The Linguistic Aspect of Hume's Method Donald F. Henze Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 30, No. 1. (Jan. - Mar., 1969), pp. 116-126. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-5037%28196901%2F03%2930%3A1%3C116%3ATLAOHM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2 Journal of the History of Ideas is currently published by University of Pennsylvania Press.
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T H E LINGUISTIC ASPECT OF HUME'S METHOD1
There is widespread agreement among contemporary commentators on Hume that he is a philosophical analyst. Likewise, opinion is seemingly unanimous that Hume's brand of philosophical analysis is not linguistic. I agree that Hume is a philosophical analyst, but, against the latter view, I shall argue that he frequently and not inconsequentially employs linguistic methods in his analyses. Typical of the received opinion is Professor Hampshire's judgment in a recent symposium on Hume: Analytical philosophers today look for exactly stated distinctions between one kind of claim t o knowledge and another. They find the sources of metaphysical pretences in the failure to notice a great variety of "grammatical distinctions." Hume dismissed any fine investigation of the meanings of words as of no philosophical i m p ~ r t a n c e . ~ Hampshire gives no references t o support this appraisal, but perhaps he had in mind Humean passages such as the following: Nothing is more usual than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and ~ o n c e r n . ~ It is fortunate, amidst all this seeming perplexity, that the question, being merely verbal, cannot possibly be of any importance. A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter into all those caprices of language which are so variable in different dialects and in different ages of the same dialecL4 There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation, which may be excited, in some degree, by any faculty of the mind, in its perfect state and condition; and to account for this sentiment is the business of Philosophers. It belongs to Grammarians to examine what qualities are entitled to the denomination of virtue. . . .6 Further detailed backing for the view that Hume eschews linguistic analysis is provided by Professor Passmore in his Hume's intention^.^ The 1 Abbreviations used in this paper: D = Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; IHU =Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding; IPM =Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals; T = A Treatise of Human Nature. 2 S. N. Hampshire, "Hume's Place in Philosophy," David Hume, A Symposium, ed. D. F. Pears (London, 1963), 5-6. "urne, "Of Some Verbal Disputes," Appendix IV, IPM, ed. C. W. Hendel (Indianapolis, 1957), 127-128. Ibid., 129-30. Cf. 139. Wume, T, Bk. 111, Pt. iii, sec. 4; ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), 610. J. A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge, 1952); Ch. IV, "The Positivist," esp. 72-74. All quotations from Passmore are from these pages.
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gist of Passmore's argument is that Hume resembles contemporary positivists in many ways but does not share their conviction that philosophical puzzles are about language. For example, Hume says that all questions concerning personal identity are '(grammatical" but contrasts grammatical with philosophical difficulties (see T, I, iv, 6/255, 262). Hume recognizes the prevalence of verbal disputes such as questions of degree, whether two things are very much alike or precisely the same, and those disputes resulting from ambiguity of expression; but Passmore adds: "Such disputes need to be distinguished more carefully than they usually are from philosophical disputes proper . . . but only to that extent is the discussion of such verbal points relevant to philosophy? Again, according to Passmore, Hume's "impulse" in the liberty-versus-necessity dispute is Cartesian with no hint of modern linguistic doctrines. To engage fruitfully in controversy we need "clear ideas"; clear ideas depend upon precise definition. . . . There is nowhere in Hume, then, any suggestion that we can solve philosophical problems by examining or prescribing usages. . . . Hume's positivism, then, is not linguistic. [As for philosophical problems which cannot be solved] . . . we should convert them, on Hume's view, into psychological, not into linguistic, issues. Passmore's outlook is reflected in Professor Zabeeh's book on Hume: "Philosophical issues cannot be easily expressed in ordinary language, since 'cornmon language,' according to Hume [see T, I, iii, 8/105], being crude and vague, is unable to reflect the complexities of life." A similar approach