The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe
Tomáš Sirovátka
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The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe
Tomáš Sirovátka
Work and Welfare in Europe Series Editors: Denis Bouget, University of Nantes, France, Jochen Clasen, University of Edinburgh, UK, Ana Guillén Rodriguez, University of Oviedo, Spain, Jane Lewis, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK and Bruno Palier, Sciences-po Paris, France Titles include: Sigrid Betzelt and Silke Bothfeld ACTIVATION AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS IN EUROPE Challenges to Social Citizenship Sonja Drobnic and Ana Guillén Rodriguez WORK-LIFE BALANCE IN EUROPE The Role of Job Quality Colette Fagan, Maria Gonzalez Menendez and Silvia Gomez Anson WOMEN IN MANAGEMENT European Employment Policy Neil Fraser, Rodolfo Gutierrez and Ramon Pena-Cassas WORKING POVERTY IN EUROPE Paolo Graziano, Sophie Jacquot and Bruno Palier THE EU AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF WELFARE STATE REFORMS Europa, Europae Karl Hinrichs and Matteo Jessoula LABOUR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND PENSION REFORMS Flexible Today, Secure Tomorrow? Trudie Knijn WORK, FAMILY AND TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD IN EUROPE Birgit Pfau-Effinger and Tine Rostgaard CARE, WORK AND WELFARE IN EUROPE Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka THE GOVERNANCE OF ACTIVE WELFARE STATES IN EUROPE
Work and Welfare in Europe Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–28026–7 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England
Tomáš Sirovátka
The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe Edited by
Rik van Berkel Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Willibrord de Graaf Utrecht University, The Netherlands
and
Tomáš Sirovátka Masaryk University, Czech Republic
Tomáš Sirovátka
Selection and editorial matter © Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka 2011 Individual chapters © their respective authors 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–25200–4 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The governance of active welfare states in Europe / edited by Rik Van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf, Tomáš Sirovátka. p. cm. — (Work and welfare in Europe) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–25200–4 (hardback : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0–230–25200–1 (hardback) 1. Welfare state—Europe. 2. Europe—Social policy. 3. Europe—Politics and government—1989– I. Berkel, Rik van. II. Graaf, Willibrord de. III. Sirovátka, Tomáš. IV. Title. V. Series. HN373.5.G68 2011 361.6 5094—dc22 2011007806 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne
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Contents
List of Tables and Figures
vii
Notes on the Contributors
ix
Acknowledgements
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RECWOWE Book Series: Work and Welfare in Europe Funding
xv xvii
1 The Governance of Active Welfare States Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka 2 The Administration of Income Provision and Activation Services Rik van Berkel
1
22
3 Accelerating Governance Reforms: the French Case Anne Eydoux and Mathieu Béraud
38
4 Fragmented Governance Continued: the German Case Irene Dingeldey
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5 Steering with Sticks, Rowing for Rewards: the New Governance of Activation in the UK Sharon Wright 6 The Governance of Activation Policies in Italy: from Centralized and Hierarchical to a Multi-Level Open System Model? Paolo R. Graziano and Annelies Raué 7 The Liberal Governance of a Non-Liberal Welfare State? The Case of the Netherlands Rik van Berkel and Willibrord de Graaf 8 Marketization in a Federal System: New Modes of Governance in Unemployment Insurance and Social Assistance in Switzerland Franziska Ehrler and Fritz Sager v
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110
132
153
vi Contents
9 Governance of Activation Policies in the Czech Republic: Uncoordinated Transformation Tomáš Sirovátka and Jiˇrí Winkler 10 Decentralization and Back to Centralization: the Swedish Case Renate Minas 11 Governance of Integrated Activation Policy in Finland Vappu Karjalainen and Peppi Saikku
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195 216
12 The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe in a Comparative Perspective Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka
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Index
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List of Tables and Figures
Tables 1.1 Performance indicators in welfare-to-work programmes 1.2 Potential effects of governance reforms 1.3 Public expenditure on labour-market policies in 2007 (percentage of GDP) 2.1 Main actors and agencies involved in administrating Unemployment Benefit (UB) and Social Assistance (SA) schemes (2010) 2.2 Main actors and agencies in the provision of activation services (2010) 3.1 The public service for placement and unemployment compensation (prior to 2005) 3.2 The three circles of public employment services (since 2005) 3.3 Unemployment compensation (insurance and solidarity schemes) and social assistance 4.1 The implementation structure for income protection and activation in Germany (1990s and 2010) 5.1 Implementation structure for income protection and activation in the UK (late 1980s and 2010) 6.1 Employment and social policy governance models: a typology 6.2 Passive and active labour-market policies (ALMP) expenditure in selected EU countries (percentage of GDP, 2005) 6.3 Share of persons with an equalized disposable income below the poverty threshold in the EU 6.4 Relative household consumption-based poverty in Italy, regional distribution 2006–9 6.5 Distribution of tasks before and after the 1997 reforms 6.6 Main Italian trade unions’ internal composition (2009) 7.1 Implementation structure for income protection and activation in the Netherlands (late 1980s and 2010)
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13 17 19
28 35 42 43 45 65 91 112
114 115 115 124 129 134
viii List of Tables and Figures
7.2 Volume of started activation trajectories (1999–2005) 7.3 Target groups of Work First (percentage of municipalities in which the named target group is the main target group of Work First programmes, 2005–6) 8.1 Main governance reforms in Switzerland 9.1 Trends in governance of activation after accession to the EU (2004) 10.1 Main governance reforms in Sweden 11.1 Ended unemployment periods in LAFOS (2004–7) 11.2 Network governance model in activation policy
148
148 159 178 196 230 231
Figures 6.1 Total unemployment rate (percentages) 6.2 Expenditure for services targeted to families, elderly people and the disabled (1980–2000) 11.1 Position of Labour Force Service Centres (LAFOS) within the administrative structure for activation policy
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Notes on the Contributors
Mathieu Béraud is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Nancy 1 (Henri Poincaré), France, Researcher at 2L2S (Institute of Sociology, Lorraine, France) and GREE (Group of Research on Education and Employment). His fields of research are employment and social policies, as well as the organization of work and working conditions. He is participating in several national and international research programmes in these topics. Willibrord de Graaf is Associate Professor at the Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His research is in welfare state development, in particular labour market and activation; his interests include the theme of a multicultural society, and in particular the transition from school to work of young migrants. He is also involved with the homeless. Irene Dingeldey is Head of the research unit ‘Changes in the Working Society’, Institute of Work and Labour at the University of Bremen, Germany. She holds a PhD in social science and has worked on various comparative EU research Projects on family tax systems and labourmarket policies. Most recently she has edited a book on ‘Governance of Welfare State Reform’ and contributed to several comparative books on labour-market reforms and the development of human rights. A comparison of Activating Welfare States will be published in Germany in 2011. Her articles have been published in peer-reviewed journals like the European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Social Policy, Feminist Economics and Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Franziska Ehrler studied Political Science and Economics at the Universities of Bern (Switzerland) and Bordeaux (France), and now works as a scientific collaborator at the Swiss Conference for Social Aid and Welfare and as a research assistant at the Centre of Competence for Public Management at the University of Bern. Her main research interests lie within the fields of social policy and family policy. ix
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Notes on the Contributors
Anne Eydoux is Senior Lecturer in Economics, Researcher at the CRESSLessor, University of Rennes 2, France, and Associate Researcher at the Centre for Employment Studies. She is also a member of the European Network of Experts on Gender, Social Inclusion, Health and Long Term Care (EGGSI). Her fields of research are employment and social policies, social inclusion and gender studies. She has coordinated several national research programmes and is the author of many articles and book chapters on employment, social policies and gender. Paolo R. Graziano is Assistant Professor at Bocconi University, Italy and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for European Studies, Sciences-Politiques, Paris. He has collaborated on a number of comparative projects on topics relating to social policy, Europeanization and social integration. He has published two books in Italian on Europeanization (2004, Il Mulino) and CSR promotion policies (Franco Angeli, 2009, with Matteo Bassoli), has co-edited a book on Europeanization (Palgrave, 2007, with M.P. Vink). He has also published in the following international journals: European Journal for Political Research, European Political Science, European Journal of Social Security, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Global Social Policy, Journal of Social Policy, Regional and Federal Studies, Social Policy and Administration. Vappu Karjalainen is Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) in Helsinki, Finland and a Docent in Rehabilitation Science (University of Lapland, Finland). Her fields of interest are long-term unemployment, activation and rehabilitation policy, with a special focus on active social policy and network approaches in organization of welfare services. She has contributed to a recent book on governance of activation policy in Yuri Kazepov (ed.): Rescaling social policies. A comparative study on the path towards multi-level governance in Europe (London: Ashgate, 2010). Renate Minas is Associate Professor of Social Work at Stockholm University, Sweden, and a Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm. Her fields of interest are welfare state reforms in Sweden and Europe, with a special focus on social assistance schemes and activation policies from a governance perspective. Some recent publications include ‘Social expenditures and public administration – are local social assistance costs in Sweden a matter of organisation?’, International Journal of Social Welfare (2010), as well as ‘The territorial organization of
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European social assistance schemes’, ‘Actors and governance arrangements in the field of social assistance’ and ‘Rescaling development in Europe: convergence or divergence?’, all published in Y. Kazepov (ed.) (2010) Rescaling of social welfare policies. A comparative study on the path towards multi-level governance in Europe (London: Ashgate, 2010). Annelies Raué currently works as Research Assistant at the Institute of Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP) at Columbia University, USA, where she focuses on the use and efficacy of social programmes, in particular education, in developing-country settings. She holds a Bachelor of European Studies from the University of Maastricht, the Netherlands (2008) and continued her studies as a Fulbright Fellow at Columbia University in New York, where she received a Master of International Affairs (2010). During her studies she worked with Professor Graziano in Italy at Bocconi University’s Department of Institutional Analysis and Public Management. Fritz Sager is Professor of Political Science at the Centre of Competence for Public Management at the University of Bern, Switzerland. He is specialized in administrative studies and theory, policy research, programme evaluation, organizational analysis and Swiss politics. He has acted as external expert for the Federal Government in various policy fields such as health, transport, environment, security, vocational education and international relations. His research has been published in the Public Administration Review, Governance, Public Administration, Policy & Politics, Political Studies, West European Politics, Journal of Urban Affairs, Public Money & Management, Evaluation, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée and the Swiss Political Science Review, among others. In 2010 he won the Marshall E. Dimock Award for the best lead article in Public Administration Review during the volume year 2009. Peppi Saikku (M.Soc.Sc.) is Researcher at the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) in Helsinki, Finland. She has participated in a number of national evaluation projects on integrated service structures in the fields of social and health care, employment services and rehabilitation. She has had several national publications in these topics. Tomáš Sirovátka is Professor of Social Policy at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic. His research is focused on the labour market, employment and social policy. He has published numerous books in the Czech Republic and contributed
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to several comparative books on employment and social policies – recently in A. Cerami and P. Vanhuysse (eds) Post-Communist welfare pathways. Theorizing social policy transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (Palgrave, 2009); in R. van Berkel and B. Valkenburg (eds) Making it personal. Individualising activation services in the EU (The Policy Press, 2007); and in A. Serrano Pascual and P. Magnusson (eds) Reshaping welfare states and activation regimes in Europe (Peter Lang, 2007). He has published in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, European Journal of Social Security, International Review of Sociology, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Social Policy and Administration, Journal of Marriage and the Family, Czech Sociological Review and Prague Economic Papers. Rik van Berkel is Associate Professor at the School of Governance of Utrecht University, the Netherlands. His research interests are situated on the interface of social policy, public administration and public organization studies, and include active welfare state transformations, the introduction of new models for the provision of social services, and processes of change in public organizations responsible for the implementation of social policy and governance reforms. He has published several edited volumes and articles in journals such as Public Administration, Journal of Social Policy, Journal of European Social Policy, Social Policy and Society and European Journal of Social Work. Jiˇrí Winkler is Associate Professor in Social Policy and social work at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic. He researches and lectures on the design, management and implementation of public programmes in social policy and employment, and on organizational development in public administration institutions. He has coordinated or has taken part in many international and national research projects, in recent years focusing on labour-market and employment policy or childcare. Recently he has worked as a government expert for the Roma Decade Programme (integration in the labour market) and currently as national expert in the Peer Review Programme (for disability management in the labour market) of the European Commission. Aside from 70 articles in peer-reviewed journals, he is the author of several Czech monographs such as Implementation: institutional aspect of the analysis (2002), Theory of decision-making and social policy dynamic (2007) and co-editor of the Czech monographs Czech labour market and the European employment strategy (2004) and Labour market insecurities (2009).
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Notes on the Contributors
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Sharon Wright is Lecturer in Social Policy at the University of Stirling, UK. Her research has included an ethnographic street-level study of employment services implementation from adviser and user perspectives; a 3-year European research project comparing employment advice services for out-of-work adults in five countries; and an in-depth study, based in Australia for six months, comparing welfare reforms and the contracting-out of employment services with the UK. She was Managing Co-editor of the journal Social Policy & Society and member of the UK Social Policy Association Executive Committee (2006–11). Recent publications include Contracting out employment services: lessons from Australia, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (Child Poverty Action Group, 2008) and, with Dr Tess Ridge, Understanding Inequality, Poverty and Wealth: policies and prospects (The Policy Press, 2008).
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Acknowledgements
This book is the result of one of the activities undertaken in the context of the EU-funded sixth Framework Programme’s Network of Excellence ‘Reconciling Work and Welfare’ (RECWOWE; see http://recwowe.eu). The central objective of RECWOWE is to create a European research network capable of overcoming the fragmentation of existing research on questions of work and welfare in Europe; its aim is to promote the research excellence required in identifying and understanding the multiple tensions between work and welfare, as well as strategies for managing or resolving these. The network was begun in 2006, for a period of 5 years. We would like to thank the RECWOWE participants, and especially the participants and coordinators of the working group ‘Toward employment-friendly welfare states’, for providing an inspiring and stimulating environment for working on this book.
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RECWOWE Book Series: Work and Welfare in Europe
Series Preface Since the late 1970s, both labour markets and welfare regimes have been under intense economic pressure and have been challenged by profound changes in social and demographic structures, as well as in social norms. The work–welfare relationship has always been key to the modern state, but has undergone substantial change over recent decades. On the one hand, approaches to social provision have become more explicit in recognizing the importance of the relationship to employment, such that it is possible to suggest that social policies have become ‘employmentled’. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that there is a profound ‘disconnect’ between labour markets and welfare systems, and that this partly explains the socio-economic problems that some countries are facing in terms of high unemployment and low activity rates in particular. Changes in labour markets, which have often tended towards more flexibilization, often pose challenges to the protective goals of social policies; thus the financial and programmatic configurations of social policies are often held to have impeded job creation. These arguments over the nature and effects of the relationships between labour markets and welfare systems have been, and are, intense and need to be further analysed. These relationships between labour markets and welfare systems constitute the backdrop for this series, which takes as its starting point the tensions that now characterize this centrally important relationship between ‘work and welfare’. Among these tensions, one might mention the tension between firms’ demands for more labour market flexibility and citizens’ needs for economic security; the tensions between the increased participation in paid work and the importance of family life; the greater fluidity in family relationships; the greater flexibility in the labour markets; the friction between quantity and quality of the jobs to be created, between job creation and maintaining or improving the quality of employment; and finally, the conflicts raised by the need to adapt (industrial) social protection systems to new labour market structures. xv
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RECWOWE Book Series: Work and Welfare in Europe
This book series has been created within RECWOWE, a European network of excellence created within the 6th Framework Programme of the European Commission (FP6). The full title for the network’s activities is ‘Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe’. Such a reconciliation is an important political objective for most EU member states. In order to meet it we need to improve our understanding of the relationship between work and welfare in very diverse national settings across member states. The RECWOWE series publishes books that analyse work and welfare, and that pay particular attention to the tensions that now characterize this relationship. Beyond the main tensions mentioned above, the series is open to any other forms of analysis of the relationship between work and welfare. It is committed to publishing work that focuses on the gender dimension of this relationship, on the impact of the relationship on migrants and, at its multi-level – European, national and local institutional dimensions. Denis Bouget, University of Nantes Jochen Clasen, University of Edinburgh Ana Guillen, University of Oviedo Bruno Palier, Sciences-po Paris Jane Lewis, London School of Economics and Political Science
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Funding
This book has been published thanks to the European research project RECWOWE (Reconciling Work and Welfare in Europe), 2006– 2011, co-funded by the European Commission, under 6th Framework Programme for Research – Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities (contract nr 028339–2) in the Directorate-General for Research. The information and views set out in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein.
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1 The Governance of Active Welfare States Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf and Tomáš Sirovátka
Introduction All over Europe, activation or active labour-market policies have become important instruments to promote the transition from welfare to work, that is, to (re)integrate unemployed people dependent on social insurance or social assistance in the labour market. Activation policies, that is programmes and services aimed at promoting the employability and labour-market participation of unemployed people, play a key role in making welfare states more activating and in reducing welfare state dependency. The European Employment Strategy, which contains specific guidelines with respect to the introduction of activation programmes, clearly endorses this orientation of social policies. European countries reveal significant variety in their activation strategies and policies: in the public expenditure on activation,1 in the nature and content of activation programmes, in the coverage of programmes and in the treatment of various target groups, and so on (Barbier, 2004; Dingeldey, 2007). Nevertheless, the social problems of unemployment and welfare state dependency are dealt with in quite different ways nowadays in the European countries compared with, say, two decades ago. Social policy analysts have written extensively on this new trend in welfare states, comparing and analysing the content of activation programmes, the consequences of the activation of welfare state arrangements for unemployed people, the effects of programmes on labour-market (re)entry, etcetera (see, for example, Lødemel and Trickey, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Van Berkel and Hornemann Møller, 2002; Handler, 2004; Serrano Pascual, 2004; Hvinden and Johansson, 2007; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson, 2007). These content-related aspects of active welfare state reforms are not the core topic of this book. Instead, in 1
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this book we will look at another type of welfare state reforms, namely those that some have called reforms of operational policies (Carmel and Papadopoulos (2003) distinguish operational and formal policies, where the latter regulate substantial, content-related aspects of social policies and the former the organization of policy delivery). These reforms affect the ways in which the provision and delivery of social policies are organized or, put differently, the governance of social policies (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007). The concept of governance has been widely discussed in the social sciences, and has been defined in a variety of ways (Rhodes, 2000; Newman, 2001; Hill and Hupe, 2002). For some authors, governance is practically synonymous with government. For example, for Kettl (2002, p. ix) governance ‘is the way government gets the job done’. Others argue that governance refers to ‘a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed’ (Rhodes, 2002, p. 209). In this context, governance may be an umbrella concept referring to a variety of forms of governance. Rhodes (2002), for example, distinguished six uses of the concept of governance. It may also have a more narrow and specific definition, such as Jessop’s (2003, p. 101): ‘the reflexive self-organisation of independent actors involved in complex relations of reciprocal interdependence, with such self-organisation being based on continuous dialogue and resource-sharing to develop mutually beneficial joint projects and to manage the contradictions and dilemmas inevitably involved in such situations’. For the purpose of this book, an encompassing rather than specific definition is more adequate, as we want to be able to distinguish various types, forms, models or regimes of governance. Rather than developing our own definition, the following definition of Kooiman and Bavinck (2005, p. 17) covers the way in which governance will be used in this book quite accurately: ‘Governance is the whole of public as well as private interactions taken to solve societal problems and create social opportunities. It includes the formulation and application of principles guiding those interactions and care for institutions that enable them’. Both the activation of unemployed people and providing them with income support are actions taken to solve societal problem and create social opportunities – irrespective of questions regarding the desirability or effectiveness of these actions. In providing activation and income support, a range of both public and private actors is involved: national and municipal authorities; public or semi-public agencies such as benefit agencies, Public Employment Services (PES), welfare agencies; private actors such as reintegration companies, NGOs, employers’
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and employees’ organizations, and so on. The principles guiding these interactions are laid down in the operational policies mentioned before. They may regulate the tasks and responsibilities of both national, regional and local state actors; they structure interactions between public and private agencies (for example, through quasi-market or network principles) and between various public agencies (for example, through principles guiding inter-agency cooperation and coordination). Care for institutions that enable them points at the importance of supporting and facilitating public and private actors in contributing to the solving of societal problems, and to the processes of capacity building for policy implementation that, as we will see, is a recurrent issue in active welfare state reforms. Governance reforms have become increasingly important aspects of public sector and welfare state reforms in general, and of the delivery of income protection and activation programmes for unemployed people specifically. Elsewhere it has been argued that, although reforms of the governance of income protection and activation programmes cannot be seen in isolation from wider public sector reforms, the transformation of passive into active welfare states has created its own governance reform urgencies (Van Berkel, 2010). Following the definition of governance presented above, activation involves new actions to solve societal problems and create social opportunities, and these ask for a reconsideration of public as well as private interactions, for the principles underlying these interactions and for the organizational capacities that these actions require. For example, income provision and activation are integrated in active welfare states as part of the conditionality of income provision. In contexts where both functions are organized separately, inter-agency cooperation and coordination are considered necessary. In addition, activation services are an important instrument in promoting unemployed people’s employability and labour-market participation. In particular where the long-term unemployed are concerned, individualized services are considered necessary to make activation successful, which may ask for local decision-making space in designing services or for the involvement in service-provision processes of a variety of providers of social services. In recent years, social scientific researchers have begun paying attention to these governance reforms in the policy areas of activation and income support programmes for unemployed people of working age. This has stimulated interdisciplinary approaches integrating insights and theories from the social policy, public administration and public management research fields. By now, publications are available on
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a range of specific governance-related issues in these policy areas (see Van Berkel and Borghi, 2008), such as marketization (Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2005), contractualism (Sol and Westerveld, 2005), inter-agency cooperation (Lindsay and McQuaid, 2008) and individualized service provision (Van Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007), whereas other publications focus on governance in a broader sense (Considine, 2001; Bredgaard and Larsen, 2005; Larsen and Van Berkel, 2009). This book aims to contribute to this relatively new strand in social scientific research.
Research questions This book analyses and compares governance reforms in the policy areas of activation and income protection for unemployed people in nine European countries. The reason for focusing on these policy areas is that – as mentioned before – they have become more closely linked and integrated, partly as a logical consequence of the increasing conditionality of entitlements to income provision. The book covers the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Switzerland; these countries represent Europe’s diversity in various ways. The countries include both large and small European countries, and they also include social-democratic (Sweden, Finland, Netherlands), liberal (UK), conservative (Germany, France, Switzerland), southern European (Italy) and post-communist (Czech Republic) welfare states. In addition, they cover countries with above and below EU average public expenditures on labour-market policies (see note 1). And from a public administration point of view, the selection of countries discussed in this book includes countries with a conservative trajectory of public management reform, modernizers, as well as marketizers (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). The book is the result of joint work by the authors in the context of a network of European researchers funded by the EU’s 6th Framework Programme: Reconciling Work and Welfare (RECWOWE). Two sets of research questions will be addressed in this book, the first addressing the nature of governance reforms. What governance reforms have been taking place in the countries? In terms of the definition of governance used in this book, this question refers to the public and private actors involved in the provision of activation and income support, on the structure of their interactions and the principles guiding these interactions, as well as the ways in which these actors are equipped to carry out their tasks and responsibilities. In addition, these reforms
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will be analysed in terms of various guiding principles of new modes of governance: – new distributions of centralized and decentralized policy making and policy implementation responsibilities; – the introduction of quasi markets, based on the principle of competition, in the provision of activation services and programmes; – the promotion of inter-agency cooperation and partnerships involving the agencies traditionally responsible for these policy areas (social insurance funds, local welfare agencies and the PES), as well as other service providers; – the introduction of new public management instruments affecting interactions between various levels of the state and interactions between national and local offices of public agencies. At a more abstract level, the question can be raised whether we see shifts of governance regimes in the countries involved in the study. The literature on governance distinguishes several of these governance regimes, which will be elaborated upon below. The second set of questions concerns the intended and unintended effects of the reforms. These questions can be approached from two points of view. First, one can evaluate whether or not governance reforms promote the labour-market participation of unemployed people: many of these reforms are justified by arguing that they support the reforms aimed at making welfare states more activating, and that they contribute to promote welfare-to-work transitions. In other words, governance or operational policy reforms are expected to support and promote the effective implementation of the new active welfare state paradigm. Secondly, the question can be raised on how governance reforms affect the nature and content of welfare state services, as well as the treatment and approach of the unemployed. Rather than interpreting new governance systems and structures as merely technical ways to get things done, that is, to administer benefit systems and effectively provide activation and employment services, we will address the issue of the impact of governance reforms on substantial characteristics of social policies: the nature, quality and responsiveness of services, the treatment of unemployed people in service provision processes, etcetera. The literature on active welfare state reforms has paid considerable attention to the ways in which substantial policy reforms affect the rights and obligations of unemployed people, and to the impact of modern welfare states on social citizenship (Peck, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Handler,
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2004). This book wants to explore whether governance reforms may have similar effects. The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, some of the main characteristics of, and guiding principles underlying governance reforms will be discussed. Then, attention will be paid to the literature on governance regimes. These sections provide the framework for analysing governance reforms in the following chapters. The fifth section of this chapter focuses on effects of governance reforms. In the final section, the structure of the book will be presented.
