This page intentionally left blank
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship Relations between the public and holders o...
36 downloads
1217 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
This page intentionally left blank
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship Relations between the public and holders of political authority are in a period of transformative flux. On the one side, new expectations and meanings of citizenship are being entertained and occasionally acted upon. On the other, an inexorable impoverishment of mainstream political communication is taking place. The Internet has the potential to improve public communications and enrich democracy, a project that requires imaginative policy-making. This argument is developed through three stages: firstly, exploring the theoretical foundations for renewing democratic citizenship, then examining practical case studies of e-democracy and, finally, reviewing the limitations of recent policies designed to promote e-democracy and setting out a radical, but practical, proposal for an online civic commons: a trusted public space where the dispersed energies, self-articulations and aspirations of citizens can be rehearsed, in public, within a process of ongoing feedback to the various levels and centres of governance: local, national and transnational. Stephen Coleman is Professor of Political Communication and Co-Director of the Centre for Digital Citizenship at the Institute of Communications Studies at the University of Leeds. He was previously Professor of e-Democracy at the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, and a senior Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. In recent years he has served as specialist adviser to the House of Commons Information Select Committee inquiry on ICT and public participation in Parliament, as a member of the Puttnam Commission on parliamentary communication with the public and as chair of the Electoral Reform Society’s Independent Commission on Alternative Voting Methods. His publications include Bowling Together (with John Gotze, 2001); Realising Democracy Online: A Civic Commons in Cyberspace (with Jay G. Blumler, 2001); A Tale of Two Houses: The House of Commons, the Big Brother House and the People at Home (2003) and Direct Representation: Towards a Conversational Democracy (2005). He has contributed numerous articles and chapters to academic volumes. Jay G. Blumler is Emeritus Professor of Public Communication at the University of Leeds and Emeritus Professor of Journalism at the University of Maryland. He is a leading, internationally recognized figure in political communication, having published numerous books, including Television in Politics: Its Uses and Influence (with Denis McQuail, 1968); The Uses of Mass Communications: Current Perspectives on Gratifications Research (with Elihu Katz, 1974) and The Crisis of Public Communication (with Michael Gurevitch, 1995). He is a past president and Fellow of the International Communications Association. In 2006 Blumler was given a lifetime achievement award by the American Political Science Association.
COMMUNICATION, SOCIETY AND POLITICS
Editors W. Lance Bennett, University of Washington Robert M. Entman, The George Washington University Editorial Advisory Board Scott Althaus, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Larry M. Bartels, Princeton University Jay G. Blumler, Emeritus, University of Leeds Daniel Dayan, Centre National de la Rechereche Scientifique, Paris Doris A. Graber, University of Illinois at Chicago Regina Lawrence, Portland State University Paolo Mancini, Universita di Perugia Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Barbara Pfetsch, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung Philip Schlesinger, University of Stirling Gadi Wolfsfeld, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Politics and relations among individuals in societies across the world are being transformed by new technologies for targeting individuals and sophisticated methods for shaping personalized messages. The new technologies challenge boundaries of many kinds – between news, information, entertainment and advertising; between media, with the arrival of the World Wide Web and even between nations. Communication, Society and Politics probes the political and social impacts of these new communication systems in national, comparative and global perspective. Titles in the Series: C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters C. Edwin Baker, Media, Markets, and Democracy W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman, eds., Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy Continued after the Index
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship T H E O R Y, P R A C T I C E A N D P O L I C Y
Stephen Coleman
Jay G. Blumler
University of Leeds
University of Leeds
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521817523 © Stephen Coleman and Jay G. Blumler 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2007
ISBN-13
978-0-511-53340-2
eBook (EBL)
ISBN-13
978-0-521-81752-3
hardback
ISBN-13
978-0-521-52078-2
paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Contents
Acknowledgements
page ix
Introduction: Anxiety and Optimism about Democracy
1
1 Democracy’s Deliberative Deficit
14
2 A Crisis of Public Communication
42
3 From Indirect to Direct Representation
68
4 E-Democracy from Above
90
5 E-Democracy from Below
117
6 Shaping E-Democracy
139
7 Realising the Democratic Potential of the Internet
166
Bibliography Index
199 217
vii
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Institute for Public Policy Research and Citizens Online for originally inviting us to write about our idea of an online civic commons; Michael Gurevitch, Jeff Chester and Lance Bennett for contributing to our thinking about this subject; numerous policy-makers, scholars and online practitioners in several different countries for engaging with us in discussion; and our editors at Cambridge University Press for their patience and assistance. The book is dedicated to Bernadette Coleman, whose encouragement, support and love have been invaluable. Any errors in the text are ours alone. SC and JGB
ix
Introduction: Anxiety and Optimism about Democracy
DIVERGENT ANXIETIES
A
pervasive anxiety characterises liberal democracy in the early twenty-first century. As one leading British politician has put it, ‘The public, and particularly young people, now have less faith than ever in parliamentary democracy. We who constitute the “political class” conduct politics in a way that turns off our voters, readers, listeners and viewers . . . Too many people believe that government is something that is done to them’ (Hain 2003). It is not that democracy as such is out of favour – on the contrary, it has never been so widely adopted as a political model – but that citizens seem to be increasingly disenchanted by and disengaged from the processes and institutions of the democratic state. There is a widespread public feeling that government is remote, insensitive and untouchable; even if one takes the trouble to speak out, organise or respond to consultations, those who hold power are unwilling or unable to listen. According to the 2007 Audit of Political Engagement, conducted by the U.K. Electoral Commission and the Hansard Society, almost 4 out of 10 people disagree with the statement that ‘When people like me get involved in politics, they really can change the way the country is run’ (EC 2007a: 35). Interestingly, no difference in this low level of political efficacy was found between respondents who were political activists and those who did not participate. As Norris has observed, there are now, globally, ‘more critical citizens, who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government’ (Norris 1999: 269). A shared unease about what has come to be regarded as a ‘crisis of disengagement’ dominates discussion of contemporary politics. Politicians 1
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
make speeches lamenting their disconnection from a public which is deemed to be, at best, otherwise engaged, and, at worst, irresponsibly apathetic. Journalists bemoan the newest generation of citizens who seem to be more enthused by voting in Big Brother than in political elections. Political scientists, who were once content to study who gets what, when and how (Lasswell 1935), are increasingly reflecting upon ‘why Americans hate politics’ (Dionne 1991), ‘the vanishing voter’ (Patterson 2002), the ‘decline of the public’ (Marquand 2004), ‘why we hate politics’ (Hay 2007), ‘the crisis of public communication’ (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995), ‘critical citizens’ (Norris 1999) and ‘disaffected democracies’ (Pharr and Putnam 2000). One might expect this crisis of political confidence to pull people together, to somehow strengthen a public sphere in which democratic innovations are tested and citizens devise new ways of making their presence felt. But upon closer inspection, anxieties about political disengagement have taken two divergent forms. For political insiders, such as politicians, anxiety takes the form of nostalgia: a longing for an idealised lost era of democracy, characterised by civic cohesion, dutiful citizens and clear political choices. When invited to articulate their disappointment about public disengagement from politics, insiders often speak about times past – part real, part imagined – when leaders were highly respected and voters paid close and serious attention to parliamentary debate, party manifestoes and press coverage. Politicians worry about what they see as an uninformed citizenry. They are eager to find ways of informing citizens so that they can play their part in making instrumentally rational and morally dutiful social choices. For politicians, reengaging the public entails a return to neglected norms, perhaps using new tools and technologies to recreate a society in which those elected to govern are trusted by the represented. Citizens’ unease with contemporary democracy tends to take a very different form. When asked to explain why they feel frustrated as democratic citizens, they refer to feelings of being unacknowledged and disrespected. Politics is seen as a relationship which is in disrepair, replete with daily failures of communication and unfulfilled promises. For an increasing number of citizens, being recipients of government, party and mass-media stories about the world is only half the story. They are interested in knowledge-sharing, which involves the upstream flow of experiential accounts, local expertise and common sense, as well 2
Introduction
as the downstream transmission of official information. Rather than seeking to restore trust in government, democratic activists are more concerned about the efficacy of citizens, whose experiences and expertise often seem to be diminished or marginalised. They do not look back to an age of deferential representation, but argue that strong democracy requires energetic and autonomous civic activity, beyond the management of the state and capable of shaping the outcomes of governance. An opening assumption of this book is that any proposed solutions to contemporary democratic ills must start by acknowledging these distinct problematisations. As Blaug has argued, the dilemmas of democracy would be better understood if we were to adopt two models for describing it, incumbent and critical: Incumbent democracy is primarily motivated to preserve and improve existing institutions by maximizing and managing orderly participation. Critical democracy seeks, instead, to resist such management and empower excluded voices in such a way as to directly challenge existing institutions. Incumbent democrats assume that effectiveness is only achieved through institutions, and that participation requires institutionalization in order to be compatible with the central representative structures of the democratic state. Critical democracy upholds a rather different assumption: that effectiveness can arise out of a collective adherence to common concerns. Here, the institutionalization of participation is seen as an attempt to tame radical energy. (Blaug 2002: 107) We share Blaug’s analysis of these two democratic models and outlooks, but take a rather less stark view of their mutual incompatibility. We would argue that for democratic participation to have a meaningful impact upon political outcomes there is a need for inclusive and accountable institutions that can provide a space for consequential interaction between citizens and their elected representatives. Indeed, a key aim of this book is to argue for an institutional innovation that could nurture critical citizenship and radical energy, while at the same time opening up representative governance to a new respect for public discourse and deliberation. Before we can make that argument, we need to be clear about what we understand citizenship to mean and why we regard the Internet as a potential space for the articulation of democratic citizenship. 3
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship BEING CITIZENS
Addressed as consumers in the marketplace, as members of audiences consuming mass-media output and as individual personalities in the sphere of intimate sociability, people have become used to having multiple social identities. The role of being a citizen is one of the more confusing of these identities. To be a citizen is to enter into a promiscuous relationship with strangers within a political community that is not of one’s own making. As citizens, we are not expected to know or understand one another, but to form political attachments that require us to abide by rules and norms of civic coexistence. Citizenship is a fluid and widely contested concept (Marshall 1950; Barbalet 1988; Turner 1990; Roche 1992; Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Miller 1998; Cruikshank 1999; Isin 2002; Sassen 2002; Heater 2004; Schudson 2006). It can be understood in at least three ways. First, there is a legal-judicial conception of citizenship which refers to one’s official membership of a political community (usually a nation-state) and its compulsory laws, regulations and customs. To be a legal-judicial citizen is to possess an appropriate passport or right of residency. According to Brubaker (1992: 21), ‘There is a conceptually clear, legally consequential, and ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners. The state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular bounded citizenry’. In this sense, to be a citizen is to be within rather than without a community; to be subject to its legal duties and socially sanctioned responsibilities, such as paying taxes, obeying the highway code, registering to vote and living in peace with neighbours, as well as being in possession of legally enforceable rights. Second, there is political citizenship, closely related to the legaljudicial conception, but extending beyond its prescriptive and prohibitive terms of normativity. The political citizen is more than just an officially-recognised member of a community, but a potentially active constituent of a body politic, capable of exerting democratic influence upon fellow citizens as well as the political state. This conception of citizenship places great emphasis upon the importance of three kinds of participation: information-gathering, with a view to gaining balanced accounts of political questions from pluralistic sources; deliberation, which, in its most basic form, entails talking with other citizens about political questions in an honest and open-minded way; and active efforts to influence public policies and decisions, which range from putting up posters, voting for a candidate or party, joining a pressure 4
Introduction
group to demonstrating in the streets or breaking unjust laws. In both a normative and empirical sense, democratic legitimacy is dependent upon citizens expressing more than the thin forms of consent usually articulated through legal-judicial procedures. But political citizens do not simply spring into life; they are constituted through complex interactions between their own life experiences, traditions of collective action, structures of opportunity and available discourses of thinking and acting politically. In recent times the project of cultivating political citizens has been buttressed by schemes for civic education, deliberative democracy and local co-governance, all in their own ways intended to democratise the civic relationship. Third, there is affective citizenship which is primarily concerned to mobilise feelings of civic belonging, loyalty and solidarity. It was with a view to cultivating this kind of affective attachment that the Italian nationalist, Massimo D’Azeglio declared, soon after the national unification of Italy, that ‘We have made Italy; we now have to make Italians’. In this sense, citizenship is what Bora et al. (2001) have called ‘an ongoing communicative achievement’. That is to say, it is constituted through a variety of symbolic repertoires, ranging from the banal (flagwaving, singing national anthems, commemorating great historical episodes, the Queen’s Christmas speech) to the profound (commitment to a way of life, political values, constitutional liberties) (Billig 1995). The intangibility of affective citizenship is its strength, insofar as it draws upon energies that flow from the nerve centres of the lifeworld, but a weakness, insofar as it renders the civic outlook vulnerable to exclusivist and xenophobic perspectives that are not easily contestable in rational terms (Honig 2001; Balibar 2002; Bhabha 2004; Silverstone 2005). These are not mutually exclusive definitions of citizenship; on the contrary, all three are instantiated in most historical experiences of citizenship, with different degrees of emphasis depending upon the political model of democracy that gives rise to them. In incumbent democracy, citizenship is conceived as being primarily state-centred. That is to say, citizens are imagined and constituted in terms of their relationship to the state. In legal-judicial terms, they are required to understand their obligations as members of a state-centred community; in political terms, they are encouraged to engage with the state within certain parameters of largely-managed participation; in affective terms, they are subjected to processes of formal socialisation (in schools, churches, through the mass media) designed to promote civic pride in the state and its national narratives. In contrast to this passive and clientalist state-centric notion is 5
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
democratic citizenship which, to put it simply, assumes that the space of governance emanates from the demos rather than constituting it. That is to say, the practice of democratic citizenship by people regarding themselves as a collectivity precedes any notion of a bounded political space to which they belong. As Tassin (1992: 189) puts it, in relation to the putative citizenship of the European Union, instead of being the precondition for a public space, the European community is actually its result: it is ‘a community resting not upon an amalgamation of interests, feelings and wills, but on the contrary upon a politically constituted public space in which the plurality of political initiatives stand face to face’. Democratic citizens differ from state-centred citizens in their rejection of obligatory commitment towards existing institutions, traditions and values. Bennett (2007) contrasts actualising and dutiful citizens, with the former characterised by a diminished sense of obligation to government; a rejection of voting in favour of other more consumerist, communitarian or transnational forms of participation; and a greater sense of connections to peer networks than conventional social movements or parties. In short, democratic citizens are less willing than state-centred citizens to enter already constituted, managed political spaces; their orientation is towards autonomous civic practices (Coleman 2007). This does not mean that each generation of democratic citizens is bound to reinvent its social role, but that they are more likely to contest and reshape the three elements of citizenship that we have outlined than to accept them in an essentialist spirit. Indeed, the early twenty-first century has witnessed a flourishing of pluralistic and reflexive performances of citizenship. Legal-judicial conceptions of state-based membership have been challenged by supranational, cosmopolitan and ethnic civic identities, often operating alongside national allegiances, but sometimes in opposition to them. Political citizenship has taken innovative forms which have tended to escape from the institutional imperatives of state rule, radically juxtaposing official-administrative politics with the sphere of the political, in which mundane encounters with power are experienced and negotiated in everyday life. Affective citizenship has likewise taken a late-modern turn, remixing identities, prosaic experience and cultural norms in ways that allow ‘the unrecognised’ and the ‘practically untellable’ (Lefebre 1991) to be absorbed into the everyday practices of civic life (Miller 1998). Unlike state-centred citizenship, democratic citizenship is not parasitical upon or consistent with the spatial formation of the 6
Introduction
nation-state. As Lefort (2000) has suggested, in contrast to pre-modern and totalitarian regimes in which power is incarnated in the body of the sovereign, in contemporary democracies ‘the locus of power is an empty place’. Within this indeterminate emptiness of democratic space, a tension is played out between two political imperatives: ‘the egalitarian universal imperative embodied in the social (the will of ‘the people’) and the sovereign, institutional imperative embodied in the legal apparatus’ (Newman 2004). In other words, at some times political citizenship is defined in terms of the state’s requirements for order amongst its subjects, and at others it emerges out of the collective values, voices and actions of the people themselves. Incumbent democracy is served by the former; critical democracy by the latter. Contemporary political theorists have observed that political policymaking is increasingly conducted within an institutional void. This does not mean that ‘state-institutions . . . have suddenly vanished or are rendered meaningless. The point is rather that . . . there are important policy problems for which political action either takes place next to or across such orders, thus challenging the norms of the respective participants’ (Hajer 2003: 175). For example, it is now widely acknowledged that policies relating to health care cannot be promoted solely by governments setting funding and practice priorities at an institutional level. The health of a population is determined by a range of other factors, including ‘lifestyle’ choices, environmental conditions, stress levels and household incomes, none of which can be ‘fixed’ by state-driven, top-down policy-making. The only way to arrive at democratic health care policy is to transcend institutional silos by generating debates that cut across established policy areas and seeking to include the widest possible range of social actors. The same applies to most complex contemporary policy-making around such issues as education, care of the elderly, policing and local economies. For such democratising approaches to policy-making to take place next to and across old state boundaries, new spaces of political citizenship are required: ones in which civic energies can coalesce inclusively and productively. Thus far, few democratic societies have been successful in creating such politically vibrant spaces. The fluidity and indeterminacy of cyberspace makes it a suggestive candidate for becoming the kind of empty space or institutional void in which tensions between state-centric and democratic citizenship can be played out. To what extent should we think of the Internet as a potential space for the articulation of civic democracy? 7
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship NEW POLITICAL SPACES
The Internet, which will not qualify much longer for the title of ‘new technology’, has not tended to be thought of as a political space. Most of the hype and speculation surrounding the Internet has focused upon new opportunities for commerce, sociability and study – as well as its more negative uses for criminality, surveillance and offensive content. Governments have initiated policies intended to deliver services and information online in cheaper or more efficient ways than they could have done in the past; representative institutions, such as parliaments and local councils, all now have their web sites; politicians and candidates feel the need to establish a web presence, with a few of them even launching blogs, MySpace pages and videos on YouTube. But fundamental political questions remain to be answered. Has the emergence of the Internet changed the balance of communicative power within modern liberal democracies? Are citizens more able than they were in pre-digital times to question, comment upon, challenge and influence those who govern them? Has the Internet served democratic ends? There has been no shortage of speculative responses to these questions: The new information technologies may, for the first time in the history of industrial societies under liberal regimes, make it possible to recreate the perfect information arena, the agora of Ancient Greece, a meeting place where citizens could go to be fully informed and to participate directly, with no intermediary, in the government of the city, exercising all their political rights unconditionally and without restriction. (European Information Society Forum Report 1999) The Global Information Infrastructure [GII] will not only be a metaphor for a functioning democracy, it will in fact promote the functioning of democracy by greatly enhancing the participation of citizens in decision-making. And it will greatly promote the ability of nations to cooperate with each other. I see a new Athenian Age of democracy forged in the fora the GII will create. (Al Gore, speech to the International Telecommunications Union, 21 March 1994) Structurally, the Internet has inverted the few-to-many architecture of the broadcast age, in which a small number of people were able to influence and shape the perceptions and beliefs of entire nations. In the many-to-many environment of the Net, every 8
Introduction
desktop is a printing press, a broadcasting station, and place of assembly. (Rheingold 1999) Whether direct Internet democracy is good or bad is quite beside the point. It is inevitable. It is coming and we had better make our peace with it. We have to better educate ourselves so that we can make good decisions. Restricting the power of the people is no longer a viable option. The Internet made it obsolete. (Morris 1999) Sceptics regard such claims as excessive and deterministic reactions to an overhyped technology. In the name of sober realism, they predict that ‘people will mold the Internet to fit traditional politics’ (Hill and Hughes 1998: 186) and conclude that ‘far from remaking . . . politics, the development of cyberspace, and particularly of the WWW, seems more likely to reinforce the status quo’ (Margolis and Resnick 2000). Some critics go as far as to argue that, rather than invigorating it, the Internet could seriously undermine the health of democracy, by providing access to individuated information environments resulting in group polarisation (Sunstein 2001) and diminishing the rational level of the public sphere by forcing political arguments to become ‘distorted, shrill, and simplistic’ in order to be noticed amongst the vast array of competing online messages (Noam 2002). And at the most dystopian end of the spectrum there are critics who contend that the Internet is producing ‘market instability, political turmoil and civil unrest, increasing rage and violent actions amongst previously passive people, as well as “immoral” behaviour on a gigantic scale’ (Angell 2000). Rather than subscribing to either of these brands of hyperbole, we prefer to think of the Internet as an empty space of power which is both vulnerable to state-centric (and, for that matter, corporate) strategies and open to occupation by citizens who have few other spaces available for them to express themselves in constructive democratic ways.
