The Global Gamble lVashington's Faustian Bid for llVorld Dom:inance
PETER GOWAN
VERSO
London· I'lew Yorl:
TO MY SON...
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The Global Gamble lVashington's Faustian Bid for llVorld Dom:inance
PETER GOWAN
VERSO
London· I'lew Yorl:
TO MY SONS
First publishod h~' Verso -t mlH Ii) Peter Gowan 19n9 All rights rusmved The 11I0rai rIghts of the author havu boon
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Verso UK: G )I.·leard Stroet, London \VIF oEG USA: 1110 Vanek Streut. New York. NY tOOH--tliIJ(i wW\\'. vorsohooks.!:ol1l
Vorso IS tim IIllpnnt of Now L(lfl Books ISBN l-U5~l8-1-1174-5 ISBN l-II!i!J/J.J-Z7t-2 (pbk)
British Library Catalugumg in Publica lion Data t\ catalogue rncord for this hook IS available from the Brilish Librar.\' Library of Congress Cataloging-III.Publication Dala A catalog rucord for this book is i1vailable li'DlIl the Lihrary of Congmss Types!!t by 1\·1 Rules Printed and hOllnd ill Groat )]l'il<1111 by Biddlos Ltd \\'\\'\\'.hiddl(!s.co.(lk
Contents
vii LIst or Acronyms and Terms PART I
XIII
THE GLOBALISATION GMdBLE
"
i ntro((uclIon
2
.)
'CaplLal Markets;; Financl,ll Systcl11s and thc Postwar intcnl
,~
Thc Dollar-Wall Strcet Reg-line
'I
The EvoiulJon or the DWSR rrom the 197()s to the
:'i
Power Politics. the DWSR and the Clinton Acil11l11lstrallon
()
The Poliucs and
7
ConclUSIons
PART II
ECUIlOIlIICS
of the Pame of '9H
()()
10:\
12!i
POLITICS IN THE CLOBALISATION PERIOD
H The Gulf War, I rag alld Western Liberalism 9
19~1Os
I-II
The Theory and PractICe or Neo-Liberalism for
Eastern Europe
1~7
10
Nco-Liberalism anel Civil SOCIety
~·IH
II
Thc Post-COl11l11l1l11st Parties
~60
12
The
Enlaq~el11ent
111
the East
or NATO and the Ell
Preface
During thc 19~)Os, AmcrIcan govcrnmcnt and busincss elitcs ha\'c attempted to 'go global" 111 other words, to entrench the United States as the power thaI will control the 1ll'~Jor cconomic and political outcomcs across the globe in thc twenty-lirst cCl1tur\'. This is a comlllonplacc amongstthosc who 1{)lIow such malleI's; but the distinClivc mcthods cmployed in tillS pn~JeCl arc less wldelr recogl1lsecl. ThIS book IS an attempt to \I1vesllgate some of these mel hods, many of them IIlnOv
VIII
PREFACE
nallle of ~Jobalisatlon: this m\'olves till' openlllg of" a state's political l'COIl10 the entry 01" products, companies. Jinanci,il flows and IinanclaJ operaLOrs from the core countries, making- state poliC\' dependelll upon de\'e1opments and (tensions taken III \'Vasilmgton. Nell' \brk and other main capllalisl centres. Tht' two changes reed each \lthel': the shih 1\1 domestic sO(J;li )JOWl']' rdatlulISlllps, known as ne()-Iil)l~ralislll ..<;I.rengthens the CIJnsutuencles );I\UIIJ"lIlf{ g-Iob,disauon. And the jiJrces j;l\,ouring globalisatlOn will J"avour thesl' S;II11C domesllc transf"ormallom. Those states and SOCial svstellls that try to resist thcse transformations will lind themsel\'cs increasinglY shut outli'olll the US market and from liS allied EU market, and sul~jeClcd to hostile eCOIHllll1C slalL'crah. The lIloS1ll1ternallonallv competltl\'C ol" their productlvl' sectors, I"e,mng- such exc\usml1, can tllllS also \)C [\lrnerl mto supporters of ~1\)\)",lli sation and neo-liberalism. Both types or change f;wllllr the transnatlOllaJ expansion of US econOllllC and political influence. slllce both proVide openmgs ror US financial operators and the US financmimarl.:ets, as well as for US transnational corporations. Both globalisatlon and neo-liberalism were spreading across the \\\'stern world before the collapse of the SO\'let Bloc but It has l)eell durlllg tile 1990:-; thal Amencan adnlllllsu-auons have actively souglll to radicalise and gener.t1ise these trends, aJ"lJclllatmg Ulell1 in \\'ay.~ whICh would anchor olher polillcal econumles to Amencan political and eCOllOmlC lI11erests. This anchonng process has been pursued both bilaterallv and through reorganISing the program Illes of multilaterai orgalllsauons so thatlhey, too, I)l'collll: IIlstrulllents of the campaign, These changes in the illlernal and transnational linkages of states are consolidated IIItn a new regime, which in turn tends lO make state leaderships want what American state and buslIless elites wanL. On the other SI(k, the pn!Jt:Cl involves ensuring that It is the states themselves that retain CIIIllplete responsibility 1'01' ever)'thmg thal Ileblls their populations. Thus tile benefits or the global transnational order will accrue to the Ul1Ited States, while the risks and costs can he distributed abroad, This IS the I\lalll distincllve rorm or the US's glObal pn~Jecl. TIllS IS the glnl)al gambie. Aher an IIneasy start at the bq~illnlllg or the dec;l(te. the lIIain "Vest European powers have become JUIllor partners III this prolecl, In a rei alJonslllp willch combines subaitern co-operation with sOllle clemL'1l t\ o/" rricllon and competlllOll. The relationshIp between the United States and Japan, on the other hanci, has been much more conI1icttlal. SII1Cl' the national and regional dynamiCs oiJapanese capitalism have been 1;\1' kss in tune with Washinglons globai prqlect than have those orvVestern Europe. The pl'ocesses lIsually ;L~sOclatcd wllh giobalis
I'RH~\(:E
ix
Bllt 111 the IIrsl part of thIs I)ook I argue that the process of glohalis
I'REE·\(:E
The collapse of" the Sm'lcl Bloc prcscllled AmcrIcan c1iICS Wilh a telllpl;!lion remllllsccnt of" Faust"s. A door Sl'l'IIIl~(t 10 swmg- opcn lin til a vlsla "j" hitherto 1Ill1mag-lIlabie cosmopolitan power. Yet within a litLle ell'cade, tlte slgnaLllre or ivlephlslopheies IS already vIsible. The eCollOl1l1C {i)I"Jlluia oj" the 'Was!JmglOn Consensus' is structurally Ilaweci but is simultaneousl\' \'I(al for the dynamism or the American econolllY. States have been restruClured wIlh great poliucal success bUlIl1 ways that will make them, 111 the rutllre, (;\I' less capable of" conlallllllg and managll1){ lhelr own c\Ol1leSllC revolt; American military asccndancy ovel- the glo!)e IS grealer thall lhalllr all\' Slalc in world hIstory. 1)l1L Its panoply or powcr IS of liLLie use 111 the 1;lce or slale breakdowns anc! popular revolt. ThiS book is not an al.lempt to producc a comprehensive treatment of" these transnational
or
I'REF:\(:E
XI
studies in tills boo!;., therefore, have required that I stray across disciplinary boundaries even wherc I have felt ill-eqUIpped to do so. The material in Pan II has clther been published already in the form of arllclcs or has drawn upon earlier published cssays. Chapter 8 first appeared as The Gulf War, Iraq and Western Liberalism' In NI~711 [AP RttlJil~w 187 (j'... lay-::June 19~11). Chapter 9 was pre\'lol1siy published as 'Nco-Liberal Theory anci PractIce for Eastcrn Europe' 11l iVl'll! /.lY( Rellll'll! ~ I:~ (September-Ocwber I 99!J) , Chaptcr I () prcviously appeared as •Liberalism, Ncu-Liberalism and Civil Society' 11l /,(lbO/ll' FO(/(,I· 011 J~flsll'rll Ellro/JI' 53 (SUJlllller 199(). An earlier version of chapter II was published as 'The Post-C01l1JlllllllSt Parlles III the East' III Donald Sassooll, eel., /.oo/{i IIg /,Iji (Ill Tat.ris, 1997). An earlier verSIOn of chapter 12 appcared as 'The DynamiCs of "European Enlargement"', [.((boll r FtJWJ Oil F(I,I"/t'm Ell mjJI' 56 (Spring 1097). I am grateful to these publishers for permiSSion to reproduce this material here. I woul(llike to thank a number of people fiJI" vcry helpfui cnllClsms ofvarious parts of thIS hook, notably the follow111g: Perry Anderson. Roblll Blackburn and other colleagucs on Nl'w Lt!fi RI7J1l'w; Leo Panltch. Gus Fagan and my other colleagues on Labollr Foms Oil HaslrTJI J~·lIrol}('; Laszlo Andor; ami Donald Sassoon. 1 wouid like to thallk l11y colleagues 111 the I-itllllanlllCS Faculty In the UllIverslt)' of North London and in the Schooi of European and Language Studies 111 parllcular for the way 111 which. despite the cIiflicuil1es facing higher cducatton. tlIC\' have managed to preservc all extrel11ely congenial context for both teachlllg and research. lowe a special debt 111 tillS context to Mike Newman. And I would also like to thank Ill\' students at UNL for bel11g a constanL sUlllulus and challenge fl)r 111)' tlunking. I would like to thank Verso, and in parllctliar Sebasllan llmlgen. the cop\'editor Jon I-Iaynes. and Susan Watkins. wl10 madc a final comprehensive (alld extremely thorough) check on the manuscript. li)J· being so dliClent and accommodating. Finally. I woul(\ like ll> thank two people Yen' close to mc. One IS Ill\' li·iend Patrick Cam iller, wltll whom I bave been talking Ii»· a quarter of a celllun' and li·olll whom 1 have learned so much. Anci the other IS my wife. I-Ialva. whose imegnty. sensJtI\,lly and generosity have been an Inspiration as well as a great support.
List of Acronyms and Terms
AFt-CIO
APEC ASEAN
BEMs BIS
BSP CAP CEE CEECs CFE CIA CIS en'IEA CPSU
Comecoll CSCE
CSFR
American Federalloll of Lahour-ColIl-{ress of Ilidustrlal Organisallons. the main American trade unioll redcratioll ASIaIi j"loncl<\n' Fund. a Japanese proposal III ;1l1lU1l1ll 1997 that was not nllplcmcntcd Asia-Pacific Economic Co-opcnILioll. It includcs the USA. Canada and thc main Asian cconomies The ASSOCiallon of SOlllh-East As iii 1\ Nal10llS The Arab Socialist Renaissance Party - the ruling part.\' III I ract and Syria The Big Emerglllg ;Vlarkels. as dcfinecl lw the Clillton aclmlnIstratlOn Bank 1'01- International Settlements - the 'central bank' of ccntral bank~ Bulgarian SOCialist Party The EU's Common Agncullllrai Policy Central and Eastcrn Europe Central and Eastern European Coulltrics Thc Treat\' on COllvenllonal Forces III Europe CClllral Intclligcllcc Agency COlllmonwcalth of Independent Slates The Council 1'01- Mutual Econolllic ASSistance - the SO"let Bloc's ecollomic association COllJIlIUnist Pan" of the Soviet L1111ol1 Allother name for tile CMEA COllference Oil Security and Co-operation· in Europe, no\\' transformed inlo Ihe orl-{a1l1SatlOll /()r Sectlntv ancl Co-operation II) Ell rope Czech ami Slo"ak Federal Republic
xiii
XI\'
DGB
D\NSR EBRD EC
EeB Eli Ex-1m Bank FDI FRG FSU G3 G7 GAlT GDP I-ISP HSWP IeI' IFIs
lIT ICC
IMF lSI LDCs LSE LTCM MAl ;OvIDI' MERCOSUR MIT MNCs NACC NAFTA NATO,
NEe
:\CIHlNYlIIS AND TERlIlS
Germall tr,lele Ullion leder~1I1111l Dollar-Wall Street Rq.\"III1C European Bou"; li,)r RcconstrUctlOll 0111(( l1eveIOplll('l11 Europeall ClIlIll1ll1nlty. 110\\' callcd till: Europcan l:lllon (El!) European Cenlrai Bank. Ji JI'nH:<1 to manage L11l: curo. 111(' E l: 's slIlglc C1I1TellC\' European UnllHl The US gO\"l.'rnllll.'nl\ trade tTcdit 0111(1 credit g-u;lranlet' agencr Foreign direcL ill\,estmell L Federal Republic of CermiUI\' Fonner SO\"lel UnulIl Croup of :1: US:\, Gcrman\", illld Japan Group of 7: USA. Germany. Japan. France, Brilalll. C~llIad;l. ILaiy General Agrcemcnt Oil l~II'ill~ and Trade Cross DomestIc Producl Hungarian Sllualisl P~II"l)" Hunganan Socialist \Vorkers Part\". lhe n~ullc 01" lhe Hunganall CommlllllsL Pan,' Iraqi ComllllllllsL Party IlllernaLiollallinancml insuLlIuol1s {the Ii"IF and WB} In u'a-Jirm trade EU IIlLel"'-go\'crnlllellLal COlllCrcnce for amending lhc Ell's baSIC lrea ltcs International i\.Jonetary Fund Import SUbslIltHlng Illduslnalisatioll Less Developcd CounlrlCs London Scholll or ECOIIOlIllCS amt Poliueal Sncnce Long-Term Capilail\lanagcmcnt The jI,'lultiJalcrai Agreelllclll 011 Im'cstmelll Hungarian Democratic ForullI .-\. li'cc.: lrade area III Lalin Amcrlca 11I\'olnng Brazil. Urugll~l\'. Paraguay alld Argclltina 1'VlassachusselS Instl!lIlc.: of Technoloh'Y Multi-national corporations North Allantlc Co-operauon Council The North i\mencan Frcc Tradc Association. lII\'ol\,lIlg til<' USA, Canada and MeXICO North Allanllc Tn:a!\' Org-~III1Satl()n National ECOIlOIllIC Council. set lip lw Ihe ClinlDJI adnllllIstraUon
,\CRONY;'IS AND TERMS
xv
NOIl-Prlllili:rauoli Treaty Amerlcall Natiollal Sccunt" Coullcil National Salvauon Front or Romalll
USTR
US Tr;lde Represelltatlvc
X\,I
VER VIE Visegr.ICt WB WEU \\TO
;\CRON\~IS
,\NII
TER~IS
VoiUlllar\' Exporl Rcstraillt Vuiulllary Impurt Expanslol\ i'uiaml. Czech Repllhlic. Slovakia, HUI1~al"\' '·\'orlel Ball k Wesl European limon '·Vurid Trade Or~'lnlsalioll. ~uccess()r lO lh(: GATT
= = = = = PART
I =====
The Globalisation Gamble
Introduction
The 1990s have been the decade of g-lobalisallOlI. We see tls cffecb eve1"\'where: III economic. social and (Jolitlcallife, around the world. Yet the more all-pcJ"\'aslvc are these effects, the Illore eiusl\'e IS the alllmal itsell: An enormOlls outpouring- of acaclClllIC Ii lerature has Eliled to pru\'lde an ag-reed vIew of its physlOnom)' or its locallon and some replllable academICS of Rig-In amI Ldt e\'en question ILs very existence. Others. notabl" Ang-Io-Amencanjournalists and polil1clans, II1SISllt IS a nug-hty beast which savag-es all who Elil to respect ItS needs. They asslIre LIS lhat 1IS g"aze, '\)lank and (lHiless as the slIn", I has turned upon the Soviet Bloc, the European SOCIal ;"vlociei, the East Asian Deveiopmelll l'vlodel, bnng-ll1g" them all to thclr knecs. For thesc pundits. g-lobalisatlOn is the hearer or a new planetary CIvilisatIOn, a slllg-le marketplace. a risk SOCletv, a wodd \)e~'ond the security or states. an unstoppable, quasl-nautral force or g-Iobal transfonnauon. Yet. as the East Asian crisis turned into a g-Iohal III ternallonal finanCIal scare, SOllle who nug-ht he thollg-ht to he deep inside the hell\' or this bcast. the big operators on 1I1l~ . g-Iobal !inaneral markets'. wondered whether g-ioiJalisauon mIght be III 1IS death ag-on\,. At the star! or 199H •.loe Ql1Inian. senIOr analyst for the Anwncan IIlVeSllIwnt hallk iVlorg'all Stanley, raised the possibility thaI g-lobalisatlOll Ill,\\' he COllllllg- 10 all clld. He noteel that 'g-lol);t!isatlOll has been the deCISIve econOlIlIC ('n'nt of this decade' and stressed that 'no one has reaped lIIort.' heneflts rrolll g-Iobalisation thall the United States and C01"()()rate America. Thl' g-reater the velOCIty and mobilitv or g-Iohai capitaL the more capllai available to plugthe nation's low level or SOlVI11g-S and hoost the lieJllI(litv of linanClallllarkets. Til short, g-ioiJalisatioll has heen bullish for tile world ("COllOm" III general and Jill' the LllIiled States in particular.' But Quinlan worried that g-o\'crnll1cnLs 111 vanDUS parts of the wodrlll1lght be turn111g- against g-Iobalisauon and illig-in dcc)(ie 1.0 bnng' 11 to an end 111 199H. As he put IL: . the blg-gest nsk 10 lhe world ecollomy next year IS 1I0t slower g-rowth.
