The Foundations of Ostpolitik: The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR (Oxofrd Historical Monographs)

T H E F O U N D AT I O N S OF OSTPOLITIK

OXF O R D H I S TO R I C A L M O N O G R A PH S Editors . . .  .  .  .  . .  . - . 

The Foundations of Ostpolitik The Making of the Moscow Treaty between West Germany and the USSR JULIA VON DANNENBERG

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford   Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York  Julia von Dannenberg 2008

The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2008 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 978–0–19–922819–5 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

To my parents

Preface Ostpolitik¹ is a subject that has greatly preoccupied cold war scholarship. This is because it addressed the issue of German unification, a central problem not only in West German foreign policy, but also in international relations in Europe. Yet in spite of this interrelationship between West Germany and Europe, research to date has neglected to analyse the interaction between international and domestic variables in Ostpolitik. Guided by the concept of the primacy of either the international system or domestic politics, scholars have instead focused on Ostpolitik as a product of domestic or external factors respectively. Similarly, scholarship has hardly attributed any significance to how, and under what circumstances this hotly contested policy, polarizing West Germany’s political establishment and society alike, was made within the Bonn Republic. The application of the realist or actor-general approach, which treats foreign policy as a result of rationally acting, unitary states, has led to a lack of research on the decision-making processes of Ostpolitik. In trying to explain the launch of Brandt’s New Ostpolitik, it becomes particularly apparent that such approaches do not adequately address the problem. The present study contends that the change from Adenauer’s old Eastern policy to Brandt’s reconciliatory Eastern policy was the result of various interrelated international and domestic factors. It therefore takes the fairly recent approach of integrating different levels of analysis, of the domestic political system, society, and the international environment, into one model. The focus here is on the domestic politics of Ostpolitik. The German–Soviet negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August 1970 are a particularly appropriate subject for analysis. This is because the treaty was the linchpin of the New Ostpolitik, which was launched by the Brandt government as a policy of reconciliation with the Eastern European countries. On the basis of this treaty, Bonn was able to develop relatively stable relations with the Warsaw Pact states over the next decades. ¹ ‘Ostpolitik’ refers to the Eastern policy of successive West German governments and political parties.

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With a focus on the decision-making processes, within the German domestic political system as well as within the global East–West environment, the study offers a new interpretation of the shift from confrontational to d´etente politics. It is hoped that this will widen the focus in favour of a fresh understanding of the interdependencies between Bonn’s domestic policy, its foreign policy, and international relations during the cold war.

Acknowledgements Numerous people have generously given much support during the course of this research. While recording my gratitude to all of them, I wish to mention those who have influenced me most in this time. First, I would like to thank my doctoral supervisor, Professor Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, for helping me to develop this topic and for offering his kind counsel and critical judgement at every stage of my research. Various other distinguished scholars have made contributions to this book. My former academic supervisor, Professor Anthony Nicholls, first introduced me into the world of cold war Germany and has remained a source of inspiration ever since my graduate studies at Oxford University. I am also much indebted to Professor Anthony Nicholls and Professor William Paterson, who, as examiners of my doctoral thesis, made suggestions for the publication of the manuscript. Many libraries and archives, listed in the bibliography, have granted me access to their facilities and offered their assistance, for which I thank them. My special thanks are due to the former politicians and diplomats Egon Bahr, Walter Scheel, Helmut Schmidt, Paul Frank, Ulrich de Maiziere, Karl-G¨unther von Hase, Erwin Wickert, Joachim Peckert, Antonius Eitel, and J¨org Kastl, for providing me with invaluable ‘insider information’ not obtainable from archival records. I would also like to thank the following for permission to reproduce published and unpublished material: Haus der Geschichte, Bonn; Bundesbildstelle, Berlin and Bonn; Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin; and Stadtarchiv Bonn. The D.Phil. project was supported by two generous scholarships, of the Stiftung Bildung und Wissenschaft im Stifterverband der Deutschen Wissenschaft and Somerville College respectively. I also enjoyed financial support from various other institutions, the History Faculty, Oxford, University College, Oxford, the German Historical Institute, London, and the Royal Historical Society, London, which enabled me to undertake extensive archival research and travelling. Furthermore, I would like to thank the following relatives, friends, and colleagues for reviewing parts of the draft and for suggesting helpful improvements: Thomas Biskup, Carlotta von Dannenberg, Joanna Innes, Arabella Malim, Jonathan Malim, Rose van Orden, Christina

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Wood, and Davina Wood. In particular, Benedikta von Seherr-Thoss has provided friendship, personal support, and scholarly encouragement without which the study would not be the same. My greatest gratitude, however, goes to my parents Christoph and Mechthild von Dannenberg. It was their unconditional support that made my efforts towards a D.Phil. come to a successful conclusion. It is to them that I dedicate this book. Cologne, June 2006 Julia von Dannenberg

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Contents List of Illustrations List of Abbreviations Introduction

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1. Setting the Stage: From Confrontation to D´etente

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2. New Ostpolitik—Whose Legacy?

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3. ‘Unpacking the Box’: The Making of the Moscow Treaty in the Domestic and International Contexts Conclusion Bibliography Glossary Index

131 260 265 297 299

List of Illustrations 1. The West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt welcoming the Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer nine days after the construction of the Berlin Wall, 22 August 1961. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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2. Willy Brandt (18 December 1913–8 October 1992), by permission of Haus der Geschichte, Bonn.

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3. Egon Bahr (d. 18 March 1922), by permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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4. The cabinet of the Grand Coalition. In the front row, from left to right: K¨ate Strobel, Heinrich L¨ubke, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and Willy Brandt. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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5. Kurt Georg Kiesinger (6 April 1904–9 March 1988). By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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6. Introducing the cabinet of the Scoial–Liberal Coalition to the Federal President Gustav Heinemann, 22 October 1969. In the centre of the front row, from left to right: Gustav Heinemann, Willy Brandt, Walter Scheel. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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7. Coalition negotiations between the SPD and FDP, September 1969. In the foreground on the right are Willy Brandt and behind him Helmut Schmidt; in the foreground on the left are Wolfgang Mischnick and behind him Walter Scheel. By permission of the Federal Government, Bonn.

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8. Chancellor Brandt (right) is welcomed by the East German Premier Willi Stoph (left) at Erfurt railway station, 19 March 1970. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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9. The signing of the Moscow Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, 12 August 1970. In the foreground, from left to right: Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. By permission of the Federal Government, Bonn.

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10. Demonstration in Bonn against Brandt’s policy of the ‘recognition of realities’, including the Oder–Neisse line as the German–Polish frontier. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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List of Illustrations 11. Rainer Barzel congratulating Willy Brandt after the no-confidence vote, April 1972. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin. 12. Brandt kneeling down in Warsaw, December 1970. By permission of the Federal Government, Berlin.

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Abbreviations AAPD ACDP

ADL

AdsD

AM B BAK BDI BdV BdV-Archiv BHE

BK BPA BRD BT-FR CDU/CSU

CSU DBPO DDR

Akten zur ausw¨artigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Archiv f¨ur Christlich-Demokratische Politik der KonradAdenauer-Stiftung, St Augustin (Archives of Christian Democrat Policy, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, St Augustin) Archiv des Liberalismus der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Gummersbach (Archives of Liberalism, Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, Gummersbach) Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (Archives of Social Democracy, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn) Aussenminister (Federal Foreign Minister) Bestand (file) Bundesarchiv Koblenz (Federal Archives, Koblenz) Bund der Deutschen Industrie (Federal Association of German Industry) Bund der Vertriebenen (League of Refugees) Archiv des Bundes der Vertriebenen, Bonn (Archive of the League of Refugees, Bonn) Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (league of those driven from their homes and those deprived of their rights) Bundeskanzler (Federal Chancellor) Bundespresseamt (Federal Press and Information Office) Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) Bundestagsfraktion (parliamentary party) Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich Soziale Union (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, or simply Union) Christlich-Soziale Union (Bavarian Christian Social Union) Documents on British Policy Overseas Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic)

Abbreviations Dep. DOD DGB DIHT DPA DzDP EC ESC FCO FDP FO FRG FRUS GDR MP N NATO NDR NL PA PREM PRO Publ. SDS SED SPD UN

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Depositum (personal papers) Deutscher Ostdienst (refugees’ press organ) Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Federation of German Trade Unions) Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag (Association of German Chambers of Commerce) Deutsche Presseagentur (German Press Service) Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik European Community European Security Conference Foreign and Commonwealth Office Freie Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Free Democratic Party of Germany) British Foreign Office Federal Republic of Germany Foreign Relations of the United States German Democratic Republic Member of Parliament Nachlass (personal papers) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Norddeutscher Rundfunk (North German broadcasting company) Nachlass Politisches Archiv des Ausw¨artigen Amts, Berlin (Political Archives of the Ausw¨artige Amt, Berlin) Prime Minister’s Office Public Record Office, London Publikationen (publications) Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist Students’ League) Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) United Nations

xvi WBA

Abbreviations Willy-Brandt-Archiv, Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (personal files of Willy Brandt preserved in AdsD)

Introduction Ostpolitik, a political issue which seemed settled by the early 1980s at the latest, has as a result of the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the reunification of Germany in 1989–90 engaged politicians and scholars anew. Michael Frayn’s highly successful play Democracy¹ is perhaps the most vivid example of the extent to which Brandt’s ‘great campaign of reconciliation with the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe’² has recently re-emerged as a matter of interest even among the British public. At the time, however, Brandt’s Eastern policy, launched in October 1969, was not unanimously praised. On the contrary, New Ostpolitik was a highly controversial and explosive policy—comparable to the Western policy on Iraq today—since it dealt with one of West Germany’s main national interests, the reunification of Germany and the return of its former Eastern territories. Opponents, most notably the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU, also known as the Union) and West German conservative circles, blamed Brandt for ‘selling out’ Germany’s most deeply held national interests. His recognition of the two states in Germany and of the post-war borders had, so ran the argument, once and for all set the seal on the division of Germany and made a reunification of the German people impossible. In fact, although by the mid-1960s the majority of West Germans had come to see the need for a new Ostpolitik—one that would serve peace and fresh relations between the East and West—reunification was still regarded as a burning national matter that, however distant the prospects of its realization, should not be abandoned by any policy. Criticism, or at least worries, that Brandt’s bold dealings with the East might have this effect were expressed even within the government: by the Federal ¹ Democracy, which tells the story of Brandt’s Eastern policies during his Chancellorship, opened at London’s National Theatre on 9 Sept. 2003. ² Michael Frayn about his play Democracy, The Guardian (6 Sept. 2003).

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

ministers, ministry officials, and members of the two coalition parties, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Free Democrats (FDP). Abroad, feelings were also mixed. On the one hand, his initiatives earned Brandt respect worldwide—he was voted 1970s Man of the Year by the American news magazine Time and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1971. On the other hand, they were perceived with reservations by the West in that they might end with Bonn concluding deals with the communists at the expense of Western interests and stability. The reason for the Western Allies’ concern was rooted in the past, when German Rapallo politics had appeared to threaten their policies. Moreover, the Hitler–Stalin Pact of August 1939 had damaged Western interests until the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941. As to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty with the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970, Brandt was also accused of granting concessions without gaining anything in return. Brandt rejected these accusations. ‘We are losing nothing with this treaty that has not been gambled away long ago,’ he told West Germans in a television address from Moscow at the signing on 12 August 1970.³ He and his closest adviser, Egon Bahr, argued that recognition of the ‘realities’ was an imperative upon which any Eastern policy had to be based. Besides, this treaty did not mean that the German right of self-determination and the goal of unification had been given up. The borders had only been respected, not legally recognized, and East Germany was still not regarded as fully sovereign, Brandt and his aides maintained. Only by unfreezing relations in central Europe could the status quo be changed peacefully in better times. Change through fostering the evolution of communism was the secret strategy of both Brandt and Bahr. Although the debate about whether or not Brandt’s policy of engagement with the East was appropriate seemed to have been politically answered when Social–Liberal Ostpolitik was adopted almost wholesale by the CDU/CSU–FDP government in 1982, it has recently been revived in an aggravated form. While one side argues that Brandt’s policy was not appropriate, that the accommodating attitude of the West German government towards the Socialist Unity Party (SED) led to the stabilization rather than liberalization of the GDR,⁴ and thus ³ The full speech is printed in Willy Brandt, Reden und Interviews (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1971), 203–4. ⁴ See Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage, 1994); Jens Hacker, Deutsche Irrtümer: Schönfärber und Helfershelfer

Introduction

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delayed the breakdown of the Iron Curtain,⁵ the other side concludes the opposite: that the West German policy of détente was the only feasible option to secure peace and a long-term strategy which made possible the non-violent revolution of 1989 and a speedy diplomatic agreement over German unification in 1990.⁶ Given the strong controversy regarding New Ostpolitik, it is particularly remarkable that it nonetheless was immediately so successful. It was launched by the new Brandt government in October 1969 and produced its first results, in the form of the Moscow Treaty, only ten months later. How was this possible? How could this new policy be implemented so swiftly? Moreover, by whom and with what objective was the new Eastern policy developed? Was Brandt’s Ostpolitik really so ‘new’ or merely the continuation of the preceding CDU Ostpolitik? This book aims to answer these questions by analysing the planning and policy-making processes, which started under the preceding Grand Coalition government in 1966 and led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in August 1970. It provides a behind-the-scenes look at who the main actors in shaping this new policy were, and at the way in which they operated and interacted to initiate this change of course. It explains not only what people, but also what factors influenced this complex bargaining process, within the domestic political system of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as within an international context. The Moscow Treaty is a particularly appropriate object for analysis because it was the linchpin of the new policy towards the East and was in effect multilaterally binding because of Moscow’s hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. It provided the framework within which Bonn could negotiate treaties with the other Warsaw Pact states, Poland, the GDR, der SED-Diktatur im Westen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1992); Konrad Löw, . . . Bis zum Verrat der Freiheit: Die Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik und die ‘DDR’ (Munich: Langen Müller, 1993). ⁵ Helga Hirsch, ‘Der falsche Weg: Politik von oben: Die Westliche ‘‘Realpolitik’’ hat den Umbruch im Osten verzögert’, Die Zeit (21 Feb. 1992); Wolfgang Templin, ‘Das schlechte Vorbild der Anpassung: Die Realpolitik des Westens vernachlässigte früher die Opposition—und behindert heute die Innere Einigung’, Die Zeit (13 Mar. 1992). ⁶ Peter Bender, Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ und ihre Folgen: Vom Mauerbau zur Vereinigung (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1995); Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, ‘Der richtige Weg: Schritt um Schritt: Erst die Entspannungspolitik hat den Aufstand der Völker ermöglicht’, Die Zeit (21 Feb. 1992).

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and Czechoslovakia, and within which the four victorious powers of 1945—the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France—could conclude the Quadripartite Agreement over Berlin. On the basis of these so-called ‘Ostverträge’ (Eastern treaties), which were ratified by 1972, Bonn could, over the next two decades, develop relatively stable relations with the Eastern European countries. This book contends that the change of West German Ostpolitik was the result of various interrelated factors, and can be accounted for only when both the specific German domestic structure and the global East–West environment with its intra-alliance dynamics are taken into account. It is therefore based on the fairly innovative approach of integrating different levels of analysis, the political system, society, and international environment, into one model. Such mixed approaches to foreign policy and international politics have increasingly been suggested in the course of the historical ‘external–internal’ debate that centres on the question of whether the foreign policy of states is to be explained by external or domestic factors.⁷ The realist approach, which treats international politics as the result of power struggles between rationally acting, unitary states and of systemic variables, can be dated back to the German historian Leopold von Ranke and his followers, who established the concept of the ‘primacy of foreign policy’ in the nineteenth century.⁸ This approach had already become the subject of controversy by the 1920s, when Eckart Kehr, for example, argued for the ‘primacy of domestic politics’.⁹ In the 1960s, Hans-Ulrich Wehler in particular further developed Kehr’s approach,¹⁰ and theories of foreign policy behaviour that focus on domestic rather than international policies have been developed over the past few decades.¹¹ In contrast to the realist or actor-general approach, the actor-specific view has been proposed. This ‘unpacks the box’ of the inner workings of nations by focusing ⁷ For an overview see Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside in and from the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy’, in David Skinmore and Valerie M. Hudson (eds.), The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation (Boulder, Colo., and Oxford: Westview, 1993), 25–48. ⁸ Leopold von Ranke (ed.), The Theory and Practice of History (1836; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 117–18. ⁹ Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History (1928; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). ¹⁰ Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), Der Primat der Innenpolitik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970). ¹¹ Richard Snyder et al. (eds.), Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University, 1954), were among the first to develop such theories.

Introduction

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on the people and units that comprise the state. In assuming that decision-makers are ‘political animals’ who must worry about their survival in office and the viability of their set of political goals, it also takes their operative and psychological environment into consideration.¹² However, there has only recently been growing consensus among scholars that the debate on the primacy of the international system versus domestic politics does not adequately address and describe the problem. Efforts have been made to develop complex models that are able to incorporate the interaction of externally and internally driven behaviour.¹³ The present book follows this trend of synthesizing the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of analysis, for which a theory still needs to be established. By adapting such a mixed approach of linking the political system to its societal and international environment, numerous different variables relevant in the decision-making process of the Moscow Treaty can be considered. The short time span of four years is particularly favourable to the chosen approach. Within the political system of the Federal Republic, not only the government decision-makers, but also the opposition, bureaucracy, personal advisers, interest groups, and public opinion can be analysed according to the ways in which they interacted with the decision-makers and influenced the Eastern policy. As regards the ¹² For a survey of the foreign policy analysis see Valerie Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, Mershon International Studies Review, 39/2 (1995), 209–38; Müller and Kappen, ‘From the Outside in’; Deborah Gerner, ‘The Evolution of the Study of Foreign Policy’, in Laura Neack et al. (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 17–32. ¹³ See for instance, Wolfram Hanrieder (ed.), ‘Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy’, American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), 971–82; James Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, and New York: Collier Macmillan, 1969) and The Study of Political Adaptation (London: Printer, and New York: Nichols Pub. Co., 1981); Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Internationale Politik (Paderborn: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1981), and ‘Internationalizing Politics: Some Answers to the Question of Who Does What to Whom’, in ErnstOtto Czempiel and James Rosenau (eds.), Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), 117–34; Charles and Margaret Hermann et al. (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) and ‘Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry’, International Studies Quarterly, 33/4 (1989), 361–87; Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization, 42/3 (1988), 427–60; Robert Putnam et al. (eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1993).

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

international context, the three Western Allies, the United States, Great Britain, and France, are recognized as important players conditioning Bonn’s policy towards the East. Because of constraints of time and finance, it was beyond the scope of this book to consider more than marginally the perceptions of the Soviet Union and GDR in this process.¹⁴ Of course, this set of factors cannot in any simple way unlock the course of history: there is a role for chance and for unforeseen combinations of circumstances. It must be the task of a narrative account to bring into play the role of specific elements in the actual pattern of events. But this book does contend that the analysis ‘from the inside out and outside in’ introduced here provides a useful framework for seeking to determine the various elements at work in the policy-making of the Moscow Treaty. It thereby introduces a more multi-dimensional picture of West German Ostpolitik. Generally speaking, it provides conclusions about the making of foreign policy in the Federal Republic and as a case study seeks to improve understanding of the complex process of national foreign policy formation. In the context of this analysis, two main questions are examined. The first is whether the Ostpolitik as pursued by the Brandt government was a product of continuity or change. It will be demonstrated that although the friendship treaty with Moscow had its origins in bilateral contacts started by the preceding CDU/SPD government, the changes and innovation introduced by Chancellor Brandt outweighed continuities with the previous policy. The second main question concerns the goals of the New Ostpolitik and the Moscow Treaty. It is argued that the making of the Moscow Treaty was a contribution to the Western détente policy and simultaneously a bold policy of pursuing the national interests of increasing autonomy for West Germany and of easing the way to reunification. It is not claimed that the subject matter of this book is in any way new. The scholarly literature on Bonn’s Eastern and Germany policy is vast, though these earlier scholars did not have the chance to examine the primary sources systematically. In the light of this wealth of information, a survey of some of the most important studies will suffice at this point. ¹⁴ For a discussion of the Soviet and East German policies towards West Germany, see Mary Elise Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

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A series of publications devoted especially to this topic have established themselves as standard works—for example those of Christian Hacke,¹⁵ Günter Schmid,¹⁶ Manfred Görtemaker,¹⁷ William Griffith,¹⁸ Arnulf Baring,¹⁹ and Peter Bender.²⁰ Of these, Baring²¹ provides an indispensable contribution to the analysis of the Social-Liberal Ostpolitik, despite its lack of references. Helga Haftendorn²² also gives important information about the genesis of New Ostpolitik and places it in an international context. Bender’s study²³ is very detailed and is based on a lot of ‘insider information’ that he received mainly because of his close relationship with Egon Bahr. Timothy Garton Ash²⁴ and David E. Patton²⁵ have made further valuable contributions to Bonn’s Ostpolitik. Moreover, none of the comprehensive works on the history and foreign policy of the Bonn Republic have been able to ignore Ostpolitik.²⁶ Apart from these broad studies, there is a wealth of analyses of the detailed questions of Ostpolitik. A number of recently published monographs deal with Willy Brandt’s life and politics.²⁷ Especially ¹⁵ Christian Hacke, Die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU: Wege und Irrwege der Opposition seit 1969 (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975). ¹⁶ Günter Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn: Die Entstehung der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik 1969/1970 (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1979). ¹⁷ Manfred Görtemaker, Die unheilige Allianz: Die Geschichte der Entspannungspolitik 1943–1979 (Munich: Beck, 1979); ¹⁸ William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978). ¹⁹ Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1983). ²⁰ Bender, Neue Ostpolitik. ²¹ Baring, Machtwechsel. ²² Helga Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1982 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983). ²³ Bender, Neue Ostpolitik. ²⁴ Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. ²⁵ David E. Patton, Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999). ²⁶ See, for instance, Richard Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik’, in Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974); Christian Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988); Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, Democracy and its Discontents 1963–1988 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 1999); Heinrich-August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, ii: Deutsche Geschichte vom 3. Reich bis zur Wiedervereinigung (Munich: Beck, 2002); Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, Nach der Katastrophe: Eine Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland (Berlin: Siedler,2000). ²⁷ Brigitte Seebacher, Willy Brandt (Munich: Piper, 2004); Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt: 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002); Gregor Schöllgen, Willy Brandt: Die Biographie (Berlin: Propyläen, 2001).

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noteworthy is the edition Willy Brandt: Berliner Ausgabe, one of the first works to make use of Brandt’s personal files preserved at the Willy-Brandt-Archiv in the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Archives of Social Democracy, Friederich Ebert Foundation) in Bonn (WBA).²⁸ Furthermore, Andreas Vogtmeier²⁹ and Stephan Fuchs³⁰ have paid attention to the concepts of Ostpolitik developed by the Social Democrats and most importantly by Egon Bahr. Vogtmeier, one of the very few scholars to have been able so far to analyse Bahr’s Eastern policies on the basis of selected primary sources, namely those in the Depositum Bahr located in the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn, nonetheless presents, with his exploration of policy-makers’ roles and intentions, a distorted perspective on historical events.³¹ Additionally, studies exist of the parties and their internal discussions concerning Ostpolitik.³² Moreover, scholarship on Ostpolitik has paid attention to the core question of the present book mentioned above, that of whether the new Eastern policy was a product of continuity or change. Until recently, the picture has been prevalent that the Ostpolitik introduced by the Brandt government in 1969 broke completely with the Ostpolitik of the preceding CDU/SPD government and was a fresh start for German–Soviet relations.³³ Some scholars have painted a more positive picture of the CDU’s role in New Ostpolitik, appreciating Kiesinger as ²⁸ Helga Grebing et al. (eds.), Willy Brandt: Berliner Ausgabe, 10 vols. (Bonn: Dietz, 2000–5). ²⁹ Andreas Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage: Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung (Bonn: Dietz, 1996). ³⁰ Stephan Fuchs, ‘Dreiecksverhältnisse sind immer kompliziert’: Kissinger, Bahr und die Ostpolitik (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt and Rotbuch Verlag, 1999). ³¹ Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr, 18; Frank Fischer, Im deutschen Interesse: Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2001), 22, reaches the same conclusion. ³² Wolfgang Behrendt, Die innerparteiliche Auseinandersetzung um die Ostpolitik in der SPD 1960–1969 (Berlin: Athenäum Verlag, 1972); Florian Gerster, Zwischen Pazifismus und Verteidigung: Die Sicherheitspolitik der SPD (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994); Clayton Marc Clemens, The Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989); Hacke, Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der CDU/CSU. ³³ Authors holding this view have given credit to the SPD as the progressive party of the Grand Coalition government, while characterizing Kiesinger and the CDU as the conservative partner, owing to the forces within the party. Most notably, Baring, Machtwechsel, 200, has been associated with this view; see also Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr, 103; Waldemar Besson, Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und

Introduction

9

‘the first Chancellor who saw the need for a re-evaluation of relations with the East’.³⁴ It is only recently that studies have been put forward that promote a different view, of Kiesinger and the conservatives as independent makers of foreign policy who developed their own Ostpolitik.³⁵ Werner Link even goes so far as to argue not only that New Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Kiesinger and the CDU/SPD government, but that it would have, in the event of a continuation of the Kiesinger government, taken a course similar to that of Brandt and Bahr.³⁶ However, on the whole, current interpretations of Kiesinger’s Eastern policy are still very general in character and remain fairly unsatisfactory.³⁷ As mentioned above, the present study revises the present trend which gives the CDU equal credit for the launch of New Ostpolitik. Another topic that has preoccupied Ostpolitik scholarship is the question of whether New Ostpolitik was the result of domestic innovation or changed international relations. Recently, the breakthrough of the new Eastern policy has ceased to be explained primarily by internal changes within the Federal Republic.³⁸ Instead, most recent studies have analysed West German Ostpolitik in an international context and have concluded that the change of international parameters for Maßstäbe (Munich: R. Piper, 1973), 429; Thilo Vogelsang, Das geteilte Deutschland (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966), 340; Wolfram Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis: Two Decades of German Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 184. ³⁴ Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willlen, 152; Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition 1963–1969 (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), 339. ³⁵ Daniela Taschler, Vor neuen Herausforderungen: Die außen- und Deutschlandpolitische Debatte in der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion während der Grossen Koalition (1966–1969) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001); Reinhard Schmoeckel and Bruno Kaiser, Die vergessene Regierung: Die Große Koalition 1966 bis 1969 und ihre langfristigen Wirkungen (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), 168; Dirk Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden! Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997), 15. ³⁶ See Werner Link, ‘Westbindung und Ostverbindungen: Die außenpolitische Staatsräson der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Peter März (ed.), 40 Jahre Zweistaatlichkeit in Deutschland: Eine Bilanz (Munich: Landeszentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit, 1999), 206; Werner Link, ‘Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags im Lichte neuer Archivalien’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 49/2 (2001), 295–315. ³⁷ Even Kroegel’s book, despite its title, does not offer a coherent explanation of Kiesinger’s goals and strategies in relation to the East. ³⁸ See for instance, Terry McNeill, ‘The Soviet Union’s Policy towards West Germany, 1945–1990’, in Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification (London: Longman, 1996), 254–76.

10

The Foundations of Ostpolitik

West German foreign policy was a crucial factor,³⁹ if not the decisive one,⁴⁰ for the change of Ostpolitik. As explained above, the present book combines both streams of research. It provides the reader with the ‘inner view’ of New Ostpolitik as well as with an analysis of its interrelation with the détente policy pursued by the three Western Allies. More recently, in connection with the growing awareness of the Federal Republic’s interdependence with, rather than dependence on, her Western partners,⁴¹ scholars have debated the question of the aims of Bonn’s Ostpolitik as distinct from the Western détente policy. Garton Ash was one of the first scholars to point out that German Ostpolitik was the pursuit of national interests within a multilateralized policy, which embarked on the strategy of ‘liberalisation through stabilisation’.⁴² Vogtmeier,⁴³ Fuchs,⁴⁴ and Stefan Henlein⁴⁵ have also focused on the ideas of Bahr’s Eastern policy. Most notably, Gottfried Niedhart has, in several articles, dealt with the strategic concepts embedded in Brandt’s ³⁹ Gottfried Niedhart draws the most sophisticated picture of the interrelation between Bonn’s Ostpolitik and international détente policy; see his ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen: Die Westmächte und die Deutsche Ostpolitik 1969/70’, in Ursula Lehmkuhl et al. (eds.), Deutschland, Großbritannien, Amerika: Politik, Gesellschaft und internationale Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert: Festschrift für Gustav Schmidt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), 1–19; ‘Revisionistische Elemente’; ‘The Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik and the United States: Initiatives and Constraints’, in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (eds.), The United States and the European Alliance since 1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 289–311. See also Detlef Junker (ed.), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, ii 1968–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Heinrich Potthoff’s two studies, Im Schatten der Mauer: Deutschlandpolitik 1961–1990 (Berlin: Propyläen, 1999), and Bonn und Ost-Berlin 1969–1982: Dialog auf höchster Ebene und vertrauliche Kanäle: Darstellung und Dokumente (Bonn: Dietz, 1997). ⁴⁰ See Link, ‘Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags’, 296, and ‘Westbindung und Ostverbindungen’, 200; Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg’, 677; Hanrieder, Stable Crisis, p. ix.; Hanrieder, ‘West German Foreign Policy 1949–1979: Necessities and Choices’, in Wolfram Hanrieder (ed.), West German Foreign Policy: 1949–1979 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), 15–36; Helga Haftendorn et al. (eds.), Verwaltete Außenpolitik: Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in Bonn (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978), 34. ⁴¹ Helga Haftendorn, ‘West Germany and the Management of Security Relations: Security Policy under the Conditions of International Interdependence’, in Ekkehard Krippendorff and Volker Rittberger (eds.), The Foreign Policy of West Germany: Formation and Contents (London: Sage, 1980), 7. ⁴² See Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name. ⁴³ Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr. ⁴⁴ Fuchs, Dreiecksverhältnisse. ⁴⁵ Stefan Henlein, Gemeinsame Sicherheit: Egon Bahrs sicherheitspolitische Konzeption und die Kontinuität sozialdemokratischer Entspannungsvorstellungen (Munster: Waxmann, 1993).

Introduction

11

and Bahr’s new approach to Ostpolitik.⁴⁶ Contrary to what these scholars argue, that New Ostpolitik was essentially a revisionist national interest policy promoting German unification, the view has been held that the Social–Liberal Eastern policy gave priority to introducing a process of European détente rather than to solving the German question.⁴⁷ As previously explained, the present book argues that New Ostpolitik was not ‘either or’, but a policy geared towards both détente and national interests. Given the wealth of research on Ostpolitik it is worthwhile asking whether there is room for a new approach to the subject, where this book differs, and what it contributes to scholarship on Ostpolitik. The answer is relatively simple: it provides the first systematic analysis of the formulation and making of New Ostpolitik based on primary sources. As Werner Link rightly points out, a comprehensive account of New Ostpolitik in the light of newly accessible archival remains a historiographical challenge.⁴⁸ Indeed, the recent opening-up of archival material has made it possible to construct a ‘complete picture’ derived from diplomatic files and other documentation rather than from oral history, newspaper articles, or fragments of personal papers as has been done in Ostpolitik scholarship so far.⁴⁹ Thus the book hopes to open up new perspectives and provoke new research on a familiar subject. Moreover, in focusing on the process of the formulation and making of New Ostpolitik, the book further contributes to scholarship. In fact, ⁴⁶ See, for instance, Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik: Vom Teilstaat mit begrenzter Souveränität zum postmodernen Nationalstaat’, Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1997), 15–23; Niedhart, ‘Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wandels in der Neuen Ostpolitik 1967–1974, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28/2 (2002), 233–66. ⁴⁷ See, for instance, Christian Hacke, ‘Relations of a Special Nature: Thirty Years after the German–German Summits in Erfurt and Kassel’, Deutschland-Archiv, 33/5 (2000), 817–19. ⁴⁸ Link, ‘Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrages’, 295; see also Wilhelm Bleck/Rainer Bovermann, ‘Die Deutschlandpolitik der SPD-FDP-Koalition 1969–1982’, in Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’ 9 vols, v: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 1144. ⁴⁹ Before the official records about the genesis of the New Ostpolitik gradually became accessible, each with the expiration of the thirty-year blocking period, some authors were able to use at least some material kept in party archives or in the personal files of Walter Scheel, Willy Brandt, and Egon Bahr: see Hildebrand, Erhard ; Baring, Machtwechsel; Karl-Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds.), Republik im Wandel 1969–1974: Die Ära Brandt (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986); Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name; Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr.

12

The Foundations of Ostpolitik

decision-making is a sorely under-researched area of German foreign policy.⁵⁰ Although a few studies exist on the decision-making processes concerning the new Eastern policy, these come up with distorted, insufficient explanations of the policy-making in that they mainly limit their analyses to the institutionalized system rather than referring to the political realities.⁵¹ Besides, and more importantly, these studies are based merely on published material and oral history. Thus there remains a specific need to explain the policy-making that led from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ Ostpolitik on the basis of official and private records. The present study attempts to fill this gap. The thesis is entirely dependent and focused on primary sources that have been collected in several archives in and around Bonn, Berlin, Koblenz, and London. The overall result of the research is that the most important material concerning the decision-making processes of Ostpolitik is contained in the Foreign Ministry’s files as well as the personal papers of the leading politicians and officials. First of all, the Foreign Ministry’s files, kept in the Politisches Archiv (Political Archives) of the Auswärtige Amt (the Federal Foreign Ministry) in Berlin, contain a wealth of useful information. The artificially constructed file B 150 was a particularly important source. It contains diplomatic records which were most useful for tracing the interaction between politicians and the bureaucracy within the German Foreign Ministry and with those of the other ministries. Another key location is the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archive) in Koblenz, which houses files of the Chancellery and other key ministries, such as the Ministry for Intra-German Affairs and Ministry of Economics, as well as some personal collections. However, apart from B 145, which contains interesting information about public opinion on Ostpolitik, the ministries’ papers contain surprisingly little relevant material concerning their role in the making of the Eastern policy. By contrast, the personal papers of leading policy-makers proved to be a much more valuable source. The papers of Ulrich Sahm, personal adviser ⁵⁰ So argue Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (eds.), Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. xiii. ⁵¹ Reinhold Roth, Außenpolitische Innovation und politische Herrschaftssicherung: Eine Analyse von Struktur und Systemfunktion des außenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozesses am Beispiel der Sozialliberalen Koalition 1969 bis 1973 (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1976); Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn; Leroy Louis Miller, ‘Theorie and Praxis außenpolitischer Entscheidungsprozesse—untersucht am Beispiel der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen in der Zeit der Regierung Brandt/Scheel bis zum Abschluß des Moskauer Vertrages am 12.8.1970’, doctoral thesis, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 1980.

Introduction

13

to Brandt, deserve particular mention. His diaries reveal very detailed information about the policy-making procedures regarding Ostpolitik. The present study is the first to evaluate these diaries. The papers of Rainer Barzel, Karl-Theodor Guttenberg, and Karl Carstens, all leading politicians and officials, gave useful insights into the CDU Ostpolitik. At least as significant are the archives of the three major parties in West Germany during the period under consideration, located at the respective party headquarters: the Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn stores important papers of leading SPD policy-makers, such as Helmut Schmidt and Horst Ehmke, and interesting protocols of meetings of SPD bodies. The personal records of Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr, preserved there in the Willy-BrandtArchiv and the Depositum Bahr, formed part of the backbone of this study. The Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der KonradAdenauer-Stiftung (Archives of Christian Democratic Policy, Konrad Adenauer Foundation) in St Augustin contains the documents of the CDU/CSU. The protocols of meetings of various CDU/CSU bodies as well as personal files of leading CDU politicians, such as Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Gerhard Schröder, were very useful for evaluating the party’s activities and attitudes concerning Ostpolitik. The Archiv der Liberalismus der Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung (Archives of Liberalism, Friedrich Naumann Foundation) in Gummersbach provide all-important sources concerning the FDP, including the personal papers of Walter Scheel, and were also considered. The records preserved at the Parlamentsarchiv (Parliamentary Archives) of the Bundestag in Berlin⁵² contain further valuable information. Particularly noteworthy are the protocols of the meetings of the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, which have only recently become accessible and which are evaluated for the first time here. They proved very revealing for the internal debate about Ostpolitik behind closed doors between members of the government and the opposition. Furthermore, the administrative files of the Bund der Vertriebenen (League of Refugees), the central organization of German refugees, stored in the Archiv des Bundes der Vertriebenen (Archives of the League of Refugees) in Bonn, were useful for evaluating the role of this lobby with regard to Ostpolitik. The Public Record Office in London contains important papers—in the files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and of the ⁵² The German Parliament.

14

The Foundations of Ostpolitik

Prime Minister’s Office (PREM)—regarding the British perceptions and attitude towards Brandt’s Eastern policy. For economic and financial reasons, relevant papers in archives in Washington and Paris could not be used for the evaluation of the American and French roles in the policy under consideration. Instead, a number of publications⁵³ and secondary literature formed the basis of this analysis. In particular, the present book is deeply indebted to Niedhart’s published contributions in that field.⁵⁴ Moreover, Soviet sources remain to be looked at once the Russians have opened their archives for this period. Besides archival sources, published sources constituted an important basis of this book. Among several printed documentary collections that were of interest (and are listed in the bibliography) two are particularly noteworthy: the above-mentioned Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, particularly the volume covering the years 1969 to 1970 (edited by Daniel Hofmann). The editors have had access to highly classified material which is otherwise difficult to obtain. These collections are therefore an essential source for any study of Eastern and Germany policy. The wealth of memoirs by leading politicians and officials constitute a second group of published sources for the study. They provided interesting details and helped to construct the ‘whole picture’ about the policy-making processes of New Ostpolitik. This reading was supplemented by oral history. Interviews and correspondence with several of the ‘central players’ of the policy under consideration, namely Egon Bahr, Walter Scheel, Helmut Schmidt, Rainer Barzel, Paul Frank, Ulrich de Maiziere, Karl-Günther von Hase, Erwin Wickert, Joachim Peckert, Antonius Eitel, and Jörg Kastl, provided the author with valuable ‘insider information’ not obtainable from archival records. However, since memoirs and oral history sources tend to shed light on merely a small section of events they were used only in combination with, or to complement, findings based on archival material. In this way, it was possible to test all available information. ⁵³ FRUS; AAPD. ⁵⁴ See, for instance, Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’; Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Partnerschaft und Konkurrenz: Deutsche und französische Ostpolitik in der Ära Brandt und Pompidou’, in Ilja Mieck and Pierre Guillen (eds.), Deutschland-Frankreich-Rußland: Begegnungen und Konfrontation: Im Auftrag des deutsch-französischen Historiker-Komitees (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000). Such publications are part of a research project on Ostpolitik and détente at the University of Mannheim. For details see www.ostpolitik.net.

Introduction

15

Using a combination of all these sources, unpublished and published, written and oral information, the book attempts to establish a less one-dimensional view of how and why New Ostpolitik came about. As it is very difficult to describe the organization of Bonn’s governmental institutions, and particularly that of the Auswärtige Amt, without using German technical terms for personnel and working units, for which no proper English translation exists, the two languages are used interchangeably.⁵⁵ Accordingly, owing to the necessary frequency of quotations in German and use of German terms, the prescribed rules about italicization have been abandoned and italics have not been followed in these instances, but have been applied in all other cases according to the usual conventions. Some of the documents quoted are preserved in more than one file. In these cases, only the most important archive—the Politisches Archiv (Political Archive) of the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin or the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz—is cited in the footnotes, unless it is important for the argument to list more than one file or the documents complement each other in the information they give. ⁵⁵ In order to limit any trouble for the reader arising from this practice, a glossary of frequently used German words is to be found; p. 297 below.

1 Setting the Stage: From Confrontation to Détente I N T E R N AT I O N A L F R A M EWO R K , D O M E S T I C S T RU C T U R E S : T H E D EV E LO P M E N T O F DÉT E N T E AND WEST GERMAN OSTPOLITIK, 1955 – 1969 New Ostpolitik was both an integral part of, and an independent German approach to, Western détente policy. It could develop only in the context of the international trend towards détente, but at the same time proved to be an independent policy of an economically and politically strengthened Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) pursuing specifically German interests. To understand the making of the Moscow Treaty as the start of New Ostpolitik, it is therefore crucial to consider both the development from the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ Ostpolitik and its relation to international détente policy. For most Germans and Europeans alike, the term ‘New Ostpolitik’ is indelibly associated with Willy Brandt. In fact, ‘the’ Ostpolitik, in other words the policy of the FRG towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe including East Germany, means primarily Brandt’s Ostpolitik when he was Chancellor of the Social–Liberal Coalition from 1969 to 1972. Yet this is not to say that New Ostpolitik and the Moscow Treaty were born in 1969. Rather, major elements of the thinking behind it were present as early as the late 1950s. Some analysts argue that New Ostpolitik was born very early on in the Cold War period. They refer, for example, to the Federal Republic’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the foundation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, after which the two German states belonged to two opposing alliances and ‘the last chance for unity in one state’ had vanished.¹ ¹ Peter Bender, Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ und ihre Folgen: Vom Mauerbau bis zum Moskauer Vertrag (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 29.

Setting the Stage

17

Others see its origins lying in the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.² Whatever the exact date, there was surely ‘an’ Ostpolitik existing in the Federal Republic long before the particular version of it which came to be known around the world as Ostpolitik. What kind of Eastern policy was it then, that preceded Brandt’s new version and what were its origins? In fact, the policy towards the East was an issue in German politics as old as the Federal Republic itself. It was more central to West German politics than to those of any other major Western state, since it dealt with what the West German constitution had made a national goal, the reunification of Germany and the return of the former Eastern territories.³ Ostpolitik was connected to the so-called ‘German question’, that is, Germany’s future existence. Negotiations with Soviet leaders, and with their Western counterparts, were to decide what would be the political solution for the defeated and divided Germany. Consequently, Ostpolitik was already on the agenda under Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG. This was primarily the case after sovereignty had finally been won for the Federal Republic on 5 May 1955, with the coming into force of the Paris treaties, as a result of Adenauer’s so-called ‘policy of fulfilment’ vis-à-vis the Western powers.⁴ On 7 June 1955, the Kremlin sent a diplomatic note to Adenauer, wherein it expressed its view that ‘the interests of peace . . . require the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic’, which would also help towards ‘the restoration of the unity of a German democratic state.’⁵ ² Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage, 1994), 35–6. ³ The constitution of the West German state succeeding the Deutsches Reich attempted to cure the causes of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and sought to achieve a lasting democratization. In the hope of overcoming the division, the authors incorporated a reunification mandate in the preamble—‘The entire German people is called on to achieve by free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany’—and in articles 23 and 146. Quoted from Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944–1993 (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1994), ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow, 6–7; see also Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. Mai 1963, ed. R. Merker (Munich: W. Goldmann, 1964), 16. ⁴ Heinrich-August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen, ii: Deutsche Geschichte vom 3. Reich bis zur Wiedervereiningung (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), 142; see also Frank R. Pfetsch, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 1949–1992, 2nd edn. (Stuttgart: UTB, 1993), 17. ⁵ Communiqué in Der deutsche Verteidigungsbeitrag: Dokumente und Reden, ed. Das Auswärtige Amt (Bonn, 1954), 13; Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 49–50; Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965–78), ii, 24–5.

18

The Foundations of Ostpolitik

Three months later, Adenauer was in Moscow and, after protracted negotiations, the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union agreed to open diplomatic relations. Yet it was an Ostpolitik that was clearly subordinated to a ‘Westpolitik’ (Western policy), or rather, that was to be pursued only in agreement with the Western powers. For the recreated West German state was after 1955 still semi-sovereign⁶ as far as its policy of reunification was concerned. Although the Allies’ universal rights in Germany had been curtailed, the Deutschlandvertrag as part of the Paris treaties had stipulated that they still applied to questions pertaining to Germany as a whole. But at the same time, the Allies were committed to consulting Bonn on these issues and to conducting a policy of reunification.⁷ As a result of this restricted status and of its position on the frontier of the Cold War, West Germany was self-consciously dependent on the Western Allies. Very close consultation on any formulation of West German foreign policy and a strict allegiance to the European Community and NATO were required. Nonetheless, this legal framework made it possible for the Federal Republic to pursue its own Ostpolitik as long as care was taken not to infringe on the Allies’ competences. Bonn’s Ostpolitik was therefore a continuum between dependency and autonomy. It was a national-interest policy that was quietly conducted—by Adenauer as well as all succeeding chancellors and governments—via the established multilateral frameworks.⁸ ⁶ The characterization of the Federal Republic as ‘semi-sovereign’ is identified with Peter Katzenstein’s Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); see also William E. Paterson, Beyond Semi-Sovereignty: The New Germany in the New Europe (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1997). ⁷ Werner Link, ‘Deutsche Ostpolitik und Zuständigkeit der Alliierten’, in Adolf Birke and Günther Heydemann (eds.), Großbritannien und Ostdeutschland seit 1918: Britain and East Germany since 1918 (Munich and London: Saur, 1992), 119; Hannfried von Hindenburg, ‘Die Einhegung deutscher Macht: Die Funktion der Alliierten Vorbehaltsrechte in der Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945/49–1990’, in Helga Haftendorn and Henning Riecke (eds.), ‘. . . Die volle Macht eines souveränen Staates . . .’: Die Alliierten Vorbehaltsrechte als Rahmenbedingung westdeutscher Außenpolitik 1949–1990 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 81–2. ⁸ Hartmut Mayer, ‘National Foreign Policy through Multilateral Means: The Federal Republic and European Political Cooperation, 1969–1986’, D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2001, 9, 14–15; see also Karl Kaiser, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany: The Case of a Reluctant Latecomer’, in Gregory Flynn and Richard E. Greene (eds.), The West and the Soviet Union: Politics and Policy (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), 81; Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Deutschland in Europa: Interessenperzeption und Rollendefinition’, in Gottfried Niedhart et al. (eds.), Deutschland in Europa: Nationale Interessen und internationale Ordnung im 20. Jahrhundert (Mannheim: Palatium, 1997), 377–8;

Setting the Stage

19

It was against this background that Adenauer affirmed that freedom for West Germany and integration into the West had absolute priority over reunification. He declined any attempts to revive ‘Rapallo politics’.⁹ Unification in return for Germany’s separation from NATO, as proposed by the Soviets in the so-called ‘Stalin Notes’ in March and April 1952, was out of the question.¹⁰ Adenauer’s vision was that the West’s ‘policy of strength’ and the inevitable attraction of an increasingly prosperous and united Western Europe would confront a growing weakness of the Soviet empire in such a way that the Soviet leadership would eventually feel compelled to yield to German unification in its own interest.¹¹ To this end of keeping the German question open, the so-called ‘Hallstein Doctrine’ became the cornerstone of German foreign policy from 1955 onwards. This doctrine was not only aimed at preventing the recognition of the GDR as a separate state, but also had the effect of limiting Federal German contact with the East.¹² As already mentioned, within the context of the Atlantic Alliance, Adenauer unofficially developed an Ostpolilitik of his own which was independent of that of the Western Powers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, he secretly launched several initiatives to open a dialogue with Moscow. These were intended to prevent possible agreements between Thomas Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 68–73. ⁹ The term ‘Rapallo politics’ alludes to the interwar cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany following from the Treaty of Rappallo (April 1922). It was an act of expediency by two international pariahs seeking to escape diplomatic isolation. On this topic see F. Stephen Larrabee, ‘Moscow and the German Question’, in Dirk Verheyen and Christian Soe (eds.), The Germans and their Neighbours (Boulder, Colo., and Oxford: Westview, 1993), 201–3. ¹⁰ Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (London: Tauris, 1991), 10; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 151. For further details see C. Laufer, ‘The Peace Treaty with Germany as a Problem in Soviet Foreign Policy: The Stalin Note of March, 1952, in the Light of New Sources’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 52/1 (2004), 99–118; Wilfried Loth et al. (eds.), Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Neue Quellen und Analysen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002). ¹¹ Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 51; see also Immanuel Geiss, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics before and after Unification’, in Klaus Larres and Panikos (Panayi (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification (London: Longman, 1996), 145; Jörg Brechtefeld, Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present (London: Macmillan, 1996), 61. ¹² For further information on the Hallstein Doctrine, see William Glenn Gray, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill: University of California Press, 2003); Rüdiger Marco Booz, ‘Hallsteinzeit’: Deutsche Außenpolitik 1955–1972 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1995); Wilfried Loth et al. (eds.), Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European? (London: Macmillan, 1998).

20

The Foundations of Ostpolitik

Moscow and Washington, which he now feared might confirm the status quo and thus render German reunification impossible.¹³ In March 1958, for instance, Adenauer undertook to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union on the basis of what he called an ‘Austrian solution’ for the GDR, namely the acceptance for a limited period of the existence of a second German state. In addition, in a discussion with the Soviet ambassador Andrei Smirnov in June 1962, he offered the conclusion of a ten-year ‘truce’ (Burgfrieden) over the German question, provided that the people in the Soviet-occupied ‘zone’ would be granted more freedom.¹⁴ As Heinrich Krone, a close associate, recorded, Adenauer said, after a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in December 1961, that for the rest of his life he regarded bringing the German–Soviet relationship into tolerable order as a top priority.¹⁵ However, he did not achieve this. Instead, the Adenauerian Ostpolitik remained overall a policy of commitment to the West and confrontation with the East.¹⁶ Nonetheless, during the last two years of Adenauer’s chancellorship, grounds were prepared for new approaches on the German question (see Figure 1). The incipient movement towards a different Eastern policy was an early reaction to international developments and the initiation of détente between the Western Allies—the United States, Great Britain, and France—and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had not retreated in the face of Western superiority, as many proponents of the strategy of ‘rollback’ had hoped. Instead, it had become a world power that had reached strategic parity with the United States. Consequently, mutual interest in relaxing tensions had already spawned the first meeting of Eastern and Western leaders in a summit conference at Geneva in 1955, and within just a few years a series of reciprocal visits of Soviet and American leaders took place.¹⁷ Efforts at rapprochement ¹³ See, for example, Karl Carstens, Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1993), 239; William R. Smyser, From Yalta to Bonn: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 143, 151, 178. ¹⁴ Dokumente zur Außenpolitik, iii: Moskau-Bonn: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands 1955–1973: Dokumentation, ed. Boris Meissner (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975), 32, 751. ¹⁵ Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie, ed. Klaus Gotto et al. (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1974), 164: Heinrich Krone, 7 Dec. 1961. ¹⁶ See also Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991), 849. ¹⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994), 9–10.

Setting the Stage

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Figure 1. The West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt welcoming Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer nine days after the construction of the Berlin Wall, 22 August 1961.

resulted in a different priority being given to the German question. The Western Allies’ operative reunification policy was brought to a definite termination during the Berlin Crisis of 1958–62. During the Four-Power conference at Geneva in 1959, the three Western Allies agreed to talk only about Berlin and no longer about the ‘impractical’ demand for reunification.¹⁸ Thus, the events before the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 already served as a watershed for the formulation of a new Eastern policy by the Western Allies as well, ¹⁸ See Wilfried Loth, ‘Internationale Rahmenbedingungen der Deutschlandpolitik 1961–1989’, in Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’, v: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag, 9 vols. (BadenBaden: Nomos, 1995), v, 89; Werner Link, The East–West Conflict: The Organization of International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Leamington: Berg, 1986), 134. On the British line of argument see Anthony J. Nicholls, ‘Appeasement or ‘‘Common Sense’’? The British Response to the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1961’, in Ursula Lehmkuhl et al. (eds.), Deutschland, Großbritannien, Amerika: Politik, Gesellschaft und Internationale Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert: Festschrift für Gustav Schmidt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), 45–62.

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

one that was guided by a sense of de facto spheres of influence.¹⁹ The catalyst for the development of a reduction of tensions was the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the most intense confrontation of the cold war. Faced with the threat of nuclear escalation, the United States made it clear to Bonn that they intended to press with détente with the Soviet Union despite the continued division of Germany.²⁰ From the West German point of view, the most evident lesson drawn was therefore that Bonn’s hard-line policy of non-recognition and pressure had not worked. Contrary to the logic of the ‘policy of strength’, national reunification was unlikely to be achieved by relying solely on the Western Allies’ agencies, and certainly not by insisting on reunification as the precondition for any reconciliation with the East.²¹ Most pronouncedly, Willy Brandt claimed that he, then mayor of West Berlin, and his press secretary Egon Bahr, as well as his other confidants Heinrich Albertz and Klaus Schütz, had after 1961 recognized the need to set a new stage in their country’s relationship with the communist East. A key role for this process of rethinking appears to have been played by the American President, John F. Kennedy, and his reply to Brandt’s appeal five days after the construction of the Berlin Wall. Kennedy asked the Berlin leaders to take their own initiatives and renounce untenable legal positions.²² As Kennedy put it, ‘it’s not a very nice solution but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war’.²³ Brandt confirmed retrospectively: ‘We ¹⁹ This supersedes the view taken by a majority of scholarly studies on Ostpolitik, for example, William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 1978); Manfred Görtemaker, Die unheilige Allianz: Die Geschichte der Entspannungspolitik 1943–1979 (Munich: Beck, 1979), 44; James McAdams, ‘The New Diplomacy of the West German Ostpolitik’, in Gordon Craig and Francis Loewenheim (eds.), The Diplomats 1939–1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 537; Smyser, Yalta to Bonn, 151. ²⁰ William E. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’, in Stephen Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German Chancellorship (London: Hurst, 1994), 143; see also Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 10; Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente, 1950–1991 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 60–79. ²¹ Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 1960–1975 (London: Collins, 1978), 168; McAdams, ‘New Diplomacy’, 537; see also Henning Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR 1955–1973: Diplomatie auf Umwegen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 472. ²² See Dieter Prowe, ‘Der Brief Kennedys an Brandt vom 18.8.61: Eine Zentrale Quelle zur Berliner Mauer und der Entstehung der Brandtschen Ostpolitik’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 33 (1985), 373–83. ²³ Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), 278.

Setting the Stage

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lost certain illusions . . . Ulbricht had been allowed to take a swipe at the Western superpower, and the United States merely winced with annoyance. . . . it was against this background that my so-called Ostpolitik—the beginning of détente—took shape.’²⁴ For Brandt and his advisers, the Wall was a huge wake-up call. Physically experiencing the division of Berlin, they first of all aimed at an undogmatic improvement of living conditions in the divided Germany and divided Europe. They put relations with the East on a new footing. Against the background of Kennedy’s ‘strategy of peace’, proclaimed in June 1963, Brandt and his team developed what they would call their ‘policy of small steps’. For more than two years they struggled, through unconventional, even conspiratorial, channels to restore at least some basic human contacts between the two parts of Germany. Brandt strove for humanitarian aid and pragmatic East–West relations within the boundaries not only of the divided city, but also of the country and continent. As mayor and leader of the Social Democrats, who were part of a Social–Liberal coalition in West Berlin, the focal point of divided Europe, he suddenly found himself acting on the world stage, discussing matters with Kennedy, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and the French President Charles de Gaulle. In Bonn, Adenauer’s associate Krone noted in his diary that Brandt and his friends were beginning ‘an Ostpolitik of their own’.²⁵ This preparation for a new direction in East–West relations was presented by Bahr at a conference in the Evangelische Akademie at Tutzing, near Munich, on 15 July 1963, which raised him to sudden political prominence. Bahr advanced the revolutionary aim of ²⁴ Brandt, People and Politics, 20. The concept of this new operational policy of practical steps towards the East had already been outlined before the Berlin Crisis that began in November 1958. For details see Wolfgang Schmidt, ‘The Roots of Détente: The Conceptual Origin of Willy Brandt’s Policy on Germany and her Relations to Eastern Europe in the 1950s’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 51/4 (2003), 521–63; Wolfgang Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, Koexistenz und kleine Schritte: Willy Brandt und die Deutschlandpolitik 1948–1963 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2001); Peter C. Speicher, The Berlin Origins of Brandt’s Ostpolitik 1957–1966 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). These studies supersede the older literature. ²⁵ Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt am Main: Propyläen, 1989); Willy Brandt, The Ordeal of Coexistence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1963), 83, 10; Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 62; Manfred Uschner, Die Ostpolitik der SPD: Sieg und Niederlage einer Strategie (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), 57–73; Manfred Görtemaker, ‘Die Ursprünge der ‘‘Neuen Ostpolitik’’ Willy Brandts’, in Arnd Bauernkämper et al. (eds.), Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen 1945–1990 (Bonn: Dietz, 1998), 51–2; Hans J. Grabbe, Unionsparteien, Sozialdemokratie und Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, 1945–1966 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1983), 256.

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

‘overcoming the status quo, by first not changing the status quo’. He saw no possibility of overthrowing the regime in East Germany against the will of the Kremlin. Therefore, East Germany would have to be respected as a reality without being recognized legally. The preconditions for reunification were to be created only by agreement with Moscow. As Bahr concluded, there might be ‘possibilities gradually to diminish the regime’s quite justified fears, so that the loosening up of frontiers and the Wall will also become practicable . . . This is a policy which one could sum up in the formula: change through rapprochement’ (‘Wandel durch Annäherung’).²⁶ However, Berlin was not Bonn. It seemed to Brandt that the necessity of developing an Ostpolitik was felt more strongly in Berlin ‘than on the left bank of the Rhine.’²⁷ In fact, even the idea of a new Eastern policy as developed by the Brandt team, and advanced also by large parts of the intellectual elite, was the subject of fierce debate in governmental circles within the ruling CDU. Many mainstream conservatives, and especially members of the CSU, were opposed to any efforts to establish relations with the Warsaw Pact states because of the risk that this might cement the division of the German nation. Nonetheless, there were also those within the higher circles of the CDU who saw the need for some revision of the ‘policy of strength’. This view was even more prevalent among members of its coalition partner, the FDP. In fact, a small, but vocal contingent in the FDP would have had the Bonn government go much further at the time. Wolfgang Schollwer, a foreign policy expert, argued that the only way the FRG could hope to hold on to its national ideals was by recognizing the GDR’s existence as a separate state.²⁸ Moroever, the FDP commissioned studies on the German question which proposed abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine.²⁹ So it can be seen that the early 1960s introduced a period of complex transition in both international and West German approaches to reducing the division of Germany and Europe, which were based on ²⁶ The ‘Tutzing speech’ is fully printed in Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–1970: Kontinuität und Wandel, ed. Boris Meissner, 3 vols. (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970), iii, doc. 17; Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (Munich: K. Blessing, 1996), 245–7. ²⁷ Brandt, 17 Jan. 1958, in Schmidt, Kalter Krieg, 219. ²⁸ James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 66–7. ²⁹ Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, Democracy and its Discontents 1963–1988 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell: 1989), 15; McAdams, ‘New Diplomacy’, 537.

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different ideas: whereas both the Western powers and the Soviet Union wanted détente to stabilize the European status quo, Bonn aimed to change it. By the time of the change of the Bonn government in 1963, new and flexible elements had been officially introduced to carve out a workable alternative to the ‘policy of strength’. Both Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder developed a policy towards the East that became known as a ‘policy of movement’. As a more constructive policy towards the Eastern European states it followed from the recommendation of an all-party Bundestag resolution of June 1961, and was influenced by the further changed climate of international politics. In 1964, the American President, Lyndon B. Johnson, advanced the idea of ‘building bridges’ between East and West.³⁰ Moreover, de Gaulle made initiatives towards détente. His visit to Moscow in June 1966 in particular broke the ice and facilitated moves by others to thaw the frozen state of confrontation between West and East in Europe.³¹ Accordingly, the Bonn government also succeeded in launching several initiatives. In 1963–4, Schröder reached agreements with all governments of the Soviet bloc, except Czechoslovakia and the GDR, to establish trade missions instead of full diplomatic relations. Schröder also sent out a ‘peace note’ in March 1966 to all world governments, with the exception of the GDR. In the note, the Bonn government declared its goal to be ‘an equitable European order on the basis of peaceful agreements’. Basically it proposed, for the first time, agreements limiting and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union and other East European states.³² However, Schröder’s ‘policy of movement’ was based on several contentious premises. Firstly, it was primarily addressed at the East European states, which it treated as sovereign partners, but at the same time it continued demonstratively to isolate the GDR. While Schröder routinely insisted that one of his chief goals was to improve the living conditions of those Germans trapped behind the Wall, he ³⁰ See Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston and London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), 471–5. ³¹ Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 123–4. ³² Bark and Gress, Democracy and its Discontents, 42; Rudolf Morsey, Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1969 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 86–7.

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

parted company with Bahr and other reformers on the desirability of any official contacts with the Ulbricht regime.³³ Similarly, Erhard was opposed to any contacts between the two parts of Germany until the end of his chancellorship.³⁴ Secondly, the seemingly conciliatory ‘peace note’ was in fact full of the kinds of qualifications that were bound to alienate even those to whom it was addressed. Apart from not even including East Germany, it insisted on German national rights, and even repeated the old assertion that in ‘international law Germany continues to exist in the frontiers of 31 December 1937, so long as a freely elected all-German government does not recognize other frontiers’.³⁵ These conditions were unacceptable not only to the Soviet Union, but also to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR. As a result, the ‘policy of movement’ turned out to present no viable alternative to the ‘policy of strength’, aiming as it did at a selective normalization of relations but simultaneously maintaining that there were not two German states. Therefore, it was not well received in Eastern Europe and caused little movement. It would be wrong to assume that the impediments to an improvement of Bonn’s relations with the Eastern European states lay solely with the Bonn government. East Berlin in its own way contributed impediments to a rapprochement between East and West.³⁶ However, in the West as well, Schröder’s policy was by 1966 perceived as not far-reaching enough. In an international environment increasingly attuned to the new path of détente policy, West Germany was threatened with becoming isolated.³⁷ ³³ Deutsche Ostpolitik, i, doc. 28: Schröder, NDR, 4 Nov. 1963; McAdams, ‘New Diplomacy’, 541. ³⁴ Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 354. ³⁵ Deutsche Ostpolitik, i, doc. 52: peace note, 25 Mar. 1965. ³⁶ McAdams, ‘New Diplomacy’, 543; see also Christian Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willlen: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), 118. ³⁷ Similar conclusions are drawn, for example, by: Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 52–3; Richard Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik’, in Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1974), 669; William E. Griffith, Die Ostpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 179; Clayton Marc Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpolitik (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 46. More critical of Schröder’s Ostpolitik are Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen, 123; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Deutschland—Europa—Amerika: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1994 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1995), 86; and Manfred Görtemaker, Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Beck, 1999), 427. By contrast, a more positive view is held by Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung: Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister

Setting the Stage

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After Erhard’s resignation, the Grand Coalition government, formed by the two biggest political parties, the CDU/CSU and SPD, and with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) as Chancellor and Willy Brandt (SPD) as Foreign Minister, had consequently to develop a new approach. By that time, the development of new principles for the conduct of Ostpolitik was far advanced. New positions had evolved in all major parties—admittedly more so in the SPD and FDP than in the CDU/CSU—as well as among academics, the media, and the public. Given the record of strained relations between the SPD and CDU/CSU, it was remarkable that both coalition partners agreed to pursue a more flexible Ostpolitik.³⁸ The government declaration made by Chancellor Kiesinger on 13 December 1966 defined the basic position of the Grand Coalition on the German question. It did not begin by asserting the right to reunification and denouncing East Berlin for preventing it. On the contrary, its main theme was peace and détente; it painted a vision of a European peace order as the precondition for an eventual reunification of Germany. It repeated the ‘peace note’ offer of renunciation-of-force agreements, with an emphasis this time particularly on the offer to the Soviet Union. Generally, it gave clear priority to relations with Moscow, as opposed to relations with other East European states. It also pleaded for the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Germany’s Eastern neighbours, thereby eroding the Hallstein Doctrine. It further abandoned any attempt to isolate East Germany, and advocated regulated coexistence (‘geregeltes Nebeneinander’). However, although both tone towards and terminology for the GDR were changed, the German Democratic Republic was still not mentioned. As Kiesinger made plain, contacts between the authorities of West Germany and of ‘the other part of Germany’ did ‘not mean the recognition of a second German state’.³⁹ The claim of sole representation was not abandoned. Nonetheless, this was the first time that a West 1961–1966 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), 333–7; Gregor Schöllgen, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999), 80; Waldemar Besson, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik: Erfahrungen und Maßstäbe (Munich: R. Piper, 1973), 316. ³⁸ McAdams, Germany Divided, 68; Christian Hacke, ‘Von Adenauer zu Kohl: Zur Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik, 1949–1985’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (31 Dec. 1985), 11; see also Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), 220. ³⁹ DzDP, 5th ser., 1: 1. Dezember 1966 bis 31. Dezember 1967, ed. Das Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, (Frankfurt: A. Metzner, 1978–87), 56–60:

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The Foundations of Ostpolitik

German chancellor had referred, even indirectly, to the fact that there might be a government in the GDR with which it might be necessary to deal.⁴⁰ This marked a new direction for Ostpolitik: the readiness to find a modus vivendi with East Germany and thereby show a genuine commitment to work for détente as the best means towards eventual reunification. In short, perceiving the strong need to readjust Bonn’s established stances to the advancing superpower détente, the new government had replaced the former strategy, maintained since 1949, of ‘détente through reunification’ with that of ‘reunification through détente’. A restoration of Germany’s unity was no longer a precondition for détente, but became a goal to be achieved as a result of peace policy. Since Kiesinger regarded a reunified Germany as hardly feasible in the present political structure of Europe, the unification was set in the context of a ‘general European peace order’.⁴¹ Bonn’s determination to normalize its relations with the governments of Eastern Europe was welcomed sympathetically by the Western powers as a breakthrough in the policies of détente. In NATO’s Harmel report and the new strategy of ‘flexible response’, the Western Powers collectively adopted the resolution to work more actively for détente and towards a European peace order in which the division of Germany would also be overcome. The Harmel report created a framework which provided legitimacy for German Ostpolitik in the eyes of the Allies.⁴² However, the breakthrough as it was envisaged was not to be achieved by the CDU/SPD government. Kiesinger, 13 Dec. 1966; Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 54; Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, 463–4. ⁴⁰ DzDP, 5th ser., i/2, 1820: Kiesinger, 13 Oct. 1967; see also James McAdams, East Germany and Detente: Building Authority after the Wall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 75. ⁴¹ Deutsche Ostpolitik, ii, doc. 25: Kiesinger, 17 June 1967; see also Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1st ser., vol. 1: 13. Dezember 1966–5. Oktober 1967, ed. Das Bundesministerium f¨ur Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 2nd rev. and supplemented edn. (Bonn: Bundesministerium f¨ur Gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1968), 78; Christian Hacke, ‘Die Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Werner Weidenfeld and Hartmut Zimmermann (eds.), Deutschland-Handbuch: Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949–1989 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale f¨ur Politische Bildung, 1989), 541; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 246–7; Bark and Gress, Democracy and its Discontents, 98; Hans Buchheim, Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1972: Der politisch-diplomatische Prozeß (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), 123. ⁴² The text is fully printed in Europa-Archiv, 23 (1968), D 75–7; Kaiser, ‘The Federal Republic of Germany’, 88; Klaus Schütz, Logenplatz und Schleudersitz: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1992), 117–18.

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In January 1967, diplomatic relations were established with Romania, and the governments of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria showed interest in following this example. Furthermore, Bonn and Moscow entered into talks on a renunciation-of-force treaty in February 1967 which were to drag on throughout the time of the Grand Coalition, but without result.⁴³ The GDR under Walter Ulbricht was greatly alarmed and eager to block the new West German offensive, calling it Bonn’s old ‘revisionist’ policy and ‘aggression in felt slippers’ and considering it to be aimed only at the isolation of the GDR.⁴⁴ Ulbricht was soon supported by Władysław Gomułka, the Polish party leader, and, more importantly, by the Soviet leadership. At a Warsaw Pact meeting in February 1967, the Warsaw Pact states obtained a pledge from all the others to adhere to a ‘reverse Hallstein Doctrine’. In other words, the states agreed not to enter into diplomatic relations, or even any correspondence, with the FRG before it had fully recognized the post-war realities in Europe, including Poland’s western frontier, the Oder–Neisse line, the statehood of the GDR, and West Berlin as an autonomous political unit.⁴⁵ Irrespective of this, Kiesinger followed his announcement of plans to establish contacts with the ‘other Germany’ with several proposals of practical measures to facilitate trade, transit, and the like between the two Germanies. This led to an unprecedented exchange of notes with the East German premier, Willi Stoph, lasting until September 1967. Nevertheless, the exchange between Bonn and East Berlin had no immediate consequences. The SED regime was not willing to make what it regarded as concessions to Bonn, and Kiesinger rejected what he termed Stoph’s ‘all-or-nothing approach’ of demanding a formal treaty, will the result that communications came to a halt.⁴⁶ Hence the central thrust of Bonn’s Ostpolitik was obstructed by the Soviet Union’s and East Germany’s ‘reverse Hallstein Doctrine’. In 1968, relations worsened. The Soviet propaganda campaign against ⁴³ This will be discussed on p. 67. ⁴⁴ Karl Seidel, Berlin-Bonner Balance: 20 Jahre deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen: Erinnerungen und Erkenntnisse eines Beteiligten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2002), 52. ⁴⁵ Thilo Vogelsang, Das geteilte Deutschland (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1966), 313–14; Richard Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik’, in Richard Löwenthal and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.), Die Zweite Republik: 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz (Stuttgart: Seewald 1974), 670. ⁴⁶ McAdams, Germany Divided, 69; McAdams, East Germany and Détente, 75; Bark and Gress, Democracy and its Discontents, 101–5; Smyser, Yalta to Bonn, 216.

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West Germany grew in intensity as ideologically ‘revisionist’ reform movements developed in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, for which the ‘revisionist’ Federal Republic was held to be partly responsible. The Czechoslovakian reformers in particular seemed to threaten the Soviet role of leadership in its Eastern Empire. When they could not be stopped by warnings, the Soviet leadership intervened, invading Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968 and thereby crushing the ‘Prague Spring’. Despite the fact that the Soviet invasion raised doubts about the wisdom of détente with the Soviet Union, Bonn, like all other Western governments, agreed that there was no alternative to a vigorous pursuit of détente. In January 1969, the newly elected US President, Richard Nixon, reinvigorated the trend towards détente in his famous inaugural plead to let the ‘era of confrontation’ be followed by an ‘era of negotiations’.⁴⁷ Also, the Soviet leadership signalled a readiness to negotiate with West Germany and with the West as a whole, surprisingly soon after the ‘success’ of the invasion. Moscow indicated to Bonn that full recognition of the GDR and the Oder–Neisse line was no longer a precondition for negotiations. The Kiesinger government, however, could not use this opportunity. Disagreement between the two coalition partners about the course of Ostpolitik had grown into outspoken confrontation prior to the Bundestag elections in September 1969, with the result that this last period became a time of political paralysis.⁴⁸ Overall, the picture of Ostpolitik as pursued by the Grand Coalition government remains ambivalent. On the one hand, it introduced adjustments in its agenda that were without doubt significant: the danger of West Germany’s isolation had been avoided and the first bridges to communist countries had been built.⁴⁹ But on the other hand, Ostpolitik did not develop far beyond its predecessor’s policies. This was largely due to the Soviets’ and the GDR’s unwillingness to allow détente to occur. Partly, however, it was due also to the policy’s inherent political limitations, which had been reached on the basis of mutual self-restraint and compromise between two dissenting ⁴⁷ ACDP, 01–403, 125/1: Nixon, 20 Jan. 1969; Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wandels in der Neuen Ostpolitik 1967–1974’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28/2 (2002), 233–66. ⁴⁸ This will be more fully explained on pp. 67–91. ⁴⁹ Löwenthal, ‘Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik’, 676–7; Besson, Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik, 350–5.

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coalition partners.⁵⁰ For these different reasons, the promising start of the Grand Coalition did not effect groundbreaking changes in relations with the East. With the formation of the new government by the SPD and the FDP on 28 September 1969, however, the right international as well as domestic political conditions were achieved for such a breakthrough. Following his election as Chancellor of the FRG, Brandt and his Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, moved rapidly to launch a ‘new Ostpolitik’ towards the Eastern European countries. This new policy had two essential components. First, it broke completely with Bonn’s twenty-year-old refusal to give any kind of official recognition to the German Democratic Republic. As Chancellor Brandt made known in his landmark inaugural address on 28 October: ‘Although there exist two states in Germany, they are not a foreign country to each other; their relations can only be of a special nature’ (see Figure 2).⁵¹ Brandt thereby recognized the GDR, although he stopped short of diplomatic recognition. Secondly, he shattered one of Bonn’s most sacred cold war shibboleths by accepting the Soviet and East European view that Germany’s eastern frontier should run along the line of the rivers of the Oder and Neisse, this being the existing border between the GDR and Poland, and renouncing claims to the 40,000 square miles of former German lands east of that line. The term ‘reunification’ was not even mentioned in Brandt’s speech. Hence, this fresh policy demonstrated a break with the old confrontational formulas that had typified past West German approaches to the East.⁵² The explicit acceptance of the fact that reunification was not a practical ⁵⁰ McAdams, Germany Divided, 68–9; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1980), 63. ⁵¹ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages: Stenographische Berichte (Andernach: Allein-Vertrieb, H. Heger, 1950– ), vol. 71, 21: Brandt, 28 Oct. 1969. ⁵² McAdams, Germany Divided, 72; Roger Morgan, West Germany’s Foreign Policy Agenda: The Washington Paper, vi (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1978), 19; Frank Fischer, Im deutschen Interesse: Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2001), 32; Klaus Hildebrand, ‘Die Außenpolitik der BRD 1949–1989’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 45/10 (1994), 619; Werner Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt 1969–1974’, in Karl-Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds.), Republik im Wandel 1969–1974: Die Ära Brandt (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 164. For a description of New Ostpolitik see, for instance, also Paterson, ‘Chancellor and Foreign Policy’, 146; Lothar Kettenacker, Germany since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 66–79; Görtemaker, Unheilige Allianz, 46; Clayton Marc Clemens, ‘The CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik, 1969–1982’, Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1986), 79.

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Figure 2. Willy Brandt (18 December 1913–8 October 1992). By ‘Haus der Geschichte’, Bonn.

policy for the foreseeable future would, it was hoped, enable the East German government to feel free to liberalize contacts between the two states and thus strengthen the sense of belonging together in one nation.⁵³ ⁵³ Roger Tilford, The Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany (Lexington, Mass.: Saxon House and Lexington Books, 1975), 34.

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It must be borne in mind that the breakthrough in Ostpolitik was framed, though not determined, by the international trend towards détente and some sort of recognition of the GDR. The Brandt government’s new stand converged happily with more propitious external circumstances. The sudden worsening of Sino-Soviet relations over the disputed border on the Ussuri River and the initiation of strategic arms-limitation talks between Moscow and Washington were the most important international factors that now, once Soviet supremacy within the Warsaw Pact had been restored, took effect. Moscow departed from its uncooperative stance and saw additional incentives to explore the new opportunities for a détente with Bonn. In the process of seeking stabilization, both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, responded positively to Bonn’s readiness to accept the continental status quo. In fact, during this process of détente, improvements in American–Soviet relations and West German Ostpolitik developed in parallel and complemented each other.⁵⁴ Only under these international conditions could treaties incorporating the Brandt government’s fundamental points follow so quickly: in November 1969, Bonn signed the controversial nuclear nonproliferation treaty, thus confirming to Moscow its renunciation of any claim to nuclear weapons. Less than a year later, on 12 August 1970, Brandt and the Soviet Prime Minister, Aleksei N. Kosygin, signed the Moscow Treaty. Without solving the German question, this arranged for a renunciation of force and fixed the ‘inviolability’ of the existing borders in Europe. As Helmut Schmidt, Brandt’s successor as Chancellor, put it, the friendship treaty with Moscow ‘marked the breakthrough’ in relations towards the East.⁵⁵ It was in effect multilaterally binding because of Moscow’s hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. What followed was a series of negotiations with the other Eastern European states including East Germany. By 1972, the so-called Ostverträge (Eastern treaties) had been concluded by the West German government. These were, apart from the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty with Poland in December 1970, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin between the Four Powers—the Soviet Union, the USA, Great Britain, and France—in September 1971, and the Basic Treaty with the GDR in December 1972. ⁵⁴ Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 12; see also Angela Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 12, 19. ⁵⁵ Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective (London: Cape, 1989), 25.

