The Gender of Democracy: Citizenship and Gendered Subjectivity

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THE GENDER OF DEMOCRACY Maro Pantelidou Maloutas

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The Gender of Democracy Citizenship and gendered subjectivity

Maro Pantelidou Maloutas

ISBN 978-0-415-38296-0

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The Gender of Democracy

As developments in the European Union and elsewhere make the re-examination of citizenship a pressing issue, this book reflects on the persisting “masculine” character of contemporary democracy and the measures taken in the EU to combat it. Combining a theoretical approach with a specific critique of EU gender policy The Gender of Democracy argues that substantial democracy as a social project cannot co-exist with the existing system of gender relations which are inherently dichotomous and thus demarcate social categories of superior and inferior status. Drawing on utopian thought Maro Pantelidou Maloutas proposes a re-examination of the notion of the gendered subject and a revision of the dominant perceptions of the relations between sex, sexuality and gender. The book contains a critique of EU gender policy and shows how in seeking to do away with gender inequality, simply formulating policies that are prowomen is not enough. Nor is “gender mainstreaming”, if gender continues to be perceived as a dichotomy legitimizing the discourse of “women’s difference”. It is argued that in order to approach democracy’s emancipatory component, far-reaching policies which deconstruct rather than modernize existing gender relations are needed. Thus, to do away with flagrant gender inequalities is not enough. Unquestioned assumptions about gender must also be confronted if we wish any gender equality strategy to have a substantial impact on social co-existence and democracy. Maro Pantelidou Maloutas is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Athens. She specializes in issues concerning gender, democracy, citizenship and the cultural aspects of politics.

Routledge research in gender and society

1 Economics of the Family and Family Policies Edited by Inga Persson and Christina Jonung 2 Women’s Work and Wages Edited by Inga Persson and Christina Jonung 3 Rethinking Households An Atomistic Perspective on European Living Arrangements Michel Verdon 4 Gender, Welfare State and the Market Thomas P. Boje and Arnlaug Leira 5 Gender, Economy and Culture in the European Union Simon Duncan and Birgit Pfau Effinger 6 Body, Femininity and Nationalism Girls in the German Youth Movement 1900–1935 Marion E.P. de Ras 7 Women and the Labour-Market Self-employment as a route to economic independence Vani Borooah and Mark Hart 8 Victoria’s Daughters The schooling of girls in Britain and Ireland 1850–1914 Jane McDermid and Paula Coonerty 9 Homosexuality, Law and Resistance Derek McGhee 10 Sex Differences in Labor Markets David Neumark

11 Women, Activism and Social Change Edited by Maja Mikula 12 The Gender of Democracy Citizenship and gendered subjectivity Maro Pantelidou Maloutas

The Gender of Democracy Citizenship and gendered subjectivity

Maro Pantelidou Maloutas

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 A. & S. Savalas Publishers S.A. Typeset in Galliard by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin This volume is part of the co-publishing collaboration of Routledge and A. & S. Savalas Publishers S.A., Social Science. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0–415–38296–3

The text was initially translated by D. Koulouthros and was re-worked, edited and expanded by the author.

Contents

Abstract Preface

Introduction 1

The correlation between democracy and gender 1.1 Democracy and gender today 10 1.2 Necessity for a new conceptualization of gender and expanding democracy 17 1.3 Gender as a form of social inequality and gendered citizens 21 1.4 Gender and political decision-making: preconceptions and practices 24

2

Restricted women’s presence in political decision-making: theoretical issues and policies 2.1 Under-representation or reduced participation? 37 2.2 The gender of the politician and the gender of politics 47 2.3 Who represents, what is represented? 55

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1 10

36

3

The gendered subject as citizen 3.1 Democracy and citizens/subjects of democracy 64 3.2 Citizenship: androcentrism and bipolarity 74 3.3 Universality, multiplicity and differences 78

64

4

Gender, democracy, utopia 4.1 From women’s multiformity to challenging the gender dichotomy 86 4.2 Gender, sex, sexuality and democracy 92 4.3 Gendered subjects, utopian thought and democracy 100

86

5

Concluding remarks

110

Notes Bibliography Index

127 173 191

Abstract

As the far-reaching developments in the EU and elsewhere make the reexamination of citizenship a pressing issue, this book reflects upon the persisting “masculine” character of contemporary democracy and on the measures taken in the EU in order to fight against it. Taking as a point of departure a problematique debated in a wide range of literature, the author argues that substantial democracy as a social project cannot co-exist with the existing system of gender relations. Gender relations that are inherently dichotomous and thus demarcate social categories of superior and inferior status, contributing to the creation of two differentiated and unequally valued types of citizens according to their sex/gender. By accepting the gender dichotomy, welfare policies and institutional reforms seeking to improve women’s political presence based on their “difference” reproduce and legitimize discrimination, thus preventing the project of democracy from being “fully” realized in society. The author argues that in order to formulate policies that target gender inequality, pro-women measures are not enough if we opt for a substantial “democratization” of democracy. Equal rights, and their effective social functioning rendering women’s citizenship more than a status, are obviously necessary. But democracy is more than that. In order that democracy’s emancipatory component is approached, far-reaching gender policies that deconstruct and not just modernize gender roles and their boundaries are needed. Based on the hypothesis that the way in which the gendered subject is conceptualized is actually significant for social reality, since it determines the framing of policies that affect it, the author argues that to open up the possibility of a symbiosis of citizens as “free and equal” necessitates a new conceptualization of gendered subjects. This can take place only if the multiplicity of human social existence is freed from all restrictive boundaries referring to essentialist identities, and in particular from those of today’s gender identities. A project that can only be fulfilled, or even approached, if theory succeeds in dissolving the dominant preconceptions about the gendered aspect of subjectivity, preconceptions that guide today’s European gender policy. Thus, the fight against gender inequality and gender prejudice is not enough, if not accompanied by a challenging of unquestioned assumptions about gender, which will lead to a re-conceptualization of gender itself.

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This re-conceptualization necessitates a re-examination of the notion of the (gendered) subject, of the distinction between mind and body and a revision of the dominant perceptions of the relation between sex and gender as well as sexuality, which contribute to the reproduction of the existing system of gender relations. In an effort to find a point of convergence between what is no longer socially and politically tolerable and what is potentially imminent, the author embarks on a discussion with reference to utopian thought. In this context it is proposed that utopian thought provides useful insights in helping to overcome dichotomous identities, which (will) constitute the only possible gendered identities of citizens compatible with a more genuine and substantial democracy. The last section of the book turns to more immediately political issues. The author investigates whether EU gender equality policies, often equated to “prowomen” measures, policies that in effect promote and legitimize gender dichotomy, may be incorporated as the starting point towards a long-term strategy of de-gendering. This is a strategy that can lead to a non-essentialist framework, permitting these policies to be transformed from measures that underline “women’s difference” into provisions that promote gender multiplicity, and thus contribute to the “democratization” of democracy, through a genuine disengagement of citizenship from gender. Insisting on the importance of the way “gender” itself is conceptualized, the author discusses gender mainstreaming as a strategy in the EU, its theoretical presuppositions and the way it is conceived and thus applied in certain countries, as well as quotas for the increase of the number of women in political decision making, which form the point of reference for the clarification of the above argument.

Preface

Feminist theory and practice have managed to challenge a long tradition of entrenched political thinking within which women either did not exist or were treated as inferior by nature.1 However, despite the fact that women in all democratic societies have long attained full political rights, formal “political equality of the sexes” has not, even in the most elementary sense in many cases, been converted into a gender-balanced distribution of political power. Nor of course of any other kind of social or economic power. The reality of political power remains predominantly masculine; women and men are treated as, and usually feel like, different categories of citizens, while politics continues unhindered to be male-dominated, to a degree directly proportional to the importance of the level in question in the political hierarchy.2 Women’s citizenship remains indeed largely at the level of status, its transformation into practice nowhere more visibly impeded than at the level of elite participation. This validates the standard positive correlation between (all kinds of) social inferiority and diminished participation, but also demonstrates the inherently uneasy relation between the functioning of democracy and the gendered identities of its citizens. Furthermore, in societies where important alterations appear within the above framework of women’s political marginalization, the changes are often mainly quantitative rather than substantive. This obviously leads to the question of whether the nature of the problem of women’s political marginalization is simply a quantitative one. And, more importantly, whether equality policies targeting flagrant inequalities related to gender are enough. Or rather, it is not sufficient to do away with prejudices about gender. We must do away with unquestioned assumptions too. The above empirical observations permit the formulation of a hypothesis that constitutes the main thrust of this study: the absolute incompatibility of democracy with the existing dominant system of gender relations. Democracy is conceived, for the purposes of this hypothesis, as the central social organizing principle of today’s society. Even a narrower definition of democracy however, which would place it exclusively within the political sphere, shows it to be incompatible with the dominant system of gender relations. This hypothesis relates to yet another one: gender-based oppression, the result of a dichotomous understanding of gender and with repercussions for democracy, is not

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simply a transient state along a trajectory of “progress” leading to ever increasing “democratization”. On the contrary, gender oppression in its current form is a structural component of the historical logic of modernity, although it apparently contradicts some of its fundamental assumptions. This hypothesis underlines the innate difficulties and the controversies of a political solution to the problematic relation between democracy and the system of gender relations, when the former respects the established perception of gender, while it highlights the fact that a lot is at stake in the way gender inequality is formulated as a policy issue. Thus, investigating the ontological foundations of political proposals appears of capital importance for the formation of a feminist politics. The specific power-based and hierarchical character of the existing system of gender relations has obviously placed women in an inferior position on all social levels, proving that the equality provided for within the current legal framework is structurally hindered. It is also clear that the position of women at the margins of politics is not the cause, but rather the consequence of the inferior social status in store for them. The compatibility of the “political” with the “feminine”, which emerged for the first time along with the establishment of women’s suffrage, proved capable of co-existing with the on-going repression and exploitation of women in the private sphere and their actual marginalization in the public. The marginalization of women in the specific sphere of politics is of particular interest however. In a symbolic sense, men’s domination assumes an exceptional significance within this framework where all universally important decisions are made. On the other hand, in practice, politics is particularly significant as a form of power influencing or controlling all other forms of power.3 Furthermore, the nature of citizenship being inherently androcentric, combined with the traditional distinction between private and public spheres – which has placed women automatically in the private equating the public with politics – underline the exceptional difficulties (and potential traps) in the attempt to convert women into genuine participants in the political process, through intervention mainly at the level of their “political representation”. Obviously, certain modernization measures that increase the legitimacy of the political system by increasing the number of women in the political arena do not necessarily contribute to the promotion of women as social category, to actual participants of the democratic political process. A typical example of the substance of women’s exclusion, the issue of their limited presence in political decision-making (often perceived as a problem of under-representation, indicating thus the constraints of the pertinent argument), was posited on a new basis by feminist theory in the past few decades, while feminist activists managed to put it on the agenda of European politics. Nevertheless, the central question to be confronted concerning women’s political exclusion remains how the above can be substantially overcome. That is, how the gendered aspect of citizens will be recognized – since genderless always ultimately refers to men – without ever enmeshing the gendered subject in pre-defined, delimiting and repressive gender constructs. The main potential contribution of feminist theory to the debate on the

xiv Preface relation between gender and democracy, and thus to the theory of democracy, can be seen at this specific point. While feminist theory has distanced itself from the traditional rejection of the state and its policies as potential agents of substantial changes in favour of women, generally espoused by its radical wing in past decades, it ought to discern today the pitfalls often concealed in certain measures implemented or even demanded by women, which seemingly aim at fighting discrimination. Feminist theory has to confront both a naïve socialdemocratic notion of the development of the welfare state as a cure-all for women too, and a played out liberal conception of the state as a homogeneous, neutral institution of class and gender arbitration. In response, feminist theory attempts to formulate hypotheses about how women may indeed put to their advantage as gendered subjects the available possibilities of political intervention, without at the same time contributing to a further consolidation of the essentialist identity attributed to them. In order to succeed in that, what must be elaborated is such an argument for women’s demands as may promote them as parts of an aggregate radical perception of, and strategy for, the abolition of the existing system of gender relations as a nodal power structure. Feminist theory must also elaborate a new conception of the universality of citizenship which transcends the pseudo-universality of liberal individualism, in which the gender-neutral citizen is conceived exclusively as an agent of rights, thus subsuming everyone, men and women, into the totality of democratic citizens.4 This presupposes a notion of “the political” and of politics, an integral element of which is the active participation of citizens freely involved in the public sphere, creating a collective space in which all, men and women, with all their particular characteristics and differences freely developed, act in concert. Something that obviously contradicts a current conception of politics in which competition for votes and influence within political elites and among pressure groups for the promotion of specific interests is prevalent, and actually restricts citizens of different categories to the role of consumer or spectator.5 Within the framework of the above argument, this study has a dual aim: firstly, to contribute to the theoretical debate in progress regarding the prospects of democracy, using as a point of reference the crucial relationship of democracy with gender as a form of institutionalized social discrimination. That is to say, the aim is to formulate a hypothesis regarding the relations of gendered subjects with citizenship, emphasizing that the political marginalization of women is also a problem of democracy. Secondly, to intervene into a political debate on the European agenda today, regarding the strategy and policies against women’s political subordination as an expression of gender inequality, insisting on the ideological components and the connotations of existing policies, contributing thus to the possibility of a new terrain for gender politics. A terrain where the demonstration of the incompatibility of democracy with the existing system of gender relations permits the refutation of the generalized unquestioned belief that a radically different (non-dichotomous) gender order is inconceivable. It is noteworthy that the above debate is still conducted to a large extent among persons of the same gender. Mainly among women, femin-

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ine political “under-representation” is conceived as a problem of social justice and an indication of the overall character of democracy in a specific society, and not merely as a demand targeting the modernization of the political process. The above comment is inspired mainly by the Greek reality, where the debate concerning women’s citizenship, encouraged today by EU policies, is still being waged well over half a century since the acquisition of political rights by women (1952), that is, since the extension of what was considered “universal”, i.e. men’s suffrage, to women. However, merely recognizing the problem of women’s social subordination expressed as political marginalization, a problem which has been increasingly acknowledged in the EU since the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, is not sufficient. Since then, the equality of men and women in all fields and activities of the EU has become further legitimized as a palpable aim of all policies instituted by the member-states, and as a criterion by which they are measured. Next to measures for “equal opportunities” for men and women and positive actions intending to correct women’s initial disadvantage in a targeted area (conceptualized nevertheless in Article 141 as “specific advantages”, a framing which is very problematic), mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies has become an obligation of all EU member states. But the academic controversies about the term itself, its political significance linked to its failing to create legally enforceable rights and the risk of inertia it presents in terms of specific policies for women set aside,6 mainstreaming a gender perspective in policy-making should not just equate to mainstreaming a pro-women attitude. Something that happens often, especially when there is a strong political will to follow European directives and no tradition of gender policy, linked to the lack of prior clarification of what exactly is a gender perspective to be mainstreamed. Depending on the conceptualization of gender, it is obvious that different policies will be implemented as means, and different ends will be thus obtained. What is more, it is highly debatable whether the dominant, dichotomous perception of gender can permit the mainstreaming of a gender perspective with radical results. Nor is it sufficient to admit that the unequal distribution of political power is politically, socially and morally unacceptable. Recognizing the existence of a significant problem of and for democracy does not automatically yield a response (contrary to what is often maintained in the case of women) concerning how to proceed to its solution. The investigation of the meaning for democracy of the existence of gendered subjects-citizens is a prerequisite for any fertile participation in the above debate. The same applies to the inquiry into the way gender is conceived, a way that through undermining and not reinforcing its dichotomous character could encourage actual indifference to it, thus contributing to the transformation of today’s male-dominated democracy into a democracy with no gender qualification. The above inquiries may also result in finding ways for the theoretical exploration into the multiple identities of gendered subjects to inspire an effective and long-term gender policy, able to mobilize all those politicians and activists seeking in good faith, if not always successfully, to intervene practically in the refutation of the current gender order.

xvi Preface The solutions customarily proposed for dealing with women’s political “under-representation” may, in my view, in the long term undermine their own aim, that is, equal access to citizen participation in the political process regardless of gender. In order to avoid the above, it is necessary to clarify how we perceive and conceptualize elements of everyday life such as gender and the notorious “difference” between the sexes, while we also define how we conceive of a future in which gender-specific social inequality will become increasingly eroded. In certain aspects of social life which appear self-evident, like the gender system, these clarifications become necessary in order to outline a response to the “why” of women’s “under-representation” in political decision-making, while at the same time we take into account its specific weight in relation to other political parameters.7 These include the usual limited participation of women as social category in the political process. The above clarifications are also needed for sketching a response as to how women’s “under-representation” can be overcome in a manner which would indicate a substantial change in the system of gender relations. That is, a way to overcome the problem of the limited “representation” of women which will require much more than merely piecemeal measures of mainly a quantitative nature that do not interfere with the root causes of women’s marginalization and thus, have no radical, subversive consequences beneficial both to the social actors and to democracy. The uneasy relationship between democracy and gender implied in the foregoing analysis does not simply constitute an obstacle for one specific social category, namely women. It poses a problem for democracy itself, since inherent in the theory of democracy is the seeking and guarantee of the substantial equality of its citizens as a presupposition for the democratic functioning of the political system. In this sense, the exploration of the relationship between gender and democracy attempted in this study aims at contributing to the overall theoretical debate concerning the future of democracy. A future that appears problematic at the same time that democracy seems triumphant politically8 and while the “crisis of democracy” is regularly attributed to the fact that democracy is not democratic enough.9 If, however, continual renewal and expansion are accepted as ingrained in the idea of democracy, and provided that we accept that tomorrow’s democracy in order to be substantive will be increasingly determined by its respect for the right of everyone to constitute themselves as subjects,10 then gender relations will have to be placed high on the political agenda. The changes already consummated in the system of gender relations and in the respective ideology clearly demonstrate the direction that any relevant action must take. Based on the above, it becomes clear that what this study finally attempts is to delineate on the level of theory – and on the basis of that on the level of politics – how to deal with the incongruity between the formal political equality of women and men and the actual exploitation and marginalization suffered by half of humanity because of their gender. The aim being the contributing of theory to the elimination of this incongruity and therefore to democracy’s becoming more substantial, through the eventual repercussions of theory on

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political perceptions. That is, the objective is to define a way in which the theoretical perception of the reality of gendered subjects, overcoming the hierarchical dichotomy of gender which has historically been accepted as self-evident, would contribute to a more equal social co-existence of subjects regardless of gender. Although this matter will surely be confronted mainly on the level of politics, it is of interest to explore how theory can contribute to a transcendence of the demand for the formal “equality of the sexes”, to another level of demands that will refer to the equality of the subjects regardless of gender. This is a completely different issue, since the latter formulation is not restricted by an inherently dichotomous conception of sex/gender. This inquiry necessarily leads us to the renegotiation of the signification of gender, which is imperative since the manner in which the gendered subject is conceptualized today obviously contributes to the undermining of democracy, despite the current attempts to dissociate women’s identity from the notion of inferiority. Attempts which, within the present framework, lead ultimately to dead-end solutions. While this is mainly a study within feminist political theory, the empirical reality that inspired it refers to the European South, and specifically Greece, where the system of gender relations is more traditional than in the North. A gender order burdened by many particular internal contradictions due to the historical origins of Greek socio-political culture. Demands and policies for “gender equality” are thus framed in specific ways, in reference also to the history of the women’s movement in this country, while they refer in a particular way to the EU directives and to what is perceived as the general EU climate of legislative measures in favour of gender equality. Nevertheless, this “theoretical view from the South” aspires to formulate generalized theoretical hypotheses in view of the development of a non-contradictory relationship between democracy and gender. Via an investigation of the theoretical prerequisites of a radical gender policy, these hypotheses could contribute to a rethink on the framing of European gender equality policies. In my view, this rethinking should refer to an initial question, which permeates the present study, centred on how the hegemony of men in the public sphere can be substantially challenged, if the understanding of gender as a dichotomy, creating men and women with different, unequally valued characteristics and thus (perceived as) suited to different kinds of work, is not also radically challenged. And this, in spite of any gender equality policy in other areas, policies that are implemented by measures based on “women’s difference”. In other words, it is highly debatable whether women, historically rendered politically invisible because of their gender inscription, will ever gain all that is due to equal citizens of democracy, by becoming visible as women. The process of writing the original of this study, published in Greek in 2002, was rather long and very enriching. It resulted in a very pleasant journey whose end I wasn’t really looking forward to, and also in many debts to many persons. These, referring to many friends and colleagues, have been acknowledged in the Greek edition. While the present edition is based on a translation which resulted in a final version that distances itself in many points from the original, I would

xviii Preface like to repeat my warmest thanks to my colleague Michalis Spourdalakis, director of the Social Science series of Savalas publications, for his positive attitude and support of this work through all its different stages. I also wish to repeat my thanks to my daughter Myrto, who was a valuable assistant in locating in British libraries hard-to-find bibliography, and an always available reviewer of translated texts. Her main role though was one of continuous inspiration, making me wish to thank her very much for providing me with reasons to be personally proud and optimistic on the social level. The Greek version of this book was dedicated to Thomas, whose contribution and continuous support I wish to acknowledge here also. However, the present edition has to be dedicated to my parents and especially to my father, John Pantelides, who would have been very happy to see it published in English by Routledge.

Introduction

The title of this study, The Gender of Democracy, may be regarded as a contradiction in terms: democracy, in all the various conceptions concerning it, is by definition a system in which the notion of citizenship is conceived beyond any individual particularities and differences.1 Furthermore, on the level of society, democracy today as an idea aims at the invalidation of inequalities in the access to political processes resulting from the specific conditions of each citizen, and is also in theory characterized by its respect for the personal freedom of individuals to realize themselves, and thus for their differences. We may refer to democracy as a system of government and a sum total of processes or as an issue for society and an ideal to which we aspire. In all cases, be it liberal,2 socialist or radical,3 democracy is theoretically committed to an indifference towards any special characteristics of “free and equal” citizens. On the basis of their quality as such, citizens constitute the people whose consensus is the prerequisite for the legitimation of a democratically elected government and of the whole political system. How, then, could democracy have a gender?4 The above question is legitimate insofar as it is accepted that contemporary democracy does in theory and should in practice function independently of the gendered constitution of its citizens, as well as of their class position, race and other differentiating and hierarchical attributes. Especially since gender is combined with the latter reinforcing other forms of inequality, something which is usually not taken into consideration in discussions of the compatibility between equality and freedom in the context of democracy. The universal dimension of citizenship is theoretically interwoven with political equality, without which there is obviously no democracy, not only in the form of equal rights but also as a means of overcoming social inequality. In order for democracy to be substantial, the universality of citizenship co-exists with the goal of liberation from as many forms of oppression as possible, including those perceived as referring to the most personal experiences.5 An area in which gender has obviously a special significance. Therefore, in a social and sociological sense, the difficult relationship between democracy and gender does not come to an end as such, but rather it is fully revealed with the institutionalization of women’s political rights. Especially since, in spite of the ideals of universality and equality for all inscribed in the idea of citizenship, its original perception was built on the exclusion of

2 Introduction women. There is an obvious fundamental gender inscription in political theory, as well as in the political institutions of representative democracy, where the traits assigned to the realm of politics “strikingly” coincide to those assigned to men.6 Also, the liberation from oppressions aspect of democracy creates the need for investigating the gender-specific forms of oppression as obstacles to democracy, which in turn reveals the special interest of studying what it means for democracy to deal with gendered citizens. On the other hand, the way in which democracy functions, triumphant as it has been in the last one-and-a-half-decades, is patently distanced from the ideal of the universality of democratic citizenship. The common reference to secondclass citizens shows that membership of a political community can be both universal and hierarchically ordered, with various categories of legally full members of the community treated as if they were not.7 Thus, the study of how democracy functions at a particular historical moment refers by definition to an incomplete process, while “democracy” consists in a critical concept,8 a point of reference for a reality viewed as deficient. Obviously equality of political rights, a prerequisite for democracy, cannot be sufficient for its functioning, since the political equality of citizens runs counter to the multiple and multiform social inequalities experienced by subjects. Inequalities which limit the subjects’ perspective and presence as citizens. With respect to class inequality, political theory has proposed many, more or less radical, solutions, or at least does away with the problem (recognizing its existence in this way), through, for example, the hypothesis that the logic of democracy itself tends towards actual social equality by extending social rights to all citizens. Even in liberal democracies, democratic practice covers in part some of the most extreme forms of social/class inequality through welfare entitlements. But, despite the foregoing, gender continues to a large extent to be unchallenged, both in mainstream political theory and at the level of policies, as a factor of social inequality that fundamentally and brutally undermines democracy. C. Pateman refers to “the mockery of the ideals and values that democracy is held to embody”, in the context of the sexist organization of society.9 Today, this “mockery” seems highly differentiated in different societies, to the degree that they institutionalize measures against political discrimination on the basis of sex/gender. The question, however, of how substantial these measures are, remains, in addition to the observation that the above measures do not usually aim at strengthening democracy.10 Commonly conceived as equality measures, they can even be viewed as creating problems for democracy.11 These comments validate the hypothesis that citizenship has an inherently male-centred character,12 that is why merely adding women to the list of those with full political rights has never been sufficient to ensure that democracy ceases to be in many cases just an additional male prerogative. Gender is obviously a significant point of reference as an organizing principle for society, a principle which determines who will enjoy what and who will have access to what. While, as a system of power relations, it determines the living conditions of all, in both the public and the private spheres.13 Furthermore, as a

Introduction 3 parameter of social life, gender illustrates in a paradigmatic way how exclusion may operate under conditions of legal equality that seemingly involve all citizens. An exclusion (among others of course, but also accentuating all others) based on what is perceived as a non-reversible quality of citizens, such as sex/gender. Thus, along with the necessary revision of the standard conceptualization of citizenship and the subsequent changes in the way it functions, in order to respond to the many social and political changes that have taken place, reference to the inherently problematic relationship between gender (due to the way it is conceptualized) and citizenship is equally necessary. Even the most casual and ill-informed look at the gender composition of all decision-making structures in the vast majority of democratic countries demonstrates that gender, apart from being a personal characteristic operates as an institutionalized form of hierarchical division upon political subjects. In a society of equals, as Ph. Green14 notes, “the occurrence of apathy should be randomized, a mere function of that mysterious entity we think of as personality”, rather than correlated with specific social identity. The correlation of gender and political participation at all levels shows that democracy as we know it is masculine and, as such, profoundly distorted. Because obviously “democracy” could not co-exist with a system of power relations such as gender. Democracy, not only as a system of political procedures but as a theory of society,15 could not be combined with a social framework of strictly demarcated and impenetrable identities, in this case, gender identities, structured in an antithetic, dichotomous and therefore hierarchical manner.16 Indeed no valid reference to democracy is possible while the dominant perception of the “political” refers to a given inflexible gender identity (men’s) and contributes practically through concrete policies to the (modernized) reproduction of gendered oppression and exploitation, via the further legitimation of gender dichotomy. While, furthermore, the worthlessness/demerit with which the “feminine” has been imbued in collective representations is an obvious obstacle for the democratic functioning of the system, so long as it defines women’s subjectivity within contexts that discourage participation.17 There is no possibility for substantial democracy on a political level, insofar as it does not exist on a broader social and inter-subjective level, which indicates the direction that any intervention, in order to be effective, must take. That the gender of democracy in Europe is at present still masculine is in my view indisputable. This is the case despite the fact that obviously the situation is not the same everywhere, with Southern Europe and the East European new and ascending EU members (where the situation has in some cases deteriorated after the fall of socialism) being the worst cases in Europe.18 It is also noteworthy that data substantiating such a view were until fairly recently very sketchy, fragmentary and questionable in their validity, especially where the malecentredness of democracy is more pronounced. Therefore any mention of women’s “under-representation” in the public sphere was usually founded upon common-sense impressions, its history was ignored, and this, despite the fact that the asymmetry seems to be actually receding everywhere, usually following

4 Introduction EU directives, if selectively in certain areas or even circumstantially. It is undeniable that EU policies play, in the European South, a major role in the implementation of various gender equality measures, while in the specific area of political decision-making, quotas made possible by EU initiatives have the potential (depending on electoral systems and type of list) to contribute to the lessening of gender asymmetry. However, the way positive action measures are usually framed19 functions on the ideological level in contradiction to what should be their aspired for long-term goal, often leaving unchallenged the malecentredness of politics. Thus, given the gendered character of democracy and in view of the need to further legitimize the political system, a pressing question arises, insofar as the realization of a radical democratic agenda of neutralizing/eradicating inequalities resulting from the special life conditions of each citizen is a goal. A question, emerging at the level of the theory of democracy, but also at the level of politics and feminist strategy, appearing as particularly urgent especially in societies that have no tradition in gender policies: what should the goal be in the medium and long term, a goal which will determine the respective approaches? Must democracy acquire a feminine gender as well, along with the established masculine, much in the same vein as (some of) the supporters of quotas and especially equal representation or participation (parity) and not only them, stipulate?20 Or would it be more appropriate to argue that the issue is neither the way in which an institutionalized dichotomy creating hierarchies (i.e. sex/gender) may become respected, nor the way in which we may be able to ignore gender. Ignoring gender always proves to the detriment of those on the lower rungs of the respective hierarchy. Must the goal not rather be to find a way in which the gendered aspect of subjects can become acceptable in its multiplicity, significant only as one of the subject’s many special characteristics and particularities? Thus, contrary to all accepted categorizations of the subjects, these special characteristics will not be concretized in any model of hierarchy (facilitated by the existing dichotomy) and will be irrelevant in the current sense to citizenship. This line of reasoning does not of course refer particularly to specific societies, but aims at confronting the issue of the difficult relationship between gender and democracy on the level of theory. A theory that takes in the possibility that basic elements of our social world could be arranged differently. That we, as “social creators”, could create new social forms, new social arrangements.21 This may lead the discussion to the terrain of utopia, that is, to an area of radical critique where new fields of conceptualization may arise and where we can imagine new and radically different forms of coexistence.22 This seems fertile, even necessary, since a feminist theory distanced from utopian approaches finds itself trapped in the existing system of gender identities – that is, the very system in which the “feminine” is by definition undervalued23 – while new conceptualizations of the socially feasible are urgently necessary with respect to the gendered dimension of our subjectivity. This study argues that indeed, contemporary democracy has a gender, which is unequivocally masculine, a fact that annuls democracy’s constitutive prin-

Introduction 5 ciples. It attempts to formulate hypotheses through which the constituent elements of a response will emerge, regarding what should be done on the level of theory, so that the theoretical presuppositions for a less asymmetrical relationship between democracy and gender could be articulated. More specifically, it addresses the way in which gender and the gendered subjects are to be conceptualized, in view of the above: that is, in order that a more substantial democracy finds its theoretical grounding with reference to gender, beyond the well-known limited “equality amendments” to democracy of the typical gender policies. Due to the latent acceptance of the dominant conceptualization of gender and of the gendered subject, gender inequality as a policy issue is usually framed in such a way as to result in the further legitimation of the gender dichotomy, undercutting any subversive potential that specific policies or strategies might have. Thus, the main variants of different conceptions concerning this issue will be examined, and specifically, the question of whether democracy should become “feminine” will also be explored, a question de facto on European political agendas. The connotations of such a target and the resulting strategies necessary for its implementation will also be examined. The main opposing argument to be discussed, which is the one that permeates this study, refers to democracy’s need, if it is to be consistent with its constituent principles, to become substantially indifferent to gender, in the sense of the latter becoming non-pertinent for the former, recognizing at the same time the (multiple) gendered existence of subjects. Only a perception of gender beyond the existing dichotomy will permit gender “indifference” not to become gender blindness, burdening those that it pre-defines as inferior. This of course presupposes a radical revision in the perception and the conceptualization of central concepts, something that does not characterize the previous view. These radical conceptual revisions are of particular significance insofar as we accept that knowledge is power, which means that the direction that our investigation will take, and what we will concentrate on, may affect the system of power relations. The revision of the concept/notion of the gendered subject inevitably results in a new conception of the citizen and citizenship, and thus appears to be necessary for policies of substantial broadening of democracy with reference to gender. Because, while the uncritical acceptance of the divide men/women and of women’s “difference”, which dominates gender equality policies, ultimately does not resolve the issue of women’s subordination, as we very well know, ignoring gender and the gendered existence of subjects simply favours those who are in a position of power within the system of gender relations. The assertion of the “feminine” as different, offering no substantial long-term solution, what is by contrast imperative is a new radical conceptualization/vision of the gendered non-dichotomous subject/citizen of democracy, which would follow the questioning of dominant assumptions that underpin gender accounts. The above questions and hypotheses make the substantiation of the masculine identity of democracy necessary, where there is lack of accessible and dependable data as well as statistics by gender, sanctioning an ignorance of the

6 Introduction history of women’s use of political rights. Thus in the original, Greek version of this study many references to data and an appendix comprising a quantitative history of the relation between women and political power since 1953 – when the first woman MP was elected – were included, substantiating the meagre presence of women in political decision-making.24 Despite the fact that the subject of this study is not restricted to “women and democracy”, since women are not treated here as just another potential pressure group, nor as a gender category taken for granted with concrete immutable attributes, it is, nevertheless, useful to underline the flagrant “under-representation” of women in the public sphere. Especially in cases in which the issue is less viewed as problematic and less documented, as in southern Europe. In Greece, where the lowest percentage of women in decision-making in the EU exists, the relationship between gender and democracy continues to be particularly problematic, in spite of recent changes, invoking important issues of social justice and rights, as well as of social consensus and political legitimation.25 The image yielded by data substantiating this reality and its interpretation leads to the pessimistic conclusion that the resolution of the problem is more complex than mere improved access to the public domain for certain select women. At the same time, the concept/notion of representation itself appears to be inappropriate or even misleading, when the gendered identity of subjects is a point of reference;26 the connotations of a view concerning women politicians as representatives of the social category women, can in many ways beat its own (long-term) purpose. Gender as a system of social relations determines (among other power relations) an asymmetrical and unequal access to decision-making and must be dealt with as such. Therefore, on the level of theory, what is initially necessary is a revision of the ontological foundation of established perceptions concerning the gendered social actors, subjects of democracy. Thus, this study leads towards the development of an argument regarding the concept of the gendered subject and towards the proposal of an alternative conceptualization of gender compatible with a genuinely universal character of citizenship. Finally the objective of this study is to reach a dual approach to its subject. On the one hand a political science approach, through which the deficit of women’s presence in political decision-making in many EU societies, at least fifty years after the attainment of full political rights for all EU citizens, is examined via the frames of policies promoted on an international level and gradually adopted by less gender-sensitized societies, with an emphasis on the theoretical and ideological connotations of these policies. On the other hand, which constitutes its main objective, this study attempts a theoretical investigation of the ontological foundation of democratic theory in reference to gender and the gendered subject. Stressing the need for extending democracy to all sectors of social life, so that democracy may also operate in the political sphere, it insists on the absolute incompatibility of democracy with a dichotomous gender order. Reference, considered as necessary for such a problematique, is made to central concepts, such as representation and participation, while an assessment of their relative significance is proposed, regarding the degree to which the deficiency in

Introduction 7 “representation” (i.e. women’s elite political participation) and/or women’s everyday political participation may be the basic expression of the problem of the women and democracy relationship. Usually this assessment is overlooked in the respective political discourses, in which the low “representation” of women, rather than the deficit in participation of the respective social category, is seen as the problem. Furthermore, a different elaboration of the concept of the (gendered) citizen and of citizenship is promoted as a dynamic point of intersection between the liberal tradition, which defines citizens as vessels of rights, and that of classical civic republicanism, which defines citizens as vessels of obligations.27 But also, one that refutes both gender “neutrality” and the incorporation of women as women in a vision of gender differentiated citizenship respecting the established gender dichotomy. The problematic relationship between gender and citizenship as a central concept of the theory of democracy makes imperative a new conceptualization of the latter, insofar as we accept, in agreement with Ch. Mouffe28 that the manner in which we define citizenship is closely linked to the kind of society and political community we strive to form. And the kind of policies and strategies we adopt in order to combat gender inequalities and enhance women’s citizenship by rendering it substantial, also have an important potential impact on the future. If we wish it to be radically different from the present in respect to gender, then the respective policies must be rethought, so that their inherent limits, defined by a priori assumptions on gender, may be erased. It is obvious from the foregoing that the two thrusts of this study differ from each other with regard to their level of abstraction and, therefore, with regard to the manner in which they are elaborated. I opted to include both in this study, considering it useful for substantiating my view/argument that no simple political intervention, no practical solution to a social issue which is far from simple and practical, is free of connotations with respect to the ways in which we perceive and legitimize, and in the end reproduce, central concepts/notions in our lives, such as democracy and gender. The relevant connotations provide substance and scope to any adopted, or aspired-for gender policy, defining in the end whether it is radical/subversive in the long run or just a modernization measure of the oppressive gender relations system, perpetuating in the end the present gender of democracy. However, only if the hypothesis concerning the inevitable advance of democracy as a result of general “progress”29 is perceived as unfounded and thus rejected (a hypothesis that is often latent in the “democratic deficit” discourse), may we effect the defining of those factors that function as necessary presuppositions for any substantial democratization of society. Because only thus may we possibly challenge what is usually taken for granted in theory, as well as the established ways of thinking and living our gendered existence, keeping in mind that the limits of the socially feasible are often broader than our imagination. Quite a number of the hypotheses formulated in this study have been inspired by postmodern accounts. However, I consider my approach as eclectic rather than as referring exclusively to the above theoretical view. On the one

8 Introduction hand, the plethora of postmodern approaches and their various points of reference deprive postmodernism of a generally accepted common corpus and allow multiple, even contradictory, meta-conceptions. As for the convergence between feminism and postmodernism there are certainly many different expressions of it, while it is noteworthy that traditional references, such as J. Lyotard, often receive severe criticism from feminist theorists who adopt postmodern approaches30. On the other hand, a certain strand in the postmodern critique actually consists essentially in the imperative demand for approaching as much as possible and for as many subjects as possible the unfulfilled promises of modernity and not in its rejection, which I find theoretically very appealing. In a sense, it is a demand for the completion of modernity aware of its own impossibility.31 And politically, freeing social subjects from all forms of oppression, exploitation and alienation cannot but form the most radical project, if we envision and conceptualize notions like universality, reason, progress and objectivity, as well as the subject itself, beyond the traditional legacy of the Enlightenment. In fact, what postmodern thinking attempts is to continue the profoundly modern project of thinking the unthought; only it abandons the idea that the unthought can be made entirely transparent.32 Therefore, the conceptualization of the term “postmodern” seems deeply ambiguous,33 especially with reference to the clarification of “post-”, which must not be perceived in a strict chronological sense.34 Moreover, since different levels of analysis necessitate different approaches, they thus necessitate reference to different theoretical discourses, rendering eclecticism particularly appropriate in an endeavour combining theoretical and political aims. And the selective reference to elements of postmodern analysis seems to me as very useful for (my own) feminist critique, insofar as indeed, a critical practice aware of its own parameters constitutes one of my objectives. In the framework of feminist theory, postmodern critique is especially productive for the fight against essentialist preconceptions that even to this day dominate within it, and for the acceptance of ambiguity and fluidity within subjective identities. Which does not mean that approaches considered to be postmodern are necessarily devoid of essentialism,35 while one could even argue that “in theory and in practice most feminists are both essentialists and constructivists”.36 However, feminist notions of the self, knowledge and truth are too much at odds with those of the Enlightenment, as J. Flax argues, to be able to fit between its boundaries, showing that feminist theory more appropriately belongs in the terrain of postmodern philosophy.37 Despite the critiques levelled against a stereotypical image of the relativism of postmodern thinking – which actually often tends towards an apolitical relativism – it may afford a penetrating critique of social reality through an emphasis on concepts that elsewhere are much less addressed as issues. However, especially with respect to “differences” an unelaborated/uncritical acceptance of any difference as a cultural expression equivalent to any other would actually constitute an expression of an apolitical relativism. For this reason the need for clarification of the context of difference is stressed in this study,38 which is none other than the respect for the principles of democracy and human existence;39 which indeed renders the

Introduction 9 “postmodern” critique that I attempt here into a demand for the “completion” of modernity, in the sense clarified above. That is, being aware of the impossibility of the endeavour, aware that there is no total and ultimate formula of life without ambiguity, risk, danger and error, as Z. Bauman so convincingly argues.40 A view of postmodernity in the sense of “modernity coming of age”: “the modern mind taking a long, attentive and sober look at itself, at its conditions and its past works, not fully liking what it sees and sensing the urge to change”.41 An approach which is rendered evident through the relevant critique of dichotomies that classify in a hierarchical manner, the resulting androcentrism of citizenship and the distortion of democracy with gender as a point of reference: the urge to change is indeed very pressing. As for the deconstruction of gender and the reformulation of the concept of the subject perceived as preconditions for the democratic co-existence of subjects, the theoretical necessity of which are invoked in this study42 as a typically postmodern tendency to be emancipated from “the characteristically modern urge to overcome ambivalence and promote the monosemic clarity of the sameness”,43 they accompany the awareness that it is “constructed”, yes, but definitely social “reality”, which is delimiting subjective experiences. Which means that while deconstruction can be used as a productive strategy of interpretation,44 we need resources from various theoretical strands to analyse social reality at different levels. And that policy measures must confront the issues of gender inequality and sexism as such, having in mind that if, indeed, “women” is not a unitary concept, it tends nevertheless to function as a unifying one, in spite of important differences in women’s lives, within the existing conditions of androcentrism. A sense of commonality can and does develop, which can be politically mobilizing.45 The way to canalize a political dynamics born out of identity politics towards a project that, in the long term, targets the feminist utopia of gender non-pertinence and of the celebration of differences within the context of democratic co-existence and subjective self-realization, while today it serves the solution of gender inequality problems, constitutes in my view the main theoretical and political issue of today’s gender politics. For that, using in concert different strands of theory appears to be particularly useful46 (albeit difficult and controversial)47 if one is interested in the political implications of one’s analysis, and wishes to render today’s actual political relevance of “women”, into tomorrow’s substantial social irrelevance of gender.

1

The correlation between democracy and gender

1.1 Democracy and gender today Depending on the questions formed by socio-political circumstance and formulated by critical social theory, the uneasy relationship between the theory and practice of democracy with gender may be explored in different ways. Judging from the literature of the 1970s and the 1980s, it seemed then not only an urgent need, but also a satisfactory goal, to underline the obvious lack or limited presence of women in all power structures and decision-making processes as socially problematic and theoretically inconsistent.1 In addition, investigation into the sexist distortion of political analysis was regarded as epistemologically interesting, especially since the limited political participation of women was as a rule dealt with, in mainstream political analysis, in a manner negatively charged against women,2 and aligned with the numerous stereotypes and projections on gender.3 Stereotypes that emerge from common sense assessments regarding the inevitability of women’s limited political participation given their social roles, and from the dominant political discourse in which the “political” is identified with men. Despite the fact that the above observations and respective findings have not become commonplace in mainstream political analysis, and even less so in everyday perceptions, investigating them has by now become a very unambitious, limited and even outdated research endeavour. Especially when path-breaking theoretical and philosophical critiques of women in western political thought, women’s citizenship and women’s inclusion-exclusion from politics have become, since the 1980s, a necessary point of reference for any investigation on women and politics.4 Substantiating the extent of women’s “under-representation” is of course useful and even necessary, since relevant verified data is sometimes, in specific contexts, remarkably scarce. But the problem is certainly no longer invisible, while more or less pertinent demands bring it back on the agenda on a regular basis. It is worth noting that thirty or forty years ago, recording and interpreting women’s limited presence in the public domain often still ran counter to the dominant perception of the above, considered as inherent and even “natural”. Nowadays the same efforts no longer aim at pinpointing and denouncing something that usually escapes attention, but rather at

Democracy and gender

11

confronting and remedying as a residue of the past, a problem viewed as practical in the form of a policy issue: the limited presence of women is seen as solvable through simple institutional changes, which can be obtained via the demands and intensive work of pressure groups. Following the above approach’s common promoting of the notion of representation as the prime point of reference for the critique of women’s small presence in political decision-making, and the response that it provoked, a new problematique on democracy has been put forward. It seems as if, when it became a common perception that not only women have gender, which expresses their “deficient” nature, but that all citizens have a gendered dimension, then an argument was formulated with regard to the way different genders are “represented”. In other words, shouldn’t women be represented as such, since their interests seem not taken care of in parliaments where a large majority is male? And how will this take place, and in what ways would the theoretical claim of the universality of citizenship not exclude in practice the participation of large social categories of citizens, including women?5 This line of reasoning, focused on the concept of representation, led theory to yet another set of questions in reference to gender: what does the demand for representation of a social category actually mean for the latter; what does the contemporary form of demand for group representation mean for democracy; and finally, who is, or can be, the represented subject, and what is this subject represented as?6 In the present situation, the contribution of feminist theory to the critical theory of democracy provides new, more radical theoretical approaches, which also constitute a response to new social problems arising, to a certain extent, from the collapse of the socialist regimes and all its consequences.7 New and complex theoretical issues8 emerge from the encounters of the theory of democracy with feminist theory, which bring to the fore some critical questions regarding the relationship between democracy and gender, questions centred around the definition of what exactly the issue is. What are we aiming at? If we were to accept that democracy is and should be “indifferent” to any particular characteristics of its citizens, if it is not sufficient for democracy to be defined by and limited to the institutionalization of participation and consensus, but it should also respect and guarantee the freedom and the differences through which citizens are constituted as subjects,9 then shouldn’t one of today’s basic democratic aims be the strengthening in fact of the stipulated indifference to specific gender positions? So that formal political equality would not coexist alongside the social inequality of gender? And yet, how could the latter come about when gender is a fundamental social organizing principle for institutionalizing hierarchies? And how can the above be challenged? A challenge that is necessary for the genuine disengagement of citizenship from gender. Or, contrary to what I have implied so far, can the problems inherent in the relationship between gender and democracy be solved by accepting the gender divide, which is based on a dichotomy between men and women, thus creating two separate universalities? A case in point is the one in France, where both political and theoretical support for the dual universality thesis is noted,10 through the

12 Democracy and gender demand for (and the legislation of) equal representation (parity).11 The same argument is also sometimes implied in the demand for the introduction of quotas, usually with less theoretical grounding, although there are notable differences between the two demands12 centred on the transitory character of quotas. The above two ways of dealing with the relation between democracy and gender obviously differ substantially with respect to how the notion of gender difference is perceived. But, first of all, they make it very clear that at present women as a social category are part of a debate from which they were historically excluded. And in particular, they participate in the above debate in the present state of affairs, when a critique of the theory and practice of democracy has become more imperative than ever, while at the same time democracy, in its liberal sense, seems to be emerging triumphant, perpetuating nevertheless the exclusion of the traditional and some newly introduced “pariahs”.13 Contemporary democracy, despite the differences in the exclusion and inclusion of women in citizenship in different national contexts,14 on the whole still refuses to establish the foundation of human community on a genuinely universal concept of the “human” in which multiplicity and polymorphism are inherently included.15 With respect to gender, this polymorphism and multiplicity necessitate a new perspective of the gendered subject, perceived beyond established dichotomies. All other visions of the gendered subject that inspire various equality policies in different gender contexts and women’s citizenship traditions, even in the most gender-equality-sensitive societies, have their limits and can go only so far, as the experience of highly developed (Nordic) welfare states shows. The theoretical discussions that have been carried on over the past few decades within the context of political theory concerning the compatibility of freedom with social equality, notions that are at the epicentre of what contemporary democracy stands for,16 and the discussions which “tormented” feminist theory regarding the relationship of equality with difference, can be seen as a very versatile gain in the theoretical and political treatment of the correlation of democracy and gender as a form of social inequality. Within the framework of the former,17 and in the aftermath of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice,18 which starts from the notion of justice as the fundamental principle for the constitutional organization of society, the principle of the fundamental equality of the subjects is redefined. This yields the principle of freedom and not, as usually characterizes liberal thinking, the other way around.19 Therefore, freedom is not only compatible with the enhancement of social equality, but it rather presupposes its existence, a line of reasoning developed subsequently by many theorists.20 Much in the same vein, C. Pateman,21 as far back as 1970, stressed that social equality is a prerequisite for democratic participation, which in turn contributes to the development and the safeguarding of social equality. On the level of politics and sectoral policies, John Rawls’ argumentation concerning the need for the focus of a theory of justice in a modern democracy to be on the means by which liberty and equality may be realized, made it possible for the institution of measures against socio-economic inequality to not be

Democracy and gender

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regarded as either socialist in their design or as concessions to militant social movements, but rather as direct references to the development of liberal traditions.22 This of course does not invalidate the existence of tension between the democratic logic of equality and the liberal logic of liberty.23 On the other hand, feminist scholarship following the road opened by C. Pateman in the treatment of gender and citizenship, attempts to establish a link between women’s social rights and democratic citizenship.24 The emphasis being on the issue of exclusion, the institutional and structural barriers for women’s access to citizenship, not only as status but also as social practice and as identity, became the main focal point.25 Despite the various critiques addressed to the thought of John Rawls from the perspective of feminist theory26 (and not only from that), his main conception of the original position – from which, and through a veil of ignorance regarding their subjective position,27 subjects choose the basic principles of justice that must govern social relations – legitimizes the view of compatibility between liberty and social equality, which is relevant to gender, through the connection of his argument with the social contract tradition.28 Furthermore, according to S.M. Okin,29 the fact that the notion of “original position” forces active political subjects to assume also the position of the underprivileged, may function as a way of accepting and appreciating multiple differences among subjects, and of expressing concern for others. In a more practical sense, regardless of the intentions of the author himself, the views of J. Rawls – which, next to a liberal conception of basic rights and liberties, permit inequalities insofar as they are to the advantage of the least well off – were interpreted in such a way as could legitimize interventionist policies on the part of liberal governments, aimed at fostering social and economic equality, something that has to be of interest to any debate on gender. Nevertheless, as Ch. Mouffe notes, political liberals like J. Rawls do not advocate pluralism because they consider diversity per se as valuable, but because they perceive as a fact of life the co-existence of people with different conceptions of the good.30 Pluralism is thus identified with the toleration of difference, in the above world-view, something which is certainly not adequate as far as gender is concerned. As a general comment, furthermore, it is noteworthy that the resurgence of normative political theory, which has been developing concurrently with the resurgence of feminism, continues to ascribe minor significance to the subjects of central interest to feminism,31 which by definition belong to its corpus.32 The exact significance of the demand for a just treatment, on behalf of gendered subjects as such (i.e., conceptualized as ontologically different), constitutes nevertheless a central theoretical question, to which feminist theory and practice steadily attempt to formulate responses.33 The long tradition of the struggle for equality on the part of women with the use of arguments invoking also their “difference”, evolved from the beginning of the 1970s into a discussion between views that dealt differently with the notion of gender difference. Despite the significant variations within the two basic schools of thought (with the discussion in France and the US epitomizing, in a sense, the divergence) the

14 Democracy and gender basic feminist theoretical disagreement of the second feminist wave generally revolved around the legitimacy of the appeal to the “difference” between men and women.34 The “equality feminists” dealt with any existing difference on the level of gender-specific behaviour as a result of the social inequality of men and women affecting all aspects of their lives. Therefore, they did not seek to politically appeal to the outcome of sexist social and political processes in order to legitimize any of their demands, thinking that accepting difference as a fact contributed, to a certain extent, to the legitimizing of inequality. On the contrary, the “difference feminists” appealed to women’s difference (by which they sometimes meant inherent superiority), seeking its positive acceptance, or in other cases promoted a consideration of the different but morally equivalent voice of men and women.35 In all cases, the differences between women and men were viewed by the latter as real and even as consisting in two substantial and different versions of the human.36 According to this view, the failure to stress the “difference” of women demotes women, since it accepts that the standard and thus the measure of comparison is always men. So, the assertion and positive reassessment of the “feminine” is, according to this view, considered imperative. On the other hand, the emphasis on difference is considered as based on stereotypical representations of women, according to the first view, resulting in an unintended re-affirmation and not in the abolition of hierarchical gender relations, through dealing with any differences as ahistorical. The political consequences of these two conceptions on the level of demands, alliances and overall strategy seem evident. However, it should be stressed that there is no simple one-to-one correspondence of these with progressive or conservative views, nor with a specific position on the left–right political divide, not even with the basic and “traditional” feminist divides. Liberal, socialist and even radical feminists37 (usually by definition supporters of women’s “difference”) never automatically recognized their place in one of the two opposing schools of thought, in a discussion unfortunately codified as “the equality or difference controversy”.38 A discussion which has led to an impasse.39 Today, within the framework of “difference feminism” thinking, “traditional” views about female difference, more or less linked to psychoanalytic theories of women as the “other”, can co-exist with left wing views in which demands are expressed in the name of women as an interest group, and gynocentric views, based on women’s superiority, espoused by radical feminists, as well as all possible combinations of the above. On the other hand, under the feminism of equality banner, one could find liberal views mainly stressing the need for equal rights (which does not mean that their bearers do not perceive gender as a dichotomy) in concert with poststructuralist or postmodern views. According to the latter, refusal to legitimize the dominant views on gender through relevant policies predominates, while equality is demanded not in spite of, but because of the many differences between the subjects. Although potentially positive, in view of the creation of (very heterogeneous) political alliances in favour of gender policies, this vague theoretical framework remains questionable as to the effectiveness of its contribution to the abolition of the root causes

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of women’s oppression.40 Especially since in the above context political alliances are often based on latent assumptions and predefined, non-discussed notions/concepts, in which gender itself is (par excellence) included. This is especially true in more traditional European societies which were reached by mere echoes of the intense theoretical discussions of past decades within feminism, and where small numbers of women/feminists felt concerned. And in particular in Greece, where the resurgence of feminism and an autonomous feminist movement, after the end of the dictatorship in 1974, coincides with the creation of large women’s organizations affiliated to political parties, something that has put an indelible mark on the specific movement, its links with the state and its tactics and strategy. All the above in a general European climate of institutionalization of feminism targeting legislation reforms and welfare provisions for gender equality, which goes along with the decline of an autonomous feminist movement. From a discussion on the significance of the differences between men and women, their conceptualization and the ways to confront them, the central theoretical contention in feminist theory evolved into a more complex and multi-referent debate, enhanced from the discussion on differences from within the women’s camp. It was mainly the outcome of critiques voiced by feminists belonging to minorities who felt that their experiences were not expressed by the theoretical discourse of feminists whose class, race and cultural references placed them in dominant social groups. Consequently, since the view of the variation of the “feminine” necessarily disputes the total, “uniform” divergence with men, this sanctions, in a sense, the predominance of the view that promotes equality on the basis of the common and multifarious human identity with no reference to the bipolarity of the men–women pattern. At the same time, on the political level, the rationale of quotas, and especially the whole debate in support of the increasingly popular idea of equal representation or participation in Europe (parity) refer to the argument of the feminism of difference, even if they are framed as equality demands. Thus it becomes critical to re-assess the two central concepts of the relevant theoretical discussion, which are also central to democracy, in order to clarify an apparent contradiction between the evolution of feminist theory and that of feminist politics. What kind of “equality” and what kind of “difference” are we talking about? Obviously, speaking of differences we do not wish to legitimize as acceptable all those that are constructed as the result of relations of subordination and should therefore be challenged and not accepted as admissible variations.41 How productive, then, is the positing of the issue in antithetical terms, implicit in an “equality or difference” disjunction? Is equality not necessary precisely because of the many and varied differences of the subjects? Differences that require conditions of equality in order to be formed freely and to be expressed as such. Consequently, the antithetical conjunction of equality and difference may denote that it is legitimate for the latter to lead to inequality. For this reason, according to J.W. Scott when they are paired dichotomously they structure an impossible choice.42 If we choose equality, it would be equivalent to saying that

16 Democracy and gender difference is antithetical to it, or if we promote difference it would be equivalent to saying that we accept equality as unfeasible. The author suggests a dual solution: “the unmasking of the power relationship constructed by posing equality as the antithesis of difference; and the refusal of its consequent dichotomous construction of political choices”. Because the notion of difference is neither obvious nor self-evident. What constitutes difference depends on what we “choose” each time to compare it with, while it is in this way, through juxtapositions, that power relations are structured. C. MacKinnon wittily notes that sex equality is “a contradiction in terms, something of an oxymoron”,43 since a built-in tension exists between the concept of equality, which refers to an equivalence, and that of sex, which pre-supposes difference. Thus, in order to be able to break the binary oppositions that form the substance of the equality-difference dilemma and “the straitjacket it imposes”, as R. Lister rightly proposes, we do indeed need to reconstruct “both equality and difference within the framework of diversity”.44 A diversity, though, that must go beyond the breaking of an essentialist perception of women by accepting women’s heterogeneity, which the above writer proposes, towards a more radical conceptual break, involving the binary opposition women-men itself.45 Therefore, couldn’t it be said that what is needed today is a theoretical view of the gendered subject, in which are challenged both the social inequality referring to/inherent in gender, and the cultural degradation of the feminine, as formed historically? In other words, shouldn’t the central scope with respect to gender be the coexistence of the universal with the particular,46 the latter being formed freely, under real conditions of respect for the (varied) human existence as such, while the former becomes particularized?47 And finally, should this aim not be one of the fundamental targets of the theory of democracy and, for that reason, of democracy itself? Especially since one of the main contradictions within democratic citizenship rests in the co-existence of the universal principal of equality of all with women’s difference, which hinders their “equal right to self-realization”.48 Because if the universal has been rightly criticized as confirming the perspectives of a dominant group, the different in a dichotomous order is trapped in a predefined, restrictive and inferior position. A. Phillips rightly notes that “feminism cannot afford to situate itself for difference and against universality, for the impulse that takes us beyond our immediate and specific difference is a vital necessity in any radical transformation”.49 The central contribution of feminist theory in the direction discussed above consists in the emphasis on the unsound character of the radical theoretical distinction between the private and the public sphere,50 implicit in classical and mainstream contemporary political theory, reinforced by and reinforcing the dichotomous gender order. At the same time, feminist and democratic theory should substantiate together the hypothesis that the striving for equal treatment of what is perceived as two preconstructed categories of gender, which are inherently hierarchical, is impossible in itself, and cannot serve as a measure of substantial equality of subjects, nor for the strengthening of democracy, since they categorize, restrict and internally homogenize subjects in an oppressive

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manner. What is forgotten is that men and women do not enter into power relations bearing preconstituted “different” gender identities. These are rather constructed as such by power relations, which shows that no substantial equality in the public sphere can exist entangled with power relations in the private. As for any eventual “differences” unmediated by power relations between women and men, J.S. Mill had already noted, in 1861,51 that nothing can be said about their respective natures since until now we have only seen them in an unequal relationship; “and no one can safely pronounce that if women’s nature were left to choose its direction as freely as men’s . . . there would be any material difference, or perhaps any difference at all, in the character and capacities which would unfold themselves”.52 Indeed, only if women and men could develop and interact as independent and equal rational subjects could one legitimately speak in terms of eventual sex/gender differences; a hypothesis however which seems paradoxical, since the terms/notions themselves, women-men, have a sense only within a dichotomous logic of power relations. What becomes thus politically imperative is a radical liberation from the same unequal social categories referring to gender, for which now (inherently contradictory and futile in the long run) attempts at equal treatment in the public sphere are being undertaken. This initially means rejecting and going beyond the logic of “women’s difference”.

1.2 Necessity for a new conceptualization of gender and expanding democracy For all marginalized groups and first and foremost for women, who constitute the largest one that intersects with all others, the issue today is how the principle of the universality of citizenship, respecting every particular subjectivity, will guarantee substantially equal access to it. How it will convert difference into a norm and not a deviance, that is, how citizenship will institutionally consolidate the multiplicity of identities as legitimate and as a matter of course. In all likelihood, the key is neither a new conceptualization of democracy, nor even a new relation of democracy to the (existing) gender system. This hypothesis stands in contrast to what is today promoted by a majority of women politicians and activists, that is, the acceptance of the dichotomy of gender evident through their demand for equal representation or participation (parity) and quotas. However, since we can hardly find a more radical and revolutionary demand than that inherent in democracy,53 what is needed may well be a new conceptualization of gender itself, through the challenging of the obvious, of that which comes forth as given and self-evident.54 This is clearly exceptionally difficult since gender continues to be one of the immutable points of reference for the formation of the subject’s identity and one of the most powerful factors differentiating their socialization, supporting the existing social structure. Equally difficult is to define policies that go in the above direction, that is, policies that substantially undermine the gender dichotomy, contrary to the usual framing of gender as a policy issue in European politics.

