The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran: Political Islamic Groups in Iran (1941-61) (Routledgecurzon Studies in Political Islam)

The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran

During the 1940s and 1950s, Islamic reformism flourished in Iran. This book examines how Iranian Islamic groups came to rethink traditional accounts of religion and nurture a politicized version of Islam. The author shows how similar social and political circumstances, but different family and educational backgrounds gave rise to socialist, democratic/scientific and fundamentalist/militant reinterpretations of Islam. What was common among these groups, however, was a tendency towards politicizing the religion. The first group discussed is the Society of Socialist Theists, whose main concern was to reconcile Islam and socialism. The author then moves on to consider the Iran Freedom Movement, whose founders emphasized the compatibility of Islam with new empirical sciences and liberal democratic concepts of freedom and democracy. The final group discussed is the Society of the Devotees of Islam, a small but politically effective group led by militant clerics, who viewed Islam primarily from a political angle and provided the next generation of Iranian clerics with a model of political activism. A significant contribution to discussions of contemporary political thought in Iran, this book will be of interest to researchers and academics of Islamic political thought and Iranian politics and history. Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi completed his PhD in Political Theory at the University of Hull, after obtaining BA and MA degrees in Politics at the University of Tehran. His research interests include political theory, cultural difference, and politics and society in the Middle East.

RoutledgeCurzon Studies in Political Islam

1. The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran Political Islamic groups in Iran (1941–61) Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi

The Flourishing of Islamic Reformism in Iran Political Islamic groups in Iran (1941–61) Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi

First published 2005 by RoutledgeCurzon 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge Curzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Seyed Mohammad Ali Taghavi All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-32162-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–35031–X (Print Edition)

To my parents

Contents

Acknowledgements

x

Introduction

1

The period under study 4 Methodology and structure 6 Some terms and concepts 7 Transliteration 8 PART I

The Socialist Theists 1 History

11 13

The period of intellectual activities 14 Entering politics 15 After the 1953 coup 19 2 Reforming Islamic thought: reconciling Islam and socialism Criticizing traditional understanding of Islam and the clergy 23 Adhering to socialism 26 The link between politics and religion 31 Freedom and democracy 32

23

viii

Contents

3 The methodology of reforming Islamic thought

35

Utilizing new sciences 35 Philosophical foundations and social values 37 4 The historical and intellectual context of the formation of the Socialist Theists’ views

41

Social and political situation 41 Concern about threats against Islam 48 New sciences and Western philosophical schools 54 Conclusion 56 PART II

The Iran Freedom Movement 5 History

59 61

Formation of Islamic associations 61 Mahdi Bazargan 62 Foundation of the Iran Freedom Movement 64 6 A new approach to Islam: a worldly Islam

67

Criticizing the traditional understanding of Islam and the clergy 67 Reinterpreting religious conceptions 71 Religion, social life and politics 73 Equality, freedom and democracy 77 A scientific approach to religion 82 7 The methodology of working out the new approach Return to the Koran: Islam as a comprehensive religion 90 Understanding Islam in the light of other schools of thought 93 Utilizing empirical sciences 95

90

Contents 8 Formative factors in Bazargan’s approach to Islam

ix 101

Social and political circumstances 102 Concern about threats against Islam 105 Empirical sciences and Western schools of thought 109 Conclusion 110 PART III

The Society of the Devotees of Islam 9 History

113 115

Navvab-e Safavi 115 Foundation of Fada’iyan-e Islam 116 Differences with Mossaddeq and Kashani 118 10 A militant approach to Islam

122

Criticizing Muslim clergy for the separation of religion and politics 123 Islamic government and Islamic economy 124 11 Social and political factors influencing Fada’iyan’s thought

127

Decline of Islamic societies 127 Religion under threat 129 Influence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 130 Conclusion 131 Conclusion Afterword Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

133 137 139 143 165 173

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to more people than I can list. I particularly thank the members of the supervisory panel for my thesis at the University of Tehran, Dr Seyyed Javad Tabataba’i, Dr Hossein Bashiriye, Dr Sadeq Zibakalam and Dr Manoochehr Mohammadi, for their insightful guidance and critical comments. Their encouragement was an incentive for me to develop the thesis into this book. A significant part of the information and analyses provided in this book was collected through interviews with prominent members and survivors of the groups discussed in the book. I am grateful to all the interviewees who, despite lack of time or ill health, provided me with the opportunity to talk to them. I express my gratitude to the staff at the Iran National Library, the Iranian Parliament Library and the Tehran University Library for providing me with precious sources. Thanks are due to Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, who allowed me access to the rare copies of the newspaper, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], published by Fada’iyan-e Islam between 1952 and 1953. I am grateful to Frank Cass Publishers for permitting me to reproduce the paper, ‘ “Fadaeeyan-i Islam”: The Prototype of Islamic Hard-liners in Iran’ published in the journal, Middle Eastern Studies, 40, 1 (2004). Part three of this book is an expanded version of that paper. I thank my father, Seyyed Mohammad Hashem Taghavi, for his help in checking some Koranic verses and ahadith referred to in this book. I appreciate the help of Mahmood Ramazani, who checked some historical events mentioned in this book. Frequent debates and conversation with many friends, including Mohammad Ja’far Re’is Zadeh and Mahmood Baqeri, allowed me to try out ideas and learn from their views. I also thank Reza Afkhami, Eric Tanenbaum, Amalendu Misra and my wife, Zahra Tabibi, who read the first draft of this work and commented on it. I owe special gratitude to

Acknowledgements xi Kathryn Spry who improved my English. I should admit that I was receptive to the intellectual support received from the above people and many others, subject only to the limits of my own capacity. Therefore, nobody save myself is responsible for the mistakes, shortcomings and misinterpretations that may be seen in this book. At various stages of preparing this book, I enjoyed the unfailing love, support and encouragement of my wife, without which none of this would have been possible. My greatest debt is to her. In the last stages of this work, I had two little companions: my two sons, Masoud and Hamid Reza, whose sweet presence was a tranquillizer for the stresses and anxieties of the research work.

Introduction

The unabated factionalism within the Islamic Republic of Iran in the past decade has shown that the Islamic Revolution has two different faces: a fundamentalist face and a modernist one. The 1979 Revolution was not merely a dismissive reaction to Western civilization, but was also a product of an intellectual tradition attempting at reconciling Islam with new sciences and schools of thought originated in the West, and enabling it to respond to the requirements of modern life. What distinguishes the fundamentalists from the modernists is not so much the issue of foreign policy as the way they think about society, politics and religion. Whereas the fundamentalists claim that they follow Islam in its pure form, the modernists accept certain types of borrowing from other schools of thought. This affects the way that the two groups interpret Islamic teachings. Whereas the former follow a strict approach in interpreting religious scripts, the latter have a broader view that allows reliance on reasoning and new sciences, when interpreting the scripts. Nevertheless, Islamic modernists and fundamentalists have one belief in common, the need for direct involvement of religion in politics. Modernist and fundamentalist approaches towards Islam have been coexisting, as well as competing, among religiously minded political activists in Iran, at least since the mid-twentieth century. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was a product of the coalition of the advocates of these two approaches, under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The developments leading to the formation of fundamentalist and modernist tendencies among Islamic activists in Iran can be traced back to the all-embracing encounter of Iranian society with Western civilization, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Since then, the winds of change have swept through Iran, with far-reaching consequences. The process of transformation of Iranian society reached its climax in the period between the Constitutional Revolution of 1906

2 Introduction and the demise of Reza Shah’s reign in 1941. Rather than creating a new society, however, this process brought about a type of dualism in various spheres of society, from politics and economy to education and culture. In the political domain, while political and administrative institutions became modernized, political relationships, hierarchy and legitimacy preserved their old forms. In the economic system, despite the establishment of new industries and the expansion of imports, the traditional subsistence economy continued to exist. In the sphere of culture, the education system was transformed and the mass media assumed importance, but the traditional institutions remained. The tension between tradition and modernity has played a significant role in political and social developments in Iran during the past one and a half centuries. Religion, which has deeply affected every aspect of Iranian society, was a key subject of confrontation between tradition and modernity. The advocates of the new institutions and Westernized circles scorned religious faith, and found it the cause of the backwardness of society. They believed that since the West had achieved progress when it got rid of religion, Iranians should do the same. For the traditionalists, on the other hand, Islam was a comprehensive and perfect way of life, far from any defect. There was, however, a third group of thinkers who, while appreciating the achievements of the West, tried to come up with a new understanding of Islam, in order to enable it to deal with the requirements of the modern age. This group, among whom there was no consensus about methods and approaches, can be called ‘Islamic reformists’ or ‘Islamic modernists’. Each Islamic reformist, depending on his background and in particular his education, had his own particular account of the weaknesses of the traditional approach to Islam, and came up with a different prescription for enabling Islam in the modern world. Westernized circles, traditionalists and reformists have competed with each other, in the modern history of Iran. They fought many battles, but the war is not yet over. More than two decades after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran is still experiencing the confrontation between these forces, as much as it did before the 1906 Constitutional Revolution. Nevertheless, the developments of the twentieth century have enormously complicated the alignment and balance of the forces. Among these developments, from the early twentieth century to 1941, the beginning of the period under discussion in this book, were the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the gradual exclusion of the clergy from the process of the Revolution, the Revolution’s giving way to the tyranny of Reza Shah, the modernization of various institutions by the

Introduction 3 Shah, the exclusion of the clergy from public life, the suppression and disillusionment of the intellectuals and, finally, the collapse of the modernism of Reza Shah, following the Allied Powers invasion of Iran in 1941. With the occupation of Iran by the Allies in September 1941, which led to the exile of Reza Shah, the clash between the Westernized groups, traditionalists and reformists intensified in a relatively open atmosphere, and a strong Marxist group entered into the conflict. Given the failure of the Westernized elite in the first half of the twentieth century, there was a new tendency towards Islamic reformism. Lay religious intellectuals established various Islamic associations, including Jam’iyat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist, or the Society of Socialist Theists (led by Jalal ad-Din Ashtiani and Mohammad Nakhshab), Anjoman-e Tabliqat-e Islami, or the Society for Promoting Islamic Teachings (established by Mahmood Shahabi), Kanoon-e Nashr-e Haqayeq-e Islami, or the Centre for Spreading Islamic Truth (founded by Mohammad Taqi Shari’ati) in Mashhad, Kanoon-e Islam, or the Islamic Centre (directed by Ayatollah Mahmood Taleqani), and Islamic associations of students, engineers and physicians. These associations, which were primarily founded to promote Islamic ideas, one by one, directly or indirectly, became involved in politics. In the 1940s and 1950s, Islamic reformism flourished in Iran. The main feature of this new trend towards Islam was a tendency towards the politicization of Islam. In other words, Islamic reformists were eager to involve Islam directly in the political struggle for changing Iranian society. In the post-September 1941 era, the main body of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran maintained its calculated aloofness from politics, following the tradition of quietism, which characterized Shi’ite communities in predominantly Sunni states for centuries. A minority of the clergy, including Ayatollah Seyyed Abol-Qassem Kashani, however, began active participation in politics. This group did not represent a sharp diversion from the dominant tradition. Since the establishment of the Shi’ite Safavid Empire in Iran, many Shi’ite ‘ulama had cooperated with the government. Later on, many prominent ‘ulama had supported the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, while a few of them had opposed it. Such involvement in politics did not entail an independent claim on government by the clergy. It was considered as the social part of mainly religious duties of the clergy. The establishment of Jam’iyat-e Fada’iyan-e Islam, or the Society of the Devotees of Islam, was a turning point. The group was founded by Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi, a low-ranking militant Shi’ite clergy, in 1945 and was

4 Introduction engaged in radical activities, particularly acts of assassination, in the name of Islam. It introduced the concept of Islamic government. The group’s politicized account of Islam was in sharp contrast with the quietism of its contemporary clerical circles, and did not attract serious attention at that time, although it inspired the next generation of Iranian clergy who participated in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Nevertheless, it was not difficult for the advocates of political Islam, and even more radical groups such as Fada’iyan, to justify their activism by reference to Islamic teachings and particularly the Shi’ite doctrine. Shi’ite folklore glorifies martyrdom for the cause of justice, and its history is imbued with frequent rebellions in the name of religion against oppressive ruling dynasties. However, in the historical context of the first half of the twentieth century, and particularly after the premature death of the 1906 Revolution, the traditional inaction and fatalism were prevalent in Iranian society. Any political action in the name of Islam was considered heresy by some religious circles. That was why, as will be seen later, many Islamic groups were reluctant to enter into politics, and it took them a long time to take on board the legitimacy of political action in the name of religion.

THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY The two decades following 1941 were crucial in the development of the project of political Islam in Iran. Islam as a political ideology was first introduced by Muslim intellectuals in this period. The first organized attempt at political action by the militant clergy was also made in this period. Both Islamic intellectuals and the militant clergy were critical of the traditional approach to Islam, but presented different alternatives. What they had in common, however, was an eagerness to politicize Islam. The politicized Islam, theorized by Islamic intellectuals and nurtured by the militant clergy, motivated many groups and individuals devoted to social and intellectual activities as well as several underground groups engaged in urban guerrilla warfare against the Shah’s regime, and it has played an increasingly significant role in the political developments of Iran ever since, reaching its climax in the Revolution of 1979. A detailed study of Islamic political groups active between 1941 and 1961 can shed light not only on the developments of that period of Iranian history, but also on contemporary developments. What has happened in Iran, during and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, has been, to a significant extent, a continuation of competition and

Introduction 5 cooperation between Islamic forces formed between 1941 and 1961. The current factional politics is taking place between forces that theoretically align themselves along the lines drawn in that period. A study of Islamic groups in the formative period of 1941–61 can therefore be helpful in understanding the political ideas motivating influential segments of the Iranian political elite in recent decades. It also helps us to comprehend the diversity of political ideas presented in the name of Islam. It shows how Islamic groups adopted different approaches in order to respond to the predicaments of Iranian society and the challenges posed by the outside world, and to address theoretical issues such as social justice, modernism, democracy and freedom. Furthermore, such a study may provide us with an insight into the views of other Islamic groups in the various parts of the Islamic world. In this book, the approaches of three groups, active between 1941 and 1961, towards politics and religion are examined. First, the views of the Society of Socialist Theists, established by Ashtiani and Nakhshab, who tried to combine Islam and socialism, are studied. Then, the approach adopted by the Iran Freedom Movement, and especially its key founder and leader, Mahdi Bazargan, who was eager to reconcile Islam with new sciences, are examined. Finally, the beliefs of the Society of Devotees of Islam, a militant fundamentalist group led by Navvab-e Safavi, are considered. What was common among these groups was that they viewed politics from an Islamic perspective. The year 1941 is chosen as the beginning of the period under consideration in this book, because, as mentioned earlier, with the exile of Reza Shah, an open political environment favourable to the flourishing of various political groups, including Islamic ones, was created. The year 1961 is chosen as the ending of the period under study, because it was the year when the Iran Freedom Movement was established. The founders of the Movement, however, started their intellectual activities in the early 1940s. The year 1961 was, in one sense, the end of the formative era of political Islam, because soon after that a new and more radical wave of Islamic activism was initiated in Iran. In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini began the anti-government activities that led to his exile, which, in turn, sparked mass protests that were crushed by the government. Suppression of the opposition, including the imprisonment of the leaders of the Iran Freedom Movement, provided a favourable environment for radical groups, such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization, formed by younger members of the Iran Freedom Movement, who tried to wage an urban guerrilla war against the Shah’s regime. This book does not cover Islamic political

6 Introduction movements or Muslim intellectuals, such as ‘Ali Shari’ati, whose activities occurred primarily after 1961. Neither does it cover secular and Marxist groups active in the period under discussion in this book.

METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE This study is mainly a theoretical analysis of the published works of the founders and influential members of the Socialist Theists, the Iran Freedom Movement and Fada’iyan-e Islam. The intention is to work out, as much as possible, a detailed and coherent picture of their thought concerning politics and religion. For this purpose, mainly original sources are consulted. In the case of the Socialist Theists and particularly Fada’iyan-e Islam, references are also made to short or serial articles published in the periodicals affiliated to them. With regard to the Iran Freedom Movement, this was not necessary, since its main founder and leader, Mahdi Bazargan, wrote widely about the topics with which this book is concerned. Furthermore, several interviews with prominent members and survivors of the groups were conducted. In considering the thought and approaches of these groups to religion and politics, the intention is not so much to criticize them as to analyse them. The study has also a historical dimension, examining the political activities of the groups. The historical aspect of the book, however, is not as detailed as its theoretical aspect. The historical chapters provide general pictures of the groups, and primarily cover events in so far as they point to the political and religious approaches adopted by their members. The assumption is that there is a strong link between their conceptions of politics and Islam and their political activities. Moreover, an attempt is made to explain the thoughts and activities of the groups with reference to their broader political and historical context, as well as the social and educational background of their founders and members. This book consists of three parts, each devoted to one of the abovementioned groups. All the parts follow a similar pattern, beginning with a chapter briefly examining the history of the group concerned, followed by a chapter on the group’s religious and political views. A third chapter discusses the methodology adopted by the group in working out its new approach to Islam, how it justified its attempt at putting forward a new interpretation. In the final chapter of each part, the social, political and intellectual factors that formed the relevant group’s views are delineated. The chapter on the history of the Socialist Theists in Part I is a little longer than the corresponding

Introduction 7 chapters in Parts II and III. Because all three groups belonged to more or less the same historical period, there was no need to elaborate in the latter parts many events already mentioned in Part I. In Part III on Fada’iyan-e Islam, there is no chapter on the methodology adopted in their approach to Islam, since not much can be extracted from their views in this regard. The book ends with a conclusion, in which the main and common points of various parts of the book are highlighted, and some concluding remarks are made.

SOME TERMS AND CONCEPTS In this book, some terms and concepts used throughout might be in need of clarification. Among these is the term, ‘reforming Islamic thought’ or ‘adopting a new approach to Islam’, which is defined as revising the prevalent or common approach to Islam. Such a definition is neutral, and does not entail any normative judgement as to whether such revision is for the better or worse. It can be said that when such terms are used to describe the intellectual endeavours of an individual or group, they imply three points. First, a commitment to Islam underpins such endeavours. Second, the justification for such reforms or revisions is sought from within Islam itself. Third, Islam is considered as a perfect religion, but any defect is attributed to approaches to Islam. In other words, it is a specific understanding of Islam, and not Islam per se, which may be considered to be in need of reform. Given the above definition, the following intellectual activities can be regarded as attempts at reforming Islamic thought or adopting a new approach to Islam: criticizing the traditional account of Islam and the traditional clergy, criticizing common religious practices, reinterpreting some Islamic concepts or highlighting them at the expense of others, utilizing sciences or other schools of thought in understanding and reinterpreting Islam, and the like. Another extensively used term is ‘politicized Islam’ or ‘political Islam’. There is a consensus that Islamic teachings are not restricted to the private sphere of human life, but have implications for the public domain. Islam sets moral standards not only for relationships between individuals but also for the relationship between state and society. However, by definition, politicized Islam goes beyond this. It regards Islam as a political ideology that unequivocally requires specific political actions in certain circumstances. Such a definition might not be very helpful for distinguishing a politicized version of Islam, since, as said before, Islam is not indifferent to the public life.

8 Introduction However, a radical account of politicized Islam, to which not all Islamists subscribe, may provide an insightful contrast between politicized Islam and otherwise. According to this account, there is absolutely no way to realize Islamic teachings, except through state apparatus. Therefore, seizing political power is regarded as a religious imperative, alongside, or even above, other religious duties. Moreover, state must be fully at the service of religion. In this account, state and religion are considered as one, and no degree of autonomy is recognized for either. Islamic government is the key word in the terminology of the advocates of this account. In this book, the term ‘nationalist’ is widely used as an adjective, in phrases such as nationalist movements or nationalist parties. It is the English translation of the word ‘melli’, in Persian. Nationalism in the context with which this book is concerned is not based on ethnicity, but means Iranian nationalism, incorporating all ethnicities within Iran. Although nationalism, even in the Iranian context, has an exclusionist connotation, in this book it mainly refers to a tendency opposing foreign intervention in Iran. On most occasions in this book, the terms ‘nationalism’ and ‘nationalist’ can be replaced by ‘patriotism’ and ‘patriotic’, respectively.

TRANSLITERATION In general, the transliteration style adopted by the journal, Middle Eastern Studies, is followed in this book. With regard to alphabetical equivalents, for the Arabic/Persian letter qaf [ ], the English letter ‘q’ is used; thus, the Iranian holy city, 130 km south of Tehran, is spelled as Qom. For the Arabic/Persian letter ghain [ ], ‘gh’ is used; hence, the Arabic/Persian term for the West is spelled as gharb. There are, however, exceptional and well-known cases like the Koran, where instead of the letter q, k is used. The guttural letter ‘ain [ ] as well the glottal stop or hamza [ ] are represented by the standard notation ‘ ‘ ’, as in ‘Ali, the name of the Prophet Mohammad’s cousin. For the Arabic/Persian letter tha ( ), ‘th’ is used. Therefore, the Arabic/ Persian term for the Prophet’s and Imam’s speeches is spelled as hadith. Such transliteration is, nevertheless, far from perfect, since, for example, no distinction is made between several Arabic/Persian consonants resembling ‘h’, ‘z’ or ‘s’, or between the long and short forms of ‘a’ and ‘i’. Where there is a difference between the Arabic and Persian pronunciations of a word, and consequently its transliteration, in most cases, the Persian pronunciation is preferred.

Introduction 9 Wherever it is thought that it may be helpful to mention the English translation of names and terms that are originally in Persian, or vice versa, they are stated between [ ]. Similarly, when in the text, notes or the bibliography, a date in the Iranian calendar is mentioned, its equivalent in the Gregorian calendar is stated between [ ]. The Iranian calendar is a solar calendar beginning with the year that Prophet Mohammad migrated from Mecca to Madina, that is, 622 AD. The first day of the Iranian calendar is 21 March. Thus, in order to find an equivalent in the Gregorian calendar, the number 621, for events between 21 March and the end of December, and the number 622, for events between 1 January and 20 March, are added to the Iranian year.

Part I

The Socialist Theists

Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist, or the Movement of the Socialist Theists, was founded, as an intellectual circle rather than a political group, in 1944 by Jalal ad-Din Ashtiani, Mohammad Nakhshab and a group of university students with a religious inclination. Ashtiani intended to establish a middle school of thought based on Islam, between idealism and Marxist materialism. Emphasizing political activism, in 1947, Nakhshab set up a separate group, which was active during the period of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry, and continued its activities until 1965. ‘Ali Shari’ati, the most famous Iranian Islamic intellectual, and some leftist Islamic groups, whose activities were intensified in the years immediately before and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, were affiliated with the group. The main concern of the Socialist Theists was to reconcile Islam with socialist ideas. Although influenced by Marxism, they were critical of it, not only philosophically, but also because of the disregard for freedom and democracy in the Soviet model. They believed in the need for both social justice and democracy, but they thought that neither capitalism nor Marxism could provide satisfactory moral foundations for these demands. For them, only a belief in God could provide such a moral foundation.1 However, they found the traditionalist account of Islam indifferent to social injustice and permeated by superstitions, and hence in need of reform, in such a way that it could accommodate socialism. Part I begins with a short history of the formation of the group through various phases. There follows an examination of how they conceived the traditionalist account of Islam, what they considered to be its shortcomings and how they thought these problems could be addressed. Their methodology in adopting their new approach to Islam is analysed. Finally, the social and political circumstances in which the Socialist Theists’ thought was formed and those schools of thought that shaped their views are discussed.

1

History

For Iranians, the summer of 1941 is associated with two events, giving rise to opposite feelings of sorrow and joy. In late August, the Soviets, from the north, and the British, from the south, entered Iran: Allied Powers occupied the country. In mid-September, Reza Shah resigned and left Iran. Iranians lost their sovereignty until the end of the Second World War, but gained freedom from despotism. It could be argued that these events symbolized the irony that Iranians could not have both freedom and self-determination at the same time, a pattern dominating the history of Iran in the twentieth century. In the open environment following the occupation of Iran and Reza Shah’s departure, many political and nonpolitical groups and parties were formed, among which the Iran Toodeh Party [the Party of the Masses of Iran] was of paramount importance. The Party, which was established in late September 1941, followed Marxism and supported Soviet policies. Nevertheless, in its early days, the Party denied its antireligious inclination, as its constitution was framed in very cautious terms2 in order not to give such an impression in the deeply religious society of 1940s Iran. In response to the creation of the Toodeh Party, many other parties were formed, some of which were supported by the British or the Royal Court. One such party was Hezb-e Nehzat-e Melli-e Iran [the Iran Nationalist Movement Party], which was established by Brigadier General Arfa’, the army’s Chief of Staff, and Dr Amanpoor. However, the Party soon disintegrated. One of the reasons for its disintegration was that young members of a group affiliated to the Party rebelled against its leadership, because of its connections to the Royal Court and the British embassy.3 One of these people was Jalal ad-Din Ashtiyani, a student of mining engineering.

14 The Socialist Theists THE PERIOD OF INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITIES Jalal ad-Din Ashtiyani was the son of Mirza Mahdi Ashtiyani, a scholar in Islamic philosophy and mysticism and one of the officials of the Ministry of Justice in Reza Shah’s era. Given his religious family background, the wave of anti-Islamic developments caused by Reza Shah’s reforms and the activities of the Bahais,4 and later the Toodeh Party, was unsettling for the young Jalal ad-Din. Hence, he decided to establish a new school of thought, based on Islam, but benefiting from modern thoughts. In early 1944, he came to know Mohammad Mekanik, a law student who later changed his surname to Nakhshab.5 The latter, whom Jalal ad-Din described as a source of ‘faith, devotion and energy’,6 had a similar religious inclination, and by his charisma attracted a group of young people around himself. These two and some university and high school students established Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist, or the Movement of the Socialist Theists, in Tehran. The group did not engage in public activities, apparently in order to train its members and attract new recruits in an environment free of political wrangling. The intention was that by the time they decided to participate in public activities, they would have a sufficient number of trained members.7 The Socialist Theists started their intellectual work through intragroup studies and presentation of papers by members, particularly Ashtiyani and Nakhshab. Ashtiyani followed his project of establishing ‘a middle school of thought’ between idealism and materialism. He denounced the royalist clergy, and called Marxism ‘utopian socialism’. He maintained his belief in Islam and monotheism, and argued that social well-being could only be achieved through ‘positivist socialism’, which he believed is the social system advocated by the true Islam.8 He decided to present the talks given within the framework of the group in a collection under the name of ‘Mankind’s Ideal: Analysis of Thoughts’. It was intended to include the following: analysis of philosophical schools of thought; presentation of a new school of thought, under the name of the Middle School of Thought, inspired by Islam; examination of previous civilizations and historical developments; analysis of social schools of thought; and presentation of a new system under the name of Positivist Socialism, based on the Middle School of Thought, which unlike Marxism was grounded on human nature and truth.9 Of this collection, only one piece from the first part, analysis of philosophical schools of thought, on materialism10 was published, in 1948. Because of the abrogation of freedoms, following a failed attempt on the Shah’s life, the publication of the

