THE GENEALOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KINSHIP, STATE AND 'TRIBALISM'
THE GENEALOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KINSHIP, STATE AND 'TRIBALISM'
by
DAVID GULLETTE University of CamVridge
INNER ASIA SERIES Volume 4 THE GENEALOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KINSHIP, STATE AND 'TRIBALISM' By David Gullette First published in 2010 by GLOBAL ORIENTAL PO Box 219 Folkestone Kent CT20 2WP UK Global Oriental is an imprint of Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints BRILL, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, and VSP. www.globaloriental.co.uk ©David Gullette 2010 ISBN 978-1-906876-10-4 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue entry for this book is available from the British Library Chapter 1, pp. 28-39, Chapter 2, pp. 48-9 and Chapter 3, pp. 81-4, contain extracts first published in David Gullette, 'Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: the debate in political science and its wider implications', Central Asian Survey, vol. 26, no. 3, 373-87, 2007 Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis.
Set in Stone Serif 9 on 10.5 pt by Dataworks Printed and bound in England by Antony Rowe Ltd., Chippenham, Wilts
To MC
Contents
Acknowledgements Note on transliteration and names
viii ix
Introduction 1. Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution' 2. The Ideologies of Kinship 3. Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination: the Construction of Relatedness 4. Obligations and the Management of Shame 5. Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities 6. The Genealogy of Kyrgyz History and Identity 7. The Genealogy of the State Conclusion Epilogue
1 18 48 80 101 120 137 156 177 184
Glossary Archive Bibliography Bibliography Index
189 195 197 215
Acknowledgements
are many people who have made this book possible. I am indebted T tohereDavid Sneath, who was one of the driving forces behind the need to reassess long-held beliefs in the discipline. His guidance was essential to this research. I am grateful for all the time he spent and insights he provided. johan Rasanayagam and Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov also provided detailed comments and have helped in expanding my vision on the topic. My friends and colleagues at the Department of Social Anthropology and the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit at the University of Cambridge were also an inspiration. The discussions and feedback were very helpful and pushed me to explore new ideas. Their support was also greatly appreciated. The editors at Global Oriental have been very generous and helpful throughout the process. Special thanks go to Paul Norbury, who took a particular interest in the manuscript and provided strong support. Fieldwork conducted in 2002-2003 was made possible through generous grants from the William Wyse Travel Fund, Richards Grant and the Ling Roth Travel Fund. I also received assistance during the latter stages of writing up from the ASA/Radcliffe-Brown Trust, Robinson College Studentship Aware, Access to Learning Fund, Ling Roth Fund, William Wyse Fund and a Research Aware from the Board of Graduate Studies, University of Cambridge. There are many more people who have helped. My host family also were very kind by letting me into their personal lives. Much of what I understand about Kyrgyzstan is thanks to them. In addition, Tineke D'Haeseleer, Hildegard Diemberger, Olga Ulturgasheva and Gwyn Williams have all provided language support. In Kyrgyzstan, I was supported by my good friend Bakyt. Ian Agnew, also, worked patiently with me on the maps for this book. Other people, too numerous to mention, also helped along the way. Their thoughts have been important in the completion of this book. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their warm words of encouragement and support. They have been a constant source of strength, for which I am eternally grateful.
Note on Transliteration and Names
TRANSLITERATION The Russian terms have been transliterated according to the British Museum guidelines. I have also transliterated Kyrgyz terms according to the same guidelines, but I have modified it to include the three extra letters of the Kyrgyz alphabet. In addition, in Kyrgyz, the 'zh' is a much harder sound than in Russian. I have transliterated this as 'j'. NAMES Many people's names and place names have been changed to protect their identity. In places where I provide a person's name, I have reproduced them with the surname last. Since independence, there is a growing tendency to drop the Russified suffixes and adopt Kyrgyz ones. In such cases people are called by their first name and patronymic name, not their surname. For men, the Kyrgyz word indicating the patronym is 'uulu'. For example, Tursunbai Bakir uulu, the former ombudsman, would be: Tursunbai, the son of Bakir. Uul in Kyrgyz translates as 'son', and the suffix -u is the third person singular possessive form, which conforms to the rules of vowel harmony. For women, the word indicating the patronym is 'kyzy'. For example, Janyl Abdyldabek kyzy would be: Janyl, the daughter of Abdyldabek. Kyz in Kyrgyz translates as 'daughter', and the suffix -y is the third person singular possessive form, which conforms to the rules of vowel harmony.
'Kyrgyz' is not an ethnonym; 'Kyrgyz' is an idea. - MURATBEK IMANALIEV (2002: 137)
Introduction
A fter the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the new Kyrgyz government 1"\.set a course to build a democratic nation. There was great enthusiasm and support, through aid and grants, from the West to ensure that the country would adhere to the new values and set an example for the region. As time passed, however, the pace of political reform slowed and corruption became a serious threat to social and political development. The concern was whether democracy would take hold, and if the initial momentum was lost, what forces would shape the political system? Analysts in the West turned their attention towards political models that reflected traditional values and modes of leadership as one possible outcome. It was assumed that former nomadic 'tribal' divisions would re-emerge, having been the previous form of social and political organization, and lead the struggle for power. From the mid-1990s, growing political tensions and accusations of 'tribalism' (in Kyrgyz, uruuchuluk; in Russian, traibalizm) among the elite strengthened the view that 'tribes' were assuming greater control and dictating politics (Osmanalieva 1999; Osorov 2002). In particular, many people felt that President Askar Akaev had concentrated power around himself and his family, fuelling dissatisfaction among the population, who increasingly felt separated from political and economic power. A broad opposition movement began to gain support in 2000. During the presidential elections then, Akaevexploited a loophole in the constitution that allowed him to run for president, beyond his first two terms in office. Akaev won a tightly controlled election, but the process had only served to convince people that he was becoming more authoritarian. During this period, the Akaev family and acquaintances also strengthened their control over the business sector. The presidential family amassed a great personal fortune and was involved in many lucrative business deals (Kimmage 2005). For example, Aidar Akaev, the president's son, partly owned the mobile telephone company, BiTel, as well as having secured an exclusive contract to supply American military aircraft with fuel at Manas Airport. One man complained to me that he felt that Aidar Akaev had 'raped' (in Russian, iznasiloval) businessmen in the country.
2
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
After Akaev had been re-elected, two events happened that catalysed a concerted effort to remove the President from power. The first was the death of six protestors in the southern town of Aksy. People had gathered to protest the imprisonment of a local parliamentary deputy, Azimbek Beknazarov. Against the official claims that he had been detained for abuses of office during his previous work as local prosecutor, he claimed that he had been imprisoned because he challenged the President for transferring disputed parts of the border to China. During the demonstration, six protestors were killed by police forces in southern Kyrgyzstan. Akaev had not been in the country, but the measures he took after his return were criticized by the opposition and victims' families as mishandling the situation. The opposition argued that this brutal crackdown revealed a worrying display of authoritarian power. The second was the 2005 parliamentary elections. 1 The opposition viewed this as the clearest attempt by the President and his family to take control of government. The successful campaigns of Akaev's two children and widespread fraudulent voting practices sparked demonstrations in southern Kyrgyzstan. Already in early March the first large-scale demonstration took place in the city of Jalalabat. Opposition groups and locals challenged the results of the first round of parliamentary elections and demanded Akaev's immediate resignation. They occupied the regional administration building and eventually won the support of the police. Later, the local administration in Osh was in the hands of the protestors. Members of various opposition parties travelled to the cities of J alalabat and Osh, and set up a parallel government body, challenging the President's authority. Similar demonstrations then took place around the country. Once the momentum was with the opposition, the protestors came up from Osh to Bishkek to bring the demonstrations to the capital. On 24 March 2005, nearly ten thousand people demonstrated in the centre of Bishkek, demanding the resignation of President Akaev. Speeches were held in the Ala-Too Square and there were skirmishes with pro-government supporters. The police were unable to disperse the crowd effectively, and the demonstrators broke into to get into the President's office, the White House, and ransacked the building. A half hour before the protestors managed to enter the building, the President and his family fled in a helicopter and were later granted asylum in Moscow. The 'Tulip Revolution', as the event came to be known, was the end of Akaev's fourteen years as president. 2 THE GENEALOGY OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Akaev's rule was clearly marked by privileged relationships, including nepotism. This was largely regarded as an indication of 'tribalism'. Analysts in the West assumed that 'tribal' relations in politics reflected similar social divisions in the country. Yet, these assumptions were based on popular accounts of kinship, developed from evolutionary approaches to the nature and development of societies. These views went
Introduction
3
unchallenged because the Kyrgyz were a former nomadic society with a history of 'tribal' divisions, which some regarded as important to their identity. These 'tribal' bonds were assumed to be the basis of society and could resurface in the void created by the dissolution of the centralized leadership of the Soviet Union. Allegations of 'tribalism', therefore, justified the view that 'clans' and 'tribes' were still influential throughout the country. The fundamental question was not whether 'clans' and 'tribes' would re-emerge, but what do people mean when they use these categories and how are the understood in everyday social interaction? The paradox was that while people criticized 'tribalism' and its negative effects on politics, people would refer to the positive values that jeti ata and sanjyra - two genealogical charters - had for social values. Indeed, these concepts also played an important role in Akaev's ideology, adding further dimensions to the way in which imagination of kinship was involved in politics. The problem was to separate the entrenched notions of 'tribal' life, particularly strong in Western approaches to (formerly) nomadic societies, and identify the multiple ways in which genealogies are used and how relatedness is constructed. General anthropological definitions of 'clans' and 'tribes' were of little help in understanding what was happening in Kyrgyzstan. Analysing the various uses and concepts of kinship required a shift from defining structures to an exploration of relationships, their manifestations and a historiography of their formation. The aim of this book, therefore, is to conduct a genealogy of genealogies. This requires an analysis of the assumptions that surround the concepts of 'clans' and 'tribes' and their influence on society. How are 'tribes' and 'clans' understood in politics? What are the differences between the Kyrgyz example and Western perceptions? How are genealogical relations important in people's lives and for the wider community? In the chapters that follow, I examine popular theories of 'tribal' society and the ways in which genealogy feature in Kyrgyz people's lives and how it became part of Akaev's ideology. It is the intersections of these discourses and theories that reveal the various concepts behind genealogy. Kinship is not just determined through biology, it is a developed through social interaction. Genealogy, here, is used in two ways. The first aspect is that genealogy is a way to examine relatedness through how it is established and maintained. An initial distinction, however, needs to be drawn between 'tribalism' and relatedness. 'Tribalism' is an allegation of corruption; it is not primarily an identification of kinship. Some political and economic ties are clearly based on family relations, as was the case with Akaev and his children. Yet, other relationships are based on other forms of acquaintance. For example, many of the people that Akaev brought into his administration when he became president were his former students from St Petersburg. In contrast to this, relatedness is a connection made through shared identities, perhaps kinship or even belonging to the same community. In this case, relatedness between family members is analysed through two genealogical charter- jeti ata (the preceding seven generations of
4
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
a person's patrilineage, literally 'seven fathers') and sanjyra (a broader account of genealogy). It is through social interaction and the values that are attached to them that make these connections. Genealogies are often categorized into 'clans' and 'tribes'. A 'clan' is frequently described as a kin community of descent that can be traced back to an apical ancestor, whether imagined or real. A 'tribe' is a much larger set of relations, often uniting several 'clans', and can be spread out over a wide territory. These definitions, however, are based on evolutionary concepts, which see such societies as at an early stage of development and, thus, the antithesis of centralized bureaucracies (i.e. the state). These views do not encompass how people conceive of these relationships or explore how they are used. David Sneath (2007), for example, points out that categorizations of 'tribes' and 'clans' were used by local elites to rule people. People established connections even when they were not biologically related, often in order to benefit from these relations. Sneath notes that many people who could link themselves to elites through their ancestry maintained their genealogies so they could establish claims to lead the people. These 'tribes' and 'clans' were similar to aristocratic orders, with bureaucratic powers- similar to that of the state - vested in the local leaders. Sneath (2007: 118) notes 'the more segmented, exclusive, and strictly patrilineal forms [of descent groups] seem to be linked to the ideology and bureaucracy of the state'. This has not been retained. Sedentarization, Soviet policies and the emergence of the modern state have changed this nomadic order. The challenge is to disconnect this view from a legacy of anthropological kinship studies which advanced notions of society based on evolutionist theories. Mary Patterson, for example, has stated that anthropological depictions of kinship are inherently problematic. In the age of postcolonialism, she noted that: 'prominent practitioners [of kinship studies] suddenly came to the realization that more than any other categories employed in anthropology, kinship was mired in an epistemic, ethnocentric murk from which there was no possibility of extricating it' (Patterson 2005: 12). From the 1960s, kinship studies began to be more rigorously critiqued, to the point where its death as an anthropological concept was officially pronounced (Schneider 2004). The Eurocentric forms of kinship reckoning at the heart of the study were systematically undone to reveal that other societies did not privilege notions of biological accounts of kinship. New approaches to kinship studies now explore the construction of relatedness between people as a constituent of kinship relations (Carsten 2000a). Following this approach, in this book, I use the Kyrgyz terms uruu and urlik ('tribe' and 'clan', respectively) to refer to genealogically imagined communities. 3 I provide the relevant English terms here to provide a sense of the extent of the relations. These terms are used by sanjyrachi (Kyrgyz specialists on genealogical descent and history), but their definitions contain two elements. First, there are subtleties about relatedness, which incorporate the variety of ways people establish relationships with each other, and is what I focus on. Second, the terms reflect Russian and Soviet concep-
Introduction
s
tions of 'tribe' and 'clan', which are also based on evolutionary concepts of society. This element is not a contradiction of the former, but acts as a popular framework for ethnic identity. While Kyrgyz academics have done much to expand the view of Kyrgyz society after independence, this particular conception has much to do with the way identity was developed under Akaev's presidency. In some cases, the Kyrgyz and Russian terms are quite similar and are used almost interchangeably in everyday situations. Indeed, there was little discernible difference between uruu and uruk; they each describe similar kinship relations. For example, some people would describe 'Mongoldor' as an uruk, while others referred to it as an uruu. It must be stressed, however, that despite parallels drawn with 'tribal' society, uruu and uruk do not exist as corporate groups, acting together to attain goals, such as to obtain greater political power. Suggestions that these categories represent a Durkheimian notion of mechanical solidarity- social cohesion based on similarities, often identified among 'tribal' groups -are misleading. Solidarity around an idea was often achieved through adherence to values imposed by the ruling elite. In contrast, the English terms 'tribe' and 'clan' and comparative Russian terms, 'plemya' and 'rod', are used in this book only when referring to general perceptions of kin groups, or when specifically used by other people. My caution in using the English and Russian terms is that they are too closely associated with evolutionary understandings of society and thus obscure local expressions of relatedness. Nevertheless, despite the prevalence of these ideas, this kind of kinship was not an overly important feature to many people's everyday lives. Far from influencing social relations, few had a strong interest in these genealogical categories. Uruu or uruk do not act as corporate groups and cannot offer people help. This was repeated many times throughout fieldwork. The question of uruu and uruk relations did arise, however, during life-cycle rituals, such as weddings and funerals. One man once described to me gathering with his uruk for a funeral. He said that he was asked to go by his father, but did not know the deceased or many of the people there. In this respect, he felt very little connection with them, but out of obligation to his father and the deceased, he attended the ceremony. Although formally it may have been his uruk, his connection to them was established through obligations and connections to their ancestors. The second aspect of genealogy used here is as an analytical methodology. For example, I examine how the government's efforts to build ethnic and state identities through a national-level notion of relatedness were an attempt to foster unity, especially during a tense political period. Genealogy is used here to investigate the various practices and images that are propagated in official accounts and their intended influence. In particular, it can explore some of these ideological underpinnings through national celebrations and linkages to other concepts. This examination reveals the way in which the knowledge of a person's relations serves a practice through which the citizens can be governed. The ways in which this is developed is explored through
6
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
government-sponsored national celebrations, which outline Akaev's ideology and the way it was developed. In addition to the various ways genealogy is used to establish relatedness between people at different levels, shame is a strong influence that runs throughout these relations. Managing shame is a significant part of social interaction. This is evident in a Kyrgyz phrase, 'Those who do not know their ancestors up to the seventh generation are slaves', which stresses knowledge of genealogies as a key part of being 'Kyrgyz'. While many people do not know their ancestors, shame is still present as a disciplining factor. It is also present in the national celebrations. Honouring the ancestors and learning from their actions is, in Akaev's ideology, the basis for the foundation of the state and the key to its future. Thus, not knowing the ancestors and following their deeds will lead to the ruin of the state. Shame is also used between family members. If the man had not gone to the funeral, for example, it would be shameful for his father and the family. Their mutual obligations are often reinforced through identifying shame. On an everyday level, it is not genealogies, but the positioning of shame that dictates obligations and relationships, imposed on a national and local level. The argument described here contrasts with other accounts of the importance of 'tribes' and 'clans' in Central Asia. In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature, which analyses political factionalism as either constituted by regional or 'tribal' associations. This division has formed a debate between scholars, especially in political science, about the strength of particular relationships and how they are used to negotiate political power (Collins 2002, 2006; Jones Luong 2002; Schatz 2004, 2005; Starr 2006). These views have created a particular image outside the region about the nature of politics and society. Regionalism examines the divisions between regions and their elites, and its manifestation in political factionalism. In Kyrgyzstan, the clear economic division and political marginalization of the south during Akaev's presidency have driven research that argues for regional blocs, grouped together to advance regional issues and struggle for greater power. 'Tribalism', or what is often referred to as 'clan politics', however, contends that kinship groups grapple for economic and political gains between each other. It is the way these groups negotiate deals between each other that determines whether there will be relative stability or political and social chaos. The political science approaches have revealed much about the Soviet Union and the period immediately following it, but the focus on political factions as representative of similar social divisions has obscured a broader understanding of relatedness in daily life and its significance. Studies that have focused on 'tribalism' have based their views on outdated anthropological theories. Kinship studies, however, have moved away from these theories, advocating for a more nuanced approach to kinship and how it is imagined through social interaction. This has led to a mismatch between political models and depictions of social life. Examining relatedness and the concepts that support it
Introduction
7
provide an alternative approach to understand kinship relations and the conditions under which become important. This book begins by exploring the discursive construction of 'tribalism'. In Chapter 1, I examine the period leading up to the 'Tulip Revolution' and the accusations made against President Akaev. This serves as the introduction into the political science debate between regionalism and 'tribalism'. As argued above, these political models are based upon kinship theories that have largely been overturned. The concept of 'tribalism', however, must also be analysed further. The term is not used exclusively to describe the distribution of powerful positions through family ties. It is the allegation that indicates feelings of 'dispossession' (Nazpary 2002) as well as attempts to distance oneself from the accused. Such accusations are made primarily about political practices, separating out what could be considered everyday forms of corruption that people often use to survive in the post-Soviet economy. The concentration of 'tribalism' overlooks the various ways in which politics can be imagined. Chapter 2 provides an historical analysis of nomadic societies and political formations. It begins by examining the attempt by one public figure to establish a political party on his uruu. This event helps to illustrate the implications behind using kinship identities. There are not only issues with defining the term, but also with the theories that have shaped the general perceptions of the term. In both English and Russian, the terms have developed out of evolutionist theories, which regarded 'tribe' or 'clan' as the basic unit of society. These groups were often presented as feudal, egalitarian and/or as a segmentary lineage system, which divided society into roughly equal units based on 'clans' and 'tribes' functioning to oppose each other and maintain social harmony. These, however, were based on the assumption that kin groups could not develop the kinds of bureaucratic orders similar to that of states (Sneath 2007). Tsarist and Soviet accounts of the Kyrgyz people provide clear examples of hierarchical orders, while theories of 'tribal' groups limit understandings of nomadic social life and development. Soviet ethnographies used these hierarchies to demonstrate how contact with tsarist Russia had changed the Kyrgyz and created early capitalist relations among them. These views have largely contributed to the lasting perception of 'tribes' and 'clans' as models of early social interaction. Chapter 3 explores an alternative approach to understanding kinship among the Kyrgyz. Following the work of David Schneider (2004) and Janet Carsten (2000a), I argue that the focus should shift from biology to forms of social interaction that establish and maintain relatedness. Through genealogy, I propose that people become aware and explore their relations with one another. I term this 'genealogical imagination', the establishment of relatedness through a process of personal and collective forms of memory and representations of history, and expressed through various deployments of scale (temporality, spatiality, local and national inclusiveness) and (politicized) formations of descent. This influences perceptions of people's sense of self and how they relate to others through
8
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
their genealogies. 1 examine this through ethnographic accounts of how people have made gathering genealogical accounts and share them with others. For some, a popular social concept is that the Kyrgyz people should not forget their ancestors and the lessons that they can learn from them. The memories about ancestors evoked through the genealogical imagination are, however, underpinned by a history filtered through personal and collective ideologies. The importance and understanding of these memories can, therefore, take different perceptions depending on the prevailing ideology. This has important implications for the way genealogy is employed in Akaev's nation-building campaign. Connections established through genealogical relatedness, however, do not attestto their strength. Closeness and support come from the obligations that people create between themselves. Chapter 4 explores the networks of help and assistance that people rely on to overcome daily challenges. People may appeal to relatives through their genealogies, but it is not through an appeal to a shared uruu or uruk identity that family connections are used to help one another. It is, instead, the mutual obligations that people hold the greatest significance for these relationships. Requests for help or assistance can be reinforced through notions of shame. This is the case particularly in cases of marriage. I explore three cases of marriage, two of which are stories of bride abduction. These demonstrate how shame is managed by people, and particularly the relationship between father and daughter. In cases of abduction, if the father requests his daughter to stay with her abductor, she risks losing any help if she disobeys her father. The situation brings shame on the family for having the daughter's modesty compromised by her being kidnapped. If she does not listen to her father, she and her family will be publically regarded as shameful, and the woman may find it difficult to find another husband, because of her reputation. There have even been cases where women have committed suicide because they are unable to deal with the burden that comes from being kidnapped. Due to these reasons, many women decide to stay. In the ethnographies provided, it is clear that the women cannot afford to loose the help of their families. In addition to networks of help, I examine how friends and acquaintances assist each other. These are not just casual relations, they also involve particular obligations. I present ethnographies which demonstrate how these relationships are essential to making ends meet, particularly when people are constantly short of money. On a personal level, genealogies are important for some, contributing to their sense of self. The memories of ancestors and the values they represent are important, but do not represent a significant factor in people's everyday lives. People are, however, reliant on their families. Here, shame becomes a strong force in managing relationships and obligations. A mixture of the importance of ancestors and shame are also visible in Akaev's nationbuilding ideology. Genealogy as a methodological tool reveals how Akaev constructed this view and integrated with people's personal views. Through this methodology, Chapter 5 explores how Akaev used ethnogenesis - a historical study, demonstrating the existence and stable development
Introduction
9
of 'nations' through language, customs, territory and economic life throughout history- and its particular manifestation in the work of Lev Gumilev. The history of ethnogenesis is traced to examine the importance this gave to ethnic identity and how it was used in Kyrgyzstan. Chapter 6 continues the examination into ethnogenesis. Through a national celebration dedicated to the Manas epos, Akaev elaborates Gumilev's theory to identify the passionate qualities of the Kyrgyz ancestors. Gumilev's notion of passoinarnost' (or passionarity) is compared to the Weberian concept of charisma - as the devotion of leaders towards their people -to examine how it is enmeshed with understandings of identity and the goals of the state in Kyrgyzstan. Akaev developed this vision to complement that of people's own understanding of their ancestors. This created a public forum, which encouraged people to explore their own genealogies further, also establishing the criteria constituting a 'Kyrgyz person'. The official construction of identity also acted as a way for people to discipline themselves. The values that were presented through the ancestors were qualities that were placed as key to Kyrgyz identity and were the responsibility of all citizens. The desire to demonstrate the contribution that ancestors made not only shaped the way in which people discussed themselves as continuing the work these figures had started, but also was an attempt to influence the actions of others. This is explored further though Nikolas Rose's (1996b) notion of 'genealogy of subjectification', which describes how the very qualities that make up a person's identity can also be used to enforce self governance, abiding to official ideology. Akaev's ideology focused not only on creating a 'Kyrgyz person', but also an image of the state. Chapter 7 explores how he presented this as the result of the ancestors' actions and the moral values they represented. In 2003, the country celebrated '2,200 Year of Kyrgyz Statehood'. A number of festivities were held throughout the year to commemorate this and explore the moral values that the citizens should guard as the legacy of their ancestors and use to strengthen the state. Using genealogy as a methodological approach, the interconnections between the ideology behind the celebration and the political context become apparent. This was not just the continuation of Akaev's ideology; it was an attempt to unite the country around the concept of the state and to overcome the tense political stand-off following the deaths of demonstrators the previous year. The celebration, however, did not generate the unity needed to quell the political tensions. Two years later, amid fresh allegations of mismanagement and corruption, protestors ousted Akaev from power. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH This book is based on fieldwork conducted in northern Kyrgyzstan 20022003 and 2008-2009. My investigation into some of the central questions of this book, however, began during an earlier trip in 2000-2001. Then, I was based at the Kyrgyz National State University studying Kyrgyz and Russian. During that time, I was struck by the stark contrast between
10
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
depictions of Kyrgyzstan as divided between 'tribes' (Dzhunushaliev & Ploskikh 2000) and everyday life, where such corporate groups did not influence people's actions. Notions of 'tribes' and 'clans' were largely absent from my conversations with people. While not all authors argued that 'tribal' society had re-emerged after socialism as the 'traditional' mode of political and social organization, there were sufficient accounts, particularly in the West, about which groups occupied what roles and the interaction between them. From my anthropological training, the kinship categories were clear, but their role was less so, particularly in the post-Soviet context. My experiences indicated that there were no such clearly-formed groups or strong indication that the categories of 'clan' and 'tribe' had a strong social effect (cf. Rosen 1984: 1). My research grew out of this struggle between established theory and empiricism. When I returned to Kyrgyzstan in 2002 to conduct fieldwork, I chose Naryn and Bishkek as bases, but also travelled throughout Naryn and Ysyk-Kol oblasts (provinces). I chose Naryn because my friends and colleagues advised me this would be where I would find the 'real' Kyrgyz. The harsh mountain environment had discouraged many Russians and other ethnicities from settling there during the Soviet era. As a result, my friends told me, people were able to maintain many customs that were no longer found in other parts of the country. Indeed, there were some customs which were well maintained. There was a lack, however, of 'tribal' organization. People had other more urgent concerns, such as how to find money to educate their children. My fieldsite preparation, however, should have also included finding a warm place for the winter. The rest of my time I spent in Bishkek. Many of the events celebrating 2,200 years of statehood were located in Bishkek. These were important as they focused on honouring ancestors. In addition, I had access to the National Library and the rare books department of the National Academy of Sciences. I was able to study archive documents, tsarist and Soviet ethnographic accounts and find new publications. I met with a number of scholars from different universities and research institutes in Bishkek. They provided me with an invaluable source of discussion and material. Furthermore, I was able to conduct interviews with several politicians and journalists who were key figures in local and national movements of that time. During my fieldwork, newspapers were an important source of information. As Akhil Gupta (1995: 385) notes, newspapers are a 'major discursive format through which daily life is narrativized and collectivities imagined'. In contrast to many other parts of Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan has a relatively liberal media. Internet websites are increasingly popular, but during my time there, newspapers remained the most popular form of media. Despite the state media sources, many newspapers are owned by opposition politicians or carried their articles, which challenged the government's position. For example, the Russian-language daily, Moya stolitsa novosti (My Capital News, which was later renamed MSN) regularly printed articles by the then-imprisoned, former Vice President
Introduction
11
Feliks Kulov. The weekly Russian-language newspaper, ResPublica, also carried articles by the outspoken opposition figure Nurlan Motuev. Agym (Trend), a bi-weekly Kyrgyz-language publication, expressed the views of its editor-in-chief and former presidential candidate, Melis Eshimkanov. A majority of the opposition newspapers were printed by the government-owned printing company, Uchkun. Only occasionally were issues blocked or altered. 4 Government and pro-government publications provided a valuable source to further understand the vision of the government. SlovoKyrgyzstana (The Word ofKyrgyzstan), a Russianlanguage newspaper, carried many of Akaev's speeches and often had detailed coverage of national celebrations. Vechernii Bishkek (Evening Bishkek), a pro-government Russian-language newspaper, was the most popular daily newspaper in the country. It often carried stories against the opposition and provided complementary articles about the national celebrations. AN OUTLINE OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Since independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has been exploring its history in part through national celebrations. As nomadic people, they did not keep records. The country's history had been largely written by outsiders and framed within a socialist ideology. After independence, Kyrgyz academics began to explore their history. Akaev also contributed to this by honouring the exemplary characteristics of the ancestors and brining the lessons of the past into the present. This section presents this history and examines some defining moments from independence which led to the 'Tulip Revolution'. In the official history, the Kyrgyz are one of the oldest ethnic groups in the region. 5 A statement made by the Chinese chronicler Sima Qian has been used to support the government's claims that the Gen'gun (which has been taken to mean the Kyrgyz) had a state in 201 BC. Apart from this reference, little is known of the extent or influence of this polity. The next time the 'Kyrgyz' are said to have succeeded in establishing political and military independence was in 840 AD when they formed a khanate on the Yenisei River in southern Siberia (Butanaev & Khudaykov 2000) by defeating the Uighur Khanate. The end of the Kyrgyz Khanate came with the rise of Chinggis Khan in the thirteenth century. The military power of the Mongols was too great for the Kyrgyz who were incorporated into Mongolian rule. Displaced from their territory in Siberia, the Kyrgyz slowly migrated south, towards what today is Kyrgyzstan. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many people throughout the Fergana Valley converted to Islam. It was not until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that Sufi missionaries were able to convert many of the mobile pastoral people in the mountainous areas of contemporary Kyrgyzstan (Haghayeghi 1995: 76-7). Many nomads in northern Kyrgyzstan had converted to the Sunni form of Islam (predominantly belonging to the Hanafi school of thought) by the early
12
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
twentieth century. The faith was not as established as it was in southern Kyrgyzstan, where many mosques and medressas (Islamic schools) had opened, and had been closer to the settled communities which had adopted Islam before. In the 1700s, many Kyrgyz came under the control of the Kokand Khanate. The borders of the Khanate stretched northwards to southern Kazakhstan, but the ruling dynasty only had weak control of this region. The Russian Empire turned the Khanate into a vassal state in 1868. Heavy taxes caused the surrounding populations, including the Kyrgyz to revolt, lasting from 1873 to 1876. Northern Kyrgyz leaders sent petitions to Russia for support. Further, Kokand Khanate's Muhammad Pulad Beg Khan's increased anti-Russian stance provoked the Empire to annex the khanate. The Russians then abolished the Khanate in 1876, assuming full control of the region. In October 1917, the Bolsheviks took power in Russia, and soon thereafter new administrators were sent to Central Asia. As part of the policy of national delimitation in 1924, the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast'was formed. On 1 February 1926, the Soviets granted the territory the status of Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Finally, on 5 December 1936, this was changed to the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic, a full member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), with nominal powers to secede. During the Soviet era, Islam was considered a threat to the goals of the socialist regime. First, for the Soviets, Islam was ideologically opposed to the secularism of communism. Second, mobilizing people in the name of Islam was a threatto Soviet legitimacy in the region (Shahrani 1993: 130). For example, the Soviets considered the basmachi guerrilla movement to be a Muslim fighting force. The movement had started in 1916 Tashkent as a reaction against the conscription of Central Asians to fight in the First World War. It was, however, the destruction of Kokand in 1918 by Russian troops which sparked greater resistance to the colonization of the region. The basmachi movement was not fundamentally a Muslim group; it was primarily a reaction against Russian colonial encroachment and the establishment of Soviet rule, lasting until the early 1930s. In addition, the bas mach i were also against the Jadids (Muslim reformers 6), who were attempting to wrestle authority away from the established clerics (Broxup 1983).7 Islamic values, however, were not entirely incompatible with the goals of communism. Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko note that Islam shared similarities with the ideology of communism. For example, they stress the 'priority of collectivist values over individual ones and the evaluation of the social and purely human significance of the individual being based on his service to the community' (Polonskaya and Malashenko 1994: 103). The similarities between some values of Islam and communism allowed for the continuation of Islamic interpretation of social actions. As M. NazifMohib Shahrani has noted: 'For Turkistanis, the refocusing of their traditional Islamic identities through their Soviet
Introduction
13
assigned, but locally interpreted, modern national identities, is perfectly congruous with the historical pluralism of Islamic umma' (Shahrani 1985: 35). 8 Yet, it was the fear that Islam could pose a threat to Soviet rule that caused heavy repression. The Soviet administration executed religious leaders, prohibited religious texts and closed down mosques and medressas. The anti-religious movement changed the way people associated with their religion. The loss of social and moral leaders changed the way people practised Islam. Central Asians still regarded themselves as Muslim, but few adhered to the laws of Islam. In addition, the complementary views between communism and Islam changed the perception of Islam from a belief system into a characteristic of their ethnicity. In short, the collectivist values of Islam were retained as part of people's identities because they could be reconciled with communist ideology. Adeeb Khalid (2007: 83) has noted: 'Being Muslim came to mean adherence to certain local cultural norms and traditions rather than adherence to strictures that were directly validated by the learned tradition.' This is now changing, particularly in northern Kyrgyzstan. People are beginning to adopt Islam as a belief system and adhere to the daily rituals. In some cases, religion is being offered as the alternative to the state, which is not meeting their needs, fuelling concerns of extremism in the country. In addition to limiting religious activity, the Soviets implemented a modernization campaign. Beginning in 1928, the nomads were forced to settle and join a kolkhoz (a collective farm, from the Russian words kollektivnoe khozyaistvo), and to implement the first of a number of fiveyear plans to support the needs of the Soviet Union through large-scale agricultural production. The administration also initiated education and language reforms. Before the Soviet era, Kyrgyz (a Turkic language from the Altaic language group), as with other Central Asian languages, was written with an Arabic alphabet. A reformed Arabic alphabet was used from 1923 to 1929. This was then changed to a Latin alphabet, which was used from 1929 to 1940. From 1940 until today, Kyrgyz is written with a Cyrillic alphabet. Unlike some of its neighbours, Kyrgyzstan has continued to use this alphabet. These reforms had another effect - the slow Russification of certain aspects of Kyrgyz life. Russian still remains a popular language in the country, but it is slowly fading out in rural areas. It is still used by government and used as a primary language in schools or there are mandatory language classes. Kyrgyz, however, is the first official language. Other Soviet policies focused on improving the status of women in society (Akiner 1997). Since independence, however, women have experienced 'a male backlash against Soviet propaganda about the heroic "emancipated woman" of the communist past' (Buckley 1997: 7). In Kyrgyzstan, women have also encountered a retreat of previous Soviet policies. Male social views dictate that women should stay at home. Women, nevertheless, are actively adapting to their situation. As Kathleen Kuehnast (1997: 36) notes, the Kyrgyz proverb, 'Let the stone
14
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
lie where it has fallen', 9 is a concept which 'introduces a strategy for how a person should address change practically, that is, not through the act of passive resistance but through an active stance of accommodation and collaborating in the process of change'. 10 While women may be largely absent from high-level positions and those with increased responsibilities, more and more women are working and travelling abroad as labour migrants. The strong central government during the Soviet era provided the model for government after the declaration of independence on 31 August 1991, but its emergence into a market-led economy and pledges to democratic values have proven a difficult transition. The period after independence was marked by a slow decline in GDP and problems associated with changing the political structure. One of the most contentious issues has been continual debates over the nature of the constitution. The first constitution was introduced in May 1993. Referendums in 1994, 1996 and 1998 brought revised constitutions- all giving greater powers to the executive branch. Further changes in 2003 led to accusations of the President increasing his power and limiting the effectiveness of political parties. After the 'Tulip Revolution', Bakievformed a constitutional commission. The process was slow and there were demonstrations throughout April and May 2006, with people camping out in Ala-Too Square, demanding speedier reforms. 11 A draft constitution was prepared in November 2006, which was passed by Parliament. This was seen as a victory for the opposition, who had demonstrated for several days to pressure Bakiev to adopt the reforms which limited presidential powers. A month later, pro-presidential supporters argued for further amendments, which would reinstate many of the powers that had been taken away from the President in the November constitution. These were provisionally adopted and a new version of the constitution was finally signed into law in january 2007. Feliks Kulov and the entire cabinet of ministers resigned as they had struggled against Parliament over the constitution and had now seemingly lost. In September 2007, the Constitutional Court invalidated the November and December 2006 amendments, as they had not been passed by national referendum. The country reverted back to the 2003 constitution, putting the country into a legal and political deadlock. Many of the reforms that had been passed since 2003 were now not legal. Bakeiv quickly announced a national referendum in October 2007, which saw a new version of the constitution adopted. The main changes were that some of the presidential powers had been strengthened, Parliament would now have ninety deputies (up from seventy-five) and deputies could only be elected from party lists. 12 There have been further problems connected to Kyrgyzstan's borders. In particular, the border with China had been unresolved since the tsarist era. A number of agreements were made between China and the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, but the dispute was never officially resolved. The Soviet Union, however, had never intended for borders
Introduction
15
created in the 1924 delimitation to be international boundaries. After independence, this caused numerous problems for nearly all the former socialist republics. President Ak.aev met with Chinese officials and agreed to cede four areas of Kyrgyz territory to China in 2002. His decision was criticized by the opposition and led to demonstrations (see Chapter 1). While there was an attempt to demonstrate that Akaev had gone through the correct process, there was never a referendum and people felt that this was a serious challenge to the sovereignty of the country. Despite the difficulties in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan set the trend in the region by pushing through reforms and expanding its international relations. In May 1993, Kyrgyzstan was the first country in Central Asia to introduce its own currency, the som. In April 1996, Kyrgyzstan with four other members (China, Kazakhstan, Russia and Tajikistan), founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The member states agreed on border delimitation, military cooperation, international trade and methods of tackling drug trafficking.l3 Later, in 1998, Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organization to develop international trade. 14 The first President of Kyrgyzstan, Ask.ar Akaev, was elected by Parliament in 1990, which was then still part of the USSR. The introduction of the constitution in 1993 granted citizens the right to vote. In 1995, Akaev won the popular vote to remain president. The constitution, however, stipulated that a person should only be president for two 5-year terms. Ak.aev ran again in 2000, challenging the constitution and creating serious political tension. He stated that in 1990 he had been elected by Parliament, not by the people, thus, he could run again. Ak.aev won the election, but many opposition candidates complained that he had prohibited certain people from running and did not allow candidates sufficient opportunities to advertise their political views. One example was the imprisonment of Feliks Kulov. A former Akaev supporter, Kulov became leader of the opposition party Ar-Namys (Dignity). One time Vice President, Governor of Chili oblast', Chairman for the National Security Committee and Mayor of Bishkek, Kulov had developed strong views against President Ak.aev and his policies, which he claimed led to his imprisonment. 15 He was arrested in early 2000 on charges of embezzlement dating back to when he was Governor of Chili oblast' (1993-1997). He was jailed not before the presidential election, in which he had announced he would participate but was acquitted, before the election. In order to be eligible for the election, he was required to sit a state language exam to assess his proficiency in Kyrgyz, the country's first official language. Kulov refused and was barred from running. After the election he was tried again on the same charges and sentenced for seven years. For many, this marked a more serious tum towards authoritarianism for Akaev and a vocal opposition increasingly challenged the President. The ousting of Ak.aev in the 'Tulip Revolution' did not bring about the changes hoped for by so many. The term 'revolution' increasingly came
16
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
to have little connotation with any real improvement in government. In personal conversations, people have expressed frustration and dismay with the government, which is now led by Kurmanbek Bakiev. The assassination of businessmen and parliamentary deputies has fuelled fears that Bakeiv's government is incapable of controlling the escalating violence in the country, unable to implement laws, and at worse, being involved in 'mafia' business. Indeed, Bakiev's close family members have taken control of key positions and there is concern that there is fighting among them. 16
1
NOTES The elections were held over two rounds on 27 February and 13 March 2005.
2
3 4
During the demonstrations, the media reported a profusion of symbols used by the different opposition groups. Yellow and pink were two colours used by opposition groups. Pink was the colour used by the opposition candidate Roza Otunbaeva during her demonstrations in the run-up to the parliamentary elections and afterwards. Tulips were used by another opposition group. In order to rob the protestors of their symbols, it was reported that the army had been ordered to remove all the tulips from the city centre before 24 March. There were other colours, such as lemon, and flowers, such as daffodils, used by different groups. This only demonstrated the lack of unity between the groups. The only goal was to oust Akaev. When the work of forming a new government began, the divisions quickly surfaced. The subsequent political fall-out and the public's displeasure with the continuation of corrupt practices destroyed the concept of a genuine revolution. Many simply called it a 'coup d'etat' (in Russian, perevorot). To avoid confusion, I use the singular form of the Kyrgyz terms. There were, however, several serious allegations of government interference. In one case, Alexander Kim, editor-in-chief of Moya stolitsa novosti accused the government of opening a number of libel cases against the newspaper with the intent to close it. Kim also said that his journalists were intimidated and his car set on fire, which he attributed to intimidation by the government (Karakulov 2003). The newspaper was closed on 13 June 2003 because it was found guilty of defamation and could not pay the damages. It later reopened on 27 June 2003 as MSN (Redaktsiya gazety MSN2003).
5
6
For more detailed discussion of Kyrgyz history, see Rafis Abazov (2004), A. Asankanov (ed.) (1996), A. Asankanov and 0. Osmonov (2002), Dzh. Baktygulov and Zh. Mombekova (2001), V. Butanaev and Yu. Khudyakov (2000), T. Chorotegin and K. Moldokasymov (2000), V. Mokrynin and V. Ploskikh (1995), T. Omurbekov and A. Dzhorobekova (1998) and Svat Soucek (2000). 'fadidism was a program of modernization that encompassed several points: reform of the traditional Muslim educational system; emancipation of women; creation of a common Turkic literary language; and fortifying the relationship among Russia's Muslims' (Sabol 1995: 239, n. 18). For more details onJadidism see Khalid (1998).
Introduction
17
See also Olivier Roy (2000) and Peter Hopkirk (1984) who give a vivid account of this period in Central Asian history. 8 The umma is an Arabic term designating the community of all Muslims. See also Adeeb Khalid (2007), Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay (1985) and Mathijs Pelkmans (2005) for more on this subject. 9 In Kyrgyz, 'Tash tiishkon jerinde oor'. 10 See Kathleen Kuehnast (1998) and Kuehnast & Nechemias (2004) for more on the influences that are shaping the category of 'woman' in post-Soviet states. 11 For more on the period following the 'Tulip Revolution', see International Crisis Group (2006). 12 Deputies had previously been elected by single mandate. In 2007, the Parliament had not been elected by party lists and new elections were held in December 2007. This saw a massive victory for Bakiev's party Ak Jol (Bright Path). 13 While the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is more of a discussion group, it does contribute to maintaining ties in the region and involving Russia and China in Central Asian affairs. 14 Kyrgyzstan was the first country in the region to join, but since none of its neighbours were members, it was not able to take advantage of the economic agreements. This caused a tariff war between the republic and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which was not resolved until 2000. 15 It is interesting to note that Kulov was written out of Bishkek history in Zh. Malabaev's (2001) book on the capital. Kulov was mayor of Bishkek from 1998 to 1999. Ryspek Baltabaev (2003) published an article in Moya stolitsa novosti describing this omission and the importance that Kulov had to Bishkek during his time as mayor. Such an error brings into question the political intentions of Malabaev and those of the publishing company in his description of the history of Bishkek. 16 For more on this and other problems after the constitutional reforms, see International Crisis Group (2008). 7
1
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
between elites is a major source of instability in C ompetition Kyrgyzstan. The struggle for political and economic resources has led to high levels of corruption. 1 During elections, allegations of corruption intensify; parties often destroy opponents' personalities rather than establish concrete plans for the country's development. In particular, allegations of 'tribalism' (in Russian, 'traibalizm', in Kyrgyz 'uruuchuluk'), one form of corruption, become more prevalent at this time. Its use is aimed at uncovering sets of relationships that are attempting to accumulate power. This was the backdrop to the period preceding the 'Tulip Revolution'. During this time, a series of tense political stand-offs and demonstrations took place, often under the banner of ridding the government of corruption, and with it 'tribalism'. The 'revolution', for some, represented a breakdown of pacts between 'clans' which led to massive demonstrations in the capital to establish a new order. This view, most notable in political science, is based on a misunderstanding about politics and people's genealogical relations. It has, however, gained support as it plays on Western assumptions about the social and political structure of former nomadic societies. The views have gone unchallenged and, thus, repeated the mistakes of earlier studies. How can 'tribalism' be separated from such entrenched views? If taken, instead, as a discursive tactic, 'tribalism' generates the perception of corruption rather than the identification of 'clan' groups and their activities within government. Retracing the events from 2002, which eventually led to the ousting of President Akaev, provides an example of how the discourse of 'tribalism' is used and the implications it carries. The situation in 2002 was one of high tensions and waning tolerance for an increasingly authoritarian president. What ensued was an attempt by Akaev to control the political process and unite the country through a nation- and statebuilding campaign with a shared genealogy as the underlying theme. In return, various opposition movements used 'tribalism' as a rally
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
19
call against the government. It was these events that strengthened the characterization of 'clan' politics in the country and set the goals of the new government. TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRITY The events of 17 March 2002- which subsequently became known as the 'Aksy tragedy' (in Russian, Aksy tragedii) - marked the beginning of heightened social unrest and increased criticism of President Akaev. 2 For the opposition, this moment signified the beginning of a series of developments which eventually led to the 'Tulip Revolution'. On 17 March, a group of protesters marched towards Kerben, the Aksy regional capital, Jalalabat oblast', demonstrating against the imprisonment of local parliamentary deputy and leader of the Asaba (Flag) party, Azimbek Beknazarov. There are conflicting accounts as to what happened during the protest. Government officials maintained that demonstrators threw objects at the special police force (OMON), 3 which was there to maintain order. ResPublica, an opposition newspaper, reported that people from the nearby village of Kyzyl-Tuu were marching towards Kerben when they were stopped by OMON officers, between the villages of Boz-Piek and Uspenskoe. When the villagers refused to turn back, OM ON officers fired on them, killing six men. The following night, President Akaev, who had been in Moscow, appeared on television. He blamed opposition groups for attempting to destabilize the government's political authority and appealed for calm. After further demonstrations, Beknazarov was released from prison on 19 March. 4 In the following months, President Akaev attempted to take charge of the situation by seeking reconciliation with the opposition parties, and initiating an investigation into the killings. Several high-ranking government officials were eventually found guilty for not preventing the violence. On 22 May 2002, Kurmanbek Bakiev, then Prime Minister, resigned from his post after a special commission found that he and several other government officials had not acted to stop the deaths of the demonstrators. 5 Bakiev cleared himself of any guilt, but stated that he felt that he could no longer hold office after being part of the current government which could allow such violence. Once he left office, he urged those that he thought to be guilty to step down (Blua 2002). During the summer and autumn of 2002 demonstrations continued throughout the country. 6 In November 2002, Beknazarov and the victims' families organized a march from Osh to Bishkek. On 18 November, just after I had arrived to begin my fieldwork, at least a dozen police buses were parked in Ala-Too Square in preparation of any demonstrations. There was a tense atmosphere throughout the city. The protestors, however, were detained in a suburb of Bishkek, Voenno-Antonovka, and later sent back to Osh on buses.
20
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
On the same day, there was a pro-government 'meeting' outside the Jogorku Kengesh (Parliament). A crowd of over a hundred people marched towards Parliament. They stopped outside and made impassioned speeches against the opposition. Shouting through a megaphone, local residents expressed their anger with opposition leaders, who they considered were only after political power and causing an unnecessary disturbance. People held placards with slogans such as: 'We condemn the actions of the opposition'; 'Masaliev and Beknazarov -resign!' and 'Askar Akaevich, we demand [that you] dissolve the Legislative Assembly!' 7 On 28 December 2002, seven police officers and local government officials were convicted for their involvement in the Aksy tragedy. Four were sentenced to prison; the others were acquitted due to a lack of evidence. The opposition voiced heavy criticism for the way in which the investigation had been carried out and that those who had been imprisoned had received lenient sentences (Albion 2003). The victims' families and supporters continued to challenge the verdicts. 8 The reasons for Beknazarov's arrest were also contested. Beknazarov was detained on 5 January 2002 on charges of abuse of his position in 1995 when he worked as a representative of the public prosecutor's office in Toktogul district, Jalalabat oblast'. It was alleged that Beknazarov delayed the investigation of a murder case and had impeded the trial. Following his release from prison on 19 March 2002, Beknazarov maintained that he was arrested because he had questioned land transfer deals with China. There were at least four places along the Chinese-Kyrgyz border that were disputed. Despite agreements, these areas had been contested since the time of the tsarist expansion into Central Asia. In a retrospective attempt to demonstrate transparency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003) published a book to answer questions relating to the border issue between Kyrgyzstan and China. The book presents a collection of articles by academics and politicians about the border, its history and more general border issues. There are also copies of agreements made between the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, the Kyrgyz Republic and China about the border, beginning with the 'Peking Additional Treaty' of 2 November 1860. These treaties, however, never officially demarcated the border, and thus, were not resolved when Kyrgyzstan became independent. The documents that are reproduced are not complete and do not describe much of the physical landscape of the disputed territories or their general significance. 9 The authors stressed, however, that the areas do not hold any natural resources that can be exploited, which was a concern of the opposition. During my fieldwork, I met Beknazarov to discuss his views on the land transfers. On a cold September day, he showed me a map with the disputed regions highlighted on his office wall in Parliament. He reproduced these for me on my own map of Kyrgyzstan, which I have included in Figure 1.1.
Fadionalism and the Tulip Revolution'
21
Figure 1.1- Areas of land transferred from Kyrgyzstan to China
The most publicized border issue was related to Dzonggii-Kuush, the largest area of disputed land (approximately 87,200 hectares), taking its name from the river running through the disputed territory (Beknazarov 2001; ResPu.blica 2001). Beknazarov and his colleagues, however, discovered that another three areas had been transferred to China. Beknazarov explained to me he had initially been investigating the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in the Aksy district, Jalalabat oblast', where a small Uzbek peninsula extends into Kyrgyzstan. He wanted to know what agreements had been made over this border region and whether there were any previous Kyrgyz claims to the area. It was only when he and his colleagues began searching the archive documents on border delimitation that they came across documents pertaining to the Kyrgyz-Chinese border. As Beknazarov stated, the issue was not just that the disputed land should be resolved, but more about how President Akaev conducted the affair without addressing all the members of Parliament and informing the general public.
22
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
STRATEGIES FOR NATIONAL UNITY In the wake of the Aksy tragedy, opposition to President Akaev increased. Victims' families and their supporters were angered by what they perceived as Akaev's incapability of handling the crisis. In addition, they felt marginalized by a government that focused more on the north than their areas in the south. This led to an increased perception of regional factionalism as southerners claimed they did not have adequate representation in a government dominated by northerners. These events influenced Akaev's decision to dedicate 2003 as the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood', a year-long campaign (see Chapter 7). Akaev stated that this celebration was intended to 'strengthen the unity' of the country (Kabar 2002). It was an attempt to shift the focus from the existing problems to building up the state, a project for the whole nation. In addition, a national referendum, held on the 2 February 2003, proposed constitutional changes aimed at reforming the govemment. 10 The referendum required a vote on two issues. The first issue asked voters to decide on a package of constitutional reforms, and not individual changes. These reforms were aimed at redistributing presidential powers, granting regional officials more authority. Following the Aksy tragedy, many saw this as a necessary concession by the President. The second issue was a vote to decide whether President Akaev should complete his term in office, ending in December ZOOS. A recommendation to restructure Parliament, however, overshadowed the referendum. The Constitutional Committee suggested that Parliament should be reduced in size from a bicameral to a unicameral parliament. The bicameral parliament that consisted of two houses the Myizam Chygaruujyiyny (Legislative Assembly) and the El Okuldor Jyiyny (Assembly of People's Representatives) with a total of lOS seats -was introduced in 1994. This had replaced the Soviet-style unicameral (or one house) parliament of 3SO seats. The newly proposed unicameral parliament would reduce the number of seats further to just seventyfive. The Constitutional Committee argued that this would provide a more effective government and stop deputies who simply occupied their place and did not perform their duties. There were mixed reactions by many Kyrgyz informants. Some people thought a new parliament would address some necessary changes. Others, however, felt that reducing the number of seats would not provide sufficient representation. They claimed the politicians had stood for election just to gain greater access to resources and to make privileged business ventures. In the end, both issues passed with clear majorities, but only created greater problems. In the run up to the referendum, many opposition parties felt that the proposed changes were being rushed through without a sufficient period of consultation. They regarded the new constitutional measures as only increasing the likelihood of corruption, including 'tribalism'. During this
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
23
time a fierce media battle broke out between the major newspapers. Front pages were devoted to slandering other newspapers and their respective supporters. Vechemii Bishkek, a pro-government newspaper, even printed mock ballot sheets on their front page and told their readers to vote in favour of the proposed changes to the constitution and to support President Akaev. The debate continued in the newspapers. Moya stolitsa novosti, an opposition newspaper, published an article, signed by nineteen opposition parliamentary deputies, 'human rights defenders' (pravozashchitniki), leaders of non-governmental organizations and others, who demanded that the referendum be delayed and further consultation be carried out on the constitutional reforms. They listed a number of grievances regarding the proposed changes and demands. In one of their complaints, the opposition figures stated that the changes would: . [exclude] the opportunity for political parties under party lists to be elected in Parliament, about which a basic arrangement was reached in the course of the Constitutional meeting. It, in turn, means denying the democratic multi-party political system in the republic and the development of such negative phenomena as tribalism, regionalism and the division by kinship and national attributes (Masaliev, Asanov, Tekebaev et al. 2003: 1). The opposition leaders objected to the reintroduction of a proportional majority representation system, which was originally withdrawn during the initial review of constitutional reforms. In their view, this would undermine the efforts to create a party-based parliament. Zaynidin Kurmanov (2004: 13), a leading figure of the Maya Strana (My Country) party, noted: According to [Article 54 Chapter 2] of the Constitution, political parties can nominate their representatives at parliamentary elections, which means that, according to the parliament's earlier decision registered in the election law, the party representatives and independent candidates compete on equal terms. The majority system has been restored - this will preserve the current archaic political system dominated by regional groups and clans, rather than political parties. If the present election system survives no efficient deputy groups will be possible. He claimed the elections had been 'strictly personified, while the voters tend to support the well-known people rather than party programmes' (Kurrnanov 2004: 11; see also Collins 2006: 184-6). If, as Kurmanov argued, parties only reflected the interests of the leaders, it created another problem. Opposition parties were concerned that individual candidates could easily invite their friends and relatives to work
Z4
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
in government, which reinforced the allegations already levelled at government officials. There was a political stalemate until ZOOS when parliamentary elections (decided over two rounds on Z7 February and 13 March ZOOS) again erupted into political turmoil. The debate over the eligibility of certain candidates and the election campaigns of two of President Akaev's children caused concerns over 'tribalism' to remain a central concern among many opposition leaders. It is particularly illustrative, as these elections demonstrated how the opposition was marginalized and that increasing demonstrations were one of the few tools left to them. The absence of transparent elections and constrained political manoeuvring of the opposition, served as a catalyst for the massive demonstrations that finally ousted Akaev. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ZOOS While there were claims of political interference in the period before the elections and voting irregularities on the voting days (OSCE ZOOS), it was the successful campaign of Bermet Akaeva, President Akaev's daughter, which created the most outrage. Her candidacy and eventual victory created the dominant impression that the President sought to secure his political legacy through his family. In addition, it contributed to the view of blatant nepotism, which was described by informants and the press as 'tribalism'. In the pre-election campaign, Askar Akaev gave his full support to his children, Aidar Akaev and Bermet Akaeva, and two sisters-in-law who had been nominated to stand for parliamentary seats. 11 Bermet ran as a member of the Alga, Kyrgyzstan! (Forward, Kyrgyzstan!) party. 12 Her constituency, No. 1 -University, became one of the most controversial seats in Kyrgyzstan. She was registered as a candidate only after another well-known politician, Roza Otunbaeva, had her registration revoked. Otunbaeva had been an outspoken politician for a number of years and well known for her years of public service. After independence, she was briefly Minister of Foreign Affairs before becoming the first Kyrgyz ambassador to the United States and Canada (199Z-1994). She then returned to Kyrgyzstan and was again Minister of Foreign Affairs (19941997). Later, she served as ambassador to the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (1997-ZOOZ). Otunbaeva stated, however, that she had become disheartened by President Akaev's politics and resigned from her post. In May ZOOZ, she became the assistant to the United Nations Secretary-General's special representative for the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia. While abroad, Otunbaeva had closely monitored the political situation at home. In discussions with her, she told me that she could see that the Akaevs were attempting to control more power. As a protest to what they were doing, she decided to run for parliament in the same district as Bermet Akaeva. In December Z004, she, together with several colleagues, founded the Ata-Jurt (Fatherland) party. On 6 January ZOOS,
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
25
Otunbaeva received her official registration certificate to run for a seat in parliament in No. 1 - University constituency. Several hours later, however, the electoral committee revoked her registration as they stated she had not lived continuously in the republic for five years before running for public office, a stipulation outlined in the constitution concerning elections. 13 On 20 january, Bermet Akaeva received her electoral registration in the same constituency. With her supporters, Otunbaeva demonstrated in the centre of Bishkek. She argued that she had served the state as ambassador and therefore was forced to live abroad. Her party, and other opposition groups, condemned what they saw as a deliberate attempt by the government to exclude those people, like Otunbaeva, that could challenge Akaev. The law was one method the government employed to marginalize the opposition. Despite her action, she was not allowed to register for the election. On 12 january, the Supreme Court rejected Otunabeva's appeal to run for election, and on 24 February, Otunbaeva appeared in the Birinchi Mai Court in Bishkek charged with disturbance of public order as a result of her demonstrations. The constituency was subject to further scandal as students reported that they had been told by university administrators that they had to vote for specific candidates in the election or risk being expelled. Despite the protests and accusations, on 27 February, the first round of parliamentary elections went ahead. Bennet Akaeva faced strong opposition. Among her competitors was Emil Aliev, Deputy Chairman of the Ar-Namys (Dignity) party. 14 Akaeva did not receive more than fifty per cent of the vote, but had secured a majority. She, therefore, had to compete in a second round of voting the following month, which she won. 15 Although she won, she was unable to hold on to her seat. She was forced to flee, and in the following months was stripped of her parliamentary seat despite her return to Kyrgyzstan. 'TULIP REVOLUTION' There is not sufficient space to go into a detailed account of the events leading up to the parliamentary elections. 16 The competition for the limited seats in the new unicameral parliament created an intense struggle for the reduced number of seats. At the same time, Akaev's support of his children's campaigns and their success intensified frustration which led to candidates marching in the streets in protest. Akaev did not permit the use of force against the protestors. He did not want to be associated with the lethal force that resulted in the Aksy tragedy. Instead, he attempted to use a softer approach as a leader ready to listen to the opposition. The opposition movement had quickly gained popular support and the police stood helpless as the people protests grew and they did not have the resources to maintain order. As early as 3 March 2005, even before the second round of voting, protestors had gathered in Jalalabat city to challenge the initial results.
26
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
The next day, the protestors had taken over the provincial administration headquarters (Radnitz 2006). After the second round of voting on 13 March 2005, there were more demonstrations across the country. On 19 March, a kurultai (congress) was called by opposition leaders in Osh. Here, they announced a rival government, creating a congress of 'national unity', which was attended by Kurmanbek Bakiev (a former Prime Minister), Roza Otunbaeva (a former ambassador and Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Adakhan Madumarov (a member of Parliament) (Abdyrazakov 2005). By 20 March, demonstrators occupied other provincial administration buildings in Osh, Talas and Naryn oblasts. These demonstrations continued, and on 23 March it was reported that there was a large convoy of buses from the south heading towards Bishkek for further protests. During this time, Jenishbek Nazaraliev, an influential medical practitioner and director of a drug treatment and rehabilitation centre in Bishkek, joined the campaign calling for Akaev's resignation. From his office in the capital, he published articles, distributed pamphlets and recorded a radio announcement supporting the opposition. He encouraged people to protest and blamed Akaev for trying to 'fool' (in Russian, durachit~ the Kyrgyz people. He argued that people could no longer tolerate such treatment and urged them to demonstrate (Nazaraliev 2005). On 24 March 2005, an estimated seven thousand people had massed outside Nazarliev's office. An eye-witness stated that the main opposition leaders also gathered outside Nazarliev's clinic adding their support to the demonstration, but appealing to the people not to get drunk and cause disruption. The leaders asked the Minister of Internal Affairs, Keneshbek Dushebaev, to order the troops not to fire on the demonstrators, which he promised he would do. The slogans and speeches delivered in the morning's rally challenged the results of the parliamentary elections and demanded President Akaev's resignation. Later in the day, several thousand protestors gathered in Ala-Too Square, in the centre of Bishkek next to the White House (the President's office). Kurmanbek Bakiev, one of the leaders of the protest, demanded that President Akaev speak to the people. In the afternoon, pro-Akaev and opposition factions began fighting in and around Ala-Too Square. The fighting eventually quietened and the demonstrators moved towards the White House. The police, who had been ordered to not fire on the protestors, were incapable of effectively dispersing the crowd. Attempts to charge the demonstrators with horses failed. The police were overrun and demonstrators stormed the White House. As protestors gathered at the gates of the White House, President Akaev and his family escaped by helicopter and made their way to Moscow. That evening, Feliks Kulov, a staunch critic of Akaev and leader of Ar-Namys party, was freed from prison by his supporters and joined the people in the city. The same night, the opposition leaders gathered and nominated Kurmanbek Bakiev as interim president.