THE C;U)\\\I.IS ..\TIOt\'
C""\~IBI.E
but rather an unra\'elling of gioba"1 1I1leniepenciellce - and therefore the enci or gl()balisal1()n.'~ For QUillian. then, ~Iohalisation IS a rather fragile, vulnerable creatul"l~. depellclelll upon the Ilurturing can: or states. Thus, we arc len \\'Itll all a\\'ar('l1t~ss that there ha\'e Indeed been powerful nt'w l(lITes in Ihe mternatIonal political economy of the I 990s, wilH"it we label globalisauon, blll their contours, clynallllcs and GIlISl'S remain obscure: as elusive to our grasp as a black cat III a dark )"(IOIll.:1 ThiS IS yet another attempt to catch thiS Cal called gioiJalisatiol1. or ratiler to catch one of its malll ()q~ans: Us celltral nervous svstem. We will argue that tillS lies 111 the wa\' III whIch IIl1ernatlonal monetary ami (inanctal relations ha\'e been redeSIgned ami managed over lhe last quarter or a century. This new monetary anci !inancial reglllle has been one or the central motors of the II1ter\ocl;.mg mechanisms o/" the Whole c\vnallllc known as globalisal1on. Anclll has been not III the ieasl a spontanco\ls O\llcome of orgamc economic or technolu).{ical processes, but a deeply polillcal result of political chOIces made by slIccessive govern ments oj" one state: the UllIted States. In this sense we are cluser to the iVlorgan Stanley view or globalisatiun as a state-policy-dependent phenomenon tllan to the nOllon of globalisauon as a deep structure favoured by Anglo-American media pundits. To mdicate Ils location 111 JIllernallonal reality we call It a "regllne" although, as we will expiall1, It is not a regIme in the guasl:lul'idical sense III which that term has been used 111 Amencan IIllCrnauonal reiat.tons literaltJre. International lJlonetary ami fillancial relaUons are always the procillClIJ/" both econonllC and above all political chOIces by leading slates. Studies o/" giobalismion which lilil to explore the politICal dimensions o/" the lIlternational monetary regIme that has eXIsted slIlce 197:1 will miss cel1!rai /"caltJres or the dynamiCS o/" giol)alisalion. TIllS inlenl
I 1'\T1H )I)ll( Tl ()N
]Jowers to choose li'om and the olle chosen, whICh has led 1.0 what we call globalisatlon. was t.he oillcome of inlernatlonai political conflicl.~ won by lhe .-\merican g-overnnwl1t. Since the 19iOs. the arran~elllents sellIl motion b)' lilt: Nixoll adminlslralton havl' developed mlO a patterned lI11ernalional regime which has conslantl" reproduced itself, has had very /"ar-reachmg dTects on transnallonal economic, political and sOCIal lire and which has been availahle /"or use lJy SllcceSSlve AIllt:ncan adnlllllstralions 'IS an enormOllsly potent Il1strulllent of tilelr econonHC statecraft. One of the most l'xtraordinary features of the whole stnn' is the way 111 which tllest: great il"wrs of Anwncan power ha\'(~ slIllplv been Ig"norecl in most or the literatures on globalisOlllon, on Illlernauunal regimes and on general de\'elopmcnl.~ III Ihe il1lerl 1 ational political economy." In exploring tilts Dollar-\<\'all Street Regime we need no algebra or geollletn' and almost Illl arithmetic or even statisLtcs. The I)aslc relallonships and concepts can be unc\erstood Wilhout the slightcst (;uniliant), wnh neo-ciasslcal economics. Indeed, for understanding lIlternallonal Illllilelary rs. One of the hlSCm
li
TI-IE (;j,OI\,\I.IS,\TION C:\r.IBI.E
stales . .Iapan. the COlllllnes or the South and 01" the I"Ol'llIer SOVIet Bloc to the regllllC. We also look at how Lhe rcg-lInl' cOl1tributl'cl towards cbanging the US dOlllestlc financiaL eCOl101111C and political systellls. In chapter 5, we tn' to place the DWSR and its effects il1LO the fralllework or the dynamics of international politics as a Whole 111 tile earl\' I 9~l(ls, \Vl' iook at tlH:se Issues, so to speak. from the angle oj" the kac\ stall': thl' United States. And we try to build 111 the elleCls o/" tile So"iet Bloc collapse on how American leaders J()rlllulated their strategic goals and recolllbined t.1leir (actlcs. I argue that tile\' ratlonallv had to, a[\d ciid, recog-lIIse that tilelr ke\' challenge lay III East anel Somh-East Asia. To tackle that challenge and to frustrate future challenges to US global leadership, the\' had to radicalise [he D\VSR al1cl Illay perhaps have used It as an IIlstr1l1l1el1t of economic statecraft 111 East ASIa: the e\'lcience is Clrclll!1sLantJal but slgnilicanl. In chapter 6 we argue that thl' cOI1\'eIlliol1al view or the unI()lding o/" the central drama of the East Asian Crisis in the autumn o/" 1997 - the events 111 South Korea - is 1l1lstakeJ1 JIlsofar as It assumes the cen tral actors 10 ha\'e i)ecll exclusi\'eiy market forces. A criucal roll' was pla\'ed hy the US Treasury. \\'hlch acwd IJ1 qUite new ways (lur1l1~ the Korean cnsls. I twas this Treasury IIltervenllon in SOllth Korea which was I-csponsiblc for the subsequent IndoneSian colJapsl' and willch IIldirectlv :lllcluninLellllonally set in lllotlOn the tngg-ers which turned the East ASian CriSIS into a I4lohal JinanClal criSIS during 1998. :\t the same tlllle, the reason why Ihe US Treasury's action could play thiS triggering role la\' in the effects o/" (welllY veal's o/" US explolLallon oj" the Dollar-Wall StreeL Reg-line Oil the world economy. \Ve concillcie bv cOIlslclenng- wheLher Lhere IS a possihle sOclaldemocratic capitaiisl alternati\'l' strate~y whICh could reverse thl" dVllanllCs of ~Iobalisati()n.
Not(!.\"
I. W. II, \<"IIS: 'Th" Secolld COlIIlIIg " .Joe QtII II lillI , 'lkl'aha;llltlIlS, Ddirlls ami Ihe 1-:1111 .. I' elohalisaIlOIl?', :-'Iorgall Slallle" (;I"lIal E'-'OII01ll\(' ForulII. The {aollal En'"011lICS 'It·al1l. SpeCIal )"""I'-EIIII IsslI'·. ~~ llen·mll .. r 1~1~)7 (MnrgOlIl Slalller,l(: CII_. 1!1!17). :1. I mUsl ,lCklllJwledge Ih" sOllrce of Ihis lIIelaphor III all ,·xn'Iit"III.1IJI,,· hI' Professllr Wagelll:r OIl iI n:n:1I1 cOllli:rI'IIC1: III Berlin, The.lokl' gOl's OIS lillluw'i: ,'COIIOIlIlC hi""r\' l'i chas1I1~ a hlack cal 1II a dark (,("lIlI: eCOllOIIIIl"S IS cha'illlg a hlack cal III " dark roOIll 1,-t"'11 lit .. cal .SII-. Ihere, 1-:<'\lIIOlIlI:lri", IS cila_"1l1!; a hlack.-al III a dark l' allah''i1S III Rohen IIn'lIl1er, 'Till' EnlllOllllrs or (:Iol>al Tllrhuh'lIn' . .\'171' Lip 1/"'/11/' :!~9 (I !19H). 5. A 1Il:~I()r "XI:\'PIIOII 10 Ihis hlilldllt:ss has heell (h,' \\'ork or Susall Slr,II\~'" whll ('onsl:lIllll' SI",~hl I'; ,·dUCII,· liS Oil II", p"li(i('s ..1" illll"rllallllllallllllllcl;lry alld lillam"jal albirs "'I"'Clalll' III III:,. claSSIC S(,.,/h'K /11/1/ Jki(i," I'o/i,:\' (()xfllrd UIlln-rsll\' Press, 1!17l), :\ p,lIh,lm-OIling arl!o de oil Ihe IIf slales III glllhalisawJII IS Leo I'anll.-II, ''1'111" R"le "I' S(;II,·S 11\ l :("IlOltisallOll-. S"nl//i,,' U,:t;W"I' ( I !IW,)_ ~.
,."k
INTROlll'< :TI< IN l;. I tic! n()l \'"1,1.
r 'Ilark,,!.,
10 Sllg,~l"st
thai
ll'lISIOIiS In:1W('.'1l
:111
JII'P""';1111 .. ili'Ti
"r
the ~o;'lb of ~(I\'l:I"lUIIt'llh and Ih(' clYl1atn-
;""t'SUg;'ill'"' Sc,' Ruhl'l'! Bllyer alld Ihlll('l I)rad,,' (",b.). S/II/'" ."Utl/I/s/ .\,,,,1:,,/.1: Tit.' i,illl//' U{(;illhtlli:llrlfl" (RcJllll"ligc·. 1~1~J(i), i, Sail Ill .. I 1llIlIllllgillll: 'Trall"",",,"al Oq'::lIl1salilllls II. W.. rld 1'"liflCs'. \lini,1 i'oiilin, ~:; ('-\I'ril !!17Tt. H.' ..
;11,' ","
7
TIlE
(;(.OIl:\l.IS,\TION (;A~mt.E
states,Japan, till: countries of the SOlllh and of IIII.' ronner Soviet Bloc to the reg-lIllc. \.\'t' also look at how the n'glllle clllHribllteci w\I'ards clI,\II~in~ the US domestic finanCial, .... conOllllc and poJillcal systems. In chapter!), we l1'Y 1O place the DWSR and its effects into till: framework of the (i\'namlcs o{" illlernalJOllal politICs as a whole in the early Im)(ls. We took at these ISSllI:S, so to speak, from the :Ingle of thl: lead slall:: the Linnell States. ,\nd we tn' to build III the erIccts of the SOVIet Bloc collapse Oil how American leaders formulated their strategic g-oals and recombined tllelr tactics. I arg-ue that lhey ralJonally hacl to, and did, recog-llise that theIr ke\' challenge lay ill East and SDuth-East Asia. To tackle 1Ilat challenge amI III li'ustratc (inure cl1allenges LO US global lcaderslllp. they had to radicalise the D\VSR and llIay perhaps have used It as an IIlstrulllent of ecollomic statecraft in East .-\sla: the e\'IC(I.'IICe is CII'Clllllstanllal bUl significallt. In chapter li we arg-ue thal the conventional \'lew or the IIn/i)ldillg oj' tIll: central drama or the East ASIan cnsis JIl lhe autumn of 1997 - lhe events in SOllth Korea - is mistaken lIlsobr as It assumes the cell tral actors to have lJeen exc\usivciy market ('orces, A cntlcai role was pi
NO/I',I
I. W. II. \i.. al.~: 'TIH' Sl'cond C"IIII11g-: !! . .Jo~· QUillian, 'I)C\'alll;\IIOII,;, Lklil'IIS ami Ih,' End or (;lohalisalJoll:' ~Iorgall Slallln' t;lohal ECIlJ III III 1(: For II III , The C)"hal 1'.(,01 II 1111 II'S Team, SpiTla) Y"ar-Eud Is,""'. !!!! Ikn:lIlh.'r 19~1i (1Ilmgan Slallky 8.: Co .• (!)!Iil. :1. I musl ac!;'lIol",,,dge the sOllree or lhis lIlelaphor 11\ all I'Xt'L'1Il'1I1 .I"kl· Ill' Proli',,"r Wag-l'II"!, al a a'celll cunl't:rellce III Berlin. The Joke g-Ul'S as lililows: "OIIlOIllIC hislorv IS ehas1Ilg- a hlack cal III a dark room; "1'0 II 0 III it'S IS clta~lIl~ a hlack CII 'II a dark n,ol1\ Wltl'lI Ih,' ,'OIl 'S\I'I Illl'n', Enlllollwlnrs I~ l:haSII\~ a iliad:. ,'a I II' "
1":li 11,"1/11' '!.!!~I 1IJ;~lor
(I D!)I'\) .
I'XCI'1'1I011 10 litis hlilldllt'ss has h"~'11 Iltl' work "rSllsall Sirallgl', wit" (,Ollsl'lIl111SIIIIl-:ltl h: l'dllC:ll,' II~ 011 Ih,· polillcs or ililerllalloJlallllollelary and lillalln;d .,t1'1I1" ('sp,'nall\' III her c!,ISSIC, S/"dill~ ",,,llJri/i...h /'oli,)' «()xli.rd l'lIl\'ersm' PI'''''' J!lil). :\ l'alh-bn:akillg art.cle Oil lIlt' rolt- "('Slall's III gluhalisalllJl' IS 1."0 P;III1I('h. 'Tltl' Role orS"'h', "' la"halisalll>lI', S,,,.m/i,,/ U,·gl.li,·r(I!l!I!I).
5.:\
I NTIHI(}l'( :rlc IN
7
(). I dn lIol wish 10 ~lIg~l'St that [,'II";IUIlS hctwt"(:u du.' ~nals of gO\'l"nU))t'IlI~ alld the d},l1anlor lIlarl;."" an' 11111 ;1l1 1111pun:1Il\ ,,1>;"<"1 or ill\"\·'Il),!;:lIiul\. s,:l" R"hen 110"'''' allll 1);\I11l:1 D,·ad .. · (.,,,- ... S/II/O :lgIII"'/ ,Hod,,'II: TI,,·l.iml/l oj (;J"/mJi:IJiJ/l1/ IH'>I11I"dgl', )!I!)I'). 7. Sallllwl 1'!llllllllglOll: 'Tral1,II:lllollal Org:lIl1s;llIolIs III World !' .. Iilles·. \I;,"" ['"iili,,,. ~:I H"S
(:\pril ! !I/:\).
===============2==============
'Capital Markets', Financial Systems and the Postwar International Monetary System
Most of the vanous nOllons of what globalisatiol1 is about li)Cus on the growlI1!; mobility of capital across the globe in the 'global capital marl,et; and upon the nnpaCl of tillS llIol)ilil), on nallonai economies. But the term 'capitall1larkl~t IS analvlIcally Itlcoherel1l, because It embraces radically dif1erent phenomena III the lield of1in;lnce, most of WhlC11 havt" Ilothlllg directlr to do WlLh capllal 111 lhe llsual common sense meal1l11g of the te I' III , while at the sallll' tlllll" It excludes a great deal or tile operauons of what capital actually does. So we Ileed to daril)' our 110liollS about 'capnal markets', global or olherwise, 111 order to understand this international phcnomcnon known as globalisalion.