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R E N U N C I AT I O N O F F O RC E : A F R AG M E N TA RY D I A LO G U E B E T W E E N B O N N A N D M O S C OW, 1966 – 1969

First Attempts to Improve German–Soviet Relations The Moscow Treaty was not merely a product of the few months of official negotiations started between the Soviet and German governments in December 1969. Rather, it concluded a four-year period of renunciation-of-force talks. As Antonius Eitel, Bahr’s personal assistant, claims, it was thus one of the most extensively negotiated treaties in German history.⁵⁶ Hence the following section will first examine the German–Soviet dialogue about a renunciation-of-force agreement that was pursued during the Grand Coalition government. It will next analyse the official negotiations by the subsequent Social–Liberal government leading to the German–Soviet treaty in August 1970. The resumption of diplomatic relations in 1955 was followed by a freeze in German–Soviet relations. It was only a decade later that both governments pondered the introduction of some form of bilateral political cooperation. The idea of a mutual ‘non-aggression’ agreement⁵⁷ had for the first time been raised between Karl Carstens, then State Secretary at the Auswärtige Amt, and the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Semjonov, during the latter’s visit in September 1965. The offer of a renunciation of force was repeated in the ‘peace note’ by the Erhard government in March 1966.⁵⁸ It gave way to bilateral unofficial talks, starting in October 1966, between Carstens and the Soviet ambassador Semjon Zarapkin at the Auswärtige Amt, about an exchange of declarations on a renunciation of force. But as Carstens was increasingly aware, the Soviets were not interested in any sort of negotiating or consideration of the German viewpoint. Their aim was simply to force Bonn to revise its policy of non-recognition.⁵⁹ This is why, in ⁵⁶ Eitel to the author, 1 Dec. 2002; see also Benno Zündorf, Die Ostverträge: Die Verträge von Moskau, Warschau, Prag, das Berlin-Abkommen und die Verträge mit der DDR (Munich: Beck, 1979), 49. ⁵⁷ This is not to be confused with the Nazi–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact concluded on 23 Aug. 1939, a little over a week before the beginning of the Second World War. ⁵⁸ Sodaro, Moscow, Germany and the West, 74; Bender, Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’, 113. ⁵⁹ Larrabee, ‘Moscow’, 207.

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this preliminary stage, disagreement already arose between Carstens and Zarapkin about the content and form of such a declaration. In particular, the consideration of the GDR in an exchange of notes was under discussion. Carstens did not rule out addressing the GDR as one of Moscow’s associates, but he rejected treating it separately for fear of raising the GDR’s status as a result. With regard to the approaching general election he recommended adjourning the discussion until the new government had been formed, which could then engage in official talks.⁶⁰ As mentioned in the previous section, in his government declaration in December 1966, Kiesinger laid further grounds for the Soviet–German dialogue by directing the ‘peace note’ offer of renunciation-of-force agreements particularly to the Soviet Union. Officially, the offer was criticized by the Kremlin as not going far enough in terms of considering the GDR. However, other Soviet sources have revealed that, apart from the announcement of the renunciation of nuclear weapons, it was regarded by Moscow as the most interesting part of the German government declaration.⁶¹ Without losing much time, Foreign Minister Brandt, who had left his post in Berlin and was accompanied by his close aide Egon Bahr, instructed his ministry staff to prepare the renunciation-of-force exchange with Moscow. In early February 1967, the German ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf von Walther, delivered drafts for declarations, which had been announced and prepared for by Carstens before the change of government. Zarapkin was asked to enquire whether his government would be prepared to take these as the basis for a move from nonofficial to binding talks.⁶² What followed was a series of confidential exchanges in which the grounds for a German–Soviet accord concerning the renunciation of force and also other aspects of bilateral relations were explored. The fostering of German–Soviet relations was sought on all sorts of different levels simultaneously: from official meetings between Kiesinger, Brandt, and the Soviet ambassador Zarapkin; and more unofficial talks between ministry staff, such as Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz and Egon Bahr, and Soviet diplomats, such as Zarapkin, Sachanov, or Bondarenko; to unofficial rounds of discussion by German and Soviet journalists and academics, and even conspiratorial receptions of German SPD members in the Soviet embassy in Bonn.⁶³ ⁶⁰ ⁶¹ ⁶² ⁶³

PA, B 150, doc. 374: Carstens, 21 Nov. 1966. PA, B 150: Semjonov to Walther, 28 Dec. 1966, and to Ruete, Jan. 1967. PA, B 150, doc. 46: State Secretary Schütz, 8 Feb. 1967. This will be more fully explained below.

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The first round of official talks between Chancellor Kiesinger and Zarapkin took place on 8 February 1967. To start with, each side reaffirmed to the other its interest in improving bilateral relations. The discussion centred on the disputed questions, most notably the status of the GDR. Zarapkin asked Kiesinger to renounce his policy of non-recognition and to take up normal relations with the GDR as a precondition for an improvement of relations with any Eastern European country. Kiesinger, in return, outlined his position with remarkable flexibility: although he could not give up any legal positions he was open to new methods wherever these would alleviate tension. One such method might be to enter into intra-German relations by taking account of the existence of another political order in the other half of Germany without recognizing it as a sovereign state.⁶⁴ But the goodwill demonstrated by Kiesinger met with no positive response from the Soviets. As the Foreign Ministry registered, Zarapkin had called Bonn’s government declaration ‘revisionist’ and besides, he had acted ‘a little bare-faced’. In further unofficial talks the Soviets revealed their disappointment that, against their expectations, the new government had not introduced any real changes into its Eastern policy.⁶⁵ Moscow was obviously still uninterested in any dealings with Bonn. In early summer 1967, however, a change in atmosphere occurred. As Moscow’s campaigning for European security at a Warsaw Pact conference in April 1967 indicated, its policy was becoming more defensive, as it was concerned with halting the erosion of its own authority in the Eastern bloc.⁶⁶ In May, Bahr reported on a discussion with his ‘Soviet dialogue partner’ in which the latter had merely insisted that Bonn must as a precondition for talks accept the GDR as an equal negotiating partner, but need not recognize it under international law. Bahr regarded this as ‘a very fine thread’ that had to be used.⁶⁷ Similarly, Bahr drew a positive conclusion after a meeting with Zarapkin a month later: Zarapkin had eagerly manifested his interest in a ‘close exchange of opinion and a constant alliance’. The Soviet ambassador had accepted as a basis for talks what Bahr had explained to be Bonn’s viewpoint, namely that irrespective of the different legal viewpoints concerning ⁶⁴ PA, B 150, doc. 47: Auswärtige Amt, 8 Feb. 1967. ⁶⁵ PA, B 150: Duckwitz, 28 March 1967; BAK, N 1474, 62: Sahm, 30 Mar. 1967; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 431/87: Bahr, 6 Apr. 1967. ⁶⁶ Larrabee, Moscow, 207. ⁶⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341, 19.12.66–31.5.67: Bahr, 2 May 1967.

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reunification, practical progress between East and West, including both parts of Germany, could be made.⁶⁸ Accordingly, in a meeting with Zarapkin, Brandt read out and handed over an exposé on possible areas of German–Soviet cooperation.⁶⁹ Another fruitful meeting about the renunciation-of-force issue took place between Bahr and Zarapkin on 10 July 1967. Bahr took the opportunity to explain his and Brandt’s plan for a ‘peaceful escalation’ from a system of renunciation-of-force-declarations to a European security system and ultimately a European peace order. Zarapkin endorsed the concept and merely made the objection that the GDR would have to participate in such a system ‘as a partner with equal rights and duties’. The Soviet ambassador underlined his wish to continue these unofficial contacts, which were in his eyes more important than ‘dry, official discussions’.⁷⁰ For such a ‘dry, official’ discussion Zarapkin visited the German Chancellor only a few days later. Again, the ideas of a renunciation of force and European security were raised, but this time to no avail. Kiesinger’s suggestion of searching for an improvement of relations simply by factoring out all disputed questions met with no response. Zarapkin countered that problems should not be deferred but tackled immediately in a European security system. Kiesinger, in return, sidestepped the question about his views on a European security system by referring to it as a problematic issue that was being dealt with in the Foreign Ministry, and as a project the realization of which lay still far ahead.⁷¹ Hence constructive talks alternated with less constructive ones. Depending on the dialogue partners involved as well as on the circumstances, progress to find common grounds for an agreement was made in one discussion, while the dissenting viewpoints were merely presented in another meeting. Walther and Eppler from the SPD, for instance, both reported such fruitless encounters with Soviet officials.⁷² The Soviet memorandum which was delivered to Bonn on 12 October 1967 was received by Bonn with dismay.⁷³ The Auswärtige Amt was ⁶⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437: Bahr, 15 June 1967. ⁶⁹ PA, B 150, doc. 224: Brandt and Zarapkin, 16 June 1967. ⁷⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437: Bahr, 10 July 1967. ⁷¹ PA, B 150, doc. 253: Kiesinger and Zarapkin, 11 July 1967. ⁷² PA, B 150, doc. 259: Walther on a meeting with a ‘contact man’, 11 July 1967; PA, B 1, 349: Eppler on his visit in Moscow, 18 Sept. 1967. ⁷³ PA, B 150, doc. 347 and PA, B 150: Buring, 12 Oct. 1967, and Ruth, 16 Oct. 1967.

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indignant about the memo, which it described as an ‘uncompromising subordination of the renunciation of force under the opposition side’s German politicy’, namely the ‘unconditional recognition of the GDR’. This was, in contrast to ‘Moscow’s initial acceptable formulas’, an ‘extreme position which could not be agreed to’.⁷⁴ The German–Soviet dialogue was further clouded when Kiesinger was quoted as having stated publicly at a press conference in October 1967 that he currently saw no possibility for successful talks about renunciation-of-force declarations with Moscow. The Kremlin was outraged about the fact that he had thereby spoilt the confidentiality of talks and hastened to make Zarapkin sound out whether Kiesinger’s remarks should be taken as a response to the Soviet memorandum. Brandt, in return, reassured Zarapkin that Kiesinger’s statements did not constitute an answer to the Soviet memo, but that Bonn wanted to continue to discuss the renunciation-of-force issue. He affirmed that non-aggression declarations should be exchanged with all Eastern states, on the condition that a special form be found in the case of an intraGerman exchange. Zarapkin contented himself with these explanations. He then read out further drafts that his government had prepared for the exchange of non-aggression declarations in the hope of normalizing relations.⁷⁵ Talks were thus continued, and progress was made not only in terms of an improvement in atmosphere,⁷⁶ as Duckwitz noted, but also in matters of substance. In December 1967, Bahr confided to Brandt that Zarapkin had again explicitly conceded that an equal treatment of the GDR would not signify a legally binding recognition. Bahr optimistically concluded that once Moscow and Bonn had agreed over this issue ‘the thing could be done very quickly’.⁷⁷ But the stern Soviet government declaration of 8 December 1967 threatened to break off the dialogue: it announced a tough stance vis-à-vis Bonn and contradicted what had been said in the last Soviet memo. However, the determination of the German Foreign Ministry to sustain the dialogue became evident: as the Ministerialdirigent (Deputy Director-General) Ulrich Sahm suspected, the Soviets’ declaration was a mere manoeuvre to reassure their Allies, behind which they could ⁷⁴ PA, B 150: European security unit, 16 Oct. 1967; PA, B 150, doc. 356: Walther, 17 Oct. 1967; PA, B 150: Schnippenkoetter, 18 Oct. 1967. ⁷⁵ PA, B 150, doc. 395: Buring, 21 Nov. 1967. ⁷⁶ PA, B 150, doc. 401: Duckwitz, 27 Nov. 1967. ⁷⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Bahr, 1 Dec. 1967.

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then secretly continue the confidential talks with Bonn, thereby keeping any opening to the West under their control.⁷⁸ The ministry staff therefore decided to ask Moscow in a memorandum to explain whether the Soviet side was still prepared to continue the confidential talks on the previous basis. Simultaneously, Bonn issued a similarly stern note publicly rebutting Moscow’s declaration.⁷⁹ Indeed, the Kremlin’s reaction was encouraging: it underlined its interest in continuing confidential talks and sent a memo in response in January 1968.⁸⁰ The Auswärtige Amt was relieved by the Soviets’ reply and prepared a draft memo in return. In this it expressed its willingness to exchange corresponding declarations with the GDR too, as long as these took into account the special intra-German relations, namely the affiliation of both parts of Germany to one nation. This memo, however, was not to be delivered until April 1968.⁸¹ Shortly afterwards, Bahr and Zarapkin entered into a discussion about the proceedings of the negotiations to come: they agreed that German–Soviet negotiations should be commenced first and that agreements with all socialist states should take place in close succession. As to an intra-German renunciation-of-force pact, Zarapkin conceded to Bahr’s insistent demand that formal recognition would not constitute a precondition for talks.⁸² But the German–Soviet dialogue remained periodically troublesome: in a meeting between Kiesinger and Zarapkin on 1 March 1968, the quarrel about the German question was predominant again. The German Chancellor and the Soviet ambassador merely warned each other that the desired improvement in bilateral relations could not take place unless the other side abandoned its legal standpoint.⁸³ The remaining German memorandum was at last delivered to Zarapkin on 9 April 1968 in the hope ‘that this might be the prelude to further fruitful talks’.⁸⁴ Preliminary comments by ministerial Soviet representatives and the Soviet press, however, implied that Moscow was dissatisfied with the German memo. Most notable was Zarapkin’s indignation a few ⁷⁸ PA, B 150: Sahm, 12 Dec. 1967. ⁷⁹ PA, B 150, doc. 430: Duckwitz, memo to Zarapkin, 14 Dec. 1967; PA, B 150: Ruete, 19 Dec. 1967; verbal note to Moscow, 22 Dec. 1967. ⁸⁰ PA, B 150: Blumenfeld, 21 Dec. 1967. ⁸¹ PA, B 150, doc. 39: Soviet Union unit, 31 Jan. 1967; PA, B 150: Duckwitz, 9 Feb. 1968, and Soviet Union unit, 31 Mar. 1968. ⁸² PA, B 150, doc. 55: Bahr and Zarapkin, 8 Feb. 1968. ⁸³ PA, B 150, doc. 75: Buring, 1 Mar. 1968. ⁸⁴ PA, B 150, doc. 121: Buring, 10 Apr. 1968.

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days later. As he informed the Foreign Ministry’s Ministerialdirektor (Director-General), Hans Ruete, he found the memorandum ‘disappointing’ and stressed that if Bonn would not decide to recognize the GDR then there were no prospects of reconciliation. Ruete’s attempts at explanations fell on deaf ears; the Soviet ambassador merely repeated over and over again, ‘you have to recognize the GDR; everything else is of no use!’⁸⁵ Making matters worse was the propaganda campaign introduced by the Soviet mass media against the alleged Nazism and militarism prevalent in the Federal Republic.⁸⁶ In fact, in the face of the growing instability in Eastern Europe, the German threat remained as one of the few cards that Moscow could play to bolster its crumbling position.⁸⁷ The Foreign Ministry rightly suspected that the stiffening of the Soviet bearing vis-à-vis Bonn was a result of the latest trend of liberalization within the Eastern bloc and the need ‘for a scapegoat of a revisionist . . . Federal Republic as a unifying band for the alliance’.⁸⁸ In a meeting with Piotr Abrassimov, the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, on 18 June 1968, Brandt gave vent to his frustration with present official comments from Moscow, which ‘were obviously not appreciating’ correctly the content of the German note of April 1968. Since the formation of the Grand Coalition, Bonn had repeatedly underlined its will for compromise. Brandt revealed that he was at times inclined to resign. Nonetheless, Abrassimov insisted that Bonn’s memo was unsatisfactory. He complained that it lacked any signal that Bonn was prepared to exchange declarations with the GDR on the ‘same international legal grounds as with other socialist states’. It therefore gave reason to question the outcome of the entire German–Soviet dialogue of the past year. However, at Brandt’s urging, Abrassimov offered to try to continue to influence the Soviet answer.⁸⁹ Abrassimov’s promise was to no avail, for the Kremlin’s answer was intransigent. On 5 July 1968, Zarapkin delivered a memorandum to Duckwitz that the latter regretfully perceived as ‘polemic in large sections’ and full of ‘sharp attacks against the Federal Republic’. In essence, the memorandum accused Bonn of violation of the confidentiality of talks, refusal to accept the existing borders, including the ⁸⁵ PA, B 150: Ruete, 29 Apr. 1968. ⁸⁶ Dokumente zur Außenpolitik, iii/2, 769. ⁸⁸ PA, B 150: Auswärtige Amt, June 1968.

⁸⁷ Larrabee, Moscow, 207. ⁸⁹ Ibid.: Brandt, 21 June 1968.

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intra-German one, avoidance of an exchange of non-aggression declarations with the GDR of a legally binding form, and the conduct of a revisionist policy. Duckwitz fended off all these accusations. He answered back that Bonn had already accepted the existing borders until their final regulation in a peace settlement. He further underlined that Bonn was willing to exchange renunciation-of-force declarations with the GDR but on the condition that Bonn’s declaration had to look different from the German–Soviet one.⁹⁰ The exchange suffered another setback with the publication of correspondence on the renunciation of force by Moscow a week later. This seemed to indicate that the Soviet Union was no longer interested in successful negotiations with Bonn, but merely in discrediting German Ostpolitik.⁹¹ Brandt and his staff decided to react with a German publication in return. Beginning on 11 July 1968, they worked on it until the early hours so that the following day Brandt was able to release details of the dialogue with Moscow to the public.⁹² The Soviet–German exchange of notes came to a halt with the Soviet invasion of Prague on 21 August 1968 and was not to be resumed officially by the Federal Republic for another year, until July 1969. Meanwhile, though, both sides were interested in carrying on confidential talks, and the exchange was thus continued on an unofficial level.⁹³

Moscow’s Growing Readiness to Negotiate The Prague invasion was a turning point after which German–Soviet relations were soon to change for the better. The invasion helped Moscow to stabilize its hegemony in the Warsaw Pact so that it could now embark on adjusting its supposed reputation as a peace-loving nation and on moving towards a rapprochement with Bonn. In a plenum of the United Nations (UN) in October 1968, Gromyko emphasized that the Soviets wished to continue the renunciation-of-force dialogue, provided that Bonn would ‘approach this problem constructively’.⁹⁴ ⁹⁰ PA, B 41, 39 and B 150, doc. 213: Soviet reply note, 5 July 1968, and Buring, 9 July 1968. ⁹¹ Dokumente zur Außenpolitik, iii/2, 769. ⁹² BAK, N 1474, 22: Sahm, 11 and 12 July 1968; see Deutsche Ostpolitik, ii, doc. 54, for Brandt’s declaration of 12 July 1968. ⁹³ PA, B 150: e.g. Kiesinger and Zarapkin, 2 Sept. 1968. ⁹⁴ Ibid.: Stempel, 7 Oct. 1968.

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It was in this environment of the UN plenum in New York that the next important meeting took place, that between Brandt and Gromyko on 9 October 1968. It was the first meeting between the German and Soviet Foreign Ministers in over six years. Most notably, Brandt and Gromyko decided to continue and intensify the renunciation-of-force dialogue. They also landed in a quarrel about the familiar problems, and both raised doubts about how far the dialogue could be expected to develop into sincere negotiations. Nevertheless, both called the meeting ‘good and useful’.⁹⁵ As a result, talks were launched, although somewhat belatedly—not before December 1968—via Ambassador Allardt in Moscow.⁹⁶ On 11 December 1968, Gromyko revealed to Allardt his government’s intention to introduce official talks.⁹⁷ Soon, Allardt himself recommended a start of the ‘second round of talks with Gromyko’, despite Moscow’s agitation over the approaching election of the West German President in Berlin.⁹⁸ Meanwhile, Bahr was given further details, via the unofficial channel provided by the Soviet diplomat Belezki, concerning Soviet ideas as to how concrete talks should proceed. Belezki reported that the Kremlin had agreed with its allies to try to reach an exchange of renunciationof-force declarations and to coordinate them closely. As to the form, Belezki reported his side’s preference of an exchange of declarations to be prepared by special emissaries, rather than by the Foreign Ministers or ambassadors. This form would allow for a ‘greater intensity and confidentiality and the possibility of leading from an exchange of opinion into a negotiation phase’. Belezki ended by underlining his government’s cooperativeness but equally its scepticism regarding Bonn’s ability to reach successful results before the forthcoming election of 1969.⁹⁹ Bahr informed Brandt that he approved of Belezki’s suggestion of initiating talks via special emissaries, for only with mediators of rank high was there ‘any prospect . . . of moving forward from the blind spot’. He ⁹⁵ PA, B 150: Ruete, 10 Oct. 1968; see also Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 255–6. ⁹⁶ PA, B 150: Duckwitz, 7 Oct. 1968. ⁹⁷ Helmut Allardt, Moskauer Tagebuch: Beobachtungen, Notizen, Erlebnisse (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1974), 129. ⁹⁸ PA, B 150: Allardt, 6 Jan. 1969. The Social Democrat Gustav Heinemann’s election as Federal President in March 1969 was the result of the simple majority of votes won by the SPD and FDP, presaging a shift towards an SPD/FDP collaboration in the Federal elections in Sept. 1969. ⁹⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 431/B: Bahr, 10 Nov. 1968.

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held that the Soviet note should be answered only once the verbal exchange had gathered momentum since the ‘written note—repeating the German position of 9 April 1968—would only block the existing Soviet cooperativeness, and besides mean a loss of time’.¹⁰⁰ Hence, by order of Brandt, in mid-December 1968 Allardt asked Gromyko for another meeting. The two men agreed to hold talks about the renunciation of force and related questions and simultaneously to negotiate about other bilateral questions still to be defined. The goal of the exchange would be to clarify whether the existing differences could be settled.¹⁰¹ In addition, on 10 January 1969, the Soviet ambassador and Brandt talked about ways to influence future talks positively. Brandt named four areas where, in his eyes, progress was possible, namely negotiations about air traffic, scientific and technological cooperation, an extension of trade, and the establishment of consulates.¹⁰² Despite the heated discussion that followed about the issue of the presidential election in West Berlin, which Moscow regarded as illegal and detrimental for the bilateral relations, Brandt drew a positive conclusion from this encounter overall. He reported afterwards on the ‘exceedingly amiable and polite’ Zarapkin and was optimistic about future talks.¹⁰³ Thereafter, talks were relocated from Moscow to Bonn at the request of both Brandt and Bahr, who decided that the substance of exchange was too ‘thin’ to be sounded out by Allardt in Moscow.¹⁰⁴ This relocation, however, resulted in Kiesinger taking over from Brandt to see Zarapkin for the next four meetings, on 13, 22, and 23 February and 1 March 1969, which were seemingly less pleasant. They were all dominated by discussion about the disputed topic of presidential elections. The renunciation-of-force issue was touched only marginally. Zarapkin read out a Soviet declaration urging Bonn to reconsider its decision. Kiesinger at first rejected what he called mere accusations, but then offered a compromise. Bonn would hold them at some other place if the Soviet Union offered something in return. For the future renunciation-of-force talks Kiesinger suggested a ‘pragmatic proceeding’ ‘without excessively high expectations of the other side’. However, the ¹⁰⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 396: Bahr, 19 Nov. 1968. ¹⁰¹ PA, B 150, doc. 410: Allardt and Gromyko, 11 Dec. 1968; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393: Ruete, 9 Jan. 1969. ¹⁰² PA, B 150, doc. 8: Buring, 10 Jan. 1969. ¹⁰³ BAK, N 1471, 71: Ruete, 10 Jan. 1969. The Bundesversammlung (Federal Election Committee) convened in West Berlin to choose a new FRG President on 5 Mar. 1969. ¹⁰⁴ PA, B 150, doc. 22: Duckwitz, 18 Jan. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 431/B: Bahr, 22 Jan. 1969.

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compromise as suggested by Kiesinger was never reached. As Kiesinger argued, this was due to the lack of a convincing return offer from the Soviet and East German side. Consequently, the decision to hold presidential elections in West Berlin remained unchanged and Kiesinger and Zarapkin quarrelled about their differing legal viewpoints. As a result of this dispute, both sides stiffened again. Zarapkin denounced Bonn’s insistence as having ‘merely negative consequences’.¹⁰⁵ More encouraging news came from the CDU member Walter LeislerKiep, who reported about the hand outstretched by Petr Borovinsky, first secretary from the Soviet embassy, in a recent meeting. As Borovinsky had revealed, notwithstanding Bonn’s decision concerning the presidential elections, Moscow was still interested in bilateral talks, provided these involved the issue of a normalization of intra-German relations. This normalization would not necessarily involve a diplomatic recognition of the GDR but would involve respect for the principle of two German states.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Brandt received confidential information via Zarapkin that Bonn could expect a less hostile attitude from the Soviet government, which was mainly worried about its strained relations with China.¹⁰⁷ Apart from a few secondary meetings in April 1969, between members of the Foreign Ministry and the Soviet embassy in Bonn,¹⁰⁸ Brandt and Zarapkin met for fruitful talks on 1 and 4 April and 18 June 1969. These meetings all centred on the Budapest declaration by the Warsaw Pact states of 18 March 1969, which was essentially a proposal for the convocation of a European security conference. The Foreign Minister confirmed that he welcomed the Budapest declaration, the main goals of which, such as a European security system, were concordant with those of the Federal Republic. He reported that his government generally approved of the idea, but added that it would be very advantageous for the proceedings of the conference if relations between Bonn and East Berlin were to improve. Regarding the issue of renunciation-of-force negotiations, Brandt proposed that these might be started either before or in the course of the conference, whichever Zarapkin preferred.¹⁰⁹ ¹⁰⁵ PA, B 150 and B 150, docs. 75, 86, and 96: Kiesinger and Zarapkin, 13, 22, 23 Feb., and 1 and 11 Mar. 1969. ¹⁰⁶ BAK, N 1371, 81, 1: Leisler Kiep, 24 Mar. 1969. ¹⁰⁷ Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 256. ¹⁰⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/A: Duckwitz and Zarapkin, 9 Apr. 1969; PA, B 150: Behrends and Nikolskij, 28 Apr. 1969. ¹⁰⁹ PA, B 1, 350 and B 150: Brandt and Zarapkin, 1 and 4 Apr. 1969, and Buring, 19 June 1969.

Setting the Stage

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On 3 July 1969, the Federal Foreign Ministry handed Zarapkin a draft of the German–Soviet renunciation-of-force dialogue, thereby taking up the exchange of notes after a whole year’s pause. As a member of the Foreign Ministry commented, the note was ‘taking pains to accommodate the Soviet proposals as far as possible without cutting back our position on Germany and Berlin’.¹¹⁰ In the summer of 1969, the German–Soviet dialogue slackened somewhat because of the run-up to the federal elections. On the Soviet side the readiness for talks was receding for fear that they might serve electoral purposes.¹¹¹ Two more noteworthy incidents, however, were meetings of both the FDP and SPD delegations in Moscow with Gromyko and other members of the Soviet government, in July and August respectively. For the SPD representatives, it was their first official visit to the Soviet Union in ten years. Schmidt, leader of the SPD delegation, drew an ambivalent picture of this encounter: on the one hand, ‘all Soviet dialogue partners had expressed the general wish for improved relations’, and the talks had ‘helped to prevent misunderstandings and clarify the individual viewpoints’. The Germans’ wish to ‘live in one house had once again been made clear’ to the Soviets. On the other hand, Schmidt notified his government that hardly any new accommodation had been perceived on individual political questions. Gromyko had seemed ‘most adamant’ and ‘hardly prepared to transcend a mere repetition of stereotype formulas of the Soviet policy’. All had stressed the need for Bonn to recognize the borders, including the intra-German one. Schmidt concluded that ‘concrete results seemed more attainable on limited factual issues than on the broad range of politics’.¹¹² On 13 September 1969, the Soviet Union communicated its response to the latest German renunciation-of-force note. Most notably, it proposed official negotiations in Moscow. Zarapkin emphasized Moscow’s serious intention of achieving positive results at such negotiations.¹¹³ In a meeting with Gromyko at the UN in New York on 22 September 1969, Brandt underlined that the government newly formed after the elections would have to reply to the Soviet proposal of negotiations ¹¹⁰ PA, B 150: Mertes, 28 July 1969; ACDP, 01–226, A 310: Kiesinger, 4 July 1969. ¹¹¹ BAK, N 1371, 81, 1: Leisler Kiep, 24 Mar. 1969. ¹¹² PA, B 150, doc. 288: Schmidt, 28 Aug., 15 Sept., and 11 Oct. 1969; see also PA, B 150, doc. 289: Auswärtige Amt, 15 Sept. 1969; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 98–9. ¹¹³ PA, B 150, doc. 292: Buring, 18 Sept. 1969.

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in Moscow. He had no doubt that it would respond to the offer. He would advise it at any rate, Brandt revealed, because although the principal questions had not been solved, an entry into talks was advisable. Gromyko, in return, reminded him that a precondition for Moscow’s interest in improved relations was that Bonn should conduct a ‘more realistic policy’. In his words, ‘if the Federal government was reasonable, progress would come’.¹¹⁴ G E R M A N – S OV I E T N E G OT I AT I O N S OV E R T H E M O S C OW T R E AT Y, 1 9 6 9 – 1 9 7 0

First German–Soviet Talks under Allardt As Brandt put it retrospectively, his confidential meeting with Gromyko in September 1969 was ‘in some respects the bridge which led to the areas of Ostpolitik entered during the first years of my chancellorship’.¹¹⁵ In fact, as Brandt had announced, the new Social–Liberal government was highly interested in leading the German–Soviet dialogue to a successful conclusion. The response to the Soviet memo of 13 September 1969 was set as one of the first priorities of the new Foreign Minister.¹¹⁶ At the same time, however, the paper also stated that the new government had no illusions about the discrepancy between the Soviet and German positions and hence about the probability of reaching the desired agreement. Bonn’s doubts were not unfounded. In soundings between members of the new government and of the Kremlin immediately before and after the elections, it became apparent that the Soviets were sceptical about the new foreign political programme. They regarded the recognition of the existence of the GDR as ‘not very encouraging’ and pressed Bonn to ‘cross the Rubicon’ and express a more far-reaching recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state. The Brandt government defended its position by stressing that negotiations of the coming months would succeed only if both sides were prepared to make concessions.¹¹⁷ ¹¹⁴ PA, B 150, doc. 297: Böker, 24 Sept. 1969; Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, 258. ¹¹⁵ Ibid. 261. ¹¹⁶ PA, B 41, 1075: Auswärtige Amt, 15 Oct. 1969. ¹¹⁷ PA, B 150, doc. 321: Klaus Schütz, mayor of Berlin, and Abrassimov, Soviet ambassador in East Berlin, 16 Oct. 1969; PA, B 150, doc. 326: Allardt, 27 and 30 Oct. 1969.

Setting the Stage

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With these reservations in mind, the West German government set about entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union. Within the first week of holding office, both Chancellor Brandt, on 28 October, and Foreign Minister Scheel, on 30 October, familiarized Zarapkin with their planned schedule for the renunciation-of-force talks: they had happily taken up the Soviet proposal of 13 September to start official negotiations and would soon propose a date. Priority would be given to the Soviet Union. After the start of negotiations with Moscow, contacts were to be opened also with the GDR and Poland.¹¹⁸ On 19 November 1969, Brandt signalled to Andrei Kosygin that the Federal Republic was ready for renunciation-of-force talks with Moscow.¹¹⁹ Some further preparatory German–Soviet probes concerning renunciation-of-force talks followed between Brandt, Scheel, and Zarapkin, and also via other channels, such as the Allies and the embassies in the Warsaw Pact countries.¹²⁰ Apart from acknowledging the GDR as a de facto state in Brandt’s government declaration in October 1969, the Bonn government had by that time given Moscow three further sweeteners to enter negotiations. First, it had signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in November 1969, thus confirming to Moscow its renunciation of any claim to nuclear weapons. Second, it had indicated that, given a satisfactory outcome to the German–Soviet negotiations, it would support the Soviet Union’s long-standing goal of a European security conference (ESC). And third, it had shown that it would respond favourably to Moscow’s desire for increased economic and technological ties.¹²¹ However, the first official Soviet–German encounter, which was at last opened on 8 December between Gromyko and Allardt in Moscow, began badly. It mainly consisted of an exchange of principled positions, essentially concerning the issue of the ESC and the GDR. As to the GDR, Gromyko presented his government’s demand that any nonaggression agreement between the FRG and GDR had to be concluded under exactly the same legal conditions as the other treaties. Allardt, in return, introduced Bonn’s view that an intra-German accord would ¹¹⁸ PA, B 150, docs. 331 and 336: Brandt and Zarapkin, 28 Oct. 1969. ¹¹⁹ AAPD 1969, ii, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), doc. 370: Brandt, 19 Nov. 1969. ¹²⁰ See e.g. PA, B 1, 350: Scheel and Zarapkin, 17 Nov. 1969, and Stewart and Smirnovki, 18 Nov. 1969; PA, B 41, 1054: the German ambassador in Belgrade and the Soviet councillor, 25 Nov. 1969. ¹²¹ Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 70; see also Seidel, Berlin-Bonner Balance, 55–6.

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have the same binding force, but would have to allow for the special relationship of the two German states within one nation, as referred to in the government declaration. Lastly, Gromyko rejected the German drafts of 3 July 1969 as a ‘not very realistic base for negotiations’, an alternative to which would have to be discussed in the next meeting. That Allardt himself did not regard the first encounter as very fruitful was revealed by his pessimistic prognosis afterwards, that in the next round of talks the Soviet government would again ‘try with might and main to assert the GDR’s full recognition’.¹²² Indeed, the next round of talks, on 11 December, began with a mere repetition of the views already exchanged on European security and the GDR’s status. In addition, the question of the content of a renunciation-of-force agreement was brought up. The Soviet Foreign Minister presented all issues he wished to have included for an agreement to be ‘real and not a mere cover’: the issue of the European borders, the GDR, West Berlin, representation of both German states in the international area, nuclear weapons, and the Munich agreement. Allardt’s reply that the German draft of 3 July 1969 was after all a viable base for further talks fell on deaf ears: Gromyko merely took the note as proof of Bonn pursuing its ‘old policy directed at a revision of the borders’ except via different, that is, exclusively peaceful, means. Thus, the rest of the conversation circulated around Gromyko’s main concern, the border question. Allardt declined his counterpart’s accusation, stating that Bonn ‘raised no territorial claims against anybody’, but for Gromyko this formulation did not suffice. He demanded Bonn should explicitly express that it fully recognized, now and in the future, all existing borders. Allardt equally drew a negative balance from this encounter. He described Gromyko as ‘polite, but tough’. With his demand for an explicit recognition of borders he aimed, in Allardt’s eyes, at a final regulation of the borders and essentially at the renunciation of reunification.¹²³ The third round of talks, on 23 December, brought no rapprochement between the respective positions either. Again, the border question was debated, resulting in an exchange of the familiar viewpoints and demands. In particular, Gromyko attacked the German viewpoint concerning an intra-German renunciation-of-force agreement. He made

¹²² PA, B 150, doc. 392: Allardt, 8 Dec. 1969. ¹²³ PA, B 150, doc. 398: Allardt, 11 Dec. 1969.

Setting the Stage

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it clear that the concept of it as having a special form, different from the other agreements, was unacceptable to Moscow.¹²⁴ Thus the first three Soviet–German encounters between Gromyko and Allardt did not bring about any real exchange. Instead of the German drafts of 3 July 1969, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, introduced the Soviets’ maximal demands as a basis for negotiations: the diplomatic recognition of the status quo, including all borders and the GDR. Allardt, in turn, because of his limited mandate for negotiation, could only reject some of these positions as ‘not negotiable’ without formulating his own demands. After those meetings, he was frustrated with Moscow’s tough stance and suspicious of its demands. He considered them to be in line with Soviet power politics generally, geared at strengthening the Soviet position in Eastern Europe as well as increasing influence over West Germany.¹²⁵ In response to the troubled start of talks in Moscow, a visitor from Moscow named Valerij Lednev applied to Bahr’s office on 24 December 1969. He said that he had been sent by Yuri Andropov to serve as a direct personal channel for Brandt and Bahr to the highest levels of the Soviet government. He told Bahr that he had been instructed to sound out matters on this level, given the troubled start of official talks.¹²⁶ Bahr felt elated. He understood now that the Soviets took the new German government seriously.¹²⁷ In effect, this secret channel was to become a very important means for the Bonn government to communicate with Moscow, and one parallel to the official negotiations.¹²⁸ Despite this positive incident, Bonn was worried about a generally deteriorating climate. It was commonly found that the GDR reacted with dogmatic rigidity to the new government’s overtures toward the East.¹²⁹ In addition, reports reached Bonn of growing hostility in the Soviet as well as the East German media in reaction to West Germany’s intention to hold sessions of the parliamentary parties in West Berlin between 22 and 27 January 1970.¹³⁰ ¹²⁴ PA, B 150, doc. 411: Allardt, 23 Dec. 1969. ¹²⁵ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392,1: Allardt to the Auswärtige Amt, 24 Dec. 1969. ¹²⁶ DzDP, 6th ser., 1: 21. Oktober 1969 bis 31. Dezember 1970, ed. Daniel Hofmann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), doc. 48: Bahr and Lednev, 24 Dec. 1969. ¹²⁷ Vjatscheslav Kevorkov, Der geheime Kanal (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), 171–3; Smyser, Yalta to Bonn, 229 ; Seidel, Berlin-Bonner Balance, 57–8. ¹²⁸ Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004; Seidel, Berlin-Bonner Balance, 58. ¹²⁹ See e.g. PA, B 41, 1054: the Soviet and Italian ambassadors in Cairo, 7 Jan. 1970. ¹³⁰ PA, B 41, 1054: Isvestija (12 Jan. 1970); Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung (12 Jan. 1970).

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Under these circumstances, Bahr urged Brandt in a strictly confidential letter to stick to the plan of ‘Moscow first’ and resume talks with Moscow without delay: the development of the past weeks had proved that the Soviet Union dominated all the countries in the Warsaw Treaty, that the Soviet Union could thwart or express solidarity with the GDR, and hence that the German–Soviet dialogue would decide all the other relations with the Eastern European countries. A loss of time would be a bonus for the opposition in Bonn. Bahr therefore stressed that the bilateral renunciation-of-force talks would have to be concluded very soon, ideally before early summer 1970, and called it a key decision to let Bonn continue its new policy.¹³¹

German–Soviet Negotiations under Bahr Allardt was blamed for some of the difficulties that Bonn faced after the first three sessions of talks in Moscow, as he was considered not competent enough to negotiate any constructive results. As a result, on 23 January 1970, Scheel informed Allardt that Bahr, as Brandt’s State Secretary, would now assume the lead in the discussion. Scheel added that Allardt was, of course, allowed to participate and would resume leadership after this intermediate stage (see Figure 3).¹³² On 29 January, then, Bahr, Brandt’s most important adviser in ‘ostpolitical’ matters, arrived in Moscow to continue the exchange. As Joachim Peckert, councillor in Moscow and member of the German delegation, testifies, under Bahr’s lead the previous quarrelling evolved into a free-flowing dialogue.¹³³ Bahr met Gromyko for a first discussion—officially called the fourth round of talks—on 30 January 1970. With hindsight Bahr noted: It started on 30 January . . . . Andrei Gromyko arrives last. . . . We are sitting opposite each other, next to him Valentin Falin, who has got the reputation of being a tough cookie, and further assistants. . . . On our side there are also eight persons . . . . I don’t want to deny that there is a lot of tension when entering negotiations now with the most senior Foreign Minister in the world. ¹³¹ AAPD 1970, i, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), doc 8: Bahr, 14 Jan. 1970. ¹³² AAPD 1970, i, doc. 20: Scheel, 23 January 1970. For further details on Allardt’s replacement by Bahr as leader of talks, see pp. 148–54. ¹³³ Joachim Peckert, Zeitwende zum Frieden: Ostpolitik miterlebt und mitgestaltet (Herford: Busse Seewald, 1990), 151.

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Figure 3. Egon Bahr (b. 18 March 1922—). I talk freely with notes, for the atmosphere of exploratory talks cannot develop when texts are read out . . . . Besides, I decide to present the whole concept immediately . . . .

Bahr then described Gromyko’s surprise at his different method of proceeding: not to report to Bonn and wait for new instructions, but to deal instantly with the questions raised. From this, Bahr said,

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a three-hour-long discussion developed, and the first test had been passed.¹³⁴ Concerning the content of the discussion, Bahr expanded the framework for negotiations, since Gromyko had not accepted the German proposal of 3 July 1969 as a basis. Significantly, he linked the treaty with the Soviet Union to a Soviet–German accord about the basic contents of the treaties with the other Eastern European states, particularly the GDR. All political issues should be dealt with as ‘one whole’. Bahr immediately introduced his complete and innovative concept. It contained a renunciation of force and a de facto recognition of the post-war European borders—with one exception: there was no renunciation of the intention to reunite, that is, no legally binding recognition of the border between the Federal Republic and the GDR. Gromyko, however, demanded exactly this diplomatic recognition of the status quo of all of Europe and refused to hear of a possibility of German reunification. From the start, he made clear that he expected, firstly, that the Germans would renounce a peaceful change to the borders as well as stating an intention to do this and, secondly, that they would explicitly mention of the Oder–Neisse line and the intra-German border. Thus views clashed, particularly on the German question. In the encounters between Gromyko and Bahr that followed, it was exactly this ‘territorial question’ that became the dominating issue of discussion. As newly accessible records reveal, the Soviets were at that stage still deeply distrustful of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which they feared was aiming at the ‘liquidation of the GDR’. They therefore intended to assert Bonn’s unconditional recognition of the realities in order to ‘ensure the results of their victory’.¹³⁵ It is important to bear this deeply engrained Soviet fear, developed over decades, in mind when considering the heated and hair-splitting German–Soviet bargaining that was to follow. Bahr, however, concluded after this first encounter that the Kremlin’s attitude did not seem fixed in every respect. Rather, it appeared open to exploratory talks. Additionally, it seemed vulnerable in that it wanted final regulations on the one hand, and insisted on its Four-Power rights concerning Germany as a whole on the other.¹³⁶ ¹³⁴ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 286. ¹³⁵ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 20: GDR Ministry for State Security, 17 Nov. 1969; Brezhnev to Erich Honecker, 28 July 1970, in Peter Przybylski, Tatort Politbüro (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1991), 280; Peter Bender, ‘Wandel durch Annäherung: Karriere eines Begriffs’, Deutschland-Archiv, 33/6 (2000), 973. ¹³⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to the Auswärtige Amt, 30 and 31 Jan. 1970.

Setting the Stage

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On 3 February, Bahr and Gromyko met for the second time. Again, the meeting was dominated by the discussion about the acceptance of borders, and particularly the intra-German border. Both sides regarded the settlement of this question as the precondition for any success in the talks. Nonetheless, no progress was made. However, Bahr and Gromyko agreed that the German–Soviet question and all other German–Eastern European questions should be dealt with as one entity. Further topics debated were Berlin, the West German claim of sole representation, the form of a renunciation of force and the ESC. Whereas Gromyko wanted to confirm West Berlin’s own status as independent from the FRG, Bahr vehemently argued against a ‘third state in Germany’. Gromyko wanted to see the Hallstein Doctrine abolished officially. Bahr, by contrast, insisted that an official abolition of this doctrine would be possible only once relations between the two German states had been normalized. As to the renunciation-of-force accord, Bahr and Gromyko agreed to use the general goals and principles of the UN Charter as a basis without mentioning certain articles, such as 53 and 107, the rights of intervention of the victorious powers vis-à-vis the former enemy states. With regard to the ESC, Gromyko made clear that he did not want to see this topic made dependent on progress in the current talks. Bahr reacted cleverly by arguing that the ESC would make sense only if the German–Soviet meetings bore fruit.¹³⁷ Bahr’s own interpretation of this second encounter was ambivalent. He said that there was cause for neither pessimism nor optimism about the developments in Moscow. At the same time, he was pleased that they had now reached a stage in which quite a few verbal understandings had been accomplished and all issues to be dealt with had been delineated.¹³⁸ In the third encounter, on 5 February 1970, Semjonov launched a surprising initiative by questioning the idea of tackling the whole package of issues hitherto discussed under the umbrella of renunciationof-force negotiations. In particular, the relations between the FRG and GDR could not be resolved without the GDR’s consent. In order to preclude such objections, Bahr proposed to fix the views exchanged so far on paper and present them to the West German and Soviet governments. They should then decide whether or not to introduce negotiations about a treaty.¹³⁹ ¹³⁷ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 33: Gromyko, 3 Feb. 1970. ¹³⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and Duckwitz, 3 and 4 Feb. 1970. ¹³⁹ AAPD 1970 i, docs. 38 and 40: Bahr, 5 and 6 Feb. 1970.

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Gromyko and Bahr agreed in private about this manner of proceeding. Bahr thus started formulating the content in the form of theses, including the complexes of the renunciation-of-force, the acceptance of borders, Berlin, intra-German relations, and the Munich agreement of 1938. Again, the border question attracted particular attention. The Soviet and German negotiating partners quarrelled for about half an hour about whether or not the German goal of reunification should be mentioned in the communiqué. Although no agreement was reached, Bahr was content with the conversation: Gromyko called it very enlightening and fairly promising for the Soviet side. Besides, Bahr still saw some room for slight modification of the Soviet position.¹⁴⁰ Four days later, on 10 February 1970, Gromyko and Bahr went through all of Bahr’s theses where the Soviets still had questions or disagreed. Bahr reported to Bonn that talks had ‘got down to the nitty-gritty’. Progress about a working paper had been made; but any mention of reunification was still rigidly rejected by the Soviets, as was the renunciation of the claim of sole representation by the Germans.¹⁴¹ On that same day, Allardt arranged a dinner in the German embassy for the Soviet as well as the German delegation, which he considered a success. This was the first time in thirty years that a Soviet Foreign Minister had accepted an invitation from the German ambassador.¹⁴² Equally, Bahr talked of the remarkably relaxed atmosphere that had now developed.¹⁴³ Indeed, Bahr had introduced a new, open style of negotiating, explaining his government’s interests while at the same time leaving no doubts about Bonn’s goodwill.¹⁴⁴ This was a great help in gradually thawing Moscow’s attitude and to interest it in honest negotiations. An agreement, however, still lay far ahead. To confirm that Moscow took Bonn seriously, the Prime Minister himself, Andrei Kosygin, accompanied by Falin and a translator, received Bahr and Allardt for a meeting on 13 February. However, the discussion revealed nothing new, because, as Kosygin admitted, he was not fully informed about the last round of talks, and final decisions had not yet been made. At the same time, Bahr was aware that over the next few days the Soviets would be busy analysing and would confront the ¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ ¹⁴² ¹⁴³ 1970. ¹⁴⁴

AAPD 1970 i, doc. 40: Bahr to Scheel, 6 Feb. 1970. AAPD 1970 i, docs. 44 and 46: Bahr, 10 Feb. 1970. Allardt, Moskauer Tagebuch, 270. AAPD 1970, i, doc. 51: Allardt to Scheel and State Secretary Harkort, 12 Feb. DzDP, 6th ser., 1, p. xxxiv.

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Germans with a decision reached ‘on a higher level’ in the next meeting. Depending on its outcome, the German delegation would have to decide between returning home, taking a break, and introducing a final round to formulate a working paper.¹⁴⁵ The meeting with Kosygin also revealed the tensions between Moscow and Ulbricht. Andropov’s personal messengers, who went by the code names of ‘Leo’ and ‘Slava’, told Bahr that ‘the man with the beard’ (Ulbricht) had tried to block Bahr’s appointment with Kosygin as well as the German–Soviet talks altogether, for fear that Moscow would ignore the GDR in a deal with Bonn.¹⁴⁶ In the next meeting, on 17 February 1970, Bahr and Gromyko agreed to interrupt talks for a week or more, because the Soviets needed more time to evaluate Bahr’s theses.¹⁴⁷ Thus the first round of talks between Bahr and Gromyko had been brought to an end. Bahr returned home ‘to change suits’,¹⁴⁸ as he put it, and to discuss the outcome with his government. Two weeks later, on 1 March 1970, Bahr returned to Moscow and the second round of talks started on 3 March. To Bahr’s surprise, however, Gromyko did not bring along a summary of Soviet reflections of the past weeks. Instead, there was discussion again of how the acceptance of borders could be combined with the goal of reunification. No new conclusions were reached—despite the fact that Bahr now proposed to accept the borders in the treaty text, provided that an exchange of letters mentioned the German goal of reunification in return. On Gromyko’s insistence, it was agreed that the two sides would record their theses in separate documents, each with their own formulations, and not in a common text as Bahr had wanted. The elaboration of a common text, or perhaps even a treaty, would be the second step. This, Bahr reported to Bonn, was Gromyko’s method of playing for time.¹⁴⁹ As agreed, Bahr at last handed over a so-called ‘non-paper’ a day before he met Gromyko on 6 March 1970, and Gromyko presented the ¹⁴⁵ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 54: Bahr and Kosygin, 13 Feb. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and State Secretary Harkort, 13 Feb. 1970. ¹⁴⁶ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 298–304, 315; Smyser, Yalta to Bonn, 233–4; David M. Keithly, Breakthrough in the Ostpolitik: The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), 75–8. ¹⁴⁷ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 59: Bahr, 17 Feb. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and Harkort, 17 Feb. 1970. ¹⁴⁸ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 59: Bahr, 17 Feb. 1970. ¹⁴⁹ Ibid., docs. 87 and 89: Bahr, 3 Mar. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and Harkort, 3 Mar. 1970.

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Soviet working paper in return. The state of Bonn’s dealings with East Berlin was also discussed in Moscow: Bahr informed Gromyko in private about the intra-German talks with the Chancellery’s Director-General Ulrich Sahm in East Berlin on 3 and 5 March 1970. He complained about the GDR’s rigid attitude and admonished that progress would be made only if both sides cooperated.¹⁵⁰ When Bahr reported home he made the following observations about his last encounter. The fact that the Soviet government had delivered written formulations was a further sign of its sincere effort to reach an agreement soon. Several Soviet formulations, such as the renunciation of the word ‘recognition’ in relation to the borders and the GDR, revealed the Kremlin’s more cooperative stance. Other theses were not acceptable, though. Altogether, Bahr concluded that a basis had now been created for a German–Soviet agreement purely about renunciation of force. The prime goal, however, had to be to create a regulated coexistence with the GDR via the renunciation-of-force treaty with Moscow. Therefore all means would have to be exhausted to reach a Soviet concession in the questions of ‘special relations between the FRG and GDR’ and ‘compatibility of the striving for a unification of the German state with the principles of non-aggression’. Bahr was not sure whether this would be possible, but concluded that it had to be tried by all means. He felt that a quick conclusion with Moscow could endow Bonn with tactical advantages in its dialogue with the GDR, but in the long run, it would disrupt a positive development of intra-German relations. He would now, Bahr reported, try to narrow down the discrepancy between both ‘non-papers’.¹⁵¹ In between the official talks, Bahr was busy finding out more about the decision-makers in Moscow and East Berlin via the Andropov channel. News about the Soviets’ and East Germans’ rejection of any consideration of the issue of reunification¹⁵² did not change his determination to uphold his demand without alteration. As Bahr told Brandt, he still hoped that he could assert himself with at least a one-sided declaration not contradicted by the Soviets.¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁰ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 93: Bahr, 6 Mar. 1970; ibid., doc. 95: Bahr to Scheel, 6 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵¹ Ibid.: Bahr to Scheel, 6 Mar. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and the State Secretary, 6 Mar. 1970; AAPD 1970, i, doc. 97: Bahr to Brandt and Scheel, 7 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵² These views were expressed during Gromyko’s visit to East Berlin on 24–7 Feb. 1970. ¹⁵³ Ibid., doc. 98: Bahr to Brandt, 7 Mar. 1970.

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In their eighth meeting, on 10 March 1970, the German and Soviet negotiating partners engaged in a tough discussion about the two working drafts. For over four hours they worked through all the points of the papers. Again, the main points of contention were the border question and German unification. Moscow wanted particular borders to be mentioned, but Bahr refused to do this unless the German goal of unification was mentioned in return. Once more, Bahr offered to do this in a separate letter and then read out a draft he had prepared. Gromyko, however, merely replied that the Soviet attitude was more than clear and that he ‘had nothing to add to this now’. The only agreement reached was that their colleagues in the delegations should now try and settle on formulations out of the thoughts that had been exchanged.¹⁵⁴ As agreed, a working paper was produced the next day by Councillor Peckert and Valentin Falin, the director of the political department at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It consisted of a middle column entitled ‘working text’, which was elaborated by the editing committee consisting of Peckert and Falin, and side columns, which reflected the already formulated, still irreconcilable, viewpoints of the two delegations. Furthermore, the paper was split up into points 1 to 4, which were designed to be part of a future non-aggression treaty, and theses 5 to 11, which were accompanying declarations of intent.¹⁵⁵ That same day, Bahr sent both Brandt and Carl-Werner Sanne, the Chancellery’s Ministerialdirigent, a letter expressing his optimism about the state of things in Moscow. It was possible now to say that an agreement about the content of a treaty had been reached. Bahr thought it very likely that he would assert himself concerning some sort of reassurance about the goal of unification.¹⁵⁶ The new working paper was talked through during the subsequent meetings, on 13, 14, and 21 March 1970, between Bahr, Gromyko, and Falin. Some points were fully agreed upon without any problems. These were the introduction (point 1), the reference to the principles of the UN Charter as the guiding line in this renunciation-of-force treaty (point 2), the validity of bilateral or multilateral treaties concluded in the past (point 4), and both governments’ as well as the GDR’s ¹⁵⁴ Ibid., doc. 104: Bahr, 10 Mar. 1970; see also docs. 106 and 112: Bahr to Scheel and Harkort, 10 and 11 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵⁵ Ibid., doc. 114, n. 1: Allardt, 11 Mar. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel, 12 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵⁶ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 115: Bahr to Brandt, 12 Mar. 1970.

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preparedness to foster an accession of both the FRG and the GDR into the UN (point 8). On 21 March 1970, both Gromyko and Bahr stated that the second round of talks had come to an end. They would now take a break of a few weeks to let their governments reflect on the points made by both sides. Later they would be able to see whether they could find formulations that could be translated into treaty articles.¹⁵⁷ During the break in talks, members of the Bonn government made plans on how to proceed. It was agreed that in order to settle the disputed questions, a compromise should be made, not on the border and unification issue, but on the point on the nature of intra-German relations.¹⁵⁸ When the third round of the dialogue was opened on 12 May, Bahr introduced the plan agreed upon in Bonn: he reported that Bonn was ready to accept the Soviet formulation concerning the question of intra-German relations but that, in turn, the German goal of unification would have to be mentioned somewhere.¹⁵⁹ Bahr drew a positive balance of this encounter and reported that Gromyko was toying with the idea of accepting a letter about unification if the formulation about the borders was made more precise.¹⁶⁰ But Bahr erred in assuming that things would now proceed steadily. The Soviet leaders in the Politburo were evidently not agreed on the conditions under which they should negotiate with Bonn. This explains why, on 15 May 1970, Gromyko presented an entirely new formulation on the border question. Bahr regarded it as unacceptable in many ways. Besides, he thought it inappropriate to question again, at this stage, the formulations about the borders, which were the result of hours of effort.¹⁶¹ Alarmed at the new formulation of the border point, Bahr arranged for a discussion with Falin about this issue. Falin appeared to be open to compromise.¹⁶² A day later, Bahr and Falin edited a final version of point 6 and reached some compromises on point 3 about the borders. ¹⁵⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel and the State Secretary, 13 Mar. 1970; i, doc. 118: Bahr, 13 Mar. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429, B/1: Bahr, 14 Mar. 1970; AAPD 1970, i, doc. 125: Bahr, 21 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵⁸ Ibid., doc. 139: Stempel to Scheel, 1 Apr. 1970; ibid., doc. 161: Bahr, 17 Apr. 1970; ibid., doc. 196: Ruete, 5 May 1970. For further details see pp. 156–60. ¹⁵⁹ Ibid., doc. 201: Bahr, 12 May 1970. ¹⁶⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr to Scheel, 12 May 1970; AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 205: Bahr to Brandt, 14 May 1970. ¹⁶¹ Ibid., docs. 206 and 207: Bahr, 15 May 1970, and Bahr to Scheel, 15 May 1970. ¹⁶² Ibid., doc. 214: Bahr to Scheel, 18 May 1970.

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The border point now read: ‘the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union agree in their awareness [Russian: recognition] that peace in Europe can only be preserved if nobody touches the existing borders.’ In a following sentence, the actual borders were mentioned. Bahr and Falin agreed to finalize point 3 the following day.¹⁶³ However, on 20 May 1970, Falin reported that the results agreed had not been accepted by his minister because they looked like a backward step. Therefore, Falin asked Bahr to think again about the possibility of using the word ‘recognition’. Bahr explained that this was impossible and urged Falin to have a word with his minister again. As Bahr stressed retrospectively, he wanted to avoid the ominous word ‘recognition’ by all means.¹⁶⁴ However, Gromyko did not: in the next encounter on that same day, he insisted that the word ‘recognition’ would greatly facilitate negotiations and asked Bahr to accept his new paper as the basis for an agreement about the borders. He added coolly that he had heard about Bahr’s plan to depart to Bonn for consultations and that his government would still be interested in continuing the exchange after Bahr’s return to Moscow. Bahr, in turn, urged the Soviet Foreign Minister to continue on the basis of the theses elaborated in the working sessions rather than on the basis of his recent paper. He tried to prevent an interruption of talks by pointing out that he was not obliged to return to Bonn quickly and that they could meet again in a few days. Looking back, Bahr noted about this encounter: Gromyko behaves like a stubborn elephant . . ., pretending the meeting with Falin never happened . . . and asking for the examination of his recent proposals . . . . In the bug-proof cabin of the embassy I cursed at Gromyko, who . . . nearly sent us out of his country. Only afterwards did I learn . . . that I had done him wrong. Sanne’s quest had led to an enquiry at Soviet places; this had been reported to the minister, who believed I wanted to pressurize him by my departure.¹⁶⁵

Similarly, Peckert recalled the encounter of 20 May as a particularly disappointing session.¹⁶⁶ ¹⁶³ Ibid., n. 8: Bahr, 18 May 1970. ¹⁶⁴ Ibid., docs. 219 and 220: Bahr to Scheel, 20 May 1970; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 317; see also Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer-Knaur, 1995), 92–4. ¹⁶⁵ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 317; Falin, Erinnerungen, 95–8. ¹⁶⁶ Peckert, Zeitwende, 161.

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In hindsight, such haggling over a single word—the ‘recognition’ or ‘inviolability’ of the borders—seems absurd, even amusing. It becomes more understandable, however, when one conceives of Bonn and Moscow’s quarrelling as the clashing not only of conflicting national interests, but also of two diametrically opposed, Eastern and Western, belief systems. The rigidity of Moscow’s reasoning was a symptom of a communist state feeling constantly threatened by the capitalist West and its Federal German version of social democratism.¹⁶⁷ Bahr reasoned that Gromyko’s position was due to inner Soviet troubles. The Soviet Union had to weigh up the pros and cons of an open conflict with Warsaw and the GDR and an agreement with the FRG. This situation was discomforting to the Soviets, so they wanted to have time to think about it and examine everything again. Consequently, Bahr was planning his return to Bonn, despite the fact that a break in the exchange of views would probably lead to a stiffening of both fronts.¹⁶⁸ But instead of departing, Bahr wrote Gromyko a letter stating that he had earnestly thought about returning home because it seemed pointless to continue the exchange of views, now that its results were being questioned again. Falin called on Bahr the same afternoon: he assured him that his minister had happily taken notice of the elaboration of the texts in the morning. Bahr’s reaction in the letter had been too harsh; Gromyko had not yet been able to take a position as a result of the collective leadership structure. He, Falin, was convinced that the session on the next day would proceed much more satisfactorily. Bahr, in turn, warned Falin that he would be prepared to react in a similar way, and in front of the entire delegation, should Gromyko continue his pressure. He then delivered a draft of the letter about unification.¹⁶⁹ Indeed, Gromyko was instructed by the Politburo to give in, and so the next day, 22 May 1970, he explained to Bahr that he now had time only to test the results of the working session, and that he was ready to accept this text as a basis for a possible agreement. Bahr thanked ¹⁶⁷ See e.g. Brezhnev to the SED leadership, 20 Aug. 1970, in Niedhart, ‘Revisionistische Elemente’, 238; see also Avril Pittman, From Ostpolitik to Reunification: West German–Soviet Political Relations since 1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 65–6. ¹⁶⁸ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 222 and AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr, 20 May 1970. ¹⁶⁹ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 227: Bahr to Scheel, 21 May 1970; see also Kervorkov, Geheime Kanal, 77.

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the minister. After the other points had been compared, they had now reached a stage at which this exchange of views could be ended. Bahr and Gromyko then agreed that they would take a break during which both sides would report to and consult with their governments about how to translate the first part of the working text into a treaty, while the second part would be considered as accepted. Before parting, Bahr and Gromyko agreed on the text of a short press release informing the public about the state of things without revealing any of the results.¹⁷⁰ ‘Done. Telegram will follow,’ is how Bahr commented on this in a note to Scheel half an hour later. In that telegram he further observed that the result enforced through his warning letter was a sign of the Soviet government’s determination to reach a conclusion quickly, despite the reserve expressed in East Berlin and Warsaw.¹⁷¹ Hence, after fifty-five hours of tedious negotiations, Bahr and Gromyko had agreed on a ten-point working paper containing issues that had weighed heavily on West German–Soviet ties for twentyfive years. This paper was soon leaked to the West German press and dubbed the ‘Bahr paper’. It stipulated, as had been intended by Bahr, that the Moscow Treaty and the other treaties with the Eastern European countries should form an entity. With the Bahr paper the essence of the Moscow Treaty had been agreed upon. Most notably, it linked West Germany’s recognition of the ‘inviolability’ of the existing borders, including explicitly the Oder–Neisse line and the intra-German border, to the Soviets’ readiness to accept a letter raising the issue of German unification. The term ‘inviolable’ rather than the preferred Soviet word ‘immutable’ (unchangeable) arguably kept the door open for a later peaceful revision of the intra-German frontier. What followed was a summer break of eight weeks in which those who had been involved in the negotiating process consulted on the results reached with different parties, such as colleagues in the government, leaders of the opposition, and the Allies.¹⁷² Additionally, preparations were made within the Auswärtige Amt to open formal negotiations with Moscow. After a draft treaty had been worked out, the cabinet finally, on 23 July 1970, gave its approval to the opening of negotiations on ¹⁷⁰ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 229: Bahr, 22 May 1970; Falin, Erinnerungen, 96–8. ¹⁷¹ AAPD 1970, ii, docs. 230 and 231: Bahr to Scheel, 22 May 1970. ¹⁷² The decision-making process of the Moscow Treaty will be explained in Chapter 3.

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the basis of the exchange as conducted so far and of the government’s official reservations concerning the national goal of unification.¹⁷³

German–Soviet Negotiations under Scheel On this basis, negotiations could finally be started between the German and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Walter Scheel and Andrei Gromyko, who had the power to sign the treaty. On 27 July 1970, Scheel and Gromyko, together with their delegates, met twice, for a duty call in the morning and a discussion in the afternoon, both very general exchanges. On the following day, Scheel delivered Gromyko the revised treaty text, the result of the collection of papers that had been elaborated by the Auswärtige Amt over the summer. Most importantly, the German acceptance of borders, article 3 of the Bahr paper, had been subsumed into the preceding article 2 on Soviet non-aggression, by a reference sentence, the so-called ‘bridge’. The Four-Power rights,¹⁷⁴ as well as the outstanding peace settlement, were also mentioned in the preamble of the treaty in return for the explicit mention of the Oder–Neisse line in the border article. Owing to the unauthorized publication of the Bahr paper, however, Scheel’s room for manoeuvre was very small; revisions of the text were almost impossible for the Soviets for reasons of prestige.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, Gromyko immediately stressed that the text had to be left as it was. Not even a comma could be omitted if the negotiating parties wanted to be sure of avoiding war.¹⁷⁶ In the next meeting, when State Secretary Paul Frank read out and explained the revised treaty text, his description of these modifications as ‘minimal’ and essential for the ratification of the treaty fell on deaf ears: Falin declined the proposals instantly as taking negotiations back to a ‘long ago’ stage. Falin dismissed Frank’s main reasoning for the modifications with the parliamentary and legal constraints as being ¹⁷³ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 329: State Secretary’s office, 23 July 1970. ¹⁷⁴ ‘The Four-Power rights’ refer to the Allies’ special rights in Germany that, though curtailed in the Paris Treaties of 1955, still applied to questions pertaining to Berlin and Germany as a whole. Although the Allies’ special rights changed in both meaning and relevance over the long period of their existence, they remained valid until the 2 + 4 Treaty (of the Federal and Democratic Republic of Germany, plus the Four Allies) went into effect in 1991. In any Ostpolitical dealings Bonn therefore had to respect these Four-Power rights. For more information see pp. 242–8. ¹⁷⁵ For further details of these indiscretions, see pp. 168–70. ¹⁷⁶ AAPD 1970, ii, docs. 337 and 338: Scheel and Gromyko, 28 July 1970.

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none of Moscow’s business. Should the treaty indeed not pass the Bundestag this would be a sign that the time for a German–Soviet treaty was not ripe. Falin therefore handed Frank back his papers and suggested that negotiations should take place on the basis of the agreed Bahr principles.¹⁷⁷ As Frank commented retrospectively, his proposals triggered a ‘strange unease’ among the Soviet delegation. Falin opted for the typical Soviet behaviour, ‘to know but not to acknowledge receipt of the text’.¹⁷⁸ By contrast, he noted in retrospect that his refusal to accept the catalogue of German requirements had not been planned, but that to accept it would have meant including them in the treaty work.¹⁷⁹ The next discussion on the ministerial level between Scheel and Gromyko proceeded similarly unsuccessfully. In response to Scheel’s repeated references to the need for a parliamentary majority and legal conformity as the only purpose of his proposals, Gromyko merely emphasized that the absolute limit of retreat had been reached. Only a renunciation of force without reservations was of interest; if article 2 were linked to the border question, it would mean that a revision of borders was illegal only if force was used. In that case his side was no longer interested in the treaty.¹⁸⁰ Hence, the negotiations, having barely started, already seemed to have come to a dead end. Scheel himself reported on the ‘essentially negative development of present negotiations’. However, in an optimistic manner that was characteristic of him, Scheel equally pointed out some positive elements, namely Gromyko’s repeatedly expressed readiness to receive a letter on reunification, the explicit abandonment for the first time of ‘intervention rights’, as in articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, and the interest expressed in related treaties in other areas.¹⁸¹ In their attempt to find a way of continuing, members of the German delegation came up with the positive conclusion that in the light of Gromyko’s latest remarks the ‘old’ text of the treaty would be acceptable to Bonn, even if none of the proposals were considered.¹⁸² Hence, in the next discussion with Gromyko, Scheel underlined that ¹⁷⁷ Ibid., ii, doc. 339: Frank and Falin, 28 July 1970. ¹⁷⁸ Paul Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft: Ein Diplomat macht Inventur (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981), 290; AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 339: State Secretary’s office, 28 July 1970. ¹⁷⁹ Falin, Erinnerungen, 103. ¹⁸⁰ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 340: Scheel and Gromyko, 29 July 1970. ¹⁸¹ Ibid.: Scheel to von Braun, 29 July 1970. For details of disagreement within the German delegation over the troubled start of negotiations, see pp. 174–7. ¹⁸² AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 341: Frowein and Fleischhauer, 29 July 1970.

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the two viewpoints were in fact not far away from each other. Given the remaining disagreement over important questions, however, he suggested that firstly those questions in which an agreement seemed possible, such as the preamble and the renunciation-of-force article, should be discussed by representatives. Gromyko agreed.¹⁸³ Though only on a ‘cosmetic level’, the Soviets disproved their opinion that ‘not even a comma could be changed any more’ in the meeting of the representatives, who proved themselves able to negotiate in a much more constructive manner than the two ministers. Step by step, Frank and Falin discussed theses 4, 2, and 1 of the Bahr paper and translated them into treaty articles.¹⁸⁴ On the ministerial level, by contrast, Gromyko continued to show Scheel the cold shoulder. The discussion about the formulation of these articles was continued, but in a very general manner. The issues of the mention of the Allies’ rights as well as of the outstanding peace settlement were brought up, but Gromyko refused to mention either of them in the treaty text.¹⁸⁵ Bahr took stock and estimated that Gromyko’s refusal to mention either the outstanding peace settlement or the Allies’ rights mirrored a resolution by the Politburo which was irreversible but could be lived with because an assent to these demands had not really been expected in Bonn anyway. As to the ‘bridge’ between articles 2 and 3, however, Gromyko would have to revise his opinion. In this situation it was important not to raise new demands or to give the impression of slowing down negotiations, nor to ‘be rushed’.¹⁸⁶ Further intense, but fruitless debate about the disputed questions dominated the meeting between Scheel and Gromyko a day later, on 1 August. The only compromise solution that seemed to emerge between them was that Bonn would, with Moscow’s implicit authorization, mention the Allies’ rights and the peace treaty in a separate exchange of letters with the Allies. A Soviet accommodation regarding the border article was not impossible, Scheel concluded confidently, not least because of positive signals he had received via the unofficial channel.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, as bull-headed as Moscow still appeared, it was by that stage keen to set the seal on the recognition treaty with Bonn, thereby safeguarding the stabilization of its empire. Consequently, in a private discussion in ¹⁸³ ¹⁸⁴ ¹⁸⁵ ¹⁸⁶ ¹⁸⁷

AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 343: Scheel and Gromyko, 30 July 1970. Ibid., docs. 345 and 349: Frank and Falin, 31 July and 1 Aug. 1970. Ibid., doc. 346: Scheel, 31 July 1970. Ibid., doc. 347: Bahr, 31 July 1970. Ibid., doc. 351: Scheel, 1 Aug. 1970; Kevorkov, Geheime Kanal, 274.

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his dacha on 2 August 1970, Gromyko gave Scheel his approval for the link between the border and renunciation-of-force article.¹⁸⁸ This was the breakthrough in negotiations. What remained to be settled were the secondary questions, and these turned out to require much less troublesome negotiation. Firstly, the preamble was worked through in two meetings between Frank and Falin.¹⁸⁹ Secondly, the content of a letter on German unity was agreed on. Moreover, the form of the mention of the Allies’ rights and the peace settlement was settled in further ‘unofficial’ discussions between the two representatives. It was agreed that Gromyko would deliver only a verbal declaration on the Allies’ rights. As to the peace settlement, Bonn could testify in a note to the Western Allies that their special rights were not affected by the treaty.¹⁹⁰ Gromyko and Scheel could state on 4 August that the whole text of the treaty had been tackled. Before agreeing to signal it, however, negotiations once more threatened to be obstructed, this time by Scheel’s demand to omit the explicit mention of the Oder–Neisse line in the border article. But Scheel realized that Gromyko would never consent to such a demand and so the topic was dropped again. All that remained to be done thereafter was to polish the text of the whole treaty, including the accompanying documents, and to discuss related questions, such as German–Soviet economic cooperation.¹⁹¹ Thus, on 5 August 1970, Scheel described the results as ‘fully satisfactory’ and asked Brandt to authorize him to sign.¹⁹² On 6 August, the two Foreign Ministers declared their negotiations to be officially concluded. The Moscow Treaty was signed in the Kremlin on 12 August 1970, by Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel for the Federal Republic, and Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko for the Soviet Union. As to the Berlin question, however, all German efforts to have it mentioned in the treaty or in a letter, as had been envisaged for this further ‘key point’ particularly by Brandt,¹⁹³ were without success.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, Brandt contented himself with a one-sided German declaration. This declaration stressed the central importance ¹⁸⁸ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 353: Scheel, 2 Aug. 1970. ¹⁸⁹ Ibid., ii, docs. 355 and 356: Frank and Falin, 3 Aug. 1970. ¹⁹⁰ Ibid., docs. 359 and 363: Scheel to Braun, 4 Aug. 1970. ¹⁹¹ Ibid., docs. 360, 365, 367, and 368: Scheel and Gromyko, 4 Aug. 1970. ¹⁹² Ibid., doc. 371: Scheel, 6 Aug. 1970. ¹⁹³ e.g. ibid., docs. 354 and 358: Brandt to Bahr, 3 Aug. 1970. ¹⁹⁴ Ibid., doc. 375: Gromyko, 6 Aug. 1970; also ibid., doc. 382: Bahr and Falin, 5 and 7 Aug. 1970.

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of a satisfactory solution in and around Berlin for détente in Europe, and stressed that the Moscow Treaty would be ratified only once such a satisfactory Berlin Agreement was concluded between the Four Powers. Hence, in a bold and risky gamble, Brandt had tied the ratification of the Moscow Treaty completely to the results of the Four-Power talks on Berlin, and thereby linked his New Ostpolitik as a whole to issues that were beyond his control. This gamble was to pay off a year later, however, when the Four Powers concluded the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

2 New Ostpolitik—Whose Legacy? ‘ C O N T RO L L E D C O E X I S T E N C E ’ R AT H E R T H A N ‘ PE AC E F U L C O O PE R AT I O N ’ : K I E S I N G E R A N D B R A N D T C O M PE T E F O R O S T P O L I T I K As has been seen, the Moscow Treaty had its origins in the renunciationof-force talks begun by the Grand Coalition government. Thus the preliminary renunciation-of-force talks which commenced in 1966 can be identified as the foundation stone for the start of official negotiations under the new government in 1969. Such a view contrasts with the picture that, until recently, dominated the historiography of Ostpolitik, namely that the Ostpolitik introduced by the Brandt government in 1969 broke completely with the preceding Ostpolitik.¹ It therefore raises the question of whether the pre-1969 renunciation-of-force policy was indeed an indispensable precondition for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty or merely an insignificant prelude. In other words, did Brandt’s New Ostpolitik build on the Grand Coalition’s Ostpolitik, or did it break with it? Moreover, should Brandt or Kiesinger be credited with authorship of the pre-1969 Ostpolitik? For clarification, this chapter focuses on a comparison between the CDU and SPD positions, which have generally been regarded as being representative of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Ostpolitik respectively. Firstly, the official Ostpolitik of the Grand Coalition government is analysed according to the degree of cooperation or disagreement between the two coalition partners, Chancellor Kiesinger (CDU) and Foreign Minister Brandt (SPD). This is followed by an investigation of the concepts of the Eastern policies of both the CDU/CSU and the SPD and the degree to which either (or both) of these concepts can be regarded as an early form of the New Ostpolitik introduced ¹ This has been discussed in the Introduction.

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in October. Only thereafter is it feasible to judge whether the subsequent Eastern policy under Chancellor Brandt was the legacy of the CDU/CSU or SPD and whether it was a product of continuity or change.

Initial Consensus and Goodwill To start with, the Grand Coalition’s formation was based on broad consensus on foreign policy between the CDU/CSU and SPD (see Figure 4). After a preliminary clarification of some disputed questions in particular of Deutschlandpolitik² between Kiesinger, his confidant Freiherr Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg, and his SPD counterpart Herbert Wehner, the CDU/CSU and SPD managed to formulate compromises on all disputed issues of foreign policy.³ As Kiesinger was aware, during the negotiation process there was much more common ground with the SPD than with the FDP. Whereas the FDP had turned out to entertain ‘romantic’ ideals and hence to be unsuitable

Figure 4. The cabinet of the Grand Coalition. In the front row, from left to right: K¨ate Strobel, Heinrich L¨ubke, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, and Willy Brandt. ² This term refers to West German policy towards East Germany. ³ Karl-Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Fußnoten (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971), 126; August H. Leugers-Scherzberg, Die Wandlungen des Herbert Wehner: Von der Volksfront zur Grossen Koalition (Berlin: Propyl¨aen, 2002), 333.

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as a coalition partner, Kiesinger concluded that the SPD and CDU would make a better coalition for Ostpolitik.⁴ Even Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the CDU’s more orthodox ‘sister party’, the Bavarian CSU, agreed with the Social Democrats’ view on foreign policy.⁵ Similarly, Bahr considered a coalition government of the SPD with the CDU. He pointed to the general ‘points of contact’ between the two parties in thought about foreign as well as domestic policy.⁶ Thus, at the outset of the Grand Coalition government there was a considerable degree of agreement, albeit a somewhat superficial one, between the coalition partners about Ostpolitik as primarily a d´etente policy aiming at a European peace order. That order would have to guarantee two things: security from Germany, and security for Germany by means of d´etente and disarmament on the part of the two opposing alliance systems. A peace order on these grounds would, it was hoped, make German reunification happen.⁷ Moreover, it was agreed by all that, unlike in Schr¨oder’s preceding foreign policy programme, priority would be given to relations with Moscow over those with the Eastern European states, and that the GDR would also be addressed, though not recognized as a state. As mentioned above,⁸ the exchange of renunciation-of-force declarations was explicitly put on the agenda in the government declaration. It is notable that the offer was now made to involve ‘the unsolved problem of the German division’ in this exchange.⁹ In the early period of the Grand Coalition government, the overall climate of relations between the two coalition partners was one of goodwill. As Klaus Sch¨utz, State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry ⁴ ACDP, 08-001, 418/2: Kiesinger to the parliamentary party committee, 28 Nov. 1966. ⁵ Heribert Knorr, Der parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß w¨ahrend der Grossen Koalition 1966 bis 1969: Strukturen und Einfluß der Koalitionsfraktionen und ihr Verh¨altnis zur Regierung der Grossen Koalition (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1975), 38. ⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Bahr, 7 Nov. 1966. ⁷ Carsten Tessmer, ‘‘Thinking the Unthinkable’’ to ‘‘Make the Impossible Possible’’: Ostpolitik, Intra-German Policy, and the Moscow Treaty, 1969–1970’, in David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), American D´etente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972 (Washington: German Historical Institute, 2004), 53. ⁸ See p 27. ⁹ ACDP, 08-001, 418/2: Kiesinger to the parliamentary party’s committee on 28 November 1966; Dokumente zur Außenpolitik, iii: Moskau-Bonn: Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands 1955–1973: Dokumentation, ed. Boris Meissner, 2 vols. (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975), ii, 1067: Kiesinger, 13 December 1966.