OUR VIEW
In this book we seek to avoid the teleological trap of assuming that the Internet possesses any deterministic propensities, but that does not mean that no relationship between the Internet and democracy can be advanced. We take the position that the Internet possesses a vulnerable potential to revitalise our flagging political communication 9
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
arrangements by injecting some new and different elements into the relationship between representatives and represented and governments and governed. But we argue that such potential will be squandered without imaginative policy intervention designed to shape and nurture the democratic opportunities provided by the Internet. It is this commitment to policy intervention that saves our argument from the ritual charge in all debates of this kind of technological determinism. We reject the notion of technologies as asocial, neutral artefacts with innate capacities to affect social organisation. We are sympathetic to the social constructivist perspective which regards technologies as explicable in terms of their social origins, the various actors and interests involved in their development and the competing ontologies and epistemologies that surround and define them. Indeed, it is precisely because we take the view that information and communication technologies are constructed, shaped and given meaning by a complex range of social forces that we argue for the importance of subjecting these processes of construction, shaping and sense-making to normatively defined policy. In rooting our assumptions about the democratic potential of the Internet in theoretically-grounded policy choices, we distinguish our position from both essentialist and deterministic accounts of the Internet as an automatic leveller of communicative power and empiricist accounts which downplay political agency and assume that the Internet must become an inevitable victim to political institutionalisation. The arguments developed in this book rest upon three central assumptions, which we develop in detail within the first three chapters. First, we argue that relations between members of the public and holders of political authority are in a period of transformative flux. On the one side, new expectations and meanings of citizenship are being entertained and occasionally acted upon. People often expect to be heard and heeded on more occasions and matters than the ballot boxes of Polling Day can settle. But this process is sporadic, and its implications for the system of representative democracy are unclear. On the other hand, government is finding it extremely difficult to respond satisfactorily to the many new needs and problems that are continually being thrown up by the pressures of a rapidly changing society. Topdown ways of coping – through established bureaucratic routines, interdepartmental committees, commissioning opinion surveys, and so forth – are simply inadequate. Better ways of tapping people’s 10
Introduction
experiences and felt needs and of feeding them into the making of laws and policy are required. Second, we contend that an inexorable impoverishment of mainstream political communication is taking place. On some counts this is now worse than even a minimally adequate democracy deserves. But because much of this trend is rooted in media systems and structures, the ensuing problems of civic communication are inherently difficult to improve or reform from within. Third, we suggest that interactive, digital media have a potential to improve public communications and enrich democracy. That potential is vulnerable, however, mainly because an infrastructure for its proper realisation is lacking. With commerce increasingly in the driving seat of Internet development, few of its big players are out to boost citizenship. While various fragmentary and marginal exercises of online consultation, promoting informed deliberation on public policy issues, have been piloted, these have not yet been integrated into the constitutional structures and processes of liberal democracies. With suitable policies and institutional support, some of the emancipatory potential of the new media could be realised and democracy reinvigorated. The historical precedent for our position is the early history of broadcasting. Some commentators regarded radio, and later television, as being inherently civically enriching, observing that it reduced the threshold of access to useful public information. Others took the view that mass broadcasting would inevitably vulgarise civic communication, reducing it to the level of the lowest common denominator. In Britain (and Europe generally) the view was taken that a degree of public regulation and institution-building was needed if the new medium was to play a civic role at all well. Out of this instinct came the BBC. In the United States the public-service instinct was resisted, and the subsequent broadcasting ecology has been very different. The BBC as an institution, and public-service broadcasting as an ethos, were not inevitable products of the new medium of broadcasting. They were contingent-constructed policy interventions based upon theoretical assumptions about the social significance of mass broadcasting. In the early twenty-first century we are once again living through a period of definition for the communications industry and its influence on society at large. While the contemporary communication environment does not call for a replication of the institutional model of a vertically organised, monolithic, national public broadcaster, it is likely to be shaped by purposeful or default policy decisions far more than by 11
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
any autonomous tendency of the Internet to democratise everything around it. Nonetheless, potentially democratising characteristics of the Internet can be identified, with the strong proviso that these are always socially and politically vulnerable: Unlike broadcasting, which has provoked long-running debates about how far, when, and over what programmes its audiences may be regarded as ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (cf. Katz 1996 vs. Kubey 1996), the Internet is unquestionably a medium of predominantly active users. Typically, one decides which web site to visit, and then, through a sequence of follow-up decisions, one may click on other pages or pursue other links of interest, ponder the material received and possibly even talk about it with others. Admittedly, the extent and depth of such activity should not be exaggerated or idealised. Empirical studies of web site pages report far more exposure to main than subsequent pages (Dutton, Elberse and Hale 1999). But if the Internet tends to encourage a more active disposition to communications than the mainstream media, then some of this should transfer over to people’s reception through it of news, public affairs and politics. The Internet’s discursive role could also diverge from that of older media. Unlike broadcasting, which works within tight time limits and essentially shows its audiences other people discussing political issues, over the Internet it is possible to involve large numbers of users themselves in a more full expression and exchange of experiences and opinions on a given topic. It can be a medium for engaging more widely in, and not just presenting and following, civic dialogue. The Internet provides relatively inexpensive public access to large stores of retrievable data that may be tapped into by users, at various levels and depths, in line with their particular informational needs. By making it easier for individuals to find and follow what concerns them personally, and by lowering the cost of obtaining information, the influence of social status on political involvement may be reduced. Citizens and groups with few resources can undertake acts of communication and monitoring that previously were the domain mainly of resource-rich organisations and individuals (Bimber 2000). The Internet facilitates lateral, peer-to-peer and many-to-many interactive exchange, enabling ‘a greater symmetry of communicative power than [the] one-way communication’ flows of the press and broadcasting (Schultz 2000). At its best, people are able to discuss issues over a period of hours, days, weeks or months in an 12
Introduction
asynchronous fashion, allowing them time for reflective debate and the space to develop evidence and argumentation; participation can be open to all, regardless of geographical spread; online discussion is conducted in language closer to ordinary people than the elite world of broadcasting; and participants in online discussion can encounter new ideas and sources of information and new ways of thinking about issues. The relevance of these unique, but vulnerable potentialities of the Internet to the competing models of democracy that we have outlined in this introduction are matters for theoretical, empirical and policy analysis. Our aim in this book is to explore the Internet-democracy relationship from all three of these perspectives. In this, we think that our approach differs from previous studies which have sought to understand the relationship through theory, observation or prescription, without seeking an overarching conceptualisation that embraces all three. Hence the structure of this book: the first three chapters are devoted to identifying the key theoretical themes which give meaning to the contemporary notion of e-democracy; the two chapters that follow provide empirical analysis of two kinds of practical e-democracy; and the final two chapters assess policy recommendations that have been made thus far, and set out our own prescription for a benign relationship between the Internet and democracy.
13
C H A P T E R 1
Democracy’s Deliberative Deficit
The public will not support decisions unless they feel that they have been properly consulted and involved in the making of them. (Gordon Brown in an interview with Andrew Marr, BBC1, 13 May 2007) People with little or no power are made to believe that there is no point in raising their voices, as it will make no difference. That they will not be listened to by those who have power and control. This habit becomes so strong that some people almost forget that they have opinions of their own, and so they just endure the hardships that they suffer. (Cathy McCormack, quoted in the report of the U.K. Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power 2000: 5)
N
ever before in history have there been so many opportunities to access, comment upon and challenge governing authorities. But never before, at least in democratic history, has the public felt so frustrated and disappointed about its lack of ability to make any difference to the policies and decisions of government. In surveys, focus groups and interviews, citizens repeatedly complain of feeling left out, unheard and disrespected; mere spectators upon a political process that is rapidly losing their trust. Partly in response to this unease, a range of innovative exercises in participatory democracy has emerged in recent years. The U.K. Parliament’s Public Administration Committee, after an extensive inquiry into innovations in methods of public participation, concluded 14
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
that ‘the period since the middle 1990s has seen an explosion of interest in involving the public more frequently, more extensively, and in much more diverse ways in the conduct of decision-making within the public services’ (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2001a: para.75). Although there has been inevitable competition between proponents of particular participatory techniques and formats, the empirical evidence suggests that different approaches are suitable for different situations. Rather than seeking to identify one ideal setting for public deliberation – online, offline; recruited, self-selected; consensual, aggregative – there is a need for a broad and critical understanding of the potential opportunities and limitations of diverse methods. As shown in table 1, Goss (1999) has outlined a typology of ways of including the public in policy and decision-making, ranging from low levels of involvement, such as information provision and surveys, to sophisticated deliberative exercises. The most exciting and innovative participatory exercises have in common an aspiration to promote and utilise public discussion as a means of engendering the collective production of policy decisions worthy of public consent. Democratic theorists have taken to heart Dewey’s contention that for democracy to work well ‘the essential need . . . is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion’ (Dewey 1927: 86). Public talk has been accorded a central position within recent models of participatory and deliberative democracy. ARGUMENTS FOR DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
At a most basic level of definition, democracy can be regarded as having five essential characteristics: Regular, free and fair elections, involving competition between more than one party The rule of law, under which all citizens are subject to a common jurisdiction Freedom to speak, assemble and publish, and for opposition to the government of the day to organise without fear of intimidation. Government accountability to the public and responsiveness to public concerns The existence of a civil society sector which is free from control by either the state or the market 15
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Table 1. Typology of public participation Giving information
Consultation
Exploring/ innovating/ visioning
Judging/ deciding together
Delegating/ supporting/ decisionmaking
Sign-posting
Surveys
Consultative workshops
Deliberative polls
Neighbourhood committees
Leaflets/newsletters/ reports
Focus groups
Visioning workshops
Citizens’ juries
Town/estate plans
Community profiles
Interactive community profiles
Simulation/ open-space events
Negotiation workshops
Tenant management organisations
Feedback on surveys and consultation Annual performance reports
Public meetings
Support/advice
Panels
Video/Internet communication
Video boxes
Community issue groups Community workshops Planning for Consensus real conferences community discovery Use of theatre, arts/ media
Community development trust Partnerships/ contracts with communities Referendums/ tele-voting
Source: Goss (1999: 23).
The absence of all or any of these characteristics seriously undermines the claim of a state to be democratic. But even where such characteristics exist, one can identify degrees and levels of democratic practice, ranging from elite-dominated democracies in which citizens have only limited and occasional controls and checks on power to more inclusive democracies in which there is an emphasis upon civic republican duties of participation and the value of arriving at decisions by public deliberation. There are two ways of thinking about the public’s preferences. Some liberal democrats argue that society consists of fixed and competing interests and preferences and that it is the role of institutions of governance to provide optimal opportunities for the strategic pursuit of interest-fulfilment by individual actors and collectivities. Deliberative theorists reject this assumption in two respects. First, they argue that interests and preferences are not inherently invariant 16
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
and can be transformed as a result of deliberative engagement. Second, they regard the function of democratic institutions as being to facilitate the collective resolution of apparent interest incompatibilities through a process of open, noncoercive deliberative talk. There is a lack of consensus amongst liberal political theorists about how important it is to have a deliberating public, as opposed to elected representatives who deliberate on the public’s behalf, but many would agree with the following three propositions: In a democracy competing arguments about policy need to be debated fairly and with a good chance of the best decisions being reached. Democratic debate should not be wholly confined to political elites, but should involve the public, both via such mediating processes as the press, television, radio, the Internet and opinion polling and by more direct participation in parties, pressure groups, public meetings, petitions and contact with representatives. The best and most democratically legitimate policies and decisions are ones which are understood and accepted by the public, especially those affected by them – and the most likely way to achieve this end is by enabling the public to take some ownership of such policies and decisions. This is where deliberative democrats come in. They argue that open discussion of matters affecting the public, locally, nationally and globally, exposes people to other views, enables them to evaluate the best arguments and results in the kind of preference changes that characterise a truly democratic culture. Deliberative democrats claim that policy formation and decision-making can benefit from public deliberation because the public can contribute information and knowledge from their store of diverse, collective experience and expertise which might otherwise remain private and unutilised; because deliberating citizens, employing fair, equal and inclusive rules of discourse, are more likely to reach just policy conclusions than elites, experts or cliques; and because public input legitimises democratic decisions. In addition to these instrumental and utilitarian arguments for public deliberation, there are compelling reasons for concluding that deliberation has an inherently democratising effect upon the public itself: that by exercising public reason, rather than merely bargaining and voting, the public will become less atomised and more civic. Specifically, democratic theorists have been optimistic about the effects of deliberation upon public morality and rationality. 17
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Bohman’s definition of deliberation as ‘a dialogical process of exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and cooperation’ (Bohman 1996: 27) usefully highlights the importance attached by deliberative theorists to the need for communicative action to be based upon an acknowledgement of social interdependence and a search for mutual understanding. The moralising potential of public deliberation moved John Stuart Mill to argue that ‘it is by political discussion . . . that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community’ (1859/1975: 38). If citizens are able to measure their own preferences and arguments against other strong preferences and arguments, they are less likely to be purely selfinterested in their political judgments. For example, in considering the future of welfare services, a discussion involving both highearning taxpayers and welfare claimants is more likely to result in exposure to new ideas and morally sensitive conclusions than a discussion involving members of just one of those groups. The ‘bounded rationality’ of strategic political discourse based upon rigid and exclusive interests can be positively undermined by a more deliberative approach to conceiving and resolving social problems. The precise principles of an ideal deliberative process have been the subject of much theoretical debate. Habermas (1996) sets out four conditions that are essential for democratic deliberation to occur: Each person must be able to express their own ideas openly and criticise others’ ideas. The concepts of force and power associated with social status must be eliminated. Arguments based primarily on appeal to tradition or dogma must be exposed. Truth is to be sought by seeking a consensus. We shall have more to say later in this chapter about the exacting demands set by Habermasian and other versions of deliberative democracy. Regardless of the realistic applicability of such demands to complex, pluralist, mass societies, few would disagree that the political cultures of most democracies, including the advanced liberal democracies of Western Europe and North America, provide remarkably few channels for such principles to be implemented, at least in nonexperimental 18
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
situations. The traditional homes of policy deliberation, such as parliaments, congresses and national assemblies, often appear to be conspicuously remote from the public and disconnected from the chatter of less official public discourse. As Sennett (1977) has observed, ‘were modern architects asked to design spaces that better promote democracy, they would lay down their pens; there is no modern design equivalent to the ancient assembly’. The absence of places and spaces for public talk on matters of common interest is related, both as cause and effect, to the atrophy of civic engagement. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION
Objections to democratic deliberation take four main forms. First, there are arguments about the impossibility of vast, physically and temporally dispersed groups of people being able to participate in anything resembling a collective conversation. If deliberation requires everyone speaking to and hearing from everyone else, are there not natural barriers to that happening? Second, there are questions about the intellectual competence of the public to engage in deliberative reflection about the diverse issues which affect a complex social order. Can ‘ordinary’ people cope with the demands of rational debate, or might it be better to leave deliberation to experts or elected representatives? Third, many political scientists would argue that such are the difficulties of arriving at rationally calculated outcomes from deliberative discussion that it is better to surrender to the mysteries of political aggregation than to imagine that citizens can talk their way to reasonable policy conclusions. Fourth, and somewhat differently from the earlier objections, there are democratic theorists who argue that the rhetoric of deliberative democracy is a thin disguise for a range of culturally hegemonic practices which tend to keep the powerful and articulate on top and everyone else in their place. It is necessary to engage with these formidable arguments if we are to go any further in considering public deliberation as a remedy for democracy’s current malaise. Ba r r i er s of Di s t a n c e , T i m e a n d S cal e
Democracy has not always been conceived in the context of mass societies comprising millions of people. Fifth-century Athenian democracy operated within a relatively small geographical area, with a population of between 20,000 and 40,000 citizens. As an archetypal democracy, Athens had some important flaws: most of the population, 19
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
who were women, slaves or resident aliens, was excluded from the sovereign citizenry; most citizens never spoke in either the Council or the Assembly; and citizens had to be paid to attend Assembly meetings (Ober 1989). Even this small-scale democracy was beset by the problem that not everyone could be in one place at the same time – and that when thousands were gathered in one place, the voices of some counted more than those of others. These fundamental problems of democratic contiguity and calibration must be addressed if participatory democracy is to be more than a rhetorical aspiration. D I S T A N C E Representative institutions emerged in an epoch characterised by what Blainey (1968) has called ‘the tyranny of distance’. Travelling for many miles on horseback, often on dangerous roads, leaving behind politically fractious or fragile situations, representatives were often happy if parliamentary sessions were brief and infrequent. As Pasquet notes regarding Edward I’s reign, ‘suit of court was then considered a duty and not a right’ (1925: 4). Distance from the political centre has disadvantaged certain areas and regions, necessitating redressing constitutional arrangements based upon devolution and subsidiarity. Even where political powers are decentralised, strong pressures exist for diligent and ambitious politicians to travel to the centre in order to seek their share from federal budgets or to pursue their careers in the most auspicious limelight. T I M E Democracy is faced with two fundamental problems of time. The first is that people do not share the same experience of time. Differing time zones constrain long-distance synchronous debate. Simultaneous, ‘live’ political events are almost impossible to manage at a global level, especially for the majority of people whose limited resources confine them to a mainly localised existence. Despite the existence of satellites, global news organisations and the Internet, the capacity to overcome localised time zones and assume a disembodied relationship to power is unequally distributed. As Bauman has observed: People who move and act faster, who come nearest to the momentariness of movement, are now the people who rule. And it is the people who cannot move as quickly, and more conspicuously yet the category of people who cannot at will leave their place at all, who are ruled. Domination consists in one’s own capacity to escape, to disengage, to ‘be elsewhere’, and the right to decide the speed at which all that is done – while simultaneously stripping the people on the dominated side of their ability to arrest or constrain their moves or slow them down. (Bauman 2000: 119–20) 20
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
Second, there are perennial pressures of temporal economics. People have many competitive demands upon their time and must allocate this precious resource as efficiently as they can manage. Choosing to debate public policy is not a serious option for many people, in comparison with earning a living, looking after children, pursuing hobbies, seeking entertainment and simply keeping abreast of the latest news. Political deliberation requires time to think, read and digest, ideally drawing upon information from many sources and perspectives. Simply finding time to read the Sunday supplements is more than many citizens are able to do. Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) have playfully suggested the establishment of an annual Deliberation Day, on which citizens would be effectively subsidised to take time off work to think about politics. But considering that millions of people do not even vote in a general election every four or five years, there are few grounds for optimism about the likelihood of this working. So formulating policy and making decisions becomes increasingly professionalised, centred upon expert bureaucracies and self-perpetuating political elites. Free time is not equally distributed. Apart from the politically committed, who sacrifice other gains to make time to argue their point, time to discuss politics is more available to the affluent, better educated or retired than to those who are poorer, less able to make sense of the debate, working hard to make ends meet or looking for work. Might public deliberation, therefore, further benefit the reasonably well-off, who have more leisure time at their disposal, and further disadvantage the worst-off? S C A L E Even if citizens can be present in the same place (or space) at the same time (or asynchronously), can they meaningfully deliberate, given the normative requirement for all to be able to speak and be heard and be civilised in turn-taking? In the British House of Commons, where 646 members represent approximately 70,000 constituents each, there is only enough seating for approximately half of the elected representatives. On the rare occasions when most of the MPs attend it is mainly to file through the voting lobby rather than to sit down and enter into anything resembling policy deliberation. A gathering of all or most citizens, even from a single constituency, let alone an entire nation, would be almost impossible to organise. Not only would it be difficult to find a space large enough for such an assembly, but the event would more than likely collapse under the weight of procedural problems. For example, in a gathering of tens of thousands of people – not to mention millions – would everyone be allowed to speak? Who would decide who could or could not have their say, and who could make supplementary points or 21
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
raise new questions? At what point would votes be taken, and would everyone be allowed to vote, even if they were not present for all of the debate? How long would such meetings last? How would a record of the event be agreed and verified? As Page observes: If . . . a nation of 250 million citizens devoted twenty-four hours to fully equal collective discussion of some political issue, each citizen would get less than .0004 – less than four ten-thousandths – of one second to talk. If each citizen insisted, instead, upon a rather modest two minutes of speaking time, the discussion would take five hundred million minutes: that is, 347,222 days, or 950 years. Extreme boredom and impatience would result. (Page 1996: 4) It is hardly surprising that the history of mass meetings has tended to involve speeches from the platform to a receiving audience, or voting by hand without collective debate. Even pre-Bolshevik Russian soviets, in what were considered to be innovative exercises in public decisionmaking, delegated key decision-making to small committees – that before too long were dominated and manipulated by a political elite. This is consistent with Michels’s (1969) ‘iron law of oligarchy’ – that ‘organisation on a large scale reduces the responsibility of the persons elected to office to any of their electors’. Th e L imits of Public C o m p e t e n c e
Lippmann’s (1922) vivid image of the citizen as ‘a deaf spectator in the back row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite manage to keep awake’ cuts to the root of the assumption that the public lacks the cognitive competence to engage with sophisticated questions of policy. Although it is in the interest of democracy to make issues more transparent and accessible – a role performed for better or worse largely by the media – the growth of globalisation has resulted in a set of policy problems that are more opaque, fragmented and expert-driven than ever. It is hardly an insult to the intelligence of average citizens to say that they would be at a loss to make sense of policy debates relating to such issues as global interest rate fluctuations, pharmaceutical regulation or the principles of international competition law. Evidence from research suggests that there are ‘large gaps in even the most elemental kinds of political information among the American electorate’. Although Americans would seem to be significantly less informed than most Europeans, and ‘German and Italians who have 22
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
never attended college are more knowledgeable about world events than Americans who have’, it is still the case that most citizens in most countries know very little about political structures, institutions or policy issues that do not directly impinge upon their daily lives (Dimock and Popkin 1999: 47, 82). Indeed, many nonvoters in elections state lack of adequate knowledge as their main reason for not feeling able to cast a vote (Hansard Society 2001). Critics of deliberative democracy may well ask how citizens who do not know enough to even choose a government can be expected to deliberate about complex policy options. Consequently, democratic theorists have tended to expect elected representatives to provide leadership rather than merely follow every whim and nuance of public opinion. Mandated by the electorate to pursue a declared programme, based upon explicit values, why should representatives call upon those who elected them to deliberate upon matters of policy? In electing representatives, voters are placing their trust in their personal competence and judgment. Citizens are free to contact their representatives with appeals for support for specific interests and pollsters may try periodically to capture the public mood, but ultimately it is for representatives to decide what is in the best interest of those they represent. Burke famously refused to sacrifice his independent political judgments to the will of those he represented, arguing that ‘authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience – these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution’ (Burke 1871: 446–7). Two later political theorists reinforced the Burkean thesis. Lippmann asserted that ‘We must abandon the notion that the people govern. Instead we must adopt the theory that, by their occasional mobilisations as a majority, people support or oppose the individuals who actually govern. We must say that the popular will does not direct continuously but that it intervenes occasionally’ (1922: 37). Schumpeter contended that ‘The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1976: 269). According to these highly influential thinkers, the climactic point of civic power occurs at the ballot box, before which citizens must deliberate upon the choices on offer; after that, deliberative power is transferred to the elected. From that perspective, excessive use of public 23
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
polling, consultation or single-issue referendums could be regarded as an abdication of responsibility by representatives to deliberate on the public’s behalf. Th e I nevitabi lity of A g gr e g at i o n a n d Ra t i o n a l C h o ic e
Whereas Lippmannesque and Schumpeterian political theorists are sceptical about the public’s capacity to cope with political decisionmaking, social choice theorists such as Arrow and Riker go further, arguing that the very nature of opinion structuration and preference aggregation makes it futile and populist to claim that any democratic vote reflects the public’s will. Social choice theory is based upon five assumptions: Political preferences are rigidly invariant. Political actors (individuals and groups) employ strategic action to pursue their own preferences in competition against others. The function of voting is to aggregate preferences so that those supported by the most people win. All mechanisms of aggregation are prone to manipulation by actors seeking their own preferred outcomes. Different voting mechanisms will produce different outcomes, on the basis of the same spread of individual preferences, depending on how options are ordered and calculated. Expressions of ‘the public will’ cannot emerge independently of aggregating mechanisms that are bound to distort most people’s intentions in supporting particular preferences. In short, social choice presents an intractable problem for democracy, resulting from the innate logic of voting mechanisms rather than the behavioural limitations of voters. For most citizens, the highly complex permutations of social choice logic raise the costs of being politically informed to too high a level. According to Downs, who sought to explain political behaviour in economic terms, ‘In general, it is irrational to be politically well informed because the low returns from data simply do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resources. Therefore many voters do not bother to discover their true views before voting, and most citizens are not well enough informed to influence directly the formulation of those policies that affect them’ (1957: 259). 24
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
The logic of social choice (and its close relative, rational choice) poses some very gloomy questions for deliberative democrats. Why should anyone take the time to become politically informed when it is unlikely that the popular will is going to be reflected in voting outcomes? In the strategic model of politics, where the aim is to pursue one set of preferences at the expense of others, there is a motive to dissemble in order to persuade; why should advocates of deliberation expect it to be free from such dishonestly persuasive talk? Given that deliberation is rarely proposed as an alternative to voting, but rather as a way of making it more informed, what is the point of having transparency at the level of communicative interaction when there is systemic obfuscation at the level of aggregating collective choices? H e g e m o n y a n d D i f f er e n c e
The objections considered so far imply that policy deliberation should remain a matter for the political elite. There are other critics, coming from a quite different perspective, who argue against public deliberation because it is an elitist exercise, serving to replicate and reinforce hegemonic cultural values in the name of democracy. Deliberation is regarded by such critics as an essentially rationalist project which is insensitive to the differences of background, language and perspective of marginalised social groups. Sanders argues that ‘Appeals to deliberation . . . have often been fraught with connotations of rationality, reserve, cautiousness, quietude, community, selflessness and universalism; connotations which in fact probably undermine deliberation’s democratic claims’ (1996: 348). From the perspective of ‘difference’ democrats, whose thinking derives mainly from feminist and cultural pluralist critiques of the existing political order, the discourse of deliberation is controlling and constraining. As Young argues: The speech culture of white, middle-class men tends to be more controlled, without significant gesture and expression of emotion. The speech culture of women and racial minorities, on the other hand, tends to be more excited and embodied, more valuing the expression of emotion, the use of figurative language, modulation in tone of voice and wide gesture. (2000: 123–4) In order to learn from ‘the social perspectives of people positioned differently in structures of power, resource allocation or normative hegemony’ (126), Young argues for what she calls ‘communicative democracy’ which would embrace other modes of communication 25
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
