The Legacy of Supranationalism

The Legacy of Supranationalism Paul Close

The Legacy of Supranationalism

Also by Paul Close FAMILY AND ECONOMY IN MODERN SOCIETY (co-editor with Rosemary Collins) FAMILY DIVISIONS AND INEQUALITIES IN MODERN SOCIETY (editor) THE STATE AND CARING (editor) CITIZENSHIP, EUROPE AND CHANGE SUPRANATIONALISM IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (with Emiko Ohki-Close)

The Legacy of Supranationalism Paul Close Senior Lecturer in European Policy Leeds Metropolitan University

First published in Great Britain 2000 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–65174–X First published in the United States of America 2000 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, LLC, Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–23524–0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Close, Paul. The legacy of supranationalism / Paul Close. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–23524–0 1. International relations. 2. Supranationalism. I. Title. JZ1242 .C58 2000 321'.04—dc21 00–036899 © Paul Close 2000 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 09

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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To the memory of Derek Allcorn and Paul Stirling

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Contents viii

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgements Introduction

1

1 Prospects

7

2 Alignments

29

3 Political Economy

53

4 Europe and Beyond

82

5 Europe, Globalisation and the Asia Pacific

135

Notes

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Bibliography

236

Index

249

vii

List of Tables 1.1 National Identity and Britain’s Relationship with the EU

22

1.2 Opinions About Britain’s Links with the EU, 1994–95

23

2.1 UK General Election Statistics, 1992 and 1997

39

2.2 European Parliament Election, June 1999, UK Voter Turnout

41

2.3 European Parliament Election, June 1999, EU-wide Voter Turnout

41

3.1 Basic Statistics of the EU, 1989: a Comparative View

58

3.2 Eurobarometer Poll Results, mid-1999

66

3.3 Global Competitiveness Rankings, 1998 and 1999

71

4.1 Council Votes, Commissioners and MEPs by EU Member State

87

5.1 Development Indices of European Countries

157

5.2 Development Indices of East Asian Countries

158

viii

Acknowledgements I am grateful for the help of Emiko and Amber Kimi, John Brennan, Rosemary Collins, David Leckie, Tony Pointon, Edward Reed and Gwen Wallace.

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Introduction

A [ . . . ] positive legacy of World War II was the determination of some far-sighted statesmen to minimize further conflict by welding firm economic links between formerly combatant countries. This initiative led eventually to today’s European Community, an association of states which, despite numerous problems, has evolved into one of the world’s most important socio-economic groupings. But the European Community is about political as well as economic union. In 1992, the year of the so-called ‘Single Market’, a reform programme was initiated to expand the EC’s decision-making powers, enabling the member states to act as one in many political and social as well as financial areas. (Beazley, 1992, p. 10) Created from the ruins of World War II, the European Community’s goal is to bring about peace and prosperity for its citizens in the framework of an ever-closer union. This process is a gradual one with economic, political and social dimensions. (European Commission, 1993, p. 2) These two extracts usefully summarise the origins of the European Union and its gradual progress as what I will refer to as a supranational regional regime (SRR) during the second half of the twentieth century. This book is partly about this development, while also being about the ideational, or ideological, underpinnings and motivation involved. That is, it is about supranationalism, a doctrine which was by the end of the century far from being confined to Europe. In previous writings (Close, 1997a, 1997b; Close and Ohki-Close, 1996/7, 1999), I have argued that the EU’s supranational progress, geo-political expansion and gathering participation in pan-European governance can only be understood in terms (a) the EU’s status, roles and relationships as a global player; (b) the EU’s circumstances within an encompassing global (economic, political, cultural) system, and accordingly within various enveloping global conditions, processes and trends; (c) the way the EU as 1

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

a supranational regional organisation, or regime, is caught up in a global trend entailing the multiplication of SRRs, and connectedly the search for ‘supranational solutions’ to such ‘problems’ as global order–disorder, global stability and global governance; and (d) the particular ‘problems’ of global order–disorder, stability and governance associated with the post-Cold War new world order, or geo-political power configuration. Other, at least emerging or embryonic, prospective or proto-SRRs include the North American Free Trade Agreement/Area (NAFTA), Mercosur (in South America), the Andean Community, the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Union, and the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) or Area (EAEA). For instance, the EU’s programme of geo-political expansion and governance in relation to eastern Europe (central and east European countries of the former Eastern bloc or Soviet empire), including by way of the European (Association) Agreements, can only be understood in terms of (a) the EU’s political (linked to its economic) considerations and concerns, and so of the EU’s political interests and advantages in maintaining and manipulating extra-EU zones of geo-politicial management; and (b) the EU’s global circumstances whereby, apart from anything else, the EU is being increasingly confronted by other regional regimes, some of which qualify as proto-SRRs. When or whether the EU expands eastwards by absorbing the Visegrad Four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), for example, will depend on the perceived (by the EU) geo-political benefits of this move compared with the (‘functional’) advantages of holding these countries in an extra-EU zone of governance; a zone which, after all, while being geopolitically managed (partially manipulated and governed) by the EU, is occupied by countries that play no direct part in those EU institutions and decision-making procedures through which this governance is exercised. When or whether the EU decides to fully embrace the Visegrad Four will depend on the EU’s assessment of the geo-political and economic consequences and benefits to itself of transferring the countries involved from an extra-EU zone of goverance in which these countries are subjected to – while being if not quite non-paticipants, then at least heavily circumscribed and weak participants in – the EU’s self-interested geo-political decisions and manipulation, management and control. When or whether the Visegrad Four are admitted to the EU will depend not just on economic considerations, and certainly not just on the Four’s attempts and achievements vis-à-vis meeting various economic and other entry conditions. Continuing to hold these countries in an extra-EU zone of governance may be regarded by the EU as ‘functionally’ advantageous on political grounds, with at the same time economic ramifications and advantages (for the EU). Thus, any extra-EU zone of governance may bring a ‘politically manipulable’ market with various trade and other economic ‘functional’ (or sectoral) attractions. But, this aside, the same zone may also provide what is

Introduction

3

judged by the EU to be a useful, even necessary, peripheral (or penumbral) geo-political defensive bulwark and supporting buttress in relation to somewhat more distant geo-political arenas – including, for instance, ones regarded as sources of unwanted external migratory pressures on the EU. On the other hand, any decision by the EU to allow these countries into the core-zone (or umbral-zone) of pan-European governance – that zone within which countries do enjoy direct participation in such governance – will depend on two considerations. First, it will depend on the EU being able to satisfactorily reconstruct what it regards as its ‘functional’ (useful, necessary) external zones of governance. Other current, emerging or prospective extra-EU zones of geo-political management include those corresponding to the European Economic Area (EEA), the non-EU countries in this zone being Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; that or those occupied by eastern European countries which have not yet secured European (Association) Agreements, but have signed other types of agreement, including ‘Partnership Agreements’ (Russia, the Ukraine); and that or those which take in various Mediterranean, north African and Middle East countries. Thus, the EU has Association Agreements with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; and has Co-operation Agreements with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (Maghreb countries), Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Mashraq countries) and Israel. But second, any decision by the EU to allow one or more of the Visegrad Four (or any other countries) into the inner-zone of pan-European governance will depend on global circumstances, conditions and concerns, such as those stemming from the emergence, evolution and expansion of competing regional blocs, organisations or regimes, perhaps especially the proto-SRR ones. Any decision by the EU to admit one or more of the Visegrad Four as full Member States will depend in part on the evolution of other regional regimes as global players; and in this regard on the competition brought by or the threat felt from such organisations with regard to not only, or purely, economic objectives, but also geo-political matters. To my mind, increasingly at the forefront of the EU’s geo-political interests considerations and concerns are those associated specifically with the post-Cold War, new world order (NWO) configuration of geo-political power and global governance; and, relatedly, with what have appeared as post-Cold War order–disorder, stability and governance ‘problems’. Of course, the EU’s NWO-related geo-political activities – such as those whereby it engages in the construction and reconstruction and the management and manipulation of its external zones of governance; and connectedly, whereby it could expand its full membership in an easterly direction – can be assumed to be largely shaped or determined by its economic objectives. Nonetheless, for me, the EU still has a distinct and important (for itself, for Europe as a whole, for the global system, and the new world order) geopolitical agenda entailing external and, indeed, pan-European – not to mention global – governance. For me, this agenda and its link with not only the EU’s economic objectives, but also with the EU’s

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status, roles and relationships as a global player within the NWO are worth exploring without any firm theoretical bias (especially of the reductionist variety), the goal being to contribute to both theoretical discourses and policy programmes. What might be referred to as the global perspective on European integration is widely acknowledged (if not equally pursued in a rigorous manner) among scholars, politicians, journalists and others. Reporting on the build-up to the November 1996 European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgement in the dispute between the European Commission and the UK government over the Working Hours Directive, Hugo Young explains that at ‘one level, this is a technical dispute about the nature of EU law: is it legal for the Commission to impose the 48-hour-week directive under the heading of health and safety, thus evading the exemption Britain thought [it] had secured from such horrors [sic] by opting out of the social chapter provisions at Maastricht?’ Young adds: ‘At the bottom of the judgement is an argument about the nature of work, the role of regulation, the effect of global competition, the very future of European societies’ (Young, 12 November 1996). Increasingly the ‘global competition’ faced by the EU is from other regional regimes, and crucially from proto-SRRs, the effect being to boost the EU’s incentive to acquire greater global strength, or clout, by way of further integration, something which in turn means adopting one or both of two strategies: (a) deepening, institutionally and supranationally; (b) expanding. But, although the latter strategy is perhaps most obviously manifested in the EU’s inclusion of more (full) Member States, for me it has an additional manifestation – that whereby the EU expands its external geo-political management. Accordingly, the task the EU then faces is that of balancing these two methods of expansion with the aim of realising as far as possible its (the EU’s) realist, self-centred and self-interested (economic, political) objectives, given its global circumstances, characterised as these are by the evolution of a new world order configuration of geo-political players in which regional regimes, prote-SRRs and SRRS are becoming more common and increasingly prominent. The extra-EU zones of pan-European governance, as well as those already mentioned, include one or more rooted in the Council of Europe (CE). In this regard, it is instructive to refer to two pertinent articles which appeared in The Guardian newspaper during October 1996. First: The [EU] has told Croatia it cannot expect privileged economic trading links unless there are improvements in its record of democracy and human rights. A senior Croatian government delegation sent to Brussels this week to plead for closer relations has been told that Zagreb must first fully co-operate with the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague, cease interfering with the independent media and recognise the rights of its political opposition. However, Croatia’s diplomatic campaign to improve

Introduction

5

its relations with western Europe may be given further momentum today, if the 39-member [CE] admits it as a member. (Palmer, 1996c) Subsequently, Croatia succeeded in joining the Council of Europe, as the second October 1996 article confirms: ‘The admission of Croatia to the Western European club [the CE] as its fortieth member was agreed last week. But it confers a cloak of respectability on the country – very much the victor in the Balkan War – which may believe it does not deserve’ (Seacombe, 20 October 1996). Mark Seacombe expands on his latter assertion by telling us that even though ‘Croatia is now subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights’, back ‘in The Hague, they are worried that Croatia has ignored an international warrant for the arrest of an indicted war criminal, Dario Kordic, now living openly in the capital, Zagreb’ (ibid.). Accordingly, human rights activists in Croatia ‘will not be reassured to learn [that their] country has been admitted to the Council of Europe, whose aim is to protect human rights. [They know that] the pledges of President Franjo Tudjman’s Ministers to the Council, ante-room to the European Union, are worthless’ (ibid.). Seacombe’s representation of the CE as an ante-room to the EU is empirically well-founded and analytically useful; and connectedly, is consistent with the idea that the CE constitutes a zone of EU pan-European governance. Many, most or all of the CE member countries that are not yet EU Member States are eagerly queuing to join the EU as quickly as possible. This both helps to explain why these countries are also keen to become membes of the CE and, relatedly, means that these countries are highly vulnerable to the exigencies of the EU’s pan-European governance (or, more specifically, of the EU’s supranational engagement in such governance). The strong desire and single-minded conviction displayed by the governments of these countries to join the EU (via the CE) means that they are highly susceptible to fully complying with the terms and conditions which are being decided and demanded (essentially dictated) by the EU for the admission of new Member States – terms and conditions which are, moreover, contingent upon the EU’s strategies for competing within the new world order. With these points in mind, a possible lesson arising out of the inclusion of Croatia in the Council of Europe in spite of its doubtful human rights record is the prospect that – while it could suit the EU to manage and manipulate the human rights activities of its non-members by getting them to meet tough demands vis-à-vis such activities (including by demanding that these countries unreservedly comply with the European Convention on Human Rights) prior to their admission as full EU Member States – it could be acceptable to the EU for it to admit further countries in spite of their miscreant human rights activities. The EU could choose to admit further countries not so much on the basis of their human rights record, as on its (the EU’s) economic and political objectives and global strategies, these being, for

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me, increasingly conditioned, constrained and compromised by growing competition the EU is facing from other regional blocs, regimes and organisations, among which are several proto-SRRs. The case of the Council of Europe and Croatia – a case in which (a) the CE has accepted Croatia as a member; (b) the geo-political relationship between the CE and the EU is reflected; and (c) attention is drawn to the way the CE, at least in effect, operates (or ‘functions’) on behalf of the EU vis-à-vis its (the EU’s) engagement in pan-European governance – is illustrative of more inclusive, European-wide events, processes and trends. At the same time, the case brings to mind the question of the extent to which the EU’s governance, including its external governance, and expansion (by means of both its acceptance of new full Member States and its engagement in pan-European manipulation through the construction and reconstruction of zones of geo-political management) can be understood in terms of the EU’s global circumstances. The latter are ones in which regional regimes, the most advanced of which is the EU, are playing increasingly prominent parts in the pattern of global governance and the global configuration of geo-political players. There is a global trend underway which entails the proliferation and consolidation of regional regimes, a trend fuelled to a considerable degree by exigencies stemming from the competitive interplay and struggle, competition and conflict among regional regimes, and otherwise spurred by a range of concurrent global events, processes and developments, including those associated with globalisation. For me, finally here, while the driving forces and shaping factors by which we can analyse and make sense of the progress of the EU are similarly applicable to the study of other regional regimes, this is not to infer that the circumstances and characteristics of the EU and these other proto-SRRs are identical. There will be an interplay between global similarities and local differences, the result being a spectrum of SRRs among which there will be a complex network of relationships. Hence, the starting assumption behind The Legacy of Supranationalism.

1 Prospects

It was Immanuel Kant who pointed out, in 1795, that the global community had shrunk to the point at which ‘a right violated anywhere is felt everywhere’. He advocated a permanent peace treaty among states [sic] combined with what he called ‘cosmopolitan right’, which would override the claims of state sovereignty. The world is much closer to the Kantian vision now. Wars between states or national armies are becoming an anachronism. This is because of global interdependence, including transnational ties at a military level, alliances, military assistance, or joint peace-keeping operations, and because of the emergence of international norms, expressed in declarations and treaties, that prohibit aggression. The new wars, such as those in Bosnia [and] Kosovo [are] global wars. They are wars that arise in the context of globalisation, and they are often characterised by an array of global connections – transnational criminals, diaspora, foreign mercenaries, media, and international governmental and non-governmental organisations [ . . . ]. The new wars violate [ . . . ] the growing body of law on human rights. The international community [intervenes in response to and to prevent] this kind of violence. Sovereignty is less absolute than in earlier times. Just as we now consider it right to intervene in families to prevent domestic violence, so it has become normal to override state sovereignty in cases of large-scale violations of human rights [ . . . ]. The new violence is [ . . . ] global: it does not respect borders. It spreads through criminal networks, refugees, and the virus of extreme nationalism. A Kantian set of global arrangements may be the only way to avoid a grim future. (Kaldor, 18 July 1999) There is much in this extract from Mary Kaldor’s article which is either contentious or uncertain and unconvincing (including some terms, concepts and meanings), but there is no doubt that in effect she is advocating the creation of supranational organisations, in particular ones with global scope. In 7

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

the name of Immanuel Kant, in support of the global enjoyment of human rights (by ‘the individual human being’), and in view of the character and consequences of globalisation, she appears to be firmly embracing the cause of supranationalism. Many decades after Kant (the eighteenth-century German philosopher) wrote Perpetual Peace (1795),1 one of Europe’s most eminent twentieth-century political leaders, Charles de Gaulle, sketched his notion of supranationalism, albeit while contemptuously rejecting the doctrine: it might have been thought that after the [Second World War] was over, those who claimed to lead public opinion would be less inclined to subordination. Far from it: for the leading school of thought in each political party [in France], national self-effacement had become an established and flaunted doctrine. [All] the old party formations professed the doctrine of ‘supranationalism’, in other words France’s submission to a law that was not [its] own. Hence the support for ‘Europe’ seen as an edifice in which technocrats forming an ‘executive’ and parliamentarians assuming legislative powers – the great majority of both being foreigners – would have the authority to decide the fate of the French people [ . . . ]. Hence, [in other words], the eagerness to submit the acts of our [nation-state] government to the approval of [an organisation] in which, under a semblance of collective deliberation, the authority of the protector reigned supreme in [various fields and prospectively] every field, whether political, military, economic, technical or monetary. (de Gaulle, 1994, p. 30) The doctrine, theory and practice of supranationalism have their origins in Europe,2 where their greatest legacy is the European Union, the first and still the clearest and most prominent example of a supranational regional regime (SRR)3 on the world stage. But, in the wake of the post-Second World War European integration process, entailing the 1990s’ emergence and evolution of the EU, it is evident that the legacy has begun to reach far further. Thus, many regional bodies with supranational aims, pretentions or prospects have been established; and, moreover, several global ones with similar attributes have emerged or have been proposed, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation (WTO): Although the WTO came into existence only in the mid-1990s, the multilateral trading system on which it is based is considerably older, and eight separate rounds of international negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have progressively abolished tariffs and other trade barriers over the last 50 years. The European Union played a major role during the eight years of negotiations, which eventually led to the establishment on 1 January 1995 of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) [ . . . ]. With most countries as members, the WTO is the only

Prospects

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international body policing trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights between countries [ . . . ]. For the WTO’s international rules to be really effective and to prevent them being undermined, they need to apply to as many participants as possible. As a result the Union is keen to encourage countries to join – and is actively helping major international players such as China and Russia to prepare for WTO entry – provided they meet the basic requirements. These include the existence of a liberal trade and investment regime with market access commitments, liberalisation of the service sector, protection of intellectual property rights, harmonisation of standards and certification systems, and efficient customs procedures at borders. (European Commission, January 1999c, pp. 4–5) But, the Commission adds: There is little point in having international rules if there is no procedure for settling disputes which might arise. One of the key features of the WTO is that it operates an effective dispute settlement system [ . . . ]. The Union is a strong supporter of the multilateral mechanism to deal with perceived violations instead of allowing governments to resort to unilateral action. During negotiations on the WTO, the European Union worked hard to ensure that the system would cover all disputes under any agreement in the WTO framework, that its use would be compulsory and that no single country on its own could prevent an allegation being investigated. Where possible, disputes are settled ‘out of court’ [ . . . ]. If, however, this fails, a panel of experts is established to examine the facts of the case and a ruling may emerge within a year. Since the WTO was created, the European Union has gradually tended to bring more cases than it is called on to defend. In 1995 it was a complainant on three occasions and a defendant on 10. In 1997, it introduced 21 cases and defended 13. (European Commission, January 1999c, pp. 6–7) Of note here is how, even though technically only individual nation-states can be members of the WTO, it is the EU which is being presented as the global player, and the EU as the WTO participant, negotiator, litigant and so on. The role of the EU, and more specifically of the European Commission on behalf of the EU and its Member States, in negotiations under the auspices of the WTO is reflected in the following: thoughts are [ . . . ] turning to the next round of [trade] liberalisation talks. Under the WTO’s agreed work programme, negotiations on agriculture and services must begin by 1 January 2000. The European Commission, with the full support of EU [Member State] governments, would like to go considerably further and see WTO members undertake a more ambitious set of negotiations [ . . . ]. [The] EU is maintaining that the next round of

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negotiations should include [ . . . ] public procurement and investment and the complex relationship between trade, competition and environment. (European Commission, January 1999c, pp. 8–9) In a manner consistent with the EU’s approach, the UK government’s trade minister, Brian Wilson: stood up and said what other government officials [in the EU and] around the world are afraid to say: that the principles behind the Multilateral Agreement on Investment – which collapsed [in 1998] amid huge opposition from non-governmental organisations [NGOs] – should be enshrined in [the next] treaty to be negotiated [through] the World Trade Organisation [ . . . ]. As last year’s events showed, the idea of a rulebook for cross-border investment arouses strong emotions among NGOs, [but the] victims are the developing countries and small and medium-sized businesses. Without a rulebook the former are unable to offer the assurances needed to prise open the multinationals’ wallets. The latter simply lack the muscle to strike the deals the big boys enjoy as a matter of routine. That is not to say the MAI was the right vehicle to level the playing field between rich and poor [countries], or between large and small firms. It was too strong on investors’ rights and too weak on their responsibilities to the host [country]. (Atkinson, 7 June 1999) What Mark Atkinson is singling out here as the main drawback of the failed MAI, leading to its abandonment, is then the focus of the following vigorous attack: Some developments in the course of history have such a potential to impact [sic] nations and humans that it would be irresponsible to ignore them. Yet few mainstream news organisations have reported on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), an international agreement [or, more accurately, proposal] which would set in place a vast series of protections for foreign investment. According to reports in the alternative press, the MAI would threaten [nation-state] sovereignty by giving corporations near-equal rights [with nation-states]. This [proposal] has the potential to place profits ahead of human rights and social justice. MAI would thrust the world economy much closer to a system where international corporate capital would hold free reign over the democratic values and the socioeconomic needs of people. The MAI [would] also have devastating effects on a [nation-state’s] legal, environmental and cultural sovereignty. (The Editor, 23 July 1999, p. 12) In spite of this argument, Mark Atkinson urges against ‘giving up on the idea of an investment treaty’, especially one that has ‘the appropriate safeguards

Prospects

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for labour and the environment’ (Atkinson, 7 June 1999). If the next WTO treaty falls short of being ‘a comprehensive agenda that encompasses investment’, then ‘the losses are likely to be incurred by [the] global constituency [which is made up of] the impoverished millions in the developing world’, precisely those people who are supposedly being defended by ‘the MAI’s most vocal opponents’ (ibid.). Whatever happens with the MAI, the next WTO treaty and the WTO itself, at stake is sovereignty, and especially the locations, divisions and distributions of sovereignty. The possibilities include that of sovereignty being increasingly syphoned off, away from people, nations and the nationstate to organisations with global scope, and more precisely to the supranational – or, at least for the time being, to the proto-supranational – global level as represented by the WTO. For many, as indicated above, the issues, problems and arguments then centre on such questions as ‘who, or what, would benefit?’4 For me, the arguments about the MAI and the WTO are a feature of the legacy of supranationalism. This book, at the risk of over-stretching the point, is itself part of the legacy of supranationalism, as is the rapidly expanding array of books on European integration and the European Union. But this book, like its forerunner Supranationalism in the New World Order (1999), is not confined to an examination of the European case. An orienting assumption is that the global system is on the cusp of a new world era, in part under the influence of globalisation and in part because of the end of the Cold War (and so the advent of the so-called new world order).5 A lot has been written on the possibility of globalisation undermining and weakening, threatening and destroying the nation-state,6 and The Legacy of Supranationalism is rooted in an acceptance of this possibility, at least in so far as it is about the demise of a particular social form: the post-feudal, or modern, sovereign nation-state, associated as this is with the rise, success and widely trumpeted triumph of capitalism: The Cold War was over, no one threatened the security of the United States, indeed the Gulf War of 1990–91 made the United States and Russia virtual allies. All the great ‘isms’ of the twentieth century against which the United States had fought – colonialism, fascism, Communism – had been defeated. This represented what Francis Fukuyama [ . . . ] called ‘the end of History’. Fukuyama postulated that the collapse of communism meant that liberal democracy had been proved superior to all its competitors. Everyone had not gotten [sic] there yet, but everyone strove for a democratic political system and a market economy. This meant the end of history, in the sense of searching for the best system. It also meant, Fukuyama indicated, the end of large-scale war. (Ambrose, 1993, p. 374)7 Perhaps! But, apart from the plethora of small-scale wars – which for Mary Kaldor are nevertheless ‘global wars’ (Kaldor, 18 July 1999) – the global system

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is far from free of all ‘isms’ other than capitalism and liberalism: other than, that is, those doctrines which underpin, respectively, market capitalism (the economic system) and liberal democracy (the political system).8 Moreover, while the other ‘isms’ may not present alternatives to – that is, challenges to the domination of – market capitalism and liberal democracy, they could be a source of impediments to the latter’s progress and, connectedly, of the persistence of serious local, regional and global conflicts. These ‘isms’ include supranationalism, especially in so far as this is tied in practice to regionalism and protectionism (as inferred by the use of the notion ‘Fortress Europe’, for example; see Close 1995a; Close and Ohki-Close, 1999). Following Kaldor, the solution – if this is what is sought – is to be found in the creation of supranational global regimes (SGRs) to which local and regional geopolitical entities would defer. However, while the doctrine, theory and practice of supranationalism have their origins in Europe, where their greatest legacy is the European Union, still the most prominent example of a supranational regime of any kind at any level, and while it is evident that the legacy has begun to reach further afield, there remain among the people of Europe degrees of antipathy towards supranationalism, and especially to its practical manifestation in the EU’s progress as an SRR. In the UK: The Conservative party today [ . . . ] have committed themselves to a nationalistic, anti-European line [ . . . ]. The leading pro-Europeans within the Conservative party are now taking cover behind the non-credible pretence that the single currency will play no part in this week’s European [Parliament] elections; and that they must rally behind the leader until the election is over; and thereafter no doubt until the general election is over; at which point they will come bounding out of the bushes to proclaim their support for a single currency in the all-party referendum campaign. In the meantime the Conservative party will have fought the European Parliament election almost entirely under the banner of ‘Save the Pound’, and a pretty similar slogan for the general election, accompanied with a lot of boasting about wielding the national veto (as if we were the only member state to possess this virility symbol) or, more incredibly still, undertaking to obey only those rules which suit us [ . . . ]. Frankly this will not do. The experience of the last 10 years has shown that, for the Eurosceptics, loyalty is a one-way street; something you demand but do not give. They [ . . . ] now [ . . . ] command the majority in the rump to which their antics have reduced the Conservative [Party]. It [is] time [ . . . ] for all those who want to restore a broad church Conservative [Party] to stand up and be counted [ . . . But], all the signs are of pro-Europeans and one-nation Conservatives cowering behind the flimsy fence of party loyalty [. . . ]. It is no longer realistic to hope that reform will come from inside the party [ . . . ] led [by William Hague]. It will have to come from those who are bold enough to make a break;

Prospects

13

from those who still regard themselves as Conservatives; who have, indeed, a better title to the name than the coalition of right-wing nationalists and authoritarians who have now usurped control of this once great party. (Meyer, 8 June 1999)9 A week before the June 1999 European Parliament election began, William Hague, the Conservative Party leader, delivered a speech in which he distanced himself from what he inferred was the supranationalism of other politicians in Britain and across Europe, while at the same time lending his support to (rather than actually initiating) an intriguing proposal about the future course of Europe within the global system: The European Union should begin talks with the North Atlantic Free Trade Areas (Nafta) [sic] about creating a transatlantic free trade area, William Hague, the Conservative [Party] leader, said yesterday [ . . . ]. Setting out a five-point programme to create a free-enterprise Europe rather than rush into further political and economic integration, Mr Hague said the goal should be global free trade by 2020. Speaking at the annual conference of the British Chambers of Commerce in Glasgow, Mr Hague also urged the EU to promote a pan-European free trade area for members, associate members and non-members by 2010. Some Conservatives have suggested Britain leave the EU and join Nafta but Mr Hague said the creation of a transatlantic free trade area should be a priority as a prelude to establishing free trade. He told delegates [that] a more flexible Europe should sweep away regulations restricting the single market and promote tax competition rather than tax harmonisation as covertly pursued by [the] Labour [Party] and actively espoused by [certain] European politicians. (Gowe, 5 June 1999) Of course, the reference at the start of this extract to ‘the North Atlantic Free Trade Areas’ should be to the North American Free Trade Agreement. This error aside, however, David Gowe’s report on William Hague’s speech10 not only raises the possibility of an alternative to the advance of supranationalism in Europe and the global system, but also brings to mind a prospective feature of this very advance – that of arrangements, agreements and alliances between SRRs, perhaps among other geo-political players, within a global system that will increasingly operate under the auspices of SGRs. Gowe’s report draws attention to a number of themes and issues of The Legacy of Supranationalism: 1. the process of European integration by way of the evolution of the European Union; 2. differential sectoral integration within the EU, whereby economic integration and political integration, for instance, are distinguishable and can proceed at different rates;

14

The Legacy of Supranationalism

3. differential sub-sectoral integration, whereby within the economic sector, for example, the process can occur in several ways – through the development of free trade, of a single market, of economic and monetary union (EMU), of a single currency (the euro), of ‘tax harmonisation’11 and so on; 4. the relationship between economic and political integration, along with the relationships between integration in these sectors and other possible areas, including ‘the social’ (covering social welfare, rights and responsibilities inter alia) and ‘defence and security’;12 5. the extent to which sectors, dimensions or types of integration are merely conceptually and analytically distinguishable from each other or, in addition, the extent to which they are empirically (concretely, observably, experientially) separate; 6. the distinctions and relationships between (a) the sectoral spread of integration,13 (b) the institutional deepening of the process, and (c) the geo-political expansion of the EU as an overall organisation; 7. the relationship between the character and progress of the organisation (or regime), on the one hand, and the organisation’s various constituent elements (its Member States and so on), on the other; 8. the organisation’s external relations; 9. the relations between the EU and similar regional organisations, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (or Area); 10. the relationship between the EU and the process of European integration, on the one hand, and global system events, processes and developments, on the other; 11. the relationship between the (regional) EU and global forms, such as the UN and the WTO; 12. the legacy of supranationalism – of the doctrine which favours the transfer of nation-state sovereignty to encompassing, overarching and supranational regimes: to, that is, SRRs and SGRs. But, let us be clear from the outset about SRRs: 1. while supranational regional regimes are not nation-states, there are no grounds for asserting that an SRR could not become (like) a nation-state; 2. an SRR will be neither a unitary nation-state nor a federal nation-state (see Padfield and Byrne, 1990, p. 3); 3. an SRR will not be a federal nation-state (a federation), but there are no grounds for claiming that an SRR could not become a federation; 4. by definition, an SRR will necessarily subsume nation-states (whether unitary like the UK or federal like Germany) in that it will necessarily entail institutions – such as a court, a legislature (a parliament) and an executive (a government) – which are constitutionally superior to the participating nation-states (the Member States) and their institutions;

Prospects

15

5. an SRR entails institutions which are constitutionally supreme in relation to its Member States, their institutions and their nationals (see Close, 1995a); 6. an SRR is not merely an instance or type of international (or intergovernmental) organisation, because whereas in the latter the nationstates involved will not have transferred (any of) their sovereignty to the organisation itself, in an SRR the Member States will necessarily (by definition) have done so; 7. a supranational global regime (SGR) has the attributes of an SRR, but rather than being confined (as is an SRR) to a particular geo-political region (such as western Europe; Europe as a whole; North America, to which NAFTA relates; or south-east Asia, as covered by ASEAN), it exists and operates world-wide; 8. SGRs will have global reach, and so will embrace – even though they may not be equally endorsed by – all geo-political players (nation-states, regional regimes, proto-SRRS, SRRs); 9. SGRs will increasingly accumulate sovereignty, to be exercised in a ‘topdown’ (Atkinson, 7 June 1999), or hierarchical, fashion over SRRs and other geo-political entities, corporations, nations, people and any other players within the global system. The Legacy of Supranationalism is about the character, progress and patterns of SSRs and SGRs within the new world order global system. Behind these particular NWO features and developments is then that ideational, or ideological, driving force which I (among many others) choose to call supranationalism. This choice of term may be regarded as self-evidently (semantically) reasonable, but – as with ‘supranational regional regime’ – it is useful to provide some initial clarification. In the spring of 1997, an investigation of Racism and Xenophobia in Europe was conducted on behalf of the European Commission, marking ‘1997 European Year Against Racism’ (European Commission, 1998; see also Bates, 25 March 1998): [An] opinion poll was carried out between 26 March and 29 April 1997 in the fifteen Member States [of the EU] at the request of the Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs Directorate General (DGV) of the European Commission within the framework of Eurobarometer 47.1. It involved 16,154 people [ . . . ]. The last poll of this kind was taken in 1988. (European Commission, 1998, p. 2) The resulting report tells us: No definition of the concept of racism was given in the survey. The term was used in its widest sense to describe a process of prejudice that leads to individuals and groups being stigmatised, discriminated against and con-

16

The Legacy of Supranationalism

sidered inferior because of the particular characteristics of their group. As such, the term encompasses racist but also xenophobic attitudes. (European Commission, 1998, p. 6) The term ‘xenophobia’ is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English as ‘a deep dislike of foreigners’ (1990, p. 1418). This phenomenon was one of those addressed by Lizanne Dowds and Ken Young in their examination of ‘national identity’ in the thirteenth British Social Attitudes survey report published in 1996 (Dowds and Young, 1996; Jowell et al., 1996). Their analysis and interpretation of the British Social Attitudes survey data entailed using and clarifying the notion of ‘nationalism’, and in doing so distinguishing between: its [ . . . ] ‘inclusive’ aspects (pride in the nation, in its achievements and institutions, readiness to admit others to the national community) [and its] ‘exclusive’ aspects (bellicose perceptions of outsiders, unease in the face of difference, unwillingness to grant entry or concede assimilation). Both rest on the recognition of difference, on a clear distinction between what is British and what is not (Parekh, 1994). But they come at it from very different directions with [ . . . ] exclusive nationalism placing stronger emphasis on the maintenance of boundaries and national autonomy. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 143) It follows for Dowds and Young that there is an ‘inclusive version of nationalism’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 143) which can be contrasted with ‘exclusive nationalism’ (ibid., p. 146), where the former ‘may be said to encompass two distinct elements: pride in national heritage and culture; and pride in the way the nation functions both at home and in the wider world’ (ibid., p. 143). Dowds and Young present figures which show that: the majority of people in Britain are distinctly proud of their heritage and culture. Over 80 per cent of English, Scottish and Welsh respondents feel proud of their history and proud of the armed forces. There is little evidence [ . . . ] of a rejection of ‘British’ identity among Scottish and Welsh respondents and the level of enthusiasm is, perhaps surprising given not only the much quoted [general] cynicism of the 1990s, but also the rising popularity of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales. However, while the English, Scottish and Welsh (by and large) appear to accept their ‘Britishness’, those in Northern Ireland appear distinctly more ambivalent. [When] distinguishing between those Northern Ireland respondents who consider themselves [when asked in the survey] to be ‘British’ and those who consider themselves to be ‘Irish’, a vast chasm of identity becomes apparent. [Among] the Northern Ireland ‘Irish’ [only] 22 per cent felt proud of the United Kingdom’s history while a token 13 per cent said they

Prospects

17

felt pride in its armed forces. [In contrast,] the Northern Ireland ‘British’ are exactly that: British in their outlook. Respondents in Northern Ireland who see themselves as British hold views that are entirely consistent with those of their Scottish, Welsh and English counterparts. This pattern can be seen time and time again in the constituent measures of national identity. [see supporting Tables 1.1 and 1.2] (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 144) While, as Dowds and Young put it, for some the first element of the inclusive version of nationalism ‘is at root backward looking, a celebration of what has been handed down from the past’, and so represents ‘the “Pomp and Circumstance” version of national identity’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, pp. 143–4), the ‘second element [ . . . ] is more forward-looking. Britain may be a diminished place in today’s world, but [ . . . ] British democratic institutions and practices, the British economy and Britain’s influence in the world’ could still attract pride (ibid., p. 145). Dowds and Young tell us: ‘unsurprisingly, the proportions of those who say they feel pride in the way the [country currently] functions are a great deal smaller than those who feel pride in its heritage and culture’ (ibid., p. 145). It is the ‘way in which democracy works [that] is the most common source of pride (cited by over half the respondents in mainland Britain [as well as among the Northern Ireland “British”])’, while ‘only around four in ten [on the mainland and in Northern Ireland overall] feel proud of Britain’s economic achievements’ (ibid., p. 145). Moving from inclusive nationalism to exclusive nationalism (ibid., p. 146), Dowds and Young regard this second element or version ‘as an undifferentiated reactionary impulse’ (ibid., p. 146): However, [Dowds and Young] argue there is an important distinction to be drawn between cultural and economic protectionism on the one hand, and raw xenophobia on the other. The first may be a pragmatic response to the threats posed, for example, by foreign cultural hegemony; a response particularly evident in the French government’s protection of language, or [ . . . ] limits placed on the import of American television programmes. [As with] cultural protectionism [so with] economic [ . . . ] protectionsim [against what are seen as] the damaging effects of import penetration [ . . . ]. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 146) Over 60 per cent of people in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland endorsed economic protectionist measures (to ‘limit imports to protect the economy’), whereas those agreeing with the view ‘Television should give preference to British programmes’ were 34 per cent in both England and Scotland, 48 per cent in Wales, 38 per cent among the ‘Northern Ireland “British”’ and just 29 per cent among the ‘Northern Ireland (All)’ category (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 146).

18

The Legacy of Supranationalism

Dowds and Young argue that ‘protectionist tendencies’ in the areas of the economy and culture can and should be distinguished from ‘a xenophobic urge which seeks to exclude people rather than products’, an urge which ‘is arguably based on a fear of social contamination or pollution’ (ibid., p. 146): With the loss of an imperial role followed by two decades of immigration from the new Commonwealth, the sense of what it was to be distinctively British underwent something of a shock. Racist politics flared briefly before being neutralised by the policies of successive governments to limit immigration. As a result, immigration is scarcely a live issue today, but retains a powerful political undertow in the guise of a fear of multi-culturalism and cultural dilution (Husbands, 1994). Here lies a xenophobic dislike of ‘otherness’ in general, and of the stranger in particular: a heterophobia which may – or may not – be coloured by emnity or degenerate into racism (Cohen, 1994). The truly xenophobic items [or sentiments] in [the] scale [of measurement] receive only minority support. For instance, only around a quarter say that immigrants increase crime rates. Less overtly xenophobic concerns are more widespread – about half of mainland Britons think that immigrants take jobs away from people born in Britain [ . . . ]. On some [ . . . ] measures [ . . . ], the Northern Ireland ‘British’ emerge as less xenophobic than the British on the mainland – perhaps because there has been comparatively little new Commonwealth immigration to Northern Ireland. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 146) The notion of ‘xenophobia’ with which Dowds and Young operate is consistent with how this term is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, that is, as ‘a deep dislike of foreigners’ (1990, p. 1418). The same dictionary defines ‘racism’ (which it equates with ‘racialism’) as ‘a belief in the superiority of a particular race; [or] prejudice based on this’; or ‘antagonism towards other races, [especially] as a result of this’ (ibid., p. 1418). Whereas the attempt here to clarify ‘racism’ mentions ‘race’, the notion of ‘racism’ used in the 1997 European Commission study is rendered vague, and even vacuous, because the researchers avoid using the term ‘race’. They merely, and nebulously, refer to ‘individuals or groups’, so that the term ‘racism’ is left (at least inferentially, and perhaps unintentionally) to cover all attitudes and acts of discrimination, prejudice and stigmatisation by any individual or group against any other individual or group. In their examination of national identity and nationalism, Dowds and Young make distinctions and comparisons between the English, the Scottish, the Welsh, the Northern Irish, the ‘British’ Northern Irish and the ‘Irish’ Northern Irish. They do not explore variations in national identity and nationalism according to the kind of ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ distinctions within the UK to which the Office of National Statistics, for instance, in its annual Social Trends, draws attention.

Prospects

19

Nonetheless, on the basis of their somewhat restricted data, Dowds and Young still propose: the concept of Britain is [ . . . ] elusive and [ . . . ] what could be termed ‘sentimental Britain’ has no single focus [ . . . ]. Historically, England has enjoyed a clear identity as a nation within the British territorial state [sic]. The main nationalist force in British politics has been a Conservative and Unionist Party whose image, historical pedigree and electoral constituency has been England first, and the Union second. Half a century ago, the term ‘British’ would have coupled more easily to Empire than to any specific society; Britain, it might now be said, has lost an Empire, and not yet found a nation. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 153) With this claim in mind, it is pertinent to note how Dowds and Young use the results of the thirteenth British Social Attitudes survey to ‘construct national identity “types” based on its constituent elements, [before proceeding to examine] how those with widely differing composite national identities view issues to do with integration into Europe’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 148). Dowds and Young tells us that ‘correlations show that [the] two main strands of inclusive and exclusive nationalism remain fairly distinct’, and how they ‘therefore constructed a typology of national identity according to [the way] respondents in Britain scored on either of the two inclusive aspects of national identity (pride in heritage and culture and the way the nation functions) and either of the two exclusive aspects ([ . . . ] labelled as protectionism and xenophobia)’ (ibid., p. 148). Dowds and Young explain how the survey respondents ‘who were in the top third of the sample according to their score on either of the inclusive aspects were considered to be high in national sentiment. Respondents who were in the top third of the sample according to their score on either of the two exclusive aspects of national identity were considered to be high in exclusiveness’ (ibid., p. 148). On this basis, Dowds and Young divide the survey respondents into four categories. First, ‘Low in exclusiveness and low in national sentiment’; second, ‘Low in exclusiveness and high in national sentiment’; third, ‘High in exclusiveness and low in national sentiment’; and fourth, ‘High in exclusiveness and high in national sentiment’ (ibid., p. 148). Dowds and Young decide to call those people who qualify for ‘Group 1’ ‘supra-nationalists’. Dowds and Young explain: ‘Low in exclusiveness and low in national sentiment, supranationalists tend to be unmoved by symbols of nation. Generally [people] who fall into this category are likely to be libertarian [as opposed to authoritarian], better educated, younger, female and rather more likely to read [such broadsheet, or so-called quality, newspapers] as The Guardian and The Independent. They are not very attached to their locality [in the sense of “feeling close to” their neighbourhood or their town/ city (ibid., p. 155)] and are rather unlikely to read the Daily Express [which,

20

The Legacy of Supranationalism

along with such newspapers as The Sun and The Mirror are known as tabloids or red-tops]’ (ibid., p. 148). People who fit into the ‘Group 2’ category, ‘with their combination of low exclusiveness and high national sentiment, [are labelled] the patriots. In common with the first group, these [people] are likely to be well-educated and (fairly) libertarian; but they also, in contrast, tend to be strongly attached to their [local] area. Patriots are likely to read the Daily Telegraph, The Times, or the Daily Express’ (ibid., p. 148). ‘Group 3’ people, ‘defined by a combination of high exclusiveness and low national sentiment, [are] termed belligerents. [Those] falling into this category are likely to be male readers of The Sun [widely recognised as not only the most popular low brow or down market newspaper, but also the most assertively, or bellicosely, xenophobic one], notably authoritarian in outlook and with few educational qualifications. They tend not to feel a sense of attachment to their [local] area’ (ibid., p. 149). Finally, those who can be placed in ‘Group 4’ are referred to by Dowds and Young as ‘John Bulls for their combination of high exclusiveness and high national sentiment. Again these respondents tend to have few educational qualifications, and are likely to hold authoritarian values. They differ from the belligerents in that they are likely to be older, strongly attached to their [local] area, and to read the Daily Mail’ (ibid., p. 149). Unfortunately, Dowds and Young are not specific about the numbers or proportions of people who exhibit each of the four types of national identity. This is a drawback, but other researchers and writers have detected links between national identity and nationalism, on the one hand, and newspaper reading habits, on the other. For instance, Mark Atkinson and Michael White tell us: Tony Blair’s difficulties in winning the public over to the euro were starkly illustrated [yesterday, 14 December] with the release of an opinion poll showing the storm over tax harmonisation intensifying hostility to Britain joining the single currency. A survey conducted after the tabloid newspaper campaign against standardising taxes across the European Union found opposition to monetary union hardening, reversing the trend of the past year. Conducted between December 3 and 9, the week after the debate flared, the poll shows 53 per cent against Britain becoming part of the euro-zone and 29 per cent in favour, increasing the majority wanting to retain sterling to 24 per cent from 19 per cent in September. This reverses the pro-EMU swing prompted by the Government’s expressions of support for the euro and the principle of joining when economic conditions are right. The poll, of 1,898 people, underlines the struggle the Government faces with anti-EMU sections of the media when it decides to stage a promised referendum on the subject. It suggests the Government will fulfil its ambition to join the euro-zone only if it convinces voters that giving up the pound would not mean higher taxes. The biggest swing of anti-EMU feeling has been among readers of tabloid newspapers, according to the

Prospects

21

poll, which is carried out every two months by MORI for the US investment bank Salomon Smith Barney. While EMU oponents have always outnumbered supporters among tabloid readers, their ranks have swelled in the past three months from a majority of 30 per cent to 37 per cent as a result of the rash of stories portraying Germany’s finance minister Oskar Lafontaine as the new Brussels bogeyman. [The] Sun’s readership was already highly anti-EMU and its views had not been changed by the episode, which the Prime Minister has tried to bury by issuing a joint UK–German tax statement ruling out harmonisation of income tax and a common business tax structure. However, anti-EMU sentiment among Daily Mail and Express readers was now of similar proportions [and even] the readers of the Labour-supporting Mirror [have shown] a sharp anti-EMU swing [ . . . ]. The Guardian readership is by far the most strongly in favour of Britain joining the single currency, supported by a majority of almost 40 per cent. However, the tax harmonisation row has reduced this support by around 12 points over the past three months. Support among Independent readers has slumped from a majority of just over 30 per cent in September to 10 per cent today. Leaving the anti-EMU Telegraph aside, broadsheet readers remain broadly in favour of British membership of the euro-zone but they have had their enthusiasm dimmed by the tax harmonisation scare. From a majority of 11 per cent in favour in September, there is now a pro-EMU margin of [just] 6 per cent. Even if the Government were to urge people to vote for membership of the euro-zone, the majority against would be 14 per cent, the poll shows, up from 7 per cent in September. (Atkinson and White, 15 December 1998) The association between people’s newspaper reading habits and their attitudes towards the deepening of the European Union, such as by way of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and in particular the introduction of the single currency (the euro) on 1 January 1999 (on the part of just eleven of the fifteen Member States, the UK being one of those which had decided to remain outside, at least initially), lends itself to the supposition that the four national identity types distinguished by Dowds and Young will have different views on European integration. Certainly, according to Dowds and Young, the ‘four national identity categories show [ . . . ] four [somewhat contrasting] ways of “being British”’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 149): the supra-nationalists [ . . . ] are the least distinctively British of the four, and [can] be said to have [relatively] little sense of national identity [ . . . ]. The fourth group – John Bulls – embody a widespread image (indeed, almost a caricature) of traditional proud [sic] and exclusive nationalism. They are antithetical to supra-nationalists. But there is a second antithesis [ . . . ] too: that [between the] patriots and [the] belligerents. [Thus,] the first are high [ . . . ] on national sentiment [ . . . ], the second low; and [the

22

The Legacy of Supranationalism Table 1.1

National Identity and Britain’s Relationship with the EU*

Percentage agreeing

Britain benefits from EU membership Britain should leave the EU Britain should unite with the EU Closer links with the EU would make Britain stronger Britain should be closer to EU Closer links with the EU would give Britain more influence in the world There should be a single European currency

Supranationalists

Patriots

Belligerents

John Bulls

58

52

22

28

9

8

20

20

51

32

23

31

45

34

26

24

44

25

27

20

34

28

22

23

28

16

15

13

Source: Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 152. *The figures are for 1995 and relate to mainland Britain only (i.e., not Northern Ireland).

second] are high [ . . . ] on exclusiveness, [but] the first are low. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 149) The manner in which the four national identity types display four different ways of ‘being British’ is replicated on the particular issue of Britain’s relationship with the European Union: Supra-nationalists and patriots are quite close in their response to the perceived benefits of European Union membership (58 and 52 per cent respectively think that Britain benefits from membership) and differ sharply from the belligerents and John Bulls, whose adverse judgements (22 and 28 per cent [think that Britain benefits from membership]) are also similar to one another [ . . . ]. Very different, however, are the patterns of response on other issues. Supra-nationalists are alone in their substantial degree of support for a closer relationship with the Union [ . . . ] on a generalised level [ . . . ]. Supra-nationalists are alone too in their remarkably high level of support – a [slight] majority – for ‘uniting fully’ with the European Union, a position which just a third of the patriots and less than a quarter of the other groups espouse. And while levels of support for a single currency are modest, it is here too that the supra-nationalists distinguish themselves. Hardly enthusiastic (with only 28 per cent in favour), nonetheless the proportion giving it their backing is around

Prospects Table 1.2

23

Opinions About Britain’s Link with the EU, 1994–95*

Britain’s relationship with the European Union . . . should be closer . . . should be less close . . . is about right Britain should do all it can to . . . unite fully with the European Union . . . protect its independence from the European Union Britain’s long-term policy should be to . . . leave the European Union . . . stay in the European Union and try to reduce its powers . . . leave things as they are . . . stay in the European Union and try to increase its powers . . . work for the formation of a single European government

1994 (%)

1995 (%)

37 23 34

29 26 39

40 53

32 60

11 25

14 23

20 28

20 28

8

8

Source: Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 150. *The figures relate to mainland Britain only (i.e., not to Northern Ireland); they do not cover the ‘don’t knows’.

twice as high as that of any of the other [categories], all united in their deep distrust of such a move. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 151) Further detail on how the four national identity categories in Britain view Britain’s relationship with the European Union is presented in Table 1.1. Dowds and Young draw on the survey results for 1995 to comment on ‘the aggregate picture of attitudes towards’ Britain’s relationship with the European Union: The negative views of Britain’s relationship with Europe are driven by the belligerents and the John Bulls on just about every issue. On the generalities of links with the European Union, and on the benefits derived from membership of it, the patriots join the supra-nationalists. On the more radical forms of integration, however – the single currency and full unification – they part company [in that the supranationalists are far more favourable]. These, then, are the fault-lines that are likely to run through the politics of Britain’s relationship with the rest of the European Union in the coming years. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 152)

24

The Legacy of Supranationalism

While Dowds and Young do not give the precise quantities or proportions of people who display each of the four types of national identity, they provide figures from the 1995 and the previous, 1994, surveys which give clues as to what the figures involved could be (see Table 1.2). For Dowds and Young, the results presented in Table 1.2 when viewed in the context of an analysis of ‘the possible impact of national identity upon the development of European integration’ leaves the firm impression that the supra-nationalist category suffered a setback during the mid-1990s. Thus, ‘a long-standing question as to whether or not Britain should withdraw from the European Union (formerly [the] EEC or European Community), asked from 1983 to 1991, [showed] a marked [ . . . ] trend [against] withdrawl’, with those in favour ‘reaching a low of 17 per cent in 1991’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 150). Subsequently, in 1994 (when ‘a different, more detailed set of questions about attitudes to Europe was introduced’) 11 per cent of respondents in mainland Britain chose the option to ‘leave the European Union’ and in 1995 14 per cent chose this option. In 1994, 37 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘Britain’s relationship with the European Union should be closer’, whereas in 1995 only 29 per cent agreed (ibid., p. 150). In view of the answers to the sets of questions about attitudes to Europe in 1994 and 1995, Dowds and Young tell us: Europe has gained renewed importance in British domestic politics. True, the shifts between 1994 and 1995 are not very large, but they are marked enough to pose the question of whether a new ‘Eurosceptic’ trend might be gathering strength both in Northern Ireland and in mainland Britain. (Dowds and Young, 1996, pp. 149–50) On the one hand, Dowds and Young speculate on the possibility that in the mid-1990s there was ‘the beginning of a re-assertion of an anti-European Union position that once commanded the support of more than two in five respondents’ (ibid., p. 150). On the other hand, when it comes to their final, parting shot Dowds and Young assert: The patriots [ . . . ] are outnumberd both by the supra-nationalists who are insouciant [or, that is, carefree] in their support for full unification, and by the John Bulls, who see few benefits from membership. When the belligerents are taken into account, it becomes clear that the moderate line – a pragmatic pursuit of the benefits of membership of the European Union within a sturdy framework of national [sic] sovereignty – is the position of a beleagured minority. (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 154) For Dowds and Young, there are signs that the moderates, or patriots – who ‘bring a confident and positive approach to European integration, place a high value on the benefits of British membership of the European Union,

Prospects

25

and are utterly committed to continuing membership’, while being ‘hostile to unification, chary of a single currency and no more willing than most to forge “closer links”’ (ibid., p. 153) – are being squeezed by advances being made by those who adopt more extreme stances. In other words, the British are becoming, and perhaps are already, largely polarised between (a) the supranationalists, who are committed to full European integration, and (b) those who are relucant Europeans – of various shades, but including a not insubstantial number who support wholesale withdrawal from the EU. For me, while the supranationalists and the belligerents/John Bulls lie at opposing ends of the British political and ideological spectrum with regard to the issue of the content of their ideas (beliefs, opinions, attitudes) towards European integration and Britain’s part in this process, the same two camps may be close vis-à-vis the form of their ideas. This is the case in so far as supranationalists want simply or largely to vertically displace the trappings of the UK nation-state (those things which make the UK a nation-state) to a higher level (the European level), with the EU assuming the institutional and organisational features of what might be thought of as a surrogate ‘nation-state’, and which might be best described as a ‘supra-state’. It seems to me that supranationalists tend to regard the EU supra-state as better suited than the UK nation-state (perhaps, indeed, any nation-state) to current global system relationships and patterns, processes and developments, including those associated with the course of globalisation, the possibility (keeping in mind the intense controversy surrounding even the notion) of ‘post-modernity’, and (most recently) the advent of the new world order. The thrust of what I have in mind here is echoed by Dowds and Young: Beyond the rhetoric of the New World Order lies a wide-spread unease, against a backcloth of failing empires, distintegrating nation-states, and new regional and ethnic claims to loyalty. The sense of identity traditionally derived from the old collectivities no longer claims special attention. And yet that sense of identity, of being ‘among one’s own’, remains a powerful human need. The 1990s could be said to be a decade characterised by a search for a more elemental sense of identity than the years immediately preceding it: moreover, an identity made special by ties of ‘blood and belonging’ (Ignatieff, 1993). So, at least, goes one argument about our current predicament. But there are other, less regressive, constructions to be put upon this new order. One of these is to regard the nation-state as the quintessential product of modernity and let it pass away unlamented. The passage into post-modernity is, it has been argued, one into a more transient and contingent world of flux and paradox, in which a single or firm sense of identity – of who one is – is neither sought nor offered. Instead, situational identities are adopted, reflecting a wider range of life-experiences that cut across the concept of ‘nationhood’. The prospect is held up of a life of multiple identities and shifting

26

The Legacy of Supranationalism

ties, in which the certitudes and loyalties of the nation-state are replaced at will from a whole range of new identities on offer. In this moral emporium, few will choose to identify themselves with either nation or state or (and perhaps this is what is meant here by the latter) nation-state and, if their attachment is in any way territorial, it is as likely as not to derive its rationale and vigour from the face-to-face community of local neighbourhoods. This lateral dispersion of identity may seem both overfanciful in the kaleidoscope of identities it can offer, and romantic in the celebration of the local in the face of the global. Yet in Britain, we are currently witnessing unprecedented confusions of national consciousness, arising from the prospect of a vertical displacement of old loyalties by those widley believed to be demanded by an emerging European ‘superstate’. On this reckoning, the old tales of solidarity within bounded territorial (but not ethnic) communities have not been forgotten but are being re-told on a supra-national scale appropriate to the emotionally powerful appeal of a united Europe (Schlesinger, 1992). To the extent that people feel themselves to be citizens of this new Europe, they might be expected to be the weaker in their national attachments; indeed, it was just such a hope, after two devastating world wars, that underpinned the original European project. On this view, the gradual eclipse of national by European identity is both natural and welcome. [And, hence] one of the greatest constitutional challenges facing British people in the coming years; the re-articulation (or even survival) of national identities in the face of what many view – some with enthusiasm, others with dismay – as a relentless drive towards European integration. (Dowds and Young, 1996, pp. 141–2) Like Dowds and Young, I am confident that what is occurring in Europe, and what the UK is caught up in by virtue of its membership of the EU, is a relentless drive towards greater economic and political integration – something which while greeted with enthusiasm by supranationalists, draws dismay from nationalists. Indeed, it is greeted with downright hostility from those at the furthest end of the political spectrum – from, that is, ultranationalists. Supranationalists and ultranationalists may not be opposed and in conflict over all political issues, but they are over the process of European integration, just as they will be anywhere in the world where supranationalism is on the agenda.14 The doctrine of supranationalism has turned out to be the ideational, or the ideologial, driving force behind the (not wholly linear) progress of European integration. The result of the supranationalist commitment of the founders of the European Communities (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 25) has been a gradual shift towards greater, deeper and wider European integration around what was the European Economic Community (EEC), then became the European Community and eventually has now established itself as the (broader, inclusive) European Union; towards an institutionally deeper, stronger and increasingly supreme (even federal) European regional

Prospects

27

organisation, or regime; towards a geo-politically more extensive and influential supranational regional regime across Europe; towards a more important and powerful global player – one which could emerge in the twenty-first century as a superpower within the global system; and towards a formation which is increasingly acting as a spur, inspiration and model for the construction and proliferation of other SRRs, albeit ones which for the time being are merely proto-SRRs. It follows from this argument about the evolving new world order, that supranationalists, rather than the (idealistic) nationalists, in the UK (as well as elsewhere in Europe), are the realists, given their pragmatic response to the character of the global system and the process of globalisation. At the same time, UK supranationalists in their approach to the outside world and to outsiders are likely to have at least one thing in common with nationalists: they, like nationalists, will tend to be protectionists. According to the European Commission: With 1997 designated as the ‘European Year Against Racism’, the [most recent] Eurobarometer results show that only a minority of EU citizens [sic] feels that people from countries outside of the European Union who want to work in the Member States should be accepted without restrictions. (European Commission, Autumn 1997, p. iii; italics in the original) If so, then following Dowds and Young, the vast majority of Europeans within the EU have protectionist tendencies of the kind that is the hallmark of the ‘exclusive nationalism’ of those people with a ‘xenophobic urge’, and which may ‘degenerate into racism’ (Dowds and Young, 1990, pp. 146–7). Such protectionist tendencies, however, are not the sole preserve of the proverbial man and woman in the street. Thus, in 1986, the Single European Act was passed with the aim of facilitating the creation of: the internal market as [ . . . ] an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured [ . . . ]. [As subsequently] summarised in a European Commission pamphlet designed to inform and reassure the ‘ordinary people’ of the European Community (European Commission, March 1993, p. 1): ‘The removal of internal frontiers within the Community is being matched by a corresponding strengthening of controls at the EC’s external frontiers. These are aimed at preventing terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminals as well as illegal immigrants from entering the Community. In addition, spot identity checks will still be possible inside the territory of the Member States. Community countries have drawn up a common list of States whose nationals will need visas to enter the Community. In addition, the conditions of granting asylum to political refugees will be tightened to make it more difficult for so-called “economic” migrants to settle in the

28

The Legacy of Supranationalism

EC. National police forces will cooperate through a new body called Europol.’ (ibid., p. 8) (Close, 1995a, p. 128) Supranationalism and nationalism as doctrines are quite close in some respects, and the serious question arises of whether current European supranationalism will go through a process of gradual metamorphosis over the next few decades to become a sort of ‘super-nationalism’ with which many Europeans will face the outside world in the twenty-first century.

2 Alignments

Central Asian leaders yesterday postponed again the founding of a free trade zone that could boost their depressed economies. Disputes over tariffs and currency controls among the four nations meeting at an annual summit – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikstan – have delayed for years the creation of the Central Asian Economic Community. Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, chided himself and his colleagues for the delay, saying the free trade zone could help rescue Central Asia’s commodities-dependent economies, which have suffered as prices of oil, metals and cotton remain depressed. Mr Karimov, whose strict currency controls in Uzbekistan are partly to blame for the stalled free trade zone talks, said he believed [that] powerful foreign economies were depressing prices to supress resource-rich Central Asia nations and keep them dependent on foreign credits. (Whalen, 25 June 1999) Although the creation of the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) by the former Soviet Union republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikstan was being hindered, the objective reflected a general global trend and dynamic, as examined in Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, the thrust of which has been summarised as follows: in the New World Order (NWO) – the post-Cold War distribution of global power and configuration of global players – the European Union (EU) is just one among a growing number of regional regimes that are acquiring prominent roles in the process of global governance, to some extent through the operation of differentiated zones of geo-political management. The EU is currently the most advanced and influential example of a regional regime by virtue of having the novel European Community (EC) at its core – the EC being uniquely constructed around supranational institutions, decision-making and laws. But, the EC’s uniqueness is unlikely to last. The evident competitive advantages of supranational 29

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

regional regimes (SRRs), in conjunction with the realism generally adopted by the various global players, is conducive to the consolidation and proliferation of SRRs in a manner consistent with the neo-functionalist perspective on the progress of the EU. Other prospective SRRs include the Association of South East Asian Nations, the East Asian Economic Caucus, the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, the North American Free Trade Area, and the Andean Community. It is argued that the emerging character of the global system will increasingly depend upon SRRs, the relationships among such organisations, and accordingly the doctrine of supranationalism. (Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, Preamble) Consistent with the overall approach of Supranationalism in the New World Order (SNWO) are a couple of events which took place shortly after the 1999 failure to set up the CAEC. First: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygystan and Uzbekistan entered into force on 1 July [1999]. They provide a general framework for developing close relations and reiterating shared beliefs in pluralist parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, individual human rights and the introduction of a market economy. Each agreement foresees political dialogue and cooperation in almost all non-military activities from education to the environment, from agriculture to science and technology. Commissioner Van den Broek welcomed the PCAs saying that these six former Soviet Republics, with their nearly 60 million inhabitants, have huge economic potential, and their political stability is important to Europe. We have much to offer each other, he said. (European Commission, 8 July 1999) The six PCAs with, on the one hand, the three Caucasus countries lying between Russia and Turkey and with, on the other, three of the four more easterly countries which had been trying to create the CAEC clearly reflect the commitment by the EU to play a pivotal part in regional and extraregional geo-political management, and consequently the acquisition by the EU of increasing weight in the process of global governance. But it was not only with Eurasian countries that the EU was busily establishing strategic agreements and arrangements, which brings us to the second event that occurred shortly after the failed 1999 attempt to initiate the CAEC in a way consistent with the overall approach of SNWO: Leaders of the EU met with their South American counterparts yesterday to forge ahead with economic, political and cultural ties that by-pass the dominance of the US in the western hemisphere. At a two-day meeting in Rio de Janeiro involving more than 40 heads of state [sic], the EU and Mercosur – the regional bloc including Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and

Alignments

31

Uruguay – agreed to launch free-trade talks between the two continents.1 While yesterday’s agreement did not mention a free-trade timetable for the talks, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso said that it was as historic as it was important. ‘We have to have access to European markets just as they have to have access to us,’ he said. More generally, however, the agreement is a boost to South America because it gives the region international recognition that it has put decades of political and financial instability behind it and is emerging as important on the world stage. It also creates new lines of co-operation between Europe and Latin America, which this century has taken its lead from the US rather than its colonisers in the Old World.2 The EU–Mercosur announcement kicked off the first summit between the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean. It will close today with the signature of a document pledging to increase co-operation on areas ranging from trade to human rights [ . . . ]. Trade and investment between the two continents have been growing fast over the past few years. EU figures show capital flows from Europe to Latin American [countries] reached $73bn in 1997, up from $26bn two years earlier. Direct European investment in Latin America doubled from 1996 to 1997, going to $17bn with Spain accounting for 33%, followed by Britain with 20% and France with 14%. EU exports to Latin America reached $52.4bn in 1997, double the 1987 amount, but well above EU imports of $38.1bn. (Bellos, 29 June 1999) Bellos notes about the EU–Mercosur trade agreement: The wording [ . . . ] was not as watered-down as many had feared, specifying that the negotiations would aim at ‘bilateral, gradual and reciprocal trade liberalisation, without excluding any sector’. Any progress on trade, however, has to follow World Trade Organisation rules. Problems are likely to emerge because Latin America believes it is kept out of the European market by generous [protective] EU subsidies. (ibid.) Bellos explains: Mercosur, which counts Chile and Bolivia as associate members, was started in 1992 with an agreement on tariffs between the [countries] but has grown into an EU type bloc with a combined economy of $1 trillion (£630 billion). (ibid.) The EU–Mercosur agreement was but one of a kind that the EU had entered into with other countries and blocs in Latin America and elsewhere. As Pascal Fontaine reported in 1995: The Union has concluded framework cooperation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and the Andean Pact countries (Bolivia,

32

The Legacy of Supranationalism

Columbia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) with the [intention] of supporting regional economic integration. Similar agreements were concluded with the Association of South-East Asian Nations [ASEAN] in 1980 and the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1988. (Fontaine, 1995, p. 39) Later, significantly, the Andean Pact became the Andean Community: When they announced on 10 March [1996] in Trujillo (Peru) the creation of the Andean Community, the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela declared that they had sought inspiration from the example of the European Union. The new Community, which replaces the Andean Pact, now 26 years old, will include a presidential council, a permanent secretariat and a parliament, whose members are elected through universal suffrage. This set-up clearly recalls the structure of the 15-[member] European Union. (European Commission, April 1996a, p. 3)3 The replacement of the Andean Pact by the Andean Community (deliberately organised along the lines of the EU), the progress of Mercosur, and the June 1999 EU–Mercosur agreement among further, similar developments can be interpreted as more or less confirming John Peterson’s claim: As political structures are adjusted to reflect increasing economic interdependence, the emergence of protectionist or even mercantialist trade blocs could become a defining feature of the international order [ . . . ]. Part of the problem is that the saliency of the Cold War military alliances, which usually discouraged inward-looking or mercantialist trade policies, has declined. Defence commitments in Asia and Europe traditionally provided the US with substantial leverage in negotiations with the EU and Japan on trade and monetary issues. This leverage diminished as the Soviet threat receded. Meanwhile new tensions emerged on the industrial and economic side of alliances (Peterson, 1996, pp. 186–7, quoted in Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, p. 48) There is ample evidence of the emergence of economic, or economy-based (but somewhat political), tensions, disputes and conflicts emerging in the post-Cold War NWO – including among what during the Cold War were military allies – over inward-looking, protectionist tendencies and, connectedly, around the formation, policies and practices of regional economic blocs, most notably (but not exclusively) that of the European Community and Union.4 But also, the NWO seems to be increasingly characterised by the forging of alternative – indeed novel – strategic alliances, this time among regional economic organisations, including for instance between the EU on the one hand and Mercosur on the other.