Governance reforms: principles, actors, capacities In this section we will discuss some of the main principles underlying governance reforms that are discussed in the literature and are relevant for the social policy areas analysed in this book. In discussing these principles, attention will also be paid to the increasing diversity of actors involved in these policy areas, as well as to the issue of organizational capacities that welfare state reforms require. Decentralization In their comparative study of public management reform, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) deconstructed the concept of decentralization by distinguishing three strategic choices: – Political decentralization versus administrative decentralization. In the first case, policy authority shifts from national government to regional or local elected political representatives. In the second, authority is shifted to some (formally independent) public agency. In the context of activation and employment policies, Mosley (2009) described this distinction in terms of a decentralization of policy responsibilities versus a decentralization of managerial discretion. – Competitive versus non-competitive decentralization. This refers to the means by which authority is passed to an agency and whether or not competition is involved. – Internal versus external decentralization. This refers to the issue of whether authority is passed within the organization or to an independent entity outside the organization. Focusing specifically on activation or employment services, Greffe (see OECD, 2003) has listed several reasons why national governments decide to opt for decentralization, most of which relate to societal
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changes and policy responses to these changes that require policy making and/or policy delivery processes in proximity to the contexts and collective and individual actors involved: the multifaceted nature of unemployment, the increasing volatility of the labour market in a globalizing and knowledge-based economy, the aim to develop innovative solutions through local partnerships, the transformation of passive into active welfare states and – for programmes aimed at promoting social inclusion in a broader sense than paid employment – the identification and development of activities that can promote social participation. In the literature on decentralization in the context of activation or labour-market policies, the strategic choices distinguished by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) are clearly present (for example, Giguère, 2005). First, internal decentralization takes place in public agencies involved in benefit administration and providing activation services. For example, national agencies responsible for PES may decide to give regional/local agencies more room in making decisions regarding programme design and programme delivery, in order to increase their ability to adapt national policies to regional/local circumstances. Secondly, political decentralization occurs when national governments devolve policy competences to regional or local governments. Similar motives may be at stake here, namely providing regional or local actors with the authority to develop services and policy programmes that are adjusted to local labour-market circumstances or to the characteristics of local target populations. Thirdly, competitive decentralization takes place when quasi-markets are established for the provision of publicly financed services such as activation and employment services. We will return to this later in the chapter. Capacity building is considered to be a major issue in decentralization processes. Mosley argues that the decentralization of responsibilities for social policy programmes to regional or local levels requires, among others, ‘being able to coordinate local actors, analyse local needs, develop appropriate strategies, implement programmes, monitor, control and evaluate performance, and comply with accountability standards that may be required by higher level authorities’ (Mosley, 2009, p. 37). In discussing the various strategic choices concerning decentralization, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000, p. 85) make an important observation that is relevant in the context of our social policy areas as well: Centralization is also part of the picture: as some authority has been decentralized, simultaneously there have been significant instances of a tightening of central control and oversight.
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In other words, when analysing governance reforms, we should focus on both decentralization and centralization trends. These trends may occur diachronically: periods of decentralization may alternate with periods of centralization, and vice versa (Pollitt, 2008). They may also take place synchronically, for example, when decentralization is accompanied by measures that should ensure that regional/local actors act in accordance with national policy objectives. In this context, the introduction of what has been called an incentive paradigm (Van der Veen and Trommel, 1999) in public administration and the use of new public management instruments (such as performance indicators, benchmarking processes, funding mechanisms) may influence local decision-making processes. Thus, even though decentralization does increase the room for local decision making and for tailoring activation programmes to local needs, the conditions under which decentralization takes place may put considerable constraints on the decisions local actors make, and may in practice function as a process of implicit centralization. Centralization may also take place as part of the capacity-building process. Municipalities may decide or be obliged to share resources with other municipalities in order to professionalize service provision processes. In several countries (for example, Denmark, the Netherlands), public administration reforms have been accompanied by mergers of municipalities in order to increase the scale at which local services are provided.
Marketization and competition Another new form of governance in welfare-to-work programmes is the introduction of principles of subcontracting, marketization and competition in service provision, accompanied by splitting the roles of service purchaser and service provider. Although subcontracting does not necessarily have to take place in a competition context (Sultana and Watts, 2004), our focus here will be on – using Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2000) terminology – competitive decentralization. Markets for providing activation and employment services often reveal characteristics of quasi-markets: purchasing power does not come from the consumers of services (unemployed people) but from the state and state agencies that act as purchasers on the market (LeGrand, 1991). The idea behind the introduction of quasi-markets in service provision is that promoting competition will have a positive impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of services, on their quality and flexibility or responsiveness to local and individual needs, and on their price.
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Markets of activation services may differ in numerous aspects. Firstly, the nature of the service purchasers may vary. Purchasers may be PES agencies or benefit agencies, and purchasing may take place at central, regional or local levels. In some cases, unemployed people act as purchasers (even though their purchasing power still comes from the state) through instruments such as vouchers, personal reintegration budgets or individual reintegration agreements (Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Kaps, 2009). Secondly, the nature of the providers may vary as well: they may involve (semi-)public agencies, private non-profit organizations and NGOs or private for-profit companies. Thirdly, the nature of contracts between purchasers and providers can be different. For example, Struyven et al. (2002) distinguish between classic contracts and trust contracts. Trust contracts are concluded for a longer time period than classic contracts, are less detailed in specification and involve more intense cooperation between purchaser and provider. Contracts may also differ in their underlying incentives for performance, for example, in terms of whether they are based on no cure, no pay or no cure, less pay mechanisms (Bruttel, 2005). Fourthly (partly related to the former), competition can vary in strength and in nature (for example, competition on price or on quality). Fifthly, the degree and nature of state regulation of the market can be different: states can rely on market selfregulation or decide to introduce regulations concerning, for example, market access, price, or nature of services. In addition, states can oblige the agencies that act as purchasers to outsource services fully or partially, or can leave this decision with the agencies. Finally, the roles of, and distribution of tasks between, purchasers and providers can be different. For example, purchasers can act as referral agencies, leaving decisions about the nature of services to the providers; or they may intervene more directly in individual activation processes of clients (Jewell, 2007). These examples of market diversity make clear that apart from the question of whether countries introduce quasi-markets for the provision of activation services, the characteristics of these markets are also an interesting research topic. Once again, building organizational capacities to enable public agencies to act as purchasers in the service market is an important topic. These agencies will have to gain insight into the market, the providers and the kind of services that their clients need, to develop tendering procedures and monitor the performance of providers, and to decide about how they want to design relationships with external providers. Of the various new forms of governance, marketization has probably been discussed and investigated most (Considine, 2001; Bredgaard
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and Larsen, 2005; Sol and Westerveld, 2005; Struyven and Steurs, 2005; Van Berkel and Van der Aa, 2005). These studies make clear that quasimarkets for the provision of activation and employment services are not a typical liberal welfare state phenomenon. Even though the USA and Australia were the first to introduce quasi-markets, they can now be found in all welfare regime types, as later chapters will illustrate. Inter-agency cooperation and partnerships Inter-agency cooperation and partnerships are the third principle underlying new forms of governance. We will use inter-agency cooperation to denote cooperation between public agencies traditionally involved in benefit administration and employment services: benefit agencies, local welfare agencies and PES. Strictly speaking, it is not a new form of governance (Newman, 2001), but nevertheless, major reforms aimed at promoting inter-agency cooperation have been taking place across the EU. Cooperation between these agencies can be promoted for several reasons: – The increasing conditionality of income support requires exchange of information regarding the activation activities of unemployed people and their compliance with obligations. – Coordination between income protection schemes may be needed to promote efficient and effective activation of unemployed people and to prevent transferrals between income protection programmes. – Service coordination and integration may also be promoted in order to make services more accessible and user friendly. Inter-agency cooperation can take a variety of forms. For example, agencies can bring their front offices together under one roof, or establish a new agency in which their front office activities are shared and direct client contacts take place. These so-called one-stop agencies should prevent the requirement for clients to be referred from one agency to another, or from one counter to another. More far-reaching forms are possible too, and may involve full mergers of formerly independent agencies. Partnerships involve more far-reaching forms of cooperation and coordination than inter-agency cooperation, in the sense that they include a large range of public and private actors in service provision. They are a new form of governance proper: according to Jessop (2000), they are a response to the failures of (quasi-)markets without a return to the state which, in his view, was politically and ideologically
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unacceptable. Geddes and Benington (2001, p. 2) argued that partnership is a concept ‘to promote integration both vertically (between different tiers of government – European, national, regional, local and grass roots) and horizontally (between different spheres of society – public, private, voluntary and civil)’. Partnerships are attempts to govern complex social problems, and in the context of social security and activation are considered a fruitful approach in providing services for the long-term and most vulnerable groups of unemployed, who – at least in a significant number of cases – are not only confronted with problems regarding labour-market participation, but also with problems in areas such as housing, drug addiction, health, debts, or child care. A study of partnerships carried out in the 1990s by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Geddes, 1998) identified several factors that contribute to building partnerships and directly refer to the capacity-building issue: an identification of the benefits gained by cooperation; strong leadership; skilled management and staff; strong shared local identity; active participation of all partners in strategic decisions and implementation; seeing new solutions to problems; obtaining new resources, as well as maintaining a solid resource base; appropriate skills training and development. New public management In many publications, new public management is defined in a broad sense as a new public administration paradigm that includes several of the guiding principles underlying interactions between public and private actors, as discussed above. For example, Carroll and Steane (2002, p. 196) write that new public management is a form of public management 1. whose proponents affirm that private sector management models and techniques can be applied in the public sector; 2. that is associated with a commitment to plural models of the provision of public services by a mixture of business, the non-profit sector and government actors, emphasizing the importance of cost, choice and quality in the precise mix of service providers; 3. that is associated with a revised role for government in the provision of public services, characterized as ‘steering not rowing’; 4. that expresses a strong belief in the role of the market and quasimarket mechanisms in coordinating the supply and demand for public services and the use of contractual mechanisms for the governance of provision;
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5. that attempts a separation of the political decision-making processes from the management of public services. In this book, we will use the concept of new public management in a somewhat narrower sense, focusing on the principles guiding the ways in which national governments steer public agencies and manage their conduct and, more specifically, their performance. Newman (2001) used the concept of politics of performance in this context, highlighting the pivotal role of results and effects in the new public management. Van der Veen and Trommel’s (1999) concept of incentive paradigm emphasizes that active welfare states are based on an image of human conduct – which not only includes the conduct of unemployed people but also of collectivities such as public agencies and other actors involved in social policy making and implementation – that is driven by economic and rational calculations: Citizens and organizations are motivated by self-interest (or organizational interest), and will always weigh the costs and benefits of conformist behavior. In such a model, the public interest requires that these calculations are influenced in such a way that self-interest (or organizational interest) corresponds as far as possible with public goals. Van der Veen and Trommel (1999, p. 294) In their volume on contractualism in employment services, Sol and Westerveld emphasize the importance of management by objectives and what they call internal public contracts ‘which are aimed at managing public actors by means of agreements on outputs and are directed at demarcating the playing fields for PES and lower-level public authorities such as municipalities’ (Sol and Westerveld, 2005, p. 384). This literature shows that new public management is characterized strongly by performance steering and by using incentives and disincentives as steering mechanisms. One of the core issues in debates about new public management is the issue of how to define performance indicators and what to measure in performance measurement. In their famous book on the entrepreneurial state, Osborne and Gaebler (1992, pp. 356–7) provide the following overview of performance indicators in the context of welfare-to-work programmes, that clearly show the political nature of decisions regarding selected indicators (Table 1.1).
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Performance indicators in welfare-to-work programmes
Indicator
General definition
Welfare-to-work
Output (or process)
Volume of units produced
Numbers of people trained
Outcome (or result)
Quality/effectiveness of production: degree to which it creates desired outcomes
Numbers of people placed in jobs, working and not in receipt of welfare after six months, one year and beyond. Impact on their lives
Programme outcome
Effectiveness of specific programme in achieving desired outcomes
Numbers placed in jobs, working and not in receipt of welfare after six months, one year and beyond. Impact on their lives
Policy outcome
Effectiveness of broader policies in achieving fundamental goals
Percentage of potential work force unemployed, on welfare and in poverty; percentage of welfare population in receipt of welfare more than one year, five years
Programme efficiency
Cost per unit of output
Cost per job trainee; placement; retained job, etcetera
Policy efficiency
Cost to achieve fundamental goals
Cost to achieve desired decrease in unemployment, poverty rate, welfare caseload
Programme effectiveness
Degree to which programme yields desired outcomes
Numbers placed in jobs, working and not in receipt of welfare after six months, one year and beyond. Impact on their lives
Policy effectiveness
Degree to which fundamental goals and citizens needs are met
Effect on larger society: for example, poverty rate, welfare caseload, crime rate, later spending to remediate poverty
Derived from Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Appendix B.
Governance regimes Another, though not completely different, theoretical perspective for analysing governance reforms comes from the literature on governance regimes. These regimes can be interpreted as ideal-type governance
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models and can be helpful in identifying broader governance reform trends. Newman (2001) distinguished four models of governance: the hierarchy model, the rational goal model, the open-system model and the self-governance model. These models are described as follows (Newman, 2001, p. 38): – The hierarchical model corresponds with what others (for example, Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000) called the old public administration, and is oriented towards control, predictability and accountability and based on formal authority. – The rational goal model captures the new public management reforms in a broad sense, with their strong emphasis on performance and (dis)incentives. It is oriented at maximization of output and outcome as well as economic rationalism, and based on managerial power. – The open-system model is most closely related to the partnership model mentioned before. Its focus is on flexibility, expansion and adaptation, and it is based on flows of power within networks (network governance is a concept more or less akin to this model of governance). – The self-governance model is a governance model that is absent in most of the other governance literature, although some of its characteristics will sound familiar. It is oriented towards devolution, participation and sustainability, and based on citizen and community power. Considine’s (2001) study of the public management of welfare-towork is one of the studies that does not specifically distinguish a self-governance model. This exemplifies the concept that citizen or community power is particularly underdeveloped in governing the social problems of unemployment and social exclusion, which in the context of active welfare states are so often constructed in terms of individual responsibilities and obligations rather than individual entitlements and empowerment – in as far as the concept of empowerment is present in the activation discourse, it refers mainly to the (rather paternalistic) notion that labour-market participation will empower citizens rather than putting them in charge of their lives or, more specifically, their activation (Van Berkel and Valkenburg, 2007). Considine’s study distinguishes four governance models. In this book, we will use these models as a heuristic typology in analysing and comparing the broader trends that characterize the often numerous specific governance reforms that have been taking place in the countries in this
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study. Considine described these governance models in terms of four dimensions: the sources of rationality, forms of control, primary virtues and service delivery focuses that characterize each model. These four dimensions can be seen as an elaboration of the principles guiding the interactions between (both public and private) actors mentioned in the definition of governance discussed in the above. First, he distinguished procedural governance: its source of rationality is the law, the form of control used are rules, its primary virtue is reliability, and the service provision focus is on universal treatment. In other words, procedural governance resembles the old public administration or what Newman called the hierarchical model of governance. Newman’s rational goal governance model is represented in two of Considine’s types of governance: corporate governance and market governance. The sources of rationality are management in the corporate governance type, and competition in the market governance model. The forms of control used are plans and contracts respectively. Whereas the primary virtue in the corporate governance type is that it is goal-driven, being cost-driven is the primary virtue of the market governance model. This distinction is also present in the service delivery focuses: targets in the corporate governance model, prices in the market governance type. Interestingly, on the basis of his empirical research Considine concludes that the corporate and market governance types are in fact representing a single strategy: ‘these two governance orientations, derived from the reform literature and previous research, are a single strategy. Officials do not distinguish them as alternate approaches, rather they successfully synthesize them into a new form’ (Considine, 2001, p. 149). Considine’s fourth governance model is network governance, which more or less resembles Newman’s open-system model of governance. Its source of rationality is relationships, its form of control co-production. The primary virtue of this type of governance is flexibility, and the service delivery focus is brokerage. Considine distinguishes two forms of network governance which are of relevance in the context of social security and activation policies. The first refers to collaboration between officials and organized interests, which in these policy areas focuses attention towards the role of the organized interests of employers and employees, which used to be – and in several cases still is – significant in many welfare states. In the second form of network governance, ‘clients, suppliers and producers are linked together as coproducers’ (Considine and Lewis, 2003, p. 134). In general, we expect to find a trend away from the traditional procedural governance model. At the same time, it is more difficult to predict to what governance regime the reforms will lead us. Here, we need to bear in mind that in practice, we may find elements of all regimes, as
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Martin (2001, p. 209) concluded: ‘This suggests not the arrival of a new, hegemonic “outcome-focused paradigm” but a more gradual transition characterized by the co-existence and interaction of hierarchical, market based and collaborative frameworks for coordinating service delivery.’
Effects of governance reforms The literature on new forms of governance often contains extensive lists of advantages or promises that proponents and advocates of these new forms of governance expect will result from their introduction. Decentralization is seen as promoting policy flexibility, the adaptability and responsiveness of policies and programmes to local needs and circumstances, and the capacities of local partnerships to develop integrated and tailor-made solutions to local problems (OECD, 2003; Mosley, 2009). Creating holistic approaches that deal with problems of silo management are seen as major advantages of networks and partnerships. They are also expected to be more innovative than traditional forms of governance, to improve effectiveness and efficiency of policies and programmes by mobilizing resources from a variety of actors and avoiding overlap in services, and to increase accessibility of services and client friendliness (Newman, 2001). The main advantages of quasi-markets for providing public services are expected to be effectiveness and efficiency. Introducing a split between purchasers and providers of services and competition between providers is expected to make services not only cheaper, but also of higher quality, less standardized and more client focused and tailor-made (Struyven and Steurs, 2003). Gains in terms of effectiveness and efficiency are also expected from the introduction of new public management in the public domain (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Of course, the real story will probably be a lot more complex than these rather straightforward hypotheses regarding the results of specific forms of governance. First of all, no such thing as a ‘pure’ form of governance exists in practice: as we shall see, the governance of income protection and activation policies consists of a mix of governance regimes in all countries in our study. Secondly, as we saw above, forms of governance come in a variety of sorts. As Pollitt (2002) argued, although there may be convergence in talk, decisions, practices and (potentially) results concerning administrative change, ideas, practices and preferences differ considerably from country to country. Thirdly, governance practices and the implementation of governance reforms may deviate from governance models introduced by governments. From
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the implementation literature we know that a variety of factors may explain this: for example, local actors’ interpretation of the reforms, the conditions under which they have to implement them, and their capacities to do so. In other words, the independent variable in studies of the effects of governance reforms is extremely complex and dynamic. As far as the dependent variable is concerned, that is, the effects of governance reforms, things are not much simpler, because the expected effects are various and there is considerable discussion on how they should be operationalized in effect studies; in addition, it is very hard to establish robust causal relationships between forms of governance and effects – a common problem, of course, in many social scientific effect studies that take place in a complex and dynamic social environment. This book does not intend to present a sophisticated evaluation of effects of new forms of governance. Our scope is far more modest and explorative: we will try to map what insights into the effects of new forms of governance currently exist in the countries discussed in this volume. We will see that while there are indications for a large variety of effects, our knowledge of what mechanisms cause these effects is still very limited. In this book, not all possible effects will be studied; we will not focus on efficiency effects. Our main interest is in three types of potential effects of governance reforms. First, we are interested in the employment effects of the reforms (outcome effects), which includes (gross and net) impact on job placement, job retention and job quality. Secondly, we will look at what could be called output effects, including coverage and reach of programmes and services (which target groups are served and what proportions of target groups acquire access to services), service
Table 1.2
Potential effects of governance reforms
Type of effect
Indicator
Outcome effects
Job placement Job retention Job quality
Output effects
Coverage and reach Service content and quality Range and variety
Process effects
Voice and choice Individualized service provision Rights, obligations, responsibilities
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content and quality, and range and variety of programmes. Thirdly, we will distinguish process effects, which focus on the treatment and approach of unemployed people as well as their social status: voice and choice of people involved in activation, the individualized nature of the service provision process, as well as the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the unemployed. Table 1.2 summarizes these potential effects.
Structure of the book Chapter 2 will present an overview of the main actors and agencies involved in the administration of income protection schemes and the provision of activation services for unemployed people in the countries discussed in this book. This chapter provides comparative background information on how social security and employment services are currently governed in the various countries. Chapters 3 to 11 are the core of the book. In these chapters, governance reforms in the areas of social security and activation will be discussed and analysed. Subsequently, the chapters will focus on the following countries: France, Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Sweden and Finland. Rather than providing an overview of all relevant reforms in the various countries, the chapters will focus on some main reform processes that have been taking place in the policy areas on which this book focuses. Thus, the chapters will provide an in-depth analysis of governance reforms and reform trends, rather than pretending completeness. In addition, each chapter will try to make an assessment of the effects of the reforms, in as far as insight into these effects is available in these countries. Chapter 12 will conclude the book with a comparative analysis of the reforms analysed in the previous chapters. Here, we will return to the framework that was outlined in this introduction to see what similar as well as dissimilar reform trends can be found in the various countries, what this tells us about the ways in which governance regimes have developed and are developing, and what – from a comparative perspective – can be said about the effects that these reforms have had.
Note 1. According to Eurostat data, the EU countries spent 1.7 per cent of GDP labourmarket policies in 2007 (public expenditure). Individual EU countries’ public expenditure ranged from 0.154 per cent of GDP in Estonia to 3.294 per cent of GDP in Belgium. Public expenditure (2007) in the countries discussed in this volume is summarized in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.3 Public expenditure on labour-market policies in 2007 (percentage of GDP) Country Czech Republic Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK EU 27
Services & measures
Support
Total
0.255 0.821 0.914 0.747 0.406 1.093 1.078 n/a 0.321 0.663
0.204 1.427 1.239 1.625 0.712 1.394 0.665 n/a 0.157 1.020
0.458 2.248 2.154 2.399 1.118 2.487 1.741 n/a 0.478 1.683
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Pollitt, C. (2002) ‘The new public management in international perspective. An analysis of impacts and effects’, in K. McLaughlin, S. Osborne and E. Ferlie (eds) New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects (London: Routledge). Pollitt, C. (2008) Time, Policy, Management: Governing with the Past (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Pollitt, C. and G. Bouckaert (2000) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rhodes, R. (2000) ‘Governance and public administration’, in J. Pierre (ed.) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Rhodes, R. (2002) ‘The new governance: governing without government’, in S. Osborne (ed.) Public Management: Critical Perspectives (London: Routledge). Serrano Pascual, A. (ed.) (2004) Are Activation Policies Converging in Europe? The European Employment Strategy for Young People (Brussels: ETUI). Serrano Pascual, A. and L. Magnusson (eds) (2007) Reshaping Welfare States and Activation Regimes in Europe (Brussels: Peter Lang). Sol, E. and M. Westerveld (eds) (2005) Contractualism in Employment Services: A New Form of Welfare State Governance (The Hague: Kluwer). Struyven, L. and G. Steurs (2003) ‘Towards a quasi-market in reintegration services: First assessment of the Dutch experience’, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, 6/2, 331–55. Struyven, L. and G. Steurs (2005) ‘Design and redesign of a quasi-market for the reintegration of jobseekers: Empirical evidence from Australia and the Netherlands’, Journal of European Social Policy, 15/3, 211–31. Struyven, L., G. Steurs, A. Peeters and V. Minne (2002) Van aanbieden naar aanbesteden. Marktwerking bij arbeidsbemiddeling en -reïntegratie in Australië, Nederland, Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zweden (Leuven: Acco). Sultana, R. and A. Watts (2004) ‘Career guidance in Public Employment Services across Europe’, International Journal for Educational and Vocational Guidance, 6, 29–46. Van Berkel, R. (2010) ‘The provision of income protection and activation services for the unemployed in “active” welfare states. An international comparison’, Journal of Social Policy, 39/1, 17–34. Van Berkel, R. and V. Borghi (2008) ‘Review article: The governance of activation’, Social Policy and Society, 7/3, 393–402. Van Berkel, R. and I. Hornemann Møller (2002) Active Social Policies in the EU: Inclusion through Participation? (Bristol: Policy Press). Van Berkel, R. and B. Valkenburg (2007) Making it Personal. Individualising Activation Services in the EU (Bristol: Policy Press). Van Berkel, R. and P. van der Aa (2005) ‘The marketisation of activation services: A modern panacea? Some lessons from the Dutch experience’, Journal of European Social Policy, 15/4, 329–45. Van der Veen, R. and W. Trommel (1999) ‘Managed liberalization of the Dutch welfare state: A review and analysis of the reforms of the Dutch social security system, 1985–1998’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 12/3, 289–310.