18 Democracy and gender In the social sciences and particularly in social anthropology, it is generally accepted that gender has a cultural content, which codifies a hierarchical social relation. Any reference to biological considerations is viewed as having a legitimating value for any latent or overt social hypothesis, to the degree that any biological interpretation has an ideological content.55 Nevertheless, references that actually question biologistic preconceptions related to the sex/gender dichotomy are fairly scarce, since as a rule, the sex/gender divide itself goes unchallenged and is perceived as self-evident and not as a contingent social practice with multiple and varied consequences. If we accept this, taking into consideration that gender is mainly one of the institutionalized social hierarchies, and if we target more equality in the everyday life of gendered subjects, then a more equitable future for all should be expected to entail a “genderless” future.56 And in a philosophical contemplation of reality, if the aim could be seen not as more equality per se for hierarchically constructed opposites, but as more “happiness” or well-being for as many people as possible (reminiscent in a way of the utilitarian maximization of pleasure school, but stripped of its various, usually justly criticized connotations, and its instrumental view of morality), or even for all, then the redefinition of the gendered aspect of subjectivity emerges as necessary. Because gender, in its established conceptualization, is restrictive and oppressive for all, despite the fact that as a system of relations it primarily hinders women. This obviously runs counter to a conceptualization of democracy as a system that grants the greatest possible freedom to the greatest possible number of citizens and which accepts and protects the greatest possible variation in subjective expression.57 Besides, the freedom of subjects to realize themselves is rightly considered as “the fundamental value which a system of social relations ought to serve”,58 something that is obviously in absolute contradiction with the logic of the existing gender system. The above argument should not be taken to imply that the exclusive oppression of women is not sufficient to be contradictory to democracy. What it wants to stress is that gender is a system of relations. Therefore, there is no “feminine” without a “masculine” and vice versa. Similar to any model of behaviour that refers to a hierarchy, and despite its appearance of naturalness, it is oppressive for all, in a way that not only does not promote democracy, but also distorts and in the end annuls it. The need to broaden and consolidate democracy in an ever-expanding number of social fields has been emerging recently with renewed vigour, accompanying the crisis of a vision of the Left and its politics. The concepts of freedom and equality, central to the theory of democracy, demonstrate that a conception restricting democracy (and its critique) to the political field is absolutely deficient, since democracy is thereby annulled in the very sphere where it is expected by definition to be dominant. The expansion of democracy is imperative in the social field in which the particularities and the differences of the subjects are fully expressed. Indeed, the demise of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War – which crumbled a perception of the world as a totality of powers active in two opposing camps, each of which

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identified its own aspirations with a vision of universal liberation – opened the road to the expression of a variety of “diversities”, or at least permitted their expression to gain impetus. Some of these “diversities’ had already been expressed in the past in a different context and still others made their appearance for the first time under the new conditions. What mainly became obvious however, was that strengthening democracy presupposes the admission that on the level of the subject, both the universal aspects and the particularities of all must be admitted as elements of their political identity, without the cultural expressions of the various identities being conceived in an essentialist quality, that is as given once and for all, and immutable. The aim and the challenge for the theory of democracy is thus how the universal and the particular may be articulated59 in such a way as not to oppress their bearers. This of course does not mean that the acceptance of difference as a democratic necessity can replace the demand for equality, since the argument concerning (the treatment of) differences refers only to a part of the social injustices endured by the subjects, and in particular underestimates class injustice. Very often in the discourse on tolerance and especially in a multiculturalist context and perspective, the demanded “tolerance of difference” equates with the tolerance of poverty.60 Besides, an inherent aim of democracy is the greatest possible social equality, while acceptance of variation and difference facilitates its implementation, at the same time as it forms and legitimizes a pluralist conception of citizenship. Within this framework, citizenship is conceptualized as the articulation point of the various positions and identities of the subject, which permits the formation of multiple alliances and construction of many different “us” aiming at the promotion of democracy.61 Thus if citizenship can be viewed in a liberal perception as one identity among others, it is of particular importance as it is the one identity that can mediate between all the others,62 while it refers to the collective and participatory engagement of citizens in the determination of the affairs of their community.63 The history of the concept of democracy makes the interest in its correlation with gender obvious, insofar as democracy traditionally referred exclusively to the bearers of one specific sex/gender. Indeed, being male was never among the various restrictions applicable to citizenship, unlike, of course, being female. Women were excluded from the political process as women, which defined them and attributed to them the special features which legitimized their exclusion.64 This observation demonstrates how naïve and deceptive can be theories that focus on “gender difference” as a self-evident pre-existing reality that poses a problem for democracy, but must be accepted as a point of reference for specific political measures. They are naïve and deceptive because they ignore the fact that gender difference is expressed and is specifically and by definition structured as a social hierarchy, facilitated by the (dichotomous) way it is conceptualized. A fact that shows the absolute incompatibility of “gender”, as we know it, with democracy. Therefore, the redefinition of gender emerges as a necessity from the perspective also of the correlation of the “gendered subject” with democracy. Still one has to wonder: is the above perception of the immutable reality

20 Democracy and gender of gender dichotomy finally always so naïve? Its political function shows that it defines not only what seems politically feasible, but also what is understood as desirable.65 The latter strongly reinforcing a reformist attitude that may also derive from contentment about the existing situation. The fact that women had acquired, by the mid-twentieth century, full political rights at least in the western world does not abrogate today’s interest in the correlation between democracy and gender. On the contrary it reinforces it for two reasons: on the one hand, women’s deficiency in democratic practice is manifest in both the quantitative and qualitative sense in the use of political rights, which of course is not solely attributable to the delay in their acquisition. On the other hand, it creates the need to investigate the significance for democracy (and for women) of the fact that a social category historically excluded from the public sphere due to its gender, finally acquired equal political rights as subjects/bearers of those very attributes that effected the exclusion. Consequently, one hypothesis to be explored refers to the possibility that the problems and the deficiencies of democratic practice related to gender (only partially entailing the perennial “under-representation” of women in political decisionmaking) may originate in the impossibility of women becoming equal members of democratic society as women. Thus, it is not a question of transforming and adapting democracy to the apparent “reality” of gender difference, but rather of how to radically do away with the existing system of gender relations which constitutes an obstacle also for democracy.66 This hypothesis can obviously have serious repercussions on the strategy and the medium- and long-term aims of feminism, but also can affect the daily practice of those women politicians and activists who intervene in the current political process, sincerely believing that they thus express, represent and, consequently, serve the social category to which they unavoidably refer to, namely women. Thus, the necessity for a new conceptualization of gender seems apparent in view of expanding democracy. However, reasons must be provided as to why the issue of the conceptualization of gender (and of the subsequent change in the conceptualization of the subject)67 emerges here with such persistence, as a condition for a re-negotiation of “gender” which aims at the augmentation of the compatibility of the gender relations system with democracy. It seems perhaps legitimate to ask to what extent the way in which the gendered subject is conceptualized is actually significant for social reality, and thus for policies that affect it. Whether, in other words, changes at the level of theory may really have substantial consequences for the reality of social relations and the functioning of the political system. The question is legitimate insofar as the (often naïve) criticisms levelled by certain radical feminists against what they derogatorily call “theoreticism”68 are frequent and very well known. On the other hand, it is evident that theory in social sciences has the ability to transform its own object, which cannot but have very important implications for the social world, since the fact that elements of theory are “being filtered into the world they analyse” has profound practical ramifications.69 Or, as N. Hirschmann and Ch. Di Stefano point out speaking of political concepts, they “are not simply the

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private domain of intellectuals . . . they play a vital role in the structuring of social relations”.70 While, obviously, the resolution of the “women’s issue” will not be achieved at the level of theory, it is certain that it will likewise never be achieved through activities promoted with no comprehensive, vision-targeted strategy and through partial measures implemented in a fragmentary manner with no theoretical elaboration and clarification regarding what the main issue and long-term target is, what the causes are that have brought about that which is perceived as a problem (but also why the latter is actually understood as such). If the present situation is not comprehended and analysed in detail, it will be impossible to form a constituted image of the way in which this could (and how we would want it to) evolve. Only following an integrated theoretical analysis will feminist politics be able to define its strategic objectives, to determine its tactics and perhaps to count its allies.71 On account of the foregoing, the way in which gender is understood and conceptualized, whether its relation to sex and the socially constructed character of both are clarified, is pivotal, which is perennially evident in women’s political action, but also something that runs through the entire history of feminist thought. The type of demands and the way in which these demands are each time pursued are also telling as to what is the dominant view of the claimants on gender, without, nevertheless, this view being an object of debate or negotiation. Something that makes communication between groups, who would otherwise be expected to function as allies, very difficult,72 while at times facilitating superficial and in the end unproductive collaboration between essentially divergent gender conceptions. A clear response to the question “what is at issue here?” regarding gender would be a necessary preliminary for any attempt at alliance politics. And in order for this politics to take shape, a necessary precondition is the clarification of the terms of the question. The “what’s the problem approach” suggested by C.L. Bacchi remains valuable since it clarifies the latent framing of issues which affect wider social perceptions as well as the outcome of policies.73 In-built issue representations always obstruct change if they are allowed to remain unquestioned and unchallenged. Furthermore, the androcentric perspective that contributes to the structuring of social reality inevitably exercises an influence on all, men and women. It influences, in other words, the way in which women themselves perceive their own roles, even their subversion,74 since critique cannot but always be situated. Consequently, what is needed is continuous struggle also at the level of theory, so that another perspective may emerge, along with a new prospect of change, founded on an other analysis of the existing reality. And the conditions under which the gender and democracy issue is on the agenda today are too crucial for both, to be dealt with in a well-disposed but conceptually ill-equipped manner.75

1.3 Gender as a form of social inequality and gendered citizens Social inequality has, of course, many faces and many facets, while its theoretical link with democracy becomes especially interesting insofar as it co-exists with

22 Democracy and gender political equality. It becomes even more interesting when linked with the classic argument of I. Berlin concerning positive and negative liberty,76 since it shows that it is not sufficient for legally established obstacles to be removed so that citizens may function as such.77 The actual capacity to pursue different choices is a core element of freedom. There is thus often a need for special measures, resulting from strong political will and long-term planning, even substantial changes in the social structure and its everyday functioning, in order to secure the conditions for the positive liberty of certain categories of citizens. Obviously, for women to really function as citizens, the abolition of the male prerogative as a constituent element of citizenship, in other words a release from their deprivation of political rights, is not a sufficient condition. Many other social conditions must be satisfied so that equality of rights may evolve into the possibility of freely chosen participation or non-participation in the political process. Because obviously the liberal (negative) definition of choice, as the right to act without interference, is not enough for women or any other social category in a position of inferiority. Such groups need a positive definition of choice, as the right to have good alternatives to choose from,78 in order to be able to fulfil their right of autonomy and self-development, and thus exercise in full their human agency.79 This can be seen in yet another conceptualization of positive liberty, which should be central in a contemporary democracy, according to C. Gould,80 and signifies the equality of subjects to develop their personalities in every possible way,81 that is, the equal access to the social and material resources necessary for the implementation of personal objectives. Gould also defines justice as equal positive liberty,82 which proves the difficulty in the application of the principle in question. It does however constitute a very fertile normative imperative towards the abolition of social inequalities and respect for differences in subjects. It would, nevertheless, be legitimate to wonder why one should isolate gender in analysis from all other relations that express inequality and thus create obstacles to the practice of democracy, since gender is not the sole nor of course the most generally accepted point of political reference as a form of inequality. Apart from the fact that gender intersects with all other inequality parameters, and beyond the obvious, which refers to the extent of the respective inequality differentiating gender from questions of minority oppression, a very concise response to this question should stress that the co-existence of political equality and social inequality is particularly problematic in its reference to gender. First of all because, contrary to social class and the inequality that it brings about which is theoretically potentially reversible (through upward social mobility) and since it can be confronted via social policy, sex/gender, as an element of the identity of the subject, cannot be invalidated in the current circumstances and actually/virtually remains unchanged (despite the fact that the perception of its social importance changes historically). Policies that confront expressions of gender inequality obviously do not eradicate sex/gender as an inherently hierarchical factor. Second, gender inequality and subordination are unique in that they affect subjects in all aspects of their lives, even the most per-

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sonal, such as that connected to sexuality. Furthermore, in contemporary critical theory, the perspective of gender is a particularly productive one, out of which (can) originate radical theories on citizenship and contemporary democracy that transcend the men–women split in their reference to the gendered subject and consequently target the point of departure of any critique of democracy. At the same time, feminism, as a critical theory of democracy, emerges today indeed as the “most important challenge” that must be dealt with and as the “most comprehensive critique”, as C. Pateman argues.83 As the same author stresses, more than two thousand years have not been sufficient to demonstrate the irreconcilable nature of the relation between women’s subordination and democracy. It is obvious that the contemporary problematique on gender demonstrates in the most succinct manner the insurmountable difficulties of implementing, in the existing frame, the mandates of contemporary democracy referring to the need to expand values such as freedom and equality to an ever-growing number of social fields and relations. Democratic rights, to be substantially considered as such, should “extend to the social relations through which preferences themselves are formed”,84 an area in which gender is of capital importance. Due to their specific gendered existence, women are in many ways a paradigmatic category that challenges the universality of citizenship which up to now, despite its radical normative content, has also functioned as a factor of social exclusion and inequality, as well as a framework for racism and xenophobia. Therefore in spite of its seemingly universal character, citizenship in its dominant conceptualization cannot be reconciled with difference and polymorphism in general, but also does not assume what is perceived as the bipolarity of gender. In other words, the gender-neutral character of citizenship conceals an inherent androcentrism, and this is why it did not undergo any substantial change after the acquisition of political rights by women. Both the historical exclusion of women from citizenship and their present day acceptance are permeated by the same preconceptions on gender, of its “nature” and its significance. Despite any differentiation in the discourse that has legitimized, and still does, this exclusion, the above preconceptions have always referred to an essentialist rationale in the determination of the attributes of women and men, with the accompanying degradation of the former and their subsequent marginalization.85 The image of the citizen who is considered able to bear arms and protect others has left indelible marks on the concept of citizenship (as well as on the structure of masculinity). Any confrontation of women with this dominant view, which is, be it latently, a constituent element of citizenship, even under present conditions86 demonstrates the measure of disenfranchisement and deficiency of women. The transition to a more substantial democracy, as an objective, inevitably involves the legitimization of an alternative conception and of another reality in the relations of gendered subjects. Attaining this political objective requires, on the one hand, consolidated knowledge of the actual social reality and, on the other, development of a critical theoretical discussion centred on the concept of the gendered subject itself, as well as on the citizen/subject of democracy it

24 Democracy and gender consists in. And while women’s struggles for political rights and legal equality initially, and then for “liberation” and gender equality,87 have certainly been part of the enlargement of democracy, contemporary conditions, marked by the significant post-war changes in traditional gender roles, constitute a challenge to feminists. A challenge in view of the making of a break with the established conception of the gendered subject, aiming at a radical modification of democracy. If democracy cannot be founded on an infeasible consensus of all, based on a reference to rationality, as sought after by J. Habermas,88 it should at least aim at an alternative, multiple conceptualization of the distinction between “us and them”, less inflexible and predefined, so that it may include the multiple reference, the inherent fluidity and the multifarious character of subjectivity.89 Only thus may the conditions for democracy be formed as applicable to all, potentially structured to reject only those “differences” that are conducive to relations of subordination.90 Because only thus may the image of the citizen/subject of democracy not refer automatically to those categorized as being of one specific sex/gender, and as a consequence, sole legitimate beneficiaries of the accompanying advantages. A democratic society will certainly be on the right path in dealing with inequality in general, when it is in the process of implementing substantial policies that fight against one of the most fundamental inequalities in the collective and the individual living conditions of the subjects. That is, policies that go beyond special rights and welfare provisions for specific categories of citizens, which of course are also necessary but not sufficient in terms of radical democratic changes, nor always positive in view of the ideological legitimation of the latter.

1.4 Gender and political decision-making: preconceptions and practices The ontological presumptions underpinning existing and sought-for gender policies are usually transparent to whoever wants to look for them, but rarely discussed between political actors. Especially measures for increasing women’s presence in political decision-making, which result in an important novelty in the history of political life – since politics has historically been the most explicitly masculine human practice91 – derive as a rule, from an essentialist view of the gender divide, a view that “spontaneously” frames gender policy. Taking as an example the Greek case, it would be interesting to see how some of the established gender preconceptions guide pro-women strategies. These, disguised as gender politics, form the basis of alliances, while they ultimately hinder the formulation and the implementation of an effective long-term policy against the root causes of gender discrimination. Gender preconceptions that are often inherent in the discourse that frames the demands of activists, as well as of women politicians in favour of “gender equality”,92 and even more so, in the discourse accompanying the implementation of gender policy measures related to what is perceived as the “women’s representation” or “women’s political participation” issue. The latter, viewed as an explicitly gendered topic

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in which it is by definition easier to launch a gender strategy applying a specific measure like quotas, is not seen here from a Europeanization vantage point. That is, as in the “new generation of studies”93 on policy change in Europe that would concentrate on the process of Greek adjustment to the EU in order to see how Greek policies implement EU recommendations and directives. It is mentioned mainly, in order to show a specific case which illustrates the potential pitfalls inherent in EU policy measures themselves. Pitfalls that derive from a priori assumptions or lack of conceptual clarity, a lack that can reinforce pre-existing dominant gender frames and the assumptive use of central concepts in national gender policy formulations, which set specific limits to the transformative possibilities of those policies. Greek women acquired full political rights in 1952, long after most of their European counterparts. Until 1985, they fitted the traditional electoral pattern leaning to the Right94 combined with minimal presence in all forms of institutionalized political participation.95 Likewise, their presence in political decisionmaking was negligible.96 It is not surprising that the absolute indifference on the part of the political system towards gender inequality and women’s social inferiority was dealt with by women, in the initial decades, through significantly low percentages of participation in the political process, something which constitutes a further expression of their social inferiority and exclusion. Recent percentages of women in the Greek Parliament and government continued to place Greece in the lowest positions among the EU countries. With an overall European average women’s presence in national parliaments at 22.5 per cent, Greece stands out with 8.7 per cent.97 The great distance between Greece and the Northern European countries in this respect (Sweden 44.3 per cent, Denmark 38.3 per cent, Finland 37 per cent and the Netherlands 34.7 per cent) may not come as a surprise. However, Greece seriously lags behind the percentage of women MPs in other countries of the European South, such as Spain 27.7 per cent, Portugal 20 per cent, and Italy 11.3 per cent. Using the percentage of women’s participation in government as point of reference, Greece has a percentage of 12.5 per cent compared to the overall European percentage of 24.7 per cent. However, in this case, Greece is ahead of Italy with 10.3 per cent and Portugal 9.8 per cent. Of course Sweden with 50 per cent women cabinet members, Denmark with 42 per cent, Finland 38.9 per cent and Germany 38.6 per cent are far ahead. All the above comparative data refer to 2001. The numerical presence of women in Greek elite politics has been steadily advancing since then due to the influence of EU directives and general climate, to which there is a strong political will to comply. This is also due to the intense work of activists and of the General Secretariat for Equality in all PASOK (socialist) governments: thus in the 2004 election, (interestingly) sanctioning the return to government of the Right, 39 women were elected MPs (13 per cent). This is by far the biggest percentage ever, while two women became members of the new government, and the first woman President of the Parliament was elected. A first that looks a lot like an alibi, by offering a recognition to the exceptional qualities of an exceptional

26 Democracy and gender woman (a university professor in the prestigious Athens Faculty of Law), while during the electoral campaign the basic terms of women’s insertion in politics were confirmed once more: what women can contribute to politics is their “difference”, that is, all the special characteristics that are socially attributed to them which are viewed as complementary to what men have to offer. Thus the latter do not have to feel threatened by them. Substantiating the inferior position of women in Greek or any society may obviously be effected in many ways. It may be done by reference to the structure and the functioning of the family and to the dominant type of interpersonal relations, to the difference in possession of wealth according to gender, to the gender divide in the positions in the labour market and the type of professions that supposedly “attract” women, to the dominant gender stereotypes in the mass media, and so on. But surely, the notably asymmetrical participation of women and men in all political, social and financial decision-making structures and all positions with power remains a clear indication of their social inferiority and marginalization, while it characterizes the specific type of women’s citizenship in Greece as one of the most traditional in the EU, where exclusions are much less subtle than elsewhere. The statement: “Greece: No data available” was until recently particularly frequent on the comparative tables of women’s presence in the decision-making structures of European countries.98 An indication of the relative indifference on the part of researchers and mainly of the National Statistics Service of Greece (ESYE) to become involved with gender, a parameter of the socio-political process considered to be of secondary importance, the above was at the same time the consequence of hesitation, prevalent until fairly recently, on the part of political organizations (political parties and political youth organizations) to provide information concerning the composition of their leadership apparatus. Nevertheless, the “under-representation” of women in political decision-making was and is regularly castigated by women politicians as a sign of a severe democratic deficit, while it is believed that what is needed is the institution of measures, in accordance with EU directives, recommendations and the general pro-gender equality climate, measures already tried in other European countries, such as quotas, in order to counterbalance this deficit. Feminists and other supporters of gender equality policies usually view this “under-representation” as proof of the long history of inferiority in the social position of women, which necessitates positive actions in order to be overcome. Obviously in a system with less unequal gender relations, the immense numeric difference in the gender composition of structures with power would no doubt tend to disappear, as was the case in the Scandinavian countries, where quotas have a long history. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that the socialization stereotypes in Greek society do not exclude strong female presence active in the private sphere or some informal part of the public,99 as a social category women are excluded from positions of power, and encounter stubborn resistance on their way to gaining such positions. Especially in sectors where power, and thus participation in decision-making structures, is accompanied by great prestige

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and clout.100 Such is the field of politics in the Greek political culture, something that adds special obstacles to women’s active citizenship and especially elite political participation. But the significance of reduced or even non-existent women’s participation in all kinds of decision-making structures, be it professional associations, trade unions or economic associations, must also not be underestimated. Linked to the limited presence of women in political elites, it appears as a structural feature of the Greek political culture,101 which expresses women’s inferior position in Greek society. This social reality is reflected in the minor position ascribed to women and to gender as topics of research, as well as to gender inequality in the Political Science bibliography of this country.102 Mainly due to EU funding, this situation has been rapidly changing during the last decade. While the General Secretariat for Equality has a central role and, in collaboration with activists and various NGOs, is the focal point for the promotion of gender policies in Greece,103 women’s obvious quantitative disadvantage in political decision-making does interest women politicians themselves. Their activities aimed at the mobilization of Greek public opinion in favour of the institution of measures for the increase of the presence of women in political decision-making, in accordance with the overall EU tendency, culminated in 1993 in the creation of an Inter-party Women Cooperation Committee. All political parties were represented, with the goal to increase the number of Greek women candidates in the 1994 European Parliamentary elections. But also, the tone was given, and the underlining assumptions of the gender policy sought after were made apparent. It appears that the immediate objective of the Committee was successfully implemented, since the Greek lists included 43 women out of 150 candidates (28.6 per cent), surpassing the overall European average.104 This Committee (without the participation of the Greek Communist Party, who regarded its task as completed after the election) sought to institute and expand its role as a representative of women who participate in the political decision-making process, but also more broadly in the areas of finance, of trade unions, and so on. The outcome of this effort was the founding of the Political Association of Women in June 1998 by forty women politicians from PASOK (socialist party then in power), New Democracy (Right), Synaspismos (Left Coalition) and POLAN (small party of the Right). Their goal was an increase in women’s participation in “democratic institutions and the centres of political decision-making”. The Association is usually mobilized ad hoc, especially prior to electoral campaigns. The immediate objective expressed in the inaugural proclamation of the Association centred on the prevention of “either of the two sexes” falling below one third participation in the lists in the next local government elections (autumn 1998). This was not implemented then, but, following the introduction of a bill by Minister V. Papandreou (who was one of the first two women Commissioners nominated in Brussels in 1989) and a legislative amendment ratified by the Greek Parliament in May 2001, it was stipulated that two thirds gender quotas would be applied to the upcoming local government elections on all lists. This interesting development, evidently influenced by

28 Democracy and gender European recommendations and by the general climate in favour of gender equality policies in the EU,105 resulted in small changes in the number of women councillors after the 2002 Greek local elections, but had important and not only positive repercussions on the ideological level. It is noteworthy that the percentage of women councillors approached 12 per cent while before quotas it amounted to 7.1 per cent. Quotas also, or mainly, exercised a positive effect in diminishing the number of local councils without any women councillors: they amounted to 327 out of 900 before the application of quotas and to 116 after. But since in a system of preferential vote and open lists 33 per cent of women candidates does not guarantee the percentage of those elected, the impression was given that women almost failed what was presented as an “equality of opportunity” policy: given the chance to be elected at 33 per cent they succeeded “only” at 12 per cent. “Who was to blame?” all those voices seemed to ask which before the election insisted that it would be impossible to find so many women candidates. Proven wrong, since women were included in the lists at the prescribed percentage (a list to be accepted by the courts had to respect quotas), these voices hypocritically wondered if women’s limited score was due to the “accused as male-centred” system, which in fact gave them an opportunity, or to women themselves. Women were made to appear as undeserving beneficiaries of preferential treatment that they could not even take proper advantage of. Obviously this logic is loaded with preconceptions about gender, depreciation of women and theoretical confusion about the liberal concept of “equality of opportunity”. Its ideological function is nevertheless disqualifying an equality measure by blaming the victims of inequality, and even in a sense legitimizing their political marginalization. Speaking of preconceptions, reference to the inter-party co-operation of women politicians aiming at an increase in the number of women in politics is useful in that it shows the assumptions tacit in the implementation of such a cooperation. This problematique serves as an introduction to the next chapter, since a discussion on how the solution to the problem of limited women’s political presence may become more effective, is treated here as legitimate and even necessary. By contrast, it is usually regarded as superfluous, since the solution is taken for granted to be of a practical order, referring to institutional changes permitting the imposition of larger numbers of women, and all the effort is directed towards the pressure necessary for their implementation. In the present approach however, the ways to a solution are considered highly conflictual, since the delimitation of the problem itself can be rigorously diversified and contradictory as to the prescribed measures for its solving: is the reduced presence of women on the political scene by itself the problem, as many women politicians seem readily to admit? So if more women are “imposed” the solution to the problem is given? Or, is it rather that the problem is attributable to the way in which gender is conceptualized and the consequent discriminations materialized in the expected marginal presence of the “subordinates” in power structures, resulting in the problematic relationship of democracy with the system of gender relations and not simply with women?

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As mentioned above, the numerical deficiency of women in the political process may be perceived in different ways. Obviously if we adopt a “what’s the problem approach”,106 we could pinpoint many diverging ways of framing what seems to be the problem with women’s minor presence in politics: is it an equality problem, related to the way (equal) legal rights function in an unequal society? Is it a democracy problem expressing what is usually framed as a democratic deficit? Is it a problem of social exclusion concerning a specific social category? Is a question of lack of equal opportunities? Is it a question of oppression of women as such? Discourse on measures targeting women’s small presence in political decision-making shows a variety of (often latent) diagnoses referring to the broader ideological reference of its bearers. If, furthermore, from a theoretical point of view it seems evident that the root of the problem rests in the absolute incompatibility of democracy with the existing system of gender relations, on a policy level it is legitimate to inquire into what should be done in order to confront the unequal distribution of political power according to gender. That is, how to define measures against a symptomatic expression of the above basic incompatibility and more specifically, measures that do not contradict, in the long run, their expressed objective. Also, and more importantly, to investigate what we wish to achieve, how far we want to go, a question linked to how we perceive the problem, and thus, expected to arouse the expression of diverging views. The underlining logic of how the problem is framed can be grouped in two broader categories. On the one hand, the problem may be seen strictly as one of limited women’s presence in the political arena due to the multiple roles that women must fulfil and the additional obstacles they have to face, that is the problem is framed as women’s problem with repercussions on other levels, and thus women must be “helped” to overcome it. A help that implies welfare provisions and small amendments to the boundaries of gender roles, plus the institutionalization of some kind of quotas. On the other hand, the problem may be understood as something more complex, involving the way in which gender is perceived and experienced, resulting in multifarious discrimination, one aspect of which is of course the political marginalization of women. Thus, it is indeed a problem of political exclusion, but women’s political exclusion is only a symptom of a wider problem, which has to be confronted. If we accept the way of viewing the problem as at least dual, with many internal variations in each group of views, it would be expected that women politicians would deal with what they call the “limited representation of women in political decisionmaking” in many different ways. This would normally result in debates, ideological confrontations and even political conflicts among women themselves (but not exclusively) with regard to the solution of the problem. Ideological contention and confrontation are obviously integral parts of the functioning of democratic processes, an expression of pluralism that allows the possibility of the formulation of a varied discourse. Besides, this variety through which the possibility of choice is offered is a precondition for democracy.107 As far as women’s demands in particular go, there has always been a wealth of

30 Democracy and gender perspectives regarding “women’s liberation”, the strategies this involves and the ways in which gender equality could be promoted. This should be true even more so today, when the fragmentation and the variety in women’s identities is more visible and accepted than ever, resulting in the feminist “us” coming across as more and more fragmented and vague.108 Consequently, diverging views and disagreement with respect to policies demanded or to be implemented against gender inequality are to be anticipated among women activists, feminists or not, and should not come as a surprise to anyone, and particularly not to women. Because, if internal differences and conflicts have “the potential capability of disrupting the collective effort of gender analysis”, as M. Hirsch and E. Fox Keller rightly observe,109 total lack of doubt, universalizing and unproblematized consent are not productive, nor do they form solid ground for effective work in gender politics. However, ideological differences and political conflict among women acting on gender issues are often perceived as strange and are frequently experienced traumatically by them. One could say that women have effectively internalized one more myth about gender, namely, that they are (or should be) all the same, and are thus expected to be inspired by common aspirations and adopt common practices, especially concerning their (perceived as common) gender interests. (The “bonds of womanhood” have effectively a double meaning110). Thus, although to be expected and absolutely legitimate, these political and ideological confrontations among women politicians, women with various ideological/party identities and women’s movement activists come as a surprise to all those who share an essentialist conception of gender.111 A conception that does not leave much space for any significant differentiation in the viewpoint of subjects,112 since, if all women were to be conceived as “the same in essence”, they would then espouse almost identical stances on the most crucial matters that concern them and therefore should agree. This is all the more true, in reference to one of the central elements of their ascribed identity, that is, what is thought of as women’s innate tendency to resolve all differences peaceably.113 Using the same rationale, the “inability” of women politicians to reach a mutual understanding and co-operate among themselves on the basis of their common gender identity, in local government114 for example or parliamentary politics, is negatively ascribed to their party alignment and the resulting party antagonisms, usually explained as linked to women’s efforts to be recognized within their own party, despite their common social (i.e. gender) position and resulting expected common objectives. This is generally seen as a shortcoming on the part of women politicians, a situation they should be combating. In other words, the possibility of inter-party co-operation among women politicians is not only considered positive, or potentially effective for the solution of specific problems, but is also strongly viewed as to be expected, almost as “natural”. The legitimizing quality of this collaboration being the commonality of gender identity, it is anticipated according to dominant social perceptions to function regardless of the individual ideological constitution of women politicians, their party identity or even their conception of gender and the social

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organization with respect to gender. It is interesting to note that, since gender identity is considered by definition as an assimilating and homogenizing factor, any relevant differentiation on the part of bearers of the same gender is almost inconceivable, since it is assumed that in its turn, gender homogenizes the theoretical conception concerning it. Attempts at establishing women’s inter-party political associations are imbued with this preconception of gender and the socio-political role of women elites with regard to women as a social category, something that is further endorsed by the framing of the problematic limited women’s presence in politics in terms of “representation”. While these remarks are inspired by specific examples from the Greek sociopolitical reality, the underlining assumptions they refer to are obviously not restricted to it. On the contrary, it is remarkable from the perspective of democracy how often, and in how different gender regimes, an apparent freedom is expected to be enjoyed by women representatives from their respective parties and electorate concerning women’s issues. A freedom which may mean that some members of parliament (“representing the people”) are legitimized to act unaccountably, since their party is not considered an adequate point of reference on the specific issue and also in the absence of alternative mechanisms of accountability,115 that is organizations expressing women’s interests within parliament. This expresses a profoundly anti-democratic conception of the role of the politician’s gender, which, obviously, refers exclusively to women. But of course, in reality the aforementioned prevalence of gender versus party accountability is not common practice, as relevant experiences in many countries demonstrate. Even in strong inter-party co-operation contexts, when there is a question of voting on specific legislature measures, women politicians follow party alignment,116 which limits the potential for effective intra-gender political collaboration. It also shows the necessity for finding alternative, political bases for collaboration. Still, one may wonder at today’s apparent co-existence of feminist theory as an area where intense differences and even conflicts are expressed, with an area of gender equality politics, where often the impression of consensus in favour of any kind of measure for the increase of women’s number in political decision-making, or that have a pro-women aspect, prevails among the interested parties (mainly women politicians). The latter, if not as a fact, at least as an expectation that still depoliticizes the issue. This critique could apply also to the demand itself, be it quotas or parity in electoral politics, since it expresses a view on “women’s interests” that supposedly should be promoted by women themselves, as if being a woman is an homogenous political stance (and also as if women’s interests always pre-exist, as homogenous, given and evident, ready to be represented)117. If, however, male-dominated assemblies can obviously be indifferent to “women’s issues”, the (feminine) gender of the politician, in a profoundly androcentric system, is no guarantee of her politics. Besides the fact that, by definition, not every seemingly pro-women measure following a gender equality logic is necessarily conducive in the long run to a more equal symbiosis of subjects regardless of gender, it must also be said that it is feminists, and not women as such, that would promote a political strategy for fighting gender inequality.

32 Democracy and gender With the above comments I do not wish to give the impression that I reject women’s elite political collaboration and related efforts. Quite the contrary. All collaboration strategies guided by clear and specific principles and explicit longterm targets, and orientated towards the implementation of specific objectives, obviously may contribute to the promotion of these objectives. Moreover, I believe that in the end the political “game” of contemporary feminism will be conducted through alliances, which will not of course be mere intra-gender cooperation of women activists. What I wish to question is the way the above collaboration, targeted at the promotion of women’s issues, is framed in reference to the preconceptions (even the post-theoretical basis) that guide it. Considering that the above gender preconceptions obstruct the rapprochement to the objective of equality for all regardless of gender, it is necessary in my view that they should be detected and come under the light of critique, in order that alliances and coalitions be formed on solid ground and inspired by clarified (and substantially subversive) targets. Nevertheless, I do not wish to underestimate the difficulties faced by women involved in mainstream political processes who are more or less inspired by feminist concerns, in their attempt to formulate a political platform for women. Women politicians of various ideological positions on the political spectrum, who have been working towards a world in which the “human” is no longer equivalent to the masculine, often at significant personal and political cost, since women’s issues are usually not considered advantageous to the furthering of a political career. The difficulties they confront arise mainly in the attempt to combine the formation of a political stance whose objective would be to contribute to the acceptance of the “feminine” and of women as absolutely equal participants in the socio-political process, with the conflicting social pressures on women to both be and not be women.118 However, expectations arising from an inter-party co-operation of women, when they are solely founded on the sharing of a common gender identity, contribute to the obliteration of women as politically active subjects; these expectations legitimize a conception of women’s identity that emerges as ahistorically consolidated and, consequently, as fundamental for the formation of coalitions and alliances, beyond any ideological and political differences. The latter are belittled in the face of the anticipation of women being of a mind on issues that concern their gendered existence, something that must preclude all kinds of internal factions. And this, even while women politicians from various political backgrounds, often with highly diverging social aspirations, are involved. An inter-party collaboration of women politicians based on the above seems to run counter to its own objectives, since it further reinforces the dominant essentialist conception of women and at the same time, as was noted above, de-politicizes the whole matter. Thus, the connotations of the practices they choose, in order to resolve the problem of women’s political marginalization and to contribute to the immediate end of the monopoly of political power by bearers of specific gender, must be critically reviewed, and their unacknowledged postulates clarified. Undeniably, it is understandable that women often wish to assert themselves

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as women, due to the continuing social inferiority to which they are ascribed in the specific system of gender relations. But what is not to be expected is that women always assess their social position in the same manner, attribute it to the same factors, or appeal to the same methods of resolving the problems. After all, subjects are immersed in other inequality regimes than gender, with which gender intersects. Nor should they be expected to share the same long-term objective with respect to the future gendered subjects of a future genderindifferent democracy. Thus, it is definitely to be expected and indeed positive for women to confront each other on the political level within the framework of common aims concerning the promotion of social equality and political inclusion of all, especially when an additional aim is the strengthening of democracy.119 But basically, what actually sanctions the seeming agreement on the matter of the resolution of the problem of women’s subordination is the on-going ambiguity in defining the nature of the problem. What exactly is at stake? How is the problem to be posited? What are the causal relations that govern it? What must be undertaken en route to its resolution? The experience of the formulation and implementation of gender policy in the Greek context shows that it is when acting within the sphere of the obvious, the self-evident, the undefined and also within the spirit of policies and directives originating in the EU – themselves burdened with unquestioned assumptions but perceived as expressing a feminist orthodoxy – that women politicians have the luxury to not disagree. Rallying around their gender, and regardless of their individual ideological and party identity, women politicians may more easily demand respect for their underestimated “difference”, rather than claim the redefinition of the notion of difference itself. Which is what usually happens in conjunction with their objective to render the “feminine” (which is readily regarded as “different”120 and, for that reason, uniform) to an equivalent to the “masculine”.121 Women politicians have no reason, in other words, to foster internal political debate, because as a pressure group that faces the additional difficulties which women in all party hierarchies aspiring to parliamentary careers have to confront, they view women’s limited parliamentary presence as a problem in itself. They thus promote the only solution that seems to provide an immediate answer to what emerges as the problem: is it the obstacles they encounter which result in the limited political presence of women? In that case, they opt for measures imposing an increase of their numbers. Without further elaboration of the meaning of this “gender policy” for women as social category, or on the kind of preconceptions this masks, and without inquiry into the possibility of applying an alternative, effective long-term policy that is beneficial for all, a substantial policy towards the disrupting of the existing gender order and for the strengthening of democracy. The latter would of course include multiple measures to promote women’s everyday political participation and not be restricted to elite level and certainly without conceptualizing the latter in terms of representation. Moreover, while acting as a pressure group and promoting their own absolutely legitimate interests, women politicians in Greek political culture seem to

34 Democracy and gender overlook the fact that, without internal political and ideological discussion and even conflict, they will not manage to contribute to a solution of the complex problem of women’s social and political marginalization, one aspect of which they experience and denounce themselves. They will also not be able to put forward the highly confrontational nature of any demand for substantial change in the relationship of democracy and gender. Because of course, a series of negotiations guided by an instrumental logic of pressure group politics, which tends to replace the inherently conflictual process of profound change within democracy, is not up to today’s expectations for radical social change and also has serious repercussions on the equality front. Only in a pluralist manner can women politicians demand the recognition of their inherent value as gendered subjects, with multiple and different identities, and not “merely” as equal to men. A demand to be expressed by them as subjects that happen to be women, but also for women, their reference to gender destined to undermine it and not to further legitimize the oppressive dichotomy as expressed today.122 Thus, at the same time, women politicians and activists would avoid slogans and practices that imply the acceptance of a common and uniform identity of a social category, the “liberation” of which is their goal, a goal, however, which is promoted by ways that contradict it, and may prove to be profoundly oppressive. Especially if mainly promoted within (political) structures that traditionally constitute central factors in the construction of women’s identity as inferior. Thus, pro-women activities and measures, representing a positive development in the treatment of specific groups of women, when they are under-theorized and not part of a comprehensive strategy in view of a coherent radical target, seem also, in the way that they are framed, to represent a risk in view of the attainment of an equality of subjects regardless of gender. An equality that seems to be the only one possible for gendered subjects as such, since any attempt towards the equality of what is conceptualized as by definition inherently unequal, has limited results. To summarize the above argument, it must be stressed that gender equality as a policy issue (like gender mainstreaming as a strategy) is not an easy task. They are highly conflictual and to be effective they necessitate prior discussion and clarifications of what gender equality is, how we perceive it and then how to approach it.123 Policy makers and lobbyists pressing for measures, especially at EU level, have an initial, often unacknowledged, task: to clarify what the problem they target really is. To do so they need to define how they perceive gender, something that is usually overlooked in the name of the obvious. A gender perspective is nevertheless not automatically evident, and it does not always coincide in a restrictive manner with a pro-women stance. This clarification is urgently needed since policy proposals have an in-built representation of the issue they target, and thus “constitute the problem they address”, as C.L. Bacchi underlines.124 However, the standard acceptance of gender dichotomy as an immutable fact of life is not the only possible, nor a radical, way of viewing gender. And if the above view permits, on the practical level, measures that have a positive effect on specific groups of women, its discoursive dimension limits the

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scope and effectiveness of changes. On the contrary, a non-dichotomous perception of gender has more far-reaching repercussions and may permit mainstreaming a gender perspective to put to the test its subversive and radical potential. Something that will not happen if the acceptance of an inherently unequal dichotomy attempts to form the basis for gender equality. Indeed, mainstreaming a gender perspective, when gender is perceived as a dichotomy, legitimizes the view of women’s “difference” and thus accepts men as the measure for the human, repositioning women as the “other”, albeit a somewhat better off “other”. Defining at the same time the terms of women’s social inclusion and “equality” in a restrictive manner, it does not do justice, in the long run, either to women or to democracy. Thus, instead of focusing all energy on pinpointing implementation problems, on debating mechanisms that may best facilitate women’s inclusion or on evaluating strategies for the increase of the number of women in politics, it may be better to investigate initially the ontological foundations of policies and proposals that target the genuine inclusion of all in contemporary democracy. For democracy to become more and more “democratic” we need to have in mind its normative ideal aspect, as well as the reality it represents today, and aim at becoming conceptually better equipped to address gender-related problems – not just well-disposed towards confronting the everyday problems and sectoral discrepancies of the reality of contemporary (androcentric) democracies.

2

Restricted women’s presence in political decision-making: theoretical issues and policies

The low number of women in the institutionalized political process is of course not a Greek peculiarity. On the contrary, comparative data suggest that the reduced presence of women in the structures of political decision-making has an international character.1 At the same time, they document the primary assertion of the feminist movement, namely the co-existence of legal equality between the sexes with the social subordination, marginalization and exploitation of women. An indication as well as an expression of the inferiority in their social position, this reduced presence is in tandem with the overall “underrepresentation” of women in all leadership groups, and is due to the multiple structural and ideological exclusions of women and the differentiated lifestyles according to gender, which are legitimated by the idea of the separation of the private and public spheres.2 The rejection of the traditional divide between the public and the private, as well as the well-known motto of the second feminist wave, “the personal is political”3 refer to this substantial contradiction in contemporary democracy, while they enrich the critique of social inequality with a dimension beyond the one generally accepted, that is class. This assertion affects the formation of a critical viewpoint with respect to the dominant conceptualization of citizenship and of the notions of universality and “neutrality” of basic concepts and values of western thought. It is very significant that the discourse on equality and rights, which refers to the legacy of the Enlightenment and which undoubtedly constituted the key stepping stone of feminist contestation, is now disapproved of as hypocritical and one-sided because it is androcentric. Obviously humanity is not venturing with a steady pace towards rationality and freedom for all, men and women alike. This critical feminist standpoint in combination with poststructuralist perspectives and psychoanalytical hypotheses contributed to the challenging of basic tenets of western thought,4 while the feminist along with other “new social movements” stressed with their action that social class is not the only factor of social inequality, nor the sole point of reference for a substantial social democratization. At the same time, under conditions of a crisis of politics (which largely refers to an ideological crisis and reflects the failure of the Left to inspire hope and to offer visible ways out5), these movements suggest alternative ways of social coexistence that involve all, men and women, in all their particularities. They thus

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widen the theoretical and political field in which it is possible to construct an authentically democratic and, for this reason, radical “we”.6 On the level of gender however, where exactly is situated the problem which is illustrated by the “under-representation” of women in political decisionmaking? And what solution to this specific problem serves democracy and the struggle against social inequality more substantially? The inquiry into these questions shall have to revolve around three axes: (a) whether the matter posited on the basis of data substantiating the limited presence of women in decision-making, political or otherwise, really is mainly a matter of reduced representation of a social category, as maintained by a large part of the feminist discourse and by the majority of women politicians in Europe. Or, is it first and foremost a matter of small numbers of women participating in a process that traditionally seems to minimally concern them as a social category with predemarcated roles, and which in a manifold sense (both structurally and ideologically) excludes them from any active involvement? (b) If we were to accept that the reduced presence of women in parliament, for example, constitutes in itself a problem for democracy, would this problem consist in the fact that the “female sex” (in what capacity?) is not sufficiently represented? And what percentage could be regarded as sufficient? Furthermore, is the whole matter really mainly quantitative? The relatively reduced women’s presence obviously demonstrates the existence of social subordination and marginalization of women. Does this mean that if the former were to be eliminated (for example, with the institutionalization of gender quotas or even “equal representation”, i.e. parity), women would necessarily cease to be in an inferior social position? And through what structures or processes would individual women in parliament represent the social category “women”? Would their physical presence be sufficient, which would legitimate the view that men MPs similarly represent men?7 (c) The relation between democracy and gender primarily demonstrates its problematic character with respect to the way in which the subjects, depending on their gender, are treated as citizens, but also with respect to how they themselves view citizenship itself. The reduced presence of women in decisionmaking illustrates in the most vivid of manners the contradiction between the subordination reserved for women and the universal equality of rights which involves “free and equal” citizens, in theory regardless of their sex/gender. It demonstrates, in other words, that that which is problematic is the relation of democracy to gender and the way in which gender is conceptualized and perceived, and not merely its relation to women. Therefore, it suggests the direction towards which the dominant conceptualization of citizenship should move, in order to include in reality all, men and women.

2.1 Under-representation or reduced participation? The reduced political participation of women as a social category, in comparison to that of men, documented also in manifold evidence from Greek reality8 is a central indication of the problematic relation between democracy and gender.

38 Women in political decision-making However this generalizing remark needs urgent qualification, because if it is true that women as a social category participate to a lesser extent than men in mainstream political processes, women’s pattern of political behaviour shows intense internal differentiation, much more intense than the respective men’s, and therefore entails more refined categorizations and more elaborate hypotheses for its investigation.9 This internal differentiation is even more accentuated in societies where gender lifestyles follow more rigidly divided gender roles, something which is strongly age-related. In spite of the above, we may accept as an introductory general remark the existence of reduced political participation of women as a social category compared to men. From this derives, in part, the so-called under-representation of women in political decision-making, something that reveals where the root of the problem is and what should be, by priority, confronted in the framework of a long-term strategy concerning the relation between women and democracy. But also for the augmentation of the legitimation of the political system. Not that women politicians do not face additional problems because of their gender. Of course they do, and obviously this is linked to their social status as women, expected to participate less and be less visible in politics. But the latter, that is the inferior social status that does not encourage participation, is infinitely more important and basic in social and sociological terms than the obstacles in (a few) women’s political careers. The pertinent problem is even more intense in Greece than in other European countries where political science is often under criticism regarding its reference to reduced women’s participation, a reference attributed to its failure to see where participation is primarily taking place – on a local level, in the neighbourhood, in demands referring to matters of the “private” sphere – thereby restricting itself to an excessively androcentric notion of the field of political action.10 In Greek society, with its sparse and underdeveloped network of organizations and thus its weak civil society linked to a feeble welfare state, one cannot claim that the same thing is true. In certain cases, it should be noted that one even has the impression that the opposite is true: in parliament, for example, in the April 2000 elections 31 women parliamentarians were elected (10.3 per cent)11, and in the new government five members out of 43 were women (11.6 per cent), that is, clearly a higher percentage than what the case was at the same period in local government. There, 14 out of 900 mayors were women (less than 1.6 per cent), while in local councils women formed 7.1 per cent. This percentage grew to 12 after the 2002 local elections with the application of gender quotas (1/3) in all lists, while the percentage of women MPs elected at the 2004 general elections grew to 13 per cent (39/300). The fact that in Greece more women seem to succeed in occupying positions as MPs than as local councillors (even with the institution of quotas in the latter) is something that seems to be indicative of certain aspects of this society that differentiate it from other European societies, but also something that urgently needs coping with in political terms. This “peculiarity” of the Greek political culture reinforces the hypothesis formulated here, namely, that due to the structural character of exclusion, the

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substantial political problem emerging through the reduced presence of women in political decision-making is primarily a problem of reduced political participation of this specific social category, connected to its general marginalization, and not a problem of its representation. If there were no question of women’s subordination also leading to their limited participatory “predisposition” and actual participation, no issue of under-representation would be in question either. More importantly specific women’s participation in political decisionmaking could not possibly be conceptualized in terms of (gender) representation. Consequently, all attempts at resolving the problem in question with measures for the augmentation of “representation” (in other words, by the imposition of a bigger presence of women in decision-making) do not view it as an important problem for society, democracy and the legitimation of the political system, but as an issue of lifting the extra difficulties faced by a few “select” women. Women who indeed do have to confront additional obstacles in the process of their upward mobility through the androcentric structures of the political parties.12 But women’s minority status among political representatives should not be (wrongly) conceptualized as women’s under-representation, because thus the main target can be blurred and the struggle for change sidetracked, losing its broader horizons. It should be repeated at this point that women’s political participation, as well as participation in the social sphere in general, has a profoundly educational character, since it socializes its agents towards the attainment of self-knowledge, responsibility and autonomy. It mainly helps the subjects moreover to acquire a sense of efficacy, to become more capable and more self-confident,13 something that increases their participatory predisposition. At the same time, participation presupposes that the subject possesses a sense of autonomy and self-worth, that is, s/he has an independent identity and the sense that s/he is worthy to participate in the political process14 – elements that are obviously not in harmony with the traditional model of socialization for feminine subjects, and even less so with the degradation that the “feminine” is invested with in dominant perceptions. This is something that makes many women share the sense of their being on the margin – since they lag in all the diverse sectors of life, in all the “spheres of justice” – not perceiving themselves as equal to other citizens, nor as full members of the community.15 Therefore, while women are manifestly not being prepared through their socialization for their involvement in participatory processes, and are indirectly discouraged through socialization messages which they receive as subjects placed in the position of the inferior within the system of gender relations, through non-participation they do not develop those qualities that would allow them to function substantially as citizens.16 Furthermore, it is obvious that by not participating one way or another and by not formulating demands, no social category has ever succeeded in securing even the most partial but substantial improvement of their status. The whole course of the women’s movement stands as a glaring testimony to the truth of this hypothesis. This vicious cycle of women’s political marginalization17 is not substantially confronted as a problem either by political action or by mainstream political

40 Women in political decision-making science, due to their commonly entrenched androcentrism.18 But also for an additional reason that becomes obvious when analysts and researchers “friendly” to non-sexist politics assert the reduced presence of women in political decision-making as problematic, concentrating on the issue of reduced “representation” and not on that of overall reduced participation of a social category. I will try below to demonstrate how an implicit restrictive view of participation, which characterizes mainstream political analysis, affects what is regarded (and why) as problematic in the relation between democracy and women within the framework of relevant dominant views. A multiplicity of factors affects the type and the level of citizens’ political participation, as empirical research has confirmed, and many hypotheses have been formulated with respect to the reasons why a higher social position entails elevated levels of participation.19 The determination of the level of political participation, which also in Greece is differentiated according to many parameters among which gender is obviously included,20 is intensely affected by circumstance and the specific life conditions of political actors, while we may be surprised by the extent of the appeal of a narrow conception about retributive benefits as a precondition for participation.21 What is of interest here is a characteristic contradiction in political science, which spills over into everyday views: while there is a wide consensus in political theory that participation is a value in itself, regarded as both a democratic virtue and an obligation of the citizens since it functions as a factor of legitimation of the political system, at the same time the view that it is neither possible nor even positive for all to participate is legitimated as acceptable. It is obvious that in such a case the point of reference is the participation of citizens from the perspective of the political system with regard to its consequences for democracy, while the aim is the avoidance of overloading the system with demands. The relevant views usually appear in political participation theories in the framework of empirical studies concentrating on the investigation of political culture, where one usually gathers the impression that there is confusion among the existing, the feasible and the ideal.22 From the point of view of the political system, what is frequently termed “political apathy” is regarded as a “necessity”, viewed as functional,23 or even as an indication of the degree of citizens’ satisfaction, since it is supposed that citizens do not intervene, satisfied as they are with the functioning of the system which they also facilitate by their non-participation.24 According to G. Almond and S. Verba, for example, whose pioneering study on political culture has exercised and still exercises a significant influence on all subsequent relevant research, in the ideal culture political activity and involvement are counterbalanced by an amount of passivity and refraining from participation.25 This political culture, which the two authors call civic culture and which they regard as appropriate for the preservation of a stable and efficient democracy, approaches in their view the relevant cultural formations of the United States and Great Britain and is attained through a balancing between participatory and passive roles on the part of the citizens.26 It is remarkable however, that the authors do not really inquire why there is the relation they observe and record between

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socio-professional or gender categories and participatory practices, nor what consequence this may have on the qualification of a political culture as democratic.27 These formulations, beyond the pragmatic description of the situation which they offer (obviously not everyone participates in the functioning of democracy, indeed, very few do participate, as shown by the relevant evidence), embark on an ideological legitimation of reduced citizen participation, which is not conceived as problematic, nor as a factor of instability, but in the end as functional for democracy. In other words, from a virtue and an obligation for citizens, political participation is transformed for the political system into a practice that must be confined and balanced by its opposite. And obviously, if the nonmassive participation of citizens is not considered as a problem for democracy, the specific women’s reduced participation will be considered even less so. Especially since the latter is usually regarded as the rule, with the diverging few who participate perceived as the exception.28 This is probably the reason why mainstream political science does not substantially treat as a problem the reduced participation of the social category women (something that was pointedly asserted by feminist critique in the 1970s and 1980s, but was ascribed to the general sexism evident also through political science’s non-involvement with women as objects of inquiry), while by contrast, political analysis increasingly refers to their reduced “representation” in political decision-making. A representation conceptualized in such a way as to appear a simpler issue, easily confronted by practical measures and obviously less subversive, were it to be resolved. Furthermore, it is interesting to note than in the case of political analysts who avoid speaking in terms of representation, there is very often a tendency to equate women’s presence in political decision-making, that is elite participation, with the general notion of women’s political participation. That is, there is a typical confusion emerging between, on the one hand, the participation of women as a social category in the broader political process, a participation which is potentially multiform and varied and, on the other hand, the presence (participation) of female personalities in political elites and political decisionmaking. It is obvious that the (restrictive) identification of the former with the latter constitutes a biased research attitude, to the degree that the latter is only a minor subset of the former, while the relevant equation, among other things, leads also to methodological errors. It is important to note that this reductive view of participation is often latent in feminist texts too, where conceptual clarity is of special importance due to its political repercussions. Obviously, women as a social category can and do participate in various ways and at various levels in politics. The fact that they participate less (or even much less) than men in general, is indeed an important issue, documenting their de facto exclusion from politics. But it must not be dealt with by equating the multiple political involvement of a social category (women) with specific women who participate at high levels in the mainstream political processes. The fact that few women (like few other social “inferiors”) are in positions of power is clearly to be expected

42 Women in political decision-making and is a sign of the social inferiority of the respective social category. If gender was not conceptualized and lived as a social hierarchy we would expect to find approximately equal numbers of women and men in political and other decision-making, as we would expect to find approximately equal numbers of women and men as party members, as persons declaring high political interest, as citizens seeking political information and so on. Which we do not. However, the various ways in which a social category is involved in politics are not restricted to the participation in decision-making of a few, it could even be said that this is a whole different matter. Equating women’s presence in decisionmaking with women’s political participation is a profoundly elitist view ideologically, and forms a very restrictive research endeavour. 29 On the level of policies, while what does not get problematized is particularly revealing as to the dominant perception of gender (and of politics), it is noteworthy that the “gender balance” in politics as a policy issue in Europe today, can easily lead to solutions that do not seem to emanate from a logic of “gender mainstreaming”, which is the one prevailing in the EU. In fact, explicitly gendered policy issues, that is policy issues where members of one sex/gender are easy to trace and target, contain a “benchmarking fallacy”.30 By facilitating the quantification of the issue they open the door for a problem analysis and solution in terms of numbers without tackling underlying structural problems, and without instituting important changes in the existing gender regimes as gender mainstreaming stipulates to be its target. Thus, when a gender policy issue can target only women, as in the framing of the problem resulting in the demand for quotas, the single focus on women is an indicator of the limited substantial results that the respective policy will have. If the limited women’s presence in political decision-making is simply one of too few women (but not of too many men), what is implied is that women have to be helped (quotas) and also take up their responsibility and act by going into politics and by voting for other women. Thus women as a social category do not have much to do in order to face the issue of their “under-representation”, just vote for women candidates, put at their disposal by measures voted in parliament. Women’s participation at all levels is thus by-passed once more in favour of women’s elite participation, usually in this case conceptualized in terms of representation, or equated in a reductive way, as was said before, with participation in general. It could also be maintained that there is an additional reason for the preference of both political science and everyday politics to consider the reduced presence of women in political decision-making as problematic, and not the reduced political participation of women as a social category: it refers to the dominant view of power and power relations inherent in the so-called pluralist perspective, which has been pointedly characterized by S. Lukes as a one-dimensional view of power.31 According to this view, the political decision-making processes are the source of determining which category has greater social power, therefore its supporters are consistent with it in promoting as a solution to the issue of women’s subordination their imposed presence in political decision-making, so

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that they may participate in the political game, thus claiming a share in power. That is, if the degree to which a subject (individual or collective) successfully negotiates solutions that promote the subject’s own interests is an indication of possession of power, then obviously the subject must primarily participate in the structures of political decision-making. However, a more elaborate conception of power32 allows the hypothesis that women do not lack power because they do not participate in decision-making, but rather that they are absent from decision-making because they do not possess power. Which does not mean however that were they to be present (imposed?) in political decision-making in bigger numbers, they would necessarily possess more power as a social category. Power which operates in such a way as to determine even their desires, while the definition of what is in their interest is neither obvious nor given once and for all. Therefore, it is obvious that the imposition of bigger women’s presence “from the top down” does not necessarily alter the system of power relations, and therefore is in no way a radical measure for the elimination of subordination in the respective social category. Furthermore, the (minimal) significance ascribed to the active involvement of citizens in the overall political process, contrary to the greater significance attributed to the presence in political decision-making, is indicative of the prevailing conception of democracy. Yet, the mass political participation of a specific category of citizens, with all it may denote (whenever and however it may be feasible), demonstrates the existence of a substantial and equal social integration, another sense of self-worth, other relations among the subjects as such, as well as other relations of the subjects as citizens with political structures.33 That is, another “quality” of democracy. This is the case, despite the fact that it is the kind of participation and the type of demands that qualify the involvement of the subjects in the political process and allow its characterization, either as legitimating/reinforcing, or, by contrast, as subversive of the existing condition. But, additionally, if women do not participate in the everyday social and political process as autonomous, independent and self-worthy members, how and in what capacity will they be “represented” in parliament, for example? What independent structures will express their supposed difference, what structures will process the specific demands of their social category and will promote those women who will express them? Unless of course it is acceptable that the mere anatomical constitution and the physical presence of a few female members of parliament are a sufficient precondition for the representation of women, in which case the issue is relegated to merely being a biological and quantitative one: if women members of parliament were more numerous, women as a social category would enjoy fuller and fairer representation. A profoundly simplistic view distorting the principles of democracy, indicative of traditional preconceptions about gender, which furthermore hardly reflects the reality concerning the role of the large majority of the “select” women who are presently members of parliament in many European countries. The case of Greece at least shows that most women parliamentarians have had or currently

44 Women in political decision-making have a minimal relation with the feminist movement, and in the case of those who subsequently did develop a feminist awareness, this has usually been limited to a general pro-women attitude and a specific concern for quotas in political decision-making. That is, for the promotion of demands that serve the special category in which they are inducted: that of politicians who (in androcentric terms) are characterized by evident disadvantages with regard to gender, resulting in their confronting multiple additional obstacles in the course of their upward mobility through the ranks of their own party, which as a pressure group, they reasonably endeavour to bypass. On the basis of the foregoing, we may justifiably suppose that however socially problematic and ethically inadmissible the evidently minority presence of the biggest social category of the electorate in parliament may be, the substantial relative social and political problem, from which the former results, consists in the reduced participation of women in the broader political process, something that expresses their social subordination and marginalization, and therefore this primarily constitutes a problem for democracy.34 Consequently, a critical reassessment must be effected as to the political consequences of a social organization that divides, both ideologically and in practice, the public and the private spheres in such a way as to result in the marginalization of any subjects it places in the latter. It is really striking that basic critical stances concerning the reduced presence of women in political decision-making do not connect it with the reduced participation in and the overall alienating relation of women to the political process, while they seem to be taken by surprise by the pertinent social injustice, seemingly ignoring that in power structures, where members of the dominant social categories participate par excellence, the socially subordinate do not participate proportionately. Something that applies to lower social strata, members of minority groups and of course women. S.M. Okin,35 referring to the United States, remarks that a mere walk through any American city may convince that the elected representatives of the people are hardly “representative” on the basis of all demographic parameters.36 Therefore, no “solution” focusing on one of the possible consequences of women’s social inferiority (i.e. their reduced presence in parliament), without confronting the direct cause from which it arises, forms a substantial contribution to the democratic functioning of society and the state,37 despite the fact that it stands to gain on the level of impressions. I imply of course the demand for quotas and that, which refers to the same logic (something that is not admitted by its supporters), for equal representation/participation, that is parity. It should be noted also, that an increase in the participation of women in parliament, for example, does not necessarily mean a greater share of power for women for one more reason: the experience of Scandinavian countries (where standards of living of women were undoubtedly improved through the benefits of the welfare state, while the significant increase in the participation of women in the political structures was encouraged) causes multiple and contradictory questions for certain researchers, who note that the “private” dependence of women was thus transformed into a “public” dependence.38 Also it seems that when the political presence of women

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increased significantly, the importance and the strength of parliament were reduced, in favour of other non-institutional structures of political power.39 At this point it is necessary to parenthetically clarify that in tandem with the intensely positive assessment of participation as a value and a necessary component of democracy, which obviously dominates in feminist political theory, there are also certain voices that express relative reservation with respect to particular kinds of participation and particular expressions of democracy. While it is generally accepted that specific expressions of direct democracy seem more easily approachable by women than mechanisms of representative democracy, certain criticisms note specific risks that result from forms of direct democracy and refer to the early experiences of their exponents from the operation of autonomous feminist groups, within the framework of which the pressure for consensual procedures had been such that it was frequently difficult for feminists “to agree to disagree”.40 Contrary to liberal forms of democracy, where disagreement and conflict are expected, participatory democracy and direct democracy procedures can function in such ways as to cover divergence under a consensual attitude which, linked with the ideology of sisterhood, could create “a tremendous pressure towards reaching a common consensus”,41 a pressure not always favourable to democracy and participation. Furthermore, as the experience of the feminist movement showed, participatory procedures could also create exclusions and inequalities among women. Other critiques are directed at forms of political participation which refer to aspects of representative democracy, and obviously express the reality that mass categories of women experience: these mainly involve, expectedly, the distortions in its functioning, but also, with respect to liberal democracy, the conceit with which the latter “claims to have met all legitimate democratic aspirations”.42 As for the participation of feminists in the mainstream political process, it was initially, until the early 80s, usually viewed by feminists themselves with a lot of distrust and suspicion towards the state and the political process, while its agents were often perceived in a derogatory way as liberal “feminists”.43 In fact the main feminist strategy was not then the participation in the political ‘‘game’’ of representative democracy, but rather self-organization and reference to civil society. However, the climate was not everywhere the same, with the Nordic countries showing more trust in the state as a potential ally in the feminist cause. The landscape has obviously greatly changed in all EU countries in the past decade, largely under the influence of EU gender policy. More and more women that identify themselves as feminists are implicated in mainstream politics at the national and EU level, giving rise to the whole discussion on “state feminism” and “femocrats”.44 Interestingly, V. Randall and G. Waylen, giving an overview of different national contexts, come to the conclusion that, in order for women’s inclusion in representative and executive political institutions to be effective, what is needed is a combination of an autonomous feminist movement with women’s weighty presence within state institutions.45 However, that which globally characterizes, more or less manifestly, the perception of political participation in the framework of feminist theory is the

46 Women in political decision-making refusal to accept one of its current conceptualizations, in the sense of an involvement in a process of selection between competing leadership groups. Subsequent to this refusal is the distinction between representative and participatory democracy that was conceptualized mainly in the 70s with references to the workplace and to the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe.46 At the same time, in the area of feminist theory are also evident ideas concerning participation that refer, more or less manifestly, to the tradition of civic republicanism with its stress on the idea of contribution to the community. These views are inspired by the thought of H. Arendt,47 as well as by more recent exponents of this current, such as Sh. Wolin, something that is especially interesting to the degree that, on the surface at least, feminist involvement with the everyday and the immediate is contrary to the emphasis on the qualitative leap, from the particular to the general, which takes place through involvement with the general good, according to these authors.48 Especially, regarding the thought of H. Arendt – as a theorist of the “political” of course and not as a theorist of gender – this has been acquiring even greater importance in recent years as a point of reference in the framework of feminist theory, mainly centring around its idea concerning the character of the political and the significance of political action as a condition of freedom.49 But also with reference to its inquiry of what it means for someone to be a pariah.50 The idea of freedom that generally characterizes the tradition of civic republicanism, in which the concept is identified with the absence of domination, could not but be of interest to women’s assertions, to the degree that in its framework it is stressed that nobody can be regarded as free if others possess and can exercise arbitrary power over him/her.51 If this conceptualization of freedom were the dominant one, it is certain that women, as much as all other oppressed categories to whom citizenship has been ascribed, would see radical changes in their social status.52 In order to summarize the way in which the notion, but also the practice, of political participation is viewed in the framework of feminist thought nowadays, one must stress the ambivalence which the fact that participation in the existing political system (may) necessarily mean(s) participation on its terms, causes to certain feminists. And this, in spite of the widespread implication of feminists in European politics. Although this is of course on a par with the historical demands of women aiming at attaining equal rights and access to institutions and professions hitherto closed to them,53 it seems that it is no longer sufficient. At least not for all women. In the current circumstances the issue cannot simply be access of more individual women to participatory processes and to structures of decision-making, leaving them more or less unchanged, but the participation of the social category “women” in changing those structures and processes that entail and presuppose multiple exclusions and mainly the exclusion of women. It seems, moreover, that the active involvement in the mainstream political process on its own terms contains for women, active in the women’s movement, the risk of shifting the aim from radical upheaval in the gender relations system (to the degree that this is the aim), in favour of the “settling” of a few more women, by virtue of the seemingly sound argument concerning the necessity of

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piecemeal changes/reforms and the balanced wielding of power. It seems that when the subversive feminist vision is entrapped in a logic of pressure group politics – especially in cases where there is no support from firm theoretical and strategic thinking in the absence of structures capable of elaborating on it – it is in danger of being lumbered with the respective demarcated protest/claim logic. A logic that ends up in affecting not only practice but also the feminist vision itself, which instead of directing action, seems to be directed and limited by it in the end, ceasing thus, of course, to constitute a radical and subversive vision.