Alignments

33

These co-operative arrangements can be understood as realist responses – intended, strategic solutions – to the NWO globalisation processes and the concomitant proliferation of regional (variously protectionist) economic blocs, sometimes merely de facto (as in the case of the East Asia, or the Pacific Asia, region), but more often de jure. As such, they can be regarded as complementing (as being extensions or extrapolations of) the tendency for these blocs to become increasingly internally integrated, economically, politically and otherwise. The link between globalisation and European integration, and more specifically the advantages within the NWO global system of furthering the latter through the single market and economic and monetary union (EMU) projects, was highlighted by Peter Mandelson, the Labour MP and former Cabinet minister,5 in a ‘lecture on Britain in Europe [given] in Brussels’ on 28 June 1999 (Walker, 28 June 1999). Prior to the lecture, Martin Walker reported: Expectations among diplomats and officials are high, after the shock of the European [Parliament] elections [in early June 1999], that Mandelson will be the [British] prime minister’s herald of a new commitment to Europe and the euro [ . . . ]. [He] will argue6 [ . . . ] ‘The Eurosceptics go hammer and tongs at it all the time, with the help of a media that is equally obsessed. The result is that the Tories are now less a party than a singleissue pressure group,’ he [said]. ‘We [or, that is, Europhiles] have to be equally focused.’ [ . . . ]. Businessmen want him to focus on the euro [ . . . ]. The traditional justification of the EU as a mechanism for imposing peace among the warring European tribes [ . . . ] has dwindling resonance for people under the age of 40, [Mandelson] thinks. [Mandelson asserts:] ‘If the EU did not exist today, in this time of globalism and extradordinarily fast economic change, it would be necessary to re-invent it,’ [ . . . ]. ‘Every other region of the world is trying to do so, from the Northern American free trade area [sic] to Mercosur in Latin America or Asean in south-east Asia.’ It’s a familiar argument – the stability that comes from large and guaranteed markets and the opportunities of free trade and structural reforms [are what] the EU must be pushed into making. (Walker, 28 June 1999) As anticipated, in his Brussels presentation, ‘Peter Mandelson launched [ . . . ] a passionate defence of Europe and the euro, stressing that “the single market and the euro are the right responses to today’s world”’ (Walker, 29 June 1999): ‘It would be totally against Britain’s interests to rule out participation in the euro, which – as long as we can get the economic conditions right – will bring lower prices for consumers, easier and cheaper finance for small firms, more inward investment and more jobs,’ he said. He dismissed

34

The Legacy of Supranationalism

Conservative claims that the European election results had given them a public mandate for Euro-scepticism. ‘I am absolutely convinced we will win the battle of public opinion. The Conservative party and the bulk of the press have portrayed Europe for years solely in terms of the last bad EU directive.7 Yet this month just 8% of the total electorate turned out to support them.’ (Walker, 29 June 1999) In effect, Peter Mandelson was convinced that the Europhile commitment to the UK’s membership of the EU – and thereby to European integration through the further strengthening and deepening of the EU and the progress of the EU’s single currency (with the UK’s eventual participation) – would be successful and so vindicated: that is, European, including UK, supranationalism would be. As otherwise summed up by Hugo Young, Mandelson showed ‘how to argue for the merits of the euro without breaching the commitment to delay the decision’ (Young, 1 July 1999): Mandelson is re-emerging as a force, on the terrain he cares most about. A key broker in the resolution of [Tony] Blair’s anxieties about [the Britainin-Europe (BiE) campaign], he [ . . . ] has become the best articulator, after [Blair] himself, of the European policy the government sincerely wants to believe in. (Young, 1 July 1999) Peter Mandelson’s Brussels’ speech on the last day of June 1999 was delivered a few days after the prime minister, Tony Blair, had given ‘his support to the campaigning group called Britain-in-Europe’ (Young, 1 July 1999): It was a pro-European move that has [ . . . ] bewildered, if not enraged, the anti-Europe forces [ . . . ]. [But, before] the deal was done, two issues needed to be settled between Mr Blair and his interlocutors. First, the campaigners had to adjust their focus from one that concentrated simply on the euro [ . . . ]. The prime minister couldn’t very well sign up to a euro-policy that didn’t incorporate the careful hesitations about the single currency which he has defined. But secondly, he for his part gave just as important an assurance [ . . . ]. [There] had been [no] change in his commitment to a euro-referendum in the early part of the next parliament [ . . . ]. [That is,] Blair insisted the position remained the same. He was as committed as ever, provided the [ . . . ] economic tests were [ . . . ] met [ . . . ]. What Blair’s move says is that the referendum, whenever it happens, isn’t exactly going to be about the euro. It will be asking a question, whatever the wording, about Britain-in-Europe, and whether the people want this to go on being part of the British condition: and in circumstances where Britain is at the leading centre not the backward edge of the EU. Unless the question is answered Yes, sterling-in-the-euro will never happen. So

Alignments

35

BiE is repositioned to address the broader question, as a prelude to a more specific one. Since the enemies of the EU spend so much time denigrating not merely the euro but every aspect of the British relationship with Europe [ . . . ], this is a necessary [ . . . ] priority. The government’s own prestige is finally committed to counteracting the massed phalanxes in the media and the Tory party who allow their paranoia about the EU to distort every word they utter [ . . . ]. [The Britain-in-Europe campaign] can’t hope to get a fair crack from much of the press, where systemic anti-Europeanism corrodes the bones of truth [ . . . ]. The more the British are persuaded [correctly] that Europe is not the enemy, and that they belong to a European country, the more unnatural will come to seem the terrors which are being stoked up to keep sterling out of the euro in perpetuity. We have no guarantee that Mr Blair will jump the Rubicon and plunge into the referendum. That will be a decision of epic importance. It will need the economic case at least to have attained neutrality: [ . . . ] it is never likely to be overwhelming. But after that, it is about politics, and identity, and national power and influence. (Young, 1 July 1999) It is about such things as sovereignty, nation-state independence and interdependence, the progress of the EC/EU as a supranational organisation (and so as an alternative to the independent, sovereign nation-state), and nationalism versus supranationalism. Contrary to Hugo Young’s fervent recommendation to the UK’s prime minister on the issues of the single currency and a referendum, however, some soon began to detect a change of tack by Tony Blair: Tony Blair and his ministers insisted yesterday that there had been no change in the government’s commitment in principle to join the single European currency, but conspicuously failed to confirm that they would hold a referendum in the next parliament. Uncertainties about the politics and economic implications of the euro were mirrored in a survey conducted by the Confederation of British Industry [CBI], which delivered a qualified declaration of support for UK membership of the euro zone – provided EU [nation-]states make serious efforts to cut their budget deficits and free up their labour markets [ . . . ]. In the wake of yesterday’s Guardian report that ministers are backing away from their previous plan to stage the promised referendum soon after the expected 2001 general election, both the prime minister and the foreign secretary, Robin Cook, were questioned after hosting a one-day summit with Italy’s prime minister, Massimo D’Alema. Mr Blair replied: ‘I have always said you should judge it over the long term. The purpose of the euro is to provide a foundation of stability for Europe and that judgement is not to be made on a day-to-day basis [ . . . ]. It’s to be made in the medium and long term.’ [And], Mr Cook said: ‘[ . . . ]. We have said we will have a referendum when we

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

judge the criteria right.’ That view appears to reflect the wary feelings among CBI members, generally more pro-European than small business leaders. In a policy statement reaffirming its support for Emu membership, the CBI president, Sir Clive Thompson, said it had the potential to deliver significant benefits to the UK economy. ‘UK membership of a successful Emu would enable British firms to participate fully in a more complete and competitive single market and remove the harmful impact of exchange rate volatility against the euro,’ he said. However, he said, the CBI’s support was not unconditional. It depended on a stronger resolve on the part of the major euro-zone countries to cut their budget deficits and a shift towards more flexible labour market policies before committing to a specific date – terms not unlike those Mr Blair and Gordon Brown seek to promote in the coming euro-debate. (Atkinson et al., 21 July 1999) While the emphasis here was on the conditional (qualified, or quality of the) support that was being expressed by both the Labour government and the CBI for the UK’s entry into the single currency – the euro-zone – for Oliver Morgan what was remarkable and most significant was, quite simply, the sheer magnitude (quantity) of this support: Supporters of British entry into the single currency will receive a major boost this week when the Confederation of British Industry releases [a] survey showing business is overwhelmingly in favour of joining the euro. The poll of 5,000 CBI members [ . . . ] will reveal that companies in favour of the single currency outnumber those against it by three to one [ . . . ]. This will be the first piece of good news for supporters of the single currency for some time. The euro has suffered a tumultuous ride on the foreign exchanges, plunging 14 per cent to near parity with the dollar, while Labour’s poor showing in the June European elections was interpreted as signalling a growth in British scepticism towards the euro. Last week [a country-wide] poll indicated that if a referendum were held now, 62 per cent of respondents would vote against, and last month the Institute of Directors found more than half its members [were] against joining [ . . . ]. (Morgan, 18 July 1999). It was this apparent widespread and deep-seated popular euro-scepticism to which the Conservative Party leader was paying attention and trying to appeal in formulating his own approach: A revealing scene [has been] played out in the campaign for today’s byelection in the Cheshire seat of Eddisbury. On Tuesday William Hague made a barnstorming swing through the constituency [ . . . ]. The Conservative candidate, whom Hague had come to endorse, told how he had asked his leader to sport one of the pound-sign lapel pins which had

Alignments

37

become de rigueur among Eurosceptic Tories. ‘I don’t need to wear a symbol of the pound,’ Hague had said. ‘I am the symbol of the pound.’ [William] Hague’s words to his eager candidate are revealing. They confirm how keen he is to be identified with the campaign to save the pound. Pumped up by their success in [June’s] elections to the European parliament [sic] – where they got the largest share of an admittedly paltry number of votes cast – the Conservatives have decided that Emu-scepticism is a winner. If they can be the anti-euro party, they reckon they can motivate their own people and appeal to the majority of Britons who, polls show, are deeply wary of the single currency. They have been emboldened not just by the [European Parliament] results, but by a Guardian [ . . . ] survey last week which found only one in four Britons with a good word to say about the euro. The bumpy ride of the currency since its launch on January 1, coupled with its recently arrested plunge towards parity with the dollar, have added to the Tories’ conviction that the euro is a loser for Labour – and a winner for them. Now the government seems to agree. As we reported on Tuesday [20 July], Labour is retreating from the once-firm suggestion of a euro referendum in the first flush of a second term – or even from having one in that term at all [ . . . ]. Diehard [sic] euro-enthusiasts are displeased. They’re angry [with] Tony Blair [ . . . ]. They want Labour to make a case for the single currency with as much vigour as the Tories make the case against. (The Guardian, 22 July 1999) At the same time, it can be noted – as Hugo Young has – pro-Europeans and euro-enthusiasts were to be found well beyond the ranks of the Labour Party. Young refers to not only ‘pro-Europe business people’, but also ‘pro-Europe Tories’ (Young, 1 July 1999). Michael White otherwise elaborates: Michael Heseltine and Kenneth Clarke yesterday joined pro-European politicians and business leaders in welcoming Tony Blair’s decision to join next month’s launch of the all-party single currency campaign [ . . . ]. Mr Heseltine had signalled unwillingness to get involved if Mr Blair did not lead the charge. Yesterday neither quibbled at [the prime minister’s] insistence that the Britain in Europe (BiE) campain would have to go wider than the single currency – and promote the case of an active role in the European Union – if Mr Blair was to get involved. John Major’s ex-deputy [Michael Heseltine] called the new formula ‘politically realistic’, while Mr Clarke, a former Tory [Chancellor of the Exchequer], said: ‘I always thought he would join. I’m glad he’s coming along.’ [But, it] did not stop the move being greeted with gleeful catcalls by the Eurosceptic Business for Sterling (BFS), which has been firing broadsides at the euro for months [ . . . ]. ‘The government’s position has not changed’ on the euro since Gordon Brown [the Chancellor of the Exchequer] set out the case in [October 1997] for eventual British membership [ . . . ], Downing Street insisted [ . . . ] yesterday.

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

[But, unlike] the 1975 referendum on whether Britain should stay in the then Common Market which it joined only two years earlier, much of the media is hostile to the Yes campaign. So is small business and a sizeable chunk of vocal City and some financial opinion [ . . . ]. Just as Mr Blair wants to join the euro if he can – but is restrained by voter hostility – so [William] Hague [the Conservative Party leader] is a ‘never’ man in his heart, but dare not rule the euro out in case it bounces back against the dollar (and [the pound] sterling) [ . . . ]. These are lean times for the pro-euro lobby. Since its launch on January 1 [1999], the new currency has taken a sustained beating in the financial markets, prompting the sceptics [ . . . ] to crow that their fears [had been] already vindicated. [The] Kosovo [conflict], the mass sackings at the European Commission,8 feeble economic growth in parts of Euroland – it has been a rough spring all round for the euor-enthusiasts [ . . . ]. [The prime minister,] Mr Blair, [ . . . ] agreed with Mr Brown in 1997 to declare for the euro ‘in principle’, subject not to constitutional considerations [ . . . ] but to the [Chancellor of the Exchequer’s] ‘five economic tests’, notably the [country’s] interest [ . . . ]. After a long phoney war on the euro, battle may be about to commence. (White, 29 June 1999) In the meantime, however, there occurred what Hugo Young refers to as ‘the disaster of the European elections’ (Young, 1 July 1999) for the euroenthusiasts and Europhiles and what Michael White labels as – to look at it from the other side – ‘Mr Hague’s mini-victory in the elections’ (White, 29 June 1999). There is no doubt about the outcome of the June 1999 European Parliament election: The Conservatives were the clear winners in the European parliamentary elections [on Thursday, 10 June 1999], returning 34 MEPs to Labour’s 26 and the Liberal Democrats’ nine. Labour saw its share of the vote fall to 28 per cent, its lowest [in any UK-wide election] since 1983. (The Editor, 18 June 1999, p. 4) The Labour Party’s share of the UK-wide vote in the June 1999 European Parliament election was considerably smaller than its share in the May 1997 UK general election, as indicated by the data in Table 2.1. Table 2.1 shows that Labour’s share of the 1997 general election vote was 43.20 per cent, over 15 per cent more than its share in the 1999 European Parliament election. Consequently, Andrew Grice tells us: A secret report has warned Tony Blair that there are ‘alarming’ implications for the party in its defeat in the European elections [ . . . ]. The initial findings of Labour’s inquest [ . . . ] says the party’s disastrous performance can [ . . . ] be explained [partly, if not] solely by Euroscepticism [ . . . ]. The

Alignments Table 2.1

39

UK General Election Statistics, 1992 and 1997 1992

Electorate, total England Wales Scotland Northern Ireland

1997

1997 % of electorate

1997 % of voters

70.78 21.71 30.57 11.86 6.62

30.68 43.20 16.76 9.35

44 203 694 36 806 557 2 222 533 3 984 406 1 190 198

Votes cast, total Conservative Labour Lib. Democrats Others*

33 619 090 14 089 722 11 567 764 6 027 552 1 926 052

31 287 702 9 600 940 13 517 911 5 243 440 2 925 911

Seats/MPs, total Conservative Labour Lib. Democrats Others

651 336 270 20 25

659 165 418 46 30

Source: Marsden, 1997, p. 215. * Others includes the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (Welsh nationalists), exclusively Northern Ireland parties, inter alia.

report, entitled The Election that Never Was after the record low turnout of 23 per cent [compared with, as can be seen in Table 2.1, the more than 70 per cent turnout for the 1997 general election], says that Labour was hit by the relatively higher turnout of the over-55s and of the agricultural communities [ . . . ]. With the 23 per cent turnout, the Tories captured 36 per cent [of the vote, compared with] Labour’s 28 per cent. (Grice, 25 June 1999) Although for some the result for the Labour Party in the 1999 European Parliament election was ‘disastrous’, others were more circumspect: Labour’s performance in the Euro-elections was poor, but it wasn’t disastrous. Put it this way: 6.5% of the total British electorate voted Labour on June 10 [1999] and [as indicated by Peter Madelson in his June 1999 Brussels speech] 8.3% voted Conservative. That hardly adds up to a Labour catastrophe and a Tory ‘triumph’ – though it clearly tells an unhappy story about British rates of democratic participation [ . . . ]. There is, even so, a warning here for Labour. It relates not to changing allegiance, but motivation. Labour’s core supporters could not be bothered to vote 10 days ago. That may be because they regarded the Euro-elections as too unimportant to bother with, a feeling that will surely disappear when the time comes to pick a [UK] government [ . . . ].9 (The Guardian, 21 June 1999)

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

Nonetheless, previously The Guardian had detected ominous signs in the Euro-election result: Who should panic now that the votes, cast on [10 June], have been added up? The answer, perhaps, is everyone. The results of the 1999 European elections offer crumbs of discomfort for almost everyone involved – from the two main parties to the electorate itself [ . . . ]. Every Briton has cause for concern at a turnout that fell below 23 per cent of registered voters. Of course, it’s true that not all of that vast 77 per cent majority of non-voters were apathetic and disengaged. Many of them were conscientious abstainers, people who had weighed the issues and could not find a party to represent them. Those who consider themselves sincerely pro-European, but Emu-sceptic, for example, felt they lacked a voice in this contest. It’s also possible that lots of Brits decided to sit out the Euro-contest simply because they don’t believe the [European Parliament] in Strasbourg matters that much. Still, the excuses only run so far. The truth is, one in three British voters didn’t even know an election was happening [ . . . ]. Most of us were left cold by this election, and that must reflect a serious lack of British faith in the European project. (The Guardian, 15 June 1999) The apathy and disengagement, disinterest and ignorance among the UK electorate appeared most evident among ‘Labour’s core supporters’ (The Guardian, 21 June 1999), as reflected in the pattern of voter turnout between constituencies: ‘Europe is very distant and remote from most people,’ sighed the local MP, Chris Mullin. ‘But that doesn’t explain why the turnout was so bad – it was pretty awful in [May 1999’s] local elections, and you can almost see the [local] council offices from the back window.’ After [the European Parliament election], Sunderland was [ . . . ] coming to terms with [ . . . ] the lowest recorded turnout in British electoral history. [An] estimated 1.5% turnout at the city’s Hope House polling station [ . . . ]. Of 972 electors, fewer than 20 bothered to vote [ . . . ]. Higher voting in rural [constituencies] than the inner city underlined Labour’s failure to rouse its supporters. [The] stories include a 17% turnout in inner London and 15% in West Bromwich. On average, Labour areas [seem] set to record 20% or less, Tory heartlands 30% or more. (Hetherington, 12 June 1999) The variation in voter turnout in the June 1999 European Parliament election between ‘Labour heartlands’ and ‘Tory heartlands’ in the UK has been summarised by John Curtice (15 June 1999) (see Table 2.2.). Of course, the June 1999 European Parliament election took place throughout the European Union, and just as there were sizeable turnout differences

Alignments Table 2.2 Turnout

European Parliament Election, June 1999, UK Voter

% turnout

Labour heartlands Middle Britain Tory heartlands Source:

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Change in Labour vote since 1997 (%)

18 23 28

–23 –18 –04

Curtice, 15 June 1999.

among UK constituencies, there were wide variations among the EU’s fifteen Member States. Thus, Stephen Bates notes how there was a ‘minority of European voters who found their way to the polling booths’, along with ‘disparities in turnout’: see Table 2.3. Bates adds that while around the time of the 1997 European Parliament election eleven of the fifteen Member State ‘governments [were] under centre-left control’, the election meant that the ‘centre-right Christian Democrats (EPP, the European People’s Party) [had] for the first time replaced the party of European Socialists as the largest, with 224 seats to 180’ (Bates, 19 July 1999). Furthermore: ‘Voters delivered more [MEPs] from [ . . . ] conventional third party groups’, with the Greens, for instance, having secured 50 seats; and ‘also delivered more [MEPs] than ever before [who were] opposed to the whole idea of the EU, such as those from the UK Independence [Party]’ (ibid.) Table 2.3 European Parliament Election, June 1999, EU-wide Voter Turnout Percentage turnout Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Source: Bates, 19 July 1999.

49 91 50 30 47 45 75 51 70 86 30 40 64 39 24

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

Thus: With his pound sign badge in the lapel of his pinstripe suit and his tourist’s camera in his hand, Michael Holmes, the leader of the UK Independence Party and one of its three MEPs, has made an unlikely rebel in Strasbourg during the opening session of the new European parliament this week. But [he] is taking the task of undermining the European Union from within very seriously. The first gesture by the three was to abstain in the procedural vote to elect a president for the parliament: ‘We are here on the basis that we don’t want the UK to remain a member. We cannot vote and look as though we are taking part in the system but we will vote on issues affecting British interests.’ The UKIP have joined the 16 strong Europe of Democracies and Differences [EDD] group at the parliament, consisting of four anti-EU Danes, three Dutch MEPs and six French members who rejoice in the title of ‘hunting, fishing, nature and tradition’. (Bates, 23 July 1999) But, it was not so much the EDD presence in the European Parliament which led John Curtice to interpret the EU-wide voting pattern as ‘Labour’s election warning’ (Curtice, 15 June 1999): The low turnout in the European elections will incline many a Labour politician to comfort themselves with the thought that little can be read into the outcome. They would be wrong. This is an election with important messages and implications for Labour, for Britain’s future in Europe and for the debate about electoral reform [ . . . ]. Plenty of excuses are already at hand. Nearly every government lost ground in the elections [ . . . ]. Trouble is, Labour’s vote fell more heavily than that of any other principal governing [political] party bar the Social Democrats in Denmark, who always lose out to anti-European parties anyway. (Curtice, 15 June 1999) Nevertheless, there were noticeable similarities between the voting patterns of the UK and of the EU as a whole, including the way there were both a swing away from the centre-left political parties and evident voter disinterest: The aftershocks of the political dismay which ran through the British Labour and German Social Democratic parties as the European election votes were counted [on Sunday, 13 June] will reverberate for the next five years. Europe’s 13 centre-left governments face a newly powerful Europe parliament [sic] now dominated by a jubilant and well-entrenched coalition of the centre-right [ . . . ]. The socialist bloc led the conservatives in the last parliament by 214 seats to 201. That has been transformed into a [predicted] conservative predominance of [ . . . ] 235 seats to 180 [ . . . ]. And the remaining socialists could lean rather more to the left than the

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last lot. This was an election where parties that were proudly socialist did well, like those of France and Spain, while parties that were more [middleground] social democratic or New Labour did badly [. . . ]. [However], the conservative bloc (known as the European People’s party) [will] still [be] 80 votes short of an overall majority [and face several] pivotal decisions soon [ . . . ]. [These include] what to do about the almost certain erosion of the national veto with the new Inter-Governmental Conference [IGC] that will start under the Finnish presidency of the EU, which begins [on 1 July 1999]. The agenda is to streamline the [European Commission], which means cutting Britain’s two commissioners back to one, and increasing the use of qualified majority voting10 [ . . . ]. But the real question for all EU politicians: what is the point of giving the parliament so many new powers of co-decision and of veto if the voters are not bothered to give it much of a mandate? [If] the newly-empowered parliament can make common cause with [the re-invigorated Commission under the incoming president, Romano Prodi], then Europe’s balance of power could shift back to Brussels and away from London, Paris and Bonn. (Walker, 15 June 1999) The issue of the ‘balance of power’ within the EU, and in particular between ‘Brussels’ (a euphemism for the EU’s institutions, especially the European Commission, located as this is in Brussels) and ‘London, Paris and Bonn’ – that is, the governments and other state apparatuses at the EU Member State (or nation-state) level – constantly attracts attention and controversy from politicians, the media, scholars, voters and so on. For instance: Romano Prodi, the in-coming European Commission President is to take control of the EU’s economic and foreign policies, in a move which will give him more power than any of his predecessors including Jacques Delors. The reform is one of a series of far-reaching changes adding up to a fundamental shift in the balance of power within the Commission. The moves are designed to buttress the role of the Commission President at the expense of individual commissioners, who in future will work like ministers in a government, rather than as a 20-strong ‘college of equals’. (Castle, 25 June 1999) Likening the European Commission to ‘a government’ – or merely an arm of government – at the EU level as distinct from, and so over and above, the Member State level is politically provocative and analytically contentious. Nonetheless, there are grounds for regarding the Commission as (an arm of) the executive, and so as engaging, in conjunction with other institutions, in governmental activities (in governance) at the EU level. These possibilities are highly pertinent to the themes of Supranationalism in the New World Order and The Legacy of Supranationalism, and so appear as prominent threads through the course of this book.

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

They are brought to mind by, for instance, what for some are the implications of the apparent widespread apathy among voters in the June 1999 European Parliament election. Martin Walker has argued: Europe was facing a crisis of political legitimacy [following the count] as fewer than half its 298 million voters11 looked likely to vote for its 626parliament, despite its dramatic new powers and high public profile it won toppling the European [C]ommission just 12 weeks ago. The poor result for Labour in Britain was mirrored across Europe as socialists fighting for the first time on a common manifesto pledging jobs growth and [sex] equality looked likely to lose their status as the largest single party to the conservative coalition, the European Peoples Party (EPP) [sic]. Eleven of the EU’s 15 [Member State] governments are socialist-led. From 18 MEPs last time, the new Tory block of as many as 30 [UK] MEPs have to decide whether to continue their affiliation [ . . . ] to the EPP, which is dedicated to building a federal Europe state and [which] strongly supports the euro. (Walker, 14 June 1999b) On this dilemma for the UK Conservative MEPs, David Wighton later reported: The Conservatives’ victory in last week’s European elections was in danger of losing its gloss yesterday when the party’s MEPs failed to decide which group they should join in the Strasbourg parliament. After the MEPs’ first meeting, John Maples, the shadow foreign secretary, admitted they were torn between joining the main right-of-centre group and pursuing their Eurosceptic agenda [ . . . ]. Of the 34 Tory MEPs at the meeting, 25 voted to retain their existing alliance with the centre-right European People’s party, the Christian Democrat group, which is strongly pro-single currency. (Wighton, 19 June 1999) This factor is to the fore in accounting for the way the predicted conservative majority over the socialists of 235 seats to 180 (Walker, 15 June 1999) proved to be – as ‘members of the European parliament [gathered] in Strasbourg [on 19 July 1999] for the first time since June’s elections’ (Bates, 19 July 1999) – an over-estimation, given that in the end the European People’s Party could boast just 224 seats compared with the European Socialists’ 180 (Bates, 19 July 1999). The possibility of a ‘federal Europe’ evolving in accordance with and driven by the ambitions of federalists, many of whom are to be found among UK and other EU conservatives, is of considerable relevance to an examination of supranationalism in Europe and the global system, as reflected in the following summary by Timothy Bainbridge and Anthony Teasdale:

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Federation is a form of political organization characterized by a division of responsibility between a central authority and component parts (usually states, regions or provinces) enjoying autonomy in certain fields. The distribution of power between the centre and the component parts in any federal structure will vary from case to case and may vary over time [ . . . ]. Among the areas usually reserved to the central authority are defence, foreign trade, external representation and the negotiation of treaties, the rights and duties flowing from citizenship [sic], and the management of the currency [ . . . ]. Most federations have a central bank, a supreme court and a two-chamber parliament in which the upper chamber is composed of representatives of the states, regions or provinces of which the federation is composed. Federalist ideas were a powerful influence upon many of the pioneers of European integration, such as Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli, in the 1940s and early 1950s [ . . . ]. Federalist ideas, ambitions and assumptions are everywhere evident in the Treaties upon which the European Communities are based. Great importance is attached in the Treaties to supranational institutions of a federal type, and even though the Commission has not emerged as the real European government [ . . . ] it is [the Commission] together with [the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and] the Court of Justice [ . . . ] that give the Community its distinctive quasi-federal structure. It was precisely the supranational and therefore federal character of the Community’s main institutions that prompted the hostility of Charles de Gaulle and, later, Margaret Thatcher, both of whom interpreted the ambitions of [certain] Commission Presidents [ . . . ] as a direct challenge to the integrity and authority of the nation-state and so of [the] sovereignty [of the latter within the Communities]. For some [ . . . ] federation and federalism [ . . . ] are [ . . . ] synonymous with the ‘European superstate’, with ‘rule from Brussels’ and the decline of [the nationstate]. [For others], they are [ . . . ] safeguards against overweening central authority and the emergence of a Europe in which the hard-won rights of nations and communities to manage their own affairs are [ . . . ] recognized [and] guaranteed. (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 236–7; my italics) It is not clear if for Bainbridge and Teasdale supranational institutions are always (by definition) federal in character or if, instead, for these authors the notions ‘supranational’ and ‘federal’ merely overlap, whereby ‘supranational institutions’ can be, but are not necessarily always, of ‘a federal type’. According to Harry Drost, for instance, ‘supranational cooperation’ in ‘the European Union (EU)’, takes place specifically and exclusively ‘within the structures of the European Community (EC), the core of the [EU as an overall] organization’ (Drost, 1995, p. 582). Drost explains: An [ . . . ] organization is considered ‘supranational’ when the [Member States] transfer specified legislative and executive powers to it and its

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

decisions are binding on them and their citizens [sic]. The EC has operated on a supranational basis from its beginnings as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, with the Council of Ministers as the main decision-making body. Over the years more and more non-economic policy areas have been incorporated into the EC framework. The EU’s two other ‘pillars’ alongside the EC, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA), are based on intergovernmental cooperation.12 (Drost, 1995, p. 582) Drost elaborates on the latter as follows: In the European Union (EU), [intergovernmental] cooperation [is conducted] outside the ‘supranational’ structures of the European Community (EC), the core of the organization. Intergovernmental forms of cooperation have been a feature of the European integration process since the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC, now EC) in 1958. They were gradually introduced in non-economic policy areas, either as a prelude to incorporation within the EC decisionmaking process (e.g. research and technology, environment) or because perceived [Member State] interests and sensitivities precluded the transfer of powers from [Member State] governments to the supranational structure (e.g. foreign policy, immigration). The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in November 1993, formalized intergovernmental cooperation in two ‘pillars’, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA). (ibid., p. 320) Given what Drost is saying here, and guided by Bainbridge and Teasdale’s notion of federation, it would seem that neither the EC (at the core – or the central pillar – of the EU) nor the EU overall qualifies as a federation. Within the EU, only the EC (not the CFSP or the CJHA) is supranational in character. At the same time, the EC manifests features which are federal-like (quasifederal), and both it and the EU overall are showing signs of evolving towards eventually being fully federal. Accordingly, for me, the EU qualifies as a proto-federation (cf. Wistrich, 1994). For Bainbridge and Teasdale, it would seem that the process of European integration has brought the installation of supranational institutions and, moreover, entails progress towards the realisation of federalist objectives. Therefore, what the integration process has been about is the distribution of power and control, authority and sovereignty between the nation-state level and the EU ‘superstate’ – or, what is perhaps more appropriately labelled, the EU suprastate – level; and, more specifically, about the redistribution of these things from the former level to the latter. Bainbridge and Teasdale tell us:

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If sovereignty in relation to [nation-]states is defined as an exclusive and comprehensive right of independent action, then it must follow that the member states [sic] of the European Union remain sovereign only in the sense that they could secede from the Union if they so wished.13 First under the Treaty of Paris [which established the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951] and later under the Treaty of Rome [or, more accurately, the Treaties of Rome, which established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (the EAEC or EURATOM)], the signatory Member States committed themselves to creating [ . . . ] an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’, and established independent supranational institutions enjoying their own exclusive jurisdiction. These institutions were endowed [ . . . ] with a capacity for making laws possessing both primacy [over Member State, or domestic, laws] and direct effect in the [Member States]. The Treaty of Rome (unlike the Treaty of Paris) was concluded for an indefinite period and contained no provisions under which a signatory [Member State] could withdraw from the European Economic Community (EEC) [or EURATOM] thereby created. It is sometimes said that in signing the Treaties the [Member States] ‘pooled’ or ‘merged’ their sovereignty in the sense that they thereby committed themselves to exercising their sovereignty in common in certain specified areas. This idea is not consistent with the definition of sovereignty given above, under which the joint exercise of sovereignty is a contradition in terms. It is more helpful to regard [Member States] as having delegated their powers within certain well-defined limits to the institutions of what is now the European Union, albeit for an indefinite period. Such a delegation has occurred with respect to both internal and external actions. Member [States] have also chosen in those areas in which the European Union acts on an intergovernmental basis to exercise their powers in cooperation with one another [ . . . ]. In [the particular case of] ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ [or, that is,] the exclusive and comprehensive right of a [Member State] parliament to make laws within [that Member State’s] constitutional framework [ . . . ], there now exists a Union-wide constitutional framework [ . . . ] and as a consequence of this, [Member State] parliaments have lost their exclusive right to make laws that are binding on their citizens [sic]. Until the European Parliament was directly elected in 1979, it could have been said that [Member State] parliaments had ‘pooled’ their sovereignty by appointing the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), but now that direct elections have given the MEPs their own democratic legitimacy such authority as the Parliament enjoys is no longer dependent on the pooling of [Member State] parliamentary sovereignty. That membership of the European Community or a fortiori of the European Union entails ‘loss of sovereignty’ is amongst the most basic of all the arguments deployed by

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

anti-Europeans, especially in the context [or, that is, in view of the objectives and implications] of federalism. (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 418–19) Bainbridge and Teasdale appear to operate with an exclusive notion of sovereignty, according to which the term refers to the exclusive and comprehensive enjoyment and exercise of power and control, rights and authority, so that sovereignty (by definition) is indivisible, at least beyond a nation-state’s geo-political boundaries. It cannot be pooled, shared or spread beyond a nation-state’s own, domestic governing (state) institutions; it is either exlusively possessed or wholly lost by a particular nation-state, and in the event of the latter will presumably mean concomitantly the demise of that nationstate. This approach to sovereignty seems to be consistent with the following: In the United Kingdom, [the sovereignty of Parliament] is the constitutional principle that supreme political authority resides in [the UK] Parliament, comprising the sovereign (in effect the Cabinet or government acting in his/her name), the House of Lords and, crucially, the House of Commons. The key implication of the principle is that any law passed by Parliament is [ . . . ] constitutional and cannot be challenged. (Drost, 1995, p. 567) In so far as the UK Parliament (or Westminster) has lost this right to the EC/EU’s institutions, then following Bainbridge and Teasdale not only the UK Parliament but the UK as a nation-state has relinquished (by Treaty) its sovereignty, this having been transferred to the EC/EU – there being no such thing (by definition) as a division of sovereignty between what are now the EU’s ‘supreme’ (that is, supranational) decision-taking and law-making institutions and the Member States’ (nation-states’) own, domestic institutions, including parliaments. Bainbridge and Teasdale’s exclusive notion of sovereignty and the difficulties it carries and ambiguities it lends itself to, as indicated in the case of the relationship between the UK and the EU’s institutions, is evident in Colin Padfield and Anthony Byrne’s account of the British Constitution: The phrase ‘sovereign power’ means for our purposes the highest power in the state [sic], i.e. the power vested in Parliament together with the Cabinet who are charged with the [ . . . ] duty of governing our lives [ . . . ]. Sovereignty is the supreme power within a State [sic]. That supreme power in the United Kingdom is Parliament [ . . . ]. In theory the sovereignty of Parliament is absolute. It is not, for example, subordinate to any other body or group inside the United Kingdom or outside [ . . . ]. In practice, the ‘sovereignty’ is a number of rights any one of which can be abstracted. The Crown makes treaties with other countries. The agreements give rights and impose duties (the duties or obligations detract

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from the concept of sovereignty [sic]). Moreover, the United Kingdom is a member of international oranisations and bodies, e.g. NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF). (Padfield and Byrne, 1990, pp. 2–24) Already, what Padfield and Byrne mean by ‘sovereignty’ and whether, for them, sovereignty (or sovereign power) is ‘absolute’ – or exclusive and indivisible, in the sense that a nation-state (or, within this geo-political entity, ‘the state’) cannot (by definition) pool, share or spread it beyond this nation-state’s geo-political boundaries – is unclear. Padfield and Byrne do nothing to help elucidate matters in this respect when they go on to say: The ultimate aim of the Treaty of Rome (1958) is to achieve economic and political unity. The Treaty of Rome is intended to be of unlimited duration. Opponents of Britain’s accession fear the loss of Parliament’s authority. They point to the legislation imposed by the community [sic], which is binding on all member States [sic] and means loss of sovereignty. The supporters of the EEC reply that there is no loss or surrender of sovereignty, but a ‘pooling’ of sovereignty by all concerned. In renouncing some of our sovereignty we receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members. (ibid., p. 24) If Padfield and Byrne are to be believed, the ‘supporters of the EEC’ argue that there is no loss of sovereignty for the UK by virtue of its membership even though the UK has renounced sovereignty. The questions arise: ‘if the UK has renounced sovereignty, has it renounced all or only some sovereignty?’; ‘is it possible to renounce some sovereignty, or is sovereignty exclusive and indivisible?’ Of course, the answers to these questions pivotally depend upon how ‘sovereignty’ is defined, but then the further question arises: ‘why define “sovereignty” in “exclusive” or “absolute” terms, especially when doing so causes analytical difficulties and results in ambiguities in interpreting the relationship between the EU’s Member States and the EU’s institutions?’ Why not allow for (conceptually) a division, or distribution, of sovereignty (or supreme authority) between the Member State level and the EU level, something which would appear to be consistent with the following from Padfield and Byrne: A Federal State is a group of constituent units (States or Territories) [where] power is divided between (i) a National Government which, in matters of common concern, e.g. defence, is supreme over the whole country; and (ii) State Governments which are supreme in those matters left to them, e.g. State schools. For the citizens living under Federal authorities there are in fact two sets of laws: (i) Federal law, and (ii) State Law. The main examples of Federal States are: the United States of America, Australia,

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

Canada, West Germany [and, since October 1990, when the Treaty of Unification came into effect, (unified) Germany, a country consisting of ‘sixteen Länder or states, each of which has wide powers over its domestic affairs’ (Isaacs, 1998, p. 571)] and Switzerland. The USA became federated because, following the War of Independence, the thirteen States then in existence were too weak individually to carry on the work of government. They joined together as equals for the common convenience. Though they gave certain powers to the Federal Government, each State preserved its own independence by reserving to itself certain well-defined powers. [The] powers which are usually yielded to a Federal Government are those dealing with (i) national defence; (ii) foreign policy; (iii) the control of international trade, through customs duties and tariffs, and similar matters. Powers of a purely local character are reserved to the State Governments. (Padfield and Byrne, 1990, p. 3) Padfield and Byrne’s explanation for the decision by ‘the thirteen States then in existence’ to federate, and so become the USA, is noteworthy: essentially, the thirteen territories ‘joined together as equals for the common convenience’, and because each territory was ‘too weak individually to carry on the work of government’. But, just as the USA was created by what became its constituent States out of choice – albeit one shaped by expediency, or a realistic assessment of what was necessary – in the pursuit of successful internal governance combined with enhanced external-oriented strength, so it has been argued: Almost half a century of European integration has had a profound effect on the development of the continent and the attitudes of its inhabitants. It has also changed the balance of power. All [Member State] governments, regardless of political complexion, now recognise that the era of absolute [nation-state] sovereignty is gone. Only by joining forces and working towards a ‘destiny henceforth shared’, to quote the ECSC Treaty, can Europe’s old nations continue to enjoy economic and social progress and maintain their influence in the world. (Fontaine, 1998, p. 8) The ‘notion of a United States of Europe’, or ‘the federalist’ approach, has provided much of ‘the impetus for European integration’ (Fontaine, 1998, p. 5), although the EC/EU is not – at least not yet – a federation, even though: What sets the European Union apart from more traditional international organisations is its unique institutional structure. In accepting the European Treaties, Member States relinquish a measure of sovereignty to independent institutions representing [nation-state] and shared interests. (ibid., p. 9)

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Instead: The Union is an advanced form of multisectoral integration, its competence extending to the economy, industry, politics, citizens’ rights and foreign policy of its fifteen Member States. The Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1951), the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (1957), as amended by the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) and finally the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), form the constitutional basis of the Union, binding its Member States more firmly than any conventional agreement between sovereign States. The European Union generates directly applicable legislation and confers specific rights which can be relied upon by its citizens [crucially, without the constitutional right of over-riding interference and control by the Member States to which the latter belong (by virtue of their respective nationalities)]. (ibid., p. 6) In this regard, Gil Carlos Roderiguez Iglesías, President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, has pointed out: The Treaties setting up the European Union have entrusted the Court of Justice with the task of ensuring respect for Community law and exercising the jurisdictional competences attributed to it. In addition to its constitutional functions in the resolution of conflicts of competence between Member States and Community institutions, the Court has the task of monitoring the legality of the actions of these institutions and of Member States in the context of the Community as such. Its major role in the interpretation of the body of Community law allows it, with the Court of First Instance and that of the courts of the Member States, to maintain the uniqueness of implementation. The Court’s legitimacy rests on the recognition and acceptance of its mission by the Member States and the people of the European Union. Consequently, the basic principles of European law which it has defined, which range from the direct applicabilty of Community measures to their primacy [over Member State measures], and include the responsibilty of Member States for the damages to individuals resulting from violations of Community law, have enabled this law to become part and parcel of the daily life of EU citizens [or, that is, Member State nationals] [ . . . ]. With the coming into force of the third stage of economic and monetary union (EMU), and of the Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May [1999], the provisions of certain conventions established in the framework of the third pillar of the European Union (justice and home affairs) will involve a considerable increase in the number of cases which will be submitted to the Court of Justice and the Court of First

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Instance, given their wide-ranging jurisdictional competence. (Iglesías, June/July 1999) In spite of the primacy (or supremacy) of Community law, the EC/EU is not a federation, federal nation-state or federal state, if only because sovereignty in relation to ‘defence’ and various other external affairs has been ‘reserved’ as the preserve of Member State governments (see above; Padfield and Byrne, 1990, p. 3). Nonetheless, sovereignty in relation to a whole range of (largely, but not only, internal) matters, has been relinquished to the EU’s supranational institutions – ones which stand, or reign, supreme in relation to the decision-taking and law-making which fall within its competence. The European Community (if not the EU as a whole), while not a federation is, nevertheless, a supranational (or, more cumbersomely, a supra-nation-state) organisation.

3 Political Economy

As with Iglesías ( June/July 1999), Bainbridge and Teasdale touch on one particular 1990s’ development which is indicative of the general European trend: The provisions governing [Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)] were added to the Treaty of Rome by the Maastricht Treaty. They set up a number of new institutions and specify the stages by which EMU is to be achieved, by 1999 at the latest [ . . . ]. A reference to EMU was added to Article 2 EEC by the Maastricht Treaty, and Article 32 EEC refers to ‘the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single currency [ . . . ]’ [ . . . ]. As well as a single currency the [final] stage [of EMU] entails the creation of a European System of Central Banks (ESCB), composed of the [European Central Bank (ECB)] and representatives of the [Member States’] central banks [ . . . ]. Most important [ . . . ], EMU raises issues of sovereignty. EMU entails the transfer of powers hitherto exercised exclusively by [nation-state] governments to an independent ECB, including the right to authorize issues of currency. (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 123–5) Harry Drost provides further detail: In the European Union (EU), [economic and monetary union (EMU), is] a policy objective aimed at the full integration of the [Member States’] economies. It was formally proclaimed in the Single European Act signed in February 1986 and set out in detail in the Maastricht Treaty agreed in December 1991. EMU is without doubt the most ambitious project undertaken thus far within the context of European integration. Its realization calls for far-reaching coordination of [Member States’] economic, financial, monetary and social policies. Specifically, it is generally considered to require [ . . . ] the free movement of goods, services, capital and people ([hence, the creation of the] ‘single internal market’); [ . . . ] and [ . . . ] the 53

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establishment of [a] ‘single currency’ [ . . . ]. The single internal market was completed at the end of 1992.1 Under proposals agreed in June 1989, progress towards EMU would be in three stages. Stage one began in July 1990 and provided for closer cooperation among governments and central banks [ . . . ]. The Maastricht Treaty sets out the next two stages. Stage two provides for the establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) to [among other things] prepare the transition to the single currency. Stage three provides for the creation of an independent European central bank [sic] (replacing the EMI) at the apex of a system of national central banks and the introduction of a single currency [ . . . ] by the beginning of 1999 [at the latest]. Under the [Maastricht Treaty] ‘opt-outs’ negotiated by their governments, the United Kingdom and Denmark were not committed to moving to stage three. (Drost, 1995, pp. 172–3)2 In the end, the so-called euro-zone began life with participation of eleven of the EU’s fifteen Member States: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. That is, as the European Commission has outlined: From 1 January 1999 the euro is the common currency of 11 European Union (EU) countries [ . . . ]. The national currencies, which will remain in use until 2002, now represent subdivisions of the euro, on the basis of firm and irrevocable conversion rates, fixed by the EU Council of Ministers [or, more specifically, the ECOFIN Council] on 31 December 1998. These rates were fixed on the basis of the rates for the ecu, the former European currency unit, on that day in the exchanges of the countries taking part in the euro. One euro was taken to be equal to one ecu [ . . . ]. The euro was introduced on international financial markets on 4 January 1999, the first working day after it was created.3 (European Commission, February 1999a) The introduction of the euro was greeted by the European Commission, and in particular its President, optimistically: The smooth launch of the euro this week on the international financial markets is evidence of its solid status, Commission President Jacques Santer [has] said [ . . . ]. Founded in an economic culture of stablity, the euro will be a strong currency and will help to create the right conditions for prosperity and employment, he said. (European Commission, 7 January 1999) Moreover, the Commission was able to report ‘Washington welcomes the euro . . . as does Japan’: ‘We welcome the launch of the euro, a historic step that 11 nations in Europe have taken toward a more complete economic and monetary

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union. A successful economic union that contributes to a dynamic of Europe is clearly in our long-term interests,’ President Bill Clinton declared on 4 January 1999. The Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, noted that same day, ‘If it’s good for Europe, it’s good for the United States.’ [ . . . ]. According to Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for the International Economy in Washington, ‘the euro will rather quickly start to rival the dollar as an international reserve instrument.’ [ . . . ]. ‘The euro has got off to a very good start,’ the Japanese Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, declared in Bonn on 12 January 1999. ‘I hope that the euro will have a stable development, and will be as strong as the dollar,’ he said, adding ‘the European currency has opened up a new chapter in history. So far the dollar has had the main role. The European currency is very important for the stablisation of the international financial situation . . . It is desirable that the dollar, the euro and the yen remain three key currencies.’ (European Commission, February 1999b) To help the euro be a strong, stable and key currency, the ‘powers of the European Central Bank (ECB) were strengthened, and its areas of action extended, thanks to the three regulations adopted by the EU Council on 23 November [1998]’ (European Commission, January 1999a, p. 2). According to the Commission: The regulations [increased] the efficiency and credibility of the ECB, in place since July 1997. Under the first of them, the ECB can impose minimum reserves on banks in the euro area. The nature and scale of these reserves are defined by the regulation. What is more, the ECB has the right to impose financial sanctions on banks which do not comply. The second of these regulations deals with the statistical data which the ECB must collect from the institutions and organisations of the countries in the euro area. It specifies the information to be obtained, and gives the ECB the power to check it for accuracy and, once again, impose sanctions on those bodies which fail to carry out their obligations. The third regulation sets out the rules the ECB must respect when imposing sanctions, where it has the power to do so. The upper limit for fines shall be EUR 500 000 and for period penalty payments EUR 10 000 per day of infringement. The European Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction over any disputes concerning sanctions. (European Commission, January 1999a, p. 2) Here, of course, the Commission is alluding to the supreme authority of the ECB and the Court of Justice as, in other words, supranational institutions within the European Union. Several weeks after the introduction of the euro, Yves-Thibault de Silguy on behalf of the European Commission, still felt able to boast:

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

The veritable vote of confidence in the euro, expressed by the markets, [is] confirmation of the successful launch of the single currency [ . . . ]. The euro has [ . . . ] acquired real credibility from the outset. (Yves-Thibault de Silguy, March 1999) However, about three months later, Martin Walker noted how the European Parliament election ‘campaign was fought as the 11 EU countries which have adopted the new single currency watched the euro sink dismally on the currency exchanges’ (Walker, 14 June 1999b), a process which continued well beyond the election. Thus, a few weeks on, Larry Elliott and Mark Milner reported how a ‘fresh wave of selling sent the euro crashing to a new low against the dollar’ on 8 July 1999, ‘driving the single currency’ very close to ‘parity with the greenback’. As a result, the euro had lost about 12 per cent of its value against the dollar in the six months following its January 1999 start (Elliott and Milner, 9 July 1999). Not long afterwards the euro’s value on the international currency markets reached a low point, subsequently increasing. On 18 July Anthony Browne reported: ‘Currency dealers have nicknamed the euro the “toilet” currency, saying that it’s going down the pan’ (Browne, 18 July 1999). On 19 July, the euro was 200 days old, but ‘rather than taking the world by storm, it [had] fallen like a stone – dropping in value from $1.17 to just over $1.01’ (Browne, 18 July 1999). Then, the next day, the ‘euro rallied sharply in hectic trading in New York’ rising ‘by well over a cent against the dollar’ (Financial Times, 20 July 1999); and the following day the ‘battered euro turned the tables on the dollar in style [ . . . ] when a record United States trade deficit and upbeat economic news from Germany prompted a wave of large-scale single currency buying’ (Elliott, 21 July 1999). On 24 July 1999, The Guardian summarised: After all the gloom, the euro appears to be retreating from the precipice. At the start of the week it stood not far off parity at 1.0105 against the dollar, but by the end of the week it was reaching above 1.05 and the prospect of its sinking through parity had retreated. The currency strategists believe that over the medium-term it will need to clear 1.08 before it is fully established that the bottom has been reached. The euro strengthening has been coming for some time, despite the yearning in Britain and elsewhere for it to slip through parity. The key has always been the relative strengths of the US and European economies. In the past week or so there has been a recognition that there might be a switch in prospect. Gradually, the economic numbers out of Germany – the core of euroland – have been improving, along with the business confidence there. As a result, the official forecasters have been able to upgrade 1999 and 2000 gross domestic product forecasts to 2% and 2.5% respectively. In contrast there have been some signals that the high-octane US economy and the super-dollar could take a breather. The Japanese have been required to

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intervene several times over the past week to prevent the yen rising against the US currency. (The Guardian, 24 July 1999b)4 By the end of July, as if any crisis over the value and fate of the euro was in the past, the European Commission confirmed that: Most Member States preparing to introduce euro notes and coins from 1 January 2002 are planning a shorter period of dual circulation (with [domestic] currencies) than the maximum six months [allowed]. They are generally aiming for between one and three months [ . . . ], according to a report drawn up by the Commission for the [Council of Economy and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) meeting scheduled for] 11 September [1999]. The launch of the euro on 1 January was a success, it says, with the new currency in active use in financial markets. Euro-denominated bond issues accounted for 45% of the world total in the first four months of [1999] (compared with the equivalent of less than 30% in 1997 [before the euro, and so during the ecu – European Currency Unit – era]). Prices are increasingly being displayed in [euros, although, many businesses], particularly [small and medium enterprises (SMEs)], are preparing [only] slowly for the euro [ . . . ]; many have deferred switching their accounts until the end of 2001. (European Commission, 29 July 1999) In spite of the tardiness of SMEs, the European Commission appeared confident about the euro’s future, and in particular about the timetable for the planned phasing out of Member States’ domestic currency notes and coins by the deadline of 1 January 2002, yet another significant step in the consolidation of the EU as a supranational organisation, and even towards the formation of a federal nation-state: Fear of more integration is the principal reason for the unpopularity of Europe, yet integration has immense advantages. We have failed even to examine the benefits because we have chosen to pretend that political union is a slander put about by Europhobes. [It] is [not] possible for Britain to participate within a single currency without taking it another step along the road to a federal state. Monetary union is essential to the prosperity of the whole continent [ . . . ]. But it [ . . . ] does involve the sacrifice of rights and responsibilities which were once the prerogative of the Westminister Parliament [ . . . ]. Three cheers for political union. On the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, we ought to accept European Union for what it is and argue the benefits of One Europe. (Roy Hattersley [ . . . ] 25 March 1997). (quoted in Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, pp. viii–ix) While fear of more integration may well be the principal factor behind the unpopularity of the European Union, the slide in the value of the eleven-country

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Table 3.1

Basic Statistics of the EU, 1998: a Comparative View

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK EU-15 USA Japan

Area (000s of sq km)

Population (millions)

84 31 43 337 544 357 132 70 301 3 41 92 505 450 244 3 234 9 373 378

8.0 10.2 5.3 5.2 58.8 82.0 10.5 3.7 57.6 0.4 15.7 9.9 39.4 8.8 59.0 374.5 268.9 126.3

Gross DomPer Population estic Product at Capita Gross Density Domestic (inhabitants per Market Prices (billions PPS*) Product (PPS *) sq km) 95 332 121 15 107 229 79 52 190 158 377 108 78 22 242 117 29 334

1 1

1

1 7 7 2

180.4 228.9 120.1 102.1 218.9 787.6 143.8 74.9 177.7 13.9 329.1 140.2 619.7 173.3 163.1 471.1 747.5 901.0

22 22 22 19 20 21 13 20 20 32 20 14 15 19 19 19 28 23

261 452 678 813 694 740 607 244 069 678 964 094 592 528 669 834 812 017

Source: ‘Basic statistics of the European Union and its 15 Member States: comparison between the European Union (EU-15), the United States and Japan’, in European Commission, February 1999c. * PPS is an abbreviation of Purchasing Power Standard – ‘a common unit representing an identical volume of goods and services for each country’ (European Commission, February 1999c). Thus, ‘1 PPS = BFR 41.99; DM 2.31; DKr 9.89; PTA 129.76; FF 6.98; UKL 0.68; DRA 223.77; LIT 1 648.04; IRL 0.71; LFR 41.90; HFL 2.31; ESC 136.52; OS 15.67; SKR 10.76; FMK 6.95; USD 1.03; YEN 193.17’ (European Commission, February 1999c).

euro on the international currency markets, against not only the US dollar but also the UK pound, may have played a part in bringing about a similar voting pattern in the UK on the one hand and throughout the EU on the other in the June 1999 European Parliament election. Whatever the various factors at work, however, there is no doubt that, in particular, the overall turnout in this election was well below the number of prospective voters: the EU’s electorate. Table 3.1 presents some ‘basic statistics’ for the European Union, its Member States and also, for comparative purposes, the USA and Japan, as compiled by the European Commission just before the June 1999 election (European Commission, February 1999). It is useful to put Table 3.1 data in perspective, including to begin with that in the second and third columns:

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In a few hours the world will mark a chilling milestone. Earth’s six billionth inhabitant will be born early [on 19 July 1999]. The birth represents an extradordinary and deeply worrying trend: it has taken humanity less than 40 years to double its numbers. ‘It took all of history for the world’s population to reach one billion in 1804, but little more than 150 years to reach three billion in 1960,’ said Amy Coen, president of Population Action International. Now, not quite 40 years later, we are twice that number. The figure is based on estimates made by the US Census Bureau. ‘It is not intended to imply that the population of the world is known to the last person,’ said an official. Nevertheless the bureau reckons that the world’s population will reach six billion at 1.24am on Monday [19 July]. The United Nations believes this figure will not be reached until 12 October. (McKie, 18 July 1999) There were disagreements over when the six billion point in the growth of the world’s population would be reached: On or around October 12 [1999], a Very Important Baby will be born somewhere in the world. The baby’s arrival is not in itself big news, since three are born every second, but this one will mark world population reaching six billion. (The Editor, 30 July 1999) It would seem that at some moment between about 19 July and about 12 October 1999, the world’s population reached six billion, around 6.25 per cent of whom are living in the EU, compared with roughly 4.5 per cent in the USA and approximately 0.63 per cent in Japan. At the same time, however, what the attempt to estimate the world’s population indicates is that it is necessary to treat the data in columns two and three of Table 3.1 with caution. Indeed, being official data, they are likely to be erroneous. Thus, according to Richard Reeves, in the United Kingdom, for instance, there is ‘a parallel world of people who do not want to officially exist’: Potentially numbering hundreds of thousands, the missing are concentrated in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow [ . . . ]. [It] is impossible, by definition, to know how many people [are involved. However, the] disparity between some sets of official figures suggests there is a big gap between official counts and reality. The population of the east London boroughs is supposed to be between 605,000 and 610,000, but 710,000 people are registered with local GPs [ . . . ]. Some of the missing around the country are clearly those worried about their immigration status. But there are many other reasons to join the shadow world: fear, ignorance, discrimination – all can drive people to the margins of society [ . . . ]. The missing are a heterogenous population; asylum seekers, anarchists, frightened Asian women, criminals, council tax evaders, sex workers.

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

But the rank and file are young men. The 1991 census ‘under-enumerated’ – statistician-speak for missed – approximately a million people. Subsequent research suggested men in the 15–45 age bracket were most likely to have slipped through the net. (Reeves, 27 June 1999) On the grounds indicated by Reeves, there is a good chance that each of the population figures in Table 3.1 will be less than accurate; and who knows, what Reeves refers to as ‘the missing’ may help account for Walker’s figure of ‘298 million voters’ in the EU (Walker, 14 June 1999b) compared with the European Commission’s: Around 289 [million people] in the 15 EU Member States [were eligible] to [vote] in [ June 1999’s] fifth direct elections to the European Parliament. The elections [to] choose 626 MEPs [took] place on 10 June in the UK [and on either] 11 or 13 June [elsewhere]. A proportional representation system [was] used in England, Scotland and Wales for the first time [covering 84 seats, and] Northern Ireland [again used] its single transferable [voting] system [to choose three MEPs].5 The count [began in] the evening of Sunday 13 June, after [all] the [polling stations had closed] across the EU [ . . . ]. (European Commission, 3 June 1999, p. 1) Around 289 million people is just over 8.9 per cent of the EU’s official population of 3 234 000, but there is a strong chance that the latter is an (even considerable) underestimate, and that the number of people who were officially eligible to vote (presumably in the sense of being registered to do so) in the 1999 EU-wide election would have been markedly less than the number who were eligible to register to vote. Whether the gap was nine million or much larger is unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that ‘the missing’ in this particular regard will have included a large number of disinterested or disaffected Citizens of the EU.6 Evidence and inference lend themselves to the firm conclusion that (to paraphrase Martin Walker) substantially fewer than half the EU’s potential (registered and non-registered) voters actually voted (Walker, 14 June 1999a) in the June 1999 European Parliament election – or, that is, probably no more than 4 per cent of the EU’s total population. It is, of course, impossible to know if the discrepancy between the potential number of voters and the actual number influenced the final distribution of the ‘626 newly elected Members of the European Parliament’ this being: ‘the European People’s Party, which includes [UK] Conservative MEPs (224 seats), Socialists, which includes Labour (180), Liberal Democrats and Reform (43) and Greens (38)’ (European Commission, 17 June 1999).7 Nonetheless, what is striking and without doubt significant about the gulf between the actual and the potential vote in the 1999 election is how it occurred in spite of changes which had been purposefully introduced within the EU to encourage people to feel less

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detached, to regard the EU’s institutions and activities as less removed and, in particular, to engage in the EU’s parliamentary and democratic processes. The European Parliament had been given greater powers in ‘response’ to – as an attempt to ‘overcome’ – the ‘democratic deficit’ within the EU (Walker, 14 June 1999a). Walker argues: ‘It didn’t work, at least in [the June 1999] elections. Apathy reigned everywhere’ (Walker, 14 June 1999a). For Walker the feeble turnout at the June 1999 European Parliament election indicated: Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’ is back with a vengeance. The phrase was first heard during the 1991–92 negotiations of the Maastricht treaty [sic], initially rejected by Danish voters and almost rejected by the French. The response was to try to overcome the deficit, and to end the sense of voters’ remoteness from Brussels and its bureaucracy, by giving the European parliament far more powers and responsibilities with the Amsterdam treaty of 1997. (Walker, 14 June 1999a) Thus, as summarised by the European Commission: The Treaty of Amsterdam, the new ‘constitution’ of the 15-[Member State] European Union, came into force on 1 May [1999]. It increases the EU’s possibilities of action and gives greater powers to the European Parliament, the only EU institution to be directly elected by European voters. The Treaty came into force, as provided by the Treaty itself, on the first day of the second month following the last ratification which, as it so happened, was by France on 30 March. However, the EU had already begun to implement the Treaty’s employment provisions last year, by adopting the guidelines for 1998 and 1999. The new Treaty gives the European Parliament a greater role in the drafting and adoption of European legislation on various matters, and, in particular, on the right of establishment, regional aid, transport, vocational training, the fight against fraud, equal opportunities for men and women, and the coordination of national social security systems. The ban on discrimination based on nationality also appears in the new Treaty. From now on, the EU can also take measures against other forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, religion, opinions, handicaps, age and sexual orientation. In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty reinforces cooperation among the Fifteen at the level of the police and the judiciary in such areas as crimes against children, corruption and terrorism. It brings the activities of the 10-nation Schengen group, whose aim is the elmination of checks at the Union’s internal borders, within the scope of the EU. The Treaty also furthers the common foreign and security policy, and gives the EU increased means for dealing with immigration and refugee problems.8 (European Commission, May 1999)

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In the build-up to the June 1999 election, the President of the European Parliament, José María Gil-Robles, confirmed: The European Parliament has seen its institutional role strengthened at the level of both legislation and controls. In the first case, the co-decision procedure has allowed [it] to intervene effectively in the adoption of more than 100 regulations, thus translating the interests and concerns of the people [which MEPs] represent into law [ . . . ]. As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, and even more so of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Commission cannot legitimately carry out its duties unless it can count on Parliament’s political confidence at all times, just as national governments cannot remain in power without the support of their respective legislative bodies [ . . . ]. The Commission will [ . . . ] benefit [ . . . ], to the extent that a strong executive, capable of securing Parliament’s support in a credible manner, will always be better placed to carry out its duties [ . . . ]. The operating methods inherited from what was simply a consultative body, made up of delegates from the various national parliaments, have been replaced by standards and practices which are more those of a genuine legislative body. (Gil-Robles, May 1999) The 1999 election was for a European Parliament which, as an EU institution, had recently become stronger – more powerful, relative to the EU’s other institutions and in relation to the Member States’ institutions, decision-making procedures and people’s everyday lives: The 626 new MEPs from the 15 EU [Member States] have for the first time the power of veto over almost all European affairs. Having forced the resignation of all 20 EU commissioners in March [1999], [the Parliament] also has the power to veto nominations from the heads of government [or state] for the commission presidency. The Amsterdam treaty [sic], which came into force on May 1 [1999], endows [the Parliament] with powers of co-decision over all EU legislation and regulation except for agriculture and foreign policy. But even in these two areas, [the Parliament] has wide influence. [For instance, foreign] policy needs money, like the proposed £3bn a year for the post-war Balkan stability pact, and MEPs have to approve the EU’s budget and judge whether money has been properly spent [ . . . ]. MEPs [have acquired] the final say over hundreds of items of everyday life, from the maximum noise of lawnmowers to car emission standards, from maximum working hours to whether extra hormones or gentically-modified organisms can get into Europe’s food. They do this through a uniquely European system called co-decision, which means all laws and regulations have to be approved by both [the parliament] and [the Council of Ministers]. If they disagree, they go to conciliation to find a compromise. If they fail, the proposal fails. The last

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parliament had powers of co-decision in 15 areas of EU-life, including consumer affairs and transport policy. The new one has co-decision powers in 38 areas, including social and employment policies and rules on open government. In the past, the [Commission] had the sole right to initiate [or, that is, to propose] legislation and the [Member States’] governments meeting in the [Council of Ministers] held the real power. [The] Parliament used to be a hybrid between a rubber stamp and a consultative body. (Walker, 14 June 1999b) Peter Norman similarly summed up the enhanced powers of the European Parliament on the day the UK elected its MEPs: It has been a struggle for politicans to stir enthusiasm among the European Union’s 297m voters for the fifth direct elections for the European Parliament, which start today. But for businesses, the 626 deputies who will meet in Strasbourg [in July] will be important as never before. The outgoing parliament hit the headlines for successfully harrying the European Commission, the EU’s executive, over charges of mismanagement, fraud and nepotism, but changes to the EU treaty [sic] will give its successor greatly increased scope to shape European legislation [ . . . ]. Since November 1993, [the Parliament] and the [Council of Ministers], have had equal powers to influence some legislation. This procedure, known as co-decision, was simplified and expanded on May 1 [1999]: now the two institutions shape most areas of EU law-making, except for agriculture, tax and monetary union. Working together on Commission proposals, [the Parliament] and [the Council] are reponsible for issues such as the environment, social policy, health and consumer protection [ . . . ]. [Thus,] thanks to co-decision [ . . . ] bank customers have deposits up to [20 000 euros] (£13,000) guaranteed in the event of bank failure; [ . . . ] European television viewers have a right to watch at least some major sporting events on terrestial channels; [and] EU consumers are informed through detailed labelling of the characteristics and properties of novel or genetically modified foods. ‘Both in quanitative and [in] qualitative terms, there is strong evidence that [the Parliament] has made a significant difference to the shape of Community legislation,’ explains Michael Shackleton, a senior Parliament official who plays a key role in ironing out differences between the [Parliament] and [the Council of Ministers]. ‘Co-decision has created a new dynamic within the legislative arena of the EU.’ (Norman, 10 June 1999) For Peter Norman, under the co-decision procedure, the European Commission proposes, the European Parliament amends, the Council of Ministers approves and the Parliament and the Council adopt: ‘If [the Council of Ministers] reject amendments, [the Parliament] can approve legislation at a

64

The Legacy of Supranationalism

second reading ready for joint approval, throw it out (by majority vote), or work on a compromise with the [Council]’ (Norman, 10 June 1999). The out-going, pre-June 1999 Parliament successfully pushed the European Commission, the EU’s executive (under Jacques Santer as its president), into resigning, before clearing the way for the appointment of a fresh Commission by confirming its new president, the former Italian prime minister Romano Prodi (Bates, 5 May 1999; 6 May 1999). The in-coming Parliament subsequently approved the ‘members of the new governing team in Brussels [as] drawn up by [ . . . ] Romano Prodi’ (Walker, 7 July 1999). But, it is pertinent to note that while both the Parliament had gained strength as an institution within the EU and ‘the incoming [president took] control of the EU’s economic and foreign policies [in] a move which [gave] him more power than any of his predecessors’ (Castle, 25 June 1999), so there were further moves being proposed to reduce the democratic deficit, and that above all in this regard: Europe’s 298m voters could win the chance to vote directly for the next president of the European [Commission] under a proposal to be debated in the new European [Parliament]. The creation of a ‘European president’ was floated by the former [Commission] chairman Jacques Delors as a way of bringing voters into the EU political process. (Walker, 16 June 1999) Whether a democratically elected European president would actually bring voters more into the EU political process aside, it could readily be interpreted as yet another development signalling the EU’s drift towards federation, albeit by way of the enhancement of its supranational character and of, at least very largely, top-down intervention and change. Certainly, the objective was keenly shared by Romano Prodi: Romano Prodi, the former Italian prime minister chosen by European Union leaders to replace Jacques Santer as head of the European Commission following its resignation [in March 1999], set out his federalist credentials yesterday. Mr Prodi’s speech, which had Tory Euro-sceptics predictably demanding his sacking before he has even [formally] taken office, insisted that Europe must build towards political as well as monetary unity. Mr Prodi, whose appointment MEPs are expected to endorse [in May 1999], said: ‘We are not here to conserve but to reform. This must be a turning point in the process of integration. We must not tolerate any delay in the realisation of our project. The single market was the theme of the 1980s, the single currency was the theme of the 1990s. We must now face the difficult task of moving towards a single economy, a single political unity.’ [ . . . ] His agenda, including a call for better co-ordination of European tax policies, more majority voting in EU decision-making and a common position on foreign and defence policy, was welcomed by

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leaders of all the main political groups in the European Parliament. Labour MEPs welcomed Mr Prodi’s speech, saying that his emphasis on economic reform and unemployment chimed with Blairite ‘third way’ politics [ . . . ]. The [Conservative] shadow foreign secretary, Michael Howard, led Tory Euro-sceptics back at Westminster in claiming that Mr Prodi was unacceptable. ‘To promote Mr Prodi as president of the commission [sic], a man totally dedicated to political union, which means the destruction of Westminster democracy and choice for British voters, is an outrageous failure of political will,’ Mr Howard said. (Bates, 14 April 1999) Michael Howard’s invective is indicative of the gap between Mr Prodi’s approach to European integration and that of not only many prominent – British and other – political leaders, but also many and even most Europeans: The scale of Mr Prodi’s task as he takes over the EU presidency [sic] was underlined yesterday when the latest poll found that only 49% of Europeans thought EU membership was ‘a good thing’, with Britain lowest at 31%. This represents a 5% fall since the poll six months ago, and contrasts with a peak of over 70% in 1991. Only 44% of Europeans in the 15-[country] poll say their country has benefitted from EU membership. This may be because when asked where the EU mostly spent its money, the biggest single group of respondents – 26% – said they thought it went on bureaucracy. In fact, the bureaucracy takes just 5% of the budget, while agriculture and the structural funds each command more than 40%. (Walker, 7 July 1999) The findings of the poll to which Walker refers may have been disturbing for some, although on the particular matter of the comparison between Britain and the rest of the EU may have been unsurprising – simply conforming with ‘conventional wisdom’ (The Guardian, 1 June 1999). But, they are not altogther consistent with those of a poll published just over a month before: Britons are only slightly more sceptical than other Europeans about the way the European Union is run, according to detailed results of the 12 country European Barometer [sic] poll published today. The 50% or Britons who say they are not satisfied with the way the EU is developing compares with a 49% European average, and the 39% in the UK who say they are satisfied is only slightly below the European average of 43% [ . . . ]. Although there are low levels of confidence among UK voters that the European commission or the European parliament [sic] can improve their lives – 36% and 34% respectively – these are significant improvements over the results seen when the question was last asked in October 1998. They are also not out of line with the general view among the rest of the EU’s voters [ . . . ]. In fact the poll, conducted [ . . . ] on the eve of

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The Legacy of Supranationalism

Table 3.2

Eurobarometer Poll Results, mid-1999* Co-operation

Army

Right Too far Not far enough

President

For

Against

For

Against

Government For

Against

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Spain UK

34 50 47 64 51 38 37 42 44 73 49 49

7 13 15 8 16 28 18 14 8 10 14 16

42 23 27 20 27 26 40 21 32 12 24 22

35 61 36 21 73 53 49 27 60 62 48 35

51 29 51 68 23 42 43 57 25 29 36 49

38 60 10 15 52 50 62 40 70 47 50 35

47 29 84 75 43 44 29 42 15 45 30 47

27 62 8 23 53 37 47 29 71 45 51 27

59 27 87 66 43 58 45 54 15 47 30 57

Total

45

17

27

52

37

50

38

46

44

Source: Travis, 1 June 1999** * Among the questions posed were: On European co-operation, would you say that your government is going too far, not going far enough, or getting the right balance?; Would you support or oppose the creation of a common European army?; Would you support or oppose the direct election throughout Europe of a European president?; Would you support or oppose the creation of a common European government? The other questions included: How do you feel about the replacement of your currency by the euro, the single European currency?; How do you feel about the fact that your country does not belong to the first group of countries to have introduced the euro? ** ‘The poll, which was coordinated by Lewis Harris, France, was conducted by mostly telephone interviews with 9,436 adults over 18 in 12 European Union countries between May 6 and May 22 [1999]. The British section was based on 1,010 interviews by ICM between May 13 and 14’ (Travis, 1 June 1999).

next week’s elections to the European parliament, shows that on a variety of benchmarks Britons are not noticeably more hostile to the EU than voters across the union. But while there is support in the rest of Europe for creating a common European army, the direct election of a European president and even a common European government, these are firmly rejected by British voters [see Table 3.2]. (Travis, 1 June 1999) With further reference to Table 3.2, Alan Travis suggests: Perhaps surprisingly, most British voters believe that Labour ‘has struck the right balance’ when it comes to the test of whether the British government has got the pace of European cooperation right. In fact those who think it has not gone far enough, 22%, actually outweigh the 16% who believe it has already gone too far. There is not much comfort for Eurosceptics in these findings. (Travis, 1 June 1999)

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Indeed, results from the UK on the ‘co-operation’ question were, like those of Denmark and France, very similar to the average profile for the twelve Member States covered by the poll. The UK and Denmark had something else in common in that they had chosen not to participate in the January 1999 launch of the euro. A third country in the poll, Greece, had been excluded because it had fallen well short of meeting the required economic conditions for being included at the outset. On ‘the crunch issue of the euro’, the poll revealed that ‘despite its fall in value’ those whose countries had ‘made the switch [were] learning to live with it’ (Travis, 1 June 1999): Only in Germany and Finland is public opinion still lukewarm about the new year switch to the euro [ . . . ]. In the three countries which did not join the first wave of the euro there is overwhelming support for that decision in Britain and Denmark, with nearly two-thirds saying they agree with it. The Greeks however are very unhappy about their failure to join the euro at its launch. (Travis, 1 June 1999) Commenting on the poll results, The Guardian said: Britons are [ . . . ] much less hostile to the European Union than conventional wisdom suggests, showing no more scepticism than our fellow member countries. Nearly a quarter of us would like Britain to take co-operation further. Only one finding raises an eyebrow. Apparently 68 per cent of us believe the European elections are ‘important’. We’ll see, when we read the turnout figures on June 10, if this is one of those cases where people tell the truth to the pollsters – and lie at the polls. (The Guardian, 1 June 1999) We now know that while almost 70 per cent of Britons may have told pollsters just a few days before the 1999 European Parliament election that they regarded such events as important, nonetheless the subsequent turnout indicated widespread disinterest and apathy. Apart from this discrepancy, the Eurobarometer results according to which 45 per cent of those polled thought their Member State governments were getting the right balance on European co-operation and 53 per cent of those polled in countries which had joined the euro expressed satisfaction with their governments’ decision to join (36 per cent being dissatisfied) are in line with the 49 per cent of ‘Europeans [who] thought EU membership was “a good thing”’ in the later poll reported by Walker. At the same time, however, the Eurobarometer findings suggest that substantially more European Union citizens are for rather than against a common European army and (a directly elected) European president, whereas support for and opposition to the creation of a common European government is just about evenly distributed.

