The Grammar of Identity: Intensifiers and Reflexives in Germanic Languages (Routledge Studies in Germanic Linguistics)

The Grammar of Identity English self-forms and related words from other Germanic languages (e.g. Dutch zelf, Swedish själv, etc.) are used in two different functions: as ‘intensifiers’ (e.g. The president himself made the decision) and as markers of reflexivity (John criticized himself). On the basis of a comparative syntactic and semantic analysis, this book addresses the question of why two such apparently different functions can be expressed by the same word. This question is answered by showing that both intensifying and reflexive self-forms can be analysed as expressing the concept of ‘identity’. In the first part of The Grammar of Identity, the most central facts concerning the distribution of intensifiers in Germanic languages are surveyed and a detailed syntactic and semantic analysis is provided. It is shown that all instances of intensifiers can be analysed as expressions of an identity function. The second part of the book offers an analysis of reflexive self-forms which is based on recent theories of reflexivity, modifying these in some important respects. In particular, the distribution of reflexive self-forms is explained with reference to semantic properties of the sentential environment. In this way, it can be shown that reflexive self-forms—like intensifiers— can be analysed as expressions of an identity function. In addition to providing a thorough comparative description of the hitherto poorly described area of intensifiers in Germanic languages, this book offers an answer to a long standing question in descriptive and theoretical linguistics, namely why self-forms are used in two apparently different functions. By combining analytical methods from syntax, lexical semantics and sentence semantics the study moreover contributes to an understanding of the interaction between structure, meaning and context in a central area of lexico-grammar. Volker Gast is currently a researcher and lecturer at the Free University of Berlin. His research interests include language comparison, the semantics of function words and the syntax-semantics interface.

Routledge Studies in Germanic Linguistics Edited by Ekkehard König and Johan van der Auwera Free University Berlin, Germany and Antwerp University, Belgium 1 Negative Contexts Collocation, polarity and multiple negation Ton van der Wouden 2 When-Clauses and Temporal Structure Renaat Declerck 3 The Meaning of Topic and Focus The 59th Street bridge accent Daniel Büring 4 Aspectual Grammar and Past-Time Reference Laura A.Michaelis 5 The Grammar of Irish English Language in Hibernian style Markku Filppula 6 Intensifiers—a Comparison of English and German Peter Siemund 7 Stretched Verb Constructions in English David Allerton 8 Negation in Non-Standard British English Gaps, regularizations and asymmetries Lieselotte Anderwald 9 Language Processing in Discourse A key to felicitous translation Monika Doherty 10 Pronominal Gender in English Peter Siemund 11 The Grammar of Identity Intensifiers and reflexives in Germanic languages Volker Gast

The Grammar of Identity Intensifiers and reflexives in Germanic languages

Volker Gast

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa Business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2006 Volker Gast All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gast, Volker The grammar of identity: Intensifiers and reflexives in Germanic languages/ Volker Gast p. cm. 1. Germanic languages—Pronoun. 2. Germanic languages—Reflexives. 3. Germanic languages—Intensification. 4. Grammar, Comparative and general— Reflexives. 5. Grammar, Comparative and general—Intensification. I. Title PD 261.G37 2006 430’.0455–dc22 2006010657 ISBN 0-203-96618-X Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-39411-2 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 978-0-415-39411-6

To the memory of my gradmother Carlota Gast

Contents List of tables

viii

List of figures

x

Acknowledgements

xi

Abbreviations and glosses 1 Introduction

xiii 1

2 The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent SELF

23

3 Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

38

4 The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

69

5 Combinatorial properties of head-distant intensifiers

108

6 The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

130

7 Reflexivity and the identity function

170

8 The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages

215

Notes

239

Sources

248

References

250

Indices Author index

260

Language index

265

Subject index

267

Tables 1.1

Intensifiers and reflexives in Germanic languages

2

2.1

The inflectional paradigm of Swedish själv-

27

2.2

Position and inflection of intensifiers in Germanic languages

31

4.1

Typology of adverbials according to Ernst (2002:10)

75

4.2

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers in Germanic languages

106

5.1

Distributional restrictions on intensifiers in English

129

7.1

Chomsky’s typology of NPs

180

7.2

Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993:659) typology of pronouns

183

7.3

Tableau: Johni föredrar PRONi

201

7.4

Tableau: Johni betraktar PRONi som expert

202

7.5

3SG-pronouns of Dutch

204

7.6

Tableau: Jani haat PRON(i)

210

7.7

Tableau: Jani wast PRON(i)

211

7.8

Tableau: Jani zette de vaas voor PRON(i) neer

213

7.9

Tableau: Jani voelde PRON(i) wegglijden

213

8.1

3SG-pronouns of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish

217

8.2

Tableau: Huni elsker PRON(i)

218

8.3

3SG-pronouns of Icelandic and Faroese

219

8.4

3SG-pronouns of German

222

8.5

Tableau: three German sentences

223

8.6

3SG-pronouns of Afrikaans and Frisian

224

8.7

Tableau: three Frisian sentences

225

8.8

3SG-pronouns of Old English

231

8.9

3SG-pronouns of Modern English

236

8.10 Tableau: three English sentences

236

8.11 Basic systems of reflexive-marking in Germanic languages

238

Figures 1.1 The syntactic positions of intensifiers

8

4.1 Tree diagrams:…dass ich selbst ’n Kuchen backen kann

79

4.2 The syntactic derivation of INSELF and EXSELF

94

6.1 Typology of ‘secondary propositional relations’

155

6.2 Tree diagram: Mary wrote this memo herself

161

6.3 The syntax of exclusive SELF according to Hole (2002a)

164

7.1 Faltz’s (1985) typology of nominal reflexives

174

7.2 Structural configurations in sentence-mate antecedence

178

7.3 A typology of locality relations

179

7.4 The structure of himself (Reinhart & Reuland 1993:286)

188

7.5 Theta-identification

189

7.6 Tree diagram: Lucie adores herself

190

7.7 Kiparsky’s (2002:201) typology of pronouns

198

7.8 The structure of zichzelf

210

7.9 Tree diagram: Jan haat zichzelf

211

Acknowledgements This study is a considerably revised version of my PhD thesis on The Grammar of Identity—Intensifies and Reflexives as Expressions of an Identity Function, which was finished in October 2002 and defended in January 2003 at the Free University of Berlin. My thesis deals with the very general question of why intensifiers and reflexives are formally indistinguishable in so many languages of the world. While most of the arguments are made using English data, evidence from a considerable number of other languages is taken into consideration as well. Since the study was not intended as a comprehensive typological survey, however, I did not use a balanced sample of languages to make any statistical statements. Nor did I primarily aim to find implicational generalizations or universals. After a first round of reviewing, I noticed that the book was somewhat eclectic from an empirical point of view, and that it was advisable to focus on a particular group of languages if I was to address a wider readership than just reflexive lovers and people interested in intensifiers. Given that the study was biased towards Germanic languages anyway, I decided to throw most of the non-Germanic material overboard. This gave the manuscript a completely new orientation. While my dissertation deals with a very general, basically onomasiological, question (‘Why are intensifiers and reflexives formally identical in many languages?’), the present book has gradually turned into a semasiological study on the family of SELF-forms in Germanic languages. Since I came up with some new ideas during the process of revision, a number of new arguments have been introduced as well. The result is probably more than a ‘revised version’ of my dissertation—as said above, it is at least a considerably revised version, and it may even be considered a completely new book. Once again, I would like to use the opportunity to say thanks to all those who have contributed to the realization of this work. First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor Ekkehard König, who encouraged my interest in intensifiers and suggested the topic of this study. I owe him a great debt of gratitude for introducing me into this fascinating domain of grammar and for sharing his knowledge with me. He has also given me the opportunity to earn my living doing linguistics and provided me with empathetic guidance and helpful advice. I hope that some of his profound linguistic knowledge has found its way into this study. Speaking of linguistic instruction, I would also like to thank my first academic teacher Walter Bisang. His knowledge of the most diverse languages as well as his acquaintance with the different linguistic theories have been a stimulus and guideline for me ever since I became a linguist. I should also take this opportunity to once again say thanks for the countless hours he spent together with me looking at Tzotzil and Zoque data, and for all the other support that I have received from him since I first met him in 1995. All members of our research group working on intensifiers have contributed to this work. Michael Cysouw and Matthias Hüning have kindly helped me with data from Dutch. For information on Swedish I thank Kersti Börjars, Anders Ahlqvist, Tore

Otterup, Eva Nyman, Harald Hammarström, Eva Lindström, Jan Kickert, Anna Bernhem, Karin Friberg, Lilian Nygren-Junkin, Jan Anward, and especially Susanna Karlsson. I had the opportunity to discuss some of the points made in this study with proponents of Integrational Linguistics, and I am indebted to Hans-Heinrich Lieb, Monika Budde and Sebastian Drude for inspiring discussion. Moreover, I have greatly benefited from comments made by three anonymous referees. Florian Haas and Rowan Payton have taken it upon themselves to read and comment on the revised version of the manuscript. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the following copyright holders for permission to include illustrations from their products or publications: Akademie Verlag Berlin, MIT Press and Maggie Browning. Special thanks go to Peter Siemund. When I started working on intensifiers, he had already written a book on this topic, and I have greatly benefited from his work. His help, advice, and friendship have been invaluable for me. Studying linguistics—let alone writing this dissertation—would not have been possible without a lot of moral and financial support from my family. My parents Heinrich and Elvira Gast have generously helped whenever help was necessary. It goes without saying that my wife Mónica has had a large share in realizing this work. Furthermore, I would like to thank our daughters Stephanie and Nayeli for giving me happiness and joy every single day of the year, and for being so understanding and patient with me. Finally, special mention must be made of my colleague Daniel Hole. I would hardly have been able to complete this work without his support, help, and friendship. In the three years during which we shared our office, Daniel never hesitated to read and comment on what I had produced, and to unsparingly criticize every single detail that was not as it should be. Since it is hard to put my gratitude into words, let me simply say, once again: Thanks for everything! Berlin, January 2006

Abbreviations and glosses ABL

ablative

ACC

accusative

ADSELF

head-adjacent SELF

ANPH

anaphor

B(IN)D(OM)

BINDING DOMAIN

CP

Complementizer Phrase

DEF

definite

DET

determiner

DP

Determiner Phrase

EXSELF

exclusive SELF

FEC

FEATURAL ECONOMY

FEM

feminine gender

FIN-BOUND

finite-bound

FinP

Finite(ness) Phrase

ForceP

Force Phrase

GEN

genitive

I(NFL)

Inflection(al node)

INSELF

inclusive SELF

INT

intensifier

IP

Inflectional Phrase

LOC(AL)

local

MASC

masculine gender

MEC

MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY

NEUT

neuter gender

NOM

nominative

NP

Noun Phrase

OBV

obviative

*ODBIND

*OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING

OPT

optative

POSS

possessor

PP

Prepositional Phrase

PREP

preposition

PRES

present tense

PTCL

particle

R-DEP

referentially dependent

RECIP

reciprocal

REFL

reflexive

SBJ

subjunctive

SG

singular

SUBJ

subject

TP

Tense Phrase

UT

uter gender

VP/vP

Verb Phrase

1 Introduction The self is a relation that relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself; the self is not the relation but the relation’s relating to itself. (Søren Kierkegaard, Sygdommen til Døden)1 1.1 SELF-forms in Germanic languages Most Germanic languages have INTENSIFIERS that have developed from the reconstructed Proto-Germanic form *selba-. In using the term ‘intensifier’ I refer to DPadjuncts like English herself in Icelandic sjálfur in and Gothic silba in The generic label SELF will be used for any element etymologically related to those items. The small caps in SELF are intended to indicate that this term refers to (elements from) a family of expressions, rather than any lexical item in particular. English His target was the Court rather than the Queen herself: ‘the Queen’s entourage’, he wrote, ‘are almost without exception the “tweedy” sort.’ [BNC ADB 63] Icelandic konungurinn

sjálfur,

þjónar

hans

og

lýður

hans

the king

SELF.NOM.SG

servants

his

and

people

his

‘the king himself, his servants and his people’ [IceBib Jeremia 22, 4] Gothic …ak

silba

atta

frijoþ

izwis,

unte

jus

mik

frijodeduþ…

…for

SELF

father

loves

you

because

you

me

loved

‘…for the father himself loves you because you have loved me…’ [Wf. John 16, 27]

The term ‘intensifier’, first used by Moravcsik (1972), has in recent times established 2 Alternative itself as a standard term for expressions like the ones illustrated in labels commonly applied to this family of expressions include ‘emphatic reflexives’ (or simply ‘emphatics’) and ‘intensive pronouns’.3 Intensifiers can best be defined in terms

The grammar of identity

2

of their semantic and prosodic properties. They are invariably focused and thus stressed, and their function is to oppose a referent x to a set of alternative referents A={y1, y2,…yn} in such a way that all elements yi of A can be identified relative to x (cf. Chapter 3). For is opposed to the Queen’s entourage, and konungurinn

example, the Queen herself in

is paradigmatically related to pjónar hans (‘his

sjálfur (‘the king himself’) in

illustrates an idiomatic use in which an servants’) and lýður hans (‘his people’). intensifier is attached to a DP with a particularly ‘important’ referent. In addition to functioning as intensifiers, SELF-forms are used as markers of reflexivity in most Germanic languages. REFLEXIVES can loosely be defined as elements indicating that two arguments of a predicate, or two terms co-occurring in a local environment, refer to the same individual (cf. Chapter 7 of this study). In (standard) English, SELF has fused with a pronoun of either the anaphoric or the possessive series (him-self and my-self respectively), thus developing into a marker of reflexivity (cf. ). In (West) Frisian and Afrikaans, the relevant SELF-forms combine with a plain object ), and in Scandinavian pronoun to indicate reflexivity (cf. the Afrikaans example in languages as well as in Dutch SELF is used in combination with an ANAPHOR deriving ). The intensifiers and reflexives from Proto-Germanic *sik (cf. the Dutch example in of some major contemporary Germanic languages are listed in Table 1.1.4 The table is ordered according to whether (i) intensifiers and reflexives are identical (English), (ii) intensifiers form part of the reflexive markers (‘formal similarity’, as in Low German and Scandinavian), or (iii) both expressions are completely unrelated (German, Yiddish). In the second group, the SELF-component is put in parentheses because it is required only in specific types of contexts (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). English John likes himself. Afrikaans Dié

vroumens

praat

te

veel

oor

haar-self.

that

woman

talks

too

much

about

her-SELF

‘That woman talks too much about herself.’ (Donaldson 1993:292) Dutch Jan

haatte

zich-zelf.

John

hated

ANPH-SELF

‘John hated himself.’

language

intensifier

reflexive

identity

English

him-/herself

him-/herself

similarity

Afrikaans

self

hom (self)/haar (self)

Introduction

differentiation

3

West Frisian

sels

him (sels)/har (sels)

Dutch

zelf

zich (zelf)

Danish

selv

sig (selv)

Dano-Norwegian

selv

seg (selv)

New Norwegian

sjølv

seg (sjølv)

Swedish

själv

sig (själv)

Faroese

sjálv-

seg (sjálv-)

Icelandic

sjálf-

(sjálf-) sig

German

selbst

sich

Yiddish

aleyn/gufe

zikh

Table 1.1: Intensifiers and reflexives in Germanic languages In some Germanic languages SELF is also used as an anaphoric marker of token identity. This applies to German selb- as well as to Old English self-/ sylf-. Even though such adjectives will not figure centrally in this study, their meaning will be shown to be closely related to intensification and reflexivity, since all of these expressions are associated with the notion of ‘identity’. German Ich

habe

den

selben

Anwalt

wie

Bill

Clinton.

I

have

the

same

lawyer

as

Bill

Clinton

‘I have the same lawyer as Bill Clinton.’ Old English ðū

eart

se

sylfa

God

ðe

ūs

ādrife

fram

dōme.

you

are

the

same

God

that

us

drive away

from

justice

‘You are the same God that chased us away from justice.’ [Ps. Th. 107, 10]

1.2 The meaning of SELF As illustrated above, SELF is used both as an intensifier and as a marker of reflexivity. Given that this pattern is found in approximately half of the world’s languages (cf. König and Siemund 2005), the question arises: what is the common denominator underlying both types of expressions? The central questions to be addressed in this study are summarized in

and an answer to these questions is given in

The grammar of identity

4

The problem stated: a. Why are the various SELF-morphemes of Germanic languages used as both intensifiers and reflexives? b. Is there a basic meaning of SELF that allows us to derive both its intensifying and its reflexive function? The answer given in this study: Both intensifying and reflexive SELF are expressions of an identity function, i.e. a function that maps a given input value onto an identical output value.

The role of the identity function in the encoding of reflexivity and intensification can be described as follows: the identity function, which we will abbreviate ‘ID’, takes an entity x as its argument and maps it onto an output value that is identical to the input: ID(x)=x. Given that such a meaning is truth-conditionally trivial, it becomes relevant only through interaction with other components of grammar, and this is where intensifiers and reflexives differ: when used as an intensifier, the identity function interacts with focus structure and relates a given referent to a specific set of alternative referents. When functioning as a reflexive marker, the identity function prevents the violation of a syntactic rule relating to the interpretation of the arguments associated with a given predicate. Consequently, the common denominator of intensification and reflexivemarking is that both operations can be carried out using the same lexical item, namely, a truth-conditionally trivial function whose output is identical to the input. The difference lies in the semantic effects which the identity function triggers at the level of sentence interpretation in interaction with other components of grammar. 1.2.1 The identity function as an intensifier The role of the identity function ID in the context of intensification can be characterized like this (cf. Eckardt 2001; Hole 2002a; Chapter 3 of this study): ID takes a nominal denoting an individual x as its argument and maps it onto itself: ID(x)=x. For example, the DP in is interpreted as shown in the function ID in the semantic representation. a.

[DP the president himself]

b.

ID (the president)=the president

The intensifier himself corresponds to

The operation illustrated in appears not to be truth-conditionally meaningful. However, the identity function becomes highly significant when it interacts with focus structure. The crucial detail of the analysis to be defended in this study is the assumption that the intensifier is the only component of a sentence which is in focus. The effect of such focusing is the evoking of a set of alternative functions which are of the same semantic type as the identity function, that is, a set of alternative functions from

Introduction

5

individuals to individuals. As shown in the DP the president himself is interpreted as ‘ID(the president)’ (read: ‘ID of the president’). Since the identity function is in focus, it evokes a set of alternative functions which are of the same type as ID (OF)—for example ‘SPOKESMAN (OF)’ or ‘SECRETARY (OF)’—while the argument of the different functions—the president—remains constant. Consequently, the president [himself]F can be opposed to the president’s [spokesman]F or the president’s [secretary]F. The paradigmatic relationship holding between the identity function on the one hand and other functions from individuals to individuals on the other can be represented as in

1.2.2 The identity function as a marker of reflexivity When functioning as a marker of reflexivity, the identity function ID does not interact with focus structure, but with syntactic rules concerning the interpretation of the arguments of a given predicate. Following König and Siemund (2000a), I will assume that the transitive predicates of Germanic languages are classified into two distributional classes: (i) ‘typically other-directed’ predicates, and (ii) ‘typically self-directed’ predicates. Typically other-directed predicates do not allow any of their internal arguments to be bound by the local subject. In other words, binding of an object pronoun by a co-argument subject is prohibited. The identity function, lexically represented by the relevant SELF-morpheme, is used to prevent the violation of this syntactic constraint. For example, the Dutch sentence in is ungrammatical because the verb haten ‘hate’ belongs to those verbs whose object may not be syntactically bound by the local subject (typically other-directed verbs). In the anaphor zich does not itself occupy the object position, but is embedded under a SELF-morpheme, which is interpreted as the identity function ID. As a consequence, binding of zich by the local subject Jan becomes possible, since zich is no longer in the object position of the predicate haat. Rather, it takes the position of the determiner his in a sentence like Johni loves [hisi wife] (cf. Safir 1996 for a similar argument). In this position, determiners are typically interpreted as being co-referential with the local subject. Consequently, what the identity function does is ‘shift’ the object DP to a different structural position, thus allowing it to be bound by the local subject without changing its referential interpretation.

The grammar of identity

6

Dutch a.

*Jan

haat

zich.

Jan

hates

ANPH

→Jan and zich are co-arguments; binding is prohibited b.

Jan

haat

Jan

hates

[zich-zelf]. [ANPH-SELF]

‘Jan hates himself.’ →Jan and zich are not co-arguments; binding is possible

I regard the aforementioned constraint on the referential interpretation of specific argument positions as an instance of ‘functionally motivated’ grammaticalization (‘diachronic adaptation’; see for example Haspelmath 1999, 2004; Kirby 1999; Croft 2000, forthcoming). The interaction of verbal meanings with the interpretation of object pronouns will be captured within the framework of Optimality Theory.5 1.3 Three use types of intensifiers It is one of the most salient properties of intensifying SELF-forms that they exhibit a considerable degree of positional variability. Consider the English examples given in

a. The minister’s assessment of the scientific data, like that of Gwyneth Dunwoody, a Labour MP, was aptly described by the Minister himself in the parliamentary debate of 27 January 1983. [BNC B73 1364] b. Then he carefully removed the clothes, not relying on an assistant but doing it himself. [BNC CAM 2072] c. If the baby’s grandmother is young and has young children herself they may all be brought up together, just like one generation. [BNC FUI 1005]

As is illustrated by the interpretation of an intensifier varies with its syntactic position. When forming a constituent together with a DP (or NP) as in intensifiers interact with the referential interpretation of that DP and they can approximately be paraphrased by no one other than.

and

differ from

in that himself occurs at a distance from its head DP. In it emphasizes that the action under discussion was carried out by the subject referent, and not by someone other than that referent. A near synonym would be alone or without help in this case. In

Introduction

7

the interpretation of himself is, again, different, and more or less appropriate paraphrases could be provided using additive particles like also or too. In several publications, Ekkehard König and Peter Siemund have used the following terminology:6 occurrences of himself as in intensifiers’, those like himself in

have been referred to as ‘adnominal have been called ‘adverbial-exclusive

as ‘adverbial-inclusive intensifiers’, and instances of himself as the one in intensifiers’. In the present study, I will make the same three-way distinction between the use types of intensifiers illustrated above, but I will use a slightly different terminology. The reason is that the syntactic analysis to be presented in this study does not allow us to consider any type of intensifier to be an ‘adverbial’ element. I take it that sall use types of intensifiers are basically ‘adnominal’, the difference being that some of them are also adjacent to their head DP, while others occur at a distance from it. Accordingly, I will differentiate between ‘head-adjacent’ intensifiers on the one hand (König and Siemund’s ‘adnominal intensifiers’) and ‘head-distant’ ones on the other (König and Siemund’s ‘adverbial intensifiers’). Among the head-distant uses of intensifiers I make the same distinction as König and Siemund, that is, I distinguish between ‘exclusive head-distant intensifiers’ and ‘inclusive head-distant intensifiers’. For the sake of simplicity, I will generally drop the adjective ‘head-distant’ when either of the terms ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ is used, since ‘exclusive’ or ‘inclusive’ intensifiers are by definition also ‘head-distant’. The following abbreviations will be used: ADSELF for head-adjacent SELF, EXSELF for exclusive (head-distant) SELF, and INSELF for inclusive SELF.7 In addition to the question of why intensifiers and reflexives are formally identical or at least related in most Germanic languages, one of the central issues addressed in this study is how the three uses of intensifiers distinguished above can be related to one another. For a syntactic and semantic analysis of head-distant intensifiers we first need a diagnostic to distinguish between exclusive and inclusive SELF. A first, intuitive approximation to this distinction can be achieved using the aforementioned paraphrases: alone/by -self for exclusive intensifiers, and too/also for inclusive ones. However, there are also distributional characteristics distinguishing both use types from each other, a fact that will be elaborated in Chapter 4. One of the most salient differences is that exclusive intensifiers are always in the scope of sentence negation, whereas inclusive intensifiers are always outside the scope of sentence negation. This can be illustrated using the examples and

and

above, whose negated counterparts are (partially) given in

respectively.8

a. …relying on an assistant and not doing it himself (≈alone). …rely on an assistant and NOT: do it HIMSELF (EXSELF) b. If she does not have young children herself…(≈either). If she has that property HERSELF: NOT have young children… (INSELF)

The syntactic differences between exclusive and inclusive SELF will be explicated as follows: exclusive SELF is properly contained in the Verb Phrase,9 whereas inclusive SELF is located outside the Verb Phrase. In Chapter 4, I will present evidence of three

The grammar of identity

8

types to support this assumption: (i) exclusive SELF, but not inclusive SELF, is always ccommanded by and in the scope of VP-external adverbials; (ii) only exclusive SELF can be left-dislocated together with a Verb Phrase; and (iii) exclusive SELF can form part of deverbal nouns and adjectives while this is not possible with inclusive SELF.

Figure 1.1: The syntactic positions of intensifiers As far as the syntax of head-adjacent intensifiers is concerned, I follow Siemund (2000) in regarding head-adjacent SELF as forming an endocentric expansion of an NP/DP. The three use types of intensifiers can consequently be characterized syntactically as shown in Figure 1.1 (note that the order of intensifiers and their sister constituents may vary from one language to another, and sometimes even within languages; cf. Chapters 2 and 4). As for the semantics of head-distant intensifiers, I will argue that they can also be analysed as expressions of an identity function. I will aim to show that the differences in interpretation can straightforwardly be related to structural properties of the relevant use types. By way of focusing, an intensifier introduces different types of alternative values, depending on its position in the sentence: head-adjacent SELF makes reference to alternative referents; exclusive SELF relates a given event description to alternative descriptions of the same event token; finally, inclusive SELF opposes a given event token to an alternative token of the same event type (cf. Chapter 6). What all intensifiers have in common is that they denote the identity function ID, and that they contrast with alternative functions that map their argument onto an output value which is different from the input. 1.4 The structure of the book The remainder of this introductory chapter is dedicated to a discussion of previous approaches towards a unified analysis of intensifiers and reflexives. Chapter 2 summarizes the distribution of head-adjacent SELF in Germanic languages. A semantic analysis of head-adjacent SELF as an expression of an identity function is offered in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 the syntax of head-distant SELF in German, Swedish and English is described and a derivational analysis is proposed. Semantic and pragmatic aspects of the distribution of head-distant SELF are addressed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a semantic analysis of head-distant SELF which is based on the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 7 deals with the role of the identity function in the encoding of reflexivity and establishes a framework accounting for the distribution of pronouns in Germanic

Introduction

9

languages. In Chapter 8 this framework is applied to the Germanic languages under discussion in this study. 1.5 Previous analyses: an overview Previous attempts to explain the tight empirical relationship between intensifiers and reflexives can be grouped into two major categories: (i) those approaches that regard this relationship only as a diachronic one (intensifiers >reflexives), and (ii) those accounts which regard intensifiers and reflexives as also being synchronically related. The relevant and

hypotheses are listed in

respectively. In Sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2, the

diachronic and synchronic hypotheses sketched in turn.

and

will be considered in

Diachronic explanations a. Intensifiers often develop into reflexive markers because they trigger a conversational implicature which gives rise to a reflexive interpretation of an object pronoun (cf. Faltz 1985; Levinson 1991). b. Intensifiers often develop into reflexive markers because they characterize the referent of an object pronoun as the ‘central’ participant in an event, thus indicating that this referent is identical to the subject referent, which likewise has a central status (cf. König and Siemund 2000a). Synchronic explanations a. Intensifiers and reflexives are formally identical in many languages because both expressions can be analysed as pronominal elements that need to be bound by a local antecedent (cf. Hall 1965; Moyne 1971; Cantrall 1973). b. Both intensifiers and reflexives are interpreted as binary predicates denoting the relation of identity (cf. Browning 1993). c. Intensifiers may function as reflexive markers because they are used to ‘protect’ the object pronoun from being co-indexed with the local subject, thus preventing a violation of Binding Principle B10 (cf. Jayaseelan 1997; Reuland 2001).

1.5.1 Diachronic explanations It is well known that intensifiers often develop into reflexive markers. The historical details of that process are well documented for a number of languages, most notably for English (cf. Faltz 1985; König and Siemund 2000a; van Gelderen 2000; Keenan 2002 as well as relevant references cited there). However, the different accounts vary with regard to the explanation of how and why intensifiers develop into reflexive pronouns. The central question that has to be answered is: how can the contribution made by an intensifier to the interpretation of a pronoun trigger a reflexive interpretation of that pronoun?

The grammar of identity

10

Intensifiers, reflexives and conversational inferencing The first explanation to be discussed in this section, sketched in above, regards the reflexivizing effect of intensifiers as the result of a conversational implicature. An argument along these lines has been made by Faltz (1985). Faltz points out that ‘in the case of a predication involving more than one argument, the unmarked situation is for different arguments to have disjoint referents’ (Faltz 1985:241f.). This hypothesis is also known in linguistic literature as the ‘Disjoint Reference Presumption’, a term coined by Farmer and Harnish (1987:557). As to the function of intensifiers, Faltz holds the view that ‘an emphatic is added to an NP as a warning to the hearer that the intended referent of that NP is unusual or unexpected’ (Faltz 1985:240). The reflexivizing function of intensifiers (or ‘emphatics’) is explained as follows: if an intensifier is used in combination with an object pronoun, this is understood as a signal to the hearer ‘that the more highly marked, less expected situation is present, namely, that the NP (argument) in question has the same referent as another one in the same predication’ (Faltz 1985:242). By way of grammaticalization, this inference can lead to the development of ‘true’ reflexive pronouns: Comparing emphatics with reflexives, we see that the change from the former to the latter consists just of the grammaticalization of the instructions for finding the referent. An emphatic carries a semantic instruction: look for the unlikely referent. A reflexive carries a syntactic instruction: look for the NP which commands us (which is to our left, which is in our clause, etc.). (Faltz 1985:241) One of the most significant problems of Faltz’s account is his analysis of the meaning of intensifiers: as will be detailed in Section 3.5.1, it is not the case that intensifiers mark their head NP as having an unexpected referent. This can be illustrated with As might be expected, he himself [Richard Baxter] assembled an extensive and dearly prized collection which, even after losses due to removals and distraints, still numbered over 1,400 volumes at his death. [www]11

A proposal similar to Faltz’s has been put forward by Levinson (1991). Like Faltz (1985), Levinson holds that the arguments of transitive predicates are typically disjoint in reference (Farmer and Harnish’s 1987 ‘Disjoint Reference Presumption’). However, Levinson emphasizes the role of the morphological complexity exhibited by intensified pronouns, rather than their function or meaning. He explains the historical change leading from intensifiers to reflexives in terms of an inference which is based on the Gricean maxim of manner (in particular, ‘be brief!’). Levinson calls this implicature ‘Mimplicature’ (‘M’ for manner). If the speaker chooses the (morphologically) complex intensifier construction instead of the simple pronoun, so the argument goes, this triggers an M-implicature: the hearer infers that a deviation from the prototypical situation is being signalled. Given that the two arguments of a transitive predicate are typically

Introduction

11

disjoint in reference, this will give rise to the inference that the two arguments of the specific predicate at issue are co-referential: …on such a view, anaphors are just pronouns marked in such a way that they will trigger an M-implicature to the complement of the normal interpretation; if clausemates are normally disjoint, a marked pronoun will M-implicate co-reference. The contrastive emphatic particle or affix will do the job nicely. (Levinson 1991:130) The fact that intensifiers make up additional morphological material when added to a pronoun also plays a role in the analysis of reflexive markers offered in Chapter 7 of this study.12 To a certain extent, the explanation offered by Faltz (1985) as well as Levinson’s (1991) elaboration thereof are consequently integrated into the proposal made here. However, I would like to point out that in itself, this explanation is not sufficient. There are two crucial points that render such an account problematic: first, if the function of the intensifier were merely to increase the morphological complexity of a pronoun, virtually anything could be used to ‘do the job’, as Levinson puts it. In particular, we would expect to find reduplicated object pronouns as a frequent source of reflexive markers crosslinguistically. For example, English might have developed a reflexive pronoun such as himhim instead of himself. However, such reflexives are extremely rare in the languages of the world (though not unattested),13 while the number of languages showing formal identity or relatedness of intensifiers and reflexives is considerable (cf. König and Siemund 2005). The models proposed by Faltz (1985) and Levinson (1991) can explain why intensifiers may contribute to a reflexive interpretation of an object pronoun, but they do not tell us why it is precisely intensifiers that are used so frequently for that purpose. The second major problem of Faltz’s and Levinson’s explanation is even more critical: Farmer and Harnish’s (1987) ‘Disjoint Reference Presumption’ applies only to a certain class of predicates. As mentioned above, König and Siemund (2000a) refer to this class as ‘typically other-directed’ predicates, which subsumes predicates denoting actions that are typically performed on others (hate, criticize, etc.). However, there is also an extensive class of transitive predicates which denote actions that are not normally performed on others (König and Siemund’s 2000b ‘typically self-directed’ predicates). The verbs wash and shave, for instance, belong to this group. If the sole function of intensifiers were in fact to trigger a conversational (M)implicature to the effect that a predicate is interpreted ‘contrary to stereotype’, we should expect the following scenario: intensifiers should be added to typically self-directed predicates in order to suggest a non-reflexive interpretation. Let us consider an example to illustrate this. In Old English a simple pronoun could be interpreted as being coreferential with a local antecedent. This can be seen in

The grammar of identity

12

Old English þa

bewende

Nero

hine

to Paulum.

then

turned

Nero

him(self)

to Paulus

‘Then Nero turned to Paulus.’ (Visser 1963:425)

The verb wendan ‘turn’ is one of those typically self-directed predicates which trigger the expectation that the subject and the object will be co-referential (if the object is human). Accordingly, we should be led to expect that in the relevant stages of English (Old English and Middle English), adding an intensifier to the object pronoun of a typically self-directed verb as in would have induced a non-reflexive interpretation via the relevant M-implicature: the morphologically more complex expression could have been used to signal that the pronoun should be interpreted ‘to the complement of the normal interpretation’ (Levinson 1991:130). Given that the subject and the object of typically self-directed predicates normally refer to the same individual, this should result in a locally disjoint interpretation of the two arguments. There is of course no indication that such a ‘dereflexivizing’ use of self should ever have existed, let alone have become grammatical in any language. Intensifiers, reflexives and ‘centrality’ The historical development from intensifiers to reflexives has been explained in completely different terms by König and Siemund (1997, 2000a). The most significant difference lies in the analysis of the function of intensifiers. König and Siemund (2000a) analyse intensifiers as expressions that are used to relate a ‘central’ value or referent—the referent of the head DP—to a set of alternatives that constitute the ‘periphery’ of that central referent (cf. Section 3.5.2). For example, the intensifier in opposes the president to his/her periphery or entourage such as to the local commander-in-chief or the vice-president. The president himself explained the strategy.

König and Siemund’s (2000a) account of how and why intensifiers may develop into reflexive pronouns is based on the aforementioned distinction between ‘typically selfdirected predicates’ and ‘typically other-directed predicates’. According to their argument, the agent of a typically other-directed predicate can be regarded as the origin, the ‘centre’ of the relevant action, while all other participants have a peripheral status in such predications. Adjoining an intensifier to an object pronoun has the following effect: the referent of the object pronoun is marked as being central; since the central participant of an action is the subject referent, the intensifier signals that the two participants involved are identical:

Introduction

13

In such situations the center is clearly the agent or the experiencer, the periphery being the persons towards whom such activities or feelings are directed. Given that the relevant situations are instances of conventionally other-directed activities and emotions, the more likely interpretation for the relevant sentences without intensifiers would be a disjoint interpretation for the plain pronouns. What the addition of self does is to signal that the referent of the object pronoun is the center rather than the periphery. (König and Siemund 2000a:59) König and Siemund (2000a:59) provide the example given in analysis. Judasi

aheng

hinei/j.

Judas

hanged

him(self)

to illustrate their

‘Judas hanged him/himself.’

is ambiguous with regard to the coreference or disjoint reference of the DP Judas and the pronoun hine. Since Old English hangian ‘hang’ is a typically other-directed predicate, the two nominals are stereotypically interpreted as referring to two distinct individuals. If the intensifier self (plus the relevant case suffix) is added to the object pronoun, however, both arguments are understood as being co-referential. This is illustrated in Judasi

aheng

[hine self-ne]i.

Judas

hanged

him SELF-ACC

‘Judas hanged himself.’ (König and Siemund 2000a:59)

According to König and Siemund’s interpretation, self in marks (the referent of) the object pronoun hine as ‘central’. Since the central participant (=the agent) of the action under discussion is Judas, we can infer that hine likewise refers to Judas. König and Siemund’s (2000a) account of the semantic relationship between intensifiers and reflexives has a major advantage over the proposals made by Faltz and Levinson: it accounts for the distinction between typically self-directed and typically other-directed predicates. This distinction is relevant both to the diachronic development of reflexives in English and to a synchronic description of Modern English, where typically self-directed verbs such as wash or shave normally do not take object pronouns (he washed, he shaved). However, I would like to argue that there are two aspects of König and Siemund’s explanation that require more discussion. First, I have doubts that the contrast between a ‘centre’ and its ‘periphery’ can be regarded as a primitive of linguistic analysis. Adopting an analysis presented by Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a), I

The grammar of identity

14

will argue that the meaning of intensifiers can better be accounted for if we assume that at a lexical level, they denote the identity function ID. This point is probably no serious challenge to König and Siemund’s (2000a) analysis, since we could easily reformulate their model using Eckardt’s and Hole’s terminology. The second issue that I would like to bring up, however, is more crucial, and it raises doubts as to the universal applicability of König and Siemund’s account. I believe that in presenting a purely semantic/pragmatic analysis of the reflexivizing function of intensifiers, König and Siemund (2000a) underestimate the structural aspect of the use of intensifiers in the context of reflexivity. This aspect becomes particularly important when we consider languages which have developed new reflexives from intensifiers, though they also have anaphors that are specialized to indicate local coreference. Dutch is one of those languages. As mentioned in Section 1.1, there is an anaphor zich, which must be locally bound, but may be bound only in the object position of a specific class of verbs. For example, it can be locally bound when it functions as an object of the predicate wassen ‘wash’, and is therefore fine. By contrast, zich cannot be locally bound in the object position of the verb is ungrammatical. Local binding in cases like can be haten ‘hate’, so achieved only if the complex anaphor zichzelf is used (=zich plus the intensifier zelf, cf. ). Dutch a.

Jani

wast

zichi/*j.

Jan

washes

ANPH

*Jani

haat

zichi/j.

Jan

hates

ANPH

‘Jan washes.’ b.

int.: ‘Jan hates himself.’ c.

Jani

haat

[zich-zelf]i/*j.

Jan

hates

ANPH-SELF

‘Jan hates himself.’

How can we explain the necessity of using an intensifier in on the basis of König and Siemund’s (2000a) theory? Remember that König and Siemund assume the following scenario: there is a simple pronoun such as Old English hine which may be either locally bound or locally free. Furthermore, there is a typically other-directed predicate such as hangian which suggests that the object pronoun should be interpreted as being disjoint in reference from the local subject. The intensifier indicates that the referent of the object pronoun is ‘central’, thus leading to a locally reflexive interpretation. In other words, the intensifier self is used to select one from among two possible interpretations (coreference vs. disjoint reference). We could say that the intensifier is used for ‘referential disambiguation’ (cf. Gast and Siemund 2006:363).

Introduction

15

Let us now consider to what extent this analysis carries over to Dutch. Here, a certain class of predicates completely bars the use of the simple anaphor zich in direct object above is ungrammatical. Neither of the two possibilities position. Therefore, (disjoint reference or coreference) is available. How can we explain the fact that the sentence becomes grammatical when zelf is added to the anaphor zich? should be motivated by It is difficult to see how the occurrence of zelf in ‘referential disambiguation’ in terms of the centrality-approach. König and Siemund (2000a:59) state that the intensifier indicates ‘that the referent of the object pronoun is the center rather than the periphery’. However, the periphery-option (zich being interpreted as being disjoint in reference from the local subject) is not even available. If speakers of Dutch are asked to assign an interpretation to in spite of its ungrammaticality, they will invariably choose the reflexive interpretation. One may of course argue that there is a conflict: on the one hand, haten is a typically other-directed verb, and a non-reflexive object nominal is expected; on the other hand, zich requires local binding and suggests a reflexive interpretation of the predicate haten. The intensifier will be used to ensure that the reflexive interpretation is chosen, thus resolving the conflict. But now, why do such conflicts between the expectations associated with a given predicate on the one hand and the semantic properties of pronouns on the other not arise universally? For example, the German sentence corresponding to here:

above is fine, although we should expect to find the same conflict German Jan

hasst

sich.

Jan

hates

ANPH

‘Jan hates himself.’

From a semantic point of view, German hassen ‘hate’ triggers the same expectation of locally disjoint reference as Dutch haten. Also, the anaphor sich needs to be locally bound. But no conflict arises. The sentence is grammatical, and sich is interpreted as being co-referential with Jan. I will argue in Chapter 7 that such cross-linguistic variation can only be accounted for if we assume that the relevant rules have a structural rather than semantic/pragmatic status: namely, certain Dutch verbs do not allow their object pronouns to be bound by the local subject. The function of an intensifier is to alter the structural position of the object pronoun. Consequently, the distinction between typically self-directed and typically other-directed predicates—which are regarded as forming distributional classes—will likewise be implemented as a rule that is relevant not only semantically, but also from a structural point of view.

The grammar of identity

16

1.5.2 Synchronic approaches Intensifiers as ‘appositive reflexives’ We will now turn to the synchronic approaches aimed at accounting for the formal overlap between intensifiers and reflexives. The first proposal to be discussed in this section, summarized in above, is based on early approaches to the syntax of reflexivity (e.g. Lees and Klima 1963; Chomsky 1965:145ff.). At that time, reflexivization was regarded as a transformational operation in which a lexical DP is replaced with a pronominal form. In a simplified manner, this process of substitution can (where be represented as in transformational grammar).14

symbolizes a transformation in the sense of early

John likes John

John likes himself

Advocates of explanations along the lines of hold the view that intensifiers (or reflexives in an intensifying function, as it were) are also the result of a process of Although the specific details of the relevant substitution like the one illustrated in analyses are of course different, a central idea of these models is that intensifier constructions are appositive, and that the intensifier represents a pronominal ‘copy of the head’ (Moravcsik 1972:272).15 For this reason, intensifiers have also been referred to as ‘appositive reflexives’ (cf. Hall 1965; Stockwell et al. 1968). Such ‘transformational analyses’ of intensifiers have been presented by Hall (1965), Moyne (1971) and Cantrall (1973). Cantrall (1973) assumes a reflexivization rule similar to the one posited by Lees and Klima (1963). He argues that reflexive pronouns (both in an argument position and in their intensifying use) can be paraphrased as ‘x’s own self’, where x corresponds to the local antecedent. Accordingly, a reflexive predication is interpreted as illustrated in John likes himself.

≡

John likes his own self.

Cantrall (1973) holds the view that intensifiers are likewise interpreted as expressions which, at an underlying level, have the meaning ‘x’s own self’, where x corresponds to the referent of the head DP. They are analysed as being juxtaposed to their head DPs. For is assumed to be derived from

example, a.

John himself came to the meeting.

b.

John, his own self, came to the meeting.

Introduction

17

The appositive approach to intensifiers runs into several problems, most of which have already been noticed elsewhere. The first striking problem is that intensifier constructions do not represent typical instances of apposition (cf. Verheijen 1986:684). Apposition is usually marked by an intonational break (cf. ). Still, Verheijen acknowledges that such an intonational break is present only if apposition is non-restrictive (cf. Quirk et al. 1972:622ff.). In restrictive apposition the two DPs form part of the same intonational ).

group (cf. a.

Jack, my brother, is living in London.

b.

Jack the Ripper is living in London.

However, if intensifiers are in fact instances of apposition, they are certainly not restrictive, since they do not narrow down the denotation of their head DP. This brings us to a second problem, which is even more serious: we simply cannot derive the effect which intensifiers have on the interpretation of a DP under this analysis. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the contribution made by an intensifier to the interpretation of a DP can be roughly described like this: the intensifier is used to relate a given referent x (the referent of the head DP) to a set of alternative referents Y, such that all elements of Y are identifiable in terms of x. Consider the minimal pair given in a.

I know the surroundings of London better than London itself.

b.

#I know Harare better than London itself.

The DP London itself can be opposed to the surroundings of London (cf. ) because there is a contextually salient relation holding between the two locations (‘x is the surroundings of y’). By contrast, London itself cannot felicitously be related to Harare (unless some contextually salient relation holding between London and Harare has been How established in previous discourse). This can be seen from the infelicity of could we derive this restriction on the use of intensifiers from the hypothesis that intensifiers are appositive copies of their head DPs? Appositive constructions can be regarded as being functionally equivalent to relative clauses, either restrictive or noncan be paraphrased as in restrictive. For example, intensifiers are copies of their head DPs, we would have to analyse

Assuming that as shown in

a. Jack, who is my brother, is living in London. b. #I know the surroundings of London better than London, which is London.

The grammar of identity

Disregarding the fact that

18

hardly qualifies as a felicitous English sentence, it from the (supposed)

seems impossible to derive the restriction that we observed in

In Chapter 3 it will be shown that the semantic

underlying meaning given in

can be explained if we assume that intensifiers denote functions, effect illustrated in and not terms. Finally, there is a third, cross-linguistic, point which remains unaccounted for by the apposition approach outlined in only a certain type of reflexives—those reflexives that are sometimes referred to as ‘SELF-anaphors’ in contemporary research on reflexivity (cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1993)—is used in an intensifying function. Why should reflexives of the German type, which do not function as intensifiers, not be able to adjoin to a lexical DP? Like English, German allows (restrictive) apposition without an intonational break (cf.

). However, the reflexive pronoun sich cannot be used in

apposition to a local antecedent (cf. a.

).

German Friedrich

der

Große

aß

gerne

Kartoffeln.

Frederick

the

Great

ate

willingly

potatoes

‘Frederick the Great liked to eat potatoes.’ b.

*Friedrich

sich

aß

gerne

Kartoffeln.

Frederick

ANPH

ate

willingly

potatoes

int.: ‘Frederick the Great liked to eat potatoes.’

Advocates of the ‘appositive reflexive hypothesis’ could of course argue that it is a lexical property of English himself that it can adjoin to a DP in an intensifying function, and that it is likewise a lexical property of German sich that it cannot do so. However, this amounts to an ad hoc stipulation. A theory of the meaning of intensifiers which can account for such contrasts as the one between English himself and German sich without the stipulation of extra rules is clearly preferable, and I claim that the explanation to be put forward in this study meets this requirement. Intensifiers and reflexives as identity predicates A second proposal to unify the analyses of intensifiers and reflexives synchronically, sketched in was made by Browning (1993). Based on work by Pica (1987) and Reinhart and Reuland (1991), Browning argues that both intensifiers and reflexives denote the relation of identity (x=y). Unfortunately—and this is one of the major problems of Browning’s (1993) proposal—the analysis applies only to head-distant intensifiers. An example of a head-distant intensifier is given in

Introduction

19

John built his house himself.

Browning holds the view that the role of a reflexive marker is to indicate that the referents of two DPs co-occurring in a local environment are identical. Accordingly, the example in

is interpreted as shown in

a.

Lucie adores herself.

b.

ADORE(Lucie, her) & her=Lucie (Browning 1993:88)

Head-distant intensifiers are analysed in a parallel way. They are supposed to indicate that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier is identical to the agent of the local matrix predicate. According to this analysis,

is interpreted as illustrated in

(cf. Browning 1993:90). a.

Mary wrote this memo herself.

b.

Mary(agent) wrote this memo & her=(agent)

Browning’s account leaves a number of questions open (although, to be fair, her paper is relatively short). First of all, her analysis of reflexives is highly problematic. Since this point will be discussed more extensively in Section 7.3, I will provide only a brief summary of my objections here. Browning argues that English self is a two-place predicate which adjoins to a simple pronoun (him, her, etc.) to form a complex pronoun (himself, herself, etc.). Since self has two argument slots, one of these slots remains unsaturated after that process of adjunction, so himself still has an open argument position to fill. This slot is not saturated through functional application of himself to a term. Rather, the complex pronoun combines with a (verbal) two-place predicate in such a way that the object position of that predicate is saturated by the pronoun him/her, and at the same time the highest argument of the verb and the first argument of self are marked as being identical. Browning (1993) relates this operation to ‘theta-identification’, a compositional process which she adopts from Higginbotham (1985). I will argue in Section 7.3 that this analysis is not feasible for several reasons. The most crucial point is that the process of composition suggested by Browning (1993) leads to a type-mismatch: the two-place predicate adore combines with the one-place predicate herself to yield another one-place predicate adores herself. Browning (1993) is of course aware of this fact and therefore resorts to Higginbotham’s ‘theta-identification’. However, I will argue that Higginbotham’s concept of ‘theta-identification’ cannot be applied to the compositional process assumed by Browning for self-forms in an object position. Browning’s analysis of head-distant intensifiers is likewise problematic (cf. Section 6.6.1). It cannot account for most of the empirical generalizations that can be made

The grammar of identity

20

regarding the distribution of head-distant intensifiers (cf. Section 6.1). To name just one example, the use of a head-distant intensifier of the type illustrated in always presupposes that some thematic relation (of interest, responsibility, etc.) holding between the subject referent and the event denoted by the predicate can be recovered. Consider

John painted the house himself.

Although it is not explicitly stated that the house under discussion is John’s house, this Moreover, if the house is not John’s house, it is clearly seems to be suggested by implied that John had responsibility for painting the house, that he was interested in the house’s being painted, etc. This detail cannot be read off Browning’s analysis. Last but not least we should return to the first point of criticism made above: Browning’s (1993) analysis takes account only of the formal identity of head-distant intensifiers and reflexives, but nothing is said about head-adjacent intensifiers. Establishing a relationship between this most basic type of intensifier and reflexive markers should certainly be a desideratum of any theory dealing with the questions raised in

above. The ‘protection’ approach

The third synchronic explanation aimed at accounting for the formal overlap between intensifiers and reflexives was first put forward by Jayaseelan (1988, 1997), and later taken up by Reuland (2001, forthcoming). Jayaseelan pursues an idea that will also figure prominently in the analysis to be presented in this study: intensifiers are used to prevent the violation of syntactic rules relating to the referential interpretation of pronouns. Jayaseelan (1997) points out that certain pronominal elements need to be bound by a sentence-mate, but cannot be co-indexed with a co-argument (e.g. Malayalam taan and the anaphors of Scandinavian languages). This is in accordance with the reflexivity framework developed by Reinhart and Reuland (1993), who relate referential dependency on the one hand, and reflexive-marking on the other, to two independent modules of grammar (cf. Section 7.2). The anaphor taan, so the argument goes, is referentially defective and thus needs to be bound, but at the same time it obeys an anti-locality restriction by which it cannot occupy the object position of a reflexive predicate. Jayaseelan (1997:193) therefore concludes that taan ‘is like an anaphor in requiring an antecedent; but it is like a [free] pronoun in obeying Principle B’. The function of the intensifier in the context of reflexivity is to change the structural position of taan in order to prevent a violation of Binding Principle B. Let us consider one of Jayaseelan’s own examples in order to understand this argument (we will return to a consideration of the idea of ‘protective SELF’ in Section 7.3, where Reuland’s 2001 elaboration of Jayaseelan’s proposal is discussed in more detail). Consider

Introduction

21

Malayalam a.

*Raamani

tani-ne

sneehik’k’unnu.

Raaman

ANPH-ACC

loves

int.: ‘Raaman loves himself.’ (Jayaseelan 1997:191) b.

Raaman [DP

tani-ne

tanne]

sneehik’k’unnu.

Raaman

ANPH-ACC

INT

loves

‘Raaman loves himself.’ (Jayaseelan 1997:194)

Although grammaticality judgements with regard to seem to vary, Jayaseelan marks such examples as ungrammatical. Ungrammaticality is predicted because taan is assumed to obey an anti-locality restriction by which it cannot be co-referential with a cothis restriction does not apply: taan and Raaman argument (here: Raaman). In are not arguments of the same predicate, and the sentence is therefore fine. As Jayaseelan (1997:199) points out, the position of taan in such sentences corresponds to that of his in Johni loves hisi wife. Consequently, ‘the function of the focus marker [tanne] is to create a smaller domain in which disjoint reference is operative, so that the pronominal is free to corefer with the other arguments of a predicate’ (Jayaseelan 1997:200). Appealing though it is, this account requires discussion and elaboration in at least two respects. First, the ‘protection-approach’ does not say anything about the semantics of intensifiers. They are treated as basic, unanalysed units. The problem sketched in Section 1.2 is thus only partially resolved: it is not clear why intensifiers in particular should be apt to prevent the violation of an anti-locality restriction associated with a specific type of anaphor. The present study offers an answer to this question: intensifiers are analysed as expressions denoting the identity function. As such, they are truth-conditionally trivial and can be used to alter the structural position of a pronoun in order to prevent the violation of syntactic rules without affecting the propositional content of a sentence. The second aspect of the ‘protection-approach’ which is not fully convincing concerns the (neglected) relevance of the predicate semantics to the syntax of reflexivity. Jayaseelan (1997) analyses the anti-locality restriction as a property of the anaphor taan. It is assumed to be part of the lexical entry of taan that it cannot be locally bound. While I have no evidence to suggest that this analysis is problematic for Malayalam in any respect, it certainly has to be modified if we take other languages into account. The assumption of a pronominal anti-locality restriction is hard to motivate for those languages that do allow simple anaphors to be bound by a co-argument at least in certain contexts. As was mentioned in Section 1.2, the anaphors of Scandinavian languages and Dutch are barred from being co-referential with the local subject only when occupying the object position of verbs denoting ‘typically other-directed’ activities, in König and Siemund’s terminology. Therefore, Dutch zich can be locally bound when functioning as an object of the verb wassen ‘wash’. This was illustrated in repeated in

The grammar of identity

22

Jan

wast

zich.

Jan

washes

ANPH

‘Jan washes.’

We seem to have two options how to account for the fact that Dutch zich can be locally bound only in certain contexts. Either we assume that there are two lexical entries for zich, or we state syntactic rules that are sensitive to certain characteristics of the matrix predicate. Since there is little independent evidence for the first option, I will opt for the second one. In Chapter 7, I will argue that verbs in languages like Dutch are grouped into two distributional classes. One of these classes allows pronominal elements in the object position to be bound by a co-argument, while the other disallows such local binding. These rules will be integrated into a system of conflicting constraints making use of the framework of Optimality Theory.

2 The distribution and morphology of head- adjacent SELF In this chapter some basic distributional properties of head-adjacent intensifiers in Germanic languages are pointed out. Section 2.1 provides an overview of the position taken by the various intensifiers relative to their head DP and of their inflectional behaviour. In Section 2.2, semantic and pragmatic properties of environments licensing head-adjacent SELF are discussed. It is shown that a single condition governs the use of head-adjacent SELF, namely (discourse-pragmatic) ‘givenness’ or ‘accessibility’: headadjacent SELF combines only with definite DPs and a type of nominal that I call ‘given indefinites’, i.e. indefinites whose restriction set is under discussion. In other words, head-adjacent SELF can be used whenever the denotation of the head DP or part of it is in the propositional background. This will be highly relevant to the semantic analysis to be presented in Chapter 3. 2.1 Syntax and inflection of head-adjacent SELF In all major Germanic languages head-adjacent intensifiers may take a position rightadjacent to their head DP. This ‘canonical’ construction is also attested in earlier stages of Germanic. Consider the following examples from Gothic, Old English and Old Norse in Gothic Aþþan

[ik silb-a]

Pawlus

bidja

izwis

bi

qairrein

but

[I SELF-NOM.SG.MASC]

Paulus

ask

you

by

meekness

jah

mukamodein

Xristaus…

and

modesty

of.Christ

‘But I myself, Paulus, appeal to you by the meekness and gentleness of Christ…’ [Wf. 2 Corinthians 10, 1] Old English [Dauid

sylf]

cwæþ

to

þam

halgan

gaste:…

[David

SELF.NOM]

said

to

the

Holy

Ghost

The grammar of identity

24

‘David himself said to the Holy Ghost:…’ [Lf. Mark 12, 36] Old Norse (Old Icelandic) Grani

rann

at

þingi,

gnýr

var

at

heyra

Grani

ran

PREP

Thing,

clatter

was

to

hear

enn

þá

[Sigurðr

siálfr]

eigi

kom.

but

thence

[Sigurd

INT.NOM.SG]

not

came

‘Grani ran to the Thing, there was clatter to hear, but never came Sigurd himself.’ [Edda Gudrunarkvida önnur 4, 2]

The constituent structure of right-adjoined intensifier constructions like those illustrated is probably uncontroversial. Siemund (2000) has argued for Modern English in that such intensifier constructions are endocentric expansions of the head NP (or DP, in the syntactic framework adopted here), and there is little evidence against such an analysis. It is also feasible from a semantic point of view, since intensifiers will be analysed as functions from individuals to individuals in Chapter 3. Accordingly, the structure of David sylf in

can be described as [DP [DP David] sylf]], and parallel

and structures can be assumed for the examples given in In some Germanic languages, intensifiers may also be left-adjacent to their head DP. In Gothic—to be more precise, in Wulfila’s Bible translation—such ‘preposed’ headadjacent intensifiers can be found when the head DP is lexical/non-pronominal (cf. ), while right-adjacent intensifiers occur only in combination with pronominal head DPs above; see also Streitberg 1900:130).16 In either case, the intensifier shows (cf. weak/definite inflection.17 Gothic a.

jah

[silb-a

Daweid]

qiþiþ

in bokom

psalmo:…

even

[INT-NOM.SG.MASC

David]

says

in book

Psalm

‘David himself declares in the book of Psalms:…’ [Wf. Luke 20, 42] b. …ak …for

[silb-a

atta]

frijoþ

izwis…

[INT-NOM.SG.MASC

father]

loves

you

‘…for the father himself loves you…’ [Wf. John 16, 27]

In Old English, head-adjacent intensifiers are generally postposed and exhibit strong/indefinite inflection, but there are some exceptions. First, ‘weak forms are occasionally found in the nominative singular’ (e.g. he sylfa in [Beo 29], as opposed to the ‘more usual’ heo sylf in [BlHom 13, 26]; cf. Mitchell 1985:188). Van Gelderen (2000:31), who provides a table with the relevant inflectional paradigms, states that ‘in Beowulf, when “self” modifies first of second person pronouns, it has indefinite

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

25

inflection, whereas when it modifies a third person pronoun (whether overt or empty), it has definite inflection’.18 As will be seen below, such morpho-syntactic variation is not uncommon in the intensifier constructions of Germanic languages. A second aspect of variation relates to the position of the intensifier relative to its head DP. There are occasional occurrences of preposed self in poetry (cf.

) and, singularly, also in prose

). Mitchell (1985:190) remarks: ‘But this example—the only one of its kind (cf. known to me in the prose—may be a deliberate departure from the norm for emphasis and rhythm […]’. Old English a.

swylce

[self

cyning]

also

SELF

king

…

tryddode… stepped

‘…also the king himself went…’ [Beo 920] b.

Se

ebreisca

cwæð:

[sylf

ic]

swelte

þonne

DET

Hebrew

said:

SELF

I

die

then

‘The Hebrew said: “Then I myself will die”.’ [ÆLS 3.591]

In some cases, preposed self takes a position between the nominal head of a DP and a determiner. However, such constructions may not be genuine instances of intensification. is a case in point: se

sylf-a

cyning

the/this

SELF-NOM.SG(WEAK)

king

‘that very king/the king himself’ [ChristC 1208]

Grein and Köhler (1912) contend that weak forms of self/sylf as in translate as ‘very’ or ‘same’, while the strong forms function as intensifiers. Mitchell (1985:197) remarks as “[t]hat same king” […]’. Given that a one-to-one that ‘we could easily translate correspondence between the type of inflection and the reading of self is difficult to establish, however, he adds that ‘a rethinking of the basic divisions in these articles of self is needed.’ While preposed head-adjacent intensifiers are rare or even exceptional in Old English, these constructions seem to have been an equivalent, or at least near equivalent, option in Old Norse. An example of a right-adjoined intensifier in Old Icelandic was provided in above, and a left-adjoined intensifier is illustrated in

(the head DP mér is the

and illustrate that dative form of the first person pronoun). The examples in sialf- could be used with the meaning own as well, either left-adjoined or right-adjoined

The grammar of identity

26

to the relevant DP (note that vár- agrees with the intensifier in ).

and with land in

19

Old Norse (Old Icelandic) a.

[For well I loved—the warrior brave] …sverða

deili,

sem

[siálfri

mér]

…sword

giver

like

SELF.DAT.SG

me

‘…the sword-giver, like myself.’ [Edda Oddrunargratr 33, 4] b.

land

[sialf-ra

vár-ra]

land

INT-GEN.PL

our-GEN.PL

‘our own land’ c.

land

[vár-t

sialf-ra]

land

our-NOM.SG.NEUT

SELF-GEN.PL

‘our own land’ (lit.: ‘the land of ourselves’) (Heusler 1950:122)

Faarlund (2004:76) states that preposed intensifying sialf- is more common than the corresponding construction with a postposed intensifier if the head DP is lexical, and that the opposite is true if the head DP is pronominal (Faarlund 2004:90). Interestingly, this is the mirror image of the situation described for Gothic above. The two examples in provide further illustration: Old Norse (Old Norwegian) a. þá then

verðr

dœmdr

úhœverskr

[konungr

sjalfr]

gets

judged

indecent

king.NOM

SELF.NOM.MASC

‘Then the king himself is judged indecent.’ [KGS 44.26], quoted from Faarlund (2004:76) b. helldr rather

en

[

than

SELF.NOM.FEM she

hon]

‘…rather than (she) herself.’ [KGS 143.19], quoted from Faarlund (2004:90)

Modern Icelandic likewise permits head-adjacent intensifiers to either follow or precede their head DP if this DP is lexical (cf. ). The intensifiers of both Old Norse and Modern Icelandic always show strong inflection, thus differing from Gothic silba and Old English self.

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

27

Icelandic a. Hvað what

sagði

[Jesús sjálfur]

í

said

[Jesus SELF.NOM.SG.MASC]

Jóhannes

10:…

in John

10:…

20

‘What did Jesus himself say in John 10:…’ [www] b. En But

hvar

er

[sjálfur

Jesús]…?

where

is

[SELF.NOM.SG.MASC

Jesus]…?