History

15

second piece was stopped. Following the departure of Ashtiyani from Iran in 1949, the other parts were not prepared for publication. However, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, some parts of this collection, such as Mankind’s Ideal: Analysis of Thoughts: Managing, Not Ruling and an examination of Judaism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, were published. The Socialist Theists’ policy of not having public activities continued until 1947. During these years, Ashtiyani was regarded as the group’s theorist and Nakhshab as its political guru.11 In 1947, Nakhshab and some of his friends called for engagement in public activities and recruitment of new members, but this request was not approved by the group’s executive committee. Nakhshab established a splinter group, while the main group continued its old policy.12 It is a matter of dispute as to who were the Bolsheviks and who were the Mensheviks in this separation. Hossein Razi, of the splinter group, rejected the view that only a minority of members joined Nakhshab, on the ground that it was the main group that did not survive long afterwards.13 After Ashtiyani’s departure from Iran and the return of students studying in Tehran to their local towns, the activities of the main group were significantly reduced. These activities were limited to publishing a magazine under the name of Mahd-e ‘Elm [The Cradle of Knowledge], which was not the official mouthpiece of the group, and providing religious and political training by an affiliated group called Jam’iyat-e Ta’avoni-e Khoda Parastan [the Cooperative Society of Theists]. Some members of the main group, in an individual capacity, later joined the National Resistance Movement, the umbrella organization consisting of parties and figures opposing the 1953 CIA-brokered coup that overthrew the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossaddeq. Also, some student members joined Students’ Islamic Associations, which had been active since 1942.14 The 1953 coup put an end to the activities of the original body of the Socialist Theists.15

ENTERING POLITICS Splitting off from the Movement of the Socialist Theists, in 1947, Nakhshab and his friends Razi, Morja’i, Mostafavi and Lajevardi gathered some young activists of the group, and established Nehzat-e Azadi-e Mardom-e Iran [the Movement for the Freedom of People of Iran]. In the process of political development, as we will see, the group changed its name several times, but the term Khoda Parastan-e Socialist

16 The Socialist Theists [the Socialist Theists], referring to its members’ way of thinking, always signified them. Given the abstention of the original group from politics, hereafter the name, the Socialist Theists, in this book refers to the group led by Nakhshab, unless specified otherwise. The Socialist Theists’ first action was their unsuccessful attempt to foil the government plan to fix the result of a parliamentary election in its own favour, in 1947. The police attacked members of the group who tried to prevent the authorities from moving the ballot boxes to a safe place where they could manipulate the process of counting ballot papers; and Nakhshab was detained. Later, the group organized a student rally before the Parliament to protest against the Britishdominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The failed attempt to assassinate the Shah by an alleged member of the Toodeh Party, in February 1949, led to the suppression of political freedoms, and many political parties were banned. Their leaders and some other independent opposition figures, such as Ayatollah Seyyed Abol-Qassem Kashani, were jailed, sent into exile or silenced. Consequently, the activities of the Socialist Theists were also reduced significantly. However, this situation did not last long. In July 1949, when the Supplementary Bill for Exploiting Petroleum was put before Iranian Parliament, the parliamentary opposition objected ardently to the bill. The bill was based on a contract between Britain and Iran, and was believed to expand British domination over the Iranian petroleum industry. The parliamentary opposition consisted of only four members, namely, Hossein Maki, ‘Abdol-Qadir Azad, Abol-Hassan Ha’eri-Zadeh and Hossein Baqaii. Such resistance changed the political environment. This was the beginning of what was later called the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry. Following the next parliamentary election, twenty political figures who later called themselves the National Front began a sit-in in the Royal palace in protest at vote rigging, and demanded that the election results be annulled.16 Their sit-in ended without success. However, following the assassination of ‘Abdol-Hossein Hajir, the then Minister of the Court and the former Prime Minister, and a demonstration organized by the National Front in early November 1949, the government caved in and annulled the results of the Tehran election. In the re-election in Tehran, the National Front’s candidates headed by Mossaddeq won the majority of votes. Hence, the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry gained momentum. The Socialist Theists were actively involved in supporting the National Front’s candidates and establishing a supervisory organization set up by the opposition for monitoring the election process.17 They

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published two weeklies under the names of Sobh-e Omid [The Morning Hope] and Baray-e Taraqqi-e Iran [For the Progress of Iran], in order to publicize their political and theoretical views. However, it seems that the group could not attract popular support. They came to the conclusion that their political success required a powerful organization, which they thought they already had, and some respected figureheads. Hence, they tried to recruit some reputable figures, who then could attract popular support. They invited Maki, Azad, Ha’eriZadeh and Baqaii, who had gained public respect by their objection to the Supplementary Petroleum Bill, to join their group, but they were unsuccessful.18 Next, they tried to join one of the reputable political parties, and chose the Iran Party.19 The Iran Party consisted of non-Marxist intellectuals and professionals, educated in or outside Iran, with a nationalist inclination, in the open environment of the post-1941 period.20 The Party did not have a clear ideological basis, but, in general, was a secular party with social democratic tendencies, similar to those of European social democratic parties. On some occasions, in response to British and Soviet intervention in Iran’s internal affairs, the Party advocated a close relationship with the USA. In the summer of 1946, the Party lost some of its credibility, because of participating, alongside the Toodeh Party, in the coalition government of Qavam, a royalist, but independent and self-centred figure. The coalition lasted only seventyfive days. However, later, the Iran Party’s support for Mossaddeq’s government helped restitute its reputation as a nationalist party. Upon joining in 1951, the Socialist Theists invigorated the Iran Party, establishing branches in most cities.21 However, the marriage, in which each party had entered with a different agenda, did not last long. It is a matter of controversy as to what led to the separation of the Socialist Theists from the Iran Party. According to the book Gozashte Cheragh-e Rah-e Ayandeh Ast: the Iran Party was experiencing internal disputes. After coalition with the Mihan Party, the Iran Party, in order to increase its membership, admitted the members of Nehzat [Nehzat-e Azadi-e Mardom-e Iran or the Socialist Theists] to its ranks, and two of its leaders called Nakhshab and Razi to its executive committee. Members of Nehzat, because of their support for Kashani, preserved their own organizational connections even within the Iran Party. With increasing differences between Mossaddeq and Kashani, the Party also faced internal disputes. Members of Nehzat decided to oust the Party’s leadership, but their plot was disclosed and failed.22

18 The Socialist Theists However, the evidence does not prove that the Socialist Theists supported Ayatollah Kashani in his dispute with Mossaddeq. A brief review of the magazine, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], which was published by the Socialist Theists after their split from the Iran Party, firmly indicates otherwise. Hormoz Momayyezi, a member of the group, confirmed that they had a friendly relationship with Ayatollah Kashani, but in his differences with Mossaddeq, they dissociated themselves from the former.23 Possibly in the anti-Kashani and proMossaddeq environment of that period, the leaders of the Iran Party accused the Socialist Theists of collaborating with Kashani, in order to justify their expulsion from the Party. It is nevertheless likely that the Socialist Theists intended to control the Iran Party through getting the majority in its leadership. It has been said that ‘Nakhshab was hopeful that when the Socialist Theists, with their Islamic ideology and socialist tendency, joined the Iran Party, the latter would turn into a nationalist party with an Islamic ideology’.24 However, there is no evidence that the Socialist Theists were trying to achieve this purpose through plotting. In the Party’s fifth congress, Nakhshab, Razi, Nooshin, Morja’i and Sami’i of the Socialist Theists were elected as the second, third, fourth, fifth and seventh members of the Tehran Committee, and were influential in the approval of socialism on the basis of theism as the Party’s ideology.25 Fearful of losing their influence, the Party’s old leaders expelled three of the above-mentioned people, and this led to the separation of the Socialist Theists from the Party.26 In their letters following the separation, the Socialist Theists accused the Iran Party’s leadership of compromising with the corrupt ruling class,27 which referred to the monarchical institutions. Whatever the reason for the split, a unity that each party tried to exploit to its own advantage ended after two years, in early 1953. After this, the Socialist Theists continued their activities under the name of Jam’iyat-e Azadi-e Mardom-e Iran [the Society for the Freedom of People of Iran], which was affiliated to the National Front, and up to the end supported Mossaddeq. ‘Ali Shari’ati, the most famous Iranian Islamic intellectual, joined the group in Mashhad, probably during this period.28 The group published the weekly, and later daily, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], in which Nakhshab’s works, whether intellectual pieces or those related to political affairs, were published. Nakhshab’s writings, books such as Bashar-e Maddi [The Material Mankind] and Neza’-e Kelisa va Materialism [The Clash of the Church and Materialism], and articles such as ‘Hezb Chist? [What is a party?]’, ‘Iran dar Astane-i yek

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Enqelab-e Ejtema’i [Iran on the verge of a social revolution]’ and ‘Farhang-e Vaje-hai-e Ejtema’i [A dictionary of social terms]’, were produced during this period.

AFTER THE 1953 COUP After the 1953 coup, the Socialist Theists’ group, the Society for the Freedom of People of Iran, experienced the same fate that other nationalist groups did. Its offices were ransacked by the Royalists, and its activists were arrested or went underground. The group changed its name to Hezb-e Mardom-e Iran [the Party of the People of Iran]. Following Nakhshab’s suggestion, Ayatollah Reza Zanjani invited nationalist and religious opposition groups to establish the National Resistance Movement. It consisted of parties such as Iran, People of Iran, Nation of Iran [Mellat-e Iran], and the Workers of the Nation of Iran (the Third Force) [Zahmatkeshan-e Mellat-e Iran (NirooySevvom)] as well as some figures from the Tehran bazaar, the clergy and academia, such as Ayatollah Teleqani, Mahdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi, ‘Abbas Radnia and Rahim ‘Ataii.29 Students’ Islamic Associations were also active in the Movement, but the Toodeh Party was not a member. It can be said that Islamic groups had the upper hand in the National Resistance Movement. Through organizing demonstrations and publishing announcements, the Movement was expressing its opposition to the regime and its actions, such as the conclusion of an oil contract with a consortium of foreign companies. The Iran Party, which advocated a more lenient policy towards the regime, left the Movement after a while. Following the election of John F. Kennedy to the US presidency in 1960 and his encouragement of third world governments allied with the West to provide limited freedoms for their people, the leaders of the National Front of the Mossaddeq era and those of the National Resistance Movement formed the National Front II. The latter consisted of parties such as the Iran Party, Nation of Iran, People of Iran and a small group called the Socialist Party led by Mohammad ‘Ali Khonji, a splinter group from the Third Force of Khalili Maleki. Alongside the parties’ representatives, independent figures such as Gholam-Hossein Sediqi and Baqer Kazemi were members of the Supreme Council of the National Front II. Jame’e-i Socialist-ha [the Society of Socialists], previously called the Third Force, headed by Maleki, and Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran [the Iran Freedom Movement], which was formed later, were not admitted to the Front. However,

20 The Socialist Theists the founders of the Iran Freedom Movement, Mahdi Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi and Ayatollah Taleqani, in their individual capacity, took part in the Front’s Supreme Council. From the beginning, the National Front II was entangled in internal disputes. People or groups considered to be radical were not admitted to the Front. There was a disagreement on the Front’s tactics against the Shah’s regime. The Front did not have any clear policy with regard to ‘Ali Amini’s American-supported reformist measures, which later the Shah himself took the initiative to implement. Some group members of the National Front II headed by the Iran Party were too cautious, and did not properly condemn the regime’s suppression of a mass demonstration led by Ayatollah Khomeini in early June 1963.30 The Front’s leadership expected US support. It has been said that the Iran Party’s leader and the leading figure of the Front, Allah-yar Saleh, joined the Front, only after consultations with the US embassy. The radical and religious faction of the Front accused the conservative faction of accepting two conditions: (1) not to criticize the Shah, and (2) not to mention Mossaddeq.31 Following the exchange of letters between the Front’s leadership and Mossaddeq, and the latter’s criticism of the former, members of the leadership resigned, and the Front was dissolved in June 1964. In the summer of 1965, encouraged by Mossaddeq, the National Front III was formed from parties such as Nation of Iran, People of Iran, the Iran Freedom Movement and the Society of Socialists.32 Nakhshab was the Front’s representative in the Confederation of Iranian Students in the USA. However, the Front did not last long. The Shah, who was under no external pressure to grant political freedoms, and did not face any serious unrest inside the country, did not succumb to the wishes of the National Front III, and had its leaders and activists arrested one by one. As for Nakhshab, following the 1953 coup, he went underground, and was later arrested for a short period. After his release, he continued his studies, and came first in his MA in Administration Studies. In 1958, he was granted a scholarship to complete a PhD in the USA.33 Hossein Razi replaced him as the Secretary General of the People of Iran Party. While in the United States, Nakhshab continued his opposition activities and established a branch of the Party. He was an active member of the Executive Committee of the US branch of the National Front II, and was involved in the publication of the quarterly Andishe-i Jebhe [The Front’s Thought], which was the theoretical journal of the Front. He began working for the UN, while doing a PhD in public management at the University of New York. As said, with the

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formation of the National Front III, he became the representative of the Front in the Confederation of Iranian Students in the United States. In the mid-1960s, he split from the Confederation, and helped found Iranian Students’ Islamic Association in North America, while writing some articles for Mojahed, the journal of the Iran Freedom Movement outside Iran.34 In his last years, he became very disheartened, and intended to undertake some research in Islamic studies,35 but died in September 1977 in the United States.36 During the period of the activities of the National Front II, some younger members of the People of Iran Party (the Socialist Theists) were unhappy that their party had to follow the conservative and cautious policies of the Front.37 They wanted the Party to take the initiative and be more active and independent of the Front. According to their leaders, discontented members presented a proposal to the Party’s first congress in 1963 for a change of policy and a turn towards armed struggle against the Shah’s regime, but these suggestions were not approved by the majority. However, Razi, the Party’s Secretary General at that time, argues that no such proposal was presented to the congress, and that the leaders of the discontented, Habibollah Peiman and Kazem Sami, were elected to the Party’s Executive Committee, without objecting to anything in particular. According to the discontented party members, since the congress of the People of Iran Party and, subsequently, the National Front II did not accept a change of policy to embark on an armed struggle against the Shah’s regime, they decided to form an underground political organization for this purpose. In 1963, they established Jonbesh-e Enqelabi-e Mardom-e Iran [the Revolutionary Movement of People of Iran], known by its Persian acronym JAMA.38 JAMA was, in fact, an underground organization within the People of Iran Party. It apparently used the Party’s facilities, without the leadership of the Party being informed. However, before it had done anything practical, active members of the subgroup, and alongside them the leaders of the People of Iran Party, were arrested in mid-summer 1965. Leaders of the Party expressed their unawareness of formation of JAMA. They publicly announced, according to Razi, that because of the restrictions imposed by the government on their control over the Party, and since they had no power over the internal activities of the Party, they would not accept any responsibility regarding the Party. This was, in fact, the end of the People of Iran Party and the Socialist Theists. The leaders of JAMA were sentenced to one to two years’ jail, and until the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the group had no significant activity. Then, its leaders, Sami and Peiman, respectively formed Jonbesh-e