TIII'Slrmlll'f/ Ca/)/I(// Mllrhl'lJ
In COllllllon scnse language we associate the word capllal with Lhl' idel or funds for prOdllCl1VC II1\'CSUlll'lll, for pULLing LOgl'ther machll1es, ra\,' materials ami empioyees to produce scllabic iLCms. TillS is a useful startin!; POlllt for llSll1g the word capitai because it stresses as SOCially bencficial role withlll a capllalist system. One of the central confUSIOns concerning globalisation lies in the WIdespread belief that the so-called 'global capitalmarkels·. 111 which trillions of dollars arc bounCing back ami rorth across the globe, arc in some wav asslslmg the de\'eioplllent or the procitlcuve sector of capitalism. It is because we Im.lgttle that the 'global markets' arc integral to produclloll that we IIl1ag"llle that we have no cholCc hut to accept them. 'ti:t III reality the great bulk (lr what goes 011 in the so-called' global capitalmarkcls' should be Viewed more as a charge Up~Hl thc productive system than as a source of funds 1i:)I' ncll' production. The idea that the current rorl11S or 'capital markcts' arc limctJOnaH), mdispensable inve.~ullent l11echallIsllls is a senolls error. The 'capital market' is both mnch mOH' and much less than the funnel 1'01' produCliw
s
"c:\I'ITAL l\IARKETS' AND INTERN,\TIO:'\!,\I,1I10NEY
lI1\'l:stllll'l1L. It IS Illllch Illtll'C I)ecause lllllciudes all forms of credit, savillgs ;lIld IIlsuranc{:' iL~ well as large, diversified marl,ets 1Il lIties to flllure Il1CUIl1C ami not.lllst credits for producllvc lIl\'eSUllelll. And Il is much less because I'el} large flows of funds Illlo producll\'c IllV{:'Stlllt'1Il do not pass through thc su-calleel 'capllal markets' at all. TIllS confUSIOn about the role of capital marl,ets is linked to another, concernmg mergers and acqUIsitions. Thus, it IS often assumed that when one com pan), buys control of another com pan", some kind of capllai investIlwnt is takmg place, Yet frequeIllir such acqulsluolls of assets may ha\'e lI()thlllg 10 do WIth new real II1Yl'stment at all. lll(tel'cJ, the reverse may be OCClIITlI1g: the acqlllslllon lIlay f)e conct'rlh.'d Wllit rUllllmg down the aClivIllCS or the acquire(1 asset, 111 OHler that the f)U\'er of the asset can eiimll1ale competition and gain g-reater market power. DUrIng the last quarter ur a cenlury this process of' cCllIralisation of capital' has been proceeding apace internatIonally. I t IS called 'Foreign Direct InvestmellL' Inll 111 most cases It SImplY means changing tile ownerslllp of compallles and may ha\'c to do wllh disinvestment 111 prO(llICLlOn rather than Ihl' commItment of new n'sources to expansIOn of proelllction. The nOlJOI1 lhat a great expansIOn of the sIze of 'cilpllal markets' IS a symptoJll of poslllve trends 111 GlpItalist pruduclJon IS as htlse as lI11agllllllg that a vast expansion of L1IC JI1surancc lIl(illstry IS a SIgn that the world IS hecomlllg a safer place, Insurance can operate 111 tile opposite way: the more crllne the bIgger the properly insurance markeL. Similarly, when great fortunes are being made o\'erI1Ighl on "capilal markets', the most usefui rule or thumb for interpretlllg sllch trends IS one wl1Jch says that somethlllg 111 capJ\alism IS functionmg \'er~' badly from a SOCIal pOlllt or \,Iew. \Ye will explore some of llwse terms, startIng w!lh the most. Ob\'lOllS reature of flnanciai S\'stellls, their role 111 suppl~'lI1g credit. Credit lI1\'oil'es lending Jlloney to people on tJle understanding that they will pal' the money back later along wIlh a bonus or 'royalty', llsually III Ihe I(JI"In of a rate of intereSL. 1 There IS nothing necessarily capllalist about credit and large parts of natIonal credit systems arc not I-dated to production at all. 'Workers can put tilelr savll1gs lI1LO a credit co-operat,,'e and draw IO;lI1s from It III hard tllllt'S 111 the hope of paving tlw money back 111 beLler llml'S, The\' pay a ro\'allv fi)r the service but tillS can be small because lite cooperall\'c IS non-prollt-makmg. Such co-operalll'cs serve cOnSllIllplJOIl needs, not produCLiDIl anci the\' are not capltalisl. Building SOCleLlCS COillined 10 tile housing- market pial' a SImilar roie III supplYll1g credit for people to purchase housll1g. A common feature of these kinds of orgalllsations IS tltal the credit-money tltal they Issue is directly del:,,'ed {rom savlIlgs deposited wIthin them, In mher words, their resources come from the past production or I'aiu!: in tiw economy: employees' savll1gs come from wages tilat they have aiready earned 111 pr()dUCll()I1,~
10
TilE (a.oIlAI.IS:\TION (;:\:\1111.1-:
Banks arc different because tile\' arc ahle to CI"I'{J/(! II/'W/JIIJI/I')' in their credit operations. We can sec thiS when we realise that at all)' onc !.lllle, the banks as a whole could be giving overdrafts to everybody in the entlrc eCOIl01ll\'. Thus. rar morc moncy is circulating 111 the economy than the lIloney derived li'olll savlllgs generated by past valuc creation. Pan of the 1lloney IS actual'" what we can call fictitlOllS money - money derived not ('rolll the past bill. from expectations that it will be validated by future productive acu\,llv.:l \ViLhlll capitalism. banks also do not. haw to be operated as private capitalIst compallles. At till' begllllllllg of the 1990s, ('or example, more thall half or the IO() biggest banks III Europe were publicly owned and their /lnanclal criteria for operatmg were, in prinCiple, matters of public choice. And e\'en if they are pnvate, the hanks play such an essential ,md powerful role in thc public ecolHllll)' because of their capaCity 1.0 Issue credit-moncy that am' sellsibie capitalist class will ellSure tllatlhe slale IS constantly IIlterferlllg III their operations (cven though, for idcological reasons, one wants to keep these state funC!.lons 'low prolile') . As Kapstelll puts it: 'Banks are wid how mllch capllai tiley must 1101d, where they can operale, what products tilcI' can sell, anci how much they can lend to anyone lirm.'·1 Thc existence of this fictitious crcdit-mOller is very bcneficial for the whoic economy because of its role in facilitaung the clrculallon or commodities. Withollt It, cconOllllC developmellt would bc far slower. It IS especially impOrlalll to cmployers, enabling thcm to raise largc amounts or muney fiJr equipment which will yield up its full valuc in production onl" ovcr many futUl-e years. If employers could lIlvest only real savlllgs - the muncy denvcd fi-om past value-creation - IIwesting in fixed capllai would be far more costly - too costiy for a lot or inVeSLll1elll. And crcdit has also become a very imponalll means or expanding the sales of goods to consUlllers. This is anothcl: way or saymg that modern economics run on large amounts of debt. So the banks do play an imponant role 111 bOlh cilannelling saVIngs and creating new funds (iictitious mOlley) for producti\'c investment. An entire capitalist economy could be run WIth a finanCIal system consisting eHl1rciy of sllch banks. Uutlllstorically, othcr forms or financial instltUlions havc grown up, cspccially 111 the Anglo-Saxon worid whICh has played such a central role III the illsLoncal dcvelopment of capitalism. First there has been the dcvelo)JllleI1l of shares and bonds as means of raising funds. A cOlllpany can oncr shares for sale and use the funds from the sail' to IIlveSt in the busllless. The sharcs are plcces of papcl- glvmg legal titles to a claim Oil (i.llurc pro(its fhllll the company's activities. Companies or governmenLs can also sell bonds and lISC the funds from, the sale for an infinite variety of purposes. Thcsc bonds arc similarly pieces of paper giving legal titles to a i1xed stream ofi'lilure IIlCClllle to the holder for a fixed period of lime. A speCIal featllre of shares and bonds (known collecltvely 111 England slllce the eiglHecllLh cenlllrr as
'( :,\PIT\I.i>IARKETS· ANf) INTERNATION,\I, ;"IONEY
It
'stocks') IS lhat secondarv markets h;I\'e g-rown up enabling people to buy and sell these pIeces or paper ('ntllling the holder to Ii.llure royallies, Today there arc all kinds or pieCl'S or paper tllat can he bought and sold and that enmit' the holder to some kind or ruture J'Ovall.v or nght. I can buy and sell paper giving- me the ngln to buy or sell a ClIITencv at a certam rale at a certam lillIe 111 lhe ruture, There has Iwen a huge growth III markets for such paper CI;U111S, The generic term ror all such tradal)le pIeces or paper is 'SC:Cllnlles It IS 1I11portalll to recoglllse that while the II1luallssulI1g or a set of shares or bOllds IS a lIIl'allS or raising rUllds that ma" (or mar not) hl' used for producllvl' capllal inveslInenl., the sl'condary markets m thl'se seCllnlles are nol cOlllributing dirl'ctl\' at all to prOdllCU\'l' II1\'estmenl." Instead the people on thl'se markets (such as the Stock lVlarket) are huymg anel selling r/(/I1I1S Oil .IiltllTl' 11(11111' tim/I,d /11 .Iil/IIH' Im)(llIf/Il'" (/ft/lI/i)" Ther are nOI handing over funds ror that product In: actIvIt\,: the\' are dalllllng future royalties from it. These dalllls Oil J'utUIT royalties rrom 1i.ltlllT production ;Ire eIther direct or lIldirect cialllls. A share 111 Ford Motors IS a direct claim on rUlllre value created in Fords, A RUSSIan g'O"ernll1ent bond whIch I hold is an Indirect ciallB on future Russian production orvaltle, I 110icl t.he bond not because I think tile RUSSIan government will produce the valul' blll becausc J 1I11agllle that II will pa" Ille m" royalty by extracting taxes Ii'om the productIve aCUvlIY of others in RUSSIa: no production. no rovalty on my hond, Against this background. we can now rclllrn to t.he phrase 'capllal market', What is mainly (although not unly) rd'erred to b,' this phrase is acwally sl'wnill'S lI/{I/li,'ls, And Wl' thus discover that' capllal market; in t.he sense ora secuntles market ma,' have nothing dircctl~' to do \\'111) suppl~'ing runds for capital investment. It lila), haye to do WIth the opposite process: t.rading in dalIlls to draw profits .Iiml/ .lilt 1m' Im)(lul't/1ll' 1/(/1111'-1'1'1'(/11011, At the same t.une, both bank credits and honds mal' he used Ii))' C
I~
THE eI.OB;\l.ISc\TION eA:-.mLE
and from crcdits In thc form ofJictitious money could be handlcd cntlrely by cOlTlmerClal banKs (which could themselvcs be publici)' owned). Thus, whcn we cxamlne thc growth of the so-callcd 'global capllat markets'; we will find that much of theIr activity is not about the suppl\' of capilal for productive actIvit)'. It IS abollL trading in royalties on futurc production in differelll pans of the world or about businesses enga~lI1g 111 vanous kinds of insurance against risks. And the trend in the orga11lsal1on of the flows of linance has been Illcreasmgly one which privileges the imercsts of rellllers and speculators over the functional requirements of productive investment. ThIS I~lct is revealed through an examination or the tensions between what wc may call the two poles of capitalism, that or money-dealing capllal and that or thc cmploycrs or capHal in the productivc sector.
T/II! Two PO/I'S (!/ (:api/a/ism alld TlII!lr HI'gll/fljioll
Whether tile finanCIal system is organlscd prcdominantly in the form of comlllcrctallJanks or in the form of securities markets, we notice a divlSlOll which is inhercnt in capitalism: the division between money-dealing capital on the one SIde and productive capital on the other. These two enlllles have different Kinds or concerns because of the different circulls of theIr capitals. For the employcr of capital in the productive sector the CllTIlIL runs as follows: capital starts as money (some orwluch IS borrowed from the money-capitalist), whIch is then turned mto plant, raw materials and empioyees III the production process. The capital then emcrges from production as a mass of commodities Ii:)r sale; when the sale is completed capllLlJ reappears III the rorm of money with the extra-surplus extracted from the production process. Olit of lhls extra-surplus, the employer of capital pays back the 1ll0ney-capllalist the sum 1I11uall), advanced, along With royal lies. But from the angle of the mOller-capitalist, the circuit looks different. It stans with a fund of money. TIllS money IS then iocked 11110 a pn~ject for a certall1 tlIne. At the end of that lIllle, the money-capitalist hopes to gct the money back with a royalty. For thc money-capitalist absolutely any pn~Ject whIch will olTer a future royalty IS what capILalislll is all about. If bUYll1g a share in Fords gl\'es a royalty of (-) per cent in a year, while a Ukrailllan glwernmelll bond will give a royalty of 34 per cent and buying a case of Ch{iteau Lafitte to sell it 111 a year will Yield I flO per cent, the problemallc IS the same for the monev-capitalist in each case: in an uncenain future, which of these diflerent . capital markets' will give me the best mix of salety and high Yield? Property that can be used as capital Lhus appears simultaneously in LWO polarised embc;diments: on the one side stand the JI/01/10·-mjJ;/alisl.\" controlling enormous accumulatIons or funds; and on the other SIde stand the 1~lI/j)/Oyl'l:5 I?/" aI/)ila/ managmg Lhe enterpnses. These are two forms of the
'<::\1'1'1':\(, 1IIARKETS' AND INTERNATIONAL
~IONE\,
same thillg-. analogous to God the Father and Cod tile Son. But their polarisatioll IS ver\' lI11ponalll I)ecause Il enables money-capital as the conu'oller ur funds to playa pJannmg- mle in capitalist development. By bell1g dislanceci and relativelv autonomous from the employers or capnal 111 the productive seClOr, the llloney-capllalists can pick and choose what sectors they advancc money captlal to. If a branch has reached 'maturity', barely aclllC\'lllg the averagc rate of prolit. then resources of value from thal sector as well as fictitious money can be advanced to other seclors which seem likely to procluce hIgher rates of return. Through such redeployments. the JinanClal svstem in the hands of the money-capllalisls IS supposed to spur growth. For supporters of capitalism lilis development co-ordinatIOn role or t.he llloney-capllalists IS considered to be one of the most mgel110lls and beautiful aspects of the entire s)'stem. One Illlght sa)' that the relationship between t.he productive sec lor and the linanclal sector is one where the produclIve seclor IS delennmant but the financial sector IS domlllanl. The productive sector is determinant because It produces the stream or value OUl of WillCh the lIloney-capitalists 111 the {inanctal sector ultimatelv gam theIr royalues, directly or IIldirectiy. On the other hand the finanCIal sector IS dommanl because It decides wlw/'(' II1Ilill channel the savmgs /i'olll the past and the new fictillOUS credit-money - who will gel lhe streams of finance and who will no\. The actual power balances between the two sectors are part.ly governed by the buslI1ess cycle. In the boom productive capital IS l1ush with cash and GilL so \0 speak. diclate terms to the monev-capllalisls; bUl III the recession the l1loney-capllalists become ruthless, bullymg tyrants as the employers or productive capital beg for credit to lIcie them (weI'. But power relations between the two are also crUCIally affected by inslltlluonal deSign - by the SOCIal reiallons of prociuction. The Slale. t.hrough a highly charged and poliLlcised process, can and does tilt the balance bC[ween the money-capital pole and the producl!ve-capitaJ pole and between the money-capllal pole and all parts of the credit system. keepmg, for example. money-Capilal out of whole sectors of tile credit system. ifil wallls to. The state also mal;.es cruCIal deCISIOns about the internal strUCture and IIlteractions within the l\loney-capIlal pole Ilself. \"'hat will banks be allowed to e1o, anel what will they be kept out of? Will we have a prIvale securlues market or not? And so 011. And we must also remember l.hatllte slate IS lloLJust designing relations between the two poles or capital; it IS also designing 11.<; own reiallon With lhe finanCIal pole l)ec(IUse It too will wish to use the credit system. Fnllll our analysis or these two poles of capital. another very important distlllclJon emerges, between the tempos and rhYlhms of two kinds of finanCIal flows linked to the lwo difrerent kinds or CIl"Clllts, For the IlHJIlev-capitalist there IS a tendency to seek qUick returns and to keep capHal in as liquid a state as possible. for reasolls of safety. The employer of
1·1
THE GLOBALISATION G:\1\IBLE
capIlal seeks to set up much longer-t.erm circuits, particularly concerningfunds for fixed capital investment, which yield their rull value only o\'el" many years. The tendency for the Iirst group is thus to generate 'hot ilion e\"· /lows, extremely sensitive to even very small changes in their enVlrOlllllent: while the second group tendst.o generate cold, long flows which have 1O he mbusl LO signilican t changes in their envimnmen t.The hOlllows are linked to royalty seeking from either securities trading orfrol1l very short-term ioans. This difference is extremely important: wilen we seek to analvse Il1lCrnallonalll1ovemenL~ o/" funds. Insol~\r as all kinds of money can /low ("reefy IIlternallonally. we would expect to sec "eryradical dirferences between these two kinds or flows: a small change in the exchange rate or one country or in t.he short-term. government-Jixed interest raWs in another can produce sudden, I1l,~jor shifts in l10ws of hot muney, but exert no significant influence on l10ws of fnnds concerned with real, long-term IIwestment III production.'; " The relationship between capital and labour within the productive sector IS, oj" course, an absolUlely lillldame11lal social relationship 111 the j"lInctiollIIlg oj" any actual capllalist system. But the relationship between llIoney-capllal and the producllve sector is another absohllely cen tral SOCIal relationship. Some oj" the sharpest conllicts within capllalist societies have OCCUlTed around these social relationsillps between the IinallClal sector ami the rest or society. At the end or the war, politics ill the AtlallLic world was governed by liJJ"Ces who favoured what the Ileo-liberais call '!inanclal repression' and what Keynes approvingly referred to as 'euthanasia Jor the rentiers', The story oj" the iast quarter of a century has been that of the resurrectioll of the rentiers in a liberatton struggle agalllst 'linanClal repression', This has gone hand in hand WIth the Idea that the approach to the deSign of linancial systems championed by people like Keynes and the US occupation regimes III Genn,\ny and Japan aher the war - 'finanCIal repression' - is an approach alien to genulIle capllalism, apparently of Far Eastem ongm! These dehates concern not only the IIlstitutional-powcl· relations betweell Illone\'-capital and the employers of capllai but also the role of the state and the rorllls or class relationships across the entire societv. But to understand thIS whoie story we must appreciate that these social and institutionai design Issues arc not necessarily resolvable at a purely nallonallevel. It is aClllally
'(:.,\1'1'1',-\1.