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Moreover, following Walker, the almost 50 per cent of people polled in mid-1999 who thought that their countries’ membership of the EU was a ‘good thing’ compares with 70 per cent in 1991. For Walker, the finding that only 44 per cent thought that their countries had ‘benefited from EU membership’ reflects a widely held belief that the EU is over-bureaucratic (Walker, 7 July 1999). The opinion poll results are mixed, but the evidence points to the conclusion that at the end of the 1990s among the people of the EU there was quite widespread support for their countries’ membership of the EU, and indeed of a supranational – even increasingly supranational – EU. At the same time, there were signs of similarly widespread opposition; of some growing disillusionment about the benefits that membership had so far brought; and of some considerable dissatisfaction, especially with the prevailing decision-making and institutional arrangements – the administration, management or governance – of the organisation. At the end of the 1990s, it may well have been that the majority of Europeans shared some antipathy towards the EU – and principally towards EU bureaucracy and bureaucrats: The European Union has lost the confidence of the citizens [sic] of its 15 member states, a confidential report for the presidency of the European commission [sic] reveals [ . . . ]. Its findings show that European integration has failed to win the confidence of its 370m citizens [ . . . ]. It complains that the EU’s insistence on harmonising regulations and standardising laws has become simplistic and inadequate. In a section entitled What is it that isn’t working [sic], the paper states: ‘The union is the product of an era dominated by a legalistic and technocratic approach [so that] problems have tended to be tackled from a technical angle to the detriment of their political or ethical dimension. This approach is out of place in an era when ordinary citizens regard progress and rationalism with suspicion. The union was founded and is still being constructed behind closed doors rather than in the open . . . Europeans are less and less willing to be presented with a fait accompli.’ [The] report sketches a series of scenarios for [the future of] western Europe. [But it does not] address the practical issue of what might happen if the single currency fails, or the EU starts to break up. ‘It is not realistic or coherent to envisage the failure of Europe. Imagining that member states would decide to dissolve the EU is just too unlikely. It would be incredible,’ [Gilles Bertrand, the report’s author,] says. (Bates, 4 August 1999) Be that as it may, the citizens of Europe were probably far less sanguine, and were certainly far less supportive of the particular style – as they saw it – of the European integration process. At the end of the 1990s, the majority of Europeans were far from convinced that either federalism or supranationalism

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were harbingers of an acceptable European future. This is in spite of the strong commitment to the supranationalist and federalist doctrines to be found among those steering the EU, its institutions and progress; in spite of the EC/EU’s tendency towards becoming in practice a deeper supranational organisation; and in spite of the palpable success of the EU judged in terms of such related considerations as the place of the regime on the world stage and the material well-being of its people. At this point, however, it is appropriate to note how just as the data in the population columns of Table 3.2 are likely to be underestimates, so the data in the GDP columns should be treated with caution. They are likely to be erroneous due to accounting difficulties. For instance: Huge tracts of European business and industry have disappeared into the black economy, according to unpublished European [C]ommission figures [ . . . ]. [A] study from Deloitte and Touche has [ . . . ] estimated that 40% of Greece’s economy did not exist for taxation and other official purposes, and suggested that the Italian government’s 16% figure for the country’s shadow economy ought to be closer to 30% [ . . . ]. The report was commissioned in 1997 by DG21, the Brussels taxation directorate. A [ . . . ] team [ . . . ] worked for a year on the project, concentrating on five sample member-states [sic] – Britain, Italy, France, Belgium and Germany – but taking in the EU as a whole [ . . . ]. [It] is understood that the most sensitive data, including the revised estimates for untaxed economic activity, will not be made public [ . . . ]. It is thought that among the findings of the report were figures for shadow economic activity well above official estimates in most cases, including Britain (8% to 10%), France (16%), Germany (14%), Italy (30%) and Greece (40%). Britain’s relatively low figure of about a tenth of the total economy is still much higher than the 1.5% added to economic data since 1992 by what is now the Office for National Statistics to take account of ‘informal’ activity.9 Belgium, home of the EU’s chief institutions, is thought to have a ‘submerged’ economy [of] around 30% of national income. (Atkinson, 24 June 1999) Because of each country’s submerged economy, the EU’s people will be materially better off than the data in the fourth and fifth columns in Table 3.2 suggest. Still, this data remains indicative and impressive, notwithstanding the material inequalities between EU locations which it appears to reveal. According to Table 3.2 Luxembourg’s per capita GDP at 32 678 (Purchasing Power Standard) is considerably greater than each of the other sixteen countries listed, including the USA at 28 812 (PPS). Indeed: The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg – the [smallest] member of the EU, with just 400,000 people – is by far the best pupil in the class of economic

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rectitude. Take any economic indicator, and its virtue shines through. Inflation? Licked, at 1.1 per cent. Economic growth? Powers away at twice the rate of the rest of Europe. National debt? Insignificant at 6.7 per cent of GDP (in Italy, it is more than 100 per cent of GDP). Budget deficit? Abolished – the government runs a surplus. Unemployment? Well, thats 5,534. In total. That’s just 2.2 per cent of the workforce – as close to the nirvana of full employment as anyone is likely to get. What’s more, Luxembourg is not just rich, but the richest country in the industrialised world. Average incomes are £24,000 for every man, woman and child, twice the level of the UK. (Browne, 11 July 1999b) It is difficult not to conclude that Browne is exaggerating when comparing the average income in Luxembourg with that in the UK. After all, the UK’s per capita GDP is 19 669, or that is slightly over 60 per cent of Luxembourg’s. Furthermore, Browne himself notes elsewhere that the British have ‘average incomes’ of £20730 (Browne, 11 July 1999a). A country’s GDP and GDP per capita (or similar quantities) are not the only ways of measuring its economic success and prowess, and even more so its overall standing in the ranking of countries, either in terms of their relational (regional, global or whatever) weight or with reference to people’s everyday lives, experiences and so on. Another – but not unconnected – economic indicator is ‘competitiveness’: Three Asian economies – Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan – rank among the world’s five most competitive economies alongside the US and Canada, according to the latest global competitiveness report from the Genevabased World Economic Forum [see Table 3.3]. Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner of the Harvard University Centre for International Development, which compiled the rankings for 59 countries, said the three had maintained the economic conditions necessary for long-term growth despite the short-term impact of the Asian crisis. By contrast, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia have slipped rapidly down the league table since the crisis broke in mid-1997. [Professor] Sachs and Mr Warner [ . . . ] suggest that today’s weak euro will be good for European growth and employment in the long term.10 (Williams, 14 July 1999) In other words: The report predicts the euro’s weakness will boost the position of continental economies in future years – most of them moved very little in the rankings between 1998 and 1999. Professor Sachs said: ‘The depreciation of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar will prove a major plus for the European economies in terms of employment and growth, even though it is viewed with some concern now.’ (Coyle, 14 July 1999)

Political Economy Table 3.3

Global Competitiveness Rankings, 1998 and 1999 1998 ranking

Singapore United States Hong Kong Taiwan Canada Switzerland Luxembourg United Kingdom Netherlands Ireland Venezuela Brazil India Ecuador Colombia Bolivia Bulgaria Zimbabwe Ukraine Russia Sources:

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1999 ranking

1 3 2 6 5 8 10 4 7 11

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

1999 index 2.12 1.58 1.41 1.38 1.33 1.27 1.25 1.17 1.13 1.11 –1.09 –1.20 –1.30 –1.34 –1.48 –1.50 –1.50 –1.65 –1.94 –2.02

Atkinson, 16 July 1999; Coyle, 14 July 1999; Williams, 14 July 1999.

According to Diane Coyle: the financial crisis that started in mid-1997 [ . . . ] has sorted the sheep from the goats among the [Asian] tiger economies. Malaysia’s ranking is nearly unchanged at number 16, while Korea, Thailand and Indonesia have fallen to 22nd, 30th and 37th respectively. Indonesia has plummeted 22 places. (Coyle, 14 July 1999) In contrast, the UK’s descent was relatively short: The United Kingdom has dropped down the world competitiveness league table because the strong pound, new employment regulations and its weakness in science and technology. The UK has fallen from fourth to eighth place. (Coyle, 14 July 1999) On the other hand, argues Mark Atkinson, the ‘UK economy may have slipped four places in “global competitiveness”, but the [Global Competitiveness Report] stating this relies on highly subjective criteria’ (Atkinson, 16 July 1999): The eminent [ . . . ] economist Paul Kruger believes that the very concept of international competitiveness is fatally flawed. Behind it is the

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assumption that [countries, or other territories,] are at war with each other in the global marketplace when in fact, unlike war, trade is not a zero sum game. If anyone is at war with anyone else, competing for a bigger share of the economic spoils, it is companies, not countries [and the like]. And no country has a monopoly on good companies [ . . . ], rendering meaningless any attempt to lump their qualities together into a single index of national [sic] economic performance. Even if the concept of international competitiveness is accepted as a valid one, the World Economic Forum’s way of measuring it encompasses some serious design faults. [In that it] relies on the opinions of 4,000 business executives [ . . . ] the results are highly subjective. The same is true of the eight criteria chosen by which to judge countries [ . . . ]. The [ . . . ] Global Competitiveness Report [ . . . ] represents the thinking of a particular neo-liberal mindset which [ . . . ] does not have a patent on economic wisdom. (Atkinson, 16 July 1999) However, by the same reasoning, neither anything nor anyone does; it is not only the ranking of countries by ‘global competitiveness’ which is basically, and necessarily, subjective; all rankings – just as all decisions about which, if any, rankings to endorse or accept – will be subjectively determined. Thus, Anthony Browne acknowledges that economic indicators such as average income(s) or per capita GDP are not the only means of assessing a country’s virtues at the level of ‘every man, woman and child’: Belgium might be small, boring and flat. It might be densely populated, but not with anyone famous. It might be brimming with paedophiles, corrupt policeman and eurocrats. But the country [ . . . ] is the best place to live in the European Union – far better than Britain [ . . . ]. A United Nations report, which ranks countries by their quality of life, says the lot of Belgians is now better than that of the citizens [sic] of any of the other 14 EU countries. ‘Cool Britannia’ [ . . . ] is fourth in Europe, behind Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, and tenth in the world. (Browne, 11 July 1999a) The UK may have had no more than 60 per cent of Luxembourg’s per capita GDP, but according to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, published at the beginning of July 1999, its quality of life was superior to that of Luxembourg’s. The UN’s assessment: looks at life expectancy, wealth, literacy and educational prospects to work out how good – or bad – life is for 174 countries. The secret of the Belgians’ success is that they are among the longest living and almost the richest, but what really shines is their education system: the best there is. The country with the highest quality of life in the world is Canada,

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which combines peace with prosperity, a decent health service – and an absence of any excitement. It is closely followed by Norway, the United States and then, bizarrely, Japan, home of the never-ending recession. (Browne, 11 July 1999a) None of the four top countries was in the EU,11 but four of the top ten countries were, inculding Britain: Britain has shot up the worldwide rankings from fourteenth last year, to tenth this year. [It’s] now officially [sic] a better place to live in than France, which is at eleventh place. This is a blow to Gallic pride, and a boost for little Englanders [ . . . ]. The report does condemn Britain for its poverty. It says the UK has the third worst poverty in the developed world – with only Ireland and the US being worse [ . . . ]. There is more inequality between rich and poor in Britain than in any other developed country, with the richest 20 per cent earning 9.6 times more than the poorest 20 per cent. In the US, the richest earn 8.9 times more. The most divided country in the world is Brazil, where the richest 20 per cent earn 32 times more than the poorest; the most egalitarian is Slovakia, where the ratio is 2.6. (Browne, 11 July 1999a)12 Slovakia just happens to be one of several Central and Eastern European countries which have applied to join the European Union: The Commission is stepping up preparations for five Central and Eastern European countries to join the EU. This new phase in relations with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia involves the examination of their national laws and the body of EU legislation. The bilateral process is intended to help the countries concerned to speed up preparations for EU membership by identifying more clearly which areas are in need of most attention. This ‘screening’ of national and EU measures is scheduled to end in the autumn [1999]. It should assist these candidates to be ready to play a full part in the accession negotiations when, at the appropriate moment, these are opened. (European Commission, 4 March 1999b) At the same time, there were more than five candidates that had applied to join: The enlargement process with 12 countries that have applied to join the EU is broadly on track, Commissioner Hans van den Broek said [on 4 November 1998], as the first regular progress report was published. These do not recommend the opening of negotiations with any further countries at this stage. The reports stress the progress made by each country in meeting the agreed accession criteria and their administrative capacity to

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apply the body of EU law. The Commission intends to propose next year that negotiations with Latvia begin if the pace of change is maintained. It welcomes considerable progress in Lithuania, but says that additional economic measures are needed. The reports update the Opinions issued in July 1997 for the central and eastern European [CEE] countries and that of 1993 for Cyprus; the report on Turkey uses the same criteria. A composite report summarises the country assesments. Negotiations continue on 10 November with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Five more countries – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia – are also part of the accession process, strengthening relations with the EU. Turkey is included in the wider enlargement process, and the Commission plans to update early [in 1999] its 1993 Opinion on Malta, which asked in September [1998] to reactivate its application. (European Commission, 5 November 1998) But, among the notable features of this enlargement process was how even those countries at the head of the queue to join had ‘sweated for years over their applications and [were] still far from ready’ (Bates, 29 June 1999). Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia: are working their way laboriously through 90,000-page questionnaires assessing their economic, political and social readiness to join. Their parliaments labour to pass [the EU’s] regulations. Their governments have been told they have to accept all the rules of the club in order to get in13 [ . . . ]. Meanwhile Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria [among other countries] are not yet at the starting gates. (Bates, 29 June 1999) For Bates, a crucial factor affecting the negotiations and so the speed of the expansion process was that even ‘the most prosperous and sophisticated applicant [was] economically far behind the poorest current EU member’ (Bates, 29 June 1999). Bates reports how the latter, Portugal, had a GDP per capita of around $US10 000 in 1997, whereas Slovenia had under $US9000. The next most prosperous CEE applicant, the Czech Republic, had just over $US5000, with Hungary having somewhat more than $US4000. The comparative GDP per capita figures of EU Member States and EU applicant countries attests to the EU’s success, to its weight on the world stage and to the prosperity of its people. While not ignoring the questionable official data in the last two columns of Table 3.1, it can be confidently assumed that in the late 1990s the EU was highly and disproportionately (judged in terms of its relative population) economically successful, something which was likely to be at the forefront of its appeal to those who were queuing to join. In turn, the EU’s determination to hold on to its high and enviable economic rankings within the global system, moreover, would have encouraged

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it not only to expand but also to engage in at least one further realist activity, as indicated by the European Commission: To maximise their influence on the international scene, the [current] 15 EU members, who represent [just] 6% of world population but one fifth of global trade negotiate as one with their commercial partners. For many years now, that role has been carried out by the European Commission on the basis of specific mandates agreed by [Member State] governments. By speaking with one voice, the Union can also provide the rest of the world with the assurance that the rules of the game will be respected on our side. (European Commission, January 1999c, p. 2; European Commission, June/July 1999, supplement, p. 1) In speaking with one voice in relation to the rest of the world with the intention of maximising their influence, the fifteen Member States of the EU (with only 6 per cent of the world’s total population) have managed to secure 20 per cent of global trade, and so about a quarter of that attributable to what Martin Wolf has referred to as the world’s high income countries: By 1997, the fifth of the world’s population who live in high-income countries [ . . . ] generated 82 per cent of world exports; the bottom fifth produced just 1 per cent. (Wolf, 14 July 1999) Connectedly, the same proportion of the world’s population enjoyed a similarly disproportionate share of global GDP: Never before has the world been both so integrated and so divided. But for a big proportion of the world’s population the ongoing march of globalisation is irrelevant. Theirs remain lives of desparation [ . . . ]. The Human Development Report, published by the United Nations Development Programme, reminds the affluent of some harsh facts about the world they live in. As it notes: [by] 1997, the fifth of the world’s people who live in the high-income countries generated 86 per cent of world product; the bottom fifth produced 1 per cent. (Wolf, 14 July 1999)14 Wolf asks ‘What, if anything, can be done about this?’, and tells us that the ‘UNDP report concentrates on finding solutions in improved global governance’. Accordingly: The first part of the solution [includes] a well-financed, UN-mandated international intervention force: a UN foreign legion, in other words. The second part is improved [internal, domestic] governance. Where countries are failing, [the required] operations could [again] be mounted under UN auspices, in some kind of protectorate. Aid should be withdrawn

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from countries governed by corrupt and incompetent dictators, but should go, generously, to democracies with decent policies. The third part is better policies. These should include liberal trade and openness to foreign direct investment. They should also include privatisation and foreign ownership of infrastructure, particularly telecommunications and electric power. To achieve this, countries will need to sign international agreements, in order to make commitments to liberal trade credible [ . . . ]. The challenge is to rescue societies that are on the borderline of the dysfunctional – or already over it. This is where the world’s efforts must be concentrated [ . . . ]. It cannot be successful without the public goods that underpin development, the first good of all being decent government. If this means some sacrifice of sovereign independence, so be it. (Wolf, 14 July 1999) On the one hand, following Wolf’s (highly value-skewed) assessment, the solution to the ‘widening gap between rich and poor’ is ‘to help failing states, particularly in Africa’ (Wolf, 14 July 1999), by requiring, and perhaps forcing, them to sacrifice sovereign independence to outside, UN-mandated intervention. On the other hand, following the European Commission, it is in the collective and individual commercial interests of the EU’s Member States to voluntarily relinquish their sovereignty to the EU in the area of ‘global trade negotiations’ – to mandate the EC to act supranationally on their behalf in this area. The result will be to maximise the ‘influence’ of the EU and the EU’s Member States ‘on the international scene’, and thereby to secure and ensure the EU’s highly disproportionate (measured against its relative overall population) share of global trade and, connectedly, global GDP. In each case, sovereignty holds the key to success, the common requirement being for nation-states to relinquish their sovereignty. In each case, presumably, the individual nation-states involved will be weakened qua nationstates, but whereas in the first case the nation-states will be open to greater outside intervention, purportedly to their benefit, in the second case the nation-states will gain greater influence, weight and protection by virtue of their pooled (accumulated and shared) sovereignty within a strengthened, supranational regional regime. But, the obvious question arises of whether in practice the EU’s pursuit of its economic objectives within the global system using the European Commission’s recommended means are compatible with – are conducive to – the supposed solution (lauded by Wolf) to ‘A world divided’ in the way revealed by the UN’s Human Development Report (Wolf, 14 July 1999; Bloom and Sachs, 1998). The question arises of whether any increased ‘openness’ by (what Wolf labels) the ‘failing states’ would not so much benefit the economies of these – perhaps politically weakened – territories, as enhance the likelihood of the supranational EU taking advantage of and exploiting them in its attempts to realise its objectives in the hugely competitive (and even, contra Paul Krugman’s argument, war-like) ‘global marketplace’ (Atkinson, 16 July 1999).

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The EU’s objectives go beyond merely maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis the global, interdependent distributions of economic and political power. They include reshaping these distributions in its favour, something which will necessarily intensify the competition between the EU and all extraneous economic (whether geo-political or corporate) players within the global system. In other words, the EU is seeking the self-interested modification of a system which is, in any case, inherently constantly changing. This brings us to a further point about Table 3.1. As with population data and analyses,15 any GDP figures and comparisions are nececessarily temporal variables. Thus, in this regard, shortly after the 1999 European Parliament election, Gerard Baker reported ‘global growth in US favour’ (Baker, 25 June 1999): When the history of the world economy of the 1990s is written, January 1 1999 will rightly be regarded as a landmark event. Minds in Europe may have been focused on their own monetary matters, but for the rest of the world the real significance of this New Year’s day lay elsewhere. It was the precise moment when the US economy broke the previous record and notched up the longest peacetime expansion this century. Even more than the arrival of the euro or the turmoil in east Asia [triggered in mid-1997], the eight-year long US expansion, which shows no signs of flagging, has been the pivotal factor in global currency markets in the last year. With Asia in collapse and Europe stagnant, the undiminished strength of the US economy has made the dollar the very rock of stablity for jittery investors. Economic growth of more than 4 per cent for the last three years and a 50 per cent increase in equity prices over the same period has justified that faith and brought more foreign currency flooding into the US [ . . . ]. The gap between the US and the rest of the world’s growth looks unlikely to close soon. In the last six months, US gross domestic product has expanded at an annual rate of approximately 5 per cent, and while growth for the rest of this year is expected to slow, it is still likely to top 3 per cent [ . . . ]. [The] major euro-zone economies,16 especially Germany and Italy, do not appear headed for firm recovery soon, and Japan remains mired in recession [ . . . ]. [Moreover,] a return to more balanced global growth [is] not something anyone is expecting to happen in the near future. (Baker, 25 June 1999) In a manner which resembled aspects of Baker’s account, Charlotte Denny had earlier written: Which will be the economic superpower of the next millenium? Japan has headed the growth league for the major economies in four out of five decades since the [Second World War]. Italy, Germany and France have occupied the next three slots for most of the period, with the United

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States and Britain at the bottom. The 1990s have seen a dramatic reversal. [The] dunces America and Britain have taken the top positions while Japan, mired in debt, has dropped to the bottom of the growth league. Meanwhile, mainland European countries have had a desparate decade squeezing their economies into the Maastricht mould [to achieve economic and monetary union]. Brian Reading, international economist [ . . . ], predicts that the US and Britain will hold on to the top slots in the first decade of the next century. Unlike Japan and Europe, which need extensive structural reform, the Anglo-Saxon economies have already been through the grinder of deregulation and liberalisation. The laggards have become leaders. [According to Brian Reading]: ‘Japan and Euroland face a miserable decade unless they embark on radical reform.’ [In] 1950 the US accounted for more than half of world output. Despite expanding more slowly than Japan and the big European [economies] between 1950 and 1980, the US is still the world’s biggest economy, with [an] annual output of $8 trillion. As the millenium approaches, it seems likely to cement its place as the sole superpower – in the economic as well as the political sphere. (Denny, 24 May 1999)17 However, here, Denny is failing to do at least two things: first, to take into account the European Union as a whole and, moreover, to treat the EU as an integrated, cohesive unit (or, indeed, union) within the global system; and second, to avoid being over-confident about extrapolating the current into the future, in spite of what she herself notes to be previous, post-Second World War alterations in the fortunes of players in the global economy. Thus, as Denny reported just two months later (and as otherwise noted earlier in this chapter): The euro staged a dramatic recovery on the foreign exchanges yesterday, powering to its best level against the dollar since May as fears grew that the US economy’s record-breaking could be coming to an end. Dealers are worried that investors are set to switch out of dollar-denominated assets in search of better returns from Asian and European economies. The euro soared to $1.724, its strongest for 10 weeks while the dollar was also out of favour against the Japanese yen [ . . . ]. The euro’s surge has been helped by signs of recovery from Germany, as well as by concerns that the US Federal reserve [sic] is set to raise interest rates. (Denny and Milner, 27 July 1999) As Denny and Milner begin by indicating, the ‘key has always been the relative strengths of the US and European economies’, there having been during July 1999 ‘a recognition that there might be a switch in prospect’, given that ‘the economic numbers out of Germany – the core of euroland – have been improving’, in particular relative to the ‘US economy’ (The Guardian, 24 July 1999b).18

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At the same time, as with Germany and euroland, so with Japan, as reported by Tony Leven and Patrick Sherwen in the early days of July 1999: what should investors make of Japan’s apparent resurgence as a viable investment opportunity after such a long period of gloom? The arguments for looking seriously at investing in Japan again have been supported by the recently published economic figures for January to March [1999, according to which] Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) had grown by 1.9% over the quarter, equal to an annual rate of 8%. This is the first positive return for a year and a half. (Levene and Sherwen, 10 July 1999; see also The Guardian, ‘Japan strikes back’, 10 July 1999) Likewise with the rest of East Asia (or, that is, Pacific Asia) and those other places most affected by ‘the turmoil’ which began in that part of the world in mid-1997 (Baker, 25 June 1999): The long-term recovery in emerging markets is under way [ . . . ]. ‘Market strength in Latin America since the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999 shows little signs of weakening,’ [Mark Mobious of Templeton Emerging Markets Investment Trust has] said. He notes that South Korean reforms in the wake of its financial collapse in 1997 had been impressive and boded well for the long run [ . . . ]. Asia [in general, moreover,] has recovered strongly from the [Asian crisis (Denny, 5 July 1999)]. (Murphy, 17 July 1999) Charlotte Denny has usefully summarised the Asian crisis which exploded in 1997 in the following way: With hindsight it easy to see that massive capital inflows caused financial instability. Asian banks borrowed in the [West] where interest rates were low, and lent out at higher rates at home. But in the process the banks took the risk that [the value of] their currencies would not fall against those of the countries in which they were borrowing money. At the time it must have seemed a reasonable gamble as most countries in the region had pegged their exchange rate to the dollar. But the Thai government ran out of foreign reserves and abandoned defending the peg [between the baht and the dollar] in July 1997. Foreign loans immediately soared in value and investors decided that if one country was bankrupt, the whole region was. They rushed to get their money out, triggering devaluations and bankruptcy throughout the region. (Denny, 5 July 1999) That is, the ‘Thai government’s decision to devalue the baht on July 2 1997 set off a financial panic which swept throughout the region’, and indeed well beyond: ‘the dominoes continued to tumble’, to the point that ‘the

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Russian debt default threatened a global depression’ (Elliott and Denny, 6 July 1999). Two years on and the apparent turn around was remarkable: financial markets believe that the Asian crisis may be over. Tokyo’s share prices closed yesterday at their highest for almost two years, growth in South Korea is picking up and currencies have recovered some of the ground lost as the financial contagion spread across the region in the second half of 1997. Yet if the world has really stepped back from the brink of global meltdown, it has been a close-run thing. (Elliott and Denny, 6 July 1999) In other words, by early July 1999, as Denny otherwise put it, the ‘markets seem to think’ that ‘the Asian crisis [is] over’: the ‘region’s economies are recovering from [1998’s] catastrophic slump and foreign capital has been rushing back in, pushing up share prices’ (Denny, 5 July 1999). But, given that it was ‘foreign borrowing [which] caused the problem in the first place’, the question arises of ‘What about the new foreign money rushing into the region?’. What about the possibility of this causing the same thing? For Denny, a crucial change of conditions has taken place: ‘This time much of the foreign investment has gone into buying local shares rather than lending to banks or the corporate sector. If foreign investors suddenly pulled their money out, the main effect would be to depress share prices rather than make banks insolvent and firms bankrupt’ (Denny, 5 July 1999). Nonetheless: [there] are still doubts whether rapid inflows of short term foreign capital are a good idea for regions with rudimentary banking systems. But the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and other financial institutions reject any kind of capital controls as a solution. The next emerging market crisis might not be in Asia, but it is no doubt developing somewhere in the world. (Denny, 5 July 1999) Consequently, the ‘mood is still one of caution. Investors are whispering softly’ (Elliott and Denny, 6 July 1999). Perhaps, and perhaps with good reason, but in her discussion, analysis and predictions of the Asian crisis, its affects and its possible legacy, Charlotte Denny (although not alone in this respect) might have addressed the relevance of at least one further factor and prospect – one brought to mind by the following: Foreign ministers from the Association of South East Asian Nations agreed yesterday that the 32-year-old organisation had been weakened by Asia’s financial crisis but was too valuable to be discarded. (The Observer, 25 July 1999)

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The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the economic bloc or organisation which stands next in line behind the EU in its development as a cohesive, integrated regional regime. ASEAN may not, as the EU does, qualify yet as a supranational regional regime, but it displays signs of being a prospective SRR – or, that is, a proto-SRR. Given that its Member States recognise its ‘value’, they could be spurred by the Asia crisis to go beyond merely retaining or recovering the organisation as it had become by the time of the crisis, as a result of which it was ‘weakened’. They could become committed to further deepening and strengthening the organisation with the aim of (to recall the words of the European Commission in relation to the EU) ‘speaking with one voice’, and thereby to ‘maximise their influence on the world scene’ (European Commision, January 1999c, p. 2). Pascal Fontaine has argued (on behalf of the European Commission) that the governments of the Member States of the EU (not to mention of many countries elsewhere in Europe) have come to ‘recognise that the era of absolute [nation-state] sovereignty is gone’, and that ‘[o]nly by joining forces’ can European countries ‘continue to enjoy economic and social progress and [connectedly] maintain their influence in the world’ (Fontaine, 1998, p. 8). If so, then presumably there is a good chance that this realist assessment and prognosis will apply to south-east Asia, as well as to other regions (including north-east Asia and Pacific Asia as a whole), and that its validity will have been recognised or will come to be so in this sector of the Asia Pacific.

4 Europe and Beyond

Supranational progress The first day of May is earmarked in the calendar as May Day, ‘as a festival with dancing, or as an international holiday in honour of workers’. 1 Indeed, it is otherwise known as ‘Labour Day’, being ‘celebrated in honour of working people’.2 As chance would have it, 1 May 1997 turned out to be a particularly notable day in the history of the Labour Party in Britain: the Labour Party [ . . . ] received only 34 per cent of the vote in the general election of 1992. Tony Blair, who became leader in 1994, supported private enterprise and promoted many reforms in the party, finally abandoning the ideological [trade] union-led principles of ‘Old Labour’ under a more popular and pragmatic manifesto which gave Labour a landslide victory in the [1 May] 1997 [general] election. Once in power ‘New Labour’, with an overwhelming majority [in the House of Commons], set about [among other things] providing a more positive approach to the [UK’s] participation in the European Union. (Isaacs, 1998, p. 783) The Labour Party’s general election victory was commemorated two years later with various assessments of the government’s record.3 For instance: This is the half-way mark. We are equidistant between two [general] elections. Two years ago today Labour won power in one of the great landslides of British political history, and the party will probably choose to face the voters again two years from now [ . . . ]. So, May 1, 1999 offers a sensible moment to take a look at how Labour is getting on. The remarkable truth is that it still feels like a novelty [ . . . ]. The [opinion] polls underline that: the latest shows Labour 23 points ahead of the Conservatives, their position enhanced since the general election [ . . . ]. [For] Tony Blair and New Labour, the honeymoon has never really ended. [But], what of the substance of Labour’s record? Here a clear theme emerges 82

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[ . . . ]. Labour has adopted the right ideas on social and constitutional policy, the economy, Europe, Northern Ireland and Kosovo: but sometimes it needs to act on those ideas more boldly [ . . . ]. In Europe, the Government has condemned the democratic deficit of the European Union, exposed so graphically in this year’s mass resignation of the Commission. It needs to be still more positive in that area, with Tony Blair exploiting for good purpose the fact that he has fewer restraints on his power than any other European leader. He has already done that over Kosovo, although here too, we would urge him to go further: if diplomacy fails, fighting the ethnic cleansers from the air will not work alone. [The] war needs to be fought on the ground. (The Guardian, 1 May 1999) Similarly, Polly Toynbee marked ‘the anniversary of the election’ by telling us: Two years on, a little balder, a little greyer, Tony Blair bestrides the nation as lord of all he surveys with power undreamed of by dictators [ . . . ]. So what crumb remains on the miserable Tories’ table? Only the anti-European chalice, but they know a sip from that plunges them into mortal schism [ . . . ]. No, they are lost, utterly lost. Better for them to [ . . . ] wait for things to go wrong [ . . . ]. Start with the war [in the Balkan region], a clear and present danger that could plunge into calamity as easily as missiles corkscrew off course [ . . . ]. That would end any chance for the Blair doctrine, any hope for his vision of the rich [West] at last taking common responsibility for humanitarian disasters around the world.4 It would also break the spirit of the European idea, reducing the EU to a spineless rich man’s trading club, selfish and politically meaningless, precisely what the Europhobic Tories always wanted. For that reason it can’t be allowed to happen. European leaders in shaky coalitions may blanch now and then, but even if it takes longer and costs more, the price of failure is too high to contemplate. Blair has more invested in this than most. For how would he fight a successful referendum campaign for Britain’s entry into the Euro amid the ruins of European idealism? (Toynbee, 30 April 1999) To the fore of Toynbee’s and others’ views of the Labour government’s first two and forthcoming years were points about the relationship between the UK and the rest of Europe, European integration and the EU. The Labour government had been ‘positive in that area’, especially in comparison with the previous Conservative government and, furthermore, the contemporaneous, predominantly ‘anti-European’ and ‘Europhobic’, Conservative Party under the leadership of William Hague. From writers who themselves appeared to be Europhiles, the Labour government and, in particular, its leader Tony Blair received generous praise for their commitment to ‘the European

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idea’, to a politically meaningful EU, to reducing the ‘democratic deficit’, and to ‘Britain’s entry into the Euro’. If anything, the government and prime minister were urged to be yet ‘more positive’ on these matters; or, that is, to pursue, promote and protect ‘European idealism’. Also on 1 May 1999 the EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, an event which on the face of it may be regarded as reflecting solid support for European integration by the Labour government, and so as going some way to satisfying those who at the time were urging a ‘positive’ approach to while demanding more concrete results from the pursuit of the European idea: The Amsterdam Treaty comes into force on 1 May [1999], following its ratification by all 15 Member States [of the EU] by 30 March. Signed on 2 October 1997, the Treaty will affect the legal base and decision-making process of some [policy] proposals. The European Parliament becomes a colegislator in transport and development policy, for example, and the legal context for proposals from the Social Protocol or Justice and Home Affairs comes within the Treaty itself. (European Commission, 29 April 1999b) The Treaty was more fully clarified shortly after the summit meeting at which it had been finally negotiated and agreed: On 16 and 17 June 1997 the Heads of State and Government of the fifteen countries of the European Union met in Amsterdam to draw up a new Treaty for Europe. The Treaty of Amsterdam lays the foundations for Europe’s development in the 21st century. It takes its place in a line of treaties stretching from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the Maastricht Treaty concluded in February 1992. As a result of the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union should be more effective and, at the same time, more democratic. It will enable Europe to create more jobs. It will strengthen Europe’s voice on the international stage and increase the scope for people to travel, live and work more easily in other countries of the European Union, while at the same time enabling the fight against organised crime to be waged more effectively. (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3) The European Commission elaborates: The Amsterdam Treaty seeks to tackle the unfinished business of Maastricht. The Maastricht Treaty was an initial response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Even as it was being drafted, it was recognised that there would need to be a review of how it was working, given the importance, not only of the new situation facing Europe, but also of the new areas of cooperation which it introduced. This review process, called an InterGovernmental Conference or IGC,5 has led to the Treaty of Amsterdam.

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The primary purpose of this new revision is to take the Union a step closer to reuniting the continent. Ten former communist countries from Eastern and Central Europe, as well as Turkey and Cyprus, have applied for membership of the EU. They cannot be admitted without setting in hand changes to the institutional structure designed for the original six [-member organisation]. The Amsterdam Treaty revision is also a response to two other developments: a perception that some of the Maastricht provisions have not proved effective in practice, and the need to bridge the perceived gap between governments and their peoples on the issue of Europe’s future development. It is a gap which the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty have tried to close. (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 4) The Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘created an entirely new “architecture” for Europe’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3), consisting ‘of three pillars of cooperation: [ . . . ] The European Community or first pillar’, within which the single internal market operates, for instance; the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), or second pillar’; and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA) (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3). The main institutions of the EU (or, in the first instance, of the EC) are the European Council – which is made up of the heads of government or state of the Member States and, through summit meetings twice a year, ‘sets the broad guidelines for [the EU’s] development’; the Council of Ministers (the main decision-making body, and consisting of the ministers of the Member States responsible for matters on the agenda, with each Member State ‘chairing its meetings for [the] six months [of that Member State’s turn to hold the office of] presidency of the Council’); the European Parliament, which ‘consists of 626 directly elected members [MEPs] who play [a] role in the legislative process, [have] control [over] the Commission and scrutinize the EC budget’; the European Commission, consisting ‘of 20 commissioners assisted by specialist departments or directorates-general [DGs], which are responsible for initiating, implementing and managing Community activities’) (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 1). The parts played by these institutions in the decision-making in each of the EU’s three pillars reflect one of two basic types of co-operation. ‘Under the first pillar, cooperation has the following characteristics: the Commission [makes] proposals [to the Council, which [often uses] qualified majority voting (QMV) [to come to decisions], the European Parliament has an active role and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has responsibility for interpreting Community law.’ In contrast, under ‘the second and third pillars’, the ‘Commission has a much reduced role, [ . . . ] the European Parliament has a purely consultative function and the involvement of the Court of Justice is limited’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3). Crucially, in the case of CFSP and CJHA, ‘cooperation is inter-governmental in nature’,

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or, that is, ‘the Council [only] acts unanimously’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3). Co-operation, or decision-making, in the CFSP and CJHA pillars is always inter-governmental. Council decisions are always by consensus or, that is, by unanimity. There being no majority voting, each Member State can always exercise a veto. This set of linked features makes the CFSP and CJHA fundamentally distinct from the first (or central) pillar of the EU – the European Community – where QMV decision-making is common. When decisionmaking by QMV takes place, it is not possible – that is, it is not permissible – for a Member State to use a veto to block a decision: Everyone knows what a veto means. What is less clear is what is meant by qualified majority voting in the EU (or ‘QMV’). This [is a combined majority voting and weighted voting] system [which] was introduced in order to make the single [internal] market possible [to construct and operate]. [It allows] Member States to be outvoted [but reflects] the fact that the size of Member States varies considerably [ . . . ]. [Furthermore, a] proposal is only agreed when 71% of the available votes are cast in favour [ . . . ] (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 1) The total number of ‘available votes’ in the Council is 87, and under the QMV system a proposal is only passed if it receives at least 62 of these ‘weighted’ (unevenly distributed) votes (see Table 4.1). This summary, however, is somewhat misleading, historically. That is: The most widely used method of voting in the Council of Ministers [is called qualified majority voting (QMV) because it] entails giving the vote of each member a state a ‘weighting’, which broadly reflects its population. These weightings are specified in the [1957] Treaty of Rome (Article 148), as is the total number of assenting votes (the threshold) necessary for a measure to be adopted under QMV [ . . . The] total number of votes necessary for a measure to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission is 62 (an abstention is equivalent to a vote against) [ . . . ]. The subject areas covered by QMV, already numerous in the Treaty of Rome, were greatly extended by the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) and again by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The SEA extended QMV mainly into areas connected with the Single Market [sic] programme, including many previously subject to unanimity. (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 378–9) A further point of clarification is necessary. While the Treaty on European Union (TEU), ‘created an entirely new “architecture” for Europe’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 3), it ‘did not substitute QMV for unanimity in any area, but provided for QMV in most of the areas that were either wholly new (such as trans-European networks [TENs], education and public health)

Europe and Beyond Table 4.1

87

Council Votes, Commissioners and MEPs by EU Member State* Council votes

Commissioners

MEPs

France Germany Italy United Kingdom Spain Belgium Greece Netherlands Portugal Austria Sweden Denmark Finland Ireland Luxembourg

10 10 10 10 8 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2

2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

87 99 87 87 64 25 25 31 22 21 21 16 16 15 6

Total

87**

20

626

Source: Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 378; European Commission, July 1997b, p. 1. *The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provides for the ‘weighting of Member States in the institutions [to] be modified when new States join in the future’ (European Commission, 1997a, p. 14). Thus, the Commission ‘shall comprise one national of each of the Member States. The “big countries” will, in effect, give up their second Commissioner. At the same time, the weighting of Member States in the Council will be readjusted, to ensure that a decision taken by a majority of Member States corresponds to a sufficient percentage of the Union’s population. This could be achieved either by a system of double majority (of Member States and population), or by determining the voting weight of each State as a function of its population. The number of MEPs will not exceed 700’ (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 14). **The Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) system means that for a proposal to be approved by the Council, 62 of the 87 ‘available votes’ are required – that is, (approximately) 71 per cent.

or subject to more extensive provisions (such as the environment and economic and monetary policy)’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 379). On the other hand, the Treaty of Amsterdam did substitute QMV for unanimity in several areas: With an eye to the next enlargement [of the EU], the Amsterdam Treaty extends the [areas] where decisions can be taken by a qualified majority [ . . . ]. Unanimity remains the rule in respect of constitutional matters and for a hard core of highly sensitive areas like taxation. (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 13) That is, the ‘Treaty introduces a number of changes in decision-making procedures to facilitate action in a larger Union’, and in particular the ‘extension of QMV [ . . . ] to a number of areas [previously] subject to unanimity’,

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including (as listed by the Commission): compensatory aid of imports of raw materials; the right of establishment; research framework programmes; joint undertakings in Community research programmes; the setting up of joint undertakings in [research and training] development (European Commission, July 1997b, my emphasis). Furthermore, the Treaty ‘also allows QMV for the following new areas of activity’: employment guidelines; incentive measures; social exclusion; equal opportunities; public health; transparency; countering fraud; statistics; outermost regions; customs co-operation (European Commission, 1997b, p. 17, my emphasis). For the Commission, the extension of QMV decision-making within the Council of Ministers by substituting it for decision by unanimity, or consensus, is but part of an attempt to provide more effective institutions for an enlarged Europe (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 12). The objective is to ‘give the Union the tools it needs to carry out the responsibilities given to it by the Maastricht Treaty’, and to do so in view of, or in spite of, the Union’s enlargement ‘particularly towards the east European countries’ (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 12) – or, that is, to ensure ‘it will work with more Member States’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 13). The alterations introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in the Council’s decision-making procedures were the latest in a series, and moreover were accompanied by collateral, institutional amendments: The Maastricht Treaty gave the European Parliament [EP] the power of ‘co-decision’ with the Council in a limited number of areas such as research, health and culture. It left the Council with the last say on a significant number of other policies, although it substantially increased the Parliament’s power. The Parliament could either amend the Council’s draft legislation (the so-called cooperation procedure) or withhold its ‘assent’ to Council decisions in certain areas (residence rights, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, Treaties of Accession and others). The Amsterdam Treaty considerably increases Parliament’s responsibilities by making the co-decision procedure more or less the general rule. The cooperation procedure will survive only within the confines of economic and monetary union [EMU]. The ‘assent’ procedure will be required in cases such as: penalties which the Council may decide to impose on one of its members in the event of serious and persistent violations of fundamental rights; applications for membership of the Union; certain major international agreements; the introduction of a uniform electoral system for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 13) Or, ‘[o]ver time the European Union has evolved many complicated methods of taking decisions [ . . . ]. Amsterdam much improves [the] situation [in that it] more or less reduces decision making methods to three’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 13). In ‘most cases in which the Council decides

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by qualified majority voting (QMV) [ . . . ], the EP will in future have the right of co-decision. In effect this gives the European Parliament the power to adopt decisions jointly with the Council and to reject proposals in certain areas’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 13). In contrast, in those ‘areas of the first pillar which are subject to unanimity in the Council [ . . . ], the EP only has the right to be consulted’. Third, on matters to do with treaty decisions, the accession of new members and international agreements, ‘the Council decides by unanimity’ and ‘the European Parliament has the power of assent. This requires an absolute majority of MEPs’, but ‘precludes the Parliament from [unilaterally] amending the Council’s position’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 13). The upshot is that the ‘elected European Parliament (EP) will have increased decision-making powers: extended co-decision’, whereby ‘it can adopt decisions jointly with the Council of Ministers or reject proposals, in more areas, including transport policy, research, development aid, Trans-European Networks and new [Amsterdam] Treaty areas such as employment policy, public health, the fight against fraud, [and] equal opportunities’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 14d). Furthermore, the ‘appointment of the Commission President is made subject to the European Parliament’s formal approval’ (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 14e). More precisely: the [ . . . ] President of the Commission will be nominated by Heads of State or Government, but the appointment will become effective only after it has been endorsed by the European Parliament. After confirmation, the new President, by ‘common accord’ with the national governments, will choose the other personalities for the team, which then be presented to Parliament for approval. (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 13) Now, there is no intention here to go thoroughly into the details, implications and analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam.6 For present purposes, it is enough to note: (i) The Maastricht Treaty substantially increased the role of the European Parliament in the Community’s procedures, giving it a new right to reject legislation outright in some cases, a greater oversight [sic] in matters of finance and audit, and a role in the appointment of the Commission [ . . . ]. The Amsterdam Treaty builds on [Maastricht’s] provisions. It rationalises the many different ways the European Parliament is involved in legislating under different articles [and] provides a modest increase in its powers over the Commission. (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 14a) (ii) Over the [ . . . ] 10 years or so [prior to the Amsterdam Treaty agreement], the areas in which a qualified majority of votes [was] sufficient for

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a decision to be taken [were] gradually extended (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 13) or, within the Council of Ministers, the [Amsterdam] Treaty extends the areas where decisions can be taken by qualified majority, including anti-fraud measures, research and employment. (European Commission, July 1997b, p. 14e)7 It is the way in which the Treaty of Amsterdam altered the decision-making procedures, rights and responsibilities of the EU’s institutions, and in particular enhanced the European Parliament’s power of co-decision and extended the areas where decisions can be taken by QMV within the Council, that it boosted the EU – or more specifically the EC – as a supranational organisation. Here it is apposite to recall Harry Drost’s summary: In the European Union (EU), [supranational] cooperation and decision making [occurs] within the structures of the European Community (EC), the core of the organization. An [ . . . ] organization is [ . . . ] ‘supranational’ when the member states [sic] transfer specified legislative and executive powers to it and its decisions are binding on them and their [nationals]. The EC has operated on a supranational basis from its beginnings as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, with the Council of Ministers as the main decision-making body. Over the years more and more non-economic policy areas have been incorporated into the EC framework. The EU’s two other ‘pillars’ alongside the EC, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA), are based on intergovernmental cooperation. (Drost, 1995, p. 582) Following Jo Shaw (a specialist in European Union law), supranational cooperation is centred on the exercise of ‘supranational authority’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 13). To some extent, the ‘sovereign powers of the nation state’ will have been ‘transferred [and] separated from the nation state level’, having been bestowed on ‘autonomous organs’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 13): Power is transferred to a central authority which exists at a level above the nation state, and which exercises its powers independently of the Member States – a supranational body. (Shaw, 1996, p. 12) For Shaw, it would seem, a supranational body (a set of organs and ‘mechanisms for exercising [supranational] powers’) is a central authority which exists independently of and at a level above the nation-state level, from where it

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exercises power over the nation-states (Member States) from which it has acquired transferred sovereignty. Those who are in favour of the European Union having and, moreover, accumulating increasing degrees of supranational authority over its Member States are referred to by Shaw as ‘neofunctionalists’: the so-called neo-functionalists [ . . . ] have advocated [an] incremental and piecemeal approach to European integration [ . . . ]. Neo-functionalism [ . . . ] underlay the decision of the founding fathers of the Community such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman to abandon grand federalist projects [ . . . ]. The idea behind neo-functionalism is that sovereign [nation-] states may be persuaded in the interests of economic welfare to relinquish control over certain areas of policy where it can be easily proven that benefits are likely to flow from a common approach to problem solving [ . . . ]. The transfer of powers [to a central authority – a supranational body – which exists at a level above the Member States] is viewed as [ . . . ] part of a continuing process. One [step in the process] of integration will lead on to the next [ . . . ]. This process [is] termed ‘spill-over’ by neo-functionalists, and, as they have evolved, the European Community and later the European Union have indeed passed through a number of stages [ . . . ], involving progressive transfers of power to them by the Member States. Spill-over has [ . . . ] operated in the extension of powers of the old European Economic Community out of the purely ‘economic’ field into other related areas such as environmental and social policy. It has [then] fuelled the debate about political union in the EU [ . . . ]. To summarise, the essence of supranationalism is found in a gradual transfer of competences to the higher level, and the evolution of a distinctive form of decision-making at the higher level where increasingly decisions are taken on a majoritarian basis, rather than by consensus. (Shaw, 1996, pp. 12–13) Paraphrasing this: ‘supranationalism’ is a pattern, process or trend vis-à-vis decision-making in relation to particular nation-states that have become Member States of a supranational organisation, or are becoming Member States, or are creating such an organisation; and consequently, perhaps in relation to nation-states in general – the nation-state as a generic geo-political form. Supranationalism in this sense is a movement, but of a concrete, structural and systemic kind. This conceptualisation of ‘supranationalism’ is consistent with that indicated by Charles de Gaulle, as noted in the Introduction, when he refers to his compatriots who: professed the doctrine of ‘supranationalism’ in other words France’s submission to a law that was not [its] own. Hence the support for ‘Europe’

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seen as an edifice in which technocrats forming an ‘executive’ and parliamentarians assuming legislative powers – the great majority of both being foreigners – would have the authority to decide the fate of the French people [ . . . ]. Hence, [in other words], the eagerness to submit the acts of [the French] government to the approval of [not only ‘Europe’, but also other] organizations [such as NATO] in which, under a semblance of collective deliberation, the authority of the protector reigned supreme in every field, whether political, military, economic, technical or monetary, and in which [French] representatives would never dare say ‘we want’ but simply confine themselves to ‘pleading France’s cause’. (de Gaulle, 1994, p. 30) As Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb explain: De Gaulle’s vision of France profoundly shaped his vision of Europe, which differed markedly from the views held by the founders of the European Communities, most noticeably Jean Monnet. De Gaulle believed in European unity, but he criticized the supranational vision of Europe as unrealistic and undesirable. He argued instead for a ‘concert of European states’ in which [Member States] coordinated their policies extensively but did not give up their rights as sovereign entities to a European ‘superstate’. De Gaulle’s unwillingness to concede France’s right to control its vital affairs led to the 1965 crisis in the Communities and eventually the Luxembourg compromise that [ . . . ] gave [each Member State] the right to veto Community decisions. In effect, the Six were forced to accept de Gaulle’s vision of an intergovernmental Europe. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 25) Here, several pertinent questions arise, including ‘how far and for how long was the Community forced to accept de Gaulle’s vision?’, But this matter aside at this juncture, notably for present purposes de Gaulle’s vision of an intergovernmental Europe was presented in opposition to the supranational vision – to that view of decision-making within the Community (among what were then the six Member States) held by those who professed the doctrine of supranationalism. For de Gaulle, in other words, ‘supranationalism’ was in the first instance a doctrine – a set, or body, of beliefs or principles; a dogma (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1990, p. 345); ‘an arrogant declaration of opinion’ (ibid., p. 346). It would seem that, following de Gaulle, supranationalism can be otherwise described as an ideology: a ‘system of ideas at the basis of an economic or political theory’ (ibid., p. 586). As such, it can be bracketed with various other -isms, such as liberalism, socialism, communism and Confucianism, in that each is a system of ideas. In other words, supranationalism is an ideational phenomenon. It is the ideational driving force behind what became the European Communities,

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what has emerged as the European Union, what was agreed at Amsterdam in 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999, and what could evolve as a yet wider and deeper supranational organisation. It is the ideational mind-set and driving force behind the concrete, structural or systemic movement to which Shaw refers when clarifying what she means by ‘supranationalism’. At the same time, however, Shaw draws attention to a distinction between that ‘form of supranationalism [which] has been termed “decisional supranationalism” by Weiler (1981)’, on the one hand, and ‘a specifically legal facet to the supranational nature of the Community, which Weiler has termed “normative supranationalism”’, on the other (Shaw, 1996, p. 13). The former is concerned with decisions being taken on a majoritarian basis, ‘an area in which the Community and now Union [ . . . ] has been quite weak, at least until the changes in the decision-making process introduced by the Single European Act and more recently the Treaty of Maastricht’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 13). Thus, the more that decision-making in the Council of Ministers is made using QMV, the more decisional supranationalism is shaping the European Union. Normative supranationalism: concerns the authority of the Court of Justice to give binding and authoritative rulings on the nature and effects of EC law, and to fashion a legal system in which EC law takes precedence over national [or, that is, domestic] law. In [this] respect, the EC has evolved more rapidly, [with] the work of the Court of Justice [having tipped the] balance between the supranational and intergovernmental elements of the Treaties [in favour of the supranational]. (Shaw, 1996, pp. 13–14) Shaw points out that while the EU/EC does not ‘have a constitution as such, [ . . . ] the Court of Justice now describes the founding treaties as the European Community’s “constitutional charter”’ (Shaw, 1996, p. 16). According to Alec Stone: a constitution denotes a body of metanorms, rules that specify how legal norms are to be produced, applied, and interpreted. Metanorms are thus [both] higher-order [and] prior organic norms – they constitute a polity. Metanorms enhance the legitimacy of legal norms (and therefore [enhance] social legitimacy) [ . . . ]. Thus, metanorms fix the rules of the game, as a means of investing lower-order norms with authority (legitimacy). (Stone, 1994, p. 444) Stone mentions having ‘noticed that public lawyers and judges [have] – all but unanimously – proclaimed the European Union (EU) a constitutional polity’ (Stone, 1994, p. 444). Their ‘argument [is] that the EU regime has been “constitutionalized”’ (Stone, 1994, p. 448). The Member States of the EU engage in ‘institutionalized cooperation’ governed by ‘supranational meta-

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norms’ (Stone, 1994, p. 457). He tells us that the ‘the banner of “international regimes” [is] shorthand for forms of institutionalized cooperation among sovereign states’ (Stone, 1994, p. 442), before he proceeds (he claims) to ‘generate a continuum of regimes capable of situating all forms of institutionalized cooperative behaviour, including the supranational constitutional’ (Stone, 1994, p. 443). The EU is an ‘international regime’ with a ‘supranational constitution’ (Stone, 1994, p. 442). For Stone ‘European integration’ is ‘a dynamic process of supranational constitution-building that [ . . . ] culminated in the Treaty on European Union (1992)’ (Stone, 1994, pp. 467–8). More recently, of course, the process has continued by way of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Consequently, the EU is a ‘supranational [ . . . ] legal regime’ in which the European Court of Justice has acquired ‘meaningful autonomy from national governments in regulating what is, in effect, transnational society’ (Stone, 1994, p. 463). Essentially, ‘supranational constitutionalism begins with rejecting the fundamental distinction between domestic and international society’ (Stone, 1994, p. 469), this being reflected in the progress of the EC/EU as a supranational constitutional regime: The EU is [ . . . ] an extraordinarily intricate example of a supranational constitution. The features of this constitutionalism are well known. First, national comptence to make policy in a wide range of functional areas has been entirely preempted by supranational competence. In such areas, ‘member states are not only precluded from enacting legislation contradictory to Community law but they are preempted from taking any action at all [ . . . ]’ [Weiler, 1981, p. 277.] Second, the treaties, as a matter of Community law, are normatively superior to national metanorms and national lower-order norms. That is, EU metanorms trump national [or, that is, domestic] metanorms. Third, [treaty] provisions [ . . . ] bestow [on] all legal persons, including private citizens [sic], rights which can be enforced not only by the European Court of Justice, but also by national courts. These rights claims can even be used to set aside national legal norms in the service of protecting the superiority of the Community’s metanorms. Thus, there is a form of judicial review based on the treaties, which are conceived as constitutional (metanorms). The EU is a case of supranational constitutionalism that appears to be theoretically indistiguishable from constitutional federalism. If all this is so, the distinction between international regimes and domestic constitutional forms is relative not absolute. (Stone, 1994, pp. 63–4) Whatever the conceptual relationship and the practical, concrete similarities and differences between supranational constitutions and federal constitutions (and for me it is both possible and useful to conceptually and analytically distinguish between supranational regimes and federations), ‘as

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far as [Stone is] aware, the EU is the first example of a [supranational constitutional] regime in world history’ (Stone, 1994, p. 473). For me, although Stone’s conclusion about the originality of the EU (or more accurately the EC) as a supranational regime is acceptable, it is necessary to make at least two complementary points. First, it may be that, as defined, the supranational regime as a form of inter-nation-state co-operation is no longer confined to the EC/EU, or at least is in the process of becoming more widespread. Second, in that supranational regimes are, by definition, rooted in inter-nation-state treaties that provide the regimes with their constitutional metanorms, then all supranational regimes will be supranational constitutional regimes, so that the descriptor ‘constitutional’ is redundant. On the other hand, it is appropriate and advantageous to identify the EU, for example, as a particular type of supranational regime by employing an alternative descriptor (adjective), that of regional. Thus, the EC/EU is a supranational regional regime (SRR), there being more than one conceivable type of supranational (constitutional) regime. I have already suggested that SRRs can be distinguished from supranational global regimes (SGRs), and for me the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are practical examples of, at least for the time being, proto-SGRs.

Regional and global governance Earlier, I mentioned that the forerunner to The Legacy of Supranationalism is Supranationalism in the New World Order: global processes reviewed (Close and Ohki-Close, 1999), where it is argued that in the post-Cold War global system, the distribution of power and configuration of players, the EU is just one among a growing number of regional regimes that are acquiring prominent roles in the process of global governance, or geo-political management. The EU remains the most advanced and influential example of a regional regime through having the novel European Community (EC) at its core – the EC being uniquely constructed around supranational institutions, decisionmaking and laws – but the EC’s uniqueness is unlikely to last for very long. The evident competitive advantages of SRRs, in conjunction with the realism generally adopted by the various global players, is conducive to the consolidation and proliferation of SRRs in a manner consistent with the aforementioned neo-functionalist perspective on the progress of the EU. Other prospective SRRs (or for the time being, therefore, proto-SRRs) include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) or Area (EAEA), the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), the North American Free Trade Agreement/Area (NAFTA), Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC). In the case of the ASEAN, it was reported on 30 April 1999 how:

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The 30-year goal of uniting all 10 south-east Asian countries under one organisational umbrella was realised [ . . . ] when Cambodia was formally admitted to the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean). At a special ceremony in Hanoi, capital of Vietnam – a historic foe of Cambodia but staunch supporter of the Khmer regime led by Hun Sen – Asean foreign ministers said Cambodia’s admission would both strengthen the organisation and help to consolidate the country’s recently attained political peace [ . . . ]. Cambodia had been scheduled to join Asean in July 1997, along with Burma and Laos. But Hun Sen’s coup forced Asean to postpone entry until after he consolidated power in a strife-torn election [in 1998]. [However,] Cambodia’s admission to Asean [and so] integration into the region [ . . . ] will come at an immediate economic cost for the cash-strapped government. It must pay a $1m (£620,000) entry fee, open up four new embassies and send officials to nearly 300 meetings a year. The total initial cost to the Cambodian government is estimated to be $5m. In addition, tariffs account for at least 60 per cent of the Cambodian government’s total annual revenue and it must start to reduce them as part of the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta). (Bardacke, 1 May 1999) For me, the emerging character of the global system will increasingly depend upon SRRs, the relationships among concrete manifestations of this type of organisation, and so the doctrine of supranationalism. This development will be accompanied by, and moreover symbiotically linked to, the simultaneous emergence of other types of supranational bodies, and in particular of supranational global regimes (SGRs). If the UN and the WTO are current examples of proto-SGRs, then they will eventually acquire superordinate relationships with SRRs, other geo-political entities and other types of global player. The latter include (a) within the political–military arena, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),8 the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); and (b) within the economic sphere, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, as well as multi-national corporations (MNCs) and transnational corporations (TNCs). It is useful for the purpose of further clarifying the notion of ‘supranational regional regime’ to note that the OECD, for example, is not an SRR, although it could be counted as a proto-supranational regime of the sectoral or functional variety – and so an SFR. Referring back to Table 3.1, all seventeen countries listed are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), described by Larry Elliott as ‘the West’s leading economic think tank’ (Elliott, 17 December 1996), and by Alan Isaacs as an ‘international organization of Western developed countries established in 1961 for the purpose of promoting economic and social welfare and stimulating aid to developing countries. It

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replaced the Organization for European Economic Co-operation [OEEC] which was established in 1948’ (Isaacs, 1998, p. 1012). Timothy Bainbridge and Anthony Teasdale similarly tell us: The OECD is a Paris-based intergovernmental organization [ . . . ] established to promote economic cooperation between industrialized [nation-] states, to coordinate development assistance to the Third World and to provide a forum for the resolution of problems affecting world trade and economic growth [ . . . ]. The founding members were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the British, French and American zones of occupied Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany joined the OEEC in 1949, and the United States and Canada became associate members in 1950. Spain joined the OEEC in 1959. The OEEC had a small international secretariat but was intergovernmental in character: all important decisions were taken by a Council, which could act only by unanimity [ . . . ], each member state having one vote. [In] 1960 [the OEEC] was refounded under its new title with the United States and Canada as full members. At the same time the scope of the organisation was widened to include relations with developing countries, but its intergovernmental character remained unchanged [ . . . ]. Japan joined the OECD in 1964, Finland in 1969, Australia in 1971 and New Zealand in 1973. The OECD has also fostered the setting up of other organizations, such as [ . . . ] the Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialized economies. The OECD works very closely wherever necessary with the European Commission, for example, on development issues [ . . . ]. It was the OECD member states (meeting as the Group of 24) that founded the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in May 1990. Mexico, the Czech Republic and Hungary are now also members. The OECD Council [ . . . ] can take decisions that are binding on member states and can make recommendations. The OECD can enter into agreements with non-member [countries] and international organisations. However, unlike the European Union, the OECD has no supranational machinery for the resolution of disputes or the enforcement of decisions, nor do its workings create a body of law enjoying primacy over [domestic or, that is, nation-state level] law. (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 355–6) All OECD Council final decisions, while ‘binding’, require complete Member State unanimity; there is no such thing within the OECD’s decision-making procedures as decision-taking by majority voting, qualified or otherwise. That is, the Council is not a supranational institution within the OECD, and therefore is fundamentally distinct from the Council of Ministers in the EU. There are no independent, sovereign supranational institutions or elements

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in the OECD whatsoever. The OECD is a wholly inter-governmental organisation. Of course, that the Council’s decisions once taken are binding on the OECD’s Member States, the number of which by the late 1990s had reached twenty-nine (Bowley, 21 February 1997),9 presumably means that countries – having after all concurred with a decision – are required to either conform or leave, or perhaps be expelled from, the organisation. In the case of the EU, Member States are likewise required to conform with all decisions (laws and rulings, directives and regulations, and so on), but these can be and sometimes are arrived at in the absence of unanimity or otherwise contrary to the preferences of one or more of the Member States. Herein lies the crucial difference between an inter-governmental body, such as the OECD or the Group of Seven, on the one hand and a supranational organisation, such as the EC, on the other. The OECD may be a proto-supranational functional regime (SFR), but the WTO is a proto-supranational global regime (SGR). The supranational potential of the WTO, with its 139 members (Elliott and Denny, 1 May 1999) is clearly reflected in the following outline: The World Trade Organisation, based in Geneva, polices global trade rules. When the European Union and the US clash over issues like American hormone-treated beef or Caribbean bananas, it is the WTO which acts as judge and referee [ . . . ]. The WTO is the successor to Gatt [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] – the organisation which ran the main body of trade rules [ . . . ] – from the second world war [sic] until 1995. Unlike Gatt, the WTO has power and clout. While a Gatt ruling could be overturned by a single member dissenting – so [that] effectively any [member] country that lost a Gatt case could veto the decision – it takes unanimity to reverse a WTO ruling. Members sign up to four basic principles: extending trade concessions equally to all WTO members, working to make trade freer with lower tariff barriers; more predictable through established rules; and more competitive by cutting subsidies. Specific details of how much [member] countries are prepared to cut tariff barriers are hammered out at trade rounds of which there have been eight since the Gatt was set up in 1947. With more than 130 members making decisions by consensus, WTO negotiations traditionally go to the wire. The next big round of talks starts in Seattle in November [1999]. On the agenda is liberalising trade in agriculture and services, and, most likely, the admission of China to the organisation. (Denny, 1 May 1999) The evolution of the WTO towards the status of an SGR and its associated growing importance to the process of effective global governance is reflected in the following (albeit somewhat exaggerated) claim:

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Global trading is on the brink of chaos today after a weekend of bitter wrangling failed to produce a new leader for the World Trade Organisation. The Geneva-based body, which polices international trade disputes, was left rudderless when director general Renato Ruggiero’s four-year term of office came to an end on [30 April 1999] and negotiations over two candidates to succeed him – New Zealand’s former prime minister Mike Moore [who was proposed by Ali Mchumo, the Tanzanian chairman of the WTO’s ruling council and who has the backing of the US, Germany, France, Italy and Latin America] and Thailand’s deputy prime minister Supachai Panitchpakdi – ended in deadlock [ . . . ]. Mr Supachai’s backers are pushing for a formal vote which could undermine the WTO’s foundations since it is built on the principle of decision by consensus. Failure to achieve a consensus would be deeply damaging for the credibility of the WTO and leave the 139 members with two equally uncomfortable choices. Either they will have to find a third candidate at a time when trade disputes are mounting and the WTO is about to launch a new round of global trade discussions, or they will have to put the names of Mr Moore and Mr Supachai to a ballot. There is no agreed procedure for voting, and if there was it would slow down the decision-making process, creating administrative gridlock. Voting on disputes would also create tensions between winners and losers since a defeat at the WTO on issues affecting jobs would run the risk of being thrown out by domestic legislatures [ . . . ]. The WTO faces an upsurge in trade disputes following the US announcement on Friday [30 April 1999] that it will file complaints against the European Union, India, South Korea, Canada and Argentina for a variety of allegedly unfair practices. The organisation is also preparing for a November ministerial conference in Seattle to set the trade agenda for the 21st century and to usher in new agreements designed to liberalise global commerce. (Atkinson, 3 May 1999) Atkinson failed to anticipate the solution which the WTO eventually came up with to settle its leadership problem: The rudderless world trade organisation ended almost three months of bitter [ . . . ] wrangling [on 20 July 1999] when it emerged with a compromise deal to share the job of the new director-general. [That is,] Mike Moore will lead the WTO for three years from September [1999] after which he will be replaced for a further three-year term by his Thai rival for the coveted post, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi. (Elliott, 21 July 1999) This problem aside, in its capacity as ‘judge and referee’ (Denny, 1 May 1999) in disputes over trade issues, at the end of April 1999 the WTO was presented with a number of complaints by the US government:

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The US is to challenge the EU in the World Trade Organisation over subsidies to Airbus. The complaint is one of seven WTO actions announced by the US – the others are against the EU over food labelling, Korea over beef and airport procurement, India over cars and Argentina and Canada over patent protection. (Financial Times, 1 May 1999)10 It is then in this capacity – as judge and referee – that the WTO arrives at rulings in response to complaints and over disputes which can only be reversed by the unanimous decision of the WTO’s members (Denny, 1 May 1999). Because no single member can veto a ruling, the WTO is clearly a protoSGR, if not already a fully evolved SGR. Just as the Supranationalism in the New World Order argument – that the emerging character of the global system will increasingly depend upon SRRs, the relationships among the concrete instances of this type of organisation and, therefore, the doctrine of supranationalism – was not to ignore the possibility of the simultaneous emergence of SGRs, also it was not to ignore the possibility of certain countervailing developments, including ones associated with the process of globalisation and with such phenomena as nationalism and tribalism, ethnicism, racism and racialism. These developments have been not only addressed, but also linked by a swathe of writers over the last few decades. For instance, in the wake of what were widely assumed to be two racially motivated ‘nail bomb’ attacks in London (the first in Brixton, the second in Brick Lane) during April 1999, George Monbiot proposed: British racism [ . . . ] is beginning to tap into modern and real fears about identity and belonging in a rapidly globalising, business-dominated world. It has also begun cleverly to co-opt the language and ideas of cultural survival and tribal self-determination. These arguments will be critical to what the [far right-wing] British National Party [BNP] calls ‘the most sophisticated election and recruitment campaign run by a British nationalist organisation’ for the European [Parliament] elections in June [ . . . ]. Clearly [ . . . ] people in many parts of the world are caught up in identity politics, but these characteristically reflect not the incompatibility of cultures, but attempts by dominant political classes to extend power by means of ethnic conflict. In Rwanda, Indonesia, Guatemala and Serbia, the politics of power have been smartly and dishonestly translated into the politics of race. But the BNP’s cleverest manoeuvre is its conflation of multi-racialism and multi-nationalism. ‘By opposing multi-racialism and New World Order globalisation,’ the party maintains, ‘we are the last protectors of human dignity, freedom and identity.’ The BNP correctly identifies the dominance of business and international treaties, such as the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment, as threats to employment, diversity and belonging, then claims that the

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response to these threats must be racial separation. (Monbiot, 29 April 1999) As Monbiot indicates here, it is not necessary to accept the BNP’s particular analysis of the link between globalisation and nationalism–racialism to acknowledge that, nonetheless, the link is intimate. Also guided by Monbiot, there may be a close and strong relationship between globalisation and nationalism–racialism, on the one hand, and the New World Order and multi-lateral agreements, on the other, even though again any racist interpretation of it does not have to be accepted. For me, it is appropriate and advantageous to pursue this line of reasoning further by recognising the late twentieth-century presence, influence and inter-dependence within the global system of nationalism, on the one hand, and supranationalism, on the other. These two doctrines and driving forces may be opposed (in conflict; sources of conflict), and even contradictory, but this does not mean they do not and cannot occur together. Nor does it preclude the possibility of them thriving concurrently, in something of a concomitant (perhaps again, symbiotic) fashion. Consistent with its growing role and particular strategy in both regional (European–Mediterranean) and global governance, the EU – the central pillar of which is the supranational European Community – has persevered with extending and consolidating its geo-political range and spheres of influence, including by pressing ahead with its programme of expanding its membership in easterly, south-easterly and southerly directions, entailing various plans, prospects and promises. Crucially, its negotiations with several potentially new members have advanced. In this context we can recall how in November 1998, the European Commission reported that the ‘enlargement process’ with the twelve countries which had by that time applied to join the EU was ‘broadly on track’, judged in terms of the ‘progress made by each country in meeting the agreed accession criteria and [ . . . ] administrative capacity to apply the body of EU law’ (European Commission, 5 November 1998). The countries were Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey. Then, a few months later – shortly after Supranationalism in the New World Order had been published – the EU’s involvement in regional governance and, moreover, its enlargement process were spurred by a major global event: the eruption of the Kosovo War (Walker, 9 April 1999). According to Martin Walker, one consequence of this conflict was an ambitious plan to use the eventual postwar settlement to bring the region into the West’s orbit (Walker, 9 April 1999): Europe and the United States are considering offering Yugoslavia and all the other Balkan countries membership of [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)] and the European Union as the incentives of a

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post-war stability pact for the region which seeks ‘to anchor them firmly in the Euro-Atlantic structures’. The highly ambitious plan for using the Kosovo war as an opportunity for long-term stablisation of the Balkan countries [ . . . ] was presented yesterday by the German presidency of the EU.11 ‘The prospect of EU membership is a key incentive to reform,’ the stability pact plan says in a copy obtained by The Guardian. [A] hurdle is that Yugoslavia itself has to co-operate. The plan says: ‘It will not be possible to bring lasting peace and stability to south-eastern Europe if Yugoslavia persists in its role as an outsider and cannot be accepted as a negotiating partner by its neighbours or the international community.’ The plan [ . . . ] seeks to shift the Balkans towards a European socialcapitalist model, and calls specifically for widespread privatisation and strengthening competitive and internationally integrated private sectors in the region. (Walker, 9 April 1999) This EU–US plan, with its objective of securing the long-term stability of the Balkan region, was underscored a few weeks into the Kosovo War: EU foreign ministers agreed unanimously to endorse an oil embargo and to increase trade and travel sanctions against Yugoslavia at a meeting in Luxembourg [on 26 April 1999]. The move is to be accompanied by promises to neighbouring Balkan [countries] of greater economic assistance. (Bates, 27 April 1999) Or, as reported by the European Commission The Council on 26–27 April [1999] stepped up sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with an EU oil export ban and other measures [ . . . ]. The Council invited Kosovan leader Ibrahim Rugova to address its next session, due on 17 May, and reiterated its support for the democratically elected government of Montenegro. Ministers condemned the Belgrade regime’s efforts to undermine [the Montenegro government’s] authority and destablise the republic [of Montenegro]. The Council also considered the position of Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], commending their policies of moderation and expressing appreciation of the sacrifices made in dealing with the huge influx of refugees from Kosovo. Finally, a Declaration was adopted on Romania and Bulgaria, noting their contribution to stablity in the region. Ministers agreed to start preparations for a stability pact for south-eastern Europe, with a conference on 27 May in Bonn. (European Commission, 29 April 1999a) Indeed, according Stephen Bates and Alex Brummer:

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The European Union held out the prospect [not only] of immediate economic aid [but also of] eventual membership to Romania, Albania and Macedonia [on 27 April 1999] as a reward for their continuing support. At a series of meetings in Luxembourg between the three countries’ foreign ministers and foreign ministers from Germany, Austria and [Finland,] Yugoslavia’s [three] neighbours [were given] pledges of closer ties. The move, intended to lock the three countries [ . . . ] more tightly to the West, holds out promises which, but for the Kosovo crisis, they could not have otherwise hoped to achieve for many years [ . . . ]. [E]ach was offered the prospect of association accords – the first step to eventual EU membership – and a part in the EU’s so-called stability pact, ultimately intended to promote better relations in the Balkans. The agreements with Romania, Albania and Macedonia will be spelled out more clearly at a meeting in Bonn at the end of [May 1999] intended to sketch out the details of the stability pact. (Bates and Brummer, 28 April 1999) Two months later, however, questions were raised about whether the EU’s apparent rewards were nothing more than that – mere apparitions: At the time it all looked so promising. In return for the help of two of Europe’s poorest [countries], Albania and Macedonia, in accommodating the flood of refugees from Kosovo, the European Union came close to hinting that their wish to be members of the hallowed western club might just come true. During a flurry of diplomatic activity in late April [1999], when Nato’s bombing was at its height and refugees were streaming across borders, the EU nodded and winked that membership was, if not exactly within grasp, not too far away. It seemed too good to be true, and increasingly looks as if it was – not a confidence trick exactly, but some diplomatic fast footwork. It may yield benefits for the Balkans, but nowhere near as quickly as they would like. Not that it’s quick for anyone. Other former communist east European countries, far more advanced and sophisticated than Albania and Macedonia, have sweated for years over their applications and are still far from ready. (Bates, 29 June 1999) As noted previously, the ‘poorest’ EU Member State, Portugal, had a GDP per capita of about $US11 000 in 1997. Slovenia, one of the likely countries to be part of the next round of EU expansion (in 2002 at the earliest), had a GDP per capita of just under $US10 000. The corresponding figures for Albania and Macedonia were around $US500 and $US1000 respectively (Bates, 29 June 1999). While such comparative figures alone suggest that the EU will gain little by actually accepting Albania and Macedonia as members within the foreseeable future, April 1999’s ‘flurry of diplomatic activity’ is indicative of how the EU recognised the gains to be had – including immediately – from doing nothing more than holding out, or just hinting (whether

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cynically or otherwise) at, the prospect of opening its doors to these countries sooner rather than later. The result is Albania’s and Macedonia’s gratitude, obedience and compliance, and so the chance of greater and swifter stability in the Balken region – in, that is, the EU’s ‘back yard’ (Ashdown, 21 May 1999) – and thereby of the EU ensuring the ‘peace of its own continent’ (Walker, 7 June 1999), with the attendant benefits this would bring vis-à-vis its prosperity, along with its prominence and power as not just a regional but also a global player. But, the April 1999 plan for the long-term stablisation of the Balkan region was not the first. It followed another – perhaps in some ways more ambitious – one, floated a couple of years earlier: No other region of the world, of a similar size, offers such rich choice in terms of conflicts past and future as does the Balkans. Almost all of its 12 states12 – speaking between them 14 languages – have seen war in the past 10 years or are preparing for it now. But the Americans have decided to introduce a little bit of order by inventing the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to bring the Balkan nations together to promote econmic and ecological co-operation. This is meant to stablise the region [. . . ]. Although the idea was America’s, Europe would finance it while the Balkan peoples would have to consent to it. (Zercin, 5) February 1997 The 1997 and 1999 plans have in common being about binding the Balkan countries, nations and peoples within either a newly created or an already established regional regime,13 the backbone of which is economic co-operation, but with the specific objective of ensuring the long-term stablisation (successful, effective governance) of the Balkan peninsula (Wheen, 28 April 1999). The 1999 version explicitly proposes that ‘conflict management in the region must continue to rely on averting bloodshed, with the threat of – and as a last resort – the use of force’ (Walker, 9 April 1999). The 1999 EU–US plan was based on the assumption that the best chance of managing the Balkan region without resorting to force lies in it becoming attached to, and being eventually absorbed by, the EU. It seems clear that for the German presidency of the EU (or the German government, which devised the plan), merely the prospect of EU membership is a key incentive to reform and stability in the Balkan region. The reform and stability the German government had in mind would then be of benefit to not only the Balkan region itself, but also the EU in conjunction with the rest of Europe and the global system. For me, the 1999 plan lends support to the Supranationalism in the New World Order thesis that in the post-Cold War global system, the EU is purposefully acquiring a prominent role in the process of governance, to some extent through the operation of differentiated zones of geo-political management. Accordingly, the EU has become a powerful regional and ‘global player in the process of managing disorderliness in the pursuit of orderliness (of

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“global order” [Axford, 1995, p. 291]) within the new world order’ (Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, p. 4). The notion of ‘governance’ being alluded to here resembles the way the term has been employed by a range of other writers, including John Peterson, for whom ‘governance’ refers to ‘collective problem solving in the public realm’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 8; see also Caporaso, 1996).14 Of course, it is necessary to keep in mind the obvious practical and effectively participating in the activity and process of governance. However, in my view, the EU has been largely successful in participating in extensive European geo-political management, judged in terms of its own objectives and interests, notwithstanding its shortcomings in south-east Europe in particular.15 There are grounds for arguing that the stature of the EU as a regional and global player in the process of governance is reflected in, and may even have been reinforced, by the way the earlier (1997) plan for the Balkans did not materialise in practice, although this is neither to assume that the EU and SECI are necessarily mutually exclusive nor to ignore how the latter (or something like it) remains a prospect: The Nato bombing campaign is having a catastrophic effect on the economies of the Balkan region, decimating growth, destroying commerce and placing a huge burden on the budgets of neighbouring [countries], says the first authoritive report issued by the World Bank and IMF yesterday [ . . . ]. Among the immediate decisions taken [by the World Bank and IMF] were: [to plan for the] post-war reconstruction which could cost $10–$30 [billion; and to start] creating a regional trading grouping. The commitment to fund reconstruction came as Europe’s next commission president, Romano Prodi, began discussions with EU officials on how to help the region recover. He considered a plan which envisaged all Balkan countries joining the [EU’s single currency] euro zone as part of a newlydesigned associated membership of the EU. (Brummer and Walker, 29 April 1999) Whether the SECI plan was a palpable failure (hence, perhaps, the Kosovo War) and whether a distinct Balkan regional ‘grouping’ is feasible and will be established are unsettled issues. However, it is reasonable to assume that the 1999 plan probably has a greater chance of success, given both the EU’s overall history – its evident progress – and the way the countries, nations and people of the Balkan peninsula (even those of what remains of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) appear eager to join the EU. Sometimes Balkan countries can seem extremely keen and highly optimistic, something which brings us back to the case of Albania: The European Union swiftly poured cold water yesterda on suggestions that Albania could qualify for rapid membership of the EU as a result of

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its support for the Nato alliance in the Kosovo crisis. European foreign ministers meering next week in Luxembourg will consider Albania’s request for urgent help to build its shattered economy but will rule out early membership. Swift denials from the European Commission in Brussels followed reports from the Albanian capital Tirana that Paskal Milo, the foreign minister, had suggested the EU’s membership criteria should be overlooked in a gesture of solidarity towards Europe’s poorest country. Albania has not even applied to join the EU, unlike some of its more propsperous and advanced east European neighbours currently undergong legthy negotiations which might allow them to join sometime undergoing during the first five years of the [twenty-first] century. Nearly two years ago, the EU agreed that Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and the Crech Republic were eligible to apply, but the countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia – all much more advanced than Albania – would have to wait. Albania’s GDP per head is thought to be less than one fourteenth of the EU average and since the downfall of its old hardline communist regime, the country has been racked with economic and political stability. (Bates, 20 April 1999) But again, it was precisely the matter of the stability – or, in the first instance, the instability – of Albania and its Balkan neighbours which, at the April 1999 Luxembourg meeting, turned out to be crucial in shaping the EU foreign ministers’ decisions. As noted above, Stephen Bates subsequently reported (from Brussels) how the EU’s foreign ministers signalled not only ‘the prospect of immediate economic aid’, but also ‘eventual membership to Romania, Albania and Macedonia’ by way of ‘association accords as ‘the first step’’ (Bates and Brummer, 28 April 1999). Bates and Brummer tell us that these moves were to be interpreted as ‘a reward for [the countries]’ support in the Kosovo crisis’, before adding how association would draw the Balkan countries involved into ‘the EU’s so-called stability pact’ (Bates and Brummer, 28 April 1999). It the earlier, Southeast European Co-operation Initiative (SECI) plan to bring together and bind the countries of the Balkan region has been a failure, nonetheless it will remain instructive and significant. It is indicative of the factors which influence the (relative) success of regional regimes; and signifies the proliferation of attempts at regional co-operation, incorporation and cohesion, primarily with economic aims, but concomitantly with the intention of enhancing both regional and global (political) stability. SECI is just one of a growing list of attempts, plans or ideas concerned with establishing regional regimes in the pursuit of both economic gains and effective geo-political management (governance). Each regional regime is from the outset a proto-SRR, and each represents the legacy of supranationalism, the doctrine either trumpeted by ‘the founding fathers of the [European] Community such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman’ (Shaw, 1996,

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p. 12) or, alternatively, attacked – while, nevertheless, sometimes being cogently articulated – by a range of opponents, including confederalists, inter-governmentalists and nationalists (Shaw, 1996, p. 14). The principal legacy of supranationalism is the existence and evolution of the EC/EU, but a further legacy (or measure of the progress and success of the EU, currently with the supranational EC at its core) is that of the ceaseless and highly charged Europe-wide debate about the future of the regime and, in particular, about supranationalism’s part in shaping it. In my view, the long-term legacy of supranationalism will be the expansion and deeping of the EU as an SRR and a global system where the doctrine not merely survives, but predominates.