21

‘But where is Jesus himself?’ [www]

A similar situation obtains in modern Mainland Scandinavian languages. However, there is a crucial difference. In Mainland Scandinavian, the two alternative constructions correlate with differences in the inflectional behaviour of the intensifier. If a headadjacent intensifier precedes the head DP, it exhibits weak inflection; if it follows the head DP, it either shows strong inflection (e.g. in written Swedish and New Norwegian), or it does not inflect at all (e.g. in Danish and Dano-Norwegian, and also often in spoken

SG MASC

FEM

NEUT

själv

indefinite/strong definite/weak

PL MASC

självt

själva/själve

FEM

NEUT

själva Själva

Table 2.1: The inflectional paradigm of Swedish självSwedish). Table 2.1 shows the inflectional paradigm of Swedish själv.22 The contrast between preposed and postposed intensifiers in Swedish is illustrated in Swedish a. [själv-e SELF-MASC.SG.DEF

president-en]

deltog

i

president-DEF

participated

in

deltog

i

participated

in

förhandlingarna the.negotiations ‘The president himself participated in the negotiations.’ b. [president-en president-DEF

] SELF-MASC.SG.INDEF

The grammar of identity

28

förhandlingarna the.negotiations ‘The president himself participated in the negotiations.’ Thorell (1973:91)

There are two major semantic or pragmatic differences between the two constructions illustrated in First, left-adjoined själv- is most commonly (though not exclusively) used in combination with inanimate head DPs (cf. Teleman et al. 1999a:469). The second corresponds difference relates to aspects of contextual appropriateness. While more closely to a ‘neutral’ intensifier construction in English (the president himself), may convey an additional aspect of unexpectedness, so the function of själve here is akin to that of a scalar focus particle like English even. Moreover, the left-adjoined intensifier construction seems to be preferred when the referent of the head DP is not currently under discussion, though uniquely identifiable. In a context like själva/själve kungen is therefore more appropriate than the corresponding construction with a right-adjoined intensifier: Då

kom

ingen

mindre

än

[själv-a

kungen]

there

came

no.one

less

than

[SELF-MASC.SG.DEF

the.king]

ut ur cellen. out of the.cell ‘No one less than the king himself came out of the cell!’ [www]23

The preference to use preposed intensifiers with new discourse referents seems to be related to the fact that in such constructions both the intensifier and the head DP may bear stress. If the head DP is, in Schwarzschild’s (1999) terms, GIVEN (and hence, the referent of deaccented), it is the right-adjoined intensifier that is preferred. In the head DP is mentioned in the immediately preceding discourse, and is therefore highly topical: Usch,

vad

jag

avskyr

Ekblad.

Hans

idéer,

menar

jag…

INTERJ

what

I

hate

Ekblad

his

ideas

mean

I…

‘Oh, how I hate Ekblad. His ideas, I mean…’ a. b.

?…Själv-a

Ekblad

verkar

rätt

sympatisk.

…SELF-DEF.UT.SG

Ekblad

seems

quite

nice

rätt

sympatisk.

…Ekblad

verkar

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self …Ekblad

SELF-DEF.UT.SG

seems

29

quite

nice

‘Ekblad himself seems to be quite nice.’ Teleman et al. (1999a:469)

The question arises as to how preposed intensifier constructions like those exemplified above should be analysed in syntactic terms. Like their postposed counterparts, preposed intensifiers clearly form endocentric expansions of the DP they adjoin to. This can be seen from the fact that they precede the determiner when there is one. In Scandinavian languages, definite DPs are accompanied by a lexical determiner only when they contain some prenominal modifier, for example an adjective. Examples of preposed headadjacent SELF co-occurring with a determiner are given from Swedish and New Norwegian in

and

respectively.

Swedish [Själv-a

[det

lilla

nav-et]]

är svårt

att se

med

SELF-DEF.NEUT.SG

DET

small

hub-DET

is

to

with

blotta

ögat.

naked

eye

difficult

see

‘The small hub itself is hardly visible to the naked eye.’ Teleman et al. (1999a:467) New Norwegian …

folkemusikken

og

dansen

sto

i

fokus,

som

folk music.DEF

and

dance.DEF

stood

in

focus

as

uttrykk

for

[sjølv-e

expression

for

INT-DEF.SG DET

[den norske Norwegian

identitet-en]] identity-DET

‘…folk music and dance were in focus, as an expression of the Norwegian identity itself.’ [www]24

Unlike in Old Norse, the preposed intensifier construction is not possible with anaphoric pronouns in Modern Scandinavian languages. This may be related to the informationstructural condition licensing those constructions that was mentioned above: if preposed intensifiers of the type själva kungen ‘the king himself’ are in fact used when the referent is newly introduced into the discourse, this would explain why such constructions are impossible with anaphoric pronouns. The ban on preposed intensifiers being adjoined to anaphoric pronouns is illustrated in using data from Swedish:

The grammar of identity

30

Swedish a.

[Jag

själv]

har

gjort

det.

I

SELF

have

done

it

‘I myself have done it.’ b.

*[Själv-a

jag]

har

gjort

det.

SELF-DEF.MASC.SG

I

have

done

it.

int.: ‘I myself have done it.’

While preposed intensifiers as in are not usually allowed in any Scandinavian language, this construction is the unmarked option in the context of Icelandic reflexive pronouns: when adjoined to the anaphor sig, sjálf-typically, though not necessarily, precedes sig, i.e. both options are possible. Two examples from the Bible are given in 25

Icelandic a. [Jesus Christ,…] sem

gaf

[sig

sjálf-an]

til

lausnargjalds

fyrir

alla.

who

gave

ANPH

SELF-ACC

PREP

ransom

for

all

‘…who gave himself as a ransom for all men…’ [IceBib 1 Timothy 2, 5–6] b. En but

að lokum

sagði

hann

við

[sjálf-an

sig]:

…

finally

said

he

PREP

SELF-ACC

ANPH:

…

‘But finally he said to himself:…’ [IceBib Luke 18, 4]

As has been seen, head-adjacent intensifier constructions in Germanic languages can be classified along two dimensions: first, the intensifiers may either precede or follow the head DP; second, they may either show inflection (adjectival/weak or strong, in English pronominal), or they may be invariant (as in Danish and Dano-Norwegian). Invariant intensifiers are particularly widespread in Continental West Germanic (cf. the German ) and Afrikaans (cf. ).26 Table 2.2 summarizes the head-adjacent example in intensifier constructions of some major contemporary Germanic languages, from the perspective of the two parameters mentioned above.

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

Languages East

type of head DP

Gothic

North Old Norse Insular

Mainland

West

Old English English Continental

31

pos. of ADSELF

inflection

lexical

PRE

weak

pronominal

POST

weak

lexical

POST

strong

pronominal

PRE

strong

lexical

PRE

strong

POST

strong

pronominal

POST

strong

lexical

PRE

weak

POST

strong/none

pronominal

POST

strong/none

lexical

POST

strong

pronominal

POST

strong

lexical

POST

pronominal

pronominal

POST

pronominal

lexical

POST

none

pronominal

POST

none

Table 2.2: Position and inflection of intensifiers in Germanic languages German Ich

habe

mit

[dem

Papst

selbst]

gesprochen.

I

have

with

the.DAT

Pope

SELF

spoken

‘I have spoken to the Pope himself.’ Afrikaans [Ek

self]

het

haar

gesien.

I

SELF

have

her

seen

‘I have seen her myself.’ (Donaldson 1993:294)

As can be gathered from Table 2.2, the syntactic and morpho-syntactic behaviour of head-adjacent intensifiers can quite straightforwardly be related to patterns of genetic and

The grammar of identity

32

areal classification within the Germanic languages. In Continental West Germanic, headadjacent SELF is generally invariant and follows its head DP. In English, it is also always right-adjoined, but inflects for person, number and gender. In Mainland Scandinavian, both preposed and postposed intensifiers are possible (with lexical DPs), showing varying types of inflection (weak/strong). Finally, in Insular Scandinavian, both options are available as well, but inflection is always strong. As pointed out above, the common denominator of the various constructions is that head-adjacent SELF always forms an endocentric expansion of its head DP. 2.2 Combinatorial properties of head-adjacent SELF in English The conditions that a DP must meet in order to be intensified are relatively well documented for English. Still, there are some points that require further discussion. In particular, it has often been claimed that referential properties of the head DP, such as specificity, have an impact on the acceptability of intensifiers. In this section, I will argue that the only requirement imposed by an intensifier on its head DP is that its denotation be in the propositional background. There are two circumstances in which DPs can be intensified: (i) if they are definite, or (ii) if they are indefinite but their restriction set is definite. I will refer to this second kind of nominals as ‘given indefinites’. The most comprehensive discussion of the distribution of head-adjacent intensifiers is provided by Siemund (2000:153ff.). Siemund states that head-adjacent SELF is generally fine with pronouns, proper names, and definite DPs (cf. ), while it is usually uninterpretable or at least infelicitous with indefinite and quantifying DPs. This is (cf. also Moravcsik 1972; Edmondson and Plank 1978).

shown in a.

He himself will come.

b.

John himself will come.

c.

The president himself will come.

a.

#A president himself will come.

b.

#Some presidents themselves will come.

c.

#All presidents themselves will come.

Intensifies are indifferent to number distinctions and combine with both singular and ). Generic DPs regularly allow intensification, too (cf. ). This plural DPs (cf. is not surprising if we regard generic DPs as ‘kind-referring’ expressions (cf. Carlson 1977; Krifka et al. 1995).27 They differ from object-referring DPs in the nature of the referent, but not in terms of the type of reference. Kinds are conceived of as individuals, and the relation holding between a generic DP and its denotation is of the same type as the one holding between object-referring DPs and their referents—a DP stands for some referent that is known to both the speaker and the hearer.28

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

33

a. The presidents themselves have made that decision. b. The offspring of the dodo is small. The dodo itself is big. (Siemund 2000:163)

Intensifies are not sensitive to the attributive/referential distinction within definite DPs (cf. Donellan 1966). This point is worth mentioning because Edmondson and Plank (1978:382) claim ‘that definite but non-referring DP’s, i.e. attributive ones in the sense of Donellan (1966), generally do not accept a head-bound intensifier’, a view to which Siemund (2000:156) also subscribes. The examples discussed by Edmondson and Plank are infelicitous for reasons independent of the attributive/referential distinction. Consider which is one of the examples supposedly illustrating the infelicity of intensified attributive definites (Edmondson and Plank 1978:382).

would be just as

). and infelicitous with a referential interpretation of the DP (cf. demonstrate that intensifiers are perfectly fine with attributive definites if an appropriate context is provided.29 a. #Smith’s murderer himself (whoever he is) is insane. b. [Speaker pointing at Jones] #Smith’s murderer himself is insane. a. I don’t want the accomplices of Smith’s murderer—I want Smith’s murderer himself, whoever he is. b. Whoever will be the next president of the United States, he himself as well as his wife are going to have a hard time.

Given such distributional asymmetries, Siemund (2000:168) claims ‘that adnominal intensifiers can only intensify DPs which are definite descriptions in the sense of Russell (1905)’, and proposes attaching a feature [+DEF] to intensifiers. Similarly, Eckardt (2001:380) states that intensifiers can combine only with ‘principal ultrafilters’, i.e. with This amounts to admitting only individuals, expressions of the form λP[P(α)], and disallowing quantifying DPs. Both of these generalizations seem to be basically correct. However, there are also occurrences of indefinite intensified DPs. Edmondson and Plank (1978:381) discuss the example in A: All Cretans lie. B: Where did you hear that? A: A Cretan himself told me.

Edmondson and Plank state that is fine because ‘indefinite DP’s with a specific reference permit himself1’.30 The same point is made by Siemund (2000:46) and Eckardt

The grammar of identity

34

(2001:380). However, this specificity claim is highly problematic. The main problem is that none of the authors mentioned ever specifies what ‘specific’ exactly means. Among the numerous definitions that are provided in the relevant literature we find ‘specific indefinite’ standing for ‘wide-scope indefinite’, ‘referentially interpreted indefinite’, ‘indefinite with a de re reading’ along with many other options.31 In dynamic models of discourse, ‘a “specific indefinite DP” is one whose referent is identifiable to the speaker but not to the addressee’ (Lambrecht 1994:81), while a definite DP can be identified by both the speaker and the hearer. This last definition is compatible with the intuition that indefinites are specific if the speaker has some particular individual in mind (cf. Ioup 1977; Hellan 1981). Although some of these notions of specificity overlap to a considerable extent, they are clearly too distinct to be considered equivalent. The specificity claim made by Edmondson and Plank (1978) thus remains blurry. We will nevertheless consider this claim, interpreting ‘specificity’ along the lines of Lambrecht (1994). To be on the safe side, we will also apply a scope test. Let us take a second look at A Cretan in seems to be necessarily specific in the sense of Lambrecht (1994), since the predicate told is in the past tense, and the speaker is supposed to have a ‘mental representation’ of the person he spoke to. However, a slight modification of that tense form triggers the opposite effect. In it is very unlikely that B has a specific person in mind, but the sentence is still fine. This is unexpected if only specific indefinites can be intensified. A scope test also provides evidence against the specificity claim. According to Edmondson and Plank (1978), we should expect that a Cretan in However, the a.

will take scope over the quantifier everybody.

is clearly preferred over the

in

A: Why do all Cretans lie? B: I don’t know. You should ask a Cretan himself about that.

b.

A: OK. Everybody will have to ask [DP a Cretan himself].

A brief glance at attested data reveals that intensified indefinite DPs are particularly prone to be interpreted with a non-specific reading, assuming the definition of specificity the indefinite DPs are clearly provided above. In the two examples given in interpreted non-referentially, in the sense that the speaker does not have a particular person or set of persons in mind. a. Since being asked to chair the Domestic Violence Homicide Prevention Task Force, I have had the opportunity to meet and talk with residents from all over the state whose lives have been affected—sometimes shattered—by domestic violence […] Whether it was a family member, friend, or often a victim herself—all of the people we heard from spoke of their ordeals with eloquence and courage. [www]32 b. […] if somebody is trying to bribe a Member [of the House of Commons] or influence legislation in an improper manner, in many ways the house itself would, I

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

35

am quite sure, feel that it ought to have a considerable say in how the matter is approached. I would understand that entirely. When it comes to matters of abuse and things like that, it may be that the House would feel that it is better sent away altogether to an outside body. When it comes in, there are the other problems about what happens if it relates to a Member himself if a Member is accused of corrupt practices. [www]33

Note that head-adjacent SELF combines not only with unspecific DPs introduced by an indefinite article, but also with quantifying DPs. This is shown by the examples in Again, specific readings of the quantifying DPs are unlikely (though not impossible). a. Several basic elements were considered individually: population, non-renewable natural resources, cultivated land and agricultured capital, industrial capital, service capital and pollution. Each element itself involves several aspects. [BNC HR3 14172] b. None the less, Contact staff were under pressure, albeit predominantly implicit, from three main sources—the local authority, users’ parents and some users themselves—to ‘encourage’ user involvement in approved activities. [BNC FPJ 1149]

I conclude from the preceding discussion that the specificity claim made by Edmondson and Plank (1978) cannot be maintained, and that the condition licensing the intensification of indefinite DPs must be of a different kind. It seems to be obvious that there is such a condition, since the overwhelming majority of indefinite DPs cannot be intensified. Thus, we still have to answer the question of why some occurrences of intensified indefinite DPs are infelicitous, while others are fine. I would like to argue that indefinite DPs can be intensified only if they select some (specific or unspecific) referent from a previously established set.34 This means that the construction [an x -self], is possible only if there is a discourse antecedent of the restriction set X, i.e. if X is given. This entails that an expression of the form [an x -self] should be possible only if the indefinite DP could be replaced with [one of the X]. Let us refer to this kind of indefinites as ‘indefinites with a definite restriction set’, or ‘given indefinites’, for short.35 When we look at the examples provided in this chapter, this descriptive generalization the victims are obviously under discussion, and the felicity seems to hold true. In of the sentence would not be affected if we replaced a victim with one of the victims. we could say one of the Members instead of a Member without there Likewise, in being any considerable change of meaning. The same applies to the quantifying DPs in and (each element/each of the elements and some users/some of the users). What all of these DPs have in common is that the relevant referents/denotations are only partially new in so far as they are elements or subsets of previously established groups of discourse participants. This claim predicts that intensifiers will be uninterpretable (rather than unacceptable) when their head DPs introduce new participants into a discourse. This seems to be true at least for English and German, as can be seen from

and

The grammar of identity

36

a.

?There once was a king himself.

b.

?Es

war

einmal

ein

König

selbst.

it

was

once

a

king

SELF

‘There once was a king himself.’

Approaching the testing of the present claim from the other direction, we have to try and see whether a sentence with an intensified indefinite nominal can be rendered acceptable by providing a context which establishes the restriction set of the indefinite DP as a discourse participant. Consider #A president himself will make a public statement.

What we have to do in order to render acceptable is, according to the present hypothesis, to pre-establish a set that can felicitously be intensified—for example, the presidents of the EU. If it is then possible to intensify a president, our claim will be is an example made up by the present author. Since most readers will confirmed. probably object that is a self-fabricated sentence which would not be uttered in actual discourse, I also provide a similar attested example in a. The presidents of the EU countries are having a conference. We are waiting for the spokesmen to provide some information about the summit. It is also possible that a president himself will make a public statement. b. It is the duty of every President of a State to attend the annual and semi-annual Conferences, which are held in this place so far as practicable, but if it should so happen that a President himself could not be present, then he should see that one or both of his Counsellors come, or some faithful man of an excellent spirit from his Stake who shall be capable of receiving the instructions given, and who is able to communicate the same to his President and to the people. [www]36

I conclude from the preceding discussion that it does not make a difference whether a definite DP is attributive or referential, and that it does not matter whether the DP has specific or non-specific reference. The only condition that must be met is that the DPdenotation has to be in the propositional background. This observation is relevant to the semantic analysis to be advanced in Chapter 6, since any analysis of head-adjacent intensifiers should be able to account for this fact. Apart from the condition that the referent of a definite head DP must be given (or the restriction set of an indefinite DP), the English intensifier -self does not impose any semantic or syntactic restrictions on its head DP. In particular, it does not impose any selectional restrictions and regularly allows the intensification of DPs referring to inanimates (as in The city itself is beautiful). Among the Germanic languages, such

The distribution and morphology of head-adjacent self

37

restrictions are only known in Scandinavian. As was mentioned in Section 2.1, the postposed intensifier construction in Swedish is basically restricted to animate referents, so either.

is clearly preferred over a. Det it

—which is, however, not strictly ungrammatical

bor

inte

så

mycket

folk

i

själv-a

London.

live

not

so

many

people

in

INT-DEF.NEUT.SG

London

‘Not so many people live in London itself.’ (Holmes and Hinchliffe 1994:147) b. ?Det

bor

inte så

mycket

folk

it

live

not

many

people in

so

i

London själv. London SELF

‘Not so many people live in London itself.’

Having provided some major distributional co-ordinates of head-adjacent intensifiers in Germanic we can now proceed to a semantic analysis, which constitutes the topic of Chapter 3.

3 Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function This chapter deals with the function and meaning of head-adjacent intensifiers. The analysis will proceed using data from English only, but I will assume that it applies to the head-adjacent intensifiers of all other Germanic languages considered in this study as well. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 provides a description of the function of head-adjacent intensifiers in terms of the kind of reference to alternatives that is made. In Section 3.2, it is shown that the function of intensifiers at the sentence level can be derived compositionally if we assume that intensifiers denote the identity function ID (cf. Eckardt 2001; Hole 2002a). A slight modification of Eckardt’s and Hole’s view is proposed in Section 3.3. This section is also intended to prepare the ground for a parallel analysis of head-distant intensifiers in Chapter 6. In Section 3.4, the analysis of intensifiers as expressions of an identity function is evaluated against empirical generalizations made by the most comprehensive descriptive studies on intensifiers to date (Siemund 2000; König and Siemund 2000a, b, c). Previous analyses of headadjacent intensifiers are reviewed critically in Section 3.5. 3.1 Intensifiers versus free focus and topic constructions We will start with an empirical analysis of the meaning contributed to a sentence by a head-adjacent intensifier, making use of minimally contrasting pairs. In other words, we will compare sentences with intensifiers to the corresponding sentences without intensifiers, trying to determine the differences in contextual appropriateness. The objective of this first approximation to the function of intensifiers is to establish some facts that seem to be a matter of general consensus, and to provide a frame of reference for the theoretical discussion to follow. As is mentioned by Siemund (2000: chapter 6) and König (2001:749), probably all analyses of head-adjacent intensifiers agree with the view that, in one way or another, intensifiers relate DPs (or referents thereof) to sets of alternative DPs (or referents thereof). It is uncontroversial that in exam-ples like those in below the DP interacting with the intensifier (Jack) is opposed to a set of alternative DPs. Somewhat pretheoretically, we can distinguish between (a) paradigmatic and (b) syntagmatic relations versus ).37 holding between the asserted value and the alternative value ( Among the paradigmatic relations, we can moreover distinguish between the relation of exclusion (or complementarity, cf.

), and that of inclusion (or conjunction, cf.

).

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

39

a. Jack himSELF wrote the letter (and not his BROther). (paradigmatic relation/exclusion) b. Jack himSELF wrote a letter (and so did his BROther). (paradigmatic relation/inclusion) c. Jack’s BROTHER is taller than Jack himSELF. (syntagmatic relation)

For a start, we could say that intensifiers are used to oppose a referent x (in Jack) to a set of alternative referents A (here, the singleton {Jack’s brother}). However, this kind of contrast is not special to intensifiers. A free argument-focus structure38 of the type illustrated in

or cleft-constructions as in

are also used to oppose a referent to a

specific set of alternative referents. In both examples in a.

JACK wrote the letter (and not BILL).

b.

It was JACK who wrote the letter (and not BILL).

Jack is opposed to Bill.

There are two crucial differences between intensifier constructions of the type illustrated in

on the one hand, and free argument structures as in

on the other (let us

which are special cases of free focus structures). disregard cleft-constructions as in First, intensifier constructions invariably make reference to alternatives, and if there are no contextually given alternatives, intensifiers will evoke them. Argument-focus structures, on the other hand, do not necessarily evoke alternatives. They often perform the sole function of filling the empty slot in the ‘psychological subject’ (or ‘[propositional] background’, ‘topic’) of a structured proposition (cf. von Stechow 1982, 1991). Consider the conversation in reference to any alternative value. In B’s answer is therefore infelicitous.39

The DP Vicente Fox in

does not make

himself invariably evokes alternatives, and

a.

A: Who is the president of Mexico?

b.

B: Vicente Fox.

c.

B: #Vicente Fox himself.

The second difference between free argument-focus structures on the one hand and intensifier constructions on the other has to do with the set of possible alternatives. While free focus constructions allow reference to a set of alternatives that are restricted only in terms of their semantic type—and, perhaps, a general discourse pragmatic ‘availability condition’—intensifiers impose an additional requirement on the set of alternatives: the alternatives must have something to do with the asserted value. Below, we will say that

The grammar of identity

40

they must be a ‘function’ of that referent. This condition can be observed in the examples above. Another example is given in The two alternative values given in mentioned here—the president and his wife—certainly ‘have something to do’ with each which is consequently other. This does not apply to the two values mentioned in awkward unless additional contextual information is provided. The same sentence ). would be possible only if some without an intensifier is fine (cf. contextually salient relation holding between Hawaii and Tahiti could be recovered, for example if Tahiti were a colony of Hawaii or stood in some other relation of dependency to it. I have met both the president himSELF and his WIFE. a.

#I have never been to Hawaii itSELF, but I’ve been to Tahiti.

b.

I have never been to HawAII, but I’ve been to TaHIti.

A parallel contrast between intensified DPs and the corresponding DPs without an intensifier can be observed in contrastive topic structures as exemplified in

40

a. Rónald loves MAry, and Geórge loves LIZ. b. Ronaldi himsélf loves MAry, and hisi cólleague loves LIZ. c. Ronald himsélf loves MAry, while Geórge loves LIZ. (requires accommodation)

Roughly speaking, in contrastive topic constructions of the kind illustrated in

both

alternatives to both the the topic and the focus are opposed to alternative values. In topical referent Ronald and the focal referent Mary may freely be selected from the discourse, the only restriction being that they have to be of the same semantic type as the and by contrast, the set of alternatives is restricted in two asserted values. In so far as the alternatives must have something to do with the asserted value. is therefore felicitous only if Ronald and George stand in some contextually given relation were uttered in actual discourse, the to one another (brother, colleague, etc.). If addressee would consequently accommodate this piece of information. According to the observations made so far, intensifier constructions are special cases of structures in which reference to alternatives is made. Their function is twofold. First, they ensure that reference to alternatives is made, while free argument-focus structures are not necessarily contrastive. Second, intensifiers provide additional information about the set of relevant alternatives. We can also say that intensifiers restrict the set of alternative values. While contrasting values in a free focus construction can be freely selected from the discourse, in an intensifier construction only those of the referents available can be selected that meet the aforementioned condition of standing in some

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

41

relation to the referent of the head DP. If this is correct, then the contextual conditions of free focus structures are expected to be a subset of those of intensifier constructions, and a free focus structure should be possible whenever an intensifier construction is possible, but not vice versa. This expectation turns out to be generally correct. For example, is possible,

whenever

should also be possible, although it is, in a way, less

The acceptability of a sentence without an intensifier, by contrast, informative than does not entail the acceptability of its counterpart with an intensifier. This is borne out by examples of the type given in a.

I have met John himSELF.

b.

I have met JOHN.

A: Have you been to HawAII? a.

B: No, but I have been to TaHIti.

b.

B: #No, but I have been to Tahiti itSELF.

However, the assumption that the contexts licensing the use of an intensifier are a mere subset of those allowing the absence of an intensifier needs to be slightly qualified. There are also contexts in which the omission of an intensifier leads to a marked contrast in interpretation, and sometimes even to deviance. Consider

and

a.

#I talked to Milleri’s WIFE, but not to the PREsidenti.

b.

I talked to Milleri’s WIFE, but not to [the president himSELF]i.

Only in

can Miller and the president refer to the same person, under normal

would make circumstances of conversation. Put differently, we could say that only the hearer believe that Miller is the president if (s)he did not know it yet. Consequently, there are contexts where sentences with intensifiers are possible, while sentences without intensifiers are unacceptable. I take it that complementarity effects of the kind observable can be attributed to (Gricean or neo-Gricean) rules of conversational inferencing in (cf. Levinson 1987, 1991, and Section 7.4 of this study). Put in a nutshell, the omission of an intensifier may become highly significant if an intensifier could have been used, but has not been used. According to an implicature relating to the maxim of quantity, the hearer may then infer that the intensifier has not been used because it could not have been used. This kind of conversational inferencing pertains to the question of why speakers use intensifiers, and not to the question of what intensifiers contribute to the interpretation of a DP. Hole (2002b) demonstrates that English self-forms are often used to trigger specific contextual effects of the kind exemplified in One of the functions of the intensifier

The grammar of identity

42

in is to allow the deaccentuation of the noun president. If the president is intended to anaphorically refer back to Miller, deaccentuation is in fact necessary. The co-indexing of two nominals x and y co-occurring in a local environment is generally avoided if x precedes y and x is unstressed while y is stressed; but this question relates to the organization of discourse rather than to the function of intensifiers. I will therefore that the set of alternatives contrasting assume in spite of examples such as those in with an intensified DP is contained in the set of alternatives associated with the corresponding DP without an intensifiers 3.2 The interpretation of head-adjacent SELF 3.2.1 Head-adjacent SELF as an expression of the identity function In two independent papers, Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a) have argued that intensifiers denote the identity function ID, i.e. a function from the domain of individuals to the domain of individuals (De→De) whose output is identical to the input (cf. also König and Gast 2002a; Gast 2004). Eckardt (2001:380) defines the identity function as follows: ID: De→De ID(a)=a for all

According to this analysis, the contribution made by a head-adjacent intensifier to the interpretation of a DP is truth-conditionally trivial, since the output value is identical to the input value. The DP Otto selbst is assumed to have the denotation shown in

The truth-conditionally trivial operation shown in becomes meaningful only in combination with the focus structure of a sentence. The crucial point is that intensifiers are considered to be generally in (narrow) focus, while the head DP is assumed to be in the propositional background. Given that the semantic effect of such focusing is invariably the evoking of alternative values that are of the same semantic type as the asserted value (cf. Rooth 1985, 1992, 1996), the identity function ID is related to a set of alternative functions from the domain of individuals to the domain of individuals—for example, functions like BROTHER.OF or WIFE.OF. If these functions are applied to the referent of the head DP (in Otto), they deliver a set of alternative referents A={y1, y2…yn} that are related to the asserted value x in a specific way. In particular, some contextually salient relation R holding between x and the elements from the set of alternatives has to be recoverable. Let us consider one of our standard examples in order

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

43

to illustrate how this works. provides a diagrammatic ‘two-dimensional’ representation of the sentence The president himself will open the meeting. The interpretation of the intensifier is indicated in and illustrates the contrast between the identity function on the one hand, and the alternative functions (Rooth-style focus alternatives) WIFE.OF and SPOKESMAN.OF on the other. As a result of this contrast, the whole sentence is related to the alternative propositions ‘The president’s wife will open the meeting’ and ‘The president’s spokesman will open the meeting’. a. The president [himself]F will open the meeting. b. ID(the president) will open the meeting. c.

According to the analysis proposed by Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a), intensifiers are used to oppose a referent x to a set of alternative referents A={y1, y2,…yn}, in such a way are functions of x. This analysis neatly matches the intuition that all elements expressed in Section 3.1 that the alternative values ‘must have something to do’ with the asserted value. We may now ask: what kind of alternative functions f may contrast with the identity function? The examples given so far were relational nouns like brother (of), wife (of) or spokesman (of). However, the relevant functions can also be given in the discourse environment without there being any lexical natural language correlate. For example, Otto himself could be opposed to the singer which he hates most. As Hole (2002a) demonstrates, the only requirement that must be met by all elements yn of the set of alternatives associated with an intensified DP is that some (contextually salient) relation R holding between the asserted value and the alternative values must be recoverable from the context. Even the South Pole qualifies as a possible alternative to the teacher himself if some relation R holding between the teacher and the South Pole is given in the context. Assuming that the South Pole is the place where the teacher never wanted to go, the example in is fine. I haven’t been to the South Pole, but I’ve seen the teacher himself.

According to the analysis outlined above, intensifiers do not primarily relate referents to sets of alternative referents—rather, it is the identity function that is related to a set of alternative functions. When these functions are applied to the referent of the head DP, however, they deliver a set of alternative referents. Thus, the effect is that of making reference to a set of alternative referents that is restricted in a specific way. This restriction has been paraphrased by saying that ‘the alternative functions must have something to do with the asserted value’, or ‘they must be functions of the asserted

The grammar of identity

44

value’. Another way of putting this is to say that it must be possible to identify the alternative values relative to the referent of the intensified DP; i.e., there must be a ‘mode of presentation’ describing the alternative referents in which the asserted value plays a role. For example, the vice-chancellor can always be identified relative to the chancellor by applying the function REPRESENTATIVE.OF to the latter. By contrast, it is much more difficult to find a function that can be applied to Tahiti, and that delivers as an output value Hawaii (hence the infelicity of

above).

3.2.2 Possible objections There are two objections that could be raised against Eckardt’s (2001) and Hole’s (2002a) analysis. First, it could be argued that not all expressions contrasting with the identity function are really functions, in a narrow sense of that word. Second, one might object that the analysis sketched in Section 3.2.1 is too liberal or even empirically vacuous since all elements of De can be construed as standing in some relation to each other. The first of these objections arises when we consider the mathematical definition of the term ‘function’. A function is commonly defined as a rule f which assigns to each element a of a set A (the domain) exactly one element b from another set B (the range). The problem is that intensifiers can also contrast with relations such as brother, which do not assign unique output values to their inputs (cf.

).

I don’t know Martha herself, but I know one of her brothers.

This problem is only an apparent one. We can regard indefinite DPs like a brother of Mary or one of her brothers as expressions in which a variable associated with a valency position of a predicate (brother) is bound by the ε-operator, which is the indefinite correlate of the Russelian ι-operator (cf. Hilbert and Bernays 1939; von Heusinger 1997, 2000 and references cited there). In mathematical terms, the ε-operator is a choice function, i.e. a function that applies to a set and maps that set onto one of its elements. Consequently, ‘indefinite relational nouns’ like a son of can be regarded as functions that assign to a given input a potentially arbitrary output value. The fact that the output value is potentially arbitrary does not mean that there is no one-to-one correspondence between input and output. Viewed from this perspective, indefinite genitives can be analysed as functions in a strictly mathematical sense. For illustration, consider in

The function

delivers an indefinite DP when it is applied to some individual x. Such an

operation of functional application is shown in

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

a.

λyεx[SON.OF(y)(x)] ‘an x such that x is a son of y’ or simply ‘a son of y’

b.

λyεx[SON.OF(y)(x)](Martha)=εx[SON.OF(Martha)(x)] ‘an x such that x is a son of Martha’ (or simply ‘a son of Martha’)

45

The second potential counter-argument could run as follows: this analysis is empirically vacuous because the set of alternatives associated with an intensified DP is actually identical to the set of alternatives associated with the corresponding ‘bare’ DP, since for there is some function f by way of which it can be related to any each element other element of De. Since we include choice functions in the set of alternatives can contrasting with the identity function ID, we could argue that all elements be related to one another in terms of the relation ‘x is different from y’. This objection is less easy to do away with. In Section 3.3, I will argue that a generalized function of ‘otherness’ is in fact what really contrasts with the identity function ID. However, we will see that the set of alternatives associated with intensified nominals is severely restricted by a focus supposition (cf. Büring 2004) associated with the relevant sentences. Focus suppositions, in turn, can be directly related to the universe of discourse available at the moment of utterance. The fact that intensified nominals cannot contrast with any arbitrary alternative value will thus be explained with reference to a dynamic model of discourse. Note that the analysis of intensifiers as expressions denoting the identity function can account for the distributional restrictions imposed by head-adjacent SELF on its head DP (cf. Section 2.2). According to this analysis, only the identity function is in focus, while the head DP is in the background. This matches the empirical generalization made in Section 2.2 that the referents of intensified DPs have to be either given or accessible. A further advantage of the approach presented in this chapter is that it can claim a high degree of cross-linguistic plausibility, in particular when we consider Germanic languages. As is well known, in some Germanic languages intensifiers also function as expressions of token identity (cf. Section 1.1). This pattern of polysemy is illustrated in for German selb-.

The grammar of identity a.

46

der

selbe

Arzt

wie

…

the

same

doctor

as

…

‘the same doctor as…’ b.

der

Arzt

selbst

the

doctor

SELF

‘the doctor himself’

Even in English, where self-forms are not used as adjectives of token identity, we can find a link between both expressions in the adjective selfsame. Moreover, in Early Modern English self was still used as an adjective of token identity. from Shakespeare:

is an example

My lord, I’ll tell you; that self bill is urg’d, Which in th’ eleventh year of the last king’s reign Was like, and had indeed against us pass’d, But that the scambling and unquiet time Did push it out of farther question. [SHHENV I, 1, 37–41]

3.3 Focus suppositions and contrast: identity vs. alterity As was shown in the previous section, Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a) hold the view that the identity function ID contrasts with all types of functions from individuals to individuals, like WIFE.OF or SPOKESMAN.OF. The set of contrasting expressions is thus theoretically infinite, though it is of course restricted in terms of ‘discourse availability’. In this section I will argue that there is an alternative way to model the type of reference to alternatives made by intensifiers. To a certain extent, the analysis offered in this section is certainly a notational variant of Eckardt’s and Hole’s proposal, but we will see that there is a subtle difference which, in my view, lends more plausibility to the approach advocated here. In addition, the analysis put forward below paves the way for a parallel analysis of head-distant intensifiers, which will be given in Chapter 6. The analysis advanced by Eckardt and Hole is more difficult to apply to head-distant intensifiers. I will argue that the identity function does not contrast with any arbitrary function from the domain of discourse. I claim that it always contrasts with one specific value, namely a generalized ‘alterity function’ OTH (for ‘other’). The meaning of the alterity function OTH is just as trivial as that of the identity function. OTH takes a value x as an input and maps it onto some output y which is different from the input; i.e., it is a choice function (cf. Section 3.2), which means that it does not assign a uniquely identifiable output value to its input.

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

47

According to my analysis a DP like the president himself does not primarily contrast with something like the president’s spokesman or the president’s wife, but simply with someone other than the president. The contrast established by intensifiers is, consequently, always binary. The interpretation of the sentence The president himself will This sentence basically open the meeting is given in a diagrammatic form in contrasts with Someone other than the president will open the meeting.

Of course, the contrast established by intensifiers does not, according to this analysis, differ in any way from the one established by free focus constructions (cf. Section 3.1). A sentence like It is [the president]F who will open the meeting likewise makes reference to alternative sentences in which someone other than the president will open the meeting. The crucial difference between intensifier constructions and free focus structures lies in the ‘focus suppositions’ associated with the relevant sentences. Focus suppositions are a specific type of (relatively weak) presuppositions—typically existential presuppositions—that result from focus marking and that are independent of lexical material (cf. Büring 2004). They can be determined by replacing the focus of a sentence with an appropriate existentially bound variable. While The president [himself] will open the meeting gives rise to the focus supposition shown in

the corresponding

sentence without an intensifier is associated with the focus supposition in a.

Focus supposition of The president [himself] F will open the meeting: [f (the president) will open the meeting] ‘Someone related to the president will open the meeting.’

b.

Focus supposition of [The president] F will open the meeting: [x will open the meeting] ‘Someone will open the meeting.’

The focus supposition spelt out in corresponds to a discourse stage previous to the moment of utterance, i.e. it represents a proposition that is taken for granted before the utterance The president himself opened the meeting is made. The set of entities potentially opening the conference is thus restricted beforehand, in a context in which the sentence The president himself opened the meeting would be appropriate. What this sentence states, then, is that among the various individuals that are related to the president, thus qualifying as potential conference-openers, the one who actually opened the meeting was identical to, and not different from, the president. Under this analysis, the restriction on alternatives observed above results from the fact that a function f, which takes the president as its argument, is in (narrow) focus. It is not crucial that the relevant

The grammar of identity

48

function be the identity function. What the identity function does is select a specific entity from a previously restricted set of individuals—the entity which is identical to the president—to the exclusion of all possible alternative values, i.e. those referents that are different from the president. Clearly, this ‘modified’ version of Eckardt’s and Hole’s analysis is basically equivalent to their own proposal. The difference basically lies in the ‘division of labour’ between focus suppositions and reference to alternatives suggested here, which are both captured by Rooth-style p-sets in Eckardt’s and Hole’s analysis. However, I qualify the adjective ‘equivalent’ by adding ‘basically’ because I think that there is a slight difference between both accounts. Nothing in Eckardt’s and Hole’s analysis explicitly states that the actual contrasting referents, which are functions of the referent of the intensified DP, will have to be different from that referent extensionally. For example, nothing explicit is said as to whether the referents of the DPs contrasting with the president himself will have to be different from the president. They will, of course, generally be different simply because they are the output of some function f, applied to the president, which is not the identity function. However, the output of such functions need not always be different from the input, since different modes of presentation may be used to refer to the same entity. Suppose the president is dead. He is still ‘the president’, but he has now become indistinguishable from ‘the body of the president’. Suppose the president’s spokesman is dead, too. The question is: can the DP the president himself contrast with the body of the president? Certainly not! Both values are, extensionally, identical, even though they differ intensionally. But the president himself can still contrast with the (dead) spokesman, who differs from the president (himself) both extensionally and intensionally. In other words: the modification of Eckardt’s and Hole’s proposal put forward in this section predicts that the focus alternatives contrasting with an intensified DP must not be extensionally identical to the referent of that DP. No such prediction is made by Eckardt’s and Hole’s account. I would like to argue that the analysis advocated here can also solve the second problem mentioned in Section 3.2.2. There, a possible objection was pointed out, namely that all elements of a universe of discourse may be trivially related to each other by applying the (choice) function ‘λy[an x that is different from y]’ to one of the elements. According to the analysis proposed here, a contrast between the president himself and someone other than the president is not only allowed, it is in fact the only possible option; but the set of possible alternative referents is restricted beforehand by a focus supposition. Focus suppositions, in turn, relate directly to a specific universe of discourse, which is defined relative to some context C at a given point in a conversation. If no such relation as ‘x is different from y’ is stored in this universe of discourse, holding between the referent of the intensified DP on the one hand and the possible focus alternatives on the other, the relevant referents will not be included in the set of alternatives and will therefore not be available as contrasting referents at the time of the utterance. 3.4 Deriving the various readings of head-adjacent intensifiers Both the analysis outlined in Section 3.2 and the modified version presented in Section 3.3 derive the manifold semantic effects of intensification from an extremely

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

49

parsimonious core meaning of intensifiers. This is certainly appealing from a theoretical point of view. However, we should also make sure that these analyses can account for all occurrences of intensifiers, and only those occurrences. In this section we will therefore subject the analysis to closer scrutiny, considering to what extent it can account for the readings of intensifiers distinguished in previous work on intensifiers. König and Siemund (2000a, b, c) have presented the most comprehensive overview to date of the contexts licensing head-adjacent intensifiers. They distinguish four such (cf. also Section 3.5.2). König and Siemund environments, which are listed here in refer to the referent of the head DP as the ‘central’ value, and to the relevant alternatives as the ‘periphery’ associated with that referent. Examples of each type of context are given in A referent x is central with regard to an alternative (peripheral) referent y in so far as: i.

x has a higher position than y in a hierarchy (hierarchical centrality).

ii.

x is more significant than y in a specific situation (situational centrality).

iii. y is defined in terms of x (identifying centrality). iv. i.

x is the centre of perspective (logophoricity). The chancellor himself was surprised at the results.

ii. Nobody cared about the fans when the fire broke out, but the rock star himself was quickly whisked away. iii. Lucy’s sister is more intelligent than Lucy herself. iv. Jemima guessed that Popey had chivalrous doubts about leaving her in the gaunt building, with only Tiger, now in a highly restless mood, as company. She herself had no such fears.41 (König and Siemund 2000b:46)

The task is, therefore, to show that each of the contexts distinguished in can be accounted for under the analysis advocated here. In other words, it needs to be shown that the various instantiations of the ‘centre-periphery’ relation assumed by König and Siemund can be modelled as a contrast between a given individual on the one hand, and a function of that individual on the other. We will consider the four contexts in turn. 3.4.1 Identifying and situational centrality The analysis of intensifiers as expressions of an identity function can most obviously account for König and Siemund’s third context typically licensing intensifiers: ‘y is defined in terms of x’. Let us consider another example:

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Joe’s father had worked for her father, and Joe himself had earned a few shillings helping out, when he was a scrawny boy with a runny nose. [BNC CDY 704]

It may be too sloppy to say that ‘y is defined in terms of x’, since we would usually not assume that a DP ‘defines’ a referent, or that one referent ‘defines’ another. What is at stake here is that two discourse entities are referred to in terms of two different modes of presentation: while Joe is identified by a proper name, Joe’s father is identified via the function FATHER.OF, applied to John. In terms of the analysis proposed in Section 3.3, we would assume that Joe’s father is available in the universe of discourse as a function of John, and thus as a possible contrasting value. A similar parallelism can be observed in König and Siemund’s second typical context licensing intensifiers, where ‘x is more significant than y in a specific situation’. Consider the examples given in a. Two such distinct behaviours can at times be observed, either by the participant himself or by an outside observer. [BNC AM6 1004] b. The guests were carefully dressed. The quiz master himself looked like a clown. (Siemund 2000:138) c. Most tourists survived the bus accident. The driver himself was killed instantly. (Siemund 2000:140)

Siemund (2000:138) argues that the quiz master in is ‘central’ because ‘[t]aking him away makes the show break down’. In terms of the present approach, we would say that there is some contextually salient relation holding between the quiz master and the guests—in this case, the guests are the quiz master’s guests. Again, the focused identity function ID evokes another function GUEST via a focus supposition, and both of them take the same referent as their argument, viz. the quiz master. How can we capture the difference between the first and the second context of ‘centrality’ distinguished above, in purely linguistic terms? I think that such a distinction can be made rather straightforwardly: in the first case (Joe—Joe’s father), the relation holding between the asserted referent and the relevant alternative is an inherent or permanent relation, i.e. a relation which remains constant over the whole stretch of discourse. In the second case (the quiz master—the quiz master’s guests), the relation is bound to a specific situation: the guests are guests only with regard to the situation of the quiz show. The interrelation between the quiz master and the guests is restricted to, or defined in terms of, the show. When we look at other examples involving ‘centrality in a situation’, we quickly become aware that this is a common feature of all examples of this type. The examples in

(taken from Baker 1995:82–83) illustrate this point.

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a. Martha refused to consider indicting the organization that had withheld evidence about the murder until she was sure that she could convict the triggerman himself. b. Of all the people who were in the courtroom yesterday morning, only the defendant herself remained completely calm when the judge handed down her sentence. c. I’m surprised that the patient himself hasn’t had a bit more to say about the proposed liver transplant. d. Vivid in their own way as may be the emotions of one who sees a fellow-citizen sand-bagged in a quiet street, they differ in kind from those experienced by the victim himself.

The definite descriptions that are intensified in all relate to a given event—we could also say that they take an event variable as one of their arguments. The has an obligatory argument slot for an event variable, since one can triggerman in never be a triggerman per se, one becomes a triggerman only with respect to a given event (here, the murder). Likewise, the defendant in

becomes a defendant only

one cannot be a patient per se, one becomes a with respect to a given trial. As to patient only in a situation of medical care. And finally, a victim is always the victim of ). some (unpleasant) event (cf. In those examples where the head DP is not a definite description with a slot for an event variable, it must be clear from the context that the referent in question could have been referred to using such a nominal—i.e., the referent performs some function with can be considered a case in point, since the respect to the event under discussion. sentence only makes sense if Bill is a lawyer, or participates in some other way in the trial under discussion. The obstacle that Bill (=the lawyer) tried to set up for the opposing lawyer ultimately caused major difficulties for Bill himself.

Cases of ‘situational centrality’ are thus characterized by the nature of the head DP: it must be a definite description that relates to a given event. We can refer to such nominals as ‘event-related’ definite descriptions. Interestingly, all alternative values contrasting with an intensified event-related nominal must relate to the same event as the head DP. are all entities that have, in For example, possible alternatives to the triggerman in one way or another, (actively or passively) participated in the crime under discussion: the accomplices, the victims, the policemen engaged in the investigation, etc. Thus, a murderer cannot be contrasted with an accomplice of another crime (cf. versus ).

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a. I will not convict the murderer himself, but I will convict his accomplice. b. #I will not convict Kennedy’s murderer himself, but I will convict the accomplice of the murderer of Uwe Barschel.

A further, very important, point is that the event itself also figures among the possible alternatives of an intensified event-related nominal. For example, the murderer can be opposed to the murder that (s)he commits, and the victim of an accident can be contrasted with the accident itself (cf.

and

).

a. We know many things about the murder itself, but we don’t know anything about the murderer. b. We got the details of Martha’s unfortunate accident from Martha herself. (Baker 1995:83)

Before coming to the more intricate cases, let us briefly make a halt and summarize what and (identifying and we have found so far: König and Siemund’s contexts situational centrality, respectively) can straightforwardly be explained in terms of the analysis provided by Eckardt and Hole. Furthermore, the difference between both contexts can be explained in terms of the type of relation holding between the asserted value and the relevant alternatives. ‘Situational centrality’ requires (i) that the relation holding between the asserted value and the relevant alternatives is bound to some event e, (ii) that the head DP has to be an event-related definite description, and (iii) that alternative referents have to participate in the same event as the referent of the intensified DP. The effect of ‘identifying centrality’ emerges if the contextually salient relations holding between the centre and the periphery are permanent relations. In this case, there seems to be no restriction with regard to the nature of the head DP, at least in terms of relationality. The victim of the murder can be opposed both to a witness (of the murder) (situational centrality) and to his mother (identifying centrality). It therefore seems that there is a relationship of inclusion holding between the two different contexts: ‘situational centrality’ requires that the head DP be an event-related description, while ‘identifying centrality’ does not impose any such requirement. 3.4.2 Hierarchical structures and organizational centres We now come to a point where the analysis of intensifiers as identity functions appears to break down. A problem arises when we consider König and Siemund’s first typical context, which is probably the one with the highest text frequency: ‘x has a higher position than y in a hierarchy’. Yet I will argue in the following that the semantics adopted here makes the correct predictions. Another example is given in

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Yet the World Bank has continued to press this issue, at one stage moving the permanent secretary in the president’s office to angrily rebuke the young leader of the Bank’s team, and to the president himself being moved to recount to the team the Biblical story of the seven fat and seven lean years. [BNC A6M 981]

The president of a bank occupies the highest rank within the hierarchy of a bank’s the president (of the World Bank) is opposed to the permanent employees. In secretary and the young leader of the bank’s team, who both rank lower in that hierarchy. Similar instances of intensifiers are often found with nominals such as the chairman, the boss, or the Pope, which are, in one way or another, perceived of as constituting the top points of hierarchical (human) organizations. These instances of intensifiers appear to pose a challenge to the semantics assumed by Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a). On the one hand, such examples can easily be accounted for: each element of the hierarchy under discussion can be regarded as the value of some function f when applied to the president—for example, the function SUBORDINATE.OF. However, we are bound to meet with the following objection: it has often been noticed that intensifiers of the type illustrated in do not work bottom-up, i.e. they cannot relate an individual ranking lower on a hierarchy to higheris infelicitous, while is fine. This is, on the face ranking ones. Therefore, of it, not predicted by the present account, since the function SUBORDINATE.OF has a bottom-up correlate, namely BOSS.OF. a.

#The serf himself worked in the fields, not the king.

b.

The king himself worked in the fields, not the serf.

The acceptability contrast between and appears to require that Eckardt’s and Hole’s semantics should be enriched with some additional component, since it otherwise allows unacceptable examples. However, this is probably not necessary. As is shown by Hole (2002a), it is in principle not impossible to use intensifiers with entities ranking low on some hierarchy, and to oppose these entities to higher-ranking alternatives. He gives the following example for illustration (p.c.): This is none of her boss’s business; the secretary herself should make sure that there are sufficient paper supplies.

Although examples of this type are relatively hard to find in corpora, they are not nonis a pertinent example from the BNC. Here, the slaves themselves are existent. opposed to the abolitionists and their (the slaves’) masters. The contrast is somewhat more explicit in discussion.

where a specific master of a given slave is the alternative under

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a. The circumstances of the 1820s and early 1830s, however, in two particular respects reminded the abolitionists that not all the elements of the situation could be shaped by them. The slaves themselves intervened dramatically by rising in revolt in Demerara in 1823 and in Jamaica at the end of 1831 and the beginning of 1832. Their masters too refused to play their assigned parts; despite some legislation in the islands in accord with Canning’s programme, evidence accumulated of slave-owner resistance to the progress of amelioration. [BNC CLN 322] b. If a slave, by order of his master, should kidnap a freeborn person, the master shall be liable for such satisfaction in damages as has been elsewhere provided in the case of freeborn persons, and shall receive a hundred lashes in public, but the slave himself shall incur no penalty, having acted under the command of his master. [www]42

What we can learn from and is that intensifiers can be used to oppose a given individual to another one who ranks higher in some hierarchy. It cannot be denied that there is a strong statistical bias towards the top-down cases; but this bias cannot be regarded as resulting from the lexical specifications of intensifiers themselves. What we have to explain is why intensifiers contextualize less easily with entities ranking low on such hierarchies, while the ‘top-down’ examples are perfectly natural. The answer to this question has to be sought in the notion of ‘contextual saliency’, or ‘availability in the universe of discourse’. The problem is that bottom-up relations such as boss of are simply not contextually salient. The highest-ranking elements of such hierarchies lexically evoke their entourage. It is a matter of world knowledge that a particular type of person is surrounded by a number of satellites, for example the Pope or the chancellor. This is linguistically reflected in the fact that definite descriptions of the lower-ranking elements are often, in lexical terms, functions of the nominals denoting higher-ranking elements. A secretary, for example, is always the secretary of someone, and you can relate the chancellor himself to the chancellor’s secretary. Thus, the nominal secretary is lexically evoked by the chancellor, and hence ‘accessible’ (cf. Lambrecht 1994). By contrast, nominals denoting higher-ranking elements of such hierarchies are typically not functions of the lower-ranking ones. For example, the president cannot be opposed to the secretary herself because the president is not the secretary’s president— he is her boss, but this relation is not lexically evoked, and therefore not contextually salient unless it is explicitly introduced into the discourse. If this is done, it becomes possible to oppose the secretary herself to the president (=her boss), as Hole’s example above demonstrates. From a lexical point of view, however, relational nouns indicating the position of a given individual in some hierarchy are typically functions from a higher-ranking member to a lower-ranking element. The examples in illustrate this point. a.

The chancellor: ‘Joschka is my Foreign Secretary.’

b.

##The Foreign Secretary: ‘Gerd is my chancellor.’

c.

The Foreign Secretary: ‘Rezzo is my Under-Secretary.’

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function d.

##The Under-Secretary: ‘Joschka is my Foreign Secretary.’

e.

The Under-Secretary: ‘Erna is my secretary.’

f.

##The secretary: ‘Rezzo is my Under-Secretary.’ etc.

55

Note that the explanation for the rarity of bottom-up intensifiers provided here is not too different from the one offered by Siemund. With regard to the asymmetry under discussion, Siemund (2000:134) remarks that ‘secretaries do not possess a natural periphery’. We could translate this statement into Eckardt’s and Hole’s terms by saying that secretaries are not associated with a number of referents that stand in some contextually salient relation to them in the same way as presidents and Popes. I conclude that ‘hierarchical centrality’ is merely a sub-case of ‘identifying centrality’, since a discourse referent y is referred to in terms of some function f which denotes a permanent relation, and which has to be applied to the referent of the intensified nominal x in order to deliver y (the president—the president’s secretary). Furthermore, ‘hierarchical centrality’ seems to be generally characterized by the fact that the head DP—the president, the chairman, etc.—is a DP containing a relational noun. These relational nouns take some organization as one of their arguments. For example, a president is a relational noun, since a president is always the president of some organization (e.g. the World Bank), and the Pope could be paraphrased as ‘the head of the Catholic Church’. 3.4.3 Head-adjacent intensifiers in logophoric contexts The logophoric use of intensifiers was first illustrated in above. In short, intensifiers are often used when the referent of their head DP is characterized as the ‘centre of perspective’ (König and Siemund 1999), the ‘assigned epistemic validator’ (Stirling 1993), or the ‘subject of consciousness’ (Zribi-Hertz 1989) of a given text passage. Baker (1995) as well as König and Siemund (2000b) include this type of context among the most typical instances licensing intensifiers. In much contextual information is included in order to illustrate the logophoric nature of the text passage.43 She’d gone about this project in entirely the wrong manner. But if she’d been frank from the outset and had admitted to him that she’d been sent by his stepmother with the plea for him to visit her the result would have been short and sharp. Bertha would have been sent the message that she could go hopping sideways while she herself would have been told to get down the road and out of his sight. [BNC HHB 1561]

With the cover term ‘logophoric contexts’ I refer both to information that is embedded under a logophoric verb (say, think, etc.)44 and to the stylistic device of free indirect speech, as illustrated in In both cases, states of affairs are characterized as utterances, thoughts, or psychological states of some protagonist other than the speaker or narrator. Often, logophoric contexts extend over larger stretches of discourse. The whole passage in

is reported from the perspective of the protagonist. This is formally

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reflected in the use of specific tense forms such as the past perfect (She’d either the simple past or the present perfect. Without any major change of gone about this project…), where the speaker perspective would require meaning, the same passage could be reproduced by embedding the whole paragraph under a predicate of direct speech, and by substituting first person pronouns for the third person ones, modifying the tense forms accordingly (She thought: ‘I have gone about this project…’). Adopting a term coined by Zribi-Hertz (1989), I will refer to a given stretch of discourse that is reported from the perspective of some unique subject of consciousness (SC) as a ‘domain of point of view’ (DPV). Two remarks are in order to define the notion of ‘subject of consciousness’ more exactly: first, I follow Zribi-Hertz (1989) in claiming that there is always an SC, also in non-logophoric discourse. In this case—which is the default case—the SC is identical to the speaker. Consequently, the defining characteristic of logophoric contexts is not that there is an SC, but that the SC is different from the speaker. The second remark concerns what we may call ‘nested DPVs’: since discourse is generally organized hierarchically, several DPVs (and the SCs controlling them) may be embedded within each other. In fact, a nested structure can always be recovered in logophoric contexts, since the highestlevel SC is the speaker (or narrator in written texts), while the logophoric passage is controlled by some other discourse participant. For this reason, Zribi-Hertz (1989) defines a special case of SC, viz. the ‘minimal subject of consciousness’ (MSC). It is the lowest-level SC, the ‘local SC’, as it were: the MSC does not control any DPV which is reported from the perspective of any other referent. A model of discourse organization capturing logophoricity facts could roughly be modelled as follows (for much more elaborate proposals, see Sells 1987 and Stirling 1993): every sentence S forms part of a given DPV. Every DPV is controlled by exactly one (minimal) subject of consciousness. Diagrammatically, this could be represented as in

DPVs are enclosed by parentheses, and subscripts on the parentheses indicate

could be the subject of consciousness controlling the relevant DPV. The structure in thought of as characterizing a discourse passage made up of three sentences uttered by and from the perspective of SC1. The third sentence S3 contains an embedded logophoric sentence (S4), which is controlled by some SC2 which is different from SC1.

From the perspective of an analysis of intensifiers as expressions denoting the identity function, the use of intensifiers in logophoric contexts is somewhat puzzling. The problem is that in these contexts, intensifiers appear not to obey the expected distributional restriction: the set of alternatives contrasting with an intensified nominal seems to be completely unrestricted. This poses a challenge to our analysis, since we assume that all elements of the set of alternatives should be the value of some contextually salient function, applied to the referent of the intensified DP. In logophoric contexts, intensifiers appear to be licensed without there being any such function

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establishing a link between the asserted value and the relevant alternatives. In order to see is an attested example illustrating the use of a this, let us consider an example. logophoric intensifier. The DPVs and SCs are indicated using the bracketing introduced in (Parker insists that (Helms has misinterpreted Whitman by reading a spurious text and that he himself rather than Helms offers the ‘genuine’ or the ‘real’ ‘Live Oak, with Moss.’)Parker)speaker [www]45

According to the analysis put forward in Chapter 3, it should be possible to refer to Helms, who is paradigmatically opposed to Parker (he himself), in terms of some function f applied to Parker. This is illustrated in

When we look for a function f that qualifies as a focus alternative contrasting with the intensifier in there is apparently only one option: the only relation holding between Parker and Helms is λxλy[x insists that x rather than y offers the real Live Oak]. The only function potentially linking Helms to Parker would thus be something like λx[the y such that x insists that x rather than y offers the real Live Oak]. However, this function is clearly not what contrasts with the identity function in This can be shown using a simple substitution test. If we substitute that function, applied to Parker, for Helms in we get the odd paraphrase in #Parker insists that he himself offers the real Live Oak, rather than the person who he insists does not offer the real Live Oak.

illustrates what was pointed out in Section 3.3, namely that functions qualifying as alternatives to the identity function must be available before a sentence is uttered, i.e. they have to figure in the universe of discourse. If a relation R such as taller than is asserted to hold between two referents x and y in an utterance U, then a function f which is derived from R (‘an x such that x is taller than y’) cannot contrast with the identity function ID in U. In other words, we cannot identify a referent y in terms of the application of a function f to another referent x if the fact that ‘y is f(x)’ is asserted in U. The result of this operation has the character of a truism, as in We consequently have to find a different solution to our problem. When we consider the nature of logophoricity phenomena more closely, it soon becomes clear why all DPs occurring in a logophoric environment are capable of contrasting with the SC controlling that DPV, even if it is intensified. As has been argued in Gast (2004), all sentences

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forming part of a logophoric context are by definition interpreted relative to a given subject of consciousness. In other words, a given subject of consciousness SCi is a component of all denotations αn forming part of a domain of point of view controlled by SCi. This is why the set of alternatives associated with an intensified SC contains all other discourse participants. This can be seen most clearly in those contexts that contain not only an explicit trigger, but also certain typical ‘symptoms’ of logophoricity. Subjective expressions like fool or sexy are such concomitant phenomena of logophoricity. Sells (1987) uses these evaluative items as a test frame to demonstrate that the ‘SOURCE’—‘the one who makes the report’ (Sells 1987:455)—of an utterance is ‘internal’, i.e. that some state of affairs is reported by a protagonist other than the speaker. Consider Fred: (Hanna wondered (why that fool had asked her to marry him.)Hanna)Fred

The DP that fool in is ambiguous between a logophoric and a non-logophoric reading. If it is interpreted relative to the SC Hanna, then it is Hanna who considers the person in question to be a fool. In a non-logophoric reading (SC=Fred), the property of being a fool is ascribed to the relevant referent by Fred. The two interpretations of the DP that fool can be paraphrased as in a. [DP that fool]1

‘the x which the speaker/Fred considers a fool’ (non-logoph.)

b. [DP that fool]2

‘the x which Hanna considers a fool’ (logophoric)

Recall from Section 3.2 that a referent y is capable of contrasting with a referent x of some intensified DP whenever there is some mode of presentation of y in which x occurs. Given that all DPs occurring in logophoric contexts can (but need not) be construed as individuals identified or perceived by the subject of consciousness, there is always some contextually salient relation holding between the referent of the intensified DP and the relevant alternative referent. For example, in the logophoric reading of that fool in Hanna forms part of a description of the relevant referent, who can be identified as ‘the person that Hanna considers a fool’. This is why that fool can be opposed to Hanna even though the DP referring to Hanna is intensified (cf. ). In the function licensing the contrast with the identity function (she herself ID(she)) is λx[that y which x considers a fool] (cf.

).

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a. (Hanna wondered (why she herself was so much smarter than that fool.)Hanna)spkr. b. (Hanna wondered (why she herself was so much smarter than the person that she Considered a fool.)Hanna)speaker

It might be objected that there is a contradiction here. On the one hand, I contend that logophoric contexts do not differ substantially from non-logophoric contexts in so far as the latter also involve a (default) subject of consciousness, namely the speaker. On the other hand, I have argued that in logophoric contexts, the contextual restriction of intensifiers narrowing down the set of alternative referents is severely weakened, and reference to a virtually unrestricted set of alternatives is possible. If, in the end, logophoric contexts differ only with regard to the nature of the perspective holder from non-logophoric contexts, why do non-logophoric contexts not allow intensifier constructions to contrast with an unrestricted set of alternatives? This point strengthens the present argument rather than weakening it. Intensifiers with an unrestricted set of alternatives are systematically licensed under certain circumstances. Namely, they can be used with first person pronouns when the speaker wants to emphasize his/her role as a subject of consciousness. A relevant example is given in

Although I myself believe that this statement is broadly true there are a number of serious research workers who now believe that it is false. [BNC H10 533]

The observation that first person pronouns (and also, though more marginally, second person pronouns) play a special role in the context of logophoricity has also been made in the context of untriggered self-forms (we will return to untriggered self-forms in Section 8.3). In particular, topic exponents such as as for…-self are best with first person subjects, more marginal but still acceptable with second person subjects, and ungrammatical with third person subjects. This ‘grammaticality cline’, which is discussed by König and Siemund (2000c:187), can be observed in a.