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and close associate of Brandt, testifies, cooperation between the SPDled Foreign Ministry and the CDU/CSU-led Chancellery, as well as between the Social Democratic and Conservative State Secretaries, was ‘without friction’ during the first ten months.¹⁰ In particular, cooperation between the planning sections of the Foreign Ministry and Chancellery was envisaged. It was hampered only because the planning staff within the Chancellery had still not taken up their duties by August 1967.¹¹ Nonetheless, goodwill and the shared determination to change German–Soviet relations for the better did not translate into a wellfunctioning common government policy. Instead, government policy was characterized by immobility and the postponement of decisions about how to proceed with German–Soviet relations. The Soviet note of 28 January 1967, for instance, in which the Kremlin had expressed its interest in an exchange about renunciation-of-force declarations, was not answered for months despite Bonn’s reciprocal interest. Eventually, on 3 May 1967, Kiesinger addressed it for the first time in a letter to his minister, Brandt. In it, he underlined his interest in sending Moscow a note, but at an ‘appropriate point in time’, and asked Brandt to forward a draft of such a note soon.¹² Even the opposition party, the FDP, made an issue out of the government’s inactivity in Ostpolitik: in June 1967, Erich Mende, MP and former Minister for All-German Affairs, criticized the government for its lack of decision-making on unresolved issues, and specifically for still not having replied to either the Soviet note of January or Stoph’s letter.¹³

Development of Two Rival Eastern Policies From the start, each partner in government unofficially started developing its own line. This was due to the division between the parties. They ¹⁰ Klaus Sch¨utz, Logenplatz und Schleudersitz: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Ullstein, 1992), 119; see also the official Staden to Stephan Fuchs, in Stephan Fuchs, ‘Dreiecksverh¨altnisse sind inmer kompliziert’: Kissinger, Bahr und die Ostpolitik (Hamburg: Europ¨aische Verlagsarstalt and Rotbuch Verlag, 1999), 135. ¹¹ PA, B 9, 178.340: Diehl, 17 Aug. 1967. ¹² PA, B 3, 21: Kiesinger, 3 May 1967. ¹³ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestagses: Stenographische Berichte (Andernach: Allein Vertrieb, H. Heger, 1950) vol. 64, 5299: Mende, 7 June 1967. For further discussion of the disagreement over initiatives towards East Germany see Daniela Taschler, Vor neuen Herausforderungen: Die außen- und Deutschlandpolitische Debatte in der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion w¨ahrend der Grossen Koalition (D¨usseldorf: Droste, 2001), 122–9.

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were never bridged to the extent that it was possible to speak of a single CDU/SPD Ostpolitik. The two parties had long stood at opposite ends of West German politics, and their interaction had often been characterized by a harsh, intolerant rivalry, particularly prior to the SPD’s political reorientation at the end of the 1950s.¹⁴ An even more important reason for the party-political differences was the composition of the Grand Coalition government itself. The situation was unprecedented in that the CDU/CSU was confronted by a coalition partner of nearly equal political weight. This increased the desire, characteristic of West German politics, on both sides to establish a profile in contrast with the coalition partner.¹⁵ As the German magazine Der Spiegel observed, ‘the trouble with this government is that we have a Foreign Minister who would also like to be Chancellor, and a Chancellor who would also like to be Foreign Minister’.¹⁶ Hence foreign policy emerged as the main battleground. Consequently, it is clear that two distinct policies were being devised from the start. Willy Brandt’s long experience of foreign affairs, the calibre of staff he brought with him, notably Egon Bahr, and the strong position of the SPD in the coalition made him a very influential Foreign Minister and one who could operate swiftly.¹⁷ The continuation of talks with Moscow, especially about a renunciation of force, as introduced by Carstens, was immediately put on the Foreign Ministry’s agenda in January 1967. Intense preparations followed in the next few months for an exchange of notes with the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Around this time, ¹⁴ Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 209. Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1930–1982 (Munich: Droemer-Knaur, 2004), 236, also testifies that cooperation within the Grand Coalition became increasingly difficult. ¹⁵ William E. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’, in Stephen Padgett (ed.), Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German Chancellorship (London: Hurst, 1994), 133; Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 23; Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage: 1994), 29. For further information on the role of coalitions in the German governments see Karlheinz Niclauß, ‘The Federal Government: Variations of Chancellor Dominance’, in Ludger Helms (ed.), Institutions and Institutional Change in the Federal Republic of Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 65–83. ¹⁶ Der Spiegel (20 June 1967). ¹⁷ Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’ 133. This will be discussed on pp. 113–14. ¹⁸ e.g. BAK, N 1474, 62: 1 Feb. 1967; PA, B 150: 24 Feb., 9 May and 15 June 1967. For various discussions on that topic see also: AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 400, 1: 17 March 1967; PA, B 150: 30 March 1967; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341: 2 May 1967. For more details see pp. 114–17.

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despite the scepticism of CDU members, Wehner, the Minister for All-German Affairs, also started pushing the renunciation-of-force offer, including that to the GDR.¹⁹ In fact, Wehner was planning, as he revealed to several journalists without consulting the Chancellor, that the exchange of renunciation-of-force declarations would be the first step towards a confederation and later reunification of the two Germanies.²⁰ Moreover, the few Social Democratic State Secretaries started meeting regularly, in order to stay in close contact and to guarantee a common SPD line.²¹ In the CDU camp, the renunciation-of-force issue was also picked as a central theme, but with more mixed feelings. This was probably due to the fact that, compared with the SPD, the CDU was a much more heterogeneous party with strong factions and a greater diversity of opinion on foreign policy.²² Despite this, Kiesinger’s Chancellery managed to remain the centre for CDU policy-making. It was also the main check on the Foreign Ministry, particularly as both its State Secretaries, Guttenberg and Carstens, were foreign policy experts.²³ Kiesinger appeared to be in favour of the renunciation-of-force idea. This became apparent most notably in March 1967: without consulting with his coalition partner, Kiesinger dispatched his friend Hans Schirmer, a high-ranking aide at the Federal Press Office, on a secret mission to Moscow to explain his approach and explore any possible common ground.²⁴ The encounter had pronounced after-effects in that it was to encourage Kiesinger’s hopes of a successful dialogue with Moscow, at least in the beginning of his Chancellorship.²⁵ ¹⁹ BAK, B 136, 3659: Wehner in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, 17 Jan. and 16 Feb. 1967; ACDP, 01–276, 311: Wehner, Hessischer Rundfunk (Hesse broadcasting company), 1 Apr. 1967. ²⁰ Dirk Kroegel, Einen Anfang finden! Kurt Georg Kiesinger in der Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der Großen Koalition (Munich: Oldenbourg: 1997), 131–4; see also ACDP, 01–276, 311: Wehner, NDR, 22 Apr. 1967; Wehner in the Stuttgarter Nachrichten (4 July 1967). ²¹ Sch¨utz, Logenplatz und Schleudersitz, 119. ²² See pp. 91–2 for more details. ²³ Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’, 134. ²⁴ For further details see G¨unter Buchstab, ‘Geheimdiplomatie zwischen zwei bequemen L¨osungen: Zur Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik Kiesingers’, in Karl Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds.), Staat und Parteien: Festschrift f¨ur Rudolf Morsey zum 65. Geburtstag (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1992), 892–901. In an interview with the author on 9 June 2004, Bahr confirmed he had known nothing about such a secret mission. ²⁵ G¨unter Diehl, Zwischen Politik und Presse: Bonner Erinnerungen 1949–1969 (Bonn: Societ¨ats-Verlag, 1994), 429. By contrast, Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, 53–6, and Kroegel, Anfang finden, 188, argue the converse, that signals which Moscow sent

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Interestingly, the CDU/CSU developed its own policy as a reaction to the SPD’s ‘ostpolitical’ activity. By the end of March 1967, Wehner had composed a letter to the East German SED containing proposals for ‘regulated coexistence’. Only after pronounced protest by the CDU/CSU did the coalition partners agree that this initiative would not be launched by the SPD alone. Rather, it would be accompanied by a ‘programme of action’ concerning intra-German relations introduced by Kiesinger in the Bundestag.²⁶ Although a concerted policy prevailed, the CDU/CSU was alerted to such maneouvres by the Social Democrats. Consequently, it was considered necessary, mainly by Guttenberg, to develop a party programme on Ostpolitik so that this particular field of foreign policy would not be left to the Social Democrats.²⁷ The formulation of proper theses for a CDU Deutschlandpolitik rather than mere responses to actual political problems was also intended to help to counter the general uncertainty which Guttenberg observed was spreading within his party regarding questions on this policy.²⁸ By April 1967, the party leadership had developed a CDU/CSU party programme.²⁹ Yet this is not to say that the CDU/CSU aimed to create an entirely separate policy. It was equally emphasized that the CDU programme should leave enough room for both party programmes to be adapted to a common governmental Ostpolitik in order to avoid a crisis developing within the coalition.³⁰ Equally, Kiesinger underlined his intention to convene leaders of both coalition parties in order to consult on the next steps in German policy.³¹ But the rivalry between the CDU-led Chancellery and SPD-led Foreign Ministry was increasing. Bahr gave expression to this when, in May 1967, he complained that the position of the Chancellor was growing too strong in relation to that of the Foreign Minister. He urged Brandt to ensure that actions in foreign policy were increasingly administrated by the Ausw¨artige Amt, rather than by the Chancellery.³² after this secret mission made Kiesinger much more sceptical about the prospects of a successful exchange with Moscow. ²⁶ Ibid. 142–4. ²⁷ BAK, N 1397, 170: Guttenberg, 6 Apr. 1967. ²⁸ Ibid.: Guttenberg, 5 May 1967. ²⁹ Ibid.: Guttenberg to Kiesinger, 6 Apr. 1967, CDU Commission for Foreign Policy, 12 April 1967, Guttenberg, 26 Apr., and Guttenberg and Kiesinger in a series of meetings, Apr. 1967; Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 138–9. ³⁰ BAK, N 1397, 170: Guttenberg, 6 Apr. 1967. ³¹ Ibid.: Guttenberg, 5 May 1967. ³² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Bahr, 19 May 1967.

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Kiesinger, in turn, was by that time already suspicious of Brandt and his adviser Bahr. His suspicions had been triggered when Brandt had expounded his view on politics towards Moscow to Kiesinger shortly after the issuing of the inaugural government declaration. Brandt had argued that since the Soviet Union would not be able to hold its empire together it would be possible to try and liberate the East. This could be done via the GDR, which constituted the weak point on the Western front. By no longer calling the GDR’s existence into question, it would lose its function of holding the Soviet empire together. Kiesinger rejected this ‘illusory’ viewpoint vehemently. He argued that firstly, the Kremlin would see through Bonn’s intentions and would be sure to thwart its plans. Secondly, the policy of liberation of the Eastern bloc would result in a Soviet intervention like that in Berlin in 1953.³³ Thenceforward, he would watch the Foreign Ministry with suspicion. Added to this was a strained personal relationship between Chancellor Kiesinger, an ex-Nazi, and Foreign Minister Brandt, a former political exile and resistance fighter, which made their cohabitation uneasy. Sahm, then Ministerialdirigent at the Ausw¨artige Amt, confirmed retrospectively that cooperation between the two ministries ‘did not function very well’.³⁴ In addition, Carstens, State Secretary at the Chancellery, pointed to tensions with his counterpart, State Secretary Duckwitz at the Ausw¨artige Amt.³⁵ The dissenting attitudes between CDU and SPD were suddenly revealed for the first time in May 1967 over an issue related to Soviet policy, namely the letter Kiesinger had received from Willi Stoph, chairman of the East German Council of Ministers. Stoph proposed to normalize relations between the two German states as the first step to resolving conflicts in Europe.³⁶ Guttenberg informed Kiesinger that, whereas the SPD wished to reply to the East German initiative in the form of a letter, parts of the CDU/CSU, especially among the parliamentary party, were strongly against such a letter.³⁷ Irrespective of this, he advised sending a letter of reply, reasoning that the damage ³³ Kiesinger in retrospect, 31 Jan. 1978, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 171. ³⁴ Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ³⁵ Karl Carstens, Erinnerungen und Erfahrungen (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1993), 383. ³⁶ The Bonn government received Stoph’s letter on 12 June 1967; see DzDP, 5th ser., 1/i, 909, 922, 1115–17. ³⁷ Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 139; see also AdsD, Dep Bahr, 384, 3 and Dep. Ehmke, 398: Bahr, 29 May 1967.

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to the coalition would be greater if the attitude of the SPD, rather than that of the restrictive CDU/CSU powers, was ignored. Such a letter should, he felt, consider the reservations of the CDU/CSU, by leaving no doubts about the basic West German position and by avoiding too much ‘camaraderie’ with the ‘penfriend’.³⁸ As party records reveal, however, it was not only conservative forces within the CDU/CSU that strongly disapproved of this initiative but also Kiesinger himself.³⁹ This disproves the picture, at least in this instance, of the Kiesinger leadership as firm supporters of Ostpolitik, thwarted by the CDU backbenchers, as has often been conveyed.⁴⁰ Despite his scepticism, by the end of May, Kiesinger decided to send off letter of reply. The CDU thus gave in to the SPD’s course of action,⁴¹ although the Chancellor made efforts to document the intra-German correspondence as a process that he himself initiated and controlled.⁴² However, following his parliamentary party’s request, Kiesinger refused to use the term ‘GDR’ in his letter as proposed by the Foreign Ministry. As Bahr saw it, this was exactly why intra-German negotiations failed at this stage.⁴³ In June 1967, the friction between the coalition parties increased. Bahr objected to Kiesinger’s remarks that Ostpolitik was ‘changed not in content, only in methods’, and about the renunciation of force, which would not be envisaged in bilateral form.⁴⁴ In addition, a few days after Kiesinger had met Zarapkin, the Ausw¨artige Amt was angered that its request to see the minutes of the talk was turned down by the Chancellor, who reasoned that he would on principle not hand out any minutes.⁴⁵ The CDU also complained about the different line followed by the SPD, which by that stage already went much further verbally. Brandt, for example, provoked anger with his remarks about a European security system, which he suggested could be established on the basis of ‘political ³⁸ BAK, N 1397, 171: Guttenberg, May 1967. ³⁹ Ibid.: Kiesinger in a meeting with CDU deputies on 5 June 1967. This will be more fully explained on p. 96. ⁴⁰ Taschler, Vor neuen Herausforderungen, 404–5, arrives at a similar conclusion. By contrast, Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 139, portrays Kiesinger one-sidedly as the one who had to convince his parliamentary party to take a new course in Ostpolitik. ⁴¹ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 5. WP, 65: Schmidt, June 1967. Stoph’s letter was eventually answered on 13 June 1967. ⁴² BAK, N 1397, 171: Kiesinger, May 1967; ACDP, 01–226, 469: CDU press, May 1967; Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 134–5. ⁴³ Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004; ACDP, 01–226, A 311: Bahr, 15 Feb. 1973; Kroegel, Anfang finden, 161; Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 44, 52–3. ⁴⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 1: Bahr, 30 June 1967. ⁴⁵ PA, B 41, 753: Ausw¨artige Amt, 14 July 1967.

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realities’.⁴⁶ Guttenberg was worried that such vague concepts might be interpreted as a recognition of the existing realities.⁴⁷ Moreover, the CDU was angered by Brandt’s and Bahr’s repeated references to East Germany, for example as a ‘territory with a different order’,⁴⁸ as ‘the GDR’ with which Bonn was ready ‘to live . . . in peaceful coexistence’⁴⁹ and which Bonn had to recognize gradually,⁵⁰ and as one of the ‘two political orders which exist on German soil’.⁵¹ In a private letter, Kiesinger complained to Brandt that for the first time he was no longer so sure whether they agreed about the substance of their policy and that people in his own ranks were increasingly worried. He then demanded avoidance of any misleading statements concerning the recognition of the GDR and a public demonstration that Ostpolitik was still consistent with the policy as announced in the government declaration.⁵² The Chancellor made it clear in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs that, contrary to press rumours, there was full agreement within the coalition about the non-recognition of the Sovietoccupied zone and the Oder–Neisse line.⁵³ Nonetheless, the divide between the two parties was by that stage already public. CDU leaders now publicly disapproved of the remarks that Brandt and Bahr continued to make.⁵⁴ The CSU deputy SchulzeVorberg even went so far as to demand Brandt’s dismissal because of what he called Brandt’s ‘programme of renunciation’.⁵⁵ During this period of increasing inter-party conflict, on 29 August 1967, the so-called ‘Kressbronner Kreis’ was formed at the Chancellor’s initiative in order to channel and resolve disagreements within the coalition and prevent them from erupting into public view. In addition, some ad hoc groups were formed—consisting of ministers ⁴⁶ BAK, N 1371, 361 and DzDP, 5th ser., 1/ii, 1402: Brandt, Deutschlandfunk (German broadcasting company), 30 June 1967; see also Kroegel, Anfang finden, 172. ⁴⁷ BAK, N 1397, 90: Guttenberg, 20 Aug. 1967. ⁴⁸ BAK, N 1371, 361 and 357, 1: Brandt to the Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, 2–3 July 1967. ⁴⁹ Bahr during a trip to Prague, 12–13 June 1967, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 174; see also Kiesinger’s complaints about these remarks, in Fuchs, Dreiecksverh¨altnisse, 30. ⁵⁰ BAK, N 1397, 90: Guttenberg, 11 Nov. 1967. ⁵¹ Brandt to the Romanian statesman Manescu in Die Welt (5 Aug. 1967). ⁵² PA, B 150, doc. 306: Kiesinger, 22 Aug. 1967. ⁵³ BAK, B 136, 16536: Kiesinger, 8 Sept. 1967. ⁵⁴ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, vol. 65, 6347: Barzel, 13 Oct. 1967; see also AAPD 1967, i, doc. 68. ⁵⁵ ACDP, 01–276, 311: Schulze-Vorberg at the CSU conference in Hammelburg, 18 Sept. 1967.

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and high-level aides from the Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, Ministry for All-German Affairs, and Press Office—which dealt with the renunciation-of-force issue. Moreover, consultation between the chairmen of the two parliamentary parties, Helmut Schmidt and Rainer Barzel, provided a means of finding a common policy in this sector.⁵⁶ The first meeting of the ‘Kressbronner Kreis’, between the leading politicians of the coalition, was in fact to prove fruitful.⁵⁷ It was agreed, Kiesinger explained afterwards, to conceive of the ‘realities’, not the existence of a second German state. He urged Brandt and Wehner to make clearer than hitherto that the SPD was also against jettisoning legal claims in Ostpolitik.⁵⁸ Although from then on the ‘Kressbronner Kreis’ met quite regularly, and was generally held—by several participants as well as by historians in retrospect—to be the most important body for coalition policy-making and conflict resolution,⁵⁹ it could not prevent the trend towards conflict rather than cooperation. It appears that two separate policies, rather than one consistent Ostpolitik, prevailed within the Grand Coalition government. In fact, within a couple of days of the successful first Kressbronn meeting, a remark by Bahr about the renunciation-of-force offer had already endangered the peace within the coalition. In a television interview Bahr explained that with this offer his government had already recognized the status quo in Europe. The CDU/CSU parliamentary party and executive committee, as well as Kiesinger in person, rejected this ‘tattle about recognition’ vehemently. Kiesinger explicitly warned the SPD to be more cautious.⁶⁰ In October 1967, Kiesinger confided to Giselher Wirsing, editor-inchief of the Catholic weekly Christ und Welt, that he aimed to reduce his Foreign Minister’s sphere of activity. He could not do this publicly, ⁵⁶ Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 65. ⁵⁷ Der Spiegel (4 Sept 1967), in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 183. ⁵⁸ Schw¨abische Zeitung (4 Sept. 1967), in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 183. ⁵⁹ This line was argued by, for instance, Eugen Selbmann on 8 June 1970, Karl Wienand on 5 May 1970, and Hermann Kopf on 4 May 1970, in interviews with Thomas Paul Koppel, in Thomas Paul Koppel, ‘Sources of Change in West German Ostpolitik: the Grand Coalition, 1966–1969’, dissertation, Madison, 1972, 408; Joachim Samuel Eichhorn, ‘Der ‘‘Kressbronner Kreis’’: Koalitionsausschuß der Großen Koalition (1966–1969)’, dissertation, Hamburg, 2002, 95; Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 60. Schmidt, by contrast, revealed in an interview with the author on 12 June 2003 that the ‘Kressbronner Kreis’ never played a significant role. ⁶⁰ DzDP, 5th ser., 1/ii, 1579: Bahr, 4 Sept. 1967; see also Kroegel, Anfang finden, 184–5; ACDP, 01–276, 311: the CDU Executive Committee and Kiesinger, 9 Oct. 1967.

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though, but only ‘in a quiet room’. Kiesinger revealed to Wirsing that he thought Bahr to be a fanatical patriot, a ‘really dangerous man’, and that he would see to it that his influence within the Foreign Ministry would not grow further.⁶¹ Guttenberg also distrusted Bahr because of what he termed his ‘nationalist’ endeavours, as he let the latter know in a personal meeting.⁶² Consequently, the Chancellor demanded that any steps Brandt was taking had to be discussed. To begin with at least, Brandt played by these rules.⁶³ For instance, in spring 1967, he informed Kiesinger about a meeting planned for the summer with Abrassimov, the Soviet ambassador to East Berlin. The Chancellor refused to let Brandt attend, informing him of his doubts over the matter.⁶⁴ But with the continuing course of the coalition government, and certainly by autumn 1967, Kiesinger became progressively less able to keep Brandt and Bahr in check.⁶⁵ In November 1967, views on the renunciation-of-force issue clashed openly for the first time, revealing Kiesinger’s much more sceptical attitude to the issue. As outlined above,⁶⁶ at a press conference on 12 October 1967, Kiesinger rejected talks with Moscow on the basis of the Soviet memorandum delivered to Bonn. In a letter to Brandt, Bahr vehemently protested against the Chancellor’s resolution. He argued that the credibility of Ostpolitik as a whole would be put in question if Bonn stopped the exchange with Moscow. In his eyes, this was a decision the Chancellor could not take without his Foreign Minister. Brandt should therefore see to it that German–Soviet talks were continued.⁶⁷ Accordingly, in a so-called Montagskr¨anzchen, a meeting between a few SPD ministers and Foreign Ministry officials, it was agreed that a letter should be written to the Chancellor in order to drive home to him the serious questions that were at stake in dealing with the renunciation-of-force issue.⁶⁸ Accordingly, Brandt did write such a ⁶¹ Meeting with Wirsing on 5 October 1967, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 173; see also Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie, ed. Klaus Gotto et al. (Mainz: Mathias-Gr¨unewald-Verlag, 1974), 198–9: Krone, 15 Mar. 1968, on the agreement between Kiesinger, Guttenberg, and Wehner to oppose Brandt’s and Bahr’s initiatives towards Moscow. ⁶² Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 140. ⁶³ As late as autumn 1967, Guttenberg, ibid. 140, also commented on the Foreign Ministry’s luckless attempts to assert a more progressive Ostpolitik. ⁶⁴ Neusel, 2 June 1967, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 173. ⁶⁵ See also Fuchs, Dreiecksverh¨altnisse, 30. ⁶⁶ See p. 38. ⁶⁷ PA, B 150, doc. 381: Bahr, 3 Nov. 1967. ⁶⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 1: Bahr, Horst Ehmke, Conrad Ahlers, and Parliamentary State Secretary Gerhard Jahn, 6 Nov. 1967.

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letter, in which he informed Kiesinger that his department would continue the German–Soviet renunciation-of-force talks. He reassured Kiesinger that in these talks the legal recognition of the GDR would remain a taboo, and appealed to the need for cooperation.⁶⁹ After Kiesinger’s threatened disruption of the German–Soviet dialogue, Brandt changed his tactics. He showed his interest in continuing the German–Soviet exchange by involving Kiesinger more closely in the preparations made in his ministry.⁷⁰ Moreover, Brandt tried to secure Kiesinger’s consent to abstaining from making further public comments on the dialogue by expressly pleading for absolute secrecy. He reasoned that the talks would be at risk if their contents were leaked to the public.⁷¹ At the same time, Brandt had ensured that the dialogue with Moscow kept going by reassuring Zarapkin that, irrespective of Kiesinger’s remarks, his government desired to continue both the bilateral dialogue and a dialogue with the GDR, but that these should remain separate.⁷² But when German–Soviet talks were clouded by the uncompromising Soviet government declaration of 8 December 1967, Brandt’s ministry switched over to a secretive policy again. Without consulting the Chancellor, the Foreign Ministry’s leading officials decided to hand over a note to Zarapkin and simultaneously issue a public note.⁷³ This shows that the Ausw¨artige Amt felt independent enough to implement its decisions without asking for permission from the Chancellery beforehand. Brandt’s decision not to consult Kiesinger about his actions was also observed by ‘outsiders’, such as Heinrich B¨ox at the trade mission in Warsaw.⁷⁴ Indeed, a couple of weeks later, Kiesinger himself expressly asked the Foreign Ministry to provide him with an analysis of the non-aggression complex.⁷⁵ Director-General Ruete from the Foreign Ministry admitted that Kiesinger had not been informed about internal preparations on this complex for one month, and accordingly had no knowledge of the most recent analysis edited by his Soviet Union unit.⁷⁶ ⁶⁹ ACDP, 01–226, A 001: Brandt, 6 Nov. 1967. ⁷⁰ PA, B 2, 206: Ausw¨artige Amt, 13 Nov. 1967, in a briefing at the Chancellery; PA, B 150: Brandt, 29 Nov. 1967, about his latest discussion with Zarapkin. ⁷¹ Ibid.: Brandt, 29 Nov. 1967. ⁷² PA, B 150, doc. 395: Brandt, 21 Nov. 1967. For further details see p. 38. ⁷³ PA, B 150, doc. 430: Duckwitz and Zarapkin met on 14 Dec., and a verbal note was sent to Moscow on 22 Dec. 1967. PA, B 150: Brandt informed Kiesinger about this meeting only afterwards, on 14 and 19 Dec. 1967. See also p. 39. ⁷⁴ PA, B 2, 176: B¨ox, 5 Jan. 1968. ⁷⁵ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: Ruete, 17 Jan. 1968. ⁷⁶ Ibid.: Ruete, 17 Jan. 1968.

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Consequently, Brandt involved the Chancellery in his policy again. This resulted in immediate disagreement: a draft of a note to the Soviet Union forwarded by Brandt’s department to the Chancellery on 9 February 1968 aroused instantaneous disapproval. State Secretary Carstens, who had received the draft via State Secretary Duckwitz, called it ‘alarming’, especially because of the inclusion of the GDR. Carstens suggested that any consideration of the GDR—and he was not even sure that this was right—ought to be in the form of an exchange of non-aggression declarations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This would involve a smaller risk of raising the status of East Berlin. In any case, it would be necessary to ensure that the status quo would not thereby be fixed, and that the German people’s right of self-determination would not be compromised. Overall, Carstens advised Kiesinger to discuss the whole complex with Brandt and to consult the cabinet as well as the Allies before making any decision.⁷⁷ In a press briefing, Kiesinger presented his understanding of the renunciation of force as being a simple expression of goodwill, thereby opposing Brandt’s intention of solving the disputed political questions peacefully.⁷⁸

Escalating Disagreement over the Renunciation-of-Force Policy In effect, tensions between the CDU/CSU and the SPD over the renunciation-of-force policy even led to Brandt’s threatening to resign as Foreign Minister in February 1968. At a local party congress in Barsinghausen, Brandt said that he had no intention of making a fool of himself, and would be forced to reconsider his position if he were hindered in carrying out the agreed policy, including the renunciationof-force policy.⁷⁹ The conflict was taken up by Conrad Ahlers from the Bundespresseamt (Federal Press and Information Office, BPA) during a press briefing. On the one hand, Ahlers played down the differences of opinion. On the other hand, he alluded to Brandt’s threat to resign in the event of continued opposition to his renunciation-of-force policy, which was in Brandt’s eyes ‘too serious’ for the West German government and ‘one of the most important possibilities for progress’ that Bonn then ⁷⁷ PA, B 150: Duckwitz to Carstens, 9 Feb. 1968; BAK, N 1337, 672: Carstens, 12 Feb. 1968. ⁷⁸ ACDP, 01–226, 008–1a: Kiesinger, 13 Feb. 1967. ⁷⁹ AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt, 10 Feb. 1968.

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had.⁸⁰ Consequently, Kiesinger eventually engaged Rainer Barzel and his parliamentary party in an attempt to appease Brandt.⁸¹ However, as Duckwitz confirmed to Brandt after his visits to the Chancellery, Kiesinger still interpretated the renunciation-of-force issue very differently. Duckwitz informed Brandt that in fact, according to Kiesinger’s preference, an entirely new concept concerning the content of a German note to Moscow had been developed in the Chancellery behind the back of the Foreign Ministry.⁸² G¨unter Diehl, who had meanwhile assumed office as head of the BPA, informed Ruete and Sahm of the Foreign Ministry that the note should be reduced to the issue of non-aggression. It should leave aside all the questions artificially linked to it by Moscow, for these would create an unfavourable starting point for the Federal Republic.⁸³ Accordingly, Kiesinger presented his viewpoint in public. In an encounter with the Soviet ambassador, Zarapkin, on 1 March 1968, Kiesinger explained his approach towards the renunciation-of-force exchange—calling it the government’s viewpoint—as a means to foster d´etente while leaving aside the disputed questions.⁸⁴ Furthermore, in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, Kiesinger stated that, for the time being, the renunciation of force was being discussed far too widely. The matter was not yet being negotiated and should be left to mature without haste.⁸⁵ In addition to the row with the Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry received criticism from Wehner’s Ministry for All-German Affairs. On 15 February 1968, Wehner informed the Foreign Ministry through J¨urgen Weichert, head of his office, that he wanted more information and cooperation between the two departments regarding questions relevant to both. He complained that thus far his ministry had not been involved in deliberations on the renunciation of force although it was very interested because of the possibility of the inclusion of the other part of Germany.⁸⁶ The Ausw¨artige Amt reacted approvingly and proposed to establish a permanent contact between the two Ministerialdirigenten, Sahm and Weichert.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, this incident undoubtedly reveals ⁸⁰ ⁸¹ ⁸² ⁸³ ⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ ⁸⁶ ⁸⁷

AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: Ahlers, 15 Feb. 1968. Rheinischer Merkur (16 Feb. 1968). PA, B 150, doc. 71: Duckwitz, 24 Feb. 1968. PA, B 150: Ruete, 1 Mar. 1968. Ibid., doc. 75: Kiesinger, 1 Mar. 1968. BAK, B 137, 16536: Kiesinger, 15 Feb. 1968. PA, B 2, 174: Arnold, 15 Feb. 1968. Ibid.: Arnold, 5 Feb. 1968, and Duckwitz, 19 Feb. 1968.

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that contrary to the prevalent picture in Ostpolitik scholarship, which sees Wehner as the key figure in the making of Ostpolitik, Wehner in reality did not even know of the proceedings going on within Brandt’s Foreign Ministry for the first half of the Grand Coalition government, at least as regards the renunciation-of-force policy. Brandt, of course, consciously excluded Wehner from his planning procedures so that he, not Wehner, would have the lead in that policy. It is clearly necessary to differentiate between Wehner in his fairly insignificant function as Minister for All-German Affairs and Wehner in his weighty position as the leading SPD politician and closest confidant of Kiesinger. In any case, it remains a fact that it was not the Kiesinger–Wehner axis but the rivals Kiesinger and Brandt who pulled the strings concerning the policy towards Moscow.⁸⁸ In order to be able to proceed with the renunciation-of-force policy Kiesinger and Brandt had to reconcile their conflicting views on this topic. Therefore, the Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, and Ministry for All-German Affairs arranged for a meeting on 6 March 1968 in Berlin between Kiesinger, Brandt, Wehner, Strauss, and some other ministers, as well as the CSU deputy, Richard Stuecklen, and Kiesinger’s advisers Carstens and Guttenberg. They eventually reached an agreement to reply to the Soviet note soon. With regard to the disputed question of whether or not other political issues should be considered in a German reply, Wehner suggested making an offer to Moscow to solve all disputed questions in renunciation-of-force negotiations. However, it was decided, in accordance with Kiesinger’s view, that the German reply should not include an offer of negotiations. It should merely consist of an explanation of the German viewpoint in line with the legal positions, and of the offer to deal with all the questions raised in future renunciation-of-force negotiations. In so far as this constituted an offer to the GDR, this was to be integrated into the answer to Moscow.⁸⁹ ⁸⁸ Fuchs, Dreiecksverh¨altnisse, 136, argues accordingly. By contrast, Kroegel, Anfang finden, and Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ara Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Aristalt, 1982), 45, maintain most pronouncedly that Wehner’s alliance with Kiesinger was the essential cement for the functioning of the coalition. In his Fußnoten, 134–5, Guttenberg also emphasizes his close relations with Wehner. ⁸⁹ PA, B 150: Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, and Ministry for All-German Affairs, 20 Feb. 1968; ibid., doc. 88: Brandt, 5 Mar. 1968; BAK, N, 1397, 93 and N 1337, 672: Guttenberg, 5 Mar. 1968, and Carstens, 6 Mar. 1968.

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A day later, the government hastened to bolster the impression of unity in this matter. First, in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, Sahm stated that there was full agreement within the government to handle the renunciation-of-force topic henceforth according to the government declaration of December 1966. The government would now reply to the Soviet note even though there was no reason for optimism. Second, Brandt stressed that any information about disagreement within the coalition regarding Bonn’s demeanour vis-`a-vis Moscow was ‘blatant nonsense’.⁹⁰ Moreover, on 9 March 1968, Brandt met a group of CDU/CSU foreign policy experts, such as Ernst Majonica, Johann Baptist Gradl, and Felix von Eckardt, in order to ease their concern over the proposed reply to the Soviet note and win their approval in the cabinet.⁹¹ Hence, for the time being, the differences between the coalition partners over the renunciation of force had been settled. Some further consultations between the Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry for All-German Affairs followed. On the basis of these consultations, including the aforementioned meeting in Berlin on 6 March 1968, the draft of the note to Moscow was revised by the Foreign Ministry, and presented to the Chancellery prior to its finalization and delivery to Zarapkin on 9 April 1968.⁹² The Chancellery, now officially sworn to abide by the Foreign Ministry’s policy of continuing German–Soviet talks, and counting on the renunciation of force being on the agenda of Ostpolitik for quite some time, instructed the Foreign Ministry to provide the analysis of this topic that Kiesinger had earlier asked for. The analysis should reflect on the policy’s political and legal repercussions, as well as on possible forms of an intra-German renunciation of force that would exclude a legal recognition of the GDR.⁹³ However, once again the underlying controversy between the CDU and the SPD about Ostpolitik boiled up—to the extent that the continuation of the coalition government was called into question—over remarks at an SPD party conference in Nuremberg in March 1968. At that conference, the SPD stated that the renunciation-of-force talks ⁹⁰ BAK, N 1474, 32 and B 136, 16536: Sahm and Brandt, 7 Mar. 1968. ⁹¹ Die Welt, (9 Mar. 1968), in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 415. ⁹² PA, B 150: Ausw¨artige Amt, 18 Mar. 1968; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 1: Ruete, 1 Apr. 1968. ⁹³ PA, B 80, 950: Boss, 23 Apr. 1968.

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would be all the more successful if Bonn clarified its respect for and recognition of the present borders in Europe until their final stipulation in a peace treaty.⁹⁴ Unsurprisingly, the CDU leaders were outraged over these utterances. They regarded them as a deviation from the common line of government policies.⁹⁵ Kiesinger objected that such a statement went beyond coalition policy. But Brandt merely replied that although ‘the Chancellor is responsible for the guiding lines of government, he is not in charge of those of the Social Democratic Party’ and that he had the right to speak his mind at party meetings.⁹⁶ Kiesinger, however, did manage to get the upper hand. In a coalition meeting, the SPD ministers agreed to explain in public, as the CDU parliamentary party had done, that the SPD was in line with the Chancellor’s declaration on this issue. The SPD and CDU/CSU then agreed that they would continue the coalition until the federal elections in September 1969.⁹⁷ Kiesinger also asserted his view with regard to the Western Allies. He ruled out Brandt’s recognition of the Oder–Neisse line as ‘very dangerous’ and portrayed himself and his party as being in control of both the SPD and the course of Ostpolitik.⁹⁸ After this rift in the coalition, the need for an agreement on a new guideline for Bonn’s foreign policy, also apropos the Soviet policy, was felt all the more. Consequently, Kiesinger organized a colloquium in Heimerzheim on 2–3 May 1968 to which he invited members of his government as well as members of both parties. As to the special issue of Soviet policy, most of the time during the two days was filled with lectures given by Brandt, some members of his ministry, and a few other ministers, in which they offered new proposals. Notably, Brandt explained that because of the Soviet Union’s present immobility in d´etente policy, it remained to be seen whether the renunciation of force would lead to a new development or would remain an isolated episode. ⁹⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 316, 2: Bahr, March 1968; Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Canpe, 1976), 246; Hans Buchheim, Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1972: Der politisch-diplomatische Prozeß (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), 124–5. ⁹⁵ Neue Z¨urcher Zeitung (20 Mar. 1968). ⁹⁶ See Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen: Mit den ‘Notizen zum Fall G’ (Berlin: Ullstein, 1994), 164; Kroegel, Anfang finden, 199. ⁹⁷ BAK, N 1397, 95: Guttenberg, 26 March 1968; see also Egon Bahr Zu meiner, Zeit (Munich: K. Blessing, 1996), 234; Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The years 1960–1975 (London: Collins, 1978), 183; Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993), 164. ⁹⁸ PA, B 150, docs. 100 and 110: Kiesinger to the American ambassadors Schaetzel and McGhee, 21 and 27 Mar. 1968.

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In order to make progress in the renunciation-of-force question Brandt suggested three things: ‘first, signal that we are regarding the border questions factually as solved, without giving up claims; secondly, express readiness to make binding agreements with the GDR without recognizing it under international law; and thirdly, mobilize Eastern Europe to talk the GDR out of its veto against a normalization of relations.’ Wehner advised that Bonn should gradually renounce some claims before it was forced to do so. By contrast, Kiesinger expressed his view that the Soviet interest was opposed to the German interest and that Bonn could not hope for progress in its Soviet policy in the foreseeable future. Neither were Brandt’s and Wehner’s proposals, that Bonn should offer sacrifices to Moscow and East Berlin in advance, likely to meet with success. Hence, whereas the SPD leaders, especially Brandt and Wehner, favoured a modification of old positions, it was Kiesinger and other CDU affiliates, such as Diehl, who emphasized the need to uphold all legal claims in Ostpolitik. The consensus that was eventually reached on a formal basis mirrored the CDU policy priorities. The Chancellor announced that the policy of d´etente with the East should be continued bilaterally in consistent efforts, but that the political substance of basic positions, especially of reunification, could not be sacrificed in order to increase the coalition partner’s readiness to negotiate.⁹⁹ This resolution had, of course, the effect of hampering a greater degree of flexibility in Eastern policy as desired by Brandt. Brandt gave expression to this in a letter he sent to the Chancellor a month later. In it he urged Kiesinger to agree to a more active Ostpolitik with particular regard to the issue of European security, and to develop a policy that would integrate national interests into the general efforts at d´etente between East and West.¹⁰⁰ But the parties clashed increasingly over their conflicting ‘ostpolitical’ agendas. In July 1968, Brandt complained to Kiesinger that the CDU and associated press organs had for some time been waging a campaign, attacking his staff repeatedly.¹⁰¹ In effect, strong groupings within the CDU/CSU, mostly consisting of ultraconservatives such as Strauss and Guttenberg, successfully obstructed progress by constantly attacking the developing new Ostpolitik.¹⁰² ⁹⁹ PA, B 150, docs. 146 and 147: colloquium, 2–3 May 1968; AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt, 2 May 1968. ¹⁰⁰ ACDP, 01–226, A 001: Brandt, 7 June 1968. ¹⁰¹ Ibid.: Brandt, 30 July 1968. ¹⁰² See e.g. Der Spiegel (24 Apr. 1967); Rheinischer Merkur (10 Nov. 1967); Die Welt (4 Sep. 1968); Der Spiegel (9 and 18 Sep. 1968).

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Nonetheless, the Brandt team still made repeated efforts to involve its partners in its policies. For instance, the State Secretaries Gerhard Jahn and Duckwitz at the Foreign Ministry suggested more cooperation with the Chancellery and the resumption of coalition talks in general. These requests, however, were either evaded or turned down by Guttenberg and Carstens at the Chancellery.¹⁰³

The Foreign Ministry’s ‘Lonely Decisions’ The Prague crisis of 21 August 1968 had the effect of widening the gulf between the SPD’s Ostpolitik and that of the CDU. Both Kiesinger’s and Brandt’s immediate reactions were naturally to declare, publicly and in government circles, that there was no alternative to the peace policy. However, whereas Brandt merely expressed the reservation that more time and a revision of methods would be needed in order to continue the same d´etente policy,¹⁰⁴ Kiesinger now emphasized that he had never aimed at an immediate rapprochement with the Soviet Union anyway.¹⁰⁵ The increasing division between the government’s two parliamentary parties also became noticeable over a resolution on the Prague events. The members of the SPD Bundestag group were opposed to the proposal by their chairman, Barzel, and his CDU/CSU parliamentary party to re-emphasize the Federal Republic’s right of sole representation in the resolution. For the sake of the unity of the coalition, however, the Social Democratic representatives gave in to Barzel’s proposal. As a result, they felt forced to confirm the Hallstein Doctrine publicly in the Bundestag on 26 September 1968.¹⁰⁶ Thus, despite the willingness expressed by Kiesinger, Brandt, and Wehner to work together to ensure order in their own ranks and the continuation of d´etente policy,¹⁰⁷ relations between the coalition partners steadily deteriorated thereafter. ¹⁰³ BAK, N 1337, 668: Carstens, 11 Sept. 1968; BAK, N 1397, 94: Guttenberg, 21 Jan. 1969. ¹⁰⁴ AdsD, WBA, Publ., 283: Brandt in an SPD press release, 22 Aug. 1968; BAK, N 1474, 70: Brandt at the Ausw¨artige Amt, 5 Sept. 1968. ¹⁰⁵ BAK, N 1397, 95: Guttenberg in a coalition meeting, 23 Aug. 1968; ACDP, 01–226, 008/1: Kiesinger, 22 Aug. 1968. ¹⁰⁶ Karl Moersch, Kurs-Revision: Deutsche Politik nach Adenauer (Frankfurt am Main: Societ¨ats-Verlag, 1978), 98; see Die Deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–1970: Kontinuit¨at und Wardes ed. Boris Meissner, 3 vols. (Cologne: Wissesschaft und Politik, 1970), ii, doc. 62, for the Bundestag resolution of 25 Sept. 1968. ¹⁰⁷ Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung (2 Sept. 1968); Der Spiegel (26 Aug. 1968).

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Faced with a partner that was advocating reservations about the Soviet Union, the Ausw¨artige Amt thereafter proceeded to further the German–Soviet exchange without consulting the Chancellery. During the UN plenum in New York in October 1968, Brandt and Gromyko set the course for a continuation of the renunciation-of-force dialogue. This was followed by preparations in the Foreign Ministry for a ‘second round of talks’ to be led by Allardt and Gromyko. The Chancellery was not involved in these preparations, as can be seen from the fact that in early November 1968 Kiesinger explicitly asked to be instructed about the directives for Allardt.¹⁰⁸ Carstens was probably referring to these preparations when he informed Kiesinger that, according to his secret source, Brandt had certain ‘ostpolitical’ plans involving the resumption of the renunciation-of-force talks. Carstens advised Kiesinger to ask Brandt to explain whether he was planning any overtures towards the Soviet Union, and if so what these were.¹⁰⁹ Hence it can be seen that the Chancellery was informed only retrospectively and on demand about the actions taken by the Foreign Ministry to revive the bilateral dialogue.¹¹⁰ As a result of the perceived increase in the SPD’s autonomy, Kiesinger invited Brandt for a meeting and informed him that he was expecting the closest possible cooperation with him in policy towards the Soviet Union in the future.¹¹¹ Irrespective of this appeal, however, the ‘Brandt ministry’ carried on with its Soviet policy. By the end of January 1969, it had already prepared new blueprints of renunciation-of-force texts and had informed Wehner’s ministry about deliberations on an intra-German renunciation of force.¹¹² As a result, in a meeting of the Chancellor with the CDU Executive Committee, it became apparent that the Chancellor’s main concern was not to be dwarfed by the SPD’s new initiatives. The CDU leaders concluded that it was necessary to make efforts to maintain the dialogue with Moscow so that this policy did not become a ‘prerogative of the SPD’. They were adamant that should Moscow one day be interested in a rapprochement with the Federal Republic then it should go without saying that the Chancellor himself would deal with it.¹¹³ Kiesinger’s concern that the SPD was ¹⁰⁸ PA, B 150: Kiesinger, 6 Nov. 1968. ¹⁰⁹ BAK, N 1337, 668: Carstens, 28 Nov. 1968. ¹¹⁰ The Ausw¨artige Amt informed the Chancellery about Allardt’s meeting with Gromyko of 11 Dec. only on 18 Dec. 1968; see PA, B 1, 349. ¹¹¹ PA, B 150, doc. 399: Kiesinger, 2 Dec. 1968. ¹¹² PA, B 150: Ausw¨artige Amt to Wehner, 29 Jan. 1969. ¹¹³ BAK, N 1397, 94: Kiesinger and the CDU Executive Committee, 16 Jan. 1969.

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overactive explains his uncontrolled criticism of the party in this period. He complained about the ‘Utopists of the SPD, the Egon Bahrs’, whom he always had to bridle and to remind that as long as Bonn was not seeing eye to eye with Moscow, it had to endeavour to effect an improvement in the atmosphere of relations while avoiding the disputed questions.¹¹⁴ In the spring of 1969, German policy issues gave reason for further conflict between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. In February and March, the coalition partners argued about the further tackling of intra-German relations. Wehner tried to get Kiesinger to reopen the intra-German correspondence by seizing upon certain points in Stoph’s last letter, but Kiesinger refused. Henceforth, personal relations between them deteriorated.¹¹⁵ In addition, the demands of local SPD groups for the recognition of the GDR triggered the conservatives’ protests. In the last half-year of the CDU/CSU–SPD government, the differences between the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister became increasingly obvious as both politicians competed to raise their profiles in the run-up to the September 1969 federal election. Significantly, the Foreign Ministry’s preparations concerning the renunciation-of-force policy were halted by the Chancellery. The Chancellery disapproved of the draft note proposing a renunciation-of-force declaration, which the Foreign Ministry had eventually forwarded upon the Chancellor’s request in mid-February 1969. In April 1969, the Chancellery returned the draft with substantial modifications. As Rantzau, an official at the Foreign Ministry, saw it, the Chancellery’s recommendations on the Foreign Ministry’s draft were pointed to the formulations already used in the government declaration of December 1966 and in even earlier notes. The Chancellery disapproved of the Foreign Ministry’s attempt to introduce new elements, regarding them as a potential source for future Soviet interference in Bonn’s inner affairs. Moreover, the Chancellery omitted the formulation proposing an equal treatment of ‘all states of Europe’, including the GDR, because it wanted to avoid any possibility that the GDR could, even indirectly, be called a state. The differences between the two drafts were so profound that the Foreign Ministry’s officials concluded that they had to be smoothed ¹¹⁴ ACDP, 01–226, 008–1: Kiesinger, 23 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1969. ¹¹⁵ Wehner in Der Spiegel (28 Jan. 1970), in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 419; see also Kroegel, Anfang finden, 302.

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out on a higher level, between Brandt and Kiesinger.¹¹⁶ They even led the Ausw¨artige Amt to question whether Bonn should continue the renunciation-of-force dialogue with Moscow at all. If Bonn did wish to continue, it would rouse the Soviets’ interest, and thus the Foreign Ministry officials’ consideration, only if at least some of the Foreign Ministry’s own formulations, and not the familiar phrases suggested by the Chancellery, were used.¹¹⁷ Hence the fundamental disagreement between the Chancellor’s and Brandt’s departments about the mode of the dialogue with Moscow had come to the fore again. It was of such importance that it consumed weeks of internal preparation. Eventually, however, the difference was settled via a letter that Brandt sent to Kiesinger. In it Brandt made clear that he wished to continue the dialogue about a renunciation of force because of the obvious Soviet interest, and that he would not be able to consider the Chancellery’s corrections. Rather, he would have to stick to his ministry’s draft, thus reflecting a line that, despite modifications in wording, had not abandoned any basic positions.¹¹⁸ Finally, at coalition meetings on 2 and 3 June, Kiesinger gave in to appeals by Brandt and Schmidt to deliver an answer to the Soviets. Consequently, it was decided to continue with the policy of an exchange of renunciationof-force declarations on the basis of Brandt’s letter of 20 May 1969 to Kiesinger.¹¹⁹ Although the Ausw¨artige Amt had managed to assert its general line, some members were unhappy with the outcome of the consultation with the Chancellery. It was felt that the new draft had lost value and might rather disappoint the Soviets.¹²⁰ Thus when the note for German–Soviet renunciation-of-force declarations was finally delivered to Zarapkin on 3 July 1969, the Foreign Ministry did not hold out much hope of reaching an accord.¹²¹ As the Foreign Ministry revealed to the Chancellery, it was hardly likely that Moscow would consent to the German proposal to reach an ‘agreement about the limited topic ¹¹⁶ PA, B 150 and B 150, doc. 146: Rantzau, 3 Apr., 28 Apr., 2 May, and 6 May 1969. ¹¹⁷ Ibid.: Rantzau, 28 Apr. and 6 May 1969, Blumenfeld, 30 Apr. 1969, and Duckwitz, 12 May 1969. ¹¹⁸ Ibid., doc. 164: Brandt, 20 May 1969; PA, B 150: Duckwitz, 20 and 28 May 1969, and Ritzel, 2 June 1969. ¹¹⁹ ACDP, 01–226, A 101: Carstens, 3 June 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Ritzel, 3 June 1969. ¹²⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 342: unit for European security, 30 June 1969. ¹²¹ See e.g. PA, B 150: European security unit, 28 July 1969.

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of renunciation of force’.¹²² However, Brandt and his staff did regain some hope of finding grounds for renunciation-of-force negotiations after the Kremlin had communicated its memorandum in response on 13 September 1969.¹²³ The German note of July 1969 was the last attempt at a concerted policy towards Moscow. Thereafter, any remaining signs of cooperation were completely overshadowed by the parties’ attempts to establish individual profiles in the run-up to the federal elections.¹²⁴ Kiesinger now charged that if Brandt came to power, he would make too many concessions to Leonid Brezhnev and Ulbricht. Brandt, in turn, accused the CDU/CSU of ignoring realities and of forfeiting any chance of progress.¹²⁵ The split between the coalition partners over Ostpolitik was confirmed in September 1969, when Brandt stated that there was no longer concord between the two parties, because the CDU/CSU had not stuck to the principles as stipulated in the government declaration of December 1966.¹²⁶ In sum, it is clear that the Grand Coalition’s Soviet policy was characterized by conflict rather than cooperation. Although from time to time the CDU/CSU and SPD did coordinate their policies, they were essentially always competing with each other to assert their own, distinct ‘ostpolitical’ agendas. There were two different centres, the CDU-led Chancellery and the SPD-led Foreign Ministry, in which two distinct policies were devised. The more important and assertive one was the Foreign Ministry. Although the Chancellery played an active role in controlling the Foreign Ministry and in seeing to it that it would lead the ‘right’ renunciation-of-force policy, it essentially only reacted to the initiatives and policy developed by the Foreign Ministry. As Brandt himself put it fairly mildly when he handed over office to the new Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, there was an ‘orderly coexistence’ of, rather than a ‘harmonious cooperation’ between, the Chancellery and ¹²² PA, B 41, 1057a: Ruete, 11 July 1969. ¹²³ PA, B 150 and B 150, doc. 293: officials at the Ausw¨artige Amt, 15 and 17 Sept. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399: Bahr, 18 Sept. 1969. ¹²⁴ See e.g. Kiesinger to Brandt concerning remarks by Klaus Sch¨utz, the SPD mayor of Berlin, about the possibility of recognizing the GDR and the Oder–Neisse -line, 15 and 17 July 1969, in Detlef Nakath, ‘Erfurt, Kassel und die M¨achte: Zum Beginn des deutsch-deutschen Dialogs im Fr¨uhjahr 1970’, Deutschland-Archiv, 33/2 (2000), 217. ¹²⁵ William R Smyser, From Yalta to Bonn: The Cold War Struggle over Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 222. ¹²⁶ Die Welt (18 Sept. 1969).

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Foreign Ministry; it was for the latter that he now aimed under his Chancellorship.¹²⁷

T H E C D U A P P ROAC H TO O S T P O L I T I K

A New Ostpolitik as a Strategy to Confront the East As discussed in the previous section, over the years from 1966 to 1969 Kiesinger’s party was active in developing its own Ostpolitik, independent of that of its coalition partner. However, it is important to point out that, in comparision with the SPD, there was much less consensus in the CDU/CSU about the approach to Ostpolitik. This was due to the fact that the CDU/CSU was a heterogeneous party with strong factions. Obviously, the factionalism of the Union was inherent, in its existence as two organizationally separate parties: the CDU and the CSU, each with its own spokesmen, press, and party congresses. The CDU/CSU’s heterogeneity served to encourage the expression of divergent views in Ostpolitik and accustomed the party to tolerating these within its own ranks.¹²⁸ The top leadership consisted of Kiesinger, Barzel, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party, Strauss, leader of the CSU, Gerhard Schr¨oder, Minister of Defence, and Bruno Heck, General Secretary of the CDU. Of particular importance, as Kiesinger’s closest foreign policy advisers, were Guttenberg and Carstens, respectively Parliamentary State Secretary and State Secretary at the Chancellery. In addition, several other leaders had formal roles directly related to foreign policy, for example Ernst Majonica, as the chairman of the parliamentary CDU/CSU’s Arbeitskreis, or ‘working circle’, for foreign policy. As a result, many CDU/CSU leaders played an active role and were consulted by Kiesinger at various times. Kiesinger and Barzel, because of their sensitive central positions in dealing with the SPD, were forced to be flexible and to try to mute any inter-party conflict. It is therefore difficult to be sure where they really stood on particular issues. This was particularly evident during the last year of the Grand Coalition government, during which Kiesinger was confronted with increasing criticism from within his own party about his lack ¹²⁷ BAK, N 1474, 78: the directors, 17 Nov. 1969. ¹²⁸ Although it would have been worthwhile to consider the CDU grassroots, the following analysis will focus on the CDU leadership and their policy.

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of leadership.¹²⁹ He had to pay particular attention to the view of CSU leaders, since he was dependent on them for nomination as both Chancellor candidate and Chancellor in the following election period.¹³⁰ This was problematic because these ultra-conservatives were more hostile to flexibility in Ostpolitik. Consequently, policy-making for Kiesinger often consisted of coordinating diverse elements of various factions as well as restraining opposition from within his own party before making commitments (see Figure 5).¹³¹ The question that then needs to be asked is what kind of Ostpolitik was favoured by Kiesinger and the other CDU/CSU leaders, as this was clearly not the Eastern policy pursued hitherto. As a matter of fact, the CDU/CSU had already promoted the need for some innovation of Ostpolitik prior to the formation of the Grand Coalition government.¹³² Most notably, Carstens, then State Secretary under Foreign Minister Schr¨oder and with strong affiliations to the CDU, had diagnosed the ‘bankruptcy’ of the current Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik. In several papers, he documented the problems inherent in the old reunification concepts, such as the Hallstein Doctrine. A jurist, Carstens stressed the need for a thoroughly revised policy in order to avoid international isolation of the FRG. Most importantly, he recommended that the policy of isolating the GDR and adhering to dangerous illusions should be abandoned. He felt that priority should be given to promoting a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The FRG would have to make clear to everybody that it wished to contribute to d´etente on the basis of cooperation. Ultimately, such a d´etente policy might increase the East’s understanding of German national interests and reduce resistance to the reunification of Germany.¹³³ Although the official party line as reflected in the political theses issued in November ¹²⁹ Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 53–4. ¹³⁰ Materialien zur Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland ’, 9 vols., v: Deutschlandpolitik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingungen, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), i, 1099; Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 40. ¹³¹ Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 401; see ACDP, 01–226, 390: at a meeting of the CDU Executive Committee in April 1970, Kiesinger claimed that he had to assert a more flexible Eastern policy against vehement resistance of his own parliamentary party. ¹³² See ACDP, 01–483, 290/2: Foreign Minister Schr¨oder had already instructed his high officials to come up with proposals for a new Ostpolitik in November 1965; see also Taschler, Vor neuen Herausforderungen, 77. ¹³³ PA, B 9, 178338: Carstens, Oct. 1966; PA, B 150: Carstens to Brandt, 5 Dec. 1966.

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Figure 5. Kurt Georg Kiesinger (6 April 1904–9 March 1988).

1966 still propagated a fairly rigid adherence to old principles, such as the Hallstein Doctrine and non-recognition of the Soviet-occupied zone,¹³⁴ a shift to a more flexible Ostpolitik favoured by the party leadership can nonetheless be traced back to the time just before the formation of the Grand Coalition government. Kiesinger even claimed that the Grand Coalition’s basic position on Ostpolitik, and particularly on the German question, as outlined by him in his government declaration of 13 December 1966, stemmed exclusively from himself and was his ¹³⁴ ACDP, 08–001, 418/2: ‘Leits¨atze zur Deutschlandpolitik’, Nov. 1966.

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concept, rather than one of the SPD.¹³⁵ Strauss even went so far as to claim that the formation of the Grand Coalition had become possible only because of the SPD’s readiness to adapt to the programme of the CDU/CSU.¹³⁶ In addition, the entire renunciation-of-force idea was the brainchild of the CDU rather than the SPD. As mentioned earlier, a first offer concerning a renunciation-of-force exchange had been made by Carstens to Semjonov during the latter’s visit in September 1965. The repeated offer of a renunciation of force in the peace note sent by the Erhard government in March 1966 can be seen as the first genuine step towards mobilizing the policy towards the East.¹³⁷ Shortly before the change of government, the exchange of renunciation-of-force declarations was again recommended as a useful policy regarding Moscow.¹³⁸ Thus from this perspective it seems that by December 1966 the CDU was not adapting to the SPD’s course of action, but was also a driving force in the newly introduced Eastern policy. However, it was also natural for the CDU leaders to make sure that the new d´etente policy was not confused with the abandonment of legal positions, as they observed that their coalition partner had done.¹³⁹ A comparison of the two parties’ preparations for the government’s Ostpolitik reveals that whereas the SPD stressed the benefit of reconciliation, the CDU/CSU hoped ‘to harness it for the reunification of Germany’.¹⁴⁰ Especially in encounters with the Western Allies, Kiesinger made it repeatedly clear that his government still regarded reunification and d´etente as a ‘joint process’, and that d´etente could not be mistaken for the acceptance of the status quo. He asked his allies to see to it that their d´etente policy would be interpreted in the same way.¹⁴¹ Equally, the CSU urged that the Allies had to be ¹³⁵ ACDP, 01–226, 310: Kiesinger, NDR, 8 June 1972. ¹³⁶ Strauss at a CDU party congress, May 1967, in Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 18. ¹³⁷ See also Kroegel, Anfang finden, 186; Peter Bender, Die ‘Neue Ostpolitik’ und ihre Folgen: Vom Mauerbau bis zur Vereinigung (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 113. For more information see p. 25. ¹³⁸ PA, B 150: Boss, CDU member, at the Ausw¨artige Amt, 2 Dec. 1966. ¹³⁹ Ibid.: Carstens, 17 Nov. 1966. ¹⁴⁰ ACDP, 01–483, 020/1: Carstens, 17 Nov. 1966, about the CDU/CSU programme ‘Außenpolitik einer neuen Bundesregierung’ and the SPD programme ‘Aufgaben einer neuen Bundesregierung’. ¹⁴¹ ACDP, 01–226, A 287: e.g. Kiesinger to the American ambassador McGhee, 20 Dec. 1966, to the British ambassador Frank Roberts, 16 Jan. 1967, and to Nixon, 14 Mar. 1967.

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constantly reminded of their responsibility for Germany.¹⁴² In a note to Kiesinger concerning his forthcoming encounter with the American President Johnson, Guttenberg underlined that it would be foolish to make any concessions at this time.¹⁴³ He even regarded the renunciation of the demand for a Germany within the pre-war borders of 1937 as an unwise concession.¹⁴⁴ As the German newspaper Die Zeit reflected on 10 February 1967, traditional patterns of thought about Ostpolitik as asserted by Adenauer, enshrining the claim to sole representation of the FRG and the Hallstein Doctrine, were still being upheld by the whole CDU.¹⁴⁵ In addition, the party programme which was developed in the spring of 1967, mostly as a reaction to the perceived SPD ‘ostpolitical’ activism, used some terminology that seemed to indicate a more confrontational course than the one announced in unison with the SPD. Firstly, unlike the government declaration, the programme made reunification of Germany the foremost issue again, as a goal ‘independent of time and conditions’. Admittedly, priority was still given to the preservation of freedom over the attainment of German unity. The key to reunification was seen as lying in Moscow, whereas the other Eastern European states, including the ‘zone’, were given secondary importance. Although reunification was held to be unattainable for the time being, any concessions without simultaneous concessions in return were ruled out as ‘absurd’. The second important principle that was put forward, and in quite an aggressive fashion, was the denial of the ‘zone’ as a state. The policy of non-recognition of the ‘zone’ as a state was defined as a legal and political task, which had to avoid not only the dangers of a factual recognition, but also those of a dogmatic non-recognition. Instead, it had to consist of a programme of action aiming at constantly confronting the SED with all-German proposals, such as exchange on a cultural, economic, technical, or sporting level and the extension of intra-German traffic.¹⁴⁶ However, there were also voices that were critical of too rigid a course in Ostpolitik. In the parliamentary party’s Arbeitskreis for foreign policy, for instance, the deputy Artur Missbach admonished his party not to be ¹⁴² BAK, N 1397, 252: unit for Germany policy, 25 Nov. 1967. ¹⁴³ Ibid., 90: Guttenberg, 12 Aug. 1967. ¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 70: Guttenberg, 31 Jan. 1967. ¹⁴⁵ Die Zeit (10 Feb. 1967); see also Der Spiegel (6 Feb. 1967). ¹⁴⁶ BAK, N 1397, 170: Guttenberg to Kiesinger, 6 Apr. 1967, and to CSU deputy Six, 26 Apr. 1967; see also Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten, p. 221.

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destructive, to withdraw maximum demands, and to get rid of clich´ed ideas. Not least because of the willingness of the Americans, the FRG would also have to respond positively to the Soviets’ demand for a treaty regulating the present borders. As he saw it, by abandoning demands, Bonn would win the free world over for consideration of the German question.¹⁴⁷ Irrespective of this, the debate between the CDU/CSU and its coalition partner about the answer to Stoph’s letter then revealed that the Christian Democrats had called the policy towards the ‘zone’ into question. Firstly, as has been seen earlier, the CDU was in fact originally against writing a letter to East Berlin, because of the resulting threat of recognition, and had to be persuaded by the SPD to do so. Secondly, Kiesinger revealed his doubts about Deutschlandpolitik as a whole. In a very instructive meeting with CDU deputies, he conceded that a reaction to the Stoph letter was mandatory, but simultaneously warned his party against being too much influenced by the SPD policy as represented by Wehner, and ruled out any recognition of the GDR. As he also made plain, he did not believe in the success of the new ‘concrete policy’. This policy was justified only by its goal to revive the moral support of the outside world and by a firm preservation of the legal claims.¹⁴⁸ True, it was Kiesinger’s close adviser Diehl who, as head of the Ausw¨artige Amt’s planning section, had introduced the idea of allowing the GDR a ‘certain contractual capability’ as early as January 1967.¹⁴⁹ Historians such as Link have taken this as proof for the CDU/CSU’s authorship of New Ostpolitik during the Grand Coalition government.¹⁵⁰ This view is not accurate, however, for Diehl had equally argued against any recognition of the GDR, and was later at the forefront of those refusing to consider East Berlin in a Soviet–German non-aggression pact.¹⁵¹ ¹⁴⁷ BAK, N 1397, 170: Missbach, 21 Apr. 1967. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 171: Kiesinger, 5 June 1967. ¹⁴⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 400, 1: Diehl, 5 Jan. 1967. ¹⁵⁰ Werner Link to the author, 22 Mar. 2003; Werner Link, ‘Die Entstehung des Moskauer Vertrags in Lichte neuer Archivalien’, Vierteljahreshefte f¨ur Zeitgeschichte, 49/2 (2001), 298; Werner Link, ‘Ostpolitik: D´etente German-Style and Adapting to America’, in Detlef Junker (ed.), The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold war, 1945–1990: A Harbook, ii: 1968–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35. ¹⁵¹ PA, B 150: Brandt and Diehl, June 1967, and Ruete, 1 Mar. 1968. For further details of Diehl’s concept of a German–Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement see p. 81.

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The reluctance of the CDU/CSU leadership to activate intra-German contacts was echoed particularly among the ultra-conservatives of the CSU. These formed the core of the ‘hardline’ opponents of Ostpolitik, who repeatedly put pressure on Kiesinger and Brandt not to make too many compromises.¹⁵² Walter Becher, a member of the Bundestag, for instance, informed Guttenberg about his worries, as well as those of many friends, over the course of the contact policy with the ‘zone’. He called it ‘absurd’ in view of the fact that behind the demarcation line no d´etente was possible, and asked for this policy to be halted.¹⁵³ After talking about this topic with many of his colleagues, Guttenberg concluded that it was essential to find a balance between avoiding a rigid non-recognition policy, which would merely deter the world from considering the German problem, and too flexible a policy, which might result in Bonn sliding into a policy of recognition.¹⁵⁴ As he expressed it clearly before a community of refugees in K¨onigstein, ‘the Federal Republic has no new Deutschlandpolitik. It remains our goal not to let our claims be buried by a so-called policy of d´etente. There is only one legitimate German government, only one legitimate German state’.¹⁵⁵ Essentially, the policy of contacts was understood as a strategy to confront rather than to collaborate with East Germany, because, as Kiesinger had put it, nobody really believed that there would be a positive response from East Berlin. The intra-German talks merely had a tactical significance in that they were geared at unmasking the GDR as the enemy of d´etente. This would then demonstrate to the world, and especially to Moscow, that it was the GDR which was responsible for the intra-German difficulties, and would thus improve West Germany’s international standing. The new German policy was addressed mainly at the Western Allies, who were still regarded as the advocates of the German interests and whose support was seen as crucial for any progress in overcoming the division. This understanding translated into the demand constantly repeated by CDU/CSU leaders, vis-`a-vis the Western Allies, that they actively integrate German national interests into their d´etente policy.¹⁵⁶ This goal in German policy, primarily to ¹⁵² ¹⁵³ ¹⁵⁴ ¹⁵⁶

See also Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 37–9. BAK, N 1397, 170: Becher, 31 May 1967. Ibid.: Guttenberg, 12 June 1967. ¹⁵⁵ Neues Deutschland (16 Aug. 1967). BAK, N 1397, 90: Guttenberg to Kiesinger, 23 Apr. and 12 Aug. 1967.

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reanimate the German question internationally, was shared by a large majority of the CDU/CSU.¹⁵⁷ The person who expressed this view most drastically was Carstens. Whereas in his post as State Secretary in the Ausw¨artige Amt Carstens had been at the forefront of developing a more flexible Eastern policy, as Kiesinger’s adviser he repeatedly pointed out that a friendly coexistence between the FRG and the hostile system of the GDR was impossible.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, he reasoned, Bonn had to fight the ‘zone’ and concentrate efforts on concluding an arrangement with the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁹ What is more, the CDU increasingly refused to address the GDR at all. Despite his initial readiness for cooperation in Deutschlandpolitik, Kiesinger became increasingly hostile to the Social Democrats’ efforts vis-`a-vis East Germany. As early as October 1967, he admitted in a private meeting that he wanted to isolate the GDR.¹⁶⁰ Wehner later confirmed that the closer the elections came, the more apparent it became that Kiesinger’s attitude was that there was no sense in even trying to talk to the East Germans.¹⁶¹ There was consensus within the party that the decisive factor for the solution of the German problem was not the GDR, but the Soviet Union.¹⁶² The CDU/CSU aimed at ‘convincing the Soviet Union’ that German unification was the precondition for d´etente and hence was also in the Soviet interest.¹⁶³ In this spirit, Kiesinger made it an urgent aim of his foreign policy to win the Soviets’ trust and improve relations. It was with the Soviet Union as the leading power of Eastern Europe that Bonn would eventually negotiate about a reunited Germany—thus the Chancellor’s thoughts. ¹⁵⁷ Even the more moderate CDU leaders, such as Gradl and Majonica, never gave up the non-recognition principle. See ACDP, 01–294, 005/3: Gradl at the party congress in Brunswick, 21–3 May 1967, 30 Sept., and 18 Oct. 1967; ACDP, 01–349, 004/14: Majonica, 25 Sept. 1967. ¹⁵⁸ Carsten’s change of position is an example of the influence that the political leadership had over bureaucrats, since it was after Carsten moved from the Foreign Ministry to the Chancellery that he became more rigid and conservative. ¹⁵⁹ ACDP, 01–483, 291/1 and BAK, N 1474, 63: Carstens, Aug. and Oct. 1966 and July 1967. ¹⁶⁰ Kiesinger to Wirsing, 5 Oct. 1967, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 331. ¹⁶¹ Wehner in Der Spiegel (27 Jan. 1970), in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 419; see also Kroegel, Anfang finden, 302. ¹⁶² e.g. ACDP, 01–294, 005/3: Gradl, Feb. 1967; ACDP, 01–226, 002: Barzel, 13 July 1967. ¹⁶³ PA, B 150: Boss, 2 Dec. 1966.

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Because of this assumption, Kiesinger and his party colleagues were toying with the idea of a renunciation-of-force exchange with Moscow, in so far as it served the goal of German unity.¹⁶⁴ It was in this light that Kiesinger publicly promoted it as the ‘cornerstone’ of his policy. He also expressed his readiness to enter discussions with East Germany, but only as long as any legal claims were left unchanged.¹⁶⁵ By contrast, the parliamentary CDU/CSU was all the more sceptical. The main concern, as articulated, for instance, by Majonica’s Arbeitskreis for foreign policy or by Johann Baptist Gradl, leader of the Exile CDU, centred on the resulting threat of recognition of the GDR. Therefore any renunciation-of-force exchange was held to be acceptable only if it was clearly understood to constitute a prelude to further negotiations and a first step towards a European peace order. On the whole, reservations prevailed against such an exchange.¹⁶⁶ Throughout the Grand Coalition government, the CDU/CSU remained convinced that efforts to reach renunciation-of-force agreements with Bonn’s East European neighbours just for the sake of d´etente in Europe were useless. The party constantly underlined that it would have to be made absolutely clear that such an exchange should not be misunderstood as a cementing of the status quo, but must be seen simply as the continuation of the same national policy by peaceful means, and furthermore a first step towards a peace order. Even the inclusion of the GDR and other political questions in such an exchange was taken into consideration, but only on condition that such inclusion did not imply the recognition of East Berlin.¹⁶⁷ With the start of the exchange of notes between Bonn and Moscow, the form and content of a renunciation-of-force declaration increasingly became an issue of discussion during 1967. The CDU/CSU adopted the line taken by Kiesinger and his advisers at the Chancellery. This line reflected the initial doubts that Kiesinger had expressed about any renunciation-of-force talks and must be seen mainly as a reaction to the disappointing Soviet memo of 12 October 1967.¹⁶⁸ As mentioned in the ¹⁶⁴ Ibid. ¹⁶⁵ ACDP, 01–226, 008-1a: Kiesinger in a press briefing, 17 Mar. 1967. ¹⁶⁶ BAK, N 1371, 366: Majonica, 8 Feb. 1967; ACDP, 01–294, 006–1: Gradl, 26 Feb. 1967. ¹⁶⁷ ACPD, 01–294, 005/3: paper on the renunciation of force, Nov. 1967; BAK, N 1371, 366: Gradl, Feb. 1968; Karl-Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg, Wenn der Westen will: Pl¨adoyer f¨ur eine mutige Politik (Stuttgart and Degerloch: Seewald, 1964), 222–3; Der Spiegel (24 Apr. 1967). ¹⁶⁸ For further information see chapter pp. 37–8.

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previous section, unlike Brandt, the ‘Kiesinger team’ was against considering the GDR in anything other than a multilateral form of exchange. It was opposed to the plan of using the question of renunciation-of-force to enter into a general discussion about Soviet–German relations, in which Bonn could only lose. In the eyes of Kiesinger and his staff in the Chancellery, the German renunciation-of-force note should therefore leave aside all other political problems. Rather than offering negotiations, it should be designed as a mere explanation of Bonn’s desire to solve the disputed questions peacefully while upholding all legal claims.¹⁶⁹ The Chancellery’s assumption behind the ‘restricted’ interpretation of renunciation-of-force declarations that it propagated was that Soviet and German interests were irreconcilable. There was no hope for progress in Bonn’s Soviet policy in the foreseeable future. This is also why the CDU/CSU was against the elaboration of a ‘blueprint’ for Ostpolitik and a policy towards Moscow, for which it perceived the SPD was preparing. Admittedly, however, the party was also interested in providing a new approach for a more successful Eastern policy. Guttenberg and Barzel agreed over the need to adapt the CDU’s Deutschlandpolitik to the present situation without ‘taboos’. They argued for a ‘Europeanization’ of the German question and stated that aiming at a European peace order was the only possible framework within which the German problem could be solved. However, Guttenberg equally warned against designing a programme for such a peace order. Contrary to Brandt’s announced assumptions, Guttenberg felt that a European peace order and with it reunification could be the goal only of a long-term policy. Only a gradual peaceful rapprochement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, rather than the dissolution of both systems in the near future, as envisaged by Brandt, would one day effect the desired peace order. At present, however, Europe was far away from such a scenario owing to the resistance of the key power, Moscow, to any real peace order. Putting questions of a security system on the agenda would therefore be a dangerous undertaking in that it would only help to realize the Eastern version of it, namely the final confirmation and fixing of the status quo. For these reasons, Guttenberg and Barzel concluded that an ‘escalation of offers’ in the form of political, military, or economic concessions to the Soviet Union would have to be avoided. Instead, a long-term policy ¹⁶⁹ See, e.g. BAK, N 1337, 672: Carstens, 6 Mar. 1968; PA, B 150: Duckwitz about Kiesinger and Diehl, 24 February 1968. This is explained in more detail on p. 81.

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aiming at step-by-step progress should be continued patiently. This policy had already proved successful in that it had freed Ostpolitik from old constraints, rebutted the accusation of Bonn’s hostility to d´etente, won some grounds in Eastern Europe, put the SED somewhat into the defensive, and won the support of the Allies.¹⁷⁰ Thus the CDU/CSU leaders wrote off any far-reaching strategy for Ostpolitik as unrealistic. They contented themselves with aiming at an improved climate between Bonn and its Eastern neighbours as the precondition for any successful future Ostpolitik.¹⁷¹ Rather than engaging in hasty activity, the characteristic strategy for Kiesinger’s party was to trust in a future development. The ‘fantasy of history’, for example in the form of a sudden crisis within the Soviet Union triggered by the ideological conflict with China, might prompt the Kremlin, in its own interest, to be more conciliatory to Bonn and possibly to renounce the second German state.¹⁷² Therefore, from this point of view, any concessions in advance on Bonn’s behalf, such as a factual recognition of all borders, as the SPD increasingly suggested, made no sense for they were likely to be accepted without any concessions in return.¹⁷³ However, this is not to say that the CDU/CSU ruled out the question of concessions outright. The records of internal party business rather show that, starting in spring 1968, some circles within the party began to debate over revising their legal positions in Ostpolitik. In a number of meetings, especially those of the Außenpolitische Kommission (Foreign Affairs Commission), moderate conservatives discussed the West German claim for sole representation, the Hallstein Doctrine, and particularly the question of the recognition of the GDR.¹⁷⁴ As early as April 1968, the MP Olaf von Wrangel questioned whether the position of non-recognition of the GDR could be maintained, and suggested differentiating between recognition of the GDR as a state and as a foreign country. Equally, Gradl and Georg Kliesing, member of Majonica’s Arbeitskreis for foreign policy, cautiously formulated the scenario of recognizing East Berlin. In addition, the MP Manfred W¨orner introduced the convergence theory used by the opposition party as a method to ¹⁷⁰ BAK, N 1397, 90: Guttenberg to Barzel, July 1968. ¹⁷¹ ACDP, 01–403, 125/1: Kiesinger, July 1968. ¹⁷² Diehl to Kroegel, in Kroegel, Anfang finden, 335–6; see also Kiesinger in the Rheinische Post (27 July 1968); Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition 1963–1969 (Stuttgart and Wiesbaden: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1984), p. 326. ¹⁷³ Strauss in the Rheinischer Merkur (10 Nov. 1967), and Die Welt (4 Sept. 1968). ¹⁷⁴ See e.g. ACDP, 04–007, 0093/1: meeting, 14 Feb. 1968.

