The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration (Europe and the Nation State)

The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration No set of international relations is as thoroughly analysed, commented on, taken apart and critiqued as the ties between Europe and the United States. A period of post-Cold War integration has been buffeted by trade disputes, economic strife and differences in prosecuting the fight against global terrorism. Now for the first time there is an accessible and theory-based analysis of European foreign policies in the post-Cold War era. The authors argue that EU- and NATOmediated geopolitics prevails in most of Europe, but that raw geopolitics tends to pop up at the fringes of this thoroughly institutionalized area. Moreover, the effects of past geopolitics persist in the collective memories of several states and compete with contemporary geopolitics in their policy formulations. Focusing on the post-Cold War era, The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration includes analyses of the Benelux, Nordic and Baltic countries, Central and East European countries and those in Southern Europe. This geographical range was made possible through contributions by leading European scholars and area experts. The coherence of this edited collection is facilitated by constellation theory, a new geopolitical theory explaining European foreign policies in a comparative perspective. Scenarios for the future of Europe are formulated as well as perspectives for the constellation theory when applied to other parts of the world. Of interest to political scientists, observers, academics and students, this is an invaluable guide to post-Cold War European relations. Hans Mouritzen of the Danish Institute of International Studies has published extensively in fields such as foreign policy adaptation, international organization, European integration, transnational relations and the Baltic Sea area. His work Theory and Reality of International Politics (Ashgate, 1998) emphasizes the spatial and historical dimensions of international relations. Anders Wivel is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. His main research interests are European integration and security, in particular the exercise of power politics and the role of small states in the integration process, and international relations theory, in particular the realist tradition.

Europe and the nation state

Edited by Michael Burgess and Lee Miles Centre for Federal Studies, Kent and Europe in the World Centre, University of Liverpool

This series explores the complex relationship between nation states and European integration and the political, social, economic and policy implications of this interaction. The series examines issues such as: • the impact of the EU on the politics and policy-making of the nation state and viceversa • the effects of expansion of the EU on individual nation states in Europe • the relationship between the EU and non-European nation states 1 Poland and the European Union Edited by Karl Cordell 2 Greece in the European Union Edited by Dionyssis G.Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G.Passas 3 The European Union and Democratization Edited by Paul J.Kubicek 4 Iceland and European Integration On the edge Edited by Baldur Thorhallsson 5 Norway Outside the European Union Norway and European integration from 1994 to 2004 Clive Archer

6 Turkey and European Integration Prospects and issues in the post-Helsinki era Edited by Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe 7 Perspectives on EU—Russia Relations Edited by Debra Johnson and Paul Robinson 8 French Relations with the European Union Edited by Helen Drake 9 The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration Edited by Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel

The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration Edited by Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 selection and editorial matter, Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-49660-4 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-59971-3 (Adobe e-Reader Format) ISBN 0-415-28280-2 (Print Edition)

Contents

List of illustrations

viii

Notes on contributors

x

Series editor preface

xii

Preface

xvi

1 Introduction HANS MOURITZEN AND ANDERS WIVEL

1

PART I Geopolitical theory and the rules of the game in Europe 2 Constellation theory HANS MOURITZEN AND ANDERS WIVEL 3 The institutional dynamics of Euro-Atlantic integration FINN LAURSEN, HANS MOURITZEN AND ANDERS WIVEL

14 39

PART II Constellation theory applied to Europe 4 Close to power? ALFRED VAN STADEN 5 The north LEE MILES 6 The south STEPHEN C.CALLEYA 7 The east RICK FAWN 8 The north-east ANDRES KASEKAMP

64 82 99 114 133

PART III Conclusions 9 Comparative analysis meets theory HANS MOURITZEN AND ANDERS WIVEL

149

PART IV Temporal and spatial perspectives 10 Prospects for Europe HANS MOURITZEN 11 The constellation theory applied outside Europe ANDERS WIVEL

187 203

References

218

Index

231

Illustrations

Figures

1.1

Power criteria for classifying states

3

2.1

The Euro-Atlantic power pole

24

2.2

Levels of theory

26

2.3

European constellations (2005)

28

2.4

Autonomy and influence-capability in four constellations

31

2.5

Our theory: the simple model

34

2.6

Our theory: the refined model

35

4.1

Close to power (2005)

65

5.1

The north and north-east (2005)

83

6.1

The south (2005)

101

7.1

The east (2005)

114

9.1

Net attractions: non-pole powers’ constellation climbings after the Cold War (2005)

153

9.2

States’ action space in various constellations

162

9.3

Types and mechanisms of parallel action

171

9.4

The outer limits of Euro-Atlantic stability projection (2005)

178

10.1 The positioning of European states over the Iraq conflict (2003) 190 11.1 Explanatory value of the constellation theory

217

Tables

3.1

Types of integration

10.1 Types of state incentives in the European bifurcation scenario

50 198

Contributors

Stephen Calleya is Deputy Director and Senior Lecturer of International Relations at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta. His most recent publications include, as editor, Regionalism in the Post-Cold War World (Ashgate, 2000) and, as author, Looking Ahead: Malta’s Foreign Policy Agenda (Agenda, 2002) and Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations (Routledge, 2004). E-mail: [email protected]. Rick Fawn is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of St Andrews. He has published various books on international security and Central and Eastern Europe, including, most recently, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences (co-edited with Raymond Hinnebusch and Lynne Rienner, 2005); Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond (co-edited with Mary Buckley, Routledge, 2003); and Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies (editor, Frank Cass, 2003). E-mail: [email protected]. Andres Kasekamp is Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn and Professor of Baltic Politics at the University of Tartu, Department of Political Science. He is the author of The Radical Right in Interwar Estonia (Macmillan, 2000) as well as a large number of journal articles and book chapters. E-mail: [email protected]. Finn Laursen is Professor at the University of Southern Denmark, Department of Political Science and Public Management. He is the author of numerous publications and has edited a number of books including, most recently, Comparative Regional Integration (Ashgate, 2003). E-mail: [email protected]. Lee Miles is Reader in European Politics, Jean Monnet Professor and Director of the Europe in the World Centre (EWC), The University of Liverpool. He is also Associate Fellow of Chatham House in London and holds a Decent in Political Science from Karlstad University, Sweden. E-mail: [email protected]. Hans Mouritzen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute of International Studies. He has published in fields such as foreign policy adaptation, democracy in foreign policy, international administration, European integration, transnational relations and the Baltic Sea area. His synthesis in Theory and Reality of International Politics (Ashgate, 1998) emphasizes the spatial and historical dimensions of international politics. He is co-editor of the Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook. E-mail: [email protected].

Alfred van Staden is Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague, and Professor of International Relations at Leiden University. His major publications concern international security, European integration and foreign policy analysis. His most recent publications include, as editor, Cannons and Canons (Van Gorcum, 2003) and, as author, The Right to Govern. The Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Clingendael, 2003) and Power and Legitimacy. The Quest for Order in a Unipolar World (Clingendael, 2005). E-mail: [email protected]. Anders Wivel is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science. He has published articles in a number of journals including Journal of Common Market Studies, Cooperation and Conflict and Journal of International Relations and Development. E-mail: [email protected].

Series editor preface

This is a book that seeks to explain European state behaviour in relation to foreign policies and European integration. In particular, its empirical focus is upon what are conventionally understood to be small states, but one purpose of the comparative investigation is precisely to challenge this understanding and present the reader with an alternative way of explaining how such states behave by looking at their respective positions not in the traditional sense of power structures but in terms of multidimensional power relations. In order to do this, the editors, Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, have chosen to reintroduce the notion of ‘geopolitics’, based upon distance and spatiality, as a way to open up the whole question of interstate relations and behaviour. This enables them to project state behaviour from the standpoint of each state, or cluster of states, placed under the microscope. Viewed from this perspective, it is possible to locate different states in a number of discrete but overlapping arenas of geopolitical concern that can engage the complex realities of their power, or polar, relations. In order to operationalize the basic theme of small state behaviour, the editors have introduced the contested concept of pole and non-pole states, referring to a state’s position in relational terms, that is, how it is located in a spatial context. For example, it might be weak in one particular relation but powerful in another. Consequently a state could simultaneously be a non-pole state in Europe and a pole power in relation to another geopolitical space outside of Europe Union (EU) boundaries. In this sense it is relational polarity that furnishes the complex basis of explanation of state behaviour. But some states can be classified in essence as non-pole states. They are consistently weak in relation to one or more power poles and in consequence share problems different from those faced by pole powers. This observation is made all the more striking if we consider that, in 2005, 22 out of the EU’s total of 25 member states can be counted as non-pole powers. In these circumstances, how do such states act, react and interact with other EU states and how do they behave in relation to Euro-Atlantic integration? What are the key factors that shape and determine their perceptions, attitudes and policy postures in the European arena? The book sets out to answer these questions by surveying the existing theoretical landscape in both international relations and European integration and concludes that none of the established theories provide a convincing explanation of why such small, non-polar states behave in unexpected and unpredictable ways. There seems to be a puzzling freedom of manoeuvre for these states that does not accord with an anticipated

uniformity of support for European integration. Indeed, there is a conspicuous heterogeneity of policy responses to shared problems that needs to be explained. The editors, however, claim to have found the answer to this puzzle. They believe that the explanation lies in a combination of a non-pole state’s present and past locations, that is, its past experience and its present position in relation to the Euro-Atlantic unipole of power: the actor with paramount positive and negative sanctions vis-à-vis the states located in its sphere. Clearly the present has primacy over the past, but the point is that historical experience bequeaths an accumulated wisdom of past locations that has been absorbed into political tradition and culture so that elites and mass publics retain a memory of past lessons learned which is fed into the state’s current ‘pole distance’ in relation to the central Euro-Atlantic unipole of the United States, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). The key to understanding how and why a non-pole state behaves as it does, then, lies in what Mouritzen and Wivel call its ‘constellation’ in relation to the power pole. This leads them to develop what they call constellation theory which takes into account not only the conventional systemic meaning of polarity that explains the prevailing power structure via a broad overview, but also the view from the particular standpoint of the state whose behaviour we seek to explain. In other words, it is important to identify the polarity from the standpoint of the state in question or, so to speak, from the ‘receiving’ end. This view furnishes an invaluable insight into the complex layers of a particular state’s ‘environmental polarity’, revealing the number of different poles that are projecting sanctions in relation to it. While admittedly offering only a relatively narrow perspective of the world for analytical purposes, it is precisely this perspective that is the most important for explaining the behaviour of the particular state under scrutiny. After all, what might be significant as a power pole from a general standpoint could conceivably overshadow or even conceal important polarities that are different for each state. The logical outcome of this line of reasoning that focuses on relational poles is to elevate the idea of environmental polarity to the status of a ‘prime theoretical tool’ (Chapter 2) that explains the constraints on a state’s position and behaviour. One advantage of this theoretical approach is that it provides a series of dynamic perspectives that emphasize how far a polarity can shift even between neighbouring territories. The critical relationship for non-pole states lies between the significance of location in terms of geopolitics and the structural conditions of power resources. Location and structure—reflected in the juxtaposition of environmental polarity and systemic polarity—are the defining factors in state perceptions and behaviour. These conceptual and theoretical concerns constitute the foundation of the subsequent analysis that begins with the institutional dynamics of Euro-Atlantic integration, the title of Chapter 3. The essay by Laursen, Mouritzen and Wivel effectively launches the empirical focus of the book by its detailed survey of the institutional superstructure of Euro-Atlantic unipolarity. The essay is pivotal because it contrasts the unique features of the unipole from other poles as an alliance of four pole powers—the United States, France, Germany and the UK—that have pooled much of their capabilities and prestige in pursuit of their common regional interests. The essay concludes by underlining the fundamental stability of the Euro-Atlantic relationship in a period of turbulent, convulsive change in the global and Euro-Atlantic security order. It stresses persistence and continuity in the overall institutional structures, especially the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), originally established in the Cold War and emphasizes their enduring significance in transatlantic and world affairs. As a result, this level of Euro-Atlantic unipole institutionalization has remained a membership pole throughout the post-Cold War era. Its institutions continue as important means of power projection for the pole powers while institutional affiliation with the EU and NATO continues as the most important measure of constellation for non-pole powers. The concomitant institutional flexibility evident in the revised decision-making procedures and changing security postures of both the EU and NATO, together with the reduced costs of disagreement in the wake of recent enlargements, has led to a conspicuous decentralization of the EuroAtlantic unipole paving the way for much more heterogeneity in state behaviour. These broad considerations enable the focus of the book to shift to the application of constellation theory to Europe. Consequently the five empirical chapters that follow take the reader on a tour de force of Europe and look respectively at Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg (Benelux) and Austria as a cluster of non-pole powers compelled to define themselves against Franco-German hegemony (Alfred van Staden), ‘the north’ including the Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Lee Miles), ‘the south’ embracing Portugal and Greece (core insiders), Malta and Cyprus (near-core insiders) and Turkey (a would-be insider) together with a ‘pragmatic’ glance at Ireland also as a near-core insider (Stephen C.Calleya), ‘the east’ conceived as the Central and East European states (CEES) of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia together with Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia (Rick Fawn), and ‘the north-east’ consisting of the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia intent upon moving away from the direct grip of Russia and towards the embrace of the EU (Andres Kasekamp). Each of these chapters highlights the complex and idiosyncratic attitudes, perceptions and policy postures that characterize the various geopolitical arenas in Europe and relates the positions of the nonpolar powers to their respective polar sites. The overall picture is effectively a kaleidoscope of different patterns, nuances and orientations that furnishes fascinating perspectives and intriguing insights into state behaviour. When Mouritzen and Wivel return to investigate where ‘comparative analysis meets theory’ in their conclusions, they have a wealth of empirical material upon which to draw. Their basic approach is to address the question why a given country is attracted to the Euro-Atlantic unipole in the first place and they proceed to synthesize, compare and add to the analyses of the empirical chapters by breaking down their investigation into the following two broad component parts: the general attraction radiating from the pole; and the individual attraction that takes account of contemporary geopolitics, past geopolitics, societal self-sufficiency and what they call the ‘palatability’ of particular states to the EU/NATO axis. By adding the various factors of pole attraction, the editors seek to understand why and to what extent each state has been attracted to the Euro-Atlantic unipole in the post-Cold War era. Taking account of contemporary contextual events and circumstances, such as the Kosovo War and the Chechen conflict, the editors situate the various case studies in terms of the theoretical propositions identified in Chapter 2. This is a long and necessarily wide-ranging chapter that looks in detail at the empirical analyses using established social science concepts and theories that effectively rebut any accusations of circularity of argument in the comparative survey. The editors conclude that their basic

theoretical propositions in respect of ‘bandwagoning’ as a distinctive behaviour pattern of ‘would-be insider’ states are corroborated. The evidence, we are reminded, relates to the unipole power structure of the post-Cold War era. The final section of the volume of essays is entitled ‘Temporal and spatial perspectives’ and contains two reflective contributions that look at the prospects for Europe (Mouritzen) and the application of constellation theory outside of Europe (Wivel). The principal focus of the former is the impact and implications of the recent Iraqi conflict for the future of the Euro-Atlantic unipole and in particular relations between the United States and various members of the EU, while the latter is described as a theoretical ‘plausibility probe’—a methodological tool—to decide whether or not there is sufficient potential validity to warrant further comparative investigations. Both chapters invite attention because they are intellectually adventurous and thought provoking essays that compel us to reassess the explanatory capacity of constellation theory as applied to the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole states in international relations. In summary, this is a refreshing, innovative approach to the subject of Euro-Atlantic relations that provides us with an alternative analytical perspective—a different way of conceptualizing and explaining power relations in the new post-Cold War age. For this reason alone it fits comfortably into our ‘Europe and the Nation State’ series and sits conveniently alongside the previous volumes with its intra- and extra-European analytical and comparative perspectives. Michael Burgess University of Kent at Canterbury

Preface

This is a study of post-Cold War foreign policies in Europe, emphasizing the continued importance of geopolitics in the Euro-Atlantic area. IR books on Europe tend to focus on either the EU or NATO. However, we find it necessary to analyse both in order to shed light on the general characteristics of Euro-Atlantic state relations. Moreover, we avoid an exclusive focus on the great powers and deal instead with all European states, in principle. This comprehensive focus is only meaningful at a reasonable level of abstraction. In order to achieve this, and make the volume accessible to the student as well as the specialist, we construct and apply a parsimonious theory. We have nothing against detailed explanations of specific cases—indeed, we often build upon them—but sometimes they make us ‘miss the forest for the trees’. First things come first. Our theory is geopolitical in the sense that it focuses on the spatial dimension of international politics. This is often sadly neglected in IR theory, tending to forget the self-evident ‘ground we walk on’. We argue that EU- and NATO-mediated geopolitics prevail, but that ‘raw geopolitics’ tends to pop up at the fringes of the institutionalized Euro-Atlantic area. Moreover, the effects of past geopolitics seem to have sedimented in several states and to compete with contemporary geopolitics in their policy formulations. Although we have aimed towards the coherence of a monograph, the empirical analyses of the volume were made possible only by contributions from a number of leading scholars and area experts from various parts of Europe. We would like to thank them for accepting the editors’ point of departure for their analyses. We benefited from comments and suggestions at an authors’ workshop held at—and sponsored by—the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen in November 2003. Financial support has been offered by this institute as well as the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, in the finishing stages of the editing process. Apart from inspiration from our colleagues at home and abroad, we are grateful for valuable practical assistance from Anna Riis Hedegaard, Morten Lihn Jørgensen, Allan Lind Jørgensen, and Ulla Rødgaard. Copenhagen, August 2004 The editors

1 Introduction Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel The power structure in post-Cold War Europe has been unipolar, the one and only pole being a symbiosis between the United States and major EU powers. This symbiosis has affected the external and domestic policies of practically all states in Europe, be they members of the EU or NATO or not. Stability and democracy have been projected. The symbiosis has constrained, not least, the region’s non-pole powers. These are sometimes referred to as, for instance, the ‘small and medium powers’ which, as will be shown, is an analytically unfortunate label. European pole powers (‘great powers’) with their power projection ability have a better chance of influencing the overall integration process. If necessary, they can credibly threaten not only to leave common undertakings, but thereby also to reduce or even destroy them, should that suit their interests. In contrast, non-pole powers are at the same time more dependent on strong international institutions and less able to influence their decision-making. For this reason the non-pole powers share problems that are somewhat different from those faced by the pole powers. In spite of this, however, it has been corroborated in a range of studies that non-pole powers respond differently to the seemingly shared problems. Specifically, they have responded heterogeneously to their geopolitical challenges in post-Cold War Europe. This leads to the puzzle that this book aims to solve: if non-pole powers experience the same problems in regard to Europe’s political order, as assumed by prevailing theories, why do they behave so heterogeneously?

The objective: explaining the external behaviour of non-pole powers in contemporary Europe The objective of this study is to explain how the geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration affects the external behaviour of non-pole powers. Non-pole powers constitute a vast majority of European states and the number is growing. For instance, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia following the end of the Cold War added 11 new non-pole powers. Moreover, the possibility of further fragmentation, notably in the post-Soviet space, remains high (Fawn and Mayall 1996). Many of the new states have joined the European ‘good company’ through EU and NATO enlargements. By 2005, 22 out of the EU-25 should be counted as non-pole powers. The countries next in line, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Turkey, all qualify as ‘nonpole’ in the EU context, although Romania and even more Turkey are pole powers in other relations. The same general pattern is discernible in NATO. The proportion of nonpole EU/NATO members has been growing significantly. Although there has been an increase in literature on ‘small’ states in general and ‘small’ EU members in particular, there is no concise publication addressing the impact of the European power structure on the behaviour of the vast majority of European

The geopolitics of euro-atlantic integration

2

states.1 This volume seeks to fill that void. To be more specific, we do not aim to explain the Euro-Atlantic or European integration process as such, but instead how this process in turn affects the external behaviour of the non-pole states. The external behaviour of states includes here policies towards the EU—integration policy—as well as traditional foreign policies and their interaction. For reasons of manageability, we exclude the internal behaviour of states, although this is often an inherent part of their adaptation towards the power pole. This would belong to adaptation studies, proper (e.g. Mouritzen et al. 1996; Petersen 1998). Generally, realists have faced serious problems when trying to understand contemporary Europe in general and the EU in particular (see Wivel 2004). We believe, however, that we have found a way to make sense of the EU/NATO as a power pole and, hence, to study contemporary Euro-Atlantic integration and its effects on foreign policies from realist premises. Our power and states-as-actors focus make this volume a realist one. This goes hand in hand with our principle of theoretical parsimony, the ambition to ‘explain much by little’. In contrast to most modern realists, we re-introduce the notion of geopolitics, i.e. ‘the influence of geography on the political character of states, their history, institutions, and especially relations with other states’ (Hay 2003).2 Distance or spatiality being the fundamental category of geography, geopolitics should help us understand what distance between states (some of them being ‘pole powers’) means for their behaviour and the relations between them. Moreover, as noted in Hay’s definition, there is both a past and a contemporary aspect of geopolitics as well as a domestic one. One reason for our emphasis on geopolitics is the re-territorialization of international politics in the postCold War era. In this way our theory, the constellation theory, breaks with neorealism. However, it fits nicely into the broader realist tradition. In particular, our theory may be seen as an addition to so-called neoclassical realism. Although sharing the flaws of much American realism, the virtue of neoclassical realism lies in its integration of foreign policy theorizing with IR as a whole. Also, we applaud the limited but systematic role it ascribes to the domestic sources of foreign policy. This book makes three contributions to neoclassical realism. First, we expand it considerably by theorizing also on the non-pole powers, rather than solely the great powers.3 Second, we specify the effect of state location on foreign policy, thereby emphasizing the role of geopolitics (having received little attention in the neoclassical literature). Finally, we reformulate the concept of polarity in order to explain non-pole power behaviour.

What is a pole? What is a non-pole state? ‘Pole’, ‘great power’ and ‘small state’ are all contested concepts in the study of international relations. No consensus exists as to their definition, and even those who share a definition may find it difficult to agree on the identification of specific instances. Usually the concepts are defined in terms of the possession of power, i.e. resources ‘owned’ by the unit in question. Understood in this way, we are dealing with a continuous size variable. Delimitations regarding this variable may be made, in turn,

Introduction

3

according to absolute or relative criteria. In absolute terms, the dividing line between small states and great powers may be set at a population size of 20 million people, or a GDP of 400 billion euros. One may also construct elaborate indexes weighing together size of population, territory, GDP, defence expenditure and political competence/stability (see Joffe 1998; Pastor 1999; Waltz 1979; Wohlforth 1999). Whatever unit of measurement is used, a cut-off point is chosen on the scale. In relative terms, the cut-off point between great and small powers may be set at the top-10 in the world, or the top-5 in Europe, according to one of the above measurements. However, both absolute and relative criteria are arbitrary. There is no reason why precisely 20 million people should make a difference to the exercise of state power or why no. 5 in Europe should be characterized as a great power and no. 6 should not. We suggest an alternative approach (Figure 1.1). Rather than delimiting pole from non-pole states on the basis of the power they possess, we focus on the power they exercise (Goldmann 1979). ‘Poles’ and ‘non-pole states’, we argue, must be defined and analysed in a specific spatio-temporal context. Characterization as a pole or a non-pole state reflects the state’s position in this context—not attributes possessed by the unit (Mouritzen 1991, 1998a). This relational perspective means that a state may be weak in one relation, but simultaneously powerful in another. For instance, Turkey may be a nonpole state in Europe, but a pole power in relation to some of the Caucasian republics. Thus, pole and non-pole states are defined in relational terms rather than in absolute or relative terms. In contrast to systemic power structure, where the poles are delimited on the basis of relative capabilities, we operate with relational polarity, i.e. states (or alliances of states) with significant positive and negative sanctions in a certain territory. A hegemonic pole, a unipole, has even paramount positive and negative sanctions in this territory. In a grey zone, by contrast, there are two or more poles competing for power and influence. Power is exercised in relationships between one or more poles and the state, whose behaviour

Figure 1.1 Power criteria for classifying states.

The geopolitics of euro-atlantic integration

4

we wish to explain. A pole may carry a heavier ‘weight’ in one state than in the calculations of its very neighbour. For instance, during their first independence decade, the Euro-Atlantic unipole was stronger in Slovenia than in neighbouring Croatia, although both are ‘small’ splinter states from the former Yugoslavia. Relational polarity is our main explanatory device in this book. A pole, in turn, may consist of one or more closely cooperating ‘pole powers’ (‘pole states’). In order to qualify as such, they should be essential to the pole’s power projection and proper functioning in its sphere. ‘Non-pole powers’ (‘non-pole states’) are all other states. Should they choose to revise their place in the structure, the structure can still persist with unchanged contours. They are stuck with the Euro-Atlantic power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific relation to it is.

The puzzle: the non-pole states’ heterogeneity of strategy As being consistently the weaker parties in relation to one or more power poles, one would expect all non-pole powers to be strongly committed towards the establishment and consolidation of multilateral diplomacy, be it globally or regionally. Since the EU is the strongest and most realistic candidate ever in this direction, this commitment should be the clearest and most unambiguous in this case. However, European non-pole states have reacted in a variety of ways to the process of European integration. This heterogeneity is also reflected in the general foreign policy postures of the states. The Benelux countries were founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957. As early as 1948, Belgium’s Prime Minister at the time, Paul Henrik Spaak, became the first President of the OEEC. In opposition to most European governments at the time he promoted an expansion of the competencies of the organization and even the first steps towards a supranational Europe (Dosenrode 1993:182). By contrast, the Nordic states—often characterized as ‘reluctant Europeans’ or ‘the other European Community’—explored alternative solutions to membership of the European integration project. They did not give up their attempt to create a Nordic customs union until 1970 and the first Nordic country, Denmark, joined the European Community as late as 1973. Finland and Sweden only joined in 1995 and even today Norway and Iceland remain outside the EU. Moreover, the behaviour of the Nordic states has varied once inside the EU. Denmark and to an increasing degree Sweden have been reluctant towards further institutionalization, whereas Finland has participated eagerly and even promoted a more active role for the EU in relation to North-West Russia. Greece—much like Denmark and more recently Sweden—has preferred membership, but at the same time tried to limit its negative consequences for national autonomy. Until the turn of the century, at least, it has taken a different stance than the rest of the EU on matters concerning Turkey and Macedonia. Generally, Greece has been the ‘black sheep in the family’. Switzerland has remained outside the EU altogether despite the important potential for economic gains through membership (see Gstöhl 2002) and has, in contrast to other non-pole states in the region, pursued a foreign policy strategy emphasizing nonmembership of international organizations. These observations are concurrent with

Introduction

5

numerous findings regarding the heterogeneous behaviour of ‘small states’. This indicates a puzzling freedom of manoeuvre for these states, when in fact they ‘should’ be uniformly supportive of European integration.

The puzzle remains in prevailing theories Theories of European integration and international relations have a hard time explaining this heterogeneity. From economic theory we would expect small and highly industrialized states to be in favour of international institutions such as the EU (Gstöhl 2002:3–4; Mattli 1999:31–40). This is because regional integration allows small states to obtain benefits that are usually available only to large countries, i.e. economies of scale, increased competition and the opportunity to specialize. Furthermore, the benefits of integration are increased if the regional integration project is a major trading partner of the state, because membership allows the state to voice concerns over existing policy and influence new initiatives. This allows us to explain why some states are eager Europeans, but not why others are sceptical member states or reject membership altogether. Besides, it tells us nothing about the general foreign policy postures of small European states, except that they are expected to promote international economic integration. Integration theory—‘the theoretical wing of the EU studies movement’ (Rosamond 2000:1)—has problems explaining the behaviour of non-pole states as well. From neofunctionalism we would expect European integration to benefit from a process of ‘geographical spillover’. In this process more and more countries join the integration project as a consequence of the efforts of elites being adversely affected from their outsider status (Haas 1958). The thesis was extrapolated from the early smooth history of European integration. It does account for the geographical enlargement of the EC/EU, but hardly for countries refusing membership or those striving for membership and then once inside spending most of their efforts safeguarding their autonomy—sometimes promoting different foreign policies than those favoured by the Union. Liberal inter governmentalism, another prominent integration approach, focuses on the importance of the economic interest groups of the pole powers for the development of the integration project. The course of European integration is determined largely by the ‘grand bargains’ reached by the pole powers at intergovernmental conferences (Moravcsik 1998). Non-pole states, on the other hand, have little influence over the results. Their lack of relative power, most importantly their low levels of self-sufficiency and export-dependent economies, means that they are more severely affected by interdependence than the pole powers and therefore need policy coordination more badly. This intense preference for regional integration combined with only marginal influence on the pole powers means that they cannot credibly threaten to ‘go-it-alone’ or refrain from signing an agreement. At best, non-pole states may find themselves in a position to influence the distribution of side payments in return for support for a coalition of pole powers’ grand bargain. This may help explain why beneficiaries of the cohesion fund such as Ireland and Portugal have generally been more enthusiastic about integration than for instance the Nordic countries. However, it does not explain why a long-term net contributor such as the Netherlands is a constructive EU core country, whereas long-term net receivers such as Greece and Denmark are sceptics.

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6

Adherents of the multi-level governance approach find that the member states are losing power due to collective decision-making and supra-national institutions: decisionmaking competencies are shared by different levels, and domestic actors act in national as well as supranational arenas (Hooghe and Marks 2001). On the one hand, this erosion of state power may be good news for the weaker member states, because it reduces the importance of state power. On the other hand, the limited resources of non-pole states may leave them worse off, because pole powers may still dominate decision-making, but now without having to pay side-benefits to them. In essence, the multi-level governance approach is indeterminate and leaves us with little guidance on how non-pole states may react to regional integration and how it might affect their foreign policies. Theories of international politics do not fare any better when applied to the effect of regional integration on non-pole states’ behaviour. Neorealism presents us only with very general assumptions about European integration. Neorealists find that European integration is either a result of hegemony or balancing. To the extent that they analyse the actions of individual states, the focus is almost exclusively on the ‘great powers’, i.e. the United States, Germany, France, Britain and occasionally Italy (Grieco 1995; Joffe 1984; Pedersen 1998; Wivel 2000). Although one study seeks to explain why weak powers opt for cooperation even when this leads to substantial losses (Gruber 2000), it leaves us puzzled as to why other states reject membership and still others seem to promote a heavy institutionalization. Even though neorealism reluctantly and only in passing expects ‘small’ states in the close vicinity of ‘great powers’ to bandwagon (Walt 1987; Waltz 1979), the theory’s lack of specification makes it virtually impossible to apply its expectations on the behaviour of singular states.4 Although lacking a common theory, so-called small-state theorists have one important belief in common with the neorealists: that size matters. As for the neorealists a basic explanatory variable was the possession of power or, in their case, the lack thereof. As frequently pointed out by critics and small-state theorists themselves, it has proven impossible, despite an extensive literature, to identify any uniform pattern of behaviour characterizing ‘small states’: the size factor has been shown to have only a modest or negligible causal power of its own.5 Some have reacted to the lack of a uniform pattern by converting to idiographic studies of small states—like those practised by contemporary historians. While these often rich, empirical studies can solve our puzzle regarding their own particular case (‘the reason why state “X” did such and such was this or that circumstance’), they cannot solve our puzzle on a general level. Neo-liberal institutionalists explain how institutions facilitate international cooperation by increasing transparency and reducing the likelihood of cheating and thereby changing the cost-benefit analyses of states in favour of cooperation (Keohane 1989). However, their focus is on institutional design, not on the reaction to the design by individual states. They expect all states to react similarly to a particular institutional design. In essence, neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism provide valuable points about the sameness of great powers, but none of them are very helpful if we want to explain differences between the behaviour of non-pole states. Constructivists point to the importance of compatibility between the national and the EU level (Marcussen et al. 1999; Tiilikainen 1998). This may help us to understand why some states are consistently more reluctant Europeans than others, but—as pointed out by Gstöhl—‘it cannot explain the timing or contents of their policy decisions’ (Gstöhl

Introduction

7

2002:6). Thus it leaves us baffled as to why Sweden and Finland suddenly changed their preferences in regard to membership after the Cold War and why Sweden quickly returned to a sceptical position once membership was secured. Applying a slightly different type of constructivism, Wæver finds that ‘[a]n analysis of domestic discourses on “we” concepts like state, nation, “people” and Europe can explain—and up to a point predict—foreign policies and when applied to small states […] it explains mostly their dilemmas and problems’ (Wæver 2002:20). ‘Explain’, however, is an overstatement. When applied to non-pole states, the approach seems more appropriate to give us a more detailed understanding of the puzzle (What are the nature of the dilemmas?) than providing an answer to it (Why do states answer them differently?) The approach is more descriptive than explanatory. If pretending to be the latter, it tends to be circular. Considering this lack of explanatory power it is no surprise that studies focused explicitly on one or more non-pole states have opted for a combination of different theoretical approaches. For instance Ingebritsen (1998) in a major study of the Nordic countries and European integration finds that it was a combination of pressure from economic interest groups (as stressed by liberal intergovernmentalists) and geopolitical constraints (as stressed by realists) that best explained the policy of these states towards European integration. Likewise, Gstöhl (2002) in a study of the sceptical European policies of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland combines an analysis of economic interests in market access with political constraints stemming from the fear of political elites or populations that integration may lead to a loss of national identity or political autonomy. Other studies have refrained from detailed theoretical frameworks (e.g. Arter 2000; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998), or allowed for multiple or eclectic frameworks (e.g. Branner and Kelstrup 2000; Miles 1996). We believe that we have solved the puzzle in this book, while retaining reasonable theoretical parsimony. The most important general argument is that non-pole states’ behaviour can be explained as a result of their present and past locations (geopolitics). Lessons learnt from past wars and geopolitics are sedimented in layers of public and elite opinion and resurface in the formulation of subsequent behaviour, urging decisionmakers to emphasize autonomy6—more for some countries than for others. The present location, though, has primacy in relation to the past. It means, for Europe, the state’s ‘pole distance’ in relation to the Euro-Atlantic unipole, both literally and metaphorically in the form of political distance. The decisive question for each state is its ‘constellation’ in relation to the power pole: is it a core insider, a ‘near core’ insider, a would-be insider, or an outsider in relation to the pole (to be defined in Chapter 2)? As distinct from ‘raw geopolitics’, stressing power and distances to traditional great powers, this is EuroAtlantically mediated geopolitics. It constrains the state’s influence-capability and autonomy and, hence, its external behaviour. It constrains, specifically, how the state copes with its post-Cold War geopolitical challenges.7

A geographical grouping of European non-pole states How should we structure our study of Europe’s non-pole states? For practical purposes, we subdivide them into five manageable and reasonably homogeneous categories: the pole power neighbours in the geographical centre of the continent, and geographically

The geopolitics of euro-atlantic integration

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delimited groupings to the north, south, east and north-east. These groupings coincide fairly well with the states’ domestic/historical backgrounds (past geopolitics) and the post-Cold War geopolitical challenges that they have been exposed to. This should facilitate comparative analysis of how they coped with these challenges. The pole power neighbours include the EC founding member states of the Benelux countries, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. In addition to their geopolitical core position, they enjoy a certain prestige as EC founding fathers and display a prointegration attitude following from that role. A major post-Cold War challenge was to safeguard the EC institutions during the large-scale European transformation that took place. We have also included Austria in this group. The Austrian population experienced, like the Benelux, severe repercussions from the Second World War. Austria might have been an EC founder state had it not been for the Cold War and its restrictions on Austrian freedom of action. Moreover, Austria’s affiliation with Germany corresponds to the Wallonian linguistic/cultural community with France. Finally, Austria shares with the Benelux countries not only economic dependence on the pole powers, but also the historic challenge of how to cope with the nearby German pole power.8 The ‘EU reluctant’ north consists of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and to a modest extent Finland. Their common denominator is that their post-war societal developments have taken place to a large part on their own terms, often described as following a special ‘Nordic’ model, a ‘third way’ between East and West. This reality has been magnified by popular ideology, partly reflected also at the level of government, saying that ‘we have done it ourselves’, we have ourselves to thank for our welfare and mutual security community. The essence of this self-sufficient attitude can be found in all five countries, although it varies with historical circumstances and their resulting patterns of nationalism and with present geopolitical situations. The major geopolitical challenge for the north, affected in various ways by the great European transformations of 1989–91, was how to reconcile these self-sufficiencies with the requirements of the new European power structure. Apart from the French pole power as well as Spain and Italy (close to pole status), the south as here conceived consists of Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus. The EC entrants of the Cold War were relatively poor and had fresh experience of authoritarian regimes (not preventing NATO membership for some of them). They applied for membership in order to improve economically and politically. As these purposes materialized, the self-sufficiency of the north has hardly been present. We have also included Ireland in the present category, since the above description holds true economically for ‘EU rich’ Ireland. Moreover, peripheral and neutral Ireland—like southern Europe—has been only indirectly affected by the end of the Cold War. The major post-Cold War challenge to the south as well as the west (Ireland) has been that the EU centre of gravity might move north-east with the two enlargements. To the southern European countries, moreover, maintaining the stability of North Africa and (especially to Turkey) the Greater Middle East is a continued challenge. Probably related to it, major terrorist attacks have occurred in Turkey and Spain. In the eastern Mediterranean, the Greek—Turkish conflict was inherited from the Cold War. The east grouping includes the ex-socialist states that were part of the Soviet Cold War empire (Poland, Czechoslovakia—split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia— Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) and also a few that were integral parts of the Soviet

Introduction

9

Union (Belarus, the Ukraine and Moldova) or Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia). The primary post-Cold War challenge for the majority of them was to exit their old Eastern structures and to enter the major Western ones. Common to them was their willingness to distance themselves from their past regimes and, particularly in the immediate post-Cold War years, embrace a corresponding enthusiasm for Western values, i.e. those officially constituting the Euro-Atlantic pole. This ideological commitment and their lack of an alternative pole had given them, together with their relative poorness, weak negotiation positions vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic pole. In spite of their ideological commitment they all shared, more or less, a socialist mental and bureaucratic heritage. To the north-east we find the three Baltic countries with parallel geopolitical histories. The above largely holds true for them as well, except that as former parts of the Soviet Union they started without statehoods of their own (although with memories thereof) and with ex-Soviet forces on their territories. With their ex-Soviet geopolitical handicaps, memberships of the EU and NATO could at no time be taken for granted before they were actually invited, although they were eagerly supported by their Nordic neighbours. Although not all constellations are represented in each grouping, there should be reasonable opportunities to analyse, undisturbed by other factors, what constellation (‘core distance’) implies for states’ power position and how they met their geopolitical challenges.

The structure of the book The book is divided into four parts. Part I formulates a constellation theory pertaining to the external behaviour of non-pole states and outlines the major developments affecting European non-pole states. Chapter 2 presents the theory and outlines its implications for the ensuing analysis. Chapter 3 concentrates on the institutional dynamics of EuroAtlantic integration. In Part II we focus on the individual non-pole states. Each chapter deals with one of the groupings delineated above: the pole power neighbours (Chapter 4), the north (Chapter 5), the south (Chapter 6), the east (Chapter 7), and the north-east (Chapter 8). What are the geopolitical post-Cold War challenges to each of these groupings? The authors delineate the individual country approaches to the Euro-Atlantic pole and ask which role the pole has played as a constraint on their external behaviour. Which role has been played by historical foreign policy lessons, pertaining to the countries’ past geopolitical location? In Part III (Chapter 9), we synthesize the results of Part II and relate them to the theory. Part IV offers temporal and spatial perspectives on this synthesis. Chapter 10 analyses two realistic geopolitical scenarios for Europe and how they will affect its nonpole states. Finally, Chapter 11 discusses which theoretical amendments will be necessary in order to apply the constellation theory in other regions than Europe.

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Notes 1 On the relationship between European integration and small-state foreign policy, see Arter (2000), Bauwens et al. (1996), Branner and Kelstrup (2000), Hanf and Soetendorp (1998), Ingebritsen (1998), Katzenstein (1997), Miles (1996), Miles (1997a), Mouritzen et al. (1996), Petersen (1998), Sverdrup (1998), Thorhallson (2000) and Wallace et al. (1999). 2 Recently, there has been a growing interest in geopolitics resulting in a highly pluralist literature spanning from the re-articulation of the impact of geography on military power projection (e.g. Mearsheimer 2001) to ‘critical’ or even ‘anti’ geopolitics contesting the scientific and normative basis of traditional thinking (see Tuathail et al. 1998). 3 As noted by Rose, ‘the major neoclassical realist works to date have been narratives or case studies of how great powers have responded to relative material rise or decline’ (Rose 1998:154). 4 Recent discussions on neorealism’s lack of specification include Brooks (1997), Mouritzen (1998a: 6, 25), Rose (1998), Snyder (1996) and Wivel (2000, 2002a). On the use of neorealism as a foreign policy theory, see also Elman (1996). 5 For a survey and discussion of early efforts, see Christmas Møller (1983) or Rosenau (1981). Some turned to other definitions of ‘small state’, but hardly obtained more encouraging results. 6 By autonomy we mean defensive power, i.e. ability to avoid the influence of other actors (see Chapter 2). 7 A previous version of the theory was presented in Mouritzen et al. (1996) European Integration and National Adaptations. A Theoretical Inquiry, New York: Nova Science Publishers. However, the theory and analysis of the present book differ in important respects. First, we do not use adaptation theory. Second, European Integration and National Adaptations concentrated solely on the EU as a power pole. This focus was a reflection of the mood in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War when NATO might seem ‘over the hills’. However, since the mid-1990s, US presence in Europe is as marked as ever, and NATO is best characterized as the primary security organization in Europe. Therefore, the present book focuses on the importance of Euro-Atlantic polarity for the non-pole states in Europe. Third, whereas European Integration and National Adaptations focused on the early 1990s, for obvious reasons, the post-Cold War era has now given us one and a half decades of experience, roughly. Fourth, the selection of case studies was much more restricted in the previous book. 8 This heritage is also shared by Denmark, Poland and the Czech Republic and to some extent Switzerland. The three former are dealt with in other groupings. Switzerland is briefly analysed in the beginning of Chapter 9.

Part I Geopolitical theory and the rules of the game in Europe

2 Constellation theory1 Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel The aim of this chapter is to contribute to a theory of state behaviour. The theory applies to the vast majority of states, i.e. all non-pole powers. Its main assertion is that states are affected in very different ways by one and the same systemic or regional polarity, depending on their location (‘constellation’) in it. Constellation, therefore, carries the burden of explanation. The spatial dimension of constellation theory makes it a species of geopolitics. There are, in turn, several types of constellation theory. The one developed here applies to unipolar regional integration, i.e. the situation characterizing most of postCold War Europe. First, we clarify our concept of polarity in relation to the one advocated by neorealists and indicate how it can solve this book’s puzzle as formulated in Chapter 1. Then the rather unconventional polarity prevailing in post-Cold War Europe is analysed. We proceed to the concept of constellation and how it can account for individual states’ power positions and external behaviour (foreign policy). The basic theory is summed up in four separate theoretical propositions. Finally, we consider the ‘shadow of the past’: the effects of past geopolitics may sediment domestically and exert a restriction on contemporary external behaviour.

Polarity From a bird’s eye to a frog perspective 2

Neorealists explain international relations in terms of rational states striving to survive in an anarchic international system. Because of the anarchic nature of the system each state has to take care of itself. The ability of states to do so depends, first, on the relative material power of the state and, second, on the distribution of material power capabilities across the system, i.e. polarity. Neorealists stress two points about the nature of poles. First, poles in the international system are always states. States are the most powerful actors in the international system and, therefore, only the most powerful states can become poles. No other type of actor is able to achieve sufficient capabilities to challenge the strongest states. Second, in order to be a pole a state must achieve a high score across a number of different categories: ‘size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence’ (Waltz 1979:131). Thus, according to neorealist theory, a state cannot be a pole in the economic sector and a small state in the military sector, for instance; capabilities are seen as convertible. Polarity is characterized as multipolar, bipolar or unipolar, depending on the number of poles in the international system (ibid.).3 Neorealists exclude alliance

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formations from their concept of polarity; for instance, the pre-First World War system is conceived as multipolar rather than bipolar, although the powers had banded together in two opposing alliances. According to Waltz, this is because alliance formation is behaviour, and that does not belong to a purely structural theory. According to this systemic meaning of polarity, the prevailing power structure is best observed from a bird’s eye perspective. However, one may also—still within the confines of neorealism—zoom in on a particular region and describe the polarity prevailing there. Examples include, among others, European bipolarity during the Cold War, when Europe was overlayed by the two superpowers (see Buzan 1991:219–21) and European multipolarity before the Second World War, when Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Russia were all great regional powers. Regional unipolarity would be defined, correspondingly, as one actor with paramount capabilities in the region.4 Systemic and regional conceptions of polarity are snap-shots taken from above. In contrast, we turn the camera upside down. Polarity is viewed from the particular nationstate, whose behaviour we wish to explain. Of course, only a segment of the world can be caught by the lens from this particular perspective, but we maintain that it is this segment of the world which is most important for the behaviour of the state under scrutiny. The camera analogy signals that we do not operate with decision-makers’ perceptions of the state’s salient environment and its polarity, but with the salient polarity of a nation-state as it can be construed by the analyst holding the camera (although the two may coincide). Thus, we focus on relational poles, i.e. how the pole(s) constrain a particular state’s power position and behaviour—the latter’s environment polarity (Mouritzen 1998a: 34– 8). It is the pole sanctions that can be projected in this particular relationship that are important, not the pole’s aggregate power to act as a potential world leader, for instance (although this may of course indirectly influence the pole’s ability to sanction particular policies). We focus on the exercise (projection) of power rather than the possession of it.5 In environment polarity, a species of relational polarity, polarity is seen from the ‘receiving’ end. This is crucial when we embark on the explanation of state behaviour. The polarity prevailing in a state territory, its environment polarity, may be labelled unipolar, bipolar or multipolar, depending on how many poles are projecting sanctions in relation to it. The intriguing phenomenon is how such polarity may shift even between neighbouring territories. Counting environment poles, based on gross qualitative judgements, is no more difficult—or easy—than the counting of systemic poles. In contrast to neorealism, stable alliances may count as one pole, in particular if the powers involved are dedicated to the same ideology and have established common institutions. If a number of states have pooled much of their capabilities and prestige, as in the Euro-Atlantic pole, this pool may function as a pole vis-à-vis states. Seen from the viewpoint of a particular state, as in environment polarity, the main characteristic of its situation is how many divergent power poles can project sanctions to its territory. If two powers always push in the same direction, they constitute one pole, for all practical purposes. Solving the puzzle The non-pole states’ heterogeneous behaviour towards, first and foremost, the EuroAtlantic pole is the puzzle of this book. Apparently, only some ‘see their own best’ and

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work for an institutionalized world/region, in which the importance of traditional (great) power assets is virtually eliminated. As argued in Chapter 1, this puzzle has remained in prevailing scholarly traditions. The puzzle can now be solved, while respecting reasonable parsimony. Unlike molecules in a gas or consumers in a market, nation-states are mutually non-mobile. On a par with its (more or less mature) anarchy, this constitutes a fundamental property of international politics (Mouritzen 1998a: Chapters 1 and 2). Non-mobility means that each state faces a specific and stable neighbourhood, consisting of a few geographically adjacent units and their mutual relationships, rather than the international system as a whole. Powerful actors in the immediate vicinity of the state are of particular importance because power and incentive wane with distance from their home base, other things being equal (Boulding 1962: Chapter 12). In contrast to economic actors who may move to more favourable suppliers or markets, the state cannot drift away so as to acquaint itself with some new neighbours. And unlike pole powers, the non-pole state can do little to change its environment by military conquest or strategies of political and economic dominance. In essence, the non-pole state is bound to face its salient environment, whether it likes it or not. The essential traits of the environment are typically stable for whole ‘eras’, only seldom to be broken off by the dissolution of neighbouring units or great power wars. For these reasons the most important challenges faced by a non-pole state are likely to originate from its (geopolitical) location. Since there is no central authority powerful enough to overrule this regularity, even during mature anarchic conditions, it follows that each state’s salient environment will have significant explanatory power in relation to its external behaviour (see Morgenthau [1948] 1993:124–6). However, we do not seek to reintroduce geopolitics as a ‘single factor theory’.6 Rather, we seek to contextualize its fundamental insight and apply it to contemporary Europe.7 For the same reason of non-mobility, also transnational interactions like trade, migration, flows of refugees, tourism, mutual national jealousies, organized crime, epidemics or environmental degradation wane with distance (more or less), other things being equal. This means that they are most intense in the neighbourhood, a globalization trend in most sectors notwithstanding (Held et al. 1999).8 Accordingly, as states attempt to regulate these interactions, they will be dealing to a large extent with their neighbours or, at any rate, states in their own region. Location is equally important for all states, whether they are situated in a region characterized by peaceful relations or in one characterized by a state of war (Wivel 2000). However, the exact state location is, other things being equal, of greatest importance to the non-pole states (Mouritzen 1998a: Chapter 2). Pole powers—in particular the two poles of bipolarity9—focus much of their attention on each other, because they constitute mutual threats militarily, economically and technologically, given their capability and spatial reach. The two poles in a bipolar structure even constitute each other’s salient environments, almost symmetrically. In this regard, therefore, postwar bipolarity may be seen as an exceptionally de-territorialized period, whereas the post-Cold War era represents a re-territorialization, back to the normality of international politics. States ‘rediscovered’ their different neighbourhoods, and their agendas were differentiated accordingly. Local polarities, conflicts and cooperation proliferated. This

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tendency was exacerbated in regions with state fragmentations and, consequently, an increasing number of states. Of course, the events of 9/11 and the challenge of terrorism represent a countervailing tendency to some extent. However, responses to terrorism, like the US attack on Afghanistan in 2002, seem to follow the traditional logic of geopolitics, including the formation of alliances with nearby powers. Moreover, it is primarily the one and only superpower that is exposed to large-scale terrorism. With its almost global military reach, this is also the power that has transcended spatiality the most. The ‘responding’ terrorist needle pricks, in turn, must be equally de-territorialized in order to cope with a superpower. Non-pole states, even during bipolarity, are more bound by their (geopolitical) location than pole states. Does this lead to uniform non-pole state behaviour? No, quite to the contrary. Geopolitical locations are extremely divergent ranging from the distantly located state to the one in the centre of events; from the favourably located state to the state threatened by a great power neighbour, etc. Even though the non-pole states have a common interest in seeking to make anarchy more mature by supporting multilateral diplomacy and regional integration, where they are reasonably influential, this long-term effort always has second priority to the immediate concerns of their crucial, though diverging locations. ‘First things come first’; if this golden rule is forgotten, there may, in the worst case, be no long term to consider. Thus, the favourably located power may allow itself the luxury of far-sighted endeavours such as the creation of a stable institutional order, but paradoxically the non-pole state threatened by a great power in its close vicinity—and therefore in the greatest need of a strong institutional order—may have to appear the least enthusiastic about it in order not to provoke the great power. In sum, it is no surprise that it has been impossible to identify behavioural regularities for the non-pole states apart from the long-term aspiration to create an institutionalized and rule-governed international society.10 Indeed, it seems more surprising that the research puzzle has arisen in the first place, since it seldom pops up in everyday thinking about international politics. It arose mainly due to the influence of neorealist theory, and the latter’s strong inspiration from microeconomic theory, on the study of international relations. Neorealism’s microeconomic analogy entails that the international system can be likened to a capitalist market place. By this analogy the assumption of actors’ mobility—legitimate for economic actors—was unconsciously transferred to a realm where it does not apply. In addition, neorealism’s grounding in the special circumstances of the bipolar superpower struggle during the Cold War gave it an unfortunate blind spot in regard to the importance of location (particularly acute for non-pole powers) as well as other structural conditions (unipolarity). The simple fact that states have different locations—with strong implications for their respective external behaviours—supports our choice of environment polarity as the prime theoretical tool. This type of polarity, by its very nature, spells out the most relevant forces at work for a state, whereas systemic polarity is too vague and aggregate to bear implications for the behaviour of the vast majority of states. Even states subject to the same systemic pressures and situated in the same region experience different constraints depending on their exact location. A number of examples illustrate the importance of environment polarity. During the great European turbulence of 1989–91 and the early 1990s, we can discern a European

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stability spectrum: the further to the east, the greater the challenges and the ensuing state upheavals. In a study of six selected countries, the Netherlands represented ultrastability with a little nervous twitch upon the German unification. For Denmark this event meant a (temporary) reorientation of its European policy. For Finland the Soviet disintegation marked a foreign policy watershed. Poland went so far as to replace its socialist regime with a Western-type democracy, whereas Lithuania and the Ukraine were (re)born as nation-states in the first place. In other words, there was not one Europe challenging all states in the same way (Mouritzen 1996a: 262–3). Distance to the Soviet Union/Russia is the main key to understanding this stability spectrum. During the Cold War, the international system was bipolar with the United States and the Soviet Union as poles. However, as viewed from particular regions the picture was different. While Europe was bipolar, Latin America was subject to American unipolarity, and East Asia may be seen as multipolar with China constituting a third pole in addition to the two systemic poles. Today the international system is unipolar with the United States as the only power with systemic reach, but viewed from particular regions the picture may once again be different. For instance, it has been argued from a geopolitical realist position (Mearsheimer 2001) that Europe is still bipolar with the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia continuing as poles because of their ability to project power in the European region. Likewise, the power configuration may be characterized in one way at the regional level, but look very different if viewed from a particular state within the region. During the Cold War the European region was characterized by bipolarity, but for Poland the environment polarity was unipolar because of the overwhelming negative sanctions available to the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Polish territory. The same was the case for most other Central and East European countries. Between the two World Wars Europe was multipolar, but viewed from some smaller states along Germany’s borders, the structure approached unipolarity from the late 1930s (Berlin being the pole).11 Ignoring environment polarity may be problematic even for the explanation of the behaviour of pole powers or whole regions. After the Second World War, West European countries should, on neorealist balance-of-power assumptions, have balanced against the United States, the most powerful state in the international system, and have allied with the Soviet Union, since this was the weakest of the two superpowers in capability terms. Still, they allied with the United States, because the nearest and most threatening pole was that of the Soviet Union.12 Analogously, from neorealist premises we would expect the Chinese great power to support the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s. Even at the height of its capabilities, the Soviet Union was weaker than the United States. However, the period was characterized by Sino-American rapprochement. The reason was that the Soviet Union—because of the extensive border between the countries and its alliance with Vietnam—was the major power in China’s salient environment. The nature of a pole Neorealists focus on the possession of material power when identifying poles. We focus instead on power projection. How do pole powers project their power? Pole powers favour very different international orders and promote very different norms and values. For non-pole states facing a pole, the political project of the pole is highly important,

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because it influences the positive and negative sanctions that the pole is likely to use. Three factors are of particular importance. First, compatibility of the pole’s values and the values of the state in question is important, because the less compatible they are, the greater the like-lihood of negative sanctions. Thus, non-pole states are usually required to signal their identification with the fundamental values of the pole. They need to signal in their general strategy that they support the pole’s global/regional status quo and nurture no revisionist ambitions. Also, they need to signal in their specific choices that they adhere to pole preferences, if necessary by infringing on their own preferences. Examples at the global level include the Gulf Conflict of 1990–91 and the war on terror after September 11, 2001. In both cases the United States formulated the initial attacks (on Kuwait in 1990 and on New York and Washington in 2001) as attacks on the fundamental values of the order. The rest of the world was asked to join a coalition against the attack. Second, the specific ideological substance of the order promoted by the pole is important, because it influences the nature of the positive and negative sanctions likely to be used against other actors. A pluralist ideology is likely to be more permissive than an authoritarian or totalitarian one. The difference between the ways the United States and the Soviet Union managed their hegemonies during the Cold War exemplifies this point. The Soviet Union administered its part of the international system through traditional measures using military intervention and replacement of governments if allies experimented with alternative models of socialism. In contrast, the United States allowed distinct ‘Asian’ and ‘European’ models of capitalism to develop without American intervention. Of course, some of the US positive and negative sanctions were managed unilaterally, as with several coups d’état in the American hemisphere that were covertly or overtly US supported. However, positive and negative sanctions were also distributed through international institutions. Some of these laid down norms and regulations in the realms of economy and trade such as the OECD, the IMF and GATT. Others were security alliances in which the United States protected its allies from military attack in return for less tangible benefits. For example, ‘European dependence on a US-led NATO prevented US—EC trade disputes from escalating too far out of control’ (Guay 1999:69). Also, America’s allies tacitly accepted that the US financed its large trade deficits in the 1960s and 1970s through its monetary policy, thereby deferring some of the costs to American allies using the dollar as reserve currency (Gilpin 1981). Third, the pole’s level of centralization is important. Highly centralized poles are less prone to external influence than decentralized ones. Poles may be placed on a continuum of centralization ranging from highly centralized states such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, over open and decentralized political systems as in the case of the United States to an ultra-decentralized entity such as the Euro-Atlantic pole.13 With our relational and environment concept of polarity, we remember that a pole need not be one and only one state, but may also be a stable alliance of states.14 With this broader conception, of course, we open up a range of rather decentralized poles. Foreign policy Our revised assumptions of international politics and the ensuing emphasis we put on the peculiarity and explanatory power of each state’s (geopolitical) location means that we

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get a much more fragmented picture of international politics than most prevailing theories. Theories of international relations tend to focus on the overall nature of the international system, but it has very little explanatory power in relation to state behaviour (foreign policy). Thereby, we would argue, its explanatory power in relation to international politics, its alleged home-ground, is also modest, since foreign policy constitutes an essential subset thereof. Thus, in contrast to Waltz we do not regard IR and foreign policy theory as two distinct fields (Waltz 1979; 1986; see also Elman 1996; Mouritzen 1998a: 5–6; Wivel 2002a). A good theory must function adequately in both contexts, even though there are differences in emphasis between the two. Our redefinition of polarity has important consequences for its applicability to the study of foreign policy. Systemic polarity makes little sense if we want to explain the foreign policy of particular states, because its effect is distributed unevenly across the system. Uneven distribution takes place between and within regions. Whereas systemic and regional polarity only leads to very general expectations about international outcomes at the global or regional levels, relational and environment polarity allows us to investigate the foreign policy choices of a particular country.

The European power structure As a prelude to our theorizing on individual states’ power positions, this section analyses the post-Cold War European polarity based on our relational understanding of polarity. What is its nature and what are its general consequences for the non-pole powers? The post-Cold War systemic (i.e. capability) polarity has been stabilized as American unipolarity, the United States being the one and only remaining superpower.15 Hence, neither the EU nor any European state counts as a systemic pole. In addition, none of them constitute a regional pole in capability terms. The EU has so far only negligible military forces of its own, and one and a half decades after the end of the Cold War none of its member states comes even close to American military power in the region. Despite European weakness, the region is undeniably subject to its own dynamics in addition to that stemming from American systemic unipolarity. The respective capabilities of Germany, France and the United Kingdom would seem to imply that Europe is now multipolar. However, multipolarity often entails shifting alliances and frequent military conflict among the great powers (see Waltz 1988), not the ultrastable and progressive institutionalization of the region embodied in the European Union. In other words, the traditional concept of polarity based on capabilities does not account for the nature and logic of contemporary Europe. The concept of relational polarity may help us here. Focusing on power projection, rather than power possession, allows us to identify the power(s) able to distribute positive and negative sanctions across the region. In contemporary Europe, a symbiosis between the EU and the United States constitutes the one and only pole. Four states are essential for the existence and functioning of the Euro-Atlantic pole: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. These pole powers are essential, because only they can transform the structure. Germany and France are usually seen as the engine driving the integration process through a series of grand bargains. If they should decide to cancel their axis, there is simply no political Europe (EU). This is due to their combined—and to

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a large extent complementary (Pedersen 1998, 2002)—capabilities and to their geographical and psychological centre positions on the continent. American troops have been stationed in Europe since the Second World War, and even today the United States continues as Europe’s main provider of ‘hard security’, most often distributed in the framework of NATO. The American security presence stabilizes the region inside and outside the Union and allows the European powers to avoid—or at least postpone—the discussion of some of the most difficult questions related to a common European defence. The United Kingdom plays an essential role for the preservation of the close relationship between the United States and Europe by reminding the other pole powers of the shared understandings and mutual interests on both sides of the Atlantic.16 Several developments have led to the symbiosis. First, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union left the EU unchallenged as the main provider of economic and political power in Europe. This process was reinforced by the strengthening of EU institutions and policies from the Single European Act in the mid1980s over the Maastricht Treaty to a Constitution agreement in 2004. In fact, the Political Union inherent in the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 was very much a reaction to the end of the Cold War. In particular, the reunification of Germany created a need for Einbindung, the institutional binding of a future powerful Germany (see Baun 1996; Grieco 1996; Zelikow and Rice 1995). In spite of popular scepticism and resistance in some countries, the Treaty stands out as the single most important event in this development, because it showed the willingness of the European pole powers to surrender autonomy in one of the essential components of state sovereignty, coinage, and commit themselves to further institutionalization. The subsequent implementation of the EMU and the development of a European foreign and security policy from the early 1990s have been contributions to the strengthening of the European leg of the EuroAtlantic pole, although no substantial convergence in European foreign policies can be discerned. Despite this development the United States continues as the main provider of hard security in the European region. With the enlargement of NATO and the reluctance of most European countries (except Britain and France) to revive their defence budgets, the United States continues as an essential part of the European power structure. Historically, the US military presence in Europe was an integral part of the Cold War continental overlay (Buzan 1991). The US stationed between a 100,000 and more than 360,000 American troops permanently in Europe and took a leading role—militarily, politically, economically and technologically—in NATO in order to contain the Soviet Union. This transformed the security dynamics of the region and provided the political and economic stability necessary for the European states to cooperate (Joffe 1984; Wivel 2000). The crucial moment came as bipolarity melted away. At first, the US took a somewhat passive stance towards the transformation of Europe, and there seemed to be an emerging consensus at the time that NATO—created in the Cold War to contain an enemy no longer in existence—would be obsolete in a transformed and undivided Europe. Even though the Cold War had left the EU without military capabilities of its own, the EU seemed to be an almost ideal security institution for many states in the immediate postCold War era. It covered almost all of the issues prominent on the wide agenda of the post-Cold War security order. Its only weakness was in the realm of traditional, military

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security, but since no military threats or significant military tasks were in sight this was seen as unproblematic by most non-pole powers (Wivel 2005). However, the Yugoslav civil war in particular made it evident that the EU could not act alone militarily, even on its own ‘doorstep’. Today the EU continues to be dependent on the United States for its military security. Despite progress in the development of a common European security and defence policy, a consensus persists that NATO ‘take charge of any situation that poses a serious threat to European peace and security’ (Brenner 2002:74). This consensus rests on the fact that the EU—despite its efforts—is still not able to act alone as an effective peacemaker in the European region, let alone to defend the territories of its member states. Thus, even though all EU states (except Denmark) have now committed a number of troops and military equipment to a European force, European military capabilities are still insufficient for the defence of Europe. For these reasons the strength, durability and actions of the EU continue to be closely interwoven with developments in the transatlantic relationship, most importantly the institutional development and enlargement of NATO. With the possible exception of the immediate post-Cold War period, the EU alone does not fulfil the requirements for a unipole: an actor with paramount positive and negative sanctions vis-à-vis the states in its sphere. The EU has paramount positive sanctions vis-à-vis states in the European region, because it controls access to its ‘internal market’—the world’s largest—and to the prestigious label ‘Europe’, signalling the ‘good company’, but it does not have paramount negative sanctions at its disposal. A continued dependence on US negative sanctions— i.e. military means—still prevails. The pole base The American military and political presence in Europe is essential to the pole. Historically, the US presence, in combination with the Soviet threat, were indirectly the precondition of the Franco-German Axis and, hence, the EC/EU. This is so, because the US tacitly limits intra-core rivalries between Germany and France. There is no competition for primacy among the European powers as long as the United States is engaged in the region, because America is an undisputed number one (see Joffe 1984; Mearsheimer 1990). Over the years France and Germany have lowered their mutual guards, as Western Europe has gradually developed into a security community under the US umbrella. Although the substantial amount of prestige and money invested by the pole powers makes an EU rollback unlikely today, more pronounced German—French competition would result from the absence of the United States in Europe. The United States exercises an indirect influence on the norms, rules and regulations of the EU. This is particularly important in regard to security affairs and enlargement. In security affairs, the Europeans are dependent on a continued American interest in the development and vitality of NATO despite the lack of a traditional, military threat after the Cold War. What the EU is allowed to do as a security actor depends on the development of America’s continental commitment. Indirect American influence may increase with the present and future rounds of enlargement. On the one hand, new members strengthen the European part of the Euro-Atlantic pole by extending the EU’s power projection into the former Soviet sphere of interest and further solidifying the importance of the European market and the EU’s claim to represent all of Europe. On the

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other hand, most of the new member states are staunch supporters of the American world order. They are all non-pole powers with an interest in a continued American commitment to Europe in order to balance the most powerful continental states. For these reasons, they are likely to block developments of a more autonomous international presence of the EU if this is perceived as a challenge to the United States. Also, the United States exercises a direct influence by attempting to influence particular rules and institutional developments in the EU, most importantly issues regarding market access, enlargement and the development of a European security and defence policy. The United States and Europe are the two most important actors in the WTO. The agreements reached between them have direct implications for the access to and regulation of the European market place. Disputes regularly result in trade wars with implications for the economy of EU member states. In security affairs, the United States has intervened on a number of occasions to influence the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP) in order to prevent the entrapment of the United States in the process. Direct American intervention in the enlargement process has been rare and supportive, but the US President made a direct intervention in favour of Turkish EU membership during the EU summit in Copenhagen in December 2002. Despite this influence, mutual divergences between the United States and the EU continue to influence the transatlantic relationship. These include trade disputes within the framework of the WTO, disputes regarding environmental protection in general and the Kyoto agreement, in particular, the Middle East conflict including the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and the Iraqi conflict (see Chapter 11). More importantly, the general approaches of Europe and the United States to the governance of international affairs seem to be diverging with Europe emphasizing the increased importance of international rules and institutions and the United States emphasizing the continued importance of power and interest (see Kagan 2003). Would not this state of affairs be better characterized as ‘bipolar’ than as symbiotic and, hence, unipolar? No, until 2002–03 at least (see Chapter 11), the United States and the EU nurtured a common interest that was more highly prioritized than the divergencies, despite their differences. This common interest seems to have been stability and democratic consolidation in Europe. The divergencies were only allowed to flourish in regard to issues that could be insulated from this common interest. Divergencies that cannot be insulated in this way may threaten the symbiosis and, hence, the current Euro-Atlantic unipolarity. This is first and foremost the divergence between French interests, notably, in an independent European security and defence policy and the US interest in preventing this. However, there is a strong Atlanticist wing in the EU that shares the US view that European defence should preferably be established within NATO and should, at any rate, not duplicate NATO’s efforts. That is to say: the EU should not develop into a military actor in its own right and even less into an independent power pole in international politics, perhaps even rivalling the US pole. The UK and certain minor European powers that risk being marginalized in an independent and strong EU defence union—in reality perhaps approaching a German—French defence condominium—are likely to take this view. The UK with its Atlantic off-shore position sees the most prominent role for itself as a Euro-Atlantic bridge-builder—its role for most of the post-Cold war era. The French, on their part, tend to regard British Atlanticism as an American ‘bridgehead’ in Europe.17

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The pole superstructure Apart from these naked power relations among the pole powers, a large group of nonpole states are affiliated with the pole through the EU and NATO. If the pole powers form the base, the non-pole powers are linked to this base by an institutional superstructure. Already from the outset, before it constituted a pole, the Franco-German axis was backed by a group of

Figure 2.1 The Euro-Atlantic power pole. states in the form of the EC. This group of states applauded Franco-German cooperation to avoid another war in Europe and, thereby, legitimized the axis. This entailed farreaching cooperation in several low politics fields. The EC and later the EU—with their formal rules, complexity and supranational ideology—tend to blur the naked pole power relations; they function much like a superstructure in relation to its base (see Figure 2.1 and further in Chapter 3). This construction is a peculiarity compared with traditional power poles in international politics. The EU is ultra-decentralized in the sense that it has very low selfcontrol, i.e. control over its own subunits (Mouritzen 1997a: 98–101). There is no single state or institution with decision-making powers akin to a state executive. The EU does not consist of one, but—by 2004—25 pluralistic member states depositing important aspects of their autonomies in a set of common institutions, most importantly the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Moreover, one of the pole powers, the United States, is not even a member of the Union. Outside actors, including member governments, may play off various EU subunits against each other: member states mutually, governments vs. their civil societies, or member states vs. the Commission. Sub-state actors may by-pass their states and influence the EU process directly. Even the Commission itself has low self-control. Individual commissioners are dependent on their own national governments for an extension of their term in office. Lobbying, therefore, has a particular stronghold in the EU, the Commission being an essential target. It is penetrated not only by national public representatives, but also industrial elites, agricultural representatives and other elite groupings (Gardner 1991). Over the past decade two contradictory developments have influenced the self-control of the EU. On the one hand, the influence of the Commission—which played a key role in the reinvigoration of European integration in the 1980s—was reduced owing to

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internal scandals in the 1990s and the recent emphasis on high politics. This has reduced the self-control of the EU, as the Council of Ministers has gained influence at the expense of the Commission. By its very nature the Council of Ministers is extremely decentralized, because it is the forum of government representatives. Coalition-building is issue-specific and unstable and, therefore, no state or coalition of states has been able to centralize power. On the other hand, the increased use of majority voting at the expense of unanimity has increased self-control. The weakness of the Union in security and defence affairs and the importance of the United States allow NATO to play an important role as well. This decreases the selfcontrol of the Euro-Atlantic pole even further. Even though most members of the EU and NATO are members in both entities, some states are only members of one of them, and most states prefer one over the other as their primary security organization. Moreover, the intergovernmental construction of NATO reinforces the decentralized nature of the EuroAtlantic pole. Implications for the non-pole powers The nature of the Euro-Atlantic pole has important implications for Europe’s non-pole states. Three general consequences can be discerned. First, the decentralized nature of the pole means that prescriptions for acceptable foreign policy behaviour are rather vague. Regarding stability and democratic consolidation in Europe, i.e. the common interest of the symbiosis powers, the US and the EU prescribe with approximately the same weight—and probably along the same lines (in purely military matters the US voice is the most important). In matters outside this common interest, EU positions can, by and large, be operationalized as the pole prescriptions—also in case of divergent EU and US voices. Again, however, the decentralized nature of the Euro-Atlantic pole means that almost any prescription is negotiable, at least for EU members. Second, Euro-Atlantic power projection is often exercised by economic means, i.e. by the provision of economic sanctions (as a punishment) or market access (as a reward). These positive and negative sanctions are felt gradually and in the long-term instead of an immediate threat to state or regime survival. The Euro-Atlantic pole has two more powerful measures at its disposal. First, states outside the superstructure may be rewarded for promoting and safeguarding the basic values of the pole and the stability of the region. The main rewards for this stability projection are EU and NATO memberships. Second, states challenging the stability of the region and its core values may be punished by military action as in the case of Serbia during the war in former Yugoslavia. Finally, inertia and sometimes paralysis follow from the low self-control of the pole. The main implication following from this for the non-pole powers is that rewards and punishments may be distributed with significant delay or not at all. The internal negotiations of the pole are likely to influence the outcome and hinder a perfect fit between the actions of the non-pole powers and the response by the pole. Thus, low selfcontrol makes the pole less reliable as an enemy and as a friend. This section has identified the contemporary European power structure as EuroAtlantic unipolarity and analysed the nature of the pole and its general implications for the non-pole powers. However, the most important implications of Euro-Atlantic

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unipolarity for the non-pole powers vary with the location of the states. Therefore, we now turn to a discussion of the different types of location in contemporary Europe.