As for myself, I won’t be invited.

b.

As for yourself, you won’t be invited.

c.

*As for himself, he won’t be invited.

König and Siemund explain the acceptability cline from the first to the third person as follows:

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What allows us to use the first person self-form, but rules out the use of the one in the third person appears again to be related to perspective and point of view. Sentences with first person subjects almost by definition reflect the point of view of the speaker and precisely this connection can explain the grammaticality of first person self-forms in contexts where third person self-forms are disallowed. (König and Siemund 2000c:187) Zribi-Hertz (1989) makes a similar observation concerning long-distance bound can reflexives. According to her argument, the grammaticality cline illustrated in naturally be explained if we assume that the speaker as well as the addressee have the status of default validators: ‘The speaker and addressee of a discourse…are a priori read as logophoric, and they are therefore always possible antecedents for 1st- or 2nd-person LDB [long-distance bound] reflexives’ (Zribi-Hertz 1989:711). 3.5 Previous analyses of head-adjacent intensifiers Having argued that intensifiers can be analysed with a very parsimonious semantics, we will now discuss some previous approaches to the function and meaning of intensifiers. One of the most widespread approaches involves scalar analyses of intensifiers, which will be discussed in Section 3.5.1. Section 3.5.2 provides an overview of the analysis offered by König and Siemund, in which intensifiers are analysed as focus particles. 3.5.1 Scalar approaches to the function of intensifiers Scalar analyses have long figured prominently in research on intensifiers and can still be found in more recent contributions on the semantics of head-adjacent SELF (for example, Kibrik and Bogdanova 1995; Lyutikova 2000). For the sake of completeness it therefore seems appropriate to briefly consider this line of reasoning as well, even though such analyses have not proven successful (see for example König 1991b:89 or Siemund 2000:124ff.). Among the first authors who explicitly proposed to account for the meaning of intensifiers in terms of a scalar analysis are Edmondson and Plank (1978). They take up an idea by Cantrall (1973:64), who states that ‘[i]ntensifiers are used rhetorically to point up “remarkability”’: Three factors figure crucially in the judgement of the appropriateness of such utterances […]: It must be the case that (a) this person or thing being mentioned, (b) in this particular situation, is remarkable (c) in the eyes of the speaker. (Edmondson and Plank 1978:379) According to this characterization, head-adjacent intensifiers are used to express a (speaker’s) assessment that it is remarkable for an individual x to participate in a situation illustrates this idea. The king is conceived of as the most unlikely person to s. work in the fields and therefore can, according to Edmondson and Plank, felicitously be characterized as remarkable or unexpected in this particular context. The serfs, by

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contrast, are expected to work in the fields, and an intensifier would be inappropriate here. a. The king himself worked in the fields. b. #The serfs themselves worked in the fields. (Edmondson and Plank 1978:381)

The idea of a scalar meaning contribution has also been defended by Primus (1992) for German selbst.46 Primus categorizes selbst in its head-adjacent function as a focus analysing it in terms

particle with sentential scope. She provides the example in of the structured propositions approach as is shown in

47

A general interpretation

rule for selbst is provided in a.

Der Gefangene SELBST lächelte.

b.

SELBST(λx[lächelte(x)], der Gefangene)

selbst’ (λXα[A’[Xα]], αB’) implies that the denotation of αB’ is ranked lower than every focus alternative of αB’ on a scale (of likelihood, expectancy, etc.) determined by λXα[A’[Xα]]. (Primus 1992:71)

Scalar analyses of the kind put forward by Edmondson and Plank (1978) and Primus (1992) are at once too restrictive and too liberal. First, there are a number of examples in which intensifiers can felicitously be used without there being any kind of remarkability or counter-expectancy. As König (2001:750) notes: ‘[t]hat analyses along these lines cannot be right is simply shown by the fact that sentences with adnominal intensifiers can be introduced by a clause like As everyone expected…without contradiction’. illustrates this nicely. In fact, in some occurrences of head-adjacent SELF the referent of the intensified nominal is even the individual most expected to have the property denoted by the VP.Siemund (2000:127) makes this point with regard to a. As everyone expected, John Major himself closed last year’s conference in Blackpool. b. Only the president himself knows the secret code to start a nuclear strike.

Scalar analyses of intensifiers wrongly predict that cases like

will be inadmissible.

What is more, these analyses allow examples that are plainly odd. For instance, should be admitted according to the semantics assumed by Edmondson and Plank (1978) and Primus (1992), since servants constitute one of the social classes least expected to be rich:

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62

#In Mexico, the servants themselves are rich.

is also instructive in another respect: it gives a hint as to why there are such acceptability contrasts as the one illustrated in above. DPs such as the servants do not combine easily with an intensifier, irrespective of the specific verbal environment. This follows from the fact that head-adjacent SELF is interpreted DP-internally and does not relate to material outside the DP, a point already made by König (1991b). Given such compelling arguments against a scalar analysis of head-adjacent SELF, it is surprising to find similar attempts even in more recent contributions on the semantics of intensifiers (e.g. Kibrik and Bogdanova 1995 on Russian sam, or Lyutikova 2000 on Tsaxur wuž). Scalar analyses of intensifiers are probably motivated by two factors: (i) intensifiers seem to be associated with a scalar semantics in a considerable number of cases, and (ii) in some languages, intensifiers are homophonous with scalar focus particles. The first of these observations is certainly related to the function of intensifiers as characterized in Section 3.1. Given that intensifiers invariably evoke alternatives to the referent of their head DP, they are particularly prone to occur in scalar contexts. Often, the scalar component of intensifier constructions is contributed by the focus structure of a sentence. Eckardt (2001) makes a similar point with regard to the function of intensifiers, noting that ‘scales of surprise play a role in the interpretation of a sentence if and only if the focus particle or construction in question contributes a scale of surprise’ (Eckardt 2001:377). However, she clearly makes too strong a statement when she claims that ‘[a] sentence with stressed selbst (not associating with a focus particle) is a no-surprise example iff selbst enters a hat focus construction’ (Eckardt 2001:388). The biconditional iff entails that all examples without a hat contour intonation should be ‘surprise sentences’. That this is not right can easily be shown with a counter-example such as that in As everyone knows, the chancellor himself makes the decisions.

The fact that intensifiers are prone to occur in scalar contexts can also be held responsible for the intensifiers’ being homophonous with scalar focus particles in some languages. German selbst is one of the lexical items exhibiting this kind of homophony. It has an scalar meaning when it precedes the DP (cf. König 1991b; Primus 1992).48 Selbst

Fritz

weiß

die

Antwort.

even

Fred

knows

the

answer

‘Even Fred knows the answer.’

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

63

Similar patterns of homophony can be observed in French (même) and Finnish (itse). As mentioned in Section 2.1, Swedish has two alternative head-adjacent intensifier constructions: one in which the intensifier inflects and precedes the head DP, and one in which it is invariant and follows the head DP. The left-adjoined intensifier construction is sometimes used in the context of unexpected participation of the relevant referent in an event. Some varieties of English likewise have a scalar use of self-forms. Siemund 49 (2002b:266) provides the Irish English examples in a. I question will Tom ever make a threepenny piece, or a penny itself, out of that old construction he has always there in the bog. b. Death itself couldn’t make me forget her.

It is quite obvious what has happened in languages showing homophony of intensifiers and scalar focus particles: a property of the context has been reanalysed as a property of the lexical item itself. Diachronic linguistics has coined a number of different terms for this process. We will content ourselves with the term ‘hypoanalysis’ used by Croft (2000). The formal identity of intensifiers and scalar focus particles in the aforementioned languages can thus be explained in terms of the fact that intensifiers tend to occur in scalar contexts. Once the scalar nature of the context is attributed to the intensifier itself, the intensifier changes into something different—namely, into a scalar focus particle. In no way, however, do we have to assume that a scalar implicature is part of the meaning of intensifiers. 3.5.2 The analysis proposed by König and Siemund As mentioned in Section 3.4, König and Siemund (2000a, b, c) regard the notion of ‘centrality’ as an important ingredient of a semantic description of intensifiers: intensifiers are analysed as elements that characterize the referent of their head DP as ‘central’, and oppose it to alternative values that are ‘peripheral’ with regard to that ‘central’ value. The notion of centrality was explicated by providing a list of typical contexts licensing intensifiers—a list of ‘instantiations of the centre-periphery’ relation, as it were. This list, given above as

is repeated here as

A referent x is central with regard to an alternative (peripheral) referent y in so far as: i.

x has a higher position than y in a hierarchy (hierarchical centrality).

ii.

x is more significant than y in a specific situation (situational centrality).

iii. y is defined in terms of x (identifying centrality). iv.

x is the centre of perspective (logophoricity).

From an empirical point of view, the description provided by König and Siemund covers a wide range of occurrences of intensifiers. However, it seems to me that the way in

The grammar of identity

64

which the semantic effect of intensifiers at the level of sentence interpretation is derived meets with some problems. König and Siemund take it that intensifiers are focus particles that assign a specific property (‘centrality’) to their head DPs. In this respect, their analysis parallels the one given by Primus (1992) (see also Ferro 1993 for a similar point of view). However, unlike Primus, König and Siemund hold the view that in their headadjacent use type, ‘such emphatic reflexives are best analysed as taking scope only within the NP to which they are attached, in other words their scope is co-extensive with their focus’ (König 1991b:90). Accordingly, itself in is assumed to be akin to alone in and only in a. The heart of the strong population growth lay in London itself and an overspill of about 1 million people was expected. [BNC G05 1577] b. To date ACET has provided professional nursing care or practical help to over 400 individuals across London, excluding hardship grants and equipment loans. In Ealing alone we have received over 30 referrals for Home Care. [BNC A00 366] c. $200 only is required to solve all my problems. (König 1991b:103)

Head-distant intensifiers are analysed as taking scope over the VP. Since they follow their head DP and bear sentence stress, König and Siemund contend that they pattern with inclusive focus particles such as too. a.

John has mown the lawn himSELF.

b.

John has mown the lawn TOO.

Like head-adjacent SELF, head-distant SELF is analysed as imposing a centrality condition on its focus, but the property of being central is assigned to the asserted value only against the background of the predication expressed in the scope of the intensifiers this approach basically says that John plays a central role in the With regard to event of mowing the lawn in so far as he is interested in or responsible for it (cf. Section 6.6.1 below). In what follows, I will argue that König and Siemund’s assumption of intensifiers being focus particles is highly problematic for several reasons. A number of formal and distributional facts argue against such an analysis. Before criticizing the analysis of intensifiers as focus particles, however, let us briefly consider some of its major advantages. Siemund (2000:15) puts forward the points listed in

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

65

s i.

Intensifiers always interact with the focus structure of a sentence.

ii.

Intensifiers exhibit a high degree of positional variability.

iii. Intensifiers can occur more than once in a sentence. iv. Intensifiers are often homophonous with focus particles (cf. Section 3.5.1).

The most striking facts arguing in favour of König and Siemund’s analysis are without and It is remarkable that intensifiers occur in different doubt the points in positions of the clause, interacting with their environment in different ways. Consider the and examples in focus particle only.

which illustrate this parallel between intensifiers and the

The Pope (himself) has (himself) (not) solved my greatest problems (himself).

a.

Only $200 can(not) solve my greatest problems.

b.

$200 only can(not) solve my greatest problems.

c.

$200 can(not) solve only my greatest problems.

Although the positions taken by himself and only are not identical, it can be seen that the function of both expressions varies with their syntactic position, and that they interact with other scope-bearing elements such as negators in similar ways. Apart from focus particles, only adverbs exhibit such a great degree of versatility (note that often, focus particles are regarded as a subclass of adverbs, namely, as the class of ‘focusing also shows that intensifiers can occur more than once in a sentence, as adverbs’). pointed out by Siemund (2000:15). Let us now turn to the arguments against an analysis of intensifiers as focus particles. Critics of this analysis include König and Siemund themselves. König (1991b:88) admits that the assumption of intensifiers being focus particles is somewhat problematic for two reasons: (i) ‘it is possible for a sentence to contain both an emphatic reflexive [intensifier] and a member of the core group of focus particles’, and (ii) ‘the contribution made by emphatic reflexives to the meaning of a sentence cannot simply be described in terms of existential presuppositions or restrictive entailments’. illustrates the first of these objections. Only the president himself can make this decision.

The second objection raised by König (1991b) concerns the information that headadjacent SELF provides about the set of alternatives. Typically, focus particles quantify

The grammar of identity

66

over domains of alternative values. This quantification is either existential for additive focus particles such as also or even, or negated-existential for restrictive focus particles such as only. Intensifiers do not express such quantification. König (1991b:88) argues that ‘[n]either of the two arguments given, however, provides real evidence against the analysis of emphatic reflexives as focus particles’. As far as the first point is concerned, König observes that the association of two focus particles with the same focus, each of them having a different scope, is not at all unusual (as in German schon allein). The second point of criticism merely amounts to the observation that ‘such expressions are not straightforward instances of additive or exclusive particles’. As König (1991a:797) points out, not all focus particles quantify ). It is usually, over sets of alternative values. German sogar is a case in point (cf. but not necessarily, associated with an additive implicature. In this respect, sogar differs from English even, which is always additive. Es

kamen

sogar

ALLE.

it

came

even

all

(König 1991a:797)

However, there are further complications. Intensifies have a number of formal and distributional properties that set them apart from focus particles. Siemund (2000:14) adds the points listed in

and exemplified in

to the provisos made by König:

a. Intensifiers inflect for person, number and gender; none of the other focus particles inflects. b. Unlike most of the other focus particles, intensifiers are restricted to nominal foci (cf. ). c. While most focus particles can occur in a pre-focal position and usually do so, intensifiers must occur in a post-focal position (cf. a.

She even smiled.

b.

*She [smiled itself].

c.

*Himself the president came.

).50

I would like to add another incompatibility that was remarked upon in Section 2.2: not only are intensifiers barred from non-nominal foci, they are also barred from indefinite DPs if their restriction set is not definite. This is also a restriction that none of the other focus particles obeys (cf.

).

Head-adjacent intensifiers as expressions of an identity function a.

#A man himself can understand this joke.

b.

Even/only a man can understand this joke.

67

The fact that intensifiers can attach only to DPs that are in the prepositional background is a particularly strong argument against an analysis of intensifiers as focus particles. Focus particles are associated with foci; imposing a restriction on foci to the effect that that they have to be in the propositional background would, in my opinion, result in a contradiction. Finally, there are also some syntactic incompatibilities. Eckardt (2001) points out that the syntactic relation between a focus particle and its focus is different from that between an intensifier and its head DP. In particular, the parallel between postposed focus particles such as too and head-distant intensifiers is only an apparent one. Following an argument made by Krifka (1998), she states that such focus particles are instances of the so-called ‘hat contour’ intonation, which is associated with contrastive topics (cf. Büring 1997). Example illustrates this point for the focus particle too. According to Eckardt, using a hat contour intonation in intensifier constructions either changes the which instantiates a contrastive topic structure),

appropriateness conditions (cf. or results in infelicity (cf.

).

a.

Ótto was at the party TOO.

b.

Ótto has washed the car himSELF.

c.

#Ótto himSELF washed the car. (Eckardt 2001:376)

In sum, there seems to be general agreement that the classification of intensifiers as focus particles is at least highly problematic. However, the trouble is that, apparently, intensifiers do not fit into any of the other commonly accepted lexical classes either. In spite of all the problems, Siemund (2000:16) therefore concludes that ‘analysing intensifiers as focus particles appears to be a reasonable move, but is certainly not beyond criticism’. König (2001:747) seems to be even more sceptical: ‘[w]hether intensifiers are expressions sui generis or can be subsumed under one of the more established minor lexical categories is still an open question’. Still, he defends the view that ‘[t]heir interaction with a focus makes them very similar to focus particles’. In any case, the decision of assigning intensifiers to the class of focus particles is clearly motivated by the principle of faute de mieux. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, it was argued that intensifiers should be analysed as lexical items denoting the identity function. This entails that intensifiers are expected to be nounlike. This assumption is also often made in the context of reflexive self-forms (cf. Chapter 7). Still, in view of the distributional and morphological idiosyncrasies of intensifiers it is probably inevitable to assign them to a syntactic class of their own, possibly a sub-class of nouns. A comprehensive cross-linguistic discussion of this question is provided by König and Gast (forthcoming).

The grammar of identity

68

3.6 Summary In this chapter I have aimed to show that head-adjacent intensifiers can be analysed as expressions of an identity function, adopting a proposal made by Eckardt (2001) and Hole (2002a). A modification of this approach has been put forward in Section 3.3, in which I have proposed distinguishing between the effects of focus suppositions on the one hand, and those of a contrast established by an intensifier on the other. This distinction will be helpful in Chapter 6, where the semantics of head-distant intensifiers will be tackled. The predictions made by the analysis adopted here have been evaluated against the empirical generalizations made by König and Siemund (2000a, b, c), who distinguish between four instantiations of ‘centrality’, i.e. between four contexts licensing intensifiers (hierarchical centrality, situational centrality, identifying centrality and logophoricity). Previous analyses of intensifiers have been shown to meet with problems of various types. Scalar approaches as advocated by Edmondson and Plank (1978) and Primus (1992) make the wrong semantic predictions, and an analysis of intensifiers as ‘centralizing focus particles’ as proposed by König and Siemund (2000a, b, c) is inconsistent with both formal and distributional properties of head-adjacent intensifiers.

4 The syntax of head-distant intensifiers In this chapter, I argue for a syntactic differentiation between exclusive and inclusive SELF in contemporary Germanic languages. The argument is mainly made using data from German, Swedish and English, but it is claimed that the different analyses carry over to other West and North Germanic languages, for which some illustration is provided as well. The discussion starts with a number of empirical generalizations about the syntax of head-distant intensifiers in German (Section 4.1). Section 4.2 addresses the syntactic behaviour of head-distant intensifiers in Scandinavian languages, focusing on Swedish, and Section 4.3 discusses relevant data from English. Section 4.4 offers a derivational analysis of head-distant SELF, and Section 4.5 summarizes the results. 4.1 The distribution of head-distant SELF in German Before considering any details of a syntactic differentiation between the two types of intensifiers under discussion, it seems advisable to provide some conclusive evidence that there is in fact a syntactic difference between them. One of the most convincing points in favour of this is that both types of intensifiers may co-occur, with each making a contribution of its own to the sentence meaning. Although attested data of that kind are not easy to find, self-fabricated examples are generally judged as being completely natural by native speakers and are not even felt to be particularly remarkable if the appropriate context is provided. Consider the conversation in a. Fritz

beschwert sich

darüber,

dass

Hans

seine

Hausaufgaben

Fritz

complains

about.it

that

Hans

his

homework

nicht

selbst

gemacht

hat.

not

SELF

made

has

‘Fritz complains that Hans hasn’t done his homework himself.’ b. Nun,

Fritz

hat

selber

well,

Fritz

has SELF

seine

Hausaufgaben

nicht

selbst

gemacht.

his

homework

not

SELF

done

‘Well, Fritz has himself not done his homework himself.’

The grammar of identity

70

For reasons of euphony, the free variants selber and selbst have been used alternatingly in but nothing hinges on this. Fritz hat selbst seine Hausaufgaben nicht selber and the same sentence with two occurrences of gemacht would be just as fine as either selbst or selber would be less euphonious, but in no way ungrammatical (e.g. Fritz hat selbst seine Hausaufgaben nicht selbst gemacht). Furthermore, it is important to note that the co-occurrence of the two intensifiers in

is not a linguistic artefact. In order

no alternative construction is available. One may to express exactly the meaning of use auch (‘too’) instead of inclusive selbst, but then the specific aspect of meaning associated with inclusive intensifiers would be lost. Also, neither of the two occurrences of selbst/selber in rise to infelicity (cf. dramatically (cf.

could be dropped. This would, in the context of

either give

), or it would change the meaning of the sentence quite which means that Fritz’s homework has not been done at all).

a.

Nun, Fritz hat seine Hausaufgaben nicht selber gemacht. ‘Well, Fritz has not done his homework (by) himself.’ (EXSELF)

b.

Nun, Fritz hat seine Hausaufgaben selber nicht gemacht. ‘Well, Fritz has not done his homework himself (either).’ (INSELF)

Bergeton (2004:77) provides a similar example from Danish:51 Statsministeren

pudsede

selv

skoene

selv.

the prime minister

polished

SELF

the shoes

SELF

‘The Prime Minister polished the shoes without any help himself.’

Given that both occurrences of selbst/selber in as well as those of selv in are clearly independent both syntactically and semantically, it follows that each of them occupies a syntactic position of its own. In the remainder of this section we will attempt to determine these positions more exactly. 4.1.1 The position of head-distant SELF relative to arguments Considering the position of exclusive and inclusive SELF relative to other constituents with an argument status will not reveal any categorical differences between both types of intensifiers. Syntactic differences will arise only when considering the position of headdistant intensifiers relative to (specific types of) adverbials. In the following I aim to show that both exclusive and inclusive SELF are located between the subject DP and the position of all other arguments in ‘basic’ syntax, i.e. in syntactic configurations that are generally considered to be characterized by the absence of any movement operations like scrambling or scope-related movement.

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

71

Let us start with the most deeply embedded constituents. Neither exclusive nor inclusive SELF can intervene between the non-finite verb and prepositional objects (the subscripts on ich and selbst indicate the syntactic relation of dependency holding between both elements):52 a. …weil …because

ichi

die

Vase

selbsti

auf

den

Tisch

stellen

will.

I

the

vase

SELF

on

the

table

put

want

‘…because I want to put the vase on the table myself.’ (EXSELF or INSELF) b. *…weil …because

ichi die

Vase auf

den

Tisch

selbsti

stellen

will.

I

vase

the

table

SELF

put

want

the

on

The order of head-distant intensifiers relative to direct objects is more difficult to determine. We have to distinguish at least between the following types of object DPs: (i) pronouns, (ii) definite lexical DPs, (iii) specific indefinite DPs, (iv) nonspecific/existential indefinites and (v) non-specific/generic indefinites. The order of pronominal objects relative to head-distant intensifiers is fixed, in such a way that ). Definite lexical DPs may

pronouns invariably precede head-distant intensifiers (cf.

either precede or follow head-distant selbst ( ). These facts are not particularly surprising in the light of research into word order within the German Middle Field. As is well known, pronouns and definite DPs may—and under certain circumstances, must— take a position at the left margin of the Middle Field. In the syntactic literature, this phenomenon is regarded as an instance of movement, and is commonly referred to as ‘scrambling’.53 a.

…weil

ichi

ihn

doch

selbsti

angerufen

habe.

…because

I

him

PTCL

SELF

called

have

‘…because I have called him myself (as you know).’ b.

a.

*…weil

ichi

doch

selbsti

ihn

angerufen

habe.

…because

I

PTCL

SELF

him

called

have

…weil

ichi

den

König

selbsti

gesehen

habe.

…because

I

the

king

SELF

seen

have

‘…because I have seen the king myself.’ b.

…weil

ichi

(doch)

selbsti

den

König

gesehen

habe.

…because

I

PTCL

SELF

the

king

seen

have

‘…because I have seen the king myself (as you know).’

The grammar of identity

72

The position of both types of head-distant intensifiers relative to indefinite object DPs depends on the interpretation of those DPs. If indefinite objects are nonspecific/existential, they always follow head-distant intensifiers: a.

…weil

ichi

jeden

Tag

selbsti

’n

Kuchen

backe.

…because

I

every

day

SELF

a

cake

bake

‘…because every day I bake a cake myself.’ b.

??…well

ichi

jeden

Tag

’n

Kuchen

selbsti

backe.

…because

I

every

day

a

cake

SELF

bake

Non-specific indefinites may precede both types of head-distant intensifiers when they are interpreted generically. This is in accordance with the observation that generic indefinites are susceptible to scrambling (cf. Büring 2001; Frey 2001, 2004b; Haider and Rosengren 2003, among others). a. …weil …because b. …weil …because

ichi

(doch)

selbsti

’n

Fahrrad

reparieren

kann.

I

(PTCL)

SELF

a

bicycle

repair

can

ichi

’n

Fahrrad

(doch)

selbsti

reparieren

kann.

I

a

bicycle

(PTCL)

SELF

repair

can

‘…because I know how to repair a bicycle myself (as you know).’

Finally, existential indefinites with wide scope may likewise precede head-distant intensifiers. They usually appear to trigger an exclusive reading of the intensifier (cf. ). But as the example in shows, this preference seems to be a consequence of the semantics, rather than the syntax, of the clauses in question, since the inclusive reading becomes available when an adverbial of indefinite past (here, schon mal ‘before’) is added. a. …dass

der

Professori

fünf

Studenten

selbsti

unterrichtet.

…that

the

professor

five

students

SELF

teaches

‘…that the professor teaches five (specific) students himself.’ b. …dass

der

Professori

fünf

Studenten

selbsti

schon mal

…that

the

professor

five

students

SELF

Before

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers unterrichtet

hat.

taught

has

73

‘…that the professor has himself taught five (specific) students before.’ (INSELF)

The distribution of head-distant intensifiers relative to indirect objects is completely parallel to their distribution relative to direct objects. We will only consider indefinite DPs. If a head-distant intensifier precedes an indefinite indirect object, this object DP ). This reading is lost if

may be interpreted in a non-specific/existential reading (cf.

which can be interpreted only the intensifier follows the indirect object, as in with a wide-scope reading. Generic indefinite objects, as in may either precede or and

follow head-distant intensifiers ( a. …da …since

respectively).

eri

ja

selbsti

einem

Gangster

einen

Orden

he

PTCL

SELF

a.DAT

gangster

a

decoration

verliehen

hat.

awarded

has

‘…since he has decorated a gangster himself (as you know).’ (narrow scope or wide scope) b. …da

eri

…since he verliehen

hat.

awarded

has

einem

Gangster

selbsti

einen

Orden

a.DAT

gangster

SELF

a.ACC

decoration

‘…since he has decorated a gangster himself.’ (wide scope)

a.

b.

…ob

eri

jemals

selbsti

einem

Gangster

einen

Orden

…if

he

ever

SELF

a.DAT

gangster

a

decoration

verleihen

würde.

award

would

…ob

eri

jemals

einem

Gangster

selbsti

einen

Orden

…if

he

ever

a.DAT

gangster

SELF

a

decoration

verleihen

würde.

award

would

‘…if he would ever decorate a gangster himself.’ (generic)

The grammar of identity

74

On the basis of the preceding discussion I make the following hypothesis (where ‘basic order’ refers to the order of elements before any scrambling has taken place): In basic order, both types of head-distant intensifiers precede all arguments other than the subject.

The claim made in rests upon the following generalization: non-specific/existential object DPs (sometimes called ‘weak indefinites’) are the only type of DP that is completely insusceptible to scrambling, and that consequently invariably appears in its base position (cf. de Hoop 1992; Does and de Hoop 1998; Büring 2001; Lenerz 2001 for this generalization). Since both types of intensifiers always precede existential/nonspecific indefinite objects, it follows that their base position must be located to the left of the structural positions of all objects. Specific and generic indefinites may always scramble; they may even occur in a position to the left of sentence adverbials (cf. ). It is therefore only to be expected that they may also precede head-distant intensifiers. a. …weil …because

’n Kuchen

wahrscheinlich

jeder

backen

kann.

A

probably

everyone

bake

can

cake

‘…because probably everyone can bake a cake.’ (generic indefinite) b. …weil …because

einen

Politiker

wahrscheinlich

jeder

kennt.

one

politician

probably

everyone

knows

‘…because there is probably one politician that everyone knows.’ (wide-scope indefinite)

Having argued that head-distant intensifiers are placed before all verbal objects in basic order, we should also consider their position relative to the subject. Quite obviously, neither of the two types of intensifiers ever precedes the subject in the Middle Field ). It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the base position of both (cf. exclusive and inclusive SELF is somewhere between the subject and the indirect object. I will propose below that they are generated as sisters of their associated head DPs. *…weil

selbsti

eri

den

Rasen

mäht

…because

SELF

he

the

lawn

mows

int.: ‘…because he mows the lawn himself.’

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

75

4.1.2 The position of head-distant SELF relative to adverbials We now turn to the relative order of intensifiers and specific types of adverbials. Table 4.1 (from Ernst 2002:10) offers an overview of some classifications of adverbials proposed in the relevant literature. The various semantic classes of adverbials are related to specific syntactic domains. The second layer of adverbials (‘event modifiers’) is associated with a ‘VP’ which is located above the VP containing ‘event-internal’ modifiers, but this categorization is qualified by a question mark. I will assume that event modifiers adjoin to, and form endocentric expansions of, a Verb Phrase,54 i.e. they are both sisters and daughters of one. Event-internal modifiers are taken to be contained in the Verb Phrase, but they do not c-command another Verb Phrase (i.e. they are ‘properly included’ in VP/vP). Both exclusive and inclusive SELF are generally located before ‘event-internal’ adverbials like adverbials of manner, and following ‘higher adverbials’, i.e. adverbials modifying the speech act or proposition. All examples in are therefore ambiguous and the intensifiers can be interpreted either in an exclusive or in an inclusive reading. Adverbial of manner …als

eri

gerade

selbsti

fachmännisch

ein

Fahrrad

reparierte.

…when

he

just

SELF

expertly

a

bicycle

repaired

‘…when he was just expertly repairing a bicycle himself.’

[SPEECH-ACT CP Jackendoff 1972

[PROPOSITION IP

– – speaker-oriented – –

Quirk et al. 1985

conjunct

McConnell-Ginet 1982

[EVENT VP?

[EVENT-INT. V]]]] VP

subj.-oriented

manner

– – – – disjunct – – – –

– – – – – – Ad-S – – – – – –

process adjunct

Ad-VP – – – –

Ad-V

Frey and Pittner 1998

frame

proposition

event

process

various works

framing

clausal neg.

time

– – – aspectual – – –

Table 4.1: Typology of adverbials according to Ernst (2002:10)

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76

Instrumental adverbial …als

eri (gerade)

selbsti

mit

einer

Schere

’n Strauch

beschnitt

…when

he

SELF

with

a

shear

a

trimmed

(just)

bush

‘…when he was just trimming a bush with shears himself.’

Propositional adverbial …weil

eri

wahrscheinlich

selbsti

kommen

wird.

…because

he

probably

SELF

come

will

‘…because he will probably come himself.’

Speech-act adverbial …weil

eri

zum Glück

selbsti

einen

Kuchen

backen

kann.

…because

he

luckily

SELF

a

cake

bake

can

‘…because luckily, he is able to bake a cake himself.’

A very clear contrast between exclusive and inclusive SELF can be observed when we consider the position of both types of intensifiers relative to quantificational adverbials of time and place, which qualify as ‘event modifiers’ in the typology presented in Table 4.1. Both types of adverbials invariably precede exclusive SELF, whereas they follow and inclusive SELF. clauses are necessarily inclusive. a. …weil …because

only have an exclusive reading, while the relevant b-

ichi

jeden

Tag

selbsti

einen

Kuchen

backe.

I

every

day

SELF

a

cake

bake

‘…because I bake a cake myself every day.’ (EXSELF) b. …weil …because

ichi

ja

selbsti

jeden

Tag

einen

Kuchen

backe.

I

PTCL

SELF

every

day

a

cake

bake

‘…because (as you know) I bake a cake every day myself.’ (INSELF)

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

a. …weil …that

77

ichi

auf

jedem

Kontinent

selbsti

ein

Haus

besitze.

I

on

every

continent

SELF

a

house

own

‘…because I own a house of my own on every continent.’ (EXSELF) b. …weil …that

ichi

selbsti

auf

jedem

Kontinent

ein

Haus

besitze.

I

SELF

on

every

continent

a

house

own

‘…because I own a house on every continent myself.’ (INSELF)

The generalization made above has been restricted to ‘quantificational’ adverbials because non-quantificational or ‘definite’ adverbials like gestern ‘yesterday’ can either precede or follow inclusive SELF, depending on the specific scope relation expressed. Consider a. I don’t understand why Hans complains that Fred was drunk yesterday… …wo

Hansi

doch

selbsti

gestern

betrunken

war.

…given that

he

PTCL

SELF

yesterday

drunk

was

‘…given that (as you know) Hans was himself drunk yesterday.’ b. I don’t understand why Hans complains that Fred is drunk all the time… …wo

Hansi

doch

gestern

selbsti

betrunken

war.

…given that

Hansi

PTCL

yesterday

SELF

drunk

was

‘…given that yesterday, Hans was drunk himself.’

As is indicated by the context provided,

would be appropriate when it is under

it only discussion that someone other than Hans was drunk yesterday, while in seems to be implied that someone other than Hans is or was drunk at some point in time. Such scope interactions can be observed only with inclusive SELF, since exclusive SELF invariably follows adverbials of time and place. We will return to such contrasts in Section 4.3 in the context of head-distant SELF in English. In the present context, the position of quantificational adverbials is more relevant than the one taken by their non-quantificational counterparts. Adverbs like gestern can occur in various positions in a sentence. It is an open question whether they may simply be ‘inserted’ at various points in a derivation (cf. Haider and Rosengren 2003 for this view), or whether they have specific base positions and are susceptible to scrambling (as is argued by Frey and Pittner 1998, among others). At any rate, gestern is very ‘mobile’, and is therefore not a good indicator of basic sentence structure (cf. ). shows that jeden Tag ‘every day’ does not exhibit the syntactic freedom of gestern:

The grammar of identity a.

78

…dass

er

(gestern)

zum Glück

(gestern)

wahrscheinlich

…that

he

yesterday

fortunately

yesterday

probably

(gestern)

nicht

betrunken

war.

yesterday

not

drunk

was

‘…that fortunately, he probably wasn’t drunk yesterday.’ b. …dass

er

(*jeden Tag)

leider

(*jeden Tag)

…that

he

every day

unfortunately

every day

wahrscheinlich

(jeden Tag)

betrunken

ist.

probably

every day

drunk

is

‘…that unfortunately, he is probably drunk every day.’

A second domain where clear asymmetries between the distribution of exclusive and inclusive SELF can be observed is that concerning the relative order of, as well as the scopal dependencies between, intensifiers and sentence negation. In Section 1.3, this observation was introduced as a diagnostic to keep the two use types of intensifiers apart. It has often been noticed (for English) that exclusive SELF is always, and inclusive SELF never, in the scope of sentence negation (cf. König 2001:748; Huddleston and Pullum 2002:1498; König and Gast 2002a:233). This is shown for German in a. …weil …because

ichi

nicht

jedes

Kind

selbsti

unterrichte

I

not

every

child

SELF

teach

‘…because it is NOT the case that [I teach every child MYSELF].’ (EXSELF) b. …weil …because

ichi

(ja)

selbsti

nicht

jedes

Kind

unterrichte

I

PTCL

SELF

not

every

child

teach

‘…because I have that property MYSELF: [NOT teach every child].’ (INSELF)

4.1.3 The base position of intensifiers In order to approach the question of the syntactic positions taken by the two types of intensifiers more closely, let us briefly take stock of the observations and hypotheses made so far. First of all, I have attempted to demonstrate (i) that both types of headdistant intensifiers are located between the subject DP and all object DPs (unless they are scrambled), and (ii) that both exclusive and inclusive SELF precede adverbials of manner and follow prepositional adverbials and speech-act adverbials. The only surface difference was found in the order of the two types of intensifiers relative to adverbials of place and time. Exclusive SELF always follows those adverbials, while inclusive SELF usually precedes them (cf.

and

above), with the exception of specific (definite)

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

79

adverbials, which it may also follow. Moreover, exclusive, but not inclusive, SELF is in the scope of sentence negation. If adverbials of time and place—which are ‘event modifiers’ in Table 4.1 on page 71—adjoin to a Verb Phrase, exclusive SELF must either be adjoined to a Verb Phrase as well, or it must be properly included in it. For reasons to be detailed below, I will argue for the latter option. Inclusive SELF, by contrast, must be located outside the Verb Phrase, since it is situated to the left (and outside the scope) of sentence negation. The hypothesis in summarizes the considerations made so far. This hypothesis is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which provides two alternative tree diagrams for the structurally ambiguous clause…dass ich selbst einen Kuchen backen kann ‘…that I know how to bake a cake myself’. The left-hand side corresponds to the exclusive reading, the righthand side to the inclusive one. These structural descriptions, which are meant to represent surface structure, will be made more explicit below. Exclusive SELF is properly included in the Verb Phrase, while inclusive SELF is located outside the Verb Phrase.

Figure 4.1: Tree diagrams:…dass ich selbst ’n Kuchen backen kann In what follows, I will provide two pieces of distributional evidence supporting the assumptions made above. First, only exclusive, but not inclusive, SELF can be moved along with a Verb Phrase to the Forefield; and second, only exclusive SELF may form part of deverbal nouns or adjectives. 4.1.4 Head-distant intensifiers and VP-topicalization In German, Verb Phrases may be moved to the Forefield if they are topical. This is shown in

The grammar of identity a. [Meinen my

80

Mantel

ausgezogen]i

habej

ich nicht ti tj.

coat

taken.off

have

I

not

lit.: ‘Taken off my coat I haven’t.’ b. [Dem DET.DAT

Fritz

ein Auto

schenken]i

würdej

ich nicht ti tj.

Fritz

a

give

would

I

car

not

lit.: ‘Give a car to Fritz I wouldn’t.’

Left dislocation as illustrated in and is not possible with functional projections higher than the Verb Phrase—say, Ī-constituents, in a lump-INFL-approach. This appears to be trivial if we consider that the finite verb obligatorily moves to C in main clauses, which makes it impossible for it to move to the Forefield. However, we could still assume that the finite verb first moves to C, which allows the remainder of Ī to move to [Spec, CP] (‘remnant movement’).55 This would deliver a structure like [Ī Meinen Mantel ausgezogen ti]j habei ich ti nicht tj.

The structure in is, in all likelihood, illicit (cf. also Haider 2003: section 2.3).56 One piece of evidence for this assumption is that no higher-level adverbial can be moved along with the constituent meinen Mantel ausgezogen, which would clearly be expected if this constituent were a (truncated) Ī, rather than a Verb Phrase. Two examples illustrating this are given in a.

*[Ī

Wahrscheinlich

die

Maria

einladen tj]k

wirdj

er tk.

probably

DET

Mary

invite

will

he

lit.: ‘Probably invite Mary, he will.’ b. *[Ī

Zum Glück

meinen

Mantel

gefunden tj]k

hatj

er tk.

fortunately

my

coat

found

has

he

lit.: ‘Fortunately found my coat, he has.’

The constraint on topicalization illustrated above is relevant to the syntax of intensifiers in German because only exclusive, but not inclusive, SELF can be moved along with a Verb Phrase to the Forefield. Consider

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

81

[Ihr

Fahrrad

selber

reparieren]i

würdej

Maria

nie

her

bicycle

SELF

repair

would

Mary

never

ti t j .

lit.: ‘Repair her bicycle herself, Mary never would.’ (EXSELF)

In the whole Verb Phrase ihr Fahrrad selber reparieren is fronted. The intensifier selber has only an exclusive, and no inclusive, reading. Even if we try to make up more prototypical examples inviting an inclusive reading of selbst, such readings are never available if the intensifier is moved along. Consider the contrast between and which only has the improbable reading that the speaker has never delegated his/her snoring to others. a.

Ichi

habe

selbsti

schon immer

geschnarcht.

I

have

SELF

always

snored

‘I have always snored myself.’ b.

Geschnarcht

habe

ichi

selbsti

schon immer.

snored

have

I

SELF

always

lit.: ‘Snored, I have always myself.’ ??Selbsti

geschnarcht

habe

ichi

schon immer.

SELF

snored

have

I

always

int.: ‘Snored myself, I always have.’

Note that we can also extract only part of the Verb Phrase, with the intensifier being left Again, the intensifier can be behind. This results in the structure given in interpreted only in an exclusive reading (for reasons to become apparent below, the Verb Phrase is represented as ‘vP’ in ). [Ihr

Fahrrad

reparieren]i

würdej

Maria

nie

[vP

her

bicycle

repair

would

Mary

never

selber ti tj] SELF

lit.: ‘Repair her bicycle, Mary never would herself.’

Finally, if we extract the whole Verb Phrase and the intensifier remains in situ, then this intensifier only has an inclusive reading. This is shown in

57

The grammar of identity [vP

82

Ihr

Fahrrad

reparieren]i

wirdj

Maria

selber

nicht ti tj.

her

bicycle

repair

will

Mary

SELF

not

lit.: ‘Repair her bicycle, Mary will not herself.’

Given that exclusive, but not inclusive SELF, can be moved to the Forefield together with a Verb Phrase, we can conclude that only exclusive SELF forms part of the Verb Phrase. 4.1.5 Head-distant intensifiers and deverbal derivation The second argument to be put forward in support of my syntactic hypothesis is based on the possibility for intensifiers to participate in processes of deverbal derivation. If a headdistant intensifier forms part of a deverbal derivate, it is always exclusive. Some relevant 58

examples are given in Selbst-bedienung

(‘self-service’)

Selbst-bestimmung

(‘self-determination’)

selbst-gebastelt

(‘made by oneself’)

Selbst-laut

(‘self-sound’, i.e. vowel)

Selbst-verwaltung

(‘self-administration’)

In order to show that inclusive SELF is not susceptible to deverbal derivation, we have to demonstrate that it is impossible to paraphrase sentences with inclusive SELF using the The embedded clause in cannot be relevant deverbal derivate. Consider transformed into a constituent of category DP without a change in meaning: while selbst is inclusive, it is exclusive in in improbable reading indicated in the translation. a. Dass that

and can be understood only in the

er

selber

schnarcht,

ärgert

mich.

he

SELF

snores

bothers

me

‘It bothers me that he snores himself.’ b. Sein his

Selber-schnarchen

ärgert

mich.

self-snoring

bothers

me

‘His self-snoring bothers me (i.e. it bothers me that he doesn’t delegate his snoring to others).’

The fact that exclusive SELF can form part of deverbal derivates is relevant because in Germanic languages (and possibly universally) only non-finite or untensed constituents

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

83

can target nominal derivation.59 In the framework adopted here, ‘untensed predication’ corresponds syntactically to a Verb Phrase. Once again, I conclude that exclusive SELF is properly contained in the Verb Phrase, while inclusive SELF is located outside the Verb Phrase. 4.2 The distribution of head-distant SELF in Swedish Even though the basic syntax of Scandinavian languages differs considerably from that of German, I aim to show that the underlying syntactic operations in Swedish are basically the same as in German, and that most of the contrasts found relate to, and result from, more general differences between the two languages. Let us start with some basic facts concerning the distribution of head-distant intensifiers in Swedish. In subordinate clauses the canonical position of exclusive SELF is between the object slot and the slot for ‘content adverbials’, in the structural description given by Holmes and Hinchliffe (1994: chapter 11). It follows both non-prepositional and prepositional objects (cf.

) and

60

respectively), but it precedes prepositional adverbials (cf. ). Since there is no scrambling in Swedish, complications like those discussed above for German do not arise. Exclusive SELF follows direct object …hon

vill

inte

tro

att

jagi

har

köpt

klänningen

självi.

…she

wants

not

believe

that

I

have

bought

the dress

SELF

‘…she doesn’t want to believe that I have bought the dress myself.’ [PAR 3436011]

Exclusive SELF follows prepositional object Och

jagi

ska

ta

hand

om

det

självi.

and

I

will

take

hand

PREP

it

SELF

‘And I will take care of it myself.’ [PAR 172701]

Exclusive SELF precedes prepositional adjuncts Mani

kan

också

söka

självi

på

universitetens

hemsidor.

one

can

also

search

SELF

PREP

university.GEN

homepages

‘One can also search (by) oneself on the homepages of the university.’ [www]61

The grammar of identity

84

Inclusive SELF is canonically situated in a position immediately preceding the finite verb in subordinate clauses. Given that exclusive SELF may not occur in this position, there is a categorical contrast between both types of head-distant intensifiers in Swedish. Inclusive SELF precedes the finite verb a. [Hans historiska kunskaper var stora och jag värjde mig för] hans

anarkistika

hållning,

som

jagi

nu

självi

har.

his

anarchist

attitude

which

I

now

SELF

have

‘[His historical knowledge was large and I was against] his anarchist attitude, which I now have myself.’ [PAR 15337596] b. När

jagi

when I

nu

självi

har

varit

i

det

riktiga

Venedig…

now

SELF

had

been

PREP

the

real

Venice

‘Now that I have been to the real Venice myself…’ [PAR 14956821]

In both examples given in the intensifier is separated from the associated DP by a sentence adverbial (nu ‘now’). If such adverbials are absent, sentences with inclusive SELF are structurally ambiguous because the intensifier could also be head-adjacent. (in both cases, the context suggests an Two relevant examples are given in inclusive interpretation of the intensifier). I regard inclusive SELF as not forming a and are constituent with the DP it interacts with, so the two readings of associated with different hierarchical structures: [jag [själv har…]] for the inclusive reading, and [[jag själv] har…] for the head-adjacent reading. a. [Jag har aldrig talat om…] att

jag

själv

har

varit

skådespelare

en

gång.

that

I

SELF

have

been

actor

one

time

‘[I have never mentioned] that I (myself) used to be an actor (myself).’ [PAR 3102447] b. Trots att although

han

själv

har

talat

om

he

SELF

has

spoken about

lysrören… the fluorescent lamp…

‘Although he (himself) spoke about the fluorescent lamp (himself)…’ [PAR 19291508]

The patterns illustrated in and are ‘default structures’, in the sense that they are particularly frequent, and that they are judged most natural by native speakers.

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

85

However, there is an alternative structure that is also relatively widespread. Inclusive SELF is often found in a sentence-final position, following content adverbials. Both and are therefore possible, though is certainly preferred.62 In addition to the ‘marked’ character of sentence-final inclusive SELF as illustrated in there seems to be a severe distributional restriction on the use of this construction in combination with nominal predicates. For example, the pattern…har varit …själv ‘…has been…-self’, with an inclusive reading of the intensifier, is not attested in the Parole corpus (on 15 October 2005), while there are as many as 31 occurrences of the pattern…har själv varit…, which is the order of elements corresponding to in main clauses (verb-second). a.

b.

Jag

vet

det

för att

jagi

[självi

har

levt

i

Oslo].

I

know

that

because

I

SELF

have

lived

in

Oslo

Jag

vet

det

för att

jagi

[har

levt

i

Oslo

självi].

I

know

that

because

I

have

lived

in

Oslo

SELF

‘I know that because I have lived in Oslo myself.’

It should be mentioned that sentences with final inclusive SELF as in are not structurally identical to sentences with exclusive SELF. As has been pointed out, below is therefore interpreted exclusive SELF precedes prepositional adjuncts. with an exclusive reading of själv, which consequently could be translated as ‘on his own’ or ‘alone’ into English. By contrast, själv in a. Söreni Sören

gå

inte gärna

goes not

gladly

only has an inclusive reading.

ner

till centrum

självi

på

kvällarna.

down

to

SELF

in

evenings

centre

‘Sören doesn’t like to go to the centre by himself/on his own /alone in the evening.’ [PAR 3776092] (EXSELF) b. Söreni Sören

gå

inte gärna

goes not

gladly

ner

till centrum

på

kvällarna självi.

down

to

in

evenings SELF

centre

‘Sören doesn’t like to go to the centre in the evening himself (either).’ (INSELF)

Like in German, exclusive and inclusive SELF in Swedish interact in different ways with sentence negation. While exclusive SELF is both c-commanded by and in the scope of the negator inte (cf.

), inclusive SELF is always outside the scope of sentence

negation (cf. both examples in

).

The grammar of identity

86

Jag

vet

att

Pauli

inte

har

gjort

sina

läxor

självi.

I

know

that

Paul

not

has

done

his

homework

SELF

Hans

mor

gjorde

dem

åt

honom.

his

mother

did

it

PREP

him.

‘I know that Paul didn’t do his homework himself. His mother did it for him.’ a. Hur

kan

Erwin

beklaga

How can

Erwin

complain ANPH about

gjort sina

läxor?

Jag

done his

homework I

gjort sina

läxor.

done his

homework

b. …Jag …I

vet

att

know that

sig

över

att

Paul

inte har

that Paul

not has

vet

att

Erwini

självi inte har

know

that

Erwin

SELF not has

Erwini

inte

har gjort sina läxor

självi.

Erwin

not

has done his

SELF

homework

‘How can Erwin complain that Paul hasn’t done his homework? I know that Erwin hasn’t done his homework himself.’

The relationship between the two types of head-distant intensifiers and sentential negation seems to be good evidence that our assumptions hold for Swedish as well: namely, exclusive SELF is contained in the Verb Phrase, while inclusive SELF is located outside the Verb Phrase. We will not apply any further tests at this point. This will be done using English data in Section 4.3. 4.3 The distribution of head-distant SELF in English 4.3.1 The position of SELF relative to arguments and adverbials The syntax of head-distant intensifiers in English very much resembles that of headdistant intensifiers in Swedish, but there are some differences to be pointed out below. Exclusive SELF usually occurs in a position following direct, indirect and prepositional objects (cf.

and

), but it precedes adverbials of time and place (cf.

).

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

87

Exclusive SELF follows non-prepositional objects But, if he wasn’t going to give her more concrete help himself, she would have to find other allies. [BNC HTR 44]

Exclusive SELF follows prepositional objects At [another] desk sat Winston doing similar lists in red ink, sipping whisky and soda, getting redder and redder, rising and going out often to glare at the machine himself, hunching his shoulders, bowing his head like a bull about to charge. [BNC EFN 1337]

Exclusive SELF precedes adverbials of time and place a. Gover took over from Strudwick in 1938 and has run it himself since 1954. [BNC AAN 180] b. Maybe he’ll tell you about it himself some time. [BNC AC5 3007] c. After he conducted it himself in Vienna, it was hailed as ‘Beethoven’s Tenth’— wrongly, for this is a great and splendid symphony that is essentially Brahmsian. [BNC KS8 128]

Occasionally, exclusive SELF intervenes between a direct and a prepositional object. This structure is often found when the prepositional object is prominent in terms of information structure and/or sentence prosody. In some cases it also seems to serve the purpose of avoiding misunderstandings. In for instance, placing himself behind Agent Hughes would result in a head-adjacent interpretation of the intensifier, and the same applies to herself in a. No, Sir. He gave it himself to Agent Hughes and signed each page. [www]63 b. Meg and Joyce leave Wentworth. Joan listens to the tape, and delivers it herself to Lorelei. [www]64

The position of exclusive SELF relative to lower-level adverbials like adverbs of manner or instrumental adjuncts may vary: exclusive SELF may either follow or precede such adverbials. Below I will argue that this is because these adverbials may be adjoined at different syntactic levels (Section 4.4.3).

The grammar of identity

88

Exclusive SELF follows adverb of manner …do it quickly yourself, delegate it if you can, or put it in the bin. [www]65

Exclusive SELF precedes adverb of manner …he’s going to do it himself with a hammer. [www]66

As far as inclusive SELF is concerned, English behaves like Swedish in so far as there are two alternative constructions: inclusive SELF either occupies a position immediately following the auxiliary (cf. ), or it follows the Verb Phrase, often in a sentence-final position (cf.

).

Inclusive SELF follows auxiliary If the gritty Hugh is away opening for his country, then no doubt there is a stronger case for testing out the leadership qualities of Maynard, who has himself been the subject of some speculation concerning the furniture vans. [BNC FT9 536]

Inclusive SELF follows the Verb Phrase He was aware that a captain with a record such as his has a big advantage, since any troops will respond better to a leader they know has been through the fire himself, and so he knew just what he could ask of his bowlers. [BNC ABR 1305]

Unlike in Swedish, final inclusive SELF should be considered the ‘unmarked’ option in is severely English. The distribution of medial inclusive SELF as exemplified in restricted in so far as it occurs only in combination with auxiliaries. Thus, (the attested) and (the unattested) are fine, while which instantiates the corresponding structure with a lexical verb, is strictly ungrammatical. This is the most important difference between inclusive SELF in English and Mainland Scandinavian languages. a. I have myself experienced false memories during my hypnotherapy training. [www]67 b. I have always myself experienced false memories during my hypnotherapy training. c. *I always myself experience false memories during my hypnotherapy training.

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

89

As was shown for German above (cf. on page 73), specific types of adverbials may enter into different scope relations with inclusive SELF. This applies to English as well, though the contrasts are less categorical than in German. Consider the examples in a. – –I b. – I have to –I

is I have to

one

a I have to

—that’s one every week

In the writing of reports is under discussion. The second part of states that ‘I have to write reports myself (too), and this applies every week’, i.e. the adverbial every week takes scope over the intensifier. It contains a stress position of its own and is thus the context is not interpreted as representing old or repeated information. In slightly different. Here, every week does not take scope over myself,68 and a licit paraphrase would be ‘I have that property myself (too): having to write a report every week.’ In that case, the adverbial every week is in the prepositional background and represents repeated information. Below (Section 4.4.3), it will be argued that differences can be related to the fact that (specific) adverbials in scope relations as illustrated in may adjoin to either the Verb Phrase or TP, i.e. either higher up or lower down in the tree than inclusive SELF. 4.3.2 Head-distant SELF inside and outside the Verb Phrase As in German and Swedish, English exclusive SELF can be shown to be contained in the Verb Phrase, while inclusive SELF does not form part of the Verb Phrase. Above, this was argued on the basis that only exclusive SELF can be left-dislocated together with a Verb Phrase. This is illustrated for English in and would be possible only with an exclusive reading of herself, i.e. in the sense ‘she doesn’t delegate her snoring to others’. a. ‘We cannot wait for another Moses or Jesus to solve the predicament we find ourselves in today,’ he said in a 1999 interview with The Boston Globe. ‘We have to do it ourselves.’ And do it himself he did, right until the bitter end. [www]69 b. ??She said she snored herself. And snore herself she did indeed.

Like in German, inclusive SELF is not in the scope of sentence negation. This property, which can be used as a diagnostic to distinguish exclusive from inclusive SELF, was already pointed out in Section 1.3 (cf. also König 2001:748; Huddleston and Pullum

The grammar of identity

90

2002:1498; König and Gast 2002a: 233). It is illustrated in b-sentences offer contexts licensing the relevant a-examples.

and

The

a. I [cannot [VP come myself]] (EXSELF) ‘I have the property: NOT[be able to come MYSELF]’ b. I am afraid I cannot come myself. I will ask my secretary to attend the meeting.

a.

I [cannot [VP come]] myself. (INSELF) ‘I have that property MYSELF: NOT[be able to come]’

b.

I don’t expect you to come. I cannot come myself.

Deverbal derivation is likewise possible only with exclusive SELF. Some examples are given in self-determination self-made self-opinionated self-educated

In order to illustrate that inclusive SELF cannot form part of a deverbal derivate, we have to show that the relevant sentences cannot be paraphrased using a nominal predicate. Consider the sentence I have learned German myself. It has both an exclusive and an (for EXSELF) and inclusive reading. Pertinent contexts are provided in (for INSELF). If we form a nominalization self-learner, the exclusive reading is still possible, but the inclusive reading is lost. This is illustrated in a. Nobody has taught me German. I have learned it myself. (EXSELF) b. Don’t tell me how difficult it is to learn German. I have learned it myself. (INSELF) a. Nobody has taught me German. I am a self-learner. (EXSELF) b. #Don’t tell me how difficult it is to learn German. I am a self-learner. (INSELF)

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4.4 Towards a derivational analysis of head-distant intensifiers So far, we have only considered the position of head-distant intensifiers in surface structure, and I have not committed myself to how and where they are generated (or ‘inserted’, ‘merged’). I make the following hypothesis: All intensifiers are generated in the Verb Phrase as sisters of their head DPs.

is inspired by the observation that head-distant intensifiers are clearly in construction with some DP, even though they are not adjacent to that DP. It is therefore difficult to conceive how the morpho-syntactic relationship holding between intensifiers and their associated DPs could be captured otherwise. I aim to show that the different syntactic configurations associated with exclusive and inclusive SELF arise as a result of different types of movement operations. The analysis presented is obviously inspired by Sportiche’s (1988) ‘stranding analysis’ of floating quantifiers, but there are some crucial differences.70 An analysis of (inclusive) head-distant intensifies as ‘quantifier-floated’ elements has been proposed by Bergeton (2004).71 Given that the semantic analysis advocated in this study does not allow us to regard intensifiers as quantifiers, such an approach will not be pursued any further. 4.4.1 Deriving head-distant intensifiers in German The syntax of exclusive SELF in German In the syntactic discussion below I will adopt a shell analysis of the Verb Phrase (i.e. a Verb Phrase of the form [vP…[VP…]]), and I will assume that subjects are merged under vP (cf. Radford 1997, 2004). The external argument is taken to be obligatorily moved out of vP. Moreover, the linear order of elements within the German Middle Field is assumed to be altered depending on the type of DPs involved (pronominal vs. lexical, definite vs. indefinite), and in accordance with focus structure (‘scrambling’). I claim that the syntactic configuration associated with exclusive SELF results when the head DP of the external argument is moved out of vP, while the intensifier stays in situ. This analysis is illustrated in

corresponds to the stage of derivation at

the which the subject has left the vP, and it is a good German sentence. In (definite) DP mein Fahrrad has been scrambled across selbst to a left marginal position within the Middle Field.

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b.

92

…weil

ichi [vP [DP ti

selbst] [DP

mein

Fahrrad]

repariere].

…because

I

SELF

my

bicycle

repair

…weil

ichi

[mein

Fahrrad]j [DP ti

selbst] tj

repariere.

…because

I

my

bicycle

SELF

repair

‘…because I repair my bicycle myself.’ (EXSELF)

The analysis of exclusive SELF as an intensifier that remains in situ is compatible with all the generalizations concerning the surface position of such intensifiers made above. Exclusive SELF invariably precedes non-specific/existential indefinite objects because it is generated further left, and because scrambling is not possible in such cases. But it may follow generic and wide-scope existential indefinites, since these types of DPs are susceptible to scrambling. The analysis provided above can also account for the position of exclusive SELF relative to the various types of adverbials distinguished above: it follows higher adverbials and event modifiers because it is located inside the Verb Phrase (vP); and it precedes manner adverbials because it is generated as a sister of the subject, i.e. to the left of such adverbials (for the position of different types of adverbials within the German Middle Field, cf. Frey and Pittner 1998). The syntax of inclusive SELF While the surface structure of exclusive SELF can be derived relatively easily, we need to have a closer look at the syntactic structure above the Verb Phrase if we wish to understand the syntactic position of inclusive SELF. I will assume a model with an ‘elaborate left periphery’ (a ‘split-CP approach’) as advocated by Rizzi (1997), adopting an analysis for verb-second languages along the lines of Holmberg and Platzack (2005:432–8). The details are not crucial, and an equivalent analysis could be provided using a different framework as well.72 We will only consider the ‘Force/Finiteness’related projections above TP (‘ForceP[hrase]’ and ‘Fin[initeness]P[hrase]’), i.e. a sentence is assumed to have the structure [ForceP[FinP[TP…]]]. The specifier position of FinP attracts the subject (via [Spec, TP]) in both main and subordinate clauses. Complementizers occupy Force0. Under these premises, the syntactic surface position of inclusive SELF can be derived as follows: like exclusive SELF, inclusive SELF is generated in vP, as a sister of its head DP; but unlike exclusive SELF, it is moved along with its head DP out of vP to [Spec, TP]. This is also the surface position of the intensifier, whereas the head DP moves on to [Spec, FinP]. provides a structural description of the clause…dass ich selbst arbeite ‘…that I work myself’, in its inclusive reading. For comparison, the structure of the corresponding clause with an exclusive reading is given in

The negated counterparts of

and

are given in

and respectively, in order to illustrate how the two use types of intensifiers interact with negation (negators are taken to adjoin to T). Tree diagrams illustrating the structures in and are given in Figure 4.2 (INSELF on the left-hand side and EXSELF on the right-hand side).

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93

Inclusive SELF in German

Exclusive SELF in German

Negated counterpart of

(INSELF)

[dass [FinP ichi [TP [DP ti selbst]j nicht [vP tj arbeite]]]]

Negated counterpart of

(EXSELF)

[dass [FinP ichi [TP ti nicht [vP [DP ti selbst] arbeite]]]]

The analysis shown in can account for all the facts concerning the surface position of inclusive SELF pointed out above. First, given that inclusive SELF is not contained in the Verb Phrase at the relevant point of derivation, it cannot be moved along to the Forefield. For exclusive SELF this option is available because it never leaves the Verb Phrase (vP). Second, the position of inclusive SELF relative to the various types of adverbials is as desired: inclusive SELF c-commands both vP-internal adverbials and adverbials of time and place, which I take to be adjoined to vP. As mentioned above, the fact that specific adverbials like gestern may precede inclusive SELF can be explained in either of two ways: (i) specific types of adverbials (definite adverbials) are susceptible to scrambling, or (ii) they may be inserted at various points in a derivation, maybe adjoined to TP. Finally, inclusive SELF is not contained in a constituent that qualifies as an input to deverbal derivation (again, at the relevant level of derivation).

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Figure 4.2: The syntactic derivation of INSELF and EXSELF A few words should also be said on the motivation underlying the different types of movement operations. I take it that the structural configurations associated with the three types of intensifiers discussed above are motivated semantically or pragmatically. The reason why a given intensifier is or is not moved has to do with the interpretation that this intensifier will trigger in its target position, in interaction with focus structure. Since intensifiers are invariably in focus, their syntactic position is also the position of the focus feature. The hierarchical position of the focus feature, in turn, determines the type of alternatives that a sentence makes reference to. These questions will be dealt with in Chapter 6. 4.4.2 Deriving head-distant SELF in Scandinavian languages Head-distant intensifiers in Swedish In spite of the surface differences between Swedish and German, my syntactic analysis of head-distant intensifiers in Swedish is completely parallel to the one offered for German above. Let us begin with one or two points concerning Swedish clause structure, or the clause structure of Mainland Scandinavian languages in general. In contrast to what was long a standard assumption in comparative Germanic syntax (e.g. Holmberg and Platzack 1995; Vikner 1995, 1997, 2001), Holmberg and Platzack (2005) propose that the Swedish verb moves to T0 in both main and subordinate clauses (cf. also Næss 1991; Thráinsson 1994a; Josefsson and Platzack 1998; a parallel proposal for English will be discussed in Section 4.4.3). Moreover, the object DP is taken to move to some position above VP.73

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Accordingly, a clause like is derived from leftward movement of both V and DP across the adverbial noga ‘carefully’.74 …att

hani

[tvättarj

bilenk

…that

he

washes

the.car

[vP ti [VP

noga

tj tk]]].

carefully

‘…that he washes the car carefully.’