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foster reunification. According to this theory, reunification of Germany was thinkable only as a long-term result of cooperation between, and a convergence of, the capitalist and communist systems. The precondition for such a convergence was the recognition of East Germany’s statehood. It is noteworthy that no one in the commission ruled out this ‘convergence theory’ completely. On the contrary, reactions were actually surprisingly open-minded.¹⁷⁵ Eventually, in the course of the debate in June 1968, however, the rejection of any recognition of the GDR asserted itself as the majority view. Gradl, for example, had come to the view that it would not lead to the desired rapprochement but would rather widen the gulf between the two Germanies. Kliesing rejected the recognition because he considered any expectations of a reunification thereafter to be as absurd as ‘wanting to heal a marriage by divorcing’. Similarly, the deputy Richard von Weizs¨acker doubted that recognizing East Berlin would have any beneficial effect on a rapprochement either between East and West or between the two Germanies. As a result, consensus was reached that the crucial step for the CDU/CSU to take would be to counter the increasing ‘pro-recognition’ movement in West Germany with opposing statements.¹⁷⁶

Retreat to the Preservation of Legal Claims The tendency was now again to put the preservation of legal claims before any progress in Ostpolitik. Even the limited aim of an improvement of atmosphere between Bonn and Moscow was approved of only in so far as it did not entail giving up any legal claims. Consequently, the CDU/CSU was concerned not to appear as too conciliatory to the Soviet Union, and not to give in to Soviet demands for concessions in the process of renunciation-of-force talks. At a CSU party congress, Kiesinger complained that Bonn’s policy towards the East was hampered by Moscow’s claims of a right of intervention and declined ‘to sign this capitulation’.¹⁷⁷ It certainly has to be taken into consideration that Kiesinger was speaking to an audience known to be hostile towards flexibility in Ostpolitik. In that sense, it is difficult at times to assess ¹⁷⁵ ACDP, 04–007, 0093/1: Wrangel and W¨orner, May 1968, and Foreign Affairs Commission, 3 Apr. and 31 May 1968. ¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: Gradl, 9 Oct. 1968. ¹⁷⁷ ACDP, 01–226, A 310: Kiesinger, 17 July 1968.

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whether Kiesinger was expressing his own view or merely trying to appease opposition from within the CSU. Whatever Kiesinger’s motivation was, he and his colleagues gave Moscow the impression of being difficult to negotiate with. This picture of an uncooperative CDU was mirrored in talks between SPD members and Soviet and East German diplomats. In a secret meeting with his ‘friend’ from East Berlin, Bahr was informed that Moscow, like East Berlin, was not inclined to make any progress in the stagnated renunciation-of-force dialogue as long as the CDU/CSU stayed in power. The impression was shared that the CDU’s old guards were dominating the course of Ostpolitik and that Carstens, for instance, was responsible for the decisive deterioration of the German memorandum. Bahr’s East German friend then hinted that Ostpolitik might break out of the deadlock if the SPD left the coalition.¹⁷⁸ In talks with Duckwitz, Zarapkin revealed how much Kiesinger’s alleged remark about the ‘Lebensraum’ (living space) of the Germans had angered the Soviets.¹⁷⁹ Again, it must be asked to what extent East Berlin’s and Moscow’s accusations against the CDU were mere propaganda or were in fact a tactic to play one party off against the other. However, the overall impression remains that Moscow clearly preferred SPD Ostpolilitik to CDU Ostpolitik as more flexible and promising more favourable and faster results.¹⁸⁰ Interestingly, even from the Western Allies’ point of view, the CDU/CSU seemed less willing than the SPD to lead a policy of d´etente other than as a temporary necessity. As Denis Laskey, an official at the British embassy in Bonn put it, ‘the policy of unilateral d´etente . . . will almost certainly lose backing if a future government is formed without the SPD’.¹⁸¹ As a result of the Prague invasion, Kiesinger’s scepticism about any success of the policy towards Moscow became stronger, and this scepticism was not to leave him for the rest of his chancellorship.¹⁸² From this point on, he advocated restraint towards the Soviet Union. He described the question of the renunciation of force as ‘not central ¹⁷⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 3: Bahr, 27 May 1968. ¹⁷⁹ PA, B 150, doc. 213: Buring, 9 July 1968. ¹⁸⁰ On the Soviet assessment of a government led by the SPD, see Karl-Heinz Schmidt, Dialog u¨ ber Deutschland: Studien zur Deutschlandpolitik von KpdSU und SED (1960–1979) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), 200–10. ¹⁸¹ PRO, FCO, 33/225: Laskey, 15 July 1968. ¹⁸² See, e.g. PA, B 150: Weber, 8 Jan. 1969. For a similar argument, see Taschler, Vor neuen Herausforderungen, 404–5.

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to the policy of fostering a European peace order’. Although he opted for a continuation of d´etente policy as the only way to secure peace, he did not believe that Moscow would be involved any longer, because of its opposition to Bonn’s stated desire to overcome the status quo. Nonetheless, Kiesinger was determined to pursue his Ostpolitik with this goal. As he put it, ‘we will not let Moscow prevent us from continuing our internationally approved policy’. Moreover, the Chancellor warned that to make any offers or concessions to the Soviet Union in this ‘situation of stagnation’ would constitute a ‘great mistake’. The resumption of intra-German talks, as a member of the cabinet had suggested, was now ruled out by the Chancellor as ‘crazy’ because of the resultant upgrading of the GDR.¹⁸³ The CDU/CSU Bundestag group, as represented by Barzel, equally questioned whether d´etente policy could be directed to any particular country at present, and whether it could be pursued with the same intensity as hitherto.¹⁸⁴ The orthodox conservatives became even more vocal in their criticism. They now gloated that Brandt’s Ostpolitik had discredited itself and was responsible for the course of events in Prague. Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag, became especially excited, stating that ‘even the most pigheaded illusionists and dreamers would now no longer contend that a policy based just on love of peace . . . could come to terms with Moscow and its satellites’.¹⁸⁵ Kiesinger, although trying to appease these colleagues for the sake of coalition unity,¹⁸⁶ felt justified in holding a sceptical attitude after an encounter with Zarapkin in September 1968. The latter’s explanation—that no one would be allowed to single out any member of the Warsaw Pact and that the FRG should recognize the present borders before any improvement of relations was conceivable—reflected a renewed hostility in the Soviet attitude towards West Germany. As a result, the Chancellor seemingly hardened. He rebutted the accusation that the FRG was pursuing a revisionist policy. In other areas, he merely insisted on his goal of reunification and on the need to find, together with Moscow, a common method of reunification.¹⁸⁷ ¹⁸³ BAK, N 1397, 95: Guttenberg on a coalition meeting, 23 Aug. 1967; BAK, N 1474, 69: Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, 27 Aug. 1968. ¹⁸⁴ BAK, N 1371, 77, 1: Barzel, 9 and 18 Sept. 1968. ¹⁸⁵ Der Spiegel (9 Sept. 1968). ¹⁸⁶ See Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestags, stenographische Berichte, vol. 67, 10049–56 : Kiesinger, 25 Sept. 1968. ¹⁸⁷ PA, B 150, doc. 277: Kiesinger, 2 Sept. 1968.

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The consequence of this ‘new phase of Soviet imperialistic policy’, Kiesinger explained to the American ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, would be to revive the political solidarity of the Western world under the firm guidance of the United States and encourage resistance to the Soviet attempts to make West Germany alter its position on reunification.¹⁸⁸ In the CDU leadership, much emphasis was now given to the importance of a patient and cautious conduct in any Eastern policy. Guttenberg underlined that in his personal view no spectacular steps should be taken towards an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the GDR, as the correct conditions were not present.¹⁸⁹ To the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag Kiesinger gave a forecast for Ostpolitik for the year, presenting it essentially as the continuation of the established policy towards the Soviet Union, without much optimism. He discarded any ‘utopian plans’, such as the Deutschlandvertrag, which the FDP had submitted in the Bundestag in January 1969 concerning a regulated coexistence between the FRG and the GDR.¹⁹⁰ Carstens, by contrast, actually came up with a somewhat more progressive approach to Ostpolitik. He concluded that the goal of reunification should still not be given up and that therefore the GDR’s attempts to enter into diplomatic relations should be vehemently warded off. Simultaneously, he argued for the modification of both the claim of sole representation and the concept of continuity between the post-war FRG and the pre-war ‘Reich’.¹⁹¹ Deliberations within the Foreign Affairs Commission also revealed a decreasing willingness to experiment in Eastern policy. The scenario of recognizing the GDR was once again thought through but eventually discarded. Instead, it was made clear that the CDU/CSU, relying on its long-term experience in dealing with the Soviet Union, would no longer participate in fruitless all-German activity and in the ‘jettisoning’ of legal claims. In addition, the FDP’s suggestion of the General Treaty was brought into discussion. Overall, it was rejected as a proposal made at the wrong time that would needlessly restrict the scope for discussion.¹⁹² The CDU/CSU took a clear stand in spring 1969, especially in response to increasing demands for recognition from the SPD camp ¹⁸⁸ Ibid., docs. 280 and 306: Kiesinger, 4 Sept. 1968. ¹⁸⁹ BAK, N 1397, 93: Guttenberg, 6 Jan. 1969. ¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 92: Guttenberg, 13 Jan. 1969; Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 100. ¹⁹¹ BAK, N 1337, 676: Carstens, Jan. 1969. ¹⁹² ACDP, 08-001, 412/2 and 01–294, 006-1: Foreign Affairs Commission, 21 Jan. and 11 Feb. 1969.

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and the Free Democrats. It announced that it would continue its policy of non-recognition, while striving for all sorts of intra-German contacts and searching for a German solution within a European peace order in close unison with its Allies. ‘Firmness, not dynamics at any cost’ became the motto for the conduct of Ostpolitik. Underlying this resolution was the supposition that it was primarily a change of Soviet interest, not new recipes from West German politicians, that would be the crucial precondition for an improvement of conditions. Yet a renunciation-offorce agreement in the strict sense was still approved of in so far as it served as a preparation of a European peace order.¹⁹³ The absence of any such change in the Soviets’ policy towards Bonn, however, meant that Kiesinger remained doubtful as to the possibilities of a German–Soviet accord. A series of conversations with Zarapkin in February and March 1969 further reinforced Kiesinger’s pessimism. In Kiesinger’s eyes, these talks revealed that, despite the mutual affirmation of the wish for rapprochement, there was incompatibility between both standpoints and Soviet hostility towards Bonn.¹⁹⁴ The whole party was similarly disenchanted about German–Soviet relations. It revealed its ‘mood’ in a paper in which it said: ‘if the miracle of an improved relationship with Moscow worked out . . . ’.¹⁹⁵ As the CDU/CSU saw it, there was ‘no indication of the Soviet Union being prepared to pursue any policy other than that of the status quo’. The task would be to find out whether the Soviet catalogue of maximum demands was negotiable. For the party still hoped that in the long run the Soviet attitude might alter as a result of changed international conditions and political cooperation, thus making a revision of their policy seem advisable.¹⁹⁶ The CSU was even more sceptical about the possibility that Ostpolitik would bear any fruit. While it expressed its support of an Eastern policy, it warned against basing too much hope on it and failing to take account of the Soviets’ imperialistic endeavours.¹⁹⁷ ¹⁹³ BAK, N 1371, 81, 1: Barzel, 26 Mar. 1969; e.g. BAK, N 1371, 81, 1 and 2, and ACDP, 01–433, 131/2 and 08-001, 467/1: Barzel, 25, 26, 31 Mar. and 2 Apr. 1969, Wrangel, 21 Mar. 1969, and Gradl, 31 Mar. 1969; ACDP, 01–403, 109: Kiesinger, 24 and 25 Apr. 1969. ¹⁹⁴ PA, B 150, and B 150, docs. 74 and 86: Kiesinger, 13 and 22 Feb. and 1 Mar. 1969. ¹⁹⁵ ACDP, 01–294, 006/2: Gradl, 11 Mar. 1969; see also BAK, N 1371, 81, 2: Barzel, 3 Feb. 1969. ¹⁹⁶ ACDP, 01–294, 006/2: Gradl, 5 June 1969. ¹⁹⁷ BAK, N 1377, 252: CSU working group for foreign policy, 13–14 June 1969.

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Hence, as regards the Soviet policy in the final stage of the Grand Coalition, it was Kiesinger’s and his party’s main concern merely to avoid any disruption of the dialogue with the Soviet Union, and this was for tactical reasons rather than because of any hope of a positive outcome. For as Kiesinger had made it plain again and again, no progress was to be expected from contacts with Moscow.¹⁹⁸ At the same time, it must be pointed out that at the beginning of 1969 and particularly towards the end of the coalition government, the CDU’s growing reservations coexisted with a renewed willingness to develop and offer new initiatives in Ostpolitik and possibly negotiations with the Soviet Union and GDR. From reading records it becomes clear that although the GDR could not be recognized legally, its existence as a separate system was not denied. Negotiations with the GDR were now offered openly despite the GDR’s dismissive attitude.¹⁹⁹ Similarly, Kiesinger, on the one hand, explicitly warned against any form of recognition of the GDR, because Bonn would not be able to assert its differentiation between a de facto and a de jure recognition abroad, and this would irretrievably bar the way to reunification. On the other hand, he underlined his wish for negotiations with the GDR as well as the Soviet Union and talked of the possibility of an intra-German treaty once a modus vivendi was reached.²⁰⁰ Indicative of the party’s partial orientation to a more flexible Eastern policy is the remarkable conclusion drawn by the CDU in late April 1969, that essentially the SPD’s German policy was qualitatively no different from that of the CDU. Whereas the CDU/CSU strongly rejected the FDP’s foreign policy based on a ‘two-state theory’ and a treaty with the GDR as giving away all remaining trumps without opening the ‘door to freedom and self-determination for the Germans’, it underlined the alleged similarities between the two coalition partners’ ideas. Both the SPD and the CDU/CSU rejected recognizing East Berlin and regarding it as foreign, and they pleaded equally for negotiations on different levels.²⁰¹ ¹⁹⁸ For instance, PA, B 150 and B 150, doc. 54: Kiesinger to Cabot Lodge, 7 Jan. 1969, to Wilson, 12 Feb. 1969, and to Nixon, 26 Feb. 1969. ¹⁹⁹ Barzel in the Rheinische Post (12 Apr. 1969), and the Bayernkurier (19 Apr. 1969); ACDP, 01–294, 006/2: CDU paper, 15 Apr. 1969. ²⁰⁰ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 69, 12666: Kiesinger, 25 Apr. 1969; ACDP, 01–226, 008-1: Kiesinger, 29 May 1969; ACDP, 01–403, 109: paper ‘Arguments Against and For a Recognition’, 1970. ²⁰¹ ACDP, 07-004, 419/2: foreign policy unit, 23 Apr. 1969.

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However, as discussed above,²⁰² such new ideas for a more active and conciliatory policy towards the Soviet Union were probably mainly a tactical measure to counter the renewed SPD initiatives and keep the upper hand for possible future German–Soviet negotiations.²⁰³ In effect, when it came to realizing such suggested negotiations with the Soviet Union, Kiesinger and his staff in the Chancellery showed themselves to be deadlocked in old patterns of thought. As the quarrel with the Foreign Ministry over the German note in summer 1969, mentioned above, undoubtedly revealed, Kiesinger rejected even flexible formulations as open to dangerous misinterpretation, not to mention the introduction of new more flexible policies, mostly concerning the status of the GDR. He was hence stuck.²⁰⁴ Admittedly, most of the ‘retarding influence’ from the Chancellery on the Ausw¨artige Amt in this matter must be ascribed to the secretaries Carstens and particularly Guttenberg, rather than Kiesinger himself. A review of the correspondence on the renunciation-of-force issue reveals that any criticism of the positions proposed by the Foreign Ministry mostly originated from these two defenders of the hard-line position and was simply adopted by the Chancellor.²⁰⁵ The Social Democrats equally regarded Kiesinger’s advisers within the Chancellery as the initiators of all resistance. During coalition negotiations, they objected that it would be impossible to launch a new Ostpolitik with Guttenberg in the Chancellery.²⁰⁶ Whatever the origins of restraint within the Chancellery were, Kiesinger freely chose to be advised by Carstens and Guttenberg. Hence, his office as a whole acted as a brake on the allegedly over-flexible renunciation-of-force policy proposed by Brandt’s Foreign Ministry. In the run-up to the elections, the differences between the CDU and SPD agendas were once again accentuated. In July 1969, Kiesinger’s Ministerialdirigent Horst Osterheld drew the following comparison: it had turned out that the SPD had developed a ‘new Ostpolitik’ that accommodated the GDR’s policy by unwisely renouncing legal claims. This was mirrored in the differentiation between the de facto and de jure ²⁰² See p. 73. ²⁰³ BAK, N 1397, 94: Guttenberg, 15 Jan. 1969, for the CDU Executive Committee on 16 Jan. 1969. ²⁰⁴ See pp. 88–90. ²⁰⁵ In an interview with the author on 31 Aug. 2003, Sahm explained that Guttenberg and Carstens were the authors of all criticism of the Foreign Ministries’ drafts and that Kiesinger merely signed their revised drafts; see also Anthony James Nicholls, The Bonn Republic: West German Democracy 1945–1990 (London: Longman, 1997), 56. ²⁰⁶ Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 427; Baring, Machtwechsel, 135.

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recognition and a ‘realignment’ of intra-German relations introduced by the offer of government negotiations. The CDU, by contrast, had continued its clear course with a programme for the 1970s. In it the CDU stated that, while not denying the existence of the GDR, it would not recognize it, because this would not induce East Berlin to a more conciliatory attitude, and hence would create no better position for Bonn.²⁰⁷ Taking Osterheld’s description as a characterization of the CDU’s and SPD’s respective policies for the new government, the CDU’s policy seemed considerably more immobile and restricted than that of the SPD. It was critical even of government negotiations with East Berlin and emphasized the negative repercussions of the recognition of the GDR, rather than offering constructive alternatives. Overall, there was no sign that the CDU/CSU would take leave of its dogma of non-recognition. On the contrary, Kiesinger’s party took a firm stand in these last weeks before the elections against the ‘chit-chat’ about recognition as heard either in the ranks of its coalition partner or in those of the opposition. In public, Kiesinger now argued as though he wanted to return to the CDU policy of the 1950s.²⁰⁸ In his statement on the state of the German nation in June 1969, for instance, the Chancellor warned ‘those . . . euphemists among us who are advocating recognition of the GDR’ that ‘such recognition would confirm injustice to be justice’.²⁰⁹ In a speech in Washington in August 1969, he maintained that as long as Moscow showed no readiness to solve the German question in negotiations, there was nothing more left to do than ‘defend the German positions’.²¹⁰ As late as in mid October 1969, the CDU/CSU, assuming an election victory, explicitly rejected legitimizing the GDR. It pointed out the damage done by the talk about recognition in terms of a creation of confusion at home, depression in East Germany, and insecurity about Bonn’s viewpoint abroad. It therefore demanded a stop to the ‘misleading use of the expression of recognition’.²¹¹ A day before the announcement of the formation of the new government, Kiesinger appealed to his CDU colleagues in the ²⁰⁷ BAK, N 1337, 672: Osterheld, 17 July 1969. ²⁰⁸ See also Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 196. ²⁰⁹ Kiesinger in June 1969, in Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, Democracy and its Discontents 1963–1988 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 144; see also BAK, N 1371, 82, 1: Barzel’s comments on Kiesinger’s statement, 7 June 1969. ²¹⁰ Deutsche Ostpolitik, ii, doc. 96: Kiesinger before the National Press Club in Washington, 8 Aug. 1969. ²¹¹ ACDP, 01–294, 006/2: Gradl, 17 Oct. 1969.

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parliamentary party to make every effort to prevent the GDR from being recognized by other peoples, as had already been endorsed, for instance, by Scheel, chairman of the opposition party.²¹² In sum, owing to his reliance upon future developments which would favour a German–Soviet accord over reunification, Kiesinger persisted in an increasingly inflexible German–Soviet policy during his Chancellorship. As a result, the exchange of renunciation-of-force declarations that was intended for the short term was meant to factor out all disputed questions and merely create a better atmosphere.²¹³ From Kiesinger’s point of view, any recognition of the ‘realities’, as was first favoured secretly and then adopted as the official course by the Social Democrats, seemed unwise, and constituted the major difference between his ideas and the policy that was introduced by the Social–Liberal government in 1969. However, before judging whether the policy that the SPD introduced in 1969 was continuous or discontinuous with, and overall similar to or different from the CDU’s policy, Brandt’s approach to the renunciation-of-force policy during the Grand Coalition government must be examined.

B R A N D T ’ S A LT E R N AT I V E P RO G R A M M E F O R N EW OSTPOLITIK

Devising a Blueprint for Treaty Negotiations with Moscow The development and making of Ostpolitik was a much more homogeneous process in the SPD camp than in the CDU/CSU camp. This was due to the fact that the SPD was a fairly integrated and centralized party with a very high degree of consensus, especially on the subject of Ostpolitik. Admittedly, the left wing of the party, much of which was linked to the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (Socialist Students’ League, SDS), formed an extra-parliamentary opposition for lack of any other left-wing party and became alienated from the SPD after the formation of the Grand Coalition government.²¹⁴ This was the ²¹² ACDP, 08-001, 1020/1: CDU/CSU caucus, 2 Oct. 1969. ²¹³ ACDP, 01–226, 310: Kiesinger, NDR, 8 June 1972. ²¹⁴ Roger Tilford, ‘German Coalition Politics’, Political Quarterly, 39 (1968), 174; Heinrich-August Winkler, Deutsche Geschichte vom 3. Reich bis zur Wiedervereinigung (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2002), Der lange Weg nach Westen, ii: 250.

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only group that exercised any pressure on the SPD leadership as far as Ostpolitik was concerned. This camp apart, however, there was virtually no disagreement, either among the party leadership or between the party leadership and the rest of the party, particularly the parliamentary party. Consequently, as leading individuals in the parliamentary SPD, such as Karl Wienand and Kurt Mattick, testified as well, the course of SPD Ostpolitik was under the firm control of a very few leaders, particularly Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, and Helmut Schmidt, who were faced with barely any resistance from any factions.²¹⁵ The number of SPD leaders relevant to this analysis is therefore very small. When one considers the policy towards the Soviet Union, it can be further reduced essentially just to Brandt and his advisers within the Foreign Ministry. The most notable of these associates were Egon Bahr, first special ambassador and then head of the planning staff, State Secretary Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz, and Ulrich Sahm, head of the ‘sub-department II A for political affairs’. This was due to the fact that except in the case of Horst Ehmke, who as Minister of Justice of the Grand Coalition had dealings with Brandt and Bahr in legal questions concerning German policy, there was hardly any exchange with his other important party colleagues, Schmidt and Wehner. As mentioned earlier, Wehner as Minister for All-German Affairs was not involved in policy towards the Soviet Union.²¹⁶ As Brandt reflected in May 1969, he was not supported sufficiently by Schmidt and Wehner.²¹⁷ Consequently, he cooperated closely with his advisers in the Foreign Ministry rather than with his party associates. The focus of the following analysis will therefore be the Foreign Ministry as the centre of Brandt’s policy-making. The SPD leadership stood united behind its programme for Ostpolitik, which was based on the party’s position as adopted at the SPD congress in Dortmund in June 1966.²¹⁸ The important conclusion ²¹⁵ Karl Wienand, Eugen Selbmann and Kurt Mattick to Thomas Paul Koppel, Apr. and May 1970, in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 397; see also Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986), 184. ²¹⁶ See pp. 81–2. ²¹⁷ Horst Ehmke, Mittendrin: Von der Großen Koalition zur deutschen Einheit (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994), 74. Knorr, Parlamentarische Entscheidungsprozeß, 43, by contrast, argues that there was generally close cooperation between Brandt, Wehner, and their colleagues in the parliamentary party. ²¹⁸ For a survey of the development of the SPD policy since the 1950s, see Daniela M¨unkel, Willy Brandt: Berliner Ausgabe, iv: Auf dem Weg nach vorn: Willy Brandt und die SPD 1947–1972 (Berlin: Dietz, 2000), 19–55; Manfred Uschner, Die Ostpolitik der

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drawn by the party then was that the Four Powers would never solve the German question and that it was the West Germans who should take new initiatives in the form of negotiating with East Germany.²¹⁹ Brandt re-emphasized the policy he had already favoured from the 1950s, which gave priority to economic, scientific, and cultural exchange, and to humanitiarian relief across the iron curtain. This would, Brandt hoped, preserve the coherence of the divided nation in both parts of Germany and promote the transformation of the communist system in the long run.²²⁰ Reunification was thus no longer thought of as the result of ‘one act’ but of ‘a long process’. Brandt announced that he could accept a ‘qualified and temporary coexistence of both territories’ if a development had been initiated internationally beforehand.²²¹ This programme was the basis on which the SPD entered coalition negotiations with the CDU. Contrary to the claim of Kiesinger and Strauss, that the CDU managed to realize its own Ostpolitik in the Grand Coalition government, a comparison between this SPD party programme of June 1966 and that of the new government shows that almost all of the points of the former were accepted in the coalition’s initial foreign policy statements.²²² Put another way, the creation of the Grand Coalition’s programme for Ostpolitik was a process of negotiation between the partners and of reciprocal adjustment to a common position in which the SPD policy was represented at least as strongly as the CDU policy. The SPD’s mere entrance into the Grand Coalition government was, however, already the first cause for conflict between the party’s leaders and its left wing. The socialist rank and file were dissatisfied with the prospect of the SPD pursuing an Ostpolitik together with the CDU/CSU, their habitual opponents. They maintained that the SPD showed too little verve and too much consideration for the orthodox SPD: Sieg und Niederlage einer Strategie (Berlin: Dietz, 1991), 7–73; Miller and Potthoff, History of German Social Democracy, 165–85; Jens Hacker, ‘Die deutsche Frage aus der Sicht der SPD’, in Dieter Blumenwitz and Gottfried Zieger (eds.), Die deutsche Frage im Spiegel der Parteien (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1989), 39–57. ²¹⁹ Willy Brandt, Der Wille zum Frieden: Perspektiven der Politik (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1971), 160; see also PA, B 7, 134: Ausw¨artige Amt, Oct. 1966. ²²⁰ Wolfgang Schmidt, ‘The Roots of D´etente: The Conceptual Origin of Willy Brandt’s Policy on Germany and her Relations to Eastern Europe in the 1950s’, Vierteljahreshefte f¨ur Zeitgeschichte, 51/4 (2003) 521–63. ²²¹ ACDP, 01–483, 035/2: SPD paper, 7 June 1966; Bark and Gress, Democracy and its Discontents, 106. ²²² Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 400, argues thus.

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attitude of the conservatives in this partnership.²²³ However, this left wing could not have known that its leader, Brandt, had actually already started developing a less orthodox Ostpolitik behind the closed doors of his Foreign Ministry. Brandt had firm control over his ministry and successfully managed to use it to further his own ideas about Ostpolitik. This was the case despite the fact that he was faced with an overwhelmingly pro-CDU bureaucracy resulting from the CDU’s long-standing dominance in Bonn’s foreign policy formation. In fact, the possibility of problems with the entrenched bureaucracy of the Ausw¨artige Amt had been a serious concern for the SPD and Brandt. As a result, Brandt had insisted from the start on having a major influence on recruitment policies within his department to ensure that the ‘right’ people worked for him. He had Klaus Sch¨utz, one of his close associates, appointed as State Secretary when he took office, and at the same time Egon Bahr was made his special ambassador. Then, after less than a year, Brandt replaced G¨unter Diehl, head of the planning staff of the Ausw¨artige Amt and a close adviser to Kiesinger, with Bahr. Diehl instead became head of the Press Office. Bahr was, in his new position, directly subordinate to the minister, independent of the remaining organization of the Foreign Ministry, and, practically speaking, the best-informed ‘man in the house’ with the most influence on Brandt.²²⁴ As Bahr recalls, he was able to recruit a team for his planning section according to his own preference.²²⁵ Contrary to Brandt’s initial fears, Bahr found his colleagues ready for loyal cooperation. He confirmed the existence of a ‘good atmosphere in the house’ a couple of months later.²²⁶ Similarly, officials such as Erwin Wickert and Hans von Herwarth characterized the atmosphere in the Foreign Ministry as a ‘spirit of political correctness’²²⁷ and as very trusting and harmonious.²²⁸ However, at the same time, Bahr, as well as several SPD members, observed some resistance on the part of ²²³ See Michael Balfour, West Germany: A Contemporary History (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 227. ²²⁴ Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ²²⁵ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 224–6; see also Staden to Stephan Fuchs, in Fuchs, Dreiecksverh¨altnisse, 211. ²²⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Bahr, 20 Dec. 1966 and 19 May 1967. ²²⁷ Wickert to the author, 24 Nov. 2002. ²²⁸ Hans von Herwarth, Von Adenauer zu Brandt: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Propyl¨aen, 1990), 372; Theo Sommer and Kurt Mattick also underlined the loyalty of bureaucrats to their Minister in interviews with Koppel, in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 421–3; see also Fuchs, Dreiecksverh¨altnisse, 211.

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CDU officials to respecting shifts of emphasis in the new policy.²²⁹ Most importantly, Bahr was worried that Walther, in his influential position as ambassador in Moscow and with his outspoken opposition to a renunciation-of-force agreement with Moscow, would have a detrimental impact on Ostpolitik.²³⁰ Nonetheless, it can be concluded that such disloyalty did not, for the most part, create any significant problems for Brandt in the making of his Ostpolitik. This was due to the fact that such CDU hardliners as Walther were in the minority and thus could not become dangerous, and the fact that Brandt was not dependent on his whole apparatus but rather devised his policy in cooperation with a few key advisers in his ministry.²³¹ Having established a grip on the operations in the Foreign Ministry, the Brandt team could set about devising a renunciation-of-force policy. In agreement with Brandt’s opinion, there was consensus among the ministry staff that the new government should engage in a direct dialogue with Moscow, including talks about the renunciation of force as introduced by Carstens, rather than delegating it to the United States.²³² The declared aim was to exercise as strong a pressure as possible on Moscow to enter into a dialogue, rather than polemicizing against Soviet accusations.²³³ The resulting preparations for an active Soviet policy consisted, during the first few months, mainly of discussions of this issue and the editing of draft notes at the level of the relevant units (Referate).²³⁴ The units in charge of questions of Ostpolitik, including German–Soviet relations, were mostly from Sahm’s sub-department II A, namely units II A 1–4, but also unit II B 2, for European security questions from department II B on disarmament and control of armaments, led by Swidbert Schnippenkoetter. Moreover, a working group was established to deal with the renunciation-of-force complex. This group consisted of Bahr, Ministerialdirektor Ruete, and three officials from his political department II, namely his Ministerialdirigenten Swidbert ²²⁹ See e.g. PA, B 150 and B 41, 753: papers by the Soviet Union unit, 29 May 1967, and by Ruete, 19 June 1967, about the limits of d´etente policy and the importance of German legal positions. ²³⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 1: Bahr to Brandt, 10 May 1967; PA, B 150, doc. 259: Walther, 11 July 1967; AdsD, WBA, AM, 47 and PA, B 150: Walther to Brandt, 16 Sep., and 12 and 17 Oct. 1967. ²³¹ Eitel, Bahr’s assistant, held this view in an interview with the author, Nov. 2002. ²³² PA, B 150: unit for European security, 19 Jan. 1967, and Ruete, 26 Jan. 1967. ²³³ Ibid.: Bahr, 24 Feb. 1967. ²³⁴ BAK, N 1474, 62: Ruete, 1 Feb. 1967; PA, B 150: Walther, 7 Feb. 1967, and Bahr, 24 Feb. 1967.

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Schnippenkoetter and Sahm, and G¨unther van Well, head of the unit for all-German affairs (II A 1). Two officials from legal department V, Ministerialdirektor J¨org Thierfelder and Horst Blomeyer-Bartenstein of unit V 1 for international law and treaties, completed the round. This working group became the inside circle dealing exclusively with this policy dilemma. Only in certain cases did it consult further ‘trustworthy officials’ when their cooperation was ‘inevitable’.²³⁵ The drafts edited in this group on the renunciation-of-force policy were then discussed by Sahm and Brandt.²³⁶ Deutschlandpolitik, or ‘German policy’, was also immediately an issue within both the ministry and the planning section in particular. On instructions by Brandt, a more active German policy with reference to the government declaration was devised. Brandt, his Director-Generals, State Secretary Sch¨utz, and Bahr were agreed that this policy should consist of extended intra-German contacts. Because of the resultant threat that the ‘zone’ might be politically upgraded, it was decided to portray intra-German relations internationally as being of a special kind, different from Bonn’s other foreign relations.²³⁷ A month later, a working group set up by Brandt introduced a plan to allow the GDR recognition as a limited contract partner. On this basis, Bonn would be able to take up the desired political and economic contacts with the authorities in East Berlin without recognizing it as a sovereign state. Any progress in intra-German relations, however, was regarded as being dependent on the success of negotiations with the Soviet Union.²³⁸ With the identification of Moscow as the key to success in any of the Eastern negotiations, the Foreign Ministry gave top priority to establishing closer contacts with the Soviet Union. Although the prospects of a positive Soviet response soon came to be regarded as small,²³⁹ the predominant view was still that attempts had to be made to renew talks with Moscow about a renunciation-of-force exchange. Besides, the Soviets’ indication of their wish for equal treatment, rather than recognition, of the GDR gave rise to hope for a continuation of ²³⁵ Ibid. and AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 1: Ruete, 18 Dec. 1967. ²³⁶ Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ²³⁷ PA, B 80, 955: private discussion, 14 Dec. 1966; PA, B 150, doc. 68: meeting at the minister’s house, 23 Feb. 1967. ²³⁸ Ibid. doc. 105: working group, 17 Mar. 1967; see also AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 400, 1: Diehl had already talked about the need to allow the GDR some form of recognition on 5 Jan. 1967; Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004. ²³⁹ PA, B 150, docs. 185 and 195: directors and Soviet Union unit, 30 Mar. and 26 May 1967.

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talks. Once these had started, it was stressed that Bonn should also signal its readiness to Moscow to renounce force towards the GDR.²⁴⁰ In mid June 1967, Bahr expounded his view that Bonn could exploit the interrelationship between the Warsaw Pact countries to its own advantage by linking together all negotiations with the East. The Soviet Union had the key role in paving the way for an uptake of diplomatic relations between Bonn and the East as a whole. Progress in intraGerman relations, in turn, was to be a means of strengthening the Kremlin’s interest in normalized relations with Bonn. With the aim of achieving this impact on Moscow, Bahr advised Brandt to answer the Stoph letter and to insist on intra-German talks. Moreover, with respect to the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future, practical policy was not about promoting an illusiory German unification, but rather about organizing a coexistence of the two parts of Germany, Bahr was the first to raise the idea of a ‘quasi-legalization’ of the status quo by means of a legally binding renunciation of force.²⁴¹ Consequently, the idea of an additional renunciation-of-force pact with the GDR, as a means to gain leverage in the stagnating German–Soviet dialogue, ripened in Brandt’s ministry in late summer 1967. In September 1967, the unit for European security questions produced a first report on an intra-German renunciation of force.²⁴² Moscow’s declaration of 12 October 1967, in which it requested that the GDR be recognized as a precondition for a continuation of renunciation-of-force talks, accelerated this new approach within the Foreign Ministry. The ministry staff dealing with European security questions agreed that an intra-German renunciation of force might be a suitable technical measure with which to remove the crucial obstacle to Bonn’s renunciation of force policy with the East. Of course, an intra-German renunciation of force would have to differ expressly from an international one.²⁴³ By autumn 1967, when Brandt himself considered that the concept of an intra-German renunciation of force should be negotiated under more or less equal conditions, this concept, and with it some kind of recognition of East Berlin, had become established thought among the Brandt team.²⁴⁴ ²⁴⁰ PA, B 150, docs. 154, 185, and 195: Ruete, 30 Mar. and 26 May, and unit for European security questions, 2 May 1967; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341: Bahr, 2 May 1967. ²⁴¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341 and 384, 3: Bahr, 18 May and 16 and 20 June 1967. ²⁴² PA, B 150: unit for European security questions, 18 Dec. 1967. ²⁴³ Ibid.: Ruth, 16 Oct. 1967. ²⁴⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Brandt, 3 Oct. 1967.

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A few weeks later, the European security questions unit devised the form of an intra-German renunciation-of-force exchange. In order to allow for the special nature of intra-German relations a differentiated form, namely a one-sided declaration, was envisaged. This was to be addressed not only to East Berlin, but also to other parties, such as Warsaw, so as to deflect any accusations that East Berlin was being treated differently.²⁴⁵ After it had passed Bahr and the State Secretaries, Brandt approved it on 5 November 1967.²⁴⁶ Consequently, at a time when Kiesinger officially rejected an intra-German renunciation-offorce,²⁴⁷ the ‘insiders’ in the Foreign Ministry unofficially adopted the view that East Berlin should be treated as a partner in such an exchange. What is more, unlike Kiesinger, Brandt and Bahr considered an agreement with Moscow to be within reach. After encouraging talks with Zarapkin as well as the Soviet note of 21 November 1967,²⁴⁸ Bahr concluded that once Bonn and Moscow had agreed over the handling of the GDR, ‘the thing could be done very quickly’.²⁴⁹ Guided by this assumption, the relevant staff members started preparing a schedule for the further stages of the renunciation-of-force policy. On 6 November 1967, they agreed that the Soviet Union should be addressed first. Moscow should then be asked to exert influence on East Berlin to enter into talks with Bonn. Thereafter, Bonn should either await the Soviet reaction or turn directly to East Berlin and propose the renunciation of force as a topic for discussion.²⁵⁰ In the winter of 1967, Bahr, who had meanwhile replaced Diehl as head of the planning staff, refined his plans. In fact, it became increasingly apparent that Bahr intended the renunciation-of-force talks to be part of a daring diplomatic plan. They were to constitute the first step that might possibly have a positive impact on an exchange about a security system for Europe, and would ultimately lead to a European peace settlement. Additionally, Bahr outlined his notion, first raised in the summer, of the renunciation-of-force issue going far ²⁴⁵ PA, B 150, doc. 376: Lankes, 31 Oct. 1967. ²⁴⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: Bahr, 31 Oct. 1967, and Brandt, 5 Nov. 1967. ²⁴⁷ See pp. 96–8. ²⁴⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Bahr and Zarapkin, 23 Nov. 1967; BAK, N 1474, 66: Ruete and Zarapkin, 28 Nov. 1967. For the meeting between Zarapkin and Brandt on 21 and 27 Nov. 1967, see pp. 000–000. ²⁴⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 396 and 399, 1: Bahr, 24 Nov. and 1 Dec. 1967. ²⁵⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: private discussion, 6 Nov. 1967.

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beyond a mere exchange of declarations as envisaged by the CDU. The motto ‘renunciation of force’ was in his eyes the catalyst in negotiating a full treaty with Moscow. This treaty would settle the political ‘cardinal questions’, notably the border question, until it could be replaced by a peace settlement.²⁵¹ Brandt equally envisaged a more far-reaching renunciation-of-force agreement with Moscow in which all political questions would be tackled.²⁵² As he indicated to the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ‘the problems arising from the division’ should be considered as well. Brandt revealed his opinion that it was not reunification, but only a solution leading to reunification that could be promoted. The progressiveness of this thought caused even the American to warn Brandt not to accept the status quo.²⁵³ SPD colleagues, such as the deputy Erhard Eppler, shared Brandt’s and Bahr’s goal of a ‘broader dialogue’ with Moscow.²⁵⁴ By the beginning of 1968, the SPD as a whole had developed a foreign policy platform in which it encouraged the government to initiate negotiations about a legally binding renunciation of force with Moscow and East Berlin. It suggested that a ‘policy of contacts on all levels’ should be launched, stopping short only of calling the GDR a foreign country in order to counter the communist two-state theory.²⁵⁵ Moreover, the orientation towards a European peace order had by that time developed in other parts of the SPD. The ‘working committee’ of the party, for instance, declared in early November 1967 that not reunification, but a peace order was now the goal of the SPD’s d´etente policy. This, in turn, would be the basis for ‘a further normalization of the middle European situation’, or in other words reunification.²⁵⁶ With hindsight, Bahr stated that the idea of coexistence with the GDR had already been floated at a conference of the Berlin SPD on 23 December 1967. A policy had then been developed which no longer regarded reunification as a topical question.²⁵⁷ Thus unlike the Brandt ²⁵¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 396 and 399, 1 and PA, B 41, 754: Bahr, 24 Nov. and 1 and 4 Dec. 1967; PA, B 41, 754: Bahr and Brandt to Soviet journalists, 21 Dec. 1967. ²⁵² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 1: Brandt, 3 Oct. 1967. ²⁵³ BAK, N 1474, 63: Brandt and Rusk, 16 Aug. 1967. ²⁵⁴ PA, B 1, 349: Eppler to Brandt and Schmidt, 18 Sept. 1967. ²⁵⁵ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 373: draft of a foreign politicy platform for the SPD Nuremberg conference, 17–21 Mar. 1968. ²⁵⁶ AdsD, Dep. Schmidt, 7747: SPD ‘working committee’, 2 Nov. 1967; see also AdsD, WBA, Publ., 267: Brandt, 7 Dec. 1967. ²⁵⁷ ACDP, 01–403,129/1: Bahr, 3 Oct. 1970.

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team, the SPD had abandoned reunification as an operative goal in its Ostpolitik. The tendency to renounce reunification was echoed among the SPD rank and file. In fact, when by the end of the first year Ostpolitik did not yet amount to anything more than the establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania and negotiations about trade missions with Prague, frustration grew in the ranks of the SPD, and the voices of critics pleading for the recognition of the realities became louder. The SPD leadership took pains to discipline the Socialist Students, who, at a congress in Mainz in December 1967, publicly demanded the recognition of the GDR, thereby openly attacking the official policy. The Hallstein Doctrine, as was argued by Young Socialists in Hesse as well, had to be given up in the face of the conditions of power in Europe. Reunification of Germany could be achieved only in small steps by direct negotiations with the GDR. Some time later, Socialist Students in Schleswig-Holstein attracted attention by propagating a de jure recognition—as opposed to a de facto recognition as suggested by the SPD at the Nuremberg party congress—of the Oder–Neisse line and the GDR.²⁵⁸ In newspaper interviews, Brandt acknowledged that his party was being badly shaken by discord. He justified his Ostpolitik as having attained more after the first year than his critics had understood, most importantly the normalization of relations with the East.²⁵⁹ What Brandt could not say publicly, for fear of offending his coalition partner, was that he also approved of a more progressive Eastern policy. Indeed, in spite of the hostile Soviet declaration of 8 December 1967, Brandt had made efforts to advance the normalization of German–Soviet relations in his department. Two days later, both the content and the tactics of German–Soviet talks were under discussion for the first time in the working group designed for this complex. The participants in this colloquium reconfirmed that German–Soviet talks had absolute priority. They planned that Bonn would offer intraGerman renunciation-of-force talks solely to Moscow. Negotiations with the ‘zone’ would follow later. The working group was also familiarized with Bahr’s idea of tackling the border question in a German–Soviet accord. It conceived of the possibility that the Federal government might offer to ‘respect and recognize’ the ‘present actual borders’ until ²⁵⁸ Die Welt (10 Apr. 1967); Der Spiegel (18 Nov. and 20 Dec. 1968). ²⁵⁹ Die Zeit (7 June 1968); Der Volkswirt (6 Oct. 1967).

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the conclusion of a peace settlement. Additionally, Bahr’s concept of the renunciation-of-force exchange as a first step to a security system and peace order was accepted.²⁶⁰

The Policy of Recognition: A Means of Preventing the Division of Germany Bahr’s plan to recognize the status quo was, however, not to declare that he had given up the goal of reunification, as the progressive Social Democrats had done. On the contrary, he was very committed to the fight for the national aim, as was revealed in several discussions in the renunciation-of-force working group. In January and February 1968, Thierfelder from the legal department, Schnippenkoetter from the department for questions of disarmament, and even State Secretary Duckwitz all came up with suggestions for recognizing, or at least upgrading, the GDR right away and concentrating on the preservation of the nation instead.²⁶¹ Bahr, by contrast, rejected such ideas. He argued that although reunification was not in sight, and should not be focused upon in the foreseeable future, it should be envisaged via intermediate steps. Therefore, a new status should be offered to the GDR only in return for an accommodation. It was due to Bahr’s protest that eventually the consensus was reached to defend the position that the GDR was not a sovereign state, nor a foreign country, but merely a social order.²⁶² Below the level of the GDR’s official recognition, however, Bahr pressed ahead with ‘ostpolitical’ preparations. In the spring of 1968, he familiarized Brandt with a ‘road map’ for German–Soviet negotiations which provided for a positive Soviet reaction to the memorandum that Bonn had delivered to Moscow on 9 April 1968. According to this, negotiations should then be commenced as soon as possible and a conclusion, positive or negative, reached by spring 1969. The aim of negotiations would be to accomplish a factual solution of the border questions without renouncing any legal claims. Bonn would discuss the principles for negotiations with the GDR and Czechoslovakia with Moscow so that the GDR would be forced to abandon its veto position ²⁶⁰ PA, B 150 and BAK, N 1474, 65: private colloquium, 10 Dec. 1967. ²⁶¹ Ibid., 67: discussion, 30 Jan. and 13 Feb. 1968; PA, B 80, 751: unit for international treaties, 31 Jan. 1968. ²⁶² BAK, N 1474, 67: discussion, 13 Feb. 1968.

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against Bonn’s efforts for d´etente. With regard to the recognition of East Germany, Bahr proposed ‘to get rid of the millstone’ as long as West Germany could still get something for it, because defence of the policy was becoming increasingly difficult and could be maintained only with ‘limited success and for a limited time span’. Nonetheless, a legally binding recognition of East Berlin remained, in Bahr’s eyes, a taboo.²⁶³ By that time, there were signs of a modified attitude towards the GDR everywhere in the Foreign Ministry.²⁶⁴ However, Bahr was the one grappling with legal positions rather than mere terminology. As he recalled, he instructed his assistants in the planning section to forget about all previous resolutions and to invent a new policy without regard for any taboo and with the only requirement being to try to make unification possible.²⁶⁵ Indeed, he and his planning staff produced a groundbreaking analysis. In it they envisaged that the renunciation of force would provide a de facto regulation of all European borders until the conclusion of a peace treaty. The GDR would also be a partner with whom it was imperative to organize coexistence. This would be feasible only via a ‘formalization’ of relations, in the form of concluding treaties with the GDR. Bahr’s strikingly ‘radical’ conclusion was that ‘the crucial result of such negotiations could be the acceptance of the GDR as a state’, and that such acceptance was not synonymous with a legal recognition of East Germany as a foreign country.²⁶⁶ Ten days later, Bahr presented more cutting-edge positions to Brandt. This time, he dealt with the topic of European security, the settlement of which he had come to regard as the ‘key to unification’.²⁶⁷ Evidently referring to preliminary discussions of this subject within the NATO council,²⁶⁸ he now set out three possible scenarios for a future development of security policy. Of these, he opted for what he called Model A. According to Model A, the continuation of the two alliances, NATO and ²⁶³ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341: Bahr, 25 Apr. 1968. ²⁶⁴ PA, B 150: Well, 30 May 1968; ibid., doc. 175, and B 80, 948: unit for international treaties, 10 and 28 May 1968. ²⁶⁵ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 226. In an interview on 7 June 2004, Bahr claimed that until his replacement of Diehl as head of the planning section, no efforts had been made to devise new approaches to the goal of German unification. ²⁶⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437, 2: Bahr, 18 June 1968. ²⁶⁷ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 227. ²⁶⁸ e.g. PA, B 150, doc. 111: Lankes, 13 May 1968. The NATO council offered talks to the East about troop reductions on 25 June 1968.

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the Warsaw Pact, would be preserved, without any institutional links, but with a maximum of d´etente between them. Unlike Model B, which foresaw the continuation of both alliances through institutional links, the application of Model A would prevent the blocs from consolidating and would also create more convenient preconditions for any future solutions. This policy would then lead to Model C: the dissolution of both alliances and their replacement by a new security system. Although it would initially fulfil Soviet demands for the recognition of the GDR and all borders, it would use these only in order to create preconditions for reunification.²⁶⁹ After another two months, Bahr reported to Brandt that the paper on security had been discussed within the working group set up by Brandt and that it had been agreed to use the paper as a basis to work out a complete foreign policy for the Federal Republic for the 1970s.²⁷⁰ Consequently, by the summer of 1968, Bahr had fully developed not only his renunciation-of-force policy, but also a long-term road map with the ultimate destination of reunification in which the bilateral renunciation-of-force treaties and a security system were indispensable intermediate steps. However, Bahr’s and his fellow advisers’ thunder was stolen as a result of the Soviet note delivered on 5 July as well as the publication of the German–Soviet exchange of renunciation-of-force notes on 11 July 1968. Frustration spread within Brandt’s department, to the extent that the continuation of the renunciation-of-force policy as hitherto pursued was called into question, mostly drastically by Sahm.²⁷¹ Unsurprisingly, the Prague invasion on 21 August 1968 had the effect of taking the Brandt team down a peg or two further. Nonetheless, in a private meeting, it was agreed to support Brandt’s view that even though Prague was a setback ‘we are continuing as hitherto, but will check our possibilities and methods’.²⁷² Accordingly, Bahr decided in his planning section that d´etente policy was to be continued. Priority should still be given, even more ²⁶⁹ PA, B 150: Bahr, 27 June 1968; see also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 227. ²⁷⁰ PA, B 150, doc. 256: Bahr, 19 Aug. 1968. ²⁷¹ Ibid., doc. 214: unit for European security questions, 5 July 1968; ibid., doc. 235: Bahr, 17 July 1968; ibid., doc. 229: Allardt, 21 July 1968; PA, B 80, 950 and B 150, doc. 214: Sahm, 17 July 1968. ²⁷² BAK, N 1474, 70: discussion between Bahr, Sahm, Duckwitz, and other ministry staff, 5 Sept. 1968; AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt, 7 Sept. 1968; see also BAK, N 1474, 70: Ruete, 29 Aug. and 30 Sep., and the directors, 1 Oct. 1968.

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than hitherto, to relations with Moscow and to the reactivation of the German–Soviet dialogue. To this end, Bahr argued for the need to introduce new ideas into Bonn’s renunciation-of-force policy. A repetition of West Germany’s viewpoints as articulated in its last memorandum of 9 April would automatically end the dialogue and block Ostpolitik altogether.²⁷³ He therefore repeated an idea he had raised earlier, that in order to overcome the status quo it might be beneficial to accept a few elements of it. West Germany could offer the declaration that the GDR was a state as a result of German–Soviet negotiations, which would lead to two peace treaties for two German states. As Bahr tried to convince his colleagues, this would give Bonn more room for manoeuvre and serve as a new starting point for the renunciation-of-force policy.²⁷⁴ However, Bahr stood alone with such suggestions. The ministry staff, and even the progressive Duckwitz—contrary to his earlier proposal of upgrading the GDR—refused to adopt Bahr’s position, and announced the continuation of the non-recognition policy.²⁷⁵ The left wing of the SPD, by contrast, pressed in the other direction. Particularly after the severe setback to Ostpolitik in August 1968, demands for a new course were formulated more radically, and also found increasing support in the upper ranks within the SPD, culminating in a ‘campaign of recognition’. Many SPD delegates proudly wore badges bearing the label ‘I too belong to the ‘‘party of recognition’’ ’, thus openly suporting the de facto recognition of the GDR as the second German sovereign state. Brandt and Wehner were unhappy about this provocative attitude. They feared it would irritate their potential coalition partner the next government.²⁷⁶ In contrast to the recognition issue, the continuation of the renunciation-of-force dialogue, even after the Prague invasion, was largely supported as being necessary.²⁷⁷ Thus, shortly after Brandt had decided with Gromyko to continue the renunciation-of-force ²⁷³ AAPD 1968, ii, doc. 293: Bahr to Brandt, 11 Sept. 1968. ²⁷⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399: Bahr, 11 and 19 Sept. 1968. ²⁷⁵ PA, B 2, 174: Duckwitz, 2 Jan. 1969; PA, B 9, 178.354: Soviet Union unit, 1 Oct. 1968; PA, B 80, 913: the unit for all-German affairs, 5 and 8 Nov. 1968; PA, B 2, 174: Lahr, 22 Nov. 1968; PA, B 80, 913 and B 2, 174: Ruete, 4 Dec. 1968 and 14 Jan. 1969. ²⁷⁶ Der Spiegel (7 Apr. 1969). ²⁷⁷ BAK, N 1474, 70: Duckwitz and Jahn, 17 Oct. 1968; PA, B 41, 1057a: Soviet Union unit, 8 Nov. 1968.

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dialogue,²⁷⁸ the relevant ministry staff started preparing for a continuation of the dialogue between Allardt and Gromyko, and for a further German note in reply to the Soviet note of 5 July 1968. These preparations were to last for months.²⁷⁹ Despite the known reservations in the CDU camp towards Moscow, Brandt and his associates resolved to include the border question and the issue of an intraGerman renunciation of force in the new note.²⁸⁰ However, for the time being it was decided not to deliver the note, but to continue with verbal negotiations, because of the perceived advantage that they would not require restricting consultations with the Chancellery or the Allies.²⁸¹ This remarkable revelation demonstrates the Brandt faction’s determination to pursue its own secret Soviet policy independently from, and even against, the Chancellery. Accordingly, in December 1968, the content of verbal negotiations to be held between Allardt, the new ambassador in Moscow, and Gromyko was under discussion. Brandt, Bahr, Sahm, Ruete, and Allardt decided that every issue raised by the Soviets should be considered and that concessions should be offered as soon as talks became more earnest. As for an intra-German renunciation-of-force accord, they agreed that Allardt should immediately try to find out whether the Soviets might be induced to work on the GDR’s readiness to enter into talks with Bonn without making unrealizable demands in advance.²⁸² The Soviet Union unit suggested that Bonn should offer Moscow the chance to enter into negotiations immediately.²⁸³ The renewed activity by the Foreign Ministry should not suggest that Brandt had no doubts about the success of his Soviet policy. On ²⁷⁸ PA, B 150, doc. 328: Brandt and Gromyko, 9 Oct. 1968. For details of Brandt’s meeting with Gromyko on 9 Oct. 1968, see p. 42. ²⁷⁹ BAK, N 1474, 80: meeting between Ruete and Allardt, 23 Oct. 1968; BAK, N 1474, 70: Ruete, 23 Oct. 1968, and Bahr and Ruete, 30 Oct. 1968; PA, B 150 and B 1, 349: Soviet Union unit, 23 Oct. and 6, 12, and 18 Nov. 1968; PA, B 150: Brandt, 28 Nov. 1968, and the unit for European security questions, 13 and 29 Jan. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 22: Sahm, 9 Jan. 1969, Sahm and Ruete, 10 and 15 Jan. 1969, and Sahm, 22 and 23 Jan. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437, 2: Bahr, 17 Jan. 1969. ²⁸⁰ PA, B 150: Soviet Union unit, 12 Nov. 1968; BAK, N 1474, 71: discussion between Brandt and staff, 12 Nov. 1968; PA, B 41, 1057a: Soviet Union unit, 17 Dec. 1968. ²⁸¹ Ibid.: Soviet Union unit, 8 Nov. 1968. ²⁸² BAK, N 1474, 71: discussion, 16 Dec. 1968; PA, B 150, doc. 419: Soviet Union unit, Bahr, and Allardt, 18 Dec. 1968. ²⁸³ Ibid., doc. 39: Soviet Union unit, 31 Jan. 1969.

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the contrary, Brandt revealed to the Swedish Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilsson, that he expected renunciation-of-force talks with Moscow to be difficult and that he was not quite sure how to ‘make progress’. In a private note, he warned his aides to ‘take into consideration that the talks could fail’ and even ‘that the Soviet side was bent on exposing the operation’.²⁸⁴ Unlike Kiesinger, however, Brandt was determined, despite his doubts, not to evade talks, nor to delay them to the distant future, even if they caused domestic problems. He was on the whole more optimistic that there was an opportunity for progress and appeared to make light of the obstacles ahead.²⁸⁵ However, German–Soviet negotiations were not to materialize for the time being. Allardt objected, arguing that no substantial German–Soviet talks about this issue were possible given the stage of deliberations in Bonn.²⁸⁶ As a result, the Foreign Ministry instructed the embassy in Moscow not to pick the renunciation of force as a theme because the opinion on this issue had not yet been completely formulated.²⁸⁷ Moreover, the German note of 3 July 1969 halted the more flexible policy of the Foreign Ministry insiders, as it was a product of considering the Chancellery’s dissident view on the renunciation-of-force policy,²⁸⁸ which focused on the limited topic of renunciation of force and emphasized the non-recognition of the status quo. By contrast, Bahr had reached the crucial conclusion that recognition of the GDR was inevitable. He felt that recognition could only be delayed, not avoided, and that Bonn could not hope to accomplish reunification before this step was taken. Bahr therefore suggested that Bonn could possibly come to appreciate the recognition of the GDR as a step to an intra-German rapprochement, provided Bonn and East Berlin would enter into negotiations.²⁸⁹ Accordingly, Brandt instructed the unit for all-German affairs to think through the idea of an interim arrangement between the two parts of Germany as a possible outcome of future intra-German negotiations. The unit for all-German affairs ²⁸⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: Brandt, 18 Dec. 1969. ²⁸⁵ AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt to Nilsson, 21 Nov. 1969; see also George Crews McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt: An Ambassador’s Account (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 239, 244. ²⁸⁶ PA, B 150: Ruete, 29 Jan. 1969. ²⁸⁷ Ibid.: Duckwitz to Allardt, 12 Feb. 1969. ²⁸⁸ For further details see pp. 88–90. ²⁸⁹ PA, B 41, 1057a and 1053: Soviet Union unit, 14 and 23 May 1969; PA, B 150, doc. 217: Bahr, 1 July 1969.

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suggested a ‘radical new way’, apparently in stark contrast to its previous position of discarding any intra-German treaty, to aim at a principal solution concerning the status of both Germany. This ‘new way’ could, for instance, consider a qualified membership of both Germanies in the United Nations, provided the regulation of the legal status of Germany was reserved for the peace settlement. Surely, the unit for all-German affairs concluded, this would present a fundamental shift in Bonn’s German policy. The pros and cons would therefore have to be examined thoroughly.²⁹⁰ Thus, during this last stage of the coalition government, Brandt and Bahr gradually asserted within the ministry the idea of an intra-German treaty that would regulate intra-German relations. Inevitably, it would also fix the status quo until a peace settlement could provide a final regulation, including the revision of the division of Germany.²⁹¹ Deliberations on the further measures to be taken concerning intraGerman relations lasted for months and were finalized when on 18 September 1969 Bahr, after analysing the pros and cons, proposed the conclusion of what he called a ‘framework treaty’ (Rahmenvertrag)²⁹² between West and East Germany. In short, this stipulated three points, namely: firstly, that the present borders would be respected; secondly, that any use of force concerning the disputed questions would be renounced; and thirdly, that provision would be made for increased intra-German contacts and common institutions. This would at least avoid ‘the further drift apart of the people in the two parts of Germany’. Bahr reasoned that the short-term objective behind this treaty was to move the GDR from its position of veto. This would be accomplished only if Bonn made the aforementioned concession of accepting the borders, and then combined this with the European renunciation of force accepting all borders, as well as the signing of a non-proliferation treaty. The framework treaty’s long-term objective, however, was still reunification. Although under the present circumstances the process of reunification could not be dealt with, the treaty would aim to enable thorough intra-German talks to start as a link between the two parts of Germany. As Bahr saw it, the German question would remain to be settled in the course of history. As to the conclusion of the treaty, it would presuppose Bonn and East Berlin treating each other as equal ²⁹⁰ PA, B 80, 948 and 150, doc. 217: unit for all-German affairs, 18 Feb. and 2 July 1969. ²⁹¹ AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt, 28 July 1969. ²⁹² The term Rahmenvertrag refers to a treaty framing a problem without solving it.

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partners. Thus Bonn’s entire non-recognition policy would have to be omitted. Bonn’s claim would thereby be reduced to one crucial element: that the FRG was the only democratic, legitimized German state and that the GDR was not a foreign country. As far as the consequences of the treaty were concerned, Bonn’s position would in Bahr’s eyes not suffer substantially. On the one hand, there was a danger that it might introduce the final process of division as wanted by the Soviets; on the other hand, it might be the first step to an erosion of the communist empire and hence to fulfilling the German interest in overcoming the division of Germany. The risks of the development of a struggle between these two irreconcilable German and Soviet interests had to be accepted in the conviction that the framework treaty would in the long run serve the German interest.²⁹³ Brandt concurred with this view. He assumed that Moscow, by consenting to increasing contacts with the West, would not be able to avoid a transformation of its empire, and that Ostpolitik, as a policy of confidence building and communication, could contribute to such a development.²⁹⁴ In his blueprint ‘On the Foreign Policy of a Future Government’, Bahr presaged the entire foreign policy for the new government. Given the inevitability of the GDR’s international breakthrough ‘in the next four years’ and the threat of strained relations with the Allies if the Bonn government insisted on old policies, Bahr emphasized once more the need for a new German policy as foreseen in the framework treaty. An active Ostpolitik would involve the establishment of diplomatic relations not only with the GDR, but also with the other Eastern European states through solutions that involved actual material progress. This would then lead to practical cooperation and political accommodation with the East and eventually also with the GDR. However, Bahr also stressed that Moscow’s interest in improved relations had to be aroused first of all, because relations with the East could be improved only to the extent to which they were tolerated by the Soviet Union.²⁹⁵ ‘Not so bad, I ²⁹³ PA, B 150 and B 150, doc. 295: Bahr, 18 Sep. 1969; see also Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 243–4. ²⁹⁴ Brandt during a meeting of the party executive of the SPD, 1–2 Nov. 1968, in Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design’, in David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), American D´etente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972 (Washington: German Historical Institute, 2004), 127–9. ²⁹⁵ PA, B 150, doc. 296: Bahr, 21 Sept. 1969. Bahr’s analyses are now also available in AAPD 1969, ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999).

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hope we will be able to use this soon’, was Brandt’s comment on Bahr’s road map.²⁹⁶ In fact, the Soviet note of 13 September 1969 reinforced Brandt’s and his aides’ hope for continued talks.²⁹⁷ It was uniformly held that this note should form the basis for bilateral negotiations under the new government.²⁹⁸ This was then followed by preparations within the Foreign Ministry for the start of renunciation-of-force negotiations between the new government and Moscow.²⁹⁹ From this analysis it is thus clear that in contrast to the CDU/CSU policy, Brandt’s policy prepared and even anticipated the Ostpolitik of the following SPD/FDP government. As Bahr put it afterwards, Gromyko later could raise ‘no single issue which we had not thought through beforehand’. Without the three years of the Grand Coalition government, no outline for Ostpolitik would have been devised.³⁰⁰ While the official government policy of the Grand Coalition, and to an even greater extent the CDU/CSU’s unofficial policy, had a markedly different focus, it is possible to speak of a continuous development in Brandt’s Ostpolitik from 1966 to his New Ostpolitik in 1969.

Continuities with Adenauer’s Ostpolitik Admittedly, one could argue that Brandt’s Ostpolitik was instead merely the continuation of Adenauer’s original Eastern policy. In fact, members of the Social–Liberal government repeatedly pointed to the similarities with Adenauer’s politics in making the existing realities the point of reference.³⁰¹ Brandt confirmed retrospectively that his concept of the New Ostpolitik tied in with Adenauer’s method. Adenauer had been the first to recognize ‘the realities’ in the West as the only means to regain sovereignty and relative independence for West Germany. ²⁹⁶ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 246. ²⁹⁷ PA, B 150 and B 150, doc. 293: Rantzau, 15 Sept. 1969, Soviet Union unit, 17 Sept. 1969, and Rantzau and Ruete, 18 Sept. 1969. ²⁹⁸ Ibid.: Rantzau, 15 Sept. 1969, and Soviet Union unit, 17 Sept. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399: Bahr, 18 Sept. 1969. ²⁹⁹ Ibid.: Bahr, 18 Sept. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 75: discussion, 8 and 14 Oct. 1969, and Bahr, 23 Oct. 1969; ACDP, 01-403, 126/2 and PA, B 150: unit for European security questions, 15 and 17 Oct. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 115, 1: Bahr, Brandt, and Sahm, 25 Oct. 1969. ³⁰⁰ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 247. ³⁰¹ Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Friedens- und Interessenwahrung: Zur Ostpolitik der F.D.P in Opposition und Sozial-Liberaler Regierung 1968–1970’, in Hans-Georg Fleck et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung, 7 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 110.

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Accordingly, Brandt and his government were now recognizing the realities in the East with the same expectation of thereby upgrading West Germany’s status in the international system.³⁰² In addition, Adenauer’s secret manoeuvres towards the Soviet Union, in the form of the ‘ten-year truce’ mentioned above, constituted the first attempts to reach a modus vivendi with Moscow, and in the extent of their concessions exceeded those of Kiesinger. Adenauer revealed to Brandt during one of their meetings in 1962 that he was contemplating negotiating the recognition of the ‘zone’ regime if the freedom of Berlin could be expected in return.³⁰³ With regard to the Hallstein Doctrine, Adenauer confided to Brandt in a further meeting in June 1963 that one had to ‘give away certain things, as long as one would still get something for them’.³⁰⁴ Thus, in contrast to Kiesinger, Adenauer seemed gradually to become disposed to pay a price in return for an improvement of the security of West Berlin and the living conditions of the Germans in the GDR. However, Adenauer—that arch-Rhinelander who essentially mistrusted Prussians and Saxons, and who once insisted that the Asian steppes started in Brunswick—lacked the determination, energy, time, and circumstances to translate his secret reorientation into a substantially different official Ostpolitik.³⁰⁵ This is confirmed by the American and British viewpoint, according to which Adenauer remained steadfast in his refusal to make any concessions to the East. The American Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, as well as decisionmakers in London, eventually saw the Chancellor as a barrier to their efforts in negotiating with the Soviets.³⁰⁶ The daring and crucial step ³⁰² Gołtfried Niedhart, ‘Revisionistische Elemente und die Initiierung friedlichen Wardels in der Neuen Ostpolitik 1967–1974, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 28/2 (2002), 241; Niedhart, ‘Friedens- und Interessenwahrung’, 110. ³⁰³ Heinrich Krone, ‘Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschland- und Ostpolitik 1954–1969’, in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen (eds.), Adenauer-Studien III (Mainz: MatthiasGr¨unewald-Verlag, 1974), 171; Manfred G¨ortemaker, ‘Die Urspr¨unge der ‘‘Neuen Ostpolitik’’ Willy Brandts’, in Arnd Bauernk¨anper et al. (eds.), Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: Deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen 1945–1990 (Bonn: Dietz, 1998), 49. ³⁰⁴ Brandt, Begegnungen, 65. ³⁰⁵ G¨ortemaker, ‘Urspr¨unge der ‘‘Neuen Ostpolitik’’ ’, 49; see also Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington: Brookings Institutions, 1993), 19. ³⁰⁶ Hope M. Harrison, ‘The Berlin Wall, Ostpolitik, and D´etente’, in Geyer and Schaefer (eds.), American D´etente, 8; Anthony James, Nicholls, ‘ ‘‘Appeasement’’ or ‘‘Common Sense’’? The British Response to the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1961’, in Ursula Lehmkuhl et al. (eds.), Deutschland, Graßbritannien, Amerika: Politik, Geselischaft und internationale Geschichte in 20. Jahrhundet: Festschrift f¨ur Gustav Schmidt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), 60.

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of acknowledging the realities was taken only when Brandt became Chancellor. This study argues, therefore, that the Moscow Treaty was indeed a product of Brandt’s policy, and that under a continued Grand Coalition government, which Bahr expected until shortly before the Bundestag elections,³⁰⁷ or even a CDU/FDP government, the Moscow Treaty could not have been concluded. ³⁰⁷ Bahr to the author, 12 February 2003; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 243.

3 ‘Unpacking the Box’: The Making of the Moscow Treaty in the Domestic and International Contexts P O L I T I C I A N S D O N ’ T WO R K I N A VAC U U M : T H E D E C I S I O N - M A K I N G P RO C E S S E S W I T H I N T H E B R A N D T G OV E R N M E N T

Decision-Making Structures As has been seen, the renunciation-of-force policy for which the Foreign Ministry prepared under Brandt’s lead was implemented, and a treaty with Moscow concluded, only nine months after the formation of the new government. Whatever the quality of the prior preparations, implementing this new ‘ostpolitical’ programme was still a very different matter from merely planning it behind the closed doors of the Foreign Ministry. Given that the Ostpolitik that Brandt announced was so hotly contested, how could it be put into action so successfully and swiftly? Which actors, interests, and factors, within the government as well as the outside it, played a role in the making of the Moscow Treaty? What were the goals and motives of the Brandt government in the policy under consideration? In this chapter, these questions will be answered in an analysis of the policy-making processes within the domestic as well as the international context. Following the Bundestag elections held on 28 September 1969, the new SPD/FDP government was formed, and Brandt was elected as fourth, and first Social Democrat, Chancellor of the FRG on 21 October 1969. In contrast with the situation during the Grand Coalition government, which had no agreed foreign policy, there was now profound agreement between the SPD and FDP about the goals as well as the course of the new Ostpolitik.

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In fact, the Social Democrats and Free Democrats had converged in the field of foreign policy and Ostpolitik in particular since the mid 1950s. Then, both Willy Brandt and Walter Scheel, who became chairman of the FDP in April 1968, had belonged to a minority in their party which favoured integration into the West and the Atlantic Alliance, and a national policy only within the context of a policy of concerted European integration.¹ The programmes for Ostpolitik that were developed in the two parties after the construction of the Berlin Wall largely coincided.² While Brandt and Bahr were developing their strategy of what Bahr called ‘social democratism’, Wolfgang Schollwer at the FDP Press Office started working on plans to achieve unification within a European security system. rapprochement between Liberals and Social Democrats over West Germany’s Eastern policy became increasingly visible during the Grand Coalition government. In the role of opposition, the FDP challenged the government’s excessively inflexible Ostpolitik and promoted a course of respecting the existing borders, which was first secretly and later openly shared by the SPD.³ Given the results of the election—the CDU/CSU maintaining its majority and just missing winning the majority of seats; the SPD continuing second with the best result ever and a substantial increase in votes; and the FDP losing two-fifths of its electorate—most political observers expected lengthy coalition negotiations. However, the FDP and SPD, just strong enough to form a government, agreed to go together rather than with the CDU/CSU. On the night of the elections, Brandt and Scheel agreed over the telephone to form a coalition government (see Figure 6).⁴ The parliamentary parties soon came to ¹ Karl Moersch, Kurs-Revision: Deutsche Politik nach Adenauer (Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1978), 120–1, 168. ² See Dieter Groh and Peter Brandt, ‘Vaterlandslose Gesellen’: Sozialdemokratie und Nation 1860–1990 (Munich: Beck, 1992), 288. ³ Scheel to the author, 11 Feb. 2003. For further details of the FDP and its Ostpolitik, see Mathias Siekmeier, Restauration oder Reform? Die FDP in den sechziger Jahren—Deutschland—und Ostpolitik zwischen Wiedervereinigung und Entspannung (Cologne: Janus, 1998); Michael Schmidt, Die FDP und die deutsche Frage: 1949–1990 (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1995); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), 98–101. On the rapprochement between Liberals and Social Democrats in 1969 see Arnulf Baring, Machtwechsel: Die Ära Brandt-Scheel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), 123–3. ⁴ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 153: FDP Committee, 30 Sept. 1969; Scheel to the author, 11 Feb. 2003. On the two party leaders’ firm determination to form a coalition

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Figure 6. Introducing the Cabinet of the Social–Liberal Coalition to the Federal President Gustav Heinemann, 22 October 1969. In the centre of the front row, from left to right: Gustav Heinemann, Willy Brandt, Walter Scheel.

the same conclusions, except where the recognition of the Oder–Neisse line was concerned. Here, Brandt had been prepared to go much further than the FDP, as Scheel revealed to his party’s Executive Committee.⁵ The SPD and FDP agreed that their Ostpolitik, to be closely linked to Westpolitik, should give priority to peacekeeping and consider the German question only in an international context. To this end, the new government should first and foremost initiate renunciation-of-force negotiations with the East on the basis of the territorial status quo. Negotiations would have to be introduced with East Berlin about a modus vivendi in the form of an intra-German treaty, as had already been proposed by the FDP in a Generalvertrag in January 1969, and by Bahr in a Rahmenvertrag in the summer of 1969. Moreover, Bahr ’s paper ‘on the foreign policy of a future government’ of 21 September see D. Hofmann, ‘ ‘‘Suspicious Haste’’: Paving the Way for the Coalition between the SPD and FDP after the Federal Elections of September 28, 1969’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 48/3 (2000), 515–64. ⁵ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 154: Scheel, 3 Oct. 1969.

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1969 was delivered by Brandt to Scheel, who approved it.⁶ On 3 October 1969, it was accepted by the FDP and became the basis for the new government’s political programme. At the same time, the crucial point of the FDP’s ‘election platform’ presented at the Nuremberg party conference in June 1969, about the ‘two German states which have a special relationship’, was adopted in the new government’s programme.⁷ Hence after ‘undramatic’ negotiations the SPD and FDP quickly reached agreement about the foreign and German political coalition programme (see Figure 7). The minutiae of the government declaration were left to Brandt and Scheel and their advisers. The decisive reference to the ‘two states in Germany’ was formulated by Brandt, Scheel, and Bahr alone. Bahr at first demurred at the explicit recognition of the GDR as a state as a ‘give-away’ and held that it should instead be the result of intra-German negotiations. Brandt, however, insisted that it would be a good idea to clear this hurdle at the start. This revealed for the first time a subtle difference in understanding between Brandt and Bahr over the tactics for their nationalistic Eastern policy. Scheel wanted to proceed as the Chancellor wished. They therefore agreed to use the formulation specifying two states in Germany that did not regard each other as foreign countries. However, they also shared the view that the GDR could never be recognized legally and that intra-German relations could only be ‘of a special kind’.⁸ In addition, the decision to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine on the condition that intra-German relations would first be regulated—a modification which later became known as the ‘Scheel Doctrine’—was made with the full agreement of both partners.⁹ ⁶ ‘Record of the coalition negotiations of 2 October 1969’, in Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, Mit Leidenschaft und Augenmaß: In Mogadischu und anderswo: Politische Memoiren (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1989), 395–7; Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (Munich: K. Blessing, 1996), 270; Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 123. ⁷ ADL, Bundespräsidium, 185: FDP Chairmanship, 22 Dec. 1969; Moersch, KursRevision, 8. ⁸ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 277; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 3: Bahr, 26 Oct. 1969; DzDP, 6th ser., 1, p. xviii. ⁹ Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 125–6; Werner Link, ‘Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Brandt 1969–1974’, in Karl-Dietrich Bracher et al. (eds.), Republik in wandel 1969–1974: Die Ära Brandt (Stuttgart: Deutschen Verlags-Anstalt, 1986), 163–4; Horst Ehmke, Mittendrin: Von der Großen Koalition zur deutschen Einheit (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994), 104; Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004; William Glenn Gary, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Casuria Press, 2003), 233.

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Figure 7. Coalition negotiations between the SPD and FDP, September 1969. In the foreground on the right are Willy Brandt and behind him Helmut Schmidt; in the foreground on the left are Wolfgang Mischnick and behind him Walter Scheel.

Moreover, in contrast with events during the Grand Coalition government, the consensus about Ostpolitik was followed by close cooperation between the two coalition partners, notably Chancellor Brandt and his newly appointed FDP Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. To start with, in the course of the restructuring of the government, a lesson was learnt from the disadvantages that resulted from the lack of coordination between Brandt and Kiesinger. Therefore a link between the previously separate Chancellery and Foreign Ministry was institutionalized in the form of a regular exchange.¹⁰ Furthermore, the recruitment policy of the departments of both the coalition partners was discussed cooperatively: in a private meeting Brandt, Scheel, and Bahr discussed the distribution of their personnel, including the move of many of Brandt’s former advisers into the Chancellery. Whereas State Secretary Duckwitz was reported to have been angry that staff from the Foreign Ministry were poached ¹⁰ Ulrich Sahm, ‘Diplomaten taugen nichts’: Aus dem Leben eines Staatsdieners (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1994), 230.