The European constellations Except for the few states that constitute systemic power poles, states are located in constellations. We define constellation as the non-pole power’s ‘basic set of relationships to the strong powers in its salient environment’ (Mouritzen 1991:218). Constellation bridges the gap between polarity and each state’s specific salient environment. It rejects the assumption that all states face the same polarity, but at the same time it does not fall prey to the temptation of saying that each salient environment is unique. Constellation explicitly links the state to its salient environment. The constellation typology depends on the specific relational and environment polarity under investigation. Constellations during bipolarity may be characterized by ‘symmetry’ or ‘asymmetry’ between the two poles, the latter including an alliance relationship. Theory can be formed on this basis.18 Unipolarity gives rise to some form of hegemony, pole-periphery, or dependency typology and corresponding theory (see Figure 2.2). A subtype of this condition is unipolar integration, to which we shall now turn. How do we identify the relevant constellations in Europe today? As indicated, it is possible for states to become closely affiliated with the Euro-Atlantic unipole by attaining formal membership of its superstructure,

Figure 2.2 Levels of theory. i.e. the EU and NATO. Many states strive for such membership, and practically none wishes to leave it. During dynamic deepening phases some states choose to dissociate themselves from selected aspects of the core, but never more than that. Therefore, the relevant constellations will be identified in accordance with the states’ institutional affiliation with the EU and NATO. We distinguish between four constellations: • Core insiders • Near-core insiders • Would-be insiders

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• Outsiders The core insiders are the non-pole states that are EU members and NATO members and have no opt-outs or corresponding reservations in any of these contexts. The near-core insiders are EU members, where one or more of these conditions are unfulfilled. For instance, they may have stayed outside NATO (like Ireland) or negotiated specific optouts in the EU context (like Denmark). The would-be insiders are potential EU member states in that they see membership as desirable and realistic, be it in the near or mid-term future (a decade). The outsiders are those that either do not want membership in the first place (Voluntary outsiders’), or realize that their possibilities of obtaining it are negligible within the nearest decade or so (‘resigned outsiders’). Finally, there may be those who, in spite of pessimistic prospects, do nurture some wishful thinking (‘aspiring outsiders’).19 In geographical terms, there is reason to believe in a centre—periphery relationship between the constellations, given the importance of contiguity for integration. Other things being equal geopolitical, geoeconomic and geocultural factors all support that integration is first attempted between proximate states (e.g. Wiberg 1996a: 49). The insiders form a European core and ‘near core’ (see Figure 2.3; the latter being a northern ‘fog bank’), the new 2004 insiders form a third layer, the would-be insiders constitute a fourth layer, whereas the outsiders constitute an outer fringe. How do states—in view of their literal non-mobility—move from one constellation to another, i.e. approach or distance themselves from the core? The answer is that it is the pole, or rather its superstructure, that is moving, i.e. growing with the enlargements. Romania, for instance, has come to border the pole superstructure from 2004. Thereby, Romania’s salient environment has become increasingly unipolar, irrespective of the country’s own status. This stipulation of constellations is hardly uncontroversial. We believe that EU affiliation is the primary factor determining European states’ influence-capability and action space. NATO affiliation is also seen as important, but secondary in comparison. Both types of affiliation are crucial in the sense that they represent the ‘good company’ in Europe, the Cold War winners. Therefore, both are important for a state’s prestige and, hence, its influence-capability. However, the EU has a finalité, an integrationist ideology that is absent in NATO. Already in its present form, the EU represents a sharper curtailment of states’ autonomy than intergovernmental NATO. Moreover, with its spectrum of issue areas, the EU covers virtually all spheres of societal life, whereas NATO is primarily relevant for the politico-military sphere. However, we have integrated the latter in a way that was absent in a previous theoretical effort (Mouritzen et al. 1996): in order to belong to the ‘core’ rather than the ‘near core’, NATO membership without reservations is required.20

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Figure 2.3 European constellations (2005). In constructing this classification, we assume that power is, in principle, convertible between issue areas rather than issue-area specific (see Waltz 1986). In day-to-day politics states may allow each issue area to follow its own immanent logic, but when high politics is at stake, power becomes increasingly convertible and issue-neutral categories like prestige and reputation, or lack thereof, gain in importance. For instance, Denmark had to compensate for its EU exemptions of 1993 through a high NATO profile, thereby assuming convertibility between the two contexts. As Turkey attempted to make its way into the EU membership queue in 2002, the country’s reputation as a loyal NATO ally for half a century was played as a trump card. The US was brought in to make the Europeans focus on the broad geopolitical outlines, rather than some ‘bits and pieces’ requirements of the EU Commission. In addition to convertibility, technical spill-over between issue areas may play a role. For instance, a country’s NATO-acquired skills may be argued to be useful in relation to the emerging EU common security and defence policy. Furthermore, we expect constellations to matter not only in relation to the pole(s), but also in relation to other states, i.e. it is expected that constellation prevails also in other relationships in the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole states in general. As an example, Russia actually classifies East European states according to their position vis-à-

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vis the EU, i.e. approximately our constellations here (Mangott 1999). One can expect, therefore, that the mutual relationships with Russia will differ with constellation. How can EU insiders be subject to Euro-Atlantic unipolarity? Are the insiders not so close to the pole that they, for all practical purposes, must be regarded as an inherent part of it? The answer depends on the type of issue at stake. Whereas Florida or Alabama have zero autonomy vis-à-vis Washington regarding US external behaviour, because it is simply beyond their competence, the EU member states have retained their independent foreign policies. Common foreign and security policy decisions (CFSP) are intergovernmental—not supranational—and even though some flexibility has been introduced in order to improve the effectiveness of the decision-making process, strategic decisions still require unanimity. This implies that on any particular question an individual insider may decide for itself where its interests diverge from the rest, whether it will acquiesce in order not to be ‘difficult’, whether it will attempt to persuade other insiders to revise their positions, or whether it will simply veto a common position, so that every state implements its own policy. Deciding among such alternatives may justifiably be seen as autonomous behaviour vis-à-vis the pole. Regarding issue areas, where the Community method prevails as in trade policy, for instance, the insider has to comply with the common policy decided by qualified majority voting, no matter whether it voted for or against the initial proposal. In these cases, the state is an integrated part of the pole, and also perceived as such from outside. Still, insiders may exert influence on the common decisions before the vote and thereby prevent or at least ameliorate proposals that challenge important interests. If they are unsuccessful in this process, they may—in rare cases and after tough high-level negotiations—decide to retreat to ‘near core’ status, in particular regarding emerging policy fields.

The constellation theory of states’ power positions and behaviour The ability of states to achieve their external goals depends on the exercise of both offensive and defensive power. We define offensive power as influence-capability, i.e. the ability to influence other actors to do what they would not otherwise do. We define defensive power as autonomy, i.e. the ability to avoid being affected by the actions of others.21 This pertains both to the state’s behaviour and its structural attributes (i.e. the state/society ‘itself’). A state’s influence and autonomy typically vary according to changes in its salient environment. Sometimes these changes are initiated and promoted by the state, but for a non-pole power, pole powers are most often responsible for changes in its salient environment. Autonomy and influence may be increased or decreased at the same time by developments in the salient environment, but they may also be adversely affected. Participation in international cooperation increases influence over the cooperation partners, but decreases autonomy vis-à-vis the partners. In the case of integration— involving supranational institutions and decision-making by simple or qualified majority—the state will gain more influence, but at the same time lose more of its autonomy. Since maximizing national autonomy and increasing influence over its salient environment are important means to achieve security and welfare, every state faces a

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dilemma between autonomy and influence when participating in cooperative or integrative arrangements (e.g. Goetschel 1998; Kelstrup 1993; Mouritzen 1993; Petersen 1998; Wallace 1999). In regard to the constellations presented above, one might expect that influence increases and autonomy decreases as we move from the outsider constellation inwards. However, the trade-off between the two is complicated by the particular dynamics of each constellation. In order to analyse these dynamics we now turn to a discussion of the logic and characteristics of each constellation. The outsiders The unipole exerts considerably less influence on the outsiders than on insiders and would-be insiders. For the outsiders, membership is either not desired or not feasible in the short or mid-term future. Therefore, they are liberated from the kind of specific goodwill considerations that the would-be insiders are subject to (see below). However, there are broader patterns of dependency—economically, culturally or generally—that the outsider is subject to, albeit to varying degrees. As with Latin American countries visà-vis the United States, there is no alternative pole within reach that could provide beneficial ‘playing off’ opportunities. Still, the dependency is less than for would-be insiders, because of the outsiders’ relative geographical remoteness from the pole. Taken together, thus, there is leeway for alternative sources of behaviour, be they domestic or external ones. The autonomy of outsiders is likely to be considerable in relation to the European unipole; in particular, it will be much higher than for would-be insiders. Outsiders’ influence-capability, on the other hand, is likely to vary more from case to case, depending on other factors such as the country’s size (capabilities), local conflict patterns, or its affiliation to a prestigious international organization (like NATO, for instance). The relatively low level of pole influence over outsiders and the ensuing multiple sources of behaviour means that this category is rather heterogeneous (see Wiberg 1996a). Nonetheless, outsiders’ dependency on the pole may leave them in a dilemma between obsolescence and subjugation. If they aim to preserve their high level of autonomy, they run a risk that their national interests are viewed as obsolescent by the pole and its essential states; they are viewed as outsiders not only to the pole’s institutional affiliations, but as outsiders to its political order as well (e.g. the Ukraine, Moldova). However, if outsiders decide to give up part of their autonomy in order to receive at least some of the benefits of the pole order, this may lead to more or less subjugation, i.e. reduced autonomy without a corresponding increase in influencecapability (e.g. the EEA states; see Chapters 5 and 9). The would-be insiders The would-be insiders suffer from the lowest influence-capability and the most restricted autonomy (see Figure 2.4). In contrast to the outsiders, the would-be insiders wish to appear as natural future insiders, i.e. as ‘good Europeans’. Their behaviour will be a mixture of identification (with the pole values) and appeasement vis-à-vis pole preferences.22 They seek to abide by the rules and norms of the pole. Because of the

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asymmetry of the relationship, it is left to the pole in general and its essential powers in particular to decide when and how these norms should be adhered to. However, the requirements of the would-be insiders are not always made explicit. Often they will have to be anticipated by the prospective member state that tends to overfulfil them in order to signal its benign intentions towards the pole. Bandwagoning (as opposed to balancing) is at stake.23 This means that the stronger and more credible the pole (here: a ‘pole of attraction’ with mostly positive sanctions), the more it will be appeased. This tendency may be self-reinforcing, if others do likewise and ‘jump on the bandwagon’. Bandwagoning is strengthened by a competitive mechanism: other would-be insiders might manage to get first in the queue and, hence, delay one’s own membership for an indefinite time period. Such fear may lead to a goodwill competition that induces goodwill behaviour far beyond what the insiders have expected.

Figure 2.4 Autonomy and influencecapability in four constellations. This mechanism is closely related to the membership issue. In addition, there are the broader patterns of dependency mentioned for the outsiders. Only here they are stronger, since we are now geographically closer to the pole. This pattern of dependency is costly to break. This should further reinforce appeasement. As with the membership

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considerations, the dependency pattern will be a parameter not only for direct relations with the pole, but also for relations with third parties. The pole’s behaviour vis-à-vis third countries will typically be imitated or approximated. In view of these two powerful behavioural restrictions—membership concerns and broader dependency—there is no space for rivalling constraints, be they domestic or other external ones. Autonomy and influence-capability vis-à-vis the pole are both at a minimum. In addition, appeasing the pole and its essential member states takes up most of the would-be insiders’ diplomatic resources. Few resources are left for independent initiatives. Would-be insiders are caught in an acute goodwill/credibility dilemma. They need to safeguard their goodwill among the insiders, but at the same time to signal a credible firmness in order to limit the concessions (see Mouritzen 1988:75–9). The dilemma arises because too strict adherence to credibility may reduce or even jeopardize the chance of membership. And too much goodwill behaviour may be self-reinforcing and result in a public backlash against membership. The most important strategy to ameliorate the goodwill/credibility dilemma is to declare adherence to selected fundamental principles, be they national, regional or ideological (bastion defence). This strategy may be pursued alone or in cooperation with other would-be insiders. Thus, two or more would-be insiders may establish a sub regional platform by signalling their adherence to a common set of values (parallel action; see Chapter 10). The platform is not an alternative to the EU, but a bastion of basic preferences that should be respected. Examples of subregional platforms include the Nordic countries and the Visegrad countries. Two factors influence the durability of the platforms. First, the greater the chance of membership, the more likely is goodwill competition between the would-be insiders to undermine the stability of the platform. Second, some would-be insiders are more desired as future insiders than others. For instance, one that is likely to become a future net contributor to the EU budget is involved in less pronounced goodwill behaviour and sticking more to its bastions than one that is likely to become a net receiver (Wiberg 1996a: 48–52). The insiders The insiders comprise the core insiders and the near-core insiders. The following characteristics apply, in principle, to all insiders, but most markedly to the core insiders. They have their autonomy restricted by membership: they are subject to the rules and norms of the pole in a variety of issue areas, and they must accept EU partners’ influence on their own behaviour and society. However, in contrast to outsiders and would-be insiders, they influence the very formulation of the rules and norms as well as their specific interpretation. They can to a certain extent protect their autonomy through reinterpretation of EU directives to suit their own interests.24 In addition, they can exert influence on the whole of Europe by promoting the interests of domestic interest groups (e.g. Garrett 1992:541, 548; Haahr 1993; Moravcsik 1998) and exporting elements of their own value system. This is likely to be conditioned, in turn, by factors such as foreign policy tradition or traumatic events in the past (see below). Even though non-pole states have only negligible influence on the ‘grand bargains’ leading to revisions of the Treaty (Moravcsik 1998), they may have considerable influence on specific initiatives

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and policies of importance for their country (Arter 2000). Thus, on specific initiatives, the effect of size is modified by the equalizing mechanisms of the EU rules (e.g. the voting weights) and the importance of coalition-building. Given these broad parameters for the core insiders, we expect their behaviour to be heterogeneous as to substance. Their level of activity, though, should be high, as they try to exploit their high influence-capability, not least to pre-empt themselves being subject to directives not to their liking. These characteristics are to a large extent shared by the near core. However, this collection of states has been willing to refrain from some of their insider influencecapability in order to bolster their autonomy in one or more respects. Again, this may be due to domestic opinion, in turn conditioned by foreign policy ‘lessons’ from the past. The near-core insider has chosen to ‘lie low’ in one or more sensitive areas, and this has been accepted by the other insiders. The near-core insider enjoys the privilege that it can return to the group of core insiders should it change its mind.25 The near-core insider balances the core in selected issue areas (as opposed to band wagoning). In other words, it responds to a strengthened core, i.e. deepened integration, by loosening itself from it. However, the process of opt-outs may be self-perpetuating. The more countries are allowed ‘special arrangements’, the more are likely to ask for this favour for themselves. In turn, this process may undermine the institutions that shield them from the effects of unrestricted power politics. Summarizing the argument Approaching the core from outsider to would-be insider will have a homogenizing effect on different states. Be it Turkey or little Slovenia, the slightly humiliating logic pertains uniformly to the would-be insider category; the smallest nations may actually be the best able to cope with it. Then again, as insiders, the old divergencies may resurface. The outsider, striving for increased ‘influence on the future of Europe’ as an incentive for membership (often the reason given in public by state leaders), will have to go through a lengthy interregnum as a would-be insider, in which influence-capability drops. This is an unintended consequence of having chosen the ‘road to Bruxelles’. The theory presented here assumes constellation to be the permissive cause of states’ power position and, hence, behaviour. In other words, it may permit/allow domestic or other external factors to affect behaviour in the outsider or insider constellations (as efficient cause), or it may not (the allowance principle).26 Summarizing the theory from the outside inwards, its propositions can be formulated as follows: • Outsiders experience variable influence-capability and relatively high autonomy. Behaviour is heterogeneous, although passivity is a not-too-infrequent option. • Would-be insiders must live with low influence-capability as well as low autonomy. The predominant behaviour is bandwagoning vis-à-vis the European pole. • Near-core insiders have chosen a lower influence-capability in order to safeguard higher autonomy (than the core insiders). Behaviour is balancing vis-à-vis the European pole, with a low profile in selected areas. • Core insiders enjoy high influence-capability at the expense of curtailed autonomy. Behaviour is heterogeneous as to substance; the level of activity is one of highintensity.

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This expected pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.4.

The shadow of the past: historical lessons and domestic politics Our reasoning so far is based on a simple model (see Figure 2.5), according to which a state’s external behaviour is caused by its influence-capability and its autonomy. Both are in turn being conditioned by the constellation it is located in. This simple model will now be modified by the ‘shadow of the past’.

Figure 2.5 Our theory: the simple model. Much of what is usually seen as the role of domestic factors in foreign policy often turns out, on closer inspection, to be traceable to ‘lessons’ inherited from the effects of past foreign policy. Typically, these lessons originate in the most recent war. The decision-makers, the press, the attentive public and—regarding major traumatic events— the population in general learn lessons that persist through socialization and other mechanisms and exert a restrictive influence on future state behaviour, including foreign

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policy. Most importantly, the lessons of the past influence the priority given to national autonomy. In this way, external behaviour may be the product not only of the present constellation, but also of a past constellation—to put it crudely. A past constellation may co-determine not only what constellation a state is currently in, but also manoeuvres within the framework of the current constellation (see Figure 2.6). As we saw above, the outsider and the insider constellations provide liberal frameworks for such codetermination. Wallace (1999) has developed a plausible explanation indicating how the position of an insider’s past hegemon may co-determine its contemporary integration attitude. This will be presented in Chapter 9 together with empirical examples of its working.

Figure 2.6 Our theory: the refined model.

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The relationship between present and past geopolitics is seen here as that between dynamics and inertia (Mouritzen 1988, part IV). Inertia can be defined as ‘the factors that prevent, delay, or reduce change in response to pressure for change [the dynamic factors]’ (ibid.: 297). The historically sedimented impulses may respond to initiatives (dynamics) from decision-makers, decided in the light of contemporary geopolitics. If so, they will function as a force of inertia, delaying, reducing or in some cases even preventing the desired change of course. For instance, as Danish decision-makers wanted to join NATO in 1949 in the light of contemporary geopolitics (a Soviet threat, an Atlantic alliance opportunity), public opinion preferred a Nordic defence union, sedimented in the light of a century’s ‘lessons’ pointing in this direction. Denmark did join NATO in 1949, but a limitative alliance profile and subsequent compensations to Nordic cooperation could be ascribed, not least, to popular inertia. In summary, this chapter has outlined a theory of foreign policy behaviour during regional integration. The main argument of the theory is that the external behaviour of non-pole powers is mainly influenced by their constellation. The argument is based on the general insight that the most important challenges faced by a non-pole state are likely to originate from its geopolitical location. Thus, the concepts of relational and environment polarity enable us to study post-Cold War Europe on realist and geopolitical premises. This is actually a least-likely case for such premises having their origins in quite different historical contexts. Moreover, with our notion of the ‘shadow of the past’ (or past geopolitics), we keep a door ajar for historical geopolitical lessons filtered through domestic politics, even though primacy is ascribed to contemporary geopolitics.

Notes 1 A draft of the present chapter has been presented to the panel ‘Small States and the International System I’, 28th Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association, December 2003, and to the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, April 2004. 2 The most important theoretical statement of neorealism is Waltz (1979). More recently neorealist theory has been refined by, for example, Buzan and Little (1996), Buzan et al. (1993), Grieco (1990), Snyder (1996) and Van Evera (1999). 3 The original statement of neorealism (Waltz 1979) only dealt extensively with the logics of biand multipolarity. After the Cold War and the end of bipolarity, Waltz and other realists have discussed the logic and stability of a unipolar world order. See, for example Hansen (2000), Huntington (1999), Kapstein (1999), Krauthammer (1990/91; 2002/03), Layne (1993), Mastanduno (1999), Schweller (1999), Waltz (2000), Wivel (2000; 2002b) and Wohlforth (1999). 4 Some neorealists, most notably Kenneth Waltz, reject the notion of regional polarity. For a powerful critique based on realist assumptions, see Walt (1987:274–81). Buzan’s (1991) perspective is regional polarity developed within the confines of neorealism. 5 For an excellent discussion of different concepts of power in realist theory, including relative and relational power, see Wohlforth (1993:1–10). On relational power, see also Dahl (1957). 6 For classic realist critiques of geopolitics as a ‘single factor theory’, see Morgenthau ([1948] 1993:174–5) and Wolfers (1962:38). Recent realist analyses that place some emphasis on geopolitics include Mearsheimer (2001) and Walt (1987). 7 For a discussion of geopolitics and interdependence, see Mouritzen (1998a: 14–17). For a discussion of geopolitics and technological development, see Deudney (2000).

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8 Regarding migration, for instance, we even find deglobalization over the last century, due to states’ restrictions (Lindert and Williamsson 2001). 9 During multipolarity, by contrast, it makes a vital difference whether a pole power is situated between its competitors or at the fringe. The former may have to prepare for a two-front war. 10 When heterogeneous lessons of the past are added to this (see below)—in turn caused by divergent past geopolitical locations—it should be even more obvious that heterogeneous behaviour can be expected. 11 This was the case for Denmark, for instance. By contrast, Norway’s position was roughly bipolar between Germany and the UK, whereas Sweden’s was tripolar between Germany, the UK and the Soviet Union. 12 In Stephen Walt’s terminology (1988:280) the ‘balance of threat’ favoured an alliance westwards. 13 On the open and decentralized nature of the American political system and its implications for the world role of the United States, see Ikenberry (2001). 14 For weak non-pole states, particularly in the Third World, it may also be an international organization or a (mega) multinational corporation. 15 See the references in note 2. 16 It is debatable, of course, whether the UK is really mandatory as a ‘stepping stone’ to the US superpower. At any rate, the UK is an important facilitator for the Atlantic link, and it is probably mandatory in times of strained Atlantic relations. 17 Developments in the wake of the British defence initiative in 1998 (St. Malo) tended to blur this pattern. However, its fate is still in the balance. 18 For instance, during Cold War bipolarity we should distinguish between a symmetric constellation (between the poles), an asymmetric constellation (between a pole and a nonpole power), and an alliance constellation (between a pole and its allies). We could ask, then, for instance: how are states in the symmetric constellation affected by rising tension between the poles, or by shifting balance of power between them? The conclusion drawn from one study was that constellation mattered in these regards much more than did the states’ size, domestic politics, perceptions or other conceivable factors, see Mouritzen (1998a: 43–50). Whereas symmetric Sweden activated its behaviour during the ‘New Cold War’ from 1980, politically dependent Finland’s behaviour was deactivated simultaneously. In other words the two states, with roughly similar domestic systems and roughly equal size, reacted in opposite directions to the same systemic inputs. This was due to their being located in different constellations: a symmetric vs. an asymmetric one. 19 Of course, states bordering a rivalling pole sphere may be ‘symmetries’ (like the Ukraine) rather than Euro-Atlantic outsiders. 20 It could be considered, evidently, also to subdivide the would-be insider and outsider categories, since NATO membership undoubtedly constitutes an asset for states in these constellations. 21 This distinction is basically congruent with the philosophical one between ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’. There exists an extensive literature on the two aspects of power; see, for instance, Organski (1960:111–12), Knorr (1975:79–80, 86, 97) or Goldmann (1979a: 14, 33). 22 In terms of mode of adaptation: ‘adaptive acquiescence’. On this concept, see Mouritzen (1988). The author described the topic as intriguing since its narrow freedom of manoeuvre made it such an infrequent policy mode during the Cold War (‘Finlandization’). The irony of fate is that in the post-Cold War era, a vast belt of would-be insiders around the EU has practised this mode of adaptation. 23 Non-pole powers must choose between balancing and bandwagoning in relation to the power pole(s). Bandwagoning means supporting the pole perceived as a trend winner, whereas balancing means the opposite (Mouritzen 1998a: 51–3, 97–102; see also Mouritzen 1998b: 283–92). It is argued here that this trend definition is more logical and applicable than the

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status definition advocated by Labs (1992, note 2) or Walt (1992), meaning that the winner in absolute terms is supported. 24 This is, of course, subject to ECJ verdicts. 25 Of course, this is not quite so easy for those non-NATO members that suddenly might wish to enter the organization. However, EU countries are unlikely to face major difficulties in this process, although it may take some years. 26 The ‘allowance principle’ (or ‘control-relax model’) assumes that some factors are more basic than others in the sense that they allow or suppress their working (see Mouritzen 1998a: 93–6 regarding the primacy of external factors and ibid. (Chapter 8) regarding the relationship between issue-areas). At a given point in time, it may appear that the efficient cause is also the basic cause. Only theory-based studies and observations of longer timespans may correct such an error.

3 The institutional dynamics of Euro-Atlantic integration Finn Laursen, Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature and development of the institutional superstructure of Euro-Atlantic unipolarity. This is important because the Euro-Atlantic unipole is a membership pole (Mouritzen 1998a: 38). In contrast to other poles, it is not a state but a stable alliance where four pole powers have pooled much of their capabilities and prestige in order to pursue their common interests in the region, most importantly stability in economic and security affairs and the liberal-democratic consolidation of Europe allowing them to maintain their positions of power. The most important means of achieving this goal are the EU and NATO, and the effect of power projection on a specific non-pole power depends on its affiliation with these two institutions. By unpacking the nature and development of the institutional superstructure, the chapter serves as a bridge between the theoretical assumptions of Euro-Atlantic unipolarity and constellations in Chapter 2 and the empirical analyses of specific clusters of non-pole powers in Chapters 4–8.

The transatlantic relationship and its institutions after the Cold War This volume argues that Euro-Atlantic unipolarity has been a fundamental condition for the foreign policy behaviour of Europe’s non-pole powers over the past 15 years. The case for Euro-Atlantic unipolarity was made in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated here, but little was said of the development of the American—European alliance and its institutions after the Cold War. This development is important for understanding the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers because it allows us to understand the nature of the pole. Cooperation and conflict are both integral to the transatlantic relationship and this has been the case since the first international encounters between Americans and Europeans. The history of transatlantic relations is the history of enduring political crises as well as successful political cooperation and institutionalization. As interaction has intensified so has institutionalization and political disagreements. In the Euro-Atlantic area, the pole powers continued to cooperate after the Cold War. In the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the American-European alliance succeeded in stabilizing the region, ensuring its peacefulness and projecting liberal-democratic norms. The pole powers agreed that the central Euro-Atlantic institutions should be transformed and enlarged.

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Cooperation continues to take place inside the international institutions created in the Cold War, and today transatlantic relations are ‘embedded in a dense network of multilateral links’ (Wallace 2001:17), most of them created by the Cold War. Multilateral cooperation was supplemented by bilateral cooperation between the United States and individual European countries in selected issue areas and trade between the United States and EU member countries continued to grow.1 Even though the territorial threat to Europe has disappeared, the United States continues to keep a very large number of troops in Europe totalling more than 115,000 in 2004, approximately the same number as in the mid-1990s.2 Outside the EU—Atlantic area, the United States and the EU have continued to cooperate closely throughout the post-Cold War area in managing economic globalization and development through the World Trade Organization and the World Bank and in managing global security affairs, often through UN resolutions and occasionally through military actions such as the one in Afghanistan. After the events of 11 September 2001, cooperation was intensified on some issues, whereas disagreement dominated others (most notably Iraq). The aftermath of 9/11 has created the most stunning act of post-Cold War American—European solidarity, when NATO member states decided for the first time in the history of the alliance to invoke Article 5 of the Treaty in 2001 and the most severe post-Cold War crisis in regard to Iraq in 2002–03 (see Chapter 10). Even during and after the conflict over Iraq, Europeans and Americans continued to cooperate closely in economic affairs in the WTO agreeing on deregulation of international trade, while occasionally clashing over specific issues. Even more telling, American—European security cooperation through NATO inside and outside the European region continued without disruption in the form of crisis-management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, as well as its engagement in Afghanistan. In addition, the attacks also led to an intensification of practical cooperation on preventing terror in the future. Despite the continued strength and importance of the American-European alliance after the Cold War (see Chapter 2), the transatlantic relationship and its institutions have undergone significant developments. During the Cold War, transatlantic relations were shaped by the shared interest of the United States and its European allies in containing Soviet power and maintaining the stability necessary for the economic and political reconstruction and development of Western Europe after the Second World War. After the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union reduced the costs of disagreement. During the Cold War, the short-term security and survival of the allies would be threatened if the alliance were to break-up. With no conventional territorial threat to either the United States or the European states, transatlantic crises and disagreements have proliferated. The most important post-Cold War transatlantic disagreements took place in late 2002 and early 2003 when Germany and France openly dissented from the US policy on Iraq and refused to support UN legitimization of the American-led invasion. The crisis over Iraq seemed even more severe because it appeared in the context of increasing disagreement between the United States and most European countries—often represented by the European Union—over the rules and principles of the contemporary world order. Thus, in the years leading up to the disagreement over Iraq, transatlantic crises had evolved over the proper role of European security institutions and their relationship with

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NATO, the importance and value of the United Nations, the International Criminal Court and the role and significance of international law more generally, the Kyoto Protocol, the Middle Eastern Peace Process (including most importantly, the foreign and security policy of Israel), so-called rogue states, trade of bananas, steel, hormone-treated cattle and food made with genetically modified organisms, and the sensitive issue of how to respond most effectively to terror. In addition, as noted by Pond (2003:12), the aftermath of the Cold War has seen an increasing focus on ideological differences between the United States and Europe on issues such as the death penalty, abortion, privately held weapons, and the balance between economic equality and economic freedom in liberaldemocratic societies. These examples illustrate the range of American—European disagreements after the Cold War, but alone the occurrence of crises between the United States and the European pole powers is not necessarily evidence of a deteriorating alliance. Historically, crises between the United States and the European great powers have been a recurrent phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, before the first American military intervention in Europe in 1917, the rise of American power and interests combined with the expansion of European international society resulted in ‘conflicting ambitions in non-European parts of the globe’ (Kahler 1996:10). Transatlantic crises continued throughout the twentieth century and in particular after the Second World War despite the common interest of the United States and the West European states in containing the Soviet Union and maintaining stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.3 The 1956 Suez crisis, the French withdrawal from NATO’s military structure in 1966, the Vietnam War and Israel’s foreign policy (in particular in the 1973 October war) all created crises in the transatlantic relationship as did the differing strategies towards the Soviet Union. Thus, even though the post-Cold War era has been characterized by a number of disagreements within the American—European alliance, this was also the case during the Cold War. The difference now is that there is no comparable threat ensuring that everyone will eventually fall into line in order to preserve the alliance. The dissolution of the Soviet opponent had another fundamental consequence for the American—European alliance: it left the United States as the only superpower in the world scoring significantly higher on measures of military as well as general capabilities than any other state in the international system (see Wohlforth 1999). In contrast to the European pole powers and any other states in the international system, the United States is a genuine global power with interests all over the world. This means that comparatively fewer resources are spent on the European region than during the Cold War when Europe played a special role as centre of the bipolar conflict (see Wivel 2000: Chapter 5). More importantly, because of the reduced importance of the European continent for American security, the United States is now less willing than before to take into consideration the interests of the European pole powers (and vice versa). Thus, US foreign policy after the Cold War has gradually become assertive of American national interests in relations with allies first in its foreign economic policy and, more recently, after the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, in its security policy. In foreign economic policy, the Clinton Administration made economic security an important foreign policy concern and applied the zero-sum logic prominent in the Cold War’s military competition to the economic sector (see Wivel 2002a). However,

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assertiveness on foreign economic policy was combined with reassurance of allies of continued US commitment to their security (see Mastanduno 1997). Multilateralism was the preferred strategy to project American power and accepted by other states as a way of restraining and committing the United States (Ikenberry 2003:65). After 11 September the United States asserted its national security interests—even when they differed from the interests of its allies—more vigorously than before. The new security policy was made explicit in the National Security Strategy presented in 2002. The main goals of the strategy were to preserve the security and superpower status of the United States and to defend America’s and its allies’ liberal ideology against its enemies. In the words of the security strategy: ‘to create a balance of power that favours freedom’. These goals were seen as complementary, because using ‘America’s unprecedented power to remake the world in America’s image’ (Daalder and Lindsay 2003:123) would allow the United States and its allies to create a world of states committed to peace and freedom with no inherent conflicts of interest. While stressing the need to continue to cooperate with other states to contain the spread of dangerous technologies to so-called rogue states, the strategy also stressed the American intention to act against emerging threats even before they were fully formed and that the United States would not hesitate to act unilaterally if necessary. This approach contrasted with that of the Europeans, reflecting differences in power as well as threat perceptions. For the Americans, the ‘war on terror’ is a genuine war beginning with the attack on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Europe, as noted by Lundestad, ‘condemned the attacks; various security measures were taken, but then gradually life moved on as before’ (Lundestad 2003:274). They do not feel that they are engaged in a war but rather that ‘they are engaged in preventing one’ (Ivan Krastev quoted in Hassner 2002:30). Moreover, ‘[u]nilateralism hardly existed as an option for Europe—the European countries did not have the power and were too dependent on each other and the outside world for that […] On the question of “rogue states” Europe generally believed in dialogue while America preferred sanctions and isolation’ (Lundestad 2003:271). This difference was an important reason why the EuroAtlantic pole powers disagreed over Iraq in 2002–03, but it should be noticed that this was more of a European than a transatlantic disagreement (see the state distribution in Chapter 10). Moreover, while the shift in American strategy towards its enemies lowered the influence of its friends on actions in the non-European parts of the world—summed up in Defence Secretary Rumsfeld’s argument that ‘it is the mission that determines the coalition, not the coalition that determines the mission’—cooperation continued in Europe, where most non-pole powers had faced Euro-Atlantic unipolarity after the Cold War (see Chapter 2). In economic affairs, cooperation often became easier, because the Bush administration relaxed many of the unilateral sanctions imposed on different countries during the focus on ‘economic security’ in the 1990s (Lundestad 2003:270). A final consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet Union for the American— European alliance was the need for institutional transformation. After the Second World War, the United States and the European pole powers developed an ever closer and still more institutionalized relationship, laying the foundations for the institutional superstructure of the Euro-Atlantic unipole, which most non-pole powers would face after 1989. The United Nations (1945), the World Trade Organization (1948 in the form of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the Organization for Economic

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Cooperation and Development (1948, in the form of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1949) and the European Union (1952, in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community) were all founded in the early Cold War years. The institutionalization of the American—European alliance was important because it created a unique organizational infrastructure allowing allies on both sides of the Atlantic to contain differences and handle them within their proper institutions through dispute settle mechanisms. Differences over security policy are rarely allowed to spill over to economic affairs (e.g. leading to trade wars or economic sanctions) and none of the long series of economic disputes ever resulted in a military confrontation between the United States and its European partners. None of these states ever left any of the institutions. Even when France withdrew from NATO’s military structure, it continued its military cooperation with the United States and NATO codified in a series of agreements minimizing the practical importance of the withdrawal. In addition, institutional membership served as a constant reminder of the compatibility of values between their member states by their explication of the ideological foundations of the organizations, their aims and membership criteria. The end of the Cold War left this institutional structure virtually unchanged. Despite the transformation of Euro-Atlantic relations due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, cooperation continued and was even expanded in some areas. However, reform was necessary if common institutions were still to provide the organizational infrastructure for furthering common interests as well as solving or at least containing differences in a radically changed security order. In the Euro-Atlantic area, two institutions were particularly important for the governance of international affairs in general as well as the specific foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers: the European Union and NATO (see Chapter 2). Both institutions have been transformed as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the new security environment, allowing both organizations to expand and at the same time necessitating institutional change.

Institutional changes in the EU: pole powers vs. non-pole powers in recent treaty reforms Institutional issues have been important components of recent EU treaty reforms since the end of the Cold War. Institutionally the big difference between NATO and the oldest components of the EU, the European Communities (EC), is the ‘supranational’ character of the former and intergovernmental character of the latter. But the EU formed by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 added two intergovernmental pillars, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) to the preexisting EC. CFSP especially is highly relevant for the geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration, and some of the discussions between the European pole powers and the USA have been related to security policy, in particular the plans for a European defence policy. The big institutional debates in connection with recent treaty reforms in the EU have most often been issues of representation and voting that relate to the supranational first pillar. Improving the second pillar was also on the agenda through the Amsterdam and

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Nice Treaty negotiations in 1996 and 2000, respectively, but reforms were more limited. The Council of Ministers can make decisions by a qualified majority vote (QMV) in the first pillar, but unanimity or consensus is usually required in the second pillar. Influence is therefore partly determined by the weights of votes in Community matters (the first pillar), while CFSP is more traditionally diplomatic cooperation where power capabilities and the ability to project power tend to be more decisive. In NATO, the USA can dominate despite the rule of formal equality of the members. In CFSP the bigger member states are decisive because they have the resources to project power. Therefore, the threats of veto of the non-pole powers are not credible in the high politics areas of CFSP and NATO. The EU pole powers The three pole powers, which are also EU member states, do not have a common integration strategy. France and Germany have always played a special role in European integration, in some sense constituting their own ‘core’. Although we do not think of the Benelux countries and Italy as a periphery in today’s European Union (EU), to some extent they constituted such a periphery in the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) established in 1951. France and Germany were the two dominant producers of steel and coal in the ECSC. For most of the history of European integration, developments have been contingent on Franco-German action and agreement. This was also the case in the negotiations leading to the most recent EU enlargement: France and Germany met bilaterally and agreed on the financing of the coming enlargement, including the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), prior to the decision in Copenhagen in December 2002 to open up for the next enlargement with eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) plus Cyprus and Malta. The first enlargement in 1973 brought in another pole power, the United Kingdom. But the UK has not been able to establish itself as an EU leader at the same level as Germany and France. It has remained a reluctant partner, still not taking part in the single currency, the euro, or the Schengen cooperation to abolish border controls. Only in the development of the CFSP has the UK played a central role. The UK blocked the developments of the EU’s defence dimension up till 1998. Owing to the situation in Kosovo, the British finally agreed with the French on developing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) inside the EU at Saint Malo in December 1998. The Treaty of Nice could therefore, after important EU decisions in 1999 at the Cologne and Helsinki summits, remove the reference to the Western European Union (WEU) as the Union’s defence arm that had been included by the Maastricht Treaty, and the EU is itself now developing a CSDP. The fourth pole power of the Euro-Atlantic unipole, the United States, played a pivotal role in the early years of European institutionalization in the post-war years making cooperation in the OEEC a condition for receiving Marshall Aid (Peterson and Pollack 2003:3) and continued to support European integration, which was viewed by the Americans as a solution to the Franco-German problem, throughout the Cold War (see Lundestad 2003:91–3). Most importantly, by acting as the region’s major security provider through its commitment to NATO, the United States created a stable and peaceful security environment among the West European states allowing them to commit

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to regional institutions and to economic reconstruction without fear that institutional commitment and lack of rearmament would lead to military attack from one another or the Soviet Union (Joffe 1984; Wivel 2000: Chapter 5). After the Cold War, the United States continued its support for European integration despite occasional disagreements with the EU member states over trade and security issues, and facilitated the intensification of the integration process by its continued commitment to the stability and security of Europe. However, the United States has little influence over the internal EU struggles over institutional reform often pitting the European pole powers against nonpole powers in the struggle for power and influence. Spain became a member in the third enlargement in 1986 and has tried hard to become a leading member state. But Spain has also fought hard for its ‘special interests’, especially more money from the Structural Funds, not really allowing this ambition to materialize. The recent fifth enlargement brought in a new relatively large state, Poland. It also fought hard for special national interests both before and after the end game of enlargement negotiations. Given further Poland’s stage of economic development, its ambitions to become a leading member may be considerably delayed. Size and representation The EU member states differ in size, economic development and willingness and capacity to integrate further. Differentiated representation in EC institutions was invented in the original Community treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) to accommodate differences in size. Some adaptation in the weighting of votes in the Council took place in 1972 in connection with the first enlargement of the European Communities. The representation of German voters was increased in the European Parliament after German unification and the negotiation of the Treaty of Maastricht, but a major institutional reform has only taken place through the Treaty of Nice negotiated by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2000 and the European Union constitution agreed by member states in 2004. In the European Union relatively strong common institutions have been established through delegation and pooling of sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998). Powers have been delegated to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Majority voting is increasingly applied in the Council of Ministers. The EU has become a quasi-federal polity. At least the first pillar of the Union has many federal traits through the application of the so-called Community method, which involves delegation and pooling of sovereignty. It is therefore fair to suggest that the issue of relative power is different in the EU’s first pillar compared with a classic international system. The institutional system of the EC has tried to accommodate differences in capabilities among the members. The EU’s second pillar, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), however, remains intergovernmental. The European Communities (EC) have used various forms of weighted representation and voting since the beginning as a way to create some ‘equity’ and balance between big and small states. The moment an organization starts making decisions that are directly applicable and binding on citizens and economic actors in the member states, the relative weight of citizens starts becoming an issue of ‘equity’ and legitimacy.

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The Treaties of Rome, signed in 1957 and in force since 1958, introduced the direct weighting of votes in the Councils of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The three big member states, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy each received four votes, the Netherlands and Belgium each two and Luxembourg one vote. The total number of votes thus was 17. A qualified majority (QMV) was defined as 12 votes, i.e. just over 70 per cent of the total votes. The three large member states or two large ones plus Belgium and the Netherlands could form a QMV. Germany and France did not by themselves have a QMV, nor did the four other member states. A blocking majority would require six votes: two large member states or one large plus Belgium or the Netherlands (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:46; Westlake 1999:91). The introduction of QMV was foreseen in specific policy areas after transition periods. It would for instance be used for the reduction of internal tariffs and fixing of the external tariff during the third stage, and for decisions on the common agricultural policy and determination of rules regulating international transport after the second stage (Robertson 1973:186). The Treaties of Rome created a common parliamentary body for the three Communities, ‘the Assembly’, later known as the European Parliament. The distribution of seats agreed at the time was 36 for Germany, France and Italy, 14 for Belgium and the Netherlands and six for Luxembourg (Robertson 1973:193). The weights introduced by the Treaties of Rome were changed in connection with the following enlargements, but the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 kept the votes in the Council unchanged, despite the unification of Germany after the end of the Cold War. A mini-reform of representation in the European Parliament took place in connection with the Brussels summit in December 1993. The united Germany received an additional 18 seats, while Italy, the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands were given an extra six, Spain four, Portugal, Greece and Belgium one each. Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg did not receive additional seats. Maybe the most important development was that the principle of equal representation of the four largest members was broken in the European Parliament. However, the discrepancy between the representation of the big and small member states in the European Parliament remained large. It took 66,000 votes to be elected to the European Parliament from Luxembourg, while it took 805,000 votes in Germany. It was agreed that the following enlargement, which eventually brought Sweden, Finland and Austria into the European Union (EU) in 1995, should be based on the Maastricht Treaty. The new member states were therefore to receive a number of votes fitting into the then current weights. Austria and Sweden were offered four votes. Finland (as well as Norway, which was also a candidate at the time) was offered three. EU-15 now had a total of 87 votes in the Council. The QMV was set at 62 votes (about 71 per cent). The blocking minority was 26 and would require two large and two small member states, but its increasing size was becoming a problem for some of the member states, especially Spain and the United Kingdom, who proposed that the blocking minority should remain at 23 to allow for two large and one small member state (except Luxembourg) to block decisions. The solution to the disagreement was the so-called Ioannina compromise stipulating that the Council would do all within its power to reach a satisfactory solution that could be adopted by at least 65 votes out of 87 if members of

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the Council representing the between 23 votes and 26 votes expressed their intention to oppose the adoption of a decision by the Council by qualified majority. It has been argued that the whole issue of the blocking minority in an enlarged EU was ‘something of a red herring since…the Council has a natural impetus towards the fullest possible consensus’ (Westlake 1999:95). The issue, however, was indicative of the fear— on the part of some member states—of losing relative influence in an enlarged EU. As the EU faced the next enlargement, with possibly ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as well as Cyprus and Malta, the issue of relative influence became even more important during the IGC 1996–97 that negotiated the Treaty of Amsterdam as well as the IGC 2000 that negotiated the Treaty of Nice. The IGC 1996–97 was partly called to address the institutional issues in the context of the coming enlargement of the EU. More than 75 official documents submitted to the IGC dealt with institutional issues. Certain institutional issues were solved relatively early during the IGC, including the idea of an increased use of the co-decision procedure and a reduction in the number of decision procedures. The co-decision procedure was simplified and all member states agreed to limit the number of seats in the European Parliament to 700. These early agreements were reflected in the draft treaty proposal presented by the Irish Presidency in December 1996 (Isaksen et al. 1998; Laursen 2002; McDonaugh 1998). The last months of the negotiations concentrated on three main issues: (1) the future size and composition of the Commission; (2) changes in the weights of votes in the Council and threshold of QMV; and (3) expansion of the scope of QMV in the first pillar. The three issues were linked, and it was thus a question of whether a package solution could be found. In respect to the Commission, a number of big member states wanted to set a ceiling on the number of Commissioners. France especially was pressing the issue, suggesting a ceiling as low as ten Commissioners. This reduction would be combined with a system of rotation. Most small member states, however, insisted on retaining a Commissioner from their country. Concerning weighting of votes, the UK, France, Italy and Spain wanted a re-weighting in favour of big states. Germany suggested a system of double majority, where the current system would be combined with the requirement that a majority should include a majority of the citizens of the Union. The smaller member states took a rather sceptical position on changing the voting weights. In the end Amsterdam reached no agreement on the two most central issues of the composition of the Commission and the voting system in the Council. The main official purpose of the Treaty of Nice was to prepare the EU for the coming enlargement(s). In contrast to past IGCs, the agenda was largely limited to institutional issues. The bigger member states insisted on changes in the existing system of representation, which was considered to favour the smaller member states too much. The new system would increase the representation of bigger states relatively compared with the smaller member states. This in turn would affect the number of states required to make up a qualified majority vote and a blocking minority in the Council. The issue of weighting of votes in the Council was linked with the question of size and composition of the Commission. The smaller member states worked hard to retain a Commissioner from their country in the future, while the larger member states, especially France, wanted a smaller Commission. Although Commissioners are not supposed to work for national interests, smaller member states see ‘their’ Commissioner as a defence against a

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directoire of the big states. In addition, the issue of ‘closer (or enhanced) cooperation’ or ‘flexibility’ was added during the conference, i.e. whether the conditions established by the Treaty of Amsterdam should be made less strict. This would make it easier for prointegration members to move faster than integration-sceptical members. The re-weighting of votes in the Council was agreed after prolonged negotiations and increased the relative weight of the five biggest member states.4 In addition, it was agreed that votes representing at least 62 per cent of the Union population should be behind a decision by qualified majority if a member state asks for control of this criterion. Obviously, this benefited the big member states and Germany in particular. The second main issue during the Nice IGC was the increased use of QMV. When the IGC 2000 started there were about 70 areas left that still required unanimity according to the treaty. The IGC discussed about 45 of these in view of possible transfer to QMV. In the end it was decided to transfer about 23 areas from the entry into force of the treaty (exact number depends on how it is measured) and 12 areas later. More than 20 areas, mainly constitutional or quasi-constitutional provisions, were considered too sensitive from the outset. It was agreed early on not to touch them. Concerning the third issue, size and composition of the Commission, it was decided that from 1 January 2005 the Commission would consist of one national from each member state, but when the number of EU members reached 27, the size of the Commission should be reduced and a system of rotation found by unanimity. The institutional solutions found in Nice were amended by the European Union constitution agreed by member states in 2004, which, if ratified, will consolidate all European treaties into one document. The constitution extends QMV to 50 new policy areas (mostly of a technically and uncontroversial nature), but retains national vetoes over foreign and defence policy, financing of the EU budget and direct taxation. For the non-pole powers the most important amendment is probably the replacement of the rotating presidency with a permanent President of the European Council serving up to five years, because, until now, the six-monthly rotating presidency has been an important platform for agenda-setting by the non-pole EU member states (Wivel 2002b; see Antola and Lehtimäki 2001:37–9). Another important change is that the principle that all member states must have a Commissioner is abandoned. From 2014 the size of the Commission will be limited. Finally, the constitution strikes a compromise between big and small member states by introducing a new ‘double majority’ voting system where 55 per cent of member states comprising 65 per cent of the EU’s population makes up a qualified majority. In addition, a blocking majority must come from four or more countries, thus safeguarding the remaining member states from a ‘negative directoire’ of France, Germany and the United Kingdom blocking new laws. Still, the new voting system increases the relative power of the four biggest member states (Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy) at the expense of Spain and Poland, which the Treaty of Nice had given almost as much power as Germany. Institutional changes relating to the CFSP The Maastricht Treaty transformed the pre-existing European Political Cooperation (EPC) into CFSP, largely codifying existing practices that had developed slowly since 1970. Member states were not ready to apply the Community method, with pooling and

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delegation of sovereignty, and accordingly the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union invented the pillar structure (Vanhoonacker 1992), where the CFSP could remain intergovernmental, based on unanimity and low involvement of the Commission—and no competence for ECJ. However, the CFSP was quickly found wanting, especially because of the EU’s failure at conflict resolution in the Balkan crises. Improving the CFSP was on the agenda of the Amsterdam treaty negotiations (Duke 2002; Laursen 2002). The so-called Petersberg tasks of peace-keeping and peace-making (i.e. soft security) were added to the Treaty, but the Western European Union remained as the instrument for such activities. The High Representative for CFSP was also introduced, and a planning unit was established. However, collective defence (i.e. hard security) was left to NATO. The treaty also introduced a new category, ‘common strategies’, to be decided by unanimity by the European Council (of heads of state and government). Flexibility was increased. The Council (of Foreign Ministers) should in principle be able to adopt joint actions, common positions or other decisions on the basis of a common strategy by a special QMV (at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least ten member states), but the treaty also included a Luxembourg-compromise-type veto (Art. J.13(2)). In addition, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the measure of ‘constructive abstention’ allowing the Union to proceed when one member state couples its abstention with a formal declaration. The member state acknowledges that the decision is binding to the Union, but need not apply the decision itself. The Nice European Council introduced ‘closer cooperation’ in the second pillar, but with an explicit exemption for defence (Laursen 2001). Nice removed the WEU as the Union’s defence arm, and confirmed the development of CSDP. A number of these decisions were taken in parallel with the Nice IGC, but confirmed by the European Council in Nice in December 2000. The use of qualified majority voting was extended to cases where the Council implements common strategies decided on by the European Council and to decisions on the implementation of joint actions and common positions. In 2004, the EU constitution committed member states to the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Furthermore it was decided to create a Minister for Foreign Affairs. The post combines the posts of High Representative of CFSP and External Affairs Commissioner. Despite this institutional development, real action continues to depend on a ‘coalition of the willing’, whether the treaty allows for ‘closer cooperation’ or not, and success and failure of new initiatives depend on the pole powers, France and the United Kingdom in particular, because of their military capabilities. In addition, the United States plays an indirect role, because the European states continue to rely on the United States as a provider of ‘hard’ security and new EU initiatives may have implications for the role of NATO and US interests in the region (see the section on NATO below). Towards ‘closer co-operation’ or a directoire of the big? Increased flexibility in the EU decision-making process is closely related to the issue of the relative influence of small and big member states. The debate of variable geometry or ‘closer cooperation’ among a smaller group of member states more willing to proceed with integration than the more Euro-sceptic members surfaced in the mid-1980s. It was used by Germany and France to send a message to sceptical member states, most

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importantly the United Kingdom, that other member states might choose to proceed without them. The debate resurfaced in connection with the Maastricht Treaty, where the United Kingdom and Denmark requested various optouts, thus clearly establishing themselves as laggards in the integration process. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced stipulations about ‘closer cooperation’. The idea was to make it possible for a core group of member states to go further than the whole group, but the Treaty put a number of restrictions on that possibility. It had to include a majority of the members (Art. 43 TEU). Closer cooperation inside the first pillar could in principle be decided by a QMV, but in reality members had a veto (Art. 11 TEC). If some member tried to stop closer cooperation the issue could move to the European Council where further measures would require a consensus. In the third pillar, though, ‘closer cooperation’ was easier (Art. 43 TEU). The Treaty of Nice made it easier to introduce ‘closer cooperation’ among a smaller group of EU countries. The emergency brake of a veto was taken out, and instead of a majority of member states in the future eight member states—irrespective of the total number of member states—will be able to initiate ‘closer cooperation’. The EU constitution agreed in 2004 further increased flexibility by allowing ‘pioneer groups’ of member states to decide to introduce QMV in areas where the treaty specifies unanimity. For instance, EMU members may implement common tax policies by QMV as long as they do not conflict with the aims of the single market. There are different kinds of ‘flexibility’. Table 3.1 illustrates a central distinction between multi-speed integration and variable geometry. Allowing different speeds has been part of the European integration process from the beginning. When new members join they are given transition periods. The plan for EMU foresaw that not all might join the third phase at the same time. It laid out so-called convergence criteria that had to be fulfilled before a member was allowed to join, but a country like Greece, which joined the single currency with some delay, accepted the goal of the single currency all the time. Some of the discussion about flexibility has been based on the idea that a smaller group of members can be a kind of avant-garde that will help move the process forward (Stubb 2000).5

Table 3.1 Types of integration Form

Goal

Speed

Examples inside the Treaty

Uniform Same Same Traditional EC/EU strategy Multi-speed Same Different Transition periods integration Convergence criteria for EMU Variable geometry Different Different Danish exemptions British exemptions Schengen cooperation after Amsterdam WEU from Maastricht to Nice

Examples outside the Treaty

Original Schengen cooperation WEU until Maastricht

Multi-speed integration exists inside the treaties in the form of transition periods. The current enlargement of the EU means more flexibility in the form of multi-speed integration, because it comes in stages over a number of years and integration will require long transition periods. Multi-speed integration was built into the plans for EMU in the

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Maastricht Treaty because certain ‘convergence criteria’ had to be fulfilled to qualify for participation in the single currency. ‘Closer cooperation’ had existed outside the Treaties among the Schengen Treaty countries working for the abolition of border controls. The idea of ‘closer cooperation’ was on the agenda of IGC 1996–97 and eventually various provisions were included in the Treaty of Amsterdam allowing a group of eight member states among the 15 to proceed with ‘closer cooperation’ on certain, rather strict conditions (Stubb 2002). The discussion again broke out in 2000 during the IGC 2000. In the end the Treaty of Nice relaxed the conditions for ‘closer cooperation’ (Galloway 2001; Laursen 2001; Stubb 2002). Flexibility becomes more problematic when the member states cannot agree on the goal. This situation existed at the time of the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty when a new kind of construction was invented giving the United Kingdom an opt-out on social policy and the UK and Denmark permission to decide later about EMU. When there is no agreement on the goal we move into variable geometry. It has little impact on the overall integration process if variable geometry is limited to a few and not-so-important areas. However, if it becomes generalized to a system where countries can pick and choose freely—so-called à la carte integration—disintegration may follow. In practice, flexibility is not without problems. In today’s EU Denmark does not take part in the third phase of the EMU, but has in reality pegged the Danish krone to the euro through an exchange rate mechanism known as ERM II. The UK and Sweden do not take part in the euro, not even ERM II. The UK also opted out from social policy in the Maastricht Treaty, but then opted in by the time of the Amsterdam Treaty. In the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation, a small continental group started the Schengen Convention cooperation in the mid-1980s. Membership in Schengen has increased over the years, but the UK and Ireland still do not take part in efforts to abolish border controls. The development of a European defence identity mainly took place within the Western European Union (WEU), considered an ‘integral part’ of the Union according to the Maastricht Treaty. But only ten of the 15 EU members are members of the WEU. Denmark, Ireland and the three formerly ‘neutral’ countries Austria, Finland and Sweden are not members of the WEU. However, the Amsterdam Treaty added the so-called Petersberg tasks of peace-keeping, peace-making and humanitarian interventions to the EU’s defence policy, and most references to the WEU were taken out by the Treaty of Nice in December 2000. Denmark has confirmed that it does not take part in these new EU efforts to develop a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which were made possible by changes in British policy in 1998. All these forms of ‘flexibility’ make EU cooperation more difficult. Decision-making becomes more complex and there is the risk that it affects the more central parts of the integration process, first of all the internal market. Major decisions in the EU are often package deals where recalcitrant members receive side-payments. But a lot of flexibility will make this kind of linkage politics more difficult. Furthermore, increased flexibility may weaken the institutional constraints on the pole powers allowing them to exercise power politics more freely. On the other hand, if non-pole powers should seek to block increased flexibility, pole powers may find that institutional constraints are too tight and instead pursue ad hoc-cooperation outside the institutions, leaving the non-pole powers without influence. In most issue areas non-pole powers will lack the capabilities to pursue this option without one or more pole powers.

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Reforming NATO: from defensive alliance to all-European security organization? The end of the Cold War called the survival of NATO into question. NATO was a defensive alliance formed in 1949 to contain the threat to West European sovereignty and stability emanating from the military power and seemingly expansive ideology of the Soviet Union. Thus, the logical answer to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization seemed to be the dissolution of NATO. Among the region’s non-pole powers this soon created fears that the United States would become disengaged from the region and leave the regional great powers to maintain stability. This ‘back to the future’ scenario envisioned Europe as an unstable multipolar region with frequently shifting alliances, military conflicts and great power competition not unlike the situation prior to the Second World War (Mearsheimer 1990/91). In the absence of a shared fear of Soviet invasion and without a common ‘American pacifier’, the European pole powers would be unable to maintain order and stability in the region (Buzan et al. 1990; see Joffe 1984). The civil war in former Yugoslavia, the American reluctance to intervene in the conflict and the European inability to do so effectively underlined the dangers of instability in Europe’s post-Cold War security order. Looking at the development of the European security order and NATO since the end of the Cold War, it is clear that these fears were exaggerated. The alliance did not wither away, but transformed its strategy as well as its membership in order to continue as the primary and ‘hard’ security organization in Europe. In particular, it played a vital role in stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe by its engagement in the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s and by committing the alliance, from 1997, to expand membership eastwards. NATO’s military and political roles are transformed (and still in transformation), but the alliance has not stagnated or lost its importance despite its origins in the Cold War. If anything, NATO might be said to have enjoyed a period of rapid change and hyperactivity. As noted by Lindley-French, ‘the old NATO is very definitely and very finally in the process of dying. NATO is in the process of transforming itself into both a Europe-wide political organization and a global reach military alliance. The question remains: can it pull off this double act?’ (Lindley-French 2003:58). The changes have led to discussions within NATO on the purpose and nature of the alliance in the future, but in contrast to the debates over EU’s institutional development analysed in the previous section, these debates have rarely been cast in terms of pole powers vs. non-pole powers. The intergovernmental nature of NATO and the focus on ‘hard security’ as in any other military alliance mean that institutional bargains are not as important as in the EU. Just as in the CFSP, resources tend to be decisive no matter what the institutions. Accordingly, debates among member states are more often played out between Atlanticists and Europeanists and between doves and hawks than between pole powers and non-pole powers. The NATO pole powers NATO tends to reflect relationships between the pole powers more accurately than any other international organization. All pole powers are members and they have all chosen NATO as their main provider of ‘hard’ security by pooling their military resources. As

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noted by one observer, ‘NATO reflects transatlantic and intra-European tensions because it is the litmus test for them’ (Lindley-French 2003:58). All Euro-Atlantic pole powers have played an active role in the post-Cold War development of Europe’s security institutions. The United States has been the primary force in reforming NATO, whereas France has been the most active pole power in creating a European security actor. Germany has been an advocate of NATO enlargement as well as the CFSP, whereas the United Kingdom has taken care of its traditional role as a transatlantic bridge-builder. In general, European pole powers and the United States have reacted cautiously to each other’s initiatives to reforms. In addition, the pole powers have cooperated outside the institutions and ad hoc cooperation among the pole powers has been fairly normal (see Duke 2001:41), although direct attempts at creating directorates have been few. The Contact Group for Bosnia was an informal directorate created in 1993–94 including the four pole powers and Russia, which took over from the UN and EU efforts ‘to find a solution for the Balkan war’ (Keukeleire 2001:78). After 9/11 the United Kingdom, France and Germany held a mini-summit coordinating military support to the US in October 2001 followed up by a meeting in the beginning of November, which in addition to the three European pole powers—after political pressure—included the leaders of Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, the Belgian EU presidency and the High Representative Javier Solana. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the pole powers disagreed not only on the strategy and institutional initiatives within NATO, but also whether NATO should continue as the primary security institution. The United Kingdom wanted NATO to continue as such in order to ensure a continued American commitment to European security. France favoured a European solution to the region’s security problems by strengthening the WEU and creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy for EU member states. This view was generally supported by Germany, the other half of the EU’s Franco-German engine. Finally, the Americans sent mixed signals on the future security order: on the one hand, they wanted the Europeans to take greater responsibility (economically, politically and militarily) for security in the region and on the other hand they wanted to maintain their influence in the region, mainly through NATO. To make things even more complicated, Russia, the successor state of the former opponent, preferred the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) to be the primary security organization in the region. This would ensure Russian access to the decision-making process and allow the Russians to avoid a Western takeover of their traditional sphere of interest. For the non-pole powers this emerging order increased the risk of marginalization as well as the risk of being caught up in a struggle between great power interests (Wivel 2005). The EU with its focus on ‘soft’ security and institutionalization and the all-European OSCE bridging the old East-West divide seemed to fit much better with the post-Cold War security order, perceived to be characterized by new ‘broader’ challenges such as ethnic conflict, migration, environmental problems and economic instability. Soon, however, NATO emerged as a viable security organization with the backing of all the pole powers. This was the consequence of NATO’s own transformation as well as the inabilities of competing organizations and the threats faced by pole powers and non-pole powers in the Euro-Atlantic area. In particular, the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s and the

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inability of the EU, the UN and the OSCE to deal effectively with the security problems stemming from them quickly resulted in a renewed interest in using and reforming NATO. The transformation of NATO NATO continues to serve two core functions as it has done since 1949: first, protecting the national security of its member states, and, second, serving as ‘the indispensable institutional, political and security policy oriented tool, which is knitting the U.S. and Europe together’ (Heurlin 2003:46). The continued ability to serve these functions has been the key to the continued importance of NATO and the ability of the pole powers to project stability on the European continent. The basis for serving these two functions is NATO’s wide membership and strong military capability and power projection ability. This was the case during the Cold War and continues to be the case afterwards, but the implications then and now are different. During the Cold War, NATO’s membership was confined to the United States, Canada and their allies in Western Europe, but still comprised all the most powerful states in the Western part of the Euro-Altantic area. The international system and the European region were both bipolar with the United States and the Soviet Union as the poles. Most nonpole powers faced relational bipolarity. The alliance institutionalized the American security guarantee allowing the former European great powers to cooperate closely in the European integration project thereby promoting European stability and prosperity. After the Cold War, most non-pole powers face relational unipolarity with the Euro-Atlantic unipole as the only pole. The fact that the United States and the United Kingdom as well as the two most important states in the EU, France and Germany, are members means that NATO continues as their most important security forum. The implications of NATO’s military strength have changed as well. As noted by Clarke and Cornish, ‘the attraction to its members (old and new) is that more can be achieved with military force jointly in permanent alliance than can be achieved in ad hoc cooperation or, certainly, individually’ (Clarke and Cornish 2002:781). During the Cold War, NATO’s military strength was used to deter the common opponent, but the ability to fight a war was never tested. After the Cold War the alliance has been engaged in real military conflict in a series of peace-enforcing operations. Thus, in the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s NATO has been engaged in a number of missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia in addition to the 1999 air campaign against Serbia. More recently, NATO contributed to the war in Afghanistan and in 2003 the alliance resumed responsibility for the International Security and Assistance Force. The experiences from these operations have helped keep NATO in focus as the main security organization in the Euro-Atlantic area, but also to highlight the need for military reform. The most important change since the end of the Cold War has been the transformation from a West European defensive alliance to a security organization with members from all of Europe and security functions stretching well beyond the deterrence of a Soviet attack. The seeds for this transformation were sown in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. In 1991, all pole powers, including France, and the non-pole NATO members agreed on a new strategic concept citing ‘the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic

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rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe’ and not the threat of military attack from a clearly identified enemy as the main challenge to their security. The 1999 version of the concept confirmed the focus on stability, and, furthermore, underlined the global challenges to stability such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, it expressed the commitment of the members to the most fundamental values of the American—European alliance— democracy, human rights and the rule of law—and the commitment of the Allies to common defence as well as the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. The transformation is important, but should not be overstated. Even though the Soviet Union was the alliance’s only opponent, NATO was always a ‘multi-purpose organization’ with political as well as military functions and taking care of security problems among the alliance members and between alliance members and outside threats (Forster and Wallace 2001/02:111). As noted in the famous phrase on NATO’s rationale attributed to the first Secretary General of the alliance, Lord Ismay, the purpose of NATO was to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in (see Lundestad 2003:7–12). In addition, whereas the Soviet challenge was the immediate and most important reason for the formation of NATO, the founding fathers of the alliance focused also on the values, which they perceived to be knitting together Western Europe and the United States: freedom, democracy and peaceful international relations (Kay 1998:32, see Forster and Wallace 2001/02:111–12 and Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty). After the Cold War, NATO countries began to project these values on the European region in general, beginning a long-term process of striking a still more delicate balance between widening the commitment to Central and Eastern Europe, while preserving the decision-making capacity of the alliance and avoiding conflict with Russia. This process began shortly after the Cold War in late 1991 even before the Soviet Union had fallen apart. At its Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO decided to create the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), an institution directed at consultation and cooperation on security issues open to all former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well as the newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC initiative was followed up in December with the decision by NATO’s foreign ministers to exchange information and documents with the CSCE and to communicate the experience and values of NATO in seminars and courses for officials from CSCE countries. The process of stability projection was continued with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme initiated in 1993 and approved by NATO heads of state in 1994. The PfP allowed NATO to signal its commitment to Central and Eastern Europe, while at the same time reassuring the Russians that this was not an offensive move directed against them. By allowing member states to ‘pick up NATO’s standard operating procedures, habits of cooperation and routines of consultation’ the PfP allowed NATO to prepare for a worst case scenario where stability was threatened by events in Russia or Central and Eastern Europe and NATO would need to expand fast in order to prevent chaos, war or a Russian attempt at expansion.6 Even in the absence of this scenario, the PfP would serve NATO’s interest in stability by managing rearmament and avoiding re-nationalization of defence policies in Central and East Europe. Also, in the absence of a closer commitment to Central and Eastern Europe, Germany might decide that it was necessary to take up this challenge unilaterally, creating substantial fears among alliance partners and Russia

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with the ensuing risk of instability. Finally, the PfP served the interests of the American administration well by showing the continued significance of NATO for European security and stability, responding to the lobbying from American interest groups furthering the preferences of citizens with Central and Eastern European roots and by giving President Clinton a foreign policy success compatible with his overall strategy of ‘enlargement and engagement’ early in his presidency.7 The PfP was explicitly linked to the expansion of NATO in the declaration issued by heads of states when approving the programme in 1994. Among the pole powers the United States and Germany were strongly in favour, while France feared a reinvigorated American influence in the region, but ultimately came out in favour in order not to marginalize its own influence among prospective member states (Lundestad 2003:255). Membership of the PfP is contingent upon accepting the values shared by Americans and West Europeans throughout the Cold War and now projected throughout the European continent. Thus, each prospective member has to sign a document committing it to the adherence of fundamental freedoms, human rights, justice and peace through democracy (Kay 1998:72). NATO enlargement was formally begun when invitations to negotiate membership were issued to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1997. The three countries formally became members in 1999. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to negotiate in 2002 and formally joined the alliance in 2004 taking the total number of NATO members to 26.8 Most recently, the projection of stability and the values of the Euro-Atlantic unipole have been illustrated by the application by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro for PfP membership. NATO has made it clear that the success of the applications is strongly linked to each country’s willingness to cooperate on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the arrest of war criminals. Enlargement has transformed NATO, increasing its value as a means to stabilize the Euro-Atlantic area rather than just Western Europe. However, this has not been accompanied by comparative military transformation (Naumann 2003:72–3). NATO must now be able to defend a much larger area, but the new (and many of the old) member states do not have the capabilities to fight modern wars. In addition, the decision-making capacity of an enlarged NATO during military crises is uncertain. In addition, just like in the case of EU enlargement, flexibility seems to be an inevitable consequence of NATO expansion. The very different nature of the major military campaigns after the Cold War combined with an enlarged and more diverse group of members means that NATO today may have a function as ‘a facilitator of coalitions rather than as the provider of the main military response’ (Howorth 2003a: 244). This development is strengthened by the ambition of the alliance to act outside the EuroAtlantic area. In conclusion, NATO may have been strengthened politically but weakened militarily. The NATO-EU relationship The end of the Cold War left the division of labour between NATO and the EU less clear-cut than it used to be. The post-Cold War enlargements changed the nature of NATO from a defensive alliance to an almost all-European security organization concerned more with preserving stability among insiders and would-be insiders and

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creating partnerships with outsiders such as Russia and the Ukraine than with collective defence against enemy states. This has important consequences for the future. As noted, by two observers, ‘NATO […] is likely to find itself occupying a rather uneasy middle ground between an imperative collective self-defence alliance and an organization like the OSCE or the EU, which have military interests but are avowedly not military organizations’ (Clarke and Cornish 2002:780; see Forster and Wallace 2001/02). At the same time the EU has evolved as a security actor, if not a military actor, in its own right. The failure of the EU to respond effectively to international security problems, in particular the Balkan crises, led to attempts to reform the nature of EU security policymaking. The Franco-British initiative to create a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was followed by a rapid development asserting that the EU should be able to act autonomously in defence affairs when NATO decided not to and attempting to create the necessary means for autonomous action by reforming decision-making procedures and planning for the necessary military forces. On the one hand, this development creates new potential for transatlantic disagreement. Without a common enemy and with the division of labour between EuroAtlantic institutions less clear-cut than it used to be, pole powers may more often be tempted to engage in buck-passing or competition between alternative institutional solutions. On the other hand, the development facilitates burden-sharing and flexibility. With no common enemy comparable with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, security interests may vary between the pole powers (as witnessed by the recent conflict over Iraq and in the early 1990s over the Balkans), and institutional alternatives with overlapping membership may allow for the flexibility necessary to preserve a healthy relationship without endangering their common capacity for decision-making (Mouritzen 1996b: 81–2). At the same time, the continued American commitment to NATO and engagement in NATO enlargement seems to answer the traditional European calls for a multilateral American foreign policy, whereas the European attempt to create an effective common security and defence policy may help to answer American calls for increased burden-sharing in regard to European security. The handover of the NATO missions in Macedonia in 2003 and in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the end of 2004 to the EU are good examples of the EU’s ability to relieve NATO of some of its commitments in Europe. Overall, institutional developments have reflected the conflicting interests of the pole powers, but they have rarely been the source of conflicts that could not be solved through diplomatic negotiations. The pole powers have been cautious when responding to each other’s initiatives. The American reaction to the Franco-British ESDP initiative was a ‘yes, but…’ approach (Sloan 2000:14–20) offering a general support for the initiative, but at the same time stressing that it should not lead to decoupling of the EU and the US, discrimination against non-EU NATO members or duplication of existing NATO assets. In essence, increased European responsibility for the region’s security was welcome as long as it did not undermine NATO. The European response to the continued American commitment and institutional initiatives has been positive, but coupled with fears of American dominance and unwillingness of the American administration to take into account European interests (see Howorth 2003b). A recent example is the NATO Response Force (NRF) launched at the summit in Prague in 2002, which was viewed by some Europeans as an attempt to ‘kill off’ the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

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However, soon a potential division of labour emerged ‘whereby the ERRF will essentially play a Petersberg role in the European theatre and the NRF will potentially play a high intensity warfare role globally’ (Howorth 2003a: 240). The pole powers have often voiced their concerns in regard to new institutional initiatives, but none of them have been willing to risk the institutional stability of the Euro-Atlantic pole and a solution accommodating the most intense preferences of the pole powers has been found. The development of the ESDP can be seen as the most important European challenge to NATO. However, so far the inability (and for some states reluctance or unwillingness) to turn the EU into a military actor has left NATO without a genuine European competitor. A more important challenge may come from American security policy. As noted above, the European region is now less important to American security than during the Cold War. Accordingly, the United States is less willing to accommodate the views of their allies and reluctant to be bound by institutional commitments outside the EuroAtlantic area. This policy was evident in the Iraq crises, but even in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 the United States chose not to make their military campaign in Afghanistan a NATO campaign and even ‘faced a situation in which the NATO allies were offering more troops and equipment than the Pentagon, for military and political reasons, wanted to use’ (Gordon 2001/02:92–3). This decision also reflected the capability gap between the United States and the European states, which has made interoperability between the United States and its allies increasingly difficult. While this problem has not been solved, the NATO Response Force can be seen as an attempt ‘to help EU forces to remain interoperable with the US counterparts and to avoid further strategic and force structure divergence between NATO and the emerging European RRF’ (Howorth 2003a: 238).