2.2 The gender of the politician and the gender of politics Even if we were to accept that actually the reduced presence of women in political decision-making is by itself a problem for democracy, it is again doubtful whether the “solution” is situated in the imposition in it of more subjects of feminine gender, that is, under the sole condition that they be women. Because if the issue arising through “under-representation” is a matter of social justice, but also a problem for the substance of democracy, in other words, if it is a political problem, then the solution as well should be political in its substance. The imposition, however, of more women as such does not constitute a political solution to a political problem. Gender is not sufficient as a legitimating argument because the gender of the politician does not necessarily predetermine the gender of his/her politics.54 And while, certainly, the particular social position of women gives rise to fundamental issues of justice and creates substantial problems in the functioning of democracy, the fact that women’s subordination is not their ineluctable “destiny”, but rather the product of an institutionalized social hierarchy constituted by gender,55 presupposes that the resolution of the relevant issue necessitates much more than the acceptance of the gender dichotomy, which is denoted in the demand for a more balanced gender presence in political decision-making. The issue of gender quotas first appeared forth on the Greek political stage on the occasion of the 1989 elections, in the form of the claim already known in demands elsewhere in support of the establishment of a specific percentage of women’s presence in the structures of political decision-making through the party lists. Women from almost all political parties and all large women’s organizations56 promoted a percentage of participation of 35 per cent as a goal for party lists – that is, at least fifteen percentage points below the percentage of women in the total constituency – as a measure of positive discrimination in their favour. It is doubtful, however, whether this demand, which obviously aimed at fighting certain expressions of gender inequality, contributed to this goal in any substantial way in the 1989 context, while at the same time on the ideological level it could even be seen as functioning in a legitimating way in its favour;57 the way it was promoted and received by the political elite and wider public opinion could give the impression that the relevant demand mainly targeted the modernization of inequality. That is, by institutionalizing the reduced

48 Women in political decision-making presence of women on the political stage (35 per cent), inequality seemed further legitimated. In other words, one could wonder whether, in the end, the demand for 35 per cent women candidates just seemingly purges of androcentrism a political power in which a few more women will (be assisted in order to) participate after negotiation. The institution of gender quotas in electoral lists seen and demanded as preferential treatment58 for a social category that is lagging behind, failed to be legitimized as a measure of social justice, thus losing any subversive potential that it might have had. It was even seen by some of the intended beneficiaries of quotas as a way of turning a lower limit into a ceiling that should not be breached. The central question, however, that arises from the demand for the increase of the number of women in parliament through quotas, which of course remains unanswered, involves the logic by which women will participate as women. Gender obviously does not refer to a political position, while women do not constitute a uniform social category, either with respect to class origin or certainly to a political world-view.59 Thus, while one can legitimately doubt men’s ability to “represent” women, it is more difficult to affirm that more women will necessarily make women better represented.60 “More women in politics”, as a slogan that expresses a wish for less sexism in politics, implies in a sense “more feminists in politics”, which indeed would be politically effective, but to which it can in no way be equated. “No to quotas: We are no minority. No to quotas: We are not objects for bargain”, declared a Greek autonomous feminist group on 8 March 1989,61 while in a joint announcement three other groups of the autonomous feminist movement, who also opposed the logic of quotas in the same period, asserted that the above “de-politicizes the whole problem, ignores the fact that women – as much as men – are neither politically nor socially neutral”. And they went on to ask: “What kind of politics do women as women exercise?”62 A spontaneous critique of a politics of presence in favour of a politics of ideas,63 and a critique of the inherent essentialism of the demand. Maybe, also, one can read between the lines a theoretical quest for finding a way to pay attention to differences, and not to “gender difference” only, which further legitimates women’s position as the “other”, and leads towards an essentialist conception of identity. It seems indeed highly contradictory for women to seek equality and recognition of a gendered identity, which has been constructed through the very gender order that feminism seeks to challenge.64 Speaking of gender quotas it must of course be noted that “not all quotas are created equal”.65 Different types of quotas in relation to different electoral and nomination systems, the degree of centralization of the party organizations, the existence of closed versus open lists, all have an important impact on the outcome. Also, quotas can be set at different levels, they can be applied at different stages of the selection process, they can be implemented either by law or by internal party rules, they can be imposed by legislation, or be informal, that is adopted by individual parties.66 In general, throughout Europe the percentage of women in political decision-making has increased drastically since quotas

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were introduced.67 It seems that the higher the level of the specified quota, the closer the quota is applied to the final stages of election and the more binding the formal regulation, the more effective its impact.68 However, the above does not mean that a very high level of women in political decision-making may not be achieved without quotas, as in the case of Denmark (37.9 per cent).69 Thus, if candidate gender quotas have become an increasingly prominent solution to women’s low numbers in political decision-making, these quotas vary, both in the way that they are framed and in the degree to which they actually increase the number of women in elected bodies. It was mentioned before that in the Greek local elections of 2002 the percentage of women councillors elected reached 12 per cent, while there were 33 per cent women candidates. Obviously in an open party list with preferential vote, choice ultimately determines the outcome, while choice itself is dependent on how gender quotas are perceived. Even if 33 per cent of the candidates are women, nothing guarantees their election if voters systematically choose men over women. Furthermore, it has been shown that in almost all political systems, no matter what electoral system is applied, it is the political parties not the voters that constitute the real gatekeepers into elected office, the party nomination practices being of capital importance.70 But still with an open list, the voter feels “free” to choose, a choice framed as based on the merit of the elected, and in the case of women elected in smaller percentage than what was possible, this may have an ideological function of “blaming the victim”. Women were given the chance to be elected at one third of the total, an opportunity that they failed to take. That seems mainly to be the conclusion drawn by public opinion in accordance to the framing of the issue by the media as preferential treatment of a largely undeserving category. A social category from which, at least in smaller cities and rural areas, it was viewed as doubtful whether enough women could be found to supply the prescribed percentage. A framing facilitated by a kind of double talk on the part of the most prominent of quota supporters, who insisted in parliament that gender quotas were imperative for the functioning of democracy, downplaying the equality aspect, which they underlined when addressing a more pro-feminist audience. Not avoiding in both cases a framing connected to a view of preferential treatment for equalizing opportunities for two essentially different gender categories, that hold different values and for whom gender is a given immutable identity. Vasso Papandreou, a dynamic (woman) Minister of the Interior, who introduced the bill on quotas for municipal and regional elections stipulating a minimum one third presence of members of each sex on the lists, emphasized women’s lack of equal opportunities to participate with men in political decision-making as undemocratic, since democracy requires citizens with equal rights and opportunities. As a consequence, women’s lack of equal opportunities was presented as a problem for the quality of democracy. However the framing of the issue greatly varied, as was said before, depending on the occasion. Obviously conceptualizing quotas as a democracy issue could be a “strategic framing” to gain the greatest possible support, democracy being far more

50 Women in political decision-making attractive than gender equality to an audience such as the Greek Parliament. On other occasions however, the problem was mainly presented as an equality issue. For instance, the same Minister, Vasso Papandreou, who introduced quotas emphasizing the democracy argument in Parliament,71 stressed the equality argument at the Conference organized by the Union of Greek Women and the European Women’s Lobby on “Women in posts of responsibility”.72 This is only one example of divergence in the framing of gender quotas for local elections, which provoked little debate in parliament and was voted in in 2001. The striking facility with which the bill had been voted in can be attributed to the relatively small importance of local elections and the fact that quotas were not expected to (and did not) have much impact as they were applied to open lists. But also to the strongly pro European profile and modernization discourse of the main parties.73 Only the Communists abstained, insisting on unemployment policies as being the main issue. Thus the Greek debate on quotas did not challenge the traditional gender regime, but was limited to find a way to “help” more women get involved in political decision-making, within the setting of traditional gender roles and for the benefit of democracy. The existing difference in gender roles was even meant to justify women’s participation in politics, since “democracy needs all its citizens”, while traditional roles were presented in a way that legitimizes their essentialist perception. The argument that a balanced participation of women and men in decision-making will lead to the consideration of the interests and needs of the entire population cannot but award intrinsic interests and needs to specific gender categories, which are once more legitimized as given once and for all.74 Is this way of promoting gender quotas a Greek peculiarity? Is it mainly due to the more traditional character of the specific society and political culture compared to other European ones? On the basis of research data,75 it doesn’t seem so. Each time the framing of quotas accepts preconceptions about gender, gender roles and women, each time discourse permits the view of quotas as preferential treatment for the, somehow, undeserving quotas cannot but have just a “modernizing” impact on gender inequality. Especially in cases where quotas are promoted mainly because of international inspiration without mobilization among larger groups of women themselves,76 and serving primarily the need to comply with EU directives. When the above is furthermore linked to a view of gender representation, apart from legitimizing an essentialist perception of gender under a progressive cover, it also does a great disservice to democracy. And the discourse on quotas, more often than not, follows more or less blindly the above roads, either following a specific strategy that just wants to amend current social arrangements while complying with supranational obligations, or falling into the trap by using conceptual tools that undermine any subversive goal.77 The question concerning if and how it is possible to substantiate theoretically and politically a demand that relates to the representation of a gender category, comes back with greater clarity when the point of reference becomes the ori-

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ginal claim for equal representation/participation of women and men in parliament (parity), a claim whose promotion was effectuated in France78 (and Belgium), with special persistence and rallying (as well as success) and whose hum just begins to reach Greece. Undoubtedly, a significant problem of democracy is pinpointed through this demand. Locating a problem, however, does not always automatically yield a solution. Nor does establishing the empirical “under-representation” of a social category, in itself, add up to a normative imperative for their “equal” presence.79 Especially in this case, in which the relevant problem obviously involves women, but is also a problem of the entire political system and the substance of its democratic functioning, a problem emanating from the dominant system of gender relations80 (a basic, but nevertheless one of many systems of inequality with which it intersects). In the claim for equal gender representation (parity) the acceptance of the dominant conceptualization of the citizen is manifest, since the women–men dichotomy appears to be non-disputed and decisive for the quality of citizenship, and consequently the fact that there is a “gender of rights” is viewed in essence as legitimate.81 According to this view – in which the women–men dichotomy is taken for granted and considered as decisive/determining for human existence, resulting in regarding a historical contingency as inevitable – in the end what is legitimated is the logic inherent in the view: “biology is destiny”.82 On the level of political claims, the colourful way in which parité was demanded in France and Belgium for example, demonstrates the absolute and non-problematized acceptance of gender bipolarity. Thus, the successful motto “from the equality of rights to the right to equality” seems to imply merely the demand for parity, since as it is maintained, “humanity needs both wings to fly towards the future”.83 Hence, the demand for parity refers to an overt and permanent institutionalization of gender dichotomy which by definition legitimizes an essentialist perception of the gender divide.84 It is true that some of its promoters were cautious about such critiques insisting that in developing a republican understanding of citizenship, parité does not mean simply adding women, but “implies the recasting of the social pact which enables women to be representatives of the universal”.85 But clearly this is not the dominant way by which parity was claimed and theoretically supported, while though initially framed as an anti-discrimination policy, it lost completely its “positive discrimination aspect”, and was willingly differentiated from quotas. The dominant argument, the one that was massively promoted via the media in France, was centred on the issue of democratic completion through the integration of “sexual difference viewed as universal”.86 Thus, while parity is a 50 per cent quota, it is also much more. The difference in the philosophical implications of parity and of quotas, as they were initiated in the European North, linked to differences in the respective citizenship regimes, are obvious, since the latter targets women’s historical exclusion from politics via a transitory measure, while the former insists on gender difference and double universality necessitating permanent measures of gender representation. Yet, through “representation”, which is “never solely a means of voicing ‘authentic’ selves”, but rather of “perpetuating certain identities and

52 Women in political decision-making interests, while denying others”,87 being a woman is further legitimated as something that is politically pertinent. Which cannot but be detrimental to democracy. But even in fervently critical and at the same time especially elaborate approaches to the patriarchal character of contemporary citizenship, such as that of C. Pateman,88 the distinction between women and men is in the end accepted as given, resulting in the failure to attain the aim, which is the deconstruction of the distinction public–private and therefore, in the failure to form another conception of what it means to be a “citizen” and a politically active subject.89 Actually, the demand for equal representation/participation (parity) is the logical consequence at the level of politics of the philosophical view concerning dual universality, a view which, from C. Gould90 to C. Pateman,91 appeared as radical until at least the previous decade.92 B. Siim, is right in noting that demands “for parity can be interpreted as the fulfilment of Pateman’s vision about full and equal citizenship for women”.93 And she goes on to add, as an objection, that nevertheless, parity “may also contribute to the reconstruction of segregation between women and men in politics”. I would say that it definitely contributes to the perpetuation, the strengthening and legitimation of the latter, while any social division of the kind is unfortunate for a social order that wants to distance itself from naturalistic explanations/legitimations of inequality and to approach a more substantial democracy. Furthermore, the fact that the existing supposedly genderless universality was distorted in practice and resulted in multiple exclusions of women does not mean that women should seek special rights at the level of representation as a radical solution to the above problem. Special measures, in cases which do not really target special categories of the population in need of special treatment, often degrade/stigmatize them and (could even) legitimate in a sense their subordination. Because through the acceptance of the logic of special rights or measures for women in general (and not for pregnant women in the employment sector for example, or for anyone who takes care of young children), the view that only women possess gender is legitimated. Gender which they bear as a synonym of their disadvantaged state,94 since they globally “differ” from the norm of the human being, that is the masculine.95 Additionally, with the acceptance of the above logic, which requires women to deal with the state “as women”, is further legitimated a normative, restrictive view concerning women’s identity as a granted and unified one with specific pre-given characteristics. With these remarks I certainly do not wish to imply that affirmative action in support of women under particular circumstances is not useful for the specific women involved, or even morally imperative in certain sectors, as incidental and temporary measures of social justice that fight cases of gender inequality as part of a framework of a more general strategy for its elimination. The same can be said about gender quotas for the increase of women in decision-making as a measure against gender exclusion and discrimination. However, at this point is situated the qualitative difference between the logic of parity as equal representation, which involves the field of democracy, and the affirmative actions that refer to a

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logic of social policy or policies against discrimination.96 The latter, even when they are consolidated in positive discrimination in favour of specific women, obey (or may be inducted in) a logic of temporariness aimed at contributing to the overcoming of accumulated disadvantages of women that arise from their longstanding exclusion. In other words, they involve policies designed to function as measures of social justice intending to counterbalance prior social discrimination against women.97 When liberal “equality of opportunity” functions in practice as it does, it is reasonable that the state should intervene in such a way that the lack of equality in opportunities be counterbalanced in certain sectors (in the workplace, for example) with provisions for relevant equality in the outcome.98 It is, however, necessary to stress that the relevant measures should be perceived and be “promoted” as temporary, for the overcoming of specific, partial expressions of the inferior social status of women. They do not constitute a radical solution to the problem, which is not encapsulated either in the reduced presence of women in structures and institutions, or in the additional difficulties that women face with regard to the respective access and to their functioning in the public sphere in general, but in the social inferiority of their gender category. An inferiority which is multifarious and primarily based in fields where affirmative actions, even if they had a positive effect in the symbolic sense (something which they sometimes lack), would not be able to intervene. I imply here the private sphere and specifically the sphere of personal relations and the family, which with its structure and function left unchanged, will never permit women’s participation in the public sphere under equal terms with men, whatever interventions are effectuated in the latter.99 Furthermore, the basic assumption that underpins all such measures, that is the unquestioned acceptance of the gender dichotomy, constitutes an inherent obstacle to any radical changes that they are supposed to initiate, thus my insistence on the necessity of their promotion as temporary measures of social justice, within a comprehensive strategy for combating the root causes of gender inequality. In the area of politics specifically, the eventual affirmative actions (for example, the imposition of gender quotas in party bodies100) are a response to particular political obstacles to the access of women to political decisionmaking, obstacles that function informally, due to the generalized traditional androcentrism of nearly all political parties, regardless of their ideological affiliation. The manner in which party cadre politics is applied, the promotion and advancement policy, the roles that are frequently reserved for women in the operation of the party and in the meetings of the party bodies, as well as their placement in favourable or not election slots when such a matter is put forth, even the character itself of the electoral system in certain cases, are partial ways of obstructing women politicians from attaining political power.101 They also prevent more women entering the mainstream political process. These obstacles may really be countered in part by measures aimed at a more balanced gender presence wherever political decisions are made.102 But, of course, their positive effect is confined103 and does not involve fighting the inferior position of women as a social category, just one of its many consequences: the additional

54 Women in political decision-making political obstacles that certain women face with regard to their upward mobility through the structures of political decision-making, to which they do not aspire mainly as such (as women), but as political party cadres. In other words, while such affirmative actions individually help certain women (politicians), and for this reason are viewed as a positive development, at the same time they do not contribute to the elimination of the structural inferiority of women. This permits certain researchers to state that the relevant measures aim at the management of discrimination and injustice and not at their elimination.104 Furthermore, not only do they not tackle underlying structural problems, but also the ease with which such solutions can be quantified creates the illusion that it is mainly a quantitative problem; that gender policy is mainly a question of increasing the number of women in decision-making,105 which, based on specific underlying assumptions about gender, legitimizes the gender “difference” discourse that often facilitates a conceptualization of the issue in terms of representation, hence obstructing any subversive developments. It also obstructs the realization of the fact that what is needed are “representative policies”, in the sense of policies targeting important issues of gender inequality in all areas and not just representatives that reflect better the gender composition of the electorate. Or as J. Squires notes, “the key difference here is whether one looks at the composition of parliament to determine its representativeness, or whether one looks at the decisions made”.106 If, however, the substantial possession of citizenship cannot be conceived any longer as the privilege of the few, then its slightly greater diffusion will not be sufficient.107 And the difference in the nature of affirmative actions is significant, when they involve sectors such as employment and when they refer to structures and processes in which the concept of representation intervenes, a case in which the seeming service paid to democracy can eventually result in its abuse.108 Not that the bigger presence of women in political decision-making cannot be per se an important issue in the present circumstances, and the discussion on quotas cannot but touch upon why women’s presence in political decision-making is important. Obviously the problems of political exclusion cannot, by definition, be adequately confronted by a politics of ideas.109 The question, however, is if by dealing with exclusion through a mechanism like quotas, the constituent element of exclusion, “women’s identity” is further established as different, exclusionary, fixed and inferior. It is obviously correct to insist that it is a question of justice to see members of the group which forms half of the population to be at approximately the same proportion among the representatives. It is also logical to insist that where policies are legislated the various social experiences and needs must have a voice. It can seem equally legitimate to underline that those who are situated at opposite ends of the social hierarchy cannot represent each other.110 However, all the above apply to all relations of social inequality, not only gender, while they form a description of it. And while the fact that the above critiques are well founded shows that gender inequality exists, it does not mean, and we should not pretend that it does, that if it were otherwise, if numbers were miraculously to change, social inequality would have disappeared.

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In general, anyhow, “feminist” claims, or more often, women’s demands,111 based on an imponderable acceptance of the gender dichotomy as socially substantial and, consequently, on the appeal to a common and uniform identity of a social category the “liberation” of whom they aim at, may in the end prove to be profoundly oppressive in their connotations and counter to their own logic. Even more so, a policy “for women” which modernizes oppression while stating that it intends to serve them. The reference to women, as a given and preexisting subject of policies for the elimination of social discrimination and inequality, restricts the very cultural possibilities that feminism potentially expresses, and fixes in time certain characteristics of the subjects that it attempts to represent and “liberate”.112 What is needed, is the formation of a new conception of the gendered citizen, that is, a new perception of the gendered subject of democracy. Any measures in support of “equality” are substantial only inasmuch as the demand for equality to which they correspond is included expressly in a framework in which universality is conceptualized as a multiplicity and not as a dichotomy which is by definition hierarchical. Consequently, I would with much hesitation accept K. Nash’s view113 (shared by many others), according to which although “women” do not form a fixed category with given common characteristics, sometimes it may be necessary for feminist practice to accept the relevant myth, in order to enable the participation in socio-political processes of subjects for whom being women is a “lived identity”. By the same logic, this author arrives at the conclusion that in general the question must be “which essentialism to risk and for what ends, rather than how to avoid essentialism altogether”.114 Let it be noted that in any case this involves a tactical manoeuvre, which only if it is inducted in a total strategy of radical changes (something that as a rule is not the case), will not just be an element of modernization of oppression in favour of certain women who strive for individual access to androcentric processes. The practices of exclusion cannot be fought substantially on all fronts without respect for the universal character of rights as actually universal,115 nor through the legitimation of a normative perception of subjects, who on the basis of the logic of the self-evident, are defined as women.

2.3 Who represents, what is represented? The reasoning in support of the participation of women as such in the political process, besides the essentialist connotations with negative political consequences it entails, at the same time creates important theoretical problems as well. These refer to the metaphysical character of representation that arises, and involve the profile and the substance of representative democracy (since the reasoning for “equal representation” is in no way harmonized with its historical principles), as well as what is legitimate to be represented.116 In the framework of representative democracy the special characteristics of the citizens elected as representatives obviously do not and cannot constitute institutionalized criteria. In other words, what is represented overwhelms the subject who is to represent it.117 This does not imply that in reality ideas are independent of their bearers;

56 Women in political decision-making the contrary is in fact correct, as we know from theories of the formation of subjectivity. It is socially expected moreover, that members of the dominant social categories be over-represented in parliament. This constitutes an inherent problem for democracy, to be combated by a wide development of social rights for all kinds of socially constructed inferiorities. Consequently, by virtue of what logic will a social characteristic, such as gender, be isolated and itself constitute a criterion of representation? In this sense E. Varikas calls on the supporters of parity to clarify what kind of democracy they refer to:118 is it the existing democracy legitimated with the addition of women, or is it about the redefinition of democracy? If the latter is the case, for what reason will only women be represented as a group, according to the claim posed by the specific supporters of equal representation? Since the subjects belong to many groups and have many identities, is it not legitimate to ask by which criterion will one of these groups/identities be chosen?119 If we want other principles for democracy, is it legitimate to aim selectively for certain groupings of citizens and certain identities which are externally defined as such, and their respective representation, instead of demanding to trace the ways so that the revolutionary principles to which democracy refers to function in practice as well for all? But is this, or another view of group representation,120 compatible with the current theory of democracy? Has not the demand for exact correspondence of the composition of the population in parliament (“mirror” representation) been sufficiently countered?121 Can descriptive representation be considered an advance over representation as accountability,122 since as a rule women representatives have no prescribed way of being accountable to women as a social category? As for “fair representation”, it is not something that can be achieved by a decision nor can it be guaranteed in advance, since it depends on the continuing relationship between representatives and the represented, as A. Phillips notes. And she goes on to point out, correctly, that “anyone concerned about the exclusion of women’s voices or needs or interests would be ill-advised to shut up shop as soon as half those elected are women”.123 With regards to women as a social category, while it has been empirically substantiated (also in the framework of Greek political culture) that they possess gender-consciousness to a rather high degree,124 and while certainly the sense of common membership of a specific gender group is very widely spread, a sense that forms a precondition so that we may refer to women in terms of social group,125 these conditions are not sufficient for us to speak in terms of representation. The latter presupposes common political aims as well. The notion of representation itself denotes the existence of an already formed common aim, so that the representative may function as an intermediary, accountable to its assignors.126 Something that obviously does not exist with respect to the heterogeneous social category “women”, in the same way that there are no common interests of all women, no common political perspective and no common proposals for the resolution of problems.127 Additionally, representing someone means acting in her/his name, but more importantly being accountable to her/him for any actions I may do.128 To what instance/body could women “representatives” of women be accountable? Is the electoral

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process sufficient? Is it logical to accept that next to organized and institutionalized actors in the framework of democracy, such as political parties, certain women’s presence will exist, with no specific organization and no coordination, mainly referring to the above parties and who will nevertheless represent the gender category to which they belong? Does this not look like calling on women representatives to act unaccountably, to “do what they choose to do”?129 Even if women were to organize en masse, would there be a different criterion of representation depending on the gender of the voting assignors? With elected women accountable to women’s organizations or even specific all-women parties? Would the second constituent of representation, as distinguished by H. Pitkin,130 that is, the descriptive one which involves what the representative is in relation to the represented, regardless of what s/he is doing, be sufficient for women? Of course in the case of parity the dichotomous gender representation is exactly what is stipulated, following the logic of dual universality. In other words, whose “equal representation”? Whose parity? Women’s as inferior to those placed at the higher positions of the social hierarchy, that is men? Since as such the former will be “represented” if the gender dichotomy which is presupposed by the notion of gender representation is accepted/legitimated. Is it possible, moreover, to argue that women members of parliament elected within the framework of particular party platforms, that is, expressing mainly class considerations in political terms, represent women as a social category? How will the common interests of the latter be determined131 if women are elected through various party lists, referring to different class logics, but also in reference to women’s organizations? The view concerning automatic representation of the social category “women” by any woman politician (who in order to be consistent must aim at the legitimation of the view that men members of parliament too represent men as a social category), betrays its interconnections with the “progressive” half of a contradictory bipolar perception, within which women are perceived, either as passive recipients of policies, or as an obvious and given uniform social category132 that functions politically as a collective agent, which is indeed expected to be increasingly implicated in the political process.133 However “women” are neither the former nor the latter, while the notion of common interests is especially problematic. Problematic with respect to how common the interests of a massive heterogeneous category could be,134 beyond the most elementary135 and also with respect to the notion of the “real” interests of women which is inevitably implicit in the argument,136 and gives an evaluative aspect to the whole issue. Interests and needs are not pre-existing, ready to be claimed, they too are the social product of a power-based and unequal system, within which social groups perceive and express them. The fact that, in the present social organization, interests can be very obviously gendered, does not mean that the enormous diversity among women is annulled, nor that at the level of claims the (latent) view that all women share the same interests can inoffensively be legitimized,137 that is without the usual more or less unintentional consequences of essentializing gender.

58 Women in political decision-making Thus, it can be said that, though women form a minority among the representatives that does not mean, and should not be translated as if, women (social category) are under-represented because few individual women are in parliament. This view presupposes a vision of representation based on description, a vision which is very narrow and highly problematic. (I would not like to give easy examples, like whether a parliament with many M. Thatchers would make women more represented.) The representation discourse, vis-à-vis a discrimination issue, is risky. Women’s presence in any kind of decision-making bodies, any kind of structure with power, is small, as is the presence of any other social “inferior”: be it on class, ethnic, colour, religion, sexual preference or any similar terms. Furthermore, women, like all social inferiors, participate less in everyday politics, are party members in smaller numbers and so on, and find enormous obstacles (when they do participate) to their advancement in party hierarchies, which further hinders their presence in decision-making. All the above refer to their socially inferior status linked to (or deriving from) a perception of gender as a dichotomy of superior and inferior, of “different” kinds of individuals. However, one of the founding principles of contemporary democracy, the abstract citizen in whose name many “inferiors” have indeed suffered, who does not recognize nor can be defined by any social, religious, cultural or sexual characteristic, does not leave any space for the use of any criteria at all, other than political (and geographical) ones, in the selection of representatives. Else it would mean breaking with the rule of equality, which must prevail among citizens as the only radical principle of coexistence among subjects, different among them in many different ways, and which can exist (in theory) only so long as only “abstract individuals” are recognized. Of course it is not in favour of “abstract individuals” that I wish to argue here, but in favour of gendered but not dichotomous subjects, whose citizenship identity is not dependent on any particular characteristic. J. Mossuz-Lavau, presenting arguments for and against parity,138 indicates a potential counter-argument to the above, centred on the fact that “if it is accepted that only this abstract individual may legitimately be recognized, why is it a problem if elected bodies consist almost entirely of men? The representatives, whoever they are, and even if they are all men, supposedly speak on behalf of all those they represent (women and men).” The emphatic answer to the above is: because the existing gender composition of decision-making shows that there is a big problem. And it is its root causes that must be confronted, not just one of its (contingent) expressions. Not only is the latter not enough, but it could also function as a counter-measure legitimizing the same gender perception that has sustained the problematic gender order for centuries. In fact, one serious critique of the implementation of parity in France is aimed at its being transformed from a claim of positive discrimination for women in view of “true equality”, into a claim for the symbolic representation of gender difference in elected bodies.139 Because it was conceptualized in terms of representation, parity saw the conception of equality that it seemed initially to embody alter, becoming “an instrument hardly more ambitious than the traditional principal of formal equality”140 limited to the sphere of politics.

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Thus, women in parliament do not, could not and should not be legitimized as representing women. Some of them do possess a political vision that could aim for more gender equality. Others are interested in issues affecting women and could work towards the solution of specific problems that face specific categories of women. Others are interested in social issues, whose solution matters a lot to women. While not all women have an anti-sexist gender perspective, all the above are certainly very positive, as is the fact that women may represent141 various women’s interests and needs better than men. But that is all. Seeing a gender representation via specific female MPs, politically promoting this gender vision, is doing a disservice to long-term gender politics. And if fighting exclusion is a positive target for democracy and social justice, what must be promoted is ways that by contesting exclusion do not perpetuate the root causes of its existence. As for feminist demands and feminist scholarship, the least that they can do is avoid conceptualizing the need for a bigger women’s presence in political decision-making – be it with arguments referring to a logic of justice, experience, interests, democracy or any other – with reference to representation. The all-too-common allusion to the latter forms a self-inflicted blow to the eventual subversive potential of any policy that targets the rapports de force with reference to gender, in politics. It also shows the strength of dominant discourses, the importance of and the need for conceptual clarity, as well as the decisive role that the framing of a problem plays in its “solution”. On the basis of the foregoing it is legitimate to agree that obviously the image of a parliament in which the approximately equal number of women and men could constitute a reflection of positive social developments, that it could have a positive socialization function for the coming generations and at the same time it would be very likely that more measures for women would be instituted because of this composition.142 However, the fragmented promotion of such a demand as a political goal is in no way a radical target, while its presentation as a demand referring to issues of representation is highly unfortunate. It is not a radical demand, because the conditions are now mature (at least in societies in which formal equality is guaranteed), to overcome the usual limits, so that feminist demands may pose as political the question of how the significance of the gender of subjects will be recognized (since “genderless” historically referred to men), so that policies may facilitate the expression of various forms of the gendered. That is, policies that are not trapped once again in essentialist and, for that reason, oppressive framings of the issue that obstruct gender’s being rendered irrelevant to citizenship. Also, policies that do not challenge democratic principles,143 whose realization for all, women and men, is now a timely, even imperative prospect and possibly the only substantial revolutionary collective vision. Consequently, while I do not wish with the foregoing reasoning to thoughtlessly reject the position of liberal feminism concerning the significance of women participating in established, obviously androcentric, political structures and processes as a means for the elimination of women’s exclusion, nor the simultaneous claim of measures for a more mass presence of women in

60 Women in political decision-making decision-making as a measure of equality, nor of course to regress to the isolation of feminist action which the radical feminists urged in the United States and many Western European countries in previous decades,144 I think that it is necessary to make two remarks. On the one hand, it must be made clear that partial policies “for women” may be simple reforms that modernize subordination and thus legitimate it further, given that indeed, historically, and despite the differentiations noted depending on time and place, the state tends in general to reinforce women’s public subordination.145 On the other hand, they may be really positioned towards the direction of overturning the dominant gender relations system, depending on the manner in which they are incorporated in a more general strategy that aims at the formation of a more just, equal and democratic society.146 That is, a society in which the gendered does not refer to dichotomy and hierarchy, permitting thus a genuine disengagement of citizenship from gender. Hence, affirmative actions, if they are viewed as provisional partial measures of social justice in the framework of a radical strategy for the elimination of discriminations on the basis of sex/gender, in which case they will become obsolete,147 can have an entirely different ideological function than they would if they were an object of demand promoted and perceived as if they were an end in itself, viewed as a result of a series of women’s achievements, a series of small victories with which women must be content, since this is what they claimed. In this sense, while the fact is certainly positive that increasingly more measures for women are demanded and instituted by international bodies and organizations (such as the committees of the Council of Europe, special committees of the European Parliament and the European Commission, such as the “Women in Decision-Making” Network, international UN conferences for women, etc.), they are not sufficient as steps towards the contemporary radical vision/claim for liberation from the bounds of gender.148 Thus, as a demand on behalf of feminists, such measures would constitute an expression of visions with limited range, since, of course, they do not, by definition, target the overthrow of the gender relations system, but its modernization. This is made evident through a conception of inescapable gender dichotomy, implied in the discourse which accompanies them. One has indeed the impression that frequently, as mentioned above,149 the entanglement in a pressure group logic, especially at EU level, on the part of women’s organizations and activists, makes this particular logic an integral part not only of their practice, but also of their vision itself. The latter, instead of directing their action, is in the end directed by it, reinforced by the usual, unelaborated acceptance of values such as “equality”, whose (profoundly radical) content is not defined considered to be self-evident, even sometimes equated to the “equality of opportunity”, which surely affects the policies promoted for its implementation. The fact is that usually demands for gender measures follow a reasoning that seems limited and aimed at a concession, or at least are represented as such. Indeed, when such a claim originates from women politicians or from women’s organizations and involves a measure of positive discrimination in political structures and processes, it is also accompanied by the failure to understand the

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lukewarm support by (certain) feminists. This is the case, mainly because the former espouse (more or less implicitly) a liberal view concerning the capability of the state to function as a neutral intermediary between conflicting interests and social groups, while the latter express by definition an ambivalent stance visà-vis the capability of the (inherently patriarchal) state to promote the radical long-term “interests” of women. Of which the primary is the deconstruction of the gender dichotomy itself. It is indeed legitimate to wonder about the feasibility of substantially challenging the subordination of a social category through the political process, when this subordination is ingrained into the existing political system. Can the institutionalization of the reference to “women” as an obvious, given social category with stable characteristics, function without contributing to the further legitimation and in the end reification of the existing system of gender relations?150 The communication problems that arise at this point between feminists and politicians (usually women) with a prowomen stance or women’s organizations with feminist tendencies refer mainly to the different perceptions of gender and of “gender difference”,151 that characterize these two types of political actors, as well as to the difficulty that frequently exists in the transformation of subversive feminist visions into political calls for action.152 Communication problems that can have significant consequences for eventual political co-operation on specific targets and on the prospect of alliance politics,153 which will not be able to become practice unless it is initially clarified, and by all parties involved, what the central long-term political aim is: is it the imposition of more women in political structures, that is, what is viewed as more balanced sharing of political (and other) power between genders? Or is it more generally the formation of another kind of society, a more just, equal and democratic society? This clarification is necessary, because the satisfaction of the first aim through the institutionalization of measures “from the top down”, though forming a solution to obstacles that certain women face, does not automatically and necessarily lead in the direction of the satisfaction of the latter, which, as has already been said, it may even counter. Furthermore, more women in politics (and not just in decision-making) necessitates other measures which will combat inequalities in the private sphere, measures that will free women, both in practice and psychologically, to pursue other interests. No initiative contained in the sphere of politics, no matter how “radical”, can be a substantial step towards achieving gender equality, as the application of parity has shown to some of its supporters.154 Parity is undeniably a very important moment in the history of gender relations. But both as a conception based on the view of dual universality and as a practice legitimizing gender dichotomy, it will be by definition unable to have a subversive impact on the existing gender order. It is necessary to stress, also, that in the course of any claims “democracy” must in any case be guarded with its constituent principles unprejudiced, and furthermore, must be promoted with specific measures for the implementation of these principles in practice. Obviously, it is not enough to underline the fact that “a non-ideal democracy is better than the existing non-ideal

62 Women in political decision-making alternatives”,155 even in relation to gender. In practice also, gender must not constitute a point of political discrimination in citizenship, nor certainly should it be regarded as a legitimate part of the political game in the democratic process. Hence, it should not be imposed as an institutionally established parameter of democracy, thus abusing it even more, or at least in a different way, and indeed in the name of equality. If undoubtedly the former is facilitated by means of social policy measures, what remains essentially unanswered is the question of how the citizens’ gender will be eliminated as a parameter of power and oppression. In other words, how the multiple identities of the subjects, among which gender is included, will be accepted as compatible with citizenship, without privileging in practice any one of these as the dominant (as is the case with gender), nor will any one be viewed as granted, evident in its constituent elements and immutable, resulting in its functioning as a normative imperative. A response to these questions may be possibly given through another conceptualization of citizenship that ventures beyond the legacy of the Enlightenment, as this is as a rule implemented in practice (through the “mistreatment” of the notion of universality), or better yet, through a conceptualization of citizenship, which will be expressed as a demand for the “completion” of modernity,156 beyond the existing distinction of particular/universal, public/private. Something to that effect, which presupposes a redefinition of “gender” and consequently of the “gendered subject”, could possibly take place only within the framework of feminist utopian thinking, which allows one to discern at their inception some (revolutionary) future developments in the present state of gender relations. On the basis of the foregoing hypothesis, and given the absolute rejection of the reasoning that promotes quotas or the demand for gender parity in decision-making with reference to the theory of representation, how could the relevant demands be confronted politically today?157 It must be noted, initially, that it is undeniable that EU policies play in the European South a major role in the implementation of various gender equality measures, while in the specific area of political decision-making, quotas made possible by EU initiatives have the potential (depending on electoral systems and type of list) to contribute to the lessening of gender asymmetry. However, bringing more women or even in equal numbers to men into (specific areas of) the public sphere is no guarantee of the substantial transformation of the existing gender relations system. Especially since, as we have seen, the way positive action measures concerning women in decision-making are usually framed158 functions, on the ideological level, in contradiction to what their aspired long-term goal should be, often leaving unchallenged the male-centredness of politics. Once the dilemma inside or outside the state seems to have been solved in favour of the former, it is imperative for feminists to find ways of relating to the state and the whole political system as a part of it, but without being absorbed by their logic. Because women’s exclusion from politics is not just a contingent element of their history to be remedied by their “inclusion”. Evidently, the kind of policies and strategies adopted in order to combat gender inequalities and enhance women’s

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citizenship by rendering it substantial also have an important potential impact on the future. If we wish it to be radically different from the present with respect to gender, then the respective policies must be rethought, so that their inherent limits, defined by a priori assumptions about gender, may be erased. But how? The foregoing question demonstrates once more the problematic character of the transformation of feminist theoretical hypotheses into political calls for action. At the same time, however, it also stresses the necessity – beyond the clarification of the substance of a perspective as feminist or pro-women159 – of investigating the possibility of political utilization of pro-women measures to the benefit of a feminist perspective, although the latter, contrary to the former, aims at the elimination of dichotomous gender.160 I suspect that in the present circumstances this investigation constitutes a pressing necessity for any subversive feminist political vision, and thus for all feminist theorists who also have political concerns that have not given up on their faith in the possibility of a radical transformation of social relations.

3

The gendered subject as citizen

3.1 Democracy and citizens/subjects of democracy All references to democracy, either as a notion or as a social and political reality, presuppose a particular idea about who the citizen is, as the subject of democracy. The way in which the citizen is defined, and, by the same token, the way in which the notion of the subject (or the individual, according to the dominant view) has been delimited beforehand, leaves its mark, seals with specific characteristics the profile of contemporary democracy itself, and contributes to its distortions and its weaknesses. However, as R. Lister notes,1 “citizenship” remains in contemporary bibliography an essentially contested concept; contested in its meaning as well as in its political application, while, especially in the feminist literature, dealing theoretically with it is frequently treated with scepticism, since it mainly refers to rights, whose formal possession is obviously insufficient. The contemporary perception of the citizen (and of citizenship), on the one hand refers to the two basic traditions from which it arises (liberalism and civic republicanism) and so involves rights as much as obligations,2 and on the other hand is inextricably linked to both the notion of the nation-state and the notion of democracy. Being a citizen of a state, in other words, refers to a legal regime that provides the citizen with rights and encumbers her/him with obligations, part of which refer to a set of moral commitments concerning the citizen’s active involvement through participation in the political process. Thus, it is useful to draw the distinction, suggested by A. Oldfield,3 between citizenship as a legal status and as practice. Whereas the former includes the rights enjoyed by the citizen as an individual/member of a community allowing her/him, among other things, if s/he so wishes, to become involved in public affairs, as well as the obligations that accompany those rights, the latter refers to the fulfilling of the essential content of her/his status as a citizen acting as such, and refers to broader social issues as well as to the substance of democracy. Thus, citizenship, being in its dominant conceptualization intimately linked to individual entitlements and to a common reference to a particular community, makes imperative in view of a contemporary democratic co-existence, the clarification of what this common reference exactly is, but especially who this individual with rights is.

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The reasons on account of which the Left as well as a big part of the feminist contestation reject an approach to citizenship based exclusively on rights are obvious, since the latter, besides being a necessary pre-condition, refer to a logic which is incapable of confronting by itself the multiple issues of social inequality.4 However, while one of the major theoretical phenomena of our time is the reinstatement of liberal democracy,5 at the same time liberal democracy clearly seems to have failed “to deliver on the promise of political equality”, focusing on rights and abstracting from the socio-economic conditions that would make legal equality effective.6 But also on the level of ideology, rights in general condense the substance of the feminist ambivalence expressed in the equality or difference discussion, through the confrontation of the question referring to what kind of rights: as A. Phillips remarks, “when men and women are treated the same, it means women being treated as if they were men; when men and women are treated differently, the man remains the norm, against which the woman is peculiar, lacking, different”,7 which is expressed in the logic of special measures and rights. At the same time, it is to be expected that certain elements in the tradition of civic republicanism, such as those focusing on the idea of active participation and collective deliberation, selectively attract many feminist theorists.8 In fact, civic republicanism’s appeal is not restricted to specific points on the political spectrum,9 its pursuit of public versus individual good, attracting also radical democratic world-views. However, the same theorists are critical of other important components in this tradition, such as a narrow conception of the political structured on the basis of an inflexible distinction between the public and the private, the reference to the concept of universality and the common good (in contrast to the “particular”), which frequently excludes women,10 and, finally, on the level of political practice, the obligations which active involvement in the political process entails and with which the dominant women’s life models cannot contend.11 It is interesting to remark that the feminist critique on the foregoing point, a critique that does not arise from a liberal perspective, contributed to the development of other very productive approaches to active and participatory citizenship,12 connected with views regarding participatory and radical democracy. It may also be maintained, that a conception of citizenship inspired by the principles of communitarianism – in which service to the “common good” through social participation is stressed, as well as the moral duty of co-citizens to care for each other and to act in a particular manner on the basis of common beliefs and values13 – could affect (for obvious reasons related to the dominant life-styles of women) one type of feminist approach. That such a thing never really took place is due mainly to the fact that usually in the framework of communitarianism an exceedingly traditional image of the family dominates, while differences among citizens (such as their gender), and political notions, such as representation or even liberty, constitute parameters that are not invested with central significance.14 Furthermore, the way in which matters of sexual ethics are treated by the more conservative communitarians is especially repulsive to any feminist, that is, anti-sexist approach.15

66 The gendered subject as citizen But certainly any reference to the contemporary concept of the citizen inevitably invokes the 1949 essay by T.H. Marshall, in which the problematique on social rights was systematized as the culmination of a course in the history of citizenship,16 in an attempt to promote a notion of freedom which includes positive freedom. “Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”.17 The third constitutive component of this threefold concept which makes up citizenship (civil, political and social rights) refers to the “whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and the right to lead the life of a civilized being . . .”.18 Thus, social rights permit the more effective exercise of other rights, since they help the disadvantaged to “overcome” some of the inequalities which undermine the equality of citizenship. Giving substance to civil and political rights, social rights are also “an antidote to the individualism of the classical liberal rights formulations”,19 and can be of great interest to women and other social “inferiors”. Despite the fact that Marshall’s aforementioned conception of rights continues to constitute a point of reference, it has not ceased to be on the receiving end of criticism from a number of points of view in the past fifty years, centring mainly on the question who is, in the end, this citizen who possesses all these rights?20 At present these criticisms mainly stem from a perspective focusing on the issue of immigration and the great postwar migration flows, the general linking of citizenship with the nation-state, which is shown to be insufficient in current conditions of development of supra-national unions, and certainly from the point of view of social class and gender.21 From this last point of view, C. Pateman, referring to T. H. Marshall – who in his treatment of social inequality (referring, however, only to “class-abatement”) maintains that the latter “is no longer content to raise the floor-level in the basement of the social edifice leaving the superstructure as it was. It has begun to remodel the whole building . . .”22 – questions whether women are also in the building, or rather whether they are in a separate annex.23 Because, among other things, the historical course of acquiring rights, described by T. H. Marshall as if it concerned everyone, actually refers to (white) men, for whom civil rights preceded political rights. Women in most cases achieved the civil rights inherent in citizenship only after they had secured suffrage.24 Even Marshall’s primary formulation, however, gives rise to questions: if citizens are the full members of a community, what happens to women (and not only to them) who are usually relegated to the margins of the public sphere? Aren’t they citizens of this community? Women in general are much less “independent” socially, they as a rule do not “bear arms” and have limited access to the labour market, elements that go into the constitution of citizenship. At the same time, it is women who get pregnant and give birth, with no provision for reproductive rights:25 is it the case that ultimately women are by definition excluded from citizenship, as conceptualized by T.H. Marshall and also established as the dominant view, since moreover the different course of

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recognition of their own rights in no way seems to concern him in the narrative of the development of citizenship he advances? It is legitimate, therefore, to suppose that in spite of its theoretically universal character, the category “citizen”, apparently neutral to gender and other particularizing parameters, is in no way compatible with the existing social diversity and multiformity, nor does it assimilate what is perceived in its framework as gender bipolarity. The “gender-neutral” citizen is a man, who was not subject to substantial changes following the acquisition of political rights by women, since citizenship continues to include in its dominant conceptualization preconceptions regarding gender, its “nature” and its significance, which are reducible to an essentialist logic26 of categorization of the qualities of women and men. The same obviously holds for the “subject of law”, which is masculine, and for that reason legislation in its effort to protect women must define them as “special cases”.27 The same logic drives contemporary theorists who are (or aspire to be) socially “progressive” to accept (while exercising criticism of T.H. Marshall’s ethnocentrism in the description of the course of acquisition of rights) the given and legitimate character of the distinction between the public and private spheres and to define the latter as a field of personal fulfilment.28 But the private sphere is of course not exclusively, nor even mainly, that, and more importantly, certainly not for all, while its equation to the domestic contributes to women’s subordination. Something which no doubt affects the way in which subjects function as citizens. If citizenship relies on “common membership of a shared community where we acknowledge others as being of equal account”, hence bringing us via politics into a particular kind of relationship through which we address the concerns of others who are different from us,29 the dominant perception of the public–private divide cannot but influence how equal those can be viewed that are seen as members of the respective spheres. The above comment does not imply a wish to annul the existence of the “private”, nor a collapse of the distinction between the public and the private. The stake here is, in I.M. Young’s terms,30 how to achieve the right to keep the aspects of our lives that we choose private, without any aspect of a person’s life being forced into privacy. If, however, being a citizen constitutes one aspect, the public, of every subject, who is this subject, which is (perceived as being) dichotomized into a citizen and a private person? The inadequacy of the dominant conceptualization of the “citizen”, for today’s social conditions, stems precisely from this issue, and, as far as gender is concerned, is reinforced by the historical equation of citizenship with gendered rights. As a rule the citizen of contemporary democracy is perceived as a fully centred, rational subject with a concrete and manifest identity, a subject who as a bearer of rights always strives to maximize its own benefit (according to a certain current in liberalism), with personal interest as the basic guiding principle. It is a subject who frequently seems not to be involved in social relations and power structures, unaffected by linguistic codes and the culture to which it belongs, and whose “private” practices are independent from its quality as a citizen,31 since it appears as double-faceted, with a public aspect (the citizen) and a private one (the individual).32 Also, it is

68 The gendered subject as citizen expected that this subject should be governed by a sense of public interest,33 which however can hardly be determined in non-ethnocentric, even nationalistic terms, to the degree that the national reference arises as the sole point of commonality among subjects with clearly differentiated, established and demarcated identities. An historical reference, presented to be the sole logical one.34 However, the foregoing conception of the subject, which commonly refers to what is called by S. Hall “the Enlightenment subject”,35 a conception implicit in the established perception of the citizen, despite its dominance, is increasingly shown to be imaginary. This is the case not only on the basis of the basic findings of psychoanalysis, which demonstrate the unsoundness of the hypothesis concerning the centred and rational character of the reactions and the practices of the subjects,36 but also on the basis of theoretical sociological investigations which involve the multiplicity of identities,37 as well as with reference to the theoretical and practical failure of the attempt to found and further legitimate democracy by means of arguments mainly referring to rationality.38 With regard to the first point, it is obvious that the (generally accepted) Freudian thesis concerning the unconscious, within the framework of which psychic and symbolic processes are performed following a “logic” wholly different from that of rationality, would run into an absolute conflict with the view concerning the centred and rational subject with a unitary, dominant and given identity.39 Even more so, in other later and more elaborate views based more or less directly on the theory of the unconscious, which further substantiate the hypothesis that the identity of the subject is formed through an unconscious process in the course of time, and is not at all given and established, but changing.40 In the work of J. Lacan indeed, who is regarded as a key figure for feminists,41 more than in that of any other psychoanalytic thinker, the attempt is made to deconstruct the concept of the centred subject as a myth, and to formulate a theory of subjectivity in the framework of which the unconscious presents a fragmented subject, with a changing and indeterminate identity and especially gender identity.42 It is stressed that constructed through language, as the child is introduced to the symbolic order of reality through language, although seemingly coherent and stable, gender identity is in reality unstable and in flux. And while the formation of subjectivity and gender identity is a concurrent and perilous process, a process that is unending and inconclusive,43 the structuring of masculinity presupposes the repression of bisexuality and the “feminine aspects” of subjectivity to the unconscious, where they remain an ever-present threat to the stability and the unity of gender identity.44 While, however, masculine subjectivity is structured in contradiction to what is perceived as the “other”, which results in the tendency towards a dichotomous understanding of reality,45 by contrast, feminine subjectivity is formed on the basis of another sense of its boundaries, since the girl in the process of the formation of her subjectivity is not required to reject the mother with whom she maintains a symbiotic relationship.46 Thus, due to the steady identification with the female model of the mother, the formation of feminine subjectivity contains psychological dimensions of connectedness-with-others and an image of

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a relational self, but also a less fixed “me”–“not me” distinction.47 Besides contradictions in the unconscious due to the identification of the girl with a socially undervalued gender model,48 it is interesting to note the view of A. Rich concerning the physical experience of women and especially pregnancy, as an experience reinforcing a non-dichotomous view of reality, since it is maintained that the child in the womb can be characterized neither as me, nor as not me, resulting in the conception of the inner and the outer not as opposites, but as a continuum.49 Sociological perspectives moreover contribute to the same direction of challenging the centred and rational subject with a single, unified and dominant identity, referring to the external factors in the formation of identities through the interaction of the subject with “significant others” and society in general, rejecting the hypothesis that these are pre-existent as autonomous and stable,50 with reference to the process of socialization. The identity of the subject, in accordance with this line of thinking, is a continuous process, in which there is no linear and set direction, while the structures formed by subjects become the agents of formation of a new generation of social actors in an uninterrupted process of changes.51 The momentum of these changes contributes to the creation of uncertainty in relation to prior, seemingly manifest identities and roles, which become thus less demarcated, not granted for the entire course of a lifetime and not so self-evident, something that is especially obvious with respect to gender identities and especially gender-referent roles. Furthermore, the analytic categories perceived as manifest, such as “child”, for example, or “woman” and “man”, it is now accepted that they are not as manifest, in the sense of a causal biological-social determination sequence which is less simple and unidirectional than the common-sense view.52 This reinforces the hypothesis concerning the existence of multiple and changing identities that the subject assumes at different times in her/his life, while the dichotomous perception constitutes the theoretical expression of a suppression of the fact that the distinction between biological definition and social sur-determination is in reality less radical.53 The fragmentation of subjective identities and their changing, even contradictory, character obviously do not justify the idea of centred subjects, but rather that of “nomads”, whose subjectivity, maintaining interconnections with basic points of reference, is in continuous motion and change.54 Therefore, despite the (apparent) importance and centrality of the social and cultural identity of the subject, subjectivity must be understood as an autonomous, separate and ever-changing yet internally unified plexus of multiplicities and particularities.55 As for identities, it is more fertile to view them as a process of different identifications, since, in S. Hall’s words, they are nothing more than “points of temporary attachment to subject positions which discoursive practices construct for us”.56 Always temporary, unstable and multiple on the subjective level, they are constitutive of the subject precisely in their multiplicity. As for social inequalities, the way in which they are experienced by the subject is defined by the above multiplicity. It is interesting to add at this point, that, on the one hand, the concept of a centred, autonomous subject with a stable and given identity is obviously not

70 The gendered subject as citizen independent from the dualisms overwhelming the philosophical tradition since Plato, while following the classic Cartesian formulation about mind-body dualism, it has become almost imperative for all philosophers to take a position on the matter, either in support and further development of Cartesian dualism or by devising alternative theories.57 On the other hand, it is also of interest to note the observation made by J. Dewey, one of the most significant proponents of pragmatism, who maintains that the foregoing view on the subject constitutes a consequence of the theological dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness of the soul.58 But, of course, the most systematic critique of the vision of the unified and centred subject, in its multiple versions, has now been mainly categorized in the area of postmodern thinking, which from this point of view continues the critique of structuralism,59 while it is especially reinforced by the theoretical rejection of the established mind-body dualism, particularly as it appears in the work of M. Merleau-Ponty, who makes reference to the “lived body”.60 Inversely of course, if the bipolar conception according to which everything is either one thing or its opposite were to be challenged, then the entire reasoning based on the hypothesis of the centredness and the stability of subjective identity would fall apart, while the latter would appear to be more fluid than originally believed by the structuralists. The dominance of this hypothesis today, when it is mainly not explicitly formulated but implied, functioning as a frame for other hypotheses, becomes principally manifest through bipolar thinking,61 whose challenge also threatens the respective concealed and obsolete certainties. The foregoing indicates that the dominant conception of the subject-citizen as unitary and rational (a conception which does not take into consideration either the multiplicity and the fluidity of its identities, or the unconscious and the not-always-rational character of its reactions) functions ideologically in such a way as to inhibit a substantial democratic co-existence of the subjects, cocitizens or otherwise, insofar as it accepts as unquestionable and definitive for the “substance” of subjects themselves, boundaries, partitions and dividing lines, be they frontiers or any other kind of categorization. It inhibits it, because by not investigating the process of structuring individual subjectivity, understanding it in an essentialist manner as a priori given, bears significant consequences also in the relations between different cultural formations; the vision of the unitary, granted and cross-temporal nature of subjective identity being projected in the perception of collective identities as well.62 But, however valuable or even radical the above critique may appear from the point of view of sociology and of psychoanalysis to the theoretical understanding of the notion of the subject (which can thus only distance itself from the “subject of the Enlightenment” in the narrow sense of the term), this critique is not sufficient: if it is imperative nowadays to conduct a radical renegotiation of citizenship, since it functions along with exclusions unable to assimilate diversity and multiformity, and if this renegotiation necessarily presupposes a fundamental revision of the concept of the subject itself, this multiform and fragmented subject will have to be treated also as gendered. A gendered subject in whose identity as a citizen the right to the free expression

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of its gendered existence is recognized.63 Something that presupposes the nonprescribed formation of gender identities, and which certainly constitutes, among other things, a challenge to all existing power relations. As far as the system of gender relations is concerned, this seems to be the only way towards a non-hierarchical gender, and thus, towards gendered citizens who have the potential to function as free and equal. It should moreover be noted that the various historical sur-determinations associated with the democratic citizen (in relation primarily to gender, class position, but also to being a native or not, ethnic provenance etc.) encumber the notion of the citizen with additional elements, which, while not always corresponding to contemporary reality or social needs, do function ideologically as preconceptions, having not only ideological consequences (for example, the identification of the notion of citizen with men). As remnants from the past, these historical sur-determinations offer in current circumstances a fertile ground for (facile) political critique. (It is obviously a fact that women lag behind with regard to the “substance” of citizenship, even though they do enjoy the same political rights with men.) An absolutely legitimate critique, which, however, if it were to restrict itself to a demand for suspending the particular social discrimination resulting from a specific, yet accepted, social partition/dichotomy, would contribute very minimally to an attempt for a substantial change to the existing “democratic” practice. This is the case because this kind of confined critique entangles itself in a logic of uncritical acceptance of what is projected as given; an acceptance which, however, suspends the potential of substantially invalidating any social disadvantage as such. In other words, it is doubtful whether women claiming as women will ever become equal citizens to men. It is impossible for the impediment inherent in their defining gender inscription to co-exist with the substantial possession of the quality of citizen. A quality in which change, with respect to gender among other discriminating factors, is more imperative than ever today, when democracy as a system of governance has become triumphant throughout the greatest part of the planet. However, these changes that appear from a certain point of view as socially imperative, at the same time seem perhaps not yet feasible, to the degree that they necessitate the radical disengagement of the gendered from the hierarchical, while the latter has until now appeared as inherent to the former. Changes, that is, that pervade all levels of life and are so radical that they also appear to be utopian, if we were to accept the definition of utopia as given by S. Weigel, defining it not as a non-rational way out, but as a position between what cannot be tolerated any longer and what is yet to come.64 In fact, utopias born out of an unsatisfactory reality provide an insight into a prospective future reality, while specifically feminist utopias65 seem necessary for feminist theory, since without them feminism remains entrenched within a system of gender identities that devalues the feminine.66 Feminist utopias, by contrast, through a particular redefined claim of difference, allow a redemarcation of the concept of gender difference itself.67 If presently the prospect of radical changes in the gender relations system still seems “utopian”, it is nevertheless absolutely indispensable as a presupposition

72 The gendered subject as citizen for the emergence of equal citizens of democracy. Because, of course, citizenship, even in its most restrictive version, presupposes the existence of diverse, but independent and equal subjects who make use of equal political rights according to their judgement. Only the most coarse patriarchal preconceptions may allow the formulation of the hypothesis that it is possible for one and the same subject to be at the same time a free citizen of democracy and a wife financially dependent and indeed one “who gives up a vital aspect of her freedom and individuality, the freedom to refuse consent and say ‘no’ to the violation of the integrity of her person”.68 If the latter assertion seems to apply to extreme situations, the contradiction it refers to is obvious in many other manifestations of the mundane life of women, an everyday life which is dominated by care of and giving to others, the belittlement of their own desires (elements regarded as features expected from the subjects of the respective gender) and finally by their cancellation as autonomous subjects. Something that, on the one hand, illustrates the unfeasibility of converting women to substantially equal citizens with men, if the liberal view concerning the disconnection of the private sphere of the (profoundly unequal) relations between women and men, and the public sphere of equal citizens, continues to be perceived as legitimate,69 and on the other hand, reinforces the hypothesis that, in order to be substantial, any change in citizenship presupposes the renegotiation of the notion of the subject as gendered. This is where the difficulty for any equality policy for the subjects regardless of gender is located, since in order to be substantial, it must aim at democracy not only as a regime, but also as a cultural framework which should primarily determine the inter-subjective relations in the so-called private sphere. This necessarily presupposes radical changes in how the gendered is perceived, changes which entail rejection of any dichotomous/hierarchical logic. As mentioned above, appeals to a dual universality and demands based on the uncritical acceptance of gender dichotomy as socially substantial, and for that reason on the assertion of a shared and homogeneous identity of the social category whose “liberation” they aim at, may in the end prove to be profoundly oppressive in their connotations. In fact, the reference to women, for example, as a given and pre-existent subject of policies for the elimination of social discrimination, fixes in time particular characteristics of the subjects whose “liberation” is sought, and therefore, in the end, seems to run counter to its own logic. J. Butler is right, when, while understanding the political necessity to make claims in the name of women, she stresses the fact that identity categories are always normative, and not just descriptive.70 She is right, despite N. Fraser’s critique (and rejection) of what the latter sees as an implicit component of the former’s reasoning, that in the end liberation means liberation from all identities.71 Indeed it does, if we perceive and thus make identities function as restrictive life prescriptions, which are burdened with inescapable value judgements. It all depends on how rigid, fixed and non-changeable identities are conceptualized as. Therefore, the deconstruction72 of the essentialist category/identity “women”73 is absolutely necessary, if we aim at fighting against a substantial

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contradiction in democracy through the changing of the dominant conceptualization of the citizen, in which the seemingly genderless character legitimates women’s subordination. Still, this deconstruction presupposes and entails at the level of political process the discoloration of “citizenship” from the inherent distinction between the universal and the particular and from the related distinction between the public and the private, as they are known today. Is it, however, politically feasible for women to be “represented”, so that they may demand radical changes in their name and aiming at their acceptance as by definition equal gendered subjects and thus citizens, without contributing through the relevant process to the essentialist consolidation of the identity ascribed to them?74 Without, furthermore, legitimating the idea that “providing for men is catering for people; providing for women is something else”?75 What the issue is here, in fact, is as maintained by K. Nash,76 to find a way so that gender differences may be taken into consideration, differences which are plausible given the existing diverging conditions of living for women and men, without in this way freezing them in their current forms, and without denying other differences among subjects. Differences that concern all, as they transect with gender and refer to social class, race, sexuality, etc. On the basis of a similar reasoning I.M. Young, innovating in relation to her prior work, suggests the redefinition of gender in such a way that the notion “women” does not refer to a group, which tends to imply a given essentialist identity which all members of the group share, but to a seriality of structural constraints and relations that condition actions and its meaning.77 However, although it confronts theoretically the issue of variety and multiformity of women’s models, this extremely elaborate proposal does not seem capable of confronting the issue of the oppressive function of gender in all its width, insofar as it does not deal with the issue of the boundary of the serial collective “women” in relation to the serial collective “men”. A related comment applies to R. Lister’s advocation of differentiated universalism and the reconstruction of citizenship along pluralist rather than dualist lines.78 While questioning what she calls a “theoretical cul-de-sac of a choice between a gender neutral and a gender differentiated model of citizenship” (p. 115), while rejecting the binary logic that homogenizes women, while aspiring “to a universalism that stands in creative tension to diversity and difference” (p. 66), Lister does not go all the way into deconstructing the women/men divide itself, thus stopping her analysis short of its logical conclusion.79 It is a fact that although democracy does demand and presuppose the rejection of strictly defined identities so that it may function for all, women and men, with no exclusions, at the same time, aiming at the maximization of the participation by all, it is necessary to appeal to the assertion of specific identities for the institutionalization of measures for equality.80 This contradiction forms an additional difficulty for the substantial democratic transformation of political and social relations, while the way it is handled determines the kind of “solution” promoted for the issue. Locating this contradiction, furthermore, makes it obvious that although on a certain level (especially in policy formation)

74 The gendered subject as citizen it seems unfeasible for the time being not to view the subjects of democracy as agents of pre-existing and given identities and interests,81 at the same time this constitutes the sole stance consistent in the long term with the constitutive principles of democracy. Something that, in other words, means that the entrapment of feminist theory and practice in the dilemma: either assertion of the difference between women and men (with everything that this entails for women) or stressing the imperative of gender equality (which in the dominant conceptualization is taken to imply sameness),82 cannot and should not be accepted any longer83 from the point of view of democracy as well.