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by Bahr, Scheel seemed to agree with these relocations.¹¹ With the start of daily business, the wish for close cooperation between Chancellery and Foreign Ministry was expressed in one of the first briefings in the Chancellery three days after the government declaration.¹² However, despite the determination to work closely together, Scheel soon felt marginalized by his coalition partner Brandt. This was not surprising in view of the leading position that the Chancellery immediately gained under Brandt. As he had done during his time as Foreign Minister, Brandt made sure that he surrounded himself with confidants. This time he simply brought his advisers from the Foreign Ministry. Most notably, the key positions were allocated to Bahr as State Secretary, Sahm as head of department II for ‘foreign and intra-German relations’, and Sanne, a former assistant to Bahr in the planning section, as Ministerialdirigent in Sahm’s department. Moreover, Brandt’s SPD friend Ehmke was made ‘minister for special tasks’ and chief of the Chancellery. Ehmke was to be of great use to Brandt and Bahr, particularly as legal adviser concerning the drafts and formulations of the Moscow Treaty.¹³ Katharina Focke was appointed Parliamentary State Secretary and, together with Bahr, was directly subordinate to Ehmke. Even the less crucial positions within the Chancellery were filled with his former staff from the Foreign Ministry. Gerhard Ritzel, for instance, formerly head of Brandt’s office in the Auswärtige Amt, became head of the Chancellor’s office and personal assistant to Brandt. Thus with very few exceptions, Brandt moved the staff close to him into the Chancellery. Having Bahr, Sahm, and Sanne at his disposal ensured that he had a loyal and efficient team for all questions related to Ostpolitik.¹⁴ As Sahm recalled, Bahr had by far the greatest influence on Brandt. In particular, as far as the policy towards Moscow was concerned, it was Brandt and Bahr who exclusively ‘had an overview of the whole policy’; a considerable number of decisions were taken just by these two without consulting others sufficiently. Despite this secrecy there were, according to Sahm, never any tensions within this inner circle.¹⁵ Moreover, Brandt extended his network across the boundaries of the Chancellery by institutionalizing links to other departments, most ¹¹ BAK, N 1474, 76: Sahm, 8 Oct. 1969. ¹² Ibid., 77: Bahr, 31 Oct. 1969. ¹³ Ehmke, Mittendrin, 129. ¹⁴ See Günther Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn: Die Entstehung der Ost-und Deutschland politik 1969/1970 (Cologne: Wisserchaft und Politik, 1979), 184; Die Welt (3 Jan. 1970). ¹⁵ Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003.

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importantly the Foreign Ministry. As explained by Ritzel on 23 October 1969, daily briefings, the so-called Lagebesprechung or ‘Kleine Lage’,¹⁶ would be held as of the following day and would include Duckwitz, the State Secretary from the Foreign Ministry.¹⁷ Subsequently, the Chancellery’s new Ministerialdirigent, Sahm, would take part in the daily morning briefing under Duckwitz in the Foreign Ministry. Through his old friend Duckwitz, Brandt thus ensured the loyalty of the Foreign Ministry.¹⁸ He made sure that the Chancellery supervised all fields of foreign policy, including relations with Moscow and Warsaw, of which the Foreign Ministry was officially in charge.¹⁹ Ahlers, as chief of the Press Office and government spokesman, was also asked to participate in the briefings in the Foreign Ministry in order to make sure there was close cooperation from his department. Additionally, contacts with the Ministry of Defence and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) were to be established by invitating General Gerhard Wessel and State Secretary Johannes Birckholtz weekly to the ‘Grosse Lage’ in the Chancellery. Furthermore, a weekly coalition meeting was introduced in the Palais Schaumburg, also referred to as the ‘Schaumburger Runde’. At this meeting, all relevant political and personal decisions were made between Brandt and his ministers Scheel, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Karl Schiller, and Schmidt, as well as Ehmke, Bahr, Ahlers, and the parliamentary party leaders Wehner and Wolfgang Mischnick.²⁰ Within a few weeks, thanks to these personal as well as structural reorganizations, the Chancellery emerged as the nerve centre coordinating government policy and decisions within the government.²¹ Although tensions sometimes arose, most notably between the SPD leaders Ehmke and Schmidt, who competed to achiever the greater leverage,²² cooperation within this more extended circle around Brandt was on the whole very effective. Scheel, by contrast, although he had announced a thorough restructuring of his Foreign Ministry, did not surround himself with ¹⁶ This term will be used without italics below. ¹⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/B, 1: Ritzel, 23 Oct. 1969. ¹⁸ Sahm, Diplomaten taugen nichts, 230; Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003; Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004. ¹⁹ BAK, N 1474, 77: Bahr and Ehmke, 31 Oct. 1969. ²⁰ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 186–7. ²¹ Eitel, Bahr’s assistant, argued accordingly in an interview with the author in Nov. 2002, and Sahm in an interview, 31 Aug. 2003. ²² Ehmke, Mittendrin, 103, 119.

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confidants.²³ On the contrary, relations with some of his key personnel, such as the FDP member and Parliamentary State Secretary Ralf Dahrendorf and State Secretary Günter Harkort, were rather distant, if not strained.²⁴ Moreover, he faced in Duckwitz a State Secretary who not only had a very close relationship with Brandt, but also outplayed him, having far greater experience in foreign policy and bureaucratic networking.²⁵ Though not opposed to the Foreign Minister, the leading officials seemingly bypassed Scheel and did not always inform him about decisions they made. They preferred to consult the Chancellery.²⁶ As a result, unlike Brandt, Scheel worked not with a team of personal advisers but rather with the whole apparatus. In addition, he did not have at his disposal a fully functioning planning section such as Brandt had had as Foreign Minister. The removal of a large number of personnel meant that many positions were not filled. In addition to the time that the new staff took to adjust to their situations, these problems delayed the planning section in such a way that effective policy was not made before the summer of 1970.²⁷ The result was an initial weakening of the Foreign Ministry and a degrading of the position of the new minister. A few weeks after coming to power, Scheel revealed to Ehmke that he felt excluded from the cooperation between the ministries. He proposed to introduce a ‘jour fixe’ once a week on which he, the Chancellor, and his minister would have lunch together.²⁸ Scheel, whose experience with foreign policy was limited to that in the development sector during his time as Minister for Economic Cooperation from 1961 to 1966, was increasingly portrayed in public as an overworked, incompetent, and weak new Foreign Minister. He himself conceded that when he took over the new post ‘a certain insecurity lasting for months’ began.²⁹ Scheel’s party, the FDP, also feared difficulties in gaining a profile as a junior coalition partner within the government. In a meeting, the party’s governing body thought of strategies to counter the strong role of the Chancellery. Leading FDP members suggested that all FDP ministries ²³ BAK, N 1474, 76: Scheel to Brandt and Bahr, 8 Oct. 1969. ²⁴ Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004. ²⁵ Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ²⁶ Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 129–30. ²⁷ PA, B 1, 472: Oncken, 16 Mar. 1970. ²⁸ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 308: Scheel, 22 Jan. 1970; Sahm, Diplomaten taugen nichts, 231. ²⁹ See Der Spiegel (29 June 1970), in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 188; Baring, Machtwechsel, 269; Stephan Fuchs, ‘Dreiecksverhältnisse sind immer kompliziert’: Kissinger, Bahr und die Ostpolitik (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt and Rotbuch Verlag, 1999), 32.

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should develop and represent one consistent political position within the cabinet in order to secure a ‘disproportionate share’ in the success of the government.³⁰ This period of difficulties for Scheel and his party was to change decisively only in the summer of 1970, when Scheel restructured and reorganized his ministry, thereby gaining more influence over his personnel as well as a stronger position vis-à-vis his Chancellor.³¹ In spite of the imbalance of power between the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry, relations between Brandt and Scheel remained friendly, and Ostpolitik and the negotiations with Moscow were executed in close consultation. Frequently, mostly on Sunday mornings, decisions and instructions concerning the further handling of negotiations in Moscow were arrived at directly between the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister.³² In fact, Ehmke described their mutual trust as crucial for the success of the Social–Liberal Coalition’s foreign policy.³³ This well-functioning partnership existed largely as a result of the consensus between Brandt, Scheel, and Bahr about the Ostpolitik they were introducing.³⁴ Moreover, the coalition between SPD and FDP, despite its weakness—it gained a majority of only twelve votes—was to both partners the indispensable key to staying in power. As Brandt wrote to his personal assistant Klaus Harpprecht, ‘like it or not, without the FDP I cannot govern’.³⁵ From his own experience as Foreign Minister, Brandt knew how easily initiatives started by the Foreign Ministry alone could undermine government policy. He was therefore greatly interested in creating strong links between his Chancellery and Scheel’s department.³⁶ Not least Brandt’s personality enabled the government’s foreign policy team to grow quickly together. Despite occasional disputes on some issues, it agreed on the basic positions of Ostpolitik.³⁷ As the FDP Executive Committee testified, the cooperation between the two coalition partners was characterized by fairness and honesty.³⁸ The other ministries, most importantly the Ministry for Intra-German Relations, had practically no say in the making of the Moscow Treaty. ³⁰ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 159: FDP Chairmanship, 19 Nov. 1969. ³¹ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 188–92; Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 129–30. ³² Sahm, Diplomaten taugen nichts, 247; Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 147. ³³ Ehmke, Mittendrin, 130. ³⁴ Scheel to Schmid on 26 Sept. 1977, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 189; Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 115, 124–5, 130, 178; Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt 1913–1992: Visionär und Realist (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002), 583. ³⁵ AdsD, WBA, BK, 7: Brandt, 24 February 1970. ³⁶ Fuchs, Dreiecksverhältnisse, 213. ³⁷ Ehmke, Mittendrin, 129–30. ³⁸ ADL, Bundespräsidium, 185: FDP Executive Committee, 22 Dec. 1969.

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During the Kiesinger government, the Ministry for All-German Affairs, as it was then called, had already been of but secondary importance. It had had no practical impact on Ostpolitik, nor had it been involved in the planning of the renunciation-of-force policy.³⁹ Under Brandt’s Chancellorship, the Ministry for Intra-German Relations, as it was renamed, still had no great role in policy-making. Admittedly, the ministry’s duties were expanded considerably where Germany policy was concerned. Egon Franke, the new Minister for Intra-German Relations, was formally named the leader of intra-German negotiations, and in a cabinet resolution on 25 March 1970 intra-German affairs were officially delegated from the Chancellery to his ministry.⁴⁰ Moreover, close links to the Chancellery were established via the ministry’s newly created planning section, whose leader was also planning chief for the Chancellery.⁴¹ However, these changes had no practical impact. IntraGerman affairs were primarily managed by the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry. Franke implemented the policy only on instructions he received.⁴² As to the negotiations on the Moscow Treaty, there is no evidence that Franke’s ministry played any role at all.⁴³ Despite this marginalization, Franke seems not to have felt the need to gain greater profile for his ministry. He was thus an unimportant minister, but, because of his personality, one very loyal to his government.⁴⁴ As for the Ministry of the Interior, it had no influence on the making of Ostpolitik and the Moscow Treaty. Although it was in permanent contact with the unit for German questions of at the Auswärtige Amt, ³⁹ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; Wehner to Gisela Rüss, in Gisela Rüss, Anatomie einer politischen Verwaltung: Das bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen: Innerdeutsche Beziehungen 1949–1970 (Munich: Beck, 1973), 155; PA, B 2, 189: Jahn to Duckwitz, 2 July 1968. ⁴⁰ Der Spiegel (26 Jan. 1970) and Die Zeit (30 Jan. 1970), in Rüss, Anatomie einer politischen Verwaltung, 68, 72, 156. ⁴¹ Die Zeit (20 Feb. 1970) and Der Spiegel (2 Feb. 1970), in Rüss, Anatomie einer politischen Verwaltung, 102. ⁴² For instance, BAK, N 1474, 81: Franke in the cabinet committee for intra-German affairs, 9 Dec. 1969; PA, B 80, 948 and B 150, doc. 415: meetings between the Chancellery and the Auswärtige Amt, 23 and 30 Dec. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 81: Ehmke, 2 Feb. 1970; PA, B 38, 274: Lahn to Franke, 16 Mar. 1970; PA, B 1, 345: Harkort to Franke, 25 Mar. 1970; PA, B 38, 321: Braunmühl, 6 Aug. 1970. ⁴³ Sahm confirmed this to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ⁴⁴ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; Der Spiegel (3 Nov. 1969), in Rüss, Anatomie einer politischen Verwaltung, 68, 72; Karl-Rudolf Korte, ‘Bonner Regierungsstile und der Wandel der Deutschlandpolitik’, in Peter März (ed.), 40 Jahre Zweistaatlichkeit in Deutschland: Eine Bilanz (Munich: Landeszentrale für Politische Bildurgsarbeit, 1999), 175.

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complaints by the State Secretary, Günter Hartkopf, about a lack of information reveal that it had no insight into important developments of Ostpolitik.⁴⁵ Its role was merely to control the compatibility of the Moscow Treaty with the Basic Law. In this function, as will be seen below, the Interior Minister Genscher and his staff exercised a hindering rather than supporting influence on the making of the German–Soviet treaty.⁴⁶ Similarly, the Ministry of Justice played a role only as far as the examination and judging of the treaty’s content from a legal point of view was concerned. As it stated in March and again in July 1970, it did not even have access to information about the state of negotiations with Moscow before the entire cabinet was informed.⁴⁷ By contrast, the ministers in the cabinet were more influential in the policy-making process. Whereas during the Grand Coalition government, the cabinet had been ineffective as a decision-making body because of its size and conflicting personalities, it was much more effective during the Brandt government because it was smaller and more homogenous. The cabinet was no longer strained by the great differences between the political views held by the ministers of the CDU/CSU and the SPD but now had united ministers from two parties largely agreeing on matters of foreign policy. In addition, Brandt put much effort into introducing a cooperative style and collective responsibility.⁴⁸ In December 1969, he revealed to his minister Georg Leber that he was extremely worried and hoped very much that he would succeed in making a team of his cabinet. He then asked Leber to help keep his ‘crew on board’.⁴⁹ Brandt’s concerns made themselves felt in the coming months: the cabinet was informed very regularly about Ostpolitik.⁵⁰ Admittedly, there was initially some delay in informing the cabinet about the bilateral talks with Moscow: a first report was given in early February and the next one only in May 1970, after the ending of Bahr’s talks. Thereafter, though, the ministers were kept ⁴⁵ PA, B 3, 4: Hartkopf to Dahrendorf, 12 Mar., and the Auswärtige Amt, 3 July 1970. ⁴⁶ Also Eitel to the author, Nov. 2002. ⁴⁷ BAK, B 141, 71110 and 71111: unit ‘IV C’, 16 Mar., and unit ‘IV A 2’, 22 July 1970; Eitel to the author, Nov. 2002. ⁴⁸ Willy Brandt, Begegnungen und Einsichten: Die Jahre 1960–1975 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1976), 303. ⁴⁹ AdsD, WBA, BK, 12: Brandt, 22 Dec. 1969. ⁵⁰ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; see: PA, B 2, 189: as early as 28 Nov., before the start of talks on 8 Dec. 1969, the Auswärtige Amt made a note that it should inform the cabinet.

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up to date very regularly. They were often privileged with absolutely confidential information, which, as Scheel once stressed, they had to be sure to treat with the necessary discretion.⁵¹ Especially towards the end of German–Soviet negotiations, the cabinet was convened once a week or more for an update on the latest developments, as well as to exchange views about the crucial issues and decisions at stake with Brandt, Scheel, and the other policy-makers. Moreover, as will be seen below,⁵² the cabinet colleagues were not only kept informed by the government, but also played a more active role in giving their opinions on Ostpolitik. In doing so, they initiated new ideas and helped to resolve disputed issues, such as article 3 of the Moscow Treaty. But consensus in basic questions did not mean that ministers would not come out with critical views in discussion. In fact, they also revealed scepticism and exercised a role of control over the process. As Genscher, Minister of the Interior, remembered, he and his colleagues Schmidt and Leber tried to slow down what they regarded as an overly enthusiastic and hasty Ostpolitik.⁵³ These three ministers constantly warned Brandt, Scheel, and the other protagonists of Ostpolitik not to focus on conclusions of treaties in too short a time span, and to aim for an improvement in the atmosphere of relations, rather than a policy of ‘cheap sale’ of Bonn’s positions.⁵⁴ They reminded the government that it could never give up the goal of reunification, or in other words could never give in to a formal recognition of the GDR, and had to stay absolutely loyal to the Allies.⁵⁵ Despite such doubts, however, the ministers became more cooperative towards the end of the German–Soviet exchange. Especially in a period of growing criticism from members of the coalition parties, concerning the written results of the exchange Schmidt and Genscher, in particular, assumed the role of defending their government. They expressed their support of the opening of negotiations with Moscow and the conclusion of a treaty.⁵⁶ As Brandt expressed it, the cabinet turned out to be a place where his ⁵¹ BAK, N 1474, 79: Scheel, 13 Jan. 1970. ⁵² See pp. 163–5, 167. ⁵³ Genscher, Erinnerungen, 191; see also Schmidt to the author, 12 June 2003; Sahm, Diplomaten taugen nichts, 259. ⁵⁴ BAK, N 1474, 82: Schmidt, 17 Mar. 1970. ⁵⁵ e.g. ibid., 79: Schmidt, 13 Jan. 1970; ibid., 82: Schmidt, Leber, and Genscher, 17 Mar. 1970; ibid., 85: Genscher, 27 May 1970; ibid., 87: Leber and Schmidt, 2 July 1970, Schmidt and Genscher, 7 and 8 July 1970, and Leber and Genscher, 8 Aug. 1970. ⁵⁶ Ibid., 85: Genscher, 27 May 1970; ibid., 83: Genscher, 4 June 1970; ibid., 87: Schmidt, 7 July 1970. For further details see p. 172.

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government worked in a team. Collective decision-making concerning the Moscow Treaty, however, was practised to a very limited degree. At party level, the parliamentary party leaders, Herbert Wehner as new chairman of the SPD and Wolfgang Mischnick of the FDP, played a significant role. Since the Social–Liberal government had such a narrow majority, the need for cohesion, both within the government and within the coalition as a whole, was crucial. As a result, the parliamentary party leaders, as the most important link between the government and the parliamentary parties, were constantly involved in the decision-making process.⁵⁷ First of all, Wehner and Mischnick or their representatives attended the Schaumburger Runde.⁵⁸ They were also regularly invited to cabinet meetings, during which their voices were as influential as those of the ministers. Furthermore, they were involved in many meetings of the Kleine Lage in the Chancellery. Wehner, who was even more involved in the discussion of Ostpolitik,⁵⁹ met Ehmke on Mondays for breakfast and discussed all ‘to-do’s’ for the week. According to Ehmke, the agreements reached between them in these meetings were vital and eased the problematic relationship between Brandt and Wehner.⁶⁰ Apart from the two parliamentary party leaders, their representatives, Karl Wienand and Knut von Kühlmann-Stumm, had a lot of influence. Because of his function as a personal link between Brandt, Wehner, and Schmidt, Wienand often acted as a substitute for Wehner, for example in the meetings of the Kleine Lage. Other important members were Kurt Mattick and Ernst Achenbach, both experts in foreign policy in their respective parliamentary parties, the SPD and FDP. They were also regularly involved in the government’s decision-making processes in that their Arbeitskreise were kept up to date on the course of the ‘ostpolitical’ negotiations. Thus, because of their important function in providing their parties’ support for the government, their voices carried much weight.⁶¹ ⁵⁷ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, pp. xiv–xv; according to Bahr in interviews with the author on 12 Feb. 2003 and 7 June 2004, Wehner was informed by Brandt, and Mischnick by Scheel. ⁵⁸ Karl Wienand to Schmid, 15 Oct. 1976, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 201. ⁵⁹ Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte (Berlin: Siedler, 1987), 29, gives Wehner credit for playing one of the most crucial roles in Bonn’s Ostpolitik in his position as leader of the parliamentary SPD. ⁶⁰ Ehmke, Mittendrin, 112, 130. ⁶¹ See also Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 29.

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The committees of the parties and the parties as a whole, by contrast, were not inducted into the government’s strategies and were kept informed only about their general course. As Bahr put it, consultation within the SPD Executive Committee, for instance about the recognition of the GDR as a state, would have triggered quarrels lasting for weeks and such an open display of the government’s concept would have ‘pre-programmed’ it to fail.⁶² Nonetheless, Wehner’s parliamentary party by and large stood united behind Brandt’s Ostpolitik.⁶³ Moreover, Wehner himself, in spite of his strained relations and disagreement with Brandt over the priority of German–Soviet talks over intra-German talks, officially backed the Chancellor’s undertakings towards Moscow at least within the period under consideration.⁶⁴ By contrast, within the parliamentary FDP there was considerably less consensus. From the start, there was a lot of internal debate about Ostpolitik, for example over the question of recognition of the GDR, the overall effectiveness of the policy as a whole, the FDP’s part in the policy, and even Scheel’s performance as Foreign Minister.⁶⁵ As to German–Soviet negotiations, opposition from a considerable number of members became especially evident towards the summer of 1970; most notable was the opposition from Erich Mende, Scheel’s predecessor as FDP chairman, and KühlmannStumm.⁶⁶ As for the relationship between the parliamentary parties, ⁶² Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 278–9. ⁶³ For instance, Wehner, NDR, 25 Oct. 1969, in Herbert Wehner, Wandel und Bewährung: Ausgewählte Reden und Schriften 1930–1975 (Berlin: Ullstein, 1976), 405–6; AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 16: Wehner and his parliamentary party, 19 Jan. 1970; ibid., 143: Wehner, 25 May 1970; ibid., 32: SPD Executive Committee, 31 May 1970; see also Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 588. ⁶⁴ After 1972, the power struggle between Brandt and Wehner became more pronounced. Wehner’s anger about Brandt’s failure to press ahead with the normalization of intra-German relations then culminated in Wehner’s public defamations of Brandt, which, according to Bahr, led to Brandt’s retirement as Chancellor in 1974. Quoted from the NDR television documentary Willy Brandt: Eine Jahrhundertgestalt, 10 Dec. 2003. For further information see August H. Leugers-Scherzberg, ‘Herbert Wehner and the Resignation of Willy Brandt on May 7, 1974’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 50/2 (2002), 303–22. ⁶⁵ e.g. ADL, A 35, 152: parliamentary party, autumn 1969 and 30 Nov. 1969; ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 159: Mende, 6 Jan. 1970; ADL, A 12, 82: KühlmannStumm, 24 Jan. 1970; ADL, A 41, 430: Kühlmann-Stumm to Mischnick, 17 Feb. 1970; ibid., 44: Mende and Zoglmann, 10 Mar. 1970; ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 160: FDP Executive Committee, 25 Apr. 1970. ⁶⁶ e.g. ibid.: Achenbach, 25 Apr. 1970; ibid., A 1, 413: Dahrendorf and Mende at the party conference, 22–4 June 1970; see also Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 122. This will be discussed below, pp. 164, 169–70.

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there was close cooperation. Wehner, Mischnick, and their representatives were in informal daily contact.⁶⁷ Regular meetings between Ehmke and Genscher created further cohesion between the coalition parties.⁶⁸ Following this general account of the structures of policy-making within the SPD/FDP coalition, the next section will analyse in detail how the policy that led to the Moscow Treaty was constructed by the Brandt team.

A Sluggish Foreign Ministry Apparatus at Work Even before the formation of the Social–Liberal government, preparations for the continuation of talks with Moscow were set in train in both the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry. In the Foreign Ministry the newly set-up renunciation-of-force working group—which consisted of the leading European security unit (II B 2) and the units in charge of questions of Eastern and Germany policy (II A 1–5), assisted by the unit for international law (V 1)—was busy preparing a brief for Allardt’s first discussion.⁶⁹ Additionally, Bahr set out his master plan for Ostpolitik, entailing the conclusion of a ‘system of renunciation-of-force agreements’ between Bonn and the various East European countries.⁷⁰ These agreements would have the effect of confirming West Germany’s provisional recognition of the existing borders of Europe, but only until a final peace settlement. In the first briefings at the Chancellery on 31 October and 1 November, the participants, namely Bahr, Ehmke, Duckwitz, Ahlers, Sahm, and Focke, agreed on the road map for future negotiations that was presented by Bahr: first, a date would be arranged for the start of talks with Moscow, and then one for Warsaw. It was hoped that this would have a positive impact on East Berlin. Consequently, negotiations with Moscow, Poland, and East Berlin would soon be proceeding in parallel. Moscow, however, would, as the leading power of the Eastern bloc, remain the main negotiating partner even in relation to intra-German matters. Talks were to start before the end ⁶⁷ Karl Wienand and Karl Moersch to Schmid, 15 Oct. 1976 and 13 Jan. 1977, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 205, 207; Alfred Freudenhammer and Karlheinz Vater (eds.), Herbert Wehner: Ein Leben mit der deutschen Frage (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1978), 239–40. ⁶⁸ Ehmke, Mittendrin, 112. ⁶⁹ ACDP, 01–403, 126/2: Ministerialdirigent Lahn, 15 Oct. 1969, and the working group, 20 Oct. 1969. See also p. 128. ⁷⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437, 1: Bahr, 28 Oct. 1969.

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of the year.⁷¹ As Bahr saw it, they would not be spectacular but would entail serious work.⁷² Simultaneously, the Foreign Ministry sent out a note to all the larger embassies explaining the government’s new course, and, in particular, that although the nature of the GDR as a state had been recognized, legal recognition was still impossible because of the special character of intra-German relations. Therefore the embassies were asked to continue to counteracting any one-sided attempts by the GDR to gain recognition.⁷³ A week later, the date of 8 December was fixed for the start of German–Soviet talks.⁷⁴ What followed in the subsequent couple of weeks were intense preparations for the first German–Soviet encounter, mainly by DirectorGeneral Ruete at the Auswärtige Amt and his leading units as well as Ambassador Allardt, but in consultation with Bahr and Sanne at the Chancellery. Most importantly, Ruete’s political department was absorbed by the editing of a German note to be sent in reply to the Soviet note that had been delivered by Zarapkin on 17 November 1969. By 4 December, a draft note had been composed and forwarded to the Chancellery.⁷⁵ Although the draft was largely approved by the Chancellery and reflected the common policy, it triggered some controversy between the departments as to whether or not the border question should be raised. Whereas Ruete wished to offer a renunciationof-force agreement expressly on the basis of the ‘actual borders’, Bahr was opposed to tying West Germany down to this formulation at this stage. However, the differences were smoothed out by Brandt’s comment that Ruete’s formulation was ‘possible’, and the note was delivered to Allardt for his first meeting on 8 December 1969.⁷⁶ However, in response to the troubled start of talks between Allardt and Gromyko, the Foreign Ministry switched to a more restrained renunciation-of-force policy. Probably influenced by Allardt’s disillusioned report on his first encounter, Scheel instructed Allardt to retreat to the offer of a ‘concrete agreement about the limited topic of the renunciation-of-force’ in the next meeting. Allardt was otherwise to ⁷¹ BAK, N 1474, 77: briefing, 31 Oct. and 1 Nov. 1969; Sahm to the author, 31 Aug. 2003. ⁷² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 437, 1: Bahr, 28 Oct. 1969. ⁷³ PA, B 150, doc. 337: Scheel, 30 Oct. 1969. ⁷⁴ BAK, N 1474, 125: Ehmke, 7 Nov. 1969; ibid., 77: Bahr, 10 Nov. 1969. ⁷⁵ Ibid.: Sahm, 4 Dec. 1969. ⁷⁶ PA, B 150: Ehmke and Ruete to Scheel, 6 Dec. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 1: Bahr to Brandt, 16 Dec. 1969.

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remain receptive to the Soviet ideas but to point to the need for further instructions from Bonn before he could respond.⁷⁷ After Allardt’s second meeting, which was similarly unsuccessful, the leading European security unit and Scheel signalled to Moscow that Bonn remained averse to considering topics other than the bilateral renunciation of force by means of a bilateral agreement. Questions of open borders were to be reserved for subsequent bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements with Poland and the GDR. The Foreign Ministry still regarded the regulation of relations with Moscow as an absolute priority and key to any intra-German negotiations, but at the same time assessed the prospect of such an accord as small.⁷⁸ This stood in stark contrast with the much broader approach developed in other government circles. Unlike the Foreign Ministry officials, the leading decision-makers wanted to link German–Soviet talks to related problems, most notably the regulation of intra-German relations, from the start. In various exchanges, Brandt, his ministers Scheel, and Franke, Bahr, Ehmke, Sanne, and the parliamentary party leaders Wehner and Mischnick discussed the need to reveal the entire concept of Ostpolitik in German–Soviet talks. They decided that the Soviets, as the key partner in all Eastern negotiations, should be made aware of Bonn’s intention to conclude a treaty with the GDR, and soon, since they did not have much time left. This treaty should regulate intra-German relations and should promote close cooperation between the two Germanys, rather than mere coexistence, until the conclusion of a peace settlement. The outline would have to be interesting enough to provoke the Soviets into putting pressure on East Berlin to react positively to Bonn’s initiative.⁷⁹ Moscow, holding the key to any progress, would have to be informed about everything Bonn wished to negotiate with the GDR in advance.⁸⁰ East Berlin would meanwhile be offered the chance of entering into a ‘broad exchange of views’.⁸¹ ⁷⁷ PA, B 150, doc. 396: Scheel, 8 Dec. 1969. ⁷⁸ PA, B 150: unit for German questions, 18 and 22 Dec. 1969; ibid., doc. 413: Allardt, 24 Dec. 1969; PA, B 41, 1054: unit for German questions, 8 Jan. 1970. ⁷⁹ BAK, N 1474, 79 and AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 1: meetings between Scheel, Franke, Ehmke, Wehner, and Mischnick, 21 Nov. and 16 Dec. 1969; DzDP, 6th ser., 1, docs. 31 and 43: Sanne to Bahr, 2 Dec. 1969, and Bahr to Brandt, 18 Dec. 1969. ⁸⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 2: Bahr to Brandt, 19 Feb. 1970. ⁸¹ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages: Stenographische Berichte (Andernach: Allein-Betrieb, H. Heger, 1950–), vol. 71, 846: Brandt, 14 Jan. 1970. On 22 Jan. 1970, Bonn delivered Stoph a letter proposing negotiations about an exchange of renunciationof-force declarations and a ‘broad exchange of views’ about intra-German relations,

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The government spokesman Ahlers, like Bahr, was much more optimistic than Scheel’s staff concerning the probability of a German–Soviet accord. They both told Brandt that according to unofficial sources the Soviets would not remain as intransigent as Gromyko suggested and that they were seriously interested in constructive solutions.⁸² Thus it was crucial for Bonn, Bahr concluded, to continue the new policy, without haste, but speedily and without deviation, ideally in the last week of January 1970.⁸³ However, Scheel’s officials prepared the next meeting according to their own more restricted conception. Ruete and his staff decided that Gromyko should be offered precise answers to the questions he had raised in his last encounter with Allardt. Ruete’s working group emphasized that this procedure should not entail abandoning the previous resolution, which had been to focus the bilateral negotiations exclusively upon the renunciation of force. It would be necessary to counteract Soviet efforts to interpret recent remarks by Brandt—about the renunciation of force representing a ‘chapter that deals with all unsettled questions’—as entailing the abandonment of this philosophy.⁸⁴ By mid January, the draft of a new brief for Allardt concerning the next meeting was shown to the Chancellery and the embassy in Moscow.⁸⁵

The Brandt Team Sidelines the Foreign Ministry’s Bureaucracy Allardt, however, was not to lead the next discussion, which he had helped to prepare. On 14 January, in a confidential letter to Brandt, Bahr strongly objected to Allardt’s continuing as the German delegate, because he saw only disadvantages arising from this.⁸⁶ Recognizing Scheel’s need to maintain a strong profile, Brandt was initially unsure whether he could expect his Foreign Minister to deprive his own ministry of these most important negotiations and instead delegate them to State Secretary Bahr.⁸⁷ But a week later, on 22 January, Brandt let his minister Ehmke discuss this issue with the Foreign Minister. see Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1st ser., 4: 28. Oktober 1969–23. März 1970, ed. Das Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1970), 277. ⁸² AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 301: Ahlers, 17 Dec. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 431/A, 2: Bahr, 15 Jan. 1970. ⁸³ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 8: Bahr, 15 Jan. 1970. ⁸⁴ Ibid., doc. 5: Mertes, 8 Jan. 1970. ⁸⁵ BAK, N 1474, 79: Ruete, 14 Jan. 1970. ⁸⁶ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 8: Bahr, 14 Jan. 1970. ⁸⁷ Baring, Machtwechsel, p. 268.

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Scheel confirmed his readiness to let Bahr take over the lead from Allardt for the next round of talks. He required, though, that Bahr appear as the government’s delegate, not the Chancellor’s confidant, and that higher officials from the Foreign Ministry, possibly Ruete, accompany him.⁸⁸ Scheel informed Allardt a day later that Bahr would be leading the talks during the intermediary stage.⁸⁹ Needless to say, the German ambassador in Moscow was not pleased to be sidelined. When Allardt, following a Soviet request, was excluded from a meeting between Bahr and Kosygin shortly afterwards, he commented to the Chancellor’s representative: ‘Then I might as well go on holiday.’⁹⁰ With Bahr’s takeover of talks from Allardt, policy towards Moscow came under tighter control by the Chancellery at the expense of the Foreign Ministry. Against Scheel’s wishes, no high official from the Auswärtige Amt accompanied Bahr on his mission. Instead, Sanne became Bahr’s closest assistant in Moscow. From the Foreign Ministry only Wiprecht von Treskow joined the German delegation as the legal expert and had, by his own account, little say.⁹¹ Bahr as chief negotiator had significant room for manoeuvre. Following a decision by the Chancellor, he was not bound by any instructions from the Foreign Ministry, and it was up to him to make use of its recommendations. Scheel was also of the view that ‘Bahr did not need queries, because he had everything in his head’.⁹² In fact, unlike Allardt, Bahr received no instructions, either from the Foreign Ministry or from the Chancellery, until the summer, and was given only such papers as he requested.⁹³ Bahr himself acknowledged retrospectively that the political concept he presented was new not only to Gromyko but also to ‘our diplomats’.⁹⁴ Allardt gave proof of this by complaining later that he had several times asked Bahr to be shown his instructions, but in vain, as it emerged that there were none and that Bahr had instead based his position only on oral instructions.⁹⁵ By Bahr’s own account, he was left to his own resources because he knew what he ‘could and could not do’ and would ⁸⁸ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 308: Ehmke to Brandt, 22 Jan. 1970. ⁸⁹ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 20: Scheel, 23 Jan. 1970. ⁹⁰ Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 299. ⁹¹ Treskow to Schmid, 1 Apr. 1977, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 270. ⁹² Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; Sahm to the author, 31 Aug 2003; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 279. ⁹³ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 196, including n. 16: Ruete, 5 May 1970, and Bahr asking for a compilation of German–Soviet questions, 20 Feb. 1970; Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 283–4. ⁹⁴ Ibid. 286. ⁹⁵ Helmut Allardt, Moskauer Tagebuch: Beobachtungen, Notizen, Erlebrisse (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1974), 266.

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need to ask for advice only if he changed the concept.⁹⁶ This meant that Bahr could now operate as he pleased. Disapproving of the restricted scope of the renunciation-of-force policy, Bahr first of all discarded Ruete’s latest draft for the next meeting. In other words, the apparatus of the Foreign Ministry was now at Bahr’s command and not vice versa. Furthermore, with the start of the first meeting between Bahr and Gromyko the number of Foreign Ministry officials involved was reduced considerably. In consultation with Bahr, Duckwitz issued an instruction to the embassy in Moscow that any reports about the German–Soviet talks should be directed only to him, State Secretary Harkort, and the minister, and no longer to the departments or units.⁹⁷ From now on, it would remain to himself and Harkort to decide whether reports from Moscow should be forwarded to Ruete, his Deputy Director-General Lothar Lahn, and the associated units, the unit for questions regarding Germany (II A 1), the Soviet Union unit (II A 4), and the Eastern Europe unit (II A 5). Consequently, in the following months, Ruete and his staff were shown Bahr’s and Allardt’s reports only at irregular intervals.⁹⁸ Moreover, the leading unit for European security questions was deprived of its responsibility for the renunciation of force, and the unit for questions related to the East (II A 3) revealed shortly afterwards that it had no knowledge of the German–Soviet talks.⁹⁹ In addition, the entire legal department no longer had any access to the reports coming from Moscow. It stated later that it knew about the state of talks only in so far as Treskow reported verbally on them during the breaks between the rounds, and in so far as its unit for international law (V 1) was involved in private discussions.¹⁰⁰ These acts of non-disclosure did not merely represent a power-political tactic on the part of the decision-makers, but also must be seen as an attempt to avoid such indiscretions as had just occurred: in early January, information about the German–Soviet talks had been leaked to the public, probably by Wolff from the embassy in Moscow, as Scheel reckoned, which is why ⁹⁶ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ⁹⁷ PA, B 2, 175: Noebel, 30 Jan. 1970. ⁹⁸ For instance, AAPD, 1970, i, docs. 46, 69 and 89: Ruete and Lahn were provided with analyses of Bahr’s talk on 10 and 17 Feb. 1970; reports on the talks of 3, 6, and 10 Mar. 1970 were forwarded to the units for Germany, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. ⁹⁹ ACDP, 01–403, 1256/2: Mertes, 5 Feb. 1970; PA, B 41, 1075: unit II A 3, 20 Feb. 1970. ¹⁰⁰ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 218: Schenck, 20 May 1970.

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Wolff was transferred on 9 January.¹⁰¹ Additionally, these measures were probably a consequence of the unpromising start of talks under Allardt, suggesting that an effective Ostpolitik could not be led by the traditionally sluggish bureaucratic apparatus. This secrecy continued until the last stage of negotiations in the summer of 1970. On 5 June, the State Secretary’s office instructed the embassy in Moscow to continue directing all reports only to the minister and State Secretary.¹⁰² When Allardt ignored this order in a report to the Germany unit, he was immediately criticized and asked to abide by the order whatever the terms.¹⁰³ According to an instruction by the State Secretary of 22 June, the planning section was now no longer to be informed about reports from any embassies either, a decision that the planning chief Dirk Oncken asked to be revised.¹⁰⁴ Even the embassy in Moscow repeatedly complained that it was excluded from the ongoing consultations in Bonn on the Bahr paper. Allardt maintained in retrospect that he was excluded not only throughout the German–Soviet exchange, but also during consultations in Bonn in the summer, for fear that he might not always agree with Bahr’s views. He was called to Bonn only once all decisions had been made.¹⁰⁵ As a result of these measures, negotiations with Moscow were, throughout the entire process, in the hands of just a few people, namely Brandt, Bahr, Sahm, and Sanne at the Chancellery, and Scheel and Duckwitz at the Auswärtige Amt. As Bahr also confirmed in retrospect, the members of the diplomatic service on the operative level had no say in the decision-making. They merely carried out, though not always without protest, the policy according to the instructions received from above.¹⁰⁶ Of course, because of their expertise they were consulted and asked for their advice.¹⁰⁷ However, on the whole, the administrators ¹⁰¹ BAK, N 1474, 79 and 80: Scheel, 9 Jan. 1970. ¹⁰² PA, B 2, 175: Schönfeld, 5 June 1970. ¹⁰³ Ibid.: Allardt, 17 June 1970, and Frank, 18 June 1970. ¹⁰⁴ PA, B 1, 472: Oncken, 23 June 1970. ¹⁰⁵ AAPD, 1970, ii, docs. 246 and 286: Allardt, 4 June 1970, and Frank, 30 June 1970; PA, B 41, 1057a: Soviet Union unit, 30 June 1970; Allardt, Tagebuch, 164, 349. ¹⁰⁶ Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004. ¹⁰⁷ For instance, Allardt was asked by Sahm to analyse the Soviets’ views on their legal position on articles 1 and 2 and articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. Allardt did so, and his thoughts on this matter were considered in the examination of the text; see PA, B 41, 1078. Additionally, Oncken was instructed by Frank to design a formula concerning the Allies’ special rights for the preamble of the treaty; see PA, B 9, 178.340.

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were excluded from policy-making during this period. As Bernd von Staden, who took over from Ruete as Ministerialdirektor on 1 June 1970, also testified, the implementation of decisions had to be confined to a small number of decision-makers. They could not pass through the whole apparatus, from the unit officers to the directors, for if they had been the policy would not have been realized.¹⁰⁸ The Foreign Ministry’s loss of access and its need for compensation were immediately apparent. In a telegram directed to the Chancellery on 11 February, the Foreign Ministry enquired about the state of talks and Bahr’s plans for further proceedings. A day later, Ruete cautiously offered Sahm a paper with suggestions concerning the latest stage of renunciation-of-force talks as well as explanations for Bahr of the formulations used.¹⁰⁹ Bahr was indeed delivered these explanations by Scheel but, as mentioned above, was given discretion to use them according to his own judgement.¹¹⁰ Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Ministry staff became increasingly critical of the course of talks under Bahr’s lead. The excluded European security unit, in particular, disapproved of the latest developments as it became aware of them. After Bahr had presented the initial working paper as discussed with Gromyko, the European security unit criticized the compromises being made and urged the use of unambiguous formulas.¹¹¹ Allardt also remained sceptical about the success of the bilateral talks. He drew a negative conclusion after Bahr had completed the first round of talks on 17 February 1970. While considering the talks ‘very useful’, he doubted whether they would open up the way to a ‘fruitful coexistence’. Because of the Soviets’ determination never to let the Germans reunite, only a renunciationof-force treaty with very limited goals was to be expected.¹¹² Clearly, this kind of criticism was raised not so much because of objections to the content of talks as because of Bahr’s leadership. The fact that a non-jurist and member of the Chancellery was now shaping the renunciation-of-force policy, which was fully screened from most of the relevant staff of the Foreign Ministry, triggered considerable ¹⁰⁸ Staden to Fuchs, 6 Mar. 1996, in Fuchs, Dreiecksverhältnisse, 136. ¹⁰⁹ BAK, N 1474, 81: Kleine Lage, 11 Feb. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/A: Ruete, 12 Feb. 1970. ¹¹⁰ See AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 196: Scheel gave Bahr the paper during his stay in Moscow on 12–13 Feb. 1970. ¹¹¹ Ibid., doc. 36: Mertes, 5 Feb. 1970. ¹¹² Ibid., doc. 69: Allardt, 19 Feb. 1970.

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discontent among Scheel’s staff. Even high-ranking officials expressed their disapproval.¹¹³ The decision-makers did not ignore these critical voices from within the Foreign Ministry, yet they did not feel obstructed in their policymaking. This was because they did not need these people’s approval of their policy.¹¹⁴ The few officials who did have an impact because of their involvement in the making of policy towards Moscow, namely the few units in Ruete’s department and the State Secretaries, seemingly cooperated willingly with Bahr. In addition, the Parliamentary State Secretary Dahrendorf described Bahr’s work in Moscow as ‘admirable’.¹¹⁵ Bahr, in turn, expressed to Dahrendorf his delight that they shared the same views in the field of German policy.¹¹⁶ The policy-makers therefore rebutted the criticism and encouraged each other to carry on. Bahr, for instance, maintained that a German–Soviet accord incorporating all important German demands, including the goal of reunification, was possible. He wrote to Duckwitz that, contrary to Allardt’s interpretation of the exchange, the Soviets’ intentions were not rigid and unchangeable and that they had never said ‘never’ to the German policy of reunification by peaceful means.¹¹⁷ Sanne agreed with this view. He emphasized all the ‘points of agreement’, notably that the borders, including the intra-German one, though called ‘inviolable’, would not be formally recognized.¹¹⁸ In Moscow, Bahr and his delegation, consisting of Sanne, Treskow, and staff from the embassy, namely Allardt, Peckert, and Immo Stabreit, on the whole also worked well together. As Peckert recalled in retrospect, it was a ‘very cooperative’ gathering. They would sit together after the talks and discuss further proceedings. Bahr was ready to listen to objections and heed, for instance, legal advice from his colleagues, so ¹¹³ Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 137; see also Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 190–1. ¹¹⁴ This view was held by Bahr in an interview with the author on 12 Feb. 2003, and by Kastl, in an interview with the author on 31 Jan. 2003. ¹¹⁵ ADL, Bundesvorstand, 159: Dahrendorf, 21 Feb. 1970; see also Gottfried Niedhart, Friedens- und Interessenwahrung: Zur Ostpolitik der F.D.P. in Opposition und Sozialer-Liberaler Regierung 1968–1970’, in Hans-Georg Fleck et al. (eds.), Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung, 7 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 121. ¹¹⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341: Bahr, 27 Feb. 1970. However, in the spring of 1970, Dahrendorf became more critical of Bahr’s concept of ‘Moscow first’. Moreover, his personal ambitions to become Chancellor added to Dahrendorf ’s confrontational stance, so that eventually he resigned from his office at the Auswärtige Amt in the summer of 1970. For further information see Baring, Machtwechsel, 287–8, 293–7. ¹¹⁷ PA, B 2, 175: Bahr, 20 Feb. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 392, 1: Bahr, 23 Feb. 1970. ¹¹⁸ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 83: Sanne, 19 Feb. 1970.

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that in general ‘one had a say’.¹¹⁹ Bahr, by contrast, painted a slightly different picture. He mentioned tensions that existed especially between him and Ambassador Allardt, who regarded the whole course as wrong. Bahr stressed that he consulted most closely, and at times exclusively, with Sanne, whereas the other participants of the delegation had not much say.¹²⁰ Treskow’s statement that he had little influence confirms this picture.¹²¹ Thus, in accordance with the policy-making structures in Bonn, and notwithstanding a generally good atmosphere among the delegates, decisions in Moscow were made by Bahr and Sanne alone. While Bahr was left more or less to his own devices in Moscow, he did make efforts to keep the political leaders in Bonn well informed. In regular reports to Scheel and his State Secretaries, as well as Sanne and Ehmke, he gave a detailed account and interpretation of each of his encounters with Gromyko. Chancellor Brandt was sent separate confidential letters concerning more general strategic aspects of negotiations with the East. For example, on 7 March, Bahr reported to Brandt some information, received via the Andropov channel, about the Soviets’ attitude to the talks with Bonn: it now seemed clear that both Kosygin and Gromyko had, as a result of his takeover of the talks, abandoned their initial distrust and were inclined to conclude ‘the whole thing’ within the next three to six months. Ulbricht, by contrast, wanted to negotiate for two years. In order to strengthen Moscow’s interest in a regulation concerning East and West Germany, it was worth thinking, Bahr concluded, of offering the GDR admission into the United Nations as it desired in the autumn session, provided intra-German relations were regulated by then.¹²² Irrespective of Bahr’s use of different channels to update Brandt and Scheel, information including such confidential letters was widely shared in Bonn, and at least the most important decisions were made cooperatively by the ‘insiders’. On 8 March 1970, Brandt, Scheel, Sanne, and Ehmke met in order to exchange their views about the state of the bilateral dialogue. Both Brandt and Scheel approved of Bahr’s reports and his suggestion that further talks be based on the German ‘non-paper’ in tandem with comments and corrections in the Soviet ‘non-paper’. Explicit mention of West Berlin would however have to be added because this was part of the ‘whole package deal’. ¹¹⁹ Peckert to the author, 7 Feb. 2003. ¹²⁰ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ¹²¹ Treskow to Schmid, 1 April 1977, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 270. ¹²² AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 98: Bahr, 7 Mar. 1970.

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As to the disputed question of mentioning the borders, Bahr should keep offering resistance, but not much importance was attached to this point.¹²³ On the whole, however, Bonn did not give Bahr much feedback. Brandt was at this time more absorbed in preparing the start of intraGerman negotiations with Stoph (see Figure 8).¹²⁴ As Sanne informed Bahr, the preliminary meeting between Sahm and Gerhard Schüssler¹²⁵ had gone so badly that energy would be concentrated on this in the following weeks. Bahr was therefore also warned against any concessions to the GDR at this stage, such as admission into the UN as suggested by Bahr. This is also why Bahr did not receive the immediate instructions he had asked for in response to his draft letter on German unity. In fact, a few weeks elapsed before Sahm revised Bahr’s draft letter.¹²⁶ However, Bahr was reassured that he would be kept fully informed about other ongoing dialogues to do with Ostpolitik.¹²⁷ Bahr, for his part, confirmed in retrospect that he became nervous when he did not receive from Bonn any answers to his reports. Sanne reassured him, though, that as long as there was no response everything could be assumed to be all right.¹²⁸ Therefore Bahr carried forward the exchange with Gromyko on the basis of Bonn’s general, implicit approval of his negotiating stance. He and Allardt continued reporting to Bonn via the usual restricted route, which kept only Brandt and the other insiders from the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry informed.¹²⁹ After the completion of the second round of talks on 21 March, Bahr returned immediately to Bonn and exchanged the latest news with Brandt and Scheel.¹³⁰ ¹²³ Ibid., doc. 97, n. 7: Ruete, 9 Mar. 1970. ¹²⁴ Brandt and Stoph met in Erfurt on 10 and 19 Mar. 1970: see ibid., docs. 111 and 124; for an overview of intra-German negotiations see Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘Spying not Only on Strangers: Documenting Stasi Involvement in Cold War German–German negotiations’, in Lori Lyn Bogle (ed.), The Cold War (New York and London: Routledge, 2001), 71–85. ¹²⁵ Sahm and Schüssler, the representative head of office of the East German Council of Ministers, met on 12 Mar. 1970; see AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 111. ¹²⁶ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, docs. 105, 105a, 105b, and 124: Sahm, 11 Mar. and 17 Apr. 1970. ¹²⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/B/2: Sanne, 10 Mar. 1970; Sahm confirmed to the author on 31 Aug. 2003 that Brandt updated Bahr regularly by telephone on his talks with East Berlin. ¹²⁸ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ¹²⁹ AAPD, 1970, i, docs. 112 and 115: Bahr, 11 and 12 Mar. 1970; ibid., doc. 114, n. 1: Allardt, 13 Mar. 1970; for further details see pp. 50–5. ¹³⁰ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 275.

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Figure 8. Chancellor Brandt (right) is welcomed by the East German Premier Willi Stoph (left) at the Erfurt Train Station, 19 March 1970.

Conflicting Views between Foreign Ministry Officials, Bahr, and Brandt During the break of nearly seven weeks that followed, preparations were made to elaborate Bonn’s position on the remaining questions in dispute, namely the borders, unification, and the nature of intra-German relations. It was agreed that in order to make progress compromises would have to be made. However, there was also consensus that the border and unification issue could not be compromised, and that the use of the word ‘recognition’ had to remain taboo.¹³¹ This was argued, most notably by Bahr, on the basis of the need to maintain the credibility of the government’s position that there was ‘one nation’ and that the ¹³¹ AAPD, 1970, i, docs. 134 and 139: Stempel, 26 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1970; ibid., ii, doc. 196: Ruete, 5 May 1970.

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‘GDR is not a foreign country’. Instead, it was proposed, Bonn should concede the other point, about East Germany’s establishing relations with third states. Bonn should at the same time pin down Moscow to the agreement that such relations between the GDR and third states would apply only with the coming into force of an intra-German treaty. On the border point, Bonn should continue trying to assert a letter on unification for domestic reasons.¹³² At Bahr’s request, experts in the Foreign Ministry produced papers on the unsettled questions during the break. On 1 April, Ministerialdirigent Lahn of Ruete’s department made proposals in relation to points 1 to 4 of the elaborated working text, which set out the substance of the renunciation-of-force treaty. His paper was submitted to the Chancellery a week later, on 7 April 1970.¹³³ In addition, Treskow of the legal department prepared a draft of the treaty according to the most recent state of the exchange.¹³⁴ This resulted in a synopsis with revisions and new recommendations relating to each article of the treaty. Parliamentary State Secretary Focke, however, who had received the synopsis, ruled out all of Treskow’s suggestions as ‘superfluous’, ‘not desirable’, or ‘unattainable’.¹³⁵ Instead, a synopsis of the renunciationof-force agreement which had been compiled in the Chancellery was accepted as a draft of the treaty by the experts in the Auswärtige Amt.¹³⁶ The break was also used to sort out some differences that had arisen between Bahr and the Foreign Ministry concerning recognition of the GDR. On 11 March, Günther van Well’s Germany unit presented a paper suggesting a remarkably new approach, namely a legal recognition of East Germany. Inspired by several of Wehner’s public remarks about the possibility of a legal recognition of the GDR,¹³⁷ his unit argued that legal recognition might result from intra-German negotiations given two preconditions: first, the conclusion of a substantial contract which would lead to regulated cooperation and the improvement of the intraGerman relationship and second, the East German population’s consent to this. Well’s unit supported this proposal mainly for its tactical value. ¹³² Ibid., i, doc. 161: Bahr, 17 Apr. 1970. ¹³³ Ibid., i, doc. 196: Lahn, 1 Apr. 1970. ¹³⁴ Ibid., i, doc. 162: draft of a treaty, 3 Apr. 1970, and Bahr, 17 Apr. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/A: Sanne, 8 Apr. 1970. ¹³⁵ Ibid.: Focke, 4 May 1970. ¹³⁶ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 196, n. 18: Ruete, 5 May 1970. ¹³⁷ Wehner in Der Spiegel (26 Jan. 1970); AAPD, 1970 ii, doc. 116: Wehner, NDR and Westdeutscher Rundfunk (West German broadcasting company), 28 Feb. 1970.

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In Well’s eyes, it was highly unlikely that the East German government would agree to any kind of plebiscite. It would thus have to reject Bonn’s offer, which, in turn, would embarrass the GDR. A confidential indication that such a proposal was possible might therefore deter both East Berlin and Moscow from focusing exclusively on the issue of legal recognition. For these reasons, Well proposed to include these ideas in the preparations for the meeting between Brandt and Stoph as well as for the German–Soviet talks. Scheel consented to Well’s proposal.¹³⁸ Bahr, by contrast, who had received the paper a day later, was opposed to Well’s ideas, although he called them ‘highly interesting’. In a letter to Duckwitz, the author of the paper, he argued that a legal recognition of East Berlin was not possible as long as the Allies retained special rights regarding Germany as a whole and these had not been conferred on both states in Germany in a peace settlement.¹³⁹ In fact, Well’s paper revealed a fundamental disagreement between Bahr and his associates in the Chancellery and the staff dealing with Germany policy in the Foreign Ministry. The disagreement was not to be settled, and therefore discussion carried on until the summer of 1970. Whereas Sanne, for instance, supported Bahr’s idea that the GDR should be recognized as a state, but not as a legal subject,¹⁴⁰ a number of officials in Scheel’s ministry had by spring 1970 come to welcome a revision of this idea. Ministerialdirektor Paul Frank, for example, criticized the persistent focus on the question of recognition of the GDR. Instead, he proposed a plan of cooperation with the GDR in which the unity not of the state, but of the nation would be preserved. The resulting peaceful rivalry between the German states, in which West Germany would perform better, would show what Germany might be one day.¹⁴¹ A little later, Werner Mertes of the European security unit also agreed with Frank that Bonn should give priority not so much to unity of the state or to territorial questions, but rather to the freedom of the German people. This, translated into practical policy, would serve the unity of the nation very effectively.¹⁴² In response to Bahr’s letter, Frank, who had meanwhile taken over as State Secretary from the retired Duckwitz, explained the views of ¹³⁸ ¹³⁹ ¹⁴⁰ ¹⁴¹ ¹⁴²

AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 116: Well, 12 Mar. 1970. Ibid., doc. 162: Bahr, 17 Apr. 1970. AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 425, 3: Sanne, 2 Dec. 1969. ACDP, 01–403, 125/1: Frank, 20 Feb. and 16 Mar. 1970. Ibid.: Mertes, 11 May 1970.

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his staff on this matter on 16 June 1970. First, he referred to legal objections raised by Dedo von Schenck and his international law unit. Schenck rejected the view that mutual legal recognition of the two states in Germany was only possible after the transfer of the Allies’ special rights to the German states by a peace treaty. In practice, moreover, there was no prospect of the Federal Republic entertaining contractually regulated relations of a special nature without these being internationally regarded as a legal recognition of the GDR. Therefore, Schenck was against ‘letting the legal recognition of the GDR hang in the balance ad infinitum’.¹⁴³ Secondly, Frank explained the political objections expressed by Well’s Germany unit. It seemed unwise to focus too dogmatically on the impossibility of Bonn recognizing the GDR legally because this might impede any contractual regulation of relations with the GDR, or alternatively require Bonn to pay a high price in return. Instead, it was much more important to regulate intra-German relations while codifying their special nature as well as insisting on the preliminary nature of the intra-German regulation.¹⁴⁴ Thus, whereas usually it was Bahr who was in the forefront of developing new positions in Ostpolitik, on the question of recognition of the GDR he emerged as less flexible than Foreign Ministry staff. In fact, the quarrel revealed Bahr’s long-term commitment to a reunified German state, rather than merely to the unity of one nation, as suggested by members of the Foreign Ministry as well as Wehner. Unsurprisingly, Bahr persisted in his own view. In the talks with Gromyko, but also in other contexts, such as consultations with the Allies, Bahr continued to insist on the non-recognition of East Germany in a legal sense and on Four-Power responsibility for this issue.¹⁴⁵ Interestingly, Brandt had slightly different priorities from Bahr concerning Bonn’s ‘ostpolitical’ goals. On several occasions, such as a cabinet meeting,¹⁴⁶ he placed the strongest emphasis on peace and security as the top priority among national interests. In his opinion, Ostpolitik had strong moral implications. In the face of the legacy not only of the Cold War, but also of the Second World War, it was necessary to aim at reconciliation with the Soviet Union and the other East European countries that had suffered under German occupation and the ¹⁴³ ¹⁴⁴ ¹⁴⁵ ¹⁴⁶

AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 270, n. 4: Schenck, 15 June 1970. Ibid.: Frank, 16 June 1970. e.g. ibid., doc. 199: Bahr to the Allies, 8 and 9 May 1970. BAK, N 1474, 85 and AAPD 1970 ii, doc. 250: Brandt, 7 June 1970.

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Holocaust. Brandt’s willingness to accept the complete consequences of Germany’s defeat and to bear moral responsibility for Germany’s sins against its neighbours was most dramatically symbolized by his kneeling down in the Warsaw Ghetto in December 1970.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, the Chancellor was seemingly less focused than Bahr on state unity. He once revealed that he believed that the unity of his people would not necessarily be realized in one national state, but in a new, supranational order for Europe.¹⁴⁸ Subsequently, Bahr confirmed that Brandt was less optimistic and said that he once called him ‘the only crazy person still believing in reunification’.¹⁴⁹ However, unlike the Foreign Ministry officials, Brandt did not differ from Bahr as to strategy, but only in his expectations of the ultimate outcome of Ostpolitik. There was consensus between the two on the long-term ‘ostpolitical’ road map as the best and indeed only possible means to effect some sort of unification.

Bahr’s Unilateral Manoeuvres in the Last Round of Talks In mid April 1970, Ehmke, Duckwitz, Bahr, Sahm, Ahlers, and Wechmar discussed the schedule for the resumption of the bilateral talks in the Kleine Lage. They were concerned to align them with other ongoing talks with Warsaw and especially East Berlin. In spite of Bahr’s readiness to resume the third round of the exchange in mid April, it was therefore envisaged that Bahr and Gromyko should not meet before the second week of May.¹⁵⁰ On 27 April, in a private letter directed exclusively to Brandt and Ehmke, Bahr also deliberated on the schedule of the ongoing German–Soviet exchange with a view to optimizing its impact on the intra-German talks. To this end, he suggested that the second round of talks should be so arranged that it would be completed before Brandt’s meeting with Stoph in Kassel on 21 May. Since it could be expected to take at least another ten days, he would have to be sent back to Moscow in mid May. On the basis of the completed talks, the German and ¹⁴⁷ Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-term Objectives, and Grand Design’, in David C. Geyer and Bernd Schafer (eds.), American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972 (Washington: German Historical Institute, 2004), 123–4; see also Anthony Glees, Reinventing Germany: German Political Development since 1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1996), 154–5; Giles Radice, The New Germans (London: M. Joseph, 1995), 87. ¹⁴⁸ Brandt to the New York Post (28 Apr. 1970). ¹⁴⁹ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ¹⁵⁰ BAK, N 1474, 83: Kleine Lage, 14, 20 Apr. and 5 May 1970.

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Soviet governments would be able to open negotiations. The conclusion of negotiations, in turn, would have a positive impact on the probably much longer-lasting negotiations with East Berlin as well as the FourPower negotiations about Berlin.¹⁵¹ Bahr finally advised discussing this information in the smallest circle of confidants and consulting on the agreed position with the Foreign Minister and the cabinet, and informed Moscow that he would be ready for talks from 11 May.¹⁵² After his first meeting on 12 May, Bahr informed only Brandt and Ehmke, and Ehmke indeed made sure that no one else was told anything.¹⁵³ Bahr reported that he had explained to Gromyko his government’s expectations that the approaching intra-German talks in Kassel would open the way to an intra-German treaty, a treaty, which would not, taking into account the Four-Power rights, lead to a mutual legal recognition but instead stipulate the special nature of intra-German relations. He conveyed his impression that, although Gromyko had again questioned the formulas already agreed, as he had repeated the request to use the word ‘recognition’, instead of ‘respecting’ in the border article, they would arrive at a positive conclusion in the following week.¹⁵⁴ Bahr also updated Scheel, notably about the deterioration of the talks in Moscow and Gromyko’s continued insistence on the reintroduction of the word ‘recognition’ into the treaty text.¹⁵⁵ However, Scheel was not informed about the letter that was prepared next, warning Gromyko that the entire exchange would fail if he did not accept the results previously agreed.¹⁵⁶ The letter had originally been Sanne’s idea and was a result of secret and daring planning between Bahr and Sanne. When Bahr showed the draft to Allardt, the latter insisted that it should not be sent because there had been no instructions from Bonn. Bahr, however, argued that he had deliberately chosen not to seek Bonn’s approval, because this way he could send the letter to Gromyko without causing the government to lose face in case of failure.¹⁵⁷ Despite Allardt’s protest, he sent off the letter. As he told Scheel afterwards, this prompted Gromyko, or rather the Soviet Politburo, to give in.¹⁵⁸ In Bahr’s eyes, ¹⁵¹ The Four-Power talks about Berlin were opened on 26 Mar. 1970. ¹⁵² AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 187: Bahr, 27 Apr. 1970. ¹⁵³ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 301: Ehmke, 22 May 1970. ¹⁵⁴ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 205: Bahr, 14 May 1970. ¹⁵⁵ Ibid., docs. 207, 214, 219, and 220: Bahr, 15, 18 and 20 May 1970. This has been discussed on pp. 59–60. ¹⁵⁶ See also p. 60. ¹⁵⁷ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ¹⁵⁸ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 227: Bahr, 21 May 1970.

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the letter gave him leverage in the dialogue. Even Allardt retracted his objection and congratulated Bahr on his success.¹⁵⁹ Scheel, in turn, sent Bahr an instruction that, in the coming discussion with Gromyko, he should under no circumstances go beyond what had been agreed with Falin about the border point on 20 May. Even this concession should be accepted only if Gromyko consented unconditionally to the letter on unity.¹⁶⁰ However, Bahr did not fully adhere to Scheel’s instruction. On 22 May, he contented himself with obtaining Gromyko’s approval of the text prepared by him and Falin, without also asking for his approval of the letter on unity. On this basis, he and Gromyko declared that their exchange had been successfully concluded.¹⁶¹ According to the subsequent testimony of former members of the Foreign Service, there were indeed a few misunderstandings between Scheel and Bahr concerning the border question during the last round of talks. Scheel resented the fact that Bahr was negotiating about the actual borders.¹⁶² During the second break of eight weeks that followed, the relevant groups in the Bonn government spent their time consulting the text and preparing for the official negotiations in Moscow.

Internal Struggles over the Bahr Paper Upon his return, on 24 May, Bahr first of all gave a report on the results of talks with his Chancellor and Foreign Minister and the other members of the Kleine Lage. He described the positions arrived at as ‘no triumph’ for Bonn, but nevertheless a ‘slap in the face’ for Poland and the GDR. In addition, the schedule for the final negotiations was under discussion. Bahr was in favour of concluding the treaty quickly. In his eyes, negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty would need only another two to three days. Since both Brandt and he wanted to ‘put the deal through speedily’ it was envisaged that Scheel would go to Moscow on 8 June with the aim of finishing the treaty by 10 June.¹⁶³ Brandt and Scheel, however, appeared less optimistic than Bahr about the further course of negotiations. In a meeting with his ministers, Brandt ¹⁵⁹ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ¹⁶⁰ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 228: Scheel, 21 May 1970. ¹⁶¹ Ibid., doc. 229: Bahr and Gromyko, 22 May 1970. ¹⁶² Dahrendorf to Schmid, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 279. ¹⁶³ BAK, N 1474, 85: Kleine Lage, 25 May 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 434: Bahr, 25 May 1970.

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revealed his expectation that Moscow would become more problematic still. Scheel pointed to the question of borders, which was still open, and stated that it remained to be seen whether the Soviets would fully accept a statement on German unity.¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, probably not least because of the desire to secure a foreign policy success before the important elections of June 1970 in the states of Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-Palatinate, Brandt asked his cabinet on 27 May to decide about negotiations on the basis of the results arrived at so far and not to put this decision off.¹⁶⁵ Allardt also urged his Foreign Minister to hurry up with the translation of the four points into a treaty. As he reasoned, the key questions—relating to the reception of a letter about reunification and consent to the formulation which specified ‘respecting’ rather than ‘recognition of’ the borders in article 3—could be resolved if they trusted Gromyko’s word. They should take his word while the ‘irons were hot and the memory fresh’.¹⁶⁶ Thus at a press conference, Ahlers commented that negotiations in Moscow had been ‘almost concluded’.¹⁶⁷ However, the Brandt team soon had to deal with disagreement inside the government coalition. It began to appear that leading right-wing FDP politicians were of a different opinion. After being informed by Scheel and Dahrendorf about the results of the German–Soviet talks on 25 and 26 May, the FDP Executive Committee emphasized the need for a thorough examination of the results before the final negotiations could be agreed.¹⁶⁸ In the cabinet on 27 May, the FDP member Dahrendorf raised a criticism. He complained about the speed of talks and the failure to assert Bonn’s national interests as well as the failure to supply information to the Bundestag, which made its consent more difficult to obtain. He revealed that several members of the FDP were thinking in these terms and were therefore reluctant to assent to the start of negotiations at that point. In addition, the FDP minister ¹⁶⁴ BAK, N 1474, 84: Brandt and Scheel, 22 May 1970. ¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 85: Brandt, 27 May 1970; see also Josef Korbel, Détente in Europe: Real or Imaginary? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 204. ¹⁶⁶ AAPD, 1970, ii, docs. 238 and 246: Allardt, 27 May and 4 June 1970. In retrospect, however, Helmut Allardt, Politik vor und hinter den Kulissen: Erfahrungen eines Diplomaten zwischen Ost und West (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1979), 336, claimed that he was not in favour of a quick conclusion to the treaty, but only wanted to prevent the Bahr paper from developing into a ‘fait accompli’ by putting it aside. ¹⁶⁷ Die Welt (28 May 1970): Ahlers, 27 May 1970. ¹⁶⁸ ADL, A 41, 44: parliamentary FDP, 25 May 1970; ADL, Bundespräsidium, 190: FDP Chairmanship, 26 May 1970.

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Genscher implied his scepticism by insisting on the need to examine the constitutionality of the Bahr paper.¹⁶⁹ In a discussion between Bahr and Genscher four days later, the dissenting viewpoint held by both Genscher and his party came to the fore. Genscher held that it was important to avoid an impression of hastiness and to prepare the result ‘safely’. In addition, with a view to the upcoming regional elections on 14 June, it was in the interest of his party not to begin negotiations before the end of June. Genscher emphasized the need to find some point in the annexe to the treaty ‘of which one could say that Scheel had wrested it from Gromyko’.¹⁷⁰ In the parliamentary FDP, too, criticism was raised. The deputies Mende, Kühlmann-Stumm, Siegfried Zoglmann, and Achenbach complained about precipitate negotiations, their content, and a lack of information. Kühlmann-Stumm even announced that he had withdrawn his cooperation with the FDP Executive Committee because he disagreed about the ‘treatment of the results from Moscow’.¹⁷¹ What is more, there were rumours that FDP members surrounding Mende were ready to overthrow Brandt.¹⁷² In contrast to the FDP leadership, the SPD Executive Committee explicitly asked the Brandt government to continue its policy towards the Soviet Union.¹⁷³ This was the first time that Bahr and his associates had met with considerable opposition from members of the government and the coalition party. They could not afford to ignore this as they had that from members of the bureaucracy. Brandt and Bahr reacted by informing both parliamentary parties thoroughly. Indeed, as a result, a change to a more positive attitude was observed within the parliamentary FDP.¹⁷⁴ Yet the plan of starting official negotiations in early June was abandoned. The problem of the FDP’s role in the forthcoming negotiations was addressed in the routine daily meeting in the Chancellery. There was consensus about the need to ensure more ‘room for the Foreign Minister’.¹⁷⁵ Aware of the shaky foundation of his coalition government, Brandt convened his cabinet on 4 June in order to urge confidence in ¹⁶⁹ BAK, N 1474, 85: Dahrendorf and Genscher, 27 May 1970. ¹⁷⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 2: Genscher, 30 May 1970. ¹⁷¹ ADL, Bundespräsidium, 191: Kühlmann-Stumm, 1 June 1970. ¹⁷² BAK, N 1371, 90, 2: Lücke to Barzel, 12 June 1970. ¹⁷³ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 32: SPD Executive Committee, 31 May 1970. ¹⁷⁴ The Stuttgarter Zeitung (2 June 1970) on the FDP parliamentary party caucus on 2 June; Die Welt (30 May, 12 and 13 June 1970). ¹⁷⁵ BAK, N 1474, 85: Sahm, 1 June 1970.

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the results reached by Bahr. He pleaded that they should not be called into question again and asked for support for quick negotiations, ideally in the second half of June. Scheel explained the contents of the working text highlighted and its good points, such as the use of the word ‘respecting’ instead of ‘recognition’ in relation to the borders. He emphasized his determination to ensure that the treaty was compatible with the goal of unification and the Four-Power rights. Reassured by these reports, Genscher declared that he was willing to examine the paper’s constitutionality and think about how possible flaws could be eliminated and certain positions held by Bonn made stronger.¹⁷⁶ Considerable doubts about Bahr’s stipulations were also expressed by members of the Foreign Ministry. According to the phenomenon observed by Frank,¹⁷⁷ that ‘the further away the colleague, the easier it is for him to express his dissident views’, criticism was raised especially in the ‘lower ranks’ and by officials excluded from the circulation list. Notably, Schenck, from the international law unit, gave notice of his misgivings concerning the Bahr paper in the name of Director-General Horst Groepper of the legal department. First of all, he complained about his legal department’s lack of participation in this policy. He then analysed the articles individually and concluded that they were all, except for article 2, one-sidedly in the Soviets’ interest; in particular, the border point 3 would help Moscow to fix the status quo and to block Bonn’s reunification policy. Therefore it would be essential to clarify that the German reunification policy was not in conflict with point 3, nor was it a ‘renewal of aggressive policy’ enabling the Soviets to apply their alleged rights of intervention derived from articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.¹⁷⁸ Schenck and Groepper concluded that sufficient room should be left for these material improvements in the text before the start of negotiations.¹⁷⁹ Ministerialdirigent Lahn also commented critically on the Bahr paper in the name of his staff from political department II, in charge of ¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 83: cabinet meeting, 4 June 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 426, 1: Sanne, 4 June 1970. ¹⁷⁷ Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004. ¹⁷⁸ PA, B 41, 1057a: Schenck, 14 May 1970. ¹⁷⁹ AAPD, 1970 ii, doc. 218: Schenck and Groepper, 20 May 1970. Scheel confirmed in retrospect that the legal department was distrustful of Bahr’s talks as the basis for negotiations, in Materialien der Enquete-Kommission, ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland’, 9 vols., v: Deutschlandpolitick, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmen bedingungen, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 1095.

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Ostpolitik. He was against any mention of the Oder–Neisse line and the intra-German border and argued that article 3 should be accepted only if the German goal of reunification was unmistakably stated. He warned that a verbal agreement to treat all renunciation-of-force treaties as one whole could provide Moscow with a means to multilateralize the planned renunciation-of-force treaties between West Germany and the other socialist states and thereby open the way for it to argue that a peace settlement for Germany was no longer necessary. Lahn proposed corrections to every article of the Bahr paper.¹⁸⁰ Such dissenting views within the Auswärtige Amt, traceable from the bottom unit to the top level of the Ministerialdirigent, retarded decision-making, to the extent that Bahr now could not gain support for his paper as easily as expected. However, they did not stop the implementation of the policy in the terms envisaged by the top leaders in the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry.¹⁸¹ Again, this was due to the fact that the crucial official, the State Secretary, and the Minister were still of one mind concerning Bahr’s course. After Duckwitz had retired and been replaced by Frank as State Secretary as part of Scheel’s engagement of new personnel on 1 June 1970, this arrangement, which was favourable for Brandt and Bahr, remained unchanged. In what Bahr called a ‘very pleasant’ conversation with Frank on 3 June, the two men agreed to coordinate their work closely. They agreed that Frank would continue Duckwitz’s habit of participating in the Kleine Lage and that Sahm would continue to attend the internal meeting in the Foreign Ministry thereafter. Frank assured Bahr of his unconditional approval for the Moscow Treaty. As to the approaching negotiations, he expressed only his worries that no conditions should be formulated which Scheel would not be able to defend such that he might have to return having failed. He, Frank, would ensure that no such ‘dangerous’ positions would be elaborated in his ministry.¹⁸² Although Frank was not to continue Duckwitz’s practice of attending the daily meeting in the Chancellery, as a consequence of Scheel’s reorganization aiming at greater independence for his ministry,¹⁸³ there was good cooperation between the departments. In the FDP camp, Frank’s loyalty to Brandt was regarded by some as so extreme as to be ¹⁸⁰ 1970. ¹⁸¹ ¹⁸² ¹⁸³

AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 241: Lahn, 29 May 1970; ibid., doc. 247: Lahn, 5 June Eitel drew a similar conclusion in an interview with the author, Nov. 2002. AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 245: Bahr to Brandt, 3 June 1970. Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004.

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detrimental to Scheel. Sigismund von Braun was therefore suggested as his successor instead.¹⁸⁴ In the Kleine Lage on 5 June, agreement was reached that points 1 to 4 of the working text would become the substance of a treaty whereas points 5 to 10 would not be included.¹⁸⁵ Two days later, Brandt confirmed this in a cabinet meeting and gave detailed information about the crucial points of the Bahr–Gromyko talks and the positions reached therein. He also expounded his entire renunciation-of-force model, in other words his policy towards the East. Brandt and his ministers also resolved to constitute a committee of State Secretaries that would analyse the compatibility of the results of the exchange with constitutional and international law.¹⁸⁶ As agreed, on 9 June, Bahr, the State Secretaries Hans Schäfer and Hermann Maassen from the Ministry of Justice and of the Interior as well as half a dozen experts on international and constitutional law met under Frank’s lead in the Auswärtige Amt and examined the constitutionality of points 1 to 4 of the working text. After two days of intense consultation, the committee of State Secretaries concluded that it had no objections to the opening of negotiations with Moscow on the basis of the working text.¹⁸⁷ Afterwards, Bahr informed Brandt that everything had ‘gone so well’, even with the sceptical experts from the Ministry of the Interior, that Genscher had suggested that the result should now be made public by the government. According to Genscher, even the parliamentary FDP would now cause no more problems.¹⁸⁸ In the cabinet on 11 June, Frank presented the result of the committee’s examination, explaining the constitutionality of every single point to the ministers. He also specified the further legal criteria that would have to be met for the text to be constitutional, namely the mention of the Allie’s rights and the link with West Berlin. It was agreed between Brandt, Bahr, and Genscher that, contrary to the Allies’ wish, their rights would not be mentioned within the text itself, but in an accompanying declaration.¹⁸⁹ ¹⁸⁴ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 160: Kühlmann-Stumm, 25 Apr. 1970. ¹⁸⁵ BAK, N 1474, 85: Kleine Lage, 5 June 1970. ¹⁸⁶ Ibid. and AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 250: Brandt, 7 June 1970. ¹⁸⁷ Ibid., doc. 255 and AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 1: committee of State Secretaries, 9–10 June 1970; PA, B 41, 1057a: Soviet Union unit, 10 June 1970. ¹⁸⁸ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 255: Bahr, 10 June 1970. ¹⁸⁹ BAK, N 1474, 85 and 86: cabinet meeting, 11 June 1970; AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 264: State Secretary’s office, 11 June 1970.

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More Trouble from the FDP However, the Brandt government suffered several setbacks in mid June. First, because of the indiscretion of an unknown source, the newspaper Bild published individual paragraphs of the working text on 12 June. This was followed, on 1 July, by the publication of the full wording in Quick magazine. Unsurprisingly, the fact that the confidential text was leaked to the public reduced the government’s room for manoeuvre and caused anger within the coalition. Brandt and Bahr suspected that the information had been leaked by some critics from the lower ranks inside the administration, possibly one of the councillors in Moscow.¹⁹⁰ Brandt told his cabinet he was embarrassed to admit that he was head of an immature country.¹⁹¹ With the text now at their disposal, officials from the administration were annoyed that Bahr had obviously exceeded his authority by negotiating a full text rather than leading a mere exchange as had been alleged. The content represented in their eyes a submission to the Soviet demands.¹⁹² Yet, on the whole, publication of the Bahr paper caused relatively little protest among the general public, reflecting the fact that a large section of public opinion was very much in favour of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.¹⁹³ Second, in the regional elections on 14 June, the coalition and especially the FDP lost many votes. The FDP did not manage to get into parliament in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Saarland.¹⁹⁴ Consequently, Brandt called upon his government, the coalition, and particularly the FDP to ‘keep a stiff upper lip’ and to ‘fight’.¹⁹⁵ The leadership agreed about the need to improve cooperation within the coalition and ensure a better image for the FDP and its Foreign Minister as an effective partner.¹⁹⁶ In fact, Scheel, for his part, had already done some work to improve his standing. In the course of new recruitment and a restructuring in ¹⁹⁰ Bahr to Fuchs, 18 June 1996, in Fuchs, Dreiecksverhältnisse, 134. ¹⁹¹ BAK, N 1474, 85: Brandt, 19 June 1970. ¹⁹² Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 318; Vjatscheslav Kevorkov, Der Geheime Kanal: Moskau, der KGB und die Bonner Ostpolitik: Mit einem Nachwort von Egon Bahr (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1995), 83. ¹⁹³ For further details see p. 235. ¹⁹⁴ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 283. ¹⁹⁵ AdsD, WBA, BK, 91: Brandt, 15 June 1970. ¹⁹⁶ AdsD, Dep. Schmidt, 7569: Ahlers to Ehmke, 15 June 1970; AdsD, WBA, BK, 91: Brandt, 19 June 1970; ADL, Bundespräsidium, 191: Ahlers and Wechmar, 14 June 1970.