Conclusion The Euro-Atlantic relationship and its institutions have proved remarkably stable after the Cold War. Despite the fundamental change of the global and Euro-Atlantic security order, Euro-Atlantic institutions originating in the Cold War persist and continue to play an important role in transatlantic and world affairs. This reflects the continued importance of the transatlantic relationship. Cooperation and conflict continue to characterize the transatlantic relationship as they did during the Cold War. On the one hand, Europeans and Americans have successfully stabilized the EuroAtlantic region after the Cold War and continued to cooperate within multilateral institutions and to seek to develop these institutions in accordance with the new global and regional order. Economic globalization and the threat of terror have led to intensified cooperation on some issues. The conflict over Iraq may have consequences for the future of the Euro-Atlantic unipole, but scenarios may be constructed for further cooperation as well as more intense conflict (see Chapter 10). On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union means that the costs of disagreement have been reduced and the number of conflicts has increased. Differences in power and threat perceptions have resulted in disagreements between the pole powers over the strategy against terror and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

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The two most important Euro-Atlantic institutions have been transformed as a consequence of the new security order and the changed transatlantic relationship. The EU and NATO have expanded their membership to 25 and 26 members, respectively, and both organizations are expected to enlarge further in the future. Both organizations are now more flexible than during the Cold War. In the European Union, decision-making procedures have been revised in order to ensure relatively effective decision-making and preserving the balance between the interests of big and small members after enlargement. In NATO, a new strategic concept acknowledging the transformed nature of the EuroAtlantic security order combined with enlargement has transformed the organization from a defensive alliance to an almost all-European security organization more prone to the formation of ad hoc coalitions than before. Informal decision-making and agenda-setting of the pole powers have increased in both organizations since the Cold War, in particular in regard to security policy. What are the implications of this transformation of the transatlantic relationship and its institutional order from the end of the Cold War until today? First, continued institutionalization of the Euro-Atlantic region and the lasting importance of EU and NATO for the region’s pole powers mean that the Euro-Atlantic unipole has remained a membership pole throughout the post-Cold War era. Thus, the institutions continue as important means of power projection for the pole powers and institutional affiliation with the EU and NATO continues as the most important measure of constellation for non-pole powers. Second, the reduced costs of disagreement combined with increased institutional flexibility have led to a decentralization of the Euro-Atlantic unipole. Thus, compared with the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the policy prescriptions for non-pole power foreign policy behaviour stemming from the pole have become less clear, culminating during the Iraq crises with pole powers disagreeing over whether to invade. However, it should be noticed that there is little disagreement among pole powers over the basic values, interests and institutions in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Notes 1 See www.bea.gov/bea/international/bp_web/simple.cfm?anon=71&table_id=10&area_id=26 and www.bea.gov/bea/international/bp_web/simple.cfm?anon=71&table_id=10&area_id=5. 2 In 1995, a total of 118,162 American soldiers were stationed in Europe. In 2004 (March 31), the number was 116,507. The total number of troops stationed outside the United States in 1995 was 238,064. In 2004 (March 31) this figure was 257,692. Thus, the European share of American troops stationed abroad fell only slightly from 49.6 per cent in 1995 to 45.2 per cent in 2004 despite the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the numbers, see http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0995.pdf and http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/M05/hst0403.pdf. 3 For a list of ‘crisis highlights’ during the Cold War stressing the parallel to the 2002–03 Iraq conflict, see Gordon and Shapiro (2004:23–31). 4 In addition, the Treaty of Nice also assigned a new number of seats in the European Parliament. 5 One prominent example is the idea of a ‘hard core’ proposed by German CDU/CSU politicians Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lammers in 1994 (Stubb 2002). 6 See the quotes by US Secretary of Defence, Less Aspin and a senior US official in Kay (1998:70, 73).

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7 These arguments are listed by Kay (1998:68–9). 8 In addition, Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are members of NATO’s Membership Action Plan preparing them for possible membership in the future.

Part II Constellation theory applied to Europe

4 Close to power? Alfred van Staden

The challenge of French—German hegemony The Benelux countries and Austria are EU insiders. Also, they are geographically close to France and Germany, the continental pole powers (constituting the so-called ‘Axis’ in the EU). By implication, their geopolitical relationship to the pole powers is assumed to be more important than that of states in more distant groupings analysed in this book. The present chapter will establish whether this assumption is borne out by evidence. In addition, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg do enjoy a certain prestige as founding members of the European Communities (EC) and also by virtue of the responsibility following from that position. In spite of its non-aligned (or neutral) status and its late entry into the European Union, Austria is also analysed here, among non-pole powers neighbouring the pole powers (see Figure 4.1). Were it not for the Cold War and its restrictions on Austrian freedom of manoeuvre, Austria would probably have been among the EC founders. Beyond that, Austria shares with the Benelux countries a high degree of enthusiasm for the community method and, like these countries, is forced to define its relationship with the nearby (German) pole power, to which it is closely affiliated linguistically, culturally and economically. Notwithstanding the similarities of the selected countries, however, it would appear that even among the Benelux countries divergent behavioural patterns have sometimes come to the surface, reflecting different traditions, domestic structures and geopolitical orientations. The outline of this chapter is as follows. After dealing with the historical background of the selected countries, the focus will be on the countries’ views and policies concerning the main outstanding European issues over the past decade. We shall then pay attention to their attitudes and positions towards France and Germany, their neighbouring continental pole powers, whose mutual Axis, as a condominium, has the potency of employing significant positive and negative sanctions vis-à-vis them and more broadly in the EU and the European space. With regard to non-pole states facing a pole, important factors were singled out in Chapter 2 that were believed to be essential for their overall strategy of keeping freedom of manoeuvre as much as possible. In the final section, two of these factors, the value compatibility of pole and non-pole powers and the pole’s level of centralization, will be reflected upon in relation to the results of the present chapter. Did these (or other) factors induce the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria to follow a strategy of balancing or bandwagoning? It will be discussed whether the external behaviour of the countries considered can be explained in terms of (past or present) geopolitics.

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Figure 4.1 Close to power (2005). Preliminary interpretations One of the presumptions underlying this book is the idea that the United States continues to be an essential part of the European power structure. As will be shown, the American involvement with European security created opportunities for European non-pole powers to defend their autonomy vis-à-vis European pole powers (dependency spreading). Given Europe’s dependence on the US for its military security, the EC alone does not qualify for a unipole, i.e. an actor that is able to exert paramount (rather than significant) influence on the international environment. Another presumption is that the FrancoGerman alliance has performed critical leadership tasks in the EU. Arguably, Germany and France have been widely perceived as the engine driving the integration process through a series of grand bargains. It is a point of debate, though, whether this is still the case. After a period of relative estrangement since the beginning of the 1990s, the recent crisis over Iraq brought the two countries closely together again. But, as conflicting interests in a large array of issue areas will dramatically increase in an enlarged EU, it is hard to imagine how the Franco-German tandem could dominate strategic decisionmaking of the Union in the future to the same degree they were supposed to do in the past. In this respect, the failure of the Brussels summit of December 2003 to find agreement on the Constitutional Treaty, as proposed by the European Convention, did not augur well for the joint bargaining power of Germany and France. Alongside the Italian

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presidency at the time, the two countries had very much committed themselves to the acceptance of the proposals of the Convention by all 25 present and new member states. It was especially striking that the Franco-German coalition was not able to overcome opposition by two countries in their geographic proximity, Poland and Spain. At the same time, the influence of all non-pole powers in the EU has been weakened since the early 1990s as the result of a number of developments.1 Clearly, the small states face the challenge of marginalization arising from the strategic and institutional transformation of the Union, but also of NATO. Three major sources of marginalization can be identified. The first source concerns, hardly surprising, the collapse of the bipolar order.2 The perception of the Soviet threat had a powerful disciplining effect on the European members of the Western Alliance. The pursuit of old-style European ‘Great Power’ rivalries had to be subordinated to the compelling need of making a united response. All states—large and small—were exposed to the risk of usurpation by Soviet power, at least it was felt that way. As a result, the protection by a powerful, distant and benign friend, i.e. the United States, had a dampening effect on the interplay between ‘big’ and ‘small’ in Europe. The ‘levelling’ and ‘equalizing’ effects of US engagement on the European power structure was the main reason for small allies to accept American leadership in the Western Alliance almost unconditionally. Although the US did not turn its back to Europe in the 1990s and proved in fact the effective ‘lender of last resort’ in the Balkan wars, the continent was to lose its centrality in American global security concerns since it was no longer a theatre of hegemonic struggle. The second source of marginalization derives from the weakened authority of the European Commission.3 Traditionally, most small (non-pole) states have considered a powerful Commission and strong European institutions in general a bulwark against any attempts by the pole states to throw their weight around. Rightly or wrongly, the Commission has often been seen as the ‘natural ally’ of the non-pole member states. It therefore mattered for the position of the non-pole members that the EU’s Council (of Ministers) gained in influence during the 1990s relative to the Commission. One reason for the lower esteem of the Commission was the departure of its energetic chairman, Jacques Delors, whose personal prestige had tremendously contributed to the reputation of this institution. But, in all likelihood, structural factors rather than the weight of personalities are more important in accounting for the shift in the EU’s internal balance of power. One of these was the increasing use of the so-called open method of coordination (OMC), being put forward as an alternative to binding decisions and rules in order to harmonize national policies. OMC heavily relies on peer pressure, benchmarking, scoreboards and the exchange of best practices. While the Commission plays some role in employing these techniques through the collection and dissemination of information as well as the publication of reports, it no longer is in the position to push the agenda as far as the direction of European integration is concerned. As a consequence, the Council and especially the European Council (of Heads of State and Government) have taken over as the EU’s ‘dominant institution’. These bodies have come to set the overall political direction for the EU, providing the mandate for subsequent Commission proposals and EU programmes. This tendency has been strengthened by the third source of marginalization: the rise of new policy fields dominated by intergovernmentalism. The position of the Commission relative to the Council is not only legally weak on the common foreign and security

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policy (‘second pillar’) and on police and justice cooperation (‘third pillar’), but also the EU’s capacity to act on diplomacy and especially security and defence matters critically depends on the leadership provided by the larger member states. However, any movement towards the creation of a formal or informal directorate (directoire) by the European pole powers is likely to be resented by the non-pole powers.4 Although the Benelux countries share a common outlook on both the institutional structure and the policy direction of the European integration process, the record of the past shows that, occasionally, there have been disagreements among them on matters of both substance and tactics. Thus, for example, while Belgium and Luxembourg have strongly favoured autonomous European defence cooperation right after the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, the strong Atlanticist orientation in Dutch foreign policy led the Netherlands to make clear reservations about the development of military institutions outside the framework of NATO.5 The divergent stands taken by the Benelux countries in early 2003 over the Iraq crisis (particularly regarding the issue of political support to the United States and military aid to Turkey) clearly illustrate that these countries do not represent a fully united political coalition. On the same issue Austria, because of it being a neutral country, was forced to remain aloof of the divide in NATO between the FrancoGerman position and the Anglo-American one. The Austrian government invoked the country’s status of neutrality in order to deny the transit or passage of US forces from Germany to Italy for onward deployment to the Gulf. It argued that it could not agree to such a movement if the forces did not have a UN mandate. The Austrian decision was denounced by the US Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld, in Senate hearings in February 2003.

Historical background The cooperation between the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, as developed in the framework of Benelux, has served as a role model for the creation of the European Communities. As early as September 1944, the governments of the three countries, being in exile in London, concluded a treaty establishing a customs union that laid the basis for economic union in the future. The intention had been to start integration with the abolition of trade barriers immediately after the war. However, when the war was over the Dutch government baulked. The reason for this was obvious: the Netherlands, whose economy had almost been completely destroyed during the German occupation, was in a weaker economic position than Belgium. The latter country, hoping to find new markets in the Netherlands and fearing future industrialization of its northern neighbour, was eager to put the customs union into effect. The Dutch government at last came to recognize that a long delay with the launch of the Benelux project might make Belgium turn to France as an alternative for economic cooperation. In 1946, at a meeting in The Hague, the Benelux partners reached an agreement: Belgium would give a currency credit to the Netherlands, and in return the latter committed itself to cooperate in implementing the customs union treaty. On 1 January 1948 the treaty became effective. Since that date, trade among the Benelux countries was freed of import and export duties, whereas third countries faced a common external tariff.6 The same was going to happen one decade later on a larger European scale.

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In the early 1950s, the Benelux countries joined France, Germany and Italy in signing the Treaty of Paris, the basic treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The governments concerned realized that this community was highly conducive to lasting reconciliation between France and Germany, and could lead to wider economic integration in Western Europe. Small countries with open, trade-dependent economies such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg had major interest in creating new, bigger markets by levelling the economic playing field. In view of its later warm feelings about the European Commission, it is interesting to note that it was of all governments the Dutch government, supported by its Benelux partners, who took the initiative to establish a Council of Ministers in the ECSC’s institutional structure. The Council was meant to check the independence of the supranational High Authority, thereby creating a link between sectoral integration and general economic policy of the member states. The Benelux countries played a prominent part in the further development of European integration.7 After the crisis which emerged as a result of the refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify the treaty for the European Defence Community (August 1954), it was a joint initiative taken by these countries that rekindled the debate about the road towards greater European unity. At the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers in Messina in June 1955 a Benelux memorandum was presented, outlining a proposal for a common market and a new community for civil nuclear power. A committee under the chairmanship of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, prepared the report that ultimately led to the Treaties of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Whilst at this stage of European integration the Benelux countries gave a clear demonstration of their ability to exercise positive influence, i.e. helping realize common projects, some years later they proved to be able to block new developments by defying the will of larger member states, first and foremost France. In the early 1960s, President de Gaulle put forward proposals aimed at the creation of a Political Union of the members of the European Communities, envisaging cooperation in the field of foreign policy and defence (the so-called Fouchet proposals). On several grounds, the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns adamantly opposed the proposals. He criticized them because of their intergovernmental nature, the exclusion of Great Britain and their potential to undermine the link with NATO and the United States. Belgium initially tended to favour the French ideas but changed tack in January 1962. At that time, the French submitted a new version of their original proposal that totally ignored the concerns of its partners about the relationship of the Political Union with the European Communities on the one hand and the Atlantic Alliance on the other. When, some months later, Great Britain stated its interest to become involved with the negotiations about Political Union, Belgium decided to side with the Netherlands in the demand for British membership of the European Communities as a precondition for approval of the proposed scheme (the so-called préalable anglais). This led to the final breakdown of the negotiations on 17 April 1962.8 Later on, the Benelux countries had to accept their relative loss of influence in the Communities. One reason was the gradual expansion of the number of member states since 1973, reducing the influence of all members. Other reasons were the less polarized relationship with France after the departure of de Gaulle from French political life by the end of the 1960s as well as the enhanced role of Germany, increasingly shaking off the

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psychological inhibitions of war guilt. Still, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Benelux countries remained actively engaged in the European integration process. Prominent representatives were heavily involved with the drafting of important reports such as the Werner report on Economic and Monetary Union, the Davignon report on European Political Cooperation and the Tin-demans report on European Union, which proposed that the Council should vote by majority in the field of foreign policy.9 These reports did not arise, however, from joint Benelux initiatives. Nor could the strong commitment of the Benelux countries to the cause of European unification hide mutual differences. On trade matters, for instance, the Netherlands espoused much more liberal views than relatively interventionist Belgium and Luxembourg. Furthermore, as already indicated, in the domain of security and defence the Dutch took an Atlanticist line, while their southern neighbours (including the Luxembourgers) were more sympathetic to continental directions. After the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, institutional issues began to feature prominently on the European agenda. The growing tendency on the part of the pole states to build ‘directorates’ was perceived as a threat to the position of the non-pole members, therefore bringing the Benelux countries closer together. They succeeded in reaching common positions that were laid down in Benelux memoranda for the upcoming Inter-Governmental Conferences (IGCs). This result was achieved in spite of the fact that the public mood in the Netherlands over the traditional goals of European unification began to cool down.10 An important reason for the decreasing enthusiasm in the country over the European project was the shift of the financial burdens in the EU. Having been a net recipient for many years the Netherlands was turned into one of the largest contributors to the European budget. Nor was Benelux cooperation always harmonious. Thus, for example, at the Nice Summit of 2000, the relationship between the Netherlands and Belgium became temporarily strained because the Dutch claimed on the basis of the larger size of its population more weighted votes in the Council than Belgium. They finally obtained 13 votes to 12 for Belgium.11 There were no formal links between the Benelux countries and Austria. Since the latter country did not join the European Union until 1 January 1995, the history of Austria’s participation in the Union is rather short. However, it is useful to point out that Austria’s accession to the EU marked the fourth fundamental reorientation in the country’s international status in the course of the twentieth century.12 After the First World War, Austria was reduced to the German-speaking core of what had been a multinational empire for many centuries. It became a small country of precarious economic and political viability, which disappeared from the map as a result of the incorporation (Anschluss) into Nazi Germany in 1938. Seven years later it reemerged again under allied control. For the first ten years after 1945, the overriding goal of Austrian foreign policy was the withdrawal of the occupation forces and the restoration of the country’s full independence. At the price of adopting permanent neutrality Austria regained its full sovereignty under the State Treaty of 1955. Having released itself from foreign encroachments, the country managed to settle as a ‘normal’ actor in international politics. Highly instrumental in this process of normalization was Austria’s admission to the United Nations (as early as 1955) and to the Council of Europe (1956). In 1958, it was one of the seven countries which founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the modest alternative to the European Economic Community. Making a virtue

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out of the necessity of permanent neutrality, the country began thereafter to seek the role of bridge-builder and facilitator in international affairs. Particularly under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, who was head of government from 1970 to 1983, Austria succeeded in gaining more political weight than its small territorial size and limited resources would warrant. Thus, it conducted an active policy of strengthening ties with the communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and tried to act as a mediator between the feuding parties in the Middle East. The foreign policy of Kreisky’s successors was mainly focused on Europe rather than on the wider international environment. No longer satisfied with the limited scale of economic cooperation in EFTA, Austria was the first of the five remaining members of this association to apply for membership of the European Communities on 17 July 1989. The lengthy negotiations on accession enabled the country to gain first-hand experience of the intricacies of decision-making in Brussels. The Austrian government was able to adapt national institutional arrangements to the anticipated impact of EU membership. It did so in order to protect typical features of Austria’s federal and corporatist political system (notably the traditional roles of the Länder and the social partners).13 After the successful completion of the negotiations a solid majority of two-thirds of the Austrian voters who took part in the referendum supported the government’s decision to join the EU. Austria became a member of the Union in 1995, but the firm popular support for membership was put in jeopardy five years later. In 2000, Austria’s EU partners decided to suspend official contacts with the Austrian government (headed by Wolfgang Schüssel) in protest against the participation in the government of Jörg Haider’s party of the national right, which had run on an anti-immigration ticket. The Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel, who was sometimes tempted to take the moral high ground, had played a leading part in staging the European campaign against Austria.14 However, the anti-European backlash that was provoked among the Austrians quickly disappeared as soon as EU countries ruefully withdrew their sanctions in September 2000.15 Together with Ireland, Finland and Sweden, Austria belongs to the four neutral or nonaligned members of the EU. The status of neutrality inevitably creates larger political distance to the American pole. For this reason, Austria is not labelled, like the Benelux countries, as a core insider but as a near-core insider. The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty required an amendment of the country’s constitution to allow for Austria’s participation in the so-called Petersberg tasks.16 The ambition of the Austrian government to become fully involved in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) demanded a restructuring of its armed forces that were basically tailored as home defence units. Although joining NATO has become a serious topic in public debate (with the governing Christian Democrats leaning towards this option), opinion polls revealed that neutrality is still firmly entrenched in Austrian society. It would appear that the reluctance of many Austrians to abandon neutrality is closely related to their positive feelings about Austria’s national experience since 1955, which has been marked by external and internal political stability as well as unprecedented prosperity.

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The game of supranationality Ever since the beginning of the process of European integration in the early 1950s, two fundamentally different views have made themselves felt as to the final destination or the end stage of this process. Was one to build a new political community that moved beyond the nation-state and superseded it?17 Or was one to make use of European cooperation as the indispensable vehicle to help the nation-state survive in an age of growing interdependence and increasingly cross-boundary or transnational problems?18 These conflicting images are at the root of the dispute between the proponents of supranationality, arguing for the (further) development of European institutions independent from national governments, and those in favour of intergovernmentalism, expressing the view national governments remain the final arbiter in any scheme of European decision-making. In other words, it is the contrast between transferring and pooling of (parts of) national sovereignty. In the debate about EU architecture and institutional arrangements, the controversy is particularly focused on whether to strengthen or to weaken the so-called community method, a mode of policy-making attributing crucial roles to the European Commission and European Parliament and allowing for judicial control by the European Court of Justice. There cannot be any doubt about the preference of the Benelux countries on this matter. Over the past decades, these countries have posed themselves as champions of enhancing the supranational nature of European cooperation. Thus, they have spoken out repeatedly in favour of strengthening the European institutions and of extending the community method to the policy domains where the national governments dominate. Since its entry into the European Union, Austria too turned out largely to share the views of the Benelux countries about the balance of influence between European institutions and member states. Indeed, it has endorsed proposals to expand the role of the Commission, extend the rule of qualified majority voting in the Council and give more power to the European Parliament. What are the reasons for the outspoken predilection of the countries concerned for European cooperation based on the principle of supranationality rather than on that of intergovernmentalism? On the face of it, the attitude may be explained with reference to the general support of non-pole countries for international organizations and the rule of law in international relations. Their interests as non-pole states are best served when the Commission enjoys wide authority and the actions of the individual member states are constrained as much as possible by binding community rules. They speculate that a mere intergovernmental Union would take European politics back to the bad customs and dangerous ways of preSecond World War power politics, with the non-pole countries being objects (or pawns) rather than subjects (or actors) of international relations. By contrast, a Union based on supranational principles is considered a guarantee for it to be governed by law instead of naked power relations. As already indicated before, the Benelux countries and Austria look upon the Commission as the natural ally of the non-pole members, since it is supposed to embody the common European interest, independent from the interests of the pole states. It is assumed that supranational institutions and rules do constitute some sort of levelling-off mechanism, that is to say these institutions are believed to equalize the

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disparity of power between large and small, pole and non-pole. Because of the system of voting weights in the Council the influence of the small members is out of proportion to their size. In addition, the big ones, no less than the small ones, have to accept certain decisions of the Commission and the rulings of the Court of Justice, as well as they can be overruled by majority votes in the Council. While the countries concerned do recognize that power differentials can never be completely discarded, let alone disinvented, by legal devices, they are convinced that the position of the non-pole states very much depends on whether or not new policy initiatives are taken by an independent body. This belief was held in spite of the fact that in practical terms the leverage of this body relies on the readiness of the pole states to support its initiatives. By the same token, the countries consider it of utmost importance that the game of interstate bargaining is played by rules equally applicable to both pole and non-pole states. The argument is refuted according to which small members may feel comfortable as long as the rule of unanimity prevails. The frequent use of veto rights by non-pole states is, in their estimation, likely to exasperate the pole states, thus increasing the risk of the creation of big power directorates (or caucuses) that would sideline the weaker players.19 In a joint memorandum about the institutional architecture of the EU (issued in December 2002), the Benelux countries have tried to influence the debate in the European Convention. The three countries reaffirmed their belief that the Union ‘must have strong common institutions, must favour and extend the Community method and must strengthen those institutional elements which can best further the common interest’.20 The countries made it perfectly clear that, in their view, the Commission is pre-eminently the institution that guarantees the common interest. Characterized as the engine of European integration, the body was considered even more important in an enlarged Union with more numerous and more diverse states than in the Union in its present shape with relative political and economic homogeneity. Several concrete proposals were put forward, the greater part of them being in line with the positions taken by Austria in the EU’s constitu-tional debate. First, in order to enhance the legitimacy of the Commission it was suggested to have the Commission’s President elected by the European Parliament. Second, in the case of a reduction of the size of the Commission, the equality of all member states based on the principle of equal rotation must be guaranteed. Third, the responsibility of the Commission for adopting regulatory measures in the application of legislation ought to be recognized. Fourth, the role of the Commission in monitoring the Growth and Stability Pact has to be strengthened. As to the position of the European Parliament, the countries concerned made the case for extension of the codecision procedure in legislative matters. Moreover, they want to expand the decision-making powers of the Parliament, together with the Council, in the full spectrum of expenditure, in order to guarantee the equality of the two bodies that have budget authority on all expenditure. To this end, the abolition of the distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure was proposed.21 The Benelux and Austria were firmly opposed to the proposal of appointing a President of the European Council outside the circle of its members for a long period (five years or so). This new office-holder was intended to be both the public face and the main driving force of the European Union. France and Germany formally launched the underlying proposal in January 2003 on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the FrancoGerman Friendship and Cooperation Treaty (the so-called Elysée Treaty).22 Great Britain

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and Spain lent their support to the proposal. Germany, however, had tied its endorsement of the proposal, which was very much pushed by France, to the election of the Commission’s President by the European Parliament. Benelux and Austria, as well as other smaller EU members (Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Finland), rejected the proposal on the grounds that its adoption would violate the principle of equal treatment of all member states and disturb the balance between the institutions of the Union. Assuming with good reason that the new President was most certainly to be a representative of one of the larger member states, they feared that he would concentrate on cutting deals among these states, thereby undermining the standing of the European Commission.23 Although the Benelux countries and Austria held common views on the institutional structure of the EU and particularly were unanimous in defending the position of Commission, Parliament and Court, it does not follow that these countries were fully agreeing on negotiation tactics. Among the ‘four’, Belgium did enjoy the reputation of the country most dedicated to the development of the EU towards a federation, whilst the attachment of the Netherlands to this goal has been cast in doubt since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the former country showed greater flexibility than the latter in accepting package deals and arranging for trade-offs with larger member states that emphasized the role of national governments in EU decision-making. As for Austria, till the very end of the deliberations in the European Convention Chancellor Schüssel called on other member states not to give in on the proposal for a full-time President of the European Council, which he depicted as a serious risk to the institutional balance in the EU.24 Moreover, together with the Netherlands, Austria also belonged to the four countries25 which opposed the suspension of sanctions towards Germany in November 2003 (because of this country’s failure to bring the national budget deficit under the 3 per cent limit as set by the Stability and Growth Pact). The position taken by the Austrian Minister of Finance to stick to the terms of the Pact testified to the growing self-assertion of Austria in its relations with Germany. In view of their anxiety about preserving the strength of the community institutions, one may wonder why the selected countries were so much in favour of enlarging the Union with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the first place. Most of the latter, having regained political independence not that long ago, were prone to keeping their sovereign rights and not very supportive to the idea of supranational governance. Besides, the unforeseen burdens arising from eastward enlargement did entail grave danger of institutional overstretch and dilution of the integration accomplishments. Furthermore, in Austrian society in particular, there were widespread fears of a mass influx of cheap labour and advance of organized crime as a result of open borders with the new member states. But all these inhibitions were by far outweighed by the belief in the historic inevitability of enlargement (‘the healing of Europe’) and by moral compulsion, i.e. the feeling of solidarity with smaller countries that had been victimized in the past by totalitarian powers.

Balancing or bandwagoning? The relationship of the countries concerned towards the pole powers in the Euro-Atlantic region has been complex. To start with, the very existence of the Franco-German

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coalition had stirred up mixed feelings. To be sure, it was realized that the reconciliation between France and Germany was at the root of European integration. But it was also recognized that the interests of France and Germany were not identical but complementary: French wide agricultural interests had to be matched with Germany’s overriding interest in gaining access to a vast market for its manufacturing goods. Likewise, the two countries held divergent conceptions about the structure of European cooperation, with France believing the nation-state was to remain the main building block of the European construction and with Germany leaning to federalist views. For this reason, prior agreement between these two countries was considered a necessary condition for making any major step forward. At the same time, the Franco-German coalition was also seen as a threat to the position of the non-pole member states, confronting them with take-or-leave-it proposals and entailing the risk of degradation of the Commission to a technical body. The historic cause célèbre was the agreement reached by President Giscard d’Estaing and Chancellor Schmidt during their informal week-end meetings about the introduction of the European Monetary System at the end of the 1970s, leaving the non-pole members no other choice but to accept. Furthermore, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg (albeit the latter two to a lesser extent) were suspicious about the motives of France. They believed that the French government, being aware of the gap between the level of its political ambitions and the size of its economic capabilities, was tempted to use the coalition with Germany as an instrument to gain political leadership over the European Community as a whole. The French strategy was, according to their view, successful as long as Germany, because of the legacy of its war past, felt inhibited to fight its national interests in the same way the other large member states were doing and was in need of gaining political respect. But Germany’s accommodative, if not submissive, attitude to France began to change after the country’s reunification in 1990, enhancing Germany’s political and economic weight and making France worried about the rise of a new power centre in Central Europe. With the advent of a new generation of political leaders, Germany was no longer willing to allow other countries, especially France, to exploit the prevailing sense of guilt in German society for political reasons. The normalization of German foreign policy made it less attractive for France to put all its eggs in the German basket. During the 1990s, the Benelux countries began to show a more realistic assessment of the significance of any dominant coalition for providing critical leadership tasks in an association of states that, like the members of the EU, had retained large portions of their sovereignty. One reason for this changing attitude was the declining influence of the European Commission after the departure of Jacques Delors. But it is quite ironical that this sense of greater realism on the part of the Benelux countries coincided with the growing strains and, consequently, lessened importance of the Franco-German coupling in EU policy-making. Thus, unlike what had happened prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht, France and Germany were unable to put their marks either on the deliberations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam or on those resulting in the Treaty of Nice. Indeed, they failed to table common proposals on the eve of the summit meeting as they used to do in the years before. The issue of reweighting of votes at the Nice Summit (December 2000) provoked a row between President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder. France insisted on the principle of equality between the two countries, whereas Germany wanted to see its larger population size converted to more votes. However, the opposition

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of both France and Germany to an early rush to war by the US over Iraq brought Paris and Berlin together again and prompted observers to speak of a relaunch of FrancoGerman collaboration. In October 2002 both countries reached a much-debated compromise about the funding of the EU’s common agricultural policy after 2006, which caused ill feelings in several member states. As already pointed out, in January 2003 France and Germany also submitted common proposals for reforming EU institutions. What strategies have the selected countries employed in order to serve their interests? Non-pole countries being confronted with a great power in their vicinity may choose between balancing and bandwagoning (see definition in Chapter 2, note 23). Contributing to institution building and rule creation as discussed in the preceding section may be taken as a subtype of balancing. The presence of two subpoles in the Euro-Atlantic region, i.e. the US and the Franco-German coalition, raised opportunities for the non-pole powers to conduct a mixed strategy, that is to say to combine balancing and bandwagoning at different levels of political action. In this respect, it is important to recognize that for several decades, overlapping a large part of the Cold War period, the Benelux countries were less concerned about American pre-eminence in the Atlantic system than about the threat of Franco-German dominance in the European system. Part of the explanation for this different attitude lies in the weight of geography. After all, the US is a distant, overseas power, whereas France and Germany are in the vicinity of the countries under discussion. Another part of the explanation is related to the perception of the US as a benevolent superpower, prepared to take a disproportionate share of the costs that are required for the supply of collective goods, such as security, free trade and access to oil and other scarce resources. The first response to the rising importance of Franco-German collaboration after the conclusion of the Elysée Treaty in 1963 was to make strong efforts in favour of British membership of the European Community. The United Kingdom was not only seen as a guarantee for preserving the transatlantic security link but also as a counterweight to the Franco-German couple. Although Britain finally joined the EC in 1973, this strategy of internal balancing did not turn out to be successful because of the lukewarm attitude of the British government to the goals of European integration and the ensuing limited involvement in European affairs. More successful proved the strategy of bandwagoning with or relying on the US in order to mobilize American power against the FrancoGerman pole, particularly against the alleged bid for regional political hegemony by France. The underlying assumption of this strategy was the readiness on the part of the US administration to reward non-pole European allies by defending their freedom of manoeuvre in intra-European politics, in return for their support to American policies to prevent the growth of an independent European military force.26 Not surprisingly, the Netherlands played the dual strategy of bandwagoning with the US and balancing against France with more vigour and conviction than Belgium and Luxembourg. After all, Atlanticism is deeply rooted in the Dutch maritime tradition. As a former naval power, the Netherlands has been much more focused on the AngloAmerican world than on the continent.27 Belgium, by contrast, has never been a seafaring country; the industrial base of its economy was much stronger than of its northern neighbour that relied heavily on international trade. In addition, the linguistic composition of the country gave rise to political cross-pressures. For a long time the making of Belgian foreign policy was dominated by the elites from the French-speaking,

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southern part of the country. As a result, the efforts of Belgium to promote its interests as a small country were muted by the appeal of French culture in general and French political discourse to the francophones in the country.28 Indeed, the general attitude of Belgium to French proposals has been less rejectionist and confrontational than that of the Netherlands. Actually, this was also the case in the years when Belgian diplomacy was run by Flemish Foreign Ministers,29 who tended to observe political equidistance towards France and Germany. Despite the Belgian penchant for pragmatism in European politics there were red lines not to be crossed. Thus, as already referred to, the Belgian government finally joined The Hague in obstructing the so-called Fouchet proposals for Political Union in the early 1960s. Furthermore, Belgium was also the sole EU member state to support the ambitious Dutch draft treaty proposal in September 1991 during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Maastricht.30 The observation made about Belgium also applies to tiny Luxembourg, which is located in the triangle between Belgium, Germany and France. United with the Netherlands in a personal union at the level of head of state till 1890, the grand duchy became increasingly exposed to political influences from its two large neighbours, from France in particular.31 Because of lack of staff resources it had to turn to outside help in performing the half-yearly EC/EU Presidency. Needless to say, Austria does not feature in this picture because it was outside the EC/EU at that time. The breakdown of the bipolar order after the collapse of the Soviet Union could not fail to affect the strategic calculations of the non-pole countries concerned. Of special importance had been the enhanced political weight of Germany after the reunification and the decreased involvement of the US with European security matters as a result of the diminished strategic importance of Europe to the US. With the outbreak of the crisis in the Balkans in the early 1990s the US government initially left the initiative to the Europeans to deal with the problems arising from the disbandment of the former Yugoslavia. On the issue of a common European security policy, which in the language of the Maastricht Treaty ‘might in time lead to a common defence’,32 Washington began to take a pragmatic stand. It was not against the development of a European identity on security and defence, as long as the cohesion of NATO was not threatened and European allies were willing to take a larger share of the common defence burden. At the same time, the German Foreign Minister at the time, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, with his heavyhanded diplomacy resulting in the early recognition of Croatia, was accused by European colleagues of undercutting attempts to draw a common European line on the independence of the entities being part of the former Yugoslavia. He infuriated the Netherlands and Belgium by his flat rejection of the federalist-inspired proposal of the Dutch EC Presidency during the negotiations about the Economic and Monetary Union and Political Union preceding the Maastricht Treaty. Many opinion leaders in the Low Countries believed that, once again, Germany had passed under the yoke of France. Under the changing condition of limited engagement of the US with Europe, the Netherlands was not able to play the American card with the same vigour as it was possible at the time of heavy European military reliance on the US. During the greater part of the 1990s, Dutch foreign policy oscillated between the Atlantic and the continental-European orientation: the Foreign Ministry was still mainly driven by the traditional Atlanticist reflex33 whilst the majority of parliament was tilting more towards Germany and, to a lesser extent, France. In contrast, especially in the domain of security

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and defence, Belgium and Luxembourg were moving closer in the direction of FrancoGerman cooperation. Thus, unlike the Netherlands, the two countries decided to join the Eurocorps, designed as an autonomous military force by France and Germany. The rapprochement between France and Great Britain on European defence cooperation at St. Malo by the end of 1998 took the Dutch government by surprise. To some extent, it also embarrassed the Dutch because their reluctance to European defence cooperation outside the framework of NATO was overtaken by events. It became perfectly clear that since Great Britain, after all the guardian of the transatlantic link par excellence, had stated its readiness to contribute to building a military capacity for autonomous European action, the Dutch could no longer drag their feet on this issue. Unilateralist tendencies and talk about pre-emptive war in the Bush administration made, in the judgement of the Belgian government, the case for the common European security and defence policy even stronger. In the summer of 2002, the Belgian Prime Minister, Verhofstadt, made a stunning move by articulating the need for establishing an independent European defence organization. In a personal letter to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac, Verhofstadt called for radical rethinking of the EU’s security and defence policy. ‘It should be relaunched with member states going so far as to turn it into a collective defence alliance completely independent from NATO’.34 The Belgian Prime Minister argued that the Western Alliance was becoming a ‘toolbox’ of Washington, which ‘was using it as a prop to build coalitions for its war against terrorism’.35 Together with Luxembourg, Belgium joined France and Germany in taking issue with the US policy of military confrontation with Iraq. With the military campaign of the AngloAmerican coalition against the regime of Saddam Hussein still raging, Belgium took the initiative to call a conference to discuss the possibilities of the formation of a core group of EU member states that were committed to move European defence cooperation forward. The conference, which eventually took place in Brussels by the end of April was attended by only the four opponents of the US. The Belgian initiative can be taken as another sign that Belgium had opted for a strategy of balancing towards the US and bandwagoning with the Franco-German pole, at least as far as geopolitical matters were concerned. The Netherlands, which had given political support to Anglo-American policies on Iraq, interpreted the Brussels conference as an anti-American gesture and remained aloof. Together with other European governments the Dutch government had deplored the timing of the Belgian initiative, while believing that European defence talks could only be meaningful if Britain participated. Clearly, old Atlanticist proclivities had not faded away in the Netherlands. As already pointed out, Austria took a similar line as it had followed four years earlier at the time of NATO’s air campaign over Kosovo: referring to the country’s status of neutrality, it refused to give the US access to its land and air space for military transports to the Gulf region. The Austrian government had denounced the US decision to take military action against Iraq because it was not based on a clear mandate of the UN Security Council. Importantly, however, these divergent positions during the Iraq crisis had not prevented the four countries from closely collaborating to influence the debate about the future of the European Union. Apparently, from a policy-making or bureaucratic point of view the global geopolitical and the European institutional issues were ‘disjoint’ or ‘unlinked’. With regard to the prospects of European defence cooperation, much would

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depend on the readiness of France and Britain to overcome their mutual differences. Both countries might come to the conclusion that neither of them, with opposite policies and strategies, was really able to wield any influence on American policies over Iraq. In as much as this conclusion is correct, the obvious lesson to be drawn is that only a politically united Europe could stand a chance of correcting decisions by the American hyperpower. No doubt, a renewed Franco-British rapprochement on security and defence, after St. Malo 1998, would almost automatically restore harmony between Belgium and the Netherlands in this field.

Theory revisited It has been demonstrated that the selected non-pole states close to the European pole powers are committed to their common interest in seeking to restrain international anarchy in the Euro-Atlantic zone by supporting supranational institutions and strengthening binding international rules. In Chapter 2, however, it is maintained that such a commitment implies a long-term effort that has always been second priority to the immediate concerns of their crucial, though divergent locations. From this perspective, the first priority of the non-pole state threatened by a great power in its vicinity is not to provoke this power. In so far as the Benelux countries and Austria feared to live in the shadow of the Franco-German Axis, that fear was at least mitigated by several factors. First, this pole represented a highly decentralized alliance, linking two former arch-enemies with quite divergent visions of European integration and differing motives underlying their cooperation. To be sure, France and Germany had demonstrated in the past their ability to strike grand bargains that were crucial to the future of the European Community. But after the last grand bargain at Maastricht, trading off the French insistence on the creation of the economic and monetary union against the German desire for political union, doubts have been expressed about the permanency and strength of the Franco-German couple. Admittedly, the late Iraq crisis brought the two countries side by side again. However, they were not able to rally a clear majority of EU members against the US, nor were they powerful enough to get the proposals of the European Convention accepted by all EU members. At any rate, the looseness of the alliance in question did enable the selected countries to defend their autonomy to a large extent. This also helps to explain that the prescriptions, if any, for acceptable foreign-policy behaviour that the non-pole powers obtained from the decentralized pole were rather vague. Incidentally, in spite of its belonging to the geographic core, Switzerland (being a non-pole state and at the same time a non-EU country with a strong sense of national identity) managed to protect its autonomy because of the low-level of pressure from the Franco-German coalition (see Chapter 9). Second, there was basic value compatibility between one of the pole states (Germany) and the non-pole states. In fact, Germany’s image of the ideal European integration order converged with the preference of the Benelux countries (and Austria) for the community method and the supranational organization of European decision-making. Paradoxically, the aggrandizement of Germany after reunification did not cause much concern about any loss of autonomy in the selected countries, because a more powerful Germany was

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considered to be in a better position to reassert its views towards France. Not Germany but France, advocating the pre-eminence of the nation-states in the European construction, was seen as a danger to the interests of the non-pole member states. To the extent that Germany was inclined to subordinate its views to the French position, the Franco-German condominium was perceived as a threat. Third, the involvement of the United States with Europe’s security offered the three small NATO allies opportunities, especially when European security cooperation was at stake, to employ a balancing strategy towards the two large European states. The Netherlands in particular, believing in the virtue of geographical distance as well as the equalizing impact of American power on the status of pole and non-pole European states alike, was tempted to put its trust in the US. In so doing, the Dutch government hoped to find a shield to protect its autonomy in intraEuropean affairs. This finding is consistent with the presumption of pole states being able to apply not only negative but also positive sanctions in a given territory. Belgium and Luxembourg, lacking an established tradition of Atlanticism, were constrained in using this option because of the inclination of Frenchspeaking elites from Wallonia and Brussels to take French interests and political ideas into account. As an outsider of NATO the option of playing the Atlantic card was completely foreclosed to Austria. The four selected countries are no exception to the rule that small states are more successful in exercising defensive than offensive power.36 The first form of power was defined as the ability to avoid being affected by the actions of others, whilst the latter was referred to as the ability to influence other actors to do what they would not otherwise do. In contrast with the prominent role the Benelux countries played, owing to special circumstances, in the formative years of European integration, their joint impact on the outcome of the IGCs that were held since the early 1990s was quite limited. Nor was Austria able to leave its footprints behind on the Treaties of Amsterdam and of Nice. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence that the policies of the countries concerned were more than incidentally affected by specific actions taken by the pole members. Especially in the field of external relations, these countries were able to profile themselves in particular areas and on particular topics that are believed to give them a comparative edge (e.g. development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping and human rights). Besides, scholarly interest should not only be focused on the grand, strategic decisions pertaining to new geopolitical directions and constitutional designs. It must also be directed at the going concerns in the European Union, i.e. the day-to-day negotiations in Brussels on the bread-and-butter issues touching on the concerns of ordinary citizens and involving the home departments. What one observes in this rather down-to-earth political arena are the operations of shifting, issue-related coalitions with common interests cutting across the borderlines between core and near-core members and pole and non-pole members.37 It is in the same context of low politics that the autonomy of all EU member states—large and small—has been shrunk as a result of binding EU decisions and rules. So, can the external behaviour of the Benelux countries and Austria in the EuroAtlantic space be explained in terms of their proximity to the pole members France and Germany? The findings of this chapter are rather inconclusive in that regard. On the one hand, the positions taken by the Franco-German alliance obviously are important inputs in the foreign policies of the countries concerned. Perhaps to a higher degree than in the

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policies of others, these positions do circumscribe their menu for choice. On the other hand, however, several factors enable the non-pole members to find significant leeway for maintaining their autonomy vis-à-vis the pole members. These factors are the fragility of the pole alliance, the commonality of vision on the future of the European Union between Germany and the four selected countries, as well as the availability of the US as the off-shore balancer. As to the outside pole power, the hands of the US over the enlarged Union may be strengthened in the future since most new member states are supportive of American policies. One of the paradoxical results of the accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the EU is that the Union will grow more continental geographically but more Atlanticist in its political outlook. Finally, this study is another reminder of the old truth that one cannot disregard with impunity the weight of political traditions and domestic structure—in turn perhaps externally conditioned—on a country’s foreign-policy choices. The observation is especially relevant to the stands taken by the Netherlands and Belgium on matters related to high politics, i.e. foreign policy and defence. Yes, the Low Countries are very much part of the EU’s geopolitical core. But in the Netherlands the impact of the long-standing maritime tradition (the ‘shadow of the past’, see Chapter 2) still makes itself felt on the country’s general foreign-policy orientation. And so do the more continental outlook and linguistic composition of national society in the case of Belgium. It helps us understand why the two countries, notwithstanding their shared vision on the appropriate balance between the role of community institutions and individual members in the EU, differed in setting the parameters for European security organization and defining their relationship with the US whenever hard choices had to be made.

Notes 1 See Everts (2000): 16–21. 2 Marginalization understood as reduced influence (offensive power). Of course, autonomy (defensive power) was simultaneously increased by the collapse of the bipolar order. As an illustration of this latter point, see the varied European reactions to the US-led Iraq operation in 2003. For the definition of these concepts, see Chapter 2 of the present volume. 3 For a nuanced assessment of this argument, see Michalski (2002). 4 For an eloquent plea in favour of a special role for the ‘big three’ (Great Britain, France and Germany), see Financial Times (2003) ‘Only a club of three can bring European unity’, 11 July. 5 See this author’s chapter on the Netherlands in the book edited by Howorth and Menon (1997). 6 See Voorhoeve (1979): 154–5. 7 See Bossaert and Vanhoonacker (2000). 8 About this episode, see Bloes (1970). 9 See Pinder (1991): 194–5. 10 See Pijpers (2002): 339–40. 11 The Belgian government had taken the view that since the equal share of votes of Germany and France had not changed, there was no reason to change the share of the Netherlands and Belgium either. It is ironical to note that this dispute about reweighing of votes seems to have been overtaken by the proposal of the European Convention to abolish the system of weighted votes and to introduce instead a more simple system of double majority (a single majority of member states accounting for at least 60 per cent of the European population). 12 See Neuhold (1996).

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13 See Luif (1998). 14 See Coolsaet (2001): 31. In July 2003, the Belgian Foreign Minister bowed to heavy American pressure to withdraw the highly contested Genocide Act from Belgian national legislation. The act was based on the principle of universal jurisdiction and had opened up the possibility of prosecuting, in Belgium, American citizens suspected of involvement with genocide. The US Secretary of Defence had threatened to remove NATO Headquarters from Belgium. 15 On this episode (‘the Austrian crisis of 2002’), see Angerer (2002): 181. 16 See Luif (2000): 68. 17 About the roots of federalism in the European context, see Mayne et al. (1990). About the supranational approach in the same context, see Sandholtz and Sweet (1998). 18 The standard text elaborating this view has become Alan S.Milward’s seminal work (1992). 19 In Chapters 5 and 9 it is explained why both Denmark and Sweden take a deviating view on this fundamental matter. 20 Memorandum of the Benelux, ‘A balanced institutional framework for a large, more effective and more transparent Union’, 4 December 2002. 21 Ibid. 22 See ‘Contribution franco-allemande à la Convention européenne sur l’architecture institutionnelle de l’Union’, 15 January 2003. 23 For a critical comment on the position of the small EU members, see The Economist ‘Tyranny of the tiny?’, 25 January 2003. 24 See a report on the European Convention in the French daily Le Monde, 18 June 2003. 25 The other two countries defiant to Germany had been Spain and Finland. 26 See van Staden (1995). 27 On the foreign-policy traditions of the Netherlands see Voorhoeve (1979), particularly 42– 54. 28 For a comprehensive historical overview of Belgium’s foreign policy see Coolsaet (2002). 29 During the greater part of the 1990s Belgium had socialist Foreign Ministers with a Flemish background: Willy Claes (1992–94), Frank Vandenbroucke (1994–95) and Erik Derycke (1995–99). 30 See van Hulten (1993). 31 See Trausch et al. (1996). 32 Article J4 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty. 33 Mr Hans van Mierlo, who served in the Foreign Ministry from 1994 to 1998, was one of the rare Dutch Foreign Ministers being sympathetic to closer cooperation to both Germany and France. Calling for an active ‘neighbour policy’ he stated that the Netherlands should hide in the Franco-German ‘armpit’. 34 Financial Times (2002), 31 July. 35 The correctness of the report has been confirmed by official sources. 36 Joris Voorhoeve, in his survey of small-state literature, notes: ‘It is difficult for the Small Power to marshal wide support among Great and Super Powers for Small Power initiatives, while it is relatively easier to influence in a negative way by blocking others’ initiatives which require Small Power cooperation’. See Voorhoeve (1979): 312. 37 For an analysis of shifting coalition patterns and the position of the Netherlands, see Hosli (1999).

5 The north Lee Miles The Nordic countries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden occupy a region that has been regarded widely as the northern periphery of Europe and, thus, their more or less ‘distant’ geographical location is a background factor as regards their perspectives towards European integration (see Figure 5.1). Equally, with their comparatively modest population1 and power capabilities the Nordic countries have not, in modern history, been known as ‘hard core’ power projectors—although the Baltic Sea area offered opportunities as a softer ‘sphere of influence’ for some of them after the Cold War.2 So with this latter nuance, the Nordic countries are justifiably seen as nonpole powers. In the context of Cold War international diplomacy, these countries also refrained from joining some of the primary international organizations of Europe today, namely the European Communities (EC) (Iceland and Norway) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Finland and Sweden), or kept a low profile in one or both (Denmark). At face value, these countries form a northern periphery of non-pole states that are sometimes insiders and sometimes outsiders of Europe’s premier international organizations.

Geopolitical challenges in the post-Cold War era The major challenge for these countries, affected in various ways by the great European transformations of 1989–91, was how to position themselves in the ‘New Europe’. Could such positioning be reconciled with their residual self-sufficiency—implying more or less reluctance vis-à-vis any supranational European project? From about the mid-1990s, an opportunity presented itself to function as the promoters in major Western institutions of the entry of the new democracies from east and north-east Europe. Moreover, in particular Denmark, Sweden and Finland saw a chance to create a Baltic Sea region that also favoured their own positions in the EU and/or NATO. As with states in the other groupings, a major challenge in the early twenty-first century was to position themselves in the potential Euro-Atlantic bifurcation. From a historical perspective, this group of countries have shared striking similarities in their general attitudes towards participation in European integration. The governments of all five expressed reservations (or were impartial) about the original foundation of the (then) European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and (later) the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957. For slightly differing reasons, their governments were wary about the specific political obligations that such a supranational organization

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based upon a customs union and a common commercial policy would have for their national sovereignties. If anything, their governments preferred to see a more panEuropean (and thus less exclusive) free trade area that would display strong intergovernmental tendencies.3 For one or two of them, the objections to the original EEC also hid deeper fears that such participation would result in their subservience to continental (pole) powers, if they joined.

Figure 5.1 The north and north-east (2005). A thematic survey General aspects Small states are not a coherent group as regards their attitudes towards European integration (see Archer and Nugent 2002; Miles 2002b: 93; Mouritzen 1998a: 22–4 or Chapter 2 of the present volume).4 As far as the Nordic countries are concerned, the following characteristics were decisive in shaping their ‘Euro-reluctance’ (though with nuances between each of the Nordic states). First, the Nordic states shared a fundamentally political judgement arising partly out of historical experience and domestic politics (other than just being a small state). On one level, their governmental policies have been largely pragmatic in orientation and have been cautious ascertaining what kind of ‘Europe’ they would like to see develop. In fact, they are much clearer about

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what European integration should not be about—namely a ‘Federal United States of Europe’—since this they believe may undermine their governmental freedom to pursue traditional Nordic policies. We could thus argue, if somewhat simplistically, that there was a modest value placed on European integration by the Nordic countries for most of the post-war period. Their general caution towards European integration reflects a second aspect—namely a value placed upon the preservation of autonomy (or national sovereignty) as the basis of the region’s long-standing economic prosperity and political distinctiveness. Consequently, Nordic scepticism over European integration has exhibited a significant, if intellectually unfashionable, attachment to a positive understanding of the sovereign state (Lawler 1997:566). Perhaps reinforcing the Nordic populations’ preference for pursuing their cherished political values ‘through their own state system rather than through the European Union’ and that somehow, ‘Nordic is better’ (Archer 2000:107). Third, the Nordic countries view themselves as model societies that, in certain instances, other nation-states can learn from. The latter has been a key feature of the ‘Nordic bastion’ (Mouritzen 1993). It is embodied, amongst other things, in the value placed by the (usually) Social Democratic Nordic governments (in Denmark, Norway and Sweden at least) towards the development and maintenance of their welfare states as part of their ‘welfare nationalism’. The need to maintain autonomy over economic policy in order to sustain the means to support their Nordic welfare states was especially influential in determining resistance to European integration in the early days. It remains one of the central arguments of those opposing Nordic participation in further integration even in the three countries that are presently EU members. How does this translate into our own analysis? For one thing, the governing elite has largely defined their country’s ‘national interest’ in relation to a distinctive set of supposedly Nordic values. However, the political elite have recognized that Nordic political objectives can be achieved effectively through membership of the European Union and on balance, the mainstream of the political elite are not ‘EU sceptic’ (see Miles, 2001:306–8). Nevertheless, they retain reservations about further (essentially political) integration and ‘anything that smacks of a federalism is normally resisted’ (Archer 2000:109–10). In short, they are ‘federo-sceptics’ in the main. There has also been a divergence of perspective between the Nordic political elite and the domestic populations. The Nordic publics have been more ‘EU sceptic’ (about membership) and ‘federo-sceptic’ (about further integration). The public debates have largely focused on questions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘Nordic identity’ (as opposed to ‘national interest’). Public affection for aspects of the ‘Nordic bastion’ is stronger since there is less susceptibility to Europeanization than amongst the political elite. In the Nordic context (see Archer 2000), we can often demarcate the attitudes of a Europeanized ‘state’ (read political elite) and that of the ‘nation’ (meaning electorate). Finally, the caution over European integration reflected the Nordic region’s peripheral position in Europe and that—in general—the Nordic countries (with the exception of Finland) had not been affected so dramatically by the Second World War. Wider options than purely European ones were treated seriously. One of the lessons drawn from the Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian political echelons was that their futures were guaranteed less by reliance on Europe and more by having an Atlanticist orientation.

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Equally, for the non-aligned Swedes, a stress on internationalism and a global perspective was deemed to have greater compatibility with their ‘neutral’ security policy. Dynamics influencing the north The various dynamics affecting our Nordic non-pole powers should now be outlined. The first dynamic represents the European hegemons constituting part of the power base underpinning the Euro-Atlantic pole. In practice, this requires the Nordic countries to respond to the initiatives and ‘grand bargains’ of France and Germany, the continental European pole powers. The ‘Franco-German Axis’ has pushed the EU forward for most of its short history and promoted agendas, such as Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), that have substantial implications for Nordic trade policies. Particular attention has been directed towards Germany. Not only have several Nordic countries—in particular Denmark—historically experienced the sharp end of German political hegemony, but also because, from an economic perspective, the country is a significant recipient of Nordic exports. The role of the German hegemon can, albeit to a limited extent, explain why the Nordic countries favoured ever-closer trading links with other EC/EU states. An aspect that had increased in importance since the 1970s—with Danish accession (1973), the formation of the EEA (1994) and eventual Finnish and Swedish EU membership (1995). At the same time, most of the Nordic countries have wanted to retain political autonomy from their larger southern neighbour. Even today, Scandinavian (especially Danish) reservations over further European integration can be partly attributed to an inbuilt concern that deeper EU participation may lead to overwhelming German influence in their affairs. Trading links with ‘core Europe’ were not sufficient alone to warrant all the Nordic governments joining the Community/Union—even if the Nordic governments have placed great emphasis on being part of the Single European Market (SEM) process (either through the EEA or full membership). The Nordic periphery has also been influenced substantially by another key player constituting part of the Euro-Atlantic pole—namely the United Kingdom, often portrayed as the ‘counterweight’ to the Franco-German Axis. The British have been an important, largely complementary, influence upon the Nordic countries as regards their national EU policies. In the first place, the Nordic countries generally share similar attitudes with the British towards European integration—not least in rejecting any kind of evolution towards a ‘Federal Europe’ as representing the centralization, as opposed to decentralization, of power at the supranational level (see Miles 1995). Thus, the UK and the Nordic countries have been, albeit to a limited extent, natural political ‘bed-fellows’. Political commonality was also reinforced by practical economic reasons. The UK represented one, and in some cases the largest, external trading partner for the majority of the post-war period. Several of the Nordic governments ‘shadowed’ UK trade policy for most of the 1950s to 1980s, since tariff-free access to the British markets—be it inside or outside the Community—was essential for Nordic exports and trade. When the British stayed outside the Community during its formation in the 1950s, the Nordic governments were happy to become founder members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) provided Britain joined. When successive British governments altered course and sought full membership status in the 1960s, Denmark and Norway specifically linked their own

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membership applications to the viability of British EEC entry. Ultimately when the British applications failed in the 1960s, both Denmark and Norway suspended theirs, even though there were no objections to their candidatures from the existing EEC ‘Six’. The post-1973 situation where both the German and British hegemons were in the Union shaped Nordic awareness on the necessity of a close economic relationship with Europe, even if at times the Nordic governments were also presented with differing political options by these two larger countries. It may also partly explain why the referendum debates in Denmark in the 1970s and Finland and Sweden in the 1990s often focused on the economic benefits and nature of participation in the Union—given the large size of Nordic exports to British and German markets. The United Kingdom also played an essential role in attempting to preserve the close relationship between the United States and Europe (Chapter 2). The more Atlanticist Danes, Icelanders and Norwegians have taken some comfort in the fact that one of the European pole powers shares a similar preference for sustaining the continued engagement of the US in European affairs and thus to enable some balancing to take place vis-à-vis continental great powers. The variations in the Nordic approaches to the Union further illustrate the contention that the European Union remains sufficiently decentralized to enable the Nordic governments to balance perceptions of influence versus autonomy and, thus, deviate between the German and British hegemons. For the Danes and Swedes, this enabled them to display selective enthusiasm for EU policy initiatives such as environmental measures (with the support of Germany), whilst also remaining outside the euro (along with the British). For the Icelanders and Norwegians, this enabled them to judge that they can afford to remain ‘outside’ the Union formally. Our third dynamic represents the other side of the Euro-Atlantic pole and, in particular, the influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the leadership of the United States. Given that Denmark, Norway and Iceland were all founder members of NATO, the organization remains at the core of their security policies. In addition, the capacity of the United States to exercise indirect influence through its role as the guarantor of stability and security for such non-pole powers is recognized (Chapter 2). This remains accurate for the Nordic region also. Iceland, for instance, relies almost exclusively on the Americans based at Keflavik and NATO in general for its defence requirements. The Nordic states were, and are, wary of the implications of belonging to a supranational Europe for the continuation of their traditional foreign and security policies. This may have been for differing reasons although their attitudes were largely shaped by their respective relationship with NATO. Domestic discussions on full membership, including during the 1972 and 1994 referendum debates in Norway for instance, focus regularly on the possible tension between their NATO commitments and any potential Community/Union security roles. In the Norwegian and Icelandic cases, the attraction of being a full member of the ‘soft’ Union has not been enough to counter the ‘hard security’ reservations emanating from their commitments to NATO. For slightly differing reasons, non-aligned Finland and Sweden rejected EEC membership for many years, arguing that membership was incompatible with their stated policies of ‘nonalignment in peacetime leading to neutrality in wartime’.