22 The Socialist Theists Enqelabi-e Mardom-e Mosalman-e Iran [the Revolutionary Movement of Muslim People of Iran], again known by the Persian acronym JAMA, and Jonbesh-e Mosalmanan-e Mobarez [the Movement of Militant Muslims]. The reality is that the Socialist Theists, under their various party names, could not attract a significant segment of Iranian society. Nevertheless, Razi, the second secretary general of the group, claimed that, before the 1953 coup, the group had a membership of about 5000 people in Tehran alone, and that it was one of the largest and most active parties of its own time.39 What is interesting about the Society of Socialist Theists is that, although an ideological group, at some stages, it pragmatically acted as a party more concerned with politics than ideology, and hence tried to expand its social basis. This was seen, for example, in its failed coalition with the Iran Party. The other two groups discussed in this book did not do that. Fada’iyan-e Islam was thoroughly an ideological movement, more concerned with ideology than party politics or anything else. The Iran Freedom Movement could be construed of having shown a pragmatism similar to that of the Socialist Theists, though probably to a lesser extent.40 However, most of the time, the Iran Freedom Movement was not in a position to see itself gaining or sharing political power, and so had no opportunity to show pragmatic features. Being in such a position, for some time, the Socialist Theists faced the dilemma of sticking to their ideological standards or becoming more pragmatic, and tilted towards the second option. This cost them, however, a majority of their potential members. In the heyday of the political activities of the Socialist Theists, most university students with religious tendencies were not interested in politics, and when they became concerned with politics, they preferred groups such as the Iran Freedom Movement, which had shown more ideological commitment.

2

Reforming Islamic thought Reconciling Islam and socialism

Although the Socialist Theists never explicitly talked about reforming Islamic thought, it can be seen that while being faithful to Islam, they criticized the traditional approach to the religion, and adopted a new approach that focussed on issues with which traditionalists were not concerned. Habibollah Peiman, a survivor of the group, argues that the Socialist Theists were concerned with expressing Islamic conceptions in a way congruent with modern knowledge, culture and requirements. Moreover, they believed that the religion’s aims in the social and private domains should be followed through new ways and by new means available in every era. They were eager to work out how Prophet Mohammad’s mission can be fulfilled in the present age.41 In the following, it is examined how it can be claimed that the Socialist Theists attempted to introduce a new approach to Islam. For this purpose, their account of the traditional approach to Islam is explored. It is also discussed which Islamic conceptions they regarded as superstitious, which ones they highlighted and which new ones they introduced. Furthermore, it is considered how they utilized other schools of thought and sciences in their approach to Islam.

CRITICIZING TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM AND THE CLERGY A significant part of the Socialist Theists’ works was dedicated to criticizing traditional beliefs attributed to Islam. This indicates that they did not find the traditional approach prevalent in the society convincing in some aspects. It was in response to what they perceived as the shortcomings of the traditional approach that they tried to reinterpret the religion, and while attempting to remove superstitions, sought to take into consideration modern knowledge and circumstances.

24 The Socialist Theists According to Ashtiyani, religion was distorted, and imbued with mysteries and bizarre miracles. It focussed on metaphysics rather than concrete issues of life, on illusions rather than realities and on the next world rather than this world. Hence, it was regarded as obstructing human progress.42 The Socialist Theists believed that social and economic rules uttered in traditional books of feqh could not respond to the problems of the modern age. For them, the traditional language of Islam, expressed through feqh and used by the clergy, was not convincing for the new and educated generations, and did not answer their philosophical, theoretical and sociological questions.43 The Socialist Theists were disappointed that religion had become the protector of capitalism, and that the reactionary forces used religion as a bulwark against progressive movements.44 They wrote: The Iranian feudal bourgeoisie, in order to continue its crimes and preserve the domination of capital [over the society], has distorted the concepts of honour, altruism, patriotism and even religion and God. The religion [that is, Islam] that once brought about glory and progression for Arabs has now been turned into the guardian of capitalism and the defender of known thieves. The truthful words of the worshipers of God that once shook the worshipers of money and power are now expressions of weakness, and are pitifully uttered for begging.45 The Socialist Theists partly blamed the clergy for what they regarded as the distortion of Islamic teachings. They remarked, ‘Socialist teachings of Islam are overshadowed by those ahadith fabricated by the sycophantic pseudo-clergy.’46 The Socialist Theists were also critical of religious leaders, with the exception of a few, because of their abstinence from social action and responsibilities or their collaboration with the dominant classes.47 Ashtiyani made a distinction between the terms ‘ulama and foqaha, which literally means people dedicated to knowledge and feqh, on the one hand, and the clergy, which literally in Persian refers to people exclusively engaged in spiritual issues, on the other. He wrote: According to the ‘ulama, there is no [social] class [that is, stratum] as the clergy in Islam, and the term clergy is adopted from Christianity. In the Koran, the terms ‘alem and faqih are used, but the Christian and Jewish clergy are scorned as people who in falsehood devour people’s property (Sura At-Tauba, verse 34) and those taken by their people as their lords (Sura At-Tauba, verse 31).

Reconciling Islam and socialism 25 In the early days of Islam, there was no such class as the clergy. The Prophet’s disciples and Imams were doing various jobs and did not make a living of religious knowledge. In other words, they did not form a separate class. In the Shi’ite denomination, too, there has never been an ecclesiastical institution similar to that of Christianity, and people have been free to choose their own [religious] teachers and guides. In the Koran, the Jews and Christians, who take their clergy as their lords, are cursed, so Muslims should not commit a similar sin.48 The Socialist Theists’ criticism of the traditional approach to Islam and the Muslim clergy’s conduct did not amount to a rejection of the religion or hostility towards the clergy, but referred to their desire to reinterpret religious teachings and to purify them from superstitions. They did not have any problem with the fundamental Islamic beliefs, and thought highly of them in their value system and intellectual outlook. The Socialist Theists believed that the inclination towards religion is an inherent and factual, rather than imposed or artificial, feature of human life, whose roots are to be found in human nature. Ashtiyani mentioned that the religious human was a historical fact.49 As we will see in their critique of Marxism, the Socialist Theists rejected a materialist explanation of history, according to which the production mode is the base and the other aspects of human life, including beliefs and values, are the superstructure. They emphasized the determining role of convictions and spiritual ideals in historical developments. In his book, The Clash of the Church and Materialism, Nakhshab wrote, ‘We believe that, alongside material factors, spiritual forces, such as free will, expedient rationality and human devotion to their beliefs, are determining in the course of history.’50 Elsewhere, the Socialist Theists asserted that, pace Marxists, thoughts, rather than instruments of production, are the significant factor in social developments.51 In particular, the Socialist Theists believed that religion has a determining role in social developments. Ashtiyani argued that the rationale of the primitive religions was to meet, or to help in meeting, the material and spiritual needs of society. According to him, myths in the primitive religions were the expression of realities in a mythological language.52 Referring to historical facts, he maintained that religion has always worked as the most important factor in uniting and gathering people together.53 In the course of humans’ social life, no factor has been as significant as religion, and other factors have

26 The Socialist Theists usually influenced human life through religion.54 Nevertheless, religion has been a double-edged sword. As the true religion has brought about livelihood, false religions have caused misery, death and destruction.55 Ashtiyani went as far as claiming that ‘the origin of government and monarchy is the deviated religion. Priests mislead people, and impose themselves as the intermediary between God and people. Abusing the innate tendency of humans for worshiping the Creator, they replace the rule of God with the rule of humans over humans.’56

ADHERING TO SOCIALISM The name Socialist Theists denotes that socialism had an important place in the group’s doctrine. They advocated socialism as a social and economic system, rather than a philosophical school of thought revealing the truth of human life and the universe. Although they might have implicitly accepted some theoretical foundations of socialism, they were interested in socialism mainly as a set of normative rules for regulating the public domain of society, particularly the economy. Explaining the term socialism, Ashtiyani wrote, ‘Socialism is a word referring to the common ownership of property, in its various forms, from the primitive human societies to the present period.’57 In response to criticism that Islam supports, or at least is indifferent towards, injustice or class differences in society, the Socialist Theists ‘re-examined Islamic convictions from the point of view of the Koran and Nahjolbalaghe’, a book containing Imam ‘Ali’s remarks.58 They concluded that in terms of advocating justice and progress, not only does Islam not lag behind Marxism, but because of its emphasis on freedom and democracy, it is superior to it. On the other hand, they argued that, in the contemporary world of industrial relationships, socialism or the public ownership of means of production is the shortest way of overcoming injustice, poverty, ignorance, self-alienation, misery and exploitation.59 According to Peiman, the reason that the Socialist Theists adhered to socialism was that they wanted to correct religion in its social dimension. They thought that there was a vacuum in this area, and believed that socialism could resolve existing social problems and antagonisms.60 Nakhshab argued that ‘a fundamental and deep socialist transformation could bring about the conditions of equal opportunity for all, facilitate the flowering of human talents and eradicate poverty, unemployment, misery and desperation.’61 However, the

Reconciling Islam and socialism 27 socialism of the Socialist Theists was different from the Soviet model,62 with the main difference being that their socialism was grounded on a belief in God. The Socialist Theists’ account of ownership indicates the type of socialism they advocated and the differences between their account and the Soviet model. Nevertheless, their views about ownership are spread in various articles, and not expressed in a systematic way. In general, they explained that ‘possession began when mankind started to work, using its intellectual capability to dominate nature, to use effectively natural resources and to turn raw materials into whatever is subject to ownership’.63 Hence, according to the Socialist Theists, human labour that changes raw material into useful things is the source of ownership.64 Interestingly, such a view can be grounded both on the Islamic teachings, according to which people cannot gain anything but whatever they have laboured for,65 and on Western theories, such as Locke’s theory of ownership and Marx’s theory of surplus value. On the basis of this theoretical analysis, the Socialist Theists expressed their views on the ownership of land and corporations. They argued, ‘No labour has been involved in creating natural lands, which like other natural resources existed before the creation of humans and will continue to exist after them.’66 Therefore, ‘lands cannot be owned like other things, and the law applying to land ownership cannot be the same as the law applying to other things’.67 Later on, they argued that since only destructible and perishable things can be owned, land cannot be owned by anybody. Nevertheless, when talking about land reforms, the group was more cautious. In his article, ‘Iran on the Verge of a Social Revolution’, in which Nakhshab talked about the government duty to provide newly land-owned farmers with technical and financial support, he recognized a role for low and middle class farmers in implementing government policies.68 This can be regarded as the Socialist Theists’ acceptance of medium-scale land ownership. With regard to companies and industries, the Socialist Theists advocated the nationalization of heavy industries only.69 Nakhshab argued, ‘Those people who, copying other countries’ models, demand the abolition of the ownership of all types of means of production try to impose their own thought, rather than [facilitating] progress towards socialism. It is not now in our interest to nationalize blacksmith workshops or carpentries by the side of streets, and establish a bureaucratic system for administering them.’70 Because of their blind imitation of the Soviet model, Nakhshab considered Iranian Marxists as imitators, fanatics and dogmatists.71

28 The Socialist Theists

Criticising Marxism A large body of the Socialist Theists’ works is devoted to criticizing Marxism. Examining these criticisms can shed more light on their account of socialism. The Socialist Theists’ main theoretical attack was targeted at historical materialism. According to Ashtiyani, Marx was a humanist reformist, who was concerned with the suffering of the masses during the course of history. He believed that Marx was not in principle hostile to religion and capital, but found them the instruments of the dominant classes for exploiting people, and thus thought that by undermining them, the evil of government can be restrained.72 Ashtiyani, however, thoroughly criticized Marx’s historical materialism, and particularly his account of base and superstructure. He wrote: ‘Marx made the mistake of assuming that thoughtful and self-conscious human beings are under the control of relations of production, as if by the development of the latter, which is a nonliving factor, the living part of society would also change.’73 For Ashtiyani, the main features of human beings are thinking and creativity; physical factors influence human life through these features; and society is the creation of humans as creative beings.74 On this account, he tried to explain the development of societies from primitive to sophisticated ones ruled by established governments, on the basis of the development of human thought and particularly religion.75 Also, Nakhshab emphasized the role of devotion, faith, conviction and human affections in social developments, and argued that recognizing this point, Lenin rightly distanced himself from orthodox Marxism.76 Ashtiyani regarded the determinism of historical materialism not only as being incompatible with the call for revolution, but also as justifying the cruelties and crimes of various social systems.77 He went on to say that ‘in Marx’s ideal society, all of a sudden, the alleged scientific laws of human society and history would change; human beings would take control; historical determinism would be tamed, and the state would wither away . . . . Would the nature of mankind change?’78 He concluded that Marx was wrong in considering human beings as material through and through, and that this ultimately caused inconsistency in Marxism. For instance, Marxists concede that humans are much more efficient than any machine, and contrary to the principle of mass–energy conservation produce surplus value.79 Moreover, according to Ashtiyani, what Marx considered to be the superstructure, that is, thoughts, arts, knowledge and laws, are so diverse in every historical period that they cannot be explained merely