Tomáš Sirovátka
2 The Administration of Income Provision and Activation Services Rik van Berkel
Introduction As a prelude to the following chapters, this chapter will present an overview of the main actors and agencies that are involved in the administration of income protection systems for the unemployed on the one hand, and in the provision of employment and activation services on the other. As far as income protection schemes are concerned, our focus will be on the agencies responsible for the administration of unemployment benefits and social assistance. Although it is not the objective of this chapter to go into the characteristics of national social policies in any detail, some of these need to be elucidated as social policy characteristics evidently constitute one of the factors determining how administrative and service provision structures appear. This is most clearly the case where income protection systems for the unemployed are concerned: a multi-tiered income protection system often implies an articulated structure for the administration of various income protection schemes. So in those cases where an elaboration of social policy characteristics is necessary to present an overview of relevant agencies and organizations, these characteristics will be highlighted. The national administrative structures for providing income protection and activation services for the unemployed and the actors and agencies involved in service provision processes are all but stable – if they were, this book would probably not have been written. As was argued in Chapter 1, this is partly related to the fact that the social policy arrangements that are supposed to be administered and implemented through these structures are being reformed; and partly the result of new ideas about governance and public administration. The unavoidable consequence of these institutional dynamics in the policy fields of income protection and activation is that the state of the art 22
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presented in this chapter shows a snapshot at a certain point in time (2010), and may no longer give an adequate description of the situation at the point of time when the reader is reading this book. However, the more detailed analyses and accounts of governance reform processes presented elsewhere in this book will compensate for this potential lack of accuracy, in that they will help in understanding the directions of, and the challenges underlying, future governance reform processes. This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, agencies involved in the administration of income provision systems for the unemployed are discussed. The second section focuses on the actors involved in the provision of activation services. In the final section, some conclusions are drawn.
The administration of income support systems Most countries in our study combine unemployment benefit systems with national social assistance systems in providing income support for unemployed people: the UK, Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, France and the Czech Republic. The two remaining countries (Switzerland and Italy) do not have national social assistance systems. In the UK, social assistance for the unemployed (Income Support) was integrated with the unemployment benefit system in 1996 into the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA). This Allowance consists of two parts: a flat-rate, contribution-based JSA, lasting a maximum of six months; and a means-tested, income-based JSA that is not limited in duration. The latter is more or less similar to continental social assistance systems, although not in the way in which it is administered, as we will see below. In Italy and Switzerland, regional social assistance systems do exist. Italy has experimented with a national RMI system, but this never resulted in national social assistance legislation. Italian regions have introduced social assistance schemes, but these are very fragmented, partly because they depend on regionally available resources for meeting regional needs – both of which are very unequally distributed across the country. In Switzerland, the cantons have their own social assistance legislation, and differences between cantons are significant, both in terms of level of services and in organizational issues, although attempts to harmonize cantonal systems are taking place. Although all countries have unemployment benefit systems, differences between them are significant. It has been mentioned already that the UK has no system of wage-related unemployment benefits. Both Sweden and Finland have voluntary unemployment insurance
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systems that provide their unemployed members with an earningsrelated benefits, and a system of basic unemployment allowance for those who did not join unemployment insurance schemes. Finland also has a system of labour market support, which offers a means-tested benefit for those who have exhausted their unemployment benefit entitlements. Another country where a similar dual unemployment compensation system exists is France, which has a social insurance system and a so-called solidarity scheme for those who have exhausted their insurance entitlements. In some countries, similar income provision systems in between unemployment benefits and social assistance previously existed but have been abolished (for example, Germany and the Netherlands). Germany and the Netherlands have an income-related system of unemployment benefits. German and Dutch unemployment insurance contributions are obligatory, which is also the case for the Swiss and Czech unemployment benefit systems. In Italy, a variety of unemployment benefit arrangements exists. There are ordinary unemployment benefits, an obligatory social insurance scheme. Apart from that, short-term unemployment benefit systems exist: an ordinary version that provides earnings supplements to temporarily unemployed workers; and a special version for people who are unemployed due to sector- or region-specific restructuring processes. Whether or not these benefits are provided depends on negotiations between the Labour Ministry and social partners. Finally, Italy has a mobility benefit that aims at facilitating labour-market transitions of dismissed workers. In several countries, reforms of the administrative structures for income protection systems have been taking place: these reforms will be analysed in more detail in the following chapters. These governance reforms may be directly related to changes in the income protection systems themselves, as was the case in Germany after the Hartz reforms. But governance reforms may also take place without simultaneous changes in income protection schemes, as was illustrated by reforms of the administration of unemployment compensation in France (unemployment insurance and the solidarity scheme) and the Netherlands (unemployment benefits). Here, we will discuss the administrative structure of income protection schemes for the unemployed as they exist in 2010. The UK is the only country in our study having a national social assistance scheme (the income-based JSA) that is not administered by municipal agencies but by a national agency, Jobcentre Plus. In the other countries with national social assistance systems, municipalities play an important role in administration and implementation;1 in France,
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however, the departments rather than the municipalities are the primary actors in the social assistance system (RSA, the successor to the RMI). In financing social assistance, there are considerable differences between the countries: funding can be national, regional, local or a combination of these. In Sweden, social assistance is funded by local taxes. Compared with other countries with national social assistance systems, Sweden’s system is highly decentralized. The Social Service Act of the early 1980s stipulated that social assistance should ensure a reasonable standard of living, but did not provide specified social assistance payment standards. Since then, attempts to harmonize social services have been made (through legislation as well as through recommendations issued by the National Board for Health and Welfare), resulting, among others, in uniform benefit standards for social assistance in 1998. Nevertheless, considerable inter-municipal variation remains. In Finland, strengthening local responsibilities for dealing with long-term unemployment has been an important objective of reforms. A reform introduced in 2006 shared the responsibility for funding both social assistance and labourmarket support for the long-term unemployed between municipalities and employment authorities, that is, Public Employment Services (PES). In the Netherlands, social assistance administration is a municipal responsibility, though funding comes from national government. Recent reforms increased municipal financial responsibilities: nowadays, the national funding of social assistance payments is budgeted, which implies that in cases of budget deficits, local resources will have to be used to fund social assistance payments. In the Czech Republic social assistance is administered by the municipalities as well; funding comes from national government. In the French social assistance system, local agents are involved in administration, but financing consists of a mix of national, departmental and local resources. Germany has witnessed the most far-reaching reform process, as the Hartz reforms combined social policy and governance reforms. The reforms integrated social assistance for those considered capable of working (that used to be administered by the municipalities) and unemployment assistance (that used to be administered by the Federal Employment Agency) into unemployment benefit II. In administrative terms, a complex situation emerged. In the mainstream administrative system of unemployment benefit II, new local agencies were established (the Arbeitsgemeinschaft or ARGE), which are jointly managed by the municipalities and the Federal Employment Agency. At the same time, an experimental administrative model was introduced in 69 municipalities, which have full responsibility for the administration of income support for the long-term unemployed (that
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The Administration of Income Provision and Activation Services
is, unemployment benefit II). In 23 municipalities, the tasks of the Federal Employment Agency and the municipalities remain to be carried out separately. As mentioned above, Switzerland and Italy have regional social assistance systems. In Switzerland, some non-binding coordination/ cooperation at national level takes place through the Swiss Welfare Conference (SKOS) that issues recommendations to federal authorities, cantons, municipalities and private welfare organizations. Public social assistance is financed by cantons or municipalities, but private actors play a role as well, and provide income support as well as services. Larger municipalities have social assistance offices that administer social assistance; in other parts of the country, a process of regionalization of the administration of social assistance is taking place. Italy’s social assistance is most fragmented. Social assistance provision is completely left to the regions, without any national legal framework or guidelines for coordination or resource distribution. The administration of regional social assistance programmes is highly dependent on third-sector agencies and actors, voluntary organizations and private players, which adds to the already considerable diversity. As far as unemployment benefits are concerned, in Sweden and Finland unemployment insurance is administered by the unemployment funds, and not by the state Social Insurance Agency (which administers other social insurance schemes). The Swedish funds are independent formally, but in reality are run by trade unions and supervised by the Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF). Decisions concerning benefits for the insured unemployed are the responsibility of the funds. In Finland, the basic unemployment allowance for the unemployed who are not members of an unemployment fund, as well as labour-market support, are administered by the National Social Insurance Institution (KELA). Both the state and the municipalities are responsible for funding labour-market support of people who are dependent on this support for more than 500 days, which implicates the municipalities in dealing with long-term unemployment. In Germany, unemployment benefit I is administered by the Federal Employment Agency, which witnessed a serious reduction in the role and influence of social partners. At the local level, the Agency’s Service Centres provide services to the benefit recipients. These Centres are located in Job Centres that also house the ARGE agencies (see above). The two French unemployment compensation systems (social insurance and the solidarity scheme) are financed in different ways (through contributions and the state budget, respectively). Governance of both systems is different
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as well: social insurance is governed by social partners through the National Insurance fund Unédic, and the solidarity scheme by the state. Nevertheless, the administration of both benefit systems at the local level is the responsibility of the same agency. Since 2009, this takes place in the so-called local Employment Counters (Pôles emplois), a merger of the local offices of the national insurance fund (Assedics, which before 2009 were responsible for the local administration of both social insurance and the solidarity scheme) and the French PES (ANPE). Compared with the other countries, Switzerland has a more diversified system of unemployment funds, in the sense that some are private initiatives of employee and employer associations, whereas others are cantonal. Unemployment insurance is obligatory, but people are free to decide of which fund they wish to be a member. At the national level, the equalization fund collects all resources for covering benefit expenses and administering unemployment benefits. The Equalization Board is the central body for implementing unemployment insurance, and is supervised by a tripartite body. The tasks of the funds are to test eligibility and administer payments. In the UK and the Netherlands, Jobseeker’s Allowance and unemployment benefits, respectively are administered by a public agency: Jobcentre Plus in the UK and the UWV (Agency for the Administration of Employees’ Insurance) in the Netherlands. In both countries, social partners are not involved in the administration of unemployment benefits. In the Czech Republic, unemployment benefits are administered by the PES. In contrast to the situation in the UK and the Netherlands, where benefit agencies have the status of an executive agency of the Department of Work and Pensions (UK) and an autonomous administrative agency (ZBO, Netherlands), respectively, the administrative body in the Czech Republic is part of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The PES administers benefits through local employment offices. In Italy the main actors in unemployment benefits are the Ministry of Labour and the National Institute for Social Security (INPS), which is responsible for the collection of contributions and the payment of benefits. Table 2.1 summarizes the above by schematically presenting the main actors and agencies involved in the administration of income protection schemes for the unemployed in the countries involved in our study.
The organization and provision of activation In the countries included in our study, activation has very different histories. For example, Sweden introduced active labour-market policies
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The Administration of Income Provision and Activation Services
Table 2.1 Main actors and agencies involved in administrating Unemployment Benefit (UB) and Social Assistance (SA) schemes (2010) UB
SA
Switzerland
Unemployment funds, Equalization Board
Cantons, regions, municipalities; private actors
Czech Republic
Public Employment Services
Municipalities
Germany
Federal Employment Agency
(UB II) ARGE (Federal Employment Agency + municipalities) or municipalities (in 69 municipalities)
France
Unédic, Employment counters
Departments and municipalities
Finland
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Unemployment funds, KELA
Municipalities
Italy
Ministry of Labour, National Institute for Social Security
Regions, municipalities, private actors
Netherlands
UWV
Municipalities
Sweden
Unemployment Funds
Municipalities
UK
(Contribution-based JSA) Jobcentre Plus
(Income-based JSA) Jobcentre Plus
in the 1940s, whereas in the Czech Republic activation – as well as the institutions involved in the provision of activation services – is a typical post-communist phenomenon. Nevertheless, with the attempts to activate welfare state arrangements during the 1990s and 2000s, all countries were confronted with issues regarding the organization and provision of activation services, as well as regarding the coordination of income protection administration and activation. When comparing the organization and provision of activation in the various countries, three issues emerge: – the degree of integration of administering income protection and providing activation; – the degree of integration of the provision of activation services targeted at unemployment benefit and social assistance recipients; – the involvement of other actors (other than PES, benefit agencies and municipal social assistance agencies) as service providers in the area of activation.
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In the UK, Jobcentre Plus is responsible for the activation of the unemployed. As Jobcentre Plus also functions as the agency administering Jobseeker’s Allowance, the level of integration of income provision and activation – and of servicing short-term and long-term unemployed people – is larger than in any of the other countries involved in this study: the UK has one agency responsible for providing income protection and activation for all unemployed able to work. The role of municipalities in the UK is modest in a comparative perspective, which is mainly a consequence of the absence in the UK of a locally administered safety net provision for unemployed people (although, as the Czech case shows, the presence of a locally administered safety net provision does not guarantee an important role of municipalities in activating social assistance recipients – see below). The responsibility of Jobcentre Plus for activation does not imply that Jobcentre Plus is the sole service provider; other actors, such as private providers and municipal actors, are involved in providing activation services as well. In recent years in the UK, the role of external providers operating in a market of providers of activation services has been increasing. In the Czech Republic integration of activation services aimed at unemployment benefit and social assistance recipients is high, in the sense that Czech PES provide activation for both groups. In addition, as we saw in the preceding section, the PES also administers unemployment benefits so that no separate agencies exist for the administration of unemployment benefits and the activation of benefit recipients. Czech municipalities have no primary role in activating social assistance recipients, which – as we will see below – is quite exceptional when we look at countries with national social assistance schemes. Characteristic for the Czech case is that the formation of democratic labour-market and employment institutions is a relatively recent phenomenon – it started in the early 1990s. The main tasks of the Czech PES in the area of activation are the design of National Action Plans for Employment, the implementation of activation policies and the monitoring and evaluation of these policies. The actual service provision takes place in local employment offices, which depend on the Ministry for funds and staff allocation. At the same time, the role of European Social Fund (ESF) funding of activation has increased during the first decade of the twentyfirst century, which has reduced the impact and control of the national Czech PES on regional and local activation. Though the involvement of private providers in service provision is not a new phenomenon, their role has become more important, and they play an especially prominent role in the implementation of activation programmes funded by the ESF.
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Compared with the UK and the Czech Republic, the other countries have more clearly separated systems for the activation of benefit and social assistance recipients – or for the easy and hard to reintegrate unemployed. At the same time, the backgrounds of these dual systems of activation are different. For example, in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, the role of municipalities in activating social assistance recipients increased because municipalities – who are responsible for the administration of social assistance, and sometimes also (partly) for funding social assistance expenses – were dissatisfied with the activation services provided by the PES for social assistance recipients. In Italy and Switzerland, the absence of national social assistance systems seems to play a role in understanding why both groups of unemployed are served by different activation systems, since benefit recipients are the responsibility of national institutions (although in Italy, this is only partly the case), whereas social assistance recipients are served by regional or local agencies that do not operate in the context of a national legal social assistance framework. In Sweden, the PES plays a crucial role in the provision of activation. The PES comes under the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment. Yearly, the government formulates an assignment that defines policy objectives, target groups, policy measures and financial conditions. By the 1990s external service providers were involved in activation; however, this mainly concerned preparatory education activities. In recent years, the Swedish national government has started to stimulate the involvement of external actors in activation, particularly in matching and coaching activities. Local discretion in activation is low in the sense that the national assignment provides detailed aims and finances. At the same time, it is high because individual frontline workers decide in individual cases what offer is most suitable, and because the range of available offers is quite large. Nevertheless, in 2006 the Swedish government decided to reduce the number of activation programmes, and to focus on shorter programmes. In the area of social assistance, municipalities have assumed increasing responsibility for activating social assistance recipients. Sweden is one of the countries where a dual system of activation exists, although this dualism has decreased recently (see below). We have already seen that inter-municipal diversity is significant where social support is concerned, and the same applies to activation. For example, local variation exists regarding the extent to which people are defined as unemployed, the extent to which the unemployed are referred to activation programmes, and the extent to which the unemployed are sent to national
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(PES-run) or local programmes. Municipalities can involve external providers, but most municipal activation programmes are carried out by the municipalities themselves. Interestingly, recent years have seen a shift of responsibilities for the activation of the young unemployed (traditionally, one of the core target groups of municipal activation) from the municipalities to the (nationally governed) PES. Because of this, the Swedish PES is not only responsible for the activation of unemployment benefit recipients, but also for activating an increasing proportion of social assistance recipients. In Germany, dividing lines in the organization of activation run between the unemployed recipients of Unemployment Benefits I and II (UBI and II). At the same time, for each of these groups income provision and activation are integrated, that is, provided by the same agency. As far as UB-I is concerned the German situation resembles the Czech, in as far as the German PES (the Federal Employment Agency) is responsible for both benefit administration and the activation of benefit recipients. As mentioned in the preceding section, local Service Centres provide income protection and activation to UBI recipients. UB-II recipients receive income protection and activation from local agencies jointly managed by the Federal Employment Agency and the municipalities (ARGE agencies; see preceding section), at least in a majority of municipalities. Thus, the activation of the long-term unemployed is the shared responsibility of a national agency and the municipalities. Traditionally, external service providers play a role in the provision of employment and activation services in Germany. The Hartz reforms, however, provided an opportunity to strengthen the element of competition in service provision, involving the Federal Employment Agency itself in the competition process. External providers can be involved in service provision in two ways: either by a process of outsourcing, where the Federal Employment Agency contracts external parties for service provision; or by so-called placement vouchers, which unemployed people may use to buy services from public or private providers. In the Netherlands, the provision of income support and activation are integrated, though separately for the two groups of benefit recipients on the one hand, and social assistance recipients on the other. Whereas the benefit agency (UWV) is responsible for the insured, the municipal local welfare agencies are responsible for social assistance recipients. At the local (or, in the case of smaller municipalities, supra-local) level, co-location and, increasingly, coordination and cooperation of services provided by the benefit agency and municipalities
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are promoted. Originally, this took place in the so-called Centres for Work and Income; since the merger between the Centres and the benefit agency in 2009, these agencies for co-location, coordination and cooperation are called Work Plazas (Werkpleinen). Nevertheless, these attempts at service integration do not mean that the primary responsibilities for activation are not as described above. External, often private, providers play a major role in the provision of activation in the Netherlands. Outsourcing activation is obligatory for the benefit agency, and optional for the municipalities (since 2005: prior to that it was obligatory for the municipalities as well). Because of this, providers of activation services for unemployment benefit recipients are mainly private providers. The number of private providers is considerable, partly because unemployment benefit recipients are allowed – under certain conditions – to select their own service provider. The situation is more mixed where the activation of social assistance recipients is concerned: some municipalities outsource most services to external providers, some municipalities rarely contract external providers, and many municipalities use a mix of outsourced and in-house activation. In Finland the PES has a crucial role in providing employment services for the insured unemployed. The PES is also an important actor in providing activation for labour-market support and social assistance recipients, but here cooperation with municipal welfare agencies takes place. Finland is another example of a country where different activation regimes exist for the short-term and long-term unemployed. As a matter of fact, in Finland the concept of activation is exclusively used in the context of promoting labour-market participation of the long-term unemployed. For the short-term unemployed, the PES introduced regional Job-seeking Centres that should provide labour-market information and coach jobseekers in finding jobs. The activation of long-term unemployed people – who may receive social assistance, labour-market support or a combination of these two forms of income support – has received specific attention in Finland. To this end, a network approach has been promoted, which materialized in the so-called Labour Force Service Centres (LAFOS). Municipalities were free to establish a local LAFOS unit, which is based on a form of network governance in which national actors (especially PES) and local actors work together on the basis of a contract between national employment authorities and municipalities. Co-funding is one of the pillars of this form of network governance: national and local authorities provide the local LAFOS units with the same numbers of workers and share costs for service provision on an equal basis. LAFOS combines a variety of disciplines considered relevant for servicing the long-term unemployed: employment services,
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social welfare services, health care, rehabilitation and social insurance. External providers are involved in service provision in Finland, but they do not play a similar primary role as in some of the other countries involved in our study. In terms of the two forms of integration mentioned at the start of this section (integration of income protection and activation on the one hand, and the activation of unemployment benefits and social assistance recipients on the other), Switzerland reveals low levels of integration. The absence of national social assistance legislation draws a clear dividing line between responsibilities for the insured (national/federal) and social assistance recipients (cantonal level). In addition, the administration of unemployment benefits (the responsibility of the unemployment funds) is organized separately from the activation of unemployment benefit recipients. A series of reforms introduced in 1995 put the activation of unemployment benefit recipients high on the Swiss political agenda and introduced new structures and institutions for implementing activation, separate from the existing unemployment funds and their administrative agencies. The reforms introduced Regional Employment Centres (REC), at least one in each canton. These RECs replaced the local employment centres that existed previously. With the establishment of the RECs, a new way of financing was also introduced: whereas the local employment centres were financed by the municipalities, the RECs are financed by the unemployment insurance funds. The tasks of the regional centres include advising jobseekers, imposing sanctions, allocating available jobs, checking employability, acquiring new jobs and allocating labour-market measures. At the national level, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs is responsible for the functioning of the Employment Centres, and has a steering role. The same reforms also created a quasi-market for activation measures. So-called Logistics Offices (one in each canton) act as purchasers on this market and, together with the RECs, these Offices determine the need for activation measures, plan offers, award contracts to providers and evaluate the services of providers. Providers may be either public or private agents. As Swiss social assistance is a cantonal responsibility, differences between the cantons are significant, including differences regarding the activation of social assistance recipients, even though the increasing emphasis on activating social assistance recipients is a national trend. Activation measures targeted at social assistance recipients include career orientation measures, assistance in integration within the regular labour market, placement and employment programmes, supplementary employment placements and therapeutic or pedagogical offers.
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Private social assistance plays a role in Switzerland as well, which may not only involve individual financial assistance but also measures aimed at work or social integration. Nevertheless, marketization of the provision of activation services did not boom to a similar degree as in the case of the insured unemployed. Cooperation in the areas of activating the insured and social assistance recipients is a relatively recent phenomenon: it has received increasing attention in recent years. The administrative integration of income support and activation has been strengthened in France, especially where the activation of recipients of unemployment insurance benefits and the solidarity scheme are concerned. An important step in this process was the above-mentioned merger between the French PES (ANPE) and the local offices of the insurance agency into local Employment Counters. These counters now play an important role in the activation of unemployment insurance and solidarity scheme recipients. Two other institutions play a core role as well: first, the Association for Adult Vocational Training (AFPA), and secondly the Regional Direction of Firms, Competition, Consumption, Work and Employment (DIRECCTE), which plays a role in defining and implementing labour-market policies in the French regions. The involvement of external service providers through network (co-contractor) or market (sub-contractor) arrangements is common in France. External providers include NGOs as well as for-profit organizations such as temping agencies and private placement agencies. There is a trend to strengthen the role of market mechanisms in involving external service providers, which challenges the position of traditional not-for-profit actors in the provision of employment and activation services. As far as the activation of recipients of French social assistance (the Active solidarity income, RSA) is concerned, other actors are responsible than in the case of recipients of the insurance and solidarity schemes. Departmental General Councils have a primary task in organizing activation services for social assistance recipients, though municipalities have competencies in this area as well and play an increasing role in activating this group of the unemployed. The General Councils may enter into partnerships with the Employment Counters in organizing the provision of activation services, but they may also decide to cooperate with not-for-profit associations in doing so. The integration of income protection and activation on the one hand, and of providing activation services for the insured and social assistance recipients on the other, seems to be most weakly developed in Italy. Whereas the National Institute for Social Security is responsible for the administration of benefits, a decentralization process in the
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1990s delegated important functions in the area of employment and activation services to the regions and provinces. National activation programmes still exist, but regional, provincial and local actors now have considerable competencies in the area of activation (for example, professional training, counselling and job mediation), resulting in a multi-level model for the governance of activation and employment services. Besides public agencies (the PES), private employment agencies also play a role in providing activation services. Opening the provision of employment services to private actors has partly been a consequence of the flexibilization of the Italian labour market, which was accompanied by the establishment of (private) temporary work agencies for matching supply and demand where temporary work and work on fixedterm contracts is concerned. Whether activation is provided in-house or outsourced is decided by public agencies. In providing activation services to social assistance recipients, a variety of actors is involved: municipalities, the PES and a range of private and public actors. Given the fragmentation of Italian social assistance, and the large differences across the country regarding both level of needs and the availability of resources to meet these needs, it is impossible to provide a general picture concerning the activation services available for Italian social assistance recipients. In Table 2.2 we present a summarizing overview of the main actors and agencies involved in the organization and provision of activation services in the nine countries. Table 2.2
Main actors and agencies in the provision of activation services (2010) UB
SA
Switzerland
Regional Employment Centres, Logistics Offices (purchasing), private providers
Cantons/regions/municipalities, private providers
Czech Republic
PES, public and private providers
PES, public and private providers
Germany
Federal Employment Agency (Service Centers), private providers
ARGE, private providers
France
Employment Counters, Unédic, AFPA, DIRECCTE, private providers
Departments and municipalities, private providers
Finland
PES, LAFOS (long-term unemployed), private providers
Municipalities, LAFOS (long-term unemployed), private providers
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Table 2.2
(Continued) UB
SA
Italy
Regions, provinces, private providers
Regions/municipalities, public (including PES) and private providers
Netherlands
UWV, private providers
Municipalities, public and private providers
Sweden
PES, private providers
Municipalities, private providers, PES
UK
JobCentre Plus, private and public providers
JobCentre Plus, private and public providers
UB, unemployment benefit; SA, social assistance.