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The penultimate dynamic influencing the Nordic governments is based outside the Euro-Atlantic pole, emanating from the eastern borders of the Nordic region: the former Soviet Union and, more recently, the Russian Federation. The question of managing relations with Russia whilst pursuing closer economic ties has been one that has long preoccupied Finnish, and to a lesser extent, Norwegian policy-makers in particular, given their common borders with Russia. The Finnish and Swedish governments have also paid special attention to raising awareness of the significance of EU—Russia relations since their own accessions in 1995 and especially during their tenures as EU Council President in 1999 (Finland) and 2001 (Sweden—see Bengtsson 2002). The final dynamic is the often complex, institutionalized interrelationship between the Nordic countries themselves through formal Nordic cooperation and represents a Northern European superstructure of the Euro-Atlantic pole. This can be seen in several ways: in the common initiatives between the Nordic EU members towards EU employment, environmental and social policies and even crisis management, the links between the Nordic countries through EU and EEA membership and in their efforts to sustain their region as a ‘zone of peace’. Equally, Nordic cooperation has been a useful ‘fall back’ for Norway and Iceland that have been unable to swallow the bitter pill of EU membership, yet wanting to reduce any negative effects stemming from their outsider status. This ‘inter-Nordic’ perspective may have been (partly) supplanted, or at least complemented by, a Baltic Sea dimension over the last decade or so. The Nordic governments have emphasized the importance of the Baltic Sea and sought to integrate any obligations towards the Union with membership of other regional organizations, such as the Council for Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Barents-Euro Arctic Council (BEAC). The rapidity of comprehensive EU and NATO enlargement to include the Baltic States means that the eastward border of the ‘Northern periphery’ is no longer neatly delineated along the borders of Norway and Finland with the Russian Federation. The Nordic countries grasped the concept of Baltic Sea cooperation close to their hearts— perhaps suggesting that the former are not part of such a distinct ‘Northern periphery’ after all (see Lagerspetz 2003). Indeed, the NATO and EU accessions of the Baltic States may actually provide the Nordic countries with new opportunities to act as bridge builders in formulating new policies towards the expanded Baltic Sea region. However, none of the above dynamics should be regarded as completely exclusive or influential at all times. Rather they may explain why differing Nordic governments adopted deviant policies or strategies towards European integration at various points. It is also acknowledged that ‘smallness is as much about identity-formation and political perceptions within small states as between small and larger states’ (Miles 2002b:94). Such perceptions reinforce more than ever that a country’s status as pole power is essentially a relational term. Thus, a country such as Sweden can regard itself as non-pole and insignificant in the context of the European Union but as a leading power in the Nordic-Baltic region. Such an analysis can also be applied to our inter-Nordic dynamic. Denmark and Sweden have traditionally competed for informal leadership of the region, since they are the largest states. In contrast, Finnish, Icelandic and Norwegian political debates are often shrouded in the sub-text of wishing to restrict the ability of Denmark and Sweden to speak as the ‘voice’ of the Nordic region. Our conceptualization of Nordic non-pole

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powers is affected by a ‘major—major’ rivalry between Denmark and Sweden and ‘major—minor’ competition between Denmark and Sweden on the one side and the three smaller Nordic states on the other.

The north constellations Denmark: a hesitant near-core insider? Denmark became the sole, rather lonely, Nordic ‘EEC insider’ in 1973 when the country became a full member state of the Community. The Danes voted for accession in the 1972 referendum by 63.4 per cent, but domestic support was largely secured on the grounds that the Community was to remain an essentially economic-orientated ‘Common Market’. From the early days of their membership, successive Danish governments resisted any fundamentally political institutional reform that sought to extend the EU supranational institutions in particular. Denmark remained an ‘awkward’ and peripheral ‘EC insider’ during the 1970s and 1980s paralleling its status in NATO, where its membership was qualified by the no to foreign bases and ‘non-nuclear’ stances (even though the Danes were founder members of this organization). Right from the start then, Denmark was more akin to being a near-core insider in the Community/Union. To some degree, our relational definition of a non-pole power explains the somewhat schizophrenic behaviour of Denmark. On the one hand, and using the metaphor of Kelstrup (Kelstrup 1993:154) about small states, the Danish elite and public have harboured concerns about the EC membership representing an ‘integration dilemma’. In some instances, full membership allows the country to be ‘entrapped’ by the plans of the larger member states, the Franco-German Axis (one of our dynamics) and EC supranationality. On the positive side, and reflecting our ‘inter-Nordic’ dynamic, Danish governments often perceived that there may be a valuable bridge-builder role in representing the wider interests of the Nordic region and the non-EC Nordic states within the Community. The Danes do not want to become too isolated since there are opportunities associated with being inside the Union. Danish attitudes towards the question of EU membership have become less hostile over time. Pedersen (Pedersen 1996:90) argues that from 1990—and in spite of a few serious hiccups on the way such as in 1992 over the TEU (Treaty on European Union) and 2000 over EMU—the Danish elite has become more predisposed to EC supranationality. Today, Denmark is no longer an ‘EU sceptic’ state since there is widespread elite acceptance of the benefits of being a full member. Yet it remains a fervent ‘federo-sceptic’ with the Danish elite and public expressing major reservations over the direction of further European integration and outright opposition to anything that represents a movement to a ‘Federal Europe’. Our identified dynamics come into play. On one level, EC/EU participation has brought an even closer economic relationship with (particularly) the German and (to a lesser extent) UK hegemons so that the question of Danish full membership is less controversial. In other instances, they have supplied the primary arguments of the ‘No’ campaigners that convinced the Danish public to reject the TEU initially in June 1992 and the euro in September 2000. It is worth having a couple of illustrations. First, Danish

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perceptions of being a ‘small state’ have been fuelled by geopolitically related arguments stemming from our ‘German’ and ‘EU’ dynamics. Given Denmark’s close geographical proximity to Germany, Danish concerns over rising German influence do fuel greater resistance to participation in specific EU policies. The Danes, for example, negotiated specific assurances on the full rights of establishment for EU nationals in Denmark during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations since there was substantial public concern over the impact this may have in some of Denmark’s best holiday locations in Jutland. Above all, a ‘national compromise’ of four opt-outs was secured after the first referendum result in 1992. Exemptions to TEU provisions on EU citizenship, EMU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in December 1992 were gained in order to shore-up public support for the Maastricht Treaty in the second referendum of 1993. These official opt-outs have thus formalized Denmark’s position as a near-core insider. Nevertheless, it means something more in this analytical context. Denmark can also be termed near-core insider precisely because it has preferred to ‘compartmentalize’ its relationship with the Union for essentially political reasons and to assuage domestic concerns over the impact of European integration on Danish ‘democracy’ and ‘identity’ (see Haahr 2003; Marcussen and Zølner 2003). Danish concern as regards EU institutional reform also reflects its position as a small state in the EU context. The Danes are wary of any reforms that will reduce the role of the small members through, for example, changes to voting rights in the Council of Ministers. They also highlight repeatedly that such reforms must incorporate measures that will recognize the importance of national parliaments. The formal existence of the opt-outs may have prevented Danish participation in some of the Union’s flagship policies, such as the euro. However, this should not infer that Denmark’s role is entirely peripheral. To some extent, the Danes act as selective nearcore insiders. They champion issues close to their hearts, such as environmental and social policy aspects, that do not contravene the opt-outs as well as seek to improve the democratic legitimacy of EU decision-making, in order to alleviate public criticism that the Union is undemocratic and overly bureaucratic. These are also spheres where the Nordic countries tend to believe they are national examples of good practice. The 2002 Danish EU Council Presidency also prioritized further enlargement—a policy that reinforces several of our power dynamics without undermining Danish ambivalence towards deeper integration (see Friis 2002). Not only did it represent a key EU agenda, but also one where the Danish government could ‘lead from the periphery’ (Miles 2003a, 2003b). At the end of a successful Presidency term, the Fogh Rasmussen government began to review the future of the Danish opt-outs that may signify a de facto attempt to move Denmark towards becoming a full-core insider. However, we should not take this too far. Although we can see some evidence of the Danish political elite pushing a stronger integrationist position, the influence of the Atlanticist elements of the Euro-Atlantic pole is still pervasive. Of all the Nordic countries, Denmark has been the most assertive in showing support for the US since 9/11. The Danish government also supported the demands of US President George W.Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair for affirmative action over the invasion of Iraq in 2003, even if this was at the cost of alienating the Franco-German Axis of continental Europe. When push came to shove, the Danish government was willing to undermine the

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unity of the emerging ESDP, illustrating that Denmark is ultimately still a ‘EuroAtlanticist’ at heart. Finland and Sweden: the new near-core insiders Finland and Sweden joined Denmark as full EU members on 1 January 1995. Reference to our dynamics can be made—all of which help to support Mouritzen’s (Mouritzen 1993, 1995) claim that their governments essentially pursued policies amounting to a strategy of ‘adaptive acquiescence’. Hereby these governments were willing to accept and follow EU policy lines that incurred certain infringements on their policy values in order to secure full membership that would in the end help to preserve more basic Nordic values associated with their welfare state systems. Certainly, the attraction of an increasingly ambitious EU dimension of the new EuroAtlantic pole was becoming decisive by the early 1990s. Swedish and Finnish experiences of negotiating the European Economic Area (EEA) had shown that, although the EEA may give crucial access to the Union’s evolving Single European Market (SEM) process, the EEA ‘decision-shaping’ arrangements were a pale imitation of the full ‘decision-making powers’ brought by full membership. From an institutional perspective, the EEA would be a somewhat flexible alternative in institutional terms to the Union. The Soviet Union was influential on Swedish and especially Finnish foreign policies for most of the post-war period of European bipolarity. As regards Sweden, balancing Soviet concerns with those of the West was an integral part of Swedish non-alignment and ‘active neutrality’ (see Miles 2000b). In the Finnish case, the influence of the Soviet Union was even greater and was directly related to the editors’ argument that geographical position can be a decisive influence on the perspectives of non-pole powers. Given Finland’s 2,000 kilometre border with the Soviet Union, taking consideration of the latter’s concerns was of central importance. They were embodied, prior to 1991, in the 1948 Treaty on Mutual Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and were an integral part of Finnish foreign policy as illustrated by the ‘Night Frost’ of 1958–59 and the ‘Note Crisis’ of 1961–62. Neither Finland nor Sweden deemed that full participation in Western structures either through EC/EU or NATO membership was compatible with their neutral security policies. The Finns, for example, were careful always to balance initiatives towards the West with concessions for its Soviet neighbour. They signed a more limited Free Trade agreement with the Community in the early 1970s (FINEFTA) in order to assuage Soviet concerns. We are reminded here that non-pole powers may be placed in a paradoxical position (see Chapter 2): that of being threatened by a great power in its close vicinity and, thus, would usually look towards membership of strong international institutions for protection and to maintain a stable order in the region. Yet, in practice, they may have to appear the least enthusiastic about such participation in order not to provoke the relevant great power(s). The Finnish example seems to be a case in point. The strategic changes to Eastern Europe—and later the disintegration of the Soviet Union—marked a watershed. It enabled the Swedes (1990–91) and the Finns (1991–92) to argue that EU membership was no longer incompatible with security policies of neutrality and non-alignment. The Swedish (July 1991) and Finnish (March 1992) membership applications also were indicative that, at long last, the influence of the EU

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dimension of the Euro-Atlantic pole had come to outplay that of the Eastern-based hegemon.5 Still, their applications were based partly on the assumptions that the Union does not have paramount negative sanctions at its disposal. Both the Swedish and Finnish governments argued that full membership would still enable them to have autonomy over most aspects of national sovereignty. For instance, the Swedish government insisted successfully on being granted exemptions to the continuation of ‘snus’ wet tobacco consumption and the country’s alcohol monopoly during the accession negotiations (see Miles 1997a). Even as a non-pole power, special conditions could be granted by the Union if so required. After EU entry, both Finland and Sweden sought to further ‘Nordic-ize’ or even ‘Baltic-ize’ the European Union as a means of reducing the need for such special conditions. The 1999 Finnish Presidency, for instance, spearheaded the development of a ‘Northern Dimension’ and all the Nordic EU member states have also been strong supporters of further EU enlargement. The later 2001 Swedish EU Council Presidency also prioritized further enlargement (see Miles 2002c, 2002d). Despite the experiences of Finland and Sweden of full membership being similar, there are discernible differences. Since EU entry in 1995, the Finns have been more comfortable with continuing full membership status and, more significantly, harness any potential opportunities. Finnish governments have, almost from the first day of membership, had fewer constraints upon their freedom of manoeuvre to conduct national EU policy compared with the governing Social Democrats in Sweden. Certainly, Finnish approval of membership in their 1994 referendum was much higher (by 66 per cent— compared with 53 per cent in Sweden) giving the Lipponen government elected in 1995 much greater legitimacy to push forward ambitious EU policy stances. In contrast, much work had to be done by the Swedish Persson government to counter the voice of a vocal minority of the domestic population who are unconvinced of the benefits of ‘being in the Union’ (Miles 2000a, 2001). One reason is Sweden’s status as a net contributor, while Finland is a net receiver. Such reservations also extend to Swedish participation in further integration, partly explaining why the government decided in 1999 that it was not the right time to participate in the euro. EU membership has provided competition opportunities for Finland to circumvent any ‘major—minor’ rivalry with Denmark and Sweden. After accession, many political observers, rightly or wrongly, expected the Finns to play a supportive role to Nordic initiatives ‘led’ by the larger Nordic member states. However, the Finns have quickly earned a reputation not just for their diplomatic professionalism—honed by decades of managing tentative relations with Russia—but also for being, albeit to a limited extent, pro-integrationist (if still ‘federo-sceptic’). Helsinki, rather than Stockholm or Copenhagen, has often become the first place that EU diplomats call when looking for the ‘Nordic’ view on policy initiatives. Despite Sweden experiencing higher levels of ‘EU scepticism’ than Finland (and certainly remaining ‘federo-sceptic’), Swedish governments have not pushed for formal opt-outs similar to those enjoyed by Denmark—although it should be also acknowledged that Danish-style opt-out arrangements have never been strictly on offer from the EU. Yet, the lack of Swedish discussion of such opt-outs suggests that the country’s status as a ‘new’ member state made it less of an insider than Denmark. Sweden is still prone to

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adaptive acquiescence and cannot play that ‘naughty boy’ role like an established member such as Denmark (Mouritzen 1993). Nevertheless, with the Swedish population’s rejection of the euro on 14 September 2003, we may be seeing indications that Sweden now regards itself as being sufficiently integrated into the Union as to be able to ‘naughtily’ reject flagship EU policies without fearing wider repercussions (Miles 2003c). On the positive side, this has not always restricted Swedish or Finnish inputting into the Union’s development. In the context of our Euro-Atlantic pole, Finland and Sweden’s non-alignment has not proved an obstacle to their participation in the Union’s ‘second pillar’. Their governments have defined their non-alignment strategies more narrowly over time so that their non-aligned security policies have come to focus exclusively on ‘non-participation in military alliances’ and represent a form of semi-alignment today (Miles 2000b). Their existing security policies do not preclude cooperation with NATO powers or even their military forces being put under NATO command provided this is done under the auspices of crisis management and peace-keeping. At the same time, Sweden and Finland have wanted to retain non-alignment as part of their ‘Nordic bastion’ of key values. They have sought always to ensure that the evolution of the CFSP incorporates a role for non-aligned EU countries and many of the internationalist principles that they themselves have long championed—principally by developing the crisis management portfolios of the CFSP (Miles 1998, 2000b, 2001). It was, for example, a Fenno-Swedish proposal that initiated the process of incorporating the Petersberg tasks into the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and thus gave the Union distinct roles in peace-shaping, peacemaking and peace-keeping. However, there have been discernible policy differences that have, at times, neutralized their ability to act as a Nordic bloc of non-pole powers inside EU decisionmaking and illustrate the limitations of a common ‘Nordic bastion’ of key values. Probably the most important of these is varying attitudes towards EMU participation. On this policy aspect, Finland is clearly the leader’ and participated partly as a means of reducing its peripheral exposure. The country became one of the founder members of the euro, engaging in the launch of stage three of the EMU timetable in 1999-In contrast, Sweden acted in accordance with almost stereotypical near-core insider behaviour— preferring to hold back from some of their insider influence-capability in order to retain their autonomy in the monetary policy sphere. The Persson government initially chose to ‘wait and see’ on the euro, refrained from ERM 2 participation (one of the Maastricht convergence criteria) and the Swedish population ultimately rejected the single currency in a referendum in September 2003 (Miles 2003c). Yet, in spite of these differences both Finland and Sweden will, most probably, continue to be labelled as near-core insiders. Even if they have become more comfortable with European integration over time, NATO membership is still someway off for these ‘semi-aligned’ countries. However, there have been developments towards NATO. In Finland, for example, the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja called for a more open discussion on Finnish membership of NATO in December 2002. Although there is at present no major political party supporting the country joining NATO, a new consensus has emerged within Finland. The parties will return to the subject of future Finnish

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NATO membership after the next parliamentary term (beyond 2007), once the impact of the accessions of the three Baltic States into the alliance has stabilized. Nevertheless, the Swedish and Finnish responses to 9/11 have been more muted than that of Denmark. Although both countries were ready to commit themselves to supporting the US after the 9/11 tragedy (Forsberg 2002), they have been more cautious over US—UK interventions in Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003). The Swedish government, in particular, has been critical of what it regards as declining US attention to respecting international law and the need for UN authorization for military action. The changing profile of the US dimension within the Euro-Atlantic pole has been divisive in terms of Nordic domestic politics and the ability of governments to foster domestic consensus behind foreign policy behaviour. In Finland, for example, both Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen and his (brief) successor, Anneli Jäätteenmäki of the Centre Party, were heavily criticized in Finland for their management of the country’s response to the Iraq crisis in which they stressed officially Finland’s non-alignment, yet gave informal support to the US. Norway and Iceland: would-be insiders or outsiders? At face value, Norway and Iceland can be categorized as EU outsiders since there are no formal membership applications outstanding from either country. At this point in time, they fulfil the criteria that such outsiders ‘do not want membership at all’. Such an outsider classification seems to be especially concrete as regards Iceland— even though the country (along with Norway) has been a full NATO member for many years. Unlike Norway, this (very) small nation-state has never submitted an application during the entire history of the Community/Union. It has not even dabbled formally with being a would-be insider. Moreover, given Icelandic sensitivities that EU accession might imply opening up the country’s fiercely protected fishing grounds as future obligations to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Icelandic governments have usually shied away from initiating extensive debate on EU questions. In short, the question of full membership has been so sensitive that it has only been an intermittent feature of Icelandic domestic political debates. Even participation in the 1992 EEA was controversial requiring Iceland to negotiate a clause in the agreement banning foreign investment in its fishing industry (Thorhallsson 2002:65). In the case of Norway, its status as an outsider has to be qualified, since the country has been a would-be insider at various points in the EC/EU history. Between 1961–72 and 1992–94, Norwegian governments strove for membership, and our external dynamics were influential. In the 1960s, the growing economic power of the Franco-German-led Community, the changing position of the British and, to some extent, inter-Nordic dynamics were all major reasons why various Norwegian governments thought full membership a good idea. Ultimately, the external dynamics were not enough to offset deeply held domestic concerns about European integration and it has been the Norwegian public in two referenda (1972 and 1994) that have stopped any membership application in its tracks (Sæter 1993, 1996). In short, the populace has not been convinced of the arguments of various would-be insider governments in Norway. Despite the failure of these membership applications, Norway has continued to display many would-be insider tendencies, even if they have had to be more clearly informal than

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formal in procedural terms. It continues to conform closely to agendas originating from inside the Union, irrespective of the fate of its membership applications. Its policymakers have followed closely and at times ‘shadowed’ EU rules voluntarily—even to the point of basing Norwegian laws upon EU principles at times. This process was also accelerated by EEA membership. Sverdrup (1998) refers to Norway as a selective, yet ‘adaptive non-member’ in this regard. Certainly, there is evidence that the Norwegian administration has been Europeanized and has embedded indirectly and through association in the European integration process (see Trondal 2000). Thorhallsson (2002) has identified a similar process going on in Iceland. The political elites of Norway and Iceland attempt to maximize ‘institutional adaptation’ in every possible way, so they can act as informal would-be insiders. Today, the Norwegian political elite seem to be once again reconsidering their options. This is partly in response to a dramatic rise in public opinion favouring full EU membership. The populace has been influenced by the EU enlargement to include a further ten states, growing concern about the future political use and rising financial costs of the EEA, and that the country should also not rely on a more unilateralist United States after the Iraq war. Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik announced in December 2002 the possibility of a third debate on Norwegian accession, and many expect a new referendum to be called after the next parliamentary elections in September 2005. Moreover, Icelandic parliamentary elections of May 2003 saw the EU membership question visited, even if the government’s official policy continues to one of ‘waiting and seeing’. Nevertheless, the arguments that convince domestic populations of the merits of EU membership tend to be less persuasive than elsewhere. Norwegian and Icelandic economic performance has been solid and at times downright impressive, whilst the political arguments for ‘better’ government from Brussels seem geographically as well as politically distant from Oslo or Reykjavik. Hence, in these countries where ‘identity polities’ are at the fore (see Neumann 2002), and which focus more than ever on the distinctiveness of being part of a ‘Northern periphery’, the arguments for joining the Union are far from being overwhelmingly convincing. Our dynamics have featured prominently in Norwegian and Icelandic debates on European integration. First, the EU tends to be perceived as more cohesive and consequently seems more threatening to the publics of Norway and Iceland in those EU policy fields such as fisheries and agriculture that are most relevant to their debates on European integration. At this point, EU membership is deemed to require substantial sacrifices of national sovereignty and changes to domestic sectors, unless the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are substantially revised. To many in Norway and Iceland, it seems easier to protect national interests by remaining outside the Union. In addition, the Atlanticist dimension within the Euro-Atlantic pole should not be underestimated either. The governments of these countries are cautious towards any EU initiatives that may dilute the primacy of NATO in European military security terms (Archer and Sogner 1998). Above all, there remain very real concerns for the Icelanders, since they rely on the United States (through the 1951 Defence Agreement) and the Keflavik NATO/US airbase for their defensive arrangements.

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We can also detect the profile of the Euro-Atlantic pole in Norwegian foreign policy behaviour since 9/11. The Norwegians were supportive of US claims for the ‘war against terrorism’ after 9/11 and have shown support for the US—UK intervention in Afghanistan. However, Norway kept its distance from the Iraq operation owing to the lack of a clear UN mandate for the latter. This caused a minor US—Norwegian bilateral crisis. Still, by early 2004, the Norwegian Telemark Battalion was operational in the NATO-led stabilization force, ISAF, in Afghanistan and elements of a Norwegian engineering company were active in the British-controlled sector of Iraq after the USUK-led intervention in 2003 (see Archer 2004:174). Although far from ‘Danish’ heights, Atlanticism remains a primary value of the Norwegians that influences their foreign policy behaviour. ‘Nordic-ness’ also plays a part, but with three of the five Nordic states as EU members, any Nordic/Northern European superstructure enhances rather than constrains elite arguments for Norway and Iceland to become formal would-be insiders. Finnish and Swedish EU accession created practical problems for the Nordic Passport Union and Common Nordic Labour Market. Norway and Iceland joined the Schengen arrangements in 2000 in order to avoid any negative effects arising from these countries becoming part of the westward external frontier of the Union. Despite formally being outsiders, Norway and Iceland display characteristics closer to being would-be insiders on an informal or piecemeal basis. In this policy field, participation in ‘Schengen’ makes them more of an EU insider than some long-standing EU member states, such as the UK or Ireland, that are not part of such arrangements.

Conclusions: misty boundaries This brief overview of Nordic Euro-Atlantic positions indicates that the Nordic countries are not as peripheral as they first seem, as they have various commitments to European integration. Applying the constellation theory, we end up with three near-core insiders (Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) and two outsiders (Norway and Iceland). However, these five states illustrate more than most that these categories have misty boundaries. First, although all three of the existing Nordic EU members are near-core insiders, their closeness to the core is rather fluid. On the one hand, Denmark as the ‘oldest’ Nordic full member and part of the economic heartland of Europe may regard itself as ‘most continental’. Nevertheless, the formal opt-outs make the country—at least for the time being—peripheral to many of the major initiatives of the Union devised in the Treaty on European Union. Despite the lack of formal opt-outs, Sweden remains on the outskirts of Europe and more peripheral than Finland. It may be an ‘insider’ and influential in certain policies, such as EU environmental, social and employment fields, yet the ‘EU scepticism’ of a vocal minority, combined with widespread ‘federo-scepticism’ of the Swedish populace restricts governmental options as regards further European integration. In any case, Sweden (along with Finland) still remains hesitant about NATO membership and thus is immediately disqualified from being a core insider of the Euro-Atlantic pole. In contrast, only Finland of our three near-core insiders has become an EU enthusiast and shows greater propensity for ‘constellation climbing’ given Finland’s intrinsic

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involvement in many of the Union’s flagship policies. The ‘Rainbow Coalition’ governments 1995–2003 took the country into the third stage of EMU without resorting to a full public referendum, maintained an elite consensus behind Finnish participation in further integration and EU crisis management and sponsored Baltic (primarily Estonian) EU enlargement. The governments led by Paavo Lipponen, for example, interpreted the country’s non-aligned status as a positive advantage, allowing them to propose initiatives to the Union’s evolving crisis-management functions that help to make it distinctive from the activities of NATO and the United States. The Danes and Swedes have been more defensive as regards their strategies towards European integration and preferred to ‘lie low’ (in the case of the Swedes) in sensitive areas or balance against the core in selected issue areas (as with the Danes and their optouts) in order to retain autonomy. In contrast, the Finnish political elite have viewed bandwagoning as a more effective tool, demonstrating their EU goodwill through participation in the flagship integrationist policies of the Union. Thereby, the Finns also accept ‘entrapment’ over ‘abandonment’ as the lesser of two evils. Turning to our official outsiders, since neither Norway nor Iceland have EU membership applications outstanding, things seem straightforward. Nevertheless, we are far from such a simplistic assessment. There is perhaps a need to make a distinction between the two countries in question. Iceland can certainly be regarded as the Nordic state with the greatest predisposition to being an outsider. The country has never applied, her population remain resolutely opposed to the CFP and domestic debates on full membership and even the EEA were and are rather controversial. Yet, as Thorhallsson (2002) argues, the Icelandic administration has become, albeit to a limited extent, Europeanized as it responds to EEA obligations and further EU agendas. Indeed, certain elements of the recent Icelandic governments of Oddsson, most notably the Foreign Minister, are favourably predisposed to an Icelandic membership application in the future. The day may come, however distant, when Iceland formally moves from being an outsider to a would-be insider. Given the fact that Norway has applied for full membership and negotiated accession terms in the past, the country has bounced between our two classifications of outsider and would-be insider. Despite the population ter-minating Norwegian accession in referenda in 1972 and 1994, the country’s policy-makers have ‘adapted’ progressively to try and influence an ‘ever closer’ Union—short of being a full member. The would-be insider credentials of the Nordic governments are never far below the surface. The Norwegian case also illustrates the importance of the distinction between the views of the largely cautious and wary domestic Nordic populations and those of the political elite that are— be it formally or informally—involved in EEA and (selected) EU policy-making. Norway should be placed very firmly on the boundaries of the outsider/would-be insider division—having a political elite with discernible would-be insider tendencies, constrained only by the EU scepticism and outsider preferences of the domestic population. Looking to the future, three EU policy areas will be important in determining the capability of the Nordic periphery to influence the European agenda. The first is the inclusion of more Nordic countries in the European single currency—although this will be a long-term development given the levels of EMU scepticism still prevalent in Denmark and Sweden.

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Second, further EU and NATO enlargements provide major opportunities for the Northern European periphery. At the very least, the EU and NATO accessions of the three Baltic States in 2004 and closer EU/NATO relations with Russia may allow the Nordic countries to downgrade their peripheral status in relation to the Euro-Atlantic pole. The marginal status of Denmark, Finland and Sweden is reduced, since there are new members—even core insiders—on their eastern/southern borders (Mouritzen 2003). The Nordic superstructure influencing the Euro-Atlantic pole may grow in size in the future. Furthermore, as the Nordic states continue to promote Nordic values in the Union and ‘Baltic-ize’ the Union through, for example, the Northern Dimension policy, they may further influence the EU agenda. Third, there is Nordic participation in EU (and NATO) crisis management. The active role of the Danes, Finns and Swedes in pushing, for instance, civil crisis management options reduces concerns that such participation will accelerate the abandonment of Swedish and Finnish nonalignment and/or that the two policies are incompatible in any way (Miles 2000c). On the other hand, if EU crisis management proves to be a success, this may also have a (limited) influence on Finnish and Swedish debates on NATO in the longer term. Eventual NATO membership may be viable and enable Sweden and Finland to ‘constellation climb’ to core insiders within the Euro-Atlantic pole. Provided that any EU crisis-management dimension is designed to be, in practical terms, subordinate to NATO, it supplies further ammunition for those arguing that Norway and Iceland’s eventual EU membership status and strong Atlanticism are compatible within a Euro-Atlantic pole. In any case, the evolution of the Union’s crisismanagement capabilities further blurs concrete distinctions between the Nordic near-core insiders, would-be insiders and outsiders. Finally, there is the wider challenge of responding coherently to a more unilateralist United States. The American call for universal support for the ‘war on terrorism’ after 11 September 2001 to be converted into ‘coalitions of the willing’ has focused and divided minds between and within the Nordic countries. Witness the divergent responses of the Nordic governments towards the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. The Danish government was largely supportive, whereas the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish counterparts were more critical—the latter three focusing on the impact of a more aggressive US on the role of the UN. Let us now reconsider the dynamics influencing our Nordic non-pole powers. There have been changes in the extent to which each of the dynamics influences the foreign policy behaviour of the Nordic states. Certainly—given the growing importance of the Euro-area and the evolution of the EU crisis-management functions in which Germany now feels able to be more active—the importance of the Franco-German Axis will continue. Equally, the role of the British—most notably as fellow ‘euro outsiders’ and strong Atlanticists—will be politically useful to the Nordic countries, even if the UK has declined in importance as a trading partner. However, the most significant influence, and one growing in importance, will be the role of the United States. American foreign policy may complicate Nordic foreign policy-making in general as well as relations with Russia (as Denmark has experienced over Chechnya) and the value placed on Nordic cooperation both within the EU and in response to growing American unilateralism. Hence, although these latter two dynamics remain important, they will—in most cases— be subservient to the development of transatlantic relations.

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Notes 1 Sweden remains the largest of the five with a population of approximately nine million. Iceland, the smallest of the five, has a population of only around 290,000 people. 2 This is not to forget Sweden’s universal role as a ‘world conscience’ during the Cold War, in particular, propagating a ‘Swedish’ or a ‘Nordic’ model of society (e.g. Mouritzen 1995). However, that role falls beyond our definition of ‘power projection’ in the present volume (Chapter 2). 3 Such as the Maudling Plan of the 1950s (see Phinnemore 1996). 4 Regarding the Benelux countries, for instance, see Chapter 4 of the present volume. 5 Regarding the Finnish case, see Arter (1995).

6 The south Stephen C.Calleya Since the end of the Cold War, the non-pole powers of the ‘south’ as defined in this volume have faced a number of common challenges with important consequences for their foreign policy behaviour. These challenges have helped reshape relations among the southern European states and between southern European non-pole powers and the EuroAtlantic pole. Based on an analysis of the three major powers in the region, this chapter will examine the evolution of foreign policies among the non-pole states in southern Europe: Portugal and Greece (core insiders), Malta and Cyprus (near-core insiders) and Turkey (a would-be insider). Moreover, it will assess the role that Mediterranean initiatives are playing in these foreign policies. For purely pragmatic reasons (see Chapter 1) the Irish near-core insider will also be included in the present chapter, although hardly belonging geographically to the south.

Geopolitical threats and challenges Stability in northern Africa is essential for southern Europe. ‘Stability’ may mean the avoidance of large-scale unrest and preservation of the status quo. Tensions between southern Europe and the Maghreb are largely caused by economic, political and cultural, rather than military issues. For example, the full-scale civil war in Algeria could have generated a flood of refugees across the Mediterranean that would have destabilized internal security in a country such as France. Another threat for which Europe has to make contingency plans is a territorial clash—for example campaigns concerning the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila in Morocco or the Canary Islands could quickly intensify. Economic collapse is a substantial threat that has to be considered—the protection of important export markets and the security of large outstanding debts is vital if European economies are to continue their gradual but fragile recovery from recession. For example, in 1992 Algeria’s external debt was approximately US$25 billions, of which more than $6 billion was owed to France.1 The fact that the major creditor, Coface—the French export credit department—had to write off its loans to Iraq after the Gulf War of 1990–91 makes the protection of its investments in North Africa all the more compelling. Another challenge facing Europe from the Maghreb and other parts of the Middle East is terrorism. Indigenous terror movements and others that may simply use sub-regions of the Mediterranean such as the Maghreb as a springboard to launch terror attacks across Europe are a high security priority for all European states and the European Union. This has become even more evident in the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 terror attack that took place in Madrid. The EU’s decision to create a counterterrorism unit division is

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likely to have a limited impact if it does not succeed in coordinating its policies with those of its counterparts along the southern shores of the Mediterranean. A challenge to southern European countries, irrespective of their affiliation to EuroAtlantic institutions, is (their perception of) an increasingly Germanic Europe, with its centre of gravity moving north and east after the northern and eastern enlargements. This is both a material challenge, because of the redirection of investments and EU funds to the north-eastern parts of the continent, and a psychological challenge, because of the perceived marginalization of southern Europe. However, it may also be an opportunity to reinforce a ‘we feeling’ and thereby political coherence among the southern European countries. What is the impact of America’s European role and the evolution of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) on the future international context within which regional relations are taking place? What are the consequences of the current wave of fluctuations on the position of non-pole states? Will the end of the east—west divide in Europe give way to a north— south divide? Will regional fault-lines separating different cultures and civilizations become a permanent feature of the emerging geopolitical landscape? A picture of two international regions emerges around the Mediterranean in the postCold War era: a European region and a Middle Eastern region. Both entities incorporate sub-groupings. The sub-groupings, which surround the Mediterranean, are southern Europe (subset of Europe), the Mashreq and the Maghreb (sub-regions of the Middle East). Comprehending the degree and types of interaction within these groupings is important because they are primary points of contact between the international regions encircling the Mediterranean (see Figure 6.1).

Foreign policy trends The pole power and its competitors No state wields more power in southern Europe than France, which is the only pole power in this region. France remains a continental European, an Atlantic, and a Mediterranean power. Although the Mediterranean dimension of French security policy is often limited, its involvement in any southern European scheme is essential if a proposal is to have any chance of success. This is evident if one examines the success rate of the various transMediterranean security initiatives launched since the end of the Cold War. While the notion of a CSCE-like ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean’ (CSCM) remains a distant aspiration, the French Western Mediterranean 5+5 Forum—promoting sub-regional cooperation between southern Europe and the Maghreb—got off to a rapid start. However, it stalled after France’s reluctance to turn a blind eye on allegations linking Libya to acts of terrorism. France’s support has been essential in relaunching the 5+5 process since 2000.

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Figure 6.1 The south (2005). The dominant position of France in southern Europe is due to its economic, political and military power projection capabilities bolstered by its nuclear deterrent force and its levels of military expenditure. Moreover, France’s current relations with the Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, its colonial past and the significance of North African immigrants in the French community all make Mediterranean and southern European issues an integral part of the French national identity (Carle 1992:41). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, France’s position in southern Europe has occasionally been challenged by Spain and Italy. The two cannot rival the status of France and the other pole powers in the European power structure, but they may gain considerable influence when projecting their power in a sub-regional setting such as southern Europe. Moreover, both have shown an increasing interest in becoming more active in creating stronger links with their counterparts on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. However, a string of largely domestic episodes have prevented both Madrid and Rome from following through and realizing their external agenda. Nevertheless, Spain and Italy influence the non-pole states around them significantly. Spain’s primary concern in the Mediterranean remains managing relations with its neighbours in the Maghreb. It has made strenuous efforts to enhance its reputation in North Africa following the Gulf War of the early 1990s. For example, it has implemented a series of bilateral agreements, including an award of $1 billion worth of export credits to Algeria in 1992–93 (Blunden 1994:140). In February 1996 Spain and Morocco agreed to commence the first phase of a 22km tunnel under the Straits of Gibraltar in 1997 that has facilitated an increase in bilateral trade between the two countries, which currently exceeds $1 billion. Spain has also argued consistently that the north—south dimension of security challenges have not been addressed by existing international security institutions. It is for this reason that it joined Italy in 1990 in announcing the necessity of creating a regional framework for dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean, namely the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Spain has consistently supported regional initiatives that have sought to enhance cooperative relations between southern Europe and the Maghreb. It supported the Euro-Maghreb Partnership that was launched in 1992 and hosted the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Barcelona in November 1995.

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Spain’s geographical position, and the political and economic capital it has managed to achieve as a member of the EU, dictates that it will continue to play a key role in southern European affairs (Agarwal et al. 1994:346–58). Militarily, Spain is entrusted with ensuring access to and the safety of passage through the Straits of Gibraltar. It also has the resources to conduct tactical naval and air operations in the western Mediterranean as demonstrated in the Perejil Island incident in the summer of 2002 against Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman 2002; Vasconcelos 2002). Spanish military bases are also useful transit points for operations conducted in the eastern Atlantic or eastern sector of the Mediterranean (Rodrigo 1992:103–4). Prior to the domestic political revolution, which engulfed Italy in the 1990s, Rome’s defence policy also focused more and more on the security dimension of north—south relations. In 1980, Rome signalled its intention to develop an active foreign policy in the Mediterranean when it decided to guarantee Malta’s neutrality. At the end of the 1980s Italy promoted the idea of a stable cooperation framework stretching from the shores of the Mediterranean to central Europe when it joined the ‘Esagonale’ (Hexagonal Group) with Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (Grieco and Guazzone 1992:73). The main objective of this regional undertaking was the promotion of cooperative relations across central Europe. After the Gulf War, Italy championed the notion of a security arrangement for the Mediterranean. Italy believed that the time had come to replace the institutional vacuum that existed in the Mediterranean basin with a comprehensive security forum that would address political, economic and military security challenges. The concept of a CSCM was presented as one possible way of addressing the endemic political and economic instability in this area. This concept of comprehensive security is the leit motif of all of Italy’s Mediterranean policies. Integrating economic, political and military means in a global cooperative strategy towards the Mediterranean is regarded as a much more effective approach than ad hoc bilateral actions. It is for this reason that Italy continues to prefer the EU as the main locus of European security and is reluctant to see an extension of NATO responsibilities in the Mediterranean (ibid.: 73). Italy and France are also keen to develop a federalist approach to EU decision-making in security policy, with the EU becoming the main security institution in the basin. Other southern European countries, such as Spain, prefer a more intergovernmental approach in this sector (Aliboni 1992:13). The melting of the Cold War glacier has therefore once again allowed the southern European pole power and its two competitors to play a much more direct role in the Mediterranean area. After all, France, Spain and Italy were at the forefront of the ‘scramble for Africa’ at the turn of the century when the Europeans divided North Africa amongst themselves. Their participation in the EU is enabling these countries to institutionalize their naval cooperation in the area by formulating contingency combat plans. Together with Portugal they established a joint land force, known as Eurofor, with a headquarters in Florence, and a naval force called Euromarfor, led by a French aircraft carrier, at the start of 1995. The new forces were initially employed within the WEU framework, but are also at the disposal of NATO.2 The setting up of a Medcorps between France, Italy, Spain and Portugal partly offsets the predominant position of the United States’ Sixth Fleet as each of these European states operate naval aircraft carriers.3 The launching of such a southern security structure assists these southern European governments to assert a southern Mediterranean

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orientation in the EU and counter what they perceive as an increasingly Germanic Europe, with its centre of gravity steadily moving north and east after the northern and eastern enlargements. The Spanish and Italian CSCM proposal and the participation of all three states in the Western Mediterranean Forum (‘5+5’ talks), coupled with the increasing number of joint manoeuvres between the naval and air forces of France, Italy and Spain, demonstrates the active interest of these southern European states in contemporary international relations of their southern periphery. The strongest link between the Maghreb and southern Europe is found in the energy sector. A gas pipeline connects Algerian gas fields through Morocco, with Spain and France. Another pipeline linking Algerian gas fields with Italy, via Tunisia and the Straits of Sicily was opened in 1983 and has undergone adjustments to increase its throughput capacity. These examples make it clear that the energy sector is the one area where cooperation across the Euro-Maghreb space is most active. Imitation of such co-operation in other areas, such as trade, investment, and technological exchange, would enhance economic solidarity between the two Mediterranean sub-groupings and help to intensify cooperative north—south transnational relations (Gillespie 2003). Remaining core insiders Remaining southern European core insiders are Greece and Portugal. Both are members of the EU and NATO and both countries’ foreign policy regularly influences patterns of interaction in southern Europe. Despite being non-pole powers and core insiders, none of them have played a role in the EU akin to the Benelux countries. In addition, initially Greece was not able to use her EU membership to improve economically vis-à-vis the other EU member states (Agarwal et al. 1994:346–58). This may be partly explained by her being the second largest arms importer in the industrialized world for the period 1988–92 (Hockenos 1994:22). After attaining membership, Greece quickly acquired a reputation as a ‘bad boy’ because of its unilateralist actions, and Portugal has taken care to balance its European priorities with interests outside the region. Greece’s introduction of an embargo against FYROM (also called Macedonia) at the time of its EU Presidency in 1994 and its threat of vetoing the EU customs union with Turkey is indicative of an inconsistent pattern of external relations.4 Athens has somewhat succeeded in diluting its ‘bad boy’ image by forcing Mediterranean security issues back on to the agenda when it held the EU presidency in 1994.5 At the Corfu Summit, EU members endorsed the idea of convening a EuropeanMediterranean conference during the coming Spanish EU presidency (November 1995).6 Greece’s more recent policy of rapprochement with Turkey, her admittance to the euro club, and her constructive EU Presidency in the first half of 2003 (setting the stage for EU enlargement in 2004) have been major boosts to Greece’s geopolitical position in the Euro-Mediterranean area. A continuation of such foreign policy frameworks, especially when it comes to the dispute with Turkey concerning Cyprus, would enhance Greece’s ability to influence patterns of relations in this part of the world. Portugal is another southern European core insider. Its decision to balance European foreign policy priorities with its Atlantic, Latin American and African external

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dimensions is axiomatic. Portugal is a member of both NATO and the EU, but it has maintained close links with ex-colonies and Portuguese-speaking countries such as Angola and Brazil. Inside Euro-Atlantic institutions, Portugal has leaned more to the Atlantic than to the European side. Thus, Portugal maintains strong security relations with the United States and both countries have remained committed to their 1951 Defence Agreement. Lisbon’s main benefit from this close relationship is that the US has regularly re-equipped Portuguese armed forces and provided a constant supply of military and economic aid under the Lajes airbase agreement (Santos 1992:89–91). Despite accession to the EU in 1986, Portugal continues to emphasize the importance of its transAtlantic linkage, in contrast to its neighbour, Spain, which has demonstrated more of a willingness to establish a common European foreign and security policy. Relations between the two Iberian countries are best described as cordial, with EU membership being a catalyst for improving bilateral relations. One consequence of closer ties with Europe is that transnational ties with the rest of the continent have increased dramatically, as illustrated in the jump in trade with Spain for example, from 5 per cent of total trade in 1985 to 15 per cent in 1990 (Agarwal et al. 1994). As a consequence, Portugal’s position in southern Europe and in the larger European region is best described as that of a balancer. Although it is committed to playing an active role in EU affairs, it also regards itself as the champion of keeping the EU’s external affairs agenda as transparent as possible, avoiding great power directories. Although it supported the integration of the WEU into the EU, it does not perceive this security arrangement as exclusive from either NATO or the OSCE. Lisbon also shares the common southern European concern of being marginalized as a result of the end of the Cold War. It argues that EU support to central and Eastern European countries should not overshadow the solidarity that has been shown to Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In the last decade Portugal has therefore expanded its European dimension but not at the expense of its trans-Atlantic and extra-continental ties. Its position in southern Europe would have to be upgraded were it to commence dedicating more of its diplomatic resources towards European concerns. In the interim, Portugal already shows signs of moving in this direction by strengthening its relations with Maghreb countries, not only through participation in the Western Mediterranean Forum, but also through development of bilateral relations with Morocco and Algeria (Agarwal et al. 1994:92). Near-core insiders The three countries dealt with in this section are EU member states, but outside NATO. For purposes of the present book, Ireland can be classified as a quasi-‘southern European’ country. Although geographically not belonging to this region, Ireland’s EU posture and foreign policy objectives have quite often mirrored those of the main actors in southern Europe. Moreover, Ireland has been a status quo power during the post-Cold War era basically ‘satisfied’ with its EU- and (lack of) NATO-affiliation. Ireland’s geopolitically peripheral position has entailed that it, like the southern European countries, has not been directly affected by the central and East European revolutions and the end of the Cold War. Given Ireland’s EU net receiver status, however, it perceived a

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certain risk of marginalization with the possible entry of a set of relatively poor member countries. It was already apparent during the Cold War that EC membership let Ireland come out of the British great power shadow. While Ireland is no longer ‘poor’, it remains a nonpole state. As such Ireland retains an interest in an economic integration process, which is shaped by European institutions, governed by law and accompanied by common policies. Still, the interest of a non-pole peripheral state in progressive European integration is not inconsistent with an element of ‘flexibility’ or ‘differentiated integration’. Such an approach has allowed Ireland to develop a close relationship with the United States (outside high politics!) and avoid suggestions of a ‘zero-sum’ game vis-à-vis its relationship with the EU. The attraction of American financial and technological investment to Ireland has also occurred in Portugal, somewhat reflecting the strong Atlantic dimension of both countries (O’Donnel 2003). Malta and Cyprus became ‘near core’ as both entered the EU. Prior to joining, their influence in regional affairs had been limited. Yet both islands are located in sensitive geostrategic positions and could potentially play more active roles in their respective spheres of influence. As already evident from their respective EU negotiations, both are keen to shed their neutral and non-aligned movement images and to begin playing a more active role in international security. EU membership in 2004 is certain to act as a catalyst for both Malta and Cyprus when it comes to defining their foreign policy priorities. Both countries are keen advocates of establishing trans-Mediterranean security initiatives, supporting the concept of a CSCM. The Maltese have also proposed the setting up of a Council of the Mediterranean, along the lines of a Council of Europe (Calleya 1994) and have initiated a drive to create a Euro-Mediterranean stability pact, a concept endorsed by the French at the Barcelona Conference in November 1995. From an economic perspective, both countries are already deeply entrenched in Europe, conducting the majority of their trade with this region. Admittance to the EU in 2004 has therefore positioned both Malta and Cyprus very well to start playing a more direct role in the evolution of Euro-Mediterranean affairs. One likely outcome is that either one or both of the Mediterranean islands find themselves interacting on a more regular basis with the southern European core group, commensurate to the increase of their own authority in the area. Malta’s strategic relevance in the central Mediterranean has led the country to pursue a comprehensive and proactive foreign policy in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The importance that Malta attaches to international security issues is highlighted by the prominent role that Malta has consistently played in security institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP). During the Cold War, Malta’s external relations were largely determined by its global East—West perspective. Positioning itself in the ‘Non-Aligned Movement’ along with Tito, Nasser or Nehru was a prime concern. In the post-Cold War era, by contrast, Malta’s neighbourhood is influencing its agenda more directly. Malta has adapted its policy of neutrality and nonalignment to more fluid international relations. Malta’s decision to join the EU and its commitment to participate in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy is an extension of its Mediterranean security dimension.

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Executing the provisions of the CFSP will complement the cooperative security role Malta and Cyprus are already playing as members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Malta’s neutrality is location specific in that it prohibits Malta from hosting operations of a military nature. If Malta were to entertain the notion of participating in a more elaborate European defence policy that to date does not exist, it would have to seek amendments to its constitution. Given its geostrategic location and geopolitical credentials, Malta can also convincingly claim that its transMediterranean security relations are conducive to the EU’s long-term objective of integrating further the European, North African and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Cyprus has also played an active role in Euro-Mediterranean affairs, primarily as a member of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Since the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey at the end of the 1990s, attempts to reunify Cyprus have also highlighted the important role Cyprus plays when it comes to stability in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean. The prospect of EU accession has helped add momentum to attempts that aim at reunifying Cyprus. In this respect the EU can already be credited for projecting stability in a region where instability has prevailed in recent decades. The negative outcome of the referendum in the Republic of Cyprus in April 2004 casts a shadow on a number of security policy areas. Reunification of Cyprus would not only have stabilized relations within the Mediterranean island itself, which has been divided for the past three decades, but would also have strengthened further relations between Ankara and Athens. Cyprus would also have been able to play a more active role in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as a unified state. In addition to contributing directly to stability in the Aegean, a unified Cyprus would have been able to promote confidence-building measures that focused on improving international relations in the eastern sector of the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean area in general. As things stand, derailment of reunification efforts puts the onus on the Republic of Cyprus to try and reactivate reunification talks in the short term. Otherwise the EU will have little choice but to continue offering direct assistance to the northern part of Cyprus (Turkish Republic of Cyprus—TRNC) given that they actually voted in favour of the reunification plan put forward by the United Nations. While the Cypriot government was clearly not satisfied with the settlement package that was put forward, it seems to have underestimated the negative impact that would result from such an outcome vis-à-vis Cyprus’ future ability to influence positively geostrategic dynamics in the Aegean and beyond. An EU would-be insider already in NATO Turkey is currently a member of NATO and an EU aspirant. Geopolitically it occupies an insulating position between the adjoining European and Middle Eastern regions. As an Islamic, but not Arab, secular state and as the former imperial power in the Middle East, Turkey has no desire to become completely engulfed in Middle East relations (Buzan and Roberson 1993:36). The conflict situations and underdeveloped neighbours to its south and east provide Turkey with plenty of incentive to pursue further its contacts with the Euro-Atlantic sphere. As a full member of NATO and the OSCE and an associate member of the EU, Turkey already has strong intergovernmental links with Europe and the United States

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(Hockenos 1994:21–2). The main challenge confronting Ankara has been to keep up with the transnational patterns taking place in Europe. Turkey signed an association agreement with the then EC in 1963. Its objective in establishing links with the EC was to enhance its European identity. Full EU integration would legitimize and thus stabilize the various cooperative transactions with Europe. Two basic problems have stalled Turkey’s 1987 formal application to join the EU. First, the essentially agricultural and underdeveloped country would result in a heavy financial burden on the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Investment Bank and the cohesion fund. Second, realizing that closer relations with Europe are being hampered by the Cypriot affair, Turkey has entered a process of dialogue with Greece under the supervision of the UN and EU to find a solution to this island’s divide. Ankara has also signed a customs union with the EU and has actively been promoting transnational economic, financial and cultural links with Europe. Another area, which supports Turkey’s institutional ties with Europe, is its strategic location. Turkey’s role in the 1990–91 Gulf War re-established its position as an essential component in the Western security alliance at precisely the time when the end of the Cold War forebode that Turkey could become a less significant player in the European region (Sezer 1992:122–6). This position has been somewhat undermined by Turkey’s attitude in the run up to the Iraq operation in 2003, when the United States was denied access to Turkish bases. Turkey shares the southern European post-Cold War conviction that it risks being marginalized by the European pole powers establishing stronger ties with central and Eastern Europe. If such ties were sought at the expense of southern Europe in general and Turkey in particular, Turkey might be forced to reconsider more closely the level and nature of its relations with the Middle East. Ankara’s dependence on Arab oil and growing support for Turkish fundamentalism are already pressuring the country continuously to reassess its position vis-à-vis this region. A shift to a more Middle Eastern dominant foreign policy would naturally affect Turkey’s standing in Europe and could theoretically eliminate it from this region altogether (Liel 2003). In this respect, much will depend on the EU Council’s decision at the end of 2004 on whether to commence accession negotiations with Turkey or not. A negative stance would certainly lead Turkey to contemplate strengthening relations further with its neighbours in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey has already strengthened its strategic interests in the Caucasus region through joint energy projects. Its strategic relationship with Israel also positions it well to play a more active role in the Middle East should it decide to shift its foreign policy agenda in this direction. Like its southern European counterparts, Turkey is also concerned with similar postCold War security challenges. These include ideological confrontations between Islamic fundamentalists and secularists in North Africa, nationalistic and ethnic confrontations in the Balkans, and economic frustrations in both sub-zones, which risk triggering international terrorism and massive population movements throughout southern Europe. The key difference between Turkey and its southern European neighbours is that while none of the others have direct territorial contact with the areas that breed potential threats to peace, Turkey does. Turkey is also keen to maintain secure access to the sea lines of communications in the Mediterranean. Yet, Turkey’s exclusion from the EU and its

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differences with Greece risk driving a wedge between it and the rest of the countries in the region and keep it in the periphery of southern Europe (Sezer 1992:132–3). Emerging Atlanticism/Euroscepticism? We have seen a northern arc of Atlanticism/Euroscepticism stretching from Britain to Scandinavia. Southern Europe (pace Greece) has never shared such a deep-rooted selfsufficiency vis-à-vis Europe; by contrast, identification with the idea of ‘Europe’ has traditionally been strong. More recently, however, a new southern arc of—more or less deep-rooted—Euroscepticism has emerged, curving from Italy through Iberia to Ireland. During the premiership of Silvio Berlusconi, Italy often broke ranks with the other EU member states and sought to forge a special relationship with the United States. Further west, Spain’s moderate right led by Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar often expressed doubts of the direction the EU was taking. The collapse of EU constitutional talks in December 2003 during the Italian Presidency was partly due to Spain’s intransigence on decision-making issues within the EU. Although the Spanish have traditionally fallen behind the Franco-German foreign policy position, Aznar came to power thinking that his country never played a role befitting it in Europe. The support Aznar offered the United States in the run up to the war against Iraq in 2003 and his request to the United States to raise the thorny issue of Gibraltar with the Blair government are indicative of Spain playing the US card to exercise greater influence in Europe and beyond. The election of the left wing government led by José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in April 2004 has resulted in a more pro-European stance once again being adopted. Portugal has become more assertive in its dealings with Brussels during the premiership of José Manuel Durão Barroso while much less of a Euro-critic than Italy or Spain. Like the two other great sea-faring countries on the continent’s western coast, the Netherlands and Denmark, Portugal has a long Atlanticist tradition. Thus, Portugal’s decision to support the United States in its war against Iraq was not too surprising, even though the extent of Portugal’s backing was quite startling. The Portuguese signed the famous ‘Letter of Eight’ in the run up to the war and even hosted the Azores summit at which Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States signalled a start to hostilities in Iraq. Perhaps the most curious of these four countries is Ireland. Recognized at home and in Europe as the state that has made the most out of EU membership, Dublin has increasingly come to be perceived as a Euro-sceptic. A constant flow of American investments has pushed Ireland to favour limited economic EU regulation. This led the EU Finance Ministers to criticize Ireland in 2001 in Ecofin meetings. Several Irish ministers have also fretted about encroachment of the EU into legal sovereign matters on a regular basis. The recently enhanced Atlantic dimension in the foreign policies of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland provides further insight into common foreign policy trends found throughout southern Europe. Whether such trends will become permanent is a question that future studies will have to examine.

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South—south regional dynamics Although Mediterranean states, irrespective of EU membership, are often perceived as sharing common political and economic objectives, these are not strong enough to be reflected in permanent political structures (Aliboni 1992:1–2; Buzan 1991:196). Throughout the Cold War, the geographical discontinuity of the area and the large number of actors with diverse political agendas amounted to a sense of political fragmentation. However, the post-Cold War emergence of countries from behind the Iron Curtain has implied that southern Europe has now direct competitors for EU investment and assistance. This had initially generated perceptions of isolation and marginalization among non-EU southern states, such as Malta and Cyprus until recently. The EU’s southern flank states have reacted by starting to coordinate their political agendas much more in an effort to prevent Brussels from shifting its external focus totally to the east. The three consecutive EU presidencies of France, Spain and Italy during 1995 and 1996 and again in 2000, 2002 and 2003 demonstrate the significance that these southern European countries attach to geopolitical concerns in the Mediterranean area. Their concerted approach to crisis situations in the littoral, such as those of Greece— Turkey—Cyprus or the civil war in Algeria, reveals at least the beginning of an effort to follow a common approach. A second unifying factor is that the end of the Cold War has weakened the ‘NonAligned Movement’ in this area. Countries such as Malta and Cyprus joined the EU in 2004. Southern Europe is becoming more homogeneous in terms of political and military affiliations: the EU, NATO and the OSCE. As the weighting of Mediterranean members increases in these security arrangements, trans-Mediterranean policies could receive more attention in European security debates and simultaneously assist in moving Mediterranean issues further up the European priority list. In fact southern European countries already share common membership in a number of sub-regional Mediterranean security initiatives including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process, the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, the Western Mediterranean 5+5 Forum and the Mediterranean Forum. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is certainly the most important regional process that currently exists in the Mediterranean, as it brings together all of the EU member states and ten Mediterranean non-EU countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Turkey. At the first Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministerial meeting, which took place in Barcelona in November 1995, the 27 partner countries established three principal areas of cooperation. The Barcelona Process set out three basic tasks: a political and security partnership with the aim of establishing a common area of peace and stability; an economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs in an effort to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies. In an effort to shore up its external policy towards the Mediterranean, the EU adopted a Common Strategy at the Santa Maria Da Fiera European Council which brought to a conclusion the Portuguese Presidency of the EU at the end of June 2000. The EU’s Common Strategy highlighted the fact that improvement in Euro-Mediterranean relations was dependent on the Mediterranean partner countries playing a more decisive role

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during the implementation stage of projects agreed upon. The Common Strategy also called for the active participation of the Mediterranean countries when it comes to defining a cooperative Euro-Med agenda. It is in the interest of Mediterranean states to draw up a list of meaningful actions. The Common Strategy actually invites them to do this: ‘the EU is bound to consider recommendations and concerns expressed by Mediterranean partners’. This specific invitation to Mediterranean states to adopt more of a self-help attitude contrasts sharply with policy-making in previous decades, when the EU would more or less dictate the terms of cooperative ventures. In the past decade the EMP has certainly strengthened north—south relations between the EU and the Mediterranean. The sheer amount of meetings and policy actions that have been launched since 1995 has resulted in the creation of an intricate web of political, academic and civil societal networks. In contrast, the EMP has only recently succeeded in spurring south—south relations in the Mediterranean, despite the high priority that has been given to this objective since the start of the EMP. As the EU becomes a more compact regional actor in international relations, the EU must seek to implement an even more effective type of cooperative framework towards the Mediterranean during the next decade. The EU should focus more of its diplomatic attention on encouraging sub-regional cooperation within the EMP—an objective already envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. Almost as if to anticipate this sort of challenge, the European Commission proposed a new framework for post-enlargement relations with neighbours in 2003 under the heading of Wider Europe—New Neighbourhood Policy. It provides a new framework for relations with eastern and southern neighbours and a good basis for developing a range of policies towards a long list of important strategic partners that include the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. This framework specifically endorsed the principle of differentiation in the pursuit of closer and more coherent relations with individual neighbours to the east and south, to be codified in jointly developed Action Plans attuned to the specificities of each country. The proposal, which was endorsed by the Council of Europe in June 2003 provides an appropriate policy paradigm within which to anchor enhanced cooperation in areas that side-step delicate political questions, such as trade, investment, industrial and financial standards, and scientific and technological cooperation, separately from the question of ultimate membership. The 5+5 West Mediterranean Forum initiative was launched by the French in 1990 and is composed of five southern European countries—France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain—and the five Arab Maghreb Union countries—Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The intention is to create a security forum in the Mediterranean based on a flexible structure of dialogue, consultation and cooperation. Ministerial meetings were to be held once a year and working groups were set up to tackle issues of concern, such as desertification, migration flows and the preservation of cultural heritage. The relaunching of the 5+5 initiative by Portugal in January 2001 offers the western sector of the Mediterranean an opportunity to try and find a common ground upon which transnational security issues can be addressed in a concerted manner. The 5+5 meetings in Tripoli at the start of 2002 and again in Tunisia on the issue of immigration in October

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2002 indicate that the 5+5 initiative may be set to experience a new lease of life after a decade in diplomatic limbo. In December 2003 the first Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Western Mediterranean Forum took place in Tunisia. The ten leaders of the 5+5 dialogue pledged their support to combat the challenges of organized crime, illegal migration, money laundering, the trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings, as well as the intensification of terrorist acts carried out against innocent civilians. They also expressed their support for the proposal for a ‘Mediterranean Forum for Investment in the Western Mediterranean’ that should be organized alternately in the different countries of the 5+5 dialogue. The recent reactivation of the 5+5 Group also offers the EU an opportunity to endorse a sub-regional grouping furthering a more cooperative western Euro-Mediterranean geostrategic area. The EU should consider revitalizing the Euro-Maghreb partnership initiative that was introduced in the early 1990s by committing specific political and economic resources to improving Euro-Maghreb ties. This could include creating a EuroMaghreb diplomatic channel of communications to deal with potential crisis situations such as the tense situation that developed between Spain and Morocco in July 2002 over the Perejil Island, just off the Spanish enclave of Ceuta in North Africa. Another sub-regional Euro-Mediterranean process is the Mediterranean Forum, which was launched in 1994 at the initiative of Egypt and France. The Forum was created as an instrument for cooperation and it was intended to be flexible in its approach and all encompassing. Besides ministerial meetings, the members of the Forum also meet at a senior official level. The Mediterranean Forum brings together 11 states: Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. It was agreed that future membership of the Forum was to be decided on a consensual basis. The fact that the Mediterranean Forum meets in an informal manner has allowed the member states to deliberate upon various issues at length. These issues include, among others, taking stock of the consequences of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 at an extraordinary session in Agadir in 2001. In fact, in recent years, the Mediterranean Forum has emerged as a type of think-tank that provides the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with fully elaborated policy proposals. The main weakness of this sub-regional grouping is that it lacks the institutional framework to ensure continuity in proceedings—there is no secretariat, and the Forum is thus dependent on the rotating presidency to ensure implementation of any decisions. The Forum also lacks a financial mechanism that would ensure implementation of any projects that are agreed upon. In an effort to become more flexible as a discussion group, the Mediterranean Forum decided, during the Portuguese presidency in 2000, to halt the working group proceedings and instead to mandate senior officials to focus on important issues as they emerged. This more flexible approach already started to pay dividends at the May 2002 Delos meeting, when the Mediterranean Forum agreed on a Code of Conduct in combating terrorism. The sub-regional initiatives described here indicate that the southern European states are trying to expand the scope of action of their present foreign policy orientation in the Mediterranean area. Implementation of such an agenda would result in a further convergence of foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis the Euro-Mediterranean region. To

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date, countries in southern Europe focus most of their attention on developments in the European region.

Conclusions The chapter identified some general challenges to non-pole powers in southern Europe irrespective of their affiliation to Euro-Atlantic institutions. The potential of economic, social and military conflicts in North Africa continue to pose a challenge to states in the region. Terrorism is a related challenge facing Europe from the Maghreb and other parts of the Middle East. In addition, all non-pole powers in southern Europe are challenged by the most recent enlargements of the EU and NATO moving the European centre of gravity north and east. These shared challenges are reflected in general characteristics of interstate relations in southern Europe. Interaction between the countries of southern Europe is largely cooperative. Exchanges are both governmental and transnational in nature, but despite common challenges and the shared objective of countering them, this has not resulted in strong and permanent political institutions. Still, the competition from Eastern Europe on investment and economic assistance and the risk of potential conflicts in North Africa have led to an increase in coordination among southern European states, even though Mediterranean issues are far down the list of foreign policy concerns, despite rhetoric often claiming the contrary. Thus, despite common challenges and increased coordination, it is essential to note that relations are far more coordinated at a Euro-Atlantic level than at a southern European one. All states discussed in this chapter are members of either the EU or NATO or both. Thus, the attraction of the Euro-Atlantic pole and its institutions has been far stronger than any Mediterranean arrangement. The important role played by the French pole power in southern Europe as well as in NATO and in particular in the EU has guaranteed the primacy of Euro-Atlantic integration over southern European cooperation. French involvement is essential for the success of any attempt at multilateral cooperation among southern European countries because of its considerable ability to project power in the Mediterranean through economic, political and military means. The general characteristics of interstate relations in southern Europe show some important similarities in the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers, reflecting a set of common external challenges. At the same time the chapter has shown that differences in foreign policy behaviour persist. Although members of the same political or military organizations (NATO, the EU or the OSCE), southern European countries do not adhere to a common defence identity. While France has been an ardent supporter of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Turkey continue to favour NATO, and Malta and Cyprus have favoured Mediterranean security initiatives. In any case, none of these Western security institutions have been able to extend their security guarantees to the Middle East bordering the Mediterranean. As a result, southern European patterns of interaction are perceived by states in the Mashreq and Maghreb as largely divisive mechanisms. Overtures to overcome this perception have to date failed, despite the successful track record of the Mediterranean Forum and the relaunching of the Western Mediterranean 5+5 Forum.

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Southern European interaction with countries outside the Mediterranean theatre reflects the lack of foreign policy convergence in this theatre. For example, after bilateral relations with other EU member states, countries such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain dedicate most of their diplomatic resources on four priorities: multilateral EU affairs, bilateral relations with the Maghreb, bilateral contacts with the Mashreq, and finally ties with Latin America and relations with former colonies throughout Africa. In general, the analysis supported the proposition of the constellation theory presented in Chapter 2 that differences in foreign policy behaviour are explainable in terms of differences in constellation. Core and near-core insiders in southern Europe had more freedom of choice in their foreign policy behaviour than would-be insiders. Thus, Spain and Italy promoted their own Mediterranean initiatives intended to challenge the leadership of France, even though this was not only due to their location as core insiders, but also a consequence of their ability to project power in the Mediterranean. Portugal, a core insider, balanced its European engagement with transatlantic and extra-continental ties. Greece, another core insider, after achieving membership quickly acquired a ‘bad boy’ image because of its unilateralist foreign policy behaviour. However, this image has been substantially modified in recent years. Ireland, a near-core insider, developed a close relationship with the United States (with the notable exception of security policy). In contrast, would-be insiders such as Malta, Cyprus and Turkey pursued a more limited agenda demonstrating their commitment to European integration in general and their contribution to the solution of southern European problems in particular. Malta and Cyprus played an active role in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and Turkey entered a dialogue with Greece in order to solve the Cypriot question. While the Cypriot government favoured reunification throughout the EU enlargement process, it could not sign up to the UN plan that was put to a referendum in April 2004.

Notes 1 Middle East International, 24 January 1992. See also Gillespie (2003). 2 Financial Times, 2 July 1995. See also Financial Times, 27/28 November 1993. 3 WEU Report, 15 July 1994. 4 Financial Times, 10 February 1995. 5 Agence Europe, 26 July 1994. 6 Ibid.

7 The east Rick Fawn No established insiders are to be found in the ‘east’ as conceived in this volume. However, of the ten states that became EU insiders on 1 May 2004, five belong to this part of the continent (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia). By 2005, four remaining would-be insiders also rest in this domain (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and perhaps Macedonia). EU membership, whether recently attained, or a definite or a likely prospect, does not end the necessity for non-pole states to exert their interests on this massive multilateral entity. And many outsiders, including aspiring outsiders, remain in this part of the continent (see Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1 The east (2005). Geopolitical challenges in the post-Cold War era The major geopolitical challenge facing Central and East European states (CEES) in the post-Cold War era has been to exit their old eastern structures and enter the major Western ones, the EU and NATO. For those having successfully met these demands, the next task has been to acquire a status as ‘equals’ to established insiders. Moreover, it has

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proven necessary to position themselves in the 2002–03 bifurcation between the US/UK and continental major EU powers. The CEES also face the delicate task of securing the EU’s eastern external border while at the same time safeguarding their own interests in maintaining openness eastwards. As the present chapter involves states at different stages of accession, the ability of these states to seek national interests over collective EU ones needs to consider both accession and likely post-accession situations. This chapter therefore considers two large dimensions to the relationship of the CEES to the EU: first, the accession process itself and, second, EU membership in the broader context of Euro-Atlantic structures, including NATO accession. This later element has taken greater consideration with the November 2002 Prague Summit Declaration that initiated accession talks with seven countries, which were fulfilled in April 2004 with the entry into NATO of the three Baltic republics, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The Summit also indicated such possibilities for Albania, Macedonia and Croatia. The concurrence of EU and NATO membership for the CEES represents an ideal: Central and East European governments have not wished to confront any sort of divide within the Euro-Atlantic area. They have generally recognized that the EU has primarily represented economic and social benefits, and NATO a hard security guarantee, but the two were mutually reinforcing of both practical benefits and reaffirmation of the region’s self-perception of geocultural belonging. It is therefore difficult always to separate NATO and the EU as actors on the CEES. However, the US-led war against Iraq and the support given to it by many post-communist governments presented the danger that the Euro-Atlantic area had, if not split, at least seemed to have fractured into two parts. The chapter starts by analysing the post-Cold War relationship between the EU and its CEES would-be insiders; this also includes those states that have just recently acquired a would-be insider status. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on a particular aspect of EU power projection, which will be referred to as ‘stability projection’. This leads to a consideration of the outer limits of such projection, i.e. the outsider states. We then proceed to the wider Euro-Atlantic power structure and its recent tendencies towards bifurcation in the Iraq war, asking how that affected the CEES. Finally, we focus on the CEES’ own dynamics, conditioned by the overall power structure, but still working independently from it.