is taken with respect to Hume's moral philosophy by Professor Hendel in the L'Introduction" t o his edition of IPiM: "Hume himself does treat of language, but i t is instrumental, as a means of diagnosis. It is used in order to detect those moral qualities marked 'in common life' as possessing merit or otherwise." After remarking on some of the passages, quoted above, from Appendix IV, "Of Some Verbal Disputes," Hendel concludes : Passmore cites five examples of these three sorts of verbal disputes from Hume's works: "How great was Hannibal?" illustrates the first; the identity of a house after alterations and personal identity the second; liberty versus necessity and "Are talents virtues?" the third. Farhang Zabeeh, Hume, Precursor of Modern Empiricism (The Hague, 1960), 26. Appended to this sentence is an ambiguously phrased footnote: "This opinion of Hume though, is in conflict with the cult of the ordinary language (if such a cult exists). . . ." In using the disparaging word "cult," does Zabeeh mean that his o m statement about philosophical issues and "common language" conflicts with the philosophical views of ordinary-language philosophers, or does he mean that ordinary-language philosophers wrongly look upon Hume as a precursor of ordinarylanguage philosophy? No documentation is offered for the latter reading, and the former suggests that Zabeeh has confused technical with non-ordinary language. Op. cit., the section of Hendel's Introduction: '(On Language and Ethics," xxixxii.
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. . . Surely that philosopher who was professing t o be guided by experience would be the last to deny the possibility of novel insights and therefore the need of further inquiry into the usage of language. Nevertheless, as students of Hume, we are under the scholar's obligation not t o attribute to him interests and theories of ethics which he manifestly did not have. Hume has his eye on the phenomena of character and personal merit, and how men actually judge of these things. The main part of his investigation advances far beyond any study of language and usage. So much for the received opinion. Coupled with the absence in Hume's works of any extended examination of language comparable to that found in, say, Hobbes, Locke, or Berkeley, the case against thinking of Hume as even a sometime linguistic analyst seems hardly worth challenging.1° Nevertheless, I want to challenge it. I hope to show, in Section I1 of this paper, that Hume pays considerable attention to the "grammatical" aspects of a wide variety of philosophical problems and that, despite his own occasional disclaimers, his grammatical observations are philosophically significant. This is not to deny that there are other important aspects of his method, for example, the application of Newtonian methods to the "moral sciences," his utilization of the logical dichotomy "matter of fact or relation of ideas?" and the sometimes psychologically-oriented recommendation to look for the impression from which an idea is derived. Moreover, I want to establish, in Section 111, that Hume's practice is often much closer to linguistic analysis than commentators have been prepared to acknowledge. In sum, then, my contention is that there is a dimension of Hume's philosophical method that has been ignored or, a t least, underemphasized. I hope, in what follows, to throw that dimension into greater relief. The nature of the case to be proved requires that I let Hume speak for himself whenever possible.
A recurrent, striking feature of Hume's method is that, after having examined two seemingly irreconcilable philosophical positions, he often concludes that the disputants are not really disagreeing with each other. It is unimportant whether Hume himself thinks of this conclusion as one of grammar or of philosophy. What is important is that Hume claims to have resolved some major philosophical disputes by attending to the meanings of the key words in those "disputes." ( I shall not consider here whether or not ~ u m e ' salleged reconciliations are acceptable. My concern is with his method, not the correctness of his results.) 10 E.g., Selby-Bigge's "Analytical Index1' to the Treatise. Only a single page reference is listed after "Language." A possible exception is Hume's discussion of abstract ideas (T, I, i, 7 ) , but the stress there is clearly on ideas not words. Hume, of course, implicitly holds an important view about language, via., that logically private languages are the foundation of our public language. On this tangential point, cf. A. G. N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (New York, 1961), Ch. 11; John T. Saunders and Donald F. Henze, The Private-Language Problem (New York, 1967), Ch. I.