Conclusion This chapter provided an overview of the main actors and agencies involved in providing income protection and activation services to unemployed people in nine European countries. As will be elaborated in the following chapters, these administrative and implementation structures are the result of extensive reform processes in most countries, some of which are very recent. Although the differences between the countries are significant, the overview presented in this chapter reveals that all countries are coping with some similar issues related to the institutional consequences of the attempts to make welfare states more activating. First, the increasing emphasis on activation raises issues concerning the tasks, roles and positions of the agencies traditionally responsible for employment services – with the exception of the Czech Republic, all countries established employment services agencies long before the activation paradigm became dominant in social policies. In all countries, reconsidering the position of public employment services agencies not only affected the competencies and capacities of these agencies, but also strengthened the role of external providers (public and private, for-profit and not-for-profit) in the provision of activation services. Secondly, activating welfare state arrangements has made coordination of the activities of public employment agencies and unemployment benefit agencies an important topic. Whereas Germany, with its integrated agency for the administration of unemployment benefits and the provision of employment services, used to be exceptional, we now see integrated agencies in the UK, France, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic.
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Thirdly, most countries with national or regional social assistance schemes – the exceptions are the UK and the Czech Republic – still have separate institutional structures for the activation of social assistance recipients, although in Sweden we see a decreasing role of municipalities and an increasing role of the PES. The traditional important role of municipalities (and, in some cases, regional authorities) in social assistance schemes plays a role in explaining this situation, as does the failure of public employment agencies in several countries to provide adequate services for the hard to employ, which stimulated and subsequently strengthened the role of municipal activation. Nevertheless, all countries show efforts to improve the cooperation of municipal (or regional) and national actors in promoting the activation of social assistance recipients, even though these efforts may vary in intensity and may take different forms. As will be elaborated later, LAFOS agencies in Finland are an example of intensive cooperation between local and national institutions. Finally, we have already mentioned the increasing involvement of external providers of activation services, through either market arrangements or networks and partnerships. There are some indications – and we will return to these in later chapters – that the introduction of quasimarkets in the provision of activation services has been more important in the activation of unemployment benefit recipients than in providing services for social assistance recipients. A possible explanation for this might be that the ‘activation needs’ of social assistance recipients are more complex, and that meeting these needs requires the integration of a larger variety of services that are not readily available on the market but ask for the cooperation of various specialized service providers. In this book, our main focus is on income support and activation services. However, it is important to emphasize that promoting the (labour-market) participation of more vulnerable groups of unemployed people – many of whom are recipients of income safety net provisions such as social assistance – will often ask for services beyond income support and activation, and that this will have an impact on the implementation and service provision structures that are developed to govern the service provision process.
Note 1. British municipalities do have a role in the administration of Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit.
Tomáš Sirovátka
3 Accelerating Governance Reforms: the French Case Anne Eydoux and Mathieu Béraud
Introduction The French welfare state regime is deemed to be corporatist-conservative in usual comparative typologies (Esping-Andersen, 1999), while its activation regime is considered as a hybrid one, a mix between the neoliberal regime, relying on market efficiency as well as on individual rationality, and the social-democratic one, imposing the burden of supporting employees’ return to work on the state (Barbier, 2002). Recent changes in activation policies and Public Employment Services (PES) have not fundamentally altered the characteristics of France’s income protection and activation regime (Béraud and Eydoux, 2009). Nevertheless, it has been through an accelerated process of reform that has led some experts to speak of a ‘brutal acceleration of history’ (Dupeyroux, 2005). Many reforms imply substantial changes in activation policies, such as the extension of activation to income support recipients and the development of a making-work-pay (neoliberal) strategy since the late 1990s, or (albeit in a more social-democratic fashion) the most recent redeployment of active measures to meet the current economic slowdown (Erhel, 2010). Some reforms also concern the steering of activation policies and the governance of PES, in line with a general trend in French governance reforms aimed at modernizing public administration and services, as well as at improving and controlling their performance (Perret, 2008). Activation policies and services are in the front line and have been through the various dimensions/trends of renewed governance (discussed in Chapter 1 of this volume): decentralizing competences to the Regional or Departmental level; developing New Public Management (NPM) practices within the national employment agency ANPE;1 outsourcing services to a wide range of providers increasingly subject to competition (quasi-markets); promoting inter-agency cooperation and the merging of the ANPE with 38
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the local benefit agencies (Assedics)2 of the national insurance fund (Unédic3 ) into a new institution, the Employment Bureau (Pôle emploi). Despite these major changes, few research publications deal with the governance of employment and integration policies or with the organization of PES in France, where these topics are matters of policy if not of politics. While official communications may act as a screen masking actual practices, fieldwork is sometimes delicate to conduct (Barbier, 2007). As a consequence, the main materials dealing with governance reforms are official public reports ordered by successive French governments during the reform process, as well as dispersed research that attempts either to assess quantitatively the outcomes of one reform or another, or, relying on fieldwork, to enlighten some aspect of the changes at stake. The diversity and institutional complexity of French labour market intermediaries, whether public or private, have long been underlined (Baron et al., 1994). However, it is only recently that this complexity has been reasserted in official reports, putting the governance of activation policies and PES institutions on the agenda (Balmary, 2004; Marimbert, 2004; Cahuc and Kramartz, 2005; CERC, 2005; Cour des Comptes, 2006; Boulanger, 2008). These reports have pointed out the insufficient coordination or the lack of evaluation in the steering of activation policies, or in PES, as sources of inefficiencies or unequal treatment. Recent governance reforms can be seen as somehow reflecting these preoccupations. Nevertheless, their impact on the French governance regime has not been studied. This chapter will address the governance of PES and activation policies by relying on the comparative literature of governance regimes, qualifying the French activation regime as a mix of procedural rules, corporate regulations, market competition and partnership relations (in the sense of Considine (2001), see Chapter 1). We will first present the main institutions in charge of activation policies and of administering income protection schemes in their relevant context of changing activation strategies. Then, the main features of governance reforms will be explored in detail, and the shifts at stake in the French governance regime will be qualified. Finally, the main impacts of the reforms will be discussed drawing on available reports and research.
Today’s challenge: monitoring changes in activation strategies The changes that have occurred in the steering of employment policies and in the governance of PES have to be analysed in their relevant
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context: the intensification and shifts of activation policies in the face of the rise of massive unemployment (during the 1980s), and in line with the European employment strategy launched in 1997. Intensifying and shifting activation policies Substantial changes have occurred in French activation policies that, if not modifying drastically the French activation regime, can be seen as reflecting a new compromise between the liberal conception emphasizing individual responsibility and the social-democratic approach concerned with universalism and state responsibility regarding employment matters. Early changes were more adaptive (in the face of the rapid increase in unemployment rates) rather than taking an explicit direction. In contrast, liberal arguments have been developed and discussed since the late 1990s, as activation policies have extended their scope to deal with income support recipients (and not solely with the registered unemployed). Liberal arguments based on individual economic rationality have been mobilized in both policy and institutional reforms. The first one favours economic incentives and the generalization of personalized support and counselling for both income support recipients (whether jobseekers or not) and the unemployed. It primarily focuses on economic incentives in order to sustain the supply of work: to make work pay has become the new leitmotiv that governs the redesigning of unemployment and assistance (income support) benefits. The second liberal argument rather focuses on employment institutions and frontline workers. The assumption is that PES and frontline workers do not behave optimally and that new procedures (profiling) and organizational change (marketization, appealing to private providers) are liable to improve the economic efficiency of the system and the unemployed return to stable jobs (Ferracci, 2007). Institutional change in the French governance regime (decentralization, NPM and contractualism,4 outsourcing, marketization) have thus developed in parallel to formal procedures and routines (profiling) and to performance assessment procedures that make frontline workers increasingly responsible for the rate of return to employment. French activation strategy has tended to increase not only the duties of the unemployed and income support recipients in looking for jobs, but also frontline workers’ responsibility for employment. The institutional governance of PES Generally speaking, the procedural governance of French PES is both centralized and corporatist, with a mix of state regulations and
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negotiations between social partners. While activation policies are essentially steered by the state, several labour-market institutions are administered jointly by social partners who contribute together with the state to set tripartite employment regulations. Describing the governance of French PES in detail is not an easy task because of its complexity and accelerated evolution. Major changes have occurred since the passing of Law No 2005-32 of 18 January 2005 on Social Cohesion, which provides the first legal definition of an extended PES. Before, only a public service for placement existed formally, apart from unemployment compensation institutions (Table 3.1). Before 2005, the public service for placement included three major institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Labour at the national level, with decentralized services or agencies at the regional/departmental/local level: (1) the Directorate General for Labour, Employment and Vocational training (DGTEFP) in charge of the definition and implementation of labour-market policies; (2) the National Employment Agency (ANPE), holding a monopoly for job placement; and (3) the Association for Adult Vocational Training (AFPA),5 dealing with vocational training and guidance. The unemployment compensation system was not included in the public service for placement but relied on a separate institution, the National Insurance Fund (Unédic), administered by the social partners. Since 2005, job placement and unemployment compensation institutions have constituted the hard core of a new, extended PES that encompasses job placement, integration into employment, vocational training and job-search support, and which includes new actors situated within three circles (Table 3.2). The first circle corresponds to hard-core PES institutions and brought together the DGTEFP, the AFPA, the ANPE, and the Unédic (formally recognized as being part of the unemployed integration into employment process) and their decentralized services or local agencies. Two major changes have occurred within this circle since 2005: after the Law No 2008-126 of 13 February 2008, the ANPE and the Assédics (local agencies of the Unédic) were merged into a single institution, the Employment Bureau,6 while the Decree No 2009-1377 of 10 November 2009 replaced the DDTEFP and DRTEFP by a new, single, regional institution, the Regional Directorate of Firms, Competition, Consumption, Work and Employment (DIRECCTE).7 The second circle is composed of organizations that contribute to the PES, that is, local authorities and municipalities. The third circle draws together a range of organizations that may participate in PES – through co-contracting or subcontracting procedures – despite the fact that they sometimes develop, or mainly
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Table 3.1
The public service for placement and unemployment compensation (prior to 2005) The public service for placement under the authority of the Ministry of Labour
Unemployment compensation Social partners
Institution at the national level
DGTEFP (1997) (State service)
ANPE (1967) (Public institution)
AFPA (1949) (Tripartite organization)
Unédic (1958) (Joint system)
Role
Definition, implementation and control of public labour-market policies
Job placement, reclassification, information and advice for jobseekers and firms, labour-market statistics
Training, vocational guidance and human resources advice
Registration of all unemployed
Regional level (Regional offices)
DRTEFP (1995)
DR-ANPE
DR-AFPA
DR-Assédic
Departmental level (administrative district)
DDTEFP (1992)
DD-ANPE Local AFPA agencies
Assédic agencies
Local level
Tomáš Sirovátka
Local ANPE agencies (ALE)
Administration of the insurance scheme Benefit-paying agency
Table 3.2
The three circles of public employment services (since 2005) First circle
Second circle
Third circle
Hard core institutions of PES
Organizations that contribute to the PES
Organizations that may participate in the PES
Main governance principles
Procedural (central steering by the state/Ministry of Labour) and corporatist (social partners participate in the administration of the Unédic, the AFPA and the Employment bureau).
Procedural and partnership
Partnership and quasi-market
Institutional actors
Until 2008
Since 2009
DGTEFP, DRTEFP, DDTEFP ANPE/ALE
DIRECCTE
Municipalities and local authorities
Co-contracting institutions: Local Missions, APEC, Employment course
Unédic/Assédics
Unédic
AFPA/AFPA centres
AFPA
Employment bureau
Subcontracting associations, temporary work agencies, human resource agencies New private placement agencies 43
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focus on, other activities. The co-contractors acting as partners of hard-core institutions are Local Missions in charge of the social integration of vulnerable young unemployed, the APEC8 dealing with managers’ job search support and the network Employment Course,9 which is in charge of the integration of the disabled. Subcontractors are NGOs (mainly associations dedicated to the reintegration of vulnerable groups), private temping agencies (for example, Adecco) or new private placement agencies (for example, Altedia), which are subcontractors for institutions in the first circle, such as the ANPE, the Unédic or now the Employment Bureau. As a consequence of the extended definition of French PES, new forms of governance have been made visible alongside the mainstream procedural (state and corporatist) one: partnership governance between hardcore institutions, local authorities and co-contractors, and quasi-market governance between the hard core and the subcontractors (see below). The institutional governance of income protection schemes The procedural governance of the French income protection system, reflecting the differentiated nature of benefits, is largely corporatist and tripartite, involving social partners and/or the state in different combinations according to the income protection scheme: insurance, solidarity or assistance (Table 3.3). The French income protection system is primarily a contribution-based, Bismarckian system linking social protection to employment (of male breadwinners) and to the family (for the spouse and dependent children), rather than attaching it to citizenship. As it became particularly vulnerable to the development of new social risks such as family break-ups or long-term unemployment that led to emerging forms of poverty, new social entitlements, essentially funded by the state, developed in the 1970s and 1980s. The Lone Parent Allowance (API) created in 1976 and the Minimum Integration Income (RMI) created in 1989 were established on a more universal basis for poor (often unemployed) households; both were replaced in June 2009 by the Active Solidarity Income (RSA). A Solidarity Scheme was created in 1984 for the unemployed with long working experience and who had exhausted their entitlements to insurance benefits. The unemployment compensation system is a dual system, divided into two schemes that are governed according to different principles. The insurance scheme relies on corporatist principles: financed through workers’ and employers’ contributions, it is administrated by social partners at the head of the National Unemployment Insurance Fund, Unédic (created in 1958). It provides the insured unemployed with
Tomáš Sirovátka
Table 3.3
Unemployment compensation (insurance and solidarity schemes) and social assistance Unemployment compensation system (passive labour-market policies) Insurance scheme
Solidarity scheme
Benefit-paying agency
Local insurance funds (Assédics) before 2009; Employment Bureau (Pôle emploi) since 2009
Administration
National unemployment insurance fund, Unédic
Solidarity fund created in 1984 The state
Social partners
Assistance and integration policies Income support scheme Local family funds (CAF) for the Département General councils (Departmental level) in charge of the integration of the income support recipients
Decision making
Tripartite
The state
The state
Financing
Employers’ and workers’ contributions
State budget
Département, local taxes and state budget
45
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Accelerating Governance Reforms: the French Case
conditional insurance benefits relative to their previous occupational earnings and experience. The solidarity scheme follows procedural governance principles: it is funded and governed by the state that offers conditional, means-tested and lump-sum benefits to the unemployed who have exhausted their rights to insurance benefits and still have sufficient employment records (5 years out of the previous 10). Despite these different governance principles, both schemes are strongly interrelated: social partners’ decisions regarding unemployment insurance must be agreed by the state since they have an impact on the solidarity scheme (when rules to access to insurance compensation harden, many unemployed who no longer qualify for insurance benefits turn to the solidarity scheme). Both schemes are integrated within a single benefit paying agency network: the Assédics (local agencies of Unédic) until 2009, and the local agencies of the Employment Bureau since then. Social assistance (allowances defined according to households’ income and structure) to those who belong to a poor household also obeys procedural governance principles. It is institutionally separated from the unemployment compensation system, but plays the role of a third stage in social protection of the unemployed. From an institutional point of view, income support schemes are defined at the national level by the state, and funded by both the state and the Départements.10 The allowance-paying agencies are the Local Family Funds (CAF) that belong to the National Family Fund (CNAF). Corporatist regulations: the role of social partners in PES administration Social partners play a central role in the governance of public employment policies and services in France, through their contribution to employment negotiations as well as to the administration of PES institutions (Freyssinet, 2010). They administrate a range of employment institutions: the Unemployment Insurance Fund (Unédic), the Association for Adult Vocational Training (AFPA), the Association for Managers’ Employment (APEC) and so on. As such, they contribute to the definition of employment services. As administrators of Unédic (together with the state), they have been in charge of designing insurance benefits since 1958. Since the 1980s, they have also participated in activation policies aimed at encouraging the return to employment through the definition of the rules allowing the combination of a job (called ‘reduced activity’) with insurance benefits, or through the development of activation programmes dedicated to the insured unemployed. In 2001, social partners went a step further in their involvement in activation policies,
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by signing the tri-partite convention of 13 June 2001 with the ANPE and the state, regarding the implementation of the Plan to Support Return to Employment (PARE). Through this convention, they committed themselves to participate in the financing of the additional human resources needed by ANPE to implement this activation programme. After 2001 and the generalization of job-search support by ANPE, the Unédic also gradually increased its participation in vocational training for the insured unemployed, to become a major contributor in this field along with the state and the regions, until the late 2000s, and the merger of ANPE and the Assédics into the new Employment Bureau (see below).
Governance reforms Since the early 1980s, many changes have occurred in the governance of French PES and employment policies. Major employment institutions were created at a time when the unemployment rate was very low (the 1950s and 1960s) and subsequently had to adapt to the rise of massive unemployment, as well as to the reinforcement of activation strategies from the 1980s onwards. Governance reforms have affected the centralized steering of employment policies (through decentralization processes), as well as the management (NPM procedures, contractualism) and the organization of PES (outsourcing, inter-agency cooperation). An unsynchronized decentralization process and a limited devolution to local government In France, where the steering of activation policies is centralized, decentralization and devolution are at work, but proceeding in a disorganized and unsynchronized way.11 Decentralization primarily takes the form of competency transfers for vocational training and social inclusion matters. Employment policies and PES remain responsibilities for central government, with only limited devolution of powers. The French decentralization process essentially concerned income support policies and vocational training. It began in the early 1980s, when 40 laws and 300 decrees gave new competencies to local government to favour local initiatives. It received a new impulse in the early 2000s (Cour des comptes, 2009). Constitutional Law No 2003-276 of 28 March 2003 regarding the decentralized organization of the Republic recognized the principle of free administration for local authorities and provided for resource allocations in accordance with their new competencies and associated expenses. The Constitutional Bylaw No 2004-258 of 29 July 2004 gave a certain degree of financial autonomy to local
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authorities. Since the 1980s, the decentralization of vocational training, social assistance and the social integration of income support recipients has taken place at three levels: regional, departmental and local (communal and inter-communal). Today, France’s regions play an important role in local vocational training policies: they have competencies (since the mid-1960s) in economic development, as well as in workers’ and youth vocational training since 1983 and 1993, respectively. Regional competencies now also encompass vocational training for the unemployed (since 2004) and extend to the governance of AFPA programmes (since December 2008). The aim of the decentralization laws of 2003 and 2004 was to reinforce the regions as the relevant level for conducing decentralized policies. This purpose has, however, been impeded by later policy decisions, for instance entrusting the implementation of the Active Solidarity Income (RSA) and the development of systematic job search support for income support recipients to the departmental level. Since 1988, the Départements have had competencies in local development and in the social integration of income support recipients. Since 2004, General (departmental) Councils have had responsibility for the activation programme Minimum Activity Income (RMA12 ). Since 2009, they have implemented the Active Solidarity Income (RSA) and have organized job-search support for all RSA recipients, either by establishing partnerships with the Employment Bureau or by contracting with associations in the non-profit sector. At a local level, communes (or groups of communes) have local competencies regarding social assistance and contribute more and more to local development in coordination with other actors in the field of employment, vocational training or assistance. All in all, the decentralization process appears unsynchronized and partly inconsistent (Cour des comptes, 2009). At a time when income support recipients are increasingly considered as ordinary unemployed, their enrolment in activation programmes could have legitimated their affiliation to the Employment Bureau. However, their integration into employment has been increasingly delegated to departmental institutions (General Councils), usually in charge of social aid (Eydoux and Tuchszirer, 2010). The devolution of responsibility for employment and activation policies reflects two alternative logics: a downward logic consisting of central steering and undifferentiated implementation at the local level; and an upward logic aiming at encouraging local development and initiatives coming from local actors (Berthet et al., 2002). Upward processes are at work in employment policies but remain limited: development
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initiatives from local actors have been gradually encouraged, while PES was compelled to participate in such initiatives. At the beginning of the 1980s, the creation of Local Missions as well as the implementation of local employment committees13 aimed at favouring local cooperation and initiatives. At the end of the 1990s, several active employment measures, based on local diagnosis and aimed at responding to both national and local needs, were delegated to local action plans. Since 2005, local actors’ cooperation has been encouraged within Employment Houses that bring together employment intermediaries and which are presided over by locally elected representatives. However, the coordination of local actors remains the Achilles’ heel of devolution: local actors do not have the same level and degree of decisional competencies. The employment zones they cover are often defined differently at the sub-regional as well as at the sub-departmental level, and their competencies may be redundant. Also, their institutional logics or vocational cultures may be conflicting (Berthet and Cuntigh, 2002; Marimbert, 2004). French employment policies remain dominated by a downward logic, implying central steering and territorial implementation, while PES remains centralized with only limited internal decentralization (Marimbert, 2004). Unemployment benefits and income support are still centrally defined at the national level, by social partners (insurance schemes) or by the state (solidarity and assistance schemes), while benefit-paying agencies mainly check whether or to what extent claimants qualify to benefit from unemployment compensation or income support. Similarly, the public effort dedicated to activation programmes is a centralized prerogative and service provisions are defined in a standardized manner – except for income support recipients. Some competencies of the National Employment Agency (ANPE, now the Employment Bureau) have been gradually delegated to the regional level or to local employment agencies, enabled to decide how they meet national requirements and to what extent they delegate service provisions to other providers. This limited decentralization of PES came with the development of limited NPM practices.
New Public Management and State contractualism: slowly, softly, paradoxically The promotion of NPM in France dates back to the end of the 1980s, when the government of Prime Minister Rocard launched a modernization process in the public sector (Decree of 23 February 1989 and Decree of 25 January 1990). The aim was to improve the quality of services for
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the public, to reform human resource management and to develop performance management, policy evaluation and accountability. However, this process remained quite slow and ambivalent in France, even with the General Revision of Public Policies (RGPP) launched in 2007 (Perret, 2008). In PES, it has essentially concerned substantive activation policies with the generalization of impact assessment procedures. The promotion of NPM in the governance of French PES has remained limited and has taken the form of much softer contractualism than in either the Netherlands or the UK. The introduction of performance contracts (so-called ‘progress contracts’) between the state and the National Employment Agency (ANPE) since 1990 is the best illustration. Barbier (2007), relying on the analysis of the first three progress contracts (1990–2003), has shown that French contractualism has been essentially formal. The ANPE was not fully independent from the state and not as autonomous, in order to be able to negotiate a contract with the state – or to be evaluated, penalized or rewarded for its results. Moreover, when contracting with the ANPE, the state was not able to predict the evolution of unemployment and the future adaptations of employment policy programmes that were not written into the contract. As a consequence, the first three progress contracts (1990–3, 1994–8, 1999–2003) were not always honoured by either party, while policy orientations and change were decided as if the contracts did not exist. Policy evaluation and accountability did not really develop and remained limited, even in the fourth performance contract for 2006–10. With hindsight, as Barbier (2007) puts it, major change in employment and activation policies as well as in the governance of the ANPE took place outside the scope of performance contracts. This was again the case when the merger of the ANPE and the Assédics was decided in 2008. If the contracting process between the state and the National Employment Agency remained limited, other forms of contracting, between the ANPE and other providers, have expanded since the 1980s. Contracting-out and outsourcing: from partnership to quasi-markets? The increasing outsourcing of activation services in France has not primarily followed explicit (neoliberal) policy orientations aimed at institutionalizing efficient quasi-markets. But things have changed since the mid-2000s, when official reports began to examine it and to perceive it as a means of extending the scope and (possibly) the efficiency of the French PES. The outsourcing of activation services originated in the development of a public activation strategy in the face of massive unemployment
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(Balmary, 2004, 2006). It began at the end of the 1980s with the implementation of programmes favouring the redeployment of laidoff workers and the integration into employment of vulnerable groups. Outsourcing intensified with the reinforcement (at the end of the 1990s) and generalization (in the 2000s) of personalized support in job search for every unemployed person, as well as with the development of consultancy services for employers. In 1998, programmes that were targeted at young unemployed with no qualifications were extended to all longterm unemployed youth (within the New Start Programme). In 2001, the ambitious PARE (Plan to Support Return to Employment) generalized individualized job-search support to all registered unemployed, by means of a Personalized Action Plan (PAP) implemented by the ANPE. In 2006, the PAP was replaced by the Personalized Project for Returning to Employment (PPAE), implying Monthly Personalized Support (SMP). The ANPE’s human resources were expanded between 1990 and 2005, when the number of employees rose from 11,000 to 28,000. Its economic resources also increased as subsidies from the state and Unédic rose. However, ANPE was unable to implement the reinforced activation strategy alone and had to delegate activation services to other labourmarket intermediaries: by the mid-2000s, two-thirds of service provision was outsourced (Balmary, 2006). Since the mid-2000s, the contracting-out policy became more conscious and organized, gradually contributing to the construction of a quasi-market for job search support and placement. In accordance with Communication 641 of the European Commission (1998), the Law on Social Cohesion of 18 January 2005 put an end to ANPE’s formal public monopoly on job placement.14 Henceforth, every provider, whether public, non-profit or private (such as temporary work agencies), has been able to participate in job placement, as long as services to the unemployed remain free and non-discriminatory. In turn, the ANPE has been allowed to create affiliated companies delivering specific, chargeable services to firms and competing with other private intermediaries like temporary work agencies, human resource or recruitment agencies, although it has not yet used this opportunity. Since 2005, the public call for tender procedure regarding services aiming to favour labourmarket integration has become increasingly competitive. These changes have raised debates opposing proponents of increased privatization and marketization of employment services in the name of economic efficiency, and advocates of public services in the name of social cohesion and equity. It has also provoked conflicts within employment institutions: on 29 March 2007, more than 43 per cent of the 28,000 ANPE agents staged a one-day strike, fearing the deconstruction of PES.