3.2 Citizenship: androcentrism and bipolarity Citizenship in its dominant conceptualization and despite its seemingly universal character excludes, as we have seen, women and does not assimilate that which is perceived within its framework as gender bipolarity. That is, the “gender neutral” character of citizenship conceals an inherent androcentrism, while both the historical exclusion of women from citizenship and their current acceptance are permeated, as already noted, by the same preconceptions concerning gender, its “nature” and its significance, preconceptions which refer to an essentialist logic of the categorization of the qualities of women and men.84 The dominant conceptualization of the citizen accepts, in fact, the dichotomy women–men as given, and following the classical tradition, as decisive for the relevant quality of the citizen.85 This is why, while it is perceived as absolutely legitimate for men to demand the consolidation of their rights, women are legitimated/expected to claim “positive actions”,86 in order to improve their disadvantageous position. The contradiction between the subordination reserved for women and universal equality of rights which concerns “free and equal” citizens, in which the former are also included, constitutes a fundamental element in the philosophical legacy of western thought. This contradiction became intensely palpable from the moment when women acquired full political rights, offering later the spark for the claims of the feminist movement of the 1960s. In them, the awareness that the equality of rights is not sufficient for the liberation of women, and thus, not for their substantial conversion into citizens became clear. The “universality of man”, in other words, continued to a great degree even after the acquisition of political rights by women to refer to the “brotherhood of men”.87 This is the case because, on the one hand, masculine gender has been inscribed in the very conceptualization of citizenship itself for the past 2500 years, and on the other hand, because, in order for women to become substantial citizens, the formal acquisition of the right to vote and other political rights is obviously not enough: the creation of preconditions for a substantial liberation of women from their traditional subordinate position and the relevant constraints presented as natural are also needed, so that they may, besides other things, acquire “real” reasons to participate in the political process. The heightened sense of futility associated with political involvement which often characterizes the

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female constituency,88 establishes the fact that such a thing has not yet happened. It also possibly documents that it is impossible to happen on the conditions it is now promoted, because the transformation of the “feminine”, as it is defined nowadays, into the “political” incorporates an internal contradiction that does not seem to be refutable. It is remarkable that in all cases in which women “lag behind” in comparison to men with regard to the level and the kind of political participation, to cite an example, this is ascribed to their subjective shortcomings (which perhaps – for the well-intentioned or the “progressive” – result from differences in socialization and adult social roles). In mainstream political analysis there is never an investigation into the hypothesis that in certain cases the notions/concepts used themselves, such as political participation or political process, are inherently androcentric, defined with men’s lifestyles as a point of reference, and, for that reason, are de facto sexist, resulting in their incapacity to contain women.89 Citizenship, ascribed to women on the grounds of their special social contribution as main legitimating argument (which in essence refers to the fundamental biological “difference”, that is to the capacity of conception and the subsequent possible motherhood), comprises the fundamental contradiction that in its conceptualization itself, it refers to everything that is not (perceived as) feminine. Independence, a central criterion of citizenship, describes in fact all that is regarded to be masculine: the capacity to bear arms, to own property and the capacity for self-government, so that one may have the capacity to govern others.90 The social contract theorists, indeed, suppressing all mention of the dimension that C. Pateman calls “sexual contract”,91 illustrated sex difference as a political difference between freedom (men) and subordination (women),92 which results in the paradox of women being excluded as well as included in the sphere of politics on the basis of the same capacities and attributes:93 women who on account of their “natural” qualities were excluded, were incorporated into the political process as the “other”, the inferior and with the supreme political duty (arising from their “difference” and legitimating their peculiar status as non-citizen citizens) the realization in fact of their ability to bear children. Consequently, part of the formal equality with men was gained by women on account of their “difference”, a difference understood in reference to its main expression, that is, motherhood, both as a factor which by definition excludes women from the political, and as an equivalent social contribution to the “service to the country”.94 Motherhood which furthermore condenses an ambivalence in its theoretical treatment within feminism itself, between its perception as an impediment to women’s liberation and its acceptance as the basis of legitimation for the above liberation.95 Women’s experience of motherhood has also been viewed as a potential new model for citizenship,96 something that has rightly attracted strong criticism since, of course, the relation of mothers with their children is profoundly unequal, an exclusive and particular practice in absolute contrast to democratic citizenship which should be collective, inclusive and generalized.97 While obviously, being a “good mother” doesn’t make one a

76 The gendered subject as citizen “good citizen”, M. Dietz, in her critique of “maternal feminism”, makes another point concerning the supposed superiority of women, noting that such a view posits as a starting point what democracy must deny: that some voices are better, more moral than others, in a way that makes “democracy itself lose its meaning and citizenship its special nature”.98 Indeed, motherhood as women’s particular characteristic that promotes the development of a different perception of reality has been viewed also as the source of the development of an ethical view based on care that differentiates women from men, whose ethical thinking is centred on an ethics of justice.99 A “women’s ethical conception”, however, that besides being viewed as superior by “maternal feminists” is also understood positively within the framework of the dominant view in reference to the private sphere; but at the same time as having an inferior significance, as clearly secondary for involvement in the public sphere. There, values such as individuality, autonomy and self-sufficiency are dominant,100 considered as by definition to be the appropriate ones, that is, liberal values with an obvious gender inscription. Apart from citizenship’s historically androcenric character, it is legitimate to question also how feasible it is for women to acquire a substantial access to citizenship, when their lifestyles are (still?) so different from those of men with regards to their public dimension; a dimension manifestly connected with every conceptualization of the citizen. Specifically, with respect to participation in the labour market, without which the subjects can hardly establish all these social rights that (along with civil and political rights101) go into the contemporary notion of the citizen, the disadvantageous participation of women constitutes an additional obstacle. At the same time, the position of men as “breadwinnerworkers”, a notion that presupposes the existence of “housewives”, has been built into the welfare state, relegating women to the status of the “dependent”.102 Therefore, either women must acquire, besides other things, an equivalent to men’s access to the labour market (something that seems to be gradually approached, but with many obstacles and additional encumbrances) or the way in which we perceive citizenship must be transformed with regards to this parameter as well.103 At any rate, the absolute precondition for any substantial change in citizenship is certainly the implementation of significant changes in the distribution of labour according to gender in the private sphere and in the entire reasoning concerning the latter. This is the case, because obviously the private and public roles of the subjects are not independent from each other, while the dominant structure and function of the family formally and substantially restricts the independent presence of women in the public sphere.104 And it is striking that contemporary theorists who follow an age-long philosophical tradition within the framework of which the family is regarded as a basic “school” for the forging of moral and just citizens, are not troubled by its character, nor do they treat the family itself as an institution based on social injustice, since it refers to and usually is founded on the exploitation of one gender by the other.105 But again, none of the above “changes” (in the labour market or in the distribution of roles in the private sphere) will have the potential for radical change, without a prior redefinition of what it means to be a gendered subject, citizen of democracy.

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While the universality of citizenship has been false, since it has always referred in essence, if not formally, to men’s “universality” which it portrayed,106 at the same time the attempts to include women with their “difference” ended up in a modernizing legitimation of subordination and created multiple theoretical and practical problems on the level of democracy. Additionally, the efforts of many women who chose to fit into the existing categories of political involvement ended up in many cases,107 in an unfortunate adoption of male stereotypes, which in no way brought about any solutions to the significant problem of legitimation faced by the contemporary democratic political system, nor did they contribute in any substantial way to the fight against androcentrism and subsequent women’s subordination. Therefore, the feminist critique of social structuring of the “feminine”, which hinders women’s participatory attitudes in respect to politics, is not sufficient (neither for women, nor for democracy). The accompanying critique of the “masculine” is a necessity, as is, more appropriately, the stressing and denunciation of the oppressive structure and function of the gender relations system. With respect to citizenship, the possible relevant omission is especially crucial: obviously it is not sufficient for women to be selectively transformed from marginalized subjects due to their gender, to (a little less) marginalized subjects due to the oligarchic and alienating character of the political system which is based also on gender bipolarity. Consequently, they must challenge the inter-dependency of the dichotomous (power) system of gender relations in its entirety with citizenship, and not merely the relation of their specific gender (predetermined with respect to its constitutive elements) to it. What emerges as imperative, in other words, in today’s circumstances, is the radical reformulation of the conception of citizenship itself, which presupposes a radical re-examination of the concept of the gendered subject who possesses and/or demands rights,108 and not simply more women with identities that are socially predominantly signified as masculine. Neither is it adequate to attempt a theoretical re-assessment of citizenship which would try to overcome its androcentric signification through the positive evaluation of women’s special input as a contribution to citizenship, something that C. Pateman suggests, pinpointing as the most complex problem for political theory and practice how to find a way for “the two bodies of humankind and feminine and masculine individuality” to be fully incorporated into political life.109 It is not sufficient because since the bipolarity of gender is not challenged, the basis on which citizenship is structured as androcentric is not challenged either. Therefore, while the aforementioned author concludes with the relevant suggestion through a view concerning dual universality, men’s and women’s, a truly non-essentialist conception of citizenship must agree with Ch. Mouffe, that what we need is “an approach that permits us to understand how the subject is structured through different discourses and subject positions” and not another “that reduces our identity to one single position, be it class, race or gender”.110 As it arises, the problematique of rights – which although exceptionally inadequate in social sensitivity in a strictly liberal version, is anyway necessary as a precondition and a starting point for any view on citizenship – even in the most

78 The gendered subject as citizen up to date, radical/participatory version of it, is exceedingly restrictive when it accepts the gender dichotomy as socially necessary and subjectively determining. Because, while obviously women should, by right, be treated as equal citizens with men on all levels, even by mainstream standards since in modern political theory all individuals have the same ethical value,111 the political and social connotations of the men–women divide are such that, remaining unaffected by critique, they create deadlocks to the substantial democratization of citizenship. In fact, the devalorization with which the “feminine” is invested in collective representations as the inferior half of the bipolarity, defines the structuring of women’s subjectivity within such a framework that does not encourage participation, constituting a further obstacle for their substantive conversion to citizens who act as such, and reinforces thus the substantial androcentrism of citizenship. Something that certainly is not and cannot be overcome with the imposition of a bigger presence of women in politics as a measure of justice, a measure concerning certain “select women”, while in the social category “women”, citizenship remains accepted as a concession, and indeed refers to second-class citizens. Women cannot escape from this classification, and citizenship will not cease to be in substance androcentric, as long as gender is perceived as a parameter that constitutes identities in a bi-polar and thus hierarchical fashion, internally homogenizing two distinct and dichotomous (supposedly by definition different from each other) categories of subjects.

3.3 Universality, multiplicity and differences The social groups on the margins, including women, who struggled in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to obtain rights, shared the belief that their acquisition would secure them substantial equality and freedom.112 The fact that such a thing never materialized became a common awareness with the development of new social movements which, after having asserted the co-existence of formal legal equality with social subordination, posed precisely the question, why the formal acquisition of citizenship never led to substantial equality.113 However, their reference, explicit or tacit, to modern political theory which declared the equal moral value of all, a declaration which inspired, guided and legitimated these struggles, ignored in fact that in the same theoretical scheme the notion of universal citizenship is perceived in such a way as to transcend all particularities and differences: if universal citizenship includes all, and if all are equal before the law, at the same time all are called upon as subjects with reference to their shared characteristics, without any mention of whatever differentiates them.114 This characteristic of universality, universality which as a principle has certainly been revolutionary, has however contributed to the exclusion of certain groups, as I.M. Young observes,115 since it is considered that while the individuals (who constitute these groups) are called upon on the basis of their general characteristics, their particular ones prevent them from acquiring a general perspective of reality, beyond a particular one deriving from their specific experience and social position.

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It is necessary however to raise the question, how is it possible to suppress mention of something that differentiates the subjects as a “particular attribute”, when this refers to the power relations among them? Such as the differences related to social class, gender and race. Even more so, when the relevant divisions seem obvious, inevitable and irreversible, such as in the cases of gender and race. When furthermore they involve all levels of life with no exceptions, even the most personal ones, those involving love relations and sexuality, such as gender relations. How can the universality of citizenship, which determines the public dimension of the co-existence of subjects, ignore a constitutive “difference” in their relations, such as that of power relations contained in the dominant and generally accepted understanding of gender, as by definition dichotomous and differentiating? On the basis of modern political thought, in other words, and aiming at equality and justice for all, the subjects are perceived, besides other things, as belonging necessarily to one of the two categories, that is, women or men, categories which are structured antithetically and compose a system of relations by definition profoundly unequal. In the framework of this system, they experience personal relations and familial courses, where exploitation is given for one of the parties involved. But as citizens and for the sake of the equal treatment of all, they are perceived in their universal dimension as subjects who have rights, and who should satisfy their respective duties, should participate in the political process and form and express their views, so that they control and thus legitimate political power, but also they must be able to overcome their individual social positions so that they may form a public interest perspective unaffected by their particularities as subjects, that will, in other words, not be determined by their “particular need, interest and desire”.116 This, notwithstanding the fact that the distinction between the public and the private, which condenses the dichotomy between general (issues concerning citizens as such) and particular (issues that involve citizens in their particularity), corresponds with the distinction men–women, and in spite of the latent equation of the human, or the individual, with the masculine. This is a logical dead-end. It is obvious that if gender bipolarity is socially necessary, it is because the existence of one category of subjects that play the leading role in reproduction, both natural and social, is functional. According to this logic, different characteristics are ascribed ideologically and enhanced socially in the two groups with thus different (due to ascription) social roles. However, insofar as such differentiation is neither socially functional nor ideologically acceptable any longer, then the oppressive gender dichotomy ceases to have any reason to be and opens up the possibility of imagining other ways of subjective gendered existence and another gender order. Even more so, when it becomes increasingly perceptible that the masculine and the feminine, as they are still defined nowadays, are existent in all, while the attempt at classification of each subject in one single, given, clear and distinct position, which necessarily dictates particular roles, attitudes, courses in life, and even dreams, is Procrustean, deeply restrictive and oppressive to all.

80 The gendered subject as citizen Consequently, the universality of citizenship, a significant achievement of western political thought, should include another conception of the ineluctably gendered subject. No longer as dichotomized, for which we apparently do not mention the relevant gender reference despite the fact that it is an element of order in a system of power relations, but as gendered in the sense of the multiple, multifarious and changing ways with which the subject experiences/lives its body.117 Ways which will thus be as unrelated with the manner in which subjects function as citizens (that is, how each subject perceives the political stakes in their public interest dimension and how it is perceived by the political system) as the colour of their eyes,118 insofar as neither refer to hierarchies and forms of power. Feminism has an important role to play in this context; a different role in a changed socio-political environment which is accompanied by profound changes in the way gendered subjects perceive their subjectivity, as well as in how theory treats inequality. While in part, these changes came about as a result of feminists’ challenging gender inequality in the name of, and for, women, this is no longer sufficient. It appears as an unambitious, too restricted target with important unwanted effects. In today’s circumstances, and as a continuation of its historical role in different conditions, Mouffe is right in noting that feminist politics “should be understood not as a separate form of politics designed to pursue the interests of women as women, but rather as the pursuit of feminist goals and aims within the context of a wider articulation of demands”.119 Feminists will have to be the protagonists in the above politics, in which gender as a primary form of inequality will (have to) be the central target, aiming at its annulment as a dichotomous system of power relations. In order to achieve the foregoing on the level of theory, which forms a precondition for the voicing of relevant claims and subsequent eventual policies, what is indispensable is the prior deconstruction120 of the “self-evident” categories of women and men, and the subsequent deconstruction of subject relations in their gendered dimension as power relations. As long as the reference to two categories of gender persists, the view that difference equals divergence from a norm shall be legitimated. On the contrary, multiplicity and differences refer to the relentless reality of diversity in the subjective existence. A diversity in spite of which (or perhaps on account of which?) subjects may actually perceive reality in its public/collective dimension and to form public interest judgements, colouring them certainly with their subjective experience, which lends its originally universal character to the universality of citizenship. This diversity, therefore, does not lead to the rejection of universal principles and to the domination of the special and the particular, since the hypothesis itself, concerning the right to the cultural expression of all, women and men,121 as well as of each particularity (to the degree of course that it respects the democratic framework), constitutes a basic principle legitimated only in terms of universality.122 The demand for deconstruction of the category “women”, proposed by critical feminist thought123 with reference to the inherently oppressive character of any predetermined identity that homogenizes its bearers, a demand which

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seemingly appears to contribute to bringing an end to the relation of feminism with politics (and for this reason, it is subject to vehement criticism by a sizeable number of feminist theorists124) on the contrary, converts the issue of the definition of identities to a political one: because if the question referring to the ways in which women will challenge their oppression if they “do not exist” is apparently legitimate, it is likewise legitimate to stress (besides that this is not the issue), the fact that the precondition for the relevant eradication consists in not perceiving women in an essentialist way, as given and preceding their social structuring. The uncritical acceptance of the category “women” (which as all categories referring to identities, is never “merely” descriptive, but also normative, and it is for this reason that it functions through exclusions125) as ahistorically given and, moreover, its institutionalization as an indubitable reality in the political process contrary to the principles of democracy, elements inherent, for example, in the problematique of parity (and often in that of quotas), undermine the pioneering character of such claims, while being pursued by their supporters with the sincerest of intentions. Indeed the cause of the reduced political mobilization of women may lie with the insistence in the seemingly manifest character and supposed uniformity of the relevant social category, since, according to J. Butler’s hypothesis,126 without “the compulsory expectation that feminist actions must be instituted from some stable, unified and agreed upon identity, those actions might well . . . seem more congenial to a number of ‘women’ for whom the meaning of the category is permanently moot”.127 It is interesting to add that the same author notes that it is not necessary to suppose that a uniform agent of action should exist initially so that action may emerge, since the relevant agent is constituted through action.128 Yet, the foregoing do not undercut the importance for contemporary feminist theory of further elaborating on a multifarious conception of subjectivity129 and subjective identity, that can function as a point of reference for feminist action and politics.130 Gender as a system of social relations is charged with multiple contradictions and ambiguities, whose confrontation on the level of policies should be mainly aimed at one main imperative: any gender policy improving social conditions for women as a social category must not contribute at the same time to the consolidation of the women–men dichotomy that in the end perpetuates (as demonstrated clearly also in the development of the welfare state131) women’s subordination and marginalization through their modernization. In the case of women in political decision-making, while it is obviously socially unjust, morally unacceptable and politically problematic for so few women to be present in structures of political decision-making, fragmentary “solutions” concentrating on the selective benefit of certain women, solutions which in the end would regard a symptom as the originating cause, are not a service to substantial social equality and democracy, nor of course do they contribute to the annulment of gender as a factor of social hierarchy. Because, besides other things, and if not appropriately formulated and presented, they further legitimate the view that there are two different, distinct and internally unified collective identities with

82 The gendered subject as citizen regard to gender, ignoring and blurring in this way the contradictory, fragmented and changing character of the relevant identities (but of the notion itself of collective identity, to the degree that “otherness” is never unidirectional). Multiplicity and differences in the expression of gender identities are hence ignored in the name of a universality that thus is not worthy of its name. A “universality” that cannot refer any more to a unitary (or a dual) standard against which all are measured, and that feminists cannot but be in favour of redefining, since the reference to an inclusive universal is a vital necessity for any radical change.132 Obviously the gist of the problem comes down to this point, and this will have to be confronted by any gender politics, if indeed it seeks to substantially claim the respect of all as subjects of democracy. Therefore, what is needed is gender policies that aim at the annulment of gender as a system of subject hierarchy, and not simply policies “for women”, since the latter may indeed function in a positive way for certain women; in the end, however, they hold in abeyance the elimination of the social inferiority of women as a social category. What is needed for gender policy so that it may overcome the level of modernizing intervention that legitimates in the end women’s subordination, is for it to aim at the service of gendered subjects/ citizens whose universality shall include as a matter of fact multiple differentiations and particularities, which the relevant policy shall seek to transform to substantially compatible to the common reference of all to a democratic political community.133 On the level of contemporary political theory the matter centres on the way in which the political significance of the gendered existence of the subjects will be recognized in its public dimension also, as citizens that is, without perpetuating and further legitimating the dichotomous and, for that reason, hierarchically differentiated categories of gendered citizens. On the basis of the foregoing, it appears that gender, besides being a constitutive element of social relations that is (apparently) based on perceived differences between women and men and leads to women’s oppression, is also a primary way of signifying power relations.134 I say “apparently” because gender is neither something stable and self-evident referring to (in the sense that it originates out of) anatomy,135 nor are there only two genders, since there is no single way in which women are women and men are men, to the degree that gender interacts with other factors of social inequality.136 Consequently, it is legitimate to formulate the following question: if it is doubtful whether women will ever become equal citizens with men, since all gender bipolarity referents exclude women from the substantial possession of citizenship and, furthermore, if the (inherently unrealistic) demand for substantially equal rights or special regulation is no longer sufficient, then what are, and how will they ever be brought about, the necessary changes in the gender relations system that would enable gendered subjects to actually co-exist as equal citizens? In a way, that is, that the established signification of power relations with reference to gender perceived as bipolar will be suspended. And on the level of political theory, how will a conception be formed of the gendered subject whose universality will not contradict particularity, but will assimilate multiplicity and

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multiformity as an expected component of the former? And finally, how will women as well as men bridge the gap between (what is perceived as) their gendered and their human existence? Before an attempt is made to sketch responses to the above questions,137 it is useful to add that, while it is obvious that there are multiple groupings of the subjects according to different points of reference, which in particular circumstances may be converted into factors of oppression (such as gender, race, physical incapacities, sexual orientation, social class, ethnicity, religious observance etc.), through the homogenization of women (and men), entailed by the acceptance of gender as a dichotomy, this multiple subjective reference is often suppressed. Thus a distorted picture of social reality emerges with consequences both on the level of policies and on the level of ideological legitimation of women’s subordination which is thus facilitated. The acceptance of gender dichotomy also invalidates in essence all attempts at denouncing the oppressive ideological function of the distinction between the public and the private, which primarily constitutes an expression and concretization of the gender bipolarity fantasy.138 On the contrary, the acceptance of multiplicity facilitates the demonstration of the paradoxical character of this distinction and functions in a liberating way for women. While society is founded on multiformities, multiplicities and differences, these differences have been structured until today mainly as bipolar, which encourages their being experienced as hierarchical, and subsequently, as power relations. Therefore, when socio-economic developments (with the input of the feminist movement as well) contribute to the direction of blunting the strict distribution of gender roles, a feminist politics posing a claim for the right to “difference” for women operates no longer in an effective way in their favour, since it accepts the dominant homogenizing and restrictive gender bipolarity. The same of course applies to the dual universality thesis. There can be no attack on one’s own status as “the other”, as long as one expresses claims as “the other”. The point of contention here is rather how to claim the right of all to develop and express all aspects of their personality, unique as it is, beyond predetermined roles and models and certainly beyond any logic legitimating the notion of gender bipolarity, which proves to be substantive only for the functioning of a power relation system. Only in this way will feminist theory essentially escape from the dilemma equality or difference,139 which will thus emerge as false, and only in this way will the aspiration to secure substantial justice (beyond the perspective restricting it to positive, but not radical social justice policies) ever be possibly able to approach what M. Walzer calls “complex equality”.140 In other words, neither equal treatment of all indiscriminately (because this is usually unjust to the weak), nor treatment on the basis of “merit” (for who will judge and on the basis of which criteria?), nor mere respect of rights (which does not suffice), but the guarantee of the possibility for all to progress in each of the various “spheres of distribution”, without having the possibility of converting their advantages from one sphere into another, thus having no possibility to dominate others.141 Without, in other

84 The gendered subject as citizen words, anyone and any group being able to exert power in all areas and over all others, through a game of superiority in one area and falling behind in another, in which all participate, by counterbalancing and thus cancelling each other out.142 If this principle is to prevail as a guiding principle for social policy, and if efforts are expended to always posit as a criterion for the implementation of policies the answer to the question “which practice best promotes complex equality?”, then according to M. Walzer, a significant step will have been taken towards substantial equality in citizenship.143 In fact nowadays, the philosophical defence of equality will have to be conducted along new terms: as M. Walzer again stresses, this can no longer ignore and silence the diversity in subjective experiences and choices that subjects make, but must accept them as expected, embrace and celebrate them and formulate them not only in individual, but also in social terms.144 Citizens, on the other hand, will thus be in a position to form multiple and different alliances, depending on the particular aim at each juncture, alliances which consequently will not be polarizing or confrontational in toto, since they will not be constituted with the entire spectrum of sociopolitical issues as a point of reference. As for the degree to which they will be mere reformist interventions or will in the long term aim at radical changes, this will depend on if and how they will be inducted in a general strategy for radical change.145 We must also add however, that the foregoing may come about only if beforehand we deconstruct the categories women–men, which function paradigmatically in the opposite direction, obstructing any attempt at achieving “complex equality”, since in their conceptualization they solidify the antithetic disjunction: dependence–independence, weakness–strength, emotion–logic and so on, in a polar fashion. In order for citizens to co-exist as equals in the public sphere they must, in other words, co-exist in all fields as multiform subjects with no predetermined identity that classifies them in one of the two different and seemingly self-evident gender categories, which at the same time denotes a particular position in a totalizing power relations system. Multiformity and differences must also be legitimated as expected positive aspects of social reality, that is, we must treat “differences differently”,146 challenging their self-evident, given and hierarchical character. Because if the reasoning concerning difference constitutes a response to the respective reasoning concerning identities, it is itself at the same time open to challenges: if in the end we are our differences,147 what matters to theory is to distinguish the process by means of which diversities are formed and not to document the differences of the subjects by substituting established identities, which of course are by definition different, with established differences which ultimately perform the same functions with the former. It is of interest, that is, to explore the ways in which the category women is structured, how what is treated as the self-evident difference related to gender is transliterated into substantial discrimination in social relations, and the way that relations of subordination are created on the basis of this distinction.148 Only thus will what C. Pateman called “the Wollstonecraft dilemma”149 be resolved, a dilemma which may be encapsulated in the ambivalent stance

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between the aspiration of women to become citizens “as women”, with their distinctive attributes and capacities given expression as contributions to citizenship, and the aspiration for equality which opts for the dimension of the genderless subject, but which implies that women must be like men.150 Because, just as a claim for equality in which it is implied that women, in order not to be encumbered by their gender, should become like men, having to choose either the right to be equal or the right to be different,151 is obviously not enough, likewise insisting on the gender dichotomy by claiming for women a citizenship which will assimilate what is regarded as feminine qualities and capacities as women’s input, will be like claiming the impossible: precisely these qualities are historically excluded by (the androcentric) citizenship.152 The latter will not cease to be in substance androcentric, as long as any changes do not strike primarily against the gender dichotomy, but merely focus on the futile effort to impose the inherently devalorized as an alternative but equivalent value. Let it be noted that the indispensable deconstruction of the gender dichotomy in order to secure for citizenship a character which precludes only exclusions, will have to understand the citizen as gendered, having disengaged, as indicated before, the relevant notion from the traditional dichotomy by admitting a variety of gender positions, but furthermore, it must be accompanied by the respective process in other areas of inequality as well, beyond gender, areas such as ethnicity, race and sexual preference with which it is obvious that gender-referring oppression intermingles.153 The liberatory potential deriving from the deconstruction of fixed, normative (“universal” and thus essentialist) categories will thus permit the “sinful” notion of universality to be salvaged, by incorporating the multiple differences and various historically and socially specific versions of the human,154 ending its role as a unitary standard against which all are judged and many appear lacking and become excluded.155 A universality discoursively structured as the product of the deconstruction of the universal/particular divide.156 By building on, while transforming the classical conception of universality – which indeed is burdened with an inherent exclusionary potential since it refers to abstract, genderless and disembodied subjects – into admitting the plural and multiform subject differences as expected, even as the substance of universality and its raison d’être, citizenship itself will be transformed.157 And references to boundaries and divisions among (groups of) subjects will be seen as a merely political – not logical – issue,158 which will make them appear less fixed and all-encompassing, more precarious and changeable, less a question of destiny than of choice, and finally more compatible with a substantial democracy, being at the same time its precondition and the evidence of its existence.

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Gender, democracy, utopia

4.1 From women’s multiformity to challenging the gender dichotomy A basic hypothesis formulated above concerns the fact that, while it is obvious that multiple axes group subjects in accordance with different points of reference which under specific conditions become factors of oppression, this multiple subjective reference is overlooked through the homogenization of women (as well as of men), which is entailed by the acceptance of gender as a dichotomous relation.1 A consequence of this is the ascription to the subjects of one of the two collective gender identities considered to be evident and given,2 as primary, even exclusive for the total constitution of their personality according to certain views, since it is perceived as decisive. Thus, a distorted image of social reality is composed, with consequences at both the level of policies and that of ideological legitimation of women’s subordination. Also, it has been argued that, though it still seems “utopian” for radical changes to come about in the gender relations system, this is nonetheless wholly necessary as a precondition for the formation of equal citizens of democracy;3 citizenship certainly presupposes the existence of different yet independent and equal subjects who exercise equal political rights, according to their judgement. Therefore, it is not possible for one and the same subject to be at the same time a free citizen of democracy and a wife, financially dependent and oppressed within the family.4 Furthermore, we have already remarked that gender dichotomy presents itself as socially necessary insofar as it is functional to have a separate category of subjects with a leading role, even to the exclusion and prejudice of other activities, in reproduction, both physical and social.5 Thus, different characteristics are ideologically ascribed and socially fostered in the two groups who have (due to ascription) different social roles.6 However, as long as this differentiation is no longer socially functional as important socio-economic developments imply, and even less so ideologically acceptable, the oppressive gender dichotomy, which expresses a social contingency, has no reason to exist. That is, when it becomes increasingly perceived that the masculine and the feminine, as they are socially defined, inhere in all, women and men, and the attempt at categorization of each subject in one given, pure and distinct

Gender, democracy, utopia 87 gender category is restrictive and oppressive to all. Which means, among other things, that it is also not harmonized with the idea of democracy, which like all ideas, historically develops and changes, resulting in meaning nowadays much more than it used to in the past, even being legitimated as a central organizational principle at all social levels. The first and primary point, necessary to be underlined in conjunction with the foregoing, refers to the fact that the acceptance of gender bipolarity, which is promoted as self-evident, must now be rejected both politically and theoretically7 since, among other things, in the current circumstances it leads to impasses in feminist action and to perplexity in theory, due to the exceedingly arbitrary and oppressive homogenization which it entails:8 if we were to accept that women are not in an essentialist manner basically “all the same”, why should we accept the fact that they are as a whole different from men? It has become increasingly acceptable in recent years that differences among women are so significant that they convert women’s subjectivity to a complex and multiform entity that cannot be defined concisely and exclusively in terms of the status of the inferior in the gender relations system. Because, obviously, if a subject is a woman, at the same time she is many other things.9 Nor is there one single women’s political identity, be it with multifarious expressions, in the same way that there is no single way in which women experience their bodies and their sexualities (which is obviously the case for men as well). In this sense, women, as multidimensional subjects with multiple identities, experience as restrictive the references to “gender difference”, which by internally homogenizing two integrated gender categories consolidates and objectifies their supposed characteristics. Additionally, it ideologically legitimates specific gender behavioural models, which are supposedly linked to their collective women’s identity.10 “Ain’t I a woman?” asks the well-known black radical feminist b. hooks, echoing the voice of S. Truth, while underlining the fact that if women “differ” from men, they do not all do so in an identical manner.11 Gender domination is not the sole form of social inequality, while the multitude of power relations and forms of domination demand that feminist critique, imperative as it is, be placed in context. The same feminist “we”, historically promoted as the rallying call for women, has started indeed since the 1980s, in certain societies, to function as a factor of division.12 The assertion that social class as much as skin colour in its social connotations, as well as numerous other parameters (including age and sexual preference which play a decisive role), differentiate the way in which gendered subjects experience their gender, has opened politically the route to the acceptance of diversity in the lived experience of women as women. Of course, with regard to the notion of experience, in general, as well as of women’s experience, it should be clarified that while experience is a process through which all form their subjectivity via contact with social reality, obviously all that is presented as an experience is in need of interpretation, and at the same time what constitutes experience, and what kind of experience at that, is already an interpretation of reality, since it is never self-evident or apparent.13 The “meaning” of experience is socially constructed, while certainly what

88 Gender, democracy, utopia counts as experience and “who gets to make that determination”14 are crucial questions to investigate. And in an androcentric social world, women’s experience in all its variety obviously differs from that of men, while at the same time is rendered invisible in theory. But to accept it as a point of reference for claims, to legitimize it as an alternative, “freely” embraced social stance, is to accept the dominant androcentric perception that by-passes the constructed character of femininity and masculinity, admitting again women as the “other”, the one who “is not a man”. As the reality and the political implications of women’s heterogeneity and multiformity become accepted,15 it is reasonable to expect that subsequently the historically necessary and the theoretically decisive character of the women–men bipolarity will also begin to be challenged. At the same time, it is also legitimate to suppose that, at the political level, the factors that constitute social subordination in general will appear more intensely interwoven. For example, the demand for rights on the part of women has obviously been as a rule a characteristic of women belonging to otherwise privileged social strata, since there is no direct correlation between the extent of one’s oppression and the degree to which one is aware of and opposed to it. However, what kind of equality of rights can claim as women, those women who belong to minorities whose male members themselves are socially subordinate? With whom can these women seek to be equal to, as citizens?16 On the basis of the foregoing, it becomes obvious that the unfolding of feminist contestation and the subsequent course of feminist theory lead to the theoretical rejection of the women–men dichotomy, which now besides being oppressive to all, women and men, is also presented as theoretically unsound: from the demand for equal rights for women and men alike and the effort to make accepted the women–men “difference” as legitimate and not as evaluative, feminism has advanced to the assertion of the differences among women, while it has passed from the necessity of accepting the internal differentiation and contradictions of each separate subject, to the rejection of the preconstructed identities that entrap them. Thus, feminist theory is led to challenging the women–men dichotomy itself, a challenge which appears, theoretically and politically, as one of the most significant postmodern hypotheses.17 At this point I would like to stress two points: on the one hand, through the sketching of the aforementioned course I attempt, among other things, to stress that the current challenging of the gender dichotomy from a feminist point of view is grounded on prior feminist approaches, in the framework of which fundamental significance was laid on the social importance of gender related difference, which had remained until then in silence. In other words, philosophy’s supposed genderless human existence – with the man equated with the human and women viewed only in relation to him – should have first been questioned as hypocritical, and the significance of gender difference in social reality and at the level of theoretical preconceptions should have been stressed as well, and then an alternative conceptualization of the subject could be attempted, as a gendered but not dichotomous subject. It is on this account that certain

Gender, democracy, utopia 89 critiques seem “unfair”, such as those against the (pioneering) work by certain feminist theorists of previous decades, critiques targeting the essentialism implicit in their conception of gender, a conception which sought to challenge the dominant androcentric/essentialist approaches and theories.18 On the other hand, I would like to point out that dualisms are obviously “profoundly anchored in structures and bodies”,19 otherwise they would determine neither the total human existence nor the dominant social organization. There is indeed the view according to which the reproduction of dichotomies, inscribed in the fundamental categorical pairs of the western philosophical tradition20, is conducted primarily at the level of the formation of men’s identity, since in this process the boy must assert his individuality, rejecting a devalorized women’s model with which he had a symbiotic relation.21 This however in no way means that the bipolar world-view is a necessary condition. And if we seek to reexamine and reflect on the preconditions for a just and democratic social coexistence which corresponds to the social, theoretical, cultural, economic and political conditions of the present era, then the re-examination of basic structures of thought and of the social organization with reference to dualisms and their contingent nature is absolutely indispensable. The central question for which an attempt to respond is outlined here on the basis of the foregoing problematique refers to the basic question of ethics, which is concerned with that which may be the best possible way for human subjects to organize their lives.22 A normative question obviously, referring to what it is right to value.23 If actually all, women and men, constitute unique, different in multiple and different ways, independent and equal subjects with a common humanity, then new ways must be traced in order for these subjects to experience their human existence beyond (oppressive) dichotomies. But what is the theoretical import of the foregoing imperative for politics and how can this be transformed or at least infiltrated into gender policy? In other words, how can the acceptance of this ethical vision be conceptualized, so that socially and politically the gendered ceases to be identified with the dichotomous? Moreover, in what ways can a radically different view concerning gender and the gendered subject influence feminist action, a view which will also overcome the established distinction between sex and gender, in the framework of which the women–men dichotomy in all its social connotations is not questioned (or rather it was never possible to be questioned effectively)? With respect to the latter point, what must be initially stressed is that frequently, political claims and the resulting “transaction” with the state may contribute to the creation of a view in the framework of which (what is perceived as) the feasible is confused with the desirable;24 while the latter is disregarded and in the end invalidated as a vision through its entrapment in a pressure group logic. This is the reason why it is not only liberal feminists who have demarcated aspirations and claims with respect to that which they conceptualize as gender inequality. Departing from numerous other theoretical points, the aims promoted in the framework of gender policies and the emergent visions for the evolution of the gender relations system are obviously moderate. And more importantly, in the end

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insufficient as a response to the importance of the issue, which demands a radical reversal in the dominant value system, but also in basic parameters of the way in which an apparently given and immutable “reality” is perceived, and thus dealt with. If we come to accept that the central issue is the formation of the preconditions so that all subjects may improve their life conditions and secure the fullest possible development of their personality, beyond constraints and normative prescriptions, aimed at their autonomy and self-realization and if, moreover, we were to ascend to the hypothesis supported above, according to which an indispensable condition for the formation of the relevant preconditions with respect to gender is the rejection of the socially constructed gender dichotomy, which is necessary also for the substantial functioning of democracy, it is essential to clarify the way in which this dichotomy can be substantiated as invalid and voidable. That is, as a social construction not based on an ineluctable natural/biological reality, as it is usually implied, but which constitutes one particular interpretation (one out of many possible ones), and, therefore, is subject to change. The change in the way in which we conceptualize gender must, however, be based on changes in the way we conceptualize the subject. It is absolutely necessary for the mind–body dualism dominating the western conception of the subject to be superseded; a conception in which there is an implicit hierarchy, with the valorization of the mind to the detriment of the body,25 and the simultaneous identification of the mind with men and the body with women.26 Beyond the foregoing, the relevant bipolar categorization facilitates, as its consequence the men/women divide, since at the level of the body, as a distinct and separate element of the subject (which in accordance to the dominant views has a body, but is not itself a body), the anatomical difference may easily be conceptualized as a bipolarity. The question that “haunts the western imagination – ‘who am I?’ – ” is answered, according to M. Shildrick,27 on the basis of a sense of subjectivity founded mainly on the fact that one constitutes a subjectivity insofar as one is differentiated from another, “secure within the well defined boundaries of the body” and not, in other words, being that body. On the other hand, the body, due to the way in which it is as a rule perceived,28 and subsequently physical differences, have been a central axis of oppression and exploitation.29 It is in reference to the body that dominant cultural models designate, isolate and devalue specific categories of subjects (the aged, the obese, homosexuals, etc.) bearing consequences that appear more encompassing than those we have supposed them to be until now. I.M. Young maintains that by imprisoning all who are defined as the “others” in their bodies, dominant social groups appropriate the role of disembodied subjects, becoming those who define standards and judge others, without ever being judged themselves against unattainable standards.30 In regard to discrimination on the basis of gender, the relevant role of the body is especially obvious moreover, insofar as the – distinct from the mind and indeterminable regarding gender – body of our philosophical tradition is tacitly masculine.31 Something that applies also in the case of other, revisionist approaches that concern it.32

Gender, democracy, utopia 91 If, on the contrary, we perceive the subject as a whole,33 as a “lived body”,34 which is constituted also by the cultural inscriptions to it, then it is much easier to distinguish the multiple, multiform and uneven differences that separate the subjects (thus, also uniting them), while at the same time the nature–culture dichotomy looks in perspective as possible to be overcome.35 Then, the anatomical difference related to reproduction may assume other dimensions, may appear as merely one of the many expressions of diversity in human existence, be invested with a different significance, a much more minor one, since sex/gender has always had as much importance as socially attributed to it. The fact that (still) nowadays it constitutes an extremely significant element of identity, being in terms of time indeed the first to be recorded and from which directly stem specific anticipations, does not mean that such a state of affairs is inescapable. Thus, it makes sense to say that another conception of the body will facilitate yet another understanding of gender and vice versa: because the sexually differentiated bodies acquire meaning, “they exist” only within the framework of particular historically formed gender relations systems.36 This hypothesis, that perceives radical changes in the gender relations system as potentially anticipated, perhaps allows one to look forward to, in unison with supporters of pragmatism, a future full of “variety and freedom” and to perceive the present “as a transitional stage to something which might, with luck, be unimaginably better”.37 Because if actually “we” cannot exist save with “the others”, a new way can be formed, a less radical and exclusive way for the drawing of the distinction,38 since, furthermore, a characteristic of democratic politics lies precisely in the change of the way that this divide is delimited, which becomes less unbridgeable. Therefore, many different and overlapping “we” may (co)exist, if it were to be accepted that all constitute social conventions capable of change and susceptible to reversal. And the women/men divide, as a social construction, is a convention. We know that all social conventions, all areas of consensus are an attempt at stabilization of a situation, which needs to be stabilized for precisely the reason that it is essentially unstable.39 If boundaries and categories were clear and stable, then attempts at stabilization would be superfluous,40 while the lack of stability constitutes at the same time both a risk and an opportunity, being the point where “the possible and the impossible cross each other”.41 As for the feminist outlook, it will stand to gain a lot if it treats the lack of stability as an opportunity which allows it to attack the foundations of a power relation, and not as an element undermining the unity of the subject of feminism, contributing even to its elimination.42 As far as women are concerned, their “liberation” seems, in the end, on the basis of the foregoing, to refer to precisely their liberation from women’s identity,43 as it is structured to this day and as it is often conceptualized even in the framework of women’s contention. The latter, on the other hand, is in a phase of development that requires that it does not undermine the cultural possibilities opened by feminist theory, through preservation via their modernization of “traditional” gender identities regarded as decisive for a feminist politics.44 Any preservation of the “feminine”, even in a modified or “modernized” form, entails the respective

92 Gender, democracy, utopia preservation of the “masculine”, and thus the preservation of an inherently hierarchical dichotomy,45 which, among other things, gives rise to and perpetuates substantial problems in the functioning of democracy.

4.2 Gender, sex, sexuality and democracy If we are to understand gender as a set of imperatives, which the subjects try to incorporate on the basis of a socially formulated reading of what is dictated by nature, we are going to agree with M. Wittig in that the fact that we experience our subjectivity as women or men does not primarily refer to natural data, but to “political categories” that serve the needs of a hierarchy.46 On the basis of this reasoning, political theory will have to deal with the ideological preconceptions that conceal the political nature of the relevant notions, as much as with the theoretical preconditions for these notions to be released from their hierarchical and oppressive connotations (releasing the subjects at the same time), contributing thus to the overcoming of (part of) the distortions of democracy. And in particular of those distortions referring to the (inherent) androcentrism of citizenship and the subsequent marginalization of specific members of society based on their sex/gender as a legitimating argument. But to what exactly are we referring in the above comments? Is gender implied or is it sex? And in what way are these two connected? The dominant view that refers to “common sense” sees, of course, an immediate connection between the two and treats in an absolutely dichotomous way and in absolute correspondence the woman–man and female–male bipolarities. That is, it regards the former as constituting the social expression of the latter which is reduced to nature and thus restricts its manifestations to select spheres of the private and especially to that of sexuality. Two types of issues result from these common-sense views on the relationship between gender and sex: the first makes imperative the investigation into how immediate and given the relation between the two is, but also how unidirectional it is. That is, are all female human beings women and all male men? Is there one core way with which these experience femininity and masculinity respectively? The second type of issue refers to the investigation into how given, manifest and indubitable sex is and therefore how its understanding may be effected without mediation referring to pre-existing hypotheses and expectations.47 It is necessary that a thorough investigation be conducted on these issues, because otherwise no gender policy (often framed as “policy for women”, thus revealing its theoretical origins) can ever manage to confront the substance of social inequality of the gendered subjects as such. An inquiry into these issues will also afford the formulation of another hypothesis, in the framework of which the necessity to challenge the absolute character of the distinction itself, between gender and sex, is made apparent, a challenging necessitated by developments in social theory, but which also facilitates the conception of a different relation of gendered citizens with democracy, as possible, foreseeable, even expected. It is interesting to note that, while the gender–sex distinction constituted a very significant contribution

Gender, democracy, utopia 93 of feminist thinking to social theory, the subsequent development of feminist theory made it possible to see that the relevant distinction did not benefit the theoretical treatment of the body and sex. The latter were thus allowed to be relegated beyond the scope of theory, to the field of “naturalness”, and the culture–nature dichotomy remained unchallenged, not recognized as a theoretical construction in which the gender dichotomy is inscribed. Hence, all political appeals to a normative imperative not to causally link gender to sex, although morally valid to many, lack in any convincing legitimating argumentation as to why it should be so, if sex is nature, and thus guide gender policies towards those well-meaning and well-known but insufficient pro-women measures. Therefore, while initially the sex–gender distinction had an important political role to play, since it challenged the androcentric attitude of relegating gender relations in toto to the realm of nature and out of that of politics,48 it has by now out-grown its purpose and functions in favour of (a modernized version of) the existing gender order. The awareness of this problem compelled feminist theorists to depart from the study of the “social interpretations and the consequences of sex” (that is, from gender, since this is the way in which they conceptualized it),49 and from cultural meanings connected with the body, to another approach focusing on how subjects interact with and through their bodies.50 The above approach is reinforced by pioneering assertions by J. Butler,51 according to which gender is not a mere cultural reflection of the natural dichotomy of the biological, but rather it determines the social practices through which the gender dichotomy is presented as originating from nature. Therefore, both sex and gender constitute cultural categories. And indeed categories “that refer to ways of describing and understanding human bodies and human relationships, our relations to our selves and to others”.52 As for exclusive gender identities, not only do they not express natural differences, but on the contrary, they signify “the suppression of natural similarities”. Indeed, as G. Rubin notes,53 exclusive gender identity “requires repression: in men, of whatever is the local version of ‘feminine’ traits; in women, of the local definition of ‘masculine’ ”. I will not go into the second category of issues, as defined above, for obvious reasons. I will simply note certain documented conclusions deriving from other scientific disciplines that appear to be interesting from the point of view of this problematique.54 The biological constituents that go into the female–male bipolarity are multiple as they include mainly hormonal, genetic and anatomical differences. However, all women and all men have different and differing amounts of female and male hormones throughout the course of life, while a subject may be anatomically female and have at the same time an XY chromosomal type, that is, be genetically male. Let it also be noted that obviously the ability of conception, gestation and birth that characterizes females, neither characterizes all women, nor can be fulfilled throughout the entire course of life, therefore, it cannot be an absolute criterion of distinction, while aggressiveness and muscular strength, as much as sexual preferences, are for good reason insufficient criteria of classification with respect to sex. Consequently, as

94 Gender, democracy, utopia V. Bryson notes, despite the fact that the vast majority of individuals feel that they have been classified correctly, there is no basis, at the level of biological difference, for a dichotomous categorization of women and men in categories that are pure, sufficient to characterize them absolutely and continuously, and mutually exclusive.55 Moreover, and this is more interesting, even differences that may be connected to biological parameters in certain cases (aggressiveness as a result of male hormones, for example), even these parameters function at a level of tendencies and predisposition. Socialization may obviously contribute to their control and restriction, or, by contrast, to the inducement of their manifestation, since what is observed is a continuum, in the framework of which the subjective position of each subject is largely determined by the social context, and not a binary division (men = aggressive, women = non-aggressive), which is reduced to nature.56 Thus, it becomes evident that many of the characteristics attributed to sex, are in reality the result of socialization,57 that is, manifestations of gender, while for other characteristics, which actually constitute biological differences between subjects, such as, for example, the fact that women are those who get pregnant and give birth, it is not necessary that they have either the social and symbolic connotations that they now have, or certainly the traditional economic and other consequences.58 While the perception of women’s ability to give birth, referring to social contract theory, renders women deficient in “the capacity to create and maintain political right”, since it “symbolizes everything that makes women incapable of entering the original contract”,59 this symbolism can change following radical theoretical and social transformations. As for mothering, a social activity with special importance, this may obviously be performed independently of the reproductive capacity of women, and surely without the well-known consequences at the level of women’s working lives.60 It is however characteristic that, as a rule, the biological approach to sexuality, which tends to be presented as scientific, objective and ideologically neutral, is charged with preconceptions concerning the gendered body and gender relations, resulting, for example, in descriptions of fertilization, conducted even to this day,61 in terms coloured by hypotheses that refer to gender: the sperm is presented as active and dynamic, while the ovum, on the contrary, is considered to be passive, etc.62 A description which, while it cannot be substantiated scientifically – since it is rather the ovum that actively “selects” which one out of the multitude of sperms in motion will be allowed to penetrate it – in case this admits of corrections, these are again done in terms that refer to stereotypical preconceptions that concern gender: the ovum in such a case is insatiable, snares, entraps and devours its unsuspecting victim like an aggressive “femme fatale”.63 In this sense, it is evident that references to the biological nature of subjects have a legitimating and not an explanatory value.64 We see, in other words, that “the reference to the biological nature normatively establishes what it is supposed to logically explain”,65 while biology – which does not express some “scientific truth”, but is itself a socio-cultural category historically constituted that functions as a metaphor for women’s inferiority66 – in no way forces

Gender, democracy, utopia 95 gender differences to remain as they are. Because we have the ability to change; thus, the future of gender-dependent differences is up to us.67 This hypothesis is further strengthened if we are reminded of another hypothesis referring to the body, in accordance to which the body is experienced not merely as a natural/anatomic unity which the subjects “inhabit”, but as a set of cultural representations and inscriptions. As long as this hypothesis is accepted, then the same must be the case for sex, resulting in the boundaries between sex and gender appearing as vague and indefinite, while both are presented, as already mentioned above, as basically social and cultural constructions.68 Thus, the reference to “gender difference” as specific and self-subsistent reifies the notion and blurs the reality that concerns the social process of the structuring and signification of gender,69 linked to an equally social process of structuring and signification of sex. However, what is especially important to be noted is the fact that ideologically the unchallenged strict and exclusive classification of the subjects in one of two mutually exclusive sex categories contributes to the perpetuation of the view that the differences between (all) women and (all) men are fundamental, substantial and immutable. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to “overcome” gender (that is, the inequalities linked to it) through policies, to the degree that it is regarded to be referring automatically and unequivocally to the natural dichotomy of the biological. While, in other words, as has already been underlined, sexual differences have as much significance as ascribed to them by society, the absolute dominance of the acceptance of naturalness with which the female–male dichotomy is invested, and the blurring of the fact that it is neither absolute nor its understanding unaffected by elements that refer to gender, obstructs the erasure of the oppressive functioning of the women–men divide,70 which bears substantial consequences for the operating of democracy. If by definition all citizens of democracy are equal at the level of deontology and of theory, “the ‘natural’ equality of citizens contradicts the ‘natural’ inequality of sexes”,71 since gender is perceived as unavoidably linked to the biological destiny of sex. Thus, the latter will also have to be invalidated in the ideological sense, so that the preconditions may be forged for a substantial democracy in regard to the gendered existence of citizens. But if we were to provisionally accept the manifest and given character of sex, as is the case in dominant views, how is this connected to gender? Getting back to the first category of issues referred to above, relative to the immediacy of the connections of the female with women and the male with men, it is interesting to return to a previous hypothesis,72 which refers to the fact that there is no one way in which women are women and men are men; gender interacts with other factors of social inequality and, moreover, the whole plexus changes historically and is differentiated according to class. Gender, a significant element in the formation of subjectivity, does not constitute a given and manifest identity attributed to the subject, but is formed through complex processes, which, on the one hand, are subject to historical and social differentiation and, on the other hand, are characterized by multiple internal contradictions.73 If we accept,