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
27
With no one with firm authority in the hours after Akaev's departure, a temporary power vacuum developed. Some people took advantage of the absence of organized security forces and looted and burned shops. The following day, the interim government set to work. Bakiev appointed Roza Otunbaeva to her old position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He also appointed Feliks Kulov as Minister for Security, whose first task was to stop the looters. One of the first actions that the interim government took was to begin an investigation into the businesses owned and influenced by the Akaev familyY The interim government enlisted the help of foreign firms to track the financial resources and business ventures of the Akaev family. Aidar Akaev had a number of lucrative businesses, which included supplying fuel to American military aircraft at Manas Airbase (Kimmage 2005). There were calls for the Akaev family to be stripped of their financial resources and to have the money reinvested in the national budget. The investigation also targeted those closely associated with Akaev and even his international business partners. These were only some of the charges that he faced. The new administration was concerned to discredit Akaev and to reclaim for the state some of the money which they claim he stole. In addition, it was an attempt to identify 'tribalism' with the politics of Akaev and distance the new government from the stain of such accusations. THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC Following their sudden departure from Kyrgyzstan, Aidar Akaev's and Bermet Akaeva's parliamentary seats came under investigation from local courts. On 30 May 2005, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Pervomai District Court of Bishkek to invalidate the election results for the No.1 - University constituency, and Bermet was stripped of her parliamentary seat. In a statement to the readers of Vechemii Bishkek, Akaeva, trying to retain some credibility, stated that elections results were overturned due to pressure from current political forces, which did not follow the rule of law (Akaeva 2005). 18 The interim government was, however, weak. Some people who were not included or did not win parliamentary seats sought to claim power through small demonstrations and physical violence. For example, supporters of the businessman Urrnatbek Baryktabasov stormed a government building in Bishkek on 17 June ZOOS in protest against his exclusion from the upcoming presidential elections. He was excluded because he was a citizen of Kazakhstan, and therefore not eligible to run in the elections. The uprising was eventually controlled, but proved a serious challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the interim government. There were also a number of assassinations during this time, which many speculated were between members of the elite attempting to gain power in the post-Akaev era. 19
Z8
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
These events underscored that opposition parties were unable to consolidate and formulate effective policies. The motivation for their alliance was to remove Akaev from office. Once this goal had been accomplished, the parties divided. As Kurmanov (Z004) stated, politics are largely based on popularity contests between different candidates and not on parties with organized mandates outlining their political goals. This situation continued following the 'Tulip Revolution'. Opposition parties resorted to picking a series of small battles to destabilize the new Bakiev government for their own political gain. While these disputes continued, the interim President, Kurmanbek Bakiev, attempted to foster unity among the Kyrgyz citizens and strengthen his own position. Addressing a group of Aksy residents on 3 May ZOOS he thanked them for their continued determination to receive justice, which had acted as an important factor in the 'Tulip Revolution' (AKipress ZOOS). On 10 July ZOOS, Bakiev was elected to be the second President of the Kyrgyz Republic. In his inauguration speech over a month later, Bakiev noted the role that favouritism had played in government structures. He stated: 'When I was prime minister I sometimes had to work with unprofessional ministers who were appointed because they were someone's relative or friend . [That] seriously damages the economy and it's a brake on development' (MacWilliam ZOOS). His speech was intended to make a break with the kinds of corruption associated with Akaev in order to support a new government. This brief account of the period leading up to the 'revolution' highlights the political volatility of the time with a recurring theme of 'tribalism' at the centre. There are clear forms of favouritism, including nepotism, during this time. Akaev's support for his children's political campaigns and the marginalization of the opposition in their constituencies are just some examples. In this context, 'tribalism' became a rally cry against Akaev. This, however, has largely been interpreted as a model of politics in the country, rather than a criticism. A series of political science accounts have explored this model, focusing on how the political elite acted on behalf of 'clan' interests. Others have concentrated on the regional differences, and, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, highlighted the apparent north-south divide. In the south, Akaev is seen as acting for the benefit of the north while the south remained underdeveloped. This view gained even greater currency after the Aksy tragedy. These models have become popular ways to describe political organization in Kyrgyzstan and in other parts of Central Asia. As will be discussed, the poorly devised theories take for granted the strength and solidarity these divisions are supposed to provide. REGIONALISM AND 'TRIBALISM' Political science accounts of the transition from communism to democracy in Central Asia have noted a trend towards factions of elites attempting to gain power in the post-socialist era. Attempts to
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
29
describe these factions have led to two main views: regionalism and 'clan' politics. Authors such as Pauline jones Luong (2002), describe regional associations. Regionalism refers to the establishment of relations between people based on their shared, locally specific or broader, territorial backgrounds, shaped by the internal administrative division of a place or region. Analyses which propose regionalism, particularly as a model for post-Soviet politics, emphasize these local connections and the attempt to secure greater political control in order to obtain resources for their region. Other authors, such as Kathleen Collins (2002, 2006) and Edward Schatz (2004, 2005), argue that 'clans' negotiate pacts which establish the distribution of political and economic power. These views (which use 'clan' politics interchangeably with 'tribalism') imply that 'clans' are acting as corporate kinship groups. Both views reveal many nuances about Central Asian politics, but are based on essentialized visions of society. The concept of 'clan' is taken for granted as a central organizing principle of society. This view will be examined further below. In her examination of regionalism, jones Luong (2002) argues that elites in post-Soviet governments have established relations through shared regional bases. She contends that kinship connections were transformed into regional ties. The term 'tribalism', she suggests, is a misnomer, as people usually refer to regional ties when employing this term Oones Luong 2002: 179, n. 53). The transformation of what she calls 'tribal' to regional identities occurred through the combination of three different processes: the Soviet administrative-territorial structure, economic specialization, and the creation and expansion of a national cadre. In the first of these categories, jones Luong notes that the Soviet administrative-territorial structure imposed in the region 'fostered regional rather than national cleavages due to its coincidence with very weak (or nonexistent) national identities and very strong (preexisting) local identities' Oones Luong 2002: 64). jones Luong argues that despite the revisions to the administrative segmentation of Central Asia in the 1920s and 1930s to reflect 'tribal' areas, the new divisions imposed by the Soviet authorities instead split 'tribes', but left 'clans' intact in the same region. 20 'Clan' identities became associated with the region, but when attempting to gain resources, it was done in the name of the region. The regional identity eventually gained greater significance, as opposed to 'tribal' identities. Administrative divisions further fostered a separate sense of north and south, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, reinforced by historical differences. In addition, jones Luong (2002: 67) notes that people from titular ethnic groups nominated to the Communist Party in their own republics contributed to the 'redefinition and extension of existing clan- and tribal-based patronage networks to the regional level'. Second, the economic specialization the Soviet administration organized each of the republics to produce specific goods for the rest
30
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
of the USSR. Jones Luong describes two effects of this: on the one hand regional (ethnic) leaders had to take responsibility for the economic performance of their respective republics; on the other hand the republics became dependent on each other as a means of supporting national incomes and for the commerce of manufactured goods. She notes that these economic structures 'reinforced regionalism rather than nationalism or tribal affiliations' (Jones Luong 2002: 68). She also argues that the ethnic division of labour helped to create and strengthen 'patron-client ties between the regional leaders, who were often representatives of the titular nationality, and the rural population, which served as the social and economic base for maintaining and expanding patronage networks. It also contributed to the growing displacement of tribal chiefs' traditional authority' (Jones Luong 2002: 68). Finally, the formation of a national cadre further strengthened regional identities in Central Asia. The Soviet policy of korenizatsiya (a Russian term for the indigenization of Soviet power through mass recruitment of non-Russians into the Party) cultivated strong regional groups. 21 There was a tendency for the first secretaries and other national-level leaders to rotate, allowing leaders from other regions to participate. This was not official policy, but the Soviets approached this as an 'unspoken, yet widely accepted, "rule" that some percentage of republic-level positions had to be dispersed among representatives from the various regions comprising the republic, albeit not necessarily evenly' (Jones Luong 2002: 70). 22 Jones Luong argues that this form of power sharing remains in place today, and that in Kyrgyzstan, the biggest regional division is between north and south, with divisions between the northern regions as well. The structure of the electoral system, in Jones Luong's view, both in the Soviet era and since independence, reflects this division. She argues that this situation has created a transitional bargaining model for political and economic power, based on regional affiliation. It is indeed the case that regional identities are important. In Kyrgyzstan, people often make references to 'southerners' and 'northerners'. Many informants related such divisions to me when they talked about Bakiev, a southerner, as president and the kinds of problems they envisaged for the north based on these regional perceptions. There are, however, two problems with this approach. First, it is misleading to assume that regional identities alone can be used as a model to understand how politics works. There are other factors that need to be taken into consideration, and a shared regional background is not necessarily top among these. Little information is provided about the motivations of voters and their personal experiences of politics. Further research on individual reflections on what politics means on an everyday level would reveal further insights. From my research in Kyrgyzstan it is clear that regionalism is one concept that is manipulated by a range of discursive tactics, especially during elections. Second, the view implicitly employs a similar concept of solidarity as that found in discredited kinship theories.
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
31
Regional groups do not act as corporate groups. If this were the case, it would be expected that the president's home regions would show signs of benefitting from greater investment (such as improved standards of living) than neighbouring areas. This is not the case. Kemin district (Chili oblast), Akaev's home district, was and continues to be one of the poorest areas of the oblast'. Also, during a trip to the south, I spoke with a man about employment in the city. He said that it was difficult for people to find work since the Soviet-era factories had shut down. The benefits of having a president from the north or south did not translate into an economic improvement in the region. Instead, regionalism, as much as 'clan' affiliation, is an identity that can be developed and exploited for specific purposes. A large group of government officials from one region does not mean that they were given positions simply due to the fact that they share a regional identity with someone higher up. It is an identity, among many connections, that can be used by both people to secure positions or support in a specific context. On the other side of the debate, Kathleen Collins (2002, 2006) contends that 'clans' are central to politics in Central Asia. Although 'clans' are informal political organizations, in Collins's view, they have a significant impact on regime type in transitional periods. In particular, the 'clans' struggle for political power and the negotiation of pacts determine regime consolidation and durability. In her view, a 'clan' is a strong social force, which has weathered numerous changes, and is characterized as: a type of social actor, with powerful rational and normative elements that reinforce each other. Although as organizations they predate the modern state, their normative content, informal structure, and rational elements enable them to adapt in many circumstances to the advance of the state. They have persisted despite the breakdown of their larger tribal organizations, and they have used clientalism and patronage as strategies for advancement and survival (Collins 2006: 43). In Collins's account, 'clans' incorporate both real and fictive kinship. Furthermore, contra Jones Luong, regional identities are not separate to 'clans', they are centred on 'clan' networks or large families. As with the 2005 parliamentary elections, family relations can be helpful, but again, these are not necessarily the basis upon which affiliations are made. It is one of a range of identities and tactics that are employed to create relationships as well as condemn those thought to be guilty of it. In addition, Collins bases her account of 'clans' on outmoded anthropological accounts and does not explore various conceptualizations of political and sociallife.23 Her account of kinship draws mainly on the work of Evans-Pritchard (1940) and complements it by arguing that kinship structures have a number of internal mechanisms to maintain
32
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
the presence of 'clans', especially as 'modern organizations' (Collins 2006: 43). She, thus, stresses the primacy of kinship and the strength of its bonds. This creates a type of corporate group, which acts rationally to provide its members with essentials, even during an economy of shortage (as experienced in the Soviet era). In her model, elites are a central feature and are able to exert influence over their kinsmen. The model of the corporate group, however, overstates the rationality of the group and its cohesion. In many cases, such groups are only temporary and often not based only on kinship ties. Despite these criticisms, Collins does remark on a number of historical features which allowed 'clans' to persist during the tsarist and Soviet eras. In my view, it may be better, however, to view this as the perception of clans rather that the survival of corporate groups. Collins notes, in particular, there were 'three critical conditions present in the Central Asian cases that enable and foster clan persistence: (1) late state formation, due in large part to colonialism; (2) late formation of a national (i.e. nation-state) identity; and (3) the absence of a market economy (and in its place, the existence of an economy of shortage)' (Collins 2006: 44). These external conditions, she argued, allowed some 'clans' to adapt and persist until today. Collins illustrates these points by focusing on the developments during the tsarist and Soviet periods. She argues that the Russian expansion into Central Asia did not disrupt 'clan' formation as the local population was governed indirectly, using existing social organizations to facilitate tsarist rule. Once the Soviets had taken power, efforts were made to overcome these social organizations. During the early Soviet period, however, Collins notes that attempts to develop socialism from scratch were unsuccessful, and native elites were retained as local authorities. Two other factors contributed to the persistence of 'clans' during this period: the introduction of the kolkhoz system, which kept local 'clan' groups together, and the policy of korenizatsiya, which turned local elites into Party members. This allowed 'clan' elites to maintain their influence in their respective groups. During the later Soviet period, Collins argues that 'clans' strengthened their control in local governments. During the Brezhnev era, many elites from one 'clan' were permitted to remain in power for long periods. This changed, however, with the introduction of perestroika under Gorbachev. 'Clans' began to create pacts and grapple for greater political power. The pacts that the 'clans' made in the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the lack of them, are the focus of Collins's broader argument of regime consolidation and durability. She argues that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan represent examples where the newly-nominated presidents in 1991 had to consolidate their power by demonstrating their willingness to organize informal pacts. Collins discusses the situation in Kyrgyzstan at length, providing examples of how former President Akaev invited family members into government. These relations were built through trust and allowed Akaev room
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
33
to manoeuvre in the political sphere, which she argues 'contributed to the more open and democratic nature of the Kyrgyz nation' (Collins 2002: 145). In places where there was no such agreement, for example Tajikistan, the new regime quickly fell apart. In Collins's view, several elements are necessary for the arrangement of pacts: a historical balance of power was required between 'clans' the pressure of an external threat (in this case from Gorbachev) and also a legitimate broker to assist the agreement between the clans. The result, Collins notes, 'established a regime in which the central element, the division of resources, was agreed upon and managed by clan elites' (Collins 2006: 132). This informal division of power and resources does not foster transparent institutions. Collins argues that in Kyrgyzstan there is sufficient evidence to claim that 'clan'-based systems corrupt state institutions, which contributes to the collapse of pacts. These and other factors brought down the Akaev regime. In another study, Edward Schatz provides a supportive account of Collins's view in his study of the prominence of 'clans' in Central Asian politics. While Collins focuses on the dynamics between 'clans' and the ways in which they establish and maintain pacts, Schatz explores how these groups were able to conceal their relations, enabling them to evade Soviet surveillance and extend their influence into independence. Examining social and political issues in Kazakhstan, he argues that genealogical descent is essential to both 'clan' affiliation and ethnic identity. In this respect, 'clans' are based on common kinship, which is part of a larger segmentary lineage system.24 These kinship bonds, however, become less distinct as these groups grow into political blocs and struggle for state power and economic resources. At this level Schatz (2005: 234) argues that it is perhaps misleading to suggest that 'clan' necessarily refers to kin-based ties, which may only be relevant in certain contexts, but could be understood as a 'metaphor for interest-based or community-based groups'. Schatz points to several reasons why 'clans' have persisted in Kazakhstan. One reason is that kinship ties - which he classifies as a sub-ethnic identity marker- can be concealed. Thus, 'subethnicity was not rooted in visible markers (as ethnic divisions tend to be) but rather in an exchange of genealogical information that defines identity and difference. "Clan" background could thus be concealed from the agents of Soviet surveillance who prosecuted network behaviour as illegal' (Schatz 2004: 17, original emphasis). As a result, 'clan' associations continued to exert considerable influence, and, thus, were used as a political platform to gather support and extend the interests of the group. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Schatz (2004: 97) argues that 'clans' were not corporate groups, but networks. Individuals could create connections with other individuals through 'clan' affiliation. This would form individual claims in a broader network, rather than a group. The concealed genealogical information hid from outsiders the
34
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
nature of the links of those who occupied and retained their positions within middle- and high-level government posts. These were mainly occupied by people from the elder and middle zhuz. 25 Schatz notes that there is a careful attempt to balance the power of individuals within the network of 'clan' relations. For example, he suggests that President Nazarbaev secured his own position by arbitration between these different networks. Schatz (2005) argues for a subtle difference between the negative role 'clans' can have in state politics ('clan clientalism'), where unified networks have a set of narrowly-defined goals, and the way this harmful aspect can be limited ('clan balancing'), which suggests that there is an informal policy which regulates relations between different 'clan' networks. Both of these concepts are surrounded by discursive battles. Political insiders may know each others backgrounds, but where discourse is limited or does not exist, outsiders speculate about the nature of the relationships in politics and include elements of backwardness (or 'pre-modern' elements) about these relationships. He argues that Kazakhstan demonstrates a mixture of clientalism at the centre of politics, but balancing at the periphery, the latter a pragmatic attempt to reduce challenges to politics. He suggests that discursive battles contest the contours of clanship and other forms of identity politics. This model attempts to describe the continual allegations of 'clan' politics as central to the 'politicized imagination of clanship' (Schatz 2005: 244). His view, however, rests on the assumption of the primacy of 'clan' identity and a repetition of misguided theories on the nature of kinship-based societies. Schatz does examine to what extent can and should 'clan' be applied, but it is the essence of the concept that is not explored or challenged. Schatz, however, does touch on two areas that require further reflection. First, he underlines the importance of genealogical information as contributing to the construction of 'clan' and ethnic identity. 26 Genealogy, I argue, is the basis from which we can discard the confusing concepts of 'clan' and 'tribe' in our discussion of contemporary Kyrgyz society (see Chapter 3). Second, the 'concealability' of 'clan' ties suggests that it is a category that can be strategically deployed to create ties, but also one, that in other contexts, is not a primary principle of social organization. In other words, the Soviet attempt to eradicate all 'clan' associations only encouraged people to conceal their relations. It is important, however, to question when and to whom these relationships were important. Schatz argues that by concealing their 'clan' identities, people continued to negotiate covert deals with relatives beyond the surveillance of the Soviet authorities and has continued to shape the way in which 'clans' operate after independence, which has stimulated public scrutiny of these practices. Both of these issues are explored in greater depth in Chapter 3. It is important to note, however, that Schatz understands genealogy as something which strengthens 'clan' identity. Genealogy is essential
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
35
to notions of the self, which builds on notions of 'clan' and ethnicity, but does not indicate that the kinship ties reflect a corporate group. Based on my fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan, genealogy plays a small part in people's lives, but for some is an important basis for developing their identities. By focusing on genealogy, confusing categories such as 'clan' and 'tribe' can be discarded. In another study, 'clans', again, are presented as the biggest obstacle to improving government institutions. S. Frederick Starr, building on Collins's model, argues that to advance from (nominal) authoritarianism to democracy, political evolutionism can only be achieved through strengthening the role of parliaments. Starr (2006: 4) argues that 'clan' leaders, magnates and power brokers - who are all largely 'invisible' and were supported the presidents - now represent a challenge and the presidents are trying to break free from their influence. Starr, careful not to label the regional governments as corrupt, says the Central Asian republics are suffering from 'under-government', as the presidents do not have the resources to provide 'the basics of normal governance and welfare, and from lower civil servants who are both grossly underqualified and under-paid' (Starr 2006: 14). The answer, Starr suggests, is that parliaments are a way to improve democratic trends and involve the population in political duties. There are several issues which stand out. First, 'clans' taken as corporate groups, a distinction, as with other studies, left unchallenged. The assumption that 'clan' and regional elites play a major role in politics simply reproduces the evolutionist notion that kinship societies are incapable of developing the political sophistication of territorially-based states. Such views assume that kinship was the main principle of social organization and limit stratification to emphasize the developmental gap between them and states (Sneath 2007). Further, Starr's account does not discuss who these vague 'power brokers' might be or provide much evidence to support this view. Second, Starr suggests that it is the president's lack of resources and struggle against shadowy groups of power brokers that prevents them from investing more in programmes, such as public welfare. What emerges from his study is a group of down-trodden presidents that are not really authoritarian, but find themselves in a bind due to their former alliances. In few places is this applicable. Starr holds up Kazakhstan as the single example where the president does not suffer from the weakness of his position and a lack of resources. In contrast, he views the Turkmenistan's Niyazov and Uzbekistan's Karimov as both in fragile positions, but does not discuss the vast revenues they receive for their gas and oil exports. Third, the suggestion that parliaments are the path towards democracy may have merit, but is yet unproven in Central Asia. In 2007, the introduction of a purely party-based parliament in Kyrgyzstan did not strengthen the institution, but put it more firmly under the control of President Bakiev. The Law on the Election Code was changed accord-
36
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
ingly, but also introduced confusing rules about the numbers of votes that had to be obtained, and were only clarified after the elections. 27 Despite irregularities and staunch opposition to the election results, Akjol (Bright Path), the president's party, won the most seats in parliament. The results of the other parties were questioned. In particular, Ata Meken (Fatherland), an opposition party, was disqualified over disputed numbers of votes in Osh oblast'. The other parties who met the regulations received a share of Ata Meken's seats. The official results of the elections, however, were never published. Bakiev merely strengthened his position and was able to receive support from parliament. Despite Starr's (2006: 20) claim that once people receive a place in parliament and recognize themselves as 1public citizens', their privileged status is clearly understood by everyone else as 1elite'. According to many people I have spoken to, becoming a member of parliament is just another way to earn more money. In addition to these two approaches, there are attempts to synthesize regional and tribal connections. 28 In these views, 1clans' are typically described as 1informal, neo-traditional structures of power' (Khanin 2000: 126). Such arguments often claim that 1clans' find support among other 1clans' from their region, and that they develop into broader, territorial organizations, which resemble patron-client networks. This general model retains the kinship connections while increasing the political strength by grouping together by region. Alisher Khamidov (2002a,b) 1 for example, advances such a view in the case of Kyrgyzstan. He places 1tribalism' at the centre of Kyrgyzstan's power struggle during the late Akaev era. 1Clan' relations then take on a regional perspective. He highlights the Kyrgyz divisions ong kanat (right wing) and sol kanat (left wing), representing 1clans' in the north and south, respectively. Both wings, he argues, replicate a defensive formation practised by the Kyrgyz people when they were nomadic. 29 Khamidov (2002b) argues: 1Informal power-sharing arrangements among clans helped maintain stability in Kyrgyzstan during the early years of independence. However . the rising political unrest in 2002 is closely connected to the northern clans' reluctance or inability to address the complaints of southern groups.' This is a similar view to that advanced by Collins, but it groups the 1clans' into regional political blocs. It, thus, bridges the divide between regional and tribal views of politics. This view has also been explored by Vladimir Khanin. He refers to these groups as 1 political clans', which are neo-traditional groups 1Usually led by a close group of representatives of the political elite on a national and regional level. This group will be closely tied with the system of direct personal relations (friends, relations, ethnic, national) or personal relations (business, professional, property, administrative, etc.)' (Khanin 2000: 126). 1 Political clans', as he defines them, are later displaced by larger networks. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, he states:
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
37
Ultimately, there emerge broad 'patron-client networks' which are turning political clans into weightier, more expansive, tribal-clan structures of a regional nature, and are bringing them stability. The ethnic-regional groups of elites, associated by common origin and with total power in their regions at their disposal, are the nuclei of these structures. Here we can highlight the Issyk Kul, Chu, Talas, Osh-Ferghana, Naryn and some other, more peripheral clans and groupings. Informal political structures have been included in broader associations of clans (macro-clans), which correspond with the ... historical delineation between the 'modernized' North and the 'traditional' South. It would appear that the former block is dominated by the Talas, and the latter by the Ferghana clans (Khanin 2000: 127). This view elaborates not only how these groups form and develop, but suggests internal mechanisms indicative of group rationality. In other words, although connections between elites can highlight kinship and regional associations these are interpreted as being part of a larger corporate group with its own system of rationality. Instead of a distinct political model, what the authors above have demonstrated is that both regionalism and 'clan' ties are ways of creating connections. These approaches may be used to build political support or obtain scarce resources. The authors have, however, developed these categories as corporate groups which conform to the 'rules of the game' of political science models. These views are better represented by the Russian term klan, which reflects the English term, but refers more to a political bloc which is not dependent on the relationships of the members. Instead of focusing on a set of 'rules' to dictate the behaviour of elites and determine the possible outcome of their actions, it would be more revealing to examine the narratives of 'tribalism' and the specific contexts in which they are embedded. This is the same argument that Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) advance. They argue that social science studies should attempt to explain how certain constructed categories of social interaction (to which, I argue, we can add 'clan' and 'tribe') have, at some moments, realities which is represented as groups. They state: We should seek to explain the processes and mechanism through which what has been called the 'political fiction' of the 'nation'--or of the 'ethnic group/ 'race' or other putative 'identity'-can crystallize, at certain moments, as a powerful, compelling reality. But we should avoid unintentionally reproducing or reinforcing such reification by uncritically adopting categories of practice as categories of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 5). The criticism of the concept of 'identity' is not to displace it as a salient category of everyday use, but rather to question its analytical
38
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
application. Similarly, studies regarding the use of 'clan' and 'tribe' as analytical categories referring to actual, corporate groups need to be carefully critiqued. In this regard, 'clan' and 'tribe' identities may be partially explained through other notions that are often used in the region. For example, Andrea Schmitz (2003) discusses the Russian term priryazannost' (attachment to someone) to examine the nuances of the relationships that exist between political elites. She notes: 'what unites the various players [struggling for political power] is privyazannost' - personal bonds that have been developed through shared biographies, common social and regional identities, and have been nurtured through long-term collaboration, shared knowledge and mutual dependences' (Schmitz 2003: 599). The connections between politicians do not need to be confined to regional or tribal affiliations, but developed through a number of shared identities and experiences over time. Accusations of 'tribalism', however, stand apart from the formation of relationships. In everyday use, 'tribalism' is often associated with three meanings. First, it is used to refer to nepotism. Such claims were clearly stated in 2005, when Akaev's children both ran in the parliamentary elections. Second, it refers to people who may have received government posts through kinship ties. This form of favouritism does not suggest that the lines of descent can be clearly traced and should not be interpreted as the essential representation of a 'clan' group. Third, it can refer to people from the same region and who may share common descent, but is not clear. This should not be confused with the use of regionalism, which indicates an association primarily by region. 30 Regionalism is sometimes opposed to 'tribalism' to indicate a separate set of relationships. It cannot be assumed, however, that the two categories are mutually exclusive. In contrast to these views, I regard 'tribalism' and regionalism as both an indication of idioms of particularlism which form part of the broader discourse of corruption. 'tribalism', I argue, does not suggest a primordial social formation, but instead, is a collection of idioms which attempt to identify different factions and networks that have emerged in government since independence and feelings of 'dispossession' (Nazpary 2002). The tendency to treat them as corporate groups is a result of poorly-developed theories which gained popular currency as they were based on a distinction of advanced societies which had a territorialized state and those that did not. This distinction appears to fit Kyrgyzstan as the country was formed into a modern state and since independence has struggled with strengthening its democratic institutions. There are two problems with this view. First, theories of the state and its opposition to nomadic societies do not, on the whole, consider the forms of stratification that existed in nomadic societies. Second, and as a result of the first, there is an assumption that new states, such as Kyrgyzstan, will succumb to re-emerging 'clan' forces. These descriptions, however, mainly focus on the national level and do not explore what these relationships mean on an everyday level, where they are assumed to exist.
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
39
Other authors have begun to move away from limiting political action to regionalism or 'tribalism'. Scott Radnitz (2005) examines various networks employed during the Aksy tragedy. The events leading up present a clear example of how people quickly gathered supporters through various networks after Beknazarov was arrested. Radnitz notes that the 'Committee to Defend Beknazarov' (created by activists in Bishkek ten days after his arrest) resembled a vertical network of relationships mobilizing people at different levels of state administration and local self-government who were sympathetic to the anti-government movement. This was facilitated by a horizontal level of networks where people contacted friends, colleagues and acquaintances to join in support of this movement. 'TRIBALISM' AS A FORM OF CORRUPTION In many cases, far from identifying actual links between people, accusations of 'tribalism' articulate perceptions of corruption or illuminate the ways politicians try to create factions. This was evident when I met with Oleg Ryabov, a former deputy editor-in-chief of Slovo Kyrgyzstana, a government newspaper. When I asked him about 'tribalism' in government, he said there was no such thing. In his view, 'tribalism' was when officials brought in their own people to work in government posts. He then qualified this by saying that those currently serving in government were not 'regionally' connected to President Akaev. 31 Ryabov stated that 'tribalism' can only really be applied as a description of factionalism. He explained that if bringing in your own people to government was a form of 'tribalism', then this could also include the presidential administration of George W. Bush. Ryabov's remarks highlight the incongruity between representations of 'traditional' forms of social organization and modern politics. This has been highlighted by J. Mciver Weatherford (1981), in his parody of the United States Congress. In his book, Tribes on the Hill, Weatherford begins by making a comparison between the Canoy Indians that used to inhabit the area that became Washington D.C. and the politicians that have come to occupy Capitol Hill. He discusses several traits that politicians exhibit and the similarities they bear to other social and political practices of non-industrialized societies from around the world. Weatherford begins by examining new Congress men and women. He parallels his account of the newly-elected officials with the coming-of-age ceremony for boys among the Shavante Indians of Brazil. In the halls of Congress, for example, new officials have to endure hazing from elder officials. As the young officials establish themselves, they organize a group (or 'clan' in Weatherford's terms) to help them fulfil their duties. The assistants of a Congress official are usually people who have been recommended by other officials and have had previous experience working in government. These people facilitate the official's duties and enable them to further establish themselves among their peers. Weatherford (1981: 51) notes that family members have
40
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
often acted as assistants, paid and unpaid. He remarks: 'The close kin ties in Congress resemble what the British anthropologist F. G. Bailey in describing politics in India calls "personal bureaucracies". Groups of personal retainers coalesce around individual politicians within a bureaucratic setting, the underlying principle of organization being the relationship of patron to client.' Weatherford's ironic view of the organization of Congress demonstrates why a description such as 'tribalism' is effective as a derogatory description of factionalism, but does not identify actual 'tribes' or regional associations. This was true during the Soviet era and in independence. For example, Turdakun Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, 1961-1985, also found himself accused of tribal and regional practices. ('Tribalism' was no longer used. It had been officially vanquished in the late 1930s. To accuse people of it would have been to admit a resurgence of an old enemy -but was nonetheless inferred.) In his memoirs, Usubaliev wrote that when Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, he found that he disagreed with many of his principles. He decided that after many years of service, it would be better to simply retire than to challenge the new leader. After he formally resigned, he soon found that he was under attack. Other Kyrgyz Party members accused him of not joining with his comrades in the 'restructuring' (perestroika). He later found a long and detailed 'top secret' document (Usubaliev 2003b: 528-52), which had been prepared by people that had been promoted during his own administration, accusing him of inviting many of his relatives and friends into government to strengthen his position. This method of accusation was a convenient way to remove Usubaliev and his supporters from interfering with the new leadership of the Communist Party and its wing in Kyrgyzstan. In independence, claims of a north-south divide in Kyrgyzstan are partly a reflection of the struggle between southern political elites for greater political representation and economic investment in the area. Since the inauguration of Bakiev as president, northerners play on this distinction as many fear southerners will come and take all the power and land for themselves. These examples indicate the mobilization of politicized identities, which exploit 'tribal' and regional associations. These narratives are not attempts to describe the internal dynamics of 'clan' or regional associations in government, but are accusations of factions associated with corruption. NARRATIVES OF CORRUPTION The complexities that lie behind accusations of corruption are more than just the exclusion from networks and resources. The specific nature of corruption in Kyrgyzstan and other parts of the former Soviet Union is a mixture of practices. The most often criticized form is the attempt to secure greater economic and political power. The collapse of the former centralized economy has made people acutely aware of the difficul-
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
41
ties of implementing new economic standards and the opportunism of some during this period. Some analysts have noted that among former Soviet countries corruption results partly from the disjuncture between democratic governance and a Western market-led economy. john Girling (1997: 30), for example, states: Corruption stems from the incompatibility, in important respects, of economic and political systems: this is most evident in the case of the mutually exclusive claims of capitalism and democracy. (The collusion of economic and political elites, with its potential for corruption, is an attempt to overcome the 'misfit'.) Corruption, when it erupts in 'scandal', is more than a matter of individual 'fault' (a criminal problem): it is a social fault. Corruption, which Girling (1997: vii) defines as 'the abuse of public position of trust for private gain', is a social problem in Kyrgyzstan, largely facilitated by the exploitation of networks. This has marginalized ordinary citizens without the same access networks or influence. The disparity between ordinary citizens and those with significant political and economic influence has fuelled accusations of corruption. Many informants complained to me that despite laws meant to limit corruption, regulations are not enforced. In addition, weak (or non-existent) regulatory groups are unable to prevent widespread corruption. A model highlighting the disjuncture between the political and economic models of a nation-state may provide an insight into the occurrence of 'corruption', but the characteristics of a range of practices considered to be 'corrupt' have a more complex history. Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath (2004: 85), focusing on examples from their respective research in Russia and Mongolia, have argued that: 'the characteristics of corruption . can be understood as a consequence of the particular nature of the Pre-Soviet and particularly the Soviet political economy in relation to the current economic collapse'. For example, the ways people have sought to obtain scarce resources or to meet challenges could be described as everyday forms of corruption. Yet, these were and in some cases have remained a part of everyday survival, and, as such, are not regarded as corrupt. Instead, they are considered a necessary, albeit regrettable, form of existence. Again, networks are essential to help people meet the everyday challenges, particularly in an economy that has never been very strong. Family connections are frequently of prime importance, but kinship connections beyond the immediate family are also significant. Many of the most important blat-style relations (Ledeneva 1998) exist between people who have no sort of kinship relations at all. Such connections are essential, for example, to get paperwork done or circumvent long procedures. I have been told many times, 'this is how things are done', meaning that people see little alternative to obtaining documentation without having to go through burdensome official processes. In order to get passports quickly, people often appeal to acquain-
42
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
tances in the relevant government offices. I have even heard cases where people have befriend people in government offices and took them out for lunch or bought them small gifts to encourage assistance or as a way of showing their appreciation. This is not generally seen as corrupt, but a necessary step in overcoming many kinds of difficulties. Such relationships are also essential to avoiding other problems, such as evading the traffic police. People who know traffic police often drive by with a wave or honk, or stop for a quick handshake before continuing on their journey. In another case, a friend, Asel, had been in a car accident and resolved her lawsuit against the other driver through family and acquaintances. Driving along a main road in Bishkek, Asel was hit from the side by a car that had pulled out into an intersection without looking. Her car was shunted into oncoming traffic and was hit by another car. When onlookers came to help her, most people thought she was the passenger and that the driver, thinking that they were guilty, had run away from the accident. Asel had not worn her seat belt and the force of the accident jolted her to the passenger seat. She lay unconscious with lacerations to her face. The car that had first hit Asel belonged to a government agency. The driver, Marat, had only started this job five days before. Alrnaz, a relative and member of the government agency, found him the work. Marat was driving Almaz to an appointment when the accident occurred. When the police arrived Almaz showed his credentials and blamed Asel for the accident. Asellater said that this immediately put the police in a difficult position because 'they are afraid of the government'. Almaz said that she was a young girl; she did not know how to drive and had caused the accident. Adding to the story, Marat said that she had been speeding. Asel regained consciousness, but was still shaken and could not concentrate. The police called her husband. He was at work, so a friend was sent to help her. The friend looked for witnesses. Two taxi drivers gave statements to the police that Asel was not guilty. The police took down the witness accounts and returned to Almaz. He changed his story and said that he did not see what happened as he was reading documents in the car. After the accident, Asel remained in hospital for several weeks. Her family talked with the driver at fault, a government-employed chauffer. He had initially agreed to pay for her medical bills and car repairs. Later, however, he refused to meet her and would not pay. When Asel was released from hospital, she decided to take the man to court Her friends suggested that she bribe the judge, so that she would be sure to win the case. Asel dedded, instead, to ask her uncle for assistance. Her uncle was an influential person in government circles. He found out who would be presiding over the case and made a personal call to the judge. This ensured that the case would be conducted without interference for the other side. In the end she won the case. She said to me later: 'In Kyrgyzstan, you can decide a case either by money or by a phone call.' This example highlights the way in which people use connection to achieve results. The connections used in this case may serve to provide
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
43
someone else assistance later. The judge, having agreed to help in this case, may appeal to Asel's uncle to resolve a problem. Such relationships and connections are more indicative of blat, a Russian term indicating 'informal contact and networks to obtain goods and services or to influence decision-making' (Ledeneva 1996/1997: 43). This was an important feature of Soviet life and continues to be useful in the post-Soviet experience. A similar example will be discussed further in Chapter 4, examining the notions of assistance. These kinds of relationships do not suggest corporate groups, but an adaptable approach to negotiating the difficulties of life in a period of increasing bribery and economic shortages. Yet, the particular forms of corruption and the ways in which they are conceived are changing in relation to the difficulties of economic restructuring that many post-socialist countries are experiencing. 32 Jakob based on his research in Kazakhstan, notes: 'While corRigi (2004: ruption in the Soviet era was embedded in the contradictions of an overcentralized bureaucracy and economy the post-Soviet corruption, occurring on much larger scale, is a characteristic of the interface between "the chaotic a new form of post-Soviet polity, which I have called mode of domination" . and the emerging mechanisms of the market.' More change is yet to come as the effects of the global economic crisis slowly play out in Central Asia.
10n
IDIOMS OF PARTICULARISM Narratives of 'tribalism' are an expression of various forms of factionalism, often with an element of corruption. Though the term is used to convey a number of idioms of particularism, they do not describe formal, corporate groups, but are criticisms of the ways in which people manipulate relationships to gain political and economic power together with feelings of disempowerment and 'dispossession' (Nazpary 2002). These are not descriptions of kinship relations, but allegations of factionalism, often with an element of corruption, made against elites and how they create support groups. Western descriptions of 'tribalism', such as that of Collins (2006), posit it as a limiting social practice from a previous era. Such claims indicate a tendency to view the involvement of supposed kinship relations at a national level to be signs of a not-completely-modern state. 33 In his study on political modernity, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) has examined similar issues. The historical consciousness of the European colonizers has in certain situations tended towards viewing non-European peoples as 'not yet' ready to fully master self-government. Chakrabarty challenges John Stuart Mill's approach of examining the prerequisites for selfrule, in which Mill argues that history must show the development of a people in order to attain their independence. 34 Chakrabarty (2000: 8) notes that: 'acquiring a historical consciousness, acquiring the public spirit that Mill thought absolutely necessary for the art of self-government, was also to learn this art of waiting [to become developed]. The waiting was the realization of the "not yet" of historicism.' This colonial view of the
44
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
need to civilize people is particularly evident in the early attempts by Soviet ethnographers to determine the ethnic identities of the people under their control, and also by later ethnogenetic theorists. 35 The hegemony of Western perceptions of historical consciousness and the development of government, as Chakrabarty describes, overlooks a very important issue: the distinct imaginations of how political processes and the state can be constituted. In the context of Kyrgyzstan, two issues need to be examined. First, the historical perception of nomadic societies must be reviewed, including nineteenth-century notions of 'clans' and 'tribes'. For exam pie, tsarist colonizers and Soviet administrators employed an evolutionary model of society, in which tribal societies were placed on the lower end of the developmental scale. This view has continued to influence analyses. When examining the stratified social and political order among nomadic groups, it is evident that they had bureaucratic state-like structures which were not dependent on coming in contact with sedentary communities or larger empires (Sneath 2007). Second, the role of kinship in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is another area that must be explored. Notions of genealogical relatedness form a central role in the everyday and official constructions of Kyrgyz identity and the state. Accusations of 'tribalism' are a form of criticism about the manipulation of relations for political gain, but they are not descriptions of kinship. What emerges is that kinship is not just a set of given relationships, but is something that must be developed and maintained, but is not necessarily the primary organizing principle in society.
NOTES 1
2
3
In 2008, Kyrgyzstan was ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. It was 166 out of 180 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, http://www.transparency.org (accessed 16June 2009). This is known as a 'tragedy' mainly because local human rights advocates saw this not only in terms of a tragic loss of life, but as they, and other opposition parties, claimed President Akaev and his supporters seemed to have disregarded the democratic and human rights of the citizens. It also marked the beginning of the most turbulent period of Kyrgyz history since independence. In his book outlining a vision of the Kyrgyz state, Akaev (2003c: 213-22) attempted to justify what happened during this period. He discussed the land transfer deals made with China, which had caused parliamentary deputy Azimbek Beknazarov to protest, and was, most likely, the reason for his arrest. It was demonstrators seeking his arrest that were killed by special police forces, while seeking his release. Akaev also addresses this issue, while making a thinly veiled criticism of Beknazarov. OMON is a Russian acronym (otryad militsii osobogo naznacheniya) often designating a riot squad.
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution' 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
45
See L. Garayushchenko (2002) for a detailed account of the Aksy events and other analytical articles. Another chronicle of events used to be available on ResPublica's, an oppositional newspaper, website for another chronicle of events: http://www.respublica.elcat.kg/ gazeta/tragedy/2.h trn (accessed 28 June 2006). Bakiev was later elected President after the 'Tulip Revolution'. He won an electoral vote on 10 July 2005 and was later inaugurated into office on 14 August 2005. Turat Akimov (2003) reported that on 4 September 2002 Aksy residents started a protest march to Bishkek, planning to meet in the capital on 17 September. Already by 12 September, however, they had been rounded up and put on buses to take them home. The demonstrators had named their march 'The Great Campaign' which is a cycle of the Manas epic. 'The Great Campaign' was the account of Manas's battle with China. The Kyrgyz warriors destroyed the Great Wall and Manas placed himself on the Celestial Throne in Beijing. The protestors were using the epic, which PresidentAkaev had based much of his ideology for Kyrgyz society, against the government. The choice of this part of the epic was also a clear indication of the anger some people felt about transferring Kyrgyz land to China. See also Marnan Karabaev (2003) for more commentary a year after the tragedy. In Russian, the slogans, respectively, read: 'My osuzhdaem deistviya oppositzionov;' 'V otstavku Masalievya, Beknazarova!' and 'Askar Akaevich, my trebuem raspustit' Zakonodatel'noe sobranie!' Absamat Masaliev was First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Communist Party from 1985 to 1991. Since independence, he has been leader of the Community Party of Kyrgyzstan. The Legislative Assembly was the upper house of Parliament. Beknazarov has continued to lead protests and calls for justice. On 17 March 2008, a people's court named forty-one officials guilty, including former PresidentAkaev and President Bakiev. Another small demonstration was held on the anniversary of the tragedy outside Parliament in 2009. This is in stark contrast with a volume produced by the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs (2004) about the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border. Here detailed maps are provided showing the lines of delimitation from different agreements. The maps clearly indicate boundaries from 1930, 1961 and 2001. Land transfers between the countries are clearly demarcated as well. A forty-member Constitutional Committee was created by a special decree signed by President Akaev on 26 August 2002. The task of the committee was to look at ways the president's powers could be redistributed to the Parliament and local authorities. This action was regarded as a direct result of calls for Akaev to resign following the Aksy tragedy (Carlson 2003). The recommendations by the Committee were voted on in the referendum. Aidar Akaev was officially registered by the Central Elections Committee (CEC) as a candidate on 18 January 2005 in the No. 57- Kemin constituency. Bermet Akaeva was officially registered by the CEC as a candidate on 20 January 2005 in the No.1- University constituency. This party was founded by Bolot Begaliev on 7 September 2003. It was a merger of the Manas El, New Time, New Movement, Party of Co-operators and (later) Birimdik. Askar Akaev and Aidar Akaev did not belong to this or any other party.
46 13
14
15 16
17
18
19
20
21 22
23
24
25
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic The law pertaining to minimum residence period is Chapter 12, Article 69, Paragraph 1. President Akaev signed this and other amendments to the electoral code into effect on 24 January 2004. Ar-Namys was led by Feliks Kulov, who, at that time, was in prison. Aidar Akaev had received a sufficient majority of the vote during the first election round to win the parliamentary seat for his constituency. For a concise timeline of events leading up to the elections and including the 'revolution', see: www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=heno--special_ index.html&s=o&o=cen tasia_kyrgyzrev_OOhtml (accessed 28 June 2006), compiled by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting. See also http:// www.rferl.org/specials//kyrgyzelections/ (accessed 28 June 2006) for several galleries devoted to the revolution by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. A report had already been published by the newspaper MSN (former Moya Stolitsa Novosti). On 8 February 2005, Rina Prizhivoit (2005) listed the businesses owned by the Akaev family. This caused Akaev to threaten legal action, but it was never brought to court. Bolotbek Maripov, a former journalist with Obshchestvennyi reiting, was elected to Akaeva's post. Aidar kept his seat in Parliament, but it remained vacant as he remained abroad and investigations were pending in Kyrgyzstan. There was a by-election for his seat on 29 April2007. Fourteen candidates, including his sister, Bermet, ran, but people voted 'against all candidates'. In October 2007, the a new constitution was passed by referendum changing the election to Parliament to party list, thereby ending any further attempts to fill Aidar's seat. Otunbaeva was not successful in her attempt to win a parliamentary seat following the 'Tulip Revolution'. Several well-known people were killed during the next two years. There were at least six assassinations of political and social figures and one assassination attempt. Jones Luong describes both 'tribe' and 'clan' as mobilized groups. In particular, she (2002: 54, n. 7) describes a 'tribe' as 'an ethnically homogeneous sociopolitical unit based on kinship, often composed of several clans. It is thus distinct from clan in that it is much larger and often serves an explicitly political purpose.' The structural quality she attributes to a 'tribe' is characteristic of structural-functionalist approaches (see Chapter 2). See Bernard Olivier (1990) for a discussion on korenizatsiya. See Steven Burg (1986) for a model of political stability connected to the mobility of (national) elites. Gabriele Rasuly-Paleczek (2005: 8-9) makes a similar point about the use of anthropology by social sciences. The segmentary lineage system was a concept that explained egalitarianism among acephalous societies. This idea was developed most fully in the work of Evans-Prichard (1940). This topic is examined more fully in Chapter 2. In Kazakh zhuz refers to 'horde'. Schatz, attempting to render it through kinship terminology, refers to zhuz as an 'umbrella clan'. Zhuz is a Turkic word that means 'hundred', which earlier was an administrative division, not formed by kinship. 'Horde' is derived from the Mongolian word ordo (ordu), which means 'palace'. According to David Sneath (2007: 72), this was used to connote a 'kingdom or royal house'. This, again, stresses the focus on the position of ruling elites. As will be argued later, genealogies were
Factionalism and the 'Tulip Revolution'
26 27
28 29
30
31
32
33
34
35
47
often used to create links to the elites, rather than reflect actual kinship networks. See also Adrienne Edgar's (2004) work on genealogy in Turkmenistan. There was particular confusion over the two thresholds that each party had to pass. In order to qualify for seat allocation, parties had to receive 1) 5 per cent of the national vote and 2) 0.5 per cent of the vote in each oblast and in Bishkek and Osh cities. It was not clear, however, how the second threshold should be calculated - whether the results to be calculated against all registered voters in the country or in each oblast. The initial decision taken by the Central Election Commission was to calculate the oblast and city results against the national population. A decision taken by the Supreme Court- two days after the election - overturned this. Therefore, parties had to receive 0.5 per cent of the vote in each oblast and city based against the registered number of voters in each of those areas. This significantly raised the number of votes that each party needed to secure, and thus, excluded many. See OSCE (2008) final mission report for the pre-term elections for more information. For more on these approaches, see Khamidov (2002a,b), Khanin (2000), Kushlubayev (1995) and Temirkulov (2004). Wmgs are noted among other Eurasian peoples, serving as administrative divisions. These were usually comprised, at some level, of aggregates of decimal units (Sneath 2007: 116-17). Similar decimal terms are found in Kyrgyz, particularly when referring to these former administrative organizations. In Kyrgyzstan, the Russian terms regionalizm and mestnichestvo, and the Kyrgyz termjerdeshtilik are used to refer to regionalism. Ryabov did not clarify whether the people in government were related to PresidentAkaev through their genealogies; he only discussed relatedness by region. David Sneath (2006) has challenged the view of what can be imagined as 'corruption'. He argues that instead of viewing certain practices as exchanges which imply a form of corruption, we need a more nuanced view whereby we can see these practices as transactions which enact different relationships. These relationships and the nature of transactions change over time and do not necessarily indicate forms of corruption, but changing perceptions to what is considered corrupt and the nature of the relations that support the transactions. However, as A. Robertson (2006) argues, we should not judge the developing world before we address the kinds of corruption that exist in the West and how this affects those countries. Charles Taylor (1993) has also challenged this view and argued instead for a developed historical consciousness. It is the desire to manage their own affairs that people form a group of those who share a set of views which focus around an identity of indispensable characteristics (which are protected by a series of rights which necessitate the respect of others), and contributes to the formation of a notion of a 'full human subject' and use this as the basis to seek self-rule. Similar remarks on modernity are made by Bruce Grant (1995) about the Nivkh on Sakhalin Island and by Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov (2003) on his research among the Evenki in Siberia. This topic is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
2
The Ideologies of Kinship
A
ccusations of 'tribalism' contribute to the illusion of organized kinship groups dominating the sphere of informal politics. This is strengthened by some who appeal to their 'tribes' to mobilize for certain goals, as will be discussed below. It, therefore, seems natural to conceive of such societies as primarily organized by kinship, often with segmentary lineage theory to describe their structure. As discussed in the previous chapter, the fundamental problem is that evolutionism underpins most theories relating to kinship societies. Politics are not controlled by pacts formed between different 'tribes' or 'clans', but between people who exploit their identities to gain and expand political power. Another problem, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, is that there are no other descriptions of social and political life. In the absence of first-hand historical accounts, the understanding of Kyrgyz 'society' has been filtered through depictions which treat social and political evolutionism as fact. In other words, kinship is assumed to be the natural organizing principle of pre-state (non-territorialized) societies. Descriptions and theories of kinship societies, including those that attempt to recreate life before the changes wrought by colonialism, have created a veil through which alternative forms of social formation are hard to imagine. In order to better understand the role of 'tribe' and 'clan' identities in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, it is necessary to examine these theories and what remains to be explored. In April and May 2003, tribal identities clashed on the front page of newspapers. Several articles by Nurlan Motuev, an opposition politician, appeared in the newspaper ResPublica. 1 These articles, written in Russian, were a reaction to a book that had been edited by Mairam Akaeva, President Askar Akaev's wife. The book, Poslovitsy i pogovorki (Proverbs and Sayings), stated that the meaning of the name 'Sayak', a Kyrgyz uruu, translates in Russian as brodyaga (tramp or vagabond). Motuev, who claimed to be the 'leader' of the Sayak, explained that the preferred translation of the name is odinokii putnik (lone traveller). 2 This issue, however, stretched far beyond the choice of translation in the book. It was the start of Motuev's political campaign.
The Ideologies of Kinship
49
In the first of a series of articles, Motuev berated the editors of the book and questioned their own tribal backgrounds. He noted that Chingiz Aitmatov, a famous Kyrgyz author and one of the editors of the book, was from the Kitai uruu, 3 which Motuev suggested was the remnants of the Chinese army defeated by the Arabs in the seventh century A.D. These people had been absorbed by what he considered to be the core Kyrgyz 'tribes'. Motuev challenged whether Aitmatov had greater authority than him to speak about the origins of Kyrgyz 'tribes' as he descends from a group which is not originally Kyrgyz. In comparison, Motuev described his uruu as 'pure' (chistyi), claiming that the Sayak are one of the true Kyrgyz uruu, and not a foreign group that had been absorbed and assimilated. Motuev also reproduced part of a telephone conversation he had with Sveta Karamoldobaeva, an editor with Sham, the publishing house of Akaeva's book. During the conversation, one aksakal, Berdibek Sydygaliev,4 said to Karamoldobaeva: 'On behalf of six thousand aksakals from the Jumgal region [Naryn oblast1 we demand the removal of this blasphemy from the book. Otherwise people will revolt, and we, the aksakals, shall not restrain them. Why do you offend only the Sayaks, when similar things can be said of other Kyrgyz tribes?' (Motuev 2003a: 5). 5 Part of Karamoldobaeva's response was also printed, in which she stated that they would remove that particular phrase and apologized. A hint of desperation was also included in her reply, pleading for the people not to rise up against them in such a manner. Motuev took this to be a victory for his 'tribe' for a 'Sayak' political movement. Motuev's attempt to generate political support through his uruu (which eventually failed) reveals a discourse that employs kinship as the primary organizing principle of society. This is developed on top of political and ethnological views which support a similar view. This chapter, thus, focuses on the construction of this view and the problems it creates for understanding the role of kinship in post-Soviet life in Kyrgyzstan. Motuev's views, however, touch on two further issues, which will be examined in the following chapter. First, what are the underlying historical representations that have created such an image of unified 'tribes' and 'clans'? There is a mixture of tsarist, Soviet and Western accounts that contribute to a complex array of views, but all build on evolutionary concepts. They construct a discursive reality whereby these groups are attributed with corporateness based on kinship, and has become the dominant representation of social and political life in the region. Soviet ethnographies shaped the discourse through which 'clans' and 'tribes' took on the appearance of corporate groups organized by kinship and served as the primary organizing principle of society. The construction of such representations is comparable to Alexei Yurchak's (2006) description of 'authoritative discourse'. Building on Mikhail Bakhtin's notion of the term, Yurchak argues that the ideological discourse created an authoritative description of social life. This, however, is only one view, and needs to be complemented by the ways in which it was reinterpreted within the language of the dis-
SO
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
course. In other words, although ethnological and official Soviet reports may have created a discourse through which nomadic societies were equated with early stages of development and where kinship is the primary organizing feature, it does not mean that it is correct or the only interpretation. In the absence of alternative views and the vocabulary it has created, this authoritative discourse monopolizes the imagination of social life. Second, and following on from the first, how do people provide different understandings of society through categories such as 'tribe' and 'clan' in the post-Soviet context? The authoritative discourse that was produced in earlier ethnographies repeats and reinforces doxic and epistemological assumptions in kinship studies in post-Soviet studies. 6 On closer inspection, 'tribes' and 'clans' do not represent corporate groups and neither does this explain how people understand these categories in their everyday lives. The use of these terms today indicates something different, which I refer to as genealogical relatedness. This issue, discussed in Chapter 3, explores alternative perceptions in conjunction with more recent anthropological approaches to kinship studies, especially with regard to David Schneider's (2004) critique of kinship studies. To begin with, however, the specific terms used to describe tribal representations need to be examined. THE POLITICS OF NAMING The introduction of reforms during the Gorbachev era saw a greater openness in public discussions of notions related to 'tribe' and 'clan' in Kyrgyzstan. Although 'tribalism' was still targeted by the administration, people began to explore their genealogical histories more freely. In 1990, new materials were published on sanjyra - the Kyrgyz term a broad account of genealogical relations often elaborated through historical accounts - which were cast as historical studies of particular 'tribes' Oetimishbaev and Masyrakunov 1994). Motuev's articles are a part of this growing discourse. Yet, it is important to address the implicit meanings of the terms. In everyday discussions in Kyrgyzstan, the terms for 'clan' and 'tribe' are not always distinct and their meanings are used interchangeably. Most commonly, the English terms 'clan' and 'tribe' are associated with the Russian terms rod and plemya, respectively. The terms, however, are attributed with a number of different connotations when translated from Russian into English. For example, rod is used to describe a 'clan', but also 'family', 'sort' and 'gender' (i.e. sex). Similarly, the Russian terms have not been easily translated into Kyrgyz. Russian literature has linked plemya and rod with the respective Kyrgyz terms uruu and uruk.? Descriptions of Kyrgyz tribal structure, as briefly described in the previous chapter, note that 'tribes' were divided into three administrative-military units before Soviet control of the region: ong kanat (right wing) and a sol kanat (left wing), and also ichkilik (centre) (Abramzon
The Ideologies of Kinship
51
1971: 26; Asanov 2002a,b; Bartol'd 1996; Kushlubayev 1995; Valikhanov 1985). 8 The ong kanat is mainly located in northern Kyrgyzstan, whereas the sol kanat and a majority of the ichkilik are predominately located in southern Kyrgyzstan. 9 These are not 'tribal' confederations, but instead indicate previous administrative and military divisions, which are found throughout Central and Inner Asia. Without greater historical records, it is difficult to know more about these divisions, but these appear to be the former administrative divisions of aristocratic houses (Sneath 2007). There is further confusion between the descriptions of the terms. Russian scholar K. K. Yudakhin (1999: 807, 808) wrote in his KyrgyzRussian Dictionary that both uruk and uruu translate into Russian respectively as 'clan' and 'tribe'. In the Russian-Kyrgyz Dictionary, he notes that both 'clan' and 'tribe' in Russian translate into Kyrgyz as uruu (Yudakhin 2000: 739, 559). Moreover, he describes uruk as a 'generation' (pokolenie), which designates a person's relatives of roughly the same age. Yet, there is another Kyrgyz term for generation (muundar), which indicates a broad age group (Yudakhin 2000: 593).1° Soviet scholar, E. V. Sevortyan, wrote that there was a Turkic word, uru, which he regarded as both uru [sic] and uruk in Kyrgyz. He noted several meanings for this term in Russian: 'clan' (rod), 'seed' (semya), 11 'generation' (pokolenie), 'child' (ditya), 'younger' (mladshii) and 'wedding' (svad'ba) (Sevortyan 1974: 604-606), but does not include 'tribe' in this definition. To add to this confusion, there is another Russian term for 'clan', which is klan, but this is used most prominently in descriptions of political factions, which is used irrespective of the personal relations of the members (Chapter 1). I asked informants to give me more Kyrgyz terms that they might use to describe their uruu or uruk. Some said that they sometimes refer to their uruk as ichinen uruu (a 'tribe' within a 'tribe'). I have even heard uruk be described as kichine uruu (a little 'tribe'). If people wish to describe immediate family members, e.g. mother, father, sisters, brothers and father's parents; then they use the term tuulgan uruk (birth 'clan' or own 'clan'). A family is usually called iii-bUlo in Kyrgyz. There is, however, a formal Kyrgyz administrative term used for family, Wffin, which is more closely associated with the household of a married couple. For example, in the village of Kyzmatchy where I conducted research in 2003 the population was described as five hundred ffitUn. As Mirlan Jumabekov, a young teacher from the village, described the term to me, stating 'a ffiffin is a married man and woman, not dependent on the number of children they have or may have' The application of these various terms caused frustration throughout my fieldwork. My informants often reversed the meaning of uruu and uruk, and some even said that they never use uruu. Other studies have attempted to clarify social organization, but are, nonetheless, based in evolutionist approaches. Kyrgyz social scientist Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen has presented a historical reconstruction of Kyrgyz nomadic society which examines descriptions of uruus and
52
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
uruks in the second half of the nineteenth century. This is, however, a reconstruction, and she examines many of the descriptions through Soviet views of nomadic society. These views of kinship (in Kyrgyz, tuugandyk, and in Russian, rodstvo) relations share strong similarities with segmentary lineage theory. For example, she describes uruk as: 'A concept [which] characterizes a rather small ethnic association in the hierarchy of all formations, and consists of a group of relatives having a general ancestor five-seven generations back. They are also united by a principle of joint settlement in one village and of general agrarian-management' (Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen 1999: 130). In anthropology, 'clans' are commonly described as a group of people who descended from a distant (real or mythical) ancestor, whether they can trace the genealogy or not (Holy 1996: 75; Keesing 1975: 31; Seymour-Smith 1986: 38). This definition of uruk would be closer to a lineage. All people within those five to seven generations, she notes, can claim a kinship connection. This resembles a more exclusive lineage known in Kyrgyz as jeti ata, or a person's patrilineal ancestors traced back seven generations (literally meaning 'seven fathers') to which people are said to derive their kinship connections. Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen notes that there is a smaller kinship group known as bir atanyn baldary (a Kyrgyz term referring to children of one father), which only includes three to five previous generations.I2 As for uruu, Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen describes this as a group, 'which can unite a few uruk, or can include only one, but are significant by the number of uruk. Here, the group of people incorporated among them have related [familial] ties, reaching up to the seven generations in the general genealogy. An uruu can have native as well as foreign elements. They take subordinate uruk under their protection' (IsrailovaKhar'ekhuzen 1999: 130). In addition, she notes that uruu in the past had their own territory for their cattle breeding subsistence economy. Despite these meanings, it is possible that whatever meaning uruu and uruk had in the nineteenth century was replaced by the official definitions used by the Soviets. Yet, these representations have continued to frame people's descriptions of their concepts of uruu and uruk. As discussed in the previous chapter, people are not organized into such formal groups, nor does this correspond to the way these categories are understood. Returning to Motuev's campaign, how are these terms used and what meaning are they given? INSTRUMENTAL KINSHIP The way in which uruu and uruk are often used, however, do not reflect their technical definitions, but an appeal to shared qualities to generate support, as in the case of Motuev, for political goals. On a hot summer day, I met Motuev at a cafe in Bishkek. Sitting outside in the shade of the trees in the city centre, we discussed his recent publications and the debate that it had sparked. He said that in 1993 at a special gathering
The Ideologies of Kinship
53
of aksakals he had been elected leader of the Sayak. The Sayak aksakals (particularly in Naryn oblast) he said, felt marginalized by the concentration of governmental power that the Sarybagysh had amassed during the Soviet era which had continued into independence. This referred to Turdakun Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Kyrgyz SSR from 1961 to 1985 and parliamentary deputy from 1991 until the 'Tulip Revolution', and President Aksar Akaev. The Sayak aksakals felt that Sarybagysh had somehow benefited from having their tribesmen in power. Motuev's intention was to unify his 'tribe' publicly and to strive for political recognition. The ultimate goal was to nominate a Sayak to run in the parliamentary elections in February ZOOS. His slogan was: 'Sayaks of all countries in the world- unite!', which he modelled after Marx and Engel's maxim for the proletariat.13 In order to achieve this, Motuev had to underline a politicized interpretation of 'tribes' and 'clans'. In his second article, Motuev stressed the centrality of people's knowledge of their tribal history, in particular, their jeti ata. Motuev (2003b: 2) expressed this through a common Kyrgyz phrase: 'Those who do not know their ancestors up to the seventh generation are slaves!' 14 The memory of the ancestors contributed to the formation of a distinct (ethnic) identity and was one way to distinguish a person as Kyrgyz in the pre-tsarist era. This popularly held belief suggested that if a person could not recount their seven patrilineal ancestors they were referred to in Kyrgyz as a kul (slave) or joo (enemy). In essence, they were not 'Kyrgyz' .15 Yet, this may have had more to do with aligning oneself, as Sneath (2007) notes, with aristocratic houses, as they usually kept their genealogies to demonstrate their superior lineage and separate themselves from the rest. Although this historical notion of jeti ata has remained, it does not determine Kyrgyz identity today. Despite the use of this idea, in reality it is quite different. Many people I spoke to about this admitted that they did not know all of their jeti ata. Often I was told that it was written down and could be referred to if necessary. Asek Kyyazov, a middle-aged Bishkek resident, showed me his own written records of his genealogy. He had traced them all the way back to Mohammed and to Adam. His teenage son, however, did not know much of the details of the genealogical history, but Asek assured me that he would know them later. The fact that families may have genealogical records written down, or know someone who can recount their family's ancestry is sufficient for many. It was clear that the notion of 'tribe' contributes to the notion of Kyrgyz identity by underlining the way in which genealogy contributes to concepts of imagined communities including the Kyrgyz nation. 16 Asek's records did not map a corporate network, but rather charted his claim on the past and his family's role in it. When people need assistance, however, they usually rely on family and friends, often through blat networks (see Chapter 1), and do not turn to their uruu or uruk. The way in which Motuev employed these categorizations suggests that there are real groups, such as Sayak and Sarybagysh. In doing so,
54
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
he discursively created a reality whereby these 'groups' form a part of daily life in Kyrgyzstan. He could thereby establish boundaries and rights for these groups. In this way Motuev created a political platform through this construction of the Sayak. Claims of this sort have had the effect of contributing to the appearance of a resurgence of 'tribe' in the post-Soviet era. As discussed in the previous chapter, this theme has become the subject of a popular debate in political science about postSoviet Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, these views only maintain a series of underlying evolutionist theories connected with the notion of 'tribes' and 'clans'. The implication of this not only distorts understandings of kinship relations, but also contributes to the construction of the discursive reality where 'clans' and 'tribes' become actual social forces. EVOLUTIONIST UNDERPINNINGS OF KINSHIP STUDIES AND THEIR LEGACIES The division of Kyrgyz society into Sa yak, Sarybagysh and others groups creates an impression of nomadic kin groups, which still exert influence over popular depictions of contemporary society. Everyday descriptions of kinship - or rather, its conditioned articulation through predominantly Western theories - has created a distinction of nomadic pastoralists as not yet or unable to reach the next evolutionary stage. Nineteenth century views on kinship and evolution perpetuated this view and created the foundation for which kinship studies was based. One of the most influential was the work of Lewis Henry Morgan (1998 [1877]), a lawyer who made who made numerous visits to the Iroquois in American in the mid-1800s. Although Morgan is credited with creating terminology for kinship, his work was concerned with the evolutionary development of people from 'savagery' to civilization, especially through a number of developmental markers: subsistence, government, language, family, religion, house life and architecture, and property. Indeed, the opening lines of his book, Ancient Society, illustrate this clearly: 'The latest investigation respecting the early condition of the human race, are tending to the conclusion that mankind commenced their career at the bottom of the scale and worked their way up from savagery to civilization through the slow accumulation of experimental knowledge' (Morgan 1998 [1877]: 3).17 Anthropology has long abandoned Morgan's blatant evolutionist vision of human development. The reflexive trend in the discipline in the 1980s addressed the way in which anthropologists conduct their fieldwork and write about their areas (Clifford and Marcus 1986). In addition, following the work of David Schneider (2004) and others, kinship theory was revised. Not all elements of the evolutionist logic have been overturned within the discipline, however, especially regarding kinship theories. William Irons (1975), for example, presented a study of the Yomut Turkmen that identified the kinship structures that organized society. He attempted to recreate the different
The Ideologies of Kinship
ss
segmentary organizations and focused on the rights they would have had. This reconstruction examined the Yomut through the lens of a particular social organization, and, thus, did not analyse the kinds of stratification that existed before the twentieth century (Sneath 2007: 142-50). Even Anatoly Khazanov (1983: 179), who attempted not to use 'clan', relied on the segmentary model to describe the division of the Kazakhs. In order to understand the mixture of concepts that underpin descriptions of nomadic societies, it is necessary to examine most influential theories: feudalism, egalitarianism and segmentary lineage theory. Feudalism
A debate which shaped representations of pastoral nomads, particularly among Soviet scholars, was the notion of 'feudalism'. This was based on a model of European forms of class society associated with small-scale agriculture as elaborated though Marx's (1938) notion of class development. In this view, the main means of production was land, and was characterized by conditional holding of the sovereign's land by lords who exploited the labour of serfs or vassals. According to Marxist theory, this represented an evolutionary stage, placing it before the development of a bourgeois society and capitalist economy. Ethnographic research on nomadic pastoralism in Central Asia and Mongolia, however, presented a challenge to this Marxist framework. The characteristic feudal relations were not clearly discernable among these peoples. As Ernest Gellner (1988: 97, original emphasis) notes: One of the paradoxes, form a Marxist viewpoint, of Russian ethnography of nomadic people under Tzarist rule, was that it was possible to find some who were still semi-patriarchal and not yet properly feudal, and others who had entered market relations and were semi-capitalist and no longer properly feudal, but there was a marked shortage of nomads who were properly feudal, neither too early nor too late. There was clearly a stratified order, but the challenge was to demonstrate nomadic peoples at an early stage of development, while also having the same social and political hierarchies as Europe in order to identify class enemies. The debates that followed in Soviet ethnography tried to solve this problem, but never with much satisfaction. In Kyrgyzstan, there were three groups that were identified as class enemies. 'Tribal' leaders (manap), 18 judges who settled disputes by customary law (bii)1 9 and rich herd owners (bai) were all classified as a threat to the fulfilment of Party activities. Manaps were believed to have the most control. They had their power increased during Russian colonization; they were given positions in the army and had more authority to rule over their people. Biis held wide authority within
56
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
the community through their knowledge of customary law (adat). Bais, according to the Soviets, were a capitalist element of Kyrgyz society that developed from increased interactions with sedentarized communities, in particular the Russian Empire. These three groups became the target of numerous Soviet campaigns to eliminate them, but also to perpetuate a fear that anti-revolutionary elements were in the Party. Those that blamed their fellow Party members became a convenient method for fomenting suspicion and further their own political careers. In some cases, blaming colleagues for continuing anti-revolutionary practices became a necessity, lest someone blamed them first. Class enemies had been identified, but whether they were feudal or not was not so easily demonstrated. Soviet Kyrgyz scholar Kubanychbek Nurbekov (1999) described manaps and biis as representing a fully classbased society. He notes: 'Kyrgyz society in the period before the October [revolution] was feudal. The Kyrgyz were still outwardly connected by forms of kinship within the boundaries of the nomadic aiyl communities. But according to their economic relations they represented a society, which had developed a form of class relations' (Nurbekov 1999: 33). 20 Nurbekov, despite clearly identifying the Kyrgyz as feudal, states they are still in an evolutionary stage where kinship dominates social order. Yet, their economic relations alone have changed the make-up of society, but this is somehow kept separate from the social organization. Other academics attempted to present a more nuanced view of nomadic relations. S. Abramzon, the eminent Russian scholar who conducted research on the Kyrgyz, argued that a monopoly over land was of primary importance to the nomads. Nevertheless, he did not state that the Kyrgyz had developed into a fully feudal society. He argued that they still had marks of patriarchal relations combined with feudal divisions, traces of an earlier evolutionary stage: A different relationship lay in the basis of class division among members of Kyrgyz society to the main means of production, which was land, especially pastures. Of key importance in the conditions of the stock-raising business was feudal land property, which was the basis of Kyrgyz patriarchal-feudal relations. Although the possession of pastures had an outwardly communal character, in fact, all pastures were divided between prominent biis and manaps who appropriated the right to dispose of their and others' lands as feudal owners. Thereby, this created a monopoly of land possession by the feudal elite of Kyrgyz society. The distinctive character of private property did not correspond to the form of communal property. The concept [of communal property] reflected in the usual right of Kyrgyz was jealously protected by the class interests of the feudal elite. Tribal and clan property of pastures existed only nominally, acting as a legal fiction, which was in fact a feudal form of landed property (Abramzon 1971: 157).