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The 2005 Law on Social Cohesion extended the scope (circles) of PES, to include the many intermediaries involved in service provisions (see Table 3.2). The three circles, however, do not reflect the intermediaries’ activities or responsibilities as purchasers or providers – or purchaserproviders like ANPE (today, the Employment Bureau). Instead, they are defined according to their institutional proximity to the state (Balmary, 2006). The third circle combines providers whose relationships to ANPE or to the hard-core PES are very different. Some of them (co-contractors), mainly in the non-profit sector, are contributing to PES through partnerships and cooperation, receiving public subsidies for their activities: Local Missions, the APEC and the Employment course. Others, called subcontractors, are more or less competing in providing services (purchased by the Employment Bureau, other hard-core PES institutions or General Councils) in the quasi-market for job-search support, training or consultancy: private non-profit providers dealing mainly with vulnerable groups as well as private for-profit providers such as temporary work agencies or human resource agencies that may either provide services to the unemployed for job search or to employers for human resource consultancy. According to Balmary (2006), the 2005 Law had a strong political meaning: by extending the definition and scope of PES, it established that the state does not assume the exclusive responsibility for the labour market situation and that employment is a matter of public (that is, general) interest, justifying the common effort of various actors. It does not however institutionalize a regulated market for service provision: while competition between subcontractors is current in France, subcontractors’ activities are not systematically evaluated, providers are only paid exceptionally according to their results (CERC, 2005) and ‘clients’ (the unemployed) do not choose their provider. Moreover, the Law reasserts public service principles in guaranteeing equal access to PES, such as non-discrimination, free job placement for the unemployed, public control and information about job placement. The quasi-market thus remains limited: competition mainly applies to subcontractors, essentially in territories where they are sufficiently numerous, while co-contractors mostly escape from it. However, the gradual extension of PES and the involvement of new private providers, together with the new rules applying to public invitations to tender in the past few years, have broadened the quasi-market. Private actors in the profit sector, such as temporary work or human resources agencies, entered the market to diversify their activities, thus challenging traditional associations in the non-profit sector whose position now appears
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more delicate (Béraud and Eydoux, 2009). Moreover, ANPE’s wish to draw together its subcontractors led the national agency to put an end to its existing contracts in December 2007 (which would normally ran until December 2008) and to launch new, extended calls for tender (concerning 20,000 to 30,000 unemployed) in broader geographical zones, thus making it hard for small providers to satisfy the new conditions. Recently, competition has also been extended to co-contractors: the APEC in charge of unemployed managers is now increasingly challenged by private providers and is worried about its future (Bissuel, 2010).
Inter-agency cooperation and the merging of benefits and activation services Governance reforms have also promoted inter-agency cooperation between the unemployment insurance agencies (Assédics) and the National Employment Agency (ANPE). An institutional merger, first evoked in 1966 just before the creation of ANPE, has been placed on the agenda again since the beginning of the 2000s, especially following the official report by Marimbert (2004) on the merger of employment services. The Law on Social Cohesion of 2005 provided a first step in this direction, by encouraging the setting up of single gateways offering diverse institutional services at the local level, in order to prevent the unemployed from going from one institution to another. It was at first experimented through new institutions called Employment Houses (Maisons de l’emploi) gathering (in principle in the same building) intermediaries from the first and second circles, most often Local ANPE agencies, the Local Missions and sometimes the Assédic or AFPA agencies, or possibly also temporary work agencies. This joint location had a tool, a single electronic file (DUDE) containing all relevant information on unemployed persons for the use of various authorized institutions (ANPE and Assédics). The Law of 13 February 2008 went a step further, providing for a merger between the two major institutions of the first circle, ANPE and the Assédics, into a single one, the Employment Bureau as of 1 January 2009. The objective was first to increase the efficiency of PES by developing one-stop agencies for the unemployed and centralizing the information regarding unemployment benefits and job search; and secondly to reduce the existing segmentation in the treatment of jobseekers who, according to their benefit status, relied on different institutions and activation programmes provided by ANPE (all unemployed) or Unédic (insured unemployed only). In other words, the aim was to
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‘cut the umbilical cord between the income protection system and the system supporting the unemployed job-search’ (Tuchszirer, 2010).
A changing governance mix? The accelerated reform process currently operating in activation policies, as well as in the organization of PES, makes it difficult to characterize the changes in the French governance regime. Reflecting the institutional segmentation of activation policies and income protection institutions, the French governance regime is a mixed one, combining state and corporatist procedural governance with corporate governance (mainly in hard-core PES institutions), partnership and market (in the contractual relationships between hard-core institutions and actors in the second and third circles). Nevertheless, adaptations are at work in the governance mix: long-term decentralization, outsourcing and marketization processes have led to three major changes. First of all, if the steering of activation policies and the governance of PES remain mainly procedural and centralized, dominated by the state’s decisions and control, proceeding by law and tripartite negotiations and asserting public service values, there is a limited and ambivalent decentralization process. Competency transfers to local authorities have been restricted in their scope to vocational training and to the reintegration into employment of income support recipients, while the devolution of employment policies has mainly responded to a downward logic, leaving little room to local initiatives. The internal decentralization of the National Employment Agency (ANPE, now the Employment Bureau) also remained limited, relying on soft new management procedures. Secondly, the governance of the many intermediaries who operate in the extended PES is now largely decentralized, obeying mainly a partnership model, as far as the relationships between the Employment Bureau and its co-contractors are concerned, and increasingly to a quasimarket model. In the past decade, changing rules have imposed more publicity and competition in the call for tender procedures regarding activation and social inclusion services. Increased marketization is at work, exposing traditional non-profit subcontractors, and even some former partners of the national employment agency (co-contractors), to the challenges of new private providers. Thirdly, if the French governance regime is partly corporatist, in the sense that unions’ regulations play an important role, social partners who have jointly administrated Unédic since 1958 have recently lost some of their institutional and decisional prerogatives in the field of activation and training programmes for the insured unemployed. The
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decision in 2008 by the French government to merge ANPE and the Assédics to create the new Employment Bureau has led to both transfer of Unédic’s activation programmes (with corresponding funds) to the new institution and confinement of social partners to the enforcement of the unemployment insurance convention: they played only a limited role in the reform of unemployment compensation during the negotiation of the 2008 national agreement on the modernization of labour market. From this point of view, the merger represents a major change (Tuchszirer, 2008) that reduces the participation of Unédic in activation policies and limits social partners’ role in unemployment insurance.
The blurred impacts of governance reforms In contrast to the substantive activation reforms and employment programmes that are now systematically assessed (the rate of return to employment being the main indicator), PES governance reforms have been evaluated much less. Measuring the impacts of governance reforms is thus a delicate task. Not only have these reforms been complex and liable to produce a wide range of (desirable, as well as unexpected) effects, but the indicators that might be used for that purpose are lacking because policy objectives were not always explicitly formulated or were changing or even ambivalent – as diverse as improving the quality of services for the unemployed, providing low-cost services, increasing the rate of return to employment. Experts and official reports often agree in asserting that the assessments of the French governance regime are scarce, not always carried out by independent experts, and hardly disseminated to the public because of a weak culture of accountability. The lack of evaluations in PES governance reforms mainly concerns the process of the state’s internal decentralization and contractualism, as well as the role of social partners: whereas Barbier (2007) demonstrates that the assessments of performance (progress) contracts between the state and ANPE have long remained partial and confidential, Freyssinet (2010) emphasizes that there has been no real impact assessment of the social partners’ actions on macroeconomic employment regulations, as well as on equity and security in the labour market. We will thus focus here on the impact of the decentralization processes, the subcontracting of employment services and increasing inter-agency cooperation. Decentralization in practice: the diversity of local implementation A recent report on the ‘State’s implementation of decentralization’ (Cour des comptes, 2009) points out the unsystematic character of
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evaluation regarding the exercise of competencies delegated to local authorities: statistics on decentralized assistance and integration policies are insufficient, shared diagnoses and information are missing, while experimentation remains timid. Evaluations and experimentation are, however, increasingly developing at a decentralized level, bearing essentially on substantive activation reforms in the field of social inclusion policies: the recent implementation of the Active Solidarity Income boosted experimentation and assessments in Départements before and after its generalization in 2009. Procedural and institutional reforms have scarcely been assessed. In recent empirical research bearing on the implementation of local social policies regarding care for the elderly and the social integration of income support recipients, Gramain and Neuberg (2009) analysed the impact of the mid-2000s decentralization. First of all, they show that the decentralization of job-search support to the General (departmental) Councils has been accompanied by the re-centralization of competencies previously delegated to a sub-Departmental level. Secondly, analysing the relationships between General Councils in charge of the activation of RSA recipients and their subcontractors, they underline the variety of local practices, pointing out the fact that despite the wish of public authorities to develop quasi-markets through new call-for-tender rules, selection procedures do not systematically proceed through call-for-tenders. Call-for-tender procedures often seem complex to local authorities, while competition turns out to be irrelevant when local providers are few or when some of them appear as key players. Moreover, local authorities tend to circumvent call-for-tenders that place providers in a precarious situation: market rules requiring that providers should be paid according to their outcomes would make them vulnerable to the local economic circumstances, while a payment based on effective provisions would expose them to cash problems. The local governance of integration policies thus tends to be based on negotiations between local authorities and their providers, rather than on market or competitive relationships, so that the variety of local arrangements exposes income support recipients to differentiated treatment. Contracting-out: the public provider performs better than private ones The outsourcing of activation and employment services since the 1980s has primarily developed without any assessment of its effects (Balmary, 2004). It is only recently, with the public objective of reforming PES
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governance and delegation of job-search support to private providers deemed to be both cheaper and more efficient, that an experiment has been carried out. The so-called OPP-CVE experimentation is aimed at assessing and comparing the efficiency (in terms of costs and rate of return to work) of public service provision by the National Employment Agency (ANPE) and private services from new providers (like Altedia or Ingeus) subcontracting for Unédic, called ‘private providers for job placement’ (OPP). For the purpose of the experiment, ANPE developed a new service provision called ‘on Course Towards Enterprises’ (CVE) that could be compared to the services of private new providers (advisors offering a comparable service to the same number of unemployed with similar characteristics). Within its methodological limits, the quantitative evaluation proved that ANPE did better than private providers in terms of reintegration into employment (Béhagel et al., 2009). Meanwhile, empirical research has shown that coaches working for these new providers do not develop innovative methods, but rather use selective procedures (such as creaming) in order to improve their outcomes (Divay, 2009). More generally, the marketization at work tends to draw new private providers into the quasi-market for placement and job-search support. These new providers in turn challenge non-profit associations specialized in the reintegration of the unemployed, creating precarious conditions for traditional subcontractors (Béraud and Eydoux, 2009). Whatever these outcomes, which could have favoured cautiousness in the marketization and outsourcing process (if not direct limits), the Employment Bureau now submits more and more providers to market rules and, given the rise in unemployment, turns increasingly to private providers. Inter-agency cooperation and the merging of ANPE and Assédics: a treacherous process The impact of inter-agency cooperation and the effects of the merger of ANPE and the Assédics are still blurred and difficult to comprehend. Employment Houses where inter-agency cooperation has developed since the 2005 Law on Social Cohesion have not been designed as experimental tools. In practice, their organization, functioning and policies have revealed great local disparities (Anciaux, 2008). Fieldwork in Employment Houses has shown that the implementation of interagency cooperation between the Assédics and the local agencies of ANPE has turned out to be very complex and delicate (Béraud and Eydoux, 2009). First, technical and practical problems have limited cooperation: the electronic DUDE file for sharing information was not available to
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all personnel in Employment Houses. Secondly, institutional problems created organizational conflicts. For instance, the director of a local ANPE agency complained about the fact that ANPE agents at the common reception of the Employment House were essentially dealing with benefits matters, and thus paid to do the work of Assédics employees. More fundamentally, difficulties were statutory: Assédic and ANPE employees had different qualifications and competencies as well as different working and employment conditions (in particular, different wage levels), but were increasingly asked to do the same work. When interviewed in 2007, directors of both Assédics and local ANPE agencies did not believe in the feasibility of the merger between both institutions at the national level because of these existing statutory differences. Nevertheless, the merger and the creation of the new provider have been effective since January 2009; in a conflictual context, aggravated by the economic slowdown and the increasing number of unemployed registering at the new Employment Bureau. The impact of the merger has not yet been assessed, but so far seems rather negative in terms of organizational efficiency: press articles often relate the organizational difficulties of the new institution in facing both its organizational change (implying conflicts, strikes, statutory changes as well as massive vocational training programmes for employees) and the new rush of unemployed brought on by the current economic crisis. All in all, the overall impact of French governance reforms remains difficult to assess, notably because the reform process has been accelerated in the past few years, blurring the evaluation processes. In terms of efficiency, the reforms have not solved the coordination problems faced by the many actors involved in the implementation of activation policies. At the local level, actors sometimes find solutions to improve their coordination (Béraud and Eydoux, 2009) or to escape from marketization (Gramain and Neuberg, 2009), but the complexity of the landscape is still the same. At the national level, the restructuring of PES has been twofold. First, the merger of the Assédics and ANPE has slightly reduced the institutional complexity in the first circle, but at the cost of major organizational difficulties, at least in the transition period. Secondly, the outsourcing and marketization processes have included new actors in the third circle competing for subcontracts with the Employment Bureau, without any empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of the quasi-market: experimentation as well as fieldwork rather suggest that much cautiousness is needed in market regulations.
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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
7. 8. 9. 10.
11.
12. 13. 14.
Agence nationale pour l’emploi. Associations pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce. Union nationale pour l’emploi dans l’industrie et le commerce. Contractualism here primarily refers to the fact that the state sets performance contracts with public organizations. Association pour la formation professionnelle des adultes. Like ANPE before, the Employment Bureau is a national institution with local agencies (local employment bureaux) in charge of the registration of the unemployed, as well as of job search support and benefit payments at the local level. While Assédic agencies have been merged into the Employment Bureau, the joint institution (Unédic), which defines insurance compensation rules at a national level, still exists. Direction régionale des entreprises, de la concurrence, de la consommation, du travail et de l’emploi. Association pour l’emploi des cadres. Cap emploi. Since 2004, the state has transferred the funds and the responsibility for financing the RMI to the Départements. Today, the Départements still finance the basic share of the RSA allowance, while the state pays for the additional (‘active’) share designed to make work pay. The French term ‘décentralisation’ refers to the transfer of power from central government to France’s regions or departments. Its meaning is closer to that of devolution, but for linguistic reasons the English term ‘decentralization’ is used as a translation here. RMA was a subsidized contract dedicated to RMI and to ASS (unemployment solidarity scheme) recipients. Comités de bassin d’emploi. This monopoly was shared with municipalities and other institutions working with ANPE; it was essentially formal because many actors used to participate in job placement.
References Anciaux, J.-P. (2008) Les maisons de l’emploi, mission d’évaluation du dispositif (Paris: Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’emploi, La documentation française). Balmary, D. (2004) Rapport de l‘instance d’évaluation de la politique de l’emploi et recours à des opérateurs externes (Paris: Commissariat Général au Plan, La documentation française). Balmary, D. (2006) ‘Un nouveau service public de l’emploi’, Droit Social, 6, 594–8. Barbier, J.-C. (2002) ‘Peut-on parler de l’activation de la protection sociale en Europe?’, Revue française de sociologie, 43/2, 307–32. Barbier, J.-C. (2007) ‘La gestion et l’évaluation du service public de l’emploi en France dans la décennie 1990: Matériaux pour une réflexion comparative
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internationale’, Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, 2007.01. Baron, C., M.-C. Bureau, E. Le Dantec and P. Nivolle (1994) ‘Les intermédiaires de l’insertion’, Dossiers du CEE, No1. Béhagel, L., B. Crépon and M. Gurgand (2009) Evaluation d’impact de l’accompagnement des demandeurs d’emploi par les opérateurs privés de placement et le programme Cap vers l’entreprise (Paris: CREST). Béraud, M. and A. Eydoux (2009) ‘Activation des chômeurs et modernisation du service public de l’emploi: Les inflexions du régime français d’activation’, Travail et emploi, 119, 9–21. Berthet, T. and P. Cuntigh (2002) ‘Politiques d’emploi et territoires’, Bref Céreq, 182, 1–4. Berthet, T., P. Cuntigh, C. Guitton and O. Mazel (2002) ‘1982–2002: La territorialisation progressive des politiques de l’emploi’, Premières informations et premières synthèses, No 24.2 (Paris: Dares). Bissuel, B. (2010) ‘Concurrencée, l’APEC cherche sa raison d’être’, Le Monde, 3 May. Boulanger, J.-M. (2008) Contribution à la préparation de la convention tripartite entre l’Etat, l’Unédic et la nouvelle institution créée par la loi du 13 février 2008 (Paris: La documentation française). Cahuc, P. and F. Kramarz (2004) De la précarité à la mobilité : vers une sécurité sociale professionnelle (Paris: La documentation française). CERC (2005) Aider au retour à l’emploi, Rapport du Conseil Emploi Revenus Cohésion sociale No.6 (Paris: La documentation française). Considine, M. (2001) Enterprising states. The Public Management of Welfare-to-Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cour des comptes (2006) L’évolution de l’assurance chômage: de l’indemnisation à l’aide au retour à l’emploi (Paris: La documentation française). Cour des comptes (2009) La conduite par l’Etat de la décentralisation (Paris: La documentation française). Divay, S. (2009) ‘Nouveaux opérateurs privés du service public de l’emploi: les pratiques des conseillers sont-elles novatrices’, Travail et emploi, 119, 37–49. Dupeyroux, J.-J. (2005) ‘Avant propos’, Droit Social, 12, 1081–3. Erhel, C. (2010) ‘Les politiques de l’emploi en Europe: le modèle de l’activation et de la flexicurité face à la crise’, Document de travail CEE. Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) Les trois mondes de l’Etat providence (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France). European Commission (1998) Modernising Public Employment Services to Support the European Employment Strategy, Communication from the Commission of 13 November 1998, COM(98) 641 final. Eydoux, A. and C. Tuchszirer (2010) ‘Du RMI au RSA: les inflexions de la solidarité et de la gouvernance des politiques d’insertion’, Document de travail du CEE. Ferracci, M. (2007) ‘Améliorer le service public de l’emploi: ce que disent les faits’, Revue française d’économie, 21/3, 75–135. Freyssinet, J. (2010) Négocier l’emploi, 50 ans de négociations interprofessionnelles sur l’emploi et la formation (Paris: Editions Liaisons). Gramain, A. and S. Neuberg (2009) ‘Réagencements territoriaux récents et conduite des politiques sociales à l’échelle locale’, Travail et emploi, 119, 77–91.
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Marimbert, J. (2004) Le rapprochement des services de l’emploi (Paris: La documentation française). Perret, B. (2008) L’évaluation des politiques publiques (Paris: La découverte). Tuchszirer, C. (2008) ‘La réforme du service public de l’emploi: suite et fin?’, Regards sur l’actualité, 343, 65–73. Tuchszirer, C. (2010) ‘France. An unemployment system ill-adapted to the economic crisis’ in F. Lefresne (ed.) Unemployment Benefits Systems in Europe and North America: Reforms and Crisis (Brussels: ETUI).
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4 Fragmented Governance Continued: the German Case Irene Dingeldey
Introduction The importance of the insurance principle for the provision of status-oriented benefits and corporatist governance arrangements (inclusion of social partners and welfare production by third sector organisations) were highlighted by Esping-Andersen (1990), when he characterized Germany as a conservative corporatist welfare state. These features, however, do not entirely reflect the rather complex governance of the German welfare system. Another important aspect, in particular in the area of employment policy, is institutional fragmentation. Since the 1960s a three-tier system provided functionally differentiated benefits to the unemployed and the poor. Those with sufficient employment records were directed to the primarily contributionbased unemployment insurance system, receiving an earnings-related unemployment benefit (UB; Arbeitslosengeld), as well as employment promotion addressed to maintain the achieved employment status. The long-term unemployed received unemployment assistance (UA; Arbeitslosenhilfe), still paid in relation to prior income (although at a lower rate) but tax financed (from the federal budget) and means tested. Finally, the social assistance (SA; Sozialhilfe) system was designed to prevent poverty through the provision of a tax-financed (by municipalities), flat rate and strictly means-tested benefit. According to the different tiers, but also within the single tiers, responsibilities for labour-market programmes, benefit payments and employment assistance were subject to multi-level governance. Hence, the main feature of the governance of German labour-market policy may be its fragmentation. Most recent reforms of the governance structure under the label of activating labour-market policy therefore not only aimed for 62
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marketization and the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) structures but primarily for a homogenization of the institutional structure, namely the improvement of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, including full organizational mergers. As a result of these reforms in Germany we see a decreasing role of the social partners, a much higher importance for NPM, a slight increase in the market as well as the rather mixed trends of decentralization and (re-)centralization. Most significant, however, is the partial failure of reforms intended to homogenize the institutional structure, which has resulted in an even more fragmented governance regime than before. This argument will be developed in this chapter in several steps: First, a brief overview will be given of the main actors and agencies involved in administering income protection schemes and activation services for the unemployed at the end of the 1990s (the start of active welfare state reforms in Germany) and at present (summer 2010). Secondly, various changes of governance will be analysed in more detail. Finally, I will give an interpretation of the effects of the governance reforms and a possible shift in the governance regime.