I will argue below that ‘short movement’ of V and DP as illustrated in is probably not the right way to account for the distribution of intensifiers in Swedish. Still, some basic observations can be shown to be compatible with the analysis proposed by Holmberg and Platzack (2005). Like in German, both types of head-distant intensifiers can be regarded as being generated inside vP, as sisters of their head DPs. Exclusive SELF remains in situ, while inclusive SELF is moved along with its head DP to [Spec, TP], but no further than that. The structure of the clause…att jag gör det själv ‘…that I do it myself’, in its exclusive reading, is given in The intensifier precedes the Verb Phrase gör det in underlying structure, but both the verb and the object move to a position to the left of the intensifier, in complete analogy to

above. Inclusive SELF can be

which provides a structural description of the clause…att derived as illustrated in jag själv har barn ‘…that I have children myself’. ‘Short movement’ of V and DP can likewise be assumed here, but this does not have an effect on the surface structure. Själv still precedes all components of the Verb Phrase because it occupies [Spec, TP]. The structures given in

and

will be revised below.

Exclusive SELF in Swedish (to be revised) …att jagi [TP ti görj detk [vP [ti själv] [VP tj tk]]] Inclusive SELF in Swedish (to be revised) …att jagi [TP [ti själv]j hark barnl [vP tj [VP tk tl]]]

While the derivation illustrated in seems to work with sentences containing only objects of category DP, such an analysis runs into difficulties when we consider the position of prepositional objects relative to both adverbials and intensifiers. In the framework adopted by Holmberg and Platzack (2005), there are no obvious reasons why prepositional objects should move to any higher position, since the checking of case features is not required. Accordingly, we would expect prepositional phrases to canonically follow adverbials, since they do so in underlying structure (pace the assumption that adverbials c-command the verbal predicate plus its complements), and since neither of the two elements is supposed to move. However, this is not what we find.

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As is illustrated in a prepositional object like om det ‘about it’ canonically precedes an adverbial like i förväg ‘beforehand’.75 a.

…så

att

vi

kan

tala

om

det

i förväg.

…so

that

we

can

talk

about

it

beforehand

‘…so that we can talk about it beforehand.’ b.

?… så

att

vi

kan

tala

i förväg

om

det.

…

that

we

can

talk

beforehand

about

it

so

The same problem renders the analysis sketched above problematic for intensifiers. In particular, we would expect exclusive själv to precede prepositional objects, but as was repeated here,

shown in Section 4.2, it follows all types of complements. Example illustrates this: Och

jagi

ska

ta

hand

(*själv)

om

det

självi.

and

I

will

take

hand

SELF

PREP

it

SELF

‘And I will take care of it myself.’

While ‘short DP movement’ cannot easily account for the distribution of either adverbials or intensifiers, the assumption that all complements simply remain in situ would likewise make the wrong predictions. If the subject DP moves out of the Verb Phrase to [Spec, FinP] (via [Spec, TP]), and the verb moves to T0, we would expect exclusive SELF to provides the (illicit) derivation of the Swedish clause precede all verbal objects. corresponding to …that he washed the car himself under this analysis: *…att hani [TP ti tvättadej [vP [ti själv] [VP tj bilen]]].

Examples like and illustrate a rather general and well-known property of Germanic VO-languages: in some respects, the Verb Phrase behaves as a very tightly connected, almost ‘inseparable’ unit. There are two important aspects of this structural compactness, which are probably related to each other (cf. Koster 1999, 2000): first, VO-languages do not allow scrambling; and second, no element may (usually) intervene between the verb and its complements. Accordingly, the assumption that much of what was previously considered ‘head movement’ is actually ‘phrasal movement’ has recently gained ground.76 Even though I would not like to dispense with head movement entirely, I claim that the problems pointed out above can be resolved by assuming a specific type of movement operation that has repeatedly been proposed in different,

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97

completely unrelated, contexts: VP-internal material is pied-piped along with the verb to some head position. I will refer to this process as ‘complement pied-piping’. Larson (1988) was one of the first authors who argued explicitly for phrasal movement at the lower level of sentence structure. Referring to earlier work by Bach (1979), Dowty (1979) and Haegeman and van Riemsdijk (1986), he introduced an optional rule of in order to account for ‘heavy-NP shift’ in ditransitive predications. behave like a lexical element (V), Having undergone in so far as they are susceptible to movement operations that are generally thought of as instances of head movement (e.g., V-to-V, V-to-I). Larson’s definition of is given in

whose θ-grid contains one undischarged internal θ-role. Then Let α be a phrase α may be reanalyzed as [V…]. (Larson 1988:348)

To illustrate this with an example, the unmarked structure in

is assumed to result

the constituent [gave to from movement of V to a higher V-position, while in John] is reanalysed as an element of category V, and is thus moved as a whole to the position targeted by gave in a.

I gavei [everything that he demanded] [ti [to John]].

b.

I [gave [to John]]i everything that he demanded ti.

The idea of phrasal movement as illustrated in is also made in some more recent work on extraposition (e.g. Rochemont and Culicover 1997), and similar processes are taken for granted in many studies on the syntax of adverbials (e.g. Alexiadou 1997; Kayne 1998; Cinque 1999: Section 1.3– 4).77 From a semantic point of view, the idea of or ‘complement pied-piping’, as I call it,78 is certainly feasible, since transitive verbs with a saturated object position are basically equivalent to intransitive verbs in semantic terms. Moreover, it is feasible from the perspective of feature checking, since the TAM and agreement features of a verb are also the features of the relevant VP or I regard complement pied-piping as a syntactic operation that relates directly to phonological output conditions—in the present context, the position of the intensifier in the sentence. It is driven by aspects of prosodic sentence organization, in particular heaviness, which is a function of constituent length and stress weight. I take it that intensifies, by virtue of being in narrow focus and carrying main stress, are treated as ‘heavy’ by the grammar, thus triggering complement pied-piping, which allows them to surface in a (prosodically preferred) Verb Phrase-final position, thus satisfying a

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phonological constraint of the type of Büring’s (2001) FINALFOCUS (‘Focus should be sentence final’).79 In accordance with the considerations made above, the structure of the clause…att han tvättade bilen själv ‘…that he washed his car himself’ can be described as in

While in an information-structurally ‘neutral’ sentence only the verb tvättade

the complement bilen is pied-piped. The structure in would move to T0, in correctly predicts that exclusive själv follows all verbal complements, but precedes content adverbials, which are taken to adjoin to VP within vP. …att hani [TP ti [tvättade bilen]j [vP [DP ti själv] tj]].

Let us turn to inclusive SELF now. As shown above, the syntactic structure assumed by Holmberg and Platzack (2005) makes the correct predictions for the distribution of inclusive SELF (cf. ). However, we have revised the underlying syntactic analysis for independent reasons, introducing the operation of ‘complement pied-piping’. Whether or not ‘complement pied-piping’ applies in sentences with inclusive SELF is actually irrelevant to the surface order of such sentences because inclusive SELF precedes all other TP-internal elements anyway. Given that complement pied-piping is taken to be a function of phonological output conditions, we should expect that it does not apply in sentences with inclusive SELF, since (medial) inclusive SELF is not final, so there would be no ‘movement trigger’. The derivation of the clause…att jag själv har barn ‘…that I have children myself, under the assumption that complement pied-piping does not apply, is given in […att jagi [TP [ti själv]j hark [vP tj tk barn]]]

It remains, then, to show how sentence-final inclusive SELF in Swedish can be derived. Sentence-final inclusive SELF should probably best be regarded as resulting from the application of a higher-level ‘stylistic rule’ to the (canonical) structure given in Such phonologically driven (optional) rearrangement rules can be observed in the placement of specific adverbials as well. For example, adverbials like ibland ‘sometimes’ or ofta ‘often’ canonically precede the Verb Phrase; but if they are either contrastively ), or phrasal (mycket ofta in ), they may also be stressed (cf. ibland in sentence-final. Such (apparent) ‘rightward movement’ of heavy elements is usually called ‘extraposition’ or ‘heavy shift’ (cf. Ernst 2002), and is by most authors (though not by Ernst) regarded as a consequence of leftward movement of the Verb Phrase. Just like complement pied-piping, such movement operations can be regarded as satisfying a FINALFOCUS-constraint.

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99

a. [Maybe it is good luck that…] …dessa

bilfria

veckor

bara

[infinner sig]i

[ibland]F ti.

…these

car-free

weeks

only

appear

sometimes

‘…these car-free weeks are held only sometimes.’ [PAR 5734924] b. [The president has the right to appeal against the decision of the committee,…] …vilket

[har

hänt]i

…which

has

happened

[AdvP

mycket

ofta] ti.

very

often

‘…which has happened very often.’ [PAR 5884160]

Sentence-final inclusive SELF can be derived as follows: the DP containing the intensifier moves to [Spec,TP]; the head DP moves on to [Spec,FinP] while the intensifier stays in [Spec,TP]. Finally, ‘heavy shift’ applies, so the (remnant) Verb Phrase is moved across the intensifier to some position above TP, which leaves the intensifier in illustrates this operation for the clause for att jag har levt i a sentence-final position. Oslo själv ‘…because I have lived in Oslo myself’.80 …för att jagi [tj har levt i Oslo]k [ti själv]j tk.

A few words are in order as to how the two phonologically driven movement rules postulated above (‘complement pied-piping’ and ‘heavy shift’) relate to each other. There are some important differences: first, while complement pied-piping is obligatory in Swedish sentences with exclusive SELF, ‘heavy shift’ is an optional operation in sentences with inclusive SELF; second, complement pied-piping is a by-effect of a feature-driven movement operation (V-to-T movement), whereas heavy shift is a rearrangement rule in its own right; finally, heavy shift applies at a higher point in the tree. Still, both operations trigger similar effects, and they seem to be, to a certain extent at least, complementary: in sentences with both exclusive and inclusive SELF only complement pied-piping may apply. This can be seen from both the Swedish clauses in and the corresponding English translations. a.

…att

jag

själv

inte

har

gjort

läxor

själv.

…that

I

SELF

not

have

done

homework

SELF

‘…that I have myself not done my homework myself.’ b.

*…att

jag

inte

har

gjort

läxor

själv

själv.

…that

I

not

have

done

homework

SELF

SELF

int.: ‘*…that I have not done my homework myself myself.’

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Note that a structure like of course requires that an intensified DP be intensified a second time, in underlying syntax: the inner DP of the constituent [DP[DPjag själv] själv] first moves to [Spec,TP], leaving the second intensifier behind. The first (inner) intensifier, in turn, is stranded in [Spec,TP], while the subject DP moves on to [Spec,FinP]. This is illustrated in …jagi…[TP [ti själv]j…[vP [tj själv]…]]

Other Scandinavian languages Mutatis mutandis, the analysis offered for Swedish above carries over to the other Mainland Scandinavian languages. Illustration from New Norwegian and Danish is given in and respectively. Complement pied-piping takes place in the a-examples (EXSELF) but not in the b-examples (INSELF): New Norwegian a. Exclusive SELF …når

eini [TP ti

[kan

gjera

…when

one

can

do

det]j [vP [ti

sjø1v] tj]]…

it

SELF

81

‘…when one can do it oneself…’ [www] b. Inclusive SELF …at

egi [[ti

sjø1v]j

erk [tjtk

eit barn

…that

I

SELF

am

a

child

‘…that I am myself a child of that generation.’ [www]

av den

generasjonen]].

of

generation.DEF

that

82

Danish83 a.

Exclusive SELF …at

Santiagoi [TP ti

[dræbte

fisken]j [vP [ti

selv] tj]].

…that

Santiago

killed

the.fish

SELF

‘…that Santiago killed the fish himself.’ b.

Inclusive SELF …at

jegi [TP [ti

selv]j

erk [tj tk

en

kristen]].

…that

I

SELF

am

a

Christian

‘…that I am a Christian myself.’

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101

Insular Scandinavian behaves more or less like Mainland Scandinavian, but a syntactic contrast between Icelandic and Mainland Scandinavian can be observed when we consider the position of inclusive SELF. Remember that in Swedish, inclusive SELF precedes the finite verb in subordinate clauses. In Icelandic, it generally follows the finite ). An intensifier preceding the finite verb can only be interpreted in a

verb (cf.

). Sentence-final inclusive SELF is exemplified in

head-adjacent reading (cf.

Icelandic a. …að …that

ég hafi

sjálf

verið

þarna.

I

SELF.NOM.SG.FEM

been

there

have.SBJ

‘…that I have myself been there.’ (medial INSELF) b. …að …that

ég sjálf

hafi

verið

þarna.

I

have.SBJ

been

there

SELF.NOM.SG.FEM

‘…that [I myself] have been there.’ (ADSELF) c. …að …that

ég hafi

verið

þarna

sjálf.

I

been

there

SELF.NOM.SG.FEM

have.SBJ

‘…that I have been there myself.’ (final INSELF)

The syntactic difference between Icelandic and Mainland Scandinavian pointed out above follows straightforwardly if we assume that in addition to undergoing V-to-T movement the Icelandic finite verb moves to some higher funtional head (say, Fin0), in subordinate clauses as well as in main clauses. If the verb moves across [Spec,TP] to Fin0, it surfaces in a position to the left of the intensifier. The structure of represented as in

can accordingly be

the alternative structure with a sentence-final intensifier—a

result of ‘heavy shift’—is given in a.

…að [FinP égi hafij [TP [ti sjálf]k tj [vP tk [VP tj verið þarna]]]].

b.

…að [FinP égi hafij [tj verið þarna]k [ti sjálf] tk]. (heavy shift)

4.4.3 Deriving head-distant intensifiers in English On English clause structure As pointed out in Section 4.4.2, the presence or absence of V-movement to some functional projection above VP (V-to-T movement, in the framework adopted here) was

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long regarded as an important parameter of crosslinguistic variation in comparative generative syntax. This parameter was generally related to the position of finite verbs relative to specific types of adverbials (‘medial adverbs’; cf. Vikner 2001:1–7 for an overview). While French and Icelandic, among other languages, were considered to exhibit V-to-T movement, it was generally held that English and Swedish lacked this type of movement operation. This position has not only been abandoned in much recent work on Scandinavian languages like Swedish (cf. Section 4.4.2), it has also been challenged for English. The most explicit arguments in favour of V-to-T movement in English has been made by Fox and Pesetsky (2003:35): ‘[i]n a TP without auxiliary verbs, the main verb v moves to T in English—just as it does in French […]. Adverbs that appear to the left of v in T are merged into the TP system’84 (cf. also Johnson 1991; Runner 1998 for earlier similar proposals). The empirical difference between the two options—no V-movement at all versus Vto-T movement—is actually minimal. The reason is that there is no well-established theory of the position taken by adverb(ial)s, medial or otherwise. Advocates of the [±Vto-T]-parameter (such as Vikner) regard medial adverbs as being adjoined to the Verb Phrase. This, however, is highly problematic from a semantic point of view. In particular, adverbs like often always take scope over predicate-related existential quantifiers. For example, I have often flown to London does not state that ‘there is an event of my flying to London which has happened often’, but rather ‘it has happened often that there is an event of my flying to London’. In Chapter 6, I will argue that T0 is interpreted as a generalized quantifier binding the event variable of the predicate denoted by the Verb Phrase. Accordingly, ‘medial adverbs’ should be regarded as c-commanding T0. This analysis is in line with most work done on the syntax and semantics of adverb(ial)s, e.g. Frey and Pittner (1998) or Ernst (2002), and it is compatible with Fox and Pesetsky’s assumption that such adverbs ‘are merged into the TP system.’ Moreover, the assumption that main verbs do not move at all in English conflicts with the fact that they usually precede prepositional adjuncts and specific types of adverbials like yesterday, which are often considered to be left-adjoined to the Verb Phrase (cf. Alexiadou 1997; Kayne 1998): a.

??John yesterday met Bill.

b.

*John in the library met Bill.

As mentioned in Section 4.2, the solution chosen by most syntacticians concerned with the placement of adverbials is to assume (phrasal) leftward movement of material other this means that met Bill has to move than the adverbial itself. For a sentence like across in the library. Just as in the case of Swedish (cf. Section 4.4.2), I suggest that this type of movement is V-to-T movement with attendant complement pied-piping. The grammatical counterparts of in

and

are consequently derived as shown

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

a.

Johni [VP met Bill]j [vP ti yesterday tj].

b.

Johni [VP met Bill]j [vP ti [in the library] tj].

103

As far as English auxiliaries are concerned, it is well known that they differ from lexical verbs in so far as they display a syntactic behaviour similar to that of main verbs in languages like Icelandic. In particular, they precede ‘medial adverbs’ like often (cf. ), while main verbs follow such adverbs auxiliaries (like Icelandic main verbs) occupy Fin0:

I will assume that English

a.

…that [FinP I have

[TP often been there]].

b.

…that [FinP I

[TP often go to London]].

A stranding analysis Let us now turn to the syntactic derivation of head-distant intensifiers in English. Just like in German and Swedish, exclusive SELF in English can be shown to be stranded in vP. A relevant structural description is given in The verb do is moved to T0, and the complement my homework is pied-piped to satisfy FINALFOCUS, just as in Swedish. Since the DP associated with the intensifier—the pronoun I—moves to [Spec,FinP] (through [Spec,TP]), the intensifier is left behind as the only element in the vP. Ii always [TP ti [do my homework]j [vP [DP ti my SELF] tj]].

If an adverbial of time and place adjoins to VP, it will follow the intensifier because it is generated as a sister of VP, which likewise follows the intensifier (which, in turn, is located in [Spec,vP]). The structure of

above is given in

and the same

above (cf. ). As we have seen, specific types of structure can be assumed for (lower) adverbials generally precede exclusive SELF. I take these adverbials to be is parallel to above, with an auxiliary (can) added generated as sisters of vP. to the sentence, since imperatives may be regarded as having special structural properties. a.

Hei’ll [TP ti [tell you about it]j [vP[DP ti himself] some time tj]].

b.

Hei’s going to [TP ti [do it]j [vP[ti himself] [with a hammer] tj]].

c.

Youi can [TP ti [do it]j quickly [vP [ti yourself] tj]].

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As pointed out in Section 4.3, exclusive SELF sometimes follows the direct object but precedes the prepositional object. This (non-canonical) configuration can be assumed to 85 result when only the direct object is pied-piped, as illustrated in a. b.

Hei [gave it]j [[ti himself] tj to Agent Hughes], (cf. Joani [delivers it]j [[ti herself] tj to Lorelei]. (cf.

) )

Inclusive SELF can be derived under premises similar, but not identical, to those made for Swedish in Section 4.2. As has been mentioned, medial inclusive SELF is distributionally restricted in English in so far as it occurs only in combination with auxiliaries. Still, I assume that it is more ‘basic’ than sentence-final inclusive SELF, in the sense that it represents an earlier stage of derivation (which is the input of additional movement operations). The intensified DP is first moved to [Spec,TP], where the intensifier is stranded, while the head DP moves on to [Spec,FinP]. This is illustrated in the structure given in

which corresponds to

above.

Hei has [TP [ti himself]j beenk [vP tj tk the subject of speculation]].

Inclusive SELF surfaces in a sentence-final position when the intensifier and the VP/vP ). Again, this phonologically driven ‘change places’, just as in Swedish (cf. rearrangement operation can be shown to parallel extraposition of sentence adverbials like often as illustrated in

(‘heavy shift’).

Hei has [tj been the subject of speculation]k [ti himself]j tk.

a.

He has often been to Munich.

b.

He has [been to Munich]i [very often] ti. (heavy shift)

As pointed out above, there is one major difference between the syntax of inclusive SELF in English and that of inclusive SELF in Mainland Scandinavian languages: in Mainland Scandinavian, medial inclusive SELF is the default option and has the syntactically wider distribution of the two alternative constructions. In English, by contrast, it is the sentencefinal intensifier which is more widely distributed, since medial inclusive SELF cannot occur in sentences without an auxiliary. In terms of the present model, this means that heavy shift is obligatory in specific configurations. More specifically, it is obligatory if there is no auxiliary. provides a structural description of the sentence I really know

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

that myself in an inclusive reading. shift.

105

illustrates the illicit derivation without heavy

a.

Ii really [knowj [tk tj that]]l [TP [ti myself]k tl] (heavy shift)

b.

*Ii really [TP [ti myself]k knowj [vP tk tj that]] (no heavy shift)

Inclusive SELF and scope interactions with adverbials Finally, let us return to a point that has repeatedly been raised without being accounted for in terms of a syntactic analysis. As demonstrated above, inclusive SELF may enter into different scope relations with (specific) adverbials of time and place. Remember the contrast between I (have to) write a report myself every week and I (have to) write a report every week myself in above. If every week precedes myself, the sentence requires a discourse environment in which it is stated that someone other than the speaker has to write a report every week. Otherwise, it is only necessary that the writing of reports be under discussion. In the first case, the relevant sentence can be paraphrased as ‘I have that property myself: having to write a report every week’. In the second case, every week takes scope over the intensifier: ‘I have to write a report myself, and this applies every week’. Structurally, this difference can be modelled as follows: if every week has narrow scope (I write a report every week myself), it adjoins to the Verb Phrase. Since inclusive SELF is located outside the Verb Phrase, every week does not take scope over it. In the second case (I write a report myself every week), every week adjoins to TP, thus taking scope over the intensifier. The two structures are given in and respectively. The a-sentences provide the surface structures, while in the b-sentences the relevant underlying structures are given. These function as an input to the semantic interpretation procedure. a.

I write a report every week myself.

b.

Ii [TP [ti myself]j T0 [vP every week [vP tj write a report]]]

a.

I write a report myself every week.

b.

Ii [TP [every week] [TP [ti myself]j T0 [vP tj [VP write a report]]]]

4.5 Summary The central objective of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the syntactic behaviour of intensifies in Germanic languages. We started with the claim that exclusive and inclusive SELF can be differentiated syntactically. I have argued that exclusive SELF is properly contained in the Verb Phrase, while inclusive SELF occupies a higher position. Both types of intensifiers have been argued to be generated as sisters of their

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106

head DPs inside the Verb Phrase. The syntactic differences between the two constructions have been attributed to different types of movement operations. While exclusive SELF remains within the Verb Phrase, inclusive SELF is moved along with its head DP to [Spec,TP], which is also its surface position. The head DP of the intensifier has been argued to move further to [Spec,FinP]. The differences in the surface structures of the various languages considered above can be explained as follows: there is a fundamental difference between OV-languages on the one hand (German, Dutch, etc.) and VO-languages on the other (Scandinavian, English). In German, surface word order is a function of (the presence or absence of) scrambling operations. Word order is therefore highly iconic under conditions in which scrambling is barred—for example, in sentences containing non-specific indefinite objects. Scandinavian languages and English are VO and do not allow scrambling. Here, word order variation is a function of two parameters: first, there is a difference in the surface position of the finite verb. In Icelandic, the finite

Language types VO [+V-to-Fin] [−V-to-Fin] OV

EXSELF

INSELF

Icelandic, English/AUX

post-VO

follows VFIN Or vP

English/LEX

post-VO

follows vP

Mainland Scandinavian

post-VO

precedes VFIN or follows vP

Cntl. West Germanic

vP-internal

vP-external

Table 4.2: The syntax of head-distant intensifiers in Germanic languages verb has been assumed to move to Fin0, while it has been taken to move only to T0 in Mainland Scandinavian. In English, auxiliaries move to Fin0, but lexical verbs are located in T0, as in Mainland Scandinavian. The second parameter concerns a stylistic rule which optionally moves a Verb Phrase across an inclusive intensifier (or heavy sentence adverbials), which I have called ‘heavy shift’ (cf. Ernst 2002). In Scandinavian languages, heavy shift is optional in sentences with inclusive SELF. In English, it is optional when there is an auxiliary in Fin0 but it is obligatory when Fin0 is empty. Moreover, I have maintained that in VO-languages, an operation of ‘complement piedpiping’ applies in sentences containing exclusive SELF. Table 4.2 summarizes the parameters of structural variation pointed out above. A major distinction is made between VO-languages on the one hand and OV-languages on the other. In VO-languages, the position of exclusive SELF is usually behind the verb and and on p. 96), while in OV-languages its position its complements (but see depends on whether or not scrambling has taken place, but it is always vP-internal. The position of inclusive SELF shows more variation: in Icelandic and English sentences with auxiliaries, it follows either the finite verb/auxiliary or the Verb Phrase, depending on whether or not (optional) heavy shift applies. In English sentences with lexical verbs,

The syntax of head-distant intensifiers

107

heavy shift is obligatory, so inclusive SELF always follows the Verb Phrase. In Mainland Scandinavian inclusive SELF precedes the finite verb or follows the whole Verb Phrase (heavy shift). In Continental West Germanic inclusive SELF generally occupies a position preceding the Verb Phrase but, again, its specific position depends on the presence or absence of scrambling.

5 Combinatorial properties of head-distant intensifiers In previous research, a number of semantic or pragmatic distributional restrictions have been claimed to apply to head-distant intensifiers. They concern both properties of the head DP and of the associated predicates. In this chapter I will argue that most of these presumably grammatical generalizations merely relate to encyclopaedic knowledge and that the only ‘inviolable’ restrictions concern matters of information structure: exclusive SELF requires that the ‘event token’ described by the matrix predicate be in the prepositional background, while inclusive SELF imposes a parallel condition of accessibility on the predicate itself. We will start with exclusive SELF in Section 5.1 and turn to inclusive SELF in Section 5.2. The results are summarized in Section 5.3. 5.1 Exclusive head-distant SELF 5.1.1 Co-occurrence restrictions: the head DP It is well known that exclusive SELF is more flexible with regard to the referential properties of its head DP than head-adjacent SELF (cf. Moravcsik 1972; Edmondson and Plank 1978; Siemund 2000). Exclusive SELF interacts with all types of DPs that allow head-adjacent SELF (definite DPs and given indefinites, cf. Section 2.2). Furthermore, it can also interact with indefinite DPs if their restriction set is not in the propositional background. This is obviously related to the fact that DPs associated with exclusive SELF can be independently stressed. In the subject an engineer bears a rising accent associated with contrastive topics, here indicated by an acute accent (cf. Büring 1997). This is impossible in a.

An enginéer should know this himSELF.

b.

#An engineer himSELF should know this. (Moravcsik 1972:274)86

Siemund (2000:233) comes to the conclusion that ‘the referential properties of the NP exclusive AVS [head-distant -self] interacts with do not matter at all.’ Nevertheless, he remarks that ‘certain sentences involving indefinite NPs are odd.’ cases in point:

and

are

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers a.

#A prince kissed Sleeping Beauty awake himself.

b.

#A woman was driving the car herself. (Siemund 2000:232)

109

Siemund states that examples such as and are infelicitous because ‘certain NPs do not easily allow the evoking of alternatives’ (Siemund 2000:234). I would like to and is related to another restriction imposed by argue that the infelicity of exclusive SELF on its verbal host. Namely, the event denoted by the predicate has to be in the propositional background, i.e. it has to be either given or accessible. This issue will be addressed in Section 5.1.2. For the time being, it will suffice to point out that sentences of the kind exemplified in context is provided (cf.

become perfectly acceptable if an appropriate

).

Fifty years ago, women did not usually drive their cars themselves, and they had either a husband or a chauffeur to drive them around. Only rarely would you see a woman drive a car herself.

Exclusive SELF can associate not only with DPs introduced by the determiners the and a(n), but also with question words and quantifying DPs. The examples in from Siemund (2000:233). a.

Some/many/all presidents came themselves.

b.

Who/which president came himself?

are taken

While there seems to be general agreement that the referential properties of the head DP do not have an impact on the acceptability of exclusive SELF, a rather strict selectional restriction on DPs interacting with exclusive SELF has been claimed: ‘the referent in question must be able to perform an activity on an intentional basis’ (Siemund 2000:234). This restricts DPs interacting with exclusive SELF to those referring to humans and higher animals. The examples in by Siemund (2000:234):

which are meant to illustrate this fact, are provided

a.

You must decode the message yourself.

b.

My dog managed to open the kitchen door himself.

c.

?The vase broke itself.

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110

On closer scrutiny, this assumed selectional restriction cannot be maintained. In natural language data, we also find cases in which exclusive SELF combines with inanimate head DPs. Some examples are provided in Any business that stores sufficiently large amounts of hazardous waste can be a storage facility even if it is merely storing the waste that it produced itself on the site where it was produced. [www]87

I think the OED has given English (throughout the world) a self-confidence. Some people would say it didn’t need it. So I think it’s more the way it has maybe changed the perception of people about the language and its history than any changes it has caused itself. We do after all try to make sure we ‘monitor’ language. [www]88

It seems that the Cool Rhythm unit was designed to filter out any interference it caused itself, but when the PlayStation is connected to the computer (to grab screen shots, etc.) the stereo speakers experienced a distinct and annoying ‘buzz’. [www]89

Instances of exclusive SELF combining with inanimate head DPs as in are very rare. In Section 5.1.2, it will be argued that this is due to a specific presupposition associated with exclusive SELF. Still, there is one context in which exclusive SELF combines relatively frequently with inanimate head DPs: namely, in reflexive predications. If an inanimate entity causes an event and is at the same time affected by that event, exclusive SELF is possible. Unfortunately, in English exclusive SELF is difficult to identify as such in these contexts because it merges with the reflexive pronoun, i.e. the form itself performs both the function of a reflexive marker, and that of exclusive SELF (cf. Dirven 1973; König and Gast 2002a:235; Gast and Siemund 2006:360; see also Section 8.3 below). Consider the following examples: a. Ten thousand years ago a star destroyed itself in a supernova explosion. [www]90 b. The star was not destroyed by a black hole, it destroyed itSELF.

a.

This silver polishes itSELF.

b.

Your argument answers itSELF. (König and Gast 2002a:235)

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

In

111

itself performs the sole function of a reflexive pronoun, indicating that the star

it is furthermore produced an explosion which resulted in its own destruction. In emphasized that the destruction of the star was not caused by an external force, but by the star itself. Here, itself performs two functions at the same time: it establishes the reflexive relation, and it contrasts the causer (the star) with possible alternative causers (a black is really *the star

hole). In fact, it is feasible to argue that the meaning of

[destroyed itselfREFL] [itselfINT]. The same argument can be made with respect to and apart from establishing the reflexive relation, the self-forms exclude the possibility that someone other than the subject referent is the agent of the event under discussion. Sentences of the form *the star [destroyed itself] [itSELF] are ungrammatical in English, but corresponding sentences are possible in languages that make a formal distinction between reflexives and intensifiers. Consider the German translations of and

given in

respectively. In both sentences sich establishes the

and

selbst additionally emphasizes that the star was not destroyed

reflexive relation. In

has

by an external force, thus performing the function of an exclusive intensifier.

is not in construction with sich (in been added in order to demonstrate that selbst in which case it would have to be analysed as a head-adjacent intensifier), but with zerstört. It clearly represents an instance of exclusive SELF. Vor

zehntausend

Jahren

hat

sich

ein

Stern

in

einer

ago

ten thousand

years

has

ANPH

a

star

in

a

Supernova-Explosion

zerstört.

supernova explosion

destroyed

‘Ten thousand years ago a star was destroyed (lit. ‘destroyed itself’) in a supernova explosion.’

Der

Stern

wurde

nicht

von

einem

schwarzen

Loch

zerstört,

er

the

star

was

not

by

a

black

hole

destroyed

it

zerstörte

sich

SELBST.

destroyed

ANPH

SELF

‘The star was not destroyed by a black hole, it destroyed itSELF.’

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112

Dieser

Stern

wurde

von einem

schwarzen

LOCH

zerstört,

er hat

this

star

was

by

black

hole

destroyed

it

sich

nicht

[SELBST

zerstört].

ANPH

not

SELF

destroyed

a

has

‘This star was destroyed by a black hole, it didn’t destroy itSELF.’

through exclusive SELF combines with In examples of the kind given in inanimate DPs and is clearly grammatical. I therefore conclude that it does not impose any selectional restrictions on its head DP. 5.1.2 Restrictions on predicates Aktionsart Dirven (1973:291) is probably the first author who noticed that aktionsart has an influence on the interpretation of head-distant SELF. He points out that these contextual conditions often have an impact on the question of whether a head-distant intensifier has an exclusive or an inclusive reading. For example, non-stative predicates correlate with an exclusive interpretation (cf.

), while stative predicates seem to favour an

inclusive reading of head-distant intensifiers (cf. 1973:290–1):

examples from Dirven

a.

He gave her the flowers and he did so himself.

b.

It’s nice to know that one will sleep there oneself one day.

Plank (1979:273) furthermore states that predicates combining with exclusive SELF must be resultative. What exclusive head-distant intensifiers emphasize is, according to Plank, that the result of the action under discussion is achieved by the referent of the subject DP. The result of the action described in

is that the car is fully functional again.

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

113

Herr K.

ließ

den

Wagen

nicht

(von

einem

Automechaniker)

Mr. K.

let

the

car

not

by

a

mechanic

reparieren;

er

reparierte

ihn

SELBST

repair

he

repaired

it

SELF

‘Mr. K. didn’t have the car repaired by a mechanic; he repaired it himself.’ (Plank 1979:274)

Plank’s claim was taken up by Siemund (2000:190), who argues that exclusive readings of head-distant intensifiers correlate with verbs denoting accomplishments and achievements, while states and activities usually trigger an inclusive interpretation (cf. vs.

from Siemund 2000:190).

a.

John cut through the wire himself, (achievement/exclusive)

b.

Bill built the house himself. (accomplishment/exclusive)

a.

I can speak Russian myself. (state/inclusive)

b.

I cannot help you right now. I’m working myself. (activ./incl.)

Siemund (2000:191) points out that this generalization is only ‘a rough guideline’: achievements and accomplishments may also co-occur with inclusive SELF (cf. and activities with exclusive SELF (cf.

):

a. Ken has lost 50 bucks himself, (achievement/inclusive) b. Sue knows what it means to water these flowers because she has watered them herself. (accomplishment/inclusive)

a.

I will drive the car myself. (activity/exclusive)

),

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114

Still, Siemund maintains ‘that states always trigger inclusive, never exclusive AVS [head-distant self]’. This appears to be generally true. There seems to be no way of interpreting myself in

in an exclusive reading.

I am a gardener myself.

However, the assumption that exclusive SELF is totally barred from stative predicates must be qualified. Predicates of mental activity such as know or believe are usually regarded as stative predicates, but they do allow exclusive SELF.

is a case in point:

I know the answer myself.

Sometimes, it seems to be difficult to decide whether head-distant intensifiers are for example, seems to convey both the inclusive or exclusive in such contexts. additive implicature of inclusive SELF and the exclusion of joint action or help, which is characteristic of exclusive SELF. In accordance with the argument made in Chapter 4, I is ambiguous both structurally and semantically: if myself is vPcontend that internal, it is interpreted as exclusive SELF; if it is located outside vP, it receives an inclusive interpretation. The structural contrast between the two types of head-distant intensifiers can be made explicit using the distributional diagnostic introduced in Section can occur both inside and outside 1.3 (cf. also Chapter 4). Head-distant myself in the scope of sentence negation. This can best be shown using the German translations of where selbst is within the scope of sentence negation, it is interpreted

In

as an instance of exclusive SELF, while SELF.

clearly represents an instance of inclusive

a.

I don’t know the answer myself. (EXSELF or INSELF)

b.

Ich

weiß

die

Antwort

nicht

selber. (EXSELF)

I

know

the

answer

not

SELF

Ich

weiß

die

Antwort

selber

nicht. (INSELF)

I

know

the

answer

SELF

not

c.

If the intensifier forms part of a vP that has been extracted, it can only have an exclusive interpretation (cf. inclusive.

).

provides the corresponding structure if the intensifier is

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers a.

b.

[vP

[vP

115

Die

Antwort

selber

wissen]i

tue

ich

nicht ti. (EXSELF)

the

answer

SELF

know

do

I

not

Die

Antwort

wissen]i

tue

ich

selber

nicht ti. (INSELF)

the

answer

know

do

I

SELF

not

Given that head-distant intensifiers combining with stative predicates may have both an exclusive and an inclusive reading, and given that the specific interpretation depends on syntactic differences, the correlations concerning aspect and aktionsart have to be regarded as statistical tendencies rather than grammatical rules. Transferability Edmondson and Plank (1978) claim that exclusive SELF requires that the event under discussion be ‘transferable’, which means that one person can carry it out for another (cf. also Siemund 2000:184ff.). while the actions in himself.

provides examples of events that are not transferable, can be delegated and thus allow an exclusive reading of

a.

#Paul has died/danced/sneezed himself, (int.: exclusive SELF)

b.

Paul came/drove/phoned himself. (Siemund 2000:186)

However, the constraint of transferability, too, is clearly an encyclopaedic one, and even the examples in can be rendered acceptable by providing more context. Imagine the following scenario in a fairy tale: a nation has been defeated in a war, and the king of the victorious country requires that some member of the defeated king’s family should die. The defeated king has the choice: either he sacrifices one of his relatives, or he must is an acceptable utterance. That die himself (!). If he decides on the latter option, SELF in contexts of this type is exclusive can be shown by applying our standard diagnostics. In

the VP including the intensifier is extracted, and

demonstrates that himself is within the scope of sentence negation. examples from German.

provides parallel

a. The king decided to die himself rather than sacrifice one of his relatives. b. He said he’d die himself—and die himself he did. c. The king decided not to die himself, but to sacrifice one of his relatives.

The grammar of identity a. Der König the

king

116

beschloss,

nicht selber zu

sterben, sondern

einen

decided

not

die

but

a

er einen

Verwandten

zu

opfern.

relative

to

sacrifice

SELF to

‘The king decided not to die himself, but to sacrifice a relative.’ b. Selber SELF

sterben wollte

der

König nicht, da

opferte

die

the

king

sacrificed he a

wanted

not

so

Verwandten. relative ‘Die himself, the king didn’t want to, so he sacrificed a relative.’

We should of course go beyond considering self-fabricated examples and also discuss attested data. One such example is given in The promise Judah gives his father is that he will die himself rather than allow the safety of Benjamin to be compromised. [www]91

Repeatability Another constraint that has been claimed to determine the interpretation of head-distant intensifiers is the question of whether an event is ‘repeatable’ or not (cf. Siemund 2000:184ff.). As a general tendency, ‘[i]nclusive AVS [head-distant SELF] is only compatible with repeatable situations’, while ‘[n]on-repeatable situations correlate with exclusive AVS [head-distant self]’ (Siemund 2000:185). This requirement is obviously related to the ‘additive’ character of inclusive SELF. Siemund (2000:185) provides the examples in (non-repeatable/only exclusive SELF) and SELF and inclusive SELF). a.

Orpheus rescued Eurydice himself.

b.

The bishop christened the little girl himself.

a.

Orpheus made a mistake himself.

b.

The bishop has christened many little girls himself.

(repeatable/exclusive

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

117

Like the constraint relating to transferability, the condition of repeatability clearly relates to world knowledge, and not to the interpretation of head-distant intensifiers at the level of word meaning. It is not unimaginable (and in fact occurs rather frequently) that a person is christened more than once, and in this case, himself in as instantiating inclusive SELF:

can be interpreted

The bishop knows what it means to christen that little stubborn girl, because he has christened her himself.

Likewise, a sentence like requires an exclusive reading only in a world in which human beings have only one life. This is probably the case in our world, but it is not part of the meaning of exclusive SELF. I know what it means to kill ever-resurrecting Slobodan because I have killed him myself.

Viewed from this perspective, any type of situation is ‘repeatable’. We should therefore better say that inclusive SELF requires that the relevant situations actually be ‘repeated’. This, as a matter of fact, paraphrases the ‘inclusive effect’ associated with inclusive intensifiers. The (assumed) agentivity requirement of exclusive SELF It is at least implied in most work on head-distant intensifiers that exclusive SELF imposes an agentivity requirement on the predicates it combines with (e.g. Edmondson and Plank 1978; Browning 1993; Siemund 2000; Hole 2002a). This amounts to saying that exclusive SELF can combine only with action and experiencer verbs. The importance attributed to this requirement, however, varies from author to author. Edmondson and Plank (1978), Browning (1993) and Hole (2002a) hold the view that emphasis on agentivity is the central function of exclusive intensifiers. According to Edmondson and Plank (1978:406), the interpretation of exclusive SELF systematically varies with the predicate type: action verbs ‘determine their subjects as most agentive’; experiencer verbs ‘exclude anyone else but the most directly involved experiencer’. Siemund (2000:249), on the other hand, claims that such an approach ‘overestimates the importance of agentivity while neglecting other crucial factors’, though he acknowledges that ‘it can hardly be denied that exclusive AVS requires an agentive NP to interact with and imposes a constraint on that NP to this effect’ (Siemund 2000:250). In the following I aim to show that predicates combining with exclusive SELF are not necessarily agentive. Still, the statistical bias towards agentive predicates is so strong that any analysis of exclusive SELF should explain it. One of the authors who have most vehemently argued for an agentivity requirement of exclusive SELF is Hole (2002a). With respect to German selbst (which has a distribution similar, but not identical, to him/her/itself in its intensifying function), Hole observes that

The grammar of identity

118

non-agentive predicates are either barred from occurring with exclusive SELF, or they are spontaneously recategorized as agentive predicates. Minimally contrasting pairs and (from Hole supposedly illustrating this are given in 2002a:136). While the head-adjacent intensifiers are fine in all those examples, exclusive and ). SELF seems to be excluded in sentences with an inanimate subject ( Hole interprets this as resulting from an agentivity requirement imposed by exclusive SELF, but not by (subject-adjoined) head-adjacent SELF, on the associated DP. [Not only the poverty of the mountain dwellers has caused the division of the country.] [Die

Menschen

(selbst)]

teilen

das

Land

(selbst)

in zwei Teile.

the

people

SELF

divide

the

land

SELF

into two parts

‘The people (themselves) divide the land into two parts (themselves).’

[Die

Berge

(selbst)]

teilen

das

Land

(#selbst)

in zwei Teile

the

mountains

SELF

divide

the

land

SELF

into two parts

‘The mountains (themselves) divide the land into two parts (#themselves).’

Die

Polizisten

(selbst)

versperren

den

Tal-eingang

(selbst).

the

policemen

SELF

block up

the

valley-entrance

SELF

‘The policemen (themselves) block up the entrance to the valley (themselves).’

Die

Berge

(selbst)

versperren

den

Tal-eingang

(#selbst).

the

mountains

SELF

block up

the

valley-entrance

SELF

‘The mountains (themselves) block up the entrance to the valley (#themselves).’

According to Hole, the predicates teilen ‘divide’ and versperren ‘block up’ are both ambiguous between a dynamic and a stative reading. While they are action-predicates in their dynamic readings, they do not assign an agent or causer role in their stative uses. Hole claims that exclusive SELF is possible only if the two predicates are interpreted in a dynamic/agentive way (as in

and

), while a stative/non-agentive reading

precludes the use of exclusive SELF (as is witnessed by the infelicity of selbst in and

).

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

119

Although Hole’s empirical generalization is certainly in accordance with a huge portion of attested data, I would like to argue that he is too categorical with regard to the and should be agentivity requirement. I consider that the infelicity of selbst in attributed to another aspect of the use of exclusive SELF, which is related to the inanimate nature of the head DPs (Berge ‘mountains’ and Taleingang ‘entrance to the valley’, respectively). Recall from Section 5.1.1 that exclusive SELF is not categorically barred from co-occurring with inanimate head DPs, but that such instances are relatively hard to find in corpora. Relevant examples are repeated in

and

Any business that stores sufficiently large amounts of hazardous waste can be a storage facility even if it is merely storing the waste that it produced itself on the site where it was produced.

This silver polishes itSELF.

The abnormality of many examples with either inanimate referents or non-agentive predicates can be explained on the basis of the semantic analysis to be presented in Chapter 6. As will be shown there, exclusive SELF requires that the head DP should stand in a twofold relation to the event under discussion. On the one hand, its referent has the subject-role; on the other hand, a second thematic relation holding between that referent and the event under discussion is presupposed, which is often one of responsibility or interest. With inanimate DPs, such a relation is usually difficult to recover. For example, a sentence like #Rain destroyed the crop itself would require that the rain, apart from being the causer of the event described in the sentence, should stand in some relation of interest, benefit, etc. to the same event. This is of course hard to imagine.92 The same explanation can be given for the infelicity of Hole’s sentences

and

above. In it is difficult to conceive how the mountain could stand in some second thematic relation to the division of the land, apart from being the ‘divider’. it is difficult to see in what second (non-agentive) relation the Likewise, in mountains could stand to the fact of the valley being blocked up. Consider the contrast between

and

how could we fill the gaps in the second part of

Die

Menschen

teilen

das Land nicht SELBST

the

people

divide the land

LEIden

aber

darunter/

suffer

though

under

it

not

in

zwei Teile, sie

SELF

into two

profiTIEren

aber

davon.

profit

though

from it

parts

they

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120

‘The people do not divide the land into two parts themselves, but they suffer because of it/profit from it (i.e. the division).’ #Der

Berg

teilt

das

Land

nicht

SELBST,

er…aber…

the

mountain

divides

the

land

not

SELF

it…though…

‘The mountain does not divide the land itself, but it…’

As we can see from (the negated counterpart of ), there is a presupposition that the people stand in some thematic relation to the fact of the land being divided, irrespective of whether they produce the division themselves or not. What kind of What we need is some relation R other than presupposed relation could that be in the ‘causer’-relation that holds between the mountain and the division of the country. Such a relation is of course difficult to find, since the mountain is probably totally indifferent to the fact that the country is divided. However, suppose the mountain marks the boundary between two different parts of the country. One of the parts is inhabited by a people A, and the other part by a people B. An outside observer may be led believe that the correspondence between the ethnic division and the geographical division is accidental, and he may utter Suppose further that the mountain is steep and dangerous to cross, so that it is downright impossible to get from one side to the other. A 93 native person may now answer as in Dieser

Berg

scheint

ja

genau

die

ethnische

Teilung

this

mountain

seems

PTCL

exactly

the

ethnic

division

des Landes widerzuspiegeln. of the land reflect ‘This mountain seems to reflect exactly the ethnic division of the land.’

Der

Berg

spiegelt

diese

Teilung

nicht

nur

wider,

er führt

sie

the

mountain

mirrors

this

division

not

only

back,

it

it

sogar

selbst

herbei.

even

SELF

here

leads

‘The mountain not only reFLECTS the division, it even produces that division itSELF.’

and might suggest that predicates combining with exclusive The examples in SELF have to be at least causative predicates, but even this generalization cannot be

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

121

maintained. Exclusive head-distant intensifiers can also co-occur with unaccusative predicates. Example

above is a case in point. A further instance of exclusive SELF

On the face of it, it seems combining with an unaccusative predicate is given in impossible for the verb fall to combine with an exclusive head-distant intensifier. Himself in

is therefore most naturally interpreted as an inclusive intensifier. John fell into the pit himself.

However, all that we need is, again, more context. states that there was an event of falling which happened to John. Alternative propositions have to be about the same event, with a different undergoer, and John still has to stand in some relation (of interest, responsibility, etc.) to that event. This becomes possible if John wished that someone other fell, but finally, he fell himself. Suppose that John put a banana peel on the floor with the intention that his secretary should slip. After that, he forgot about the banana ). The function of himself in

peel, and he slipped himself (cf.

is similar to the

one of selbst in the German proverb in John wanted his secretary to slip on the banana peel, but finally he slipped himself.

Wer

anderen

eine

Grube

gräbt,

fällt

selbst

hinein.

who

others

a

pit

digs

falls

SELF

in it

‘He who digs a pit (for others) falls into it (himself).’

In order to show that these intensifiers are really instances of exclusive SELF, let us illustrates that selbst is c-commanded by (and thus in apply our standard tests again. the scope of) the sentence negator. The structure corresponding to inclusive SELF, is infelicitous. demonstrates that the VP together with the headillustrated in distant intensifier can be extracted. This shows that the head-distant intensifier must be an instance of exclusive SELF. The adverb meistens ‘in the majority of cases’ in been added to make the sentences more apt to contextualization.

has

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122

Wer

anderen

eine

Grube

gräbt,

fällt

meistens

nicht

selbst

herein.

who

others

a

pit

digs

falls

usually

not

SELF

in it

‘He who digs a pit (for others) does usually not fall into it himself.’ (EXSELF) #Wer

anderen

eine

Grube

gräbt,

fällt

selbst

nicht

herein.

who

others

a

pit

digs

falls

SELF

not

in it

(INSELF) Selbst

in

die

Grube

fallen

wird

der,

der

sie

anderen

gräbt.

SELF

in

the

pit

fall

will

the one

who

it

others

digs

‘He himself will fall, he who digs a pit (for others).’ (EXSELF)

In conclusion, I do not deny that there is a strong tendency for exclusive SELF to cooccur with agentive predicates. The mere fact that I had to provide plenty of context and discussion to render the counter-examples acceptable can be taken as further evidence to substantiate this point. However, there are counter-examples, which shows that the assumed agentivity requirement of exclusive SELF cannot have the status of a grammatical rule, and that this tendency has to follow from some other fact. I have explained the observed asymmetries in terms of the requirement that, apart from the asserted thematic relation holding between the subject referent and the event under discussion, there must be some second presupposed thematic relation. Such a relation is usually difficult to recover with inanimate beings and with non-agentive predicates. We will return to this point in Section 6.3.1. The condition of accessibility of events In the above discussion, I have argued that the assumed restrictions on the distribution of exclusive SELF are merely tendencies that result from world knowledge and the potential for a given sentence to contextualize more or less easily. I will now introduce a condition that has, to my knowledge, thus far gone unnoticed: the ‘condition of accessibility of events’. The condition of accessibility of events says that the events described by sentences containing exclusive SELF have to be in the propositional background, i.e. they have to be given or at least accessible (cf. Lambrecht 1994; Schwarzschild 1999 for definitions of these notions). Thus, exclusive SELF cannot be used with predications that introduce new events into the discourse. As will be detailed in Section 6.2.1, I assume a Davidsonian framework of event semantics, so events are treated on a par with individuals. The requirement that events denoted by verbs combining with exclusive SELF be accessible can be seen most clearly in structures that are often called ‘support verb’ constructions.94 In these constructions, the thematic role of the external argument is represented by a verbal predicate, while the event is encoded by an ‘autonomous’ event nominal. In verbs in italics:

the nominalized events are in small capitals, and the support

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers a.

John made the DECISION. (~John decided.)

b.

John took a WALK. (~John walked.)

c.

John had a SHOWER. (~John showered.)

123

In the present context, support verb constructions have the advantage of lexically separating the event which they denote from the thematic relation holding between the event and the participants (make a/the decision, take a/the walk, have a shower). As a consequence, the event is overtly marked for (in)definiteness and has an accent pattern of its own. In monolexemic verbs such as decide, walk or shower, these two components of verbal meaning are lumped together, and the status of the event and the thematic relation The main accent may cannot be spelled out separately. Consider the examples in fall on either the support verb make or the event nominal decision, depending on the focus structure of the sentence. a.

—Did you LIKE that decision? —Well, I [MADE]F that decision, (emphasis on the agent-role)

b.

—What did you do? —I [finally made the decision]F. (predicate focus)

Support verb constructions combine with exclusive SELF only if the event nominals are given or accessible. Thus

is fine, while

the blue. The monolexemic predicate in and

is infelicitous when uttered out of is subject to the same constraints as

and is thus felicitous only if understood in the sense of

a.

John has made the decision himself.

b.

#John has made a decision himself, (int.: exclusive)

c.

John decided himself.

The contrast between and shows that both interlocutors have to be aware that the event under discussion—the decision—has taken place. An indefinite event nominal as in

becomes acceptable only if a specific (type of) decision is under

discussion. This is shown in The chancellor usually doesn’t make any decisions. He always lets his wife decide. Last year, however, he made a decision himself.

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124

The condition of accessibility of events is reminiscent of a comparable restriction postulated for head-adjacent SELF: recall from Section 2.2 that head-adjacent SELF requires a (nominal) co-constituent whose denotation is in the propositional background. 5.2 Inclusive head-distant SELF A rather comprehensive account of the distributional restrictions associated with inclusive SELF is offered by Siemund (2000: chapter 7). With regard to English, Siemund notes the distributional restrictions listed in i.

Inclusive SELF is ‘by and large’ restricted to subjects.

ii.

Inclusive SELF is restricted to human referents.

iii.

Inclusive SELF does not easily combine with indefinite DPs.

I would like to show that the condition relating to the syntactic relation of the head DP ) and its referential properties as stated in

interacting with inclusive SELF (point

are basically correct, but that the animacy restriction in qualified.

needs to be

The restriction concerning the syntactic relation of the DP Let us start with interacting with inclusive SELF is a point where English and German show an interesting contrast. German allows the association of inclusive SELF with non-nominative DPs more easily than English. Usually, these DPs have at least some subject properties. For are dative and accusative example, the head DPs interacting with inclusive SELF in DPs performing the function of an experiencer (cf. Siemund 2000:115). In the English translations, these DPs are in the subjective (or nominative) case. a.

Mir

gefällt

die

Situation

selbst

nicht.

me

pleases

the

situation

SELF

not

‘I don’t like the situation myself.’ b.

Mich

regt

Eifersucht

selbst

auf.

me

agitates

jealousy

SELF

PREP

‘I can get angry about jealousy myself.’

In a footnote, Siemund (2000:117) mentions that he found only one instance of inclusive SELF in English where the intensifier interacts with an accusative DP (cf.

).

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

125

However, he adds that ‘most people do not seem to like it’. The German correlate of given in

is fine.

a.

His answer didn’t strike me as particularly convincing myself.

b.

Seine

Antwort

hat

mich

selbst

nicht

besonders

überzeugt.

his

answer

has

me

SELF

not

particularly

convinced

Taking these facts into account, the restriction imposed by inclusive SELF on its head DP in German cannot be explained in terms of the syntactic function of that DP alone. König and Siemund (1996a:11) observe that the semantic role of the head DP also has a bearing on the acceptability of such sentences, and they claim that inclusive SELF always interacts with the element ranking highest on the hierarchy of thematic roles (agent>experiencer/beneficiary>patient>theme). But this does obviously not apply to passive sentences, as is shown by

(Siemund 2000:180).

Ich

bin

selbst

von

Hans

betrogen

worden.

I

am

SELF

by

Hans

cheated

been

‘I have been cheated by Hans myself.’

suggests that in addition to the semantic and syntactic aspects mentioned above, inclusive SELF is sensitive to the discourse pragmatic status of its head DP. Although it is certainly true that in most cases, inclusive SELF is associated with DPs in the subjective case, and with those DPs bearing the ‘highest’ thematic role in the clause, it is probably more accurate to say that inclusive SELF requires a head DP with a topical status, rather than the syntactic relation of a subject, or a specific semantic role. Typically, topics are also subjects, and subjects often occupy the highest position on the hierarchy of thematic roles (in active sentences), but this need not be so. It is also important to note that in English, the correlation between the semantic role, the syntactic relation, and the information-structural status of a DP is stronger than in German. I take a nominal to be topical if some property is predicated of it, i.e. if it is the psychological subject of a structured proposition (in the sense of von Stechow 1982, 1991). Lambrecht (1994:118) defines the notion of ‘topic’ as ‘the thing which the proposition expressed by the sentence is ABOUT’. If topics are contrasted with other discourse participants, they can always be copied into an introductory phrase such as as for…or as to…. Consequently, we should expect that DPs interacting with inclusive SELF can likewise occur in such explicit topic exponents, given that the topical referent is opposed to some alternative value. A glance at some pertinent examples seems to confirm this expectation (cf.

).

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126

It embarrassed him now to remember it, his pleadings, his promises. (As to him,) [h]e had come close to tears himself. (cf. Siemund 2000:179)

Scarlett knows what it means to be blown by the wind. (As to her,) she was once blown by the wind herself. (cf. Edmondson and Plank 1978:385)

Was

mich

betrifft,

hat

mich

seine

Antwort

selbst

nicht

what

me

concerns

has

me

his

answer

SELF

not

besonders

überzeugt.

particularly

Convinced

‘As far as I’m concerned, his answer didn’t strike me as particularly convincing myself.’

Was mich betrifft,

mir

gefällt

die

Situation

selbst

nicht.

As far as I’m concerned

me

pleases

the

situation

SELF

not

‘As far as I’m concerned, I don’t like the situation myself.’

Let us now turn to the claim that inclusive SELF generally requires DPs denoting human referents. This claim seems to be generally true as long as we speak of inclusive SELF in its sentence-final use. There is a marked difference in acceptability between

and

a. Fred not only hosts a number of malodorous animals, he smells rather disgusting himself. b. ?This tree not only hosts a number of malodorous animals, it smells rather disgusting itself.

However, inclusive SELF can easily be used with DPs denoting inanimate referents if it combines with nominal predicates (i.e. in copula sentences). Attested English examples taken from the BNC are given in

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

127

The alcohol in alcoholic drinks is itself an organic solvent, and it ‘competes’ with several other solvents for detoxification enzymes, slowing their breakdown. [BNC BM1 676]

Obviously this will not do, for pain is itself a sensation, not something of which one is aware through a sensation. [BNC CM1 584]

We are works of art, belonging to a world that is itself an aesthetic phenomenon. [BNC H0N 1007]

In and two instances of German selbst are given that function as inclusive SELF in combination with an inanimate DP: Das

Buch…ist

selbst

ein

Dokument

des

the

book…is

SELF

a

document

of the

…personenzentrierten

politischen

Journalismus…

…person-centred

political

journalism…

‘The book…is itself a document of person-centred political journalism.’ [www]95

Logik

hat

ihre eigenen

logic

has its

own

Axiome

und ist selbst

ein logisches

System.

axioms

and

a

system

is

SELF

logical 96

‘Logic has its own axioms and is itself a logical system.’ [www]

In German, there are also instances of inclusive SELF interacting with inanimate DPs in combination with verbal predicates.

illustrates this.97

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128

[Preservatives like Benzalkoniumchloride or Natrium-EDTA are used to keep eye medicines aseptic. We have downgraded those substances one point:] Benzalkoniumchlorid,

weil

es

selbst

allergisierend

wirkt…

Benzalkoniumchloride

because

it

SELF

allergetic

acts

98

‘Benzalkoniumchloride, since it provokes allergies itself…’ [www]

The third set of co-occurrence restrictions pointed out by Siemund (2000) concerns referential properties of the head DP. Siemund (2000:181) mentions that ‘it might be conjectured that, as far as the properties of the relevant NPs are concerned, inclusive AVS [head-distant -self] behaves very much like ANS [head-adjacent -self]’. Consequently, inclusive SELF requires that its head DP be in the propositional background, and indefinite DPs are possible only if their restriction set is definite (cf. The observation that DPs interacting with inclusive Section 2.2). This is shown in SELF have to be in the propositional background is obviously related to the fact that these DPs have to be topics, since only given DPs can be topics. a.

?A minister was surprised himself. (Siemund 2000:181)

b.

One of the ministers was surprised himself.

As far as the types of predicates combining with inclusive SELF are concerned, it has been demonstrated that inclusive SELF may combine with any type of predicate (Section 5.1.2). Certain tendencies concerning such ontological properties of events as repeatability or transferability cannot be regarded as forming part of the lexical meaning of inclusive SELF. We have therefore assumed that inclusive SELF does not impose any strictly semantic co-occurrence restriction whatsoever on its verbal host. However, there is a pragmatic restriction: the predicate of the relevant sentence needs to be in the propositional background. This fact is trivially related to the additive implicature associated with inclusive SELF. Consider I have children myself.

As will be argued in Chapter 6, a sentence like is possible only if it has been mentioned in previous discourse that someone other than the speaker has children. The difference between exclusive and inclusive SELF can be described like this: while inclusive SELF merely requires that the predicate be under discussion, exclusive SELF imposes an additional requirement which states that a specific event token must be given. These points will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

Combinational properties of head-distant intensifiers

129

5.3 Summary The semantic and pragmatic aspects of the distribution of intensifiers in English pointed out above are summarized in Table 5.1. For comparison, the relevant properties of headadjacent SELF are included in the table as well (cf. Section 2.2).

animacy

function definiteness

predicate

ADSELF –

–

definite DPs and given indefinites

–

EXSELF usually but not necessarily animate

subject

–

event token is given

INSELF

topic

definite DPs and given indefinites

predicate is given

usually but not necessarily human

Table 5.1: Distributional restrictions on intensifiers in English

6 The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers This chapter is concerned with the interpretation of head-distant intensifiers in English, both at the sentence level and at the word level. In Section 6.1, the function of exclusive SELF is examined, starting with the type of alternative propositions evoked by sentences containing exclusive SELF. In Section 6.2, some assumptions concerning the syntaxsemantics interface are outlined. Section 6.3 offers a semantic analysis of exclusive SELF which derives the semantic effects described in Section 6.1 compositionally. This section also addresses some of the distributional asymmetries pointed out in Chapter 5. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 are dedicated to the interpretation of inclusive SELF. The discussion starts with a number of empirical generalizations in Section 6.4 before turning to a compositional analysis in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6 previous analyses of headdistant intensifiers are briefly reviewed. Section 6.7 summarizes the results of this chapter. 6.1 The interpretation of exclusive SELF Exclusive SELF is used to oppose a proposition π, headed by a predicate P, to a set alternative propositions in such a way that the following condition obtains: in each alternative proposition the semantic role associated with the external argument of P—henceforth, the ‘subject-θ-role’—is assigned to some referent other than the subject referent of π. For example, himself in propositions like those in

(cf. also Gast and Siemund 2006:357–61):

John wrote the letter [himself]F. subject-θ-role of ‘write the letter’→John a.

John had his secretary write the letter. subject-θ-role of ‘write the letter’→John’s secretary

b.

establishes a contrast to

John’s wife wrote the letter for John. subject-θ-role of ‘write the letter’→John’s wife

The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

131

In both sentences in the action of writing the letter in question is carried out by someone other than John. The question arises as to what distinguishes sentences with exclusive SELF from common subject focus constructions as in

or head-adjacent

since such sentences also establish a contrast with intensifier constructions as in alternative propositions in which someone other than John wrote the letter: a.

It was [John]F who wrote the letter.

b.

John [himself]F wrote the letter.

The difference between on the one hand, and and on the other, is that only the former is associated with a focus supposition to the effect that John stands in some (non-agentive) thematic relation to the event of writing the letter in question. In and it is presupposed that John is the interested party or beneficiary, both even though the letter was written by someone else. The existence of such (presuppositional) ‘secondary thematic relations’, as I will call them, is characteristic of all instances of exclusive SELF, and is one of the most important aspects of interpretation distinguishing exclusive SELF from subject-adjoined SELF (cf. Siemund 2000’s ‘centrality condition’ on the use of exclusive SELF; see Section 6.6.1). The propositional content of the focus supposition that it evokes and the type of proposition that it contrasts with are given in a.

Propositional content of John wrote the letter.

b.

Focus supposition of John stood in some relation R to the action of writing the letter.

c.

Contrasting propositions: Someone other than John wrote the letter.