The EU vis-à-vis the CEES would-be insiders: setting the terms of reference? Much literature has already been devoted to considering how accession to Western institutions—foremost the EU—have shaped domestic policies in the CEES (e.g. on institutional influence generally, see Pravda and Zielonka 2001; on EU specifically, Mayhew 1998, Linden 2002, Smith 2004). This section briefly considers some of the ways in which the CEES have been compelled to view the EU as their main actor and thus how their ability to act in foreign policy has been shaped or curtailed. The process is not wholly one-sided. Arguably, individual post-communist Central European leaders encouraged the then-European Community to consider the principle of enlargement, and thereafter pushed the body to develop a timescale for accession. It was, of course, the EU

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that set the terms for entry and then measured the CEES’ achievement in meeting those criteria. In that way we can contend that the EU set the rules of the game, even if it was nudged somewhat to do so, and even if some CEES have been able to change some of the rules slightly. It is the margin between EU and CEES desires on the rule-setting and their application that really determines how much influence the latter have and to what extent, therefore, it operates as a periphery. By late 2002, at the Copenhagen Summit, the accession schedule was at last clear: by 1 May 2004 eight post-communist states were expected to be able to gain entry. But that is historical hindsight and demands context. From the vantage of 1990 and the tentative start of democratization in the post-communist space, the situation was perceived very differently. The EC did not issue any outright rejection of post-communist accession. But rather than welcoming the CEES into the EC’s fold, the EC did not outline general terms of membership until the announcement of the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. And while Agenda 2000 in July 1997 gave a sense of progress, outlining more specifically how some aspirants stood for accession, the joke ran until 2002 among frontline candidates that they at last knew when accession would occur: in five years, but, so the joke went, they were told that every year. The process and terms of accession have been principally driven by the EC/EU. While this practice has been given vast and detailed attention elsewhere, a few examples illustrate for our purposes here how the CEES have overwhelmingly had to work to EU terms. The starting point in this is to consider the very different criteria for entry. For the post-communist leaders of particularly Poland, Hungary and the then-Czechoslovakia, the return to Europe was based on moral, cultural and historical rights. Immediately upon their ability to create an independent foreign policy after the revolutions of 1989, these new governments called for integration in Western institutions. Throughout the 1990s various leaders of these states have asserted a moral and cultural basis—a right—to membership of Western institutions. Hanna Suchozka, Poland’s Prime Minister in 1992– 93, declared: It is not that we are ‘obsessed with having no roof after the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact’—as one EC politician suggested some time ago. It is not that we desperately look for some multilateral structure to take care of us…. The family of democratic West European countries…is what we aim at. Not because we need some umbrellas, but because we all share the same values and objectives.1 For most post-communist leaderships, Western institutional membership was based on moral, cultural and historical claims: these societies had not only contributed to the ethos of what is ‘Western’ but are also a fundamental part of and contributors to it, and through their peaceful revolutions of 1989, earned the right of integration. In other words, by professing the view of ‘back to Europe’ the CEES did not want to conceive of ‘Europe’ in asymmetrical terms, as a core—periphery relationship. However, the CEES’ existential and normative views of how their relations with the EU should be did not translate in practice; rather the CEES were obliged generally to frame their terms of relations by that given by their Western interlocutor. One Polish

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commentator bluntly made comparisons after 1989 to Poland’s communist-era unipolarity with the Soviet Union: ‘now it was the West who had all the (mostly positive) sanctions which could be implemented to influence Polish politics in various domains. Therefore, in the Polish salient environment, the unipolar arrangement did not cease to exist. What indeed changed, however, was the location of the pole’ (Kostecki 1998:196). The Central Europeans were always concerned about exclusion and how their relationship (or lack thereof) defined their position in Europe. In 1991, for example, Czechoslovak President Václav Havel warned in the Western media about the CEES being perpetuated as ‘second-class countries’.2 Even in 2002, the Romanian government warned of ‘attempts to create new dividing lines in Europe…based on cultural and religious determinism, which limits democratic values, the rule of law and market economy to certain European countries, while excluding others’.3 For almost all CEES, EU membership has been a key foreign policy goal. The process of accession therefore provides further indications of the nature of core—periphery relations. While there may have been some sympathy for the post-communist view of European membership (and considerably more in under-empowered academic circles), the accession hopefuls were instead given political, economic and bureaucratic requirements to meet. Since the onset of the accession process, the aspirants have also been subject to extensive reviews by EU bodies, codified in the annual accession reports of their progress in fulfilling these criteria. In assessing the role and potential power of would-be insiders, two large questions arise: to what extent has the accession process been influenced by them and to what extent are the benefits of membership outweighed by the tradeoffs made in achieving it? In asking these questions we must recall also that the whole process is subject to public opinion and democratic accountability. The pro-accession governments of these countries therefore have had an understandable interest in presenting the accession process as both favourable but also one in which they have been able to secure, often against odds, a desirable outcome for their electorates. Even the EU at times has argued that it has changed its accession policies in light of CEES needs, such as the negotiations concluded between Poland and the EU on 21 March 2002 on the free movement of capital and taxation chapters. In this case, Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen said: The European Union made great efforts to accommodate Poland’s particular needs’ and that the outcome ‘proves that the Union takes the sensitivities and particular concerns of different candidate countries seriously’. Poland, demographically and geographically largest among candidate countries, may have been in a different bargaining position from other CEES. Even so, reports throughout the accession process have written that even Poland has had to ‘bow’ to EU pressure. An unnamed EU ambassador summarized the likely EU view of CEES influence on the accession process, commenting in 2001: ‘we expect several applicant countries to reduce their demands because they are desperate to join the EU’.4 Several post-communist governments have felt disadvantaged on issues such as the right of foreigners to purchase land and on the delays in giving full working rights to CEES citizens in the EU after accession. On the latter, the EU ambassador commented that Germany and Austria, at the forefront of upholding the delay, would not make concessions because, ‘At the end of the day, what can the applicant countries do about it? Zero’.5

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In these circumstances, CEES governments have generally adopted a quiet but firm view that accession must only be on terms favourable to the country. Some postcommunist leaders have attacked the EU for eroding national sovereignty, much as Eurosceptics have done in Western Europe. The difference may be, however, that postcommunist states have been enjoying the ability to make independent foreign policy for a relatively short period. Regardless, some of the post-communist Euro-sceptics have turned their comments into virtues, suggesting that their societies’ communist-era experience offers lessons for Europe. Thus, said Czech Prime Minister Klaus in 1994: ‘from the structural viewpoint, there are various things there that I can compare’ and ‘We know what integration in a community with a capital 2,000km away means. There are very few opportunities to change things when non-elected bureaucrats sit and have great power’.6 By contrast, EU officials often suggest that new members are net beneficiaries. Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen, for example, explained that the EU would be expending over 40 billion euros in just 2005 for the ten new states. Where CEES were seen to have objections, such as on limitations on the movement of labour, Verheugen thought otherwise, declaring ‘there is already considerable flexibility’. He also suggested that resistance to free movement of labour was limited to a few members and that he thought migration would be wholly unrestricted within two or three years of accession.7 The ‘power’ of the CEES in negotiating with the EU on this point was weakened when Hungary broke ranks in June 2001 and made a unilateral offer at the EU’s Goethenburg summit to accept limitations on the movement of labour. In return, Sweden promised to open its labour market soon after accession, and EU states informed Hungary that work possibilities for its citizens ‘should improve substantially’ after its entry into the Union. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan said the Hungarian measure ‘has limited our room for manoeuvre’. His comment, however, was seen by observers as a parallel to Hungarian and Polish sentiments when the Czech government consented to EU conditions on land purchases by foreigners.8 We know now that almost all member states imposed a seven-year restriction on labour movement. Britain, along with Ireland, both obviously on islands at the most removed point from Eastern Europe, did not, although the former decided belatedly and haphazardly in February 2004 to impose some restrictions as well. It is impossible to know how well the CEES could have changed EU opposition to important issues like land sales and labour mobility, but the ability to secure a better deal with the EU was surely compromised to some extent by defections. Apart from more general and shared matters, many applicant countries have expressed concerns over issues specific to them, and to varying degrees have arguably achieved some limited concessions from the EU. Some of these measures are ones that countries desiring to be consolidated democracies and functioning market economies would want to enact anyway. However, this is done to specifications of the EU and according to its timetable. Thus, for example, Hungary was chastised in 1999 for enacting its own free trade agreement with Croatia, which did not, in turn, hold a trade agreement with the EU. For the Hungarian government, the measure was seen in terms that otherwise would surely have been welcomed by Brussels: ‘Croatia is a neighbouring state. We know whether it is valid for us to make an arrangement, even for a limited amount of time’ and that such an agreement ‘can be a very useful tool of good neighbourly cooperation’. The Hungarian government was also aware that the agreement would cease upon the

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country’s entry into the EU. Nevertheless, an EU official accused Hungary of disregarding the political relationship between Croatia and the European Union and that a pre-accession agreement could provoke compensation claims later.9 From aspiring outsiders to would-be insiders The margin of manoeuvrability with regard to the EU seems even less for Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. Romania and Bulgaria shifted from being resigned to aspiring outsiders, as they oriented themselves westwards around the mid-1990s. However, they were able to approach NATO faster than the EU; at the time they were invited as NATO members (late 2002), they were only invited to start EU negotiations, with a membership perspective for 2007 at the earliest. These countries were (and are) potentially more vulnerable to EU demands, because the EU has placed them in a later stage of membership. For instance, the Bulgarian government imposed visas on 17 countries in 1999, including many post-Soviet states, expressly in response to unlawful immigration to the Union through Bulgaria.10 Official Romanian publications speak of concerns about being cast on the other side of the European divide. Thus, we can suggest that the EU serves again to define outsiders’ perceptions of their geopolitical location. The vulnerability of countries remaining outside the EU was summarized sharply by France’s President Chirac in his condemnation of CEES support for the US war on Iraq. When asked why he did not criticize existing members in the same way, Chirac stated ‘When you are in the family…you have more rights than when you are asking to join and knocking on the door’. He singled out Bulgaria and Romania for his sharpest attacks. This suggests that insiders were spared, soon-to-be members received a moderate attack, and outsiders got the fiercest lambasting. Croatia is a special case because of its relationship to the Yugoslav wars. It applied for EU membership on 21 February 2003. Its economic performance has been strong, with growth nearing 4 per cent and inflation at 2.2 per cent. Prime Minister Ivica Račan boasted (probably as rhetoric in advance of re-election) that his country could join the EU by 2007, which would be a considerable success. The EU gave Croatia candidate status at a Brussels summit meeting on 18 June 2004, with accession talks slated to begin in 2005. In announcing this decision, the EU already set broad conditions for Croatia’s membership, such as amelioration of its policies for minorities, anti-corruption measures and advancing regional cooperation. Even before the EU’s announcement, post-conflict justice in Croatia had been an extra condition for its consideration of EU candidacy, and the country’s need to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal was included in the announcement of accession negotiations. Apart from specific requirements in this regard, the British and Dutch governments declared that they would refuse to ratify Croatia’s candidate status unless Zagreb submitted General Ante Gotovina to the War Crimes Tribunal for his attacks against Serb-held Krajina in 1995. Without complying with the International Criminal Tribunal, Croatia’s attempts at membership would not make the country a ‘credible’ applicant.11 As an EU diplomat stated, when the Croatians ‘hand over the application for membership, they should also consider handing over some war criminals’.12 After being elected in November 2003, Croatia’s new Prime Minister, Ivo Sanadler, said he had

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established close contacts with Hague prosecutors and that ‘We are ready for full cooperation’. While he added ‘we want all war criminals to be prosecuted’, presumably as a principle in its own right, the influence of the EU cannot be discounted. As Western reports noted, ‘Croatia’s failure to secure a positive report from the tribunal could delay its plans for achieving EU membership in 2007’.13 These examples should illustrate how non-pole states not only shape their overall foreign policy goals, but also their sense of geopolitical location in relation to the pole. However, first and foremost they are overwhelming consumers of the pole’s policies rather than shapers of it or interlocutors with it. State fragmentation or stability projection? In acting like a pole, the EU has created a wider political environment that limits or even prevents bilateral tensions or outright conflict between CEES. To be sure, the then-EC, almost certainly unwittingly, contributed to state fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe. Direct interference did not occur in the case of Czechoslovakia, the break-up of which, as Jacques Rupnik concludes, ‘took place without outside interference’ (Rupnik 1995:272). But in Slovakia, as in Slovenia and to an extent in Croatia, nationalists could believe in the possibility of being small(er) nations in a bigger Europe on account of their perception of the EC project as one allowing for the independence of small(er) nations while having the benefits of a (wealthy) supranational entity. Membership was not to be fulfilled for over a decade (and longer for Croatia), but both the seeming permissiveness and the goal of the EC was important. Permissiveness because, rather than having to make hard, power-political choices among several great powers in Europe, as was the case in the 1930s, the democratic essence of the EC was non-threatening. A goal because of the perceived relative ease (in the optimistic view of would-be secessionists) of entry and what such membership signified as a re-affirmation of cultural and political values. The ability of the EC to cast a normative cultural impact on how peoples perceived their geopolitical location in Europe was immense. This amounted to the EC being nothing less than ‘Europe’, and the Balkans as being something else. We need not only turn to academic observations—such as one jointly by a Czech and Slovene political scientist— for perceptions that Slovenia was going ‘from the Balkans to Europe’ (Bobrovcová and Cabada 1998:26). Most tellingly, the slogan of the independence-minded Slovene League of Communists already in 1989 was ‘Europe, Now’. More negatively, the rejection of responsibility towards the ensuing Balkan war by Europe, as Slavenka Drakulić famously remarked, equated to a statement that ‘the West tells us “You are not Europeans, not even Eastern Europeans. You are Balkans, mythological, wild, dangerous, Balkans’” (Drakulić 1993:2–3). In these circumstances, it was auspicious for Slovene and Croat collective self-perceptions that their independence leaders realized the chance and the need to convince ‘Europe’ that they had the historio-cultural lineage to be entitled to membership (see Woodward 1995:105). In Czechoslovakia, peaceful yet nationalist Slovak leaders saw the process of integration within the EC as an imperative for Slovakia to gain independence. Vladimír Mečiar declared in 1991 that ‘the time had come’ for Slovakia to ‘demand its right to self-determination and achieve sovereignty’ because postponing that was ‘a grave mistake that will leave Slovakia outside an integrated Europe’.14

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To be sure, 1989–91 represented international systemic change, and part of that was the disappearance of constructed nations that emerged from previous shifts in the international system: Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the USSR (as it called itself from 1922) were reconfigurations of the post-First World War order. East Germany, a product of the post-Second World War order, equally disappeared, in this case in fusion with West Germany in October 1990. To the extent that systemic forces contribute to the disintegration of the former federations, then the EC surely is part of that level of explanation. The prospect of EC membership featured in the nationalist-secessionist discourse in some CEES, and in that way the EC unintentionally can be said to have contributed to state fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe. The EC has also projected stability, of course. This was both in a largely abstract, normative way and in more specific, practical forms. The former was the idea of ‘behaving’ in a certain manner—showing conformity to Western practices of non-violent conflict resolution and engaging, as will be discussed, in liberal-style economic and political cooperation among themselves. While conflict prevention was not an expressed part of European Political Cooperation that operated from 1970 to 1993, it was still, ‘implicitly, the over-riding concern in almost all the particular contexts in which European diplomacy engaged’ (Hill 2001:316). While those areas included the Middle East, Central America and South Africa’s apartheid, the post-communist world, on the EC/EU’s immediate frontier, became such an area as well. As the EU’s assistance to the region grew, particularly to war-ravaged former Yugoslavia, so too did backing within the Union for it to undertake conflict prevention (Smith 2003:150). Perceptions of the EC as a body capable of being a conflict prevention or resolution entity were strong in parts of CEE, and the EC, especially in the guise of Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, was confident about being able to ‘solve’ Yugoslavia.15 Certainly, nascent Slovenia, in the throws of federal Yugoslav attack in June 1991, turned immediately to the EC (and IGOs) for ‘mediation’ (as Slovene Foreign Minister Dmitrij Rupel wrote; see Rupel 1994:191). While the wars in Yugoslavia generally proved a foreign policy failure for the EC (and other international bodies), the EU has become a fundamental actor in projecting stability in south-eastern Europe. But even in this process, the EU largely chooses to whom, to what extent and how it projects stability. When Albania disintegrated into violent anarchy in 1997 after the collapse of a widespread financial scam, neither the EU or NATO intervened as organizations. Albania directed its request to the EU and even ‘pleaded’ with NATO for help.16 Rather, the USA, Britain and Germany worked to prevent NATO intervention. Instead, neighbouring Italy, faced with the brunt of continuing Albanian exoduses, confronted the crisis and managed to secure bilateral assistance from seven other European countries. The operation Italy mounted, named ‘Alba’ for ‘sunrise’, was sanctioned by the United Nations, but NATO Secretary-General Solana may have tried to emphasize its European character when he commented at the NATO fiftieth anniversary meeting in Washington: ‘The success of Operation Alba demonstrates the importance of European capabilities, and I congratulate Italy on the leadership role it played in that operation’.17 Certainly observers attempted to applaud Operation Alba as European (e.g. Scognamiglio-Pasini 2001). However, in that case Albania did not get what it sought from West European institutions. But when tensions rose in Kosovo in 1998–99, and much more was deemed at stake by these institutions, Albania (and Macedonia) were given, in this case by the Atlantic Alliance,

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what have been considered ‘de facto NATO security assurances, if not formal legal guarantees’ (Latwaski and Smith 2003:52–3; Hendrickson 1999). Elsewhere in the region, the EC/EU can also be said to have projected stability by preventing what would otherwise seem like logical conflict. Given the permissiveness brought by the end of Soviet hegemony, Hungary and Romania are held as examples of countries that should have engaged in ‘conflict’. After all, they share a high degree of historical animosity—including two wars—and have contemporary differences that include the treatment of one’s co-ethnics in the other. And yet, rather than clashing, they have behaved well (Linden 2000:121). Even if domestic politics are key, those domestic politics work in the context of EU enlargement. The EU may have sheltered CEES from the adverse influence of larger or wealthier EU states. Austria and Germany provide examples. This included the issues of the Beneš decrees that gave legal foundation for the post-war expulsion of Sudeten Germans (from Czechoslovakia to Austria and to Germany, as well as Hungarians to Hungary, all without compensation and in some cases with violence).18 There was also opposition to the operation of the Czech nuclear power station at Temelín and the Slovak one at Jaslavské Bohunice (which is located near Vienna). In each of these cases, however, the Austrian opposition was not successful, illustrating how an insider can attempt to use the EU to influence would-be insiders, and how the latter are not necessarily swayed. At certain points German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer even had to offer public reassurances that Czech EU entry negotiations would not be linked to Temelín or the Beneš decrees.19 Without the EU it is likely that the singular diplomatic and economic importance to the Central Europeans of the Germans and Austrians would have meant that the former had had to concede substantially to the demands of the latter. But this may not always be the case. The outcome for Slovenia on similar issues—historical German rights and the Křsko nuclear power station—was rather different, with the Austrian government demonstrating that it had ‘enough leverage to push Slovenia into making concessions’ (Šabič 2002:107). As Zlatko Šabič points out, Italy had sufficient influence in the EU to convert into a European matter the bilateral issue of historical property claims against Slovenia (Šabič 2002:114). The EU may therefore be a means generally—but not always—to balance non-pole state interest against those of larger powers. A popular Polish view recounts: ‘If we stay out of the EU, we will end up being dominated by Germany. Inside the European Union German power has to be channelled and diluted’ (see also, ‘Einbindung’, Chapter 10).20 Polish diplomats also suggest that Poland’s importance to the United States is only as an EU member, although later discussion in this chapter indicates strongly that Poland and other CEES do see the USA as a separate actor in military-security matters.21 However, the EU does not always serve as a foil for the wishes of other, including larger, states against smaller hopefuls. Consider in this context the case of Croatia. It sought to establish its own control over the eastern Adriatic, both as an environmental area and as an exclusive economic zone. Under this unilateral plan Slovenia—otherwise cut from access to the Mediterranean—would retain transit rights. But it was not consulted and, as some press put it, it sensed an ‘insult’, prompting angry diplomatic exchanges.22 While Croatia’s intentions may have been selfless and benign on the environmental front, it earned disapproval from EU states and Solana replied that the

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Adriatic ‘should be protected in a consensual manner’.23 Croatian unilateralism, for good or ill, was retrained by the EU.

The EU vis-à-vis outsiders: some contrasting experiences Let us now turn to the outsider constellation. While the EC/EU has undoubtedly projected stability and other benefits over much of Central and Eastern Europe, its influence is modest when a country opts out of what it offers materially and what it stands for culturally and politically. The experiences of certain CEES are illustrative, as the contrasting examples of Slovakia, Serbia, Belarus and Ukraine indicate. Slovakia under Vladimír Mečiar, who was Prime Minister three times in the 1990s, adopted policies that undermined the country’s relations with the West. This included antagonizing relations with the country’s Hungarian minority and several practices that cast doubt on democratic accountability of the government, such as the apparent use of the secret services to kidnap the son of Mečiar’s rival, President Michal Kováč, and the manipulation of a referendum on NATO membership. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel called the latter a violation of democratic rules. While Mečiar’s government did not seek to be excluded from Western institutions, membership was effectively denied, as the country’s exclusion in 1997 from the first round of NATO and EU accession negotiations indicated. Mečiar lost the 1998 elections, being replaced by a coalition government that itself included a coalition of ethnic Hungarian parties. When Mečiar contested the 2002 elections, Western governments and institutions were outspoken about the costs to Slovakia of his potential victory. While it is difficult to determine the causation between his two defeats and Western opinion, it is worth considering some of the comments and threats made by foreign officials to get a sense of the potential power of the Euro-Atlantic pole vis-à-vis a non-pole state. In June 1997 in the EU—Slovak joint parliamentary committee that was meeting in Bratislava, EU representatives told their Slovak counterparts ‘repeatedly’ that the government had to respect and improve democratic standards.24 The next month EU Foreign Relations Commissioner Hans van der Broek warned that ‘serious political discrepancies’ remained in Slovakia that impeded accession talks.25 European parliamentarian Herbert Bosch similarly counselled in September 1997 that unless political changes occurred the EU would not commence accession discussions.26 The demands on Slovakia for democratic change came likewise from NATO. Alliance Secretary-General Javier Solana declared several times in 1997 and 1998, including in Slovakia in person in March 1998, that the country had to ameliorate its democratic standards in order to qualify for NATO enlargement.27 All of these statements were reported (and are drawn here) from the Slovak press. The sense that Mečiar was damaging the country’s reputation and its chances of accession were therefore clearly in the public domain. While Mečiar rejected the need for change on Hungarian minority rights, even he sought to improve relations with the EU. After Mečiar’s defeat in 1998, the priority of Slovak foreign policy expressly became and remained entry into the EU and NATO. The allure of the EU contrasts with Serbia and Belarus that rejected Brussels’ influence. The Serbian case is extreme because of its war. With the overthrow of the

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Milošević regime in 2000 a de facto condition for the country to improve its relations with the EU occurred. Thereafter the power of the EU is shown even in its ability to encourage Belgrade to change the name of the country to ‘Serbia and Montenegro’, thereby symbolically weakening Belgrade’s control over the last remaining republic. Solana, who brokered the name change between Serb President Vojislav Koštunica and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanović, said: ‘This is not the end of anything, but a beginning of a new chapter that will bring you closer to the European Union’.28 While international institutions, particularly the EU, have significant influence over how Serbia behaves, indeed, even over its polity and country name, that sway is still limited by domestic political directions. The strength of non-Western-oriented Serb nationalists remains significant. The ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party won a plurality of votes, 27.3 per cent of the electorate, in the December 2003 parliamentary elections, although this was too small to form a minority government. Its candidate, Tomislav Nikolić, also won a plurality in the presidential elections in June 2004. And even the apparently moderate, pro-Western Koštunica pursued a foreign policy that sought to strengthen both Serbia’s political and economic relations with Russia. Forging stronger relations with Russia—which seem to be enthusiastically reciprocated by Moscow—again shows the possibility of domestic politics limiting the sway of Western institutions. Attempting to gain the best foreign policy position irrespective of nationalist ideology, however, may explain why the Serb government gave Washington information in advance of the Iraq war on Yugoslav-constructed bunkers in that country and offered 1,000 Serb soldiers for the post-conflict coalition.29 Belarus is less ambiguous, by contrast, and has opted both for a proRussian policy and a rejection of Western norms and therefore of most dealing with the EU. It gives an unusual case of a state operating between poles in contemporary Europe in the more traditional sense of balance-of-power. Partly out of necessity and certainly because of his affinity for Russian culture and for vestiges of Soviet rule, Lukashenka achieved a ‘Union’ with Russia through a series of treaties signed since 1996 that make provisions for the joint use of the Russian rouble, common citizenship, a unified foreign policy and integrated armed forces. It is only Moscow that has resisted the full union of the two countries that Lukashenka has sought. Widely viewed abroad as a dictator, Lukashenka’s lack of democratic practice prompted the EU to refer to his government as ‘totalitarian’. Among repeated EU concerns were the parliament’s curtailed powers, the lack of access to state media by opposition parties, the composition of the electoral commissions and the generally limited respect for human rights. Solana, responsible for EU foreign policy, instructed Lukashenka that the October 2000 presidential elections had to be free and fair, and told him that the country would be excluded from ‘the family of nations’ if it did not democratize.30 But this was to no avail. Unlike, arguably, in Slovakia, Croatia and Serbia where the EU has been able to influence some public opinion or popular action to oppose their governments, the EU has been categorically unable to induce Lukashenka to change practices in any significant way. Ukraine, however, is more ambiguous, and in contrast to Serbia and Belarus, it provides an intermediate case of Euro-Atlantic influence. This is partly the result of Ukraine itself being—to use Samuel Huntington’s term—a cleft state, stretched and split across civilizational divides (Huntington 1996: esp. 165). Its geocultural extremes are considerable: its western-most section was part of and draws on heritage from the Austro-

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Hungarian empire, while one-fifth of the population are ethno-linguistically Russian, with strong allegiance to the kin-state. Some Western policy-makers may have viewed Ukraine’s geopolitics as such that it could not ‘belong’ in Europe. Of course, it was important in many respects, such as for the dismantling of Ukraine’s inherited Soviet-era nuclear arsenal and its hand-over to Russia. But even with a population and territory comparable with that of France, some considered Ukraine not to be an actor in its own right. A major strand of Western geopolitical perception of Ukraine is summarized as the ‘tendency of many in the West to see Ukraine through a Russian prism. That is, they believed that the extensive historical and cultural ties of Ukraine to Russia would probably soon overcome nationalistic fervour in Ukraine and bring Ukraine back into the Russian fold’ (Albright and Appatov 1999:4). It could therefore be seen as outside Europe. Ukrainian politics have not helped this perception, having been divided on foreign policy orientations. As Jonathan Dean, a former US arms control ambassador, observed, Ukraine has been ‘split between anti-Russian and pro-Russian groups, which in itself is a reason for tense relations between the Atlantic Community and Russia’ (Dean 1996:19). During the period when Western institutional accession was the key issue in European affairs, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministers between 1994 and 2000, Hennadiy Udovenko and Borys Tarasyuk, were ardent backers of EU and NATO membership, and, arguably Ukraine achieved special recognition by NATO in 1997 with the Charter on Special Partnership. By contrast, from 2000, Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko ceased mention of Western integration as an aim.31 After Ukraine was suspected of selling the Kolchuha early warning system to Iraq, relations with NATO deteriorated so far that all 19 NATO leaders declined to meet with President Leonid Kuchma in the NATO—Ukraine summit (as part of the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002) and instead downgraded the meeting to one of Foreign Ministers.32 The Orange Revolution of 2004, nonetheless, indicates a major reorientation towards Western institutions. The ambiguities in both Western and Ukrainian views of where Ukraine ‘fits’ have been moderated somewhat by Central European actions, an indication in itself that the Central European states have some freedom of foreign-policy movement, if in a direction away from the Euro-Atlantic structure. In an early expression of independent, postcommunist foreign policy, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (along with Canada, home to a large Ukrainian population) first recognized Ukrainian independence, and they did so in advance of the collapse of the USSR. Then Central European leaders referred to Ukraine as ‘Central European’, a term that was consciously used to differentiate that region from the more backward ‘east’. In practical terms, while Ukraine of course participates in several post-communist regional groupings, it was also included at the behest of the Central European states in a regional organization that bares the geopolitical moniker of Central Europe: the Central European Initiative. Indeed, Ukraine’s relations with the Central European states have been considered ‘its primary contact with the West’ (Wolchik and Zięba 2000:153). But these actions have not of course fundamentally changed Ukraine’s position. Ukraine gives us indications of the ambiguities that occur when, unlike in the other three cases, contradictions exist both within Western and domestic perceptions of geopolitical location. In the case of Ukraine, a concentrated and unambiguous push Westward may still have been unlikely to change Western views (though it may have helped); and equally, as much as the West may

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intrinsically have deemed Ukraine to be fully ‘European’ or ‘Western’, domestic Ukrainian cleavages would have weakened or undermined that Western pull. The EU/NATO power and influence has some limits, but costs to the peripheral state in those cases is a high degree of political isolation and loss of extensive material benefit. Therefore, the Euro-Atlantic community can be considered a pole by its power of denial. The outcast might take pride in such a position and deny the practical benefits (which is often the case for those who hark back to communist-era values), but that position is still defined by relations with the pole.

CEES in Euro-Atlantic bifurcation The EU was never seen by the CEES as the sole actor or pole in the Euro-Atlantic area. The US-led war against Iraq brought to the fore what had been masked by a convergence of common interests and outlook among European actors: that a bifurcation between separate power poles might emerge in the near future. Post-communist governments had often expressed strong support for the retention of American involvement in European affairs and the presence of American military on the continent. The separate—and potentially balancing—influence of the USA in European relations has been brought to the fore with the 2003 war in Iraq, but was present before. A column in Romania’s Expres gives an indication of some opinion of how West European governments did little to assist the CEES: We can ask ourselves what France and Germany did in 50 years on communism for all the countries in the Eastern bloc. The answer is simple: nothing else than business. To us, who were moaning in the prisons of communism, they sent only friendly greetings…. And now they are surprised that all the countries in the former communist bloc do not give a damn about obsolete stratagems of France and Germany. NATO was seen as the region’s one viable military organization, and the one which these countries wanted to join. To be sure, NATO membership was not necessarily to the exclusion of other possibilities. In the early 1990s the CEES expressed strong support for the CSCE—in part because many of their leaders were communist-era dissidents for whom the Helsinki Accords were important in their existential anti-communist struggles. That said, membership of NATO was a key foreign policy aim of Central European states, and the leaders can be credited for convincing the Clinton administration to push for enlargement, a policy that also came to coincide with other perceived American interests. Here, then, is an example, of non-pole states having some influence on broader European politics. Of course, these states were constrained by also being compelled to go to war in Kosovo. In both the new NATO countries and aspiring Romania and Bulgaria, public opposition to participation in the war was roughly 70 per cent.33 The expectations of these governments was surely that they could compensate for the domestic unpopularity of their support for the NATO war with earlier accession to the Alliance and probably also the EU. In both of these countries we know that neither accession process would

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materialize for several more years, and with these two remaining outside the first wave of post-communist EU enlargement. Post-communist governmental support for the Anglo-American war in Iraq in 2003 may also be cast in realpolitik terms: that such backing, no matter how disliked at home and among several West European governments, would net these countries disproportionate favour in Washington. As Poland’s former ambassador to Germany and director of Warsaw’s Center for International Relations, Janusz Reiter, said: ‘As long as the U.S. is a functioning reality and a united Europe is a dream, we will always choose the reality over the dream’.34 To this realist thinking must be added that many voices in post-communist Eastern Europe declared that because these societies had recently experienced totalitarianism they understood the ethical importance of ridding the world of yet another murderous authoritarian. The response of French President Jacques Chirac to the CEES support for the USA hardly reinforced CEES’ sympathy. He declared their stand to be ‘not really responsible behaviour’ and to have ‘missed a good opportunity to keep quiet’. Romania and Bulgaria—not included in the 2004 wave of EU enlargement—were singled out for Chirac’s scorn, being admonished that ‘If they wanted to diminish their chances of joining Europe, they could not have found a better way’. Before the Iraq conflict, the CEES had sought to interpret the coexistence in the EuroAtlantic area of two institutions as something indivisible that did not force trade-offs in their policies. For them, a strong and enlarged NATO and EU were mutually reinforcing. Iraq prompted a division in this interpretation, both by many CEES and by some West European countries, especially France, following two declarations of support in late January 2003 for the US position on war against Iraq: the Letter of Eight, signed by the leaders of five West European countries and those of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic; and the ‘Vilnius 10’, the heads of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. As Jacques Rupnik, one of France’s key commentators on European affairs said—and someone known to have sympathies for the post-communist states: ‘There is a lot of irritation in France about the alignment of the candidates toward the U.S. position’. He also indicated French suspicions that the post-communist states were only seeking EU financial assistance and ‘for the serious stuff they address themselves to Washington’.35 The tensions created within Europe and between parts of Europe and the AngloAmericans by the Iraq war already seemingly began to dissipate by the Evian Summit of the Group of 8 in June 2003, and CEES will continue to be concerned about their relative influence in Europe. They may, however, be beneficiaries of American military presence. Speculation in some quarters was that the Pentagon was seeking to relocate military bases from Western Europe to Eastern Europe—not to save money by benefiting from lower local operating costs, but ‘to punish “Old Europe”’ for its lack of support in the war.36

East-east dynamics: cooperation and competition The post-Cold War power structure has shaped subregional relations. It is unlikely that cooperation among post-communist states would have occurred as extensively as it has without the perceived need to do so. Within Central Europe, the principle of cooperation

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was initiated right from the outset of the ability of these states to engage in independent foreign policy. Dissident Václav Havel travelled to Poland and Hungary within days of coming into office. To the parliament of each country in January 1990 he called for cooperation similar to that of the communist era, when each showed solidarity to the suffering of the other under adverse circumstances. This may have been Havel’s idiosyncratic foreign policy. But his additional comments and his concrete efforts to convene diplomatic meetings so that the three should coordinate their ‘return to Europe’ demonstrated the practical importance of conducting foreign policy in view of the expectations of the EC and NATO. While these countries at times sought to achieve EC membership unilaterally (largely for domestic political reasons), these attempts evidently failed. Furthermore, the economic dimension of Central European cooperation went no further in the early 1990s than was expected from the Association Agreements signed with the EC in December 1991. Whatever ideological values may have inspired regional cooperation, the EC/EU set the parameters in which it operated. However, competition has also been an essential ingredient of CEES dynamics in the post-cold War era. The CEES have, arguably, behaved as ‘good international citizens’ in order to show their fitness and aptitude for Western institutional memberships. Thus, almost all CEES have participated in peace-keeping operations. While they may have done so, it is hard to imagine the extent and frequency of this without an expectation that doing so demonstrated their political commitment to (apparently) prevailing Western norms and their practical ability to operate with multinational forces. In this sense, we can say that goodwill competition may have occurred among the CEES. Partnership for Peace, launched in January 1994, specifically laid foundations for and encouraged cooperation among Western and Eastern armed forces in non-traditional military activities, but peace-keeping became so common that it cannot have merited one country particularly stronger benefits over another (Poland’s participation in post-war Iraq, however, is of a different nature to UN-sanctioned multilateral peace-keeping). Is it likely that the CEES will continue their mutual pattern of behaviour—both cooperative and competitive—inside the EU? While some competi-tion to enter the EU has been evident among CEES, representatives of would-be insiders have also expressly said they wanted to join simultaneously. Hungarian Foreign Minister János Martonyi, for example, said in July 2001, before the accession timetable was announced, that his government ‘would insist that we joined together’ with Poland.37 While not all of the smaller, ‘eastern’ states will have exactly the same interests and outlooks, these will tend to converge on major issues regarding the operation of the EU. To that end, these states will be best served by maintaining a caucus. The most ready form is Visegrád. Group cooperation and even membership is, to a large extent, determined also by the EU. With Slovakia able to catch up after the electoral defeat of Mečiar in 1998, EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen said in April 2000 it was ‘desirable’ for Slovakia to join with the other Visegrád states, and that ‘it’s clear that Slovakia does have the possibility to catch up…and has already started to catch up with other candidates’.38 The joint press release following the Portorož meeting of representatives of the four Visegrád countries and Slovenia and Austria in October 2002 declared: ‘cooperation between the countries of Central Europe could be further enhanced due to’ their future membership of the EU.39 The then-Czech Prime Minister Miloš Zeman even said in 2002 that, once in the EU, the Visegrád group would function like the Benelux group of Belgium, the Netherlands

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and Luxembourg. Hungarian Foreign Minister Martonyi seemed critical of such a view, stating that even the citizens of Benelux states have been unable to define its meaning. He also said that new EU members might not always have the same views and interests once in the Union, but he nevertheless declared categorically ‘Visegrád will exist even after we join the Union’.40 This outlook was affirmed in practice when the Visegrád Four convened in October 2003 to discuss and issue a joint statement on the EU Constitution. The fact of such unity does not in itself mean ‘power’ for the Four or for smaller states but does show, at a minimum, the potential. Said Slovakia’s Ján Figel (who became the country’s first European Commissioner in 2004), ‘Although without an institutional basis, this cooperation is bearing fruit. I’m glad that after twelve years, the Visegrád cooperation is not ending, nor is it being questioned. On the contrary, it is entering a new stage’.41 Former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiří Dienstbier, an architect of early Visegrád cooperation, wrote in 2002 that countries that shared similar economic levels and geographic proximity remained natural partners.42 Foreign diplomats, however, have said privately to the author that they have discouraged the Central Europeans from using or presenting Visegrád as a ‘bloc’ within the EU. Visegrád will probably function within the EU when common interests merge, rather than the simple fact of the Four’s relative size and new entry. It is also misleading, especially through a geopolitical lens, to consider Poland as on a par with the other Visegrád states; both its size and particularly its population differentiate it from Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Polish policy has also been to elevate the country’s status within Europe. Its position, for example, on voting rights in the enlarged Union, elevated both the country’s perception of size (judging by discourse on the subject) and its actual vote weighting, with Poland being bracketed with Spain. Furthermore, while Poland clubs with non-pole CEES when beneficial, it has also participated in the Weimar Triangle with France and Germany. Finally, it also established a distinctive position in Anglo-American relations in 2003 by contributing militarily to the anti-Iraq coalition and being elevated thereafter as a full partner in administering the country, and, in so doing, taking direct charge of a section of Iraq and, within that, the troops of a dozen other states.

Conclusions The ideal for the post-communist states joining the EU was that the process would prove mutually beneficial. The drive of any state, though, must surely be to maximize its own interests in the EU, while enjoying socio-economic benefits. To an overwhelming degree the EU has set the rules of the game, but the ability of would-be insiders to operate within them and to have gains that would not otherwise be possible, remains. While more the exception than the rule, cases nonetheless exist where the EU has sheltered some CEES from the demands of larger or wealthier insiders. For the would-be insiders, the EU has not been entirely zero-sum. Foremost it has been of an existential nature: perhaps unbeknown to it, the EC/EU served as a reaffirmation, after Soviet rule, of these societies’ imagined geocultural location. However, the CEES values were not immediately reciprocated, and the terms that Brussels enunciated for consideration of membership reaffirmed that the relationship—in

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material terms—was one of core and periphery. Different views are evident, however, as to who is the real beneficiary. To the extent that existing members think they are giving charity to the new members, ironically, they may actually reinforce the perception of a core—periphery relationship. The CEES have not and did not want to think in such terms. They see themselves as contributing to ‘Europe’ in many forms, several of those being non-financial. In addition, the post-Cold War world has not simply been one of relations between the individual post-communist states and the EU. These relations also operate in the broader spectrum of international relations. NATO enlargement and the post-9/11 environment show that the Central and East European states have opportunities to gain benefits from the USA and from multilateral institutions, including NATO. They have seen the institutional development of the Euro-Atlantic area—including NATO and EU enlargements—as a win—win scenario and therefore the antithesis of classical balanceof-power politics. The Iraq war in 2003, however, suggested that choices need to be made and, for most CEES governments, that band-wagoning with the United States was the preferred route. The response from Chirac reinforced the idea that CEES were supplicant powers. In particular, states having barely become would-be insiders—Romania and Bulgaria—were targeted. The effects of Iraq may be relatively short-lived, but they—and the accession process—demonstrate that power (including pole-periphery) dynamics have considerable relevance for understanding the EU’s relations with would-be insiders. Whereas the EC/EU unintendedly may have contributed to state fragmentation, notably in the years immediately following the Cold War, the EU has generally succeeded in projecting stability eastwards. Rather than mutual conflict behaviour, many CEES have engaged in a pattern of mutual cooperation and (peaceful) competition. However, we have also seen a set of peripherally located outsiders in this chapter that still remain beyond the reach of Euro-Atlantic power and influence. The EU and NATO enlargements mean that the frontiers of both the institutions themselves and of the CEES have been redefined. Central and Eastern Europe are now the ‘frontier’ eastwards and thereby contend with a range of risks and opportunities. Among these are of course securing what is now the EU’s own external border. At the same time, these countries have had to recast their economic priorities: the countries further east are important sources of cheaper resources and especially of labour in, for example, Poland (as Poles may be to Western interests), and this process is now outside the hands of the post-communist countries and under the regulation of Brussels. It is therefore not surprising that the CEES, again particularly Poland, have advocated policies of relative openness to the east. The extent to which they can balance their own interests against those of the EU collectively in eastern policies will be an important indicator of the forces of geopolitics in an integrated Europe.

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Notes 1 Suchozka, Hanna (1993), address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. 2 Havel, Václav (1991) ‘Don’t make us Europe’s second-class citizens’, in The European, 14 June. 3 Romania, Ministry of Public Information (2002) Romania 2002, Bucharest: Ministry of Public Information, p. 486. 4 Quoted in Financial Times (2001) ‘Eastern land issue clouds EU negotiations’, 3 April. 5 Quoted in Financial Times (2001), 3 April. 6 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1994), 21 February, in FBIS, 23 February 1994. 7 International Herald Tribune (2002) ‘Interview with EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen’, 4 October. 8 See Financial Times (2001) ‘Hungary unlocks progress in EU Enlargement Talks’, 13 June. 9 Financial Times (1999) ‘Hungary plans annoy Brussels’, 3 February. 10 BTA in International Herald Tribune (1999), 20 February. 11 Quoted in Financial Times (2002) ‘Croatia to apply early in 2003 for EU entry’, 27 December. 12 Watson, op. cit. 13 Financial Times (2004) ‘Croatia’s leader realises Zagreb must confront its past before it can enjoy a future in Europe Union: Stefan Wagstyl talks to prime minister Ivo Sanader about his country’s need to co-operate with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague in order to clear the path to European Union membership in 2007’, 30 January. 14 Quoted in RFE Report on Eastern Europe (1991) ‘Further Discussions on the Future of the Federation’, 20 September. 15 For assessments of international, including EC, failures in responding to Yugoslavia’s demise see, for example, Almond (1994) and Gow (1997). 16 Financial Times (1997), 14 March. 17 Solana, Dr Javier (1999) ‘NATO: Its 50th Anniversary—The Washington Summit—The Next Century’. Online. Available at (accessed 30 June 2004). 18 For a recent summary of expellee views, see Tampke (2003). 19 RFE/RL Newsline (2001) ‘Fischer wants Czech Temelin shut down’, vol. 5, no. 137, Part II, 23 July. 20 The Times (2002) ‘Troubled past weighs heavy as Poles vote on EU’, 7 June. 21 Quoted in The Times (2002) ‘Troubled past weighs heavy as Poles vote on EU’, 7 June. 22 See The Economist (2003) ‘Slovenia and Croatia: Hey, that’s my bit of the sea’, 23 August. 23 See Financial Times (2003) ‘Croatia aims to be ready for EU membership by 2007’, 10 October. 24 Sme (1997), 17 June. 25 Sme (1997), 18 July. 26 Narodná obroda (1997), 11 September. 27 Narodná obroda (1997), 10 November; CEO (1998), 9 March. 28 The Scotsman (2002) ‘Accord will see Yugoslavia vanish from the world map’, 15 March. 29 See The Economist (2003) ‘Serbia: Cuddling up to the Americans’, 23 August. 30 See Financial Times (2000) ‘Solana delivers tough message on Belarus’, 22 July. 31 RFE/RL Newsline (2002) ‘Ukrainian parliament and public favor NATO accession efforts as President waivers’, vol. 6, no. 91, Part II, 16 May. 32 When efforts to stop Kuchma from attending the Summit in person failed, the Alliance resorted to French, its other official language, to rearrange the alphabetical ordering of official seating, so that neither the American nor British delegations sat near Kuchma.

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33 Comparison of popular and official reactions to the Kosovan war among Central and Southeast European states is given in Fawn (2001). 34 The New York Times (2003) ‘Poles cherish U.S. as friend, fondly recalling its support’, 22 February. 35 International Herald Tribune (2003) ‘East Europe rebuts Chirac’, 19 February. 36 New York Times (2003) ‘The Pentagon’s Eastern obsession’, 30 July. 37 RFE/RL Newsline (2001) ‘Hungarian foreign minister expects EU membership by 2004’, vol. 5, no. 138, Part II, 24 July. 38 Reuters (2000), 18 April. 39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2002), Joint Press Release. Online. Available at . 40 Mladá fronta Dnes (2001), 27 March. 41 Quoted on Czech Radio (2003), 13 October. 42 Integrace (2002) ‘České středoevropské zkušenosti jsou pro Evropu cenné: Rozhovor s Jiřím Dienstbierem o střední Evropě, visegradské sploupráci a její budoucnosti v Evropské unii’, October.

8 The north-east Andres Kasekamp For the purpose of the present volume, it is reasonable to lump the individual foreign and European policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into one chapter. Unlike the neighbouring Nordic countries, there has been no divergence in their strategic orientations or membership in alliances. The three Baltic states have shared a common destiny since the beginning of the Second World War. As independent states once again since 1991 their geopolitical situation has been identical as have their strategic priorities: distancing themselves from their former hegemon Russia and integrating as quickly as possible with the Euro-Atlantic pole, i.e. guaranteeing their security through membership of NATO and their well-being through membership in the European Union. As former parts of the Soviet Union, however, these states started to approach the Euro-Atlantic pole virtually from scratch. As distinct from Poland, for instance, it was by no means certain that future Euro-Atlantic enlargements would include the Baltic countries—quite to the contrary. The foreign policies of the Baltic states have been primarily conditioned by their historical experience. All three countries emphasize that they are not ‘newly independent’ states, but restored ones. The principle of restitution was central to their state-building efforts. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania came into existence as sovereign nation-states at the end of the First World War after having successfully struggled to overcome both Russian and German dominance. They enjoyed two decades of independence before being annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Non-Aggression Pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany which allocated them to the Soviet sphere of influence. During the Second World War they fell under Nazi rule before being reconquered by the USSR. Unknown to the rest of the world, guerrilla warfare raged in the forests and swamps for nearly a decade after the end of the war. Unlike the Warsaw Pact countries which maintained their sovereignty under Soviet dominance, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were eliminated from the map of Europe. Their living memories of independent statehood, democracy and market economy, together with the fact that most Western countries never formally recognized their annexation, differentiated the Baltics from other Soviet Socialist Republics. This gave them a headstart in the process of reforms initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. The public recovery of historical memory during 1987–89 rapidly served to delegitimize Soviet rule and fuelled the drive towards independence. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania spearheaded the moves towards national sovereignty which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

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The Soviet and Russian challenges The 1990s: the ghost of the past Moscow was previously the pole with which the Baltic states were completely integrated as constituent republics of the USSR. Starting from the drive to economic selfmanagement in 1987, the Baltic Republics started to reorient themselves towards the Euro-Atlantic pole. With the recognition of their independence in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, the political rupture was almost complete. The withdrawal of the last Russian troops from Baltic territory in 1994 completed the process. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s Russia claimed that former Soviet republics formed a special category of states known as the ‘near-abroad’ over which Russia still had special influence. Political reorientation came somewhat swifter than economic reorientation to the Euro-Atlantic pole. Estonia broke away from the rouble zone first, introducing its own currency in 1992, and followed with radical free market reforms, liberalization and privatization. Russia’s position as the leading trade partner was soon eclipsed by Finland and Sweden (who become EU members in 1995). The process took longest in Lithuania where the Russian financial crisis of 1998 finally forced Lithuanian producers to reorient themselves irrevocably to the EU.1 Having struggled hard to win their freedom from the Soviet Union, Balts were acutely aware of the need to preserve their newly won sovereignty. In the 1990s, military intervention by Russia making use of the pretext of ethnic conflict—unrest among the Russian-speaking settlers—in Estonia or Latvia was a possibility not to be discounted lightly. After all, Soviet troops did enter the countries and attempted to seize strategic objects in January and August 1991. The lessons of history as interpreted by Balts in the 1990s were that citizens must be prepared to defend their country against an outside aggressor. The capitulation of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian governments in 1940 to the USSR without firing a shot was seen as something disgraceful that could not be allowed to happen again. The three are determined to avoid the mistakes of the 1930s when their diplomatic isolation led to their absorption by a hostile neighbour at the outbreak of the Second World War. Neutrality had been their hope for survival in 1939, but proved to be a fatal illusion. The need to anchor themselves firmly in the West was the lesson drawn. Baltic—Russian relations remained tense in the 1990s after independence. The Russian side resorted to its tested strategy of dividing the Baltic states: applying pressure to one, while seeming to reward another for good behaviour. Mostly this meant belligerent criticism of Latvia—the obvious target of Russia’s propaganda attacks because it has the largest number of Russian settlers—while Lithuania with the fewest Russian settlers was usually singled out as the positive example. Lithuania’s relative gains have, however, been ephemeral. The oft-cited EU/NATO stability projection can be corroborated in the Baltic case: potential conflicts in the region were solved more easily owing to the EU/NATO ‘shadow of the future’. After the end of the Second World War, the Russian Federation annexed 5 per cent and 2 per cent of Estonian and Latvian territory, respectively. In the early 1990s

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Estonia and Latvia stuck to their position that Russia must restore the territory granted to them by the peace treaties with Soviet Russia in 1920. Gradually in the mid-1990s Estonia and Latvia realized that not only was maintaining this position unrealistic, but that it was detrimental to their EU and NATO hopes. The EU and NATO would not accept new members with border disputes with their neighbours. This realization led to a change in policy unilaterally renouncing their territorial claims. After the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin initiated a policy reorientation towards closer cooperation with the USA. One positive consequence was that Baltic membership in NATO became widely accepted. It deflated the tension surrounding the issue, because obviously there were suddenly much greater global problems to be faced. Though Russia has remained opposed to Baltic NATO membership, Putin stated that while NATO membership would not do any good for the Baltic states, nevertheless it would be ‘wrong’ for Russia to try to block them and that their membership would not be a ‘tragedy’ for Russia.2 Other Russian politicians, however, have continued to grumble darkly about Russian countermeasures. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the new millennium, Russian—Baltic relations remained at a standstill. Both sides were waiting for the next big moves: the decisions in 2002 regarding EU and NATO accession and actual membership in 2004. For the Balts it appeared that the only movement in the relationship would begin when Russian policymakers finally realized that integration into the structures of the Euro-Atlantic pole is irreversible. Relations with the Baltic states have remained low priority for the Russian government. No progress has been made on resolving issues, which have been on the bilateral agenda for several years, like the ratification of the border treaties, except with Lithuania where this was directly related to the resolution of the Kaliningrad visa regime problem with the EU. It was quite evident that the border treaties were linked by the Russian side to other issues, particularly the status of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. The delay in the ratification of the treaties (initialized by the Foreign Ministers several years earlier) was clearly related to the Russian desire to prevent the Baltic states from joining NATO. It was hoped that by keeping the issue open, NATO and the EU would not want to admit new members that had unresolved borders disputes with their neighbours. Though the border regime has been functioning without any significant problems for the past ten years and Baltic and Russian border guards cooperate smoothly on a daily basis, it is nevertheless difficult to see progress on bilateral relations while Russia continues to refuse to ratify this basic document of interstate relations (Tiiman 2002). Though Russia was not directly an issue in the EU referendum campaigns of 2003, both the pro-and anti-sides resorted to using the Russian card to frighten the electorate in the final days of the campaigns. The pro-EU side painted the choice starkly as being one between joining the Western world or relapsing into Moscow’s sphere of influence, while the anti-EU side drew parallels with self-serving politicians voluntarily surrendering their nation’s sovereignty and the meek capitulation of Baltic leaders to the USSR in 1940. Russia for its part, though it had strenuously opposed Baltic NATO membership, had always officially viewed their EU membership positively. That attitude, however, began to change in late 2002, evidently when Russia finally began to realize that the Baltic

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states would actually be slipping irreversibly from its sphere of influence. Russia began to accuse the EU of ignoring its own democratic criteria by admitting Estonia and Latvia. The Balts as ‘West’: new relations with Russia? EU membership will undoubtedly have an influence on the future of relations between the Baltic states and their former hegemon, Russia. Relations remained frosty throughout the 1990s with both sides refraining from making any positive overtures to the other in the run-up to the big decisions at the end of 2002. The Balts believed that their situation vis-à-vis Russia would improve only with EU and NATO membership. Bilateral relations between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with Russia will then be partly subsumed in the wider EU—Russian relationship. Russia will no longer be dealing with Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius, but with Brussels. Thus the Baltic states’ accession to the EU will also have an impact on EU-Russian relations. This became apparent in spring 2002 when an issue that had lain dormant for all these years unexpectedly exploded into the forefront of EU— Russian relations. The Kaliningrad question of course needn’t have been a surprise for anybody who looked at a map. Kaliningrad has now gained significance far beyond itself. It suddenly became the ‘test case’ for EU—Russian relations (Joenniemi 2002). The Russian oblast will soon be surrounded by the EU (and NATO) member states of Poland and Lithuania who will have to bring their regulations in line with those of the EU. The EU, however, does not want to bend its own rigid Schengen visa regime rules to accommodate Russian demands of free movement of its citizens from Kaliningrad across EU territory (Lithuania) to other parts of Russia. At the same time, Presi-dent Putin, who has otherwise pursued a policy of increased cooperation with Europe, initially took a bellicose stance on the issue. Nevertheless, in November 2002 a comprise solution was reached when Russia accepted the European Commission’s proposal for a ‘facilitated transit document’ to be issued to Kaliningraders. Lithuania was not particularly happy with the outcome, which in many respects disregarded Lithuanian interests. Nevertheless, she put on a good face because of the overriding importance of her EU aspirations.3 This is another example of EU stability projection. Though the Balts have hoped that things will automatically improve with EU membership, such as cancelling the punitive double tariffs against Estonian goods, it appears that the Russian side will not act unless it receives something in return. President Putin has declared that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia should not automatically be extended to the new EU member states. The Russian government has often used the technique of linking seemingly unrelated issues. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in January 2004 linked Baltic accession to the EU—Russia PCA with the treatment of the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia. By contrast, the European understanding of the PCA is that it applies to all member states, old and new, and it is of crucial importance from the Baltic perspective that it does, of course. The antics of the recent head of the Italian EU presidency, Silvio Berlusconi, who claimed to be Putin’s ‘advocate’ and ignored the common EU positions (by amongst other things, promising visa freedom for Russia), were not very reassuring about the resolve of some of the larger EU member states to support the interests of the new member states. Russia has always managed to circumvent or undermine common

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EU positions by developing special relations with the larger member states and their leaders, be it Berlusconi, Chirac, Schröder or Blair (Trenin 2003).

‘Return to Europe’ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, like other Central and Eastern European countries, have all employed the rhetoric of ‘return to the West’ or ‘return to Europe’. EU accession has been portrayed by the Baltic governments not just as an economic necessity but as a civilizational choice, just as NATO membership has been characterized not only as a defence alliance, but as a community of ‘shared values’. It is not surprising that Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis of the early 1990s was received enthusiastically in the Baltic states since Huntington drew his dividing line between Western and Eastern civilizations along the eastern borders of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The first major breakthrough in joining European institutions was admittance to the Council of Europe in 1993 (though Latvia was only admitted two years later because of concerns over the status of the Russian minority). Membership in the European Union, however, was not under discussion in the early 1990s immediately after the reestablishment of independence. The most pressing foreign and security policy goal was securing the withdrawal of Russian troops from Baltic territory. The EU itself only started to contemplate the possibility of eastern enlargement at the European Council in 1993 in Copenhagen where the criteria for membership were laid out. The Baltic states, however, were not on the agenda at this time. The real turning point came with the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU in January 1995. This completely transformed the geopolitical situation in northern Europe. Obviously, it made sense for the Balts to follow their neighbours. Particularly for Estonia, the impact of its two closest neighbours and friends joining had an enormous importance. For Finland and Sweden, conversely, it was in their strategic interest to eliminate instability and uncertainty in their immediate neighbourhood and bring the Baltic states into the European fold. Between October and December 1995 the Baltic states formally submitted applications to join the EU, but at the time it seemed a very distant dream indeed. Their impressive efforts of radical and rapid reforms and state-building have been motivated by a desire to be accepted by the Euro-Atlantic pole. Perhaps the main challenge for Estonia and Latvia in fulfilling the political criteria for EU membership (and also to a lesser degree for NATO membership) was the question of minority rights. The major issue of contention for the international community regarding Estonia and Latvia was the status of the Russian-speakers who had settled in those two republics during the Soviet occupation.4 The initial attitudes of the Estonian and Latvian governments were that these people were illegal colonists, whereas the international community pressurized Estonia and Latvia to give them equal status. For Estonia and Latvia demonstrating to the international community that they were actively willing to integrate the large Russian-speaking settler populations was an enormous challenge. As would-be insiders, successive Estonian and Latvian governments, however, were persuaded to make electorally unpopular decisions to relax language and citizenship laws at the urging of the Organization for Security and

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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in order to appease the Euro-Atlantic pole (Herd and Löfgren 2001). Though many at the time believed that the concessions endangered the very survival of the Estonian and Latvian nations, the goal of membership in the EU and NATO, i.e. ultimate security from Russia, was deemed a price worth paying (Jurado 2003). Recognition of their success in fulfilling the demands of the international community was confirmed by the closure of the OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia by the end of 2001. In this process, EU/NATO stability projection can be corroborated, i.e. a situation of potential conflict was diffused owing to the EU/NATO ‘shadow of the future’. The invitation to Estonia in 1997 to begin EU accession negotiations among the first wave of applicant countries came as a surprise for nearly everyone. Estonia was included into the first group because of its quicker start on free market reforms compared with the other Baltic states and also probably because of the geopolitical reasoning that including one of the Baltic states was better than none, thus sending an important signal that EU enlargement would not stop at the border of the former Soviet Union (Asmus and Nurick 1996). As the only state that was formerly part of the Soviet Union, Estonia had the weakest starting point of the first-round applicants and therefore adopted a strategy of overcoming this handicap by trying to be the best student in the class. Estonia adopted EU requirements quickly and requested very few transition periods or derogations. Estonians tried to emulate the Finns by securing a reputation in Brussels of being constructive and eager learners. This strategy paid off with Estonia annually receiving one of the most positive Progress Reports and closing negotiation chapters at a quick pace. Estonia’s inclusion in the first round was initially considered a blow to Baltic solidarity by Latvia and Lithuania, but it subsequently provided a stimulus to friendly competition between them in the race to close negotiation chapters. Estonia did everything to retain its leading position in the so-called Luxembourg group, i.e. those six countries that had been invited to begin negotiations first in 1997. The Latvians and Lithuanians, on the other hand, put immense effort into catching up with the frontrunners. By 2001 Latvia and Lithuania had caught up with Estonia, though by then it was evident that the enlargement would not follow the ‘regatta’ approach but the ‘big bang’ model whereby membership would not be limited to the countries of the Luxembourg group. All three Baltic states simultaneously concluded accession negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2002. National referendums approving the EU accession treaties were held in all three countries between May and September 2003.5 In this process, one could clearly see an aspect of parallel action (see Chapter 9): eagerness to appease the pole led to a goodwill competition, where the other candidates behave likewise and band wagoning occurs. Having witnessed the initial Estonian success in receiving a positive opinion from the European Commission, Latvia and Lithuania copied the Estonian approach and sought to catch-up and out-do Estonia. The closing of the negotiation chapters became a race with each country looking over its shoulder to see how many chapters the other countries had already managed to conclude. Only in the final few months of the negotiations (when it was clear that all would be accepted as members together) did the Baltic governments start employing rhetoric emphasizing the quality of the individual chapter agreements rather than the number that had been closed.

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The lessons that the Balts have drawn from the Nordics is that their behaviour once inside the Union should follow the example of Finland rather than that of Denmark. The Finnish positive pro-European, prointegrationist approach has won respect and influence in Brussels. Furthermore, it is commonly assumed that use of the community method rather than intergovernmentalism is the best way to protect the interests of small states. Small states generally tend to rely more on the Commission for support (Archer and Nugent 2002:8). This type of approach has been evident in the behaviour of the Baltic countries during the accession negotiations, where they have striven to play the role of best pupil in the class. The fact that the Finns are the Estonians’ closest friends and have constantly counselled Estonians on the wisdom of following the Finnish approach has undoubtedly contributed to this strategy. Recently, however, there have been signs of change in this approach. In the debates in the Convention on the Future of Europe and the IGC, the Balts, as well as other Eastern Europeans, often took positions defending intergovernmentalism and the status quo, being afraid that the draft constitution proposed by Convention President Giscard d’Estaing might lead to ‘federalism’. In particular, this echoed the positions of some current small member states such as Finland, who each want to keep a Commissioner and have misgivings about the creation of a European President and the increasing use of qualified majority voting. This favouring of intergovernmental positions also applies specifically to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), where there is a strong reluctance to countenance any further deepening (Raik 2003). Underlying this position is explicit anxiety that NATO could be weakened and the unstated fear that the old EU member states might force the Balts into some unacceptable accommodation of Russia. This is in accordance with Mouritzen and Wivel’s questioning of the proposition that non-pole powers would always be strongly committed towards the establishment and consolidation of multi-or supranational diplomacy (i.e. deepening and further institutionalization of international politics; see Chapter 2). In addition to the natural anxieties of small states, the historical experience of the Baltic countries has made them particularly wary of further integration creating more powerful EU institutions. The most common refrain of Baltic Euro-sceptics has been ‘why join a new union after having struggled so hard to achieve independence from another union’. Their recent negative experience inside the Soviet Union has made Balts more sceptical than other candidate countries regarding grand blueprints for ‘ever closer union’. It has been easy to score emotional points in the debates on EU membership by drawing superficial parallels with some of the bureaucratic excesses of the EU with the absurdities of the USSR. Indeed, of all the East European candidate countries Estonia and Latvia were the two with the lowest level of support for EU membership in the referenda held in September 2003.

The Atlantic dimension As in the EU accession process, ‘goodwill competition’ functioned in the Baltic states’ parallel bids for NATO membership. In this case, however, it was Lithuania rather than Estonia that was initially thought to have the best chance of success. One line of

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geopolitical reasoning prevalent during the period 1998–2001 was that if only one Baltic state (Estonia) was taken into the EU then another one (Lithuania) should be accepted by NATO since it was generally believed at the time that taking in all three Baltic states would be too grave an affront to Russia. The Lithuanians seemed to have the best case for NATO membership, since of the three they had the largest armed forces, didn’t have a troublesome Russian minority and had a common border with a NATO country (Poland). To demonstrate their commitment to the values of the Euro-Atlantic pole, the Baltic states eagerly took up the role of peace-keepers in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. For them, it is an important way of demonstrating that they are not simply security ‘consumers’, but also security ‘providers’ and thus can make a notable contribution. Peace-keeping has proven to be extremely popular and has helped to bolster the image of the military in the Baltic countries, which was initially quite negative in the beginning of the 1990s. Indeed, per capita, the Baltic states are among the leading providers of peacekeepers in the world. The Baltic states have striven to find opportunities to play a constructive role in disseminating the values of the Euro-Atlantic pole. One area where they have started to carve out a niche for themselves is by exporting their experience of transition and reforms to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. For example, they have initiated a programme to assist in the implementation of democratic control over the armed forces in Georgia. This sort of activity can only be expected to increase after the EU proclaimed its ‘Wider Europe—New Neighbourhood’ policy in 2003. It is clearly in the direct interest of the Baltic states to support democratic reforms in and bolster the statehood of their neighbours Belarus and Ukraine, but also the more distant Moldova and Georgia. In line with the criteria for NATO membership, the Baltic states all increased their defence spending to 2 per cent of their Gross Domestic Product by 2002. The continuing societal consensus in committing scarce resources to this area is a remarkable testament to the strength of the attraction of the Euro-Atlantic pole. The present high level of military cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is also largely a result of incentives provided by the Euro-Atlantic pole. The initial impetus to establish various joint Baltic projects came from NATO and Nordic countries. The clear message was that practising cooperation among their own three countries was necessary in order to demonstrate their readiness and maturity for participation in the defence alliance. The three countries have since developed an impressive number of joint military projects: the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET) and the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), to mention the most significant. The Balts, like the other Eastern European new member states, are strong Atlanticists. They have always viewed the USA as the only counterbalance to Russia and as the only country that could guarantee their security. The US—Baltic Partnership Charters, signed in 1998, where the US states its ‘real, profound, and enduring interest’ towards the Baltic states are valued highly (though initially it was feared that the Charter would be a substitute for NATO membership).6 Eagerness to appease and maintain the interest of the major security provider of the Euro-Atlantic pole, the United States, meant that the Baltic states were willing to bendover backward to attract US investment. At the end of the 1990s two of the largest

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privatizations or sell-offs of state-owned strategic enterprises was to US companies: the Estonian power plants at Narva to NRG Energy and the Lithuanian oil refinery at Mažeikiu to Williams International. The latter deal ended in disaster and the former was later called off at the last minute. In both cases, the governments of the day argued in favour of the sell-offs, not just in economic terms, but also in security and identity terms. Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar once claimed that having this major American investment was the equivalent in security terms of having a NATO division stationed on Estonian soil. Lithuanian President Valdus Adamkus used a similar argument to promote the ill-fated deal with Williams. In that specific case, there was also direct competition from a rival Russian bidder, which rhetorically transformed the issue into that of making a fundamental fateful choice of linking the country’s future with the West or the East. While NATO and EU enlargement proceeded in parallel, there was no conflict of interest between supporting EU and US policies. In the future, however, this is likely to change. The first warning signs came in the summer of 2002 when the US administration launched a campaign to secure bilateral agreements with partner countries excluding US troops from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Like other European countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were signatories to the Treaty establishing the ICC. The EU response to the US initiative was overwhelmingly negative and it recommended that candidate countries not sign such an agreement. This placed the EU and NATO candidate countries in an extremely awkward situation of potentially having to choose sides. The Baltic countries have tried their utmost to maintain close relationships with both the EU and the USA and it would be a nightmare scenario for them to have to choose who is their best friend. Unsurprisingly, the Baltic countries kept a low profile and said as little as possible about the ICC bilateral accords. They tried to balance between their knowledge that strict adherence to international law is the best guarantee for the security of small states and their need for US support for their NATO membership bid. They have maintained that it is an issue for the EU and the US to sort out between themselves first and have sheltered behind the EU position. In July 2003, US legislation led to the mandatory termination of military assistance for those states that had not signed an immunity accord with the US. However, in the meantime NATO membership had been secured, and therefore this move had no impact. The Iraq crisis was the first big test during which the tensions came to the surface. For the Baltic states, maintaining the unity of the Euro-Atlantic pole is of primary importance. It is the strength of the pole that can guarantee the security of the Baltic states, and weaknesses and divisions within the Euro-Atlantic pole which lessen Baltic security. Here there is a lesson from the Cold War recalled, when the USSR constantly attempted to split the US and Western Europe. Verbal exchanges between the US and the EU became particularly heated in the months immediately preceding the US attack on Iraq in March 2003. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s characterization of opponents and supporters of US policy towards Iraq as ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe, respectively, raised the ire of the opponents—not least France and Germany. In February 2003 the Eastern European candidate countries (the ‘Vilnius 10’) signed a letter supporting the US line on Iraq, angering French President Jacques Chirac, who admonished the Eastern European candidate countries that they missed ‘a good opportunity to keep quiet’.7

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The attitude of the Baltic states was perhaps put across most forcefully when Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas visiting the White House in September 2002 interrupted George Bush, saying ‘you don’t have to tell us about what happens when democracies don’t stand up against dictators’.8 Clearly, the legacy of their own history informed the Baltic understanding of the Iraq crisis. The Baltic states needed little convincing to join the American-led ‘coalition of the willing’. All three countries dispatched troops and specialists to both Afghanistan and Iraq to participate in the post-war security operations. Though their resources are meagre, they have been extremely eager to prove themselves faithful friends to the dominant power of the Euro-Atlantic pole. As then Prime Minister of Estonia Siim Kallas put it, the Balts have a moral obligation to help the US when their assistance is called upon, because the US has supported the Baltic states in the past. Or as Estonian Minister of Defence Margus Hanson stated justifying Estonia’s Iraq mission: ‘it is necessary to show that the Balts aren’t simply “security consumers”, but also can be “contributors” to global security’.9 As the editors of this volume claim, appeasing the pole and its essential member states takes up most of the would-be insiders’ diplomatic resources. The Baltic states have focused completely on accession to the EU and NATO and have not had the time or capacity to formulate policies regarding more distant parts of the world such as Africa or South America or even the Middle East. It is telling that the Baltic states proceeded in the late 1990s with setting up embassies in all of the member states of the EU and NATO. Outside of these countries plus the former Soviet bloc, however, they have only a handful of tiny embassies in a few select capitals such as Beijing and Tokyo. As for the rest of world, the Baltic states have aligned themselves with the EU Common Positions and thereby have basically ‘bought into’ a comprehensive policy for the greater part of the world. In other words, as argued in this volume, the pole’s behaviour vis-à-vis third countries is imitated or approximated.