Reconciling Islam and socialism 29 by means and relations of production, or what Marx regarded to be the base.80 Hence, he argued, pace Marx, production is not the key to explaining human history.81 Ashtiyani also maintained that, contrary to what Marx thought, revolution occurred and consequently socialism was established, not in advanced capitalist states, but in countries such as Russia, with relatively backward and peasant economies. Third world countries with backward economies and widened class gaps have been more ready for a mass socialist revolution,82 as Lenin later theorized it. The Socialist Theists also criticized the theory of the class struggle, and believed that in third world countries it would lead to division between intellectuals and workers and cause dispute among progressive forces. Nakhshab wrote, ‘It is shared beliefs, rather than shared interests on the ground of economic class, that is the basis of unity and solidarity.’83 The Socialist Theists attacked Marxism from various perspectives, but what they particularly emphasized was the implausibility of establishing socialism as a system pursuing collective values on the basis of materialism. They argued that materialism, which regards humans as thoroughly material beings and explains their behaviour on the ground of interests and individual needs, cannot account for collective moral actions, such as revolution, which require sacrifice. In their view, in order to be a socialist, one cannot be a materialist. This is because, in philosophical materialism, the universe is no more than material forces, and only interest-seeking can be a motive for humans. Materialism can only support a value system that entails gaining more material benefits more efficiently.84 The reason that the Socialist Theists emphasized the incompatibility of materialism and socialism, and argued that the moral implications of materialism are contrary to socialism and justice,85 was that they wanted to stress their belief in God as the basis of their adherence to socialism. Article 1 of the constitution of Jam’iyat-e Azadi-e Mardom-e Iran, one of several groups formed by the Socialist Theists, stated ‘Our Society consists of people with similar thoughts, based on a belief in God, and a social ideal that is socialism.’86 Elsewhere, they pointed out that The foundation of our thought is a belief in God, rather than materialism. In the true theism, [human] life is not without a purpose or value. Humans possess free will; and their will power and intellectual capabilities enable them to overcome the constraints of their surrounding circumstances. We believe that materialists cannot be socialist, while every theist and believer in God is a true socialist.87

30 The Socialist Theists The Socialist Theists argued that socialism cannot be established, save on moral principles; and morality cannot be contractual, but requires unshakable foundations. They maintained that morality and humanism are two requirements of theism, which can also be the most valuable and reliable foundation of socialism.88

The Clash of the Church and Materialism A discussion of what Nakhshab called the clash of materialism and the Church, or in general any religion permeated by superstitions, can give us more insight into the Socialist Theists’ thought. In his book, The Clash of the Church and Materialism, Nakhshab argued that the Church on the basis of its dogmas hindered the progress of knowledge and, for some time, suppressed intellectuals and scientists. However, from within the situation created by the Church, materialism rose. Thereafter, everything was considered as possible to know, every problem was considered as possible to solve and humans regarded themselves as omnipotent, as if they were God. Nakhshab went on to say that, however, as mankind has proceeded to know more, they have come to realize how much they do not know. Therefore, the cracks in positivism soon appeared, the problems of materialism surfaced and the optimism of the eighteenth century faded away. ‘Dialectic’ was added to materialism, in order to justify the lack of certainty in positivism and to explain morality. However, Nakhshab believed, the effectiveness of this modification did not last long. When scientists split the atom, and no indivisible article, on which materialism is grounded, was found, materialism collapsed.89 The Socialist Theists maintained that materialism does not have any solution for social and moral decline, which is the cause of all other social problems. This is because materialism entails determinism, and denies free will, virtue and devotion, and hence paves the way for corruption and moral decline.90 The Socialist Theists believed that a synthesis of the two opposites, that is, materialism and the Church, or religion, in general, can have the advantages of both, while being free of their drawbacks. In such a synthesis, what would be left from religion would be monotheism, ideals and morality, and what would be left from materialism would be the rejection of false gods, the significance of the worldly and material life, sciences and socialism;91 and these are what the Socialist Theists considered as worthwhile to be preserved.

Reconciling Islam and socialism 31 THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION The Socialist Theists believed that Islam is not indifferent to social problems, but requires sensitivity towards them.92 It is important to note that in the period of the activities of the group, the prevalent view in Iranian society was the separation of religion from politics. Such a view not only was supported by Westernized modernizers, but also was the traditional and dominant approach among the Shi’ite clergy. In his ‘A Dictionary of Social Terms’, Nakhshab wrote, ‘Some people, under the name of religion, prohibit others from performing their political and social duties, while religion [that is, Islam] calls on all people to implement justice, strive for social progress, and struggle against oppression.’93 Referring to Prophet Mohammad’s hadith, according to which a Muslim who sleeps overnight without being concerned with Muslims’ affairs is not a Muslim, Nakhshab maintained that Muslims are required to perform their social duties and participate in politics.94 During the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry, many nationalist groups, in order to promote their patriotic cause, were in favour of recourse to the religious feelings of the masses. According to the Socialist Theists, not only was the progressive movement of Iranian people not contrary to religious principles, but also it was their religious and nationalist duty to cut off the hands of the oppressors and foreign countries from the product of their labour and their natural resources.95 The Socialist Theists maintained that the truth-loving people of Iran were inspired by the progressive and antireactionary teachings of Islam in their political struggle.96 On many occasions, in explaining the political developments of their time, the group referred to religious symbols and the events of the early days of Islam and the actions of Prophet Mohammad or Imams. For instance, those who split from the National Front were described as the Khawarij, who rebelled against Imam ‘Ali, or as those who killed the third Shi’ite Imam, Hossein.97 It should also be added that the group was aware that it could attract younger generations to its religious and intellectual ideals through engaging in political activities, which were appealing to this group of people.98 Ashtiyani elaborated the link between religion and politics in the Socialist Theists’ account, as follows: Religion is not something distinct from the believer. As people’s beliefs affect any minor issue in their lives, politics, which is about administrating a country, is directly influenced by politicians’

32 The Socialist Theists beliefs. In Europe, the name of parties, such as Christian Democrats or Christian Socialists, indicate that the separation of politics from religion is implausible. What is important is the separation of the clergy from government.99 Hence, by rejecting the separation of religion from politics, the Socialist Theists stressed the duty of all Muslims to be concerned with the problems of their society, rather than recognizing special rights and privileges for the clergy in politics and government. According to Peiman, they did not advocate theocracy, as the rule of religious leaders, but supported democracy, as the rule of the people.100

FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY For the Socialist Theists, freedom was of such importance that they evaluated the truth of a religion by whether it grants, or deprives people of, their freedoms. According to Ashtiyani, in true religions, religion is for people, rather than people being for religion; thus, a tradition that calls on people to obey one of their own is antireligious. From his point of view, freedom is the basic teaching of true religions, because without freedom, human perfection cannot be realized.101 Given this account, the group highlighted the concept of freedom in Islam. Ashtiyani pointed out that in the early days of Islam, there was freedom of expression, and all those religious sects that had previously been persecuted were able to express themselves and to attract followers. Thus, various schools of thought flourished. This was because Islam was based on reason, and the Koran explicitly denounced following a religion without any reason.102 The other concept that the Socialist Theists stressed was shovra, or public consultation in issues affecting a society. Ashtiyani remarked that about a millennium and a half before the establishment of modern democracies, Islam regarded public consultation as highly worthwhile, as there is a Koranic sura under this name, that is, sura Shovra.103 Freedom and public consultation entail democracy, which was very dear to the Socialist Theists. The group blamed despotic governments for most social problems, particularly the submissiveness of the subjects and the arrogance of the rulers. Ashtiyani was so hostile to the domination of one person over another that his ideal was to substitute ‘managing’ for ‘ruling’. He wrote: Ruling is contrary to human nature, and those who follow their nature never accept the domination and rule of another person,

Reconciling Islam and socialism 33 and never obey anybody else. Primitive people, whose nature is not contaminated by civilizations, and are in the early stages of [social] evolution, unconsciously object to obeying another human being. Once socially advanced people consciously reject obedience, managing replaces ruling, and as they progress more, management will be the prevalent form of regulating human affairs. Management is in accord with human nature, and, when accepted consciously, directs societies to unending progress towards perfection. In a management system of regulating human affairs, it is the law, rather than humans, that rules.104 Nevertheless, the Socialist Theists’ favoured type of democracy was conjoined with socialism. They did not want one without the other. According to Nakhshab, in backward countries, a centralized democracy as well as a socialist system are needed, in order to realize social reforms, increase production and diminish poverty.105 For the Socialist Theists, their belief in God required submitting to nobody other than God, and entailed social justice, all these to be achieved through democracy and socialism.106 In his paper, ‘What is a Party?’, Nakhshab suggested that a party should be managed on the basis of centralized democracy. He argued that a progressive party that advocates socialism and democracy can accept neither the leadership of an authoritarian person who claims to have superhuman powers nor liberalism and anarchy, which might undermine solidarity within the party, and pave the way for the infiltration of enemy’s agents and the ineffectiveness of the party.107 An examination of the Socialist Theists’ views on democracy indicates that they were critical of Western-style democracy. They believed that democracy without social justice and socialism leads to oligarchy and the rule of the wealthy and the powerful. More importantly, they opposed the individualism of Western democracy, which they considered to be a product of liberalism and the capitalist open market.108 Denouncing Western states, which while subjugating other peoples, talk about freedom and equality, Ashtiyani wrote: Western societies, which form a small part of the family of nations, enjoy the state of affluence at the expense of the poverty and suffering of many others. Nevertheless, the signs of decline and self-alienation can also been seen in the West. The rule of capitalism and misguided democracy have turned people into machine parts and into talking ballot papers, which can be sold

34 The Socialist Theists and bought . . . . Political parties are gradually turning into election shops. In the West, there are few parties that rely on an intellectual or philosophical theory. Parties are more like bureaucratic organizations whose objective is to gain political power. The differences between the parties are mainly a matter of taste, rather than fundamental and philosophical issues.109

3

The methodology of reforming Islamic thought

In this chapter, on what basis the Socialist Theists made their selection of Islamic conceptions, highlighting some while ignoring others, reinterpreting some while describing others as superstitious, is examined. Moreover, how they justified their borrowing from other schools of thought and introducing novel ideas is considered. The discussion of the methodology used by the Socialist Theists in reinterpreting Islamic thought provides us with a pattern that gives shape to the various arguments that otherwise seem disparate. Such discussion does not suggest that the Socialist Theists strictly followed the methodology attributed to them. This is particularly so, because they themselves did not talk explicitly about their methodology. It is, nevertheless, important to see how faithful the Socialist Theists were to this methodology, and, moreover, how and by reference to which Islamic notions they grounded this methodology.

UTILIZING NEW SCIENCES In the introduction of his book, The Material Mankind, which is a critique of materialism and Marxism as well as the traditional account of Islam and the clergy, Nakhshab explained his method as follows: ‘In this book, through observation and experience, which are accepted [research methods] nowadays, I show how significant is the impact of beliefs and ideals, and how every person’s attitude affects his life.’110 The reference to observation and experience indicates that the Socialist Theists were interested in scientific methods, as can be seen in Ashtiyani’s works. With regard to utilizing sciences in understanding the Koran, he wrote, ‘As humans proceed towards perfection, their understanding of the Koran evolves. That is why it can be seen that with the progress of sciences and knowledge, our understanding of

36 The Socialist Theists the Koran changes, and we arrive at new approaches to the principles [of Islam].’111 These remarks show that the Socialist Theists thought highly of sciences and knowledge in interpreting religion. Nevertheless, their account of knowledge was not limited to empirical sciences. They were not empiricists. Unlike many others of their educated contemporaries, they did not reject philosophical approaches, and even welcomed them. This was one of the differences between Bazargan, another Muslim intellectual whose thought is examined in Part II of this book, and the Socialist Theists, and probably can be attributed to the influence of Ashtiyani, whose father was a philosopher. As we have already seen, it was Ashtiyani’s intention to establish a middle school of thought on the basis of Islam, through a wide research in ancient and modern philosophies. Hence, his method was intentionally philosophical. Comparatively, Nakhshab’s works were less philosophical, although he, too, thought highly of philosophy. In an article entitled ‘At the Threshold of the World of Thought’, after talking about the importance of philosophy, Nakhshab argued that the main purpose of philosophy is to shed light on human life and to find appropriate ways of regulating human relations. However, he pointed out that some people have diverted philosophy into complex and abstract thinking.112 Hence, it can be seen that Nakhshab, while denouncing philosophers for causing unnecessary perplexities, admired philosophy. Although the Socialist Theists believed that knowledge and sciences have an important role in understanding religion, they maintained that the purpose of religions is not to talk about sciences. Hence, sciences and other nonreligious branches of knowledge should not be expected to be accounted for by religion. Ashtiyani argued, Since the sole purpose of religion is providing moral guidance for societies, there has been no attempt to discuss or to establish scientific issues in religious scripts. Therefore, if we try to extract scientific information from the scripts, or to reject or establish scientific theories on the basis of what is literally mentioned in the scripts, we end up in inconsistency between religion and sciences. Such an enterprise is mistaken, as it was tried during the Middle Ages and, for instance, from Jesus’ remarks about the flat earth, the Church arrived at the conclusion that the earth could not be a globe. Religion is like a farming machine for ploughing and disseminating seeds. Such a machine, however, cannot be used as seeds . . . . Hence, religion, too, cannot function as science. It can only pave the way for the progress and exploitation of sciences for the welfare of society, through creating a moral and intellectual environment favourable to knowledge.113

Methodology 37 The Socialist Theists did not say how any incompatibility between certain scientific findings and a part of a religious script should be dealt with. However, it can be inferred that since, in their view, it is not the purpose of religion to talk about nonreligious issues, such incompatibility would not be expected to occur. The Socialist Theists justified their recourse to sciences by referring to Prophet Mohammad’s various hadith, for instance, when he remarked that ‘all Muslims are required to seek knowledge’, and called on them to ‘seek knowledge even if it is necessary to go as far as China’, and to ‘seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave’. The Socialist Theists maintained that scientific progress does not undermine the true religion, which actually encourages its followers to promote knowledge.114 According to Ashtiyani, an informed and intellectual Muslim regards seeking science and technology not as sin, but as a religious requirement.115 Although, theoretically, the Socialist Theists emphasized the value of utilizing knowledge and particularly modern sciences in understanding Islam, in comparison to Bazargan, whose thought is considered in Part II, they did not make an extensive attempt to do so. In particular, not many references to empirical sciences can be found in their works. They were more interested in social sciences. The group’s belief in socialism indicates that the main methodological feature of their thought should be found elsewhere, that is, in their attempt to make a distinction between the philosophical foundations of their thought and the social system they aspired to create.