The Hartz reforms and beyond: a path break in the governance of labour-market policies With respect to labour-market activation, Germany may be called a late reformer. While other European countries had started to reshape their unemployment assistance systems by the end of the 1990s, Germany transplanted its system to the east (Dingeldey, 2007, 2009). During the reunification process one of the major goals of labour-market policy was to cushion the enormous job losses through various labourmarket programmes. Thus, it was not until 1998 that labour-market policy was activated (still under the Christian Democratic–Liberal coalition), encompassing a re-regulation of the rules for the unemployment insurance system; reform of the Federal Employment Office (FEO; Bundesanstalt für Arbeit); and changes to the instruments of active labour-market policy. Within the law employability was formulated as a major goal of labour-market policy and the process of reforming the governance of the FEO began (Finn et al., 2005). At the beginning of 2002 the so-called placement scandal happened, following a Federal Audit Office report in 2002 which revealed that the FEO had exaggerated its job placement data. As a reaction the government imposed the commission on ‘Modern Services in the Labour
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Market’ (briefly the Hartz Commission, named after its chairman), which may be regarded as a strategy to overcome reform deadlock by externalizing the preparation of political decisions.1 The job of the commission was not to develop an entire concept for employment creation, but to prepare a reform of labour market administration and services. The commission’s proposals (Hartz, 2002) have been enacted, with some revisions, by four subsequent legislative acts on Modern Services on the Labour Market between 2002 and 2005, briefly called the Hartz Reforms I–IV. Although the reform of job placement services had begun prior to the Hartz Commission, the process was greatly intensified under Hartz I and II, although Hartz III (which came into force on 1 January 2004) provided the major impulse to change the FEO into a modern provider of labour-market services. Under Hartz IV, local employment agencies were supposed to become Job centres responsible for all labour-market services to the unemployed. The organization of Job centres as one-stop shops was supposed to end the division of responsibility between the FEO and municipalities, the former being responsible for the administration of unemployment insurance benefits and employment promotion measures and the latter for payment of social assistance and other social services. The combination of formal and operational reform elements, respectively the integration of unemployment assistance and social assistance into one benefit system for all those capable of working in 2005 and the respective change of organizational structures, may be seen as the most drastic reform in the field of labour-market policy during the last 20 years in Germany. The comparison of the respective governance structures, however, shows that it hardly displayed a reduction of complexity and fragmentation. At the end of the 1990s, just before the starting point of active welfare state reforms in Germany, the concrete implementation structure for income protection and employment services for the unemployed was as outlined in Table 4.1. The FEO was established as the central body of the unemployment insurance system. Although contributions and benefits are determined politically, it enjoyed considerable autonomy in relation to implementation. Its organizational structure reflected Germany’s federal system of government. The FEO was organized as a self-governing corporation under public law. Its Council and Management Board were dominated by a corporatist governance structure, including representation from the social partners. This structure was replicated in the other
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65 Table 4.1 The implementation structure for income protection and activation in Germany (1990s and 2010) Late 1990s
2010
Unemployment Insurance Benefit
Unemployment Benefit (UB)
Unemployment Benefit I (UB I) regulated by SGB III
Benefit Administration
Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit)
Federal Employment Office (Federal Agency for work)
10 regional employment offices (Länder)
10 regional directories
181 local FEOs (660 branch offices)
178 local Agencies for Work (610 branch offices)
Funding
employer’ and employees’ contributions; deficit financing by federal budget
employer’ and employees’ contributions; deficit financing by bank credits as proposed in 2010
Activation
FEO, local offices
FEO, local offices
Private providers
Private providers
Unemployment Assistance
Unemployment Benefit II (UBII) regulated by SGB II
Benefit Administration
equal to UB
from merger of Unemployment Assistance and Social Assistance (for those capable of working)
Funding
taxes out of federal budget
Activation
equal to UB
Social Assistance Benefit Administration
Municipalities
Funding
Taxes, municipalities’ budget
Activation
Municipalities; private providers
356 ARGE consortia (joint bodies of FEO and municipalities) or municipalities (69 opted-out municipalities with sole responsibility and 23 municipalities/local FEOs with complete separation of responsibilities) Taxes: benefit from federal budget; housing costs from municipalities’ budget
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Table 4.1
(Continued) Late 1990s
2010 Activation as co-financing from FEO (contribution funded) and federal budget plus additional measures funded by municipalities Equal to UB I; but promotion of 1-Euro Jobs dominated by municipal employment providers
Source: Own design.
two administrative levels that consisted of a network of ten regional employment offices at Land (state) level and 181 local or regional public employment offices, with 660 branch offices, which covered districts of varying sizes and usually connected with several municipal districts (Finn et al., 2005). The FEO was responsible for the implementation of active labourmarket policy and two main benefit payments: Unemployment Insurance Benefit was paid for a maximum of 12 months (since 1987, for a longer duration of 18 (32) months only for those older than 42 (53) years). Unemployment Assistance was unlimited, but means tested. Both benefits were related to prior earnings, although the replacement rate for the latter was much higher than that for the former (UB: 60 per cent, 67 per cent with dependants; UA: 53 per cent, 57 per cent with dependants). While UB was funded mainly by payroll contributions paid in equal parts by insured employees and their employers to the FEO, UA was financed by taxes out of the federal budget. Labourmarket programmes for both UB and UA recipients were funded from payroll contributions. When unemployment rose, an increase in both government funding and contributions was necessary. The municipalities administered a third, means-tested benefit, namely Social Assistance, formed as a last and separate safety net for those in need but ineligible for UB or UA.2 It provided a flat-rate payment for adults with additional payments for children and other adult dependants living in the same household. Additional financial assistance was provided towards housing costs. The means test for SA was much stricter than for UA and included also the wider family, such as parents in separate households (Clasen, 2005; Steffen, 2009).
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Hence, a general feature of the German labour-market policy was its multi-level governance, briefly summarized as follows: At federal, Land (state) and local government levels, institutions are either wholly or partially responsible for the development, implementation, and application of labour market policy instruments and measures. Their activities are guided by federal legislation that specifies general employment policy and the labour market policy instruments to be applied nationally by the FES (Bundesanstalt [now Bundesagentur] für Arbeit). The 16 Länder have no direct influence on these policies with the exception of their participation through the Bundesrat. Until 2003, the Länder were also represented, together with social partners, in tripartite committees controlling the middle tier of the FES. The Länder supervised LAs which delivered SA, the lowest level of ‘income support’. Finn et al. (2005, p. 7) Although many changes have occurred prior to 2010, the aspect of multi-level governance still persists: since reforms in 2002 the FEO operates as the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and local offices have become Agencies for Work (AfW). The middle-tier Land level of administration has been reconstituted as a number of Regional Directorates. The 178 local AfWs still have a unified structure for three main services, namely placement, active labour-market policy and the administration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit (renamed as UB I; Arbeitslosengeld I) (Eichhorst et al., 2008). Entitlement to UB I is still restricted to the unemployed with an adequate contributions record and is limited to one year (with exceptions only for older workers). The greatest organizational changes were therefore related to the merger of the two benefit systems UA and SA to form Unemployment Benefit II (UB II), thereby creating a single benefit for all needy people capable of working but not eligible for UB I.3 The new benefit is paid as a flat-rate basic income support scheme (Grundsicherung) for jobseekers and other adults in the same household, with additional supplements for children as well as for housing costs (Eichhorst et al., 2008). The resulting two-tier system of unemployment protection is regulated by two legislative frameworks within the Social Code Book (SGB): the insurance-based UB I, with most of the employment promotion measures being regulated in SGB III, while the means-tested Unemployment Benefit II is regulated by SGB II (Dingeldey, 2011).
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In order to administer this new benefit and to design employment services for the respective clients, 356 joint bodies of local AfW and municipalities – the ARGE consortia – were created (being responsible for 80 per cent of territorial units serving 85 per cent of customers). In 23 municipalities a division of responsibilities between the AfW and the municipalities has continued, which means that local FEOs cooperate with municipal administrations but do not have formal agreements. A further 69 so-called opted-out communes (Optionskommunen) took over sole responsibility for implementing UB II and activating the respective benefit recipients (Brussig and Knuth, 2009; Kirsch et al., 2009). In spite of a homogenization of the benefit system through the creation of a two-tier system (Dingeldey, 2011), the governance of the German unemployment protection system remains complex with respect to regulation within two legal frameworks and the distribution of responsibilities, both concerning the payment of the various components and the provision of services to the unemployed.
Main trends in governance reforms Major reforms to the unemployment protection system in Germany have taken place since the end of the 1990s, as indicated in the previous section and in Table 4.1. The placement scandal in 2002 and the subsequent Hartz reforms accelerated the reform process, combining formal and operational policy reforms. In this section, I will discuss in more detail the impact of these reforms on the different modes of governance detailed in Chapter 1. Diminishing role of the social partners In 2002, as an immediate reaction to the placement scandal, the corporatist boards of directors at all three levels of the FEO were abolished and replaced by three-person Executive Boards, with a Chair, initially on a renewable five-year contract (Kannengießer and Gundel, 2003; Finn et al., 2005; Eichhorst et al., 2008). Furthermore, the competence of the still-corporatist governing board was reduced to a mere controlling function, curtailing indirectly the role of the social partners (Konle-Seidl, 2003). Even more important was the indirect marginalization of the social partners that took place with the introduction of UB II. In contrast to the self-management structures of the German unemployment insurance system, the ARGEs, or municipal administrations, are not legally obliged
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to develop co-determination structures. The majority of administrations responsible for UB II voluntarily created some advisory councils which, however, do not only include the social partners but also other social and welfare associations (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008). Within the emerging network structures the representation of interests of the unemployed through trade unions became more difficult, and in administrations without councils it does not exist at all. In the entire unemployment protection system, therefore, the structures of tripartite codetermination and the influence of the social partners were weakened, whereas the role of third-sector organizations as provider of employment promotion measures increased, also in the area of interest representation (Klenk, 2009a, b). In consequence it is not corporatist tripartism but network governance that dominates the implementation of UB II at the local level (see also below). Inter-agency cooperation It was intended that the local FEOs be turned into Jobcentres that were to serve as one-stop shops to administer all labour-market services and unemployment benefits – an idea partly modelled on the British Jobcentre Plus that indeed created a unified single gateways for all unemployed people receiving a single, flat-rate benefit (Knuth, 2009). However, while the UK reform took place within a centralized political system, the respective reform plans in Germany intended not only the merger of a federal and a municipal benefit but also the reshaping of a rather complex and multi-tiered governance system. The motivation for this fundamental organizational reform in Germany was at least twofold: – One of the long-standing critics of the old, three-tiered unemployment protection system in Germany was that it created incentives for institutional actors to transfer the unemployed from one system to the other in order to save costs within the particular budgets instead of investing in their reintegration into the labour market. This practice, being characterized as a marshalling yard, was intended to end through the merger between UA and SA as a new framework for integrated provision of benefits and labour-market services. – Furthermore it was the attempt to solve problems – understood as cross-cutting or wicked issues – hitherto fragmented among the responsibilities of various public authorities in line with ideas of NPM theory through joined-up or holistic forms of governance (6, 1998; 6 et al., 2002).
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In spite of these goals the external reorganization of the unemployment protection system and employment services resulted in an even more fragmented financial and organizational structure than before, due to the institutional setting and protracted negotiations within a federal state (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Brussig and Knuth, 2009). First, the organizational division of benefit administration remaining as UB I is still administered by the local AfW and financed through the unemployment insurance fund. In contrast, UB II for all other people capable of working is financed by taxes paid out of federal and municipalities’ budgets and administered by different types of organizations, namely by ARGEs (consortia of AfW and municipality), by 69 (opted-out) municipalities in sole responsibility and – in 23 cases – separately by local AfWs and municipalities. Secondly, even within the ARGE organizations a clear division of labour between the local AfW and the municipalities remains. The local Agency for Work is responsible for financing and implementing active labour-market measures and the administration of the benefit for all those categorized as being capable of working (359 ¤ per month in 2010; 90 per cent of it to partners considered as being capable of working) as well as supplements for children below the working age of 15 (Sozialgeld). The municipalities are in charge of the rent subsidies4 and traditional social services like debt, drug, social-psychological counselling and childcare facilities (Eichhorst et al., 2008). The character of the ARGE as a joined body is still questioned, because there is a clear tendency within the consortia to develop into organizations of their own that use only staff and facilities of the partners who established them (Brussig and Knuth, 2009). This means that, for example, variation in case managers’ contractual employment conditions regarding working time and salaries is a function of being employed either by the local AfW or the municipality. Hence, with respect to just one case, the process of placement, employment promotion and benefit administration is still based on the division of work between different organizational entities with different promotion cultures. In the 23 cases that still have an entirely separate fulfilment of administering UB II by local authorities and the AfW, hardly any integration of the different employment services and the administration is to be found. Hence, only the 69 opted-out municipalities are fully responsible for all services. In consequence, the orientation towards case management is much stronger and the various functions are much more integrated here (Schütz, 2009).
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The continued fragmentation of the reformed unemployment system is summarized as follows: Instead of the desired ‘single gateways’ or the uniform ‘Job-Centre’, Germany now has two separate regimes of social protection and employment services for workless people as before, but the second tier has now become much larger [ . . . ] and comes in three variants. In the 23 territories with ‘separate fulfilment’ not only two gateways exist, but the majority of workless people actually have to visit both of them in order to collect their means of subsistence. Brussig and Knuth (2009, p. 78) Thirdly, the fragmented financial responsibilities still create incentives to transfer the unemployed from one benefit system to the other. When the new benefits were created, the municipalities used the classification ‘being capable of working’ in a way that meant that 90 per cent of former SA recipients were transferred to UB II, also including people with severe disabilities, as it was in the interest of the municipalities for their benefits to be partly financed through the federal budget (Eichhorst et al., 2008). At the same time, incentives were maintained to avoid labourmarket activation for the hard-to-place unemployed receiving UB I, as they were not expected to be integrated easily into the labour market, but would soon transfer to another system, namely UB II. In order to combat that trend, since 2008 half of the costs of employment promotion and administration for the long-term unemployed have to be paid as an integration fee (Eingliederungsbeitrag) out of the insurance fund of the FEO (the other half is financed out of the federal budget). Decentralization and (re-)centralization In Germany the FEO decides the structure and content of public employment services. The provision of the respective services takes place within a unified federal structure, where decentralized implementation units cooperate with private service providers (Botzem et al., 2009). Within that multi-level governance system various processes of decentralization and recentralization have occurred, so that no strong emphasis on either can be recognized. A process of decentralization began in 1998 with the introduction of the SGB III (see above). Since then, the local FEOs are able to decide on the allocation of their funds to various programmes financed by a global reintegration budget for active measures regulated by SGB III. Furthermore, they may allocate 10 per cent of the budget to developing
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their own innovative programmes (Schütz, 2009), a regulation that has been expanded in 2010 to include the organizations implementing SGB II. In toto, this increased the competencies of the local employment offices to decide on the mix of instruments they want to use in line with the development of local labour markets. Since then the German unemployment insurance system is now regarded as a system with high budget flexibility at the local level. However, it is equally argued that in the German system extensive powers were given to the regional level in conjunction with re-centralization (Schneider et al., 2006; Mosley, 2009). One indicator may be the centralization and standardization of the purchase of labourmarket services through the creation of five regional purchasing centres (Regionale Einkaufszentren, REZ) that replaced the former process of negotiations of vocational training and employment promotion programmes between local FEOs and providers, including the contracting-out of placement services (Kaps, 2009b). Each of these regional centres specializes in purchasing a particular type of labour-market service, although the awarding of a contract is done by the regional department located in the respective district. This new practice is criticized, because the purchase of programmes is subject to a long bureaucratic process and the centralized tendering favours cheap suppliers without sufficient integration into local labour markets (Oschmiansky, 2010). Furthermore, the current practice through the REZ is generally seen to be detrimental to delivering integrated and very specialized services to those very distant from the labour market (Goerne, 2010). Observers therefore see a (re-)centralization of competencies in the way that local priorities within programmes may be performed only additionally, as the priority is the performance of nationally set ratios and goals. Among these, cost effectiveness is being defined as the key criterion when choosing programme contents and participants (Eichhorst et al., 2008). In this context also the centrally introduced practices of NPM may be seen as an element of centralization and standardization (see below). With respect to the governance of SGB II this judgement, however, has to be differentiated with respect to the various organizational models. As the local AfW is subject to guidance, management by objectives and control by the federal ministry of employment, the ARGE consortia are widely attached to this hierarchical model of governance while the municipal lead organizations are not (Schütz, 2009). Hence, the autonomy of local decision making is much higher for municipal providers than for the ARGEs (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009). A disadvantage of this organizational model, however, is seen
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in the fact that a standardization of controlling and statistic software across the various institutions is still missing. Thus, even the various grades of centralization or decentralization with respect to the different institutional models may be seen as another element indicating the high degree of fragmentation in the German system. New Public Management The introduction of New Public Management in the German FEO included new forms of guidance, control and management by objectives. Since 2004, national priorities have been imposed through the planning of targets for the management by objective system that links budgets in respect of costs of particular programmes (input) with integration results (output). Cost-effectiveness became a key criterion when choosing programme contents and participants. The measurement of output is based on newly introduced IT systems for control available to all local employment agencies (Schütz, 2009). Thus, quantitative goals are set for each local office taking into account special problems of regional labour markets (Eichhorst et al., 2008). The core element in the new organization of the local FEO was the conversion of the formerly hierarchically organized employment offices into service centres (Kundenzentrum). The new organizational design is based on case management and has been closely related with the goal of reducing caseloads. The profiling of jobseekers constitutes an essential element of the new placement process, which is controlled centrally. It serves as a tool for customer segmentation and the determination of individual assistance, but also as an instrument for the allocation of resources. Hence, market clients (a) are considered to be job ready and have the best chances of finding employment. Clients for counselling and activation (b) are adjudged as needing minor adjustments of skills through limited training. Clients for counselling and qualification (c) need more attention and are likely to be directed to training programmes and other measures to increase flexibility. Incentive assistance clients (d) require special attention because they face the poorest re-employment prospects and bear the risk of long-term unemployment. The assignment to one of these four categories determines participation in particular action programmes and resource allocation, namely quick and sustainable placement (a), a change of perspective (b), reduction of employment barriers and qualification measures (c) and preservation of marketability and case management (d) (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Oschmiansky, 2010). The individual targeting of active measures includes the active cooperation of the person seeking assistance. At the end of the assessment
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process an integration agreement between the caseworker and the jobseeker is signed, specifying individual integration objectives. Since 2006, integration plans must be renewed every six months, three months in the case of younger claimants. The placement process is monitored and finally controlled along process ratios within the local agencies. Beyond the econometrically measured effects on the individual reintegration chances, the monitoring results from the centrally organized controlling system providing information on the achievement of the agency’s operational goals (Eichhorst et al., 2008). Marketization Processes of privatization or contracting-out were traditionally of minor importance in Germany, because the provision of labour-market programmes was always conducted by third parties, mostly by private, non-profit, third-sector organizations while private for-profit organizations were not very important (Trampusch, 2002; Dingeldey, 2009). The only exception to that rule was the public monopoly for job placement services, which was abolished in 1994. At the end of the 1990s, job placement conciliation through private organizations, however, still made up a share of only 5 per cent of all registered placements (Konle-Seidl, 2003). In line with the ideas of NPM, competition between public and private providers was increased and elements of marketization were introduced in order to empower the unemployed in their role as clients. In line with these ideas, contracting out of placement services to non-public agencies was enforced and vouchers, both for placement services and training measures, were introduced in 2002. The effect of these transformations may be regarded as limited in relation to both market share and effectiveness (Oschmiansky, 2010). Since 2002 the FEO has been able to commission the delivery of the placement service in total to third parties, namely private providers5 (Kaps, 2009b). In 2009 this was used for 213,978 cases (entrants, whole year), about 7 per cent of all unemployed UB I and UB II benefit recipients (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010a, own calculation). While the contracting-out of placement services was aimed at promoting competition among private agencies for contracts, the voucher system was intended for the promotion of competition between private and public services. Furthermore, it was intended to increase self-responsibility and choice and strengthen the role of the unemployed as customers (see below).
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In order to strengthen the use of temporary employment as a placement instrument, Personnel Service Agencies (PSAs) were set up as publicly funded but privately organized temporary work agencies. The creation of local PSAs was subject to tendering and regulated by contract. As private service providers, PSAs receive payments from the public employment agency in exchange for employing jobseekers as temporary workers (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006). A more intense focus on the compensation of individual integration deficits led to a re-regulation that introduced the individual placement budget in 2009 (§ 46 SGB III). This joined various instruments of mobility aids, that is, travel expenses for job interviews, daily travel costs or relocation assistance in line with the acceptance of a new job, in order to make access less complicated (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010b). Together with the centralization of the purchase of labour-market services, the introduction of vouchers for training measures curtailed the capability of local AfWs to design training measures in response to short-notice demands. This was combined with an increased control of the quality of suppliers as well as outcomes with respect to the final labour-market integration of clients (Schütz, 2009). For UB II recipients the dominant form of employment promotion is the so called 1-Euro-job, which means working for benefit plus a supplement. Although this programme created strong controversies because of the supposed substitution of regular work, it was used extensively by all the governing institutions of the SGB II. Guidelines for the use of these programmes were elaborated by the above-mentioned newly created networks of local labour-market actors, mostly designed as advisory boards of the ARGE (Kaps, 2009a). The municipal employment provider (Beschäftigungsgesellschaften), created by municipalities in order to integrate hard-to-place SA recipients in employment, still plays a dominant role in implementing the 1-Euro-jobs policy. In the founding contracts of the ARGE it usually has a particular role. In the opted-out municipalities it is even more important, as relevant parts of service provision are often delegated to it (Kaps, 2009a). Hence, marketization within the area of employment promotion for UB II recipients may be regarded as limited.
Effects of governance reforms Besides controlling and monitoring, evaluation of policy interventions is part of effective governance within the NPM approach. In Germany
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the Hartz legislation made allowance for this demand, requiring evaluation research of single labour-market instruments and of the performance of the different implementation institutions of SGB II, namely the ARGE and municipal providers. Measurement was orientated towards the global objectives formulated in the legislation itself, namely integration into the labour market, improvement of employability and social stabilization of clients (§1, section 1, SGB II). In the following section I will discuss only evaluation results concerning process, outcome and output effects (see Chapter 1) related to the governance structures discussed above, namely particular elements of marketization as well as effects concerning the reform and organizational differences of provider institutions of SGB II.
Outcome effects With respect to the general labour-market performance we have seen a considerable decrease in the numbers of registered unemployed people since 2005, until the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. Apart from a positive macroeconomic development, this may to some extent be explained by increased job-search activities by the unemployed motivated by the ‘threat’ of a transfer to UB II. In general, however, simulation studies show only marginal effects on labour supply (Eichhorst et al., 2008). And overall for the long-term unemployed, incentives to move from benefit receipt to work were as limited as the demand for their qualifications in the labour market. Thus – in spite of all the latest reforms – long-term unemployment6 in Germany was still 45.5 per cent in 2009. This was rather high compared with other European countries like Denmark (9.1), the UK (24.6) or France (32.7) (OECD, 2010). The results of the evaluation studies indicated that labour-market services provided by ARGEs were oriented strongly towards direct labourmarket integration, including a stricter practice concerning sanctions. In contrast, the municipal providers gave greater priority to social integration, enabling access to additional social services and the promotion of qualifications (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009). Thus in general, the ARGE performed better with respect to labour-market integration, in effect the end of means-tested benefit receipt, while the municipal providers were better at improving employability (Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung and Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009).
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Output effects The quality of private placement services was not assessed in general to be better than that of public ones. While there were some positive results for the placement services voucher concerning shortening the duration of unemployment, the third-party delegation did not have any significant positive effects in the first years (Kaps, 2009b). Due to marketization, however, the use of private placement services increased. In 2009, 56,455 persons (entrants, whole year), about 1.8 per cent of all unemployed UB I and UB II benefit recipients, asked for a voucher for private placement. Successful placement, however, was much lower (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2010a; own calculation). The importance of the PSAs, namely the use of agency work as a labour-market integration instrument, turned out to be much lower than initially intended by the legislator. In 2007, the number of PSA participants was below four thousand, of which less than 30 per cent entered the regular labour market (Bundesregierung, 2006a). Hence, even negative effects concerning the integration into the first labour market were shown for PSA participants (Bundesregierung, 2006b). Early evaluation studies showed an improvement in placement services within the FEO. This may be related both to an improved ratio, from 409 to 256 clients per placement officer in the area of SGB III due to the introduction and separate treatment of SGB II clients between 2004 and 2005 (WZB and Infas, 2006), and the reorganization of the placement process within the newly introduced customer centres. Overall, the profiling process created a creaming of labour-market promotion. ‘Incentive assistance clients’, considered as hard to place, scarcely got access to high-quality labour-market promotion measures7 (Schütz, 2009). This negative development was further enforced by the new financial structure concerning unemployment protection and employment promotion that continued to create incentives for the local employment agencies to deny employment promotion measures that would burden the integration budget of the insurance fund and to ‘wait’ until the hard-to-place clients passed on to UB II.8 In terms of the quality of activation measures, the marketization of further training programmes was evaluated in 2006 to have positive results concerning the integration of participants into the labour market (IZA/DIW/infas, 2006). It is, however, critically recognized that this effect may be due to the reduction of the overall number of participants and a ‘positive’ preselection of the participants. The suppliers of training measures need certification given by separate organizations, and only programmes that expect a re-integration of 70 per cent of
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participants by six months after the end of the programme get public funding. This restrictive regulation, in conjunction with the introduction of the training voucher, is suspected of provoking a strategy of risk minimization from the side of the providers, which in consequence leads to a standardization of programme supply and a reduction in the quality of programmes (Bundesregierung, 2006b; Oschmiansky, 2010). With respect to innovation and programme quality, this development has been seen as ambivalent (Baethge-Kinsky, 2007) or even negative (Oschmiansky, 2010). Thus the service orientation in Germany is still criticized as being overly concerned with optimizing only the organization of the placement process. Hence the differentiation of services in line with profiling categories is supposed to create greater efficiency in labour-market integration. Within that framework the individual customers’ satisfaction is given low priority (Franck, 2006; Hielscher and Ochs, 2009). Process effects The evaluation of the different organizational models, namely ARGE and municipal providers (opted-out municipalities), is differentiated between a general case management approach and a specialized case management approach. In 2007 only one-third of all provider institutions used a general case management approach (for clients older than 259 ), while all the others applied the specialized case management approach in limiting it to the difficult-to-place clients. With respect to the case management approach, however, variations between the different organizational traditions were striking. While 77 per cent of the ARGEs used case management only for specialized groups, 81 per cent of municipal providers used a case management approach for all clients (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009). When case management was practised, placement services were included to a major extent (65 per cent of all institutions; ARGE 65 per cent; municipal provider 61 per cent).10 In contrast, benefit provision continued to be organized as a separate task. Hence 93 per cent of all institutions did not integrate benefit provision with case management, and the practice of integration was even lower for the ARGE (6 per cent) than for municipal providers (17 per cent). Furthermore, the networking with other social services like drug and debt counselling or childcare services was performed better by municipal providers (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009). It is therefore concluded that the placement process is much more individualized within municipal providers than within the
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ARGE organizations (Institut für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, 2009). Some elements of marketization may have increased choice concerning specialized services, but also created new problems. For example, a lack of market transparency creates difficulties for jobseekers in finding the most suitable private service and constrains their ability to act like customers. This is compounded since the FEOs are not allowed to advise jobseekers on the quality of private placement agencies (Kaps, 2009b). Overall, the development of rights, obligations and responsibilities in this organizational context must be regarded as dispersed. For the short-term unemployed, a high level of social protection, employment promotion and service quality has been maintained, while benefit cuts, tightened conditionality and a higher flexibility concerning sanctions have been applied to UB II recipients (Eichhorst et al., 2008). Thus, a dualization of not only governance structures but also of social rights was produced (Dingeldey, 2010).