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his ministry, he had built up a loyal senior staff. In particular, the so-called Sonntagsrunde, a weekly meeting on Sundays between Scheel and his State Secretaries at his house in which the general course of foreign policy was discussed, turned out to be a good instrument for leading the ministry.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, Scheel loosened the institutional links between his department and the Chancellery and thereby created a stronger and more independent position as Foreign Minister.¹⁹⁸ It was in his ministry, not the Chancellery, that the preparations for the final negotiations in Moscow were now concentrated. Bahr was still to be part of the German delegation, but was to remain in the background.¹⁹⁹ However, in terms of his standing within the FDP, Scheel was still experiencing difficulties in making his party stick to the government’s course in Ostpolitik. A meeting of the parliamentary party on 16 June dramatically revealed how the divisions within the party had come to a head. Zoglmann rejected the government’s renunciation-of-force concept. He called it ‘wrong’ to include the question of borders rather than concentrate on extending economic and technical cooperation between Bonn and Moscow. Mende remained critical despite Scheel’s efforts to demonstrate the constitutionality of the renunciation-of-force policy. He claimed that Bahr had cheated the government by concluding negotiations secretly.²⁰⁰ On 17 June, Mende and Zoglmann founded Nationalliberale Aktion (National-Liberal Initiative), a grouping of FDP members that was sceptical of the government’s over-progressive Ostpolitik. At the party conference from 22 to 24 June, the internal dispute continued. Mende criticized Bahr again for having fooled the public and parliament by denying the existence of any written results of his talks and asked his party to reject any recognition of German division. In return, Mende was criticized by other members for public statements revealing his lack of solidarity with the party.²⁰¹ Meanwhile, Kühlmann-Stumm complained about the form of negotiations with Moscow and about unclear spheres of competence, and demanded that questions of foreign politicy be tackled solely by the Foreign Minister ¹⁹⁷ Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 146–7. ¹⁹⁸ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 160: FDP Executive Committee, 25 Apr. 1970; see also Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 283. ¹⁹⁹ For instance, AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 281: Frank, 24 June 1970. ²⁰⁰ ADL, A 41, 44: parliamentary FDP, 16 June 1970. ²⁰¹ ADL, A 1, 413: Mende, 22 June 1970; ibid., 408: Lademann on Mende, at the conference from 22 to 24 June 1970.

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and his ministry.²⁰² According to Barzel, Kühlmann-Stumm revealed that not only he, but also 90 per cent of the FDP parliamentary party were opposed to Bahr’s text and had asked Scheel to ‘take matters into his own hands’.²⁰³ In fact, some of these conservative-nationalist opponents were to switch over to the CDU in October 1970 because of the course of Ostpolitik.²⁰⁴ Nevertheless, on 23 June the parliamentary FDP declared its support of the government’s Ostpolitik.²⁰⁵

The Policy Leaders Press Ahead with Final Negotiations Bahr advised his Chancellor not to make the government’s decisions dependent on prior consent from these adversaries in the FDP but instead to proceed as planned. He asked to have his texts, the letter on reunification, and a declaration on Berlin translated directly into the text of a treaty and for any changes in substance to be avoided. Merely cosmetic corrections could be considered, but nothing more, because otherwise Moscow might be provoked to raise new demands and the whole ‘ostpolitical’ concept would be jeopardized, leading to long-term difficulties in Soviet–German relations. Additionally, he and Sanne urged hurrying up the negotiation of the treaty because any delay would cause inconvenience both domestically and externally. Time in which to arrive at a modus vivendi was running out. As to tactics, Bahr recommended that Scheel stay in Moscow for a week at the end of July, during which he would negotiate the preamble and additional wording related to the issue of reunification, conclude the treaty, and then return with his mission fulfilled.²⁰⁶ Scheel, unlike his FDP colleagues, agreed that negotiations about the treaty should be started, instead of elaborating a new programme that would have no prospect of being realized. If they did not want to run the risk of isolation, there was no alternative to the new Ostpolitik, including the German–Soviet treaty. In the cabinet, he therefore urged his colleagues to back this decision.²⁰⁷ There was thus broad consensus among the key decision-makers that negotiations should be opened without delay. ²⁰² ADL, A 1, 414: Kühlmann-Stumm, 23 June 1970. ²⁰³ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Barzel, 19 June 1970. ²⁰⁴ Niedhart, ‘Friedens- und Interessenwahrung’, 123. ²⁰⁵ ADL, A 1, 414: parliamentary FDP, 23 June. ²⁰⁶ AAPD, 1970, i, doc. 280: Bahr, 24 June 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 426, 1: Sanne to Bahr, 24 June 1970. ²⁰⁷ BAK, N 1474, 85 and 86, and PA, B 1, 350: Scheel, 25 and 29 June 1970.

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On 27 June 1970, the cabinet agreed that decisions about negotiations should not be postponed.²⁰⁸ Moscow also sent encouraging signs via Councillor Alexander Bogomolov to the effect that it was interested in opening negotiations by the end of July.²⁰⁹ Thus by the end of June, preparations were under way for a final treaty text on the basis of Bahr’s working paper. As agreed, the Foreign Ministry became the centre of preparations, in the process of which the units on the working level were involved again. The Soviet Union unit, the unit for German questions, and the international law unit edited articles 1 to 4 of the Bahr paper and the letter on German unity, and drafted the text of a preamble.²¹⁰ They also edited a letter to the Allies about the link between the German–Soviet treaty, the other agreements with the Warsaw Pact states, and Berlin.²¹¹ Most notably, with regard to article 3, on the borders, they recommended trying to improve these formulations as much as possible in order to avoid this regulation being viewed as a peace treaty. In the preamble, they envisaged mentioning the Allies’ special rights and the pending peace treaty. Furthermore, a timetable was prepared which, according to Frank’s proposed schedule but contrary to Bahr’s, envisaged that negotiations would take place in two shifts. They had to be expected to be lengthy because of the improvements of the texts that had been suggested, which, with an eye to public opinion, were mandatory now that the working texts had become known.²¹² On 2 July, Scheel informed his party about the upcoming negotiations, appealed to the FDP’s key role for the ratification of a treaty, and asked for support.²¹³ Three days later, Scheel met with his State Secretaries and the proposed delegation and finalized the treaty text, including the four articles as well as the preamble. Cosmetic corrections apart, Scheel and the State Secretaries recommended substantial change in several respects. To start with, they held that article 3 on the borders, should be linked to and serve as confirmation of article 2, the paragraph on the non-use of force, by means of a linking ²⁰⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr 426, 1: Ahlers, 27 June 1970. ²⁰⁹ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 159: Bogomolov, 29 June 1970. ²¹⁰ The Soviet Union unit produced a first draft preamble on 13 June 1970; see AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 284, n. 14. ²¹¹ The unit for Germany questions composed a first draft letter about Berlin on 19 June 1970; ibid., doc. 257, n. 5. ²¹² AdsD, Dep. Bahr 426, 1: Soviet Union unit, 30 June 1970; AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 284: Staden, 30 June 1970. ²¹³ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 161: Scheel, 2 July 1970.

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sentence, because otherwise it could be misinterpreted as prejudicing a peace treaty. They also suggested eliminating the mention of the Oder–Neisse line. Regarding the Four-Power rights, they decided that because the Soviets would probably reject this element these should not be mentioned in the preamble but in a separate letter to the Allies. As to the letter on reunification, they emphasized that acceptance by the Soviets would be a crucial precondition for opening negotiations. Moreover, attention was given to the Berlin Junktim (package deal). It was recommended that the Four Powers should issue a communiqué on Berlin, making clear that the treaty with Moscow could be ratified only once a satisfactory regulation for Berlin had been reached. Finally, various secondary questions, such as the composition of the German delegation, were discussed.²¹⁴ In order to get the ‘green light’ for Scheel’s revised treaty text from the whole coalition, the decision-makers convened the cabinet in a so-called Klausur (meeting), lasting from 7 to 8 July 1970, and invited the parliamentary party leaders Wehner and Mischnick and a few other leading party members, such as Achenbach. After Scheel had read out the revised treaty texts, a discussion followed, mainly about the border question. Achenbach, in particular, rejected the mention of special borders and argued against any compromises. However, Scheel and Bahr defended the government’s plan of promising merely to ‘respect’, not ‘recognize’, the borders and pointed to the Soviet concession of the letter on German unity. Achenbach was now the only one raising doubts. Ehmke, Eppler, and even the sceptical Schmidt defended the border article. Wehner also warned against giving the Soviets the impression that Bonn wanted to change the results, since it was important to conclude negotiations soon. In addition, Brandt re-emphasized that the political status quo would not be recognized, only accepted, as this was the only way of changing it and more importantly the best way to promote peace. Thus the coalition finally reached agreement on the start of negotiations in late July or early August on the basis of the revised treaty text.²¹⁵ Meanwhile, final preparations were made inside the Auswärtige Amt, with Frank leading the negotiation platform. Thought was given by Staden, his political sub-department, and the legal unit as to how best to ²¹⁴ PA, B 150 and AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 300: Legation Councillor Henze and Staden, 6 July 1970. ²¹⁵ BAK, N 1474, 87: coalition meeting, 7 July 1970.

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present to Gromyko the desired revisions of the Bahr paper. First of all, it was decided that Bonn’s position should be explained to the Soviets in a preliminary meeting a couple of days before the start of official negotiations. The modified text should primarily be presented as arising from legal and political constraints within the FRG. The argument of Staden and his colleagues should be advanced, that is, that in order to avoid constitutional debates about a violation of the Basic Law, which might endanger the ratification of the treaty, it had been necessary to mention the pending peace settlement in the preamble. For the same reason, article 3 had been related to article 2 by a linking sentence and the explicit mention of borders had been avoided. In addition, because of the problematic lack of an adequate reference to the goal of reunification, the Soviets would have to accept a letter about German unity.²¹⁶ Moreover, with regard to the Allies’ repeated insistence on having their special rights mentioned in the treaty, Schenck, of the legal unit, was instructed by Staden to re-examine the possibility of incorporating such a passage. He concluded that if the Soviets agreed to mention the Four-Power rights in the preamble at all, these would, in the German interest, have to be stated explicitly to refer to Germany and Berlin as a whole, in order to avoid the erosion of the rights. If the Soviets continued to reject any form of reference to the Four-Power rights, only the option of a one-sided declaration by Bonn would remain.²¹⁷ On 23 July, the cabinet gave its official approval by instructing Scheel to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the exchange so far and in the light of the familiar demands concerning the national goal of unification.²¹⁸ Thus, whereas during Bahr’s exchange with Gromyko most of the policy-making had been directed from the Chancellery, during the summer break the Auswärtige Amt had gained more weight again in the preparations for the final negotiations. This was due both to the above-mentioned need for a stronger profile for Scheel and his party, and to the fact that the experts in legal and political questions who were needed at the stage when Bahr’s paper was examined were in Scheel’s, not Brandt’s, department. With the explicit approval of Brandt’s department, the experts in the Foreign Ministry had slightly revised the Bahr ²¹⁶ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 309: Staden, 14 July, and the legal unit, 15 July 1970; ibid., doc. 324: Lahn, 21 July 1970. ²¹⁷ Ibid., doc. 321: Schenck, 20 July 1970. ²¹⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/A: cabinet, 23 July 1970; AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 329: the State Secretary’s office, 23 July 1970.

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paper and prepared the so-called ‘Scheel platform’ in order to demonstrate Scheel’s own contribution to the negotiations. Furthermore, the delegation that went to Moscow—aside from Bahr, one expert from the Ministry of the Interior, two officials from the Press Office, and Wienand and Achenbach—consisted mostly of officials from the Auswärtige Amt. From his ministry, Scheel nominated his State Secretary Frank, the Ministerialdirektor Staden, Alfred Blumenfeld from the Soviet Union unit, Schenck from the legal unit, Guido Brunner from the press unit, and the most important consultants from the embassy in Moscow, as well as the legal expert Jochen Frowein.²¹⁹ Allardt, by contrast, was by his own account excluded from the delegation after he expressed his disapproval of the treaty in the prepared form.²²⁰ Nonetheless, thanks to the good relationship between the top leadership of the two departments, the Foreign Ministry and Chancellery cooperated closely at this stage.²²¹ As previously mentioned, official negotiations were finally started on 27 July 1970.²²²They took place on two levels, between the two delegations under the leadership of both Scheel and Gromyko and in the form of a working group led by Ambassador Falin and Frank. In addition, Scheel and Gromyko met for several confidential discussions.²²³ Once again, reports on all talks were sent to Bonn with only a small circulation, to the State Secretaries Sigismund von Braun and Karl Moersch, and the representative Director-General Walter Gehlhoff in the Foreign Ministry, as well as to Brandt, Ehmke, and Sahm in the Chancellery. In addition, Scheel kept Brandt informed exclusively by confidential telegrams and occasionally by telephone.²²⁴ After a troubled start to negotiations, in which the ‘Scheel platform’ was rejected outright on both the official and the working group level, by Gromyko and Falin,²²⁵ the German delegation considered an early departure. Allegedly, Scheel pre-emptively ordered the plane for the return to Bonn in order to signal his determination to interrupt the negotiations in case the Soviets continued to be stubborn.²²⁶Achenbach came up with the idea of offering to conclude a peace treaty with the Soviets in order to overcome the deadlock.²²⁷ In Bonn, the troubled start ²¹⁹ Paul Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft: Ein Diplomat macht Inventur (Stuttgart: DVA, 1981), 287; see also Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 318. ²²⁰ Allardt, Tagebuch, 352. ²²¹ BAK, N 1474, 85: Sahm, 9 July 1970. ²²² See p. 62. ²²³ Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004. ²²⁴ See Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 319. ²²⁵ For further details see pp. 62–3. ²²⁶ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 319. ²²⁷ Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft, 285.

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also triggered nervousness about further developments. After Brandt had received the bad news from Scheel in a telephone call, he resolved to summon his cabinet if necessary and to decide whether the negotiations should be stopped or continued.²²⁸ Ehmke confided to a member of the CDU/CSU opposition that he was worried about the ‘entirely unsettled situation in Moscow’ and that negotiations would now in his view take much longer than had been foreseen.²²⁹ Similarly, Sahm noted in a private letter that negotiations in Moscow would surely last for a while.²³⁰ On 30 July, the cabinet was informed by Moersch about the state of negotiations in Moscow.²³¹ The next day, Scheel had slightly better news for Brandt. He reported that, although the Soviets were not willing to change the substance of the Bahr paper, they were still very interested in the treaty. At least as regards the design of the preamble and of articles 1, 2, and 4, consensus was emerging. However, Scheel still thought an interruption of the talks possible. He announced that in relation to the questions still being disputed he might have to consult the cabinet in the following week.²³² Bahr, by contrast, was determined to come to an agreement with Gromyko through compromise. He argued against Scheel’s return for consultation with the cabinet because this would make Scheel seem incapable of acting, undermine his authority in Moscow, and arouse the suspicion that he might bring along new requests.²³³ While no agreement over the disputed questions was reached, Scheel and Gromyko could at least refer to the progress made by their representatives. In the working group Frank, Falin, and their colleagues had agreed on the exact wordings of articles 1, 2, and 4 and to a large extent on that of the preamble.²³⁴ Bahr indeed saw the agreements reached in the working group as the ‘salvation’ of the negotiations, which had threatened to fail or be disrupted by the Soviets owing to Scheel’s alleged incompetence. In fact, Bahr gave an alarming account of the development of negotiations since Scheel had taken the lead: in his eyes, Scheel was unable to cope with Gromyko’s style of argument, surprised the Soviets with new demands, and ‘did not realize what was going on’. As he wrote to Brandt, ‘Frank and I were torn between shock and despair up to the point where we wondered whether he ²²⁸ ²²⁹ ²³⁰ ²³¹ ²³² ²³³

BAK, N 1474, 87: Brandt, 29 July 1970. BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Ehmke, 31 July 1970. BAK, N 1474, 125: Sahm, 30 July 1970. Ibid., 87: Moersch, 30 July 1970. AAPD, 1970, ii, docs. 344 and 346, nn. 11 and 14: Scheel, 30 July and 1 Aug. 1970. Ibid., doc. 347: Bahr, 31 July 1970. ²³⁴ See also p. 64.

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should not be extracted from the negotiations.’²³⁵ As Bahr further maintained, since Frank was not fully familiar with the matter, it took a few private conversations between him and Falin to set the dialogue ‘afloat’ again. In these discussions, Bahr basically managed to assert his government’s demand for a link between the two articles ‘as an essential’ with the result that the Politburo finally decided to accept it on 31 July. Bahr therefore urged Brandt to see to it again that Scheel did now not raise new demands or return to Bonn, but instead signal the treaty as soon as all the points requested by the cabinet were solved.²³⁶ Bahr’s account of Scheel’s performance indicates the tensions that had arisen within the delegation during the course of the problematic negotiations. Peckert also recalled personal tensions clouding the generally good atmosphere, such as Allardt’s dislike of Scheel, whom he derogatively called ‘the little sausage’. Peckert himself regarded Scheel’s contribution to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty as ‘pathetic’.²³⁷ It would be wrong, however, to take this criticism as proof of Scheel’s incompetence. Rather, it must be seen mostly as an expression of personal rivalry existing between the competing policy-makers. Frank, for instance, confirmed subsequently the injustice done to Scheel by so many people then and later concerning his performance during the negotiations. Unlike Bahr, Frank explained the communication problems between Scheel and Gromyko with reference to Scheel’s extreme skilfulness, as a result of which Gromyko could not ‘grasp’ what Scheel meant.²³⁸ Falin gave Scheel credit for his inexhaustible optimism, due to which he never lost heart despite Gromyko’s uncompromising tone. Falin held that if any other politician had led the negotiations ‘all might have turned out differently’.²³⁹ In addition, Bahr’s description of his encounters with Falin as the breakthrough should be taken with a pinch of salt. In Falin’s memoirs, there is no mention of such encounters; Falin instead alludes to the private meeting between Scheel and Gromyko in the latter’s dacha as well as talks on 4 August in ²³⁵ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 352: Bahr, 1 Aug. 1970. ²³⁶ Ibid.: Bahr, 1 Aug. 1970; Zehn Jahre Deutschlandpolitik: Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1969–1979: Bericht und Dokumentation, ed. Das Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1980), 156. ²³⁷ Peckert to the author, 7 Feb. 2003. ²³⁸ Frank to the author, 21 Jan. 2004. ²³⁹ Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer-Knaw, 1993), 103.

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which the decisive questions were settled.²⁴⁰ Moreover, apart from Bahr’s contribution, unofficial talks between Wienand and Achenbach and influential Soviet politicians helped to make clear to the Soviet Politburo the Bonn government’s limited room for manoeuvre and the domestic consequences that would ensue from failed negotiations.²⁴¹ At Scheel’s suggestion, Wienand flew to Bonn on 1 August to inform Brandt about the state of negotiations in detail. In a meeting with Brandt, Ehmke, Sahm, Genscher, Braun, and Moersch on 2 August, he went through all the articles of the treaty, and together they discussed the remaining questions. In relation to the German demands that had not been accepted as part of the treaty text, namely the mention of the goal of unity, the Allies’ special rights, the pending peace treaty, and Berlin, it was decided that these should be dealt with in accompanying documents, and ideally in one letter directed to Gromyko. Finally, it was agreed in accordance with Bahr’s view that Scheel would stay in Moscow until the treaty had been concluded and would only thereafter return to Bonn in order to get the cabinet’s permission to sign.²⁴² A day later, Brandt gave Scheel notice of the decisions reached in that meeting. In addition, he proposed a wording for the letter on the pending peace treaty, Berlin agreement, and goal of unification. He also asked him to discuss the other related questions on economical, technical, and humanitarian matters with Gromyko. Brandt strongly recommended that Scheel should talk with Gromyko about Bonn’s position on Berlin, namely that it had links to the Federal Republic, and that the ratification of the Moscow Treaty depended on a satisfactory solution in relation to Berlin.²⁴³ In a separate letter, Brandt informed Bahr in similar terms. He also instructed Bahr to lead talks about Berlin ‘alongside’ and thus create the precondition for Scheel to take this issue up with Gromyko. In this way, Brandt gave clear expression to his concern that peace and security could not be reached until the situation in Berlin had improved.²⁴⁴ That day, 3 August, was the last hard-working day of preparations for the Moscow Treaty in Bonn. As Sahm noted in his diary, he worked for thirteen hours, first preparing for a meeting with Brandt and then ²⁴⁰ Ibid., 106. ²⁴¹ Wienand to Schmid, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 320; Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft, 293. ²⁴² BAK, N 1474, 87: Sahm, 2 Aug. 1970; see also Ehmke, Mittendrin, 133. ²⁴³ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 354: Brandt, 3 Aug. 1970. ²⁴⁴ Ibid., doc. 358: Brandt, 3 Aug. 1970.

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making treaty drafts thereafter. At six in the morning, Braun, Moersch, and Walter Gehlhoff came to his home in order to work through the texts and ‘exterminate litres of whisky’!²⁴⁵ At ten in the evening, Sahm accompanied Ehmke to his office for a one-hour discussion. ‘Everything is very exciting and fun,’ Sahm noted.²⁴⁶ In Moscow, negotiations proceeded quickly and successfully thereafter.²⁴⁷ However, the conclusion of the treaty threatened to be halted again when on 4 August Scheel requested that the explicit mention of the Oder–Neisse line in article 3 be omitted but was turned down by Gromyko. Scheel asked Brandt for a decision. Sahm met Braun, Gehlhoff, Schenck, and Jürgen von Alten in the Foreign Ministry in order to discuss how to proceed. After some discussion, they agreed that if the clause could not be deleted then it should be accepted, provided that the Four-Power rights and peace treaty were mentioned in an exchange of notes between Bonn and the Allies, and the Soviets notified about it at the signing of the treaty. After consulting Ehmke, Brandt informed the Foreign Ministry that he agreed with this vote, and early on 5 August Scheel was instructed accordingly.²⁴⁸ In this way, this dispute between Scheel and Gromyko was settled. On condition that the Soviets would tolerate the delivery of a German declaration on the link between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a satisfactory solution for Berlin on the day of signing, Brandt then permitted his Foreign Minister to signal the treaty, and on 6 August the negotiations were officially concluded.²⁴⁹ At the airport upon returning from Moscow, Scheel declared ‘the task commissioned by the cabinet’ to be fulfilled.²⁵⁰ As Sahm recalled, he welcomed an exhausted, but ‘inwardly satisfied’ delegation on 7 August 1970.²⁵¹ On 8 August, Brandt convened the cabinet as planned in order to obtain authorization for the signing of the treaty. Apart from the ministers, Wehner, Mischnick, Wienand, Achenbach, and Klaus Schütz, ²⁴⁵ The Brandt team, and particularly Brandt himself, are known for having consumed so much alcohol that Brandt was given the nickname ‘Weinbrandt Willy’. For further information on Brandt’s personality and private life, see, for instance, Merseburger, Willy Brandt; Gregor Schöllgen, Willy Brandt: Die Biographie (Berlin: Propyläen, 2001). ²⁴⁶ BAK, N 1474, 125: Sahm, 3 Aug. 1970. ²⁴⁷ For further details see p. 65. ²⁴⁸ AAPD, 1970, ii, doc. 365: Schenck and Braun, 4 Aug. 1970. ²⁴⁹ Ibid., doc. 373: Braun to Scheel, 6 Aug. 1970. ²⁵⁰ PA, B 41, 1056: Scheel, 7 Aug. 1970. ²⁵¹ BAK, N 1474, 87: Ehmke, 5 Aug. 1970; ibid., 125: Sahm, 8 Aug. 1970.

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mayor of Berlin, participated. Scheel gave an account of the course and result of negotiations, presented the text of the treaty, and praised it as, most importantly, having given the FRG a new status. ‘We will now be increasingly involved in world politics,’ he said. Although the treaty was ‘not a maximum’, it was ‘the optimum’, he maintained. Brandt expressed his satisfaction with the success achieved by his Foreign Minister and particularly thanked Bahr for all the preparatory work which had laid the foundation for this. He depicted the treaty as of great importance in that it endowed West Germany with more security and, by merely describing the current reality, ‘showed the way to what might exist at some time’. Brandt then asked his cabinet to consent to the signing of the treaty. After some precautionary comments had been made—for instance, by Schmidt about the need for full consultation of the Allies and the opposition, by Genscher about the treaty’s constitutional risk, and by Schütz about the problems caused by a link with Berlin—the ministers finally gave their consent.²⁵² On 9 August, Brandt and Scheel informed the chairs and executive committees of their parties as well as the parliamentary parties about the content of the treaty and received their support for an immediate signing.²⁵³ A day later, another Kleine Lage was held in order to arrange final details for the trip to Moscow and the signing of the treaty.²⁵⁴ Brandt and Scheel signed the treaty in the Kremlin on 12 August 1970 (see Figure 9). In the cabinet, to which they immediately gave an account after their return from Moscow on 13 August, Brandt reported again on the ‘historic significance’ of the treaty. It would pave the way not only for a ‘new stage’ in bilateral relations, as he had agreed with Kosygin and Brezhnev in two longer meetings, but also, he hoped, for talks with the GDR and Poland according to the same model.²⁵⁵ In private, Brandt underlined that the most important success was that the government had succeeded in putting forward in a treaty the prospect of the restoration of German unity.²⁵⁶ ²⁵² Ibid., 87: cabinet meeting, 8 Aug. 1970. ²⁵³ ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 162: FDP Committee, 9 Aug. 1970; Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 324. ²⁵⁴ BAK, N 1474, 88: Kleine Lage, 10 Aug. 1970. ²⁵⁵ Ibid.: cabinet meeting, 13 Aug. 1970; AdsD, WBA, 91: Brandt, 12 Aug. 1970; see also Brandt in Der Spiegel (17 Aug. 1970), in Willy Brandt, Die SPIEGEL-Gespräche 1959–1992 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1993), 203. ²⁵⁶ Willy Brandt to Olof Palme, 15 June 1970, in Carsten Tessmer, ‘ ‘‘Thinking the Unthinkable’’ to ‘‘Make the Impossible Possible:’’ Ostpolitik, Intra-German Policy, and the Moscow Treaty, 1969–1970’, in David C. Geyer and Bernd Schaefer (eds.),

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Figure 9. The signing of the Moscow Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union, 12 August 1970. In the foreground, from left to right: Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt, Sovier Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

B E T W E E N C O O PE R AT I O N A N D C O N F RO N TAT I O N : T H E C D U / C S U ’ S TAC T I C S TOWA R D S G OV E R N M E N T P O L I C I E S

Turning the CDU/CSU into an Opposition Party After the September 1969 elections, the CDU/CSU formally became a parliamentary opposition for the first time, banished from the government benches by the newly formed coalition of the SPD and the FDP. This exclusion from political power was partly a price for the Union’s apparent reluctance to embrace a new policy towards the East in line with the international trend towards an East–West rapprochement. Along with the unpopularity of its prescriptions for the economy, it was American Détente and German Ostpolitik, 1969–1972 (Washington: German Political Institute, 2004), 62.

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the conservative Ostpolitik which had cost the party votes, though only to a minor extent, and created the common bond between the SPD and FDP in the realm of foreign policy.²⁵⁷ This so-called Machtwechsel²⁵⁸ took the Union, still the FRG’s largest party, which had just fallen short of an absolute majority,²⁵⁹ completely by surprise. Until the last minute not only the conservatives, but also the Western Allies had expected the Union’s governance, together with the FDP to continue.²⁶⁰ The party’s understanding of itself as the major national governing party was mirrored in its structures. In contrast to the long-standing opposition party the SPD, the CDU/CSU lacked certain important preconditions for exercising the unwelcome role of opposition. The party had made only slow progress towards becoming a mass party in the organizational sense: for the first ten years at least, the party machine had been neglected because of Adenauer’s personal prestige as a national and international figure. Accordingly, neither was there an independent parliamentary party in its own right. Throughout twenty years of government, it had become intertwined with the governmental apparatus on all levels. Rainer Barzel, the parliamentary party leader, stated that ‘the CDU as the Chancellor’s party since Adenauer times had always been outshone by the Palais Schaumburg’, and that therefore ‘the CDU had to undertake substantial organizational change’.²⁶¹ It was Barzel who undertook all the necessary restructuring of the parliamentary party, with great determination and zest. Even in first briefings on 20 and 21 October 1969, he suggested a thorough reorganization of the parliamentary CDU/CSU and its personnel.²⁶² In the course of this process, the parliamentary party emerged as the centre of the opposition party where the Union’s policy was formulated and ²⁵⁷ Clayton Marc Clemens, ‘The CDU/CSU and West German Ostpolitik, 1969–1982’, Ph.D. dissertation, Tufts University (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1986), 79; Barbara Marshall, Willy Brandt: A Political Biography (Basingstoke: Macmillan and Oxford: St Antony’s College, 1997), 64. ²⁵⁸ Baring, Machtwechsel, has coined this term for the change of government in autumn 1969. ²⁵⁹ SPD and FDP: 254 seats; CDU/CSU: 242 seats. For detailed information on the election results see Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1999: Gesamtausgabe in drei Bänden: Eine Veröffentlichung der wissenschaftlichen Dienste des deutschen Bundestages, ed. Peter Schindler, 3 vols. (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999). ²⁶⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436: Bahr, 1 Oct. 1969; see also Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, Fußnoten (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1971), 161–3; Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen 1930–1982 (Munich: Droemer-Knaw, 2004), 265–6. ²⁶¹ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 212. ²⁶² Ibid.

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decided.²⁶³ This was due to the fact that the leading and most experienced politicians from the CDU and CSU, with the exception of a few Minister Presidents of the Länder, were members of the parliamentary party. The parliamentary party’s Executive Committee consisted of Kiesinger, Strauss, and Erhard, and their representatives, Annemarie Griesinger, Hans Katzer, Gerhard Stoltenberg, Detlef Struwe, Heinrich Windelen, Manfred Wörner, and Richard Stücklen. The Executive Committee was complemented by the chairmen of the six Arbeitskreise, and five parliamentary chairmen, as well as a few other members. The question of leadership was effectively open once the party had gone into opposition. Although Kiesinger had been re-elected as CDU chairman in November 1969, he had lost face because he was no longer Chancellor. It was accepted as unlikely that he would reappear as the party’s standard-bearer in a future Bundestag election. Under these circumstances, Barzel exploited his position as parliamentary spokesman of the opposition and asserted himself as leader. He eventually emerged as CDU chairman in autumn 1971.²⁶⁴ Apart from him, Stoltenberg, Katzer, Will Rasner, and Olaf von Wrangel were the most influential colleagues in the opposition’s decision-making concerning Ostpolitik. Stoltenberg and Katzer led the parliamentary party’s planning section, which was established in January 1970. Rasner was important in his position as parliamentary chairman and hence spokesman of the opposition. Wrangel was influential as the link to the press, foreign policy spokesman, and one of Barzel’s closest aides. In addition, Stücklen played a crucial role as a close friend of Barzel’s and, as a CSU member, the most important link between the CDU and CSU. This function was emphasized by the fact that Strauss, the CSU leader, was rarely present in Bonn and rarely attended the parliamentary party meetings. Moreover, Kurt Birrenbach, the parliamentary party’s foreign policy expert, was one of Barzel’s closest advisers. Apart from constant informal exchange between these intimates of Barzel, initiatives for decisions on Ostpolitik within the parliamentary party came from Arbeitskreis V on foreign policy, led by Ernst Marx, and from individual members. Within the Arbeitskreis Georg Kliesing and Richard von Weizsäcker dealt with ‘ostpolitical’ matters. After decisions ²⁶³ Ackermann und Barzel to Schmid, 19 Oct. and 16 Dec. 1976, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 212; Kohl, Erinnerungen, 285. ²⁶⁴ Roger Tilford, Ostpolitik and Political Change in Germany (Lexington, Mass.: Saxon House and Lexington Books, 1975), 54.

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had been suggested, they were then usually consulted in the so-called Elferrat. This was a board consisting of twenty-one members, namely Barzel, Kiesinger, and Strauss, the representatives, the chairmen of the Arbeitskreise, and the parliamentary chairmen. The line which was adopted in the Elferrat was usually accepted by the entire parliamentary party. In fact, the Elferrat emerged as the central leading body for the 242-strong parliamentary party. But Barzel undoubtedly had the greatest say in the decision-making process on Ostpolitik. He decided and coordinated the actions of the CDU/CSU opposition. He was also the most important dialogue partner for the government and was repeatedly informed exclusively by members of the government.²⁶⁵ The party as a whole and the other party bodies, such as the Executive Committee of the Union, had no proper links to the parliamentary party. They therefore had no great influence on the internal decision-making process. Kiesinger, chairman of the party, gave expression to this by emphasizing publicly that the parliamentary party and the chairmanship of the CDU/CSU should coordinate their cooperation more strongly. In place of the parliamentary party, the party’s leadership should gain greater profile as the focal point of opposition work.²⁶⁶ Similarly, Jürgen Echternach complained to Kiesinger about the lack of ‘political weight’ that the Executive Committee held. He asked Kiesinger to ensure that it at least took part in the formation of the party’s opinion.²⁶⁷ As a result, cohesion was hampered and the number of separate factions within the opposition party grew. The opposition leaders were constantly concerned about the expression of different views from within the party and hence the impression in public of a disunited party.²⁶⁸ In fact, the party suffered from a lack of internal discipline because of the pluralistic and federal nature of its internal relationships. The fact that the opposition really consisted of two political parties, the CDU and the CSU, each with its own chairman, organization, and membership, proved a divisive factor. The party was particularly disunited over how best to respond to Brandt’s overtures to the East. A large faction, led by Strauss, Kiesinger, and Guttenberg, espoused a strictly fundamentalist interpretation of ²⁶⁵ Die Zeit (29 May 1970); Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 212. ²⁶⁶ BAK, N 1371, 87, 1: Kiesinger, 23 Jan. 1970. ²⁶⁷ BAK, N 1371, 91: Echternach, 11 Aug. 1970. ²⁶⁸ For instance, ACDP, 01–226, 390: Kiesinger, 23 Jan. 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Kiesinger, 18 Feb. 1970, and Barzel, 24 Feb. 1970; ibid., 041/2: Marx, 11 Mar. and 28 Apr. 1970.

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party policy and a rigid resistance to Social–Liberal Ostpolitik. A reformist minority did not reflect the strict CDU/CSU orthodoxy, but believed that a new approach in Ostpolitik could bear fruit and hence favoured a more flexible response to Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Such exponents of flexibility were found exclusively in the CDU, and the spokesmen of this group were Schröder, Stoltenberg, Marx, and Weizsäcker. Sometimes the dividing line between these two categories was unclear and party leaders fluctuated between total opposition and a more flexible attitude. Another group, which stood between the orthodox majority and the more flexible minority, was led by Rainer Barzel. He was inclined to experiment and advocated some change in Ostpolitik. Though also critical of Brandt’s approach, he exercised more constructive criticism than the fundamentalist conservatives.²⁶⁹ Because of these internal divisions, Barzel struggled to assert a unified CDU/CSU position and hence effective opposition to Brandt’s policies. In a group of powerful party ‘barons’, he was rather a primus inter pares. It was an achievement for him simply to fend off challengers like Strauss, Schröder, and Kiesinger who aimed at replacing him as nominal party chief.²⁷⁰ These background factors contribute much to an understanding of the opposition’s interaction with the government during the making of the Moscow Treaty.

Cooperation as a Method of Preserving ‘Ostpolitical’ Continuity At the start of the Brandt government, the CDU/CSU opposition was determined to cooperate, most importantly in order to ensure a continuity of Kiesinger’s Ostpolitik. Even before Brandt’s election as Chancellor, Barzel expressed his concern that the new government might introduce substantial changes. However, he declared that it was necessary to wait and see which course the new government would introduce and underlined his party’s readiness to cooperate over the big questions.²⁷¹ At a meeting of his parliamentary party Barzel advised ²⁶⁹ Barzel to the author, Sept. 2003. ²⁷⁰ Clemens, ‘CDU/CSU’, 88; see also Kohl, Erinnerungen, 286. ²⁷¹ Barzel in Die Welt am Sonntag (19 Oct. 1969); see also Michael Lemke, Die CDU/CSU und Vertragspolitik der BRD in den Jahren 1969–1975: Kontinuität und Wandel Christdemokratischer Ostpolitik und Deutschlandpolitik (Saarbrücken-Scheidt: Dadder, 1992), 27.

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that, despite the widely held concern about a substantial change in foreign policy, it was necessary to ‘take Brandt at his word’ as one who had said that he wanted continuity. As a method of preserving continuity, cooperation should therefore be offered. At the same time, one of Barzel’s colleagues emphasized the need to be ‘alert’ and to scrutinize even the smallest steps taken by the government in case they should diverge from this.²⁷² Brandt’s government declaration on 28 October 1969 triggered a first change in the level of cooperation. Barzel classified it as a clear abandonment of continuity. The reference to the two states in Germany, the so-called ‘two-state theory’, and what were perceived as other ‘advance services’, especially evoked criticism from opposition leaders as irreconcilable with the Basic Law.²⁷³ There was largely agreement that the government had made a dangerous mistake in recognizing a second German state. Most articulately, Kiesinger envisaged that this policy would strengthen the GDR’s position, lead to its legal recognition, and undermine the case for German unity.²⁷⁴ However, simultaneously, Barzel admonished his party that it could not retreat further than Kiesinger’s policies, but had to develop own standards. Instead of legal formulas, human rights should be put to the fore.²⁷⁵ In the Bundestag, he thus portrayed the Union as the party ensuring progress in ‘human matters’ by pointing to Kiesinger as the person who had started ‘offering talks to East Berlin’. However, only if such advances towards the East were made on the basis of the policy of non-recognition would his party cooperate.²⁷⁶ Marx’s Arbeitskreis agreed with Barzel that it was necessary to counter with their own policy rather than merely reacting negatively to Brandt’s new policy. With a view to public opinion, the opposition should not respond too harshly, in order to avoid the impression of being a ‘bad loser’.²⁷⁷ Therefore, initiatives and proposals concerning a solution of East German questions were called for. As the Arbeitskreis saw it, these should focus on European solutions, a greater transparency of the borders, and the promotion of human rights in the West and East.²⁷⁸ ²⁷² ²⁷³ ²⁷⁴ ²⁷⁵ ²⁷⁶ ²⁷⁷ ²⁷⁸

ACDP, 08–001, 1020/1: Barzel, 21 Oct. 1969, and Stark, 22 Oct. 1969. See Guttenberg, Fußnoten, 164. ACDP, 08–001, 1020/1: Kiesinger to the parliamentary party, 25 Nov. 1969. Ibid. and BAK, N 1371, 86, 2: Barzel, 28 Oct. 1969. Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 71, 237 Barzel, 30 Oct. 1969. ACDP, 08–001, 412/2: Arbeitskreis, 11 Nov. 1969. ACDP, 01–483, 174/3: CDU/CSU, 11 Nov. 1969.

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Indeed, on 4 December 1969, the parliamentary party launched its first initiative by announcing publicly its regret at the government’s failure to develop a catalogue of practical issues to be negotiated with East Berlin in order to achieve an improvement in living conditions.²⁷⁹ Inside his parliamentary party, Barzel made efforts to assert his course of cooperation with the government. He made plain that, in spite of his worries that the Bonn government might fulfil all the Soviet demands in the talks recently started with Moscow, he was against the opening of a controversy before Christmas. He urged his colleagues to avoid saying ‘no all the time’ in order to convey the impression in public that the opposition was pursuing a solid and calm policy. Marx agreed that it was inappropriate to attack the government now that it was launching all its initiatives. Some scepticism could be articulated, but the readiness for a renunciation of force should not be called into question.²⁸⁰ In public, Barzel therefore welcomed soundings with the East, but at the same time asked the government to take a clear stand and to proceed patiently. He requested that the Brandt government consult the Allies and the opposition prior to any further steps, and concede nothing without a return offer.²⁸¹ The government was also very willing to consult with the opposition about its policy. With the start of preparations for the German–Soviet dialogue between Allardt and Gromyko, Brandt and Scheel immediately started informing Barzel in several meetings, on 8, 13, and 15 November.²⁸² In a private meeting with Barzel, Brandt assured him of what he had already underlined earlier: that his government attached importance to a confidential exchange with the opposition’s parliamentary party leader about the important questions of Ostpolitik. Such confidential talks should be held according to requirements and at the initiative of both the government and the opposition.²⁸³ On 11 December 1969, the government informed the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs about its planned steps in Ostpolitik for the first time. At the ²⁷⁹ BAK, N 1371, 87: parliamentary party, 4 Dec. 1969; Süddeutsche Zeitung (6 and 7 Dec. 1969). ²⁸⁰ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel and Marx, 9 Dec. 1969; see also Rainer Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil (Munich: Droemer-Knaur, 1978), 100–1. ²⁸¹ BAK, N 1371, 87: Barzel, 30 Dec. 1969. ²⁸² Ibid., 153: Brandt, Scheel, and Barzel, 8 Nov. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 77: Scheel and Barzel, 13 Nov. 1969; BAK, N 1371, 86, 1: Scheel and Barzel, 15 Nov. 1969. ²⁸³ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 2: Brandt, Dec. 1969.

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particular request of certain CDU deputies, such as Guttenberg and Birrenbach, Scheel revealed his ‘impressions’ of the first German–Soviet encounter and the prospects for the conclusion of a sound renunciationof-force agreement, which would put German–Soviet relations on a new footing.²⁸⁴ However, the opposition developed a more confrontational stance with the start of the new year. Marx announced in January 1970 that it was high time for the opposition to distance itself clearly from the government in German policy because of Brandt’s ideas, which he found unclear and dangerous, and his unwillingness to cooperate.²⁸⁵ Admittedly, this statement had not been cleared with the party. Weizsäcker complained to Barzel that such far-reaching public comments had to obtain the Executive Committee’s consent beforehand.²⁸⁶ The fact, however, that even Barzel complained publicly for the first time, in a declaration on 11 January, about the insufficient (and only verbal) information concerning the most recent ‘ostpolitical’ manoeuvres indicated that the opposition was embracing an increasingly confrontational course.²⁸⁷ Two weeks later, Barzel admitted in a meeting of his parliamentary party that his aim was to shake the credibility of the government.²⁸⁸ The government took the opposition leaders’ complaints about insufficient information seriously. When, in a meeting between Brandt, Ehmke, and the leaders of the opposition and governing parliamentary parties, Barzel warned Brandt to improve cooperation between the parties, Brandt conceded that this would not remain so selective as it had been hitherto. In fact, in that same meeting, Barzel, Mischnick, and Wehner were informed in detail about the ongoing exchange with Ulbricht, the talks which had been initiated with Moscow, and the soundings with Warsaw.²⁸⁹ However, it was not only the lack of information, but also the course of Brandt’s policy that increasingly provoked Barzel’s criticism. Barzel criticized the Chancellor for his ‘wrong’ reference to the two German states and for thereby downplaying reunification. Instead, he asked to refer to the resolution commonly reached in the ²⁸⁴ Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Auswärtiger Ausschuß, 4. Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Scheel, 11 Dec. 1969. ²⁸⁵ ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: Marx, 5 Jan. 1970. ²⁸⁶ Ibid.: Weizsäcker, 8 Jan. 1970. ²⁸⁷ BAK, N 1371, 1: Barzel, 11 Jan. 1970. ²⁸⁸ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, 27 Jan. 1970. ²⁸⁹ BAK, N 1371, 153 and ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: Gradl, 13 Jan. 1970.

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Bundestag on 26 September 1968, which had made West Germany’s right of sole representation the basis of any policy, as the guiding line for the talks with Moscow and East Berlin. As to the conclusion of a renunciation-of-force agreement with Moscow, the government would have the opposition’s support only if Brandt clung to the nonrecognition of the GDR and Oder–Neisse line, and dropped articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter. But Barzel met with no support; both Wehner and Mischnick disapproved of his suggestions. Brandt, for his part, merely emphasized the unity of the nation and the right of self-determination as his point of reference in any of his overtures towards the East. Ehmke explained that the government had not dropped reunification from the agenda for good, but only for the time being.²⁹⁰ Thus, initiatives that the government launched with Moscow, East Berlin, and Warsaw drew an ambivalent response from the Union leaders, especially because of the German question. As the party leaders had argued during the Grand Coalition government, it was still held that an accord with the Kremlin could not be construed as recognizing or formalizing Europe’s status quo. Rather, it should be an entirely provisional compromise between Bonn and Moscow, declaring peaceful intentions, but leaving every disputed issue, above all that of the borders, unmentioned, to be permanently settled at a later date.²⁹¹ Although the government’s report on the state of the nation on 14 January 1970²⁹² was received with relief, as re-confirming a few positions such as the non-recognition of the GDR,²⁹³ it did not prevent Barzel from questioning the government’s policy in the Bundestag debate that followed a day later. He criticized the government especially for having initiated many talks simultaneously, instead of waiting for the results of the Allies’ soundings in Moscow about Berlin.²⁹⁴ Whatever doubts emerged, a conditional willingness to cooperate prevailed. In public, Barzel summed up his line as ‘negotiate but accomplish something for the people’.²⁹⁵ ²⁹⁰ BAK, N 1371, 153. ²⁹¹ Clayton Marc Clemens, Reluctant Realists: The Christian Democrats and West German Ostpopitik (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 72. ²⁹² See Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1st ser., vol. 4, 201. ²⁹³ Westfalen-Blatt (15 Jan. 1970); Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, 100. ²⁹⁴ BAK, N 1371, 87, 1: Barzel, 16 Jan. 1970. ²⁹⁵ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, 27 Jan. 1970.

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Powerful Party ‘Barons’ Disagree over the Official CDU/CSU Line What Barzel said and believed was not, however, necessarily the viewpoint commonly held among the opposition party. As records of the internal discourse in those weeks reveal, the party showed a peculiar lack of solidarity over the issue of Ostpolitik and of behaviour towards the government. Chairman Kiesinger, for instance, one of the more orthodox conservatives, who was bitter at the loss of the Chancellery, dissuaded his colleagues in a parliamentary party meeting on 20 January from making further offers of cooperation to the government. He advised them instead to ‘wait until they came’. In his eyes, the government’s perceived goal of unity of the nation was insufficient. Unity within a single state had to remain the ultimate goal instead. Kiesinger insisted that while the government was renouncing legal positions, the opposition had to fight actively against this trend.²⁹⁶ Kiesinger understood this fight to consist of winning over public opinion for the alternative CDU policy at home and abroad. On 22 January 1970, he met John McCloy, an adviser to the President of the United States, to tell him about his worries and explain to him the dangers of Brandt’s ‘frivolous’ abandoning of legal claims. He then stressed the need for the West to stick together more than ever.²⁹⁷ In addition, Kiesinger repeatedly made clear his scepticism concerning any advances to East Berlin. The CDU/CSU should not be so foolish, he declared, as to think that Brandt’s present efforts, namely the letter to Stoph, would be any more successful than his attempts of the last two years.²⁹⁸ Other CDU members, such as Herbert Czaja and Becher, were similarly worried that the government might make ‘worthless’ compromises in order to enter into intra-German negotiations, and that these had the potential to weaken the whole free world.²⁹⁹ Kiesinger and his associates thereby revealed a pessimistic assumption characteristic of the more orthodox conservatives, that the SED could have no interest ²⁹⁶ Ibid parliamentary party, 20 Jan. 1970 ²⁹⁷ ACDP, 01–226, 386: Kiesinger, 22 Jan. 1970. ²⁹⁸ Ibid., 390: Kiesinger, 23 Jan. 1970; AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 133: Kiesinger, 26 Jan. 1970. ²⁹⁹ Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Ausschuss für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 8, 7. Sitzung: Czaja and Becher, 29 Jan. 1970.

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in a rapprochement with the FRG because of the threat to its survival that this would entail.³⁰⁰ When Brandt was reported to have said during his stay in the United States that ‘reunification was not going to happen’, and that he believed in the ‘unity of his people but not necessarily in one state’,³⁰¹ this reinforced the orthodox CDU/CSU criticism. Again, Kiesinger urged his colleagues in the Executive Committee to ‘strike back’ against such fatal statements and to stand up for reunification of the Germans in one state. Surely, the CDU/CSU should not appear to be aiming only at a legal mechanical unification of the two parts of Germany. It should make clear that it was interested primarily in improving the life of East Germans and that it would allow for intermediary solutions. As to the talks with Moscow, the party should make plain its view that the renunciation of force should be negotiated in isolation and not be burdened with other issues.³⁰² By contrast, the more moderate conservatives warned against treating German policy under the exclusive postulate of unity in one state. The deputy Wörner, for instance, was against putting the state-run unity so much to the fore for fear of losing credibility among CDU/CSU members. Nothing much could be said against Brandt’s position, which was to want unity in one state but realistically to expect it to take place in a different form from that of previous times. Hence more attention should be given to the intermediary stages, in which an increase of freedom should be the prime concern and which would, it was hoped, lead to reunification. Guttenberg tried to arbitrate between the orthodox and the reformist positions, maintaining that Kiesinger’s focus on unity in one state did not contradict the party’s old position of giving freedom priority over unity.³⁰³ Unlike Kiesinger, Weizsäcker regarded it as a ‘must’ to search for cooperation with the government on national questions despite the insufficient efforts on the part of the government.³⁰⁴ Similarly, Jürgen Echternach called for more caution and restraint. In a debate in the Executive Committee on 23 April 1970, he disagreed with ³⁰⁰ See also Wilhelm Bleck and Rainer Bovermann, ‘Die Deutschlandpolitik der SPD/FDP-Koalition 1969–1982’, in Materialen der Enquete-Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folger der SED-Dikatur in Deutschland ’, v: Deutschland politik, innerdeutsche Beziehungen und internationale Rahmenbedingurgen, ed. Der Deutsche Bundestag (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 1151–2. ³⁰¹ Brandt, National Educational Television, 17 Jan. 1970. ³⁰² ACDP, 01–226, 390: Executive Committee, 23 Jan. 1970. ³⁰³ Ibid. ³⁰⁴ Ibid.

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Kiesinger, who had come to the conclusion that active resistance, rather than mild warnings, was needed against Brandt’s harmful negotiations with Moscow. Echternach argued that though the government’s recognition of the GDR as a state had been unwise, it should not cause a decisive difference between government and opposition. He felt that it would be impossible to prove that the government’s concessions were unacceptable until the negotiations were over. In the interest of winning new voters, it was now wrong to pretend, as so many in the party did, that the government was about to give Germany away. Rather, the party should confine itself to cautious words of warning.³⁰⁵ Schröder was another more compromising critic, and was reported to stand out pleasantly from the ‘choir of politicians delivering cheap propaganda’.³⁰⁶ Indeed, as the author of the ‘policy of movement’, he sympathized with a more flexible course of Ostpolitik and tried to remain somewhat independent. Consequently, his opinion was heard more in interviews that he gave than in party meetings. Speaking to the newspaper Schwarzwälder Boten, for instance, he praised the government’s efforts to provide sufficient information to the Foreign Affairs Committee. He then admonished his party that, despite its natural right of criticism, the last word on whether or not Ostpolitik was dangerous could not yet be given.³⁰⁷ Thus, the course of the government’s Ostpolitik exacerbated differences between the more moderate CDU/CSU leaders and the uncompromising critics. As a result, Union leaders in different party bodies tried to enforce more loyalty within the joint CDU/CSU parliamentary delegation. Efforts were made to portray a united party to the public.³⁰⁸ But differences kept boiling beneath the surface, and these were to come to the fore particularly after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty.

Growing Hostility to the Government’s Efforts at Regular Consultation The more hostile, orthodox stance gradually asserted itself as the party’s official line. The trigger for growing complaints was the government’s allegedly insufficient information policy. The government’s ³⁰⁵ Ibid.: Kiesinger and Echternach, 23 Apr. 1970. ³⁰⁶ Kölner Stadtanzeiger (20 Apr. 1970). ³⁰⁷ BAK, B 136, 6505: Schröder, 6 May 1970. ³⁰⁸ BAK, N 1371, 89, 2: Barzel, 27 Apr. 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Stoltenberg, 28 Apr. 1970; ibid., 041/2: Marx, 28 Apr. 1970.

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efforts to keep the opposition informed, such as Scheel’s discussion with opposition members in the Foreign Affairs Committee on 29 January 1970 about the talks in Moscow,³⁰⁹ did not appease Union leaders. They accused the government of secrecy and of a tendency to inform them after, rather than before, decisions were made. Making matters worse was the rebuff of bipartisanship by Wehner, who announced in an interview, ‘I don’t need the opposition.’³¹⁰ Retrospectively, Barzel saw this remark as the ‘breach of a common policy’ after which the divisions in parliament stiffened.³¹¹ In order to prevent relations from worsening, Birrenbach wrote Brandt a letter. In it he urged Brandt to conduct closer consultation with the opposition about the negotiations with Moscow, East Berlin, and Poland. Birrenbach argued that the elimination of the opposition would deprive the government of an important trump for the difficult negotiations that were approaching.³¹² Brandt, in return, reacted approvingly. In a letter he re-confirmed that his guideline, as expressed in his government declaration, was the common duty of both government and opposition to ensure a good future for the FRG in ‘factual confrontation and national cooperation’. He emphasized that Wehner had meanwhile made clear that he would be happy to help improve the form of consultation between government and opposition.³¹³ Internally, government leaders also saw the need for the opposition to be thoroughly informed. Schmidt, in particular, reminded his cabinet colleagues repeatedly of this need in order to avoid isolation.³¹⁴ Consequently, throughout the early months of 1970, Brandt and Scheel briefed the Union leaders on the Eastern talks very regularly. A thorough briefing with the opposition leaders and governing parliamentary party leaders about the German–Soviet talks followed on 12 February. Scheel gave a detailed account of all issues raised so far and asked the opposition leaders to stop the in chit-chat about a ‘sellout’, which was unjustified.³¹⁵ Nevertheless, Union leaders continued to criticize the meetings as ex post facto information sessions.³¹⁶ In fact, this non-stop criticism ³⁰⁹ Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Ausschuss für Auswärtiger Angelegenheiten; 8. Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1970. ³¹⁰ Wehner in Der Spiegel (26 Jan. 1970). ³¹¹ Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, 101. ³¹² BAK, B 136, 6505: Birrenbach, 30 Jan. 1970. ³¹³ Ibid.: Brandt, Feb. 1970. ³¹⁴ e.g. BAK, N 1474, 82: Schmidt, 18 Feb. 1970. ³¹⁵ BAK, N 1371, 153: Scheel, 12 Feb. 1970. ³¹⁶ Clemens, ‘CDU/CSU’, 113.

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was part of an explicit strategy. Union leaders had agreed that the best tactic for the opposition to enforce the government’s cooperation would be constantly to demand more information.³¹⁷ Simultaneously, Barzel made great efforts to confront the government with as much party unity as possible. He and his parliamentary party therefore presented a common standpoint in response to the government’s initiative towards East Berlin.³¹⁸ The CSU leader Strauss expressly consented to the line agreed upon, thereby demonstrating the full unity of CDU and CSU.³¹⁹ In mid February, the government kept the opposition informed in various ways. On 19 February, Scheel gave an extensive survey of the German–Soviet talks in the Bundestag Committee for Intra-German Affairs.³²⁰ On 23 February, Bahr informed Kiesinger in private about the working text he had elaborated with Gromyko.³²¹ On 24 February, Bahr invited several Union leaders, such as Barzel, Stücklen, and Gradl, into the Foreign Ministry for a briefing,³²² and on 26 February, Scheel displayed confidential information in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs.³²³ Notably, the opposition leaders were told about the government’s plan to respect the present borders in a German–Soviet agreement. Simultaneously, they were assured that respecting the territorial status quo would not mean recognizing it legally, renouncing the goal of reunification, or allowing Berlin to become a ‘third’ state.³²⁴ All these efforts by the government did not appease the Union leaders. On the contrary, prophecies of doom as well as complaints could be heard from various members in the parliamentary party about a cementation of Germany’s division and a loss of legal claims as a result of Brandt’s undertakings. Barzel now denounced cooperation with the government as a farce. He advised his colleagues not merely to cease participation but to renounce cooperation altogether. If the government approached the opposition again, they should welcome ³¹⁷ BAK, N 1371, 153: parliamentary party, 16 and 17 Feb. 1970. ³¹⁸ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1 and 01–294, 053/1: parliamentary party, 18 and 19 Feb. 1970; ACDP, 01–226, 389: CDU Chairmanship, 19 Feb. 1970. ³¹⁹ BAK, N 1371, 153: Strauss and the CSU, 18 Feb. 1970. ³²⁰ Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Ausschuss für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 8, 9. Sitzung: Bundestag Committee for Intra-German Relations, 19 Feb. 1970. ³²¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/B: Bahr, 23 Feb. 1970. ³²² BAK, N 1371, 153: Bahr, 24 Feb. 1970. ³²³ Parlamentsarchiv, des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Auswärtiger Ausschuss, 10 Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, 26 Feb. 1970. ³²⁴ BAK, N 1371, 153: Bahr, 24 Feb. 1970.

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it but not make another offer. Becher agreed that the CDU/CSU should no longer remain silent in the Bundestag.³²⁵ The Union leaders also deplored the fact that Bahr’s talks in Moscow were obviously not preliminary ones, but were rather proper negotiations.³²⁶ The party’s committee suggested a strategy of repeatedly exposing the weaknesses and failures of the government and presenting a clear CDU programme as an alternative, in order to regain the trust of the voters.³²⁷ In the run-up to Brandt’s first meeting with Stoph, the Executive Committee and the Elferrat deliberated on what standpoint to take. Since Barzel had pressed Brandt already in December to seize the initiative on intra-German talks, his parliamentary party group had to endorse the summit. There was agreement that the opposition would lose credibility in public if it rejected any form of talks that had already been initiated by Kiesinger. Thus the parliamentary party issued a declaration expressing its approval of talks with East Berlin and the other undertakings with Moscow and Poland. It declared, however, that only an agenda geared to progress for the people should be subject to negotiation and that other matters should be delayed until the Four-Power talks about Berlin.³²⁸ Barzel asked his colleagues in the parliamentary party to adhere publicly to this line.³²⁹ A day before Brandt’s departure for Erfurt, on 18 March, Barzel assured the Chancellor that he would feel supported by the opposition in his attempt to talk to Stoph in the interest of the people.³³⁰ Simultaneously, the opposition’s attacks on the government continued. There was talk of ‘absolute silence between government and opposition’ and the need for the government to finally put an end to secrecy and tell the public the plain truth.³³¹ These attacks were perceived as so far-reaching that Ehmke rang Rasner up on 10 March and told him that he doubted whether Brandt would be willing to cooperate after Barzel’s most recent attacks. Ehmke revealed that he expected there would be long pauses in the consultation between Brandt and Barzel ³²⁵ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 429/B: Kiesinger, 23 Feb. 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, Kiesinger, Becher, and others, 24 Feb. 1970. ³²⁶ ACDP, 01–433, 191/1: Carstens, 3 Mar. 1970. ³²⁷ ACDP, 01–226, 389: CDU Executive Committee, 27 Feb. 1970. ³²⁸ BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: parliamentary party, 9 Mar. 1970; ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: the Elferrat, 13 Mar. 1970. ³²⁹ Ibid.: Barzel, 13 Mar. 1970. ³³⁰ BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: Barzel, 18 Mar. 1970. ³³¹ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, 10 Mar. 1970.

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because of their problematic personal relationship. He, Ehmke, would be at Barzel’s disposal whenever he pleased, however.³³² In response, the CDU Federal Branch Office warned that overly sharp attacks on the government would lead to a consolidation of the present coalition. It admonished that the opposition had to be more moderate towards the government, should criticize only in a matter-of-fact tone, and should give support to national undertakings. It should develop a long-term plan for a future government, but no all-encompassing counter-agenda.³³³ Despite the opposition’s attacks, the government made efforts to keep the Union leaders posted about its ‘ostpolitical’ projects. On 12 and 19 March, Scheel and Bahr explained and discussed the Moscow talks in the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs.³³⁴ On 16 March, Brandt even received Barzel for a private discussion of his programme of Ostpolitik.³³⁵ This was followed a day later by a round of discussion between Bahr, Scheel, and the Union leaders, as well as the representative leaders of the governing parliamentary parties, about the content of articles 1 to 4 of the working text elaborated in Moscow.³³⁶ Again, the government leaders tried to win over the opposition by depicting negotiations with Moscow as the only way to relax relations with the East and by emphasizing the limits of compromise. Brandt, Bahr, and Scheel stressed their determination to keep reunification as a legitimate goal, though perhaps not in the form hitherto envisaged, and to request a satisfactory settling of the status of Berlin as a precondition for the conclusion of a German–Soviet accord. As Bahr told Barzel, ‘I am much more of a nationalist than you think.’³³⁷ The Union leaders, however, remained very dismissive of the new Eastern policy. Barzel, in particular, made plain that his party regarded the government’s policy as compromising the case for reunification and violating West Germany’s ³³² BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: Ehmke, 10 March 1970; see also Ehmke, Mittendrin, 146; Schmidt emphasized in an interview with the author on 12 June 2003 that Brandt and Barzel disliked each other. ³³³ ACDP, 01–226, 389: CDU Federal Branch Office, 11 Mar. 1970. ³³⁴ Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Ausschuss für Auswärtiger Angelegenheiten, 11. und 12. Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 and 19 Mar. 1970. ³³⁵ BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: Brandt and Barzel, 16 Mar. 1970. ³³⁶ Ibid.: Bahr, 17 Mar. 1970. ³³⁷ Ibid.: Brandt, 16 Mar. 1970; ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: Bahr, 17 Mar. 1970; Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Bonn and Berlin, Ausschuss für Auswärtiger Angelegenheiten, 11. Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Scheel, 12 Mar. 1970.

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constitution. The government’s subtle distinctions between de facto and de jure recognition were in his eyes a ‘farce’ and would result in a legally binding agreement with East Berlin. A renunciation-of-force treaty should be concluded with Moscow in its pure form, without giving up crucial positions or ‘squeezing anything into it’. Besides this, instead of leading hasty negotiations with Moscow, the government should await the Berlin talks.³³⁸

The Switch to a Strategy of Active Resistance The opposition now switched over to active resistance to the government. Barzel rejected the Chancellor’s offer to Barzel and Stücklen to attend the cabinet meeting about the Erfurt meeting on 19 March 1970 with the explanation that it was too late to be invited at the end of an operation.³³⁹ A day later, Barzel launched a declaration in the Bundestag expressing his disapproval of Brandt’s policies, which in public was perceived to be a ‘declaration of war’.³⁴⁰ Moreover, the opposition leaders came up with new reasons to denounce Brandt’s policies. In a parliamentary party meeting, Barzel fulminated against Brandt’s readiness to accept the Soviet demands, which would give the FRG a status open to Soviet intervention, hence risking its security and leading to the legitimization of Soviet hegemony over Europe. Union leaders charged that Brandt’s ‘sell-out’ policy would be tacitly accepted by the Western Allies or, even worse, that Bonn’s unilateralism and hints of neutralism might lead to a loosening of ties with them. They agreed that a crucial turn in German policy was at stake and that the parliamentary CDU/CSU had to resist it by all means.³⁴¹ The chairman, Kiesinger, arrived at a similar conclusion when he pointed out the Chancellor’s idea, which he considered dangerous. As he revealed to his colleagues, Brandt had told him during the Grand Coalition government that he entertained visions of convergence between East and West. By treating the SED as an equal negotiating partner the East would be so liberalized by Social Democracy that eventually the Soviet empire would collapse. However, the evolution Brandt intended to trigger was in Kiesinger’s eyes very dangerous because ³³⁸ BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: Barzel, 16 Mar. 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, Kiesinger, and Guttenberg, 17 Mar. 1970. ³³⁹ Ibid.: Barzel, 17 Mar. 1970; BAK, N 1371, 88, 2: Marx, 19 Mar. 1970. ³⁴⁰ Ibid.: Barzel, 20 Mar. 1970; Der Spiegel (20 Mar. 1970). ³⁴¹ ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, Kiesinger, and Guttenberg, 17 Mar. 1970.

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the FRG would be much more vulnerable in this process. The former Chancellor warned his colleagues that Brandt, the ‘great peacemaker’, could thereby undermine the will to resist Soviet expansionism and alienate West Germany from its Western allies.³⁴² The opposition was therefore developing a new kind of activism to block the government’s policy. On 22 March, Barzel turned to the American diplomat Martin Hillenbrand for help. He complained that official policy was no longer pursued in cooperation with the opposition and that it accommodated the East without concessions in return. He then suggested that the Allies’ negotiations about securing the status of Berlin should be given priority over all other talks.³⁴³ Guttenberg also asked an American friend to gain American support for the opposition and against Brandt’s alleged policies of preparing the way for Soviet hegemony over Europe. It was therefore highly important, Guttenberg argued, that in the approaching encounter between Brandt and Nixon the latter should question Brandt’s real goals and express some aloofness.³⁴⁴ The opposition’s intrigue did not go down very well among the Allies, however, who conveyed to the CSU a strong message of solidarity with Brandt.³⁴⁵ Tensions between government and opposition were aggravated when on 25 March Brandt cancelled a meeting with Barzel at short notice. Barzel told Ahlers that the government was limiting its room for manoeuvre with such actions.³⁴⁶ While opposition leaders were kept updated about the progress of Bahr’s talks in Moscow,³⁴⁷ Barzel used this incident to complain again in public about the government’s secretiveness and about the allegedly insufficient, and merely verbal, information given to the opposition.³⁴⁸ That Barzel’s complaints were very much a publicity campaign is clear from the fact that, in a meeting with Bahr on that same day, Barzel explicitly expressed his satisfaction with the information received.³⁴⁹ ³⁴² ACDP, 01–226, 390: Kiesinger, 23 Apr. 1970. ³⁴³ BAK, N 1371, 151: Barzel, 22 Mar. 1970. ³⁴⁴ BAK, N 1397, 229: Guttenberg, 4 Apr. 1970. ³⁴⁵ Christian Haase, ‘In Search of a European Settlement: The Königswinter Conferences and West German–Allied Relations 1949–1973’, D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2004, 274–5. ³⁴⁶ BAK, N 1371, 88, 1: Barzel, 24 Mar. 1970. ³⁴⁷ e.g. Bahr gave an account of his talks in Moscow to Barzel on 25 Mar. 1970, and to Gradl on 27 Mar. 1970; ibid. and ACDP, 01–294, 053/1. ³⁴⁸ BAK, N 1371, 88, 1: parliamentary party and Barzel, 25 Feb. 1970; Die Welt (25 Mar. 1970). ³⁴⁹ BAK, N 1371, 88, 1: Barzel, 25 Mar. 1970.

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In April 1970, the opposition became even more hostile. As Die Zeit noted, a tougher trend took hold inside the Union. Members of the parliamentary party regarded Barzel as too cautious and the constructive opposition as led by Weizsäcker, Kiep, and Wrangel as too ‘pale’.³⁵⁰ During a stay in California, Strauss delivered a speech about the ‘sell-out’ policy of the Brandt government, which Bahr called a ‘contamination’.³⁵¹ Furthermore, Strauss and Barzel delivered speeches at the CSU party congress that were received as a declaration of war against the government. Barzel’s speech culminated in a demand for the appointment of a better government for the free Germany.³⁵² In a meeting of the parliamentary party on 14 April, Barzel instructed his colleagues to end their attempts at cooperation. He now, for the first time, spoke of the opposition’s aim not only to present better alternatives but also to bring the government to an end in the course of the legislative period.³⁵³ Thus, by mid April, the fundamentalists’ strategy of confrontation had asserted itself among the opposition leaders. It was based on the calculation that relentless assaults upon Brandt’s Ostpolitik would undermine his razor-thin parliamentary majority and restore the CDU/CSU to power (see Figure 10).³⁵⁴ The government noted the deterioration of relations with the opposition with concern. However, it was determined to carry on its policies as envisaged. As Bahr saw it, the government should not give the impression of doubting the rightness of its policy as a result of the opposition’s attempts to discredit it.³⁵⁵ Harpprecht, Brandt’s personal assistant, also warned the Chancellor against letting himself and his cabinet become ‘sterilized’ by governing in tandem with the opposition. The time was right for implementing rigorously the decisions that had been envisaged. However, this would not necessarily result in a collision course in the Bundestag. Harpprecht called it a big mistake to adapt to Strauss’s provocative strategy.³⁵⁶ In mid May, the second Brandt–Stoph meeting, set for the 21st, absorbed the CDU/CSU’s attention. As with the Erfurt meeting, the CDU/CSU formally endorsed the summit, but only on condition that Brandt would accept East German concessions intended to ease the ³⁵⁰ ³⁵² ³⁵³ ³⁵⁴ ³⁵⁶

Die Zeit (10 Apr. 1970). ³⁵¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/B, 2: Bahr, Apr. 1970. Das westfälische Volksblatt (11 Apr. 1970). ACDP, 08–001, 1021/1: Barzel, 14 Apr. 1970. Clemens, ‘CDU/CSU’, 98. ³⁵⁵ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341: Bahr, 25 Apr. 1970. AdsD, WBA, BK, 7: Harpprecht, 30 Apr. 1970.

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Figure 10. Demonstration in Bonn against Brandt’s policy of the ‘recognition of realities’, including the Oder–Neisse line as the German–Polish frontier.

human effects of the division of Germany. Even before the meeting took place, however, the CDU/CSU launched an attack against the government in the Bundestag, focusing specifically on the ‘Twenty Points’ that Brandt had proposed at Kassel as the basis of a potential treaty.³⁵⁷ When the Kassel meeting did in fact prove largely fruitless, the CDU/CSU saw its scepticism justified: Stoph’s all-or-nothing approach—‘all for him, nothing for us’—showed that East Berlin would insist on full recognition before even discussing practical matters and thus did not want coexistence.³⁵⁸ Especially under CSU pressure—Strauss denounced Kassel as proof that Bonn’s new Ostpolitik was ‘bankrupt’, a ‘disgrace’—the position of opposition leaders, including the more reformist ones, hardened further.³⁵⁹ In Barzel’s view, the ‘Twenty Points’ left no room for the German right of selfdetermination and therefore had to be seen as the offer of a ‘treaty of division’.³⁶⁰ ³⁵⁷ ³⁵⁸ ³⁵⁹ ³⁶⁰

Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 72, 2665: debate, 17 May 1970. Süddeutsche Zeitung (23 and 24 May 1970), in Clemens, Reluctant Realists, 69. See e.g. ACDP, 01–294, 001/1: Gradl, 24 May 1970. ACDP, 01–294, 007/1 and 08–001, 1022/1: Barzel, 21 and 25 May 1970.

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As regards the talks with Moscow, the Union’s harsh accusations did not cease either. When Barzel heard about the government’s proposed plan to introduce negotiations on the basis of the Bahr paper, he urged his parliamentary party on 26 May to take a united position as the only means to avoid a treaty ‘giving away everything that belongs in a peace treaty’.³⁶¹ Thus, the parliamentary CDU/CSU issued a declaration on that same day. In this, it formally endorsed again the negotiations with Moscow and all other planned talks with the East, on condition that certain CDU/CSU principles were realized, such as the preservation of the right of self-determination and firm ties with NATO and the EC. It announced its intention to resist in the event that any material regulation of the borders was made.³⁶² This was followed by Barzel’s warning in the Bundestag, a day later, that the CDU/CSU would consider it a change in German policy if the government decided to send Scheel to Moscow on the basis of Bahr’s soundings. In public, Barzel’s speech was perceived as a major offensive.³⁶³ Brandt and Bahr countered in the Bundestag by emphasizing the continuity of their policy with that of Adenauer as well as that of the preceding government.³⁶⁴ Barzel and Guttenberg, however, denounced Brandt’s claim of continuity as a ‘legend’,³⁶⁵ and as a misinterpretation of Kiesinger’s renunciation-of-force policy.³⁶⁶ Observers found the scene during the May parliamentary debates reminiscent of the 1950s debate over rearmament, with the common ground steadily crumbling. Brandt and his advisers, however, were counting on the fact that the opposition would not be able to stay the course of attacks because of the differences in its own ranks about the CDU line.³⁶⁷ On 7 June, at Barzel’s request, Scheel and Bahr invited him, Guttenberg, Schröder, and Gradl to an exchange about the talks that Bahr had concluded in Moscow. As a sign of the government’s cooperativeness, Bahr read out the elaborated articles 1 to 4 of the future treaty.³⁶⁸ Afterwards, the government assessed the briefing of the opposition as very thorough. It emphasized the high level of knowledge which the Union leaders at least had acquired and compared it to that of the cabinet ³⁶¹ ³⁶² ³⁶³ ³⁶⁴ ³⁶⁶ ³⁶⁷ ³⁶⁸

ACDP, 01–294, 1021/1: Barzel, 26 May 1970. BAK, N 1371, 89, 1: parliamentary party, 26 May 1970. Westfalen-Blatt (28 May 1970). BAK, N 1371, 89, 1: Barzel, 1 June 1970. ³⁶⁵ Ibid. BAK, N 1397, 141: Guttenberg, 3 June 1970. AdsD, WBA, BK, 1: Anders to Brandt, 23 June 1970. ACDP, 01–294, 053/3: Gradl, 7 June 1970.

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members. As Bahr put it in retrospect, he found out later that Barzel was much more thoroughly informed by the government than Wehner and Mischnick were.³⁶⁹ The government also maintained that despite the opposition’s excessive agitation it was determined to continue briefing opposition leaders.³⁷⁰ Shortly afterwards, in the Bundestag on 17 June, Brandt expressly confirmed his determination to cooperate.³⁷¹ Nevertheless, the gulf between government and opposition widened and so did the Union’s proposed range of options for thwarting Brandt. An event that further hardened fundamentalist opposition was the leaked publication of the Bahr paper. Bahr made great efforts to explain the origins of the written formulations in the Foreign Affairs Committee on 17 June. He argued that these had to be composed to avoid the risk of misunderstanding. By pointing to Moscow’s initial unacceptable demands, Bahr highlighted the agreed positions in the working text as a great accomplishment. He maintained that the formulations were not binding articles, but only a recommended basis for future negotiations.³⁷² Irrespective of this information, Barzel, Guttenberg, Kiesinger, and other Union leaders declared their worst suspicions to be confirmed. Irrespective also of the fact that the Bahr paper had already been read to Guttenberg and Barzel, they expressed their surprise and indignation at the new version. In their eyes, the paper indicated Bahr’s acceptance of the conclusion of a treaty of division that would alter West Germany’s constitution. It would therefore require a two-thirds majority in parliament for ratification, which it would not get.³⁷³ Union leaders charged Bahr further with having simply accepted Soviet euphemisms, allowing Moscow to interpret them in its own interest to legitimize its hegemony over Eastern Europe. What is more, they said that the Kremlin would interpret Bahr’s clauses agreeing to ‘respect’ all European borders as forswearing any change in Europe’s territorial configuration and would ³⁶⁹ Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004 and 12 Feb. 2003. By contrast, Eitel, for instance, argued in an interview with the author in Nov. 2002 that the opposition was barely informed. ³⁷⁰ PA, B 4, 70: SPD press service, 8 June 1970. ³⁷¹ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 73, 3216–17: Brandt, 17 June 1970; see also BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Barzel, 17 June 1970. ³⁷² Parlamentsarchiv des Deutschen Bundestags, Ausschuss für Auswärtiger Angelegenheiten, 19. Sitzung, 6. Wahlperiode: Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 June 1970. ³⁷³ BAK, N 1371, 90, 2: Barzel, 9 June 1970; PA, B 41, 1057a: Guttenberg to Schröder, 9 June 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 1022/1: Kiesinger, 16 June 1970; Clemens, Reluctant Realists, 74.