According to this analysis, what distinguishes exclusive SELF from free foci and cleftconstructions as in

or from head-adjacent SELF interacting with a subject as in

is a focus supposition saying that the subject referent stands in some ‘secondary thematic relation’ to the event under discussion. As pointed out above, secondary thematic relations typically have to do with notions like ‘interest’ or ‘responsibility’. The presuppositional status of such relations can be shown using several presupposition tests, such as their stability under negation or in the protasis of a conditional clause (cf. respectively):

and

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132

Secondary thematic relation is stable under negation: a.

John did not write the letter himself…

b.

It is not TRUE that John wrote the letter himself…

…but he was the interested party.

Secondary thematic relation is preserved in protasis: If John wrote the letter himself, there is a chance that the application will be successful. (John is the interested party)

All sentences in and are appropriate only if the letter under discussion is related in some way to John—for example, if it is a letter that he needs to write or wants to write. More accurately, we should say that these sentences require that John should stand in some relation R to the action of writing the letter. As mentioned above, the presence of a secondary thematic relation is a crucial difference between exclusive SELF on the one hand (cf. SELF on the other (cf.

), and subject-adjoined

). This can be illustrated using minimal pairs like the one

in a.

Yesterday the boss himself wiped the floor of Mary’s office.

b.

Yesterday the boss wiped the floor of Mary’s office himself.

simply states the (surprising) fact that the boss (himself) wiped the floor of Mary’s office. The only focus supposition made here is that any referent contrasting with the by contrast, boss can be conceived of as a function of the boss (cf. Chapter 3). triggers the focus supposition that the boss stands in some (non-agentive) relation to the action of wiping the floor of Mary’s office. For example, he may have had a particular interest in that action being carried out, or he may always have criticized Mary because of her filthy office, usually asking her to wipe the floor—only this time, he wiped the floor himself. This scenario is certainly compatible with required by

as well, but—crucially—it is not

This point can be illustrated by negating the sentences in

a.

The boss himself didn’t wipe the floor of Mary’s office.

b.

The boss didn’t wipe the floor of Mary’s office himself.

While is much less surprising than above, is still remarkable in so far as it seems to suggest that the boss should have, or at least could have wiped the floor of

The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

133

Mary’s office. This is due to the fact that the secondary thematic relation has a requires that some thematic relation R should hold presuppositional status, i.e. between the boss and the action of wiping the floor in Mary’s office, which is accommodated on the part of the hearer if it is not stated explicitly. above:

summarizes the two conditions on the use of exclusive SELF as pointed out

Exclusive SELF is used to relate a proposition π headed by a predicate P to a set of alternative propositions

in such a way that:

i. in each element of A the subject-θ-role of P is assigned to some individual x other than the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier ii. π is associated with the focus supposition that the referent of the head DP stands in some semantic relation R to the event described in π which is not the subject-θ-role of P.

Let us consider some more examples underpinning the generalizations made in Consider John made the decision himself.

According to the analysis provided above, is expected to contrast with propositions in which someone other than the subject referent makes the decision at issue, while this referent is still saliently related to that decision. Attested examples for this are given in Here, the alternative propositions are explicitly mentioned in the context. Typically, these contrasting propositions describe states of affairs in which some referent x consciously leaves a decision to someone else, or some decision is made which concerns x, without x knowing about it (for example, for the reason of being unconscious). a. Brian truly wants what is best for Justin and he wants Justin to make the decision himself rather than let Brian make it for him. [www]99 b. Unless a person formally makes his health care preference explicit, or formally gives another person the power to make health care decisions through a durable power of attorney, the state may not permit the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments when the person is unable to make the decision himself. [WWW]100

The two points listed in above can easily be identified in both and first, in all contrasting propositions someone other than the referent of the DP interacting

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134

with the intensifier makes the decision at issue; and second, the agent of the asserted proposition in both cases stands in some thematic relation R to the decision in question in so far as it ‘concerns’ him/her. The same point can be made with regard to the examples in

which have been taken from the BNC. a. ‘I have taken the liberty of writing to you in English, being informed that you can either read it yourself, or have some persons who can translate it for you.’ [BNC ALU 489] b. Boo does not conform to the community’s code because when he got into trouble at the age of 18, his father, a very strict Baptist, undertook to punish his son himself, rather than let the law do it and for the rest of his life until he died, he kept his son away from the outside world and would not let him mix with the neighbours. [BNC KAY 158] c. Some channels may commission work from independent producers; but there is often a preference for either making it yourself, or importing it from afar. [BNC EF6 42]

In the proposition ‘You can read it yourself’ contrasts with ‘You can have someone translate it for you’. In either case, the addressee is the beneficiary of the action of reading the letter, the difference being that in one case, s/he is also the agent of that event, while in the other case someone else performs the action of reading the letter. expresses that Boo’s father ‘undertook to punish his son himself’, rather than letting someone else do it for him (the law). In either case, he is interested in his son the addressee is the ‘recipient’ of some product (secondary being punished. In thematic relation), but only in one of the alternative propositions considered (‘making it yourself’) is s/he also the agent. 6.2 From syntax to semantics Having made two important empirical generalizations concerning the distribution of exclusive SELF in above, we now turn to a consideration of how these semantic effects can be derived compositionally. This analysis will be related to the syntactic analysis provided in Chapter 4. There, it was argued that exclusive SELF is inserted as a sister of its head DP, and that its head-distant position results from movement of the head DP out of vP, while exclusive SELF remains in situ. For Swedish and English it has moreover been argued that the verb together with its complements is moved to T0. This for the sentence John will mow the lawn himself. analysis is illustrated in shows the sentence in question with a head-adjacent intensifier for comparison (only structural aspects relevant to the interpretation of the intensifier are indicated).

The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

135

a.

Johni will [TP ti [mow the lawn]j [vP[ti himself] tj]]. (EXSELF)

b.

[John himself]i will [TP ti mowj [vP ti tj the lawn]]. (ADSELF)

In order to derive the semantics of head-distant intensifiers as described in Section 6.1, we need to digress briefly into matters concerning event semantics and the syntaxsemantics interface. A Davidsonian model of event semantics is outlined in Section 6.2.1. Section 6.2.2 addresses the question of how movement or, more generally, syntactic binding, is interpreted semantically, and the consequences of this analysis for the interpretation of the (existentially bound) event variable are set out. The main discussion resumes at Section 6.3. 6.2.1 Sentences as descriptions of events or facts The conceptualization and description of events or situations will be particularly central to the arguments made in this chapter. I will adopt a Davidsonian framework of event semantics. This approach to the analysis of sentence meaning goes back to Reichenbach (1947:268), who notes the equivalence of

and

a.

George VI was crowned at Westminster Abbey.

b.

The coronation of George VI took place at Westminster Abbey.

Reichenbach points out that ‘there are two ways of splitting a situation’, and he uses the term ‘thing-splitting’ for sentences like type of

and ‘event-splitting’ for sentences of the

In thing-splitting representations, properties are attributed to individuals,

is while in event-splitting representations, the existence of a fact or event is stated. a thing-splitting sentence in so far as the property of being crowned at Westminster Abbey is an event-splitting sentence, since the existence of an is attributed to George VI. event is asserted which has the property of being the coronation of George VI. Reichenbach uses an asterisk to symbolize the operation of deriving event-splitting from thing-splitting expressions. If P(x) stands for ‘x has the property P’, then [P(x)]*—a ‘fact-function’—is interpreted as the property of the corresponding situation, for example the predicate be the coronation of George VI. This predicate has an unsaturated argument slot for an event variable, usually represented as e.101 If the argument slot for an event variable is not saturated, a fact-function has the form λe[[P(x)]*(e)]. The event variable can either be bound by the Russelian ι-operator (cf. Egli 1995 and references cited there), yielding an event nominal (cf. proposition (cf.

).

), or by an existential quantifier, giving rise to a

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a. ιe[[CROWNED(George VI)]*(e)] ‘the event e that has the property of being the coronation of George VI’ (or simply ‘the coronation of George VI’) b. ‘There was an event e such that e had the property of being the coronation of George VI’ (or simply ‘George VI was crowned.’)

Reichenbach’s (1947) proposal was taken up and elaborated by Davidson (1967). Davidson points out that Reichenbach’s assumption of ‘event-splitting’ and ‘thingsplitting’ representations being equivalent ‘spoils much of the merit in Reichenbach’s proposal’ (Davidson 1980:116), and that the event-splitting type of representation is in fact the only possible one. This hypothesis is a matter of debate up to the present day (for some discussion, cf. Rothstein 1998a). I prefer not to take a stance as to whether a representation of sentence meaning is possible without assuming an event variable of the Reichenbach-type; I would merely like to claim that it is possible to do so with an event variable, so that, in the worst case, our representation of sentence meaning will be redundant.102 Reichenbach (1947:269) remarks that ‘[s]ynonymously with the word event we can use the word fact’. This is an important point because it demonstrates that Reichenbach does not regard events with well-defined starting and end points as the only arguments of fact-functions. For example, the proposition Mary is tall can also be conceived of as an ‘event’, in the wider sense of the word. In this case, a paraphrase using the term fact is more appropriate (‘the fact that Mary is tall’; hence the term ‘fact-function’). This standpoint is also taken by Higginbotham (1985): There seem to be strong arguments in favor of, and little to be said against, extending Davidson’s idea to verbs other than verbs of change or action. Under this extension, statives will also have E-positions [positions for an event variable]. The bundle of objects answering to these positions might well be called ‘situations’, following Barwise and Perry (1983). (Higginbotham 1985:555) I will subscribe to this view, and I will use the notions ‘event’, ‘situation’ and ‘fact’ as referring to entities of the same type, for which we can use the more general notion ‘eventuality’. They differ in terms of their internal spatio-temporal constituency: ‘events’ are dynamic, ‘situations’ are static but temporally bounded, and ‘facts’ are temporally unbounded. In more recent publications, the Reichenbach/Davidson-programme has been tightly connected with research into thematic roles (cf. Parsons 1985; Dowty 1989, and several contributions in Rothstein 1998a). Dowty (1989) refers to this younger tradition as ‘neoDavidsonian’. In a neo-Davidsonian approach, the different semantic relations holding between the participants of an event e and the event itself are regarded as predicates that correspond to thematic relations (e.g. λxλe[AGENT(e)(x)] ‘x is the agent of e’). Although I will stick to the more traditional representation of event semantics proposed by

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137

Reichenbach and Davidson, I take it that everything which is said in the present study could easily be translated into a neo-Davidsonian framework. Let us now turn to the status of the event variable and its existential binder, which will play a central role in this chapter. Following Reichenbach (1947) and Davidson (1967), I can be interpreted as in (disregarding have assumed that a sentence such as tense). Note that I do not use Reichenbach’s asterisk to mark ‘fact functions’ as such. As is common practice in event semantics, I will simply regard the event variable as an additional argument of the verbal predicate. a.

Jack is dancing.

b. ‘There is an event e such that e is an event of Jack’s dancing.’

The analysis in shows that the verb dance is associated with two argument slots: one for the ‘dancer’ (the external argument), and one for the event of dancing. The verb dance therefore has a lexical entry of the form given in

λxλe[DANCE(x)(e)]

In order to derive the proposition in from the lexical entry in two operations of functional application have to be carried out: the argument slot for x has to be saturated, and e has to be existentially bound. While the first operation does not pose any problems—the semantic predicate-argument relation holding between the verb dance and the DP Jack is directly reflected in the syntax—the question arises as to what sentence component is responsible for the existential binding of e. I will assume that the event variable gets existentially bound by TAM-related inflectional material—i.e. by material encoded in the T0-node. T0 is generally assumed to be associated with a tense-feature, e.g. PAST or FUTURE. Such features can be interpreted as properties of the variable bound by the relevant (existential) quantifier. To see this, consider Jack will dance.

In the auxiliary will conveys information about the temporal and modal properties of the event described by the verbal predicate dance: it says that there actually is an event of dancing (modal information, INDICATIVE), and that this event is temporally located after the moment of utterance (temporal information, FUTURE). Accordingly, be represented as in

can

The assertion of the existence of an event of dancing is

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expressed by existentially binding the event variable e, and the temporal information is represented as an additional predicate FUT, which can be interpreted as ‘taking place after the moment of utterance’.

‘There is an event e such that e occurs after the moment of utterance and e is an event of Jack’s dancing.’

The negated counterpart of (cf. ) has the same form as with the exception that the existential quantifier binding the event variable is embedded under a ).

negation operator (cf. a. Jack won’t dance. b.

‘There is no event e such that e occurs after the moment of utterance and e is an event of Jack’s dancing.’

The next step is to determine how movement operations such as those illustrated in above can be represented semantically, and how semantic representations like those in and can be related to syntactic structures. This brings us to the syntaxsemantics interface, which is the topic of the next section. 6.2.2 The syntax-semantics interface Syntactic and semantic binding The interpretation of movement (or, more generally, of syntactic binding or traces) is a notoriously neglected topic in syntactic and semantic theorizing. Probably, the most pertinent work has been done by Heim and Kratzer (1998) and, more recently, Büring (2005), who relate binding to λ-abstraction. Accordingly, a structure of the form [Johni [ti snores]] is interpreted as ‘John λx[SNORE(x)]’ (cf. also Reinhart 2000; Reuland 2001, forthcoming). While this procedure works perfectly well in cases where movement does not have any repercussions on the scope relations holding in a clause, it cannot easily account for those cases where movement alters the interpretation of a sentence—i.e. for instances of non-reconstructed movement. I will therefore use a slightly modified (though near-equivalent) version of the Heim-Kratzer-Büring model, which allows one to take differences in scope relations into account. I take it that syntactic binding (more precisely, A-binding from a subject position) corresponds to semantic binding in the sense that a trace is interpreted as a variable whose assignment is restricted by the

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139

antecedent.103 Simplifying somewhat and factoring out a number of theoretical issues, the sentence John likes Mary can accordingly be interpreted as shown in [

Johni

[vP

for x=John:

ti

likes

Mary]]

x

likes

Mary

The subject John figures as an antecedent of the corresponding vP-internal trace in the syntactic structure, and as a restrictor of the corresponding variable in the semantic representation. This point of view is fully compatible with the tradition established by Diesing (1992), who incorporates a number of important insights arrived at by Irene Heim and Hans Kamp with regard to the interpretation of indefinites (e.g. Kamp 1981; is an example of a structure Heim 1982; cf. Diesing’s 1992 ‘mapping hypothesis’). in which an indefinite DP seems to have universal quantifying force. What really is at stake, however, is that a man is not interpreted as a referential expression, but as a predicative DP that restricts the interpretation of the variable x in the Verb Phrase. A similar interpretation procedure is assumed by Hajičova et al. (1998) for the mapping from focus structure to semantic representations. [

A mani

[vP

for

ti

shouldn’t

do

that]]

x

shouldn’t

do

that

If we consider the type of interpretation illustrated above against the background of the syntactic analysis given in Chapter 4, the question arises as to how to deal with syntactic ‘chains’—i.e., n-tuples of syntactic positions that are occupied by the same element in the course of a derivation—which contain more than one element. For example, how should a structure like

be interpreted?

I will assume that chains like the one in are interpreted pairwise from right to left: first, the ‘component chain’ which corresponds to one syntactic object, is ‘extracted’. Then, this chain forms a second chain with John: Each pair in this nested structure is interpreted in such a way that the first element restricts the interpretation of the second, which is represented as a variable. This means that every movement operation is considered in its own right, which is compatible with the view expressed in more recent syntactic work that movement is actually an operation of ‘copy-and-delete’. In

restricts the interpretation of

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and John restricts the interpretation of

is accordingly interpreted as

shown in [

Johni

[

for

x=John:

[for

]] y=x: […y…]]

‘Cyclic variable restriction’ as shown in may seem redundant at this point, and we could assume, alternatively, that only the first element of a chain is a restrictor, while all the other elements are interpreted as variables. However, this is not feasible. The reason is that every syntactic chain corresponds to one syntactic object (a point emphasized by Reuland 2001). Consider the passive sentence in

Johni [

was killed

].

If we wanted to interpret as standing for a formula of the form ‘for x=John: x was killed x’, one of the occurrences of x would be ‘dangling’ in the sentence structure without being syntagmatically related to any other element of the sentence.

can

only be interpreted as shown in for x=John: [for y=x: [y was killed]]

Of course,

is equivalent to the formula ‘for x=John: x was killed’. But as we will

and are responsible for the different see below, configurations like the ones in interpretations associated with head-distant intensifiers (Sections 6.3 and 6.5). The reason is that the intensifier, and hence the focus feature, may intervene between pairs of a and This triggers specific effects at the restrictor and a variable as shown in level of sentence interpretation, since alternatives are introduced at different levels of syntactic and semantic structure. Interpreting the T0-node The second central question concerning the syntax-semantics interface that needs to be addressed is: how is the event structure of a sentence encoded syntactically? As stated above, I take it that the features contained in T0 (e.g. FUT) are interpreted as properties attributed to an existentially bound event variable. For the sentence Jack dances, this can be modelled as follows: to start with, there is an unsaturated predicate dance which has two argument slots: one for the ‘dancer’, and one for the dancing event in question. This

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141

was represented in above as λxλe[DANCE(x)(e)]. The subject position is filled by the DP Jack—or, after movement of this DP out of the Verb Phrase, by its trace. This leaves us with a predicate that has an open slot for an event variable: [

Jacki

for

x=Jack:

[vP

ti dance-

]]

λe [DANCE(x)(e)]

The variable e gets existentially bound by a quantifier that is encoded in T0. T0 can thus be interpreted as a generalized quantifier. For example, if it has the feature FUT, it can be interpreted as the set of all sets of events that intersect with FUT, i.e. the set of events that are temporally located after the moment of utterance. The feature PRES is interpreted as the property ‘contain the moment of utterance’. Leaving aside technical details, this means that (the semantic correlate of) T0 takes ‘untensed’ predicates as an argument, and maps them onto ‘tensed’ predicates, i.e. predicates whose event variable is existentially bound. The structure underlying the sentence Jack dances is given in movement of Jack through [Spec,TP]). Jacki

[TP

TPRES

[vP

for x=Jack:

(I disregard

ti dances

]]

DANCE(x)(e)]

‘For x=Jack: there is an event e which contains the moment of utterance and which is an event of x’s dancing.’

In the following, we will generally disregard temporal, modal and aspectual information in hierarchical representations of sentence meaning. Moreover, (feature-driven) verbal movement operations will be neglected in semantic representations, since they are generally assumed not to have any effect on the interpretation of a sentence.104 Accordingly, the correspondence between syntax and semantics will be represented as in (remember that ‘T0’ corresponds semantically to the position of the existential quantifier binding the event variable of the verb dances). [

Jacki

for

x=Jack:

[TP

T0

[vP

ti dances

[

DANCE(x)(e)]

]]]

6.3 The syntax and semantics of exclusive SELF Equipped with the model outlined in the previous sections, we are now in a position to tackle the interpretation of exclusive SELF. As mentioned above, we can disregard verbal

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movement operations, which are assumed to have no effect on the interpretation of a provides (a simplified version of) the syntactic sentence (cf. Section 6.2.2). structure of where all types of semantically irrelevant movement operations have been reconstructed; i.e.

is what I assume to be the input of the semantic

(this formula will be interpretation procedure, leading to the representation in made more explicit below; in particular, it will be necessary to consider the position of the existential quantifier binding the event variable of the predicate mow, or of the VP mow the lawn). a.

Johni

b.

[[xi himselfF] IDF(x)

for x=John:

will

mow

the

lawn]

will

mow

the

lawn

What needs to be shown is that the semantic effects described in Section 6.1 can be To see this, consider first of all the argument derived from the structure given in set out above. I have argued that exclusive SELF is used to oppose propositions to alternative propositions in which the subject-θ-role of the main predicate is assigned to some individual other than the referent of the head DP. This follows from the fact that the intensifier—semantically, the identity function—is in focus, thus contrasting with a family of functions that map their input on a value which is different from that input (cf. Section 3.3). I have used a generalized function of alterity ‘OTH’ to represent these values contrasting with the identity function. The paradigmatic contrast between ID and OTH is represented in

for

has mown the lawn

A natural language paraphrase of the propositional content of

and the type of

propositions contrasting with it are given in a.

Propositional content of As far as John is concerned, the individual identical to him has mown the lawn.

b.

Propositions contrasting with As far as John is concerned, someone other than him has mown the lawn.

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143

The second point that needs to be shown is that there is a focus supposition to the effect that the subject referent stands in some (non-agentive) thematic relation to the event in question. In order to see this, we have to consider the status of the event variable associated with the predicate mow, as well as the existential binder of that variable. As argued in Section 6.2.2, I assume that the existential quantifier binding the event variable of a predicate is syntactically encoded in T0. Given that exclusive SELF is c-commanded gives the relevant by T0, it is also in the scope of this existential quantifier. semantic description, making use of our ‘two-dimensional’ diagrammatic representation.

for

The formula in can be interpreted as follows: the double lines represent a local contrast within the sentence. Assuming that ‘contrast’ is the mention or assertion of a given value against the background and to the exclusion of specific alternative values that might have filled the relevant position in the sentence, we can assume that a contrast can be interpreted as a conjunction in which it is positively stated as expressed in that the asserted value is true, and it is considered, in terms of potential modality, that the relevant alternative value may have been true. Considered from this perspective, the formula in

can be paraphrased as in

As far as John is concerned: there is an event e such that e is an event of mowing the lawn, and e has been performed by the x identical to John and e may have been performed by some x different from John.

The paraphrase in renders the contrast expressed in sentences with exclusive SELF quite closely. Two different descriptions of the same event token are considered. Both alternative propositions relate to the same event variable e. This is an important aspect distinguishing exclusive from inclusive SELF: in occurrences of inclusive SELF, two alternative event tokens are under discussion. We will consider this point in Section 6.4 below. Let us now return to the second important aspect of the semantics of exclusive SELF, viz. the secondary thematic relation, which has the status of a focus supposition. It says that exclusive SELF always requires that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier should stand in some thematic relation to the event under discussion, in addition to the relation associated with the external argument. The focus supposition of

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our example sentence can be extracted by inserting an existentially bound variable in the place of the focus. This has been done in

for

The focus supposition given in says that, as far as John is concerned, there is an action of mowing the lawn which is carried out by some function f of John. Irrespective of whether the referent f(John) is identical to or different from John, all contrasting propositions will obviously provide information about John. This can be clearly seen if we insert the complementary value of the identity function (the function OTH) into the is accompanied by a natural language position of the focus, which is done in paraphrase in order to illustrate that even though someone other than John has mown the lawn, the sentence still provides information about John. In other words: there is a relation of ‘aboutness’ holding between John and the event described in the proposition.

for ‘As far as John is concerned, there is an event of mowing the lawn that has been carried out by someone other than him.’

The question arises as to how we can model more formally what might sloppily be called an ‘aboutness relation’ between the subject and the event described in a sentence. What needs to be done is the following: we have to show that in formulae of the form given in there is always some relation R holding between the restrictor of the highest-level variable on the one hand (John) and the existentially bound ‘inner’ variable on the other (e). This fact can be made explicit if we make use of a process that is called ‘skolemization’ in logic: if an existential quantifier binding some variable x is in the scope of a universal quantifier binding some other variable y, and if some relation R holds then x can be regarded as a function of y—say, between x and can be represented as In order G(y). Consequently, to apply skolemization to the formula in we first have to transform the sentence into an implicational statement.

is a notational variant of

above:

From an intuitive point of view, the process of skolemization can be described as follows: if a formula of the form is true in a model M, this means that for each x, there is some y such that R holds between x and y. If we choose for

The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

145

each x just one arbitrary y, we get a function from De to De (say, ) such that R(x)(G(x)) is true in M. Of course, R(x)(G(x)) is weaker than because it may well be that some stands in relation R to more than one other We will see, however, that this is not a problem in the present context. The is given in The existentially bound variable e is here ‘skolemized’ version of replaced with a Skolem-function G, applied to x.

As has been said, skolemization does not yield equivalent formulae—it weakens the truth conditions of a sentence—but it is, consequently, truth-preserving. Accordingly, entails and in turn, entails that some relation R holds between the event of mowing the lawn (here, G(x)) and John, since G(x) is a function of John. It thus follows that

entails that there is some relation R holding between x and e. In other words: is an entailment of the focus supposition associated with

above. We can

as described in this section in fact confirms the conclude that the interpretation of existence of a (presuppositional) secondary thematic relation. The argument made above has merely shown why, under the analysis advocated here, there is always some (presuppositional) relation holding between the referent of the intensified DP one the one hand and the event described in the sentence on the other. As mentioned above, such relations typically have to do with notions such as ‘responsibility’ or ‘interest’, but the range of secondary thematic relations is theoretically infinite. Still, given that in sentences with exclusive SELF the subject referent always stands in two semantic relations to one event at the same time, the range of secondary thematic relations is actually limited (cf. Siemund 2000 for an overview and Section 6.6.1 below). As shown in Section 5.1.1, a given subject referent may be both actively and passively involved in an event. A pertinent example is repeated in The star is both actively and passively involved in its own destruction. While the active involvement is asserted, the passive involvement is presupposed, so destroyed, even though it did not destroy itSELF.

clearly suggests that the star was

a. Ten thousand years ago a star destroyed itSELF in a supernova explosion. b. The star didn’t destroy itSELF.

The secondary thematic relation is a central determinant of the distribution of exclusive SELF. We will therefore briefly consider in the next section how and why it renders many occurrences of exclusive SELF infelicitous.

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6.3.1 On infelicitous cases of exclusive SELF It was argued in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 that the different contextual restrictions that can be observed in connection with exclusive SELF—especially the agentivity requirement— are not categorical, but epiphenomenal. We can now substantiate this argument, making use of the analysis presented in Section 6.2. Many predicates do not combine easily with exclusive SELF because a secondary thematic relation is not recoverable. It is often difficult to conceive how an inanimate subject referent could stand in a second thematic relation to the event in question. Let us consider one of the examples characterized as odd by Hole (2002a:136): The glacier blocks up the entrance to the valley itself.

According to the empirical generalizations made in Section 6.1 and the analysis presented should be associated with a focus supposition saying in Section 6.2, the sentence in that apart from blocking the entrance to the valley, the glacier stands in some second thematic relation to the fact of the valley being blocked up. What relation could this be? Obviously, the kind of focus alternatives that we have come across so far will not do. For example, the glacier cannot be ‘interested in’ the valley being blocked up. I prefer not to take a stance as to whether there are possible contextualizations of I cannot provide any corpus data, and it would certainly not be very helpful to make up another example. Instead, I will offer an attested example from German which is in order to show that the infelicity of and other sufficiently similar to examples of this type is not due to a built-in lexical specification of exclusive SELF, but to the difficulty of construing alternative states of affairs which fulfil the conditions imposed on the use of exclusive SELF. below, some background information is necessary. If a person To understand suffers a stroke, this is the result of a lack of oxygen supply in the brain. Oxygen is transported into the brain tissue by the red corpuscles (the ‘erythrocytes’). Erythrocytes are relatively flexible, and although they have a diameter of approximately 7.5 My, they can pass capillaries of a diameter as narrow as 2 My. If there is too much acid in the blood, however, the erythrocytes lose some of their flexibility, and they may therefore obstruct the capillaries. As a consequence, they can no longer transport oxygen into the brain tissue, and the lack of oxygen supply leads to a stroke. The erythrocytes stand in a twofold relation to the obstruction of the capillaries: on the one hand, they cause this obstruction; on the other hand, they are, in a way, negatively affected, since they can no longer transport the oxygen into the brain tissue. This twofold relation makes it possible to use an exclusive head-distant intensifier: […a stroke may result because suddenly the capillaries are obstructed and…] …die

erstar[r]ten

Erythrozyten

die

Kapillaren

sogar

selbst

…the

solidified

erythrocytes

the

capillaries

even

SELF

The interpretation of head-distant intensifiers

147

verstopfen. obstruct ‘…the solidified erythrocytesi even obstruct the capillaries themselvesi.’ [www]105

Note that the negated counterpart of which is given in negates only that the erythrocytes are the causers of the obstruction, but it does not negate that they are ‘negatively affected’. This is due to the presuppositional status of the secondary thematic relation holding between the erythrocytes and the obstruction of the capillaries. Die

Erythrozyten

verstopfen

die

Kapillaren

nicht

selbst.

the

erythrocytes

obstruct

the

capillaries

not

SELF

‘The erythrocytes do not obstruct the capillaries themselves.’

Example shows that an interaction between exclusive SELF and inanimate head DPs is possible as long as a secondary thematic relation is recoverable. Since this is not very often the case, such examples are extremely rare. A similar explanation can be given for the tendencies concerning aktionsart which were discussed in Section 5.1.2. There, it was shown that exclusive SELF is typically associated with resultative predicates. This is related to the fact that alternative thematic relations holding between an individual x and an event e can best be conceived of when the event is resultative: resultative events affect people or things, persons may have responsibility for and control over them, etc. For states, it is usually more difficult to find alternative thematic relations. That this is not impossible, however, was shown in Section 5.1.2. We will repeat one of the examples provided there in order to illustrate this. Above, (I know the answer myself) was argued to have both an exclusive and an inclusive reading. In the exclusive reading, it expresses that the speaker knows the answer (is the experiencer), and that s/he stands in some second relation to that fact: in all likelihood s/he benefits from knowing the answer. This second thematic relation (beneficiary) has a presuppositional status, and is thus also given in someone other than associated with the negated counterpart of the speaker knows the answer, but the speaker benefits from that knowledge. a. I know the answer myself. b. I don’t know the answer myself (but my brother will certainly know it).

We now turn to an analysis of inclusive SELF in which the differences between the two types of head-distant intensifiers are related to the structural contrasts pointed out in Chapter 4.

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6.4 The interpretation of inclusive SELF 6.4.1 Reference to alternative propositions Inclusive SELF behaves like exclusive SELF in so far as it is used to relate a proposition π to a set of alternative propositions elements

in such a way that all

of A differ from π in terms of the subject referent (cf.

on page 119). Two

typical examples are given in a.

Max hates it when Mary snores, although he snores himself.

b.

I can’t help you. I don’t know the answer myself.

In the proposition ‘Max snores himself’ is paradigmatically related to a proposition in which it is stated that someone other than Max snores (Mary), and in the proposition ‘I don’t know the answer (myself)’ is related to a proposition which implies that someone other than the speaker does not know the answer. In both by way of concessive examples, the relevant propositions are conjoined (in subordination). Inclusive SELF can also be used to oppose two (contingently though not necessarily) mutually exclusive propositions to one another. This is illustrated in the invented example in

and in the attested one in

a. The president does not fight against corruption, he is himself corrupt! b. Consider the young White male who commits an assault specifically against a Black man not because he is himself a racist in any sense, but because he has fallen in with a peer group of racists whose approval he desires greatly and he is too weak and insecure to resist or reject his new friends. [www]106

In the proposition ‘The president is himself corrupt’ contrasts with ‘The president fights against (other people’s) corruption’, which implies that other people are the fact that ‘the young White male is himself a racist’ is opposed to a corrupt. In proposition which implies that someone other than ‘the young White male’ is a racist (members of his peer group). Again, the two propositions differ in that the predicate ‘being a racist’ is attributed to a referent x in one proposition (π), and to some referent y≠x in the contrasting proposition Given that both exclusive and inclusive SELF are used to relate a proposition π to a set of alternative propositions in which the property predicated of the subject referent in π is attributed to someone other than this referent, the question arises of what is the difference between both types of head-distant intensifiers. The difference concerns the second condition on the use of exclusive SELF as stated in

on page 119: remember that

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149

exclusive SELF requires that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier stand in a ‘secondary thematic relation’ to the event in question. Inclusive SELF, on the other hand, is associated with a related, yet crucially different condition, which can be described like this: inclusive SELF requires that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier stand in some relation R to the proposition that results when the identity function is replaced with the contrasting function OTH. above to see this point. In the Let us consider both examples in proposition ‘Max snores himself’ is related to ‘Someone other than Max (Mary) snores’. ‘I don’t know the Moreover, it is stated that ‘Max hates it when Mary snores’. In answer’ is related to ‘Someone other than the speaker (the addressee) does not know the answer’. Further, it is implied that the speaker cannot remedy the addressee’s ignorance. ‘I cannot help you’ here basically stands for ‘I cannot make you know the answer’. In both analogy and contra-distinction to my analysis of exclusive SELF presented in Section 6.2, I will refer to this type of relation as a ‘secondary propositional relation’, where the adjective ‘propositional’ indicates that such relations hold between an individual and a proposition. Like the secondary thematic relation in sentences with exclusive SELF, the secondary propositional relation associated with inclusive SELF has the status of a focus supposition. Therefore, a sentence like Max drinks himself requires that it should be under discussion that someone other than Max drinks, and that Max stands in some relation R to that fact. If such a proposition is not explicitly stated in the discourse environment, it will be evoked or accommodated on the part of the hearer. A sentence like

can hardly stand by itself and requires a context of the type given in

above. illustrates that the secondary propositional relation in fact has the status of a focus supposition. While negating that Max snores, it still clearly implies that someone other than Max snores, and that Max stands in some relation to that fact. a. Max snores himself. b. It is not TRUE that Max snores himself (but he hates it when others snore).

The generalizations made above can summarized in the following ‘felicity conditions’: Inclusive SELF is used to relate a proposition π to a set of alternative propositions in such a way that: i. in each proposition the subject-θ-role of the main predicate is assigned to some individual x other than the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier ii. π is associated with the focus supposition that the referent of the head DP stands in some relation R to the propositions

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According to the view advanced here, exclusive and inclusive SELF are associated with the same type of contrast: both make reference to a (generalized) function of alterity, which I have called OTH, and both relate to propositions with different subject referents. The difference between exclusive and inclusive SELF concerns the focus suppositions evoked by the two types of intensifiers: exclusive SELF requires that a ‘secondary thematic relation’ hold between the subject referent and the event under discussion, while inclusive SELF requires that a ‘secondary propositional relation’ hold between the subject referent and the contrasting proposition. As I will aim to show in the following, this description can also be paraphrased in a different way when approached from the perspective of event semantics. 6.4.2 Event tokens, event types and head-distant intensifiers As pointed out in Section 6.2.1, I adopt a Davidsonian model of event semantics. Events are thus to be regarded as individualized items, and predicates with no open referential argument slot can be conceived of as sets of events. For example, the predicate snow can be interpreted as the set of all events of snowing, just like man can be interpreted as the set of all men. In what follows, it will be crucial to make a distinction between (a) event tokens, i.e. individualized Davidsonian events, which are similar to individuals or entities, and (b) event types, which are sets of events that share a specific property (i.e. predicates). For example, the predicate snow describes a specific event type. Not all events of snowing are identical, but they are sufficiently similar to be subsumed under the same verbal predicate. Of course, event types can also be described by verbs with a valency higher than one: the (semi-saturated) predicate read a book likewise describes a specific type of event, in this case one in which some human being participates.107 Let us now consider to what extent the distinction between event tokens and event types can help us understand the difference between exclusive and inclusive SELF. In what follows, I aim to show that in occurrences of exclusive SELF, two alternative descriptions of the same event token are opposed to each other, whereas inclusive SELF makes reference to alternative tokens of the same event type. Let us start with illustration.

for

I have read that book myself.

is ambiguous: in an exclusive reading, it is opposed to a proposition like ‘I had someone read the book for me’; in an inclusive reading, it is related to something like ‘I know that many others have read the book before’, or ‘I know what the book is about’. In terms of a Davidsonian event semantics, the difference can be described like this: in the exclusive reading, both contrasting propositions provide (alternative) descriptions of the same event token. Consequently, they are mutually exclusive. Either the speaker carried out the act of reading himself/herself, or s/he had someone else read the book. This is paraphrased in

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There is an action e of reading the book, and e was carried out by myself, not by anyone else.

By contrast, in the inclusive reading, reference is made to alternative propositions that describe different tokens of the event type ‘read the book’. The inclusive reading of is paraphrased in There is an action e1 of reading the book that I have carried out myself, and there is at least one event e2 of reading that book that has been carried out by someone else.

Consequently, exclusive SELF is used to relate two alternative descriptions of the same event token to one another (‘I read the book’ vs. ‘You read the book for me’), while inclusive SELF opposes two different tokens of the same event type to each other (‘I have read the book’ vs. ‘You have (also) read the book’). This point of view also allows us to rephrase the description of the secondary propositional relation as stated above. It was said that there is a relation R holding between the referent of the head DP on the one hand and the paradigmatically related proposition on the other. Alternatively, we can say that there is a relation R holding between the referent of the head DP on the one hand and the event or fact described in the alternative proposition on the other. However, this relation will not be a thematic relation, i.e. the relevant referent does not participate in the event in question; it will be an ‘external’ relation as denoted by a factive predicate: for example, Max snores himself is associated with the focus supposition ‘Max stands in some relation R to the fact that someone else snores’, for instance the relation of ‘annoyance’. These ‘alternative felicity conditions’ on the use of inclusive SELF are summarized in Inclusive SELF is used to relate a proposition π to a set of alternative propositions in such a way that: i. in each element the subject-θ-role of the main predicate is assigned to some individual other than the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier; ii. in each element of A the event token described is different from the one introduced in π, though both events are of the same type, and the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier stands in some (non-thematic) relation to that event.

Given the description in it follows naturally why inclusive SELF should be associated with what has been called the ‘inclusive effect’ by Siemund (2000), i.e. the additive focus supposition that is characteristic of such uses of SELF: inclusive SELF may be used only if it is under discussion that another instance of the event type ). Note, however, that the described in the asserted sentence has taken place (cf. use of inclusive SELF is more restricted than the use of additive focus particles like also

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or too: in addition to the aforementioned condition, it must be under discussion that the referent of the head DP stands in some relation to the fact described in the contrasting sentence. 6.5 Deriving the function of inclusive SELF As I aim to show in this section, the function of inclusive SELF can be derived from the syntactic analysis provided in Chapter 4. As was argued there, inclusive SELF is moved out of the Verb Phrase to a specifier position which is higher than T0. Given that T0 is assumed here to correspond semantically to the position of the quantifier existentially binding the event variable of the relevant predicate, the difference between inclusive and exclusive SELF is that inclusive SELF c-commands the constituent encoding the existential quantifier binding the event variable of the relevant predicate, thus being outside its scope, whereas exclusive SELF is within the scope of that binder. This is obviously related to the difference between reference to alternative event tokens (for inclusive SELF) and reference to alternative descriptions of the same event token (for exclusive SELF). Let us consider a simple example in order to understand how the function of inclusive SELF can be derived from the syntactic representations given above. I will use make my point, since

is assumed to be derived from

to

via the application of

a ‘stylistic rule’ (‘heavy shift’; cf. Section 4.4). The syntactic structure of

is given

provides the input for the semantic interpretation, i.e. verbal movement in operations are disregarded/reconstructed. a.

Jack is himself a drinker.

b.

Jack is a drinker himself.

a.

Jacki isj [TP [DP ti himself]k tj [vP tk tj a drinker]].

b.

Jacki [[ti himself]j T0 [tj is a drinker]]

The semantic representation corresponding to is given in As was pointed out in Section 6.2.2, syntactic chains are interpreted pairwise, and each pair consisting of an antecedent and a trace is interpreted in such a way that the antecedent restricts the interpretation of the trace. Accordingly, the structure in in

for

is interpreted as shown

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In order to see why should give rise to the semantic effects described in Section 6.4.1, we need to consider two things: first, the type of contrast that is established by inclusive SELF, and second, the focus suppositions that are triggered. Let us start with the former. In intensifier.

the contrasting function OTH is inserted in the position of the

for

As can be seen from a sentence like John is himself a drinker contrasts with sentences of the form ‘for x=John: for y≠x: there is a fact e such that e is the fact that y is a drinker’. If we paraphrase this formula in prose, it reads ‘As far as John is concerned, someone other than him is a drinker’. This paraphrase illustrates the first aspect of the above: sentences with inclusive SELF function of inclusive SELF pointed out in make reference to alternative propositions in which the predicate under discussion is assigned to someone other than the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier. Moreover, the alterity function OTH is introduced before the existential quantifier binding the relevant event variable. In other words, the focus feature on the intensifier takes scope over this existential quantifier. As a result, the alternative proposition (with OTH in the position of ID) introduces an existentially bound event variable of its own. This is what crucially distinguishes inclusive SELF from exclusive SELF, where both contrasting expressions ID and OTH are within the scope of the existential quantifier, thus providing alternative descriptions of the same event token. It remains to show that the second condition in

can also be derived from the

This condition states that there is always a focus representation given in supposition saying that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier stands in some relation R to the fact described in the contrasting sentence. This focus supposition can, again, be linked directly to the ‘aboutness relation’ holding between the subject and the eventuality described in a sentence, which was made more explicit in Section 6.2 using the notion of ‘skolemization’: in all alternative propositions contrasting with John is the subject (or topic), even though the predicate in question is attributed to someone other than John. Accordingly, the events described in the alternative propositions likewise stand in some relation R to the subject referent (John). In order to see this, consider what happens if we insert the alterity function OTH into the position of which is done in The natural language paraphrase given in ID in shows that the same ‘aboutness relation’ that we observed in the context of exclusive SELF can also be observed here—which is actually trivial if we assume that such an ‘aboutness relation’ holds invariably between the topical referent of a categorical statement and the eventuality described in the sentence.

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for As far as John is concerned: there is a fact e such that e is the fact that someone other than John is a drinker.

As was argued above, the ‘aboutness relation’ illustrated and paraphrased in —the ‘secondary propositional relation’—corresponds to prepositional complement-taking predicates in natural language. Two relevant examples are given in a.

John complains that Mary drinks, although he drinks himself.

b.

John hates it when Mary snores, although he snores himself.

The predicates complain that and hate it when correspond to what I have called the above. The nature of such secondary ‘secondary propositional relation’ in propositional relations in natural language is extremely varied. We can distinguish two major groups that make up the lion’s share of actually attested instances of inclusive SELF: (i) predicates of representation, and (ii) predicates of causation. Let us start with the first class, to which I have given the unorthodox label ‘predicates of representation’. This class is meant to comprise all kinds of predicates that serve the function of representing some state of affairs in words, thoughts, etc. Two major groups can be distinguished within this larger class: (i) predicates of mental activity, and (ii) predicates of communication. Let us consider some examples. Among the predicates of mental activity we often find (a) verbs of perception (see, hear, feel…), (b) verbs of thinking (think, know, imagine…), and (c) verbs of emotions or attitudes (hate, feel annoyed by…). Each of the three groups is exemplified in

An

example of a verb of communication is given in a. Mr Gillis continued writing and when Alec turned to me I could see the strain on his face. I had no time to feel sorry for him though because I was under considerable strain myself. (see/perception) [BNC ASN 217] b. It is disquieting to realize that one will sooner or later end up there oneself, (realize/thinking) (Siemund 2000:182) c. The parish didn’t mind that the old Priest frequently forgot his lines. Most of them were fairly old themselves, (mind/attitude) (Siemund 2000:183) d. How can Fred complain about the odour of other people when he smells a little himself? (complain/communication) (König 1991b:93)

The second major class of predicates that tend to occur in the context of inclusive SELF is the class of predicates of causation. This class includes causative predicates in a narrow

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sense (make somebody do something, have someone do something), but also ‘weaker’ causative verbs such as let, allow, and help. Examples are provided in a.

I cannot help you with your work because I am rather busy myself.

b.

You can make them apologize only if you apologize yourself.

In the class of predicates of causation we can also include verbs of transfer such as give and lend. These verbs qualify as predicates of causation in so far as they can be paraphrased as make someone have something. Relevant examples are given in Figure 6.1 on page 141 provides an overview of predicates typically and functioning as ‘secondary propositional relations’ in sentences with inclusive SELF. a.

A: You can use my car. B: Thanks, I’ve got a car myself. (Siemund 2000:193)

b.

A: I need some money. Could you lend me ten pounds? B: I am sorry, but I am a bit short myself. (Siemund 2000:194)

Figure 6.1: Typology of ‘secondary propositional relations’ 6.6 Previous analyses of head-distant intensifiers In this section, we will review some previous semantic analyses of head-distant intensifiers. We will start with exclusive SELF in Section 6.6.1 and turn to inclusive SELF in Section 6.6.2.

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6.6.1 Exclusive SELF Edmondson and Plank (1978) have analysed exclusive SELF as a marker of a high degree of participation, which is basically compatible with the approach advocated here, but some technical questions remain unresolved. Siemund (2000) regards exclusive SELF as a focus particle and tries to account for its semantics in terms of the same ‘centrality’ condition that is also assumed for head-adjacent SELF (cf. also Section 3.5.2). A proposal made by Browning (1993), who analyses exclusive SELF as an identity predicate, will briefly be discussed and, finally, a more recent proposal made by Hole (2002a) will be considered. Exclusive SELF as a marker of a high degree of participation Edmondson and Plank (1978) propose accounting for the meaning of head-distant intensifiers in terms of a high degree of ‘participation’ (or ‘involvement’). They regard participation as a scalar notion: one can participate ‘more’ or ‘less’ in an event. The maximal type of participation is agency. What exclusive SELF indicates, according to Edmondson and Plank (1978), is that the referent of the DP interacting with the intensifier displays a particularly high degree of participation, which basically means that s/he is agentively involved. Edmondson and Plank (1978) point out that ‘[a] great many predicates are simply vague about the degree of agency, involvement or independent causation expressed by their subjects’ (Edmondson and Plank 1978:406). According to their argument, exclusive head-distant intensifiers characterize the referent of their head DP as maximally involved or agentive in the action described by the verb. They assume a ‘scale of directness’ ranging from ‘most directly involved agent or experiencer’ to ‘more indirectly involved agent or experiencer’. Exclusive SELF is assumed to indicate that its head DP (which is usually, but not necessarily, the subject) is ranked highest on this scale. Edmondson and Plank distinguish categorically between agents and experiencers. When co-occurring with action verbs, the subject referents are assumed to be marked as ‘most agentive’ by exclusive SELF (cf. note that has an inclusive reading which we disregard). In combination with experiencer verbs, exclusive SELF is supposed to ‘exclude anyone else but the most directly involved experiencer’ (Edmondson and Plank 1978:406; cf.

).

a. Ironside rolled over the edge himself. b. The President heard the news himself. (Edmondson and Plank 1978:406)

With regard to Edmondson and Plank state that the intensifier ‘serves to exclude those readings […] that place the ultimate responsibility for Ironside’s death […] on others’ (Edmondson and Plank 1978:406). From the perspective of reference to alternatives, we could say that exclusive SELF evokes alternative predicates or situations in which the subject referent is ‘less agentive’ or ‘less directly involved’ than the

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participant ranking highest on the ‘scale of directness’, and that this highest thematic role is thus assigned to some other individual. The analysis presented by Edmondson and Plank certainly overlaps to a considerable extent with the empirical generalizations about the distribution of exclusive SELF made if the function of exclusive in Section 6.1. It can account for condition (i) stated in SELF is to emphasize the agentive involvement of the subject referent, then alternative propositions are evoked which differ from the asserted proposition in terms of the subject referent. The presuppositional ‘secondary thematic relation’, however, which, as I have argued, is a central feature of exclusive SELF, has not been addressed by Edmondson and Plank (1978). This may be due to the fact that Edmondson and Plank regard the function of exclusive SELF as a truth-conditional matter, rather than a focus-related effect. From the perspective of a compositional analysis of exclusive SELF, two further questions arise: first, given that Edmondson and Plank (1978) regard the concept of ‘directness of participation’ as the lexical meaning of exclusive SELF, how do they relate their analysis of exclusive SELF to the meaning which they ascribe to head-adjacent SELF? The second issue concerns the technical aspects of their analysis at the syntaxsemantics interface: to what part-of-speech do Edmondson and Plank (1978) assign exclusive SELF, and how does the effect described above arise compositionally? The answer given by Edmondson and Plank (1978) to the first of these questions is problematic. Edmondson and Plank link the notion of ‘directness of involvement’ to that of ‘expectancy’, regarding the latter as the most important contribution made by headadjacent SELF to the interpretation of a DP (cf. Section 3.5.1): ‘[q]uite often the scale of increasing directness is paralleled by decreasing expectancy’ (Edmondson and Plank 1978:406). Two pertinent examples supposedly illustrating the link between expectancy and agentivity are given in

and

Since serfs are expected to be more

directly involved in the plowing of the fields, so the argument goes,

is fine,

108

supposedly requires accommodation.

whereas a.

The King plowed the Royal fields himself.

b.

#The serfs plowed the Royal fields themselves.

However, the claim that exclusive SELF has to do with notions such as ‘expectancy’ or ‘likelihood’ has to be given up, just as it had to be given up for head-adjacent intensifiers in Section 3.5.1. The following real-world example clearly shows that exclusive SELF also combines with predicates in which the actual agent is also the most expected agent. In 1938, Hitler assured Mussolini of his support for Italian claims against France, and he intended to make public the letter in which this intention was stated. Only after the German Foreign Secretary, von Ribbentrop, had dissuaded him from doing so did he decide not to publish the letter. In a note sent to the Acting Secretary of State in the USA, the diplomat E.Wilson wrote the passage in Hitler was certainly the only person to be entitled to make such a far-reaching decision in the Third Reich, and it would have

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been much more unexpected if someone other than Hitler had made it. This can also be seen from

where the positive expectation is made explicit.

a. My friend again expressed incredulity that it had been Hitler’s intention to publish the letter. He was told that Hitler had made the decision himself, while [v]on Ribbentrop was in Paris …[www]109 b. As we all expected, Hitler made the decision himself.

The second question raised above concerns the syntax-semantics interface. Edmondson and Plank (1978) regard exclusive SELF as an adverb. This idea is certainly not too farfetched, and has also been explored by Siemund (2000:97ff.) (although Siemund ultimately prefers analysing exclusive SELF as a focus particle). However, exclusive SELF can certainly not be a particularly typical adverb, in view of the fact that it agrees with the associated DP in gender, number and person. Moreover, the relationship between (‘adverbial’) head-distant SELF on the one hand and (‘adnominal’) headadjacent SELF would certainly have to be made explicit. This brings us to Siemund’s (2000) analysis of head-distant intensifiers, which tries to account for the three different types of intensifiers in a more or less unified way. Siemund’s analysis of exclusive SELF Although his analysis is in several respects inspired by Edmondson and Plank (1978), Siemund (2000) takes an approach considerably different from the one outlined in the previous section. Building upon earlier work by König (1991b) and König and Siemund (1996a, b), he analyses the function of exclusive SELF from the perspective of the hypothesis that intensifiers are focus particles, and that their interpretation is crucially related to the notion of ‘centrality’ (cf. Section 3.5.2). Siemund’s definition of the function of exclusive SELF is given in

Typical instances of ‘centrality in a

situation’ are listed in Adverbial exclusive intensifiers structure a set of possible agents in a situation S into a central agent X and oppose it to peripheral agents Y. (Siemund 2000:254)

Siemund’s instances of centrality in a situation (Siemund 2000:254) i.

X is responsible for [a situation] S

ii.

X is the beneficiary of S

iii.

X is the maleficiary of S

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159

Let us consider an example in the context of this analysis: Frederic wrote the letter himself.

According to Siemund, himself in indicates that the letter was written by the central agent—Frederic—and not by some peripheral agent, such as his secretary or his brother. Frederic is more central than his secretary in so far as he is responsible for, or interested in, the letter being written. Applied to one of our corpus examples, repeated here as the addressee is marked as central with regard to the predicate λx[x reads the letter], and possible alternative agents are the other persons that might read and translate the letter instead of the addressee. ‘I have taken the liberty of writing to you in English, being informed that you can either read it yourself, or have some persons who can translate it for you.’ (cf. p. 120)

on

As outlined in Section 3.5.2, König and Siemund analyse intensifiers as focus particles. According to their analysis, exclusive SELF differs from head-adjacent SELF in that it takes scope over the VP, while head-adjacent SELF takes scope only over its focus. A structured proposition interacting with exclusive SELF can thus be represented as in (supposing that the addressee in

is called Frederic).

self(<λx[x read the letter], Frederic>)

We could assume, now, that Frederic is opposed to a set of alternative agents that are peripheral with regard to the predicate λx[x reads the letter] or, alternatively, with regard to the action of reading the letter. These peripheral agents are the translators. Accordingly, the contribution made by exclusive SELF in this context is the additional information that ‘the reader of the letter is central with regard to the action of reading the letter’. If we compare the empirical claims associated with Siemund’s analysis with the set of (Section 6.1, p. 119), it turns out felicity conditions of exclusive SELF as stated in that, again, there is a considerable overlap. The condition that sentences with exclusive SELF make reference to propositions with alternative agents (cf. is accounted for by Siemund (2000), and Siemund’s ‘centrality condition’ of exclusive SELF can be which says that the agent of the predicate considered as covering our point forming a constituent together with exclusive SELF should stand in some secondary thematic relation to that event, typically a relation of interest or responsibility. The major incompatibilities between Siemund’s approach and the one presented here concern the

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way these effects are modelled compositionally. As argued in Section 3.5.2, the analysis of intensifiers in English as focus particles meets with considerable difficulties, even though intensifiers are often diachronically related to focus particles. Exclusive SELF as an identity predicate Browning’s (1993) analysis of exclusive head-distant intensifiers was briefly hinted at in Section 1.5.2. As was pointed out there, Browning (1993) regards the self-component of reflexives and intensifiers in English as a two-place predicate denoting the relation of identity (cf. Pica 1987; Reinhart and Reuland 1991). It can be represented as in and is assumed to be interpreted as in a.

λxλy[SELF(y)(x)]

b.

λxλy[x=y]

In Section 1.5.2, it was argued that this analysis is problematic for reflexives, a point to be developed further in Section 7.3. I will argue that an analysis of head-distant intensifiers as expressions of an identity relation likewise faces some problems. We begin with an example. Browning (1993) uses to illustrate her analysis: Mary wrote this memo herself.

The semantic structure of is shown in Figure 6.2 (from Browning 1993:89, using the notational conventions of Higginbotham 1985). The argument slots associated with a given constituent are indicated by numbers in angle brackets, and an asterisk indicates that an argument slot has been filled (‘discharged’). The two-place predicate self takes her as its first argument and forms the complex pronoun herself, which is interpreted

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Figure 6.2: Mary wrote this memo herself semantically as a function of the form λx[SELF(her)(x)] (or λx[x=her]), and syntactically as a DP which adjoins to the V’-constituent wrote this memo. This operation of adjunction obviously gives rise to a type-mismatch: the predicate λx[WROTE(the memo)(x)] cannot easily combine with the predicate λx[SELF(her)(x)]. Therefore, Browning adopts Higginbotham’s (1985) operation of ‘theta-identification’ (discussed in more detail in Section 7.3), which allows precisely this process of combining two oneplace predicates in such a way that they form a new one-place predicate. The DP herself and the V’-constituent wrote this memo are assumed to form another V’-constituent, and the first argument of wrote this memo is ‘theta-identified’ with the second argument of herself. This delivers the predicate which corresponds to the higher V’-node. Finally, this predicate applies to Mary and yields the sentence meaning represented in Mary wrote this memo & her=Mary

It seems to be difficult to derive emphasis on agentivity from the conjunction displayed in In prose, this formula reads ‘Mary wrote this memo and the referent of her is identical to Mary’. Browning (1993) is aware of this problem and points out that the representation in

‘leaves out the crucial part played by theta-roles in the preceding

discussion’ (Browning 1993:89). She comes to the conclusion that meaning shown in

actually has the

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Mary (agent) wrote this memo (patient) & her=agent (Browning 1993:90)

Browning explains the interpretation of

as follows:

The manner reflexive adds the information that her, which is ultimately identified with Mary by means of theta-identification, is the agent. But this information is contained within the simple sentence ‘Mary wrote this memo.’ Therefore, the manner reflexive is re-emphasizing the assignment of the AGENT theta-role to Mary, and it is this emphasis on agency which I take to be the essence of the manner interpretation, in this case. (Browning 1993:90) The concept of ‘emphasis on agentivity’ is reminiscent of Edmondson and Plank’s analysis in terms of ‘participation’. However, Browning is more explicit than Edmondson and Plank in so far as she distinguishes between the lexical meaning of SELF—an identity predicate—on the one hand, and the sentence semantic effect of the intensifier— emphasis on agency—on the other. An assessment of her analysis thus crucially hinges on the way she derives emphasis on agency from the identity predicate. Let us assume, following Browning (1993:89), that ‘is actually’ It is still not immediately obvious how emphasis on the agentive involvement of Mary could be derived from this representation. The problem is that the second part of the conjunct (‘her=Mary’ or ‘her=agent’), which supposedly emphasizes Mary’s status as an agent, does not actually contain any such information. It either says that ‘the referent of her is identical to Mary’, or, alternatively, ‘the referent of her is identical to the agent of this predication’. But nothing is said to the effect that ‘Mary is the agent (of this event)’. This piece of information is implied in the component Mary wrote this memo. Further, it is hard to see why her should ‘ultimately [be] identified with Mary by means of theta-identification’. Browning defines theta-identification as a process by which ‘an open theta-position in one predicate links to an open theta-position in another predicate; the two are, in a sense, simultaneously satisfied by the saturation of the second theta-role’ (Browning 1993:86). But in our example, the first argument slot of self is not open at the time theta-identification applies, it is saturated by her. Consequently, her cannot be identified with any other element via theta-identification, and its reference remains unclear (or is determined only by the proposition ‘her=Mary’). I believe that Browning’s analysis works only if we assume that the reference of her is determined independently, for example through syntactic binding. Assuming that we already know that ‘her=Mary’, and assuming that the intensifier contributes that ‘her=agent’, we could by modus ponens conclude that ‘Mary=agent’, and this (redundant) information could be taken as putting emphasis on the agentive status of Mary. Mapping the agentive voice head onto itself: Hole’s analysis Hole (2002a) presents an elaborate and highly original analysis of exclusive head-distant selbst in German. One of the cornerstones of Hole’s analysis is the assumption that exclusive head-distant intensifiers110 do not interact with ‘complete’ predicates, but only

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with parts thereof. Hole adopts the sentence-semantic framework developed by Kratzer (1996). In a way, Kratzer proposes a compromise between a traditional Davidsonian framework of event semantics—where predicates are analysed as having an additional valency position for an event variable—on the one hand, and a so-called ‘neoDavidsonian’ framework (Dowty 1989:83)—where each thematic role is represented by a separate predicate—on the other (cf. Section 6.2.1). Like Reichenbach and Davidson, she assumes that internal arguments are arguments of the verb. However, external arguments are analysed as arguments of a two-place predicate representing the appropriate thematic The verb bought takes only relation. Kratzer (1996:131) provides the example in two arguments: an argument of type e (an individual), which corresponds to the traditional internal argument, and an event variable. The agent we is an argument of a predicate representing the agent relation. The agent-predicate and the verbal predicate bought are conjoined by way of a compositional mechanism which Kratzer calls ‘event identification’. a. We bought your slippers in Marrakesh. b.

Hole argues that exclusive SELF, like head-adjacent SELF, denotes the identity function. However, what exclusive SELF takes as an argument is not a DP or its referential value, but the (syntacticized) agent relation. This is shown in without exclusive SELF is given in a.

The corresponding sentence

for comparison (cf. Hole 2002a:144–5).

John baked the cake himself.

b.

a.

John baked the cake.

b.

is represented in a Kratzer-style representation in There are two predicates that are co-ordinated via event-identification: there is an event e such that John is the agent of e, and e is an event of baking the cake. The identity function applies to the agent relation in the first part of the conjunct and maps it onto itself. The various effects resulting from that operation are, again, derived from facts relating to focus structure, to which we will turn now.

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Syntactically, the agent relation is assumed to occupy a structural position in the head of a functional projection called ‘Voice Phrase’. This is where exclusive SELF operates according to Hole: it takes the head of Voice Phrase as its argument, and maps it onto (Kuchen means ‘cake’, and itself. This can be illustrated as shown in Figure 6.3 for back- ‘bake’).111 Since the intensifier is in focus, alternative functions of the same type as exclusive SELF are evoked (Hole identifies the type of the head of VoiceP as <s,<e,t>>, so

Figure 6.3: The syntax of exclusive SELF according to Hole (2002a) exclusive SELF is of type <<s,<e,t>>,<s,<e,t>>>). Alternative functions of this type likewise take the agent relation as their argument, but they map it onto some other thematic relation. Examples for possible relations delivered by alternative functions applied to the agent relation include λeλx[x has somebody do e] (the causer relation), or λeλx[e is performed for x] (the beneficiary relation). The set of alternatives contrasting with baked the cake himself is thus a set of predicates of the form where f stands for the function provides another example, which is

contrasting with the identity function. represented in terms of Hole’s analysis in a.

Hans

wusch

das

Auto

selbst.

Hans

washed

the

car

SELF.

‘Hans washed the car himself.’ b.

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The question arises to what extent Hole’s analysis matches the empirical generalizations made in Section 6.1. First, it certainly predicts that sentences with exclusive SELF contrast with alternative sentences in which the thematic role associated with the subject is assigned to someone other than the subject referent, since functions contrasting with the identity function map the agent relation to some other (non-agentive) relation, while the agent role is assigned to some other referent. Second, it predicts that there will always be a focus supposition to the effect that there is some thematic relation holding between the referent of the external argument and the event described by the verb, namely an existential focus supposition (i.e. there is always a ‘secondary thematic relation’). It seems, thus, that Hole’s analysis is appropriate from an empirical point of view, and that it derives the observable effects of exclusive SELF from a very parsimonious semantics. However, there are also some problems. I seems to me that Hole’s formal implementation is too restrictive: either some occurrences of head-distant intensifiers are not categorized as such—which restricts the empirical coverage of the model to a considerable extent—or the theory makes wrong grammaticality predictions. Some of the issues to be discussed in the following have also been addressed by Siemund (2002a). One of the problems is that exclusive head-distant intensifiers may also interact with (syntactic) non-subjects. This should be excluded, according to Hole’s formalism. is a case in point: Mir

ist

die

Lösung

für

dieses

Problem

selbst

eingefallen.

me

is

the

solution

for

this

problem

SELF

came to mind

‘I have come up with the solution to the problem myself.’

This problem could probably be resolved by amending the syntactic implementation (which we cannot discuss any further here). However, there is another aspect of Hole’s analysis that requires more discussion. As was shown in Section 5.1, exclusive SELF typically occurs with agentive predicates, but it does not impose a strict grammatical constraint to this effect. Remember the examples discussed in Section 5.1.2, two of which are repeated in a. John wanted his secretary to slip on the banana peel, but finally he slipped himself. b. Wer who

anderen

eine

Grube

gräbt,

fällt

selbst

hinein.

others

a

pit

digs

falls

SELF

in it

‘He who digs a pit (for others) falls into it (himself).’

Hole is aware that not all subjects interacting with exclusive SELF are agentive in the narrowest interpretation of that word, and thus adopts a prototype definition of agentivity along the lines of Dowty (1991). In view of the strong theoretical claims associated with Kratzer’s framework, this move certainly weakens the overall plausibility of his account.