European federalism The founding fathers of the EU are generally recognised to be Jean Monnet, a French civil servant and diplomat as well as the creator the Action Committeee for a United States of Europe, and Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, after being perusaded by Jean Monnet ‘to propose the European Coal and Steel Community’ (Nelson and Stubb, 1994, p. 17). As noted by Ernest Wistrich, ‘in launching his project for the European Coal and Steel Community [the ECSC], [Schuman] described it as the first step in “laying the foundation of a European federation”’ (Wistrich, 1994, p. vii; see also Nelson and Stubb, 1994, pp. 11–12). The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, which ‘outlined a plan to unite under a single authority the coal and steel industries of [ . . . ] France and Germany’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 11) was concluded with the following claim: By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace. (Nelson and Stubb, 1994, p. 12) The High Authority specified in the Schuman Declaration to oversee the ‘Franco-German production of coal and steel’ following the creation of the ECSC (which also included Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy) in 1952 (Nelson and Stubb, 1994, pp. 11–12) was then first presided over by Jean Monnet. But this aside, Schuman’s experession High Authority aptly presages the notion of a ‘supranational Europe’ which Charles de Gaulle was later to outline but, as a representation of the preferred future of Europe, to reject. De Gaulle16 had a ‘vision of Europe’ [ . . . ] which differed markedly from the views held by the founders of the European Communities, most notably Jean Monnet’, the fervent federator (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994,

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p. 235; see also Jean Monnet, ‘A ferment of change’ in Nelson and Stubb, 1994, pp. 17–24). De Gaulle argued: in the vast arena of Europe [ . . . ] not one of [the past] federators17 succeeded in inducing the subject countries to surrender their individuality. On the contrary, arbitrary centralization always provoked an upsurge of violent nationalism by way of a reaction. It [is] my belief that a united Europe could not today, any more than in previous times, be a fusion of its peoples [ . . . ]. My policy therefore [has been] aimed at setting up a concert of European states which in developing all sorts up a ties between them would increase their interdependence and solidarity. From this starting point, there [is] every reason to believe that the process of evolution might lead to their confederation, especially if they were one day to be threatened from the same source. (de Gaulle, 1994, pp. 30–2) De Gaulle was disdainfully dismissive of those – such as the French ‘negotiators in [the] 1957’ procedures which led to the Treaties of Rome that created the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) – who were ‘caught up in the dream of a supranational Europe’; in the fantasy of becoming ‘citizens of an artificial motherland’ (ibid., p. 34). He was contemptuous ‘of the supranational school’; ‘of those who wanted Europe to be a federation’, held together by a ‘superstate’, supported by ‘all the trappings of sovereignty’ (ibid., pp. 34–5). Basically, he was passionately opposed to the doctrine of supranationalism – its prognosis for Europe: What depths of illusion or prejudice would have to be plumbed in order to believe that European nations forged through long centuries by endless exertion and suffering, each with its own geography, history, language, traditions and institutions, could cease to be themselves and form a single entity? What a perfunctory view is reflected in the parallel often naively drawn between what Europe ought to do and what the United States [has] done, when the latter was created from nothing in a completely new territory from successive waves of uprooted colonists?’ (de Gaulle, 1994, pp. 39–40) Essentially, therefore: De Gaulle believed in European unity, but he criticized the supranational vision of Europe as unrealistic and undesirable. He argued instead for a ‘concert of European states’ in which states coordinated their policies extensively but did not give up their rights as sovereign entities to a European ‘superstate’. De Gaulle’s unwillingness to concede France’s right to control its vital affairs led to the 1965 crisis in the Communities and

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eventually the Luxembourg compromise that, in practice, gave every member state [sic] the right to veto Community decisions. In effect, the Six were forced to accept de Gaulle’s vision of an intergovernmental Europe.’ (Nelsen and Stubb 1994, p. 25)18 De Gaulle’s political legacy is known as ‘gaullism’, this being: [the political] outlook in France based on the values and policies in France of Charles de Gaule [ . . . ]. The main thrust of his political philosophy was nationalism, which expressed itself in the pursuit of an independent role for France on the international stage [ . . . ]. De Gaulle saw European integration essentially in terms of a confederation of nation states [sic], expressed in the notion Europe des patries (‘Europe of the fatherlands’). In this sense the term ‘gaullist’ is now also used outside France to denote support for such a vision of what is now the European Union (EU) and a rejection of strong supranational structures. (Drost, 1995, p. 251) Accordingly, there is much common ground between ‘gaullism’ and the view of European integration held by a subsequent prime minister of the UK: Margaret Thatcher served as Britain’s prime minister from 1979 to 1990 [ . . . ]. Her distrust of big government extended to the institutions of the European Community [ . . . ]. While prime minister, Thatcher raised the ire of most EC leaders by working tirelessly and unapologetically for Britain’s particular interests and by resisting, often alone, most attempts to expand the powers of EC institutions [ . . . ]. [She] oultlined her views on European integration in a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, on 20 September 1998. There she placed Britain firmly in Europe but rejected the notion that ‘Europe’ meant the absorption of Britain – and all the other [Member States] – into a single, bureaucratized European ‘superstate’. The European Community, she argued, would succeed only if each [Member State] was allowed to maintain its own identity. Her vision of Europe as a ‘family of nations’ – which mirrors de Gaulle’s – represents well the traditional British approach to integration, but challenges the federalist vision of the founders and continental builders of the Community. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 45) Thus, after claiming: ‘We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any other nation’, Margaret Thatcher went on to say: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states [sic] is the best way to build a successful Community. To try to supress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardize the objectives we

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seek to achieve. [W]orking more closely together does not require power to be centralized in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy [ . . . ]. We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European superstate exercising a new dominance from Brussels. (Thatcher, 1994, pp. 46–8; originally, September 1998)19 Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 Bruges speech appears to echo the demands of nationalists in the UK, in particular those in Scotland and Wales. Their commitment to not merely devolution but full independence (and so the break-up of the UK) lies behind the decision by the UK’s central, Westminster government to allow the Scottish and Welsh people to choose, via referendums, to have their own Parliament and Assembly respectively. This is not to say that Thatcher herself would have expressed or felt sympathy with Scottish and Welsh separatists, even as her own nationalism, or anti-supranationalism, became more extreme: William Hague, [having] denounced those who advocate withdrawing from the European Union as ‘extremists’, [has] now discovered that they include many of his own supporters. A survey by academics at Hull university [ . . . ] reveals that 26% of Tory MPs want to quit the EU. And Margaret Thatcher is leting it be known that she agrees with them. According to the Independent on Sunday, [she] ‘has told friends she now believes the UK should sever its links because the EU is turning into a federal superstate’. This, lest we forget, is the Margaret Thatcher who gave her consent to the Single European Act. (Wheen, 11 August 1999) It is difficult to decide how Margaret Thatcher’s approach to European integration, and more specifically to the UK’s relationship with this process, squares with that of one of her eminent predecesors, namely Winston Chuchill, whom Thatcher admired so much. It is evident that Churchill can be counted as having been guilty of, in de Gaulle’s terms, naively drawing a parallel between what Europe ought to do and what the United States has done. De Gaulle no doubt had in mind such people as Jean Monnet, but there are unmistakable similarities between Monnet’s vision of Europe and Churchill’s prognosis. As Nelsen and Stubb summarise: Winston Churchill (1874–1965), the great wartime prime minister of Britain [ . . . ] remained a key architect of the postwar world by identifying the dangers facing the West and articulating a clear strategy for defending Western interests and values. Churchill’s speech at Zurich University on 19 September 1946 profoundly influenced the shape of postwar Europe. He began this speech with the refrain common to all postwar integrationists: Europe must unite before war destroys the continent, its glorious

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civilization, and perhaps much of the rest of the world. He called specifically for a ‘United States of Europe’ led by Europe’s former antagonists, France and Germany [.. . ]. [He] argued simply and powerfully for Europe to adopt an ideal to style its future [ . . . ]. His efforts eventually led to the Hague Congress of May 1948 and the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, both milestones in European integration.20 (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 5) Whereas de Gaulle anticipated and prescribed the prospect of European peoples and nations increasing their interdependence and solidarity towards confederation, especially if they were one day to be threatened from the same source (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 32), Churchill identified dangers facing the West and articulated a strategy for defending Western interests and values, a strategy which entailed, at least by inference, European federation. At the same time, however, ‘Churchill seemed to exclude Britain from his grand European project, thus reflecting an ambiguity towards Europe that remains strong in Britain today’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 5). Almost half a century later, in his book The United States of Europe, Ernest Wistrich lent his support to the kind of European future imagined and advocated perhaps by Churchill and certainly by Monnet, while explaining: Three terms have been used over the last fifty years to describe the aims of European integration. First, there is the ‘United States of Europe’, used by Winston Churchill in several of his speeches in the 1940s calling for European unification. Jean Monnet, one of united Europe’s founding fathers, promoted the objective through his Action Committee for the United States of Europe. The term ‘European federation’ was first used during the Second World War by federalist organisations such as [the] Federalist Union in Britain and the European Union of Federalists on the Continent [sic]. After the war, French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, in launching his project for the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC], described it as the first step in ‘laying the foundation of a European federation’. The third term ‘European Union’ has come into common usage with the [1957] Rome Treaty, setting up the European Economic Community. This resolved ‘to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Eruope’. It is also the title given to the Maastricht Treaty. (Wistrich, 1994, p. vii) Wistrich goes on to claim: All three terms [ . . . ] describe a Europe united on federal lines: that is, not as a centralised unitary state but a union of states that retain autonomous powers over all issues that have not specifically been agreed by its memebrs to be exercised in common. The responsibilities that are pooled within the existing European Community are carried out by common institutions

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under Community laws, enacted by them, and taking precedence over national legislation. The distribution of powers between the European and national levels, agreed within the treaties or amendments to them, are subject to interpretation and ultimate adjudication by the European Court of Justice [ECJ], which has the final word on these issues. (Wistrich, 1994, p. vii) Wistrich tells us that he chose the title of his book, The United States of Europe, ‘to emphasise the federal definition of a union in which several states constitute a political unity while remaining independent as to all internal affairs not transferred to the federal level. The title is not [ . . . ] to be understood as [interferring that] the model of the United States of America [will necessarily be copied by Europe], which is developing according to its own logic and circumstances’ (Wistrich, 1994, p. viii). The USA may not be the model for the EU as an eventual federal system by way of its own, novel supranational path. Nevertheless, the latter can be understood as having been influenced to some extent by the USA. We can recall how, according to Stephen Ambrose, in the post-Cold War NWO ‘no one threatened the security of the United States’; all ‘the great “isms” of the twentieth century against which the United States had fought – colonialism, fascism, Communism – [having] been defeated’21 (Ambrose, 1993, p. 374). Hence, Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of History’ thesis. For Fukuyama, ‘the collapse of communism meant that liberal democracy had been proved superior to all its competitors. Everyone [was striving] for a democratic political system and a market economy. This meant the end of history, in the sense of searching for the best system’, as well as of ‘large-scale war’ (Ambrose, 1993, p. 374): the future is going to be radically different from the past. There are no guide posts. In this new world, Germany and Japan – premier examples of liberal democracies – pose more of a challenge to the American people than any military power or enemy possibly could [ . . . ]. In the twentieth century, the United States turned back the forces of totalitarianism – the Kaiser’s Germany, Hitler’s Nazi Germany, Japan’s militarist and expansionist government, Mussolini’s Fascist Italy, and Soviet Communism. Surely justice has never been better served. The legacy of the American Century is a world in which people are relatively freer to make their own choices, certainly far freer than they were under any of the isms, than ever before. That is a splendid legacy. The counterpart is American hubris. The experience of the Cold War gives Americans a sense that they can run the world because their military power is so much greater than that of any other nation or group of nations. But the nation’s economic base is smaller than ever, so resources do not support expectations. In addressing the first crises of the new world order,22 [President George]

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Bush had to respond to both expectation and reality. (Ambrose, 1993, pp. 374–80) Aside from the way he is alluding to the USA’s post-Cold War global hegemony but concurrent relative decline, Ambrose is claiming that above all the USA, during the twentieth century, spearheaded the fight against and defeat of a number of ‘isms’ – the forces of totalitariamism – thereby ensuring the undisputed success of (and following Fukuyama, vindicating) an alternative set of ‘isms’, those favouring a new world order global system dominated by liberal democratic politics and market capitalist economics. But, it can be noted, the USA has not only been the champion of unfettered, global liberalism and capitalism. In the first place, the history of federalism is firmly rooted in the eighteenth-century origins and subsequently development of the USA as an independent, expansionist and, eventually, hegemonic nation-state. Furthermore, the USA has played a major part, albeit in this case less by example and so more incidentally, in the progress of another ‘ism’; one which only relatively recently (that is, since the Second World War) has begun to have a presence, impact and importance on the world stage. Thus, as John Peterson puts it: The US has provided considerable moral and political support to the European integration process, but American attitudes have often been arrogant and patronizing. The EU’s own development has proceeded in fits and starts. Its inability to speak with one voice on issues extending beyond its most protectionist and insular policies frequently has made it a difficult partner for the US [ . . . ]. [In] the immediate post-war period, [ . . . ] [e]conomic integration was viewed in Washington as the only way to ‘kick-start’ economic growth in Europe, while binding the new Federal Republic of Germany firmly to the West. European political unity was seen as crucial to the collective defence against the Soviet threat. (Peterson, 1996, pp. 35–6) The latter – collective defence against the Soviet threat, as Peterson puts it – eventually paid off with ‘the end of the Cold War’ and so the advent of ‘a “New World Order”’, marked by the ‘demise of the Soviet Union’. At the same time, however, while on the one hand ‘bipolarity along an East–West axis [was] no longer the defining feature of the international system’, the EU had emerged as ‘a new centre of power in a more multipolar world’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 7): whatever type of global system emerges in a post-Cold War world, the US and the EU will be crucial in determining how it will differ from the system it is replacing. [Peterson’s] central arguments [ . . . ] are that the US and EU are the most powerful actors in the international system, and

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that usually they are much more powerful acting together than separately. (Peterson, 1996, p. 7) For me, it can be argued also that in so far as the USA remains a powerful, and indeed the most powerful, player in the global system, and the USA cannot be relied on to always act together with the EU, then this is an additional incentive for the EU itself to become a more powerful player and therefore, in turn, more integrated. In this regard, it can be noted that while ‘the US actively encouraged the negotiations’ which ‘culminated in the singing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957’, the US government’s ‘views had changed somewhat by the early 1960s’ in response to the Community’s protectionist and insular policies (Peterson, 1996, p. 36) European integration once received the active support of the US’s government, while in the post-Cold War NWO it is spurred by, among other things, the USA’s presence in the multipolar world as the only remaining superpower, not only in the military but also the economic and (associated) political spheres. Active support for European integration on the part of those actually participating, or that is directly embroiled, in the process – especially in so far as this entails a commitment to ‘political unity’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 36) – means encouragement for supranationalism and the realisation of this doctrine in a supranational, perhaps eventual federal, European Union. Although Ernest Wistricht tells us he is not inferring that ‘the model of the United States of America’ will necessarily be copied by Europe, developing as this is ‘according to its own logic and circumstances’ (Wistrich, 1994, p. viii), nevertheless ‘The United States of Europe points the way to a federation that will integrate the whole of Europe and become a major force in world affairs’ (Foreword to Wistrich, 1994), and so will become similar to the USA both internally and, relatedly, externally. Ernest Wistrich can be said to advocate a maximalist approach to European integration, an approach that subsequently found echoes in the views of certain prominent European politicians in the late 1990s: Transforming the European Union into a single state with one army, one constitution, and one foreign policy is the critical challenge of the age, the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, said yesterday [25 November 1998] a few weeks before his government takes over the EU presidency [ . . . ]. ‘A common [EU] constitution has to be tackled which would produce a European Union as a subject of international law,’ the foreign minister and Greens leader said in an interview with the [ . . . ] Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper. ‘That is my aim. It will take a while, but it is the decisive task of the times.’ He said the single European currency being launched in January was the ‘first real transfer of sovereignty’ from the nation states of Europe to the union and suggested it would not be the last. (Traynor, 26 November 1998)

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A wide range of definitions of ‘sovereignty’ are available, including one from Alan Isaacs: Supreme and independent authority over a given territory. Sovereignty is usually invested in the people of the territory, who delegate it to the government administering the state on their behalf. Internally, sovereignty implies a legitimate source of rule within society, above which there is no higher authority. This can in practice diverge from and conflict with the actual power of the ruling élite [ . . . ]. Externally, the claim to sovereign control of a given territory is normally recognized by other sovereign states eigher de facto (because it exists in fact) or de jure (by right). In practice, international law imposes restrictions upon the sovereign power of states, which are not allowed to act simply as they please within their territory.23 (Isaacs, 1998, p. 1259) The German foreign minister was by no means alone in supporting the construction of a European Union which would assume and be accorded (internally and externally) the sovereignty of ‘a single state’, at the expense of the separate state (state apparatuses) of the independent Member States – the nation-states – that belong to the Union. What he had in mind was the further transfer of sovereignty from the states at the Member State level of the Union to the state at the level of the Union itself: of the Union’s own, distinct set of institutions. Thus: Chancellor Gerhard Schröder also advocates that the single currency be used as a stepping stone to a fuller political union, while Mr Lafontaine, [the German finance minister,] is eager to harmonise corporation tax levels across the EU and co-ordinate fiscal and economic policy-making. The German government of Social Democrats and Greens is expected to push such polices when it takes the helm [by taking its turn as Presidency] of the EU in January [1999]. ‘If there was a full union, there would also one day be a single foreign and security policy,’ said Mr Fischer. ‘The core areas of sovereignty are money, constitution, fundamental rights, law and order, and external security. But we European will never be a homogeneous national state [sic], because the peoples here in Europe are quite different from the federal states of the USA in their idiosyncracies, languages, histories, values and prejudices, loves and hates.’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998) Mr Fischer argued that ‘a future European [central] government should be made up of politicians from member states rather than from the European Commission and that the European parliament should be given a second chamber of MPs from national legislatures’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998).

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It was because of his views on economic policy, fiscal policy and taxes that Oskar Lafontaine had been ‘branched by the Sun [newspaper on 25 November 1998 as] the biggest threat to the British way of life since the Nazis [ . . . ]. [In response, speaking] in Berlin, where the [German] cabinet met for the first time in the history of the post-war republic, Mr Lafontaine’s spokesman quipped that the Sun’s attack on the finance minister put him in good company with Tony Blair since the [newspaper] had once labelled Mr Blair [as] dangerous’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998). That is, German ‘government spin doctors contemptuously brushed off [the] anti-German broadside from the Sun[ . . . ], which [had] dubbed Oskar Lafontaine [as] “the most dangerous man in Europe”’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998). If so then what could the Sun say about the German foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, given how – on the very same day as that newspaper’s outburst – he ‘went further than his cabinet colleague has ever done in spelling out his maximalist designs for the EU’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998). Indeed, it would seem that the Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, who like Fischer ‘advocates that the single currency be used as a stepping stone to a fuller political union’ (Traynor, 26 November 1998), also shared Fischer’s maximalist approach to European integration and so the EU: Chancellor Gerhard Schröder yesterday [10 November 1998] called for the European Union to be transformed into a federation and pledged to use Germany’s EU presidency, starting in six weeks, to push for greater integration – including on the political front. In a two-hour address to the newly elected Bundestag, Bonn’s lower house, Mr Schröder set out his blueprint for the next four years of his coalition of Social Democrats and Greens – a blueprint that aims to make Berlin the capital of ‘a new republic of the centre’. The European single currency, to be launched on January 1 as Germany takes over the rotating presidency was but a stepping stone, he said, to ‘political union . . . a modern Europe of the social market economy and environmental responsibility.’ Mr Schröder said he would call a special EU summit early next year to hammer out a new financial dispensation in Brussels entailing ‘fundamental changes’ to the Common Agricultural Policy. Europe-wide policies to fight unemployment were a priority, he added, reversing Helmut Kohl’s opposition to French calls for an EU jobs pack. ‘We will actively set the pace in reforming the EU,’ he said. ‘We’ll ensure that Germany no longer acts to break social policy in the EU.’ The chancellor [ . . . ] pointed out that the centreleft ascendancy across almost all EU states meant there was a new consensus of ‘social modernisers’ in power [ . . . ]. The issue of a European federation has long been a bugbear to Anglo-German relations, not least because the British equate ‘federal’ with ‘centralised’, while Germans take the word to mean ‘decentralised’. Mr Schröder signalled that the Social Democrats are every bit as integrationist on Europe as Mr Kohl, Germany’s

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previous chancellor. ‘A federal order in Europe seems to be the best guarantee of peace, solidarity and progress. The federal system in Germany has proven itself,’ Mr Schröder said. ‘We will only succeed in shaping a common Europe that is closer to its people by developing further towards a political, a social, and an environmental union.’ He stressed that relations with France remained the ‘foundation’ of German European policy. He expanded on German relations with France, the United States and Poland, but made only one brief reference to Britain. (Traynor, 11 November 1998) While, guided by Wistrich, the three terms used to indicate the aims of European integration may describe a Europe united on federal lines, currently (the prevailing means for achieving a federal – a United States of – Europe), in a manner consistent with the incrementalism of the neo-functionalist approach to European integration, the process has brought into being a set of common institutions and common laws, where the latter (to paraphrase) take precedence over Member State legislation, and are accordingly interpreted and enforced by one particular appropriate, European-level institution, the European Court of Justice. It follows that, in the field of Community laws and the areas (the sectors of everyday life, activities and relationships) covered by these laws, the ECJ takes precedence over all the courts and law-making bodies at the Member State level, and therefore assumes the mantle of a supreme court. On these grounds alone, the European Community can be regarded as having a supranational character, in that its Member States have transferred ‘specified legislative and executive powers to it and its decisions are binding on them and their’ nationals (Drost, 1995, p. 582).24

New Europe, new world The EU has evolved as an increasingly deep supranational organisation, contrary to de Gaulle’s criticism of ‘the supranational vision of Europe as unrealistic and undesirable’, and by reversing his actions whereby each Member State had ‘the right to veto Community decisions’ and ‘the Six were forced to accept [his] vision of an intergovernmental Europe’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 25). Subsequently, and perhaps not unrelated to Charles de Gaulle’s resignation in April 1969 (followed by his death in 1970), as the Six became the Nine (in 1973), the Ten (in 1981), the Twelve (in 1986), and the Fifteen in January 1995, the Community’s inter-governmental framework increasingly became the target of revisionists with a supranational agenda. Whereas de Gaulle insisted on a concert of European states, or nothing more than an inter-governmental confederation, the Community and now Union – its bodies and institutions – have gradually acquired the authority to decide the fate of the French people equally with that of all the people of the EU’s Mem-

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ber States. The doctrine of supranationalism has turned out to be the ideational, or the ideologial, driving force behind the (albeit not wholly linear) progress of European integration. The legacy, or gift,25 of the supranationalist commitment of the founders of the European Communities (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 25) has been a steady shift in favour of greater European integration around what was the European Economic Community (EEC), what became the European Community and what eventually established itself as the broader (more sectorally inclusive) European Union; of an institutionally deeper and increasingly ‘sovereign’, or supreme, European regional regime; of a geo-politically more extensive and influential supranational regional regime across Europe; of a more important and powerful global player – one which could become during the twenty-first century a superpower within the global system; and of a social form which is increasingly acting as a spur, inspiration and model for the global proliferation of SRRs, or at least for the time being of proto-SRRs. Supranationalism is a relatively recent doctrine, or ideology. Like a number of previous, historically important -isms, it has its origins in Europe and has had its initial impact and concrete manifestations in the same location. But, as with these other ideational driving forces – such as capitalism, liberalism, socialism and indeed nationalism26 – for me supranationalism’s reach is likely to become globally encompassing: a further feature of the latest variant on the process of globalisation. In this regard, I would seem to be in eminent company: Monnet drew on the functionalism of David Mitrany27 for his vision of Europe. He argued that problems of insecurity and human need in the world [ . . . ] required radical changes in the way people thought about solving these problems. Nations, he believed, should adopt common rules governing their behaviour and create common institutions to apply these rules. Such a strategy, even if [adopted] on a small scale, would create a ‘silent revolution in men’s minds’ that would change the way people thought and acted. For Monnet, the European Communities of the early 1960s [following the 1957 Treaty of Rome] demonstrated that small collective steps set off ‘a chain reaction, a ferment where one change induces another’. This ferment, he asserted, would [ . . . ] lead to [ . . . ] a united Europe [that] would be able to shoulder an equal burden of leadership with the United States [ . . . ]. [At the same time, it] would [not] be confined to Europe. Integration [is] a process that may have started in Europe but [it will] soon have to include the [whole of the] West at first, and then the rest of the world, if humanity [is] to ‘escape destruction’. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 17–18) The opposing view, with clear echoes of de Gaulle’s rejection of the belief that ‘European nations forged through long centuries by endless exertion

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and suffering, each with its own geography, history, language, traditions and institutions, could cease to be themselves and form a single’ (supranational, not to say federal) entity, can be found in an array of other writings (see Bulmer, 1994; Moravcsik, 1994). Included here are contributions which, while recognising – and perhaps anticipating further – European regional integration, are reluctant to accept that the same process can occur in different, but in important respects comparable, regions. One such region is East Asia – otherwise known as Pacific Asia or the Far East), and covering the two sub-regions of north-east Asia and south-east Asia – and it has been assessed in this regard by Endymion Wilkinson (1991), for instance.28 Wilkinson expresses deep-seated doubt about the possibility of East Asian de jure, or constitutional, regional integration along the lines of that evident in Europe, limiting himself to an acceptance of the prospect of tighter (as he puts it) East Asian de facto regional integration, a process which will depend on surrounding global circumstances and conditions, demands and pressures, and in particular on what happens in other globally prominent regions, especially those of western Europe and North America. Wilkinson’s focus is Japan, or more precisely (as reflected in his book title), Japan Versus the West. The editions of this book span the period 1980 to 1991, and in the last edition he points out that ‘Japan has become a major economic and financial power, and [as a result] has affected its neighbours in Asia as well as the other two main centres of wealth and power in the world, the USA and Europe’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. xi). For Wilkinson, ‘we live in a multipolar world economy where growth in one of the three main centres depends upon growth in the other two’ (1991, p. 12), in recognition of which ‘the idea of a trilateral relationship between the USA, Western Europe and Japan was [mooted by] the Japanese prime minister, Mr Ikeda, during a trip to Europe in 1962. “The free world,” [Ikeda] proposed, “should be supported by three pillars, that is, North America, Western Europe, and Japan and East Asia”’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 12). Of course, much has happened since the early 1960s which both lends support to the view of ‘Japan and East Asia’ as one of three main pillars of the global economy and engenders caution about viewing this particular region in this way. According to Martin Wolf: Japan’s surprising failures and its amazing successes are two sides of one coin [ . . . ]. Japan is the only significant non-European country to have caught up with – and in some respects surpassed – the [West]. It has developed an economy almost as large as the economies of Germany, France and the UK [ . . . ] combined [ . . . ]. Japan is the world’s largest creditor [country. Yet] recently, Japan has become a by-word for failure. From the speculative excesses of the second half of the 1980s to their dismal aftermath in the 1990s, the country has stumbled from one economic calamity to another. Now it is in recession, widely blamed for exacerbating

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the Asian economic crisis and apparently unable to pull itself out of trouble. (Wolf, 1999, pp. 31–2) Yet, by the middle of 1999, Jonathan Watts was able to report: Fresh evidence emerged yesterday that the Japanese economic recovery is starting to grow, thanks to stronger demand for exports in Asia and the United States. Taking a cautiously optimistic stance, the government’s economic planning agency (EPA) noted that production activity in June increased [by] 3% over the previous month, with further rises expected in July and August [ . . . ]. With other Asian markets picking up after last year’s financial turmoil, and with growing demand for cars and personal computers in the United States, the trend is expected to continue. (Watts, 11 August 1999) If so, then while the 1990s may have been a ‘miserable decade’ (Wolf, 1999, p. 31; see also, Yoshio Suzuki, 1997) for Japan and much of the rest of East Asia, they may have represented only a short-term setback for the region. At the very end of the twentieth century East Asia seems to have gone some way to recovering its standing as the third, long-term pillar of the global economy. Wilkinson argues: In each of the main poles of the world economy the already existing trends towards regionalism are being strengthened. Whether this takes the form of exclusive and protectionist trading blocs [ . . . ] will depend on whether or not solutions can be found to the problems of managing the world economy, especially the interfaces between the three main players [ . . . ]. Interdependence not only increases the potential areas of friction between industries and between countries, but it also means that now, more than ever before, decisions taken for domestic political reasons have an immediate external impact [ . . . ]. Much depends on how Japan, the epicentre of the third pole of the world economy and now the world’s largest creditor nation, will seek to translate its new wealth into political gains, and how it will use its power to help sustain and manage the world economy. [Part] of the answer lies [near] to Japan, in East Asia [ . . . ], because it is here that some of the indications of Japan’s new leadership role are emerging. (Wilkinson, 1991, pp. 14–15) Thus, ‘by the [nineteen] seventies [Japan] was the main trading partner and principal source of loans, aid and direct investment for nearly all the countries’ in East Asia (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 18). In particular, Japan ‘does more business with China than does the USA and all the European countries put together. It is also China’s largest supplier of concessional loans, direct

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investments and development aid’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 21). It can be taken as a sign of the Japan’s growing importance throughout the region, and more specifically its ‘[c]loser links with Southeast Asia’, that the Japanese prime minister, ‘Mr Takeshita, [was] the only outside head of government to be invited’ to the ‘ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] summit in 1987’, and in return ‘offered a loan of $2 billion’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 22). Wilkinson makes a set of further points, which are important enough for present purposes to be quoted at length: The ties, especially the economic ones, between Japan and the other countries of East Asia will grow much closer as economic integration is stimulated by the huge investment flows from Japan itself as well as from Korea and Taiwan. The emerging pattern of the region is Japan at the apex, followed at the next level by the four Asian NICs [newly industrialising countries] and China; at the third level, the rest of the ASEAN group (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), and at the fourth level, the East Asian ‘failures’ which have hardly started to be integrated into the new regional economic system – North Korea, Vietnam, the rest of Indo-China and Burma.29 [However, in] spite of the trend towards regional economic cooperation in other parts of the world, it is unlikely that a tightly organized trading bloc will emerge in the [East Asia] region in the near future. The region is too large; its political systems, economies and cultures too heterogeneous. Bitter memories of the war are also not far from the surface [ . . . ]. [C]ontroversial statements [from within Japan, including from Japanese political leaders] from time to time raise the spectre of belligerent Japanese nationalism, giving the impression that the Japanese are still not prepared to acknowledge their responsibility for the suffering they caused during the Pacific War [ . . . ]. [S]lips of the tongue seem to indicate not only a forgetfulness of Japan’s record as a colonial power, but also arrogance tinged with racism [ . . . ]. Like Germany in Europe, Japan is the major agent of peaceful change in its region, but unlike Germany, Japan has no European Community ‘umbrella’ to cover its growing regional influence. Not wishing to be isolated and fearing the formation of regional blocs in other parts of the world, Japan has a clear interest in strengthening its relations with the countries around it [ . . . ]. But too hasty a Japanese assumption of leadership could easily awaken the fears and resentments of the past. Another complication is that [ . . . ] the smaller countries fear that too overt a role for the big powers [such as Japan] could dilute their efforts at subregional cooperation in established groups such as ASEAN. [Accordingly,] there [is no] consensus as to whether [not just Japan, but also] countries such as China or the USSR [as it then was] should be included. So, the numerous efforts made by Japanese prime ministers and others to foster the growth of regional cooperation have been deliberately rather vague

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and cautious. There are a number of informal annual get-togethers of [ . . . ] officials from the [East Asian] countries; [and] from time to time calls are heard for the formation of [ . . . ] some trade policy forum for the region [ . . . ]. [However, for] the time being, Japan will continue to support existing groups, such as ASEAN [ . . . ]. [Beyond that, much] depends on what happens in Japan’s most important markets, the USA and Europe. If either, for whatever reason, should significantly increase existing levels of protection against Japan, Tokyo will be faced with two enormous trade blocks [sic]; it will then no doubt step up its own not inconsiderable level of protection and more actively seek some kind of defence groupings with certain of its Asian and Pacific neigbours. (Wilkinson, 1991, pp. 26–8) For Wilkinson, there are greater impediments to the construction of a regional bloc in East Asia than in Europe, although these do not necessarily mean that further and deeper East Asian integration is impossible. It could take place through the extension of ASEAN, or entail the construction of an entirely new entity, as touched on by Ian Nish in an account which is more recent than, while resembling, Wilkinson’s: Japan has been a leader in Asia for some decades. Asia is a many-sided continent; and the countries which make up the Southeast Asian region are as many-sided as the countries of Europe. Japan has overcome much of the distrust left over from [the Second World War] and has since the 1980s won the respect of most of its leaders who have appreciated [its] contribution to their fast-developing economies. Moreover, the Japanese have played their part in affairs of the region through their efforts for ASEAN, APEC etc. But there are still countries and communities in the area which are suspicious of too close a relationship with Japan. China and Korea fall in a different category, and are still uncertain about Japan’s hegemonist ambitions as a result of their experiences in the war years [ . . . ]. They have criticised the prominent voices in political circles which have interpreted Japan’s conduct in the media in an unacceptable way [ . . . ]. This controversy over past history has necessarily spread to the publishing of school textbooks. They have given the Chinese and Koreans grounds for doubting whether Japan has fundamentally changed. These issues have left the atmosphere charged [ . . . ].30 China is obviously a challenger to the leadership of Japan in the region and will become increasingly so.31 But the East Asian region is big enough to accommodate two leaders which must learn to build bridges between each other for the sake of their own national interests and world peace. There is an urgent need for [the] study of proposals like that of Professor Morishima Michio in his recent book for an Asian Union covering the states of Northeast Asia (NEA), especially China and Korea which have a long-standing

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tradition of cultural exchange. At the economic level, it might serve to promote the development of the under-developed parts of the region [ . . . ]; at the political level, it might increase the possibility of political harmony between [countries] which have a deep gulf in their mutual understanding. All parties in the region seek peace and stability but there is not enough sense of interdependence and trust to bring about a joint NEA security arrangement. [Still,] something along the lines of an Asian Union in the area might be an imaginative contribution to the relaxing of tensions and might contribute at a bilateral level to amicable relations in the [twenty first] century. (Nish, 1999) Guided by Wilkinson, the determinants of the course of East Asian regional integration, like that of European integration – entailing as this does the development of supranational institutions and a federal-style geo-political system of governance – are not just internal factors, but also external ones, and in the long term the latter could be decisive. The internal factors are about (the inhibiting influence of) such things as cultural matters, historical events, political considerations and ambitions and nationalism. But here, it is pertinent to note both that these, among other, factors are present in many or most other parts of the world and that they can be regarded as precisely those features of everyday social life and relationships which should be and indeed can be kept in check, ameliorated and diluted by the process of integration. This approach is evident in Nish’s account. It would seem that for Nish, while cultural and other sources of divisions and distrust, tensions and antagonisms are impediments to the creation of an Asian Union in the north east Asia sector of the Pacific Asia region, economic and political interests and assessments could be enough to overcome the depth and influence of these things. In turn, the result could be the diminution of what are frequently regarded as impossible barriers to the development of something approaching the European Union. If so, then the character of the Pacific Asia region and the purpose of something like the Asian Union would be remarkably similar to their counterparts at the other end of the Eurasian landmass. According to Pascal Fontaine: The vision of a new Europe which would transcend antagonistic nationalism finally emerged from the resistance movements which had sprung up [against] totalitarianism during the Second World War. (Fontaine, 1998, p. 5) Klaus-Dieter Borchardt’s expands: Even before the founding of the European Community and its development into the European Union, the idea of a closely knit association of

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European States had found political expression in a variety of ways. There had been attempts to impose unity through hegemony or by force. On the other hand, there had also been schemes for a peaceful voluntary association of States on terms of equality, especially after the harrowing experience of the First World War [ . . . ]. All [the] efforts for peaceful unification, however, failed to make any real headway against the still dominant tides of nationalism and imperialism. Only after Europe had yet again been devastated by war was the disatrous futility of national rivalry truly appreciated. Europe’s total collapse and the political and economic disintegration of outdated national structures set the stage for a completely fresh start and called for a far more radical approach to the reordering of Europe. The subsequent moves towards integration sprang from three main considerations. First was Europe’s realization of its own weakness. Through conflict and war its age-old place at the centre of the world stage was lost. That place was taken instead by the two new superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union [ . . . ]. Second was the conviction, summed up in the motto ‘Never again!’, that the possibility of renewed military conflict must be banished forever. [This] became the mainspring of all political action. Lastly, there was the earnest desire to create a better, freer and more just world in which international relations would be conducted in a more orderly way. (Borchardt, 1995, pp. 4–6) Be that as it may, the creation of the European Communities and construction of the European Union has far from resulted in the demise of nations and nationalism in Europe, and as wider features of the global system they remain a major source of division and strain, conflict and destruction both between nation-states and within them.32 In September 1998, the journal Scientific American presented an account of conflicts around the world which it identified as taking place within nationstate borders, or ‘countries’ as Robin McKie’s summary of the Scientific American article describes them: Most global conflict can be blamed on a basic imbalance: mankind is made up of 5,000 ethnic groups with only 190 countries to live in. This has produced bloodshed, costing 15 million lives since 1945. A million died in Rwanda’s civil war. But as this month’s Scientific American points out, ethnic diversity is not necessarily a recipe for genocide. Yes, Bosnia and central Africa are marked by several different races – and also by civil war. Yet Peru and India have high ethnic diversity, but little strife. ‘Federal systems, such as the one instituted in India, can help dampen ethnic tensions by giving minorities regional autonomy,’ says the journal. ‘Intermarriage – between Thais and Chinese in Thailand, or Taiwanese and mainlanders in Taiwan – erodes ethnic differences. And free-market forces tend to mitigate ethnic tensions.’ By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa

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has the worst record for racial hostilities, a legacy of boundaries imposed by colonial powers with little regard for the many population groups. In Nigeria, the Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo tribes were bound together and left to fight for power. Since 1960, there have been six military coups and two civil wars. In such countries a few ethnic groups fight for supremacy. But in India, with thousands of different races and castes, no single group dominates. Combined with an educated civil service, this has produced relative peace. (McKie, 20 September 1998) McKie’s summary of the Scientific American account of, as he puts it, the flames of conflict raises the issue of the meanings of several pivotal terms (some of which McKie appears to conflate, notably ‘ethnic groups’ and ‘races’), and the basis and accuracy of the specified number of ethnic groups and countries in the world. On the latter, the figure of 190 for the number of ‘countries to live in’ is consistent with the fact that the UN had a membership of 185 by the end of 1997, there being several countries which had still not joined, at least as full members (including North Korea, Switzerland and The Vatican). Furthermore, the figure of 5000 for the number of ‘ethnic groups’ receives support from Bernard Comrie’s estimate of the number of languages spoken in the world: ‘Probably the best one can say, with any hope of not being contradicted, is that at a very conservative estimate some 4000 languages are spoken today’ (Comrie, 1990, p. 2). Or, as David Crystal has put it: There is no agreed total for the number of languages spoken in the world today. Most reference books give a figure of 4,000 to 5,000, but estimates have varied from 3,000 to 10,000 [ . . . ]. There are over 20,000 language or language dialect names listed in Voegelins’ great Classification and Index of World Languages (1977), and these have been grouped into around 4,500 living languages. Since the publication of that work, the total must have become somewhat less, [ . . . ] but it seems unlikely that it [will] be less than 4,000. (Crystal, 1987, p. 284; see also Crystal, 1999) The relevance of language in the present context is indicated by Crystal’s suggestion that ‘language [is a] signal of ethnic identity’ (Crystal, 1987, p. 35). Crystal expands: Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group with which one has ancestral links. It is a general notion which applies to everyone, and not just to those who practice a traditional rural culture (a current usage of the term ‘ethnic’) [ . . . ]. Questions of ethnicity are closely related to those of national identity. Once a group becomes aware of its ethnic identity, it will wish to preserve and strengthen its status, and this often takes the form of a desire for political recognition, usually self-government. Political

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commentators have stressed the subjective elements in the idea of a ‘nation’ – the difficulty of defining a psychological bond that motivates a nationalistic movement, or predicting which elements will contribute most to a group’s sense of identity. Religious practices, long-standing institutions, and traditional customs are all important in this respect; but perhaps the most widely encountered symbol of emerging nationhood is language [ . . . ]. It is important to recognize the extent to which national diversity can give rise to linguistic issues. Political entities that comprise a homogenous national group are quite rare. A study of 132 [nation-]states existing in 1971 found that only 12 were [nationally/ethnically homogeneous]; 50 contained a major ethnic group comprising more than three-quarters of the population; and in 39 [ . . . ], the largest ethnic group comprised less than half the population [Connor, 1978].33 National and [nation-]state loyalties thus rarely coincide, and when different languages are formally associated with these concepts, the probability of conflict is real. (Crystal, 1987, p. 34) While for David Crystal, ethnicity is about linguistic and other cultural threads around which identities are generated and cohere, and thereby ethnic groups form, and then perhaps engage in struggles and conflicts, Robin McKie seems to use the notions of ethnic groups and races interchangeably. Perhaps the way in which McKie has employed the terms involved is understandable, and even acceptable, on the grounds that he is, after all, only a journalist, using – and indeed having to use – the terms in a popular manner. Other writers – notably, specialists and scholars of various kinds – tend to approach the meanings of the terms differently: usually far more carefully and cautiously, given the connotations which can be inferred from, for instance, sliding between using ‘ethnic group’ and using ‘race’, as if the words are synonyms. According to Crystal: Several factors define a person’s physical identity, the most obvious being age, sex, physcial type [ . . . ], and physical condition. These factors, supplemented by the criteria made available through modern genetic techniques, are also taken into account when identifying the broad, biologically defined groups of human beings known as ‘races’. Such considerations [ . . . ] lead to several questions. Are there any correlations between languages and the physical characteristics of an individual or a race? Can any of the differences between languages, or the variations within a language, be explained by referring directly to the physical constitution of the users? [The answer is that there] seems to be little [ . . . ] relationship between speech and [ . . . ] physical characteristics [ . . . ]. [In particular, this] conclusion [applies] when we consider the kinds of anatomical variation that distinguish the world’s racial groups. (Crystal, 1987, p. 18)

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However, there are those (aparently unlike David Crystal) who are deeply suspicious about the very word ‘race’: Ethnicity is a term which helps to describe what used to be called ‘race relations’ before the term ‘race’ was edged out of the vocabulary. Writers like Robert Miles have argued that ‘race’ is not an analytical concept and does not have an independent existence apart from ‘racism’. (McCrone, 1998, p. 25) That is, the use of the word ‘race’ – never mind the attempt to define it categorically – represents an act of ‘racism’ by virtue of the particular ‘socially constructued’ character of the word-notion: the way in which it ‘racially’, and so artificially, draws attention to and lends significance to physical attributes and differences which otherwise would be meaningless, socially unimportant and sociologically insignificant. Social scientists in general try to be sensitive about the meanings, explicit and implicit, they attach to the term ‘race’ and strict about distinguishing between ‘race’ and ‘ethnicty’, ‘races’ and ‘ethnic groups’. David McCrone (1998) touches on the thorny issue, but seems to settle for the overlapping approaches of the ‘social anthropologists Michael Banton (1983) and Thomas Eriksen (1993)’: Banton argues that [ . . . ] ‘race’ [is] a biological category [which] serve[s] as a role sign. In other words, what people see is [biological] variations to which they attribute social meaning, just as other biological categories like age and sex are significant in the cultural interpretations which they carry. [The] use of ‘race’ in sociology focuses on the ways physical characteristics like skin colour are used as the basis of group indentity. ‘Ethnicity’ implies that cultural characteristics like language, customs, religion and so on operate as important cultural markers. [Banton] comments that no one can hear, see, smell, taste or touch ethnicity; we can only know it through signs. ‘Racial’ and ethnic differences are then mapped on to socio-economic differences in different societies in different ways [ . . . ]. As regards the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, these are [ . . . ] distinct in the minds of both Banton and Eriksen. The former argues that national differences are essentially political, defined in relationship to the state: ‘The English, Welsh and Scots are accounted nations comprising the British state [sic], not as ethnic divisions of a British nation or race’ (Banton, [1983, p. 64]). Similarly, Eriksen defines nationalism as a political ideology which holds that the boundaries of the state should be coterminous with cultural ones, whereas many/ most ethnic groups do not demand control over their own state [ . . . ]. If and when cultural differences come to be expressed territorially, then the ethnic movement becomes a nationalist one. Eriksen points out that the

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key to both ethnic and national identity is self-identification, and he uses the distinction between ‘emic’ and ‘etic’ categories to make the point: the former refers to the native’s self-definition, whereas the latter is the analyst’s concept. (McCrone, 1998, pp. 26–7) While Banton and Eriksen address in similar ways the meanings of nation and nationalism, by ‘the 1990s, Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an “imagined community” [had become] the dominant one’ (McCrone, 1998, p. 5; see Anderson, 1996): In essence, says Anderson, the nation is an imagined political community, in the following [among other] ways [Anderson, 1996, pp. 6–7]: ‘It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each [sic] lives their image of communion [ . . . ]’; ‘The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’ (McCrone, 1998, p. 6). McCrone then proposes: ‘Nationalism [ . . . ] is a form of “practice” [which while being] a universal and global phenomenon, [ . . . ] is ineluctably particular and local [ . . . ]; it is a feature of the modern age, but has its roots in something much older [ . . . ]; it is essentially about cultural matters – language, religion, symbols – but cannot be divorced from matters of economic and material development’ (McCrone, 1998, p. 6).34 In so far as nationalism is essentially about cultural matters, then it has ‘ethnic origins’ (Clarence, 1999). But, guided by McCrone, its manifestations are very much conditioned by economic factors and so, presumably, interests, such as those shared by Europeans, or by East Asians, or by North Americans, and so on. Consistent with McCrone’s views, Anthony Smith has argued: nations and nationalisms are [ . . . ] the products of pre-existing traditions and heritages which have coalesced over generations [ . . . ]. [M]odern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to earlier ethnic ties and memories, what [can be called] the ethno-symbolic base. This base is crucial in accounting for the deep and abiding emotional appeal of nationalism [ . . . ]. ‘Civic’ or state nationalism may [then be distinguished as] the nationalism of order and control, but ethnic nationalism becomes an important weapon against the state. ‘Theirs [ . . . ] is the politics of cultural revolt [1996a, p. 363], which helps to explain the deeper, inner source of many ethnic and national conlficts today. (McCrone, 1998, p. 15)

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For McCrone (following Anthony Smith) the ‘salience’ of ‘nationalism [as] a potent ideology’ at a time when ‘“modern” society’, in the form of the nation-state, is ‘passing away, or at least transforming itself’ (McCrone, 1998, p. 16), is of considerable significance. However, it would seem that the (modern) nation-state is not only under successful attack from nationalist movements. Thus, McCrone tells us: In the West, regions and nations which seemed settled within their existing [territorial nation-]states for so long began to seek greater autonomy in the final quarter of the century just as supra-national organisations such as the European Community/Union and the North American Free Trade Association [sic] were eroding the sovereignty of these [nation-] states. (McCrone, 1998, p. 1) In other words, apart from nationalism, it follows (at least as far as I am concerned) that supranationalism is playing a successful part in the destruction or transformation of the (modern) nation-state – hence its successor form, the ‘supranational’ organisation. It is especially noteworthy here how McCrone refers to NAFTA as an example of a ‘supra-national’ organisation which is, to paraphrase, eroding the sovereignty of its Member States. If so, then supranationalism will already be chipping away at the (modern) nation-state as exemplified by the USA, Canada and Mexico; and, moreover, it will go on taking its toll as NAFTA expands to encompass other countries – with Chile (located, of course, in South America) willingly and keenly being the next in line. If McCrone’s account is accepted, then supranationalism has taken a hold well-beyond Europe. The question arises: if it has taken hold in the Americas, why not gradually (and with concrete results) also in East Asia? After all, surely at the end of the twentieth century ASEAN is more advanced organisationally than NAFTA. For me, a further question is: during the twenty-first century, will the Americas evolve as a supranational regional regime at a faster rate than East Asia, in spite of the head-start the latter has due to the establishment of ASEAN, and notwithstanding the late-1990s Asian economic crisis? There is nothing either theoretically or empirically that lends itself to the view that the success of the doctrine of supranationalism will be confined to Europe or the view that if the doctrine takes a hold and so concrete shape beyond Europe, then this is most likely to be in the Americas, and will certainly not be in East Asia. If ‘Europe’s bitterest enemies, France and Germany’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 11) can be persuaded by Robert Schuman – who in turn was encouraged by Jean Monnet (Fontaine, 1998, p. 5) – to go ahead with the 1952 ECSC under ‘a common High Authority’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 12), then it is possible to imagine (as Jean Monnet did) ‘a chain reaction, a ferment where one change induces another’, first of

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all ‘in Europe [ . . . ] and then the rest of the world’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 17–18), including East Asia in spite of the various historical, political and cultural considerations. The existence and evolution, expansion and – albeit highly cautious and very gradual – deepening of ASEAN is a testimony to the reality of and prospects for integration in East Asia. To paraphrase Scientific American, ethnic diversity is not necessarily a recipe for genocide nor, for that matter, a barrier to integration in Europe, south-east Asia or anywhere else in the world. Indeed, if the Scientific American claim that ‘[f]ederal systems, such as the one instituted in India, can help dampen ethnic tensions by giving minorities regional autonomy’ (McKie, 20 September 1998) is valid, then East Asian regional integration becomes not only possible (against the background of considerable cultural, ethnic and national diversity), but also perhaps the best guarantor of (relative) harmony and peace, in a manner consistent with the purpose (as trumpeted by Jean Monnet) of European integration. If so, then I will risk floating the prediction that during the twenty-first century wholly inclusive East Asian regional integration will not only be encouraged by the existence of south-east Asian integration (ASEAN), but also promoted from within (throughout the region) and from without. It will, if anything, be boosted from within by cultural, ethnic and national diversity, because of the chances of these things leading to conflict being mitigated by the process of integration. In addition, East Asian integration will be pushed from without by the circumstances and conditions, the demands and pressures associated with such factors as globalisation, the NWO configuration of economic and political global players, and the presence and growing prominence on the world stage of competing regional blocs, organisations or regimes, some (and perhaps a growing number) of which will be supranational or protosupranational in form. The possibility of full, East Asian integration along the lines of (but not necessarily anywhere near identical to) European integration was seriously addressed in Supranationalism in the New World Order (Close and Ohki-Close, 1999). In line with the argument of Supranationalism in the New World Order, an assumption guiding this follow-up book is that the doctrine of supranationalism has been the ideational, or ideological, driving force behind the process of European integration: behind the strengthening, deepening and widening of what has become the EU, an organisation which has gradually been consolidated as a supranational regional regime. I have mentioned that the construction and progress of the EU as an SRR can be regarded as a legacy of supranationalism, but that there are other – if only prospective – gifts that have been bequeathed to the world, and thereby to posterity, by this doctrine. These further strands to the legacy of supranationalism include the way the EU is becoming a more prominent player, and could become a superpower, within the global system. They also include how the EU could become a spur, inspiration and model for the construction and proliferation

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of other SRRs on the world stage, and so in effect the primary source of a global system historically distinguished by a network of relationships among a range of geo-political entities that include SRRs, some of which could become major (highly powerful) players. The term ‘legacy’, with the general semantic connotations on which I have drawn, is used liberally in popular, journalistic, scholarly and other publications.35 Thus, it has been used with the impact of the life and death of Diana, the Princess of Wales, in mind. For instance, William Rees-Mogg gave the title ‘This was the true lgacy of Diana’ to an article commorating the death of the Princess of Wales, an article which – while focusing on the impact the life and death of Diana has had on the British monarchy – brings to mind a useful idea for our purposes: A year after Diana’s death, there are two [ . . . ] appropriate reactions. The first [ . . . ] is to show sympathy to all those who suffered bereavement [ . . . ]. The second [ . . . ] is to look at Diana’s impact on history; that is her lasting importance. She felt she had [a] historic role. She wanted to change the monarchy in certain positive ways; she believed it had to adapt to her generation, that it needed to establish a warmer, more open, more loving relationship with the public. She resented what she saw as the cold and distant attitude of the old court. She admired and understood the Queen; she was closer to the views of the Prince of Wales about the development of the monarchy than either probably realised at the time of their divorce [ . . . ]. The monarchy has gone through a Hegelian sequence of thesis, antithesis and synthesis: the synthesis has only been emerging in the past year. The thesis was that of the old monarchy, deeply traditional, strongly hierarchical, rather remote, founded on a masculine concept of duty and emotional restraint; the antithesis was the Princess’s idea of a warm and caring monarchy, relatively relaxed in discipline, accessible and emotionally open. The first was concerned with survival; the second with love. Both combined experience of suffering [ . . . ]. Since her death, the synthesis has become apparent, even though it is not yet complete. To start with, the older figures in the Royal Family have, with the exception of the Queen, withdrawn into the background of public consciousness. The public now concentrates its attention on the monarchy and its sucessors, the Prince of Wales and Prince William. The Queen has adjusted, perhaps with relief, to the new monarchy, consciously moving towards the needs of the next century. The changes have been made discretely and gradually, but they are being made; the court is getting younger, the monarchy is becoming warmer and more open [ . . . ]. The court itself recognises and admits the influences of Diana on these changes. The Prince of Wales was always a reformer [ . . . ]. He represents the present synthesis between the old monarchy and the new. Beyond that, Prince William is the future hope [ . . . ]. I am not sure that

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Diana saved the monarchy [ . . . ]. I am sure that the generational change was necessary if the monarchy were to survive, and that Diana both symbolised and helped to bring that about. She will, of course, be remembered for centuries as one of the most romantic women in the history of the Royal Family, and for her tragic death. She should also be remembered as someone who understood the nature of her own time; few politicans manage that, even fewer members of Royal Families. (Rees-Mogg, 31 August 1998) While Rees-Mogg employs ‘legacy’ in a casual, incidential fashion, it is clear from the content of his article what he wishes to convey by choosing the term.36 The article is about ‘Diana’s impact on history; that is her lasting importance’. After all, Diana ‘felt she had [a] historic role’: she ‘wanted to change the monarchy’ in tune with her belief that ‘it had to adapt to her generation’. Subsequently, the impact has been that the ‘monarchy hs gone through a Hegelian sequence of thesis, antithesis and synthesis’ – dialectical process – where the ‘thesis [as] that of the old [ . . . ], deeply traditional’ monarchy: ‘the antithesis’ is ‘the new monarchy’, embodied and symbolised by Diana: and the ‘Prince of Wales [ . . . ] represents the [emerging] synthesis between the old monarchy and the new’. For Rees-Mogg, above all, the unfolding synthesis of the old and the new will help to ensure that Diana will ‘be remembered as someone who understood the nature of her own time’. For me, there is a strong possibility that the legacy of (the doctrine of) supranationalism will be a synthesis between, on the one hand, this doctrine as an ideational thesis in favour of a new geo-political form first of all in Europe and then elsewhere, and on the other hand, long-standing (somewhat conflicting) doctrines and their concrete geo-poltical representations, in particular those of nationalism, the nation and the modern nation-state. The possibility of a synthesis between nationalism and supranationalism being the emergence and proliferation of concrete SRRs, spearheaded and flagged by the EU, brings us to a further example of the use of ‘legacy’, that found in Stephen Haseler’s The English Tribe (1996). Haseler refers to Anthony Smith who, in Varieties of Nationalism (1983), has argued that a distinction needs to be drawn between: two kinds of nationalism, ethnocentric and polycentric. The former or ‘weaker’ kind was a movement of resistance to foreign rule in order to preserve the group’s culture and freedom [ . . . ]. The ‘polycentric’ kind of nationalism sees the world as divided into nations, each with its own value, each requiring a state of its own to realise its communal potential and sovereign autonomy, and each seeking to join the ‘family of nations’ by contributing its peculiar experiences to the common fund of humanity [Smith, 1983, p. 231]. (Haseler, 1996, p. 68)

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Haseler then argues: The legacy bequethed by the unadapted national culture of Englishness to late twentieth-century British national sensibility was to help shape it into the former, not the latter, kind of nationalism. These nationalist illusions of power and superiority were increasingly to clash with the realities of the world in which Britain was inhabiting. The country’s humiliation during the Suez affair and the jolting experience of joining the European Community both served to emphasise these new realities. (Haseler, 1996, p. 68; see also p. 131) For Haseler, therefore, the legacy of Englishness is an ethnocentric British culture, a culture which has increasingly clashed with the realities of ‘joining the European Community’, an increasingly supranational organisation. But for me, what this means is that the legacy of Englisness is being increasingly challenged, resisted and replaced by the legacy of supranationalism, a doctrine and associated (socio-political) movement and drive which is increasingly bequeathing major social, political, economic and cultural alterations, or adaptions, to (the future of) the member nation-states (the Member States) of the resulting SRR(s). The legacy of supranationalism is that of an unprecedented social form and model, which is being bequeathed not only to the EU’s Member States, but also consequently to a growing number of other nation-states both near and far – both as a result of the EU’s proximate regional (European, Mediterranean, north African, Middle Eastern) influence and as a result of its wider systemic impact; its global reach. Supranationalism’s legacy, in other words, is to the future character and course of the whole global system. What is being offered is a new (supranational) social form and model; what is being concretely displayed is an operational, working and (albeit not totally) successful supranational regional regime; what is being bequeathed is a dialectically synthesised – but itself novel – social form and model for adoption by the players (in particular, the nation-states) within the global system. The SRR as a social form is being bequeathed for both adoption and adaptation within (the realities of) the global system, with its various and somewhat contrasting locations, sectors and regions, but given the forceful process of globalisation and the advent of the far from inconsequential new world order (NWO). What has to be recognised is the shaping influence of local realities – such as those which make western Europe different from East Asia, and also makes locations within East Asia different from each other – on the process entailing the spread and proliferation of SRRs. At the same time, what also has to be recognised are the ramifications of the process of globalisation, boosted as this appears to have been by the end of the Cold War global stand-off, a process which could lend itself to the dialectical evolution of some rather than other SRR types, and even of one pre-eminently

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successful type. There are no empirical or theoretical grounds for assuming that the SRR type manifested by the EU now or in the future will be the only type; nor are there any such grounds for assuming that what we can call the EU-type of SRR will be necessarily the most successful. It could be that a more successful type, and so model, will emerge elsewhere, and that this alternative form of SRR will consequently strongly influence and shape the EU, albeit again in a dialectical fashion due to the additional influences of local realities, along with further global developments and events which as yet cannot be confidently anticipated or imagined.37

5 Europe, Globalisation and the Asia Pacific

Global patterns, processes and trends In his ‘Review essay’ on ‘Searching for signs of globalisation’,1 Anthony Woodiwiss (1996) cites with approval Roland Robertson’s notion of ‘globalization’, according to which the process entails the ‘making of the world into a single place’ (Robertson, 1990 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 799),2 before offering a decidedly uncomplimentary assessment of the contributions made by Barrie Axford (1995) and Tony Spybey (1996) to debates about the process. Woodiwiss’ criticisms of these two texts (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 800) centre on the linked problems of what Axford and Spybey understand by the process, what they assume to be the content and course of the process, and what they take to be the underlying and driving ‘cause’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801) behind the process. Woodiwiss asserts: In sum, [Axford and Spybey] typically instance the palimpsest produced by the repitition of favoured images in slightly different terms rather than a properly social-scientific representation, let alone explanation, of what needs to be represented. (Woodiwiss, 1996, pp. 800–1) The grounds for Woodiwiss’ ‘disappointment with the first two texts’ is the way each echoes the account of the process(es) of globalisation previously presented by Anthony Giddens (1990), for whom ‘the social content as well as the ultimate cause of globalisation’ is to be identified ‘with something called “modernity”’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801), and more precisely ‘with western modernity’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, pp. 801–2). For Giddens, ‘modernity’ is, at least ‘minimally, “the nation state and systematic capitalist production”’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 174 – quoted in Woodiwiss; italics omitted). Given the apparent influence of his approach to globalisation, it is apposite and useful to quote Giddens directly and in some detail: 135

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When we speak of modernity [ . . . ] we refer to institutional transformations that have their origins in the West [ . . . ]. In terms of institutional clusterings, two distinct organisational complexes are of particular significance in the development of modernity: the nation-state and systematic capitalist production. Both have their roots in specific characteristics of European history [but] in close conjunction with one another [ . . . ] have since swept across the world [ . . . ] above all because of the power they have generated. No other, more traditional forms have been able to contest this power in respect of maintaining complete autonomy outside the trends of global development. Is modernity distinctively a Western project in terms of the ways of life fostered by these two great transformative agencies? To this query, the blunt answer must be ‘yes’. One of the fundamental consequences of modernity [ . . . ] is globalisation [entailing] a diffusion of Western institutions across the world in which other cultures are crushed. Globalisation [ . . . ] introduces new forms of world interdependence, in which [ . . . ] there are no ‘others’ [ . . . ]. Modernity is inherently globalising [ . . . ]. The globalising tendencies of modernity [ . . . ] connect individuals to large-scale systems as part of complex dialectics of change [through which individuals increasingly] experience [ . . . ] living in ‘one world’ [ . . . ]. (Giddens, 1990, pp. 174–7; italics in the original) Woodiwiss’ ‘dissatisfaction with the concept of modernity’ (see also Woodiwiss, 1993, pp. 142–4) as espoused by Giddens and borrowed by Giddens’s followers – such as Axford and Spybey – necessarily lends itself to his (Woodiwiss’s) further dissatisfaction with the concept of globalisation as presented by the same cohort of writers. This is because, for these writers the content, and moreover ‘cause’, of globalisation is identified with ‘modernity’; and, therefore, globalisation minimally entails ‘the diffusion of the nation state and the capitalist economy’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801). Indeed, in Axford’s case, Woodiwiss tells us, there ‘is an even more complete identification of the content of globalisation with “modernity” than that to be found in Giddens’ own work: to wit, “market capitalism”, “industrialism”, “nation states”, “the international system of nation states”, and “the whole corpus of cultural and philosophical knowledge, which provides the underpinning for the ‘Western cultural account’” [Axford, 1995, pp. 2–3]’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801). In other words, Axford pinpoints five ‘great themes of Western modernity’, which (to quote Axford more accurately than Woodiwiss) are ‘the institutional forms of market capitalism’; ‘industrialism’; ‘the territorial nation-state’; ‘the international system of states’; and the corpus of knowledge which underpins ‘the “Western cultural account”’ (Axford, 1995, pp. 1–2).3 Axford attributes the phrase ‘Western cultural account’ to John Meyer and his colleagues (1987), who Woodiwiss includes among ‘the “institutionalists” of international relations [theory]’, while counting Anthony Giddens