The ‘Nordic’ pole of attraction As Mouritzen and Wivel argue, the characterization as a pole or non-pole state reflects the state’s position in a specific spatio-temporal context. They define pole and non-pole states in relational terms rather than absolute terms. From this perspective, we can see that the Nordic countries—in this case Denmark, Sweden and Finland—while being nonpole states within Europe have nevertheless proved to be a strong relational pole for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This was already the case immediately after the re-establishment of independence, when Swedish and Finnish investors were the first to demonstrate confidence in the future of the Baltic republics. Sweden and Finland’s role became even more significant after their accession to the EU in 1995. The Swedish and Finnish governments were the champions of the swift integration of the Baltic states into the EU (Karlsson and Knudsen 2001; Visuri 2001). Largely thanks to Finnish lobbying, the 1997 invitation to begin negotiations with the EU included one Baltic state rather than none at all (Arnswald and Jopp 2002:24). While the Danish government also strongly supported the inclusion of the Baltic states, as was demonstrated by the effective work of the Danish EU Presidency in

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successfully concluding accession negotiations with the candidate countries in December 2002, the Danes were the primary champions of the Baltic countries’ NATO membership aspirations. Estonia among the three Baltic states has quite consciously been positioning itself as a ‘Nordic’ country, emphasizing its links to Scandinavia and down-playing its ‘Baltic’ identity. The beginning of this shift in identity can be pinpointed quite precisely to the speeches of former Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Iives in 1999.10 He advanced the idea that Estonia belongs to the Nordic family and that the grouping of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania together as one unit is not only artificial but even detrimental to their aspirations. He noted not only the common cultural links, particularly with Finland and Sweden, but also statistics such as the number of Internet connections per capita and mobile telephone ownership as well as negative statistics signifying common behaviour such as high divorce and low birth rates. Nordic critics have pointed out that the key component of the Nordic model—the welfare state—is missing in Estonia. In fact, Estonia has pursued quite the opposite policy of privatizing as much as possible and minimizing the state’s role (Lagerspetz 2003). Certainly there is a political calculation behind this conscious identity shift: Estonia was the first of the Baltic states to receive an invitation to enter into membership negotiations with the EU in 1997. At the time it appeared that EU enlargement to Eastern Europe would happen in at least two rounds. Therefore it was important to distinguish Estonia from its southern neighbours whose progress was slower. Blocking the Baltic states together as one unit would necessarily have meant holding up Estonia until the least developed of the three states caught up. It was also important in Ilves’s view to differentiate between the former Soviet republics, and indeed to jettison the label of ‘post-Soviet’. At the same time as Estonia was pursuing its Nordic strategy, the Lithuanians were also undermining the Baltic identity by emphasizing their belonging to ‘Central Europe’ (Jurkynas 2004). Just as the Estonians could claim their cultural and historical links with Finland and Sweden, the Lithuanians could do so convincingly vis-à-vis Poland. After the NATO enlargement of 1999 to include the Central European countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, this Central European orientation became an attractive option for Lithuania. The fact that of the three Baltic countries, only Lithuania had a common border with a NATO country (Poland) was perceived as a strong geopolitical argument in Lithuania’s favour. The difficulty with these Nordic and Central European orientations were that they left Latvia alone in the middle. Latvia was the most vulnerable of the three Baltic states because of its large ethnic Russian minority and the influence of Russian business interests on its economy. It is thus no coincidence that Latvians have historically been the greatest advocates of Baltic unity. These debates, however, have now lost their immediate relevance as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will be entering both the EU and NATO together. Nevertheless, the Baltic affinity with the Nordic identity will only grow in the future. Already there are many fora where the Nordic and Baltic officials and non-governmental organizations regularly meet (the 5+3 model). It is only a matter of time before the 5+3 actually become 8 together in a single unit. Furthermore, the idea of a wider Baltic Sea region, which also includes the current and future EU states of Germany and Poland plus

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north-western Russia has gained currency during the past 15 years. Nevertheless, the relevance of its institutionalized form, the Council of Baltic Sea States (established in 1992), will almost certainly decline as a majority of the CBSS members become EU member states and more and more issues will be decided in EU fora. Together with the growing trend towards regionalism within the EU and the fact that since 1 May 2004 the Baltic Sea is practically an EU lake, the Nordic—Baltic region’s significance will undoubtedly increase with Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian EU accession. The most recent confirmation of this is that the three current Nordic EU member states’ Prime Ministers and their Baltic counterparts have begun to hold regular meetings four times a year preceding all EU summits. Significantly, there will no longer be separate Nordic EU meetings. Though they will not act as a bloc within the EU, this demonstrates a definite growing together. It is likely that this new 3+3 format will be more consequential than the 5+3. Not all coalitions, however, are based on positive strivings, but often on a desire to prevent policies from being adopted that would impact negatively on perceived national interests. For example, the Nordic and Baltic countries share positions on several issues, but for entirely different reasons. Neither want harmonization in the field of taxation and social policy and both are apprehensive about the further development of a common European Security and Defence Policy. While the Nordics are anxious that the EU will weaken their generous welfare states, the Balts are worried that the Brussels bureaucracy will impose costly and burdensome red-tape which will slow down their economic growth. While the Nordics value their neutrality, the Balts don’t want the ESDP to undermine NATO (Stålvant 2003). Within the EU there aren’t firm coalitions but shifting alliances which are formed on various issues. Since the opening of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Latvia and Estonia have in fact been closest with Ireland and the United Kingdom, as the article in the Financial Times co-authored by Tony Blair and Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts on 3 October 2003 showed.11 Here the cement in the relationship has been a common desire to liberalize the EU and increase competition while preventing harmonization of taxation and social policy and the development of an ESDP which would undermine NATO. Naturally, of course, the Balts also have much in common with the other new entrants. To a certain extent we can already observe effects of the Balts having become de facto insiders. They behaved as model students during the EU accession process, but in 2003 after having signed the Accession Treaty the Balts became more assertive in their positions. This became particularly obvious at the IGC, which sought to reach agreement on the new Constitutional Treaty (Lobjakas 2004). While having been used to being treated as objects rather than subjects of decision-making, the rhetoric of the Balts began to assert the importance of the equality of EU member states. This was reflected in the high priority given to symbolic aspects of the EU’s institutional framework such as retaining a Commissioner for every member state.

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Conclusions Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania started from a far less promising point than other Eastern European countries in their reform process but managed to exceed all expectations. By the end of the 1990s they were ahead of many of the Central European countries in their EU accession bids. How can we account for this astonishing success? The major factors were geopolitical and historical. Proximity to the Nordic countries, amongst the most stable and with the highest living standards in the world, certainly helped. Finland, Sweden and Denmark all grasped the fantastic opportunity for expanding their economic and political influence and became the champions of rapid Baltic integration into the Euro-Atlantic pole (Mouritzen 1998a: 64–79). The Baltic understanding of their fragile geopolitical position, a realization that they only had a small window of opportunity to become fully integrated into the West or lapse in the sphere of influence of Russia was a driving factor. Unlike the other Eastern European countries who maintained their sovereignty during the Cold War, they had to struggle to prove their worth to once again be fully recognized as independent countries. It should be recalled that in the first half of the 1990s when Russian troops were still stationed on their territory, their future was very much in doubt. The situation could perhaps be compared with that of Moldova or Georgia today. The Balts were keenly aware of the fact that they didn’t have the luxury of time. Baltic societies formed a remarkable consensus on the need for radical free market reforms because of the overwhelming desire for quickly distancing themselves from Russia. Unlike other Soviet Socialist Republics, they still had many citizens who remembered what life was like in a capitalist democratic system. The non-recognition policy maintained by most Western countries throughout the Cold War regarding the annexation of the Baltic states by the USSR also differentiated their status from other former Soviet Republics. Being small was also an advantage in the transition. Reforms were more manageable and easier to implement quickly. There was also a certain benefit in not having been formally independent like the Warsaw Pact countries: there were no foreign affairs or defence ministries staffed with old bureaucrats. Instead, a new, young generation with a good knowledge of English was immediately able to create structures based on Western models from scratch rather than going through the difficult process of reforming entrenched bureaucracies. The youthfulness of the leading officials and politicians in the Baltic states was truly remarkable. Even at the beginning of 2004, the Estonian government contained three ministers under 30 years of age. As a group, they were more prepared to adopt new ideas and push through radical reforms. Unlike some more geographically central candidate countries like Poland who knew that the EU and NATO would never enlarge without them, the Balts were well aware that there were plenty of political arguments for excluding them. Perhaps the most fundamental was that the boundary of the former USSR formed a ‘red line’ which shouldn’t be crossed by certain Western organizations or, in other words, that Russia continued to be accorded a special right to influence developments in the territories formerly under Soviet rule. Thus the Balts had to struggle extra hard to prove the merits of their case. In this, they benefited from the fact that more than in any previous enlargement, the EU and NATO laid down ‘objective criteria’ to measure the readiness of

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the candidate countries. This provided them with a lever or an opportunity to overcome their geopolitical handicap. The fact that they shared the same goals, but that reaching them was always in doubt until 2002, led to a ‘goodwill competition’ among the three, especially after Estonia received an invitation to open accession negotiations in 1997. This competition to best appease the Euro-Atlantic pole worked to the benefit of all and helped ensure that all three Baltic states surpassed some of the south-eastern candidate countries such as Romania and Bulgaria who initially were in a much stronger starting position.

Notes 1 By 1998, the EU had become the major external trade partner for the Baltic states. The percentage of the EU share of total imports to Estonia was 60.1, Latvia 55.3 and Lithuania 50.2. The percentage of the EU share of total exports from Estonia was 55.1 and Latvia 56.6. Only Lithuania with 38.0 was still more attached to the Russian market (though this would soon change). Figures from Arnswald (2000:78). 2 Postimees (2002) ‘Raudseset vastuseisust sai rahulik suhtumine’, 26 June. 3 Financial Times (2002) ‘Lithuania may drop support for Kaliningrad Plans’, 28 September. 4 The percentage of ethnic Estonians had declined from the end of the Second World War to 1989 from 90 to 65 per cent and ethnic Latvians from 75 to 52 per cent. The settlement of Russians and other Soviet nationalities in Lithuania was much more limited. 5 Lithuanians voted 91 per cent in favour, Estonians 66 per cent and Latvians 67 per cent. 6 Full text online. Available at (accessed 6 July 2004). 7 The Wall Street Journal Europe (2003) ‘New Europe won’t “keep quiet” until all Europe is new’, 19 February. 8 Hadley, Stephen (2002) ‘Challenge and Change for NATO’, Address by US Deputy National Security Advisor, Brussels, 3 October. Online. Available at (accessed 24 June 2004). 9 Postimees (2003), 7 August. 10 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik (1999) ‘Estonia as a Nordic Country’, Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, 14 December. Online. Available at (accessed 24 June 2004). 11 Financial Times (2003) ‘The enlarged EU must be free to compete’, 3 October.

Part III Conclusions

9 Comparative analysis meets theory Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel With the emergence of the Euro-Atlantic unipole at the end of the Cold War, the agenda changed for the European non-pole powers. Instead of choosing sides—which at least the Western part of the continent had been able to—it was now a matter of deciding how and to what extent a state should adapt to the one and only pole. Even at this point there were nuances, of course. Some states were preferably US-adaptive and some were rather EC/EU-adaptive, if the two segments disagreed. Still, in the grand perspective of the East European revolutions there was no doubt that the US and ‘Europe’ were playing for the same winning team—that of the ‘West’. In spite of other disagreements they could now work together on the project of building democracy and stability in Europe as symbolized by the parallel EU and NATO enlargements. Later, in particular during 2002–03, the unipole assumption was called into question. Bifurcation may actually be a realistic European scenario (Chapter 10). However, when dealing with the first decade, roughly, of the post-Cold War era the European states faced a Euro-Atlantic unipole. The aim of the present chapter is to synthesize, compare and add to the analyses of the country chapters (Chapters 4–8) in order to challenge the book’s theory (Chapter 2). The structure is as follows. First we clarify, why and to what extent a given country/group of countries was attracted to the Euro-Atlantic pole. Having thus understood states’ basic positioning (the constellations), we proceed to the comparative analysis of their external behaviour. This basic (voluntary) positioning now appears as a constraint on state behaviour. We analyse how the behaviour within a given constellation is conditioned not only by the requirements of this constellation, but also by alternative factors. Finally, we ask how constellations matter in the aggregate. Because of the interaction of states, the aggregate outcome may be unexpected. We focus on parallel action among sets of wouldbe insiders and analyse their behaviour compared with outsiders in order to explore to what extent the Euro-Atlantic pole projects stability. In the process of summing up our results, we compare the homogeneity of would-be insider behaviour with that of the outsiders and insiders, respectively. The chapter closes with reflections on the theoretical status of our insights, i.e. what has been learnt in relation to the theory presented in Chapter 2?

Facing a pole of attraction: the basic positioning The fundamental question why a given country is attracted to the Euro-Atlantic unipole in the first place can be answered by focusing at the general attraction radiating from the pole and the individual attraction for a particular non-pole power. The latter encompasses

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the country’s contemporary geopolitics, its past geopolitics (e.g. a past hegemon), its degree of economic or mental self-sufficiency, and its palatability to the EU/NATO. The general attraction: contiguity The unipole has been attractive to most of the European continent (see Chapter 2). The state attraction encompasses incentives like influence/prestige (joining the ‘good company’), economic prosperity (taking part in the internal market) and an ideological identification with ‘Europe’ (for some more than for others, of course). These incentives were strong, exactly because the pole was a unipole. That is to say: there were no alternatives. Of course, for regimes with identity values and societies markedly different from those of the Euro-Atlantic pole, the incentives simply did not work. However, by 2004 this only pertains to the Belorussian dictatorship, whereas Serbia—until recently trying to establish itself as a Balkan pole of its own—gradually seems to be adapting to the unipole. The original geographical core along the banks of the River Rhine (The Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s) has only recently moved slightly eastwards. This is due to geographically contiguous enlargements in all directions. Ideological or rhetorical ‘Europe’ attraction hardly wanes with distance. Nonetheless, the realism of various possible enlargements tends to converge around contiguity. Geopolitical, geo-economic and geocultural factors all support that integration is first attempted between proximate states and the tendency tends to be self-reinforcing, because candidates deemed ‘realistic’ by the unipole start behaving in a pro-pole manner and thereby become even more realistic. The integrated and integrating units are not distributed like the black squares on a checkers board; quite to the contrary. The insiders form a European core and ‘nearcore’; the would-be insiders of Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Croatia are contiguous to the crescent of newly arrived 2004 insiders, and further to the east, contiguous to Bulgaria, we find Turkey that (by 2004) is still controversial as a future EU member (see Figure 2.2). Until recently subsequent enlargements cancelled each other out geographically because of trade-offs among insiders (‘this time we take my neighbours, next time it is yours’). The tendency, however, has for some time been less than concentric. Whereas there is an agreed upon, natural barrier to the south, in the form of the Mediterranean Sea, a corresponding barrier is absent eastwards. This geopolitical circumstance is likely to cause continued battles over the identity of Europe, as the belt of aspiring outsiders or would-be insiders gradually moves eastwards. The Baltic Sea was crossed with Finnish member-ship in 1995 and followed up with the 2004 Baltic memberships. By 2005, the attraction seems to radiate as far east as the Caucasian republics. We have seen a corresponding tendency of contiguous growth regarding NATO enlargements. They are not only driven by threat perceptions, be they current or historically based. For instance, NATO has had difficulties with Austrian neutrality in the middle of Europe (Luif 2000:71), but no problem with peripheral Ireland in this regard. The underlying mechanism here is transportation in case of war (overflight, bases, etc. regarding the Kosovo war), in other words a spatial category. In the case of Austria, at least, this seems to build up to a membership pressure in order to avoid correspondingly delicate situations in the future.

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Apart from the recent West Balkan war territories and a few micro-states, the only one among Europe’s approximately 40 states that is clearly and obviously breaking with the principle of geographic contiguity is Switzerland, the European ‘hole in the middle’. This pertains both to the EU and NATO aspects of the Euro-Atlantic unipole. Since there is no reason to believe that the general attraction should be absent regarding Switzerland in particular, we shall briefly return to individual attraction factors below that may explain this anomaly. The three remaining attraction factors—that we shall now turn to—are specific to sets of countries or individual countries. They may each have a plus or minus sign in front of them. Individual attraction factors Contemporary geopolitics Incentives pertaining to a state’s influence/autonomy or territory belong to this category. This does not necessarily mean that the state is involved in war or exposed to threats thereof. Contemporary geopolitics is at stake in most (but not all) states’ pole attraction. Specific geopolitical incentives (strategies) behind Euro-Atlantic integration include: • Balancing, e.g. ‘pick your friends at a distance’. This means, in practice, that the UK and US offshore powers are perceived by non-pole powers as balancing the continental great powers (dependency spreading). • Einbindung. Binding means integrating one or more great powers into a multilateral norm system and an intricate web of commitments (the EU, NATO). Hereby the relevant (smaller) neighbour hopes to avoid bilateral dependency on the great power (or great power condominium) in question.1 • Extra carrots. In addition to the general Euro-Atlantic attraction, a country may be tailored to receiving EU CAP or structural funds. Also economic gains through the leasing of base rights to the US/NATO count in this category (to bandwagon for profit, Schweller 1994). Past geopolitics The effect of past geopolitics may be difficult—and unnecessary—to disentangle from that of contemporary geopolitics if the two are roughly similar. However, if they are markedly different, the effects of past geopolitics on a country’s political culture may, in turn, restrict present-day decision-makers and impede their implementation of contemporary geopolitical imperatives. In particular the existence of a past hegemon (‘the ghost(s) of the past’) is important, due to its often durable—sometimes traumatic— imprints on the everyday lives of people in minor powers. If the hegemon is seen as somehow affiliated with—or even part of—the current unipole, the unipole’s attraction will naturally diminish (Wallace 1999). Conversely, if no such affiliation is at stake, unipole attraction may increase. It may be seen as a bulwark against any future threats from the hegemon.

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Societal self-sufficiency This is a minus factor, referring to a reluctant integration attitude based on one’s possession of specific raw materials, for instance, or corresponding assets that one does not necessarily wish to share. A mental self-sufficiency may be grounded, for instance, in one’s specific societal model that is seen as threatened by far-reaching integration. Also nationalism, typically sedimented in the political culture owing to past geopolitics, may be at stake. Palatability to the EU/NATO This is the other side of the coin, namely whether the established EU/NATO insiders regard a state as palatable for membership (e.g. Wiberg 1996a: 48–52). For the EU, this was operationalized in the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ requiring stable democracies, capitalist economies, human rights’ respect, peaceful resolution of conflicts, etc. Additionally, there may be controversial ‘off the record’ criteria like a Christian (i.e. nonMuslim) political culture, for instance.

Individual pole attractions By adding the various factors of pole attraction, we should now, in principle for each state, be able to understand why and to what extent it has been attracted to the EuroAtlantic pole in the post-Cold War era (see Figure 9.1). For ease of reference and clarity, however, we stick to the same clusters of countries that have structured the chapters of Part II. Where necessary we point to the deviations at stake within each group. Close to the pole powers, the Benelux countries have continued as core insiders and reliable integrationists. Their geopolitical past as ‘in between’ the former enemies—and current pole powers—Germany and France and their status as EC founding fathers have been strong common denominators supporting this position. The Dutch—Belgian difference as to Atlanticism can be ascribed to Dutch geopolitics, invalid in the Belgian case owing to its Wallonian ‘French connection’.2 Balancing a possible French—German hegemony is carried out in two ways: first, staunch support for a strong EU, meaning in practice a strong Commission with Einbindung capacity; and second, support for as much involvement as possible of the UK/US (NATO) in high politics European affairs, where Commission influence is unrealistic. In other words, the Netherlands eagerly supports both Euro-Atlantic ‘sub-poles’—the EU and the Atlantic segment. In practice, the power of the potential hegemons has been rather diluted.

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Figure 9.1 Net attractions: non-pole powers’ constellation climbings after the Cold War (2005). Notes IS: Iceland; NO: Norway; CH: Schweiz; DK: Denmark; IE: Ireland; FI: Finland; SE: Sweden; EE: Estonia; LV: Latvia: LT: Lithuania; BE: Belgium; NL: Nederland; LU: Luxembourg; AT: Austria; CZ: Czech; HU: Hungary; PL: Poland; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; BG: Bulgaria; HR: Croatia; RO: Romania; GR: Greece; IT: Italy; PT: Portugal; ES: Spain; AL: Albanien; BY: Belarus; BA: Bosnia; AM: Armenia; GE: Georgia; AZ: Azerbaijan; MD: Moldova; CS: Serbia; UA: Ukraine; CY: Cyprus; MT: Malta; MK: Macedonia; TR: Turkey (Countrycodes: ISO-2).

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For Cold War reasons, Austria (with its ‘German connection’) was an exception compared with the Benelux countries. With Cold War restrictions loosening, Austria moved during the era from being an outsider to a near-core insider. However, neither past geopolitics (neutrality), nor the absence of a threat in the post-Cold War era, were convincing arguments for Austrian NATO membership. The unique terrain of Switzerland, unsuited as it is for traditional military action and thereby the great powers’ physical power projection, has put the country beyond geopolitical calculations in modern times. This has enabled it to remain credibly outside great power conflicts (‘permanent neutrality’ since 1815) and reap the commercial and other benefits from this position. Moreover, given the Swiss linguistic and religious heterogeneity, neutrality was probably the only course that could preserve the country’s unity (Gabriel 2003). Neutrality, in turn, has been seen as excluding membership of the most important international organizations.3 To the north, we see a ‘Europe’ reluctant, though also diversified. The common denominator is a societal self-sufficiency, because all Nordic countries have historically created welfare societies on their own (the ‘Nordic model’). Also, they constitute a century-old mutual security community, making them less impressed by the EC accomplishments in this regard. In addition, there are country-specific status quo advantages: the Norwegian and Icelandic fishing riches and, particularly in the Norwegian case, massive supplies of oil and gas. These factors have caused Norway and Iceland to remain EU outsiders. As a Cold War legacy, however, they are NATO members and solid Atlanticists. There are obvious economic benefits for Iceland in keeping Keflavik as a major US base. The general unipole attraction was strong enough to push Sweden over the EU threshold, but hardly more than that. The ‘Swedish model’ legacy combined with her current net contributor status has kept Sweden low profile. Neither past geopolitics (neutrality), nor the absence of a threat in the post-Cold War era, have been effective arguments for NATO membership. Turning to the two remaining Nordic countries, Denmark and Finland have learnt inverse geopolitical lessons owing to different positions of their past hegemons (‘ghosts of the past’): Germany being ‘EU establishment’ and Russia being far outside. This has made Denmark EU reluctant4 and Finland the opposite. Denmark shares the Dutch calculation as far as the need for Anglo-American counterweight is concerned—in the Danish case vis-à-vis EU deepening and specifically vis-à-vis bilateral dependency on Germany. The countries to the south were the least affected by the end of the Cold War. Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece had already acquired both NATO and EC memberships. The Greek—Turkish conflict seemed, initially, to be unaffected. With favourable structural funding (along with Ireland), the ‘south’ had something to lose by the EU entry of ‘poor’ East Europeans, moving the EU centre of gravity north-east. They were therefore status quo oriented and reluctant vis-à-vis the eastern (and northern) enlargement. The Maltese and Cypriot EU memberships were among their compensations. This latter issue seems to be part of a greater package that has so far entailed Greek—Turkish détente and the established NATO member Turkey becoming an EU would-be insider. Its EU palatability is, however, still controversial among current insiders.

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The countries to the east all started from outsider positions at the end of the Cold War, and some of them ended as core insiders by 2004. In other words, pole attraction was at a maximum. This is understandable from the individual attraction factors pointed out above. The new democracies’ societal self-sufficiencies were negligible, since they almost started from scratch. They were willing to learn from the ‘West’ in all respects of state building and the building of civil societies. Their eastern hegemon of the past had made such a durable impression that they strived for unconditional membership of any ‘Western’ institution, most importantly the EU and NATO. Although their patience with political and bureaucratic requirements has been tried hard, most of them seem to succeed, in the last resort, in their membership strivings. Whereas NATO membership has materialized for Romania and Bulgaria, EU membership has not yet been safeguarded for these two states, being currently would-be insiders scheduled for membership by 2007. This analysis applies as well to the north-east, i.e. the Baltic countries. Except that they started even without independent statehoods and with exSoviet forces in their territories. Not only past, but also present geopolitics were at stake for Estonia and Latvia, in particular, with conflict issues in relation to Russia (that had to be solved as a consequence of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’). In the process, they managed not only to overcome their geopolitical handicaps by crossing the ‘red line’ of the former Soviet empire, but also overtook Bulgaria and Romania and even their own catalysts in the process, the Nordic countries, when they became Euro-Atlantic core insiders in 2004.

Theoretical expectations We have seen how European states climbed to—or remained in—various Euro-Atlantic constellations in the course of the first 15 post-Cold War years. Geographical contiguity and to some extent a concentric logic were crucial dynamics in this process. For each state its past and present geopolitics, its degree of self-sufficiency and its EU palatability determined which constellation it ended up in. In Chapter 2, we formulated and justified four propositions about the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers in each constellation: 1 Outsiders experience variable influence-capability and relatively high autonomy. External behaviour is heterogeneous, although passivity is a not-too-infrequent option. 2 Would-be insiders must live with low influence-capability as well as low autonomy. The predominant external behaviour is bandwagoning vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic pole. 3 Near-core insiders have chosen lower influence-capability in order to safeguard higher autonomy, compared with the core insiders. External behaviour is balancing vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic pole, with a low profile in selected areas. 4 Core insiders enjoy high influence-capability at the expense of curtailed autonomy. External behaviour is heterogeneous as to substance; the level of activity is one of high intensity. The essence of these propositions will be challenged below. Note that influencecapability and autonomy are theoretical justifications for the expected behaviour that we observe. They are not in themselves objects of observation.

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Our analysis pertains in particular to proposition 2 above. Would-be insiders seem to be the states most clearly characterized by a distinguishable behaviour given the obvious constraints they are subject to. Moreover, with the many new democracies striving for membership, the would-be insider constellation has been of crucial interest in post-Cold War Europe. However, synchronic and diachronic comparisons enable us to use the other constellations as ‘control groups’ and thereby relate to the remaining propositions. For instance, it is theoretically crucial, whether bandwagoning starts with would-be insider status and ends with the winning of an insider position—or whether it is a more enduring behaviour unrelated to constellation. As a subset of this, it is important whether successful stability projection is delimited to would-be insiders or it is a more general phenomenon (proposition 2a below).

European cross-cuts: behavioural patterns This section’s analysis is synchronic (cross-cutting), i.e. we compare the (external) behaviour of different units (here states) in relation to the same stimulus. The aim is to evaluate if there is an overall pattern in states’ behaviour that can be derived from their constellation (outsider, would-be insider, near-core insider or insider) and if not, which alternative factors are involved. We carry out a series of synchronic comparisons. Each of them typically represents a dramatic event where states are forced to go beyond their normal vague rhetoric and signal their positioning in a more committing manner. The series covers the post-Cold War era, roughly. The first cross-cut refers to the very transition phase between bipolarity and Euro-Atlantic unipolarity. Recognition of the Baltic countries The unsuccessful communist coup in late August 1991 was the critical event that precipitated the Baltic countries regaining independencies from the Soviet Union (e.g. Palk 2004). These independencies quickly led to further secessions and soon to a disintegration of the whole Union. European bipolarity had disappeared already with the dramatic events during 1989: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the East European revolutions—although no new polarity had crystallized. It became obvious during this chain of events that Moscow was no longer willing to use military force to safeguard the socialist regimes in its orbit. However, the ‘Red Army’, although withdrawing from one country after another, was still a significant non-Western military force in the continent. In any case, it was still master of its own house. Also, there was the possibility that ‘reactionary’ forces might take over in the Soviet Union and try to reverse the whole development. That was exactly what happened on 19 August 1991. The coup, however, quickly failed and set in motion the whole Union disintegration. The Soviet pole melted down, and Euro-Atlantic polarity was now definitely prevailing. However, during these dramatic days polarity was in a state of flux. It is not obvious which states belonged to which constellation. Regarding the Baltic states’ claim to be internationally recognized, no potential pole segment like the US or the EC had so far tried to play a leading role. On the contrary,

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they chose to lie low. Still staking on USSR President Gorbachev, they had encouraged Lithuania, the frontrunner, to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union. Iceland with her Nordic affiliation, liberation from Denmark as late as 1944, and a protected location far from any Soviet orbit had been first to recognize Lithuania by March 1990 (although this was seen as mere demonstration policy at the time). During the August coup Denmark, having heightened her profile in correspondence with Red Army withdrawals to her south-east from 1988, took the lead together with Iceland by sending an ambassador to Riga and reinstalling diplomatic relations with all three Baltic countries—a bit out of tune with diplomatic practice, since none of the three were physical masters in their own house (although democratically mandated). This act was followed within days by recognitions from Norway, Sweden and Finland (the so-called Nordic ‘bicycle race’), as well as from Hungary, Poland and Ireland.5 As her last act of ‘Finlandization’, Finland avoided in her official statements during the coup to call it a ‘coup’ (instead ‘events taking place in the Soviet Union’)—before slipping out of the Soviet soft sphere of influence. Finland and Sweden with their many (low politics) ties to the Baltic countries were pushed by public opinion to follow the Danish lead, even though they were in a (high politics) dilemma in relation to the Soviet Union. Yeltsin (Russia), however, who saw a chance to give Gorbachev (the Soviet Union) his final blow, came in-between by recognizing the Baltic countries. This facilitated the Finnish decision, in particular. Recognitions from the US came on 2 September, i.e. about a week after the first wave of recognitions. Moreover, as should appear, there was no such thing as a common EC recognition. What we can see in the situation is, hence, that non-pole powers adjacent to the Baltic countries acted on their own. With the prevailing flux in the European power structure, states acted on the basis of raw geopolitics—their distances to the Baltic countries and the Soviet Union, respectively. This could be summarized as ‘twin distance’ concerns (Mouritzen 1998a: 64–79, in particular 65–7). Before the breakdown of the Soviet Union lay in the cards, Sweden and Finland, in particular, were in a dilemma between two sets of neighbourhoods: the one to the hypothetically future Baltic states—and the contemporary one to the Soviet Union. The pattern of non-pole initiation partly repeated itself in connection with the wouldbe Baltic memberships of the EU and NATO. Within the EU, Denmark and Sweden played the role of Baltic advocates, whereas Finland supported adjacent Estonia, in particular. Iceland and Denmark were the only advocates in NATO for Baltic memberships, until the Baltic caucus in Congress made the US turn around. Indifference or resistance prevailed among the European great powers—until they finally acquiesced to the US position. Recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia The recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia at the inception of the Yugoslav civil war took place immediately after Euro-Atlantic unipolarity was established. Moreover, the war was a conflict at the EC’s geopolitical ‘doorstep’. In spite of these two circumstances, however, it turned out that the EC/EU—without US military assistance—had problems in influencing events, to say the least. Military intervention—strongly resisted by the UK— in the form of peace-keeping forces were considered prior to the outbreak of hostilities

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and shortly thereafter (e.g. Salmon 1992). The EC had vast economic sanctions at its disposal owing to the (geo-economically derived) fact that 50 per cent of Yugoslav trade took place with the EC. Sanctions were put into effect from November 1991. Also, the EC had the decisive diplomatic sanction against Yugoslavia/Serbia to recognize the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia—provided that member states could agree. At first, however, the EC (formally the WEU) acted as an ‘honest broker’ that sent monitors to the area and established a peace conference in The Hague in September 1991. With hostilities continuing, the question of recognition came more and more in focus. It thereby became increasingly questionable whether the EC could act coherently or be an actor in the first place. On 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Germany soon decided in favour of recognition of the two republics. Along with the Austrian would-be insider, Germany supported the republics for historical and cultural reasons (e.g. Roman Catholicism) mediated through public opinion. Most other EC states felt that recognition would be premature in relation to normal diplomatic practice (pace the recent Baltic recognitions) and would pour petrol on the fire. Also, it would lead the recognized republics to press for military assistance, and it would as a minimum require the establishment of minority rights throughout exYugoslavia. Since the unitary acting of the EC was still an essential priority also for Germany, the compromise amounted to postponing the decision for some months. After much pulling and hauling, the Foreign Ministers on 17 December agreed on criteria for recognition (including minority rights). Republics that passed these tests as determined by the Badinter Commission would be recognized by 15 January 1992. However, by 23 December the German President recognized the republics in formal letters to their governments to the discomfort of most EC partners. Although the report in early January cast serious doubt on the fulfilment of the criteria, the EC recognized the two republics on 15 January. It is arguable that the Maastricht Treaty negotiations during the autumn of 1991 and the almost federalist expectations prevailing in Europe at the time played a role for the virtual acquiescence to the German line. A publicly divided EC would have been disastrous for the whole treaty project, not least in view of the less-than-convincing EC role during the Gulf Conflict 1990–91 and in connection with the Baltic recognitions. Turning to the would-be insiders, Austria was less balanced in relation to the emerging civil war than the EC during its ‘neutral’ phase (Luif 1995:269). In particular, Austria wished to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as soon as their independence had been declared. However, chiefly in view of negative press comments from Paris and London, and with regard to its striving for EC membership, Austria waited and recognized Slovenia and Croatia only in company with the EC. The would-be insiders to the north, Sweden and Finland, recognized Slovenia and Croatia a few days after the EC. In other words, all three would-be insiders adapted to the EC: Austria by waiting and the two northerners by hurrying. It is highly questionable, when (or whether) their recognitions would have been forthcoming in the absence of the EC decision. In contrast, the outsiders apparently acted wholly on their own impulse. The Czech Republic together with the recently recognized Baltic republics and the Ukraine extended recognitions to Slovenia and Croatia even before the EC had made its controversial decision (Fawn and Mayall 1996). Other outsiders, like Poland, waited.

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The Chechen conflict The Chechen conflict has been of limited importance to major Euro-Atlantic powers. As in connection with the recognitions of the Baltic countries, the relationship with Russia and, hence, raw geopolitics unrelated to the Euro-Atlantic unipolarity seems to be decisive for their policy. Accordingly, the Russian human rights violations in Muslim Chechnya 1995–96 and 1999–2000 did not lead to a set of clear pole prescriptions. Prevailing Western powers—as well as Islamic and Third World countries—proclaimed the conflict an ‘internal Russian affair’ (Cornell 1999). Neither the US Clinton Administration nor the Bush Administration threatened to put conditionality on economic aid to Russia, although Congress repeatedly advocated this. The events of 9/11 only served to sharpen an image of a common US—Russian enemy and thus improve the ground for a partnership in the fight against Islamic terrorism’ (Malashenko 2003). The EU countries adopted a tougher stance. Although affirming that Chechnya was a part of Russia, the criticisms of human rights violations have been substantially stronger (Cornell 1999). The strongest reactions have come from states around the Baltic Sea covering all constellations from near-core insiders to would-be insiders to outsiders at the time, advocating sanctions against Russia to different extents. The Estonian Parliament recommended its government to recognize Chechnya ‘at the earliest opportunity and as soon as the international situation permits’ (13 February 1995). This led to a harsh Russian reaction, but no Estonian government follow-up. Public conferences with the presence of Chechen government representatives have been permitted in Poland and Denmark, and a Chechen Information Office’ has been opened in Warsaw. Turning to a hypothetical would-be insider—the Muslim NATO-member Turkey— popular opinion and Caucasian minorities in Turkey have been strongly in favour of recognition of Chechnya and supplying arms to the Chechens. Russia, however, has hinted continuously at its ability to retaliate by supporting the Kurds and PKK in Turkey. It seems that the Turkish posture on this issue has been constellation independent, i.e. unrelated to both its precarious EU relation and its NATO membership. Terrorism in Turkey during 2003 may have pushed Turkey away from taking a clear stand. Despite being a Muslim state, the Western enemy Iran has supported Russia based on the common geopolitical interest in limiting Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Cornell 1999:92). The marked caution of prevailing Euro-Atlantic pole powers was based on a wish not (further) to inflame Russian nationalism, in a period when the dual NATO enlargements and the Kosovo war provided enough fuel for this. After 9/11 the Russian turn-around to support the US/Western war against terrorism further exacerbated this view. This posture, however, did not inhibit would-be insiders like the Baltic states and Poland from criticizing Russia (also affected by past geopolitics, probably). The Kosovo war After tough diplomatic pressure proved to be in vain, NATO attacked Yugoslavia (Serbia) by air strikes in March 1999 in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophy in Kosovo (the ‘Kosovo war’). We observe remarkably similar unipole bandwagoning among states in the war neighbourhood in relation to this unusual operation (Fawn 2001). For three of them, it involved relations to an immediate neighbour and for all of them, to

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different degrees, a cultural and political ally. They were all Euro-Atlantic would-be insiders, though in different phases: the new NATO members, close to the EU (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and those hoping soon to become NATO members (Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania; Slovakia being closer to the EU than the two others). The new NATO members had just signed the NATO Charter (12 March 1999). For all of them this crisis came to be seen as an early alliance credibility test. Hungary decided to open its airspace to NATO planes as well as airports and bases, in spite of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina (Serbia). Poland sent forces to Kosovo in the wake of the crisis. The Czech case was partly an anomaly, however, in that the government was publicly divided. Only belatedly, the cabinet consented to NATO military overflights. During the crisis a Czech—Greek peace proposal was formulated that did not request full Serb withdrawal from Kosovo as a condition for the suspension of bombings. The new NATO candidates Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania—until 1998, 1997 and 1996 ruled by nationalist or leftist forces—seized this opportunity to show their prointegration state of mind. Although disappointed not to be included in the first round of enlargement, they opened their airspaces as well as airports and bases to NATO forces. Slovakia was/is strategically valuable (Zemko 2002), being the only north/south transport corridor in Europe (neutral Switzerland, neutral Austria and pro-Russian Ukraine blocking the alternatives). In spite of a Slovak minority in Vojvodina, Slovakia actually functioned as air and rail corridor during the conflict. The previous leader, Meciar, and his nationalist party criticized the war support as a precedent for a future Hungarian minority uprising in Slovakia. Bulgaria was a least-likely case for NATO support, given its cultural and religious links to Russia/Serbia. Fifteen per cent of Bulgarian trade was lost, as the Danube was blocked. Still, Bulgaria demonstrated its support for NATO/EU. Romania was likewise a nationalist outsider during the first six years of the 1990s. Analogously to Meciar, the former President Iliescu warned that the Hungarian minority in Romania might take advantage of the Kosovo precedent. As an apparent provocation, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania denied transit rights (and air space) to Russian forces—an impartial and mandated peace-keeping mission. There were also restrictions on transit of fuels from Russia to Yugoslavia (formulated with thinly veiled pleasure). Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania were a priori least-likely cases for supporting NATO during the conflict. Public opinion was overruled, however, as were considerations regarding trade and other neighbourly repercussions. For all three, NATO bandwagoning should assist their overall foreign policy goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. The reward— membership of NATO (and perhaps later the EU)—was by far their no. 1 priority. It was potentially deceptive, however, since no timetable was attached at the time. Nonetheless, as we now know, NATO membership eventually materialized with the Prague decision of November 2002. The CIS states were all Euro-Atlantic outsiders. They displayed much more heterogeneous behaviour than the states in Yugoslavia’s neighbourhood. There was no common stand from the CIS summit of 2 April. There were reactions all over the spectrum from extreme Serbia support to NATO support. Whereas Belarus expressed whole-hearted support for Serbia, Moldova and the Ukraine appeared as ‘neutral’ or ‘balanced’. ‘I shall not permit the isolation of the Ukraine’, as expressed by President

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Kuchma (i.e. in relation to NATO/EU). Azerbaijan was probably the most pro-NATO among the CIS; she would like to join NATO as a fully fledged member. From Armenia, by contrast, support for NATO was muted. With great domestic Serb/Russia sympathies (the shadow of the past), Armenia must also consider relations to Russia/Serbia. Georgia, with a pro-NATO population, found justification for the NATO action; seeking membership in NATO was unexpectedly declared as a future possibility. What was judged to be of primary importance in all cases was the possible Kosovo precedence in relation to their own territorial integrities: for Moldova, the parallel to Transdniester was crucial; for the Ukraine the parallel to Crimea; for Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, and for Georgia to Abkhazia. In all cases, the state saw the international support for the Albanians as a precedent that might threaten their own territorial integrity. They therefore chose sides not least on this basis. The main key to the differences, however, seems to have been whether the states were aspiring or resigned outsiders. The former aspired, in spite of difficult odds, towards Western integration in the (very) long run. An accommodating attitude regarding Kosovo was seen as important in this respect. Examples were, as we saw, Azerbaijan and Georgia and perhaps Ukraine (Cummings 2001).6

Approaching the EU: how is behaviour affected? We now turn to diachronic comparison, but in relation to the same theoretical expectations. This means that we follow one unit (here state) over a time-span and compare its behaviour with its own previous or subsequent behaviour. As a would-be insider, a state has to live with unintended constraints on its behaviour, limiting its autonomy (action space). Our expectations have been illustrated in Figure 9.2, a simplification of Figure 2.4 (in which also the states’ expected influence-capability was depicted). By climbing from outsider to insider, a number of countries have experienced the would-be insider constellation for half a decade or more (see Figure 9.1). Below some particularly well-suited constellation climbers, who have solid experience from at least three distinct constellations, have been selected. The advantage regarding Sweden, Finland and Austria is that they have had reasonable time as EU insiders (since 1995) to make an interpretation possible regarding this phase. The advantage regarding our fourth case, Slovakia, is that this country has experienced a distinct outsider period after already having been a would-be insider for some years. Of course, the short insider period from May 2004 is a handicap. Still, even if Slovakia did not attain formal membership until then, it enjoyed a de facto insider status since December 2002 (the Copenhagen summit).

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Figure 9.2 States’ action space in various constellations. Sweden The EC internal market plans involving effective external protectionism constituted a serious threat to all the EFTA economies, including that of Sweden (approximately 65 per cent of EFTA non-mutual trade went to the EC). The ensuing asymmetric negotiations for a ‘European Economic Area’ implied that the EC internal market should be extended to encompass the whole EFTA area as well (Wise and Gibb 1993: Chapter 8). However, the EFTA states were offered no influence on the designing of the market rules and standards. This was a privilege reserved for EC members. Still, the alternative of staying outside was even worse: exports to the internal market would be seriously reduced, and key industries in the case of Sweden had already threatened to leave for the EC. With such an unattractive waiting room, the neutrality restrictions that had previously prevented Swedish EC membership came to be seen as an unnecessary liability. Moreover, as the European balance of power shifted in disfavour of the East in the course of 1989–90, Sweden bandwagoned with the West by loosening its interpretation of neutrality sufficiently to allow for EC membership. The intention of applying for membership was made public in October 1990. Even though Sweden had won autonomy (‘security’) with these European developments, it had simultaneously lost influence by no longer being able to play the role as bridge-builder between East and West or ‘world conscience’, notably during the Oluf Palme era. By becoming part of the ‘good European company’ Sweden could—at least to some extent—avoid the peripheral status resulting from the collapse of bipolarity. Before obtaining membership, however, Sweden had to adapt continuously to the preferences of major EC capitals to qualify as a good European. In regard to general foreign policy, the Swedish Foreign Minister declared that he could have voted for the

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EC statement on the Soviet coup and disintegration in August 1991 had he had the opportunity. Such a declaration on a hypothetical situation—and a hypothetical commitment—is rare in international diplomacy. Since the late 1980s, the EC Commission had started examining more closely the UN voting behaviour of applicant countries. Maybe for this reason the EFT A applicant countries approached the EU countries in their UN voting behaviour (Luif 1995: Chapter 11). Sweden closely followed the EC lead on Yugoslav disintegration when it came to recognition of new states such as Slovenia and Croatia. Regarding Macedonia, the EC had been prevented from recognizing this state under its preferred name by a Greek veto. Therefore Sweden followed the line of non-recognition, even though this was inconsistent with the Swedish recognitions of other states in the region. However, consistency was less crucial than the wish not to alienate Athens. Southerners should not be offered pretexts for postponing or even blocking a northern enlargement. Regarding direct EU relations, the same pattern was discernible. During the EEA negotiations the EFTA countries were almost blackmailed to contribute to the EC cohesion fund for the benefit of southern EC members and Ireland (but were denied influence over the use of the contribution). In other words, developed nations in one trading bloc contributed to the cohesion in a competing trading bloc of almost equally developed states (Wise and Gibb 1993:273). In the European currency crisis during September and October 1992, the welfare burden of adaptation was laid on Swedish society itself, as witnessed by the fairly dramatic ‘crisis package’ that was agreed between government and opposition instead of exporting Swedish economic problems by way of a devaluation of the Swedish crown (although in the end it was forced into devaluation). As interpreted also by foreign observers,7 this slightly masochistic behaviour aimed to safeguard Swedish goodwill in general vis-à-vis the EU, but in particular it signalled the kind of monetary credibility that might make Sweden belong to the future core group of a European Union. In order to mitigate fears of a Nordic caucus in the EU, Nordicity rhetoric was banned. Sweden portrayed itself as a European ‘Musterknabe’. Instead of teaching a ‘Swedish’ or ‘Nordic’ model of society and being world conscience, Sweden should now eliminate its goodwill deficit in European capitals (since the Palme era) by being a student in the European integration class—and preferably the best! Of course, the Danish opt-outs (1993), most importantly on defence policy and the common currency, tempted Sweden and to some extent Finland to try to obtain similar permanent arrangements. However, Sweden could not afford the slightest support for the Danish arrangement, even though it was in perfect harmony with traditional Swedish neutrality (strongly internalized in the political culture) and reluctance vis-à-vis a common currency. With Nordic habits of mutual imitation, it was difficult for the Swedish—and Finnish—government to convince the Swedes/Finns that what was good enough for ‘continental’ Denmark after 20 years of EC membership should not suffice for the other Nordic newcomers. The previously positive EU opinion polls—i.e. regarding a clear-cut membership—in both Sweden and Finland were negatively affected by the ‘Danish solution’ (Mouritzen 1993:383–4). The Danish halfway house did appeal to many pragmatically oriented politicians. However, Sweden as a would-be insider had to behave like a paragon of virtue, a ‘Musterknabe’ (‘we follow a policy with a clear European identity’, as expressed by Prime Minister Bildt). Denmark as an insider could afford to be the ‘naughty boy’ in the European

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integration class and demand special conditions for itself. Paradoxically, the luxury of integration reluctance can only be enjoyed by those already integrated. As a would-be insider, the parameters of the unipolar power structure were stronger for Sweden than domestic factors or historical experience (the neutrality tradition). The action space was extremely narrow. One might object that the fact that Sweden did hold a membership referendum bears witness that domestic factors were allowed to exert an influence after all. But in the Swedish case, a referendum would have been unavoidable regarding the constitutional revisions that were necessary for membership—meaning in practice an EU referendum. After membership was attained with a narrow electoral margin and Sweden became a significant net contributor, membership justification became a persistent government concern. The Social Democratic government therefore reformulated the Swedish model of society and sought to introduce it in the EU context (the ‘EU can join Sweden’, as the joke went). This was not in the form of a grand societal design as previously, but as a more technical model of piecemeal social engineering (although sometimes in the traditional messianic style!). It succeeded reasonably regarding such issues as EU openness (transparency), environment, egalitarianism and enlargement, and may succeed on feminism and asylum/immigration policy in the future. Swedish idealism and internationalist principles were advocated within the framework of the ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’; it has been more important for Sweden than for other non-pole powers to emphasize during the Constitutional Treaty negotiations that no ‘common foreign policy’ view should be forced upon any country.8 Furthermore, Sweden has—like Denmark—tried to link the EU to the popular Baltic Sea project (Miles 2002a), although with limited success. Also, the Nordic rhetoric and pragmatic cooperation that was downplayed during and immediately after accession seems to have been somewhat reprioritized after membership. With euro-, and in particular EMU, scepticism in the electorate, the Swedish government chose to have a referendum on participation in the third phase of the EMU. The Danish EMU ‘no’ in September 2000 had postponed the Swedish time schedule considerably in this regard. Nonetheless, the government was massively defeated, when the referendum was eventually held in September 2003. Sweden fits our expectations. As a would-be insider, Sweden accepted severe constraints on its foreign policy. As an insider, with improved action space and influencecapability, it has tried to export the so-called Swedish model to the greater Community. In this sense, Sweden is an idealist innovator type as seen from the Community angle, but the combination of this propensity with popular reluctance has not been the most effective mixture for the export effort. Finland The Swedish imperative in Finnish trade policy—never to be left out of export markets in Western Europe that the rivalling Swedish industry (wood and wooden products) had access to (Väyrynen 1993)—seemed increasingly difficult to fulfil as Sweden approached the EC. Whereas Finland was willing to follow Sweden into the EEA, EC membership was excluded owing to the Soviet imperative of good neighbourly relations. The Finnish economic crisis was exacerbated by the simultaneous decline of exports to the Soviet

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Union. It was an unpleasant interregnum from when the Swedish intent to join the EC became clear until the Soviet ‘connection’ could be disregarded, as the Soviet Union started to disintegrate in late August 2001. Finland could now bandwagon with the West in high politics as well. Finland regarded it essential not to allow the southern European member states a pretext for postponing the northern enlargement, and, generally, Finnish foreign policy now followed the EU lead. With the exception of the decision to float the Finnish currency in September 1992, which was deplored by the Commission, and was not preceded by the same efforts to bear the costs of the economic crisis as in the Swedish case, Finland acted as a European ‘Musterknabe’. As already mentioned, the EFTA applicant countries approached the EU countries in their UN voting behaviour (Luif 1995: Chapter 11). Finland, in particular, revised a good deal of its previous ‘good neighbourly relations’ voting. Like the other EEA members, Finland had to support the EC cohesion fund. Like Sweden, Finland followed both the timing and the substance of the EC recognition policy in the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1993 Finland—like the EC—expressed its solidarity with Yeltsin in his struggle with parliamentary chairman Khasbulatov of the ‘old guard’—hence interfering in Russian internal affairs, a Finnish policy choice without precedence. Influential Finnish politicians were tempted by a Danish ‘arrangement’ in 1992–93. However, as expressed by the Foreign Minister, ‘Finland will become a paragon member of the Community if the negotiations can be successfully completed’.9 Simultaneously, Finland has been more open to the Atlantic pole segment than Sweden. Although the neutrality label was retained longer than by Sweden—eventually being replaced in both cases by ‘non-alignment’—Finland has also been more open to NATO membership (a non-issue in Sweden). Although neither Swedish nor Finnish public opinion have even modestly supported this, Finland’s line at this time was to keep all doors open in regard to future security arrangements—as it still is by 2005 after Baltic memberships: ‘We do not exclude the possibility of either that in the future we will participate in the would-be common defence forces of the European Union in the framework of WEU or that we shall become members of NATO. In other words, we join Europe with an open mind…’ (ibid., transl.). It is remarkable that ‘Europe’ meant the Euro-Atlantic area. In the name of action space, no narrowing of options was made. The solid pro-membership majority in the Finnish referendum gave decision-makers significant leeway as an EU member—in contrast to their Scandinavian colleagues. This was exacerbated by Finland’s status as a net receiver of EU funds, in contrast to Sweden. Finland exploited its competitive edge in relation to Sweden as an EU border country by launching the EU Northern Dimension as a framework for the EU relationship with north-west Russia. The special relationship with Estonia has also contributed to a Finnish linking-pin position in the EU. And participation in the third phase of the EMU has contributed to a continued Finnish ‘Musterknabe’ profile, both compared with Denmark and Sweden. Finland has benefited in the EU from its pragmatic political culture; it has not attempted to export a specific societal model to the rest of the EU—not a word about ‘Norden’ that was vital to Finnish identity during the Cold War. Finland has not taken on the battles for openness and Commission transparency that it could have done. In accordance with its traditional emphasis on Realpolitik in foreign policy, Finland has been unwilling to fight any idealistic battles in the EU. Instead, Finland has won

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considerable influence by skilfully playing by the rules of the existing system, with no ‘elbowing’ to exploit its increased action space. So whereas Finland lived up to our expectations during the would-be insider phase, it hardly suits our general expectations as an insider. Austria Austria was the first of the EFT A countries to apply for EC membership. Due to the early popular support of membership (Luif 1995:232) and a perceived danger of marginalization with the new EC dynamics during the late 1980s, Austria applied for membership on 17 July 1989, even before the collapse of bipolarity. The application presupposed that Austria could retain its ‘permanent neutrality’, although in practice diluted (Falkner 2001). Neutrality had turned out to be a post-war success story and still carried popular legitimacy and even superseded membership in opinion ratings (Luif 1995:243). As mentioned, the Commission began scrutinizing UN voting behaviour of applicant countries at the end of the 1980s. Austria, however, did not take common foreign policy very seriously at the outset and did not move closer to the EC core until 1991. Austria was no longer in a calm zone between the two blocs, but now ‘on the edge of a storm front’. Whereas the country had previously been: ‘pressed to the edge of the Western world, the reform process in the East offered an historical chance to move into the centre of a united Europe’ (President Klestil 1989). Foreign policy was ‘concentrated on the immediate environment’ (Kramer 1996:190). Economic aid to the new neighbours and a new refugee and aliens’ law came to the top of the agenda. However, as regards the recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independencies, Austria restrained itself and waited for the EC and other applicant countries. As expressed by Chancellor Vranitzky (after some Western criticism): Austria must ‘proceed in step with the international community […] acting on its own is out of the question’ (3 September 1991). Already during the Gulf War, though, Austria had adapted to the Euro-Atlantic community by allowing planes of the Western allies to overfly Austria (Luif 1995:239). After Austria joined the EU Community in 1995 with a large majority (66.6 per cent), it did not continue as a ‘Musterknabe’ in the Euro-Atlantic community. There are several instances of frictions and misfit (Falkner 2001). Support for the PfP (1994) and PfP+(1997) have been lukewarm and slow compared with Sweden and Finland (Luif 2000:63). Austria angered the French by rejecting military passage to Slovakia in 1998 (ibid.: 68). During the Kosovo war (not UN approved), Austria did not allow NATO war planes to pass Austrian airspace; this attitude was based on the autonomy of an EU insider, but can be expected to lead to cross-pressure in the light of transportation needs to future hot spots since Austria is now surrounded by NATO countries. In addition, popular support for EU membership is declining (Austria being a net contributor) and various EU projects like the eastern enlargement have been met with popular reluctance (ibid.; only 33 per cent of the respondents supported the forthcoming widening of the Union to the east and south, being the lowest rate in the EU). The 2000 diplomatic quarantine vis-à-vis the ÖVP—FPÖ government formed in February—owing to the participation of FPÖ—put Austria in a peripheral and humiliating position not previously experienced by any EU member state. According to

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the EU 14, FPÖ and its leader Jörg Haider have repeatedly ‘questioned the values and principles of humanism and democratic tolerance underlying the European project’ (cited from Luif 2000:70; see also Falkner 2001; Merlingen et al. 2001). The unexpected quarantine showed that even for an EU (non-pole) insider, influence and autonomy may be low—and apparently much lower than calculated by itself. The quarantine was decided intergovernmentally among the EU 14, being more watchful vis-à-vis the ‘ghost of the past’ than they would have been if it had been a country with a different history than Austria. It was lifted on 12 September 2000, as ‘three wise men’ had found that the Austrian government’s respect for the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants was not ‘inferior to that of the other European Union member states’ (although adding critical remarks on the FPÖ). The lasting effect of the episode was a feeling that Austria was lacking close allies among the insiders. This was probably an incentive behind Austria’s launching of a ‘Regional Partnership’ in June 2001 with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (Lukáč 2002). The idea was that Austria as an experienced insider could assist these would-be insiders in their EU policy. However, the project never took off, as the latter felt that Austria’s real support in the process was lukewarm. Also, there were serious bilateral problems with the Czechs and Slovaks, notably ‘old fashioned’ nuclear power plants near the Austrian border and—once again—the ‘ghosts of the past’ in the form of the Benes decrees expelling Germans/Austrians and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia in 1945 and confiscating their property. More generally, there was a disharmony between Austria’s continued neutrality and the others’ strong Atlantic predispositions (ibid.). In the Convention and the negotiations concerning an EU Constitutional Treaty, Austria has staunchly supported ‘small state views’ (e.g. one voting Commissioner for each member and no permanent Council presidency).10 These views have been voiced more intensely than that of the Nordic non-pole powers. Although generally a supporter of strong EU institutions, Austria has shown no accommodation to the pole powers in their alleged strivings to make the enlarged EU functionally efficient. Moreover, Austria has shown no acquiescence vis-à-vis its German big brother in connection with the latter’s non-compliance to the ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ in November 2003 (see Chapter 4). Although Austria has not wished to impose a societal model (like its own traditional corporatism; see Luif 2001:91) on the rest of the EU, Austria’s willingness, once an EU member, to adapt to the Euro-Atlantic community and its pole powers has been modest— be it to the EU or by joining NATO. Austria has been a reluctant adaptor. Austria fits our expectations by accepting pole constraints as a would-be insider and by exploiting her improved action space as an insider (though with limited influence-capability). Slovakia Slovakia is different from most other central and East European countries by experiencing a real outsider period in the post-Cold war era. To make it even more remarkable, Slovakia actually started its ‘return to Europe’ as part of Havel’s Czechoslovakia. Even after Slovak independence in 1993 there was a certain amount of integration momentum left in the process, amounting for instance to a signing of a Europe Agreement in October 1993 (Pridham 2002), prescribing a ‘structured dialogue’

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with the EU at all levels. The Prime Minister (1994–98), Meciar, did not change course abruptly but applied for Slovak EU membership in June 1995. Also, in time for the Paris Conference in March 1995 regarding the ‘Pact on Stability in Europe’, Slovakia signed a ‘Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation’ with Hungary about, for example, the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. This took place in spite of strong opposition from the small nationalist coalition partner SNS (compensated on other issues), but was justified as ‘enabl[ing] the government to fulfil its stated aims of membership of the EU and NATO’.11 Having reached the level of a would-be insider, Slovakia followed most other ‘new democracies’, but Meciar’s philosophy—with its rural and traditionalist base—was that ‘unique’ Slovakia should stand for its own independent development and not imitate that of the West, culturally or otherwise. His interest in Euro-Atlantic integration was more tactical than strategic (Pridham 2002:211), and the government would not accept de facto constraints on Slovakia as an integral part of the integration process. The EU, the United States and Western leaders in general expressed their dissatisfaction with an alleged lack of parliamentary control over the Slovak executive, the Security Service in particular (see Haughton 2002:1323), assaults on the independent media, ‘Berufsverbot’ among state employees and discrimination against the Hungarian minority (11 per cent of the population). The Hungarian minority was now in a much more exposed position than during the previous rule from Prague. Factors outside Slovakia added to its difficulties. The Slovak state that had popped up, unexpectedly to most foreign observers, lacked an inside sponsor in the EU/NATO. Furthermore, it was instrumental to unipole insiders (and would-be insiders) to have a ‘scapegoat’ in the sense of a negative reference point for the enlargement process. The numerous EU or other démarches from abroad tended to increase government cohesion. Conspiracy theories about Western influence in the country were cultivated. Through such a negatively self-reinforcing process, Slovakia became a clear outsider. This was formalized with the EU Commission’s Agenda 2000 from 1997, whose verdict was that Slovakia had failed in relation to the political membership conditions (the Copenhagen criteria). Analogously, Slovakia failed to be invited for NATO membership in spite of its obvious strategic value (the north—south corridor). The foreign policy of the Slovak outsider was summarized by Meciar as one of ‘bridge building between West and East’, the latter apparently referring to Russia. Relations with the Russian great power were remarkably positive, energy dependence being one of the reasons. Meciar talked about a ‘new epoch’ in mutual relations (1995), with frequent mutual visits and also a large number of intergovernmental agreements being signed. Moscow apparently saw Slovakia as a future forward bastion in Europe and refrained from criticizing its internal developments. Thus, according to one of the mutual agreements, the parties promised not to open their territory for a third party threatening the other, which in practice meant that Slovakia promised not to open its territory for NATO. This agreement—correspond-ing to the one between Russia and Romania—was one of the reasons why NATO did not see Slovakia as a serious candidate for membership. Meciar expressed his support for the specific Russian proposal that the OSCE should be the new European ‘super organization’ and that NATO should, at best, be subordinated to it (November 1995). There was no condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the Slovak—Russian agreements. By contrast,

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Hungary managed to obtain a condemnation of the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary inserted in its treaty with Russia. Relations with neighbouring countries were deteriorating. According to one of the Slovak—Russian agreements, Russia should modernize the Slovak nuclear power plant in Mochovce, but Austria, Slovakia’s only neighbour in the EU at the time, wanted the plant closed altogether. The cultivation of a would-be sponsor for Slovak EU membership like Austria was apparently not as crucial as relations with Russia. Also relations with another essential actor in the enlargement process, the southern neighbour Hungary, deteriorated. A ‘Basic Treaty’, which temporarily improved relations, was signed, but before the treaty was ratified they deteriorated again with a Slovak language law—a law presumably contradicting the ‘Basic Treaty’ and even the Slovak Constitution. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, the Slovak media did actually quote authoritative Western comments and possible sanctions vis-à-vis Slovakia. Eventually international and transnational influences helped to mobilize Slovak opposition forces, toppling Meciar’s coalition government in the 1998 parliamentary elections. The new Dzurinda government included, among others, representatives of the Hungarian minority, partly because this was known to please both the EU and NATO (Pridham 2002:218). The top priority of the new government was to meet the EU and NATO political conditions for membership and it succeeded in both regards. The difference from the previous government was underlined with a new language law that guaranteed the status of minority languages in official contacts. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, it was decided to begin membership negotiations with Slovakia: its ‘would-be’ insider status had been retrieved. At its meeting in December 2002 in Copenhagen, the European Council decided to invite Slovakia to become a member along with the other applicants. Both before and after this decision, however, there have been difficult issues like the conditions of the Roma population and administrative reform. Membership was approved in a referendum in May 2003 with a considerable majority. Foreign policy changed drastically as Slovakia had again become a would-be insider. European and Atlantic integrations were now warmly praised, whereas relations with Russia came to a virtual halt (Krupnick and Atkinson 2003:61–2). Better conditions for the Hungarian minority improved relations with Hungary. This facilitated the resumption and even a revitalization of the Visegrad cooperation between Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary from May 1999. Moreover, Slovakia supported NATO during the Kosovo war in 1999. For Slovakia as well as the other candidate countries, November and December 2002 marked the invitations to join NATO and the EU, respectively. Although ratifications remained, these invitations implied a de facto insider status for them. Of course, with Slovakia’s interregnum as an outsider it could not raise its profile as pointedly as its Visegrad partners (which they had already been doing for some time). Still, Slovakia supported the ‘small state’ view of each EU member being entitled to one Commissioner of equal standing and argued in favour of mentioning Christian values in the Constitution foreword. Moreover, Slovakia was at the forefront in the issue of established members’ transition periods (restrictions) for newcomers’ labour force. These are ‘inexcusable and unjustified’ argued Slovak Foreign Minister Kukan in February 2004.12

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The foreign policy behaviour of Slovakia nicely fits our expectations. As an outsider, Slovakia behaved independently of the Euro-Atlantic unipole and cooperated closely with Russia. As a would-be insider, Slovakia was willing to accept constraints on its external (and domestic) policy in order to distance itself from its recent past. As an insider, Slovakia used its increased action space to raise its profile, but stayed well within the norms of Euro-Atlantic integration. As with the rest of the four states selected for diachronic analysis here, the stage changed with Euro-Atlantic bifurcation during 2002–03. We shall return to this challenge in Chapter 10.

Interaction effects: how constellation matters in the aggregate How does constellation matter in the aggregate? Since states interact, the immediate effects of constellation on states may have some (un)intended consequences in the aggregate. We focus first at parallel action among sets of would-be insiders. Subsequently, we analyse conflict behaviour or its absence among and between would-be insiders and outsiders. Does the Euro-Atlantic pole actually project stability? In the process of summing up our results, we compare the homogeneity of would-be insider behaviour with that of the outsiders and insiders, respectively. Parallel action Non-pole powers may be engaged in parallel action (Mouritzen 1997b). This means roughly similar action patterns, because they are geopolitically analogously located (normally neighbours) and share the same identity values. Their main concern is, of course, the pole(s). Incentives for mutual cooperation and conflict may be strong, due to proximity, but any mutual conflict or common interest will be overlayed by pole relations. Thus, we are not dealing with ‘life and death’ rivalries (like India—Pakistan or in the Middle East); a specific mixture of cooperation and rivalry is at stake, where part of the rivalry is actually induced by cooperation (e.g. ‘who should be honoured for our cooperative successes or blamed for our cooperative failures?’). The parties’ mutual behaviour may comprise coordinated as well as non-coordinated aspects. The former means cooperation for a common purpose (‘we do this, if you do that’). The latter means that both engage in unilateralist behaviour, though still ‘looking over the shoulder’. It encompasses both mutual inspiration/identification and goodwill competition (rivalry, jealousy) in relation to their common power pole (ibid.: 38–42) (Figure 9.3). Since location and values are typically enduring phenomena, the same goes for parallel action, once it gets started. Thereby it easily becomes self-supporting, since habits of cooperation/imitation and jealousies win time to sediment in the political cultures of both countries involved. There are ‘islands’ of parallel action in post-Cold War Europe (or, rather, in periods of it): pairs of Nordic countries, the Visegrad group, the Baltic countries and Romania— Bulgaria. Parallel action has been most pronounced in these states’ phases as would-be insiders. The groups have a common interest vis-à-vis other groups (for instance northern applicants vis-à-vis the southerners), and any set of applicants has a common interest in

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being treated decently by the Commission/NATO. However, the power structure is so unipolar that it sets limits to the common interests. There is always, as the strongest element, a competitive incentive between the states. ‘Good marks’ are by their nature given on the basis of comparison; they are given by the Euro-Atlantic power pole (the EU or NATO) on the basis of a good-will competition, not least. Goodwill is acquired by (over)fulfilling pole preferences. This may be done, for instance, by being a frequent ‘security provider’ rather than a ‘security consumer’. If a contribution to peace enforcement is offered beyond one’s normal radius of activity (e.g. Danes in central Asia, Balts in the Caucasus), goodwill behaviour or even goodwill competition is a likely interpretation. It means that bandwagoning behaviour induced by the unipolar power structure is reinforced by the parties themselves.