The philosophical import of Hume's frequent willingness to classify arguments as "verbal1' may best be understood and appreciated, perhaps, in a context provided by his "Introduction" t o T. There i t is stated that none of the arts and sciences "can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority" (T, xxii). And having seen "that we have arrived a t the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented" (Ibid.). This has special application to Hume himself, considering his "prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles" (Ibid.). What Hume seems to be telling philosophers is this: Instead of taking sides when confronted by a philosophical deadlock-a choice that will almost certainly force one to overstep the "extent of human reason" as established by experience-make a different sort of philosophical move, then "sit down contented." When empirical facts fail to settle a question, in spite of agreement by both parties on substantially all such facts, the dispute is likely to be verbal. But, as Hume's practice illustrates, it takes more than a mere grammarian to point this out and to bring two philosophical factions to the realization that their dispute turns on the meanings of words. Verbal disputes, for Hume, may not count as genuine philosophical arguments, but clearly it takes a philosopher to show this. "Disputes of words" are (often a t least), as Hume says, the province of grammarians, but to call attention to the fact that a dispute is a dispute of words (is verbal/is not real) is the province of philosophers. It is important to remember that these are two different lLprovinces" and that Hume's strictures do not apply t o the latter. Indeed, a rapid survey of particular cases will readily reveal how often he applies himself to that latter task. (1) Liberty versus necessity. Hume's judgment on the clash between libertarians and (hard) determinists is a classic instance of the sort of philosophical move he is so adept a t making. Here we have a long-standing controversy which is a t deadlock: "we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression," "that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words" (IHU, sec. VIII, Pt. 1 ; cf. T, 11, iii, 1/406). Convinced that liberty-versus-necessity is just such a dispute Hume refers to his own effort as "this reconciling project" (IHU, Sect. VIII, Pt. 1).
(2) Philosophical sceptics versus philosophical dogmatists. This dispute is entirely verbal, or a t least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance, which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning. . . . No philosophical dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science: and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolveable. No sceptic denies, that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning with regard to all kind of subject . . ." (D, X I I , 219n).11 l1
References to D cite Part-number and pages in Kemp-Smith's edition.
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If there is a difference between sceptic and dogmatist it is one of attitude. (3) Natural versus non-natural origin of general principles of morals.
"I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal" (T, 111, i, 2/473-74). This is fertile ground for verbal disputes. To reduce the likelihood of their occurrence Hume distinguishes no fewer than five meanings of "nature": that which is opposed to miracle, to the rare and unusual, to artifice as well as to what is rare and unusual, to "civil," or to "moral." (4) The dignity or meanness o f human nature. We find few disputes that are not founded on some ambiguity in the expression; and I am persuaded that the present dispute, concerning the dignity or meanness of human nature, is not more exempt from it than any other ("Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature," par. 3). (5) O n the apparent agreement among critics. "In all matters of opinion and science" it often appears that when men are quarrelling over generals an explanation of terms with reference to particulars will bring agreement. I n matters of taste, however, the apparent, or verbal, agreement on generals gives way "when critics come to particulars . . . and it is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their expressions" ("Of the Standard of Taste," par. 2).
( 6 ) Theist versus atheist. All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and theological enquiries. . . . The remedy lies in clear definitions. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of Ianguage and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. . . . That the dispute concerning theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest enquiry (D, XII, 217-18). The theist allows a great difference between the human and the divine mind; the atheist admits that there is some remote analogy between parts of the world and the human mind. Hence their differences would seem to be ones of attitude.
(7) Interaction versus non-interaction of mind and body. [Either] . . . nothing can be the cause of another, but where the mind can perceive the connexion in its idea of the objects: Or . . . all objects, which we find constantly conjoin'd, are upon that account to be regarded as causes and effects (T, I, iv, 5/248). Restating this point with reference to the disputed question, the inter-
actionist is not affirming anything denied by the non-interactionist. If these disputants can only settle on a common, and correct, meaning of "cause"-Hume is only too willing to offer one (cf. ibid., 250)-then their disagreement is seen to be verbal.