The Ideologies of Kinship
57
The attempt to demonstrate different stages of development proved difficult to maintain. Other research pointed to taxation, specifically focusing on land and herds. The forms of taxation and the social classes it created presented a society that had clearly developed stratified relations, which was at odds with the kinship-based social structure that was supposed to exist. A. Khasanov (1968: 1 a Kyrgyz social scientist, notes that in the colonial period, manaps preserved 'feudal practices' over society. In some cases working cattle were seized from those indebted to the manap (known as kiich or atmai). Manaps kept sharecroppers (chairiker). In addition, taxes were imposed and a requirement for some men to be in the service of the manap (jigi kyzmaty).These taxes were part of a number of taxes paid to the manap. There were more levies and fines paid even for wide range of events (see Table 2.1) serving many purposes. Not only were there taxes to be paid within encampments, but some Kyrgyz also had to pay taxes to regional empires. For example, rulers of the Kokand Khanate imposed taxes on the nomadic herders:
n
The Kokand Khanate actually imposed various taxes on all Kyrgyz land; and a special tax for cattle was collected- zyaket. Much of the land was rented to nomadic communities. Besides, separate Kyrgyz clans and large family groups procured areas by means
Table 2.1 - List of taxes paid to manap Tax21
Description
aiyp tartuu
a fine for the infringement of a common law
baila or shyralga
the manap's right to take half of the game from a hunter a levy for the 'judicial duty' of an investigation a levy covering the manap's expenses for hosting guests a levy for the victim of a natural disaster, a large part of which is given by the manap an offering to the manap for different reasons a tax for the use of pasture working cattle, seized from those indebted to the manap a poor person taking care of a herd for the current year, but for a limited time systematic tax of the population for the manap a levy for the manap's table a tax for driving a herd through a manap's land
(nark) biilik chygym jurtchuluk and sel'vik koshumcha otmai kiich (atmai) sa an salyk soyush tuyakat
58
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
of purchasing state land [gosudarstvennaya zemlya] which then was distributed between all members according to the amount they had paid with the right to resell. Basically this concerned irrigated areas, [but] as a rule, pastures remained for general use (Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen 1999: 71). The Kokand Khanate's territorial control spread to northern Kyrgyzstan, but was less influential than in southern Kyrgyzstan, where it is thought such taxes would have been forcefully imposed on the settled peoples in the Fergana Valley. Nomads were forced to adapt to limited pasture use for herding their animals and increased contact with sedentary communities due to land allocation for Russian settlers moving to Central Asia in the nineteenth century. 22 The control of land was not just a focus of Soviet scholars, but had been noted by Russian explorers and ethnographers. Petr Semenov (1827-1914), during his travels in Central Asia, remarked on the importance of land among 'tribes' in northern Kyrgyzstan. 23 He recorded a particular encounter with the manap Borombai (Burambai)24 of the Bugu 'tribe'. When he arrived at the manap's encampment he found Borombai to be in exceptional spirits: Burambai's joy at the arrival of Russian assistance was explained by his absolutely critical situation, as the whole of the eastern half of the basin of Lake Issyk-kul', which was in his domain, was virtually already lost to him. He had evacuated it along both the northern and southern shores of the lake (along the Kungei and Terskei) since his defeat in the autumn of 1854 and moved to winter quarters by the Santash Pass, leaving behind only a few auly in the valleys of the rivers Tiup and Dzhargalan, the eastern tributaries of the lake. It was to these auly that the Sarybagish tirelessly directed their baranty [raids], and during one such raid, while Burambai was in Terskei with his forces, they managed to outflank him from Kungei and from there to reach his auly at the river Tiup, and to smash them completely, taking prisoner part of his family, namely one of his wives and the wives of his three sons. That happened at the end of 1856, after which Burambai led a nomadic existence beyond the Santash, and the Sarybagysh already considered the whole basin of Issyk-kul' to have been conquered by them (Semenov 1998: 144). Semenov's account demonstrates the importance for control of territory between the 'tribes'. Raids and skirmishes among elites and their followers were common in northern Kyrgyzstan. Greater pasture land enabled manaps to collect more taxes and to spread out the herds. In addition, as evident in the case of Borombai, the arrival of tsarist forces obstructed the competition over land between manaps and elites.
The Ideologies of Kinship
59
Some Soviet scholars argued that not only control of land important, but livestock was an essential means of production. B. Vladimirtsov (2002), a Soviet social scientist, has been credited with advancing the notion of 'nomadic feudalism'. From his research of Mongolian nomads, he argued that there were three stages of feudalism. The earliest stage, a trait usually found in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, was marked by a reliance on livestock but also increasing competition over land use. The success of the nomadic subsistence economy depended on maintaining livestock and controlling a place of residence or an area of migration (nutag). 25 The idea of 'nomadic feudalism', however, was heavily criticized. The importance of land and livestock was a nuanced view, but was refuted mainly by scholars who asserted the primacy livestock was the main means of production, not land. The maintenance of livestock was a crucial part of nomadic existence, and for many scholars was the determining factor in the development of feudal-like relations among nomads. The precarious mountain and steppe environment often meant that a herder might have many animals one year, but due to blizzards or drought conditions, they might loose most of the livestock, which would substantially decrease their wealth. As M. Nazif Mohib Shahrani (1979) describes, however, wealthy herders usually distributed their herd among other families. In which case, if there were poor conditions, then some of the herd may survive if it is herded in a different area. Furthermore, if any of the herd was lost in the poor conditions while being herded by other families, they may have been required to compensate the wealthy herder. In his study of a number of Kyrgyz families who lived in the high Pamir Mountains in the Wakhan Corridor of northern Afghanistan in the 1970s, Shahrani focused on the adaptation of the group's social, political and economic structure to the closed Chinese and Soviet borders that surrounded them. He demonstrated that wealthy herders dominated production through livestock. He noted that the 135 families depended on Haji Rahman Qul (the khan? 6 as Shahrani describes him), or from other wealthy herders, for support. Shahrani stated that there were two forms of animal distribution: saghun and amanat. Under the saghun system: 'poor families who do not own animals and do not have the labour force to herd livestock year round are provided by the rich oey units with ten to thirty ewes and does, with lambs and kids, shortly after the lambing season, or one or two yak cows with their calves' (Shahrani 1979: 179).27 This system operated mainly for the poor families to obtain milk and wool over spring and summer but livestock would have to be returned by autumn. In the amanat system, poor oeys were given large amounts of livestock by richer oeys for a long period: The herders exercise all rights over the products (milk, wool, and fuel) that can be earned from the herd while they are in charge of raising them. But the rich Kirghiz retains the right of ownership (i.e. disposal) over the herd. Reciprocally, the herders must give
60
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
an annual accounting to the owner and must show an increase in the size of the herd to ensure the continuation of the arrangement (Shahrani 1979: 179). Shahrani (1979: 184) argued that these systems of animal distribution represented an 'increasingly more centralized, mildly authoritarian and "feudal" structure in which the khan figures prominently'.28 Although this particular organization among these families seems to have developed after their arrival in the Wakhan Corridor, these relations did not develop without specific knowledge of similar practices that had been used in the past. 29 This, therefore, suggests that these stratified relations were similar to those in the period before the tsarist colonization of Central Asia. There were a number of Soviet scholars, however, who attempted to address what they felt were mistakes in descriptions of nomads as feudal, including Vladimirtsov's discussion of 'nomadic feudalism'. One such scholar, S. E. Tolybekov (1959, 1971), argued that nomadic groups, chiefly because of their continual mobility, were not able to develop any further, and, therefore, did not attain the characteristics of a feudal society. In essence, the nomadic way of life prohibited nomads from social and political development. As Gellner (1988: 106) has summarized this view: '[Nomadic society] constitutes a sociological cul-de-sac, or to use the expressive Russian word, a tupik'. By stating that nomadic societies could not develop further and that land was not a primary means of production, Tolybekov (1971) provided the first strong criticism against Vladimirtsov's work. Another scholar, G. E. Markov (1976), continued Tolybekov's antifeudal argument. 30 Markov took Tolybekov's ideas further: 'Where Tolybekov asserts with firmness, and perhaps a touch of bitterness, that nomads could not develop further than they did, Markov contents himself with asserting that they did not' (Gellner 1988: 111, original emphasis). Under certain conditions, elements of feudalism could appear, but not through nomadic development. Instead, according to Markov, it was as a consequence of colonizing forces, particularly the Russians, which imposed administrative measures on the local population. Bat-Ochir Bold, a Mongolian social scientist, argues that we should not apply the term 'feudalism' to Mongolian (and other) nomads. He states: 'The concept of feudalism was formulated on the basis of an assumed universality of the special economic, political and social system that was created by the resolution of the contradictions in early social conditions of Byzantine and some European people' (Bold 2001: 24). Nevertheless, in the Mongol examples that Bold presents, and in the Kyrgyz examples provided above, the titles given to elites, such as manap and bii, indicate that society was stratified which also dominated economic relations between the elite poorer herders. David Sneath's (2000: 25) description of 'feudal' as being a 'convenient shorthand term to describe the stratified social order' is a helpful way
The Ideologies of Kinship
61
to understand these relations. This discussion should not be limited to a debate over the means of production, but needs to explore the various relations developed to maintain this stratification and control over resources. 31 Furthermore, the Marxist scheme of evolutionary development and its use in Soviet social sciences not only limits an understanding of pre-tsarist nomadic life, but also perpetuates viewing nomads as a primitive and undeveloped people.
Egalitarianism Studies focusing on feudalism, however, contained a tension between clear elements of social and economic divisions among the people with an underlying notion that since nomads are not territorialized, they must be fundamentally different. There were some differences in the way this developed in Russian, Soviet and Western studies, but they all focused on pre-capitalist forms of social relations, assuming that among kinship groups people were generally equal. In later Soviet studies, such as with Tolybekov and Markov, feudalism was largely abandoned as it was not a useful description of nomadic society. Views tended to describe stratifications arising from increased contact with colonialism. Instead, an emphasis was placed on forms of egalitarianism. As Yuri Slezkine (1991: 479) has noted: 'the ethnographers' usefulness to the building of socialism consisted in their ability to uncover class structures, while their task as scholars was to study societies that by definition had no classes'. Some Soviet scholars focused on nomadic groups exhibiting forms of 'primitive communism', the earlier development stage in Marxism. Nikolai Ssorin-Chaikov (2003) notes this view developed from Russian intellectuals who presented an idealized notion of 'socialist' peasant communities in the late nineteenth century. Although Marxists criticized this, it still remained a part of ethnological representations. By retaining this feature of nomadic societies, it reconciled the aims of the Soviet political practices with the notion that the end of capitalism would be followed by a return to communism. Therefore, the 'organic purity' of peasant communities as natural models of socialist existence was reified in this context. In the West, egalitarianism was often presented through a model of the segmentary lineage system. It was claimed that without sedentarization, other forms of political and economic development leading to asymmetrical relations were difficult to achieve. Nomadic society was conceived of as naturally divided by kinship. In anthropology, the characteristics of segmentary pastoral nomadic groups have been described as: 'the weak, elusive, ephemeral nature of political centralization, the wide diffusion of power and political participation, the precarious and relatively mild degree of social differentiation, the prominence of collectives practising mutual aid and self-defence' (Gellner 1988: 107). The model of segmentary lineage system was persuasively put forward as a social type in African
62
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Political Systems by Meyer Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940), which linked egalitarianism with stateless societies. Deviations from this model, Talal Asad (1979) points out, are usually conceived of as isolated examples. This ideal type of pastoral nomadism, however, needs to be addressed by examining the 'total system'. Asad (1979: 421-2, original emphasis) argues that anthropologists have failed 'to realize that the equality of segments specified by such a system represents a formal equivalence at the ideological level, that it does not define the productive capacity or political power (material resources, manpower, etc.) of opposed groups'. This concern was reflected in later anthropological studies which examined the issue of land ownership and trade between pastoral nomadic and sedentary groups (Khoury and Kostiner 1990). Nevertheless, Asad (1979: 422) remarks: It is not merely that nomads 'interact' at different social levels
with sedentaries, but that the social conditions of their existence are reproduced by the total system, a system which is historically formed and reformed by complex combinations of the forces and relations of production. And since the conditions, and the system which reproduces them, vary radically according to time and place, there cannot be an essential 'pastoral nomadic society' According to Asad, the relationships that exist between nomads and with sedentary communities exclude the possibility of egalitarianism. The clear forms of stratification and taxes imposed provide further evidence against the idealized view of society as the essence of freedom and organized by kinship.
Segmentary lineage system Segmentary lineage theory furthered the perception of egalitarianism through the balancing of acephalous kinship groups. It struggled, however, to overcome the stratified elements of social life. Proponents of the theory achieved this by presenting societies outside of time. Nomadic groups' social formations were presented as having developed naturally through the primary organizing principle of kinship characterized by equality. The anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) developed such a social structural formation in his study of the Nuer. He constructed a dual model (Figure 2.1) of social segmentation and the divisions of these groups throughout different territories. 32 In a simplified version of this model (Figure 2.2), A represents an apical ancestor from which a 'clan' claims descent. B and Care maximal lineages which descend from A; and in turn, D and E descend from B; and F and G descend from C. According to Evans-Prichard's theory, if two segments opposed each other, for a specific reason, then their agnates will join to support their
The Idrologies of Kinship
63
lineages
Vi IIage 'ommunities..___________~Minimal linecrges Figure 2.1- E. E. Evans-Pritchard's (1940: 248) model of segmentary lineage system
A
I
I
I
B I
D
I
I
I
E
F
c I
I
G
Figure 2.2- Simple diagram of a segmenatary lineage model
defence. For example, if D and F should quarrel, then D and E will join together, which represents B, and F and G will join, which represents C. This was a compelling model that was used to describe a number of sodeties (Fox 1971; Geiss 2003; Holy 1996; Keesing 1975). In earlier works, Evans-Pritchard had argued that this model reflected evolutionary transitions from a society based on 'clan' divisions toterritorial organization (Kuper 2004). In his The Nuer, however, this model became a functionalist description of Nuer core values. 'Clans' were abandoned and replaced by 'lineages'. Adam Kuper (1988: 198) noted:
64
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
'The lineage system was an ideological construct, a way of thinking and talking about the actual camps and villages and their relationships with each other. It was assumed to be primary, since values were primary; but it need not match any particular concrete praxis'. In retrospect, the distorting effect of this model on ethnographic representations was quite apparent. The approach was developed out of the theoretical influences of the time, but a historically informed perspective, as Asad argued, is essential in understanding the formations of society. 33 A mixture of the above models is present in descriptions about Kyrgyz society in the tsarist and Soviet periods. In these examples, an elite class is identified, but society is still regarded as fundamentally different to that of the surrounding empires and states. What is created, however, is a discursive reality in which the elites are representatives of what is believed to be an idealized nomadic existence. During the Soviet era, however, they come to be associated with leaders who have grown in power due to contact with the Russian Empire. They derive their power from holding their subjects in an early stage of development, and, thus, represent class enemies. Both views, however, rest upon poorly-formed notions about nomadic societies. It has, nevertheless, created the framework in which such relations, especially in politics, are articulated. TSARIST-ERA RESEARCH ON LOCAL ELITES Travellers and ethnographic accounts during the tsarist era demonstrate that the Kyrgyz elite are rulers, but, in most cases, have been given their post by the general consensus of the people. Manaps and biis are described in familiar European aristocratic terms, yet appear to naturally derive their authority from the people, and do not mention taxation or other forms of control. For example, in the 1880s, Lieutenant General N. I. Grodekov (1843-1913), Governor-General of the Syr-Dariya oblast', wrote about the Kirgiz (Kazakh) and Karakirgiz (Kyrgyz) in the region. 34 He quotes Mulla Asan, who he calls a manap, stating: A manap has rank, a kind of Russian prince. No manaps came from the house of Chingiz Khan. Those who became manaps were chosen from the people (yurtan ozyb), distinguished themselves in bravery and generosity and leadership of the people at times of anarchy. During enemy invasions they collected all the people and led them (el bashlagan35 ) those, who themselves were divided among the manaps (uzi ozyb chykkan). They did not elect them; but if they were to be elected, they would be elected (Grodekov 1889: 6). Grodekov, possibly adding to what Mulla Asan may have said, clearly aligns the role of manaps in comparable terms for European sensibilities. Semenov provides a similar account of the role of biis in Kyrgyz society.
The Ideologies of Kinship
65
This is worth quoting at length as it gives a full description of the nobility of the elites: I was greatly interested in the personalities of these biys, especially as I did not see in them hereditary dignitaries, but elected representatives of the people. However, it transpired that in the middle of the nineteenth century no-one either elected or appointed biys. They were simply identified by public opinion as people to whom all those in need of justice turned of their own free will to settle disputes, people who were experienced and who had secured a universal reputation by their fairness, intellect and other qualities, but especially by their intimate knowledge of popular customary law. Among such persons were both noble people of blue blood, and also quite often common people, but in any case individuals who were renowned for their indubitable personal virtues. The residences (nomadic encampments) of these people were known to everyone, and the more fame they enjoyed, the more clients they had (Semenov 1998: 130-1). Here, again, society is described in aristocratic terms. The 'noble people of blue blood' shares a strong resemblance to European aristocratic houses. In this case, however, their recognition of their authority was based on the opinion of the people who highly respected the personal characteristics of the biis. Another account by Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff (1837-1918) argues that the manaps' and biis' power relied more on external support. In his 'Observations sur les Kirghis', he notes: Each of these biis has direction of a certain number of families over which they exercise administrative and judiciary functions. They can meet in assembly, but only to treat the business which concerns the subjects of different biis, or that of general interest. These assemblies are presided over by the Aga manap (the chief manap), who, according to national law, has no authority himself and can do nothing without the assistance of the biis and manaps. The nomination of all these [biis and manaps] is sanctioned by the Russian government, which gives them, after several years of service, either medals or an officer's rank in the cavalry. The Aga manap is ordinarily a major (Radloff 1863: 322). Radloff's account differs by noting the basis for authority in society. Although biis and manaps have administrative and judiciary control over their people, this seems to be limited to certain issues and they are not presented as dominant rulers. With colonization, the Russian government begins to sanction their actions and provide them with their basis of authority.
66
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
In other accounts, the elites are more clearly described as abusing their power. Chokhan Valikhanov (1835-1865), a Kazakh ethnographer, presented a strong class-like description of Kyrgyz society. Valikhanov notes that Kyrgyz social organization was similar to 'castes', with manaps controlling a majority of political, economic and social power. In his description of the 'dikokamennye kirgiz' ('wild mountain Kyrgyz')/ 6 he notes: People, as on estates, are divided in two castes: possessors (manaps) and simple people (kara-bukhary). Manaps, as direct descendents of the most ancient ancestor of a horde, originally had patriarchal right as father of the family, but gradually over the course of time this power increased and has turned into, in the end, despotic relations of the possessor and slaves (Valikhanov 1985: 38). Valikhanov (1985: 38) describes the manap as 'a strong, unapproachable despot'Y His descriptions demonstrate that there are no notions of egalitarianism and that society is organized in ways, such as 'castes', which suggest that there are clear divisions between people reinforced by status and authority. Valikhanov's description of the manaps as originally 'father of the family' seems more a way to create inclusion with the people they administered than an actual kinship title. This is also expressed through the notion of 'bones' (in Kyrgyz, soak), but seem to be understood as lineages. Although less pronounced among the Kyrgyz than the Kazakhs, it appears that the notion of identifying bodily matter with descendents validated their authority, particularly those descending from strong rulers. 38 The 'simple people' (kara bukhary) represents more of a general group of people, not inclusive of slaves. 39 Class clearly stands out, refuting the other versions of a more egalitarian society with governing elites who enjoy popular support. Valikhanov's view is one of the few accounts which portray the 'simple people' and not just the view of the manaps. SOVIET (RE)INTERPRETATIONS OF MANAPS AND BIIS Soviet interpretations of society, similar to tsarist views, were based on notions of evolutionist theories and developed through the work of Marx and Engels. This is clearly evident in the preface to the first edition of Origin of the Family, where Engels (1940) remarks on evolutionary development, and notes Morgan's contribution to the subject. While Engels used Morgan's work as a basis for his own analytical critique, he concentrated on the characteristics of social evolution which formed notions of class consciousness. The focus on evolutionism and the development of class relations led many scholars to return to the themes described in Valikhanov's work. 40 Society remains entrenched in an early stage of development,
The Ideologies of Kinship
67
where leaders exploited kinship relations to establish their authority. For example, Abramzon, in his main work on the ethnogenesis of the Kyrgyz, comments at great length about the control of the manaps and biis. In his description of Kyrgyz social structure, he notes: Various groups of the population were under the leadership of a feudal-patrimony 41 known as biis and manaps. Exploitation of the workers by manaps and biis occurred by penetrating the social life ideologies of 'clan unity' and 'clan solidarity', in which was located their expression of various phenomena of patriarchal-patrimonial life. Manaps and biis widely used the enduring patriarchalpatrimonial traditions in order to mask these feudal relations by the maintenance of the forms of exploitation, but they also actively promoted the preservation of these traditions, acting as 'keepers' and 'interpreters' of patrimonial customs and of the common law of zang and nark (Abramzon 1971: 157). 42 In the nineteenth century, there were clear hierarchical divisions in Kyrgyz society. Among the elite, five different manaps were identified: chief (chong or aga manap), a relative (bukhara manap), hereditary (chynjyrluu manap), secondary (chala manap) and minor (cholok manap). 43 A bii was often considered as a judge or, in some cases a 'clan' leader. In addition, there was a datkha, often described as a 'prince' or 'princess', usually attached to the Kokand Khanate. A bek was a vassal dependent on the datkha. The lower classes were divided into essentially two groups: the 'simple people' or animal herders (bukhara) and slaves (ku/). 44 The bukhara as well were divided into animal herders who worked for the manaps and biis and migrated with them (koichu), farm labourers (batraki) and those who had settled on farming land (jatak). The batraki were also divided into three groups: servants (malai jalchy), sharecroppers (chairiker) and day labourers (mandiker). In addition to the classes that already existed, the Soviet view portrayed the increasing contact between Russian settlers and colonial administration helped change the position of manaps and biis. For example, Abramzon notes that between the 1850s and 1870s, the social organization of manaps and biis transformed. With the introduction of Russian capitalism, the patrimonial and feudal relations in the Kyrgyz villages and herding groups began to fall apart. The manaps and biis re-grouped: 'The new type of manap - the manap-bai - appeared first of all in regions where they had been drawn towards relatively developed points in economic relations; brought elements of capitalistic exploitation into the system of feudal relations; and created a distinctive system of oppression of farm labourers and poor peasants' (Abramzon 1971: 171). 45 For the Soviet administration, the bai, or rich herder, represented the link between 'traditional' society and growing capitalist trends. This category of elites became the new target for the administration.
68
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
THE SOVIET ADMINISTRATION'S VIEW OF MANAP-BAIS46 Abramzon (1971: 171) classified the manap-bais as: 'a type of dealer, entrepreneur and capitalist'. Soviet documents examined the problems they presented for the Party and possible solutions on how to overcome them. In the late 1920s and the 1930s, the Soviets ran campaigns targeting rich land-owning peasants (kulaks), who were presented as an obstacle to the success of communism. In Kyrgyzstan, the Soviets created a similar class which included manaps, bais and other 'tribal' elements. The Soviets investigated and noted these social positions very carefully. In the state archive there are many documents from the Soviet era. In one document the Soviet administration defined a manap as: The so-called manap is a family, who since the time of their ancestors have been in one volost', settlement or encampment, [and] are the administrative managers of the economic and political life of the people of the encampment, settlement or volost', 47 where this one family continues until now to manage at their own discretion. There are manaps who are rich in cattle; and there are poor manaps who do not have any cattle whatsoever. Only one successor of a father will be a powerful descendent and go into the arena of public life. The rest [of the sons] remain faithful to him, but are on a level with the remaining mass. They are called bad manaps. This category of manaps, however, differs sharply from the common mass as they are relatives of manaps and are therefore not oppressed. 48 In the eyes of the Soviet administration bais were another threat as they had about as much influence as the manaps. As Abramzon (1971: 171) noted, the word had come to be used for a new class of rich people who benefited from the capitalist economy that the Russians brought with them during the tsarist era. Bais are described in a similar way to manaps: Strong [bais] are closely connected to those powerful manaps, who they are forced to obey and manage their economy by means of using exclusive wage labour 'malai', 49 but they personally do not touch the work of their economy. They help influential manaps with their own wealth. And [because of] all their expenses, flowing out in connection with this help, [and because] they are closely linked to manaps; they force the population to pay double. When they come to get their debts from the population, they always finish with an advantage on their side. 5° The Soviet administration was concerned that the manaps and bais had so much influence among the Kyrgyz that they might dominate local party organization. Many documents examine the extent of the influence of bais and manaps - which was called baistvo and manapstvo, Russian terms describing the social position and privileges associated
The Ideologies of Kinship
69
with their respective positions - in Party documents. In the run-up to the Party elections in 1927, a report was issued explaining the extent to which bais and manaps influenced not only local people, but also Party members. 51 In a report for the Kyrgyz Oblast' Party Conference, covering the period from November 1925 to December 1926, it was stated: [Those engaged in] manapstvo and baistvo [practices] started preparatory work for the re-election in the councils some months prior to the official announcement of the re-election campaign. Long before the elections, the question of the structure of the council was predetermined by means of persuasion, bribes, namys [shame] and violent fights. In this way, [those engaged in] manapstvo and baistvo found allies among some sections of communists, not only the rank-and-file, but for example such senior people, like the senior secretary of the Kyrgyz oblast' committee Babakhanov, like the member of presidium Oblast' executive committee Khudaikulov, like the senior secretary Karakolskii district committee Sukhanov, etc. It seems it enough (though the list can be increased considerably) to judge the difficulty of the work in general, and in particular on re-elections in the councils.52 In a tone of anxiety, another 1926 report stated: 'Under the guise of an authority (an agent, or a farm labourer, or even a communist), bais and manaps are already involved in the Soviet and Party networks'. 53 Reports by the Soviet administration noted further frustration with those manaps and bais who had become Party members. In a 'Draft resolution by the Central Committee Bureau on the report on the investigation of Kyrgyz organization' in 1926, it states clearly: 'the presence of internal stratification within the party organization, and confrontation between different factions within the party, this situation is a consequence of the influence of communists who were originally from bai and manap groups, struggling between themselves for authority and the possible exploitation of the labour population'. 54 In the same report, Party members were warned and given instructions on stopping the influence of manaps and bais in society and again in the Party ranks. Party members were told: To lead an information campaign for the local population of the harm, especially about those remains of social customs used by bais and manaps for the exploitation and enslavement of the poor class. In particular, it is necessary to expose the bai and manap elements which practise the robbery of the poor and middle classes under the guise of 'hospitality'. The Communist Party organization should also lead a resolute struggle against the widely practised bribery which is presented in the form of 'gifts' to officials. 55
70
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
During this time, the Communist Party also had to contend with local opposition groups and individuals who they deemed to be anticommunist and reactionary. This reveals a moment in the history of the expansion of the Communist Party in Kyrgyzstan where there were struggles between groups within the Party. In particular, one group was the focus of heavy suppression. The 'Tridtsatki' or 'the Thirty', a group of thirty Kyrgyz workers of the Oblast' Committee and the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), were opposed to the Communist dictatorship. In the summer of 1925, the Tridtsatki openly criticized the direction of the Communist Party in an address to the Central Committee Party, the Central Asian Bureau, the Nationalities Council of the USSR and the Kyrgyz Oblast' Committee parties (Dzhumanaliev 2002; Kurmanov 1997). 56 In archive documents, biographies (including place of birth, previous occupations and activities, and even 'clan') were written about each of the members of the Tridtsatki. The investigation immediately draws connections with the Tridtsatki and possible 'manap and bai elements'. In the investigations, two men came under intense scrutiny from the Soviet administration: Sydykov and Khudaikulov. Sydykov was a member of the Communist Party (although he had been excluded four times from it). He was one of the original Tridtsatki, and even more damagingly, he had fought with the tsarist troops in 1917 against the Soviets. He was described as a strong manap from the Solto 'tribe'. Khudaikulov was another Party member who was also seen as a counter-revolutionary who conspired with others in the Party to protect bais and manaps. The followers of Sydykov and Khudaikulov were also described in the archive documents. A follower of Sydykov, a Sydykovshchin, 'has intellectual, nationalist and bourgeois trends, [who also] has the tendency to penetrate our party, trying to lead our party on a course against the interests of the [... ] working public' .57 The followers of Khudaikulov, Khudaikulovshchin, were described as 'a [member of an] anti-party group, which masquerades as farm labourers, but they are against the labouring public in the interests of baistvo and manapstvo'. 58 These reports supported the view of corporate groups still present among the Kyrgyz, and having broken into the Party ranks. The Soviet administration also implemented a number of social and economic reforms which were partly directed towards eliminating any 'classes' in society. For example, to stop the influence these opposition groups and other bais and manaps could have on the Par~ Soviet administrators devised a number of solutions. Party members discussed ways of uniting the poor and middle classes against the bais and manaps in order to reduce their position in society. Descriptions and programmes were to be put into action among the working class. One report on this topic read as such: The malicious manaps, bais and atkaminery [strangers masquerading as Soviet activistsV 9 are keeping to their [groupsL
The Ideologies of Kinship
71
and under their influence only the middle class will be punished ruthlessly. In order to fulfil this task [of liquidation], it is necessary to lead an [information dissemination campaign) among poor and middle-class men, by way of conducting [... ] organizational and propagandist works verbally and through the press about the harm of rnanaps and others [... ).When the poor and middle classes of encampments, settlements and volosts can stand against their oppressive, malicious manaps and bais, only then is their unification against their enemies possible. 60 Plans were also created for a publishing campaign to criticize manaps and bais. This was facilitated by a low publishing cost for books which encouraged people to read and educate themselves (and spread the Russian language), and helped to accelerate the dissemination of Soviet propaganda. Administrators saw collectivization as an effective method for combating the influence of manaps and bais and dissolving 'tribes' and 'clans'. Collectivization in Kyrgyzstan began in 1928 and was aimed at 'bringing together small, mainly subsistence farmers and sheepherders, eliminating wealthy feudal lords and landlords (manaps and bais) and sedentarization of pastoral nomads as well as establishing the Soviet local administration and Soviet political system in the rural areas of the republic' (Abazov 2004: 106). A report in 1930 on issues related with collectivization outlined important areas of attention. One point stressed: 'The liquidation of kulakchestvo as a class is only completed in areas of continuous collectivization, and in the remaining areas is carried out by a policy of severe restriction and supplanting the tendencies of the exploiters [engaged in] kulakchestvo and baistvo.' 61 Another Communist Party report in 1931 stated how collectivization led the struggle against 'feudal' elements: 'On the basis of continuing collectivization we are carrying out the liquidation of kulaks, bais and manaps as a class; to root out the rest at the centre of capitalism, [and to] liquidate the rest of the feudal-patrimonial ways.' 62 The Soviet administration continued to monitor the influence of manaps and biis throughout this period. In 1934, Belotskii, the head of the Kyrgyz Oblast' Committee Party, made a report in which he claimed: 'The influence of feudal-clan remnants and groups struggles continue within the Kyrgyz Communist Party organization. This impedes the bolshevization of the Kyrgyz Party organization.' 63 He focused on a number of issues, including Party member jusup Abdrakhmanov, who had successfully advocated for the establishment of a Kyrgyz Republic within the Soviet Union. Abdrakhmanov was accused of maintaining connections with manaps and bais. Belotskii even accused Party members of not having done enough to eradicate tribal elements from their own regions. 64 Many Kyrgyz Party members responded quickly to his report in the following days. One Party
72
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
member, Tokbaev, claimed: 'On the basis of collectivization we have beaten kulaks, bais and manaps in Kyrgyzstan, but we have not beaten them completely. All our actions, which will be directed towards the improvement of the working class's position - by the strengthening of collective farms- certainly, will be resisted by kulaks, manaps and bais. ' 65 In another response to Belotskii's report, Ail' chinov reported on fellow Party member Chonbashev, 66 who he claimed was guilty of maintaining ties with bais and manaps: Comrade Chonbashev was sent out on business in the Karakol District [Ysyk-K51 oblast1 to conduct important political work. There, he continued his old policy- he protected bais and manaps, was engaged in counter-revolutionary affairs and protected his brother and other class enemies from eviction out of Kyrgyzstan. When the rural Party activists insisted on the eviction of the bais, Chonbashev organized the persecution of rural Party activists and dismissed Party activists from their work. Chonbashev has not told the Party about thisP In 1937, G. G. Kuranov, a Party member, compiled a number of archive documents into a book to demonstrate the transformation of Kyrgyz society from before the October Revolution to the successes the Soviets brought, including improvements in agriculture, internal republic divisions and Party organization. This was done in order to show the ways in which both Lenin and Stalin 'personally helped and supervised' the success of socialism in Kyrgyzstan. He praised the Soviet influence for liberating the people from their colonial, feudal and patriarchal servitude: 'The great October socialist revolution has freed the Kyrgyz people from the severe oppression of Russian autocracy, bourgeoisie, kulaks, bais and rnanaps' (Kuranov 1937: 3). These, of course, were not sensitive archive documents, but displayed an apparent victory of the Soviet administration in eradicating bai and manap elements in Kyrgyz society. Not only had the leaders been weakened, their 'tribe' and 'clan' groups had been displaced and mixed through collectivization and other social engineering projects. These examples demonstrate the attempt by the Communist Party and its members to transform Kyrgyz society from what they perceived as a society with feudal characteristics and assisted it through social evolutionary stages to socialism. While the Kyrgyz never fully experienced the economic changes associated with capitalism, Soviet social sciences did define Kyrgyz social relations as having traces of capitalist influence. The Party, therefore, actively sought to limit the influence of manaps, bais and Party members with suspected feudal or patrimonial relations during the formation of a Kyrgyz identity in connection with socialist ideology. These views have contributed to the current view of 'tribalism' in Kyrgyz politics.
The Ideologies of Kinship
73
THE FORMATION OF A DISCURSIVE REALITY The Soviet accounts outline the perception of and struggle against patriarchal and 'tribal' elements in Kyrgyz society. This view constituted an official discourse which defined the characteristics of society based on an evolutionist approach to social development. The effect of this discourse continues to shape interpretations of the Kyrgyz and other nomadic societies in the former Soviet Union. These views have come to represent one view of Kyrgyz society. It creates a continual fear of 'tribal' elements secretly taking a hold of politics and destroying it from within. This language, and the underlying theories, has framed the way in which 'tribes' and 'clans' are often discussed locally and in the West. This language has developed an epistemological barrier to alternative imaginations, and as such, has largely gone unchallenged. This has led to a limited view of 'tribes' as an early stage of social development, without the presence of a central ruling power. Sneath (2007) argues, however, that the ruling elite were able to establish relationships that had similar appearance to the state. He notes, 'on these grounds, the institutionalization of the relations between rulers and their political subjects found in aristocracies appear as statelike as those of the grander imperial polities' (Sneath 2007: 203). In addition, the pervasive discourse has also shaped conceptions of them in the present. Throughout my fieldwork, it became evident that when people discussed uruu and uruk, they were not describing formal groups, but they were discussing various identities imagined through their personal ancestors. It was not the concept of uruu or uruk as a group, but a way of imagining relations. This was clearly illustrated through meetings with many people and aksakals. These people described not the adaptation of kinship groups to different political regimes, but that the idea of relatedness had been maintained through these concepts. The elaboration of a 'group', instead, represented particular ideological models or tactics. I argue that genealogy should be analysed separately from group formation and examined as an important way of constructing relatedness.
1
2 3 4
NOTES For the full set of articles see Nurlan Motuev (2003a,b,c,d,e). Motuev's articles were published in Russian. He used the term plemya ('tribe') to describe the Sayak. It should be noted that the word for 'China' in both Russian and Kyrgyz is 'Kitai'. The Kyrgyz term aksakal refers to an elder, but it literally translates as 'white beard'. Aksakals are respected members of Kyrgyz society, but are usually recognized as such by leading a distinguished life. Sydygaliev is respected as he fought in the Second World War and had received many awards and medals.
74
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Jumgal is a region in Naryn oblast' where many Sayak descendents live. See Maurice Godelier (1977) who provides an in-depth analysis of the nature of the theoretical problem of 'tribal' societies in anthropology. Thirty years later, David Sneath (2007) returns to this discussion and its implications in Inner Asia. Clearly, the popular use of the terms continues to perpetuate evolutionary visions of (formerly) nomadic societies. 7 Many sanjyrachi (Attorkurov 1995; Jetimishbaev and Masyrakunov 1994; Jusupov, Kushubekov and Apyshev 1994; Torokan uulu 1995a,b; Umar uulu 1991) have formalized this usage of the Kyrgyz terms corresponding to their Russian translations. 8 See Tolstov, Zhdanko, Abramzon et aL (1963) for charts and maps of 'tribal' groups, especially pages 175-7. 9 Rysbyubyu Beibutova (1988) notes that wings originally faced north, so the left wing would have been to the west and the right wing to the east. (This is different from many other societies in Inner Asia where they were orientated towards the south.) The designation of ichkilik appears to be a later division. This may be because in many documents those 'tribes' that are part of the ichkilik were incorporated by the 'Kyrgyz' later. It is also possible, however, that the Kyrgyz wings were reorganized in accordance with the Mongol legal and administrative code, known as the Yasa (also Yasaq or J asaq), when the Mongols invaded Siberia and Central Asia in the thirteenth century. Andrea Schmitz (1990) examines the question of the 'left-right' organization as one of a number of dichotomies among the Kyrgyz. She argues against structuralist notions of dualistic organization and suggests that while these dichotomies may exist, the theories which have attempted to explain them do not provide much historical analysis and do not look for the origins of these divisions. These divisions must be examined in connection with wider social, political and economic issues in society. 10 Strangely, muundar is not found in Yudakhin's Kyrgyz-Russian dictionary. 11 The Russian word 'seed' (semya) should not be confused with 'family' (sem'ya). 12 Anatoly Khazanov (1983: 129) translates bir atanyn baldary as 'sons of one father'. Although the Kyrgyz are a patrilineal society, another translation of the phrase is 'children of one father'. I prefer to use the broader definition as it not only an important form of identity to men, but also it can be used and is used by women. 13 In Russian: 'Sayaki vsekh stran mira- soedinyaites'!' This was the slogan he used during our interview. 14 Motuev wrote this in Russian: 'Kto ne znaet svoikh predkov do sed'mogo kolena, tot rab!' 15 Motuev also recounted the historical importance of 'tribes' and 'clans' throughout Central Asia, Siberia and the Middle East. In addition, he added an element of religiosity by stating that generally 'tribe' was important to Muslims as well, noting the 'tribal' origins of the Prophet Mohammed. He may have weakened his argument, however, by his next two examples of strong tribal leaders: Saddam Hussein, the late President of Iraq, and Dzhokhar Dudaev, the late Chechen President and rebeL By doing so, he attempted to create a well-rounded image of himself as an observant Muslim. 5
6
The Ideologies of Kinship 16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23 24
25
26
75
Genealogy has also become one of the central themes of the governmentsponsored nation-building celebrations. I will return to this in Chapters 5 to 7. These views were part of a broader set of ethnological discourses of that time. For more on this, see john Haller (1971), Meyer Fortes (1969), Elisabeth Tooker (1992) and Thomas R. Trautmann (1987). The origins of the term 'manap' have been commented on by the Soviet ethnographer, V. V. Bartol'd. Drawing on the work of Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff, who had made similar notations in the 1860s, Bartol'd (1996: 240) states: 'one bii of the Sarybagysh tribe bore the name Manap; he became the head of his tribe, and later, after his death, all biis called themselves manaps'. See below for another explanation by Valikhanov. Bartol' d (1996: 239-52) provides a general history of several important manaps in Kyrgyz history. Another Kyrgyz term for a judge is kazy. Kazy, according to Yudakhin (199 5: 317), seems to have been more focused on settling disputes by forming their judgements on the Shariat. This term is used predominantly in sou them Kyrgyzstan. In 199 5, President Akaev 'reinstated' a local court system, known as aksakal courts. He argued that these were 'traditional' systems of justice. See Judith Beyer (2005, 2006) for more on aksakal courts. Under a new law in 2005, many akaskal courts have been incorporated into CPCs- community preventative centres (obshchestvenno-profilaktichskie tsentry) - into each aiyl okmotii (a small administrative unit covering one or several villages). These CPCs also include women and youth councils, local police inspectors; and, depending on the location, can even include representatives of community committees and territorial-community councils, and non-governmental organizations. More work needs to be done to understand how these work and how aksakal courts fit in with the community preventative centres and what the role is for each of these councils. For an example of a CPC from Chiii oblast', see Alymbekov (2008), and for a general description see AKipress (2008). An ayil is the Kyrgyz term for a small herding group, encampment or village. In modern usage, it usually refers to a village. This table is based on information from the Kochkor Regional History Museum, Abrarnzon (1971: 162), Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen (1999: 71), Khasanov (1968: 11) and Yudakhin (1999). In Abramzon's description of the taxes, he describes salyk in Russian as quitrent (obrok), a rent payable by a freeholder or copyholder to his lord that released him from liability to perform services, usually paid in horses and sheep. An example of this is Gulnar Kendirbai's (2002) account of the allocation of land used by nomadic herders to the Cossacks and Russian settlers arriving in northern Kazakhstan. From 1906 Semenov became known as Petr Semenov-Tyan'-Shan'skii. There are a number of different spellings for Borornbai's name, but I have chosen this spelling as it is consistent with a number of contemporary spellings of his name. For a description on the various meanings of nutag (or nutug), see BatOchir Bold (2001: 41-3). 'Khan' is Turko-Mongolic word meaning 'leader' or 'ruler'.
76 27 28
29
°
3
31
32
33
34
35
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic An oey, as Shahrani describes it, is a 'house (yurt), family, household' (Shahrani 1979: 236). While some Kyrgyz left the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China before the borders were closed, the economic and political difficulties that they faced contributed to the increasingly visible nature of these feudal-like practices. Nevertheless, they share a high degree of similarity with earlier practices that had been noted in Kyrgyzstan, in particular those from the nineteenth century. For further discussion of pastoral nomadism, see David Sneath (2000). See also Tatjana Emeljanenko (1994) on Kyrgyz bais (rich herd owners) and herding practices. Although Shahrani does not indicate that the same terms are used among the Pamir Kyrgyz, the forms of leasing and levies that are imposed are similar to the earlier forms listed in Table 2.1. Following Tolybekov and Markov, Anatoly Khazanov (1983) has also argued against feudalism. This is the focus of Bat-Ochir Bold's (2001) work. Bold's view is developed from Fred Scholz's discussion of land use. However, there is a misunderstanding in Bold's use of Scholz's work. Scholz (1995: 26) argues that private ownership 'does not belong to the nature of nomadic culture', postulating instead for an original state of nomadic society. Nevertheless, he argues that in cases where there is private ownership, this restricts the access to pasture. This is quite different from Bold's argument where he argues against private ownership of land and pastures. This structure has also been referred to as a 'conical clan'. In other geographical locations the 'conical clan' has been regarded as 'a model often applied to chiefdoms or tribes dominated by a "royal" family' (Lindner 1982: 692). Similar structural hierarchical divisions to that outlined in segmentary lineage theory also apply here. Nevertheless, the real concern in examining a 'tribal' society in such a way, is that such a description may neglect other relationships that may cross-cut this model. See Sneath (2007) for a presentation about different views within anthropology concerning segmentary lineage theory. There have been attempts to salvage some elements of segmentation. Paul Dresch (1986), for example, has argued that segmentation helps to understand the possibility of certain events and the forms of action. Nevertheless, this still employs structural-functionalist logic. He attempts to provide a mechanism for equality predetermined by a very rigid division of 'tribal' societies. Until the 1920s, today's Kazakhs were called Kirgiz or Kirgiz-Kaisak, and the Kyrgyz were called Karakirgiz in Russian and Soviet documents. The division between the two was that the Kirgiz (Kazakhs) lived in the steppe region, and the Karakirgiz (Kyrgyz) lived in the mountains and were thought to be darker skinned due to their exposure to the sun at high altitudes ('kara' in Kyrgyz means 'black'). Yudakhin (1999: 946) translated the Kyrgyz term 'el' in Russian as a 'tribal union' (plemennoi soyuz), 'tribe' (plemya), 'clan' (rod) and even 'people' (narod). Peter Golden (2003: 50), however, has suggested that el eventually became associated with 'polity'. Although it would be difficult to ascribe a formal notion of political unification to nomads, this can be under-
The Ideologies of Kinship
36 37
38
39
40
41
42
77
stood as a loose description for those dependent upon a manap. Perhaps this could also refer to Borombai's description of the importance of the 'people' among his group. Polity does not suggest kinship, which is often assumed when discussing 'tribe' leaders. The connection to the manaps and biis shows little evidence to support kinship theories and seems to support the notion of a polity. Tolstov et al. (1963) have also referenced the Kyrgyz as occasionally being referred to in Russian as 'zakammnykh kirgiz' ('mountain Kyrgyz'). This view has been supported by other authors. A. Dzhymagulov (1990: 4), have almost despotic quoting Radloff in 1863, notes that 'Manaps power over their people.' The origins of the term sook are difficult to trace, but similar metaphors are known to have been used by the Mongols (yas) in the twelfth century. For example, white bone in Mongolia became associated with those that could claim direct descendent from Chinggis Khan, while commoners were from the black bone. This was also the term commonly used throughout Inner Asia to describe commoners or 'simple' people. Among Kazakhs, these terms are more prevalent. For example, Nurlan Amrekulov (2000: 102-103) notes that the white bone (in Kazakh ak suyek) were descendents of Chinggis Khan, and the black bone (in Kazakh, kara suyek) referred to commoners. There was another group of religious elites who claimed to be descendents of the Prophet Mohammed. They were known as the rare (precious, noble) bone (in Kazakh, asyl suyek). The lowest level of Kazakh society consisted of slaves. Providing a slightly different view, Shirin Akiner (1995) argues that the descendents of Chinggis Khan and the religious elite were part of the white bone. She notes that khans were elected from the white bone elite and 'possessed' groups of 'clans' and 'tribes'. The elites competed with each other for political power within the Kazakh Khanate (from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries). She also states that that batyrs and biis belonged to the black bone. They had legal and military jurisdiction over a number of 'clans'. Despite her claims that this demonstrates a 'tribal' structure, it instead suggests a clear class distinction. Descent charters, such as through bones, were used to establish authority. Denis Sinor (1990: 310) has suggested that the term, qara budun, or 'hoi polloi', has existed since the sixth century and was used during the Turk Kaghanate. The meaning seems to have been largely retained in Kyrgyz usage. There is much literature which focuses on illustrating hierarchies within 'tribe' and 'clan'. SeeAbramzon (1971), Asanov (2002a,b), Bartol'd (1996), Dzhumagulov (1990), Khasanov (1968), Nurbekov (1999), Valikhanov (1985) and Vinnikov (1956). For Abramzon, 'feudal-patrimony' represented a feudal class society, which divided the people into patrimonial domains. Zang is a word which in Kyrgyz describes forms of 'custom' or a kind of 'law'. Nark has several meanings in Kyrgyz. It can mean a 'common right' or 'custom', but it can also mean the 'cost', 'value' or 'worth' of an object. In this particular case, the more appropriate meaning of the terms highlights the duty of the custom in question, or the value of performing
78
43
44
45
46
47 48
49
so 51
s2 53 54
ss 56
s? ss 59
6o 61
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
the custom. For a more detailed examination of the legal culture among the Kazakhs in the nineteenth century - which can inform an understanding of other nomadic groups, e.g. Kyrgyz, particularly regarding nark - see Virginia Martin (2001). Information based on materials from the Kochkor Regional History Museum. See also Abrarnzon (1971: 159), Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen (1999), Nurbekov (1999: 38-40), Radloff (1863) and Yudakhin (1999). Information based on materials from the Kochkor Regional History Museum. See also Abramzon (1971: 159-60) and Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen (1999: 95-6). It should also be noted that for one category 'koichu', in addition to the description that was given, this term translates from Kyrgyz as 'sheep herder'. Other Kyrgyz classifications of the poor class were: jylkychy (herd driver) and kongshu (those that tended to the cattle of the manaps and bais during the movement between seasonal pastures) (Tolstov et al. 1963: 172). Kongshu, in addition, were often economically dependent on manaps and bais (Abrarnzon 1971: 160; Yudakhin 1999: 404). For a distinction between bais, see Abramzon (1971: 180, n. 8). IsrailovaKhar'ekhuzen (1999: 94-5) also notes that there was stratification among the bais. This section is comprised of findings among materials in the Central State Archives of the Kyrgyz Republic. A volost' is a Russian term used by tsarist colonizers indicating a small administrative division of a territory. This is a reference from the Central State Archives of the Kyrgyz Republic. The citation is: f. 10, op. 1, d. 32, 1. 35. I have kept the citation as it appears in the archive documents and all references appear in a separate bibliography. A malai is a Kyrgyz word which refers to a farm labourer or a hired worker, and often connotes a person who is a domestic servant (Abramzon 1971: 160; Yudakhin 1999: 513). f. 10, op. 1, d. 32, 1. 35 Such reports often contained a great deal of information about the people, including their 'clan', e.g. f. 10, op. 1, d. 32, 1. 2-8 and f. 10, op. 1, d. 33, 1. 17-23. f. 10, op. 1, d. 74, 1. 111 f. 10, op. 1, d. 30, 1. 8 f. 10, op. 1, d. 38, 1. 54 f. 10, op. 1, d. 38, 1. 56 An official investigation into the Tridtsatki can also be found in the archive documents: f. 10, op. 1, d. 27, 1. 46-79. Further descriptions of Tridtsatki members can be found in f.10, op. 1, d. 46, 1. 153-155 and f.lO, op. 1, d. 143. f. 10, op. 1, d. 42, 1. 9-10 f. 10, op. 1, d. 42, 1. 10 Atkaminery have also been described as people engaged in election propaganda (Kyshtobaev 2004). f. 10, op. 1, d. 32, 1. 38-39 f. 10, op. 1, d. 244, 1. 99
The Ideologies of Kinship 62
63 64 65
66
67
79
f. 10, op. 1, d. 308, 1. 43. More recent studies, however, have argued that the collectivization helped to maintain 'tribe' and 'clan' groupings (Collins 2006; Yoshida 2005). In personal visits to former kolkhozes, I did not find sufficient evidence to suggest that collectivization maintained 'tribe' and 'clan' groupings. In several places in Naryn oblast' I was told that the kolkhozes were created from two or three villages. There was no suggestion that people lived in different sections of the kolkhoz depending on the 'clan'. The Soviet administration mixed people together in an attempt to displace any 'tribe' or 'clan' identity. In some places I was told that a local leader was appointed as kolkhoz manager. The manager may have been a former leader, but if several villages were combined, it would only increase the likelihood that the establishment of connections to the manager was not necessary based on kinship. f. 10, op. 1, d. 527, 1. 108 f. 10, op. 1, d. 527,1. 108-111 f. 10, op. 1, d. 527, 1. 12 This transliteration is in keeping with the spelling of the name in Cyrillic. It would follow Kyrgyz grammar more closely, however, for this name to be written as 'Chongbashev'. The difference in spellings may be due to the continued development of the Kyrgyz Cyrillic alphabet at that time. f. 10, op. 1, d. 527, 1. 76. Without confirmation of first and patronymic names it is not clear, but this may also be the same Chonbashev that was investigated in earlier archive material (f. 10, op. 1, d. 27, 1. 46-79) due to his connections with the Tridtsatki.
3
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination: The Construction of Relatedness
K
inship is not only a biological account of ancestry, but also a description of relations established through social interaction. Since the 1960s, David Schneider has argued for a reassessment of kinship. He noted that 'the prevailing view since Morgan has been that the fictive or presumptive or indemonstrable biological relationship, the social aspect itself, is modelled after, or is a metaphorical extension of, or is a social accretion to, the defining and fundamental biological relationship' (Schneider 2004: 259). He abandoned the predominant 'Eurocentric' view of kinship encompassed in the emic/etic approach (Stone 2004: 244). Instead, following Talcot Parsons, he advocated a cultural system of kinship, focusing on symbols and meanings. He argued that 'the biological elements which previous theories took as merely defining features, "givens" in the state of affairs, could be understood better as symbols for kinds of social relationships, and probably these did not derive from, nor stand for, the biological material they purported to order functionally' (Schneider 2004: 271). Through the exploration of a 'cultural level', he examined the ways in which kinship could be symbolically constituted. For example, in the United States, Schneider (1980 [1968]) argued blood is a biological trait, but it is also conceptualized as a symbolic characteristic of the strength of certain relationships. The turn from a primarily biological understanding to social creation of kinship led him to argue that 'it is apparent that "kinship" is an artefact of the anthropologists' analytic apparatus and has no concrete counterpart in the cultures of any of the societies we study' (Schneider 2004: 271). Following Schneider's critique,] anet Carsten (199Sb, 2000b) developed what she called 'cultures of relatedness', the construction of kinship through everyday social interaction. Based on her fieldwork experiences among Malays on Langkawi Island, she argued that everyday practices - the construction of houses and hearths, sharing of food and birth
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
81
and death - constituted a large role in the construction of relatedness. Carsten (199Sb: 224) notes: 'I take for granted that the meaning of "kinship" cannot be assumed a priori. I use the term "relatedness" to indicate indigenous ways of acting out and conceptualizing relations between people, as distinct from notions derived from anthropological theory.' Relatedness, she argued, overcomes the 'arbitrary distinction between biology and culture ... without presupposing what constitutes kinship' (Carsten 2000b: 5). This is an important distinction, as kinship studies often privilege biological notions, as Schneider noted, over other means of social interaction. Relatedness, thus, focuses on how relations are established through social interaction over time, and not bound simply by rigid biological categories. Further, it elaborates how particular representations of kinship ties are developed and elaborated. In Kyrgyzstan, one way relatedness is developed is through two genealogical forms - jeti ata (the preceding seven generations of a person's patrilineage, literally 'seven fathers') and sanjyra (a broader account of genealogy). These are accounts of biological descent, but also place a person within a set of social relations that establish connections between living relatives as well as with deceased ancestors. The genealogies establish a historical context, morals and stereotypes, which socialize a person through their relations. This social effect of these genealogies I term 'genealogical imagination'- the establishment of relatedness through a process of personal and collective forms of memory and representations of history, and expressed through various deployments of scale (temporality, spatiality, local and national inclusiveness) and (politicized) formations of descent. 1 Memory refers to the remembrance of people and places, and the commemoration of their images and ideas cast through different filters of historical representation. The focus, here, is on the construction of relatedness through social memory, given its shape by history, and what role this has in the production of selfhood. The oscillation between different scales of representation refers to not only patrilineal descent, but can establish relations between people on an inter-regional or even national level. Scale dictates the extent of inclusiveness of their genealogies and the ways in which they are deployed. In particular, there are two scales which are used to describe genealogies: temporality and spatiality. Temporality is a resource and past events can be made directly relevant to current circumstances. As Rubie S. Watson (1994: 9) argues: 'In creating shared memories we construct visions of the past rather than chronologies. Time itself may be collapsed or made inconsequential as the memory of visions are evoked, shared, transmitted, and continuously altered- while remaining ostensibly the same.'2 Spatiality entails another important notion of scale. The use of public space to explore relationships through monuments and exhibitions can have an important effect on people's understanding of their relations. Monuments transform public space, reflecting personal narratives, which are also linked to local and broader, national ideas and issues.