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Furthermore, the examples in show that exclusive SELF is also possible with unaccusative predicates, which cannot be regarded as agentive verbs even under the widest interpretation of the notion ‘agentivity’. Finally, it seems to me that Hole’s analysis can be applied less easily to intensifies like English self-forms than to particles like German selbst. In my opinion self-forms do not have the make-up of elements that combine with diathetic functional heads. They agree in gender, number and person with another DP from the same clause, which would be highly unusual for a diathetic marker. I cannot, however, rule out the possibility that German selbst could be analysed along the lines of Hole’s approach, while English selfforms would require a different analysis. For the purpose of the present study, which aims at providing a comparative analysis of SELF-forms in Germanic languages, it is of course desirable to provide an analysis that can be applied equally to all languages under discussion. 6.6.2 Inclusive SELF Given that inclusive SELF has received little attention in the relevant literature, and that the few pages that have been dedicated to its semantics are often somewhat vague, this section is relatively short. The proposals put forward by Edmondson and Plank (1978), Plank (1979) and Primus (1992) have been discussed by Siemund (2000:213ff.), and we will not repeat that discussion here. Briefly, these authors, again, try to attribute a scalar meaning contribution to inclusive SELF. Edmondson and Plank (1978:409) hold the view that ‘[w]hat is being scaled here is not the involvement of certain individuals as opposed to others in actions, states or processes, but rather the appearance of one and the same individual in different semantic roles’. However, just as scalar analyses of intensifiers are not appropriate for head-adjacent SELF and exclusive SELF (cf. Sections 3.5 and 6.6.1 respectively), they are not feasible for inclusive SELF either. For a more detailed refutation of these proposals, the reader is referred to Siemund (2000:213ff.). Having shown that scalar accounts of inclusive SELF are not feasible, Siemund puts forward his own analysis. Again, he takes the notion of ‘centrality’ to be the key ingredient of the meaning contribution made by inclusive SELF to a sentence. Siemund’s definition of the function of inclusive SELF is provided in Adverbal inclusive intensifiers structure a set of elements with a common property P into a central representative X of P and peripheral representatives Y of P. (Siemund 2000:229)

A referent may be central with regard to a given property for several reasons. For example, s/he is often ‘characterised as possessing particular knowledge about the situation denoted by the actual sentence’ (Siemund 2000:221). This can be observed in the examples given in

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167

a. Professors know the needs of students because they once were students themselves. (Siemund 2000:182) b. My grandmother knows these things. She is (herself) a witch (herself). (Edmondson and Plank 1978:384)

Furthermore, ‘[s]entences containing inclusive AVS [adverbial -self] are often used to decline an offer/request or to reject criticism’, which can also be interpreted as marking the relevant referent as central. Examples for this are provided in a.

A: You can use my car. B: Thanks, I’ve got a car myself. (Siemund 2000:193)

b.

A: I need some money. Could you lend me ten pounds? B: I am sorry, but I am a bit short myself. (Siemund 2000:194)

Another generalization made by Siemund is that ‘[i]nclusive AVS [adverbial -self] turns a sentence into a premise, reason or explanation for a proposition given in the previous or following discourse’ (Siemund 2000:221). This can be seen in the conversation in as well as in a. A: Could you help me today? B: Sorry, I’m terribly busy myself. b. Sarah knows what it means to have a boyfriend for she has a boyfriend herself. (Siemund 2000:224)

In all these occurrences of inclusive SELF, we can sense the notion of centrality. However, the basic problem of this account is the same as we faced when we considered the centrality approach in the context of head-adjacent SELF and exclusive SELF: it is hard to define the notion of centrality other than by providing a list of possible instantiations of centrality, or by understanding that notion metaphorically. It is thus impossible to predict when a given sentence will be fine, and when it will be infelicitous. An approach differing considerably from those that argue in terms of scalarity and centrality has been pursued by Browning (1993). Like exclusive SELF, Browning analyses inclusive SELF as an identity predicate λxλy[x =y] (cf. Section 6.6.1). She provides the example given in John is angry himself.

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Browning argues that himself in should be analysed in such a way that him is the first argument of self, and that ‘the second position of self is saturated by a VP’ (Browning 1993:92). This should deliver a sentence meaning of the form shown in John is angry & him=be angry.

The representation in is not explicitly given by Browning, but it clearly follows from her analysis. In order to interpret this formula, Browning makes the following assumption: …while him cannot be referential because it doesn’t receive a referential theta-role, it can, by Existential Generalization, play the role of the existential quantifier in also. Since it is contra-indexed with John its interpretation will be ‘there is someone≠ John’ (Browning 1993:92) Let us disregard the way in which him could be interpreted as an existential quantifier. What is more important in the present context is the sentence meaning resulting from the computation. Browning argues that her analysis ultimately leads to the sentence meaning given in John is angry & there is someone≠John who has the attribute ‘x is angry’

As can be seen from Browning reduces the function of inclusive SELF to the additive presupposition associated with too. Even if we were inclined to accept the assumption that inclusive SELF and additive focus particles are equivalent, and even if we were willing to accept Browning’s derivations as stated above, it is not at all clear from the assumption that self is an how we could derive the meaning displayed in identity predicate. If the intensifier were in fact interpreted as a two-place predicate of the form λxλy[x= y], the meaning expected to be delivered by Browning’s analysis should be something like John is angry & there is someone≠John who is identical to the attribute ’x is angry’

6.7 Summary This chapter has provided a set of empirical generalizations about the distribution of exclusive and inclusive head-distant SELF. It has been shown that both types of

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intensifiers are used to express a contrast to alternative propositions with different subject referents. I have argued that exclusive SELF and inclusive SELF differ in terms of the focus suppositions that they trigger: while exclusive SELF triggers the presupposition that the referent of the head DP stands in some ‘secondary thematic relation’ to the event under discussion, inclusive SELF presupposes that this referent stands in some relation to the alternative proposition itself. This contrast can also be paraphrased in terms of a Davidsonian model of event semantics like this: exclusive SELF relates sentences to alternative descriptions of the same event token, while inclusive SELF relates sentences to alternative event tokens of the same type. I have attempted to show that the syntactic representations given in Chapter 4 can account for these empirical generalizations. The crucial difference between exclusive SELF and inclusive SELF is that exclusive SELF is in the scope of the existential quantifier binding the event variable of the main predicate, while inclusive SELF is outside the scope of that quantifier. Accordingly, alternatives to the identity function are introduced at a higher syntactic level in sentences with inclusive SELF—thus allowing reference to alternative event tokens—whereas all alternatives contrasting with exclusive SELF are introduced with reference to the same event token.

7 Reflexivity and the identity function The central question of this study, raised in Chapter 1, is the following: why do SELFforms function both as intensifiers and as reflexive markers? In Chapters 3 and 6, it was claimed that intensifiers can be analysed as expressions of an identity function. In this chapter, it will be argued that SELF-forms with a reflexivizing function can likewise be analysed as denoting the identity function ID. This explains the polyfunctionality of SELF. As has been seen, the identity function is truth-conditionally trivial and becomes relevant only through interaction with other components of grammar. When used as an intensifier, it interacts with focus structure. In this chapter it will be shown that in the context of reflexivity, the identity function interacts with syntactic rules, namely with restrictions concerning the interpretation of arguments associated with the same predicate (‘co-arguments’). I will argue that pronouns occupying the object position of a specific class of predicates may not be bound by a co-argument subject. This rule will be claimed to represent an instance of a ‘functional motivation’ of syntactic structure, a phenomenon widely discussed in contemporary linguistic typology (cf. Croft 2000, 2003, forthcoming; Hawkins 1994; Haspelmath 1999, 2004; Kirby 1999, among others). Under this view, tendencies and necessities characteristic of actual discourse manifest themselves in grammar as syntactic constraints. Adopting the terminology established by König and Siemund (2000b) (cf. also König and Vezzosi 2003; Zribi-Hertz 2003; Smith 2004), I will refer to the class of predicates under discussion as ‘typically other-directed predicates’. This class includes verbs such as hate, insult and criticize, i.e. verbs denoting activities that are typically performed on others. From a functionalist point of view, the ban on co-argument binding across typically other-directed predicates can be regarded as the grammaticalization of a frequency effect: the rarity of such predicates with a reflexive meaning in actual discourse has been reanalysed as a syntactic rule. As will be seen, the status of that rule differs across Germanic languages. Since the objects of typically other-directed predicates may not be bound by the local subject, the grammar resorts to a ‘trick’ in order to achieve co-indexation of both arguments: the object pronoun—typically a (referentially defective) anaphor—is embedded under the identity function, thus being shifted into the specifier position of the object DP. In that position, it can be bound by the local subject, since it is no longer a coargument of its antecedent. Given that the reflexive marker denotes the identity function, the denotation of the object DP will be identical to that of the subject DP without the object being bound by the subject. A more or less formal treatment of this analysis will be offered within the framework of Optimality Theory. It should be mentioned, however, that the model to be presented in this Chapter is far from capturing all the facts concerning the distribution of anaphors and pronominals in Germanic languages. It is

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intended only as a basic framework, and the main objective of this chapter is to elucidate the role of the identity function in reflexive-marking. The discussion starts with a typological overview of reflexive markers in Section 7.1, which establishes some parameters of cross-linguistic variation as a frame of reference for the discussion to follow. In Section 7.2, two of the most influential frameworks accounting for the distribution of ‘anaphors’ and ‘pronominals’ are discussed, namely those put forward by Chomsky (1981, 1986b) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993). Section 7.3 presents two proposals concerning the lexical content of anaphors: Reinhart and Reuland (1991) and Browning (1993) propose analysing the SELF-component of anaphors as an identity predicate, and Reuland (2001) claims that SELF should be regarded as an expression denoting the identity function, very much in line with Jayaseelan (1988, 1997), and with the position advocated in this study. The analysis offered by Reinhart and Reuland (1991) and Browning (1993) will be shown to meet with several problems, while the one presented by Reuland (2001) will be found to be highly plausible. In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, frameworks of reflexivity will be discussed that can be subsumed under the label ‘output-oriented’. Levinson (1987, 1991) has aimed at reducing the inventory of syntactic rules determining the distribution of pronouns by enriching the interpretation procedure with generalized rules of pragmatic inferencing (cf. also Huang 1989, 1991, 2000). This discussion will lead into OT-based theories of reflexivity, which will briefly be reviewed in Section 7.5 (focusing on Burzio 1991, 1996, 1998). In Section 7.6, one of the most elaborate (and, arguably, most convincing) competition-based models to date will be presented, namely the reflexivity framework of Kiparsky (2002). The analysis advocated in this study will be put forward in Section 7.7. It builds upon Kiparsky’s framework, which it modifies in several respects. The argument will mainly be made using data from Dutch. Section 7.8 summarizes the conclusions. 7.1 Typologies of reflexive markers 7.1.1 Parameters of variation From a cross-linguistic point of view, the term ‘reflexive’ encompasses an extremely heterogeneous class of expressions. What all of these expressions have in common is that they are used to indicate that two terms co-occurring in a local environment refer to the same entity. There are basically two dimensions along which reflexive markers vary: (i) the properties of the reflexive markers themselves, such as morphological make-up and syntactic class-membership, and (ii) the syntactic domain within which reflexive markers find their antecedent (the binding domain). Further parameters of variation include restrictions concerning the grammatical relation of either the reflexive or the antecedent, asymmetries with regard to the grammatical category of person, and some other finegrained aspects of the distribution of reflexive markers. The discussion to follow will be confined to the two major aspects mentioned above. For surveys of the other parameters of variation, the reader is referred to the relevant literature, for example the overviews provided by Faltz (1985) and Kemmer (1993).

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The morphological complexity of reflexive markers ranges from invariant affixes to fully fledged DPs. Consider the contrast between the verbal prefix mo- in Tetelcingo Nahuatl in the determiner a.

and the reflexive DP is optional).

wyin in Copainalá Zoque in

(note that

Tetelcingo Nahuatl (verbal reflexive) Šowa

mo-htak

pa

tieskatl.

John

REFL-saw

in

mirror

‘John saw himself in the mirror.’ [FN] b.

Copainalá Zoque (nominal reflexive) Kyenu he.saw

wyin DET

REFL.3SG

in.mirror

‘He saw himself in the mirror.’ (lit.: ‘He saw the his body in the mirror.’) [FN]

It is certainly reasonable to regard the distinction between verbal reflexives on the one hand and nominal reflexives on the other as the most basic one in a typology of reflexive markers (cf. Faltz 1985; Genuišienė 1987; Kemmer 1993). This distinction is significant not only with regard to the morphosyntax of these expressions; it also makes a difference semantically whether reflexivity is marked by a modification of the predicate, or whether a specific type of nominal is used which is interpreted as being co-referential with, or bound by, an antecedent in a specific syntactic domain. Verbal reflexives should be regarded as pertaining to the realm of voice or diathesis. They are akin to passives or antipassives, and languages exhibit systematic patterns of polysemy in this domain. Broadly speaking, verbal reflexives are often used for detransitivization. Cross-linguistic surveys of the patterns of polysemy typical of verbal reflexive markers can be found in Genuišienė (1987), Haspelmath (1990), Kemmer (1993) and Lidz (1996). The examples in illustrate the range of meaning associated with the reflexive paradigm of Classical Nahuatl (no-/mo-/mo- for 1st/2nd/3rd person). Classical Nahuatl a.

Reflexivity

1SUBJ-1REFL-love ‘I love myself.’ (Siméon 1996: LI) b.

Reciprocity

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173

3RECIP-love ‘They love each other.’ (Siméon 1996: LI) c.

Middle voice (change in body posture) ni-no-tlāliā 1SUBJ-1REFL-sit.down ‘I sit (myself) down.’ (Sullivan 1992:57)

d.

Impersonal passive ka

miek

tlamantli

īk

mo-čiwa

and

many

things

with.it

3REFL-make

‘…and many things are made of it.’ [CodFlor App., XIV, 29]

The second major type of reflexive marker is more heterogeneous than verbal reflexives and has concerned linguists across theoretical boundaries for many years now: the class of nominal reflexives, also referred to as ‘anaphors’. Although it has been assumed in certain grammatical traditions (notably in the tradition of Chomsky 1981, 1986b; cf. Section 7.2) that anaphors form part of the most basic inventory of the lexicogrammatical elements of a language (or Universal Grammar), nominal reflexives show a great degree of cross-linguistic variation along the two major dimensions specified above. 7.1.2 The typology of Faltz (1985) One of the most influential and most useful typologies capturing the variation with regard to the morphosyntax of nominal reflexives is still the one offered by Faltz (1985). It is summarized in the form of a diagram in Figure 7.1. Faltz distinguishes between four types of nominal reflexives: (i) ‘head-reflexives’, where the reflexive marker is the syntactic head of the object DP; Turkish kendi- and Amharic ras- are of this type (cf. ); (ii) ‘adjunct reflexives’, which adjoin to simple pronouns; Old English (self) and ); (iii) ‘fused adjunct reflexives’, Zapotec (lagahk) have such adjunct reflexives (cf. which have historically developed from the combination [pronoun+ adjunct reflexive], but have been reanalysed as single lexemes (Modern English him-/her-/itself); and finally, (iv) ‘true reflexive pronouns’, i.e. reflexive

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Figure 7.1: Faltz’s (1985) typology of nominal reflexives markers that form part of the class of pronouns, and that are dedicated to indicating coreference of a given DP and a local antecedent (Latin se, German sich, etc.). a.

Amharic (head reflexive) ras-u-n

gäddälä

head-3POSS-ACC

he.killed

‘He killed himself.’ (Leslau 1995:57) b.

Zapotec112 (adjunct reflexive) Nayeli

bawii-ni

lagahk

lohni

nenn

giwahn.

Nayeli

saw-3

REFL/INT

her

in

mirror

‘Nayeli saw herself in the mirror.’ [FN]

In subsequent work, a number of modifications have been proposed with regard to Faltz’s typology. For example, Reinhart and Reuland (1993) distinguish only two types of nominal reflexives, namely SELF-anaphors and SE-anaphors. SELF-anaphors (roughly) correspond to Faltz’s ‘compound reflexives’, and SE-anaphors to Faltz’s ‘reflexive pronouns’. We will discuss Reinhart and Reuland’s proposal in Section 7.2. In a similar vein, König and Siemund (2000b) and König (2001) have proposed reducing the number of distinctions within the group of nominal reflexives: they argue that one should differentiate between those reflexive markers that do double duty as intensifiers and reflexives (English self-forms, Amharic ras-, Arabic nafs-, etc.), and those forms that function as a reflexive marker but not as an intensifier (German sich, Latin se, etc.). The typology proposed by König and Siemund is similar to the one of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) in so far as Reinhart and Reuland’s SELF-anaphors (or a component of those) are usually also used as intensifiers, while SE-anaphors do not have an intensifying function. As will be seen in Section 7.7, the two typologies are in fact basically equivalent, and we could also reformulate the distinction as follows: SELF-anaphors are pronouns that either denote the identity function, or incorporate a morpheme denoting the identity function.

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175

SE-anaphors, by contrast, are monomorphemic (referentially defective) pronouns that require a syntactic binder in order to be assigned a referential interpretation. The distinction between compound reflexives and reflexive pronouns is justified not only if the make-up of those reflexives is considered, but also with regard to the syntactic properties of the different types of reflexive markers. This brings us to the second dimension of cross-linguistic variation mentioned above: the syntactic domain within which a reflexive finds its antecedent, i.e. the binding domain of nominal reflexives. Compound reflexives tend to require an antecedent that is more local than that of reflexive pronouns. In some languages, reflexive pronouns can be bound by antecedents that are as distant as in a higher clause. This phenomenon is well-studied for Latin and Ancient Greek, where it is usually called ‘indirect reflexivity’ (cf. Bornemann and Risch 1978:172; cf. Section 3.4.3 and Note 44). provides an example of an indirect reflexive from Ancient Greek. The reflexive pronoun spheĩs functions as the subject of the embedded clause, referring to the same referent as the subject of the superordinate clause. Such indirect reflexives are used only in ‘internally dependent’ clauses, i.e. in clauses that denote a thought or utterance of the subject of the matrix predicate (cf. Bornemann and Risch 1978:236). Reflexives that refer back to an antecedent from a higher clause are also known from Icelandic (cf. ). In the generative tradition, such instances of nominal reflexives are called ‘long-distance reflexives’ or ‘long-distance anaphora/anaphors’ (Maling 1984; Koster and Reuland 1991).113 a. Ancient Greek Élegon,

hóti

oudèn

àn

they.said

that

nothing

PTCL

agágoien

spheĩs less

REFL3PL

than

Xenophon.

stratiàn

lead.OPT.PRES.3PL

the

army

‘They said that they could lead the army no less than Xenophon.’ (Bornemann and Risch 1978:173) b. Icelandic Joni

sagði

þeim

að

Maríaj

elski

sigi.

Jon

told

them

that

Maria

loves.SBJ

ANPH

‘Jon told them that Maria loved him.’ (Pica 1991:119)

7.1.3 A typology of locality relations In typologies capturing the variation of the binding domain of nominal reflexives, we can make the following distinctions (for similar or equivalent proposals, cf. Faltz 1985; Wexler and Manzini 1987): first of all, there are reflexives that can be used only if they are ‘clause-mates’ of their antecedents, i.e. if the reflexive and the antecedent occur in the same clause. A clause can be defined as a syntactic unit corresponding to a predicate plus

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its arguments and adjuncts. Another type of nominal reflexives need not be bound by a clause-mate, but requires a ‘sentence-mate’ antecedent, i.e. it may be co-referential with an antecedent from a different clause forming part of the same sentence (cf. the examples in ). Among the clause-mate reflexives, we can furthermore distinguish between those reflexives that are co-arguments of their antecedents, and those that are not subcategorized for by the main verb, forming part of an adjunct. I will refer to the latter type of locality relation as ‘co-participation’, and to reflexives occurring in such contexts as ‘co-participant reflexives’. This terminology is inspired by the observation that the referents of such reflexives participate in the same event as the relevant antecedents (they are in the scope of the existential quantifier binding the event variable of the main verb), but they form part of a different predicate—namely, the predicate denoted by the relevant adjunct (cf. Davidson 1967 and Marantz 1984, among others for the view that prepositions form predicates without introducing an event variable). Examples of coargument and co-participant reflexives are given in

and

respectively.

Co-argument reflexivity a.

John looks at himself in the mirror.

b.

Hans

betrachtet

sich

im

Spiegel.

Hans

looks at

ANPH

in the

mirror

‘Hans looks at himself in the mirror.’ Co-participant reflexivity a. Ginny looked flustered but Harry moved over and made room for her [near himself]. [www]114 b. Harry Harry

machte

Platz

für

sie

[neben

sich].

made

room

for

her

near

ANPH

‘Harry made room for her near himself.’

Among the sentence-mate reflexives, we can distinguish at least three types (cf. Wexler and Manzini 1987): (i) occurrences of reflexives that are not clause-mates of their antecedents, but form part of a non-finite (verbal or nominal) constituent which is embedded under the clause containing the antecedent, (ii) occurrences of reflexives that are part of a non-finite IP115 which is embedded under the clause hosting the antecedent, and (iii) occurrences of reflexives which form part of a finite IP, and which are coindexed with an antecedent from a higher clause. Types (i) and (ii) can be subsumed under the label ‘finite-bound’, and type (iii) can be dubbed ‘non-finite-bound’ (this terminology is chosen so as to correspond with the labels used by Kiparsky 2002; cf. Section 7.6). Furthermore, I will distinguish between the locality relations (i) and (ii) by referring to the former as ‘intra-inflectional finite-bound’, and to the latter as ‘extra-

Reflexivity and the identity function

177

inflectional finite-bound’. Examples of the different locality relations are given in

finite-bound/intra-inflectional (Italian) a. [IP Alicej

vide

Marioi

Alice

saw

Mario

[VP

guardare

sèi/j

nello

specchio]].

look at

ANPH

in the

mirror

‘Alicei saw Marioj look at himj/heri in the mirror.’ b. [IP Alicei Alice

guardò

i

ritratti

di

sèi/j

di

Marioj].

looked at

the

portraits

of

ANPH

of

Mario

‘Alicei looks at Mario’sj portraits of heri/himselfj.’ (Wexler and Manzini 1987:416)

finite-bound/extra-inflectional a. Icelandic [IP

Mariai

skipað

Haraldij

Maria

ordered

Harald

[IP

að

raka

sigi/j]].

to

shave

ANPH

‘Maria ordered Harald to shave heri/himselfj.’ (Wexler and Manzini 1987:417) b. Dano-Norwegian [IP

Joni

ba

meg

Jon

asked me

om

[IP

about

å

snakke

om

segi]].

to

talk

about

ANPH

‘Jon asked me to talk about him.’ (Hellan 1991:29)

non-finite-bound (Latin) a. [IP

Cicero

effecerat

ut

Cicero

had achieved

that

[IP

Quintus

Curius

Quintus

Curius.NOM

consilia

Catilinae

sibi

proderet]].

designs.ACC

Catiline-GEN

REFL.DAT

reveal.SBJ

‘Cicero had induced Quintus Curius to reveal Catiline’s designs to him.’ [Sall. Cat. 26, 3], quoted from Benedicto (1991:171) b. [IP

quid

Ariovistusi

exercitu

suo

praesente

Ariovistus.NOM

army.ABL

his.ABL

present.ABL exclaimed

[IP

sei

ad

venirent]].

conclamauit

The grammar of identity why

to

ANPH

178

came.SBJ

‘Ariovistus exclaimed in the presence of his army, why they were coming to him.’ [Caes. BG I, 47, 6], quoted from Benedicto (1991:171–2)

Figure 7.2 illustrates the structural configurations characterizing the different sentencemate locality relations. The classification of intra-sentential locality relations holding between a nominal reflexive and its antecedent as outlined in this section is summarized in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.2: Structural configurations in sentence-mate antecedence 7.1.4 On necessary and sufficient conditions It is well known that typologies of the kind shown in Figure 7.3 allow for the formulation of certain implicational statements (cf. Faltz 1985): if a reflexive can be used in a locality relation x, then it can also be used in all locality relations y that are more local than x, where the co-argument domain is the most local domain.116 Furthermore, it was mentioned above that there is a correlation holding between the morphological complexity and the binding domain of an anaphor: compound reflexives tend to be restricted to the more local domains, while reflexive pronouns such as Latin se and Icelandic sig can be non-finite-bound, under specific circumstances. Given that the typology displayed in Table 7.3 allows us to make implicational generalizations, it can be used for a cross-linguistic classification of anaphors: we can specify each reflexive marker with regard to its maximal binding domain, entailing that it can be used in every domain that is more local as well. For example, the Latin reflexive se can be used as a non-finite-bound reflexive, which entails that it can be bound in the

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179

co-participant and co-argument domain, too. German sich and Dutch zich range from intra-inflectional/finite-bound to the co-argument domain (although Dutch zich can be

clause-mate

sentence-mate finite-bound

co-argument

co-participant

intra-inflectional

extra-inflectional

non-finite-bound

Figure 7.3: A typology of locality relations bound only in the context of specific verbs; this is due to an intervening constraint, cf. Section 7.7). However, the usefulness of our typology of locality relations is limited. This classification can only tell us under what circumstances a given reflexive marker can be used, but it does not provide any information as to when it must be used. For example, Latin se can be used in the intra-sentential domain, given that it occurs in an internally dependent (logophoric) clause, but it need not be used in that domain, and a free pronoun (is, ea, id in the appropriate case form) is also a possible option. Thus, is a possible sentence in Latin, with the indexation given. By contrast, is/ea/id cannot be co). indexed with an antecedent from the co-argument or co-participant domain (cf. In these contexts, se is obligatory for the expression of co-reference or binding. This difference should of course also be accounted for by a theory of reflexivity. Latin a.

Ciceroi

effecerat

ut

Cicero

had achieved

that

Quintus Curius-NOM

consilia

Catilinae

eii

proderet]].

designs-ACC

Catiline-GEN

he.DAT

reveal.SBJ

[IP

[IP

Quintus Curiusj

‘Ciceroi had made Quintus C. reveal Catiline’s designs to himi.’ b. Sebastianus

Corradus

vero

…eum

laudat:…

Sebastianus

Corradus

though

…him

praises:…

‘[Sebastianus C.]i, however, praises him*i…’ [BibAug 153]

Table 7.3 as well as comparable typologies only provide the necessary conditions of the use of an anaphor, but they do not say anything about the sufficient conditions. From a structuralist point of view, this comes as no surprise: the question of when a nominal reflexive must be used depends not only on the syntactic properties of the anaphor itself; it is also crucially dependent on the syntactic properties of the relevant paradigmatically

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contrasting pronominal elements. In addition to the rules determining the distribution of anaphors, it is thus necessary to take the paradigmatic alternatives into account. This undertaking has been one of the central objectives of the Binding Theory as put forward by Chomsky (1981, 1986b) as well as the reflexivity framework developed by Reinhart and Reuland (1991, 1993). We will turn to a discussion of these models in the next section. 7.2 The distribution of anaphors and pronominals 7.2.1 Chomsky’s Binding Theory Chomsky (1981:188) tries to capture the distribution of anaphors and pronominals117 in terms of the now-classical three Binding Conditions A, Overt

Empty

[+anaphor, −pronominal]

lexical anaphor

NP-trace

[−anaphor, +pronominal]

pronominal

pro

[+anaphor, +pronominal]

−

PRO

[−anaphor, −pronominal]

R-expression

wh-trace/variable

Table 7.1: Chomsky’s typology of NPs B and C. These conditions are given in

The notion of ‘governing category’ is

explicated in a.

An anaphor is bound in its governing category.

b.

A pronominal is free in its governing category.

c.

An R-expression is free.

α is the governing category for β if and only if α is the minimal category containing β and a governor of β, where a=NP or S.

Chomsky regards anaphors and pronominals as being specified as such in the lexicon, so their binding properties are an integral part of their meaning. In Chomsky (1982:78), it is proposed that nominal elements be classified according to the features [±anaphor] and [±pronominal]. The resulting DP-types are again cross-classified according to whether or not they have phonological content. This classification is displayed in Table 7.1. Chomsky’s early Binding Theory met with several problems, both empirical and conceptual. One of the conceptual problems is that it can hardly be said to have

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‘explanatory adequacy’, one of the most frequently cited claims of generative grammar. As Reuland (2001:441) points out, ‘from the perspective of the overall structure of CHL [computational system of human language] the binding conditions […] are arbitrary as stated. They reflect no conceptual necessity, nor do they obviously follow from any of the basic properties of the grammatical system’. In other words: the Binding Conditions are stipulated as an independent ‘module’ of grammar. As a matter of fact, the rules stated in above are little more than a set of descriptive generalizations about the distribution of pronouns in English. Since the binding domains of pronouns are regarded as lexical specifications, the proposition ‘an anaphor is bound in its governing category’ amounts to an analytic statement, since an anaphor is defined as something that is bound in its governing category, and the same criticism applies to Condition B. Chomsky stipulates that Universal Grammar makes a distinction between ‘pronominals’ and ‘anaphors’, but he does not provide any justification for the existence of that dichotomy. The empirical problems of Chomsky’s Binding Theory are manifold. First, the predictions made by the Binding Conditions as specified in soon turned out to be partially wrong. Anaphors and pronominals are not in complementary distribution, as is predicted by Conditions A and B. For example, English allows both simple pronouns and self-forms in the co-participant domain to be co-indexed with the local subject. Also, some structural configurations allow both free pronouns and self-forms in the subject position of DPs (Johni…a picture of [himi(self)]i). Chomsky (1986b:169) therefore includes a semantic (θ-theoretic) component in his modification of the 1981-theory, specifying the notion of governing category as a ‘“complete functional complex” (CFC) in the sense that all grammatical functions compatible with its head are realized in it—the complements necessarily, by the projection principle, and the subject, which is optional unless required to license a predicate, by definition’ (Chomsky 1986b:169). This modification was a first step away from a purely syntactic treatment of the distribution of pronouns, and towards the integration of semantic aspects into the theory. However, this ‘resolves just a small part of the overlapping distribution problem’, as Kiparsky (2002:180) notes, and a lot of data remain mysterious for the Binding Theory as put forward in Chomsky (1986b) as well. A further problem of Chomsky’s Binding Theory is that it was designed for English and could not easily cope with data from other languages. This problem was tackled by regarding the binding domain associated with a given anaphor as a parameter of crosslinguistic variation (cf. Everaert 1986; Wexler and Manzini 1987; Thráinsson 1991). Furthermore, not all languages show a binary opposition between (free) pronominals on the one hand and (bound) anaphors on the other, as the one between English self-forms and simple pronouns. Some languages do not have anaphors at all (cf. Levinson 1991), and other languages have more than one class of pronouns qualifying as anaphors. For example, Dutch distinguishes between three pronominal categories: a set of simple pronouns (hem, haar, het, etc.), a monomorphemic anaphor zich, and a complex anaphor zichzelf. Obviously, this kind of three-way opposition requires a treatment that is crucially different from the traditional Binding Theory.

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7.2.2 The theory of Reinhart and Reuland The problems pointed out above have given rise to a radical reconsideration of the Binding Theory from the mid-1980s on. One of the most influential paradigms has been the framework established by Reinhart and Reuland (1989, 1991, 1993). Reinhart and Reuland modify Chomsky’s (1981, 1986b) Binding Theory in several respects. The most important modifications are summarized in a. Reinhart and Reuland differentiate between two types of anaphors: SE-anaphors (‘simple expression’) and SELF-anaphors. b. The rules determining the distribution of pronouns are distributed across two different modules of grammar: while the distribution of anaphors as opposed to that of free pronouns is governed by rules relating to movement (theory of chains), the Binding Theory accounts only for the distribution of SELF-anaphors as opposed to simple pronouns (SE-anaphors and pronominals). c. The Binding Conditions A and B are regarded as conditions on predicates, not on pronominals or anaphors. d. Reinhart and Reuland regard Condition A as applying to syntactic representations, while Condition B is taken to apply to semantic representations.

It would go too far to discuss every single detail of Reinhart and Reuland’s analysis here, and the reader is referred to Reinhart and Reuland’s own work for more specific information. We will consider only those points that are relevant to the present discussion as well as to the analysis to be presented in Section 7.7. Let us start with Reinhart and Reuland distinguish between two classes of anaphors, namely between SE-anaphors on the one hand (Dutch zich, Norwegian seg, Swedish sig, etc.), and SELF-anaphors on the other (Dutch zichzelf, Dano-Norwegian seg selv, Swedish sig själv, English himself, etc.). What both kinds of anaphors have in common is that they are referentially defective, i.e. they cannot refer by themselves (this assumption is also made, or at least implied, by Chomsky 1981, 1986b; cf. also Burzio 1991, 1996, 1998 on referential deficiency of anaphors). Both SE-anaphors and SELF-anaphors are thus specified as [−R(eferential)] in the lexicon. Anaphors (of both the SE and the SELF type) are referentially defective NPs, which entails, for example, that they cannot be used as demonstratives, referring to some entity in the world (though it does not entail that they must be bound variables). Binding may be viewed as the procedures assigning the content necessary for their referential interpretation. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:658)

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What distinguishes SE-anaphors from SELF-anaphors is that only the latter have the ability to reflexive-mark a predicate. In this respect, SE-anaphors pattern with free pronouns, which cannot reflexive-mark a predicate either. Free pronouns differ from both types of anaphors in that they are [+R(eferential)], i.e. they have the ability to pick out The typology following from the cross-classification of some individual pronouns according to the features [±R] and [±REFL] is summarized in Table 7.2.118,119 The two different features determining the distribution of pronouns ([± REFL] and ). The question [±R]) are sensitive to rules from different modules of grammar (cf. of whether or not a pronoun is referential pertains to the theory of chains. Only [−R] elements are assumed to be capable of forming a chain with a given antecedent.120

SELF

SE

[free] pronoun

Reflexivizing function

+

−

−

R(eferential independence)

−

−

+

Table 7.2: Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993:659) typology of pronouns If an anaphor forms a chain with an antecedent, it is interpreted as being co-referential with or bound by that antecedent. It follows that only pronouns that are [−R] can be bound. We will not consider Reinhart and Reuland’s assumptions about the relationship holding between movement rules and binding in detail. For the present purposes it is sufficient to note that the binding properties of a given pronoun follow from its specification as either [+R] or [−R]. Unlike the referentiality feature [±R], the feature [±REFL] relates to the Binding Theory proper (cf. ). In Reinhart and Reuland’s framework, the Binding Conditions are regarded as a set of rules concerning the reflexive-marking of predicates ). This amounts to a return to the more traditional point of view that reflexivity (cf. is a property of predicates, not of terms. Reinhart and Reuland argue that only pronouns that are [+REFL] can mark a predicate as reflexive. The modified Binding Conditions A and B as assumed by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) are given in

121

Definitions of

reflexivity and reflexive-marking are provided in Condition A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive. Condition B: A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:678) A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed. A predicate (formed of P) is reflexive-marked iff either P is lexically reflexive or one of P’s arguments is a SELFanaphor. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:663)

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We can now turn to the last respect in which Reinhart and Reuland’s model differs from ): namely, the two conditions A Chomsky’s traditional Binding Theory (point and B are regarded as applying at different levels of representation: condition A is defined as a condition applying to ‘syntactic predicates’, while condition B is assumed to be relevant to semantic predicates. This is one of the most central claims made by Reinhart and Reuland. The distinction between syntactic and semantic predicates is 122

detailed in

The syntactic predicate formed of (a head) P is P, all its syntactic arguments, and an external argument of P (subject). The semantic predicate formed of a P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:678)

The assumption that Condition A as stated in applies to syntactic predicates while Condition B applies to semantic predicates is meant to account for certain asymmetries in the distribution of pronominals and anaphors (cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1993:675ff.). For example, the predictions made with regard to the distribution of pronouns in the complement position of prepositions differ from those made by the traditional Binding Theory. Consider

and

a.

Luciei explained Maxj to *heri/herselfi.

b.

Maxi saw a ghost next to himi/himselfi. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:686)

On the face of it,

and

are structurally similar, but the two sentences differ

crucially with regard to the option of using a pronominal or an anaphor: in

her

both the pronominal and the anaphor cannot be co-indexed with Lucie, while in are possible. According to Reinhart and Reuland, this contrast can be derived from the Binding Conditions as stated in

assuming the definitions of syntactic and semantic

The complement of the preposition to in is a predicates provided in (semantic) co-argument of Lucie, and Condition B therefore rules out her. The by contrast, is not a co-argument of the complement of the preposition next to in predicate saw, since that preposition forms a predicate of its own. However, the predicate formed by next is only a semantic, but not a syntactic predicate, since it lacks an external ). Consequently, Condition A does not apply, and the self-form is argument (cf. likewise allowed. According to Reinhart and Reuland, such self-forms that do not have a reflexivizing function generally receive a logophoric interpretation:

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This means that in checking the index of the NP in the PP, our binding conditions apply differently to the two types. In top V predicate; in

they check the

they check only the P predicate. Condition B

thus rules out the coindexed [free pronoun] in since the coindexation renders the V predicate reflexive. But this predicate is irrelevant for Condition B in

Condition A allows a SELF

anaphor in both cases, but, again, in different ways: In

the

anaphor is a reflexive-marker of the verb explain. But in the situation is analogous to what we have just observed with NPs: Since there is no subject, there is no syntactic predicate, so the condition is automatically met (that is, it does not apply). This means that in unlike the anaphor should have logophoric properties. (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:687) The theory developed by Reinhart and Reuland certainly represents a major step forward in comparison to Chomsky (1981, 1986b), and considerably broadens the range of phenomena accounted for. However, it also faces some problems, which Reinhart and Reuland are well aware of. One problem concerns the status of those verbs that do allow SE-anaphors in an object position, like wassen ‘wash’ or verdedigen ‘defend’. Contrary to what is expected from the [−REFL]-feature of SE-anaphors, zich and comparable pronouns may occupy the object position of such verbs (cf.

).

Maxi

wast

zichi.

Max

washes

ANPH

‘Max washes.’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:666)

The solution offered by Reinhart and Reuland (1993) is that wast in is ‘lexically reflexive-marked’. Condition B is therefore met. Given that zich is [−R], it is allowed to be bound by (form a chain with) Max. Moreover, it is now the only possible candidate, since hem, being [+R], cannot be bound by Max, and since zichzelf is not possible because wast is already reflexive-marked. This solution comes at a relatively high price: given that wassen may also take non-reflexive object pronouns, as illustrated in it is necessary to assume that this verb has two lexical entries: one that is specified as inherently reflexive, and another that is not lexically reflexive-marked. Maxi wast hemj. ‘Max washes him.’

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Reinhart and Reuland are willing to pay that price: ‘Verbs like wassen “wash” […] are listed twice in the lexicon, both as reflexive and nonreflexive; their reflexive entry allows the SE-anaphor, and their transitive entry occurs with a SELF-anaphor’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:666). The assumption of homophony for verbs like wassen is relatively costly because there are prima facie no good independent reasons for it. In Section 7.7, I will propose an alternative way of dealing with verbs of this class which does not require assuming two lexical entries. A further problem of Reinhart and Reuland’s framework concerns its range of crosslinguistic applicability: it cannot easily cope with data from languages in which simple anaphors can be used with reflexive predicates, even with those predicates that are not lexically reflexive-marked (cf. also König and Siemund 2000b for this point). German is one of those languages. Consider Hansi

hasst

sichi.

Hans

hates

ANPH

‘Hans hates himself.’

What kind of anaphor is sich? Morphologically, it has all the relevant properties to qualify as a SE-anaphor. However, Reuland (2000) explicitly excludes the possibility that sich might be a SE-anaphor, and he makes the same assumption with regard to Italian si: ‘The fact that [s]ich in German may bear stress or that si in Italian is a clitic is in both cases sufficient to rule them out as SE-anaphors in the sense intended’ (Reuland 2000:38). But if German sich is not an SE-anaphor, what could it be? Obviously, it cannot be a SELF-anaphor either, since it can be used without a reflexivizing function for example, no predicate is reflexive-marked by sich, and sich does too. In certainly not qualify as a ‘focus anaphor’ (cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1993:672f.). Hansi

sah

eine

Schlange

neben

sichi.

Hans

saw

a

snake

beside

ANPH

‘Hans saw a snake beside him.’

The only way out of the dilemma that I see is to assume, again, two lexical entries for sich. We could assume that German has two anaphors, namely sich1 and sich2, where sich1 is a SE-anaphor, and sich2 a SELF-anaphor.123 A third problem of Reinhart and Reuland’s framework concerns the status of SELF). As was shown above, the theory allows SELFanaphors in adjunct positions (cf. anaphors to occur in such positions because the relevant prepositional predicates are not syntactic predicates, and Condition A does not apply. Why, then, should SELF-forms be possible at all?

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Hei pushed the brandy away from himselfi. (Levinson 1991:120)

Reinhart and Reuland offer the following solution: SELF-anaphors are allowed to occur in such positions, but they are not interpreted as reflexive-markers then. Instead, they are ‘focus anaphors’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993:672ff.). While it is certainly feasible to have a status different from that of self-forms in object assume that self-forms as in positions, Reinhart and Reuland do not answer the question of how the two types of selfforms are related to one another. Why should a SELF-anaphor have a reflexivizing function in one context, and a logophoric function in another? Is this another case of homophony? This last point raises yet another question: Reinhart and Reuland (1993) do not explain why SELF-anaphors are also used as intensifiers in the languages under discussion. How can we relate the reflexivizing function of SELF-forms to their intensifying function? Is it, again, inevitable to assume homophony? I will argue in Section 7.7 that this assumption is not necessary, and Reinhart and Reuland (1991) themselves provide a hint as to where the conceptual link between intensifiers and reflexives could be found by analysing SELF as an identity predicate. We will consider this analysis in Section 7.3. Reinhart and Reuland’s (1991) proposal will lead into an argument made by Reuland (2001), who analyses the SELF-component of SELF-anaphors as an expression denoting the identity function. This anticipates my own account to be presented in Section 7.7, where I make the same assumption in the context of an analysis of reflexivity phenomena within the framework of Optimality Theory. However, the explanation that I offer for the use of the identity function in the context of reflexivity differs in crucial respects from the one provided by Reuland (2001). 7.3 SELF: identity predicate or identity function? 7.3.1 Reflexive SELF as an identity predicate Reinhart and Reuland (1991) Reinhart and Reuland (1991) analyse the English element himself as a complex NP headed by (the noun) self. The pronominal element him is taken to occupy the specifier position of that NP (cf. Higginbotham 1983). A self-form is consequently supposed to have the structure shown in Figure 7.4 (cf. Reinhart and Reuland 1991:286). Semantically, SELF is analysed as a two-place predicate denoting the relation of identity. It has a lexical entry of the form λyλx [ID(y)(x)], and is thus similar to transitive predicates. According to Reinhart and Reuland, the function of SELF is to indicate that the element in [Spec, NP] (him) and some other element in the clause are identical: In more intuitive terms we may say that SELF […] expresses an identity relation between him and another argument which needs to be found. Under this view, it is this missing argument which is responsible for the

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defective nature of SELF-NPs, i.e. for their anaphoric status. (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:286)

Figure 7.4: The structure of himself (Reinhart & Reuland 1993:286) The main problem of this approach is that it is not clear how we can compositionally derive a sentence meaning under the assumption that SELF is a two-place predicate. Reinhart and Reuland describe the interpretation of a SELF-NP in object position as follows: ‘When a SELF-NP occurs on a grid position, it is interpreted as a restriction on that grid, which, consequently, restricts the range of the predicate interpretation’, namely, to the effect that ‘the SELF-conjunct specifies that the two arguments of the V grid must be identical variables’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:291). The structure in

is thus

interpreted as shown in a. b.

…[V…[…SELF<x,y>]] (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:291)

It is difficult to see how could be derived from Both SELF and the verb are interpreted as predicates. The combination of V and SELF should therefore result in a type-mismatch. Reinhart and Reuland (1991) do not provide an explanation for the to assuming that ‘the unorthodox interpretation procedure leading from specific details assumed here for capturing the SELF-relation are not crucial for our analysis, and other formulations with the same results are conceivable’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:286). I do not agree with Reinhart and Reuland that the details of such an analysis are not crucial. It is precisely the details that we have to work out if we want to understand how reflexive-marking functions in compositional terms. The intuition that reflexivity involves identity marking in one way or another is not new; the central puzzle is the question of how we can derive a reflexive reading of a SELF-anaphor, assuming

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only the generally accepted mechanisms of meaning composition, and with as little stipulation of extra-rules as possible. Browning (1993) The proposal made by Reinhart and Reuland (1991) was taken up and elaborated by Browning (1993). Browning aims to explain the interpretive process illustrated in above in terms of a mechanism called ‘theta-identification’, which she adopts from Higginbotham (1985) (cf. Section 6.6). Higginbotham (1985) defines theta-identification in order to account for the compositional process of modification, by which two elements combine in such a way that the variables associated with two different valency positions, each of them pertaining to a different predicate, are unified. For example, the adjective big is analysed as a one-place predicate λx [BIG(x)], and the noun butterfly is likewise analysed as a one-place predicate, namely λx [BUTTERFLY(x)]. When the adjective big modifies the noun butterfly, then the arguments of BIG and BUTTERFLY are ‘θidentified’. In a tree diagram, theta-identification can be visualized as in Figure 7.5.124

Figure 7.5: Theta-identification Like Reinhart and Reuland (1991), Browning (1993) assumes that reflexive self-forms have an unsaturated argument slot. According to her proposal, the variable associated with that argument slot is marked as being identical with the external argument of the governing verb via theta-identification. This process is illustrated in the notation used below. The numbers in angle brackets by Higginbotham (1985) in Figure 7.6 for stand for the different argument positions of the relevant predicates. An asterisk indicates that an argument position has been ‘discharged’, as Higginbotham (1985) calls it, i.e. that the argument position has been saturated. The computation displayed in Figure 7.6 (from Browning 1993:88) is assumed to have the meaning given in

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Figure 7.6: Lucie adores herself a.

Lucie adores herself.

b. ‘Lucie adores her and her=Lucie’

The problem with Browning’s analysis is that theta-identification as put forward by Higginbotham is crucially different from the process illustrated in Figure 7.6. Higginbotham (1985) introduces theta-identification in order to account for the way in which two predicates can be combined to form a head-modifier pair without giving rise to a type-mismatch. Assuming that both butterfly and big denote one-place predicates of the form λx[P(x)], it is of course necessary to assume some special compositional mechanism which allows one to bring these two originally incompatible elements together. A more traditional way of combining an adjective and a noun in an attributive construction would be to assume that the adjective big is a function of the form which makes it unnecessary to assume any kind of compositional process apart from functional application. However, Higginbotham’s treatment probably mirrors the lexical semantics of such expressions more closely, especially in view of the fact that adjectives in English can typically also be used in a predicative function.

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In the present context, it is not obvious how and why Higginbotham’s thetaidentification should carry over to the process of combining a verb with one of its arguments, since this is clearly a process of functional application. As a matter of fact, Browning assumes that at the level of V’ in Figure 7.6, two processes occur simultaneously: the second argument position of adore is ‘discharged’, and the second argument of DP identifies with the first argument of V. This operation differs crucially from θ-identification as proposed by Higginbotham (1985). In my opinion Browning’s analysis does not really explain how or why a predicate denoting the relation of identity in the object position of a transitive predicate should give rise to a reflexive interpretation of that predicate; it merely restates that problem. We now have to answer the question: how is it possible that a DP with an unsaturated argument position combines with a two-place verb, thus forming a V’-constituent, in such a way that the unsaturated argument slot of the self-form identifies with the first argument slot of the verb? Resorting to Higginbotham’s theta-identification amounts to giving that problem another name, but it can hardly qualify as an explanation. The same criticism applies to the analysis offered by Reinhart and Reuland (1991).125 Reflexives as generalized quantifiers Some authors have proposed that reflexive pronouns or anaphors are functions, not terms, and that these functions incorporate an identity predicate without denoting the identity function themselves. Cresswell (1973) regards himself, herself, etc. as expressing a function which takes a two-place predicate as its input and yields a one-place predicate as its output, indicating that the two arguments of the relevant predicate are identical. Similar analyses can be found in Keenan (1987) and ter Meulen (2000). Ter Meulen analyses Dutch zichzelf as a generalized quantifier. In

it is supposed to have the

meaning given in a. Peter

scheert

zichzelf

Peter

shaves

himself

b.

Approaches along the lines of Cresswell (1973), Keenan (1987) and ter Meulen (2000) regard reflexive-marking as an instruction to interpret two arguments of a given predicate as being identical in reference. The reflexive marker itself, however, is not regarded as an identity predicate in any respect, i.e. it does not have a form similar to λxλy[x=y]. It merely states that the two arguments of the predicate that it takes are identical. Again, this solution offers another technical description of how reflexive-marking could be modelled compositionally, but it does not really provide an answer to the question of how it could be derived, under the assumption that reflexive markers denote identity predicates. Also, there are some incompatibilities with regard to ‘exceptional case marking’-structures (ECM), where the arguments of the predicate supposedly taken by a

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reflexive marker are not identical, and with regard to reflexive pronouns occupying the and respectively). Such complement position of prepositional phrases (cf. occurrences of self-forms cannot easily be accommodated within a generalized quantifier approach. a.

Jack considers himself smart.

b.

Jack pulled the blanket over himself.

Having pointed out some problems of the various versions of the ‘identity predicate’analysis, I will now turn to a more promising account, namely the one put forward by Reuland (2001). 7.3.2 Reflexive SELF as an identity function Reuland (2001) sets out from the central hypothesis of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) that the relation of dependency holding between an anaphor and its antecedent is that of chain formation, a process that is generally associated with movement (cf. Chomsky 1981, form a chain, since she is 1986b). For example, the two elements shei and ti in analysed as having raised from the position of ti to the position that it occupies in overt syntax. The passivized verb be admired is a one-place predicate. As Reuland (2001:476) states, ‘the chain (she, t) is the overt argument of the predicate’. Shei is admired ti.

Reinhart and Reuland (1993:690ff.) argue that an anaphor and its antecedent also form a the DP Willem and the anaphor zich are supposed to form chain. For example, in the chain (Willem, zich).126 Since each chain is only one syntactic object, incorporating several ‘occurrences’ of that object, ‘the verb schamen has as its syntactic argument (two occurrences of) one syntactic object’ (Reuland 2001:477). In other words, schamen is syntactically and semantically monovalent (cf. a.

b.

).

Willemi

schaamt

zichi.

Willem

is ashamed of

ANPH

λx[SCHAAMT(x)(x)] (Willem)

According to Reinhart and Reuland (1993), is well-formed because schamen is lexically reflexive and hence intrinsically monovalent. However, the grammar runs into

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problems when SE-anaphors occupy the object position of a verb that is not lexically reflexive.

is therefore ungrammatical. *Willemi

haat

zichi.

Willem

hates

ANPH

int.: ‘Willem hates himself.’

Reuland (2001:477) states that ‘(Willem, zich) form a CHAIN,127 which in turn is interpreted as one semantic argument’. However, haten is a two-place predicate and must therefore take two (semantic) arguments. The result is, in Reuland’s terms, an ‘arity violation’: the number of arguments that are lexically required differs from the number of arguments that are actually present. This is the point where the identity function comes into play. Heavily inspired by the work of Jayaseelan (1988, 1997) (cf. Section 1.5.2), Reuland (2001) argues that grammars may take a simple way out of that dilemma: instead of filling the object position of a transitive predicate with an SE-anaphor, the complex DP zichzelf is used (cf. ) Zichzelf is interpreted as the identity function ID applied to the anaphor zich, very much like it is assumed for intensifies in the present study. The semantic interpretation of is provided in a.

Willemi haat zichzelfi.

b.

λyλx[HAAT(y)(x)] (ID(x)) =λx[HAAT(ID(x))(x)] λx[HAAT(ID(x))(x)] (Willem) =HAAT(ID(Willem))(Willem)

In the two arguments of the predicate haten are syntactically distinguishable, since a chain128 is formed not between the external argument and the internal argument, but between the external argument and a pronominal element in the specifier position of the internal argument. The semantic component of interpretation will nevertheless assign identical denotations to both argument positions, since SELF denotes the identity function. Reuland (2001:481ff.) refers to the zelf-component of zichzelf as ‘protective SELF’. Protective SELF is truth-conditionally meaningless, and its function basically is to ‘deceive’ the syntactic component of grammar with regard to the number of arguments associated with a predicate: Note that I am making a very strong claim, namely, that some aspect of the grammatical system is in fact dysfunctional: in language an obvious requirement on any communicative system—namely, that it can represent

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reflexive acts—can only be met by what looks like a trick. (Reuland 2001:482) With regard to the lexical content of SELF, Reuland (2001:480) argues that ‘this analysis does not rely on specific assumptions concerning the interpretation of SELF. Specifically, it does not require that SELF represent an identity predicate […]. Rather, from the perspective of the interaction between CHL and the interpretive system, any element introducing a branching structure will do’. I do not agree with Reuland with regard to the last point. All elements functioning as ‘protective SELF’ have to meet a specific condition: they must not alter the referential interpretation of their argument. For instance, a function such as BROTHER. OF will not do as protective SELF, since in a sentence such as John likes his brother, different denotations will be assigned to the subject and the object. Admittedly, Reuland (2001:482) is right when he points out that many languages use body-part expressions as protective SELF (cf. Schladt 2000), but these expressions are clearly reinterpreted metonymically so that they are basically equivalent to the identity function. A similar argument is made by Safir (1996:555) in a slightly different framework: Anaphoric SELF is a metonymic anaphor. By this I mean that it represents a part of an individual as being identical to the whole of that individual, with the result that the atom SELF is employed as a two-place identity relation. The second argument of SELF, which I will write as self, corresponds to the ‘part’ argument. Self inherently saturates the part argument of SELF, leaving one open argument place corresponding to the whole which is metonymically represented by the part. I believe that Jayaseelan’s (1988, 1997) and Reuland’s (2001) idea of a ‘protective SELF’ provides an adequate explanation for the occurrence of SELF-elements in the context of reflexivity. However, I claim that the role of the identity function in the encoding of reflexivity can be explained more straightforwardly if we adopt a model accounting for reflexivity phenomena in terms of Optimality Theory. I will argue that an OT-analysis has a broader range of cross-linguistic applicability than Reinhart and Reuland’s reflexivity framework, and that it is more economical in so far as it allows us to make fewer lexical distinctions (for example, by dispensing with homophony of verbs such as wassen). We will now turn to a consideration of those approaches that can be subsumed under the notion ‘output-oriented’: we will start with a proposal made by Levinson (1987, 1991), who tries to reduce the number of grammatical rules by incorporating processes of conversational inferencing in the interpretive procedure (Section 7.4). After that, we will briefly consider some approaches within the framework of Optimality Theory (Section 7.5). One such account is not only particularly convincing but also lends itself to answering the questions addressed in this study, namely the one proposed by Kiparsky (2002). This model will be presented in Section 7.6. It will serve as a frame of reference for my own analysis to be presented in Section 7.7.

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7.4 Binding and conversational inferencing Parallel to the development of Reinhart and Reuland’s (1989, 1991, 1993) reflexivity paradigm, several attempts were made to reduce the amount of grammatical stipulation in the Binding Theory, and to ‘re-apportion the burden of account’ between different levels of interpretation (Levinson 1987:380). This type of approach also offers a new perspective on apparent incongruities in the distribution of pronominal elements: assuming that different levels of linguistic representation interact in the assignment of referential indices to DPs, a certain overlap in the distribution of anaphors and pronominals is to be expected. Levinson (1987) proposes apportioning the principles determining the distribution of pronouns between the syntactic and the pragmatic components of interpretation. He argues that it is not necessary to state two independent syntactic rules determining the distribution of pronouns (Conditions A and B). In his 1987-proposal, Levinson assumes only one such condition—Condition A—and derives Condition B from general rules of conversational inferencing (‘generalized conversational implicatures’). This approach, which is dubbed the ‘A-first’ approach in Levinson (1991), can be summarized as follows: anaphors are specialized for indicating local co-reference, i.e. they abide by the syntactic Binding Condition A. Furthermore, Levinson assumes that anaphors are ‘more informative’ than free pronouns in so far as they restrict the reference of a given term more narrowly. According to the Gricean maxim of quantity (‘Make your contribution as informative as is required’), the use of a non-reflexive form will thus trigger the conversational implicature that a reflexive form could not have truthfully been used. Therefore, free pronouns are assigned a locally disjoint interpretation. No grammatical rule is assumed, however, to the effect that free pronouns have to refer to some entity that is different from the local antecedent. A similar approach has been advocated by Huang (1989, 1991, 2000). In Levinson (1991), the A-first approach is revised, and it is now proposed that only Condition B has the status of a grammatical principle, while the distribution of anaphors should be regarded as an elsewhere-phenomenon (the ‘B-first’ approach). Condition B requires that pronominals should be free in their governing category. This is related to (or follows from) the so-called ‘disjoint reference presumption’ (DRP) established by Farmer and Harnish (1987:557), which says that ‘the arguments of a predicate are intended to be disjoint, unless marked otherwise’. Simple pronouns will therefore generally be interpreted as being disjoint in reference from their co-arguments, since they are morphologically simpler than self-forms, and will thus trigger the ‘inference to stereotype’ that co-arguments are distinct. Complex anaphors, by contrast, will have the opposite effect: based on the Gricean maxim of manner (‘be brief’), a conversational implicature will be triggered which says that himself should be interpreted contrary to stereotype, i.e. as being co-referential with its co-argument. An analysis similar to Levinson’s B-first approach is the one advocated by Kiparsky (2002), which we will consider in Section 7.6. Levinson holds that the question of whether an A-first or a B-first account is preferable should be regarded as a matter of cross-linguistic variation. He argues that

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the B-first account is essential for some languages—no grammatical account and no A-first kind of pragmatic account seems possible at all. But equally, a B-first account clearly fails where there are grammaticalized Anaphors; in those languages, an A-first account seems essential. Since the pragmatic apparatus used on both accounts is more or less identical, a typological distinction between the two types of language on the basis of different anaphoric ‘strategies’ might be appropriate. (Levinson 1991:107f.) 7.5 Reflexivity and Optimality Theory The idea that interacting principles of the kind proposed by Levinson are subject to crosslinguistic variation strongly suggests accounting for reflexivity phenomena in terms of Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 1993). In OT, the various interacting principles can be regarded as universal constraints, while languages may still vary with regard to the ranking of the constraints. It comes as no surprise, thus, that a considerable number of OT-based analyses of reflexivity have been proposed lately. This section will focus on the model advanced by Burzio (1991, 1996, 1998), which is most central to an understanding of the discussion in Sections 7.6 and 7.7, but occasional reference will be made to other models as well (e.g. ter Meulen 2000; Wilson 2001; Fischer 2004). Burzio (1991, 1996) proposes some principles of interpretation in the domain of reflexivity that are based on the idea of ‘competition’ between grammatical alternatives and elsewhere-phenomena in the distribution of anaphors and pronominals.129 In Burzio (1998), an explicit account in terms of Optimality Theory is provided. One of the cornerstones of Burzio’s theory is the idea of ‘referential economy’, developed in Burzio (1989, 1991): Burzio argues that anaphors, pronominals and NPs differ in terms of their feature specifications: anaphors are ‘NP[s] with no features’ (Burzio 1991:87), pronouns have features, and R-expressions have ‘both features and further information’ (Burzio 1991:95). This is captured in the hierarchy of ‘referential economy’: (Burzio 1998:93). The Binding theory is reduced to a principle of ‘morphological economy’, which says that ‘A bound NP must be maximally underspecified’ (Burzio 1991:95). Hendriks and Spendauer (forthcoming) translate this into the constraint hierarchy Even though the relationship between ‘featural poverty’ and referential economy has been challenged (see e.g. Safir 2004:69–72), the idea itself, or some version of it, has found its way not only into most OT-accounts of reflexivity phenomena,130 but also into strictly derivational models such as the one advocated by Reuland (2001, forthcoming) (cf. Section 7.3.2). A second hierarchy postulated by Burzio (1998) (‘blocks and antecedents’) relates to the binding domain of pronominal elements. Burzio distinguishes between different types of locality relations holding between the antecedent and the anaphor, and he contends that the choice of antecedent is determined by the following hierarchy: (a more detailed version of this hierarchy is given in Burzio 1996): ‘subject of: This hierarchy

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determines not only whether binding of a pronominal element by a given antecedent is possible, it also predicts which is the ‘optimal antecedent’ for a given anaphor (cf. Burzio 1998:100). A third important aspect of Burzio’s theory which, in one way or another, plays an important role in virtually all OT-models of reflexivity phenomena relates to the structural complexity of (specific types of) anaphors: ‘Avoid structure’. It is closely related to Levinson’s idea of a reflexivizing M-implicature sketched in Section 7.4, and it simply says that less complex elements are favoured over more complex ones. Burzio (1998) captures this in the form of the following hierarchy: Similar or equivalent constraints have been proposed by ter Meulen (2000) (‘SC2: Using words costs effort [the more complex they are, the more they cost]’) and Fischer (2004:491) (‘*SELF: Avoid complex anaphors’). Finally, Burzio (1998) proposes a hierarchy that will not be central to the following discussion, namely the hierarchy of ‘optimal agreement’. It relates to number specifications of the antecedent and says that ‘if a “SE” reflexive (in a language or a subsystem within a language) allows a first or second person antecedent, it will also allow a third person one, and in turn that if it allows a third person one it will also allow an impersonal one’ (Burzio 1998:97). The hierarchy is: The four hierarchies established by Burzio (1998) lead to three interacting and partially competing principles. These principles are given in

(cf. Burzio 1998:104).

a.

AVOID PRONOUN:

Referential Economy […]

b.

AVOID REFLEXIVE:

Optimal Agreement […] Optimal Antecedent […]

c.

AVOID STRUCTURE:

*Morphological complexity […]

On the basis of these considerations, Burzio (1998) points out that the distribution of pronominal elements in a given language ultimately depends on two factors: (i) ‘differences in lexical inventories’ (Burzio 1998:106), and (ii) language-particular rankings of constraints (‘some constraint re-ranking seems necessary’, Burzio 1998:107). These two variables will also figure prominently in the models to be outlined in Sections 7.6 and 7.7. 7.6 Kiparsky’s reflexivity framework Kiparsky (2002) combines insights arrived at by Chomsky (1981, 1986b), Reinhart and Reuland (1991, 1993) and Burzio (1991, 1996, 1998) with a comprehensive typology of pronouns, which admits wide cross-linguistic applicability. We will begin our review of his framework with that typology. Kiparsky cross-classifies pronouns according to two logically independent parameters: (i) the degree of referential independence, which determines the maximal syntactic distance of a pronoun from its antecedent, and (ii) the

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specification for ‘obviation’,131 which determines whether pronouns can be co-referential with (or bound by) a co-argument ([−OBV]) or not ([+OBV]). Pronouns bearing the feature [−OBV] are also referred to as ‘proximate’ pronouns. The typology of pronouns provided by Kiparsky (2002) is displayed in Figure 7.7. Kiparsky’s typology of pronouns can be regarded as a multi-layered elaboration of Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) [±R]-feature and covers a range of phenomena similar to Burzio’s (1998) hierarchy of ‘blocks and antecedents’. It corresponds closely to the typology of locality relations provided in Table 7.3 on page 162. The more referentially independent a pronoun is, the more distant it can be from its antecedent. Kiparsky (2002:201) provides some diagnostics for identifying the degree of referential (in)dependence of a pronoun. For example, it is a defining property of referentially independent pronouns that they can be used deictically (It’s him!). The different degrees of referentiality are defined in

(Kiparsky 2002:200f.).