than rational argumentation. Young has in mind three alternative ways of enabling the public to articulate its views and feelings: rhetoric, greeting and storytelling, each of which allows room for emotional, testimonial and vernacular forms of discourse that are free from the constraints of rationality. Young, and other critics of the hegemonic practices of deliberative democracy do not dismiss the democratic function of political talk, but they cast doubt upon the demanding – sometimes constraining – conception of deliberative talk as a hallowed, hyper-rationalistic activity. Mouffe, in a radical critique of deliberative democracy, argues that it is based upon a misplaced ‘belief in the possibility of a universal rational consensus’ that cannot be achieved and is not good for democratic politics.. For Mouffe, ‘Instead of trying to design the institutions which, through supposedly ‘impartial’ procedures, would reconcile all conflicting interests and values, the task for democratic theorists and politicians should be to envisage the creation of a vibrant ‘agonistic’ public sphere of contestation where different hegemonic political projects can be confronted’ (Mouffe 2005: 3). Mouffe probably has in mind here deliberative democrats like John Elster, who, in a somewhat utopian vein, has contended that as a result of policy deliberation ‘there would not be any need for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences’ (Elster 1997: 112). The implication that wellconducted talk can transcend conflicts of interest or value seems like a recipe for depoliticised politics. Idealised constructions of discursive process may be forceful and compelling in making normative claims for deliberation as a civilising approach to political debate, but they fail to give appropriate attention to the structural inequalities and institutional hierarchies which have traditionally constrained democratic processes and outcomes. Mouffe’s call for the pursuit of agonistic politics is helpful in rescuing deliberative theory from an apolitical indifference to difference and an unhistorical belief in consensus as a form of hegemonic closure. BRINGING DELIBERATION DOWN TO EARTH
Though critical of some of the more excessive claims and constraining demands of deliberative democracy, we are convinced by the strong arguments in favour of embedding deliberative exercises within trusted democratic institutions and processes. We favour a more deliberative democracy, without being committed to the normative and teleological 26
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
case for Deliberative Democracy as a political end in itself. Our arguments in response to the objections discussed above are therefore more grounded and pragmatic than might be expected from fully committed deliberative democrats. In seeking to bring deliberation down to earth, we wish to defend four main positions. First, that hitherto intractable barriers to communicative co-presence can now be transcended with the support of new media. Second, that effective deliberation in the policy sphere needs to be carefully cultivated by developing and utilising techniques designed to foster inclusive, collaborative public communication. Third, that deliberation offers the one practicable escape route from the dilemmas of social choice theory. Fourth, that deliberation can be democratically inclusive only if its procedures and style reflect and encourage cultural diversity, and if its political norms acknowledge the intractable realities of interest, difference and conflict. Ov e r c o m i n g T i m e , S pace and S c a l e
A characteristic of modernity has been the separation of time and space through processes of mediation (Giddens 1984). Castells’ (1996) notions of ‘timeless space’ and ‘the space of flows’ helpfully describe what it means to live in a world where time is compressed and desequenced and simultaneous social practices can be organised without geographical contiguity. New information and communication technologies have facilitated the growth of relationships of mediated co-presence, leading to shrinkage of social space and the collapse of traditional constraints of distance. Virtual co-presence transcends the problem of proximity by digitally simulating the presence of physically distant actors so as to make them instantly ‘accessible, available and subject to one another’ (Goffman 1963). In the age of the Internet, it is increasingly the case that virtual social space supplants the sovereignty of place and asynchronous message storage reduces coordination problems created by temporal dissonance. This is not to say that physical togetherness, in space and time, are not preferable or even necessary for certain kinds of social interaction. But mass, political discussion is probably not one of those social interactions that require embodied, synchronous presence, for it can just as well be conducted within a virtually constructed social space. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that, in veiling social cues, the disembodied nature of online interaction benefits some social groups that have traditionally been most silent, ignored or disrespected within 27
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
the public sphere (Schneider 1996; Yates 1997; Stromer-Galley 2002; Bowker and Tuffin 2002, 2003; Herring 2003). But even within the context of virtual co-presence, problems of scale still persist. How can vast numbers of people engage in collective talk without the voices of individuals being drowned out by the noise of the crowd? One solution to this problem is to invite representative groups to deliberate on issues as proxies for the public as a whole. (Fishkin’s [1997] deliberative polls, discussed later in this chapter, are organised around this principle.) Another option would be to have large numbers of small-group discussions, with summaries from each feeding into a meta-account of public deliberation. A more radical solution is offered by scholars working in the field of discourse architecture and conversation-mapping. By plotting the semantic and pragmatic associations between terms, they aim to provide meaningful graphical representations of large-scale discussions, so that the process of accessing and making collective sense of the evolving views of vast numbers of people need not involve reading every word of text produced (Sack 2002; Buckingham-Shum 2003; Viegas and Smith 2004; Verheij 2005; Renton and Macintosh 2007). The scope of the Internet to reduce spatial and temporal barriers by establishing arenas of virtual co-presence goes some way towards confuting the claims of those who dismiss the possibility of the public’s capacity to deliberate on its own and for itself. By making it easier for citizens to connect with one another, and those who represent them, time and distance are diminished as obstacles to democratic communication. Pr o d u c i n g Inf ormed Delib eration
Turning from obstacles of scale to those of public competence, how far might the Internet facilitate the necessary environmental conditions and pedagogical resources to support informed public deliberation? Intelligent public deliberation is unlikely to occur spontaneously. Just as aggregative processes, such as elections, require a range of tools and methods for managing effective structuration, successful deliberation calls for well-designed and carefully evaluated techniques of communicative collaboration. Although online deliberation faces its own specific problems, its designers can draw upon a number of well-tested examples from offline communication. The most common example of a managed deliberative situation is the jury room. Jurors are not selected because they possess deliberative skills. 28
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
On the contrary, the strength of juries is their random composition and ‘common-sense’ approach to decision-making. Jury deliberation presents us with an interesting case study of how the public actually deliberates, often in relation to deeply complex issues. Since the thirteenth century, when trial by jury began to become more common than trial by ordeal, random members of the public have been thrown together to hear cases in courts. Early jurors were occasionally condemned to prison for bringing ‘wrong’ verdicts in the view of judges, but by the later Middle Ages the notion of the independent jury became a principle of justice. Even so, not all judges or legal experts have respected the competence of jurors, and there has been an ongoing debate about the extent to which lay people, with no legal training, can provide a useful contribution to public justice. For example, Oppenheimer argued that: We commonly strive to assemble twelve persons colossally ignorant of all practical matters, fill their vacuous heads with law which they cannot comprehend, obfuscate their seldom intellects with testimony which they are incompetent to analyze or unable to remember, permit partisan lawyers to bewilder them with their meaningless sophistry, then lock them up until the most obstinate of their number coerce the others into submission or drive them into open revolt. (1937: 142) Herbert Spencer referred to juries as ‘a group of twelve men of average ignorance’, while Dean Griswold (1963: 506) of the Harvard Law School asks, ‘Why should anyone think that twelve persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons’? Given these reservations by experts, the surprising evidence from jury trials has been that of general agreement about verdicts between judges and juries. Extensive U.S. and U.K. studies, in which judges were asked to produce separate verdicts from juries, found that in most cases both reached the same conclusion (Kalven 1964; Kalven and Zeisel 1971; McCabe and Purves 1972). Other researchers have created simulated jury trials, in which jury deliberations can be observed, recorded and analysed with a view to assessing their deliberative features. Reviewing these, Baldwin and McConville (1979: 14) concluded that ‘the overwhelming weight of this body of evidence points strongly towards the jury being a reliable and competent fact-finding body. The simulated juries on the whole, it seems, discuss cases conscientiously, 29
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
stick fairly doggedly to the evidence as presented in court, and decide individual cases according to their merits’. Other well-tested deliberative exercises are more experimental in design, but have some important lessons to offer about ways of generating useful discussion. We shall consider three such techniques: citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and deliberative polls. C I T I Z E N S ’ J U R I E S Citizens’ juries have been established in recent years by a number of local authorities, government agencies and NGOs (nongovernment organisations) as a way of enabling members of the public to think through policy issues with the benefit of balanced information, expert advice and an opportunity to question witnesses. In the United States the Jefferson Center has been running citizens’ juries on a range of policy issues since the mid-1970s. These have been intended to provide independent scrutiny of the policy process, but have not been directly connected to the process of government decision-making (Crosby 1999). In Germany, since 1970 there has been experience of organising Plannungszellen (planning cells) comprising groups of 25 randomly selected people who are released from work for up to a week to hear evidence and make recommendations on matters of planning or policy. Participants are given lectures and taken on field trips and then, together with an independent facilitator, invited to draft a set of recommendations which are passed to the relevant decision-making body (Garbe 1986). British citizens’ juries have been smaller in size than German or U.S. ones, with 12 to 16 members of the public selected to participate. Like courtroom juries, they present a test case of lay deliberation upon complex issues that are usually the province of the political elite (Smith and Wales 2000; White, Lewis and Elam 1999; Coote and Lenaghan 1997). Evidence from several citizens’ juries suggests that participants are likely to change their minds once exposed to new arguments (Stewart, Kendall and Coote 1994) and to become more civically active after having participated (Renn, Webler and Widemann 1995). But, as Smith and Wales (2000: 61) argue, the sustainability of such effects depends upon participants’ belief ‘that their deliberations will be taken seriously’. C O N S E N S U S C O N F E R E N C E S Consensus conferences are in many respects similar to citizens’ juries. They were developed by the Danish Board of Technology, which has used them to consider issues ranging from air pollution to gene therapy. In Denmark they have had a direct effect upon parliamentary decisions and have since been used in the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and France. A sociodemographically representative citizens’ panel is 30
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
recruited, comprising between 10 and 20 people who have had no prior involvement with the issue they are asked to consider. Panel members are given information packs on the subject of the conference, prepared by an independent advisory group, and they spend two weekends preparing for the conference by learning to work together and think through the key questions to be addressed and the witnesses they would like to question. The autonomy of the panel is crucial to this method. With the support of an independent facilitator, they set their own agenda and frame their own questions. At the conference itself, participants question their chosen witnesses and discuss their findings at length, with a view to producing an agreed-upon statement which they then present to a press conference at the conclusion of the event. The aim of this process is to reach a consensus rather than explore political disagreements. The extent to which consensus is sustained after the formal exercise is over is unclear. D E L I B E R A T I V E P O L L S Deliberative polling, as developed by Fishkin, provides a sophisticated method of encouraging informed public deliberation on issues where the public is under-informed. Deliberative polls are counterfactual events, designed to discover what the public would think about complex issues if it were informed by balanced information. Fishkin and Luskin, who are proponents of deliberative polling, argue that: Expertise helps with some questions but not others. Although experts may possibly reach some soft consensus about what policies serve what values, they can never authoritatively say what values or therefore what policies to pursue. For that, as democrats, we should prefer the public’s policy preferences, based on its values – or, better yet, given its ignorance, the policy preferences it would have if everyone had the chance to inform him or herself, acquiring something like expert knowledge of given policies’ implications for given values, and to weigh competing arguments and tradeoffs. (quoted in McCombs and Reynolds 1999: 6) Participants in deliberative polls are selected as a random, representative sample of the population and are then given the opportunity and incentive to behave like ideal citizens. The process begins with an initial in-depth face-to-face survey with each of the 500-odd participants to find out their views on a range of questions relating to a specific policy theme, such as crime, the future of the monarchy or foreign policy. They are then invited to spend a weekend deliberating upon the 31
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
policy theme. Participants are encouraged to acquire new information and to question a range of expert witnesses, to share their views in small discussion groups, to listen to the views of others and to be open to changing their original positions. In such a situation, instead of being one voice in millions, participants are one in a few hundred; instead of relying on sound bites to obtain their information, they have access to nonpartisan briefing papers and can listen to and cross-examine policy experts and politicians; instead of passively reading, watching or listening to the media in isolation, they share their thoughts, visions and concerns in group deliberations. After the weekend of deliberation, the participants are polled again to see whether they have changed any of their opinions as a result of the deliberative process. Fishkin and Luskin claim that there have been both net and gross changes of opinion amongst participants in deliberative polls, indicating that exposure to information and argument results in individual and overall preference shifts (McCombs and Reynolds 1999: 25). All of the methods described above depend for their success upon the construction of appropriate environments for effective deliberation to take place. A key question for our research is whether online communication environments are particularly conducive to the kind of deliberative outcomes that are routinely missing from most current political debates. Critics of online deliberation warn that unequal access to the Internet skews online deliberation in favour of richer and better educated people (Ebo 1998), that groups of like-minded people are likely to herd together online to reinforce their beliefs and prejudices (Hill and Hughes 1998; Sunstein 2001) and that the quality of online deliberation might be limited by an absence of credible information (Barabas 2004). However, several empirical studies offer a more promising account of the potential of online discussion to overcome hitherto intractable barriers to effective public deliberation. First, evidence is emerging to suggest that by transcending geographical confines and enabling Internet users to connect with a broader range of perspectives than they would encounter through face-to-face communication, citizens online are more likely to be exposed to heterogeneous debate than is the case in the offline world (Price and Cappella 2002; Graham and Witschge 2003; Kelly, Fisher and Smith 2005; Janssen and Kies 2005; Albrecht 2006; Muhlberger and Weber 2006). Furthermore – and crucially for the case for a civic commons that we shall be outlining in the final chapter – the design of online spaces can promote forms of deliberation in which participants 32
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
are exposed to a broad range of perspective in contexts likely to generate discursive civility (Edwards 2004; Wright 2006; Wright and Street 2007). Second, by eliminating the presence of social status cues, online deliberation reduces the likelihood of judgements being made on the basis of who the speaker is rather than what they are saying (McKenna and Bargh 2000; Stromer-Galley 2003; Kenny et al. 2007). Third, online deliberative interaction offers greater opportunities for knowledgesharing and long-term community-building than many forms of offline deliberation (Plant 2004; Johnson and Kaye 2004; De Cindio and Schuler 2007). Finally, although certainly a contested finding, some studies suggest that online deliberation has mobilisation and efficacy-building effects, which qualify it as being regarded as a positive stimulant to democratic participation (Johnson and Kaye 1998; Shah, Kwak and Holbert 2001; Horrigan, Garrett and Resnick 2001; Price and Cappella 2002). Overall, these various empirical findings suggest that online discussion and debate offer some hope to those seeking a more deliberative democracy. ESCAPING FROM SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
Even if problems of communicative scale can be overcome and citizens can be relied upon to disprove the worst fears of elitists, there still remains the bleak picture of democracy presented by social choice theorists. Their claim that aggregation is inherently vulnerable to manipulation is not one that proponents of a more deliberative democracy can afford to dismiss. On the contrary, one response to this claim is to say that if all electoral arrangements are likely to defeat the best intentions of voting citizens, the very least that can be done is to precede all voting by robust periods of public deliberation. That way interests become transparent and actors are exposed to influence before, if not during, the voting process. For example, even in the case of a referendum in which the order of choices can be manipulated by astute strategists and the question of wording does not meet standards of objectivity, a lengthy period of public deliberation before votes are cast would at least stand some chance of helping voters to decide what they really want to achieve, even if the perverse permutations of preference structuration deny them their desired end. A major benefit of prevoting deliberation is that people could address the question of the distorting voting mechanism and consider openly and collectively how best to achieve a fair outcome. 33
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Democratic theorists have offered an ‘escape route’ from the problems of social choice theory by suggesting that people should reveal their preferences openly in advance of voting, thereby rendering strategic manipulation less of a threat. Dryzek and List have constructed a sophisticated theoretical argument for reducing the effects of strategic manipulation and the problem of ‘cycling’ by inducing preference structuration in the course of deliberation, thereby enabling ‘people to reflect on their preferences, in the knowledge that these preferences have to be justified to others’ and creating ‘a situation of social interaction where people talk and listen to each other, enabling each person to recognise their interrelation with a social group’ (Dryzek and List 2003: 9) The Dryzek and List thesis depends upon the capacity of deliberative environments to generate sufficient transparency, integrity and selfreflection amongst discussants to undermine the effects of aggregatory manipulation: How do we explain discussion-induced cooperation? Discussion provides participants with opportunities for multi-lateral promise-making about choices they will make. Rational choice theory would predict that in one-shot interactions such promises will be broken, but empirical evidence suggests that social norms and/or psychological dispositions in favour of keeping promises are more powerful. (Dryzek and List 2003: 11) Recent research in the area of group decision analysis offers some promising support for the Dryzek and List approach. For some time, decision analysts have been designing methods to help groups articulate and structure their preferences in ways that will enable them to reach decisions that are consistent with their values and intentions (Gregory, Fischoff and McDaniels 2005; French 2005). The aggregation of individual perspectives on the basis of deliberatively-structured sensitivity analyses has helped to generate a reflexive approach to the decision-making process and strategic outcomes, thereby avoiding the worst pitfalls of Arrow’s (1951) impossibility theorem. French (2005) has shown that web-based group decision-making support tools ‘offer the possibility of supporting much larger groups’ in structuring discussions so as to enable people to share their views about the outcomes they most desire and then order and weight voting options in accordance with these sensitivities. The aim of the European Science Foundation’s Towards Electronic Democracy project (http://www.esf. org/ted) has been to produce an online ‘toolset’ that would help lay 34
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
decision-makers to facilitate ‘discussions between stakeholders to explore their perceptions and values’; identify and structure ‘key issues, providing complementary perspectives on the uncertainties and the scale of possible impacts’; and document ‘the process in a way which both explains the rationale behind the final decision and lets all stakeholders explore the decision and understand the reasoning’ (French 2005). The extent to which web-based decision-making of this kind might contribute to a closer relationship between preference expression and democratic outcomes has yet to be tested, but, in theory at least, it would seem to be the case that distributed decision-making, facilitated by preference-structuring software, could at least reduce some of the uncertainties identified by social choice theorists. An illustration of the scope for distributed public judgements being made are recommender systems, in which users’ past experience of visiting a web site or reading a posted message are aggregated with a view to guiding the future preferences of others. The Slashdot web site (http://slashdot.org), a major gathering space for technology enthusiasts, uses a recommender system based upon the ratings of a pool of accredited moderators, whose judgements are themselves subjected to evaluation by the wider Slashdot community. Lampe has found that: In general, the Slashdot moderation system seems to work. Readers employ the ratings to change how they view comments, new users receive some amount of feedback from the scores of their comments, survey respondents report high levels of satisfaction with the moderation system, and the moderators mainly agree on the disposition of a comment when making ratings and reverse ‘incorrect’ moderations. (Lampe 2006: 138) Poor argues that ‘Slashdot’s primary mechanism, moderation, supports the concept of the public sphere in that it allows comments (ideas) to be judged on their own merit’ and contends that ‘Slashdot meets the four criteria laid out for an online public sphere: (1) it is a space of discourse; (2) it opens a space for a wide range of computer enthusiasts to come together and discuss many issues, (3) including many political ones; and (4) ideas are judged by their merit’ (Poor 2005). The application of the Slashdot model of collaborative evaluation, combined with more sophisticated tools designed to support distributed group decisionmaking, offers the prospect of a more reflective approach to democratic structuration and consequently a more substantive (rather than processcentred) approach to collective decision-making. 35
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
B eyond the Ra t i o n a l i s t St ra i g h t j a c k e t
Deliberative democrats sometimes seem to be promoters of deep, sombre, rationally-bounded cerebral rumination, more suited to the Senior Common Room than the workplace, community hall or public square. The depiction of deliberating citizens as possessing special qualities of tolerance, fairness and articulateness and, above all, rationality serves to place deliberation beyond the norms of everyday discourse. Deliberation becomes fetishised and artificial. But what about people who find it difficult to express what they think or who find it hard to stay calm in the face of values they regard as hostile to their interests or who simply do not want to be reasonable about every issue that affects them? Should such people be excluded from public deliberation – or educated to become better citizens so that they can join the consensus-seeking discourse without dissent? Why does deliberative democracy, in its most ideological formulations, make such little allowance for marginal, eccentric and dissentient values, perspectives and ways of speaking? Deliberative democrats have tended to conceive of deliberation taking place within specially dedicated, procedurally regulated environments, such as ‘juries’ or ‘panels’. It is as if deliberation is something people do when they stop doing anything else. In fact, most public talk about politics and civic affairs is of a much more autonomous, casual and unstructured nature than deliberative theorists demand. At the most informal level, ordinary political conversation can be both deliberative and nondeliberative in nature, often within the course of a few sentences. Within what Merelman (1998) calls ‘mundane political culture’, conversation about politics is not uncommon. There is evidence that citizens talk about politics within the private sphere of family and friends far more frequently than they would ever do so in public places (Beck 1991). Deliberation in public is widely conceived as potentially conflictual, embarrassing and even stigmatising (Eliasoph 1998; Noelle-Neumann 1993). Critics of the notion that political conversation can be deliberative, such as Schudson (1995), argue that the nonpurposive, casual and entertaining nature of conversation is qualitatively different from deliberation. But both deliberation and conversation can be regarded as intermediating networks between personal reflection and political behaviour, within which ideas, experiences, fears and desires can be rehearsed. If formal deliberation is intended to arrive at consensual truth, political conversation is more modestly and informally about making, expressing and sharing common sense. Conversations have 36
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
three characteristics that differentiate them from institutionalised debate. First, they are reciprocal undertakings, in the sense that participants agree to enter into them and adhere to the protocols of a collaborative speech relationship. Second, conversation participants possess equal rights to speak and respond, in accordance with implicit codes of turn-taking. Third, conversations are informal, unpremeditated and unbounded. One rarely sets a time for a conversation to begin or end; genuine conversations tend not to be structured by agendas or expected outcomes. The value of political conversation for deliberation is its inclusive informality. Conversational logic is not always sequential or tightly framed, but it does provide opportunities for sharing information and can be influential in helping people to adjust their opinions. People often know privately and experientially more than they appear to know formally, when questioned by pollsters or called upon to speak at a local meeting. Their values and impressions are not deliberatively inferior just because they do not sound like politicians. On the contrary, informally expressed views are often deemed to be authentic and sincere precisely because they are constructed out of the messy fragments of mundane experience (Gamson 1992; Herbst 1995; Coleman 2006). The emergence of the blogosphere (see Chapter 3) marks a transition from the kind of online political discussion that is characterised by the protocols of the forum, with its rhythm of formal argument and counterargument, to more autonomous, self-expressive and experientially rooted approaches to the political. In blog posts the conventional political agenda is remixed to fit in with the ethos of citizens as self-reflecting, biographical beings whose encounters with structures and relationships of power obtain meaning through performances and narratives of everyday life. Studies of fan and reality TV web forums suggest that participants are indirectly addressing questions of social value and power, but not in a language that would be familiar to traditional scholars of political communication (Baym 2000; van Zoonen 2005). Of all the objections to the deliberative approach, Mouffe’s (2005) concern about the non-agonistic fashion in which online consensusseeking fails to address crucial conflicts that are at the heart of politics comes closest to our own anxieties about certain forms of deliberative democracy. As Mouffe suggests, too often deliberative debates are conducted in ‘the moral register’, emphasising the virtues of deliberation as a civilising process rather than assessing its scope as an instrumental 37
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
strategy. With the deliberative democrats, we take the view that simply aggregating votes is too parsimonious a foundation for democracy; but, in contrast to some of these theorists, we want democratic deliberation to have a hard political edge: to be a means of contesting values, challenging hegemonic beliefs and achieving material outcomes. In the blogosphere, and other informal sites of social networking, we are witnessing an approach to deliberation that resists the pressures to arrive at settled positions and argument closures, and reflects well the messy, fragmented, experiential and yet inherently public nature of politics. A MORE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
This chapter has suggested that deliberation, in the broad sense of public talk about issues that affect communities, nations and sometimes the whole world, offers a remedy to the current ills of democracies that appear to have become distant from the lives, concerns and beliefs of the demos. There are convincing responses to the standard arguments against taking public deliberation seriously, and there are examples, experimental and otherwise, of effective and democratically invigorating public deliberation. But, unlike many theorists, we are sceptical about the claims and demands of deliberative democracy. We are happy to settle for a more deliberative democracy. What exactly does that mean? A more deliberative democracy would encourage and take seriously a range of forms of public talk, from the informal and conversational to the consultative and evidential. Democratic governments, at all levels, would operate on the basis that on most issues there is room for public discussion to feed into the process of policy formation, legislation, policy scrutiny and post-legislative review. As we shall argue more fully in the final chapter, such public deliberation is best conducted in trusted space, dedicated to the most accessible, inclusive and meaningful deliberation. A more deliberative democracy would seek to connect a wide range of consultative and participatory projects, as well as fragmentary and informal public conversations, to the everyday workings of political policy formation and decision-making. Too often the public is asked for its views about an issue – by government, individual politicians, the media or interest groups – only to discover later that the policy has already been decided and that consultation is taking place either as a formality, because there is a duty to consult, or in order to claim public 38
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
support for a controversial decision. There is a danger of public energy being squandered or exploited in such tokenistic or manipulated exercises. There is evidence to show that participants in deliberative exercises often feel a greater sense of political efficacy after taking part: they feel that they are being listened to and can influence the political process. But if citizens’ deliberative input is manipulated or ignored, increased confidence in democracy will soon turn into an increased sense of inefficacy, cynicism and resentment. Evidence to the House of Commons Public Administration Committee inquiry into new forms of public participation, based on a survey of 332 U.K. local authorities, found that whereas 20 percent considered that participatory consultation exercises strongly influenced final policy decisions and 16 percent thought that they led to better informed decisions, 20 percent considered that such exercises had very little impact on decisions, and 20 percent stated that they merely confirmed decisions that were already made (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 2001b: 29). In her evidence to the inquiry, Dr Sue Goss, Director of Public Services Development at the Office for Public Management, declared that ‘While organisations are learning to consult, they are failing to respond effectively to consultation and this harms potential relationships between citizens and government’ (House of Commons Public Administration Committee 2001b: 188). The key to the effectiveness of public deliberation is for it to be embedded within the constitutional structure of policy formation and decision-making. Rather than offering it as a novel add-on, public deliberation should become an essential part of a working democracy. This presents risks to politicians, for there is always a chance that deliberative consultation will arrive at different answers – even different questions – from those being contemplated within the political elite. The democratic challenge here is to ensure that public deliberation should be linked to governance, but not appropriated or manipulated by politicians or officials. The conception of deliberative exercises as being about exposing non-experts to expert agendas reinforces a one-way information flow which undermines democratic efficacy. In the case of many deliberative techniques citizens are conceived as performing a different role from expert witnesses or policy professionals; specialised knowledge is pitted against the generalised, testimonial input emanating from experiential wisdom. 39
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
All of this leads us to conclude that there is a need for real-world experimentation in public deliberation, utilising technologies which support effective democratic interaction, and embedded in structures and processes that can result in meaningful consequences. A more deliberative democracy would not be dogmatic about the search for model deliberative formats and procedures. There are many ways to talk things over. Pluralistic techniques are likely to be best suited to a diverse population debating a wide range of issues. In a more deliberative democracy one might hope to see public talk about political and civic issues characterised by the following basic principles: Access to balanced information – Deliberative exercises are primarily concerned to discover what citizens think about issues once they have become reasonably informed about them. The provision of information to deliberating citizens needs to be comprehensive, balanced and accessible. It need not be the case that all participating citizens read or study information provided to the same extent, but efforts should be made to provide for all a basis for acting as informed deliberators. An open agenda – In deliberative exercises, whilst governmental and other promoters are likely to set out the broad parameters of the anticipated discussion, the agenda must be open to revision or expansion by the deliberating citizens. So, in the debate about the siting of a new airport, a deliberative agenda could move on to a discussion of the benefits of air travel as opposed to alternative methods, or a broader debate about the usual criteria for planning decisions. Time to consider issues expansively – Deliberative exercises must be temporally expansive, allowing citizens adequate time to think through an issue and then work out where they stand on it. Freedom from manipulation or coercion – Deliberative exercises must involve a high degree of protection of the independence and free thought of participating citizens. The analogy is with juries in courts of law, where the freedom of jurors from any influence but that of the factual evidence is paramount. A rule-based framework for discussion – Democratic deliberation is not to be confused with an anarchic free-for-all. People feel safer and discuss more freely when they are aware of the transparent rules of the debate. Participation by an inclusive sample of citizens – Efforts must be made to recruit participants who are representative of those affected by or concerned about the issue being considered. 40
D e m o c r a c y’ s D e l i b e r a t i v e D e f i c i t
Scope for free interaction between participants – Deliberative exercises require two extra-directional flows: citizens to government (so that participating citizens can in turn ask questions of those asking them to deliberate) and citizen to citizen (so that participants can exchange views with one another). Recognition of differences between participants, but rejection of status-based prejudice – Effort must be made to ensure that prejudices based upon status do not diminish the value of any contributions. What we are envisaging is the transition from a counting democracy, where citizens are valued only as aggregated voters, to an accounting democracy in which, before and after voting, people’s accounts of who they are, how they live and what they want are accorded fundamental political value.