~I:\RI\ETS'
..\NIII;\TER"i:\TIONAI.
~«
INEY
15
The transformation oj" the n~lall()ns hetween the mOlley-capital pole and lhe produClin- sector of national capllalisllls has been a celltral fealllre of what has coml'lll be known as 'neo-libl'ralisllI' over the lasL CJuarter ora cellLuI'\', But LillS transformation has been achieved in close connecLion wiLh profound chang-L's III the fidd orillterllallonallllollclary and linancial relations. A~alnst thIS backgTllllllCl, \\'e willl'x:tlllllle lile 111 LernallonallllollC:'tary S\'stl'1lI and how Il relales to illterll;tIHmOli alld national linanClai s\'stems.
'nil' /1I/I'nlrt/If}II(1/ "folll'iar.\' S\,s/l'lIl
The lIeed for an internallOllai 1Il0llCtar\' svstCIlI IS !lol. In IIsdf, sOlllething denved Ihllll capllalislIl. It anses frolll lilt' political as well as economic fact that t.he world IS di\'lded mto separate Slates with scparate ClIrrenCles and from lht' I:ICI tltal ~rollps W!lltlll one Slall' wlsll to do IJlISIIH'sS With (and IIlsldl~) other states, Historically, most or lital lIlternallOl1aJ hllSlIlCSS has been concenleci with lrade 111 ~o()c1s, The problem or inlernaLJOl1al IlltlIlelarv relatlOIlS anses 111 the lirsl place over how two g-roups 111 difli.:renl currency zones can btl\, and sell g'oods. Onl' ObVIOllS wa\' or halldlill~ IhlS problem is to lise ncIther orlhe currencies o{'eacit state but inslead 10 lise a third li)]'lll or Illone\', sa\' g'old, which has an exdl
or
or
II)
THE GLOIl:\I.ISATION
(;:\~II\IJ:
are aiso established bv political agreement among Slall'S. And the Ireatllll'1ll of COUlllneS \"Ilh current account deJicll.~ or surpluses IS also politIcal'" established. Should there I)e an arrangement whereby Slates With current account deficits cut back on their purchases from abroad to get rid oj' theIr deficits? Or should the surpius states be presslIrised to blly more from the ddicit COlll1lnes? Arrangements of either sort call be pllt III place. If the dc1icll countries must a(~just, that will have a depreSSive effect intcrnat.lllllall\', bccause they will Cit back on their international purchases. If lhe opposite approach is USL'd, It. will havc a SlJllllliali\'(: dl'cct on tnterllallonal economic activit)'. WhKl1 approach IS adopted will depend upon IIltern;tlional political ,Ign'emelll between states over the nature or tilt' Illtenlauonal monetary regIme that IS to operate. AmI this agreelllelll will not be one between equais. The bIggest powers, or perhaps even one slllgie I)ig power, can lay down whal the reg-lIlle will be. All the olher slates will be 'regime takers', rather than 'regime makers',;
'nil' Brt!lfo/l Woods R"g/lI//'.Iil/·/II/I'l'IIflfu}//a/ Mo/u'/(I/)' (/1/11 Fil/al/Clal RI'frlflOlIS
The concerns or Keynes and Dexter 'WhIle III theIr dli.n-ts to constJ'llCl a new IIHernauonal monetaf\' systcm for the postwar workl were to CllnstJ'lICl arrangcments whIch would privilege IIlternaLJonai economic dcyciopmelll. ThIS required a predictable and stable internatIOnal monctary regIme that would be nIie-based and would not be mal1lpulal)le by powerful states ((II' mercantilist advantage. They there/c)re )'(!talnecl gold as the anchor of t.he systcm - a monc\, separate from the currcncy of allV natlOIl-state. Ane! tllcr laid dowll that thL' dollar wuuld have ItS price Iixe(1 againsl gold, Other states lhen Iixed theIr currency pnces agamst the dollar and were not allowed to unilaterally change lhat pricc as they pleased. Changes 111 currcncy prices woui(1 he settled co-operauvely between states through a supranatIonal body, Llll' International Monetarv Fund, which would be obliged to acccpt the change 111 a currency's par value only if it was needed to correct 'fundamental disequilibnum' 111 the Slate's currcnt account (mainl\' concerned wILh track). The allll of these arrangemcnts was to ensure tllat econOllllC operators enJoyed stability III the pnces of the mall1 currencics agalllst each olher since all were fixed at a gIven pnce agalllst gold. In practice, the dollar \"
·C:\I'IT:\1.
~I:\RKETS'
AND INTERNATIONAl. MONEY
Ii
Private finance was allowed to transfer flll1cb for the purposes of Iill
IX
TI IE (;1.( lH,\LJSATII >;-,: (;..\\1I\1.l.:
lO exert surticiellL politlcalllJllul'nce In establish thelllsein's as all oIFshon·. prl\'atc lin;JIlnal n'lItre alld acqlllrt'c\ ~ro\\'lJIg slglliliclIlCL' III till' I ~H)()s throl1~b t he so-called Eurodollar alld EUJ'o-\)olld markels, .-\nd the gnJ\l"Lh of I.OJlcieHl and oi" US banks ;lIlcl 11llll11nallollal curlInrcglllatL'CI IIHenl;1l101lal
porations operatillg wllh ()n~shore funds created growing spl'clIlaIIH' prcssure~ agamsi lht' Ihetl"ll Woods sysll'1Il or lixl~d bIll ;lctjusI;lbk t'XCIl;lIlgl' ratcs 111 tile 19fiOs. The Nixon acilllllllSlrallol1 's refusal to an'cpt the BrellOIl Wooris disClplinc of reCJlIlI'\l1g thc US to relll;tlll 1Il surplus was.llIstilh'd by till' arg-ulIlt'lIt that JL~ ele/int was G1l1sc
ill
order
\0 Sl'I/.L'
markcl
sharc from US COl1lpalllCS and challcngc American industrial capllalislll. \"'illl thiS arglllllclH !l sough I In .luslilY I\:'i c:lmpaigll III the e;lrl\" 1970.~ \0 scrap till' cClll.rallllSlllullClIlS of the Brelton \\'ooc.\s rq{IIlH:.~
NO/I's I. Tilt, I,'PII 'royalll' n",'rs IlIll·rl.·'I. !-(rolllld relil. lax"s, lill;lIln,!I 'l'n'ln' "',., ;lIul dinlit-lids. i II' refns III IllII.\I· arlll·lIil·., IlIal 1' .. "'111 ... · IISe-\'IIII"S. Nol all such pr",III<:ll
II,,''''
lalt.'S the :-,can'h of conlpaulI."s aud g'U\'('flllIH.'Jlh
Jr)J' 1)(1~'{~rs
of IJu'Ir Ulrl"nll~" o( .. 11;lrcs 411'
hllllds: 111l' \)IIH"I".' hOI\"(' Iho' sail-I)' III' klll1l1"llIg 11t'1l Ilto'\' elll St-II tllI'l" IIIHI
===============3=============== The DolIar-vVaIl Street Regime
The New Intcntational Monctary System Crcated in the 19705 T/t<: collapse 1// cClilral pillars o/" Ihe BreI/oil \I'(lo(h rq.':-IIII(" ill lire e;lrl"
1970s has Onl'1l IWe'1l prl'sl'llted, /)0111111 the US alld III oliln COlllllnl'S, as some S()rt or defeat for a weakellecl ,-\menGIII capllalisJIl, Ill\'oh'llIg the breakdowll or ils /;l\'ourccl IIllernallollal 1ll()Ilt'tary order alld a slide Inlo a chaOtlC'IHlII-S\'slelll , Bill thL' reality was n::rv differellt. Tlw Nixoll adlllllllslralloll was delerlllllWcl 10 bl"e;d, (lul oj' ;1 sci of IIlStltlllioll.tli~l'd al"l"'lI1gelllellls which limited US r\OIllIIl,lI1l'l' 111 IlllerllatiOIl.tlIJJOllel;11"\' poiHIe; III ()rder 10 eSlablish a IWW regmll' willch would gl\T II lIIoll0cr;tllC powel" oyel" illtel'llaU(lnal 1ll00H:l"ry ,dIlIrs, LiS capnal \\,;IS Indeed IKlng challenged!)\' It.~ c.l()J(;tlist riyals ill (Jroc!llCllllarkc,ts at Ihl' lillie, The breaklip or llw BreltOIl \V()()ds syslem was part or a Sl.ralq..,'Y for reslol"lIlg lhe dominallce of US clpIlais throllgh !tlnllng the Inlerllallollal lllolH'lan S\'Sll'll1 II1l0 a dollar-st.mdarcl regillle, \\'c will nol SII I' \'(:1' lhl' dc/ails oj' Ihe 1I11el"lI'llll1l1al mOIH'I;II'I' LTl.~IS or !lie lall' I ~)(l()S and earh' I Q70s, I ThelT \\'tTl' two cleUSI\T 1lI01lH'II\S III the sLOJ'\', The firs\. was Nixol1's deCISion to cut the link twtweell lhl' dollar and g'lIlrl in :\ugUS( 1971, And lhe second was till' oi! price nsL' 111 tlH' allltllllll 0(' I ~)7:\ auri Ille wav III whll'h lhe finanCl.tI cClIlseqlll'lH'l'S or lh,lI pnn: rise wcn,' handled bl' the Illalll \Veslern P()\I'l'rS,
TIII'/l/llIIp:llmlllJlI
flllIf
'\11'111'1"""1/(1111' /)(Jllrn-\\flll .\/,./,I'I III'P,'IIIlI'
The ,\ugust 1971 deCISIOn to 'dose Ihe g-o!cl Wllldull' lIIeallt lhat the USwas llel I()n~er slll~fel'l til the disnplint: ha\'lng- to liT 10 m;lIlItall1 a (ixed par "aim' urlhe dollar ag-alllsl !-{olrl 01" all\'lllIlIg'l~lsl': lll'olllrl let the dollar lllOW as lite US Tn~aslll'\' Wished and pOlllter! tl)\\',lrrb !II(' l'l'IIlO\, .. i or gold rrOIll
or
f ~J
TILE (;1.01\:\(JS ..HIOS
(;:\\Il~U:
IllIernthers, it IS Olle thlllg 1\l s;lCrifin: Sll\'l'!'l'lgI11Y )I) till' lI1ll:rests or illlerclepenclellce; Jl is gl1lte another when the rcla!.iol1slllp IS one way, Tht' difrerence IS tllat between the EEC and a cololllai empll'e The ract IS lilat acceptallce or a dollar standard Ilccessari\1' Illlplil'S a dCgl'l'L' or aSYllIlllell,\, tn power whtch, ailhough II netarv OHler was de"d and the whole negllLJalJoll lizzled (JUt. The Nixon admil1lstrallon thus g"ined its dollar standard and III tlte lIphe;l\'ais or the early 1~170s lIlCl'easlllg lIulllbers or coulltnes were r01'(L'(\ lu al)anclon attempts to matlltalll I1xeci exchange rales bl'lWeell their currellCles and the dollar. ThiS sUlte(t the US admlnlstratioll because 11 wisIH:r1 to furce a I-evalualion on other states and could now do so throu.!4'h Us own polin' for the dollar. ThiS was all enormousl\' IIIl]Jortanl developmellt, because, Il'r rcasons whlell we will disCI ISS i"lel: LIlt' LIS ~O\'L'I'n111elll COUld, alone amol1g governments, mOl'e the cxchange price of the dollar ag;lll1st OLilCl' CUITenCles hy huge amoul1L<; witholll sullenng the econOllllC cOllsequences that would bce other stateS wlll(:i1 attempted to do the same_
or
The NiXOJl adlllllll~l.rallnIl s ~ecolld :step was to tn' to ensure thaI. Illternallunal finallCial relations should be takt:n out 01' the cOlltrol oj" state central banks and should be Incn.:aslI1giy n~lltrcd UplllJ pl-i\'ate financial operators. It snught to achlc\'c thiS go.allhrough explOltlng US control over IIlternatlOnal oil supplies_ It is still II'ldeh' bclkvecllllat 11ll' sharp and stecp IIllTl'asC III oil prices III 197:~ was cllned mIL h\' lhc Gull' ~Iates as pari oL\Il '1IIl1-lsrael and allll-llS polin' cOJ1llectcdtll Ihc \!J1ll Kippur war, \l't as we now know, the oil prace rises were the rcslli! or us IIlllucncc on the oil states and the\' wcrc ;lIl' ahllllt n'lTding the pl'trod'lllars \\':lS pari of a wIrier (ll-ball' among thl: malll capllalist powers over whelller 10 scrap IlIllTllallon.1I ·finallClal reprcsslOlI' and the system oj 111.lllltallHng cOlllrol "vcr internatlona[ (inanClal ll10vements firmly III thl' ilands or lllc celltral hallks or states, In
TIIF. i;1.( m\l.IS,\TIU:-: L \ \ 1\1 \'F
these debates. willch took place \\'Ilhlll Ilrc I",IF, tlie US \"as ClJlllpktl'lr ISOI;Heel, a~ all other g-o\"t'rlll11L'lIts as WL'1l as rllC 1i\IF stall \\';llltl'd tu ret;1I11 SlI"Jl:t C()IHrols oil pnvale IJlICrllallull;lllillalln;t/IlI()\'Cllll'Jlh,7 But till.' US I{ol lis IVa,' throug-h unilaleral actlOm, SUpplcllll'I1I.l11g' the pl'trociollar 1I11l"l' Willi iL'i own abolilloll 111 197-1 orreslnclIolls Oil liw ilulI" orl"llllds IIllu alld 0\11 of lhe US (known, IIllhc.larg-oll, as lhe alllllilioll or 'GlpllaJ Ctllllrots'), IllS Irue thallhe Nixon adlllIlllslralloll was able to expluil a hreach III Ihl.' Brelton Woods svstCIll that ha{1 alrcady l'Xlstl'd SJlICl' lhl' I ~):i()s: the IJllernalion.II role of lhL' CilY or I.oJldOIl III Ilnannal Irallsacllolls, Bnlalll\ gO\'enlIlH:lll hac! 'I\lowcd lhc Cill' of I.olldon to "Pl'l';lll' as all ' on~sh()n: ccntre for interna\lollai pI'lV
Tile Nix()n stratl"/.,"· In 'Iihcratlll/.( llllernational lin:ll)cial markets was h;lscd lIll till' Idea thaI doing; so w()uld /ihl'/'(I/(' /hl' :\IIII'I'/fIlli .\/111.' /i'lllll .1//((,II/Ilbill,!!: /11 If.'