Figure 7.7: Kiparsky’s (2002:201) typology of pronouns a. A pronoun may be REFERENTIALLY INDEPENDENT or REFERENTIALLY DEPENDENT. Referentially independent pronouns can (but need not) introduce something new into the discourse. For example, they can have deictic and demonstrative uses. Referentially dependent pronouns cannot introduce anything new into the discourse: they must have at least a ‘discourse antecedent’. b. Referentially dependent pronouns may be REFLEXIVE or NON-REFLEXIVE. (Referentially independent pronouns are necessarily non-reflexive.) Reflexive pronouns need a syntactic antecedent. Non-reflexive pronouns can (but need not) get their reference from context/discourse.

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c. Reflexive (hence referentially dependent) pronouns may be FINITE-BOUND or NONFINITE BOUND. […] Finite-bound pronouns require an antecedent within the same finite clause. Non-finite-bound pronouns can (but need not) have an antecedent within the same finite clause. d. Finite-bound (hence reflexive and referentially dependent) pronouns may be subject to the requirement that they be LOCALLY BOUND, or not. Locally bound pronouns require an antecedent in the first accessible subject domain. Non-locally bound pronouns can (but need not) have a ‘long-distance’ antecedent.

It is important to note that pronouns with a given degree of referential independence can also be used in ‘less referential’ contexts. Thus, there is a relationship of inclusion holding from right to left in the classification displayed in Figure 7.7. For example, English him can also be used in the local domain (John saw a snake near him). However, in the more local contexts, the distribution of him is restricted by an additional condition. This brings us to the second feature of Kiparsky’s classification, viz. the obviation feature [±OBV]. Kiparsky’s feature [±OBV] is the counterpart of Reinhart and Reuland’s feature [±REFL]: [+OBV] corresponds to [−REFL], and [−OBV], conversely, to [+REFL]. Reinhart and Reuland’s REFL-feature indicates the ability to mark predicates as reflexive, so SELF-anaphors, which have that feature, can occur only in the object position of semantically reflexive predicates. Kiparsky’s feature [+OBV], by contrast, indicates that the pronoun in question cannot occupy an argument position of a reflexive predicate, so the distribution of Kiparsky’s [+OBV]-pronouns is identical to the distribution of Reinhart and Reuland’s [−REFL]-pronouns. The examples given by both authors confirm this parallelism: Swedish sig and honom are classified as [+OBV] by Kiparsky, and Dutch zich and hem are classified as [−REFL] by Reinhart and Reuland. The constraints used by Kiparsky to account for the distribution of pronouns are listed in

(Kiparsky 2002:187). a. BINDING DOMAIN: A pronoun has a compatible antecedent in a designated domain D. b. OBVIATION: An obviative and its coarguments have disjoint reference. c. PROX: A proximate is a bound anaphor (i.e. it is indexed to the same variable as its antecedent). d. FEATURAL ECONOMY: Avoid pronominals. e. MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY: Avoid morphologically complex pronouns. f. PARSE: The output is not empty.

The first constraint (BINDING DOMAIN) ensures that each pronoun is co-referential with or bound by an antecedent that is within its Binding Domain as specified in the typology of pronouns displayed in Figure 7.7. The OBVIATION constraint concerns the interpretation of pronouns that are classified as [+OBV]. These pronouns must not be coreferential with co-arguments. As was mentioned above, Dutch zich and Swedish sig

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belong to this class, but also the referential pronouns hem and honom. Likewise, English him is classified as [+OBV], and is thus sensitive to the OBVIATION-constraint. The PROX-constraint concerns those pronouns that are [−OBV], i.e. ‘proximate’ pronouns. Among the proximate pronouns we basically find SELF-anaphors, i.e. Dutch zichzelf, English himself, and Swedish sig själv, but also combinations of free pronouns and SELF, for instance Dutch hemzelf and Swedish honom själv. The PROX-constraint concerns the interpretation of these pronouns: according to Kiparsky, they are invariably interpreted as bound variables and do not allow a co-referential interpretation (cf. Reinhart 1983, 1986; Reuland 2000 for the distinction between a bound variable reading of a pronoun and a co-referential interpretation). The two economy constraints assumed by Kiparsky relate to the featural and morphological make-up of pronouns. FEATURAL ECONOMY corresponds to Burzio’s (1991, 1996, 1998) notion of ‘referential economy’, which says that anaphors are less referential and thus more economical than pronominals. The MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY-constraint concerns the form of an anaphor. This constraint is akin to Levinson’s (1991) implicature based on the Gricean maxim of manner (‘be brief’), to Burzio’s constraint ‘Avoid structure’, and to ter Meulen’s (2000) SC2:132 The PARSEconstraint ensures that the output is not empty. For the languages investigated by Kiparsky (e.g. Swedish), the constraints are ranked as shown in The two economy constraints are subsumed under one general economy constraint, but it is crucial to see that there are two such constraints, since there is a potential competition between output candidates that differ with regard to the number of ECONOMY-constraints that they violate (more on this below). In the following discussion, the PARSE-constraint will be disregarded. This constraint is necessary from a technical point of view since the does not violate any of the other constraints.

As the next step, we have to determine the featural make-up of pronouns. Let us consider Swedish, to which Kiparsky dedicates a relatively comprehensive discussion. The 133 inventory of simple pronouns in Swedish is given in Both simple pronouns are classified as [+OBV]; sig is furthermore referentially dependent—more specifically, it is [+REFL[+FIN-BOUND[-LOC]]]. We will in the following indicate only the ‘minimal positive feature specification’, which in this case is [+FIN-BOUND]. Honom is referentially independent (i.e. [−R-DEP]). sig:

[+OBV], [+FIN-BOUND]

honom:

[+OBV], [−R-DEP]

In addition to the simple forms sig and honom, two complex pronouns can be formed by adding själv. What själv does, according to Kiparsky (2002), is cancel the positive

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obviation feature of a pronoun, thus deriving [−OBV]-pronouns (cf. Reinhart and Reuland’s assumption that the SELF-component of SELF-anaphors is responsible for the reflexivity-feature of these anaphors). The two complex pronouns of Swedish are given in sig själv:

[−OBV], [+FIN-BOUND]

honom själv:

[−OBV], [−R-DEP]

We can now consider some examples. Let us start with the input in

which

is represents an instance of a co-argument reflexive. The tableau corresponding to provided in Table 7.3 (cf. Kiparsky 2002:194). As was pointed out above, the PARSEconstraint is disregarded. Johni

föredrar

PRONi.

Johni

prefers

PRONi.

Johni föredrar PRONi

BD

OBV

Johni föredrar sigi

PROX

ECONOMY

*!

Johni föredrar [sig själv]i

*

Johni föredrar honomi

*!

*

Johni föredrar [honom själv]i

**!

Table 7.3: Johni föredrar PRONi The simple pronouns sig and honom are ruled out because they violate DEVIATION. They are classified as [+OBV] and may therefore not be bound by a co-argument. The two proximate pronouns (sig själv and honom själv) violate only economy constraints. Since they are [−OBV], they can be co-indexed with a co-argument. Sig själv is chosen in this particular context because it violates only one economy constraint, namely the constraint of MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY (‘Avoid morphologically complex pronouns’). Honom själv likewise violates this constraint. Since, in addition to that, it violates FEATURAL ECONOMY (‘Avoid pronominals’), it is suboptimal vis-à-vis sig själv. Let us also consider a case in which the pronoun is not a co-argument of the antecedent. Kiparsky (2002:189) provides the example in Johni

betraktar

sigi

som

expert.

Johni

regards

ANPHi

as

expert.

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The simple anaphor sig, which is [+OBV] and [+FIN-BOUND], is optimal in this case because it does not violate any constraint. The OBVIATION constraint is not relevant since sig and John are not (semantic) co-arguments. All the other candidates are ruled out by ECONOMY, since they are either less economical than sig in terms of FEATURAL ECONOMY (honom and honom själv), or in terms of MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY is provided in (sig själv and honom själv). The tableau showing the evaluation of Table 7.4. A corresponding tableau could be given for co-participant reflexives, but Kiparsky does not provide a relevant example from Swedish (but see his discussion of English snake sentences on p. 215f.). Kiparsky’s approach covers a wide range of data, since it provides a comprehensive typology of pronouns, and since it has the built-in possibility to account for crosslinguistic variation by re-ranking the constraints (cf. also Chapter 8). However, there are two points that require further discussion: (i) like Reinhart and Reuland (1993), Kiparsky (2002) faces the problem that a specific class of verbs (defend, wash, shave, etc.) can occur with simple anaphors of the sig-type in direct object position, and (ii) it is stipulated that, but not explained why, själv cancels the obviation feature of a pronoun.

Johni betraktar PRONi som expert

BD

OBV

PROX

ECON

Johni betraktar sigi som expert Johni betraktar [sig själv]i som expert

*!

Johni betraktar honomi som expert

*!

Johni betraktar [honom själv]i som expert

**!

Table 7.4: Johni betraktar PRONi som expert The explanation given by Kiparsky for the ability of defend-type verbs to take object pronouns that are [−OBV] although they have the same referential index as a coargument differs from the one given by Reinhart and Reuland (1993). On the one hand, Kiparsky follows Hellan (1988) (and Reinhart and Reuland 1993) in assuming that ‘defend-type reflexives must have a dual argument structure, transitive and intransitive’ (Kiparsky 2002:213). However, he comes to the conclusion that this fact cannot account for the occurrence of SE-anaphors in direct object positions: ‘[…] defend-type verbs probably have both a transitive and an intransitive variant, but the reflexive form of both is exempt from Obviation’ (Kiparsky 2002:213). He therefore assumes that ‘the special property of defend-type verbs is that their objects are inherently proximate’. But how is it possible for obviative/referential pronouns to occur in those positions, then, i.e. why are sentences of the form Hani försvarade honomj ‘Hei defended himj’ well-formed? Assuming that defend-type verbs specify their objects as inherently proximate, such sentences should be expected to be either ungrammatical, or they should be interpreted reflexively. Do we have to assume that the transitive variants of defend-type verbs are, again, sub-classified in the lexicon, so that there are ultimately three different entries for that verb?

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The second problem mentioned above concerns the lexical content of själv. Why and how should själv turn an obviative pronoun into a proximate one? Kiparsky writes: Själv is a pronominal operator which excludes other contextually determined or implicit entities […]. In the combinations sig själv and honom själv, the effect of själv is to negate Obviation. Sidestepping the interesting question how to derive this function of själv from its emphatic meaning, we can think of it as having inherently the feature [−obviative], which it adds to sig and honom (while leaving all their properties intact, including the [+anaphor] feature of sig). (Kiparsky 2002:190f.) We will no longer sidestep the question of why själv ‘negates obviation’, and we will address this issue in the next section. I will argue that the occurrence of SELF-forms in the context of co-argument reflexivity can straightforwardly be explained if we assume that själv, like its cognates in other Germanic languages, denotes the identity function ID. I will also propose some modifications to Kiparsky’s theory, which allow us to dispense with the assumption that defend-type verbs have two lexical entries. 7.7 Reflexive-marking and the identity function In the analysis to be presented in this section I will adopt some of the proposals made by Kiparsky (2002), including his classification of pronouns with regard to referential (in)dependence displayed in Table 7.7 (p. 181), and some of his constraints listed in (p. 183). I will modify Kiparsky’s account in three respects: first, I will not regard pronouns as being specified with regard to any feature relating to obviation or reflexivemarking. I will show that the [±OBV]-feature can be dispensed with if Dutch zelf and the corresponding SELF-forms of other languages are analysed as expressions of an identity function. Second, I will classify predicates into ‘typically self-directed’ and ‘typically other-directed predicates’, a distinction adopted from König and Siemund (2000b) (cf. also König and Vezzosi 2003; Zribi-Hertz 2003). And finally, I will propose a constraint relating to the interpretation of co-arguments which is slightly different from the one proposed by Kiparsky. This constraint is sensitive to the distributional class of the relevant predicate (typically self- or other-directed). In the discussion to follow, we will mainly be concerned with Dutch, but in Chapter 8 the analysis will be applied to other Germanic languages as well. 7.7.1 The pronouns of Dutch Dutch has a referentially dependent anaphor zich, which is more local than Swedish sig. It cannot refer back to an antecedent from outside the minimal IP, i.e. it qualifies as [+LOCAL], in Kiparsky’s classification. More explicitly, zich can be specified as [+RDEP[+REFL[+FIN-BOUND[+LOCAL]]]]. illustrates that binding from outside the IP is impossible in Dutch, unlike in Swedish, where this configuration is available (cf. from Kiparsky 2002:189).

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Dutch Ricei

roept

Syriëj

op

zich*i/j

niet

te

isoleren.

Rice

calls

Syria

on

ANPH

not

to

isolate

‘Ricei calls on Syriaj not to isolate itselfj/*heri.’ Swedish Generaleni

tvingade

översten

att

hjälpa

sigi.

the general

forced

the colonel

to

help

ANPH

‘The generali forced the colonel to help himi.’

Besides the anaphor zich, Dutch has a series of simple (third person singular) object pronouns hem, haar and het/er, which are referentially independent. Neuter het is used in object positions while er occurs in combination with prepositions, preceding these (e.g. er-in ‘in it’). The inventory of Dutch pronouns is summarized in Table 7.5.134 I regard the referentiality feature [±R-DEP] as a syntactic feature. It determines whether a given DP bears a lexical index of its own or not. Nominals with the specification [−R-DEP] have an index corresponding to some individual Nominals that are marked as being [+R-DEP] do not receive an index of their own; they are assigned an index from an antecedent which is within the domain corresponding to their degree of referential (in)dependence as specified by the [±R-DEP]-feature. The rules determining the referential indexation of nominals are given in accordance with the characterization given by Kiparsky (cf. Reuland 2001:447 for a similar treatment).135

These rules are in above; see also

a. Referential ([−R-DEP]) DPs bear a lexical index corresponding to some individual b. Referentially dependent but non-reflexive ([+R-DEP [−REFL]]) pronouns receive an index from some previously mentioned discourse participant. c. Referentially dependent and reflexive ([+R-DEP [+REFL]]) pronouns receive an index via syntactic binding from an appropriate c-commanding antecedent

pron.

features

zich

[+LOCAL]

hem

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +OBJ]

haar

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +OBJ]

het/er

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +OBJ]

Table 7.5: 3SG-pronouns of Dutch

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If a non-referential DP receives its referential index via syntactic binding, I will say that it ‘inherits’ the referential index of its binder. Inherited indices will be put in parentheses (for example, zich(i)). The distinction between ‘lexical’ indices and ‘inherited’ indices only has a heuristic status and is made for matters of representation and textual crossreference. Theoretically, both kinds of indices are indistinguishable, differing only in the way they have been assigned. To illustrate the process of ‘index-inheritance’ with an The DP Jan is classified as [−R-DEP] and consequently bears a example, consider while the anaphor zich (syntactically) lexical index i corresponding to some inherits its index from Jani. Jani

wast

zich(i).

Jan

washes

ANPH

‘Jan washes.’

Zelf is taken to denote the identity function ID. Unlike intensifying SELF, reflexive SELF is not necessarily in focus. Zichzelf is not regarded as a monomorphemic lexical item, but as the identity function ID, applied to the anaphor zich

136

Likewise,

hemzelf is interpreted as

7.7.2 [+OD]- and [−OD]-predicates One of the central aspects of the analysis advocated here is a classification of transitive verbs into ‘typically other-directed’ verbs on the one hand (‘OD-verbs’, for short), and ‘typically self-directed’ verbs on the other (‘SD-verbs’). OD-verbs denote actions that are typically performed on others, while SD-actions are typically performed on oneself (cf. König and Siemund 2000a). Note that (unlike König and Siemund) I regard the two types of predicates as forming distributional classes, not purely semantic ones. OD-verbs can simply be defined as those verbs that do not allow co-argument-bound zich in an object position, whereas SD-verbs do allow this configuration. Some Dutch representatives of each type are listed in

(cf. Donaldson 1997:203ff.).

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206

a. OD-VERBS aangrijpen ‘attack’, afranselen ‘beat’, haten ‘to hate’, kennen ‘to know’, lachen in ‘to laugh about’, praten met ‘to talk to’, praten over ‘to talk about’, zorgen voor ‘to care for’ b. SD-VERBS aankleden ‘to dress’, amuseren ‘to amuse’, bewegen ‘to move’, omdraaien ‘to turn around’, omkleden ‘to change o.’s clothes’, overeten ‘to overeat’, scheren ‘to shave’, uitkleden ‘to get undressed’, verbergen ‘to hide’, verdedigen ‘to defend’, verkleden ‘to masquerade’, wassen ‘wash’

As pointed out above, I regard OD-predicates and SD-predicates as distributional classes, not as semantic ones. Still, the composition of these classes is, on the whole, semantically motivated. This does not mean that every single predicate forming part of one of the two classes will exhibit the ‘appropriate’ semantics. For example, zorgen voor ‘to care for’ may be argued as belonging to those predicates that are ‘typically self-directed’ semantically, but it behaves like an OD-predicate in distributional terms, since a sentence like

is semantically deviant (though probably not ungrammatical): ?Jan

zorgt

voor

zich.

Jan

cares

for

ANPH

int.: ‘Jan takes care of himself.’

Such ‘exceptions’—if they are exceptions, that is—can regularly be found in semantically motivated distributional classes. Singular mismatches of this type are probably most notorious in gender categories. For example, most of the Latin nouns ending in -a in the nominative singular have feminine gender, but the noun poeta ‘poet’ usually refers to men. Similarly, neuter gender in Indo-European is generally restricted to inanimate entities, but there are also exceptions, like the German (neuter) noun Mädchen ‘girl’, which was originally the diminutive form of the noun Maid (diminutives always have neuter gender in German). The distinction between OD-predicates and SD-predicates can be used to refine Farmer and Harnish’s ‘disjoint reference presumption’ (DRP), which says that ‘the arguments of a predicate are intended to be disjoint, unless marked otherwise’ (Farmer and Harnish 1987:557; cf. Section 7.4 of this study). The DRP is meant to qualify as a functional motivation underlying certain grammaticalization paths in the domain of reflexivity (cf. Levinson 1991; Comrie 1999; for more general approaches to ‘functional motivation’ of linguistic structure, cf. Haspelmath 1999, 2004; Croft 2000, 2003, forthcoming). However, the DRP is clearly insufficient as the basis of a functional explanation, since the expectation that co-arguments should have disjoint reference only holds for a specific class of predicates—namely, for typically other-directed predicates. For typically self-directed predicates, the opposite assumption has to be made, since

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207

actions like washing and shaving are stereotypically performed on oneself. We could say that these predicates are associated with a ‘presumption of co-reference’. If we assume that Farmer and Harnish’s DRP will manifest itself as a syntactic principle in grammars, we should thus expect that it will show up only in the context of typically other-directed predicates, and this is precisely what the distinction between OD-verbs and SD-verbs captures. König and Vezzosi (2003) have shown that the differentiation between OD-predicates and SD-predicates is relevant to a number of grammatical phenomena, both crosslinguistically and language-internally. One of the most striking grammatical manifestations of this differentiation is of course the fact that in languages like Dutch (though not in all Germanic languages), only SD-verbs may take an anaphor (zich) as an object. However, there are further parts of grammar where this distinction plays a role. For example, the (default) interpretation of the implied argument in nominalizations and infinitives crucially depends on whether the nominalized verb is an SD-verb or an ODverb. Consider the examples in Reuland 1993:666).

and

(cf. also Kiparsky 2002:213; Reinhart and

Dutch a.

Wassen

is

gezond.

Wash

is

healthy.

‘Washing (oneself) is healthy.’ b.

Haten

is

niet

gezond.

hate

is

not

healthy.

‘To hate (others) is not healthy.’ English a.

John’s defence was good. (John defended himself)

b.

John’s attack was good. (John attacked someone else)

Moreover, the interpretation of SE-anaphors with plural antecedents is intimately related to the OD/SD-distinction in many languages. With OD-verbs, SE-anaphors are typically interpreted as markers of reciprocity (if this interpretation is possible), while reciprocal interpretations of SE-anaphors with SD-verbs require special marking. The German examples in a. Die

illustrating this fact are given by König and Vezzosi (2003).137 beiden

meiden/

duzen

/bekriegen/

The grammar of identity the

both

avoid

helfen

sich.

help

ANPH

208

address informally

are at war with

(typically other-directed/reciprocal) b. Die

Spieler

denken

viel

über

sich

nach/

bereiten

sich

the

players

think

much

about

ANPH

PTCL

prepare

ANPH

gut

vor.

well

PTCL

(typically self-directed/reflexive)

The distinction between SD-predicates and OD-predicates obviously has a different status in different grammars. For example, in German it merely represents a tendency concerning the interpretation of anaphors and nominalizations, while in Dutch it must be regarded as the basis of a lexico-grammatical categorization of verbs. Such variation will be accounted for in terms of different constraint rankings below (Chapter 8). In the following, I will use a binary (syntactic) parameter [±OD] to distinguish between OD-verbs and SD-verbs. Dutch verbs are regarded as being specified in the lexicon as either [+OD] for typically other-directed verbs, or [−OD] for verbs that are not typically other-directed. The [−OD]-class also subsumes the semantically ‘neutral’ predicates, i.e. predicates that do not show any tendency towards either a reflexive or a non-reflexive interpretation. It should be noted that, unlike in the frameworks of Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and Kiparsky (2002), [−OD]-verbs like wassen are not taken to be listed twice in the lexicon. There is only one entry, and this entry contains the feature [−OD] (cf. ). wassen

v. [−OD]…

haten

v. [+OD]…

Reflexivity and the identity function

209

7.7.3 The reflexivity constraints of Dutch The relevance of the [±OD]-feature to the grammar of reflexivity in Dutch will be captured by the constraint in I will refer to this constraint as *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING (*ODBIND, for short). *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING/*ODBIND The complements of an [+OD]-predicate P may not be bound by the subject of P.

In addition to *ODBIND, I will adopt the four constraints in from Kiparsky (2002:187). I do not take Kiparsky’s constraint PROX into consideration, since I am not primarily concerned with the interpretation of pronouns (bound variable vs. co-referential reading). a. BINDING DOMAIN/BINDOM: a pronoun has a compatible antecedent in a designated domain D. b. FEATURAL ECONOMY/FEC: avoid pronominals. c. MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY/MEC: avoid morphologically complex pronouns. d. PARSE: the output is not empty.

My ranking of the constraints (for Dutch and Scandinavian) slightly differs from the one assumed by Kiparsky (for Scandinavian): unlike Kiparsky, I do not rank the two economy constraints equally: FEATURAL ECONOMY ranges higher than MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY. The ranking for Dutch is given in PARSE will be disregarded in the following).

We can now consider some examples, starting with the input in Jani

haat

PRON(i).

Jani

hates

PRON(i)

(again,

The grammar of identity

210

We have four candidates: the anaphor zich, the pronominal hem, and the two complex forms zichzelf (=ID(zich)) and hemzelf (=ID(hem)). The evaluation of the input specified is given in Table 7.6. The anaphor zich violates *ODBIND: objects of [+OD]-verbs cannot be bound by co-arguments. The same constraint rules out hem.138 Hemzelf violates both economy constraints. Zichzelf is the optimal candidate because it violates only the constraint of MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY. Why should this be so? In order to understand this, we have to take a closer look at the syntax and semantics of the sentence Jani haat in

Jani haat PRON(i)

BD

*ODBIND

Jani haat zich(i)

*!

Jani haat hem(i)

*!

FEC

MEC

*

Jani haat zich(i)zelf

*

Jani haat hem(i)zelf

*!

*

Table 7.6: Jani haat PRON(i) [zich(i)zelf]. Zelf is analysed as denoting the identity function ID, so zichzelf is interpreted as ID(zich). Accordingly, zichzelf must be regarded as a branching DP, made up of the identity function—lexically represented as zelf—and the anaphor zich (cf. Section 7.3). The syntactic and semantic structure of zichzelf is shown in Figure 7.8. Semantically, zich is represented as a free variable (cf. the right-hand side of Figure 7.8).

Figure 7.8: The structure of zichzelf The DP zichzelf can refer to the same individual as the local subject without violating because zichzelf is not bound by Jan. It is the anaphor zich that is *ODBIND in bound by Jan, and zich is not a co-argument of Jan, so *ODBIND is not violated. The syntactic and semantic position of zich corresponds to the determiner position of a DP, i.e. to the position of his in a sentence like Johni is washing [his(i) car]. Here, his is not a co-argument of John either. Furthermore, the specifier position of the object DP is not only potentially, but even typically, taken by elements that are bound by the local subject. Consequently, a reflexive interpretation of pronouns in this position is not only licensed,

Reflexivity and the identity function

211

it is even preferred (cf. Jayaseelan 1997 and Section 1.5.2 of this study). According to this analysis, a sentence like Jan haat zichzelf is interpreted (more or less) as Jani hates his(i) self (cf. Safir 1996 for a similar argument).

Figure 7.9: Jan haat zichzelf The syntactic structure of the sentence Jani haat zich(i)zelf is shown in Figure 7.9. The straight arrow indicates the process of binding by which zich(i) (syntactically) inherits its referential index from Jani. The object of the verb form haat (DP1j) has a lexical index of its own (j), and is consequently not bound by Jan. Since zelf denotes the identity function, however, and since its argument zich is bound by Jan, thus inheriting the index i, DP1 will nevertheless be interpreted as referring to Jan. The contribution made by zelf to the interpretation of DP1 is to indicate that the referential indices of DP1 and DP2 are identical (i=j). The analysis of SELF in reflexive contexts put forward here is of course similar to the ones offered by Jayaseelan (1997) and Reuland (2001), which were discussed in Sections 1.5.2 and 7.3. Like Reuland, I claim that co-indexation of Jan and zich (zelf) is achieved through a ‘trick’: instead of passing the index

Jani wast PRON(i)

BD

*ODBIND

FEC

MEC

Jani wast zich(i) Jani wast hem(i)

*!

Jani wast zich(i)zelf Jani wast hem(i)zelf

Table 7.7: Jani wast PRON(i)

*! *!

*

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212

i from Jan to DP1 via syntactic binding, which is prohibited by *ODBIND, the grammar takes the roundabout-way via zich in the specifier position of the object-DP in order not to violate that constraint. Let us now turn to [−OD]-verbs. These verbs do not impose any restriction on co-argument binding. Thus, zich can be used without violating any constraint, and it must be used because of its economical nature. This is shown in Table 7.7 for the input given in Jan

wast

PRON(i).

Jan

washes

PRON

Some words should be said about why Jan wast zichzelf is ruled out, even though this is clearly a good Dutch sentence. The point is that Jan wast zichzelf corresponds to a different input: it would be used if emphasis were desired, i.e., if the object pronoun were intensified. In other words, Jan wast zichzelf would be delivered by the input Jani wast IDF(zich), with the identity function in focus, thus functioning as an intensifier. As far as the object positions of transitive verbs are concerned, the model put forward in this section thus delivers the desired results. But what about the other structures under discussion? Let us have a look at co-participant reflexives, considering the input given in The tableau corresponding to this input is provided in Table 7.8. Jani

zette

de

vaas

voor

PRON(i)

neer.

Jani

put

the

vase

before

PRON(i)

down

As in Table 7.7, zich is optimal because it does not violate any constraint. The other candidates are uneconomical with regard to either morphology or feature specification (or both). Sentences involving exceptional case marking (ECM) and raising-constructions will also deliver zich: zich is optimal simply because there is nothing which prevents it from being used, and since it should be used whenever this is possible because of its economical nature. There are only two reasons justifying the use of a pronoun other than zich: (i) the input requires a pronoun that functions as a direct object of a [+OD]-verb, or (ii) zich cannot be used because it is too distant from its antecedent, thus violating BINDING DOMAIN. In the first case, zichzelf is used instead of zich; in the second case, a referential pronoun (hem, haar, etc.) is inserted.139 An example of an which is evaluated in Table 7.9 (this example has ECM-structure is given in repeatedly been used by Eric Reuland).

Reflexivity and the identity function

Jani zette de vaas voor PRON(i) neer

BD

213

*ODBIND

FEC

MEC

Jani zette de vaas voor zich(i) neer Jani zette de vaas voor hem(i) neer

*!

Jani zette de vaas voor zich(i)zelf neer

*!

Jani zette de vaas voor hem(i)zelf neer

*!

*

Table 7.8: Jani zette de vaas voor PRON(i) neer Jan

voelde

PRON(i)

wegglijden.

Jan

felt

PRON

slip

Table 7.9 shows the same pattern as Table 7.8. *ODBIND is not relevant because Jan and zich are not semantic co-arguments. Consequently, nothing prevents zich from being used, and since it is the most economical expression at hand, it is preferred to the alternative pronouns hem(zelf) and zichzelf. 7.8 Summary In this chapter, I have aimed to elucidate the role of the identity function in the encoding of reflexivity. We started with an overview of the typology of reflexive markers, and briefly recapitulated two of the most influential theories dealing with the distribution of pronouns (Sections 7.1 and 7.2). In Section 7.3, two attempts at analysing the SELFcomponent of anaphors as an element expressing identity were considered: Reinhart and Reuland (1991) and Browning (1993) have tried to analyse SELF as a two-place predicate of identity, while Reuland (2001) has analysed SELF as the identity function

Jani zette de vaas voor PRON(i) neer

BINDOM

*ODBIND

FEC

MEC

Jani voelde zich(i) wegglijden Jani voelde hem(i) wegglijden

*!

Jani voelde zich(i)zelf wegglijden Jani voelde hem(i) zelf wegglijden

Table 7.9: Jani voelde PRON(i) wegglijden

*! *!

*

The grammar of identity

214

ID, calling the resulting self-forms ‘protective SELF’ (cf. also Safir 1996; Jayaseelan 1997). The proposal made by Reinhart and Reuland (1991) and Browning (1993) was rejected for reasons of general incompatibility with our assumptions about the composition of meaning, but much credit was given to Reuland’s (2001) analysis. We then briefly discussed the genesis of output-oriented analyses of reflexivity phenomena in Sections 7.4 and 7.5, and we outlined the theory developed by Kiparsky (2002) in Section 7.6. The approach advocated in the present study was put forward in Section 7.7. Kiparsky’s model was modified in several respects. At the heart of the present proposal is the idea that predicates are classified into typically self-directed ([−OD]) and typically other-directed predicates ([+OD]), a distinction adopted from König and Siemund (2000a) and König and Vezzosi (2003). It was argued that there is a constraint preventing the objects of [+OD]-predicates from being bound by their co-arguments. This constraint was argued to represent an instance of a functional motivation of syntactic structure, i.e. a process in which grammar is shaped by language use. The role of the identity function in the grammar of reflexivity consists in preventing a violation of this constraint. If an intensifier combines with the plain object pronouns, it is not the anaphor itself that occupies the object position of a transitive predicate, but the identity function, applied to that pronoun. The pronoun occurs in a position corresponding to the specifier of a DP, where it may be bound by a local antecedent.

8 The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages There are two variables built into the model proposed in Chapter 7 that allow us to account for cross-linguistic variation. The first of these is intrinsic to Optimality Theory: while it is assumed that constraints are universal, the ranking of the constraints may be language-particular. This puts us in a position to derive a certain amount of crosslinguistic variation from a re-ranking of constraints. The second variable included in the present model concerns the feature specification of the pronouns: languages have different pronominal paradigms. In interaction with the various constraints determining the distribution of pronouns (e.g. economy constraints), this leads to different output conditions as well. In this chapter the approach developed in Chapter 7 will be applied to some major contemporary Germanic languages, in addition to the ones already discussed in Chapter 7. We will start in with Scandinavian languages in Section 8.1. Some contrasts between Mainland and Insular Scandinavian languages will be discussed, and some subtle differences between Faroese and Icelandic will be pointed out in the context of ECMstructures. Section 8.2 is dedicated to Continental West Germanic languages, against the background of the analysis of Dutch presented in Section 7.7. German differs from Dutch in that the constraint of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING is ranked lower than the economy constraints. Frisian as well as Afrikaans are shown to be special in not having SE-anaphors: hence, the only choice is between plain pronouns and SELF-pronouns. An analysis of reflexive self-forms in English is provided in Section 8.3. Unlike in the other languages discussed in this chapter, these forms cannot easily be analysed in a fully compositional way, and I will propose that specific types of self-forms should be regarded as being semantically complex, even though they appear to be monomorphemic from a purely distributional point of view. This argument is based on the historical development of self-forms. Section 8.4 provides an overview of the different systems of reflexive-marking considered in this study. It is shown that the Germanic languages can be classified in terms of reflexive-marking along two parameters: (i) the presence vs. absence of SE-anaphors, and (ii) the relative ranking of *ODBIND and the economyconstraints.

The grammar of identity

216

8.1 Reflexivity in Scandinavian languages 8.1.1 Mainland Scandinavian The reflexivity system of Swedish was discussed quite comprehensively when we considered Kiparsky’s (2002) reflexivity framework in Section 7.6. As was argued there, the Swedish anaphor sig is [+FIN-BOUND], i.e. it requires an antecedent within the same finite clause, but the antecedent may be situated outside the minimal IP if this IP is nonfinite. An example illustrating this is repeated in

and a parallel example from

Danish is given in Swedish Generaleni

tvingade

översten

att

hjälpa

sigi.

the general

forced

the colonel

to

help

ANPH

‘The generali forced the colonel to help himi.’ (Kiparsky 2002:189) Danish Peteri

bad

mig

barbere

sigi.

Peter

asked

me

to shave

ANPH

‘Peter asked me to shave him.’ (Bergeton 2004:117)

The other Scandinavian languages have anaphors with basically the same syntactic properties. Table 8.1 provides an overview of (partial) paradigms of the most important Mainland Scandinavian languages. Like in Dutch, the verbs of Mainland Scandinavian can be categorized into [+OD](cf. also and [−OD]-verbs. Some Danish examples from both groups are given in Bergeton 2004:146ff., who distinguishes between three distributional types). The constraint ranking for Mainland Scandinavian can be assumed to be as in (disregarding PARSE). Danish a. [+OD]-verbs: mistœnke ‘suspect’, misunde ‘envy’, etc. b. [−OD]-verbs: dukke ‘duck’, skamme ‘be ashamed of’, forsvare ‘defend’, vaske ‘wash’, etc.

The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages

217

Swedish New Norw.

D.-Norw.

Danish

feature specifications

sig

seg

seg

sig

[+FINITE-BOUND]

honom

honom

ham

ham

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +OBJ]

henne

henne

henne

hende

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +OBJ]

det

det

det

det

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +OBJ]

Table 8.1: 3SG-pronouns of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish

We will now consider some examples from Norwegian. As in Swedish, the anaphor seg and its antecedent are always both situated within the same finite IP, i.e. seg may be bound by an antecedent from a higher IP only if the closest IP is non-finite. This is and for Dano-Norwegian in illustrated for New Norwegian in that binding from outside a finite IP-node is not possible.

illustrates

New Norwegian Joni

freista IP[−FIN]

å

få

Jon

tried

to make

henne

til

å

tala

vent

om

segi].

her

PREP

to say

nice

about

ANPH

‘Joni tried to make her say something nice about himi.’ (Askedal 1994:251)

Dano-Norwegian Joni

ba

meg

om [IP[−FIN]

å

snakke

om

segi].

Jon

asked

me

PREP

to

talk

about

ANPH

‘Joni asked me to talk about himi.’ (Hellan 1991:29)

*Joni

var

ikke

klar over [IP[+FIN]

at

vi

hadde

snakket om

segi].

Jon

was

not

aware

that

we

had

talked about

ANPH

int.: ‘Joni was not aware that we had talked about himi.’ (Hellan 1991:31)

As in Swedish, the Norwegian SELF-forms are either used to prevent a violation of *ODBIND, or for the sake of contrast. In the latter case, they function as intensifiers, i.e.

The grammar of identity

218

the resulting structure corresponds to a different semantic input. Consider the three sentences in Dano-Norwegian a.

?Hun

elsker

seg.

she

loves

ANPH.

b.

Hun [ELsker seg selv]F.

c.

Hun elsker [seg SELV]F.

is sub-optimal because the verb elske ‘to love’ is a [+OD]-verb, so cois the optimal candidate for the input ‘Shei argument binding is prohibited. loves PRONi’ because it does not violate *ODBIND, and because it is more economical in terms of its featural make-up than the corresponding sentence with corresponds to henne selv (which does not violate *ODBIND either). Finally, the input ‘Shei loves IDF(PRONi)’, which is reflected in the different stress pattern. Here, selv functions as an intensifies The evaluation of the input corresponding to is given in Table 8.2.

BD

*ODBIND

FEC

MEC

Huni elsker PRON(i) Huni elsker seg(i)

*!

Huni elsker henne(i)

*!

*

Huni elsker seg(i) selv

*

Huni elsker henne(i) selv

*!

*

Table 8.2: Huni elsker PRON(i) 8.1.2 Insular Scandinavian The pronominal inventories of Insular Scandinavian languages are very similar to those of Mainland Scandinavian languages (cf. Table 8.3 below). However, there are two significant differences. First, the relevant anaphors (Icelandic sig and Faroese seg) are referentially more independent than their Mainland Scandinavian counterparts. Under specific circumstances to be made more explicit below, they may refer back to an antecedent from a higher finite clause. Accordingly, they will be classified as [+REFLEXIVE] (again, indicating only the ‘minimal positive feature specification’). The

The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages

219

second difference is that Icelandic sig and Faroese seg have more elaborate case paradigms than their Mainland correlates.

Icelandic

Faroese

features

sig

seg

[+REFLEXIVE, +ACC]

sín

sín

[+REFLEXIVE, +GEN]

sér

sœr

[+REFLEXIVE, +DAT]

hann

hann

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +ACC]

hana

hon

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +ACC]

það

tað

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +ACC]

Table 8.3: 3SG-pronouns of Icelandic and Faroese Icelandic is special among the Germanic languages in so far as sjálf- commonly (though not necessarily; cf. Section 2.1) follows the anaphor sig. Therefore, the forms most often found in reflexive predications are sjálfa sig (FEM.SG.ACC) and sjálfan sig (MASC. SG.ACC; cf.

Faroese behaves like Mainland Scandinavian with respect to the order

of the anaphor and sjálv- (cf.

).

Icelandic Haraldur

talar

við

sjálfan

sig.

Harold

speaks

with

SELF.ACC

ANPH.ACC

‘Harold talks to himself.’ (Thráinsson 1994b:170) Faroese Jógvan

er

stoltur

av

sær

sjálvum.

Jógvan

is

proud

of

ANPH.DAT

SELF.DAT

‘Jógvan is proud of himself.’ (Barnes 1994:209)

The constraint ranking of Insular Scandinavian is identical to the one of Mainland Scandinavian (cf.

above). It is given in

The grammar of identity

220

In and SELF is used in order to prevent a violation of *ODBIND. This constraint does not play a role when the anaphor and its antecedent are not co-arguments, for instance in non-local contexts. Examples of non-finite-bound anaphors in Faroese and and respectively. Such occurrences of anaphors Icelandic are given in always require that the relevant sentence be ‘internally dependent’ or ‘logophoric’.140 In this respect, sig and seg behave like Latin se and Ancient Greek he (cf. Chapter 7, this sentence is ungrammatical.

p. 161). Given that this condition is not met in Faroese Guðruni

skilti

at

Martin

hevði

skrivað

eitt

bræv

til

Gudrun

understood

that

Martin

had

written

a

letter

to

síni. ANPH.GEN ‘Gudruni understood that Martin had written a letter to heri.’ (Thráinsson 1991:55)

Icelandic a.

Jóni

sagði

að

ég

hefði

svivið

sigi.

Jon

said

that

I

had

betrayed

ANPH

‘Joni said that I had betrayed himi.’ (Thráinsson 1991:55) b.

*Jóni

kemur

ekki

nema

Maria

kyssi

sigi.

Jon

comes

not

unless

Maria

kisses

ANPH

int.: ‘Jon will not come unless Maria kisses him.’ (Hellan 1991:37)

In order to accommodate these facts in the model presented in Chapter 7, we may have to refine our notion of ‘finiteness’. In particular, we may have to make a distinction between indicative and subjunctive mood. However, it is possible that we can do without this distinction. Given that in Germanic languages, non-finite-bound anaphors are always bound across an IP headed by a subjunctive INFL-node, all we have to do is assume that pronouns with the feature specification [+R-DEP[+REFL[−FIN-BOUND]]] always require an antecedent within the next higher indicative IP. It is an interesting question whether there is an intermediate type of pronoun between [−FIN-BOUND] and [−REFL], i.e. a pronoun that may be bound across an indicative finite IP but not from outside a CP. At least within the Germanic languages, such a pronoun does not seem to exist.

The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages

221

Let us now consider ECM-structures. These structures are particularly interesting in insular Scandinavian languages because they illustrate the way in which the sub-system of reflexivity interacts with other systems of the grammar, and because there is a contrast between Icelandic and Faroese. Consider the examples in

and

Icelandic *Maríu

fannst

sig

vera

gáfuð.

Maria.DAT

thought

ANPH

be

gifted

int.: ‘Maria thought she was gifted’ (Taraldsen 1996:200)

Faroese Maríu

tókti

seg

vera

klóka.

Maria.DAT

thought

ANPH

be

wise

‘Mary thought she was wise.’ (Taraldsen 1996:201)

On the face of it, the ungrammaticality of

(in Icelandic) is unexpected, while the

(in Faroese) is expected. According to the system presented in grammaticality of Chapter 7, the use of an anaphor should be possible in ECM-structures, since *ODBIND does not apply, and anaphors should be used because of their economical featural makeup. The problem with

is that oblique subjects assign nominative case to ECM-

is objects in Icelandic, while they assign accusative case in Faroese. Consequently, not ungrammatical because of illicit binding of sig, but because of the case clash produced by (accusative) sig in a position where nominative case is required. This clash cannot be remedied using a SELF-form, so the corresponding sentence with sjálfa(n) sig would be just as ungrammatical as

or even worse. The only way out of this case

conflict is to use a free pronoun which, unlike the anaphor, has a nominative form. is therefore grammatical. What we can learn from example

is that the constraint

ranges higher than FEATURAL ECONOMY, responsible for the case conflict in which is the only constraint barring hún from occurring in an ECM-structure. Icelandic Maríui

fannst

húni

vera

gáfuð.

Maria.DATi

thought

she.NOM

be

gifted

‘Maryi thought shei was gifted.’ (Taraldsen 1996:205)

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8.2 Reflexivity in Continental West Germanic and Afrikaans Given that the distribution of anaphors and pronominals in Dutch was already dealt with in Section 7.7, we will not consider it any further in this chapter, but occasional reference will be made to some relevant details. We will start with German in Section 8.2.1. Frisian and Afrikaans will be considered together in Section 8.2.2 because the two systems are largely parallel. These languages represent what we could call the ‘Low German’ pattern of reflexive marking, since it is very likely that Dutch showed similar distributional patterns of pronouns before it borrowed the anaphor zich from German. Interestingly, Afrikaans shows indications of a development that makes it very similar to English, which may be due to language contact. 8.2.1 German Among the Germanic languages considered in this study, German is special in so far as it has a feature which distinguishes it from all the other languages: namely, the constraint of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING is ranked lower than both economy-constraints. As a consequence, it is virtually without effect, and the anaphor sich can be used even if it is a co-argument of its antecedent in a [+OD]-context. The pronominal paradigm of German parallels those of Scandinavian languages and Dutch. In addition to the anaphor sich there is a series of object pronouns that are marked for person, gender and number. pronoun

features

sich

[+LOCAL]

ihn

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +ACC]

sie

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +ACC]

es

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +ACC]

Table 8.4: 3SG-pronouns of German The pronominal inventory or German is partially given in Table 8.4. Like Dutch zich, it cannot refer back to an German sich is classified as [+LOCAL]. As is shown in antecedent from a higher IP. gives the constraint ranking for German. *Hansi

bat

Maria,

sichi

zu

rasieren.

Hans

asked

Mary

ANPH

to

shave

int.: ‘John asked Mary to shave him.’

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Given that the constraint of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING is ranked very low in German, selbst is never obligatory in reflexive contexts. Moreover, the anaphor sich is used whenever this is compatible with its binding domain.

BD

FEC

MEC

*ODBIND

Hansi betrachtet PRON(i) Hansi betrachtet sich(i)

*

Hansi betrachtet ihn(i)

*!

Hansi betrachtet sich(i) selbst

* *!

Hansi betrachtet ihn(i) selbst

*!

*

Hansi sah eine Schlange neben PRON(i) Hansi sah eine Schlange neben sich(i) Hansi sah eine Schlange neben ihm(i)

*!

Hansi sah eine Schlange neben sich(i) selbst

*!

Hansi sah eine Schlange neben ihm(i) selbst

*!

*

Hansi bat Maria, PRON(i) nicht zu belügen …sich(i) nicht zu belügen

*!

…ihn(i) nicht zu belügen

*

…sich(i) selbst nicht zu belügen

*!

…ihn(i) selbst nicht zu belügen

*

*!

Table 8.5: Three German sentences Let us consider three sentences for illustration. The inputs shown in Table 8.5. a.

b. c.

are evaluated in

Hansi

betrachtet

PRON(i).

Hans

looks at

PRON

Hansi

sah

eine

Schlange

neben

PRON(i).

Hans

saw

a

snake

beside

PRON

Hansi

bat

Maria,

PRON(i)

nicht

zu

belügen.

Hans

asked

Maria

PRON

not

to

lie to

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represents an instance of a co-argument reflexive. The only constraint violated by sich is that of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING, which is the lowest-ranking one. All other pronouns violate at least one of the economy constraints. The same applies to the sich is used because it is the most co-participant reflexive illustrated in economical candidate of the pronouns under discussion. illustrates a sentence in which sich is excluded because the antecedent is outside the designated binding domain. Here, ihn is chosen because it violates only FEATURAL ECONOMY, while ihn selbst violates both FEATURAL ECONOMY and MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY. 8.2.2 Frisian and Afrikaans Frisian and Afrikaans are both particularly interesting for us because they have pronominal systems that are very similar to the Old English system. The data to be presented in this section will therefore help us understand the historical developments leading from Old English to Modern English in Section 8.3. The crucial difference between Frisian and Afrikaans on the one hand, and the languages considered so far on the other, is that the former do not have SE-anaphors. Consequently, there are no elements that are positively specified as referentially dependent ([+R-DEP]). Therefore, the constraint of FEATURAL ECONOMY does not apply. There is simply no contrast between pronominals and anaphors. BINDING DOMAIN is likewise without effect, since the simple pronouns of Frisian can always be used referentially. The highestranking constraint of Frisian and Afrikaans is *ODBIND. Like Dutch, both languages classify verbs into [+OD]-verbs and [−OD]-verbs, and [+OD]-verbs are subject to the constraint that their object may not be bound by a co-argument subject. Frisian

Afrikaans

features

him

hom

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +OBJ]

har

haar

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +OBJ]

it

dit

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +OBJ]

Table 8.6: 3SG-pronouns of Afrikaans and Frisian The pronouns of Frisian and Afrikaans are summarized in Table 8.6. The intensifiers sets (Frisian) and self (Afrikaans) adjoin freely to DPs, as does Dutch zelf. The ranking of the only constraints relevant to Frisian and Afrikaans is given in

Let us now consider the Frisian examples in

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225

Frisian a. b. c.

Jani

wasket

PRON(i).

Jan

washes

PRON

Jani

hatet

PRON(i).

Jan

hates

PRON

Jani

sette

de

faas

foar

PRON(i).

Jan

put

the

vase

in front of

PRON

delivers the output Jan wasket him because nothing prevents him from being bound by Jan, since *ODBIND is not violated (waskje is [−OD]).

*ODBIND

MEC

Jani wasket PRON(i) Jani wasket him(i) Jani wasket him(i)sels

*!

Jani hatet PRON(i) Jani hatet him(i)

*!

Jani hatet him(i)sels

*

Jani sette de faas foar PRON(i) Jani sette de faas foar him(i) Jani sette de faas foar him(i)sels

*!

Table 8.7: Three Frisian sentences The object of hatet (cf. ), by contrast, must be embedded under the identity function in order to prevent a violation of *ODBIND, since haatsje is not a [−OD]-verb. For the input in

the simple pronoun him can and must be used because of its

is summarized in Table 8.7. morphological economy. The evaluation of The pronominal system of Afrikaans is basically identical to the Frisian system. However, there is an increasing tendency to either add self to the plain object pronoun where it was formerly absent, or simply drop the pronoun. Donaldson (1993:291) writes: The reflexivity of verbs and their use with or without the compound pronoun in -self is something that is in a state of flux in Afrikaans with two strong tendencies current, both of them presumably the result of

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English influence: 1) the loss of the need for a reflexive pronoun at all […] 2) the use of the compound form in -self where historically it was not required or was even considered incorrect […] Donaldson (1993:291) provides the example in

to illustrate his first point, and that

to exemplify the second:

in a.

Toe

hoor

sy

iets

en

sy

draai

(haar)

om.

then

heard

she

something

and

she

turned

her

around

‘Then she heard a voice and she turned around.’ b. Hy

het

(hom

(-self))

ooreet.

he

has

him

SELF

overeaten

‘He’s overeaten.’

While haar in

was still required for the sentence to be grammatical not too long

there are ago, more recently pronoun-dropping has also become acceptable. In three alternative structures: first, the simple pronoun hom can be used. This is what we would expect in Frisian. Second, the pronoun can be dropped. This is basically what we would expect in English (cf. Section 8.3). And finally, -self can be added. A similar Whereas in former times example with a first person pronoun is given in was the only possible option—i.e. the verb skeer could only combine with a plain object and

pronoun— a.

b. c.

have recently become more common.

Ek

het

vanmore

vergeet

om

my

te

skeer.

I

have

this morning

forgotten

about

me

to

shave

Ek

het

vanmore

vergeet

om

te

skeer.

I

have

this morning

forgotten

about

to

shave

Ek

het

vanmore

vergeet

om

my-self

te

skeer.

I

have

this morning

forgotten

about

me-SELF

to

shave

‘I forgot to shave this morning.’

Again, of Frisian, and

would be delivered by a system of reflexive marking like the one corresponds to the English system, where the object pronoun

of [−OD]-verbs may be phonologically empty (cf. Section 8.3). The form in seems to be the result of a generalization of the use of SELF-forms from [+OD]-verbs to

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[−OD]-verbs. We could interpret this development as the disappearance of the distributional distinction between [+OD]- and [−OD]-verbs and, possibly, as the emergence of a referentially defective anaphor. The Frisian and Afrikaans data, apart from being interesting in themselves, are particularly useful for forming an understanding of what has happened in the development from Old English to Modern English. This question will figure centrally in the next section. 8.3 English self-forms as markers of reflexivity 8.3.1 On the status of synchronic and diachronic analyses In Chapter 7 and the preceding sections, I have argued that the distribution of pronouns in languages like Dutch, German and Frisian can be explained in terms of a relatively parsimonious lexicon of pronouns together with a set of ranked constraints which can be regarded as being well motivated from a functionalist point of view. We have assumed only two classes of pronouns, namely anaphors (e.g. Dutch zich, German sich, etc.) and free pronouns/pronominals (Dutch hem, German ihn, etc.). I have argued that intensifiers, interpreted as expressions of an identity function, can be used to form complex pronouns (zichzelf, hemzelf, etc.). The contribution made by the identity function to the interpretation of those pronouns is truth-conditionally trivial, but highly relevant from a structural point of view: the pronoun is shifted from the argument position into the specifier position of the object DP. In this position, it is not only allowed to be bound by the local subject, a co-referential or bound interpretation is even strongly preferred. The analysis put forward above is intended to offer an explanation for the twofold function of SELF as a marker of both intensification and reflexivity. Both functions can be expressed using a lexical item denoting the identity function. Depending on the specific component of grammar the identity function interacts with, it triggers different syntactic and semantic effects: it may cooperate with focus structure, thus relating a given referent to a set of alternative referents that are restricted in a certain way, and it may interact with rules relating to the interpretation of co-arguments, thus licensing reflexivity. Cross-linguistic variation in the domain of reflexivity has been accounted for by assuming differences in the pronominal inventories of the specific languages, and by re-ranking some of the relevant constraints. A description of the distribution of pronouns in English, and an answer to the question of why intensifiers and reflexives are formally identical in English, is more difficult to provide. The reason is that Modern English has a couple of rules that cannot easily be motivated in terms of a purely synchronic analysis, and that must probably be regarded as relics of earlier stages of the grammar.141 This makes it difficult to describe the English system in compositional terms. Historically, reflexive self-forms are also combinations of a pronoun and an intensifier (him+self). The strategy employed by English to encode reflexivity is thus similar if not identical to the strategies of Dutch and Frisian, and the role of the identity function in this strategy is likewise that of preventing the violation of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING. But in English, this strategy is not synchronically recoverable, since additional historical processes in both the lexicon and the syntax of

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English have blurred this interaction. Most importantly, a pronominal copy of the head DP has been incorporated into the intensifier (OE self vs. ModE him-self), so that self no longer has the status of an independent lexeme in Modern English. Furthermore, Old English had optional pro-drop of both reflexive and non-reflexive object pronouns. In Modern English, non-reflexive object pronouns can no longer be dropped, but bound pronouns in the object position of a specific class of verbs have disappeared (wash, shave, bathe, etc.). We will return to these points below. Taking into account such historical considerations is necessary not only with regard to the question of why reflexives and intensifiers are formally identical in English. There are some other rules of Modern English that require a historical explanation as well. Socalled ‘untriggered self-forms’ are a case in point.142 Examples of such self-forms are given in a. Hugo looked at his contemporaries, less clever than himself, and saw them outstrip him. [BNC C8S 1102] b. Again Karelius was painfully aware that ‘us’ excluded Moreau and himself. [BNC B20 1300]

Untriggered self-forms are so called because they are not syntactically required, and their occurrence is unexpected from the perspective of most theories dealing with the distribution of pronouns (cf. Section 7.2). Baker (1995) and König and Siemund (2000c) have shown that the distribution of these forms is determined by the same contextual conditions as the distribution of intensifiers. Untriggered self-forms are therefore analysed as intensifier constructions with incorporated or phonologically empty is interpreted as either pronominal heads. Accordingly, himself in himself] or [DP[DPhim]-self]. Such analyses, which can also be found in traditional English reference grammars (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985:359) are supported by comparative evidence: untriggered self-forms are usually translated as combinations of a pronoun and an intensifier into languages that distinguish formally between intensifiers and reflexives. and translates er selbst and ihn selbst, For example, himself in respectively, into German. The analysis of untriggered self-forms as intensifier constructions with empty or incorporated pronominal heads is difficult to motivate from a purely synchronic point of view. The problem is that self is not a productive morpheme of Modern English, and there is no independent evidence for the existence of some covert head in those constructions. However, if we take the historical development of self-forms into consideration, it becomes obvious why untriggered self-forms can be analysed as ‘headless’ intensifier constructions. In Old English, the intensifier self could freely adjoin to full DPs and pronouns, so we find both se cyning sylfa ‘the king himself’ (cf. Section 2.1) and he self ‘he himself’. In the course of the development of English, self was lost as an independent intensifier and fused with the object (originally the dative) pronouns to form the paradigm of intensifiers of Modern English. The formation of the complex intensifiers started out as an apposition-like construction of the kind exemplified in

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and König and Siemund (2000a:47) state that ‘[t]his process of incorporating a pronominal copy of a focus […] is in many ways analogous to the development of clitic doubling in Spanish (Lo ví al rey “I saw him the king”) or many Balkan languages’. a. godd him seolf ariseð ‘God himself ariseth’ [S.Warde 261] (c1200, quoted from Keenan 2002:339) b. Ne him self ne wente ‘nor himself didn’t go’ [King Horn] (c1225, quoted from Keenan 2002:341)

Pronoun doubling as in and was obviously redundant with object pronouns, so forms like *him him self were never formed, or at least not frequently enough to establish themselves as a part of English grammar. Thus, untriggered selfforms can be regarded as representing an older stage of the grammar of English: the incorporation of a pronominal copy into the intensifier has not taken place in this particular context. In Keenan’s (2002) words, this is an instance of ‘Inertia’. From a historical point of view, it is therefore justified to regard him as the pronominal head of untriggered self-forms, which combines with an intensifying suffix -self. A second aspect of English grammar which can probably best be accounted for in historical terms is the distribution of pronouns in the complement position of prepositions (the co-participant domain). Consider the examples in a. As it happens he was well able to look after himself in such matters. [BNC EDA 351] b. He dragged her after him until they stood over her father’s body. [BNC C8T 1843] c. Ten minutes later he left the tower, locking the door after him. [BNC C8T 1016] d. He closed the door after himself and walked over to the large fireplace where Dumbledore and McGonagall were standing, waiting for him. [www]143

All of the examples in include PPs headed by the preposition after and complemented by some pronoun which refers to the same individual as the local subject. In

the reflexive marker himself is obligatory if co-reference is intended. In the reflexive marker cannot be used, and the plain pronoun is the only option. In the simple pronoun him is fine, and we could also have used himself, preserving

grammaticality (cf.

).

While the contrast between on the one hand, and through on the other, is accounted for by both Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) and Kiparsky’s (2002) theory, the impossibility of using himself in

is somewhat mysterious. As a general

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tendency, self-forms seem to be possible in the complement position of prepositions only if the relevant pronoun could be replaced with some other DP (cf. Kiparsky 2002:215f. for this generalization).144 Further instances of prepositional adjuncts in which self-forms are disallowed are given in The crucial point seems to be that a contrast between the referents mentioned and possible alternative values is not even conceivable: John cannot have friends around or leave his family behind someone else. a.

John has many friends around him/*himself.

b.

John left his family behind him/*himself. (Kiparsky 2002:215)

It is remarkable that himself is excluded in examples like and because selfforms are not necessarily contrastive. Why should a grammar be sensitive to the question of whether the nominal in question could have contrasted with some other discourse participant? This is a pragmatic, rather than semantic or syntactic, question, and grammars are usually indifferent to such hypothetical issues. Kiparsky (2002:216) therefore assumes that ‘[t]his is a remnant in Modern English of the much wider proximate use of the pronominals in Old and Middle English’—again, an instance of ‘Inertia’, using Keenan’s (2002) term. Likewise, König and Siemund (2000a) hold the view that ‘[i]n contexts such as these the old situation prevails’: simple pronouns were used in a wide variety of contexts, while self-forms had a rather limited range of application. They were basically restricted to positions in which emphasis or contrast was expressed. Later, these forms could also be used without a contrastive component (e.g. John HATES himself), but in positions in which contrast was impossible for pragmatic reasons, self-forms were never introduced into the grammar of English. Let us now return the central issue of this chapter, viz. the question of the formal identity of intensifiers and reflexives, and the role of the identity function in the encoding of reflexivity. Consider

and

a.

John himself likes him.

b.

John likes himself.

The self-forms in and are morphologically indistinguishable. However, they are clearly different in terms of their combinatorial properties: while himself in denotes a function from individuals to individuals, himself in stands for an individual and is thus of type e. From a synchronic point of view, we have to assume two It is not possible lexical entries for the two instances of self-forms exemplified in to regard the encoding of reflexivity as a result of the interaction between an intensifier and a simple pronoun, as it was shown to be for Scandinavian languages and Dutch above. The link between reflexive and intensifying self-forms in English can only be understood from a diachronic perspective. We will therefore briefly consider the

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historical development of reflexives in English, which is more illuminating than a purely synchronic analysis in several respects, and which will help us understand why self, interpreted as the identity function, came to be used in the context of reflexivity. 8.3.2 The historical development of reflexives in English The historical development of English self-forms is well-documented and, as far as the major coordinates are concerned, relatively uncontroversial. In the present section, only the most important facts will be outlined. For more information the reader is referred to the comprehensive overviews provided by Keenan (1996, 2002), König and Siemund (2000c), and van Gelderen (2000), from which I draw most of the relevant information.

he

pronouns

heo

CASE

hit

him

NOM

PERS.NUMBER GENDER

hire

him

hine

DAT

3SG

3SG

3SG

3SG

MASC

FEM

NEUT

MASC

3SG

heo

hit

ACC 3SG

FEM NEUT

3SG MASC

3SG

3SG

FEM NEUT

Table 8.8: 3SG-pronouns of Old English Old English had only one paradigm of simple pronouns, and in this respect was considerably similar to Frisian (cf. Section 8.2.2). The inventory of Old English third person pronouns is summarized in Table 8.8. Since the forms listed in Table 8.8 were the only anaphoric (i.e. non-deictic) pronouns of Old English, they covered a wide range of contexts. We can distinguish between at least four major use types of simple pronouns: (i) referential/non-reflexive, (ii) referential/reflexive, (iii) non-referential, and (iv) pleonastic occurrences. According to Keenan (2002:331), pleonastic pronouns are often used to express ‘involvement’. Examples of each use type are provided in a. referential/non-reflexive Ne

sohte

not sought

ic na

hine,

ac

he

sylf

com

to me.

I

him

but

he

himself

came

to me.

not

‘I did not seek him, he himself came to me.’ [ÆLS.III.1.445] (quoted from Keenan 2002:336) b. referential/reflexive …

hweðer

hei

hinei

gefreclsian wolde

whether

he

him

set free

would

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‘…whether he would set himself free.’ [BlHom III.29] (c971, quoted from Keenan 2002:331) c. non-referential …

hei hynei

ac

but he

gewyrpte

him

recovered

‘but he recovered.’ [Beo 2976] (quoted from van Gelderen 2000:36) d. pleonastic …

him

for ðæm

hi

ondrædað

because

they them fear

ða

frecenesse ðe

the

danger

hi

ne

that they not

gesioð see ‘…because they fear the danger that they do not see.’ (lit.: ‘…theyi fear themi…’) [PastCa 433] (c880, quoted from Keenan 2002:332)

As was outlined above in the context of untriggered self-forms, the intensifier self/seolf/sylf could freely adjoin to both lexical DPs and pronouns (heo self in the nominative, hine self-ne in the accusative, etc.). Combinations of a free pronoun and a SELF-form were often used in the context of unexpected co-reference. Relevant examples are given in a.

(from König and Siemund 2000a).

se

Hælende

sealde

hine

selfne

for

us

the

Saviour

gave

him

INT.ACC

for

us

‘The Saviour gave himself for us.’ [ÆLet 4 1129] b.