96 Gender, democracy, utopia by contrast, that gender affects in an identical manner all women and all men, this is similar to accepting that subjects are the “passive and unsuspecting victims of its wicked ways”,74 which obviously is not verified if we observe the diversity in the expressions of gender. However, according to the dominant view, gender is understood as a simple social expression of the biological, which appears to be unmediated in particular manifestations and, especially, those related to sexuality, regarded as a “natural” expression of desires and drives. While, though we know that sexuality is also socially constructed through the discourse that concerns it,75 it is worth noting that in common views, the sexual practices of subjects may ascribe gender identities to them: thus, “the real man” is he who penetrates76 (in certain cultural milieus, indeed, even independently of the sex of the sexual partner) and “the real woman” is she who engages in sexual relations with men. That is, from an expression of sex, the sexuality of the subjects and the subsequent practices are rendered into factors that ascribe gender identities to them. While, however, homosexual sexuality regarded as deviant constitutes in the framework of the dominant view an object for inquiry with regard to its explanation (where psychological, hormonal, social and sociological factors are examined), by contrast, the causal relations that govern heterosexual relations remain beyond the scope of inquiry as being “natural”. In scientific studies concerning sexuality, heterosexual identity often seems not to need to be investigated, remaining naturalized, while at the subjective level nothing impels heterosexuals to consider their sexual identity and investigate its origin.77 Thus, remaining in a critical vacuum due to “naturalness”, heterosexual identity contributes to further legitimating the gender dichotomy, a substantial precondition for the preservation of an oppressive gender relations system. It should, however, be parenthetically added that homosexual identity when investigated within the framework of the dominant (essentialist) logic concerning sexuality, mainly involves male homosexuality; often, in dominant views as expressed through legislation, lesbians do not exist, since “there is no sexuality without a man”, as long as women are viewed as vessels for male desire.78 It is characteristic that even in the work of the very theorist who has perhaps endeavoured the most systematic anti-essentialist treatment of sexuality demonstrating the ways in which it is structured through discourse, namely M. Foucault, women’s homosexuality is ignored in the structuring of the category homosexual, to the point that (even) homosexuality is implicitly conceptualized as a male quality.79 The feminist contribution to the theory of sexuality, suggesting for the first time a “women’s” perspective free of patriarchal preconceptions, in all its internal divisions and controversies, offered a subversive view;80 it permitted the revelation as a political issue, of the connection of the way in which sexuality is conceptualized and experienced at the subjective level, with the preservation of the existing gender relations system and, consequently, in accordance with the problematique expounded here, with democracy as well. Actually, the “truths” concerning sexuality are not revealed with the progress of science, but are constructed according to the ideological context surrounding the gender relations

Gender, democracy, utopia 97 system,81 and thus, their political nature becomes manifest. For certain radical feminists, indeed, sexuality makes up the primary means of controlling and preserving the subordination of women.82 For them, a theory of sexuality qualifies as feminist, “to the extent it treats sexuality as a social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women and constitutive of the meaning of gender.”83 While, obviously, the dominant model of sexual relations reflects the inferior social status of women (something which is also accepted by socialist feminists),84 at the same time, it decisively contributes to its preservation. However, it must not be overlooked that although the orientation of desire is regulated in such a way as to promote and establish heterosexuality as inevitable and natural,85 at the subjective level, personal experience can contradict dominant socio-political discourses. According to R. Horrocks, it is even likely that sex is the key area of counter-cultural experience.86 Heterosexual desire87 and the respective practices that do not usually form, as mentioned above, an object of special investigation considered to be “natural” as a necessary condition for reproduction, promote a model for sexuality through which the gender dichotomy is indeed further legitimated.88 The dominant manner of reading gender is actually conducted through a conception of the body, in the framework of which it is thought that a stable and manifest, biologically determined as female or male body, is erotically expressed through a stable and given gender identity (masculine or feminine), defined antithetically through heterosexual practice.89 And, while, surely, the body, due to its physiology (that is, mainly depending on whether the subject has a vagina or a penis), affects what type of sexual experience (stricto sensu) a specific subject is going to have, it is not the body that determines the kind of sexual practices subjects will desire to become engaged in, and certainly not the manner in which they will signify them. The bodily dimension of subjectivity acquires the power to form human sexual behaviour through its signification in a specific cultural context,90 which determines what a subject will perceive as sexually desirable. The dominance, moreover, of that which A. Rich calls “compulsory heterosexuality”,91 is produced at the level of discourse and social practice, and, certainly, not at that of the body; at the same time it perpetuates the inequality in gender relations and the exploitation of women, since it contributes to the legitimation of the gender dichotomy and of the internal homogenization of a bipolar gender identity, establishing thus the existence of two genders as obvious and given.92 Consequently, heterosexuality as a norm, beyond any “biologizing” conception concerning its naturalness, comes forth as a system of political hegemony that has been profoundly oppressive for women and which at the same time has contributed, and continues to contribute to furthering the consolidation of the gender dichotomy and, subsequently, of the power component indicative of the gender relations system. According to this logic, it is legitimate to form the hypothesis that doing away with “compulsory heterosexuality” will advance the cause of the liberation of the human quality of subjects “freed from the shackles of sex”,93 since only within the framework of heterosexual relations can the notions “woman”/“man” and the relevant dichotomy acquire a stable

98 Gender, democracy, utopia and manifest character and, subsequently, have the well-known consequences for democracy. Nevertheless, heterosexuality, a major area of disagreement among feminists,94 is not just a primary institution of women’s oppression, since on the subjective level it may – like all institutions that structure and reproduce domination – leave space for countering its character. While as a rule it functions politically as such in the existing conditions of institutionalized compulsory heterosexuality, restricting in fact women’s lives no matter what their sexual practices, it seems that it is precisely the compulsory aspect that is problematic, as well as the sexist connotations of its perception and discoursive function, and not heterosexuality per se. But of course, a counter-argument to the above would be that heterosexuality would anyway have no conceptual validity in a radically different gender order, while “heterosexuality per se” seems impossible to be conceptually conceived, since this would mean to approach it beyond its constitutive context, encapsulated in its structurally compulsive character. Since, however, sexual practices in part determine gender (and not merely vice versa, insofar as, as mentioned above, man is the one who penetrates), it is legitimate to wonder whether the relevant toleration,95 observable in recent decades towards forms of sexuality considered to be deviant, will ever constitute a substantial factor of change in the dominant, oppressive gender relations system. Evidently, if the foregoing were to take place (that is, if the acceptance of forms of sexuality presently regarded as deviant were to become generalized), this would be a breakthrough towards the direction of the democratization of social symbiosis. This would be the case, not only through the diminishing of the importance of the women–men divide, but also through the bridging of one of the deepest rifts that isolate the sexual “others” and reduce them to pariahs; something which will thus release the “other” in the interior of each subject. R. Horrocks,96 observing that in the western world the dominant social stance visà-vis sexuality has been radically changing (citing as an example the generalized acceptance of non-procreative sex, the relative waning in the rejection of homosexual sex, etc.) asks, without offering an answer, whether we are actually headed towards a significant transformation of patriarchy or whether, on the contrary, we are simply witnessing an ingenious Foucauldian manoeuvre, conducted by the foregoing, aimed at attaining control through “liberalization”. I have the impression that the extent of the importance of the emerging changes will greatly depend on how they will be handled by all those interested in maximizing their significance for the elimination of the dominant gender relations system.97 Because the pertinent changes, especially those substantiating the nondependence of sexuality on reproduction, do not necessarily attack the existence of the women–men divide, which usually is hardly challenged, but mainly the boundaries where the dividing line is drawn between the two, boundaries that are subject to negotiation.98 What is certain, however, is that no increase in the toleration towards the sexually divergent can ever be sufficient. Despite the fact that, according to M. Walzer, “toleration makes difference possible; difference makes toleration necessary”,99 I would say that in sectors exceptionally significant for subjectivity, the liberal toleration of difference is never quite enough,

Gender, democracy, utopia 99 because the notion itself implies that “difference” is linked to power.100 Contrariwise, the total acceptance of “difference”, taken in the sense of diversity, as an expected and positive fact of life, is absolutely necessary as a moral principle. This acceptance will have certainly to be manifested in the framework of the equally absolute respect for human existence and of the principles of democracy,101 that is, a total acceptance of “difference” that is not interconnected with inequality; “cultural difference can only be freely elaborated and democratically mediated on the basis of social equality”.102 Thus, if we are to accept that today there are two basic impediments to substantial democracy, as N. Fraser argues,103 one being social inequality and the other the misrecognition of difference, at the same time we must clarify how we perceive difference. Which cannot be through the uncritical acceptance of such “differences” as those related to gender, produced as a result of subordination. In opposition to the total acceptance and positive valuation of diversity, the non-likeable or the acceptable by ascription are inherent as an implied meaning within the notion of toleration in which a negative value judgement seems implied, elements that cannot sustain basic structures of democratic social co-existence. And whether we evaluate positively or just tolerate diversity will dictate different policies, only the former going beyond the protection of formal rights.104 With the above comments no unrealistic hypothesis about social harmonization is implied, in which no rivalry or conflict will exist since there will be acceptance. It is implied, however, that in basic principles of social co-existence there must be a consensus concerning the acceptance of diversity as a positive element that enriches all, and not as a tolerated parameter of reality, a toleration that finally may possibly originate from indifference.105 In the name of toleration of the different (which is in fact necessary for particular, secondary social expressions), cultural “differences” may actually be glossed over, “differences” which are totally incompatible with respect for human existence (such as, for example, the case of clitoridectomy). On the contrary, a socialization aiming at the absolute acceptance of the different, in the concrete framework of respect and democracy set forth above, and the encouragement of diversity in the expression of subjectivity in all sectors, allows the greatest possible development of human potential, conditions of freedom and equality, as well as the preconditions for facing all anticipated antitheses and eventual conflicts under conditions that are morally legitimated. Within such a framework, the concept itself of difference will relinquish its specific character (since the implicit question “different from what?” will sound a false note when there is no one norm) and, consequently, it will no longer signify the meaning of variety. Furthermore, the non-classification of subjects in specific, absolute and impenetrable categories of sexuality, which will not equip them any longer with impermeable identities that by definition exclude each other (heterosexual/ homosexual), contributes to the theoretical erasure of the women–men dichotomy and, subsequently, of the dominant gender relations system. A basic precondition for the substantial “democratization” of democracy. Because, as becomes apparent, a substantial component of the latter is the democratization

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of interpersonal relations, in which obviously sexual relations are included. This politicization of sexuality encourages the forging of a view for a gendered, yet not dichotomous, subject, as the future citizen of democracy: citizens who are different among them in any number of different ways, and who structure their political identities as they interact with the political system; identities that are not pre-existent and therefore do not function as a self-fulfilling prophecy (e.g., “women are less participatory than men”), neither claim expression and recognition through representation in the democratic process, resulting in the further consolidation of their devalorized “difference”, abusing at the same time democracy as well. Additionally, as far as the level of visions is concerned, subjects who today constitute a social category experiencing conditions of marginalization and degradation will not restrict themselves to claims of bigger participation in a process from which they are inherently excluded, and whose rules they will never manage to change in any substantial manner, since through their participation they also contribute to the modernizing legitimation of a social reality that is (and should be) tolerated no longer. This reality will change only if the subjects are freed of their dichotomous gender, a process that will also alter the terms of their participation in the political process, since it will necessarily concern participation in transforming and no longer in preserving it, and for that reason, will also promote the development and the deepening of democracy itself.

4.3 Gendered subjects, utopian thought and democracy If we accept that one of the most important dimensions of our subjectivity – which indeed is one of the last identities that in dominant views remain in the sphere of the natural – that of sex/gender and sexuality,106 is itself fluid, changing and socially constructed, then new and original ways-out are opened for both theoretical thought and the political understanding of the future, which will contribute towards democracy. Only if the road is opened towards a future in which “partial” identities and provisional or in the process of being formed identifications will be the self-evident rule, substituting bipolar crystallizations, again only then will the preconditions be created for the substantial elimination of discriminations referring to gender.107 And only then will the usually implicit claim be able to be satisfied, a claim for a space in which the subjects will form their gendered identity beyond normative imperatives of what it means to be “woman” and what “man”.108 Thus the right to the protection and the expression of an imaginary psychic and moral field, existing in every gendered subject, will have been implemented.109 By contrast, the mere extension of rights and “opportunities” historically functioning as male privilege, to women as well, which is sought through a specific dominant (de facto liberal) feminist perspective, is not sufficient as a measure of “equality”, as already shown by the pertinent experience, since, among other things, this concerns only those women who can and want to

Gender, democracy, utopia 101 adopt masculine models.110 And obviously the issue here is not the way in which the number of women with “contemporary” life-styles will increase (in the sense of a minor variation in a society of “dual gender men”111) to the detriment of “traditional” women, but how the oppressive boundaries of the gender relations system will be ruptured, to the benefit primarily of the social category “women” but not solely of them in the end. We have already noted that doing away with the restrictions of gender will be liberating from certain points of view for men as well, while beyond gender the rupture will bring about substantial changes in quite a number of other power relations systems. This despite the fact that each system of domination has its own logic. Furthermore, allowing traditional men’s identities to remain basically unchanged, along with their respective lifestyles, and promoting their extension on the level of behaviour and social practice to women as well,112 is not something to look forward to; nor can it be regarded as desirable and at the same time a feasible goal to obtain the conversion of the “feminine” as the equivalent of the “masculine”. On the one hand, this is because the former, as the inferior part in the bipolarity, is inherently devalorized, as has already been noted, while at the same time it is constituted at the level of practices and attitudes as a result of oppression and exploitation that the respective social category is subjected to. But also, because on the other hand, in the demand for the “equivalence” of the feminine to the masculine, the fact that they constitute a relation is ignored. They are not given, but one affects, depends on and defines the other within the framework of an inferior–superior logic, while “all forms of femininity in this society are constructed in the context of the overall subordination of women to men”, as R. W. Connell rightly notes.113 Consequently, in one sense, the above demand is self-contradictory: how can what are conceptualized in their correlation by definition as dominating and dominated be transformed into being equivalent? When, in other words, gender forms a system of power relations? Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing, the necessity to investigate the way in which may be conceptualized the gendered but not dichotomous subject of (a future and in this view more authentic) democracy, appears as urgent, since this subject in its multiplicity emerges as the only prospect that secures the preconditions for the emergence of the latter, as far as gender is concerned. The foregoing problematique promotes a perception of subjects as possessing many partial identities, including those referring to gender, thus being gendered but not dichotomous, and can lead, in a sense and on the basis of mainstream terms concerning gender, to the formation of a theoretical hypothesis concerning an androgynous subject; a hypothesis which needs manifold clarifications. Prior to these clarifications, it must be reminded that, as I have tried to argue, the way in which the gendered subject is conceptualized is very significant for social reality, and thus for policies that affect it. Thus changes at the level of theory may have substantial consequences for the reality of social relations and the functioning of democracy. Consequently, what is needed is continuous effort at the level of theory, so that another perspective may emerge.114 As for the “androgynous subject”, it will be useful, on the one hand,

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to be reminded of its long history in the framework of the philosophical tradition in general,115 and especially the western philosophical tradition,116 even if through incidental and/or marginal references, and on the other hand, its dubious position in feminist theory. In the framework of the latter, and while there have for a long time been sporadic references to an androgynous ideal,117 it is important to remark that in the first phase of the revival of feminist theory and action the central significance laid onto the social construction of gender differences and the analysis of social roles as a source of women’s oppression propelled the argument in favour of the reduction of the polarity of men’s and women’s roles and, therefore, explicitly or implicitly, tended towards their replacement by some form of androgyny.118 Afterwards however, the current that came forth in support of a gynocentric approach, in the framework of which women’s “difference” was now being perceived not as a factor of oppression, but as the bearer of the seeds of “liberation”,119 since women, due to their historical experience, had “special virtues” (which for certain theorists substantiates the inherent superiority of women),120 distanced feminist theory from the androgynous subject. The fact that today this current fits in better with the concerns of liberal thought, which, on the one hand, is harmonized with contemporary post Cold War political debates and, on the other hand, brings feminist thinking back in contact with one of the most significant traditions from which it “originates”, has been greatly conducive to the temporary termination of androgyny as a theoretical hypothesis. Under present circumstances, however, the return to and the reformulation of the androgynous hypothesis are absolutely timely as central to the theoretical and political debate on the deepening of democracy. This is true, because those who supported the hypothesis of the innate moral superiority of women (a notion which, among other things, is obviously profoundly essentialist121), must by now realize that they have been deceived: it is clear that both women and men can as easily be corrupted by power (simply, until recently there had been no applicable possibility for the former as a social category). But more importantly, because it has by now become evident that the substance of the devalorization of the feminine cannot be circumvented by means of a more massive access of women to the public sphere. Besides, contemporary developments in social theory, the dissemination of psychoanalytic hypotheses as well as poststructuralist perspectives tend to converge towards the same direction: if some kind of “completion” could be conceived at the subjective level, this should necessarily transcend the boundaries of gender. A subject, for whom one type of behaviour is absolutely dominant, conventionally defined either as feminine or (in an exclusively disjunctive sense) as masculine, cannot function as an integrated and effective individual, capable of confronting various situations. Only subjects who have (and manifest with impunity) qualities categorized as feminine, but at the same time also qualities which are regarded as masculine, may cope, practically and emotionally, in situations that are expected to be confronted by women and men under contemporary conditions.122 But who is, or what could be, this androgynous subject in contemporary

Gender, democracy, utopia 103 theory, so that the identification of the subject with the “man” be overcome, as well as the inherent weaknesses of the effort to impose the feminine as a “different but equal” version of the human through a modernized acceptance of the gender dichotomy? It should be stressed, to begin with, that the relevant conceptualization of the gendered subject as androgynous does not imply the cancellation/suppression of sex.123 The gendered citizen of democracy is understood in the totality of its existence, and obviously this is manifested physically as well, through a body lived in a number of different ways. That which is presupposed by the hypothesis of the androgynous subject is the deconstruction of sex as a distinct, absolute and stable dichotomy and, especially, the elimination of the inflexible gender structures, as they have come to be known till today. Structures which, despite all changes, continue to function in a derogatory manner for women, keeping them steadfastly in an inferior position on a gender hierarchy. It is legitimate to suppose that this elimination will bring about change also in the way in which sex is conceptualized and, of course, in the sexual choices of the subjects, which will cease to be dictated by the hierarchy inherent in the gender relations system, as we know it at present. Moreover, deconstruction of gender, as has been stressed already, does not mean its theoretical elimination. On the contrary, it means extrication from predetermined Procrustean structures and ensuring the preconditions for a more substantial democratic co-existence of citizens,124 who, among other things, will be also disengaged from preconstructed political identities (“women are more conservative”, “women are less participatory”, “indifferent to politics” etc.), so that they may form their political profile under conditions of greater autonomy and equality (at least with respect to one of the parameters of inequality, namely, gender). Therefore, the term of androgyny, as it is understood here, refers to a theoretical hypothesis concerning a continuum in which the gendered subjects are (could be) placed independently of any given, pre-existent, determinant parameters,125 but also, at the subjective level, it refers to an ideological and psychological stance indicative of the disengagement from the constraints and the norms of gender.126 That is, to the hypothesis of the disruption of the normative connection between sex and gender, which will initially encourage the transformation of subjects from the exclusive disjunction “either man or woman”, to the inclusive conjunction “both man and woman”. Namely, to androgynous subjects, which will finally lead them to be constituted as “neither man nor woman”. In this sense, the androgynous subject signifies ultimately the end of gender,127 as we know it in contemporary societies,128 while it is a concretization at the level of gender of a conception of “partial” identities, provisional and changing identifications, which substitute binary crystallizations. In this sense, the androgynous continuum, proposed above, does not refer to a multiplicity of specific “gender slots”, which would replace the binary classification but still be classificatory, but rather to the acceptance that gender labels have no sense, since there are as many such labels as there are social subjects. A radical gender diversity that annuls gender,129 and renders sex politically insignificant.

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Furthermore, androgyny is (must be) mainly perceived in its social and political connotations as an ethical imperative,130 which suspends one of the central inherent contradictions of gendered citizenship, and in its theoretical and epistemological connotations as (the sole?) substantially anti-sexist stance in the conceptualization of gender, which recognizes its contingent nature and which includes the prospect of possible radical future developments. If furthermore, we accept that discourse constitutes the social reality which it supposedly merely describes, the social importance of a new conceptualization of gender based on the androgynous hypothesis becomes evident. The same applies to its political importance and to the prospects thus opened for the project of democracy. We should note, however, that in the notion of androgynous subject there is an inherent contradiction: while it promotes the elimination of stereotypical views on gender and the qualities that supposedly accompany the classification along the women–men divide, at the same time as a concept it is constituted with reference to the very same terms it rejects.131 This is certainly a problem and indeed with such significance that it is legitimate to ask whether it is unfortunate to refer to the relevant concept so long as it seems to echo all the theoretical weaknesses and ideological distortions it explicitly seeks to demonstrate and overcome. If, however, “androgyny” is conceptualized not as pseudo-totality, nor as universality with all the traditional connotations of uniformity, but, quite the opposite, as the abolition of the boundaries of gender characteristics, as we know them in the current social reality,132 namely, as liberation from the respective bounds and as acceptance of multiplicity and diversity, then, despite the inherent contradiction that characterizes the concept of the androgynous subject, the reasoning accompanying its use emerges as exceptionally positive: C. Heilbrun, with whom I will agree, characterizes the concept of the androgynous subject as a step along a route that may prove to be the most significant and which is certainly the most revolutionary in the course of humanity.133 Because then, when that is, we can no longer talk about women or men, then the question same or different? will no longer have any meaning, and thus it will not determine the conditions of our lives, proving at the same time that the opposite of gender difference is not uniformity, but diversity in the expression of the gendered.134 A question that will thus be answered only in the (paradoxical) manner suggested by L. Sargisson: “Are they then the same or different? Both, I suggest, and neither and more”.135 Then the bipolarity of gender will have been transgressed, but also the notion of the androgynous subject itself will have fulfilled its role. That is, completing T. Moi, who refers in a critical manner to the characterization of the current era as post-feminist, I would say that as post-feminism at the political level is impossible without post-patriarchy,136 likewise a postandrogynous theoretical perspective will become necessary and will be functional only after the end of the dichotomous gender-referent logic. Before coming to this end, the androgynous subject will remain the only acceptable reference to the gendered subject of democracy at the level of political ethics, a democracy which can only thus become substantial with regard to gender, while being the only substantially anti-sexist approach at the level of theory.

Gender, democracy, utopia 105 But what about political practice? First of all, it is interesting to note that the non-acceptance of an androgynous perspective within radical feminist thought is often precisely voiced in reference to political practice. It is mainly based on the idea that androgyny cannot resolve problems of political strategy and tactics, because through it no differences are stressed.137 The androgynous subject is even sometimes rejected as a political vision since it is characterized as “a goal without any road map for getting there”.138 The initial reaction to the above rejection could be one based on the absolute refutation of the idea that the ethical dimension of issues is less significant than the imperatives of politics. Obviously, it cannot be acceptable for a logic focusing strictly on strategic choices to dominate in feminist thought. Whatever the difficulty in formulating and implementing specific policies, long-term objectives should guide and be served by policy choices. But, furthermore, it could even be said that, as a way of approaching social issues, the acceptance of a distinction between an instrumental logic and an ethical one can be highly detrimental to the development of thought,139 and to the specific feminist vision. The target should be to find ways to serve a clear, subversive vision/goal regarding gender, with clear and effective policies, which while able to solve immediate problems, target the specific long-term goal. The specific policies that would promote an androgynous viewpoint will obviously be in the direction of a substantially anti-sexist policy, whose nonnegotiable precondition will be the aiming at the redefinition of “gender” and the gendered subject in accordance to the hypotheses formulated above. Something which would obviously tint the strategy and the tactics to be pursued in the implementation of the relevant policies and in the confrontation of everyday gender related issues. Therefore, no policies can be included in the above, if on the contrary, they accept in practice and especially in the accompanying discourse the logic of gender dichotomy, even in the case they serve the immediate needs and satisfy the expectations of a specific category of women.140 That is, the question that must be clarified for any such policy concerns the long-term aims of the latter: a society in which gender will not exist as a factor of differentiation (and thus of hierarchical classification) of subjects. Or a society in which women (or certain women) will increasingly acquire more power, as a measure for the abolition of absolute male dominance. Obviously, varying conceptions of gender and the gendered subject, but also differences in the internalization of the ideology of gender difference, orientate the choice towards one or the other direction in the sketching of a policy. As for the specific character of a substantial anti-sexist policy aiming at the elimination of gender role prescriptions, this will include interventions and changes in the basic social institutions where sexual/gender difference is created and in all sectors in which the binary model is reproduced: from the primary socialization of infants through the model provided to them by primary care, the socialization of children and adolescents in the family, in school, in the peer groups, in the structure of the family itself which would permit changes in the above, in the messages transmitted by the mass media, in the structure of employment and the pertinent time

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schedules, in the political system, its structure and functioning, in the treatment of sexuality and “marriage”, and so on.141 The cultural changes, but also the changes in the psychological constitution of the subjects entailed by such interventions aiming at the de-institutionalization of gender difference and thus the elimination of gender, would really be revolutionary; the source of women’s oppression is definitely located in the way in which the social world is organized, while we do not know and we can hardly imagine, as Ch. Delphy, rightly notes, what values, culture, individual personality traits would be dominant in a society that was not hierarchically structured on the basis of gender. ‘‘But to imagine it, we must think that it is possible. Practices produce values; other practices produce other values”.142 As for the practices towards which the policies mentioned above would aim, they can be condensed in the everdiminishing importance of gender as an organizing principle in institutions, in everyday life, in interpersonal relations, in one word, everywhere. But are we, maybe, in the domain of utopia? While, in a sense, a positive answer to this question is absolutely legitimate, since, according to Lamartine’s saying, utopias are often nothing but premature truths,143 what is imperative is the conceptual clarification of “utopia”. This is necessary, on the one hand, so that its interconnections with feminist thinking may emerge and, on the other hand, in order to show the political nature of feminist utopia, which, while usually located in the area of the imaginary, springs forth from the real and from a strong desire to disrupt it. There lies utopia’s inherent contradictory aspect that is difficult to handle, since it is in a sense “self-undermining”: obviously, we can speak of what transcends the present only in the language of the present. Thus we risk cancelling out our critical visions of the future in the very act of articulating them.144 Nevertheless, it is worth trying, especially in the area of gender in which utopian ways of perceiving the future appear more and more as a political necessity. And a difficult one to serve, since it implies ways of harmonizing women’s project with a (utopian) gender “indifferent” social order. “Utopia”, a pun on two Greek words, eutopia (the good place) and outopia (no place),145 is the result of expectation motivated by anxiety, such as, for example, the classic expectations of plenitude born of scarcity. And it is this deficiency of plenitude (and for that reason, satisfaction), the state, that is, of dystopia, that steadily and radically transforms desire into utopia.146 In this sense, utopias, the story of which is the other half of the history of humanity, according to L. Mumford,147 are intimately connected with and dependent on reality,148 but they are also destructive for the latter: the existing condition creates utopias, which in turn disrupts this condition, “break the bonds of that existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence”.149 Thus, utopian thought, characterized by an intense critical disposition, emerges as an other, a radical way in which a society may imagine its future, that is, imagine possible/probable developments, even “foresee the unforeseeable”.150 By approaching thinking in a new way, utopian thought “thinks the unthinkable”.151 The latter is possible only insofar as in the logic of the existing system may be detected encoded elements, which if they develop in

Gender, democracy, utopia 107 a certain direction have the strength to disrupt the entire system, and only then there is “authentic utopian thought”, according to T. Eagleton,152 when these are dealt with theoretically. In this sense, feminism is by definition a political utopia,153 and indeed a typical reconstitutive utopia,154 since it aims at the abolition of gender in view of a new social reality, in pretty much the same way the socialist utopia has the abolition of social class as its main objective. At the same time, it is evident that in any contemporary political utopia, that is, in any disruptive understanding of an other social reality which anticipates the future, the feminist dimension is absolutely indispensable, because without a radical upheaval in the gender relations system, no radical social and political change can ever be possible as such. While utopian aspects have always been visible in the framework of feminist theory as early as M. Wollstonecraft,155 I consider, as already noted, that the utopian aspect is inherent in feminist perceptions, so much so that if it is lacking, the latter cannot conceptualize a different gender relations system (and not simply an improved version of the existing), that is, an other expression of the gendered.156 An element which constitutes in my view a necessary condition for an approach to be considered today as feminist (and not “merely” as gynocentric or pro-women). This distinction, between feminist and pro-women, is very important because it indicates that no feminist politics or feminist demands are at present conceivable, if their ultimate goal is other than to dispense with gender as we know it.157 While, however, utopia is perhaps “where we store our hopes of happiness”,158 a contemporary and functional delimitation of the term is distanced, as it appears on the basis of the approaches suggested above, from classical definitions which are centred on the notion of the ideal (non-existent) place,159 and also from the connotations that these definitions bear in everyday conceptions: there, the utopian is identified with the non-realistic, the unattainable, thus functioning as a legitimating reason for rejection, contrasted to what the one who rejects proposes as feasible.160 Feminist utopias, usually through literature do not describe perfect worlds, but radically different worlds in which established dichotomies and primarily that of gender do not exist,161 demonstrating the intensely critical dimension of the utopian perspective. In this sense, the utopian appears as “the not yet”,162 which we need to invent, that in which totally new ways of being can be envisaged, which is desirable. A perspective uniquely significant to be the object of elaboration in the framework of feminist theory, aiming at the extrication of gender from the established conceptions which have distinct limits. Limits translated into boundaries which at the level of policies direct the latter towards reformist, “modernizing” interventions that do not disrupt the gender relations system, and, therefore, do not suspend women’s subordination, contrary to feminist utopian narratives in which appears a discourse referring to political actors and to citizenship, beyond the logic of what C. Pateman calls the sexual contract.163 If, however, utopias are desirable developments that emerge as prospects at some particular historical moment, in their characterization as desirable it is implied that they form a project that some aspire to, but certainly not all. The

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utopias of some are dystopias to others. Therefore, and in combination with their characterization as prospects, that is, as a contingency, it is legitimate to develop a problematique on what is to be done, so that the prospect and, in this case, the feminist prospect does not remain simply a contingency. At the level of theory what is decisive as a contribution to the relevant direction is the renegotiation of gender as non-dichotomous and that of the gendered subject who is bodily, as a whole with multiple and changeable identities. Beyond this, it is up to the political aspect of utopia and the utopian aspect of politics to imagine, plan and implement the required subversive change. And, indeed, by overcoming a political problem that emerges as an assertive contingency in feminist politics: the lack of coherence that has been recently increasing between a radical feminist utopian thinking, which is (or can be) consumed by investing its energy in the creation of imaginary/theoretical “new worlds”164 and a feminist, performing as woman-friendly political practice, which results simply in a modernizing reform of the old, by acting within the specific boundaries of a gender equality policy based on “women’s difference”. Utopian thinking in the end condenses a glance into a future established in the present, through what “could be done”: insofar as, through the ability of the mind to imagine and to reorder reality even beyond experience, utopian thinking can formulate what we need to invent.165 Utopia, therefore, consists in a kind of “daydreaming of that which is not yet”, which is characterized by aesthetic concerns as well as by political aims,166 which emerge through its intensely critical dimension. However, contrary to night-time dreaming, that needs to be analysed in order for what is no longer conscious to emerge, daydreams are indicative of what is not yet conscious,167 but is latent at the level of desire. And if not elsewhere, at least in the rich feminist utopian thought developed in the sphere of theory and literature,168 the strong desire for the disruption of the existing gender relations system is more than evident. On the other hand, at the level of social reality where a definite narrowing of the gap between gender models has been recorded while the developments in reproduction technologies are indeed significant, one may observe as a contingency a tendency (towards a development) that could potentially function in a liberating way for the subjects/citizens, and as a catalyst for the “democratization” of democracy. Is this an idealist illusion?169 Is, in other words, the classic critique levelled against utopian thought, that of idealism usually documented with references to the non-feasibility which supposedly characterizes utopias, founded? No, because imagining that the social conditions of existence and co-existence of subjects could be very different, but also much better, is an absolutely realistic hypothesis.170 It is important to stress, however, that the notion of ideal society is nowhere and in no way implied in this argument. A feminist political utopia does not propose a vision of a society that has solved once and for all social problems, not even all sex/gender related issues. It admits that new and unpredictable issues may arise, while it proposes radical ways out concerning sex/gender as we know it today. Besides, what is and what is not feasible is

Gender, democracy, utopia 109 subject to change in correlation with the changes noted in the agents of change themselves, in the social agents who change in the course of the changes they seek to materialize.171 Analysis and critique of the existing reality that may allow elements of the “new society” to emerge in the context of the old, may also contribute to the transformation of the diffuse desire for change into subversive strategies, so that the structuring of a radically new reality may be set in motion. To the degree that we realize I. Wallerstein’s (self-evident) observation, that “progress” is not inevitable,172 utopian thought, which is inherently critical, seems also the sole way of investigating alternative potential forms that the future may assume.173 Because, as D. Cornell notes, “the truth of what is possible cannot theoretically derive from reality”,174 something more is needed. This is where utopias’ power and social significance lie, beyond any reasoning on the feasible or unfeasible. For feminist theory, moreover, the appeal to utopian thinking with regard to an other gendered reality forms nowadays an ontological necessity, but also, the only actual proof of its refusal to get entangled in the dominant (be it pro-women) tendency of modernizing oppression through partial improvements to a binary gender relations system that cannot, as such, but continue to be oppressive, even if to a lesser degree.

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The central conclusion one arrives at, on the basis of the reasoning developed above, refers to the fact that values such as equality, liberty and self-realization, values intrinsic to the contemporary notion of democracy, in order to be “materialized” as far as the gender relations system is concerned, presuppose the deconstruction of gender as we know it. In the sense of the abolition of the social connotations that constitute it, so that gender may cease to constitute a norm, which subjects try to incorporate, and become a way (one out of many) in which they (choose to) experience their life stories and their bodies. Which implies a new, non-classificatory and non-bipolar conception of sex and “sexual difference” projected onto gender, both becoming irrelevant to their identity as citizens. This is, in other words, the end to the definitive mediation of sex/gender between the subjects and their social milieu, attesting to the genuine disengagement of citizenship from gender through the deconstruction of the dichotomous logic that defines them as unequal also as citizens, affirming thus the absolute incompatibility of democracy with the existing gender order. The fact that contemporary democracies do not meet their constitutive ethicopolitical principles must not mean that we have to compromise our vision and aim for less. And as far as gender is concerned, claiming a gender equality in which the idea of gender dichotomy is inherent is indeed claiming less. But also it attests to a lack of effort to render democracy more compatible with its own assertions: “Liberty and equality for all”, the most radical principles for the organization of society, in order to be approached from the perspective of gender, necessitate the end of sex/gender as we know it. Not just less flagrant inequalities for women. Consequently, in order for citizenship to develop beyond its formal aspect of status and become substantial, its “universal” character must be strengthened and not its existing gendered dimension be further institutionalized; a dimension based on an essentialist structuring of gender identities which are thus by definition contradictory to democracy. The attempt to institutionalize the gendered dimension of citizenship is perhaps an expression of the tension, specific to modern democracy, between the democratic logic of equality and the liberal logic of liberty,1 and as such, it is to be expected. However, under the present conditions, democracy aims (must aim), among other things, also at the great-

Concluding remarks 111 est possible reinforcement of the possibilities of self-realization for all subjects, which necessitates the negation of stable and given identities ascribed to them, so that it may be open to all, women and men. As soon as we have accepted that the brittle unity of our subjectivity is not structured around a supposed “essence”, a coherent self with a unitary identity primarily reduced to our sex/gender,2 we will then relinquish a central aspiration of the contemporary dominant current of feminist theory and practice, of promoting a genderdifferentiated citizenship.3 Because only the multiple, fluid and non-mutually exclusive and non-divisive identities, and as far as gender is concerned, what we called in today’s terms the “androgynous” subject,4 which refers to a multiplicity of possibilities in the expression of gender, allow universality to be “universal” but also sensitive to the multiple differences of the subjects and ultimately sensitive to its own particularities. That is, not the abstract universalism referring to an “undifferentiated human nature”, that cannot but function on the basis of exclusion, but “universalism . . . particularized”.5 The latter, viewed as the acceptance of multiplicity, variety and fluidity in subjective identities that constitute the universal, and not as dichotomous categorizations attempting their inclusion. Only in this way, the ever in the process of being formed democracy will progress, substituting the false (androcentric) universality of liberalism, not with further abuse of its radical principles, but with targets that implement them, reducing to non-acceptability only those “differences” that violate the principles of democracy, equality and the respect of human existence. By contrast, the discourse on “women’s difference” turns a historical life model based on a contingent gender dichotomy into an ahistorical universal model of femininity. And this, while “difference” has been used as the main legitimating factor of women’s unequal status. Only a proliferation of differences, conceptualized as expected positive variety can permit the social coexistence of free and equal subjects regardless of gender, gender thus rendered non-pertinent to the above co-existence. Ch. Di Stefano rightly notes that “In asking how basic gender differences are, we are also asking how basic we want them to be for particular purposes and ends. This is really what the feminist debate about gender these days is all about.”6 And the stake is not to turn gender, which has always been pertinent for citizenship though often invisible, into overtly and legitimized as pertinent, but to make it substantially nonpertinent. Because women’s political exclusion has not been a contingent feature of their history, to be overcome by more women in politics, but the result of the dominant conception of political society. As C. Pateman has convincingly shown, women have been constructed as political minors since “according to the classic contract theorists, they are naturally deficient in a specifically political capacity, the capacity to create and maintain political right”.7 I have tried to argue that the only way to render gender substantially non-pertinent for citizenship is through the deconstruction of its dichotomous character; that is through the elimination of gender in its actual form. As is rightly argued from many different parts substantial social equality is a precondition for a substantial democracy.8 And while it is absolutely positive to

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see the inclusion of members of previously marginalized groups among political representatives, this is not sufficient, nor is it a radical long-term measure towards substantial social equality and thus substantial democracy. Hence the necessity for the “elimination” of gender becomes even more evident to the degree that it is not (or should not be) sufficient anymore for women to become (a few more of them) mere participants in processes from which they have hitherto been excluded, nor to contribute to partial improvements in the political process, on the basis, for example, of the logic that they can contribute their own social experience that refers to an ethics of solidarity and care for others.9 And the foregoing are not (should not be) sufficient, because they do not offer an answer to the contemporary radical demand for the liberation of subjects from all bounds, including those of gender. A demand which is the only one capable of substantially confronting the, problematic for democracy, character of the existing gender relations system, as it is. When the issue is no longer the way in which women will intervene in the political process in order to express their category demands while they are not recognized as agents of political action,10 then a pressure group logic in which the issue is simply the recognition of the ability of a few more women to function as political actors,11 is no more sufficient. Moreover, the substantial elimination of women’s exploitation and oppression cannot be implemented through a conception of “gender difference” and through policies based on it, since by definition the latter aim at partial rearrangement in the social roles according to gender and at the improvement of conditions, so that subjects defined as women more easily fulfil their own, ever belonging to them and de-valorized roles.12 Therefore, the reasoning based on “gender difference” – explicit or implicit in dominant women’s discourse which aspires to be feminist, but also in the relevant policies, national or European – in the end defeats its own purpose. That is, the substantial elimination of women’s exploitation and oppression. The relevant discourse does not take into consideration that anatomical differences related to reproduction do indeed have the political and social importance socially attributed to them, while gender, as we know it today, constitutes nothing but an oppressive historical contingency and not a necessity. The same could be said in part also for what is conceptualized as sex, since it cannot but be a socially constructed reading of what is perceived as biology. If we have no access to the “real world” except through the way it is discoursively constructed, the challenge is how to create new representations of the “real”, more open and fluid, that create fewer exclusions and that function in a less normative way for individual life stories. And at the level of politics, what matters in the long term is not so much how to defend the rights of preconstituted identities, but how to permit the formation of self-identities beyond social prescriptions. Thus, although the assertion of one’s (“pre-existing”) identity may be a necessary first step towards more equality, it cannot be sufficient. It can even be viewed today as sabotaging its own purpose, since the discourse on women’s equal worth gave whatever it had to give: it made gender equality a (widely?) accepted value. Beyond that, it cannot render what is conceptually unfeasible as far as dichotomies are concerned, that

Concluding remarks 113 is, cancel the inherent hierarchy. Which means that the discourse based on women’s difference and the political claims deriving from a vision of dual universality refer to an endogenous contradiction, which makes it a transvestite universality once again. Furthermore, while feminist standpoint theory contested the presumptions of dominant models of knowledge referring to the Enlightenment by arguing that men comprehend the social world through their position of gender dominance and by promoting a women’s point of view, today this is again not enough; the logic that underlies this revisionist approach “remains tied to an Enlightenment paradigm to the extent that the appeal to a unitary concept of the knowing subject (for example ‘woman’) is said to serve as a foundation for objective knowledge”.13 What is needed today is a position that admits a view of social knowledge as involving multiple standpoints and perspectives linked to the multiple subjective allegiances, permitting partial identities to emerge on specific issues as a result of theoretical and political choice.14 Moreover, if gender identities and the roles referring to them are not attributable to subjects on the basis of a biological reality, as maintained, but are rather socially and politically constructed, a political reflection on the consequences of the existing structuring for democracy is imperative. Which means that a redefinition of the distinction between the private and the public is likewise imperative, insofar as the existing demarcation and the existing relations between the two spheres are in the focus of any problematique concerning the gender relations system and the consequences it bears for citizenship and the functioning of democracy. A private sphere transformed through the distinction public–private being dissociated from gender roles, as proposed by A. Phillips,15 is the only democratic prospect which also can be very enriching for all. In order for citizens to co-exist as equals in the public sphere they must co-exist in all fields as multiform subjects with no predetermined identity that classifies them in one of two different and seemingly self-evident gender categories, which at the same time denote a particular position in a respective sphere. This is the only way to make lack or diminished political participation a “random expression of personality”16 as far as gender is concerned and not a predestination for bearers of specific gender. The theorists of democracy can indeed no longer ignore the significance of the “private sphere” and of inter-subjective relations in everyday life, as far as the functioning of democracy, and the distortions to which it is subject on account of them, is concerned. Even more so if democracy is to be understood in its social connotations, as the main principle of social organization and coexistence. Because the social preconditions for democracy are certainly not limited to the problems issuing from class inequality, while the preconceptions and the practices governing the gender relations system and determining the living conditions and the relations among the subjects on all levels, can no longer be considered unrelated to the political process and bearing no significance for the theory of democracy.17 It can no longer be accepted, as C. Pateman has so convincingly showed,18 that the “equal citizens” of democracy acting

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“freely” in the framework of the political process are at the same time women and men who maintain profoundly unequal relations among them, since they are embedded in a hierarchical power relations system, which determines their everyday existence in all its coordinates. From any point of view we may choose to view it, that is, to conceptualize democracy, its absolute incompatibility with the dominant gender relations system is set forth with glaring clarity, indicating that the ontological foundations of a contemporary theory of democracy cannot accept gender as a dichotomy. The democratization of the private sphere, therefore, constitutes a necessary condition for the democratization of the public sphere, while democracy in order to be substantial needs both of the foregoing, on the level of ethics and deontology as much as of that of practice. But for the democratization of the former and subsequently of the latter extremely radical changes are required that venture well beyond elementary changes in the social distribution of gender roles, already observed mainly with respect to the redelineation of the boundaries in the relevant roles. What are needed are important political interventions in all basic social institutions favouring the shaping of a framework that will allow the subjects individually as well as collectively to imagine other ways of expressing their gendered existence, transcending the restrictive imperatives of what “woman” and what “man” mean, and thus institutionalize other social and political structures and processes that will contain the preconditions for being substantially democratic. Because, while obviously gender-related inequality is not the only inequality, no vision for radical social changes can ever be implemented without a simultaneous subversion in the existing gender relations system, with which all inequality systems intermingle. Gender, as it is experienced and perceived at present, constitutes, among other things related to social inequality, a socially constructed boundary in the imagination, the desires and the aims of the subjects.19 It impels them instead of orientating their lives on the basis of “freely” formed tendencies and choices, to adopt predetermined roles and to occupy specific positions in a pre-existing hierarchy within whose framework they were born. It could even be argued that this treatment of gender is a “betrayal” of the substance of modernity and, for this reason, one part of contemporary feminist theory stands critically in relation to it, regarded as either rejecting modernity as a process that has by now been discredited (according to a particular reading of postmodern criticism), or that, on the contrary, through its disruptive critique essentially constitutes a demand for the “completion” of modernity.20 In the sense of the demand for the liberation of humanity from all existing forms of oppression, exploitation and alienation, put on in practice. The reasoning concerning the multiplicity of identities moves in the same direction as well as the political conception dictated by it, on the basis of the hypothesis that the opposite of the different social treatment of women and men is neither assimilation nor special measures that will help a particular social category (women), traditionally marginalized and oppressed, to reach the level of its counterpart. The opposite of the difference in treatment according to gender is the acceptance of multiformity within each gender as

Concluding remarks 115 well,21 the multiplicity of social identities, that is, which are primarily neither feminine nor masculine, but are many things together. Multiform identities, the field of multiple interpenetrations, even contradictions and antagonisms. Thus, what Z. Bauman calls the “post modern wisdom”, which “does not expect any more to find the all-embracing, total and ultimate formula of life, without ambiguity, risk, danger and error”,22 can accommodate an utopian vision of a social world where equality and difference of gendered subjects will co-exist alongside liberty, as an answer to today’s issues. That is, being fully aware that other issues will arise and will have to be confronted. This non-monolithic character of identities can be exceptionally fertile politically, because it allows also multiple ad hoc alliances, concerted action, and various intersecting points for aspirations and interests, recognizing that there is no straightway forward, there are no unique solutions for all, women and/or men, that is, without rigid circumscriptions and rifts between invariable allies and “opponents”, which may prejudice democracy. Besides, as asserted by J.W. Scott,23 these multiplicities of identities, this diversity within gender categories, also compose the “very meaning of equality” which could be defined as “deliberate indifference to specified differences” of the subjects. In the kind of fight against social inequality that the above conception favours, and in the type of equality policies that it seems to promote, feminists can find allies within the Left, in a global strategy against multiple inequalities and exclusions, which are always “constructed on and thus must be challenged from the ground of difference”,24 always viewed in its variety and multiformity. Thus, beyond identity politics, a form of which may indeed be necessary for confronting specific problems based on commonality, we can pass to a politics based on coalitions, as a result “of shared political analysis of the features leading to oppressive power relations”.25 It is significant to stress at this point that as it seems, the framing of “gender difference” has a decisive significance for the policies chosen for the elimination of women’s social oppression and marginalization26 particularly as related to the area of politics. These policies are differentiated with regard to their subsequent goal, which may either tend towards the invalidation of the significance of gender as a definitive factor in the social existence of the subjects that would put an end to men’s absolute domination and women’s subordination and thus to women’s political exclusion or, as is usually the case, towards the facilitation of acquisition of strength and power by (a few) women as well, as a measure for the elimination of men’s absolute domination or even political monopoly. This latter aim evinces of course an essentialist conception of gender, within the framework of which “differences” lose their socially constructed character to be reduced in the end to differences that refer to the supposed differing biological existence of the subjects, who thus acquire different social qualities. The fact that this conception and the policies that serve it seem accepted by (some) women themselves – insofar as relative policies dominate at the level of demands on behalf of women claiming changes in their social status – is no surprise, but neither does it make them any more acceptable theoretically, or politically.27

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This confinement of women’s demands within a framework that does not disrupt the existing order/situation is certainly to be anticipated, since under conditions of androcentric social organization, most women have no other choice than to be shaped into subjects who accept their “women’s” status, seeking merely partial improvements under the present circumstances. Daring to venture on a psychoanalytic interpretation inspired by a point raised by M. DeKoven28 concerning the way in which modernist writers are gender differentiated with regard to the manner in which they face the contradiction between the appeal that the vision of radical change exercises upon them and the fear, which for men is concretized as a fear of loss of their hegemony, I would say that for women the relevant appeal co-exists with the fear of imminent punishment, should they desire this radical change. This functions as an impediment to their imagination and their vision and results in the invalidation of the fascinating cultural changes that feminist critique and action may potentially set in motion.29 This is so, to the benefit of a “modernizing” reformist policy which of course respects existing gender identities, perhaps offers remedy to specific gender inequalities so that they may not be felt as so unbearable, but at any rate does not contradict the profoundly problematic relation between gender and democracy, since the bipolarity of the former continues to not challenge the androcentrism inherent in citizenship. Thus, if the universality of citizenship has been a sham, this does not mean, however, that we should promote a view of citizenship qualified with regard to gender, in the way C. Pateman does, claiming a “sexually differentiated citizenship”, nor another which in general refers to the pertinent group differentiations, according to the conception of I.M. Young.30 More unsatisfactory is the view that aims at rendering the qualities regarded as “feminine” to elements of citizenship, such as the one inspired by “maternal thinking” feminism, urging us to find a new model of citizenship in women’s experience as mothers.31 No really democratic conception of citizenship can be supported by a perception of gender that transforms a historically determined and multiform women’s model, which has, moreover, excluded by definition its bearers from citizenship, to a universal and ahistorical model given once and for all. Even more so, it cannot be based on a view concerning women’s superiority,32 in obviously pretty much the same way it cannot be legitimated on the basis of its opposite, namely, the view of women’s inferiority, because it’s not an issue of which essentialist identity is “better”. The problem lies with essentialist identities and essentialism per se. Therefore, a significant step towards the constitution of democratic citizenship for all will neither be the institutionalization and legitimation of gender as a factor of differentiation, nor its becoming an overt element of citizenship, since gender primarily functions as a system of power relations and, consequently, cannot “equalize” what is inherently and by definition unequal. What, on the contrary, can be a significant step towards the constitution of democratic citizenship for all, and at this also I will agree with Ch. Mouffe, is the actual invalidation of any significance which gender nowadays has in practice. That is, “by constructing a new conception of citizenship where

Concluding remarks 117 sexual difference should become effectively non-pertinent”.33 Which for me can only mean the elimination of gender, in the sense of elimination of the social connotations that constitute it, through the deconstruction of the dichotomy in question. This obviously presupposes the institutionalization of anti-sexist policies in all sectors of social life with no exception,34 policies framed in such a way as to promote the idea that sex/gender is/must become irrelevant in the specific field, but also, a vigorous movement that will dynamically claim them. As for the experience of democracy in such a framework, it will have to consist in the recognition of multiple social logics that permeate the subjects/bearers of multiple and different identities, referring to various systems of inequality to be fought against, along with the necessity of their articulation.35 An articulation that will have to be continuously recreated and continually be the object of renegotiation, since there will not be any permanent and immutable identifications, and thus no “final point, at which a balance will be definitely achieved”.36 Which means that if the problematic relationship between gender and citizenship makes imperative today a new conceptualization of the former, which must be facilitated by the kind of policies and strategies we adopt in order to combat gender inequalities, this does not mean that thus, we will have achieved a desired “final” point of social harmony. Not only because obviously, other forms of inequality exist, but most importantly, because other forms of inequality, hitherto not perceived as such, will appear. If we were to perceive democracy not as something given, an existing political order, but as a project to be ventured – whose definition even has become “a political project”37 – aiming at the elimination of gender as we know it today is, consequently, an exceptionally significant step in the pertinent direction. Because even if we know that “pure democracy” is impossible, the only moral political stance comes to what S. Zˇizˇek38 calls acceptance of the constitutive paradox of democracy via an “active forgetfulness”: that is, despite the fact that one is aware of the impossibility of democracy, “I act as if democracy were possible”. And this awareness of the impossibility of “pure” democracy is not, in the view of the above author, a “fatal flaw” of democracy, but, on the contrary, it is the source of its very strength, because democracy may in this way recognize that its limits are endogenous, originating “in its internal antagonism”.39 Or, as Ch. Mouffe says of democracy “to come”, “conflict and antagonism are at the same time its condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of its full realisation”.40 While, however, it is obvious that the inferiority which is ingrained into the gender signature that determines women as such, cannot possibly co-exist with the substantial possession of citizenship – therefore it is necessary that the dichotomous and, for that reason, evaluatively differentiated categories of citizens be not validated and legitimated further through gender policies – the significance of the gendered aspect of citizens must be recognized. This is because historically, as noted primarily by feminist theoretical contentions, the suppression of gendered existence has referred (and still refers) to a supposed genderless subject which has been (and still is) a man. Yet the gendered

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subject/citizen of contemporary democracy can neither be dichotomous, while gender identity cannot be perceived as given once and for all and manifest with respect to its social consequences. Gender, as a social relations system, makes evident that we ought to conceptualize “universality” as a multiplicity and not as dichotomy – which by definition is hierarchical and therefore cancels the former – if we aspire to the suspension of its functioning as a power relations system. Because as was mentioned before, only if “partial” and “open” identities and provisional identification constitute the accepted norm in all areas, only then will the preconditions for the abolition of gender discriminations be created. Thus the articulation of the universal with the particular in a nonoppressive to its bearers way will be permitted, attributing other characteristics to democracy that render it more substantial. The aspiration, furthermore, for the imposition of women as an accepted “other” invalidates the cultural potential expressed by feminism in the current circumstances through the demand for the disengagement of the subjects from predetermined gender identities, which, among other things, undermines the radical claim for the “completion” of modernity which potentially is expressed by feminist critiques. In this sense the view that the problem of “underrepresentation” of women in structures of political decision-making illustrates the problematic relation of women with democracy – a hypothesis that emerges through the way in which its supporters try as a rule to legitimate their demand – and not the problematic relations of the gender relations system with it, finally promotes in no way the issue of the demand concerning the “free” constitution of subjectivity, beyond predetermined identities. Therefore, it does not promote the substantial deepening of democracy either. And it is really a pity that feminist politics, entrapped in the effort towards gender equality and equal opportunity in the framework of the existing gender relations system has relinquished the revolutionary goal of Sh. Firestone,41 who stressed more than thirty years ago, possibly in a way not especially elaborate, but at any rate very insightful, that “the end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike that of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction itself: genital differences between human beings would no longer matter culturally”. It needs to be added that without the elimination in question, men’s model is asserted once again as equivalent to the “human”, while women are presented as subjects who must be aided in order to approximate it. As for the “deliverance” from the women’s model without the corresponding exemption from that of men (even if it were possible), it means the rapprochement of the former to the latter; that is, adoption by women (or by particular women) of a men’s model, a model of domination, which by definition constitutes a contradiction: in order to become dominant, there must be someone over whom you dominate.42 Could this be what we want? Finally, it seems that the central question, to which all those who seek to promote a feminist critique of politics must answer today, is not what spontaneously comes to mind: that is, how women will be helped through a more mass acceptance of certain of them in traditional androcentric strongholds (in

Concluding remarks 119 which it is implied that they will try to transform from within) so that they may cease to be second-class citizens. This is not the case, because, as we saw already, the selective treatment of this question through policies possibly leads to self-entrapment. We should rather initially clarify what kind of society we look forward to and in particular with respect to gender, at which of the two are we aiming: is what we seek merely placing more women in positions of power? Or forming a more just and free society for all subjects? If the answer leans towards the latter, then it must be asserted, as supported above, that the former by itself does not constitute a medium nor of course a strategy with the latter as its ultimate aim. Strategies can have unintentional consequences that may counter the specific objective for which they are intended. And if the final goal is a more just, equal and democratic society, which, as we have argued, presupposes the deconstruction of the gender dichotomy, then a strategy further legitimating this dichotomy, exalting “women’s difference”, even if it is in the name of equality, certainly contradicts the ultimate end for which it is supposed to have been chosen. Thus, it becomes clear that it is not a question of the choice of pace for changes, some promoting (realistically) gradual reforms towards a common goal that others envision as to be achieved by radical reversal of the existing situation. This is not the issue here. It is not about different means towards the same end. The end anticipated by the two above approaches is what is profoundly different. But this is exactly where the problem lies: on the level of clarifying/determining the long-term political objective and the policies available for its achievement. While at the same time the confusion between pro-women measures and feminist policies is dominant, a confusion that does not facilitate its resolution. The former, aiming ultimately at “gender equality”,43 are advantageous to certain women on the short term,44 satisfying justified category demands. They frequently constitute the result of the spontaneous reaction of any well-intentioned citizen who is governed by anti-sexist views (in the sense of being against discrimination based on sex/gender) and confronts women’s marginalization as socially unjust. But in “gender equality”, gender is as a rule perceived as a dichotomy which is not challenged. The dominant framing of the issue shows that the claim refers to the equal treatment of two different versions of the human who deontologically and thus practically must expect and receive equal treatment, so that the undisputed gender of the one version ceases to function as an impediment. Feminist policies, on the other hand, ultimately aiming at the elimination of gender as experienced till today, are certainly profitable to women as a social category, but they are not limited to them in the long term, and furthermore they contribute via anti-sexist measures – that is with policies that aim at the cancellation of the social importance of (what is perceived as biological) sex – to the equality of subjects regardless of gender, thus promoting democracy. Hence, a conceptual clarification of gender is an imperative, especially felt as far as gender policies in the EU are concerned. Because obviously, mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies presupposes a clear answer as to what it is

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that we want to mainstream. What exactly is a gender perspective, or a gender equality perspective? Which perception of gender do we wish to promote? Which means, initially and primarily, what perception of gender must support all the concerned policies? That is, what is gender? How do we perceive and conceptualize it, and how do we wish to politically conceptualize it, in view of a future society in which it will not be a hierarchical factor? This is a political issue/question that urgently needs to be addressed and one whose answer is crucial for the feminist emancipatory project. Thus, in order to avoid the common confusion of any policy related to gender being in practice equated to pro-women measures, with the well-known disadvantages of legitimizing a view of women as always being in need of protection, and as citizens demanding special rights (as opposed to the substantial application of citizens rights to them as well), the conceptual clarification of gender is an absolute prerequisite. Even, or maybe especially, in areas in which gender mainstreaming seems obliged to adopt special measures for women, that is, in the “balanced participation” of men and women in the political process, there must also be a prior conceptual analysis of how we perceive gender. Otherwise, latent assumptions and common-sense perceptions will always obstruct the application of policies that may have a subversive potential (which can easily be neutralized), turning them into partial reforms in favour of specific categories of women, which is of course a good thing, but which also can rob radical gender policy of its potential. Indeed, gender remaining unclarified, and “gender perception” referring to a tacit, well-meaning view expressing the wish to fight flagrant gender inequalities, robs gender mainstreaming of its radical potential and gives voice to different critiques that often express a vague uneasiness about the concept. If mainstreaming refers to the dominant perception of gender robbed of its most unacceptable expressions, it seems that there is a disproportion between expectations and possible outcomes. Mainstreaming a modernized mainstream gender order cannot be enough. If that is not the case, if a more radical vision is expressed through gender mainstreaming as a strategy, then the impression is created that there is a disharmony between aims and means. A disharmony that forms one of the main challenges that EU gender equality policy has now to face. Because if the aim is the creation of a society in which gender will not function as a hierarchy, will not determine life courses and hinder autonomy and self realization, and thus in politics will not exclude and marginalize one category of citizens, that is a society in which gender will be no more than a life-style choice, then the means cannot steadily legitimize a view of “gender difference”. Yet, the latter is expressed in all gender equality policies which suppose women and men as given and obvious social actors belonging to two distinguished by specific boundaries gender categories and bearing different identities, that must nevertheless be treated as equals, with equal value and opportunities. This view of gender equality is nowhere more clear than in languages (like Greek) in which gender equality is translated as “equality of the two sexes”. The aim for gender equality policy in such a context, in which assumptions about sex/gender are left unquestioned, can be nothing more than the