I'/'{)l/IIIIIII 111/'(tlil/I'.I.I'I'.1
(II/(/ m01l1t! .\/I'/·uK,lwlI 1111' I/(/Iil/mi I}(II(l/'/' (//II/I~
.1·la/I'. ACl'!lrdill~ to Ene HellclIle ... LIS offiCIals uuderstood ill lhe 19iOs thaI a liberalised inlcrnallonai finallClai l1lad;.ct would preserve the pn\'ilq~ccl global Iill,mnal POSilJOll or t he liS and gra~ped also that this would hcip prl'sern' tlle (Iollar s central 1I11ernatlOlIai nIle. I-1dleinl'r SIlIllS IIp the 1'1I11flallWIllai POlllt ahollt the (/\'el'all political and l'C()1l01ll1C slglliliCIIICL' the changl's: 'the baSIS or AIlH::ncIII hegelllOl\\' was helllg shifted froJII line or direct powcr over otiler states to a more market-based or ''strucILlral" 1'0n11 of powe!'. 'I~ n'" shall SlT below holl' these pr(lCL's.~l'S ;lew;IlI\, worked to strengthen the polillcal polI'er ;I1HI l..'COIlOIllIl' (Julin' I'n'ecloln till' liS. l~ul first Wl' 1I111S[ pOlllt 0111 tile slgnificallce orthe nse Orpny"te IIltern,l\JollaJ finance ror IIlternational IIHlIlctar\' relatiolls bl'tween states. ThiS nSl' altered till' hasis UpOIl ",11Icl1 g-()\·el'llllll'lll.~ 1l\;\llItallll'ci till' IIllel'll""llllal slahilitY llr tltt:lr 0\\,1) 1'111'r('lInt:s: 1I11c1t:1' the old Ikclloll \Voods S\'slelll, Ihl' I);ISIS !'t,.. a UIITt'IICY'S stability was c1oseh'w:d Imlh to Its trade balallu' and to the altitude orllll' I;\·IF and or the gO\'l'rnll1enls (central hallks) or I he III a III Cilpllalist powers towards the gO\'l~rllmelll or Ihl' ClHUHI'" 11\ trade bal'lIll.T dillinlllll's. SI.lIes Wllh slIrplll~es 11II lhelr CII]'J'l'1I1
or
or
TIlE
(;J.()B;\I.ISATI()~
(;;\:>11\1.1-:
(in,lIloal Illarkets, Tlnl$, the 111..'\,' IIIlernal1()naIIllOIlL'tar\' arrallgt'll1ClllS gave the llJ1lted Slales goYc)'nJJ}ent Ell' more IIllhll~nCL' over lhl.: nllCl'natlollal monetal'r and linancial reiallolls 0(' the world I han Jl had el~I0\'ed IIllcit:!" lhl' Brelloll Woods rules, It could ('reeh' decide I he price of I he doll;lr. Slall" wuulcl become Illcn::aslllgh' dept' ndell t upon ch:velllpllll':l1lS III Augl (JAml'ncan finanCIal markels ('or managlllg their IIlternallonal 11l00Wlar\, reialiolls, And trcnds In these lin
celltre 01' the riollar area or to raIse hlllds !11 111011 centre. In this way, tile strell~lh or Wall Street has rellllllrcerl the dOll1inance of the dollar ;IS an illlt"l"nallollal c1Irrel1c\".I:1
Tht'/~'({JII(JII/I(
olld Polil/ml Sign Uim II 0' ojDol/o/" Sf'If!,"1I101"tlgt'
Tht" t"COlloIl1IC and poliLJcal SIg"lIiliclIll"e of" IhlS 1Il'1\' reg"lInc Gill he appn:datcd olll\' wilen liT understand the rllle or sCIg"1lI0rag"c 111 ~I\'lnl--\' till: American ~o\'ernment an Ill1ll1ensei\' potellt polillcal IlIstnll1lelJl ill the rorlll or the new reg-lIlle. A, We sa\\" when Wt' IIlltiall\" discllssecllnlerllalloJ\aJ Illonl'\', a state has to aC[[lllre ("unds or internationallv acceptable 1l10lWY III order lCl be ;Ihle ttl pay for goods and services from al)J"oad. To t;\l,e an extreme example. few pl'Opk: WOlllel acccpl pa\,lllcnt frolll Chad ill Chad's own c1Irn:nc\,: II would be IIseless 10 all but a handful Ill' people Oll\Slde Chad. So Chad has to carn (or bOITO\\,) an IIIternalJonal ClIlTellcr. sal" till: c/ollar, he/clre l[ can bu,' anythlll).!; ("rolll al)roa(1. Ul.lt tillS hUg"e COllstralllt IS IIIJI1-exlstentlor the US ullder the ncw, p"st-Bn:uon ',Voods lIJ1ern
or
or
TIlE (;I.()I\,\l.IS,\TI();\; (;;\;>'IIII.E
Ihat, hann,!!; gre;ll lTOlI0!111C cO!1sequences ror Ihl' resl or Ill!' lI'orld while till: US n:111a111S cushiolled rrol1l the conseqllcllcesthal would applY to olher Slall'S,I,'
The Nixon acilllllllstralioll's ,'IClo)"" III 'liberallllg" lhl~ ,-\lIglo-.-\IIIl'ricali pri\';IIt: \),lIIkJllg sYSll'!11S for lI11eI'Il;lllllll,ll operations hold 11)111' kel'l'IlcClS. Firs!. It suddenly catapulted prIvate ballks mto lhe celltre or illtcrna1.l011al finallct', pushing OUI the earlier dominance oj" llie CCIII)";11 hanks atld kd C]1lIc\dr In thc 1I1lern;ILlonal cloll1l1l.lIlce III' the Anglo-AmerlGlII finanCial S\'SleniS aile! AmerIcan linanClai operators. Secondly. Illlpt:ncd lip all t'nllrnl()US holl' ill lhe public stipernSICIIl ililt'rllatlonallill:lndal operalors, Tlllrdlv.IlII1'IC!ttile financlai systems anelexchange I-atcs ur ollwr Slall's, eSIlL"Clilllr C(JUlllnes of the South, lllcreaslllgl\' vulnerable 1O dc\'elopmcnls III the .-\lIlenCall (inrJ.: do bUSiness witll pcopk Iinlll all O\'CI' lhl' wodrl. Funds 1I0\\' (lut f"rOlll and back III to lhosl' t\\'O n'llll'l'S ('1'0111 most ("{I \ II II i'll'S or the world. Bllt thiS docs 1111/ (// aI/mean th,11 all Ihl' lillilnl'1i1llllar);,l'L~ of tile world arc l\llilied III a single, IIltq{rat.ed finallcial markt'l. On till: (011 t rar\'. linallCl,t\ marKets n:mallll'c\ - ;l1Ic1largel\' slill n:l1lalll - rompanllll'llla\iwd, not only between COltlllneS bUl even Wllhlll COlllllnes: we call sec thiS if Wl'
or
or
or
rcalisc titat eVen \\'1 till II Eurolam[ arter the launch or Ihl' cum Iherc will slill hc ,~nhsl"IlII;I1 b:IITIL'r,o; lU thc full Integl'allllll of fillallClal lllarkets, BUl what did happl'1l III till' 19iOs was thaI I,Olldull alld Ncll' \i.II"\;, operators did bq~ill to eSlal)Iisl1 linkag"cs bctwcen their international liIlallCial lIlarkcts and I1allonallin:lIlcial s\'stellls around the world which wen' far slrollg'er than ill Ihl' 191i(Js, The CXP:1I1SIOIi ur thcst' II lIC I'll a lIollai pm'ate Ii (lallnal operal1oIlS call bc appreciated /)\' conlpanll~ thc SIZl' or intern:tllollal ballk loans and bOlld lellclin~ hctwl'l'n I ~17:1 and I~l~)(): hank iO;lIlS rosc froll! S,(() hillioll in I ~17:i 10 wcll O\'lT S:~/J() billioll lw I \)!HJ; dllrlng thc salllC pcnoel bond lending rose almosl lCllli)lcl. froll\ S 19 billion to ow... S 170 hilliuII, TOIl!;. or a g;!ollll{ lin:lnoallll:II'kc!. rathcr thall or the JIlncaSIIl~ JIll1uenu~ or thc Amcrlcan lin:tllCJ;d markct ovcr othcr nalloll:iI linanCial llJarkets, ubscures the powcr dillH:nslon us linanciai dOIllIll;!nCe, Those who belicvl' lhat the ;Jr\il'ClI\'e 'Allll'lIcan' IS l!"l\'lal or e\'l:n redundant should ask thcmselves a Simple qucstion: would Ihe\', theil, hc C]lJItc happy Ihllll an l'COIWJllIC :IIHI polilJcai pnJllt of'ncll' if' thc IIllerllalJonai iillallclal SVSIl'Ill was dO)1lIIJ;ltcC( hy tIll' lllark\'ls and "pl'l-awrs or Cllilla or Iraq, .I"S1 so IOllg as thc\' could oner similar kinds of crcdit or other lillallcial services Oil Similar terms to those on,Vall Street? Btl! III lllakl' 11ll' pOlllt IllllCh llIorc directlY. \n~ GlJ) slIllph' lIole 111;11 hccause thl' ,-\mcrH.:an lill;lllnal lIlarkct:-. h"n: bl'L'1I dOJlllllant \\'Ilhlll lhc hierarchlcai IIctworks or finanCial markets. access to that market. dilTer('nt kinels or linka!!;es I)Cl\Wl'1I natiollal eCllllOllllCS alld th:11 market. and prlCl: m()\,Clllelll~ WJlillJl tilat Illarkct. have had enonllOllS eCl 1l101i1iC {/ lid /J(}{illmf Sl~lIiIiGliln" The stun' SII1Cl' till' I~J7()s has hecl! om' or ).!;roWlng pressure rrom Ihl' \\'all Sirecl celllrl' \0 wcakell thc barncrs to IlS pCllclr:lIJ1l11 IlllO r\OIl1CSliC lill:\IlnOli svstCJll~, This pressure has a lnpk targcl: lirs!. III rl'I11(l\'l' barners 10 tIll,' In'L' !lo\\' 01 funds III t)lIlh c1irccliolls betwcl'1l \\':111 Strel'1 :lIld pn\'atc operators wlllllll the tar),{ct slate: second, lIJ gl\'C full ng'hts 10 Wall Street operalors LD do buslncss WJlhlll tile lillallnal srstl'll1S alld eCOlltlJIIIl'S of Ihe largct stales: am! ltllnl/v. 10 redl'slgll lhl' linanuat S\'Sll'IIIS of larget stales III Iii III with lhc husiness stratq{ll's or Wall Street operators ,lIld or tilelr All Il'J'IGUl cJ i Cll ts (lrallsllatJ ollal rorporallllils. mollt'\' marh:.e I III III LJal I'll nets, etL), or course, Wall Strn:l alld I.olldon ha\'e 1I0t haci a ll1ol]()polv, Tok~'o has ~r()\\'1\ ami SOllll' (If till' hl!!;!-(csl linallcial opl'rat()rs ;Ire .Japallese, Frankfurt, Zunch. Pans. Hong Kong and Singapore arc: all IInpo)'\anl. nut 1I01l!: or 11,,:sl' other Cl'lltrc,~ as rct COilles dose Itl Iwallillg tile ,~II.C or Wall Streel ;lI1d l.ondoll, allcl III liJl
or
or
THE (;IDII:\I.IS ..H\ON (::\1-([11.1-:
unreg-ui,IIl'(l nalun: of thl' London and Wall Stn:et operatDrs, .slll'll rel-{II1a1101l as eXlSleci aIllounted onlv LO-rather \'ag-ue, non-Ieg-a\ g"tllClelines ag-rced bv CCIltl';li ballks III tile Han\;. Ii,,' InltTllatiollal Setllellll'nL~,I' This, 1()~l,thlT \\,tlh s(;lh: a(h'antages, 110t Oil!\, lI1alI1t,\lIH:ci Wall Street's elo11llllance 11111 started a corrosive process or uncil:rmllling the pulllic regulation linanciai opel"llors lIIJI[,illlllhtT s\ales, as l)PI'I~ltors there CSl'OII)L'c\ Illfsilol'e thl'lll~eh't:s Ii. ClllllPl'Il', lillllld "'a\'S arounci local rLiles anel exerted pressures on their g"on:rnIllt'lliS 10 liheralise III order to enaiJie them to cOIllpete ag-ainst Wall Street. ,\s wt' ~;\\\' lls for baJlking SI'stellls if hanks operOlLJllllS an: allowerl to go llllreglliated, Unbridled competition between l1anks leads them III uJlllpcle wllh cach other to the pOlI1tof collapsl" Bllllwcallsc III' till' dll11l1l1anCe of\VOIII Streel III prmHe Illte1"nal\onallinallce, what COIl1PCll 1I011 , what regulalloll ;lnd what IJ)ternatlOnal arrangements ror ballks bcco111J11g 1I1sol\'elH sh()uld he establisiled becanll' C)ueStiullS iar).!;eI\' \1\ tiw hands or Ihl.' AIlH:rican gm'ernmcnt, III alliancl' with the Bnllsll amhonties, If lhe US goverllment dlOSC not to rcgulate, It became extremel\' dinicult (()I. tlw other Jl\;\!l\ cap\l;\lis\ Slates til m',lln\O\m their regulatllP' fr;1Il1c\\'Olks, II' Iht, LIS cleclded to reg-ulate, other banking aUlhonties woulel follow SUIl, bUI the US could still large'" dictall' the form and scope of reg-ulation, Thus a whole challl reafllOn or eJTects ,\I1e1 pn:~sl1res Oil l1anking systems around thc "'lJrlei was lInieashed by the dCClsions taken in 'Vashing-LoII, l.{'t us I1lenUOI1 some or these cham rCOlcllons, First, thl' LIS Fcderal Rl'snn: (ollld largel\' dictate the !cl'eis or international interest rates through 11100'IIIg US domestIc II1terest rates, It could thus determine the costs 0(' credit 1I11cr1l00lionalh', with clIormollsly po\\'crli.t1 clfects (Ill olh,'r CCOI\OIllll'S, ~\'hl'1\ 1J1lernauonai pn\,.lle credit IS chcap, economic operators \\'Ith access to cheap int!:rnational credit stan pn~lecL<; wInch seem viable 1I\ the currellt conditions, Bill if lIS clCClSI()~l" suddenly makc [rt'elil \'cn' expellSlye, rUlHlamen[i1Il,' sound cl1lcrprises may finei themsel\'es gOlllg bankrupt bccause or a sudden contractIOn of ch<:ap credit. And an IIItcrnational IinatlClal S\'stem dClIlIIIl;lll:d by lhc US lillanclillmarket C;l1l s\\'lJ)g wildh', lJ\'ersllpplnng credit at DIll' mOlllelH anel dramatically [ontracl.mg it at another, To make mailers worse, tIll' tempo or the LIS bllsinl'ss Cycil: is IInpossihle 10 predict \\'1111 an:urac\, ,HId the directIOn or us polio' IS equalh' Impossible to prcdiClI)l'C
or
TIlE [)OI.L\R-\\':\1.1. STREET REl;L\IE
inlernalionaliinaJlnaJ ope:rarors, whethc:r, as III Iht' I 97()s, the~' ;lrc the bigUS lllOne:\'-Cl'ntre cOllll11el"Cial h'lliks or wheLher Lhev :II'C the IIIVeslll\cnt banks or Iwdg-e fllnds of the I 991ls, \Vhell tillS happl~JlS, ellDrllloliS compelitive pressures an: piaCl'ri UpOl1 linanCial operators elsewhcre, and they prt:ssurlse theil' go\,crnments to rcl:tx LllL'll' reg-uialllllls, or lind "'aI's of l'\"ading what rq~lIlaLi()ns eXIst. The cry IS oftcn heard III WashlIlglOlI thai for Lechnologlcal or other reasons rq.{ulauon IS IIllpossible, Blll when IL slIits \Vashlllgloll to IIItrll(IIICl: rq-\,lIlatlOll it has hccll showll to 11:1\'1.' he:l'1l ahlt: to acllle\'e it, with n:markahIe ease, This was shown wllh the so-railed Hasle: Accord of 1988, lavlIlg down ),.{11I(lelilH's 1'01' ll\tenlal1onai hanklng SIIPlTvlslon. Thc Hash' :\n:ord was acillevcd I.hrollgh the LIS governlllellL i()rtlllllg all alliance: wllh l.ondon fi.JI' ;lJoint Anglo-Anwrlcall n:glllalOr v rcgllllc, ThiS was e:IIClllgh to ensure that allothcr OECD g-O\,CrIlllll:nts w(lui£! COIlll' tugethl'l to estalllish ;I COllll)lOn rl'~II11C, The rl'sultlllg rq~tllatorl' reglllle has blTll a 'gellticlllcll\ agrecnH.'llt' skcwcd towards scrnng- LIS I11len.'sts ~incl' II g-ivl's all ballks an IIlcenl1\,l' to prIvilegc tht: huying- or g-ovcrnllll'llt bonds, a presslIlg US Iwe:d, gl\ocn ItS g-o\'(:rnIllCll!'s IIlrlchlcdnc:ss, and a diSlllccnu\'l' to knrl to IIlrillstry, TIllS Accord cienlOllstralnlJllsL ho\\' easy It IS for slalcs to rq~lIlalt' illtlTlI,ltional JinanClallllar),els, on olle condition: thatthc rcgu\;lliol1 IS dOIll' II'llh US support. IH TllIrdl\' and "t'ry IIl1pOrlalltl\', liS g-m'crnlllcllIs discon dunllg thc l.atin Aml'rIcan lI11el'llall!lnai linanClal Crisis OIl the st,ln or thl' 19HOs and it ",as a soil ItHlIl "'lIh rl'all" Illajor l'CIlIHIIllIl' and plllilIcal slgllilicancc, We will rl'tllrn to Ihis expericnCl' lall'!'. :\\ thc sallie III Ill' , th~' US ~ll\'(' .. nmclll