41
C H A P T E R 2
A Crisis of Public Communication
B
eing an active citizen is complex and time-consuming. First, it involves being sufficiently informed to know what’s going on in the world, what matters personally and what matters globally, how government works and how language is used both to illuminate and obfuscate political realities, where to access reliable information and how to compare sources so that rival perspectives can be transformed into useful knowledge. Second, active citizens need to arrive at judgements about who and what can be trusted. Can one party or politician be trusted more than another? Are elected representatives and governments able to do what they promise at election time? How far can friends, neighbours and strangers be depended upon to engage in the kind of collective action that might bring about desired changes? Can the existing constitutional system be trusted to serve the interests of all people, or should active citizens be thinking about working around the system, creating their own rules of engagement? Third, active citizens need to make their voices heard and their presence felt. This involves using whatever skills and resources are available to develop networks of collective self-organisation, contribute to the political discourse and make a tangible impact upon the ways in which political power is exercised. Most people find these challenges overwhelming. They know little about formal politics (Lupia and McCubbins 1998), rarely trust politicians or political processes (Norris 1999) and feel that they have little or no voice in policy formation and decision-making (Vergez and Caddy 2001). It is little wonder that most people do not even vote in local elections, let alone engage in active campaigns to bring about changes that might make life better for them. The media play a crucial role here, by enabling citizens to encounter and make sense of events, relationships and cultures of which they have 42
A Crisis of Public Communication
no direct experience. As such, the media constitute a public arena in which members of the public come together as more than passing strangers. As media theorist, Michael Schudson, has argued: When the media offer the public an item of news, they confer upon it public legitimacy. They bring it into a common public forum where it can be discussed by a general audience. They not only distribute the report of an event or announcement to a large group, they amplify it. An event or speech or document in one location becomes within a day, or within hours, or instantaneously, available to millions of people all over a region or country or the world. This has enormous effects. (Schudson 1995: 19) The ability of mainstream media to serve citizenship and democracy properly has latterly become an increasingly contested topic of debate in the twenty-first century. Of course, such concern is not entirely new. Since the political communication process interrelates competing interests and values, its workings and outcomes are perennially controversial. But in recent times the debate has been sharpened by two developments. One has been the ‘growing intrusiveness of media in politics’ (Seymour-Ure 1987). As Bennett and Entman (2001: 1) put it, ‘Mediated political communication has become central to politics and public life in contemporary democracies’. Schulz (1997) epitomises this trend in his model of a ‘media-constructed public sphere’, in which the ‘mass media are regarded as the precondition of a public sphere’ – not only indispensable to but also constitutive of it. And, of course, as mediated communication becomes more pivotal in politics, questions and issues about its civic strengths and limitations proliferate. Recent transformations of the political communication process have been a second spur to debate. Almost everything to do with political communication seems to be in flux these days: social formations and lifestyles, strategies of persuasion, politician-journalist relations, media technology, organisation and finance. Critical in the last sphere has been the shift from a system in which limited-channel, nationwide television was the dominant medium of political communication to a more abundant and fragmented system, providing not only more channels for political messages but also more opportunities for audiences to ignore (or only cursorily scan) those messages in favour of more sheerly enjoyable fare (Blumler 1999). The ability of political messages to offer value to citizens becomes more important as a result, 43
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
and attention is naturally directed at the ‘important normative issues that emerge within this transformed communication landscape’ (Bennett and Entman 2001). Underlying both of these developments and perceptions is the undoubted fact that the mass media have ‘become the main cultural institution and principal means of public expression in contemporary society’. Consequently, they ‘are perceived to occupy a key position in the public life of most societies’ (McQuail 2003: 4, 5). It is natural therefore to hold them responsible for whatever seems constructive or defective about the communicative relationships between citizens and politics. Some have argued (including ourselves) that recent trends have ensnared mainstream media in a ‘crisis of public communication’. This allegation is sometimes depicted simplistically – as if maintaining that a combination of journalistic shortcomings was directly responsible for negative effects upon citizens’ knowledge of, perceptions of and willingness to take part in politics. It is important to specify at the outset therefore five features of a more mature version of this position. First, it is more of a normative than an empirical thesis. Its prime focus is the adequacy or otherwise of present-day political communications for the performance by people of their roles as citizens in a well-functioning democracy. Certain effects on their stores of information and political attitudes may be implied, but they are secondary to the main thrust of the critique. Second, it is not a narrowly one-sided thesis. It acknowledges that in communication terms our democracies do have their better moments, better impulses, better dialogues and better organised sectors. Its proposition is not that everything has gone to the civic dogs but that overall the political communication process tends to strain against rather than with the grain of citizenship. This matters at a time when many political problems have become more complex and difficult and when public understanding may affect the ability of governments to tackle them effectively. Third, it does not stem from some romanticisation of former times. Of course, the makeup of ‘political communication man’ has always included elements of partisan deviousness, journalistic sensationalism and electoral indifference. In the past, however, it could be assumed that the role of publicity in politics was not only to reflect but also to counteract such shortcomings. Today, it is 44
A Crisis of Public Communication
alleged, the shortcomings are built into the very structure of the publicity process. Fourth, it is not confined to the cutting edge of political messages and their reception by citizens. It is rather a systemic analysis. It is about a large-scale process (or set of processes), which has been affecting relationships among key communicators and their would-be audiences, structuring in turn the incentives to which all respond and the constraints on their behaviours and perceptions. In Blumler and Kavanagh’s (1999: 211) formulation: ‘Today the major influences on political communication seem even more volatile than before. They include new styles of politics, developments in media technology and organisation, and shifts in social structure, all changing in interlocked ways and impacting on people’s lifestyles’. Fifth, it is not a deterministic thesis. In the words of Semetko et al. (1991: 184–5): ‘A “downhill all the way” scenario is certainly plausible, but given the interactive nature of the forces that animate political communication systems, so too is a more cyclical scenario in which reactions against the worst trends and excesses might eventually build up and help to reverse the swing of the pendulum’. Indeed, signs of such a reaction were prompted among a number of British political communicators by the shock of an unprecedentedly low turnout of voters at the U.K. General Election of 2001. Since then, the BBC has shaken up its political news service, aiming to gear it more closely to audience interests and mentalities; and the government has overhauled its communications apparatus, aiming to restore credibility to its discredited workings and output. These measures may be interpreted, however, as clear institutional acknowledgements of the crisis of public communication in which they are involved. How did it originate? The ‘crisis of public communication’ may be regarded as emanating from three sets of forces: developments in the societal environment; responses to those developments among political institutions, including consequential reactions by media institutions; and developments in the media sphere per se. These are dealt with in the following three sections in turn, after which we consider the characteristic kinds of political communication content that these trends have produced. T H E S O C I O - P O L I T I C A L E N V I R O N M E N T All declarations of a building ‘crisis of public communication’ insist that its ultimate origins are exogenous to the making, sending and receiving of political messages. The seeds of political communication trouble are planted deep in a 45
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
confluence of social forces which have transformed the environments of leading political and media institutions. As Blumler and Coleman (2001) have put it, the problems of civic communication ‘stem not so much from the deficiencies of particular individuals or groups but from the interplay of political institutions, media institutions, and audiences, within a continually evolving technological and sociopolitical environment’. The most influential social trends may be termed individualisation, modernisation and secularisation. I N D I V I D U A L I S A T I O N Since the end of World War II, all advanced democracies seem to have experienced an increasing elevation of personal aspirations for better lives, the onset of consumerism and higher expectations of standards of service in all areas of provision, including politics. This has entailed a relative but seemingly irreversible dissolution of traditional social ties. Institutions that previously organised meaning, identity and authoritative information for many people, that structured their political preferences and simplified the process of democratic power-seeking – notably political parties, the nuclear family, mainstream religion, the workplace, and neighbourhood and social class groupings – all have waned in salience and influence. In their approaches to politics, citizens have become more like consumers (instrumental, oriented to immediate gratifications and potentially fickle) than believers. Politicians must therefore work harder to gain and retain their interest and support. M O D E R N I S A T I O N In place of the relative coherence and stability of institutionally fashioned social organisation, a more complex and fragmented society has developed, full of interest groups and contending value orientations. People have been acquiring ‘an ever more separate set of personal identities, as evidenced by their ethnic affiliations, their religious allegiances, their views of personal morality, their ideas about what is valuable in life, their tastes in art, music, and so forth’ (Miller 1998). In these conditions, moral consensus has declined, while the bases of social conflict, including identity politics, have multiplied and become more difficult to resolve. This has complicated the tasks of political aggregation, leadership and consensus building. The political communication scene has become more turbulent and less manageably containable than before. Both politicians and journalists face increased competition for access to publics and audiences – the former from a wider range of interest groups clamouring for publicity; the latter from many new makers of news, sources of commentary and investigative purveyors of scandal in talk shows, tabloids and Internet web sites. 46
A Crisis of Public Communication S E C U L A R I S A T I O N Public attitudes towards authority holders, leaders and experts have shifted in many walks of life. Relations of elites to masses have been transformed by the evaporation of deference. ‘Messages from on high’ no longer enjoy an automatic or even a ready acceptance, and scepticism has virtually become the norm. The floodgates have consequently been opened to currents of populism in politics and the media, validating the testimony of personal experience, the assertion of personal needs and views and the registration of majority attitudes in opinion polls. T H E P O L I T I C A L R E S P O N S E Political transformations have emanated inexorably from these societal transformations. Relationships of political parties to their constituents have been radically altered. Allegiances to and membership of political parties have declined, as has the voting loyalty of those retaining party identification. Demographic correlations of party preferences are no longer so predictive, and political socialisation is less effective. Internally, parties have been ‘de-energised’ (Seyd and Whiteley 1995) with fewer members taking part in their activities. In the electorate at large, voting is less an act of solidarity and more an expression of present personal opinion. As Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) put it, the emancipation of major parts of the populace from traditional political institutions breeds more ‘self-mobilised citizens’ (a term coined by Dalton), to whom ‘the ubiquitous availability of information via mass media is an important resource . . . for developing their political outlook individually and independently of political ideology’ (Dalton 1996: 253). The role of the media has consequently become more crucial for politicians as well as for individual citizens when following their doings. Politicians and those seeking to influence public opinion believed they had no place to turn to other than to the media. The lines of access they afford, their ways of framing issues, their ways of constructing public opinion preferences and demands, their occasional support for certain policies, their (sometimes trenchant) criticisms of the decisions and conduct of politicians – all have become significant if variably influential cards in the political game. Nowadays the authority of leaders derives from their ability to appeal to public opinion through the news media.