Hannibal…

hine

selfne

mid

atre

acwealde

Hannibal

him

INT.ACC

with

poison

killed

‘Hannibal killed himself with poison.’ [Or 4 11.110.2]

The occurrence of SELF-forms in the context of verbs where co-reference is unexpected—i.e. in the context of typically other-directed verbs—is not particularly surprising, and reminds us of the situation found in Scandinavian languages and Dutch (cf. Chapter 7). However, it is not entirely clear whether the use of self in combination with bound object pronouns was always optional in Old English, or whether there was a certain class of verbs that categorically required self if the object was to be interpreted reflexively. Farr (1905:25) states that there is such a class of verbs—verbs of bodily harm—whose object pronouns are always accompanied by a SELF-form if co-reference with the local subject is intended. According to Keenan (1996:12), this class comprises the verbs listed in

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ācwellan ‘kill’, āhōn ‘hang’, fordōn ‘destroy’, forseon ‘scorn, renounce’, ‘cure, castrate’, ofslēan ‘slay’, (ge)swencan ‘afflict, oppress’, (ge)þrēagan ‘threaten, torture’

For want of negative evidence, it is of course impossible to decide whether the verbs merely show a strong tendency to require self for a reflexive reading of listed in their object pronouns—a tendency which is so strong that not even a single counterexample can be found in the corpora of Old English—or whether there was a syntactic rule disallowing binding of the object pronoun by the local subject. were syntactically barred from taking bound object Assuming that the verbs in pronouns, the Old English system must have been considerably similar to that of Frisian: there was only one class of simple pronouns, and these pronouns were used in all kinds of contexts. However, the object pronouns of a certain class of verbs could not be bound by the local subject, so that SELF-forms—expressions denoting the identity function—were used to ‘move’ the object pronouns into the specifier position of the object DP, where binding was allowed. However, even if we assume that the verbs in prohibited local binding, there is still a crucial difference between Old English and Frisian: Old English made extensive use of pro-drop (cf. van Gelderen 2000: chapter 3; Ohlander 1943), which was possible with both reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns. In

a reflexive object pronoun is

it is a non-reflexive pronoun that is dropped (note that omitted, and in would also allow a reflexive reading, i.e. they were afraid; in the context given, it is interpreted non-reflexively). a.

omission of reflexive object …ðæt

he

sona

forðæm

hreowsige

that

he

soon

therefore

repents

pro

‘…that he soon repents.’ b.

omission of non-reflexive object Ondreardon (they) feared pro ‘They feared them.’ (van Gelderen 2000:148)

Pro-drop in Old English should probably be regarded as an instance of ellipsis, since it seems to be possible only if the reference of the dropped pronoun is contextually was in all likelihood restricted recoverable. Omission of a reflexive pronoun as in to, or at least heavily biased towards, objects of typically self-directed verbs. Visser

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(1963:146f.) provides a list of verbs that regularly allow pro-drop of reflexive object pronouns which includes those given in

āþwēan ‘wash’, (ge)baþian ‘wash, bathe’, (ge)dyrstlœcan ‘presume, dare’, ‘fear, be afraid (refl.)’, restan ‘rest, repose’, (ge-) wendan ‘turn, direct’

In accordance with the points set out above, the distribution of pronouns in Old English can be summarized as follows: there was only one set of simple pronouns, which was used in all kinds of contexts, both with a locally co-referential interpretation and with a locally disjoint interpretation. However, there was a (relatively small) class of verbs which disallowed simple object pronouns to be bound by the local subject, or at least showed a strong tendency to this effect (cf. In order to mark such object pronouns as reflexive, they were intensified by the mono-morphemic expression self. Moreover, prodrop was relatively common, and bound pronouns in the object position of typically selfdirected verbs could be omitted. Let us briefly translate this set of empirical generalizations into the framework presented in Section 7.7: Old English had a series of pronouns that were referentially independent ([−R-DEP]). Furthermore, verbs were classified into [+OD]- and [−OD]verbs, and there was a constraint of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING, which barred the object pronouns of [+OD]-verbs from being bound by the local subject. The class of [+OD]-verbs was relatively small, and basically restricted to verbs of bodily harm. In the object position of those verbs, bound pronouns were embedded under the relevant SELFform in order to prevent a violation of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING. Moreover, it is feasible to assume that self was licensed only when it was required for some pragmatic or syntactic reason. This amounts to assuming that Old English likewise had an ECONOMY-constraint. In addition to all these facts, there was the possibility of dropping the pronouns whenever their reference could be inferred from contextual information. Let us now consider how the system of Modern English developed from the Old English system. Two major changes occurred: (i) a copy of the pronominal head was incorporated into the intensifier, so that mono-morphemic self was lost and the Modern English paradigm of self-forms established itself (univerbation), and (ii) the omission of reflexive pronouns in the object position of typically self-directed verbs became obligatory, while ellipsis of non-reflexive pronouns (with definite reference) was lost. The first of these processes, which was already outlined above, has to be regarded as a change in the lexicon of English.145 In Early Middle English, the intensifier self began to fuse with the simple object pronouns, thus giving rise to the complex forms himself, etc. By the 16th century, this process was completed, and the monomorphemic intensifier self was lost. This change gave rise to the pattern of formal identity of intensifiers and reflexives that can be observed in Modern English. However, it has already been pointed out that this formal identity is, to a certain extent, fallacious: the pronominal part of the reflexive self-form corresponds to the object pronoun of Old English, while the pronominal part of the intensifier is a relic of the pronominal copy of the head associated with the intensifier, and should thus be regarded as an agreement-like phenomenon.

The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages

235

The second major change mentioned above occurred in the course of the development from Middle English to Modern English. The use of locally bound simple pronouns decreases dramatically around 1500 (the same applies to non-referential and pleonastic ). This process can be regarded as a tendency towards an pronouns, cf. intransitivization of those verbs: ‘Since OE there has been a steady drift from the reflexive towards the intransitive form […]’ (Mustanoja 1960:431). Alternatively, we can assume that English has developed a phonologically empty pronoun which is restricted to the object position of typically self-directed verbs, and which is invariably interpreted as a bound variable. The omission of simple pronouns in this position can certainly be regarded as an economy-related process. 8.3.3 A synchronic analysis of English Taking these historical facts into account, we can now describe the distribution of pronouns in Modern English as follows: there are two series of pronouns, namely the simple pronouns him, her, etc. and the complex pronouns himself, herself, etc. The simple pronouns are referentially independent. The complex pronouns can be regarded as expressions denoting the identity function, applied to the simple pronouns. Therefore, reflexive self-forms are interpreted as shown in

if they occupy DP-positions:

Given that ‘full’ (intensifying) self-forms are also used as expressions of an identity function, I assume that the identity function ID exhibits allomorphic variation: it is realized as a fully fledged SELF-form in some contexts, and as an affix -self in others: ID

→

PRON-self

after lexical DPs and subjective pronouns

-self

after objective pronouns

In addition to the pronouns him and her, I will moreover assume a phonologically empty pronoun for English, which behaves like a SE-anaphor in many respects, but which is distributionally restricted to a position following verbs. In other words, it is a (phonologically empty) verbal clitic. As far as its referential dependence is concerned, this pronoun is classified as [+LOCAL]. Its status as a clitic is captured by a feature [+CLV]. Like SE-anaphors, is maximally economical with regard to both featural and morphological economy. The inventory of English pronouns is summarized in Table 8.9.

The grammar of identity

pronouns

236

features [+LOCAL], [+CLV]

him

[−R-DEP], [+MASC, +SG, +OBJ]

her

[−R-DEP], [+FEM, +SG, +OBJ]

it

[−R-DEP], [+NEUT, +SG, +OBJ]

Table 8.9: 3SG-pronouns of Modern English As far as the verbs of English are concerned, we can, again, assume that there is a class of [+OD]-verbs, which prohibits co-argument binding, and a class or [−OD]-verbs, whose object pronouns may be bound by the local subject Moreover, there is a constraint of *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING, and there are two economy constraints (FEATURAL ECONOMY and MORPHOLOGICAL ECONOMY). In addition to those constraints, we need one which ensures that pronouns occur only in positions where they are distributionally allowed to occur. I will simply include a very general constraint of *CATEGORY MISMATCH (*CATMIS/*CM), which says that elements of a given lexical class C can only occur in syntactic positions allowing elements of category C (e.g. a verb cannot be inserted in a DP-position). The constraints of Modern English can be ranked as shown in We can now feed the three sentences provided in into the evaluative component of English grammar. The results are summarized in Table 8.10.

*CM

BD

*ODBIND

FEC

*!

*

MEC

Johni hates PRON(i) Johni hates him(i) Johni hates him(i)self Johni hates

*

*

*!

Johni washes PRON(i) Johni washes him(i)

*!

Johni washes him(i)self

*!

Johni washes Johni saw a snake near PRON(i) Johni saw a snake near him(i)

*

*

The grammar of reflexivity in Germanic languages Johni saw a snake near him(i)self Johni saw a snake near

237 *!

*

*!

Table 8.10: Three English sentences a.

Johni hates PRON(i).

b.

Johni washes PRON(i).

c.

Johni saw a snake near PRON(i).

The input in delivers John hates himself because hate is a [+OD]-verb, so the simple pronoun him cannot be used. The phonologically empty anaphor is likewise ruled out by *ODBIND. Himself is chosen because it violates only the two economy delivers constraints. Since it is interpreted as ID(him), *ODBIND is not violated. The anaphor can be used because the antecedent is within the output John washes the binding domain specified in the lexical entry of ([+LOCAL]), and the position is open to verbal clitics. *ODBIND is irrelevant since wash is a [−OD]-verb. Moreover, is more economical than him in terms of both feature composition and morphological delivers economy. Himself violates both economy constraints. Finally, the input in is not licensed in this position (owing to a John saw a snake near him because *CATMIS-violation), and himself is less economical that him from a morphological point of view. is concerned, one may, again, argue that both him and himself are As far as possible, and that the predictions made by the present model are therefore too strong. However, we should bear in mind that self-forms in this type of context are analysed as untriggered self-forms, and consequently correspond to a different input: the (focused) identity function, which has an intensifying function, is considered to be part of the input in such forms. Thus, the sentence John saw a snake near himself is regarded as the output corresponding to the input specified in

Johni saw a snake near IDF(PRON(i))

To conclude, the pronominal system of English cannot be explained in synchronic terms as easily as the other systems considered in this study. Still, if we make the following assumptions the data fall into place: (i) English has an empty pronoun which is distributionally restricted to the object position of transitive predicates, and (ii) reflexive self-forms are semantically complex, even though they cannot be so analysed from a morphological point of view. I have assumed that reflexive self-forms are interpreted as combinations of a plain object pronoun (him, her, etc.) and a SELF-form, which in this

The grammar of identity

238

case assumes the (affixal) form -self. This assumption can be regarded as an instance of morphologically conditioned allomorphy: when adjoining to a lexical DP or a subject pronoun, the lexical correlate of the identity function incorporates a pronominal copy of the head; when adjoining to object pronouns, it has the form of a suffix -self. 8.4 Summary As has been shown in this chapter, Germanic languages can be classified along two major dimensions, as far as their pronominal systems are concerned: first, we can make a distinction between those languages that have SE-anaphors on the one hand, and those languages which lack such anaphors on the other. And second, we can distinguish between languages with a high-ranking *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING constraint and those languages in which this constraint ranks low, in comparison to the ECONOMYconstraints. The first of these parameters allows for further sub-classification: while the SE-anaphors of German and Dutch are [+LOCAL], those of Mainland Scandinavian languages are [+FIN-BOUND], and the anaphors of Insular Scandinavian are [+REFLEXIVE]. This is summarized in Table 8.11.

[±R-DEP] [+SE] [+LOCAL]

[−SE]

Dutch

[+FIN-BOUND]

Mainland Scandinavian

[+REFLEXIVE]

Insular Scandinavian

German

English Frisian

–

Afrikaans

Table 8.11: Basic systems of reflexive-marking in Germanic languages As can be seen, there is one blank field in Table 8.11: there are no languages without SEanaphors that have a low-ranking *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING-constraint. Old English may have been of this type, but as was argued in Section 8.3, it is very likely that some Old English verbs were actually barred from being bound by the subject when taking the object position of a [+OD]-verb. As a matter of fact, the absence of languages of the type represented by the bottom-right field of Table 8.11 is probably not unexpected, since the amount of ambiguity arising in the object position of transitive verbs would probably soon give rise to a ‘strengthening’ of the *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING-constraint; i.e. the constraints would be re-ranked as a result of ‘striving for clarity’, in the sense of von der Gabelentz (1901:256).

Notes 1 Manuscript SV 1 XI, 127 (Pap. VIII 2 B 171), Royal Library, Copenhagen, 1849: ‘Selvet er et Forhold, der forholder sig til sig selv, eller er det i Forhold, at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv; Selvet er ikke Forholdet, men at Forholdet forholder sig til sig selv.’ 2 Cf. Edmondson and Plank (1978), König (1991b, 2001, 2005), Siemund (2000), König and Gast (2002a), Bergeton (2004), König and Siemund (2005) and Gast and Siemund (2006), among others. 3 Cf. Gast and Siemund (2006:346ff.) for a terminological overview and some discussion of the various labels. 4 Yiddish does not have an intensifier related to the SELF-forms illustrated above. The Yiddish intensifiers aleyn and gufe are completely unrelated to the SELF-intensifiers of other Germanic languages. A relevant example is given in Der

direktor

aleyn/gufe

vet

undz

ufnemen.

DET

director

SELF

will

us

welcome

‘The director himself will welcome us.’ (Adam Albright, pers. comm.) 5 I will not make any introductory remarks concerning the general architecture of OT. For readers who are not familiar with OT, the following introductory surveys may be helpful: Archangeli (1997), Kager (1999), McCarthy (2002). 6 Cf. also König (1991b, 2001), König and Siemund (2000a, b, c), Siemund (2000), König and Gast (2002a, forthcoming). 7 It should be noted that the terms ‘exclusive’ and ‘inclusive’ are to be taken cum grano salis. Exclusive intensifiers are not exclusive in the same way as focus particles like only, and inclusive intensifiers do not trigger the same additive presupposition as the focus particles also and too. In the course of this study, we will also see that the paraphrases provided above can at best be regarded as rough approximations. To provide more explicit semantic characterizations of the different use types of intensifiers is one of the major objectives of this study. 8 Cf. also König (2001:748), Huddleston and Pullum (2002:1498) and König and Gast (2002a:233) on the relationship between head-distant intensifiers and the scope of negation. 9 In saying that a constituent α is ‘properly contained’ in a constituent β I mean that α is a daughter of β, and it is not a sister of another constituent that is of the same category as β. In other words, [α β] is not an endocentric expansion of β. 10 ‘A pronominal is free in its governing category’ (Chomsky 1981:188). 11 Source: http://www.litdict.eom/php/speople.php?rec=true&UID=304, 4 January 2006. 12 This aspect of the use of intensifiers in the context of reflexivity is captured in the form of an economy constraint in the spirit of Burzio (1991, 1996, 1998) and Kiparsky (2002). 13 LaPolla (2003:576) reports that in Qiang, a Tibeto-Burman language, ‘[r]eflexive pronouns for first and second person are formed by reduplication of the regular pronouns’. On the face of it, instances of reduplicated reflexives can also be found in some Caucasian and South Asian languages (e.g. Tsakhur wuž and Malayalam taan tanne, respectively).

Notes

240

However, on closer scrutiny it turns out that these structures should probably better be analysed as combinations of an intensifier and a reflexive, from which it can be inferred that they are not really instances of juxtaposition, let alone reduplication. Crucially, ‘reduplicated’ reflexives in Tsakhur and similar languages are possible only if those reflexives are used as intensifiers anyway. Some Malayalam data will be discussed in Section 1.5.2. 14 Cf. Lees and Klima’s (1963:23) ‘Reflexive Rule’:

where Nom=Nom’=a nominal, and where Nom and Nom’ are within the same simplex sentence. 15 Moravcsik (1972:274) also considers analysing intensifiers as an instance of reduplication. 16 It is important to note that Wulfila’s translation does not always (though certainly often) reproduce the word order of the Greek original. As far as

is concerned, the head

pronoun egō follows the intensifier autos in the Greek source text (cf.

), which we can

is not a translational

take as a relatively safe piece of evidence that the structure in artefact: [autos

de

egō] Paulos parakalō hymas dia tēs

[INT.NOM.MASC.SG

PTCL

I]

prautētos

kai

epieikeias …

meekness

and

modesty

Paul

ask

you

by the

…

‘I myself, Paul, ask you by the meekness and modesty…’ 17 It is of course possible that the intensifier showed either strong or weak inflection, agreeing with the associated DP in (in)definiteness. Given that the DPs in question are typically, though not necessarily, definite, it can only be expected that in a corpus as small as the Wulfila Bible intensifiers with strong/indefinite inflection cannot be found. 18 For an overview of the distribution and morpho-syntactic behaviour of OE self, cf. also Lange (2003:111ff.). 19 Cf. König and Gast (forthcoming) on the relationship between the types of intensifiers discussed here and expressions like own. 20 Source: http://www.samhjalp.is/index.asp?p=pistlarDetails.asp&item=63, 6 August 2004. 21 Source: http://kirkjan.net/postilla/pred/jol/advkv2002.htm, 6 Aug. 2004. 22 Holmes and Hinchliffe (1994:91f.) state that there is ‘stylistic variation’ in the use of -a as opposed to -e for the definite masculine singular forms. 23 Source: http://www.ur.se/svx2/sagav02/saga6.htm, 4 March 2004. 24 Source: http://www.mic.no/nmi.nsf/doc/art2002020510260366882581, 13 August 2004. 25 Note that sig sjálf- and sjálf- sig are not in free variation and differ in terms of their distribution. In particular, sig sjálf- usually requires a contrastive context whereas sjálf- sig can also be used as a non-contrastive marker of reflexivity. 26 At least some ninety or so years ago, Flemish had an intensifier that displayed weak adjectival inflection (zelv-), but Verbeek (1917:90) mentions that ‘some writers use zelf as an invariant form, like German selbst’ (translation mine).

Notes

241

27 For a discussion of intensified generic DPs, cf. Siemund (2000:162), where the claim made by Edmondson and Plank (1978) that generics do not easily combine with intensifiers is shown to be false. 28 This notion of definiteness is in line with dynamic models of discourse as proposed by Kamp (1981), Heim (1982) and Lambrecht (1994). 29 There are some further, rather trivial, restrictions on DPs interacting with head-adjacent SELF: head-adjacent SELF cannot be used with interrogative pronouns, relative pronouns, etc. Furthermore, it may not co-occur with vocatives (#Would you please come, Mr. President himself?); cf. Edmondson and Plank (1978:382) and Siemund (2000:45–6) for some examples. 30 Edmondson and Plank’s himself1 corresponds to our ‘head-adjacent intensifiers’. 31 For a survey of the discussion cf. Heim (1991). 32 Source: http://www.michigan.gov/gov/1,1431,7–104–769–2975M_2001_4,00.html,5June2002. 33 Source: http://www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/jt199899/jtselect/jtpriv/43/8033104.htm, 5 June 2002. 34 This corresponds closely to Enç’s (1991) definition of ‘specific indefinite’. There, a specific indefinite DP is taken to be one that ‘introduces into the domain of discourse individuals from a previously given set’ (Enç 1991:6). However, this notion of specificity differs so crucially from most of the other conceptions that I hesitate to adopt it as a general definition of specificity. 35 ‘Given indefinites’ are similar, but not identical, to Diesing’s (1992) ‘pre-suppositional indefinites’ (cf. also Milsark 1974). The difference is that in ‘presuppositional indefinites’, the existence of a member of the restriction set is merely presupposed; ‘given indefinites’ are characterized by the additional condition that the restriction set must be ‘under discussion’ and thus definite, that it must be ‘active’ in the sense of Lambrecht (1994:39ff.). See also Note 34. 36 Source: http://www.helpingmormons.org/TLC.Mani/RefLibraryFolder/JournalOfDiscourses/Vol%20 24/JD24–117.html, 5 June 2002. and is ‘paradigmatic’ in so far 37 The relationship between Jack and his brother in as both DPs occupy the same slot within the predication given—λx[x wrote the letter]— whereas in they occur in two different argument positions of the same predicate— λxλy[x is taller than y]. 38 I use the term ‘free focus structure’ for constructions in which constituents are marked as being in focus only through stress (cf. von Stechow 1991); the term ‘argument-focus’ is taken from Lambrecht (1994) and refers to clauses in which only an argument, but not the VP, is in focus. 39 Note that the question is unresolved as to whether the difference between contrastive and non-contrastive focus structures is epiphenomenal—as argued by Halliday (1967) and Schwarzschild (1999), among others—or whether there is in fact a deeper semantic or pragmatic difference between ‘contrastive foci’ and ‘non-contrastive foci’ (cf. Lambrecht 1994:286ff. and Kiss 1998 for this latter point of view). This question is not relevant here. The crucial point is that intensifiers cannot be used in non-contrastive contexts of the kind exemplified in 40 The acute accent indicates a rising accent, typically associated with contrastive topics, and small capitals stand for a falling main accent, generally used to mark focus (cf. example on page 99). For a formal treatment of contrastive topics (or ‘S-topics’), cf. Büring (1997). 41 Antonia Fraser, A Splash of Red. Methuen, 1982, p. 100.

Notes

242

42 Source: http://libro.uca/vcode/vg7-3-htm, 3 September 2002. 43 For a general discussion of logophoricity phenomena and perspectivization, cf. Hagège (1974), Clements (1975), Kuno (1987), Sells (1987) and Stirling (1993). For the specific relation between logophoricity, intensifiers and reflexives, cf. Cantrall (1974), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Reinhart and Reuland (1991), Baker (1995), Kemmer (1995), König and Siemund (1999, 2000c) and Hole (2002b). 44 In traditional Latin and Greek grammar, such embedded clauses are called ‘internally dependent’. 45 Source: http://www.iath.virginia.edu/fdw/volume3/price/lowm.php?inc-=introduction, 3 March 2003. 46 I consider English -self and German selbst in their head-adjacent uses as being approximately equivalent. 47 For analyses of focus particles in terms of the structured meaning approach, cf. von Stechow (1982, 1991), Jacobs (1983) and König (1991a). 48 It should be noted that the focus particle selbst and the intensifier are not totally homophonous since the intensifier has a free variant selber which cannot be used with a scalar meaning. 49 Siemund quotes Tanigutchi (1972), who, in turn, quotes the examples from Montagues’s and O’Neill’s Christie III, Temple 50 German selbst does occur in a pre-focal position, but has a different function then; cf. Section 3.5.1. 51 Bergeton’s translation differs from mine: ‘The Prime Minister himself polished the shoes without help from anyone.’ 52 Here as well as in other places, I use subordinate clauses to illustrate syntactic claims concerning the clause structure of V2-languages, since they are generally taken to represent basic word order, following the tradition of Bach (1962) and Bierwisch (1963). 53 Cf. Webelhuth (1989), Grewendorf and Sternefeld (1990), Vikner (1991), Corver and van Riemsdijk (1994), Haider and Rosengren (2003) and Sabel and Saito (2005), among others. 54 ‘Verb Phrase’ may refer to either VP or vP. In Section 4.4 a shell structure will be introduced which is not yet necessary at this point. 55 Of course we would have to assume that A’-movement allows reconstruction, since otherwise the trace of the finite verb in the Forefield would not be properly bound. 56 ‘In German, the topicalized constituent must not contain the trace of the finite verb’ (Haider 2003:784). Haider uses particle verbs to illustrate this. 57 Note that the English translation might be read with an inclusive interpretation of herself, which is not available for the German sentence 58 Of course, selbst can also have a reflexive function in compounds, which is not relevant at this point. 59 Cf. Hole (2002a) for a discussion of gerunds in the context of exclusive intensifiers. 60 These rules are relatively robust across varieties of Swedish but probably not without exception. 61 Source: http://www.campus.hbg.lu.se/bibliotek/bibluppxjobb.html, 16 December 2004. 62 Three of six native speakers that I have consulted classify as ‘ungrammatical’; two consultants point out that it is possible in spoken, but not in written, language; and three informants find just as fine as has been judged ‘fine’ by all informants. 63 Source: http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/tcca/PDF/023/robersont.pdf, 8 March 2006. 64 Source: http://www.wwwentworth.co.uk/week671.htm, 8 March 2006. 65 Source: http://www.businessderbyshire.co.uk/syob/start6.htm, 13 February 2005.

Notes

243

66 Source: http://www.tvtome.com/tvtome/servlet/GuidePageServlet/showid-7360/epid245286/, 13 February 2005. 67 Source: http://www.123webpages.co.uk/user/index.php?user=mgc&pn=10710, 13 February 2005. 68 Note that it may be tempting to say that ‘myself takes scope over every week’, but I do not assert that intensifiers take scope at all. Still, we could say that the focus feature on myself takes scope. These questions will be addressed in Chapter 6. 69 http://www-tech.mit.edu/V120/N65/col65hall.65c.html, 21 Dec. 2004. 70 Quantifiers are either specifiers of NP, or they occur in DP, whereas intensifiers are, syntactically, relational nouns that take a DP as their argument. Floating quantifiers are consequently ‘stranded specifiers’ or ‘stranded determiners’, while intensifiers are ‘stranded nouns’. Another difference is that intensifiers, but not quantifiers, are invariably stressed. 71 Bergeton’s analysis is, in some respects, similar to the one advocated here, but differs crucially from it in others. First, Bergeton regards only inclusive SELF as an instance of quantifier-floating, while he analyses exclusive SELF as a ‘manner adverbial’. In this study, a unified analysis is given for all three use types of intensifiers. Second, the derivation assumed by Bergeton is completely different from the one proposed here. Finally, the two analyses differ in semantic terms and, even more strikingly, in terms of how syntax and semantics are related to each other. 72 See for instance Fanselow (2002), Frey (2004a). 73 More specifically to ‘a Spec-vP lower than the external argument’ (Holmberg and Platzack 2005:426). 74 Holmberg and Platzack (2005) refer to Koizumi (1993) for a parallel analysis of English. The assumption that object DPs move to a functional projection is also made in early Minimalism (Chomsky’s 1995 AgrO-projection). 75 The order of prepositional objects and adverbials (or ‘bound’ and ‘free adverbials’) is not entirely fixed in Swedish (cf. Teleman et al. 1999b:489–91, Teleman et al. 1999c:17). However, the canonical situation seems to be that prepositional objects (‘bound adverbials’) are closer to the verb than are adverbials (‘free adverbials’; cf. Teleman et al. 1999b:490), which is in accordance with standard assumptions about phrase structure within the Verb Phrase. 76 For example, Koopman (2003) claims that ‘head-movement is either not an option allowed by UG, or is a severely restricted option’. Koster (1999, 2000) argues that the presence or absence of head-movement is a matter of parametric variation. He proposes that VP-internal elements cannot move individually in Germanic VO-languages like English, and that they are always pied-piped along with the verb to [Spec,TP] via some relevant DP-related functional projections (‘collective feature checking’ via ‘feature percolation’; cf. also Zwart 2003). Similarly (but for different reasons), in a talk given at the MIT in May 1998 Dominique Sportiche argued that the Verb Phrase moves to [Spec,TP] in ‘affix hopping’ configurations. According to such approaches, the surface sequence [V DPOBJECT] is not the result of head movement as shown in

but results from phrasal movement as

illustrated in a.

…[Vi [ti DP]]

b.

…[[V DP]i ti]

77 Cf. also Haegeman (1998a, b), Hróarsdóttir (2000), Koopman and Szabolcsi (2000), Taraldsen (2000) and Note 76 for similar proposals in other contexts.

Notes

244

78 Note that ‘complement pied-piping’ is not identical to Larson’s (1988) because the latter only applies to constituents with ‘one discharged internal ’ (Larson 1988:348) while no such restriction applies to ‘complement pied-piping’. 79 It may well be that complement pied-piping is not contingent upon the presence of heavy elements in a sentence, especially in view of the fact that (most) adverbials may likewise not take a position between the verb and its complements. However, the claim that ‘complement pied-piping’ applies universally in Germanic VO-languages may have far-reaching consequences, both empirical and theoretical. I therefore prefer to regard complement piedpiping as an operation that is triggered by specific output conditions (adverbials may of course be associated with specific output conditions as well). Still, Koster (1999, 2000) has argued that verbal projections may only move as a whole in VO-languages; therefore regarding complement pied-piping as an obligatory, purely syntactic, movement rule, is certainly an option. 80 Note that phonological rules like ‘heavy shift’ allow reconstruction, so the trace tj in the vP [ti har levt i Oslo] is not unbound. 81 Source: http://www.jur.uib.no/ansatte/joreh/Publikasjonar/Autonomi%20og%20aktiv% 20dodshjelp.htm, 13 February 2005. 82 Source: http://www.dagogtid.no/arkiv/2003/40/thune/, 13 February 2005. 83 Source informant: Nana Brandenhoff, p.c. 84 Note that Fox and Pesetsky (2003) argue that Swedish does not have V-to-T movement; in this respect I follow Holmberg and Platzack (2005). 85 Note that the derivations displayed in are incompatible with a ‘classical’ Larsonian analysis, according to which the verb forms a constituent with the prepositional object but not with the non-prepositional one. This assumption, however, is highly questionable (see for instance Jackendoff 1990 for a critical discussion of Larson’s analysis). 86 Stress assignment has been added by the present author. 87 Source: http://www.law.mercer.edu/elaw/toxics3.html, 2 August 2002. 88 Source: http://www.wordsmith.org/chat/oed.html, 2 August 2002. 89 Source: http://www.psillustrated.com/hr_nu_cr.html, 2 August 2002. 90 Source: http://www.drao.nrc.ca/outreach/images/hb9.html, 2 Aug. 2002. 91 Source: http://www.freechurch.org/genesis/genal.htm, 12 Sept. 2002. 92 As was shown in Section 5.1.1, however, such twofold relations can relatively easily be found in reflexive situations such as the one in 93 In both selbst and herbei are stressed. We could also construe a parallel example in which this is not the case, for example: Dieser Berg spiegelt nicht etwa eine Teilung wieder, welche die MENschen herBEIgeführt haben, er führt diese Teilung SELBST herbei. 94 For example, in HPSG and Lexicon Grammar; cf. Gross (1984), Gross and Valli (1991) and Danlos (1992). 95 Source: http://www.zeit.de/2002/16/Kultur/200216_p_schroeder.html, 1 September 2002. 96 Source: http://www.sprachkritik.de/forum/messages/53.html, 30 Aug. 2002. 97 It should be noted that semantically, wirken is not too different from the copula sein, and the relevant part of that sentence could also be changed into …selbst allergisierend ist. Still, in this particular context, wirken translates as act into English. Furthermore, examples of the kind given in are extremely rare. 98 Source: http://www.umweltjournal.de/fp/archiv/AfA_gesundheit/020302allergien.shtml, 30 August 2002. 99 Source: http://pub88.ezboard.com/fqueerasfolk87597frm14.showMessage?topicID=71.topic, 24 July 2002. 100 Source: http://www.candlaw.com/newsletters/july90-2.html, 24 July 2002.

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101 It is important not to confuse the variable e ranging over events with the logical type e, which is the type of entities/individuals. 102 For some striking arguments in favour of the assumption of an event variable, cf. Rothstein (1998b). 103 That this interpretation is basically equivalent to the Heim-KratzerBüring model can be seen when we consider what the term ‘functional application’, which relates a function to its arguments, implies. Note first that λ-abstraction is a process that derives a ‘characteristic function’. When such a function is applied to a given input value (‘functional application’), this means that we determine the output value of the function for that input. For instance, λx[TALL(x)] is a characteristic function; when it is applied to a given value—say, ‘John’—it delivers a proposition (set of worlds) as its output. In prose, this process of functional application can be paraphrased as: ‘for the input x=John, the value of the function λx[TALL(x)] is the proposition/set of worlds π’. Accordingly, λx[TALL(x)](John) is basically equivalent to ‘the set of worlds w such that it holds in w that: for x=John: x is tall’. 104 In terms of Generative Grammar, they are ‘reconstructed at LF’; cf. Uriagereka (1995), Wurmbrand (2000) and Zeller (2003), among others. 105 Source: http://www.vit-gesund.de/tepperwein-collectionbuecher/Schlaganfall/schlaganfall.html, 20 September 2002. 106 Source: http://ethics.sandiego.edu/video/APA/Pacific/2002/Reidy/Hate%20Crimes.html, 16 November 2002. 107 In a traditional Davidsonian semantics ‘read a book’ is regarded as a relation between an individual and an event; if the external argument is ‘severed’ along the lines of Kratzer (1989), however, such predicates correspond to sets of events. 108 A similar argument is made by Primus (1992). 109 Source: http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t295a04.html, 17 September 2002. 110 Hole speaks of ‘agentive intensifiers’; I will stick to the term ‘exclusive head-distant intensifier’ here, assuming that it is equivalent to Hole’s ‘agentive intensifiers’. 111 The variable r in Figure 6.3 ranges over heads of VoiceP. 112 Double consonants indicate tense articulation. 113 We will not consider true logophors, i.e. pronouns that are specialized for referring back to an antecedent from a higher clause; cf. Hagège (1974) and Stirling (1993). For a discussion of logophoricity phenomena, cf. Section 3.4.3 of this study. 114 Source: http://hgnetwork.co.uk/siye/viewstory.php?sid=3747, 7 January 2006. 115 In what follows, I will use a ‘lump-IP’ structure to represent sentence structure, but nothing hinges on this. 116 Note that this generalization does not apply to specialized logophors (cf. Note 113). Furthermore, SE-anaphors such as Dutch zich are sometimes barred from occurring in the co-argument domain. However, it will be argued below that this is due to an intervening constraint rather than the inherent ‘binding potential’ of zich. 117 I will adopt the following terminology (cf. Chomsky 1981; Kiparsky 2002, among others): any type of nominal pro-form is called a ‘pronoun’; ‘free pronouns’ or ‘pronominals’ is used for non-reflexive pronouns, i.e. the class of pronouns that is traditionally called ‘anaphoric pronouns’ (him, her, it, etc.). ‘Reflexive pronouns’ will be used for the form class that paradigmatically contrasts with free pronouns, and that is used to indicate co-reference of coarguments (himself, herself, etc.). The term ‘anaphor’ is used to refer to referentially defective pronouns. Later in this section, we will distinguish between different types of anaphors. 118 Anagnostopoulou and Everaert (1999) argue that the logically predicted combination [+REFL, +R] is also attested, and that Greek o eaftos tu and Dutch hemself are of this type. 119 There is some terminological confusion in the literature on reflexivity. As pointed out in Note 117, Chomsky and Kiparsky use ‘pronominal’ to refer to non-reflexive/bound

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pronouns. By contrast, Levinson (1991) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) use ‘pronoun’ for this class of nominals. I will stick to the Chomsky/Kiparsky-terminology. 120 This relates reflexivity phenomena to movement rules, a link that was already established by Chomsky (1973, 1981), but given up in Chomsky (1986a). 121 Chomsky’s Condition C has not been regarded as a principle of grammar in most recent work on reflexivity and will also be disregarded here. 122 The idea of relating certain rules concerning the distribution of pronouns, notably Chomsky’s Binding Condition B, to semantic rather than syntactic facts has also played a role in several other proposals dealing with reflexivity phenomena; cf. Keenan (1974), Pollard and Sag (1983, 1992). 123 The assumption that there are two lexical entries of German sich is ac-tually not too farfetched. In fact, Gast and Haas (forthcoming) argue that such a distinction needs to be made if one wants to account for certain facts concerning the interpretation of sich. In particular, sich does not have reciprocal readings when it occurs in a PP. However, this distinction between a ‘pronominal sich’ and a ‘clitic sich’ is completely independent of the question of what kind of anaphor sich is. If we wanted to make another lexical distinction between two pronominal uses of sich—say, SE-sich and SELE-sich—this would lead to at least three different entries for that element. In my opinion, the proliferation of lexical entries is to be avoided whenever possible, and the analysis to be advanced in Section 7.7 does not require the assumption of another lexical entry for sich. 124 Higginbotham modifies this analysis by including an additional component which ensures that the N’-node denotes the property λx[x is a butterfly and x is big for a butterfly], but this detail is not relevant to the present analysis. 125 Reinhart and Reuland also offer an alternative solution, namely a movement analysis: ‘[…] SELF can be viewed as an operator from Vn to Vn (rather than as a relation), which applies to the V and identifies two of its arguments’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1991:291). An analysis along these lines is also taken up by Reuland (2001:483ff.). Again, my feeling is that the problem is not resolved or explained, it is merely restated. 126 The chain formed by Willem and zich is different from the one formed by shei and ti in Reuland (2001) therefore distinguishes between different types of chains. In addition to the traditional Chomskyan chain, he defines the notions ‘Chain’ and ‘CHAIN’. For the relevant definitions, cf. Reuland (2001:457f.). In the present context, these subtleties can be disregarded. 127 Cf. Note 126. 128 More accurately, ‘CHAIN’. 129 Burzio uses the term ‘pronoun’ for what is here called ‘pronominal’; cf. Note 117. 130 See e.g. Wilson (2001:472–3), who proposes a constraint REFECON; ter Meulen (2000:270–3), who ‘considers reflexives easiest to process as they are most economical, only requiring a call to local memory for the referent of the subject’; Fischer (2004:491), who assumes a constraint hierarchy of the form 131 This somewhat unfortunate terminology, which tries to establish a probably illicit link to obviation phenomena in Algonquian languages, is adopted by Kiparsky from Chomsky (1981). 132 ‘Using words costs effort (the more complex they are, the more they cost)’ (ter Meulen 2000:275). 133 Kiparsky (2002:194) classifies sig as [+REFL], but in his classification on p. 201 it is specified as outlined here. 134 I will disregard the series of pronominal clitics ’m, d’r and ’t as well as other case and number forms of the pronouns indicated. Recall from Section 7.6 that referentially independent pronouns also cover the whole range of contexts in which referentially dependent pronouns are licensed, i.e. the distribution of a pronoun x is a subset of the

Notes

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distribution of a pronoun y if x exhibits a higher degree of referential dependence than y. The fact that pronouns of the type of English him cannot be used in the co-argument domain has to do with them being specified as [+OBV], in Kiparsky’s account, not with their degree of referential independence. 135 Reuland (2001:447) writes: ‘At the C-I interface pronouns can be translated either as expressions receiving a value directly from a discourse storage or as a variable to be bound by an antecedent’. 136 More accurately, we should say that zichzelf denotes the identity function ID, lexically represented as zelf, applied to the denotation of zich, i.e. 137 Note that the first example in may not be very well chosen, since reciprocal interpretations of the German anaphor sich are prohibited in PPs anyway; cf. Gast and Haas (forthcoming). 138 Note that binding of hem is not prevented by its referential specification, which is [−RDEP], but by *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING. 139 It should be noted that there is a certain amount of variation in the acceptability judgements of sentences such as Some speakers of Dutch would also accept but the majority seems to judge this type of sentence non-standard. However, the sentence becomes better if instead of the full form hem, the phonologically reduced ’m is used, as in Still, is clearly preferred over which is also regarded as non-standard by most native speakers. For grammaticality judgements similar to those assumed here, cf. Everaert (1991:91ff.). a.

Jani zette de vaas voor zich(i) neer.

b.

?? Jani zette de vaas voor hem(i) neer.

c.

? Jani zette de vaas voor’m(i) neer.

140 Cf. Thráinsson (1976), Maling (1984), Sigurðsson (1986) and several contributions in Koster and Reuland (1991). 141 This point is emphasized by Keenan (2002:327), who attributes some properties of the English language system to ‘Inertia’: ‘[t]hings stay as they are unless acted upon by an outside force or Decay’. 142 For discussions of untriggered self-forms, cf. Cantrall (1973, 1974), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Parker et al. (1990), Baker (1995), König and Siemund (2000c), Hole (2002b), König and Gast (2002a), Gast (2004). 143 Source: http://wolfiesden.50megs.com/hpps7.html, 27 October 2002. 144 It is furthermore important to note that self-forms in the complement position of prepositions seem often to be excluded if the preposition is stressed. 145 The reasons for that change are a little mysterious. For discussion, cf. Siemund (2000) and König and Siemund (2000a).

Sources [ÆLet 4]

Letter to Sigeweard. In: The Old Version of the Heptateuch. Aelfric’s Treatise on the Old and New Testament and his Preface to Genesis. Ed. S.J.Crawford. London: EETS 160, 1922.

[Beo]

Beowulf. Ed. F.Klaeber. Boston: D.C.Heath, 1922.

[BibAug]

Bibliotheca Augustana historica, critica et chronologica. Ossinger, J.F.Ingolstadt, 1768.

[BlHom]

The Blickling Homilies of the Tenth Century. Ed. R.Morris. London: EETS OS 58, 63, 72, 1874–80.

[BNC]

British National Corpus (http://www.hcu.ox.ac.uk/BNC).

[Caes. BG]

Gaius Iulius Caesar. De Bello Gallico. Ed. M.Deißmann. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980.

[ChristC]

Christ C, from The Exeter Book. Ed. G.P.Krapp. New York, 1936.

[Edda]

Edda, die Lieder des Codex Regius nebst verwandten Denkmälern. Ed. Gustav Neckel. Heidelberg, 1983.

[FN]

Notes made during fieldwork by the author.

[IceBib]

Icelandic Bible. Available online at: http://www.hi.is/Uppl/Biblia.

[KGS]

Konungs skuggsiá (Kongespeilet). Ed. Ludvig HolmOlsen. Oslo, 1945.

[Lf.]

Lindisfarne Gospels. Ed. W.Skeat. Cambridge, 1871–87.

[Or]

King Alfred’s Orosius. Ed. H.Sweet. London: EETS 79, 1883.

[PAR]

Parole Corpus (Språkbanken). Available online at: http: //spraakbanken.gu.se/parole.

[PastCa]

King Alfred’s West Saxon Version of Gregory’s Pastoral Care. Ed. H.Sweet. London: EETS 45, 1871.

[Ps. Th.]

Libri Psalmorum versio antiqua Latina. Ed. B.Thorpe. Oxford, 1835.

[Sall Cat.]

Gaius Sallustius Crispus. De Coniuratione Catilinae. Ed. Karl Büchner. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1978.

[SHHENV]

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[S.Warde]

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[Wf.]

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Author index Alexiadou, A. 90, 94 Anagnostopoulou, E. and M.Everaert 228 Archangeli, D. 220 Askedal, J.O. 199 Bach, E. 89, 224 Baker, C. 48, 49, 53, 209, 223, 230 Barnes, M.P. 201 Barwise, J. and J.Perry 123 Benedicto, E. 161 Bergeton, U. 67, 84, 198, 220, 225 Bierwisch, M. 224 Bornemann, E. and E.Risch 159 Browning, M. 9, 18, 19, 106, 141, 145–147, 152, 155, 172, 173, 195, 196 Büring, D. 43, 44, 64, 69, 70, 90, 99, 125, 223 Burzio, L. 155, 166, 179–181, 183, 221, 229 Cantrall, W. 9, 16, 58, 223, 230 Carlson, G.N. 30 Chomsky, N. 16, 155, 157, 163–166, 168, 175, 181, 221, 225, 228, 229 Cinque, G. 90 Clements, G.N. 223 Comrie, B. 190 Corver, N. and H.van Riemsdijk 224 Cresswell, M. 174 Croft, W. 6, 61, 154, 190 Danlos, L. 227 Davidson, D. 122, 123, 148, 160 de Hoop, H. 70 Diesing, M. 125, 222 Dirven, R. 101, 102 Does, J. and H.de Hoop 70 Donaldson, D. 2, 29, 189, 206 Donellan, K.S. 30 Dowty, D. 89, 123, 148, 150 Eckardt, R. 4, 14, 31, 36, 40–42, 44–46, 50, 60, 64, 65 Edmondson, J. and F.Plank 30–33, 58, 59, 65, 99, 104, 106, 114, 141–144, 151, 220, 222 Egli, U. 122 Enç, M. 222

Author index

261

Ernst, T. 71, 91, 94, 98 Everaert, M. 165, 230 Faarlund, J.T. 25 Faltz, L. 9–11, 13, 156, 157, 159, 162 Fanselow, G. 225 Farmer, A. and M.Harnish 10, 11, 178, 190 Farr, J.M. 213 Ferro, L. 61 Fischer, S. 179, 180, 229 Fox, D. and D.Pesetsky 94, 226 Frey, W. 69, 225 Frey, W. and K.Pittner 71, 73, 85, 94 Gast, V. 40, 55, 230 Gast, V. and F.Haas 229, 230 Gast, V. and P.Siemund 15, 101, 117, 220 Genuišienė, E. 156 Grein, C. and J.Köhler 24 Grewendorf, G. and W.Sternefeld 224 Gross, G. 227 Gross, G. and A.Valli 227 Haegeman, L. 226 Haegeman, L. and H.van Riems-dijk 89 Hagège, C. 223, 228 Haider, H. 75, 224 Haider, H. and I.Rosengren 69, 73, 224 Hajičova, E. et al. 125 Hall, B. 9, 16 Halliday, M. 223 Haspelmath, M. 6, 154, 156, 190 Hawkins, J. 154 Heim, I. 125, 222 Heim, I. and A.Kratzer 125 Hellan, L. 31, 161, 186, 199, 201 Hendriks, P. and J.Spendauer 179 Heusler, A. 25 Higginbotham, J. 19, 123, 145, 146, 171–174 Hilbert, D. and P.Bernays 42 Hole, D. 4, 14, 36, 39–42, 44–46, 50, 51, 65, 106, 107, 131, 141, 147–150, 223, 224, 228, 230 Holmberg, A. and C.Platzack 85, 87, 88, 90, 225, 226 Holmes, P. and I.Hinchliffe 35, 78, 222 Hróarsdóttir, T. 226 Huang, Y. 155, 178 Huddleston, R. and G.Pullum 74, 83, 221

Author index

262

Ioup, G. 31 Jackendoff, R. 71, 226 Jacobs, J. 223 Jayaseelan, K. 9, 20, 21, 155, 176, 177, 193, 196 Johnson, K. 94 Josefsson, G. and C.Platzack 87 Kager, R. 220 Kamp, H. 125, 222 Kayne, R. 90, 94 Keenan, E. 9, 174, 209–213, 228, 230 Kemmer, S. 156, 223 Kibrik, A. and E.Bogdanova 58, 59 Kiparsky, P. 155, 160, 165, 177, 179, 181–188, 190–192, 196, 198, 210, 211, 221, 228–230 Kirby, S. 6, 154 Kiss, K.E. 223 Koizumi, M. 225 König, E. 36, 58–63, 65, 74, 83, 140, 144, 156, 158, 162, 220, 221, 223 König, E. and V.Gast 40, 65, 74, 83, 101, 220–222, 230 König, E.and P.Siemund 3, 5, 7, 9, 11–15, 21, 36, 46, 47, 53, 57, 58, 61, 65, 113, 144, 154, 158, 169, 187, 189, 196, 209, 211, 213, 220, 223, 230 König, E.and L.Vezzosi 154, 187, 190, 191, 196 Koopman, H. 225 Koopman, H. and A.Szabolcsi 226 Koster, J. 89, 225, 226 Koster, J. and E.Reuland 159, 230 Kratzer, A. 148, 227 Krifka, M. 64 Krifka, M. et al. 30 Kuno, S. 223 Lambrecht, K. 31, 32, 52, 111, 113, 222, 223 Lange, C. 222 LaPolla, R.J. 221 Larson, R. 89, 90, 226 Lees, R.B. and E.Klima 16, 221 Lenerz, J. 70 Leslau, W. 158 Levinson, S. 9–13, 39, 155, 165, 170, 177–179, 183, 190, 228 Lidz, J.L. 156 Lyutikova, E. 58, 59 Maling, J. 159, 230 Marantz, A. 160 McCarthy, J.J. 220 McConnell-Ginet, S. 71 Milsark, G. 223 Mitchell, B. 23, 24 Moravcsik, E. 2, 16, 30, 99, 221

Author index

263

Moyne, J.A. 9, 16 Mustanoja, T. 215 Næss, A. 87 Ohlander, U. 214 Parker, F. et al. 230 Parsons, T. 123 Pica, P. 18, 145, 159 Plank, F. 102, 103, 140, 151 Pollard, C. and I.Sag 228 Primus, B. 58–61, 65, 151, 227 Prince, A. and P.Smolensky 179 Quirk, R. et al. 17, 71, 209 Radford, A. 85 Reichenbach, H. 121–123, 148 Reinhart, T. 125, 183 Reinhart, T. and E.Reuland 18, 20, 145, 155, 158, 163, 165–172, 174, 175, 178, 181, 182, 184–186, 190, 191, 195, 196, 210, 223, 228, 229 Reuland, E. 9, 20, 125, 126, 155, 164, 169–171, 175–177, 180, 183, 188, 193, 196, 229, 230 Rizzi, L. 85 Rochemont, M.S. and P.W.Culicover 90 Rooth, M. 40 Rothstein, S. 122, 123, 227 Runner, J. 94 Russell, B. 31 Sabel, J. and M.Saito 224 Safir, K. 5, 177, 180, 193, 196 Schladt, M. 177 Schwarzschild, R. 27, 111, 223 Sells, P. 54–56, 223 Siemund, P. 8, 23, 30, 31, 36, 48, 52, 58–60, 62–64, 99, 100, 103–106, 112, 113, 115, 118, 131, 137, 140, 141, 143–145, 150–152, 220, 222, 230 Sigurðsson, H. 230 Siméon, R. 157 Smith, M. 154 Sportiche, D. 84 Stirling, L. 53, 54, 223, 228 Stockwell, R. et al. 16 Streitberg, W. 23 Sullivan, T. 157 Tanigutchi, J. 224 Taraldsen, K.T. 202, 226 Teleman, U. et al., 26, 27, 225

Author index ter Meulen, A. 174, 179, 180, 183, 229 Thorell, O. 26 Thráinsson, H. 87, 165, 200, 201, 230 Uriagereka, J. 227 van Gelderen, E. 9, 23, 211, 212, 214 Verbeek, H. 222 Verheijen, R. 16, 17 Vikner, S. 87, 94, 224 Visser, F. 12, 214 von Heusinger, K. 42 von Stechow, A. 37, 113, 223 von der Gabelentz, G. 219 Webelhuth, G. 224 Wexler, K. and R.Manzini 159–161, 165 Wilson, C. 179, 229 Wurmbrand, S. 227 Zeller, J. 227 Zribi-Hertz, A. 53, 54, 57, 154, 187, 223, 230 Zwart, J.-W. 225

264

Language index Afrikaans, 2, 3, 28, 29, 197, 203–207, 218 Amharic, 158 Danish, 3, 26, 28, 67, 92, 93, 198 Dutch, 2–5, 14, 15, 21, 97, 162–166, 174, 182–198, 203–213, 218, 228, 230 English Early Middle, 215 Early Modern, 43 Irish, 60 Middle, 12, 211, 215 Modern, 1–19, 23, 26–34, 60, 80–83, 92–117, 121, 157, 158, 164–166, 182–185, 190, 203–218, 224–230 Old, 3, 12–14, 22–25, 29, 157, 205, 207–215, 219 Faroese, 3, 197, 200–202 French, 60, 94 Frisian, 2, 3, 197, 205–208, 212–214, 218 German, 2, 3, 15, 18, 29, 33, 43, 58, 60, 63, 66–88, 98, 101–115, 132, 147–150, 158, 162, 169, 170, 189, 191, 203–209, 218, 222–224, 230 Gothic, 1, 22, 23, 25, 29 Greek Ancient, 159, 201 Modern, 181 Icelandic, 181 Modern, 1, 3, 25, 28, 95, 97, 159–161, 200–202 Old, 23, 24 Italian, 161, 170 Latin, 158, 159, 161–163, 201 Maharati, 181 Malayalam, 20, 21, 221

Language index

266

Nahuatl, 156, 157 Norwegian, 166 Dano-Norwegian, 3, 26, 28, 161, 166, 198, 199 New Norwegian, 3, 25, 27, 92, 198, 199 Old, 25 Old Norse, 22–25, 28 Russian, 59, 181 Swedish, 3, 25–28, 34, 60, 66, 78–83, 87–96, 121, 166, 181–187, 198, 199, 224 Tsakhur, 59, 221 Turkish, 181 Yiddish, 2, 3, 220 Zapotec, 157, 158

Subject index A-first approach, 178, 179 aboutness relation, 130, 139 accessibility, 22 of events, 100, 111 of referents, 43, 52 accomplishments, 103 achievements, 103 activities, 103 additive particles, 6, 63, 137, 153 adjectives and intensifiers, 7, 75 argument structure of, 172, 173 of token identity, 3, 43 adverbials content, 78, 79, 90 definite, 72, 86 distribution of, 88, 89 event-internal, 71 higher-level, 76 instrumental, 72, 81 lower-level, 95 medial, 94, 95 of indefinite past, 69 of manner, 71, 74, 81, 82 of time and place, 73, 74, 81, 86, 95, 96 prepositional, 78 propositional, 72, 74 quantificational, 72, 73 scope of, 83 sentence, 70, 79 speech-act, 72, 74 syntax of, 90 types of, 67, 71, 85, 86, 94 VP-external, 7 vP-internal, 86 affix hopping, 225 agentivity, 106, 107, 110, 131, 141, 143, 150 aktionsart, 102, 104 alterity function, 44, 128, 135, 139

Subject index

268

anaphors, 2, 5, 14, 15, 20, 155, 157, 163–166, 168–170, 175, 176, 178, 179, 183, 191–193, 195, 200, 202, 203, 207, 228 referential deficiency of, 166 SE-anaphors, 158, 166, 169, 170, 186, 197, 205, 216, 218 SELF-anaphors, 158, 166, 170, 172, 182–184 animacy, 112, 114 antecedent, 155, 156, 159, 161, 188, 194, 198, 199, 205, 217, 230 and chain formation, 167, 175 clause-mate, 159, 160 co-argument, 163, 203 co-participant, 163 discourse, 182 distance from, 181 local, 9, 12, 16, 18, 158, 178, 196 long-distance, 159, 160, 182, 187, 199, 200, 203, 228 plural, 190 sentence-mate, 160 apposition, 16–18 appositive reflexives, 16 arity violation, 176 aspect, 104 assigned epistemic validator, 53 B-first approach, 179 binding conditions, 164, 166, 167, 178 revised, 167, 168 BINDING DOMAIN (constraint), 183, 192, 195, 205 binding domain, 156, 159, 162, 164, 165, 180, 217 Binding Theory, 163–168, 178, 179 CATEGORY MISMATCH, 216 centrality, 12, 13, 46, 61, 62, 65, 144, 151, 152 hierarchical, 50–52, 65 identifying, 47, 49, 52, 65 logophoric, 53, 65 situational, 47–49, 65 centre of perspective, 53 centre-periphery relation, 47, 61 chains formation of, 167, 169, 175, 176 interpretation of, 125, 126, 138 theory of, 166 types of, 229 choice functions, 42, 44 cleft-constructions, 37, 118 co-participation, 160 complement pied-piping, 89–92, 95, 98 complete functional complex, 165 contextual saliency, 52

Subject index

269

contrast local, 129 to alternatives, 37, 40–45, 54–57, 65, 101, 117, 118, 121, 128, 129, 135, 138, 149, 153, 199, 210, 211 contrastive topics, 38, 64 conversational implicatures and reflexivity, 10, 11, 39, 177, 178 generalized, 155, 178 definites attributive, 30, 31, 34 referential, 30, 34 deverbal derivation, 75, 86 Disjoint Reference Presumption, 10, 11, 178 domain of point of view, 53, 55 ECM-structures, 175, 194, 195, 202 emphatics, 2 event identification, 148 event nominals, 111, 112 event semantics, 121, 135, 136, 148 Davidsonian, 121, 122 neo-Davidsonian, 123, 148 event structure, 127 event variable, 122, 123, 127–129, 137 event-splitting representations, 122 events, 123 descriptions of, 8 tokens, 8, 129, 136, 138, 153 types, 136 eventualities, 123 exclusive particles, 63 expectancy, 143 extraposition, 90, 91 fact-function, 122, 123 facts, 123 FEATURAL ECONOMY, 183–185, 192, 205, 216 felicity conditions of exclusive SELF, 119 of inclusive SELF, 135, 137 FINALFOCUS, 90, 91 Fin(iteness) Phrase, 86 floating quantifiers, 84 focus anaphors, 170 focus particles, 58–65, 223 focus suppositions, 43–46, 65, 118, 119, 128, 129, 131, 135, 137–139, 149, 153 focusing adverbs, 63 Force Phrase, 86 Forefield, 75–77, 86 free foci, 37, 44, 118

Subject index

270

free indirect speech, 53 functional application, 124 functional motivation, 154, 190, 196 generalized quantifiers, 127 genericity, 30 givenness, 22, 43, 100, 111 governing category, 164 grammaticalization, 6, 10 head movement, 89, 225 heaviness, 89–93, 96, 98, 226 heavy shift, 89, 91–93, 96, 98, 226 hypoanalysis, 61 identity function, 4, 5, 8, 14, 36, 40–44, 54, 55, 65, 128, 148, 154, 155, 158, 170, 176, 177, 193– 196, 208, 211, 216 identity predicate, 9, 18, 145, 155, 171, 174, 177 impersonal passive, 157 inclusive effect, 137 indefiniters, 30, 31, 68, 69 de re, 31 existential, 69, 85 given, 22, 30, 33, 99 non-specific, 32, 34, 69, 70, 85, 97 existential, 68 generic, 68–70, 85 referential, 31 specific, 31, 34, 68, 70, 222 wide-scope, 31 index and binding, 188 inheritance, 188, 193 lexical, 187, 188, 193 referential, 186, 188, 193 inference to stereotype, 178 inflection strong, 23–25, 28, 29, 221 weak, 23–25, 28, 29, 221 intensifiers adnominal, 6 adverbial, 7 adverbial-exclusive, 6 adverbial-inclusive, 6 as focus particles, 144, 145 head-adjacent, 7, 8, 19, 22–30, 32, 34–36, 40, 43, 46, 53, 58–63, 65, 79, 99, 102, 107, 112, 115, 116, 118, 121, 141–144, 148, 151, 152, 222, 223 head-distant, 7, 8, 18, 19, 36, 44, 62, 64–71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 94, 99, 102– 106, 109, 110, 115, 117, 121, 126, 132–134, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148, 150, 153, 227

Subject index

271

exclusive, 7, 8, 72–89, 92–112, 116–121, 128–145, 148–153 inclusive, 7, 8, 72–74, 77–93, 96–99, 103–106, 110–117, 129, 133–141, 151–153 of Germanic languages, 2 internally dependent clauses, 159, 163, 201 involvement, 141 directness of, 143 iota-operator, 122 left periphery, 85 logophoricity, 53–56, 201 logophors, 228 M-implicature, 11, 12 mapping hypothesis, 125 maxim of manner, 10, 178, 183 maxim of quantity, 39, 178 Middle Field, 68, 71, 85 middle voice, 157 minimal subject of consciousness, 54 mode of presentation, 41, 45, 47, 56 MORPHOLOGICAL ECON. (cnstr.), 183–185, 192, 205, 216 morphological economy, 179 OBVIATION (constraint), 183–185 obviation, 181, 184, 186 obviative, 183, 186 *OTHER-DIRECTED BINDING, 191, 195, 197, 199, 202–206, 208, 214–219 PARSE, 183, 184, 192, 198 participation, 147 directness of, 142 high degree of, 141 periphery, 12, 13, 15, 46, 50, 52, 61 phrasal movement, 89, 90, 95, 225 predicates causative, 109 dynamic, 102, 107 resultative, 102, 133 semantic, 167, 168 stative, 102–104, 107 syntactic, 167, 168 typically other-directed, 5, 11–14, 154, 187, 196, 213 typically self-directed, 5, 11–13, 187, 196, 214, 215 unaccusative, 109 pro-drop, 206–208, 214 pronominals, 155, 163–166, 168, 178, 179, 183–185, 192, 203, 228 pronouns anaphoric, 228 distribution of, 68 finite-bound, 182

Subject index

272

intensive, 2 interrogative, 222 locally bound, 182 pleonastic, 212, 215 referential (in)dependence of, 20, 181, 182, 229 reflexive, 10–12, 16, 18, 101, 157–159, 162, 175, 182, 206, 214, 221 reflexive interpretation of, 2, 9–13 propositional background, 30, 34, 37, 40, 64, 99, 100, 111, 112, 115 protective SELF, 20, 176, 177, 196 PROX, 183, 192 proximate, 181, 183, 184, 186 psychological subject, 37 quantifying DPs, 30, 32 reciprocity, 157 reference to alternatives, 8, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 45, 56, 60, 87, 117, 133, 135, 136, 138, 142, 145, 153 referential economy, 179, 180, 183 reflexive-marking definition of, 167 lexical, 169 reflexives, 2 adjunct, 157, 158 co-argument, 160, 184, 186 co-participant, 160, 185, 194 compound, 158, 159, 162 emphatic, 2 finite-bound, 160 extra-inflectional, 161 intra-inflectional, 161 fused adjunct, 157 head, 157 long-distance bound, 57, 159 nominal, 156, 157, 159 non-finite-bound, 160–162 of Germanic languages, 2 pronominal, 158, 159, 162 sentence-mate, 160, 161 verbal, 156 reflexivity, 157 and movement, 228 and the identity function, 4, 5, 8, 154, 177 as a property of predicates, 167 definition of, 167 indirect, 159 SELF-forms as markers of, 2, 3, 208, 211 syntax of, 16, 21 repeatability, 105, 115

Subject index

273

scalar analyses of intensifiers, 58, 59 scalar focus particle, 26 scope, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 144 and movement, 67 of adverbials, 7, 82, 83, 94, 96, 97 of existential quantifier, 129, 137, 139, 160 of focus feature, 138 of indefinites, 32, 69, 85 of negation, 7, 63, 73, 74, 80, 83, 104, 105, 110 scrambling, 67, 68, 70, 78, 85, 86, 89, 97, 98 secondary propositional relation, 134–136, 139 secondary thematic relation, 118, 119, 129, 131–133, 135, 142, 145, 149, 153 selectional restrictions, 26, 34, 100, 102 SELF, see intensifiers situations, 123 Skolem-function, 130 skolemization, 130, 139 split-CP approach, 85 states, 103 structured propositions, 37, 58, 144 subject of consciousness, 53–57 subject-θ-role, 117, 119, 128, 135, 137 support verbs, 111 tense-feature, 124 theta-identification, 19, 146, 147, 172–174 thing-splitting representations, 122 transferability, 104, 106, 115 typology of pronouns, 181, 183, 185 of reflexives, 156, 157 untriggered SELF-forms, 57, 208–210, 213, 89, 90 V-to-T movement, 94, 95 Voice Phrase, 148