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND SOCIAL VALUES In examining the Socialist Theists’ thought, we saw that they repeatedly talked about ‘their adherence to socialism on the basis of a belief in God’. It has been said that Nakhshab and the Socialist Theists, at large, were the first people to synthesize Shi’ism and European socialism.116 In order to justify this novel combination, they sometimes argued that the true Islam is nothing but socialism, although over the centuries, superstitions had permeated the religion and distorted it. Hence, they called Prophet Mohammad the most important herald of socialism and Imam ‘Ali the most prominent socialist. However, the Socialist Theists at other times provided a more coherent argument in support of their views, by distinguishing between the philosophical foundation of their views, which was a belief in God and Islam, and the social system that they advocated, that is, socialism. They believed that monotheism, as the theoretical foundation of their views, is

38 The Socialist Theists universal and unchangeable, whereas social systems, which are based on this foundation, vary. This is because, due to the constant development of society, social and economic relations cannot remain unaltered. The Socialist Theists argued that the main objectives do not change, but the way to achieve them varies, according to circumstances.117 This, however, does not mean that there is no relationship between the theoretical foundation and social systems, but that social systems are dependent on the theoretical foundation, on the one hand, and on social circumstances, on the other. The Socialist Theists believed that there must be an affinity between philosophical foundations and social and economic values and systems, and did not intend to combine two incommensurate or incompatible sets of viewpoints. The adoption of socialism by the Socialist Theists gives rise to the question as to how they interpreted the Islamic belief that Islam is a comprehensive religion, responding to all human needs in all ages. Peiman pointed out that, for the Socialist Theists, the completeness of Islam did not mean that the religion, taken literally as all that mentioned in the Koran or expressed through sunna, meets all human needs in all eras and societies. They held that the belief in the completeness of Islam has two meanings. First, it means that Islam met all the needs of the society of early Muslims, as the Koranic verse stating ‘We have completed your religion’118 was addressed to them. This does not mean that the religion can satisfy the needs of people in all ages.119 This interpretation of the completeness of Islam is, however, contrary to the belief that Islamic teachings are universal, rather than being revealed solely for the society of early Muslims. According to Peiman, the second, and the more plausible, meaning of the completeness of Islam is that the religion provides the criteria, the main methods and the guidance necessary for making right decisions in all ages and societies. This interpretation is more compatible with the Shi’ite belief in the principle of ijtihad, according to which Muslims should work out Islamic rules appropriate for particular circumstances through reasoning and on the basis of Islamic principles. Peiman argued that the principle of ijtihad indicates that social rules and systems should vary according to the circumstances of every age.120 Peiman maintained that regarding Islam as a complete religion, in a strict sense, is contrary to the Koran’s calling on Muslims to think, reason and accept the responsibility for their actions. He argued that, according to the Koran, humans should shoulder the responsibility for their own decisions. Hence, the completeness of Islam means that the religion gives direction, rather than the details of making every

Methodology 39 decision. With regard to the Socialist Theists’ adherence to socialism, Peiman pointed out that the group believed that Islam does not provide a social system for any specific society, and that it is the duty of Muslims to solve the problems of their time through reasoning and thinking, or ijtihad.121 Ashtiyani defended the need for the alteration of Islamic social rules, in the following way: In recent years, we have witnessed drastic changes in society and social relations, with an increasing pace. With the continuation of this process, how can a society be managed in ten or hundred thousands years time, on the basis of such primitive approaches? Can the rules appropriate for primitive Bedouin Arabs still be applicable to human societies that would settle in the space or live in spaceships? . . . In various ages and places, the true Muslims, such as Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus122, . . . using different languages and discourses, called on people to follow the true religion. None of them proclaimed a new religion, but applied the true religion to their own temporal and geographical circumstances . . . . Hence, Islam was introduced, when humans came into the existence, and will be completed with the perfection of human beings.123 According to Ashtiyani, Muslims should recognize that the Islamic rules of the time of Prophet Mohammad were required for realizing Islam in that age, and that, in different societies and in various circumstances, the applicable Islamic rules should be worked out through ‘the true ijtihad’. He believed that only when Muslims recognized this requirement could Islamic societies disentangle themselves from their current situation of decline, backwardness, poverty, misery and colonialism.124 Employing a language more committed to Islamic fundamentals, Kazem Sami, a member of the Socialist Theists, explained the group’s approach as follows: We have tried to present the old customs in a new form. Although our thoughts are based on unchangeable, eternal and divine principles, the universal principle of change and development applies to these thoughts. The required changes, however, are not fundamental, but are necessary in order to correspond to temporal and geographical circumstances . . . . Nevertheless, we recognize that however human societies advance, and technological

40 The Socialist Theists progress opens the gates of the space to us, nothing will be added to our advanced culture. The history of civilization . . . unwittingly has benefited from the Islamic culture.125 Hence, the Socialist Theists claimed that monotheism and the fundamental principles of Islam formed the foundation of their views, and called these beliefs their Weltanschauung,126 while in their social views, they followed socialism. This was because, as mentioned earlier, they believed that in the age of industrial relationships, the shortest way of overcoming injustice, poverty, ignorance, exploitation and self-alienation is the realization of socialism or the public ownership of the means of production.127 The Socialist Theists’ interpretation of the belief in the completeness of Islam indicates that, for them, Islam was not merely an instrument in their social and political struggle. According to Momayyezi, a member of the group, although some members viewed Islam as such an instrument, the leaders of the group sincerely believed in the religion.128 Also, Peiman maintained that the Socialist Theists were true and practising believers, and did not regard Islam as a disguise for promoting socialism, in the deeply religious society of Iran.129 The Socialist Theists’ various arguments in defending their adherence to socialism did not prevent even the younger generation of the group from criticizing their approach. For instance, they were criticized for lack of a good understanding of Islam, in several articles published in the periodical, Ummat, the mouthpiece of the Jonbesh-e Mosalmanan-e Mobarez [the Movement of Militant Muslims], a group consisting of some younger members of the Socialist Theists led by Peiman. In one of these articles, the synthesis of two different sets of beliefs, namely, Islam and socialism, was ascribed to a defective understanding of Islam. The Socialist Theists were scorned for not recognizing the comprehensiveness of Islam in various social, economic and ideological dimensions.130 In another article, the combination of the words socialism and theism, in the group’s title, was criticized as being contrary to the comprehensiveness of Islam and its independence from other schools of thought.131

4

The historical and intellectual context of the formation of the Socialist Theists’ views

The Socialist Theists were a product of their social and historical circumstances. Their thought can be better understood when these circumstances are taken into consideration. In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the social and political context in which the group was formed, by going beyond the history of the formation and activities of the group and studying the broad historical background that influenced the minds of its founders and members. Which schools of thought were influential in persuading them to adopt a new approach to Islam, distinguished by their innovative synthesis of Islam and socialism, is also considered. It is particularly significant to see which social or intellectual factors were pointed out by the Socialist Theists themselves as having an influence on their views.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SITUATION In a discussion of the social and political situation that had an impact on the views of the Socialist Theists, three factors deserve a detailed examination: the domination of foreign states over Iranian affairs, which gave rise to anti-Western feelings, the chronic problem of despotism in Iran, and the social and economic backwardness of the country.

Foreign domination and influence After the Russian invasions of the nineteenth century and the occupation of the northern parts of Iran by Tsarist Russia, the influence of foreign countries gradually increased in Iran. Foreign interventions, first, affected Iran’s external relationships and diplomacy, then its internal politics and finally most aspects of public life in the country.

42 The Socialist Theists The embassies of European countries, and particularly those of Britain and Russia, increasingly and sometimes explicitly and directly interfered in the appointment and dismissal of high-ranking officials and local governors and even the kings, as well as in the management of financial, military and diplomatic services. They were even involved in establishing the taxation system and granting economic, including mining, oil and trading, concessions. This was despite the fact that Iran officially remained an independent state. Western domination and intervention gave rise to a deep-seated sense of resentment and hatred of Europeans among Iranians. In the period with which this book is concerned, that is, 1941–61, three foreign powers were competing or cooperating to expand or preserve their presence in Iran, with Britain being the most influential. Before the Russian Revolution of 1917, the north and south of Iran were respectively the exclusive domains of Russian and British influence. After the Revolution, on the basis of its communist ideology, the Soviet Union abandoned the Tsarist policy of intervention in the affairs of its weaker neighbours. More importantly, Communist leaders had to concentrate on their internal affairs and suppress the rebellion supported by Western countries. Hence, the era of the ‘Great Game’ came to an end, providing the British with a golden opportunity for which they had been competing with Tsarist Russia for a century to obtain: exclusive domination of Iran, which they maintained until the Second World War. In 1921, the British brought Reza Khan to power to consolidate their influence and block the spread of communism in Iran. In the view of ordinary Iranians, the British were Reza Shah’s accomplice in his cruelties and repression. During the Second World War, Iran was neutral, but Reza Shah increasingly became sympathetic to Nazi Germany. This led to the occupation of Iran by Allied armies, which forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favour of his son, Mohammad Reza. From 1945, when the Soviet Union tried to get the concession for exploiting Iran’s northern oil fields, the idea of the nationalization of the petroleum industry gradually gained popular support in Iran, and in March 1951, the Iranian Parliament made it a reality. Britain, as the biggest shareholder of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, persistently opposed this move. The tension between the two countries increasingly intensified, until the nationalist government of Mossaddeq was overthrown by a CIA-led coup, in August 1953. This deepened Iranians’ hatred of the British government, which was also the main colonial power in the Muslim world. The second powerful external force in Iran was the Soviet Union. As said before, after the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia ended its

Historical and intellectual context 43 policy of directly interfering in Iran’s internal affairs, although there were some cases of indirect intervention through supporting communist groups or separatist movements in the north. However, in 1941, as part of Allied military intervention in Iran, the Soviet Union occupied the north of the country. The Soviets were quick to consolidate their position and catch up with their old rival and new ally, Britain. The rapid expansion of the Soviet-supported Toodeh Party, established after the Allied occupation, was worrying for many Iranians. Such worries turned into a nightmare when the Red Army refused to leave the country by the end of the war. The Soviets virtually separated the north-west part of Iran from the rest of the country, and established a separatist movement in the Azeri parts of Iran. Following lengthy negotiations, the Red Army left, only after an ultimatum by the United States and when the Iranian government pledged to give the concession for exploiting the oil fields in the north to the USSR. Soviet insistence on acquiring the above oil concession,132 which was backed by the Marxist Toodeh Party, proved to Iranians how deceitful the communist states and parties were in their anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist claims. Jalal Al-Ahmad, a young activist of the Party who later became a famous intellectual and writer, remembered the day that the Toodeh Party organized a rally in support of granting the Soviets the oil concession. By the end of the rally, he was so ashamed of his and his comrades’ action that he hid himself in an alley to cry. The occupation of Eastern European countries and, later on, the disclosure of the facts of grand scale torture and suppression in Stalin’s Soviet Union had a significant impact on the minds of most Iranians.133 Not only the masses, but also many educated people and potential sympathizers of Marxism denounced the Soviet model, particularly because the religious culture of Iran did not provide a favourable environment for the expansion of an atheist ideology. Nevertheless, the egalitarianism of communism and its scientific pretence attracted a significant body of educated people. From the abdication of Reza Shah until the 1953 coup, Marxists were the most powerful group in academia. The Toodeh Party was the most organized political party, which was sometimes described as an intellectualmaking machine, whose members were active in various areas of culture. The third influential foreign force in Iran was the United States, which joined Britain and the Soviet Union later in their occupation of Iran during the Second World War. Until then, from Iranians’ point of view, there was no negative point in the US record. Irrespective of

44 The Socialist Theists American oil companies’ unsuccessful bid for the exploitation of oil in the north, which offended Iranians’ sense of patriotism, and regardless of the misbehaviour of American soldiers during their presence in the country, there was no serious problem to cause a negative impression of the United States among Iranians. Many nationalist politicians, such as the leaders of the Iran Party, had an inclination towards the USA.134 Hence, Washington played the role of an intermediary in the dispute between London and Tehran over oil. However, after a while, the United States decided to side with its main ally, Britain, and helped the latter in boycotting Iran’s oil export, in order to pressurize Iran to solve its dispute to the favour of Britain. Consequently, Iranians became disillusioned with US foreign policy. After the 1953 coup, which was organized by the CIA, US influence in Iran increased, to the extent that it ultimately replaced Britain in its role as the main power broker in Iran. In the circumstances that foreign forces dominated various aspects of public life in Iran, deep-seated anti-Western feelings were expanding among the masses. Ashtiyani talked about a world in which the hue and cry of freedom, equality, justice and truth were deafening, but there was no peace and freedom in it, a world where many nations were subjugated in the name of freedom and humanism.135 The Socialist Theists believed that the Communist block under the banner of defending the world proletariat and the Western block under the name of democracy and freedom, while trying to destroy each other, were expanding their domination over new markets and peripheral nations. In such a situation, the Socialist Theists called on the colonized people to mobilize the forces of peace against the warmongers of the Cold War and to unite against the financial power of the USA and the military power of the Soviet Union.136 The aggressive foreign policy of Western states, whether communist or liberal democratic ones, also led many educated Iranians and intellectuals to the conclusion that imported theories cannot solve the problems of Iranian society. It was in response to such disillusionment with Western countries and their claims of promoting socialism or freedom and democracy that the Socialist Theists attempted to establish ‘a middle school of thought’ inspired by Islam. They believed that only such a school of thought could provide Muslims with a practical plan, consistent with Islamic teachings, for a continuing revolutionary struggle. According to them, neither Marxism nor bourgeois liberalism could be a theoretical basis for revolution in the Middle East.137 Their version of Islam, however, in no way tolerated complacency towards foreign domination.