The Profession ali sation of P o l i t i c a l A d v o c a c y
Arguably the most formative development in the political communication process of present-day democracies has been the professionalisation of political advocacy. In an early essay, the second author treated the news media but not political parties as examples of professionalised 47
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
organisations (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). It is as if since that time politicians have been impelled to absorb, match and ape news media professionalism. The conditions described above, then, have encouraged politicians and parties to think about and to handle communication along certain lines (Swanson and Mancini 1996). Of course, their approaches have not been universally identical. Traditional characteristics of societies’ political systems, media systems and political cultures have served as mediating and differentiating influences. Nevertheless, a response to modern imperatives, combining in its fullest form seven specifiable features, has been favoured: 1. Strategic comprehensiveness. The response of politicians and parties to current conditions has not been merely tactical – a matter of every now and then staging a publicity coup or scoring a good news point. It has been based rather on a more comprehensive approach to the tasks of communication, persuasion and news management. This ‘holistic’ feature of the process is illustrated by Gould’s (2002) characterisation of New Labour’s approach to the 1997 U.K. election as one of ‘total campaigning – the campaign as an integrated machine – rooted in message, able to defend itself against attack with extraordinary speed, connecting with voters with ever-increasing sophistication’. Bennett and Manheim (2001: 282) refer to this as ‘strategic communication’, defined as the ‘scientific engineering and targeting of messages that subordinate the ideals of deliberation and transparency to the achievement of narrow political goals’. Kernell (1997: 325) states that the concept of what he calls ‘routinely going public’ (his emphasis) must ‘be appreciated as a strategic adaptation to the information age’. According to McQuail (2003: 122), ‘Information management, in and out of elections, . . . is now a salient feature of public communication involving much propaganda, manipulation of news agendas, and the extensive deployment of spin doctors’. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 207) describe what they term the ‘thoroughgoing professionalisation of political advocacy’ as ‘the near-universal response of political parties (and others) to the dissolution of previously more firm anchorages of political attitudes, the increasing centrality of television, and the proliferating demands of multiple news outlets for instant comment and appearances’. 2. A conceptual core. When daily news becomes the chief pipeline to politics for most citizens, politicians and their advisors tend to see 48
A Crisis of Public Communication
themselves as caught up in ‘a competitive struggle to influence and control popular perceptions of key political events and issues through the major mass media’ (Blumler 1990: 103). What matters, according to this ‘theory’, are the ‘perceptions’ that people form on contested issues. Since political reality and its central issues can often be ‘perceived’ in opposed ways; since political news supplies much of the material on which such perceptions are based, politicians must therefore strive to ensure that their version of reality prevails in the news over that of their rivals. 3. A high priority for communication functions and activities. More resources are poured into their organisation and performance. More staff (some quite high in status) are dedicated to them. Getting communications right is thought essential, not only for winning power, but also for wielding it effectively while in office. As David Gergen advised U.S. President Reagan early in his first term, ‘to govern successfully, the government has to set the agenda; it cannot allow the press to set the agenda for it’ (Hertsgaard 1988). Or as Philip Gould (2002), advisor to U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, put it more recently, ‘integrated and professional campaigning . . . is an essential part of good governance’. It follows that communication considerations are no longer secondary to policy thinking; they must be integrated into it. As an advisor to Tony Blair was quoted by Butler and Kavanagh (1997: 61), ‘In the mass media age, policy is there to win elections’. 4. Professionalisation. Political news is too important to be blundered into, toyed with, or entered into impulsively. Waging publicity competition through the media, massaging journalists’ news values, putting the best possible spin on significant stories, fashioning political advertising, designing tracking polls and interpreting their results – all require the skills of experts who are single-mindedly dedicated to the goal of victory in such competition. Consequently, a new role, that of the specialist political consultant, has been injected into modern politics all round the democratic world – albeit in varying degrees and with different positions of authority (see surveys by Plasser and Plasser 2002; see also the 11-country analysis in Swanson and Mancini 1996). 5. Proactivity. Merely reacting to the initiatives of opponents and journalists will not suffice. Needed instead is a continual provision of events and statements that stand a chance of leading and shaping the news media. An equally continual massaging of influential 49
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
journalists may also be required – flattering, bullying and spoonfeeding them as appropriate, to influence running orders and the interpretation of stories. 6. Orchestration of communication activities and messages. Strict internal discipline is imposed – both to ensure that all party sources stay ‘on message’, doing nothing to distract reporters from the adopted ‘line of the day’; and to ensure that the press are offered no signs of dramatic splits to headline. Lines of command and rules of procedure are instituted across all internal sources and departments to ensure that those in charge are aware of publicity initiatives in advance and can decide who should appear where and when. 7. Exhaustive thoroughness. Professionalism is equated with leaving no stone unturned, no detail omitted, no statement unplanned, no journalist unbriefed, no opportunity unexplored and no pitfall unanticipated. Since there are no holidays or days off in the political publicity game, a ‘permanent campaign’ is instituted and waged. Finally, one general implication of this approach may be mentioned. That is its adherence to Machiavellian perspectives of Realpolitik. If political news is a source of power, one must realise that one is involved in a power struggle to shape it to one’s advantage. Information comes to be regarded as a weapon in that power struggle, and sentimental motions like a free marketplace of ideas, the social responsibilities of the press and the role of the informed citizen in democracy are discarded as illusory. The ethics of the modern publicity game also become uncertain as a result. What distinguishes acceptable attempts by politicians to puff up a favourable publicity wind from manipulation that is beyond the pale? The line may be difficult to draw. In Britain, New Labour has been accused of unethical manoeuvres from time to time – for example, by releasing an item of ‘bad news’ on September 11, 2001, knowing that it would be buried and ignored by the saturation attention paid to the attack on New York City’s Twin Towers on that day. Th e J o u r n a l i s t i c Re a c t i o n
News management based on the above precepts may be interpreted as a systematic effort to narrow journalists’ options of political coverage. They suggest that the party publicity ideal is to shape the news environment so that journalists are driven to focus only on such and such an issue or theme, on this message about it, and on that 50
A Crisis of Public Communication
spokesperson on it. For their part, however, journalists do not relish having their news choices severely narrowed by those whose activities they are supposed to cover. Although they may sometimes repeat what has been served up to them on a plate, fashioned to satisfy their news values, they recognise and jib at the fact that they are being ‘used’ to pass on what the news makers have dreamed up. In Zaller’s (2001: 247) words, ‘Professional reporters loathe running politicians’ press releases . . . and . . . therefore [rewrite] the script’. Indeed, Zaller (2001) provides a plausible ‘Theory of Media Politics’ to explain this side of the dynamic. In part it is a matter of mutually operative systemic constraints: ‘if candidates are constrained to approach communication strategically, journalists are not constrained to like it, and most do not’; ‘the harder . . . campaigns try to control what journalists report . . . the harder journalists try to report something else instead’ (247, 248). Zaller terms this a ‘rule of product substitution’, whereby ‘the more strenuously politicians challenge journalists for control of a news jurisdiction, the more journalists will seek to develop substitute information that the mass audience is willing to accept as news and that gives expression to journalistic voice’ (255). In the heyday of attempted news management, several influences pushed journalists in that direction. Most powerful were their professional values. As Zaller (1999: 249–50) explains: Like other professional groups – lawyers, doctors, architects and university professors, journalists value autonomy both as an end in itself and as a means to creating the kind of product they wish to create. The kind of product they wish to create is one that requires as much personal skill and expertise as possible. This is not only inherently satisfying. It paves the way to promotion, better pay and higher status. The best regarded political journalists are those who can put the most arresting stamp of their own on stories, find the most vivid words in which to tell them, or conduct the most robust and challenging interviews. Two related consequences have followed from this reaction. First, political reporting over time has become more interpretive. Drawing on an analysis of political coverage by the U.S. television networks across several postwar decades, Hallin (1992: 9–10) notes that: In the 1960s and 1970s, the journalist’s role as a communicator was relatively passive . . . Today’s television journalist displays a 51
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
sharply different attitude toward the words of candidates and other newsmakers. Today those words, rather than simply being reproduced and transmitted to the audience, are treated as raw material to be taken apart, combined with other sounds and images, and reintegrated into a new narrative. Indeed, increasingly interpretive commentary by journalists appears to be one of the few long-term trends reshaping election campaign coverage that has been consistently documented by empirical researchers in a number of Western democracies (Wilke and Reinemann 2001). Thus, what politicians have to say is subordinated to the stories that journalists decide to tell. A content analysis of television in the 2001 U.K. election showed, for example, that Andrew Marr, the BBC’s Political Editor, was ‘seen or heard in the news more than any politician, possibly more than all the party leaders combined’ (Harrison 2001: 143). Second, much political story-making by journalists tends to be pejorative. Again this may be regarded in part as a reaction to politicians’ news strategies. As Zaller (2001: 255) explains: ‘Media negativity toward candidates is . . . determined in significant part by the candidate’s strategy of news management. When aggressive news management limits journalistic opportunities to express voice, journalists create their own outlets in the form of investigations, critical analyses, and, to the extent they think the public will tolerate it, blunt expressions of sarcasm’. It may be that in a period of heightened publicity manipulation, journalists are more prepared to believe the worst about politicians; that at a time of a heightened sense of being involved in a struggle for control with them, they may take greater relish in exposing their iniquities; and that at a time of widespread public disenchantment with politicians, they may feel more free to hit out at them. A n A dv e rs a ri al Re l a t i o n s h i p
The modern publicity process has thus intensified conflict between politicians and journalists. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) have termed this ‘a chronic state of partial war’. Since the politician-journalist relationship is part adversarial, part collaborative, the state of war is partial. Nevertheless, the adversarial climate today seems fiercer and more abiding than in the past – hence the ‘chronic state of war’ tag. Like a smouldering volcano, such a relationship periodically erupts into high-profile rows, punctuated by lots of mutual recrimination. An example is the conflict between No. 10 Downing Street and the 52
A Crisis of Public Communication
BBC over a reporter’s claim that the Prime Minister and his Director of Communications had ‘sexed up’ an intelligence service’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction before its release to the public in September 2002. Readiness to believe this charge probably stemmed from the government’s reputed obsession with presentation. But the government firmly denied the accusation and sought a retraction from the BBC, its Director of Communications even accusing the Corporation of lying. In response, despite doubts about some features of the reporter’s story, the BBC Board of Governors decided to support him, seeing this as the only way to demonstrate its political independence. According to the Chairman of the BBC’s Board of Governors, in testimony to the Hutton enquiry, more important than the strengths and defects of its journalist’s story was the imperative that the BBC ‘must not buckle to government pressure’. The Me d i a S ys t e m : I ntensifi ed C o m p e t i t i o n
Meanwhile, the media system in which journalists work has been changing in ways that affect political reporting. As media abundance advances, politics intended to inform, reveal or persuade must vie for the attention of editors, reporters and audiences in a far more competitive environment. Partly this is because there are so many more outlets through which people can follow politics, none of which can dominate as before. Partly it is because politics must compete with the increased appearance in many of those outlets of entertainment, sports and other more beguiling fare. Partly it follows from the exposure of many journalists’ media employers to a market logic, which subjects politics like everything else to the leveling impact of a profit-and-loss calculus. Thus, even the BBC has stated that its news, current affairs and political programs have entered ‘a period of hyper-competition’, in which ‘a “pick and choose” news culture prevails’. The logic of this situation entails four consequences for political communication through the mainstream media. First, political communication loses its formerly sheltered position inside many media organisations, comes under pressure to demonstrate its compatibility with those organisations’ goals and is often obliged to compromise with other influences inside those organisations. According to Underwood (2001: 100), ‘the intertwining of news and marketing goals is everywhere’ in the United States. Definition of the news is ‘recast’ to ‘what is relevant to the audience. Newspapers’ traditional beat structure whereby reporters focused on coverage of 53
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
politics, government, the courts and police has been replaced by ‘thematic coverage that is built around self-help, family and financial issues viewed as personally meaningful to readers’. Serious minded journalism is ‘being overwhelmed by the media marketer’s image of the public as busy, distracted, fulfilment-seeking consumers who must be pleased at all costs, even if it means abandoning the higher traditions of the profession’ (101). Some research suggests that broadcast news and current affairs in Europe have not been overwhelmed by trivialisation and sensationalism in the wake of multichannel competition (Brants 1998). Nevertheless, the role of the public service idea in shaping BBC coverage of the 2001 election campaign in Britain seemed to observers of its news operations ‘less comprehensively dominant, less single-mindedly didactic; somewhat less confidently pursued [than in the past]; and having at times to be bargained for against other interests’ (Blumler and Gurevitch 2002b: 219). Consequently, ‘the task of those fighting its corner has become more difficult. Public service is being pursued in an environment of both external and internal conditions that are less amenable to its realisation than ever before . . . [By] 2001 countervailing influences seemed to be piling up on more fronts – in a firm template of journalistic assumptions and workways, in an indifferent audience, in the entertainment priorities of BBC-l (described . . . by a senior executive as “fighting for its life” in the competition with ITV), and in the persistence of long-standing campaign rituals’ (229–30). Second, sacerdotal approaches to politics tend to be regarded as not viable for reception by mass audiences. Typically, politics must fight for its place in reporting and scheduling on the basis of its news value and likely audience appeal. As a reporter justified the BBC’s more newsy coverage of the 2001 campaign, ‘No more can we say, watch this because it’s good for you’ (Blumler and Gurevitch 2002b: 225). Some signs of this include drastic reductions of campaign coverage by the U.S. networks, similar reductions in verbatim reporting of parliamentary proceedings by Britain’s broadsheet press, the near demise of long-form documentaries in many national broadcasting systems, and reduced use by the BBC of correspondents with special areas of policy expertise to cover the 2001 General Election, partly ‘because the longer films they prepared in the previous election were no longer required’ (Blumler and Gurevitch 2002b: 227). Third, given that much of the increased competition stems from entertainment, ‘infotainment’ approaches to politics are favoured. This 54
A Crisis of Public Communication
is reflected not only in the explosion of subgenres designed as hybrids – breakfast shows, news magazines, talk shows and so forth, but also in the further mixing of information with drama, excitement, colour and human interest in the topics, formats and styles of many other programmes. This is partly a response to the diminished standing of political, media and other elites in popular eyes. In such conditions, paternalistic discourse is no longer an option. Communicators who wish to inform and empower their audiences must therefore adapt more closely than in the past to what ordinary people find interesting, relevant and accessible. It is also important, however, whether such communicators do wish to inform and empower or just want to grab eyeballs and sop up ratings. Increased competition is likely to encourage the latter response. For example, whereas in responding to the perceived indifference of the audience towards the 2001 campaign, some BBC reporters sought ways of making serious politics interesting and accessible, others were primarily concerned to catch and hold (or not to lose) viewers’ attention (Blumler and Gurevitch 2002b). This is not to imply that only programmes formally labelled as ‘informational’ should be regarded as legitimate outlets for civic communication. There are nevertheless several reasons to temper enthusiasm for ‘infotainment’. For one thing, it tends to stage politics as spectacle and to suffer from glitziness and shallowness. Its dissolution of the boundary between political and nonpolitical realms may encourage people even more than before to perceive and evaluate their leaders as celebrities rather than as civic problem-solvers. For another, its agenda tends to be slanted towards the more immediately riveting issues with strong sociopersonal elements and away from anything more structurally complex. In addition, the appeal of ‘infotainment’ may be tuned more towards audiences’ affective impulses than their cognitive ones. Of course, affect has a proper part to play in determining the ends that people wish to achieve in politics. But those ends will only be socially defensible and viably attainable if they are also shaped by a cognitive awareness of surrounding interests and circumstances (B1umler 1999; Blumler and Gurevitch 1995). Fourth, the combination of increased competition and an audience known to be sceptical about politicians’ credentials reinforces journalists’ tendencies to focus much of their coverage on their mistakes, alleged misdemeanours and policy failures. Such treatment has the double advantage of being arresting and sensational and of chiming with audience perceptions. According to Jones (2002: 1), in a competitive 55
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
media system, reporters are ‘judged increasingly on their ability to deliver exclusive stories’, which more often than not will be exposes. And according to Toynbee (2003: 25), the intense circulation war in which the British press is engaged has nurtured an extreme anti-politician mentality – especially among tabloid newspaper journalists. As she describes it: ‘Get the politicians, catch the government lying, denigrate, mock, kill. Never mind the substance of a policy – that’s boring and time-consuming. The fun is to go after the next minister who might be knocked off his or her perch’. C haract eristic C o n t e n t
The developments of organisation and interrelationships outlined above do appear to have been transforming the news systems of many democracies, though in varying degrees and respects. On balance, certain ways of presenting politics have been encouraged and have increased. 1 . T R U N C A T E D P O L I T I C A L A D V O C A C Y Studies across time in the United States, Britain and Germany show that politicians’ statements are being reported less frequently than in the past and that the average length of direct quotations is shortening. According to Deacon, Golding and Billig (2001: 668), for example, ‘sound-bite politics is growing in Britain’. Quotes from television news broadcasts fell on ITV from an average length of 22.3 seconds in the 1992 election to 17.6 seconds in 2001 and on BBC1 from 26.5 to 20.3 seconds. According to Lichter (2001), the average politician’s sound bite fell from its already short length of 9.8 seconds in the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign to 7.8 seconds in 2000. This is not just a matter of compressed utterances by politicians. The principal talkers about politics in the news are now journalists themselves. In the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States, three-quarters of the speaking time was allocated to journalists (Lichter 2001). For Britain, Deacon, Golding and Billig (2001: 672) also report that ‘the average speaking time of the media’s own journalists was nearly twice as great as the average speaking time of politicians during the 2001 campaign’. Even when politicians have a voice it is not necessarily on their own terms. Very often their words are chosen by reporters and editors to illustrate the points which they wish to make about the state of the political debate at the time. Kendall (1993: 135) vividly describes what is involved from her study of U.S. network coverage of 1992 primary election candidates: 56
A Crisis of Public Communication
Speech episodes were used . . . chiefly as a form of proof. They were always in a dependent role; that is, the anchors and reporters made claims about the presidential campaign and backed them up with instances of the candidates speaking. The anchors and reporters were the omniscient narrators . . . The candidate’s words were treated as of decidedly secondary interest. 2 . HEAVY PRESENTATION OF POLITICS AS A ‘GAME’ The scholarly expert on this feature is Thomas Patterson (1993), who found that the ratio of election news stories in the New York Times dominated by a ‘game’ schema (about political strategies, successes and setbacks) to those centred on ‘policy’ (about policy and leadership issues and problems) shifted dramatically from 1960 – when it was 45:52 – to 1992 – when it had become an overwhelming 80:15. Although British political news has historically been more substantive than American reporting, and although it has been less thoroughly tracked by such measures, research evidence shows that recent elections have witnessed a sharp increase in stories about campaign organisation, strategy and tactics, advertising, polling and activity on the stumps (Goddard, Scammell and Semetko 1998; Blumler and Gurevitch 2002a; Harrison 2001). Other research suggests that the game frame is replete with further consequences, few of them reassuring. As Lawrence (2000: 94) puts it, it presents a ‘one-dimensional view of politics’, squeezing the news hole for policy substance. According to Patterson (1993: 59), drawing on survey evidence, this does not mesh with voters’ main concerns, for whom ‘policy problems, leadership debates, policy debates and the like are the key dimensions of presidential politics’. Yet at least two studies have shown that reporting of the political game encourages audience members to assume spectator roles, ‘responding more to the status of the race than to what candidates represented’ (Patterson 1980; Graber 1988). Jamieson (1992: 166) succinctly explains the connection: ‘In the strategy schema, candidates are seen as performers, reporters as theatrical critics, the audience as spectators’. Content analyses have also shown that politicians’ quotes in gameframed stories provide less evidence in support of their statements than in policy-framed ones, that experts quoted in game-framed stories comment more often on the state of play than on the issues and, perversely, that the game frame is more prevalent at times when an issue is being contested than when it has been settled. As Lawrence (2000) elaborates this last finding: ‘news organizations are most likely to approach the world with the superficial and cynical game schema at 57
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
precisely those times when public opinion is most likely to be focused, mobilized and tuned into politics during elections and highly charged legislative debates’. In the case of welfare reform (the focus of her analysis in 1996), much of the information of use to the public came too late to help the public participate meaningfully in that debate. 3 . BIAS TOWARDS ‘MEDIATISATION’ A media-constructed public sphere is full of references to media-related actors and processes (Blumler 1998). Not only do political broadcasters become celebrities, better known than most politicians, party publicity managers also become leading political personalities in their own right, often attracting sharp controversy and often depicted as moving (even sinister) forces behind the scenes. Policy initiatives are rarely reported without accompanying comments on how they were prepared for presentation, how pressed on the media and with what forms of ‘spin’. In Scammell’s (2000: 381) words, they are continually ‘deconstructed’ for their ‘base strategic significance’. Striking details of this tendency appear in an analysis of the political coverage by eight newspapers of Britain’s national press during six months preceding and including the 1997 election campaign. The study found 444 articles about ‘spin doctoring’ by the major parties, amounting to an average of 17 such pieces per week (Esser, Reinemann and Fan 2000: 213). Many of these were overtly critical: ‘the expression [spin doctor] often implied lack of political substance, sometimes even lying. It is obvious from reading the news reports that journalists were using the term to indicate that a “spin doctor” did not offer them hard facts, but a more slanted version of events’. Such a communications road can be bumpy for governments with ambitious policy projects in train. Their efforts, targets, spending plans and proclaimed achievements are continually portrayed as publicity stunts. McNair (2000: 137) declares that in Britain, for example: ‘The demonisation of spin . . . flourished after the election of Tony Blair as Labour Leader in 1994, and became the dominant formula applied by journalists to the coverage of Labour in power’. Seyd (2001: 609) concludes that ‘The [Labour] party’s pre-1997 campaign professionalism had been an electoral bonus but the government’s attempts to control the news agenda made it renowned more for its “spin” than for its policy performance, and this became something of an electoral handicap’. 4 . P E R S O N A L I S A T I O N Political personalization is advanced because it is easier to project than the hard stuff of issues and policies. A leader-seeking media system promotes a leader-elevating political system. According to 58
A Crisis of Public Communication
an 11-nation survey of recent developments in electioneering, The centrepiece of parties’ approach to campaigning ‘typically consists of focusing attention on the personalities of party leaders, for appealing personalities are currency of high denomination in media logic’ (Swanson and Mancini 1996: 251). 5 . I N C R E A S E D N E G A T I V I T Y This is fuelled by both political and media impulses. On the political side, there is an increased temptation to resort to negative campaigning, which is believed to be more memorable and easier to present in crisp terms than a positive case. Indeed, a majority of the points made in both Conservative and Labour party press releases of the 1997 campaign were coded by Butler and Kavanagh (1997) as negative. But on the media side journalistic commentary on political developments, statements and personalities has been increasingly negative (see Patterson 1993 for the definitive U.S. analysis). Parry-Giles and Parry-Giles (2001: 162) perceptively note that journalists are increasingly casting themselves as ‘authenticating agents or rather as unauthenticating agents in the political publicity process’. This encourages journalists to focus on ‘issues that politicians cannot keep under control, ones which reporters can run and break down doors with and apply conventional news values to’ (Blumler 1998). In Britain’s 1997 election, the Conservatives seemed to suffer from this preference. A campaign based on their relatively successful economic record was ‘distracted by greater media interest first in the issue of sleaze’ and later in the Party’s splits over European questions (Gavin and Sanders 1997). After that election, as noted above, it was Labour’s turn to be the target of journalistic negativity with frequent emphasis on its news-spinning machine. 6 . S O M E L O S S O F S P O N T A N E I T Y Although such a quality would be difficult to operationalise and measure, a media-constructed public sphere, which is run by two sets of large, well-oiled, preprogrammed and highly professional machines (those of the parties and the newsrooms), may lose some of the essential ingredients of attractive and meaningful communication – like spontaneity, a sense of adventure that could lead to discovery and a sense of wrestling with reality instead of always trading smoothly in appearances and perceptions. Such interlocked professionalism may also become wedded to routines that may appear to voters repetitious and unappetising. Seasoned observers suggest that this may explain the failure of recent British General Election campaigns to connect with voters (Butler and 59
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Kavanagh 2002): ‘The public was perhaps becoming bored with the ritual of modern campaigns. The morning press conferences, the setpiece media interviews with prominent politicians, the party leaders’ bus trips to encounters with voters (largely staged for the benefit of cameras), instant rebuttals and the speeches before invited and largely sympathetic audiences may now be past their sell-by date’. C ri sis o f Publi c C o m m u n i c a t i o n Re v i s i t e d