lillka~es will! Ilatlollallillan("lal systems, IJrl'akilll!; c!0\\'1l barners to lill' thickelllllg Ill" linkages with clOllle~llC finallClal S\'SlcIllS, these latter would lend to slip ollt of' Lite cOlllrol of' Ihelr dOll1estic slall'S, III a lTISIS WiLhlll a lIallonai finanCIal S\'Slell\, Ihl' ;\lllerll'all Sl;lll' IIsel!' 1'1)\11(\ open LlH: whole capItalist svslelll dll' stale cOilcerlled 10 IWlIlg rC-ell). pneered in the llHcn'sls Amencan capllalislll,l"
could stl'l:nglhen Its ~late
or
or
1/1/' US ([ /If! G/o/1fI1 Mfl //([W'III/'III JUSL as llle slate plays a ce III ra I role III dOlllestlc Illonclan' al1cl finallCial aIr'llrs, "'llether the dOIlH:SlIC l"eJ,!;ll11e IS Ke\'lll'si;\ll III strllt'lllre or IH.'o-lilwl ai, SO the lllalll slates Of Slale piar a Cl'lllral role ill InLern:ll1ollalnlOlleLary and finanCial amurs . The hlet that Lhese COllllllllal political 1I11l'rVellliol1s III these celltral aspeCls or the ll11erlla110ual eCOll()II1Y lelld nol III rl'~lsl.'r III Illllch u/" the literature 011 IIlterllatlOllal CCIIIIOlllU':S IS the result or ideol, >g'Ical blinkers, alllhe more powerrul 1'01" hemg entrellched in the profi.:sslClnal aGldemic divlsioll o[,lahour bctween polillcal SClellce and t'CtliHIJIIKS. TIlt':-'l' blinkers arc evidcnt III lhose delinlllolls oj" glohalisatioll ",filch slIggest 11 IS a purely tcchno-CC0110llllC force llot olll\' scpanllc froJl1 slat<:-polillcal colltroIs but InimICal lo thel1l . Bu\. these blinkers arc n'mforced also Iw the f;ll"l Lhat sll nl',ll'" parcclkd out between Slates, To pul. 11 lIlildly. political IJlIlIICIlCl' III lhese otll lhe new, posL-Nixon reglllJ(: was that lh~' US was ~till (j\'c\'\"hdlllIJlgh' dOllllnallt bUlllOlll was l10t cO\lsLralned bv rules. The Dollar-\Vall Sireet ReglJol...' ha~ been a hlL Iikc the Brlllsh COl1SlItlIUOIl: til{' c!llIllln,1I1l pm\'l'!' has hn'll abi~ to make lip lhL' rules as H weilL along, The liS could dende lht: doll'lr price and IL could also ha\'(~ lhe dcciding Illllllellu' Oil thl' c\'olvlJlg' dVn
thl' USA tl) the colle[\1\'e gioballlllcre"t? Or -;1 third pm'\ihilily - would the US gO\'l:rlllllCllt steer a tlllddle course, and Sl~t up a rlJllq.~tate board the lllalJ) capitalist states III a more or less large (or small) oligarcIw III whirl\ the liS WOllld c()lllpr()llIl~e /IS lIallollal IIIlerest to SIlIlIC eXlel)l for the colleru\'e g-ood of the olig'archv? The atlSI\'lT IS that the Utllted States ,l!;()\'Crnllwll!. has dOlle Its constiLUlIollal duty, It has pili ;-\nll'f1ca first. Thc whole pU1I1I uf the NixUIlIllO\'C.:S to destro\' the Breltoll Woods system and set up the Dollar-Wall Strect Reg'imc /11({,\ 10 {1ll1 flllll'f/mll jinf, Thcre IS a straightforward test titat Gill bc applied to dl'leClthc dirertioll IJ) whICh US polin' has bCl'1l applied, I-las the lIS sought to cstablish rules .\lld Il\stnllllellts ('or thc cllectln.: public managelllent or lI11crnatlOnal moncv and 1l1lCnl
or
I)
Thcrc IS a VCl"\' sll'ong 11IterllallOnai IlItcrcst III IIllerIlallollallllllllctary slabilil\', YetIIlSIl"ad, Ihe D\YSR has Sl'l"Il Illl' prIlT Ill' lhl' m:lln 11Itl:rll;ll/ollai UIITCllC" dnvcll lip and d01\'1\ III wild SWlllgS wIlhoUI hlstllncal prccedcnt. swing-s lliallllakc C\'CII the I~J:10s look likl' all era of'relatlH' IIH>Ill'l;lry COllIn! Thls l'xtraonlillar" \ui;] tj Ii 1\' has bcell the product of (ldiberate US polin' ;lIld Washlllg-ton s rt,rusal to work towards a stable, rlIie-lJasl'd SYStClll, Puhlic IlIauo-n:g-lIlalloIl of lhl' StippI\' or en'dit \\'1111111 the \,'odd l'CIII1om\' to CIlSlIrc some measure or stabililY: Illstead IlIterllatlOll"lllo",s of. rredit ha\'e S\\'llIIg I\'ildll- rrolll O\'lT-SlIppiv to chaotIC cOlltr:IClIOIl III crcle after q'cle, agalll ovcrwllchllill).!;l\' bccallsl' \,Vaslllllg-ton ha~ Wished mallcrs to bc handlerl III lhls wa\" Public lI\icr()-rq~ulaLl
or
~)
:l)
,I)
or
A Illllll\wr Ill' allth() .. ~ Ilan' slIf!;l!;cstcd that tlte subscflllcllt hlSlof\' of l;S illll'J'l1allonai 1111l11ctal".' and JinanClal polin' has hcell 'holll1d b)' thL' J'lIles of' co-operatll'c oligardw wnh thc rest of the (;7, Bllt the c\'lcil'llcL' \llI' thiS IS extremel" weal;, a~ regard~ thc Ill\ nlL'an till' l;S iL~l'\r has ,H\OpICll a colleglale ;Ipproacll, SOIllL' authors havc p01l1tcd to the supposedlr great ~lgl1ilicallce oJ'tllt: I ~)7H BOIlIl SlIllIllllt as an lI\~tancc oJ' co-operau\'c polin'-makmg,:!'1 It \\,;1', hut 111 thL' rorm or Gennan\''s govcrn IlICIl t agrl'clllg to do most or what the liS gm'el'nmcnt w:tnwel, And whatL'\'er co-operative Splt'lt thcre "';IS III Llle Carter acimllllSl.raUOIl yal1lshed undcr Reagan,:!1 The strollgest claim liJI' colleglalltv III 11Igh monelar" poiillcs concerns th..: Plal',
TI-IE DOI.UR-\\';\1.1. STREET REGltllE
This, thelL Imllgs u~ to a fillal question: if" US polin- o\'cr Illlt'rnational IlHllletan ;lIlCi linallCial affairs has g()\'CI'lIc
TIlt' /JW,l,iN
tiS (/
,')/·IFSII,\'ir/llllllg R"gllll(!
We arc no\\' In a posllioll to II01ice 1111: palll.:rn of 1i.lnrLllll1il1g Ill' the DWSR, The (Iollar IS thl' II1lerllational 11101le\' to ",hlch all other convertihle cllrrcncies arc lillJ;.t:rl Iw exchan~t' rates, The :\Illencan govcrnment chooscs Ilot to sl'ck liXl'cj l'xc:llaJ1~l' ratcs wltll the otller malll cnrrcnnes, Sllllt' thal would rCC]L!!re lh!.' US go\'(:rlllllcIlL to gwe lip II.~ USt' or tilL' (Iolbr pnce as:In IIIStrUllIenl for achie\'lng- olher goals, Thereforc, undcr till' rcgllllL'. thc dollar Jll()H~S 111 g-re:ll gnallons up and down ag'alI1sl the olher ClIITl'nCles, lIlIed\' lranslc'l'Il11llg (hell' trading and other l'\1I'I1'Onllll:IJlS, c\ml WIUlln Ihcse macro-swings there IS conSlanl1l1ICro-\'olatilill', Slalcs and eCOllonl1C 0pcI'alors around Lill' world must stnlclllrill\" adilpl Ihl~lr operations \11 tIllS constant macro- alld nllcnl-I'lllalilitv of the dollar or risk \';II'lOlIS kinds uf domestIc cconOl111C imbalance or criSIS, At IIll' same Ilmc_ Ihe Al11l'I'Ic.\11-doll1tnatecl illlcrnilliollajlinilnCI;tlmarkct ;lIlcllt.~ prI\,atc linancl:li operators IIlllTClClto ;Ill eyer-~reatel' extcntll'llh the II1IernallOllal 11l0llctar\, relations of Ihe dollar systel11, The dollar's c\ol11i1I;\IICt' :\S tilt' IIllel'll;ll\ollai LlIlTCIIC\' IlIcal\.' thai st;ltes build IIJl l'un.·lgn exchange reservcs l11alllil' III dollars, Exchan~e rale lllrbulcllct: l11t:ans thaI states wlshJI1~ 10 Iry to mallllain thc siahilit\, of their own ctIlTCIlc\' nccd I;\r~cl' I'l'SCI'\'es lhall Ilefon', Thcse I'l'st'rves aH~ plan'r.lll1 Ihl.' LIS (in.HILlal Illad:cls (such as US TreaslIn' bunds) bccause tlll'll' liqUldill' I11cam the funds can easily bc wllhdrawn for exchange rate stahilisation purposcs, AI lli(' same lIll1L', \Vall Strcel offers litt' most CIII11PClltI\'C tcrllls for l{m'el'IlllIelllS \\,Ishlllg 10 borrow mllller j'OI' \'anOllS purposl's (including- dcfcnding
Til E (;J ,( )1\:\I.IS:UIl IN (::\\II\U:
their CIlITl'IlClCS) and it offers I!t:\\' IIlSI.I'IIIIICIIIS so lhal. !4O\'erllllll'llts alld l'COI\I lillie lI\>l'i',llurs Gill lackle probll'lll~ "f CXCh
or
or
cnses, As 11ll' Wall Slt'eel eCOIlOII1ISl Helin' [.;,aul"man POIIIlS 01lt, national linallC\.r1 cnst's han.' e!l"Il' repealedl\' troubll' ahroac!, the b'lil-ollt IS p:II<1 I'or IlOI I)\' tht' .-\llleJ'lcan laxlhe \Jurro\\,lllg- C. the SI;I\t' Cllllct'l'Iwd III list l'xport 111111 Ihe ((ollar arl'a to lind Ihe rl'sollrt'('S lil!' dl'hl St.T\KIllg', ThiS I'urther strcngthl'lIs Ihe cl'llIralily Ill' till.' doll,,!'. Tlmdly, Ihl' I'ls!;s EKed lw liS lillOlnnal llpn;ll(]\'s are \1'Hich' ('(1\'('J'ed hI' Ih ... IillF, ('lIahlillg thellJ 10 rl'!lIrll \IJ IIIlerllalIPl1al ;ICtl\'lt\' IllO!"\.' ;r~!;n'ssl\'l'k th;1Il evcr. Filially, the \\,l";tl~l'lIl11~ or lile Slates ur tilt: Somh strl'lIgIlll'ns Ihe hOlrgallllllg' power or tIll' Wall Slrl'l'l credil 1l1stllllilons III ;1111; lil!'t'lg·1l t'XCh:lIlg'l' reservl's: il was the CliITelll'\' III wlllch 7(i,H ptT relll or all IlIll'rllatlOIlOlI b;lI1k loalls were dl'IHlIllIlIa!l'CI. III which :l!J.!j per (,l'1I1 or alllllll'rll:ltiollal hOlld issues \I'l're
or
TI-IE (;1 _011 ..\1 .IS.-\T!O!'i
C'-\~III1.E
dcnOllllllatecl, aml.J.-I.:i pcr cent Dfal! ElII"OClIITCI1C\' cicposlts: the dollar alsl) served as tile 1\l\'lllcmg ClIrrCIln' 1'01' ·li,l) pCI' CCllt Dr world trac\e and W,IS one oj' thc Iwo Oll'l'enCICS III H:-; pcr ccnt or all 1()rcl~n ex('l!allge trans,lcliOI1S, Ane! il' IIltra-European transactlOlls were elilllll1atecl frOill tlll's(' ligures, Ille dollar's dOll1l11ance on:r all other transactions III the GlICI-{LlI'ICS ..,1' hstec\ ahove bccoml's ovcrwhclllllng-, - , ~
n", i)\-\-'SI? 11m/IIII'
CIJI1l 11'1I iI!JllfI (
Nollflll o/,U/'g'lll/l's
The nouon thallhere arc regimes 111 international reiauons was lirst pllt 1'111'warcl III the 19iOs bv Rohen Keohane and.loseph Nyc.:!' ;111(1 was g-I\'en IlS classIC dc:lilHlIoll b\' Stephen Kramer 111 19H:t:!K Krasncr eidilll'd reglllll'S as 'pnllClplt:s, ltorms, rllies alld deCIS(()n-ll1ai;.lJl~ procecilln:!'o .Irollnd \\'ll1ch aClOr expeclallons cOl1verge III Ll gl\'en isslle an:a', ThiS concept has become extremel\' mlluelltial III the analYSIS or international reiauol1s ;lI1el III the rllnCll()nlJl~ or multi-lateral or~aI1lSallons. Th<.' notion or re~lIne which IS used here overiaps In some respects with Kr;\sller\ notion iJlll difICrs from it III ccrtall1 fundamcntal respects. The D\VSR is a reglllle III Krasner's sellse III three I·espects. First, It c()rresponcls to the Idea lhal IIllerll;lllolla1 rc1al.lons do not consist simpl\' or states lI11eraclIng with each other In all anarcllic VOId along-side eCOIlOlIllC operators II1teracllng- \\'Ith each olher as atoms III :I wodd markct. There an." paul'I'llccl, structureri regimes ~(l\'erllmg thl'SC lllleractlOlls, The DWSR IS;1 rcgllllL' In thiS sense of an IIlterniltlonal lIleCilalllSm WhICh ,~trllU\lreS ,111(( piltterns IIlleractions. Secondly, the DWSR corresponds to the Iclea ImpliCit in Krasner's nOtion, that the slales pal'liCiPatin~ III these reg-lines ((0 so becausc the\' !ind illll their IIlterest to co-operate III the regJlllc. ThiS IS trlle also of Ihe DWSR. ThlHlIy, Krasner IS preparcci to accept that one slatc, thl: clominant state, IS often the deCISIVC and even unilateral actor III establishing'the regime: it is not to be imagined that It IS established consellsllalh' or III a COIIe~lilll~lShlOlI, ThiS IInpo~e(1 character of a re~lIl1e Gill appl\' also \0 the DWSR. Bllt hcn: thl' agreement enels, Krasner COIlCel\'eS of hiS rq.~lIl1cs as bClIIg qllasi-h:~ai in ci1araclCl', States havl'. III hiS new, come to adopt ,I sel orrlllc:-. or 1l0rll1s or pnnciples or a lixecl set or collective decislOn-llIakill~ procl'dun's. \<:1 ciollar dOllllllance alld the g()\'ernin~ or internatiollal nllTCIlCl' prices bv tile dollar exchange r;lle IS nol it quasI-legal norm or rule: Il IS ojilrl which rq~ularly rcproduces iL~c1r. All statcs thai moun laill all\' degree of cllrrenc\' convertibility partin/mil' III 1111.1);11'1: the price or their ClIlTenC\' will he lixed, direc'Ll)' or indirectly, in reial10ll to the dollar, 'states do have the 0Plloll of eXll from the regime: the\' call make their clllTenCy IIlcolI\'crtihh::, Blil il' tllt.:\·
lltl' 1I'0ricl l'COIlOI11V, And lhl' 1:ICl thal slatl's do parllclpale ill the regIme dDl'S not lIHlicatl' tll~\l lhe\" lind It bellclinal: It slmpl\' IIldkall"S tllal tlley lack I Ill' POI\'!.'I' III do allvlilmg abpUllt, The sallie applies to the other poll' 01' Ihe: regulle: tile AIIHTIGItI JinOlncial marke:!. Slaies and economic opl'ratnrs rio not ha\'e: 10 partIcipate III lhis market. The\' can aVOId placing Ille:lr reserves tlle:re:, Lhc)' can ,l\'Old borl'O\\,llIg thnt', bUL 111 prarltcc illS almost impnssibie I'DI' the:lll to avoId be:lIlg drawil III bl'l'aust' of thell' need for linance: for lhelr economIc acLiI'iLies as a whole. ,-\lId if Liw\' lIeed lo IJOIT()\\' frolll abroad. the most eCIl as the Il\Olll'lan and [inannOll framework Elcing states III theIr attempts to cOllie to grtpS \\'nh a vas I. rallge of issue areas III 111lernatlOnai and domestic polilics and eCl)lHlllllCS, AlHllile atlemptLO coniine re:gllllt'S to 'issue areas' chops realit\' lip in trll'lalis11lg ways: there IS n\J eqUivalence: ()r kllld between all IIlterllallonallegal regime ('or e:nsunng aIr safetv anei a framework rq.\"lllle like the D\VSR. A furtber problem lies 111 the fact that reglmc lheonsts will tend 10 treaL lIISlItlluOIlS like the IMFj\VB as Krasllcr-type regImes, di\'OITlng thelll rrom lhe palll"rtll'ci rq-\"ulanlics of t hc DWSR III whIch they operatl~ and which gIves llIL'alllllg [() the dVllallllcs or t Ill' I r-.I F/WB 's aCll\"1\1l'S, "-\ncl ;1 Ii 11;11 prohil'111 II'HII Ihe ].i.,raslIc)' cidi III lill 11 of reglllle:s IS thatH prl'SlIppOSl'S a se:p;lratiOIi betwel'n reglllles Oil llll' one SIde and hoth stales and lIlarkl'!.~. Yi:t the DWSR IIIdUfles as integral pans of its strllctures both stales and markets,