Concluding remarks 121 creation of a society in which more women gain positions of power and adopt men’s life patterns supported by welfare and other provisions. A profoundly narrow and unambitious aim today. However, gender mainstreaming offers itself up for various interpretations: on a policy level it can in fact be no more than a series of pro-women measures, if the perception of gender that prevails is a dichotomous one celebrating women’s “difference”. If we accept the existing gender dichotomy as a given fact of life, gender mainstreaming cannot but express the wish to take care of hidden inequalities in all areas, and have in mind this dimension in all planning and implementing of policies. A noble aim, but one that may be better served by more targeted pro-women measures, as many critiques insist: if fighting gender inequality through mainstreaming is “everyone’s responsibility”, it can easily become “no-one’s job”.45 In fact, while in theory gender mainstreaming and targeted action are complementary, in practice they are often competing, and there are many cases of abolition of specific pro-women initiatives in the name of mainstreaming.46 This risk is more important in societies where there is a tradition of gender equality policies, while it is in societies in which androcentrism and patriarchal structures are still very prominent and frame a strong political wish to adopt a European pro-gender equality spirit, where gender mainstreaming tends to be reduced to pro-women measures. What M. Stratigaki (2005) calls “the ambivalent outcome of gender mainstreaming”, rightly viewing it as “inherent and structural”, can indeed have two different versions, according to the specific character of the gender regime in each society, both robbing it of any radical potential. But, more importantly, if we do not conceptualize gender as a dichotomy, if we accept a view of the existing gender order as a contingent social interpretation of an equally contingent and ideologically structured reading of biology which hinders subjective autonomy and selfrealization as well as democratic social co-existence, then gender mainstreaming can have the potential to be something else: an important tool for a reforging of gender as one of the many subjective identities which express a multiplicity of possible interpretations and subject positions within a plural self that will not anymore have to become unitary and well-defined under a specific (one of two) gender identity, rendered single by the social order. The above, while in the short term it can fight gender inequality in all areas, promoting respective measures as emergency interventions that combat symptoms, to be substantially eradicated via long-term policies. As more and more people feel ill at ease in their rigid gender identities, while we know that to function effectively in contemporary situations all need to be able to express all those characteristics that traditionally are ascribed to one and the other gender identity, and also when the demand for self-expression, selfrealization and autonomy is heard from more and more sides, the lack of conceptual clarity regarding gender hinders the process of substantial gender equality. In the sense of equality of all regardless of gender perceived in its multiplicity, and leaving space for auto-definition, without the risk of marginalizing sexual minorities. From the above perspective, gender mainstreaming appears as

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potentially too important a task and too difficult a struggle that will face ardent resistance in many societies, to be dealt with in a well-disposed but conceptually ill-equipped manner. Which is the case in many European societies. Because to do away with flagrant gender inequalities and prejudices about gender is not enough. We must also do away with unquestioned assumptions about gender, if we are to radically change the existing gender relations system, and make productive gender mainstreaming’s potential to have a substantial impact on social co-existence and democracy. However, one can legitimately wonder what one is to do, in the existing framework of EU gender policy and the respective national gender policies, with respect to measures targeting the increase of “gender balance” in political decision-making, apart from trying to propose another view of gender framing. Because, while obviously the democratic imperative is not satisfied simply with the imposition of more women on the political stage, not even by attempts for their ethical acceptance as rightful participants in the political process through legislative measures and regulations, while the foregoing are not sufficient since they do not counter the dominant logic of the dichotomous character of gender (without the deconstruction of which the relation of gender and democracy is persistently, as we have seen, incompatible/problematic), the question is legitimate notwithstanding: can one stay outside the dominant game of representative democracy as it unfolds nowadays? Can one politically stand up to the dominant trends and tendencies of its evolution, even if sometimes the latter look like a falsification of the basic principles of democracy? That is, can one counter the development towards the institutionalization of quotas and equal “representation” of women and men (parity) in structures of political decision-making on the basis of the theoretical reasoning developed in this study? And to struggle in support of the creation of a more just and democratic society for all (how?), primarily aiming at the deconstruction of the gender dichotomy, which means, in the current circumstances, staying outside the mainstream political process? And more specifically: can one politically reject the demand for quotas on local and national parliamentary ballots (especially where the issue is still a novelty) from a feminist standpoint and become at the same time understandable so that one may promote the goal of the elimination of gender dichotomy, thus promoting democracy? Or maybe, it should be investigated whether the relevant measures, that on the level of theory present themselves as unconducive to the aforementioned goal (a goal which in my view is also a constitutive characteristic of contemporary feminism), can nevertheless become admissible by the same logic (and the same reservations) that certain affirmative actions become accepted, actions which refer to the participation of women politicians in the political party organs? That is, not on the basis of the logic that women must be represented as women and by virtue of being women, and thus they are to represent women – a pronouncedly problematic logic referring to women’s group representation and thus absolutely unacceptable politically – but on the basis of the hypothesis that citizens who happen to be women, should participate too in parliament,47 for example, something

Concluding remarks 123 which functions as an element of “equality” but especially as a measure of justice,48 against women’s exclusion. With the additional note that the above constitute temporary measures intended to offer immediate partial solutions to a situation viewed today as intolerable. That is, if it is clarified that the ultimate goal is the abolition of gender and granted the absolute rejection of the line of reasoning that promotes quotas (and even more so parity) in the structures of political decision-making with reference to the theory of representation, how at present can the relevant measures and the respective demands be politically confronted from a (my own) feminist point of view? The foregoing question essentially concerns the way it is dealt with in this study, what is aptly called by J.W. Scott, the inevitable “paradox” of feminism, which by “acting for women” produces the “sexual difference” it sought to eliminate: that is, “the need both to accept and to refuse ‘sexual difference’”. This paradox, according to Scott, “was the constitutive condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its long history”.49 I would add that on the way in which it is confronted now, depends to a great degree the entire course of feminism and not of feminism alone, while a necessary condition in confronting it is of course not losing along the way the ultimate goal, which is the abolition of the famous “gender difference”, in other words, the abolition of gender. Hence, it remains to be inquired whether such pro-women measures, in which attempts at “gender mainstreaming” in specific policy areas often end up, are capable of being politically inducted in a feminist strategy of really radical changes targeting the emancipatory feminist project. Or, in other words, how to pass from radical critique and deconstruction as an analytical tool, to a project of reconstruction, via a reconceptualization of gender and democracy in a new frame,50 allowing for a transitional tactic which, while referring to the existing context of EU gender policy, opens up a prospect for a radically different function of gender. The inquiry presents itself as legitimate, because theoretically as much as politically the response to the question whether one can stay out of the process of representative democracy and promote radical goals and visions in other ways is today, in my opinion, negative.51 With regard to theory, because the structures of politics as much as that of language constitute the contemporary field of power, and therefore “there is no position outside this field”,52 while activity on the margins of the political seems today to be impassable or at least ineffective. But even in political terms, in which one can rightly maintain that the political is not restricted within the bounds of the political system, the answer is once again negative. This is so, because, while liberation from the shackles of gender presupposes much more than claiming, planning and implementing policies “for women”, especially since these policies by definition attest to the dichotomy in question contributing to the reification of gender relations,53 a political proposal must be able to be convincing to those it is mainly aimed at, something that is not feasible on the plain of negating (from a feminist point of view) measures that are presented as manifestly pro-women. Only from the point of view of extreme conservative conceptions is it possible to politically

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comprehend the rejection of the legitimate character of the claim for such measures in support of women who have been kept out and face multiple additional obstacles in their access to the political process, since there such a rejection is to be expected. To any democratically predisposed ears the claim for more women in decision-making appears and is absolutely legitimate. Simply, the respective reforms are not enough, are usually promoted in a way that is ideologically unacceptable, while they certainly do not lead automatically towards the formation of a substantially democratic citizenship for all. So what is left? First of all the effort to form a framework which, while allowing the acceptance of pro-women measures that function in favour of the legitimation of the gender dichotomy, at the same time they are endorsed with a prospect favourable to their gradual transformation into measures for the abolition of the gender dichotomy. A transitional tactic, in other words, that will support a long-term strategy of gradual invalidation of the dichotomy, which will not be subject to negotiations. This can be set about through the way in which the relevant measures are promoted, through an emphasis on their transitional character, through other measures with anti-sexist aims that are instituted in parallel and through a feminist discourse which will accompany them, incorporating them under an encompassing strategy. A strategy which will not promote, but, on the contrary, will denounce the logic of women’s difference. Stressing the fact that the blatant contradictions that will no doubt have to be directly confronted within the framework of citizenship of subjects defined as women, will only be dealt with substantively and radically by means of the “deconstruction” of gender. Because only gendered citizens whose universality shall include as a matter of fact multiple differentiations and particularities, without perpetuating the existing dichotomous and, for that reason, hierarchically differentiated gender categories, will be able to confer as equals, bearers of a common reference to a democratic political community. As for the necessity for support and assistance to the oppressed social category in question, within the process of which gender dichotomy is further legitimated, it should not make us forget that it is this very dichotomy that is at the source of oppression. This is the case regardless of how reasonable the tendency is for “self-assertion” through an essentialist identity characterizing subjects and groups who do not manage “to see oneself reflected in the mirror of history”.54 What must be made absolutely clear is that in order that one is able to see oneself reflected as one wishes, one must be able to form one’s image as “freely” as possible, which is not feasible within the rigid boundaries of dichotomous sex/gender and through identity politics that cannot go beyond their inherent logic. Actually, being aware that the consequences, which the demand for ballot quotas55 will have, and especially later on, that of parity should it be satisfied,56 are defined in the sector of formal “equality”, and pointing to the traps lurking in the reasoning that implicitly or explicitly57 accompany them, feminist theory and the respective practice can (should?), I believe, utilize to the benefit of a radical perspective the European possibilities opened in favour of pro-women measures. Proving thus, that the tension between attacking the existing gender order based

Concluding remarks 125 on an oppressive dichotomy and promoting women’s “interests” can indeed be rendered non irresolvable. Because to the degree that in today’s conjuncture the rapport des forces allows the promotion of a demand beneficial to a particular category of women, a demand whose rejection on the part of feminists, among other things, seems politically vacuous, radical feminist politics should manage to utilize the new conditions to the benefit of the feminist vision. That is, feminist politics should find ways to politically combine the rejection of the gender dichotomy and of the logic of “women’s difference”, with a woman-based politics58 promoting solutions to specific inequality problems of specific categories of women. Especially since it does not seem, under the present conditions, to have the potential (or the impetus) to promote any other particular claim in the area of politics, harmonized more immediately with the vision of disengagement from the shackles of sex/gender. Ever insisting, however, that the imposition of measures, such as quotas or even more so measures that favour gender parity in parliament, are possibly, according to a certain reasoning, a delayed concretization of universal suffrage, that they perhaps symbolically illustrate the formal equality of rights, that since political participation per se is beneficial for its bearers it is positive for more women to exercise it at high levels, that thus, “women’s interests” may indeed be better represented, and that these measures may under certain conditions function positively as an initial stage towards a vision of the feasibility of really universal citizenship. But, stressing at the same time that in no case are the measures in question a goal in themselves, nor a philosophical principle thus gratified, but, on the contrary, they have meaning only as transitional “emergency” regulations mainly in the course of the fight against particular discriminations against certain women in the framework of a logic of abolition, and not of further establishment of the bipolarity of gender, which is the source from which all sex/gender discriminations flow: if the a priori assumption that humans are divided into males and females, and thus into men and women, a division which is clearly dichotomous, substantive and foundational for subjective identities is not put to question, there is no possibility for gendered citizens to co-exist as equals, no possibility for genuine inclusion of gendered subjects in democratic deliberation. Pointing out the above seems imperative, because it is certain that if we conceptualize the exclusion of women in terms of social status, the universality of citizenship is presented as both an abstract ideal that has been brutally distorted in its application (while being ontologically pregnant with its own distortions) and as a vision, democratic and radical,59 which determines goals and political strategies totally different from those of quotas and parity: the only substantial claim for equality for gendered subjects is that which furthers the logic of rightful participation of all in the socio-political processes on the basis of their shared yet multifarious human quality, without the acceptance of hierarchies, ingrained into bipolarities through the divisions and modifying interventions in the principle of universality. A principle which only as a multiplicity can be conceptualized, something that holds of course for the gendered dimension of the subjectivity of all. Thus, if the rejection of such measures and demands in favour of women politicians on the basis of the reasoning concerning non-furthering the

126 Concluding remarks legitimation of the gender dichotomy seems politically impassable, the utilization of the pro-women milieu is what remains; as well as the critical acceptance of the respective claims as an absolutely legitimate category demand, not of women in general but of one particular pressure group, comprising women politicians. With the concomitant assertion that despite the positive consequences on the symbolic level from an image of political power identified less domineeringly with the masculine, the risks lurking are especially significant if the satisfaction of the pertinent demand is viewed as an achievement of women, who had this as their aim in the sector in question. In this last case the tendency for perpetuation of the problematic relationship between gender and democracy becomes obvious, due to the institutionalization and the further legitimation of an essentialist identity (“woman”) which in this sense seems all the more natural, immutable through time and ineluctable for a part of the citizenry, rendering gender even more problematic for the functioning of democracy. A critical acceptance with full awareness, however, of the fact that we are situated before an informed contradiction: by satisfying, on one level, the legitimate demand by one category of women, at the same time through the institutionalization of women’s “difference” in the political process it seems that, if no other prospects are opened, the problematic character of the relationship between gender and democracy is perpetuated and further established. It is, in other words, a “stake” referring to the possibility of promoting in the long run a profoundly anti-essentialist aim, that is the genuine disengagement of citizenship from gender, through “essentialist” tactics, for which attempts will have to be made to be included in a long-term strategy of radical social change and accompanied by a discourse opening such a prospect. Besides this critical acceptance of the demand as pertaining to a specific category, something else is still there: the hope remains that perhaps T.H. Marshall was right when he held that the diminution of inequality can strengthen the demands for its elimination,60 despite the fact that the relevant hypothesis is not always verified. Especially, however, what remains is a “nostalgia for the future” which constitutes the feminist (and likewise any other) utopia, in relation to the shaping of a world without the bounds of (dichotomous) sex/gender, which is the only substantially compatible version of the relation of the gendered with democracy. The hope also remains that this world, still a distant dream, is not necessarily unrealizable. But, in any case, the only feminist political stance is one that makes as if its imminence depends on our actions, and thus, initially, on the way we understand and conceptualize gender and democracy.

Notes

Preface 1 See the pioneering and classic study of feminist political theory by S.M. Okin, 1979. See also a recent collection of essays: F. Collin, E. Pisier, E. Varikas, 2000. It should be noted that, contrary to twentieth-century mainstream political theory, which usually ignores women and the dimension of gender, in the past most theorists referred to them. See S.M. Okin, 1979 and V. Sapiro, 1992. 2 It is also noted that usually where more women appear, real power seems to move elsewhere. However, the above observation is not always correct, to the extent that for political reasons in certain cases, for example in Greece, proportionally more women are appointed to higher political positions, i.e. in government, than are elected to local government. 3 For this conception of political power see M. Walzer, 1983, pp. 281–285. 4 Feminist theory has indeed engaged in this endeavour for the past two decades. For an extensive discussion of this point see below, ch. 3.2. 5 This first conception of politics is inspired by the thought of Hannah Arendt (see ch. 2.1). For the second, see the relevant criticism by C.B. MacPherson, 1977, and for a comparison of the two conceptions, see I.M. Young, 1998, p. 479 ff. 6 For a presentation of the discussion concerning this issue see E. Lombardo, 2003. 7 It is obviously initially necessary to produce statistics by gender, in order to document the extent of the gender disparity in those societies where they do not exist or are difficult to obtain. Thus the Greek edition of this study (M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2002), included an Appendix with data on women’s presence in political decisionmaking in this country since 1953. 8 See C. Offe, 1996, p. 45, an idea further elaborated in C. Offe, 1996a. 9 See mainly A. Giddens, 2000. 10 See A. Touraine, 1994.

Introduction 1 It would be practically impossible to include a concise overview of the bibliography on democracy. Beyond references throughout this study, see two classic Political Science studies, which contain useful bibliographical selections, R. Dahl, 1989 and 1998, as well as Ph. Green, 1993, an anthology of important contributions on the subject, which treats democracy as a “contested concept”. Absolutely essential with regard to the French bibliography on democracy, as well as to the approach espoused here, is reference to A. Touraine, 1994. The important feminist literature is of course referred to extensively throughout this study. 2 See N. Bobbio, 1990 with respect to the difficulties arising in the relationship

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between liberalism and democracy, concepts that are usually perceived as complementary. For the latter, see Ch. Mouffe, 1992a and D. Trend, 1996. For a typology of democracy, see the classic study by C.B. MacPherson, 1977, as well as D. Held, 1996. Important feminist bibliography exists on the subject. See mainly, S.M. Okin, 1979, 1989, C. Pateman, 1988, 1989 and A. Phillips, 1991. For this conception of democracy, see A. Touraine, 1994, p. 23, p. 38 and in general pp. 17–56. See the introduction in Ph. Green, 1993, p. 12, for a concise reference to the above issue and the necessary bibliography. See U. Vogel, 1994, p. 76. Not to mention the status of inhabitants of a country who are non-citizens. For democracy as a critical concept, see A. Arblaster, 1991, p. 6. For democracy as an incomplete process, see also the classic view about citizenship formulated in 1949 by T.H. Marshall, 1977. C. Pateman, 1989, p. 223. Although strategic framing of the issue of quotas sometimes stresses the democracy aspect when the audience is considered not particularly gender-equality-friendly. The discussion concerning parity is implied here. See E. Varikas, 1994. See below ch. 3.2. For gender as an analytical category, see J.W. Scott, 1988 and G. Bock, 1989. See also the introduction of P. Loizos, E. Papataxiarchis, 1991, for an interesting anthropological approach to gender, as well as a publication in Greek that partially overlaps with the above: E. Papataxiarchis, Th. Paradellis, 1992, the introduction, which refers to the history of the “discovery” of gender by social science. Ph. Green, 1985, p. 178. See V. Held 1993, p. 175, who refers to the relevant classic formulation by C.B. MacPherson, 1973. This argument is further developed in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996. This study will not deal with the reasons why the specific system of gender relations came into being, why it is still maintained or “why some people willingly accept their own subordination” as E. de la Boetie wondered. Despite the relevance of the latter question to the subject of this book, it is obviously not within its scope. For a general elaboration on this point, which does not specifically refer to gender, see M. Rosen, 1996. With respect to the formation of women’s subjectivity, the bibliography is extensive. C. Gilligan, 1982, L. Irigaray, 1974, N. Chodorow, 1978, remain classic references on the subject. I do not ignore that the situation in other parts of the world can be incomparably worse. But in this study I refer to democracy and gender as they appear mainly in the European context. Concerning the situation in former socialist societies see Z. Eisenstein, 1993. See also Ch. Bretherton, 2001, on gender mainstreaming and the EU enlargement. See C. Bacchi, 2004, on the framing of positive action as preferential treatment. See below ch. 2.2 and 2.3. See F. Twine, 1994, pp. 171–176, for a discussion concerning the sociological imagination. For this conception of utopia, see L. Sargisson, 1996, p. 21. See D. Cornell, 1991, p. 169. A small part of the detailed data existing in the Greek version of this study is referred to here in a selective and condensed form. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989, 1997, 1998. See below ch. 2.3. For a concise discussion of contemporary versions of the different citizenship concep-

Notes

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31

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35

36 37 38 39

40 41 42 43 44

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tions, with an emphasis on social-liberal citizenship, which particularly interests feminists, see R. Voet, 1998, pp. 8–15. Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 25. For this line of reasoning and the consequences of its being relinquished on the level of theory, see A. Weale, 1999, p. 4 ff. See, indicatively, S. Best, D. Keller, 1991, pp. 206–214. In general on the relations between feminist and postmodern theory, see. N. Fraser, L.J. Nicholson, 1990, L.J. Nicholson, 1990, J. Butler, 1992, D. Elam, 1994, A. Yeatman, 1994. See also J. Flax’s interesting thoughts concerning the reasons why certain feminist theorists feel threatened by postmodernism, 1992, pp. 446–447, and also her argument concerning the common confusion between a unitary and a core self and its theoretical repercussions (J. Flax, 1990, p. 218). See J. Habermas, 1987 and 1996, and especially the various contributions in M. Passerin d’Entrèves, S. Benhabib, 1996, for the issues at stake in the interesting debate between the former and postmodernist thinkers. See also J. Squires, 1998, pp. 126–146, for an interesting discussion of the attempt to synthesize, under the rubric of the cultural politics of difference, the epistemological insights of postmodernism with more conventional political issues. The author refers to various critical readings of Habermas that attempt to resolve the tensions born out of that endeavour. See D. Couzens Hoy, 1996, pp. 128–129. I do not understand “ambiguity” here in the same way as J. Habermas. See Ch. Norris, 1996, p. 98. See J.R. Gibbins, B. Reimer, 1999, p. 8 ff. See also A.M. Hebert, 1992, p. 10, who on the basis of a similar view of the postmodern approach, characterizes V. Woolf, a representative of modernist writing par excellence, as “a post-modern modernist”. This is so on account of the particular relation of the latter with multiplicities, especially on the level of subjectivity. There are many different claims that can be categorized as essentialism, one form of which is common in sexual difference theory. See R. Alsop, A. Fitzsimons, K. Lennon, 2002, pp. 192–200. See J. Squires, 1998, p. 133, who argues that affiliations are much more ambivalent than a first reading allows us to think. See J. Flax, 1990a, p. 42, who notes that nevertheless it is appealing for those who have been excluded to believe that reason will triumph. See below, ch. 1.1. As for “sexual difference”, its acceptance as an immutable fact of life and as a theoretical strand are conducive neither to democratic co-existence of subjects, nor to an analysis permitting a liberating vision of a possible radically different future. Z. Bauman, 1993, p. 245. Z. Bauman, 1990, p. 272. See below, ch. 4. For deconstruction in general, see also ch. 3, n. 72. Z. Bauman, 1990, p. 98. As D. Couzens Hoy argues, the critical potential of deconstruction can become a productive strategy of interpretation and not just a destructive enterprise, 1996, pp. 138–144. Deconstruction, “if properly understood”, is even considered as belonging to the same “philosophical discourse of modernity” that J. Habermas sets out to defend, according to Ch. Norris, 1996, p. 100. See also my ch. 3, n.72. See M. Maynard, 1995, p. 275, who refers to the distinction between unitary and unifying. See R. Alsop, A. Fitzsimons, K. Lennon, 2002, especially ch. 10. See also, N. Fraser, 1995, p. 72 who proposes an attempt to develop new paradigms of feminist theorizing “that integrate the insights of Critical Theory with the insights of poststucturalism”.

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47 See J. Squires, 1998, pp. 140–145, for a concise presentation of relative debates and interesting comments on the “particularly knotty problem” faced by those interested in the politics of postmodernity, particularly in respect to “the extent to which the aesthetic can be incorporated within procedural notions of the political”. The author notes that the integration of the expressive seems much more easily accommodated (p. 140).

1 The correlation between democracy and gender 1 See the author’s own treatment of this issue and the relevant bibliography of the period in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1987. Specifically, for the absence of women in the executive, see M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989a. 2 This observation does not imply that political participation is assessed positively at all times by all, nor that there is an agreement on its conceptualization within the framework of the multiple theories of democracy. One could argue, on the contrary, that the various conceptions of democracy are differentiated according to the extent to which they presuppose popular participation in the making of policy decisions. See relevant categorization in A. Weale 1999, p. 84 ff. 3 See the critique and bibliography in S. Goot, E. Reid, 1975, S. Bourque, J. Grossholtz, 1974, J. Siltanen, M. Stanworth, 1984. 4 I imply here mainly the work of S.M. Okin, 1979 and of C. Pateman, 1988, 1989. 5 The relevant bibliography is already quite extensive. Two representative opposing views concerning gender parity should be noted at this point: F. Gaspar, 1994 and E. Varikas, 1995. See ch. 2.2. For group representation see I.M. Young 1990, a classic work on this issue, as well as A. Phillips, 1994 for a more “moderate” approach. 6 See ch. 2. 7 See A. Touraine, 1994, p. 25, who makes the interesting point that democracy is best defined in any era by the attacks to which it is subjected. 8 Z. Bauman, 1992, p. xxv, notes that the collapse of socialism introduced us to a world without a collective utopia, a world with no conscious alternative to itself. 9 A. Touraine, 1994, p. 25. 10 See S. Agacinski, 1998, for a philosophical argument on the issue. 11 See below, ch. 2.2. 12 See B. Siim, 2000, p. 69, for a discussion of the differences on the philosophical and practical level. 13 See the discussion in E. Varikas, 1998, referring to Hannah Arendt’s thought. See also C. Forment 1996, pp. 314–330. 14 See B. Siim, 2000, which deals with the respective differences. 15 See later in ch. 1 and in the Concluding Remarks specifically how I conceive the “universal”. 16 The conflict between the claims of liberty and the claims of equality has a long history in democratic thought and is epitomized by the divide between the tradition derived from Locke and the tradition derived from Rousseau. See J. Rawls, 2001, §1, a brief presentation of the matter, centred on the different philosophical doctrines dealing with how the respective claims are to be understood. 17 As a matter of convention I distinguish at this point feminist theory from political theory, while I consider the former as an integral part of the latter, despite the fact that few political theorists treat feminist theory as such in mainstream political theory. 18 J. Rawls, 1st edn 1971. Here I use the 1999 English edition, in which the revisions made in the 1975 German edition are included. For the importance of this work as a

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turning point in political theory, in the sense that Rawls “relaunched” political philosophy, see I.M. Young, 1998, pp. 481–482, and B. Barry, 1998, pp. 537–538. But of course, “justice as fairness” is one among the possible interpretations of the principles of equality and liberty, as Ch. Mouffe, 1993, pp. 52–53 notes, criticizing a perception of Rawls as having found the rational solution to the question. For a concise reference to studies in political theory which were inspired by J. Rawls’ theories see I.M. Young 1998, p. 481 ff. C. Pateman, 1970. On this issue see I.M. Young, 1998, pp. 481–482. See also on this point Ch. Mouffe’s 1993, pp. 48–52 critique concerning Rawls’ understanding of the political. See Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 150. The author considers that the specificity of modern democracy lie precisely in this tension, a tension that should be valued, since it is constitutive of pluralist democracy. On this line of reasoning see B. Siim, 2000, the introduction. See also C. Pateman, 1988, 1992, R. Lister, 1997. See B. Siim, 2000, pp. 1–2. See J. English, 1977, D. Kearns, 1983, S.M. Okin, 1989, C. Pateman, 1988, I.M. Young, 1987. Most political theory references to the debate on democracy and the relation between social inequality and political equality refer as a rule exclusively to class inequality, ignoring gender. There are a few exceptions in which the influence of feminist considerations is noticeable. See for example, M. Walzer, 1983, Ph. Green, 1985, as well as I.M. Young, 1998, pp. 484–487, who refers to the evolution of democratic theory with reference to the above. See J. Rawls, 1999, p. 11 ff. Later Rawls (2001, p. 19) clarifies that the conception of the person found in the original position is a political conception that does not presuppose any specific view of the nature of the self. Although it is debatable how and to what extent family is relevant to J. Rawls’ theory of justice. See the relevant discussion in S.M. Okin, 1989, pp. 26–33. S.M. Okin, 1990. Ch. Mouffe, 1993, pp. 136–137. See S.M. Okin, 1991, pp. 67–68. J. Rawls, in his “restatement”, 2001, pp. 162–168, refers extensively, nevertheless, to S.M. Okin’s, 1989, “critical but not unsympathetic discussion of Theory”, p. 167, especially concerning whether the principles of justice apply to the family. On this problematique, see D. Cornell, 1998, p. 14 ff. The respective bibliography is extensive, while a number of the studies on this issue are cited in this study. For a brief presentation of the theoretical contention in American feminist theory see N. Fraser, 1996, pp. 198–206 and for her French counterpart, see C. Delphy, E. de Lesseps, N.M. Mathieu et al., 1997, pp. 3–19, and J. Mossuz Lavau, A. de Kervasdoué, 1997. The interesting title of this study, Les Femmes ne sont pas des hommes comme les autres, shows the relation of the authors with the rationale of the feminism of difference. See also G. Bock, 1993, pp. 53–83. I imply here the work of C. Gilligan, 1982, concerning the existence of differences in moral thinking according to gender, a claim that has generated intense controversy. “humans are dual not unitary, divided and not one” according to S. Agacinski, 1998, the Foreword (my translation). I am using here a conventional way of classifying second wave feminism. However, there is no real consensus as to the above categorization, neither on its internal divides nor on some of the thinkers placed under one or the other label, while obviously new labels have appeared recently referring to psychoanalytic, postmodern, lesbian feminism etc. See M. Maynard, 1995. The name of this bipolar pattern is unfortunate since obviously both currents aim at

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Notes equality and the respect of difference. They just conceive of them differently, attributing diversified weight to a bipolar perception of gender, and its consequences. For a fuller account of the relevant discussion, see G. Bock, S. James, 1992, G. Bock 1993, C. Pateman, 1989 and J.W. Scott, 1997. On the concept of oppression and the formulation of criteria according to which a social group may be characterized as oppressed, see the classic study by I.M. Young, 1990. See Ch. Mouffe, 1995, p. 262, on the distinction between “differences that exist but should not exist and differences that do not exist but should exist”. See also Ch. Mouffe, 2000. J.W. Scott 1997, p. 765. The author stresses that “equality might well be defined as deliberate indifference to specified differences”. C. MacKinnon, 1998, p. 295. R. Lister, 1997, p. 99. The latter presupposes radical revisions concerning the perception of the body, and specifically the rethinking of some basic assumptions related to the body/mind, nature/culture dualisms. See below, ch. 4. It is interesting to note here M. Gatens’ 1992, p. 129, comment concerning the fact that the responses to the “sexual equality versus sexual difference debate . . . are caught up within the same paradigm. Both understand the body as a given biological entity which either has or does not have certain ahistorical characteristics and capacities.” On this issue see F. Collin, 1995 ff. See also J. Mossuz Lavau, A. de Kervasdoué, 1997, p. 265, who also refer to F. Collin’s 1995 reasoning. Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 13, indicates that “radical democracy demands that we acknowledge difference . . . in effect, everything that has been excluded by the concept of Man in the abstract”. Thus “universalism is not rejected but particularized”. For this right which “constitutes the value of equal positive freedom which is a cornerstone of a new democratic theory”, see C. Gould, 1981, p. 52. A. Phillips, 1993, p. 71. All the more so, when our “immediate and specific difference” is the result of social conditioning in an unequal gender order. See S.M. Okin, 1991, pp. 67–90, on the ambiguity in the theoretical distinction of the private and the public sphere. See also A. Phillips, 1991, pp. 92–119, for an interesting argument in favour of the “uncoupling” of this distinction from the division between women and men. In The subjection of women, written in 1861 and published in 1869. See J.S. Mill, 1970, p. 57. See also how C. Pateman, 1989, p. 215, presents Mill’s argument. See W. Natter, 1995, p. 268. See below ch. 4. See the introduction by E. Papataxiarchis, in E. Papataxiarchis, T. Paradellis, 1992, which summarizes the contemporary approaches to gender in social sciences, referring to the relevant contribution of feminist theory. In the same way in which race, having lost all its significance as a meaningful biological difference, has relinquished all legitimacy as a factor of distinction of subjects and social groups. This does not mean, of course, that racism has disappeared. For this definition of democracy, see A. Touraine, 1994, p. 25. C. Gould, 1981, p. 51. The articulation between them is far from evident. See E. Laclau, 1996, the Introduction. On this argument see Th. Maloutas, M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004.

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61 Compare this to the way in which Ch. Mouffe, 1992, delineates citizenship in the context of radical democracy. 62 Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 84, defines citizenship as an articulating principle that affects the different subject positions of the social agent. 63 See M. Dietz, 1998, p. 390, who insists on the importance for feminism of a democratic perception of politics. 64 See C. Pateman, 1989, p. 5, on the contract theorists’ construction of sexual difference as political difference, “the difference between men’s natural freedom and women’s natural subjection”. See also M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996. 65 For this line of reasoning, referring to feminists inside the state, see J. Brenner, 1996, p. 54. 66 C. Pateman, 1989, p. 14, insists on her side that “if women are to be citizens as women democratic theory and practice has to undergo a radical transformation”. 67 See ch. 4. 68 See, on this topic, the response by A.M. Jaggar, 1983, p. 357. The relevant question is certainly much more general. Indicatively, on the influence of ideas on political life, see Ph. Pettit, 1997, the Introduction, and, specifically, on what kind of theory feminism needs, see J.W. Scott, 1997, pp. 758–770. 69 See A. Giddens, 1984, p. 354, and pp. 348–354, for an interesting juxtaposition of natural and social sciences, where it is shown how “social sciences enter into the very constitution of ‘their world’ in a manner which is foreclosed to natural science” (p. 350). 70 N. Hirschmann, Ch. Di Stefano, 1996, p. 4. 71 On the need for theoretically substantiated feminist action and the typical tensions between feminist theorists and feminist activists, with examples from the 1970s, see N. Hartsock, 1998, pp. 9–13. 72 On the political significance of feminist alliance politics, with a comparison of British with American reality, see S. Walby, 2000, pp. 75–78. The author attributes the manifestly greater successes of the feminist movement in England than in the United States in the area of social rights for women, to precisely the fact that due to the specific socio-political environment, the former struck successful alliances with the working class (p. 77). 73 See C.L. Bacchi, 1999, the Introduction. 74 I do not imply here a notion of “false consciousness” concerning women. See, on this topic, N. Hartsock, 1998, p. 107. See also D. Cornell, 1991, and 1998, p. 169, on the consequences of the imposition of a “true” consciousness. 75 The EU context is implied here. See also Concluding Remarks. 76 See I. Berlin 1969, pp. 127–131. Despite the justified criticism that this line of thought has received (see a brief presentation of the relevant criticisms in T. Gray, 1991) it is still very interesting and has a radical potential. 77 Furthermore, the logic of negative liberty has been criticized from a feminist perspective mainly with reference to the latent acceptance of family as a place of freedom, as well as with regards to the tolerance of pornography that it entails. See R. Voet, 1998, pp. 56–57. 78 See J. Brenner, 1996, p. 62. 79 See R. Lister, 1997, pp. 36–41, for citizenship as an expression of human agency. 80 C. Gould, 1988, p. 32. See also, C. Gould, 1981, pp. 50–58. 81 See also C.P. MacPherson, 1973, who suggests the possibility of using and developing personal skills as a central aim of a democratic society. 82 C. Gould, 1996, p. 180. 83 C. Pateman, 1989, p. 210. See also pp. 210–225, where the relevant debate, which inspired my argument, is fully presented. Pateman’s ground-breaking analysis of

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86

87

88

89 90

91 92

93 94 95

96

97 98 99

Notes women’s citizenship (mainly 1988), concludes in supporting the idea of a sexually differentiated citizenship, which is not what the present study intends to promote. The expression, used in a different context, belongs to S. Bowles, H. Gintis, 1986, p. 131. On the hypothesis of the inherent androcentric character of citizenship, which is not accepted by all, see mainly S.M. Okin, 1979, C. Pateman, 1988, 1989, N. Fraser, L. Gordon, 1994 and R. Lister, 1997. For an opposing view, see A. Oldfield, 1990, p. 159 ff. What happens to this conception of citizenship, asks C. Pateman, 1992, p. 27, when, as in the case of the US Armed Forces in the Gulf War, some of the soldiers were women (in this case 6 per cent), many of whom were mothers? I am implying here the history of the women’s movement in Greece, since the late nineteenth century. See E. Avdela, A. Psarra, 1985, E. Varikas, 1987, K. Xiradaki, 1988, D. Samiou, 1984, S. Moschou-Sakorrafou, 1990, and E. Varikas, 1985. See also A. Psarra, 1999, for an interesting history of feminism in Greece. See J. Habermas’ critique of postmodern theory in J. Habermas, 1987 and 1996. See also M. Passerin d’Entrèves, S. Benhabib, 1996, for an interesting collection of articles, which criticize this critique. Especially for the concept of alterity in J. Habermas, see the critical observations of D. Coole, 1996, pp. 221–224. See below ch. 3.1. See C. Mouffe, 1995, p. 262 with respect to the distinction of differences, as well as N. Fraser, 1996, p. 205 ff. for a critique of the “pluralist” version of multiculturalism, due to the uncritical acceptance of difference it entails, failing to investigate its relation to inequality. See W. Brown, 1988, p. 4. A European research project titled Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming, co-ordinated by M. Verloo, which started in 2003, takes gender equality as a case in order to analyse the framing of policy problems in various European countries. The author of the present book is responsible for the Greek study, in which are highlighted interesting aspects of Greek political culture concerning gender preconceptions. What is still more interesting is the on-going investigation of the basic commonality and the specific differences in gender preconceptions among different European societies. On this important “new” approach see V.A. Schmidt, C.L. Radaelli, 2004, p. 183. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989 and 1999. The year 1985 is mentioned here as a benchmark, since in the parliamentary elections of that year the feminine constituency turned out for the first time in greater numbers than their masculine counterparts in favour of a non-rightist party, PASOK. A gender gap was thus created in Greek electoral politics (M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989) noted in all subsequent elections until today. One should not forget that beyond their institutionalized participation, Greek women made a significant contribution to the national liberation struggles and the struggles for democracy, see L. Cram, 1994, p. 230, while in addition, there has always been an active women’s movement in Greece since 1887, with the exception of times of war and dictatorship. See D. Samiou, 1984. Data refer to spring 2001: European Database “Women in Decision-Making”. This is largely with regard to the respective references in the publications of the European Network “Women in Decision-Making”. Especially mothers in a family-centred vision of society. Apart from socialization patterns, the hypothesis that Greek women do in fact participate in greater numbers than shown in official statistics should be examined closely, their participation being mostly informal and unrecorded, mainly in financial decision-making structures in an indeterminate and non-institutional capacity. This seems fully justified in social per-

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ceptions through a singular ideological extension of the private sphere far beyond what is usually established, so that it includes family business, strategies for upward social mobility for descendants etc. Obviously there are exceptions to the reality of exclusion of this social category. P.N. Diamandouros is the main point of reference for the historical origins and the contemporary profile of Greek political culture. See P.N. Diamandouros, 1983 and P.N. Diamandouros, 1994. See P.N. Diamandouros, M. Spourdalakis, 1991 and M.J. Tsinisizelis, 1993 for a history of Political Science in Greece, which shows the limited attention devoted to gender. This comment refers to the GSE under PASOK (socialist) governments. It is too soon to be able to say what will happen under ND (Right) government, which returned to power in March 2004. However, it is certain that the EU gender policy directives will continue their important role in the implementation of respective national policies. The relevant percentage for Portugal was 27.5 per cent, the Netherlands 26.7 per cent, Spain 26.5 per cent, Great Britain 20 per cent and Italy 14.3 per cent. See European Commission 1994 V2078/94EN, for a count of women per political party. Following the Beijing World Women’s Conference, the “balanced participation” of women and men in decision-making was one of the main goals of the Fourth Action Programme (1996–2000), while in the Recommendation of 2 December 1996 the Council of the EU called on its member states to develop suitable measures and strategies to correct the “under-representation” of women in decision-making, Finally in 1997, in the Amsterdam Treaty (ratified in 1999) gender equality was made a criterion against which all areas of policy must be measured, and gender mainstreaming was promoted into the main strategy. See C.L. Bacchi, 1999, the Introduction, and J. Squires, 2000, for an interesting problematique on framing. See C. Offe, 1996, p. 50 ff., as well as C. Offe, Ph. Schmitter, 1995. For more extensive treatment on the issue see M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996. M. Hirsch, E. Fox Keller, 1990, p. 3. See N. Cott, 1977. The surprise expressed and the accusation of political immaturity concerning women who struggle for women’s rights diverging in their approach, is of course not new. See N. Cott, 1987, p. 122. See also Ch. Vlahoutsicou, 2003, who refers to the above, as well as to the existing bibliography on the matter of women’s conflicts and the way they are perceived, pp. 14–104. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2003, for full development of this theme. The only legitimate deviations in the context of this traditional logic are those referring to the clashes among women that result from antagonism for favours from the other sex, a classic case of the accepted confrontational scenario concerning the relations of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. See Ch. Vlahoutsikou, 1997. Research findings of the European research project Genre et gestion locale du changement dans sept pays de l’Union Européenne (Coord. J. Heinen), substantiate, concerning Greece, the hypothesis of strong expectations and negative ascription to women themselves of their non-collaboration specifically in local politics. Data refer to 134 interviews with local government actors in various parts of Greece, in many of which a profound belief was detected that it goes without saying that women as such can automatically collaborate among themselves, and if that is not happening it is because party barriers form obstacles that they should be able to overcome. On this type of reasoning, see an interesting critique in A. Phillips, 1998, p. 238. See examples from Norway in H. Skjeie, 1991, pp. 233–263.

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117 Although women may have common interests, I do not think that gender inequality can be adequately conceptualized in terms of interests and especially not in reference to the objectionable distinction between objective and subjective interests. See a critique of V. Sapiro, 1998, by I. Diamond, N. Hartsock, 1998, both first published in 1981 and still important references for the issue, as well as R. Pringle, S. Watson, 1998. The latter insists on the discursively constructed character of interests, which take shape in the process of engagement with the state. 118 For the contradictory pressures faced by contemporary women in respect to their many conflicting roles, see A. Snitow, 1990, p. 19. 119 The argument of the democratic deficit in discussions on the limited presence of women in political decision-making is implied here. 120 There is an indication within the Greek political culture of the existence of a crosssection related to age in the gender perception of women actively involved in local government and expressed in the way in which they experience their own gender. A cross-section especially significant in generational terms and apparent around the age of forty. This hypothesis, which needs further investigation, is inspired by data from interviews with women councillors that were undertaken within the framework of the research project Genre et gestion locale du changement dans sept pays de l’Union Européenne (see note 114). The remarks made above involve in particular conceptions of women politicians active on the central political scene and in their forties or early fifties. 121 I deal with the dead ends in such a practice below in ch. 2.2 and 2.3. 122 See the argument of J. Lorber, 2000, who suggests by the title of her article (“Using gender to undo gender”) the implementation of policies for gender, which in turn annul it. 123 See also M. Verloo, 1999, who insists in an evaluative report for the Council of Europe that there is a lack of elaboration of gender equality as an objective, and a need for ongoing dialogue on what it should be. 124 1999, pp. 66–67.

2 Restricted women’s presence in political decision-making: theoretical issues and policies 1 The relevant bibliography is quite extensive. For some of the classic studies on this topic see J. Hills, J. Lovenduski, 1981, V. Randall, 1982, M. Sineau, 1988, P. Norris, J. Lovenduski, 1995. See also the European study coordinated by J. Lovenduski, S. Stephenson, 1997, in which there is a bibliographical guide. For recent data see L. Walter, 2003. The Scandinavian countries are of course an exception to the rule of the great numerical lagging of women in political decision-making, something which is not independent of the changes in the distinction between public and private spheres noted there as a result of the higher development of the welfare state. See also below, n. 34. 2 In M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1987, I deal more extensively with this issue. 3 For an in-depth discussion on the multiple interpretations of what “the personal is political” means, as well as for the conditions under which this emerged as a motto in the 60s, see A. Phillips, 1991, pp. 92–119. See also C. Pateman, 1985, p. 174. 4 See J. Flax, 1993, especially p. 136 ff. I certainly in no way imply that the feminist standpoint is the only one from which the relevant tenets of western thought were challenged. 5 For this conception of the crisis of politics, see D. Miliband, 1994, the Introduction. 6 See Ch. Mouffe, 1992, on the notion of radical democracy. 7 It is interesting to note that this last parameter in the relevant problematique is not addressed in the political discourse within the framework of which it is maintained

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that the augmentation by all means of the presence of women in parliament is imperative, so that women may be better represented. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992. For example, in the framework of Greek political culture, young and aged women are clearly more differentiated amongst as political agents than young and aged men, but also than young men and young women. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992, p. 262 ff. See the first documented refutation of the relevant political science “axiom” concerning the reduced political participation of women in S. Welch, 1977, pp. 711–730. See also R. Lister, 1997, pp. 147–149. Following their election, five of these women had to relinquish their seats, since the Electoral Courts ruled that they had a candidacy impediment. Obviously this is also true. With the foregoing remarks I attempt to state what in my view is the central problem for women as a social category, and how this is not confronted substantially by means of the established ways or demands, such as quotas or equal representation/participation (parity). See ch. 2.2. See the view of C. Pateman, 1970 and 1985, which is based on her personal reading of classic references of the theory of democracy, such as that of J.-J. Rousseau and J.S. Mill. See S. James, 1992, p. 60. The view of M. Walzer concerning the necessity of guaranteeing a complex view of equality within the framework of which different individuals will be distinguished in various sectors, but no-one may transfer the power resulting from the relevant distinction in one sector to others, is especially valid in reference to women. It could also be maintained that the dominant women’s model paradigmatically illustrates the hypothesis of the author, M. Walzer, 1983, p. 321, that it is impossible for an individual or a social category lagging behind in all sectors to be equal citizens with the rest. The conditions have certainly improved in both the practical and the ideological sense in recent decades. But, although the framework of women’s subordination has significantly changed, its substance has basically remained the same. S.M. Okin, 1979, p. 294, referring to the relations of women with the labour market and their exclusion, remarks pointedly that the view that women’s place is in the home is a self-fulfilling prophecy. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1987, which includes the relevant bibliography of the period. I will not elaborate on this topic which is not within the scope of my interest here. See a relevant review and bibliography in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1993. On gender as a factor of social inequality and its consequences for the political behaviour of women, see S. Walby, 1997, pp. 139–140, where there is extensive reference to the pertinent international bibliography. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1990. Even in studies in which the hypothesis concerning the dangers of “overload” is not so manifest (as for example, in G. Almond, S. Verba, 1963), a confusion can be detected between the deontological description of the functioning of a successful democracy and the reality of specific democracies regarded by their researchers as successful, such as the United States and Great Britain (p. 338). See also R. Dowes, J. Hughes, 1972. K. Lenk, 1990, pp. 172–173. R. Macridis, S. Burg, 1991, p. 57. G. Almond, S. Verba, 1963, p. 362. G. Almond, S. Verba, 1963, p. 360.

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27 See the interesting critique by C. Pateman, 1989, pp. 141–178, of the study of G. Almond, S. Verba, 1963. In M. Pantelidou Malouta, 1987, p. 34 ff., I deal with a critical presentation of the relevant theoretical scheme. 28 S. Walby, 1997, pp. 139–142, rightly observes that in the relevant bibliography the active political participation of women as individuals, but also as a social category, is treated as an exception to the rule of women’s political apathy. 29 The Greek interpretation of parité, not as equal representation, as suggested by E. Varikas, 1995, (in the Greek translation of E. Varikas, 1994) which is in accordance with the dominant reasoning on the basis of which it was promoted in France, but as equal participation, demonstrates precisely this confusion. But of course, this is one example referring mainly to a topical political framing of the issue, when there are many others, referring to the international feminist bibliography. 30 This hypothesis belongs to P. Meier and was developed in P. Meier, E. Lombardo, M. Bustelo, M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004, from which this paragraph borrows freely. 31 See S. Lukes, 1974, p. 11, who levels a critique at the designation of the approach by R. Dahl, N.W. Polsby, and others, as pluralist, observing that in this way it is implied that the conclusions of the inquiry in question are presupposed in the conceptual tools used in its framework. 32 This, S. Lukes, 1974, pp. 21–25, calls a three-dimensional view. 33 This should not be taken to mean that, especially on the individual level, nonparticipation in the political process cannot constitute a conscious political choice under particular circumstances, nor that it is necessarily identified with political apathy. 34 The fact that only in societies with a significantly developed welfare state the presence of women in structures of political decision-making approaches the presence of men is indicative of the substance of this issue. For an investigation into this hypothesis with regard to Scandinavian countries, see S.M. Okin, 1996, pp. 140–142, J. Lovenduski, P. Norris, 1993, H.M. Hernes, 1988, B. Siim, 1988. Of course if the development of the welfare state is one of the presuppositions for women’s political activity, this will in no case be tantamount to a guarantee of a change in the gender distribution of power. For the contradictory character of women’s experience that relates to the development of welfare state in Scandinavia, see especially B. Siim, 1988, pp. 178–181. 35 1996, pp. 122–123. 36 See also Ph. Green, 1985, pp. 177–178, who in the same vein unfolds his arguments venturing beyond the non-correspondence of demographic parameters, around the non-correspondence between the lifestyle of those who legislate on matters of education, health, housing policies, etc., and the relevant experiences that result from their activity for all the rest. 37 By the same logic on the basis of which the acquisition of political rights for women, an unmistakably significant step for democracy, did not bring about the end of women’s subordination, since the deprivation of the former was the result of the latter and not vice versa. I elaborate this line of reasoning further in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989. 38 See B. Siim, 1988, p. 174. 39 See H.M. Hernes, 1988, p. 200. 40 A. Phillips, 1993, p. 110. See also I.M. Young, 1990, p. 301. For the operation of self-knowledge feminist groups as a form of political intervention (and indeed as the most characteristic form of political activity of the women’s movement in the United States, according to the author of the article), in the light of H. Arendt’s thinking concerning the relation between experience, theory and action, see L. Disch, 1997, pp. 132–165. 41 A. Phillips, 1993, pp. 109–111.

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42 See A. Phillips, 1993, p. 114. 43 See R. Voet, 1998, p. 109. The author notes that that was considered to be “the wrong kind of feminism”. It must be added that often it was (and is) perceived as not feminism at all. 44 For various ways of seeing women’s inclusion in political elites and “state feminism”, see, B. Siim, 1988, H. Skjeie, 1991, D.S. McBride, A.G. Mazur, 1995, J. Jenson, M. Sineau, 1995, D. Thompson, 2001, pp. 14–17. 45 V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, pp. 202–203. 46 C. Pateman’s problematique of that era is typical in this respect, while its theoretical origins are evident. See C. Pateman, 1970. 47 For a response to the reasons why feminist theory should refer to the thought of H. Arendt, which is distinguished among other things for its strict distinction between the public and private spheres, see B. Honig, 1992, pp. 215–235. 48 For the relation between feminism and the tradition of civic republicanism, see A. Phillips, 1991, pp. 115–119. 49 See C. Calhoun, J. McGowan, 1997, the Introduction. Let it be noted though, that voices within feminist theory continue to be heard articulating both absolute rejection of H. Arendt’s thinking with reference to her “phallocentrism”, and justification of her acceptance on the basis that her thinking is much more gynocentric than it seemed initially, especially in The Human Condition. It is obvious that the appropriation of H. Arendt can only be selective from the viewpoint of feminist theory, and have as its focus the richness of her thinking about action in the public sphere extending into a discussion concerning identities, where her reasoning promotes the (specially hopeful) hypothesis that the exclusion of “them” is not necessary for the recognition of “us”. See L. Disch, 1997, p. 162. 50 See E. Varikas, 1987a, pp. 37–44, on the use of the notion of the pariah by women activists in nineteenth-century France, as a metaphor for the exclusion of women. The term is of much interest, because it not only refers to the objective state of exclusion, but also includes a subjective dimension that refers to an internalized stance, either of the society or the oppressed themselves vis-à-vis the rejection that they are subjected to (pp. 85–86). 51 Regarding this notion of freedom as the crux of the tradition of civic republicanism, see Ph. Pettit, 1997, specifically the Introduction. 52 This conceptualization of freedom is not the dominant one and this has been true since the end of the eighteenth century, when, according to Ph. Pettit, 1997, Introduction, the ascription of citizenship to broader social strata made imperative the redefinition of the notion of “freedom”, which could no longer but be conceptualized in less radical terms. This author, p. 7 ff., proposes the redefinition of “freedom” within the traditional framework of civic republicanism as a way of facing many of the contemporary social issues. The same author, elsewhere (Ph. Pettit, 1996), supports the idea that civic republicanism is especially appealing for anyone espousing a view of the subject that rejects anything inspired by “collectivism”, in the sense of a definition of the individual inspired by absolute historical determination, as much as by individualism. 53 M. Evans, 1997, p. 137, mentions as a characteristic residue of this logic the example of the women in the United States who demanded the right to full and equal participation with men in the armed forces, that is, the right to occupy positions which, if need be, would require them to kill. 54 It is even illustrative of the situation that, as shown by M. Sineau, 1988, concerning Frenchwomen politicians, the less a woman politician deals with issues pertaining to gender, the more chances she has to move up the political party ranks and therefore to advance her election to a parliamentary seat. 55 See S.M. Okin, 1989, p. 6.

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56 But not the autonomous feminist groups. 57 I develop these views in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1989b. It must be reminded here that in all political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party of Greece–KKE) exist today or had existed for brief periods (KKE) quotas within certain levels of their party structures, but at a percentage below 35 per cent. None of the political parties of course have yet implemented quotas on their (open) lists in parliamentary elections, while it seems, based on press information, that the attempts to significantly increase women’s presence in the lists of the two bigger political parties failed in the April 2000 elections, because, according to common views expressed in the press, “not enough women were found” ready to assume candidacy. The landscape had changed by the 2004 elections that took place after the institution of quotas for (the 2002) local elections. In particular the two main parties competing for power had by then greatly increased their women candidates under pressure from the European climate and its various active supporters in Greece. 58 See C. Bacchi, 2004, p. 129, on affirmative action measures seen as preferential treatment, and thus having “a range of deleterious effects for target groups”, while they leave “the status quo largely unchallenged”. 59 Many opposing views to the ones presented here on quotas were obviously made public at this period, and if the claim failed to be accepted, it was not for the reasons argued above. 60 See M. Sawer, 2000, p. 363, who further notes that the presence of women can be used as an alibi for policies that have a big impact on women. 61 Adesmefti Kinisi Gynaikon. See Dini 4, 1989, p. 101. 62 Aftonomi Kinisi Gynaikont, Periodiko Dini, Spiti Gynaikon. See Dini 4, 1989, pp. 96–97. 63 See A. Phillips, 1994 and 1995. 64 See P. Waugh, 1992, p. 119 for a similar argument. 65 This is the title of a paper by M.L. Krook, 2003. 66 For different kinds of quotas see P. Norris, 2000, p. 3. 67 M. Russell, 2000, p. 14. 68 See P. Norris, 2000, p. 3. 69 In the past, two parties of the Left, influenced by feminist ideas, had adopted a 40 per cent quota for internal party elections and later adopted candidate quotas for parliamentary elections, both later abandoned. Nevertheless the number of women elected continued to grow. See B. Siim, 2000, p. 131, where there is further bibliography on the issue. 70 J. Lovenduski, P. Norris, 1996. 71 Parliamentary discussion on the amendment of Law 2910/2001, article 75, on the application of quotas in municipal elections, 28.3.2001, V. Papandreou’s speech. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas et al., 2004, for a detailed analysis of speeches on quotas. See also P. Meier, E. Lombardo, M. Bustelo, M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004. This analysis is part of the European Research Project Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming (Coord. M. Verloo). 72 See M. Pantelidou Maloutas et al., 2004. 73 See M. Pantelidou Maloutas et al., 2003. 74 See P. Meier, E. Lombardo, M. Bustelo, M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004. 75 From the European Research Project, Policy Frames and Implementation Problems: The Case of Gender Mainstreaming (Coord. M. Verloo), which started in 2003. 76 See D. Dahlerup, 1998. 77 See, C. Bacchi, 2004, who shows how the construction of affirmative action as preferential treatment undermines the legitimacy of the reform and reduces its impact. 78 See F. Gaspar, 1994 and E. Viennot, 1994, for texts which are points of reference in

Notes

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82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

93 94

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support of parity, as well as the European study by the Equal Opportunities Unit directed by E. Vogel-Polsky, 1994. See also M. Sineau, 1995, for an interesting overview of the relevant debate in France. The critique of parity developing in this study refers mainly to the reasoning by E. Viennot, 1994. Compare E. Varikas, 1994 where a multi-faceted critique of the philosophical substantiation of this demand may be found. See also the two special issues of Nouvelles Questions Féministes, 1994 and 1995. Let it be repeated that in June 2000 as a result of the relevant pressure a law was passed by the French Parliament on the obligation of parties to include individuals of the same sex not exceeding 50 per cent on their electoral lists, accompanied by a provision that made it impossible for the majority of the slots up for election to be occupied by individuals of the same sex (obviously men), undermining in this way the spirit of the law. The first elections (municipal elections of March 2001) held in France under the new law resulted in the rise of the percentage of women city council members from 25.7 per cent to 47.5 per cent. See M. Sineau, 2001, pp. 264–276. For parity see also the collective volume by J. Martin, 1998, where there is a multi-level treatment of the claim for parity, with references to the respective problematique in other countries. See A. Phillips, 1998, pp. 225–226, who gives convincing examples of why this is so. As far as gender disparities are concerned. All systems of inequality obviously create problems at the level of democracy and “representation”. This is the title of an international conference held by the Diotima Centre for Women’s Studies in February 1996 in Athens whose minutes are interesting for the problematique developed here. See Diotima, 1999. “There are two sexes. This is a reality that the history of human rights . . . must adopt now as its principle”, is stated in the founding declaration of Club Parité 2000, with the certainty of the self-evident. See M. Th. Coenen, 1999, p. 43 and p. 76. This is why B. Siim, 2000, p. 152, characterizes the claim for parity as static and not dynamic from a democratic perspective. B. Marques-Pereira, 2000, p. 23. See L. Bereni, E. Lépinard, 2003, on the framing of parity in France (p. 18), and the disillusionment of some of its supporters. See, J. Squires, 2000, p. 215, who advises us to “consider which exclusions are implicit in the new forms of inclusiveness proposed”. Mainly C. Pateman, 1988, 1989. For an interesting critique of the thought of C. Pateman on this point, see Ch. Mouffe, 1992, pp. 374–377. Mainly, C. Gould, 1976. C. Pateman, 1988, 1989. As far as I know, the demand for parity has not substantially utilized in its argument these philosophical “origins” in their feminist interpretation, referring more to the French tradition of republican citizenship. A notable exception is the study by philosopher S. Agacinski, 1998. On the contrary, it often refers to psychoanalytic theories within the framework of which L. Irigaray, 1994, p. 107 (seconded in L. Irigaray, 1995, p. 140), supports the dual character of universality, since according to her, “the universal is dual, masculine and feminine”. See also J. Landes, 1988 and J.W. Scott, 1996, on how the universal bourgeois subject of the French Revolution was a gendered subject, with women excluded from the sphere of politics. B. Siim, 2000, p. 70. As early as 1949, T.H. Marshall, 1977, pp. 88–89, remarks that women and children working in factories in the nineteenth century enjoyed “protection” by the relevant laws in England, because they were not citizens. It seems that these laws took

142

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96

97 98

99

100

101 102

103

104 105

Notes meticulous care to avoid the extension of the relevant protection to adult men, out of respect for their status as citizens, according to which the imposition of protective measures curtails the civil right to conclude a free employment contract. I certainly do not imply that the relevant views are manifestly legitimated nowadays, and obviously do not find institutional regulation. However, in common sense views it is expected that those who are in need of protection are the weak, and consequently, the different from the norm and indeed those who are deficient. Moreover, the relation between equality and difference has proven to be historically an especially problematic one, both socially and theoretically. See, for example, G. Bock, S. James, 1992, and also here above ch. 1.1. For the notion of the difference of the sexes, as formed in nineteenth-century philosophical thought, in which the concept of man of natural law subsides in favour of a systematic inquiry that concerns it, see E. Varikas, 1987b. For the relevant terminology, the connotations of which are differentiated between the American and the British bibliography concerning affirmative action, positive discrimination and reverse discrimination, see B. Goodwin, 1995, pp. 293–296. It is interesting to note that the theoretical debate concerning positive discrimination caused issues that were hitherto ignored, like racism and sexism, to become objects of research in the framework of American political theory. See I.M. Young, 1998, p. 492. For the importance of the discursive construction of the above measures see C.L. Bacchi, 2004, pp. 128–146. See V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, p. 201. At the same time, however, these policies denote a particular perception of justice. See I.M. Young, 1990, p. 138 ff. At this point is located the basic contention in positive discrimination from a liberal perspective. See in general for the logic and a chronicle of affirmative action, C.L. Bacchi, 1996, as well as D. Ashley, 1997. See also A. Brown, 1990, pp. 197–200 for a systematic classification of arguments against affirmative action with their counterpoint. This author (pp. 199–200) presents the relevant measures as an interesting social experiment, whose substantial results will show through in the future. For the fundamental role of the family in the preservation of women’s subordination, with references to classical political philosophy, see S.M. Okin, 1979. See also S.M. Okin, 1989. Which obviously and by definition contribute to the significant increase in the number of women in positions of power within political parties (R. Ingelhart, P. Norris, 2000, p. 14), and also contribute to the election of more women to parliamentary seats (M. Caul, 1999). For the manner in which different electoral systems affect the election of women, see P. Norris, 1985, as well as J. Lovenduski, P. Norris, 1993, pp. 309–320. There is of course the case of the negative effect of quotas on women party cadres, since on the basis of the logic that they will be elected anyway due to quotas, the party mechanism may preferentially “strengthen” other candidacies, which for a variety of reasons need to be privileged with increased acceptance. There is also the issue of stigmatization, in the sense of diminished “specific weight” and influence of a political actor elected with the assistance of quotas in comparison to someone else elected without. With reservations and stressing their temporary character, feminist theorists, such as A. Phillips, 1991 and S.M. Okin, 1996 accept these measures, while the former mentions (p. 7) that she regards as transitional the emphasis on “sexual differentiation” inherent in such regulations, until those who were previously silenced acquire a voice. See, for this reasoning, D. Ashley, 1997, pp. 206–209. C. Bacchi, 2004, p. 142, attributes the European focus on affirmative action for

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108 109 110

111

112 113 114 115 116

117 118 119 120

121

122 123 124 125

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women in political decision-making to the fact that it is a less contested arena, because it does not impinge upon the labour market. J. Squires, 2000, p. 203. It is interesting to remind ourselves that quotas have been challenged in supreme courts in France and Italy as a breach of the principle of universality and of equality of citizenship, which shows that similar arguments can serve completely diverging world-views. See ch. 2.3. See A. Phillips, 1994, p. 74, for the development of this idea. Those are not the only arguments in favour of women’s presence in political decision-making. They are just the ones that I consider more important. See R. Voet, 1998, pp. 100–112, for an overview of the relative arguments, as well as for an interesting critique of the views of the European Network of Experts “Women in decision-making”. See also A. Phillips, 1995, 1998. In M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996, pp. 105–106, I suggest a distinction between feminist and women’s demands, which is useful to the reasoning developed here. In my view and given the historicity of the character of demands, a demand or a policy can be seen as feminist in the current circumstances, when it aims in the long run at the elimination/deconstruction of the existing gender order, that is, of gender itself as we know it today. Not merely when it serves the interests of a certain category of women, or when it satisfies a legitimate equality demand, moving a little the boundaries of the gender divide, thus modernizing gender inequality. See the view of J. Butler, 1990, pp. 147–149. K. Nash, 1998, p. 56. K. Nash, 1998, p. 55. See also my Concluding Remarks. See ch. 1.1, as well as the Concluding Remarks for my conception of the “universal”. See E. Varikas, 1994, for a documented critique of the logic of “equal representation”. For group representation, see also the classic text by I.M. Young, 1990, as well as the critique by A. Phillips, 1993. See A. Phillips, 1994, pp. 75–76, in which there is also a rebuttal of this dominant hypothesis. E. Varikas, 1994, p. 45. S.M. Okin, 1996, p. 140. The best documented defence of group representation is certainly that by I.M. Young, 1990, centring on the view that all oppressed groups must secure a role in the formation of policies. For a forceful refutation of the bottom line and call for action of this reasoning, see Ch. Mouffe, 1992, pp. 379–381. But see also I.M. Young, 1994 and 1996, where the author’s views are further elaborated. See A. Phillips, 1991, pp. 62–63. Let it be noted that the author, who maintains the necessity of equal participation for men and women in all party functions, distances herself from the view that women in the relevant framework represent women (p. 72). The fact that it is not possible for men to represent women was first formulated by a group of Frenchwomen during the Revolution. See A. Phillips, 1994, p. 76. Clearly it is not mere coincidence that France nowadays is the country in which the demand for parity is promoted with greatest resolve (and success), which in the end refers to the same reasoning. See also H. Pitkin, 1967, p. 226, for a classic critique of the “mirror” view. The terms belong to H. Pitkin, 1967. A. Phillips, 1995, p. 82. In the sense of feeling that they belong to a socially inferior category. See M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992, p. 132 ff. See A.H. Miller, A. Hildreth, G.L. Simmons, 1988, p. 108.

