Me._,

12. William Gei bel , ne Worid'. Greal Tllillkfl"S.

of LIIe: , ....

,tab

of Ille

'...... r ,..,.'--,..... a..

It",~"

" Pi"' . ' ,.' ... cI' 7'

7

1111'

"

7, . . . . .

,'I . . .,~~. ..

tt' or , 7 P' .....

till>

:

....

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