82
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
For example, local monuments caneasilybe connected to nation-building campaigns, while public monuments in the centre of Bishkek can also have regional or even personal meanings. The ancestors represented in monuments and narratives also connect groups of people that are spread out over the country. These projections of scale demonstrate ways in which people create connections with each other between different sets of relations, e.g. local and national. 3 Museums dedicated to genealogies explore these relations further through historical accounts, reinforcing the perception connectedness to living and deceased relatives, and their meaning for the present. The genealogical forms are not important to everyone. Despite popular sayings that a person is not truly 'Kyrgyz' unless they know their seven fathers (jeti ata), this does not hold true. Many people only have a limited awareness of their ancestry or do not find it an important element in their lives. As will be discussed below, there are some, however, who do find it an essential part of their identities and enthusiastically attempt to educate others on the past and the significance of the ancestors. A person's knowledge of different genealogical elements constitutes part of the formation of their self. For those not interested or unaware of their ancestry, this will obviously not be a strong element in their lives, but a general awareness will nonetheless have an effect on their understanding of themselves. The self, here, is described as a person's subjective awareness of themselves, created and developed through the negotiation of personal understanding and exterior influences. It is not a category of thought, as Marcel Mauss (1985) describes, as this would introduce a priori assumptions about the nature of this identity (Collins 1985). Instead, the relation between genealogy and the understanding of the self is one such 'predicament of personhood', as Steven Collins (1985) describes, which highlights an element of people's experiences in social relations, influencing the way they understand their self. The self is the 'locus of experience' (Harris 1989: 601), which is a way through which people author their view of the world, but are also authored by their experiences. It is principally, although not exclusively, through discourse that this is achieved. Charles Taylor (1985: 276), using slightly different terminology, notes: Being a person is being self-aware, but this is inseparable from being open to different significances, the specifically human ones, which can't be reduced to the vital and the sentient. These involve our being open to strong evaluations, which have to be treated as assessments, rather than conferrals or preference .... They are shaped by the language in which they are enclosed. Or, as Mauss (1985: 22) notes, the self 'is formatted only for us, among us'. The language used to describe the self simultaneously narrates our own understandings of it.
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
83
The role of language helps us to define what our perception of the self is, yet, at the same time, categorizes different aspects of the self. Different social contexts bring various roles and interpretations. Thus, the self is not a unified concept; it contains, as Martin S5kefeld (1999) notes, many different parts or 'selves'. These selves are related and have various meanings in different situations and contexts. People develop notions of particular selves through kinship relations, religious affiliation, language groups and social members - to name but a few - all of which contribute to their overall identity. They are used in various ways and are constantly changing. There may be inconsistencies or depending on the context may shift suddenly, but the speaker is often unaware of the differences and regards these different selves as part of their whole identity, rather than separate selves (Ewing 1990). In this regard, the selves, which make up a more general understanding of the self, are the point through which reflexive approaches to the self and its narration, the internal negotiation of external representations, takes places. Genealogy forms a part in the construction of the self. Again, this may not be an important part, but for some, it is a central part of their identity. It can facilitate the establishment of relatedness, but should not be assumed as the fundamental reason for the establishment of ties. There are many other social roles which also contribute to the formation of the self and can serve to create connections to others. The role of genealogy helps to understand how some forms of relatedness are established and maintained. For those who regard genealogy as an important element in their lives, it serves different purposes. Some gather information out of personal interest, to better understand their family's history. In many cases, public discussion of genealogies becomes visible during political manoeuvring, as with Nurlan Motuev (Chapter 2). In other cases, it serves as a conduit through which state practices and national ideology can be developed. Askar Akaev's notion of '2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood' is a one such example. Political ideologies permeate notions of the self, but this is separate from the political delineation of identity. This, I describe as the construction of the' person'. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, nation- and state-building campaigns develop the notion of the 'Kyrgyz person'. While both the concepts of the self and person are negotiated and internalized through dialogue, it is the explicit political ideologies that run through the formation of the person that distinguish it. In this respect, it resembles Mauss's (1985) description of the personal as a 'moral fact'- an entity endowed with specific statuses and qualities, including moral consciousness. Ideologies create particular qualities that define the political person. Again, temporality is used as a resource in this construction. The meaning and representation of time, particularly appealing to defining historical moments, articulates many experiences between the citizens and the state. Caroline Humphrey (1992) describes this as the 'deep past'. Examining the Mongolian government's establishment of moral authority after the fall of socialism, Humphrey notes that the 'deep
84
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
past' is a reified historical era which is used to inspire the nation in order to overcome the discontinuity with the recent (Soviet) past. There are two types of enactments through which people refer to the past: historical mimicry and embodiment. Historical mimicry is the attempt to reproduce events, i.e. through re-enactments or commemorative ceremonies, which demonstrate the 'symbolic capacity' for the present and future of the nation. Embodiment refers to the 'self-identification' of people or people's actions with those of the past. In short, Humphrey (1992: 387) notes: The first mimics facts and appearances from a time attributed with greatness and genuineness, but constructs the likeness as an analogy, which allows the 'copy' to symbolise an idea about the present and future. The second transforms present intuitive haphazard activity into 'sacred actions' by giving them an identity as bearers of an idea, such that, whatever they are, these actions are held to represent the idea in just the same way as it was done in the past. Although these can be distinguished as separate ways of evoking a 'deep past' they are often combined in invented traditions. This is particularly evident through the use and representations of genealogy. In the case of Mongolia and other former Soviet regions, temporality is collapsed; the chronological timeline is usurped by social amnesia and political objectives. The notion of the person will be discussed further, but it is first necessary to understand the two genealogical formations and the various meanings which they convey. GENEALOGICAL FORMATIONS Jeti ata represents a person's seven patrilineal ancestors, or literally their 'seven fathers'. In contemporary usage, there are at least two reasons why jeti ata holds such importance. First, knowledge of it is popularly held as a definitive marker of Kyrgyz identity. For some, reciting the names of their ancestors helped to evoke memories and stories about them. Moral lessons contained within the genealogies serve as guiding principles in their own lives. Second, jeti ata ensures proper distance between families when marrying. I was told on a number of occasions by village elders that a bride and groom had to be separated by seven generations in order to marry. 4 In order to get married, a bride or groom would have to prove that they do not share any of their seven forefathers with the prospective spouse. In a village in central Naryn province, Esenbai Medetbekov showed me his personal records of his uruu, T'ynymseiit. He said that couples would come to meet him to make sure that their jeti ata do not coincide before they were to get married. He stated that he had been keeping genealogical records and advising couples on this for many years, even during the Soviet period, but had not discussed it at that time.
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
85
These more personal genealogies, however, are enmeshed in a broader set of genealogical relationships, which are recounted through a sanjyra. 5 In the Chili oblast' encyclopaedia, sanjyra is described as 'the oral history of Kyrgyz people, in which they have found a reflection of the legend about the source of the people and their customs' (Zakirov 1994: 657). It is not only genealogical information, but there is also a greater emphasis on historical episodes when recalling ancestors. Several informants stressed that sanjyra were meant to unify rather than divide people. These were not charters for individual groups, but a description of the inter-related histories of such categories as uruk, uruu, several uruu or even of the whole Kyrgyz people. For some, genealogies went beyond history. Some sanjyrachi regard sanjyra as an ethnic trait. Despite the importance attributed to sanjyra, it is important to note that it does not determine people's identities. It does, however, give them an awareness of their social customs and family background. Pocket-size booklets of sanjyras, for example Turdubai Umar uulu's (1991) pamphlet, are often used by people as a quick reference guide to understand their family history and connection to people. In villages where I enquired about uruu and uruk, people often double-checked their genealogies with these books. In the village of Tashtak, my colleague Bakyt and I met our neighbour Mirlan on a number of occasions. He had hurt his back during work and was resting at home. When we spoke to him about his uruu and uurk he had just as many questions as we did. This was a regular experience in many places that I visited in Kyrgyzstan. People may not have known much about their ancestry, but they were often interested to learn more. In such situations, this kind of social memory performs a type of 'commemorative ceremony', to draw on Paul Connerton's (1989) work, ofthe relations they are said to represent. Here, it is the performative aspect of examining texts and genealogical charts, and the lengthy discussions people have over them, reminding people of their identities. Thus, people constructed images of their jeti ata and sanjyra through interacting with others, discussing and hearing stories about previous generations. This partially informs them of their relatedness to their uruk and uruu, which can be understood as 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983). As Bohannan (1952: 312) states in her discussion of genealogy as charter: 'Genealogies validate present relationships; these relationships prove the genealogies; and the form of the genealogy is modelled on the form of present relationships.' Furthermore, genealogy as a charter not only validates both past and present relationships, but acts as a mnemonic device for constructing relatedness. People who research uruk and uruu describe the history and past and present relations of these imagined communities and validate their formation through their knowledge of sanjyra. Moments when people gather with their close and more distant relatives are to fulfil obligations to others. For example, a friend in Naryn, Amanbai Saraev, told me about the last time he gathered with
86
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
his distant relatives which was at a funeral. There, he said in Russian, members of his rod gathered. His use of rod referred to his family, close and distant relatives, some of whom he had never met before, but not a corporate group. He did not know the person who had passed away, but out of 'duty' (obyazannost~ and 'respect' (uvazhenie) to the deceased and other members of his rod, he attended the funeral with his father. He explained that for members of the rod that live in the village where the man died, there is a 'system of help' (skhema pomoshchi) in which they all (theoretically) participate, especially in helping each other carry out the requirements of certain life-cycle rituals. When people come to the funeral, they give money towards the carrying out of funeral rites. A list is compiled of all who attend the funeral and the amount of money they contribute. The money set aside to contribute towards the expenses of the funeral (in Kyrgyz, raja) is an important aspect of their assistance during this period. Families must prepare for the burial by buying and cooking food for the guests. Also, according to Islamic customs, they must hold special events on the fortieth day after the death and a one year commemoration. Amanbai described the difficulties with carrying out these proper funeral rituals with a small budget. The money received from relatives is essential. 6 In another discussion I had with another friend, he stated in Russian that 'tribal relations play a very small role in my life'. He noted, however, that when there was a funeral, the help he received from his relatives was extremely valuable. He said that not long before one of his older brothers passed away. The funeral continued for three or four days, and many of his relatives helped him to pay for the funeral expenses, rituals and duties. He acknowledged that this was one moment when his relatives are very important. At the funeral, Amanbai explained that people are obliged to go as part of relationships partly based on mutual help and their absence could cause them to be excluded from any future help, whether in life-cycle ceremonies or for personal reasons. It is at these moments, particularly in the participation in life-cycle ceremonies, that their interaction with other members of their uruk becomes important, while in everyday experiences, it does not determine people's actions. The demands of everyday life are no less great, and continued support from close family members is an essential lifeline. Again, it is not a corporate group, but there are obligations that come with it (Chapter 4). SANJYRA MUSEUM
For some researchers, genealogies are not just about life-cycle rituals, they are a guide for their lives. There are some who are passionate about this and have made it their life's work. In August 2003, I was told about a museum dedicated to sanjyras. I travelled along the south shore of Ysyk-Kol to the village of Orgochor. Here, Kalen Jetimishbaev had opened his own historical and ethnographic museum in a renovated
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
87
produce store. Out of a desire to learn more and teach people about
sanjyras he had opened this museum with his own money in the early 1990s. When I met him, he was eighty-two years old and still collecting material for his museum.? Due to his work on sanjyras and the founding of this museum, Kalen was well known and had even been awarded an honorary professorship from the Bishkek Humanities University. When we met,Jetimishbaev explained to me his aspirations for sanjyras. He stated: 'Starting in 1990, I collected the history of not only my uruu, but the Kyrgyz people. I try to spread the history of the Kyrgyz people throughout the whole world.' 8 I asked]etimishbaev why he felt it was so important to collect the history of the Kyrgyz uruu. He said that he saw a very fundamental role in honouring his uruu and uruk: 'My father and my mother are important to me, and also earth, nature and water. In my lifetime I must save what [my parents] said and did, to glorify them. Then I will make my uruu and uruk famous.' Jetimishbaev's pride in his ancestors was clear as he told me about his jeti ata. One of the most important patrilineal ancestors was Tilekmat ake. He explained how Tilekmat had united his uruu (Bugu) and stood up against the Kokand Khanate. In fact, in 1998 a statue of Sart ake and Tilekmat akewas erected across the road from the museum. 9 Both figures were described in Kyrgyz as 'great thinkers' (in Kyrgyz, uluu oichul). Jetimishbaev was obviously very proud of this recent recognition and there were many photographs of the unveiling of the statue. President Askar Akaev had attended and made a speech, which added special importance to the event. In October 1990, Jetimishbaev organized a 'congress' (in Kyrgyz, kurultai) in Orgochor. There were photographs of people attending on many walls of the museum. Many respected elders from all over Kyrgyzstan gathered in Orgochor to tell stories, recount their uruu and uruk histories and to contribute to the widening knowledge of Kyrgyz history. With the assistance of a journalist, Rashid Masyrakunov, they published a small book about this kurultai entitled Wise Sayings of the Sanjyra (Sanjyra sanaty). In it, Jetimishbaev and Masyrakunov (1994: 3) note: Today's descendents were created by the Supreme Being [Tengir], and the succeeding generations will merge into a consanguineous relationship and unite; even if it does not pass through seven or seventy fathers, but seven hundred fathers, they will appear as a considerable people. The individual, family, yurt, home, clan [uruk], tribe [uruu], nation and people - this is our flag, like an arrow aspiring to unite us together. As Jetimishbaev states, the uruu and uruk are the flag of the nation. They not only recount history, but they are, in his view, intended to unite people. The actions of people today, and particularly those of the ancestors, are what shape uruu and broader Kyrgyz identities that form
88
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
the sanjyra. This is not simply a recitation of historical figures; each one that is recollected is considered to have played a valuable role in the continuation and development of the uruu and uruk of the Kyrgyz, particularly in the government's view of Kyrgyz history. J etimishbaev was not the only person to be collecting information on sanjyra and attributing it with national importance. Another enthusiast, Marat Chanachev, attempted to make a computer resource of sanjyras. INTERNET SANJYRA Genealogies are beginning to be to be explored on the internet. 10 In Kyrgyzstan, Marat Chanachev, former analyst at the International Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic and, later, manger of the Ak Jol (Bright Path) party office, has attempted to create an 'Internet-Sanjyra' computer resource (Chanachev 2002). In Chanachev's project proposal, he stated that the 'Internet-Sanjyra' will become an 'informational resource, permitting people to trace the evolution of Kyrgyz nationality and statehood, and is connected with real geopolitical situations and the influence that other civilizations have had on the Kyrgyz' . 11 In theory, any person of Kyrgyz ethnicity would be able to locate themselves in the genealogical records contained within this computer resource. Furthermore, the project intends to examine the nature of sanjyras further, such as to analyse their purpose and meaning. In this regard, the project is centred on five main points: social structure of society, state structure, sources of laws (collection of laws, Shariat, adat12 ), the scope of laws (whether they cover property rights, marriage, criminal, etc.), and various forms of industry. The project even plans to investigate the sanjyras of other Turkic peoples, e.g. Tatars and Kazakhs. 13 In addition to this, Chanchev had planned to organize a Sanjyra Festival (Sanjyra mairamy) to take place towards the end of 2003, in order to participate in the year-long celebration of '2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood'. The goal of the festival was 'to reveal new genealogical resources and names, the transmission of the cultural oral heritage to the Kyrgyz youth, and to overcome prejudices about the sanjyra' .14 Chanachev wanted to teach people about their sanjyras and overcome the negative, backward stereotype that had developed during the Soviet era as a remnant of previous evolutionary stages. In this way, Chanachev's festival was to serve as an educational opportunity to complement the national celebration and to underline the importance of sanjyra to the Kyrgyz people. 15 In Chanchev's opinion, Soviet ideology had caused many people to forget their origins. This was a sentiment that J etimishbaev described as well. Many young Kyrgyz, growing up during the Soviet era, became 'enemies' against local knowledge practices and customs. As many people had described to me, their extended families were not important to them, except during funerals and other
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
89
life-cycle ceremonies. People had forgotten their sanjyras as they were not practically relevant to everyday life. The efforts of these people could be interpreted as 'salvaging' social customs and knowledge, although I would argue that they are constructing new interpretations of social values. The work by Jetimishbaev to preserve and chart sanjyras is also part of this process. The attempt to salvage them illustrates the feelings of urgency by some that these old, relatively little-used forms of identity are slowly disappearing. I argue, however, that another interpretation of these attempts to emphasize the importance of sanjyras is to underline the ways in which to create relationships in the post-Soviet period. Sanjyrachis, I suggest, are attempting to evoke an imagination of the past as a central feature (in the moral construction) of the present. It is not only what these sanjyras represent, but also their politicized usage in the nation-building project, which reveals sanjyras as a way of relating individuals to the nation and the state. Here we see the oscillations between various scales of personal, national and political representation. The construction of relatedness through memories attached to the sanjyras is one way in which a 'Kyrgyz' identity is being created. THEMANKURT
Those who see genealogies as an important way of developing identity, often say if you forget them, you loose yourself. Yrysbek, a widely respected sanjyrachi, told me that sanjyras were people's histories, and they must know theirs to know where they came from. People, such as Motuev and others, claim that to forget, or not to know, your genealogy disassociates a person from the relatedness that constructs the Kyrgyz (national or ethnic) identity. This was even an important theme in Soviet literature. Chingiz Aitmatov, one of the most famous Kyrgyz authors during the Soviet era, has described a person who does not know their family or origins as a mankurt. 16 The importance of remembering social customs forms a central theme in Aitmatov's novel, The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred YearsY This novel examines life on a remote settlement at a train junction, Boranly-Burannyi, on the edge of the Sarozek Desert in Kazakhstan. 18 At the beginning of the novel, Kazangap, a railroad worker, dies, and his friend, Yedigei Zhangel'din (or Burannyi Yedigei), the junction manager, had to bury him. As Yedigei and several other men travelled to bury his friend, he relived many painful and happy memories of his life, of the landscape and environment. One of these memories was connected to the Naiman 'tribal' cemetery they were travelling to, Ana-Beiit (The Mother's Resting Place). Here, he remembered the story of the how the cemetery was founded. As the funeral procession moved through the desert, Yedigei recalled that many centuries ago the Juan-juan controlled this area. 19 He remembered a story about when the Juan-juan captured enemies, they would turn them into slaves, or mankurts, thus depriving them of
90
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
their selfhood. The slaves had a shiri, the udder of a nursing mother camel which had been cut off, put onto their heads and were then left out in the sun, without food, shackled and fitted with wooden collars so they could not remove the shiri. 20 The shiri would slowly dry and constrict the head. The slaves' heads were shaved and when the hair grew again, it could not penetrate the shiri, so it was driven back into the skull, causing yet more pain. 'The man who was subjected to the ensuing torture either died because he could not stand it, or he lost his memory of the past forever. He had become a mankurt, or slave, who could not remember his past life' (Aitmatov 2000: 125). Fatefully, '[t]he mankurt did not know who he had been, whence and from what "tribe" he had come, did not know his name, could not remember his childhood, father or mother- in short, he could not recognize himself as a human being' (Aitmatov 2000: 126). When a man was caught by the juan-juan, his relatives and 'tribe' members assumed that he had become a mankurt or had died. Yedigei recalled the story of a young man from the Naiman 'tribe', who was captured by the juan-juan. His friends and relatives gave up searching for him, thinking he was dead or had become a mankurt. The man's mother never lost hope, and set out to find her son. She heard from a group of passing travellers that they had met a mankurt tending a herd of camels in the desert. She set off, in hope to find her son. When she arrived, she recognized that it was her son. He, now a mankurt, could not remember her. She tried to take the camel udder off his head, but it had become part of him, and it would kill him if she took it off. During this exchange, the mother was forced to flee several times because her son's juan-juan masters came to check on him and give him food. The juan-juan, however, had seen the woman and ordered their mankurt to shoot her with an arrow. Obedient to his masters, the man fatally shot his mother with an arrow. The place where she lay is the Naiman tribal cemetery, where Yedigei was travelling to bury his friend. The journey was long and difficult. When the funeral procession neared the cemetery they were prohibited from going any further. The cemetery was in an area cordoned off for Soviet military space rocket launches. The guard on duty, also a Kazakh, refused to let them enter and seemed completely unaware of the significance of the burial site. He only spoke to the men in Russian, not his native Kazakh. Instead, the men had to bury the body nearby, and Yedigei was the only one who could remember the Muslim burial rites. Aitmatov's novel, which appeared in 1980, was not a reaction against the Communist Party per se, but highlighted the loss of social customs through the hegemony of Soviet ideology. This was a call for a pluralism of local traditions and Soviet ideals. Aitmatov's concern was to show how the slow erosion of customs and changing attitudes was a threat to society's ability to recognize itself. The mankurt theme is a recurring theme throughout the book. For example, Yedigei admonished Kazangap's son, who accompanied him in the funeral procession, as a
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
91
he denounced his father for being stuck in the past. In doing so, he forgot the memory of his father as the man he was, and instead, turned 'his back on his nation and paternity' (Mazur 1987: 24). This was a criticism of the Soviet education system, which taught the young to respect modern advancements and disregard older forms of knowledge, in particular their genealogies. Other examples are the guard and the restricted area encountered by the funeral procession. There is even an analogy between the satellites being launched from the cordoned off area and forming a 'hoop' around the world, and the shiri that the mankurts wore. 21 Also, 'the barbed wire fence which severs the characters- all of whom are Kazakhs -from Ana-Beiit, is in a sense a mankurt's cap which is to rob them of their right to memory, and thereby cut them off from their national heritage. Those living within the confines of the fence are by implication, arising from the same imagery, already mankurt' (Mazur 1987: 15). Furthermore, the loss of religious knowledge was another painful realization, suggesting another way in which Central Asians were becoming mankurts. Aitrnatov's characters make a strong political comment on the slowly changing values and the danger this will have on the people. Aitmatov's style, while critical, uses the popular prose methods of the time to convey his thought, and thus, evade censorship. Katerina Clark (1983, 1984) notes that Aitmatov was able to use the conventions of socialist realism to a greater extent than other authors had previously done. The narrative is a synthesized construction of Stalinist, post-S talinis t and village prose. The characters in the novel are accepted because they conform, in part, to the conventions of positive role models that were present at that time. In other styles, a character's positive role is based on their attempt to forge a communist future. Aitmatov inverts these conventions. Yedigei's character attempts to capture the past. This style focuses on increasing the uses of memory 'as a motivation for exploring the traditions and the sense of national identity of an author's own ethnic group' (Clark 1984: 576). In this particular novel, Clark (1984: 587) argues that Aitmatov 'provides a case study of the ways authors can play with the formal conventions of the socialist realist tradition to produce meanings that are highly suggestive but open to radically different interpretations and ultimately elusive'. Thus, while the novel is not a direct attack on the Soviet system, the mankurt personifies the loss of social customs, effectively arguing against some of the problems that the Russian-orientated socialist society brought with it. This is a theme that Aitmatov has touched upon in earlier novels. In The White Steamship (1972), for example, some of the main characters of the story uphold and believe in the Bugu uruu myth of origin, while others refute this account providing Soviet modernist representations. Those that believe in the myth of origin are ridiculed by drunkards and abusive people who speak of modernism, rejecting the mythic past. Aitmatov demonstrated how those who no longer remember their customs led a hollow life.
92
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
This story articulated many similar concerns of the Central Asian intelligentsia at that time. The story of the mankurt alludes to several issues. First, it is a lesson regarding the importance of remembering genealogies and other social customs. Second, for some, it serves as an element in the development of their conception of self. In other words, it is the way through which they understand their identity within society. Third, it has formed a popular mode of expression to articulate such loss. The term continues to be employed by the Government and others in Kyrgyzstan to represent such an absence. 22 Finally, the story has political relevance. The emphasis attributed to memory and history is a politically motivated narrative which employs social concepts to convey its meaning. The story is often used by those that regard their heritage, including their sanjyra, as a way not only important for maintaining customs and passing on moral values, but also for maintaining the unity of the nation. KNOWING YOUR URUU The image of the mankurt is one that is employed in many cases. Nurlan Motuev employed this in his newspaper campaign to highlight the importance of being able to identify oneself as a Kyrgyz person. The moral lesson contained within the sad tale of the mankurt, is one that, nonetheless, needs to be contextualized through history. As Caroline Humphrey (1992) indicated, the 'deep past'- as a historical construction - is evoked to identify a time when social values and ideals were strong. In Kyrgyzstan, the figure of the mankurtis used as a corrective lesson that people are straying from certain values that characterize the 'deep past'. While this past is enacted through a mixture of historical mimicry and embodiment, genealogical imagination shares particular resonance with embodiment. Within this logic, each person, as the descendent of their ancestors, is responsible for developing the links with their ancestors and other relatives and learning the moral lessons that are a part of those relations. If a person does not know their jeti ata, as is popularly said, they are not Kyrgyz; much like the mankurt, they are unable to recognize themselves as human beings. The particular use of history plays an important role in the development of genealogical imagination. This is clear in Nurlan Motuev's newspaper campaign. His later articles continued the tirade against the editors and publishers of the book which contained an offensive translation of his uruu name. He developed, however, a broader historical context, where his uruu plays a vital role in the past and present. He described how his uruu, although not celebrated as others, is no less important to Kyrgyz independence. In his third article, Motuev (2003c) noted that many street names, which were changed after the fall of the Soviet Union, were renamed after prominent Sayaks. 23 Another example he cited was over half of the banknotes, bore portraits of Sayak members. 24
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
93
Motuev also reminded the readers that Jusup Abdrakhmanov (19011938), another famous Sayak, was made the first Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars from 1927 to 1933 of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Kyrgyz ASSR)?5 after vigorously campaigning for greater recognition of their status as an ethnic group. By recalling the importance of Abdrakhmanov to Kyrgyz statehood, Motuev made a strong and provocative critique of the official presentation of history, as Abdrakhmanov did not receive the same recognition through state celebrations or the dedication of monuments that other 'national' ancestors had received. In short, Motuev stressed that without 'the Sayaks' there might be no modern-day Kyrgyzstan. Motuevwasattemptingtoestablishhisownpoliticalcareerbya ttacking Akaev and strategically deploying the notion of his own uruu and gaining support through it. Motuev made further attacks. He suggested that if the Sham publishing house wished to provide such a rude translation of name 'Sayak', then perhaps he could help in the translation of a few other Kyrgyz uruu names. His rough translations were: Sarybagysh (red elk), Karabagysh (black elk), Saruu (yellow venom), Azyk (food), Cherik (Chinese frontier guard), Sart (red dog), Boston (grey fur). These were not accurate translations and did not represent the descriptions that people from these uruu would use. Instead, Motuev wanted to highlight the misconceptions that can arise when translating such names from Kyrgyz to Russian. Again, Motuev asserted his authority to speak on this subject by claiming he was the 1leader of the Sayak', and, somewhat defensively, stated that he was invited to represent his uruu by the 1Sayak elite'. He concluded his article by stating: 1By right I bear the rank of leader and I shall struggle to the end for the honour of my plemya' (Motuev 2003c: 8). Although no letters of complaint were published in the newspaper, Motuev was forced to issue a direct apology in his next article because of his crude translations. His response was only an apology to some of his readers. Examining the text, however, it is clear that he took this opportunity to make another political attack the Akaev regime. Motuev reached out to the Saruu uruu, which he characterizes as a 1broadshouldered people' (in Russian, narod plechistyi): from the leaders of the Saruu tribe I ask for your apology, and I sincerely admire this proud, courageous, independent [and] heroic Kyrgyz tribe' (Motuev 2003d: 3). He praised the Sayak and Saruu for their struggle against stronger powers. He noted that: 1
The militant Sayak, led by Tailak baatyr, dispersed the Kokand regime from northern Kyrgyzstan, and also did not allow the Chinese to come near (for example, they crushed the campaign of the Chinese general Bayan batu [who was moving towards] Kyrgyz land), and the Kalmyks. [T]he Aksy people, from which the majority of inhabitants are made up of [members] of the Saruu tribe, conducted military campaigns against Kokand twice and
94
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
replaced the khanate, putting there an administrator from their own people. So from all the Kyrgyz plemya the most militant and freedom-loving are the Sayak and the Saruu (Motuev 2003d: 3). The historical reference conceals within it two links to the contemporary situation in Kyrgyzstan. First, the historical reference to Chinese invaders is an allusion to the border issue between Kyrgyzstan and China (Chapter 1). Motuev places the Sayak as the guardians of Kyrgyz territorial sovereignty. Second, the specific mention of the Aksy people refers to the victims of the 'tragedy'. At the time this article was published, people from Aksy continued to demand justice for the death of six demonstrators the previous year. Motuev's article was an appeal for the Sayak and Saruu to join in opposition against the Government by establishing a base of support through their uruu. It must be stressed that Motuev's views are polemical. Not everyone takes their uruu and uruk identities so seriously. This was one of the reasons why his political campaign quickly lost momentum shortly thereafter. THE ROLE OF HISTORY IN MEMORY Moteuv's use of history is an attempt to direct how genealogies are remembered and the role it plays in people's construction of selfhood. The 'deep past' and the way it is connected to people's lives, through the embodiment of their genealogies, is a historical construction, articulated through political ideologies. History is used to suture the memories and social relationships formed through the genealogical imagination together with a broader vision of the nation and state. It is, as Benedict Anderson (1983: 204) notes, how history is used to bridge the gap perceived when looking at a photograph of yourself as a baby. You cannot fully remember how you began to talk, walk, write and develop into the person you are today. Usually, a parent helps to fill in the gaps when recollection alone is insufficient to connect the pieces over such a period of time. 26 History serves this role to create a seamless continuation of identity -both in regard to the self and the politicized person- through the genealogical imagination. J etimishbaev's sanjyra museum, and other places exploring the history of their ancestors, was one such place. People come with vague memories of their ancestry to study their genealogies further. I met Almaz, a history student from the Bishkek Humanities University. He explained that he lived in the area and had come to investigate his sanjyra and learn more about the history of the region. The museum offered a space for people to explore their ancestry and history, and to learn about themselves and their people. Sanjyras are a framework, contoured by history, for the exploration and examination of collective memory and remembrance. While knowledge of the jeti ata will help people to know a part of their sanjyra, the work of Jetimishbaev and others is contributing to a 'collective memory' in
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
95
the construction of the categories uruu and uruk and enhancing their national importance. Maurice Halbwachs (1992: 38) notes that: 'it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize and localize their memories'. The creation of genealogical imagination takes places within the same context. There is a process between the enunciation of memories and locating selfnarratives in a context of the more general array of memories held by a society. Michael Lambek and Paul Antze (1996: xviii) state: There is a dialectical relationship between experience and narrative, between the narrating self and the narrated self. As humans, we draw on our experience to shape narratives about our lives, but equally our identity and character are shaped by our narratives. People emerge from and as the products of their stories about themselves as much as their stories emerge from their lives. Through acts of memory they strive to render their lives in meaningful terms. However, individual genealogical memories and opinions about ancestors can threaten the construction of a collective memory of genealogical knowledge. If there are gaps and ellipses in the constitution of memory, then it is the work of (a politicized) history to 'fill the gaps'. As Edward Said (2000: 179) argues, 'the art of memory for the modern world is both for historians as well as ordinary citizens and institutions very much something to be used, misused, and exploited, rather than something that sits inertly there for each person to possess and contain'. Memory is contingent on the various constructions of history and on the historical narratives which may be dominant at a particular moment. Genealogical imagination is a form of relatedness between individuals and constituent parts of the notion of self, but it is reliant on a version of history which also defines the politicized 'Kyrgyz person' as a member of a sovereign ethnic group. This underpins the memories people recall, including representations of their ancestors. These two mnemonic devices contributing to the genealogical imagination- jeti ata and sanjyra- are not just charters of memories, but are also interrelated forms of knowledge demonstrating an awareness of the significant contributions of the ancestors to a person's personal self and broader community identity. Knowledge of patrilineal ancestors enables people to establish a connection to broader imaginations of the genealogical construction of uruu and uruk. Moreover, knowledge of personal ancestors contributes to the recognition of these figures' roles in the construction of uruu and uruk. In relations to political ideology, an individual should be able to connect themselves through their genealogies to figures that 'founded' the Kyrgyz nation as represented in the official history. In their examinations of memory and history, Said, Lambek and Antze remark on the 'invention of tradition', drawing on Hobsbawm and Ranger's (1983) description of the establishment and labelling of
96
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
events as 'traditional'. The invention of tradition mobilizes collective memory through the ideological manipulation of history. In particular, Said (2000: 179) notes: 'The invention of tradition is a method for using collective memory selectively by manipulating certain bits of the national past, suppressing others, elevating still others in an entirely functional way' .27 The organization of history is one part of a wider logic which determines the constitution of the national identity. Sanjyra are woven into the national historical narrative so as not to allow division and gaps in memory to threaten its structure. Like Almaz, most Kyrgyz do not have many memories connected with figures in their sanjyra. By going to the genealogy museum, he was able to learn more about his ancestry and formation of it. Yet, the museum also fits in with the national ideology of the time, which attempted to create an appearance of an inclusive narrative. These memories and views on sanjyra are moulded into a discourse which constantly adapts various accounts into a general history of the 'Kyrgyz people'. THE MENTALITY OF RELATEDNESS There is a continuous exchange between personal and collective forms of memory which contributes to the construction of identity. By taking genealogy as a basis upon which to establish a national history and identity for the Kyrgyz people, the government has, in part, appropriated a form through which alternative notions of identity could be created. Personal and collective (including on a national level) memories mutually reinforce each other, so that with the introduction of a politicized history the gaps that could emerge from memory are filled. The construction of history with genealogical qualities gives it a doxic quality, resembling people's understandings of their own ancestors and therefore their own history (Lambek and Antze 1996). One such example is the description of a general'mentality'. On a broad scale, some Kyrgyz social scientists expressed to me that the particular categories of uruu and uruk are not just parts of self-descriptions, but 'part of our mentality'. Mentality, I suggest, is part of a discourse that blurs the distinction between memory and history, the self and the person. It is a discourse which transcends temporality, there is no definable beginning. It is a consciousness that always existed, shaping historical events. In the construction of a new independent history some Kyrgyz social scientists have been conscious of keeping the memories of ancestors and their honourable deeds in close connection with the aspirations of the contemporary Kyrgyz identity. For example, several historians have written about 'the mentality of the Kyrgyz' and its social effectiveness: It seems to us, no matter how certain events or persons reflect
history, they cannot be the only thing, but are a more determining component of mentality, for they reflect only the concrete facts, the
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
97
qualities of this or that person of their epoch. Mentality, obviously, includes a lasting dignity of the people, which serves not as an ornament, but 'works' on this authority (Koichuev, Mokrynin and Ploskikh 1994: 5). 'Dignity' (in Russian, dostoinstvo) attributes the importance of events and genealogical memory to relatedness, as well as the recollection of those memories which are valuable for present unity. Furthermore, the authors indicate that this dignity has an authority which 'works' by influencing and directing certain actions and thoughts. Mentality provides a space in which the memories, complementing the official history, are dignified. These academics see the role of history as the restoration of (or filling in the gaps in) their ethnicity's dignity: Undoubtedly, in Kyrgyz history there were virtues of lasting meaning, but some of them were not saved in people's memory. The purpose is to restore these blanks in the hope that public values again will find the shine of a precious metal. History not only helps us to leaf through the reverential pages of the past, but also to understand that it will represent the value for the present and the future. The history of the people- this is forming the mentality of the nation (Koichuev et al. 1994: S). History is used to overcome gaps in memory through which people locate their dignity in their values and ancestors. This deliberate use of history superimposes a refashioned memory onto the construction of a 'Kyrgyz person'. What appears as an examining tool turns into a method of dictation in the formation of genealogical imagination. This use of history serves as the referential point in wider society for the understanding and acceptance of memories. The memories of ancestors acceptable to the official historical narrative are appropriated by the government. Not all memories, however, must conform to this discursive style. Yet, a form of national dignity has been constructed as part of a discourse about knowledge of the role of genealogies in society. The ancestors, and their respective uruu and uruk, are not cause for division, but instead for celebration and unity. During the Akaev era, this discursive interaction between personal and wider social memories is blurred or taken for granted. 'Identity is not composed of a fixed set of memories but lies in the dialectical, ceaseless activity of remembering and forgetting, assimilating and discarding. Explicit memory is but the self-conscious pole of a process that contains much else' (Lambek and Antze 1996: xxix). 28 Here, the representation of the official history provides a discursive enactment of memories. Certain selective memories and details become a form of social habitus, or practices which subconsciously shape the actions of society. 29
98
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic NOTES
Genealogical imagination was previously used by Andrew Shryock (1997), based on his fieldwork in Jordan. He examines local attempts by Bedouin 'tribes' to document and publish histories that were, until recently, orally transmitted, and which also have significant political implications. Shryock (1997: 22) notes that a couple of Bedouin 'clans' stated that their 'genealogical knowledge was not simply a model of social topography, it was a way of articulating past and present, a way of transmitting and talking about history'. 2 As will be described in later chapters, scales of temporality are demonstrated through memories of ancestors and evoked by the erection of monuments in their honour as part of the nation-building campaign. 3 The theme of spatiality and temporality is explored further in Chapter 5. 4 Grodekov (1889: 27 -8) remarks on these marriage proscriptions, but notes that it is not so strict. He quotes Mulla Asan, who states that: 'formerly between the Karakirgiz, like the Kirgiz, they took a bride from the seventh generation. Now they take from the third, they have even begun to take from the second generation, as according to the Shariat. In this, manaps and the simple people do not differ.' 5 There are many examples of written sanjyra. One of the first was written in the sixteenth century by Saif ad-din ibn damullo Sakh Abbas Aksiketi and his son Nurmukhammed (1996). One of the earliest genealogies written by a Kyrgyz was in 1913 by Osmanaaly Sydykov (1990). Many other books have been published examining individual uruu and uruk, for example Aitbek Kaziev (2000) wrote a sanjyra of the Bugu uruu. Some books examine much larger categories, for example, Esenkul Torokan uulu (199Sb) produced a book about the uruu and uruk in southern Kyrgyzstan. Some are pocketsized booklets containing information on many Kyrgyz uruu, for example Turdubai Umar uulu's (1991) pamphlet, which is used more as quick reference guide. Asan Kaibylda uulu (2000) even explored Kyrgyz sanjyras through melodies. He argued that many songs composed for the komuz (a small, three-stringed guitar) were accounts of genealogies. His book is an extensive exploration of early accounts of Kyrgyz history and relations. 6 A similar money collection practice also happens at the workplace. For important celebrations or deaths, people often give money to help their colleagues. The support gained from being part of a team or group (in Russian, kollektiv) is another important coping measure in people's lives. 7 J etimishbaev passed away in February 2004. His daughter continues to work there, supporting the new director. 8 During the interview, J etimishbaev spoke in Kyrgyz. He purposefully used the terms uruu and uruk, however, he employed them in a similar way to plemya and rod. I have also kept these in the singular form of the terms throughout so as not to cause confusion. 9 Ake is a Kyrgyz word which means 'father' or 'older brother'. It is very close to the Kyrgyz word aga, a term of respect used when speaking to male teachers. 10 The Central Asian History Server provides a number of articles on the history and some genealogical tables of Central Asian peoples, of which 1
Identity, History and Genealogical Imagination
11 12 13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21 22
23
24
99
the Kyrgyz have several charts investigating their origins and genealogical descent. See http://www.kyrgyz.ru (accessed 18 July 2006). This is a description from Chanachev's project proposal. Adat in Kyrgyz means 'customs'. Kazakhs already have some similar resources on their own shezhire. The website: http://www.elim.kz/index.php (accessed 18 July 2006) offers some information on Kazakh shezhires, similar to what Chanachev had hoped to organize. This website also offers a number of links to other genealogical tables of Mongol, Turkic and Central Asian peoples, including individual Kazakh rod. It also contains links to Jewish genealogies and Russian families. This is a description from Chanachev's project proposal. Due to a lack of funding, this festival never took place. After the 'Tulip Revolution', however, he opened his website. It only had ancient records and findings, but people said that it was 'too soon' to reveal this kind of information, and that it would cause further problems with 'tribalism'. He, therefore, shut it down, but continues to gather information, with a hope to reopen the website one day. In contemporary Kyrgyzstan this term is used broadly as a derogatory word for someone considered dim-witted or stupid. ChingizAitmatov is one of the most celebrated Kyrgyz authors, not just in his own country, but throughout the former Soviet Union. A national celebration was in his honour in December 2003 (during the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood') for his seventy-fifth birthday. In June 2008, he passed away and was given a grand state funeral. His works, many of which were written during the Soviet era, still find resonance today and are often praised in Kyrgyzstan. Despite the story taking place in Kazakhstan, the description holds many similarities for Kyrgyzstan, and, as Aitmatov is Kyrgyz, the novel is held as a important example Kyrgyz literature. The Juan-juan controlled parts of Inner Asia from roughly the fifth century A.D., but internal strife slowly caused the disintegration of the group and their control of the region. The Turk people dominated the region from the sixth century A.D. See Daniel Sinor (1969, 1990) for more on the rise and dissolution of the Juan-juan. In addition, see Peter Golden (1992) and L. R. Kyzlasov (1996) for more on the history during this period. While shiri has the same meaning in Kyrgyz, Beibutova (1988: 234) and Yudakhin (1999: 404) note that another term for this in Kyrgyz is 'kook'. This is an analogy made by Kolesnikoff (1999). For example, in parts of Central Asia, this notion has been applied to language proficiency. Bhavna Dave (1996) has written about the mankurtization of people in Kazakhstan and their (in)ability to speak Kazakh. Since independence in 1991, the government renamed a number of streets in Bishkek. The five som note bears the portrait of Biiriisara Beishenalieva (19261973), a highly renowned ballerina. On the ten som note is Kasym Tynystanov (1901-1938), a linguist, poet and political activist who was killed during Stalin's purges for alleged anti-communist activities. On the twenty som note is Togolok Moldo (1860-1942), a great poet. The one
100
25
26 27
28
29
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
hundred som note has a portrait of Toktogul Satylgan uulu (1864-1933), a talented komuz (Kyrgyz: a small three-stringed guitar) player. On the five hundred som note is Sayakbai Karalaev (1894-1970), considered one of the finest and most eloquent manaschis (Kyrgyz: those who recite the epic poem Manas). He had his version of the epic recorded, but later had it denounced amid accusations that it contained anti-communist elements. For more detailed biographies on the people represented in the currency, please see Abazov (2004), Tolstov et al. (1963) and Urstanbekov and Choroev (1990). In 1938, after years of speculation by Party members, Abdrakhmanov was accused of anti-communist activities and executed. Maurice Halbwach (1992) provides a similar example of a favourite childhood book, and reconnecting with it as an adult. Lambek and Antze (1996: xxii) argue: 'If individual experience provides idioms and metaphors for understanding collective experience and vice versa, there may be a kind of mutual validation, a reciprocal rendering real that serves to naturalize what has been imagined. However, this will not be seamless.' This complements Said's argument, but also indicates that in certain cases, particularly instances of trauma which they are researching, individual and collective memories will not always support each other. This is reminiscent of how Ernest Renan (1990: 11) describes forgetting as an important process in the creation of a nation. See also Janet Carsten (199Sa) on this topic. Pierre Bourdieu (1990: 53) describes habitus thus: 'The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.'
4
Obligations and the Management of Shame
connections play a role in forming relatedness, but Genealogical their strength depends upon the types of obligations people share. Genealogies are one way to establish relationships, but they require continuous effort and the recognition of mutual indebtedness towards one another. Relatedness formed through genealogical imagination does not create a unified group of people based on a notion of solidarity. Often, accessing forms of assistance or fulfilling obligations is a significant factor in establishing and maintaining relations. Indeed, in many cases, it underpins the forms of relatedness elaborated through a genealogical imagination. The relations established through jeti ata and sanjyra, for example, are one way to impress upon others their duty to help, but individual circumstances and capabilities do not mean that they will recognize the need to help or be able to render any kind of assistance. People living in the same village, for instance, may share the same uruk, but this does not mean that they will provide help simply because they are relatives. Despite the importance given to genealogies by some, networks of support fulfil a more practical role. This was made clear by one aksakal, who I met in Naryn to discuss his genealogies. I arrived unexpectedly one afternoon at his home, having been told by others he had kept extensive genealogical records. We spoke for hours about his ancestry, only pausing when dinner was served. We cleared his numerous files of genealogies away and laid the dostorlwn (tablecloth). As we ate our fried potatoes, the man became embarrassed. He felt he was not fulfilling his duties as a host and apologized that they did not have enough money to buy meat. He said that, despite all his work, his uruk and uruu are not very important to him. During this time, when the economy is weak, salaries are months in arrears and there is high unemployment, he said that he needed people for support (using the Kyrgyz word koldoo), whoever they are. The acute economic shortages in Kyrgyzstan have forced many to create various networks to manage the difficult transition period. Genealogies,
102
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
often, do not translate into actual networks of help and assistance. In many cases, a person's family remains their most important support to find work and make ends meet on a tight budget. Remittances sent home from migrant labourers are growing as an important coping method for many. Yet, this is also subject to change, not least during a global economic crisis. The practicality of the links between people and the ways support can be returned is an important strategy when people seek help and assistance. My host family was one such example. They did not have relatives abroad sending money home, but their father did have a generous pension that he was able to share with his children. This was an important lifeline for many family members. This help was noticeable in the choices that people made, or were forced to make, in order to maintain the support that they were offered. Throughout my fieldwork, particularly among my host family, I noticed two forms of support: help and assistance. 'Help', I suggest, refers to an offering of support that goes beyond reciprocal or calculable exchanges. It is not a form of exchange which seeks a return of goods and favours with equally measurable responses; it is an expansion of mutual indebtednesses. Help is given of oneself, no matter how big or small. There is no intention on repayment, but to offer what one can when it is required. In Kyrgyz, the notion of help is referred to as jardam. This has two meanings: it can be used in a general request for help, the extent of which is usually found between family members as mentioned above, or it can refer to a specific request in conjunction with the completion of a project or goal, such as building a house, which can include friends and colleagues. Help, in return, is expected over time and through various forms. In the way that it is used here, the focus on help within the context of greater obligations means that it is more often found between family members. 'Obligation' is the expectation and duty to render help, particularly between family members. There are, of course, instances when, despite the desire to support others and all obligations, a person cannot provide help that is expected. For example, one man I knew was castigated by his father for not helping his step-brother get into university. Despite willingness to help, the man was contacted late and could not help his step-brother. In addition, it was not clear when and what course his step-brother wanted to study. The man would have had to call on other people, but by the time that his step-brother asked him for help it was too late for him to get in contact with the people he knew as they had either moved away or were no longer at the university. The relationship between this man and his father, which was already difficult, suffered considerably because of this. Yet, the expectation of what is to be done is a significant factor in these relations. If a person is seen as not fulfilling their obligations, it can, as in the example above, create further problems between family members. Obligations are also emphasized in other ways. Marriage constitutes another area where notions of shame (in Kyrgyz, uyat) are employed to reinforce duty,
Obligations and the Management of Shame
103
obligation and the place of help. 1 This is especially true in cases of bride abduction. Shame is used in a variety of ways an contexts, and will be explored below. Help is contrasted by what I define as 'assistance', or requests for support when needed, but includes an emphasis on reciprocity. These ties stretch beyond the family and are often dependent on work colleagues, classmates, army buddies, friends and acquaintances. This support also plays an important role in people's daily lives. In Kyrgyz, this is referred to as komok. This is different from Sahlins's (1974) account which focuses more on a determinate economic value. The kinds of material reciprocated are important, but an equally strong emphasis, if not greater, is on the maintenance of the relations between people. Assistance, as in the example below, also includes the development of emotional ties and the support that these can provide people. They are an important part of how people meet daily challenges and obtain necessary items and services. They are not, however, described as tribal relations, but as essential informal networks. VILLAGE AND TOWN CONNECTIONS The ties between families and friends that emerged during my fieldwork demonstrated that there were many informal networks, helping people meet their needs, particularly in light of overwhelming financial burdens. This was evident within my host family. Salaries and pensions were often months in arrears and any additional support by family and friends was greatly welcomed. There was no appeal to wider kinship groups; support was provided through whatever means possible. My introduction to these informal networks happened when I began to conduct fieldwork in Naryn with my host family, headed by a single mother, Nazira. One afternoon, I came home and found Nazira's father, Kachkymbek, sitting in the kitchen. He had just come from his village, about fifty kilometres south of Naryn, to deliver milk to Nazira. Due to his large pension, Kachkymbek was able to travel between his village and Naryn to offer to some help to his children who lived there. On this day, he brought milk to Nazira. Aigul, Nazira's ten-year-old daughter, had already gone out on this late November morning to sell the milk to families they knew in the area and had already agreed to buy their milk. They were not always able to sell milk. After they had taken what they needed, they would sell the remainder. In the early morning, Aigul would go out to sell the milk to local families. Aigul and her thirteen-year-old brother, Jyrgal, only studied for half of the day. Jyrgal would go to school early in the morning, and in the afternoon, Aigul would attend classes. On the day that Kachkymbek came, Jyrgal had already come home and went out to sell milk. This was a familiar routine. When Kachkymbek came with milk, or when the bus driver, who was a friend of the family, agreed to deliver the milk for a small sum, Nazira and her children would sell the milk to the local
104
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
families. They did not shout, as other traders did, calling for customers. Instead, they waited on the street at regular times, and people eventually would come to them. Occasionally, there would be a knock at the door by someone asking to buy milk if they had not had the opportunity to do so beforehand. Sometimes on weekends, Nazira would help her children to sell milk. Nazira and her children did not earn a lot of money from this, but it was at least a few more som every week. The money was carefully counted and part of it was used and some sent back to the village. The extra income made from selling milk helped to lighten the burden of other expenses. The apartment that we lived in was not theirs. It belonged to Nazira's aunt, Dinara, who had recently moved from Naryn to Bishkek to begin a new job. The apartment was located in a block of four apartments; one of many identical copies had been built roughly twenty years before. Nazira paid rent to Dinara, who used the money to renovate her new place in Bishkek. Nazira was uncomfortable with this arrangement. She did not feel as if it was her own home. She was grateful, however, that it was a spacious apartment in a relatively good area of Naryn, and they lived close to the local school. The apartment was in fairly good repair, but heavy snows caused the roof to leak in certain places. In addition to rent, Nazira had to pay for the heating, electricity and telephone each month. Unlike other apartments in the area, the central heating did not work properly. This was exacerbated by the continual water shortages and burst water pipes throughout the winter. When the water was shut off, all the radiators had to be bled to release the air so that the water could circulate again. This happened several times a week, if not several times a night. In order to maintain a reasonable temperature, additional electric heaters were used. As the apartment was quite large, it was expensive to heat. It was a constant battle to keep the home warm so that the children would not get sick. There were numerous other problems as well. Cooking was a particular challenge. There was a gas stove, but there was no central gas supply. Nazira sometimes used bottled gas that Dinara had bought, but it quickly ran out. It was too expensive for Nazira to constantly refill and too heavy for her to transport on her own. While at times it was necessary to cook food on the gas stove, she mainly used a small electric-coil hob, which stood precariously on a small table next to the kitchen door. Only one or two small pots could be placed on this hob at one time. The hob did not get very hot and took a very long time to boil water. As it was electric, it was also an expensive way to cook. The refrigerator was unplugged and food was stored on the balcony or in the basement of the small apartment block in order to save money on electricity. Yet, the electricity frequently failed, creating further problems. Nazira worked for the city council. She did not earn much money and her salary was paid in arrears. The milk was an important supplement to her salary and helped her to pay for household expenses. Once or twice
Obligations and the Management of Shame
lOS
a week, a bus from her parent's village would come. It carried many items for people living in Naryn, sometimes milk for Nazira. She and her children would collect it and take it home, either in a minivan taxi (which cost three som, about $0.06) or by sledge (in winter). Some of the milk would also be kept or used to make such things as kaimak (cream). There were other things which they also received, but were not sold, such as meat and kumys (fermented mare's milk). These were less frequent and it was often a special occasion when such foodstuffs arrived. The milk sent from the village was just one form of help, the connection between the village and Naryn served many other purposes. Kachkymbek occasionally would travel to Naryn from his village, depending on the condition of the roads. The road heading south from Naryn travels over several mountain passes, and due to rain and melting snow, would often disintegrate. When Kachkymbek was able to come, he would often bring money. Kachkymbek received a substantial pension in comparison with others. He received around 1,500 soma month at the time (about $32).2 He had been the chief economist for his village and a couple of surrounding villages, only retiring in 2000. Having continued to work well beyond retirement age he received a better pension. When I first met him in November 2002, however, he said that he had not been paid for the last two months. In addition to his pension, he was able to make a living off of his 400 hectares of land and was able to raise animals. 3 He was thus able to help his six children. In comparison, Kachkymbek's wife, who was also retired, only received a pension of 300 som per month ($6.50) and Nazira's salary was just 900 som per month ($19.00). Both Kachkymbek and his wife were in failing health, so they often came to Naryn to go the hospital. They would often stay with their eldest daughter, Jyldyz, who lived down the road from Nazira. As soon as they had managed to see the doctor they would return to their village. They had to take medicine constantly and their prescriptions always needed to be refilled. Nazira or Jyldyz would do this and send it to their parents with one of the bus drivers who transported the milk. Nazira and Jyldyz often sent medicine and letters this way. This was a very effective way of communication. The telephone connection to the village was very bad. Nazira had a telephone, but her father did not. A neighbour in the village owned a telephone, but the connection was very poor and it was inconvenient to make calls. One of Nazira's brothers, Bolot, had a car and lived in the village with Kachkymbek. The car was often in need of repairs, but when it was available for use, they drove to Naryn. This was expensive and would only be done when there were enough people for the trip and they could take goods with them and bring some back. Petrol was expensive as well, and would also limit the use of the car. Jyldyz's husband, Azamat, also had a car, a beaten up Lada Neva. He worked for the army border patrol and had to buy a car in order to get to the border and back. He would often drive to the village in order to deliver goods and take people home if there was an opportunity when he was not working. His car was only
106
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
in slightly better condition to Bolot's, which meant that neither could really be counted on to work. During public holidays, such as New Year and summer holidays, Nazira, Jyldyz, and any other immediate family members would travel to the village to be with their parents. In 2002, I travelled with Nazira and her children to be with her parents for New Year's Eve. When we arrived at the house it was full of guests and relatives. Some of the guests were only visiting and would later go to Kachkymbek's brother's house next door. Nazira always enjoyed travelling to the village and staying there. The children enjoyed it as well, as they were with their family and could ride horses and go walking in the mountains. More than at any other time of year, New Year was a family holiday and time for celebration. This was a time for the family to be together. Many people travel great distances to be with their families, especially over New Year. During the time that I stayed with Nazira it was evident just how important her relationship with her family was. Without it, she would not have had milk to sell and, therefore, would not have had the necessary extra income. But it was also important for Kachkymbek to have his children close so that he could help them as well as have help in refilling his prescriptions when necessary. Nazira's parents became of greater help when her son wanted to go to live in the village and attend school, preferring village life to Naryn. While Nazira wanted her son to be with her and attend a school in Naryn, it was difficult for her to do so with such a small wage. Her parents were willing to have their grandson there, as he could also help out with the chores. When she reflected on her situation, she often said that she wanted to leave Naryn to live in her parents' village and work as a teacher. It was cheaper there and she could be with her family. What had developed was an informal network, using various means of transport and people, between family members in Naryn and the village. Of course, family members who lived in more distant parts of Kyrgyzstan were not excluded, but because the village was closer to Naryn, the links were stronger and provided much needed help. The continual flow of goods and people from both settings was meaningful and an important necessity. This was a network that revolved around immediate family members, but also included some friends. There was no appeal to a wider uruk or uruu community. This was made clear on a separate journey. One day, I was visiting a friend in his home in Ysyk-K6l oblast', when he asked me to accompany him to a friend's house. The man we visited had recently lost his wife, but my friend was unable to attend the funeral, so he met the widower to recite prayers and to convey condolences. Afterwards, my friend explained that I was doing research on uruk and uruu. The man said that he did not care about them. The collapse of the Soviet Union had made life financially difficult for them. He lamented the change and said that things were better during that time. The only thing important to him was his own family. His sons, he said, were his wealth.