N,,/(',\
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================4================
The Evolution of the DWSR fr01TI the 1970s to the 1990s
The US Policy for the Evolution of the DWSR rrom Nixon to 1993 :\rter Nixoll till' stor\, (,f US adnUlllstratHlils alld the nWSR IS a Illl~t\lrl' or l\l'U strallds: lirst, allextr;u)nlillan' s{'ril's orgalllhies both with lhe dollar alld with lI11erllalloll;il pri'-,It<' lillallee. III hoth cases e~ph'J\lIIg,the reg-lIul': ;uHI sl'('oJld. a gro\\,lIlg helier ill lhe cl'lItral illlportanCe or the nWSR lill' LIS illlel'llatiOllal IIIterests alld attl'lllpts to deepell thl' D',,"SR ami radicalise It. Thest' two thelllcs hoth ill\'Ol\'l'rl;t1l approadl or -,\Il\('n('a lirst . but there was 110 COIlSIStellt 1Il;ISter plall \llltil the 1~)!J()s ;11\(( thl' (:Iintoll adlllllllslraLlol1. RatlH:'r, a str;lleglc \'ll'I\' <,1' t ht' l'l'glllll' S rule III a liS II;! lJ< 'Ilal str;l\q,'Y ~'llll.'I,!-~l'd gr;u,luall\', "hell III the Illidsl (II' crises callsl'd I)\' earlier galllbies gOlllg \\'rOllg, :\t l"'l'I'I.' stage, AIlll'I'IGIII arilllllllstraLIOlls Illallilgl'd Illl'Xpel the ('(,sts "I' these blundcrs Olllwards Oil to others and thro\\' IhcIlISl'l\'l'S 11110 Ilell' lacues \\'lllCIt ilad the dli:Cl of deLvelllllg' lhe n:glllle, ()III~' III lhe I ~)!J[)s, alld cspl.'t'laJ]\' IIl1dn the Clilltoll acllllllllstraLl<1I1. did a COllsenSliS Sl'l'llI to elllerge \\,1111111 the ,\merican Clpl(alisL rlass that IlIal'hl: at last lht'\' had disl'ol'lTcci a Illasler plan, comprchellSI\T III scupe aud \\'Ith all the t;l('lll'al illSIl'lllllelllS lil/'Ils UltllIlatI.' clIlllplell' ,O;lllTess. Bllt Ihls too, III tilt' fill'lll plIrslled hI' Ihe ClilltOl1 ;ldllllll .... traIJOn. JlI;I\' also (111'11 \lIIL to he ;lJlolher blullderlng galllhk-. Earll pll;ISL' or tillS slor\' does not end with Iht' world hack ",helT II SI;trtcd. Inslead il IS marked IJI' a COl\stant l'\'(lllIlHlIl nl'tlll' inlllT ioglC ofa nWSR L'xploilt'd III AllIlTICl11 III Ien.:sts. Thl' (:;ll'Icr arllllllllstraliOl1 \\'as atll'IIII)(III)1; III IISt';1 [Il\\' dollar to 1I1;lIlIlalll SOI11l' sort of gro\\,lh ,tralq.,'), n'lIll'ed 011 thl' lIulllstnal ~L'l lUr alld Oil IraclitlOll;ti quasl-l,enll'slall tl'Chlllfllll'S, Ikl\\'l'l.'tl 197:-> aile( I !)7~) the dollar 10Sl on... a qllarter 01' ils ,';11111.' ;lgall1~1 11ll' "L'II ;llld lhl' mark ;IS Ihl' ;Icllllllllst.rauoll sllIlgIll til hoost IIUIPIlI alld l'~pllrl.~ of lhe LIS m
40
THE
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l'vlalters changed oni\' with the Reag-all admlllistralion. The shirt III doll .. r polin' had beg-un before Reagall's eieclioll. \'\'orncd that the dollar s rail might slip Olll of control and worried about rismg inflation comhllwd with mdllslrial overcapacity, Federal Reserve Chalrmall Voicker made his EUl1o\ls tUl'n,Jacking lip IIlterest raIl'S, SWl11glllg towards a strong dollar and a drl\'(' 10 resLOre 11100\(:Y\ role as a stable stanclard orvalue (ratill:r lhall.lllsi as an mllallonary means of nrclllatlOll). These steps wcre taken much further Iw liw Reagan adl11l1l1slration. The central fealllres of the Reaganlle turn III matters of political CCOIlOIll\' were tworold: first, to put money-capital in lhe polic\' saddle ror the lirsl lime in decades; and secoll{llv to extend and exploit the DWSR III the IIlterests of Amenca First. PULLmg Il1oneY-Glpilai 111 lhe saddle 111\'oln;d squeCllllg out lIl11ation (Which eroded royalties on money-capital), taking steps to (kreguJate the banklllg and financial sector. offering IllIge tax Cllts ror tilL' nch which always boost the finanCial sector and renUer aClivllv and pursuing a high dollar policy. Indllstriai growth would he driven prinCIpally bv a great expansion of the derence budg-Cl, running an expanding- budge! deficll and SLIcking III capitai from abn)ad. ThiS aspect or policy !;ssenllallv mealll lhat the US stale was acting as a surrogate export market for the II1dustnal sector. The new domillance or 1l10Ilc\'-capllai and tile anti-inllatlon dI'J\'e was essenuallyan II1Cenl!\'c to cmplovers of capital to begl11 an assault Oil till' power, rights and seCUl'lt)' of their workers to l·cSlOre profitability. Bul Reagan's team also begall to seek to decpen the DWSR, I11lliall\' as a pragmatic set or sollllions to discrete problems. Thus, maml
{:t'lltral European debt cnses of the earh' 19HOs, Volcker did not raise IIItlTest r,lIes and suppurt a 111gh dollar ill order to produce this cnsis. It II early produceci a collapse In the LIS bankll1g- system, but in the course of mallagIIIg the cnSIS, the Reag-anites, who II'tTl' \'ery IIltl'lTsted III hrll1g-lIlg Third \\'orld capllalisllls to hed, learned SOliI{' n:ry (J0werhillessuns, The~' learued an old truth frolll the days of European llupcrialism: the llupcnal power ('ollid take acll',lIltagl' of a cOllnlJ-y's debt ensls to rC()1'J,~,II1Jse its II1ternal SOCIal reialHllIs of' produClHHl III sllch .1 wav as to ElI'our the penetration of liS own capitals into that coun trv, Thus started the use of the D\VSR to opel\ coulltnes' domestic finanCIal regll1l1:s and domestic product markets to ;\nWI'lCOIIl (lpl'rawrs, The secollCl lesson, learnl 1)1' AIllt'l'Ican finanCIal operalors, was that the kinds of long or mediUIll-term syndicated bank loans used IiII' rl'c\'c1illg the petrodollars was too ng-id SIIICe it locked the funds of these hanks tip III the btl'S or thl' bOlT01\'lng COllIlll'lt'S, Thl'l'eiill'l' the\' Slllight \.() shirt towards Illuch safer operations WillI II1terest-beal'lng- capital: lending thwugh honds !i'om which the)' could withdr,lIl' lw tradill~ them on the sccurioes m'lrkels. They also learnt that the\' couid g-CI cI'Isis-ncirlen target CllllIlIl'!l'S to build dOI11t:sllc stock markCL<; and could start til pia\' thest' as " profilahle wal' to earll royailles, But these KlIlcls or operations would require rt'IllDvlIlg the cCll1lrols on Ihe Glpnal accounts or such counlries, Yet anothl'l' rundamelltal ksson from the L"tll1 Amencan ensls was a IT!'\' Important paradox: financial cnsls ill a COUll try 0(' the SOlllh could aClllally boost Wall Stn'l't thrllllg-h capHill l1i~hL. \Vhen a finanCIal cnsls hll a coulltry, lilrl,{l' ('unds would flee not onl" that cOlmtr\, Inll OUlel'S rearlllf{ contagloll and the funds would Ike to tile Anglu-Amencan linannalllexus, hoosl1n~ liqUIdity. iowel'! ng II1terl'st ra tl'S and ha\'lng a generally IwalLl1\' 1111 pac\. And tht' ('illal, and III sOllie wal's most Important lesson was that the \i\,IF/\VB liTre lIot, aner all, a waste or time I'llI' Amencan capllalism, With the establishment of the DWSR, the 11\,11' was elbowed Ollt or the way \w Ihe Ll.S Treaslln' ami Ille US /inancra; market.<; and seemed headed 1(1(' histon<~ proverlllal dusthlll. Reagan C
TilE C;l,()JI .. \I.lS.,\TlC)N
(;'-\~IHI.E
defellrling- llit' IlIlegnl\' or lht' III1l'rll;tllollal finanCial S\'Slt'lIl. llll' 11\1[-" "·;\S ddelldillg a SVSlt'1ll of liS expioll"llllll or the DWSR, Secolld, hy n'SlruclllrIIlg dOIllt'SIll" I'C()nOlllll'~ to 1'1I;lhll' lhelll 1Il pal' oil Ihl'lr dehls. llll' \VB \'·;IS aClaptlllg-thelll lO the sallie liS-centred illlernatIollal system: lhl' l1l'CeSSIl.lt'S or ilS struclure pushed lhelll lowards domestic deflaLlOlI. l'IIITl'J\C\' clt','alualiolt and an export clnn' along wilh IIIcasures 10 ease IJlldgel delinls alld earn foreign ClllTcnlT 11\1 till' t';lpllal accounl by pnyallslng \\'Ilh Iht' help III foreign capilal and allraCllllg IIlwarcl noli's harcl-clIITelHT fUllds throug'll liberalismg- IhL' capllal accoulIl, Thus did US rcllliers gel lheir (khlS paid. U~ 1J){IUslry gOI cheaper IlIIp.,rh or the IIlPUlS IIlTdt'cl for proclll('{IIJII, lIS l'IJlllpalll("S clluid hll\' tip ;\ssels IIlclmling prt\'ausecl Ulilitles III till' cOlllllr\' clIIIU'nll'd, alld lhL' capuai accoullt wlluld be liill'raliscd so lhal local S\IlC~ IIIMkl'ts could he plan'(\. ,-\IIc\ lhe whole wslc'lll couie! Iw mack t'\'l'l\ IIwn' rule-based by the EtCI lhat llcoclasslcal eCOllOllllCS supplies liS wllh hundreds or rules and Ilorms alld allllost all of lhem are Ilewr qUlle Ilperallllg 111 any cOUlll)'\' at all\' 111llt', Su the 1j\'IF and WB could slllIph' pICK and choose wlllrIlC\'er aspect ora dOilleslic eCOIIOIlI\' [he\'wanled lo COllcenlrall' challge upon and could aiwavs point to SOIllC rule or norm of l\('orIassical CCOIHllllics lhal was lIot helll)!; mel! .Just as Ihe Nixon-Ford-( :arLt'r phase left a hang-m'er I'DI' lhl' RI';Ig-alliles, so the Reagan pcrtod lel't a hang-on:r for Bush: thIS 1II1ll' the hugl' doubk dC/iulS Oil lhe balance III' p;l\'lIlell\s ;\Ild lhe ddicll and Ill) 1l\\)Ilt'\' III IIH' klll\' 1'01' exe\'llllg- inlluence oYer lhl' So\wl Bloc reglllll ;I.,> II collapsed, ,'sJwo Clalk hc:cause Ill' the dOllleSl1C spentlau\'c blow-OUI III the hllusillg Sl'Clor (If tht: lillanCial syslelll, ilul tIll' diakcllo 01 pnl!!;H'SS Lhrou).!,h hlulHkL'lllg )!;.llllhks cOllllllued 10 work slnCl' lhe deht cnsls had produced a deq'!opllIenL or lhe DWSR which could he explOited by the US 10 o\'crCOllll' IlS lI'l.'aknesses III IlS efrons to dnmlliaic de\'clopmellls III RUSSl,l alld Eastern Europe, The Il'vlF-World Ball\;. Strul'ltlral ACUIISllllcl1t ,~ub-s\'ste\ll could he illlposerlupoll Lhe reglOll with Lhe dalill Lhat IL was the lIew global c!e\'cIOpml'lll paradigm ;ind lIol an ad hoc dC\,lcc 1(11' ser\'ing ll.s IIIll'rCSlS III thl' l.:\lIll :\lIlericlIl criSIS, Bush showed great si~ilI ill persuadillg- the \Vest EUI'OPC;llIS tf) knuckle IInder LO IMF (US TreaslIr\') lcaders/llp oyer Lhe tl'allsilioll III lhL' East. alld Ihe result was 10 perpeilialt' ,\IIeI sll'l:ngllicll the rcach Ilr Ihe DWSR, gl\'lllg gn:al sl'l>pe lor US lin;\IInal 0pt'r;\lors II) lillk lip with tIn' t'X-lIllllll'lIkLlllir;ls Oflhc regllHI III orgll..'s ol'spl'culau\'c, corrupl and eXlrellll'i\, prolil;liJil' \'(:11lures. through pnr
or
or
S!tII\',CSPl'CIOllh' )..\1\'CIl tlw ran Ih,lI thl' Cort:lIlL roll.' fir the IMF as a pllblic authority IiII' lII'lIl;\~IIlg- Ihe erIi:ns of the regllne Oil CUllJllrtl'S or the Smith alld former E
ur
or
II
The Respollses of Political EeOIl()JllICS to the DWSR
Lip tOIlO\\' we lta\'l'l.'UIICt'lllrall'rl olll\' lIpOIl Ihl' rok oJ'Ihe L'S ill Ihl' f)\VSR. Bill we 11IlISI hndh' SIIITe\' III,' I'CSP(HISl'~ III' (/Il' oilier 111<1111 UHIIPOII('IIIS 01' thl' world l'COIIOII\\' 1<1 IIIIS SYstl.'lll SII1Cl' liS lallllClt ill tlte 1~)7(Js, DlIrtllg the post-war (>l'rtll(l, llll' ('lire 11(' Ihl' \I'orld l'l'OIlOIl\\' was lIla(k lip 01'.1 (;l'I'lllan-{'elltrl'd Western F.lll'llPl' ;lIld.lapall, "Iollg- IhLlI :-JOrlh ,\Illl.'IK'1. The l'e\,I\',11 ur the capilalisms at the 1\1'0 opposile ellds EuraSia had ['01lowed \'l'P' dilTlTell1 pall('),lls rrOlll Ihe :lIlgll' or IIltern;!llllllal p"lilJcal en II WillY, t:erm;lIl\' 's rC\'I\'al was hili It 11f)( III till' de\'l'loplIll'llI or decpelllng-
or
+1
')"I·IE (;(.Olt\I.1S.. \T10N (;:\i\IIll.E
regIOnal links WIlh1l1 Western Europe. Japan's ren\'al took placc largel\' 11\ isolation and throug-h c1ccpcnillg lin!;;s wllh lirst the American and thcll a\so with thc VVcst Europl'an markets. Thus Ihc l110\'C lowards the Dollar-Wall Street system III the 1970s had vcr)' dirrcren t impacts upon thcse two nonAmencan CClltrcs, as we shall sec. NCllhcr thc ica(krs oj' Gcrman capJl;i1isl11 nor thosc olJapan welcolllcd or appro\'cd of ellhcr thc maug-uralJoll or the c\'olution 0[' the DWSR nul' lIr L11C v"nous W4\VS In which till' US has sOIlg-h t 10 cxplOltl\. On thc olher hand. 111 both rcgiolls Ihe D'VSR has 11a(llls supporters and c\'el1 enthUSiasts, especially. or coursc, 111 COUl1tnes Iikc Britalll and Holland with powcrl'ullinancml sectors anc! amongst those most cioselv Illvolvcd With pnv;ttc intcrn
Both Westcrn Ellrope and Japan wcrc, or course, cxtremel" hostile to ami WOITICd hy the IIlternatllJllal mOl1ewry chaos Ill:lugnrated b\' the D\VSR IIJ the early 1970s, The West European responses de\'ciopcd along li.llIr axcs. r-irst a dclcnslvc response to the reglllle 111 the monetary field by building a new regIOnal monctary regimc 111 \,Vestern Europe: the exchange rate mecha III Sl11 , leading towards a full mont!tar\, unlllll. Secondly, a shirt towards a new aeCllllllllallOIl strate!:.''}' which piaccct llloncy-capllai III dOl11l1l;lJlcC over employers or capllal. ThIrdly. an aLlelllpt to explOlllhe DV\'SR Internatiollall)'; and founhi)'. an lllLl'a-Europeall conl1icl o"er the role or renller capitalism wllhm \-"estern European socIety. \~'e will look at each or these stranc\s III turn.