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and his coterie as among ‘the “structurationists” of sociology’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801). Woodiwiss tells us that although ‘what we are promised’ by Axford is a ‘synthesis’ of the two theoretical frameworks (ibid., p. 801), ‘[t]his is not what we find’ (ibid., p. 801) in Axford’s actual account. What we find instead is Axford’s glaring bias in favour of ‘Giddens’ social theory’ (ibid., p. 801); Axford’s exaggerated identification of the content and course of globalisation with ‘modernity’; and Axford’s resulting (but seemingly unintentional) portrayal of ‘the “global social system” as an “homogenised and culturally anodyne ‘world system’” [Axford, 1995, p. 93]’ (ibid., p. 801). Woodiwiss explains: once the content of globalisation has been identified with western ‘modernity’, ‘other cultural accounts’ and the actions they inspire can only be understood as reactive rather than constitutive of different forms of sociality. In other words, because all the sources of globalisation are regarded as ‘western’ [any] aspiration to produce a portrait of ‘global systemness’ which fully acknowledges its multiple sources and therefore its unsettled and necessarily hybrid character is not realised. Instead, we are presented [by Axford] with an [ . . . ] utterly familiar and entirely Occidentalist review of some of the literature concerning the economic, political, cultural and international dimensions of a supposed global system and some minor reactions to it. Moreover, not only is the possibility of local assertiveness restricted to the cultural sphere [Axford, 1995, pp. 164–71], but also this sphere itself is identified with the processes associated with the making and unmaking of national identities. (Woodiwiss, 1996, pp. 801–2) According to Woodiwiss, the upshot is that Axford underestimates the importance of the ‘cultural dimension to economic, political [and] international social relations’; and consequently fails to recognise the salience of the associated differences between local ‘social relations’: ‘between, say, British and Japanese social relations’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 802). These differences were not, when they might have been, treated by Axford as ‘constitutive of global social relations’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 802); as constituent, independently viable and separately influential – or to some extent proactive rather than wholly and merely reactive – components of the global system. In effect, Axford does not accurately represent the presence, prominence and power (recalling Giddens’ view of why ‘modernity’, and consequently globalisation, is a distinctively ‘Western project’) of ‘non-western’ cultural and associated social forms in his account of the content, course and causes of globalisation. Woodiwiss is similarly critical of Spybey’s ‘identification of the content and indeed mechanism of globalisation with “modernity” in its political, economic, communicational, and miltary forms’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 802),

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which Spybey in turn ‘identifies with Americanism’ (ibid., p. 802). Woodiwiss explains: Spybey [ . . . ] uses the identification of ‘modernity’ with Americanism both to give some progressive content to globalisation [ . . . ] and to give some sense of what modernity and therefore globalisation mean concretely, namely participation, consumerism and reflexivity. (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 802)4 In a similar way to Axford, ‘Spybey, following Giddens, hierarchises [ . . . ] influences by demoting “non-western” [ones] to the status of reactions’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 804). For Spybey, as for Giddens, globalisation permits cultural and associated social variety, but does so only in so far as this variety is confined to ‘differences [ . . . ] between the “western” models and what [are] local variants’ of these particular, dominant models (Woodiwiss, 1996, pp. 804–5). Woodiwiss sums up: The fundamental problem, then, with Giddens’ Eurocentric conception of globalisation and therefore with the work of all those who depend upon it is that, by narcissistically identifying it with the spread of western [sic] institutions, it pre-empts the need for research in general and for research into, or even knowledge of, the nature of non-western societies in particular. Thus [ . . . ] for Giddens and his followers [ . . . ] globalisation is more a matter of wish-fulfilment than an empirically grounded proposition [ . . . ]. (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 805) For me, what Woodiwiss might have added is that, in spite of the way the followers of Giddens (such as Spybey) replicate closely Giddens’ ethnocentric assumptions about the content, course and causes of globalisation, they do not always do so entirely. Spybey’s account, for instance, diverges from Giddens’ with regard to a crucial, indeed ‘causal’, feature of globalisation; with regard to one of the two (for Giddens) minimal elements of ‘modernity’ – or at least, that is (for Spybey), in modernity’s late-twentieth-century stage and form. For Giddens, as we have noted, globalisation entails a diffusion of Western institutions across the world at the expense of non-Western ways of life and cultures, being fostered by the two great transformative agencies of (originally European) ‘modernity’: the nation-state and systematic capitalist production. Giddens argues that globalisation not only entails the spread of these two distinct organisational complexes, but also is facilitated, driven and ‘caused’ by them, ‘above all because of the power they have generated’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 174). No other, alternative (traditional or contemporary) forms have been able to contest this power; have been able to successfully compete with, counter or impede the global development of the nation-state,

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occurring as this has done and continues to do in conjunction with the parallel global consolidation of systematic capitalist production. Giddens is in no doubt that ‘nation-states are the principal “actors” within the global political order, [and that] corporations are the dominant agents within the world economy’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 71). This means that the ‘main centres of power in the world economy are capitalist states5 – states in which capitalist economic enterprise [ . . . ] is the chief form of production’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 70). Giddens argues that ‘[b]usiness firms, especially the transnational corporations, may well wield immense economic power, and have the capacity to influence political policies in their home bases and elsewhere [ . . . ]. But there are some key respects in which their power cannot rival that of states – especially important here are the factors of territoriality and control of the means of violence’ (Giddens, 1990, pp. 70–1). Giddens goes on to assert that ‘the sovereignty of particular states’ is not diminished by, for instance, ‘global agencies such as the United Nations’, the ‘influence [of which is] still decisively limited by the fact that it is not territorial and does not have significant access to the means of violence’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 73). That is, the ‘global influence of the U.N. [ . . . ] is not purchased [ . . . ] by means of the diminution of the sovereignty of nationstates’ (Giddens, 1990, p. 73). Giddens remarks: So far as the relations between states are concerned it seems evident that a more coordinated global political order is likely to emerge. Trends towards increasing globalisation more or less force states to collaborate over issues which previously they might have sought to deal with separately. Many of the first generation of authors to discuss globalisation, towards the end of the nineteenth century, believed that a movement to world government would naturally follow on from the development of global interconnections. Such authors underestimated the degree of sovereign autonomy of nation-states, and it does not seem likely that any form of world government resembling a nation-state ‘writ large’ will emerge in the forseeable future. Or rather, ‘world government’ might involve the cooperative formation of global policies by states, and cooperative strategies to resolve conflicts instead of the formation of a super-state. (Giddens, 1990, p. 168) Giddens is without doubt convinced that, while collaborative or co-operative formations of nation-states may well become more common and extensive due to their strategic advantages and appeal in the face of the continuing process(es) of globalisation (entailing enhanced global interconnections), the nation-state, and so (nation-)state sovereignty, is safe and secure against encroachments from ‘global agencies’, such as the UN, or any other collaborative or cooperative formation which qualifies as a ‘super-state’. While

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nation-states may be increasingly pursuaded or pressured, to the point of being forced, to engage in ‘cooperative strategies’ within the evolving global(ised) political order, they will be unlikely, nonetheless, to relinquish their sovereignty in favour of super-state formations. In an earlier publication, Giddens (1985) makes similar assertions, while giving further clues about what he means by cooperative (‘inter-governmental’) strategies and formations and ‘super-state’ formations. Thus, on this occasion, Giddens begins by suggesting that the ‘United Nations and the Common Market’, the latter of which Giddens otherwise labels the EEC, ‘are two agencies that partly’ represent (i) inter-governmental agencies, and partly represent (ii) those organisations which can be categorised as cartels, economic unions or transnational corporations (Giddens, 1985, pp. 282–3). Giddens continues: Although [the UN] is the major ‘world agency’ [it] has not and is not making substantial inroads into the sovereignty of states. It is not a sovereign body in its own right, and the most significant impact of the UN globally has actually been towards extending states’ sovereignty rather than limiting it. By contrast, it might be claimed that, although a more localized inter-governmental agency, the EEC does serve to restrict preexisting forms of states’ sovereignty. The union has the capability to frame laws which then apply in principle to the populations of the states comprised within it. In addition, agreements can be formulated between the Commission or the High Authority with other states on behalf of the member countries. [But, while certain] bodies of the Community do have the capacity to formulate legal principles, [ . . . ] these cannot really be regarded as ‘laws’ effective within the particular states, since they must be ratified within the parliamentary bodies of those states, which also alone possess the capability of sanctioning them. The EEC possesses no military arm and cannot reduce the capabilities of states to deploy the means of violence independently of whatever prescriptions it might make. [Such] authorities [as the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice] do not [ . . . ] hold sovereign power. It is primarily in respect of economic relations that a certain transfer of sovereignty has taken place. Even here, however, there is a two-way exchange, since member states have gained certain forms of autonomy that would otherwise have been forfeited in international trading relations in other parts of the world. The EEC might at some future point become a distinct and integrated super-power alongside those that currently exist. But short of some major world conflict it is difficult to see this as more than a relatively remote possibility. (Giddens, 1985, p. 283) I will not engage in a detailed critique of Giddens’ ideas here, if for no other reason than these things are self-evidently weak and dubious. What is

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apparent from his 1985 and 1990 publications viewed together is that for Giddens a super-state is one in which nation-states do more than merely collaborate or co-operate in an inter-governmental fashion. In a super-state the member nation-states transfer some of their sovereignty to the resulting super-state bodies. Apart from this, however, Giddens’ ideas about superstate formations, inter-governmental formations, and the EC among other related matters are highly impressionistic, vague, unclear, ambiguous and unconvincing. They far from rely on the use of in-depth analysis, coherent concepts, rigorous reasoning, firm evidence, or anything else which would afford them social scientific respectability, support and strength. Giddens’ understanding of the EC’s legal processes and decision-making procedures, and connectedly of the Community’s distribution of rights, power and sovereignty, hovers between being, at best, incomplete, thin and shaky and being, at worst, flagrantly flawed, even taking into account the particular period of the Community’s evolution during which Giddens was writing.6 Of course, both the Community and the global political order (Giddens, 1990, p. 168) – as well as, relatedly, the global economic order – have undergone dramatic and major changes since the mid-1980s, both because of the continuing process(es) of globalisation and because of the advent of the post-Cold War NWO. However, Giddens’ 1990 publication merely serves to confirm what would seem to be his unshakeable argument concerning the persistence of the global presence and prominence of the nation-state in conjunction with the global resistence to the transfer of (nation-)state sovereignty to super-states. At the same time, as I have inferred, Giddens’ arguments are to some extent difficult to discern and, in so far as they can be discerned, are to a large extent difficult to accept. There are at least two major sources of problems with Giddens’ arguments, including that on the evolving relationships between nation-states, (nation-)state sovereignty and collaborattive formations. The first of these is Giddens’ cavalier approach to central notions and concepts, as reflected in the way he deploys and juxtaposes such terms as ‘state’, ‘super-state’, ‘superpower’, ‘inter-governmental’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘autonomy’. The meanings of key terms in his argument, and therefore of his argument itself, are not easy to pin down in any coherent and consistent fashion. The second source of problems with Giddens’ argument is that of being unable to confidently grasp his interpretation of the relationships between nation-states, (nation-)state sovereignty and collaborative formations in general, along with the way these relationships are reflected in the development of the EC in particular. On the one hand, Giddens claims that globalisation is occurring (a) together with the creation of a global political order which is increasingly characterised by co-operative strategies and formations, but (b) not with super-state formation(s) nor any, presumably associated, diminution of sovereignty at the nation-state level. On the other hand, for Giddens, the

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Community has managed to restrict its Member States’ sovereignty in that (a) it has the capability to frame laws which then apply to its Member States and their populations, and that (b) in respect of economic relations a certain transfer of sovereignty has taken place from the Member State level to, what it seems to me – employing Giddens’ terms and notions – is to be called the ‘super-state’ level. Giddens’ view of the relationship between the Community and its Member States by way of the distribution and exercise of sovereignty lacks clarity and coherence, is rendered somewhat ambiguous and confused, and moreover is at odds with reasonable interpretations of an abundance of evidence on the political, legal, decision-making and power dimensions of this relationship: evidence which other (including various notable specialist) writers have used in support of conclusions which categorically contradict Giddens’ view on the relationship between the Community and its Member States along with what seems to be his argument about the general character – and especially the general conservation – of (nation-)state sovereignty in the evolving global(ised) political order. Thus, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt is unequivocal: The major innovation of the EC compared with other international bodies is that its members have given up [ . . . ] national sovereignty with the goal of forming a cohesive, indissoluble organizational and political unit. They have conferred on [the EC] sovereign powers of its own, independent of the Member States, which it can exercise to adopt acts that have the force of national law. The EC [ . . . ] forms the core of the ‘European Union’ established on 1 November 1993 with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. (Borchardt, 1995, pp. 7–8) Elsewhere, Borchardt (1994) has clarified what the conferring of sovereign powers on the EC means as far as the legal relationship between the Community and its Member States is concerned: ‘through the establishment of the Community, the Member States have limited their legislative sovereignty and in so doing have created a self-sufficient body of law that is binding on them and on their nationals’ (Borchardt, 1994, p. 55). The transfer of sovereignty to the EC, or the EC’s institutions, from the EC’s Member States and the associated establishment of the ‘autonomy of the Community’s legal order’ (Borchardt, 1994, p. 56) is manifested in (i) ‘the direct applicability of Community law’, and (ii) ‘the primacy of Community law over conflicting national law’ (Borchardt, 1994, p. 58). The direct applicability of Community law ‘simply means that the latter confers rights and imposes obligations directly not only on the Community’s institutions and the Member States [and so the latter’s institutions] but also on the Community’s citizens’ (Borchardt, 1994, p. 58), or more accurately on the Community’s Member States’ nationals (Borchardt, 1994, p. 55). The

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direct applicability principle lends itself to the primacy principle, and vice versa. That is, the primacy principle means ‘that Community law, which [has been] enacted in accordance with the powers laid down in the [founding] Treaties, has priority over any conflicting law of the Member States. Not only is it stronger than earlier national [that is, Member State or domestic] law, but it also has a limiting effect on [Member State] laws adopted subsequently’ (Borchardt, 1994, p. 61). It follows that, contra – but to paraphrase – Giddens, Community bodies have acquired the sovereign capacity to arrive at decisions which can be regarded as ‘laws’: that (due to their acquisition of sovereign powers) EC bodies, or institutions, can make decisions which, even without being ratified at Member State (nation-state) level, have the force of law. In a sense, EC decisions which qualify as ‘laws’ must be ratified at Member State level, but not in the sense that their qualification, legitimacy, application and enforcement depend on ratification at this level. The EC’s decisions which qualify as ‘laws’ must be ‘ratified’ at Member State level only in the sense that such decisions must be endorsed and enforced by the Community’s Member States under the latters’ treaty – or, that is, membership – obligations. EC ‘laws’ are those decisions made at Community level which the ECJ has ruled, or at least would rule, as having been arrived at legitimately by way of the EC’s institutions and decision-making procedures and in accordance with the EC’s competence, capacity and power,7 authority, rights and sovereignty. In a similar manner to Borchardt, Jo Shaw (1996) tells us how, within the EC, ‘the Court of Justice has consistently distanced the EU legal system from “ordinary” international law, arguing that by accession to the Community the Member States have transferred sovereign rights to the Community, creating an autonomous legal system in which the subjects are not just states [sic], but also individuals. The Court has given effect to this view by enunciating four key principles’ (Shaw, 1993, p. 14): EC law penetrates into the national legal systems, and can and must be applied by the national courts, subject to authoritative rulings on the interpretation, effect and validity of EC law by the Court of Justice; in other words, the duty of ‘Community loyalty’ [ . . . ] provided for in [the founding treaties] applies to courts as well as to all other organs of the Member States such as the government and the legislature; [ . . . ] in this context individuals may rely upon rules of the EC law in national courts, as giving rise to rights which national courts are bound to protect (the principle of ‘direct effect’); [ . . . ] in order to guarantee the effectiveness of this structure, EC law takes precedence over conflicting national law, including national constitutional provisions (the principle of ‘supremacy’ or ‘primacy’); [ . . . ] the organs and constituent bodies of the Member States, including the legislative, executive and judiciary, are fully

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responsible for reversing the effects of violations of EC law which affect individuals. (Shaw, 1996, p. 17) For me, Shaw neatly sums up the (political, legal, decision-making and power) relationship between the EC and its institutions, on the one hand, and the Member States, their institutions and nationals, on the other, in two statements: much of the ‘constitutional law’ of the EU is contained not in the Treaties themselves, but in the judicial pronouncements of the Court of Justice which plays a pivotal role in the legal system, and which has a commitment to the pursuit of integration through law. It has consistently given a maximalist interpretation of the authority and effect of EC law, of the regulatory and policy-making competence of the institutions and of its power to control both the institutions and the Member States to ensure that ‘the law is observed’ [ . . . ] (Shaw, 1996, p. 16); therefore, the Court has constructed a system which comes close to the power conventionally held by the supreme court in a federal system, namely the power to invalidate [member] state legislation which contravenes the federal constitution [ . . . ] (Shaw, 1996, p. 19)8 Shaw’s portrayal of the EC as coming close to a federal system, while far from unique, is controversial and indeed for some highly provocative. Nonetheless, in so far as the Court of Justice has successfully assumed the mantle of a ‘supreme court’ in accordance with the principle of the primacy, or the supremacy, of EC law in relation to Member State (or nation-state level) law, then for me the EC overall represents what can be labelled a supra-national organisation or, following Alex Stone (1994) a supra-national (constitutional) regime.9 Giddens’ version of globalisation on the particular matter of the nationstate and (nation-)state sovereignty is at odds with a growing and impressive number of (but still by no means all)10 other contributors to the debates surrounding the process. For instance, more recently than Giddens, in Democracy and the Global Order, David Held (1995) argues that in the modern global order, as part of the advance of ‘globalization’: the day of the independent nation state is over, and has been for some time. Economic, cultural and military developments have whittled away the sovereignty that was the hallmark of the Westphalian model.11 At the same time the internationalization of goods, images and people is bringing into being ‘global civil society’ which could be the constituency of global institutions of democratic governance. He looks forward, following a suggestion of Hedley Bull’s, to a ‘neo-medieval’ order of divided and

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overlapping sovereignties, in which states share their authority over their citizens with democratically controlled regional and global institutions on the one hand, and sub-state and sub-national units on the other.12 Held is [ . . . ] critical of the current international institutions, headed symbolically by the United Nations [ . . . ]. But he remains convinced that the germs of a cosmopolitan democratic order are there, shown fitfully in the working of such institutions as the European Court of Human Rights13 and various UN agencies. (Kumar, 1996) Likewise, Tony Spybey’s approach to globalisation seems at odds with Giddens’ over the inevitability of ‘modernity’ in so far as it entails and is driven by the unstoppable, global dissemination of the politically resilient nation-state; and so over the viability of alternative, competing and successful forms of ‘modernity’. Spybey, in a similar way to Giddens, argues that those cultural aspects and underpinnings of globalisation which he lists as participation, consumerism and reflexivity (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 802) are manifestations of ‘western lifestyles’ (Spybey, 1996, p. 9 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803) and are being diffused in conjunction with such ‘globalized social processes’ (Spybey, 1996, p. 9 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803) as ‘the irresistible rise of the transnational corporation’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803). However, Spybey also argues that the same social processes include ‘the decline of national sovereignty’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803). For Spybey, one ‘result of exposure to [such] globalized social processes’ (Spybey, 1996, p. 9 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803) as the decline of national sovereignty is an ‘enhanced capacity for reflection [on the part of] the individual’ (Spybey, 1996, p. 9 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803). Concomitantly, Sypbey adds, ‘the avatars of reflexivity have [increasingly created] their own, selforganised International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) to take care of them as they struggle for peace, gender equality and a cleaner environment (Chapter 7)’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 804). In suggesting that the onward march of globalisation entails the decline of (nation-)state sovereignty while encouraging International Non-Governmental Organisations, Spybey’s account of globalisation diverges from Giddens’ while, conversely, converging with that of one of the most influential (or, at least, most quoted) writers on the processes entailed, namely Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995). Anthony Woodiwiss mentions the work of Ohmae, but specifically refers neither to the overlap between Ohmae’s ideas and Spybey’s nor, for that matter, to Ohmae’s strenuous commitment to (if somewhat sketchy presentation of) the argument that the nation-state is not just on the decline, but that the nation-state is already close to having become a thing of the past, obsolete (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5), unnecessary (ibid., p. 4), ‘unnatural, even impossible’ (ibid., p. 5); and that in ‘a world in which economic borders are progressively disappearing’ (ibid., p. 2) in conjunction with ‘the artificial political borders of countries’ (ibid., p. 5) – in other words,

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in ‘the borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1990; 1995, p. ix) – nation-states have withered and are being replaced by ‘region states’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5). Woodiwiss’ interest in Ohmae is circumscribed by the way Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson in their Globalization in Question (1996) present an ‘empirical challenge’ to ‘the Giddensian conception of globalisation’ based on ‘a model of what a true “global economy” would look like [as] derive[d] from the work of Kenichi Ohmae (1990)’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 805). In so far as a ‘true “global economy”’ would be ‘dominated by truely transnational corporations – “genuinely footloose capital, without national identification and with an internationalized management, and at least potentially willing to locate and relocate anywhere in the globe to obtain the most secure or highest returns” [Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 11]’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 805), then it is not the global economy model, but ‘the international economy model [which] emerges as more plausible’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, pp. 805–6). An ‘”international economy” [model is one] wherein corporations have clear home bases and are therefore [ . . . ] regulatable through nation states [as well as] the treaty organisations to which they are party’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 806). If so, then Hirst and Thompson’s empirical challenge to the globalisation thesis – a strong challenge, according to Woodiwiss, in that it is based on an ‘array of evidence’ which is ‘very impressive’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 806) – may turn out to be more damaging to some versions of the thesis than to others, including that version attributable to Giddens. The evidence presented by Hirst and Thompson may well render the global economy model derived from the work of Kenichi Ohmae less plausible than the international economy model, and even less plausible still, if Woodiwiss is to be believed, than the ‘hybrid model wherein [ . . . ] “the globalized economy would encompass and subsume the international economy [ . . . ]” [Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 16]’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 806). That is, following Woodiwiss, the evidence suggests (a) ‘the weak development of TNC’s [Transnational Corporations] and the continuing salience of MNC’s [Multinational Corporations] . . . [along with] the ongoing dominance of advanced countries in both trade and FDI (foreign direct investment)’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 16 – quoted in Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 806); and consequently (b) the persistence of (nation-)state sovereignty, and concomitantly the resilience of the nation-state as a generic social form, which as we have seen is a pivotal claim made by Anthony Giddens in his version of the globalisation thesis. But for me, all these writers (Giddens, Hirst and Thompson, Ohmae and Woodiwiss) on the globalisation process(es), notwithstanding their widely differing claims about the fate of the nation-state, nonetheless share one particular idea about the course of globalisation: about the character or content of the evolving global political and economic order or system. These writers variously ignore, underestimate or dismiss the presence, not to say

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the growing presence, of one particular additional – complementary, alternative – social form to the nation-state within the global order, namely, the supranational regional regime. My argument is, first, that – consistent with Giddens’ assertion that continuing globalisation forces nation-states to strategically co-operate or collaborate over issues (Giddens, 1990, p. 168) – the evolving global system is showing signs of the universal proliferation, geo-political extension and institutional deepening of regional regimes that qualify as either SRRs or proto-SRRs; second, that – consistent with Giddens’ identification of globalisation with ‘modernity’ and Westernisation – these regimes have their origins in western Europe, the first concrete example being what is now the EU; but, third, that any extra-European regional regimes will be adaptions to those particular parts of the world in which they emerge and evolve. ExtraEuropean proto-SRRs and SRRs will be constructed and re-constructed with something of a local flavour. They will display features that are somewhat distinctive, due in part to local cultural – or civilisational – circumstances, conditions and constraints. This third point readily lends itself to a fourth. The original SRR (the EU) and current extra-European proto-SRRs will be interacting, and are likely to increasingly interact, with each other (along with other global players) in ways whereby the extra-European examples will exert various degrees of feedback, or playback, and re-forming influences on the EU. This is not to ignore the specific cultural roots and associated distinctive characteristics of the EU. The re-forming impact of extra-European regimes on the EU will reflect how all SRRs and proto-SRRs will be constructed and reconstructed on the basis of (culturally filtered and fashioned)14 collective strategic goals within an encompassing political-cum-economic global order or system (Axford, 1995), marked by an unequal distribution of power and an associated configuration of differentially powerful players. This configuration will exhibit not only a range of super-powers, but also a growing number of SRRs, or supra-powers. To be more precise, for me, the EU is likely to become increasingly embroiled in mutually re-forming relationships with a growing set of other regional regimes (proto-SRRs and SRRs) especially that or those located within the Asia Pacific region, and perhaps above all the Pacific Asia sector of this region. My prognosis is in recognition of the evident way that the global distribution of (political, economic and even military) power has shifted and will continue to shift (in spite of the 1990s’ Asian crisis, for instance) towards this part of the world, both reflecting and reinforcing the advent and progress of Asia Pacific regional regimes. My argument is consistent with Kenichi Ohmae’s on the decline of (nation-) state sovereignty, but differs from Ohmae’s in that I am not claiming that the nation-state is therefore obsolete, nor necessarily close to being obsolete. My argument also differs from Ohmae’s in that in so far as the nationstate is weakening and withering, this will be happening in conjunction

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with the creation of well-bounded, geo-political SRRs, rather than with the emergence and spread of what Ohmae refers to as ‘region states’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5) within a borderless world (Ohmae, 1990; 1995, p. ix). My preference for the label ‘supranational regional regime’ is not meant to infer that what I have in mind is similar to Ohmae’s ‘region state’. My concept of SRR is fundamentally different from Ohmae’s notion of ‘region state’. The choice of the label ‘supranational regional regime’ indicates that the (economic, political, even military) organisations involved are consitutionally based; are constructed and organised around institutions that are – albeit variously and differentially – supranational; and are ‘regional’ rather than global in their geo-political (and perhaps cultural) embrace. As I have noted, Hirst and Thompson’s empirical challenge to the globalisation thesis leads these authors to reject this thesis, at least as derived from the model of globalisation which they glean from Ohmae’s Borderless World, with its stress on the decline of the nation-state. This theme is then pursued by (among others, including David Held in his Democracy and Global Order, 1996) Ohmae in his 1995 The End of the Nation State. In this later book, Ohmae presents a picture of ‘progressive globalization’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 15) towards ‘a genuinely global economy’ (ibid., p. 16), in which ‘nation states have become little more than bit actors’ (ibid., p. 12), and therefore ‘the nation state is increasingly a nostalgic fiction’ (ibid., p. 12). Ohmae argues that an ‘information-led transition to a genuinely borderless economy [which calls] into question the relevance of nation states as meaningful units of economic activity’ is taking place (ibid., p. viii): we are witnessing [ . . . ] the cumulative effect of fundamental changes in the currents of economic activity around the globe. So powerful have these currents become that they have carved out entirely new channels for themselves – channels that owe nothing to the lines of demarcation on traditional political maps. Put simply, in terms of real flows of economic activity, nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless world. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 11) While globalisation is a process which is ‘driven by global exposure to the same information, the same cultural icons, and the same advertisements, that [Ohmae, with echoes of Spybey, refers] to as the “California-ization” of taste’ (Ohmae 1995, p. 15), the ‘borderless economy’ (ibid., p. viii) and ‘borderless world’ (ibid., p. ix) are characterised, distinguished and defined (ibid., p. 2) by ‘the flows of what [Ohmae] calls the 4 “I’s”’ (ibid., p. 2). These are ‘industry, investment, individuals, and information’ (ibid., p. viii).15 In the case of the first of these real flows of economic activity (ibid., p. 11), Ohmae explains that ‘industry [is] far more global in orientation today [ . . . ]. The strategies of modern multinational corporations are no longer shaped and

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conditioned by [the] state’ (ibid., p. 3): by, that is, ‘discrete, independent nation states’ (ibid., p. x). Ohmae argues: If the unfettered movement of [the four] I’s makes the middleman role of nation states obsolete, the qualifications needed to sit at the global table and pull in global solutions begin to correspond not to the artificial political borders of countries, but to the more focused geographical units – Hong Kong, for example, and the adjacent stretch of southern China, or the Kansai region around Osaka, or Catalonia – where real work gets done and real markets flourish. I call these units ‘region states’. They may lie entirely within or across the borders of a nation state. This does not matter. It is the irrelevant result of historical accident. What defines them is [ . . . ] the fact that they are [ . . . ] the true, natural business units in today’s global economy. Theirs are the borders – and the connections – that matter in the borderless world. [T]raditional nation states have become unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global economy. [In their stead,] region states are [ . . . ] effective ports of entry [in]to [this economy]. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5)16

International relations, regional regimes and East Asia Ohmae acknowledges the existence of organisations – of instances of a ‘form of organization’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. vii) – that could be treated as alternatives to and replacements for nation-states within the global system, but summarily dismisses their importance and viability, asserting that their global relevance is largely inconsequential and that their fate is similar to that of the nation-state. Because Ohmae interprets these organisations as nothing more than groupings, collectivities or assemblies (Ohmae, 1995, p. vii) of nation-states, their future in the borderless global economy and world is predicated on that of the nation-state, and consequently is similarly bleak. As with individual nation-states, these organisations, being merely assemblies of independent nation-states, will give way to geo-politically amorphous – to the point of being borderless – ‘region states’. At the outset of The End of the Nation State, Ohmae refers to ‘both modern nation states and the assemblies of such states (the United Nations, for example, and the European Union and the parties to the North American Free Trade Act [NAFTA])’ (Ohame, 1995, p. vii),17 before proceeding to account for the existence of these assemblies as follows: in today’s more competitive world, nation states no longer possess the [ . . . ] resources [ . . . ] to fund their ambitions. These days, even they have to look for assistance to the global economy and make the changes at home to invite it in. So these new claimants will turn to international

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bodies like the United Nations. But what is the UN if not a collection of nation states? So they will turn to multilateral agencies like the World Bank, but these too are the creatures of a nation state-defined and -funded universe. So they will turn to explicitly economic groupings like OPEC [the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries] or G-718 or ASEAN [the Association of South East Asian Nations] or APEC [the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum] or NAFTA or the EU (European Union). But once again, all they will find behind each new acronym is a grouping of nation states. (Ohmae, 1995, pp. 1–2) Here, Ohmae’s argument overlaps with Giddens’ in that for Giddens the processes of globalisation are forcing nation-states to collaborate over issues (Giddens, 1990, p. 168). However, the resemblance between Ohmae’s account and Giddens’ is superficial relative to deeper, more fundamental, differences over the viabilty and future of the nation-state. Whereas Giddens is convinced that nation-states remain the principal ‘actors’ within the global political order (Giddens, 1990, p. 71), Ohmae is equally convinced that nation-states have declined to the status of ‘bit actors’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 12) within ‘today’s borderless world’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 11). One way of elucidating the difference between Giddens’ approach and Ohmae’s to the global system, nation-states and (nation-)state sovereignty is in terms of how each relates to that branch of international relations theory known as realism. As Hugh Miall (1993) summarises: From a realist perspective, the basic institution of the international system is the sovereign state. The [two hundred or so nation-]states are the constituent legal personalities of international society. According to the norms of this society, which are reflected in international law, each state is responsible for jurisdication in its own territory; each is the supreme law-making authority, holding the majority of legitimate force, upholding the rule of law and domestic order [ . . . ]. Between [nation-]states, order is fragile, given the absence of a supreme authority [ . . . ]. Nevertheless, international order can exist to some degree, in so far as states observe common norms and act in such a way as to preserve themselves individually and collectively. (Miall, 1993, p. 19) Miall singles out Hedley Bull (1977) for having ‘made the classic statement from a realist position’ (Miall, 1993, p. 19), but for me Giddens is also a leading proponent of the realist perspective. Giddens can be categorised as a conventional realist compared with Ohmae, who in contrast adopts a modified realist stance. For Ohmae, while once nation-states and (nation-)state sovereignty represented the primary loci of power, authority and control, and so of ‘order’ and ‘disorder’, within the pattern of international relations, now these features of the global system are rapidly disappearing and being

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replaced by ‘region states’. At the same time, however, notwithstanding their differences, Giddens as a conventional realist and Ohmae as a modified realist share a crucial assumption about international relations, the global system, global processes and global trends. Each of them rejects the view that nation-states are being replaced by regional (constitutional) regimes, and especially by regional regimes that are tightly bounded, highly organised and supranational. In effect, Giddens and Ohmae ally themselves with such writers as Andrew Moravcsik (1991, 1994), who from a realist position scrutinises and rejects the supranationalist interpretation of the process of European integration as presented by, in particular, Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman (1989, 1994). As Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb (1994) put it: Sandholtz and Zysman [argue] that supranational actors [have] played a major role in relaunching Europe [the European Community and Union]. Neo-functionalism was suddenly back in style among students of the European Community, who now saw spillover everywhere.19 Realists, who assume that nation states operating in an anarchic (or near anarchic) world are still the most important international actors, eventually reacted to the emphasis on supranational institutions and processes with their own explanation of recent events in Europe. Andrew Moravcsik [ . . . ] offers a realist challenge to Sandholtz and Zysman’s explanation of the 1992 [single internal market] process. He argues that the ‘supranational institutionalism’ of Sandholtz and Zysman cannot, in fact, account for the ‘negotiating history’ of the Single European Act (SEA) [ . . . ]. Moravcsik argues instead that the SEA was the result of bargaining among the heads of government of the three most powerful EC countries: Britain, France, and Germany [ . . . ]. (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 211–12) For Moravcsik, the structure, processes and development of the EC exemplify the operation of ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’ (Moravscik, 1994, pp. 216–18), described by Moravcsik as an ‘alternative approach to explaining’ European integration and in particular ‘the success of the 1992’ single internal market ‘intitiative’. The approach ‘focuses on interstate bargains between heads of government’, especially ‘in the [ . . . ] largest’, or most powerful, ‘member states of the EC. This approach, [known as] “intergovernmental institutionalism”’, to distinguish it from supranational institutionalism, ‘stresses the central importance’ – in accordance with the realist approach to international relations – ‘of power and interests, with the latter’ being dependent upon, but ‘not simply’ being ‘dictated by’, each nation-state’s ‘position in the international system. Intergovernmental institutionalism is based on three principles: intergovernmentalism, lowestcommon-denominator bargaining, and strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty’ (Moravcsik, 1994, p. 216).

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Likewise, for Ohmae, economic groupings like not only the European Community and Union, but also NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC, are nothing more than assemblies of nation-states, or presumably what Giddens (in a similar way to Moravcsik) calls inter-governmental agencies (Giddens, 1985, pp. 282–4). As such, they are instances of just another type of artificial and obsolete organisation in the borderless world, rooted as this world is in the borderless economy, and driven as it is by ‘the four “I’s” – industry, investment, individuals, and [primarily] information’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. viii). Because these four I’s now ‘flow freely unimpeded across national borders, [then] the building-block concepts appropriate to a 19th-century closed-country model of the world no longer hold’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. viii). Moreover, nor will the various economic groupings of nation-states. By treating the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC as just assemblies of nation-states, Ohmae has a ready-made answer to the question: what ‘really [are] the primary actors in today’s global economy’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 2), the source of the borderless economy and the borderless world? For Ohmae, the answer does not lie with social formations that are assemblies – weakly bounded, collections or gatherings – of nation-states, but instead with borderless, or vaguely bounded ‘region states’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 5). But, Ohmae’s loosely and rhetorically delivered account of globalisation and the associated processes of nation-state decline, the rise of region states and the unpromising future of such economic groupings as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN and APEC conflicts with a welter of other – and in my judgement more cogent and convincing, better reasoned and supported – accounts and prognoses. For instance, writing at about the same time as Kenichi Ohmae, Michael Dobbs-Higginson (1994) tells us that ‘in the new world order’ (1994, p. xvii),20 in ‘the West, two trading communities, the European Community and the North American Free Trade Agreement community (NAFTA), are emerging to fill at least a material part of the vacuum caused by the Cold War’s end. In the East [ . . . ] another such community is forming’ (DobbsHigginson, 1994, p. xix). Dobbs-Higginson goes on to ‘draw the reader’s attention to’, what he declares to be ‘the vitally important role that [ . . . ] the countries of Southeast Asia will play in bringing the [whole of what he defines as the Asia Pacific] region21 together [ . . . ], particularly the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxi). For Dobbs-Higginson, ‘ASEAN is the most viable and credible locomotive for negotiating into place [ . . . ] a [far more geo-politically extensive] regional community’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxv), one that could extend as far as incorporating ‘“Greater China”, namely the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Hong Kong,22 the “Overseas Chinese” spread throughout’ the East Asia region. It could embrace not just the whole of south-east Asia, but also Japan, Korea, Australasia and ‘even Asiatic Russia’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxiv), and so cover the whole of Pacific Asia.

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What Dobbs-Higginson means here by ‘Greater China’ is otherwise clarified by Pedro Nueono: China is embracing a long-submerged entrepreneurial spirit. Its economy is undergoing substantial change, providing opportunities and challenges both for the Chinese and foreign businessmen. The [ . . . ] ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs control large portions of the economies of southeast Asia, reflecting the strength of the entrepreneurs. About 1 per cent of the population of the Philippines is ethnic Chinese yet they control 40 per cent of the economy. In Indonesia and Thailand, with 4 per cent and 10 per cent of ethnic Chinese respectively, they control 50 per cent of the domestic business activity in each case. In Malayasia about one-third of the population is ethnic Chinese but they control about two-thirds of the economy. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have a majority of ethnic Chinese and they control nearly the entire domestic wealth. [A] network of trust [is a] well-known characteristics of Chinese culture. Many of the Chinese who left the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and became wellknown entrepreneurs in south-east Asia maintained links with their communities on the mainland. Many have made their fortunes through activities related with the PRC in areas such as trade, finance and real estate. (Nueno, 13 January 1997) The prominence of overseas Chinese in East Asia has been noted by Dennis Ng: The Overseas Chinese have built a dominant position in the booming economies of the Pacific Rim. Their economic strength in this region is substantial, with well over 50m Overseas Chinese controlling some US$2,000bn in cash or liquid assets. To put the figures in context, these Chinese constitute 10 per cent of the region’s population and around 70 per cent of its economy. The Overseas Chinese produce nine out of ten of the regions billionaires and control around two-thirds of the retail industry. In addition the majority of their business are family businesses. The main explanation for their economic success have always been attributed to one factor: culture [ . . . ]. The Overseas Chinese’s cultural make-up, with an emphasis on tradition and Confucian roots, [has] served the Chinese family business well in the face of a variety of economic policies carried out by the host governments. It [has] also enabled them to be flexible and therefore competitive in changing economic climates. With greater collectivisim, central control and clear vertical order, Overseas Chinese family businesses have managed to generate the coordination and control needed to stimulate massive growth. (Ng, December 1996)

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Dobbs-Higginson predicts and prescribes (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, pp. xxii– xxvi) the creation of an ‘Asia Pacific’ (roughly comprising north-east Asia plus south-east Asia and Australasia) regional community, or – the impression being – a Pacific Asia regional regime (see Stone, 1994). For Dobbs-Higginson, this will occur through the geo-political expansion of ASEAN. Confidence in, sometimes combined with a strongly held preference for, the construction of a pan-Pacific Asia or, at least, pan-East Asia regional regime is to be found among other notable writers, some of whom, unlike Michael Dobbs-Higginson but like Kenichi Ohmae, are themselves East Asians. These writers vary somewhat in their assumptions about the relative organisational strength and institutional depth of the regime, just as they vary in the labels they apply to it. However, the title ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ appears to be popular for that regime which could be emerging to cover the two Pacific Asia sub-regions (or sectors) of north-east Asia and south-east Asia. Thus, Tamio Nakamura (1995) chooses the title ‘East Asian Economic Caucus’ (EAEC)23 to describe the evolution of an organisation that resembles what Dobbs-Higginson seems to mean by ‘Asia Pacific regional community’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxi), at least in so far as the possible inclusion of Australasia is put aside. Nakamura makes several initial, orienting points about East Asia, the first being that ‘[e]conomic interdependence among East Asian countries is growing fast. East Asia in this context is, (a) ASEAN [ . . . ]; (b) Asian NIEs (Newly Industrialised Economies): Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; (c) China; and (d) Japan [ . . . ]. The interdependence of East Asian economies is growing so [much] that the region [can be regarded] as a de facto economic area.24 Indeed, [there is now frequent] talk about forming a regional economic forum to discuss common interests within the region, and within the rest of the world’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 9). Nakamura’s second orienting point is to note that a current example of a regional economic forum is APEC, which ‘brings together [ . . . ] eighteen Asia-Pacific countries and economies (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States)’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10). Third, claims Nakamura, there is at least the prospect of a somewhat more geo-politically confined Asia Pacific regional economic forum, namely the EAEC, as originally ‘proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in December 1990’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10). Nakamura reports how, subsequently, in a speech given ‘in Tokyo on 13 May 1993’, Mahathir stated: ‘although trade is crucially important, [the EAEC] should not be confined to trade. In East Asia [ . . . ] there is also much that can be done with regard to optimising joint development zones, investment, technology, tourism, even labour flows [ . . . ]’ (quoted in Nakamura, 1995, pp. 10, 21). Nakamura claims that, in effect, ‘Mahathir Mohamad [was referring] to the

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four freedoms in his proposal for the EAEC’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 11): that is, to ‘the four freedoms of movement of goods, services, capital and people [which constitute] the major legal principles of the [European Union’s] Common Market [sic]’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 11), or 1992 single internal market project. But, the EAEC is as yet little more than a ‘seminal idea’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10), and therefore stands in sharp contrast to the EU, the most organisationally advanced regional economic forum anywhere. Nakamura’s focal issue is then ‘whether the legal principles and structure developed by the European Union can be used as a model for the construction of a similar East Asian forum’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10). Nakamura argues that there are ‘difficulties involved in deepening the market interdependence of East Asia from the legal point of view’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 11), his analysis of which leads him to conclude that ‘an East Asia structure for economic cooperation would take the shape of an intergovernmental structure comprising a specialists’ Commission and a consensus-based ministers’ Council [ . . . ], with no Parliament, no legally binding law, and hence no Court of Justice’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 19). While Nakamura is confident about the creation of an East Asian regional regime, this regime will not replicate what he takes to be the European Union model. Organisationally and institutionally, the East Asian regime will be different from – will remain more rudimentary than – the EU due to the East Asian regime’s distinctive regional location, historical background and cultural and political character, composition and diversity. For instance, a ‘fundamental difference between East Asia and Europe is that East Asian countries are younger democracies than European countries. Indeed it is doubtful whether there could be any agreement on what democracy entails among East Asian countries. Thus [the possibility] of an Asian Parliament [ . . . ] would [be an insurmountably] controversial issue in [attempting to create] a community structure in East Asia’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 18). It is not only in the area of ‘democracy’ that considerable differences between Europe and East Asia, on the one hand, and among East Asian countries themselves, on the other hand, have been highlighted. Gordon Redding has pointed out: ‘Not only are ways of doing business in Asia subtly different from those in the West but they are also different ways within the region itself. It is a region of immense variety, far more so than is Europe’ (Redding, 13 January 1997). According to Pedro Nueno, networking and trust is a major characteristic of Chinese culture, and ‘many of the Chinese who left the PRC to become leading entrepreneurs in South East Asia have maintained links with their communities on the mainland’ (Nueno, 13 January 1997). For Redding, this aspect of Chinese business and culture is one of ‘three powerful systems of business, each represented by a particular kind of organisation’, which have emerged over the ‘past 30 golden years’ in East Asia: (i) in Japan the business network ‘known as the kaisha or in [ . . . ]

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extended form the keiretsu’; (ii) in South Korea ‘the now internationalising chaebol’; (iii) and elsewhere, ‘the Chinese family business – that most obtrusive and little-understood instrument of wealth creation and progress’ (Redding, 13 January 1997). In suggesting that the historical, political and cultural differences between Europe and East Asia in combination with those among East Asian countries are a major hurdle to the construction of an East Asian regional regime of the de jure, or supranational, variety, Nakamura appears to be in agreement with Endymion Wilkinson (1991), who as we have noted argues that in ‘spite of the trend towards regional economic cooperation in other parts of the world, it is unlikely that a tightly organized trading bloc will emerge in the Asia Pacific region [ASEAN apart] in the near future’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 27), especially along the lines of the European Community with its ‘supranational level’ of ‘sovereignty’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 80) because, apart from anything else, it is ‘too hetrogeneous’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 27). Nakamura, moreover, concurs with Wilkinson over the suggestion that an impediment to East Asia forming a regional regime along the lines of the EU model stems from East Asia’s greater economic hetrogeneity: the ‘disparity of development among East Asian countries is much larger than among European countries’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 16). In support this conclusion, Nakamura provides development indices data for countries in Europe and East Asia (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2).25 Notwithstanding their reluctance to acknowledge the formation of a Pacific Asia or, at least, East Asia regional regime which is similar to, and perhaps modelled on, the European Community and Union, neither Nakamura nor Wilkinson can be categorised along with Giddens as a ‘conventional realist’ or with Ohmae as a ‘modified realist’ in that Nakamura and Wilkinson explicitly or implicitly acknowledge the existence not just of regional blocs or organisations (such as within south-east Asia – see Wilkinson, 1991, p. 28), but also of supranational regional regimes, in particular that in Europe. Both Wilkinson and Nakamura are doubtful only about the creation of a supranational regional regime across Pacific Asia or East Asia rather than about the creation and spread of regional regimes elsewhere and their progress to SRRs. Indeed, for Wilkinson and Nakamura, the emergence of a panPacific Asian or a pan-East Asian SRR is unlikely in the foreseeable future even though there are existing regimes which not only present a guiding model or template, but also act as a source of competitive pressure on and so as an incentive for the nation-states of the Pacific Asia region – on straightforward self-interested, realist grounds – to construct their own matching (similar but not necessarily identical) regime or regimes. For instance, as Wilkinson mentions: ‘Not wishing to be isolated and fearing the formation of regional blocs in other parts of the world, Japan has a clear interest in strengthening its relations with the countries around it’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 28).

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Development Indices of European Countries

** Austria *** Czechoslovakia * Denmark ** Finland * France * Germany * Greece Hungary * Ireland * Italy * Luxembourg * Netherlands Norway Poland * Portugal * Spain ** Sweden * United Kingdom

GNP per capita US$ (1991)

Human Development Index (1990)

20 380 2 450 23 660 24 400 20 600 23 650 6 230 2 690 10 780 18 580 31 080 18 560 24 160 1 830 5 620 12 460 25 490 16 750

0.952 0.892 0.955 0.954 0.971 0.957 0.902 0.887 0.925 0.924 0.943 0.970 0.979 0.831 0.853 0.923 0.977 0.964

Sources: Nakamura, 1995; Sekai Kokusei Zue (World Statistics Illustrated), 1993, pp. 24–33; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993, 1993, pp. 135–7. * Members of the European Community in 1990–1 ** Joined the European Union on 1 January 1995 *** Before partition into the Czech Republic and Slovakia

If Wilkinson had been able to accept that ‘the formation of regional blocs in other parts of the world’ would by itself be sufficient to expect and explain the formation of a similar – perhaps supranational – pan-Pacific Asian or pan-East Asian regional bloc or regime, then in my terms his approach would warrant the label ‘modified realism’. This is because Wilkinson would have accepted that, due to (especially since the end of the Cold War) globalised market-capitalism – and so globalised market-capitalist self-interested competition, competitive pressures and incentives – the global system (Axford, 1995; or the ‘world system’ – see Wallerstein, 1974; 1976; 1979; 1984; 1987; 1989) is becoming increasingly characterised by the proliferation and advance of regional organisations that are subsuming and variously replacing independent, sovereign nation-states, even though these organisations continue to act and interact in accordance with the framework, principles and assumptions of the realist school of international relations theory. The perspective I bring to the study of regional regimes within and throughout the NWO global system qualifies as modified realism, or alternatively as ‘neo-realism’, my preferred label. For me, regional regimes and SRRs are best

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Development Indices of East Asian Countries

* Brunei *** Cambodia China **** Hong Kong * Indonesia Japan *** Laos * Malaysia ** Myanmar (Burma) * Philippines * Singapore **** South Korea **** Taiwan * Thailand

GNP per capita US$ (1991)

Human Development Index (1990)

9 600 (1989) 200 370 13 200 610 26 920 230 2 490 408 (1990)

0.186 0.566 0.913 0.515 0.983 0.246 0.790 0.390

740 12 890 6 340 8 728 1 580

0.603 0.849 0.872 0.715

Sources: Nakamura, 1995; Sekai Kokusei Zue (World Statistics Illustrated), 1993, pp. 24–33; United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993, 1993, pp. 135–7. * Members of ASEAN in 1990–1 ** Joined ASEAN in 1995 *** Joined ASEAN during 1997–9 **** Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), but non-members of ASEAN

studied, analysed and understood largely in terms of the process of globalisation, as boosted by the end of the Cold War and the advent of the new world order, whereby nation-states acting and interacting within a globalised market-capitalist system in a realist, self-interested fashion are increasingly opting for the competitive (not to say defensive and protective) strategy of joining and constructing regional regimes – that is, proto-SRRs. Some if not all regional regimes are likely to become SRRs, and furthermore are likely to progress as (become more deeply institutionalised) SRRs, in a manner which is consistent with the ‘neo-functionalist’ approach to, and therefore in accordance with the ‘spillover’ process of, European integration. Guided by Jo Shaw (1996, pp. 11–15), neo-functionalists advocate an incremental approach to European integration: Power is [gradually] transferred to a central authority which exists at a level above the nation state, and which exercises its powers independently of the Member States – a supranational body. However, the transfer of powers is viewed as just part of a continuing process. One level of integration will lead on to the next; a sectoral Treaty dealing with [one set of industries] leads on to a general Treaty covering all economic sectors; a customs union [ . . . ] leads on to a common or internal market [ . . . ]. This

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in turn creates demands for [ . . . ] fixed exchange rates, or even a single currency managed by a single central bank (a monetary union). [This requires] a convergence of economic policies [such as through] the transfer of macroeconomic powers to a central authority (an economic union), and [ . . . ] a [centralised] regional policy to ensure [ . . . ] (economic and social cohesion). This process [is] termed ‘spill-over’ by neo-functionalists, and as they have evolved, the European Community and later the European Union have indeed passed through a number of stages [ . . . ] involving progressive transfers of power to [their institutions] by the Member States. Spill-over has also operated in the extension of the powers of the old European Economic Community out of the purely ‘economic’ field into other related areas such as environmental and social policy. It has also fuelled the debate about political union in the EU [ . . . ]. According to the [ . . . ] notion of political union, the EU should exercise powers which are commensurate with its economic powers. For example, external trade competence should be linked to the introduction of foreign trade cooperation. (Shaw, 1996, pp. 12–13) The neo-functionalist theoretical-cum-prescriptive approach to European integration with its pivotal notion of ‘spill-over’, and applied specifically to the EU’s progress as a ‘political union’, is well illustrated in a 1996 speech delivered by Jacques Delors, who was succeeded as President of the European Commission at the beginning of 1995: The history of European integration shows a ‘spill-over’ effect from the economic to the political, allowing the European concept to advance despite the obstacles placed in its way by our venerable nations [ . . . ]. The Treaty of Rome [of 1957 and the basis of the European Economic Community] was [ . . . ] essentially economic in substance. [ . . . It led to] the 1992 Single Market programme [and through] extrapolation [will lead on to] the completion of economic and monetary union. [In turn], the experience of joint sovereignty in the monetary sphere will bring about a quantum leap in the direction of truly political integration. The whole history of [European integration] would appear to support the spill-over theory. (Delors, 25 September 1996) My perspective on the study of the emergence and evolution of SRRs in general resembles Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman’s interpretation of European integration (Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, 1994). This fits the neo-functionalist approach while having been described otherwise as ‘supranational institutionalism’ (Moravcsik, 1994, pp. 213, 216). Their account of European integration around events (such as the acceptance of the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market [1985] and the passage of the Single European Act [1986]) leading to the (so-called ‘1992’) single

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internal market draws ‘on neofunctionalism and [certain] approaches derived from international relations [theory]’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 189). The result is that Sandholtz and Zysman ‘explain the “1992 process” by focusing on supranational institutions’, but at the same time crucially argue ‘that changes in the international structure – specifically the decline of the United States and the rise of Japan – “triggered the 1992 process”’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 189). On the other hand, Sandholtz and Zysman’s account is restricted in that it both focuses exclusively on European integration and was presented prior to the revolution of 1989. In contrast, my scope is that of regional regimes wherever they occur, before and since the events of 1989. The 1989 events resulted in the new world order, and fed into the process(es) of globalisation, centred very much as this is on market-capitalism’s global conquest. In a similar way to Sandholtz and Zysman’s version of the European integration process, the EC’s progress as an SRR and the EC’s drive towards completing the single internal market, my analysis of regional regimes in general – of their global proliferation and progress – stresses the shaping if not strictly determining influences of international relations, and especially of distinctive features of these relations within the NWO. While I draw on the realist branch of international relations theory, I do so by modifying realism in view of the decline of the nation-state in favour of regional regimes and SRRs, the outcome being my formulation of what I call neorealism for the purpose of examining, analysing and understanding supranationalism in the new world order. Tamio Nakamura comes close to adopting a neo-realist approach in his assessment of the evolution of a regional regime in East Asia (under the banner of the EAEC), most notably when he expands on his third initial, orienting point about East Asia: [A]mong ASEAN members, Indonesia did not give support to the idea at first. [However], the European community’s [sic] 1992 internal market project proceeded successfully, and North American countries concluded NAFTA [ . . . ] in 1993.26 In January 1993 President Clinton took office in the United States and he suggested that APEC should become more formalised and expanded to include political and security cooperation in the Pacific region. In reaction to these economic developments and political proposals, all ASEAN member states came to support the EAEC plan in July 1993, and in October the same year, they decided to invite Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan to become founding members of the EAEC. (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10) Following Nakamura, there are signs of a fledgling, or at least an embryonic, East Asian regional economic forum, or (reverting to Dobbs-Higginson’s terminology) an Asia Pacific regional community, or presumably (in my

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terms) an East Asia or Pacific Asia regional regime. Moreover, Nakamura lends weight to Dobbs-Higginson’s suggestion that ASEAN represents the most likely locomotive for the development of the EAEC (DobbsHigginson, 1994, p. xxv). For Nakamura, as for Dobbs-Higginson, the main impetus behind EAEC has come from ASEAN, seen as an already well-established, developed and organised regional regime, as indicated by Chris Dixon: The formation in 1967 of ASEAN, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Brunei became a full member in 1984), marked an important step in the establishment of an organised proAmerican27 bloc in South East Asia. While [ . . . ] ASEAN originated [as] an economic and cultural organisation, [and some] progress has been made in establishing economic cooperation and integrating the markets of the member states [ . . . ], in military and political affairs developments have been considerable, particularly since the reunification of Vietnam in 1976. (Dixon, 1991, p. 9) Vietnam was reunified in 1976 as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, before soon embarking upon a programme of economic reforms designed to establish a market economy, and moreover a market economy which would be embroiled in the globalisation process, moves which in 1995 led to the normalisation of Vietnam’s diplomatic relations with the USA, the opening by the USA of an embassy in Hanoi, and to Vietnam’s admission as a full member of ASEAN. The inclusion of Vietnam raised ASEAN’s total membership to seven, although this particular event was shortly followed by ASEAN’s decision to admit three further applicants: the ‘Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) has agreed to admit Burma [Myanmar] into the grouping, along with two other applicant nations [ . . . ] Cambodia and Laos [ . . . ] in 1997’ (Saragosa, 2 December 1996). But, while ASEAN may be the main internal, East Asian inspiration behind the development of EAEC, if Nakamura and Dobbs-Higginson are to be believed, ASEAN’s support and striving for an expansive, pan-East Asian regional regime can only be understood in terms of the influence of extraregional factors and forces; and of events, processes and developments with global scope, or ramifications. That is, in accounting for the intra-regional tilt towards an East Asia or Pacific Asia regime, both Nakamura and DobbsHigginson pinpoint the influence of certain global considerations, thereby aligning themselves with Ohmae and Giddens. At the same time, however, the overlap between Ohmae’s and Giddens’ approach, on the one hand, and Nakamura’s and Dobbs-Higginson’s, on the other, is limited, being confined largely to the form of their respective approaches in so far as this can be distinguished from the content.

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When it comes to the latter, in stark contrast to the views of Ohmae and Giddens about global trends, the nation-state, (nation-)state sovereignty and regional regimes, Nakamura and Dobbs-Higginson portray ASEAN as a geo-politically well-defined or bounded and organisationally welldeveloped organisation, which has ambitions for geo-political expansion, even to the point of embracing the whole of East Asia. Moreover, both Nakamura and Dobbs-Higginson interpret ASEAN’s policies in these respects as responses to the competitive pressures the regime perceives it is under from other, rival and competing regional regimes in the global system. For Nakamura, the members of ASEAN have been persuaded to contribute their full, collective and organised weight to the pursuit of EAEC due to what they see as the combined threat posed by the progress of the European Union around the success of the single internal market, the creation and expansion of the North American Free Trade Area, and the proposals for advancing APEC. There is an affinity between Nakamura’s points about East Asia and John Peterson’s assessment of ‘trade blocs’, and in particular of the conditions favouring the construction of an East Asia regional regime (Peterson, 1996, pp. 180–204), even though Peterson is far from sanguine either about APEC (cf. Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxv) or about the concurrent ‘idea of a “transatlantic economic space”, or even some type of US–EU free trade area’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 185). This idea is a reflection of the ‘New Transatlanticism of the early 1990s’ which emerged as ‘a consequence of geo-political change – [of] the fall of communism and [of] European integration (Peterson, 1996, p. 181). One concrete sign of this change and its consequences came from ‘the Paris meeting of OSCE [the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe] in November 1990’, this being the Transatlantic Declaration. This ‘committed both sides to more intensive and institutionalized consultations’ (Peterson, 1996, pp. 14–15; see also Wallace, 1992). Although the Transatlantic Declaration is described by Peterson as ‘anodyne’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 48), some have taken it – its general purpose and its guiding sentiments – very seriously. For instance, the construction of an ‘Atlantic bridge’ in the form of ‘a transatlantic free trade area’ (Elliott, 3 June 1996) has been proposed, including by Margaret Thatcher (White, 8 March 1996). The theme of an Atlantic bridge is a popular one with Margaret Thatcher and her supporters. When still Britain’s prime minister, she ‘outlined her views on European integration in her speech at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, on 20 September 1988’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 45), concluding as follows: Let us have a Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks outward and not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic Community – that Europe on both sides of the Atlantic – which is our noblest

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inheritence and our greatest strength. (Quoted in Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 50) The possibility of constructing an Atlantic bridge in the form of an Atlantic Free Trade Area (AFTA), guided by Ali El-Agraa (1995), however, is neither new nor taken seriously only in Europe. El-Agraa tells us that the ‘idea [ . . . ] was actually suggested by Professor James Meade about 40 years ago’; and refers to ‘the interest the US has shown in the European proposal for an Atlantic Free Trade Area’ (El Agraa, 1995, p. 8). The possibility of AFTA has also been grasped on the other side of the Pacific, and has been interpreted as a major consideration in rationalising the founding of an East Asian regional regime, something explained by Peterson: As political structures are adjusted to reflect economic interdependence, the emergence of protectionist or even mercantilist trade blocks could become a defining feature of the international order. Changing notions of security and stiffer competition have created new incentives for states to share the same agendas in global trade to form sub-groups which allow them to pursue their collective interests. For example, [there is a] danger [ . . . ] that like-minded blocs of states [such as the North American bloc and the EU] will take actions which will erode global free trade. Critics of a US–EU ‘economic space’ or ‘free trade area’ warned that [the] initiative ‘might [ . . . ] drive Asian nations into their own trading bloc’ (Duesterberg, [1995, p. 78]). In this context, a small but growing section of the Japanese political class began to urge that Japan should create its own sphere of economic influence in Asia [ . . . ] (see [Ishihara, 1989; Ito, 1990; Drifte, 1990; see also So and Chiu, 1995]) [ . . . ]. Thus, despite the lofty ambitions of APEC and political interest in a transatlantic economic space, the outcome of weaker security alliances [relative to the stronger trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific security alliances of the Cold War era] and the pursuit of economic security [in the NWO and within globalised market-capitalism] could be the emergence of trade blocs in each corner of the ‘triad’ of Europe, America and Asia. (Peterson, 1996, pp. 186–7) The idea of Japan creating ‘its own sphere of economic influence in Asia’ is far from new and has been embellished with the further idea of Japan having its own, or at least being the leader of, an East Asian regional regime. At the same time, it has attracted considerable controversy, not to mention downright hostility (see So and Chiu, 1995; Wilkinson, 1991). As reported by So and Chiu: Summing up the pattern of post-World War II development in East Asia, Arrighi [1994] argues that it resembles a three-stage rocket. In the first

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stage, the main agency of expansion was the U.S. government, whose strategies of geopolitics propelled the upgrading of the Japanese economy and created the political conditions of the subsequent transborder expansion of the Japanese multilayered subcontracting system. In the second stage, Japanese business itself became the main agency of expansion. As the catchment area of its subcontracting networks came to encompass the entire East Asian region, the Chinese capitalist diaspora was revitalised and the Chinese government was offered unique opportunities to mobilize this diaspora in the dual spirit of economic advancement for mainland China and national reunification for greater [sic] China. In the incipient third stage, it is precisely the Chinese government acting in concert with the capitalist diaspora that seems to be emerging as the leading agency of expansion. (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 27–8) The dispersion (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 27–8) of market-capitalism into and within China has occurred at great speed and with considerable consequences. Figures showing ‘who produces the industrial output in China [since] the start of economic reform in 1978 [indicate] that the output of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has falled below 50 per cent and that trend is continuing’ (Nueno, 13 January 1997). Indeed, whereas the ‘industrial gross output value’ by SOEs amounted to 77.63 per cent in 1978 (the other 22.37 per cent being ‘collectively’ produced), by 1994 this figure had fallen to 34.07 per cent (compared with 40.87 per cent being ‘collectively’ produced) (Nueno, 13 January 1997, Figure 1). Nueno continues by reporting: ‘Collectively-owned enterprises [had almost] doubled their industrial output and individually-owned enterprises [had become] responsible for more than 10 per cent [that is, for 11.51 per cent, to be precise] of industrial output’ by 1994 compared with 0 per cent in 1978, and ‘are growing at more than 25 per cent a year’. A fourth ‘ownership type’, that labelled ‘other’, includes ‘foreign enterprises’, and whereas it accounted for none of the industrial gross output in 1978, it accounted for 13.55 per cent by 1994. The ‘bulk of foreign investment in China comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. Part of this investment is made by Chinese entrepreneurs who establish companies abroad and then invest in the PRC’ (Nueno, 13 January 1997), but it also reflects the distinctive features of ‘Chinese business culture’ (ibid.), with its emphasis on ‘networking and trust’ (ibid.), and connectedly the prevalence of ‘Chinese family business’ (Redding, 13 January 1997). The second stage in the pattern of post-World War II development in East Asia (Arrighi, 1994) was marked by the fact that by ‘the 1980s Japan had [ . . . ] emerged as [the] regional economic power in East Asia’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 273). Writing in the early 1990s, So and Chiu report: ‘Japan has become the largest exporter to East Asian states, and its companies also dominate the exports from East Asian states to Japan. In terms of investment

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and foreign aid, Japanese corporate investment in the Asia-Pacific region [as a whole] amounts to nearly twice the investment of American companies’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 273). It would seem to be with this kind of development in mind that Endymion Wilkinson claims that it is ‘in East Asia [ . . . ] that some of the first indications of Japan’s new leadership role are emerging’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 15), although what Wilkinson also has in mind here is the possibility of Japan assuming a leadership role well beyond East Asia, and moreover beyond merely an economic leadership role. For Wilkinson, that is, ‘Japan, the epicentre of the third pole of the world economy and now the world’s largest creditor nation, will seek to translate its new wealth into political gains’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 15). But, So and Chiu go on to mention, by ‘the early 1990s there [were signs] that the strong economic growth of East Asia may [have] come to an end. First, the pace of economic growth [ . . . ] slackened in the NIEs [ . . . ]. Second, Japan [had] experienced its longest recession since World War II. The burst of the “bubble economy” in the late 1980s caused a major crisis in the Japanese financial system and a slump in domestic demand’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 272). While not ignoring these setbacks, So and Chiu argue that there are: also signs of revitalization of the East Asian economy as the region move[s] toward the 21st century. First, the NIEs [have begun] to relocate their [labour]-intensive industries outward, hoping to capitalize on lower production costs abroad. Subsequently, NIEs’ economic structures were upgraded to high-tech and capital-intensive industries. Domestic demand also played a more significant role in promoting economic growth, especially in the larger economies of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. The tertiary service and financial sectors also figured more prominently in the distribution of national products. Second, there was the rapid economic growth of mainland China and the ASEAN countries. China in particular, with its population of 1 billion and a fledgling middle class, enjoyed the potential for keeping the NIEs’ exports soaring to higher levels. For example, by 1994, China should overtake the United States as Hong Kong’s main market for the first time (FEER, December 30, 1993). In addition, China’s domestic consumer demand burgeoned as its exports continued to grow [ . . . ]. Furthermore, China [had even] applied for membership of GATT signifying the accelerated integration of the Chinese economy into the capitalist world economy. In the future, China [is likely] to become the locus of economic dynamism of the East Asian region [ . . . ]. (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 272–3) China’s economic ascendency both regionally and within the global marketcapitalist economy has continued apace, one manifestation being that by 1996 it had become ‘the world’s top steel producer [ . . . ] with [an] output

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of 100m tons’ a total which ‘included 86m tons of rolled steel’ (Financial Times, 3 January 1997). The significance of this latter figure lies partly in the fact that China still failed through its production totals to meet its own consumption requirement for rolled steel: ‘China needed 98m tons of rolled steel and made up the shortfall by importing 10m tons and using 2m from stocks’ (ibid.). In other words, there were various signs by the mid-1990s in support of So and Chiu’s view that China was on its way to replacing Japan as ‘the locus of economic dynamism of the East Asian region’. Even so, what ‘seems likely to happen in the next decade [ . . . ] is the continuation of the present trend toward interregional economic integration among Japan, mainland China, and the NIEs on the one hand, and the Southeast Asia states on the other. So, by the early 21st century, researchers may speak of a Greater East Asia region that links [north east] and [south east] Asian [countries] together economically’ (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 274–5).