A shift towards a new governance regime? In the German case the question concerning a shift towards a new governance regime according to the various types discussed in Chapter 1 may be even more difficult to answer than for other countries. The traditional unemployment insurance regime provided a status-oriented unemployment benefit that was based on procedural governance. The merger of the former UA, a benefit strongly linked to the unemployment insurance system, with SA created a flat-rate basic income scheme that tended to develop into a universal working-age benefit. Due to the abolition of status protection for former UA recipients, the fierce conditionality of benefits and the expansion of work-for-benefit programmes as employment promotion measures, the installation of the new regime was considered as a pathbreaking change or paradigm shift (Oschmiansky et al., 2007; Mohr, 2008; Knuth, 2009). The question concerning the emergence of a new governance regime, therefore, has to be answered in the light of a dualization of the German unemployment protection system (Dingeldey, 2010), with respect to both the new regime and changes within the old, insurance-based regime. The old, insurance-based system was overwhelmingly characterized by continuity, although some changes within the procedural governance regime were implemented; the principle of elements of selfgovernance via tripartite corporatism at the management level was partly withdrawn, although not generally questioned (Klenk, 2009b).
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Old forms of rule-based governance were combined with NPM elements such as management by objectives. Output- and efficiency-oriented goals, however, are still implemented within standardized forms of procedural governance. As control now refers to both output targets and processes, compliance with formal regulation is even stronger than before. Furthermore, stronger uniformity of placement models and elements of marketization curtailed the scope of action for local employment agencies and may be interpreted as re-centralization (Schütz, 2009). Elements of decentralization, however, can be seen in an increase of budget flexibility given to local AfWs (Schütz, 2009). The newly created basic income regime is governed differently: it is entirely tax financed, mixing federal and municipal budget resources. Furthermore, in the management of the local implementation institutions we see the emergence of network governance through the voluntarily created advisory boards replacing the formal regulation of tripartism (Klenk, 2009b). Beyond these general features, there are questions over the extent to which the implementation structure of UB II can be characterized by a single governance regime, when its main feature is the fragmentation of responsibilities concerning both the area of service provision and financial support of the clients between the federal employment agency and the municipalities. Furthermore, the organizational variety between – and even within – the implementing institutions is huge (Knuth, 2009). Overall, we may therefore conclude that the dominant feature of the entire German governance regime of labour-market activation seems to be the continued fragmentation of responsibilities and the mix of governance forms.
Notes 1. Like its chairman, most of the 15 members of the Hartz Commission were representatives from the business sector. The different groups of representatives of the social partners, of government and public administration and scientific experts had only a few places each (Schmid, 2003). 2. It was also used by UB and UA recipients who needed additional support (as a top-up), because the payments of the respective benefits were too low to maintain the household. 3. SA therefore remains as a residual system to cover needy persons not capable of working. 4. In order to avoid the overburdening of municipalities, a share of housing cost that may not exceed 49 per cent of total costs (calculated by a complicated formula reflecting the number of households receiving UB II) is financed out of the federal budget (SGB II § 46).
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5. Earlier versions of partial commissioning had already been introduced in 1998 (Kaps, 2009b). 6. Persons unemployed for more than 12 months as a percentage of all unemployed. 7. As a reaction to this practice of exclusion of incentive assistance clients from the ordinary measures of employment promotion, between 2005 and 2008 additional programmes for the hard-to-place were established (Oschmiansky, 2010). 8. This happened between 2005 and 2008, when the FEO avoided costs for the labour-market promotion of the hard-to place unemployed in order to pay only a penalty tax to the ARGE claimed when clients passed from UB I to UB II (Eichhorst et al., 2008). 9. For clients younger than 25, the general case management approach was more often used within all institutional forms. 10. In the other institutions case managers are not responsible for processes concerning the integration of clients into the first labour market, but may arrange access to employment promotion measures.
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Kaps, P. (2009a) ‘Die Rolle der Kommunen in der Arbeitsmarkt- und Beschäftigungspolitik’, in S. Bothfeld, W. Sesselmeier and C. Bodegan (eds) Arbeitsmarktpolitik in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft – Vom Arbeitsförderungsgesetz zum Sozialgesetzbuch II und III (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Kaps, P. (2009b) ‘Marketization of placement services as a double recommodification of labour’, in F. Larsen and R. van Berkel (eds) The New Governance And Implementation of Labour Market Policies (Copenhagen: DJOeF). Kemmerling, A. and O. Bruttel (2006) ‘New politics’ in German labour market policy? The implications of the recent Hartz reforms for the German welfare state’, West European Politics, 29/1, 90–112. Kirsch, J., M. Knuth, G. Mühge and O. Schweer (eds) (2009) Können wir nicht einfach gute Freunde bleiben...?Getrennte Aufgabenwahrnehmung in der Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende bietet keine Zukunft. IAQ – Report 2009–04 (Essen Duisburg: Universität Essen Duisburg). Klenk, T. (2009a) ‘Die korporatistische Arbeitsverwaltung’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 27, 34–9. Klenk, T. (2009b) ‘Vom Arbeitsförderungsgesetz zum Sozilagsetzbuch II und III: Pfadwechsel in der korporatistischen Arbeitsverwaltung?’, in S. Bothfeld, W. Sesselmeier and C. Bodegan (eds) Arbeitsmarktpolitik in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft – Vom Arbeitsförderungsgesetz zum Sozialgesetzbuch II und III (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Knuth, M. (2009) ‘Grundsicherung “für Arbeitsuchende”: ein hybrides Regime sozialer Sicherung auf der Suche nach seiner Governance’, in S. Bothfeld, W. Sesselmeier and C. Bodegan (eds) Arbeitsmarktpolitik in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft – Vom Arbeitsförderungsgesetz zum Sozialgesetzbuch II und III (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Konle-Seidl, R. (2003) ‘Von der Anstalt zum ersten Dienstleister am Arbeitsmarkt? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Reform der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’, Gesundheits- und Sozialpolitik, 1/2, 22–9. Mohr, K. (2008) ‘Creeping Convergence – Wandel der Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Großbritannien und Deutschland’, Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 54/2, 187–207. Mosley, H. (2009) ‘Decentralisation and local flexibility in employment service’, in F. Larsen and R. van Berkel (eds) The New Governance and Implementation of Labour Market Policies (Copenhagen: DJOeF). OECD (2010) Employment Outlook: Moving Beyond the Jobs Crisis (Paris: OECD). Oschmiansky, F. (2010) ‘Aktive Arbeitsförderungsinstrumente seit Einführung des SGB III: Rückblick und Ausblick’, Sozialer Fortschritt, 1, 16–23. Oschmiansky, F., A. Mauer and K. Schulze (2007) ‘Arbeitsmarktreformen in Deutschland – Zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Paradigmenwechsel’, WSIMitteilungen, 60/6, 291–7. Schmid, G. (2003) ‘Gestaltung des Wandels durch wissenschaftliche Beratung: Das “Bündnis für Arbeit” und die “Hartz-Kommission” ’, in S. Ramge and G. Schmid (eds) Managment of Change in der Politik? Reformstrategien am Beispiel der Arbeitsmarkt- und Beschäftigungspolitik. Ein Werkstattbericht (Münster/New York/München/Berlin: Waxmann). Schneider, H., W. Eichhorst and K. Zimmermann (2006) ‘Konzentration statt Verzettelung: Die deutsche Arbeitsmarktpolitik am Scheideweg’, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 7/3, 379–97.
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Schütz, H. (2009) ‘Neue und alte Regelsteuerung in der deutschen Arbeitsverwaltung’, in S. Bothfeld, W. Sesselmeier and C. Bodegan (eds) Arbeitsmarktpolitik in der sozialen Marktwirtschaft – Vom Arbeitsförderungsgesetz zum Sozialgesetzbuch II und III (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Steffen, J. (2009) Sozialpolitische Chronik, http://www.arbeitnehmerkammer.de/ sozialpolitik/doku/02_politik/chronik/chronik_gesamt.pdf (accessed 1 November 2010). Trampusch, C. (2002) Die Bundesanstalt für Arbeit und das Zusammenwirken von Staat und Verbänden in der Arbeitsmarktpolitik von 1952 bis 2001 (Köln: Max Planck Institute). WZB and Infas (2006) Evaluation der Maßnahmen zur Umsetzung der Vorschläge der Hartz-Kommission, Modul 1a, Neuausrichtung der Vermittlungsprozesse, Ergebnisbericht 2005 (Berlin/Bonn: WZB).
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5 Steering with Sticks, Rowing for Rewards: the New Governance of Activation in the UK Sharon Wright
Introduction The past decade has seen significant changes to both the content and governance of benefits and services for unemployed people in the UK. Between 1997 and 2010, Labour governments broke a new path following bearings set, to a large extent, by their Conservative predecessors. An extensive programme of welfare reform was justified primarily on the grounds of cost saving, in an uncompromising effort to ‘promote work as the best form of welfare’ (DWP, 2008a). This form of activation was designed for ‘moving people from welfare into work’ (DWP, 2003, p. 3), without a precise official definition of what this work-first approach meant (Lindsay et al., 2007; see below). What emerged was a series of reforms to social security law that offered relatively small carrots and threatened strong sticks in an explicit attempt to reduce the number of people claiming benefits. This focus on stimulating rates of job entry (often at the lower end of the labour market) also influenced the new forms of provider–contractor relationship that have evolved during several stages in the marketization of employment services. The relationships between different providers (in statutory, voluntary and private sectors) have been increasingly permeated by market values and competitive impulses, controlled by the central state through incentives that favour short-term employment placements. The UK has played an interesting role on the international stage of governing activation, appearing initially as a pioneer in applying competitive market forces to the administration of benefits and services for out-of-work adults, at first in transforming the civil service, then through incorporating incentive-based financial reward systems 85
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for providers in prototype Employment Zones (in 2000). After the first forays into marketization, new governance arrangements developed incrementally and the UK kept further backstage whilst countries like Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark transformed employment services more extensively. Currently, the UK has regained prominence in designing new contracts that are billed as being capable of avoiding the pitfalls experienced elsewhere (DWP, 2008a). However, concerns remain about the extent to which it is possible to avoid risks such as: questionable efficiency gains/cost savings; widespread creaming and parking of the most disadvantaged jobseekers; lack of innovation; and concentration on short-term, cheaper job placement techniques at the expense of longer-term training, education or support (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Van Berkel and Borghi, 2008; Wright, 2008). 2010 marks a significant point in these ongoing developments, with work-first activation tested by recession in the unfamiliar political territory created by an incoming Liberal–Conservative coalition government at UK level. This chapter outlines the implications of the trends towards combining work-first activation with increasing marketization in the development of new modes of governance. First, the work-first emphasis of UK policy is discussed, before outlining current governance structures for the administration of social security for the unemployed and employment services. The main trends in the reform of the governance of activation are identified, highlighting processes of decentralization and (re-)centralization, marketization and contractualization. Finally, the effects of these reforms are considered.
A liberal work-first type? The UK approach to activation is not simply the type of liberal workfare model that is epitomized by the US (Handler, 2003). Rather, UK policy making has, if only to a limited extent, been informed by ethical (White, 2000) and client-centred (Lindsay and Mailand, 2004) approaches (Lindsay et al., 2007). The broader policy context has included more social democratic attempts to make work possible (with a National Childcare Strategy to increase the availability of affordable, high-quality childcare and the Child Tax Credit, which can help some parents with the cost of childcare) and to make work pay, with the introduction of the National Minimum Wage and Working Tax Credit to top up low wages (see Millar, 2002, 2009). On balance, however, the New Labour approach can be viewed as predominantly work first in character because of its overarching goal of increasing short-term job entry,
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achieved through interviews to promote job search activities. An alternative human capital development approach would give greater weight to the development of qualifications and skills that could lead to more fulfilling long-term employment, with greater concern for retention and advancement (Lindsay et al., 2007).
Governing activation in the UK: an overview Perhaps surprisingly, the UK has retained a highly centralized system, in one form or another, for administering benefits and providing employment information, advice and job matching for more than a century. Although the past ten to fifteen years have seen significant changes to the content of policy, to the target group for employment services and in the governance of employment services, core functions for the majority of job-seeking benefit recipients have remained consistently within the control of central government, delivered within the realm of the civil service. In hindsight, the initial creation of the UK public employment service in 1909 was a centralization of an existing open-market mix of private and charitable labour bureaux (Showler, 1976, p. 21). It was this very early step that established the state monopoly over job matching that was met shortly afterwards (in 1911) by what was to be an irreversible involvement in insurance-based benefits. In long-term perspective, the UK norm was to provide integrated financial assistance and job search support to unemployed people. This situation continued for the majority of the twentieth century and was only reversed a generation ago, when the roles of benefit administration/policing and job matching were separated by the creation of Jobcentres in 1973 (Fletcher, 1997; Price, 2000). This was the context for the introduction of activation and new governance arrangements from the late 1980s onwards. Mass unemployment in the 1980s placed the system under immense pressure, and in 1987 the dual roles of unemployment benefit administration and job matching were again joined together. Despite these developments, it was not until 1990 that the first move was made away from traditional civil service monopoly, when the Employment Service was one of the first areas of civil service to be reformed into an executive agency (Price, 2000). As one of a new type of government Next Step agencies, this meant functioning semi-autonomously from central government, with greater operational freedom offered in exchange for new forms of financial accountability through management systems (led by a chief executive) and performance measured against indicators
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(Price, 2000). Most policy making continued to be done at government department level, with the Employment Service mainly concerned with matters of implementation. The new Employment Service was at the vanguard in applying business principles to public service practice and values (Horton and Jones, 1996; Foster and Hoggett, 1999) and cost cutting came to be a key priority. It was not long after this first flush of managerialism that marketization also began to creep in. In practice, elements of marketization were evident in the early 1990s, but not extensive – involving market testing, contracting-out (mainly of training services) and cost reviews. These first experiments with using the private sector to provide training for unemployed people created a degree of service fragmentation and were considered by some commentators as amounting to quasi-privatization (Tonge, 1999), but in terms of marketization this step barely registered on the scale in comparison with the developments of the late 1990s and early twenty-first Century. By then, it was the delivery arrangements for New Labour’s welfare-to-work policies (starting in 1997) that developed substantial roles for non-state agents in the direct delivery of employment services (see below). Organizationally, between 1990 and 2002, there were separate central government departments1 and networks of local offices for dealing with social security claims (latterly named the Benefits Agency) for all those who were not required to look for work, in parallel with a network of local Jobcentre offices (which dealt with benefits and job-search assistance for unemployed people). In 2002, these separate agencies were merged to form Jobcentre Plus, as a one-stop shop for the delivery of benefits to working-age adults, with increased work-related conditionality for non-Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, including inactive groups such as lone parents and ill or disabled people who had previously been exempt from work-related conditionality. Since then, all income maintenance has been administered centrally, except for housing-related benefits, which have always been administered by local authorities. This means that, unlike many European countries, local authorities (the equivalent of municipalities) do not have any role in administering core benefits or employment services for people out of work. This new governance of social security and employment services coincided with the advent of activation. It was the late 1990s that marked a watershed in the UK approach to dealing with unemployment. The outgoing Conservative government implemented the controversial Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) Act just before leaving office in 1997. Blair’s
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New Labour party had condemned the harshness of the new jobseeker regime on several grounds whilst in opposition. They argued that introduction of JSA undermined the principle of earned entitlement. Similarly, there was an increase in the proportion of unemployed people claiming means-tested benefits. Young people were particularly disadvantaged by JSA because the value of the benefit was reduced for 18–24-year olds, and 16- and 17-year olds were excluded from entitlement entirely (except for exceptional cases of severe hardship). In addition to this, there were increased obligations for unemployed people to prove they were actively seeking work, which were policed more closely in accordance with new back-to-work plans (Jobseeker’s Agreements). There were also tough penalties for non-compliance with procedures. On gaining power, however, Blair’s New Labour party revised their views and moved towards increasing conditionality and compulsion, creating an ever harsher regime than the one they previously criticized. Job preparation and training services were expanded and fragmented rapidly through the multiple New Deal programmes, which operated via local partnership arrangements (Theodore and Peck, 1999). Similarly, there was incremental development of a range of small area-based initiatives, which pushed the boundaries of marketization, promoted decentralization and incorporated inter-agency working (see below). An intensive phase of reform was undertaken by successive Labour governments (1997–2010) and, in 2010, the Department for Work and Pensions was engaged in a major project to develop a UK-wide quasimarket in employment services. The clearest statements of the intended governance and delivery arrangements for this new way of working were set out in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) Commissioning Strategy (2008a) and the welfare reform white paper ‘Raising expectations and increasing support: reforming welfare for the future’ (DWP, 2008b). Policy makers have consciously adjusted the role of government in the field of social security and employment services from rowing to steering. The, then, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, James Purnell, who oversaw these changes, clearly viewed the desired effect as moving ‘away from a mindset of top-down control into a world where we devolve initiative and innovation’ (2008b, Ministerial Foreword). Similarly, the DWP Commissioning Strategy (2008a, p. 7) presented the department as a ‘key enabler’ in ‘delivering the Government’s ambition of becoming a world leader in skills and tackling concentrations of worklessness at a local level’. The rowing is mainly to be done by an army of frontline workers in private and voluntary sector agencies, with
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preferential prime contractor positions available for large and successful private companies (including multi-national corporations). Helping people to find work has become highly profitable for some private agencies. Prime contracts have been won mainly by large for-profit agencies, which subcontract local delivery to a range of local providers. In the case of the Flexible New Deal 1, this amounted to 179 public (including local authorities), private, voluntary sector and mixed-sector organizations, many of which were already providing employment services in their localities. There has been criticism of this contracting model, including concern over the ethics of private companies profiting from the misfortune of vulnerable people (Piggott and Grover, 2009). The implications of these changes are far reaching for all concerned. These new delivery arrangements have been laid on top of pre-existing principles for the provision of social protection. There has been no fundamental challenge to the prevailing character of UK intervention, which is currently less generous than at any time in the post-war period, favouring residual, stigmatizing and punitive approaches to the support of adults who leave the labour market (even when, in the case of JSA claimants, this exit was involuntary). Broadly, benefits have become increasingly conditional upon active job search requirements for a widening client group, with only minimal narrowly defined forms of human capital development (Lindsay et al., 2007). Cost cutting has been a persistent concern for successive governments, increasingly achieved through incentives and directives to monitor and control the behaviour of advisers and benefit recipients. The timing of these developments is also interesting, because the construction of benefit dependents as a drain on national resources intensified during a period when economic conditions had allowed for a relatively consistent spell of low unemployment (around 5 per cent) over the first decade of New Labour power (1997–2008); such low unemployment had been achieved only once before in UK history during the immediate post-war period (Nickell, 1999). Perhaps even more significantly, UK employment rates were exceptionally high in both historic and international comparison in the period preceding the global economic downturn in late 2008. Welfare-to-work policies were not, therefore, as might easily be assumed, a response to high unemployment. Quite the reverse, they were conceived at a time of unusually high employment. Not only did the employment rate remain extremely high, but it peaked at 74.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2008 (National Statistics, 2008), making the UK one of only a handful of EU and OECD countries to achieve such success.
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Work-first policy proposals and quasi-market delivery arrangements were conceived of during a stable period of healthy economic conditions, but have been implemented in an adverse environment. This means that policy makers have chosen to base reforms on a model of human action that emphasizes individual behavioural explanations for unemployment at a time when economic projections suggest that the global downturn will result in less secure employment possibilities for a substantial proportion of citizens. Added to this are ongoing changes to eligibility conditions for other benefits, including the abolition of social assistance in the form of Income Support and the introduction of the Employment Support Allowance, which will re-allocate benefit recipients (particularly lone parents and ill and disabled people) to Jobseeker’s Allowance. The end product is that unemployment (measured by both ILO and claimant count) are set to rise at a time when benefit recipients are charged with greater responsibility for the circumstances in which they find themselves and are required to take specified action to find jobs. The following sections explore the trends in the development of welfare governance in the UK (summarized in Table 5.1) that have led to this current situation.
Table 5.1 Implementation structure for income protection and activation in the UK (late 1980s and 2010) Late 1980s
2010
Unemployment Insurance/benefit administration
Jobcentres/Department of Social Security (later Benefits Agency)
Jobcentre Plus
Social assistance administration
Department of Social Security (later Benefits Agency)
Jobcentre Plus
Activation of insured
Jobcentres
Jobcentre Plus
Various programmes
Various programmes delivered by a range of agencies
Manpower Services Commission Activation of uninsured
No compulsory measures
Jobcentre Plus (via Work-ocused interviews) Various programmes delivered by a range of agencies.