1) 1'111' rt'g/ol/(d J//olIl'lary
rt~!!;IIII(,
Without a defcnslve reg-lOnai response to lile DWSR 111(' development or the Eurupean Commulllty towards a cllstoms ul1lon would havc i)el'1l destroyed by chaotic II1tra-European currency mo"ements wh leh WOll irl ha\'{~ made iliLY could be Ill
Chancellor Kohl responded with the decisIOn [0 malllwin llll' regional arrangt'llIcnls h\' decpcnmg them mIn lidl nHlnelar~' IIll1on, TllI.~ decision has held. ~
2) ','Ii'I-jill(lIIl"I(ti/lIllIIJ 1//111
11'1'
111711 /1'l/(mlii)'
IJllllOill:r-m/lllfll
A number o("\·Vesl European stales sought to mamtain the l\.evnesmn lIlode 01" accumulation III which inrlustnal caplIal's expansion was the celllral target polie\'. Thc Frcnch ;;()nalist govl'rllmen I alll'mpled thiS III the early 19HOs. This efl"ort was frustrated IIO t least hecause 01" the Reagan administration 's economIC statecrart. (tused tht' high dollar and 11Igl1 illlerest rates as a \,'capon agalllst the French proJect.: 1 The failure 01" the French proJl'ct led Iill' Miuerrand go\'crnlllelll to accepllhe scrapplllg or controls on IIltl'rnatlOlIalfinannallllO\'CIllC.,'nts as part of a wlcler stratq.,'")' (the single market anrlthc aChle\'l'nwnt or monetary unIOn). With a polin' framework consisting or Jixeci exch,lIlge rates and fret' 1ll()\'Cl11l'nt or Jinann~, West European gm'l'l'nments except Germanv\ lost most of their cOlltrol O"l'r monetary polin' 10 rhe pnvate IinallClalmarKels or Europe.- I When European governments deciared that . ~I()balisation had mcant that the\' had lost the ahilit\' to steer their domestic eCOnOl1lleS as bel{lrC, thel' aCllI:dl\' lIll'ant lhat their dClerlllll1atiol\ to suhordinatc dOllJestic eCOIlOllllC managclIll'llt to fixcd European exchange rates and rree movement or !inanee was what was tyin~ their hands domestically. ThIS shirt brought abolll a sllnilanty II) dOlllcstlc macroeconollllC pnorluL's bctweell \Vestern Europe alld the LISA: the pnont\' orIo'" II1l1ation, mallltall1l!1~ 1Il()JlC"'S roil: as a lixed standard or\'alue 111 tht' II1tcrcsts moner-capital anrl pushl11g cmpio"L'rs or capital to cngage III labotlr-shcddin~ aCll\'IlY and dO\\'ll\\'ant pressurc Oil wage costs. ThiS was t he real baSIS for the 111
or
or
3) TIll' tlfI"iII/)//II,'x/)IIii( th"jJ\'E"i}?
/J1/I'rn(/II/JIIII/~)'
At the samc time, Westcrn European capllaL bred With dOlllcstlc IOllg-term stagnatloll over thl' last quarter or a centur\'. was ahle to explOIt the POSSIhilitles .,IlL'ITd by the D\VSR to ttlrn outwards beyond the core III search of nl'\\' fields or accumulation. It was thus ahle to live with
or
-I) Til" ('{}lIfTirI1Jl1I'I' "II' mIl' 0('''1'
I"I'JII/I'"
Sl~ri()"
AltlwlIgh the power of lJ\llIH~)'-capll,,1 \\'llhlll thl.: baiallCl' or money-capil"lIsts/l'lllploVl.:rs ul'capll.ll was sharply shifted by llle chall~es descrihl.:d abo\'e, IIlllst gm'CJ'11Illents in Westcrn Europe did not go aiollg- wllh the Idea
or
-IIi
TilE (a,e )11,\I.IS:\T]()?\ (;,\\II\U:
dismamlillg- the l'l\Ure IllstIllIlIC>I1alli'
japan lilllllfi Itselr in a /;\1' more vulnerable position lilr coplllg Willi Ihe IWW moneta!'\' chaos ttl,ll arose 11\ the I 970s, Bccause or its depcndcllce UpO!l the US lIlarket. it EKed one '\ll\l'nClll-IlH!UCC(\ ;!(UustIllL'l\l crISIS "her another. has beL'n sIJl~leClL'cI \0 greal polillcal prcssu/'l' to establish a lIIallaged trade regllllL' Wilh the US and constant al1elllpts \)\' the US to lIl\crfCn: wllil its inlernal sociai n'lations of prodUClllll1. Attempts to di\'ersiJ,' illtn Lhe Wesl Eurupe;tll J1lad~ct met With strong Eli npposl\l(lIl. onl\' partia!h' O\'('ITOIIH: lhrough the lkllish back dllor, The \,er" rkpenclenl'l' oj' the Amcrlcan stall' upon Japanese financial l10ws 11110 New York only rlldled the gmwt h of all aggresslvc Lrellfl in US public Opll1lOll t\l\\'ards.lapan. Ih SUCClllllhlllg to LIS
pressures III Ihe lall' 19HOs 10 lo()sl"Il.lapalll"se dOIlll'sl1c e(,OIHII\IIC policy, the Japallew gU\'('rtlllll'1I11illllld lIsdr Illlkaslllllg 11ll' kiml 411' l'1l0 1'1 11 UlIS huhble ill liS linallClal S\'slelll Ihat Germall gm'erlllllellis had always managed to repudiale, alld Ill(' hllrslllIg or lhl' hubble al Liw stan of Ihl' I 990s plullged I heJapalll'sl' dOlllesllc {'COllOm\' Illto a 101114 SI agll a 111 III rrom whirh II has llol ren l"l' rl'd, '\l'l III Ihe sl'('olld half oj' till' I ~)H()s, .Japallese dill'S did stan to develop a new accumulal.ioll sirateh'"": the deH'loplllellt ora strong rq~i()llallll'I\\'ork 111 1-:asl alld SOlllh-Easl ,\.~Ia ami Ollt' IWI based 011 West Ellrope;lIl-style Ile()IlH'IT;Ullilist rq!;10 II a I track polin', hill ralhl'l' 011 till' ('xport of prudllCliVe capilalllllo thl" rq!;llln to hoost rq.\'I!Hlal growlh - the klll(l or p()lic~' so obviousl\' lacking III Wl'St Europeall polin' l!Jwards Easlel'll alld Easl (:elllral Ellrope or (i.l' that ll\alll'r ill :\Il\cl'lcall polio' lowanb l.allll AIlll'l'Ica, Through this s\I';llcg,\" .Jap;lIlesl' capllai could cope WILli the wild SWlIlgS Ihe dollar: a hi~h dollar gaw scope (i.r tlll'Japallesl' dOIlll"sllc base, while a low dollar ga\'(' scope (ill'lhe rl'gl
or
·lH
American support in the early po.~twar years, no such e\'ollll\on lwei \J{.TIIITectm.lapan\ rqpol1ai hllllcrianci.
TIll' BiJilrml/()J/ (}f /III' S(}lIlft During the long boom III the postwar period the countnes of the South Oil the whole abo experienced lugh rates of ~ro\\,lh: liftv of these countries had average gro\\'Lll ratc:s of I)\'el" ~ pc:r cent per year IlClween 19()O and I ~)75-" Total factor productivity growth was particularly hIgh JI1 the Middle East and Latin America: ':!.:~ and I,H pCI' cent respectively - a beller perforlllance than East Asi;1 whme annual productlvitv growth was only 1.:l per CCIlI. With the start of the Oollar-\-\'a11 Street RegIme and the oil cnSIS, a hifurGIllon I)egan on the hasls of one cnlenon: how well the slate cOl1cerned coped wnh the volatile and often s;l\'age dYnamIcs or thc new Dollar-Wall Street RegIme. With the oil shocks and the onset of slagnation III the COlT, the over\\'liell1llllg m;~JOI'IlY o("coulltnes of" the Sollth expenenced stralll Oil the current accoullt. They couid c1tl)(:r horrow milsslvely abmad ullder Ihe new Dollar-Wall Street Reg-line, or they could make sharp domestic Internal macroeconomic acUustmcnts, ughtcnmg- Iiscai polic"
DlE';R.
th,' US
gOVI'J'}III/I'II/ tml/.\"/11II/I·t/
Ihrough Ihl' wllrld
I'('()IIOIII)' I~\'
Iftl'
Those COllllll"leS whICh tDl)k the bDrro\\'inp; CDllrsc - III tilt, l'vlidrlle East, Lltlll :\JlH'I"ICI alld parts tlf till' SovIet mOC (espcClall" Polalld anril-lllllgary, as ,,'cll as Yllg( Isla\,la) - were thcll trapped ill dcbt CrISt'S alld long slagllatiolls or lincCll veal'S or mon.: as the" were dr;lggcd through the 'structural ac\justIIlt'lll I'lnger oj' the Ii'vJF/\VB, ThClSl' cOlllllru:s w(lIcll undcrtook lI11l'rllal a(li"sIJIlCIlI amI ;l\'(lIded the clt-ht trap \\'crl~ mailli\' III East ASIa alld were able 10 wcather the onset of the Ill'W n:glllle and ClllHinued to grow,S Ot.hers wcl'l~ drag-ge(1 down hI' the DWSR Into a svstclllicall\' l1lctuccci selWs or lillancial IJlo"'-()llts, DUl'lng the I ~17()s, the 1111III Ilel' or finanCIal Cl'lSl'S neycr ruse abO\'e Iiv\:' countl'les pcr year, Bctween 19HO and 19~)5 the IHtmber fell below live pt'r ycar onl" III two vcars (I \IHH and I qH~)) and in SlIlllt' \'ears the llumbcrs rail at IJ\'er tell CllIllllries pCI' war. According [() Ihe IMF, tll'O tlllrds oLdl it~ members have CXPl'rtCllc('(1 ~e\'erc finallClal lTISt'S slncc 1SlHO, SCHlIl' tIlOlT than ollCCY It IS important to underlillc olle poillt ahout tillS cxpenellCl:, Till' ideoll)gl.~ts 01" the D\VSR cLllm that lhl' debt lTIS1S of the LltJl1 ,\nlt'rIcan Coulltncs (anel states in Easterll Eu .. op~) was U//I,\/'r! by tlIe hankruptc), o{' th~lr earlier IIIl(lOrl-SUbslItl1l1ng dc"e1opml'llt strategIes Ill\'oinllg iarge Slate sectors and protectiolllsm, Thlls, they had to cmbran' a IlC\\' stratcgic paradi~m- till' so-called 'fret' lllad;,ct' CJlW, Yct as Dalll Rodnck has ShOWll, lhe dcbt cnsls .uHI the allellri;lllt r10111CSllC fin;lIlLl;d (,!'ISCS 111 tilest' cOllntl'les had bel'll callsed /101 by thclr iIllPllrt-Sllbslltllllllg, slaUst accull1ulation .~lratC)~les - ill llla11lstlTalll tenns thcst' ;\IT IIII/TO/'/WIII/II/(' deyelopmellt dcvlces - but by their govcrnment S failures 01' II/(I(J'UI'(//IIIIIII//' polin' aC\justment to the Illlpact or the uil p1'1cc nsl..:S and the llew mOllClan'-ljllallcml svstem oJ' rhe I 97()s, A~ RodrIck explallls. IIllpo1'l Suhstltlltlng industrlaiisal10ll (lSI) 'hrnught llllpn:Cl'cit:ntcrl CCllllOllllC growth to scores oj' C()Ulltl'leS III Lal1ll America, the ;'\'I icldle East alld Nortll ,-\I'1'1c<1, all(lC\'Cll to some 11l Sub-Saharan Afnca' for two dccades, . when the eC01l0111ICS Dr these samc l'Ollnt1'1cs beg;ll) to bll apart III the sccoml ilalr or the 1!)70s. rill' reaS011S had \'I.:I'\, liWe lei do !l'llh IS/ Im/iot's per s(' or tll(" ('X[e11t ofgol'er11ll1C11t IlltlTvcnlIollS, CoulltrIes that weathcred the slOrl11 \\TIT lhose in which ~o\'ernlllcnls undcrtook the appropnall' 1I/{/t'HI/'('()II(J1I1/1' adjustllleIlIs (in the areas liscal, IlHllletary aBd l'xchang(' rate polin') rapldh' and deClsl\'c!\" 'W Thus, the real pallern 01 rallsalilv III lite t.ran:-;J'orlll'\l!OIlS j'ul\Oll'lllg the adoption or t.llc Dollar-Wall Strect RegIme was as follows: a successful developlllcnt ,I'lm//:!!,:\, E.lcerl suddcll. bl'ge challenges to m;tlTOl'CII110/ll1c /111'111'.1' prodllced by I.he (ll'clH:stratcc\ chaos or till' lIew 1Iltl'rllatioll:tI 1l10ncIar\,-li/JanClal rcgime, Thc macrOL'l'OI)OIllIl' I;lclIcal 1~lilllJ'c led to tl'l'rihle cllITellc~' and linancial cnst~s and t.hese enabled \VashlnglOlI to impose a lie\\, strat.egic modd (Ill lIlesc COllnll'lL"~, ThiS llIodel was [hen dmllll.'d to be a sl1pel'lor Slratl'g-\' to an earlier railed stratcg\" Yer tht' nell' BIOCkl was
or
TilE
(;1.( )1\:\l.l~.\Ttc)N
C \;>.1111 F
llolillllg more than a combination oj ad 110c solutIons to pay oil liS hallks pius a new vlliner
These criscs, Lhell, hiruJ'call:ci llle Soulh 1I1lo two ZOIlCS: Ihe IICW (!ePCIIdcnclcs lhc DWSR and Lhc nl'\\, growLh cenlre 111 Easl alld Soulh-East ASia. Till' new c\epcnriellCics thclIIsel\'cs C()IIl11) Ie, willel! l'l1h:red a path lowards sllual dislIlLegratJoll (mllch oL\/i'ica) alld others which t:l1lerc0sL-19HOs dependennes has beell l)lll' (II' chrolllC finanCial inslabilil\' and !;Iagnalloll. pllnctualed b\· /Ilful growilt ;\/lel rurther finanCIal blow-oms, Since 19HO, serwus Iillan<:tal crises han' bl'l'l1 happl'nlll,l!; Il\ olle COlllll