Asia Pacific regionalisation in the world system At least by inference, for So and Chiu, China stands a greater chance than Japan of acting as a leader, not just in an economic sense but also even more importantly in a political sense, as Greater East Asia tends towards and perhaps eventually becomes a ‘regional organisation’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 274), and moreover even becomes ‘hegemonic’ (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 273–5). The explanation for this lies to a large extent in Japan’s previous, pre-Second World War, ‘pursuit of regionalization [through] the building of [a Greater] East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 105; see also Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. 50, and Wilkinson, 1991, p. 81), a move which reflected the growing ‘call [in Japan] for ultranationalism, militarism, and continental expansion’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 105) – reflected, that is, Japan’s imperialist ambitions. As So and Chiu put it, Japan’s pre-War ‘regionalization strategy’ through the promotion of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was a manifestation of its ‘empire-building’ and ‘colonialism’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 84). For So and Chiu, Japan’s regionalisation strategy can be viewed as illustrative of more widespread projects, practices and processes which can be best understood by using the ‘new methodology and innovative concepts’ of ‘world-systems analysis’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 4).28 So and Chiu tell us that ‘world-systems analysis, in its mature version [ . . . ] offers a new mode of thinking that stresses large-scale, long-term, and holistic methodology. In addition, it has formulated many innovative concepts – such as incorporation, semiperiphery, regionalization, hegemony, rivalry, and anti-systemic movements – to examine the changing development in the world economy’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 26). So and Chiu then set out to ‘further extend world-systems analysis in order to explain the unique pattern of East Asian

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development over the past [two] centuries’ (ibid., p. 28), including ‘the efforts of Japan in trying to construct an East Asian empire in the early 20th century’ by way of its ‘regionalization project’ (ibid., p. 29). So and Chiu summarise their preferred analytical perspective as follows: In world-systems analysis, a region of the world economy refers to a zone of multiple states, which, although fully integrated into the world economy, also manifests a high degree of integration of production processes within its bounds, and thus approaches being a single fairly large state. For Wallerstein (1991, p. 6), regionality is a means through which a semiperipheral state establishes a niche for itself in the world economy. (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 84) According to So and Chiu, therefore, Japan’s proposed Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere represented the culmination of the regionalisation strategy through empire-building and colonialism on which it had embarked towards the end of the nineteenth century (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 105) in response to and with the intention of emulating the imperialism (including in East Asia) of the ‘Western core states’ (ibid., p. 84): nationstates which Japan saw as rivals, with which Japan wished to effectively compete, and which Japan intended to match: By the late 19th century, the world economy [had] reached a downward phase, marked by [the] stagnation and contraction of the global market [ . . . ]. In order to overcome stagnation, core states competed with one another for new colonies and investment rights in the [world-system] periphery [see So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 22–30]. Therefore, [ . . . ] Western core states practiced territorial annexation and colonialism by the end of the 19th century [ . . . ]. Observing this trend towards colonialism, the Japanese state developed a regionalization strategy of empire building in East Asia. (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 84) So and Chiu argue, in other words, that ‘Japan developed a regionalization strategy to attain upward mobility through the domination of East Asia. This strategy of ascent inevitably pushed Japan into imperialism’. However, ‘the people of the Japanese colonies and even [of] Japan [itself] suffered a great deal in sustaining Japanese imperialism in the world system’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 87), most notably during the 1930s and through the Second World War. By ‘the early 1930s, [the] combined weight of economic depression [and] economic dislocation within Japan’ among other factors lent itself to the ‘pursuit of regionalization [through] the building of a [Greater] East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (ibid., p. 105). So and Chiu explain that ‘the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ (ibid., p. 109) was simply the revitalisation within Japan of the, anti-Western, ‘Pan-Asian ideas

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that had enjoyed currency at the turn of the 20th century’ (ibid., pp. 108–9). Drawing on J. Crowley’s account of Japan’s relationships within East Asia (Crowley, 1970), So and Chiu summarise the pro-Asian, anti-Western ideological underpinnings of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project by quoting as follows: We must show the races of East Asia that the order, tranquility, peace, happiness, and contentment of East Asia can be gained only by eradicating the evil precedent of the encroachment and extortion of AngloSaxons in East Asia, by effecting the real aim of the co-prosperity of East Asia, and by making Nippon the leader of East Asia [Crowley, 1970, p. 238]. (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 109) By the time it sent ‘its bombers to Pearl Harbor [sic]’ in 1942, ‘Japan’s colonial empire, euphemistically called the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, already extended from the Japanese archipelago to Korea and Manchuria, through China to Southeast Asia’. In ‘the colonies they occupied, the Japanese attempted to create a new cultural order where discipline and absolute loyalty to Japan were the key elements. But the effort of imposing its own system on the rest of Asia proved untenable’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. 50). While pre-Second World War Japanese saw ‘themselves as the natural leaders for Asia’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. 48) against the West (see Wilkinson, 1991, Chapter 7), for the rest of East Asia the manner in which Japan went about asserting its leadership, imperialistically and brutally (see, for instance, Kristof, 24 January 1997; So and Chiu, 1995, Chapters 3 to 5; Wilkinson, 1991, Chapters 2 and 14),29 perhaps especially during the Second World War, has left ‘[b]itter memories [ . . . ] not far from the surface: witness the angry reactions through [North E]ast and [S]outh east Asia in 1982, to the revision of Japan’s history textbooks to downplay its wartime attack on the region by describing it as an “advance” rather than as an “invasion”’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 27). Accordingly, claims Wilkinson, any ‘Japanese assumption of [political] leadership could easily awaken the fears and resentments of the past’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 28), at least for the forseeable future. Nakamura addresses the same theme in his discussion of ‘the difficulties involved in deepening the market interdependence in East Asia from a legal point of view’ (Nakamura, 1995, p. 11): East Asia has politically sensitive trade barriers resulting from wars in Asia or the difference of political systems [ . . . ]. For example, South Korea has maintained a ban on Japanese pop culture products such as films, music and comics since 1945. This ban was introduced in reaction against harsh Japanese colonial rule from 1910 to 1945, in particular the imposition of

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the Japanese language on Korean people. Only now is this ban coming under revision by the South Korean government. (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 13–14) Here, what is significant is not only that for several decades after the Second World War the South Korean government maintained a ‘pop culture’ embargo, but also that by the early 1990s the government appeared to be shifting its stance on this matter in an reconciliatory direction. For me, the significance of this shift lies in the way it reflects a growing and expanding movement in favour of pan-East Asian co-operation, cohesion and integration, or towards a pan-East Asian regional regime, despite the difficulties rooted in historical events. It can be interpreted as indicative of a gathering desire and ability to overcome – to leave behind – historical difficulties and divisions, along with various interdependent political, economic and cultural impediments, in recognition of East Asia’s shared interests within a global system increasingly characterised by (especially within the new world order) the process of globalisation; universal market-capitalism; and the advance of other, rival regional regimes. The signs are that across East Asia there is an increasing acceptance of a realist approach to the persistent process of globalisation, now entailing as this does not only the well-established universal reach of market-capitalist competition, demands and pressures, but also the rise, spread and advance of regional regimes, protoSRRs and SRRs. This acceptance is what lies behind – is the principal factor in accounting for – the increasing acceptance in turn of the pursuit of, even the need for, an East Asian regional regime (a regime which, in my view, could evolve over the long-term into an SRR), in spite of the region’s historically rooted difficulties and current diversities. This is not to ignore the relevance of the presence and influence of pervasive differences and persistent divisions to the construction of a regional regime, and especially an SRR. But, for me, this influence will not so such prevent the long-term construction of an East Asian SRR, as contribute to shaping the distinctive features of the resulting organisation: those features whereby the East Asian regime will be distinguishable from other SRRs, including those within Europe and the Americas. Moreover, I recognise Endymion Wilkinson’s important point that, while the ‘emergence of East Asia, with Japan at its core, marks the most recent shift in the balance of world economic power’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 3), ‘it is unlikely that a tightly organized trading bloc will emerge in the region in the near future around Japan as its political leader’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 27), as its ‘core hegemon’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 273), because of ‘the historical legacy of the Japanese empire. Memories from World War II make it difficult for other East Asian countries to accept Japan’s hegemony.’ Subregional ‘integration among mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong competes with Japan for regional dominance. Moreover, the ASEAN states are reluctant to

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join any Asian regional organization that calls for sole Japanese leadership’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 274). While this assumption may be well-founded, it still leaves open the possibility – and indeed for me the probability – that Japan will be included as a member; as well as the further possibility that Japan will assume the status of one of the regime’s joint leaders. As Dobbs-Higginson tells us, his ‘proposed general blueprint for [ . . . ] a regional community’, is based on the assumption that ‘none of the countries of the region will accept Japan attempting to provide the primary leadership [ . . . ] as opposed to [its] co-leadership’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxv): Japan has a vital role to play in [the Pacific Asia region]. The old rhetoric is that, owing to its behaviour in World War II, Japan is mistrusted and feared by the rest of [Pacific Asia]. But [ . . . ] Japanese co-leadership of [a Pacific Asia regional community] is not only needed but will [ . . . ] be largely welcomed by the other countries of the region. If Japan acts with sensitivity [ . . . ], it could [make] a contribution towards regional unification, as well as providing economic leadership. [For the forseeable future, Japan] is the only [Pacific Asian] country with the economic credibility and strength to negotiate with the rest of the world. The other countries of the region [could] harness this power for the collective good [ . . . ]. (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxiv) Since the Second World War, Japan has made various overtures towards its neighbours, signalling its interest in joining or in co-founding a regional regime, and in return Japan has received similar invitations from its neighbours. As reported by Wilkinson, ‘from time to time calls are heard [from within Japan] for the formation of [ . . . ] some trade policy forum for the [Asia Pacific] region’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 28). For instance: Stimulated by the formation of the European Community [ . . . ], [in 1967] Prime Minister Miki put forward the idea of a Pacific Association [ . . . ]. Mr Ohira’s 1978 proposal for a Pacific Rim Community eventually merged with an Australian initiative as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference [ . . . ]. Mr Nakasone’s 1987 proposal for a Pacific Forum for Economic and Cultural Cooperation was not taken up. Mr Takeshita’s espousal, in 1989, of a regional dialogue was an effort to tone down a more ambitious Japanese proposal for a Regional Trade Conference and to leave to the Australians the running of the first conference on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) [sic] at the end of [that] year which brought together twelve Asia Pacific nations. (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 266) Since 1989, APEC has progressed, albeit in a somewhat unsteady, uncertain and restricted manner. By the end of 1994, APEC had accumulated eighteen

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Member States from around the Pacific Rim, and had instituted annual summit conferences. Its November 1996 conference in Manila brought together leaders of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, South Korea and the United States. A subsequent editorial in The Guardian newspaper assessed the impact of this conference and the importance of APEC as an organisation by locating these things and their implications in a wider context: Asia is on the move, and not just in the much-hyped sense of its famous ‘economic miracle’.30 In the week after the APEC conference, the Chinese president Jiang Zemin has begun a tour of the [Indian] sub-continent; South Korea has renewed its disagreement with the US over how to handle the North;31 Japan may be edging towards a possible deal with Russia on the Northern Territories; and the ASEAN group has vigorously slapped down European unease over human rights in Indonesia and Burma.32 There is no obvious pattern but new limits are being tested and new alignments being explored [ . . . ]. Power relationships [in East] Asia are [ . . . ] in a fluid state. Russia has become a factor again: first China and now Japan are looking more carefully at relations with Moscow. Mr Jiang will visit there [in April 1997]. [On 1 December 1996] Tokyo was reported to be planning to open a consulate office in Soviet-controlled southern Sakhalin – in spite of its claim to sovereignty.33 Japan’s wider ambitions remain a source of considerable suspicion, not least in Beijing [ . . . ]. The APEC drive for free and open trade and investment cannot be seen as presenting a solution to the region’s other problems. The US, with a century for the advocacy of the ‘open door’ in Asia, is prone to regard economic liberalisation as the catch-all answer. But the APEC conference underlines the wide divergence between those members who seek binding commitments, and those with mixed feelings about globalisation who would prefer a looser arrangement. It was evident too that much of APEC’s value lay in the opportunity provided for bilateral talks on the political and security issues. Throughout the region there is a lack of multilateral mechanisms for discussion of the issues – apart from the tentative Regional Forum of ASEAN.34 Yet the future shape of post cold-war [ . . . ] Asia is not any clearer than that of Europe: it requires just as much hard thinking. (The Guardian, 2 December 1996) This assessment of APEC resembles that to be found in other popular accounts, such as the one offered by the Financial Times immediately after the Manila conference: ‘A Perfect Excuse to Chat [APEC]. That unflattering description of Apec [ . . . ] is now doing the rounds after its unproductive summit in Manila this week. The harsh truth facing leaders of the 18 countries who attended is that the expression is embarrassingly apt [ . . . ]. By not

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injecting political momentum at a critical moment, the leaders have raised doubts about the value of the Apec process’ (Financial Times, 27 November 1996). As inferred, APEC may be dismissed as being merely a ‘talking shop’, a view specifically addressed by Ali El-Agraa: This group of 18 may seem an odd assortment. It has been derided as nothing more than a trans-Pacific talking shop. ‘Just look at its rag-bag of members; what, apart from a Pacific shoreline, do they have in common?’ it has been asked. The response by The Economist (12 November 1994) has been to suggest that such barbs are a little unfair since ‘any round-table talking, of which APEC does plenty, must surely help bind the region together, a region that has [had] more than its share of upheavals and hostilities in the recent past. For smaller Asia countries, APEC is a welcome way of sustaining an American presence on their side of the Pacific as a counterbalance to the power of Japan and China. And any kind of forum in which China, Taiwan and Hong Kong sit at the same table is better than none at all.’ (El-Agraa, 1995, p. 5) Apart from the merits which accrue from the availability of a Pacific-wide talking shop, other countervailing considerations come to mind. First, the APEC forum may yet advance, becoming an organisationally stronger, an institutionally deeper and a globally more powerful regime in accordance with what has been described as ‘Apec’s step-by-step development’ (Corbet, 2 December 1996; see also El-Agraa, 1995; and Buckley, 1993). Second, the Asia Pacific region is clearly not immune to the formation of regional regimes. It has, after all, spawned at least one already successful and still advancing regional regime, ASEAN, which although far more geopolitically confined than APEC, nonetheless, (a) is culturally, politically and economically highly diverse (see Dixon, 1991; Bajunid, 1994); (b) has during the 1990s expanded by including Vietnam and then Myanmar (Burma) and Laos, and most recently (in April 1999) Cambodia; and (c) has signalled that it is (or certain of its political leaders are) seeking to be much more geopolitically, culturally, politically and culturally encompassing by at some point embracing, among other countries, Japan. While ‘ASEAN states may well be reluctant to participate in a regional organisation with sole Japanese leadership’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 274), nevertheless, as Nakamura has noted, in October 1993 ASEAN still invited Japan (along with China and several other East Asian countries) to be founder members of the EAEC (see also El-Agraa, 1995; and Yohei Kono, 1995). Whatever the eventual outcome of this initiative, there are already clear signs of Japan showing a reciprocal interest in firming up – as distinct from, but perhaps as a prelude to, actually organising within a regional regime – not only its economic but also its political-cum-security relations with ASEAN.

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As reported by William Dawkins in January 1997: Mr Ryutaro Hashimoto, the Japanese prime minister, leaves for Brunei today on the first leg of a five-nation Asian tour [ . . . ] intended to reinforce Japan’s ties in a region with which trade and investment are [still] growing fast and which shares Tokyo’s concerns about China’s territorial and economic ambitions. The Japanese leader plans to spell out [ . . . ] a ‘Hashimoto doctrine’ of Tokyo’s policies in the region in a speech on January 14. He will propose annual summits between Japan and the seven members of the Association of south-east Asian Nations (Asean) [ . . . ]. All Asean members apart from the Philippines and Thailand are included on the tour [Mr Hashimoto having visited the Philippines and Thailand during 1996 (see Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997)]. ‘The Asean countries, positioned at the core of the Asia-Pacific region, have joined hands with Japan in the past. I would like to deepen that relationship,’ he [has] said. This is part of a general increase in Japanese interest in south-east Asia, a source of new political allies to complement the relationship with the US, the traditional core of Japanese foreign policy, which has come under occasional strain in recent years. The visit reflects the region’s growing economic importance. Asean accounted for 16 per cent of Japanese trade last year, and supplies 10 per cent of its oil and 80 per cent of its natural gas. (Dawkins, 7 January 1997) In his Singapore speech on 14 January 1997, as anticipated, Ryutaro Hashimoto did call ‘for closer contacts between Japan and the [then] seven members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean), through regular summits, and increased private sector business contacts – the main point [ . . . ] of a “Hashimoto doctrine” for the region’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). Hashimoto praised ASEAN, claiming that ‘“Asean holds a unique position [ . . . ] as a successful model, achieving both stability and political growth”’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). Here, Dawkins claims, Hashimoto is ‘reflecting the growing assertion among Japanese politicians and bureaucrats of an Asian model of capitalism, composed of a flexible mixture of market forces and government intervention’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). However, here, there is an allusion not just to the ‘statist approach’ to ‘East Asian development’, as outlined and ‘evaluated’ by So and Chiu (1995, Chapter 1),35 but also to the evolution of a culturally distinctive (East) Asian economic and political regional regime model, a model displaying fundamental differences in comparison with Western models, such as that represented by the Europe Union, this purportedly being less ‘statist’. There is evidence that the East Asian regional regime would be culturally distinctive, but not only in that it would adopt a more ‘statist approach’ to economic development, something which in any case might increasingly come up against the difficulty of accommodating the process of globalisation

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in favour of a global ‘liberal trading order’ (Axford, 1995, p. 187), or ‘open world trading order’ (ibid., p. 188): a ‘liberalized’ (ibid., p. 182), non-protectionist, ‘open door’ market-capitalist system vis-à-vis ‘world trade’, as promoted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and now by the World Trade Organisation (ibid., p. 182).36 It could be culturally distinct also in the way its businesses and business activities would be managed; or, that is, in its style of ‘corporate governance’. This assumption is lent support by the findings of a research project, based on interviews with around 400 ‘senior executives across Asia, the US and Europe’, reported in the Financial Times in January 1997 (Summers, 17 January 1997). That is, ‘sharp differences’ exist in ‘east-west management styles and business practices’. According to the report, the ‘management style’ in the West ‘is more open, direct and confrontational’; ‘is more flexible and creative’; ‘encourages empowerment of line workers’; ‘favours databasees and resits intuition’; ‘is more productivity-oriented than peopleoriented’; ‘is characterised more by individual initiative than by group consensus’; and ‘puts greater importance on short-term profits’. In contrast, the Eastern style ‘puts greater value on seniority, relationships and family ties’; ‘is likely to be paternalistic’; ‘supports life-time employment and opposes hire-and-fire’;37 ‘places more emphasis on corporate loyalty’; ‘is more resistant to women assuming positions’; and ‘is more likely to stress quantity rather than quality’ (Summers, 17 January 1997). The interviews also revealed significant differences on the issue of the ‘importance of connections’, with the Western ‘senior executives’ placing less emphasis than their Eastern counterparts on ‘bribes’, ‘gifts or favours’, ‘family’, ‘alumini contacts’ and ‘government connections’. The last West–East difference, of course, sits well with the way the ‘statist approach’ to economic development is (following So and Chiu) more readily adopted in East Asia than in the West. This aside, what also binds ‘Japan and its Asean neighbours’, Hashimoto has argued, is the way they are ‘faced [with] similar challenges, in managing economic reforms and becoming more open to international market forces’, a point which, Dawkins suggests is ‘underlined by the recent slide in Japanese share prices’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). The international market forces to which Hashimoto draws attention here are those which symbolise the process of globalisation in favour of the universal reach of market-capitalism, of market-capitalist competition, demands and pressures, and so of market-capitalism’s distinctively inherent challenges and problems. Hashimoto argues: ‘Both sides would benefit from “sharing each other’s pains if necessary, to help solve each other’s problems”’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). For Hashimoto, there are benefits to be gained from adopting a common, co-operative and cohesive regional (not to say realist) strategy within the globalised system of market-capitalism, the prevailing global distribution of (economic, political, military) power, and the associated configuration of global players. More specifically and concretely, Hashimoto

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‘outlined a number of areas where co-operation between Japan and Asean would bring benefits to all sides, including representing Asian interests in bodies such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (Apec) forum’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997). Within the East Asian region itself, Hashimoto suggested, Japan and its ‘Asian neighbours [could] help China become a “constructive partner” by encouraging its economic reform and boosting dialogue with the Beijing leadership’ (Dawkins, 15 January 1997), thereby furthering not only the globalisation process, but also presumably the ascendancy of China as a global (economic, political, military) player, and connectedly perhaps its appeal as a future member of a pan-East Asian regional regime. Certainly, China itself is aware of its ascendancy, as reflected in its growing regional and global assertiveness, while appreciating how nonetheless there are still benefits to be gained for the purpose of pursuing its realist approach to international relations and the global system from regional alliances, co-operation and cohesion. Reporting on the December 1996 visit of the Chinese prime minister, Li Peng, to Moscow, Tony Walker tells us: China and Russia will stand firm against US domination and strengthen economic ties to bolster their political relationship, the People’s Daily said in a commentary [on 29 December 1996], hailing the visit to Moscow last week by [ . . . ] Li Peng, [adding that the] leaders of the two countries had ‘made it clear that they do not favour a world dominated by one power’. Beijing [has, in effect, sent] a warning to Washington not to take the warming of US–China relations for granted. ‘Both Russia and China well deserve to be two important and independent poles in a multipolar world,’ said the commentary, which reflected continuing Chinese concern about US willingness to assert itself in such areas as trade, arms proliferation and human rights [ . . . ]. The two countries [China and Russia] are seeking to extend co-operation in military and industrial spheres [including] in large-scale projects in energy, machine building, aviation, transport, agriculture and military technology. (Walker, 30 December 1996) Interpreting these bilateral (Sino-Russian) developments, ambitions and assertions as an expression or extension of, what is labelled, ‘the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue’, to which other countries including Japan (see Kono, 1995, p. 16)38 belong and which may be the foundation of an organised regional regime, would be highly speculative. However, there is no doubt about how in recent years China (in it own right) has rapidly risen as a regional and global player – with the prospect for some of China emerging as a ‘new hegemonic power’ (Axford, 1995, p. 185) within the new world order (see Huntington, 1993) – a development which has been mentioned

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as a major factor in accounting for Ryutaro Hashimoto’s ‘doctrine’. In anticipation of Hashimoto’s speech, William Dawkins and James Kynge explain that Japan’s ‘more active [involvement in the] development of regional links’ is a response to ‘[c]hanging balances of power in Asia’ (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997): Mr Ryutaro Hashimoto [ . . . ] will be seeking to build relationships on a grander than usual scale in Singapore today, when he is due to deliver a speech outlining a ‘Hashimoto doctrine’ [ . . . ] the main part of [which] is a call for regular summits with the most important regional group in Asia, the seven members of [ASEAN], to discuss security, trade, investment and official aid for other countries [ . . . ]. Mr Hashimoto wants to build solidarity with his neighbours – many of whom harbour painful wartime memories of their island neighbour – in response to several changes in the regional balance of power [to a large extent centred on that entailing] the growing power of China. Mr Hashimoto’s proposal for an Asean[–Japan] summit aims to counterbalance that power. At the same time, Tokyo is eager not to be seen to gang up on China, a sentiment even more keenly felt by its smaller Asian neighbours [ . . . ]. Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s prime minister, [told Mr Hashimoto that an] answer to the summit proposal should come from the Asean group, rather than from individual governments [ . . . ]. Indonesia’s President Suharto promised to raise the idea at Asean’s [own] December summit. It is no surprise that Asean members wish to take cover in their group when dealing with an enigmatic giant such as China. So Mr Hashimoto’s overtures have certainly not been rejected. Indeed, foreign policy experts in Tokyo are certain that Japan–Asean summits will become a reality. If so, Japan will have taken a significant step out of its post-war shell. (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997)39 Japan is already engaged in a security dialogue with ASEAN through what Dawkins and Kynge refer to as ‘Asia’s main security body, the Asean Regional Forum’, or ARF, which ‘brings together foreign ministers from 20 countries including China, Russia and the US, plus the European Union’ (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997). But, herein lies an important motive underlying Hashimoto’s ‘doctrine’ in relation to security issues: ‘newly confident Japan carries less influence in [ARF] than it would in a Tokyo–Asean summit (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997).40 While for Dawkins and Kynge, ARF is Asia’s main security body, according to the aforementioned Guardian editorial (2 December 1996), ARF also provides an alternative to the weakly organised APEC within the Asia Pacific region as a multilateral mechanism for addressing issues which will affect the future shape of post-Cold War NWO. The ASEAN Regional Forum has been outlined as follows:

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The confidence which Asian countries are acquiring in the economic sphere is beginning to spill over into the political sphere also. The ASEAN countries set up the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) in 1994, for the discussion of regional security issues. Although a regional forum, participants [include] not only [other] Asian countries but also the EU, the United States and Russia. (European Commission, April 1996b) Here, in its interpretation of ARF, the European Commission seems to be echoing the view of Dawkins and Kynge (14 January 1997) about the motive behind Ryutaro Hashimoto’s ‘doctrine’ in relation to security issues. For Dawkins and Kynge, ‘newly confident Japan carries less influence in’ ARF ‘than it would in a Tokyo–Asean summit’ (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997). Just as (guided by the European Commission) ARF represents a spillover from the economic sphere into the political sphere in the wake of ASEAN’s economic surge, so (following Dawkins and Kynge) Japan’s invitation to ASEAN to engage in an exclusive (extra-ARF) Japan–ASEAN security dialogue similarly represents a spill-over from the economic sphere, in the train of Japan’s economic achievements – whereby Japan has become an ‘economic giant’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 226), or ‘has transformed itself into a financial and technological super-power’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 3)41 – into the political sphere. Japan has arrived at the point where it now ‘seek[s] to translate its new wealth into political gains’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 15), into commensurate political influence. As reported by Dawkins and Kynge, among ‘the several changes in the [East Asia] regional balance of power’, the ‘first change’ is rooted in Ryutaro Hashimoto’s ‘own government. Japan is ready to be more explicit about the influence it wishes to wield in Asia. “The time has come for Japan to spread its own values,” said Mr Hashimoto, just before starting his [ASEAN] tour’ on 7 January 1997. While Axford claims that ‘both Japan and the European Union are still only economic players on the world stage [being] barely competent actors in the geopolitics of their respective regions (Joffe, 1993; Funabashi, 1994)’ (Axford, 1995, p. 185), Japan seems to have signalled its intention to bridge the gap by becoming a competent political player in its region(s), and perhaps beyond, and to find a mechanism to enable it to facilitate this transition. Another way of representing the similarities between ASEAN’s development as ARF and the subsequent move by Japan to supplement, if not supersede, ARF through a collaborative Japan–ASEAN security arrangement is to regard each as reflecting both ASEAN’s and Japan’s relative political weakness and insecurity – relative not only to each of these regional and global player’s economic strength and prospects, but also to other players’ political presence and progress, reflections as these things are of certain salient late twentieth-century (and especially post-Cold War) alterations in the overall distribution of political-cum-military (linked to economic) global power.

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Dawkins and Kynge argue in a realist fashion – according to which ‘the rationale of states is to compete with each other’ (Axford, 1995, p. 183) within regional and global distributions of power – that the Hashimoto doctrine of seeking to build regional links on a grander scale than usual, in particular with ASEAN, is a response to the changing balance of power in Asia, which to a large extent is centred on ‘the growing power of China’, but which has been affected also by ‘a rapprochement between the US and China’ (Dawkins and Kynge, 14 January 1997). This latter event, moreover, has occurred alongside ‘recent strains in the US–Japan security alliance’ (ibid.). Dawkins and Kynge argue that it is these factors ‘which invite the question of whether a wider, multilateral, Asian security alliance is needed to compensate. The times when Japan could take “peace and prosperity for granted [ . . . ] under the US wing have already passed,” said Mr Hashimoto’ (ibid.). Here, however, one possibility is that any strains in the US–Japan security alliance along with any decline in the United States’ security umbrella under which Japan’s post-Second World War peace and prosperity have been ensured and enjoyed may be taken as a symptom not so much of a change just in the particular bilateral relationship directly involved – that between the United States and Japan – but more of an alteration, or more to the point of a diminution, in the USA’s general global presence and power, especially since the culmination of the Cold War: For many observers America’s leadership of the Gulf War [in January– February 1991] presaged a new period of multilateral engagement with the world’s problems under a benign hegemony. But a more cautious interpretation now counsels that the United States has neither the capacity nor the will to play the world’s policeman. More radical interpretations like that of Immanuel Wallerstein paint a starker picture of hegemonic decline in which recent events, like the making of the Gulf War coalition42 [ . . . ], are the final throes of a decaying hegemonic order and not evidence of its continued vitality. The strength of the NWO can be gauged by looking at the question of American hegemony and at the institution of multilateralism on which the legitimacy of any NWO so much depends. (Axford, 1995, p. 183)43 Immanuel Wallerstein’s analysis and prognosis of the post-Cold War NWO under the impact of, in particular, what he sees as the USA’s hegemonic decline, while referred to by Axford as a radical interpretation, has been presented by John Peterson under the banner of ‘reformism’ (Peterson, 1996, pp. 201–4): Many reformists take an extremely pessimistic view of the chances for ‘stable peace’ based on liberal values and Western leadership: ‘We have

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now entered into the post-American era, but also the post-liberal era. This promises to become a time of great world disorder, greater probably than the world disorder between 1914 and 1945’ [Wallerstein, 1993, p. 4]. (Peterson, 1996, p. 202) My inclination, as previously indicated, is to categorise Wallerstein’s worldsystem theory perspective on international relations and the global system alongside Giddens’ as, if anything, ‘realist’ (see Giddens, 1991, pp. 65–78). But, it has been labelled ‘neo-realist’ (see Peterson, 1996, pp. 197–8), and as such has been attacked because its assumptions mean that ‘whole sectors of international reality become marginalized, such as the considerable amount of cooperation, the importance of common conventions for sustaining international systems, and the links between domestic disorder and efforts of institutionalizing international interactions’ (Kratchowil, 1993, p. 64 – quoted in Peterson, 1996, p. 197). Peterson argues that ‘[n]eorealists are right to insist that intense economic competition between sovereign nation-states will continue to be a central characteristic of the international system. Strengthened international institutions cannot eliminate the “anarchy” of a system which lacks an overarching political authority’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 198). Nonetheless, the ‘primary weakness of neorealism [lies in the way] that it cannot accommodate changing notions of security which give [sovereign nation-states] stronger incentives to pool efforts and resources within international organizations’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 198). Peterson recommends that ‘neorealists must draw upon the insights of other schools of thought ([Buzan et al., 1993, p. 20])’, and in ‘particular, the assumptions of institutionalism’, because institutionalists ‘expect [that] new institutions [can] be] formed by states on the basis of changing interests’, and so can ‘adapt and [ . . . ] persist’ (Keohane, 1993, p. 297 – quoted in Peterson, 1996, p. 198). Institutionalists ‘prescribe’, as well as predict, ‘“responsibility-sharing” through strengthened international institutions, especially because the US can no longer provide “hegemonic stablity”. Even those theorists who insist that “in realist terms the United States will remain the world’s largest power well into the next century” submit that’, nonetheless, ‘Washington “will have to combine traditional power and liberal institutionalist approaches if it is to effectively pursue its national interest” ([Nye, 1992, pp. 95–6; see also Huntington, 1992])’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 199). As I see it, institutionalists have a good deal in common with what Peterson distinguishes as ‘reformists’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 201). I acknowledge, like Peterson, that ‘reformists have much in common with neorealists in their criticisms of international organizations (see [Gallarotti, 1991])’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 201), in that for neo-realists ‘intense competition between sovereign nation-states’ vies and conflicts with (is unlikely to be eliminated by but, instead, is likely to undermine) attempts to ‘[s]trengthen international

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institutions’ within a global ‘system which lacks an overarching political authority’, and where (not unconnectedly) ‘many international organizations are poorly run’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 197). But, ‘reformists depart from neorealists in insisting that [nevertheless] international organizations can be the only guarantors of global security’, and indeed in being ‘hopeful’, or optimistic, ‘that international institutions [will become stronger in the face of] outdated notions of national sovereignty which leads [nation-states] to compete with each other for power and scarce resources’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 202). Reformists and institutionalists, it would seem, anticipate the advance of international organisations as the most likely outcome of the way nation-states will attempt (in a realist manner) to deal with the universal problem of achieving ‘a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p. 17 – quoted in Peterson, 1996, p. 202). Reformists are institutionalist who, at the same time, are explicit and forthright about wishing ‘to see the dissolution of [nation-]states’, at least ‘in the long term’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 201). But Peterson adds critically that institutionalists ‘remain vulnerable to the charge that competing institutional agendas will undermine responsibilitysharing’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 199). In support of this reproval, Peterson mentions the institutionalist view held by Weiss et al., that ‘in Europe, UN diplomacy could well be combined with the use of NATO forces under a UN flag in regional disputes’ (Weiss et al., 1994, p. 39 – quoted in Peterson, 1996, p. 199). Peterson cites ‘the problem in Bosnia’ as evidence of the overoptimism of institutionalists to see ‘international cooperation’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 199) as an approach to problem solving, alluding to the lack of co-operation and even disarray in this particular case not only between the UN Nations and NATO, but also among the UN, NATO and the EU (Peterson, 1996, pp. 199–200). Here, however, Peterson’s example in support of his criticism of institutionalism entails the competing institutional agendas of international organisations – or, following Barrie Axford, of ‘multilateral institutions’ (Axford, 1995, pp. 180–90) – at different (and so perhaps inherently competitive) levels of international relations: on different planes within the global system, the UN being a global organisation, NATO being a sectoral or functional body; and the EU being a regional regime. Peterson does acknowledge the (theoretical) issue and (practical) problem of the lack of co-operation – the competition and to some extent conflict – between international organisations on the same plane of the global system, and in particular on the regional plane. He refers to such ‘regional trade arrangements as the EU or NAFTA’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 200), as well as ‘APEC or FTAA’ (ibid., p. 201), the latter being the ‘Clinton administration’s initiative for a Free Trade Area of the Americas [ . . . ] in 1994–5’ which ‘sought to link NAFTA with Mercosur, a customs union agreed between Brazil, Argen-

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tina, Paraguay and Uruguay’ (ibid., p. 188). Peterson tells us that ‘liberals remain suspicious of intitiatives such as [these] on the grounds that they may add to trade discrimination instead of eliminating it, as another GATT round would do ([Bhagwati, 1995]). They rightly view the WTO as a fragile institution’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 201). Peterson explains: As political structures are adjusted to reflect increasing economic interdependence, the emergence of protectionist or even mercantialist trade blocs could become a defining feature of the international order. Changing notions of security and stiffer competition have created new incentives for states which share the same agendas in global trade to form sub-groups which allow them to pursue their collective interests [ . . . ]. However, the danger is that like-minded blocs of states will take actions that erode global free trade [and so undermine] the development of the WTO when [it] is till in its infancy. (Peterson, 1996, p. 186) But here, it is not now nation-states which through realist strategies, competition and conflict are limiting and undermining international organisations. Instead, it is international trade organisations at the regional level that are threatening the activities and advance of an international trade organisation at the global level, specifically the WTO. Peterson’s argument, it seems to me, provides tacit support to my modified-realist (or neo-realist – still my preferred label) perspective on international relations and the global system, according to which nation-states and nation-state sovereignty are giving way to regional regimes that, nonetheless, continue to interact as global players in a ‘realist’ (self-interested, self-seeking, competitive and conflictual) fashion within the NWO distribution of global (economic political, military) power. At the same time, Peterson’s argument brings us back to Axford’s argument that ‘the strength of the NWO can be gauged by looking at the question of American hegemony and at the institution of multilateralism on which the legitimacy of any NWO so much depends’ (Axford, 1995, p. 183). Axford is touching on what he identifies as the ‘related elements’ of the ‘putative new world order (NWO)’ (ibid., p. 182). These distinguishing elements include ‘the voluntary withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its “historical” world role’, as a result of which ‘the United States [is] the only real superpower’ (ibid., p. 182). The elements of the supposed NWO ‘also have a geo-economic dimensions’, with pax Americana ‘carrying market liberalism to former state-socialist economies through multilateral institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development]. Overall the flow of world trade would continue to be liberalized through GATT [the

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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and since 1994 through the World Trade Organisation (WTO)] and through the growing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world economy’ (ibid., p. 182); or, that is, through an enhanced, post-Cold War, globalisation process centred on the universal pervasion of market-capitalism. Globalised market-capitalism along with ‘lasting peace and prosperity in the NWO’ was meant to be facilitated by multilateral institutions – through multilateralism – including by, above all, a ‘revitalized [ . . . ] United Nations’ (ibid., p. 182) for overseeing ‘the world community’ (ibid., p. 182). According to John Ruggie (1993), the United States has maintained a ‘commitment to multilateralism through the post-war years (Ruggie, 1993, p. 567)’ (Axford, 1995, p. 186).44 But, Axford argues, the advent of the NWO has brought ‘a significant difference’ (Axford, 1995, p. 186): ‘As the only real superpower the United States is now much more reluctant to police the world [ . . . ]. In its more cautious approach to the governance of global order, recourse to multilateralist structures has assumed a growing importance both in security matters and in economic cooperation (Boutros-Ghali, 1993)’ (Axford, 1995, pp. 186–7). Guided by John Ruggie, Axford explains: Multilateralism entails the ‘coordination of the behaviour of states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct’ (Ruggie, 1992, p. 562). Norms governing behaviour may be codified in different domains of interstate relations [ . . . ], but they may also display a more ‘diffuse reciprocity’ which is not codified in any way. Principles of conduct include norms whereby trading regimes establish reciprocity in traded goods, or in which security regimes uphold non-aggression pacts. In the years since 1945, the range and diversity of multilateral institutions have increased markedly (Ruggie, 1992, p. 584), a phenomenon associated with [ . . . ] the influence of the dominant American world view. (Axford, 1995, p. 187) Among the multilateral institutions that represent the post-Second World War ‘multilateralist agenda’ of the United States are ‘the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the various institutions of Western European integration – the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Authority (EURATOM) and [ . . . ] the European Union’ (Axford, 1995, p. 187). On the global plane, they include multilateral ‘bodies like the GATT, the IMF and the World Bank’, which have pursued ‘the ideals of a liberal trading order and [ . . . ] the supraterritorial governance of global financial flows’ (Axford, 1995, p. 187). While GATT among other global bodies is engaged in supraterritorial governance, what Axford regards as ‘advanced multilateralism’ (Axford, 1995, p. 188) is exhibited especially by one particular regional body or regime, namely the European Union (Axford, 1995, p. 187): ‘Usually the European

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Union is held up as the most developed attempt to create a Gemeinschaft by using Gesellschaft methods and to craft a civil society beyond the nationstate’ (Axford, 1995, p. 188). Likewise for me, the EU is an advanced case and model of multilateralism, but so much so that it exemplifies something further than mere multilateralism. The EU is a multilateral regime, but because it qualifies also as a crafted society beyond and above its Member States (and so the nation-state), it also counts as a ‘supranational’ regime (Axford, 1995, p. 189), and more precisely as a supranational regional regime. Axford asserts that ‘the search for peace, freedom and justice in the new world order relies heavily on multilateralist solutions to local and global conflicts and problems’ (Axford, 1995, p. 188). Such global multilateral regimes as the United Nations (ibid., p. 182) that play a part in formulating and enforcing ‘international law’ (ibid., p. 188), aided by the International Court of Justice located in the Hague, and GATT (among other global ‘economic institutions’ (ibid., p. 188)), have come to play various parts in the overall framework and process of ‘[g]lobal governance’ (ibid., p. 188). Moreover, they play these parts by, for instance, ‘making the concept of human rights subject to non-state jurisdication’ (ibid., p. 188), the result being that multilateral institutions have ‘modified the sovereignty [or, that is, the] decisional autonomy of [nation-]states’ (ibid., p. 188). Herein lie grounds for referring to my approach to the study of international relations as modified realism. In spite of these developments, however, Axford suggests that there are ‘limitations’ on the search for multilateralist solutions to local and global problems and conflicts in the new world order (ibid., p. 188). Axford explains that while, on the one hand, the ‘problems [involved are] not capable of solution by national governments’, on the other hand, ‘they are hardly on the agenda of multinational and supranational bodies’ (ibid., p. 189). Axford does not elaborate on what he has in mind here. But the gist of his point seems clear, being consistent with the realist approach to the analysis and practice of international relations. According to this, the ‘international system [is] structured by the realist strategies of nation-states [among other global players] in shifting and unstable alliances’ (ibid., p. 181). For me, Axford’s view is essentially tenable. For me, in so far as nation-states (or those within them who exercise governance over them) are searching for solutions to ‘problems’ which they are incapable of solving themselves, they will tend to turn to multilateralism – to multilateral (or ‘multinational’) solutions and organisations, actions and interactions. But then, in so far as mere multilateralism fails to bring the solutions sought, nation-states will proceed to a more ‘advanced’ strategy. They are likely to resort to supranational arrangements. They will be prepared to relinquish sovereignty to regimes, institutions and decisionmaking procedures which stand over and above themselves, their own (nation-state) institutions, and their domestic decision-making procedures.

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Nation-states will predictably do this because of their tendency to adopt a realist (competitive, self-interested, achievement-oriented, power-seeking) approach towards international relations and alliances, the global system, and global processes and developments. Nation-states are increasingly prepared to pay the price of relinquishing their sovereignty to regional regimes, proto-SRRs and SRRs in exchange for the gains to be had in solving the ‘problems’ – that is, their own perceived economic, political, security and other ‘problems’ – within the new world order. The realist strategy assumed by both nation-states and regional regimes will not, however, guarantee that local and global problems and conflicts in the new world order (as Axford puts it) will be solved, or for that matter eased. Problems and conflicts are likely to persist. Nation-states and regional regimes will still face problems and conflicts precisely because of their continuing, common inclination to adopt a realist strategy towards these things, and moreover to do so within a highly unequal distribution of global power, with its associated hierarchical configuration of geo-political players. One possibility is that local, regional and global problems and conflicts will persist in so far as specifically global multilateral regimes remain relatively weak compared with nation-states and regional regimes, acting and interacting as these entities do in a realist, competitive and to some extent conflictual manner. The particular neo-realist perspective I have in mind allows for the possibility of nation-states and regional regimes keeping global regimes weak, while nonetheless occasionally and increasingly turning to this latter (higher level) type of organisation and governance for solutions to (their) problems and conflicts. The long-term outcome will be supranational global regimes (SGRs), such as an institutionally deeper UN, a stronger WTO, and so on. The realist analysis of multilateralism and supranationalism on which I am drawing can be read into the following: No important new initiatives can be expected from the World Trade Organisation in the near future towards the liberalisation of trade, a top former US trade official [has] warned [ . . . ]. Neither the European Union nor the US is prepared to play the sort of leadership role needed to give the global body greater momentum, Mr Jeffrey Garten, the former US under-secretary for commerce, told top government leaders and industrialists meeting at the European Forum in Berlin. Instead, regional trade groups such as Apec, Mercosur [the ‘international organisation formed’ in ‘1991 to establish a South American common market by the end of 1994’, when its ‘members’ were ‘Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay’ (Dresner, 1994, p. 362)] and Nafta, as well as the EU, are likely to become relatively stronger over the coming decade, he said. (Peel, 25 November 1996)

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The omission of ASEAN from the list of ‘regional trade groups’ that ‘are likely to become relatively stronger over the coming decade’ is notable, ASEAN being already a relatively strong organisation. The members of ASEAN are acting individually, collectively and co-operatively in a manner consistent with the practical and theoretical approach to international relations and global system patterns and processes which I have distinguished as modified realism, or neo-realism, and which lends itself to the clear prospect of this particular organisation growing steadily stronger (in a manner consistent with the neo-functionalist approach to the evolution of the EU). ASEAN is interacting with other geo-political entities and political bodies in accordance with the realist perspective I have in mind, hence the details of the relationships between ASEAN, on the one hand, and the EU and Japan, for example, on the other. We can recall that for So and Chiu, Japan’s pre-Second World War regionalisation strategy can be best understood in terms of the ‘new methodology and innovative concepts’ of ‘world-systems analysis’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 4). So and Chiu tell us that ‘world-systems analysis, in its mature version [ . . . ] has formulated [such] innovative concepts [ . . . ] as [ . . . ] semiperiphery [and] regionalization [ . . . ] to examine the changing development in the world economy’ (ibid., p. 26); and they propose that, given these concepts, ‘world-systems analysis’ can be used ‘to explain the unique pattern of East Asian development over the past [couple of] centuries’ (ibid., p. 28), including ‘the efforts of Japan in trying to construct an East Asian empire in the early 20th century’ by way of its ‘regionalization project’ (ibid., p. 29). So and Chiu explain that in ‘world-systems analysis, a region of the world economy’ is: a zone of multiple states, which, although fully integrated into the world economy, also manifests a high degree of integration of production processes within its [boundaries], and thus approaches being a single fairly large state. For Wallerstein (1991, p. 6), regionality is a means through which a semiperipheral state establishes a niche for itself in the world economy. (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 84) So and Chiu argue that Japan’s attempt during the 1930s and 1940s to impose a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere on East Asia through imperialism, colonialism, invasion and war (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 105) represents a case of regionalisation in the sense covered by world-systems theory. It can be accounted for in terms of world-systems theory: as an attempt by Japan as a semi-peripheral nation-state (So and Chiu, 1995, pp. 29, 78, 83–5, 99–102) at competitive regionalisation in response to – with the objective of emulating – the empires, power and other associated achievements of the ‘Western core states’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 84) within the world system.

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World-systems analysis can be criticised on a number of grounds (see Giddens, 1991), but all I will point out for present purposes is that while Japan can be regarded as having been a semi-peripheral nation-state before the Second World War, it is difficult to treat it as such at the end of the twentieth century. The difficulty for world-systems analysis is then accounting for the way Japan, like a number of other post-Second World War core nation-states – such as (West) Germany, eventually the UK and most recently the USA – has been showing increasing signs of turning to ‘regionalization’, including through its relations with ASEAN.

Flows, floods and fortresses In 1998 Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JMFA) opened its Diplomatic Bluebook with the following – among other – points: With the collapse of the Cold War structure [ . . . ], the critical task engaging the international community in the 1990s has been the construction of a new and stable international order [ . . . ]. [The] post-Cold War world brought [ . . . ] the frequent outbreak of regional conflicts – previously suppressed by the Cold War structure – based on ethnic, religious and other grounds [ . . . ]. However, through the multi-tiered development of cooperative relations on a bilateral, intraregional, interregional and global scale, the members of the international community continue to move forward toward the construction of a stable international order. (JMFA, 1998, pp. 3–4) This view of how the NWO is evolving may be somewhat optimistic, but that in itself is no reason to reject it. For the JMFA, ‘the world is entering into a new phase in the construction of a new order’, there being evidence in ‘the Asia-Pacific region’, with its ‘four main players, namely Japan, the United States, China and Russia’ ( JMFA, 1998, p. 4). Thus, there has been the ‘further strengthening of the bilateral ties among’ these together with other Asia Pacific countries, and furthermore there have been notable moves towards greater intraregional co-operation. For instance, in 1997 there was ‘the decision to allow Russia and a few other countries to join the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and [also there has been] the expansion of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)’ (JMFA, 1998, pp. 4–5). The JMFA suggests: While the search for a new international order continues, two major tides have emerged in the international community today: deepening interdependence and accelerating globalization [ . . . ]. [Further] integration of the global economy will provide the international community

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with opportunities for increased prosperity, through such factors as the promotion of competition and the spread of technological innovations. Moreover, deepening economic interdependence through trade and investment will draw countries more strongly toward a stable international order [ . . . ]. On the other hand, the rapid progress of globalization in recent years has created a situation in which a problem arising in one country can spread more easily and more swiftly to other countries, the surrounding region and even across the globe. ( JMFA, 1998, p. 6) For the JMFA, globalisation presents a challenge to ‘the international community’ that has to be tackled ‘on a regional and global basis’: The most striking example of [the] new challenge was the economic crisis in Asia. The plunge of the Thai baht in July [1997] affected the currency and financial markets of the Republic of Korea, Indonesia and other Asian economies, forcing each government to undertake difficult economic management. The effects of this economic crisis were not confined to Asia; a wave of uncertainty swept across the globe, causing temporary drops in stock prices on major stock markets such as New York and London. The high level of economic growth achieved by the East Asian countries – once described as the ‘Asian miracle’ – was [in part] the product of an increasingly integrated world market which has facilitated free and vigorous trade and investment [ . . . ]. On the other hand, the instantaneous transmission of information and the integration of financial markets brought about by globalization [ . . . ] amplified the extent of the crisis [ . . . ]. [Increasingly,] economic confusion in [one] country or region will eventually arrive [elsewhere, due to] the economic interdependence among the countries of the world [ . . . ]. [Meeting the challenge of] globalization [means] creating international cooperative mechanisms to prevent [crisis] contagion [ . . . ]. ‘A New Framework for Enhanced Asian Regional Cooperation to Promote Financial Stability’ (The Manila Framework) is one such new mechanism. ( JMFA, 1998, pp. 6–7) Globalization brings with it de facto global and regional integration through economic interdependence, but problems and (the possibility of) crisis invite co-operative, and thereby de jure, integration at the same levels. Regional and global co-operative frameworks are a – or the – way of checking and managing globalisation, of ensuring damage limitation in response to and in anticipation of the (as far as the JMFA is concerned) unwanted effects of this otherwise welcome process. In the late 1990s, widespread concern and anxiety was expressed about ‘the instability of financial markets’ as highlighted by the ‘Asian crisis’, which ‘was disastrous for those countries directly involved – unemployment

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in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea rose from 5 million to 18 million between 1996 and 1998’ (Smith, 15 August 1999). Smith explains: The Asian crisis was an extreme example of the way in which bubbles in asset prices, volatile capital flows and unstable exchange rates all feed on one another. At one moment a flood of foreign capital was helping drive up share and property prices and putting upward pressure on exchange rates; the next moment, investors were panicking, the bubble burst and the outflow of capital led to plummeting exchange rates. (Smith, 15 August 1999) Smith points out that ‘the West seems to have got through relatively unscathed’ (Smith, 15 August 1999). But, this does not mean that the West has not been affected nor that it is not at risk of being engulfed in a global crisis rooted, like the Asia crisis, in the ‘instability of financial markets and exchange rates’ (Smith, 15 August 1999). Therefore: The international financial system is due for a overhaul. The last time this was done was in 1944, when the Bretton Woods Agreement set up the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as part of an international regime [ . . . ]. It is time for a new Bretton Woods that will take into account the way in which the world has changed [ . . . ]. The liberalisation of capital markets and the growth of international financial markets led to the break-up of the Bretton Woods system of ‘fixed’ exchange rates [ . . . ]. It is neither practical nor desirable to return to such a system. The nearest alternative for countries whose economies are highly integrated and convergent is complete currency union, as in the Emu. [But,] there cannot be one all-embracing system. There are just too many countries and currencies involved. There must be a two-tier approach, with regional arrangements of varying kinds, and global arrangements to manage the rates between such groupings and the leading currencies on which they are based. The starting point would be a ‘tripolar’ system of management for the euro (plus sterling), the dollar and the yen, with the IMF responsible for a global stablisation fund [ . . . ]. The evolution of a global and regional system [ . . . ] should be a key item on the agendas for a new Bretton Woods agreement. (Smith, 15 August 1999) Here, there are obvious allusions to the kind of hierarchical arrangement of supranational regional, supranational global and even supranational functional regimes (SRRs, SGRs and SFRs) I envisage, as well as to the factors, flows and forces which are conducive to this particular development. In a Guardian newspaper article at the end of 1997, John Ezard lists the ‘Top 20 international news stories of 1997, according to the Associated Press poll of its subscribers around the world. Ten points were awarded for every

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first-place vote down to one point for each 10th-place vote’ (Ezard, 23 December 1997). The first ten in the list (resulting from a survey of 119 media outlets in 43 countries by the news agency Associated Press) is as follows: 1. Princess Diana’s death – 908 points; 2. The Hong Kong handover from Britain to China – 529 points; 3. The Asian currency crisis – 527 points; 4. Mother Teresa’s death – 305 points; 5. Tony Blair’s election as Prime Minister – 290 points; 6. The attack on tourists in Luxor, Egypt – 280 points; 7. Den Xiaoping’s death – 275 points; 8. The Middle East peace process getting bogged down – 267 points; 9. The four-month hostage crisis at Japan embassy in Peru – 266 points; 10. Scottish scientists clone Dolly the sheep – 251 points Ezard argues: Three of the deepest human instincts – tenderness, fascination with celebrity and gut self-interest – dominated the world media’s sense of priority yesterday in choosing the biggest news stories of 1997. (Ezard, 23 December 1997) Be that as it may, three of the first five news stories as well as the tenth directly relate to Britain, and the third is about something which had major consequences for Britain, as it did for the rest of the world. Several of the stories in the top twenty are directly about Asian events, but the third in Ezard’s list concerns something of great global importance and theoretical significance. It had, and continued to have for many months, major effects (financial, economic, political, social) even in the most geographically distant locations; on most places and people in the world; and at all geo-political levels of the global system. The 1997 Asian currency crisis and its ramifications are, quite simply, sharply indicative of what has become known as globalisation, a forceful set of flows, processes and developments that cannot be ignored in the study and analysis of nation-states, co-operation among nation-states, regional regimes, global bodies, supranational organisations and the whole network of (often competitive, sometimes conflictual) relations which characterise the new world order global system. Barrie Axford explains: the term ‘globalization’ refers to those processes which are serving to ‘compress’ the world in David Harvey’s (1989) sense, and thus help fashion a single global space. The richness and diversity of various ‘transnational practices’ (Sklair, 1991), which are serving to broaden and deepen the extent of global interconnections between individuals or groups, are seen in many areas of life. [Or,] ‘globalization’ [ . . . ], following Robertson

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(1992), [means] the ‘processes by which the world is being made into a single place with systemic qualities’. (Axford, 1995, p. 5) There are many writers who have written about globalisation, the processes entailed, the sources (or ‘causes’), the consequences, the concurrent (perhaps interdependent) processes, and so on. Among these, as we have already seen, is the controversial Japanese scholar Kenichi Ohmae (1990, 1995; cf. Scott, 1997), for whom ‘the progressive globalization of markets for consumer goods’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 15) is a major feature of the ‘[i]nformationdriven [development of a] global economy’ (ibid., p. 16). According to Ohmae, ‘the basic fact of linkage to global flows of information is a – perhaps, the – central, distinguishing fact of our moment in history’ (ibid., p. 15). The global flow of information is one of four flows which define, distinguish and determine ‘today’s global economy’ (ibid., p. 2) and ‘today’s borderless world’ (ibid., p. 11). Ohmae argues that as ‘the 21st century approaches and as [ . . . ] the four “I’s” – industry, investment, individuals, and information – flow relatively unimpeded across national borders, the building-block concepts appropriate to a 19th-century, closed-country model of the world no longer hold’ (ibid., p. viii). The flow of the four forces of industry, investment, individuals and, most important, information has brought about a borderless world judged in terms of not just economic activity but also political activity and arrangements: The forces now at work have raised troubling questions about the relevance – and effectiveness – of nation states as meaningful aggregates in terms of which to think about, much less manage, economic activity. Once-powerful examples of such nation states have come apart at the seams [ . . . ]. And many of the core values supporting a world order based on discrete, independent nation-states [ . . . ] have shown themselves in serious need of [ . . . ] replacement. (Ohmae, 1995, p. viii) Or, that is: Taken together, the mobility of [the] four I’s makes it possible for viable economic units in any part of the world to pull in whatever [direction] is needed for development [ . . . ]. This makes the traditional ‘middleman’ function of nation-states – and their governments – largely unnecessary. Because the global markets for all the I’s work just fine on their own, nation states no longer have to play a market-making role [ . . . ]. If the unfettered movement of [the] four I’s makes the middleman role of nation states obsolete, the qualifications needed to sit at the global table and pull in global solutions begin to correspond not to the artificial political borders of countries, but to the more geographical units [such as the Kansai region in Japan] where real work gets done and real markets flourish.

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I call these units ‘region states’. They may lie entirely within or across the borders of a nation state [ . . . ]. What defines them is not the location of [any] political borders but the fact that they are [ . . . ] the true [ . . . ] business units in today’s global economy. Theirs are the borders – and the connections – that matter in borderless world. (Ohmae, 1995, pp. 4–5) Or: Put simply, in terms of the real flows of economic activity, nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless world. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 11) The pre-eminent example of a once-powerful nation-state which has ‘come apart at the seams’ due to the forces which distinguish, define and determine the global economy and the politically borderless world is the Soviet Union (Ohmae, 1995, p. viii). However, the USSR is by no means the only case. Europe seems especially rich with instances – perhaps ironically in that it was the birthplace of the (modern) nation-state as the continent emerged from the feudal era – from the Balkans to the former Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; from Spain to France (see Henley, 1 May 1999, 5 May 1999, 27 June 1999) to the Russian Federation. Ohmae claims that at a conference in 1990, he ‘predicted that the “global logic” unleashed by [the] forces [of globalisation] would lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. vii). Of course, the disintegration of the Soviet Empire followed by that of the USSR itself is among the leading – not to mention unexpected (except by a few, including it would seem Ohmae) – stories of the twentieth century. The collapse of the Soviet Union can be seen either as following or as an integral and inevitable phase – perhaps the concluding phase – of ‘the frigid Fifty Years’ War between Soviet-style communism and the West’s liberal democracy’, which has led ‘some observers – Francis Fukuyama, in particular – [to argue] that we have reached the “end of history”’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 1). For Ohmae, a – perhaps the – prominent, distinguishing feature of the post-Cold War NWO, under the all-pervasive impact of globalisation, is that of the decline of the nation-state (cf. Giddens, 1990, 1991): on the way to former U.S. President Bush’s so-called ‘new world order’ [ . . . ] the old world has fallen apart. Most visibily, with the ending of the Cold War, the long-familiar pattern of alliances and oppositions among industrialized nations has fractured beyond repair. Less visibly, but arguably far more important, the modern nation state itself – that artifact of the 18th and 19th centuries – has begun to crumble. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 7)

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Ohmae is somewhat ambiguous about whether the demolition of the nationstate is specific to the NWO, but is nonetheless clear that this process is an inevitable consequence of and is, in turn, a facilitating factor fostering further globalisation and, thereby, the creation of a borderless world, economically and politically. For Ohmae, this development – the decline of the nation-state as a result of the flows and forces associated with a global economy – has a further implication of considerable importance for the future evolution of the NWO, and within the latter for all global system players. This concerns ‘the assemblies of [nation] states (the United Nations, for example, and the European Union and the parties to the North American Free Trade [Agreement (NAFTA)])’ (ibid., p. vii), at which point it is apposite to recall Ohmae’s allimportant claim: in today’s more competitive world, nation states no longer possess the seemingly bottomless well or resources from which they used to draw with impunity to fund their ambitions. These days, even they have to look for assistance to the global economy and make the changes at home in order to invite it in. So these new claimants will turn to international bodies like the United Nations. But what is the UN if not a collection of nation states? So they will turn to multilateral agencies like the World Bank, but these too are the creatures of a nation state-defined and -funded universe. So they will turn to explicitly economic groupings like OPEC or G-7 or ASEAN or APEC or NAFTA or the EU (European Union). But once again, all they will find behind each new acronym is a grouping of nation states. (Ohmae, 1995, pp. 1–2) However, there is an alternative view. Ohmae may be guilty of seriously misjudging what can be found behind at least some of the new acronyms, including most obviously – but not necessarily exclusively, especially over the long term, as the NWO gradually takes shape – the EU. For me, the EU represents a social form which, on the one hand, reflects and reinforces the decline of the nation-state while, on the other hand, retaining some of the main (even defining) characteristics of the nationstate – characteristics which mean that the NWO will remain far from ‘borderless’. My view appears to receive support from Barrie Axford, writing in 1995 when ‘it was [ . . . ] not entirely fanciful to depict the completion of the internal market in Europe and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union as harbingers of a new, fully institutionalised regional polity, with some of the attributes and core functions of stateness transferred to a supra-national level’ (Axford, 1995, p. 4). Bordered and bounded, exclusive and protective, sovereign and supranational regional (not just trading blocs, but political and constitutional) regimes (SRRs), the forerunner of which is the EC, will inevitiably

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proliferate within the NWO in conjunction with the process(es) of globalisation. SRRs will grow in number, will tend to become more geo-politically extensive (will expand), and will become ever-deeper institutionally, constitutionally and legally: that is, they will become more and more supranational, to the point of displaying the geo-political characterisics of nation-states. Again, what I have in mind is alluded to by Axford: In the period since 1945, the globalization of the world economy has proceeded [quickly]. In critical areas of trade, production and finance, the world is not only more interconnected but also more interdependent, although not exclusively for ‘economic’ reasons. The globalization of financial markets and their often volatile effects on national economic management seem, on the face of it, to have produced an increasingly integrated but still curiously anarchic structure, in which both nationstates and the institutions of liberal multilateralism are threatened and where market forces and the realist ambitions of large corporations hold most sway. These tensions are seen most clearly in the pattern of interdependence as it has developed over the period, and they reflect a growing sense of vulnerability in conventional actors like nation-states. This growing vulnerability has two faces: that of adaption to global pressures and that of resistance. In fact both are at the root of one of the main features of the post-war [that is, the post-Second World War] global economy, namely the emergence of regional trading blocs within an integrating world economy. Potentially the most significant of these is the European Union (EU) after the completion of the single market, and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) [ . . . ]. It is now commonplace to include Japan and the Pacific Rim as the third of the great trading blocs which will dominate the world economy in the twenty-first century, but [ . . . ] the Pacific Rim is in fact still a proto-trading bloc. Proto-blocs, or groupings which have the potential to form blocs, can also be seen in other parts of the world, and their appearance [ . . . ] reflects the fragility of the liberal trading order [as] enshrined in the GATT [and now the WTO, for instance]. Both the European [Union with its] single [internal] market and NAFTA are essentially defensive responses to the threats and opportunities of globalization. [The] EU in its ‘relaunched’ version, after the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 represents [ . . . ] an optimistic adaption to the new challenges of globalized markets, designed to achieve important economies of scale. At the same time, it is also a defensive strategy, based on the recognition that the European economy was and is losing out to the more dynamic, expansionist and technologically efficient Japanese, and to the still massive economies of scale seen in the United States. NAFTA too was born of a sense of growing weakness on the part of the Americans and a loss of

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faith in the liberalizing power of multi-lateralist institutions like GATT [ . . . ]. Protectionism and the threat of trade wars between the ‘triad’ powers [ . . . ] forced the idea of an open world trading order on the defensive, and for the time being, there it remains. The general form of the global economy going into the twenty-first century is one in which powerful regional actors are jockying for position, and where both protectionism and defensive bilateralism seem on the increase. (Axford, 1995, pp. 120–2) Globalisation processes are playing a central part in encouraging the formation of not just offensive and competitive but also defensive and protectionist (powerful) regional actors – figuratively speaking, island fortresses among the global flows, tides, waves and constant threat of financial tsunami. Axford’s argument finds echoes in what Mark Eyskens and Karel Welens have to say: The world is getting smaller and increasingly interdependent every day. As a result, national and regional developments are as a matter of evidence seen in a global framework. [Nation-s]tates want to preserve their independence but they are confronted with a growing list of problems which they can only solve in co-operation with others. (Eyskens and Welens, 1997) Eyskens and Welens then proceed with an examination of about ‘50 leading organizations’, among which is ASEAN, but perhaps surprisingly not the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. Other Asian regional organisations, regimes or blocs omitted are the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), and the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) (or Area, EAEA), the latter, we can recall, having attracted the endorsement of Mahathir bin Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia. For me, the event which came third in the top twenty news stories of 1997 (AP poll), the ‘Asian currency crisis’, is the kind of event which – along with being symptomatic of globalisation – could act as a vital spur in favour of the long-term development and consolidation, expansion and deepening of organisations, regimes and blocs like SAARC, ASEAN and the EAEA. John Ezard tells us that the ‘currency crashes, affecting tens of millions – and potentially billions – of people [was only in third place] because they have not, so far, unhinged Japan’s economy or lived up to the fears of a repeat of the 1929 Wall Street crash’ (Ezard, 23 December 1997). In so far as not only Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand of ASEAN, but also South Korea and even Japan (both of which have been invited by Mahathir bin Mohamad to join the EAEA) have at least been shaken by the recent Asia crisis, then – just as Britain reluctantly accepted the realist reasons for joining the European supranational project, and was eventually accepted as a member; and the US decided to initiate NAFTA and has shown

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interest in (apart from APEC) a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – the further expansion of ASEAN, the creation of an Asian Union in north east Asia (see Nish, 1999) and the development of the EAEA all offer realistic possibilities for the twenty-first century. If so, there are profound implications for the rest of the global system. Contrary to Ohmae, I anticipate that by the end of the twenty-first century there will not be a borderless world, far from it. The NWO is likely to display a configuration of bounded, protective and aggressive ‘global system’ players in the form of SRRs, each of which will be vying for economic and political power (or hegemony). In East Asia there could be two SRRs, that is ASEAN plus one in north east Asia or, alternatively, there could be an all-inclusive East Asian organisation, perhaps known as the East Asian Economic Caucus, Area or Union. This East Asian SRR could stretch from eastern Russia through Mongolia and China to Irian Jaya, incorporating in its geographical middle and at its geo-political core a reconciled Japan. Here we can refer again to the account by Tamio Nakamura (1995), a leading researcher in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo’s Seikei University: the EAEC [ . . . ] was proposed by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in December 1990. Because this caucus aims to group only East Asian members, the United States [ . . . ] criticised it as an attempt to create an East Asian trading bloc. Even among ASEAN members, Indonesia did not give support to the idea at first. Meanwhile, the European community’s [sic] 1992 internal market project proceeded successfully, and North American countries concluded NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) in 1993. In January 1993 President Clinton took office in the United States and he suggested that APEC should be more formalised and expanded to include political and economic cooperation in the Pacific region. In reaction to these economic developments and political proposals, all ASEAN member states came to support the EAEC plan in July 1993, and in October the same year, they decided to invite Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan to become founding members of the EAEC. Japan, as the middleman between the US and ASEAN, is yet to make its position clear on the EAEC. (Nakamura, 1995, p. 10) The future development of the EAEC, seen as a tactical response to the US-led consolidation of APEC, is far from clear and certain. President Clinton, perhaps reinvigorated by his November 1996 re-election, and perhaps spurred on not just by the prospects surrounding the EAEC but also by the competition posed by another, but current SRR – namely, the EU – has shown signs of digging in his heels over APEC, as reported by Martin Walker (on 17 November 1996):

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Bill Clinton is planning to bounce [or, that is, to hustle and coerce] the European Union on his free trade agenda again [by] [p]laying the Asian card [ . . . ] once more. Three years ago, when United States and European trade negotiators were deadlocked on the last lap of the Uruguay Round of the Gatt world trade pact, Clinton convened the first Pacific Rim summit, in Seattle in November 1993. Dubbed the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (Apec) [sic], it was designed to exclude the Europeans [who] grew very nervous. If the Gatt round failed, the US was content to arrange its own trading strategy with the Pacific Rim, the fastest growing economies on the planet. ‘We had no choice but to reach a settlement,’ commented a top European negotiator. ‘The Americans had an alternative and we didn’t.’ [Conveniently,] the fourth Apec summit [is soon to be held] at the old US naval base of Subic Bay in the Philippines. Walker explains: [The] first Apec summit agreed to explore whether the Pacific Rim countries could ‘achieve free and open trade and investment in the region’. The second, at Bodor, Indonesia, agreed they could, and formalised a plan for the industrialised Apec members to achieve free trade among themselves by 2010, with the less industrialised countries following suit by 2020. The third [meeting], at Osaka last year, laid down the procedure to achieve this, with each country expected to produce an individual action plan, and co-ordinate this with a comprehensive action plan. According to Walker: An awesome potential is being built, whose implications range far beyond trade. This is a forum where Taiwan and China sit together, where countries such as Chile and Peru are being steered into membership [ . . . ]. The US [will, therefore, be] at the heart of what will be one of the central [organisations] of the next century [ . . . ]. [At] the Subic Bay conference [the] idea is to secure an Apec consensus and then move to the World Trade Organisation’s first ministerial meeting in Singapore, and bounce the Europeans into agreement, as was done with the Uruguay Round. Important voices [including that of Fred Bergsten, Chairman of Apec’s Eminent Persons Group] hope to get the WTO to follow the Apec commitment to achieve global free trade for all developed nations by 2010, and for all others by 2020 [ . . . ]. Fred Bergsten [wants to] ‘[ . . . ] install Apec definitively as a permanent bulwark of regional co-operation and a decisive force for world prosperity and stability,’ [and connectedly wants Apec to] ‘assert leadership of the global trading system’. (Walker, 17 November 1995)

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The implication here is that the US has in mind throwing down the gauntlet to the EU, and doing so with the support of a cohort, or coterie, of Asia Pacific countries acting together in an increasingly cohesive, unified and organised manner. At least for the time being, however, organisationally speaking, while APEC may be somewhat more advanced than the EAEC, it is far less advanced the EU, and also quite a lot less advanced than another Asia Pacific rival, that of ASEAN. The latter – or some of its prominent political leaders – moreover, see the organisation as not only deepening, but also expanding beyond the borders of south east Asia into the north-east sector of the East Asia region. Accordingly, ASEAN and EAEC can be readily regarded as an alternative, challenge and threat to APEC, dominated as this is by the USA, or more broadly by the Anglo-Saxon quartet of the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. ASEAN is independent of APEC, assertively and steadfastly so; and it is making its own mark on the global scene, including via inter-regional (or ‘bilateral’) relations well beyond East Asia, and especially with the EU. As summarised by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its 30th anniversary in 1997, continuing to promote intraregional cooperation widely across political, economic and social areas. In political and security spheres, ASEAN worked to realize the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), while on the economic side, efforts also progressed toward further promoting intraregional trade and investment through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Investment AREA (AIA) and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme (AICO), etc. The ASEAN Vision 2020, which embraces the above initiatives, was announced at the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in December [1997]. In 1997, the number of ASEAN members expanded from seven to nine. Expansion to include all 10 Southeast Asian [countries] has been an ASEAN objective since the association was established, and at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 31 May [1997] in Malaysia, the decision was made to admit Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar simultaneously. However, because of subsequent military clashes in Cambodia in July, the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Malaysia at the end of July allowed only Laos and Myanmar to join, with Cambodia’s accession postponed. ( JMFA, 1998, pp. 119–20) As we know, Cambodia has since been admitted to ASEAN, completing the organisation’s embrace of south-east Asia, from where it has stretched out a hand northwards, including to Japan in spite of its atrocious past in the area and the lingering bitterness this has caused. The late 1990s’ official view from Japan is as follows:

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Japan has historically had deep ties with the Southeast Asian countries in a number of areas, and the Japanese Foreign Minister attends the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences. Recently, Japan has also been actively promoting dialogue and cooperation with ASEAN at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF), in which ASEAN has been playing the proactive role. In 1997 in particular, [being] the 30th anniversary of the founding of ASEAN, Prime Minister Hashimoto visited Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Viet Nam and Singapore in January, and issued the Hashimoto Doctrine, which announces Japan’s intention of further strengthening close ties with ASEAN, working on the maintenance and conservation of the region’s traditions and culture, and working together with ASEAN to address global issues. At the Japan–ASEAN Summit in Malaysia in December [1997], Japan announced that in view of the Asian economic turmoil, Japan would cooperate with ASEAN toward stablizing Asian currencies and financial markets, and would also assist ASEAN in achieving stable and sustained development through economic and structural reform. (JMFA, 1998, pp. 120–1) Of course, Japan’s co-operation with ASEAN in response to the Asian economic turmoil – or economic tsunami – does not necessarily mean that what will follow is the construction of a defensive island fortress along the lines of the EU. Again, in this regard, there is the kind of argument presented by Endymion Wilkinson, among others, according to which while East Asia may become more and more regionally integrated in a de facto economic manner, very much helped by Japanese-led investment flows, ‘it is unlikely that a tightly organized trading bloc’ will emerge, if only because ‘its political systems, economies and cultures are too hetrogeneous’ and ‘[b]itter memories of the war are [ . . . ] not far from the surface’ (Wilkinson, 1991, pp. 26–7). In a mid-1990s’ issue of the Euro Japanese Journal (August–November 1996), two articles appeared of relevance here: Jonathan Lloyd-Owen’s piece ‘EU-Japan summit broadens debate’ (pp. 11–12) and Sadaaki Numata’s on ‘US-Japanese relations: do they matter to Europe?’ (pp. 24–6). Lloyd-Owen’s assessment of the economic, trading and investment relationship between the EU and Japan is most poignant for present purposes in the final paragraph: Europe has importance [ . . . ] beyond the size of its markets, some Japanese will point out. It has an approach to issues, a way of thinking, that can’t be found elsewhere. The very fact that Europe is grappling with plans to implement a single currency bespeaks a tremendous sense of purpose that some Japanese believe they would do well to study at close hand. If Japan is one day to become part of a regional alliance of its own,

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the lessons learned in Europe may still stand it in good stead. (LloydOwen, 1996, p. 12) Here, Lloyd-Owen seems to be inferring his acceptance of the possibility that Japan will become a member of a ‘regional alliance’ along the lines of the EU. If so, then Lloyd-Owen’s view is somewhat at odds with Sadaaki Numata’s. For Numata, the EU does have a shaping influence over Japan and the East Asia region, but it does so more by way ‘of interdependence in the global economic community’ than through the EU providing a template – a model alliance, organisation or regime – towards which Japan and its neighbours in the East Asia region are striving or veering. While Numata acknowledges East Asia’s ‘active search for [ . . . ] dialogue and cooperation with Europe under the rubric of ASEM’ (the Asia–Europe Meetings), as well as ‘for open regionalism under APEC’, he is sceptical about the formation of ‘a highly cohesive Asian grouping’ resembling the EU. Numata explains: Unlike Europe, Asia is yet to possess a sense of oneness or the catholicity of ideas and cultures. As one Japanese commentator has put it, in Asia economic interests are looking for a common spirit or a common temple, whereas in Europe nations are assembled in one spiritual cathedral to talk about their common economic interests. The evolutionary approach that has been seen in the habit of dialogue and cooperation in the ASEAN, APEC and ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum] is a characteristic arising out of the diversity of the countries in the region and is not likely to change dramatically for some time to come. (Numata, 1996, p. 25) For me, however, the contrast Numata draws between the foundation of the various attempts at regional co-operation around the Asia Pacific, on the one hand, and within Europe through the EU, on the other, are exaggerated. After all, the roots of the EU firmly lie in its diversity, divisions and resulting Second World War devastation, a point made by many writers, including, we can recall, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt: ‘Europe’s total collapse and the political and economic disintegration of outdated national structures set the stage for a completely fresh start and called for a far more radical approach to the reordering of Europe’, hence the 1951 ‘Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)’ (Borchardt, 1995, pp. 5–9). Numata may be over-estimating the contrast between Europe and East Asia judged in terms of the cultural diversity of each region, or at least in terms of the implications of the diversity within East Asia for the development of realist, self-interested co-operation in the form of a ‘cohesive [regional] grouping’ (Numata, 1996, p. 25) which will resemble, without necessarily fully replicating, the EU. I contend that, in comparison with Lloyd-Owen, Numata may be attributing undue weight to the difficulties

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thrown up by intra-regional variety relative to the consequences for East Asia of the growing interdependence in the encompassing global economic community, as well as of the presence within this ‘community’ of the EU alongside an array of other (if so far not so advanced) economic-cum-political regional alliances, blocs or regimes. These other proto-SRRs include ASEAN which, consistent with the growing global influence and appeal of the doctrine of supranationalism is becoming institutionally deeper, and simultaneously has been signalling an ambition to expand into North East Asia as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) (see Nakamura, 1995). The consequences for East Asia of the globalization process(es), and within this of the proliferation of regional regimes, will be filtered through, and thereby facilitated by, the realist, self-interested aims, assessments and actions of East Asian countries, including Japan; with, for me, the likely long-term outcome being the formation of an East Asian regime, probably with Japan as a member. As far as I can see, there is a good chance that it will become more and more difficult, perhaps impossible, for East Asian countries to succeed, if not survive, in an increasingly interdependent global economic community, if these countries fail to create regional regimes, even one all-embracing regime, with the inention of more effectively competing – economically and politically – with other global players, including a growing array of rival regional regimes. In my view, the evolution of ASEAN is testment to the adoption and application of a realist approach to dealing with global trends, growing global interdependence, and the increasing competition presented by these other regional regimes; as well as, moreover, to the way the countries involved are capable of creating a regional regime despite the presence of the kind of intra-regional diversities and difficulties which can be readily observed in Europe – features that have consistently impeded but not seriously prevented European integration by way of the obvious progress of the EU. The pervasiveness, potency and potential of supranationalism in the new world order are being increasingly acknowledged. For instance, as reported by Quentin Peel: ‘Mr Jeffrey Garsten, the former US under-secretary of commerce, told top government leaders and industrialists meeting in the European Forum in Berlin [that] regional trade groups such as Apec, Mercosur and Nafta, as well as the EU, are likely to become relatively stronger over the coming decade’ (Peel, 25 November 1996). The presence and progress of the 18-member APEC forum – ‘the leaders [of which have] set their sights on creating a “community” of economies in the region [by] achieving “free and open trade and investment [by] 2010 for [the organisation’s] industrial economies and 2020 for [its] other members’ (Cumming-Bruce, 23 November 1996), and who held a summit meeting in Manila in November 1996 towards this end – can be taken to indicate, if nothing else, a widespread willingness among governments within the Asia Pacific region to show an interest in participating in, or of experimenting with, proto-SRRs. But fur-

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thermore, as previously noted, APEC has motivated a number of its members to press on with, perhaps even at the expense of APEC itself, the construction of a more geo-politically confined and manageable regime, that of ASEAN. ASEAN, after all, is far more socially, economically, politically and culturally homogeneous than APEC, as indeed would be the proposed EAEC. The growing prominence of ASEAN on the world stage has been displayed in the way it played host to and, more to the point, steered the quite recent (March 1996) EU–Asian summit in Bangkok. There is evidence that ASEAN largely dictated the summit’s agenda and ‘closing statement’, ensuring the marginalisation or neglect of, what it saw as, ‘“controversial and irrelevant” topics’ (Field, 1996), especially those to do with ‘human rights abuses and proposals for minimum global labour standards’ (Palmer, 1 March 1996). Accordingly, if for no other reason than the fact that ‘Asia is one of the world’s few regions where military spending budgets continue to grow in the post-Cold War era [ . . . with] Britain’s share of the arms trade there [being] worth an estimated £520 million’, then ‘all questions of human rights [were] sidestepped as European leaders [chased] lucrative trade deals, including arms sales worth billions of pounds’ (Field, 1996). The outcome may turn out to be especially regrettable for women: Left out of Asia’s economic success story, women from poorer parts of the region have become the world’s fastest growing pool of cheap and often abused migrant labour, according to the International Labour Office [ . . . ]. About 1.5 million women, mostly from the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, now work abroad, mostly as maids, nurses and ‘entertainers’, a euphemism for a booming sex industry. Whereas women accounted for only 15 per cent of the Asian migrant workforce in the 1970s, they now equal or outnumber male migrant workers [ . . . ]. Domestic service and entertainment are rarely covered by labour laws or social security, leaving many female migrants defenceless against abuse [ . . . ]. (Higgins, 1996)45 Given the ascendancy of ASEAN, the issues arise of (a) the way Pacific Asia’s long-term economic surge is being accompanied by a distinctive, ‘home grown’, culturally specific approach to human rights and labour standards; and (b) how far the competition and rivalry between the Pacific Asia region and within it ASEAN, on the one hand, and Europe and the EU, on the other, brings pressures the EU and its Member States to review and reshape their own social programmes, policies and legislation with regard to such matters as the rights, protection and opportunities of their nationals, employees and women; and, more specifically, brings a realist incentive to adopt an approach to these matters which is closer to the Pacific Asia pattern, design or model.