Obligations and the Management of Shame
107
OBLIGATIONS UNDER STRAIN For Nazira and her family, the network between the village and the town was a vital link for everyone involved. One of the main issues that the network addressed was that of financial shortages. This was a problem in the Soviet period and has worsened since independence, leaving many with a feeling of deep insecurity. Joma Nazpary (2002) describes this as a feeling of 'chaos' (in Russian, bardak), resulting from the rapid change from a centralized economy under the Soviet regime to a market-based economy, where people have struggled to secure their finances and access to goods. Those who have profited during this period, often acquiring these goods through illegal means and physical force, are seen as having contributed to the situation. Their actions are regarded as immoral as they go against the conventions of helping fellow citizens as was emphasized during the Soviet regime. This was, however, a morality that was stressed more in propaganda rather than in everyday practice, as shortages were prevalent throughout the Soviet era. Nazpary (2002: 16) terms these people as 'dispossessed', referring to a 'strongly articulated polarized consciousness [which] is not only rooted in common suffering, although differentiated in degrees, but by the depth of post-Soviet expropriation and the speed with which it has been carried out. '4 People have developed a range of coping mechanisms during this period. Help provided by relatives is one of the most important ways of dealing with daily challenges. 5 Indeed, as Deniz Kandiyoti (1998: 561-2) points out, this help 'is a key determinant of the range of options available to households.' 6 In the example above, Nazira was reliant on the help afforded to her by her family and the people with whom they had connections. Although she lived in a town, she had a small salary and the financial support she received from her family was invaluable. After her father passed away in mid-2003, however, it caused great uncertainty and hardship for the whole family. Nazira's family relationship was more than simple support, it was based on obligation. The maintenance of these relations is of equal (if not greater) importance than the type or form of exchange (Sneath 2003). These relationships depend heavily on many factors, such as age, gender and how close people are to each other. Networks founded on obligation are not based on calculated reciprocity, but are a type of permanent indebtedness to each other. Further, they entail a moral duty to provide help to someone else. Fulfilling obligations to others can provide a form of security; it is a mutual willingness to support one another, and not judged on the type of help provided or its return. This is a key feature of obligatory relationships (Sneath 1993), and has been particularly noted in transition economies (Werner 1998). There are, of course, instances where obligations are almost too difficult to be fulfilled or where the pressures people find themselves under make them consider whether the obligatory relationships can even be maintained. These moments highlight precisely what is at
108
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
stake and how important it is to the people involved. In many cases, if obligations are not fulfilled or the relationships become too strained, people risk being excluded from future help. Implicit to the notion of obligation is a subtle positioning of power relations. Nazpary (2002: 76) argues that within 'help', exchange is 'disguised by ideologies, discourses and feelings which are associated with marriage, kinship and friendship.' It is in these cases, in particular, that the power relations between people become visible and enforced. To be obliged to do something for someone, or to give of oneself, assumes an explicit desire and intention to complete and reciprocate certain actions. It is when these obligations are drawn into question that the positions of power begin to be revealed and what the result would be if they were not fulfilled. How do people fulfil their obligations in such cases? What are the ideologies used? Where do the power relations between people emerge? One of the clearest examples when obligations come under strain is during weddings and married life. Women are in a particularly difficult situation. Marrying into another family requires them not only to meet their own family's expectations, but they must also abide by the role they are required to fill in their husband's family. The women I spoke to had different responsibilities placed upon them; some were more difficult and demanding than others. Three women I met highlighted the difficulties women have in balancing the various demands of their families and the importance it has for making ends meet. Jypara I had been friends with Jypara for many years. She had been a good friend during my earlier research visits to Kyrgyzstan. After many years working hard and with some financial help from her family, she applied to study abroad. She eventually travelled to Britain where she studied. She also worked part time to help her family repay many debts after her father's business collapsed. While she was living in Britain, she met a Kyrgyz man, Melis, through friends. They dated for nearly a year and the man asked her to marry him. They decided to register their marriage when they returned to Kyrgyzstan. Melis returned to Kyrgyzstan shortly after proposing as his visa was about to expire. Jypara was going to return a couple of months later. When Melis met his family, he told them he had proposed to Jypara. However, his family disagreed with his choice. First, Jypara was several years older than Melis. Age is important in Kyrgyzstan. Many people said to me women should marry when they are young and have many children. If they do not marry when they are young, people think that they might be bad or difficult women to live with. Second, his family wanted him to marry a woman from a well-respected and rich family. They had hoped that their son would be able to get a good job, and hopefully, that they might be able to use these good connections themselves. Melis had told his family about]ypara's father's debt, which made them more concerned. His sister introduced him to another
Obligations and the Management of Shame
109
woman from an influential family. Jypara, still in Britain, had no idea what was happening. Melis called less often and when she asked about their future plans his answers became increasingly vague. He toldJypara that his parents had reservations, but did not tell her that he had started dating another woman. He eventually broke off contact and did not tell her when he later got married. Jypara had kept the relationship a secret from her family. She was concerned what her family might think if they found out she had been dating Melis. When she returned to Kyrgyzstan, she began dating an old friend from a wealthy family whom she eventually married. Nevertheless, she felt that the relationship was not strong. She and her husband did not share many things in common and her time in Britain had changed her outlook on life. She wanted to be more independent, but her husband's family expected her to prepare food and host guests. She was called to help at most family gatherings and was often looked down on for not having new clothes. Further, her parents asked her to support her younger brother who wanted to study abroad. In her spare time, she worked to get all the necessary documents and money together to send him abroad. Jypara was upset with her situation and longed to return to Britain. Jypara had more opportunities than most. She had a good education and was able to travel. Yet, like many, her personal aspirations and desires were second to family obligations and managing various forms of shame. She was unable to marry Me lis because his family had developed a negative view of her because of her age and they had their own plans for his future with another woman and possible job opportunities in her father's business. Jypara later found herself divided between the expectations and obligations of her own family and her husband's family. She was unable to fulfil many goals and slowly conformed to the roles expected of her. If she had not helped her family, her father's debt could have led to many problems. Her life with her husband's family could have been more difficult had she not helped as expected. Other women I met also told me about how family expectations had limited their personal goals. In some cases, women were abducted brides, forcing them into terrible situations. In Nazira's family, obligations came under strain precisely because of this. Both Nazira and her younger sister, Gulaina, had been abducted. In discussions with them, it emerged that their father asked them to stay with their captors. Despite wanting to leave their new husbands, they were faced with a dilemma: stay with a strange family or face the consequences of going against their father's wish and being excluded from the support he could provide them. Bride abduction, in Kyrgyz ala kachuu, is attributed to a number of situations. Sarah Amsler and Russell Kleinbach (1999: 185) have described it as 'the act of abducting a woman to marry her and includes a variety of actions, ranging from consensual marriage to kidnapping and rape. 17 Research into marriages in Kyrgyzstan (Bauer, Green and Kuehnast 1997, Handrahan 2004, Kleinbach 2003) suggests that up
110
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
to a third of all marriages are a result of kidnappings, both consensual and forced. In often romanticized versions of its history, the practice of bride abduction is said to date back to when the Kyrgyz were nomadic, yet there is little evidence to support this (Kleinbach and Salimjanova 2007). Although it was officially outlawed during the Soviet era, there are accounts that it still took place. Since independence, the Kyrgyz Government has also made the practice illegal in the constitution and made specific amendments to laws regarding bride abduction, but there seems to be a greater frequency than during the Soviet era. 8 Few police investigations are launched and those that are do not take their inquiries very far (Human Rights Watch 2006). 9 Bride abduction is becoming a more openly discussed problem. There are public debates and non-government organizations working to stop this from happening. In 2003, for example, the popular daily newspaper Vechernii Bishkek published an article about bride abduction on the front page to raise awareness about the problems women face (Karimova and Kasybekov 2003). Yet, according to a Human Rights Watch (2006) report, abduction remains largely unreported and is still a significant problem in the country. While this is less visible in cities, it is a problem in smaller towns and villages. 10 The reasons given for abduction are various: poverty, pressure to abduct, men unable to find a partner and as an expression of male power through tradition (Human Rights Watch 2006). For example, men often claim that poverty prevents them from paying a bride price (in Kyrgyz, kalym) and are reluctant to spend money courting a woman. Abduction, in such cases, allows them to avoid such costs, and usually play it down suggesting that the woman enjoys her new married life. Men's families often play a strong role in pressuring them to abduct a woman. In Petr Lorn's film, 'Kyrgyzstan- The Kidnapped Bride' (2004), a mother was shown pressuring her son to abduct a woman. The mother said that she would be happy to have someone to help her around the house. In some cases, family pressure exists because the man is not a 'good match'. Men with disabilities or even with criminal pasts are unable to find a partner and resort to abducting a woman instead (Human Rights Watch 2006: 94-5). In addition, abduction, sometimes, is the result of a resurgence of what some hold as traditions, but are based on the assertion of male power. With the rise of independence, men saw themselves as the bearers of ethnic tradition, and extended their supposed control over women's bodies. Lori Handrahan (2004: 222) notes that 'kidnapping is one of many forms of hegemonic masculinity. Specificalljj kidnapping seems to symbolize the male act of "claiming" one's ethnici ty, while women, of the same ethnic group, "belong" to the ethnicity by submission to male ethnic dominance.' 11 Further, she notes that '[through] kidnapping Kyrgyz men demonstrate not only an adherence to "Kyrgyz tradition" but an ability to dominate Kyrgyz women. This, in a sense, is "claiming" a place as an ethnic adult male- a decision-maker with the ability to decide any Kyrgyz woman's fate through forced marriage' (Handrahan 2004: 223).
Obligations and the Management of Shame
111
When men prepare to abduct a woman, it is usually friends of the man seeking the woman that do it or assist in carrying it out. They try to isolate her and then drive her away in a car. They return to the man's home, where they prevent her from leaving and the women of the family try to put on a headscarf (in Kyrgyz, jooluk), signifying that the abducted is now married. In most cases, once the woman has been abducted, the parent's of the groom speak with the woman's parents. They are seeking a kind of forced approval for the marriage from the woman's parents. The father's decision, in many cases, decides whether the woman stays with the family or not. If the father's answer is for his daughter to be married to the man that abducted her, and the woman does not listen to him, this can cause further problems for the woman. In such cases, the decision the woman must make is whether her interests are that of the family and community, or whether she will act out in her own self interests (Mody Spencer 2000). By ignoring the father's decision, she can bring shame upon herself and the household. Managing shame is implicit in fulfilling obligations and maintaining relations. If not, the woman risks being excluded from the family and the support it entails. The following stories of the women in my host family highlight the problems involved with bride abduction and attempts to manage shame.
Nazira One night, Nazira and I came back to the apartment after having been to a birthday party at a neighbour's home. We began speaking and I asked Nazira about her husband. While she kneaded dough to make bread for the following day, she recounted the story. Nazira met her husband while she was studying at university. She had met him just once at a gathering between two groups of friends. She liked him, but she did not know him well enough to have any strong feelings. They did not date or meet again after that. The next time that she saw him, she said that he 'stole' her. Of course Nazira was distraught at the time, but she was not overly critical of the practice; she saw this as something that happens to women in Kyrgyzstan. Her husband, Marat, came from a poor family. They lived in a village, where, as Nazira remarked, everything was dirty. Her father asked her to stay, which she did, despite all her feelings. Five years after being abducted, Nazira gave birth to her son. Her friends and family, however, did not believe that it was Marat's son; they thought that she had been seeing other men. Nazira said that she did not understand what people were talking about at the time. Later, she said, she understood that people find other lovers. She did not realize any of this at the time. Nevertheless, the gossip stopped as soon as her son grew up and people could see that he had a striking resemblance to his father. A couple of years later, Naziragave birth to a daughter. At the time of the birth, however, Nazira was very ill, and spent three months in hospital.
112
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Due to her illness, she gave birth to her daughter two months premature. The baby's condition was critical, requiring a blood transfusion, but her husband could not be found. Eventually, Nazira's brother had to give blood twice in order to save the baby. Marat never came to the hospital. Nazira received reports through her friends and family as to what he was doing and where he was. Everyday was a different story. One day he was working and the next day he had gone to the village to help his parents. All the time that she was in hospital, Marat never once came to see his new daughter or to help Nazira. After she left hospital, Nazira stayed with Marat's family in their village for ten days, waiting for her husband to return. Someone, however, told her that he had found another woman. She eventually found Marat, and asked him to return to her and help her raise the children. He did not want to, he was living with another woman and they had a son together. While Nazira had been in the hospital and later with Marat's family, she decided she did not want to live with her husband, but was willing to try for the sake of her children. Yet, she thought her life with him as a prison. She felt her life was out of her control and she did not want to live that way. With the help of her family she filed for divorce. Marat's parents did not want the divorce, but Nazira could not longer endure the situation. Marat agreed, but refused to pay child support. She has written many letters to her aunt, Dinara, asking for assistance in bringing this to court. Dinara works as a lawyer, but she could not help Nazira. This has led to some awkwardness between family members. Nazira chose to live on her own with her children, but it was very difficult to make ends meet. Her income was only 900 som ($19.00) a month; and rent, food and other expenditures were very difficult to manage. Nazira's parents, therefore, wanted her to move to their village to be with them, but she did not want to. She said that she loved the village, but it was not possible to find work there. Her father said that he could get her a position as director of a school, but at that time she was not committed to teaching, although her opinion later changed. Nazira said that she preferred to live on her own. Some people thought it was strange that she would want to, but she was content with her situation. Indeed, she joked that when people came to visit and would see me, they might wonder if she had started a new relationship, but explained to everyone who I was and what I was doing. In fact, Nazira even told people that I was a member of her family. One night, after returning from a party in a village outside of Naryn, Nazira said she had seen her husband in a car. She did not comment on it at all, just to say that she did not want to see him. Both her children were adamant that their mother wanted to stay single and they had no interest in seeing their father. The son once showed me a picture of him, but the daughter did not want to talk about him and found it painful to mention him.
Obligations and the Management of Shame
113
Gulaina Nazira's younger sister, Gulaina, had also been abducted and suffered similar difficulties. Nazira had already told me Gulaina had been abducted, but nothing more. One night I asked Gulaina how she met her husband. She told me that after she finished school in Naryn, she went to work in a store in Bishkek, which was owned by her brother, and attended university. She lived in an apartment which her brother had bought in a university hostel. While she was working at the store, her future husband came in one day. She did not speak with him much, and when he left, she did not think any more about it; he was just another customer. Two years went by and she never saw him again. Then one night she was walking home and a car pulled up in front of her. She did not pay attention to the car; she kept walking as she was very close to home. One man, dressed in military clothes, got out of the car. He spoke with Gulaina while several other men, who were all drunk, got out of the car. Suddenly they grabbed her and pushed her into the car. Gulaina cried as she thought that they were going to kill her or throw her in a lake. They drove out of town, eventually stopping at a rest place and the men got out of the car. The driver turned to Gulaina and asked: 'Why are you crying? We have just kidnapped you.' 12 She then cried more, partly out of relief that she was not going to be killed, but also because she had been stolen. She was taken to her new husband's parent's village in Ysyk-Kol oblast'. The man's parents put a headscarf on Gulaina signifying that she was married, despite her constant protests. Meanwhile, in Bishkek, people were aware that Gulaina had been missing for several days. The neighbours said they had seen a car stop and pick her up, and reported the car registration number to the police. The police traced the registration number to the owner, but that person had sold it some time ago and the police had not been informed of the change of ownership. The police spoke to the neighbours again, but they were unable to give them any more information. At this time, Gulaina's parents were in Bishkek. Kachkymbek was in hospital having suffered a heart attack. The parents of Gulaina's new husband travelled to Bishkek to ask her parents for their approval for the marriage. 'It's like that in Kyrgyzstan,' Gulaina said, meaning that they only ask to marry you after they have abducted you. Gulaina's parents agreed to the marriage and said that she should stay with her new husband's parents. Nazira travelled to the village to tell her. It was only a few years later that they officially registered the marriage in Bishkek. Gulaina said that after some time she had grown used to her new husband and loved him, but it was not a strong love. She had admitted that she did not know what love was at that time. The feelings she had for her husband had come through familiarity rather than any deep emotive connection. Since they had been together they had two daughters. Gulaina said that she truly loved her daughters, more than her husband.
114
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic THE PRACTICALITIES OF LIFE
Gulaina had temporarily moved to Naryn from Bishkek to look for work. After a long absence from her studies due to being abducted and giving birth, she was able to finally finish her degree in economics. Her husband, Sanjar, was a carpenter. He was often out of work and came home with friends and expected Gulaina to cook for them. She did not have enough money to cook for everyone or enough time to look for a job and take care of her children. Nazira told me that in the past three years Sanjar had given her gold earrings as a present, but she was forced to sell them as she needed the money. Gulaina hoped to find a job in Naryn where she could use her skills as an economist and asked her friends to help her find a job and for somewhere to live. While she was looking for work during the day, her father had helped pay for her children to go to a day care centre. Sanjar was still in Bishkek. He did not want to come to Naryn as he did not think he would be able to find work there. Furthermore, he did not want to be close to Gulaina's family, where they might be able to try to exert their influence over him or find him specific jobs that he may not have wanted to do. Sanjar eventually did come to Naryn and, together with Gulaina, they looked for somewhere to live and visited her parents. Sanjar, however, did not like Naryn and returned to Bishkek. Gulaina preferred being close to her family, but was also confused about her relationship with Sanjar and what she should do about it. I asked Gulaina once why she did not run away after being abducted. She was scared and did not like the family that had abducted her. She said that her father had told her to stay with Sanjar. She said that if she had run away, she would not have respected her father's decision, and then she 'would not be his child.' If a woman had been abducted and spent the night at the man's house, it was assumed that they had consummated their relationship. If she left the house, especially after her father consented to the marriage, people might think of her as a prostitute. Ignoring her father's decision would bring further problems. People might think she would be a bad wife and it would be difficult for her to find another husband. If she had left Sanjar, she would have brought shame upon herself and her family. Gulaina, as Nazira, depended heavily on the support of her family. She could not afford to lose this and bring upon herself social shame that would continue to affect her. The intricacies of the consent to marriage by the father and acceptance by the daughter/abductee are played out in the ideologies marriage and kinship, and the position of power implicit in the notion of obligation. The daughters were threatened with exclusion from the network of help if they did not accept their father's decision. To loose this connection would have been devastating. The obligation to remain with their abductors may appear at first sight as the theft of the women's agency. There is a loss of physical freedom and, sometimes, sexual violence involved. The social relations that bind them through obligation do not fully limit women's agency.
Obligations and the Management of Shame
115
The apparent passivity, for some, might be a strategy of its own (Akiner 1997). In situations, the decision to stay may be influenced by their need to continue to receive help from their family. It is an overstatement to suggest that a woman's decision to stay with her abductors is a calculated strategy. Being abducted by, and forced into marriage with, in some cases, a complete stranger is an unparalleled and terrifying experience. Women do resist and there are many stories about how they have escaped their abductors (Werner 2009). 13 For many, however, physical restraint and social and family pressure limit their resistance and force many to obey their fathers. They remain their father's daughter, and, as in the case of Gulaina, continue to have access to the help their father can provide. In the case of bride abductions, the family's honour, as Cynthia Werner (2009) suggests, is put in jeopardy. She notes that in southern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, female modesty is essential to a family's social standing in their community. Accepting the marriage, Werner states, is a way to manage shame and restore honour to the family. Shame, I suggest, also works to moderate behaviours and impose power relations between family members. Shame is not something that occurs as the result of another action, it is constantly present in all relationships. Limiting exposure to shame and finding ways to manage it if it does occur are an important part of social relations. This ranges from the complications of marriage and abduction discussed above, but also to offering people tea and bread. There are acknowledged standards in society and, while people may go against them, they do so at the risk of incurring shame in the perception of other community members. Thus, for some abducted women, the decision to stay is reinforced through familial and social notions of shame, and the lasting problems that can result from not fulfilling obligations to others. NETWORKS OF ASSISTANCE Obligations entail relationships where the expectations and demands on others generally expand mutual indebtedness. Shame is often used to impress upon people their duty to one another to provide help. There are occasions, through marriages and bride abduction, that shame is used, however, to exert power. A family will be shamed in their community if their daughter returns home after being abducted. Managing shame is often done behind subtle power relations, which, if not addressed in an appropriate manner, could threaten the continued provision of help. In the examples above, all three women were in difficult situations and needed their families. Nazira and Gulaina, in particular, would have suffered greatly without their parent's help. Yet, this meant that they had to agree to stay with their abductors, accepting their father's decision and managing the shame of the situation they were put in. Obligations, thus, imply relations that freely render help, yet are moderated through power relations, often encapsulated within notions of shame.
116
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
In contrast to the networks of help, relationships established through what I call networks of assistance, are often outside of the family. Here neighbours, work colleagues, classmates, army buddies, friends and acquaintances provide assistance to support people, often through difficult periods. Important to these relationships is a notion of reciprocity. This is not necessarily calculable, but assistance demands a return of some kind. Nazira had a number of friends that provided assistance to her every day and she likewise helped. There was a specific incident that emphasized how important friends and colleagues were to support not only financial, but also emotional, coping strategies, and how this grew into more than just reciprocity. During my fieldwork, Nazira had a problem with the electricity company, but the way it was resolved and the relationship that grew out of it was an example of a relation of assistance. Nearly two weeks after New Year, Nazira returned from her parent's village to Naryn. She arrived just as a man from the electricity company was about to cut off the electricity supply to the flat. Nazira stopped him and spoke with a woman, Jyldyz, also from the electricity company that was supervising the disconnection. A bill had arrived while N azira was away, but the company had decided to disconnect the electricity without sending any further warnings. Nazira had no money at that moment, so she quickly ran around and collected money from friends and neighbours. She gathered enough to pay for the minimum cost and promised to pay the rest later. She paid the bill and the people from the electricity company left. A couple weeks later, Nazira ran into Jyldyz in the market and thanked her again for not cutting off the electricity. She invited Jyldyz to her home for dinner as a way to show her appreciation. They began to meet regularly and quickly became close friends. Jyldyz often came to the flat; Nazira cooked dinner andJyldyz took hot baths, as she did not have hot water at home. They also came to an arrangement over the electricity; Nazira would pay less than the full amount and Jyldyz would make it seem as though the full amount had been paid. Jyldyz continued to come to the house at various times, even when she was not coming for dinner. One day, she arrived visibly upset. She had had an altercation at work which left her shaken. She had come to Nazira to discuss her problem and anxieties that, as she put it, she 'could no longer trust anyone'. It was a difficult situation, but Nazira tried to comfort her and Jyldyz was obviously grateful for this. Their relationship had developed over time. What began as an agreement over the electricity bill became a strong friendship with emotional support. This was beyond calculable reciprocity, but was the basis for mutual support. Assistance goes beyond notions of exchange. On the one hand, it shares similarities with blat connection, relationships that helped people to obtain the things they needed in a shortage economy (Verdery 1991). These connections, pulling strings to gain access to necessary items, were an important strategy during the Soviet Union. It did not exist purely
Obligations and the Management of Shame
117
for exchange. As Alena Ledeneva (1996/1997: 46) notes, blat was 'an exchange for the sake of a relationship'. Informal understandings existed dictating the type of return that was required and the appropriate time to make the exchange, but maintaining the relationship was essential. On the other hand, while the emphasis on blat connections focuses on what can be obtained, assistance identifies a broader set of relations, often not with getting specific goods or services, but with helping to meet daily needs. For Nazira and Jyldyz, their relationship became more than the repayment of a debt, it developed into a friendship where they could find emotional support. This is not to say that reciprocity became less of an issue, but that the relationship itself meant much more than the services provided, and became a way for them to deal with daily challenges. When discussing the kinds of help and assistance people could rely on, there was no mention of appealing to people through their uruk or uruu. Establishing and maintaining a relationship, whether through kinship or some other connection, is essential to receiving help and assistance. Uruk and uruu, however, are not there as a resource that can be accessed whenever needed. Relations to people have to be established and maintained in order for people to render support. While genealogies are regarded as socially important and to the creation of a particular self, it does not necessarily provide people with a charter through which they can appeal for support. The concept of a cohesive group is not demonstrated through relations to overcome everyday challenges. In short, tribal relations do not appear in daily life. While there is some discussion of gathering with uruk members during life-cycle rituals (Chapter 3), it is not imagined as a way to gain access to help or assistance to meet daily challenges. Further, such genealogical relations are almost completely ignored in cases of bride abduction. In contrast, genealogies took on greater importance at the national level, building the notion of what constitutes the Kyrgyz person as a citizen of the state. Connecting the nation through a general genealogy became the centre of Akaev's nation-building ideology. This contributed to making the Kyrgyz look more tribal than they really are. Several national celebrations contained a central notion that the ancestors built the Kyrgyz state, and thus, the people are connected to the state through their ancestors. They are the nation and state, and it is their moral duty to continue the work of the ancestors. The expansion of the genealogical imagination through an official history to unite all Kyrgyz was most evident in the 2003 celebrations of 2,200 years of statehood.
1
NOTES I use the term abduction to discuss those cases where a woman is forcefully taken against her will by strangers for marriage. This is different from bride kidnapping, which can also imply consensual marriage and 'kidnapping' may involve a mock abduction or a pre-arranged meeting with the groom's parents.
118 2
3
4
5
6
7
8 9
10
11
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
The average exchange rate in 2002 was US$ 1.00 = 46.9175 Kyrgyz som. Data from the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, http://www.nbkr.kg (accessed 8 August 2009). Another time, Kachkymbek had complained that the villages were left without the technological capabilities of using the land to better effect. Although in the mountains there is only a short harvest season, they could have planted some carrot and potato crops, but without machinery to help them achieve this, it was very difficult. While the language that Nazpary notes was not explicitly used by the people I spoke with, the same sentiments and concepts of feeling 'dispossessed' were present. See also Caroline Humphrey (2002) on the mythologizing of the dispossessed in Russia. Growing economic dependence by women on their families has been a trend noted in Kyrgyzstan following independence (Bauer, Green and Kuehnast 1997: 49). See also Howell (1996) on the difficulties of coping with poverty in the transition period. For more on bride kidnapping, see Karimova and Kasybekov (2003), Kleinbach, Ablezova and Aitieva (2005), Lloyd-Roberts (1999), Moldosheva (2008), Rodriguez (2005), Smith (2005) and the United Nations Population Fund (2007). Cynthia Werner (1998, 2009) has also examined cases of bride kidnapping in southern Kazakhstan. See Human Rights Watch (2006: 137-40) for more on the relevant sections of the Criminal and Administrative Codes which cover bride abduction. Petr Lorn's film, 'Kyrgyzstan -The Kidnapped Bride' (2004), made for Frontline/World and filmed mainly in northern Kyrgyzstan, recounts the story of one young lady who was kidnapped. Because of the shame she felt from being kidnapped and possibly being raped, she hanged herself. The parents of the deceased girl went to the police, but explained in the film that nothing had been done. To see clips from the film, see: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kyrgyzstan/thestor y.html, accessed 5 July 2005. Another story is the BBC reporter Sue LloydRoberts' (1999) article on bride kidnapping and her own struggle with the moral implications of it. Arranged marriages are still practised, both in cities and in rural areas, although there is no detailed information on the extent of the practice. Although bride kidnapping could be used as a tactic to escape from an arranged marriage, or as a way of subverting another one, this does not happen in many cases. There are various reasons why parents would want to arrange the marriage of their children, but usually it involves issues of securing a marriage for their children before they become too old (particularly in the woman's case, which is by her early twenties). The daughter-in-law can also be of help to her mother-in-law. These reasons are also sometimes justifications for kidnapping. Such notions are supported by Nazpary, who comments on hooligans' harassment of women in Kazakhstan. He notes: 'harassment is particularly imposed on non-Kazakh women, because, according to women, hooligans claim that the Kazakhs' primordial rights in the territory of Kazakhstan entitle Kazakh men to an undisputed right over the bodies of
Obligations and the Management of Shame
12
13
119
women who live in Kazakhstan. And they frequently resort to violence to enforce such claims' (Nazpary 2002: 48). This story was told to me by Gulaina in Russian. When she said that she had been 'kidnapped', she used the Russian verb ukrat', which literally translates as 'to be stolen.' For example, Craig Smith (2005) recounts the story of a woman that was kidnapped twice. The first time she was kidnapped, the woman lied, screamed that she was not a virgin so that they might release her. As they had not reached the man's village, the men reconsidered their actions and took her home. People, however, found out what had happened, and made fun of her. To say she was not a virgin is widely interpreted that she is a prostitute. These rumours upset her father, who was seen not to have control over his daughter. Eventually, she was kidnapped again, and this time, remained married to her abductor. Despite attempts to resist abductions, it is difficult to deal with the resulting insults and suspicions that follow.
5
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
morning in Bishkek's Ala-Too Square, soldiers stand guard next Every to the Kyrgyz flag while speakers blare out the national anthem. On the cold and rainy morning of 15 May 2003, President Askar Akaev, high-ranking politicians and academics attended a special flag-raising ceremony. This ceremony marked the beginning of a two-day international conference on Kyrgyz statehood. 1 After the flag had been raised and the soldiers had taken their guard, the politicians and delegates attending the conference went to the Kyrgyz National University. Here, the President unveiled a new statue of the eleventh-century poet and philosopher jusup Balasagyn in front of the main entrance to the university. Balasagyn was most noted for his book Kutadgu Bilig, or Beneficent Knowledge,Z in 1069, which outlined laws and moral codes within an Islamic context. In his speech at the unveiling, Akaev praised Balasagyn, calling him: 'a great fellow countryman [zemlyak], a well-known compatriot, one of the symbolic representatives of our ancient culture, [and] one of the symbols of our whole society' (Akaev 2003f: 336 ). 3 Akaev also noted that: 'The majestic figure of jusup Balasagyn- a sage and statebuilder rgosudarstvennik] -finds new importance and new scope in the thousand-year memory of our people' (Akaev 2003f: 340). 4 The President argued that by linking the present with figures of the past, he was supporting a national revival, 'when a new epoch of power calls our people to form a national spirituality [dukhovnost1, in the context of universal human values. Today, it is important to return to the spiritual wealth of the past, which is our great cultural heritage' (Akaev 2003f: 337). At the same time, Akaev added another dimension to the relationship with Balasagyn. He stated that Balasagyn was a leader of a Kyrgyz uruu, Chigilei, which today is argued to be the ancient name of the uruu Cherik. In his closing remarks, the President announced: 'By opening the monument to jusup Balasagyn, we, his descendents, carry out the sacred duty to the great son of Kyrgyzstan' (Akaev 2003f: 342). The implication was that the continual goal must be to improve and strengthen the 'state' and to focus on the moral development of the people by drawing
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
121
on (secular) social values elaborated through the government's account of history. This representation places Balasagyn within a sanjyra of the Cherik uruu, but also as part of an officially sanctioned genealogy of the Kyrgyz people. This latter ascription promotes him as a national hero, whose actions and moral virtues should be emulated in the present. In short, the government appropriated the sanjyra to narrate the formation of the state. These actions and morals are encompassed in Akaev's use of the Russian term 'dukhovnost", which translates into English as 'spirituality'. Here, dukhovnost' does not describe a set of religious beliefs, but rather a set of morals connected to the maintenance of the Kyrgyz ethnic values, as Akaev described them through the seven precepts he formulated from his reading of the Manas epos (Chapter 6). Morality, as Caroline Humphrey (1997: 25) has described, is an 'evaluation of conduct in relation to esteemed or despised human qualities'. Akaev's use of dukhovnost' recalls the strength and importance of the ancestors' moral values which acted as a guide for the 'Kyrgyz people'. This association of strong moral virtues attached to a genealogy of national heroes develops a notion of 'exemplary figures' (Humphrey 1997). By focusing on the positive characteristics of an idealized past, however, he also points to a lack of morals in the present, which threatens the unity of the people and the strength of the state. GENEALOGY AS A METHODOLOGICAL TOOL Akaev's constructed genealogy clearly links the Kyrgyz people of today and Balasagyn. This is not following an individual descent line, but is a general charter for the nation and state through prominent figures, which highlights their collected values. The line drawn between the people and concept of the nation and state reveals the traces of the discursive formation of the relationships it creates. In this manner, genealogy can serve as a methodological tool. In this, I follow David Owen's (1994: 221) definition of genealogy as '[a] historical reconstruction of how we have become what we are which acts as an immanent critique of what we are and which is directed towards the practical achievement of human autonomy'. The methodological use of genealogy attempts to uncover the ideologies behind our conception of ourselves, as was Owen's concern with focusing on the history of philosophical movements, and, in particular, tracing Immanuel Kant's concept of maturity and his intellectual legacy in modernity. I employ this methodology as a study of the present, which traces the discursive elements employed to construct contemporary images of our identities. There are two issues which represent the basic concerns of this methodology. First, genealogy is used to identify and analyse the a priori assumptions of our social life. The values and beliefs which form the basic concepts a person's identity are developed through experiences which are internalized and contribute to the formation of
122
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
reified concepts. While these concepts seem to be an eternal part of identity, they are temporal, conveying influential notions from the time they were elaborated. In other words, genealogy traces the construction of ideas within the context and circumstances they are elaborated. Second, genealogy examines the language which is used to construct a priori assumptions in social life. Discourse analysis emphasizes the ambivalence of language and the changing interpretations and meanings connected with ideas and concepts. Meaning is created externally, following the contours of ideologies, shaping individual identities. Concepts which appear to be essential to identity are created outside, internalized and reproduced, recreating the means through which ideas are conveyed, adapted, expanded and overturned through new concepts in different contexts. These two points are by no means a complete account of all the elements employed to create identity; such a project would never be complete. Also, this is not to exclude non-discursive actions, such as feelings and impressions. Here, rather, the intention is to analyse the construction of the nation and state as an identity elaborated through relatedness and portrayed in nation-building projects. As Owen explains, the general move to explore a priori assumptions developed from critiques of Immanuel Kant's study of reason. Kant's views were criticized by a number of philosophers, most notably Friedrich Nietzsche (1990), whose work can be described as a move from epistemology to genealogy. It was a shift from a theory of a stable, bounded body of knowledge founded upon distinct notions of reason, to that of an investigation of the elements which constructed that knowledge. Nietzsche's use of genealogy was an evaluative measure, to understand the historical development of knowledge and morality. Since, in Nietzsche's view, language had no universal meaning, a priori judgements could not be made. He disregarded Kant's transcendental ego, i.e. the unity of the individual's consciousness; it was not an object that can be experienced itself. Instead, he postulated an alternative form of consciousness, which he imagined as 'a social product whose historical development is co-extensive with the development of language' (Owen 1994: 22). In other words, Nietzsche was concerned with the hegemony of interpretation. 'Interpretation is reading without being able to fix the origin, proper place, code, or principle of the text. It was to suppose that meaning is always external and that the text does not contain its code in and of itself, but depends [... ] upon what is outside of itself' (Blondel 1994: 313, original emphasis). Thus, interpretations and the resulting meanings, informing a sense of 'personhood'- particularly how they are shaped through political ideologies- are external to us. We do not create language, but instead we are created by its representation of ourselves. Michel Foucault developed Nietzsche's view of the hegemony of interpretation, in his own discussion of genealogy. Foucault (1984: 83) noted that genealogy was a method to comment on the 'hazardous play of domination', which conditions our understanding of ourselves. Foucault (1984: 86) argued that if interpretation is a 'violent or surreptitious
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
123
appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations'. In other words, interpretation reveals the entrenched judgements about ourselves and the continual shifts in how we recast our identities. Further, we have no control over these external judgements of identities. He demonstrated the influence these judgements have over us in his study of power and hegemony. Ultimately, Foucault's development of genealogy as a methodology is directed at the investigation of relationships between ethics and power. The aim is to understand what we have become, but also to know how concepts of ourselves are entrenched in our cultural lives. It is to recognize that the meanings attached to ideas of what we have become are interpretations. In this regard, it is the task of genealogy to chart the changes in the history of interpretations in reference to present circumstances (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1983: 108). Focusing on Akaev's vision, I use genealogy to reveal the ideologies that lie behind the concept of national-level relatedness, the formation of the state and the ways they are expressed. Here, particular focus is given to Akaev's use of ethnogenensis, the study of the origins of a people and the characteristics that separate them from others. This reveals much about the development of Kyrgyz identity before and after independence. Akaev's sympathy for the particular theoretical strain of Lev Gumilev has had implications for supporting the use of sanjyra as a base for Kyrgyz history. The theory, however, is contentious. It can evoke ethnic chauvinism. This was a concern in previous debates about the theory. ETHNIC STUDIES IN THE 1990s Ethnogenesis had been a popular theory since the 1930s and was the predominant theory in much Soviet research. Ethnogenetic studies focused on demonstrating the existence and stable development of 'nations' through language, customs, territory and economic life throughout history. Victor Shnirelman (1996: 10) noted that as 'Soviet patriotism' or nationalism grew, scholars were encouraged 'to study the formation and evolution of peoples living in the USSR'. The reforms introduced by Gorbachev in the 1980s permitted Soviet scholars to reconsider the directions of their disciplines. This led to an intense debate about the purpose and intention of nationalist ideologies in the late- and post-Soviet period. Ethnogeneic studies were used to support the leadership's ideological position that ethnic groups needed to be presented as developing into socialist societies. With the introduction of Gorbachev's more liberal policies, academics were able to expand somewhat the parameters of the ethnogenesis discourse. In 1990, Anatoly Khazanov (1990: 220) remarked that 'Soviet anthropology is at present at the crossroads in matter [sic] connected
124
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
with the general theory of ethnicities and particularly in its application to the ethnic situation in the USSR.' Ethnic studies in the USSR, Khazanov noted, were based upon the notion that ethnic groups are stable and continuously transmit their social structures from generation to generation. However, this did not, he argued, explain or moderate the rising ethnic tensions visible in various parts of the Soviet Union. It was his hope that the social sciences would move beyond this impasse to be able to adopt a multiplicity of views. A few years later, Valery Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology in the Russian Academy of Sciences, lamented that ethnos- a term describing a community consciously aware of its separate identity - and ethnogenesis were still the most 'powerful and sacred categories in post-Soviet anthropology and in public discourse' (Tishkov 1994: 88). Although he was writing not long after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was clear that in many cases ethnogenesis was one of the biggest interests in post-Soviet academic discourses and, for some remained 'sacred', because it supported many ethno-nationalist political ideologies. While ethnogenesis had been a Soviet tool to authenticate different 'peoples' and to chart their position on the scale of civilization, it was now used to demonstrate the independence of new countries and separatist movements. Moreover, established academics, who had employed this theory, asserted their seniority over the new scholars, who were 'simplistically presented as naive newcomers lacking understanding of the theoretical depth of the "domestic school", and at the same time lacking proper patriotism' (Tishkov 1994: 89). 5 Although ethnogenesis supported independence movements, some of its proponents also used it to express chauvinism and xenophobia. Scholars, such as Viktor Shnirelman and Sergei Panarin, criticized this view, specifically targeting the work of Lev Gumilev, one of the most popular ethnogenetic theorists since the 1960s. Shnirelman and Panarin (2001: 10) have summarized Gumilev's view of ethnogenesis: The birth of an ethnos [is formed] by [the] appearance of a small group of people, united by common sympathy and a great feeling of patriotism, who are prepared to sacrifice personal prosperity and even their lives for the achieving of their projected goal. In its name they are ready to break with their usual norms of behaviours, i.e. with the existing stereotype. They claim that Gumilev's theories are highly dangerous. They attack Gumilev's judgement of history as born of a patriotic viewpoint which has led to 'extreme subjectivisim, fed by a priori assumptions and ethnic stereotypes' (Shnirelrnan and Panarin 2001: 5). They accuse Gumilev of leaving historical events and other significant information out of his theories, as these do not fit with its logic. They continue by saying: 'Gumilev's adoption by principle of historical amoralism, which allows his theories to be used by political extremists, is combined with deeply
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
125
conservative attitudes adopted from Eurasianists' (Shnirelman and Panarin 2001: 14). Finally, they state: 'Gumilev was not the "father of ethnology" but the prophet of dilettantes and xenophobic half-educated people - the kind of people who are filled with a furious desire to provide humanity with a new version of universal history' (Shnirelman and Panarin 2001: 15).6 Such criticism has highlighted the struggle between historical research and the use of history as a tool for separatist movements and the assertion of power. In some places, such as Kyrgyzstan, ethnogenesis has not been taken to such extreme lengths, but does supports attempts to articulate a separate ethnic identity and continual efforts to attain independence. ETHNOGENESIS AND LEV GUMILEV Despite such criticisms, and the ways his theories have been interpreted, Gumiev's theories illustrate a precarious balancing act inherent in the Soviet ideological pursuit of creating nationalities and its collapse into independence movements. This was the ultimate source of his success, but also the reason for his suppression. Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), the son of Anna Akhmatova and Nikolai Gumilev (both prominent poets who suffered under Soviet repression)/ was an eminent historian and geographer from 1960 to 1988. He had been sentenced to hard labour in gulags several times in the 1930s, served in the Second World War, and again was sent to a gulag from 1949 until1956. 8 Although he managed to establish himself as an academic and retain a post in Leningrad State University, he was closely monitored. Only during perestroika was he allowed to publish his most famous work, Ethnogenesis and the Earth's Biosphere (Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli). 9 Since that time, his work has become very popular. Although he was restricted throughout his career, his theories of ethnogenesis do not necessarily reflect an anti-Soviet agenda. It was instead the way in which they could be interpreted as grounds for independence, particularly by ethno-nationalists leaders. His theories are prominent not only in Kyrgyzstan, but throughout the former Soviet Union. Gumilev's studies of Eurasia, for example, have led the President of Kazakhsan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, to name the Eurasian National University in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, in Gumilev's name to honour his work on the subject. Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis was distinctive because of its focus on biology, as opposed to socio-political factors. 10 This was a theoretical interest he developed from the work of Sergei Shirokogorov (18871939), an ethnologist who worked in the Russian Far East and China. 11 Shirokogorov (2002) viewed mankind as representing a biological species, divided into ethnic units. Expanding this view, Gumilev argued that 'ethnos, which exists naturally, is based on a group of people's unique behaviour stereotype. It exists as a power system, based upon a sensation of komplimentarnost' ['complimentarity'], and is opposed
126
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
to all other similar groups' (Gumilev 1989: 481). Komplimentarnost', as Gumilev defined it, could potentially have positive and negative effects. It was a 'sensation of subconscious mutual sympathy (antipathy) of the individuals, determining the division between "ours" and "others'" (Gumilev 1989: 478), therefore acting as a form of self-awareness. 12 He argued that komplimentarnost', often called patriotism, 'is found in the competence of history, for it is impossible to love people while not respecting their ancestors' (Gumilev 1989: 225). He argued, however, that komplimentarnost' sometimes emerges as a form of chauvinism on an inter-ethnic level. Although ethnos occurs naturally, Gumilev argued that it was born out of a desire for fundamental change. He termed this 'passionarnost" ('passionarity'). It was 'the ability and aspiration towards changing the milieu, or, translating this into the language of physics- breaking the state of inertia' (Gumilev 1989: 257). Gumilev called passionarnost''factor x' -the development of a desire for change, which will permanently alter a group's self-awareness and representation. This desire was the result from the accumulation of energy which generated strong feelings of change. In the biosphere, the Earth's crust where all living matter is located, social groups receive energy from the cosmos. In this way, groups build up a well of passionarnost', essential for them to enact change. This represented the most intimate relationship between society and nature. Here, Gumilev drew from the war k of Vladimir I. Vernadskii ( 18 63-1945), a famous mineralogist and public figure in Russia who wrote extensively on the biosphere. Vernadskii argued that the source of free energy in the planet is from living organisms and the surrounding environment. Following Vernadskii's work, Gumilev stated: 'our planet receives more energy from the cosmos than is necessary for the maintenance of the biosphere's equilibrium. This [energy] leads to an excess, generating[ ... ] among people- passionarsnost' impulses or explosions of ethnogenesis' (Gumilev 1989: 308). Gumilev's theories could be described as a form of 'biological primordialism'. Ethnic groups do not just exist as a result of socio-political factors, but passionate energy from the surrounding environment building inside its members, until a new ethnos eventually breaks away from other groups. These new groups assert that 'their' history has always existed, if previously under a different name. This theory gave some politicians the justification to mobilize their people as nationalities in attempts to break away from the Soviet Union. This focus on nationalism was not an invention of the communist intellectuals. Reforms that targeted nationalism, introduced in Russia in the 1820s, were developed out of a discourse on how to structure education and train people's minds and bodies in order to create a coherent nation. Such views were based on the work of the German scholar Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Fichte's vision, to educate children in nationalist ideology, laid the foundation for Gumilev's description of ethnogenesis. This has subsequently influenced Akaev's
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
127
notion of how to train a nation through its genealogies and the moral duties people have to their ancestors. ANTECEDENTS OF ETHNOGENESIS In his Addresses to the German Nation, Fichte outlined his idea for the construction of the German nation through education. He argued that not only would people see themselves as a separate ethnos, but, through education, they would train future generations to act in defence of this identity. His views were no doubt influenced by his reaction against the French occupation of parts of Germany in 1808 when he delivered these lectures in Berlin. His views gained the support of a large segment of the population who also tired of the occupation and were galvanized by this patriotism. A German nation, according to Fichte, could only be achieved by unifying the people. In his opening address, Fichte (1968: 3) stated: Only of Germans and simply for Germans, I said. In due course we shall show that any other mark of unity or any other national bond either never had truth and meaning or, if it had, that owing to our present position these bonds of union have been destroyed and torn from us and can never recur; it is only by means of the common characteristic of being German that we can avert the downfall of our nation which is threatened by its fusion with foreign peoples, and win back again an individuality that is selfsupporting and quite incapable of any dependence upon others. In Fichte's view, the struggle to achieve unity would be painful. Difficulties and hardships were necessary, but in order to reach their goals, Germans must not be made prisoners to these pressures. He stated the only way to achieve this new notion of nationalism was 'a total change of the existing system of education that I propose as the sole means of preserving the existence of the German nation' (Fichte 1968: 11). Fichte's new system of education focused on training the whole person. He noted: 'Accordingly, as the old system was able at best to train some part of man, so the new must train man himself, and must make the training given, not, as hitherto, the pupil's possession, but an integral part of himself' (Fichte 1968: 12). In the late 1820s, education reforms in Russia introduced new laws in order to train students in 'national' subjects, echoing Fichte's views. This was a reaction by Tsar Nicholas I to the Decembrist uprising of 1825. Through these reforms, Nicholas I reasserted his autocracy. It was 'the era of official nationalism, of nationalism by decree' (Vucinich 1965: 247). In other words, there was an emphasis placed on duty to the nation mixed with paranoia. Nicholas I made professors and students sign statements declaring that they did not belong to any secret societies and instituted a number of limiting measures. In 1826, he created a new
128
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
organization, the Supreme Censorship Committee, which was made up of members of the Ministries of National Education, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs. He also created a new censorship decree, much harsher than the existing one of 1804. The emphasis of this new degree was concentrated on science and education, morality and internal security, and the orientation of public opinion (Vucinich 1965: 247). At this time, significant changes took place within the sciences. The new emphasis of the education system included a greater concentration on educating the children of the aristocracy. The new laws passed by Nicholas I made it more difficult for the middle and lower classes to receive an education. 13 'The gymnasiums, as college preparatory schools, were to concentrate on educating the children of the gentry and government officials. Parish schools were to be opened for the peasantry, to give them as much education as seemed fit' (Vucinich 1965: 25 1). The children of the gentry and government officials were privileged in their education and also status. This did not mean that lower classes were completely excluded from higher levels of education, but their numbers were almost a token gesture in comparison with the number of upperclass children that were admitted to university. Count Sergei Uvarov (1786-1855), Minister of National Education from 1833 to 1849, developed many of these reforms. In 1832, just before he took his post, Uvarov announced the slogan for a 'Russian system' of education: 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality' ('Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost"). These three elements were presented as fundamental and closely interconnected components of Russian ethnic identity. These values 'raised the flag of old-fashioned patriotism and rang a proud affirmation of native values. It proffered a cogent outline of the dynamism, content, and form of Russian development' (Whittaker 1984: 94). Cynthia Whittaker described Uvarov's reforms as providing a fresh approach to education, within the Tsar's attempts to limit dissent. In her examination of this period, Cynthia Whittaker (1984: 135) noted: While Uvarov simultaneously sought to raise the quality of instruction and to create a 'new spirit' or 'morality' among youth, Nicholas [I] was primarily concerned with a 'morality even higher' than 'learning or erudition'. For the tsar, 'morality' served as a code word for loyalty to the autocracy, belief in Orthodoxy, and a pride in being Russian, all of which was to help prevent revolution and create domestic stability (Whittaker 1984: 135). The reforms that Uvarov instigated, I suggest, were influenced by German idealist philosophers more than has previously been discussed. Uvarov had travelled and studied in German-speaking countries in his youth and would have been well aware of the work of Immanuel Kant, and the work of some of his contemporaries, such as Friedrich Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Johann Gottlieb Fichte; and these
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
129
philosophers were already being taught in Russian universities from the 1820s. Intellectuals, such as Peter Redkin and Nikita Krylov, both lecturers in law; Timothy Granovskii, a historian, and M. G. Pavlov, an agronomist, were well acquainted with Fichte's work as well as with other German idealists, and were discussing them with students. The educational reforms in Russia stressing a nationalist view were developed in an intellectual climate strongly influenced by the works of contemporary German scholars. Uvarov's reforms were vital for the construction of Russian nationalism at the time. Vucinich (1965: 256) argued that Uvarov's policies: ... [gave] higher education a national character by ridding the social sciences and the humanities of all potentially subversive ideas. The rigid control of scientific thought was accompanied by an expansion of the curriculum dealing with 'national' subjects; Russian history was introduced as a special university subject, as were special courses in Slavic languages and literatures. The reorganization of the education system in Russia, almost twenty years after Fichte had made his pronouncements, reflected a concern to orientate education around a national ideology. In the case of the reforms instigated by Nicholas I, the focus was on official nationalism. This focus remained and was in some ways incorporated into the educational reforms of the early Soviet period. It helped generate a preoccupation with the creation of the Soviet man (Homo Sovieticus) - the citizen who embodied the ideals of socialism and whose ethnic identity was superseded by their devotion of the Soviet people. SOVIET ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNOGENESIS Creating a new society based on reforms which sought to train the people was a specific feature of cultural and educational campaigns following the October Revolution. In the early Soviet period, Serguei Oushakine (2004) noted there was a perception of instability connected with everyday life (in Russian, byt), which he described as a loss of self. Soviet writers and academics, such as Maxim Gorky, constructed a new public identity which many people integrated into their own experiences as they were searching for something to help them internalize the upheaval of the previous years. In particular, the theme of 'loss of self' was presented as 'instability of environment in general and nature in particular' (Oushakine 2004: 394, original emphasis). Discursive shifts in literature, science and pedagogy at that time reflected an attempt to overcome this loss: 'an absence of clearly articulated models of subjectivity was overcome (and overshadowed) by a very powerful and vivid rhetoric of various techniques through which a controlled environment of culture- a "second nature" in Gorky's words - could be created' (Oushakine 2004: 394).
130
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
The erasure of the self, an important condition for the modernization of Russia, in Oushakine's view, leads to what he termed the 'void subject', or 'a process of reducing the complexity of one's identity to "bare life", to the "biopolitical body", so that one's dependence on the protective shield of "second nature" becomes all the more crucial' (Agamben 1998: 171; cited in Oushakine 2004: 395). In particular, pedagogy provided a way of creating new people in the socialist image. In the 1920s and 1930s, Anton Makarenko (1888-1939), a school teacher from Ukraine, developed a new pedagogic method for training children and shaping their personalities. The organization of children into a collective body 'simultaneously acts as an external context and as an internally motivated force, a social hybrid achieved by a means of mentored training' (Oushakine 2004: 416). His method made the children aware of their place in a new system, a new way or organizing themselves in relation to others in their group. The disciplining techniques helped to orientate the children into their new surroundings, as the Soviet subject would try to merge with the environment to avoid a bare life, lacking meaning and structure. This desire for severing the ties with the past, retraining and reeducating people, and providing them with a new identity was reflected in Lenin's speech to the youth leagues in 1920. Lenin (1966: 283) noted that in order to build communism, the youth needed to be completely re-taught and this could only be accomplished by 'destroying the foundations of the old, the capitalist way of life'. The new generation of children were to create a new society. Lenin (1966: 299) stated: 'This generation should know that the entire purpose of their lives is to build a communist society.' The goal was to build a radically different society, through social and physical education. This is echoed in Oushakine's (2004: 416) comments on the Soviet subject: 'The successful development of an organism was considered to be a result of a double operation: severing the organism's attachment with the past was compensated by the organism's full and controlled immersion within newly-created conditions.' In a similar way, ethnographers too refined the categories by which they described peoples in the Soviet Union. The authorities attempted to reorganize former tsarist colonial subjects into nations which would eventually become Soviet citizens - an identity associated with the super-national state. This reflects another attempt to severe the past and start a new society. The elaboration of nationalism in a socialist context was, to a certain extent, something of a preventative measure (Martin 2001) so that separatist nationalisms would not challenge the authority of the Soviet regime. In accordance with these goals, theories of ethnogenesis were designed to study the ethnic origins of the Soviet people, formulating their research to conform to the stipulations laid down by Stalin in the 1930s. Attempts to reorganize and create a new society are clear from the censuses conducted by ethnographers in the early years of the
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
131
Soviet Union. These censuses created a standardized template to establish the social categories and dynamics of ethnic groups. Deviations from the questions were not allowed; answers had to conform to options on the questionnaires. For example, in the census of 1937 instructions given to the ethnographers were: 'If it should happen that the respondent, not having understood the questions, names something else instead of natsional'nost', either a religion (for example, Moslem), former estate (for example, inorodets [non-Russian]), place of birth (for example, Sibiriak)/ the census taker was instructed to 'explain his mistake to him and obtain a correct answer' (material from archive documents cited in Hirsch 1997: 271). Thus, many nuances were overlooked. In her study of Soviet censuses, Francine Hirsch (1997: 253) noted that: '[throughout] the 1920s and 1930s, officials consulted the [official census]lists in repeated attempts to "rationalize" the state's administrative structure and systematize the use of ethnic categories' .14 Censuses during the imperial era had focused on two criteria: language and religion. During the Soviet era, however, religion was not used to determine national identity. In early censuses, there was already a debate about the differences between the Russian terms natsional'nost' (nationality) and narodnost' (ethnicity), creating a hierarchy of self-recognition and relative independence of ethnic groups. These two terms continued to be a complicated issue throughout the censuses. At times these two terms were given separate meanings or one was included as a subgroup of the other; in the 1926 census they were even synonymous. By the mid-1930s, the definition of the terms had developed a hierarchical component: 'In official discourse, national'nosti were 'developed' peoples, and narodnosti were still developing' (Hirsch 1997: 267). This idea continued until the census in 1937 where natsional'nost'was used as the category of determining ethnic identity and narodnost'was dropped. Finally, in the 1939 census, the term natsional'nost'was used for a group which had definite territorial claims, and included nations, narodnost', and national groups. 15 Hirsch stated: Nations were defined as 'those making up the main population of a union and autonomous republics'. Narodnosti were 'peoples making up the main population of autonomous oblasts and national regions', and 'peoples of a significant number, living compactly in defined regions and having literacy in their own language'. National groups included 'these peoples, which in their main mass live outside the USSR', and which 'inside the USSR make up national minorities' (material quoted from archive documents cited in Hirsh 1997: 272-3).16 Therefore, in order to be a natsional'nost', not only did a group have to comply with the categorization of narodnost' (which meant they had a separate ethnic identity), they also had to reside on and have claims to a specific territory. This final change to the terminology supported
132
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Stalin's previous remarks concerning the national question: 'A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin 1973: 60, original emphasis). The Russian terminology and its change in different censuses lead Hirsch (1997: 278) to conclude: ... the consolidation of nationalities was very much in keeping with the revolutionary agenda of transforming the peoples of the former Russian empire into a modem citizenry. The paradox is that this 'modem citizenry' was one based on a western European prototype-a citizenry divided into economically viable nationalterritorial units, each with an official language, culture, and history. The divisions made by the ethnographers, in accordance with the stipulations of the Soviet administration, divided peoples along an evolutionary continuum and into various levels of national groupings. It was a shift in nature and reflected the emphasis of the origins of the new citizen. Ethnographers had to demonstrate how people could be ushered through the different stages and eventually to socialism. This was the goal of ethnogenesis, but as we have seen in Gumilev's work, the construction of national identities was reinterpreted to legitimate the strengthening of ethno-national identities in the late Soviet period. REPRESENTATIONS OF ETHNlClTY IN CENTRAL ASIA During the Soviet era, the study of ethnogenesis not only attempted to describe the origins of a people, it was a teleological discourse which posited that separate ethnic identities would eventually be abandoned in favour of a broader socialist identity. The establishment of ethnic groups, the ideological construction of those ethnicities into nationalities and the development of the nationalities policy by Lenin (which was continued by subsequent leaders of the Communist Party) eventually led to a situation where perceptions of nationally constructed imagined communities became markers of identityY Ethno-nationalleaders began to use Gumilev's theory to emphasize ethnic distinctiveness and their place in history. Another development which strengthened national identity was the organization of national cadres, through the 1923 policy of korenizatsiya ('indiginization'). This gave the nationalities a larger role in Communist Party ranks (Olivier 1990), and allowed the national cadres to recruit their 'own people' to institutions, creating an ethno-national majority, which slowly minimized the effect that non-nationals had in each republic (Slezkine 1994: 433). Although the republics still had to answer to Moscow, the local elites were strengthening their positions through the access networks they had cultivated throughout the Soviet era.
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities
133
By the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev had difficulties resolving 'ethnic' violence due to his slow decisions on how to tackle disputes throughout the USSR, especially those arising over territorial claims. 18 His reformulation of the policies initiated by Lenin, and his openness to reforms only encouraged ethno-nationalist leaderships with (more or less) demarcated territories to secede from the Soviet Union. This led to the disillusionment with the notion of a 'coming together' or 'convergence' (sblizhenie) of the various nationalities. Since the policy of national delimitation in 1925, social scientists argued that the 'coming together' of the different ethnic/national groups would led to a 'merging' (sliyanie) into a Soviet narod (people) (Smith 1990). The goal of sliyanie became increasing difficult to realize, but notions of inter-nationality 'friendship' and sblizhenie were still stressed by the Party. Economic reforms initiated under Khrushchev strengthened local interests and were viewed by administrators in Moscow as mestnichestvo (regionalism) (Smith 1990: 8), presenting another obstacle in achieving sliyanie. By the Gorbachev era, the notion of sblizhenie was almost abandoned for greater friendship between the nations. The ideal of the different Soviet republics coming together through a common cause had become less important than maintaining cordial official ties with each of the territories. Gorbachev's answer was to reassess the nationalism question to give the nations more equality, but this did not represent a form of federalism. This, nevertheless, provided an opportunity for republics to challenge their connections to the Soviet Union, and several republics declared independence. The countries and national identities that established independence or greater autonomy were predominantly Soviet creations (Ro'i 1991), and have been subject to nation-building efforts of their new political leaders. In cases such as Kyrgyzstan, the ethno-national vision, often underpinned by elements of Gumilev's theories, strengthened the desire to secede from the Soviet Union. The effect, as Yuri Slezkine (1994: 452) has described it, was that of a communal apartment where the occupants (the Soviet republics) had fallen out with one another: [The] tenants of various rooms barricaded their doors and started using the windows, while the befuddled residents of the enormous hall and kitchen stood in the centre scratching the backs of their heads. Should they try to recover their belongings? Should they knock down the walls? Should they cut off the gas? Should they convert their 'living area' into a proper apartment? Since independence, the new ethno-national elites have been vigorously engaged in their own nation-building projects. For example, Akaev's discussion of Balasagyn - a strong leader who embodies the goals of a unified Kyrgyz nation - is underpinned by ethnogenetic theories which legitimate its distinctiveness and separation from the Soviet Union.
134
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
In short, since the collapse of the USSR, the new elites have been reinterpreting ethnogenetic theories and employing them in the construction of independent ethno-national identities. In many ways this was a continuation of Soviet practices. For example, in his study of postSoviet Central Asia, Olivier Roy argued that: 'Nationalism was created by the administrative, cultural and political habitus installed by the colonial power, within an entity that had no antecedents of nationhood' (Roy 2000: x). Berg Fragner (2001: 13) contends that post-Soviet nationalism should not be seen 'as a break with Soviet traditions but as a more or less unconscious continuation of Soviet habits towards the "National Question'". The suggestion in both Roy's and Fragner's arguments that there is a continuance of Soviet ideology with little or no modification by local elites is misleading. Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet republics have maintained many facets of the Soviet ethnogenesis project in the descriptions of their respective nations, nationalities and 'peoples', this should not be seen simply as the workings of a habitus imposed by Soviet ideology, but an ideological field that has been actively manipulated by the new political elite. As Bruce Grant (1995) noted, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the ideological backdrop for the construction and crystallization of ethnic (i.e. national) identities became apparent, as they were no longer reinforced. In other words, the ways ethnogenesis is employed in political and some public media should not be seen as an unconscious continuation of Soviet models, but newly-applied visions. The old models may be used as they retained significance, but should not be mistaken for a continuation of previous logics. The Kyrgyz example shows that nationalism has been reinterpreted and presented to stress other values and goals in its post-Soviet development, some of which were reinterpretations of former Soviet concepts. The construction of a Kyrgyz national identity and the vision of history that underpins it have been used to govern the people, but in a way that also encourages them to govern themselves.
1
2
3 4 5
NOTES The conference, 'The Development of Statehood within the Conditions of Interaction of Nomadic Groups and Settled Oases in the Area of the Great Silk Road', was a key part of the statehood celebrations which mainly functioned to support the government's claim to 2,200 years of statehood, rather than offer an opportunity to critique and question the legitimacy of such notions. This is a general interpretation of the title. Rafis Abazov (2004: 83), however, translates the title as 'Knowledge which Gives Happiness'. See Balasagyn (1998) for an English translation of the text. Akaev delivered this speech in Russian. Gosudarstvennik could be translated as 'statesman'; however, I find that 'state-builder' matches Akaev's usage more closely. See also Tishkov (1997) where he describes ethnic studies in Soviet social sciences.
Ethnogenesis and the Construction of Ethnic Identities 6
7
8
9 10
135
Gumilev was often noted as the 'father of ethnology' as his particular methodology was quite a nuanced approach in Soviet social sciences. For more, see also Dragadze (1980: 163-4). Nikokai Gumilev- born in 1886, executed in 1921. Anna Akhmatova -born in 1889, died in 1966. Gulag describes a network of forced labour camps, or in this case, one particular camp. It is an acronym, which 'expanded' is rendered in Russian as: glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel'no-trudovykh lagerei (fhe Chief Administration of Correctional Labour Camps). He had published other work during the 1970s, but this was regarded as one of his most important works. One of the most important scholars in this debate, providing an alternative perspective from Gumilev, was Yulian Bromlei (or Bromley, depending on the translation) (1921-1990). Bromlei was a highly influential academic and head of the history department of the National Academy of Sciences in Russia from 1976 to 1990, and had made his mark on ethnogenetic studies since the 1960s. In contrast to Gumilev, who argued for a close interaction between nature and society as a determining factor in explosions of ethnic identity, Bromlei focused the formation of identities through an evolutionary delineation of social and economic factors. Bromlei preferred to use the Greek term, etJmos (in Russian, etnos), instead of the Russian term narod, for describing a community consciously aware of their separate ethnic identity. The term narod has a number of different meanings, none of which give an accurate definition for what Bromlei wanted to attribute to ethnic identity. Bromlei refined his description of ethnos, creating a distinction between what he called ethnicos and ethnosocial organism (ESO). Bromlei (197 4: 72) used ethnicos to define ethnos in a general sense, or what he called the 'ethnic phenomenon proper'. He described this as 'an historically-formed aggregate of people who share relatively stable specific features of culture (including language) and psychology, an awareness of their unity and their difference from other similar groups, and an ethnonym which they have given themselves' (Bromley 1980: 155; see also Bromlei 1973: 37, 1974: 66). This meaning was extended to groups that had the same 'ethnic' features, but did not share the same socio-economic formation, which Tamara Dragadze (1990: 207) claims was 'usually a rather spurious distinction between 11 socialist"cum-Soviet and 11 capitalist'". The ethnosocial organism, on the other hand, was part of a particular ethnicos: '[often] the main part of a given ethnicos is contained within the boundaries of a single state (a social organism)' (Bromely 1980: 155). In other words, this was a smaller group of people, who shared similarities with other people in their ethnicos, but were defined by living in one state, and belonged to a 'definite socio-economic formation which unavoidably gives a specific character' (Bromely 1980; see also Bromley and Kozlov 1989). Bromlei recognized three different socio-economic formations, all devised from a Marxist model of evolutionary typology: plemya ('tribe'), nationality or ethnicity (narodnost'), and bourgeois and socialist nations. Thus, the ethnosocial organism denoted territorially-bound ethnic groups at these different evolutionary stages, while ethnicos was a description of the wider ethnos of the people, i.e. their historically-formed commonalities
136
11
12
13
14
15 16
17 18
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
which indicated a certain level of corporateness, representing a separate ethnic group, but not necessarily confined to a single state. Shirokogorov's (2002) views have underpinned many scholars' concepts of ethnogenesis. In the Soviet theories, however, there is very little consideration of ethnic self-awareness or self-consciousness forming as the result of actual or perceived conflict or deprivation. See Dragadze (1980) for a short historical description of ethnos in Soviet ethnography. In contrast, this was a feature of some work on ethnicity in the West, particularly in the 1970s. See Dragadze (1980) for more on the differences between Soviet and Western views, and for a short history of ethnos in Soviet ethngraphay. A gymnasium statute in 1828 meant that the way schools taught subjects and who the students they taught completely changed. A later reform in 1835 essentially ended university republicanism as outlined in the 1804 education charter. It should also be noted that specific institutions in the various parts of the Soviet Union also had a significant effect on training and educating people in socialism. See Shoshana Keller (2003) on the role the Central Asian Bureau had in building up a group of native cadres or organizing groups with detailed knowledge of socialism. For a short discussion about the differences between the terms, see also Tishkov (1997: 33). There were different levels of autonomy granted to territorialized groups based on their size and official status as a nationality. For example, in 1924, Kyrgyzstan was regarded as the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Kyrgyz ASSR), within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Autonomous republics were also based on nationality and had specific territorial claims and special administrative autonomy within union republics. Within autonomous republics were krais, or large areas grouping together disparate groups of ethnicities. Within krias were autonomous oblasts. These oblasts had some territorial and administrative claims. Also, there were oblasts which were part of larger territorial and administrative structures, and had no separate claims. The largest and, technically, most autonomous formation was the Soviet Socialist Republic. In the latter part of Soviet rule, they were nominally given the right to secede from the Soviet Union. In 1936, the Kyrgyz were granted this status, and became known as the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic (Kyrgyz SSR). See Graham Smith (1990) for a discussion on the administration of the nationality policy throughout the Soviet era. In his book focusing on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Thomas de Waal (2003) highlights the effects of Gorbachev's indecisiveness.