(8) Whether some ideas are innate or none are. This is the same as asking whether all ideas be derived from sensation and reflexion. . . . I hope this clear stating of the question will remove all disput,es concerning it . . . (T, I, i, 1/7; cf. "Abstract" of T, par. 6). For what is meant by "innate"? If "innate" be equivalent to "natural," then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word [cf. (3) above], . . . If by innate we meant contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous . . . (IHU, Sect. 11). (9) Personal identity. The status of this problem is marginal, for Hume holds that some, though not all, disputes about personal identity are verbal. All the questions of personal identity can never be decided; they are (with some qualification) grammatical not philosophical difficulties. Identity depends on a relation of ideas, but such relations "may diminish by insensible degrees," so we have no standard to determine exactly when there is and when there is not identity. All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union . . . (T, I, iv, 6/262; cf. 255). For when identity is incorrectly attributed to "variable or interrupted objects" the error is "attended with a fiction." The variety of philosophical difficulties diagnosed as "verbal" by Hume is impressive, touching as they do upon morals ( 1 4 ) ) criticism (5), theology (6)) psychology (7-9), and science and knowledge (2). The significance, as well as the number, of these difficulties surely establishes that attention to the ambiguities of language in connection with the dissolution of important disagreements among philosophers is a major not an incidental feature of Hume's philosophical method.
I11 Hume's sensitivity to the "common sense" or "common use" of words is nowhere better shown than in his philosophical theology. This is already suggested in I P M (Appendix IV, "Of Some Verbal Disputes") where he notes that theology admits of no terms of composition, but bends every branch of knowledge
to its own purpose without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or to the unbiased sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural course. . . .
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Hume furnishes the particulars for the charge of linguistic warping in the more mature O.Indeed, given the frequency with which he jibs a t talk about God, it is surprising that commentators have not given more attention to this aspect of his examination of natural theology. In his attacks on the alleged analogy between human minds and a divine mind, Hume has Philo observe that words customarily employed in talking of God are ineluctably tied to the human situation. For example: Wisdom, thought, design, knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other conceptions, by which we can express our adoration of him (D, 11, 142). More precisely, in God-talk, words such as those here cited by Hume may retain their honorific use but lose, what Hume calls in another place, their "common signification" (T, I, iii, 11/124). The same holds for All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, [which] have a plain reference to the state and situation of man . . . (D, 111, 156). I n general "our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, successive, and compounded" (D, 111,156-57). Take these away and one takes away human thought. "[It] would, in such a case, be an abuse of terms to apply to i t [viz., to "a supreme existence"] the name of thought or reason" (Ibid.). Even Cleanthes is made to endorse the broad lines of this reasoning:
A mind . . . that is wholly simple, and totally immutable . . . is no mind a t all. It is an abuse of terms to give to it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition (D, IV, 159). Again, Cleanthes suspects "the frequent repetition of the word, infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy . . ." (D, XI, 203; cf. X, 199). Better for both reasoning and religion are "more accurate and more moderate expressions" such as the "terms, admirable, excellent, superlative, great, wise, and holy" (Ibid.). The penultimate paragraph of the essay "Of the Immortality of the Soul" provides a nice r6sum6 of the foregoing points. Hume wonders how we can "prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen?" Responding to his own question he says: "Some new species of logic is requisite for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind, that they may enable us to comprehend that logic." Philosophers as well as theologians are guilty of abusing language. They "talk of any being . . . as endow'd with a power or force, proportionld to any effect"; they "speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are endow'd." Hume's comment upon philosophical appeals to "power" is instructive up to a point: in all these expressions, so apply'd, we have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate ideas.