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The question arises of how far the developing new world order economic and political arrangement will entail, in the long run, the EU and its Member States pursuing a less ‘progressive’ – even a ‘regressive’ – approach to social and other citizenship rights (see Close, 1995a). Indeed, a serious debate over the possibility of Europe ‘emulating’ the ‘Asian tigers’ gathered a head of steam in the mid-1990s.46 The exchanges involved were concerned with whether Europe and the EU will, because it needs to, imitate the social model being displayed by the ‘Asian tigers’, by the Asia Pacific regional regimes, and especially by ASEAN, an issue which otherwise surfaced during the arguments and machinations leading to the result of the 1996 tussle between the UK government, the European Council, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the introduction, implementation and validity of the EU’s Working Hours Directive. Here we can recall how, reporting on the build-up to the November 1996 ECJ judgement in the dispute over the Working Hours Directive, Hugo Young explains that at ‘one level, this is a technical dispute about the nature of EU law: is it legal for the Commission to impose the 48-hour-week directive under the heading of health and safety, thus evading the exemption Britain thought [it] had secured from such horrors [sic] by opting out of the social chapter provisions at Maastricht?’ Young adds: ‘At the bottom of the judgement is an argument about the nature of work, the role of regulation, the effect of global competition, the very future of European societies’ (Young, 12 November 1996). The course and outcome of the Working Hours Directive court case poignantly illustrates the supranational character of the EU (of its institutions, and especially of the European Council and the ECJ), the increasing influence accruing to the supranational EU in shaping (national) social affairs, policy and protection (with convergent consequences), and the considerations and concerns being expressed at both the nation-state and the supranational levels within the EU about the need when approving and implementing directives and other legal provisions to take into account their impact on the economic competitiveness of the EU and its Member States, especially in relation to the economies of – assisted by the evergrowing economic co-operation within – the Asia Pacific region. The EU’s interest in and concern about the impressive and unrelenting (if somewhat uneven and sometimes erratic) economic advance and gathering economic co-operation within the Asia Pacific region has been variously, and often vigorously, expressed by the EU, thereby being used as a rationale for further geo-political expansion and institutional (supranational) deepening; something which, in return, has not gone unnoticed within the Asia Pacific region, sharpening the spur to yet further, more extensive and deeper economic-cum-political co-operation within this region. Following Hugo Young, the Working Hours case and outcome is about the changing character – quantitatively and qualitatively – of global competition,

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increasingly centred as this is on regional regimes and SRRs: a development which, for me, is an integral feature of the globalization process. What can be referred to as the global perspective on European and other instances of regional integration is widely acknowledged, not just among journalists (such as Hugo Young), but also among scholarly writers (see, for instance, Dent, 1997). For me, increasingly the ‘global competition’ faced by the EU is from other existing, emerging or embryonic regional regimes or SRRs, the effect being to encourage the EU to acquire greater global strength, or clout, by way of further integration, something which in turn means adopting one or more of three strategies: (a) deepening institutionally and supranationally; (b) expansion (see Preston, 1997); and (c) adopting competitive economic, political and social programmes, policies and legislation (see Hantrais, 1995). Concurrently other global regions and sub-regions could come under pressure to adopt the same strategies, thereby feeding into a spiral favouring the proliferation and consolidation of regional blocs and subsequently SRRs, and in their wake SGRs.

Notes 1.

Prospects

1. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), the ‘German philosopher, [is] one of the great figures in the history of western thought [ . . . ]. He [ . . . ] wrote on political topics, and his Perpetual Peace (1795) advocates a world system of free states’ (Magnusson, 1990, pp. 806–7). 2. On the doctrine, theory and practice of supranationalism, see Close and Ohki-Close, 1999; Shaw, 1996. 3. The phrases ‘supranational regional regime’ (SRR) and ‘supranational global regime’ (SGR) were originally coined by Close and Ohki-Close (see especially Close and Ohki-Close, 1999). 4. It is germane to note in this context Alex Brummer’s 20 July 1999 report on how the ‘largest companies are involved in a frenzy of mergers and acquisitions but the benefits of this third industrial revolution are uncertain’. Thus, Brummer tells us, the ‘pattern of corporate ownership is changing dramatically as the clock races towards the end of the century. Open markets (globalisation, if you like) are showing in a huge number of mergers – many of them across nation-state boundaries – which is radically reshaping capitalism. Once decisions taken in Detroit affected investment and jobs in Dagenham and Luton. Now such decisions may be taken anywhere from Munich to Stockholm, from Philadephia to Pretoria [ . . . ]. There have been other periods of large-scale corporate agglomeration, but none on this scale or so international in nature’ (Brummer, 20 July 1999). Here, Brummer appears to be alluding to how the international corporate players within the global system of the multinational type (MNCs) are being increasingly joined by those of the transnational type (TNCs). Brummer asks ‘Is agglomeration beneficial?’; his answer is equivocal. In this particular article, Brummer does not touch on the issue of the implications of the prospective progress of the WTO as a (prospective) supranational global regime (SGR), never mind of the MAI, in this regard. See also, Martin Woollacott (8 August 1999), who has claimed: ‘Large corporations are undermining unity and democracy’; or, ‘big business [is getting] mean and greedy right across Europe’. 5. There is no doubt that the phrase ‘new world order’ has a long and chequered history, stretching back well before its use by the US’s President George Bush in the middle of 1990: ‘Within less than a year of Bush’s declaration that the Cold War was over, two crises erupted, one in the Persian Gulf and one in Yugoslavia. The crises gave Bush the opportunity to establish a new foreign policy, and beyond that a new world order [ . . . ]. President Bush called the crisis that began when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 the “defining moment” in setting a new foreign policy for a “new world order”. It was the first post-Cold War crisis. Although it took place in the home of crises, the Middle East, it had many new elements to it, the first of which was that the United States was able to operate freely as the only superpower [ . . . ]. Bush insisted that his policy was clear: the United States would punish aggression to insure the new world order. In other words, the United States would act as world policeman in defending the status quo’ (Ambrose, 1993, pp. 377–8). Subsequently, the phrase ‘new world order’ has been widely used, albeit with various meanings and messages: ‘As each day passes we see and hear snippets 204

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and details of news – but is there more? We know there is, for we hear of monetary unions, a global curriculum in education, a world divided into regions rather than nations, and moves to unite fragmented religions in celbration of fellowship. Gradually the concept of a new world order is becoming part of the 90’s [sic], introduced and discussed by politicians until we are comfortable with it. Environmentalists are working with zeal to clean up our global village and educate us how to live. The changes in vocabulary and concepts have been rapid, yet appear spontaneous. Who or what is behind this strategy for the world, unseen and unknown in the twilight areas of power, lobbying its cause – a united world, a design into which we all must fit. When the world is a community, where then will be your rights and freedoms? The Bible speaks of these events and places the pro’s and con’s [sic] before you’ (1999 advert for The Great Controversy, published by Advent Books, Hinckley, Leicestershire). A modification of the phrase, whereby nonetheless the notion carries echoes of George Bush’s concept of ‘new world order’, is to be found in Paddy Ashdown’s ‘A different European order, post-Kosovo’ (21 May 1999), where we are told: ‘Despite the fact that [the EU has] a population half as large again as the US, we spend less than two-thirds as much on our defence, and our ability to deploy forces beyond our borders is just one 10th of America’s. We can’t go on relying on Uncle Sam to bail us out every time there’s trouble in our back yard [ . . . ]. There is a desperate need for a Europe-wide defence review, to look at how, by co-ordinating our efforts more closely, we can get better value for money and greater effectiveness for our military [ . . . ]. Let us be clear [ . . . ]. From here, we are going to be in a very different European order, one that will require a stronger and better organised EU, and a properly resourced common foreign and security policy.’ These are extracts from a speech given by Paddy Ashdown in May 1999, when he was still the leader of the UK’s Liberal Democrats. A couple of weeks later, Martin Walker claimed: ‘Nato’s first war was not high-risk. Military [success] was never in doubt. [However,] Nato’s 10-week campaign [in Yugoslavia has] transformed the geo-political future of Europe. A victorious Nato stands at its core, with the Atlantic Alliance and the American presence now in place for the forseeable future [ . . . ]. But the ever-fractious European tribes have learnt their lesson. [EU] leaders have lost a kind of virginity. Not only have they fought a war and won, they have learnt the seductive appeal of the just war in an honourable cause [ . . . ]. Kosovo has been the historical catalyst which pushed the EU into adopting at the Cologne summit [in May 1999] a formal European Defence Identity, aimed at giving the EU the military tools to ensure the peace of its own continent. It is also aimed, ironically, at keeping the Americans in place by not over trying their patience’ (Walker, 7 June 1999). See note 12 below. 6. The issue of the decline of the nation-state is addressed at various points in The Legacy of Supranationalism, attention being paid to, among others, Anthony Giddens’ contribution to the debates involved. 7. Francis Fukuyama’s writings include ‘The end of history?’, The National Interest, Summer 1989; ‘Liberal democracy as a global phenomenon’, Political Science and Politics, December 1991; The End of History and the Last Man (1992); Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity (1995); The End of Order (1997); and The Great Disruption: human nature and the reconstitution of social order (1999). 8. It is of interest to compare Francis Fukuyama’s ideas about global system developments with those of other prominent writers, including Ulrich Beck in Risk Society (1992), Anthony Giddens in The Third Way (1998), Will Hutton in The State We’re In (1996), which among other contributions have been summarised by Patrick

206

9.

10.

11.

12.

Notes Wintour (25 July 1999). According to Giddens, for instance, ‘socialism has failed, capitalism rules. The left must forget collectivism and empower individuals’ by way of the ‘social investment state’ and ‘positive welfare’ (Wintour, 25 July 1999). Sir Anthony Meyer is a ‘former Conservative MP’ who stood ‘for the south-east region on behalf of the Pro Euro Conservative party in [June 1999’s] European elections’ (Meyer, 8 June 1999). William Hague made his speech on the same day as ‘German plans to shore up the flagging euro collapsed in disarray’. When ‘European Union leaders ended their [summit] meeting in Cologne’ marking the end of the German government’s presidency of the EU, there was ‘bickering over a message of support for the currency in an end of summit communiqué. In place of a tough early draft they merely issued a bland statement calling for stability in the currency’s value for the sake of jobs and growth – which left it languishing close to the new low of $1,0270 set on [the] night [of 3 June 1999]’ (Traynor, 5 June 1999). In this particular regard, as reported by George Trefgarne on 9 June 1999: ‘Tony Blair gave another commitment [on 8 June 1999] to veto the EU’s withholding tax. He told the Commons [ . . . ]: “We will not agree to any tax being imposed on Britain from Brussels and we won’t agree to any measures that damage the City of London.” The withholding tax would impose a 20 [per cent] levy on all bonds and there are fears it could drive the eurobond market away from London to Switzerland, costing 11,000 jobs in the City. Mr Blair’s pledge to protect the City came after new research showed that Frankfurt has failed to rival the City as Europe’s main financial centre. Some had thought London might lose out if Britain was not in the first wave of Emu, but this has not been the case. Instead, Frankfurt’s fifth position in Europe is being challenged by Edinburgh [ . . . ]. If the euro falls further, Edinburgh could overtake Frankfurt’ (Trefgarne, 9 June 1999). As reported by Martin Walker on 12 May 1999, the ‘EU moved a step closer to establishing its own defence force yesterday when the 10 member countries of the Western European Union agreed in principle to merge the two organisations. Coming in the week when the new [Commission] president, Romano Prodi, said a common European army was “the logical next step”, the agreement means that the EU sees itself as on course to become a regional superpower, with its own aircraft carriers, satellites and intelligence [ . . . ]. Under the Amsterdam treaty, which took effect on May 1, EU members are required to develop a common security and foreign policy, and to work on peacekeeping and peace-enforcing measures. This is called the European Defence Identity (EDI). Its main thrust is meant to be managing regonal crises, with emphasis on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. The EDI was given a push by Britain at the AngloFrench summit in St Malo in December [1998], spurred by Tony Blair’s frustration that European Nato members could not mount effective operations without US military support and leadership. “We are now seeing the European nations taking a much greater grip on their own future,” [George Robertson, the defence secretary,] said yesterday after the WEU conference in Bremen [ . . . ]. The WEU was formed by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 but was quickly overshadowed by Nato’s formation a year later. The WEU is the only European defence alliance that requires members to go to war if one of them is attacked – Nato requires members to take only “such action as it deems necessary”. Initially, the WEU included only European powers, beginning with Britain, France and the Benelux countries. It now has 10 full members, who are members of the EU and Nato.

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There are six associate members, including Turkey and Norway, who are members of Nato but not the EU, and five observers, the four EU neutrals and Denmark’ (Walker, 12 May 1999). The ‘four EU neutrals’, as Walker puts it, are Austria, Finland, the Republic of Ireland and Sweden. Denmark is a full member of both NATO and the EU. On 16 August 1999, ‘Chris Patten, European Commissioner responsible for external relations, [ . . . ] joined the growing debate on closer military cooperation by saying EU taxpayers must be persuaded to pay more for their armed forces, and that a Eurocorps could be operational “in the not too distant future”’ (Norton-Taylor, 17 August 1999). 13. On so-called ‘spill-over’, see Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, p. 81, 113–14, 190, 257. 14. Supranationalism and ultranationalism can occur and oppose each other anywhere. But this does not mean that linguistically they can be catered for equally for anywhere. In this context, it is instructive to draw attention to what for me is the important distinction between ‘supranationalism’ and ‘supranational regional regime’, on the one hand, and Japanese ‘ultranationalism’ and the Japaneseinspired, or imposed, pre-Second World War East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, on the other (see, for instance, Muruyama, 1995; Radek, 1995; So and Chiu, 1995; and Storry, 1995). The term ‘supranationalism’ causes problems on translation into Japanese, and in discussions about the possibility of an East Asian SRR because of the semantic similarity (and occasional confusion) in Japanese between the terms ‘supranationalism’ and ‘ultranationalism’, and because of the history of Japanese ultranationalism in East Asia, its concrete manifestations and its emotional connotations. However, ‘supranationalism’ and ‘ultranationalism’ are oppositional notions, even though the former has some similarities with and could evolve into the latter in practice. Guided by The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1990), ‘supranational’ implies ‘transcending national limits’ (ibid., p. 1226). As a prefix ‘supra-’ means above, beyond or transcending; whereas an adverb in Latin supra means ‘above’ (ibid., p. 1226). Hence, ‘supreme’ meaning ‘highest in authority or rank’; and ‘Supreme Court’ meaning ‘the highest judicial court’ (ibid., p. 1226). In the case of the European Community, the central pillar within the overall European Union, the ECJ operates to some extent as a Supreme Court above the EU’s Member States and their courts. Thus, Charles de Gaulle was opposed to ‘the doctrine of “supranationalism”’ because it would entail ‘France’s submission to a law that was not her own’ (de Gaulle, 1994, p. 30). Supranationalism is a ‘doctrine’ which urges nation-states to transfer their sovereignty (sovereign powers, authority, independence) to a supranational set of institutions (perhaps, and probably, including a court) which stands over and above themselves, their institutions and citizens, or more inclusively nationals (see Close, 1995a). Accordingly, Dowds and Young (1996) categorise those who, in the 1995 British Social Attitudes Survey (1996), show the least ‘national sentiment’ (and related traits) as ‘supra-nationalists’ (Dowds and Young, 1996, p. 148). Supranationalists ‘have little sense of national identity’ (ibid., p. 149), and so as far as feelings and expressions of ‘nationalism’ (ibid., p. 143) are concerned stand at the opposite end of the spectrum from what Dowds and Young categorise as (given the British context) ‘John Bulls’ (ibid., p. 149). Supranationalism is a doctrine or movement which stands opposed to nationalism, never mind ultranationalism. The prefix ‘ultra-’ infers ‘extreme’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1990, p. 1324), so that an ‘ultraist’ is ‘the holder of extreme positions in politics, religion, etc.’ (ibid., p. 1324). Thus, ultranationalists are extreme nationalists, and

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Notes would presumably be extremely hostile to supranationalism, supranationalists, supranational institutions, supranational regional regimes; and in Europe, would presumably be extremely hostile to the European Community/Union, the ECJ and the EC’s other supranational institutions. Guided by Sanseido’s Daily Concise English–Japanese Dictionary (1990), ‘supra-’ as a prefix when translated into Japanese becomes ‘ue’, ‘cho’ or ‘mae’ (ibid., p. 564); and ‘supranational’ becomes ‘chokokka no’ (ibid., p. 564). By imputation, ‘supranationalism’ becomes ‘chokokka shugi’. However, ‘ultranationalism’ when translated into Japanese becomes ‘cho kokusui shugi’ (ibid., p. 605). Interestingly, ‘supreme’ translates as ‘shikou no’, ‘saijo no’, ‘kyukyoku no’ or ‘saigo no’; and ‘Supreme Court’ becomes ‘Saikou Saibansho’. I am not sure if it is possible to coin terms or phrases in Japanese for ‘supranational’, ‘supranationalism’ and ‘supranational regional regime’ which draw on and are sematically consistent with the Japanese for ‘supreme’ and ‘Supreme Court’, and which crucially avoids any confusion with the Japanese for ‘ultranationalism’, with its unfortunate historical, cultural and emotive associations.

2.

Alignments

1. ‘Every leader of every [country] in all three regions was present with the exception of the British and Irish prime ministers Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, who stayed away to be on hand of [sic] the Northern Ireland negotiations. Robin Cook took Mr Blair’s place’ (Bellos, 29 June 1999). 2. ‘In November 1990, both the [European] Community and its [individual] Member States jointly signed the Transatlantic Declaration with the United States’ (Fontaine, 1995, p. 36; quoted in Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, p. 46). Subsequently, ‘the United States, Canada and Mexico [ . . . ] constructed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since January 1994, NAFTA has been the basis of a “trade pact” which, judged in terms of population and GDP, matches the EU’s size; and which may eventually be transformed into the far more extensive Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as proposed by US President Clinton, the first step in this direction being that attempted in 1994–5 when the US government “sought to link NAFTA with Mercosur” (Peterson, 1996, p. 188)’ (Close and Ohki-Close, 1999, p. 47). Given the absence of the FTAA, the EU may have gained a march on the US through its June 1999 agreement with Mercosur. 3. On Mercosur and the neighbouring Andean Community, see Close and OhkiClose, 1999, pp. 6, 46–7, 127. See also: ‘Brazil rocks Mercosur boat’, The Economist, 13 February 1999. 4. A taste of the various late 1990s, trade disputes between the EU and the US is acerbically presented by George Monbiot: ‘The United States might have beefed about bananas, but it’s about to go bananas about beef. Today is the day on which we were to have been forced to start eating American beef laced with artificial hormones. Had the European Union done as the World Trade Organisation ordered, we would have found ourselves in the curious position of being forbidden to eat beef on the bone, yet obliged to eat been injected with carcinogens. Instead, because we have refused to allow the United States to export its disgusting habits over here, we have been threatened with an almighty war. While Bill Clinton imposed $520m (£320m) worth of sanctions when we disdained to buy all our bananas from a Democratic party funder, he is threatening nearly a billion dollars worth as punishment for our perverse reluctance to let his beef producers poison

Notes

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

209

us. Something has gone terribly wrong with the way the world is being run. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) emerged from a global system established to protect the weak against the strong. Big countries would no longer be able to bully small ones into accepting their goods on whatever terms they dictated, while protecting their own markets from small countries’ exports. Instead, world trade would be governed by a set of fair, comprehensible rules, allowing everyone to engage on equal terms. But the [ . . . ] aims of equity and fairness have been perverted by corporate lobbyists who now make almost every government on earth dance to their tune. Instead of defending fair trade, the WTO is forcing nations all over the world, strong as well as weak, to open their borders to the crudest forms of exploitation [ . . . ]. The world is being run by a group of fanatics, fundamentalists who view free trade much as the Taliban view God: as an uncompromising tyrant which must never be contradicted. No ecosystem, no tribe, no nation is too important to be sacrificed on its alter. Their holy war is being waged against us all’ (Monbiot, 13 May 1999). Peter Mandelson was the Labour government’s ‘former trade secretary, forced out of office after home loan revelations’ (MacAskill and Milne, 1 July 1999). As reported by David Hencke, he ‘escaped punishment [on 1 July 1999] after being condemned as the first minister to breach new tough standards of integrity in public life by not declaring his £373,000 home loan from his fellow MP, Geoffrey Robinson’ (Hencke, 2 July 1999). It seems that Martin Walker had interviewed Peter Mandelson for an insight into Mandelson’s ideas and forthcoming lecture on Britain in Europe (Walker, 28 June 1999). An EU, or more accurately EC, directive is ‘one of the three [types of] binding legal instruments for implementing policy or decisions (the [other two] being the “regulation” and the “decision”). A “directive” is an instruction adopted by the Council [of Ministers] to one or more [Member States] to legislate on a specific matter within a defined period of time. It gives an outline of the required legislation, but leaves the details of implementation to the Member States’ (Drost, 1995, p. 165). This is a reference to how on Monday, 15 March, ‘all 20 members of the European Commission resigned in the wake of a damning anti-fraud report which found the executive guilty of lax management, corruption and nepotism at the highest level’ (The Editor, 20 March 1999, p. 6). On 22 July 1999, a by-lection for a vacant seat in the House of Commons was held in the Cheshire constitutency of Eddisbury, the total electorate being 67 086 and turnout being 34 497 (or 51.42 per cent). The result was a victory for the Conservative Party, which therefore retained the seat, with 15 465 votes, or 44.83 per cent of the total number of votes, an increase of 2.31 per cent over what it attracted at the May 1997 general election. The Labour Party candidate secured 13 859 votes, or 40.17 per cent, an increase of 0.04 per cent. The Conservative majority was 1606, or 4.66 per cent of all the votes cast, representing a swing to the Conservatives from Labour of just 1.13 per cent (Hetherington, 24 July 1999). The Guardian commented: ‘These should be happy days in the life of Anthony Charles Lynton Blair. Five years ago this week he was elected leader of the Labour party, and he’s built up a hefty record of achievement in the relatively short time. Not only has he transformed his party, [in 1997] he also notched up the largest [general] election victory in modern history. Blair’s reshaping of the British political landscape was confirmed in the early hours of yesterday morning with the by-election result from Eddisbury. Labour did not

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win there, but it did fall only 1,600 votes shy in what should be a safe, rural Tory heartland. The Cheshire seat used to be a land of five-figure majorities for William Hague’s party: it’s a measure of Labour’s accomplishment that – right at mid-term when governments are ordinarily punished with by-election humiliations – it gave the Conservatives such a close run’ (The Guardian, 24 July 1999a). 10. Qualified majority voting (QMV), the ‘most widely used method of voting in the Council of Ministers, [ . . . ] entails giving the vote of each [Member State] a “weighting”, which very broadly reflects [the relative size of its] population. These weightings are specified in the Treaty of Rome (Article 148), as is the total number of assenting votes (the threshold) necessary for a measure to be adopted under QMV. At present, the weightings are as follows’: France 10; Germany 10; Italy 10; United Kingdom 10; Spain 8; Belgium 5; Greece 5; Netherlands 5; Portugal 5; Austria 4; Sweden 4; Denmark 3; Finland 3; Ireland 3; Luxembourg 2. The total number of votes necessary for a measure to be adopted on a proposal from the Commission is 62 (an abstention is equivalent to a vote against). ‘A very small number of Treaty articles allow the Council to take a decision by QMV without a Commission proposal: in such cases the 62 votes must be cast by at least 10’ Member States (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 378). 11. While Martin Walker tells us that there are about 298 million voters within the EU, the figure given varies between sources. Thus, according to the European Commission: ‘Around 289m voters in the 15 EU Member States are eligible to vote in the fifth direct elections to the European Parliament, choosing 626 MEPs in total’ (European Commission, 10 June 1999, p. 1). 12. In this context, it is pertinent to note how, according to a July 1999 report by Martin Walker, ‘Britain is seeking to persuade its European partners to set up a rapid reaction humanitarian force to be on permanent standby for emergencies. “Crisis management does by its very nature, by definition, require a response that is not simply routine management”, the foreign secretary, Robin Cook, told fellow EU foreign ministers yesterday’ (Walker, 20 July 1999). A few days later Patrick Wintour told us: ‘Britain is to ask other European countries to put some more [ . . . ] “backbone” into their fighting forces after being dismayed by the reluctance to accept the inherent dangers of war in Kosovo. Wary of alienating our European neighbours, British defence chiefs [nonetheless] want a strengthening of the European military capability as part of a major review of defence and foreign policy in the wake of the Kosovo crisis [ . . . ]. [The Foreign Secretary] is to press its EU allies to “professionalise and restructure” their armies to make them better equiped to respond rapidly to humanitarian catastrophes similar to Kosovo [ . . . ]. The Foreign Office is also considering whether EU Defence Ministers should meet regularly in a specific forum, but fears such a body might be seen as a move to caucus against the US at Nato, or even be seen as a precursor to an EU army’ (Wintour, 25 July 1999a). The British government is even more reluctant, to the point of being insistent, that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – one ‘of two intergovernmental “pillars”’ of the EU, and more specifically that pillar which ‘embraces all those means by which the European Union seeks to exercise influence in foreign affairs (setting aside exclusively economic or commercial aspects of external relations)’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 57) – should go beyond being anything other than wholly inter-governmental: should, in other words, become supranational (see Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 57–61; Drost, 1995, p. 104).

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13. The only part of the EC/EU to ever secede is Greenland: ‘Until 1953 Greenland was a Danish colony [sic]. After that date it became an integral part of Denmark itself. In January 1973, as part of Denmark, Greenland joined the European Community. In May 1979 Greenland was granted a substantial measure of home rule within Denmark, including the right to hold a referendum on whether to remain inside the Community. The vote was held in February 1982, with a majority in favour of withdrawal. A treaty was accordingly signed in March 1984 ‘amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities’, and Greenland’s departure to take effect in July 1986. Since then, it has been one of the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) of the Community’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 269).

3.

Political Economy

1. The single internal market was formally put in place on 1 January 1993, but in practice was far from completed: ‘The European single market is making progress. As of 15 October [1998], the proportion of directives not yet implemented in at least one EU Member State had fallen to 14.9%, as against 26.7% a year ago (November 1997). This information is contained in the latest edition of the single market scoreboard, published by the European Commission on 3 November [1998]. The Nordic countries have transposed more than 98% of directives, while Ireland and Luxembourg are making slower progress – they still have some 6% of directives to transpose. The most difficult economic sectors in this respect are telecommunications (only one third of the directives have been transposed in all EU countries), government procurement (40%) and transport (47.9%)’ (European Commission, January 1999b, p. 3). 2. On EMU, see Deborah Owen and Peter Cole’s EMU in Perspective: understanding monetary union (1999). 3. One euro (EUR) was deemed equal to 13.7603 Austrian schillings; 2.20371 Dutch guilders; 40.3399 Belgian francs; 5.94573 Finnish markka; 6.55957 French francs; 1.95583 German marks; 0.787564 Irish pounds; 1 936.27 Italian lira; 40.3399 Luxembourg francs; 200.482 Portugese escudos; 166.386 Spanish pesetas (European Commission, February 1999a). 4. See also: The Guardian (editorial), 21 July 1999; Levene and Sherwen, 10 July 1999. 5. In other words, for ‘the first time, the whole of the UK [used] proportional representation, electing 87 MEPs in total’ (European Commission, 10 June 1999, p. 1). 6. Citizens of the European Union are a consititutional and legal category following the introduction of Citizenship of the European Union with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993. On the rights, social implications and social significance involved see Close, 1995a. 7. Although following the election results, according to Hugo Young: ‘For [Tony Blair], the indifference of the majority [of the electorate] is quite as dangerous as the limited reward won by the zealot minority [ . . . ]. By showing they did not care, the majority said they did not believe the European election mattered. Europe did not touch them. Their vote would change nothing. There was little, indeed, to be voted about. It was all a great, distant mystery. One part of the sceptics’ case was thus confirmed: there is apparently little sense [in the UK] of Europe as a political community [ . . . ]. Ministers’ own indifference to the election mimicked the country’s, and endorsed it. Our leaders became part of the national

212

8.

9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

Notes sense that the European elections were completely unimportant’ (Young, 15 June 1999). ‘The Commission intends to propose an EU law on asylum procedures after the Amsterdam Treaty comes into force. The aim is to develop a measure that strikes the right balance between efficiency and fairness in asylum procedures and to find a common minimum level for all EU countries, Commissioner Anita Gradin [has] explained’ (European Commision, 4 March 1999a). See also Peter Hetherington, ‘Black economy booms as crooks eye nice little earner’, The Guardian, 5 July 1999. See Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, The Global Competitiveness Report, 1999. ‘The rankings are based on statistical data and survey responses from about 4,000 business executives, grouped in eight “factors of competiveness” judged to be determinants of long-term growth – openness, government, finance, infrastructure, technology, management, labour and institutions’ (Williams, 14 July 1999). The UK’s rankings within each of the competitiveness categories in 1999 was: openness, 19 (1998, 15); government, 16 (1998, 19); finance, 1; infrastructure, 6 (1998, 7); technology, 22 (1998, 13); management, 19 (1998, 15); labour, 12 (1998, 5); institutions, 3 (1998, 2) – see Atkinson, 16 July 1999. Although, according to ‘a poll published on 16 January [1999], 45% of Norwegians are in favour of their country’s membership of the European Union, with only 40% opposed to it. The Norwegians voted against membership during referendums held in 1972 and 1994’ (European Commission, ‘Seen from abroad’, Frontier-Free Europe, March 1999, p. 4). On poverty and inequality in the UK, see also Aldridge, 27 June 1999; Close, 1995a. On the EU’s acquis communautaire, see Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 4–5. On the related issue of the EU’s participation in European governance, see Close and Ohki-Close, 1999 (Index), p. 252. Also on the UN’s Human Development Report and the issues of global inequalities, see Denny and Brittain, 12 July 1999; Elliott, 12 July 1999. Indeed, the data in the second column are only provisional or estimates in the cases of France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK and the EU-15. The so-called euro-zone, or EU-11, is made up of those countries which joined the single currency at the outset on 1 January 1999. They are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain: ‘From 1 January 1999 the euro is the common curency of 11 European Union (EU) countries [ . . . ]. The national currencies, which will remain in use until 2002, now represent subdivisions of the euro, on the basis of firm and irrevocable conversion rates, fixed by the EU Council of Ministers on 31 December 1998. These rates were fixed on the basis of the rates for the ecu, the former European currency unit, on that day in the exchanges of the countries taking part in the euro. One euro was taken to be equal to one ecu’ (European Commission, February 1999a). Thus, 1 euro (EUR) is equal to 13.7603 Austrian schillings; 2.20371 Dutch guilders; 40.3399 Belgian francs; 5.94573 Finnish markka; 6.55957 French francs; 1.95583 German marks; 0.787564 Irish pounds; 1 936.27 Italian lira; 40.3399 Luxembourg francs; 200.482 Portugese escudos; 166.386 Spanish pesetas (European Commission, February 1999a). See also Alex Brummer (6 July 1999), for whom ‘It’s not Clinton but Alan Greenspan, the wise man from the Fed, who is taking the credit for record growth in the US economy’; and Robin Stoddart (10 July 1999), for whom

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‘Goldilocks is alive and well . . . The world economy is benefiting from the continuing US boom.’ Compare with John Monks’ ‘The EU is OK’, in which we are told: ‘Despite the lack of evidence it seems to be part of Britain’s common sense that Europe has everything to learn from the Anglo Saxon way of doing things [ . . . ]. Pick up any Eurosceptic newspaper and within a week all the following themes will be repeated: “Europe is over regulated”; “All the economies are going down the tube”; “flexible Britain and super-flexible US are doing well”; and something called the European social model “imposes a uniform straightjacket”. The truth is that Britain would be better off if it were more like Europe’ (Monks, 2 June 1999). John Monks is the general secretary of the Trades Union Congress and author of Jobs in Europe – What the Eurosceptics Won’t Tell You, available on www.tuc.org.uk 18. On EU economic growth and recovery, see also Woollacott, 8 August 1999.

4.

Europe and Beyond

1. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1990, p. 734. 2. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1990, p. 659. In the USA and Canada, Labour Day is the first Monday in September. In an article on May Day and ‘New Labour’, Larry Elliott mentions how the ‘Labour Party has always had a soft spot for William Morris’, whose ‘last published writing was to celebrate May Day 103 years ago’ (Elliott, 3 May 1999). Elliott quotes Morris: ‘“Certainly May Day is above all days of the year fitting for the protest of the disinherited against the system of robbery that shuts the door betwixt them and a decent life; the day when the promise of the year reproaches the waste inseparable from the society of inequality, the waste which produces our artificial poverty of civilisation, so much the bitterer for those that suffer under it than the natural poverty of the rudest barbarian.” There was never any chance of this sort of language finding its ways into Labour’s manifesto for the [general] election it fought and won, by a landslide, 101 years later. Morris is one of the names trotted out when new [sic] Labour wants to show that it is not just a movement created in the past five years but is actually rooted in the traditions of democratic socialism. In reality of course [New] Labour’s aim in its first two years in government has to be to show that it is managerially competent’ (Elliott, 3 May 1999). Being ‘managerially competent’ within, over and beyond British society can be regarded as more or less the same thing as being successful in exercising geo-political management, which for me means ‘governance’. 3. See New Statesman (exclusive issue for Guardian readers), 1 May 1999, in which is to be found: ‘New Labour must come clean’ (editorial); Steve Richards, ‘Go on Tony, try and be really brave’; Fay Weldon et al., ‘Labour: the best and the worst’. See also in the same issue, Linda Colley, ‘This country is not so special . . . the historical myths about Britain, the US and Europe’. 4. According to Hugo Young: ‘The Blair Doctrine is an irresistible notion [ . . . ]. Previous [ . . . ] global doctrines [ . . . ] have [likewise] sought to lay down, for their time and place, the principles according to which outside intervention would be declared either legitimate or intolerable. In Chicago last week, Mr Blair proposed the outlines of a “new doctrine of international community” that comes close to claiming a right for Nato to intervene in “other people’s conflicts” wherever this seems the only way to suppress the evils perpetrated by dictators [ . . . ]. The doctrine is a long way from fathering a global catechism [or, that is, (religious)

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instruction by question and answer]. After Kosovo we do not, yet, give you Tibet. On the other hand, there is a wish-list for future geo-politics. Through the fog of war whose ending nobody can yet describe, Nato leaders are thinking about the post-war world. Here, too, the British are taking an important lead. [A number of] zones of change and movement are beginning to be a major pre-occupation for the Prime Minister. First, the [nation-]states in the front line of Serbian aggression. At the [NATO] meeting in Washington last week, no one made a more potent impression than the leaders of Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania [ . . . ]. They’re passionate to see Milosevic destroyed, and Serbia become truly democratic. To this end, it’s unlikely to be long before Nato leaders harden up existing indications about the future of these countries as potential members of both Nato and the European Union. The promises need to be held out, even though they will be difficult to make good. Given the numbers of countries already backed up and waiting to get into both bodies, it will be years before anything can happen. But [ . . . ] it will be surprising if [Mr Blair] fails to deliver a [plan] shaping a future Europe [sic] enlarged to include the south-eastern quadrant. To anyone who raises an eyebrow at [Mr Blair’s] ambition of settling the Balkans, the answer will come back: who’d have thought, 100 years ago, that Germany and France would one day belong to an indissoluble Union? [ . . . ]. [Furthermore], the relationship between the US and Europe is bound to evolve further. Mr Blair’s depiction of himself as the bridge between the two [ . . . ] seems to be gaining war-time credibility [ . . . ]. If the war ends with something like real victory, future Atlantic solidarity will get a boost, and the Blair analysis a striking vindication. In Blair’s world it has become extraordinarily important that the US/EU relationship does not become a zero-sum game of the kind that obsesses France in particular. Not excluded from this forward thinking is the impact of the Balkan crisis on Britain’s own attitudes towards Europe [ . . . ]. If militarily Europe is being led by a strong Britain, and if the campaign succeeds, wouldn’t Britain have proved that Europe belonged to her as much as she to Europe? [The] Blair doctrine can be seen at work in his determination to ensure that, at least, [ . . . ] Europe [will hang] together, and [ . . . ] the Brit is the one who propels them to this unity’ (Young, 29 April 1999; cf. Colley, 1 May 1999). 5. ‘An Inter-Governmental Conference is the term used to describe the negotiations between Member State Governments about changes to the Treaties. These negotiations are concerned with the legal and institutional mechanics of co-operation [ . . . ]. Such conferences can be called at any time by the Member States (Article N of the Treaty on European Union [TEU]). [By mid-1997, there had] been six Intergovernmental Conferences in the history of the [organisation], the sixth [ . . . ] culminating, after more than a year of negotiations between foreign ministers, in the Amsterdam Treaty agreed at the summit of the Member States’ Heads of Government or State in June 1997’ (European Commission, July 1997a, p. 4). 6. See European Commission, July 1997a and July 1997b; and European Parliament Supplement to EUR-OP News, 4 December 1998. Of note is the following: ‘Social legislation across Europe is well-developed in a number of areas, such as freedom of movement for workers, health protection, safety in the workplace and equal opportunities for men and women. The Union gives all European workers the right to move to and live in any Union country and to enjoy the same rights and privileges there (health insurance, social security, retirement benefits, family allowances and so on) as the nationals of the country concerned [ . . . ]. Other initiatives in the area of labour law, for example promoting the practice of informing

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and consulting workers, complete the European legislation so far adopted to meet the requirements of the single [internal] market. There are, however, subjects such as pay and the right to strike or lock workers out, which remain matters purely for national Governments. Other important questions like social security, redundancies and worker representation, require the unanimous agreement of the [ . . . ] Member States. This limits the effect of the Union’s activities. However, in all, the new Treaty gives the Union a greater role in legislation. The Social Protocol incorporated into the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 expressed the determination of all the Union countries – except the United Kingdom, which did not share its partners’ objectives – to make significant advances in social policy. The establishment of European works councils, the right to parental leave for men as well as women, and equal rights for part-time and full-time workers. As the United Kingdom [following the May 1997 general election victory of the Labour Party] has now decided to join the Social Protocol, the Protocol has been incorporated into the Treaty’s provisions on social policy, education, training and youth. This means that the Union can get to grips with wider-ranging problems such as the changes caused by new ways of organizing production and work’ (European Commission, July 1997a, pp. 6–7). 7. See also Andersen and Eliassen, 1993; Daintith, 1995; European Commission, 1999; O’Keefe and Twomey, 1994; Shaw, 1996. 8. April 1999 saw a significant moment in the history of NATO: ‘Today in Washington Nato’s 19 leaders assembling for its 50th anniversary will be in no mood to celebrate half a century of peace or winning the cold war [sic]. Instead they face the most difficult decision most will even make in their political lives. It will have a profound effect on the world for at least the next 50 years – a new world order or no order at all. Either they strengthen their resolve to win [the Kosovo War] or they prove that liberal democracies are unable to act together to oppose tyrany, fatally weakened by the very democracy they seek to fight for’ (Toynbee, 23 April 1999). Here, Polly Toynbee is alluding to the inter-governmental character, or process of decision-making, of NATO. There is nothing ‘supranational’ about NATO, nor for that matter anything which would warrant its categorisation as a proto-supranational regime. Decisions and actions are adopted and carried out on the basis of consensus, or unanimity, and there are no signs whatsoever that NATO will alter its decision-making procedure in favour of the supranational variety. This is not to ignore the obvious point that NATO’s decisions and actions are taken by Member States that are highly unequally placed in relation to each other in terms of their power and influence. But, what about if NATO or something like it – such as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), for example – was to become supranational in character, how could it be described? Well, it seems to me that the alternatives include ‘supranational sectoral regime’ and ‘supranational functional regime’ (SFR). On balance, generally speaking, the latter is preferable if only to avoid confusion when it comes to using abbreviations. 9. According to Graham Bowley, the OECD was ‘created [ . . . ] as an economic bulwark against communism’, but more recently: ‘Globalisation is [ . . . ] what is happening to the OECD – its membership has expanded by 5 to 29 member countries since 1994, and many more nations are knocking at the door. Some fear this expansion is making decision making more difficult within the organisation and is diluting what the OECD stands for – member countries are required to be economically and politically open, as well as democratic’ (Bowley, 21 February

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1997). Gillian Tett and Guy de Jonquières argue that ‘the organisation’s exclusivity poses a problem. Though trade with emerging markets is vital for western growth, Mexico is the only developing country to belong to the OECD. Hungary and the Czech republic [sic] recently entered, and Poland is expected to do so soon. Last month, Russia startled OECD ministers by applying to join’ (Tett and de Jonquières, 3 June 1996). At the end of the 1990s, Mexico remained the only developing country member of the OECD, it having been the last country to join before the first one from what had been the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. Then, Mark Atkinson reported: ‘Rich western [countries] today throw open the doors of their exclusive Paris club to non-members in recognition of the increasingly important role of developing countries in the global economy. For the first time, part of the annual ministerial meeting of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the developed countries’ think-tank, will be attended by outsiders, including economic heavy weights such as China, Russia and India. Having admitted nine new members since its foundation, and with another one, the Slovak Republic, in the antechamber, the club is thought to have little enthusiasm for enlargement, fearing it will become unwieldy like the United Nations. However, the OECD recognises it needs to become more open and outward looking in a world of closer social, environmental and economic links. Secretary-general Donald Johnson said the OECD had been overtaken by globalisation [ . . . ]. Pointing out that in 20 years’ time non-OECD members will account for more global output than the 29 member countries’ (Atkinson, 26 May 1999). 10. Nancy Dunne provides more detail: ‘The US yesterday said it would challenge the European Union in the World Trade Organisation over subsidies granted by France for the development of a new flight management system for the European Airbus. The WTO case is one of seven announced by the US yesterday. The others are against the EU over “geographical indications” of food and farm products, South Korea over beef and airport procurement, India over its car market and Argentina and Canada over patent protection [ . . . ]. In Brussels, the European Commission reacted relatively calmly to Washington’s announcement, made as part of a review of other countries’ trade practices. A senior official said the WTO cases were unlikely to trigger big new transatlantic conflicts. The US and EU have only recently called a truce over banana imports and aircraft noise regulations and are struggling to settle differences over an EU ban on hormone-treated beef. The US has complained for years about European aid to Airbus, insisting it lacks transparency and violates a 1992 US–EU agreement on civil aircraft subsidies. However, it has been reluctant to bring trade cases, partly for fear that EU airlines would retaliate by failing to buy US-made aircraft. But gains by Airbus have alarmed Boeing, the giant, remaining US aircraft manufacturer. The European consortium recently said it would compete with Boeing’s new 717 by building a new 100-seat jet. For all of last year it came close to claiming 50 per cent market share. The moves are seen partly as an effort to show the US Congress and public that the WTO can bring results. This is deemed important in the run-up to a possible new round of world trade talks’ (Dunne, 1 May 1999). 11. The ‘presidency of the EU’ is ‘shorthand for the presidency of the Council of the European Union or Council of Ministers, the main decision-making body’ of the EU. It is held in turn by each Member State for six months (Drost, 1995, p. 490). 12. The twelve Balkan countries, or nation-states, are Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova (Moldavia), Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

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13. The notion of ‘international regime’ has been defined by Alec Stone as ‘institutionalized cooperation among sovereign states’ (Stone, 1994, p. 442). 14. Peterson refers here to J. Caporaso (1996), but see also David Held’s Democracy and the Global Order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance (1995), reviewed by Krishan Kumar (November 1996). My notion also has similarities with that used in relation to corporate management, as in an April 1999 newspaper article by Lisa Buckingham and Roger Cowe on how ‘[c]orporate hazard management is being overhauled’, it being reported that a ‘director of one of Britain’s largest firms said: “Corporate governance is completely revolutionising the way we look at the risk management function [ . . . ]”’ (Buckingham and Cowe, 20 April 1999). 15. For assessments of the EU’s involvement in Balkan affairs, and in particular the geo-political management (governance) of the region, see Stjepan Mestrovic, The Balkanization of the West, 1994; Close, 1995a; Close and Ohki-Close, 1999. 16. Charles de Gaulle was born in 1890. After entering ‘Paris at the head of one of the earliest liberation forces in August 1944’, he ‘became head of the provisional government of France in 1944’ (Magnusson, 1990, p. 400); prime minister until 1946; and president from 1958 until 1969 (Drost, 1995, p. 251). He was elected as the ‘first president of the Fifth Republic in December 1959’; he ‘blocked Britain’s entry into the Common Market in 1962–3 and 1967’; in ‘1965 he was re-elected’ as President, but ‘only by a second vote’; ‘in April 1969 he was forced to resign as president after the defeat of his referendum proposals for senate and regional reforms’ (Magnusson, 1990, p. 400). He died in 1970. 17. Historically, these include the Roman emperors, Charlemagne, Charles V and Napoleon, as well as Hitler (Charles de Gaulle, ‘A concert of European States’, in Brent Nelsen and Alexander Stubb (eds.), The European Union: readings on the practice and theory of European integration, London, 1994, p. 31 – reprinted from ‘Europe’ in Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: renewal and endeavour (1971). 18. The so-called Luxembourg Compromise represented an imposed and enforced rejection of supranational decision-making in the Council of Ministers by one member of the Six, and indeed more precisely by the President of France, Charles de Gaulle: ‘The Luxembourg Compromise was an informal arrangement, arrived at by the Six in January 1966, whereby the decisions which the Treaty of Rome foresaw being taken by majority voting in the Council of Ministers could be postponed until unanimous agreement had been reached. Its effect was to create a national veto over all key decisions, and for at least 17 years it acted as a constraint in many important areas of policy. Although in some quarters it is believed that the Luxembourg Compromise still exists, it no longer has any discernible bearing on the way the Union functions. Majority voting now applies in all areas where it is provided for in the [founding] Treaties. A [Member State] can veto a proposal only if unanimity is explicitly specified as the decision-making method. The Luxembourg Compromise resolved an acute crisis in the Community’s development, which had two linked but distinct components. The first was the rejection by France in June 1965 of a series of key proposals: on the functioning of the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) [and] the widening of the budgetry powers of the European Parliament [among other matters]. The second was the outright refusal by France to accept that, when the so-called “thirdstage” of the transitional phase of the Community’s development came into effect in January 1966, majority voting should automatically be introduced on a significant range of issues in the Council. So long as these important problems

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remained unresolved, the President of France, Charles de Gaulle, instructed his ministers to boycott all Council meetings during the second half of 1965 – a period that conveniently coincided with his re-election to office [in France] (for the first time by universal suffrage) at the end of the year. The empty chair crisis, as it became known, effectively immobilized Community decision-making and delivered a severe blow to the prospect of closer European integration’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 308–9). 19. One irony here is how, at the time of her speech, Margaret Thatcher was the prime minister of what is widely regarded as a highly politically centralised United Kingdom. For instance, Will Hutton argues: ‘British democracy [suffers] from structural deformations’, at the forefront of which is the ‘centralisation of government’ (Hutton, 1996, pp. xi–xii). Hutton criticises ‘Britain’s acutely top-down form of governance [and] wide use of executive discretion [which] derive from [its] constitutional arrangements’ (ibid., pp. xxi–xxii). He explains: ‘The constitution, which defines the responsibilities and institutions of government, is [ . . . ] a central determinant of how the country is governed. Yet Britain has no written constitution. During the twentieth century it has been content to work with the legacy of previous centuries and govern the country through its unwritten constitution, which can be defined in a sentence: whatever the Crown assents to in Parliament is law’ (ibid., p. xxviii). At the same time: ‘Monarchical power has passed in effect to the majority party in the House of Commons. There are no limits to the centre’s capacity to take power away from the regions and local authorities. The executive branch is held only nominally accountable to Parliament’ (ibid., p. 3). But, the UK is even more political centralised than this infers: ‘The Prime Minister is appointed by the monarch and is normally the leader of the majority party in the [House of ] Commons. His or her power stems from majority support in Parliament; the authority to choose and dismiss ministers; the leadership of the party in the country; and control over policy making [ . . . ]. The Prime Minister consequently has great power within the British system of government, and it is suggested that the office has become like an all-powerful executive presidency [ . . . ]. [There] is a greater emphasis upon prime ministerial government today, [compared with] the traditional constitutional notions of Cabinet government. The Cabinet is a small executive body within the government [ . . . ]. Constitutional theory has traditionally argued that government rule is Cabinet rule [ . . . ]. But this notion has weakened. Since the Prime Minister is responsible for Cabinet agendas and controls Cabinet proceedings, the Cabinet can become a “rubber-stamp” to policies that have already been decided by the Prime Minister or smaller groups’ (Oakland, 1998, pp. 103–4). Hutton’s stark conclusion is that ‘Britain’s unique unwritten constitution and its quasi-feudal state handed down intact from the seventeenth century’ means a ‘lack of checks and balances [and] the most centralised state in the industrialised world. The effects of [Margaret Thatcher’s] market experiment have been most pervasive in Britain because the political system allows a determined government to do what it will without let or hindrance’ (Hutton, 1996, p. 22). 20. Nelsen and Stubb reprint Churchill’s 1946 Zurich speech under the heading ‘The tragedy of Europe’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 5–9). See: Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: his complete speeches, 1897–1963, vol. VII, 1943–1949, NY: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974. 21. ‘Except for Communism in Cuba, China and Southeast Asia’ (Ambrose, 1993, p. 374). Of course, it must be noted, the USA has a long history as a major coloniser

Notes

22.

23.

24.

25.

26. 27.

28.

29.

30.

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in the conventional, traditional sense – that is, apart from its colonisation through cultural imperialism and, relatedly, global economic, political and military hegemony. ‘Within less than a year of [President George] Bush’s declaration [in November 1990] that the Cold War was over, two crises erupted, one in the Persian Gulf and one in Yugoslavia’ (Ambrose, 1993, p. 377). The questions of the way in which ‘international law imposes restrictions upon states, which are not [therefore] allowed to act as they please [even] within their’ own territories, and of the rights and responsibilities of other states in the event of a state infringing international law are what were addressed by the UK’s Law Lords in November 1998 in the particular case of Augusto Pinochet, the former President and dictator of Chile. On 22 November 1998, Pinochet arrived in London to undergo back surgery at the London Clinic near Harley Street; after London’s Metropolitan Police had been contacted by a Madrid court via Interpol, a provisional warrant for Pinochet’s arrest was issued; on 16 October, Pinochet was put under arrest while he was still in his hospital bed; on 28 October, the High Court ruled that Pinochet’s arrest was illegal, but he was kept in custody pending an Appeal against that ruling – an Appeal which had to go to the House of Lords; on 6 November, Spain issued a formal extradition request on the grounds of Pinochet’s alleged part in international crimes against Spanish nationals in Chile during his period as Chile’s head of state; and on 24 November five Law Lords declared a three-to-two split decision in support of permitting the extradition process to go ahead (Ian Black, ‘How the drama unfolded’, The Guardian, 26 November 1998). On the distinction between supranational decision-making through the Council of Ministers and supranational decision-taking through the ECJ, see Shaw, 1996, pp. 13–15. According to The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (1990), the word ‘legacy’ is a noun which means ‘a gift in a will’; or ‘something handed down by a predecessor’. The origins of the word can be traced to the Latin legare, meaning ‘bequeath’ (ibid., p. 676). To ‘bequeath’ means to ‘leave (a personal estate) to a person by a will’; or to ‘hand down to posterity’. A ‘bequest’ is then ‘an act or an instance of bequeathing’; or ‘a thing bequeathed’ (ibid., p. 103). The origins of the words ‘bequeath’ and ‘bequest’ are Old English. The word ‘posterity’ is a noun which means ‘all succeeding generations’; or ‘the descendents of a person’ (ibid., p. 931). For examinations of nationalism, see Anderson, 1996; Calhoun, 1997; McCrone, 1998. See Jean Monnet, ‘A ferment of change’ in Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 17–24, reprinted from Journal of Common Market Studies, 1, 1, 1962, pp. 203–11 (Blackwell Publishers); and David Mitrany, ‘A working peace system’, in Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, pp. 77–97, reprinted from A Working Peace System, 1966. Apart from Wilkinson’s account, on East Asia see Hugh Cortazzi, Modern Japan: a concise survey (London, 1993); Chris Dixon, South East Asia in the World Economy (Cambridge, 1991); George T. Yu, Asia’s New World Order (London, 1997). By 1998 Burma, Laos and Vietnam had joined ASEAN. Cambodia might have joined, but its accession was put on hold given its continuing political turmoil. Cambodia was subsequently admitted in April 1999. In this regard, we can note how, according to Jonathan Watts, in mid-1999 Japan was ‘torn by [a] row over [a] shrine to wartime dead’ (Watts, 14 August 1999): ‘with war criminals enshrined alongside kamikaze pilots and more than [two million] others, [the Yasukuni shrine] has also proved the focus for the conflict

220

31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

36.

37.

Notes over Japan’s militaristic past. Cabinet ministers who plan to attend the memorial service [on 15 August] have come under fire from pacifists for sanctioning the past and violating the constitutional separation of state and religion. Those who are staying away have drawn fire from nationalists for neglecting the sacrifices of the war-time generation’ (Watts, 14 August 1999). On China, see George Bull, ‘China’s global challenge’, Euro Japanese Journal, vol. IV, no. 1, 1997. See note 26 above. David McCrone reports: ‘Some scholars such as Connor [1994, ch. 8] have pointed out that very few so-called nation-states are actually such (he claims less than 10 per cent in 1971), and historical sociologists like Charles Tilly are at pains to distinguish between “nation-states” and “national states” which are governed by common political and institutional structures. He comments that [there have been] very few European [ . . . ] nation-states (possibly Sweden and Ireland), and that “Great Britain, Germany and France – quintessential national states – certainly have never met the test” [Tilly, 1992, p. 31]’ (McCrone, 1998, p. 7). In support of McCrone’s approach to ‘nationalism’, see Brubaker (1992, 1996); Anderson (1983; 1996a, 1996b); Smith (1981, 1986, 1996); Nairn (1977, 1997). See: Larry Elliott and Mark Atkinson, ‘The Tory Legacy’, The Guardian, 13 March 1998. Elliott and Atkinson argue: ‘Tony Blair and his ministers seem to have been left with a particularly difficult legacy, in part because the sheer longevity of the previous regime gave it time to treat Britain as a laboratory for a free-market experiment in which deregulation, privatisation, cutting red tape, downsizing the public sector and reducing state spending were seen as the way to putting the country on the path to higher growth and prosperity.’ On a topical note, in mid-1998, I also came across an article by John Broder on ‘The Lewinsky legacy’, published by the Asahi Evening News (Japan), 7 August 1998 (originally published in the New York Times). A week earlier, I spotted Terence Corcoran’s ‘Radical feminism’s absurd legacy’, published in The Globe and Mail (Canada), 31 July 1998. And, according to Margaret Thatcher, ‘We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any other nation. Our links to the rest of Europe, the continent of Europe, have been the dominant factor in our history’ (Margaret Thatcher, ‘A family of nations’, in Nelsen and Stubb (eds.), The European Union, 1994, p. 46 (my italics) – reprinted from Mrs Thatcher’s speech at the College of Europe in Bruges on 20 September 1988). In this speech, Thatcher ‘placed Britain firmly in Europe but rejected the notion that “Europe” meant the absorption of Britain – and all the other member states – into a single, bureaucratized “super-state” [ . . . ]. Her vision of Europe [was] as a “family of nations” – which mirrors de Gaulle’s [and] represents well the traditional British approach to integration, [challenging as it does] the federalist vision of the founders [ . . . ] of the Community’ (Nelsen and Stubb, 1994, p. 46). See also, John Blair, ‘Anne Frank’s legacy’, The Guardian, 15 October 1998. See also: Gordon Turnbull, ‘Don’t give me any lip’, The Guardian, 18 April 1998: ‘We are now a nation of sentimentalists. According to the Social Affairs Unit, which has published a book called Faking It – The Sentimentalisation of Modern Society, we have become self-indulgent and obsessed with our own feelings, the legacy of the “self-centred” Princess Diana’ (my italics). The term ‘legacy’ has been employed specifically in relation to the drive towards ever greater, more thorough European integration around the EU. Thus, in 1993 The European newspaper (in its Maastricht Made Simple supplement) published an

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article headed ‘The legacy of Edinburgh’, a reference to the European Council summit meeting which took place on 11 and 12 December 1992, its machinations and outcomes: ‘The challenge facing government leaders as they gathered in Edinburgh’s historic Holyrood Palace was essentially to make the Maastricht Treaty more palatable to Europe’s citizens in general, and the Danes in particular [ . . . ]. The summit’s first task was to dispel any Danish anxiety about elements of the Maastricht Treaty, particularly those sections dealing with defence, a single currency, citizenship and police co-operation. Until Denmark ratified Maastricht, the Treaty could not come into force [ . . . ]. The feat was achieved by agreeing a series of decisions and declarations that essentially [clarified] wording in the treaty and which [was then] put to the Danish electorate when it [voted] in a second referendum [on the Treaty on 18 May 1993]’ (The European, supplement on Maastricht Made Simple, ‘The legacy of Edinburgh’, 1993, p. 38). The Treaty on European Union was agreed at a European Council summit in Maastricht on 11 December 1991, was signed on behalf of the Twelve on 7 February 1992, before eventually coming ‘into force on 1 December 1993, 10 months after the projected date. The ratification process was delayed because the Treaty proved highly controversial in Denmark, where voters rejected it in a referendum in June 1992 and only approved it the following May after the government had negotiated several “opt outs” from its provisions’ (Drost, 1995, p. 602). That is, the ‘Maastricht treaty [ . . . ] failed to secure the necessary fivesixths majority in the Danish Parliament, and in the referendum that followed (2 June 1992) it was defeated by 50.7 to 49.3 per cent of the vote. The following month the other governments decided to press ahead with ratification, even though technically the Treaty could not enter into force without having been ratified by all 12 member states. A referendum in Ireland followed on 18 June 1992, the Treaty securing 67 per cent majority. In July President Mitterrand announced that the Treaty would also be submitted to a referendum in France, even though there was no constitutional requirement to this effect. The referendum took place on 20 September, four days after the events of “Black Wednesday” [had] forced both the [British] pound and the [Italian] lira out of the [Exchange Rate Mechanism] (ERM), and resulted in a tiny majority of only 51.05 per cent for the Treaty’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, pp. 316–17). At the Edinburgh summit, to ‘alay fears that Danish citizenship might be devalued [ . . . ], the summit expressly noted that the new European citizenship provided for in [the] Maastricht [Treaty] would give [the] individual extra rights and protection. It would not deprive them [sic] of their existing citizenship. Moreover, Danish law alone [would] determine whether other [EU] nationals [could] become Danish [nationals]. On monetary union, [the summit] recognised Denmark’s decision, announced the year previously at [the] Maastricht [summit], to join the United Kingdom in not taking part in the third stage of [Economic and Monetary Union], with its single currency and new rules on economic policy and co-ordination’ (The European, ‘The legacy of Edinburgh’, 1993, pp. 38–9). In other words, as Bainbridge and Teasdale put it: ‘At the European Council meeting in December [1992] Denmark was granted a permanent opt-out from stage three of EMU, and received the necessary clarifications on citizenship; [and furthermore,] Denmark’s non-participation in “decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications” was formally recognized’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 317). ‘A second referendum was held on 18 May 1993, the Treaty securing a majority of 56.8 per cent’ (Bainbridge and

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Notes Teasdale, 1996, p. 317). While the Danish referendum results were of considerable importance to the process whereby the Maastricht Treaty was finally ratified, according to Bainbridge and Teasdale, it ‘was in the United Kingdom that ratification posed the most serious problems. The result of the April 1992 general election gave John Major’s Conservative Government a much smaller majority, giving the Conservative MPs most hostile to European integration in general and the Treaty in particular much greater influence. The Government promised that although the “clause by clause, line by line” examination of the Maastricht Treaty could be started, ratification could not be completed until the result of the Danish referendum was known. The Labour Party, although not opposed to the Treaty, was fiercely critical of the [British] opt-out from the Social Chapter, and [ . . . ] exulted in the Government’s discomfiture. The passage of the Bill through the House of Commons was slow and acrimonious. The final vote, on 24 July 1993, was won by a very narrow majority, achieved only by a threat to dissolve Parliament and call an election’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 317). However, it was neither the Danes nor the UK’s House of Commons which were responsible for the final ratification being delayed until November 1993: ‘the last Member State to ratify the Treaty was Germany, where anti-Maastricht campaigners had succeeded in referring the Treaty to the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. The legal arguments were not resolved until a ruling in favour of ratification on 12 October 1993, allowing the Treaty to enter into force the following month [ . . . ]’ (Bainbridge and Teasdale, 1996, p. 317). See also: Deidre Curtin and Ronald van Ooik, ‘Denmark and the Ediburgh summit: Maastricht without tears’, in David O’Keefe and Patrick Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (1994), ch. 23; David Barker, Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlow, ‘The parliamentary siege of Maastricht’, Political Affairs, vol. 47, no. 1, January 1994; Matthais Herdegen, ‘Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: constitutional restraints for an ever closer union’, Common Market Review, vol. 31/2, April 1994.

5.

Europe, Globalisation and the Asia Pacific

1. Anthony Woodiwiss, ‘Review essay: searching for signs of globalisation’, Sociology ( Journal of the British Sociological Association), vol. 30, no. 4, November 1996, pp. 799–810. Woodiwiss reviews five books: Barrie Axford, The Global System: economics, politics and culture (Cambridge, 1995); Tony Spybey, Globalization and World Society (Cambridge, 1996); Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, Globalization in Question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance (Cambridge, 1996); M. Featherstone, Undoing Culture: globalization, postmodernism and identity (London, 1995); Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: states and industrial transformation (Princeton, 1995). 2. Woodiwiss also refers to ‘Roland Robertson’s [ . . . ] helpful epigrammatic definition of globalisation as involving the “interpenetration of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism”’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 804). This definition, claims Woodiwiss, reflects the way Robertson is ‘struggling to maintain a sense of the openness of the globalisation process to multiple influences whatever their provenance’ (ibid., p. 804), including to ‘“non-western” influences’ (ibid., p. 804). 3. See also Axford’s ‘specification of the “axial features of globali[z]ation” [Axford, 1995] pp. 28–31’ (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 801).

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4. For the ‘strongest formulations’, as Woodiwiss puts it, of ‘“reflexive modernity”’, see Beck, 1992; Lash and Urry, 1994 (Woodiwiss, 1996, p. 803). See also Close, 1995a. 5. Giddens slips between the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation-state’ (at least in the passages being referred to here) as if they are interchangeable or synonymous, something which is far from uncommon in sociological and other literature; as is the similar, and occasionally inclusive, practice of slipping between the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ (see, for instance, Krishan Kumar’s review of David Held’s Democracy and the Global Order: from the modern state to cosmopolitan governance, 1995, in Sociology, November 1996, pp. 839–40). But see also Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, 1983), ch. 1; W. Connor, ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a . . . ’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, 1978, pp. 379–88; and Roger Jowell et al., British Social Attitudes – the 13th report (Aldershot, 1996). Roger Jowell recommends adhering to a ‘distinction between nation and state’ in contrast to the way ‘[t]hese separate words have been commonly used as interchangeable abbreviations for a much more specific entity – the nation-state’ ( Jowell et al., 1996, p. 153). Jowell claims that the ‘hyphenated term [nation-state] was coined specifically to describe the case of a territorial-political unit (the state) whose borders coincided with the territorial distribution of a national group (the nation). Such nation-states are less common than is often imagined [and] Britain is not among them’ (Jowell et al., 1996, p. 153). Similarly, for me, it is useful to distinguish between the terms ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘nationstate’, even though my definitions are not wholly consistent with those of Jowell and his colleagues. For me, ‘the state’ is primarily a political institutions, apparatus or agency, or set of political institutions, apparatuses or agencies. Likewise, Ernest Gellner’s approach to the definition of ‘state’ (Gellner, 1983, p. 4) hinges on the idea that it ‘is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else it may be concerned with). The state exists where specialized order-enforcing agencies, such as police forces and courts, have separated out from the rest of social life. They are the state’ (Gellner, 1983, p. 4). In addition, however, I concur with Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O’Leary (Theories of the State, London, 1987), for whom the state (a) ‘is a recognizably separate institution or set of institutions, so differentiated from the rest of society as to create identifiable public and private spheres’; and (b) ‘is sovereign, or the supreme power, within its territory, and by definition the ultimate authority for all law, i.e. binding rules supported by coercive sanctions. Public law is made by state officials and backed by a formal monopoly of force’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987, p. 2). For me, ‘the state’ in general terms is a arrangement, configuration or framework of political institutions, agencies or apparatuses which (apart from anything, and if nothing, else) tries to maintain (to paraphrase Gellner) social order through establishing and asserting itself as sovereign, or the supreme power, within a society and territory (Dunleavy and O’Leary), or geo-political sphere. In so far as a particular state is successful in establishing itself as sovereign within a particular society and territory, the resulting geo-political sphere or social formation can be referred to as a nationstate. Of course, this begs the question of the empirical relationship between the prevailing set of more or less established nation-states and the concurrent assortment of ‘nations’. My notion of ‘nation-state’ does not presume any neat and tidy correspondence between ‘nation-states’ and ‘nations’. Gellner tells us: ‘Nationalism holds that [nations and states are] destined for each other’

224

6.

7.

8.

9.