Figure 9.3 Types and mechanisms of parallel action. Sweden and Finland competed to be no. 1 ‘Musterknabe’ in the school class of European integration (reinforced by traditional jealousies). With memberships being attained by 1995 and the two EU postures beginning to deviate, the intensity of competition waned considerably. We have also observed parallel action in the phase where Denmark and Sweden were both EU members and had roughly similar Baltic/PfP agendas (see Chapter 5). We saw a competition for Baltic Sea leadership and a goodwill competition in relation to the Clinton administration (again backed up by habits of cooperation/imitation and traditional jealousies). However, there was a limit to how much US unilateralism could be accepted on the Swedish premises of non-alignment and whole-hearted UN support; this became more obvious during the subsequent Bush administration. Danish and Swedish postures again drifted apart. Parallel action was obvious as institutionalized in the Visegrad cooperation (although Poland may be too powerful compared with the rest to qualify unambiguously). This cooperation had originally been formed as an instrument to safeguard common interests in leaving Eastern structures (the Warsaw Pact and Comecon) and in joining the major Western ones (the EU and NATO). Slovakia’s geopolitical core position in the cooperation meant that it was frozen during Slovakia’s outsider intermezzo, causing a ‘hole in the middle’. After that, however, cooperation could be intensified and divided

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into different sectors (defence, environment, culture, etc.). Rivalry has been an enduring feature of Visegrad—primarily in each state’s efforts to get ‘good marks’ in the EU. Also a high level of participation in peace-keeping operations has presumably been an aspect of Euro-Atlantic goodwill competition (see Chapter 7). In EU accession negotiations, Hungary broke ranks regarding free labour movements, as the Czech Republic had previously done regarding land purchases by EU foreigners. Still, the cooperation has also been disturbed by the inflammation of more serious, historically and nationally rooted conflicts, unrelated to the current polarity (see below). However, Visegrad is still realistically discussed as a future EU caucus comparable with Benelux or the Nordic countries. The Baltic countries constitute a paradigm case of parallel action. They share a common history (past geopolitics), an essentially common location (present geopolitics) and parallel foreign policies, including EU and NATO approaches. Their mutual cooperation structures—both governmental and parliamentary—have to a large extent been inspired by the Nordic countries (military cooperation from PfP). Side by side with cooperation, competition and jealousies have been essential to the countries’ mutual relationship.13 Estonia, taking the lead in EU negotiations, wished to ‘go alone’ in a first enlargement round (strongly supported by the Finns). Also, Estonia has declared herself to be more of a Nordic than a Baltic country. Lithuania, correspondingly, has seen herself as more central European than Baltic and geopolitically justified as a NATO member, following closely in the Polish footsteps—and not necessarily burdened by the company of her Baltic brethren. However, these declarations belong to ‘normal’ (Baltic) parallel action. Moreover, a pioneer engaged in parallel action is emulated by the others; as illustrated in Chapter 8, the Latvians and Lithuanians ‘put immense effort into catching up with the [Estonian] forerunner’. The closing of negotiation chapters became ‘a race with each country looking over its shoulder to see how many chapters the other countries had already managed to conclude’ (ibid.). Romania and Bulgaria also engaged in parallel action from the mid-1990s, as they oriented themselves westwards. Their similar roles in the Kosovo conflict meant that some mutual cooperation developed. Both were invited into NATO in October 2002, and in early 2003 they started negotiating side by side for EU membership. Goodwill competition has been obvious both in relation to the EU and NATO (the US). In negotiations with the Commission Bulgaria seems to be the ‘Musterknabe’; not surprisingly, therefore, Bulgaria has signalled that she is prepared to go alone if Romania cannot make it or is too slow in her approach (Bulgaria fearing in that case to have to wait for still other applicants). There may be other dyads or groupings in Europe that qualify, but hardly as comprehensive cases. Aspects of parallel action can be found in the relation between the Netherlands and Belgium. Still, their basic geopolitical orientations (re Atlanticism) are too different for the concept to apply. We have already noted the classic Swedish imperative in Finnish integration policy, i.e. ‘always follow in the Swedish footsteps in West European integration’ (with its roots in the Cold War: EFTA, EEA, EC). This is obviously competitive parallel action, although the difference in geopolitics (the Soviet connection) prevented its full-scale functioning until late 1991. Historically, Hungary and Romania have been involved in goodwill competition vis-à-vis both Hitler and Stalin. In

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the post-Cold War era, however, their relationship has been too asymmetrical to qualify, Hungary being considerably closer to the Euro-Atlantic pole than Romania. This latter pattern, with different geopolitical conditions even for neighbours is, as we remember, more the rule than the exception according to the axioms of the present book. The parallel action spheres are merely ‘islands’ in the European geopolitical landscape. However, their inherent goodwill competitions imply that the bandwagoning effects of unipolarity are reinforced. Just as this is convenient for the EU, it means that the action spaces of several would-be insiders are unnecessarily limited. Some of their constraints are self-inflicted. Stability projection One possible interaction effect is stability between states. Ultimately this is about peace or war. Successful stability projection to states (or their geographical area) means that their conflicts are peacefully resolved by the interference of the projector (or the parties’ anticipation thereof); at the very least, the conflicts are prevented from escalating to war. Stability projection is not tantamount to the existence of a security community, though (Adler and Barnett 1998; Deutsch et al. 1957).14 Under fortunate circumstances, it means a top-down initiation of such a community, but only in a longer time perspective (Mouritzen 2004). Moreover, stability may be projected by a pole of attraction, threatening the deprivation of positive sanctions, or by a traditional hegemonic power in its sphere of interest, threatening with primarily negative sanctions. In the case of the Euro-Atlantic pole of attraction, stability has allegedly been projected by the EU and NATO (e.g. Linden 2002:369–73). Still, the EU has probably also, inadvertently, projected instability right at the initiation of the post-Cold War era. As analysed in Chapter 7 the EU encouraged, by virtue of its suitability for smaller states, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (together with other factors, of course). Returning to (Euro-Atlantic) stability projection, the strongest effect should be exerted, of course, if both the EU and NATO are involved. Moreover, it requires two parties to resolve conflicts; therefore both of them should preferably be affected. On the other hand, it also requires two parties to have conflict escalation; therefore, it does have a certain dampening effect, even if only one of the parties is affected. According to our theory (Chapter 2), the would-be insiders should be the most amenable to pole sanctions (proposition 2), but the outsiders hardly at all (proposition 1). According to our expectations, therefore, a relation between two would-be insiders should be the most susceptible to stability projection, a relation between a would-be insider and an outsider should be susceptible to some extent, whereas the relation between two outsiders should be rather immune to such projection. We should expect the following proposition to be true (dealing with a type of interactive consequence of bandwagoning (proposition 2), we label this sub-proposition ‘2a’):

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2a More than any other territory, a geographical belt of would-be insiders will be the subject of successful stability projection. A range of alleged cases of stability projection can be mentioned (with time of détente mentioned in parentheses): Greece—Turkey (late 1990s), the Cyprus conflict (ditto), Bulgaria—Turkey (mid-1990s), Estonia—Russia (whole post-Cold War era), Latvia— Russia (ditto),15 Romania—Hungary (1995), Slovakia-Hungary (1998), Croatia-Slovenia (2003; see Chapter 7), and Romania-Moldova (2002). Note that only state relations have been included in this list—not relations between a state and a minority like the Turkish state vis-à-vis the Kurds,16 or Russia—EU (over Kaliningrad 2002). Moreover, these are cases, where some conflict escalation did occur; of course, we might also add cases, in which no overt crisis occurred in spite of a con-flict potential, probably due to the anticipation of pole power (e.g. Poland—Lithuania in the early 1990s). Space does not allow even a modest justification here for all the above-mentioned candidate cases. Below, the occurrence of Euro-Atlantic stability projection will be argued in a few cases along the geopolitical ‘necklace’ from Slovakia over Hungary and Romania to Moldova/Transdnjestr. From Slovakia to Hungary In the Slovakia section above, we have already seen stability projection to Slovak— Hungarian relations. Briefly to recapitulate, we saw that deteriorating conditions for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia during Meciar’s rule had disrupted state relations. A negative self-reinforcing process followed, also more generally in relation to the EU/NATO and Slovakia’s remaining neighbours. The Slovak nationalist challenge was tackled by the EU and NATO by putting Slovakia in the ‘freezing box’. Not least due to Western transnational influences and encouragement of the Slovak opposition, Meciar’s coalition was toppled at the 1998 elections. The new coalition government, encompassing the Hungarian minority party, quickly managed to improve relations with Hungary and with the Euro-Atlantic power pole. Subsequently, Slovak—Hungarian relations were challenged by Hungarian nationalism. Apart from Hungary’s rapid EU approach and entry into NATO, also her economic success contributed to a more self-confident and assertive posture. However, the increasingly nationalist Hungarian Prime Minister Orban—apparently preparing for an election campaign in 2002—overplayed the Hungarian hand. The so-called ‘Status Law’ (Lukáč 2002:71–3; Partos 2003:102–8) should provide a range of benefits and a special status to ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring states (also if temporarily moving to Hungary). According to Orban, the law should—within the framework of the EU—‘unify the nation across the borders’. Instead of traditional Hungarian revisionism, trying to revise borders, this law should eliminate the ‘injustices’ of the Trianon Treaty (from the First World War) by gradually wiping out borders. The law draft infuriated not only the nationalist parties in Slovakia and (even more) Romania, but also more mainstream parties. After extended pulling and hauling, the Slovak—Hungarian aspect of the issue seemed to be solved in connection with a Minority Agreement between the two countries in December 2003. Budapest would only support the Hungarian minority in

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Slovakia in line with the ‘Slovak legal order, via organizations registered in Slovakia’ (Slovensko.com, 21 July 2003). To this was added Orban’s criticism in the European Parliament of the validity of the post-Second World War Benes Decrees. Moreover, he linked this issue with EU enlargement: the decrees should be abolished, before the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the Union. As a consequence, a planned Visegrad summit meeting in Hungary was cancelled; analysts talked about the ‘clinical death of Visegrad’ and ‘the end of Central Europe’ (Lukáč, ibid.). However, emotions cooled after some time. The Commission managed to decouple the issue of the Benes Decrees from the enlargement process. Both Slovakia and Hungary were would-be insiders in the two crisis escalations described in this section. In the former case, the Euro-Atlantic sanction of reducing the ‘nationalist’ party (Slovakia) to outsider status had to be implemented, before its government could be replaced with a more ‘friendly’ one. In the latter case, the mere threat of such a sanction (vis-à-vis Hungary) and other EU intervention restored relations—although much mutual bitterness was created. From Hungary to Romania No Hungarian—Romanian agreement on ‘good neighbourly relations’ could be signed in time for the Paris Conference in March 1995 regarding the ‘Pact on Stability in Europe’. Hungary with reasonable prospects for both EU and NATO membership was the ‘eager’ party in this regard. Romania with its considerable Hungarian minority was beyond effective Euro-Atlantic pressure; Romanian EU/NATO prospects were too unrealistic anyhow (Partos 2003:100–1). However, as she moved towards realistic prospects for NATO membership,17 Romanian ultra-nationalists and neo-communists were pushed out of government. Shortly thereafter a treaty with Hungary could be agreed (September 1996). As Romanian leaders now frequently reiterated: ‘the road to Europe and the West [leads] through Hungary’ (ibid.). This seems to be stability projection—from NATO rather than the EU. The balance of power between the two parties tilted in Hungary’s favour; Romania was now dependent on Hungary regarding such important matters as getting Schengen exceptions for Romanians (as Hungary would enter the EU), a possible Romanian NATO membership, and (later) Romanian EU negotiations. As subsequently expressed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Orban regarding Romania’s candidatures: ‘NATO and the EU would consult Hungary… because Budapest knows Romania best’ (1999). On this power background, the Hungarian minority party was invited into the Romanian government and Romania improved conditions for its Hungarian minority. Even if Iliescu returned to government in 2000, it did not make a difference in these regards. As mentioned, Romanian authorities also reacted strongly against the proposed Status Law, indicating that it implied Hungarian ‘co-sovereignty’ over Transylvania and aimed to ‘magyarize’ the population. This serious Hungarian—Romanian conflict was referred to the ‘Council of Europe’ and the OSCE, where the law draft was subject to criticism (ethnic discrimination, extra-territorial jurisdiction and setting a dangerous precedent). The EU Commission strongly criticized it in the ‘progress report’ on Hungary (November 2001). At the latest in connection with Hungary’s entry into the EU, the law would have to be amended. Not least this latter criticism implied that an agreement could be reached

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between Hungary and Romania before the law’s coming into force (New Year 2002). Most importantly, the Hungarian labour market was made equally accessible to all Romanian citizens (although subject to quotas). The replacement of Orban after the April 2002 Hungarian elections also improved relations. Summing up, as only Hungary was subject to stability projection in 1995, no progress could be made. It came, however, as Romania became subject to NATO projection. Some years later it was Hungary’s turn to play the nationalist card (the Status Law). The EU, primarily, managed to put the situation back on track. What seems to surface occasionally in Central and Eastern Europe is the classical post-First World War geopolitical conflict (Lukáč, ibid.): the dissatisfied revisionists (Hungary, Austria, Italy) vs. the satisfied status quo powers (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania). This conflict has been sedimented in segments of public opinion, more in some states than in others (notably Hungary). In connection with the dynamics of election campaigns, it tends to come alive. In the cases analysed here, the current EuroAtlantic polarity—in practice the EU—remained, after all, stronger and managed to get the dynamics of the classic conflict under proper control. Current geopolitics prevailed over past geopolitics. From Romania to Moldova and Transdnjestr Moldova being culturally and linguistically a largely Romanian state (during the interwar years a part of Romania) took a pro-Western course after her independence and the victory of democracy (Partos 2003). As was geopolitically evident, the ‘road to Europe’ went through Romania. Almost symbolically Cyrillic script was replaced by Latin. From the mid-1990s, however, Moldova recognized the need to repair relations eastwards, notably with Moscow (energy dependence, agricultural exports; see further below). Moreover, Moldova was soon disappointed not only with relations to Romania, but also with her prospects for integration in Euro-Atlantic structures (she had no EU sponsor, for instance). After negotiations since 1992 a Romanian—Moldovan treaty was signed in 2000 promoting Moldovan accession to the ‘Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’. However, relations de facto developed for the worse. After the communists had won an absolute majority in Moldovan elections in 2001, tension rose between the two countries from October with all the classical ingredients of crisis escalation: cancellation of state visit, mutual insults, accusations of (Romanian) interference in (Moldovan) internal affairs,18 expelling of diplomats, etc. The crisis eventually de-escalated. As with the 2000 treaty, it seems that Romania was the most compromising party. It is likely that Western stability projection (prospects for NATO membership) was effective in relation to Romania (ibid.). Of course, Romania was particularly careful not to ‘rock the boat’ up to the Prague summit of November 2002. Still, the Moldovan communist President was hardly a Lukachenko copy. Analogously to Meciar, he described Moldova as a ‘bridge between Russia and the West’; also a certain amount of responsiveness to the Council of Europe was evident. Perhaps, NATO stability projection also functioned weakly in relation to Moldova through her participation in PfP. Although increasingly leaning to Russia, Moldova is still a shatter zone between the Euro-Atlantic and the Russian pole (bipolar environment polarity).

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However, Euro-Atlantic stability projection has not had the slightest effect on the Transdnjestr conflict (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999; ibid.). The area of Transdnjestr, formally the eastern rim of Moldova, seceded de facto in 1991 supported by paramilitary forces (although not obtaining international recognition). Its mostly Russian and Ukrainian population felt discriminated by the new Moldovan state, culturally and—at the time—politically leaning to the West and Romania. After some fighting in 1992, Russian troops present in the Transdnjestr region protected the secessionists and after some time were legalized as peace-keeping forces by the OSCE (1997). Gradually the situation stabilized and a stalemate developed. Moscow recognized the area as belonging to the Moldovan authorities, but in return expected Moldova to orient herself towards Moscow (including associate membership of the CIS). After the communist victory in the 2001 Moldovan elections, this expectation was increasingly fulfilled. Chisinau and Tiraspol seemed to compete for Moscow’s goodwill (Russian forces being still in Transdnjestr). So even if Moldova is still a shatter zone, the Dnjestr river, delimiting Transdnjestr westwards, marks the definite outer limit of Western stability projection in this geographical direction. Western stability projection: how far? Marking the outer continental ‘border’ of Euro-Atlantic stability projection obviously requires more empirical justification of its proper functioning. It seems, however, on the basis of current evidence to run roughly as follows by 2005 (see Figure 9.4). Its northern half is rather clear-cut, along the Finnish and Baltic eastern borders. It then presumably follows the Ukraine’s western border, with Moldova being a shatter zone (whether the western part of Ukraine also belongs to this category may be debated, see Chapter 7). The border then passes across the Black Sea to the Caucasian republics, where we again face a shatter zone. Individual states lean in different directions, but they have unstable regimes in common and are more or less subject to fragmentation risks and pole rivalry (environment bipolarity). Again, the ‘border’ is clear-cut in relation to Iran, Iraq19 and Syria and then passes through the Mediterranean south of Cyprus and Malta (not forgetting, of course, that Western or any other stability projection was inefficient in the ex-Yugoslav wars). The ‘Council of Baltic Sea States’, the ‘New Neighbours’ Initiative’, Euromed and similar cooperation initiatives represent attempts to project Euro-Atlantic stability even further, albeit by more modest means. As here conceived, however, as long as they lack the prospects of EU or NATO memberships, their effects are likely to be much more limited.

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Figure 9.4 The outer limits of EuroAtlantic stability projection (2005). Summary: do would-be insiders bandwagon? Let us summarize the external behaviour of would-be insiders through, first, the synchronic cross-cuts. Simultaneously with, and related to, the recognition of the Baltic independencies in late August 1991, the post-Cold War power structure was taking shape in those very same days (the Soviet disintegration!). Old constellations vanished (like ‘Finlandization’), and new ones were created. No lead was taken by either the US or the European great powers regarding recognitions (let alone the EC), but instead by a few non-pole powers adjacent to the Baltic region. In other words, there was no lead taken that potential bandwagoners could follow. This cross-cut obviously does not answer our question. A few months later, however, we observe a textbook case of the new European power structure in function. One of the pole powers, Germany, succeeded in gradually convincing its pole partner, France, and the rest of the EC insiders to recognize the Yugoslav break-away republics of Slovenia and Croatia in a common EC decision. The

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would-be insiders at the time band-wagoned in relation to this: by either slowing down their recognitions (Austria) or by speeding them up (Sweden and Finland). Neither the US nor the European pole powers took the lead in connection with the Chechnia issue from the mid-1990s. Non-pole powers took a stand mainly on the basis of their relationship to Russia. In particular, states with anti-Russian predispositions—due to past geopolitics—were harsh in their criticisms of Russian behaviour, independently from their constellation in the current Euro-Atlantic power structure. As in the first cross-cut, no Euro-Atlantic lead was provided for those who might be ready to bandwagon. The Kosovo war, however, again displayed the Euro-Atlantic power structure at its best. The would-be insider behaviour was rather homogeneous. In spite of strong incentives to the contrary, the would-be insiders bandwagoned to follow the EuroAtlantic pole powers (not least the US) on the basis of their constellation requirements. This applied to all six would-be insiders in the war neighbourhood, except for one (the Czech Republic) that was internally split. The Euro-Atlantic unipolarity as conceived here has not been continuously visible. As in any power structure, the strong may occasionally—or often—allow others to follow their own preferences. We have seen a couple of such instances, where the great powers did not take the lead. Instead, non-pole powers—including would-be insiders—acted on their own and sometimes exerted decisive influence together. However, this does not mean that the power structure was absent, as demonstrated by other cases. At any rate, we have not seen cases where would-be insiders (or others) defied the pole powers (as will be analysed in Chapter 10, such defiance could be observed in connection with an emerging new power structure in 2002–03, where the pole powers were no longer reasonably united among each other). Turning to the diachronic analyses, our expectations fit for the four selected cases (Sweden, Finland, Austria and Slovakia) regarding the would-be insider phase (bandwagoning!). Also in the general picture, as analysed in Chapters 5–9, we observe bandwagoning behaviour from all would-be insiders: close to the pole powers (Austria), in the east (the Visegrad states, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), the north-east (the Balts) and the north (Sweden, Finland). This behaviour was intertwined with EuroAtlantic identification, in particular for states in the east and north-east. Regarding interaction effects, we saw Euro-Atlantic stability projection as well as ‘islands’ of parallel action. In these islands, would-be insiders mixed cooperation and goodwill competition, reinforcing their bandwagoning vis-à-vis the power pole. A long list of likely cases of stability projection was mentioned; however, our corroboration was confined to the relations Slovakia—Hungary, Hungary—Romania and Romania— Moldova/Transdnjestr (the geopolitical ‘necklace’). We saw EU projection, NATO projection and both simultaneously. It is noteworthy that NATO projection was effective on its own in relation to Romania before EU projection was at all possible. An alternative explanation for the observed conflict resolutions could, for instance, be the thesis that ‘democracies do not fight each other’ (e.g. Gleditsch 1992). ‘Democraticness’ may work simultaneously with stability projection, of course. However, we do observe that severe conflicts also escalated between democracies, but that visible NATO or EU intervention resolved these conflicts. For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Orban, hardly being questioned for his democratic merits, obviously took the initiative in conflict escalation (part of his re-election campaign). More broadly,

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nationalism and thereby a mutual conflict potential has been much stronger among the post-Cold War Central and Eastern European states—developing democracies—than among their Cold War socialist predecessors (where mutual ‘socialist brotherhood’ or outright Soviet stability projection was effective).

Summary: do outsiders and insiders behave heterogeneously? Whereas our observations regarding the would-be insider constellation corroborate proposition 2, we have more scattered evidence concerning propositions 1 and 4. However, they seem generally to be supported. The distinction between homogeneity and heterogeneity, meaning uniformity versus the opposite, obviously refers to a macrophenomenon. If our above results are correct, then by definition would-be insider behaviour is rather homogeneous—in the form of bandwagoning (proposition 2), including stability projection (proposition 2a) not least. However, it remains to be corroborated that this type of behaviour is not so general as to characterize all constellations. For reasons given in Chapter 2, we do not expect a specific behaviour for the insiders and the outsiders, but we expect that it will be heterogeneous. In other words, it is distinguishable from the homogeneity that we ascribe to the would-be insiders. The outsiders In the cross-cuts with ‘power lead’, we see heterogeneous outsider behaviour. As reported, some outsiders extended recognitions to Slovenia and Croatia even before the EC, others took their time, but all apparently enjoyed their ‘outsider freedom’ and acted on their own impulse. Turning to the Kosovo war, the picture was also heterogeneous among the outsiders: they covered the full spectrum from ardent war supporters to the opposite. The CIS outsiders were influenced by a range of (mostly geopolitical) factors, as we saw. As part of this heterogeneous picture, bandwagoning did admittedly occur (the ‘aspiring outsiders’ of Azerbaijan and Georgia, notably). So it is not an exclusive privilege of would-be insiders. Euro-Atlantic stability projection (see Figure 9.4) did not work on outsiders like the ex-Yugoslav republics with strong mutual war incentives in the 1990s. Actually, the EC may unintentionally have contributed to the conflict initially, as we saw.20 Likewise, the geographical belt encompassing Euro-Atlantic outsiders was generally conflict-ridden. Military or serious non-military conflict occurred in relations such as Moldova— Transdjnestr (technically a civil war) and Bulgaria—Turkey 1989, between and within Caucasian republics, and in the Middle East and (parts of) North Africa. Russian stability projection managed to stop violence in Moldova—Transdjnestr and in parts of Caucasus. Essentially US stability projection was attempted in the Arab—Israeli conflict for most of the post-Cold War era, but in vain. Compared with the would-be insider belt, the general picture among outsiders was one of frequent conflict and instability (although, of course, also including areas of tranquillity). Taken together, whereas successful stability projection and, thereby, stability was accomplished vis-à-vis the would-be insiders, stability projection was either not attempted or attempted in vain vis-à-vis outsiders. Together with other types of conflict

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determinants, the resulting stability picture in the vast Euro-Atlantic outsider belt was heterogeneous. It seems, in other words, that whereas would-be insiders adapt to enjoy mutual stability, heterogeneity prevails among outsiders in this regard. This corroborates proposition 2a. The basic reason is hardly that stability projection is not attempted here. It is rather that the Euro-Atlantic unipole is much more successful in this regard than other power poles. The reason is that it can offer membership of the EU and/or NATO as a stability incentive. Still, in areas where it does not offer such prospects, for one reason or another, the effectiveness of stability projection decreases (e.g. the ‘new neighbourhood’). The insiders Turning to the insiders (including ‘near-core’ and de facto insiders), our evidence is more scattered. Even though most of them followed the pole powers during the Kosovo war, the Greek core insider with her bonds to the Serbs distanced itself from the operation (the Greek-Czech initiative sought to accommodate the Serbs). In the ‘near-core’, Sweden, Finland and Austria expressed their reservations (the missing UN mandate). Austria refused to open her airspace to NATO planes. Taken together, insider behaviour was heterogeneous in this situation—just like the outsider behaviour, but distinct from the homogeneity of the would-be insiders. As noted in the diachronic cases, the insider status resulted in a more assertive posture (pace Finland). Even if it may be too early to judge, we have also seen this tendency for states who have safeguarded their EU or NATO memberships only in recent years. This could be noted already for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as they had entered NATO in 1999 and felt rather sure that EU membership would also materialize. By contrast, the Balts were more cautious in their approach, due not least to their geopolitical handicap. They in no way felt assured before they were actually invited in November and December 2002. After that, however, they seemed to raise their profiles, for instance with ‘small state’ views regarding the Constitutional Treaty 2003–04. Together with other new-comers, they expressed their EU deepening reluctances that had previously been less obvious. With the Visegrad states at the forefront, all newcomers voiced their frustrations in relation to existing member states’ transition rules for their job-seekers in the EU labour market. Hungary, perhaps the highest profiled among the newcomers, argued that as she would become the only EU country sharing a border with Romania, she should be given a formal role—even if still not a member and much to Romania’s dismay—in Romanian membership negotiations that were expected to have finished their most critical phase about the time of Hungary’s entry (Hungary even hinted that she might otherwise not ratify Romanian membership21). Taken together, insiders (including de facto insiders) seem to exhibit a variety of behaviours, encompassing a range of assertive profiles with mutual variations. How about stability projection to insiders? In the Greek—Turkish conflict (with its roots during the Cold War and enduring until the late 1990s), both countries’ NATO memberships may have prevented overt hostilities; however, no détente whatsoever took place. Turkey was a NATO member, but an EU outsider. Greece was a NATO member and an EU insider. In other words, neither of the two states were exposed to the

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uncertainties of a would-be insider status and the ‘disciplining’ effect that this typically entails (Greece was invited to the EC back in the early 1980s—during tense bipolarity— after a rather superficial screening process). Then, however, as Turkey from 1999 (the Helsinki summit) moved to EU would-be insider status, we suddenly saw a détente between the two countries (probably sustained by the Cypriot EU approach, favoured by Greece). It is, of course, difficult to corroborate at this stage, but the temporal sequence of events strongly supports the interpretation that EU stability projection is at stake (proposition 2a). In the Cyprus conflict, a sub-conflict to the Greek—Turkish one, the prospect of EU membership seemed to pave the way for reunification. However, as Cyprus actually gained membership, its interest in endorsing the UN reunification plan obviously waned, and it was rejected in the popular referendum. This should illustrate insiders’ increased autonomy compared with would-be insiders and, thereby, their possibility to withstand stability projection should they so wish.

General reflections The propositions that we have mainly focused on, 2 and 2a, are corroborated in all cases (with the partial exception of the Czechs in the Kosovo war). Moreover (propositions 1 and 4), we have seen that neither insiders nor outsiders engage in such behaviour (with the exception of a few outsiders). Consequently, bandwagoning is a distinctive characteristic of would-be insider behaviour. Moreover, a geographical belt of would-be insiders invites successful stability projection; stability therefore prevails in such a belt. One reflection concerns the (few) bandwagoners among the outsiders. These outsiders were aspiring to join NATO, reflecting that NATO has grown more speedily eastwards than the EU, since its requirements regarding economic performance are less advanced. Still, there may be a mechanism of wishful thinking involved, helping to explain why these states have chosen to bandwagon in spite of low membership odds. In any case, we have also seen in other instances that future NATO membership is a strong behavioural incentive, independent from any EU attraction. An objection is often raised to research that is both theoretical and empirical in its orientation that (more or less) circularity is involved in its intellectual operation: that its propositions were inspired by the authors’ pre-knowledge of their subject matter. If true in the present volume, our cases would just be a heuristic aid for the establishment of propositions and, subsequently, they would be mere illustrations of their content. Two specifications should be made initially. First, our explanations why states ended up in the constellation, they did, is not part of our theory. Although theory based, the individual attraction factors that we list, including the specific geopolitical incentives, are explicitly derived from the European post-Cold War experience. No secret is made of that. This means that their relevance to non-European regions is debatable (see Chapter 11). Second, regarding our theory, the very stipulation of constellations (core insiders, near-core, etc.) is, of course, dependent on which polarity prevails in the spatio-temporal context we are studying (Mouritzen 1998a). This is the way it should be. The interesting question, however, is the substance of our propositions, namely their asserted connections between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ factors. We shall now turn to this question.

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The circularity objection is often based on the misleading assumption of empiricism: that theories and their propositions are contained in phenomena. However, our propositions are not inductively established from experience. As seen from the epistemology of critical rationalism (Popper 1972) that we adhere to, the propositions are derived from many other sources of knowledge than empirical experience, let alone our own cases. They are based on such non-empirical assumptions as states-as-actor, role behaviour, pole distance (‘power wanes with distance’), actor rationality in the light of autonomy and influence as well as positive/negative sanctions, socialization of historical memory, and, on a lower level, anticipated reac-tion, goodwill competition, bastion defence, etc. These are general social science concepts and theories, often applied in quite different contexts and at different levels. If anything, there may be some empirical inspiration from a previous study of adaptive acquiescence (Mouritzen 1988), dealing with Nordic Second World War cases of non-pole states neighbouring a paramount power and, to some extent, Finland’s Cold War experience in the same regard. What we are saying is, in fact, that the same theoretical mechanisms that could explain these ‘historical’ cases can account for nonpole power behaviour in post-Cold War Europe! This is anything but circular. Compared with the widespread conception of post-Cold War Europe as ‘post modern’, and in any case to its admittedly unique macro-features, this region is actually a ‘least-likely case’ (Eckstein 1975) for the application of such theory. And still, its expectations fit with very few exceptions. This must be because it is a good theory. Of course, there is a loophole for circularity, if one’s thinking is not provided with an underlying theoretical logic with reasonable parsimony—so it can ‘stand on its own feet’. This is, in our view, partly the case with neo-functionalism, for instance, obviously inspired by the most favourable periods of European integration. We believe, however, that we have given our thinking an immanent model authority in virtue of such parsimony, thereby eliminating the traces of circularity that could be feared. Nonetheless, Chapter 11 challenges the theory outside Europe. What has been said in this chapter pertains to the unipole power structure in the postCold War era. However, from about 2002 there were signs that a new power structure might emerge from a bifurcation of the existing Euro-Atlantic symbiosis: one pole being the continental great powers (Germany and France), the other being the US with its UK ally. Should this materialize, we would face quite a new set of constellations. As distinct from the bandwagoning that we have seen in this chapter vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic unipole, there was now a dilemma for many non-pole powers whether to support one or the other of the newly emerging poles. This will be analysed in Chapter 10.

Notes 1 A great power condominium reduces neighbours’ influence and autonomy: ‘When the elephants fight, the grass suffers; when they make love, it also suffers’ (Wiberg 1996b: 34). The German term ‘Einbindung’ has become common for the binding strategy, since one of its most famous examples was the binding of Germany by several neighbours after her unification in 1990. 2 For Belgium and Austria, being penetrated nationally and linguistically by France and Germany, respectively, balancing against their ‘mentor’ states is hardly an option (neither is it for Switzerland or Luxembourg, being penetrated by both). The Belgian foreign policy

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elite, notably its strong Wallonian segment, sees the best opportunities for Belgium as (loosely) associated with France. 3 These are not the only explanations behind the Swiss ‘anomaly’, but they seem to be the most basic ones. 4 Although at the same time, notably in the Danish pro-EU establishment, appreciating the EU Einbindung capacities vis-à-vis the continental pole powers. 5 Recognition of the Republic of Estonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Estonia, 27 September 1991. 6 Going beyond the Euro-Atlantic sphere to Central Asia, we find heterogeneity as well. There was no automatic link between Muslim heritage and siding with the Albanians (Cummings 2001). Again, we can observe the full spectrum from pro-US Uzbekistan over neutral Turkmenistan to pro-Russian Tajikistan. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzistan seem contradictory. See also note 19. 7 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9–10 September 1992. 8 Convention Watch, 2nd issue, October 2003, Rome: Institutio Affari Internazionali. 9 Speech in the Danish parliament by Paavo Väyrynen, 25 January 1993. 10 Convention Watch, op. cit. 11 Government declaration as cited from Haughton (2002:1330). 12 See euobserver.com, 2 March 2004. 13 For a more modified interpretation of inter-Baltic relations, see Apsalons (1996). 14 In which war is unthinkable between the involved states. The existence of such a community is indicated by a series of ‘non-wars’. A non-war amounts to the peaceful resolution of a conflict that under other conditions would have typically led to war (e.g. Wiberg 2000). 15 Regarding Euro-Atlantic stability projection in Baltic—Russian relations, see Chapter 8 or Mouritzen (2004). 16 On ethnonational tensions in relation to minorities, see Wiberg (1996a: 60). 17 One reason being probably Romania’s strategic location between the Russian and the Serbian (pro-Russian) spheres of influence. 18 The internal affairs at the time seemed to focus on symbolically sensitive educational issues: Russian as a compulsory school language and ‘Romanian’ vs. ‘Moldovan’ syllabus in history teaching. 19 Iraq after the 2003 war is seen here as in the US sphere of influence in the greater Middle East, rather than belonging to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. After the Afghanistan war of 2002, notably, parts of Central Asia have become a shatter zone, subject to US-Russia rivalry. However, this is Asia rather than Europe. Whereas the Caucasian republics, in virtue of geopolitical contiguity, belong to the very fringe of the Euro-Atlantic sphere, Central Asia obviously does not. See also Chapter 11. 20 The conflict was insulated to its region, nonetheless, and eventually the Serb power was defeated militarily by unipole forces in the Kosovo war of 1999. 21 Transitions online 26/7–2000.

Part IV Temporal and spatial perspectives

10 Prospects for Europe Hans Mouritzen The two scenarios for Europe delineated in this chapter are of a ‘mid-term’ nature, looking a decade or so into the future (2015, approximately). This is seen as the most interesting time frame. Roughly speaking, in the long run ‘too much’ is possible, and the short run is normally too similar to the present to bear interesting implications. A decade allows the assumption that the US remains the undisputed superpower, also with a unique position in Europe’s neighbourhood. China with its economic growth rates and political self-assertion may one day challenge the superpower globally, if its (military) power projection ability is improved. For one thing, however, this will hardly happen within the coming decade.1 Second, whereas the Chinese development and self-assertion is crucial for Europe economically (trade), it hardly is geopolitically. China is simply beyond Europe’s sphere of influence, and vice versa. The mid-term perspective will include elements of extrapolation from the current situation, but also theoretical assumptions carrying the analysis beyond that. These assumptions are, not surprisingly, derived from the theoretical foundation of the present volume (see Chapter 2). It is not denied, of course, that specific occurrences—and sometimes also major developments—may be caused by ‘accidental’ details in the decision-making process of a particular state, familiar to any student of history. While such factors may be recognized after the event, their randomness and short-term nature make them unsuited for scenario construction. If this purpose is to be meaningful and worthwhile in the first place, analytically more basic and long-lasting factors should be identified and isolated. Well aware that a large range of other factors may be effective in practice, it is necessary to build parsimonious skeletons of expectations on this basis, thereby avoiding too many and too complicated scenarios.

The realistic scenarios The analysis will be limited to two scenarios that are seen as realistic within a mid-term perspective. They are based on different relational power structures in Europe. The symbiosis scenario assumes a reintroduction of the Euro-Atlantic unipolarity and symbiosis that prevailed from the end of the Cold War till 2002 (Chapter 2). There is a reasonable division of labour between the US and the EU to safeguard stability and democracy in and around Europe, taken care of not least by NATO. EU integration may proceed more or less within this stabilizing framework. The EU will have a role in high politics, but it will never challenge US global supremacy. As political and military tasks for the unipole there will be intransigent ‘resistance pockets’ (like Serbia back in the 1990s) or unstable grey zones (like Ukraine 2004) at its fringe (see Figure 9.4).

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The bifurcation scenario, on the other hand, assumes that the above polarity has been replaced by (relational) bipolarity in Europe. The poles are constituted by an ‘inner’ Europe and an ‘outer’, Atlantic Europe. The seeds of the two sides in connection with the European Iraq conflict have been labelled ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe by the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld2 and in much subsequent rhetoric. I shall avoid this age terminology, however, owing to its normative implications. The UK and presumably Poland will function as European leaders for the Atlanticists and together with the US form the pole base. Correspondingly, France and Germany will lead inner Europe. International institutions will play a negligible role in high politics. NATO may still exist as an empty shell, but hardly more than that; ‘coalitions of the willing’ will be the order of the day. UN Security Council paralysis will occur in some major issues, often with the UK and France on different sides. The EU lives on in low politics, but its redundancy in high politics—or areas approaching this status—has been fully recognized. In the symbiosis scenario, non-pole states will be classified according to their distance to the Euro-Atlantic core: core insiders, near-core insiders, would-be insiders and outsiders. The structure being one of pole—periphery, EU/NATO location is decisive. This is institutionally mediated geopolitics as previously analysed. If bifurcation prevails, by contrast, traditional geopolitics, be it past or present, will decide the positioning of each particular state.

The unrealistic scenarios Logically one can of course imagine further scenarios which, however, can be ruled out for a number of reasons. The first of these could be termed Atlantic bifurcation (as distinct from European bifurcation above). It implies the US on one side and European states on the other, the cleavage literally being the Atlantic Ocean. After all, ‘the crisis in Atlantic relations’ has been an often heard short-hand formula in debates both during the post-Cold War era and previously. This scenario can be conceived in two ways: either with the EU having acquired state-like qualities and pursuing its own independent foreign, security and defence policy, or as individual European foreign and security policies being intergovernmentally coordinated. According to the former, EU integration has been deepened so as to make the EU a fully fledged high politics actor.3 In view of the aggregate economic GDPs of the 2004 EU states, roughly equal to that of the US, a significant military upgrading would do the trick of bringing the EU almost on a par with the US in world politics, according to this way of thinking. However, already the first step is unrealistic as here conceived. It is, in fact, a modern parallel to the historic unification of American states. American unification could take place because the young and relatively homogeneous states had simply not had enough time to cultivate cultural, linguistic or foreign policy identities or, for that matter, governmental vested interests. By contrast, the European states have had ample time for this. In order not to jeopardize their acquired identities and vested interests, they need to keep control (‘uncertainty avoidance’; Hoffmann 1970:94; Mouritzen 1996b: 68–71). Established states (like established organizations in

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organization theory) are willing to renounce considerable gains if only uncertainty can be avoided and control be retained. This cautiousness is most marked in high politics, where potential losses are the most significant. Even close allies are reluctant to integrate their military forces, intelligence services, etc., or even engage in a modest military division of labour. ‘Will we be friends for ever?’ is the sceptical question asked. An autonomous defence has a value comparable with other essential state symbols like the flag, the national anthem and diplomacy. The clinging to these may vary from state to state, but the outcome in the case of the EU is rather certain, since it is determined, in practice, by the ‘slowest boat in the convoy’ (since the necessary EU treaty revision requires unanimity). Turning to the second type of Atlantic bifurcation, the states may agree intergovernmentally on a common course. Why is this unrealistic? In Atlantic high-policy issues, governments may converge, at best, on a compromise, i.e. the semi-assertive role to Europe described in the symbiosis scenario. In the European patchwork of states, individual states have too varied geopolitical locations and traditions (present and past geopolitics) for a united European assertion vis-à-vis the US to be realistic (see Chapter 2; see also, for example, Hoffmann 1970, or Hay 2003b). To be specific: Britain and France, in particular, have too divergent Atlantic (geopolitical) philosophies. A scenario of shifting European alliances, in which classical multipolarity prevails among the European states, is likewise avoided.4 Superficially, the bifurcation scenario as here conceived may look like a specific form of this scenario. However, that would be a misunderstanding. Bifurcation does not develop from scratch, from a tabula rasa; it entails a high politics split growing out of the current situation (2004, approximately). Each of the ‘halves’, and in particular the inner one, is likely to be rather well-integrated. There are no shifting alliances; by contrast, it can be predicted, which states will be Atlanticists and which not. A French—German antagonism, for instance, is ruled out. As long as there continues to be an extra-European superpower, shifting alliances in Europe as during the eighteenth, nineteenth or first half of the twentieth century are ruled out. A European Cold War backlash could be seen as a possibility just after the Cold War.5 However, its prospects were markedly reduced with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it can be ruled out today, given the transformations that have taken place with the completed EU and NATO enlargements. Of course, an isolated Russian set-back in the form of an authoritarian/nationalist takeover cannot be excluded, although it seems less likely today than in the early and mid-1990s and, in any case, will bear less wide-ranging European implications.

The Iraqi conflict and the seeds of a new European polarity? The likelihood of the preferred scenarios depends, of course, on the nature of the current situation, the status quo. Typically, a specific dramatic event that requires states to take an explicit stand will convey the most reliable picture of the polarity prevailing—as distinct from the routine, where states can more easily hide behind vague rhetoric to preserve their action spaces. The conflict over the war on Iraq 2003 provides such an unusually clear picture.

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The war effort that had failed to get a clear UN blueprint in the Security Council was started by the US, the UK and the rest of the coalition forces on 19 March 2003. Schröder had, since his election campaign in the autumn of 2002, declared Germany’s nonparticipation and non-support for such a war operation, partly basing himself on postSecond World War pacifism in German society. With German contributions to the Kosovo war 1999 and the Afghan operation 2001–02, he felt that Germany had done ‘enough’ for the unipole militarily. France, together with Russia, worked energetically— and succeeded—in preventing a UN blueprint to the Iraq war operation. The positioning of European states between the parties of France/Germany and the US/UK took place, for instance, through such an unusually clear signal as the signing of support statements for the US.6

Figure 10.1 The positioning of European states over the Iraq conflict (2003). The map (Figure 10.1) should illustrate the division between the war positive and the war negative states. The former encompass the war participants, the strong war

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supporters (e.g. non-belligerents providing bases, airspace etc.) and the moderate war supporters (i.e. states expressing their diplomatic support for the war effort). The latter means the war opponents, i.e. states criticizing or condemning the war effort (in addition, there is a small category of states with vague or contradictory behaviour). The classification deserves a few specifications. Micro-states and states that were so far from Euro-Atlantic values and interests that they were in conflict with both parties rather than in a dilemma between them (e.g. Belarus) have been omitted from the classification. Turkey has also been omitted, although for another reason. It had such strong geopolitical interests in the war zone and its proximity (notably to avoid the emergence of a Kurdish state) that its dilemma between the US and the EU tended to be overshadowed by these specific interests. Apart from general criticism, of ‘old Europe’, the most forceful US criticism targeted at non-pole powers was directed at its NATO partners Belgium and Norway. Correspondingly, France/Germany (notably President Chirac, see Chapter 7) levelled their sharpest criticism towards the vulnerable would-be insiders Romania and Bulgaria for lack of European solidarity. They were explicitly told that their ‘behaviour’ could cost them their future EU membership. The state distribution was overwhelmingly a result of states’ past and present geopolitics, rather than governmental ideology, public opinion or their size (Mouritzen forthcoming). Ideological proximity to the Bush administration was unimportant. Among its supporters were British and Polish Labour Party governments, while bourgeois governments like the French, Belgian, Norwegian and Finnish ones supported inner Europe. Public opinion, although being strongly mobilized, was likewise unimportant. In almost all the war supportive states, public opinion was strongly against the operation. Moreover, size (capabilities, see Chapter 1) was unimportant. Many ‘small states’ that according to small state theory should favour multilateralism (the UN) and be opposed to the war, supported it: Denmark, the Balts and Bulgaria. Whereas great powers like France, Germany and Russia acted as the most UN loyal. The above ‘flash picture’ tends to be correlated with other dividing issues, most clearly war-related ones. However, the picture is not as clear as one might expect. For instance, states’ attitude to the US request to have its personnel exempted from judgement by the ICC, the International Criminal Court, is only weakly related to the above distribution. Apart from the EU members, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria (all supporters of the war operation) refused to sign a bilateral agreement with the US exempting its personnel. As a consequence, US military aid to them was cut. The main reason for their attitude was probably the anticipation of EU membership and, hence, an interest in not offending major EU powers that could block it. Together with other evidence, this indicates that the European 2003 status quo was still fluid; it cannot clearly be classified as belonging to one or the other scenario. Even though the seeds of European bifurcation were clearly visible, EU membership was still so attractive for otherwise Atlantically inclined states that they were put in a serious dilemma. Also, as witnessed for example by the general support for the ICC, ambitions to base international politics on multilateralism were still alive. After the Iraqi conflict and its peculiarities the seeds of bipolarity may grow to become bipolarity proper. This will become apparent the next time a corresponding

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divisive issue emerges. However, the situation may also return to the kind of unipolar symbiosis prevailing for most of the post-Cold War era. Which factor or factors decide what scenario that will prevail for the next decade or so?

The driving force(s) Whereas the agenda in European capitals was initially, just after the Cold War, filled by the ‘German’ and ‘Russian’ problems, they have, increasingly after 9/11, been substituted by an ‘American’ challenge. Today, the German problem only exists indirectly as sedimented from the past in certain neighbouring countries’ political cultures. As such it may still be significant, as we have seen in previous chapters. With completed EU and NATO enlargements, Russia is geopolitically too much on the margin to present any general ‘problem’. Again indirectly, though, the ‘Russian problem’ exists as sedimented in many countries’ political cultures, and as such it still influences their positioning. The prerequisite of the American challenge is that the European balance of power has shifted in favour of the US since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Calleo 2001). This was not a self-evident development, as the Cold War ended—quite to the contrary.7 In spite of the Soviet/Russian demise, however, the US remained a European power. Its military power was indispensable even at the EU’s own ‘doorstep’, as demonstrated by the wars in the West Balkans. Moreover, the US extended its power projection eastwards with two NATO enlargements, even encompassing ex-Soviet territory. Also, the NATO and EU newcomers are generally Atlanticists. With the balance of power in Europe thus favouring the US superpower more than ever, the major dividing issue among European powers is how to relate to this superpower challenge. Which are the scenario determinant(s)? With no signs of decline in US global power projection ability for the next decade or so, the scenario basically depends on which specific behaviour the sole superpower will engage in. The wider the gulf to a European ‘average’ position, the more difficult it will be to reach the required European compromise on proper Atlantic relations, as required by the unipole scenario. Although not challenging the US superpower position, the terrorist ‘needlepricks’ have been the single factor affecting US behaviour the most since the millennium shift. The superpower behaviour will be conditioned by the future (mid-term) persistence of terrorist onslaughts as such and their effects on US domestic politics. For a sole superpower, domestic fluctuations are allowed a very significant role in its external behaviour. Not surprisingly, the transnational attacks on the US homeland, affecting Americans’ everyday lives, have fuelled US patriotism and centralization at all levels. With continued attacks, or risks thereof, this national mobilization of ‘adrenalin’ will continue.8 This is likely to be more important than the specific nature of the US administration (Republican vs. Democrat). If terrorism continues as the overwhelming national security problem, any administration will have to consider USA ‘here and now’, thereby most likely widening the gulf to the European average. The US will not have the patience required by European multilateralism; speed and (perceived) efficiency are seen as more important than multilateral legitimacy. In this way, the likelihood of a European (essentially British—French) compromise on Atlantic relations diminishes. Bifurcation between Atlanticists and non-Atlanticists will take place.

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The occurrence of large-scale terrorism vis-à-vis the US seems, hence, to be the main scenario-determinant. Strictly speaking, the symmetry/ asymmetry of the terror danger vis-à-vis the US/Europe is decisive.9 In other words, if the terror danger were directed as much against continental European countries as against the US, the prospects for mutual understanding might be more favourable and, hence, the likelihood for the unipole scenario to re-emerge. The Madrid attack on 11 March 2004 could mark such a development. Still, European allies may be seen as substitute targets for the US, the ‘big Satan’. Hereby, the indicated asymmetry is retained. In any case, the strategy to fight terrorism may be a divisive issue. Terrorism is obviously an exogenous factor in relation to the scenarios. As we shall see, it may be supplemented by endogenous factors that may reinforce or modify each of the scenarios. Let us now turn to the characteristics and implications of each of the two stipulated scenarios.

The symbiosis scenario The symbiosis (unipole) scenario implies that European relations return to the post-Cold War normality after the special circumstances of the Iraqi war operation in 2003. The shock impetus of 11 September gradually fades away, and no further large-scale attacks on the US are reported for several years. The Bush administration (or its follower) moves towards the middle-ground of US post-Cold War behaviour. The US remains the only superpower, of course, but it re-approaches a multilateralist posture vis-à-vis global institutions. This will be further emphasized by a democratic administration, traditionally more committed in this direction. So-called ‘preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ military operations are virtually taken off the agenda. Apart from reasons of international legitimacy, one important incentive for such a rapprochement is fear of ‘imperial overstretch’—i.e. the need for EU/NATO/UN co-sponsoring in relation to global military undertakings and reconstructions. There will still be significant US—EU disagreements and conflicts in selected areas, but they will be kept apart from the common interest of projecting and safeguarding stability and democracy in Europe and its salient environment. The rapprochement is, of course, welcomed in Europe. The UK offshore power will reinvent its influential position as bridge-builder between the US and continental European powers, as this task is again becoming realistic and manageable. Germany moves back to a linkage position between the US/UK and France. With revised signals from Washington, Berlin will be eager to repair the damage of the recent past. As a result partly of this German move, British—French and thereby EU defence and security cooperation get back on track. There are, thus, two compromises involved: the Atlantic one (the symbiosis) and the intra-European, essentially British—French, ‘compromise on the compromise’. According to the symbiosis, the EU shall strive for a certain independent role in high politics, but never to the brink of challenging US global supremacy. The US—EU symbiosis in relation to stability and democracy in and around Europe is re-established in this way. By the same token NATO regains a significant position.

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Poland may acquire the status of a pole power in the mid-term perspective considered here. This is not so much in view of its (rising) economic and military capabilities, but rather due to its central location. Poland is a linking pin between the western EuroAtlantic countries, the other Visegrad countries to the south, the other Baltic Sea countries to the north, and the ‘eastern dimension’ countries to the east (the Ukraine and others). The EU eastern dimension, initiated by Poland, naturally makes Poland itself a key country, in which it tends to see itself as an EU (and NATO) representative (Makarychev 2004), rather than a moderator like Finland in the ‘northern dimension’. In this role, Poland will tend to overstate candidate countries’ opportunities in relation to western structures (as with Ukraine at least prior to the 2004 revolution), because this makes the Polish role all the more important. In contrast to other aspiring pole powers as Spain and Italy, there is no natural barrier (like the Mediterranean) limiting how many countries Poland can accompany into western structures. In this way, Poland can make itself indispensable to Euro-Atlantic power projection eastwards for the foreseeable future. This fulfils our definition of a pole power (Chapter 1). The non-pole powers will be grouped, as for most of the post-Cold war era, according to an EU centre—periphery classification: core insiders, near-core insiders, would-be insiders and outsiders. With the enlargement process continuing, Romanian, Bulgarian or Croatian EU memberships will hardly exert feedback on the general nature of the scenario. However, a possible Turkish membership will do so. In relation to continental Europe, Turkey is geopolitically the south-eastern equivalent of the UK: separated from the continent geographically and with an empire of the past that has provided a potential alternative (Islamic) identity to the European one (corresponding to the British Commonwealth identity). Moreover, albeit for widely different reasons, the UK and Turkey have established strong Atlantic ties. Both the British and the Turkish approaches to the EC/EU were met with scepticism in continental Europe—not least in France, partly based on these circumstances. Should Turkey, nonetheless, acquire membership like the UK did, it seems likely, bearing the UK parallel in mind, to entail a pause to EU deepening. However, Euro-Atlantic integration will not suffer from this—quite to the contrary. As the US gets a close ally like Turkey within the EU, the EU ‘average’ will be pushed a little bit closer towards the US position. The US—EU cleavage will be reduced, other things being equal, further strengthening the symbiosis. Moreover, new EU neighbours like Syria, Iraq, Iran and the South Caucasus republics will increase the necessary EU radius of action. In the context of the unipole scenario Russia will be left out in the cold, roughly speaking. With the NATO (and EU) enlargements and a constructive Euro-Atlantic relationship ensuring the continued importance of the area’s key international institutions, the Russian outsider will be seriously handicapped, not least symbolically and psychologically. Moreover, most of the 2004 EU and NATO newcomers carry with them anti-Russian lessons of the past. Poland, with EU and NATO authority, actively rivals Russian influence in the Ukraine. The Russian soil will be increasingly fertile for those nationalist circles, be they to the right or left, who argue that the post-Cold War has amounted to a series of Western broken promises (‘betrayals’) or neglects of Russia, from the negotiations over German unification, the two (or more!) NATO enlargements, the Kosovo war, the 2004 Ukrainian revolution, etc. During the proper circumstances in Russia, such nationalist forces may attempt a military take-over. If successful, this would

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hardly feedback on the general nature of the unipole scenario, as it would during the 1990s. However, the Euro-Atlantic community would get a much sharper edge eastwards along its present outer limit of stability projection (see Figure 9.4). It should be remembered, however, that a Russian self-assertion as here conceived may not be very likely, generally speaking. The argument is, solely, that it is more likely during EuroAtlantic symbiosis than in connection with bifurcation. The EU neighbourhood during the symbiosis The symbiosis will be challenged in Europe’s salient environment, not least. This pertains both to its general stability and democratic development, but also to rivalry with a frustrated Russia. Even without an authoritarian coup in Russia, Moscow, isolated at the European fringe, will cling to its remaining spheres of influence. Polish (Western) rivalry with Russia over Ukraine may, ultimately, entail the splitting of Ukraine into a Russian-oriented state east of the Dnjepr and a Euro-Atlantic oriented one to its west. A mini version of this split can be expected in Moldova, where Transdjnestr will join Russia or East Ukraine. Correspondingly, rivalries will intensify in and among the Caucasian republics. The US and the EU, including Turkey, support Azerbaijan and Georgia (Tbilisi). By contrast, Russia will support Armenia and the separatist areas of Georgia. In the background, Iran will be waiting for opportunities to export its Islamic revolution. For all parties, Caspian oil and its installations will be crucial. Further to the south, a Euro-Atlantic mediating partnership can be expected in a Middle East peace process, although it will remain an asymmetric one led by the US (Brenner 2003). In connection with conflicts and instability in North Africa, the partnership will be on more equal terms, not least due to strong Spanish, French and Italian interests here. The institutions during the symbiosis In the present scenario, one can imagine both common military action and action carried out by the US or the EU as part of a comprehensive division of labour: • The US and European countries may use NATO to implement common action, being sanctioned in international law or by the UN. • The US can ‘go alone’ (more or less), but still backed by the required UN legitimacy. • The EU can implement its own action as part of the CFSP and ESDP. This can take place either with its own forces or with forces and equipment borrowed from NATO (the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement). The action is, of course, sanctioned in international law or the UN. With the basic geopolitical difference between the UK and France, the ESDP compromise between the two will be fragile. For France, the ESDP should be the beginning of something much more important, functioning independently from the US. For the UK it is, at best, a supplement to NATO. If, in addition, the US is directly suspicious vis-à-vis an emerging ESDP (see Grant 2003), the UK will keep it boiling over a slow fire, in particular keeping its own staff at an absolute minimum.

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With the geopolitical and other reasons given initially against the EU as a fully fledged high-politics actor, revising the CFSP/ESDP rules of the game to qualified majority voting instead of unanimity is therefore unrealistic, even in a longer time perspective. It would probably do more harm than good because the states voted down will be able to undermine majority policy. The split will be apparent both internally and externally and therefore deprive the decided policy/action of credibility. The split will in turn be worsened, and there will even be a likelihood that the CFSP/ESDP will break down. EU operations will, if necessary, be carried out in its neighbourhood, not least North Africa, Southern Caucasus and possibly Ukraine/Moldova. Since NATO countries’ previous concerns about ‘out of area’ operations seem to have vanished already by 2004, NATO operations can take place further away from Europe: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, etc. Future containment of China or North Korea, however, will be carried out by the US, with more or less diplomatic support from individual European states.

The bifurcation scenario With continued US-directed terrorism, we will see persistent US unilateralism and more generally a pronounced US superpower ethos. ‘Preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ military operations are recurrent possibilities. This means that the intra-European disagreements illuminated by the 2003 Iraqi war operation will be frozen to form the backbone of fixed state groupings. The former war opponents will form inner Europe, headed by France and Germany, whereas the war participants, as well as their strong and moderate supporters, will form outer Europe, headed by the US/UK and presumably Poland, being strategically located for several purposes.10 The inner grouping, notably, will become increasingly structured and perhaps even institutionalized, building to some extent on the ethos of the EC founding fathers (with only the Netherlands and perhaps Italy absent). The outer grouping, on the other hand, will—in close consultation and cooperation with the US—be more oriented towards Europe’s ‘new neighbours’ and how to build relations with them. A reliable indicator of the present scenario would be if the US moved its bases in Germany to Romania, for instance.11 The groupings’ mutual disagreements will tend to correlate with an increasing number of issues. For instance, France will block further EU enlargements, because they will be feared to favour outer Europe too much. A self-reinforcing political competition may develop; however, there is an upper limit to conflict. There is no significant ideological divide between the two groupings, and the EU area remains, after all, a mutual security community. Moreover, there is still a low politics EU, albeit without dynamism. Its habits of cooperation, at all levels, constitute an important stabilizer. The Euro-Atlantic unipole has, in any case, been definitely dissolved. Disagreements can no longer be safely insulated from the previous US—EU ‘common interest’ of stability and democracy in Europe and their systematic projection.

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European powers facing the US challenge What are the incentives behind states balancing or bandwagoning with the US? In answering this question, we should start with the continental states with the greatest power projection ability, i.e. France, Russia and Germany. Their alignments (plus that of the UK) will affect the balance of power in and around Europe and set the parameters for the remaining powers. France, Russia and Germany will balance rather than bandwagon vis-à-vis the intransigent superpower. They realize that the enterprise is only realistic if they all do it. Even though formulated during a different power structure, this is a traditional French and Russian geopolitical philosophy: de Gaulle’s ‘l’Europe des patries’ and Gorbachev’s ‘common European home’. The additional reward for both France and Germany is, provided they stick together and extend their traditional Axis into high politics, that they will be the geographic and symbolic core powers in a future continental security and defence union (whose weakness, of course, will be the absence of the UK, see below). Instead of the traditional EU/NATO binding of Germany, France’s reward from bifurcation is the German de facto commitment to the French side. This may, in due course, be reinforced by the operation of an inner Europe integration/binding logic. Germany’s reward—somewhat less marked—is that the prospects for a (mini-) ‘European’ foreign policy are improved and thereby also German independence vis-à-vis a unilateralist US. With the absence of a balancing tradition, Germany is obviously the ‘expensive partner’ in this union. Russia will strengthen its position considerably in the context of the present scenario. With Euro-Atlantic bifurcation, Russia will be reintegrated into European diplomacy as before the First World War. Stagnation or irrelevance of Euro-Atlantic institutions will strengthen the Russian outsider, relatively, to their member states. Moreover, continued terrorism, being the assumption of the present scenario, will improve Russia’s international role (the common enemy). The continental reasoning does not apply to the UK, quite to the contrary. The UK has traditionally functioned as Europe’s ‘holder of the balance’, balancing any continental power hegemony (Napoleon, Gross Deutschland, the Soviet Union). An unbalanced French—German security and defence union, even if only the seeds of it, awakens the British balancing instinct. Moreover, the British do not feel harmed by American unilateralism, since they see themselves as the US’s privileged partner (the traditional ‘special relationship’, the linguistic community). Joining a purely European security and defence union, independent from NATO, the UK would be on a par with the French, roughly, but hardly with France and Germany together. This is obviously inferior to the role as leading ‘Atlantic Europe’ that the UK can play in harmony with its offshore position and its traditional Atlantic affiliations. The positionings of the non-pole powers We have now seen how four European states together with the US have created a new European power structure. They are its pole powers. Other European states, in turn, position themselves in relation to this US/UK vs. France/Germany/Russia polarity. There is now a new set of constellations on the stage: inner Europe vs. outer Europe (and perhaps a group of symmetries between the two). States need to make either/or choices

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rather than positioning themselves in a core—periphery structure. There is no general unipolar attraction at stake—no ‘good company’. ‘Einbindung’ with its multiple contacts belongs to an institutionalized context like the Euro-Atlantic one, rather than to one of classic geopolitics that we now see. Moreover, the groupings in the bipolar scenario do not have the kind of entrance test that characterizes the EU or NATO. Since no ‘grand deal’ is now in operation, states follow their raw geopolitical incentives rather closely. Since the non-pole powers can hardly affect the overall competition among the groupings, their primary incentives spring from their own neighbourhoods and immediate geopolitical concerns that they can affect considerably. The state incentives in the bipolar scenario may be contemporary or historic, as well as positive or negative. Contemporary incentives are assumed to have primacy in relation to historic incentives, just like dynamics has primacy in relation to inertia (see pp. 39–40). Negative incentives can be given primacy over other political concerns—and even be exploited domestically—by being formulated by state leaders as matters of ‘external danger’, ‘high polities’ or ‘security’, for instance. Dangers or risks create more consensus than the winning of possible gains, thereby also providing a better platform for external action. The two sets of incentives logically entail the following four categories of incentives for the non-pole states (see Table 10.1).

Table 10.1 Types of state incentives in the European bifurcation scenario Time Contemporary perspective Value

Historic

Negative

II ‘The ghosts of the past’ Fear of one or more continentalgreat powers sedimented in the political culture entails Atlanticism IV ‘Standard operating procedures’ A ‘successful’ foreign policy tradition sedimented in the political culture is continued

Positive

I ‘Friends should be at a distance’ The nearby great power is balanced through Atlanticism; i.e. a nearby political dependency is replaced by a distant one III ‘Fringe benefits’ Atlanticism is not geopolitically required, but there are fringe benefits attached

I: The contemporary, negative incentive This means balancing against a great neighbour, whereby a nearby political dependency (here: on France/Germany or Russia) is replaced by a more benign distant dependency (if such an ally is available; here: on the UK/US). This presupposes that the state is not prevented from balancing by being nationally pole penetrated (here: Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria by France and/or Germany). The traditional Dutch and Danish Atlanticists (Chapter 9) are likely to reinforce their balancing strategy vis-à-vis the French-German condominium. The Baltic countries feel more reassured by US balancing than EU balancing vis-à-vis their big eastern neighbour. They fear that the European great powers would be inclined to ‘sell’ them by compromising with Russia (Chapter 8). Poland also wishes to balance Russia, although from a stronger position, as illustrated by its contemporary rivalry with the great power in

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relation to Ukraine. Again, the US is seen as a stronger and more proactive ally than the EU, being too ‘soft’ with Russia in high politics. As we saw, institutional enlargements are blocked in the present scenario. Turkey, in other words, has been excluded from EU membership in spite of significant adaptation in the past. For geopolitical and geo-economic reasons, a frustrated Turkey will nonetheless have important dealings with the EU and the continental powers, including Russia. American counterweight will be valuable in this connection. In other words: close dependencies are sought replaced by a distant one. In relation to the threat from Islamic fundamentalism, the US will continue to be a close ally. There may be instances of local balancing, unrelated to the continental great powers that belong to the present category. For example, Ireland is likely to continue balancing against its British great power neighbour, thereby aligning with the continental powers. II: The historic, negative incentive There is a historically sedimented fear of the continental great powers of Germany, France or Russia/the Soviet Union in the state’s political culture, in turn predisposing its current decision-makers towards Atlanticism and, hence, outer Europe. The fact that Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union have been the two major aggressors on the European continent during the last one and a half centuries has since long sedimented in the political cultures of a number of victim states. Likewise has the circumstance that the US and the UK were the main contributors to the halting of German aggression and to the later ‘containment’ of the Soviet Union. Since slowly changing factors are at stake here, these sediments should be a reliable parameter for predictive purposes Obvious examples are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and the Baltic states. For Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the historically transmitted fear of Germany—that was also found in the Danish case—should play a role (the Second World War and the partitioning of Czechoslovakia immediately prior to it). A corresponding fear of Russia should play a role among all new Atlanticists. A purely European defence union is hardly perceived as reassuring in this connection.12 Moreover, the French— German record of supporting the independence movements of these countries during the Cold War was relatively modest; by contrast, US and UK hardliners like Reagan or Thatcher were popular among Cold War regime critics, now belonging to the foreign policy elites of their countries. Therefore, if the bifurcation scenario materializes, these countries can be predicted to join ‘outer Europe’. III: The contemporary, positive incentive In the absence of negative incentives, positive ones may play a role. Typically, countries in the possession of base facilities that suit the needs of the only superpower will be in this favourable situation. They are rewarded financially and otherwise for making the facilities available. This hardly rules out an independent position in other issues, but they are obviously on the US side in conflicts, where the facilities are used. For instance, Portugal with its Atlantic location can offer the Azores as, literally, an American stepping stone to Europe and the Middle East. This is, of course, tantamount to

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belonging to outer Europe. In return, Portugal can expect considerable economic and political rewards. Correspondingly, Turkey will be a link regarding military operations in the Middle East, Iraq, Iran and the Caucasian republics. Iceland’s defence agreement with the US is based on the country’s Cold War strategic location—a location it no longer has. The way to Russia is no longer as interesting as that to the wider Middle East, and that does not pass Keflavik. The political logic is therefore different than above: in order to safeguard the persistence of the profitable base (perhaps unrealistic, after all), it is essential for Iceland to maintain continued American presence with political means. Such obviously entails belonging to outer Europe. IV: The historic, positive incentive With negative incentives having priority over positive ones, and contemporary over historic ones, the present category has the lowest priority. However, in the absence of incentives in the above categories, the historic, positive ones will be allowed to play a role. The most important among these is probably a ‘successful’ foreign policy tradition. This is likely to be a useful predictor, given the relative constancy of elite or culturally based factors. In our context, this means the presence or absence of an Atlantic tradition. In contrast to category II, we are here dealing with a positive foreign policy lesson. Decision-makers, bureaucracy or the foreign policy elite have over time accustomed themselves to an orientation perceived as a success. This seems to be the case regarding Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland. They were all in some form ‘neutral’ during the Cold War (in all four cases perceived as a success story), and none of them have so far definitely broken with this tradition. It entails an absence of formal bonds to the US and of a standard operating procedure of the form ‘we follow the US’. To this can be added, related to their neutrality, that these same countries (apart from Switzerland) traditionally give high priority to the UN. With all their investments in the UN and its related norm system, supporting a unilateralist superpower around the globe would be far from logical. Accordingly, in the absence of unexpected incentives of other kinds, these countries will be found in the ‘inner Europe’ camp. After the demise of the previously axiomatic conflict with Turkey, the positioning of Greece may be in flux. Still, its pro-Russian, pro-Serb and anti-American tradition should, nonetheless, speak for inner Europe. Correspondingly, a range of countries already mentioned in other categories have developed strong Atlanticist traditions: Iceland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey, notably. On the above simple basis, it is hardly possible to predict the orientation of each and every state in the bifurcated Europe. Doubts prevail regarding a few remaining cases. Spain and Italy do not quite share the British great power ambitions, but can better live with being next in line to the continental pole powers. The two have traditionally positioned themselves as both Atlanticists and ‘good Europeans’, and their choice in a bipolar structure is likely to depend on domestic politics and specific circumstances. In contrast to the Iraq situation, Bulgaria should most likely belong to inner Europe now that NATO membership has been safeguarded and, at least until 2007, EU membership is at stake. As distinct from the other new democracies, Bulgaria is traditionally proRussian (due not least to a Turkish ‘ghost of the past’) and does not have a German ghost.