. . . 'tis more probable, that these expressions do here lose their true meaning by being wrong apply'd, than that they never have any meaning . . . (T, I, iii, 14/162). Unfortunately, Hume, who is still in the grip of a private-referent (or associationist) theory of meaning, wants to pursue the matter by trying to discover "the nature and origin of those ideas, we annex to them [i.e. to "those expression^'^] " (Ibid.) . Inattention to language has also led philosophers t o raise meaningless questions. A good example is the question "whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance." We have no notion of substance "by means of a definition," nor one of inhesion, presumably for the same reason (T, I, iv, 5/234). Related to the foregoing is Hume's contention (against Hobbes?) "that an object may exist, and yet be no where" (Ibid., 235). For example: "A moral reflection cannot be plac'd on the right or on the left hand of a passion, nor can a smell or sound be either of a circular or a square figure" (Ibid.). It must be allowed, however, that his argument here is carried on in the material, not the formal, mode: "These objects and perceptions, so far from requiring any particular place, are absolutely incompatible with it, and even the imagination cannot attribute it to them" (Ibid.). Clearly Hume believes it meaningful (and true) to say that some kinds of "objects" exist but are nowhere, not primarily because of common linguistic usage, however, but because of what we learn by reflecting upon the very ideas and impressions which back up the words for "these objects and perceptions" and give them meaning. This serious limitation on Hume's part is partially offset in a number of instances where he seems to have forgotten or ignored his own theory of language and dealt directly with language and its workings. I n the essay "Of the Standard of Taste" (par. 2) he recognizes what would now be called pro and con uses of words: "There are certain terms in every language which import blame, and others praise. . . ." For example, Hume points out that everyone applauds elegance, propriety, simplicity, and spirit in writing; everyone blames fustian, affectation, coldness, and false brilliancy. I n writing of the words frequently used in expressing taste, Hume remarks that "all men who use the same tongue must agree in their application of them." This hints a t an appeal to somet,hing approaching common usage, but might it be more than a hint? And, if more than a hint, then also more than a stray occurrence of such an appeal? The answer t o both questions is "Yes," as will be borne out if we look a t the pattern that emerges in his discussions of induction and miracle. Hume's scepticis~nregarding the logical justification of induction has a t times been criticized for violating canons of ordinary language. Seriously entertain Hume's demand for a logical justification of inductive inferences, we are told, and one is inexorably drawn into a conceptual maelstrom where the only correct arguments are deductive and knowledge is limited to the immediate awareness of perceptions and t o relations of ideas. Consider, for example, Strawson's anti-Humean outlook: "It is an analytic proposition
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that it is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a statement which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour." l-ome such analytic (or conceptual) truth is required if evidence is ever t o count as inductive evidence. Lacking a criterion for this purpose Hume is led t o ask why we are ever entitled to regard the past as evidence for the future. If Strawson is right about this and other matters bearing on the justification of induction, then it is easy to see where Hume goes wrong. But if Hume makes some sort of mistake when he asks logically odd questions about induction, it. is not a t all clear that his errors result from conceptual muddle and linguistic insensitivity. And if they do so result, it is not clear what those errors are. I n Section X of IHU, "Of Miracles" (which should be read as the con?plement of Section IV, "Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding"), Hume states that conjunctions of events range from the highest certainty to the opposite extreme, and that "A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence." It is true that Hume goes on to assert that such a man expects the event with full assurance and that he regards past experience as full proof of the occurrence of that event, and that the key words (underlined) permit the standard question to be asked: Is the man justified in so expecting and regarding the future to be such and such? All the same, Hume terms the man wise who so proportions his belief, and, presumably, because he is wise, he has such expectations and so regards the future. This seems to run against the argument in IHU, Section IV, but the two sections, it may be argued, are compatible. This may be seen when Hume's discussion of miracles, especially Part I, is read along with that part of T which treats of similar topics, namely "Of the probability of chances" I, iii, 9 ) . Both the section in T and the one in IHU follow discussions of matters of fact and relations of ideas, induction, and belief. I n T Hume acknowledges that as the result of earlier distinctions he has made, we are oblig'd to comprehend all our arguments from causes or effects under the general term of probability. But tho' every one be free to use his terms in what sense he pleases; and accordingly in the precedent part of this discourse, I have follow'd this method of expression; 'tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence" (I, iii, 9/124). Here we have, in one striking passage, an acknowledgment of a deliberate departure from "common discourse" and, in what immediately follows it, a concession to that "common discourse" and the "common signification of words" : One wou'd appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho' 'tis plain we have no further assurance of these facts, than what experience affords us. For this reason, 'twould perhaps be more convenient, in order a t once to preserve the common signification of words, and mark the several degrees of evidence, l2P. F. Strawson, Introduction t o Logical Theory (London, 1952), Ch. 9, Pt. 11, sec. 10, 256.