6
The Genealogy of Kyrgyz History and Identity
-.:::' thnogenesis was a double-edged sword for the Soviet regime. It .l.:Jwas the state's tool to identify separate ethnic groups within their attempts to create a new structure and disciplining practices that would result in an idyllic civilization. Ethnographies helped define these identities and civilizing stages still to be passed in order to reach the final stage, communist. Yet, their tool was also adapted and used by others to support their independence movements. The particular theoretical approach of Lev Gumilev only heightened the precariousness with which the concept was applied. This was also the case in Kyrgyzstan. After the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic had been created in 1936, research continued into the republic's origins. Epic tales were examined for the historical and social information they contained about the Kyrgyz. In particular, the Manas epos was studied as an 'encyclopaedia of the Kyrgyz'. For Soviet administrators, this became a problem. The struggle to keep it from being widely celebrated was not so much about the story, but what it threatened- a heightened independence movement. Yet, the celebration that eventually did take place did not represent a complete break with the past or a passive application of Soviet ideas; it employed a variety of ideas, but set the stage for a new form of self-governance. Kyrgyzstan celebrated the 1,000th anniversary of the epic poem Manas in 1995. 1 It was of such importance that the commemoration received an endorsement from the United Nations in 1994. 2 The event celebrated an epic as a cornerstone of their ethno-national identity. The main focus of the festivities centred in Talas, in northwestern Kyrgyzstan. Here is what is believed to be the giimboz (burial vault) of Manas, a mythical warrior who united the Kyrgyz people. An entire complex, Manas Ordo (Manas's Palace), was constructed for the celebrations, which included a three-storey boz-iii (nomadic felt tent or yurt). The complex contained a museum about the epic Manas, other epics and also the region. Many people had constructed their own boz-iii, selling traditional handicrafts and other items. A separate
138
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
historical and ethnographic complex, Manas Aiyli (Manas's Village), was also built in Bishkek for the celebrations. The Manas epic is told by manaschi, people who, through divine inspiration, are able to recite the story. 3 According to general accounts of the legend, Manas was the only son of Jakib, a wealthy Kyrgyz aristocrat, who grew up to be a strong leader. From an early age he showed great strength, especially when he protected his father from a group of Kalmyks and killed their leader. He then slowly united the Kyrgyz plemya and defeated the Kalmyks and the Chinese. 4 In the officially sponsored government history he is the most important figure in the Kyrgyz nationbuilding project. The figure of Manas is evoked in many contexts. He is even remembered in the national flag. In the centre there is a golden tiindiik (the latticed smoke hole in the roof of a yurt) surrounded by forty flames, representing the forty Kyrgyz plemya that Manas united. This celebration was the culmination of a long struggle to have the epic recognized and further establish the Kyrgyz nation. Versions of the epos had been recorded and published during the era of the Russian Empire, but from the 1940s onwards, there was increasing scepticism about the meaning of the story, plays and publications were limited and no official celebrations were allowed. There had been plans by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1945 to celebrate the 1,100th anniversary of the epic. 5 The intention was focused on the 'strengthening of further development of Soviet patriotism, friendship between the nations of the USSR in the spirit of Stalin, as well as a development of Kyrgyz culture' (Akaev 2003c: 273). 6 In 1946, parts of one thematic cycle of Manas were translated into Russian and published in Moscow. There was also an opera. Nevertheless, some intellectuals began to raise questions about the underlying intentions of the epic, and labelled supporters of the epic as 'bourgeois nationalists'. Despite the argument from Kyrgyz communists, such as I. Razzakov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kyrgyz SSR from 1946 to 1950), the Party decided that the epic was too inflammatory. In a Soviet-era document, quoted by Akaev (2003c: 274), stated: 'For the sake of their class interests bourgeois nationalists forced some storytellers of Manas to distort the epos, mixing it with anti-national, Pan-Islamic, and Pan-Turkic ideas and in certain instances with open counter-revolutionary attacks against the Soviet authorities, the Bolshevik party, and its leader V. I. Lenin. This was the case in the version by Sagymbai Orozbakov[a famous manaschij.' Versions of the epic recorded by Russian ethnographers in the nineteenth century undoubtedly contain traces of information relevant to the time. The Kyrgyz were surrounded by China, the Kokand Khanate and the Russian Empire, all of which were attempting to establish their control over the region. Certain versions of the epic may reflect the view of those people caught up in the power struggle (Hatto 1990).7 Orozbakov's account, similarly, was quite likely a product of its time. It may have contained traces of popular sentiment at the time, including anti-Soviet ideas. Although his version had been given wide acceptance and Orozbakov
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
139
officially recognized for his talents, it was eventually banned. Orozbakov, according to Daniel Prior (2000: 15), was 'inaccurately characterized by Soviet scholars not as an innovative bard but as a captive of the old thinking and the old ways of a pre-Revolutionary society dominated by the bays and manaps, or wealthy men and chieftains. The main reason for this characterization is his sentiment for and knowledge of Islam.' The concerns of the 1940s meant that all celebrations of the Manas epic were suspended. There was a small revival in the 1950s, which resulted with the publishing of a more 'harmonized' version of the epic. It was not until the 1980s, however, that Chingiz Aitmatov once again trumpeted the virtues of the epic and a statue was erected in 1985. 8 Yet, there were still objections to Orozbakov's version of the epic by the Kyrgyz poet Aaly Tokombaev, who stated his complaints in a letter to the First Secretary of the Kyrgyz Socialist Soviet Republic Masaliev and Second Secretary Kiselev in 1986. He recalled that in 1952 Orozbakov's version had been condemned at a scientific conference as it was seen to be anti-Russian, pan-Islamic and nationalist (Ro'i 1991). The struggle by manashchi, Kyrgyz academics, politicians and others to establish Manas as a central figure of 'Kyrgyz' identity is a point of confrontation between Soviet ideology on the construction of nations and the local conceptions of the 'Kyrgyz' people. 9 On one hand, it is a story of ethnogenesis, the origins, history and society of the Kyrgyz people. On the other hand, it presents a dangerous case, where national identity, established through war, might also give rise to strong separatist movements. Reluctant to give official support, Soviet administrators were caught in a position of tacit acceptance. They accepted it as a part of Kyrgyz identity, but did not fully endorse it. The commemoration of the epic in 1995 was not a rejection of the Soviet stance, but took the ethnogenesis project further by demonstrating the development of the Kyrgyz state over time. During those festivities in Bishkek, President Askar Akaev made a speech, extolling the virtues found in the epos: 'We propose Manas as the companion of our life today; the union of the people, who are inspired for tomorrow; and an immortal spirit, which lives from generation to generation' (Akaev 2003d: 30). Akaev outlined seven precepts of Manas, which he had taken from his reading of the epos: 1) Unity and mutual support; 2) Interethnic harmony, friendship and cooperation; 3) National honour and patriotism; 4) Through hard, relentless work and knowledge comes prosperity and well-being; 5) Respecting the spirits of the ancestors and future generations; 6) Harmony with nature; 7) Strengthening and defence of Kyrgyz statehood (Akaev 2003d: 30-2). 10 These seven principles became the basis of the spirituality (dukhovnost~ that was mentioned at the unveiling of the Balasagyn statue. They form the basis of the official charter for the future based on the (mythical) past. Spirituality was an important feature, one that Akaev (2003c: 12) developed in a later discussion about the importance of the Manas epos to the Kyrgyz people:
140
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Our national epos connects the succession of generations of Kyrgyz with its high moral principles and ethical standards, which have become the flesh and blood of the Kyrgyz. [... ]Heroism and nobleness - two great features of the Kyrgyz national character born out of the difficult conditions of our history- have continued to develop and have received powerful reinforcement by the epos Manas, as a result of its spiritual [dukhovnyi] influence on the national consciousness of the Kyrgyz. 11 The moral implications expressed through the notion of 'spirituality' are a central concern in the representation of the ancestors. Akaev's use of the term 'spirituality' carries two further connotations. First, it offers a new version of moral values based on local concepts. It is a break with Soviet concepts, although they retain some traces of socialist ideals. For example, references to spirituality and the particular ways it is defined through Kyrgyz tropes is a specific characteristic of the independent nationalist ideology, yet, the general goals - unity and the development of responsible and disciplined citizens- retains some Soviet-era goals. Second, it develops a secular moral system, not one purely based on Islam. This was the ideological basis for the construction of the 'Kyrgyz person'. This also had the effect, when this was announced in the mid-1990s, of cultivating an image of Kyrgyzstan as a secular Islamic society, receptive to Western interpretations of democracy and the development of civil society. The moral system also introduces notions of shame. Knowing the importance of the ancestors and their virtues needs to be continued to maintain the independent state, which, in the official history, the ancestors struggled to create. LEV GUMILEV IN KYRGYZSTAN As mentioned in the previous chapter, Akaev's depiction of spirituality
is underpinned by Lev Gumilev's theories of ethnogenesis. In his book, Kyrgyz Statehood and the National Epos 'Manas', 12 Akaev dedicated an entire chapter to Gumilev and what significance passionarnost' has for Kyrgyz statehood. Akaev's use of passionarnost' defines his conception of the Kyrgyz struggle for independence, characterized by the moral virtues which he derives from the epic Manas. 13 Akaev focused on Gumilev's notion of 'passionate people' as social catalysts of change. He noted: 'When I speak about a person, I mean a passionate person, around whom the process of unification can take place' (Akaev 2003c: 332-3). Akaev discussed a number of Gumilev's examples of passionate people, such as Alexander the Great to demonstrate this point. He continued: 'What was the framework in which the political will of this passionate person found its ideological base? It must be statehood' (Akaev 2003c 334). 14 In Akaev's view, statehood is the ultimate goal of those historical figures. It is the formal establishment of the state which
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
141
is the implicit goal of Akaev's ethnogenetic ideology and his depiction of the historical figures. Akaev complemented Gumilev's notion of ethnogenesis further by drawing on his background as a physicist to help 'ground' Gumielv's theories in the natural sciences, in his view, to give it more relevance to the Kyrgyz case. Akaev examined the work of Il'ya Prigozhin (19172003), a highly renowned chemist. Prigozhin's theory of open systems examines systems 'which exchange substances and energy with an environment' (Akaev 2003c: 328), which Akaev used as a model for studying passionamost'. Prigozhin's theory 'analyzes the phenomenon of self-organization, which takes place in dissipated structures after their transition from the state of chaos' (Akaev 2003c: 328). Through positive reactions in an open system there can be fluctuations, or a series of fluctuations, which causes the previous state to collapse. The result is a bifurcation, in which the system could become chaotic or organized. With the use of lasers, Prigozhin found that the charging of photons would 'orientate' or organize the system. This led Akaev to conclude: 'Ethnic systems result from the bifurcation of a state of chaos (homeostasis) and the reaching of a high internal organization through the charging of passion' (Akaev 2003c: 342-343). Akaev's description of historical figures, as filled with passionamost' in order to organize a Kyrgyz nation and state, is suggestive of Max Weber's notion of charisma in the sociology of authority and obedience (Feuchtwang and Wang 2001). 15 The two terms share many similarities. In Akaev's usage of passionarnost', however, the characteristics of the historical figures are described by their exceptional level of devotion towards their people in the continual struggle for independence, as opposed to what could be construed as a 'divine quality' of a person. This is an important part of his political ideology, stressing that the construction of the state and people's service to it are crucial factors. Nonetheless, a brief examination of the similarities between the two concepts reveals new perspectives in the involvement of passionamost' in the nation-building project. It is important to note, however, that my use of the term 'charisma' is not a comparison made by Kyrgyz friends and discussants, it is my own. Charisma, like passionarnost', can be imagined as being an extraordinary attribute. People usually identify a person with charisma as having special characteristics, and it is usually conceptualized as an important quality for good leadership. For example, Weber (1978: 241) stated that charisma is: ... applied to a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of the divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as 'leader'.
142
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Friedrich Nietzsche's influence on Weber's notion of charisma is evident in this description, as Charles Lindholm (1997: 53) has noted: 'Weber understood charismatic appeal as arising from the vivid emotional intensity of the charismatic figure. In this he followed Nietzsche, whose superman [Obermensch] was superior precisely because of the force of his passions. However, where Nietzsche imagined his hero in solitude, for Weber charisma could exist only in relationships.' 16 Weber states: 'It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma' (Weber 1978: 242). It is this key point, the realization of charisma through social relationships, which has led to it being conceptualized as creating forms of solidarity. Taken in this context, it is similar to that which Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth-century northAfrican intellectual, described as 'group feeling' (in Arabic, asablya), or a kind of solidarity, vital for social cohesion. Khaldun (1967: 269) notes: 'Leadership over people, therefore, must, of necessity, derive from a group feeling that is superior to each individual group feeling. Each individual group feeling that becomes aware of the superiority of the group feeling of the leader is ready to obey and follow (that leader).' 17 Charisma conceptualized as an innate 'quality' in a leader is a reification that is created through the discursive practices employed in the imaginative construction of these figures. In his study of the location of charisma in the Catholic Charismatic Revival, Thomas Csordas (1997: 139) stresses this discursive formulation: 'Could not charisma be a product of the rhetorical apparatus in use of which leader and follower alike convince themselves that the world is constituted in a certain way?' This question emphasizes that a fundamental aspect of 'charisma' is not an individual trait, but a result of rhetorical devices employed and explicated through social relations. He notes: '[Charisma] is a particular mode of interpersonal efficacy: not a quality, but a collective, performative, intersubjective self process' (Csordas 1997: 140). It is the construction of a rhetorical apparatus that serves as the locus of charisma, not as the source of it. The intersubjective self is a continual process made by interaction with others and also contributes to general interpretations of charisma. What implications does this have for the nation-building process? Passionarnost' is presented as a personal quality of the historical figures. Like charisma, it is a reification of features of historical accounts generated through intersubjective discussions. This underpins the formation of genealogical imagination. The discourse influences people's memories of their ancestors. Akaev's depiction of the passionate energy of the ancestors and their virtues complements people's own views. This enables people to articulate their own views within the nation-building campaign; in this case, both government and local views are mutually supportive. In addition, I suggest that Akaev's projection of passionarnost' onto people's everyday lives introduced a series of disciplining practices. For those, in particular, who are mindful of their ancestors' legacies and
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
143
see their relevance in their daily lives, citizens would govern themselves by honouring the values that the ancestors represent and have been included in the official discourse. I argue this is similar to Weber's notion of the 'routiniza tion of charisma' (Gerth and Mills 1998 [1948)), or what has also been called the "'banalization" (Veralltiiglichung) of charisma' (Bourdieu 1987: 132-3). Banality describes both the ways in which charisma is included into everyday life, and how it becomes indistinguishable from people's daily actions and thoughts, acting as a guiding force in people's lives. Michael Billig (1995) argues that banality is a theme at play particularly in the West. He suggests that 'banal nationalism' reflects a series of actions and events that have been subtly woven into the practice of everyday life. He notes that 'the term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. [... ] Daily, the nation is indicated, or "flagged", in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition' (Billig 1995: 6). Although Billig notes that established Western countries often see nationalism as a concern for those emerging from colonialism, this need not limit the conception of banality to just the West. In Akaev's view, nationalism is a display of passionate energy, which struggles for unity for the present and future, based on the examples of the past. He combined the notion of passionamost' with the image of ancestors such as Balasagyn and Manas, and simultaneously inscribed it onto people's personal genealogies. Thus, the notion of nationalism for Akaev is present through the constantly repeated recollections of ancestors and is also reflected through the presentation of history in national celebrations. However, as Stephen Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming note, for Weber, charisma was also an attempt to displace the actions of the present and return to an idealized past. They state: Charisma is the name for the innovative and restorative potential of tradition. It is a potential realized in explosions of social movement and invention when internal and external disturbances and dissatisfactions sharpen boundaries between a present that does not live up to traditional expectations which are 'remembered'. What is remembered is a past when mythology says those expectations were really fulfilled. Such utopian explosions occur on the boundaries between an 'us' who know this and a 'them' or a 'world' which as yet does not (Feuchtwang and Wang 2001: 19). This is also visible in Akaev's rhetoric of passionamost', where he stresses people must look to the past for guidance. The numerous statues he unveiled to ancestors and the elaboration of their qualities illustrates this aspect of the revival of the past in the present and for the direction of the future. The recognition of historical figures as moral guides- or, what could be described as 'exemplary figures'- in people's everyday lives is highlighted by Caroline Humphrey (1997) in her analysis of morality in Mongolia.
144
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
People choose their exemplars as a kind of teacher that will guide them to enhance their morality through the development of the 'self'. Through this analysis, Humphrey highlights the distinct moral values between European religious and secular models and Mongolian examples. One of the main 'ethics of exemplars' in her Mongolian example is that 'it constructs a particular kind of individuality' (Humphrey 1997: 34). The exemplary person, whether religious or secular (or both), living or historically venerated, is regarded as someone that serves as a guide to developing admirable qualities in those that seek their inspiration. Even the act of searching for an exemplar 'is part of discovering and cultivating oneself' (Humphrey 1997: 36). Christopher Kaplonski (2006), drawing on Humphrey's example, highlights the political ideologies implicit in the selection of exemplars. The isolated moments of history from which an exemplar is chosen are dependent on political ideologies. History and politics, therefore, cannot be separated, and as the person who finds an exemplar places themselves as a 'person in history' (Bloch 1996). To be a 'person in history' implies that once the person has selected an exemplar they are enmeshed in a series of moralities, a product of the political ideologies of that time, which shape representations of the figures and moral values of the past. In Kyrgyzstan, this is a selection of ancestral exemplars characterized as exemplary figures by their moral virtues and struggle towards unification- their images are a fundamental part of the political rhetoric of nation-building projects. Charisma, as it appears in this analysis, represents two concepts at the heart of Akaev's ideology about socially constructed values and political leadership. First, there is a cultivated rhetorical apparatus, which serves as the locus of charisma. The images of certain figures become widely associated with charismatic traits, and through a process of banalization are inscribed into people's everyday lives. For Akaev, this involves the repeated reference to ancestors by people, linkages established through the official history to ancestors and national celebrations. Second, the emphasis on leadership, high morals and devotion to the goals attributed to the historical figures indicates that these qualities are lacking in contemporary society. As in Akaev's description of Balasagyn and Manas, these qualities which they possessed are highlighted as important traits for the continuation of Kyrgyz society. The creation of a 'national genealogy' is aimed at fostering unity. As many people noted throughout my fieldwork, the genealogies (sanjyra, in particular) helped unify the Kyrgyz people. The government has built on this concept and tried to control identities through sanjyra to strengthen patriotism and reduce political turmoil. In this discourse, passionarnost', like charisma, is an intersubjective discursive construction perpetuating an image of innate characteristics. To return to Csordas's point, those in authority do not impose this view, it is one which is negotiated between those regarded as having certain claims of authority (i.e. political, moral, etc.), or those making such claims on their behalf and the wider public. The construction of an intersubjective
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
145
rhetoric entails that what is deemed as 'charismatic', or as displaying 'passionamost", will always be reinterpreted. For Akaev, and others, who organize celebrations around such notions, there is a need to represent these concepts in a way that corresponds to people's views. In this particular case, Akaev evoked people's images of their ancestors, complementing their own views with national images, and used them in an attempt to strengthen the unity of the people. THE SPACE AND TIME OF MONUMENTS This ideology was not only carried out though discussions, but also the erection of monuments. The physical presence of the monuments introduces another element of disciplining practices associated with the veneration of Kyrgyz ancestors. Statues to ancestors hold important meaning for their descendents, but also, they are partofthe time and politics in which they are constructed. Akaev's official support for monuments to ancestors carried with it the sanctioning of governmental disciplining practices. The monuments spread throughout the country became a kind of visible sanjyra and promoted interest in the public importance of the ancestors. They are personal repositories of meaning, but also conveyed official notions of patriotism and notions of self-governing behaviour. Although monuments are highly visible and often occupy large public spaces with the intent to convey certain messages, Bruce Grant (200 1), drawing on the work of the Austrian writer Robert Musil, argues that monuments actually 'deflect' or divert our attention. Focusing on monuments built in Moscow after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he notes that monuments are likened to the effects of the state, a series of practices that obscure our vision from the modes of governmentality. They operate as a mask, concealing the struggles and contestations for power in the public space. Thus, Grant (2001: 340) argues that monuments should been seen 'as a form of political practice itself, rather than as a metalanguage derived from hidden realities. They create new subject effects, new cognitions, and new forms of political legitimacy.' The space which monuments occupy, therefore, is transformed, indicating the kinds of political practices in society. Not only are political claims invested in the erection and dedication of monuments in the public space, but there are also implicit conceptualizations of time, which shape the understanding of monuments and their historical significance. In other words, the construction and ordering of temporality adds further emphasis to the meaning of the historical figures. Monuments evoke a particular temporality, which presents a past as framed by reified concepts of history, often articulated through dominant strains of political ideology of that time. In his examination of time in the Cretan town of Rethemnos, Michael Herzfeld makes a distinction between social and monumental time. Social time is the substance of everyday life.l 8 In contrast to this, he describes monumental time as:
146
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
... reductive and generic. It encounters events as realizations of some supreme destiny, and it reduces social experience to collective predictability. Its main focus is on the past-a past constituted by categories and stereotypes. In its extreme forms, it is the time frame of the nation-state. To it belongs the vicarious fatalism-the call to submit to one's ordained destiny-that marks all authoritarian control (Herzfeld 1991:10). The monumentalization of historical figures and their place in the national history redefines the past in terms of present concerns and contexts. Time, as much as the constitution of space, is continually contested and the struggle to obtain the hegemony of meaning is never ending. Herzfeld (1991: 4) notes the 'battle over time is a battle over the possession of identity'. In Kyrgyzstan, the 'identity' of the historical figures represented in the monuments is an attempt to establish their images as strong uruu or uruk leaders, and as passionate and moral persons who struggled to maintain a separate ethnic (or national) identity and state. In this context, there are at least two representations of time. First, there is an overarching sense of linear progression, which could include monumental time. In Akaev's use of ethnogenesis, there is a linear framework which demonstrates persistent attempts of the historical figures to create a fully independent nation and state which are expressed almost in terms of inevitability. Second, added to this linear progression is a dimension of timelessness. The 1,000th anniversary of the epos Manas and the celebration of '2,200 Years of Kyrgyz Statehood' in 2003 are not commemorations of exact dates, but are an indication of the earliest recorded reference and are therefore argued by both politicians and local people alike as an indication that the history of the Kyrgyz people could stretch much further back in time. In Akaev's view, the myth of origin established in the Manas epic supports a notion of timelessness. The monuments to historical figures are part of the government's presentation of a 'Kyrgyz' history, which is created through the establishment of dominant official meanings in the organization of public space and also in the imagination of time. In the official view, the figures are the 'ancestors' of Kyrgyz uruu and the ethnic group (or nation). These ancestors are mythical figures (e.g. Manas), appropriated (e.g. Uyghurs claim that jusup Balasagyn is 'their' ancestor) and figures from more recent periods, particularly the tsarist and Soviet eras. Nevertheless, in Akaev's narrative, they demonstrate important aspects of the moral virtue of the Kyrgyz people. ATAKE BAATYR AND SHABDAN BAATYR 19 One example, similar to Akaev's view and echoed in public discourse, is found in the dedication of the statue of Atake baatyr. On 23 August 2003, Akaev unveiled a statue of Atake baatyr in the
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
147
village of Kyzyl-Bairak, Kemin region, Chili oblast'. The statue was of Atake baatyr (hero), a leader of the northern Kyrgyzstan, who made the first official diplomatic contact with the tsarist government. A day before, a direct descendent of Atake, Janyl Abdyldabek kyzy, published an article in a popular, pro-government newspaper, Vechemii Bishkek. In her article, which depicted the history of the Atake, she acknowledged President Akaev as having made 1 [a] huge contribution in the work of the rehabilitation of historic figures' (Abdyldabek kyzy 2003: 5). It was with the support of the President and in line with the goals of the Year of Kyrgyz Statehood' that Abdyldabek kyzy found an opportunity to teach other Kyrgyz through the story of her ancestors and demonstrate the importance for the spiritual (i.e. moral) development. After reading her article, I organized a meeting with her, during which she described to me the moral significance of her predecessors. She explained: 1A non-spiritual [bezdukhovnyi] people will not exist as a people. In any case spirituality needs to be supported. If a person does not love their ancestors, and does not honour them, how would that person think and talk about the Kyrgyz? Naturally [that person] will not turn out to be a patriot. Therefore, any spiritual education begins in the family.' 20 In particular, she considered Akaev's 1rehabilitation of historic figures' as providing proper emphasis to the role that those figures have in the spiritual (moral) life of the Kyrgyz people. These figures, she said, should be at once the very centre of the nation, and also of the core of individual families. In Akaev's book, Kyrgyz Statehood and the National Epos 'Manas', Atake baatyr (b. 1738) clearly occupies the role of a passionate and moral person and a paramount figure in the maintenance of the Kyrgyz people and the state's sovereignty. Atake was a leader of the Sarybagysh uruu at a turbulent period in Kyrgyz history. In 1718-1722, the Dzhungar Khanate took possession of Kyrgyz land (i.e. parts of what today are considered the northern Kyrgyz oblasts, including Chili), forcing the inhabitants to move to the Fergana Valley. The Kyrgyz retaliated against the Dzhungars in the area around the Ala-Too range and gradually reclaimed their land and Ysyk-K61. Later, Atake held a kurultai (congress) between the Sarybagysh and the Bugu uruu. They decided to divide the territory of Ysyk-K6l between them. The Kyrgyz, however, still had a number of external threats. The northern Kyrgyz were living on the outer reaches of the Kokand Khanate. 21 Khan Norboto (who ruled from 1770 to 1798) invited Atake to Kokand in anattemptto bring the northern Kyrgyz firmly under his control. Atake refused, and instead sought Russia as an ally. Atake held a meeting with the other leaders and agreed to send envoys to St Petersburg. He sent two letters with his envoys, one addressed to General N. Ogarev, the chief of the Siberian border patrol, and the second to Empress Catherine II. Abdyldabek kyzy notes, however, that these letters were not a direct request for Russian intervention into their disputes. 22 Providing a nationalist interpretation, she notes: 1The dispatch of Kyrgyz ambassadors to Russia was not a search for protection; it was undertaken
148
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
as the first attempt of the establishment of equal rights in economic and political contacts. It was done as a request for the recognition of the Kyrgyz people and land' (Abdyldabek kyzy 2003: 5). The statue of Atake stands next to the museum of Shabdan baatyr (1839-1912), the great-grandson of Atake. Shabdan baatyr (Shabdan J antaev) is another renowned Kyrgyz hero. Descendents of Shabdan and local citizens contributed to the construction of the museum. It is a small building with historical information and genealogies on the walls. It is as much a museum to Shabdan as it is to his importance to the region. The material and files for the museum came from the State History Museum, the State Archives and Abdyldabek kyzy's personal archive collection. Although the museum is small in size, she feels that it is important for the Kyrgyz people so they know their history. Shabdan was one of the most respected leaders of the Sarybagysh uruu by the time the Russian Empire expanded more fully into Central Asia. Instead of fighting, he considered the benefits of seeking peace with the Russians. He was not the only one to decide this. In January 1855, Kachybek Sheralin took an oath on the Koran to pledge his uruu's (Bugu) allegiance to Russia. Not all supported the Russians, however, and in July 1863, Ozmon Tailakov, a Sayak uruu leader, ambushed and held captive a small Russian detachment led by Major G. Zagryazhskii, head of the Tokmok uezd (the smallest administrative territorial unit). Shabdan used this opportunity to gain Russian support by rescuing the Major and his troops. He also aided the Russians further in helping them to negotiate with the southern Kyrgyz uruu and uruk. In 1867, he met with Kurman jan datkap who controlled the Alai region, which was still under the influence of the Kokand Khanate. It was through Shabdan that part of what is southern Kyrgyzstan today came (somewhat) peacefully under Russian suzerainty (Voropaeva 2000). Akaev noted that Shabdan explained to all the people the importance of 'the establishment and preservation of peace on their land, [and] made a significant contribution to unifying the nation [sic]' (Akaev 2003c: 137). Shabdan himself also highlighted his achievements. He used the epic poetry genre to tell of his tales and emerge as a modern leader of the Kyrgyz people (Prior 2006). In particular, heroic accounts describe Shabdan's raid against the Kalmak and the defence by the Kyrgyz against Sultan Kenesary, a strong Kazakh 'tribal' leader. Shabdan's biography, and Akaev's use of it, not only fits into the general historical narrative, but is a political metaphor for the fractured Kyrgyz political environment that existed during his presidency, providing lessons from the past to guide the present and future. The way in which Akaev described the historical figures influenced the way Abdyldabek kyzy articulates her memories about her ancestors. Abdyldabek kyzy's interest in illustrating the history of her ancestors is to tell other Kyrgyz about their history. In her article about Atake baatyr, she notes: 'And that this monument is located near the museum of his great-grandson, Shabdan baatyr, shows the great
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
149
continuity of generations. And owing to this continuity, the Kyrgyz carry the core of their ethnos from millennium to millennium' (Abdyldabek kyzy 2003: 5). Both Akaev and Abdyldabek kyzy are concerned in stressing the historicity of the Kyrgyz people and the lessons that can be learned from their ancestors. Their complementary views stress similar notions of passion, morality and their necessity to the contemporary situation of the Kyrgyz nation and state. The official view of the government attempts to find popular support among such citizens, who are able to articulate their ideas related to their ancestors not just in their own words but through an officially promoted nationwide discourse. It introduces two issues. First, it implicitly introduces the notion of shame. If a person does not know their ancestors, they are not a patriot. This is more than just recognizing the importance of the past; it is presented as the obligation to fulfil one's duties to the actions of the ancestors and, thus, the present. If a person does not recognize their duties, it is shown as a moral stain and the person cannot be a part of the future of the country. Second, the intersubjective rhetoric that has been created is at the very constitution of the 1Kyrgyz' person and how the citizens govern themselves. In this way, the promotion of a series of historical ancestors an element of government rationality, or as Foucault (1991) described it, governmen tali ty'. 1
GENEALOGY OF SUBJECTIFICATION' An exploration of the modes of governmentality reveals practices and ideologies which govern people's everyday lives. In the above examples, the government's support and inclusion of genealogies into the national history has an effect in organizing people's understanding their role in the maintenance of the nation and state. For example, in the dedication of the statue to Atake baatyr, the moral virtues emphasized through his actions are not only viewed as a way to conduct a person's life, but also that these values should be passed on to others and directing their values as 1Kyrgyz' people. Such conceptions are echoed by Colin Gordon (1987: 296) in his remarks on Foucault's study of governmentality: the growth of explicit reflection on the 11 art of government" in the early modern period is accompanied by a consciously elaborated notion of the inner connectedness of the government of oneself, the conduct of individual existence, on the one hand, and the government of others, the regulation of the lives of many, on the other'. Such notions of interconnectedness' are present in the official celebrations. The moral virtues derived from the Manas epos are present in the rhetorical apparatus which is used to refer to the historical ancestors. These ancestors of the nation are also people's own ancestors to whom they can chart their relatedness through their sanjyra. The image of the ancestors, which helps to construct a person's identity through their genealogical imagination, also locates them in a broader 1
1
1
150
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
national identity, accompanied by a moral system. The techniques of government, such as these, are increasingly concentrated on the people at the 'very heart of themselves by making its rationality the condition of their active freedom' (Burchell1996: 30, original emphasis). At the end of the Soviet Union people were able to discuss their ancestry more openly. The sanjyrachi meeting that Kalenjetimishbaev organized in 1990 is an example of this. This new freedom (and others), however, is precisely the same freedom through which their actions and behaviours are being governed and are being used by them to govern others. The history of Atake baatyr was a convenient way for Akaev to convey his message of the state and, along with it, the kinds of disciplining practices that are required to achieve this. Likewise, Abdyldabek kyzy's view supported this, and, combining them with similar views, reproduced the disciplining effects to more audiences. This interiorization of external representations and reinterpreted as a person's own identity is a particular focus of studies of governmentality (e.g. Rose 1996b). In this case, the official (external) representation of historical figures is a view developed between Akaev's and the people's opinions about their ancestors. The very specific, official rhetoric, which encompasses the presentation of historical figures, forms a new way of conceiving these figures with regard to the whole Kyrgyz people. Those that are interested in and promote the images of their ancestors on local and national scales engage with this discourse. Nikolas Rose has examined this phenomenon, particularly related to studies of liberalism in the West, through what he calls a 'genealogy of subjectification'. This, he argues, 'focuses directly upon the practices with which human beings have been located in particular "regimes of the person'" (Rose 1996b: 131, original emphasis). Such a genealogy is a study of the trajectories and tactics that have been employed in the subjectification of individuals who have internalized the external encounters and meanings and reified them as components of personal identity. 'The human being,' states Rose, 'is not an entity with a history, but the target of a multiplicity of types of work, more like a latitude or a longitude at which different vectors of different speeds intersect. The "interiority" which so many feel compelled to diagnose is not that of a psychological system, but of a discontinuous surface, a kind of infolding of exteriority' (Rose 1996b: 142). He continues by arguing: Perhaps, then, we might think of the grasp that modes of subjectification have upon human beings in terms of such an infolding. Folds incorporate without totalizing, internalize without unifying, collect together discontinuously in the form of pleats making surfaces, spaces, flows and relations. Within a genealogy of subjectification, that which would be infolded would be anything that can acquire authority: injunctions, advice, techniques, little habits of thought and emotion, an array of routines and norms of
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
151
being human - the instruments through which being constitutes itself in different practices and relations (Rose 1996b: 143). Under Akaev, the ancestral exemplars represent a 'habit of thought and emotion', serving as another technique to govern the Kyrgyz people. Through this conception of the ancestors, moreover, these moral virtues are presented as constituent parts of the 'Kyrgyz' identity, and those that adopt such views locate themselves within a series of disciplining practices. This moral system and its articulation are located within the dialectic of memory and history of the genealogical imagination. The attribution of passionamost'would have little effect, if it was not also tied to a concept of unity of the country today through knowledge of their ancestors. Here, the ideologies shaping the politicized 'Kyrgyz person' become more visible. This is similar to Serguei Oushakine's (2004) description of the 'void subject' of early Soviet modernity. It was through readjusting to external conditions that people were able to regain a notion of their daily life (in Russian, byt) that they felt was missing in the period immediately following the October Revolution. Oushakine (2004: 399-400) argues: 'there is a profound and incessant preoccupation with external conditions: it is through redefining the existing parameters, through modifying ("altering") them, that the empty signifier of a new life is capable of revealing its meaning'. Again, the external is interiorized to establish the meaning through which people understand their lives, but at the same time it operates as to how those people govern themselves. The person, in this case, is stripped of its former meaning. It becomes the new template upon which ideologies take hold and create new identities. The tactics people employ for operating within this system of (new) meaning illustrate ways in which they are using these new forms in their own lives.24 For example, in the post-Soviet era, people have openly been able to explore their genealogies. People likejanyl Abdyldabek kyzy, who is proud of her ancestors, are devoted to expanding contemporary awareness of these figures. In one sense, this has been encouraged by Akaev's nationbuilding project. The celebration of ancestors and their actions in the new ethno-nationalist rhetoric has given Abdyldabek kyzy, and others like her, a framework to realize the importance of the ancestors in their lives. In our discussions, she would tell me the importance of the lessons she learned from the ancestors. She would continue by noting that it was her aim to now teach others about these morals and their place in Kyrgyz society today. This is a personal goal, but it is supported and elaborated through the ideological goals of the Akaev era. This particular form of governance seeks to distance itself from political institutions. It is instead an idea through which Akaev expresses the importance of the ancestors and the qualities which led them to secure the freedom and independence of the Kyrgyz people. This is what Nikolas Rose (1996a: 46) calls governing 'at a distance'. The 'advanced liberal'
152
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
technologies which some countries advocate, Rose (1996a: 53-4) argues, 'see techniques of government that create a distance between the dedsions of formal political institutions and other social actors, conceive of these actors in new ways as subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice, and seek to act upon them through shaping and utilizing their freedom'. The freedom of Kyrgyz people today to explore their genealogies and discuss them is one way through whichAkaev's administration attempted to construct and create the conditions for people to govern themselves. An already existing notion of genealogies and the contribution they could make to Kyrgyz identity were already present. Passionamost' and the moral virtues of the officially recognized ancestors was an addition by Akaev, but one that rested on a pre-existing notion of honour and respect for the ancestors. URUU, NATION AND STATE
The self-organizing effect of governmentality targets all citizens. This could be seen through a number of other celebrations that took place around Kyrgyzstan during 2003 that claimed to be part of the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood'. Those that celebrated these local commemorations marked the place of the ancestors in the contemporary political ideology, and in doing so, gave implicit support to the official rhetoric. In many cases, the celebrations were connected with localities and specific places. Borombai bii (Chapter 2), for example, is associated with Tyup region, Ysyk-K6l oblast'. The anniversary celebrations of Borombai and other figures are placed within the context of the national celebration of statehood. Thus, the scales on which these figures are projected are an important aspect of the nation-building project. People are able to engage through their ancestors to celebrate the contribution they have made to the formation of the Kyrgyz nation and state. Recalling the dedication of the statue of Jusup Balasagyn, Akaev noted that Balasagyn was a great 'state-builder' (gosudarstvennik), in addition to his role as an uruu leader and a claim that he was an important 'Kyrgyz' historical figure. This was a move to unify three identities in one person. To return to Rose's description of 'regimes of the person', each of these classifications is a distinct part in the genealogy of subjectification. These categories are also interconnected and play a vital role in the construction of the state. The government presentation of the state maintains a close relationship with 'the people' and is expressed through genealogies connected with the construction of a national identity. While often the bureaucratic aspects of the state are imagined as external to people (Mitchell 1991), in Kyrgyzstan, as has been described above, there is an attempt by the government to create a role for the state in people's lives. This is done through a number of different activities and events, such as parades, statue unveilings, meetings and speeches. In Akaev's adaptation and expansion of local notions of genealogy, the population interact with
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
153
constructed images of the 'nation' and 'state', and are able to imagine the possibilities through which these concepts can be employed in their own lives and how they can (or possibly should) be used as a template to judge other people's actions. The celebration of '2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood' in 2003 is an example ofthe interaction between the people and the state. 'Statehood' is presented by the government as the continuity of the state as a condition of the persistent struggle by historical figures to maintain unity among the Kyrgyz people and is encompassed in a set of moral values as core to their ethno-national identity. In this view, the condition of the state is contingent on the moral actions of their people directed towards unity and harmony. The state becomes another rhetorical device through which the 'Kyrgyz' are governed; it is a constructed image to be internalized in order for the people to govern themselves. NOTES 1
2
3
4
5
See Kagan Arik's (1995) account for a short description of the events that took place. Arik represented the University of Washington at the festivities. The resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations (1994) stated that the epic poem was 'a vital link in sustaining and unifying the peoples of the Central Asian region throughout their long history', and also recognized that the epic 'is not only the source of the Kyrgyz language and literature but also the foundation of the cultural, moral, historical, social and religious traditions of the Kyrgyz people'. Although some people have managed to learn large sections of the epic, people often say that it is only through visions and dreams that you learn the full story. Manas visits people through dreams where he tells the story to them. When they wake up they can recite a version of the epic, which is very long. For example, one manaschi, Sayakbai Karalaev, recited over a half million verses in his version of the epic. Another manaschi, Rysbek Jurnabaev, carne to London in August 2004 to give several performances at the British Library. In a conversation with him following one of his performances, he told me that he had been touched by Sayakbai when he was four years old, and that he has seen Sayakbai seven times in his dreams. Although Rysbek could recite the poems, he did not do so for twenty years. However, two years previously, when he was unemployed and had no family, he began reciting the poem again. His life started to improve, and he stated that: 'Manas showed me the way'. When he recites the poem, it comes to him as if by inspiration. He said that when he closes his eyes and performs movements with his head and arms while seated, the poem comes to him clearly. For more on manaschis and akyns (poets) see A. Asankanov and N. Bekrnukharnedova (1999). For more on the Manas epos, its history and epic tradition in general, see Prior (2002) and Vander Heide (2008). An inscription, which was believed to have been an 'historical prototype of the Manas character', was dated from 847 AD (see Prior 2000: 29). However, this was later discredited and there is little evidence in the epic itself to suggest that it was devised much before the fifteenth century.
154 6
7 8
9
10
11
12 13
14
15
16 17
18
19 20
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
Although it is not referenced, this quote appears to be a quote from Soviet documents from the 1940s. In this respect, the Manas epos could be compared to Caroline Humphrey's (1994) notion of 'evocative transcripts'. Manas is situated on a high pedestal riding his horse, Ak-Kula, while slaying a dragon, and flanked on both sides by his wife, Kanakei, and his counsellor, Bakai. This is located in front of the Philharmonic in Bishkek. See Vander Heide (2008) for more on how ethnic identity was introduced into the Manas epos. I have taken these from the text of the original speech. In later versions of the principles, slight variations have occurred, but the general meaning is the same. In later editions the fifth point has been changed to: 'Humanism, magnanimity, tolerance'. For further descriptions of the 1,000th anniversary of Manas and the seven principles, see Akaev (2002a,b, 2003d), Kinzer (2000) and Vander Heide (2008). The editors of the English translation of Akaev's book did not clarify the differences in meaning when they translated specific words, e.g. etnos, dukhovnyi. Therefore, I have included the original Russian words in brackets where applicable (see Akaev 2002a). In this case, Akaev used Gumilev's definition of ethnos, which in the English version has been translated as 'ethnicity'. Indeed, former President Akaev has not been the only one to employ Gumilev's version of ethnogenesis in the construction of national identities. See the work of Olexander Hryb (2000), who comments on the use of Gumilev's theories in Ukraine and Russia. This article is referenced with the kind permission of the author. This is Akaev's view. I would not, however, go as far as to suggest that the actions of a person embodying passionamost' are primarily concerned with unification. This is just one form of charisma that is described by Weber. The other form is examined in religious systems, see Weber (1998 [1948]). See Weber (1968) for a collection of essays specifically related to the way in which he develops his ideas of charisma. See Nietzsche (1978) for his description of the superman. Ibn Khaldfm's explanation of solidarity resembles the Durkheimian notion of 'mechanical solidarity'. As Ernest Gellner (1993) notes, however, Durkheim contrasts mechanical and organic solidarity, and assumes that both these forms are recognized, but Ibn Khaldun only knows, or thinks, in terms of mechanical solidarity. Carol Greenhouse (1996) has also examined 'social time' which she conceptualizes as social experience which articulates people's understanding of agency, or cultural notions of how the world works. Baatyr is a Kyrgyz title which denotes a 'hero', which is closely associated with bravery in battle (Beibutova 1988: 84-5). A similar view of 'spirituality' is also reflected in the works of Dastan Sarygulov (2001, 2002), former secretary of state, who has advanced views on Tengrianstvo -belief in a supreme being, closely connected with the sky, with a series of moral virtues - as a way to counteract global problems. Key to his view is that he positions morality (nravstvennost) and
The Genealogy ofKyrgyz History and Identity
21
22
23
24
155
spirituality (dukhovnost) as core values of the Kyrgyz which have helped them maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This kingdom was located in the eastern Fergana Valley and controlled much of what is today Kyrgyzstan. There was a fort based in Pishpek (Bishkek). Copies of these letters, and other important documents, can be found in Abdyldabek kyzy (1999). Datka is a Kyrgyz title used for an aristocrat - equivalent to 'prince' or 'princess' of the Kokand Khanate. Kurmanjan datka in the independent history of Kyrgyzstan is often viewed as leader of the south; see Ploskikh et al. (2002) for a short biography of her life. Barbara Cruikshank (1996) argues a similar point through her examination of a self-esteem campaign in California in the 1980s.
7
The Genealogy of the State
government presentation of the state attempts to form a close T herelationship with 'the people' through a national genealogy, intended to represent the will of the people. This 'imaginative engagement of subjects with the state' is what David Sneath (2003: 46) calls 'technologies of imagination'. Such images are produced through a number of different activities and events, including parades, meetings, speeches and national celebrations. Expanding personal notions of genealogy is one such imaginative technology. Many people, who have an interest in their ancestry, have found a resonance with Akaev's vision and their own understandings of their ancestry. The formal recognition of genealogy, moreover, has encouraged some to incorporate this vision within their own lives as well as a framework with which to judge other people's actions. The celebration of '2,200 years of Kyrgyz statehood' in 2003 was another example of the interaction between the people and the state, developed through a series of imaginative practices. The government presented the notion of 'statehood' as the continuity of the state, which was a condition of the persistent struggle by historical figures to maintain unity among the Kyrgyz people and attain independence, and encompassed in a set of moral values presented as core to their ethnonational identity. The condition of the state, in this representation, was thus contingent on the moral actions of their people directed towards unity and harmony. The state became another rhetorical device through which the 'Kyrgyz' are governed, and was to be internalized in order for the people to govern themselves. Genealogy, as a methodological tool, serves to examine the particular discursive formation of the state and how it was employed. Returning to Owen's (1994) definition, it provides a critique of what has been created and how this strengthens the concept of autonomy. This methodology reveals the creation of the 'state' and the ways in which this has served to create a concept of the 'Kyrgyz person' as separate ethnic and state identity. Akaev's ideology of the state, however, was not ultimately successful. As Slavoj Zizek (1994) has argued, ideology is not totalizing, it leaves gaps. When the official discourse is contrasted with the events
The Genealogy of the State
157
that were on-going in the country, gaps appear in the seams of this discourse. The celebration of the state failed to unify the people and bring political stability. Here, genealogy provides a critique on this particular representation.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE The phenomenon called 'the state', Timothy Mitchell (1999: 77) argues, 'arises from techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appearance of an abstract, nonmaterial form'. The state appears as an entity separate from society. The divide is created by the perception of an external force, which has over-arching powers to control and direct the lives of the citizens. The ideological construction and reproduction of the state (Abrams 1988 [1977]), however, reveals that this abstract image conceals the subtle internalization of its disciplining practices. As in the case of banal nationalism (Billig 1995), these practices form a part of people's everyday lives, advanced largely through discourse, and are often unnoticed. Thus, the public perception of the state as an external actor imposing its demands on our lives hides the ways ideologies create new roles and adapt to new circumstances, which silently become a part of lives, shaping our actions and concepts. This view of the state is similar to Homi Bhabha's (1990) description of the discursive construction of the nation as a continuously recreated phenomenon of the present, not an historical object. Its formation is the result of a tense division between representations of an a priori historical existence, or what he terms a 'pedagogical object', contrasted with a narrative 'performance' elaborated through the rejuvenation of concepts and ideas in the present and reflected onto a discursive field outlining the 'nation'. The pedagogic aspect is concerned with the self-generation of the concept of the nation as a reality; however, the performativity of this creation continually disrupts the formation of this image. 'The performative intervenes in the sovereignty of the nation's self-generation by casting a shadow between the people as 'image' and its signification as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from Other or the Outside' (Bhabha 1990: 299). People, thus, are the 'cutting edge' between these two forms of representation. This distinction keeps the nation in the present, constantly opposed to different and changing 'objects' articulated as external to its own representation. This marks the internal constitution of the nation as a 'liminal' space of discursive formation - not a totalizing representation, but one where the boundaries are fluid and continually shifting. joel Migdal's (2001) 'state-in-society' approach complements Bhabha's ideas. His concern is to focus on the way in which tactics of physical and discursive power are used to make people engage with politics and each other in certain ways, and the conditions under which this changes over time. The state, as much as the nation, is a contradictory concept. It is an image, which is represented as a 'bounded and unified organization',
158
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
but also as a practice of constantly shifting boundaries and 'loosely connected parts' (Migdal2001: 22). It is the task of political discourse to combine these disparate elements and present them as a significant form of identity for its citizens, and to demonstrate its self-determination to those outside. Since independence, Akaev's ideology has attempted to create a seamless concept of the state. It focused at once on developing two complementary notions: the ancient origins of the state and the formation of, what I have called, the 'Kyrgyz person'. The state was created by the continual efforts of the ancestors to assert their autonomy, unify the people and strengthen their territorial boundaries. By tracing their origins back to their ancestors, the state, therefore, belongs to all people. Here, the concepts of nation, as a seperate ethnic identity, and state have virtually become synonymous. The state is the unification of the nation, and the nation is the realization of the independent state. The concept of the 'Kyrgyz person' has been developed within this vision. The Kyrgyz person is elaborated through general moral values, passed down from the ancestors, in an attempt to maintain social unity. It is predominantly expressed through the Kyrgyz sanjyra, the broad genealogical charter, but it does not necessarily exclude other nationalities as there are figures, which, despite their ethnic origins, are incorporated into this general group of historical figures. The figure of Lenin is one such example, and I will return to this issue later. In the official view, however, genealogy is the connecting thread between the nation and state, developing complementary notions of the person and a broader national identity. Akaev highlighted the importance of unity by designating it first among the seven principles he derived from the epic Manas. He argued: 'The purpose for all the achievements of Manas was the unity of his people. When this goal was finally achieved, the star of the Kyrgyz people had risen. With quarrels and domestic conflicts, Manas's dream was destroyed. The Kyrgyz people had failed and their star died' (Akaev 2003c: 282). If internal division could be overcome, then, in the President's view, the Kyrgyz would continue to develop and the state would become stronger. These views were encapsulated in Akaev's slogan: 'Kyrgyzstan is our common home'. The unity of all people in the country- irrespective of their ethnic origin, yet recognizing the independence of the Kyrgyz nation- was the strength of the state. Many shared Akaev's views on Manas, the nation and state. Although many did not know the epic in detail, they found in it a common sense of importance for their customs and identities. For example,] anylAbdyldabek kyzy, similarly having admitted that she only knew parts of the story, said: 'I think that everyone who considers themselves Kyrgyz must be proud of [the epic]. It is not simply a literary work, it is a sacred thing which our ancestors have kept, not as literary texts, but such a large work was saved as creative work [and should be admired]'. 'It is, she said: 'the spiritual heritage of the people [and] should be in everyone's heart'. In short,
The Genealogy of the State
159
for her, it was a guide for people in their daily lives and the way through which the nation and state could be strengthened and maintained. During 2003, the Kyrgyz Government encouraged a number of events around the country to develop the notions of the nation and state. Two events, in particular, focused these concepts at the national and local levels. These created the image of the state as belonging to everyone and, therefore, the responsibility of all. The official rhetoric elaborated the notion of the 'Kyrgyz person', and their role in the maintaining the state. The first event was a national meeting of all different nationalities in the country, demonstrating the historicity, diversity and strength of the state. It was an attempt to incorporate all, not just Kyrgyz, into the formation of the state. The second event was a school concert about citizenship and its meaning in the lives of school children. Both events play an important role in the formation of the 'Kyrgyz person' - the creation of an identity through disciplining practices encapsulated within celebrations and events based on broad notions of genealogy.
The People's Kurultai On the morning of 6 March 2003 a large number of people assembled in front of the Bishkek Philharmonic, where the Manas statue stands. They had gathered for the People's Kurultai (congress). 1 Many students lined the perimeter of the square in front of the Philharmonic, waving different coloured flags. They also stood in the aisles between the empty flower beds running through the centre of the square. I had passed by the day before and seen students practising their moves while the organizers shouted instructions at them. Classes had been cancelled in several of the nearby schools and universities so that the students could perform, and those that did not participate were there to support their classmates. This was not a rare occurrence. I often saw students walking around with bags carrying their flags when they were required to participate in similar events. On this day, I met a group of students from a neighbouring school. They were not directly participating, but were told to come to the Philharmonic and support the others. They said that their classes had been cancelled and that they were interested to see what was taking place, although they did not have strong idea about what this all meant or why it was happening. On the day of the kurultai, a man and woman read messages in Russian and Kyrgyz, which blasted out from a set of speakers on one side of the square. 'We are the future of Kyrgyzstan', they shouted. This and other similar statements were repeated constantly, including the seven principles of Manas. The statements reflected the government's concept of the people at the centre of the state. In front of the Manas statue were military guards in full dress regalia standing to attention. After nearly half an hour President Akaev arrived. He walked down the red carpet to the centre of the square facing the Philharmonic and the Manas statue. In what was more reminiscent of an Olympic ceremony, four men ran
160
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
towards the President with a torch and lit a flame in the centre of the square. Together with the President they declared the People's Kurultai now open. All participants went into the Philharmonic and listened to speeches from government officials and watched a cultural performance of various musical pieces, singing and dancing. The whole event was televised throughout Kyrgyzstan. The President opened with a long speech about the importance of this event in the history of the Kyrgyz Republic. Akaev, drawing on the ancient Chinese historical records of Sima Qian, stated that the Kyrgyz were a unified people a 'minimum' of 2,200 years ago, because they must have existed before then in order for them to be recognized. He also announced the planning for the Second Global Kyrgyz Kurultai later in the year, where representatives of Kyrgyz diasporas from around the world would come for a special meeting (Akaev 2003b: 3).2 Furthermore, the President discussed the importance of democracy and democratic practices. He referred to the changes made to the constitution by referendum on 2 February 2003 (Chapter 1). These, he said, were for the improvement of the republic. In his view, people needed to regard the state in a more personal view: 'If everyone regards the work of the state structures and participation in the state governance from the position that "we are the state", we shall quickly achieve efficiency and adequacy of the state in the interests of society' (Akaev 2003b: 5). 3 He continued by stating '[d]emocracy is not Bolshevism, but a movement of the people's general interests' (Akaev 2003b: S; see also Karimov 2003), in an attempt to put the people at the centre of efforts to strengthen the political and social aspects of the country.
'I am a Kyrgyz citizen' Another state-building event shortly followed this on 14 March 2003. I was invited to watch a performance at a Russian-language school in Naryn. On that day, the students performed 'Ya- grazhdanin Kyrgyzstana' ('I am a Kyrgyz citizen'). It was a concert that would be similarly repeated in schools throughout the country during the year. The concert was of such importance that the Regional Governor of Education, T6r6bek Imanberdiev, and the Mayor of Naryn, A. Aidaraliev, were in attendance. The basic principle of the concert was that the children were important citizens of the state and would carry forward the goals and moral virtues upon which the state was established. The concert was held in the school's main auditorium hall, at the front of which, there was a large banner reading: 'Ya - grazhdanin Kyrgyzstana!' The children began the concert by naming aspects of life that they should strive to protect and, thus, strengthen the state. Then Mayor Aidaraliev stood and addressed the audience. Among other things, he stated that '2,200years ago we were a state'. Today, in his view, this should be guarded as closely as ever. As for the concert, he called it a 'children's movement', in regard to their struggle to preserve the
The Genealogy of the State
161
Kyrgyz state. Aidaraliev's involvement was a key element to demonstrate that this concert was officially sanctioned and directly tied into the national statehood celebrations. Following this, three young boys took the stage and recited short passages from the Manas epos, in a manaschi style. A woman dressed in traditional Kyrgyz costume stood behind them and praised them for their work. She underlined the importance of the Manas to the Kyrgyz people and for the survival of the state, before kissing the national flag. Then several children played Kyrgyz instruments, such as the komuz (a small, three-stringed guitar) and the ooz komuz (mouth harp). Finally, several students danced. As the performance drew to a close the students sitting in the audience raised a large tUnduk (the latticed smoke hole in the roof of a yurt) in the middle of the room, with multicoloured strands stretching across the entire auditorium. 4 The tUnduk is a sign that attempts to capture the history and social values of the Kyrgyz people together with a meaning of inclusiveness for all citizens of the republic, and is often used during national celebrations. The wooden poles that fit into tUnduk, and during the school concert were represented by multi-coloured strands, are often depicted as stretching out, covering all those underneath it and indicating that they all live in one home. For example, on the 30 August 2003 there was a children's concert in Bishkek, commemorating the importance of statehood. During the performance that evening, a large, illuminated tUnduk was lifted above dancers in the centre of Ala-Too Square. The programme was called Uluu Tunduk or Sacred Light. The tunduk was reported to symbolize 'yurt - country' (Shepelenko 2003). This complements Akaev's earlier slogan: 'Kyrgyzstan is our common home'. In this particular context, it also suggested that all rights within the common home are equal. This supportedAkaev's new slogan for the Year of Statehood: 'Kyrgyzstan is a country of human rights'. This statement contained another message as well. It demonstrated the urgency with which Akaev attempted to foster unity within the country, particularly after the Aksy tragedy (Chapter 1). The death of the protestors had caused concern among many people that the Akaev regime was becoming increasingly authoritarian and he wanted to distance himself from this image. The buildings around the square had been decorated for the festivities. They were adorned with blue banners, depicting mountains, eagles and other national icons. Two banners had quotes on them, which underlined the importance of strengthening the qualities of the state in society. One quoted Manas: 'I gathered buzzards and turned them into falcons. I gathered different peoples and turned them into a nation.' 5 The other was a quote by Akaev: 'Statehood is a great idea, helping the nation survive in difficult times.' 6 The reference to Manas highlighted the unity of the country, despite the different ethnic groups. The quote by Akaev complements this by focusing on the main aim of ethnogenesis which - in his view -was the primary goal of statehood. The maintenance of statehood, therefore, helped remind the people of the moral values that
162
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
led them to become independent and the struggle with which it was achieved. These lessons, in his view, reinforced the state, particularly in times of difficulty, as was evident during this politically tense period. The central themes of the performance stressed the centrality of the Manas epos and the moral virtues that Akaev derived from the epic to their identity as Kyrgyz citizens. In a speech at the Second Global Kyrgyz Kurultai, the President attested to the importance of the Manas. Akaev (2003a: 5) said: 'The unique oral creation of the Kyrgyz people, the epic Manas, was [throughout history] the carrier not only of the national idea, but was also a prototype of the national constitution, the code of laws and moral standards, [and] the code of honour and morality [nravstvennosti]'. In Akaev's view, the epos embodied all of these qualities. THE GENEALOGY OF THE STATE Akaev's discursive construction of the state had two effects. On the one hand, the state was presented as the result of the unification of its citizens. The public events and advertisements that accompanied the anniversary were an attempt to shape people's identities in accordance with Akaev's political goals. On the other hand, this discourse attempted to displace other issues, such as the rising wave of discontent following the Aksy tragedy (Chapter 1). The methodological use of genealogy, as I have advanced it, reveals such attempts to displace the newness and disunity of the state. Official interpretations highlight the state's ancient origins, the timeless qualities imparted upon it by its ancestors and the unity it has created. This division between the ancient qualities of the state and its constant renewal reflects Bhabha's (1990) split between the pedagogic and the performative in the conceptualization of the nation. Genealogy as a methodology elaborates the conditions under which contemporary representations of identity are constructed and the shifting movements in discourse which underpin it. This genealogical investigation of the state, therefore, examines the processes that have led to its representation at a particular moment. This methodology is employed precisely at the point where the state is attributed with primordial characteristics. Thus, the practices that represent the state as a form of historical consciousness are exposed, and the language in which it is framed is critiqued (Navaro-Yashin 2002). The hegemony of interpretation which underpins the state as a bounded entity is investigated and used against this image. The 'real' age of the Kyrgyz state is no longer of great significance; it is the particular representation at its moment of articulation which becomes the focus of this methodology. The ancient myth of the state - developed through various ideologies, and, in particular, ethnogenesis - provides an insight into the interpretative hegemony of particular discourses and their effect on framing and disciplining the people. Yet, genealogy also exposes the much more recent creation of administrative and bureaucratic
The Genealogy of the State
163
structures of the modern state. From the early eighteenth century, what is Kyrgyzstan today was under the control of the Kokand Khanate. The ruling dynastic family broke away from the Emirate of Bukhara in 1710, establishing their new capital in Kokand, in the Fergana Valley (in modern day Uzbekistan). The rulers succeeded in capturing the territory to the east, and by the early nineteenth century had established posts in northern Kyrgyzstan, but their control in this area was by no means well established. The Kyrgyz in the Fergana Valley lived in sedentary agricultural communities. A number of taxes (Chapter 2) were imposed by the rulers on the people in the Fergana Valley. The Kyrgyz that lived in the north were still nomadic and the khanate did not have strong control over them. The repression of the Kyrgyz people in the south led to a popular uprising in 1873-1876. Also at this time, the Khanate was engaged in a series of battles with the tsarist Empire that had expanded into the region. The uprisings and the force of the tsarist army were too great, and in 1876, the Khanate was abolished and all its territory became part of the Governorate-General of Turkestan. The Governorate-General of Turkestan was based in Tashkent, but did not have jurisdiction over the Emirate of Bukhara or the Khiva Khanate (which remained protectorates of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union until 1920). During this period, the tsarist administration divided Turkestan into several oblasts (provinces). The modern boundaries of Kyrgyzstan were divided between the Fergana and the Semirechie (Seven Rivers) oblasts. In 1886, the Governorate-General of Turkestan was renamed the Turkestan krai (a region which is a large administrative territory, but is not an autonomous province). After the October Revolution, in 1918 the Soviets renamed the Turkestan krai the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, retaining the tsarist internal divisions.? This included all of Central Asia including Kazakhstan. Turkestan, however, was largely separate from the central administration. In 1918-1919, both Russian and Muslim groups struggled against the Soviet regime. During these years, the Soviets in Moscow and the Turkestan administration, with the assistance of the local Communist party, managed to repress these anti-revolutionaries and begin to implement their own social development policies (Soucek 2000). In 1924, the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast' was formed (this was changed to the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast' in 1925), after the completion of the national border delimitation by Soviet ethnographers. The Soviet policy of nation building was founded upon the view that the people of the region were not advanced and needed to be ushered through the evolutionary stages until they developed a cohesive national identity, which they would eventually abandon for a Soviet identity. As the former stated: 1The nationFirst Secretary, Turdakun Usubaliev (1982: 1 state delimitation promoted the acceleration of the regional people's consolidation and the liquidation of their former political1 economic and cultural dissociation and backwardness to the successful realization
n
164
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
of the social transformations.' The designation of the Kyrgyz as an autonomous oblast'was still subject to the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic. In 1926, the territory was renamed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. This recognized the Kyrgyz as having a distinct ethnic identity and granted them the power to exercise the powers and administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on its own territory. Finally, in 1936 Kyrgyzstan was made a full Soviet Socialist Republic. The country had now become a full member of the USSR and had jurisdiction over all its cultural and domestic affairs, but its foreign, security and defence policies were still centrally controlled by administrators in Moscow. In a new constitution in 1937, a section was added, allowing Kyrgyzstan the formal right to secede from the USSR. This was not, however, an actual power that could be exercised. The declaration of its membership to the USSR recognized the Kyrgyz as a historically-defined ethnic group with common economy and social customs, in keeping with Stalin's definition (Chapter 4). During the Soviet years, a number of cultural and educational programmes were implemented by the administration. Opera, ballet and other fine arts were developed and encouraged. A campaign against illiteracy was initiated. This also served as a way of disseminating the ideology of the Communist Party. In 1918, the first newspaper in Russian, Pishpekskii listok (Pishpek Paper) was published. In 1924, the first newspaper in Kyrgyz (Arabic script) was published, Erkin too (Free Mountain). These served as mouthpieces for the government. Even in 1930, a Kyrgyz language paper was published, Sabattuu bol (Be Literate). Books were also published cheaply to encourage people to read. In contrast to Benedict Anderson's (1983) notion of 'print capitalism', the inexpensive books supporting the state ideology could be said to a form of 'print state socialism'. Together with the literacy campaign, numerous schools and institutes were opened. In 1951, the first university was opened in Frunze (today, Bishkek). The Kyrgyz State University was a pedagogical institute and has subsequently expanded. When the Kyrgyz Republic declared its independence in 1991, its form and structure were the creations of the Soviet administration. The organization of the new government was based on this Soviet system, and, even today, it retains many of its original characteristics. The republic is divided into seven oblasts (Batken, Chiii, Jalalabat, Naryn, Osh, Talas and Ysyk-K51), similar as it was during the Soviet era. These are divided into raions (regions), cities and villages. The republic is divided into legislative, judicial, and executive branches. There are local kengesh (council) in the regions. These are joined to the ]ogorku Kengesh (Supreme Council or Parliament). Officials are elected to the kengesh and akims (regional leaders) are elected as administrative leaders for the regions. The borders are also a creation of the Soviet border delimitation. The different republics represented the largest ethnic groups in
The Genealogy of the State
165
the region. In Central Asia, the decision to formally demarcate these republics reflected another concern within the Soviet administration. It was an attempt to stop a federation of (Muslim) Turkic peoples. If the separate national identities were not enforced, then a pan-Turkic identity may have developed and the worry of the Soviet authorities was that this identity would challenge Soviet rule. The republic borders were intended to be internal divisions. The borders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the Fergana Valley, for example, were designed so that the three countries could share the resources of the valley. These artificial boundaries, however, have now become international borders, and a source of contention. Kyrgyzstan has had border disputes with all of its neighbours. Attempts have been made to demarcate and settle the borders with China and Kazakhstan and both created public protest. 8 While these have been more or less formalized, further official delineation remains on the Tajik and Uzbek borders. The political elite of the Kyrgyz Republic are predominantly former Soviet apparatchiks (members of the Communist Party). The first president Askar Akaev, however, was the only one of the Central Asian leaders not to be the former First Secretary of the country. From 1972 to 1986 he was a lecturer of physics at the Leningrad State University. In 1987 he was elected as vice-president of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, and in 1989 became its president. He was a member of the Communist Party, but did not hold any significant positions. In 1990, he was elected by the Jogorku Kengesh as President of Kyrgyzstan. Many of his closest advisers and ministers have had long careers in the Soviet Party. Until the 'Tulip Revolution', many of the former Soviet first secretaries and apparatchiks retained parliamentary seats in the independent government. The independent Kyrgyz Republic was the result of policies which delineated ethnic groups. During the Soviet Union, Party leaders believed that ethnic identities would eventually be replaced by a general Soviet identity. National identities did not disappear, but instead strengthened and, together with ideas of defined territorial boundaries, became the vehicle through which many disputes were articulated. This was the case in Kyrgyzstan, most notably just before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, when Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashed over land rights. The dispute quickly turned violent supported by ethnic stereotypes, ideologies and fear of the Other which were used against each other. Another national celebration in 2000, the 3,000th anniversary of the city of Osh, highlights the sharp divisions that still exist in the south and how the national genealogy attempts to displace this within the context of Akaev's presidential campaign. THE HISTORICAL VISION AND ITS GAPS The Osh 3,000th anniversary built upon the ideological vision Akaev depicted during the celebration of the Manas epic in 1994. The official aim was to underline the ancient origins of the city by establishing it as a
166
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
major location on the Silk Road in Kyrgyzstan. This was complemented by an overall concern for unity, expressed through the actions of the ancestors, contributing to the maintenance of the state. This notion was emphasized by the Kyrgyz academic A. Asankanov (1998: 7), who said: ... the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the epic Manas and the 3,000th anniversary of the city of Osh is a natural event for all the multinational people of Kyrgyzstan, during a period which finds them with independence, sovereignty, and statehood. These two major events promote the definition of the place of Kyrgyzstan in the world community and serve as a catalyst for further national progress. Osh was a main trading centre on the Silk Road, the ancient trading routes throughout Eurasia. By celebrating this anniversary on a national level, the official history could claim a part of this past. The anniversary of its antiquity did not make Osh any less Kyrgyz, but rather served to establish the Kyrgyz as the oldest people in the region and strengthening their claims over the terri tory. On 4 October, a three-day event began, celebrating the ancient origins of the Kyrgyz people, the different ethnicities that live in the country and the borders of the state. 9 The Kyrgyz Government invited many international dignitaries to the celebrations. As the guests were driven through the main streets into the city before the official opening day, they were greeted by children waving flags with 'Osh 3000' written on them. An official programme had been organized for the guests, which included many cultural shows and a concert by local children on the final day. On the first morning of the celebrations, I walked around the main streets of the city. In the cool and rainy weather, people had set up stalls selling Kyrgyz handicrafts and food. I explored the centre before going to the city administration building to attend the official opening of the festivities. 10 The opening ceremony was the beginning of an international conference that continued for most of the festivities. The central theme of the conference was organized around a discussion of ethnogenesis. The conference participants were academics from all parts of the Commonwealth of Independence States, and included the Russian archaeologist and historian, Professor Mikhail Masson, who had excavated the area where the epic hero Manas is believed to be buried, and where the Manas Ordo complex is now located in Talas (Chapter 6). The scholars, who participated in the conference, gave a range of papers devoted to different aspects of ethnogenesis and the importance of Osh and the Fergana Valley to Kyrgyzstan. After the conference, the guests and conference participants were driven to Sulaiman Too (Mount Solomon), the most sacred place for Muslim pilgrimage in the Fergana Valley. Here, they were taken to a museum in the mountain.