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126 Of course there are never conditions of perfect representation. In one sense, indeed, “a perfect representation involves a logical impossibility”, see E. Laclau, 1996, pp. 98–99. 127 Beyond the end of their subordination women cannot be viewed as having common interests (if the foregoing can be seen in terms of interests, which may create additional theoretical problems), while they greatly differ on how to achieve it. See a relative exchange of views between V. Sapiro, 1998 and I. Diamond, N. Hartsock, 1998. 128 See the elaborate analysis of H. Pitkin, 1967, pp. 8–9, for the notion of representation which locates four dimensions: the first, the typical representation, to which the above allusion to the notion of representation refers, is, according to H. Pitkin, due to Hobbes, since Hobbes replaced the mythical dimension of representation from “standing for”, to “acting for” someone, p. 250. 129 See A. Phillips, 1998, p. 238. 130 H. Pitkin, 1967, pp. 8–9. 131 For this latter question, see A. Phillips, 1991, pp. 89–91. 132 Therefore, symbolically, an aged peasant woman may, according to this logic, feel that she is represented by a young woman MP with gender identity as the basic legitimating argument (something that is certainly unfounded, even if we were to accept that potentially women representatives promote women’s “interests” in a more efficient way than men, while at the same time they are not accountable to women as a social category. See A. Phillips, 1995, p. 82). See also the views on symbolical representation by H. Pitkin, 1967, pp. 95–105. 133 See V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, p. 191. 134 For an interesting discussion around this topic, see V. Sapiro, 1998, I. Diamond, N. Hartsock, 1998 and R. Pringle, S. Watson, 1998. 135 But see how the argument that women have at least common substantive interests in relation to care has been challenged in the Scandinavian case, in B. Siim, 2000, p. 153. 136 What a social category regards as being in its interests is certainly affected by the dominant perception as well. A successful attempt to define “real interests” is taken up by W.E. Connolly, 1972, p. 472, as follows: “Policy x is more in A’s interest than policy y, if A, were he to experience the results of both x and y would choose x as the result he would rather have for him”. But this refers mainly to individual not group interests. See also S. Lukes, 1974, pp. 34–35, who refers to the foregoing definition in order to underline the dimension of choice and (relative) autonomy linked to the notion of “real” interests, but also to assert the need for discussion around the nature and the conditions of autonomy. Lukes maintains that any view of power rests on some normatively specific conception of interests. 137 See a different way of viewing this issue in A. Phillips, 1995, p. 68. 138 J. Mossuz-Lavau, 2003. 139 See L. Bereni, E. Lépinard, 2003, pp. 12–31. 140 L. Bereni, E. Lépinard, 2003, p. 29 (my translation). 141 See A. Phillips, 1995, p. 82, who insists on the emphasis on may. 142 Obviously the reduced presence of women does also have practical consequences for all structures of political decision-making and on policy outcomes. See S.M. Okin, 1996, pp. 134–135, on how the number of women politicians in a political body influences their willingness to promote women’s issues. See also G. Duerst-Lahti, D. Verstegen, 1998, pp. 213–238. The two authors, referring to the theoretical scheme by H. Pitkin, 1967, concerning representation, analyse the dynamics of representation of women in the United States during 1992, the “Year of the Woman”. 143 Because through the overturning of the basis on which the principle of representation is founded, a basic principle of democracy is challenged.

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144 Let it be noted that in practice the rejection of mainstream politics by radical feminists is increasingly unfeasible, since in reality they have to challenge the state, but also to cooperate with it, especially on the local level for the resolution of concrete problems. See V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, pp. 186–188. 145 See V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, pp. 7–9. In general there are very interesting references to the relation between the state and gender in this study, a research sector not particularly developed by feminist thought. 146 See the distinction that J. Brenner, 1996, p. 54, makes between a reformist and a revolutionary gender politics, which is based not on whether one organizes to obtain concessions, but on how that effort fits into an overall strategy. 147 See C. Gould, 1996, p. 184, who insists on the idea that all differences should be taken care of seriously in public life and stresses the temporary character that the measures in question should have, as well as on the non-necessary identification of the representative with the represented, to the degree that what is important in the end is the representation of shared interests rather than of essentialist characteristics. For a systematic presentation of various views on representation, see A. Weale, 1999, pp. 108–123. 148 However, it must be recognized that in many cases the relevant measures constitute a significant factor in the improvement of life conditions of particular categories of women. See M.K. Meyer, E. Prügl, 1999, on the efficiency of women’s intervention in international organizations. Especially in specific EU countries in which the system of gender relations is more traditional the above measures are very positive in alleviating for specific women the extra burdens that go with their gender, as well as the exclusions that accompany it. 149 See ch. 2.1. p. 47. 150 For the hypothesis of reification of gender relations, through the construction of the category “women” as a coherent and stable subject of feminist discourse, see J. Butler, 1990, p. 5 ff. 151 See also ch. 2.1 and ch. 5. 152 The motto “more women in Parliament” is obviously a more efficient communication device than any possible formulation of a demand in favour of a new conception for the gendered subject of democracy. 153 These comments relate more to the Greek reality of the late 1970s and 1980s and less to what is going on today in EU countries. For an always interesting approach to autonomy and the alliance politics of feminism, see S. Rowbotham, L. Segal, H. Wainwright, 1979. 154 See the critique in L. Bereni, E. Lépinard, 2003. 155 See the way in which A. Gutmann, 1996, p. 341, interprets and counters the famous W. Churchill maxim. 156 In my view, the “postmodern” critique is not necessarily an attempt at the rejection of modernity. On the contrary, it may function extremely productively as a demand for its “completion” and as such it is treated in this study through the relevant criticism on bipolarities, the androcentrism of citizenship and the distortion of democracy with regard to gender. As Z. Bauman, 1998, p. 31 so nicely argues, the hope of making things better than they are is modernity’s “most defining of its defining traits”. See also the Introduction here, where the notion of completion is defined, as well as the Concluding Remarks. 157 In the Concluding Remarks I attempt to formulate a response to this question. 158 See C. Bacchi, 2004, on the framing of positive action as preferential treatment. 159 See also ch. 2.2, n. 111. While the discussion on who or what is feminist can seem rather pedantic, it must be said that although in politics, every well-meaning selfproclaimed feminist should be welcomed to join forces on specific issues, feminist scholarship, on the contrary, needs conceptual clarity, and thus needs a kind of

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working definition of what is feminist and what is not. Without this, welcoming other voices, permitting the flowering of various “feminisms”, can function as a trap from within, side-tracking the movement, camouflaging means as targets, transforming pressure group politics into a politics of ideas. It is a pity that, within this context, radical feminism, often considered by its supporters as feminism per se (D. Thompson, 2001, p. 2), and offering a powerful critique to the current situation, can still declare complacently that “if radical feminism has not been welcomed into academe, the feeling has been mutual” (p. 3). By contrasting everyday issues of “real” concern to women to long-term theoretical visions of radical change that presuppose theoretical treatment and conceptual reworking, they de facto help those self-identified feminisms that they do not qualify as such, to have the initiative for demands and the institution of changes. Finally, although the discussion on different forms of feminism is not within the scope of this study, I want to argue that the most radical pro-women and (in the sense of the discourse of radical feminism) the only per se feminist stance and thus the most effective in the long run for women, is one that perceives the fight against male supremacy as a fight in view of the future deconstruction of existing gender categories, and engages in theory also, in order to create the conceptual prerequisites for its political promotion. 160 See ch. 5.

3 The gendered subject as citizen 1 See R. Lister, 1997, the Introduction. 2 But usually for citizens themselves it means mainly rights, for some mostly social and for others civil, while for most people citizenship is “the right to have rights”, as the US Supreme Court once put it, according to W. Kymlicka, W. Norman, 1995, p. 310. 3 A. Oldfield, 1990. R. Lister, 1997, p. 41, suggests a distinction between “to be a citizen and to act as a citizen”, noting that to act as a citizen involves “fulfilling the full potential of the status”. 4 Let it be noted, however, that M. Silverman, 1999, pp. 130–131, correctly underlines the fact that while Marxist thinking contributed to the significant assertion of the distinction between formal and substantive rights, the solution it proposes is situated in the framework of the same logic, since it refers to the provision of collective rights, opposing abstract individualism with an equally abstract version of “the people”. See also W. Kymlicka, W. Norman, 1995, for an interesting concise presentation of the theoretical debate on citizenship. As for feminist postmodern critiques of the logic of rights, see D. Elam, 1994, pp. 77–79, on how “rights produce subjects who can hold them” (p. 78). 5 See, A. Phillips, 1991, p. 13, where she notes that “radicals now take seriously what used to be regarded as the liberal side”. 6 See A. Phillips, 1993, p. 105. This author notes, nevertheless, that it is not a question of being for or against liberal democracy, since its theoretical fixity has not historically been such as to legitimize this question, while feminists must target engendering democracy, without also worrying whether the end result would still be liberal democracy. See pp. 103–122. 7 A. Phillips, 1993, p. 45, speaking of sexual equality. 8 Like M. Dietz, 1985, 1998, C. Pateman, 1989, A. Philips, 1991 and 1993, and I. M. Young, 1987 and 1990, whose critique of civic republicanism is at the same time very important. 9 See R. Lister, 1997, p. 24, who notes also (p. 23) that “the renaissance of civic republicanism represents a reaction against the individualism of the liberal citizenship paradigm that has dominated contemporary political life”.

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10 If the sense of a “common good” is perceived as formed through the active participation in public affairs, how will it be formed in subjects who by definition are situated in the private sphere? See also K. Jones, 1988, p. 17. 11 Cf. R. Lister, 1997, pp. 23–29, in which the author refers to the relevant critical positions and in general carries out an interesting review of feminist critiques of the tradition of civic republicanism. We should not forget, moreover, the long tradition of the connection of “virtue” with manliness, in the framework of civic republicanism. See also R. Voet, 1998, p. 134. 12 See R. Lister, 1997, p. 24 ff., A. Philips, 1991 and 1993, and with respect to radical democracy, see Ch. Mouffe, especially 1992. In general, it is true that until recently “citizenship” had very little been the focus of feminist theory. See R. Voet, 1998, p. 8 ff. for a substantiation of this observation, as well as for the hypothesis concerning the need for connection between the vocabularies of feminism and of citizenship. 13 For contemporary proponents of this tradition, see, for example, M. Sandel, 1982, and A. Macintyre, 1985, as well as M. Walzer, a voice less typical of this tradition, and politically quite distinct from the former. See also, R. Lister, 1997, p. 19, on the communitarians’ challenging the discourse on rights, so as “to shift the fulcrum of the citizenship paradigm”. 14 See R. Voet, 1998, p. 133. 15 See D. Cornell, 1998, p. 64. 16 The presentation of the historical succession of rights constitutes one of the points in T.H. Marshall’s analysis which has received sharp criticism, since the linear course which the author describes is not carried through in all cases, while potentially a state of law and the welfare state may exist without the existence of democracy. See J. Habermas, 1994, p. 31. See also N. Fraser, L. Gordon, 1994, pp. 92–94, where interesting observations are made concerning the socio-political environment of the period when T.H. Marshall expressed his thoughts. For another view on the history of “citizenship”, see R. Dahrendorf, 1994, pp. 13–14, who refers to a pattern of concentric circles with a hard core of fundamental, basic human rights at the central nucleus. 17 T.H. Marshall, 1977, p. 92. 18 T.H. Marshall, 1977, p. 78. 19 R. Lister, 1997, p. 34. 20 According to A.S. Orloff, 1993, p. 30, just as the independent male household head is employed as the model of the citizen in classical liberal theory of democracy, so is the working male in the respective social rights bibliography. 21 The pertinent bibliography is quite extensive. See, for example, the essay by T. Bottomore, in T.H. Marshall, T. Bottomore, 1992, referring to Marshall’s thinking forty years later and published along with the text by T.H. Marshall, where the author refers to a great part of the critical literature. See also F. Twine, 1994, ch. 10, and C. Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 10, where the significance of the kind of social investment and the degree to which it is allowed to individuals to maintain a standard of living independently from market forces is stressed as a criterion of satisfaction of a social right. For feminist critical perspectives, see also two texts which constitute central points of reference in the numerous pertinent critical approaches: C. Pateman, 1989, ch. 8 and A. Philips, 1993, pp. 75–82. 22 T.H. Marshall, 1977 p. 106. 23 C. Pateman, 1989, p. 185. 24 S. Walby, 2000, pp. 73–74. This is the French translation of the original published in 1994, in Sociology, 28, 2. 25 For reproductive rights as a special category of rights and as a demand, see A. Gautier, 2000. 26 While the critique of essentialist logic originates from various theoretical currents and

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Notes is expressed by different thinkers, in recent years a strong anti-essentialist tendency has developed within the framework of feminist theory. This, however, does not mean that feminist thinkers in general adopt a non-essentialist view, nor even that there is a clear distinction between those feminists who can be listed in the so-called postmodern current and those who are inspired by essentialist logic. (See also the Introduction.) Moreover, in the field of feminist politics an essentialist view does not necessarily mean a conservative politics, as is correctly pointed out by Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 370, since essentialism may actually be expressed in “progressive ways”. Nevertheless, this logic presents inevitable weaknesses in view of the construction of a substantially democratic alternative through the articulation of struggles referring to different forms of oppression. For a critical account of the emergence of the antiessentialist current in feminist theory, see Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 383, which includes the relevant bibliography. See Ch. Delphy, 1995. See, for example, B. Turner, 1990, pp. 201–209. See A. Phillips, 1993, p. 84, where the author mentions this perception of citizenship as one of the common points in M. Dietz’s and I.M. Young’s views on citizenship. I.M. Young, 1987, p. 74. See the critique by Ch. Mouffe, 1996, pp. 5–6, of the “metaphysical” perception of many liberal thinkers, who view the individual as pre-social. This view concerning the universality of the characteristics of the citizen in opposition to the particularity of the characteristics of the individual has been developed in French political thinking more than anywhere else, due to the tradition of the French revolution. See M. Silverman, 1999, p. 128 ff. The (common) view of the citizen that I sketch at this point includes elements from both main traditions referring to it, on the one hand, as a bearer of rights (individualistic liberalism) and on the other hand, as a bearer of obligations (civic republicanism). See D. Schnapper, 1998, p. 455. Contrary to the “sociological subject” and the “postmodern subject”. See S. Hall, 1992, p. 275 ff., where there is an interesting review of the critical literature on the “subject of the Enlightenment”. J. Flax, 1993, pp. 92–93, holds that the existence of a unitary self is not only impossible, but also a dangerous illusion. However, in J. Flax, 1990, pp. 218–219, she warns us of a usual confusion between a “unitary” and a “core” self, insisting on the existence of a basic cohesion of the self “that makes the fragmentation of experience something other than a terrifying slide into psychosis”. An important warning on behalf of a therapist against possible excesses in a postmodern view on the fragmentation of “de-centred selves”. For the process of identity formation and the various theoretical views concerning it, see S. Hall, 1992, pp. 274–316, who (p. 277) qualifies the identity of the postmodern subject as a “ ‘moveable feast’ formed and transformed continuously”. On this point Ch. Mouffe, 1996, p. 5, bases her very selective agreement with R. Rorty, who agrees that it is time we radically distinguished the liberalism of the Enlightenment from the relevant rationalism. The bibliography on this point is impressive. One reference that is exceptionally accessible to non-experts is S. Hall, 1992, pp. 286–288, who characterizes Freud’s “discovery” of the unconscious as one of the “great ‘de-centrings’ in twentiethcentury Western thought”. See also B. Morris, 1996, pp. 79–101, where the psychoanalytic approach of the subject is utilized from the point of view of its contribution to the whole western tradition concerning subjectivity. It should be noted here that the view concerning the influence of the unconscious was widespread in the area of literature and philosophy long before its “discovery” at the end of the

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nineteenth century, something which was acknowledged by S. Freud. See J. HanwellRiker, 1997, the Introduction. For an account of the development of the conception concerning the subject and subjectivity in the framework of western philosophical tradition, see B. Morris, 1996. I do not imply here that the input of psychoanalysis and especially that of S. Freud in the theory of the formation of subjectivity is limited to references to the unconscious. They simply constitute the most obvious relevant contribution. For a thorough overview on this topic, in association with the hypothesis concerning the development of the bodily self, that presents a special interest for feminist theory, see D. Cornell, 1998, p. 34 ff. Especially of the French school. See J.W. Scott, 1988, p. 42. See J. Lacan, 1966. See also J. Mitchell, J. Rose, 1982, p. 26, for the employment of the relevant view for the needs of a feminist psychoanalytic approach to gender identity. See also J. Henriques, W. Holloway et al., 1998, p. 212 ff., for a summary evaluation of the contribution of Lacanian thinking to the deconstruction of the subject. See also the interesting thoughts of K. Doxiadis, 1992, p. 66, relative to the significance of the theory of J. Lacan for the constitution of the subject as a theoretical basis of the view of M. Foucault on power. The notion of power in M. Foucault’s thinking, as that of freedom, present great interest for feminist thought, since they refer to a “state of the relations themselves that constitute the subject”. See K. Doxiadis, 1992, pp. 67–68. S. Alexander, 1994, specifically stresses this dimension of Lacanian thought in order to demonstrate the vulnerability of the unitary subject vis-à-vis its unconscious. See the way in which J.W. Scott, 1988, summarizes the positions of J. Lacan, of interest to feminist theory, exercising at the same time a critique from the relevant point of view. See N. Hartsock, 1998, pp. 117–119, who builds on prior bibliography, for an interesting presentation of how early experiences form an important ground for men’s sense of self as “even disconnected”, and for the creation of a tendency to perceive the world and their lives by dualisms. I refer here to the classical views of N. Chodorow, 1978. See N. Chodorow, 1997, p. 16. A lot has been said on the ambivalence in the mother–daughter relation. See N. Chodorow, 1974 and 1978 for a classic point of reference on the issue. A. Rich, 1976, pp. 63–64 and p. 167 ff. See S. Hall, 1992, p. 276, concerning the “sociological subject”. I refer at this point to the reasoning of A. Giddens, 1984, especially chs 1 and 6. P. Bourdieu, 1979, makes a pointed reference to subjects as “classeurs classés par leur classement”. It is notable how little the sociological thinking of P. Bourdieu has influenced feminist theory – not so much his obvious references to gender, such as P. Bourdieu, 1998, which may be criticized from a feminist point of view – and in particular the notion of habitus, central to his approach, which is especially useful for the investigation of the formation of gender identity through everyday practices in the process of socialization. See specifically, P. Bourdieu, 1972 and 1980. See below, ch. 4. On bipolarities as a theoretical expression of the common view concerning the disjunction of phenomena regarded exclusively as either biological or social, see J. Henriques, W. Holloway et al., 1998, p. 22. For the “nomadic” character of subjectivity, see R. Braidotti, 1994, who proposes this term. The author refers specifically to women’s subjectivity. However, see J. Flax’s, 1990, pp. 218–219 warning, mentioned here above n. 36. See R. Harré, 1998.

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56 S. Hall, 1996, p. 16. See also E.F. Isin, P.K. Wood, 1999, pp. 1–24, who refer to Hall among other key contributors to the bibliography on identities. 57 See C.O. Schrag, 1997, p. 46. 58 As reproduced in R. Rorty, 1999, p. 77. The latter adds that Dewey could equally well have associated it with the arguments of Plato’s Phaedo or with Kant’s doctrine that the moral self is a non-empirical self. On pragmatism in general, where the social dimensions of subjectivity are stressed, see ibid. On the views of J. Dewey, relative to mind-body dualism as an expression of the class structure of ancient Greek society, see B. Morris, 1996, p. 296 ff. See also R. Rorty, 1994, pp. 42–69, for an interesting attempt to assert the potential contribution of pragmatism to feminist theory. 59 Whether we refer to the “death of man”, in relation to M. Foucault’s thinking (while initially incorporated in the structuralist approach of C. Levi-Strauss), or to the “death of the author” of R. Barthes, or to the deconstruction of the subject of J. Derrida. For an account of the pertinent postmodern view, see C.O. Schrag, 1997. See also Ch. Mouffe, 1996, for an interesting discussion on the common points between the tradition of pragmatism, as expressed by R. Rorty, and poststructuralism, as formulated in the deconstruction theory of J. Derrida. J. Henriques, W. Holloway et al., 1998, in the Foreword, mention three theoretical perspectives from which originate the critique of the centred subject. 60 Le corps vécu. See M. Merleau-Ponty, 1962. See also below, ch. 4. For a postmodern view on the subject, see also J.R. Gibbins, B. Reimer, 1999, specifically, pp. 54–71. 61 See J. Henriques, W. Holloway et al., 1998, the Foreword. 62 While stereotypical references to the concept of national identity in the sense of national character have relinquished all scientific validity, they are still present as deep-rooted preconceptions and as such, affect common-sense views. For interesting thoughts on how multiculturalism is challenging the existing notions of identity, nationality and citizenship across Europe, see the Introduction by T. Modood, in T. Modood, P. Werbner, 1997. 63 D. Cornell, 1998, in the Introduction (p. 18) refers to “a person’s freedom to pursue her own happiness in her own way” which will have to be perceived also as a right for the space to re-imagine one’s sexual difference (p. 6). On sexual rights as an element of citizenship, see also D. Richardson, 2001. 64 See S. Weigel, as referred to in E. Varikas, 1993, p. 83. 65 See, for example, L. Sargisson, 1996. 66 See D. Cornell, 1991, p. 169. 67 I deal with this topic in more detail below, ch. 4. 68 See C. Pateman, 1989, p. 219, who notes that “if contemporary democratic theorists are to distance themselves from the patriarchal assumptions of their predecessors they must begin to ask whether a person can be” both these things at the same time. The author here implies rape within marriage, which until recently was not recognized as such in most European countries. See, by the same author, 1988, chs 5 and 6, where the same problematique is developed more extensively. 69 See C. Pateman, 1985, J. Elshtain, 1981, 1982, S.M. Okin, 1989. It is interesting to note that these three authors, who stress the necessity of change in the relation between the public and the private, at the same time (particularly the two first) support the acceptance of the gender dichotomy as an element of a new “social conception of individuality as feminine and masculine”, which by giving “due weight to the unity and the differentiation of humankind” will help the concept of citizenship to include women as well (C. Pateman, 1985, p. 193). This view, which is more thoroughly elaborated by C. Pateman, differs radically from what is formulated in this study concerning the gendered as non-dichotomous. See below, ch. 4.1. 70 J. Butler, 1992, pp. 15–16.

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71 N. Fraser, 1995, p. 71. Nevertheless, I agree with Fraser in that feminists need “both deconstruction and reconstruction, destabilisation of meaning and projection of utopian hope”. 72 Deconstruction as a concept belongs to an exceptionally controversial area of theory, while primarily it refers to the critique of structuralism proposed by J. Derrida, mainly 1967. It would not be within the scope of the present study to get engaged in that debate. It should suffice to be reminded of the immense significance for feminist theory that the critique on the women–men dichotomy presents. A critique which in the end refers to the reasoning of J. Derrida concerning western thought which has developed by suggesting antithetical bipolar concepts presented as merely descriptive and neutral, while in substance one part of the bipolarity is presented as primary and the other is placed in the position of the inferior. Contrary to this bipolar logic, the deconstruction of the notions “women” and “men” gives rise to a multiplicity of possibilities in the expression of gender which is radical, since it allows the nonclassification of the subjects. A classification otherwise irrevocable, in one manifest and given, with respect to its characteristics, position. It is interesting to note here the critique to the critique of deconstruction of J. Habermas, mainly 1987, conducted by Ch. Norris, 1996, pp. 97–123, who argues that “deconstruction, properly understood, belongs within that same ‘philosophical discourse of modernity’ that Habermas sets out to defend against its present-day detractors” (p. 100). 73 The deconstruction of concepts/terms does not mean the end to their use, notes J. Butler, 1992, p. 17, deflecting the multiple attacks sustained for views she develops in J. Butler, 1990. It means rather to “continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as instruments of oppressive power”. 74 This question, formulated in many different ways, has for some time been at the centre of the problematique in feminist theory. See K. Jones, 1988. See also above, ch. 2.1. 75 The phrase belongs to J. Evans, 1995, p. 4. 76 K. Nash, 1998, p. 45 ff. 77 I.M. Young, 1996, pp. 158–183, and in particular p. 182. 78 R. Lister, 1997, p. 197. 79 See ch. 4. 80 For this line of reasoning, see K. Nash, 1998, p. 56. 81 Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 86, criticizes I.M. Young, 1987, 1990, for perceiving groups “with their interests and identities already given”, which obviously is the common perception of the matter. 82 The entrapment in this dilemma is characteristic of the entire course of feminism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and becomes evident in the reactions arising and in the arguments for or against certain measures, such as the protective legislation for women’s employment or affirmative actions. 83 See J.W. Scott, 1990, for a classic critique of this kind of “entrapment”. 84 On the inherently androcentric character of citizenship, see, specifically, S.M. Okin, 1979, C. Pateman, 1988 and 1989, N. Fraser, L. Gordon, 1994, and R. Lister, 1997. 85 Let us not forget that contrary to contemporary political analysis in the framework of which gender is usually unseen or peripheral, in classical political thought it would be inconceivable for basic views of the political to be formed with no reference to the gendered dimension of social life. See S.M. Okin, 1979, K. Jones, 1988, p. 13 ff. 86 For the relevant differentiation, see J. Evans, 1995, p. 4. 87 F. Anthias, N. Yuval-Davis, 1993, p. 28. But see also, C. Pateman, 1988 and S.M. Okin, 1979. 88 See the relevant empirical data referring to Greece, in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1992, pp. 197–206.

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89 I have dealt with this topic in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1987a, where examples are provided. 90 See C. Pateman, 1989, pp. 185–186, for independence as the central criterion for citizenship. C. Pateman is a valuable reference on issues of gender and citizenship in general. 91 C. Pateman, 1988, p. 1 ff. 92 C. Pateman, 1988, p. 6. 93 C. Pateman, 1992, p. 19 ff. 94 What happens to the above argument now that mothers are also enlisted in the army? asks C. Pateman, 1992, p. 27, referring to the 6 per cent of women on the American side in the Iraq war. 95 See E. Varikas, 1994a, p. 41. 96 See, specifically, J. Elshtain, 1981, (and also S. Ruddick, 1989) where, following a critique of the liberal, androcentric model of citizenship, it is maintained that the identity of women as mothers should be preferred as model for the public sphere, since the values it represents, love, intimacy, concern for the “concrete other” exhibit ethical superiority. 97 The article by M. Dietz, 1985, pp. 19–37, remains a classic on this topic. 98 M. Dietz, 1998, p. 388 and p. 393. See also A. Phillips, 1993, pp. 82–84, on feminism and republicanism, where the author presents M. Dietz’s arguments. 99 See C. Gilligan, 1982, who argues that moral reasoning takes different forms according to gender, with women, as children’s caretakers, defining morality in terms of responsibility and relationships, and developing an ethical outlook concentrating on the concept of care, in opposition to the respective ethical view of men focusing on the concept of justice. While Gilligan herself does not treat one ethical outlook as superior to the other, her views have been used by others in such a way. It is interesting to note also, that S.M. Okin, specifically, 1990, through a critical reading of J. Rawls’ theory, 1971, attempts the theoretical erasure of the dichotomy “ethics of care/ethics of justice”. But see also J. Evans, 1995, p. 52, for a critical presentation of Okin’s critique of Rawls, where according to Evans, Okin appears “as some form of difference feminist, ill though the stance sits with her general views”. 100 J. Hanwell-Riker, 1997, p. 14, referring to the unconscious and trying to combine the two ethical visions, argues that “the people who are most able to know and realise their own good, are those who take an ethical stance towards the world”. 101 For all discussions on rights and citizenship, the 1949 essay by T.H. Marshall, 1977, remains, as mentioned above, a classic point of reference. See also on this point C. Pateman, 1989, pp. 185–192. 102 See C. Pateman, 1989, p. 187. 103 See S. Walby, 1997, particularly p. 20, where she makes a similar comment. 104 See S.M. Okin, 1979, specifically, pp. 286–289, where she insists that it will be impossible for women to be included in the political scene, if the basic assumptions about the family and the traditional gender roles in its framework are not challenged. See also, S.M. Okin, 1989, where this point is further developed. 105 See the interesting observations by S.M. Okin, 1990, p. 16 ff., on the family, departing from an attempt of critical feminist reformulation of the thinking of J. Rawls (specifically 1971), and in particular, with reference to his latent assumptions about the family that refer to J.-J. Rousseau, G.W.F. Hegel and A. de Tocqueville. 106 See S.M. Okin, 1989, pp. 10–13, in relation to false gender-neutrality in theory and public policy. 107 Especially in societies with no developed welfare state or a long tradition in gender policies, as well as where women political personalities have not grown out of the women’s movement, due in part to the latter’s specific profile. 108 For various approaches on this issue, see Diotima, 1999.

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109 C. Pateman, 1989, p. 53. This author, whose contribution to feminist political theory is invaluable, following a very incisive critique of political thinking in respect to citizenship as a patriarchal category, concludes with the aforementioned imperative, which, however, does not seem to be adequate for the goal she seeks to achieve. 110 Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 382. Ch. Mouffe criticizes C. Pateman for remaining trapped in the very problematique that she wants to challenge (p. 376). 111 I.M. Young, 1990, p. 117 ff. notes that ever since, in the framework of modern political theory, the equal moral worth of all persons was asserted, social movements of the oppressed (women, Jews, blacks, etc.) regarded that this should be interpreted as an imperative for the inclusion of all in full citizenship. Beyond this, however, the end of the identification of the citizen with the subject of law, entailed by the conception of equal moral worth of all individuals with no exceptions, is a very significant democratic development, which, on the one hand, concerns immigrants (legal or not) and, on the other hand, allows a new conceptualization of the notion of the citizen itself, which is certainly narrower than the “subject of law”. See J.L. Cohen, 1999, specifically p. 258 ff. 112 As for women in inter-war Greece struggling for political rights, the relevant acquisition was framed by some in terms of “liberation from slavery”. See E. Avdela, A. Psarra, 1985, p. 55 ff. 113 See A. Touraine, 1994, pp. 86–89, for the bond between democracy and social movements. 114 On this aspect of universality, see I.M. Young, 1990, who, following a pertinent analysis of the character of the relevant dominant view that emerges as socially problematic, arrives at totally diverging conclusions from those suggested in this study. Young supports the necessity of group representation in the framework of democracy as the only solution, so that the oppressed may have a say. See also an interesting critique of her thought in Ch. Mouffe, 1992. 115 1990, p. 117 ff. “The idea of citizenship as expressing a general will has tended to enforce a homogeneity of citizens” (p. 118), resulting thus in multiple exclusions. 116 See I.M. Young, 1990, p. 120. The possibility for understanding social reality unaffected by one’s particular social status and situated experience is certainly a myth, while the identification of the private with the self-serving, as opposed to that of the general with public interest is a simplistic distortion. See I.M. Young, 1987, pp. 57–76. Because of course even when the goal of a subject or a group is to act with public interest as a guiding principle, what is regarded to be just, unjust or beneficial for all is obviously affected by the life experience of the particular subject or group, resulting in multiple interpretations of what is in the public interest, in spite of the common goal. 117 For this conception of the gendered, see J. Butler, 1987, p. 133 ff., who develops S. de Beauvoir’s notion of the body as a situation, noting that “ ‘existing’ one’s body becomes a personal way of taking up and reinterpreting received gender norms”. 118 See A.M. Jaggar, 1974, p. 285, who speaks of a society in which gender has no more significance than eye colour. 119 See Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 87, who promotes the idea of “a new conception of citizenship where sexual difference would become effectively irrelevant” (p. 82), but without elaborating on how the gendered subject is to be perceived, just indicating that she is “not arguing in favour of a total disappearance of sexual difference as a valid distinction”. 120 See ch. 3.1. 121 For cultural rights as an attribute of citizenship, see N. Stevenson, 2001, where it is maintained that beyond the “right to be different” (R. Rosaldo, 1994), the recognition of cultural rights presupposes the formation of special institutions which must be democratic, but also protected by the “excesses” of the market (p. 3 ff.).

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122 See E. Laclau, 1996, p. 48, who considers the right of all ethnic groups to cultural autonomy to be “an argumentative claim which can only be justified on universal grounds”. At this point a discussion could be raised on the concept of multiculturalism, and its significance for women, which is not within the scope of this study. Indicatively I will make reference to two different approaches: on the one hand, T. Modood, P. Werbner, 1997, where there is an attempt to document the absolute acceptance, as well as the multiformity, of multiculturalism itself and, on the other hand, S.M. Okin, 1999, where there is a productive debate (and intense disagreement) on what the acceptance of a kind of multiculturalism may mean for women in a world with compulsory marriages, polygamy, clitoridectomy, etc. 123 See, for example, on this line of reasoning, J. Butler, 1990, and D. Riley, 1988. 124 One of more substantiated being that by K. Soper, 1990, pp. 234–237, which nevertheless, according to Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 87, is based on a misunderstanding of the anti-essentialist position that consists in believing that the critique of an essential identity leads necessarily to the rejection of any concept of identity. See also J. Flax, 1992, for a concise presentation of feminist critiques, for which “postmodernism is threatening . . . because it radically changes the background assumptions and contexts within which debates about such questions are usually conducted” (p. 446). The variety of approaches included in postmodernism permits a general rejection of a postmodern approach by certain theorists who, like J. Evans, 1995, view it as a “recipe for stasis, if not indeed paralysis” (p. 140), and dismiss what they (wrongly) perceive as its inherent relativism, which “would give equal standing to an argument that women should remain oppressed” (pp. 125–126). This is clearly not the case concerning the main postmodern feminist approaches, and it is a pity to dismiss the radical potential of an approach which favours the deconstruction of essentializing categories in the name of some purist theoretical interpretations that refer to its initial promoters. 125 See the reasoning of J. Butler, 1992, p. 15. 126 J. Butler, 1990, p. 15. 127 This reasoning could substantiate a response for anyone who, without outright rejection of postmodern perspectives, seems to be sincerely yet naïvely troubled, feeling the need to stress, like M. Hallberg, 1989, p. 5, the obvious, i.e., that while there is no single and unique way of conceptualizing gender differences, at the same time women’s oppression does not belong exclusively to the sphere of ideology or discourse. 128 J. Butler, 1990, p. 142 ff.: “There need not be ‘a doer behind the deed’ . . . the ‘doer’ is variably constructed in and through the deed”. The influence of F. Nietzsche’s formulation, in On the Genealogy of Morals, 1969, p. 45: “ ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything”, comes out very vividly, an influence referred to by J. Butler herself. 129 See A.M. Hebert, 1992, pp. 10–18, for the immense interest that V. Woolf’s work, fiction and non-fiction, presents for a feminist perception of subjectivity, where the way in which the multiple self becomes unitary in the look of the other is shown. 130 See K. Weeks, 1999. 131 The relevant bibliography is very extensive. As an indication I will note two of the most elaborate theoretical treatments that are encapsulated in the reference to the “patriarchal welfare state”: C. Pateman, 1989, pp. 179–209, and A. Philips, 1993, pp. 75–102. 132 See A. Phillips, 1993, p. 71 and p. 66, who makes a similar comment, noting also (p. 70) that some feminist theory “does read as an affirmation of sexual differentiation against universal concepts or ideas”, adding that where it does this, “it risks losing what has been a powerful weapon against women’s subordination or exclusion”. See

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136 137 138

139

140 141 142

143 144 145 146

147 148 149

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also here below, as well as the Concluding Remarks for more on my view of “universality”. According to Ch. Mouffe, 1993a, p. 80, what is needed is a kind of common attribute that respects diversity and allows different forms of individuality. As a common political identity, citizenship would thus characterize persons “with differing conceptions of the good, but who are bound by their common identification with a given interpretation of a set of ethico-political values”, 1992, p. 378. I espouse here a definition that belongs to J.W. Scott, 1988, who also notes (J.W. Scott, 1997, p. 765) that “There is nothing self-evident or transcendent about difference. . . . The question always ought to be, What qualities or aspects are being compared? What is the nature of the comparison?” See J. Flax, 1993, p. 140, who notes that we do not know what consequences the female and male embodiment of the human would have, in societies with no genderbased domination. See also above, ch. 1, and below, ch. 4. See J. Flax, 1993, p. 97. See below, ch. 4. For the “phantasmatic” character of the feminist “we” that is linked to the bipolarity fantasy see J. Butler, 1990, p. 142. The critique on bipolarity, central to the work of J. Derrida, has proved to be productive for feminist theorists, such as D. Elam, 1994, and J. Butler, 1990 and 1993, who base on this critique their own, regarding the system of gender relations. For this dilemma in feminist theory (and practice), see G. Bock, S. James, 1992, and J.W. Scott, 1990. See also Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 372 ff., for a critique on the essentialist understanding of reality as a factor which demonstrates the unsoundness of the relevant dilemma. See also above, ch 1.1. M. Walzer, 1983. M. Walzer, 1983, p. 19 ff. Despite the multiple and documented critiques against this view of M. Walzer, 1983, concerning the different “spheres of justice” (see, for example, D. Miller, M. Walzer, 1996, where some of the most significant critiques are cited), it remains especially interesting as an alternative principle that may lead to the organization of fairer social relations. D. Miller, in D. Miller, M. Walzer, 1996, p. 13 underlines the special significance ascribed by M. Walzer to citizenship, in the framework of his theoretical conception. See a critical presentation of the thought of M. Walzer in M. Rustin, 1996, p. 19. This idea is linked to my final point in the concluding remarks. See Ch. Crosby, 1992, p. 140, who insists that “thinking differently about differences” is what is to be done; otherwise they will remain as self-evident as identity. “I am my differences, which have been given to me by history”, says Ch. Crosby, 1992, p. 137. See Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 372 ff. C. Pateman, 1989, p. 196. M. Wollstonecraft, 1978, who in 1791 formulated the first thorough analysis of the women’s question demanding not merely improvements, but the complete introduction of women into civil society as a condition for the reform of the world, with exceptional insight discerns three factors contributing to women’s subordination: the acceptance of the view of the natural inferiority of women, the particular education they receive and their economic dependence on men. Obviously, historically both views have been proposed, while C. Pateman, 1989, opts for the first. On this conception of equality, evident in the dilemma “equality or difference”, see G. Bock, S. James, 1992, the Introduction, specifically p. 4 ff.

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152 See Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 375 ff., who rightly criticizes C. Pateman’s, 1989, “essentialist slip”, thinking that the solution proposed by the latter “remains trapped in the very problematique that Pateman wants to challenge” (p. 376). 153 For this reasoning, see V. Randall, G. Waylen, 1998, p. 13, who refer also to N. Yuval-Davis, 1996. Class obviously intermingles with gender oppression, and must be part of the same problematique, albeit in somehow different terms. 154 While obviously I am not proposing the dual universality thesis, I neither agree with the view of differentiated universality proposed by R. Lister, 1997, which targets towards a group differentiated citizenship, since I want to go beyond the predictable differences and espouse the inclusion of all imaginable differences among subjects (differences that are situated within a democratic frame), as acceptable versions of being an equal to others human. 155 See A. Phillips, 1993, p. 66. 156 S. Bordo, 1990, p. 152, is right in stressing that in a culture constructed by gender duality, one cannot simply be “human”. Obviously. It would be naïve to support such a view. But I am dealing with a completely new culture. Feminists, among others, have rightly criticized “the pretensions towards a universal truth or a universal humanity”, since “persistently such abstractions confirm the perspectives of a dominant group”, as A. Phillips, 1993, p. 71, rightly notes. Nevertheless, as the same author adds, “feminism cannot afford to situate itself for difference and against universality” an opinion with which I absolutely agree, while she notes (p. 66) that we “cannot do without some notion of what humans have in common; we can and must do without a unitary standard against which they are all judged”. Where I part with A. Phillips, is when she seems to narrow the meaning of politics in a way that leaves out power relations beyond the conventional political arena (see A. Phillips, 1993, p. 86, as well as the respective critique by R. Lister, 1997, pp. 28–29, who notes that on this point, A. Phillips seems to treat the “political” and citizenship as if they were interchangeable), and in her, be it moderate, appeal to “group representation”, where the attempt to propose a synthesis of a “politics of ideas” with a “politics of presence” argues in favour of gender parity in a way that (in spite of her wish) does not prevent essentialism, while it gives the impression that there are only two possible alternatives, the well known supposedly genderless one, and a dual universality. 157 Beyond citizen’s rights, this problematique refers also to human rights, since as N. Bobbio, 1996, p. 63, notes speaking of “the enormous importance of the human rights question”, there is no democracy without their recognition and effective protection, while without democracy the minimum conditions do not exist for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. As for their character, S. Mendus, 1995, p. 22, speaking of human rights, notes that the appeal to them “might best be understood as a set of rules . . . for the accommodation of difference, rather than justifications for the assertion of similarity”. And that (p. 23) “human rights should be seen not as appeals to universal and timeless goods, but as acknowledgements of the diverse and the fluid”. 158 I paraphrase here L.J. Nicholson, 1998, p. 296. 4 Gender, democracy, utopia 1 See ch. 3.3. 2 On collective identities, see Ch. Mouffe, 1995, as well as 1992, pp. 370–372. For my own view concerning the collective identity “women”, see M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996. 3 See ch. 3.1. 4 I referred in ch. 3.1 to this inconsistency noted by C. Pateman, 1989, p. 219. This is obviously one example among many.

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5 See ch. 3.3. 6 It is interesting to be reminded that J.S. Mill (1970, p. 22) as far back as 1861 in The Subjection of Women, holds that what is called women’s nature is “an eminently artificial thing – the result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural stimulation in others”. Not even today is this conception dominant, while S. Freud, as the German language translator of J.S. Mill, commenting on the above hypothesis, expressed, on the contrary, his well-known (sexist) view according to which “all reforming action in law and education would break down in front of the fact that Nature has determined women’s destiny”. See the Introduction by W.R. Carr in the aforementioned edition of The Subjection of Women (pp. xx–xxi), where the pertinent references to S. Freud are presented, as well as complete bibliographic references. 7 At present, the studies by J. Butler, 1990 and 1993, form a basic point of reference in challenging the “natural” character of gender bipolarity. The influence of J. Derrida is palpable in the thought of J. Butler, as in general in poststructuralist or postmodern feminist thought (see ch. 3.1). It is interesting to note that this influence seems to be exercised to a greater degree on feminist theory developed in the United States than in France and other European countries. See F. Collin, E. Pisier, E. Varikas, 2000, pp. 681–685. 8 I deal with this topic more extensively in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996a. 9 See J. Butler, 1990, p. 4, concerning “identity” as a misnomer, when “the ‘specificity’ of the feminine” is decontextualized and separated off from class, race, ethnicity etc. 10 I deal with this topic in M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 1996. 11 See b. hooks, 1982. This was a call for a new feminist theory that would reflect the needs of non-white women, and a denunciation of the dominant feminist current in the United States on the part of black feminists. A denunciation which implies the necessity for the theoretical deconstruction of gender in the framework of feminist theory. 12 J. Butler, 1992, p. 15 ff. 13 See a classic article on “experience” and its use in history, by J.W. Scott, 1992, pp. 22–40 and specifically p. 37. 14 See J.W. Scott, 1992, p. 33. 15 This acceptance, in the sense of attribution of significance to differences among women, is of course not general. On the contrary, they have vehemently been theoretically rebutted on the part of certain proponents of radical feminism, in the framework of which it is maintained that the accentuation of “differences” among women, displacing the issue of the oppression of women from the field of male domination to the interior of the category “women”, fragments the feminist vision into multiple partial visions and in this way incapacitates action, since it offsets the vigour of feminists away from the main objective. See, for example, D. Thompson, 2001, p. 92 ff. 16 See, on this issue, A. Yeatman, 1994, pp. 47–48, who notes that, for these women “it does not make sense . . . to seek equality with their male peers”. 17 The delineation of the course in question that I attempt at this point should not be taken as a generally accepted view on the development of feminist challenges and of the respective theory, since this is clearly not the case. It is rather my own reading of it and should be understood as such, since furthermore the theoretical challenging of the dichotomy is not even the dominant pertinent tendency in the framework of the social perception that is understood as feminist. 18 See, for example, the critique of the work of N. Chodorow, mainly 1978, and of C. Gilligan, mainly 1982, which N. Fraser, L.J. Nicholson, 1990, conduct. Compare also S. Bordo, 1990, pp. 139–141. 19 P. Bourdieu, 1998, p. 110, says that dualisms are “profondement enracinés dans les

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Notes choses (les structures) et les corps” attributing with great facility to this remark his rejection of the hypothesis of the transcendence of dualisms. Dichotomies which are based on “an unacknowledged and camouflaged sexual distinction”, thus apparent “at the very heart of philosophy”. See R. Braidotti, 1996, p. 193. See S. Harding, 1981, pp. 152–153, and N. Hartsock, 1998, pp. 117–119, as well as ch. 3.1. On this definition of ethics, see J. Hanwell-Riker, 1997, p. 19. A. Touraine, 2000, asks “can we live together?”, criticizing the view that gradually more people co-exist as equals in a world sharing the same social and cultural values. See E. Frazer, J. Hornsby, S. Lovibond, 1992, the Introduction, p. 1. See J. Brenner, 1996, p. 54, on feminists inside the state. On the various philosophical readings of the content of Descartes’ meditations, where he unfolds the mind–body distinction, see J. Hodge, 1988, pp. 152–168. See also S. Bordo, 1987 and G. Lloyd, 1987, for two interesting feminist views on Descartes’ influence. On the cultural dominance of this identification, see, mainly, E.V. Spelman, 1982. See M. Shildrick, 2000, p. 79. For an interesting analysis of the symbolic power of the body, see G. Pomata, 1983, pp. 1434–1469, where the significance of the fact that the body, as an object of investigation, continues to be treated primarily as referring to nature and not to society or culture, is stressed, something which is not taken for granted everywhere, insofar as the boundaries between physiology and cultural intervention are not everywhere as clear as in the western world. See, on this issue, J. Grant, 1993, pp. 187–188. Let it be noted that the body, which remained for a long time outside the sphere of theory due to the dominant view concerning it, has become a significant object of interest in social theory. In recent decades, on the basis of poststructuralist hypotheses a new view was developed of the body, in which it was stressed that the representations of the body and its cultural inscriptions are not independent of the natural and physical entity, which we supposed that it consisted in, but, on the contrary, go into its constitution, they “coconstitute it”. Thus the body started to have a central position as an object of inquiry especially in the field of “cultural studies”. The interest of this approach to feminist theory is obvious, insofar as the female body is, more eminently than the male, a target of disciplinary practices and at the same time a source of disappointments and a sense of inadequacy and failure for women, who often set unfeasible goals in what it concerns it. See S.L. Bartky, 1997, pp. 93–111. For an interesting overview of the theoretical investigations focusing on the body in recent decades, see D. Welton, 1999. For their use by feminist theory, see, indicatively, K. Davis, 1997. See also M. Featherstone, 2000, for a review of a new sector of sociological analysis referring to the changes brought about by the subjects to their bodies (body modification). See I.M. Young, 1990b, p. 123. See J. Hodge, 1988, pp. 152–168, on the Cartesian view concerning the subject and its ingrained androcentrism connected to the logic of the mind–body dualism and the undetermined character of the latter with respect to gender. See S.L. Bartky, 1997, pp. 93–111, for an interesting critique of the “docile bodies” of M. Foucault which are not differentiated with respect to gender, as if the bodily experiences of women and men did not differ. According to Bartky, 1977, p. 95, as a result of the above, “even thought a liberatory note is sounded in Foucault’s critique of power, his analysis as a whole reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout Western political theory”. See also the critique by J. Butler, 1990, pp. 128–132. It is especially interesting to note that women philosophers, contemporary to R.

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Descartes, such as Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1616–1680), Margaret Caventish Duchess of Newcastle (1623–1673) and Anne Viscountess Conway (1631–1678) (as well as others) – of whom the first at least corresponded with Descartes – radically disagreed with him on the mind–body dualism in support of the unity of the subject. For the pertinent texts see M. Atherton, 1994, where there is an interesting anthology of pieces by seventeenth-century women philosophers who are virtually unknown. In the same, p. 18, there is a letter by R. Descartes to Elisabeth of Bohemia, dated 28 June 1643, where he propounds the reason why “those who never philosophize and make use only of their senses” regard body and spirit as being one thing, insisting on his view, without ever managing to win her over, as it seems in her response (1 July 1643), where she explains: “I do not excuse myself for confusing the notion of the soul with that of the body for the same reasons as do ordinary people; but that does not dispel for me the first doubt” (in M. Atherton, 1994, p. 21). M. Merleau-Ponty, 1962. For a feminist critique of M. Merleau-Ponty’s thought, focusing on the underestimation of gender which is noted in his approach, see W. Parkins, 2000, p. 60 ff. See also N. Totton, 1999, where the psychoanalytic character of the subjective treatment of the body is stressed, with an emphasis on the need of finding ways so that the subjects may accept that they are bodies that think and feel. See, on this issue, G. Pomata, 1983. For a similar hypothesis, see G. Lindemann, 1997, p. 73. See R. Rorty, 1999, pp. 28–31. The second reference refers to J. Dewey’s reasoning as transcribed by R. Rorty. See Ch. Mouffe, 1996, pp. 8–9, who on this point exercises criticism on J. Harbermas, and on R. Rorty and J. Rawls. Due to the strong distinction between public and private that the latter adopt, they can support the relegation of antagonism to the private, while in the public sphere the dominance of consensus allows the illusion that “it is possible to establish a ‘we’ that would not imply the existence of a ‘them’ ”, p. 9. See the way in which J. Derrida, 1996, pp. 83–84 summarizes the outlook of deconstruction, in response to his critics. Furthermore, according to J. Derrida, 1996, p. 84, because stability does not exist by itself, nor is it substantial, this is why politics exists and an ethical perspective is possible. J. Derrida, 1996, p. 84. The selective reference in this paragraph to the thought of J. Derrida, who at this point doesn’t even refer to gender, is due to the fact that the pertinent line of reasoning facilitates the further development of the hypothesis concerning the utility of the utopian component in the feminist vision. I return here to the suspicion usually in store for theoretical attempts at deconstructing the category of “women”, expressed by certain feminist theorists on the basis of the hypothesis that, if women “do not exist”, that is if their “sameness and ‘common cause’ ” are challenged, then they cannot pose a challenge for anything. See a substantiated expression of this suspicion in K. Soper, 1990, p. 235. See also, above, ch. 3.3. It is interesting to note at this point the response by D. Cornell, 1992, pp. 280–288, to the feminist critiques on J. Derrida’s theory of deconstruction, where the liberating role of the latter for women’s sexuality is presented. The foregoing hypothesis holds, of course, also for men. On the notion of liberation from identity, see J. Squires, 1998, p. 133, who refers to the manner in which N. Fraser interprets J. Butler’s thinking, criticizing its connotations. See J. Butler, 1990, p. 14, who insists that the “deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics”. See J. Grant, 1993, p. 184 who notes that, “even a revalued femininity reproduces the gender structure”. Let us not forget, furthermore, the strong associative links

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Notes between “manliness” and virility, and the idea of domination, conquest and power in the framework of western culture (and not limited to that alone). See N. Hartsock, 1998, p. 17. Here I refer to the reading of M. Wittig’s thought, specifically 1981, by J. Butler, 1987, pp. 134–135. The fact that in common-sense views the sphere of sex and gender is the sphere of the self-evident par excellence, is perhaps indicative of its special weight at the level of ideology, both in the structuring of subjectivity and in total social structure. D. Outram, 1995, p. 86, reminds us that for the Enlightenment “biological difference and culturally induced sex roles were seen as one and the same thing”, while numerous medical and scientific attempts were made in order “to define social and cultural differences between men and women as ‘natural’ and therefore right and inevitable” (p. 81). This conceptualization of gender persists in being dominant in feminist theory, as much as in sociology, in social psychology and in political science. Recent critical views have made it imperative, however, to point out that the connection between sex and gender (but also their divide), is less simple and unidirectional, insofar as it is stressed that gender does not bear the same relation to sex, as culture to nature. See J. Butler, 1990. For an investigation of this hypothesis, see L. Disch, M.J. Kane, 1996, pp. 326–356. For a chronicle of feminist references to the distinction between sex and gender, see K. Davis, 1997, pp. 8–10. J. Butler, 1990, pp. 6–7. D. Glover, C. Kaplan, 2000, in the Introduction, p. xxvi. G. Rubin, 1975, p. 180. The problematique on sexual dichotomy that follows refers mainly to a substantiated presentation of the topic by V. Bryson, 1999, pp. 46–49 and 86–89, where there is extensive bibliographic support. See V. Bryson, 1999, pp. 48–49. The same author, p. 87, states indeed that the clearcut biological divide male–female “can only be a legal fiction”. For evidence on this hypothesis, see C. Renzetti, J. Curran, 1992, p. 28 ff., referred to also by V. Bryson, 1999, p. 48. Violence, for example, is an element in the socialization of boys much more than girls, which is not unrelated to gender related transgression in adolescent and postadolescent ages. See L. Segal, 1990. As for rape, V. Bryson, 1999, p. 47, notes that while men have the physical ability to rape, the frequency and the degree to which rape is an actual threat to women of a particular society is socially and culturally differentiated. See C. Pateman, 1988, p. 96. See D. Cornell, 1992, p. 292. I do not refer here to pre-eighteenth-century analyses concerning the anatomical sexual differences, based mainly on the idea that women’s bodies were “turned inside-out”, similar but inferior to men’s. See, R. Horrocks, 1997, pp. 100–101. An interesting example is that of the well-known surgeon Ambroise Paré, who arrived in 1634 at the conclusion that, while women may evolve into men, the reverse is not possible, because “nature tends always towards what is most perfect and not, on the contrary, to perform in such a way that what is perfect should become imperfect”. As referred in D. Glover, C. Kaplan, 2000, pp. xiii–xiv. R. Horrocks, 1997, p. 100 ff. The description belongs to D. Harvey, 1996, p. 159, who refers to the article by E. Martin, 1991, p. 498, where there are other examples in which the influence of gender and of the concomitant preconceptions related to it, are evident in the understanding of sex.