The trends outlined above contain the seeds of a crisis of communication for citizenship. What is meant by this? What are the components of such a crisis? In 1995 Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) identified six, most of which still hold true today. First, they said, the very move of the media to the centre of the political process (including what was termed ‘mediatisation’ above) entails a degree of de-politicisation. This is because in Western democracies the press (especially television) base their claims to legitimacy and credibility with the public on their nonpolitical status and on their disavowals of explicitly political, particularly partisan, motives. Such a stance underlies in turn their preoccupation with personalities and the flow of events rather than with policies. It also suggests that the claims of citizenship as such are not central to news media operations but are subordinate to their primary purposes of holding audience attention, earning revenue and profit, and satisfying news values. Second, the present system disseminates an oversupply of oxygen for cynicism through the visibility of manipulative publicity efforts and the increased flow of negative messages. A related product is a highly pejorative, oversimplified and, in many cases, probably unfair stereotype of the standard politician as someone who cares only for power and personal advancement, is not bothered about the problems that matter to ordinary people and is constitutionally incapable of talking straight. Audience disillusionment with political leaders and their utterances is a natural outcome of such a bombardment. Credit is not given to government even when it deserves it. Difficulties of making sense of what appears in the media inevitably arise when people are disposed to disbelieve what is presented from the very outset. Third, less of the political communication diet serves the citizen role due to the predominant presentation of politics as a game and the diminished space and time devoted to policy substance resulting from provision of ever shorter sound bites. This is not to claim that a brief message is always shallow or unenlightening but that, other things 60
A Crisis of Public Communication
being equal, it often oversimplifies the issues and blocks meaningful argumentation. In any case the sound bite providers are rarely moved by a concern to offer illuminating ideas in captivating capsules. Much of the snappiness of modern political communication arises from the influence of advertising on political persuasion, from that part of the journalistic culture which regards political talk as inherently boring, and from the assumption that people have incredibly short attention spans. Fourth, because voters’ needs to understand and make sense of civic problems are increasingly confounded and frustrated, they are virtually excluded from any say or significant stake in public communication. The absorption of politicians and journalists in their own complex and fraught patterns of collusive conflict results in what Rosen (1993) terms a ‘public sphere commandeered by insiders’. A classical example of this was the months-long absorption of Britain’s political and media elites with the details of the government’s preparation in September 2002 of an intelligence dossier about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and a piece of investigative journalism about them by a BBC reporter. Fifth, developments in the relationship of the media system to the political system have catapulted the press into a position of surrogate opposition. Since it is the duty of an opposition to oppose, reporting is yet more imbued with the qualities of challenge, vigilance, criticism and exposure at the expense of giving credit where it may be due, fairly recognising the difficulties involved in shouldering political responsibility and a rounded political coverage overall. And as media framing of politics has become increasingly negative, leaders, bereft of strong parties, have lacked a sounding board to counter the press’ discordant orchestration. All this has injected an extra element of conflict and mutual recrimination into the relationship of media personnel with politicians. Finally, an irony of the present situation is that, although democracies face many urgent problems requiring a considered canvassing of difficult choices, and although frequent attention to such problems in our expanded communication system ensures broad public awareness of them, formats of constructive discourse about them are in rare supply in the established news media. With the possible exception of top-level candidate debates in the United States, conventional civic communication seems to be dominated by point-scoring, tallies of rivals’ advances and slipbacks in the game of political snakes and ladders, childish sound bites, interview gamesmanship and a plethora of scarcely believable attempts to establish plausibility. Not a pretty picture – nor an involving one! 61
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
A n A l te rna ti ve Pe rs p e c t i v e
The notion of a ‘crisis of public communication’ is not universally accepted. Norris (2000: 4), in particular, denies mass media involvement in such a crisis and proclaims instead their association with a so-called ‘virtuous circle of political communication’. Empirically her outlook derives from analyses of data from both European and American surveys, showing that those individuals who are more exposed to news on television and in the press are also more knowledgeable and less cynical about politics and are more likely to be politically active – and that after controls for education, age and income (which also go with political engagement) have been applied. According to Norris, the most plausible interpretation of such evidence is that already active citizens read and watch more news and are reinforced in their positive dispositions as a result, ratcheting up those dispositions in a virtuous circle. This is to address the thesis of a crisis of public communication at only one point. It reduces that notion to a theory of media effects, connecting journalistic shortcomings with public disenchantment. As should be clear from what has already been said above, this translates what is a normative thesis about systemically rooted trends into a unidimensional theory of media effects. Nevertheless, it is clear from Norris’s data that, among samples of electorates as a whole, exposure to the news media does not go quantitatively with increased political cynicism and apathy. There are, however, several flaws in Norris’s approach in general and specifically in the idea of a virtuous circle of political communication. First, with one minor exception, the surveys on which Norris relies were snapshots of samples at one moment in time; none traced developments over time in panels of respondents interviewed on two or more occasions. Strictly speaking such an approach cannot speak to effects; it can produce correlations, not evidence of causation; it cannot demonstrate a dynamic process, such as is implied by a ‘virtuous circle’. It is possible therefore that the associations she detected were due to a tendency for more knowledgeable and active citizens to be more interested in following politics in the media. Again strictly speaking, a reinforcement effect among them has not been demonstrated. In fact, one of the few pieces in the literature that followed a sample before and after media exposure showed that Americans who had read newspapers with more front-page stories critical of political institutions became more cynical about American politics afterwards (Erbring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980). Miller and colleagues focused 62
A Crisis of Public Communication
on the members of a national sample who had been interviewed first in 1972 and again in 1974 and who had on both occasions given their responses to five statements comprising a trust in government scale. In 1974 they also determined which newspapers respondents were reading and then content analysed political articles appearing on the front pages of those papers. The aim of this analysis was to measure the amount of institutional criticism appearing in the stories. Institutional criticism was operationalised by coding the content of each political article to indicate if the actions, positions, policies or actors in the story were criticised, praised or discussed in neutral terms. Finally, developments in voters’ levels of trust in government over the 1972–4 period were charted against the amount of institutional criticism found in their papers. When readers of papers with above-average amounts of institutional criticism were compared with readers of papers with below-average amounts, a sample-wide tide of increasing mistrust proved significantly greater among the former – and especially among less educated Americans. An implication of the study is that when subjected to careful content analysis, media reporting may well help to influence attitudes in ways that can have repercussions on political legitimacy. Second, none of Norris’s surveys adopted a strategy of trying to identify subgroups of the electorate who might be more vulnerable to negative media effects. Whole samples were not broken down by potentially significant divisors. If, for example, more actively inclined citizens follow the news media more frequently, what happens to the less active sector of the public? They may form unfavourable impressions of politics through exposure to political news and as a result tune out more often. Or, to consider a different possibility, many electors are probably ambivalent about politics and the value of following it in the media. And those who are most ambivalent might be most susceptible to negative portrayals of politics and politicians in political communications. Here quantitative measures of influence might be supplemented by qualitative ones – aiming to tap the impressions people form when following political news, the judgments they make about political institutions, actors and processes featured in the news and how they rate the communications they receive for utility, interest and credibility when following political affairs. Third, Norris’s optimism is based on an uncritical celebration of the onset of media abundance through the multiplication of channels and the arrival of new media, all of which she equates with a diversification 63
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
of information sources. As she puts it, the more abundant environment ‘offers a wide range of political information broadly defined in different formats and different levels so citizens can select the type of information most useful to them’. But this is to ignore two downsides to diversification. One concerns its impact on the previously dominant sources of people’s access to news about politics. These are not replaced by media abundance; they remain the most important sources of people’s impressions of politics; but their ability to perform their civic roles is weakened by their exposure to the competitive pressures that have been discussed above. Another concomitant of diversification is fragmentation. As Bimber (2003: 229) argues, the more abundant information environment lowers the threshold for groups seeking support for their causes to receive publicity and to be noticed. As he puts it, ‘more mobile, ad hoc organizations . . . appear better able than ever before to have a voice in politics’. On the one hand, this enhances political equality, but on the other hand, ‘universal “sense-making” and the building of shared conceptions is that much harder as the public sphere becomes more diverse and fluid as a result of technological change’ (245). In our words (Blumler and Coleman 2001: 12–13): Admittedly, there may be more chances in such a system for more voices to be heard, more problems to be brought to people’s attention, and more chances for people to find what they want to hear, see or know about. But it may also be more difficult to put all this together at the centre. Such communication flows could be conducive more to a public sphere of cacophony than to one of coherence. Finally, Norris’s thesis ignores and lacks an answer to a recently emergent and now widely recognised problem of political communication. Conditions differ today in one significant respect from those that obtained in the mid-1990s when the notion of a ‘crisis of public communication’ was coined. There is a broad awareness in elite circles of the existence of a crisis of public trust and of communication practices that have reinforced and deepened it. We live, it is often said, in an age of cynicism. Consequently, a frequent theme of present-day commentary is the need to find ways of reconnecting the institutions of politics and the media with a thoroughly sceptical and disillusioned citizenry. An example is the reaction of Britain’s Electoral Commission 64
A Crisis of Public Communication
to the very low turnout of voters after the 2001 election campaign. Since, according to evidence from opinion polls it had commissioned, few voters found the campaign interesting, since most of the impressions of the campaign they volunteered were negative and since even the bulk of those people who were ‘very interested’ in politics before the election did not find the campaign itself interesting, the Commission held that declining turnout was ‘not a function of declining interest in politics or elections but rather a failure of the campaign to connect with the electorate’ (Electoral Commission 2001). Regarded in this light, the crisis of public communication could be said to be reflected today in the difficulties communicators face in managing to restore that connection. Various issues of feasibility arise. Once lost, trust is difficult to regain. The deeper conditions that gave rise to the crisis of public communication cannot be wished away. How much confidence can one have that the intercommunicator relationships and trends of characteristic content, discussed above, can be reversed sufficiently to enable mainstream political communication to serve citizens more adequately? Arguably, the disjunctures and problems of the now widely acknowledged crisis of democratic participation, rooted as they are in multidimensional transformations of elite-mass relationships over the postwar period, are too profound to be overcome through the mainstream media. In any case, how strong are the means at the disposal of mainstream communicators for overcoming mass indifference and hostility? In recent election campaigns the efforts of BBC newscasters to make their campaign reporting more interesting and accessible to viewers failed in the end to overcome their unfavourable impressions of the campaign. As Blumler and Gurevitch (2002b) concluded, ‘such wellintentioned, even essential approaches could be regarded as little more than tinkering on the surface of a deeply rooted antipathy among many voters towards the uncongenial way in which political communicators have addressed them for so long in the past’. Lo o k i n g A h ea d
It would be fair to conclude from much of the foregoing that a mediated public sphere, dominated by mainstream newspapers and broadcasting, gives only fleeting and haphazard succour to citizenship. But there are signs of change in the new media landscape. The top-down model of news production that dominated the ‘industrial’ age is unlikely to survive in the digital age, now that it is possible for anyone with access to the Internet and other digital technologies to publish their own 65
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
accounts or remix others’. As in the case of the music industry, which lost its cultural and commercial grip in the face of online file-sharing, the threat to the news media comes from online social networks which empower ‘ordinary people’ to produce, distribute and remix news without passing through the mass-media filter. Columbia University’s Project for Excellence in Journalism has declared that ‘Journalism is in the middle of an epochal transformation, as momentous probably as the invention of the telegraph or television’. Both the producers and receivers of news are going to have to adapt. According to a 2005 Carnegie survey, the Internet is the most frequently cited source of news for 18–34-year-old Americans. Fortyfour percent report using online news portals at least once a day, compared with 37 percent who watch local TV news and 16 percent who watch national network news on a daily basis. In the 2005 U.K. election 71 percent of 18–25-year-old British Internet users visited the BBC election web site, and only 20 percent said that they did not visit any election-related web sites. Clearly there is a generational migration towards online news sources, a trend born out by latest Ofcom* research among 16–24-year-olds. Online news-seekers are currently gravitating towards sites run by newspapers and broadcasters with established reputations. Of the 12 most popular news web sites in the United States, eight (CNN, Gannett Newspapers, New York Times, Knight Ridder, Tribune Newspapers, USA Today, Washington Post and ABC News and Hearst Newspapers) were established news publishers, and the other four were run by Internet service providers or search engines. In the United Kingdom, the BBC and The Guardian have been spectacularly successful in adapting to online formats, although all old media organisations face an inevitable tension between intellectual property rights (owning their stories) and the open-source ethos of content-sharing. But established media organisations are under growing pressure from open-source news sites which have abandoned top-down editorial control for a more participatory style of journalism. The Indymedia network was established as a response to the failure of traditional media to cover the anti-globalisation protests on the streets of Seattle in 1999. A web-based global network of reporters and photographers was set up, designed as ‘an interactive platform for reports from the struggles for a *
Ofcom is the independent regulator and competition authority for communications industries in the United Kingdom.
66
A Crisis of Public Communication
world based on freedom, cooperation, justice and solidarity, and against environmental degradation, neoliberal exploitation, racism and patriarchy’ (Indymedia UK Mission Statement, http://www.indymedia. org.uk/en/static/mission.html). There are now 160 Independent Media Centers on six continents, making it the largest alternative media service in the world. According to one of its leading activists, ‘Open publishing means that the process of creating news is transparent to the readers. They can contribute a story and see it instantly appear in the pool of stories publicly available.. . . Readers can see editorial decisions being made by others. They can see how to get involved and help make editorial decisions‘ (http://purplebark.net/maffew/cat/openpub.html). Another major success, Ohmynews, emerged out of the fierce South Korean electoral contest of 2002. It is a grass-roots news service, comprising over 30,000 citizen-reporters who submit about 200 articles each day. The editorial objective of Ohmynews is to create ‘a two-way journalism’ in which ‘the readers are no longer passive. They can be reporters anytime they want’ (Ho 2004). Key to the success of both of these new news services has been a democratic notion of accountability, based upon the participatory production of news, with minimal and transparent editorial control. This democratic trend conflicts with the claims of professional journalism to possess exclusive expertise and adhere to rigorous ethical standards. Open-source news providers, such as citizen-reporters and bloggers, argue that they are simply going back to the days when journalists were people who published accessible journals and news correspondents were people who wrote letters reporting on what was going on around them. Although these developments seem promising so far, the Internet’s civic potential has been greater than its use. At bottom, that potential is vulnerable mainly because an infrastructure for its proper realization is lacking. With commerce increasingly in the driving seat of Internet development, few of its big players are out to boost citizenship. It is true that various exercises of online consultation, promoting informed deliberation on public policy issues, have been piloted. But lacking constitutional status and effective links to mainstream politics, their contributions have been fragmentary and marginal. Yet with suitable policies and institutional support, some of the emancipatory potential of the new media could be realised. This line of argument is developed in Chapter 7.
67
C H A P T E R 3
From Indirect to Direct Representation
I
n the first two chapters we have identified fundamental weaknesses in contemporary democracy: the lack of a political culture in which citizens can deliberate effectively and the presence of mass media which undermines public trust in politics per se. These two profoundly disturbing tendencies contribute to a third aspect of democratic dysfunction: a pervasive sense of disconnection between most elected representatives (politicians) and most represented citizens. As one former Leader of the U.K. House of Commons has astutely observed: The public today is worryingly inclined to see politics as something, which belongs to a political class, rather than a process which is rooted in decisions by the public themselves. The most common complaint of the public is that politicians as a class do not listen to what the public want, which is curious as there has never been a time when the major political parties have spent more effort on trying to find out what the public thinks. (Cook 2002) In theory, political representatives are supposed to speak for the people they represent. ‘Speaking for’ becomes necessary when citizens are physically, culturally or cognitively removed from the locus of public decision-making and their interests, preferences and values have to be expressed via an aggregating intermediary. As the democratic theorist Hanna Pitkin (1967: 209) puts it, in what still remains the most cogent analysis of the functions of political representation: representing . . . means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. The representative must act independently; his action must involve discretion and judgment; he must be the one who acts. The represented must also be (conceived as) capable of independent action and judgment, not merely being 68
From Indirect to Direct Representation
taken care of. And, despite the resulting potential for conflict between representative and represented about what is to be done, the conflict must not normally take place. The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict, or if it occurs an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest. Although not bound simply to reflect, mimic or personify the will of the represented, neither, according to Pitkin, should democratic representatives be detached from or indifferent to citizens’ interests, preferences or values. Representation entails an ongoing connection between politicians and citizens, albeit one that is often tenuous, tense and difficult to sustain. However, the practice of representative democracy is rather at odds with theory. In most contemporary democracies, whether old or new, parliamentary or presidential, the representative relationship is in chronic disrepair. There is a pervasive sense that politicians and the people they represent inhabit different worlds, speak mutually incomprehensible languages and fail to respect one another. To be sure, the disconnected citizen is not unique to late modern democracy. Recall Lippmann’s ‘deaf spectator in the back row, who ought to keep his mind on the mystery off there, but cannot quite manage to keep awake’, a pathetic figure whose bewilderment helped to define expectations of citizens’ political behaviour in the twentieth century (Bachrach 1967; Lippmann 1922: 10). Lippmann’s ‘deaf spectator’ was characterised (perhaps caricatured) as lacking the cognitive skills to connect. Nearly a century later the problem seems to be different: citizens are awake (in the sense of being educated) and quite able to hear what is going on (insofar as they are exposed to a daily array of mediated political messages and images), but the show on offer is not to their taste. Figure 3.1 depicts the contrasting characteristics of connected and disconnected representation. Cl ose ne s s
Connection suggests boldness in the face of the seeming intractability of distance, not only linking the near to the far and the present to the past, but the informed to the uninformed and the strong to the weak. To be connected in a vast, complex society of inequalities, linguistic diversity and group polarisation is an ethical transcendence of differential 69
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship Closeness
Distance
Mutuality
Detachment
Coherence
Exclusivity
Empathy
Aloofness
Figure 3.1. Diagram of political connection and disconnection.
communicative opportunities. Connected representatives are those who are not regarded as ‘distant’, either in the geographical sense of being nonlocal or unreachable, but also in the sense of being approachable and capable of communicating at many levels. Mu t u a l i t y
The notion of connectedness implies mutuality: if I am connected to you, then you must be in some sense connected to me. To be connected means to be in touch, either physically or via mediation. Connection is more than merely reaching out; being connected involves being reached as well as reaching, being touched as well as touching others; it is a relationship both dialectical and dialogical. Representatives who collaborate with those they represent, by sharing information, consulting regularly and being highly accessible and ‘in touch’, are less likely to be regarded as disconnected than detached representatives who are perceived as secretive, self-serving, autonomous operators. C oherenc e
Connection conjoins and coheres, linking hitherto separated entities. The connected representative gives a single voice to many separate lives. Connectedness invokes the aspiration towards common understanding 70
From Indirect to Direct Representation
in a world of sovereign artificers. Connected representatives are good at articulating diverse experiences and narratives and aggregating competing interests and preferences. In contrast, politicians who are seen to pursue narrow ideological courses and to be obedient to partisan interests and structures are likely to be regarded as disconnected from those they represent. Em p a t h y
Finally, and least tangibly, to connect is to empathise, in the sense of imagining oneself in the position of an other (Goodin 2003). As Bowlby (1969: 442) argues, ‘Intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub around which a person’s life revolves . . . from these intimate attachments a person draws his strength and enjoyment of life and, through what he contributes, he gives strength and enjoyment to others’. Intersubjective connectedness entails not a sense of not being someone else, but of knowing what it means to be someone else. In an increasingly post-deferential culture, citizens will disengage from people and institutions as they experience the solitary pain of not being recognised, heard or valued. FEELING REPRESENTED
For citizens, being politically represented is a matter of intermittent concern. Apart from a small minority of highly active, often ideologically committed, citizens, most people have reason to connect to politicians and political institutions only at exceptional moments of personal crisis or public excitement. Whereas the work of representing is a permanent one for elected politicians, the sense of being represented is only ever an occasional realisation for citizens. In order to examine the extent to which U.K. citizens feel themselves to be connected to political institutions and other social actors, an online survey of a representative sample of 2,273 U.K. citizens was commissioned from the online polling organisation yougov. The value of using an online survey is that secondary questions could be asked of respondents, seeking qualitative explanations for their initial responses. The initial survey, comprising seven questions, was conducted between 11 and 13 September 2003. Seventy-two percent of the sample reported feeling ‘disconnected’ from Parliament, with nearly half (46%) feeling ‘very disconnected’. Over half of 35–44-year-olds (52%) and nearly half of 45–64-year-olds 71
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
felt ‘very disconnected’ from Parliament. Perhaps surprisingly, fewer 18–34-year-olds felt very disconnected from Parliament than in the older cohorts. There were no significant differences between responses to this question from men and women or between higher and lower social classes. When asked how connected they felt to their local MP, levels of disconnection were slightly lower. In these responses, disconnection decreased with age, suggesting that as people grow older they are more likely to establish some sort of communication with their MP. Respondents were asked how ‘in touch’ they are with their local MP, local councillor, doctor, clergyman and next-door neighbour. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 0 indicating total disconnection and 10 indicating intimate connection, over half (54%) rated their level of connection to their next-door neighbour at a point of 7 or above. Perceptions of connection to local GPs were not far behind, with 52 percent reaching 7-plus. Only 1 in 10 felt connected to a clergyman at 7-plus, slightly behind councillors (11%), but ahead of MPs, at 7 percent. Looking at the bottom end of the scale, taking zero to three to indicate a perception of significant disconnection, next-door neighbours were so evaluated by 18 percent of the sample, GPs by almost 1 in 4 (24%), councillors by 77 percent and MPs by 79 percent. Clergymen were so rated by 81 percent of the sample, with 62 percent expressing 0 connection (compared with 50 percent who rated their connection with their MP at 0). When asked about the kinds of contact they had with their MP in the past year, nearly half (48%) claimed that they had read a letter or leaflet from their MP. A quarter claimed to have seen their MP on television, 20 percent to have written to their MP, 16 percent to have visited their MP’s web site, 12 percent to have met their MP face to face and 11 percent to have listened to their MP making a speech. Almost 4 out of 10 respondents (39%) claimed to have had no contact of any kind with their MP. There was a significant correspondence between having had contact with and feeling connected to MPs. People who had met their MP in person were more than five times more likely to feel connected to them than those who had not; those who had visited their MP’s web site were nearly three times as likely to feel connected. Ninety-four percent of respondents who had no contact with their MP in the past year felt disconnected, compared with 61 percent of the overall sample. 72
From Indirect to Direct Representation
In a 1999 survey by the U.S. Council for Excellence in Government (CEG), almost two-thirds (64%) of Americans agreed with the statement ‘I feel distant and disconnected from government’. The CEG research found that citizens who felt connected were more likely to have contacted their elected representative. In our United Kingdom Survey there was a similar correlation between communication with MPs and perceptions of connection. On average, those who felt disconnected from Parliament were 18 percent more likely than those who felt connected to have had no contact at all with their MPs. Those who felt disconnected from their MPs were 37 percent more likely not to have had any contact with them at all. 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
People who feel connected to MPs People who feel disconnected to MPs Non Voters
N on e
d
en
st
ea
Li
R
of th e ov e
P
P
M
M
m
by
ro
tf
ch
fle
ee
ab
sp
ea
te
si
TV
eb
on
w
P
r/l
to
tte
ed
le
M
s
P
M
P’
M
to
ed
d
ch
te
at
si
W
Vi P
n
M
te
rit
et
M
W
Figure 3.2. Graph showing relationship between contact with MP and voting.
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
39
41
Average
Disconnected
21
Connected
Figure 3.3. Feelings of political connection amongst those who had and had not been in contact with Parliament. 73
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
44 39
6 Connected
Average
Disconnected
Figure 3.4. Feelings of political connection amongst those who had and had not been in contact with their MP.
A key finding was that the vast majority (80%) of people who felt disconnected from Parliament reported that they had not voted in the previous general election. Ninety-eight percent of those who felt very connected, and 89 percent of those who felt slightly connected reported voting, whereas over half (52%) of the very disconnected had not voted. Nonvoters were far less likely to have had contact with their MPs than voters. ARTICULATING DISCONNECTION
How can these widely-held negative perceptions of the citizen– representative relationship be explained? The qualitative method used to obtain a more detailed picture of what citizens mean by political disconnection was to recontact survey respondents, inviting them to complete two sentences: ‘I don’t feel connected to my political representative because . . .’ and ‘A connected political representative should . . .’ . Of the 2,273 respondents to the initial survey contacted by e-mail, 1,783 responded to the invitation and posted a total of 23,642 words to complete the first sentence and 25,821 to complete the second sentence. In their comments respondents identified eight types of disconnected representative:
The The The The
unknown representative invisible representative distant representative alien representative 74
From Indirect to Direct Representation
The The The The
partisan representative untrustworthy representative arrogant representative irrelevant representative.