Historical and intellectual context 45

Dictatorship Throughout its history, Iran has been ruled by despotic governments that came to power through military force and, until a more powerful individual or dynasty emerged, they controlled all aspects of life in the country. They imposed heavy taxes, and used all methods to suppress any sign of dissent. Only when the power of a dynasty or king was in decline, and before a new ruler came to power, could people experience security and ease, at the expense of becoming victims of local rulers, or falling prey to chaos and anarchy. In the modern history of Iran, during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, people wrested a constitution establishing a disciplined judiciary and parliament from the ailing Mozaffar al-Din Shah. The attempt of his successor, Mohammad ‘Ali Shah, to close down the Parliament failed, when, among others, the people of Tabriz, in the north-west of Iran, resisted his dictatorship and marched to Tehran to force him to abdicate in favour of his son and Crown Prince, Ahmad Shah. However, with the interference of Russia and the British Empire in Iranian affairs, the Constitutional Revolution soon lost its momentum. Not long after, Iran became the battleground of Russian and British forces against the Ottomans and German agents, during the First World War. Following the Russian Revolution and the withdrawal of Russian forces, Britain, through the 1919 Pact, tried to establish a system according to which British advisors would be appointed to consultancy positions in all governmental ministries and organizations. These advisors, however, would virtually run the ministries and organizations. This plan failed when some parliamentarians led by Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Modarres opposed it. Hence, the British sought another way of buttressing their domination over Iran, a plan that brought about another phase of despotism for Iranian society. They decided to reinforce the central government in Tehran, particularly in order to counter the threat posed by the communists. The latter had already established a de facto breakaway state in Gilan, in the north, and formed a coalition government with Mirza Kochek Khan, a local religious and nationalist leader.138 Hence, in 1921, the British organized a coup, whose military leader was Reza Khan and whose political leader was Seyyed Zia’ Tabataba’i, a then unknown journalist. Reza Khan was not going to tolerate a rival, and soon got rid of Seyyed Zia’. Later, Reza Khan was appointed as Prime Minister, and in 1925, he deposed Ahmad Shah to replace the latter as Reza Shah. Consequently, despotism came back to Iran in the form of a modern dictatorship, and Iranians lost their freedom for another two decades.

46 The Socialist Theists The reality is that Iranians were fed up with the years of chaos, after the Constitutional Revolution, and with the incapability and weakness of Ahmad Shah and the statesmen of this period. Hence, at the beginning, they welcomed Reza Shah. It seems as if history was repeating itself, as if Iranians were destined to have no more than two options: absolute chaos or absolute despotism. During Reza Shah’s sixteen-year reign, only one voice was heard from Iran, and only one force ruled over the country. Unlike previous despotic rules, there was no escape from Reza Shah’s modern dictatorship, and no institution remained untouched by his tyrannical rule. With the forced resignation of Reza Shah in August 1941, Iranian society was reinvigorated and, once again, experienced full freedom. However, the memories of dictatorship and the worry that it might reappear remained. Hence, many political activists decided to identify the roots of tyranny in Iranian society, in order to prevent its reoccurrence. A distorted account of religion and some segments of the clergy were held partly to blame for despotism. Although a part of the Shi’ite clergy was in the front line of combating foreign forces and internal tyranny, there were important cases of their support for despots. In the Constitutional Revolution, the assumption of power by Reza Shah and the nationalization of the petroleum industry, the clergy as an influential elite in Iranian society could be found on both sides of the conflict. According to the Socialist Theists, only a distorted version of religion supported despotism.139 Hence, they tried to portray their preferred account of religion, free from the stigma of supporting tyranny. In an editorial in their periodical, the Socialists Theists wrote: We announce that the [only] way of restoring the dignity of people and defeating oppressors and tyrants, under any name such as Shah, Sultan or else, is a true monotheism and a genuine belief in God. People who believe in the power of the Truth, which is above all worldly powers, will never submit to the rule of those who treat people meanly and snub them.140 It was in response to the accusation of religion’s support for tyranny that the Socialist Theists, in their account of Islam, emphasized the concepts of freedom, public consultation and democracy.

Social and economic backwardness, poverty and class division Social and economic degeneration has been the most tangible problem that Iranians have faced in their modern history. This problem hurts

Historical and intellectual context 47 them more when they realize the extent of progress in Western societies. In Iran, overcoming social and economic backwardness has been the reason or the excuse for staging all the revolutions, reforms and coups, appointing political officials or ousting them, concluding or annulling foreign pacts, and so on. In the 1940s, social disorder increased, first as a result of the Second World War, and second because of the lack of a stable government, which led to anarchy and mayhem in the country.141 An aspect of social and economic degeneration is class division. Throughout the history of Iran, class division has been a familiar phenomenon, with social disorder and backwardness widening the gap. The existence of summits of wealth alongside valleys of poverty was an undeniable fact of Iranian society in the 1940s and 1950s, when the majority of Iranians succumbed to poverty and starvation, while a minority increasingly added to their wealth. These facts had significant impact on the Socialist Theists, who described the situation as follows: In cities, which are built in order to meet the needs of the business and bureaucratic classes, the distribution of wealth and economic laws, as well as moral, intellectual and religious beliefs, are formed in such a way that workers and peasants are exploited to their limits, while being paid only to the extent of survival. On the other hand, middlemen enjoy material well-being as much as possible. Consequently, because of this gap in prosperity, in comparison to the labour and efforts of the two classes, the population of active farmers and workers is gradually reduced at the expense of the number of middlemen and those working in public services . . . . In the current situation, even those who genuinely work do not work in the way that is required by modern industries.142 It was in response to these social and economic circumstances that, according to Peiman, the Socialist Theists found the traditional account of Islam ineffective. They believed that socialism as a social system would provide the quickest way out of the existing situation. They maintained that their differences with the Marxist Toodeh Party were merely that, first, they did not follow the Soviet Union’s instructions, and, second, they did not believe in materialism.143 In other words, for them, the Party’s socialist agenda was acceptable. They described their social plan, which they never delineated, as a ‘scientific and revolutionary’ programme, grounded on the spirit of Islam and monotheism, to eradicate the illegitimate and oppressive rule of the

48 The Socialist Theists feudal bourgeoisie and to establish social justice and socialism.144 Hence, establishing social justice, rejecting the piling up of wealth and narrowing down the class gap were the features of the Socialist Theists’ version of Islam. That was why they called Imam ‘Ali the most prominent socialist the world has ever seen, and whose socialist teachings show the way of combating poverty and misery to all generations.145

CONCERN ABOUT THREATS AGAINST ISLAM With the early signs of the decline and weakness of Muslim societies, in comparison to modern Western societies, a theory according to which such decline and weakness was attributed to the dominant culture in Muslim societies, which was deeply influenced by Islam, was presented. In other words, Islam was blamed for causing the backwardness of Muslim societies, including Iran. Various developments in the past two centuries, and the increasing contacts and confrontations between the West and the East, more and more showed the failures of Muslims, as their countries were colonized directly or dominated indirectly by Western powers. Hence, the advocates of the theory claimed to have substantive evidence to support their thesis. Because of such accusations, religion and religious circles in most Muslim societies, such as Iran, were gradually isolated, and lost their central place in the public life of these societies. The newly educated class, which was running the country more and more, became indifferent to religion. During the reign of Reza Shah, religion and the clergy, more than ever, were undermined. Unlike his predecessors, from the Qajar dynasty, he was powerful enough to introduce institutional changes in Iranian society, and to substitute religious institutions with secular ones copied from the West. He restricted the clergy to mosques and religious seminaries, while excluding them from education and judicial systems, which traditionally were the domains of the clergy. Public performance of religious festivals, which are very important to the Shi’a, was also limited. Reza Shah’s reforms were, of course, wideranging. Iran was modernized in many aspects, internal security was ensured, a modern and professional army was founded, the education system was reformed, the first Western-style university was established, the industrial infrastructure was improved, and it even looked as if foreign forces no longer had a hand in the country’s affairs. These changes were accompanied by some more superficial reforms, such as

Historical and intellectual context 49 the imposition of European-style dress. However, in August 1941, Reza Shah’s modern empire collapsed. The Iranian army did not resist the advancing British and Soviet armies, with the exception of a few cases where patriotic low-ranking officers unsuccessfully fought with the invaders. The absolute ruler of Iran for almost two decades, Reza Shah, surrendered, and without any resistance abdicated in favour of his son. Once again, the hidden hand of the British in the affairs of Iran surfaced. After August 1941, religion and religious circles re-emerged from years of repression. However, they never gained the position that they had held before Reza Shah’s era. Their influence was limited to the civil society, the masses and nongovernmental institutions. The fact that the restriction of religious institutions during the reign of Reza Shah did not bring about genuine progress undermined the theory that religion has been the cause of the backwardness of Iranian society. Many educated people once again embraced Islam, and those in academia who had been reluctant to reveal their faith were no longer so. Nevertheless, still there was a long way to go in order to prove that the theory was ungrounded, and the majority of intellectuals and university students distanced themselves from religion. During the historical period with which this book is concerned, three groups, in particular, attacked Islam. The first group consisted of the elite deeply influenced by Western civilization and mainly educated in the West or in Western-style institutions in Iran. This was the continuation of the group that, as mentioned earlier, blamed Islam for the backwardness of Muslims and, in particular, Iranians. The Westernized elite believed that, as European progress was achieved through denouncing the Church and Christianity, Iranians as well as other Muslim societies should get rid of Islam if they wish to overcome their backwardness. They argued that religion is a set of superstitious beliefs that restrict progressive forces. In the 1940s, Ahmad Kassravi, a famous Iranian historian, was an influential figure who tried to theorize such criticism of Islam. The second group were Marxists, who had been suppressed in Reza Shah’s era, but in the open environment of post-August 1941 were free to promote their views. The Marxist Toodeh Party was established in late September 1941, and the universities soon became its power base. According to Marxism, the bourgeoisie and its institutions, such as the state and religion, as well as prebourgeoisie institutions, should be eradicated. Religion is regarded as ‘the opium of the people’ and another instrument of the dominant classes and their foreign masters to rule over the dominated classes. The remarkable success of

50 The Socialist Theists communists in turning the backward Russia into an industrialized state, and the admirable resistance of the Red Army against Nazi Germany, were presented as evidence of the truth of Marxist ideology, and attracted many people, particularly in academia. On the other hand, the presence of the Soviet army prevented the British and Americans from prohibiting Marxist activities. Communism was regarded as the most powerful antireligious force in Iran during this time.146 The Bahais, who had resumed their activities in Reza Shah’s era, after being suppressed during the reign of the Qajars, were the third group to attack Islam and particularly Shi’ism. Alongside the Toodeh Party, the Bahais were active in academia and particularly the University of Tehran, between 1942 and 1949.147 Nevertheless, they did not have the appeal that the Marxists had among the young and educated Iranians. In these circumstances, some students with a religious inclination, who were studying at high schools and universities, decided to stand up for Islamic beliefs. The main motive of these people was to defend Islam and the religious identity of the society against ‘the cultural and intellectual invasion of imperialists and Marxists’. Although the activities of some of these people did not go beyond a defensive reaction to antireligious forces, some others went on to formulize their own social and philosophical theories.148 Since, in the post-1941 era, the main threat against religious views, particularly in academia, was posed by the Marxists, and the leaders of the Socialist Theists were university students and graduates, a significant part of the latter group’s work was dedicated to criticizing Marxism.