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In particular if aspirations for American bases have been disappointed, inner Europe seems the natural choice. Regarding Norway, the need to compensate for a considerable European political marginalization speaks for outer Europe and the US connection, as well as the country’s traditional Atlanticism. This, however, may come to compete with Norway’s traditionally strong UN ideology as during the Iraq conflict. Norwegian action space is considerable, so its positioning may be decided by domestic politics and specific circumstances. A symmetric position is an obvious possibility. Europe’s neighbourhood during bifurcation In the present scenario, there is no division of labour between inner and outer Europe/the US in relation to Europe’s ‘near abroad’. Rivalry or coincidence will determine who does what. By virtue of its integration in the ‘good company’ and its improved position, Russia will act in a more relaxed manner in its sphere of influence. This tendency is reinforced by Western institutions having terminated their enlargement process. In other words, the Western ‘pull’ on a number of countries has been reduced. As Poland can no longer play the enlargement card, its position will be weaker eastwards. Polish—Russian rivalry regarding the Ukraine will be modest, and the Ukraine as well as Moldova will persist in their present forms. The US will, together with Turkey, seek to keep inner Europe/the EU out of Caucasus. This will be an easy task, since its attraction has been diminished in this region with the termination of EU enlargement. The US/Turkey will compete with Russia and Iran in the Caucasian republics, following the same pattern as during the symbiosis. There will not be agreement among EU countries to be junior partner to the US, neither in the nearer or more distant Middle East. Still, there will continue to be a modest role for traditional US supporters like the UK, Poland and Denmark. In relation to North Africa, by contrast, European states will dominate. Spain, France and Italy will act in relation to challenges in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia/Libya, respectively. From one scenario to another Apart from the few possible exceptions previously mentioned, the state distribution in the bifurcation scenario resembles the one in Figure 10.1 regarding the Iraq operation. This is no coincidence, since the latter was also geopolitically conditioned. There seems to be a continuity between the ‘shadow’ Atlanticist positioning during the first decade of the post-Cold War era (Chapter 9), the Iraq positioning 2002–03, and the distribution we can expect should real European bifurcation materialize. As we have seen, the latter possibility will depend on an exogenous—not easily predictable—factor, namely the occurrence of US-directed terrorism. Should European bifurcation take place, however, we know with reasonable certainty which states will be on what side and why. Europe does not move freely between the two realistic scenarios. The termination of terrorism or its restart will be important, of course. However, each of the two scenarios has dynamics of its own by virtue of certain self-sustaining mechanisms. For instance, Turkey entering the EU, which is likely to happen during the symbiosis, will push the EU average in an Atlantic direction and thereby reinforce the symbiosis. And vice versa in

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connection with bifurcation. During the latter, Russia will strengthen its position and influence significantly. This means that it will exploit the opportunities to stabilize EuroAtlantic bifurcation further. The situation in late 2004 does not point unequivocally in the direction of one or the other scenario. Fences have been mended and institutional plans have been agreed upon since the Iraq conflict. However, the scenario litmus test will not be forthcoming until the next major geopolitical disagreement. Since the dissolution of the Soviet threat, there has been a decrease in common interests between the US and the European ‘average’. In spite of their value community, the future picture will be that the challenges, as currently terrorism, affect them differently. The main reason for this is their different geographical reach: the global interests of the superpower vs. ‘Europe’s’ limited radius of action. In a longer time perspective, China is likely to challenge the US superpower. As the EU will keep a low profile in this future geopolitical conflict, we have here another source of Euro-Atlantic and European bifurcation. This, however, lies beyond the mid-term perspective that has been considered in this chapter.

Notes 1 China’s GDP is expected to supersede that of the US from about 2040 (and already be second from 2016), provided that China ‘maintain(s) policies and develop(s) institutions that are supportive of growth’ (Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, Global Economics Paper 99, http://www.gs.com/). 2 ‘You’re thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I think that’s old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a lot of new members’ (22 January 2003). 3 This corresponds to the ‘hard core integration’ scenario developed by Buzan et al. (1990). 4 This scenario roughly corresponds to the ‘fragmentation scenario’ as conceived by Buzan et al. (1990). Fragmentation, at least in their version, presupposes a French—German split; concern about German domination of Europe is its guiding principle (the fate of German unification and its accompanying great power deal was still in the balance at their time of writing). See also Mearsheimer (1990/91). 5 See ‘Cold War III’ in Buzan et al. (1990). 6 United we stand, 30 January 2003, and Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries, 5 February 2003. 7 For instance, it is not among the scenarios considered by Buzan et al. (1990). 8 See Mouritzen (1997a), building on the sociological theory of Coser (1956). 9 Bertrand et al. (1999) include a European terror scenario, where the US has been spared any major attack and seems rather disengaged. 10 On Poland as an American protegé and a future regional power, see Zaborowski and Longhurst (forthcoming). 11 This was hinted by Pentagon sources during 2003, but then faded away. If it should materialize, it would indicate that the Iraq bifurcation was not merely a temporary affair. 12 As formulated by a Polish representative in February 2003, quoted in Chapter 7: ‘As long as the US is a functioning reality and a united Europe is a dream, we will always choose the reality over the dream.’

11 The constellation theory applied outside Europe Anders Wivel The aim of this chapter is to assess the relevance outside the Euro-Atlantic area of the theory developed in Chapter 2 and applied throughout the book. Generalizing and applying the theory’s insights to other regions helps to specify the boundaries of the theory’s explanatory power and reveal which of the theory’s assumptions that are applicable in general and which are more closely tied to the Euro-Atlantic area. The chapter is structured as a plausibility probe—not a test—of the theory advanced in Chapter 2 and applied throughout the book. It offers a set of theoretical propositions and some empirical evidence to support these propositions, but it makes no attempt at falsifying the propositions. A plausibility probe is a useful methodological tool at a stage of inquiry preliminary to testing. As noted by Eckstein, ‘[i]n essence, plausibility probes involve attempts to determine whether potential validity may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant the pains and costs of testing, which are almost always considerable, but especially so if broad, painstaking comparative studies are undertaken’ (Eckstein 1975:108). This is the case here: we want to know whether a theory taking its point of departure in Euro-Atlantic politics may be applicable to foreign policy behaviour in other regions as well. Theoretical plausibility probes—outlining the internal logic of the theory and how it applies to the field of study—should generally precede empirical plausibility probes surveying potential cases and both should precede genuine testing and comprehensive case studies. Accordingly, I now proceed to a theoretical plausibility probe exploring how the logic of the constellation theory may be revised to apply to foreign policy behaviour outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Then an empirical plausibility probe surveys core—periphery regionalism in the Americas, East Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The plausibility probes concern the specific version of the constellation theory constructed and applied in this volume (see Figure 2.2), but in the concluding section of the chapter, I briefly relate the results to the general constellation theory (see Mouritzen 1991).

Generalizing the argument: a theoretical plausibility probe The constellation theory took its point of departure in realism, but developed the perspective further in order to explain the puzzle of the book: the heterogeneous foreign policy behaviour of small European states (see Chapters 1 and 2). Most importantly, we argued for the importance of using the concepts non-mobility, relational polarity, constellation and past geopolitics when explaining the foreign policy behaviour of nonpole powers. To what extent is the internal logic of these concepts linked to the peculiarities of Euro-Atlantic integration and how may the logic be applied outside the Euro-Atlantic area?

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Non-mobility The importance of non-mobility is not tied to the specific geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration (see Chapter 2; Mouritzen 1998), but the intention to move our focus away from explaining the foreign policies of small states in contemporary Europe in order to construct a general theory necessitates a specification of how the importance of nonmobility may vary over time and space. Three variables—all of them consistent with modern realist theory—condition variations in the importance of non-mobility for states’ foreign policy. First, the importance of non-mobility depends on the stability of the states system. States do not face a stable geopolitical environment if the mortality rate of states is high and the creation and dissolution of states is common. When this is the case, the geopolitical location of the state may be changing despite its fixed geographical location. In the modern international system states are remarkably stable organizations and their death rate much lower than the death rate of private firms or organizations (see Waltz 1979). The dissolution and formation of states is not evenly distributed throughout world history but tends to appear in ‘clusters’ following serious power struggles between great powers (Hansen 2002). Thus, in Europe clusters of state formation followed the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War and in the rest of the international system state formation was often an effect of decolonization following from the decline of the old European great powers and the similar interests of the superpowers of the Cold War in limiting the colonial powers of the old European great powers (ibid.: 317). Second, the importance of non-mobility varies with the ability to project power over long distances. If power projection were to be perfect all over the system then the fixed locations of states would not matter at all: all states would be equally threatened and influenced by the great powers and the system would, in effect, be no different from an anarchic system with mobile units (see Mouritzen 1998:12). In contrast, if power projection is only possible over very short distances then non-mobility becomes extremely important. Some states would permanently be on the verge of extinction, while others would enjoy a peaceful location far away from any substantial threats. The ability to project power over long distances depends on what is usefully summed up by Buzan as ‘interaction capacity’, denoting the ‘absolute quality of technological and societal capabilities across the system’ (Buzan 1993:79). The evolution of systemically distributed technological capabilities is vital for the increase in capacity for interaction— and consequently the projection of power—within the system. This is particularly true for communication and transportation technologies. Societal capabilities include shared norms and organizations. Shared norms facilitate political communication and thereby contribute to the construction of international organizations. In turn, these organizations strengthen political communications and shared norms even further. In general, we would not expect our theory to apply to cases of extremely high interaction capacity, because this would negate the effects of non-mobility. Also, we would not expect our theory to apply to cases of extremely low interaction capacity, because the technological and social infrastructure would not allow for the creation of regional integration schemes. As the level of interaction capacity has risen during the course of history and in particular as a consequence of the technological revolutions at sea, on land and in communications (Buzan and Little 2000:279–88), we will expect the constellation theory to be more easily applicable to the present than to distant pasts

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characterized by extremely low interaction capacity and distant futures potentially characterized by extremely high interaction capacity. This is no surprise, since the theory was formulated in order to answer a contemporary puzzle. In addition we will expect the applicability of the constellation theory to vary over space in the contemporary international system with variations in interaction capacity. Finally, the importance of non-mobility varies with the relative power of the state (see Chapter 2). Pole powers in all parts of the international system tend to be less constrained by their geopolitical location because their relative capabilities leave them better positioned to influence their immediate vicinity through political, economic and military means. Thus, we expect the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers to be more restricted by non-mobility than the foreign policy behaviour of pole powers. Non-pole powers exist throughout the international system and consequently this expectation is not linked to the Euro-Atlantic area. Relational polarity Relational polarity, i.e. how poles constrain a particular state’s power position and foreign policy behaviour, serves as a condition variable in the constellation theory, i.e. the impact of constellation varies with polarity. Power projection does not take place within a political, economic or military vacuum, but follows certain rules of the game. As realists we assume these rules of the game to reflect the interests and identity of the great powers. Thus, we would expect the general norms of the systemic great power(s) to be reflected in the global rules of the game and the general norms of the regional great power(s) to be reflected in the regional rules of the game. What is the effect of variations in relational polarity on the non-pole powers? Two factors are of importance: the nature of the pole(s) and the number of poles. Even though non-pole powers are subject to the restrictions of the pole powers no matter their regional location in the international system, we would expect the nature of power projection to vary with the nature of the pole, i.e. value compatibility, ideological substance and pole centralization (see Chapter 2). During regional integration value compatibility with the pole is of particular importance for the non-pole powers. Regional integration—even when confined to trade issues—is characterized by a broad and most often gradually expanding scope for collective decision-making. As trade barriers are lowered, decisions have to be made on how, when and to what extent and the terms of fair trade need to be agreed upon. This is likely to create conflicts of interests no matter the values of the participants, but if values are incompatible, conflicts are likely to escalate and may in the end prove unsolvable. The non-pole powers are likely to lose any such conflicts because of their lack of ‘go-it-alone’ power: in contrast to the pole powers they cannot credibly threaten to go ahead with their own alternative integration project (see Gruber 2000). Similarly, the ideological substance of the pole’s values is important, because during regional integration these values determine the character of power projection through the institutional superstructure. If liberal values make up the basic ideological substance of the pole, then the institutional superstructure is likely to reflect this in terms of transparency (allowing non-pole powers to discern the decision-making process among the great powers), the protection of minority rights (allowing non-pole powers themselves

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to voice their concerns through the institutions of integration) and the nature of power projection (mainly being economic and diplomatic with direct military power projection only being used as a measure of last resort). Finally, centralization of the pole is important because decentralized poles allow for more active participation and influence of the non-pole powers and less effective sanctions from the pole. In contrast to neorealism, the constellation theory argues that stable alliances may count as one pole, in particular if the powers involved are dedicated to the same ideology and have established common institutions. This allows for extremely decentralized poles. However, while this is a general assumption about polarity in international relations, it could be argued that it is particularly relevant—or maybe only relevant—for Euro-Atlantic integration. It may be argued that the duration and institutionalization of the close cooperation between the United States and the European great powers based on their shared interests and ideology is not only an ideal type example, but also the only example of a stable alliance as a relational pole. Nowhere outside the transatlantic areas are we able to find an alliance of comparable strength and stability. However, this is not a problem for the theory. The assumption of stable alliances as poles has already shown its usefulness in the study of Euro-Atlantic integration throughout the book. If it turns out to be irrelevant in the analysis of all or most cases outside the Euro-Atlantic area then this helps us specify the applicability of the assumption without damaging the logic of the theory. The point is not that poles will always or even predominantly be alliances, but that seen from the individual non-pole power, it matters little whether it faces a pole which is one state or a pole which is an alliance of more states always pushing in the same direction. In Chapter 2 the three variables were kept constant, because the aim was to discuss the consequences for non-pole powers in the case of: (1) a high level of value compatibility between pole and non-pole powers; (2) the ideological substance of the pole is liberal; and (3) the pole is decentralized, i.e. the relevant values in the Euro-Atlantic case. Generalizing the insights from the Euro-Atlantic we would expect variations to take place along a continuum, rather than being a question of either/or. Values may be more or less compatible, but they are very rarely perfectly compatible or perfectly incompatible. Likewise, no pole is perfectly consistent with liberal ideology or completely opposed to all aspects of it, and no pole has achieved perfect centralization or decentralization. What is the effect on non-pole foreign policy behaviour as we move down the three continua? The effect of perfect value compatibility between a pole and a non-pole power would be—ceteris paribus—for the non-pole power to seek a place in the core insider category. As we move along the continuum towards less and less compatibility we would expect the non-pole power to seek a place in the near-core insider and outsider categories. In the case of total value incompatibility we would expect neither the pole powers nor the non-pole powers to be interested in integration, because they would disagree on the most basic issues. The effect of liberal values dominating the ideology of the pole powers would be—ceteris paribus—for the non-pole power to seek a place in the core insider category. As we move along the continuum towards more and more autocratic values dominating the ideology of the pole powers we would expect the non-pole power to seek a place in the near-core insider and outsider categories. Probably no non-pole power would voluntarily commit to regional integration with a pole power committed entirely to autocratic values, because of the lack of transparency and minority rights as well as the

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lack of restraints on military means of power projection. The effect of a thoroughly decentralized pole would be—ceteris paribus—for the non-pole power to seek a place in the core insider category. As we move along the continuum towards more and more centralized poles we would expect the non-pole power to seek a place in the near-core insider and outsider categories. Probably, no non-pole power would voluntarily commit to a regional integration project dominated by a fully centralized pole, leaving virtually no chance of influencing major decisions while swiftly sanctioning any behaviour out of line with the pole’s preferences. Thus, the nature of the pole explains the tendency of non-pole powers to become a member of one of the four constellations: core insider, near-core insider, would-be insider and outsider. Variations in the nature of the pole helps us to explain variation over space (i.e. why the distribution of non-pole powers in the various constellations differ among regional integration projects) and time (i.e. why non-pole powers move from one constellation to another), and thereby provides a prelude to the theory presented in Chapter 2, which explains how a non-pole power’s foreign policy behaviour is affected by a particular constellation. What is the effect of variations in the number of poles? In Chapter 2, we only theorized relational unipolarity and said nothing about the effects of bi-and multipolarity. Relational bipolarity means that two poles have paramount influence on the non-pole power’s position and foreign policy behaviour. Relational multipolarity means that more than two poles have paramount influence on the non-pole power’s position and foreign policy behaviour. In general, we would expect an increase in the number of poles to ameliorate the integration dilemma of the non-pole power. During relational unipolarity, the non-pole power faces a highly asymmetrical distribution of power projection ability. The power projection of the non-pole power on the pole powers has little or no effect on them, whereas the power projection of the pole powers on the non-pole power may significantly alter its prospect of political, economic and military success. Because of this asymmetry, the pole powers have the power to ‘go-it-alone’: they may proceed with their regional integration project no matter the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole power (see Gruber 2000; Moravcsik 1998). During relational bipolarity the pole powers may still ‘go-it-alone’ but now the potential costs have increased. The rival pole may offer each of the non-pole powers bilateral or multilateral cooperation and thereby strengthen its own power projection ability. This potential cost increases the bargaining power of the non-pole power and—thereby—ameliorates its integration dilemma: the non-pole power may now increase its offensive power (influence) without decreasing its defensive power (autonomy). As the number of poles increases, so does the strength of this dynamic creating still greater potential costs of ‘going-it-alone’ for the pole powers and a still milder integration dilemma for the non-pole powers. Constellations We argue that except for the few states that constitute systemic power poles, states are located in constellations. Constellation denotes the non-pole power’s ‘basic set of relationships to the strong powers in its salient environment’ (Mouritzen 1991:218). In general these relationships need not be institutionalized, but during regional integration, relationships are typically characterized by institutional affiliation, which affects the

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offensive and defensive power of the non-pole powers and defines their major dilemmas in regard to foreign policy behaviour (see Chapter 2). In the case of Euro-Atlantic unipolarity, the relevant constellations were identified in accordance with the states’ institutional affiliation with the EU and NATO. Institutional affiliation is a useful measure of constellation during regional integration in general, but the effect may vary across the international system due to variations in the number of functional areas covered by collective decision-making (scope) or the institutional efficiency of the common institutions (institutional capacity) (see Laursen 2003a). Rather than the only or even the typical example of constellation we can most usefully view the Euro-Atlantic institutional structure as placed towards one end of a continuum of constellations stretching from highly institutionalized, multilateral structures to non-institutionalized relationships between pole powers and non-pole powers. In regional integration projects where the institutions are weaker than in the Euro-Atlantic area we would expect direct, bilateral relationships between pole powers and non-pole powers to play a more prominent role. In regions without integration projects, constellations will not be defined in terms of institutional affiliation, but in terms of bilateral relationships between pole powers and non-pole powers (see Mouritzen 1991). Past geopolitics The constellation theory argues that the geopolitics of the past plays a modifying role in relation to the current geopolitical location. We expect the shadow of the past to matter in any region and to any state, but how much will vary from region to region and from state to state. There is no reason to believe that the geopolitics of the past should play a particularly large or small role in the Euro-Atlantic area compared with other regions. Rather than regional location, we expect the modifying role of past geopolitics on foreign policy behaviour to vary with power. Thus, one systematic difference is between pole powers and non-pole powers. Pole powers tend to be less constrained by their geopolitical location, because their relative capabilities leave them better positioned to influence their immediate vicinity through political, economic and military means. The external constraints on the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers typically leave a more restricted role for the modifying influences of past geopolitics on the present than in the case of pole powers better able to impose their domestic preferences on other states. To the extent that past geopolitics play a role in the foreign policy behaviour of nonpole powers the shadow of the past tends to be dominated by historical experience with the pole powers and perceptions of the success or failure of the non-pole power prior to regional integration (see Chapters 2, 4–8). Generalizing from the European experience, we would expect the shadow of the past to affect the foreign policy of non-pole powers by inducing scepticism towards cooperation with pole powers that have dominated them in the past, but enthusiasm towards cooperation with pole powers that may help to free or safeguard them from domination. The shadow of the past affects which constellation states are willing to join and how they are likely to behave within the constellations no matter the region, but since the shadow of the past follows from the perceptions of individual states, detailed empirical investigation of these states and their history are necessary in order to assess the exact effects.

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Comparative insights: an empirical plausibility probe The aim of the empirical plausibility probe in this section is to provide some empirical evidence in order to evaluate the theoretical propositions and assess whether genuine testing of the revised theory involving comprehensive case studies of other cases than the geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration may be worth the work. We expect the constellation theory to have the greatest explanatory value, where institutional affiliation with the pole has the greatest impact on the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole powers, and we expect the impact of institutional affiliation to increase with institutional authority and scope. The institutional superstructure of EuroAtlantic unipolarity is much further developed than in any other region. This is true whether we focus on the number of functional areas covered by collective decisionmaking (scope) or the institutional efficiency of the common institutions (institutional capacity) (see Laursen 2003a; Chapters 2 and 3 in this volume). Regional integration schemes outside the Euro-Atlantic area are—in general—similar in scope, but vary considerably in their institutional capacity. The American and Asian schemes have proceeded further than integration projects in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East (see Laursen 2003b: 283–4). Comparing the most important regions in terms of integration outside the Euro-Atlantic area—the Americas and Asia—we find important differences as well. As noted by Grieco, ‘[t]he level of regional authority associated with cooperative arrangements in the Americas is much more modest than in Western Europe […] There is even less supranationalism in Asia […] Thus, in contrast to Europe and the Americas, Asia presents a case of the absence of significant institutionalization in economic affairs’ (Grieco 1997:169–70). Therefore, we will expect the theory to be applied most easily to the Euro-Atlantic area, as has been the case in this volume, whereas the Americas, Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa represent still harder cases for testing and refining the theory. We now turn to a brief overview of each of these regions moving from the easiest testing ground outside the Euro-Atlantic area, the Americas, to Asia, and, finally to Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa in order to assess the potential of the constellation theory. The Americas The Americas appear to be an ideal testing ground for the constellation theory outside Europe. Foreign policy in the Americas is not bound to the peculiarities of Euro-Atlantic integration, but at the same time the puzzle of the book presents itself just as clearly in the Americas as in Europe: if non-pole powers experience the same problems in regard to their regional political order, why do they behave so heterogeneously? Furthermore, the Americas are now in the process of a hemispheric-wide integration process—the Free Trade Area of the Americas—with potentially important implications for non-pole power foreign policy. The United States is the only pole power in the Americas and dominates the region economically and in security affairs. In contrast to the Euro-Atlantic area, the institutional superstructure is not dominated by one economic organization and one security organization, but characterized by a very large number of bi- and multilateral agreements in economic affairs and a regional balance of power system combined with unilateral US

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intervention in military affairs. This diverse nature of the institutional superstructure reflects the diverse interests and power projecting ability of the pole power in different parts of the Americas. Applying the constellation theory, it is logical to begin with the pole power and its immediate vicinity in North America. In North America, Canada and Mexico are nonpole powers and both countries face relational unipolarity with the United States as the pole. The pole’s institutional superstructure consists of two international organizations, NATO and NAFTA. Only the United States and Canada are NATO members. In contrast, the United States, Canada and Mexico are all founding members of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), which entered into force on 1 January 1994. In regard to the integration of the Western hemisphere, the United States is the pole power and NAFTA members Canada and Mexico are core insiders of the current negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which began with a formal declaration and a ‘Plan of Action’ agreed upon in 1994 by the leaders of 34 Western hemisphere countries. Sometimes referred to simply as an enlargement of NAFTA, because it is likely to mimic the basic aspects of this agreement, or less courteously as ‘the Free Trade Agreement for America’, because of the American influence over negotiations so far, the FTAA in 2003 begun concrete negotiations on the specifics of the construction of a free trade area, which would create the largest trading region in the world with a market of approximately 800 million people. Even though NAFTA members are not formally privileged in FTAA negotiation, it would be politically impossible for the United States to deny membership to Canada or Mexico, because of the similar nature of the agreements and it would, of course, be impossible to create an FTAA without the United States. As we would expect from the constellation theory, the non-pole core insiders have participated actively in the development of NAFTA and FTAA, but without challenging the basic structures, which primarily reflect American preferences. Also, as would be expected from the constellation theory, both countries have some freedom of action in their foreign policy behaviour. Thus, neither of them were part of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ against Iraq in 2003–04. The would-be insiders include all other states in the Western hemisphere except Cuba, which is the only country in the region not participating in FTAA negotiations. All would-be insiders have modified the external behaviour in the sense that they have accepted the American agenda of hemispheric-wide free trade. However, there are important differences in the foreign policy behaviour of the would-be insiders. Central American states have been most eager to adapt their foreign policy behaviour signalling their ability to be good and cooperative Americans. For instance, in security policy, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras all joined the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ against Iraq with the latter three sending troops. In foreign economic policy, five Central American states—Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have been very interested in participating in an integration scheme with the United States, and the American decision to deny Central America membership of NAFTA has led to eager adaptation of their foreign policies as well as their domestic societies. Their renewed effort to strengthen the Central American Common Market (CACM)—created in 1960 and reinvigorated in the 1990s by its five member states—and the System of Central American Integration (SICA), which also includes Panama and Belize, can be seen as a response to American reluctance to admit

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them into NAFTA and the reduction of American interests in Central America after the Cold War. By cooperating in these institutions the Central American states could prove their commitment to international cooperation and free trade and use it ‘to demand the extension of the benefits enjoyed by Mexico within NAFTA’ (Sánchez, 2003:38; see Bull 1999:963). The recent Central American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala may be seen as a step in this direction. The eagerness of each of the states to position itself as strongly as possible for inclusion in American-led integration has led to goodwill competition foreclosing a move towards a stronger and more enduring process of regionalization among themselves. For instance, Costa Rica, the most developed state in the region, has generally been reluctant to take part in initiatives aimed at deepening integration, because this could reduce their own chance of inclusion in NAFTA-like arrangements. Moving further away from the pole power to South America, the would-be insiders are less dependent on trade with the United States and have been less eager to submit to American preferences for hemispheric integration. Also, their foreign policy behaviour in general has been less adaptive to the preferences of the United States, for example only Colombia was a member of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ against Iraq but it did not contribute troops. Brazil stands out as the most reluctant of the would-be insiders (see Petrash 2000:189–95). From the constellation theory we would explain this scepticism as a consequence of Brazil’s own ability to project power in the region. Brazil has significantly affected its geopolitical vicinity by expanding previous trading agreements with Argentina and thereby creating Mercosur in 1991. Paraguay and Uruguay immediately joined the organization and later Bolivia and Chile were accepted as associate members. Despite its influence, Brazil does not rival the power projection ability of the United States in South America. Instead, Brazil’s role in South America resembles the role played by Spain and Italy in southern Europe. It is able to influence politics in South America to a much greater extent than the other non-pole powers, but only the United States is able to change the conditions of non-pole power foreign policy behaviour in the region. If FTAA integration is successful, Brazil risks losing its current institutional means for projecting power at its neighbouring states. Thus, it is no surprise that Brazil and its Mercosur allies have argued that FTAA should be based on existing trading blocs, including Mercosur, rather than building a new, alternative system, which would in effect be an expansion of NAFTA. The United States has reacted by including Brazil as an equal partner and co-chair of FTAA negotiations. There has been little goodwill competition in South America, but Chile, the South American country best positioned to participate in NAFTA-like cooperation, has eagerly pursued its interests independently of other states in the region concluding free trade agreements with the United States and Canada. Finally, we turn to the only outsider state, Cuba. In accordance with the constellation theory, Cuba’s influence-capability is low and its autonomy is high. It opposed the war in Iraq and it has maintained its Socialist rule after the end of the Cold War. In general, the outside world’s attitude to Cuba’s domestic politics plays a large role in its foreign policy. For instance, Cuba decided not to engage in development cooperation with the EU following the decision of the EU in June 2003 to invite members of the Cuban opposition. However, Cuba has rebuilt its relationship with most Latin American countries after the Cold War. Relations with the United States continue to be tense but

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somewhat improving. As we would expect Cuban foreign policy does not seem to be constrained by the regional integration in the Americas. In essence, this admittedly brief survey shows that the constellation theory seems to have considerable potential in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers in the region. However, as was the case in Chapter 6 on the Nordic countries, the boundaries of constellations appear to be misty, but for different reasons. The non-pole powers in the Americas seem to be placed in clusters along a continuum, rather than in very neat categories. These clusters coincide with distance to the pole. Overall, the theory has passed the plausibility probe, and we should proceed to proper testing of its propositions on this region. East Asia As noted in a recent comparison with regionalism in the Americas, ‘Asian regionalism relies less on formal agreements and intergovernmental institutions and more on a web of bilateral economic relationships, but with a regional overlay’ (Mittelman and Falk 2000:14). Thus, surveying the region for integration projects, the institutional structure of Asia appears more ‘messy’ than Europe or even the Americas. In fact, two highly profiled integration schemes, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group) ‘may serve some useful ancillary political and security functions, but they do not appear to be viable vehicles of regional economic integration’ (Mattli 1999:174). However, recently, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) organizing all but three states in East Asia (Taiwan, Hong Kong and North Korea) has emerged as the most potent regional integration scheme in economic affairs in Asia (Webber 2003) and ASEAN’s platform for regional security dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARE), as an important regional security organization (see Buzan and Wæver 2003). Asia comprises one undisputed pole power, China. China’s ability to project power in the region is primarily related to its military strength, including the world’s largest army and nuclear capability. The economic growth over the past decade is enhancing China’s ability to influence the economy of the region considerably. Only one power, the United States, rivals the power projection ability of China in Asia. With a strong economic and military presence, including bases in South-East Asia, the United States has been able to affect the institutional development in the region more than any other state until recently. In contrast to the Euro-Atlantic area, the two pole powers are not cooperating in a stable alliance but competing for influence over regional and—increasingly—world affairs. Thus, Asian territory presents us with a case of environment bipolarity and each pole has its own institutional superstructure. How has this affected the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole powers? The United States has mostly projected its power in the region through bilateral agreements in economic and security affairs with the region’s non-pole powers. It also promoted APEC linking Asian and Pacific economic cooperation, but generally the United States has not sought to create strong regional institutions in Asia, and has, until recently, succeeded in impeding others from doing so (Grieco 1999; Katzenstein 1996). The 1997–98 Asian financial crises and the failure in 1998 to reach an agreement on the implementation of the trade liberalization programme in APEC significantly weakened

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the American power projection ability in the region. In the financial crisis the non-pole powers attributed it to US influence that APEC left crisis management to the IMF with harsh short-term consequences for the region’s economies. The negotiations on trade liberalization showed a spilt between the American focus on liberalization and the East Asian focus on economic and technical cooperation (Webber 2003:140–1). Thus, the late 1990s showed that value incompatibility between the United States and the East Asian states was a significant obstacle to close cooperation and integration. Despite its power-projecting ability, China has not been the centre of regional integration projects in the region until recently. Applying the constellation theory we expect this to be due to China’s own strategic choices as well as China’s highly centralized political system and authoritarian ideology, which made it an unattractive partner of regional integration for any non-pole power. The developments of APT and ARE may be considered complementary processes of institutionalization, not unlike the EU and NATO, because APT is devoted to economic affairs, whereas ARE is devoted to security affairs. However, there are important differences as well. The level of institutional authority is much weaker and the scope much more narrow, and in contrast to Europe and the Americas (and Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, see below) both organizations are driven by the non-pole powers’ initiatives to integrate China, rather than China’s desire to project its power through regional integration. Above, it was argued that relational bipolarity ameliorates the integration dilemma, because compared with relational unipolarity, the non-pole power has more bargaining power. The development in East Asia seems to support the assumption in the sense that non-pole powers have been able to redirect their foreign economic policy towards the APT at the expense of APEC following the events in the late 1990s. The overlap in membership between APT and APEC should work to the benefit of the non-pole powers as well. The former excludes the Pacific members of the APEC, including the United States, but includes the East Asian states, including China. Also, the ARE could be seen as evidence of the influence of the non-pole powers as it implements their long-standing goal to create a multilateral regional security organization in East Asia, a goal opposed by the United States until recently. Still, the shadow of the past with several Chinese military interventions may keep the East Asian non-pole powers closely tied to the United States in security policy as evidenced by their membership of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in Iraq 2003–04: Japan, the Philippines and Thailand all contributed troops and South Korea and Singapore were coalition members as well. In sum, East Asia will prove an interesting testing ground for the constellation theory. On the one hand, bipolarity and overlapping regional institutions may explain why nonpole powers seem to face a less severe integration dilemma leaving them with more influence as well as more autonomy in their foreign policy behaviour than in the EuroAtlantic area and in the Americas. On the other hand, East Asian states continue to rely on the United States to balance Chinese military power in the region and this seemingly reduces their autonomy and influence. Thus, it will prove a harder case for the constellation theory than the Americas, but also a chance of refining our understanding of non-pole foreign policy behaviour.

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Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa As noted above, we only find rudimentary regional integration projects in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and we would expect it to be difficult for the poles to project their power through these institutions. The constellation theory points to two reasons for this state of affairs. First, the weakness of the states in these regions means that the effects of non-mobility are less important in sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East than in the Euro-Atlantic area, the Americas and East Asia. In the EuroAtlantic area and most other parts of the international system, state failure and dissolution are rare exceptions and the assumption of non-mobility and its effects on the foreign policy of non-pole powers is useful. Only south of Sahara are we witnessing ‘the stagnation and decay of many African states, and the steady replacement of the illusion of a Westphalian system by something much more complicated and chaotic…’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003:222–3). These ‘quasi-states’ are unable to provide effective government and are often domestically unstable (Jackson 1990), but even for the more effective states in Central Asia and the Middle East, threats against their stability and survival are as likely to come from actors inside their societies as states in their geopolitical vicinity (Ayoob 1998; David 1991). Thus, even if these states could miraculously leave their geopolitical neighbourhood behind, they would continue to face some of the most important threats to their survival: those originating in their domestic societies. Accordingly the foreign policy choices of non-pole powers are less likely to be a consequence of constellation and more likely to be a consequence of domestic politics, or perhaps more accurately their ‘internal constellation’, i.e. the government’s basic set of relationships with strong actors in its domestic society. Second, ‘the international system is marked by quite extreme uneven development in interaction capacity…’ and ‘[s]ome parts of the periphery are even going backwards, as in those African countries that have proved unable to maintain the road and railway systems they inherited from the Europeans’ (Buzan and Little 2000:297). These variations in interaction capacity have important implications for the variation in the strength and nature of power projection across the international system, and therefore, for the applicability of the constellation theory in Africa and the Middle East. Power is projected more easily over long distances inside the developed world than outside because of the high level of technological and social interaction capacity. Furthermore, the nature of power projection is different. A high level of social interaction capacity means that power may be projected through international organizations much more easily than when interaction capacity is low as in Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East. These two points seem to be borne out by the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers in cases of regional integration in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. For instance, in a study of the development of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Central Asia in the 1990s, Rahigh-Aghsan (2000) shows how the power projection of the pole powers, Iran and Turkey, through the institutions and the location in different constellations were only of secondary importance for the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole powers Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Instead they were primarily affected by domestic instability. In the 1990s Afghanistan’s policy towards ECO itself shifted with the power struggle between the pro-Pakistani Taliban and the pro-Iranian Rabbani Ahmad Shah Masoud alliance. Likewise, Tajikistan’s foreign policy was mainly determined by the

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civil war in the country. Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s foreign policies illustrate the limitations of the pole’s power projection. Their foreign policies have been difficult balancing processes between their two relations poles, ECO in cultural and economic affairs and Russia in military affairs, resulting in sectoral bandwagoning with each. Kazakhstan’s dependency on Russia resulted in bandwagoning with this country despite its explicit interest in closer cooperation with ECO members. Another example is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East. In a recent study of the formation of the GCC in 1981 by Saudi Arabia (which we would consider the pole power) and five small countries in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (which we would consider non-pole powers), Cooper and Taylor (2003) found that the pole power and the non-pole powers mainly used the GCC to reduce regime vulnerability towards Shiite groups threatening the stability of the Gulf states—all Sunni monarchies—after the Iranian revolution in 1979. This explains the organization’s focus on ‘trade, investment, and intelligence cooperation but [with] only weak alliance functions’ (Cooper and Taylor 2003:108). The GCC allowed the Sunni monarchies to increase their ‘legitimacy by moving closer to the longheld goals of an Islamic community and an Arab community’ at the same time as ‘it facilitated cooperation by national intelligence services in combating domestic subversion’ and ‘provided economic benefits that could be targeted to dissatisfied minorities’ (Cooper and Taylor 2003:117–18). Still, ‘persistent rivalries and suspicions among these Gulf states have made economic (and strategic) collaboration tenuous and fragile’ (Aarts 1999:913). In sum, domestic politics accounted for foreign policy behaviour—at least in regard to the GCC—for the pole power and the non-pole powers. The lack of social interaction capacity resulting in suspicion and rivalry made power projection through the GCC weak. Finally, two attempts at regional integration in Africa underline the importance of domestic politics and the lack of social interaction capacity. In West Africa, Nigeria— despite close to being a failed state—has been the pole power in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, domestic conflicts have continued to dominate the foreign policy agendas of West African states and the creation of ECOMOG—a Nigerian-dominated peace-keeping force that intervened in civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone—has not ‘been able successfully to manage intense internal conflicts […], mainly because of limited resources available and the high level of mistrust among the protagonists’ (Keller 1997:316; see Buzan and Wæver 2003:238–41). In Southern Africa, the apartheid regime in South Africa meant that social interaction capacity in terms of shared norms and interests were too low in the region and that value compatibility between the pole power South Africa and its neighbours was virtually nonexistent until majority rule became a reality. Subsequently, South Africa became a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1994 joining Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and later, in 1997, joined by DR Congo. However, domestic problems in the member states including the pole power, South Africa, which became increasingly inward-looking, combined with ‘[s]erious splits [which] began to unravel the sense of security community’ meant that once again domestic concerns were the primary source of foreign policy behaviour (Buzan and Wæver 2003:235).

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In conclusion, we expect the constellation theory to have difficulties explaining the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers during regional integration in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The major differences between Africa and the Middle East and the regions discussed above are the prominent role played by domestic factors in foreign policy behaviour and the lack of social interaction capacity. Thus, we would expect only a revised version of the theory incorporating these factors to serve as a useful tool for explaining non-pole power foreign policy behaviour in these regions.

Conclusion The plausibility probes in this chapter show that the constellation theory is a promising candidate for explaining the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole powers—i.e. the vast majority of states—during regional integration. This would be an important contribution because even though the multiplication of regional integration projects has been accompanied by a large number of studies of regionalism, this literature is mainly focused on the causes and effects of regionalism per se and on the actions of the pole powers. As regionalism becomes more important in the international system so does the need for a theory explaining the actions of the non-pole powers. The theoretical plausibility probe revealed that the explanatory value of the central concepts of the theory may vary over time and space. In particular, it was argued that variations in the importance of non-mobility for state action and in the nature and number of poles would lead to variations in the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers. However, the logic of the theory was not tied to the Euro-Atlantic case. Thus, the main conclusion of the theoretical plausibility probe was that it would be fruitful to proceed to empirical investigations of non-pole power foreign policy behaviour in other regions than Europe. The empirical plausibility probe showed that the explanatory value of the theory varies between regions. As is evident from Chapters 4–8, the theory has a high explanatory value in regard to the Euro-Atlantic area. This chapter showed that the constellation theory seems to have considerable potential for explaining the foreign policy behaviour of non-pole powers in the Americas. East Asia proved to be an interesting case of bipolarity and overlapping institutions, whereas the theory had only limited explanatory value in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa because of the prominent role played by domestic factors in foreign policy behaviour and the lack of social interaction capacity. Figure 11.1 illustrates these differences. In cases of low interaction capacity, we would expect raw geopolitics unmediated by international institutions to play a greater role than when interaction capacity is high. Therefore, when interaction capacity is low, the general constellation theory (Mouritzen 1991) may have greater explanatory power than the specific theory for foreign policy behaviour during regional integration constructed and applied in this volume (see Figure 2.2). East Asia would be an interesting case for the general theory as well as the specific theory and the analysis above could benefit from incorporating assumptions from the general theory about how the level of tension between the pole powers affects the strategies of the non-pole powers. Also, the explanations of Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa may be enhanced by incorporating aspects of the general theory unrelated to

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regional institutionalization. After all, even when the security agenda of weak states is dominated by internal threats, these are often affected by political, economic and military interventions by nearby states. Thus, even if distance seems to matter less in regard to weak states, we need to establish exactly how it matters and a return to the general theory may be a fruitful way of doing this. The result of the plausibility probes has theoretical implications for realism in general and for geopolitical theory and the constellation theory presented in Chapter 2 in particular. The general conclusion in regard to realism is that a focus on the power politics of states in an anarchic international system is useful even during regional integration. The usefulness of realism seemed to correlate with the strength and stability of states. When states were weak and unstable, internal threats rather than external ones tended to dominate and realism became less useful as an analytical tool. The same was true for geopolitical theory and the constellation theory. In regard to geopolitical theory, the analysis showed that distance from the pole played a key role in the foreign policy behaviour of the non-pole powers, which were primarily affected by relational poles, rather than systemic or regional poles in all of the regions surveyed. The exact effect of distance was identified with the greatest precision in the Americas where the behavioural differences between Central American states and South American states were illustrative. In regard to the constellation theory, the logic of the theory was not coupled to the peculiarities of the Euro-Atlantic area, but some of the concepts will need further development if the theory is to survive a test on cases outside Europe and the Americas. This is particularly true for the concepts of non-mobility and polarity. The theory’s point of departure in more general theorizing on the importance of geopolitics and constellations in international relations should provide us with a sound basis for these theory developments in future studies (see Mouritzen 1991, 1998a).

Figure 11.1 Explanatory value of the constellation theory.

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Index

Aarts, P. 242 Adamkus, Valdus 158 Afghanistan 44, 61, 65, 104, 107, 159, 242 Africa 111, 241–3, 244 Albania 67 n8, 136–7, 143 Albright, D.E. 140–1 Algeria 111, 114, 115, 117 alliances 16, 17, 18, 21, 29, 41 n18, 211 allowance principle 37, 42 n26 the Americas 236–9, 244, 246 APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group) 239, 240 Appatov, S.J. 140–1 Archer, C. 94, 95 Armenia 180 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 239, 240 Austria: autonomy 186; EU 52, 185–7; foreign policy 114, 137, 176, 177, 186, 187; and Franco-German axis 82, 87–8, 89; historical background 77–9; Iraq crisis 74–5, 87; neutrality 57, 78–9, 87, 185; polarity 9, 71, 88–9, 171, 171f; and supranationality 79–82; see also Benelux countries autonomy 88, 94, 95, 97, 102, 181, 185, 186; definition 11 n6, 33; EU effect on 31, 32, 90 n2, 211; theory 8, 35f, 36, 37–8, 174, 180, 181f Azerbaijan 180, 242 Aznar, Jose Maria 121 balancing 37, 42 n23, 84, 169, 220–1 Balkan conflicts 58, 59, 61, 64, 73, 85, 176 Baltic countries 10, 149–64; EU/NATO stability projection 151, 153;

Index

232

and Iraqi crisis 159; military projects 157; NATO 129, 156–9; ‘Nordic’ pole of attraction 154, 155–6, 160–3, 185; parallel action 192–3; peace-keeping 157; pole attraction 171f, 173; recognition 174–6; ‘return to Europe’ 153–6; Soviet and Russian challenges 150–3, 163; and USA 158–9 bandwagoning 84, 108, 146, 178, 179, 193, 200, 220, 242; definition 34, 42 n23; theory 174, 204 Barents-Euro Arctic Council (BEAC) 98 bastion defence 36, 205; Nordic bastion 94–5, 103–4 Belarus 139, 140, 157, 168, 179; see also the east Belgium 51, 59, 90, 90 n11, 90 n14, 91 n29; see also Benelux countries Benelux countries: balancing and bandwagoning 84–7, 88–9; and Franco-German axis 83, 84, 85–6, 87–8, 89; historical background 75–7; parallel action 193; polarity 4, 9, 49, 71, 74, 170–1, 171f; supranationality 79–82 Benes decrees 137, 187, 195–6 Berlusconi, Silvio 121, 153 Blair, Tony 86, 101, 121, 162 Bobrovcová, D. 135 Bondevik, Kjell Magne 106 Bosch, Herbert 139 Bosnia and Herzegovina 44, 63, 64–5 Boulding, K. 17 Brenner, M.J. 24 Bulgaria 2, 133–4, 142–3, 178, 179, 193; see also the east Bush, George W. 47, 86, 101, 159, 177, 192 Buzan, B. 40 n4, 226 n3–4, 230, 241, 243 Cabada, L. 135 Canada 141, 236 CAP see Common Agricultural Policy CBSS see Council for Baltic Sea States Central America 237 Central and Eastern European states (CEES) see the east Central Asia 241–2, 244 Ceuta 111, 125 CFP see Common Fisheries Policy

Index

233

CFSP see Common Foreign and Security Policy Chechen conflict 177–8, 200 China 20, 209, 226, 239, 240, 241 Chirac, Jacques 83, 86, 134, 143, 146–7, 159 CIS see Commonwealth of Independent States Claes, Willy 91 n29 Clarke, M. 61, 64 Clinton, Bill 63, 142, 177, 192 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 49, 83, 106, 120 Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 105, 106 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 25, 32, 48, 49, 50, 54–5, 60, 100, 104, 112, 119, 156 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 157–8, 179 community method 79, 155–6 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 60, 62, 142 Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) 113, 114, 115, 118 constellation theory 8, 11 n7, 15–42, 38f, 39f; attraction factors 168–73, 171f; behavioural patterns 171f, 174–90, 181f, 199–201; constellations 8, 15, 29–33, 31f, 233–4; European power structure 22–9; historical lessons 38–40; homogenizing effect 37; interaction effects 190–9, 191f, 200–1, 202; and neoclassical realism 2–3; permissive cause 37; power positions and behaviour 33–8; propositions 37–8, 173–4, 201–3, 204–5; symmetry/asymmetry 29, 41 n18; typology 29, 29f; see also plausibility probes; polarity constructivism 7–8 Cooper, S. 242 core insiders 30, 31, 31f, 35f, 36–7, 38, 72f, 93f, 113–17, 113f, 128, 128f Cornell, S. 177 Cornish, P. 61, 64 corroboration of propositions 204–5 Council for Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 98, 161 Council of Ministers 27–8, 48, 50, 74 Croatia 2, 67 n8, 85, 133, 134–5, 138, 143, 176–7, 186, 200; see also the east CSCE see Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CSCM see Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean Cuba 237, 238 Cyprus 52, 116, 118, 119, 203; see also the south Czech Republic 63, 132, 133, 177, 178, 179, 187; see also the east; Visegrád countries Czechoslovakia 114, 135, 136, 137, 187, 189; see also Czech Republic; the east;

Index

234

Slovakia Daalder, I.H. 46 de Gaulle, Charles 76 Dean, J. 141 Delors, Jacques 74, 83 Denmark 5, 6, 19, 32, 51, 55, 57, 178, 182–3, 183, 192; see also Nordic countries Derycke, Erik 91 n29 D’Estaing, Giscard 82–3, 156 Dienstbier, Jiří 145 distance: power and incentive wane with 17, 204; contiguity 168–9 Djukanović, Milo 139 Drakulić, Slavenka 135 Dzurinda, Mikulas 189 the east 10, 128–48; core insiders 128, 128f; East-East dynamics 144–6; EU vis-à-vis outsiders 138–42; EU vis-à-vis would-be insiders 130–8; Euro-Atlantic bifurcation 142–4, 146–7; Franco-German axis 142; geopolitical challenges 129; NATO 61, 62–3, 129, 142–3, 146; near-core insiders 128f; outsiders 128f, 138–42; pole attraction 171f, 172–3; stability projection 136–8, 147; state fragmentation 135–6, 147; would-be insiders 128, 128f, 130–8, 146 East Asia 20, 239–41, 244 ECJ see European Court of Justice Eckstein, H. 228 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 23, 49, 56, 57, 76, 85, 99, 100, 104, 183–4, 185 economic theory 5 ECSC see European Coal and Steel Community EEA see European Economic Area EEC see European Economic Community efficient cause 37, 42 n26 EFTA see European Free Trade Association Einbindung 23, 169, 205 n1 EMP see Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EMU see Economic and Monetary Union EPC see European Political Cooperation ERM II (exchange rate mechanism) 57, 104 ERRF (European Rapid Reaction Force) 65 ESDP see European Security and Defence Policy Estonia 63, 143, 154–5, 160–1, 178;

Index

235

see also Baltic countries EU (European Union): closer co-operation? 55–8; Constitution 50, 54, 55, 73, 183, 187; directorates 74, 77; flexibility 56–8; institutional changes 48–58; Minister for Foreign Affairs 55; non-aligned members 78; non-pole powers 1–3, 73; pole powers 1, 23, 49–50, 221; QMV (qualified majority voting) 51, 52, 54, 56; self-control 27–8; size and representation 50–4, 77, 80, 90 n11; stability 24, 26, 28; stability projection 136–8, 147; supranationality 79–82; types of integration 56–7, 56t; US influence 25–6, 72–3; see also NATO-EU relationship; security EURATOM 51, 76 Euro-Atlantic pole 27f; attraction factors 168–70; bifurcation 142–4, 146–7; and Cold War 45–8; compatibility of values 45, 48, 63; implications for non-pole states 28–9; institutional transformation 47–8, 66–7, 218–19; stability projection 151, 153; threat perceptions 46–7; transatlantic cooperation 43–4, 47–8; transatlantic disagreements 45–7, 64, 142–4; see also security Euro-Maghreb Partnership 114, 125 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 114, 118, 119, 123–4, 125 Eurofor 115 Europe: prospects 209–27; Atlantic bifurcation 210–11; Cold War backlash 211–12; driving forces 214–16; effects of Iraqi conflict 212–14, 213f; European bifurcation 210, 219–26, 222t; intergovernmental agreement 211; shifting European alliances 211, 226 n4; symbiosis scenario 209–10, 216–19, 226 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 4, 47, 49, 75, 93 European Commission 27, 50, 52, 53, 73–4, 75, 79–81, 82–3, 124; open method of coordination (OMC) 74 European Communities (EC) 26–7, 48, 51, 99 European Council (of Heads of State and Government) 54, 55, 56, 74, 81–2, 154

Index

236

European Court of Justice (ECJ) 50, 54, 79, 80 European Economic Area (EEA) 101, 105, 106, 182 European Economic Community (EEC) 4, 51, 76, 93, 99 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 78, 96, 181, 182 European Monetary System 83 European Parliament 51, 67 n4, 79, 81 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 54, 76, 86, 136 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 65 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 49, 55, 57, 64, 65, 78, 101, 112, 156, 219 Expres (Romania) 142 Falk, R. 239 Falkner, G. 185 Figel, Jan 145 Finland: defence 57; EU 5, 7, 51, 52, 107, 182–3, 184–5; foreign policy 19, 177, 184, 185; parallel action 192, 193; Soviet influence 101, 102, 175; see also Nordic countries Fischer, Joschka 137 foreign policy 2, 22, 28; Africa 241, 242, 243; Central America 237; Central Asia 241, 242; Middle East 241, 242; South America 238; see also constellation theory; countries by name; plausibility probes France: bifurcation scenario 220; ECSC 75; EU 51, 53, 54, 55; NATO 47–8, 59; Partnership for Peace 63; pole power 22, 23, 49, 81, 112–13, 113, 115; security 26, 59, 60; see also Franco-German axis; the south Franco-German axis 25, 26–7, 49, 71, 73, 82–3, 84, 85–6, 87–8, 89, 95, 110, 142, 212 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 236–7, 238 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 242 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 85 geopolitics 2, 8, 15, 17, 169, 170, 244–6; past geopolitics 8, 38–40, 170, 234–5 Georgia 157, 180 Germany 136; bifurcation scenario 220;

Index

237

ECSC 75; EU 50, 51, 53, 54; foreign policy 95–6, 97, 137, 176–7; NATO 59; Partnership for Peace 63; pole power 22, 23, 49, 81, 214; security 59, 60; and the south 112, 115; see also Franco-German axis Gibraltar 121 Gleditsch, N.P. 201 goodwill competition 34, 35–6, 144, 155, 156, 191–2, 193, 237, 238 goodwill/credibility dilemma 35–6 Gorbachev, Mikhail 150, 175 Gordon, P.H. 65 Gotovina, General Ante 134 ‘great powers’ 1, 3, 4f, 7 Greece 5, 6, 10, 51, 56, 116, 203; see also the south Grieco, J.M. 235 Gruber, L. 7 Gstöhl, S. 7, 8 Guay, T. 21 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 242 Gulf War (1990–91) 21, 120, 186 Haas, E.B. 6 Haider, Jörg 78, 186 Hanson, Margus 159 Hassner, P. 47 Haughton, T. 188 n11 Havel, Vaclav 131, 144 Hay, W. 2 Hendrickson, R.C. 137 Heurlin, B. 60 Hexagonal Group 114 Hill, C 136 Howorth, J. 63, 65–6 Hungary: foreign policy 114, 143, 178, 179; parallel action 193; Regional Partnership 187; and Romania 137, 195, 196–7, 203; and Russia 189; and Slovakia 188, 189, 195–6; Status Law 195, 196; see also the east; Visegrád countries Huntington, S.P. 140, 153 Iceland 5, 105, 106–7, 108, 110 n1, 175, 176;

Index

238

see also Nordic countries IGC see Intergovernmental Conferences Iliescu, Ion 179, 196 Ilves, Toomas Hendrik 160, 161 influence-capability 33, 35f, 37–8, 174 Ingebritsen, C. 8 insiders 32, 36–7, 72f, 162, 202–3 integration theory 5–6 interaction effects 190–9; parallel action 190–3, 191f, 200–1; stability projection 193–9, 201, 202 Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) 50, 52–3, 77, 162 intergovernmentalism 6, 79, 156, 211 International Criminal Court 45, 63, 134, 158, 214 Ioannina compromise 52 Iran 178, 218, 242 Iraqi conflict: Coalition of the Willing 101, 110, 122, 134, 140, 143, 144, 146, 159, 237, 238, 240; effects on Europe 212–14, 213f; neutrality 74–5, 87; US-EU dispute 26, 44, 45, 47, 73, 74, 86–7, 104, 107, 110, 120, 206 n19 Ireland 51, 57, 117–18, 122, 133, 162; see also the south Ismay, Lord 62 Israel 26, 45, 121 Italy 49, 51, 53, 54, 59, 75, 113, 114–15, 121, 136–7; see also the south Jäätteenmäki, Anneli 105 Jurkynas, M. 161 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 48, 57, 100 Kahler, M. 45 Kaliningrad 151, 152–3 Kallas, Siim 159 Kavan, Jan 133 Keller, E.J. 243 Kelstrup, M. 99 Keukeleire, S. 59 Kinkel, Klaus 138 Klaus, Václac 132 Klestil, Thomas 186 Kosovo war 44, 49, 87, 137, 142, 178–80, 186, 200 Kostecki,W. 131 Koštunica, Vojislav 139 Kováč, Michal 138 Kramer, H. 186 Krastev, Ivan 47 Kreisky, Bruno 78 Kuchma, Leonid 141, 148 n3 2, 179–80 Kukan, Eduard 190

Index

239

Kyoto agreement 26, 45 Laar, Mart 158 labour movement 132–3, 147 Labs, E.J. 42 n23 Latin America 19–20, 33 Latvia 63, 129, 143; see also Baltic countries Latwaski, P. 137 liberal intergovernmentalism 6 Lindley-French, J. 59 Lindsay, J.M. 46 Lipponen, Paavo 103, 105, 108 Lithuania 19, 63, 129, 143; see also Baltic countries Little, R. 241 Luif, P. 186 Lukáč, P. 195 Lukashenka, Aleksandr 140 Lundestad, G. 47 Luns, Joseph 76 Luxembourg 9, 51; see also Benelux countries Maastricht Treaty 23, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 85, 100 Macedonia 2, 64–5, 67 n8, 116, 143, 182; see also the east Maghreb 111, 112, 117 Malashenko, A. 177 Malta 52, 114, 118–19; see also the south Marshall Aid 49 Martonyi, János 145 Mattli, W. 239 Mečiar, Vladimír 135–6, 138, 139, 179, 187, 188, 189 Mediterranean Forum 125 Mexico 236 Michel, Louis 78, 90 n14 Middle East 10, 26, 45, 78, 112, 121, 218, 241–2, 244 Miles, L. 98, 100 Mittelman, J. 239 Moldova 157, 179, 180, 197–8, 218; see also the east Moravcsik, A. 6 Morocco 111, 114, 117 Mouritzen, H. 11 n7, 17, 29, 94, 229, 233 multi-level governance 6 NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) 62 NAFTA see North American Free Trade Association NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 47, 120;

Index

240

the Americas 236; Balkan conflicts 58; Baltic states 156–9; and Cold War 58, 60, 61; the east 61, 62–3, 129, 142–3, 146, 188–90; military strength 61, 63–4; non-pole powers 2, 129, 133; and Nordic countries 40, 97, 109, 160; pole powers 59–60; Prague Summit Declaration 129; primacy of US 48–9; transformation 58–9, 60–4; see also NATO-EU relationship; security NATO Response Force (NRF) 65–6 NATO-EU relationship 11 n7, 24, 26, 28, 31–2, 64–6 near-core insiders 30, 31f, 32, 35f, 36, 37–8, 72f; the east 128f; the north 93f, 99–105, 107–8; the south 113f, 117–20 neo-functionalism 6 neo-liberal institutionalism 7 neorealism 2, 6–7, 15–16, 19, 20, 40 n3 Netherlands 6, 19, 51, 59, 90, 90 n11; see also Benelux countries neutrality 78–9, 87, 101, 102, 119, 172, 185 Nikolič, Tomislav 139 non-mobility 17, 229–30, 246 non-pole powers 1, 3; balancing and band wagoning 84; bifurcation scenario 221–5, 222f; criteria 4, 4f; environment 17; external behaviour 1–3, 8; geographical grouping 8–10; heterogeneity of strategy 4–8, 17–22; location 18–19; marginalization 73–4, 90 n2; and supranationality 79–82; transnational interactions 18 Nordic countries 9, 36, 92–110, 93f; autonomy 94, 95, 97, 102, 181, 185; and Baltic States 98, 109, 154, 155–6, 160–3, 175, 176, 185; constellations 99–107; core insiders 93f; EU crisis management 109; and Franco-German axis 95, 110; future prospects 109–10; geopolitical challenges 92; and Germany 95–6, 97; historical perspective 93–5; influence vs. autonomy 97;

Index

241

interNordic perspective 97–8; NATO 40, 97, 103, 104, 109, 160, 185; nearcore insiders 93f, 99–105, 107–8; Nordic values 9, 94–5, 104, 109, 110 n2; pole attraction 171f, 172; and Russia 97, 110; and United Kingdom 96–7, 110; and United States 96, 97, 101, 104–5, 110; welfare states 94, 160; would-be insiders or outsiders? 93f, 105–7, 108 the north see Nordic countries North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) 236–7, 238 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 62 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO the north-east see Baltic countries Norway 5, 41 n11, 52, 105–6, 107, 108–9; see also Nordic countries NRF (NATO Response Force) 65–6 Oddsson, David 108 Orban, Viktor 195, 196, 197, 201 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 5, 47, 49 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 60, 118, 120, 154 outsiders 30, 31f, 33–4, 35f, 37, 113f, 138–42, 201–2 Palme, Olof 181, 182 parallel action 190–3 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 153 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 62–3, 144, 186, 198 Parts, Juhan 162 Pedersen, T. 99 Petersberg tasks 54, 57, 78, 104 plausibility probes 228–46; Africa 241–3, 244; the Americas 236–9, 244, 246; Central Asia 241–2, 244; constellations 233–4; East Asia 239–41, 244; empirical probe 228, 235–43, 244, 245f; implications 244; interaction capacity 230, 241–2, 244; Middle East 241–2, 244; nonmobility 229–30; past geopolitics 234–5; relational polarity 230–3; theoretical probe 228, 229–35, 243–4 Poland: EU 50, 54, 73, 130–1, 132, 138, 146; foreign policy 20, 114, 138, 143, 144, 146, 161, 178, 179; NATO 63; stability 19;

Index

symbiosis scenario 216–17; see also the east; Visegrád countries polarity 3–4, 15–22, 246; bipolarity 18, 19–20, 233, 239, 240; centralization 21; compatibility of values 20–1; environment polarity 16–17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 239; foreign policy 22; heterogeneous behaviour 17–22; ideology 21, 231–2; multipolarity 20, 22, 41 n9, 233; regional polarity 16, 20, 22, 40 n4; relational polarity 3–4, 16, 22, 23, 230–3, 240; systemic polarity 15–16, 19, 22 pole base 25–6 ‘pole distance’ 8 pole power neighbours see Austria; Benelux countries pole powers 4, 4f, 18; Africa 243; the Americas 236; Asia 239; EU 1, 23, 49–50, 221; Euro-Atlantic pole 23; Middle East 242 pole superstructure 26–8, 43 poles 3, 4f, 15–16, 20–1 Pond, E. 45 Poos, Jacques 136 Portugal 51, 115, 116–17, 122; see also the south power criteria 3, 4f, 20–1, 33 power projection 229–31, 233, 241–2 Prague Summit Declaration 129 President of the European Council 54, 81–2 Putin, Vladimir 150, 152–3 Račan, Ivica 134 Rahigh-Aghsan, A. 242 Rasmussen, Anders Fogh 100–1 realism 2, 20, 244; neoclassical 2 Reiter, Janusz 143 Romania: EU 131, 133–4; and Hungary 137, 195, 196–7, 203; and Kosovo war 142–3, 178, 179; and Moldova/Transdnjestr 197–8; NATO 63, 129, 196; parallel action 193;

242

Index

243

polarity 2, 30; see also the east Rosamond, B. 5–6 Rose, G. 11 n3 Rumsfeld, Donald 47, 75, 159, 210, 226 n2 Rupel, D. 136 Rupnik, J. 135, 143 Russia: Balkan war 59; and Baltic states 150–3; bifurcation scenario 220; and Central Asia 242; Chechen conflict 177–8; and E. European states 32, 139, 140, 188–9; influence 214; and Nordic countries 97, 110; security 60; symbiosis scenario 217–18 Sabič, Z. 137 SADC (Southern African Development Community) 243 Sanadler, Ivo 134 sanctions 21, 24, 28, 47 scenarios 209–12; shift of 225–6 Schengen agreement 49, 57, 107, 152, 196 Schmidt, Helmut 82–3 Schröder, Gerhard 83, 212 Schüssel, Wolfgang 78, 81–2 security: EU 23–4, 25, 26, 28, 64, 72–3, 86; Euro-Atlantic pole 44, 45, 46, 61, 72–3; NATO 23, 24, 54, 60, 61, 62, 103, 104, 185; the south 114–15, 116, 121; US 23–4, 25, 44, 46, 49–50, 55, 60, 65, 67 n2, 72–3, 85, 138, 143, 215 SEM see Single European Market September 11, 2001 21, 59, 177 Serbia 28, 139–40, 168; see also the east Serbia and Montenegro 63 Single European Market (SEM) 96, 101 Sloan, S.R. 65 Slovakia: EU 135–6, 138–9, 180, 187–8, 189–90, 195–6; foreign policy 143, 178, 179, 188, 189, 190, 195–6; NATO 63, 129, 188–90; Regional Partnership 187; see also the east; Visegrád countries Slovenia 63, 129, 135, 136, 137, 138, 176–7, 186, 200; see also the east;

Index

244

Visegrád countries ‘small states’ 3, 4f, 7, 94, 98, 156, 187, 190, 214 Smith, K. 136 Smith, M.A. 137 Solana, Javier 59, 137, 138, 139, 140 the south 9–10, 111–27, 113f; Atlanticism/Euroscepticism? 121–2; core insiders 113–17, 113f; energy sector 115–16; foreign policy trends 112–22; geopolitical threats and challenges 111–12, 126; and Germany 112, 115; near-core insiders 113f, 117–20; outsiders 113f; pole attraction 171f, 172; pole power and competitors 112–16; political fragmentation 122; security 114–15, 116, 121; south—south regional dynamics 122–6; would-be insiders 113f, 120–1 South America 237–8 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 243 Soviet Union 10, 19, 20, 21, 62, 101, 102, 136, 149, 163, 174–5, 175; see also Russia Spaak, Paul Henrik 4–5, 76 Spain 10, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 73, 81, 113–14, 115, 121–2; see also the south stability 19, 24, 26, 28, 58, 61, 62–3, 111, 119 stability projection 174, 193–9; EU 136–8, 147; EU-Atlantic pole 151, 153, 194, 198–9, 199f, 202; Hungary—Romania 196–7; Romania—Moldova/Transdnjestr 197–8; Slovakia-Hungary 195–6 state formation 229 Suchozka, Hanna 130–1 Sverdrup, U. 106 Sweden: autonomy 102, 181; currency 57, 182; EU 5, 7, 51, 52, 107, 181–4; foreign policy 104, 177, 182, 184; labour movement 133; parallel action 192, 193; security policy and NATO 103, 104, 185; see also Nordic countries Switzerland 5, 88, 171–2 Tarasyuk, Borys 141 Taylor, B. 242 terrorism 10, 18, 21, 46–7, 110, 112, 215–16

Index

245

theoretical parsimony 2, 8 Thorhallsson, B. 106, 108 Tindemans report 76–7 Transdnjestr conflict 198 transnational interactions 18 Treaties of Rome 50, 51, 76 Treaty of Amsterdam 48, 52–3, 54–6, 57, 78, 83 Treaty of Nice 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 83 Treaty of Paris 50, 75 Tuomioja, Erkki 104 Turkey 2, 10, 26, 32, 116, 120–1, 178, 203, 217, 242; see also the south Udovenko, Henndiy 141 Ukraine 19, 140–1, 157, 177, 179–80, 218; see also the east unipolar integration theory 15, 29–30 United Kingdom: bifurcation scenario 221; EU 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 81, 84, 162; labour movement 133; NATO 59, 60; and Nordic countries 96–7, 110; pole power 22, 23; security 59, 86; social policy 57; trade policy 96; and United States 23, 26, 41 n16 United Nations 45, 47, 118 United States: and the Americas 236–9; and Asia 239–40, 241; and Baltic states 158–9; bifurcation scenario 219–20; foreign policy 46; ideology 21, 45, 46; influence on Europe 25–6, 49–50, 50, 143, 215; NATO 48–9, 59, 60, 64; and Nordic countries 96, 97, 104–5, 110; Partnership for Peace 63; pole power 19, 21, 23; superpower 20, 22, 46, 215, 216; symbiosis scenario 216; see also security US—Baltic Partnership Charters 157 values 20–1, 45, 48, 63, 231–2, 240 Van der Broek, Hans 139 Van Mierlo, Hans 91 n33 Vandenbroucke, Frank 91 n29 Väyrynen, Paavo 184 (n9)

Index

246

Verheugen, Günter 132–3, 145 Verhofstadt, Guy 86 Visegrád countries 36, 145–6, 189, 190, 192, 195 Voorhoeve, Joris 91 n36 Vranitzky, Franz 186 Wæver, O. 7–8, 241, 243 Wallace, W. 39, 44 Walt, S.M. 41 n12, 42 n23 Waltz, K.N. 16, 22, 40 n3, 40 n4 Warsaw Treaty Organization 58 Western European Union (WEU) 49, 54, 55, 57, 60 Western Mediterranean 5+5 Forum 113, 115, 124–5 Westlake, M. 52 Wiberg, H. 205 Wider Europe—New Neighbourhood Policy 124, 157 Wolchik, S.L. 141 World Trade Organization (WTO) 25, 26, 44, 47 would-be insiders 30, 31f, 34–6, 35f, 37, 173, 174, 180; the east 128, 128f, 130–8, 146; the north 93f, 105–7, 108; the north-east 153–6; the south 113f, 120–1 Yeltsin, Boris 175, 184 Yugoslavia 10, 24, 58, 114, 136, 176 Zapatero, José Luis Rodriguez 122 Zeman, Miloš 145 Zięba, R. 141 Zlenko, Anatoliy 141