A significant minority (about one in five respondents) did not know who their MP was. Considering that 39 percent of respondents had had no contact with their MP (mediated or otherwise) in the previous year, it is not surprising that about half of that number could not identify their MP, with comments such as: I don’t know who they are and they make no attempt to rectify this. I don’t even know who he/she is! We have only lived here four months, but we have not had any newsletters or correspondence from any political representative. Some respondents complained about their MP’s lack of visible presence: ‘He isn’t very “visible”, hardly hear anything about him’. The importance of being ‘seen’ was clearly about more than formal representation. To be seen is a first step to being trusted. Respondents seemed to perceive unseen representatives as being ephemeral, faceless, ghostly figures: Even though he only lives up the road I have never ever seen him. I don’t even know who is representing me politically and I don’t know anyone who does. They don’t seem to want to be known. He or she does not have a ‘face’ in the constituency. After the election and its promises, nothing’s changed. I voted but have actually forgotten his name as I haven’t seen nor heard of him since. Respondents were uneasy about the distance of their representative from them. Even in an age of time-space compression, local rootedness and attachment are highly valued as grounds for representing. Paradoxically, although distance between citizens and the loci of central power is a key reason for the necessity of political representation, representatives are expected to transcend the symbolic manifestations of distance in their work of representing. Respondents expected representatives to be near, in the sense of reachable and touchable: He never walks around our town, we have to go somewhere once every month for a surgery of about two hours. 75
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
They are not seen very often round here. They don’t seem to like mixing with the public. They have no local presence, and make no obvious effort to communicate with their constituents. A London politician, not a local politician. A repeated observation from respondents was that their MPs came from a different world, an alien planet. The prevalence of this metaphor was striking, perhaps reflecting a perception of representatives as ‘outsiders’ with life histories that made them incapable of registering everyday meanings: They live in a totally different world to the man on the street. They are disconnected from the real world. He lives in a different world from me. He is too remote and not on the same wave length as the people generally. They haven’t a clue about the real world. They say they do, but I feel it is just lip service. I don’t think they are on the same planet. They have no idea about normal life. Respondents commonly complained about their representatives being politicians, more attached to their parties than those they represent. In the minds of many respondents, there seemed to be a split between the work of representing and the rituals of high politics. Respondents wanted to be consulted and heard rather than simply regarded as voting fodder: He is a party loyalist, a careerist who towes the party line irrespective of whether it is appropriate to his constituency. He just appears to be a publicity machine – not a politician. He does not refer to me for my opinion on any question. Mainly he follows the party line. Some respondents expressed serious distrust about their MPs, but these were a relatively small minority. In general, respondents distrusted the process of representation rather than the character of representatives. But there were strongly-expressed exceptions: I regard my MP as a self-serving opportunist who is interested in power for power’s sake and will do and say anything to secure his position. 76
From Indirect to Direct Representation
I can’t trust any politician/party to treat me like an adult, and tell me the truth. There is so much secrecy and behind the scenes tradeoffs. There is no relationship between his policies and my expectations. I do not trust politicians in general, even those who entered politics for the best of motives. In a post-deferential culture, representatives are required to respect people whose experiences and backgrounds they do not understand. As Sennett has powerfully argued, equality entails respect based on the autonomy of the respected rather than the comprehension of the respecter (Sennett 2003). This places elected representatives in the odd position of having to demonstrate respect for vast numbers of unknown recipients. A widespread complaint from respondents was that their MPs did not care about who they really were and how or what they thought: I have been seduced with the belief/idea that what I think and feel will have an influence over decision-making when it doesn’t. My views have been canvassed so many times yet no regard is taken of them at all. She seems more at home in the Today programme studio than the constituency. She has a huge majority and I suspect she takes us for granted. They treat us as if we were invisible and do what they want, not what the people they represent want. The MP for here looks down his nose at us lower mortals. Finally, a significant minority of respondents considered their MP to have little or no relevance to their lives. Unlike the respondents who did not know who their MP was, these knew their MP in the way that a childless couple might know the local school or a vegetarian might know the local butcher shop. They were unconvinced that they had any need to be represented politically: They don’t play a part in my life. I have never had any reason to ask the assistance or advice from my MP or councillor. What should one make of these pervasive perceptions of political disconnection? The most striking feature is the overwhelming extent to which they refer to process rather than outcome. In open survey questions, respondents were free to give whatever reasons came into their minds for feeling disconnected, but hardly any chose to criticise 77
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
their representatives for not serving the right interests, pursuing correct policies or delivering better outcomes. Connection was conceived almost entirely in terms of the health of the representative-constituent relationship. References to mechanisms of connection, such as elections, accountability or constitutional arrangements, were few, with the exception of some proposals for representatives to initiate local referendums and online consultations. Public frustration appears to be less about constitutionality or policy than affective perceptions of attachment, affinity and respect. When asked how their representatives could become more connected, respondents wanted them to be more accessible, to spend more time listening to constituents, to be more independent from parties and to be more like the people they represented. FROM INDIRECT TO DIRECT REPRESENTATION
After nearly a century of political representation based upon the principle of universal franchise, what is the public saying about how it feels to be represented by others? The overwhelming negativity of the survey and qualitative data considered here, as well as the extensive data from other studies of public attitudes to politics and politicians, could be read as suggesting that the public has had enough of representation and now wants to make most or all political decisions for itself. There is certainly strong evidence that the public wants more say in politics and trusts its own judgments more than those of politicians (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2003). But there is little to indicate that citizens want to dispense entirely with representative democracy and initiate a direct democracy, at least in its crudest sense of transcending all representative institutions and passing unmediated power over decision-making to all voters. Indeed, when asked directly whether institutions such as parliaments should cede power to a plebiscitary electorate, few are in favour of this (Coleman 2007b). Bowler, Donovan and Karp offer intriguing evidence to show that many citizens do not distinguish between direct or representative democracy. According to this thesis, the determining variable is one’s attitude to democracy as such and distrust of representative democracy affects distrust for direct democracy. Those who have faith in the public’s democratic capacity in representative democracy are more likely to support greater direct democracy than those who do not. A helpful feature of Bowler, Donovan and Karp’s analysis is their rejection of the 78
From Indirect to Direct Representation
direct-representative dichotomy and their conceptualisation of a spectrum of more or less direct or indirect democracy (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2003). A second response to the data presented here is offered by Inglehart’s post-materialism thesis, according to which there has been a shift in emphasis in recent times ‘from maximising economic gains to maximising subjective well-being’. Post-materialist citizens are regarded as moving away from trust in secular or religious authorities, especially so in the case of the young and better-educated (Inglehart 1977). It would certainly seem from the qualitative data that citizens care more about the quality of political relationships than could be explained by a simple materialist analysis of ‘who gets what’. But, contrary to the Inglehart thesis, there is no significant evidence from this survey that better-off, more educated people feel any more or less disconnected from their political representatives – and indeed the youngest cohort of respondents report feeling slightly more connected. A third response would be to interpret the public’s mood of disconnection as a demand for a more direct form of representation. Indirect representation is characterised by an apparently inevitable fracture between the representing centre and the represented outer layers. The indirectness of political representation is not inevitable, but is contingently rooted in some of the most enduring features of modernity: the intractability of distance, the bounded nature of place, the professionalisation of mediation and the spectacular nature of authority. In a world of increasing inter-connectedness, these justifications for indirect representation appear less credible. With the emergence of reconfigured patterns of interaction across space and time, resulting particularly from computer-mediated communication, traditionally centralised and indirect social processes are under increasing pressure to adapt. Shopping, banking, learning, travel and health care are being reshaped by new forms of mediation, so it seems unlikely that political representation can remain undisturbed. At the functional level of governance, the Internet has been at the heart of major programmes to make information more transparent and to rationalise service delivery. At the level of political representation, parliaments have slowly started to engage with digital media at a number of levels, but neither representative institutions nor individual representatives have so far done much more than replicate offline communication practices (Coleman and Spiller 2004; Gibson, Ward and Nixon 2003). 79
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
The prospect of using the inherent interactivity of the Internet to enhance democracy has been raised by a number of scholars (Coleman 2007c). Early cyber-democrats predicted that representative institutions would be radically transformed, or would even become obsolete, in the face of the public’s capacity to state views and vote on any issue (Becker and Slaton 2000; Etzioni 1992; Morris 2001; Toffler 1981). These visions of a return to the Greek agora or the New England town meeting reflected a combination of overdeterministic reliance upon the apparently democratising features of digital technologies and a naı¨ve belief in the dispensability of representation in a world where the total presence of those who will be affected by decisions is rarely, if ever, possible. But, just as techno-populist fantasies have been a distraction, the assumption that indirect representation is inevitable has served to constrain imaginative efforts to more closely link the act of representing to the needs and desires of the represented. Somewhere in between these two conceptions of democracy lies a third position, which we refer to in this book as direct representation. By direct representation we have in mind a democratic system which rejects paternalistic modes of governing associated with the postwar welfare state and adopts techniques and technologies that go beyond formal consultation on preestablished policy agendas by mobilising, listening to, learning from, mapping and responding to diverse articulations of public experience and expertise. Direct representation entails an ongoing rather than episodic political conversation, inhabiting trusted spaces of everyday communication rather than being confined to official zones of electoral manipulation. Direct representation offers many of the same benefits as direct democracy, but fewer of the burdens. In short, it offers citizens the prospect of representative closeness, mutuality, coherence and empathy, without expecting them to become full-time participating citizens. A key factor in making direct representation a realistic possibility has been the emergence of interactive, digital media. As depicted in Figure 3.5, four conceptual and strategic shifts combine to create the potential for a reconfiguration of representative democracy. Vulnerable though such potential is, it opens up the possibility of overcoming the two most glaring defects of contemporary political culture: the absence of effective mechanisms for public deliberation and the presence of mass media, which seem to be persistently at odds with democratic civic values. In the concluding sections of this chapter we outline the 80
From Indirect to Direct Representation online surgeries – videoconferencing Closeness…. …
Co-presence
virtual communities – email lists Mutuality … …
Network
online consultations Coherence… …
Dialogue
blogging – multimedia ‘reality’ TV Empathy … …
Self-disclosure
Figure 3.5. ICT and democratic connection.
features of each of these areas of potential reconfiguration and the extent to which they might provide the foundations for a more direct representative democracy. Fr o m Di sta n c e to C o -Pr e s en c e
Digital technologies have facilitated the growth of relationships of mediated co-presence, leading to shrinkage of social space and the collapse of traditional constraints of distance. Virtual co-presence transcends the problem of proximity by digitally simulating the presence of physically distant actors so as to make them instantly accessible and subject to one another. The shrinkage of political distance has two principal effects: representatives become more visible to remote constituents, and citizens find it easier to engage in virtual contact with politicians. The ability to manage their own visibility and control public impressions is a skill long cherished by politicians. It allows them to be seen in different ways by different people, and not seen at all in moments of uncertainty and ‘backstage’ rehearsal. As Thompson has observed, the ubiquity of digital media makes it much harder to maintain such control: 81
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Whether they like it or not, political leaders today are more visible to more people and more closely scrutinized than they ever were in the past; and at the same time, they are more exposed to the risk that their actions and utterances, and the actions and utterances of others, may be disclosed in ways that conflict with the images they wish to project. Hence the visibility created by the media can become the source of a new and distinctive kind of fragility. However much political leaders may seek to manage their visibility, they cannot completely control it. Mediated visibility can slip out of their grasp and can, on occasion, work against them. (Thompson 2005: 42) Apart from well-publicised occasions, when politicians have been exposed by blogs, phone cameras or leaked e-mails as duplicitous or inauthentic (the U.S. Senator Trent Lott’s off-the-cuff support for racial segregation; the U.K. Ministerial adviser Jo Moore’s suggestion that 9/11 presented a good opportunity for the government to make announcements that would be buried amidst other news), elected representatives are faced with a permanent sense that they are on stage, observed not only by the 24/7 professional media, but by a citizenry equipped with the latest surveillant technologies as well. Politicians’ web sites become vulnerable to hackers; they can be talked about by bloggers; an e-mail reply to a single constituent can be copied and distributed to thousands within seconds. At the same time, citizens regard mediated co-presence as grounds for rejecting forms of thin political communication with which they once had to be satisfied. When addressing a political representative involved having to make physical contact – a visit to a weekly surgery or a letter addressed to a physical office – the management of the relationship was largely controlled by politicians, via appointment systems and mail protocols. As representatives can be addressed at any time and in any place via mobile phone, text message or e-mail, citizens experience greater communicative equality. So far, most analyses of this new situation have emphasised the discomfort of politicians in the face of communication overload. The U.S. Congress has gone as far as to support a research project intended to address the curse of overload by unsolicited communications. The Congress Online report (2001a) ‘E-mail Overload in Congress: Managing a Communication Crisis’ states ‘With individual House offices now receiving as many as 8,000 e-mail messages per month and Senate offices receiving as many as 55,000, the burdens on staff are viewed as unmanageable’. Members of 82
From Indirect to Direct Representation
Congress, like elected legislators elsewhere, are in search of effective mail-filtering techniques and protocols designed to protect them from unwanted communicators. From the citizens’ perspective, the problem is one of nonresponse rather than overload. Another Congress Online study (2001b), entitled ‘Constituents and Your Web Site: What Citizens Want to See on Congressional Web Sites’, reports on a series of focus groups in which citizens were asked what they want from online communication with their representatives: ‘Participants . . . wanted assurances that, once expressed, their views would be both acknowledged and taken into account. Just as importantly, however, they expressed their appreciation for Members who showed the courtesy to tell them when they did not agree with them’. Whereas politicians are instrumental in seeking to manage their connection with constituents, citizens tend to be more affectively motivated, expressing concern about the quality rather than the volume of their relationships with their representatives. In the United Kingdom, the Hansard Society has run some experimental online surgeries designed to explore how these peculiarly private consultations about public affairs work in a context of virtual co-presence. The most obvious benefit is the collapse of distance. The MP can be in London and the constituent in Yorkshire, but, for the duration of the interaction, they are in the same virtual place. This not only frees time for the representative, who does not have to lose precious hours moving from one location to another, but allows constituents to engage from the relative security and familiarity of their own home or workplace, the most typical spaces of political opinion formation and exchange (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Wyatt, Katz and Kim 2000; StromerGalley 2002). Virtual co-presence diminishes nonverbal cues, especially significant when constituents, often in the role of a victim or supplicant, encounter articulate, confident politicians. Online interactions are archived, so that both parties to a meeting can recall what was said or promised. As with most forms of online communication, virtual or cyber-surgeries should not be thought of as a substitution for the richness of face-to-face interaction, but as an additional option, which for some at least might prove more convenient or satisfying. Fr o m Pl ace to Ne t w o r k s
As people’s lives become more dispersed across networks of interest, preference and passion, the possibility of representing them within centralised, hierarchical institutions becomes less credible. The 83
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
proliferation of social networks, through which weak ties connect citizens to numerous others, weakens the logic of narrow representation, whether based upon bounded territory or partisan ideology. Policy networks have long played a central role in the political process, largely by linking hitherto disconnected sections of the political elite (Marsh 1998; Rhodes 1998; Thatcher 1998; Jordan 1990). Heclo (1979) wrote in the 1970s about the need of governments managing complex policy issues to connect with networks of experts and activists which come to perform ‘subgovernmental’ roles. A consequence of networked governance has been the decline of ‘governing by a central actor’ and increased ‘interdependence between . . . socialpolitical-administrative actors’. As access to online communication and information abundance spreads beyond elites, the threshold of access to the arena of collective action is lowered, and potential mobilisers of public opinion find it easier to disseminate their messages (Bimber 2002; Bach and Stark 2004) In their review of ways in which civil society organisations influence policy processes, Pollard and Court (2005) note that ‘the Internet has enabled groups such as One World and IPS [Inter Press service] to become global hubs for the civil society media, publishing stories on a wide range of development issues and creating opportunities for both large and small groups to publish informative reports, commentaries and opinion pieces’. An early example of an online network lobbying, with a relative degree of success, against powerful transnational policy-makers was the campaign in the late 1990s against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). When the MAI negotiations collapsed in 1998, the French government noted that ‘the development of the Internet is shaking up the world of negotiations’ (Deibert 2000: 257). According to Deibert, the Internet performed three functions in the anti-MAI campaign: it helped to coordinate strategic information between the 600 groups from 70 different countries involved in the campaign; it publicised anti-MAI views to people who would not otherwise have known about them; and it placed pressure on politicians. Deibert’s analysis of the campaign suggests that the Internet’s role was qualitative, transforming a range of nationally based groups into something like a global movement: having been created around the MAI, the network shows definite signs of being sustained into the future. Some of the prominent World-Wide Web sites have now situated their campaign against 84
From Indirect to Direct Representation
the MAI into a wider campaign against ‘corporate rule’ or ‘neoliberalism’ generally, alongside new issue areas . . . This network shifts its focus comfortably between the local, the national and the global, from issues in one national jurisdiction to another, and from issue-area to issue-area. (Deibert 2000: 264–5) Successors to the anti-MAI campaign have been the much more sophisticated digitally-sustained anti-globalisation movement and the Indymedia alternative journalism network, widely regarded as the most vibrant spaces of radical activism in contemporary politics. Civil society networks do not operate only at a transnational level. For example, in the small European state of Latvia an alliance of NGOs have joined together within a single online portal where all of their research papers are deposited and policy debates conducted in public. The Politika portal (http://www.politika.lv), which was launched in July 2001 with the explicit objective of promoting more open policymaking, currently attracts approximately 13,000 unique users per month who produce 150,000 page views. Mainstream media have come to acknowledge Politika as a neutral and reliable source of policy thinking, and both print and broadcast journalists encouraged Politika to monitor the content and ethics of the Latvian media. The key to Politika’s sustainability has been its capacity to operate as a decentred network, combining organisational resources to produce a powerful collective voice. Fr o m Tr a n s m i ss i o n t o D ialogue
The rise of digital interactivity has blurred the boundaries between the production and consumption of mediated content. Though used in a variety of inconsistent ways, ranging from human-computer interaction to one-click credit-card donations to politicians’ web sites to many-to-many peer-based discussion, media interactivity opens up the possibility for a more dialogical style of public communication; one in which message senders and receivers frequently exchange roles and are compelled to collaborate on the framing of common agendas. The ubiquitous spread of phone-in programmes, online discussion boards and e-mail discussion lists is suggestive of a more accessible, socioculturally inclusive, democratised media landscape. Broadcasters have come to realise that simply transmitting news and elite opinions alienates audiences with a growing appetite for talking back. Politicians too are eager to demonstrate their ability and willingness to use digital 85
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
technologies not only to propagandise, but to be seen to engage in dialogue with the people they represent as well. There is evidence to suggest that there is a generational migration to online political spaces. According to a 2007 Eurobarometer poll, 24 percent of Europeans aged between 15 and 30 said that they had presented their views in an online discussion forum during the past 12 months, compared with only 8 percent who had been involved in trade union activity and 5 percent who had actively supported a political party. (Interestingly, young people within the new, post-communist European democracies were 3 percent more likely to have participated in political discussion online than were those from the older democracies.) It is unlikely that the younger generation is going to stop discussing politics online once they reach middle and old age; if anything, we can expect this trend to increase as the cohort grows older. Governments in various countries and at various levels have entered the online arena with a view to being seen to engage in dialogue with citizens and to obtaining a more nuanced sense of public opinion than can be gleaned from crude polling. A recent study from the U.K. Department of Justice, examining 12 case studies of governmentmanaged online engagement, concluded that they brought ‘people and communities into the policy process who had not previously participated’ (Department of Justice 2007: 112). But, as we shall discuss further in the next chapter, participants themselves were less than enthused by the willingness of government representatives to contribute their part to the dialogue. Indeed, the technical capacity to facilitate citizen-to-representative dialogue makes failures of responsive communication even more conspicuous than they had been in the pre-digital era. F ro m S pectacle to S elf -Di sc l o s u r e
As relatively inexpensive and increasingly convergent media technologies have become accessible, and the rigid division between producer and audience evaporates, opportunities for self-representation become more realistic (Bruns 2006). Many citizens are no longer content with the role of just being passive spectators. Audiences and publics seem to be converging, leading some commentators to speak of a new, hybrid category combining these once distinct roles (Manin 1996; Livingstone 2005). The rise of the political blogosphere exemplifies the way in which technologies are being used to open up a more subjective space for 86
From Indirect to Direct Representation
citizens’ self-expression. Blogs, which are publicly accessible, regularly updated personal journals (or logs), provide an ongoing account of the beliefs, discoveries and personalities of their authors. Blog software allows bloggers to archive their past entries so that they are searchable and to link any entry to related material, both in other blogs or elsewhere on the web. So blogs become a form of networked expression, an ongoing experiment in the social production of reflection and knowledge. Blogs are fast becoming sophisticated listening posts of modern democracy. To blog is to declare your presence, to disclose to the world that you exist and what it’s like to be you, to affirm that your thoughts are at least as worth hearing as anyone else’s and to emerge from the spectating audience as a player and maker of meanings. Although a number of politicians have established their own blogs (Coleman and Moss 2008; Wright 2008), the main political value of blogging is not to be found in politicians presenting themselves to an audience of potential voters, but in the dense networks of intellectual and symbolic intercourse involving millions of private-public bloggers. The blogosphere is characterised by three democratising characteristics. First, it provides a bridge between the private, subjective sphere of selfexpression and the socially fragile civic sphere in which publics can form and act. As democracy becomes more sensitive to affective dimensions, attention is paid to a revalued recognition of subjective and intersubjective articulations. As several commentators have observed, it is often within the safety of private or familiar environments that people feel most able to speak as citizens (Eliasoph 1998; Gamson 1992). By allowing people to both interact with others and remain as private individuals, blogs provide an important escape route from the ‘if you don’t come to the meeting, you can’t have anything to say’ mentality. Second, blogs allow people – indeed, expect them – to express incomplete thoughts. This terrain of intellectual evolution, vulnerability and search for confirmation or refutation from wider sources is in marked contrast to the crude certainties that dominate so much of political discourse. As Mortensen and Walker (2002) have explained: We post to our blogs as ideas come to us. Daily, hourly, weekly. The frequency varies, but it is a writing that happens in bits and pieces, not in the long hours of thought that suit the cliche´d image of the secluded scholar in the ivory tower. In this sense blogs are suited to the short attention span of our time that worries so many traditionalists. Blogs are interstitial for the writer as for the reader. 87
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
Third, blogs lower the threshold of entry to the global debate for traditionally unheard or marginalised voices, particularly from poorer parts of the world which are too often represented by others, without being given a chance to present their own accounts. Blogs such as the South Korean OhMyNews (http://www.ohmynews.com) and Blog Africa (http://blogafrica.com) are refreshing additions to a global debate in which contributors have tended to be better at speaking for than listening to the world’s least privileged. In Iran blogging has become the sphere of opposition debate. Hossein Derakhshan, whose Editor: Myself (http://hoder.com/weblog) blog is one of the most widely respected sources of Iranian political commentary, has observed that blogs have served different functions for different groups of Iranian Internet users: They have provided first-hand reports from several events such as student protests They have helped young people find new dates or know more about potential dates, in the lack of legitimate dating services They have helped parents to get to know more about their children’s values and norms They have provided Iranian emigrants outside of Iran with firsthand information about the new and unofficial Iran (new values, new lifestyles, new slang, etc.) Some of well-known bloggers have been hired by newspaper publishers to write for them, something they had never had a chance to do They have attracted several top officials and politicians as regular readers; in some cases they have commented on some posts in some blogs They have popularised the concept and use of the utf-8 standard as the ultimate standard for putting Persian texts on the Net They have hugely increased the total volume of searchable Persian content on the Internet, both directly by their own content, and indirectly by popularizing the idea of full utf-8-friendly Persian web sites They have shifted the attention of many young users from chat rooms towards reading and writing blogs They have encouraged a number of groups of bloggers to gather and publish e-zines (such as Cappuccino, a weekly e-zine with more than 50,000 visitors per month) based on their experiences as bloggers (http://hoder.com/weblog/archives/006659.html, last accessed 10 March 2007). 88
From Indirect to Direct Representation
It is as channels of honest self-presentation that blogs make their greatest contribution to democracy. If Walter Cronkite’s famous sign-off ‘That’s the way it is’ was the dictum of the world of media-represented factual certainties, ‘That’s the way I am’ is the dictum of a self-expressive culture where truth emerges in fragmented, subjective, incomplete and contestable ways. DEVELOPING THEORY – INTERROGATING PRACTICE
Our arguments so far have proceeded on the basis of normative theory, supported by empirical findings. We have stated that contemporary liberal democracies are blighted by communicative disconnections which have resulted in widespread public disengagement from politics as usually practiced. In theory, interactive, digital information and communication technologies would seem to offer promising ways of creating forms of political discourse consistent with democratic norms. Digital interactivity could facilitate political communication characterised by greater transparency and public co-presence, networked collective action, dialogical debate and individual self-representation, but whether it does so will need to be explored empirically. In the next two chapters we turn to such empirical investigation, examining case studies of specific attempts to use digital technologies to create a more direct form of representative democracy.