Notes (Gellner, 1983, p. 6). But, in practice, the relationship between nation-states and nations is both complex and shifting, something which may help account for the history and pattern of ‘nationalism’. What contributes to the complexity of the relationship, or at least to the complications of empirically discovering the contours of the relationship, is quite simply the problem of defining ‘nation’ (something not attempted by Jowell and his colleagues). As pointed out by Gellner, the ‘definition of nation presents difficulties graver than those attendent on the definition of the state’ (Gellner, 1983, p. 5) – although Gellner makes it clear that for him ‘nations’ are rooted in a combination of ‘culture’ and identity (or ‘recognition’) (Gellner, 1983, pp. 6–7). If so, then it would be far from surprising to learn that not only Britain as a nation-state (in my sense) but also most, even all, nation-states sustain highly complex relationships with various, often numerous, ‘nations’. See, for instance, Jo Shaw (1993, 1996), who has pointed out that ‘the Court of Justice has consistently distanced the Community legal system from “ordinary” international law, arguing that by accession to the Community the Member States have transferred sovereign rights to the Community, creating an autonomous legal system in which the subjects are not just states, but also individuals’ (Shaw, 1993, p. 14). For a more up-to-date and elaborate version of the same point, see Shaw’s Law of the European Union (Shaw, 1996, pp. 17–20). On the ‘concept of “competence”, and system of limited powers’ within the European Community and Union, see Jo Shaw’s Law of the European Union (1996), especially pp. 70–1. In a newspaper article in December 1996, Andrew Phillips argues that within the European Union there is ‘a struggle for supremacy between politics (compromise) and regulation (inflexibility) [and] it is the bureaucrats and lawyers who usually rule the roost. They are the high priests of the new European order’ (Phillips, 15 December 1996). In this context, Phillips mentions how in ‘a judgement [in November 1996,] the European Court [rejected] the UK Government’s claim that the forced introduction of the Social Chapter [in Britain] would be a breach of the principle of subsidiarity’ as spelled out in the Treaty on European Union (Phillips, 15 December 1996); and so in effect a breach of the decision – at Britain’s insistence – against including the proposed Social Chapter in the final Treaty, or that is against the decision in favour of relegating the contents of the proposed Social Chapter to the status of a Social Protocol in the final Treaty. A few days later in another newspaper article, David Brindle reported how the ‘European Court of Justice [was preparing] to rule on whether the [British] Government’s “habitual residence test” for [social] benefit entitlement breaches European law [ . . . ]. A spokesman for the Department of Social Security [in Britian] said: “It would have implications if they say there are European rules which override our own”’ (Brindle, 23 December 1996). Here, the significance for present purposes is that, because EU law has supremacy over British law, the implications of a decision by the ECJ against the British government include a requirement on the latter to alter British law and practices with regard to social benefit entitlements so that these laws and practices fully correspond with the Court’s interpretation of EC law and practices. See Alec Stone (1994), for whom ‘the EU regime has been “constitutionalized”’ (1994, p. 448); and ‘European integration’ is to be seen as ‘a dynamic process of supranational constitution-building that [has] culminated in the Treaty on European Union (1992)’ (1994, p. 468).

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10. See, for instance Anthony Smith, Varieties of Nationalism, 1981, 1986, 1996; 1983; Krishan Kumar, in Sociology, November 1996, p. 839. 11. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) ended the Thirty Years War and is credited with having paved the way for the establishment in practice of the ‘Westphalian model’ of modern, European nation-states. 12. Hedley Bull’s ‘“neo-medieval” order of divided and overlapping sovereignties, in which states share their authority over their citizens with democratically controlled regional and global institutions on the one hand, and sub-state and sub-national units on the other’ (see Kumar, 1996). 13. The European Court of Human Rights is an institution of the Council of Europe responsible for examining and adjudicating on alleged breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights (see Drost, 1995, pp. 121–3, 193–5). 14. Here, what arises are the linked issues of (a) cultural and civilisational interaction, clash and conflict; (b) cultural and civilisational hierarchical global influence and ‘power’; and (c) in particular that civilisational interaction, clash and conflict involving the continuing global influence and ‘power’ of the Western cultural account, as labelled by Axford (1995, p. 2, following Meyer et al., 1987, p. 29; see also Axford, 1995, chapters 6 and 7). As Axford points out, ‘the concept and fear of civilizational conflict [is] offered by some observers as the defining conflict of the post-Cold-War age (Huntington, 1993). Such at any rate is the argument of Samuel Huntington (1993) [for whom] civilizational identities – he refers to the Western but also the Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibily African – will be the principal source of global politics in the post-Cold War world, superseding the Western model of international politics based on the nation-state and the conflict of ideologies which informed the Cold War [ . . . ]. This cultural shift in global politics is due to a number of factors. The first is that civilizational differences are fundamental and far more enduring than modern political ideologies and particular regimes. Civilization[al] “fault lines”, says Huntington are always there, and with the end of the Cold War and the faltering in the ascendency of the Western cultural account they have been uncovered once again ([Huntington], 1993, p. 29)’ (Axford, 1995, p. 191; see also Ohmae, 1995, pp. 10–16). More recently, Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order has been published (1996), having been reviewed by Martin Wolf (1996). As Wolf tells us, Huntington’s ‘thesis [ . . . ] rests on six legs: [f]or the first time in history, global politics is being played among powers that belong to different civilisations’; the ‘new world order will be based on three civilisations – the chief protagonists being the western, Sini (i.e. Chinese), Islamic, Hindu, Japanese and Orthodox Christian’; the ‘west, though still much the most powerful civilisation, is in relative decline’; ‘“The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of western arrogance, Islamic intollerance, and Sinic assertiveness.”’; also, ‘“the survival of the west depends on Americans re-affirming their western identity and westerners accepting their civilisation as unique and not universal”’; finally, ‘“avoidance of a global war of civilisations depends on world leaders [ . . . ] co-operating to maintain the multi-civilisational character of global politics”’ (Wolf, 30 December 1996). Wolf goes on to tell us that Huntington ‘correctly insists that [ . . . ] changes [in favour of western ideas, or modernisation, and so of greater political participation and personal freedom] are beyond the west’s power to impose. [Huntington] argues that “western belief in the universality of western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous”.

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It is immoral because it is imperialist, and dangerous because [it is] implicitly bellicose. The west has neither the right nor the power to re-make the world in its own image’ (ibid.). Wolf, however, then asks whether, in so far as ‘convergence on the western values of democracy and human rights is uncertain and, at best, [slow, does] this necessitate conflict? “Of course not” is [Wolf’s] answer’ (ibid.). Although Huntington foresees a world of ‘mistrust, conflict and even war’, what ‘he describes is merely a world of differences’ (ibid.), differences which will not necessarily be transposed into major, global conflict(s). Likewise, for me, the West (essentially, or centred on, Europe plus North America) no longer enjoys the global (economic, political, military) power or clout (see Axford, 1995, ch. 7) to impose its civilisation (cultures, life styles) on the rest of the world, and especially on the Pacific Asia sector of the Asia Pacific region. Instead, culturally and civilisationally there is a considerable degree of two-way traffic between the Occident and the Orient rooted in an underlying, determining re-distribution of global power towards the Orient, the Asia Pacific region and, especially, the East Asia sector (covering north east Asia and south east Asia) of the Asia Pacific region. This shift of global (economic, political and to some extent military) power both helps to account for and, in turn, is partially to be accounted for in terms of the development of Asia Pacific regional regimes and proto-SRRs, which while having (as a type of social form) originated in the West (in Europe), have spread to the Asia Pacific region, along with the Americas and other regions and sub-regions of the world. Having been widely disseminated, proto-SRRs have become embroiled in what they are in part a product of – that is, of competitive struggles (entailing degress of conflict) among themselves and various other global players, across a range of global (geo-political, cultural) regions and sub-regions. One outcome of these struggles, reflecting the shifts which have taken place and are continuing to take place in the global distribution of power, is that the original SRR (now the EU) is under pressure to re-form, to reorganise, to (geo-politically) expand and to (institutionally) deepen. Of considerable importance in this regard is the economic and political (and to some extent military) ascendancy, and so perceived or experienced, threat of the Asia Pacific region with its embyonic SRRs. The EU is under pressure to re-form in response to the competition and success of Asia Pacific regional regimes, and even in line with the culturally and civilisationally specific, conditioned and distinctive form(s), style(s) and image(s) of these particular regimes. 15. When Ohmae elucidates what he has in mind by the flows, movements and mobility (Ohmae, 1995, pp. 2–4) of ‘the 4 “I’s”’ (ibid., p. 2), he otherwise refers to ‘individuals’ as ‘individual consumers’ (ibid., p. 4) – these ‘having become more global in orientation. With better access to information about lifestyles around the globe’, individual consumers ‘increasingly want the best and cheapest products, no matter where they come from’ (ibid., p. 4). Of course, Ohmae’s representation of what would appear to be akin to a modern, or indeed postmodern, global consumer culture is somewhat simplistic (see Axford, 1995, ch. 1; Close, 1995a; Robertson, 1990; Smart, 1992; Walters, 1995; Woodiwiss, 1993). However, I wish to point out that when it comes to this particular global flow, an obvious manifestation is to be found in the area of travel, and perhaps especially long distance (inter-national, inter-regional, inter-civilizational) travel. In 1987 just over 1.0 billion (1 000 000 000) passengers ‘travelled on domestic and international scheduled flights’ (Skapinker, 30 December 1996); but by 1996, this figure had risen to 1.35 billion. Among these passengers are those who travelled on

Notes

16.

17. 18.

19.

20.

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international flights, and almost ‘twice as many people flew on international flights [during 1996] than in 1987, when the number was 222’ million (ibid.). Ohmae’s economistic account of globalisation and the decline of the nationstate in favour of ‘region-states’ (a perhaps unfortunate phrase given the usual approaches to defining ‘the state’), resembles not only Giddens’ but also other notable versions, including Immanuel Wallerstein’s. But, Ohmae’s account remains at odds with Gellner’s argument concerning the relationships between ‘nation-states’, ‘nations’ and ‘nationalism’ (see, for instance, Gellner 1983, 1994); as well as with a wide range of other writings, most notably those specifically concerned with the character, ‘causes’ and consequences of nations and nationalism in both Europe and elsewhere. NAFTA is an acronym for ‘North American Free Trade Agreement’ (or ‘Act’), not ‘North American Free Trade Act’. G7, or the Group of Seven, has been described as consisting of ‘the seven wealthiest nations in the world: the USA, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Canada’ (Upsall, 1991, p. 152); of ‘the most powerful industrial countries’ (Norton-Taylor and Black, 29 June 1996); and of ‘the seven largest industrial countries’ (Brummer, 28 June 1996). According to Michael Upsall in his 1991 summary of the Group of Seven, since ‘1975 the heads of government of these seven countries have met annually [ . . . ] primarily to discuss economic matters but in recent years have moved more into the political arena [ . . . ]. Perhaps the strongest message to emerge from the 1991 London summit was that G7 is now a solid part of international politics and may well find it necessary to establish some sort of permanent secretariat to ensure that the decisions it takes are followed through and implemented’ (Upsall, 1991, p. 152). Consistent with this shift, Richard Norton-Taylor and Ian Black reported that the G7 summit held in Lyon in June 1996 ‘trumpeted a new crusade against terrorism [ . . . ]. The 40-point anti-terrorist plan announced at the G7 summit in Lyon was a political imperative for President Clinton [ . . . ]. It [has] emerged [ . . . ] that the 40 points were prepared by a meeting of G7 senior experts in Paris on April 12 [1996], to deal with “transnational organised crime” rather than terrorism – though some of the issues and methods are clearly relevant to both’ (Norton-Taylor and Black, 29 June 1996). According to another account of the same meeting, however, this ‘twenty-second World Economic Summit’ signalled yet a further, perhaps even more significant, political development: ‘although the final communiqué was littered with the usual banalities, there was an intruiging change of tone. Western heads of [government] are losing their sense of omnipotence. They welcome globalisation [ . . . ] but no longer feel equipped to deal with it alone. They want allies to share the burdens of regulating and policing the new world order’ (The Observer, 30 June 1996). On ‘spill-over’, ‘neo-functionalism’ and ‘functionalism’, see Mitrany; Lindberg; Groom; Bulmer; Schmitter and Streek; Sandholtz and Zysman; Moravcsik; Keohane and Hoffman; and Sandholtz – all of which are in Nelsen and Stubb, 1994; and Shaw (1996, pp. 12–20). Dobbs-Higginson somewhat confusingly, not to say contradictorily, asks how, on the one hand, ‘the countries within’ the Asia Pacific ‘might collectively respond to each other and the rest of the world in the new world order’ (DobbsHigginson, 1994, p. xvii), before then almost immediately asserting that, on the other hand, ‘in reality, there is no new world order, instead the world is in a state of considerable disorder’ in the wake of ‘the effective demise of communism, and

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of the superpower rivalry which has predominated since World War II’ (DobbsHigginson, 1994, p. xix). While what Dobbs-Higginson appears to be alluding to here is the problem being experienced by the G7 in ‘policing the new world order’, nevertheless, for me, Dobbs-Higginson also appears to be confusing two senses of ‘order’. In the first sense, such synonyms as ‘pattern’, ‘arrangement’ and ‘configuration’ are apposite (see in this regard, Axford, 1995, pp. 30–1), it being in this sense that the ‘former U.S. President Bush’s so-called “new world order”’ (Ohmae, 1995, p. 7) is credible. The opposite (or absence) of ‘order’ in this sense is indicated by such terms as ‘unorderd’, ‘untidy’, ‘shapeless’, ‘amorphous’ and ‘nebulous’. In the second sense of the term, the opposite (or relative absence) of ‘order’, as Dobbs-Higginson himself indicates, is represented by the term ‘(social) disorder’. A disorderly world is then one which could be otherwise described as an unstable world or chaotic world, it being notionally, empirically and evidently possible to have a world which (i) displays various degrees (spatially and temporally) of disorder, instability and chaos (see Axford, 1995, including pp. 3, 14, 19), manifested in various sites and levels of confrontation and conflict; and (ii) exhibits widespread disorderliness in conjunction with, nonetheless, a clear configuration (‘order’) of global players (including nation-states) whose ‘international relations’ (loosely understood) are conducted within a particular distribution of (economic, political, military) power. A phrase which comes to mind here is ‘pecking order’, defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as ‘a social hierarchy [ . . . ] as observed among hens’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990, p. 876). It could be that the advent of the ‘new world order’ (NWO) – or of the post-Cold War distribution of global power and its associated configuration of unequally placed global players – has been accompanied by greater instability and chaos, manifested in more widespread and intense open confrontation and conflict. Accordingly, sociologically, an appropriate and interesting empirical issue is whether the transition from the old, Cold War, world order to the NWO has been accompanied by such increases: an issue which, in turn, lends itself to the further, theoretically pertinent, issue of how such increases can be interpreted, understood or explained. These are issues which have attracted the attention of Hugh Miall, who ‘reviews theoretical notions of “order”’ in conjunction with addressing the problem of ‘how the order, in the sense of the arrangement of states, societies and international institutions in Europe, affects “order”, in the sense of inducing cooperation and limiting conflict at the international and domestic levels. The starting assumption is that the events since 1989 [that is, the end of the Cold War] reflect not only a redistribution of power and territory, but a deeper change in the relationships between international institutions, societies and states’ (Miall, 1993, p. 19). 21. For Dobbs-Higginson, ‘the Asia Pacific region’ is covered by ‘the inverse triangle of India down to New Zealand and up to China and Japan’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xv). At the same time, Dobbs-Higginson suggests, ‘the Asia Pacific region is really two sub-regions. One is from India to Indonesia and up to China and Japan. The second sub-region includes Papua New Guinea, Australia and New Zealand, which [can be otherwise] termed [ . . . ] “Australasia”’ (DobbsHigginson, 1994, p. xx). This approach to delineating the boundaries of the Asia Pacific region is, in my view, somewhat unusual and unappealing. Apart from anything else, it arbitrarily results in the Asia Pacific region stretching as far west as India and as far north as (the northern border of) China, giving rise to the question: what about, for example, various other Asian countries to the west and

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north, including Pakistan, Mongolia and Russia (or, at least, Asiatic Russia or Siberia)? Dobbs-Higginson acknowledges certain omissions, but in doing so merely confirms the arbitrary basis of his Asia Pacific boundaries: ‘due to the vast size of this region, I have deliberately left out a number of the smallest countries [ . . . ], such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the islands of Melanesia and Polynesia’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxi). Dobbs-Higginson’s reference here to Melanesia and Polynesia, draws attention to a further query thrown up by his notion of the Asia Pacific region: why does it exclude all Pacific (or Pacific Ocean, or Oceanian) nation-states and territories east and north-east of what he distinguishes as the Australasian sub-region, and so places such as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Hawaii? Of course, Hawaii is a constituent part (a state) of the USA, a point which brings us to what is perhaps the most surprising feature of Dobbs-Higginson’s approach to defining the boundaries of the Asia Pacific region. While, for Dobbs-Higginson, the region includes India (which is not located within, next to nor particularly close to the Pacfic Ocean), its eastern edge is taken to run along the western side of the Pacific, the result being the exclusion not only of many Oceanian islands, territories and nation-states, but also of the whole of the Americas. This is strange if only because, after all, of the eighteen members of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum (and so of the eighteen countries which attended the APEC summit in Manila towards the end of November 1996), four – Canada, the USA, Mexico and Chile – belong to the Americas: are four of the eleven (North and South) American countries with territorial borders in or on the Pacific Ocean. Dobbs-Higginson acknowledges APEC, but with little enthusiasm or confidence: ‘it is my view that [the] Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) initiative [ . . . ] will fail’ (Dobbs-Higginson, 1994, p. xxv). Nonetheless, the list of countries within, and so the geo-political area covered by, APEC suggests a very different approach to the boundary of the Asia Pacific region than that assumed by Dobbs-Higginson. It reflects an approach which is not only indigenous, but also more widely held than Dobbs-Higginson’s, and which permits the Asia Pacific to be more or less equated with what is often labelled the Pacific Rim (see, for instance, Buckley, 1993). According to Richard Buckley: ‘In purely geographical terms, “Pacific Rim” is open to various definitions. At one extreme it could be taken to include the whole of all the nations with territory in and around the ocean, which would theoretically encompass over half the surface of the Earth and include half the world’s population. [A preferable alternative] takes it in a somewhat stricter sense, to mean the Pacific Basin and its coastline and, in the cases of the USA, China and Russia, focusing mainly on the seaboard areas’ (Buckley, 1993, Introduction). My approach to defining the Asia Pacific region, while being informed by Dobbs-Higginson’s notion, has a far more easterly centre of gravity. It is strongly influenced by the meaning of ‘Asia Pacific’ as implied by the geopolitical reach of (and so the self-identification of) APEC. For me, the Asia Pacific region extends across the Pacific Ocean to include the western seaboard areas of the Americas, and therefore all or part of those (North and South) American countries with borders in or on the Pacific Ocean. For me, the Asia Pacific region extends westwards to take in all or part of those Asian and Australasian nationstates and territories with borders in or on the Pacific Ocean and its integral seas. In drawing the western edge of the Asia Pacific region, I am being guided by the following definition of Oceania: ‘the islands of the Pacific and the adjacent seas’ (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1990, p. 820). The western segment of the Asia

230

22.

23.

24. 25.

Notes Pacific region can then be labelled ‘Pacific Asia’ in that it is on the Asian side of the whole Asia Pacific region. My notion, here, of ‘Pacific Asia’ is not necessarily novel. It appears consistent with that adopted for the purpose of the Economic and Social Research Council (London) Research Programme on Pacific Asia, a programme of research which commenced in April 1994 and was due for completion in January 1999 (with Gerald Segal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies as Programme Director, and an ESRC allocated budget of £2.2 million). The Pacific Asia segment of the Asia Pacific region can be divided into three subregions: Australasia; south-east(ern) Asia, which (guided by Chris Dixon, 1991) includes all nation-states and territories north of Australasia as far as and including Burma, Laos and Vietnam; and north-east(ern) Asia, which covers all or part of the nation-states and territories north of south-east Asia, beginning with China (or ‘Greater China’, which includes Macao, Hong Kong and Taiwan, perhaps among other territories – see So and Chiu, 1995, p. 250), but nation-states and territories which, at the same time, have borders in or on the Pacific Ocean. I realise that this approach still leaves open the question: precisely which parts of China and Russia, say, are to be included in the Asia Pacific region? This aside, however, for me, the combined geo-political spread of south-east Asia plus northeast Asia can be otherwise referred to as ‘East Asia’; and East Asia plus Australasia can be referred to as Pacific Asia (see Nakamura, 1995; So and Chiu, 1995). My definition of ‘Asia Pacific’ would seem to be the same as that of Endymion Wilkinson: ‘the map of East Asia and the Pacific region (Asia Pacific for short)’ (Wilkinson, 1991, p. 18). The chances of a ‘Greater China’ emerging to include Taiwan while at times appearing remote, at other times seems to be steadily or incrementally increasing, such as at the beginning of 1997, when ‘Taiwan and China [on 22 January] reached an accord to restore direct sea links across the Taiwan strait, paving the way for an end to a 48-year ban. The two sides glossed over long-standing differences on sovereignty to reach the accord [ . . . ]. That apparent break-through was made a meeting [ . . . ] in Hong Kong, which returns to Chinese sovereignty in July [1997]’ (Tyson and Ridding, 23 January 1997). Nakamura, as he himself indicates, has not coined the title East Asia Economic Caucus. See Richard Higgott’s project on ‘Identity, policy networks and international policy coordination in Pacific Asia’, being conducted as part of the ESCR Research Programme on Pacific Asia (see note above). See So and Chiu, 1995, especially Parts III and V; and Wilkinson, 1991, especially Chapters 1 and 2. Nakamura does not present this data in table form (see Nakamura, 1995, pp. 15–16). His sources are Sekai Kokusei Zue (World Statistics Illustrated ), Tokyo, 1993; and United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993, Oxford, 1993. Of course, since 1990–1 there have been many, and sometimes large, changes in the pertinent figures, changes which appear set to continue. As reported by Daniel Green: ‘Most of the world’s fastest growing countries [during 1997] will be from Asia and Africa, while the slowest will be former communist countries and wealthy members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, according to a report published [on 13 January 1997]. World growth will be 2.9 per cent, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit [World Outlook 1997, London, 1997]. The [next] fastest growing country [after] Iraq [will be] China, growing at 9.3 per cent, [then] Vietnam, at 8.5 per cent, and [then] Malaysia, at 8 per cent [ . . . ]. Among the more surprising slow-growth countries

Notes

26.

27.

28. 29.

30.

31.

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are Switzerland, at 1.3 per cent, and Italy, at 1.6 per cent. Also among the slowest twenty countries are the US, Japan and Germany, with growth rates barely over 2 per cent. [And] French growth [will be] down to 2.2 per cent, [while] UK growth should be 3.4 per cent [ . . . ]. GDP growth in Asia and Australasia, excluding Japan, will be 6.5 per cent, [well above average, but] below the levels earlier in the decade’ (Green, 13 January 1997). Since Green wrote there has been the ‘Asian crisis’ and its consequences for economic growth in East Asia, as well as for other places around the world. More accurately, the ‘emergence of a North American free trade area began with the signing of the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1988. Two years later, President Salinas of Mexico formally requested a free trade deal with the United States, a move [which led in] November 1993 [to] the House of Representatives [voting] in favour of NAFTA, [followed by] the Sentate’ (Buckley, 1994, p. 1). Dixon otherwise refers to ASEAN as a ‘pro-capitalist group’ (Dixon, 1991, p. 3). On the matter of the relationship between ASEAN and the USA, Dixon suggests that while ‘ostensibly ASEAN originated within the region – Adam Malik, the Indonesian foreign minister, is credited with originating it – [as] an economic and cultural organisation, there is little doubt that the driving force was American and the aims political and military (Caldwell, [1978, p. 14])’ (Dixon, 1991, p. 9). However, as already inferred by Nakamura (1995, p. 10), at least more recently, the relationship between ASEAN and the USA has become somewhat more complex and competitive, and even strained and confrontational. See especially the work by Immanuel Wallerstein and the assessments of ‘worldsystems analysis’ by, in particular, Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991). Nicholas Kristof reports how from ‘1931, when they invaded north-east China to the end of the [Second World War], Japanese troops massacred civilians, tortured captives and raped young girls almost everywhere they went. Collectively they killed up to 30 million people’ (Kristof, 24 January 1997). This famous ‘economic miracle’ has not unfolded without waverings and setbacks, as reflected in, for instance, the downturn in the Tokyo stockmarket which began towards the end of 1996 and then gathered pace: ‘The Japanese government has woken up from celebrating the incoming year of the ox with an unexpected economic and financial headache. The slide in share prices to their lowest level in more than a year has been greeted with alarm by government ministers [ . . . ]. Share prices fell again yesterday, leaving the Nikkei 225 index at [ . . . ] a 13-month low [ . . . ]. The main [explanatory] factor [ . . . ] is a recent worsening in the domestic economic outlook. [M]ost economists believe GDP will grow at rather less than the government’s target of 1.9 per cent in the fiscal year to March 1998, itself a slowdown from the 2.5 per cent target for the current year [ . . . ]’ (Dawkins, 9 January 1997). The downturn continued, so that on 21 January 1997, Andrew Higgins reported: ‘The Nikkei stock average now stands at 17,480 points, compared with nearly 39,000 seven years ago’ (Higgins, 21 January 1997). Higgins added that the Japanese stock market’s ‘month-long decline with a 3 per cent fall in the main index’ market the ‘country’s longest post-war slump’, with ‘[g]rowth’ languishing at around 1 per cent since 1992 (Higgins, 21 January 1997). In this regard, the editorial refers to ‘South Korea’s reversion to hardline tactics. [However, a] compromise was reached between Presidents Kim Young-sam and Clinton at [the] APEC [conference] – by which Seoul would no longer make an apology from Pyongyang (for its submarine incursion) the precondition for new

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talks’ (The Guardian, 2 December 1996). Nevertheless, subsequently, the North Korean government did apologise to the South Korean government, as reported by Nancy Dunne and Catherine Lee (30 December 1996): ‘North Korea yesterday expressed “deep regret” for sending a submarine to South Korea in September. Its unprecedented apology, urged by the US and issued through Radio Pyongyang, is expected to lead quickly to improved business co-operation with the US and South Korea. For example, the international Korea Energy Development Organisation [KEDO] can now proceed to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea [ . . . ]’ (Dunne and Lee, 30 December 1996). Indeed, as Caroline Southey and Peter Montagnon (9 January 1997), later reported: ‘Progress [is] being made on an international scheme to modernise North Korea’s nuclear industry [ . . . ]. The European Union [ . . . ] agreed “in substance” the terms and conditions of its formal participation in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation [ . . . ]. The deal, which will give the EU a seat on the Kedo board through the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), will unlock Ecu15m (£11m) in annual funding’ (Southey and Montagnon, 9 January 1997). And that is far from all. On 13 January 1997 North Korea agreed ‘to meet the US and South Korea in New York on January 29 [1997] to hear a briefing on proposed four-party talks concerning a peace treaty to end the 1950–53 Korean war [ . . . ]. The talks would also include China’ (Burton, 14 January 1997). 32. At its summit meeting in Jakarta towards the end of 1996, ASEAN ‘agreed to admit Burma into the grouping [ . . . ] in spite of opposition from the [W]est, which favours isolating Rangoon for its crackdown on a pro-democracy movement [ . . . ]. The crackdown on Burma’s pro-democracy movement [ . . . ] has provoked condemnations from the west, particularly the European Union. Brussels’ relations with Asean have become strained over the issue, with Asean nations saying that the EU has no business to comment on the internal workings of the Asean association. The two groupings clashed again [ . . . ] on a separate issue. At the end of the summit, Mr Ali Alatas, Indonesia’s foreign minister, complained that Portugal’s attempts to make human rights questions in East Timor an issue in EU–Asean relations was becoming an “increasingly aggravating and irritating factor”. East Timor was annexed by Jakarta in 1976 but the United Nations still recognises Portugal as the administering authority. Asean leaders registered their concern in a joint statement which said that the EU’s stance on East Timor threatened to “jeapordise the tripartite process on East Timor presently taking place under the auspices of the United Nations secretary general”’ (Saragosa, 2 December 1996). 33. As far as I am aware, Japan does not claim sovereignty over any part of Sakhalin, the whole island being universally treated as an integral part of the Russian Federation. However, Japan does claim sovereignty over the two southernmost Kuril Islands, a chain of about fifty small islands stretching from the north-west tip of Hokkaido (Japan) to the southernmost tip of Kamchatka (Russia). These two islands (together with two other nearby islands, which are not part of the Kuril Islands, but claimed by Japan) were seized by the USSR at the very end of the Second World War. In 1972, the USSR agreed to the two nearby islands being returned to Japan, but Japan has refused to accept what it regarded as a partial and inadequate settlement. The continuing dispute over the two Kuril Islands (Etorofu and Kunashiri) has prevented Japan and the Soviet Union, and now Russia, signing a peace treaty for the purpose of formally terminating the Second World War.

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34. The ASEAN Regional Forum has been outlined as follows: ‘The ASEAN countries set up the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) in 1994, for the discussion of regional security issues. Although a regional forum, participants included not only most Asian countries but also the EU, the United States and Russia’ (European Commission, April 1996b). As reported by Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the European Commission, in 1995 the European Council has explicitly given its ‘support [to] efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and subregional level [through, for instance] the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing peace and security in the region [ . . . ]’ (Brittan, August–November 1995, p. 4). See also Yohei Kono, ‘Japan’s role in Asia-Pacific regional cooperation’, Euro Japanese Journal, vol. 2, no. 2, August–November 1995, pp. 14–16. Yohei Kono (the Japanese government’s Minister for Foreign Affairs) tells us: ‘regional cooperation through such bodies as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARC) is extremely valuable in strengthening the mutual trust among the countries of the [Asia Pacific] region and creating a sense of community for the future’ (ibid., p. 14). 35. So and Chiu discuss the ‘statist perspective’ on ‘East Asian development’ (So and Chiu, 1995, especially pp. 12–16) alongside four alternative approaches: ‘the neoclassical’, ‘the culturalist’, ‘the dependency’ and ‘the world-systems’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 4). So and Chiu summarise: ‘Instead of emphasizing free markets, trade liberalization, private enterprise, and the restricted role of the state, the statist perspective contends that states have a strategic role to play in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to national ends’ (So and Chiu, 1995, p. 12). If so, then there is evidence of a degree (various degrees) of ‘statism’ well away from East Asia, such as in Europe, and more specifically within the European Union. As reported by Julie Wolf, ‘British manufacturers received fewer state subsidies per worker than any of their counterparts in other European Union countries, competition commissioner Karel Van Miert declared [on 22 January 1997]. Government subsidies have 10 times the impact on the Italian economy as on the British economy [ . . . ]. The [ . . . ] provisional data showed a [ . . . ] rise in state subsidies during 1993–4, the latest year for which data is available. He said total government aid in the EU averaged £73 billion a year in 1993–4, compared with £70.5 billion annually in the previous two-year period. Nearly half the funds went to the manufacturing sector, with the rest paid to such areas as agriculture and fishing [ . . . ]. According to the [C]ommission’s estimates, state aid to the manufacturing sector was about £211 per worker in Britain in 1992–94, [but] aid per worker was highest in Italy, at about £1,770. State subsidies to industry totalled about £13.3 billion a year in Germany, £8.5 billion in Italy and £5.3 billion in France during 1993–4. In the UK, the figure was about £900 million, about half way down the list of member states’ (Wolf, 23 January 1997). But, it is not only the state at the nation-state level which through subsidies engages in ‘statism’. The European Community and Union also engages in the same ‘strategic role’ by redistributing a portion of its revenues (the EU/EU budget) back to Member States in support of various economic sectors, especially the agricultural sector – by virtue of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The total EU budget in 1996 was 85.1 billion ecu, and 48 per cent of this went to the ‘CAP budget for market support’ (Southey, 24 January 1997). Over eight billion ecu of such support, by far the largest amount, was redistributed to France in 1995. Other economic sectors are subsidised by way of ‘structural funds’ and ‘other receipts’, with Spain receiving the most of these forms of redistribution: around seven billion ecu in 1995 (Southey, 24 January

234

36.

37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42. 43.

44.

Notes 1997). At the same time, as pointed out by John Peterson, the ‘EU budget agreed for 1993–7 aimed to compensate poorer [Member States] by increasing regional aid to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain [ . . . ] equalled less than 1.3 per cent of total GDP, a figure put into perspective by the fact that the US federal budget accounted for nearly 25 per cent of national GDP’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 183). For an impression of Japan’s approach to ARF, see Yohei Kono (Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs), August–November 1995, pp. 14–16. Yohei Kono tells us: ‘regional cooperation through such bodies as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is extremely valuable in strengthening the mutual trust among the countries of the [Asia Pacific] region and creating a sense of community for the future’ (ibid., p. 14). See also Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate (1970). The Gulf War between 16 January and 28 February 1991 was between Iraq and a coalition of 28 nations led by the US, following the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August 1990 (Dresner, 1994, p. 481). On the issue of the US hegemonic decline, see Wallerstein, 1993, 1994; Kennedy, 1988; Nye, 1989; Nau, 1990; Cohen, 1993. The WTO reportedly had 127 members (Elliott, 11 December 1996) in time for its first ministerial conference held in Singapore during December 1996. Among those countries which were not members but were keen to join was China, which sent ministers led by Long Yongtu, assistant minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation, to attend in an ‘observer capacity’ (Financial Times, 9 December 1996). Although, with regard to this particular aspect of the eastern style, there is some evidence of change, or at least of attempts to impose change from ‘above’ – by the state – most notably in Korea: ‘Mr Kim Young-sam, the South Korean president, is scheduled to meet oppostion leaders today [21 January 1997] in the first sign of a government retreat from its controversial new labour law, which has provoked more than three weeks of labour unrest [ . . . ]. The beleaguered president has bowed to public pressure in opening talks with his political opponents on the labour law [ . . . ], which gives employers new powers to sack workers and replace strikers’ (Burton and Montagnon, 21 January 1997). On ‘the modern history of Chinese–Japanese relations’ see Akira Iriye’s China and Japan in the Global Setting (1994). See also, Wang Fuchun, 1995. Shortly after the completion of his ASEAN tour, Ryutaro Hashimoto held a meeting with another East Asian leader, Kim Young Sam, South Korea’s president. This particular meeting while billed as the ‘Soccer summit’ (Financial Times, 20 January 1997), may also be seen as indicative of Japan’s late twentieth-century interest in strengthening its East Asian ties to the point of moving beyond merely a de facto regional trade bloc: ‘Kim Young Sam [ . . . ] arrives in Japan for two days of talks [ . . . ] with Ryutaro Hashimoto [on 25 January]. The issues include the soccer World Cup of 2002, which their countries are co-hosting, fishing rights in the Sea of Japan, and the lingering gap between their countries in their perceptions of their historical relationship. Both leaders want to build strong [ . . . ] ties, though, and the summit should produce frank views’ (Financial Times, 20 January 1997). The USA’s commitment to multilateralism is perhaps much more equivocal than is assumed by Ruggie. After all, apart from anything else, the USA’s arrears in its payments due to the UN were approaching $1.5bn (£880m) (Martin, 9 January 1997), far more than any other member. This is in spite of the way ‘the United

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Nations is [ . . . ] dependent [ . . . ] on the US’ (Kaplan, 22 December 1996) more than it is on any other member, a reflection of the globally dominant (if no longer wholly hegemonic) position of the USA. In addition, however, for others, such as Robert Kaplan, there is evidence which points to ‘America’s hesitant internationalism’: as ‘a continental power with its own economy-of-scale, it has always been wary of international commitments, generally sending its forces on humanitarian grounds only when the situation intersects with strategic selfinterest’ (Kaplan, 22 December 1996). See also John Peterson’s discussion of the United States’ ‘aggressive unilateralism’ (Peterson, 1996, p. 183 and Chapter 8). 45. A strong thread linking work done for Citizenship, Europe and Change (Close, 1995a), Supranationalism in the New World Order and The Legacy of Supranationalism among other publications (see Close, 1995b, 1996) concerns the question of the way (a) the relationship between policy, law, citizenship and gender within the EU is (b) manifested in the differential use and experience of ‘space’, both public and private. The results of this work are consistent with those from other researchers and writers, including Louise Ackers (1995) who examines the implications of European Community law for labour mobility mediated by gender. For me, Ackers’ work and preliminary results are consistent with a more inclusive range of information and ideas which suggests that within the EU there are strong forces operating in favour of frameworks, policies and laws whereby the use (or consumption of and through) public and private ‘space’ – such as by way of labour mobility among other forms of migration – by Citizens of the Union remain highly gender-skewed, to the considerable disadvantage (or relative social exclusion) of women. See also Massey (1994); Trench et al. (1992). 46. See Hutton (28 October 1995); Macwhirter (29 October 1995); Tang (1995).

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Index

acquis communautaire 73, 74, 85, 87 Africa 76 Albania 102–6 Algeria 3 American Century 112 see also superpower; United States of America Americanism; California-ization 137–8, 148 see also Ohmae; Spybey Amsterdam, Treaty of 51, 61–3, 84–5, 87–90, 93–4 see also European Union’s constitution; Treaties of the European Communities Andean Community; Andean Pact 2, 30–2, 95 Anderson, Benedict 128–9 Anglo-Saxon economies 78 anti-supranationalism see supranationalists Argentina 30–2, 99–100 Armenia 30 Asia Pacific 2, 81, 95, 122, 135–203 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum 2, 95, 122, 150, 154, 160, 162–3 Asia Pacific regional community; Asia Pacific regional economic forum 154, 160–1 see also Dobbs-Higginson; Nakamura Asia(n) crisis; Asian economic crisis 70–1, 77, 79–81, 119–20, 129, 147 Asian newly industrialised/ industrialising countries (NICs); Asian newly industrialised/ industrialising economies (NIEs) 121–34, 152, 154, 158, 165, 166 Asian Parliament 155 see also East Asian Economic Area, institutions of Asian tiger economies 71 Asian Union 2, 122–3 Asiatic Russia 152 Association Accords; Association

Agreements 2, 3, 13, 103, 105–6 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA); 2, 15, 30, 32–3, 80–1, 95–6, 121–34, 150, 152, 154–6, 158, 160–2, 165–203 see also EU–East Asian relations; Japan–ASEAN relations; regional flows Association of South East Asian Nations, expansion of 152, 154, 158, 160–2, 166–203 asylum 27, 28, 59 see also refugees Atlantic bridge; Atlantic Community; Atlantic Free Trade Area (AFTA) 162–3 see also transatlantic economic space Australasia 152–4 see also Australia; New Zealand Australia 49, 97, 154 see also Australasia Austria 41, 58, 66, 87, 97, 103, 157 Axford, Barrie 135–8, 147, 157 Azerbaijan 30 Balkans; Balkan peninsula; Balkan region; Balkan War 4, 5, 7, 62, 83, 101–6 see also Kosovo Banton, Michael 127–8 Belgium 41, 58, 66, 69, 72, 87, 97, 107, 109 Bergsten, Fred 55 see also Institute for the International Economy bipolarity; bi-polar world 113–14 Blair, Tony 20, 21, 34–8, 65, 82–4, 116 see also New Labour Bolivia 31–2, 71 borderless global economy; borderless world 145–52 see also global trends; Ohmae; region states 249

250

Index

Bosnia 7, 124 Brazil 30–2, 71, 73, 79 Britain; Great Britain see United Kingdom Britain in Europe (BiE) campaign 34–5, 37 British; British identity 16–18, 21–5, 35, 37, 39–40, 42, 100, 109, 133 British Commonwealth; British Empire 18–19 British National Party (BNP) 100–1 British Social Attitudes Survey 16–25 Brown, Gordon 37–8 Brunei 121, 154, 158, 161 Bulgaria 71, 73–4, 101–2, 106 Bull, Hedley 114, 115, 150–1 see also neo-medieval order; realism Burma; Myanmar 96, 121, 158, 161 Bush, George 112–13 Business for Sterling (BFS) campaign 37 Cambodia 96, 158, 161 Canada 50, 70–1, 73, 97, 99–100, 129, 154 capitalism; social-capitalism; social-capitalist model 11–12, 75–6, 102, 113, 116, 118, 124–5, 135–47, 157–8, 160–1, 163–203 see also market economy Caribbean 31 Caucasus region 30 central Africa 124 central Asia 29–30 Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) 29–30 Central and East European (CEE) countries 73–4, 85 Chile 31, 129, 154 China, People’s Republic of; Chinese culture; Greater China; Overseas Chinese 9, 98, 120–4, 149, 152–6, 158, 160, 164–6 Chiu, S. 163–5 Churchill, Winston 110–11 citizens; citizenship 45–6, 49, 51, 60, 67–8, 72, 94, 108, 142–5 see also nationality Clarke, Kenneth 37 Clinton, Bill 55, 160 see also United States of America Close, Paul 1, 11–12, 15, 27–8, 101, 104–5, 130–1 co-decision procedure; co-operation procedure 62–4, 84–5, 88–90

Cold War 32, 84–5, 112–13, 133, 160, 163 Colombia 32 colonialism; imperialism 11, 108, 112, 121, 124–5 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 116 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); second pillar of the European Union 46, 61, 64, 66, 85–6, 90, 102, 106, 114–15, 140 see also European army; intergovernmental co-operation and decision-making Common Market see European Economic Community Commonwealth see British Commonwealth Communism; communist countries; former communist countries 11, 92, 103, 106, 112, 162 Comrie, Bernard 125 confederation; confederalists see European confederation Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 35–6 Confucianism 92, 153 constitution, concept of; constitution, supranational 93–5, 143–4, 148 see also European Union’s constitution; United Kingdom’s constitution Cool Britannia 72 Co-operation Agreements 3, 31–3 see also Partnership and Co-operation Agreements Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs (CJHA); third pillar of the European Union 46, 51, 61, 84–6, 90 see also intergovernmental co-operation and decision-making Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) 54, 57 see also Council of Ministers Council of Europe (CE) 4–6, 111 Council of Ministers 45–6, 54, 57, 62–4, 85, 88–90, 93, 97, 102, 106 see also European Community Court of First Instance 51–2 see also European Court of Justice Croatia 4–6 Crystal, David 125–7

Index culture; language; traditions 16–18, 30–1, 54, 76, 88, 100, 104, 108–9, 115, 118–19, 121–34, 136–47, 148–9, 153, 155–6, 161, 164–203 see also Chinese culture; East Asian cultural diversity; ethnic; nation; Western cultural account Cyprus 3, 74, 85, 101, 106 Czech Republic; Czechoslovakia 2, 74, 97, 101, 106, 157 de Gaulle, Charles 8, 45, 91–2, 107–9, 111, 117–19 Delors, Jacques 64, 159 see also European Commission president democratic deficit 44, 47, 57–8, 60–2, 64, 67–8, 83–5, 117 Denmark 41–2, 54, 58, 61, 66–7, 87, 97, 157 development indices 156–8 see also economic competition devolution 110 dialectic; dialectic sequence; dialectic synthesis; dialectics of change 131–4, 136 see also Hegel Diana, Princess of Wales 131–2 see also Rees-Mogg differential sectoral integration; differential sub-sectoral integration; multi-sectoral integration 13–14, 51, 53, 91, 118, 158–9 see also European integration differential zones of geo-political management see governance direct inward investment see foreign direct investment directives, European Community 4, 34, 98 directorates general (DGs) see European Commission disorder; European disorder; global disorder 2–3, 99, 104–6, 123–34, 139–40, 150–1 Dixon, Chris 161 Dobbs-Higginson, Michael 152–4, 160–2 Dowds, Lizanne and Young, Ken 16–27 East Asia; Pacific Asia 33, 70, 77, 79–81, 119–34, 147, 149–203 see also ASEAN; ASEAN, expansion of; Japan–ASEAN relations; non-Western social and cultural forms

251

East Asia(n) crisis see Asia(n) crisis East Asian cultural diversity 155–6, 166–203 East Asia(n) Economic Area (EAEA); East Asia(n) Economic Caucus (EAEC) 2, 30, 154–6, 160–2 see also ASEAN expansion; Mahathir Mohamad; Nakamura East Asian Economic Area and the EU 155–6, 162–3 East Asian Economic Area, institutions of 155 East Asian de facto integration; East Asian economic forum; East Asian economic integration; East Asian regional integration; pan-East Asian regional regime; pan-East Asian regional institutions 119–34, 153–7, 160–5 east(ern) Europe 2–3, 73–4, 85, 88, 101–5 ECOFIN Council see Council of Economic and Financial Ministers economic competitiveness; economic development; economic growth 70–5, 77–8, 113, 119–20, 122, 128, 153–4, 156–8, 164–6 see also development indices; global competitiveness; Global Competitiveness Report; gross domestic product economic and monetary union (EMU) 14, 20–3, 33, 36–7, 40, 51, 53–7, 64, 67, 78–9, 87–8, 92, 115–16, 159 see also single currency ecu see European currency unit Ecuador 32, 71 Egypt 3 El-Agraa, Ali 163 end of history thesis see Fukuyama England; English; little Englanders 16–19, 39, 60, 73, 127, 133 see also United Kingdom Estonia 74, 101, 106 ethnic; ethnicism; ethnicity; ethnic conflict; ethnic groups 18, 25–6, 59, 61, 83, 100–1, 124–34, 152–3 ethnocentricism; Eurocentricism; Eurocentric conception of globalisation 138 EU–Andean Pact co-operation/trade agreement 31–2

252

Index

EU–East Asian relations; EU–ASEAN relations 32, 155–7, 163 EU–Gulf Co-operation Council co-operation/trade agreement 32 EU–Mercosur co-operation/trade agreement 30–2 EU–US relations 32, 98–102, 104–5, 112–14, 118–19, 162–3 see also transatlantic economic space Eurasia; Euroasian landmass 30, 32, 123 euro; euroland; eurozone see single currency Euro-Atlantic structures 102 see also EU–US relations; North American Free Trade Agreement Eurobarometer 65–7 euro-enthusiasts 37 see also Europhiles Europe; Europeans 1–6, 8–9, 11–13, 15, 25–8, 31, 33–5, 40, 45, 47–8, 53, 55, 57, 65, 69–70, 77–8, 81, 83, 85, 91–2, 101, 103–4, 107–9, 111–12, 115–20, 122–4, 128–30, 133, 135–203 Europe of Democracies and Differences (EDD) 42 European army 66–7, 114–15, 140 European (Association) Agreements see Association Agreements European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC; EUATOM) 47, 51, 108 see also Treaties of Rome European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 97 European Central Bank (ECB) 53–5, 159 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 47, 50–1, 107, 111, 129 see also Treaty of Paris European Commission 4, 9–10, 15–16, 18, 21, 27–8, 30, 32, 38, 43–5, 54–8, 60–5, 68–9, 73–6, 81, 83–90, 97, 101–2, 105–6, 110, 115–16, 140 see also European government European Commission president 43, 45, 54, 62, 64–5, 68, 89, 105, 159 European Communities 26, 45, 92–3, 107, 118, 124 European Community (EC); first pillar of the European Union 1, 24, 26–9, 32, 35, 45–6, 48–9, 51–2, 69, 85–6, 88–95, 98, 101, 106–10, 117–18, 121, 123, 129, 133, 140–4, 151–2, 156–7, 159–60

see also supranational regional regime European Community law; European Community’s legal system 4, 12, 14, 29, 47–9, 51–2, 55, 61–4, 68, 73–4, 84–7, 89–95, 97–8, 101, 112, 114–15, 117, 140–4 see also normative supranationalism European Community, main institutions of 85 European confederation 92, 107–11, 117 see also intergovernmental co-operation European Convention on Human Rights 5 see also Council of Europe European Council; EU Council; EU summits 55, 62, 84–90, 116 European Council’s presidency 85, 102, 104, 114–16 see also European Union’s presidency European Court of Human Rights 5, 145 see also Council of Europe European Court of Justice (ECJ) 4, 45, 47, 51, 55, 85, 93–4, 111–12, 117, 140, 143–4 see also supreme court European Court of Justice, president of 51–2 European Currency Unit (ecu) 54, 57 European Economic Area (EEA) 3 European Economic Community (EEC) 24, 26, 38, 46–7, 49, 53, 90–1, 108, 111, 118, 140, 155, 159 see also Treaties of Rome European executive see European government European federalism see federalism European government; European state 45–6, 62–4, 66–7, 90–2, 110, 114–15, 143–4 see also nation-state European idea; European ideal; European idealism see European project European integration; European unity 1, 4, 8, 11, 13–14, 19–27, 33–4, 45–6, 49–51, 53, 57, 64–9, 83–5, 90–2, 94–5, 107–17, 118–19, 123–4, 144, 151–2, 158–63 see also European Union; European Union’s disintegration European integration, maximalist approach to 114–16

Index European integration, neo-functionalist perspective on; incrementalism 30, 46, 91, 94–5, 106–7, 117–19, 129–30, 151, 158–60 see also differential sectoral integration; spill-over European integration and social policy see social policy integration European Monetary Institute (EMI) 54 European Parliament (EP); European Parliament elections 12–14, 33, 36–44, 45, 47, 56, 58, 60–7, 77, 84–5, 87–90, 92, 100, 115, 140 European Parliament’s powers; European Parliament’s sovereignty 43–4, 47, 61–4, 88–90, 92, 140 European Parliament’s president 62 European People’s Party (EPP) 41, 43–4, 60 European president 64, 66–7 European project 26, 40, 83–4, 91, 111, 114, 123–4, 130, 159 European Socialists 41–4, 60 European state see European government; governance European superstate see nation-state; supra-state European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 53 see also European Central Bank European tribes 33, 100, 103 see also ethnic; nationalism; tribalism European Union (EU); European political union 1–6, 8–14, 20–7, 29–35, 37, 40–3, 45–8, 50–3, 55, 57–61, 63–6, 68–70, 72–8, 81–8, 90–1, 93–5, 97–118, 123–4, 129–30, 133–4, 140, 142, 147, 149–52, 155, 157, 159, 163 European Union’s accession criteria, negotiations and procedure 73–4, 85, 87–9, 101, 106, 143 see also European Union’s expansion; Treaties of Accession European Union, citizenship of see citizens European Union’s constitution 47, 51, 61, 87, 93–5, 114–15, 144 see also Treaties of the European Communities European Union’s crisis of political legitimacy see democratic deficit

253

European Union’s decision-making 1, 8, 29, 43, 46, 48, 52, 62–6, 84–95, 98, 109–10, 117, 140–4 European Union’s disintegration 68–9 European Union’s expansion 1–6, 14, 73–4, 85, 87–8, 101–7, 117–18, 157 see also governance European Union’s external relations 1–6, 8–10, 13–14, 25–8, 30–2, 43, 45–7, 50, 52, 54–8, 62, 64, 69, 74–7, 81, 84, 88–9, 95, 98, 106, 108, 111, 113–15, 124, 133–4, 140, 147, 159, 162–3 see also European Union’s expansion; international relations theory European Union as a federal system see federalism European Union, feedback on; playback on 147 European Union and governance see governance European Union’s intergovernmental co-operation and decision-making see intergovernmental co-operation and decision-making European Union law see European Community law European Union’s Opinions 74 see also European Union’s expansion European Union’s pillars 46, 51, 101 see also Common Foreign and Security Policy; Co-operation on Justice and Home Affairs; European Community European Union’s presidency 43, 85, 102, 104, 114–16 see also European Council’s presidency European Union’s screening process see European Union’s expansion; governance European Union’s social policy see social policy integration European Union’s tax harmonisation see economic and monetary union European Union, withdrawal from 110 European Year Against Racism 15, 18, 27 Europhiles 33–4, 37–8, 40, 49, 57, 65–9, 82–4, 91, 111 see also Europhobes Europhobes; Europhobia; Euroscepticism; Eurosceptics 12–13, 24, 33–42, 44, 47, 49, 57, 64–9, 83, 110–11

254

Index

fascism 11, 112 federalism; federalists; federation; federal constitution; federal nation-state 14, 26, 44–7, 49–50, 52, 57, 64, 66, 69, 91, 94–5, 107–19, 123–4, 130, 144 Federalist Union 111 Federalists, European Union of 111 Finland 41, 43, 58, 66–7, 87, 97, 103, 157 Fischer, Joschka 114–16 foreign direct investment (FDI) 31, 33, 76, 120–1, 146, 164–5 Fortress Europe 12, 27–8, 31, 113–14 see also protectionism France; French 8, 17, 31, 41–3, 45, 58, 61, 66–7, 69, 73, 77, 87, 91–2, 97, 99, 107–9, 111, 116–17, 119, 129, 151, 157 Fukuyama, Francis 11, 112–13 fundamental rights see human rights gaullism 109 see also de Gaulle General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) see World Trade Organisation geo-political management see governance Georgia 30 Germany 14, 21, 41–3, 50, 56, 58, 66–7, 69, 77–9, 87, 97, 99, 102–4, 107, 111–17, 119, 121, 129, 151, 157 Giddens, Anthony 135–47, 150, 151–2, 156, 161–2 global capitalism see global economy global civil society 144–5 see also Held Global Competitiveness Report 70–2 see also economic competitiveness; World Economic Forum global conflict; global disorder see disorder global economy; global economic model; global system; global trends; globalisation 1–14, 25–7, 29–33, 44, 59, 70–1, 74–6, 77–81, 83, 95–101, 104–7, 111, 113–14, 118–20, 122–5, 128, 130–3, 135–203 see also modernity; world system global flows 148–52, 154 see also Ohmae global meltdown 80 global perspective 4, 161–2 governance; European governance; global governance 1–4, 6, 29–30,

43–5, 48–50, 68, 73–6, 85, 95, 99, 101–7, 113, 115, 118, 120, 139–47, 164 government; governments 14–15, 18, 20, 23, 30, 33–9, 41–4, 46–50, 52–4, 57, 62–3, 65–7, 70, 74–6, 81–5, 90–2, 94, 96, 104, 109–10, 114–16, 120–2, 125, 140–4, 151, 164 see also governance; intergovernmental co-operation Greece 41, 58, 66–7, 69, 87, 97, 157 gross domestic product (GDP) 56, 58, 69–72, 74–6, 77–9, 103, 106 see also economic competitiveness Group of Seven (G7); Group of Twenty Four (G24) 97–8, 150 see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guatemala 100 Gulf Co-operation Council 32 Hague Congress (1948) 111 Hague, William 12–13, 36–8, 83, 110 see also Churchill Harvard University Centre for International Development 70 Haseler, Stephen 132–3 see also tribalism Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 131–2 Held, David 144–5, 148 Heseltine, Michael 37 High Authority 107, 129, 140, 158 see also European Coal and Steel Community; Schuman; supranationalism Hirst, Paul 146, 148 Hong Kong 70–1, 149, 152–4, 158, 169, 164–5 Human Development Report 72–3, 75–6 see also United Nations human rights; international law 4–5, 7–8, 10, 30–1, 83, 115, 143 Hungary 2, 74, 97, 101, 106, 157 Iceland 3, 97 Ignatieff, Michael 25 immigration see migration India 71, 99–100, 124–5, 130 Indo-China 121 see also south-east Asia

Index Indonesia 70, 100, 121, 153–4, 158, 160–1 industrialism 136, 145 Institute for the International Economy 55 see also Bergsten institutionalists see international relations theory Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 43, 84–5 intergovernmental agencies, co-operation and decision-making; intergovernmentalism 46–7, 54, 61, 85–6, 90, 92–3, 96–8, 107, 109, 117, 139–41, 147, 154–5 see also European confederation; intergovernmental institutionalism intergovernmental institutionalism 151, 152–5 see also international relations; supranational institutionalism internal market see single European market international economic model 146 see also global economic model international law see human rights International Monetary Fund (IMF) 49, 80, 96, 105 see also supranational functional regime International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) 145 see also Spybey international relations theory 136–7, 144–6, 149–66 see also realism Ireland; Irish 16–18, 22, 24, 41, 58, 66, 71, 73, 87, 97, 157 see also Northern Ireland Israel 3 Italy 35, 41, 58, 64, 66, 69–70, 77, 87, 97, 99, 107, 112, 157 Japan 32, 54–9, 73, 77–80, 97, 112, 119–34, 137, 149, 152, 154–6, 158, 160, 163–6 Japan–ASEAN relations; Japan–East Asia relations 121–34, 156, 160, 163–5 Japan’s business network; kaisha; keiretsu 155–6, 164 Japan’s Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 120 Jordan 3

255

Kant, Immanuel 7–8 Kazakhstan 29–30 Kohl, Helmut 116–17 Korea; North Korea; South Korea 71, 79–80, 99–100, 121–3, 125, 152, 154, 156, 158, 160, 165 Kosovo; Kosovo conflict; Kosovo War 7, 38, 83, 101–5 Kruger, Paul 71–2 Kyrgystan 29–30 Labour Day 82 Lafontaine, Oskar 21, 115–16 Länder 50 see also Germany; states, federated language see culture Laos 96, 158, 161 Latin America 31–3, 79, 99 see also South America Latvia 73–4, 101 Lebanon 3 liberal democracy 11–12, 30, 39, 76, 92, 112–13, 144–5, 155 see also liberalism liberalism 12, 92, 113, 118 Liechtenstein 3 Lithuania 73–4, 101 Luxembourg, Grandy Duchy of; Luxembourg compromise 41, 58, 66, 69–73, 87, 92, 97, 102–3, 106–8, 157 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of (FYROM) 102–4, 106 Maghreb countries 3 Mahathir Mohamad 154–5 Malaysia 70–1, 121, 153–5, 158, 161 Malta 3, 74 Mandelson, Peter 33–4, 39 market capitalism see capitalism; market economy market economy; social market economy 11–12, 30, 75–6, 112–13, 116, 124–5, 136, 157–8, 160–1, 163–6 see also capitalism Mashraq countries 3 McCrone, David 127–9 Meade, James 163

256

Index

Mediterranean 3, 101, 133 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) see European Parliament mercantialism; mercantialist 32 see also protectionism Mercosur 2, 30–3, 95 Mexico 31–2, 97, 129, 154 Meyer, John 136–7 Miall, Hugh 150 Michio, Morishima 122–3 see also Asian Union Middle East 3, 32, 133 migration 3, 18, 27, 46, 53, 59–61, 84 Mitrany, David 118 modernity; Western modernity 25–6, 28, 135–47 see also Giddens; globalisation; post-modernity Monnet, Jean 45, 91–2, 106–8, 111, 118, 129–30 Montenegro 102 Moravcsik, Andrew 151–2, 159 Morocco 3 multi-lateral agreements 100–1, 150 Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 10–11, 100–1 see also World Trade Organisation multi-national corporations (MNCs) 96, 139, 146–9 see also supranational functional regimes; transnational corporations multi-polar world; tri-polar world 113–14, 119–34, 163–5 see also bipolarity Myanmar see Burma Nakamura, Tamio 154–62 nation(s); immagined community 15–16, 19, 25–6, 45, 50, 104–5, 108, 110–11, 118, 124–34 see also Anderson nation-states; nation-state, concept of; nation-state decline 9–11, 14–15, 19, 24–6, 35, 43, 45, 47–52, 53–4, 57, 62, 65, 72, 75–6, 81, 89–99, 104, 109–18, 120, 122–9, 132–3, 135–66, 157–63 see also sovereignty; state, notion of the; Westphalian model nation-state, the European Union as a 114–15

nation-states, international system of 136–47 nation-state and violence 139–47 see also Giddens national identity 16–27, 35, 124–34, 137 nationalism; nationalists 7, 12–13, 16–28, 33, 35, 100–1, 107–10, 118, 121–34 see also ultranationalists nationalism, synthesis with supranationalism 132–4 nationality; nationals 15, 27, 46, 51, 61, 90, 94, 117, 142–4 see also citizens neo-functionalism see European integration neo-liberalism; New Right 78 neo-medieval order 144–5 see also Bull; Held; nation-state decline Netherlands 41–2, 58, 71–2, 87, 97, 107, 157 New Labour 43, 60, 65–6, 82–4 newly industrialising economies (NIEs) 121–34 see also Asian newly industrialising countries New Transatlanticism 162 see also EU–US relations; transatlantic economic space new world disorder see disorder; new world order new world order (NWO) 2–5, 11, 15, 25–7, 29–30, 32–3, 84, 95, 99–102, 104–6, 112–14, 117–34, 141, 144–5, 157–8, 160, 162–3 see also George Bush New Zealand 97, 99, 154 see also Australasia Ng, Dennis 153 Nigeria 125 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 10 non-Western social and cultural forms; non-Western influences 137–8 north Africa 3, 133 North America 15, 17, 33, 119, 128–9, 160, 163 see also North American Free Trade Agreement North American Free Trade Agreement/ Area (NAFTA) 2, 13–15, 30, 33, 95, 129, 149–50, 152, 160, 162–3

Index North Atlantic Free Trade Area see transatlantic economic space North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 49, 92, 96, 101–3, 105–6, 163 see also supranational functional regime north-east Asia (NEA) 81, 119, 122–3, 152–5 see also Asian Union; East Asia Northern Ireland; Northern Irish 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 39, 60, 83 Norway 3, 73, 97, 157 Nueno, Pedro 153, 155 Obuchi, Keizo 55 see also Japan Occidental view 137 see also Western cultural account; Ethnocentricism Office of National Statistics (ONS) 18, 69 Ohki-Close, Emiko 1, 11–12, 29–30, 101, 104–5, 130–1 Ohmae, Kenichi 145–51, 161–2 One Europe 57 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 96–8 see also supranational functional regimes Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 150 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 96, 162 see also supranational functional regimes Overseas Chinese see China Pacific Asia see East Asia Pacific Rim 153 see also Asia Pacific Pacific War 121–2 pan-Pacific Asia regional regime see East Asian integration etc. Papua New Guinea 154 Paraguay 30–1 Partnership Agreements; Partnership and Co-operation Agreements(PCAs) 3, 30 Peru 32, 124 Peterson, John 162–3 Philippines 121, 153–4, 158, 161 Poland 2, 74, 101, 106, 117, 157 population; population density 58–60, 69, 72, 75–6, 86–7, 125–6, 153, 165

257

Portugal 41, 58, 74, 87, 97, 103, 157 post-modernity 25–6 Prodi, Romano 64–5, 105 see also European Commission president protectionism; protectionists 12, 17–19, 23, 27, 31–3, 113–14, 120–2, 158, 163 see also Fortress Europe; mercantilism proto-federation 46 see also federalism proto-supranational global regimes see supranationalism proto-supranational regional regimes see supranationalism qualified majority voting (QMV) 43, 64, 85–91, 93, 97–8, 117 see also European Union’s decision-making quality of life 72–3 see also economic competitiveness quasi-federal; quasi-federation 45–6 see also federalism race; racialism; racism 15–16, 18, 27, 61, 100–1, 121, 124–34 realism 4, 12, 27, 30, 33, 37, 50, 75–6, 81, 95, 108, 113, 117, 133–4, 150–1, 156–8, 160, 163 see also international relations theory Rees-Mogg, William 131–2 refugees 27, 28, 61, 103 see also asylum regional flows 154–5 regionalism; regional regimes 12, 25–6, 32–3, 104–7, 120, 124, 129–30, 145, 147–66, 154–203 see also supranationalism region states 146–52 see also borderless world; Ohmae regulations, European Community 55, 62, 68, 74, 98, 144 Robertson, Roland 135 Romania 73–4, 101–3, 106 Rubin, Robert 55 see also United States of America Russia 3, 9, 11, 30, 71, 80, 121, 124, 152 see also Asiatic Russia Rwanda 100, 124

258

Index

Sandholtz, Wayne 115, 159–60 Santer, Jacques 54, 56 see also European Commission president Schengen Group 61 Schröder, Gerhard 115–17 Schuman, Robert; Schuman Declaration 91, 106–7, 111, 129 Scotland; Scottish 16–18, 39, 60, 110, 127 Serbia 100–2 Shaw, Jo 90–1, 93, 106–7, 143–4, 158–9 Singapore 70–1, 152–4, 158, 161, 164 single currency; single European currency 12, 14, 20–3, 25, 33–8, 42, 44–5, 51, 53–8, 64, 66–8, 70, 77–9, 83–4, 105, 114–16, 159 see also economic and monetary union; single European market Single European Act (SEA) 27, 51, 53, 86, 93, 110, 151, 160 single European market; single internal market 1, 13–14, 27, 33, 36, 53–4, 64, 85–6, 151, 155, 158–60, 162 see also regional flows Slovakia 2, 73–4, 101, 106, 157 see also Czechoslovakia Slovenia 74, 101, 103, 106 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 57 Smith, Anthony 128–9 So, A. 163–5 social chapter 4 see also social policy integration social policy integration 14–15, 53, 61, 63, 84, 88–9, 91, 116–17, 144, 159 Social Protocol 84 see also social chapter; Treaty on European Union socialism 92, 118 see also European Socialists South America 30–2, 129 South American integration 31–2 South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) 30, 95 south-east Asia 15, 33, 79, 80–1, 95–6, 119–34, 152–7, 161 see also Association of South East Asian Nations Southeast Europe Co-operation Initiative (SECI) 104–7 see also Balkans; east Europe

south-east(ern) Europe see Balkans; eastern Europe South Korea see Korea sovereignty; supreme authority 7, 10–12, 14–15, 24–5, 35, 43, 45–53, 55, 57, 76, 81, 90–2, 94, 97–8, 108–10, 114–15, 117–18, 129, 132, 139–48, 150–1, 156–7, 159, 162 see also supranational, concept of sovereignty, exclusive notion of 48–9 sovereignty, notion of 48–9, 115 sovereignty, pooling of 47–9, 76, 111–12 Soviet bloc; Soviet empire; Soviet Union 2, 29–30, 112–13, 121, 124 Spain 41, 43, 58, 66, 87, 97, 149, 157 spill-over 91, 151, 158–9 see also functionalist perspective on European integration Spinelli, Altiero 45 Spybey, Tony 135–8, 145, 148 state, notion of the 48–9, 111–12, 115, 141 see also government; nation-state state, rolling back the 110 see also Thatcher states, federated; States 11–12, 49–50 see also federalism Stone, Alex 93–5, 144, 154 structurationists see international relations theory; Woodiwiss submerged economy 69 see also gross domestic product sub-Saharan Africa 124–5 super-dollar 56 super-nationalism 28 superpower(s); superpower, European Union as a 27, 75, 77–8, 113–14, 118, 124, 130–1, 140–1, 147 see also supra-power superstate; super-state see supra-state supranational constitutional regimes 93–5 see also Stone supranational co-operation 45–6, 90–1, 93–5 see also supranational, concept of supranationalism, the doctrine of; supranational organisations; supranational functional regimes (SFRs); supranational global regimes (SGRs); supranational regional regimes (SRRs) 1–4, 6–8, 11–15, 19–28, 29–30, 32–5, 44–7, 52, 55, 57, 64,

Index 68–9, 76, 81, 90–101, 104, 106–19, 123, 129–31, 133, 142–4, 147–8, 151, 156–60 see also regionalism; supranational institutionalism supranational, concept of; supranationalism, concept of 8, 14–15, 19, 25–8, 45–7, 52, 55, 76, 90–6, 101, 107–8, 117–18, 141–4, 148–9 see also supra-power supranational institutionalism 151, 159 see also intergovernmental institutionalism supranational regional regimes, dominant type of 133–4 supranational regional regimes, global proliferation of; neo-functionalist perspective on the proliferation of SSRs 118–19, 129–34, 135–203 see also European integration supranationalism, decisional; supranationalism, normative 93–4 supranationalism and nationalism, dialectic/ synthesis of 131–4 see also dialectic supranationalists 19–27, 110, 118, 151 see also ultranationalists supra-nation-state 52, 114–15 see also nation-state supra-power(s) 147 supra-state 25–6, 43–7, 92, 108–10, 114–15, 139–41 see also supra-nation-state supreme court; European Court of Justice as a supreme court 45, 52, 55, 94, 112, 117, 142–4 Sweden 41, 58, 72, 87, 97, 157 Switzerland 50, 71, 125 Syria 3 Taiwan 70–1, 121, 124, 152–4, 158, 160, 164–5 Tajikstan 29 Tanzania 99 Thailand 70–1, 79–80, 99, 121, 124, 153–4, 158, 161 see also Asia crisis Thatcher, Margaret 45, 109–10, 162–3 see also gaullism; nationalism third way; Third Way 65 see also New Labour

259

Thompson, Graham 146, 148 totalitarianism 112–13, 123 trade blocs see regionalism; supranationalism Transatlantic Declaration 162 transatlantic economic space; transatlantic free trade area; Transatlantic Free Trade Area (TFTA) 13, 162, 163 see also Peterson transnational corporations (TNCs) 96, 139–40, 145–6 see also multi-national organisations; supranational functional regimes Treaties of Accession 88 Treaties of the European Communities 45, 48, 50–1, 84, 87–90, 93–5, 112 Treaties of Rome; Treaty of Rome 47, 49, 51, 53, 57, 84, 86, 90, 108, 111, 114, 118, 159 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 4, 46, 51, 53–4, 61–2, 78, 84–9, 93–4, 111, 142 Treaty of Paris 47, 50–1, 107, 129 see also European Coal and Steel Community tribalism 33, 100, 103, 132–3 see also European tribes Tunisia 3 Turkey 3, 30, 74, 85, 97, 101 Ukraine 3, 71 ultranationalism; ultranationalists 26 United Kingdom (UK) 4, 10, 12–14, 16–27, 31, 33–45, 48–9, 54, 56–60, 63, 65–7, 69–73, 78, 82–4, 87, 97, 100, 109–11, 116–17, 119, 127, 131–3, 137, 151, 157 United Kingdom’s constitution 48–9 United Kingdom, devolution in see devolution United Kingdom’s disintegration 110 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 41–2 United Nations; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 8, 14, 59, 72–3, 75–6, 95–6, 125, 139–40, 145, 149–50 see also supranational global regimes United States of America (USA; US) 11, 17, 21, 30–2, 49–50, 54–9, 70–1, 73, 77–8, 97–102, 104, 108, 112–15, 117–22, 124, 129, 154, 160–5

260

Index

see also Americanism; superpower; western hegemony United States decline 112–13, 160 United States–EU free trade area see transatlantic economic space United States of Europe; United States of Europe, Action Committee for a 50, 107, 111–12, 117 see also Monnet Uruguay 31–2 Uzbekistan 29 Vatican 125 Venezuela 32, 71 Vietnam 96, 121, 161 Visegrad Four 2, 3 Wales; Welsh 16–18, 39, 60, 110, 127 Wallerstein, Immanuel 157 West Germany; Federal Republic of Germany (FGR) 50, 97, 113 see also Germany Western civilisation see Western cultural account Western cultural account 78, 110–12, 135–48, 155 see also Western hegemony; Western project western Europe 68, 101–3, 110–11, 119 Western European Union (WEU) 49, 96 see also supranational functional regime Western hegemony 76, 78–9, 83, 101–3, 112–13, 118–19, 160–1 see also modernity

Western modernity, five themes of 136–7 see also Axford; modernity Westernisation 147 see also Western cultural account; Western hegemony Westphalian model 144–5 see also nation-states Wilkinson, Endymion 119–23, 156–7, 163–5 Wistrich, Ernest 46, 107–17 Wolf, Martin 75–6 Woodiwiss, Anthony 135–8, 145–6 Working Hours Directive 4, 62 World Bank 96, 105, 150 see also supranational functional regime World Economic Forum 70–2 world government 75–6, 139–40 world’s high income countries 75 see also economic competitiveness world system 157 see also Wallerstein World Trade Organisation (WTO) 8–11, 14, 31, 95–6, 98–100, 165 see also supranational global regime xenophobia

15–20, 27

Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of see also Montenegro; Serbia

101–3, 105

Zimbabwe 71 zones of geo-political management see governance Zysman, John 115, 159–60