The Genealogy of the State
167
(The museum in Sulaiman Too was built by the Soviets, who blasted a hole in the side of the mountain to make space for it.) Next, the guests were taken to a new museum at the foot of Sulaiman Too, where the exhibitions presented the history of the region. 11 The celebrations continued for the next couple of days. On 5 October, a series of social and cultural events were planned for the official guests and the public. This included sporting events at the city's hippodrome. On the final day, 6 October, there was a celebration in the city of <.Jzg6n, near Osh. (Ozg6n was officially recognized as being roughly the same age as Osh, and, therefore, shared in some of the celebrations during this time.) Here, there was an official ceremony to unveil a new monument in the town. President Akaev attended the event and uncovered a line of new busts of famous and respected people from the area. In the middle was a globe with a dove flying over it. One bust my guide pointed out to me was of Salizhan Sharipov, a distinguished cosmonaut from this town. Sharipov has served on missions to the Mir and International Space Stations, and received awards from President Akaev. Sharipov is of Uzbek parentage, but was born in Kyrgyzstan. By unveiling a statue in his honour, it was clear that Akaev was making an attempt to extend the notion of 'Kyrgyzstan is our common home' to the people in a region, one fraught with ethnic tensions. From 4 to 10June 1990, five thousand crimes (including rape and murder) were committed, in a dispute that originated over land claims between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz living in the area (Razakov 1993; Tishkov 1995, 1997). The people I spoke to still had bitter memories of the conflict. These monuments unveiled during the celebrations, however, had an alternate effect. The Uzbeks were incorporated into a Kyrgyz construction of honouring the ancestors based upon a sanjyra model. This, in essence, had the opposite effect; it ostracized the Uzbeks from the very state they are meant to embody. This and similar events have left Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan looking towards Uzbekistan for meaningful forms of political authority (Liu 2002). For Akaev, however, this was more than honouring the past and present heroes of the region to make all citizens feel part of the state. The speech at the unveiling was part of his political campaign for re-election. The presidential elections this year (29 October 2000) were particularly contentious. According to the constitution, the president could only serve two terms. Akaev argued that he was appointed by Parliament in 1991, instead of elected by the people, and, therefore, his re-election in 2000 would only constitute his second term in office. Faced with allegations of abusing his position, Akaev's address to the residents of <.Jzg6n was important, especially given that he was not popular in the south. The absence of Uzbeks in Parliament or other decision-making bodies highlighted feelings of distance, for which Akaev was held responsible. In addition, southerners felt that much of the power and wealth was concentrated in the north, and little had been done to improve the situation in the south. The President's appearance at the unveiling of these statues was an attempt to
168
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
sway voters in his favour. While sharing a taxi on the way back to Osh, the other passengers agreed that it was necessary for Akaev to make such a gesture in order to gain votes in the region. The anniversary also presented an opportunity for Akaev to address this growing division between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan. Yet, these gestures did not address the underlying problems. In a series of meetings Tursunbai Bakir uulu, the republic's Ombudsman and native of the Osh region, described to me the difficult situation of the south and the importance of this celebration. He described how he had fought for greater economic and political involvement in the south for many years before these festivities. Since 1993 he had also campaigned to have the capital moved from Bishkek to Osh. He believed that this would raise the standard of living in the region. 'Bishkek', he said, 'is like a European city, whereas the other cities are old and derelict.' Southern political elites would often draw such comparisons, stating that they were politically under-represented and economically marginalized in contrast to the higher income and number of businesses emerging in the north. Although Bishkek remains the capital, during the celebrations Akaev announced that Osh was Kyrgyzstan's 'second capital' (Akaev 2003e: 153). While the southern elites were able to draw attention to their concerns, the government's decision to promote the festivities was also connected to other political developments that had taken place in the Fergana Valley region in the preceding years. In 1999 and 2000 Uzbek officials ordered that fences be erected and minefields laid around parts of its border with Kyrgyzstan in an attempt to defend the country against terrorism (Megoran 2002). In 1999, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a rebel group, detonated bombs in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, in an assassinate attempt against the President, Islam Karimov. From their bases in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, they launched a series of incursions into Kyrgyzstan, with the goal of making their way to Uzbekistan and establishing an Islamic caliphate. The IMU also engaged in armed conflict with the Kyrgyz army during the summers of 1999 and 2000, but was apparently defeated. The celebrations in Osh provided the government with an opportunity to stress its secular goals and the dangers of religious fundamentalism. A STATE OF THE PEOPLE The economic stagnation and political isolation felt by southerners and other ethnicities has become a predominant narrative in the country. This was apparent even in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. This has led to alternative political realities for some citizens. Morgan Liu noted this among Uzbek men living in Osh. The distance between the ideology of the state and people's perceptions of it left them feeling excluded from the state since independence. In their disillusionment they did not look to Akaev, but conceptualized the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, as their khan. Liu (2002:
The Genealogy of the State
169
5, original emphasis) notes: 'In a predicament where [Uzbek men] find themselves unable to mobilize for political action within Kyrgyzstan, and unable to connect themselves politically to Uzbekistan, Osh Uzbeks produced the imagination about ideal state and leadership that articulated their desires for good community and belonging within the reconfigured political landscape.' This imagination focused on Karimov as exhibiting idealized characteristics. Liu notes the concept of the khan occurred with regularity in Osh Uzbek discourses. This was exemplified by the social and spatial context of the mahalla:
To live in a mahalla meant to be under a seemingly ubiquitous authority that exerted influence on social conduct within the neighborhoods. The mahalla operated as a field of authority. Osh Uzbek men envisioned an ideal post-socialist state as a kind of quasi-mahalla space under the paternal authority of the khan. The Khan oversaw his state with the same sense of personal stewardship as elders were supposed to oversee the neighborhood (Liu 2002: 6). Authority is treated 'as being dispersed through a space in the sense that its effects were recognizable throughout the space' (Liu 2002: 5, original emphasis). The mahalla acts as a space through which authority is felt. The mahalla and the state were compared to each other, creating a recognizable medium through which disciplining practices and authority could be distributed. Liu (2002: 7) noted: 'The state was thus treated like a mahalla writ large in both "content" (paternal oversight) and "form" (spatial characteristics).' 12 In the absence of involvement in local politics, political imaginations and affiliations are fixed beyond national borders and connected with familiar concepts and ideas. The exclusion of minorities from politics is an area that Akaev's vision of national unity could not address. The concept of the 'common home' also did not hold, as Kyrgyz Uzbeks looked beyond their border to find political legitimacy elsewhere. Furthermore, minorities did not share in forms of genealogical relatedness as they were represented in local and national levels. This precluded them from being able to locate themselves in the construction of the Kyrgyz state and ostracized from it. Both official and personal commemorations that were part of the year of Kyrgyz statehood reinforced the idea of a unified 'Kyrgyz' history and genealogical imagination. Thus, for many, the state becomes not a 'common home', but a distinctly Kyrgyz space. LENIN BAIKE13 In Kyrgyzstan, one historical figure that did find resonance with Kyrgyz and other nationalities was Lenin. Many recognized him as establishing the modern state. Lenin, thus, attained a place among the nation and state builders, although he is not 'Kyrgyz'. Yet, even the father
170
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
of socialism had a divided identity. He had been incorporated into the official genealogy, but his very image also recalled the collapse of the Soviet Union, and for many, the loss of a much more secure time. A scandal erupted in 2003 when the Lenin statue was moved. The public reaction from all quarters revealed how Lenin remained an important figure for many in the country, and was perhaps the only figure with which some minorities could feel a sense of shared understanding and belonging. In early August 2003, scaffolding went up around the Lenin statue, which stood in the centre of Ala-Too Square in front of the State History Museum. The Lenin statue was only erected in 1984, and since independence in 1991 laws had been passed to protect all Soviet iconography. A special law pertaining to the protection of the Lenin statue in Ala-Too Square was passed on 22 May 2000. The sight of scaffolding triggered concern among several politicians and local residents; however, the workers claimed only to be carrying out routine maintenance work. It came to the attention of the media (Orlova 2003) thatthe actual plan was to remove the Lenin statue and replace it with another (Semenyak 2003 ), which turned out to be true. Just before Independence Day, a new statue 'Freedom' ('Erl
The Genealogy of the State
171
force people to fight in the First World War. Many people did not want to fight other Muslims in Russia's war against Turkey. In order to conscript the Kyrgyz (and other Central Asian peoples) the Russian army forced them into service. Although few people are still alive from that period, those that I met said it was a terrible time. Sultangazy, an old aksakal in the village of Tashtak, told me that he remembered when the Russians came they were abusive. He said he was kicked over by a Russian guard for no reason and it was a frightening time. He said he was happy when Lenin came to power. Other people told me stories of tsarist Russians shooting people on the street. Fear of the Russian troops and a desire to avoid fighting in the war caused many people to flee to Xinjiang Province in China. 18 The journey over the mountains was difficult, and many died in the harsh conditions. When the refugees arrived in Xinjiang there was little food, causing many to die of starvation. In 1917, after the Bolsheviks took power, the refugees started to come back into what had become Soviet Central Asia. Usubaliev comments that in the years after the October Revolution the Soviet administration gave 435 million roubles to the refugees so that they could have bread and rebuild their facilities. He claims that: 'Only during the Soviet period did the Kyrgyz people acquire their statehood, having created the most important conditions for its national consolidation, political, social and economic and spiritual development' (Usubaliev 2003a: 1). He notes that the wisdom of Lenin was his national politics, and to forget this would be a fatal mistake for the Kyrgyz. The removal of the statue for Ala-Too Square revealed the conflicting interpretations surrounding Lenin. For many, Lenin was the founder of the modern state. Friends frequently told me that without the Soviets, the Kyrgyz would probably still live in yurts and there would be no Kyrgyzstan. One aksakal, Esenkan, told me: 'If the Kyrgyz remembered the role of the Soviets in1917, there would be a portrait of Lenin on every corner'. Replacing the statue emphasized the importance that people attributed to him. Yet, Lenin also represented a time when many considered life to be better. Many people shared with me feelings of regret over the collapse of the Soviet Union. The guarantees that the state provided ended with independence. Life had become much more difficult and uncertain. In addition, the many statues around the country, street names and signs all had an effect of making Lenin apart of everyone's life. With independence and the rise of Kyrgyz forms of national identity, many other nationalities felt separated from the state that they had previously contributed to building. The demonstrations emphasized further the loss some people felt and further isolation in their home. 2003 - '2,200 YEARS OF KYRGYZ STATEHOOD' The scandal that erupted over the Lenin statue may have been a small and isolated incident, but it revealed many underlying concerns and
172
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
tensions within the country. It also indicated that the concept of unity behind the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood', was not taking hold. Instead, the celebrations appeared more as an attempt to deflect the growing discontent in the country. Even the conception and development of the celebrations indicated that they were introduced as a direct result of the Aksy tragedy. In August 2002, President Askar Akaev announced that 2003 would be nominated as the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood'. The Kyrgyz news agency, Kabar, quoted Akaev as stating that the idea for Kyrgyz statehood 'came from the epos "Manas". Kyrgyz statehood [is]2,200 [years old] and 2003 ... as a Year of Kyrgyz Statehood, according to [the] President will help to consolidate the nation, strengthen the unity and [... ] develop young Kyrgyz Statehood' (J
The Genealogy of the State
173
The claim of 2,200 years of I
Figure 6.1 - The official translation of the section (having already been translated from Chinese into I
174
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
section from the newspaper was translated from Chinese to Kyrgyz and then to Russian. The translators, however, did not write 'Gen'gun', they changed it directly to 'Kyrgyz'. Although the importance of this celebration in the government's broader nation-building project is consistent with the other celebrations which emphasized the historicity of the Kyrgyz people and their customs, what is less clear is why this was not organized for 2001, which was officially declared the 'Year of Tourism'. Furthermore, unlike the 1,000th anniversary of Manas and the 3 ,OOOth anniversary of the city of Osh, plans for the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood' were not started well in advance. Planning committees and publishing campaigns had been started two to three years before the official commencement of the previous anniversaries. Also, the United Nations received requests by President Akaev to recognize these events long before they were due to begin. President Akaev did not address the United Nations on the matter of Kyrgyz statehood until after the Aksy tragedy and less than four months before the official start of the celebrations. The President's timing of this national commemoration suggests a compelling need to take action in the social life of the country. This was in addition to direct political and economic intervention that was to benefit the affected families in Aksy, and to begin to address the perceived divisions between the north and south. It also signalled a moment of political expediency. The political tension growing in the country was of such significance that the claims for unity in his speeches indicate attempts to address these problems. The construction of the myth of the state and the national celebrations of this image were attempts to displace the focus on social tensions and political opposition. Genealogy as a methodology provides an opportunity to examine events, such as the celebration of statehood, and trace its construction through multiple and complex discourses. As Foucault (1984) noted, such a genealogy enables us to chart the shifting reinterpretations and their effects on the concepts of ourselves. In this study of the state, this method analyses how the notion of the state changes over time, but in doing so, also performs a critique of the present representation. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the genealogical analysis of statehood and its various discourses also produces a critique of that representation. In this case, the desire for unity expressed through the state was the result of increasing opposition, which eventually led to Akaev's downfall. The gaps in official ideology and underlying the creation of the Kyrgyz person were widening and would soon engulf the weak foundations upon which they had been established.
1
NOTES Kurultai refers to a form of council or congress that was held while the Kyrgyz were nomadic. This word is Turko-Mongolic in origin and can still be found throughout Central and Inner Asia.
The Genealogy of the State 2
3
4
5
6 7 8
9
10
11 12
13
14
15
16
17
175
The Second Global Kyrgyz Kurultai was held on 28-29 August 2003 in Cholpon-Ata on the shores of Lake Ysyk-Kol. In the speech that Akaev (2003a) delivered at the conference, he outlined the past, present and future of the nation and called for all to take part in its development. Akaev delivered the speech in Russian. 'We are the state' in Russian is 'gosudarstvo - eto my'. The tiinduk is also one of the symbols of the Kyrgyz state. It appears on the flag with forty flames emanating from it, indicating the forty plemya of the Kyrgyz. In Kyrgyz: 'Kulaaly taptap, Kush kyldym. Kurama jyiyp, furt kyldym.' In Russian: 'Gosudarstvennost'- eto velikaya idea, pomogayushchaya natsii vyzhivat' v trudnye vremena.' In a new Soviet constitution of 1920, the area was renamed the Turkestan Soviet Socialist Republic. Further land disputes began in April 2008 when Kyrgyzstan, under President Bakiev, formally ceded three parcels of land to Kazakhstan and gave the Kazakh Government long-term leases of four holiday properties at Lake Ysyk-Kol (Karakulova 2008). On 22 January 2010, Parliament ratified the lease of 58 hectares of Kyrgyz land to Kazakhstan for 49 years. A booklet available to conference participants, published in Russian, Kyrgyz and Uzbek, told the 'legend' of the city of Osh (Khasanii 2000). This event was also included in the UNESCO calendar of celebrations. A representative from UNESCO was present at the conference to discuss the importance that this celebration had for the international community and for Kyrgyzstan. I had been given an official invitation to attend the anniversary by the dean of the university faculty that I was attached to in Bishkek. Although I had an invitation, I was not one of the guests invited to each of the places that were visited on the cultural itinerary. John Rasanayagam (2002a,b) describes similar interaction between representations of the mahalla and state. Baike is a Kyrgyz word meaning an 'older brother', 'uncle', or a term of respect for an older person to whom you are speaking. In 1991 Dzerzhinskii Street was renamed Erkindik, and had a smaller version of the statue that now stands in Ala-Too Square at the northern end. This smaller statue has been taken down and replaced with a statue of Kurman jan datka. This is also where Muslims gather to pray on Orozo Ait, marking the end of the fast of Ramadan. A feud ensued in Parliament, with angry deputies blaming the Prime Minister, Nikolai Tanaev, for violating the codes protecting the statue and joining in with the popular discontent of the demonstrators (Bezborodova 2003, ; Sydykova 2003: 1). In the end, the State Secretary, Osmonakun Ibraimov, stepped in to rescue Tanaev, claimining that it was his idea to move the Lenin statue, as he felt that the plan reflected the vision of a sovereign Kyrgyzstan. This article was reprinted in Usubaliev's home region of Kochkor, Naryn oblast'. The article was first published on 22 June 1998, in the pro-government newspaper, Slovo Kyrgyzstana.
176 18
19
20
21
22 23
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
This is known as 'Urkun' or the 'Exodus'. The Kyrgyz Government unveiled a small monument in 2003 on the Bishkek-Balykchi highway, commemorating the deaths of an estimated 100,000 people who died in 1916, who were killed by the Russians and those who died as they fled to China (Chekirov 1991). The Bakiev government also planned to erect another monument. Akaev's request to have the United Nations (2002a,b) officially recognize 2003 as the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood' was approved on 1 November 2002 and the resolution was later adopted during the 57th session of the General Assembly on 20 December 2002. There was also a claim made by Rakhman Razzakov, then editor-in-chief of the Osh Taims newspaper, that he wanted to organize a political party just for southern Kyrgyzstan (Argumenty i fakty- Kyrgyzstan 2003; Kalet 2003). To my knowledge, he never succeeded in this attempt, but it demonstrates the extent to which some members of the elite emphasized a notion of difference and separation from the north. In Russian this slogan is: 'Kyrgyzstan- strana prava cheloveka!' The previous slogan, still to be found around Kyrgyzstan, announced in 1994 was 'Kyrgyzstan is our common home!' ('Kyrgyzstan- nash obshchii dom!'). This was an attempt to overcome inter-ethnic problems, specifically between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan. For further information on this see Bartol'd (1996) and Tolstov et al. (1963). This translation deviates from the Chinese as printed in the article. Another translation, directly from Chinese into English taken from the Shih Ji reads: 'Later he [Modun] made the northern countries of Hunyu, Quyi, Dingling, Gekun, Xinli submit to him. Thereupon the noble people and the great ministers of the Xiongnu all submitted, with Maodun (Modun) Chanyu [sometimes pronounced as shanyu] as the leader [literally: sage, worthy person]' (Tineke D'Haeseleer, personal communication). In addition, it is peculiar to highlight a point in history where the first mention of the Kyrgyz is when they come under Chinese control. In my opinion, this example suggests two things. First, from the viewpoint of the official history, it shows that the Kyrgyz are one of the oldest ethnic groups with a state in Central Asia, and second, that they are highly resilient and have always struggled towards greater freedom and independence. This presentation of history supports the construction of Akaev's broader notions of nationalism.
Conclusion
olitical lenses often distort and refract social concepts and their Psignificance in a variety of ways. Public debates on particular issues often make them seem more prevalent than they may be. For example, 'tribalism' is often regarded as an enduring feature of social life, framing politics and social interaction. Allegations of it give the impression that political decisions are made between corporate 'clan' groups, which reflect similar social groups. In addition, national celebrations, which focus on honouring ancestors and describing the history of their uruu or uruk ('tribe' and 'clan', respectively), further the perception of strong 'tribal' organization. These images, however, obscure personal meanings of uruu and uruk identity and the significance attributed to them. A further abstraction is made when such concepts are compared to external interpretations of society. Western views of kinship, in particular, have largely been based on evolutionary notions of social complexity. Former nomadic groups, such as the Kyrgyz, are viewed as having retained their strong kin relations due to their nomadic past and the frequent references to 'tribalism' appear to have emerged intact after the Soviet Union. The basic notions of kinship, as popularly understood in the West, are based on flawed notions of pre-modern, egalitarian social organization. This mismatch between theories and daily life is apparent in that many studies are unable to address evidence of hierarchies, distributed 'technologies of power and forms of governance that administer political subjects in ways that can resemble those found in centralized state structures' (Sneath 2007: 202) in the nomadic period and what changes have subsequently happened during the Soviet era. The models applied not only misrepresent the kinds of social relations that existed, but also project this image onto current relationships. Such views have marked representations of Kyrgyzstan since independence. Descriptions of kinship links combined with theories on social order have established the logic behind 'tribal' political alliances and the reason for the collapse of the Akaev government. Studies of 'clan politics' have revolved around how 'clans' as corporate groups
178
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
negotiate and concede power, and where pacts between groups may collapse, creating a power vacuum and the possibility of violence (Collins 2006; Schatz 2004). These views have revealed many aspects of politics and the rise of power of the local cadre in the Soviet republics, but on further reflection, they do not address two important issues. First, theories of 'clan politics' are often based on anthropological models that have been overturned for new understandings of kinship and models which challenge classical conceptions of nomadic society. While models of political pacts are useful, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, they need not be premised by kinship; they are often short-lived alliances, exploiting any connections between people to achieve particular goals. Second, accusations of 'tribalism' are aimed at articulating narratives of overlapping conceptions of 'corrupt' factions based on various forms of favouritism. The power of the claim lies not in its ability to identify relatives, but describes the use of various personal connections to exploit political or economic power, often through corrupt practices. This also serves to emphasize that those making the allegations stand outside such relationships without equal access to the same kinds of power and wealth. For many, this is separate from those actions which comprise daily forms of corruption but are needed to exist, such as bribery for particular goods and services. Contrary to the refracted images of corporate groups, there are no real active, organized groups. Categories of descent, such as uruu and uruk, do not feature prominently in people's daily lives. They are remembered and referred to, but not as a source of political action, although some public figures, such as Nurlan Motuev, have tried and failed. For some, however, the images of the ancestors do play an important role in understanding themselves and social values. The ways in which ancestors and kinship relations are remembered is through what I have termed the 'genealogical imagination'. This focuses more on how relatedness is created between relatives through social interaction, rather than simply through biological determinism. In this understanding, personal and collective memories are recalled to strengthen the connections between people. Memory, however, is often a production of history, particularly through official accounts of the people and state. To connect personal memories and broader historical representations, various deployments of scale (temporality, spatiality, local and national conceptions of inclusiveness) and (politicized) formations of descent are deployed. Relatedness is thus described through genealogies, but memories of ancestors, through which people establish connections, are underpinned by the political context in which they are elaborated. The genealogical imagination plays a role in developing relations with family and distant relatives, but coping strategies are grounded in close friends and family networks, rather than on uruu or uruk connections. There were examples of this throughout my fieldwork. For example, Yrys, a woman in her late forties living in Naryn, relied
Conclusion
179
heavily on her family. She lived in a flat with her teenage son. Yrys's husband, Rysbek, lived in Bishkek. He had moved there to look after their daughter who studied at a university in the capital, but also to have greater job opportunities. Yrys depended on the money Rysbek sent her as her own salary was months in arrears. In our conversations, she continually returned to the topic of money and the pressures of not having enough to make ends meet. For example, she worried about finding enough money to be able to send her son to university. Family help is most people's most important resource to overcome the difficulties of surviving in a developing economy. Although people may rely on the assistance of others, there is no wider kinship group that serves to render such help. People may impress upon others that they are related to access help, but this is often one strategy of many to obtain the basic necessities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the reliance on remittances from migrant workers in bigger cities and abroad has become an important factor in many people's coping strategies. In 2008, remittances from abroad made up a significant portion of the GDP. 1 With the global economic crisis, there has been a sharp reduction in the inflow of remittances and, thus, families have been forced to limit their expenditures. This has come at a time when high food prices and rising energy prices are draining household resources, and energy curtailments during the 2008-2009 winter severely affected small and medium businesses. Families in rural areas with their own land also suffered. Three years of drought meant that before the start of winter in 2008 there was not enough fodder to feed the animals. Farmers were forced to sell their animals, but market prices had dropped and few made sufficient money from their sales to feed their remaining animals or their families. During this time, family and friends provided essential support in order to meet daily demands. Maintaining these vital relationships is essential. Finding and establishing connections with people is important, but knowledge of uruu and uruk does not guarantee support. Many people relied heavily on their families, as did Yrys. When her husband suddenly died, it was clear that it was not only a great emotional loss, but that she had also lost vital financial support. My host family used friends and acquaintances to establish a link between the village and Naryn. Food, medicines and letters were shipped back and forth, providing much needed help to all the family. Maintaining the relationships within the network is vital for continuance of help. Ensuring that people meet their obligations, positions of power can be enforced through the imposition of shame. Social situations often include the potential threat of shame. Thus, obligations must be fulfilled in order to limit this and maintain relationships. The man who was unable to help his step-brother get into university is one such example. Despite his willingness to help, he was asked to help earlier and he had already lost touch with his contacts in
180
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
the university. He did not have time to get in touch with anyone else and could not help his family. Although it was not his fault, the fact that his family was relying on him to get his step-brother into university, put him in an awkward position. The relationship between this man and his father, which was already difficult, suffered considerably as a result. Elements of shame were brought up in arguments and the man was made to feel separate from his family. The complexities of managing shame and obligations are evident particularly in marriage. In many marriages, women are unable to achieve personal goals because they must fulfil the expectations of their family and their husband's family. In situations of bride abduction, if a father tells his daughter to remain with the family that abducted her, she is at risk of being excluded from help her family can provide if she disobeys her father. Two women in my host family had been through such experiences. Their father asked them to stay with their new family. If the daughters had returned, it could have brought various and lasting forms of shame upon the family, especially, upon the women themselves. If the women returned, community members may have through that she was a bad daughter for not listening to her father. She may not have been able to find another husband as she may be regarded as a bad wife for leaving another man's family and a promiscuous woman for having spent time with another man. Her father would also have been shamed for not being able to control his daughter. Both women depended heavily on their families for help and could not have risked losing such support. Shame mixed with obligations often force women to obey their fathers and stay with their new husbands. The importance of maintaining obligations and receiving help, while limiting shame, is a central concern among people. This concept was used by Akaev as the basis for his ideology, which presented genealogy as morally and socially valuable to the development of Kyrgyz ethnic identity and the state. While for some, genealogies are important to the conception of the self, the government created a discourse through which people were to honour their ancestors through national celebrations, emphasizing their virtues and significance. Shame was an implicit part of this discourse. If people did not demonstrate proper respect to their ancestors, then they were not patriots. Here, genealogical imagination was deployed on different scales. For example, some locally venerated historical figures were included into the national history as having struggled for the creation and maintenance of the Kyrgyz nation and state. Likewise, national heroes were also celebrated locally among their descendents and in particular areas. By attending many ceremonies honouring ancestors, Akaev attempted to connect these various scales of genealogical representation to strengthen his national ideology. Using Lev Gumilev's notion of ethnogenesis, Akaev demonstrated that these figures were the reason for Kyrgyz independence today. He focused on the ancestors' values and morals, stressing their importance for people's lives today and for
Conclusion
181
the future of the country. These views often complemented people's own memories about their ancestors, and provided them with an opportunity to articulate their views within an official discourse. This use of genealogy has marked the development of the Kyrgyz national identity in the post-Soviet period. The parallel construction of complementary notions of genealogy between individual perspectives and government rhetoric acted as a form of governmentality. The effect of this disciplining practice created an official vision of a 'Kyrgyz person', elaborated through a widely recognized custom. People interested in their genealogies were encouraged to express their ideas in connection with the official discourse, which simultaneously acted as a form of self-government. This concept is suggestive of Nikolas Rose's description of 'regimes of the person', which identifies practices which contribute to the forming notions of personal identity. These regimes involve Foucauldian nuances in locating and examining the place of disciplining power in social and political relations. Rose's aim is to focus on the 'history of the relations which human beings have established with themselves' (Rose 1996b: 130). The regimes involve locating how humans are viewed as problematic, how they are being governed, who is making claims over the representation, what are the aims of these views and how are these practices connected with broader political realities. The development of a discursive field in which the regimes of the person are elaborated is a central concept to the distribution of ideology. By examining the different ways in which this concept is understood in people's everyday lives and its use in political rhetoric, the techniques used to govern people emerge. The discursive construction, however, is constantly changing. The investigation of particular representations reflects social and political issues of that time. Retracing social and everyday practices that encourage self-governance represents another use of genealogy. This is a methodological tool, which can be used to uncover the history and interconnectedness of concepts employed to construct particular ideologies. Such a methodology examines, in this case, the shifting discourses which combine to construct new understandings of the nation and the state. Furthermore, this methodology simultaneously performs an analysis of the production of these notions and their wider social and political significance at the moment they are expressed. For example, why did Akaev nominate 2003 as the 'Year of Kyrgyz Statehood'? Through an investigation of the circumstances of the period leading up to Akaev's announcement of this anniversary, I argue that while this was a continuation of previous festivities, it was an attempt to address social and political divisions in the country. The death of six protestors in 2002 sparked a series of demonstrations against the President. In response, he initiated a number of measures, among which he proposed a national referendum to change the constitution. The referendum and other events were part of the
182
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
statehood celebrations and attempted to foster greater unity and were expressed through the actions of the ancestors and people's duty to honour their memories. This methodology is an effective mode of investigation of the production of identities. It transverses local and national discourses, and identifies points of interconnection. Furthermore, it allows the possibility to analyse events and issues critically that influence the representation of these identities. It is a methodology which explores multiple, overlapping discourses, which contribute to the construction of identities in the present. BAKIEV'S PATH Since Ak.aev was ousted in 2005, many of the problems that dogged the government are still present. Accusations of 'tribalism', however, are less prevalent. It is well known, however, that Bakiev's family is very much in charge (International Crisis Group 2008). There are still concerns that elections serve the president, rather than advancing the goals of democracy. In the 2009 presidential election, the OSCE (2009) noted that the process did not meet international standards and had identified many violations. This presidential election, however, was relatively quiet. There were no demonstrations or major newspaper battles, until after the election results had been announced, giving Bakiev a clear victory. Yet, the opposition is not able to mobilize people. Despite the allegations of corruption and authoritarianism, Bakiev has demonstrated that he is able to bring money into the country and kept the country relatively stable throughout the global financial crisis. The promise of $2.15 billion in grants, loans and credit from Russia as aid and to support large-scale hydropower projects, and an increase in money from the United States to keep the base (now 'transportation hub') open has provided greater macroeconomic stability. Remittances have dropped as well as industrial output, but for the first half of 2009, these have not had a significant impact. The country has also emerged from a three-year drought, which means that harvests will be improved. This is significant as agriculture makes up around 40 per cent of the economy. While not all indicators show a steady improvement, the country has avoided plunging into a full crisis. It is no surprise, then, that with the opposition unable to articulate their platform and Bakiev able to bring in much needed money, particularly during a financial crisis, that the President called the elections early to take advantage of the situation. Bakiev has not, however, concentrated much on creating a new national ideology, compared with his predecessor. Akaev's ideological legacy has not changed significantly, but neither has it been actively supported. People continue to erect statues to their ancestors, but there is not the same support as before. Their actions demonstrate respect to important figures in the past, but also a way to establish the family's name in the present. One the whole, however, President Bakiev has not developed his
Conclusion
183
own ideological path. This changed before the 2009 presidential election. On 11 June 2009, Bakiev made his own attempt at charting a national ideology. A new national project 'Culture' is to examine the cultural legacy of the Kyrgyz people and their future. Academics and politicians -including Zaynidin Kurmanov (a parliamentary deputy from the AkJol party, formerly a member of the Maya Strana party) -began to develop the basis for this project. In the President's speech, there were signs that research and festivities would focus on Kyrgyz nomadic life and cultural traditions. Attempts to reveal and continue such traditions, which may have fed into attempts to strengthen ethnic identity and concept of the state, reflect similarities with Akaev's ideology. The project, however, was never formally developed as Bakiev was ousted less than one year later. Nevertheless, such projects must be understood with the context in which it was developed and how it responds to the country's situation, and not a reflection of reified notions of nomadic life and mentality.
1
NOTES According to National Bank figures, remittances make up 19 per cent of the GDP. This is based on the amount of money sent through money transfer companies, and not cash or goods sent to Kyrgyzstan. The actual amount of remittances, therefore, is much higher.
Epilogue
olitical instability and violence have returned to Kyrgyzstan. On 6-7 PApril 2010 violent uprisings erupted around the country. In what seemed like a replay of the 2005 'Tulip Revolution', demonstrators stormed the White House, causing the president to flee. This time, however, there were no organized demonstrations in Ala-Too Square. The events were chaotic with no real leadership. The regime of Kurmanbek Bakiev- which had controlled the country through what many locals described to me as increasing authoritarianism and blatant corruption- quickly collapsed. In a last, desperate attempt by the regime to retain power, police were ordered to fire on the protestors as they struggled to break through the gates of the White House. The violence -which left at least eighty-six dead and over 1,600 injured - was the result of public outrage at the privatization of companies to business groups that were close to or included members of the president's family, namely his son Maksim Bakiev. In particular, the sale of Severelektro, an electricity distribution company which serves much of northern Kyrgyzstan, appeared to benefit Maksim as he would gain extra revenues from recently imposed high energy tariffs. However, this was the culmination of years of growing frustration with a government that promised change and an end with family politics, but followed the corrupt practices of its predecessors. Demonstrations began to appear in Naryn in February, with tension mounting around the country. On 6 April, protestors gathered outside the oblast' administration building in Talas demanding that the governor step down. The crowd eventually stormed the building, took the governor hostage and appointed a 'People's Government'. Later, the crowd attempted to capture the local department of internal affairs. Riot police were flown in from Bishkek and the Minister of Internal Affairs Modomusa Kongantiev arrived to quell the demonstration. Protestors fought with the police and captured the minister, beating him severely as a warning to other government officials. On the same night, the national security service arrested opposition figures in an attempt to stifle an opposition rally scheduled for the following day in Bishkek. The demonstration went ahead with
Epilogue
185
representatives from the OSCE, German and American embassies observing. After the international observers left, the police moved in. A government official pronounced that the meeting was illegal and the police attempted to break it up, arresting some protestors. The police were quickly overpowered as people joined the demonstrators after hearing news reports and receiving messages from friends at the scene. Despite using tear gas and rubber bullets, the police were pushed into a building where they were beaten and had their weapons and armour taken. The demonstrators then charged more riot police who put up little resistance. By the early afternoon, the demonstrators had moved to the centre of the city where they fought with riot police as they attempted to storm the White House. I was in the centre as the demonstration came into Ala-Too Square. I was aware of what had happened at the demonstration and the escalating violence. When the protestors came into the centre by foot and on top of a captured armoured personnel carrier, I ran through the square to avoid the angry mob as it descended on the White House. Police were deployed inside the White House gates, while several other groups of interior ministry forces marched from Lenin Square, in front of Parliament, to the area surrounding Ala-Too Square to occupy positions and block the protestors. It was, however, too late. The protestors were fast and some used the weapons they had earlier taken off the police. The security forces were broken up into small groups and were immediately forced to take defensive positions. Only the police inside the White House compound, supported by snipers on the roof, were able to repel numerous waves of attacks. By evening, the protestors had gained control of the White House and captured the national television station a few blocks away, airing a message that signalled the end of the Bakiev regime. Gunfire continued throughout the night. Fighting also broke out during the day in other parts of the city. Protestors swarmed the National Security Services building to free the jailed opposition leaders. After an intense gun battle, the protestors took the building and the opposition leaders were released. While fighting continued at the White House, the opposition leaders formed a provisional government and announced they had taken over the reins of government after Bakiev fled for jalalabat. While the framework of power was being negotiated, looting spread throughout the city. On the 8 April, people began to form volunteer security brigades to protect homes and properties, but the militias only slowly managed to claw back control from the anarchy in the streets. In the weeks following the uprisings, the new interim government, led by Roza Otunbaeva, struggled to establish its authority. A series of crises tested the coalition of opposition leaders. Land grabbers, exploiting the interim government's tenuous control, attempted to seize plots around the capital. On 19 April, people attacked Meskhetian Turk homes in the Bishkek-suburb of Maevka, killing five. Later, on 13 May, Bakiev supporters ousted newly appointed governors in all three
186
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
southern oblast' administrations. The following day, interim government supporters regained control, sometimes using violence, but the episode demonstrated how weak authority was in the country. The interim government, however, had received support from local Uzbeks. The Uzbek community leader and member of the Rodina (Motherland) Party Kadyrjan Batyrov led a group of followers to help reinstate the acting Jalalabat Governor Bektur Asanov. While his efforts were seen as an important role in overcoming the Bakiev supporters' actions, he is also blamed for having created further instability. After helping to reinstate Asanov, Batyrov and his supporters allegedly set fire to Kurmanbek Bakiev's family home in the village of Teiit. While Batyrov led the drive for greater integration of Uzbeks in political and civic roles in the country, and for the recognition of Uzbek as an official language of the republic, many, including some from his own diaspora, had begun to see his actions as provocative. In particular, his alleged association with the destruction of the Bakiev home and his push for greater rights offended some Kyrgyz; others perceived him as a threat. On 19 May, several thousand Kyrgyz youths attempted to take Batyrov into custody and to reinstate the former governor of Jalalabat oblast'. The Kyrgyz youths marched towards the Batyrov People's Friendship University, which Batyrov had founded. It was there that fighting started. There were also reports of gunfire by the Uzbek leader's people from inside the building aimed at the Kyrgyz trying to gain entrance. The violence left two dead and over seventy injured. These heightened tensions were the prelude to further violence in Osh city. The scene of clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbek residents twenty years before, the city was once again engulfed in nearly a week of bloodshed. A popular version of the events was that on the night of 10-11 June, a small fight between Kyrgyz and Uzbek youths started and quickly grew out of control. Rumours spread rapidly throughout the city and the surrounding area that Uzbek youths had raped and killed Kyrgyz women, prompting Kyrgyz youths to take revenge. Throughout the day of 11 June fighting took place in the streets of Osh and there were many deaths on both sides. There is, however, strong evidence that Uzbek homes were purposely targeted and burned. On the same day in Bishkek, a large group of people gathered in front of Parliament Oogorku Kengesh), which had become the offices of the interim government following the April uprising. Organizers took names of people who wanted to go to Osh to join the fighting. I watched as the police stood by and people inside Parliament simply looked through the curtains at the angry crowd. On 12 June, ethnic Uzbek women and children began flooding to Uzbekistan's border. The interim government requested Russia to deploy peacekeeping troops, but the Russian government dallied and then declined military support. Fighting spread to the region around Osh and later to Jalalabat city and oblast', causing more people to flee. During the violence, the United Nations estimated that nearly 100,000 people crossed the border into Uzbekistan, where many were placed into camps,
Epilogue
187
while approximately another 375,000 people were internally displaced. The government's military eventually gained control over the south and local leaders led peace negotiations in their areas. Official figures claimed that over three hundred people were killed; yet interim President Roza Otunbaeva acknowledged that the actual number of dead could be around 2,000 people. During the violence, wounded ethnic Uzbeks were turned away from the Osh city hospital, forcing them to set up make-shift clinics in Uzbek neighbourhoods, witnesses reported. People were forced to bury friends and relatives without registering the deaths, thus the total number will likely never be known. Despite the multitude of rumours about what sparked the events and the actors involved, it is clear that one event alone was not enough to trigger the wide-scale violence that ensued. A struggle for resources, poor governance and political and civic marginalization of minorities played an equal role in driving tensions that were unleashed in anger. A lack of business infrastructure and employment are two major issues, which have prompted many young people to see work abroad. The reduction in remittances during the global economic crisis further hurt those left behind. This has added to a perception that Uzbeks, who comprise nearly half of the population in southern cities such as Osh, controlled the small business sector, increasing frustrations among Kyrgyz. The image of Uzbeks as prominent businessmen and the push for greater recognition on the national level collided with a general perception of Kyrgyz identity and ownership of the state. The development of Kyrgyz identity under Akaev led to the notion that while Kyrgyzstan may be a 'common home', it is primarily the home of the Kyrgyz. As one young Kyrgyz man said to me during the initial fighting on 11 June, 'Uzbeks do not respect the Kyrgyz.' Asked why, he provided an analogy, 'You wouldn't like someone to come into your home and tell you what to do.' The deployment of identities during this time sheds light on how different peoples are perceived and their actions comprehended. For example, 'tribalism' did not feature as a prominent discourse in the months before Bakiev's ousting, but there was outrage at what many saw as blatant nepotism. The uprising in April was predominantly focused against the President and his family. While Bakiev's supporters did try to regain control, it was not expressed as a 'tribal' struggle. For some people, the interim government was illegitimate and they wanted the security of the recognized government to return to power. At the same time, minorities attempted to voice their grievances, hoping a change in power would result in greater recognition. Yet, instead of a focus on inclusivity through citizenship, angry narratives took on a divisive, ethnic dimension. In attempts to gain resources, such as the land-grabbers in the village of Maevka, or in the acts of violence that resulted from local tensions in the south, ethnicity became the vehicle to articulate fears and anger, and to justify action. Yet, as I have argued, none of these idioms of particularlism- the terms people use to express themselves or others - are concrete categories.
188
The Genealogical Construction of the Kyrgyz Republic
They are deployed to define and delineate people. This book has focused on the way in which Kyrgyz identity was developed on a national level, building on the notion of genealogical relationships. Akaev used these relationships, emphasizing their significance to social values, as a unifying element in his national ideology following independence. 'Tribalism' was the antithesis; it revealed how relationships could be exploited to gain political and economic advantages and served as a focal point to describe the means of corruption, irrespective of the actual relationships involved. The opposition used this rhetoric in the ZOOS uprising that toppled Akaev's government. The way in which identities were portrayed during the June violence, however, highlighted deep-rooted anxieties about what it means to be Kyrgyz and the concept of the state. Weak governance, corruption and extensive poverty have underpinned grievances that brought people onto the street. The power vacuum that opened after Bakiev's ouster, however, exposed the state's weaknesses and the attempt by minorities to claim a greater stake in political and civic activities raised concerns among some Kyrgyz about their authority and control over the state. In an attempt to take what some Kyrgyz consider should be theirs, the village of Maevka became the scene of nationalist violence in the absence of effective state structures to deal with land issues and internal migration. The violence in Osh city and Jalalabat city and oblast' further revealed the tensions between communities and the explosive nature they can take. There have been positive effects as well. The lack of security also sparked the need to establish volunteer militias, playing on notions of patriotism and defence of the homeland. Groups sprung up around Bishkek and other areas in the country to provide security as the law enforcement agencies were immobilized by the April violence and change in government. The state slowly resumed its normal functions and began to assert its control, yet the uneasiness fostered by the instability continued a need for the people to take control of the situation. These anxieties about the nature and strength of the national identity coupled with chronic poverty and corruption have the power to cause further instability. In previous chapters, I discussed the accusations of 'tribalism' as a discourse of corruption and political divisions. I also examined how genealogy was used to construct a vision of the state drawn from people's own understandings of their relationships to one another. Yet, fear can also cause such visions of the state, particularly when closely related to Kyrgyz identity, to be mobilized in different ways. The June violence saw 'Kyrgyz' pitted against 'Uzbek', obscuring the more complex issues of everyday life. The use of ethnic identities in such instances erects barriers that exclude or hide other identities, such as 'friend', 'neighbour' or 'citizen'. In a context where battles over political and social authority are played out through people's daily struggle with poverty, the deployment of identity will determine whether there is further instability or a concerted effort to addresses tensions and forge reconciliation.
Glossary
adat aga aiyl ake akim aksakal
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
aksakaldar sotu akyn ala kachuu apparatchik
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian
asablya
Arabic
ata atkaminery
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
baatyr
Kyrgyz
bai bardak basmachi
Kyrgyz Russian Kyrgyz
bii
Kyrgyz
bir atanyn baldary boz-iii brodyaga byt chisti
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian Russian Russian
customs respected teacher encampment; village father; older brother oblast' governor respected elder; literally 'white beard' aksakal courts poet bride kidnapping member of the Communist Party 'group feeling', or a kind of solidarity father people masquerading as Soviet activists; people engaged in election propaganda 'hero', a title usually associated with a display of bravery in battle rich herd owners chaos fighters part of popular movement against the establishment of Soviet rule judge or judiciaries who settled disputes by customary law amonguruu children of one father nomadic felt tent or yurt tramp or vagabond everyday life pure
190
Glossary
datka
Kyrgyz
dostoinstvo dostorkon dukhovnost' durachit' eje
Russian Kyrgyz Russian Russian Kyrgyz
el
erkindik etnos
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian
gosudarstvennik gosudarstvo gulag
Russian Russian Russian
giimbOz Homo Sovieticus
Kyrgyz Russian
ich inen uruu ichkilik iznasilovat' fadidism
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian Arabic
jardam jerdesh til ik jeti ata
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
jigit
Kyrgyz
fogorku Kengesh
Kyrgyz
joo jooluk kaimak kalym kara
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
a title of an aristocrat of the Kokand Khanate dignity tablecloth spirituality to fool respectful term for an older woman ethnicity; people; tribal union freedom a distinguishable set of ethnic characteristics as offidally defined by the Soviet administration state-builder state glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel'notrudovykh lagerei (The Chief Administration of Correctional Labour Camps), hard labour camp burial vault the citizen who embodies the ideals of socialism and whose ethnic identity has been superseded by their devotion of the Soviet people a uruu within a uruu centre to rape a reform movement in Central Asia in the early twentieth century advocating changes to education and politics, and the reformation of an Islamic society help regionalism a person's seven patrilineal ancestors, literally 'seven fathers' a young warrior, often in the service of a manap Supreme Council, Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic enemy headscarf cream bride price black; common; majority
Glossary kazalchy
Kyrgyz
kazy khan kichine uruu klan
Kyrgyz Turko-Mongolic Kyrgyz Russian
koldoo kolkhoz
Kyrgyz Russian
kollektiv
Russian
kom pi imen tarnost' komok komuz kook
Russian Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
korenizatsiya
Russian
korruptsiya krai
Russian Russian
kul kulak
Kyrgyz Russian
kumys kurultai kyrk choro
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
kyz mahalla manap manaschi
Kyrgyz Uzbek Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
man kurt
Kyrgyz
medressa mentalitet mestnichestvo
Kyrgyz Russian Russian
191
poet (especially during the pretsarist and tsarist eras) judge leader, ruler a little uruu a political bloc, not dependent on the relations between the members support kollektivnoe khozyaistvo - collective farm team or group, usually in a workplace complementarity support; assistance a small, three-stringed guitar the udder of a nursing mother camel, which has been cut off and put onto the heads of captives to turn them into mankurts the indigenization of Soviet power through mass recruitment of non-Russians into the Communist Party corruption a region which is a large administrative territory, but is not an autonomous oblast' slave a peasant-proprietor working for their own profit in the preSoviet era fermented mare's milk congress the forty Kyrgyz warriors Manas is said to have united daughter; girl neighbourhood uruu leader a person who can recite the epic poem, Manas a person who has lost their memory and has become a slave; dim-witted, stupid person Islamic school mentality regionalism
192
Glossary
mol do
Kyrgyz
muundar nark narod narodnost' natsional'nost' natsiya nepotizm nravstvennost' nutag
Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian Russian Russian Russian Russian Russian Mongolian
oblast' obyazannost' oey ong kanat orda otvetstvennyi ooz komuz passionamost'
Russian Russian Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian Russian Kyrgyz Russian
perestroika
Russian
plemya plemennoi pokolenie pravozashchitnik raja
Russian Russian Russian Russian Kyrgyz
regionalizm rod rodstvo ru sanjyra
Russian Russian Russian Kazakh Kyrgyz
sanjyrachi
Kyrgyz
sblizhenie
Russian
literate, educated person; imam, mulla generation, a broad age group common right; custom people ethnicity nationality nation nepotism morality a place of residence or an area of migration province duty house (yurt), family, household right wing horde responsible mouth harp the build up and explosion of passionate energy that causes change in a social group, usually associated with the establishment of an ethnic group, breaking away from a larger group, passionarity a programme of political and economic reform initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev 'tribe' 'tribal' generation human rights defender money paid towards the expenses of a funeral of a family member regionalism 'clan' kinship 'clan' genealogical information combined with an account of the past specialists on genealogical descent and the history of particular rod and plemya coming together
Glossary Shariat
Arabic
shiri
Kazakh/Kyrgyz
sliyanie sol kanat sook
Russian Kyrgyz Kyrgyz
traibalizm tandiik
Russian Kyrgyz
tatun
Kyrgyz
tuugandyk uezd
Kyrgyz Russian
ukrat' umma urkun uruk uruu uruuchuluk uul uvazhenie uyat volost
Russian Arabic Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Kyrgyz Russian Kyrgyz Russian
yas zang zemlyak zhuz
Mongolian Kyrgyz Russian Kazakh
193
the code of law based on the Koran the udder of a nursing mother camel, which has been cut off and put onto the heads of captives to turn them into mankurts fusion; merging left wing literally 'bones', but similar to lineages 'tribalism' the latticed smoke hole or wheel in the roof of a yurt the household of a married couple kinship a small territorial administrative division during the tsarist era to steal community of all Muslims exodus 'clan' 'tribe' 'tribalism' son respect shame the smallest administrative division of a territory, especially during the tsarist era bones, lineages custom; law countryman horde
Archive Bibliography
Archival documents from the Central State Archives of the Kyrgyz Republic cited:
f.= fond (archive), op. = opis' (list), d. = delo (file), 1. =list (sheet) f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op. f. 10, op.
1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d. 1, d.