89
C H A P T E R 4
E-Democracy from Above
C
ommunicating with the public used to be a straightforward operation for governments, parliaments and local authorities. The communicative relationship was largely one-way, with the dissemination of minutes, official records, reports and memoranda being placed regularly within the public domain, usually to be read by a small audience of interested experts. For most citizens, communication with state bodies has tended to be conducted via post or telephone and has involved specific problems relating to their personal circumstances. At election time, publicity campaigns intensified this relationship of monological transmission, leaving citizens with little room to do anything in response except cheer, boo and vote. During the last decade these old communicative arrangements have come under pressure to change. As citizens begin to experience two-way relationships with other institutions – shops, travel agencies, banks, broadcasters, colleges and universities – there is an increasing expectation that those elected to represent and govern them will be both accessible and interactively accountable online. Most government departments and parliaments now have web sites, as do individual MPs and other elected representatives. But these tend to be little more than electronic brochures: accessible via the Internet, but not conforming to the interactive ethos of online communication. A number of innovative online projects have been initiated. One of the most radical, in terms of shifting the balance of power from the state to citizens, is the Estonian government’s TOM web site (TOM stands for ‘Today I Decide’). This allows Estonians to propose new laws which, if supported by a relatively small number of signatories, have to be considered and reported upon by the Estonian government. In the United Kingdom e-petitioning has been initiated, and there are proposals from both main parties to make it 90
E-Democracy from Above
compulsory for popular petition proposals to be debated in parliament. Several governments, parliaments and councils have established online consultation mechanisms to support them with policy-making. In 2001 the European Union established the Interactive Policy-Making Unit with a view to obtaining continuous access to the opinions and experience of EU citizens. In the United States the main focus has been upon e-rulemaking, which allows the public to search regulatory documents and submit comments electronically on proposed new rulings by government agencies. In many countries both national and local governments have run online consultations, designed to involve citizens, communities, businesses and pressure groups in policy-making and legislative processes (Gustafsson 2002; Jankowski and van Os 2002; Renton and Macintosh 2007; Coleman 2006; Delakorda 2007). The common feature of all these initiatives is that they were initiated, funded and managed by state bodies. We refer to these as examples of top-down e-participation, in contrast to other online projects that have come into being from beyond the state, which we refer to as e-participation from below. In this chapter we explore empirically two examples of top-down e-participation, and in Chapter 5 we present three empirical studies of e-participation from below. As we shall see, there is a thin line between these two categories, which should perhaps be conceived as a spectrum rather than being mutually exclusive. Our aim in both this and the next chapter is to understand how these initiatives have come about, what those who initiated them hoped to achieve and how far, if at all, they provide citizens with new democratic opportunities. At the end of this and the next chapter we draw attention to the limitations of the category that we have been exploring. In the final two chapters of the book we turn to questions of policy, arguing that the best aspects of both of these models should be incorporated in an effective strategy for e-democracy. CASE 1 – ONLINE PARLIAMENTARY CONSULTATIONS
A series of experiments in using the Internet to facilitate public input to the U.K. Parliament were launched in 1998. Since that time over 20 online consultations have been run by or on behalf of Parliament. Instead of simply creating a web forum and inviting the public to have its say, rather like an online phone-in programme, these consultations were designed to recruit participants with experience or expertise in relation to specific policy issues. For example, consultation forums 91
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
have been established to discuss policies on subjects as diverse as domestic violence, family tax credits, stem cell research, constitutional reform, hate crimes in Northern Ireland and the treatment of diabetes. The objectives of these online consultations were to do the following: Gather informed evidence from the public to help parliamentarians understand policy issues Recruit citizens whose evidence might be unheard or neglected in the usual course of parliamentary evidence-taking Enable participants to interact and learn from one another over an extended period of asynchronous discussion Enable participants to raise aspects of policies under discussion that might not otherwise have been considered Enable legislators to participate in the online discussion, raising questions and responding to citizens’ comments, as time permits Derive a fair, independent summary of views raised which can constitute official evidence to Parliament. We focus here upon two of these online parliamentary consultations: the Womenspeak consultation on domestic violence and the consultation on the draft Communications Bill. Both were set up, moderated and summarised by the Hansard Society, an independent, nonpartisan body that has been active in encouraging the British Parliament to use digital technologies in innovative ways. Womenspeak was commissioned by the All-Party Domestic Violence Group and was conducted over a one-month period in March 2000. The consultation on the draft Communications Bill occurred in May 2002, when a Joint Committee of MPs and peers was established to consider and report on this important piece of draft legislation. (Pre-legislative scrutiny is a post-1997 innovation introduced by the Modernisation Select Committee with a view to enabling parliamentarians to examine draft legislation before the ink is dry on the final Bill.) The Joint Committee introduced two important innovations into its proceedings: The public was able to see and hear all of its evidence sessions which were webcast live on Parliament’s own site, http://www.parliamentlive.tv, and broadcast on BBC Parliament the following weekend. In order to gather a wider range of views on the draft Bill, the Committee commissioned an online forum, under the auspices of the Hansard Society and the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, to accompany its formal evidence-taking. 92
E-Democracy from Above
The two consultations examined here contrasted in their purposes: the first was designed to enable women survivors of domestic violence to submit experiential testimony to a group of parliamentarians interested in developing policy; the second allowed the public to submit and discuss evidence for consideration by a committee of MPs and peers as part of the process of pre-legislative scrutiny. Demographic profiles of participants in both consultations were produced by examining user registration forms. All messages in both consultations were analysed by a team of trained coders. A post-consultation survey was sent to participants in both consultations, and face-toface interviews were conducted with participating MPs and peers. In c l u s i v e C o n s u l t a t i o n o r ‘T he Us u a l Su s p e c t s’?
Identifying survivors of domestic violence and persuading them to participate in an online parliamentary consultation is far from simple. Participants for this consultation were recruited by the Hansard Society in partnership with Women’s Aid, which has confidential access to a national network of local refuges, as well as women’s groups and disability groups. In October and November 1999, five months before the consultation began, it was announced via flyers in Women’s Aid newsletters. Other recruitment was conducted at a number of regional meetings across the United Kingdom. Most of the registration for the consultation was conducted face-to-face or by post. The Womenspeak consultation faced two initial problems: accessibility and security. Many women who were enthusiastic about participating had no access to or familiarity with the Internet. Fifty-two percent of the registered participants had no knowledge of using the Internet before they took part. Most of the participants were able to go online using computers in refuges (secure shelters provided for women who are at risk from domestic violence). This had several advantages: the personal and often distressing stories they had to tell could be recounted in friendly and familiar surroundings; there were trained workers to help them if they needed personal support during or after posting their messages; IT help was close at hand – 60 percent of the women reported needing help in getting to the consultation web site, and most of the time that was provided by refuge workers. A second problem concerned security. Had the participants been invited to attend Parliament to tell their stories and express their views, few would have gone. Parliament is an intimidating place, and most women would not want their names recorded as witnesses. Many of 93
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
the women thinking of participating in this consultation expressed concerns about the confidentiality of the online medium. This was particularly the case when they were sharing homes and/or computers with their abusers. In the consultation participants were given pseudonyms, assured that their real names (which were registered for purposes of authentication) would remain private and that the content of the online discussion would only be made available to other participants and the Hansard Society. According to the post-consultation survey, 85 percent of the participants felt that the web site was a safe and secure place. The Womenspeak forum recorded an average of 1,574 hits per day, with 78 users visiting the forum each weekday and 111 on weekends. Seventy-three percent of the participants visited the site at least six times; 18 percent visited at least 10 times. The average visitor session lasted 16 minutes and 31 seconds; 199 women registered and participated online, submitting 960 messages between them. Participants came from throughout England and Wales, with a demographically typical spread of ages and ethnic backgrounds. Six percent were registered disabled. Recruitment of participants for the draft Communications Bill consultation was much easier. The clerks of the Joint Committee provided the Hansard Society with a list of potential participants, including organisations from which the committee would like to have heard evidence had there been more time. In addition, other participants were recruited who were unknown to parliamentarians and could bring diverse as well as alternative perspectives to the consultation. The Communications Bill consultation web site recorded 1,949 hits per day, the average duration of which was 17 minutes and 12 seconds. An average of 85 people visited the site each weekday and 55 at weekends. Registration for this consultation was 373 people, but only 136 posted messages to the forum. In all 222 messages were posted. Unlike the domestic violence consultation, where the emphasis was upon sharing experiences, discussion and mutual support, in this consultation there was a more traditional focus upon influencing policy. Most of those who registered were either more interested in what others had to say or else felt that they would not be able to influence policy, so did not submit their own comments. Typical comments from registered non-posters in the post-consultation survey were ‘I preferred to watch the debate develop and take note of the points raised’ and ‘I did not submit a personal message mainly because I did not feel I knew enough about the topic, and time reasons’. 94
E-Democracy from Above
How politically engaged were these consultees prior to their involvement in this exercise? In the post-consultation surveys, participants were asked whether they had ever contacted an MP and whether they were members of a political party. A majority (58%) of Womenspeak participants had never been in contact with an MP, whereas for the Communications Bill consultation the number was just over one-third (38%). Ninety-six percent of Womenspeak participants and 78 percent of the participants in the Communications Bill consultation were not members of political parties, the usual point of entry for citizens to the policy process. Was it the case that participants in these consultations, while registering as individuals, were in fact representing interest groups? According to the post-consultation survey, 94 percent of the Womenspeak participants and 82 percent of the Communications Bill participants had no organisational affiliation related to the subject of the consultations. The majority of participants in both consultations lived outside of London: 77.5 percent for Womenspeak and 63 percent for the Communications Bill consultation. In the case of Womenspeak, which included many low-income participants and single mothers, the opportunity to take part in a parliamentary inquiry without travelling to London was a significant benefit. Although one might have expected Communications Bill consultees to be more able to visit Parliament in person, according to the post-consultation survey only 17 percent of registered participants ever attended Parliament to see the committee in session. (Twenty-seven percent watched at least one webcast of the committee in session, and 66 percent visited the committee’s web site.) This suggests that interactions which would not otherwise have taken place were facilitated by the creation of a space for online consultation. Cr e a t i n g an d C onnectin g Onli ne N et wor k s
There was a significant contrast in the extent of interaction between participants in the two consultations: in the Womenspeak forum over four-fifths (82%) of all messages were replies to previous messages; in the Communications Bill forum fewer than one in 10 (8%) messages were replies to previous messages. This reflects the sociable, networking character of the former consultation, as opposed to the more advocative nature of the latter forum. Many participants found the experience of interacting online with other survivors of domestic violence to be empowering in itself, regardless of their access to parliamentarians. As the one-month 95
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
consultation went on, Womenspeak participants increasingly used the forum to create an online community of mutual support, as well as engaging in a formal consultative exercise. Comments posted in the forum towards the end of the consultation indicated the extent to which a virtual community had been built: It was brilliant; I felt really close to the participants during the consultation as if I were part of a giant support network. Through this site I have built up so much strength by reading all your stories and I wish the best to every one out there and a big thank you to all that have worked tirelessly to get this site working every day. Let’s hope this isn’t the last. Thank you to everyone involved in this discussion. Thank you to all of you who have become friends to me. I never imagined feeling this sad at the end of this. I will miss you all and hope it is not too long until we are in touch again. Take care and stay safe. A majority of women (60%) reported in the post-consultation survey that participating in the forum helped them deal with their own experiences of domestic violence. As a result of networking online, some participants made contacts with one another in the offline world. In the post-consultation survey, 24 percent of participants reported making new contacts, and 92 percent reported learning something new as a result of reading other participants’ messages. Several of the participants were eager to continue the virtual network beyond the life of the parliamentary consultation and subsequently set up their own web site in which survivors’ stories and views could be exchanged. In the case of the Communications Bill consultation, there were fewer signs of community-building, related to the markedly lower level of online interaction between contributors to this forum. Nonetheless, in the post-consultation survey most (72%) participants (including majorities of both message posters and nonposters) claimed to have learned something new from reading messages from other participants. I n t e r a c t i o n w i t h Politi c al R ep r es e n t a t i v es
In the Womenspeak consultation forum 31 messages (3.2% of all) were contributed by six MPs. In the Communications Bill consultation forum eight messages (3.6% of all messages) were contributed by four MPs and peers. Despite the emphasis upon peer-to-peer communication in the Womenspeak forum, three-quarters of the participants 96
E-Democracy from Above
reported that a major reason for taking part was the opportunity to interact with MPs. In the post-consultation survey, however, 68 percent of Womenspeak participants stated that they did not consider that the MPs who took part were interested in what they had to say, and almost four out of 10 (39%) were not satisfied with the contributions from MPs. Nonetheless, perhaps surprisingly, 94 percent of participants considered that the online consultation was a worthwhile exercise, and 93 percent said that they would like to take part in future exercises of this kind. This suggests that participants measured success in terms of group networking more than political interaction. In the case of the Communications Bill consultation, a majority (53%) of participants were satisfied with the degree of involvement in the forum by MPs and peers on the committee considering the draft bill. One in four participants considered that the committee was interested in what they had to say; fewer than 3 percent disagreed, and the majority were unsure. But 72 percent considered the online consultation to have been worthwhile, 91 percent were in favour of there being more online parliamentary consultations and 87 percent said that they would definitely be prepared to participate in future online consultations – with the other 13 percent saying that they would possibly do so. These are mixed messages. Clearly, there was some concern amongst both groups of consultees about the extent of parliamentarians’ interest in what they had to say. If an objective of online consultations is to increase public trust in politicians as good listeners, the exercises reported here do not provide grounds for optimism. The parliamentarians who participated in the Womenspeak consultation expressed enthusiasm about its method of collecting evidence: ‘If you meet with a group in the constituency for 5–10 minutes you don’t always have sufficient time to listen to all the problems. This was a unique experience because you were able to listen to a dialogue for an extensive period of time’ (Linda Gilroy MP). But the length of the process proved difficult to integrate into already crowded schedules: I knew I had to do it because I had been asked to. But I had other commitments which I had to make time for as well. And my brief is actually Health . . . I guess it was worthwhile, but it was hard to find time to do it. It coincided with other commitments. (Caroline Spelman MP) 97
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
With the Internet format, people are used to immediate responses, but it does take time to change legislation. In that sense it isn’t an equal participation; a lot of women had this as their number one priority, whereas MPs work on a huge amount of other issues. And with the time you have it is not realistic to expect MPs to read all the contributions. (Julia Drown MP) Members of the committee examining the draft Communications Bill, from all parties, were enthusiastic about the exercise: The online consultation worked exceptionally well, and proved its worth as a vital tool in the democratic process. I am sure future committees will find it as invaluable as we did. The responses were of a very high quality, and gave us a real sense of public opinion across a wide range of issues. We should promote future fora as aggressively as possible to maximise participation. (Lord Puttnam, Chair of the Committee) It helped us change the questions we were asking the witnesses and made us focus on areas we would not necessarily have thought of. It tended either to reinforce something that we already knew or it changed questions that we would not otherwise have asked. (Brian White MP) It opens it up to a wider range of people to feed in ideas and opinions into the Parliamentary process. The fact that we were able to get ideas and opinions from the regions, particularly input on the importance of regional broadcasting, meant that the exercise was not restricted to Whitehall and Westminster. It allowed us to get on the road, electronically. The alternative would have been to hold a series of public meetings around the country. In my view, it was an advantage to the credibility of the committee and its work. One benefit of this consultation is reinforcing policies that are already well known and throwing up the concerns that may not previously have arisen. The argument against it is that you have to have the facility to participate in an online forum. (Lord McNally) We thought it worked very well – it clearly was popular, we had very substantial response, we had very good information and we incorporated some of the points that came out from the online forum in our recommendations. (Lord Crickhowell) 98
E-Democracy from Above
Evi dent ial Q uality
Traditionally, parliamentary inquiries select witnesses who are acknowledged experts, question them formally and minute their evidence, which is then used to determine and support recommendations. Online parliamentary consultations should fulfil the same purpose: the accumulation of high-quality evidence. Critics of online deliberation argue that that most policy issues are too complex and time-consuming for the public to give serious consideration to them. Much of the literature about online political discussion has been pessimistic about the quality of online discourse. Hill and Hughes, who conducted research on political chat rooms, concluded that ‘Chat rooms are a difficult format for thoughtful discussion. The short line space and the fast pace require people to make snap comments, not thoughtful ones’ (Hill and Hughes 1998: 130). Davis found, on the basis of his study of political Usenet groups, that ‘In Usenet political discussions, people talk past one another, when they are not verbally attacking each other. The emphasis is not problem solving, but discussion dominance. Such behaviour does not resemble deliberation and it does not encourage participation, particularly by the less politically interested’ (Davis 1999: 177). Wilhelm concluded from his research that ‘The sorts of virtual political forum that were analyzed do not provide viable sounding boards for signaling and thematising issues to be processed by the political system’ (Wilhelm 2000: 102). These are strangely noncontextualised accounts of online discussion. Chat rooms and political party discussion lists during election campaigns are hardly appropriate places to expect to find the discursive characteristics of democratic deliberation. The environment and structure of communication has a significant effect upon its content; synchronous chat rooms and peer-generated Usenet groups are no more indicative of the scope for online public deliberation than loud, prejudiced and banal political arguments in crowded pubs are indicative of the breadth of offline political discussion. Assessing the quality of public deliberation is particularly problematic, involving sensitive normative standards. Nonetheless, attempts have been made to design methodologies for measuring the quality of stated opinions (Price and Neijens 1997; Wyatt et al. 2000; Capella, Price and Nir 2002; Muhlberger 2000). Three rudimentary characteristics of deliberative quality were analysed in this study: the extent to which messages were supported by external information, the frequency of message posting and the level of interaction between 99
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
messages and previous messages. Normatively, one might expect a deliberative discourse to include widespread use of external information sources; nondomination by a minority of frequent posters, to the exclusion of other, less articulate or sociable prospective participants; and high levels of interaction between agenda-setting messages and responses. In submitting messages, participants could draw upon information from a number of external sources, including books, reports, newspaper articles and web sites, or upon self-referential information derived from personal experience. The use of external sources is commonly associated with the rational validation of evidence. In the Womenspeak consultation, one in three messages (32%) cited external sources of information. The fact that two-thirds of the messages did not go beyond personal testimony or opinion reflects the highly subjective nature of the experience of domestic violence. In the case of the Communications Bill consultation, nearly half of all messages (48%) referred to an external source, but fewer than one in 10 (7%) drew upon personal, anecdotal experience. Insofar as deliberative quality is dependent upon argument repertoires that extend beyond subjective experience, feelings or opinion, the majority of messages submitted to both consultations fell short of this standard, although a significant proportion of messages to both consultations were informed by external sources. In the Womenspeak consultation most participants (52%) submitted only one message; 90 percent submitted fewer than 10 messages; but 21 percent of all messages were submitted by just two participants, and a third were submitted by just 11 percent of the participants. Frequent posters were much more likely to be agenda-setters than onetime posters: 18 percent of messages to the consultation were classified as ‘seeds’ (they started a new discussion thread); of these, most were submitted by the minority of participants who were frequent posters. In the Communications Bill consultation 82 percent of participants submitted only one message. There were very few frequent posters (4%), and these contributed less than one in 10 messages. Rafaeli defines interactivity as ‘the extent to which messages in a sequence relate to each other, and especially the extent to which later messages recount the relatedness of earlier messages’ (Rafaeli 1988). Eighty-two percent of messages to Womenspeak responded in some way to a previous message in the forum. The extent of dialogue and information exchange in this forum was striking. In the Communications Bill 100
E-Democracy from Above
consultation only 14 percent of messages were responses to preceding messages. Participants in this forum were less interested in discussing others’ ideas than stating their own. The largest numbers of responses in the forum were to messages submitted by MPs. In this respect, there was a striking contrast in the degree of interaction between discussants in the two consultations under consideration. So m e Co n c l u s i o n s
The principal conclusion to be drawn from these case studies is that not all online parliamentary consultations are alike. Womenspeak was a relatively informal consultation designed to collect experiential evidence. The Communications Bill consultation was more closely connected to the legislative process and adopted a multimedia strategy for making this process more accessible to interested citizens. It would be a mistake to expect all online parliamentary consultations to perform the same functions or deliver the same results. These online consultations created a more inclusive environment for public deliberation. Most participants in both of them were not ‘the usual suspects’: party members, lobbyists or people who lived in or around the Westminster village. The voices heard in these consultation forums would probably not otherwise have been heard by parliamentarians. But online participation had to be actively promoted. In particular, the success of the Womenspeak consultation depended upon extensive outreach work, not least to overcome problems of digital exclusion. Despite the top-down character of these online consultations, they did serve to generate and connect networks of interest or practice. In both consultations a majority of participants claimed to have learned from other contributors. But, whereas participants in the Communications Bill consultation considered that the committee had been interested in what they had to say and that members of the committee had participated in a satisfactory way, Womenspeak participants tended to be unconvinced at the end of the consultation that MPs had been interested in what they had to say. Although it would be unwise to conclude from these case studies that parliamentary online consultations raise the quality of public deliberation, neither can the conclusion be drawn that online discourse is somehow doomed to ranting and prejudice. Although these findings are based upon elementary indicators of discursive quality, significant proportions of messages to both consultations 101
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
referred to external information; frequent posters did not dominate the discussion to the exclusion of others; and, in the case of the Womenspeak consultation, there was a high level of interactivity. These were, by almost any democratic standards, civilised and productive debates. CASE 2 – THE COMMUNITY CAMPAIGN CREATOR†
Our second case study was also initiated and funded by government: Bristol City Council, with a grant from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minster’s e-Innovations Fund. Unlike the parliamentary consultations, which sought to use the Internet to build vertical connections between elected representatives and citizens, this project aimed to give local people access to technologies with a view to encouraging an empowered notion of citizenship whereby, as well as occasionally voting, citizens are able to become effective ‘community campaigners’. Campaign Creator focused on engaging the civically unengaged and politically excluded, rather than serving already active citizens or community groups. As such, it constituted an attempt to redress asymmetries of access to political resources at the local level by democratising the ability that people have to raise their own agendas. The Project Initiation Document acknowledged that ‘there is an uneven playing field, as established community groups are likely to have greater access to resources and are therefore likely to be able to communicate their issues and concerns more effectively’. A member of the project team explained that: the role of a local authority is to be a community leader; it’s not simply to be a service provider. . . There is a role in helping those people who haven’t had much opportunity to make their voice heard, to bring their concerns forward. . . . It is easy for certain types of people from particular areas to impact the agenda because they’ve got access to resources; they know how things work, [they have] got personal contacts. So I think it’s our responsibility within the authority to bring forward those voices that perhaps aren’t heard quite so much. (Member of the Project Team) †
This case study is based upon an evaluation report commissioned by Bristol Council, produced by Stephen Coleman and Giles Moss.
102
E-Democracy from Above
Campaign Creator comprised four key resources: The Community Campaign Manager – A hosted web application and online campaign management tool. The application was designed to allow first-time campaigners to develop their own web sites e-newsletters, online surveys and e-petitions. It also allows campaigners to create offline campaigning materials, such as leaflets and posters, thus combining the online and offline aspects of campaigning. The Community Campaign Guide – A booklet, available in print and online formats, providing written guidance for those who are new to campaigning. It covers all ‘the information you need to launch, organise and publicise a community campaign’. It comprises case studies and interviews drawn from successful campaigns and an introduction to how the formal democratic process works. The Community Campaign web site – A central hub for the project that provides a gateway to the Community Campaign Manager and access to the Community Campaign Guide. It also includes discussion forums for campaigners to contribute thoughts and share advice with one another. Community Campaign Coaching – In order to develop links with citizens who might want to engage politically, but lack skills, resources or confidence, the Campaign Creator project funded the Scarman Trust, a charitable organisation that specialises in the field of citizen empowerment, to run an innovative ‘campaign coaching’ course. Four part-time, paid campaign coaches worked regularly with people in some of the most deprived areas of Bristol, helping them to think through issues of local concern and consider how to organise together in order to take effective action to address these issues. In our interviews with them, the project managers were eager to define community campaigning as being distinct from ‘political’ or ‘marketing’ campaigns, as well as from ‘national’ or ‘international’ campaigns. According to them, community campaigning refers to campaigns that concern an issue, idea, proposal, policy or action relevant to a local geographical area or a community of interest. This definition formed part of the terms and conditions for use of the web site: A ‘community campaign’ in the context of this project is recognised to be separate from: (1) A ‘political campaign’ (which is primarily concerned with securing stated party political objectives or has the aim of securing political office); (2) A ‘marketing campaign’ (whose 103
The Internet and Democratic Citizenship
primary objective is increasing take up of a specific product or service) and; (3) A ‘national’ or ‘international’ campaign (whose initial intent is to operate over the widest geographical area). (http:// www.campaigncreator.org/about/terms_conditions.html) The citizenship skills that Community Campaign Creator aimed to encourage were of a very specific kind. In our interviews we endeavoured to discover how this conception of active citizenship was understood and promoted by those involved in the project. First, the project initiators were eager to promote what they called ‘constructive citizenship’. The meaning of this term is aptly captured in the slogans used to publicise the Campaign Creator project: ‘Don’t just Complain, Campaign!’ or ‘You Can Do It!’ Community campaigning was seen as a means by which citizens could assume responsibility and take a more active role in their locality. Community campaigners were seen as those citizens willing to assume a responsible role in deciding upon and bringing about change for themselves. In this process, it was argued, they gain confidence as the local authority provides them with the support for doing what they could not have done through their own efforts alone. The Leader of Bristol City Council described the need for such an approach as follows: ‘Quite a lot of people are quite good at shouting and saying, you know, “the Council should be doing this, that and the other”. What we’re short of is people saying, “this is what needs to be done and I’m prepared to take a lead on it, if you’ll support me”’ (Council Leader, Bristol City Council). Second