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thus castigate West German efforts to hold out for reunification as a violation of the agreement.³⁷⁴ Bolstered by a series of victories at regional elections, the Union hinted that it would soon have the strength to bring Brandt down on a vote of no confidence over Ostpolitik.³⁷⁵

Scheel’s Luckless Attempts at Bipartisanship Scheel, by contrast, tried to rekindle a spirit of bipartisanship. On 19 June, he asked Barzel for a meeting. He wanted to investigate the possibilities of finding a consensus on the disputed questions. Barzel retorted that the opposition’s objections were well known. He demanded a ‘new beginning’, a renunciation of the Bahr paper as a condition for any cooperation.³⁷⁶ A week later, Scheel made another approach. He called Rasner to express his goodwill but equally maintained that activities such as those of Marx and Guttenberg were not making his attempts at agreement with the opposition any easier. As to the Union’s request for new negotiations, the Foreign Minister explained that the Bahr paper was merely a draft and that some parts of it were not acceptable. Rasner replied that until the presentation of the government’s new intentions, the opposition would continue to react harshly.³⁷⁷ Behind the scenes, Union leaders made it even clearer that they aimed to prevent the government from continuing its ‘calamitous foreign policy’ and to make it abide by the opposition’s line.³⁷⁸ The government, in turn, was increasingly aware of the need for a broad majority in the Bundestag and hence of its dependence on opposition support for the realization of its Eastern policies. Consequently, it was eager to assert its cooperation with the opposition by holding it to account.³⁷⁹ Schmidt and Genscher stood out from the cabinet in admonishing their government to make all efforts to get the opposition to cooperate. If cooperation was not achieved, Schmidt argued, the opposition would be blamed for this failure.³⁸⁰ ³⁷⁴ BAK, N 1371, 75–6. ³⁷⁵ Ibid. 74; ACDP, 08–001, 1022/1: Kiesinger, 16 June 1970. ³⁷⁶ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Scheel and Barzel, 19 June 1970. ³⁷⁷ Ibid.: Scheel on Rasner, 26 June 1970. ³⁷⁸ ACDP, 08–001, 455/1: Rasner to Schröder, 6 July 1970. ³⁷⁹ AdsD, WBA, BK, 91 and BAK, N 1474, 87: Brandt, 5 and 7 July 1970; ibid., 85: Achenbach in the cabinet, 8 July 1970. ³⁸⁰ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Schmidt and Genscher, 31 July 1970; AdsD, WBA, BK, 18: Schmidt, 30 July 1970.

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As a result, the Foreign Minister invited the CDU/CSU to send one member to accompany him to Moscow for the formal negotiations of the treaty. The CDU/CSU, however, reacted sceptically to this offer. Rasner doubted that it was serious, as his parliamentary party representative was to accompany the German delegation as an observer rather than as a member. Scheel explained that the CDU/CSU representative would have the same status as Bahr. He recapitulated that as to using the Bahr paper as a platform, there were some good points, some which would have to be negotiated anew, and further issues still which he would raise for the first time, such as the fixing of the German option, if not in the preamble, in an exchange of letters.³⁸¹ Inside the Union leadership, Scheel’s offer of more cooperation in the last stage of negotiations triggered debate. However, the parliamentary party agreed, ‘without any deviation, from Schröder to Strauss’, as Rasner happily informed Barzel, to make CDU/CSU cooperation dependent on the Soviets’ willingness to negotiate anew.³⁸² In the following couple of days, Brandt and Scheel made repeated efforts to convince the opposition of the constitutionality of the Bahr paper and to obtain the Union’s support and thus a broad parliamentary basis for the upcoming negotiations. On 13 and 15 July, the Foreign Minister, accompanied by his experts Karl Fleischhauer and Staden, explained his plan for negotiations to Schröder, Heck, Marx, and Weizsäcker. He again emphasized his freedom to negotiate new issues and revisions of the Bahr paper. In particular, he would be concerned with improving the West German position concerning reunification and the right of self-determination. He equally praised the results achieved so far, in particular stating that the reference to the ‘inviolability of the borders’ in article 3 was a great success. Finally, he emphasized that the treaty provided for a reduction of tensions in Europe, but presented no danger to West Germany’s close relations with its Allies.³⁸³ On 19 July, Scheel told Barzel that it would ‘serve our wishes if selected representatives of parliament confirmed my argument and thereby gave it more weight’.³⁸⁴ But the opposition leaders remained unconvinced. They continued to reject the Bahr paper, not necessarily for legal but for party-political reasons, as CDU members in the Bundestag committee for legal ³⁸¹ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Scheel and Rasner, 8 July 1970. ³⁸² ACDP, 08–001, 455/1: Rasner, 8 July 1970. ³⁸³ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Scheel and the opposition leaders, 13 July 1970; ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: Scheel and the opposition leaders, 15 July 1970. ³⁸⁴ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Scheel, 19 July 1970.

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questions also admitted.³⁸⁵ On 20 July, Rasner wrote to Scheel that, in view of the basis of the Bahr paper, the lack of information about the minutes of the negotiation, and the mistaken priority given to concluding a German–Soviet treaty before reaching satisfactory results over Berlin, his parliamentary party would not be able to send a representative to Moscow.³⁸⁶ What followed was an exchange of blows in the press between the government and the opposition. Wienand called the argument of insufficient consultation ‘ridiculous’, believing that consultations with the opposition had never been as thorough as in recent times. He maintained that by rejecting the paper the CDU had ‘committed desertion’.³⁸⁷ Stücklen, in return, argued that the government was trying to make the CDU/CSU bear responsibility for a risky policy, which could, as Ehmke had admitted, still fail.³⁸⁸ On the cabinet’s formal consent to the opening of negotiations, the opposition commented that the results would show whether the government would succeed in negotiating a real renunciation-of-force accord, which was, however, more than questionable.³⁸⁹ Behind the scenes, the Union not only refused any participation in the final negotiations, but also furthered plans to topple the Brandt government by forcing the FDP to abandon the SPD. In his talks with Scheel, Rasner revealed his party’s secret plans to replace the present government with a CDU government, by 1973 at the latest, but much earlier if possible. Since the ‘marriage between FDP and SPD’ was already broken, it was the Union’s short-term goal, he confided to Scheel, to form a new government with the FDP within this legislative period. Scheel evaded this advance by maintaining that it was of course his intention to ‘bring the present SPD/FDP coalition to an end fairly and neatly’.³⁹⁰ Guttenberg was the most fervent spokesman of these plans. Shortly afterwards, he mentioned to an American friend his party’s intentions to topple Brandt, calling them ‘not entirely impossible’.³⁹¹ ³⁸⁵ BAK, N 1397, 329: SPD press service, 16 July 1970; ACDP, 08–001, 406: parliamentary party, 16 July 1970. ³⁸⁶ PA, B 1, 350: Rasner, 20 July 1970. ³⁸⁷ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 616: Wienand, 21 and 24 July 1970. ³⁸⁸ BAK, N 1397, 141: Stücklen, 21 July 1970. ³⁸⁹ BAK, N 1371, 372: parliamentary party, 23 July 1970. ³⁹⁰ Ibid., 90, 1: Rasner and Scheel, 8 July 1970; according to Scheel, Heck had asked him a ‘similar thing’ already. ³⁹¹ BAK, N 1397, 67: Guttenberg, 3 Aug. 1970; see also Thomas Francis Banchoff, The Party Politics of Foreign Policy: Germany and European Institutions, 1949–1992 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 143.

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The Return to a More Moderate Attitude However, inside the Union the need was also seen to leave the door open to an eventual ratification of the treaty. After some internal debate, it was decided to respect a ‘truce’ until Scheel had completed his talks in Moscow. As Kiesinger put it, the CDU had no intention of being disruptive during the negotiations, but it intended to follow them attentively and examine the results afterwards.³⁹² Shortly after the start of negotiations, Ehmke informed Barzel about the first results. Moreover, he confided that he and a smaller circle of cabinet members had discussed the question of whether Barzel, as the leader of the opposition, should be exclusively consulted in greater detail and, if possible, thereby be drawn into co-responsibility. He and Brandt should therefore meet as soon as possible for a thorough discussion.³⁹³ But the opposition leader’s tactic was still to spoil the government’s wish for cooperation. To this end, Barzel denied in a private meeting with Zarapkin that he had heard anything about the state of negotiations in Moscow.³⁹⁴ In addition, after the conclusion of negotiations on 7 August, Barzel immediately turned to Brandt and Scheel and complained about the complete lack of information about the negotiations. He warned that if the government was interested in constructive talks with the opposition as offered by Brandt it should leave enough time for an opinion to be arrived at inside the Union.³⁹⁵ On 9 August, Scheel, Brandt, Ehmke, Bahr, Frank, and Braun met privately with Barzel and his colleagues, a day before the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, in order to discuss the negotiated treaty. In presenting the treaty’s content Scheel tried to defuse criticism by stressing the differences from the earlier version. He had won Soviet acceptance of several formulations, and of the mention of the Allies’ special rights and the pending peace settlement in a note to the Allies, designed to protect the legal basis of Bonn’s case for pursuing German unity. Notably, he had also accomplished a link between articles 3 and 2. Thus the recognition of the status quo was now seen only in connection with the renunciation-of-force pact. In sum, the treaty would now endow the Federal Republic with a new status; Bonn would ³⁹² BAK, N 1371, 372: Kiesinger, 24 July 1970. ³⁹³ Ibid., 90, 1: Ehmke, 31 July 1970. ³⁹⁴ Ibid., 90, 2: Barzel, 6 Aug. 1970. ³⁹⁵ PA, B 1, 350: Barzel, 7 Aug. 1970.

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become an important partner of the Soviet Union. Barzel, Kiesinger, and their colleagues, however, remained averse. They made clear that Scheel’s reservations were far too vague a way of protecting Bonn’s right of self-determination.³⁹⁶ As Barzel’s party saw it, the final treaty was the Bahr paper with only ‘cosmetic changes’ and in substance, had signed away the nation’s rights. However, Barzel realized that an immediate rejection of the Moscow Treaty would disqualify the CDU/CSU from holding public office for a long time, especially if the government succeeded in asserting ‘something for the people’ in future. The broad public approval of the accord as a step towards détente compounded pressure on Barzel to tread carefully. He therefore opted against a ‘no’ to the treaty and pleaded instead to ‘stay on the ball’ and try to gain as much influence and support as possible. On the other hand, the advantage that Brandt might get through cooperation with the opposition had to be offset.³⁹⁷ In a private meeting with Bahr, even Strauss turned out to be much more ambivalent than he had seemed in his public propaganda campaigns. As Bahr told Brandt, on the one hand, Strauss believed Bonn was ‘eating humble pie’ and capitulating to Soviet demands by signing the Moscow Treaty. On the other hand, he admitted that the treaty was the key to the whole of Eastern Europe and therefore had considerable value for all Western European states. If the treaty turned out to have this potential then there should perhaps be better teamwork between government and opposition.³⁹⁸ Moreover, Schröder confided to Schmidt that ‘although he could not say it publicly, the treaty was surely not bad’.³⁹⁹ In the Elferrat, Barzel repeated that a ‘no’ to the Moscow Treaty would isolate the CDU/CSU in the near future and prevent it from exercising further pressure on the government. But he could not advise a ‘yes’ either. Since Ostpolitik, in Bahr’s own words, constituted a ‘uniform whole’, the Union could judge the Moscow Treaty only when it was clear that the Kremlin would accept a Four-Power settlement on Berlin. Even Kiesinger agreed that the opposition should now abstain from loud protest.⁴⁰⁰ The next day, Barzel informed Brandt of the opposition’s resolution. According to a decision reached in the Elferrat, he suggested holding ³⁹⁶ ³⁹⁷ ³⁹⁸ ³⁹⁹ ⁴⁰⁰

BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: government and opposition leaders, 9 Aug. 1970. BAK, N 1371, 372, : Barzel, 9 and 10 Aug. 1970; Clemens, ‘CDU/CSU’, 118–19. AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 304: Strauss, 10 Aug. 1970. AdsD, WBA, BK, 18: Schröder, 13 Aug. 1970. ACDP, 01–294, 053/1: Barzel, 10 Aug. 1970.

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talks about Berlin, in which he would explain to Brandt what the CDU/CSU regarded as satisfactory solutions, and offered a bipartisan policy on this matter in the coming months.⁴⁰¹ Brandt for his part delightedly reported to his cabinet on the pleasant meeting he had had with opposition leaders, and that at the moment the Union obviously wanted to abstain from confrontation and to ‘participate in governing’. As the Chancellor told his ministers, he regarded a common platform as useful.⁴⁰² In a letter to Barzel, in which he gave formal notice of the government’s signing of the Moscow Treaty and his intention to conclude further treaties with Poland, the GDR, and CSSR, Brandt expressed his readiness for the proposed confidential talks in order to reach a broad parliamentary majority for the treaties.⁴⁰³ Despite the agreement to withhold a final judgement until after a Berlin settlement, most opposition spokesmen, such as Kiesinger, Guttenberg, Marx, and Wrangel, freely gave their opinions on the treaty. The majority condemned the accord outright.⁴⁰⁴ At the same time, Barzel and more moderate Union leaders, such as Majonica, Echternach, and Birrenbach, tried to contain these critics.⁴⁰⁵ They were also speculating about how to cooperate with Brandt and improve the treaty so that the CDU/CSU could support it.⁴⁰⁶ Thus, while there was internally much divergence, debate, and preparation by the newly established ‘Moscow Treaty Commission’ and the Elferrat concerning a future assessment of the Moscow Treaty, Barzel made his parliamentary party officially adopt a line which Schröder described as a ‘critical expectant’ attitude.⁴⁰⁷ Barzel was to cling to this strategy until the ratification of the Moscow Treaty.⁴⁰⁸ Simultaneously, emphasis was given to the expressing all crucial doubts and the CDU/CSU’s position. On 26 August, the CDU Executive ⁴⁰¹ BAK, N 1371, 151: Barzel, 10 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰² BAK, N 1474, 88: Brandt, 11 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰³ BAK, N 1371, 90, 1: Brandt, 14 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰⁴ e.g. ibid.: Marx, Wrangel, Strauss, and Guttenberg, 13 Aug. 1970, and Kiesinger, 14 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰⁵ e.g. ibid., 91, 1: Majonica to Barzel, and Barzel to the parliamentary party, 17 and 27 Aug. 1970; BAK, N 1371, 372, 1: Echternach to Kiesinger, 18 Aug. 1970; ACDP, 01–356, 237: Birrenbach to Marx, 24 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰⁶ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 304: Bahr to Brandt, 15 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁰⁷ ACDP, 01–356, 237: Schröder, 21 Aug. 1970; on 15 Sept. 1970, Barzel talked about a ‘policy of keeping a critical distance’: see ACDP, 08–001, 1023/1. ⁴⁰⁸ Anselm Tiggemann, CDU/CSU und die Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik 1969–1972: Zur ‘Innenpolitik der Außenpolitik’ der ersten Regierung Brandt/Scheel (Frankfurt am Main and New York: Lang, 1998), 60.

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Committee issued its objections to the Moscow Treaty and emphasized essential conditions for Ostpolitik, notably a consolidation of the status of Berlin and improved living conditions in East Germany.⁴⁰⁹ With this strategy Barzel hoped best to secure influence on the remaining negotiations with the East, and to force the government to make the maximum effort to achieve the most concessions possible in intraGerman talks and negotiations about Berlin.⁴¹⁰

Abstention in the Bundestag Almost two years later, during the process of ratification of the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty, and the Four-Power Pact on Berlin that had been signed in the meantime, the opposition eventually adopted a strategy of bipartisanship. This was accompanied by bitter bargaining inside the Union between the fundamentalists, who wanted to kill off the treaties, and the reformist spokesmen, who wanted to allow them to pass. But Barzel decided to promise Brandt that the accord would be allowed to survive, providing that the government first addressed the major concerns of the CDU/CSU about their impact. The result was the editing of a joint parliamentary resolution as an interpretive document of the treaties, acceptable to the government, opposition, and Moscow alike. However, Barzel could not hope to win over the fundamentalists to accept the treaties on the basis of this resolution without splitting the party. Under this pressure and on the advice of his closest adviser, he agreed that the CDU/CSU should unanimously abstain.⁴¹¹ At least abstaining meant that the party could not be blamed for killing off the treaties, nor would it be identified with them. On 17 May 1972, the Union unanimously accepted the now-official joint resolution, but neither the Moscow Treaty (238 CDU/CSU abstentions, 10 votes against) nor the Warsaw Treaty (231 CDU/CSU abstentions, 17 votes against) (see Figure 11).⁴¹² ⁴⁰⁹ ACDP, 01–356, 237: CDU Chairmanship, 26 Aug. 1970. ⁴¹⁰ e.g. ACDP, 08–006, 020/1: Barzel, 5 Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–433, 191/1: Executive Committee, 14 Sept. 1970; Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, 107; see also Banchoff, Party Politics, 144. ⁴¹¹ Rainer Barzel, So nicht! Für eine bessere Politik in Deutschland (Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1994), 20. For further details see Richard von Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1997), 220–1. ⁴¹² Clemens, Reluctant Realists, 89–105; Barzel to the author, Sept. 2003.

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Figure 11. Rainer Barzel congratulating Willy Brandt after the no-confidence vote, April 1972.

With the decision to let the treaties pass in parliament, Barzel had saved his country from a severe crisis, Weizsäcker stated retrospectively.⁴¹³ With hindsight, his insistence on an improved Moscow Treaty as a condition for its ratification can be seen as a contribution to Bonn’s reunification policy.⁴¹⁴ ⁴¹³ Weizsäcker, Vier Zeiten, 220.

⁴¹⁴ Barzel stated this to the author, Sept. 2003.

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In sum, it has been seen that the CDU/CSU renounced cooperation after a few weeks and switched over to an aggressive opposition throughout the negotiating process of the Moscow Treaty. Nevertheless, not least because of internal divisions, the opposition did not manage, with any strategy, to mount an effective challenge to the government’s Ostpolitik. Admittedly, from the government’s point of view, the opposition was a force to be guarded against and courted, in the hope that it might eventually vote for the ratification of the treaty in the Bundestag. However, the Brandt team deliberately exaggerated and exploited this in order to assert more national interests vis-à-vis those of the Soviets.⁴¹⁵ Especially in the final stage of negotiations, Scheel constantly referred to the legal and parliamentary constraints ‘at home’ as a means of improving the treaty text as much as possible. Eventually, during the ratification process of the Eastern treaties, the opposition turned out to be a supportive factor for the government.

I N T E R E S T G RO U P S : A P R E S S U R E FAC TO R F O R T H E B R A N D T G OV E R N M E N T ? One of the characteristics of the decision-making process concerning the Moscow Treaty is that the influence of interest groups on the government’s policies was generally rather small. This was, firstly, due to the fact that the parties in government had already developed their stance in consultation with different pressure groups. Secondly, a shift in public opinion towards favouring a modified Ostpolitik had begun to emerge by the mid 1960s and prepared the ground for a change of policy towards the East. As a result of domestic debate embracing all social formations, the whole domestic scene in the FRG had changed by late summer 1969 and revealed clear signs of a changed Ostpolitik.⁴¹⁶ This is certainly not to say that there were no pressure groups of importance for Ostpolitik. On the contrary, there were several lobbies with pronounced foreign political interests which articulated their opinions on questions of Ostpolitik and attempted to exert influence on the government’s decision-making. The government, in return, was ⁴¹⁵ Thus also Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ⁴¹⁶ Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968–1973 (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag für Demoskopie, 1974), 524, 567, 575; Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 238.

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very conscious of them as factors to be considered and taken seriously while making its Eastern policy. In particular, these were the business pressure groups (including trade unions), refugee organizations, and public and published opinion. In the following discussion, these three most important pressure groups will therefore be analysed according to their role and influence during the making of the Moscow Treaty.

West German Business Elites: Partners with Similar Interests West German business had a major direct interest in relations with the East. In fact, after the Second World War it had been West German business which had filled the vacuum resulting from the mutual policy of non-recognition between West Germany and the Eastern European states (except for the Soviet Union) by keeping alive its own connections to its traditional trade partners. This had always been done in close consultation with the government.⁴¹⁷ In the early 1960s, however, certain leading firms, such as Krupp, had been far more eager than the Erhard government to expand trade with the East. The efforts of German business had been hampered for a long time by the reluctance of the Bonn government to accept a détente in the area of trade, as for instance in the case of the government’s embargo on the export of wide-diameter pipelines to the Soviet Union in 1963. With the change of government, the Grand Coalition government initiated a much more active economic Ostpolitik than had been present under Erhard. It agreed with industry over the desirability of formalized trade relations with the Soviet Union. However, Bonn soon faced problems in the trade negotiations with Moscow: for several economic and political reasons, one problem being the question of liberalizing German import regulations, and another one the consideration of Berlin in any trade treaty, the Soviet attitude towards trade with the Bonn government turned out to be erratic. One day it expressed its wish for a trade agreement, the next it denied the existence of any economic dealings at all between the two countries.⁴¹⁸ These conflicts notwithstanding, both government and German business continued their policy of seeking to conclude trade agreements. ⁴¹⁷ Otto Wolff von Amerongen, Der Weg nach Osten: Vierzig Jahre Brückenbau für die deutsche Wirtschaft (Munich: Droemer-Knaur, 1992), 114. ⁴¹⁸ Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German–Soviet Relations, 1955–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 144.

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Trade became an even more important issue as Bonn’s Ostpolitik in general became increasingly deadlocked. Brandt’s Foreign Ministry repeatedly emphasized that, given the problems with establishing political contacts with the East, more attention should be given to trade as the main instrument for Bonn’s détente policy in the foreseeable future and as a ‘political weapon’ against ‘East Berlin’s divisive policy’.⁴¹⁹ Not long after the Prague invasion, direct German–Soviet negotiations on trade were resumed. In April 1969, a cooperation treaty was concluded between Moscow and the German firm Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG in cooperation with the Ministry of Economics for the joint construction of pipe factories. This treaty, which was praised by Ernst Wolf Mommsen, the head of Thyssen, as a possible new model for German–Soviet cooperation,⁴²⁰ turned out to be the prelude to the even more important German–Soviet natural gas deal concluded in February 1970. Until then, it was the biggest transaction ever concluded between the Soviet Union and West Germany.⁴²¹ The Foreign Ministry wished to use the Soviets’ increasingly visible interest in trade relations and to expand economic cooperation into contractual trade and political relations. In July 1969, Brandt and his staff repeatedly pointed out this interest to Schiller’s Ministry of Economics.⁴²² However, the government’s attempts to exploit trade for its foreign policy concerns failed, not least because of the resistance of German industry. West German business was reserved about mingling trade with Eastern policy. Prominent German business leaders, such as Ernst Schneider, President of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag (Association of German Chambers of Commerce, DIHT), criticized politicized trade with the Eastern bloc and opposed the view that trade with the East was a flexible instrument of foreign ⁴¹⁹ PA, B 150 and doc. 185: Ruete, May and 2 Oct. 1967, Foreign Ministry, Dec. 1967, and unit for all-German affairs, 22 June 1968. After the Prague invasion, on 6 Nov. 1968, Ruete regarded Eastern trade as one of the few remaining topics of interest in the dialogue between the West and East; ACDP, 01–226, A 001: Brandt to Kiesinger, 7 June 1968. ⁴²⁰ BAK, B 102, 100017: Mommsen to Schiller, 6 May 1969. ⁴²¹ Angela Stent, Wandel durch Handel? Die politisch-wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deuschland und der Sowjetunion (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), 142; Hélène Seppain, Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917–91: Politics by Economic Means (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 201. ⁴²² BAK, B 102, 99987: Herbst, 3 July 1969, and Brandt, 10 July 1969.

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policy to be used for furthering national interests.⁴²³ Moreover, Bonn’s economic incentives and offers to conclude a trade treaty were too insignificant to move the Soviets to any political concessions. As a result, trade remained a private sector that developed independently of political relations and despite the absence of a formal trade agreement.⁴²⁴ The new Social–Liberal government switched to a policy that avoided exploiting economics for political purposes. Having realized that previous administrations had failed to extract any important political concessions through the negative use of economic levers, Brandt altered the interface between politics and economics in German–Soviet relations and no longer strove for a politicization of trade. Yet both he and Scheel did hope that politics and trade would reinforce each other.⁴²⁵ Indeed, there were considerable grounds for this hope, for it was obvious to the Brandt government that the Soviets were sincerely interested in expanding economic and political cooperation with the FRG.⁴²⁶ Dimitri Polianski, a Soviet Politburo member, revealed this Soviet interest to several SPD politicians most clearly during their stay in Moscow in summer 1969. He remarked that if economic relations between the two states improved, this would surely ‘not be without influence on political relations’.⁴²⁷ As Scheel saw it, it was the Soviet Union’s chronic economic needs that were forcing it into cooperation with the Western world.⁴²⁸ Although Bonn no longer wanted to exploit trade for its Eastern policy in the manner in which it had been exploited previously, it was not averse to using economic incentives for political purposes. Bahr advised the new government to strive for an intensification of ⁴²³ Thomas Paul Koppel, ‘Sources of Change in West German Ostpolitik: The Grand Coalition, 1966–1969’, dissertation, Madison, 1972, 331. ⁴²⁴ Ibid. 330–1. For further information on West German trade policy until 1969 see Karl-Heinz Schlarp, Zwischen Konfrontation und Kooperation: Die Anfangsjahre der deutsch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen in der Ära Adenauer (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000); Robert W. Dean, West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1974), 143–56; Robert Mark Spaulding, Osthandel and Ostpolitik: German Foreign Trade Policies in Eastern Europe from Bismarck to Adenauer (Providence, RI: Berghahn, 1997), 440–69. ⁴²⁵ Stent, Embargo, 177–8. ⁴²⁶ e.g. PA, B 41, 1054: Ruete, 10 Nov. 1969; BAK, B 102, 99989: Ambassador Emmel, 11 Feb. 1970. ⁴²⁷ PA, B 150, doc. 288: Polianski and Kosygin, 22 Aug. 1969. ⁴²⁸ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 71, 914: Scheel 15 Jan. 1970.

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bilateral relations in the economic sector because this might create beneficial conditions for a rapprochement in the political sector.⁴²⁹ In fact, during the sluggish early phase of bilateral renunciation-of-force talks Brandt seemed to be trying to lure Moscow by emphasizing his government’s interest in extended trade relations.⁴³⁰ At this stage, the Foreign Ministry’s Ministerialdirektor Frank also suggested to a Soviet pressman that Bonn and Moscow should start with an economic and cultural cooperation, which would then influence political relations in the desired fashion.⁴³¹ As to relations between the Brandt government and business organizations, these were characterized by a much improved and closer cooperation. Generally speaking, the industrial conservatives, and even the younger generation of the industrial elite, only slowly learnt to cope with a government that, for the first time in forty years, was led by a Social Democrat.⁴³² However, when it came to trade with the Soviet Union, the interests of government and business now coincided felicitously, whereas previously they had often been at loggerheads.⁴³³ It was against the background of the start of Brandt’s German–Soviet renunciationof-force negotiations that leading West German industrialists prepared to journey eastwards to make potentially lucrative deals with Moscow.⁴³⁴ In the following months, government and business leaders regularly consulted and exchanged ideas about economic projects and political plans, which developed on different levels. In that sense, they acted as partners who helped each other to further their respective projects in trade and Ostpolitik. Accordingly, trade unions adopted a loyal attitude to the new government and supported Brandt’s policy towards the East. This was not least due to the fact that certain leading functionaries of the Deutscher Gwerkschaftsbund (Federation of German Trade unions, DGB, the umbrella association of West German trade unions, were also members of the Executive Committee of the SPD, and that Brandt’s Ostpolitik ⁴²⁹ PA, B 150, doc. 296: Bahr, 21 Sept. 1969; ibid., doc. 301: Bahr, 24 Sept. 1969. ⁴³⁰ Ibid., doc. 297: Brandt to Gromyko, 22 Sept. 1969. ⁴³¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 399, 3: Frank, 23 Oct. 1969. ⁴³² Volker R. Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945–1973 (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986), 320, 329. ⁴³³ Stent, Embargo, 168. ⁴³⁴ Volker Berghahn, ‘Lowering Soviet Expectations: West German Industry and Osthandel during the Brandt Era’, in Volker Berghahn (ed.), The Quest for Economic Empire: European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996), 150.

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also served their own interest by making contact with trade unions in the Eastern bloc.⁴³⁵ West German business leaders made efforts to show their goodwill from the start. For instance, the Bund der Deutschen Industrie (Federal Association of German Industry, BDI), the umbrella association for all the big economic and industrial organizations, stated its approval in its 1969/70 annual review of the government’s first initiatives towards the East. It emphasized that its main objective was to act as a ‘reliable and constructive adviser to business and government . . . geared to real opportunities for the development of economic relations with the countries in the East’.⁴³⁶ In addition, Heinz Schmidt of Daimler Benz AG congratulated Bahr on his nomination as State Secretary at the Chancellery and expressed his wish that he might help to solve the important political questions from this central position. Schmidt informed Bahr about the very promising relations of his firm with the Soviet automobile industry and offered to keep him posted on their further development, for this would surely also have political repercussions.⁴³⁷ Soon afterwards, Schmidt confided to Bahr that during talks with representatives of the automobile industry it had been revealed that the Soviets had great expectations concerning the new government’s Ostpolitik. Schmidt then repeated his wish to consult with Bahr about relations with the Soviet automobile industry.⁴³⁸ Similarly, the head of Thyssen, Mommsen, entered into close contact with Bahr to inform and consult him about his projects as well as new possibilities for economic cooperation with the Soviet Union on a governmental level. He warned Bahr in advance that the Soviets would soon approach the FRG with far-reaching proposals concerning German support for their industrialization programme. Mommsen also announced that he would meet Ambassador Emmel in order to discuss these potential new forms of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.⁴³⁹ ⁴³⁵ For instance, see AAPD 1970, i, doc. 81: Vetter to Dahrendorf, 2 Mar. 1970; Deutscher Gewerk schaftsbund, press service, 30 Dec. 1969, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 239; David E. Patton, Cold War Politics in Postwar Germany (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 3. ⁴³⁶ The annual review for 1 May 1969–31 May 1970, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 240. ⁴³⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Daimler Benz, 56: Schmidt to Bahr, 6 Nov. 1969. ⁴³⁸ Ibid.: Schmidt to Bahr, 26 Nov. 1969. ⁴³⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Mommsen, 109: Mommsen to Bahr, 21 Nov. 1969 and 19 Jan. 1970.

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In fact, in the coming months, bilateral economic projects were promoted by the government as well as the industrial elite. First of all, the establishment of a committee for German–Soviet economic cooperation, which had been initiated in the summer of 1969, was under discussion. Given the problems caused by the German demand for the inclusion of Berlin and the Soviet wish for import liberalizations, both government leaders and business leaders decided to abstain from treaty negotiations for the time being and to introduce preparatory talks instead.⁴⁴⁰ The talks were started in Moscow in February and were regarded as a success in that they laid the basis for cooperation in concrete issues in the near future.⁴⁴¹ Most important of all were the negotiations conducted on the natural gas deal. These followed from Nikolai Patolichev’s visit to the Hanover fair in April 1969 in connection with the concluded cooperation treaty. During this visit, Patolichev had suggested that West Germany might be interested in importing Soviet natural gas in return for large-diameter pipes. The negotiations were led by Klaus von Dohnanyi, State Secretary at the Ministry of Economics. Also involved was the Bavarian Economics Minister as well as Ruhrgas, Germany’s largest distributor of natural gas, and several steel firms, notably Mannesmann AG and Thyssen Röhrenwerke AG. The deal was finally signed in Essen on 1 February 1970.⁴⁴² It was especially significant and innovative in that economic and political interests converged in it. Whereas the firms and banks were attracted by the economic advantages of the deal, the government was clearly interested in its political pay-offs.⁴⁴³ In a confidential meeting after the signing of the treaty, both the Economics Minister, Schiller and Patolichev welcomed this deal and agreed that it was an incentive for further expanding bilateral economic relations. At the same time, however, Schiller made clear that his government wanted parallel progress in talks about trade and political problems, in particular the renunciation of force. Although Patolichev stressed that the development of trade relations could not be made dependent on political questions, they both agreed that progress in ⁴⁴⁰ BAK, B 102, 99989 and 100001: Ministry of Economics, 20 Nov. 1969 and 27 January 1970. ⁴⁴¹ Ibid., 99989: Ambassador Emmel, 11 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁴² See AAPD 1970, i, doc. 23, n. 1; Michael Kreile, Osthandel und Ostpolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1978), 126. ⁴⁴³ Stent, Embargo, 168.

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trade, such as the natural gas treaty, would have a positive influence on political relations—in this case on the ongoing talks in Moscow.⁴⁴⁴ The conclusion of the gas treaty was followed by discussion between representatives of the Bonn government and Soviet officials about further forms of German–Soviet cooperation in the economic field. As Ambassador Emmel reported, this meeting, in turn, created a first basis for the elaboration of practical forms of cooperation in the near future.⁴⁴⁵ However, in March 1970, in a consultation between members of the government, notably from the Ministry of Economics, Chancellery, and Foreign Ministry, the improvement of political, not economic relations was given top priority. It was decided that, despite Bonn’s economic as well as political interest in a trade treaty, no trade negotiations should be opened before the political talks between Bahr and Gromyko had taken place.⁴⁴⁶ Consequently, governmental negotiations about economic questions were put on hold and were not resumed until after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. This did not mean that government and business leaders ceased to cooperate, however. Business leaders continued to inform Bonn about the progress of unofficial trade negotiations and were in turn supported by the Brandt government. They also expressed their support of the government’s ‘ostpolitical’ initiatives. For instance, Bahr was kept updated by Schmidt of Daimler Benz about the latest preparations for negotiations about the automobile project. Schmidt then thanked Bahr for his promotion of the project.⁴⁴⁷ In fact, negotiations about the automobile project were started with Moscow in the summer of 1970. From 23 July to 2 August, a Soviet delegation visited Daimler Benz AG in Stuttgart. Alexander Tarassov, minister for the automobile industry, happily stated afterwards that the technical preconditions for cooperation could now be taken for granted.⁴⁴⁸ Thereafter, Schmidt met Ehmke and other State Secretaries from the relevant government departments in order to discuss the ‘very positive’ development of this project, namely the participation of Daimler Benz in the automobile project in the Soviet Union.⁴⁴⁹ ⁴⁴⁴ BAK, B 102, 100026: Schiller and Patolichev, 1 Feb. 1970; ibid., 100029: Schiller to Brandt, 4 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁴⁵ AAPD 1970, i, doc. 49: Emmel, 11 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁴⁶ BAK, B 102, 99988: Ministry of Economics, 12 Mar. 1970. ⁴⁴⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Daimler Benz, 56: Schmidt, 1 Apr. 1970. ⁴⁴⁸ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 368, n. 5: Scheel on Tarassov, 5 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁴⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Daimler Benz, 56: Schmidt to Bahr, 18 Aug. 1970.

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In addition, Mommsen, in a thorough analysis addressed to Bahr, pointed to several possibilities for expanding trade with the Soviet Union. He suggested a completely new form of cooperation which would introduce a linkage of the Soviet and German economies. He then reported on the positive development of his firm’s experiment in the joint production of pipes in the Soviet Union.⁴⁵⁰ A few weeks later, Mommsen briefed Bahr about a new, very attractive deal which the Soviets had proposed in the area of armament supply. Everything seemed to be possible now, Mommsen jubilantly reported, and he proposed to talk this over with Bahr personally.⁴⁵¹ In May 1970, Mommsen expressed his commitment to the government’s new Ostpolitik towards the Soviet Union. As he wrote to Bahr, he was following his work with great interest and was very enthusiastic about Bahr’s steady progress. He then offered to help with Bahr’s work.⁴⁵² Matthias Schmitt from AEG-Telefunken was another partner with whom Bahr had exchanges about German–Soviet trade relations. In April 1970, Bahr asked him for an analysis of the possibilities of more intensive trade with the Soviet Union.⁴⁵³ As soon as an agreement about the text of the Moscow Treaty was in the offing, the Brandt government turned its attention to economic questions again. Immediately after the initialling of the Moscow Treaty, the cabinet deliberated the question of resuming governmental trade negotiations, which had been interrupted in autumn 1966 and had not been resumed since because of the known difficulties. Again, the political interest in a trade treaty as a further step to improve bilateral relations and to begin economic cooperation was stated. In addition, the economic interest of both government and German business in securing the supply of crude oil and ores, as well as in getting new orders, was underlined. At the same time, however, the familiar problems of the Berlin clause and import liberalization were listed as disadvantages. It was decided to weigh up the pros and cons in the light of the results of political negotiations in Moscow. Scheel should be asked to comment on the prospect of trade negotiations and also on the establishment of a working group for industrial and technical cooperation after the conclusion of political negotiations.⁴⁵⁴ ⁴⁵⁰ ⁴⁵¹ ⁴⁵² ⁴⁵⁴

AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Mommsen, 109: Mommsen, 4 Apr. 1970. AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Mommsen, 23 Apr. and 27 May 1970. Ibid.: Mommsen, 29 May 1970. ⁴⁵³ Ibid.: Professor Schmitt, Apr. 1970. BAK, B 102, 100001: Ministry of Economics, 7 Aug. 1970.

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First of all, on 5 August 1970, Scheel and Gromyko addressed the question of economic cooperation and in particular the Daimler project.⁴⁵⁵ Moreover, Brandt’s first encounters with President Kosygin in Moscow during the signing of the Moscow Treaty were dominated by a discussion about the new prospects for German–Soviet relations in the economic field. Kosygin immediately proposed the development of a programme for commercial cooperation for five years. Brandt also reassured Kosygin of his government’s interest, as well as that of German business, in long-term economic cooperation.⁴⁵⁶ Thus Brandt rediscovered the great significance of the economic factor in German–Soviet relations. In fact, the Soviets’ interest in official economic relations with the FRG turned out to be the prime motive for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. The Kremlin hoped that the signing of the treaty would give it an opportunity to increase economic links. In Brandt’s eyes, the Soviets regarded the Daimler project in particular as a ‘test case’ for further German–Soviet relations.⁴⁵⁷ Scheel and other important aides, such as Sahm, arrived at the same conclusion: that the Soviets’ basic motive for concluding the Moscow Treaty was their interest in industrial cooperation with the FRG.⁴⁵⁸ The reactions of West German business to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty were ambivalent. Both Mommsen and Schmidt congratulated the government, and Bahr in particular, on the treaty. They each praised it as a crucial step towards a normalization of relations and close cooperation with the Soviet Union, which they had always regarded as right.⁴⁵⁹ The business newspaper Handelsblatt reported that businessmen felt that the renunciation-of-force treaty could have a positive effect on the climate of bilateral economic relations. However, given the problems with West German–Soviet trade as a result of the absence of a trade treaty and the unresolved issue of a Berlin clause, the crucial political negotiations for business were the Four-Power talks on Berlin. Hence the German–Soviet treaty was seen as useful to the extent that it might be the first step to facilitating an agreement on ⁴⁵⁵ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 368: Scheel and Gromyko, 5 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., docs. 387 and 390: Brandt and Kosygin, 12 and 13 Aug. 1970. ⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., doc. 401: Brandt, 19 Aug. 1970; Stent, Embargo, 170. ⁴⁵⁸ BAK, N 1474, 87: Scheel in the cabinet, 8 Aug. 1970; BAK, N 1474, 125: Sahm in a private note, c. Aug. 1970. ⁴⁵⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Mommsen, 109: Mommsen, 14 Aug. and 4 Nov. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, Daimler Benz, 56: Schmidt, 18 Aug. 1970.

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Berlin.⁴⁶⁰ However, there were other business leaders, such as Fritz Berg from the BDI, who were much more sceptical of Ostpolitik. Not surprisingly, such individuals were in many cases not involved, and hence not interested, in any trade with the East. They warned against giving Eastern initiatives priority over Westpolitik, and against being overly optimistic about the potential of trade with the East.⁴⁶¹ Representative of the views of the BDI and its Ostausschuss (committee for questions related to the east) was an article written by Otto Wolff von Amerongen, spokesman for German business interests in the Soviet Union, after the treaty. In it, he explained why there should be only a mild optimism about the prospects of German–Soviet trade.⁴⁶² In its annual review for 1970/1, however, the BDI gave a generally positive assessment of the government’s Ostpolitik. It confirmed that the active Ostpolitik introduced in October 1969 had had an undeniable stimulant effect on trade policy. Never before had so many official economic negotiations with Eastern European countries been undertaken as in 1970/1.⁴⁶³ In essence, under the Brandt government the interests of the government and parts of West German business had much in common concerning both Eastern trade and Ostpolitik. For the government, trade was a convenient complement to its Eastern policy and was successfully used as an incentive to improve the general atmosphere of political talks. Conversely, West German business welcomed new Ostpolitik to the extent that it constituted favourable conditions for improved trade relations with the East. Despite their different motivations, West German government and business supported the same end, an expansion of bilateral trade and political relations. Those business leaders with no involvement in Eastern trade, by contrast, were much more sceptical of both trade with the East and Ostpolitik. However, neither the supportive nor the critical areas of business affected the decision-making of Ostpolitik decisively. They remained in the background. Trade as a factor, by contrast, cannot be underestimated. In fact, along side the need to contain both the Sino-Soviet conflict and the ⁴⁶⁰ Stent, Embargo, 174. ⁴⁶¹ German International (Sept. 1970), 13, in Stent, Embargo, 174. ⁴⁶² Otto Wolff von Amerongen, ‘Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit dem Osten’, in Erik Boettcher (ed.), Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit dem Osten (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971), 9–14; Stent, Embargo, 175; German International (Sept. 1970), 13, in Stent, Embargo, 174. ⁴⁶³ The BDI’s annual report 1970/71, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 241.

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Warsaw Pact partners, the importance of trade relations with the West in the light of a stagnating economy and the need for access to Western technology constituted the political reason for détente from Moscow’s point of view.⁴⁶⁴ The perspective of trade with the ‘economic giant’ West Germany was one of the most important incentives for Moscow to conclude the Moscow Treaty.

The Refugees: Vocal but Uninfluential Naysayers Next to West German Business, the lobby with the most direct interests at stake in Ostpolitik consisted of the refugee organizations. In fact, the refugees, who had fled or been expelled from their homes east of the Oder and Neisse rivers after the Second World War, formed the only group which was concerned first and foremost with the Federal Republic’s relations with the East. In the period under consideration, they formed a large group, claiming a membership of two and a half million members out of approximately ten million refigees in the West German population altogether. According to one source, they published 361 newspapers, and at their annual meetings an average of 400,000 Silesians, 350,000 Sudeten Germans, 200,000 East Prussians, and 150,000 Pomeranians attended.⁴⁶⁵ These groups, organized as Landsmannschaften according to place of origin, were in turn united in the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV—League of Refugees).⁴⁶⁶ The refugees tried to influence Ostpolitik in various ways and on various levels. Firstly, they attempted to affect public opinion through their publications, public statements, large annual meetings, and cultural events. Secondly, they tried to influence governmental policies through their representatives in the Bundestag, the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs, the parties, and, at times, the cabinet. Since their own refugee party, the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (league of those driven from their homes and deprived of their rights, BHE), had been abolished shortly before the Bundestag election of 1961, the refugees were represented in all three national parties in the Bundestag, the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP. As a result, they had access to the parliamentary as well as the executive level. ⁴⁶⁴ Christoph Bluth, The Two Germanies and Military Security in Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002), 28; Kreile, Osthandel, 134–6. ⁴⁶⁵ Rheinischer Merkur (12 June 1970), in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 322. ⁴⁶⁶ Ibid. 321–2.

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From the mid 1960s, when the pressing needs of the refugees, welfare and the problems of their integration into West German society had become less urgent, and when the Bonn government became increasingly involved in improving relations with Eastern Europe, the refugees gave more attention to Eastern political affairs. At the beginning of the Grand Coalition government, the refugees trusted the leading politicians of both the CDU/CSU and SPD to conduct an Ostpolitik in their interest. As stated in the Deutscher Ostdienst (DOD), the refugees’ press organ, they thought their concern for their Heimatrecht (right to a homeland) in the lost territories in the East and for a Germany with its borders of 1937 to be in safe hands.⁴⁶⁷ As it became increasingly clear, however, that the SPD was the party most willing to make compromises on legal claims and to give priority to a détente policy over the representation of the refugees’ concerns, the relationship between SPD and refugees deteriorated. The Nuremberg SPD congress in March 1968 revealed the deep divide between the political views and led the refugees vehemently to reject the SPD position on Ostpolitik.⁴⁶⁸ Reinhold Rehs, an SPD member and President of the BdV, wrote to Brandt that his comments on a provisional recognition of the Oder–Neisse line had triggered great concern among the refugees and that the BdV was expecting some clarification in terms of the SPD still holding to its policies as announced in the government declaration of 13 December 1966.⁴⁶⁹ From then on, the BdV ceased to take part in talks with the SPD. It virtually declared war on the SPD, stating that the next election would offer the voter the opportunity ‘to decide whether to vote for a party which recognizes and respects unjust circumstances created by force’.⁴⁷⁰ Consequently, SPD representation in the refugee organizations weakened ⁴⁶⁷ DOD-, 8/48–9 (8 Dec. 1966), 1. ⁴⁶⁸ Rheinischer Merkur (5 Apr. 1968); Die Zeit (5 Apr. and 4 June 1968); Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung (6 Aug. 1968); Die Welt (14 May 1968); Hans-Josef Brües, ‘Artikulation and Repräsentation Politischer Verbandsinteressen, dargestellt am Beispiel der Vertriebenenorganisationen’, dissertation, Cologne, 1972, 144–6; see also Johann Heinrich Frömel, ‘Die Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands und die Vertriebenenverbände 1945–1969: Vom Konsens zum Dissens’, Deutschland und seine Nachbarn: Forum für Kultur und Politik, xxiv (Bonn, 1999), 23. ⁴⁶⁹ Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik: Dokumentation, i: Eine Dokumentation von Stellungnahmen, Reden und Entschließungen des Bundes der Vertriebenen—Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landesverbände 1949–1972, ed. Werner Blumenthal and Bardo Faßbender (Bonn: Bund der Vertriebenen, 1984), doc. 103: Rehs to Brandt, 19 March 1968. ⁴⁷⁰ Die Zeit (12 Apr. 1968), in Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 325.

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and the CDU/CSU was clearly in the ascendant in the individual Landsmannschaften, as first became apparent with the significant loss of votes in the elections in Baden-Württemberg in summer 1968.⁴⁷¹ By the end of the Grand Coalition government, it was clear that the CDU/CSU, and not the SPD, was the party of the organized refugees.⁴⁷² However, by that time, the refugees’ influence on the two major parties had already begun to decline drastically. Crucial for this process had been the Evangelical Church’s memorandum of October 1965, which put the moral claim of the Germans into perspective by stressing that the Poles also had a Heimatrecht, and that West Germany had to contribute to the process of reconciliation and abandon the refugees’ revisionist claims.⁴⁷³ Given that the Protestant Church had formerly been regarded as a bastion of German nationalism, and was an institution to which the majority of Germans were affiliated, this memorandum carried heavy symbolic weight. The country’s political elites now failed to rush to the defence of refugee organizations in the manner that had been customary in the early 1960s.⁴⁷⁴ The new Social–Liberal government was perceived with scepticism among the refugees. It raised fears that ‘everything’ would be ‘recognized now’.⁴⁷⁵ To start with, the BdV protested against the government’s dissolution of its Ministry of Refugees, as well as the renaming of the Ministry for All-German Affairs as the Ministry for Intra-German Affairs. President Rehs held that with these moves the government had promoted a policy at the refugees’ expense, and sent the chairmen of the parties and parliamentary parties a written complaint.⁴⁷⁶ The government, in turn, defended the measure, arguing that the Ministry of Refugees had merely been integrated into the Ministry of the ⁴⁷¹ PA, B 2, 189: Ahlers, 10 June 1968. ⁴⁷² Die Zeit (30 May 1968); Frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung (24 May 1968); Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 327. ⁴⁷³ William E. Paterson and David Southern, Modern Governments: Governing Germany (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 285. For further details on the roles of the Evangelical and Catholic churches in Ostpolitik, see Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945–1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 203–7; Ralph Duwe, ‘Die Haltung der evangelischen Kirchen Deutschlands gegenüber der Politik und Programmatik der Sozial-Liberalen Koalition in den Jahren 1969–1974, dargelegt anhand von ausgewählten Beispielen’, dissertation, Koblenz, 1995, 41–73. ⁴⁷⁴ Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 205. ⁴⁷⁵ AdsD, SPD-PV, 3014: Reitzner to Stephan, 3 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁷⁶ BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1969, 417: BdV, 10 Oct. 1969; see also complaints by Reinhold Rehs, 24 Oct. 1969; AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 944: BdV, 10 and 28 Oct. 1969.

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Interior, where the refugees’ concerns would be considered in the same manner and by the same people as before.⁴⁷⁷ Genscher, Minister of the Interior, tried to reassure Rehs privately. He asked Rehs to continue talks with him and look for opportunities to cooperate even though there would be disagreement on certain issues.⁴⁷⁸ Moreover, the Bonn government reconfirmed what Brandt had underlined in the government declaration of 28 October: that there would be no politics behind the refugees’ backs and that nobody would represent their interests better.⁴⁷⁹ Rehs was neither convinced nor reassured by this reasoning. Instead, he criticized the government declaration, particularly the comments on the two German states, and called it a violation of the refugees’ interests.⁴⁸⁰ Simultaneously, he made efforts to ally himself with the CDU/CSU against Brandt’s policies. He thanked the opposition leaders for making comments in favour of the refugees and giving a warning of the new Ostpolitik in parliament. He then expressed his hope of discussing the government’s negotiations with Moscow and Poland with the opposition leaders.⁴⁸¹ Indeed, on 20 January 1970, the chairmen of the CDU and BdV exchanged views; both rejected the government’s recognition of a second German state and asked Brandt to cling to reunification.⁴⁸² The atmosphere improved, however, at least from the government’s point of view, after a first meeting with the Silesian refugee organization about ‘German–Polish neighbourliness’. Hans Stephan, the SPD official in charge of refugee questions, reported to Brandt, Wehner, Schmidt, and Wischnewski that all participants had agreed on the need to enter into renunciation-of-force talks with the Poles. Moreover, Stephan observed that the refugees’ leading bodies now seemed prepared for a sincere debate and recommended renewing the dialogue with the refugee organizations.⁴⁸³ ⁴⁷⁷ AdsD, SPD-PV, 3013: SPD Chairmanship, 17 Oct. 1969. ⁴⁷⁸ BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1969, 417: Genscher to Rehs, 26 Nov. 1969. ⁴⁷⁹ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 71, 225, 252–4: Mattick, 29 Oct., Genscher, 30 Oct. 1969, Genscher and Ehmke, 5 Nov. 1969; also ibid., 3147: Schäfer of the parliamentary SPD, 5 June 1967. ⁴⁸⁰ BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1969, 417: Rehs, 1 and 27 Nov. 1969. ⁴⁸¹ Ibid., 1969, 417, and 1970–71, 418: Rehs, 1 Nov. 1969 and 16 Jan. 1970; BAK, N 1397, 152: Barzel asking for more consideration of the refugees’ concerns, 21 Nov. 1969. ⁴⁸² ACDP, 01–294, 53/1: CDU and BdV chairmen, 20 Jan. 1970. ⁴⁸³ AdsD, SPD-PV, 3013: Stephan, 26 Nov. 1969.

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In fact, not least owing to its weak parliamentary majority, the government ignored the BdV’s criticism and repeatedly underlined its wish for talks. The BdV, also interested in consultation, responded positively to this request. Thus from the start, consultative meetings took place, though less frequently than in previous years, between Scheel, Genscher, Franke, and refugee leaders, most importantly President Rehs as well as his representatives, the deputies Herbert Czaja (CDU), Herbert Hupka (SPD), and Walter Becher (CSU). Other representatives of the government involved in an exchange with the refugees about the talks in Moscow and Warsaw were Ehmke, Dahrendorf, Duckwitz, and Sahm.⁴⁸⁴ Yet the first résumé after these soundings with governmental representatives was negative. In the ‘Bremer resolution’, the BdV declared that it would resist the recognition of the GDR and any borders with all democratic and legal means. It then asked for the support of all democratic parties to prevent any illegal undertakings.⁴⁸⁵ In the coming months, the refugees watched and commented critically on Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Incidents such as Brandt’s remarks in an interview in February, about his belief in the German people’s unity but not necessarily in one state, as well as declarations regarding the two-state theory, added to their hostile attitude towards the Brandt government. Through regular publications in their press organ as well as speeches and demonstrations, refugee leaders tried to mobilize their members as well as the public against Brandt’s Ostpolitik.⁴⁸⁶ From January 1970 onwards, however, the government observed that the refugee press was less critical of governmental policies. Key refugee activists stressed the need to remain non-partisan and to build ‘loyal relations’ with the new government. The SPD refugee expert Stephan explained this by referring to the insecurities and controversies about the right political position manifesting themselves inside the refugees’ organization. As he told Ehmke and the SPD Committee for Refugees (Referat Heimatvertriebene), for the first time ⁴⁸⁴ Brües, ‘Verbandsinteressen’, p. 154; BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen, des Präsidiums 1969, 417: Hupka, Brandt, Scheel, and Franke, Oct. 1969; BdV and Genscher, 20 Nov. 1969; BdV about the minister’s wishes for meetings, 27 Nov. 1969; Rehs and Duckwitz, 11 Feb. 1970; Erklärungen zur Deutschlandpolitik, doc. 131: BdV, BMD (Bund der Mitteldeutschen—Federation of Central Germans), and the government, 13 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁸⁵ ACDP, 01–291, 125/1: the BdV, 17 and 18 Jan. 1970. ⁴⁸⁶ e.g. AdsD, SPD-PV, 3013: DOD (4 Feb., 6, 23, and 30 Apr., 11 June, and 9 July 1970); AdsD, SPD-PV, 3014: refugee demonstration in Cologne, 5 Mar. 1970.

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the BdV had indicated that it felt less confident about its course. It regarded the retreat to legal arguments as no longer efficient and many of its demands as too backward-looking. The BdV chairmanship had therefore decided to pause and possibly revise the BdV’s principles, against the resistance of some reluctant members and Landsmannschaften who did not want to adapt to any changes. Stephan advised respecting the BdV’s wish to stay out of the public eye at this time and to conduct talks very privately in order to avoid internal conflicts with its members. He emphasized that the government should continue its efforts to inform the refugees about all talks with the East.⁴⁸⁷ More ideas about how to win the refugees over came from other SPD members. Walter Richter of the SPD Committee for Refugees, for instance, urged the government to make greater efforts to consider the refugees’ concerns by increasing the political significance of the relevant department inside the Ministry of the Interior. He suggested a ‘wise’ policy of subsidizing certain refugee organizations, which might influence these in favour of government policy.⁴⁸⁸ The tendency towards better relations and compromise between the BdV and government faded away, and was even reversed, when Herbert Czaja took over from Rehs as head of the BdV in March 1970. Brandt congratulated Czaja on his presidency and re-emphasized his government’s intention to consider the refugees’ interests as well as his hope for the refugees’ cooperation in his peace-orientated policy, but Czaja was not easily impressed.⁴⁸⁹ Under his lead, the BdV was developing a tougher stance, realizing that the government intended to proceed with its Ostpolitik regardless of its interventions. Stephan warned his ‘refugees’ unit’ that in the near future it would be necessary to account for attacks against the government’s and especially the SPD politics from this camp. The refugees’ activities would therefore have to be observed carefully.⁴⁹⁰ While conducting talks with Moscow and Warsaw, the government took various measures to reconcile the refugees. There was agreement about the need to hear the ‘reasonable people among the refugees’, ⁴⁸⁷ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 320 and SPD-PV, 3014: Stephan, 18 and 19 Feb. 1970; see also BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1969, 417 and 1970–71, 418: Rehs addressing these problems, 2 Oct. 1969 and 11 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁸⁸ AdsD, SPD-PV, 2997: Richter, 23 Feb. 1970. ⁴⁸⁹ AdsD, WBA, BK, 35: Brandt to Czaja, 17 Mar. 1970. ⁴⁹⁰ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 922, and SPD-PV, 3014: Stephan, 11 Mar. 1970.

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as Brandt put it, prior to making any decision about the recognition of the Oder–Neisse line.⁴⁹¹ Thus representatives of the government arranged for a couple of meetings with the refugee leaders in which they explained all their Eastern initiatives. Most importantly, they again defended their recognition of the GDR as a state as reconcilable with the right of self-determination.⁴⁹² In addition, Ehmke advised countering the hostile attitude of the refugees with a policy of drastically increasing the information given out and distributing special information to the refugees in their organizations.⁴⁹³ Further efforts to appease the refugees were made in the Bundestag, by Brandt and the parliamentary State Secretary Dahrendorf. Dahrendorf emphasized that the refugees’ arguments would be considered in all Eastern negotiations, and Brandt paid tribute to the refugees’ valuable cooperation in the past.⁴⁹⁴ However, Czaja turned a blind eye to the government’s attempts at cooperation. He described Bonn’s two-state theory, as well as the recognition that was envisaged of the Oder–Neisse line, as a violation of the Deutschlandvertrag (Germany treaty).⁴⁹⁵ The government’s announcement of its intention to participate at the BdV’s Easter events was rejected, so that for the first time no government representative attended them. A climax of tension was reached when on 17 May Czaja publicly appealed to all refugees as well as any ‘politically responsible forces in the FRG’ to enter into legal resistance against a ‘fatal’ Eastern policy.⁴⁹⁶ Announcements of resistance against Brandt’s ‘policy of recognition’ also came from several Landsmannschaften, such as the Silesians and Pomeranians, and refugee press organs.⁴⁹⁷ In a demonstration on 30 May, the BdV described resistance against Ostpolitik as ‘a civil duty’.⁴⁹⁸ ⁴⁹¹ PA, B1, 348: Auswärtige Amt, 10 Apr. 1970; BAK, N 1474, 83: Brandt, 15 Apr. 1970. ⁴⁹² Ibid.: meeting between representatives of the government and the BMD, 15 Apr. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 393, 2: further meeting between Bahr, Genscher, and BdV leaders, 3 May 1970; AdsD, SPD-PV, 3014: Ehmke, 22 Apr. 1970. ⁴⁹³ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, 265: Ehmke to Brandt, 22 Apr. 1970. ⁴⁹⁴ Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, vol. 72, 2441, 2565: Dahrendorf, 30 Apr. 1970, and Brandt, 8 May 1970. ⁴⁹⁵ DOD, nos. 7 and 9: Czaja, Apr. 1970. ⁴⁹⁶ ACDP, 01–456, 53/5: Czaja, 12 May 1970; ACDP, 01–291, 125/1: Czaja, 17 May 1970. ⁴⁹⁷ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 343 A: the Pomeranians, 8 May, the Silesians, 24 Apr. 1970, and Pommersche Zeitung (8 May 1970). ⁴⁹⁸ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 343 A: BdV, 30 May 1970.

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The government, in turn, was determined to strike back against the refugees’ increasingly vitriolic attacks. Stephan concluded that the refugees had acted outside the democratic framework and thus could no longer be treated as part of it.⁴⁹⁹ Brandt appealed to his government, the governing parliamentary parties, and his party not to let reactionary elements force them on to the defensive. Present borders would have to be respected ‘dispassionately’, which did not mean that the right of self-determination and the German problem would be ignored in any agreements.⁵⁰⁰ Moreover, probably as a result of growing tensions, Ehmke decided in early May to cut subsidies for the BdV and give priority to cultural arrangements.⁵⁰¹ At the same time, however, the government had an interest in avoiding an escalation of tension. In late May, Stephan reassured several refugee organizations of his government’s resolution to ‘decide nothing behind their back’ and not to renounce the national goals of self-determination and reunification in its Eastern political undertakings.⁵⁰² Additionally, government representatives arranged for a further consultation on 3 June, again explaining and defending their Eastern policy as allowing for progress with German unity in the future. However, the refugee representatives criticized the government’s undertaking as upsetting the foundation of human rights; they argued that there was no second German state, and that a renunciation-of-force accord was generally ‘nonsense’. At the same time, Czaja emphasized that the refugees were not generally opposed to negotiations with the East.⁵⁰³ In a ‘working lunch’ with Foreign Minister Scheel on that same day, the refugee leaders agreed, after considerable protest against the government’s policies, to contine consultation.⁵⁰⁴ Thus Bahr speculated that the refugees would in future possibly abstain somewhat from making defamatory statements.⁵⁰⁵ But this prediction was wrong. Alarmed by the increasingly certain prospect of a German–Soviet agreement, Czaja instead intensified his ⁴⁹⁹ AdsD, SPD-PV, 752: Stephan, 22 May 1970. ⁵⁰⁰ BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1970–71, 418: Czaja on Brandt’s letter, 29 June 1970. ⁵⁰¹ BAK, B 106, 22489: Ehmke, 8 May 1970. ⁵⁰² AdsD, SPD-PV, 752: Stephan, 26 May 1970; ibid., 3013: Stephan, 9 June 1970. ⁵⁰³ BAK, B 106, 27362: Czaja, 3 June 1970. ⁵⁰⁴ BAK, N 1397, 55: government and refugee leaders, 3 June 1970; AdsD, SPD-PV, 2113: SPD Executive Committee, 11 June 1970; BdV-Archiv, des Sitzungen Präsidiums, 1970–71, 418: Czaja, 29 June 1970. ⁵⁰⁵ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 245: Bahr to Brandt, 3 June 1970.

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campaigns against the government. He now courted the opposition for support in steering a clear course of rejecting the possible treaties with Moscow and Warsaw and in forcing the government to consult the refugees before making any decisions.⁵⁰⁶ What is more, the BdV appealed to the United States for help: it asked all politically responsible Americans to resist the attempts to make a border treaty out of a non-aggression treaty.⁵⁰⁷ The publication of the Bahr paper increased Czaja’s opposition. He vehemently rejected its content, namely the recognition of the status quo, as a mere customization of Gromyko’s concept and a prejudicing of a peace settlement. Again, he asked for resistance against this policy.⁵⁰⁸ The BdV’s committee for politics and international law was instructed to examine the Bahr paper; the outcome was, unsurprisingly, negative.⁵⁰⁹ Scheel’s ‘amendments’ to the Bahr paper did not cause any change in the refugees’ attitude: the Moscow Treaty was firmly rejected as a border treaty incompatible with the Basic Law and with human rights in general. The ‘safety measures’, in other words the letter on German unity as well as the letter to the Western Allies, were dismissed as insufficient. Additionally, the BdV now turned to the Bundestag and Federal Council and asked them to examine diligently the content of the treaty, hoping that the treaty’s ratification would be rejected by a majority in both. It announced the establishment by the parliamentary CDU/CSU of a committee for the examination of the texts, in which at least two refugee deputies, Czaja and von Wrangel, would take part.⁵¹⁰ While there was disagreement inside the refugee organizations concerning the Moscow Treaty—the Seliger Gemeinde, or seliger community, a Sudeten German group of 25,000 members, for instance, expressly welcomed the Moscow Treaty⁵¹¹—the BdV chairmanship repeated its criticism of ‘the illegal treaty’ a month later.⁵¹² To summarize, the BdV vehemently rejected the government’s initiatives towards the East, and the Moscow Treaty in particular. Not ⁵⁰⁶ ACDP, 01–291, 129/2: Czaja to Kiesinger, 1 July 1970. ⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., 125/1: Czaja in a publication, July 1970. ⁵⁰⁸ DOD, nos. 22 and 13: Czaja, 1 and 3 July 1970. ⁵⁰⁹ ACDP, 01–291, 129/2 and PA, B 41, 1057a: Rehs, July 1970; see also Die Welt (22 July 1970) and the BdV’s Osmipress (27 July 1970). ⁵¹⁰ BdV-Archiv, Sitzungen des Präsidiums, 1970–71, 418: BdV, 9 Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–291, 125/1: the BdV, 11 Aug. 1970. ⁵¹¹ Ibid.: Federal Press Office on interviews with Hupka and Paul of the Seliger Gemeinde, 24 Aug. 1970. ⁵¹² ACDP, 01–291, 134/2: BdV, Oct. 1970.

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least because of its weak parliamentary majority, the Brandt government could not afford to ignore the refugees’ protests and made efforts to reconcile them with its own views. The opposition mounted by the refugees, reduced to condemning new policies without producing credible alternatives, had little impact, however. Moreover, Hupka confirmed that the refugees’ opinion had no influence on the government’s decision-making process.⁵¹³ Despite this, the BdV did not, beyond the announcement of resistance, draw any consequences in the form of a break of relations with the government. On the contrary, some months after the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty it became increasingly willing to re-enter into a dialogue with the government.⁵¹⁴ This was because it depended on the government financially: it needed government subsidies in order to survive as an organization.⁵¹⁵ It did not therefore act as a real opposition and was not perceived as a seriously threatening opposition lobby by the government either. As Helmut Schmidt put it, the refugees played a vocal, but insignificant role.⁵¹⁶

Public and Published Opinion: A Source of Concern Generally speaking, it is fair to say that West German public opinion was initially very favourable towards all ‘ostpolitical’ undertakings. Even during the Grand Coalition government, public opinion would have been prepared to support even greater concessions in dealing with the East than the Kiesinger government actually made.⁵¹⁷ Influenced by the increased activity of the liberal section of the mass media, public opinion would have approved, for instance, of meetings at the highest level between Bonn and the East German leadership. Remarkably, the public’s support for a more flexible and active policy towards the East was not dampened by the relatively limited achievements or the hostility shown by the East during this period. Even after the Prague invasion, ⁵¹³ Hupka to Schmid, 27 June 1976, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 247; see also Peter Reichel, ‘Die Vertriebenenverbände als außenpolitische Pressure Groups’, in Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), Handbuch der deutschen Außenpolitik (Munich: Piper, 1975), 233–8. ⁵¹⁴ AdsD, SPD-PV, 2997: Stephan, 11 Nov. 1971. ⁵¹⁵ See also Brües, ‘Verbandsinteressen’, 161. ⁵¹⁶ Helmut Schmidt to the author, 12 June 2003. Eitel, by contrast, argued in an interview with the author in Nov. 2002 that the BdV was a strong lobby and had considerable influence not least because of its representatives in Parliament. ⁵¹⁷ BAK, B 145, 4287: Emnid opinion poll, 29 Oct. 1969, on mass opinion on Ostpolitik since Dec. 1967.

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mass opinion was in favour of a continuation of Ostpolitik. If one compares public opinion on certain issues, such as the recognition of the GDR, before and after the Prague crisis, it is noticeable that it remained very stable and consistent.⁵¹⁸ Thus, despite the disappointments of this period, there was no obvious tendency for mass opinion to fall back to old positions. Rather, mass opinion was patient and willing to adhere to the announced policies of the Kiesinger government. Concerning the partypolitical positions, SPD supporters tended more towards ‘progressive’ policies whereas CDU supporters adhered to more legalistic positions. However, although the SPD was the party more clearly in step with mass opinion, the differences between the two major parties were not very great. Support for Ostpolitik bridged party divides.⁵¹⁹ For Brandt this was a very important precondition for launching his new Ostpolitik. One public figure who should be mentioned in this context as a crucial ally for Brandt and his policy is the author and intellectual Günter Grass. From the early 1960s onwards, Grass lent his support to Brandt’s Ostpolitik, with many speeches, pamphlets, and election manifestos, in order to attract the intelligentsia and achieve a breakthrough in the public sphere.⁵²⁰ Public opinion about Brandt’s new Eastern initiatives remained favourable, as the BPA’s first reports confirmed. In November 1969, Ahlers reported on several opinion polls on Ostpolitik, undertaken shortly before the change of government, which concluded positively that half of the population was looking forward with hope to the Ostpolitik of the new government. Three-quarters of the population, again across both SPD and CDU camps, approved of political negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin.⁵²¹ Two other studies of October 1969 confirmed that a significant majority (64 per cent) of the population trusted that the new government would not endanger German interests. Just under half (46 per cent) of mass opinion even held that the German question could temporarily be neglected to achieve an improvement in relations with the East, although simultaneously opinions were divided on whether or not the new government should recognize the GDR ‘as a state which is not a foreign country’ (45 per cent agreed, 34 per cent ⁵¹⁸ Ibid.: Emnid opinion poll, 29 Oct. 1969, on mass opinion on Ostpolitik since Dec. 1967. ⁵¹⁹ Koppel, ‘Sources of Change’, 250–5. ⁵²⁰ See Franz Walter, ‘Der Kanzler und seine Intellektuellen’, Spiegel Online (26 Apr. 2006), <www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,412585,00.html>. ⁵²¹ For the percentages, see BAK, B 145, 4292: Infas study, 7 Nov. 1969.

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disagreed, 21 per cent abstained). As to relations with the Soviet Union, an overwhelming majority of the population (78 per cent), with fairly similar percentages for all party affiliations and different backgrounds, held that the new government should enter into talks with Moscow. Remarkable, too, was the fact that a majority of 69 per cent of the population was of the opinion that the new government should conclude renunciation-of-force treaties with Eastern European countries.⁵²² The public’s positive perception of Ostpolitik continued after the Brandt government had taken office. In January, the BPA confirmed that the majority (52 per cent) of West Germans were so far content with the Social–Liberal government. In addition, the BPA reported that a majority (55 per cent) was expecting a relaxation of relations with the East as a result of the government’s new initiatives.⁵²³ The government was aware that for a successful implementation of its planned policies towards the East, it was necessary to keep the public informed about all Eastern initiatives more than had been the case so far. In particular the national press, including the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, and Der Spiegel, was regarded as an important recipient and medium through which to reach the public. At the same time, the press organs were perceived as a pressure group because of their power to influence and form public opinion. In the period under consideration, the most influential press organs appeared to be split into two dissenting camps. The left-liberal press, most notably Die Zeit, Der Spiegel, Stern, and Süddeutsche Zeitung, by and large supported Brandt’s Eastern policies. The other camp, led by the Axel-Springer group with Die Welt and Bild, was critical of the new Ostpolitik.⁵²⁴ The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung steered a middle course between those two groups, being neither for nor against Ostpolitik. The government was aware that through targeted use of the media it could counteract, neutralize or exploit published and public opinion in its favour.⁵²⁵ ⁵²² For the percentages, Infas study, 25 and 28 Nov. 1969; ibid., 4287: Ahlers to Brandt, 5 Dec. 1969. ⁵²³ BAK, B 145, 4292 BPA, 6 Jan. 1970. ⁵²⁴ Gudrun Kruip, Das ‘Welt’-‘Bild’ des Axel Springer Verlags: Journalismus zwischen westlichen Werten und deutschen Denktraditionen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 193, 257–68. ⁵²⁵ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 248–9. For the interaction between the government and the public, see also Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies’, World Politics, 43/4 (1991), 479–512.

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To this end, the government immediately launched public information initiatives. In early November, Scheel organized a meeting with representatives of the press, in which he informed them about all the Eastern political initiatives that he envisaged with the east.⁵²⁶ A few weeks later, Scheel consulted with Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz of the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland (Association for the Promotion of German Reunification) about additional ways of informing the public, such as organizing more discussions in certain circles, for example among youth.⁵²⁷ In a meeting of leading Foreign Ministry officials, it was decided to familiarize not only the German public, but also the international public with the new policy towards the East.⁵²⁸ Moreover, the Brandt government regularly briefed individual privileged journalists from Die Zeit, Stuttgarter Zeitung, and Frankfurter Rundschau.⁵²⁹ In February 1970, Brandt’s assistant Harpprecht suggested to Bahr that he should introduce himself, as well as his diplomatic task in Moscow, to the public, in one of the next broadcasts of Dialoge, a German television programme.⁵³⁰ Another initiative taken by the government was an analysis of the foreign media, to be pursued by the Institute of Psychology at the Nordrhein-Westfälische Technische Hochschule of Aachen, which would keep Bonn informed about attitudes towards its new Ostpolitik abroad.⁵³¹ It is difficult to prove how successful the government’s information campaigns were in yielding fruit. It was a fact, however, that the majority of West Germans responded very positively to Brandt’s Eastern policies in the first few months of his government. Several opinion polls of February 1970, for instance, revealed that slightly less than half of the population supported both Brandt’s decision to write Stoph a letter (49 per cent), and Bahr’s talks with Moscow (40 per cent), whereas only a small minority opposed these initiatives (5 to 10 per cent).⁵³² In March 1970, the public by and large gave similarly supportive feedback. Despite their low expectations regarding any improvements in intra-German relations, a clear majority of West Germans (80 per cent) wanted Brandt to visit Stoph, and many even ⁵²⁶ ⁵²⁷ ⁵²⁸ ⁵²⁹ ⁵³⁰ ⁵³¹ ⁵³²

PA, B 41, 1054: Auswärtige Amt, 10 Nov. 1969. PA, B 38, 276: Scheel to Schütz, 20 Nov. 1969. PA, B 150: Frank, 5 Dec. 1969. Moersch to Schmid, 13 Jan. 1977, in Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 249. AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 58: Harpprecht, 25 Feb. 1970. BAK, B 145, 5489: BPA, 3 Apr. 1970. Ibid., 4288: Emnid studies, 3 Mar. and 1 Apr. 1970.

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thought (46 per cent) that the question of recognizing the GDR could be a topic of discussion. In the latter poll, however, there was a fairly significant divide discernible between supporters of the government and the opposition party (SPD/FDP: 57 per cent, CDU: 35 per cent).⁵³³ Regarding talks with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR, including renunciation-of-force talks in particular, most of the population welcomed them (63 to 79 per cent supported the talks, 8 per cent opposed them) as a chance that the government should not miss. Not surprisingly, the percentage of those approving among SPD and FDP supporters was significantly higher than that among the CDU/CSU supporters (SPD: 77 per cent, FDP: 80 per cent, CDU/CSU: 46 per cent). By early May, after Brandt’s Kassel talks, public opinion concerning the recognition question had changed quite remarkably: although a majority (44 per cent) still rejected the recognition of the GDR, the number of those supporting it had increased considerably (from 35 per cent to 40 per cent). This was perhaps due to the estimation by 51 per cent of the population that the FRG could no longer avoid the recognition of the GDR in the long run.⁵³⁴ However, in April 1970, the government noticed a shift in public opinion. As Ahlers of the Press Office informed Brandt, the public was losing confidence. The government’s initial drive and, with it, the public’s positive expectations were gone. Since no results were visible yet, the public started anticipating undesirable results. For these reasons, it expected the government to deliver results that would compensate for these and to demonstrate to the public that it was making efforts to deliver such compensations. Also problematic was the fact that Bonn was unable to deliver the required explanation about its negotiations because of the need to keep them confidential. In order to avoid a detrimental effect, the party would have to try and compensate by delivering extra information.⁵³⁵ Ehmke drew a similar conclusion after a discussion in the SPD committee. He thus urged Brandt that the government as well as the coalition parties would have to intensify its information policy in this area.⁵³⁶ Two months later, the BPA was still complaining about the scepticism of the public and published opinion. West Germans evidently had ⁵³³ ⁵³⁴ 1970. ⁵³⁵ ⁵³⁶

Ibid.: Emnid study, 29 Apr. 1970. BAK, B 145, 4293: Infas study, 20 May 1970; ibid., 4289: Emnid study, 15 July AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436, 1: Ahlers, 23 Apr. 1970. AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 301: Ehmke, 22 Apr. 1970.

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decidedly mixed and suspicious feelings towards Brandt, who regularly ran behind other Social Democrats in opinion polls. On the one hand, many people were attracted to Brandt, who with his husky good looks struck them as a friendly, shambling bear. On the other hand, he was a hard man to know, intensely moody and withdrawn. His nervous habit of snapping matches between his fingers testified to an inner tension that he tried hard to keep from surfacing.⁵³⁷ As regards Brandt’s dealings with Moscow and Warsaw, Moersch, the parliamentary State Secretary in charge of information policy, noticed that the press was reporting only very superficially on them. Die Welt and Bild, published by the Springer Press, even revealed an increasing rejection of the government’s Ostpolitik. This culminated in the publication of Bahr’s confidential negotiations papers in both newspapers in June and July 1970.⁵³⁸ Ahlers explained the loss of support among the public with reference to several mistakes made in public information policy. Most notably, opinion polls of the last few months were showing, he explained, that Ostpolitik had been perceived as too accommodating to communism and Soviet pressure. This was due to the fact that the government had failed to strive publicly for additional results, had not fended off the Eastern propaganda attacks, and had concluded the Moscow talks too hastily, without portraying them as a success. The government’s secretiveness had even given the impression of it having a bad conscience. Ahlers concluded that more emphasis should be given to the national interests of the FRG. In addition, Ostpolitik should no longer take centre stage so much; then the confrontation would recede.⁵³⁹ The publication of the Bahr paper greatly added to the government’s resolve to improve its ‘marketing’. The Foreign Ministry suggested that, in particular, the difference between an abstract and a concrete renunciation-of-force agreement should be pointed out to the public. Consequently, increased information campaigns followed, such as briefings between members of the government and the press. Most notably, at Moersch’s suggestion, a briefing about all political and legal questions concerning the approaching negotiations in Moscow was launched, together with the Federal Press Office, inside the Foreign Ministry, The chief editors of all leading newspapers and of radio as well as television ⁵³⁷ Time Magazine (4 Jan. 1971). ⁵³⁸ Schmid, Entscheidung in Bonn, 249. ⁵³⁹ AdsD, Dep. Schmidt, 7569: Ahlers to Brandt, 15 June 1970.