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64 P. Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 20–21 states that the fact there were no terms for the description of the female sexual organs until the Renaissance is due to the belief that women have the same sexual organs as men but in another physiological order (usually reversed), since women and men were regarded as two versions, one superior and one inferior, of the same physiology. 65 See the introduction by E. Papataxiarchis, in E. Papataxiarchis, Th. Paradellis, 1992, p. 22, for interesting comments on this issue. 66 See G. Bock, 1989, pp. 7–30. 67 See L. Rogers, 2000, p. 18. In this study, the author, a professor of neuroscience, presents interesting cases concerning the influence of the social milieu on the formation of gender characteristics. 68 See, J. Butler, 1987, p. 134, who also notes that “the limits to gender . . . seem less restricted by anatomy than by the weight of the cultural institutions that have conventionally interpreted anatomy”. Let it also be noted here that G. Bock, 1989, p. 11, asserts that the distinction between gender and sex and the attempt to clarify how many and which characteristics of the subjects are due to one or the other, simply posits the broader issue of the nature/nurture distinction. 69 See N. Chodorow, 1980, p. 18, as well as J. Butler, 1990, pp. 1–16, for a different approach to a similar conclusion. 70 On the basis of the foregoing, risking an apparent paradox, I would say that if one is to agree with the pioneering (in 1949) formulation by S. de Beauvoir that one is not born but rather becomes a woman, it could be said that the same holds for females. For an interesting analysis of S. de Beauvoir’s formulation with references to J. Butler, 1987, emphasizing the way in which the former conceptualizes the body, see A. Aalten, 1997, pp. 45–47. See also K. Davis, 1997, p. 4 ff. 71 See the introduction by E. Papataxiarchis, in E. Papataxiarchis, Th. Paradellis, 1992, p. 20. Obviously the former refers to a political proclamation and not an empirical reality. 72 See ch. 3.3. 73 Subjectivity, that is, is structured also through these processes. The subject is not preexistent as a being capable of reason and then acquires a gender and other secondary characteristics, in accordance to a humanist conception of the subject. See the pertinent critique in J. Butler, 1990, p. 8 ff. 74 On this hypothesis, see T. Chanter, 1999, p. 369. 75 M. Foucault’s work (especially 1976), through its challenging of the central tenets of western thought (and particularly, the one referring to an essentialist conception of sexuality) has had and still does have an enormous influence on the conceptions concerning sexuality in the framework of feminist thought as well. Certainly, the fact that this author, while analysing power, limits his references to women’s struggles and feminism to an absolute minimum (R. Braidotti, 1996, p. 86) and especially the treatment he reserves for women’s sexuality, have received ardent criticism. In general, it is stressed that in the reasoning of M. Foucault there is no consideration of the relationship between gender inequality and sexuality, which is treated as a unified genderless category. See, for example, M. Evans, 1997, p. 91 ff., S. Walby, 1990, pp. 117–118, D. Fuss, 1990, and especially, R. Braidotti, 1996, pp. 82–97, where the basic points of intersection between feminist theory and Foucauldian thought are underlined. See also J. Butler, especially 1990, for an exceptionally productive employment of Foucault’s thinking referring to power (which structures the subjects it is supposed to represent), with gender as a point of reference. 76 See, on this topic, R. Horrocks, 1997, pp. 150–153. 77 See, C. Vance, 1994, p. 267. It should be noted that S. Freud, 1979, shattered the notion of unified human sexuality, insisting on sexual heterogeneity, and, despite his

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Notes androcentric preconceptions, noted that heterosexuality is as problematic as any other form of desire (pp. 56–57). See R. Horrocks, 1997, pp. 165–166, who refers to Christianity as having provided “the supreme ideological justification” for this view on women’s and men’s sexuality. See, on this topic, D. Fuss, 1990, and D. Richardson, 1993, p. 81 ff. For a review of the (disruptive) feminist contribution to the theory of sexuality, focusing also on its internal controversies, reference to R. Horrocks, 1997, pp. 128–145, is of interest. This author writes in the capacity of psychotherapist and theorist of sexuality dealing with issues of masculinity. See also, D. Richardson, 1993, pp. 74–98, C. Vance, 1984, and A. Snitow et al., 1984. See the formulation by R. Horrocks, 1997, p. 102, which has inspired the foregoing. There is an obvious relation between Horrocks’ formulation and M. Foucault, 1976, in reference to the “production” of sexuality, its structuring that is, through discourse. See also D. Richardson, 1993, p. 81, who, referring to the latter, makes a similar point noting that “it is not a case of peeling back the layers of social conditioning to get to our true natures”. See A. Dworkin, 1981 and C. MacKinnon, 1982. This feminist view is not new. We should be reminded that one of the mottos voiced by British suffragettes was “Votes for women and chastity for men”. See D. Richardson, 1993, p. 76. See also, C. MacKinnon, 1982, p. 514, whose well-known saying holds that: “sexuality is to feminism what work is to Marxism”, that which is closest to the individual, but at the same time that from which the individual is most alienated. C. MacKinnon, 1991, p. 128. Socialist feminists, contrary to their radical counterparts, do not view sexuality as a determining factor in the preservation of women’s subordination, a role they attribute to their unequal status in the labour market and the distribution of roles within the family. See, for example, S. Rowbotham, 1990 and L. Segal, 1987. See J. Butler, 1990, pp. 6–7 and 151, n. 6, on what the author calls a “heterosexual matrix”, a “grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, genders and desires are naturalised”. It is a “model of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere . . . there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender . . . that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality”. See R. Horrocks, 1997, p. 134, who notes that gender roles can “be inverted, subverted, dissolved”. On the problematic character of the notion of desire in feminist theory, see M. Evans, 1997, p. 93 ff. and of course J. Lacan, 1966, a point of reference for many feminist definitions. See also, R. Horrocks, 1997, pp. 11–12, for Christian perceptions of desire. See J. Mansbridge, 1998, pp. 153–154, who refers to A. Dworkin’s and C. MacKinnon’s analyses, in order to present the domination aspect implicit in the traditional sexual act, codified through who is expected to take the initiative, through the posturing and the positioning of the bodies, moves, etc. On this conception of heterosexuality, see J. Butler, 1990, specifically p. 5 and p. 151, n. 6. See J. Butler’s 1990a, critique of the common view that femininity and masculinity are cultural expressions of the material reality of fe/male bodies, proposing to view gender as corporeal style, p. 272. A. Rich, 1980. Manifestations of the compulsory character of heterosexuality have been, according to the author (pp. 635–640), the existence of the chastity belt, childhood marriages and the idealization of love and marriage between young men and young women. We could also add clitoridectomy, certain forms of which have been a prototype of compulsion into heterosexual practice, and possibly, at a totally

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different level, the revulsion to breastfeeding that many women feel (while there is a neurophysiological basis to associate breastfeeding with sexual gratification). G. Pomata, 1983, p. 1469, asks whether such revulsion is one of the “invisible mutilations” to which women are subjected. J. Butler, 1990, pp. 31–32, supports the idea that the “unity” of gender is the effect of a regulatory social practice that aims at rendering gender identity uniform through compulsory heterosexuality. Compare the view of M. Foucault, 1980 (in the Introduction to the English edition) on gender as structured on the basis of a historically constituted view of sexuality. Gender is not, in other words, the cause from which result particular sexual practices, but rather the result of the latter. M. Wittig, 1980, p. 108, also maintains that gender is a category produced and disseminated through the system of compulsory heterosexuality. While elsewhere, 1979, p. 114, she makes the hypothesis that if desire could be liberated, it would be entirely independent from any gender-referent preselections. See J. Butler, 1990, p. 19, who attributes this view to M. Wittig. See D. Richardson, 1993, pp. 87–93, for a concise presentation of the discussion. But also, R. Horrocks 1997, p. 145, who, speaking of feminist approaches to sexuality, notes that in the twentieth century, “no other field of study . . . has been so rich, varied and energetic, with the possible exception of psychoanalysis”. It is not certain that in all cases toleration should be transliterated as such and not as tolerance. I (reluctantly) retain the former for reasons of consistency, since any diversification should be justified, which is beyond the scope of the central problematique of this study. For a theoretical treatment of toleration, see M. Walzer, 1997. Of course the Letter on Toleration by J. Locke, written in 1685, as well as J.S. Mill, 1989, dated 1859, headlines all classic treatments referring to toleration. R. Horrocks, 1997, p. 155. Compare this to A. Giddens, 1992, who in emphasizing the significance of developments in sexual relations referring to the augmentation of women’s “sexual autonomy” and the “flourishing of homosexuality” (p. 28), maintains that the emerging changes in sexuality, which compose what he calls “plastic sexuality” (p. 2), form profoundly radicalizing possibilities implying the transformation of intimacy that causes changes in the entirety of social institutions. These transformations of intimacy imply a “democratising of the interpersonal domain, in a manner fully compatible with democracy in the public sphere” (p. 3). The same author draws extensively on the research by L. Rubin, especially 1990, where the hypothesis of the greater change in the sexual behaviour and attitudes of girls compared with that of boys is documented. As L. Nicholson, 1998, p. 296, rightly observes, “boundary issues can always arise, whether they do or not is a political – not a logical – issue”. See also P. Bourdieu, 1979, p. 558, on how limits become boundaries “which constrain and have to be moved”. M. Walzer, 1997, p. xii. See in the same, pp. 10–11, a way of categorizing toleration, where the “enthusiastic endorsement of difference” assumes the extreme position in the toleration continuum, an attitude which according to the author himself, is situated beyond the range of toleration. See also the way in which I. Berlin, 1990, pp. 46–48, presents a problematique concerning the bipolarity toleration-acceptance of difference, supporting at the same time the idea that in human affairs there can be no perfect solution, not only in practice but also in principle. See A. Phillips, 1994, p. 89, n. 10, who notes that “If we could imagine a world in which difference was genuinely detached from power . . . I am not sure we would be talking of the need for toleration”. Thus, this does not refer to respect for any difference as a cultural expression equivalent to any other. I strongly wish to avoid the apolitical relativism of which

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Notes postmodern approaches are often accused. Furthermore, obviously, I disagree with the hypothesis that the latter necessarily suffer from the former. See also the Introduction. N. Fraser, 1996, p. 207. This statement says a lot also about the invalidity of the grounding of arguments referring to “women’s difference”. Speaking of radical democracy. N. Fraser, 1996, p. 198. See on this point S. White, 1999, p. 110. Toleration is not far from indifference, as J.-C. Kaufmann, 1998, p. 208 states, analysing attitudes towards women’s topless bathing, which in an empirical study conducted in France are codified under the formulation: “It doesn’t bother me.” On social toleration as indifference, see also Th. Maloutas, M. Pantelidou Maloutas, 2004, p. 460. It is interesting to note that, in the framework of dominant views, the discourse concerning minority rights seems not to refer to sexual minorities, especially in the United States. Gay men and lesbians are not legitimated, according to these views, to claim minority rights, because it is not obligatory for them to have the sexual preference they have. That is, they do not form a real minority group. The counterargument frequently posed by activists from the area in question refers to an essentialist gender identity, something which, in the long run, in no way benefits the case for the abolition of discriminations based on sexual preference. See on this topic, C. Vance, 1994, p. 266. On this line of reasoning, and especially on partial identities and “mobile subjectivities”, see K. Ferguson, 1993, p. 158. See D. Cornell, 1998, p. 6 and pp. 8–11 for feminism and the demand for “space”. On the right to an imaginary space, see D. Cornell, 1998, especially the Introduction. See also A. Snitow, C. Stansell, S. Thompson, 1984, the Introduction, where they subscribe to J. Benjamin’s, 1984, view that politics must turn its attention to the erotic and imaginary coordinates of life. On this model of “contemporary” woman, more and more widespread in developed capitalist countries, see J. Mossuz Lavau, A. de Kervasdoué, 1997 pp. 273–276. As for women politicians implied above, it would probably be more accurate not to refer to women politicians who wish to adopt a men’s model, but to women who aim at promoting the sole proven model of being an effective, dynamic and capable politician that they are aware of, which of course refers predominantly to men. See J. Mossuz Lavau, A. de Kervasdoué, 1997 p. 277, who refer to an eventual social reality in which women and men will both embody the masculine model, as it is known nowadays. V. Bryson, 1999, p. 204, rightly asserts that “society could not function if everyone behaved like men”, while very few would view positively “a world in which women acquired the attributes traditionally associated with masculinity, while men themselves remained unchanged”. R.W. Connell, 1987, pp. 186–187, referring also to V. Klein’s study of conceptions of the feminine, where the “bewildering variety of traits considered as characteristics of women”, is noted (p. 183). See mainly ch. 1.2. But also in mythology and literature. Moreover, there are androgynous models in numerous Indo-European religious doctrines. See C. Heilbrun, 1973. See C. Heilbrun, 1973, for the history of this notion from Plato to V. Woolf. As in E.C. Stanton, who describes in 1895 the “Heavenly Being” in The Woman’s Bible as androgynous (see M. Humm, 1995, p. 10), or in V. Woolf, 1977, who in A Room of One’s Own, refers (in 1928) to the fecundity of the androgynous mind, a mind which is “fully fertilized and uses all its faculties”, p. 94. See on this topic, H. Eisenstein, 1984, the Introduction, where the course of feminist

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thought in the first fifteen years of its revival is presented in an interesting manner from the perspective that concerns us here. The work of C. Heilbrun, especially 1973, remains classic on the issue of androgyny. The parallel that could be drawn here is very obvious, between this perception of the role that women’s oppression may play, and a Marxist reading of the historical role of the working class. See N. Chodorow, 1980, for a critique (that concerns women) of the inherent biologism contained in the typical tendency of oppressed social groups to reduce the element that signifies their inferiority to superiority. Which, furthermore, is rife with messianic connotations. See, on this line of reasoning, M.A. Warren, 1982, pp. 170–185, where relevant examples are cited. See also S. Bem, 1976, and especially 1974, where a scale for measurement of androgynous tendencies of the subjects is suggested, which is used in psychology (the Bem Sex Role Inventory: BSRI). See also n. 126. See A. Ferguson, 1991, pp. 199–203, who elaborates on the hypothesis that only androgynous personalities can develop “ideal love relationships”. Neither does it refer to anatomic hermaphroditism, with which it is often confused. All subjects have to a greater or lesser degree elements of personality that are stereotypically attributed to the so-called opposite sex, mostly repressed. While, however, in women their manifestation may or may not be apparent in any age (they come forth, in other words, recede and come back depending on phases in life), in men it usually follows a predetermined course with the age of forty years as a benchmark. See E. Badinter, 1992, pp. 243–246, who, referring to studies by specialists, states that while until this age the structuring of masculine identity is usually confused by men with the total personality, after the age of forty the norms of manhood change, allowing the manifestation of “feminine” qualities as well. Thus men become “human in full extent of the term”, notes Badinter, referring to D.L. Levinson, 1978 (p. 245). I do not find helpful the distinction between mono-androgynous and polyandrogynous models (see J. Trebilcot, 1982, pp. 163–169). Referring to a “continuum”, I imply of course that it is possible for any amount of “femininity” and “masculinity” to appear within the framework of this model, and in this sense I promote a poly-androgynous model. In her reference (in the year 1928) to the androgynous spirit in literature, V. Woolf, 1977, p. 94, asserts that this osmosis fertilizes the spirit, so that it may employ the entirety of its capacities and to show its creativity. An empirical documentation of this hypothesis can be found in the researches of S. and D. Bem, who supported (fifty years later) the idea that the individuals who are characterized by psychological androgyny – that is, individuals with a high score in both scales by means of which the degree of identification with qualities conventionally attributed to women and men is measured – fare better and in a wider spectrum of situations than individuals with clearly dominant gender characteristics, while, at the same time, the brightest and most accomplished persons measured as most androgynous. See S. Bem, 1976, pp. 48–61, as well as H. Eisenstein, 1984, pp. 60–61, who refers to the findings of the former. (Clearly, there is an effect of co-linearity between the two, since both parameters are related to educational level.) See also M.A. Warren, 1982, pp. 170–185, and, more generally on this topic, M. Veterrling-Braggin, 1982. A. Giddens, 1992, pp. 198–199, referring to the androgynous subject, states that “as anatomy stops being destiny, sexual identity more and more becomes a life-style issue”. Compare also the view of a transgender theorist (on this theoretical current, see B. Hausman, 1999, p. 192 ff.), M. Rothblatt, 1995, p. 3, who foresees the formation of a world in which “manhood and womanhood can be life-style choices

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135 136 137 138 139 140

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Notes open to anyone, regardless of genitals”. On gender as life-style, see M.A. O’Farrell, L. Vallone, 1999. Because if there are different ways in which men are men and women are women in the context of one specific society, cross-culturally there are major differentiations in the structuring of masculinity and femininity, something which obviously reinforces the hypothesis of the possibility of a radical redefinition of gender. E. Badinter, 1992, pp. 48–52, cites striking examples of the differentiations in question, referring to the works of M. Mead, M. Godelier and other social anthropologists. This comment is inspired by B. Hausman’s, 1999, p. 196, critique of M. Rothblatt, 1995, who, according to the former, while wanting to do away with the binary classification, proposes another classification with more slots, but still a classification, showing thus a dependence on “the idea that we should be able to label and know people through classifications”. And the ethical dimension of issues is at least as significant as the imperatives of political intervention. See, on this topic, the thoughts of R. Braidotti, 1992, p. 189. It is for this reason that it is not acceptable to certain radical feminists, such as M. Daly, 1979, pp. 387–388, who regards the employment of this concept as a trap, since “when we heard the word echoed back by those who misinterpreted our thought, we realized that combining the ‘halves’ offered to consciousness by patriarchal language, usually results in portraying something more like a hole than whole”. For a strong critique of the androgynous ideal, with references to the problematic character of the acceptance of the masculine–feminine dichotomy and other dichotomies, see E.L. Beardsley, 1982, pp. 197–200. Of interest here is B. Hausman, 1999, who, while reluctant as far as a gender continuum is concerned, suggests the demonstration of the radical discontinuities possible between bodies and behaviours (p. 197). C. Heilbrun, 1980, p. 265. This view on “difference” and its opposite is formulated by J. W. Scott, 1997, p. 766, who does not, however, treat the androgynous subject in the way it is conceptualized here. Scott claims a “more complicated historically variable diversity than is permitted by the opposition male/female”, but thinks that androgyny hides the diversity of the category “women”. In fact, the latter is not put forth by the androgyny hypothesis, which focuses, in a broader way, on the promotion of gender diversity (in which the former is thus included). L. Sargisson, 1996, p. 196. See T. Moi, 1987, p. 12. See, for example, J. Raymond, 1975, pp. 56–75. C. Secor, 1974, p. 164. This comment is inspired by J. Dewey’s ideas on democracy as presented by R. Geuss, 2001, ch. 3. This does not mean that no such (pro-women) policies should be implemented. The point is, as mentioned before (see ch. 2.2), that such necessary measures must be part of a general strategy serving a long-term goal of fighting the gender dichotomy and be accompanied by a discourse that clearly promotes them in such a perspective. See also Concluding Remarks. For interesting examples, especially in the area of parenting, see J. Lorber, 2000, pp. 86–90, who perceives the pertinent policies and the respective claims as part of a feminist degendering movement, arguing in support of it. See also K. O’Donovan, 1993, p. 74, especially on “intimate relationships”, in “a minimally gendered society”. In the Concluding Remarks I return to this issue. Ch. Delphy, 1993, p. 8, as reported by J. Lorber, 2000, p. 88. See B. Baczko, 2001, p. 15. For the “self-undermining” aspect of utopia, see, T. Eagleton, 1999, p. 31.

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145 See L. Mumford, 1962, p. 267. 146 For this view of utopia, see F. Bartkowski, 1989, p. 10, who refers to F. Jameson, 1971 (p. 137 ff.) and his reading of E. Bloch. 147 L. Mumford, 1962. See the title of his first chapter. 148 In early utopias indeed, such as that of Th. More or P.J. Proudhon, there is a simple reversion of the usual: eternal youth, abundance of food, everlasting festivities, and of course elimination of the suffering that results from domination and exploitation. See on this topic F. Haug, 1999, p. 54. 149 K. Mannheim, 1979, p. 179. For Mannheim, however, utopian thinking, in order to be regarded as such, must not only look forward to revolutionary changes, but also succeed in shattering existing conditions, which further intensifies the confusion between this notion and that of “revolution”. See the relevant critique in L. Sargisson, 1996, pp. 48–49. Evidently I do not adopt this part of the conception in question on utopia, if it is thus read, although I consider that the first part, in which the association of utopia with reality is stressed, utopia being presented as “not yet”, is remarkably significant in the context of the line of reasoning presented in this study. 150 This formulation belongs to L. Sargisson, 1996, p. 107, who paraphrases H. Cixous. 151 L. Sargisson, 1996, p. 107. 152 T. Eagleton, 1999, p. 34. 153 See F. Haug, 1999, pp. 53–55, who refers to the paradox of her project, the investigation of the relation between feminism and utopia, insofar as the former is already a political utopia. 154 L. Mumford, 1962, ch. 1, draws a distinction between utopias designed mainly for escape and for social reconstruction. 155 But even before M. Wollstonecraft’s, 1792, Vindication of the Rights of Women there are impressive gynocentric utopian conceptions, even if they are not included in the framework of a systematic theoretical elaboration of the resolution of the “woman’s issue”. See, for example, M. Caventish, 1992, written in 1666. And of course there are revisionist references to gender and the organization of sexuality in the framework of utopian schemes that are in no way gynocentric, with the Platonic Republic, the oldest known “utopia” in western thought, as a prototype. 156 It is interesting to note that the utopian element in the framework of twentiethcentury women’s literature (contrary to the respective element in the nineteenth century, see F. Bartkowski, 1989, p. 9 ff.) is focused to a great degree on other expressions of the gendered, leading in the description of worlds with no men (as, for example, in Ch.P. Gilman’s 1979, Herland, written in 1915), or where the “masculine” has completely disappeared after having been restructured (and men have the ability to breastfeed, such as in M. Piercy, 1978), while women are presented as dynamic with absolute control over their bodies and their fortunes, with a different role in the process of reproduction, etc. 157 See also ch. 2.2. 158 J. Carey, 1999, in the Introduction, p. XXVI. It is interesting to note here an observation made by F. Haug, 1999, p. 59, in relation to the especially limited aspirations often expressed by social groups as utopian desires. (In particular, the author refers to a group of students who, having the recording of their personal “utopia” as a project topic, did not manage to formulate any other vision or claim beyond the solution of the most mundane everyday problems, like better and inexpensive public transportation, affordable apartments etc.). F. Haug, noting that social-democratic reforms have taken the place of utopias, stresses that even the ability of conceiving utopian thoughts will have to be learned all over again. While, in absolute agreement with her on this last remark, I would also like to note another experience from a small sample of graduate students, to whom I posed the same question, but with different results. Half of the students conceived and formulated

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Notes interesting, critical and revolutionary utopian prospects. It is worth noting, however, that it was predominantly young women who were confronted with the difficulty of conceiving utopian projects and were restricted to pedantic demands of everyday life. The sample was extremely small, so no generalization could be drawn from this. However, it is legitimate to pose the hypothesis that the increased difficulty in question is not independent from the social position determined by their gender. Furthermore, contemporary analyses doubt that the notion of the ideal world is inherent in utopia, even in the classic form of the latter as formulated in 1516 by Th. More, 1975, something that arises from the subtitle itself of this work, which refers to “the best state of a commonwealth and the new island of Utopia” and not an ideal condition. See the relevant analysis by L. Sargisson, 1996, pp. 24–27, where a useful bibliography is included. For the history of utopias the study of L. Mumford, 1962 (first edition, 1922) remains a classic, stressing that utopia is not the opposite of the real world, but a separate reality. Among others, very useful are the studies by K. Kumar, 1991 and R. Levitas, 1990. For an interesting overview of the development of utopias on the basis of excerpts from pertinent texts in which less known works are also included, see J. Carey, 1999. See also B. Baczko, 2001, p. 20 ff., for a discussion of the ambiguous etymology of the term. On this aspect of the critique which arises frequently in proposals that are characterized derogatorily as “utopian”, see R. Levitas, 1990, p. 3. Novels that could be regarded as science fiction, myths that are deconstructed and restructured, texts that combine theory and imagination constitute a wide category under the designation “feminist utopian literature”. For an all-around review of the field with the necessary bibliographic references, see F. Bartkowski, 1989, but also S. Gearhart, 1994, and M. Barr, N.D. Smith, 1993. See also A. Harris, 2000, for an interesting exploration into alternative forms of expression of the gendered in select texts by women writers of the twentieth century. “The not yet”, conceived in E. Bloch’s, 1986 (first edition in German, 1959) important work, as the anticipatory element that is pivotal to thought, is the central point of the conception of utopia espoused here. See also, D. Cornell, 1992a and 1998, p. 185, who notes that “a good definition of utopian is that what is possible cannot be known in advance of social transformation”, while (p. 230) “the impossibility of knowing what is possible, is what keeps open social transformations and new realities that cannot yet be thought”. See C. Pateman, 1988. The analysis of two classic works of feminist utopian literature is of interest in this respect, namely, M. Piercy, 1978 and J. Russ, 1975, as conducted by R. Silbergleid, 1997, pp. 156–171. For the possible self-defeating aspect of utopian thinking, see T. Eagleton, 1999, p. 34. E. Bloch, 1986, vol. 1, p. 3. See also pp. 114–117 for a comparison with the notion of the unconscious. See, F. Bartkowski, 1989, p. 11, who refers to E. Bloch’s, 1986, vol. 1 conception. F. Haug, 1999, p. 59, characterizes beautifully reading literary utopias as a “possible means of remembering the future”. See E. Bloch’s, 1986, pp. 114–117 references to the Freudian analysis of dreams, as well as the juxtaposition of dreams and utopias in the thought of E. Bloch, 1986, proposed by L. Sargisson, 1996, and F. Bartkowski, 1989, pp. 10–11. It is very interesting to note that there are direct influences of theory on literature, such as, for example, in the case of the theoretical thought of S. Firestone, 1971, echoed in the literary creation of M. Piercy, 1978. The former supports the necessity of elimination not only of men’s privileges, but also of the very distinction of gender, in the sense of the elimination of the cultural significance of biology (pp. 11–12), while the latter, in her description of new conditions in mothering, says (p. 105):

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“Finally there was one thing we had to give up too, the only power we ever had, in return for no power for anyone [...]: the power to give birth. Cause as long as we were biologically enchained, we’d never be equal. And males would never be humanized to be loving and tender. So we are all mothers”. See also an analysis on the communality in the thinking of the aforementioned authors, in L. Sargisson, 1996, pp. 164–166. Compare also E. Badinter’s, 1992, p. 244, view on the humanization of men. The classic critique against utopian thought is, in fact, that of idealism, linked to the “non-feasible” character of utopias and which is regarded as a source of evil, should the attempt be made to materialize it. See A. Lancaster, 2000, for a presentation of the most important critiques of utopian thinking, both from the standpoint of liberalism and from that of postmodernism. The latter critiques (for example, the foregoing author, pp. 112–113 refers to J. Baudrillard, S. Fish and F. Lyotard), focus on the fact that utopian thought presupposes some pre-existing view of “human nature”. See T. Eagleton, 1999, pp. 33–34, who also, analysing the Marxist view of utopia, maintains that its opposition to utopian thinking does not originate from the hypothesis that a radically different society is not conceivable, but from the rejection of a conception that views such a society as if it could be “simply parachuted into the present from some metaphysical outer space”. For the Marxist treatment of utopian thinking, see also B. Baczko, 2001, specifically pp. 24–26. On this line of reasoning concerning changes, see D. Cornell, 1998, p. 186. I. Wallerstein, 1998, ch. 1, who speaks of “an alternative, credibly better, and historically possible (but far from certain) future”. This author levels, however, a severe critique at utopian thinking, stressing that it fosters illusions and, for that reason, disappointments. See the relevant problematique of A. Lancaster, 2000. D. Cornell, 1998, p. 231.

5 Concluding remarks 1 On this specificity of modern democracy, and on the foregoing tension as something to be defended, since it “constitutes the best guarantee that the project of modern democracy is alive and inhabited by pluralism”, see Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 150 and p. 133. 2 But see also n. 36 in ch. 3 for a distinction between a unitary and a core self, proposed by J. Flax, 1990, pp. 218–219. 3 This particular aspiration of the dominant current frequently urges me to place quotation marks around the adjective “feminist”, since in my view intrinsic to the contemporary notion of feminism is (should be), on the contrary, the seeking to abolish the gender dichotomy. See above ch. 2, especially n. 159. 4 See, ch. 4.3 for my conception of androgyny. 5 For the relevant view on universality, see Ch. Mouffe, 1993, especially p. 13. On the relation between universality and particularity, with critical reference to the thought of Ch. Mouffe and E. Laclau, as well as to S. Zˇizˇek, see J. Torfing, 1999, pp. 168–186. 6 Ch. Di Stefano, 1990, p. 66. 7 C. Pateman, 1988, p. 96. See also M. Gatens, 1992, p. 121, who also refers to and comments on this formulation by C. Pateman. 8 See Ph. Green, 1985. 9 This is the well-known reasoning on the “ethics of care”, see C. Gilligan, 1982. 10 On this logic of action, as far as the suffragettes in Britain are concerned, who did not

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simply act as if they were citizens, but rather “they acted citizenship”, see W. Parkins, 2000, p. 63. An ability that women lacked par excellence, according to the classic social contract theories. See C. Pateman, 1988, p. 96 ff. For a different view, in which the possibility for the development of women’s solidarity through the assertion of “difference” is supported, see J. Mansbridge, 1998, p. 157. See S. Seidman, 1994, pp. 10–11, as well as his Introduction in general for an interesting treatment of this issue. See S. Seidman, 1994, the Introduction, where he refers to R. Rosaldo’s arguments on the relation between social analysis and moral advocacy (pp. 12–13) and to N. Alarcon on the intersection of the dynamics of gender, race, class and sexuality (p. 11). A. Phillips, 1991, p. 119, proposes the “uncoupling” of the distinction between women and men. See Ph. Green, 1985, p. 259. C. Pateman, 1989, pp. 214–215 and p. 220, argues that if J.S. Mill’s feminist essay was left to obscurity by democratic theorists, “although it provides a logical extension of the arguments of his academically acclaimed On Liberty” it is precisely because Mill, by extending the principles of liberalism to the area of marriage, shook the established distinction in the tradition in question between parental and political rule, as formed by J. Locke (that is between the private sphere of the family and the public sphere dominated by non-personal character and contractual relations). See on this topic also T. Brennan, C. Pateman, 1998, pp. 100–105, who formulate interesting observations also on the views of Th. Hobbes concerning the family, the apparent relevant differences between Leviathan and The Elements of Law, but especially in relation to what they call the problem of the “missing parent”, in Th. Hobbes, pp. 101–102. As to the supporters of participatory democracy, who attempted a reformulation of the distinction between the public and private spheres (with references especially to the world of labour), they too paid little attention to the significance of the gender division of labour in the private sphere, which obviously is not free of consequences for its counterpart in the public sphere. It is interesting to note that the critique on theorists of participatory democracy which is formulated by C. Pateman, 1989, extends self-critically to a prior study by her (1970) in order to remark (pp. 220–221) that theorists of participatory democracy (within whom she lists herself), despite the fact that they deal especially with issues of labour, are not the ones who pointed to the differences in the position of working women and especially married women, in relation to that of working men, but feminist theorists. C. Pateman, 1988 and 1989, especially, pp. 218–219. According to Z. Bauman, 1999, one of the objectives of sociology is to elucidate these socially constructed restrictions, which usually go unnoticed. See here above, the Introduction, on how I perceive postmodernism’s importance for feminist theory, and in particular how I understand the above demand. This interesting view on opposites is developed in J.W. Scott, 1997, pp. 758–770. Z. Bauman, 1993, p. 245. J.W. Scott, 1997, p. 765. See J.W. Scott, 1997, p. 768, speaking about power. See the analysis of R. Alsop, A. Fitzsimons, K. Lennon, 2002, ch. 10 and particularly, p. 233, in respect to “collective agency as a reflexive political choice”, as a critique of J. Butler. For a classic, though brief, presentation of the process of formation of the differences observed in behavioural patterns, attitudes and perceptions pertinent to gender, with an emphasis on their acquired, social character due to the importance of early social-

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ization and the process of separation-individuation, see N. Chodorow, 1997, pp. 8–20. See also by the same, 1978, where a problematique is thoroughly developed concerning the importance for the formation of gender identities, of the exclusive women’s occupation with childcare. I paraphrase here C. MacKinnon, 1982, p. 542, saying that “women’s acceptance of their condition does not contradict its fundamental unacceptability”. M. DeKoven, 1991, p. 4. On the invalidation of cultural changes implicit in feminism, see J. Butler, 1990, p. 147. See C. Pateman, mainly 1992, and I.M. Young, mainly 1990 and 1994. The latter, by insisting on the engagement in reflective deliberation of members of subordinate groups with others, proposes an argument for group representation that attempts to avoid the risk of essentialism. However, the democratic effectiveness of her proposal is undermined by the majoritarian rule. There is nothing to prevent more numerous or powerful participants from ignoring weaker voices (see M. Williams, 2000, p. 124). See S. Ruddick, 1989, J. Elshtain, 1981, but also N. Chodorow, 1978, C. Gilligan, 1982. For a critique of the main hypothesis of “maternal thinking” feminism, see M. Dietz, 1985 and specifically for women’s moral superiority, 1998, pp. 388–389. Ch. Mouffe, 1992, p. 376. It is interesting to note, however, that Mouffe does not set the relevant process as an objective for feminism. But rather, wishing to underline the need to go beyond single identities, “the struggle for the equality of women”, against “the multiple forms in which the category ‘woman’ is constructed in subordination” (p. 382). That is, policies that aim at the invalidation of the social importance of gender and not at furthering its legitimation. See also above, ch. 4, n. 141. On this conception of democracy, and especially on the danger of particularism and fragmentation, see E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, 1985, p. 188. E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, 1985, p. 188. See Ph. Green, 1993, p. 2. ˇ izˇek, 1991, pp. 166–169. I believe that it is in accordance with this logic that Y. S. Z Stavrakakis, 1994, p. 61, states that democracy is in need of an ethics, a moral of discord, and by choosing a Lacanian ethics for this role, he attempts an interesting intervention on the part of psychoanalysis in what he calls a domain of antithesis between traditional ethics (which seeks harmony) and democracy. See also Y. Stavrakakis, 1999. ˇ izˇek, 1991, are from p. 168. All quotations by S. Z See Ch. Mouffe, 1993, p. 8. Sh. Firestone, 1971, p. 11. See Ch. Delphy, 1993, p. 8, who insists that gender precedes sex. It is the social division of labour which leads to physiological sex being used to differentiate those who are assigned to be dominant from those who will be subordinate. In one sense, the project of “gender equality” is absolutely contradictory. The genders, as we know them today, are intrinsically unequal, this is by definition also the function of the applicable dichotomy. Therefore, claiming sex equality sounds like an oxymoron, notes C. MacKinnon, 1998, p. 295, adding aptly that possibly this is also the reason “why we are having such a difficult time getting it”. Or to all women if they refer to legal measures cancelling prior discriminatory legislation. See J. Gregory, 1999, as cited in E. Lombardo, 2003, p. 163. See M. Verloo, 2002, pp. 3–4, who mentions the abolition of women’s units, gender

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49 50 51

52 53 54

55

56 57

58 59

60

Notes

equality units, women’s rights committees etc. See also M. Verloo, 2001 and M. Stratigaki, 2005. For the distinction in question, which refers to the distinction between individual and group representation, see V. Sapiro, 1998, p. 162 ff. A. Philips, 1998, p. 229 is right in holding that the strongest argument in support of parity in political decision-making is that which refers to the notion of justice, since “it is patently and grotesquely unfair for men to monopolize representation”. Another logic is that of statistical analysis in the framework of which a weighted sample obviously guarantees better population “representation” than its nonweighted counterpart. J.W. Scott, 1996, pp. 3–4. See the interesting points made by J. Squires, 2000, particularly in the Conclusion, pp. 226–232. S. Bordo, 1990, p. 153, departing from a critique of postmodern hypotheses, notes that in political practice: “We need to be pragmatic, not theoretically pure, if we are to struggle effectively”. While this view can be subject to strong theoretical rebuttal, as well as political questioning concerning the definition of “effectiveness”, it is indicative of the uneasiness with which feminist theory is sometimes related to practice. For this reasoning see the interesting problematique of J. Butler, 1990, p. 5 ff. which is evidently inspired by Foucault’s thinking. See J. Butler, 1990, p. 5, who notes that such a reification is “precisely contrary to feminist aims”. This formulation belongs to C. Vance, 1994, p. 266, who does not refer to women but to subjects characterized as homosexuals and whose essentialist conceptions do not usually originate from a theoretical attachment to essentialism. I deflect here the practical problems (which should however be dealt with by their supporters) that may emerge on the level of the application of quotas and eventually on that of parity in specific political systems, if there are no significant changes in the electoral system. Beyond France, where more and more voices attempt a rethinking of parity. See L. Bereni, E. Lépinard, 2003, on the disillusionment of some of its supporters. Despite the fact that in the reasoning accompanying the institutionalization of parity in France, the central theoretical hypothesis of its promotion based on the dual universality thesis and the need for representation of women as such, was not adopted, it is certain that implicitly at least the relevant problematique is present in many of those who support it unreservedly. See R. Alsop, A. Fitzsimons, K. Lennon, 2002, p. 232 ff. for a similar problematique. And in this sense it refers to the demand for the “completion” of modernity. See here above, the Introduction. E. Varikas, 1987b, p. 99, stresses that the struggles for women’s liberation had everywhere as a point of departure the problematique of natural law, in the framework of which its dual dynamic is discernible: as an abstract ideal that was employed by the victors of history and as a vision “from the bottom up”. See T.H. Marshall, 1977, p. 106, who refers to essential social rights in the twentieth century. It seems however, that historically, partial “concessions” or partial satisfaction of radical demands function rather as an emotional release for social claims something which is not solely limited to the context of feminism.

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Index

accountability 31, 56 “active forgetfulness” 117 activists 17, 20, 24–25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 60, 133n71, 139n50, 164n106 affirmative action 52, 54, 122, 140n58, n77, 142n96, n98, 142–143n105, 151n82 age-related, gender roles 38 alliance politics 21, 133n72 alliances, formation of 32, 84; political 14–15 Almond, G. 40 Amsterdam Treaty (1999) 135n105 anatomical sexual differences 160n61, 64 androcentric 21, 31, 35–36, 38, 44, 55, 59, 75, 88, 93, 111, 116, 118, 162n77; citizenship 77–78, 85, 134n85, 151n84, 152n96 androcentrism 23, 38–39, 40, 48, 53, 74–78, 88, 118–119, 134n85, 151n84, 164–165n118, 165n122, 125–127, 166n, 128–134 androgynous subject 101–105, 111 androgyny 101–105, 111, 164n115, 119 anti-sexist policy 53, 105–106; institutionalisation of 117 apathy 3, 40, 138n28, 33 arbitrary power 46 Arendt, H. 46, 127n5, 138n40, 139n47, n49 armed forces 134n86, 139n55, 152n94 assumptions,unquestioned xii, 33, 120, 122 asymmetrical participation 26 autonomous feminist movement 15, 48, 140n56 autonomous subjects 69, 72 autonomy 90, 103, 120–121, 144n136, 145n153, 154n122, 163n97 Bacchi, C. L. 21, 34

Bauman, Z. 9 Beauvoir, S. de 153n117, 161n70 Beijing World Women’s Conference 135n105 Belgium 51 “benchmarking fallacy” 42 Berlin, I. 22 biological: approach to sexuality 93–96; interpretation 18; reality 112–113 bipolar world view 89 bipolarity 15, 23, 67, 74–78, 82–83, 93, 101, 116, 125, 131–132n38, 149, 151n72, 155n138, 157n7, n53, 155n138; acceptance of 51, 87; challenges to 88; as socially necessary 79, 89; transgression of 104 body: conceptualisations of 161n70; role of 90–91, 153n117; in social theory 158n29; symbolic power of 158n28; theoretical treatment of 93 boundary issues 163n98 Bryson, V. 94 Butler, J. 72, 81, 93 Cartesian dualism 70 categories, deconstruction of 80–81, 84; pre-constructed 16 centred subject 67–70, 148n36, 150n59 characteristics, shared 78 choice, as precondition for democracy 29–30 Christianity 162n78, 87 citizen models 147n20 citizenship 64–74; androcentrism and bipolarity 74–78; conceptions of 128–129n27; disengagement from gender 110; dominant conceptualization of 37; gender-neutral character of 23; perceptions of 148n29; restrictions 19–20; significance of 155n143

192

Index

civic culture 40–41 civic republicanism 46, 65, 139n48, 51, 146n8–9, 147n11, 148n33 civil rights 66 class 1, 2, 15, 19, 22, 36, 48, 57–58, 66, 73, 77–79, 83, 87, 95, 113, 119, 131n26, 113n72, 150n58, 157n9, 165n119, 170n14 class inequality 2 class injustice 19, 22 classifications 166n129 closed lists 48 Cold War 18–19 collective agency 170n25 collective identity 87, 151n81, 156n2 collective rights 146n4 common attributes 155n133 common good 147n10 common interests 57, 136n117 commonality of gender identity 30–31 communication problems 61 Communist Party, Greece 27 communitarianism 65 “complex equality” 83–84 “compulsory heterosexuality” 97 concessions 60–61 conflicting roles 136n118 Connell, R. W. 101 consciousness 133n74 contemporary concept of the citizen 66 contemporary critical theory 23 contemporary lifestyles 101 “contemporary woman” 164n110 core self 169n2 Cornell, D. 109 Council of Europe 60 counter-cultural experience 97 critical acceptance 126 Critical Theory 129n46 cultural: autonomy 154n122; changes 171n29 cultural content of gender 18, 90–91, 93, 95 cultural difference 70 99 cultural possibilities 55, 91, 116, 118; rights 153–154n121 day-dreams 108 decision-making structures, gender composition 3, 122–123 deconstruction 9, 72–73, 80, 85, 110–111, 117, 122–123, 129n42, n44, 143n111, 146n159, 149n42, 150n59, 151n71–73, 154n124, 159n39, n44 DeKoven, M. 116 Delphy, Ch. 106 demands, articulation of 80

democracy 10–17; as central social organizing principle xii; complex view of 137n15; constitutive paradox of 117; definition of 1; distortions of 45, 64, 92, 113, 125; expansion of 17–21; functioning of 2, 137n22; and gendersex connection 92–100; gendered subjects of 100–109; as an idea 1; incompatibility with 114; preconditions for 29; quality of 49–50; strengthening of 33; subjects of 64–74 democratic deficit 136n119 democratisation 36, 99 74; typology of 128n3 demographic parameters 138n36 Denmark 25, 49 dependence 44–45, 76 Descartes, R. 158n25, 159n33 descriptive representation 56–58 desire 162n87 “deviant” forms of sexuality 98 Dewey, J. 70 Di Stefano, C. 20–21, 111 dichotomies, legitimization of 61, 96–97, 119; reproduction of 89 dichotomous: gender order xiv, 6, 16, 121; logic, deconstruction of 72, 105, 110; understanding of gender xii dichotomous subject 12, 55, 58, 78, 88, 100–101, 122 dichotomy: women–men 11, 51, 74, 81, 88–89, 99, 159n72; hierarchical xvii, 3, 9, 58, 82, 92 Dietz, M. 76 difference 78–85, 98–99, 155 n134; context of 8–9; as cultural expression 8; discourse 54, 111; as divergence from norm 80; as diversity 99, 146, 147, 157n14, 164n102; endorsement of 163n99; formation of 170n26; framing of 115–116; motherhood as expression of 75–76; sexual 123; support for 170n12; toleration of 19, 98–99; total acceptance of 99 “difference feminists” 14–16 differentiated participation 40 differentiated universalism 73, 156n154 Diotima Centre for Women’s Studies 141n81 direct democracy 45 discrimination, management of 54; social xiv diversity: acceptance of 87, 99; expression of 19; framework of 16; reality of 80 dominant social categories 56 dual universality thesis 11–12, 52, 83,

Index 193 113, 131n36, 141n92, 156n154, 172n57 dualisms 70, 89, 90, 132n45, 157–158n19 Eagleton, T. 107 Eastern Europe 3, 18–19 eclecticism 8 electoral systems 142n101 Elements of Law 170n17 elite participation 33, 41–42, 43–44 Enlightenment 8, 36, 68, 70, 113, 148n35, n38, 160n48 entrapment 151n82, n83, 153n110 equal positive liberty 22 equality: compatibility with freedom 1; demand for 51–52; formal 58, 124, 125; institutionalisation of measures 73–74; philosophical defence of 84; policies xii; as a policy issue 34–35, 82; of rights 88, 125 “equality feminists” 14–16 essentialism 8, 30, 32, 73, 81, 89, 96, 129n35, 147–148n26, 155n139, 156n152 essentialist identity 48, 72, 73, 116, 124, 126 essentialist perception 16, 32, 50, 52, 70, 87 ethics 89; of justice 76 ethnocentrism 67 Europe 3–4, 15, 37 European agenda xiv European Commission 60 European Parliament 27, 60 European politics 46 European Union: decision-making 6; policy issues 42; policy measures 4, 25, 26, 28, 33, 45, 50, 62, 119–120, 122, 123; pressure groups 60 exclusion 38–39, 78, 123, 125 exclusive gender identities 93 experience 12, 15, 31, 33, 44, 45, 59, 69, 75, 78, 84, 87–88, 97, 102, 108, 112, 116, 117, 147n13 factors of division 87 family 142n99, 152n105; oppression within 86; structure of 105 feminine: conversion of 101; devalorization of 78, 102; preservation of 91–92; social structuring of 77; theory for 133n68 feminine subjectivity 68–69 feminine traits 93, 116, 164n113 femininity, revalued 159–60n45 feminism, inevitable paradox of 123; course of 123; ‘wrong kind of’ 139n43

feminist contestation 34, 88 feminist critical standpoint 36 feminist political stance 126 feminist politics 80 feminist scholarship 145–146n159 feminist theorists 89 feminist theory xii–xiii, 11, 16–17, 31, 45, 88, 114, 127n1–2 feminist vision 12, 47, 52, 61, 63, 89, 105–106, 108, 125 feminists: liberal 89; radical 60, 105 “femocrats” 45 fertilization 94 Firestone, S. 118 Flax, J. 8 formal rights 146n4 Foucault, M. 149n42, 150n59, 161n75, 162n81 Fox Keller, E. 30 framing 135n106, 141n86, 145n158 framing of problem 29, 92 France 11–12, 13–14, 51, 58, 131n34, 139n50, 54, 140 141n78, 141n92, 143n107, n121, 148n32 Fraser, N. 72, 99 freedom: compatibility with equality 12; conceptualization of 46, 139n52; political action as condition for 46 Freud, S. 148n39, 149n40, 157n6 gender 10–17; abolition of 123; as analytical category 128n13; as boundary 114; conception of 89; conceptual clarification of 119–122; deconstruction of 9, 103, 110, 124, 157n11; distinction from sex 92–93; elimination of 112; experienced 114–115; as form of social inequality 21–24; framing of 115; as immutable fact of life 34; as interpretation 90; new conceptualisation of 17–21; as an organizing principle 2–3; and political decision-making 24–35; of politics/politicians 47–55; redefinition 73, 166n128; regardless of xvii, 31–31, 34, 119; as social hierarchy 42; as system of relations 18; underestimation of 159n34; unity of 163n92 gender assumptions 122 gender categories 50–51, 120 gender characteristics 104, 161n67 gender dichotomy 7, 17, 20, 34, 51, 57, 60–61, 78, 85, 93, 110, 114, 166n140, 169n3; acceptance of 17, 47, 53, 55, 72, 78, 83 103, 121; challenges to 79, 86–92 157n17; deconstruction of 61, 85, 111, 119,

194

Index

gender dichotomy continued 122; freedom from 100; legitimization of 3, 5, 86, 97, 124, 126; as social contingency 86, 90, 111, 121 gender difference 12–17, 58, 61, 104, 115, 120, 141n80 gender divide 11–12 gender duality 156n156 gender equality 34, 112, 118–121 gender identity 31, 68–69, 93, 118, 121 gender mainstreaming xv, 34–35, 42, 119–120, 123 gender norms 103 gender order xiv, 33, 58, 124 “gender of rights” 51 gender perceptions 116–117, 120–121 gender perspective 34, 119 gender policy 33, 89, 120 gender related transgression 160n57 gender relations system 128n17; changes in 71–72, 82–83, 89; reification of 145n150; structure/function of 77 gender relations, dominant system of xii–xiii gender roles 76, 162n86 gender, sex distinction 89, 92–93, 161n68 gender statistics 127n7 gender-based domination 155n135 gender-based oppression xii–xiii gender-indifferent democracy 33 gendered citizens 21–24, 71, 82, 125 gendered rights 67–68 gendered subjects xii,12, 19–20, 33–34, 70–71, 100–109, 117 genderless universality xiii, 52, 80, 92 gender-neutral citizenship 67, 74, 152n106 gender-specific behaviour 14 general good 46 General Secretariat for Equality, Greece 25, 27 Germany 25 Gould, C. 22, 52 Greece xvii, 6, 15, 24–28, 33, 36–37, 38, 43–44, 47–50, 51, 128n17, 134n87, n96, 134–135n99 Green, P. 3 group representation 56, 122, 130n5, 143n116, n120, 153n114, 171n30, 172n47 Habermas, J. 24 Hall, S. 68, 69 Heilbrun, C. 104 heterogeneity 16, 88 heterosexuality 96, 97–98, 161–162n77, 162n85, n89, n91

Hirsch, M. 30 Hirschman, N. 20–21 historical sur-determinations 71 historically formed gender relations systems 91 history of democracy 19–20 Hobbes, T. 144n128, 170n17 homogeneity 153n115 homogenization 86, 87 homosexuality 96, 98 hooks, b. 87 Horrocks, R. 97, 98 human: as equivalent to men 118; existence 16, 88–89; universal concept of 12; versions of 119 Human Condition, The 139n49 human rights 156n157 idealism 107–109 identity: concept of 154n124; consolidation of 17; definition of 81; formation of 69, 148n37; fragmentation of 30; liberation from 72–73, 159n43; men’s 89; multiplicity 68, 114–115; party 33, pre-constructed 88, 103; uniform 89; women’s 32, 52 independence 75, 152n90 indifference 99 individualistic liberalism 148n33 inequality 21–23; modernization of 47–48 inferiority 117–118 injustice, management of 54 inside/outside dilemma 62 institution of measures 26–28 institutional changes 11, 28 institutionalization of feminism 15 institutionalized social hierarchy 47 institutions, access to 46–47 instrumental logic 105 inter-party co-operation 28, 30–32 Inter-party Women Cooperation Committee, Greece 27 inter-subjective relations 113–114 internal differentiation 38 interpersonal relations, democratisation of 100 intra-gender collaboration 31–32 Italy 25, 135n104, 143n107 justice: demand for 13–14; ethics of SOS 76; as fairness 131n19; measure of 123; perceptions of 142n97; spheres of 155n142 Justice, A Theory of 12–13 labour market participation 76, 137n17 Lacan, J. 68

Index 195 language 120–121, 123 Left 36, 88 legal status, citizenship as 64–65 lesbians 96 Leviathan 170n17 liberal democracy 146n6; democratic practice 2; reinstatement of 65 liberalism and democracy 127–128n2 liberalization: control through 98; creation of preconditions 74–75 liberation 29, 34, 114, 123; perspectives of 29–30 Lister, R. 16, 64, 73 “lived body” 70, 80, 91 “lived identity” 55 Locke, J. 130n16, 170n17 long-term political objectives 4, 119–120 Lukes, S. 42 MacKinnon, C. 16 majoritarian rule 171n30 male hegemony xvii male power 97 male prerogative, abolition of 22 males, socially subordinate 88 marginalization xii, xiii, xvi, 29, 39–40 Marshall, T. H. 66, 67, 126 Marxism 146n4, 165n119 masculine: gender of democracy 3–6; models 101, 164n111, n112; subjectivity 68–69; traits 93 “maternal feminism” 76, 171n32 medium-term goals 4 Merleau-Ponty, M. 70 metaphysical character of representation 55–56 Mill, J. S. 17, 137n13, 157n6, 170n17 mind–body: distinctions 158n25; dualism 70, 90, 132n45, 150n58, 158n31–32, 158–159n33, n34 minorities 15, 88; oppression of 22 “mirror” representation 56 modern democracy 169n1 modernist writers 116 modernity, completion of 8–9, 118; historical logic of xiii; substance of 114; unfulfilled promises of 8 modernization xiii; of inequality 47 modernization measures xiii Moi, T. 104 moral self 150n58 moral superiority 102 moral worth 153n111 More, Thomas 167n148 Mossuz-Lavau, J. 58 mother–daughter relations 149n48 motherhood 75–76, 152n96

mothering 94 Mouffe, Ch. 7, 13, 77, 80, 116–117 multiculturalism 154n122 multiformity 86–92, 114–115 multiplicity 78–85 Mumford, L. 106 Nash, K. 55, 73 national identity 150n62 nation-state, link with citizenship 66 natural inferiority xii “naturalness” 93, 95, 96, 97 nature–culture dualism 132n45 negative liberty 22, 133n77 Netherlands 135n104 New Democracy, Greece 27 “new social movements” 36–37 Nietzsche, F. 154n128 non-citizens, status of 128n7 non-classification of sexuality 99–100 non-participation 138n33 non-procreative sex 98 normative political theory 13 norms, divergence from 80 Northern Europe 25 Norway 135n116 Okin, S. M. 13, 44 Oldfield, A. 64 On Liberty 170n17 On the Genealogy of Morals 154n128 ontological foundations of political proposals xiii open lists 48–50 oppression: concept of 132n40; liberation from 2, 112, 114; modernization of 3, 55, 109 “original position” 13 “outopia” 106 Papandreou, Vasso 27, 49–50 parenting 166n141 pariahs 12, 98 parity 4, 12, 31, 37, 44, 51–52, 56–58, 61–62, 122–125, 128n11, 130n5, 137n12, 141n78, n84, n86, n92, 143n121, 156n156, 172n48, n56, n57 partial identities 101 participation: educational character of 39; Greece 24–28; labour market 76; reduced 37–47; retributive benefits of 40; as women 48 participatory citizenship 19, 65, 78 participatory democracy 45, 46, 65 particularism 169n5, 171n35 particularities 1, 4, 36, 69, 78–80, 82, 111, 124

196

Index

party: accountability 31; hierarchies 58; nominations 49 PASOK 25, 27, 135n103 Pateman, C. 2, 12, 13, 23, 52, 66, 75, 77, 84–85, 107, 111, 113–114, 116 patriarchal: assumptions 150n68; character of citizenship 52; societies 153n109; welfare state 154n131 patriarchal preconceptions 72, 96 patriarchy, transformation of 98 perfect representation 144n126 “personal is political” 36 personal skills 133n81 phallocentrism 139n49 Phillips, A. 16, 56, 65, 113 Pitkin, H. 57 “plastic sexuality” 163n97 pluralism 13, 19, 34, 42–43, 138n31 policies: ontological foundation of 35 policy measures: divergent views on 30–31; EU 4, 25, 26, 28, 45, 50, 62, 119–120, 122, 123; Greece 24–25, 27; impact of 140n60 Political Association of Women, Greece 27 “political categories” 92 political claims 51, 55, 58, 59, 74, 81, 89, 100, 113, 124, 126 political collaboration 28, 30–32 political culture 33–34, 40–41 political decision-making 24–35 political difference 133n64 political equality xvi, 1, 2, 11, 22, 65, 110, 131n26 political hegemony 97–98 political hierarchy xii political identities 19, 81, 87, 100, 104, 155n133; preconstructed 103 political immaturity 135n111 political marginalization 29, 32, 34, 39–40 political objectives 4, 119–120 political parties, membership 135n104 political perceptions xvi–xvii political power xiii, 29, 32, 45, 48, 53, 79, 126 political practice 105 political proposals xiii political rights 2, 20, 25, 66; use of 6 political science approach 6, 7 political utopia 107 politicians: gender of 47–55; as representatives of social category 6; as representatives of women 59 politicization of sexuality 100 politics: crisis of 36–37; democratic perception of 133n63; exclusion from 62; gender of 47–55; of ideas 54; rejection of 145n144

polymorphism 12 Portugal 25 positive action 4, 26, 62, 74, 128n19, 142n96, 145n158 positive discrimination 47, 51, 53, 58, 60, 142n96, n98 positive liberty 22, 66 post-feminism/patriarchy 104 postmodern approaches 7–8; conceptualization of 8;and feminism 8, hypotheses 88; relativism of 8 postmodernism 7–8, 129n30, 31–34, 130n47, 134n88, 150n60, 170n20 post-structuralism 129n46 poverty, toleration of 19 power 149n42; conceptions of 43; field of 123; movement of 127n2; power positions, women in 142n100 power relations 79; gender system of 101; structuring of 16–17; system of 116 power structures 44–45 practice, citizenship as 64 pragmatism 70, 91, 150n58–59 preconceptions of gender 23–35, 88 preconditions, formation of 90 predefined concepts 15 preferences, formation of 23 preferential treatment 28, 49, 128n19, 140n58, n77 prejudices xii, 122 premature truths, utopias as 106 pressure groups 11, 33–34; logic of 47, 82, 112 private dependence 44–45 private sphere xiii, 61, 76; Greece 26–27; significance of 113–114 protection of women 141–142n94 “pro-women” 107; measures 34, 121, 123–125; milieu 126; stance 61 public dependence 44–45 public sphere 76, 114 public/private: deconstruction of 52; distinction 36, 65, 67–68, 79, 150n69, 159n38 quotas 15, 17, 26, 27–28, 29, 42, 47–53, 54, 122, 128n10, 140n66, n69, 72, 141n92, 142n102, 143n107; Greece 28, 49; transitory character of 12 racism 132n56 radical democracy 133n61, 136n6, 147n12 Randall, V. 45 rape 150n68, 160n58 rationality 68 Rawls, John 12–13

Index 197 real interests 144n136 reformist gender politics 145n146 relativism 8 re-negotiation: of citizenship 70–71; of gender 20 representation 33, 55–63; dimensions of 144n128; equal 37; of gender 11; inbuilt 34; of women 59, 143n121; principle of 144n143 representative democracy 45–46 representative policies 54 reproductive capacity 93, 94, 112 republican understanding of citizenship 46, 51, 65, 141n92 republicanism 152n98 revolutionary gender politics 145n146 Rich, A. 69, 97 rights, historical succession of 147n16, logic of 146n4 rights of citizenship 64–67, 146n2 roles of women 29 Room of One’s Own, A 164n117 Rousseau J.-J. 130n16, 137n13 Rubin, G. 93 Sargisson, L. 104 Scandinavia 12, 26, 44, 45, 136n1, 138n34 Scott, J. W. 15–16, 115, 123 second wave feminism 131n37 second-class citizens 2 self-identities, formation of 112–113 self-organization 45 self-realization 111 sex 92–100, 112, 160n63; deconstruction of 103 sex, gender 160n47–49, n54, n55; connection 92–100; distinction 89, 92–93; divide 18 sexist organisation of society 2 sexual: contract 75, 107; difference 51–52, 129n35, 39, 132n47, 142n95, 103, 153n119, 154–155n132; diversity 98–99; minorities 164n106; practices 96, 98; rights 150n63 sexual act 162n88 sexuality 92–100; conceptions of 161n75; feminist approaches 163n94 sexually differentiated citizenship 133–134n83 Shildrick, M. 90 short-term political objectives 119–120 social category: representation of 36, 51; women as 53–54 social conditioning 132n49 social contract theory 75, 94, 170n11 social conventions 91

social equality: and political equality 22, 33; as precondition for democracy 12, 111–112 social experience 112 social groups 15, 56–57, 61, 78, 90, 132n40, n46, 165n120, 167n158 social identities 3, 115 social importance 88–89 social inequality xvi, 12–13, 22, 36–37, 54, 65–66, 69, 95, 99, 115, 131n26; gender as form of 11–12, 14, 21–24, 82, 87, 92, 137n19 social inferiority xii, 53, 143n124 social injustice 19 social institutions, interventions in 105–106, 114 social integration 43 social justice, temporary measures of 52–53 social movements and democracy 153n113 social organizing principles xii social policy, principles for 84; measures 62 social position, assessment of 33 social reality 9: distorted image of 86; effects of theory level changes 20–21, 101–102 social relations: gender as system of 6, 18; systems 81–82, 118 social rights 66 social roles 79, 86–87; analysis of 102 social status 38–44, 46, 125 socialism, collapse of 130n8 socialist regimes, collapse of 3, 11, 18–19 socialist societies 128n18 socialization 59, 69, 94, 99, 105 social-liberal citizenship 128–129n27 socially constructed meaning of experience 87–88 socio-economic developments 83 sociological imagination 128n21 Southern Europe xvii, 3–4, 6, 25, 62 Spain 25, 135n104 Spourdalakis, Michalis xvii Squires, J. 54 state: “inside or outside” 62; as neutral 61 state and gender 145n145 “state feminism” 45, 139n44 stereotypes 10, 14, 26–27, 77, 94, 165n124 Stratigaki, M. 121 structural exclusion 36, 38 structural inferiority 54 Subjection of Women, The 157n6 subjectivity 17, 24, 81, 90, 98–99, 148–149n39, 149n54, 160n47,

198

Index

subjectivity continued 161n73; bodily dimension of 97; formation of 56, 68–70, 87, 95, 118, 128n17, 149n50, gendered dimension of 4, 18, 68, 100, 125; nomadic character of 149n54; perceptions of 69, 80, 81, 154n129; unity of 111; women’s 3, 78, 87, 92 subordination: contributions to 155n149; expressions of 44; framework of 137n161; ideological legitimation of 83; modernizing legitimation of 60, 77; relations of 15 substantive rights 146n4 suffragettes 162n84, 169–170n10 superiority of women 76, 116 symbiotic relations 89 symbolic representation 58, 144n132 targets: radical 34; subversive 32 theoretical approach xvii, 6–7, 11, 75 theoretical debate xiv, xvi, 12, 15, 23 theoretical preconditions 9, 80, 92 theoreticism 20–21 theory of democracy 11, 16–17, 137n13 theory of justice 12–13, 131n28 theory of representation 62 theory of sexuality 96–97, 162n80–81 theory of the unconscious 68–69 toleration 13, 98–99, 164n105 traditional gender roles 24, 50, 152n104 traditional identities 101 transitional tactic 123–124 unconscious 148–149n39, 149n40, 43, 152n100 under-representation 36–47; extent of 10–11; Greece 26–29; political xvi Union of Greek Women 50 unitary: identity 68, 70, 111; standard 85, 156n156; subject 70, 121, 129n30, 131n36, 148n36, 149n43, 154n129 unitary self 148n36, 169n2 universality 1–2, 16, 17, 36, 52, 74, 77, 78–85, 104, 110–111, 125, 153n114, 169n5; dual 11, 52, 57, 61, 72, 77, 141n92, 156n156

US 13–14, 40, 60, 131n34, 133n72, 139n53, 142n96, 144n142 utilitarian maximization of pleasure 18 utopian thought 86, 106–109, 128n22, 159n41 Varikas, E. 56, 128n11, 130n5, 134n87, 138n23, 139n50, 141n78, 142n95, 143n116, 157n7, 172n59 Verba, S. 40 vision: ethical 89; political 18–19, 58–59, 63, 105; radical 59, 60, 114, 123 Wallerstein, I. 109 Walzer, M. 83, 84, 98 Waylen, G. 45 Weigel, S. 71 welfare 15, 29 welfare state 138n34, 152n107 Western Europe 60 western thought: challenges to 36, 136n4; philosophical legacy of 74–75; political 80 Wittig, M. 92 Wollstonecraft, M. 84–85, 107, 155n149 Woman’s Bible, The 164n117 women, inferior position of xi, xiii women: politicians 30, 32–33, 122; as the “other” 88, 118; specific groups of 34 women’s demands 143n111 women’s interests’ 36, 61, 125 women’s issues 31–32; willingness to promote 144n142 women’s movement 46 women’s multiformity 86–92 women’s organizations 15 women’s policies 123–124 women’s superiority 116 Woolf Virginia 154n129, 164n117, 165n126 Year of the Woman (1992) 129n34, 144n142 Young, I. M. 67, 73, 78, 90, 116 Zˇizˇek, S. 117