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Main trends in governance reforms Governance reforms in the field of social security and employment services mainly took place from the 1990s onwards, intensifying in the early twenty-first century. As in the Netherlands (Van Berkel, 2010), the speed of change was rapid and gained momentum in the absence of evidence that the chosen methods would result in the desired effects (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008). In the UK at least, the motivations for reform were clear from the outset, with explicit goals of cost cutting by reducing entitlement (alongside goals such as the eradication of child poverty) and introducing competition to increase efficiency, reinforced by an ideological commitment to end so-called benefit dependency (Freud, 2007). Paradoxically, policy makers’ increased faith in market mechanisms came at a time when the foundations of the economy were shaken by market failure in global finance, which led to rises in unemployment not witnessed in a generation. Rather than leading to a reflection on the ability of competitive forces to deliver improvements in well-being for vulnerable citizens, the recession of 2008 appears to have redoubled efforts to cut costs. There is still little evidence that independent agencies operate any more efficiently or effectively than public bureaucracies in assisting people to find employment. In fact, since the majority of jobseekers return to employment without contact with private providers (Harker, 2006), there can be little justification for the routine dismissal of bureaucracy as synonymous with inefficiency in the field of employment services (Davies, 2008). This section explores the main trends in governance reforms, in relation to processes of de- and re-centralization, marketization and contractualization. Strong central control, decentralization and (re-)centralization In the UK, there is a legacy of central control over political processes and policy making in the field of social security and employment services. This is important because it constrains action at local level, which is mediated by standardized Department for Work and Pensions policies, priorities and procedures. This provides the context for local delivery, which, although delivered by a range of subcontracted agencies for certain programmes, is controlled strongly via contract compliance and standardized delivery frameworks. Centralized policy making leaves little room for the development of innovative or localized responses. This means that central control coexists alongside ongoing developments in the decentralization of service delivery and simultaneous re-centralization through contract control, targets,
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incentives and outcome payments. These seemingly conflicting processes actually appear to be mutually reinforcing in some instances. First, a strongly controlled central political and policy-making state has survived, despite devolution in 1999 to Scotland and Wales. Secondly, a form of decentralization is evident in the development of executive agencies like the Employment Service in the 1990s and the evolution of the quasi-market in employment services from the late 1990s through to 2010, which has fragmented delivery arrangements and propagated a new amalgam of agencies resting between the citizen and the state. Finally, re-centralization has undoubtedly occurred in two dimensions: (a) through the organizational merger of the Benefits Agency and Jobcentres into a one-stop-shop, Jobcentre Plus, in 2002; and (b) the compliance and control measures for managing the work of frontline advisers via standardized priorities and procedures. The following sections explore these processes in greater depth. Centralized control One distinctive aspect of the governance of activation in the UK, in contrast to many other European countries, is the unusual power of the central state to mandate change. UK political systems, organizational structures and policy-making practices all reinforce powerful centralizing tendencies, with limited roles for sub-national or local governments, social partners or interest groups (see Barlow and Röber, 1996). This means that the Westminster government has retained a long-term ability to dictate the content and delivery mechanisms for policy in the field of social security and employment services that is almost unparalleled among Western democracies. There are relatively few veto points in the UK system and barely any meaningful negotiations or compromises to be reached with interested parties. These conditions allow for radical changes to be implemented quickly, with limited resistance. This position has survived the ideological challenges of neo-liberalism during the 1980s and political devolution in the twenty-first century – the new administrations in Scotland and Wales have no jurisdiction over this policy sphere. The Department for Work and Pensions is one of the richest and most powerful departments in the UK government, within which decisions about the content and governance of social security and employment services have developed in relative isolation. This central mandate for reform is also related to the limited role of social partners in political or policy-making processes. This absence of social partners from debate or delivery means that the boundaries of consultation are tight and can be expected to defer to employers’
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interests (which have been disproportionately represented through forums such as the National Employment Panel) rather than the concerns of employees or unemployed people (see Finn et al., 2005). However, even without such exclusive conditions for policy making, there now appears, in any case, to be a strong cross-party consensus (amongst the three main political parties: Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and Labour) on the main principles of reform in relation to: increases in work conditionality for all claimant groups (Theodore and Peck, 1999); defining unemployment, its causes and politically acceptable solutions; the use of competitive market forces and contracting-out (see below). Decentralization The story of the governance of activation in the UK is not, however, just about the strong central state. A parallel process of decentralization has been evident, especially since the constitution of the Employment Service in 1990 as a semi-autonomous executive agency, organizationally distinct and distanced from the traditional structures and practices of the central state. This first phase of decentralization was connected tightly with the application of new public management practices (including incentive management) as an alternative to state bureaucracy rather than devolving decision-making, since the Employment Service (like its successor, Jobcentre Plus) remained tightly controlled by central government (Horton and Jones, 1996; Clarke and Newman, 1997). The purpose of decentralization was primarily to save money by restructuring, removing a tier of management and changing frontline practice in line with private sector values (Clarke and Newman, 1997). Although this represents a significant form of decentralization, the extent of the process was limited by the continuing central control over standardized approaches, design of policy instruments and the dictation of performance measurement priorities and techniques (which focused on monitoring and rewarding short-term job outcomes). The second form of decentralization emerged most concertedly with the evolution of the quasi-market in employment services from the late 1990s onwards. This fragmented and marketized delivery arrangements, but again reinforced the role of the central state in setting the terms of contractual engagements. Contracting-out was developed within particular programmes, especially for long-term unemployed people claiming the means-tested, assistance version of benefit (Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance). This began to intensify with the introduction of partnership arrangements for New Deal programmes (from 1998
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onwards). New Deal programmes were designed at UK level by the New Deal Task Force (which included representatives from private, public and voluntary sector agencies, employers and trade unions). The details of delivery arrangements varied amongst the 144 delivery units, with the Employment Service (from 2002 Jobcentre Plus) working with local agencies from all sectors (including, for example, local authorities and colleges) to develop annual ‘District Delivery Plans’ (Finn, 2009). Separate programmes existed for target groups including young people (aged 18–24, unemployed for six months plus), adults (aged 25 and over), lone parents and disabled people. These programmes were designed at national level, but administered locally via a two-tier system beginning with series of gateway interviews at a Jobcentre (later Jobcentre Plus) office, after which referrals were made to one of a number of available options, such as paid employment or training. This process established the expansion of contractualization and decentralization in terms of the large-scale engagement of non-state actors. This trend developed with the introduction of prototype areabased Employment Zones targeted at specific local areas of high long-term unemployment in 2000. These involved extensive use of private providers and rewarded success (counted as 13-week job placements) with outcome payments. This initiated the trend, now embedded, of the acceptability of profiting financially from job-matching services for benefit recipients. Similar area-based initiatives, such as Working Neighbourhoods Pilots, increased the engagement of private providers and increased financial rewards for job placements in particular neighbourhoods. Overall, though, the use of private agencies was seen as supplementary to the core centralized and standardized provision, because most unemployed people continued to find employment before being referred to a private provider. Following the Freud Review (2007), large-scale decentralization was introduced in a UK-wide quasi-market of employment services, establishing major players in prime contractors and subcontracting arrangements for the delivery of the Flexible New Deal. The Flexible New Deal replaced all previous New Deal programmes that differentiated between user groups (for example, lone parents, disabled people, young people, older people and the longest-term unemployed). Participants engaged in a series of interviews with Jobcentre Plus advisers for the first phase of the programme, before being referred to contracted-out providers in later phases. This was the centrepiece of the new quasi-market, and yet the role for non-state actors in dealing face-to-face with benefit recipients was still confined to long-term unemployed after one year of
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claiming benefits. Until that point, Jobcentre Plus retained the majority of contact with jobseekers through a series of standardized interviews at different stages of the claim. Interestingly, however, Jobcentre Plus has also been reformed to minimize face-to-face contact with benefit recipients. Decentralization has not come full circle, since the central state has retained and strengthened its role in dictating every level of reforms from the overarching policy goals, through the governance arrangements to the precise instruments used by frontline advisers. Even the most right-wing thinkers have not suggested a complete withdrawal of government intervention in assisting people into employment. In this sense, central government intervention in employment transitions (especially those of the lowest-paid and most vulnerable workers) is more or less universally accepted. This is not simply a question of ensuring fair play through market regulation. The Department for Work and Pensions (incrementally, especially between 1997 and 2010) has operated to establish compliance and control with a new incentive paradigm. Re-centralization As has been demonstrated above, the strong central UK state has brought about changes that have strengthened the centre and decentralized delivery – pulling inwards and pushing outwards simultaneously. In addition to these processes, there is also evidence of re-centralization, particularly in relation to the organizational merger that formed Jobcentre Plus in 2002. The creation of Jobcentre Plus involved joining the Benefits Agency (which had main responsibility for administering income maintenance) with Jobcentres (which already had a role in activating all Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants). This shift towards onestop shops has occurred in several countries (Clasen et al., 2001; Van Berkel, 2010). This development went hand in hand with a widening of the activation net to involve benefit recipients previously exempt from compulsory job search conditions (that is, ill or disabled people and lone parents) in work-focused interviews. This re-centralization allowed for more concentrated application of the work-first and work-for-all approach. Also, in a similar way to the creation of the Employment Service in 1990 (representing decentralization, see above) the driving principle was cost cutting. The Jobcentre Plus organizational merger also involved 30,000 job cuts. The second element of re-centralization in the UK involved the use of contracts to impose central control over the management and frontline
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delivery of services delivered by a multiplicity of actors. The anticipated dismantling of Jobcentre Plus following the Freud Review (2007) did not transpire fully, because it remained necessary to deal with the administration of benefits centrally and because most jobseekers return to work anyway before they reach the point of referral to external agencies. Jobcentre Plus retained a substantial role in administering benefits and job search support, continuing to deliver the majority of employment services for all short-term unemployed people. Both the Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus continue to re-centralize through marketization and contractualization, based on particular assumptions about the motivation and actions of out-of-work citizens. Marketization Increased marketization has been closely connected with the process of decentralization outlined above, and is an increasingly significant trend in the new governance of activation in the UK. For more than a decade, the UK Government has increased its efforts to contract-out advice and job-matching services for benefit recipients. A decisive moment came in these developments when, in 2006, investment banker David Freud was commissioned to review welfare-to-work programmes and recommend changes that were reputedly intended to increase the employment rate (although, as noted above, this was already exceptionally high by historical and international standards). Freud’s (2007) proposals for a large-scale marketization of advice services for benefit recipients were far-reaching and contentious. Market-based reforms were subsequently adopted. Freud’s personal influence on these developments was very strong, since, following his figure-heading of Labour welfare reforms, Lord Freud changed allegiance and was appointed in 2010 as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government, again playing a key role in welfare reform. In practice, the development of the quasi-market in employment services was dominated quickly by a small number of prime contractors, with a subordinate role for other providers, including voluntary agencies and local authorities, as well as smaller-scale private providers. For this reason, some analysts have interpreted this change largely as a privatization (Grover, 2009; Piggott and Grover, 2009) rather than simply a marketization, within which private sector values and practices are generalized to all providers via contract design and performance management (see below). However, the dominance of the market by largescale profit-making agencies does not necessarily mean big changes in what is available at local level, because subcontracting arrangements
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often result in the use of existing services. This means that change is mainly in the terms of the contract – mediated by profit-making multinationals. Private providers dominate this new market and squeeze out not only competitor organizations, but alternative ways of working, values and beliefs. In this way, the impact of reforms in the governance of activation may impact on benefit recipients indirectly in the longer term, if the conditions of marketization and contractualized funding mechanisms come to threaten the operation, and ultimately the organizational survival, of agencies that have the capacity to represent and advocate on behalf of vulnerable citizens (either through policy campaigning or face-to-face support). That is to say, the consequences of a reorientation of state support for advice, towards services that offer work-first advice, may leave voluntary sector agencies without financial support for the aspects of their work that do not fit this mould. Contractualization New governance reforms of decentralization and marketization are closely connected with developments in contractualization. Contracts are now used extensively to regulate cooperation within the public sector or between public sector and private and voluntary sector agencies. Delivery arrangements for the New Deal programmes (1997–2010) marked a step towards contractualization and fragmentation of delivery for specific groups, but also contributed towards a form of network governance (Considine, 2001). It is difficult to discern the extent to which the rhetoric of joined-up government and partnership working shaped real relationships between different types of provider organizations. The design of contracts (see DWP, 2009) imposed standardized practices that limited discretion and were underpinned by a logic that assumed an understanding of the problem of being out of paid employment that was not necessarily shared by user organizations, who may find it more appropriate to prioritize supporting the well-being of users in relation to needs other than employment (for example, housing, health, family responsibilities).
The shift towards a new hybrid governance regime The evolution of the UK quasi-market in employment services has taken place over almost 20 years. As Newman (2001, 2004, 2005) has argued, it is not possible to track a straightforward shift over time from hierarchy to networks, because these forms of governance coexist and interact.
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However, it is possible to identify changing priorities in the logic of governance reforms. The first such change was to begin to apply market values to the procedural governance (Considine, 2001) that characterized centralized, standardized and rule-bound monopoly state provision of employment information and advice to benefit recipients (approximatel 1990–7). The second collection of reforms was to pioneer the contracting of private providers to deliver area-specific programmes for long-term unemployed people (approximately 1997–2002). The third phase was the current large-scale development of the quasi-market in employment services (designed 2006–8 and implemented from 2009 onwards). These changes can be related to Considine’s (2001) analysis of procedural, corporate, market and network governance. The main change in governance was to apply corporate governance to this new organizational formation through the introduction of competitive business principles, values and practices (Horton and Jones, 1996; Foster and Hoggett, 1999). A lasting concern that was embedded during this period was the pressure to save money by operating more efficiently, implemented through middle-management redundancies, downgrading of terms and conditions for the employment of frontline staff and increasing use of performance targets (Finn and Taylor, 1990; Fletcher, 1997). The emphasis on management by incentives contributed to what Van der Veen and Trommel (1999) call the incentive paradigm, which is based on a particular understanding of human motivation and behaviour that has become increasingly popular as a point of reference in reforms of the content and delivery arrangements in this policy field. However, there is empirical evidence from the late 1990s to suggest that the penetration of new forms of corporate governance may have been limited, with street-level staff acting mainly in relation to a vast system of rules and regulations, signalling deferral to the older procedural form of governance (Considine, 2001; Considine and Lewis, 2010). For the majority of jobseekers, their interactions with advisers were governed mainly by the rules, alongside new systems of numeric job placement targets (Considine, 2001; Wright, 2006). This would seem to suggest that, rather than a clear transition from procedural to corporate governance, strong aspects of procedural governance resisted the new vogue for corporate values and practices, leaving very little room for discretion or enterprise. In fact, it may be that the primary influence of corporate governance in the late 1990s was rhetorical rather than being strongly realized in practice, with its true significance being to open the door for future marketizing tendencies (Considine, 2001).
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The simultaneous operation of procedural governance with the targets of corporate governance thus represents a hybrid type (Wiggan, 2009). Changes were clear in both governance and activation. Despite a general embedding of corporate governance during the 1990s and early twenty-first century, there was still no wholesale shift away from hierarchy or bureaucracy, with the vast majority of jobseekers being assisted back into employment by civil servants before reaching the duration of claim to enter an intensive programme such as one of the New Deals.
Effects of governance reforms It is very difficult to find evidence that isolates the effects of changes in the content of policy (for example, formal reductions in eligibility for benefits, compulsory job-search activities and requirements to accept any job offers) from the effects of changes in governance (such as marketization), particularly since area-based initiatives (such as Employment Zones) operated concurrently with standard Jobcentre Plus provision and other programmes (for example, New Deal programmes). Establishing, for example, whether quasi-markets in employment services offered higher-quality services or better value for money is difficult because of a general lack of ‘valid and systematic knowledge on the outcomes and effects the system is able to deliver’ (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008, p. 345). Furthermore, these ongoing processes are, to some extent, interconnected, even if they may appear contradictory (as in the case of simultaneous decentralization and re-centralization in the UK case). The intricacy of each of the processes captured by the term governance reform further complicates the task of unravelling causes and effects. In addition to these methodological difficulties (see Hasluck and Green, 2007; Stafford, 2007), it is impossible to establish the counterfactual – that is, to compare how effective public provision could have been if the resources used for marketization (for example, incentive payments for providers and employers, transaction costs) had been invested instead in the existing services. Outcomes In terms of straightforward job placement, standard Jobcentre Plus services claim the greatest success rate of assisting nine out of ten jobseekers back into employment within a year (Harker, 2006). However, since Jobcentre Plus provides only limited support with minimal direct contact or assistance, and ‘the great majority of customers leave benefit without having participated in any of the major Jobcentre Plus
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interventions’ (Hasluck and Green, 2007, p. 4), it would perhaps be more accurate to attribute a proportion of this success to individual jobseekers’ efforts. When data for 2001–6 were compared with five-year periods in the 1980s and 1990s, they showed that the number of people claiming benefits for unemployment had reduced (as had the average duration of claim), and that there had been no increase in the number of people making repeat benefit claims (NAO, 2007b). Overall, official evaluation evidence concludes that initiatives such as the New Deal programmes, Employment Zones and Working Neighbourhoods Pilots were successful in assisting more benefit recipients into employment than would have got a job otherwise (Hasluck and Green, 2007; NAO, 2007a). Jobseekers, rather than other client groups (for example, lone parents or disabled people), have benefitted most from employment programmes and relatively few people from workless households have participated (Dewson et al., 2007; NAO, 2007a). Between 1998 and 2007, 1.8 million people entered employment from a New Deal programme (NAO, 2007b). However, the independent effects of programmes that pushed disadvantaged groups towards the labour market are difficult to identify, since at the same time a thriving economy offered job opportunities, which paid better because of minimum wages and in-work tax credits and were made more possible through help with the costs of childcare, which increased in availability (Gregg et al., 2006). It could be that the solution to high levels of benefit receipt amongst inactive groups lies with meeting needs (through, for example, adequate remuneration for employment and childcare provision) rather than activation. Overall, the cost effectiveness of programmes such as New Deal and Employment Zones was variable, with cost effectiveness dependent on longer-term employment outcomes (NAO, 2007b). Longitudinal cohort data showed a minority (12–21 per cent) of New Deal and Employment Zone participants moving into employment immediately after the programme, and remaining in a job for six months on average (NAO, 2007b, p. 16). The same data tracked programme participants in the 2002–3 cohort and found that participants in the New Deal for Lone Parents and the New Deal for Young People spent, on average, about one quarter of the four years after they took part in the programme in employment – the same proportion of time on benefits and approximately 5–6 per cent of their time back on the programme (NAO, 2007b). Results were worse for the New Deal 25 Plus cohort, who spent only 10 per cent of the four years following programme participation in employment (ibid.). Even the more successful Employment Zone evaluations showed that almost half of mandatory participants left without
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securing paid work (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007), and increasing proportions of disabled people are reported to have stopped claiming benefits, without finding employment (Stafford, 2007). This reinforces longstanding concerns over the third of young people who left the New Deal for Young People to ‘destinations unknown’ (Hasluck, 2000). Intractable problems of low pay and poor job quality continue to present barriers even for the most enthusiastic providers (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007), especially in ‘demand-deficit’ local labour markets (Hasluck and Green, 2007). There has been a lack of employer engagement in employment programmes (Dewson et al., 2007). Sustainability of employment was a major issue, with criticism of early job placement into entry-level jobs, which may be unsuitable and unsustainable (usually not lasting into the longer term) without any additional employability, development of skills or advancement (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; Hasluck and Green, 2007; NAO, 2007b; Yeo, 2007). This was found to lead to ‘churning’ between low-paid unsustainable employment, benefits and employment programmes (Hasluck and Green, 2007). Indeed, around two-thirds of the annual 2.4 million new JSA claims were repeat claims and around 40 per cent of JSA claimants who gain employment will make a repeat claim within six months (NAO, 2007b). The work-first design of programmes and contracts was problematic. Outcome payments rewarding jobs lasting 13 weeks were found to be ‘too short, and falls short of the point at which most employment programmes deliver a positive return on investment’ (NAO, 2007b, p. 10). Recommendations were made for longer-duration contracts and targets that could take into account individual jobseeker needs; provide for disadvantaged participants who want better-quality jobs; and avoid creaming and parking, perhaps by measuring aggregate employment (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; NAO, 2007b). Recommendations were also made for more effective in-work support and initiatives to increase skills and qualifications, that is, more of a holistic human capital development approach than a short-term work-first approach (ibid.). However, there are contradictions, since Employment Zones appeared to achieve better results, except for lone parents (when measured according to immediate job entry) than the New Deal Programmes but offered much worse value for money (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). This reinforces the message that quick fixes are expensive and do little to address the very real, acute and multiple difficulties faced by the small proportion of long-term unemployed people in the UK (Hasluck and Green, 2007).
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Outputs Several studies have highlighted the sensitivity of providers to financial incentives and contract requirements, leading to efforts being directed at those who are most profitable rather than those with greatest need (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; Stafford, 2007). Perhaps the clearest evidence that the goal of cost cutting was paramount (over, for example, the desire to raise the employment rate or eradicate child poverty) was from contract negotiations for the New Deal for Disabled People, where successful providers had their numbers of participants capped by the DWP because of over-performance (Stafford, 2007). There has also been disquiet from a range of providers, since the unprofitability of some programmes led to contract renegotiation (in some cases withdrawal from provision) – a process that benefitted larger private providers who could cross-subsidize from alternative internal or external sources (Stafford, 2007). This tension between cost effectiveness (or even cost cutting) and performance seems set to continue, and Employment Zone evaluations also showed that steps to increase value for money could endanger the success of the initiative (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). Several evaluations have pointed towards the quality improvements made possible by flexibility (for example, to offer users longer and more frequent interviews at times to suit them); discretion and autonomy; and individually tailored practical and financial assistance (Dewson et al., 2007; Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; Hasluck and Green, 2007; NAO, 2007a). However, this combination of flexibility comes at the price of transparency and accountability within the implementation black box (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). There is little evidence that these improvements could not have been made through Jobcentre Plus provision. However, there has been a general lack of innovation (Dewson et al., 2007), and any that has developed has failed to benefit the most disadvantaged (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; Hasluck and Green, 2007). Processes Over the last decade, there has been an observable simplification of the problem that social security policies are designed to tackle: ‘worklessness’ has come to be seen as the functional equivalent of unemployment. The policy instruments that form the solution have been blunted. The principles and practices that were originally developed (the provision of work-first employment information and advice to stimulate jobseeking activities towards early job entry (see Hasluck and Green,
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2007)) for one client group, the unemployed, have been generalized and applied to others, principally lone parents and those who are ill or disabled. The impacts of reforms in the governance of activation are potentially significant and far reaching for a range of different social actors: primarily the citizens who are subject to these reforms, but also front-line advisers, agencies (of all types, including those newly subcontracted as well as Jobcentre Plus) and even whole sectors (for example, the voluntary sector). It is certainly conceivable, for example, that the voluntary sector, in its unique position of representing the interests of vulnerable and disadvantaged people and organizationally susceptible to changes in funding, may be affected to a large degree by becoming dependent on DWP contracts to provide work-first job search support. Evaluation of several marketized programmes (such as Employment Zones, Working Neighbourhoods Pilots and New Deal programmes) showed disappointing results in relation to the promised development of participant choice (Dewson et al., 2007; Griffiths and Durkin, 2007; Hasluck and Green, 2007; Stafford, 2007). Choice of provider was often not available at all for mandatory randomly allocated referrals from Jobcentre Plus and, where available (more commonly for voluntary participants), it was either restricted by availability of locality or limited to initial selection, after which point changing provider was impossible (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007). Mandatory enrolment in employment programmes has also created difficulties, since motivation plays a key role in effectiveness, with good outcomes in voluntary programmes (Stafford, 2007). If benefit recipients ‘feel coerced into taking provision, where they feel such provision is inappropriate, where they feel that the cost to them of overcoming barriers is greater than the benefits of entering employment, their chances of moving from benefit into employment are much less’ (Hasluck and Green, 2007, p. 46). This undermines the functioning of a quasi-market, a necessary precondition of which is user choice (see Wright, 2008). Another inherent flaw in the quasi-market model is that ‘policies designed to develop the market and demonstrate the commercial viability of delivery appear to run counter to objectives designed to increase provider competition and achieve better value for money’ (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007, p. 73). One benefit of contracted-out support appears to be better customer satisfaction, perhaps due to a more customer-orientated culture and greater autonomy and flexibility to respond to users needs (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007), or due to greater resource allocation and more intensive case-loading. Better-off calculations have been identified as
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an effective tool for advisers (NAO, 2007b). However, even in the best performing contracted-out provision, the Employment Zones: ‘there is no evidence that private sector providers necessarily perform better than the voluntary sector, or indeed the public sector’ (Griffiths and Durkin, 2007, p. 72). For Working Neighbourhoods Pilots, marketized to different degrees in some areas, there was also no evidence that contractors performed better than Jobcentre Plus (Dewson et al., 2007).
Conclusion The UK has been remarkably robust in retaining a substantial role for the civil service in providing centralized administration of social security benefits and employment services. Early signs of reforms began in the late 1980s, with activation through stricter conditionality, mandatory interviews and tougher sanctions. The governance of this new approach to stimulating job entry was to outsource training services. Major reforms were undertaken in the 1990s, starting with the creation of the Employment Service as an executive agency, working at arm’s length from central government to deliver job-matching assistance to unemployed people. This organizational transformation also involved the application of new managerialist working practices, cuts in staffing levels and a simplified management hierarchy. During the 1990s, interagency cooperation was evident through partnership working arrangements in the delivery of training and back-to-work programmes. Efforts both to activate (including a widening of the target group to include previously inactive groups) and to reform governance (particularly through marketization and the development of a quasi-market in employment services) were intensified in the late 1990s and continue into the 2010s. The governance of activation in the UK presents an example of a hybrid model (Wiggan, 2009; Considine and Lewis, 2010). Strong aspects of procedural governance still exist, although the overarching governance logic has shifted firmly towards corporate and market governance. Aspects of network governance also continue to be important, but are overshadowed by corporate and procedural governance. Overall, a highly centralized mandate (largely excluding alternative voices, for example social partners, campaigners and policy makers at devolved (Scotland, Wales and, to a lesser extent, Northern Ireland) and municipal levels) exists for decentralized delivery, which is closely controlled through contracts and new managerialist incentive structures. Whilst policy-making processes are closed-off and hierarchical, this contrasts with the rhetoric of inclusiveness and empowerment that
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surrounded the introduction and development of partnership working and marketized delivery arrangements. Since the late 1980s, developments in work-first activation and changing governance structures and practices have been driven by a cost-cutting rationale, backed up by ideologically based calls to end welfare dependency. A high level of continuity and cross-party political consensus regarding these policy drivers has allowed for the widespread application of market values (despite a lack of evidence that competition can deliver the intended outcomes, or outcomes that are beneficial to citizens) and seemingly conflicting developments, such as simultaneous decentralization and re-centralization, which may not otherwise have been possible.
Note 1. 1990–2001 social security was within the remit of Department of Social Security; Employment Services were the responsibility of the Department of Employment (1990–4); then the Department of Education and Employment (1994–2001); social security and employment were merged from 2001 onwards within the Department for Work and Pensions.
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6 The Governance of Activation Policies in Italy: from Centralized and Hierarchical to a Multi-Level Open System Model? Paolo R. Graziano and Annelies Raué
Introduction The Italian welfare state has traditionally been characterized by extensive protection of the workers and insiders, and very limited provisions in terms of security or employment opportunities for the outsiders. Low participation rates and rising unemployment – already surfacing in the 1970s – were partially consequences of this traditional organization of the welfare state. The early warnings of the unsustainability of the system could, however, still be ignored in times of economic prosperity. Yet the oil shocks and the subsequent economic downward trends signalled the beginning of a new period of more troubled times. Although the first, cautious steps to deal with the situation were taken in the 1980s, significant reforms found enough political and social support for policy adoption and implementation only in the 1990s. Also, due to external European constraints (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004; Graziano, 2004), reforms became unavoidable and the social p