to distinguish human reason into three kinds, vie. that from knowledge, from proofs, and from probabilities (Ibid.) . An abridged version of this passage also occurs in a footnote a t the start of IHU, Section VI, "Of Probability," in which Hume divides arguments into three sorts "to conform our language more to common use." I cannot pretend to grasp all the implications which these remarks have for a correct interpretation of Hume's thinking about knowledge, induction, and miracles, but I believe that they show minimally that Hume paid heed to ordinary language in the course of philosophizing. I n his discussions of induction, Hume knowingly distorts common usage (in contrast to the warping of language a t the hands of unwitting theologians) in order to bring forcefully to our attention important differences between two kinds of reasoning, "demonstrative" and "moral." It seems to me quite natural that Hume should do this with a problem chiefly of concern to philosophers but should then alter his approach when he turns to the more popular topic of miracles. "Common discourse" will be more appropriate when discussing the latter. There Hume's point, I take it, is that even when we waive the special doubts which arise in connection with all non-demonstrative reasoning, there still remain powerful arguments against belief in miracles. Thus he can "give away" the technical distinctions drawn earlier in T and in I H U , can accede to reason "from proofs, and from probabilities," and still bring out the irrationality of belief in miracles. There are additional examples of Hume's appeal to or acknowledgment of the common sense or common use of words. "Of Relations" begins with the recognition that The word RELATION is commonly used in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one naturally introduces the other . . . ; or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them. I n common language the former is always the sense, in which we use the word, relation; and 'tis only in philosophy, that we extend i t to mean any particular subject of comparison, without a connecting principle (T, I , i, 5 / 1 3 4 ) . Hume does not hesitate to use an ordinary word in a technical sense (which is not identical with using a technical word in its ordinary sense), but as in his treatment of induction and miracles, he knows when he does this, and why. A different and somewhat more negative slant on Hume's regard for common usage is provided by a remark on "imagination." In general we inay observe, that as our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, it resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression i t appears that the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different senses; and tho' nothing be more contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings I have often been oblig'd to fall into it (T, I, iii, 9/117n).
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This disparaging tone is not prevalent throughout his writings, however, as I have already shown. Further examples of Hume's attention to common usage are these: The most common sense of the word "natural" is noted (T, III,i12/474; and see (3) in Section I1 above), and four other senses of the word are given without evident disapproval. In the course of writing "Of Liberty and Necessity," Hume observes not only that few are capable of distinguishing between the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of indifference but that "The first is even the most common sense of the word . . ." (T, II,iii,2/407). Given that Hume's "reconciling project" depends on taking "liberty" in the first sense, it is interesting t o find him invoking "the most common sense of the word" in mild support of his thesis. Finally there is a marginal case from the opening section of T (I,i11/2n). Hume reproaches Locke for having "perverted" the word "idea" from "its original sense," making it stand for all perceptions. Hume allows that his own use of the terms "impression" and "idea" will be different from what is usual, but in view of the subsequent critical reference to Locke I understand him to be saying that he (Hume) is departing from usual philosophical usage and, by restricting the sense of "idea," will restore it to its original sense (identical with ordinary or common sense?). I have no further examples to give in support of my claim that Hume pays more than incidental attention to common usage, although I should not be surprised if others were uncovered. Hume's attitude toward common usage is not uniform, as I have shown, but neither can it be said to manifest itself haphazardly. The balance of cases, in my judgment, favors the interpretation that Hume utilizes linguistic methods in his philosophical analyses. The prevailing opinion of Hume's methods of philosophizing therefore requires modification. San Fernando Valley State College, California.