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stations were invited to this briefing. As Moersch put it, the event was very well attended, and was largely approved of by the guests.⁵⁴⁰ Moreover, in a briefing with journalists, Bahr and Frank gave a detailed account of the Bahr paper’s content and of Bonn’s other initiatives in general.⁵⁴¹ In fact, in June, the Federal Press Office had some slightly more encouraging news about public opinion on Ostpolitik. For instance, 67 per cent of West Germans now said they were in favour of negotiations with the East, even at the cost of giving up some legal claims.⁵⁴² Yet overall, the government remained worried about its standing in public. It observed a growing insecurity among the public, which it explained with reference to the opposition’s increasing propaganda. Especially with a view to the forthcoming Bavarian elections, it feared that the opposition would intensify its campaigns against Brandt’s Ostpolitik, as a result of which the public might be further intimidated and return to its former fears. To some extent, the government was blamed for this trend. As Karl Anders, Brandt’s adviser, criticized, Bonn lacked a strategy towards the opposition. Its reactions to the CDU/CSU’s wave of attacks had been too defensive and half-hearted, resulting in an even more aggressive opposition. The government had not decided clearly enough between a course of confrontation or cooperation, which is why it came across as confused and divided. Additionally, Anders again raised the problem caused by the government’s secretiveness, which resulted in the false impression of the Brandt team concealing ‘evil things’.⁵⁴³ Indeed, opinion polls during that time revealed an ambivalence among the public, an attitude of ‘yes and no to Ostpolitik’, as the Allensbach Institute called it. On the one hand, the West Germans sincerely longed for a rapprochement and peaceful reconciliation with the East. On the other hand, they were afraid to give up their own interests without any compensation by the other side. Their opinion about Ostpolitik was thus quite often contradictory.⁵⁴⁴ In response, the government made new efforts to win over the public for the Moscow Treaty. The SPD board proposed to intensify the ⁵⁴⁰ Moersch, Kurs-Revision, 146; PA, B 3, 4 and B 41, 1075a: Moersch to Bahr, 16 and 20 July 1970. ⁵⁴¹ PA, B 1, 350: Bahr and Frank, June 1970; BAK, N 1474, 85: Ehmke, Bahr, and other leaders preparing the briefing with the journalists, 18 June 1970. ⁵⁴² BAK, B 145, 4289: Emnid study, 5 Aug. 1970. ⁵⁴³ AdsD, WBA, BK, 1: Anders, 23 June 1970. ⁵⁴⁴ AdsD, SPD-PV, 1477: the ‘Allensbacher Berichte’ (opinion polls), 21 Oct. 1970.

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discussion about Ostpolitik in and outside the party. It also suggested the publication, in very many copies, of a pamphlet about Ostpolitik, portraying the advantages of a renunciation-of-force treaty.⁵⁴⁵ In addition, Brandt encouraged his cabinet to elaborate a ‘plan of action’ for the rest of the summer in order to win over those groups that formed public opinion.⁵⁴⁶ After negotiations had been started under Scheel, Harpprecht reminded Brandt that it was high time to comment on them, irrespective of their outcome. Speaking clearly would also free the cabinet of its reputation for being indecisive. The Germans had to be told that they were approaching a historic moment.⁵⁴⁷ At the beginning of August, the Federal Press Office, Chancellery, and Foreign Ministry started to prepare to present the Moscow Treaty to the public. For instance, a list of arguments was issued illustrating the content and reasons of the treaty.⁵⁴⁸ Thought was even given even to creating an effective name for the treaty.⁵⁴⁹ Analyses of public opinion on the Moscow Treaty were carried out even after its conclusion: shortly before the signing of the treaty, a quick survey reassured the government that a large majority (81 per cent) approved of it and that most held (78 per cent) that this treaty would contribute to détente. At the same time, however, it revealed once more the population’s great fear of the Russians and the suspicion that they might benefit too much from the treaty. The treaty was therefore not regarded as providing the FRG with any advantage but simply with more tranquillity.⁵⁵⁰ In short, public opinion was a factor that the government took seriously. This was especially the case after it had shifted from an initial attitude of approval of all announced Eastern political initiatives to a more sceptical attitude concerning the realization and benefits of Ostpolitik. From then on, Bonn struggled to win the public over until the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. Several members of the Brandt government confirmed in retrospect that public opinion and especially published opinion were debilitating, rather than supportive, factors, although externally they were also useful for the assertion of West German national interests in negotiations with Moscow. They confirmed that the government struggled considerably with these ⁵⁴⁵ ⁵⁴⁶ ⁵⁴⁷ ⁵⁴⁸ ⁵⁴⁹

Ibid.: SPD Committee, 25 June 1970. BAK, N 1474, 87: Brandt, 7 July 1970. AdsD, WBA, BK, 8: Harpprecht, 30 July 1970. PA, B 38, 325: Lahn, 30 July 1970. BAK, B 145, 5491: Koch, 11 Aug. 1970. ⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

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restraints until the ratification of the Eastern treaties in 1972.⁵⁵¹ Only with the results of the 1972 election was it clear that a majority supported the rapprochement with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.⁵⁵²

C O N S E N T W I T H R E S E RVAT I O N S : T H E W E S T E R N A L L I E S A N D T H E M O S C OW T R E AT Y

Initial Relief at Bonn’s Contribution to D´etente The perception of Ostpolitik in the Western capital cities reflected its two main components: Ostpolitik was a policy that was firstly directed at recognizing the post-war realities of the divided Europe, in order, secondly, to transform them in a long-term process. The Western Allies welcomed this prioritization of stabilization before transformation. They were relieved that the German question ceased to present an obligation for them and a hindrance to détente between East and West. Bonn now no longer reminded them of their responsibility to defend the German interests and treat détente and unification as a ‘joint process’.⁵⁵³ Therefore, the three Western Allies, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, each encouraged the Germans in their new approach, which was already in the offing during the Grand Coalition government. In fact, when beginning its initiatives towards the East, the Bonn government followed the general American lead. The Germans referred, for example, to the beginnings of détente during Kennedy’s presidency. In February 1967, both President Johnson and State Secretary Rusk assured Brandt of their support. They emphasized the need for improving relations with the East, and Rusk offered to assist wherever help was needed.⁵⁵⁴ Shortly afterwards, Johnson let two influential German ⁵⁵¹ e.g. Eitel to the author, Nov. 2002; Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003; Schmidt to the author, 12 June 2003. ⁵⁵² In 1972, the SPD won 271 seats in the Bundestag, as opposed to 224 in 1969. ⁵⁵³ ACDP, 01–226, A 287: Kiesinger to McCloy, 16 Dec. 1966, to McGhee, 20 Dec. 1966, and to Frank Roberts, 16 Jan. and 9 Feb. 1967; ACDP, 01–403, 125/1: Kiesinger to Nixon, 14 Mar. 1967; BAK, N 1397, 90: Kiesinger to Johnson, 23 Apr. 1967; BAK, N 1474, 63: Kiesinger in Washington, 14 Aug. 1967. ⁵⁵⁴ Notes by Brandt on his talks in Washington, 8 Feb. 1967, AdsD, WBA, AM, 17, in Gottfried Niedhart, ‘The Federal Republic’s Ostpolitik and the United States: Initiatives and Constraints’, in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes (eds.), The United States and the European Alliance Since 1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 292.

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journalists know that the German government did not need to ask his permission for any initiative. In Johnson’s eyes, German bridge-building towards the East was highly useful. He trusted in Germany’s reliability within the Western alliance and in Brandt. Johnson felt reassured since he regarded himself as the undisputed leader in the process of bridge-building and the Germans as firmly subject to the guidance of the United States.⁵⁵⁵ De Gaulle had started experimenting with conciliatory overtures towards the Eastern bloc and particularly the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and had thus led the way in developing détente. The new French President, Georges Pompidou, followed his strategy, which was geared to liberalizing the East and reducing the superpowers’ influence in Europe, albeit more cautiously.⁵⁵⁶ Thus Paris congratulated the Grand Coalition government on its new course as the beginning of a process of evolution and offered support whenever it was needed.⁵⁵⁷ It assured Bonn that it regarded its efforts to enter into a renunciation-of-force exchange with Moscow as ‘helpful’.⁵⁵⁸ The Foreign Office in London also welcomed the Grand Coalition government’s détente policy. As the British ambassador in Bonn, Frank Roberts, put it, ‘it must be in our interest and that of the West as a whole that the Federal government should persevere in their policy of seeking to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, of which their effort to find some way of dealing in practical matters with the East German regime forms part’.⁵⁵⁹ The British government supported the Federal German policy, even though it already anticipated that it was ‘moving towards a recognition of East Germany’, because it ⁵⁵⁵ Henri Nannen and Theo Sommer about their meeting with President Johnson on 8 July 1967, in Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 292; see also George Crews McGhee, At the Creation of a New Germany: From Adenauer to Brandt: An Ambassador’s Account (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 231, 240–4. For further information about American bridge-building policies towards the East, see Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968, xvii: Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: Dept. of State, 1996), and FRUS, 1969–1976, i: Foundations of Foreign Policy 1969–1972, ed. Louis Smith and David H. Herschler (Washington: Dept. of State, 2003). ⁵⁵⁶ David Williamson, Europe and the Cold War, 1945–1991 (London: Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 2001), 114. ⁵⁵⁷ e.g. BAK, N 1474, 62: Prime Minister Couve de Murville to Brandt, 27 Apr. 1967. ⁵⁵⁸ AdsD, WBA, AM, 18: Brandt on a meeting of European Foreign Ministers in Paris, 15–16 Feb. 1968. ⁵⁵⁹ PRO, FCO 33/224: Roberts to Brown, 13 Mar. 1968; see also Edwin Brooks, 20 Nov. 1967; Henning Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR 1955–1973: Diplomatie auf Umwegen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), 357.

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held that ‘it would not do for us to be seen publicly to be holding the Germans back’.⁵⁶⁰ The Allies’ willingness to back Bonn’s Eastern policy did not change in October 1969, when the new form of Ostpolitik was introduced by the Social–Liberal government. Initially, the new American President, Richard Nixon, greatly burdened by the debilitating involvement in the Vietnam War and himself seeking a deal on nuclear agreements with Moscow, was not interested in halting the Bonn government’s new détente policy. He therefore expressed his support. Although he had mistakenly rushed to congratulate Kiesinger on winning the 1969 election, Henry Kissinger, his key adviser on European and Germany policy, hastened to underline that Nixon had no preference, but was pleased about, and prepared for, full cooperation with Brandt in the future.⁵⁶¹ In a meeting with Bahr in Washington, Kissinger explained Nixon’s hope of establishing relations with the new government at least as close as those it had had with the former government.⁵⁶² This was followed by further affirmations, by Nixon and other American politicians and diplomats, of the wish to work together as real partners and to support German efforts at normalizing relations with the East.⁵⁶³ Nixon reacted similarly positively to Brandt’s first messages about Bonn’s opening of renunciation-of-force talks with the Soviet Union: he stated that he thought Brandt to be on the right track in seeking to pursue meaningful negotiations on concrete issues.⁵⁶⁴ The Nixon administration, which had identified as a principal concern for the 1970s the effort to ‘move from stalemated confrontations to active negotiations . . . with the Soviet Union and ⁵⁶⁰ PRO, FCO, 33/225: Stewart, 25 July 1968; see also Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 359; Anne Deighton, ‘British–West German Relations, 1945–1972’, in Klaus Larres and Elizabeth Meehan (eds.), Uneasy Allies: British–German Relations and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 42. ⁵⁶¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436: Bahr to Brandt, 1 Oct. 1969. ⁵⁶² AAPD 1969, ii, doc. 314: Kissinger to Bahr, 13 Oct. 1969. ⁵⁶³ Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President 1969, i (Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records, 1971), doc. 399: Nixon to Brandt, 21 Oct. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 23.10.69–30.11.69: Rush, American ambassador to Bonn, 28 Oct. 1969; FRUS, 1968–69, ed. Richard Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), doc. 51: Secretary of State Rogers, 6 Dec. 1969; AdsD, WBA, BK, 91: Nixon, 25 Dec. 1969; FRUS, 1969–1976, i, doc. 51: Secretary of State Rogers, 15 Jan. 1970; AdsD, WBA, Publ., 338: Bahr on Nixon, 18 Feb. 1970. ⁵⁶⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 439/2: Kissinger to Bahr, 26 Nov. 1969.

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others’, welcomed Brandt’s new Eastern policy as a key ingredient in that process.⁵⁶⁵ Similarly, the British government reacted positively to the new ‘ostpolitical’ course of the Social–Liberal Coalition. The British Foreign Minister Michael Stewart gave encouraging feedback in his first encounter with Brandt. After being informed about Brandt’s new programme he stated that he agreed that it was necessary to enter into an era of negotiations and test the Soviets’ willingness to participate sincerely.⁵⁶⁶ With regard to Bonn’s newly opened bilateral talks with the East in early December, Stewart made known the ‘view of her majesty’s government that all these attempts by the Federal Republic are things which we ought to encourage and which we hope will succeed’.⁵⁶⁷ Although one could never be sure that such bold policies would not hit ‘hard rock’, Stewart explained, he agreed with Brandt that the risk had to be taken.⁵⁶⁸ Official approval of Bonn’s Ostpolitik continued throughout Wilson’s term as Prime Minister as well as under the Conservative government which took office in June 1970.⁵⁶⁹ Paris’s initial reaction was also to give a warm welcome to New Ostpolitik.⁵⁷⁰ Shortly before the elections, Francois Seydoux, the French ambassador in Bonn, informed Bahr that the French world welcome the change of government and thus of Ostpolitik.⁵⁷¹ Indeed, with regard to the newly introduced Social–Liberal Ostpolitik Seydoux spoke of an opportunity that had opened up ‘for the first time in history’, for, as the Elysée Treaty of 1963 had envisaged, a very close German–French cooperation.⁵⁷² Bonn, in return, expressed its gratitude for France’s political and moral support of German Ostpolitik. In the ⁵⁶⁵ FRUS, 1970, ed. Elaine P. Adam and William P. Lineberry (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), doc. 3: address by Rogers, 15 Jan. 1970; see also FRUS, 1968–69, doc. 7: Nixon’s inaugural address, 20 Jan. 1969. ⁵⁶⁶ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 16: Brandt and Stewart, 14 Nov. 1969. ⁵⁶⁷ PA, B 41, 1054: Wickert on Stewart’s speech, 10 Dec. 1969. ⁵⁶⁸ PA, B 38, 273: Foreign Office and Stewart to the Federal Press Office, 15 Jan. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 90/1: Federal Press Office, 15 Jan. 1970. ⁵⁶⁹ e.g. BAK, N 1371, 153: Stewart, 2 Mar. 1970; PA, B 38, 276: Foley, 1 Apr. 1970; see also Haase, ‘European Settlement’, 271–81. ⁵⁷⁰ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 5: Seydoux to Brandt, 30 Oct. 1969. ⁵⁷¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 341, 1.1.69–12.11.1969: Seydoux, 8 Oct. 1969; see also Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Partnerschaft und Konkurrenz: Deutsche und französische Ostpolitik in der Ara Brandt und Pompidou’, in Ilja Mieck and Pierre Guillen (eds.), Deutschland-Frankreich—Rußland: Begegnungen und Konfrontation: Im Auftrag des deutsch-französichen Historiker—Komitees (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 350. ⁵⁷² DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 5: Seydoux, 30 Oct. 1969.

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following months France and Germany praised each other for their cooperation.⁵⁷³

Concerns over Brandt’s Hidden Agenda However, while the Western Allies welcomed New Ostpolitik as a contribution to détente and stabilization of the status quo, there were shared fears, mostly behind the scenes, over the motives and dynamics of Ostpolitik in its second stage.⁵⁷⁴ Even during the Grand Coalition government, indications of a new course as envisaged by the SPD as coalition partner had triggered a certain nervousness across the Atlantic.⁵⁷⁵ Brandt’s information in summer 1967 about his plan to enter into renunciation-of-force negotiations with Moscow under consideration of the ‘zone’ was merely met with sceptical questions.⁵⁷⁶ From the American President’s point of view, Bonn was treading a ‘spongy road’ with its policy of accommodation with the untrustworthy Soviet Union.⁵⁷⁷ Similarly, the British Foreign Office saw the need ‘to bring home’ to the West Germans ‘the likely consequences of any change, however gradual, in the direction of recognition’.⁵⁷⁸ Bahr’s explanations to his colleagues in the American and British planning sections in April 1969 about the aims of new Ostpolitik met a guarded response. Bahr’s British counterpart was struck by Bahr’s policy, which he saw as aiming to put ‘an end to the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe’ and a ‘disintegration of the Soviet bloc’. It was in his eyes a ‘high risk and ⁵⁷³ e.g. AdsD, WBA, Publ., 363: Brandt, 20 Mar. 1970; ibid., 337: Seydoux, 27 Feb. 1970. ⁵⁷⁴ Eitel to the author, Nov. 2002; Kastl to the author, 31 Jan. 2003; Wickert to the author, Dec. 2002; see also Klaus Larres, ‘Germany and the West: The ‘‘Rapallo Factor’’ in German Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s’, in Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (eds.), The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification (London: Longman, 1996), 314–15. ⁵⁷⁵ On German–American relations during the Cold War see also Detlef Junker, The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook, ii: 1968–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Roger Morgan, The United States and West Germany 1945–1973: A Study in Alliance Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). ⁵⁷⁶ BAK, N 1474, 63: Brandt and Rusk, 16 Aug. 1967. ⁵⁷⁷ Nixon to Scheel, 13 June 1969, in Gottfried Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritiationen,: Die Westmächte und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1969/70’, in Ursula Lehmkuhl et al. (eds.), Deutschland, Großbritannien, Amerika: Politik, Gesellschaft und intermational Geschichte in 20. Jahrhurdert: Festschrift für Gustav Schmidt (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003), 5. ⁵⁷⁸ PRO, FCO, 33/225: Morgan, 8 July 1968.

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forward policy based on a more confident assessment of the Soviet threat and the U.S. commitment than our own and reflecting considerable confidence in Germany’s own position and influence with both sides’.⁵⁷⁹ The Allies expressed their doubts about the Ostpolitik introduced by the Social–Liberal government in extreme terms. Brandt’s new Eastern policy evidently implied a moment of incertitude from the Western point of view. The Allies were wary of the fact that Brandt was concerned not only with preserving the status quo but also with transforming it at a later stage. Therefore they wondered what price the Federal Republic would be willing to pay for Soviet concessions on the German question. Moscow could conceivably offer something that might lead to unification if the Federal Republic turned to neutralism. Would Bonn be tempted to lead an isolated German policy between East and West?⁵⁸⁰ Nixon was worried in particular, as he revealed in a discussion with the British Prime Minister, Wilson, that the new German government might not be firmly committed to the Atlantic Alliance or that this commitment might be gradually eroded by Brandt’s new policy.⁵⁸¹ From the American point of view, Bonn’s new line might have uncontrollable consequences for the USA, namely unacceptable changes of the status quo.⁵⁸² Kissinger was especially nervous about the dangers of a ‘selective détente’ between the Soviet Union and West Germany. He feared that New Ostpolitik might endanger the NATO alliance and that inherent German nationalism might lead at best to a neutralization of West Germany and at worst to a German return to a Rapallo policy.⁵⁸³ Kissinger was affected by his personal judgement of Bahr, whom he considered above all a German nationalist who wanted to exploit Germany’s central position to bargain with both sides. In his eyes, Bahr ‘was obviously not as unquestioningly dedicated to Western ⁵⁷⁹ PRO, FCO, 49/265: Burroughs, 25 Apr. and 30 May 1969; see also Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 4. ⁵⁸⁰ Ibid. 6; Andreas Wilkens, Der unstete Nachbar: Frankreich, die deutsche Ostpolitik und die Berliner Vier-Mächte-Verhandlungen 1969–1974 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1990), 189. ⁵⁸¹ PRO, FCO, 7/1823: Nixon, 27 Jan. 1970; see also Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 6. ⁵⁸² PA, B 150, doc. 367: Pauls, 16 Nov. 1969; BAK, N 1397, 56: Leisler-Kiep, Feb. 1970. ⁵⁸³ Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 409–12, 529–30; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 735; Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 292; William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 116.

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unity as the people we had known in the previous government’.⁵⁸⁴ He therefore advised President Nixon to limit himself to a ‘general support for the improvement of the FRG’s relations with the East . . . without approving specific FRG moves’.⁵⁸⁵ Paris was equally wary. It was particularly the Federal Republic’s confident activism that the French noted with concern. As Seydoux put it retrospectively, ‘the Germans were reasserting themselves . . . the Federal Republic was taking France’s place and was taking over the lead in Western Europe!’⁵⁸⁶ France was worried about West Germany’s growing influence. It observed that Brandt’s Ostpolitik made for a far greater probability of success regarding the unification of East and West Germany. This of course represented a danger to France’s authority, not only in Western Europe but also as the prime negotiating partner of the Soviet Union as established under de Gaulle. It resulted in a latent mistrust of German Ostpolitik and feelings of envy on the French side about the fact that West Germany had managed to enter into talks with the Russians so quickly.⁵⁸⁷ Moreover, Pompidou’s chief adviser, Jean-Bernard Raimond, suspected that Bonn planned nothing less than a ‘destabilization of the East’. However, this policy might fail and lead to a ‘destabilization of the West’ and increased Soviet influence instead.⁵⁸⁸ The French were haunted by the possibility of ‘a German reunification on Eastern terms’.⁵⁸⁹ Pompidou told Brandt as early as their first encounter in January 1970 about his greatest fear, which was that Ostpolitik might lead ⁵⁸⁴ Kissinger, White House Years, 409–11, 529–30; see also Karl Seidel, BerlinBonner Balance: 20 Jahre deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen: Erinnerungen und Erkenntnisse eines Beteiligten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2002), 56; Bundy, Tangled Web, 116. For discussion of Bahr as a neutralist see Alexander Gallus, Die Neutralisten: Verfechter eines vereinten Deutschland zwischen Ost und West 1945–1990 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001), 296–306. ⁵⁸⁵ Kissinger, White House Years, 409, 530–3; Ernest May, ‘Das nationale Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten und die deutsche Frage 1966–1972’, in Gottfried Niedhart et al. (eds.), Deutschland in Europa: Nationale Interessen und internationale Ordnung in 20. Jahrhundert, (Manheim: Palatium, 1997), 279. In an interview with the author on 12 June 2003, Schmidt underlined that the United States was the most sceptical ally. ⁵⁸⁶ Francois Seydoux, Botschafter in Deutschland: Meine zweite Mission 1965 bis 1970 (Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1987), 7. ⁵⁸⁷ PA, B 41, 1054: Braun, 9 Dec. 1969; Niedhart, ‘Partnerschaft und Konkurrenz’, 348. ⁵⁸⁸ Raimond, 6 Nov. 1969, 8 Dec. 1969, and 25 May 1970, in Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 6; George-Henri Soutou, ‘Präsident George Pompidou und die Ostpolitik’, in Niedhart et al. (eds.), Deutschland in Europa, 173. ⁵⁸⁹ Claude Arnaud, Director of European Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, to Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Under-Secretary for European Affairs in the US Department of State, in Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik: Phases’, 121.

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to an all-embracing German–Soviet accord and hence German–Soviet dominance over Europe under Moscow’s hegemonic influence.⁵⁹⁰ Léo Hamon, the French government spokesman, was even more direct when in an unofficial encounter with Ahlers he revealed his government’s worries about a German–Soviet rapprochement at the cost of a common ‘Westpolitik’, in other words of a new Rapallo.⁵⁹¹ The Foreign Office in London shared, although not quite as strongly, the American and French concern about an over-powerful West Germany.⁵⁹² The British ambassador in Bonn, Roger Jackling, observed a new trend of increasing self-confidence among the West Germans and a new awareness of national interest and power.⁵⁹³ London also estimated that German influence in Western Europe would increase and that the Federal Republic was about to take over the lead in Western Europe from France.⁵⁹⁴ Britain reacted with apprehension to the prospect of the Federal Republic’s increased authority, especially because its own international status had indisputably declined since 1945, when it had ranked automatically as one of the ‘Big Three’.⁵⁹⁵ Like Washington and Paris, the British government feared that the Federal Republic might seek arrangements with the Soviet Union at the expense of Western interests and hence might undermine the West’s position and the balance of Europe altogether.⁵⁹⁶ As a German official analysed, unlike the United States (which as a non-European power was at least not plagued by fear about the balance of Europe), London was for this reason also opposed to Germany’s reunification.⁵⁹⁷ Bonn was well aware of such reservations concerning its ‘ostpolitical’ activities and its resultant gain in power. As a result, throughout the ⁵⁹⁰ Soutou, ‘George Pompidou’, 173–4. ⁵⁹¹ AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, 297: Ahlers, 30 June 1970. ⁵⁹² In retrospect, Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen: Mit den ‘Notizen zun Fall G’, (Berlin: Ullstein 1994), 189, held that London seemed least distrustful of his new Ostpolitik. ⁵⁹³ PRO, FCO, 33/566: Jackling, 9 Apr. 1969, and Morgan, 9 May 1969; Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 7. ⁵⁹⁴ DBPO, 3rd ser., 1, doc. 31: Stewart, 15 May 1969. ⁵⁹⁵ Roger Morgan, ‘Willy Brandt’s ‘‘Neue Ostpolitik’’: British Perceptions and Positions, 1969–1975, in Adolf Birke et al. (eds.), An Anglo-German Dialogue: The Munich Lectures on the History of International Relations (Munich: Saur, 2000), 183; see also John Darwin, ‘Between Europe and Empire: Britain’s Changing Role in World Politics since 1945’, in Birke, Anglo-German Dialogue, 207. ⁵⁹⁶ PA, B 41, 1054: Wickert, 12 Mar. 1970; on Britain’s reservations see also Morgan, ‘Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik’, 187. ⁵⁹⁷ PA, B 38, 236: Oncken, 10 June 1968. Eitel argued in an interview with the author in Nov. 2002 that the United States had less fear of a strong West Germany than the United Kingdom and France.

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period in question, Brandt went out of his way to defuse the Allies’ concerns by assuring them of his country’s firm ties with the West. The Chancellor repeatedly underlined that he agreed on the need for a strong Western alliance as a condition for reducing any tension within Europe and for launching New Ostpolitik.⁵⁹⁸ Apart from their concern about Bonn’s loyalty to the West, the Allies’ other major worry was that Bonn might violate their special rights and responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole and Berlin, and with it the principle of West Germany’s limited sovereignty. This is why the Allies felt particularly uneasy about the new emphases set by Brandt in his declaration about the ‘two states in Germany’. They worried that the qualification of the GDR as a state might result in an international recognition of the GDR and consequently an infringement of their special rights.⁵⁹⁹ The Bonn government, in return, was ‘quite aware of the difficulties involved in presenting a clear picture of these interrelationships’ and of gaining the Allies’ understanding of them. For this reason, it immediately launched a worldwide démarche to explain its policy. In it, Bonn asked other states to respect the German nation’s right of self-determination and to wait ‘until such time as an arrangement has been made between the two parts of Germany’.⁶⁰⁰ The Allies, however, questioned to what extent Bonn was able to keep up this ‘moratorium’ regarding the GDR’s external relations, given the increasing pressure that was being applied by other states towards an international recognition of East Berlin.⁶⁰¹ It seemed clear that it could ‘now only be a matter of time’ before such international recognition would become widespread.⁶⁰² Because of this assumption, disapproval of Brandt’s new position on the GDR was expressed in all three major Western capitals, Washington, ⁵⁹⁸ DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 5: Brandt to Seydoux, 30 Oct. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 78: Brandt, 11 Nov. 1969; DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 37: Brandt to Rogers, 6 Dec. 1969; PRO, FCO, 33/1147: Drinkall, 14 Sept. 1969; Brandt, Erinnerungen, 190. ⁵⁹⁹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 2: Bahr, 23 Jan. 1970; BAK, N 1474, 81: Brandt, 23 Jan. 1970. ⁶⁰⁰ PA, B 150: Duckwitz at the NATO meeting, 5 Nov. 1969. ⁶⁰¹ Ibid., doc. 354: the Allies in the Bonn Four group, 28 Oct. 1969; ibid., docs. 340 and 341: Morgan to Blankenhorn, 30 Oct. 1969, and Hillenbrand to Oncken, 31 Oct. 1969. ⁶⁰² PRO, FCO, 33/914: Jackling to Brimelow, 20 Apr. 1970; see also Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 453.

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London, and Paris.⁶⁰³ The Allies complained that strictly speaking, the German Chancellor had not been authorized to deliver such a declaration concerning Germany as a whole without even consulting with them.⁶⁰⁴ The Federal Republic was in theory still a semi-sovereign country that had to bear in mind the constraints stemming from the rights of the Four Powers.⁶⁰⁵ Therefore the American and British ambassadors announced at first in the so-called Bonn Four group—which was composed of the Federal Germans and the representatives of the Three Powers—that their governments would continue in not recognizing the statehood of the GDR.⁶⁰⁶ However, it was felt that after Brandt had spoken openly of two German states, it was impossible to stick rigidly to old formulas.⁶⁰⁷ The British government therefore made known, although somewhat reluctantly, on 20 November that it was ‘now ready to concede some form of qualified statehood to the GDR’.⁶⁰⁸ As the representative of the British Foreign Minister, George Thomson, reasoned later, ‘we had no wish to get out in front of the Germans . . . but we were anxious also not to be left behind’.⁶⁰⁹ Nonetheless, criticism did not cease. London and Washington stated as another reason for complaints the timing of Bonn’s factual recognition of the GDR, in other words, the fact that Bonn was ‘giving away too much and too fast’ for which it would receive nothing in return.⁶¹⁰ In order to avoid the negative impact that they feared the GDR’s new status might have on the Allies special rights, all three Western Allies stressed how crucial it was now to stick to a common agreed Western policy on the German question.⁶¹¹ ⁶⁰³ PA, B 150: Blankenhorn, 11 Nov. 1969; Rush, 17 Nov. 1969, in Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 11; PA, B 150, doc. 377: Fessenden, 27 Nov. 1969. ⁶⁰⁴ AAPD 1969, ii, doc. 354: Bonn Four group, 10 Nov. 1969; Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 11. ⁶⁰⁵ Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 291. ⁶⁰⁶ PA, B 150, doc. 354: the Bonn Four group, 28 Oct. 1969. ⁶⁰⁷ PRO, FCO, 33/913: Gladstone, 26 Jan. 1970. ⁶⁰⁸ PRO, FCO 33/476: Foreign Office, 20 Nov. 1969, and Gladstone, 20 Nov. 1970; see also Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 10. ⁶⁰⁹ PRO, FCO 33/913: Williams, 9 Feb. 1970; see also Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 453. ⁶¹⁰ Erwin Wickert’s private archive, annual report 1970, 22; Wickert in an interview, Nov. 2002; PA, B 150, doc. 377: Fessenden, 27 Nov. 1969. ⁶¹¹ PA, B 80, 950: Ruete, 6 Nov. 1969; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 3: Bahr, 9 Dec. 1969.

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Bonn’s Efforts at Regular Consultation Faced with these doubts, the Auswärtige Amt concluded that Bonn would indeed have to be careful to keep the GDR’s international status under control and to win the Allies’ understanding of the new political programme. The Bonn government quickly reached consensus that regular information and close consultation about its Ostpolitik was a crucial precondition for receiving support from the Western partners.⁶¹² Consequently, Brandt expressed his wish to cooperate closely and work in a team with the Western Allies.⁶¹³ He instructed his Foreign Minister to have his entire ministry maintain a clear policy in this area. No doubts should be left that Bonn was sticking to its former policy of preventing the international recognition of the GDR as well as its access to any international organization.⁶¹⁴ In the Bonn Four group, Bonn and the Allies discussed the repercussions of the new German policy on the Allies’ rights in several meetings.⁶¹⁵ Scheel reported to Brandt in December 1969 that he had rid the Allies of their confusion by making clear that the West German attitude was opposed to any negative prejudicing of the GDR’s status.⁶¹⁶ In fact, in the coming months, every ‘ostpolitical’ initiative that was taken was reported and explained to the Western Allies. To this end, Brandt met, and sent many letters to, the Presidents of America and France as well as to the British Prime Minister. In addition, endless bilateral and multilateral meetings took place on various levels. Foreign Minister Scheel met his colleagues frequently. The Chancellery was in constant contact with the representatives of the Western embassies in Bonn.⁶¹⁷ Moreover, the conferences of the Bonn Four group provided a regular occasion for an exchange of views and information.⁶¹⁸ Regular ⁶¹² PA, B 80, 950: Ruete, 6 Nov. 1969. ⁶¹³ DzDP, 6th ser., i, doc. 5: Brandt to Seydoux, 30 Oct. 1969. ⁶¹⁴ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 1: Brandt, 3 Dec. 1969. ⁶¹⁵ Wickert’s private archive, annual report 1970, 21. ⁶¹⁶ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 3: Scheel, 12 Dec. 1969. ⁶¹⁷ PA, B 38, 330: Auswärtige Amt, 2 and 17 Dec. 1969; BAK, N 1474, 81: Bahr, 27 Jan. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 398/A, 1: Bahr, 25 Feb. 1970; AdsD, WBA, Publ., 337: Seydoux, 27 Feb. 1970; ibid., 363: Brandt, 20 Mar. 1970; PA, B 2, 175: Brandt and Wilson, 22 Mar. 1970; PA, B 41, 1075: Thomson and the Auswärtige Amt, 9 Apr. 1970, and Brandt, Thomson, and Heath, leader of the Conservative Party, 7 and 8 May 1970; PA, B 41, 1074: Brimelow and the Auswärtige Amt, 18 June 1970; Wickert’s private archive, Scheel and Alec Douglas-Home, the new British Foreign Minister, 16 July 1970. ⁶¹⁸ See the numerous meetings of the Bonn Four group documented in AAPD 1970; Scheel confirmed this in an interview, 11 Feb. 2003; see also Niedhart, ‘The British

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consultations also took place in the NATO Council. There was constant political interaction especially about the state of dialogue with the Soviet Union. As Bahr claims, during the final negotiations with Moscow in August there was daily contact between Bonn and representatives of the three Western Powers.⁶¹⁹ Regarding the United States as the most important ally for their Ostpolitik, Brandt and Bahr made special efforts to brief the American government with extra information. Even before he was elected Federal Chancellor, Brandt asked the United States government to accept information about his government’s concept of Ostpolitik via Bahr as his special envoy. From mid October onwards, Bahr and Kissinger took part in a series of talks, in the course of which they agreed to establish direct contacts between the White House and the Chancellery in Bonn.⁶²⁰ Within a few days, this channel was used as the most direct way to keep the Americans informed. Bonn was also concerned to avoid any deterioration of relations with Paris.⁶²¹ The Auswärtige Amt warned that a German–French rivalry was in the Soviet interest, but surely not in the German interest. Not least because of the uncertainty over what course the German–Soviet dialogue might take, it was crucial that the French be reassured of Bonn’s constant willingness to have close consultation. Everything that might place stress on the laboriously re-established German–French partnership, based on the friendship treaty of 1963, would have to be avoided.⁶²² Additionally, Bonn would have to see to it that the Quai d’Orsay understood the government’s Eastern negotiations better. Bahr maintained that it was necessary to search for areas where France could be asked for help.⁶²³ However, at the same time, Bonn wanted to pursue its Ostpolitik as autonomously as possible, and as independently as possible from any Western ally. From the Brandt government’s point of view, negotiations with Moscow did not require the Allies’ special blessing. Bonn did not Reaction towards Ostpolitik: Anglo-West German Relations in the Era of Détente 19671971’, in Christian Haase (ed.), Debating Foreign Affairs: The Public and British Foreign Policy since 1867 (Berlin: Philo, 2003), 11. ⁶¹⁹ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ⁶²⁰ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 439/2: Bahr, 14 Oct. 1969; see also Kissinger, White House Years, 411; Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 295. ⁶²¹ BAK, N 1474, 77: Bahr, 31 Oct. 1969. ⁶²² PA, B 41, 1055: Soviet Union unit, Oct. 1969. ⁶²³ BAK, N 1474, 83: Bahr, 19 May 1970.

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intend to embark on any policy that might violate existing obligations. On the contrary, Ostpolitik was to remain compatible with ‘Westpolitik’ in every stage. A close partnership with the United States and the alliance was still regarded as the unquestioned premise for any Eastern policy.⁶²⁴ However, it had to be implemented with West Germany’s own authority. In a meeting with Kissinger on 13 October 1969, Bahr announced that Bonn was now assuming a greater degree of independence, and would not ask every two months whether the American ally ‘still loves us’.⁶²⁵ As Bahr saw it, the Western Allies should be informed, not consulted, about Eastern political steps made by Bonn.⁶²⁶ Remarkably, in another context, Brandt questioned the use of cooperation with the Allies altogether, and wondered whether it was in Bonn’s interest at all.⁶²⁷ Both Brandt and Scheel wished to emancipate the Federal Republic from its post-war supervision by the Western powers and win some freedom of activity. They wanted to be accepted as an equal partner.⁶²⁸ As Brandt saw it, Bonn should not underestimate its role ‘as a partner of the Soviet Union’.⁶²⁹ Thus although the Brandt government still respected the Allies’ spheres of responsibility it interpreted them in an increasingly limited way.⁶³⁰ In comparison to the previous Ostpolitik, Bonn therefore conducted the negotiations with Moscow with remarkable independence from its Western Allies.⁶³¹ In Bahr’s eyes, the Allies’ distrust was directed mainly and primarily at Bonn’s increased room for manoeuvre towards the East.⁶³² ⁶²⁴ PA, B 1, 472: Bahr, 23 June 1969. ⁶²⁵ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 439/2: Bahr, 13 Oct. 1969; Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 294. ⁶²⁶ BAK, N 1474, 77 and 83: Bahr, 31 Oct. 1969 and 4 May 1970. ⁶²⁷ Ibid., 76: Brandt in a meeting preparing for the next NATO Council meeting, 31 Oct. 1969. ⁶²⁸ Brandt, Erinnerungen, 189; Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 294. ⁶²⁹ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 5. WP, 119: Brandt, 4 Mar. 1969, in Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 293. ⁶³⁰ See also Werner Link, ‘Deutsche Ostpolitik und Zuständigkeit der Alliierten’, in Adolf Birke and Günther Heydemann (eds.), Großbritannien und Ostdeutschland seit 1918: Britain and East Germany since, 1918 (Munich and London: Saur, 1992), 107. ⁶³¹ Eitel maintained in an interview with the author in Nov. 2002 that the Moscow Treaty was discussed with the Western Allies much less than the subsequent Eastern treaties; see also Stephen A. Kocs, Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe’s Strategic Choices 1955–1995 (Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 1995), 247. ⁶³² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436: Bahr, 6 Nov. 1969; see also ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle 16: Scheel, 25 Apr. 1970; Brandt, Erinnerungen, 192.

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As a result, the Western Allies repeatedly expressed criticism of Bonn’s information policy. Even before the start of any talks, in November and early December 1969, Bonn noticed ‘clear signs of alienation’ among the Allies as a result of having been informed neither in time nor sufficiently about the state of the German–Soviet dialogue.⁶³³ British officials in London maintained that they ‘were up against a real and urgent need for consultation and coordination’, meaning ‘consultation in advance’ and not information ‘post facto’.⁶³⁴ The American embassy minister Russell Fessenden in Bonn also regretted that no ‘intensive consultation’ about Bonn’s steps had taken place yet, which did not help to inspire confidence.⁶³⁵ The Federal Press Office also reported on sceptical voices in the American press which were questioning Brandt’s plan of starting several ‘ostpolitical’ negotiations at the same time.⁶³⁶ In late February 1970, complaints were heard in the Quai d’Orsay about the ‘fragmentary’ character of Bonn’s information on Bahr’s talks.⁶³⁷ There was disagreement with Bonn also about the speed and proceedings of its Eastern negotiations.⁶³⁸ London was suspicious that party tactics might be a reason and warned that these could not play a role in negotiations about Germany’s national questions. Besides, rushed negotiations might lead to the impression among the Soviets that Bonn was under pressure. This is also why the British government argued from time to time that Bonn had reached the limit of its concessions, which it should not exceed without Soviet concessions in return.⁶³⁹ However, despite all criticism and disquiet, the Allied governments regarded German Ostpolitik as useful and as coinciding with their own aim of reducing tensions in Europe. As a British official put it, Ostpolitik was showing that Bonn was thinking ‘constructively’ and acting in consultation with its Allies. ‘No harm has yet been done and the Germans obviously want to keep in step.’⁶⁴⁰ The impression was ⁶³³ BAK, N 1474, 76: Auswärtige Amt, 18 Nov. 1969; ibid., 79: Bonn government, 2 Dec. 1969. ⁶³⁴ PRO, FCO, 33/476: the Foreign Office, 19 Nov. 1969; PRO, PREM, 13/3221: Drinkall, 2 Mar. 1970; see also Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 8. ⁶³⁵ PA, B 150, doc. 377: Fessenden, 27 Nov. 1969. ⁶³⁶ New York Times (14 Jan. 1970). ⁶³⁷ Quai d’Orsay, 25 Feb. 1970, in: Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 8. ⁶³⁸ PA, B 41, 1057a: Blumenfeld at the Auswärtige Amt, 17 June 1970; ACDP, 01–403, 129/1: Stein, Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–433, 188/1: Birrenbach, 6 Nov. 1970. ⁶³⁹ PA, B 41, 1054: Wickert, 12 Mar. 1970. ⁶⁴⁰ PRO, PREM, 13/3221: Foreign Office, 2 Mar. 1970; Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 8.

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shared that the Germans and Allies could now pursue a policy with joint responsibility.⁶⁴¹ There was thus simultaneous criticism and approval of German Ostpolitik. Generally speaking, it was characteristic that the Allies worried about an over-independent West German foreign policy, but equally trusted in Brandt’s commitment to the Western camp. The first two rounds of German–Soviet talks were completed when Bonn felt the need to intensify its exchange with the American government. While the American embassy in Bonn expressed full support, parts of the Nixon administration, including the Pentagon and sections of the State Department, had become increasingly vocal in their disapproval of Brandt’s Eastern policy. Opposition to Ostpolitik also came from conservative Congressmen. As Denis Healey, the British Defence Minister, put it, John McCloy, Dean Acheson, Lucius Clay, and the rest of the ‘American dinosaurs from the occupation age’ found it difficult to come to terms with a world in which they were no longer able to determine the policies not only of the USA but also of Germany.⁶⁴² They criticized the haste and the concessions with which Bonn had started Ostpolitik, questioned its use altogether, and worried greatly about its repercussions for the position of America, West Germany, and Berlin.⁶⁴³ In June 1970, Kissinger told State Secretary Frank of the Foreign Ministry : ‘I tell you, if a course of détente is to be pursued, we do it!’⁶⁴⁴ Even genuine advocates of Bonn’s new Ostpolitik, such as Kenneth Rush, the American ambassador in Bonn, worried every so often about the Federal Republic’s striving to ‘represent its own things and become ‘‘more equal’’ than before’.⁶⁴⁵ Brandt and his advisers took this American ‘lobby of opposition’ very seriously. They therefore planned Brandt’s visit to the United States for early April 1970. This was meant to help to cast Bonn’s Eastern political ⁶⁴¹ AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 268: Hase, 13 June 1969; see also Morgan, ‘Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik’, 188. ⁶⁴² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 301/4: Healey, 23 Apr. 1971, in Niedhart, ‘Ostpolitik and the United States’, 292. ⁶⁴³ ACDP 01–226, A 386: Kiesinger, 22 Jan. 1970; ADL, A 41, 430: KühlmannStumm, 18 Feb. 1970; ACDP, 01–433, 139/3: Birrenbach, 9 Mar. 1970; BAK, N 1371, 89, 1: Barzel, 19 May 1970; Dean Acheson, 10 Aug. 1970, on the ‘mad race to Moscow’, in: Brandt, Erinnerungen, 191; Larres, ‘Germany and the West’, 315. ⁶⁴⁴ Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft, 287; Frank to the author, Jan. 2004. ⁶⁴⁵ Rush, 17 Nov. 1969, in Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 10; Brandt, Erinnerungen, 189; see also Larres, ‘Germany and the West’, 315–16.

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activities in a favourable light.⁶⁴⁶ In April 1970, Brandt did indeed visit the United States. He reported afterwards that the trip had been a success. Nixon had confirmed that he looked with sympathy upon the German talks with Moscow, Warsaw, and Erfurt and would cause no trouble during the negotiations. No communiqué had been needed because American and German views had largely coincided.⁶⁴⁷ As Kissinger pointed out, he and Nixon gradually accepted Ostpolitik because they felt that attempting to obstruct this policy would be equally dangerous. It would carry ‘the risk of cutting the Federal Republic loose from the bonds of NATO and the restraints of the European Community’.⁶⁴⁸ This positive feedback had much to do with Brandt’s special standing in Washington.⁶⁴⁹ Brandt was equally popular in Britain. As an editor from The Times of London noted, Brandt’s press in Britain had always been good and was ‘now approaching idolatry. In a way, he has replaced Kennedy as the long-lost necessary hero.’⁶⁵⁰ Similarly, Karl-Günter von Hase, the West German ambassador in London, stated that many British worries over Bonn’s Ostpolitik were attenuated by the prestige Brandt was enjoying.⁶⁵¹ In fact, Brandt had been known as an ‘international player’ and had gathered credit since his days as mayor in Berlin. It was Brandt’s popularity and perceived trustworthiness that turned out to be a crucial compensation for the Allies’ worries over Bonn’s new Ostpolitik.⁶⁵² Bahr even went so far as to maintain that the Federal Republic’s new-found autonomy was acceptable to the Allies only if it was balanced by their confidence in Brandt as Chancellor. The cultivation of this confidence was therefore an important precondition for leading an independent foreign policy.⁶⁵³ ⁶⁴⁶ ADL, A 41, 430: Kühlmann-Stumm, 18 Feb. 1970, and Brandt, 24 Feb. 1970; AdsD, WBA, BK, 8: Harpprecht, 30 Apr. and 17 Dec. 1970, and Brandt, 6 May 1970; see also BAK, N 1474, 83: Scheel, 5 May 1970. ⁶⁴⁷ AdsD, SPD-BT-FR, 6. WP, 139 and ACDP, 01–294, 53/1: Brandt, 13 and 16 Apr. 1970; Public Papers of the Presidents, ii docs. 109 and 110: Nixon and Brandt, 10 Apr. 1970; see also Brandt, Erinnerungen, 191; May, ‘Nationale Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten’, 280. ⁶⁴⁸ Kissinger, Diplomacy, 735–6. ⁶⁴⁹ AdsD, WBA, BK, 7: Harpprecht, 26 Jan. 1970. ⁶⁵⁰ Ibid., 4: Michael Ratcliffe, editor of London Times, Dec. 1970. ⁶⁵¹ AAPD 1970 II, doc. 268: Hase, 13 June 1970; see also Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 454. ⁶⁵² AdsD, WBA, BK, 7: Harpprecht, 26 Jan. 1970; see also ACDP, 08–001, 41/2: Leisler-Kiep, 16 Feb. 1970. ⁶⁵³ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436: Bahr, 6 Nov. 1969; see also ADL, Bundesvorstand, Protokolle, 16: Scheel, 25 Apr. 1970.

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Simultaneous Criticism and Approval of German–Soviet Negotiations The apparent sympathy for the German Chancellor, however, could not prevent the Allies from becoming increasingly wary of the impact that the imminent German–Soviet agreement might have on their own interests. The Allies’ intention to insist on the legal status quo simply clashed with the Federal Republic’s striving to overcome it gradually. The more the American and British governments perceived the Soviet partner as problematic, the more they worried about Bonn’s reliability to defend their special rights in talks.⁶⁵⁴ Given Soviet resistance to any link between German–Soviet talks and talks about Berlin, they feared that Bonn might renounce the Allies’ rights and conclude a treaty with Moscow at the expense of Western rights and interests. As Hillenbrand in Washington put it, ‘the Germans could unwittingly take steps which would tend to undermine the Four-Power status’.⁶⁵⁵ Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Under-Secretary at the British Foreign Office, also revealed his uneasy feeling ‘that we are being conned by the Germans into accepting a situation in which our rights may be fundamentally affected’.⁶⁵⁶ Brandt, in return, made repeated efforts to underline that his policy was not interfering with the Allies’ position and that his government would never touch the basic principle of the responsibility of the three Powers.⁶⁵⁷ For, despite its unofficial wish for more emancipation from the Allies’ supervision and dissident long-term objectives, the Bonn government was not interested in superseding the Four-Power rights. On the contrary, it actively defended them as an important tool to assert own interests. As has been seen, in his talks with Gromyko, Bahr used the legal fact of the Allies’ rights and the Federal Republic’s limited sovereignty in order to deflect the Soviets’ maximal demands and assert Bonn’s own position concerning the recognition of the GDR and the borders. With the defence of the Four-Power rights Bonn even trespassed ⁶⁵⁴ Wickert’s private archive, Ditchley Park Conference, 15 May 1970, 2; PRO, FCO, 33/1147: Douglas-Home, 16 Sept. 1970; Hoff, Großbritannien und die DDR, 455; see also Morgan, ‘Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik’, 186. ⁶⁵⁵ Hillenbrand, 6 Apr. 1970, in: Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 13. ⁶⁵⁶ DBPO, 3rd ser., 1, doc. 47: Greenhill, 13 July 1970; see also Anthony James Nicholls, Fifty Years of Anglo-German Relations (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 2000), 10. ⁶⁵⁷ e.g. BAK, N 1474, 81: Brandt, 23 Jan. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 384, 2: Bahr, 23 Jan. 1970; PRO, PREM, 13/3221: Brandt to Wilson, 26 Feb. 1970.

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on grounds which only the Four Powers were actually allowed to tread, in that it linked its renunciation-of-force negotiations in Moscow to the expectation of reaching a satisfying regulation for Berlin. From the start, the Bonn government self-confidently took initiatives to ‘synchronize’ its negotiations in Moscow with the Berlin talks of the Four Powers.⁶⁵⁸ This reassured the Allies, particularly the Americans, somewhat. They emphasized their confidence that Brandt would, according to his assertion, not touch their rights. Indeed, in the summer break of 1970, the Allies generally welcomed the results reached in the Bahr paper, about which they were informed in several meetings.⁶⁵⁹ Scheel talked about the enthusiastic reactions of all three Western Foreign Ministers to his reports about Bahr’s concluded talks in Moscow in the NATO Council.⁶⁶⁰ Fessenden complimented Bahr on the task he had fulfilled and called it a miracle.⁶⁶¹ Moreover, Bonn was relieved to find that the majority of the American political public had expressed full support of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.⁶⁶² However, while expressing their general approval of the Bahr paper, all three Allies underlined again that they would support the German–Soviet treaty only on the condition that their special rights would not be in any way infringed.⁶⁶³ Bonn, in return, although equally keen not to jeopardize these rights, had reservations over implementation. Specifically, there was disagreement on how the inviolability of those rights would be contained in the treaty. Ideally, the Western powers would have liked to have their rights as well as the pending peace settlement explicitly mentioned in the treaty text. Brimelow underlined ⁶⁵⁸ PA, B 150: e.g. the Bonn Four group, 12 Nov. 1969, and Ruete, 12 Nov. 1969; ibid., doc. 362: Brandt, 14 Nov. 1969; PRO, PREM, 13/3221: Brandt to Wilson, 25 Feb. and 22 Mar., and Drinkall to Bendall, 2 Mar. 1970; Bahr, 10 Apr. 1970, in Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 12; PRO, FCO, 33/913: Jackling, 20 Apr. 1970. ⁶⁵⁹ AAPD 1970, ii, docs. 233 and 236: Scheel and Rogers, Schumann and Stewart, 25 May 1970, Bahr, 25 May 1970, the Bonn Four group, 25 May 1970, and Scheel and Schuman, 25 May 1970; ibid., doc. 263: Fessenden and Sahm, 11 June 1970, and Brandt and Pompidou, 3 July 1970; ibid., docs. 291 and 292: Scheel and Schuman, 3 July 1970; ibid., doc. 306: Auswärtige Amt, 13 July 1970; ibid., docs. 316 and 325: Scheel and Douglas-Home, 16 and 17 July 1970, and the Bonn Four group, 17 July 1970; ibid., docs. 318 and 320: Scheel, Nixon, and Rogers, 18 July 1970. ⁶⁶⁰ BAK, N 1474, 85: Sahm, 27 May 1970. ⁶⁶¹ AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 436, 1: Bahr, 3 June 1970. ⁶⁶² PA, B 41, 1074: Soviet Union unit, 13 July 1970; PA, B 38, 273: Well, 15 July 1970. ⁶⁶³ e.g. ACDP, 01–356, 311: Pompidou, 3 and 4 July 1970; PA, B 38, 325: Auswärtige Amt, 7 Sept. 1970.

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that Gromyko’s mere verbal confirmation to Scheel, ‘you can go and tell the Western Allies that their rights will not be touched by the Moscow Treaty’, would not be sufficient for the British government. The Soviets would have to confirm them in a legally binding form. The German delegation, in return, initially confirmed to the Western ambassadors in Moscow that a written declaration by the Soviets on this matter would be provided. However, Bahr then informed the Western powers about his growing doubts that the Soviets would ever concede to such a demand. Instead, he proposed to tackle this question in an accompanying declaration.⁶⁶⁴ Soon afterwards, Bahr came to the conclusion that the Allies’ had to be told that a mention of their rights in the text itself would be impossible.⁶⁶⁵ The Auswärtige Amt also engaged in internal reflections on how the Allies’ rights could be considered. It concluded that an attempt should be made to mention them in the preamble of the treaty or, if the Soviets refused this, to confirm them in a one-sided declaration directed to the Allies as well as the Soviet Union.⁶⁶⁶ In the course of the official renunciation-of-force negotiations between Scheel and Gromyko in Moscow, Bahr convinced the Allies that Gromyko would never accept their request of a mention of their rights in the treaty text itself. Though with some resentment, the Allies settled for an accompanying declaration on the continued validity of the Four-Power rights.⁶⁶⁷ The British, however, reacted less approvingly. In fact, the British embassy in Moscow nearly caused the treaty to fail. In the night before the initialling of the treaty, Edmonds, a delegate from the British embassy in Moscow, contacted the German delegation and informed it about his government’s disapproval of the proceedings as envisaged. He urged Scheel to delay the initialling of the treaty until the Soviets agreed to deliver a written, legally binding statement on the Allies’ rights. After a heated argument between the German and British representatives, Scheel decided to ignore the British request and to proceed as planned. In retrospect, Bahr called this decision an important step of ‘political emancipation’.⁶⁶⁸ Despite its discontent with the regulation as well as the formulation agreed between Bonn and Moscow, the British ⁶⁶⁴ ⁶⁶⁶ ⁶⁶⁷ 1970. ⁶⁶⁸

BAK, N 1474, 84: Bahr, 8 May 1970. ⁶⁶⁵ Ibid., 85: Bahr, 19 June 1970. AAPD 1970, ii, doc. 321: Schenck, 20 July 1970. For further details, see p. 173. BAK, N 1474, 85: Bahr, 29 June 1970; DzDP, 6th ser., 1, doc. 169: Rush, 31 July Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, 329; Frank, Entschlüsselte Botschaft, 300.

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government decided to refrain from public complaints after a consultation with its Allies in the Bonn Four group. It merely replied to the German note with one of its own, stating that in the British view also the Allies’ rights could not be affected by bilateral German–Soviet treaties.⁶⁶⁹ After the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the German diplomats made efforts to pour oil on troubled waters. In fact, they received positive feedback from all three Western partners. Ruete in Paris could report that France trusted in Bonn’s Ostpolitik.⁶⁷⁰ Although the London Foreign Office held that Bonn had gone a long way towards meeting Soviet wishes as regards the acceptance of frontiers in Europe, it described the Moscow Treaty and its accompanying talk of détente as ‘not in any sense unwelcome’.⁶⁷¹ Washington’s scepticism concerning a positive outcome of German–Soviet negotiations was also proved wrong. The Nixon administration gave its full support to Ostpolitik, and Kissinger expressed to Bahr his wish to continue ‘our close relationship’. He reassured Bahr that the remaining critical voices, such as Fessenden and Acheson, should not worry Bonn, for as they were from lower ranks, they did not represent the White House’s opinion.⁶⁷² The Moscow Treaty increased Bonn’s prestige in America. Washington now argued that it did not want to interfere in intra-German or German–Soviet affairs. It wished to leave its Allies room for manoeuvre and besides ‘could not be more German than the Germans themselves’ (see Figure 12).⁶⁷³ The Allies welcomed the Moscow Treaty as a contribution to the stabilization of the status quo. However, as mentioned above, they were more reserved as regards Bonn’s far-reaching goal of transforming the status quo. In their eyes, it was doubtful to what extent Brandt would be rewarded for his ‘concessions’ made in the treaty ⁶⁶⁹ Wickert’s private archive, Wickert, 12 Aug. 1970., fos. 1–6; PA, B 41, 1056: British embassy, 11 Aug. 1970.; see also BAK, N 1474, 87: Bahr, 6 Aug. 1970. ⁶⁷⁰ Ruete and French official, 7 Aug. 1970, in Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 14. ⁶⁷¹ DBPO, 3rd ser., 1, doc. 50: Brimelow, 14 Aug. 1970; see also PRO, FCO, 33/1148: Bendall, 18–19 Sept. 1970. ⁶⁷² AdsD, Dep. Bahr, 343 B, 1.7.–31.8.70: Kissinger, 20 Aug. 1970; AdsD, Dep. Ehmke, HEA000, 306: Bahr, 23 Dec. 1970. ⁶⁷³ BAK, N 1371, 91, 1: Federal Press Office, 8 Sept. 1970; ibid. and BAK, N 1371, 374: Barzel, 4 Sept. 1970 and 14 Apr. 1971; ACDP, 01–294, 53/1: Gradl, 8 Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–403, 129/1: Stein, Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–433, 90/2: Birrenbach after his visits to Washington of 25 Oct–1 Nov. 1970, 23 May–2 June 1971, and 11–24 Nov. 1971.

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Figure 12. Brandt kneeling down in Warsaw, December 1970.

by Soviet responses in the form of a satisfying settlement on Berlin. The Western Powers did not rule out the possibility that Ostpolitik could eventually achieve positive results, but their perception of the Soviet Union was still shaped by mistrust. From the Allies’ point of view, it remained to be seen whether the other long-term advantage of reunification as envisaged by Brandt would ever be achieved.⁶⁷⁴ Moreover, in this state of insecurity, when the consequences of the Moscow Treaty could not yet be foreseen, the Allies emphasized the ⁶⁷⁴ See e.g. DBPO, 3rd ser., 1, doc. 50: Brimelow, 14 Aug. 1970; PRO, FCO, 7/1842: Heath and Nixon, 17 Dec. 1970.

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need for wariness concerning the future course of détente. As had been underlined before, any violation of their special rights or weakening of the Western position by German undertakings was out of the question.⁶⁷⁵ The Allies now regarded it as a priority to make sure that the Federal Republic remained tied to Western Europe, and that the course of a ‘defined’ Western détente policy, and most notably of the Berlin negotiations, remained under their control.⁶⁷⁶ Broadly speaking, the Allies perceived and supported the West German Ostpolitik that led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, despite its distinct national bias and despite the doubts that they retained, as a long-awaited contribution to world security and co-operation in the world. The Brandt team, in turn, having secured general consent, was able to conduct Ostpolitik with a remarkable degree of independence from the Western Allies. ⁶⁷⁵ PA, B 38, 325: Auswärtige Amt, 7 Sept. 1970; ACDP, 01–294, 53/1: Gradl, 8 Sept. 1970; BAK, N 1371, 374: Barzel, 14 Apr. 1971; ACDP, 01–433, 90/2: Birrenbach, 23 May to 2 June 1971. ⁶⁷⁶ See e.g. DBPO, 3rd ser., 1, doc. 50: Brimelow, 14 Aug. 1970; PRO, FCO, 7/1842: Nixon and Heath, and Heath and Rogers, 17 Dec. 1970; see also Niedhart, ‘Zustimmung und Irritationen’, 15; Niedhart, ‘British Reaction towards Ostpolitik’, 15; Soutou, George Pompidou, 172; Noel D. Cary, ‘Wagging the Dog in Cold War Germany’, German History, 24/2 (2006), 290–3.

Conclusion This book has shown the characters, factors, and objectives that were the driving forces in the ‘ostpolitical drama’. It remains to put these findings into a succinct form. First, New Ostpolitik was the realization of Brandt’s, not Kiesinger’s, ‘ostpolitical’ agenda as devised during the Grand Coalition government. It is possible to speak of a CDU legacy of New Ostpolitik only in so far as Adenauer was the first Chancellor to offer negotiations about the ‘recognition of the realities’ to the Soviet Union, and in so far as Erhard and Schröder were the ‘fathers’ of the renunciation-of-force policy. Other than that, Brandt’s new Eastern policy constituted a break with, rather than a continuation of, the CDU’s Ostpolitik. The change of government in 1969 was indeed decisive for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. Under a CDU government or a continued Grand Coalition government the outcome would have been different. In fact, the SPD’s Ostpolitik was gradually also endorsed by the CDU/CSU in the 1970s. When the opposition party took over power from the SPD in 1982, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister HansDietrich Genscher continued Ostpolitik in almost full accordance with Brandt’s ideas. Second, Ostpolitik was the work of only a handful of authors: Chancellor Brandt, the mastermind Bahr, and some other key advisers. The departments and actors formally in charge of foreign policy, most notably the Foreign Ministry, had little or no say in the execution of the new Eastern policy. While during the Weimar Republic the Auswärtige Amt had still been an efficient foreign political instrument,¹ it became more of an executive assistant in the politics of concern. Foreign Minister ¹ For a survey of the Foreign Ministry’s history see Kurt Doss, ‘The History of the German Foreign Office’, in Zara Steiner (ed.), The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World (London: Times Books and Westport: Meckler, 1982), 225–57; Paul Gordon Lauren, Diplomats and Bureaucrats: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976).

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Scheel, though closely involved throughout the policy-making process, was a weak Foreign Minister. He cooperated with the Brandt team, but his role remained an auxiliary one. The bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry was almost entirely sidelined by Bahr during his negotiations with Moscow. In fact, the conduct of secret diplomacy at the expense of the exclusion of most ministry officials was a precondition for the quick conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. Despite what Max Weber, probably the oldest theorist of bureaucracy, already feared,² and nowadays political scientists, such as Haftendorn, maintain,³ the foreign policy bureaucracy did not administer foreign policy; it played no role in the making of the Moscow Treaty. As Bahr confirms, one of his great experiences in politics was that the Foreign Ministry and its bureaucracy did not make foreign policy. They only implemented it according to instructions from the political leadership.⁴ The making of the Moscow Treaty as a typical example of foreign policy creation was a highly centralized, secret process, during which Brandt and his elite group of associates skilfully restricted any outside involvement. By dint of his knowledge of Ostpolitik since his time as mayor of Berlin, Brandt could, together with his associates, immediately implement his ‘ostpolitical agenda’. Thus, the Moscow Treaty as a case study reveals, and confirms, that the Chancellor is the key figure in the making of foreign policy within the political system of the Federal Republic. The Chancellor’s key position is, of course, due in part to the formal rights granted by the constitution, most importantly the prerogative to determine policy guidelines. However, within these guidelines the constitution also stipulates foreign relations to be the Foreign Minister’s domain. This results in an inbuilt tension between the authority of the Chancellor and that of the Foreign Minister. This tension erupts particularly when the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister belong to parties with dissenting aims, as in the case of the Grand Coalition government. Therefore, as can be seen in the case of all German Chancellors, from Adenauer to Brandt, it is ² Max Weber feared that the rise of bureaucratic social structures would eventually leave no more room for the creative activity of the individual. For an introduction into Weber’s thought, see, for instance, W. J. Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1974), p. ix. ³ Helga Haftendorn et al. (eds.), Verwaltete Außenpolitik: Sicherheits- und entspannungspolitische Entscheidungsprozeße in Bonn (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1978); see also Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpf, Policy-Making in the German Federal Bureaucracy (Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier, 1975), 48. ⁴ Bahr to the author, 7 June 2004.

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the leadership style and nature of relations with the Foreign Minister, rather than any constitutional grant of authority, which is decisive. Depending on his personality and his knowledge of foreign policy, the Chancellor either leaves his Foreign Minister more room for manoeuvre, as Erhard did, or asserts himself as the central figure in foreign policy, like Brandt or Adenauer.⁵ Aside from constitution and personality, the Chancellor’s pre-eminence in foreign policy is also derived from the Federal Republic’s distinct international, semi-sovereign status. Since he headed a divided nation, it was almost a given that the Chancellor would concentrate on the foreign policy sector. However, there are people and elements at other levels which constrain the control of the Chancellor and his key adviser over foreign policy. In the case of the making of the Moscow Treaty, the coalition’s slim parliamentary majority was a source of difficulty for the Brandt team. In addition, the opposition, and public as well as published opinion, exercised pressure on Brandt, varying between support and rejection of his policies. Conversely, the expansion in German–Soviet trade, the emerging international interest in détente, and the growing pressure towards some sort of recognition of the GDR constituted crucial preconditions for the flourishing of the New Ostpolitik. Thanks to West Germany’s semi-sovereign status in legal terms regarding its foreign policy, the Western Allies still had a say, though a far smaller one than previously, in West Germany’s conduct of Ostpolitik. Thus, it was not Brandt and Bahr who ‘made their own history’, but all these various interrelated domestic and international factors which helped to shape New Ostpolitik. ⁵ Some scholars have coined the term ‘chancellor democracy’ to denote the Federal Chancellor’s pre-eminent role in West German policy-making. See Jost Küpper, Die Kan¨ ¨ zlerdemokratie: Voraussetzungen, Strukturen und Anderungen des Regierungsstiles in der Ara Adenauer (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1985). For further discussion of the Chancellor’s leadership see Klaus H. Goetz, ‘Chancellor, Chancellery and Party’, in Stephen Padgett et al. (eds.), Developments in German Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2003), 31–4; Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for Research’, Political Psychology, 18/3 (1997), 553–81; Judith SiwertProbst, ‘Die klassischen aussenpolitischen Institutionen’, in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein et al. (eds.), Deutschlands neue Aussenpolitik, iv: Institutionen und Ressourcen (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1988), 13–46; Stephen Padgett, Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German Chancellorship (London: Hurst, 1994); William E. Paterson, ‘The Chancellor and His Party: Political Leadership in the Federal Republic’, in William E. Paterson and Gordon Smith (eds.), The West German Model Perspectives on a Stable State (London: Cass, 1981), 3–17; Gordon Smith, ‘The Resources of a German Chancellor’, in George William Jones (ed.), West European Prime Ministers (London: Cass, 1991), 48–61.

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Within this network of constraints and influences it is all the more remarkable that Brandt and Bahr were able to execute their daring diplomatic plan as a policy that was effective in the national interest. The decision-makers’ immediate concern was to achieve peace and reconciliation by bringing about a fresh relationship between East and West, and more equality for West Germany in international affairs. But this did not mean that Ostpolitik was a policy of defeatism. As was perceived with unease particularly by the Western Allies, Brandt and Bahr had equally a secret agenda of pursuing the goal of unification. The long-term strategy was that the Moscow Treaty would be the first step to transforming the communist system by opening it to Western influence. This, in turn, would create conditions for German unification. Retrospectively, Bahr maintained that this is exactly what happened. As he put it, without the Social–Liberal Ostpolitik Gorbachev would not have become ‘number one’ in the Kremlin.⁶ Indeed, New Ostpolitik succeeded in smoothing the way to better East–West and particularly intra-German relations and may have, over the years, changed the Soviets’ perception of the Western foreign policy. But to construct a direct causality between the new Ostpolitik and the events of the late 1980s would be to overestimate grossly West German influence on world policy. Most pronouncedly, the historian Frank Fischer has argued that the Eastern bloc would have imploded even if the Moscow Treaty had never been concluded.⁷ However, discussion of the reasons for the downfall of communism is beyond the scope of this book. In this context, it is Brandt’s and Bahr’s intentions, not the effects of their Ostpolitik, which are of interest. Bahr still believed in an eventual reunification in one German state. This became apparent particularly in discussions with the Foreign Ministry staff. Brandt was seemingly less focused on unity in one state. He repeatedly revealed his belief that the unity of his people would not necessarily be realized in one national state, but in a new, supra-national order for Europe.⁸ In retrospect, Bahr confirmed that Brandt was less optimistic and had called him ‘the only crazy person still believing in reunification’. With his orientation to European rather than German national unity, Brandt profoundly challenged the traditional approach to the German question, while ⁶ Bahr to the author, 12 Feb. 2003. ⁷ Frank Fischer, Im deutschen Interesse: Die Ostpolitik der SPD von 1969 bis 1989 (Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2001); Fischer to the author, 6–7 Feb. 2003. ⁸ e.g. Brandt to the New York Post (28 Apr. 1970).

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tying in historically with a German nationalism that was connected less to the state than to the culture. Whatever the differing expectations concerning the final outcome of Ostpolitik were, Brandt and Bahr agreed on their long-term road map as the best and only possible way to effect unification. When this goal of German unity was achieved only two decades later, it came as a largely unanticipated result of the GDR’s collapse, rather than of the peaceful evolution of communism. It therefore did not constitute the realization of the ‘ostpolitical’ concept, as has been portrayed in retrospect.

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Glossary Arbeitskreis Ausw¨artige Amt Bund der Vertriebenen Bundestag Deutschlandpolitik Deutschlandvertrag Elferrat Kleine Lage L¨ander Landsmannschaften Ministerialdirektor Ministerialdirigent Ostpolitik Palais Schaumburg Rahmenvertrag Schaumburger Runde

Working circle The Federal Foreign Ministry League of Refugees Lower house of German parliament West German policy towards the GDR General treaty concluded between West Germany and the Western Allies in 1952–55 CDU/CSU committee of twenty-one members Daily briefings held at the Chancellery States of the Federal Republic of Germany The refugees’ regional organizations Director-General Deputy Director-General West German policy towards the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the GRD The Chancellor’s registered office or the Chancellery Intra-German treaty proposed by Bahr in the summer of 1969 Weekly coalition talk held at the Palais Schaumburg

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Index Abrassimov, Piotr 40 Adenauer Konrad 17–20, 23, 95, 128–9, 181, 260–2 Ahlers, Conrad 80–1, 137, 145, 148, 160, 163, 234–5 Allardt, Helmut German-Soviet negotiations 47–50, 54, 146, 148–9, 161, 174, 176 Renunciation of force talks 42–3, 87, 124–5 Allied rights see Four-power rights Andropov, Yuri 49, 55–6, 154 Atlantic Alliance see Western Allies Bahr, Egon German-Soviet negotiations 49–61, 64, 149–50, 153–4, 175–6 In the Foreign Ministry 73, 75, 77–8, 111, 113 In the Chancellery 136 Ostpolitik 2, 23–4, 115–27, 126, 134, 145, 156–60, 263–4 Renunciation of force talks 36–9, 42–3, 103 Bahr paper 61–2, 64, 151, 162–75, 201–4, 206, 229, 235–6, 255 Barzel, Rainer 91, 100, 104, 182–9, 193–201, 205–8 BDI 215, 220 BdV see refugees Berlin Junktim 172 Berlin question 65–6, 177–8, 219–20, 255, 258 BHE 221 Border article 171–3, 203 Brandt, Willy Deutschlandpolitik 23, 112, 115–7, 125–6, 190, 225, 248, 263 Foreign Minister 71, 73–4, 78–91, 111, 113–4 German-Soviet negotiations 46–7, 50, 219 In the Chancellery 136–7, 139, 261 Ostpolitik 1–2, 6, 31–2, 112–20, 127–30, 134, 159–60, 246, 260, 263–4

Renunciation of force talks 35, 37–8, 40–7, 123–5 Carstens, Karl 34–6, 72, 74, 80, 87, 91–2, 98, 105, 108 CDU/CSU Decision-making 181–4, 189–91 Opposition party 1, 180–210 Ostpolitik 9, 24, 72–5, 92–110, 184–91, 194–6, 198–9, 260 Party structure 91, 181–2 CSU 92, 94–5, 97, 106, 198–9 Cuban missile crisis 22 Dahrendorf, Ralf 153, 163–4, 227 D´etente 16, 20, 22, 25–8, 30, 33, 92, 94, 96–7, 104, 206, 237–9, 242–3, 257, 259, 262 Deutschlandpolitik 96–7, 158–60 Deutschlandvertrag 18, 105 DGB 214 Diehl, Guenter 96, 113 DIHT 212 Duckwitz, Georg Ferdinand 35, 40–1, 74, 80–1, 86, 103, 111, 120, 123, 135, 137–8, 145, 150 Eastern Treaties 4, 33 Ehmke, Horst 111, 136–7, 145, 172, 175, 194–5, 227–8, 234 Erhard, Ludwig 25–7, 94, 260, 262 European Peace Order 28, 69, 100, 104–5, 118, 120 European Security Conference 44, 47, 53 Expellees see refugees Falin, Valentin 54, 57–60, 62–5, 174–6 FDP Ostpolitik 24, 105–7, 132–4, 163–4, 168–70 Party structure 138–9, 143–4, 168–9

300 Foreign Ministry staff 114–5, 138, 145, 148–53, 157–8, 165–6, 171–3, 260–1 Four-power rights 62, 161, 165, 171–3, 177–8, 246–7, 254–7, 259 Frank, Paul 62–5, 158–9, 166, 175–6 Franke, Egon 140 Gaulle, Charles de 23, 25, 239, 244 Generalvertrag 133 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 137, 141–2, 163–5, 167, 179, 202, 260 German question 17, 19–21, 24, 27, 96–8, 100, 238, 247, 263–4 Grand Coalition Coalition negotiations 68–9, 108 Decision-making 30, 69–91 Gromyko, Andrej Renunciation of force talks 41–2, 45–6, 123 German-Soviet negotiations 47–65, 174–6 Guttenberg, Karl Theodor 72–6, 78, 85, 91, 95, 97, 100, 105, 108, 183, 190, 197, 200–1, 204 Hallstein Doctrine 19, 24, 27, 53, 86, 92–3, 101, 119, 129, 134 Harmel report 28 Johnson, Lyndon 238–9 Kennedy, John F. 22–3, 129 Kiesinger, Kurt Georg CDU chairman 182–5, 189–90, 196–7 Chancellor 68–70, 72–82, 84–91, 93–4 Ostpolitik 8–9, 27, 29, 35, 93–4, 96–8, 100–5, 107–10 Renunciation of force talks 36–9, 43–4, 70, 72, 81, 104, 106 Kissinger, Henry 207, 240, 243, 249–50, 252–3 Kossygin, Andrei 33, 54–5, 219 Kressbronner Kreis 76–7 Leber, Georg 141–2

Index Letter on German unity 162, 172–3, 177 Moscow Treaty 2–3, 33–4, 65, 179, 218–9, 221, 229, 237 NATO 16, 18–19, 28, 100, 121, 200, 243, 249, 253 New Ostpolitik 9–11, 31, 33, 66–8, 96, 242–4, 263–4 Nixon, Richard 30, 240, 243, 253, 257 Oder-Neisse line 29, 31, 119, 133, 166, 172, 178, 188, 222, 227 Ostvertraege see Eastern Treaties Policy of movement 25–6 Policy of non-recognition 22, 95, 97, 101–2 Policy of strength 19, 22, 24–6 Prague invasion 30, 41, 86, 103, 122–3, 212, 231–2 Pompidou, Georges 239, 244 Public opinion 168, 210, 221, 229–38 Rahmenvertrag 126–7, 133 Rapallo politics 2, 19, 243–4 Refugees 221–30 Reunification 1–2, 6, 11, 17–20, 27–8, 31, 95, 118–22, 126, 158–60, 190, 263–4 Sahm, Ulrich 56, 74, 83, 111, 122, 136, 145, 177–8 Scheel Walter Foreign Minister 135–9, 168–9, 173–4, 176, 202–4, 261 German-Soviet negotiations 50, 62–5, 174–9 Ostpolitik 132–4, 162, 170–1 Scheel doctrine 134 Schmidt, Helmut 33, 45, 111, 137, 142, 172, 179, 202, 229–30 Schroeder, Gerhard 25, 91, 184, 206, 260 Schuetz, Klaus 69–70, 113 Security policy 121–2 Social Liberal coalition Coalition negotiations 131–4

Index Decision-making 3–5, 135–79, 260–2 Ostpolitik 147–8, 155–60 SPD Ostpolitik 106–7, 111–12, 118–19, 123, 132 Party structures 110, 112–3, 143–4 Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund 110–11, 119 Stoph, Willi 29, 155, 160, 194, 198 Stoph letter 70, 74, 88, 96, 194, 198, 233 Strauss, Franz Josef 69, 85, 91, 94, 182–4, 193, 198–9, 206 Trade unions 214–15 Trade see West German business

301 Tutzing speech 23–4 Ulbricht, Walter 29, 55, 154, 187 Unification see reunification Warsaw Pact 3, 29, 33, 36, 41, 100, 121, 221 Wehner, Herbert 72–3, 81–2, 85, 88, 96, 98, 111, 143, 192 Western Allies 6, 181, 238–59, 263 West German business 211–2, 214–21 Zarapkin, Semjon 34–41, 43–5, 81, 103–4, 106 Zone 20, 93, 95–8, 115, 119, 129, 242