27, 1. 46-79 (3July 1925) 32, 1. 2-8 (15 April1925- 30 May 1926) 32, 1. 8 (15 April1925- 30 May 1926) 32, 1. 35 (15 April1925- 30 May 1926) 32, 1. 38-39 (15 April1925- 30 May 1926) 33, 1. 17-23 (15 January 1925-16 May 1926) 38, 1. 54 (19 January 1926- 25 November 1926) 38, 1. 56 (19 January 1926- 25 November 1926) 42, 1. 9-10 (4June 1926- 5June 1926) 42, 1. 10 (4 June 1926-5 June 1926) 46, 1. 153-155 (5January 1926-21 February 1926) 74, 1. 111 (1 March 1927-7 March 1927) 143 (5 March 1927) 244, 1. 99 (1 January 1930- 7 March 1930) 308, 1. 43 (1 September 1931-29 December 1931) 527,1.12 (12January 1934 -13January 1934) 527,1. 76 (12January 1934 -13January 1934) 527, 1. 108 (12 January 1934- 13 January 1934) 527,1.108-111 (12January 1934 -13January 1934)
Bibliography
Abazov, R. 2004. Historical Dictionary of Kyrgyzstan (Asian/Oceanian historical dictionaries; No. 49). Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press. Abdyldabek kyzy, J. 2003. 'A take Batyr'. Vechemii Bishkek, 22 August: 4-5. -. 1999. Shabdan baatyr: Epokha i lichnost'. Dokumentyi materaly. Bishkek: Sham. Abdyrazakov, S. 2005. 'Boiling Over'. Transitions Online. Accessed 22 March 2005. http://www. tol.cz/look/TOL/article. tpl?IdLanguage=1andldPublic ation=4andNrlssue=107andNrSection=1andNrArticle=13772 Abrams, P. 1988 [1977]. 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State'. Journal ofHistorical Sociology 1 (1): 58-89. Abramzon, S. 1971. Kirgizy i ikh etnogeneticheskie i istoriko-kul'tumye svyazi. Leningrad: Nauka. Aitmatov, Ch. 1972. The lVhite Steamship (trans.) Tatyana and George Feifer. London: Hodder and Stoughton. -. 2000. The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years (trans.) John French. Moscow: Kyrgyz Branch of International Centre 'Traditional Cultures and Environments'. Akaev, A. 2002a. Kyrgyzskaya gosudarstvennost' i narodnyi epos 'Manas'. Bishkek: Uchkun. 2002b. Pamyatnoe desyatiletie: Trudnaya doroga k demokratii. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. 2002c. Statement by H.E. Mr. Askar Akaev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic (General Debate of the 57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly). United Nations. Accessed 2 December 2004. http:/ /www.un.org/webcast/ ga/ 57 I statemen ts/020920kyrgyzstanE. htm -. 2003a. 'Izglubiny tysyacheletii vdostoinoe budushchee'. SlovoKyrgyzstana, 2 September: 5-10. -. 2003b. 'Krepit' gosudarstvennost', krepit' natsional'noe soglasie (Rech' Prezidenta Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki A. Akaeva na Kurultae naroda Kyrgyzstana 6 marta 2003 goda)'. V kontse nedeli, 7 March: 3-5. -. 2003c. Kyrgyz Statehood and the National Epos 'Manas'. New York: Global Scholarly Publications. -. 2003d. "'Manas" - Kyrgyz rukhunun ochpos jyldyzy: "Manas" eposunun 1000 jyldygyna arnalgan saltanatta siiilogon sozii (Bishkek shaary,
198
Bibliography
1995-jyl, 28-avgust)'. In Menin elimdin uluulugu- Velichie moego naroda: Tandalmalar, Izbrannye rechi. Bishkek: Uchkun. -. 2003e. 'Ordoluu Osh oniikso, Kyrgyzstan kubattuu mamleketke ailanat - Osh shaarynyn 3000 jyldyk uluu toyunun saltanatynda siiilogon sozii (Osh shaary, 2000-jyl, 5-oktyabr')'. In Menin elimdin uluulugu - Velichie moego naroda: Tandalmalar, Izbrannye rechi. Bishkek: Uchkun. -. 2003f. 'Velikii gosudarstvennik proshlogo i nashe gosudarstvo na puti v budushchee - Rech' na otkrytii pamyatnika poetu i myslitelo Jusupu Balasagynu (Bishkek, 15 maya 2003 g.)'. In Menin elimdin uluulugu Velichie moego naroda: Tandalmalar, Izbrannye rechi. Bishkek: Uchkun. Akaeva, B. 2005. 'Obrashchenie k izbiratelyam Universitetskogoizbiratel'nogo okruga No. 1'. Vechernii Bishkek. Accessed 14 July 2005. http://www. vb.kg/2005/07 /01/panorama/5.html Akimov, T. 2003. 'Ekho Aksy (Analiz politicheskoi situatsii)'. Moya stolitsa novosti. Accessed 24 June 2005. http://www.msn.kg/page.shtml?option= i temandyear=3andmon=1andid=3027 Akiner, S. 1995. The Formation of Kazakh Identity from Tribe to Nation-State. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. -. 1997. 'Between tradition and modernity: the dilemma facing contemporary Central Asian women'. InPost-SovietWomen:From the Baltic to Central Asia (ed) Mary Buckley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. AKipress. 2005. 'Kurmanbek Bakiev: Events in Aksy generated March events in Kyrgyzstan'. Accessed 12 June 2005. http://www.akipress.com/_en_ news.php?id=12989 2008. 'MVD predprimet kompleks mer po profilaktike pravonarushenii v Kyrgyzstane'. Aaccessed 19 June 2009. http://kg.akipress.org/ news:53291 Albion, A. 2003. Aksy shooting trial ends, draws opposition criticism. Central Asia Report (RFEIRL) 3 (1). Accessed 18 July 2005. http://www.rferl.org/ reports/cen tralasia/2003/01 /1-020103 .asp Alimov, K. 1994. 'Are Central Asian clans still playing a political role?' Central Asia Monitor. (4). Accessed 21 April2006. http:/ /web.archive.org/web/200008230437 47 /http:/ /www.chalidze. com/cam/42,4,4.htm Alymbekov, U. 2008. 'Sud, kotoromy doveryayut'. Chuiskie izvestiya, No 21, 2 August, p. 1. Amrekulov, N. 2000. 'Zhuzes and Kazakhstan's Social and Political Development'. Central Asia and Caucasus (3): 100-15. Amsler, Sand R. Kleinbach. 1999. 'Bride Kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic'. International Journal of Central Asian Studies 4: 185-216. Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso. Argumenty i fakty Kyrgyzstan. 2003. 'Budet takaya partiya. Yuzhnaya'. January 2003: 3. Arik, K. 1995. 'The Celebration of the 1000th Anniversary of the Epic Manas: An Eyewitness Account'. Kazakh andKirghiz Studies Bulletin 2 (2): 15-19. Asad, T. 1979. 'Equality in nomadic social systems? Notes towards the dissolution of an anthropological category'. In Pastoral production and society I Production pastorale et societe (ed.) L'Equipe ecologie
Bibliography
199
et anthropologie des societes pastorales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Asankanov, A. (ed.) 1996. Kyrgyzy: Etnogeneticheskie i etnokul'tumye protsessy v drevnosti i srednevekov'e v tsentral'noi Azii. Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, posvyashchennoi 1000-letniyu eposa 'Manas', 22-24 entyabrya 1994 g., g. Bishkek. Bishkek: Kyrgyzstan. -. 1998. 'Prazdnovanie 1000-letiya eposa "Manas" i 3000-letiya goroda Osh kak faktor samoutverzhdeniya Kyrgyzstana'. In Fergana- dol ina druzhby i vzaimosoglasiya: Sbomik materialov mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, provodimoi v ramkakh dnei eposa 'Manas', posvyashchenennoi 2000-letiyu Osha, 29-30 avgusta 1997 g., g. Osh (ed) A. A. Asankanov. Bishkek: Muras - Uchkun. Asankanov, A. and N. Bekmukhamedova. 1999. Akyndar jana manaschylarkyrgyz elinin rukhanii madaniyatyn tiiziiiichalor jana saktoochular. Bishkek: Muras. Asankanov, A. and Osmonov 0. 2002. Istoriya Kyrgyzstana (S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei). Bishkek: Uchkun. Asanov, T. 2002a. 'Etnopoliticheskaya struktura kyrgyzov v XV-XVI vv'. In Dialog tsivilizatsii na velikom shelkovom puti (Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Bishkek, 26-27 sentyabrya 2001 goda). Bishkek. 2002b. 'Politicheskaya konfederatsiya i struktura vlasti severnykh kyrgywv v XVIII veke'. In Koriiniiktiiii mamlekettik jana koomduk ishmer Yusup Abdrakhmanovdun 100 jyldygyna amalgan 'El dep sokkon jiirok' attuu respublikalykilimii-praktikalykkonferentsiyanynmaterialdary,Bishkekshaary, 25-26-dekabr'. Materialy respublikanskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii 'Zhizn', otdannaya narodu', nosvyashchennoi 100-letiyu vydayushchegosya gosudarstvennogo i obshchestvennogo deyatelya Yusupa Abdrakhmanova, g. Bishkek, 25-26 dekabrya. Bishkek. Attokurov, S. 1995. Kyrgyz sanjyrasy. Bishkek: Kyrgyzstan. Baktygulov, Dzh. and Zh. Mombekova. 2001. Istoriya kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstan as drevneishkikh vremen do nashikh dnei. Bishkek: Kyrgyzstan - Mektep. Balasaguni, Y. 1998. Beneficent Knowledge (trans.) W. May. Bishkek: Kyrgyz Branch of International Centre - 'Traditional Cultures and Environments'. Baltabaev, R. 2003. 'V istoriyu legche vlipnut', chem popast". Moya stolitsa novosti, 7 March: 4. Bartol'd, V. 1996. Izbrannye trudy po istorii kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana. Bishkek: Sham. Bauer, A., D. Green and K. Kuehnast. 1997. Women and Gender Relations: The Kyrgyz Republic in Transition. Manila: Asian Development Bank. Beibutova, R. 1988. Stratifikatsiya kirgizskoi voennoi leksiki dosovetskogo perioda. Unpublished dissertation for kandidat filologicheskii nauk. Institut yazykoznaniya: Akademiya nauk SSSR. Beknazarov, A. 2001. 'Chto delat' dal'she?' Obshchestvennyi reiting, 28 June: 8-9. Beyer,]. 2005. 'Die Aksakal-Gerichte in Kirgistan. Entwicklung und aktuelle Situation einer traditionellen Rechtsinstitution'. In Rechtspluralismus in der Islamischen Welt: Gewohnheitsrecht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft (eds) M. Kemper and M. Reinkowski. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
200
Bibliography
-. 2006. Revitalisation, invention and continued existence of the Kyrgyz aksakal courts: Listening to pluralistic accounts of history. Journal of Legal Pluralism (53-54): 141-76. Bezborodova, 0. 2003. 'Duel' Lenina ... s Tanaevym'. Vechemii Bishkek, S September: 4. Bhabha, H. 1990. 'DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation'. In Nation and Narration (ed.) Homi K. Bhabha. London: Routledge. Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage Publications. Bloch, M. 1996. 'Internal and External Memory: Different Ways of Being in History'. In Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory (eds) P. Antze and M. Lambek. London: Routledge. Blondel, E. 1994. 'The Question of Genealogy' (trans.) D. Blacker and A. Prichard. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals (ed.) R. Schacht. London: University of California Press. Blua, A. 2002. 'Kyrgyzstan: Government Resigns Following Protests Over March Violence'. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Accessed 19 April 2006. http:/ /www.rferl.org/features/2002/0S/22052002091711.asp Bohannan, L. 1952. A Genealogical Charter. Africa XXII (4): 301-15. Bold, B. 2001. Mongolian Nomadic Society: A Reconstruction of the 'Medieval' History of Mongolia. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. Bourdieu, P. 1987. 'Legitimation and Structured Interests in Webers' Sociology of Religion' (trans.) C. Turner. In Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity (eds) S. Lash and S. Whimster. London: Allen and Unwin. - 1990. The Logic of Practice (trans) R. Nice. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bromlei, Yu. 1973. Etnos i etnografiya. Moscow: Nauka. - 1974. 'The Term Ethnos and its Definition'. In Soviet Ethnology and Anthropology Today (ed) Yu. Bromlei. The Hague and Paris: Mouton and Co. Bromley, Julian and Viktor Kozlov. 1989. The Theory of Ethnos and Ethnic Processes in Soviet Social Sciences. Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (3): 425-438. Bromley, Yu. 1980. 'The object and the subject-matter of ethnography'. In Soviet and Western Anthropology (ed) E. Gellner. London: Duckworth. Broxup, M. 1983. 'The Basmachi'. Central Asian Survey 2 (1): 57-81. Brubaker, R. and F. Cooper. 2000, 'Beyond "identity". Theory and Society 29 (1): 1-47. Buckley, M. 1997. 'Victims and agents: gender in post-Soviet states'. In Post-Soviet Women: From the Baltic to Central Asia (ed.) Mary Buckley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burchell, G. 1996. 'Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self'. In Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (eds) Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose. London: UCL Press. Burg, S. 1986. 'Central Asian Elite Mobility and Political Change in the Soviet Union'. Central Asian SurveyS (3/4): 77-89. Butanaev, V. and Y. Khudyakov. 2000. Istoriya yeniseiskikh kyrgyzov. Abakan: Izdatel'stvo Khakasskovo gosudarstvennovo universiteta im. N. F. Katanova.
Bibliography
201
Carlson, C. 2003. 'Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Referendum Culminates Five Months of Heated Debate'. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Accessed 14 April2006. http://www.rferl.org/features/2003/0l/14012003162155.asp Carsten, ]. 1995a. 'The politics of forgetting: Migration, kinship and memory on the periphery of the Southeast Asian state'. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 1 (2): 317-35. - 1995b. 'The Substance of Kinship and the Heat of the Hearth: Feeding, Personhood, and Relatedness among Malays in Pulau Langkawi'. American Ethnologist 22 (3): 223-41. - (ed.) 2000a. Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. - 2000b. 'Introduction: cultures of relatedness'. In Cultures of Relatedness: New Approaches to the Study of Kinship (ed.) ]. Carsten. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chakrabarty, D. 2000. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Chanachev, M. 2002. 'Sanjyra Internetke tiishobii?' Kyrgyz Tuusu, 19 November: 10. Chekirov, M. (ed.) 1991. Vosstanie kirgizov i kazakhov v 1916 godu. Bishkek: Uchkun. Chorotegin, T. and K. Moldokasymov. 2000. Kyrgyzdardyn jan a Kyrgyzstandyn kyskacha tarykhy: Baiyrky zamandan tartyp biigiinkii kiingo cheiin. Bishkek: Mektep. Clark, K. 1983. 'Forward'. In The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. - 1984. 'The Mutability of the Canon: Socialist Realism and Chingiz Aitmatov'sJ dol'she veka dlitsia den". Slavic Review 43 (4): 573-87. Clifford, J. and G. Marcus. 1986. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. London: University of California Press. Collins, K. 2002. 'Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia'. Journal of Democracy 13 (3): 137-52. -. 2006. Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collins, S. 1985. 'Categories, concepts orpredicatments? Remards on Mauss's use of philosophical terminology. In The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins and S. Lukes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Connerton, P. 1989. How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cruikshank, B. 1996. 'Revolutions Within: Self-Government and Self-Esteem'. In Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (eds) A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose. London: UCL Press. Csordas, T. 1997. Language, Charisma, and Creativity: The Ritual Life of a Religious Movement. London: University of California Press. Dave, B. 1996. 'National Revival in Kazakhstan: Language Shift and Identity Change'. Post-Soviet Affairs 12 (1): 51-72. De Waal, T. 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. London: New York University Press.
202
Bibliography
Dragadze, T. 1980. 'The place of 'ethnos' theory in Soviet anthropology'. In Soviet and Western Anthropology (ed.) E. Gellner. London: Duckworth. -. 1990. 'Some Changes in Perspectives on Ethnicity Theory in the 1980's: A Brief Sketch'. Cahiers du Monde russe et soveitique XXXI (2-3): 205--12. Dresch, P. 1986. 'The Significance of the Course of Events Take in Segmentary Systems'. American Ethnologist 13 (2): 309-24. Dreyfus, H. and P. Rabinow. 1983. 'Interpretive Analystics'. In Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. kto oni?' Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, Dzhumagulov, A. 1990. 'Manapy 16 November: 4. Dzhumanaliev, Akylbek. 2002. Politicheskaya istoriya Kyrgyzstana (Stanovlenie politicheskoi sistemy kyrgyzskogo obshchestva v 1920-1930-e gody). Bishkek: DEMI. Dzhunushaliev, D. and V. Ploskikh. 2000. 'Tribalism and Nation Building in Kyrgyzstan'. Central Asia and the Caucasus (3): 115-23. Edgar, A. 2004. Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Emeljanenko, T. 1994. 'Nomadic year cycles and cultural life of Central Asian livestock-breeders before the 20th century'. In Nomads in Central Asia: Animal Husbandry and Culture in Transition (19th-20th Century) (eds) C. van Leeuwen, T. Emeljaneko and L. Popova. Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute. Engels, F. 1940. The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (trans) Alick West and Dona Torr. London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. Evans-Pritchard, E. 1940. The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ewing. K. 1990. 'The Illusion of Wholeness: Culture, Self, and the Experience of Inconsistency'. Ethos 18 (3): 251-78. Feuchtwang, S. and M. Wang. 2001. Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders in China. London: Routledge. Fichte,). 1968. Addresses to the German Nation. New York: Harper and Row. Fortes, M. 1969. Kinship and the Social Order: The Legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Foucault, M. 1984. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'. In The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought (ed.) P. Rabinow. London: Penguin Books. 1991. 'Governmentality'. In The Foucault Effect Studies in Govemmentality (With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault) (eds) G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Fox, R. 1971.Kin, Clan, Raja, and Rule: State-Hinterland Relations in Preindustrial India. London: University of California Press. Fragner, B. 2001. "Soviet Nationalism": An Ideological Legacy to the Independent Republics of Central Asia'. In Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century (eds) I. van Schendel and E. Zurcher. London: I. B. Tauris.
Bibliography
203
Garayushchenko, L. (ed.) 2002. Aksyiskii dnevnik (Part 1 and 2). Bishkek: Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Geiss, P. 2003. Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal commitment and political order in change. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Gellner, E. 1988. State and Society in Soviet Thought. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. -. 1993. Muslim Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gerth, H. and C. Mills. 1998 [1948]. 'Introduction: The Man and His Work'. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (eds) H. Gerth and C. Mills. London: Routledge. Girling,J. 1997. Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy. London: Routledge. Godelier, M. 1977. Perspectives in Marxist Anthropology (trans) Robert Brain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Golden, P. 1992. An Introduction to the History oftheTurkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modem Eurasia and the Middle East. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. -. 2003. Nomads and their Neighbours in the Russian Steppe: Turks, Khazars and Qjpchaqs. Aldershot: Ashgate. Gordon, C. 1987. 'The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and Government'. In Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity (eds) S. Lash and S. Whimster. London: Allen and Unwin. Grant, B. 1995. In the Soviet House of Culture: A Century of Perestroikas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. -. 2001. 'New Moscow Monuments, or, States of Innocence'. American Ethnologist 28 (2): 332-62. Greenhouse, C. 1996. A Moment's Notice: Time Politics across Cultures. London: Cornell University Press. Grodekov, N. 1889. Kirgizy i karakirgizy- Syr-Dar'inskoi oblasti (Tom pervyi. Yuridicheskii byt). Tashkent: S. I. Lakhtin. Gurnilev, L. 1989. Etnogenez i biosfera Zemli. Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta. Gupta, A. 1995. 'Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State'. American Ethnologist 22 (2): 375-402. Haghayeghi, M. 1995. Islam and Politics in Central Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press. Halbwachs, M. 1992. On Collective Memory (trans.) L. Coser. London: The University of Chicago Press. Haller, Jr.J 1971. 'Race and the Concept of Progress in Nineteenth Century American Ethnology'. American Anthropologist New Series 73 (3): 710-24. Handrahan, L. 2004. 'Hunting for Women: Bride-Kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan'. International Feminist Journal of Politics 6 (2): 207-33. Harris. G. 1989. 'Concepts oflndividual, Self, and Person in Description and Alaysis'. American Anthropologist (N.S.) 91 (3): 599-612. Hatto, A. 1990. The Manas of Wilhelm Radloff. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Herzfeld, M. 1991. A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
204
Bibliography
Hirsch, F. 1997. 'The Soviet Union as a Work-in-Progress: Ethnographers and the Category of Nationality in the 1926, 1937, and 1939 Censuses'. Slavic Review 56 (2): 251-78. Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger (eds) 1983. The Invention ofTradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holy, L. 1996. Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship. London: Pluto Press. Hopkirk, P. 1984. Setting the East Ablaze: On Secret Service in Bolshevik Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howell,]. 1996. 'Poverty and transition in Kyrgyzstan: How some households cope'. Central Asian Survey 15 (1): 59-73. Hryb, 0. 2000. 'Soviet Ethnography Heritage and the Revival of Ethnogeopolitics in Russia and Ukraine'. Paper presented to the Sixth Annual Northwest Regional Conference for Russian, East European and Central Asian (REECAS-NW), Tacoma, WA. Human Rights Watch. 2006. 'Reconciled to Violence: State Failure to Stop Domestic Abuse and Abduction of Women in Kyrgyzstan', Vol 18, No9. Humphrey, C. 1992. 'The Moral Authority of the Past in Post-Socialist Mongolia'. Religion, State and Society 20 (3 and 4): 375-89. -. 1994. 'Remembering an "Enemy": The Bogd Khaan in Twentieth-Century Mongolia'. In Memory, History, and Opposition Under State Socialism (ed.) R. Watson. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press. 1997. 'Exemplars and rules: Aspects of the discourse of moralities in Mongolia'. In The Ethnography of Moralities (ed.) S. Howell. London: Routledge. Humphrey, C and D. Sneath. 2004. 'Shanghaied by the Bureaucracy: Bribery and Post-Soviet Offialdom in Russia and Mongolia'. In Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society (ed.) I. Pardo. Aldershot: Ashgate. Imanaliev, M. 2002. Ocherki o vneshnei politike Kyrgyzstana. Bishkek: Sabyr. International Crisis Group. 2005. 'Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State'. Asia Report N° 109. -. 2006. 'Kyrgyzstan on the Edge'. Asia Briefing N° 55. -. 2008. 'Kyrgyzstan: A Deceptive Calm'. Asia Briefing N° 79. Irons, W. 1975. The Yomut Turkmen: a study of social organization among a central Asian Turkic-speaking population. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Israilova-Khar'ekhuzen, Ch. 1999. Traditsionnoe obshchestvo kyrgyzov v period russkoi kolonizatsii vo vtoroi polovine XIX - nachale XX v. i sistema ikh rodstva. Bishkek: Ilirn. Jetimishbaev, K. and R. Masyrakunov. 1994. Sanjyra sanaty. Bishkek: Kyrgyzstan- Meerim-1. Jones Luong, P. 2002. Institutional Change and Political Continuity in PostSoviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jusupov, K., K. Kushubekov and M. Apyshev (eds) 1994. Kyrgyz sanjyrasy. Bishkek: 'Ala Too' zhurnalynyn redaktsiyasy. Kabar. 2002. 'Segodnya sostoyalas' prezentatsiya novoi knigi prezidenta Kyrgyzstana "Kyrgyzskaya gosudarstvennost' i narodnyi epos
Bibliography
205
'Manas"". Accessed 27 August 2002. http://www.kabar.kg/rus/ news/20020826/68 Kaibylda uulu, A. 2000. Kuu bayany. Volume 1. Elpek: Bishkek. Kalet, A. 2003. 'Party for Southern Kyrgyzstan'. Times of Central Asia, 23 January: 3. Kandiyoti, D. 1998. 'Rural livelihoods and social networks in Uzbekistan: perspectives fromAndijan'. Central Asian Survey 17 (4): 561-78. Kaplonski, C. 2006. 'Exemplars and Heroes: The Individual and the Moral in the Mongolian Political Imagination'. In States of Mind: Power, Place and the Subject in Inner Asia (ed.) D. Sneath. Bellingham, WA: Western Watshington University Press. Karabaev, M. 2003. 'Aksyiskaya tragediya. God spustya'. Agym, 14 March: 5. Karakulova, E. 2003. 'Silenced Kyrgyz editor condemns 'general pressure on journalists". EurasiaNet. Accessed 7 August 2006. http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/qanda/articles/eav061803a.shtml -. 2008. 'Border Deal Could Spark New Protests'. IWPR, Reporting Central Asia No. 542. Accessed on 10 July 2009. http://www.iwpr.net/ ?p=rca&s=f&o=344142&apc_state=henirca2008 Karimov, D. 2003. 'Vozvrata v bol'shevizm ne budet'. Vechernii Bishkek, 7 March 2003: 4. Karimova, G. and A. Kasybekov. 2003. 'Molchanie nevest'. Vechemii Bishkek. 201. Accessed 22 October 2003. http://www.vb.kg/cgi-bin/article. cgi?2003-10-21-panorama-1 Kaziev, A. 2000. Sanjyra. Kyzyl-Suu aiyly. Keesing, R. 1975. Kin Groups and Social Structure. London: Hold, Rinehard and Winston, Inc. Keller, S. 2003. The Central Asian Bureau, an essential tool in governing Soviet Turkestan. Central Asian Survey 22 (2/3): 281-97. Kendirbai, Gulnar. 2002. Land and People: The Russian Colonization of the Kazak Steppe (ANOR 12). Berlin: Klaus Schwartz. Khalid, A. 1998. The politics of Muslim cultural reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. London: University of California Press. -. 2007. Islam after communism: religion and politics in Central Asia. London: University of California Press. Khaldfin, I. 1967. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (trans.) Franz Rosenthal (Volume 1). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Khamidov, A. 2002a. 'Kyrgyzstan's Unrest Linked to Clan Rivalries'. EurasiaNet. Accessed 14 June 2005. http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insight/articles/ eav060502 .sh tml -. 2002b. 'Kyrgyzstan: Organized Opposition and Civil Unrest'. EurasiaNet. Accessed 14 June 2005. http://www.eurasianet.org/departrnents/rights/ articles/eav121602.shtrnl Khanin, V. 2000. 'Kyrgyzstan: Ethnic Pluralism and Political Conflicts'. Central Asia and the Caucasus (3): 123-30. Khasanii, M. 2000. Osh-khair ul-bilod (Skazanie o gorode Osh). Osh: Oshskaya oblastnaya tipographiya. Khasanov, A. 1968. 'Iz istorii klassovoi bor'by v Kirgizii v kontse XIX veka'. Izvestiya akademii nauk kirgizskoi SSR 2: 10-16.
206
Bibliography
Khazanov, A. 1983. Nomads and the Outside World (trans) J. Crookenden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -. 1990. 'The Ethnic Situation in the Soviet Union as Reflected in Soviet Anthropology'. Cahiers du Monde russe et soveitique XXXI (2-3): 213-22. -. 1995. After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Khoucy, P. and J. Kostiner (eds) 1990. Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East. London: University of California Press. Kimrnage, D. 2005. 'Kyrgyzstan: How Wealthy Is The Ousted Kyrgyz Leader's Family?' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Accessed 8 June 2005. http:/I www.rferl.org/fea turesarticle/2005 /04 /214c9 54a-9dc9-4a90-b6 3 753d50653a08e.html Kinzer, S. 2000. 'A Legendacy Hero Guides a Reborn Kyrgyzstan'. The New York Times, 2 J anuacy: 3. Kleinbach, R. 2003. 'Frequency of Non-Consensual Bride Kidnapping in the Kyrgyz Republic'. International Journal of Central Asian Studies 8 (1). Accessed 5 July 2005. http:/ /faculty.philau.edu/kleinbachr/bride_ki.htm Kleinbach, R., M. Ablezova and M. Aitieva. 2005. 'Kidnapping for marriage (ala kachuu) in a Kyrgyz village'. Central Asian Survey 24 (2): 191-202. Klienbach, R. and L. Salimjanova. 2007. 'Kyz ala kachuu and adat: nonconsensual bride kidnapping and tradition in Kyrgyzstan'. Central Asian Survey 26 (2): 217-33. Kolesnikoff, N. 1999. Myth in the Works of Chingiz Aitmatov. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Koichuev, T., V. Mokcynin and V. Ploskikh. 1994. Kyrgyzy i ikh predki: Netraditsionnyi vzglyad na istoriyu i sovremennost'. Bishkek: Glavnaya redaktsiya Kyrgyzskoi Entsiklopedii. Kuehnast, K. 1997. Let the Stone Lie Where It Has Fallen: Dilemmas of Gender and Generation in Post-Soivet Kyrgyzstan. PhD thesis. Department of Anthropology: University of Minnesota. Kuehnast, K and C. Nechernias. 2004. 'Introduction: Women Navigating Change in Post-Soviet Currents'. In Post-Soviet Women Encountering Transition: Nation Building, Economic Survival, and Civic Activism (eds) K. Kuehnast and C. Nechernias. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Kuper, A. 1988. The Invention ofPrimitive Society: Transformations ofan Rlusion. London: Routledge. -. 2004. 'Lineage Theocy: A Critical Retrospect'. In Kinship and Family: An Anthropological Reader (eds) R. Parkin and L. Stone. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Kuranov, G. 1937. 'Predislovie'. In TsK VKP(b) i Soyuznoe Pravitel'stvo oKirgizii (Sbornik dokumentov za 1919-1937 god) (ed.) G. G. Kuranov. Frunze: Kirgizosizdat. Kurrnanov, Z. 1997. Bor'ba politicheskikh elit Kyrgyzstana v period vozrozhdeniya natsional'noi gosudarstvennosti kyrgyzskogo naroda (19171927 gg.). Unpublished dissertation for kandidat istoricheskii nauk. Department of Politics and the Histocy of Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyz State Pedagogical University (im. I. Arabaev).
Bibliography
207
-. 2004. 'Evolution in the Party Structure in Kyrgyzstan'. Central Asia and Caucasus 5 (29): 7-15. Kushlubayev, V. 1995. 'Tribalism and State Formation in Kyrgyzstan'. MA dissertation. Department of Sociology: Central European University. Kyshtobaev, D. 2004. 'Liliputiya v ogne. No pri chem tut Kyrgyzstan?' Slovo Kyrgyzstana. Accessed 6 December 2005. http://www.sk.kg/2004/n13/ obch3.html Kyzlasov, L. 1996. 'Northern Nomads'. In History of civilizations of Central Asia. Volume III. The crossroads of civilizations: A.D. 250 to 750 (eds) B. Litvinsky, G. Zhang and R. Samghabadi. Paris: UNESCO Publishing. Lambek, M. and P. Antze. 1996. 'Introduction: Forecasting Memory'. In Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory (ed) Paul Antze and Michael Lambek. London: Routledge. Ledeneva, A. 1996/1997. 'Between Gift and Commodity: The Phenomenon of Blat'. Cambridge Anthropology 19 (3): 43-66. -. 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours: Blat Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lemercier-Quelquejay, C. 1985. 'From Tribe to Umma'. Central Asian Survey 3 (3): 15-26. Lenin, V. 1966. 'The Tasks of the Youth Leagues. Speech Delivered at the Third All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League, October 2, 1920'. In V.I. Lenin Collected Works. Volume 31. April-December 1920. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Lindholm, C. 1997. Charisma. In The Dictionary of Anthropology (ed) T. Barfield. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Lindner, R. 1982. 'What Was a Nomadic Tribe?' Comparative Study of Society and History 24 (4): 689-711. Liu, M. 2002. Recognizing the Khan: Authority, Space, and Political Imagination among Uzbek Men in Post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of Anthropology: University of Michigan. Lloyd-Roberts, S. 1999. Kyrgyz bride theft goes awry. BBC News. Accessed 21 March 2005. http: I /news. bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/programmes/from_ our_own_correspondent/299512.stm MacWilliam, Ian. 2005. Challenges facing new Kyrgyz leader. BBC News. Accessed 14July 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asiapacific/4674571.stm Malabaev, Zh. 2001. Bishkek- Stolitsa Kyrgyzstana. Bishkek: Erkin-Too. Markov, G. 1976. Kochevniki Azii: Struktua khozyaistva i obshchestvennoi organizatsii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta. Martin, V. 2001. Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and the Russian Colonisation in the Nineteenth Century. London: Curzon Press. Marx, K. and R Engels. 1938. The German Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Masaliev, A., B. Asanov, 0. Tekebaev, A. Beknazarov, et al. 2003. 'K tvoei, narod, vole i mudrosti obrashaernsya! - Zayavlenie politicheskikh partii
208
Bibliography
i obshchestvennykh ob"edinenii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki'. Moya Stolitsa Novosti, 17 January: 1. Mauss, M. 1985. 'A category of the human mind: the notion of person; the notion of self' (trans) W. Hall. In The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins and S. Lukes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Megoran, N. 2002. The borders of eternal friendship? The politics and pain of nationalism and identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary, 1999-2000. Unpublished PhD thesis. Department of Geography: University of Cambridge. Migdal, J. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Socieites Transform and Constitute one Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2003. Kyrgyz-kytai mamlekettik chek arasy joniindo materia/dar jana dokumentter- Materialy i dokumenty o kyrgyzsko-kitaiskoi gosudarstvennoi granitse. Bishkek: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. -. 2004. Kyrgyzstan jana Kazakstan: dostuktun jana yiak kongshulashtyktyn chek arasy Kyrgyzstan i Kazakhstan: granitsa druzhby i dobrososedstva. Bishkek: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Mitchell, T. 1991. 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics'. American Political Science Review 85 (1): 77-9 6. -. 1999. 'Society, Economy, and the State Effect'. In State/Culture: StateFormation after the Cultural Tum (ed.) George Steinmetz. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Mokrynin, V. and V. Ploskikh. 1995. Istoriya Kyrgyzstana. Bishkek: Kyrgyzstan. Moldosheva, Anara. 2008. 'Violence Against Women in Kyrgyzstan: Baseline Assessment'. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) report. Morgan, L. 1998 [1877]. Ancient Society: Researches into the lines of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization (The Early Sociology of the Family, Volume 3). London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press. Motuev, N. 2003a. 'Dzhumgal'skii triumf sayakov'. ResPublica, 1 April: 3. -. 2003b. 'Kto ne znaet svoikh predkov do sed'mogo kolena, tot rab!' ResPublica, 15 April: 2. -. 2003c. 'Sarybagysh- ryzhii los". ResPublica, 22 April: 8. -. 2003d. 'Saruu- narod plechistyi'. ResPublica, 29 April: 3. -. 2003e. 'U kyrgyzov i indeitsev- obshchie predki'. ResPublica, 3 June: 8. Mozur, J. 1987. Doffing "Mankurt's Cap": Chingiz Aitmatov's "The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years" and the Turkic National Heritage. The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies No. 605. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for Russian and East European Studies. Navaro-Yashin, Y. 2002. Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Nazaraliev,]. 2005. 'Jenishbek Nazaraliev: Idet massovyi protest'. ResPublica. Accessed25March2005.http://gazeta.respublica.kg/?archive/2005/0323_ 14/ll.html Nazpary, J. 2002. Post-Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in Kazakhstan. London: Pluto Press.
Bibliography
209
Nietzsche, F. 1978. Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for None and All (trans) W. Kaufmann. London: Penguin Books. -. 1990. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (trans) R. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books. Nurbekov, K. 1999. Istoriya gosudarstva i prava Kirgizskoi SSR. Bishkek: Kyrgyzskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet. Olivier, B. 1990. 'Korenizatsiia'. Central Asian Survey 9 (3): 77-98. Omurbekov, T. and A. Dzhorobekova. 1998. Istoriya kyrgyzov i Kyrgyzstana. Bishkek: Poliglot. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 2005. 'Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions'. Parliamentary Elections, The Kyrgyz Republic, 27 Feburary 2005. -. 2008. 'Kyrgyz Republic: Pre-term Parliamentary Elections, 16 December 2007'. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report. -. 2009. 'Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions'. Presidential Election - Kyrgyz Republic, 23 July 2009. Orlova, T. 2003. 'Detektiv, ili Lenin pomeshal?' MSN, 15 August: 2. Osmanalieva, R. 1999. 'Tribalism in Kyrgyz Society'. Central Asia Monitor (5): 10-11. Osorov, Z. 2002. 'Traibalizm i demokratiya'. Moya stolitsa novosti. Accessed 22 June 2005. http://www.msn.kg/page.shtml?option=itemandyear=2a ndmon=8andid=1327 Oushakine, S. 2004. 'The Flexible and the Pliant: Disturbed Organisms of Soviet Modernity'. Cultural Anthropology 19 (3): 392-428. -. 2005. The Patriotism of Despair: Symbolic Economies, National Memory, and Communities of Loss in Russia. PhD thesis. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences: Columbia University. Owen, D. 1994. Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason. London: Routledge. Patterson, M. 2005. 'Introduction: Reclaiming Paradigms Lost'. The Australian Journal of Anthropology 16 (1): 1-17. Pelkmans, M. 2005. 'Missionary Encounters in Kyrgyzstan: Challenging the National Ideal'. Central Eurasian Studies Review 4 (1): 13-16. Ploskikh, V,]. Juldosheva, S. Mamytov and M. Rudov. 2002. Kurmanjan Datka - tsaritsa Alaya. Bishkek: Sham. Polonskaya, L and A. Malashenko. 1994. Islam in Central Asia. Reading: Ithaca Press. Prior, D. 2000. Patron, Party, Patrimony: Notes on the cultural historyoftheKirghiz epic tradition (Papers on Inner Asia; No.33, Central Asia). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies. -. 2002. The Twilight Age of the Kirghiz Epic Tradition. PhD Thesis. Indiana University: Department of Central Eurasian Studies. -. 2006. 'Heroes, Chieftans, and the Roots ofKirghiz Nationalism'. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 6 (2): 71--88. Prizhivoit, R. 2005. 'Prezident izdal ukaz: vsekh otmyt; v poslednii raz!' MSN. Accessed 21 February 2005. http://www.msn.kg/page.shtml?option=ite mandyear=5andmon=2andid=9349 Radloff, F. 1863. 'Observations sur les Kirghis'. Journal Asiatique 6 (2): 309-28.
210
Bibliography
Radnitz, S. 2005. 'Networks, localism and mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan'. Central Asian Survey 24 (4): 405-24. -. 2006. 'What really happened in Kyrgyzstan?' Journal of Democracy 17 (2): 132-46. Rasanayagam,]. 2002a. The moral construction of the state in Uzbekistan: Its construction within concepts of community and interaction at the local level. Unpublished PhD thesis. DepartmentofSocialAnthropology: University of Cambridge. -. 2002b. 'Spheres of communal particiaption: placing the state within local modes of interaction in rural Uzbekistan'. Central Asian Survey 21 (1): 55-70. Rasuly-Paleczek, G. 2005. 'Comparative Perspectives on Central Asia and the Middle East in Social Anthropology and the Social Sciences (Part 1 of 2)'. Central Eurasian Studies Review 4 (2): 2-17. Razakov, T. 1993. Osh koogalangny: KGBnyn maalymattary boyuncha- Oshskie sobytiya: na materialakh KGB. Bishkek: Renessans. Redaktsiya gazety MSN. 2003. 'Prazdnik, kotoryi vsegda s nami'. MSN, 27 June: 1. Renan, E. 1990. 'What is a Nation?' In Nation and Narration (ed.) H. Bhabha. London: Routledge. ResPublica. 2001. 'Vopros o kyrgyzsko-kitaiskoi granitse na ostrie'. 29 March: 1. Rigi, J. 2004. 'Corruption in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan'. In Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society (ed.) I. Pardo. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ro'i, Y. 1991. 'The Soviet and Russian Context of the Development of Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia'. Cahiers du Monde russe et soveitique XXXII (1): 123-42. Robertson, A. 2006. 'Misunderstanding corruption'. Anthropology Today 22 (2): 8-11.
Rodriguez, A. 2005. 'Kidnapped, forced to wed'. Chicago Tribune. Accessed 26 July 2005. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ chi-0507240351 jul24,1,1130165.story?ctrack=1andcset=true Rose, N. 1996a. 'Governing "Advanced" Liberal Democracies'. In Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government (eds) A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose. London: UCL Press. -. 1996b. 'Identity, Genealogy, History'. In Questions of Cultural Identity (eds) S. Hall and P. du Gay. London: Sage Publications. Rosen, L. 1984. Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim Community. London: The University of Chicago Press. Roy, 0. 2000. The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. London: I. B. Tauris Publishers. Sabol, S. 199 5. 'The Creation of Soviet Central Asia: the 1924 national delimitation'. Central Asian Survey 14 (2): 225-41. Sahlins, M. 1974. Stone age economics. London: Tavistock Publications. Said, E. 2000. 'Invention, Memory, and Place'. Critical Inquiry 26 (2): 175-92. Saif ad-din ibn damullo Shakh Abbas Aksikenti jana anyn uulu Nurmukhammed. 1996. Tarykhtardyn jyinagy ('Majmu atut-tavorikh') (trans.) Moldo Mamasabyr Dosbolov and Omor Sooronov. Bishkek: Akyl.
Bibliography
211
Sarygulov, D. 2001. XXI vek v sud'be kochevnikov. Bishkek. -. 2002. Tengrianstvo i global'nye problemy sovremennosti I Tengirchilik kyrgyzdardyn diiino taanyrny, tiiboliik bilimi. Bishkek: Fond 'Tengir Ordo'. Schatz, E. 2004. Modern Clan Politics: The Power of 'Blood' in Kazakhstan and Beyond. London: University of Washington Press. -. 2005. 'Reconceptualizing Clans: Kinship Networks and Statehood in Kazakhstan'. Nationalities Papers 33 (2): 231-54. Schmitz, A. 1990. 'Zur Frage einer Dualorganisation bei den Kirgisen'. Miinchner Beitrage zur VOlkerkunde 3: 69-104. -. 2003. Schmitz, A. 2003. 'Elite change and political dynamics in Kazakhstan'. Orient44 (4): 579-600. Schneider, D. 1980 [19 68]. American Kinship: A Cultural Account. London: The University of Chicago Press. -. 2004. 'What Is Kinship All About?' In Kinship andFamily: An Anthropological Reader (eds) R. Parkin and L. Stone. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Scholz, F. 1995. Nomadismus: Theorie und Wandel einer sozio-okologischen Kulturweise. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Semenov, P. 1998. Travels in the Tian'-Shan', 1856-1857 (trans.) L. Gilmour, C. Thomas and M. Wheeler. London: The Hakluyt Society. Semenyak, 0. 2003. 'Kuda shagaet Lenin?' Vechernii Bishkek, 14 August: 2. Sevortyan, E. 1974. Etimologicheskii slovar' tyurkskikh yazykov (Obshchetyurkskie i mezhtyurkskie osnoby na glasnye). Moskva: Nauka. Seymour-Smith, C. 1986. Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology. London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd. Shahrani, M. 1979. TheKirghiz and Wakhi ofAfghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers. Seattle: University of Washington Press. -. 1985. '"From Tribe to Umma": Comments on the Dynamics of Identity in Muslim Soviet Central Asia'. Central Asian Survey 3 (3): 27-38. -. 1993. 'Central Asia and the challenge of the Soviet legacy'. Central Asian Survey 12 (2): 123-35. Shepelenko, A. 2003. 'Velikaya ideya odukhotvoryaet'. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 2 September: 2. Shirokogorov, S. 2002. Etnograficheskie issledovaniya. Kniga vtoraya: Etnos.
Issledovanie osnovnykh printsipov izmeneniya etnicheskikh i etnograficheskikh yavlenii. Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo universiteta. Shnirelman, V. 1996. Who Gets the Past?: Competition for Ancestors among Non-Russian Intellectuals in Russia. London: Johns Hopkins University Press. Shnirelman, V. and S. Panarin. 2001. 'Lev Gumilev: His Pretensions as Founder of Ethnology and his Eurasian Theories'. Inner Asia 3 (1): 1-18. Shryock, A. 1997. Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan. London: University of California Press. Sinor, D. 1969. Inner Asia: History- Civilization- Languages. A Syllabus (Uralic and Altaic Series Volume 96). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University. 1990. 'The establishment and dissolution of the Turk empire'. In The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia (ed) Denis Sinor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
212
Bibliography
Slezkine, Y. 1991. 'The Fall of Soviet Ethnography, 1928-38'. Current Anthropology 32 (4): 476-484. -. 1994. 'The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularlism'. Slavic Review 53 (2): 414-52. Slovo Kyrgyzstana. 2003. 'Pervoe upominanie v 'Istoricheskikh zapiskakh' ('Shi Tszy') Syma Tsyanya (II-I vv. don. e.) o kyrgyzyskom gosudarstve 201 g. don. e'. 15 May: 8. Smith, C. 2005. 'Abduction, Often Violent, a Kyrgyz Wedding Rite'. New York Times. Accessed 20 April 2005. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/30/ international/asia/30brides.h tml Smith, G. 1990. Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev. In The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (ed.) Graham Smith. London: Longman. Sneath, D. 1993. 'Social relations, networks and social organisation in postsocialist rural Mongolia'. Nomadic Peoples 33: 193-207. -. 2000. Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -. 2002. 'Reciprocity and Notions of Corruption in Contemporary Mongolia'. Mongolian Studies XXV: 86-99. -. 2003. 'Lost in the Post: Technologies of Imagination, and the Soviet Legacy in Post-Socialist Mongolia'. Inner Asia 5 (1): 39-52. -. 2006. 'Transacting and Enacting: Corruption, Obligation and the Use of Monies in Mongolia'. Ethnos 71 (1): 89-112. 2007. The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kkinship Society, and Misrepresentations of Nomadic Inner Asia. New York: Columbia University Press. Sokefeld. M. 1999. 'Debating Self, Identity, and Culture in Anthropology'. Current Anthropology 40 (4): 417-47 Soucek, S. 2000. A History of Inner Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ssorin-Chaikov, N. 2003. The Social Life of the State in Subartic Siberia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Stalin, ). 1973. The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-52. London: Croom Helm. Starr, S. 2006. 'Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia'. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Roald Studies Program. Washington, D.C.: John Hoptins Univesity-SAIS. Stone, L. 2004. 'Introduction'. In Kinship and Family: An Anthropological Reader (eds) R. Parkin and L. Stone. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Sydykov, 0. 1990. Tarikh Kyrgyz Shadmaniya: Kyrgyz sanjyrasy. Frunze: Kyrgyzstan. Sydykova, Z. 2003. 'Lenina snes, a Tanaeva spas'. ResPublica, 9 September: 1. Taylor, Charles. 1985. 'The person'. In The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History (eds) M. Carrithers, S. Collins and S. Lukes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -. 1993. Why Do Nations Have to Become States? In Reconciling the Solitude: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (ed.) Guy Laforest. Montreal and London: McGill's-Queen's University Press.
Bibliography
213
Temirkulov, A. 2004. Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic. Berliner Osteuropa Info 21: 94-100. Tishkov, V. 1994. Post-Soivet Ethnography: Not a Crisis but Something More Serious. Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia 33 (3): 87-92. -. 1995. "Don't Kill Me, I'm a Kyrgyz!": An Anthropological Analysis of Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict'. Journal of Peace Research 32 (2): 133--49. -. 1997. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame. London: SAGE. Tolstov, S., T. Zhdanko, S. Abramzon and N. Kislyakov (eds) 1963. Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana (Volume 2). Moscow: lzdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR. Tolybekov, S. 1959. Obshchestvenno-ekonomicheskii stroi kazakhov v XVII-XIX vekakh. Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo. 1971. Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII-nachale XX veka: Politiko-ekonomicheskii analiz. Alma-Ata: Izdatel'stvo 'Nauka' Kazakhskoi SSR. Tooker, E. 1992. 'Lewis H. Morgan and His Contemporaries'. American AnthropologistN. S. 94 (2): 357-75. Torokan uulu, E. 1995a. Kyrgyzdyn kyskacha sanjyrasy (2 volumes). Bishkek: Uchkun. -. 1995b. Sol kanat kyrgyz. Bishkek: Koko-Tengir. Trautmann, T. 1987. Lewis Henry Morgan and thelnvention ofKinship. London: University of California Press. Umar uulu, T. 1991. Kyrgyz sanjyrasy (Tegingdi bil. Yimanyngdy sakta. Atasaltyn unutpa). Bishkek: Arym. United Nations. 1994. 'Commemoration of the millennium of the Kyrgyz national epic, Manas'. A/RES/49/129. 49th General Assembly, 92nd Plenary Meeting. 19 December 1994. Accessed 23 May 2005. http:// www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r129.htm United Nations. 2002a. 'Second Committee unanimously approves resolution declaring 2003 the Year of Kyrgyz Statehood, takes up globalization and interdependence'. GA/EF/3012. 57th General Assembly, Second Committee, 23rd Meeting. 01 November 2002. Accessed 2 December 2004. http://www. un.org/N ews/Press/docs/2002 I gaef3012 .doc.h tm United Nations. 2002b. 'Resolution adopted by General Assembly'. 57/248. 57th Session. 20 December 2002. Accessed 5 December 2004. http:// ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/555/76/PDF/N025 5576. pdf?OpenElement United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). 2007. 'Fact sheet on bride kidnapping'. Accessed 1 August 2009. http://www.unfpa.org/16days/ documen ts/p l_bridenapping_factsheet.doc Urstanbekov, B. and T. Choroev. 1990. Kyrgyz tarykhy: Kyskacha entsiklopediyalyk sozduk. Bishkek: Kyrgyz Sovet Entsiklopediyasynyn Bashky redaktsiyasy. Usubaliev, T. 1982. 'Sovetskii Kirgizstan v sem'e bratskikh respublik'. In Kirgizskaya sovetskaya sotsialisticheskaya respublika entsiklopediya (ed.) B. 0. Oruzbaeva. Frunze: Glavnaya redaktsiya Kirgizskoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii.
214
Bibliography
-. 2003a. 'V chyom Lenin vinovat pered kyrgyzskim narodom?' Emgek tuusu, 13 September: 1-2. -. 2003b. 0 nashem vremeni i o delakh moei zhizni. Tol'ko khorosho znaya proshloe, mozhno sozdat' nastoyashchee, predvidet budushchee. Book 5. Bishkek: Sham. Valikhanov, Ch. 1985. Sobranie socinenii v pyati tomakh (Tom 2). Alma-Ata: Glavnaya redaktsiya Kazakhskoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii. Van der Heide, N. 2008. Spirited Performance: The Manas epic and society in Kyrgyzstan. Amsterdam: Rozenberg Publishers. Vinnikov, Ya. 1956. 'Rodo-plemennoi sostav i rasselenie kirgizov na territorii yuzhnoi kirgizii'. In Trudy kirgizskoi arkheologo-etnograficheskoi ekspeditsii (ed) G. F. Debets. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo akademii nauk SSSR. Vladimirtsov, B. Ya. 2002. Raboty po istorii i etnografii mongol'skikh narodov. Moscow: 'Vostochnaya Literatura' Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk. Voropaeva, V. 2000. Kyrgyzstan and Russia: Past and Present. Central Asia and the Caucasus (3): 28-35. Vucinich, A. 1965. Science in Russian Culture: A History to 1860. London: Peter Owen. Watson, R. 1994. Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism: An Introduction. In Memory, History, and Opposition under State Socialism (ed.) Rubie S. Watson. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press. Weatherford, J. 1981. Tribes on the Hill. New York: Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc. Weber, M. 1968. On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers. London: The University of Chicago Press. -. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline o(Interpretive Sociology (Volume 1). Los Angeles: University of California Press. -. 1998 [1948]. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (eds) Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. London: Routledge. Werner, C. 1998. Household networks and the security of mutual indebtedness in rural Kazakstan. Central Asian Survey 17 (4): 597-612. -. 2009. 'Bride abduction in post-Soviet Central Asia: marking a shift towards patriarchy through local discourses of shame and tradition'. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.) 15(2): 314-31. Whittaker, C. 1984. The Origins of Modern Russian Education: An Intellectural Biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press. Yoshida, S. 2005. Ethnographic Study of Privatisation in a Kyrgyz Village: Patrilineal Kin and Independent Farmers. Inner Asia 7 (2): 215-47. Yudakhin, K. 1999. Kyrgyzcha-oruscha sozdiik (Kyrgyzsko-russkii slovar'). Bishkek: Sham. -. 2000. Oruscha-kyrgyzcha sozdiik (Russko-kyrgyzskii slovar'). Bishkek: Sham. Yurchak, A. 2006. Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. Oxford: Princeton University Press. Zakirov, S. 1994. 'Sanjyra Kyrgyzov'. In Chiii oblusu Chuiskaya oblast': bashky entsiklopediyasynyn Kyrgyz Bishkek: Entsiklopediya. redaktsiyasy. Zizek, S. 1994. 'The Spectre of Ideology'. In Mapping Ideology. London: Verso.
Index
Alx:lrakhmanov, Jusup, 93, 100 Alxlyldabek kyzy, Janyl, 147--8, 149, 150, 151, 155, 158-9 Abramzon, Saul, 56, 67, 68, 75, 77 Afghanistan, 59-60, 168 Aidaraliev, A., 160 Ail'chinov (Communist Party member), 72 Aitmatov, Chingiz, 49,89-92,99,139 Akaev, Askar and Aksy 'tragedy', 19, 22, 25, 28, 44,45, 161,162,172, 174;and Afanas,9, 121,139-40,146,158, 162, 165-6, 172; and statehood, 6, 9,22,83, 120,139,140,146,147, 159-60, 161-2, 171-4, 175, 176, 181; and the Lenin statue, 169-71; biography of, 165; children of, 2, 24-5, 27, 38, 45, 46; concentrating power, 1, 14, 15-16, 39; criticism of, 93; descriptions of ancestors, 144, 147, 152; investigation of, 1, 27; national ideology, 9, 45, 83, 117, 123, 126, 140-5, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 169, 175, 177, 180-1, 182, 183; ousting of, 2, 9, 15, 16, 18, 24, 182; presidential elections, 24, 165, 167; statue unveiling, 87, 120, 133, 146-7, 167; wife of, 48-9 aksakal (elder), 49, 53, 73, 101, 171; aksakal courts 7 5 Aksy (tragedy), 2, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28, 39,45,93,94, 161,162,172, 174 ala kachuu see bride abduction
assistance, networks of, 8, 86, 101, 102, 103, 116, 117, 179 Atake baatyr, 146-8, 149, 151 bai (rich herd owner), 55-6, 60, 67-72, 76, 78, 139 baistvo see bai Bakiev, Kurmanbek as President, 14, 16, 17, 28, 30, 40, 45, 175, 182; national ideology, 182-3; presidential election, 35-6, 182; resignation as Prime Minister, 19; role in 'Tulip Revolution', 26-7 Bakir uulu, Tursunbai, 168 Balasagyn,Jusup, 120-1,134, 139, 143, 144, 146, 152 banality, 143, 157 basmachi (guerrilla movement), 12 Batken oblast', 164 Beknazarov, Azimbek, 2, 19, 20, 172 Belotskii (Communist Party member), 71, 72 bii (judge), 55-6, 64, 65, 67, 75, 152 Bishkek capital, 168; demonstrations in, 2, 19, 25, 26, 45; events in, 10, 120, 137, 159, 161; fieldwork in, 10; fortress in, 155; marriage negotiations in, 112; monuments in, 82, 154, 159, 169-71, 175; people in, 113; voting, 47 blat (informal networks to obtain goods and services), 41, 43, 53, 116-17 border disputes, 14-15, 20-1, 94, 165 Borombai, 58, 75, 77, 152
216
Index
bride abduction, 8, 103, 109-11, 113,115,117,118, 180; stories of, 111-12, 113, 118, 119; kidnapping, 109, 110, 113, 117 Britain, 108, 109 Carsten, Janet, 7, 80-1 Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 43-4 Chanachev, Marat, 88-9 charisma, 9, 141-5, 154 China border with Kyrgyzstan- see border dispute; in Manas epic, 138; Xinjiang Province, 171 Chinggis Khan, 11 Chonbashev (Communist Party member), 72, 79 Chtii oblast', 15, 31, 75, 147, 164 'clan', 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 34, 40, 46, 50, 53, 54,62-63,70,73, 74, 76,77,78, 79, 98, 177; and regional ties, 36-7 'clan' politics see 'tribalism' collectivization, 71-2, 79 Collins, Kathleen, 29, 31-3, 36, 43 Communism, 130 Communist anti-, 70, 99, 100; ideology, 13, 91, 137; intellectuals, 126; members, 68-72; October Revolution, 72; Party, 29, 40, 45, 69, 70, 71, 72, 90, 100, 132, 138, 163, 164, 165, 170 constitution conception of, 162; on elections, 25; reforms, 14, 22-3, 46, 160 corruption, 39-43, 178, 182 currency (Kyrgyz som), 15, 92, 99-100, 104, 105, 111, 116 egalitarianism, 61-2 ethnogenesis, 8, 67, 123-7, 130, 132, 134, 137, 139, 140-1, 146, 154, 161, 162, 166, 180 ethnos, 124-7,135-6,149,154 Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 31, 62-3 Fergana Valley, 11, 58, 147, 155, 163, 165, 166, 168 feudalism, 55-61 Fichte, Johann, 126-7, 128
Foucault, Michel, 122-3, 149 genealogical imagination, 7, 8, 81, 92,94,95,97,98, 101,117,142, 149,151,169,178,180 genealogy as a methodological tool, 5, 53, 121-3, 156-7, 162, 181-2; as relatedness, 3-5, 44, 50, 83, 85, 101, 116, 169; in national celebrations, 75, 83, 121, 156, 170; memory of, 91, 92, 95, 96; of subjectification, 150-2; recounting, 84-9 Gen'gun, 11, 173, 174 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 123, 133, 136 governmentality, 149-52, 181 Grodekov, Nikolai, 64, 98 Gumilev, Lev, 8, 9, 123, 124-7, 132, 133, 135, 137, 140-1, 154, 180 help definition of, 102; networks of, 8, 86, 101, 102, 107, 108, 114, 116, 117, 179-80 history and memory, 7, 8, 53, 81, 85, 87,88,92,94,95,96,97, 178; concepts of, 43, 94, 125, 126, 132; Kyrgyz official, 11, 16, 17,20, 93, 97, 116, 121, 123, 134, 160, 161, 166, 169, 173, 180 Humphrey, Caroline, 41, 83-4, 92, 118,121,143-4,154 Ibn Khaldfm, 142, 154 Imanberdiev, Torobek, 160 Islam, 11-13 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 168
fad ids (Muslim reformers), 12 Jalalabat city, 2, 25; oblast', 19, 20, 164 jeti ata (genealogical charter), 3, 52, 53,81,82,84,85,87,92,94,95, 101 Jetimishbaev, Kalen, 86-8, 94, 150 J ogorku Kengesh (Parliament) debates in, 175; elections to,
Index 24-7,31, 35-6,47, 53; reform of 22-4 Jones Luong, Pauline, 29-31, 46 Jumabaev,Rysbek, 153
kanat (wings), 36, 50-1, 74 Kant, Immanuel, 121, 122 I<aralaev, Sayakbai, 15 3 I<arimov, Islam, 168, 169 Kazakhstan, 33, 34, 35, 41, 45, 89, 99,115,118,125,148,165,175 kinship, 6, 23, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37,38,43,44,46,52,54,56, 57,61,62,66,67,73,77,79,80, 81, 83 102, 103, 108, 113, 116, 177, 178, 179 I
manap ('tribal' leader), 55--8, 60, 64-72,75, 77,78,98,139
manapstvo see manap Manas (epic poem) dream visitation, 153; epos,
217
45,100,121,137-40,149,154, 158, 161, 162, 172; national celebration, 9, 137-40, 146, 153, 161-2, 165, 174; statue, 154, 159; the warrior, 139, 144 manaschi (people who recite the Manas epic poem), 100, 138, 139, 153, 161 mankurt (slave), 89-92 Markov, Gennadii, 60, 61, 76 Marxist theory, 55 Masaliev, Absamat, 139 Masoon, Mikhail, 166 Masyrakunov, Rashid, 87 memory and history, 7, 53, 81, 85, 87,88,92,94,95,96,97, 178; as collective of personal remembrance, 7, 53, 81, 85, 90, 91,92,94,95,96,97, 178, 181; gapsin,94,95,96,97 mentality, 96-7, 183 Mongolia, 41, 55, 59, 60, 77,83-4 monuments, 81, 82, 93, 98, 120, 145-6, 167, 176 Morgan, Lewis Henry, 54, 80 Motuev, Nurlan, 11, 48-9, 50, 52-4, 83,89,92-4,178
narodnost' (ethnicity), 131, 135 Naryn city, 103-106, 112, 113, 114, 116, 178, 179; fieldwork in, 103; oblast', 10, 26, 49, 53, 74, 101, 164, 175 natsional'nost' (nationality), 131 Nazaraliev, J enishbek, 26 newspapers, lO-ll, 19,23,39,44, 46,110,164,170,173-4,175,176 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 122, 142, 154 obligation, 5, 6, 8, 85, 86, 101, 102, 107-108,109,111,114,115,149, 179-80 Orozbakov,Sagymbai, 138-9 Osh anniversary of, 165--8, 175; as capital, 168; city, 2, 47, 168; land rights dispute between Kyrgyz
218
Index
and Uzbeks, 165, 167; oblast', 26, 36, 164 Otunbaeva,Roza,24,26,27,46 Owen, David, 121, 122, 156 Ozgon city, 167 Parliament see Jogorku Kengesh particularlism, 38 passionarnost' ('passionarity'), 8, 9, 126, 140-5, 151, 152, 154 pastoral nomadic society critique of, 61-2 person concept of, 83, 97, 117, 121, 122, 127, 181;Kyrgyz,9,92,95,116, 140,151,156,158,159,174,181 plemya ('tribe'), 50, 98, 135, 138 'political clans' see 'clans' political science, debates in, 6, 28-39 Prigozhin, ll'ya, 141 Radloff, Wilhelm, 65, 75 Razzakov, Iskhak, 138 reciprocity, 103, 107, 116, 117 regionalism, 6, 23, 29-31, 38, 39, 47, 133; and 'clan' ties, 36-7 relatedness, 3, 44, 50, 73, 80-1, 83, 85,89,95,97, 101,122,123,169, 178 remittances, 102, 179, 182, 183 rod ('clan'), 5, 50, 98, 99 Rose, Nikolas, 9, 150-2, 181 Russia and ethnogenesis, 154; as ally, 147, 148; educational reforms, 127-9; Empire, 7, 12, 14, 20, 56, 58, 64, 65, 67, 68, 138, 163, 170; Moscow, 145; research in, 41; Soviet educational movements, 130, 164
sanjyra (genealogical charter), 3, 4, 50,81,85,86-9,92,94,95,96, 98,101,121,123,144,145,149, 158, 167 sanjyrachi (Kyrgyz specialists on genealogical descent and history), 3, 74,85,89,150 Schatz, Edward, 29, 33-5, 46 Schneider, David, 7, 50, 54, 80, 81
segmentary lineage system (SLS), 61-4,76 self, 81, 82-3, 92, 94, 95, 117, 180 Semenov, Petr, 58, 65, 75 Shabdan baatyr Oantaev, Shabdan), 148-9 Shahrani, M. NazifMohib, 12, 59-60, 76 shame,6, 101,102,109,111,114, 115,117, 118, 149, 179-80 Sharipov, Salizhan, 167 Shirokogorov, Sergei, 125, 136 Sima Qian, 11, 172, 173, 176 Sneath, David, 4, 41, 46, 47, 53, 60, 73, 74,76,156 sook (bones), 66, 77 southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan, 168-9, 176; disparity with north, 22, 40, 167-8 Soviet administration, 29, 67, 68, 69, 70,71,72, 107,130,132,137, 136, 163, 164, 165, 171; anti-, 125, 138; authorities, 12, 13, 29, 30,32,44, 52,56,66,67, 68, 70, 137, 138, 139, 165, 167; border, 59, 164; campaigns, 13, 56, 68, 69, 71; censuses, 131-2; citizens, 130; constitution, 175; countries and regions, 12, 41, 84, 133, 137, 139, 163, 164, 171, 175, 178; documents, 49, 50, 68-72, 73, 76, 138, 154; education, 91; era, 10, 12, 13, 14,30,31,32,40,41, 53,64,68,84,88,89,99, 107, 108,110,122,129,131,140,146, 164, 171, 177; ethnography and social sciences, 7, 10, 44, 49, 52, 55,61,72, 75,123-7,134,135, 136, 163; Homo Sovieticus, 129; iconography, 170; ideology, 88, 90,91, 125,134,137,138,139, 140, 163, 165; influence, 72; life, 43; literature, 89, 91, 129-30; military, 90; modernity, 151; parliament in Kyrgyzstan, 22; people, 133; policies, 4, 13, 30, 34, 61; post-, 7, 10, 17, 29, 41,
Index 42,43,44,48,49,50, 54,89, 107, 123, 134, 151, 163, 181; practices, 134; pre-, 41; propaganda 13, 71; scholars, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 139; surveillance, 33; Union, 1,3, 6, 13, 14, 15,20,32, 33,40, 71,73, 76,92,99, 106,115,124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 145, 150, 163, 165, 168, 170, 171, 177,179 spatiality, 7,98, 145,154,169, 178 spirituality, 120, 121, 139-40, 147 Stalin, Josef, 72, 91, 99,130,132, 138, 164 Starr, S. Frederick, 35-6 state ancient 'Kyrgyz', 173, 174; concepts of, 6, 44, 73, 117, 120, 121, 122, 141, 152, 156, 157-9, 162, 169, 171; creation of modern Kyrgyz, 163-5; genealogy of, 162-5; ideology of, 175, 180 statehood concept of, 93, 140-1, 153; Year of,9, 10, 22,83,88,99, 117,146, 147, 152, 153, 156, 161-2, 166, 169, 171-4, 176, 181 Tajikistan, 165, 168 Tal as city, 137, 166; oblast', 26, 164 taxes to Kokand Khanate, 57-8; to manap, 57-8, 75 temporality, 7, 98, 145-6, 178 Tokbaev (Communist Party member), 72 Tolybekov, S. E., 60, 61, 76 'tribalism' and regional ties, 36-7,43-4,72,99, 177-8; as corruption, 7, 38, 39-43; descriptions of, 1, 3, 6, 7, 18, 23, 24,27,28,31-8,39,50, 177,182 'tribe', 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 34, 46, 50, 53, 54, 63, 70,73, 74, 76,77,79,98,
177 Tridtsatki (The Thirty), 70 Khudaikulov, Rakhmankul, 70; Sydykov, Abdykerim, 70
219
tsarist administrators, 66; colonizers, 44, 78; documentation, 49; era, 14, 32, 64, 68, 146; ethnography, 7, 10, 52; expansion into Central Asia, 20, 60; forces, 58, 70, 163, 170, 171; geographic divisions, 163; pre-, 53, 61; rule, 32, 130, 147, 163; Tsar Nicholas I, 127, 128 'Tulip Revolution', 2, 6, 15-16, 18, 25-8, 99, 165 tiindiik (the latticed smoke hole in the roof of a yurt), 161, 175 Turkmenistan, 35 Ukraine and ethnogenesis, 154
uruk ('clan'), 4, 50, 51-2, 73, 85, 86, 87,95,96,97,98, 101,106,117, 146, 148, 177, 178, 179 uruu ('tribe'), 4, 7, 48-9, 50, 51-52, 73,85,87,92,93,94,95,96,97, 98,101,106,117,120,146,147, 148, 152, 177, 178, 179 Usubaliev, Turdakun, 40, 53, 163-4, 170-1, 175 Uvarov, Sergei, 128-9 Uzbekistan, 35, 165, 167; border with Kyrgyzstan, 168; Tashkent, 168 Dzonggi.i-Kuush see border dispute Valikhanov, Chokan, 66 Vernadskii, Vladimir, 126 Vladimirtsov, Boris, 59, 60 Weber, Max, 9, 141, 154 women's role in society, 13-14 Yasa (Mongol legal and administrative code), 74 YomutTurkmen, 54-5 Ysyk-Kol oblast', 10, 106, 113, 147, 152, 164, 175 zhuz (horde), 34, 46