Shortcomings of the traditional approach to Islam and the clergy What provided the critics of Islam with ammunition was the weaknesses of the traditional account of Islam and the clergy. In other words, the fact that many university graduates turned their back on religion should not merely be attributed to foreign plots, and even if there were such plots, it was the weak points of the traditional approach to religion and the unpleasant actions of some clergy that allowed the plots to be effective. Superstitions permeated Islamic beliefs, and many religious rules were incompatible with new scientific findings or with the requirements of the modern life. The pretence of religiosity and hypocrisy were common. Although the details of religious ceremonies were

Historical and intellectual context 51 observed meticulously, the society was submerged in corruption, dishonesty, deception and many other immoral actions prohibited by religion. More importantly, fatalism, attributed to religion, inhibited the society from taking action to overcome problems and eradicate corruption. Nakhshab, in the introduction of The Material Mankind, wrote, ‘While, in Tehran, a group of people recourse to amulets and talismans, in order to avoid evil and cure their illnesses, and some others, under the name of mourning for Imam Hossein, inflict injury on their head, another group utterly deny the existence of God and advocate materialism.’149 This statement indicates that, according to the Socialist Theists, it was superstitious beliefs, attributed to Islam, that provided antireligious groups with excuses to denounce Islam. Another weak point of the traditional account of religion and the traditional clergy was that they were used by the economically welloff classes, and particularly the businessmen and merchants of the bazaar, to justify their exploitation of the lower classes of Iranian society. Historically, there has always been a relation of mutual support between the Shi’ite clergy and the merchants of the bazaar. Given the class division within Iranian society, any institution thought to contribute to, or even be indifferent towards, class division was denounced by the opponents of the status quo. This was a reason for pushing many young people towards antireligious views and particularly Marxism. In The Material Mankind, Nakhshab talked about the predicament of a hypothetical young religious individual who was influenced by his materialist friend, while witnessing the misconduct of some clergy and the wealthy’s justifying their situation by referring to religious fatalism. The person argued, I saw the hypocrisy and deception of a group of mean people [under the name of religion]. Hence, I did not know how to response to the criticisms [posed by my materialist friend]. I reckoned that his views were true. Once, I asked my local clergyman about these criticisms. He shouted at me, saying ‘Who are you to doubt about God’s religion? You are no longer a Muslim, and no Muslim is allowed to socialize with you. Not all people are supposed to know the answers to these questions. You are either one of the ‘ulama, in that case you would know the answers, or an ordinary Muslim, in which case you must only obey; otherwise you will be condemned to the hell fire.’150 In those days, while many clergy lived a simple life, and dedicated all their efforts sincerely to religious teaching and learning, others

52 The Socialist Theists collaborated with the dominant classes and oppressive governments. The Socialist Theists’ criticisms were mainly based on this account of the clergy’s conduct and views. Another issue considered as a weak point of the traditional clergy by groups such as the Socialist Theists was that the former allegedly devoted their lives mainly to spiritual matters. In those days, the separation of religion and social and political issues was an accepted view within Iranian society. This does not mean that the clergy were never involved in social and political issues. Far from it, the clergy were a significant social and political force. The relationship between politics and religion in the country has been a complex one. As touched upon before, during the reign of the Shi’ite dynasty of the Safavids, when the majority of Iranians converted to the Shi’ite faith, a strong mutual relationship of support between the clergy and the government was established, whereas before that the ‘ulama mainly abstained from politics. During the rule of the Qajars, with modernization programmes, the role of the clergy, to some extent, diminished. They, however, played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Even when a few prominent clergy, such as Sheikh Fazlollah Noori, stood against the Revolution, the highest ranking ‘ulama in Iran and Iraq supported it. However, in the process of the Revolution, the clergy were gradually excluded. This experience, which they never forgot, dissuaded them from more direct involvement in politics. To this should be added the spread of the view promoted by Westernized circles, according to which religion was a cause of the backwardness of Iran. These circles did their best to exclude religion from significant domains of the society. Such exclusion was completed with the suppression of religious institutions and the clergy by Reza Shah. Even after the abdication of Reza Shah in September 1941, the clergy by and large remained passive, and adhered to the pre-Safavid view of the separation of religion and politics. In the period between 1941 and 1961, the clergy could be categorized into four groups, on the basis of their political stance. The first group was the traditional clergy headed by Grand Ayatollah Hossein Boroojerdi. The majority of the clergy belonged to this group, which refrained from involvement in politics. During the movement for the nationalization of the petroleum industry and the dispute between Mohammad Reza Shah and Mossaddeq, this group of the clergy did not side with either party. However, towards the end of the Mossaddeq government, because of an increase in the activities of the Marxist Toodeh Party and its support for Mossaddeq, they leaned towards the Shah’s camp.

Historical and intellectual context 53 The second group consisted of activist and political clergy, whose main representatives were Ayatollah Kashani and Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi. As we have already seen, Kashani’s political activities went back to his participation in fighting against the British in Iraq, which led to his exile. During the nationalization of the petroleum industry, he first totally supported Mossaddeq, as in July 1952, when he successfully called on people to take to the streets to request the reappointment of Mossaddeq as prime minister, because the Shah had replaced the latter with Qavam as-Saltane. Later on, Kashani developed some differences with Mossaddeq, and joined his opponents. Navvab-e Safavi, on the other hand, was a devoted cleric with fundamentalist tendencies. He helped the movement for the nationalization of the petroleum industry on very sensitive occasions. His group, Fada’iyan-e Islam, assassinated General ‘Ali Razm-Ara, the then prime minister, and opened the way for the nationalization of Iran’s petroleum industry by Iranian Parliament. However, from the beginning of Mossaddeq’s premiership, the relationship between Navvab-e Safavai and the government was marred by difficulties. Royalist clergy, led by Seyyed Mohammad Behbahani, formed the third group. They supported the Shah against Mossaddeq. Later on, when the Shah embarked on land reforms and provided women with some rights, Behbahani’s relationship with him deteriorated. The fourth group consisted of the clergy with democratic and somewhat radical views, such as Ayatollah Abol-Fazl Zanjani and Ayatollah Mahmood Taleqani. This group supported Mossaddeq to the end, and even after the 1953 coup was active in the struggle against the Shah’s regime, within the frameworks of the National Resistance Movement and National Front II and III.151 Unlike the first group, the other three groups only attracted a minority of the clergy. The majority of the clergy not only refrained from involvement in politics, but also did not take part in many other domains of social life, such as the media, universities and cultural activities. The greater part of the clergy were not familiar with the needs of modern life, and particularly those of young and educated people, and consequently did not try to find a solution for them. More importantly, it was alleged that those parts of Islamic teachings concerning social issues were gradually forgotten. For instance, Ayatollah Morteza Motahari mentioned that the principle of ‘the promotion of virtues and prevention of vices’, as an Islamic rule that has significant implications for society, was excluded from religious handbooks.152 The alleged indifference of the traditional account of

54 The Socialist Theists religion to the predicaments of society provided antireligious groups, and particularly the Marxists, with grounds to accuse Islam and the clergy of supporting the status quo, if not of being the root of social problems in Iran. In response to these accusations, groups such as the Socialist Theists tried to introduce a political and activist version of Islam, which they believed was not indifferent to social and political predicaments. It is against this background that the Socialist Theists’ rejection of the separation of religion and politics, as well as their attempt to ground social and political actions on religious beliefs, can be explained.

NEW SCIENCES AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOLS Within the works of the Socialist Theists, the trace of, at least, three intellectual tendencies developed in the West can be found. These are the positivism of empirical sciences, liberalism and Marxism. To begin with the former, after the Middle Ages, and particularly in the eighteenth century, new sciences rapidly expanded in Europe and became the motor of intellectual development on the continent. Empirical sciences, which are based on positivism, replaced philosophy and religion as the true account of reality. Metaphysical concepts lost much of their creditability; reason was regarded as the only way of revealing the truth; observation and experience were considered as the only reliable methods of research; utility was thought to be the ground of morality; and progress became the ultimate ideal. However, the developments of the nineteenth century undermined the optimism of the previous century. When the positivism of empirical sciences was applied to social sciences, its shortcomings soon surfaced. In the twentieth century, there were attempts at modifying positivism, through dialectics, logical positivism, hermeneutics and critical rationalism. The spectacular progress of the West in the areas of knowledge and technology had a significant impact on Iranian society. As Westerneducated students returned to Iran, and the Western education system was copied in the country, admiration of new sciences became common. Hence, the Socialist Theists tried to refer to new sciences, particularly social sciences, and to utilize the observation and experience method used by these sciences in their works. However, despite these attempts, scientific methods were not widely used in the Socialist Theists’ works. Probably, this is because such methods were not applicable to the study of the topics with which the group was concerned.

Historical and intellectual context 55 The second intellectual impact on the views of the Socialist Theists can be attributed to liberalism. The origin of liberalism goes back to the theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke in the seventeenth century. Liberalism is associated with concepts such as humanism, secularism, positivism, individualism, capitalism and a belief in progress, and individual freedoms and the public/private divide are its main requirements. Civil, political and, later, social rights are among the rights required by liberalism. In the second half of the twentieth century, in the West, the welfare state was established on the basis of liberal democratic theories. Liberalism came to Iran through Iranian students studying in Europe, and was spread through newly established centres of higher education, where the Socialist Theists came to know liberal ideas, and particularly the concepts of liberty and democracy. It was under the influence of liberal ideas that the group tried to find and highlight the equivalents of these concepts in Islamic texts. Nevertheless, from the early 1940s, by the introduction of socialist views and the emergence of a new generation of intellectuals belonging to the middle classes, liberalism lost some of its appeal among Iranian intellectuals. Hence, compared to the intellectuals of previous generations, the Socialist Theists referred to liberal ideas to a lesser extent. Among various Western schools of thought, Marxism had probably the most significant impact on the Socialist Theists. Marxism was a product of the failure of liberal theory, in the nineteenth century, and a synthesis of German philosophy, English economics and French socialism. It consists of two parts: dialectical materialism, which is Marx’s materialist philosophy, and historical materialism, which is the application of dialectical materialism to human society and history. Marxism’s egalitarian approach attracted a significant part of the working class and the intellectuals of the middle and higher classes, in Europe. The 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was claimed to be one link in the chain of revolutions predicted by Marx, and the leaders of the Soviet Union claimed to implement Marxism. Thereafter, a large body of revolutionary forces in the colonized countries embraced Marxism as a theory of revolution. In Iran, Marxism was first introduced by the communists who formed a revolutionary coalition government in the de facto breakaway province of Gilan in 1920–1, as well as by the communists coming from the Caucasus and Iranian guest workers in Russia. During the Reza Shah era, European-educated Iranians tried to promote communism in Iran, but were harshly suppressed by the regime, which arrested members of a communist group known as Fifty-Three Persons [Panjah va Se Nafar]. In the post-August 1941 era, the conditions for

56 The Socialist Theists the spread of Marxism in Iran were favourable. The Marxist Toodeh Party was welcomed by the young and educated Iranians. The social justice and egalitarianism promoted by communists were appealing to many people, some of whom did not understand very well the philosophical underpinnings of Marxism. As a matter of fact, it was socialism that was appealing to these people. The Socialist Theists had a profound understanding of Marxism153 and were deeply influenced by it. An example of this influence can be seen in the group’s concern with the issue of class division.154 Nevertheless, because of their faith in Islam, the Socialist Theists were not ready to embrace materialism and atheism. Hence, they distinguished between materialism and socialism, and while advocating the latter, they were hostile to the former, as they talked about ‘a socialism based on a belief in God’. It should be noted that a similar intellectual movement known as Islamic Socialism was active for a while in some Arab countries, particularly in Egypt. Thus, some analysts have thought that the Socialist Theists were influenced by that movement.155 However, this is unlikely. There is no mention of the Islamic Socialism movement in the works of the Socialist Theists. Such mention could have given the views of the latter group more credibility.

CONCLUSION The Socialist Theists were the first group of Iranian Islamic intellectuals to establish a political organization and to enter politics actively. Their significance, however, should be attributed to their theoretical works. They were critical of the traditional account of Islam and the clergy, whom they blamed for providing antireligious forces with excuses to attack Islam. Their main concern was to introduce a plausible account of Islam to new generations of young and educated Iranians, a version of Islam engaged with the realities of modern life and responsive to political and social problems facing contemporary Iranian society. The Socialist Theists found the solution in a politicized Islam and particularly a synthesis of Islam and socialism. The distinction that they made between the philosophical foundation of their beliefs, which was monotheism and Islam, and the social system that they advocated, that is, socialism, has probably been their most important theoretical contribution to the modern Islamic thought in Iran. However, next generations of Islamic intellectuals in Iran were not content with the Socialist Theists’ explicit borrowing of ideas

Historical and intellectual context 57 from other schools of thought. They did not also favour the idea of a fragmented theory, in which the social/political agenda is not a direct corollary of the theological/philosophical world-view. New Islamic groups and thinkers sought an integrated theory, and, more importantly, were confident that necessary solutions for all contemporary social problems can be found in Islam itself, if the principle of ijtehad is properly followed. Should they find a new idea appealing, they preferred to see it as an integrated part of Islam, and tried their best to extract it from within Islamic texts, rather than seeing it as a conception borrowed from an alien culture. These groups and thinkers were also more eager than the Socialist Theists to politicize Islam.

Part II

The Iran Freedom Movement Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement, was established in 1961, on the basis of the view that Islam is a comprehensive way of life, providing for the social, political and spiritual needs of mankind. It is still active in Iran, but its leaders have, now and then, been subject to pressure and persecution. In its heyday, it mainly attracted educated middle class people with a religious inclination. In this part, I concentrate on the group’s approach to Islam, mainly through the works of its co-founder and main leader, Mahdi Bazargan, since his works can be considered as representing the views of the Movement.156 Bazargan was, perhaps, the first prolific Iranian thinker to try to reconcile Islamic teachings with empirical sciences. Later, he tried to prove the comprehensiveness of Islam by reinterpreting traditional conceptions in such a way that they address the needs of the worldly life in a modern setting. His approach has provided other thinkers and religious–political groups with a model for the reconciliation of Islamic teachings with other ideas and schools of thought. Among these groups and individuals have been the People’s Mojahedin Organization, whose founders tried to combine Islamic thought with some versions of Marxism, and ‘Abdol-Karim Soroosh, who has tried to reconcile Islamic views with liberal democratic doctrines. Bazargan even inspired the clergy close to academic circles, such as Ayatollah Motahari. He served as the first Head of the Board of Directors of the nationalized Iranian petroleum industry, under Mohammad Mossaddeq’s government. He entered actively into politics after the 1953 coup. His intellectual and political activities were rewarded by his appointment by Ayatollah Khomeini as the first Prime Minister after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, but soon he fell from grace. Radical revolutionaries found his political stance too conservative, and later on, fundamentalists regarded his thought as not Islamic

enough. Since then his group, the Iran Freedom Movement, has not been allowed to participate in elections, but is tolerated. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing trend towards what he stood for, among the new generation of Iranians. This can mainly be attributed to the appeal of his political moderation, which might have been a reflection of his way of thinking about Islam and politics. Understanding Bazargan’s views helps in comprehending the current situation in Iran from both a political and a theoretical point of view. He is, explicitly or implicitly, a source of reference for the present reformists. In this part, as in the previous part, first, a short history of events leading to the formation of the Iran Freedom Movement is provided. Then, Bazargan’s approach to Islam is substantively examined. This is followed by an analysis of his methodology in working out his approach. Next, it is considered what social and political circumstances and what schools of thought were conducive to adopting such an approach. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered about the overall development of Bazargan’s thought.

5

History

FORMATION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS The toppling of Reza Shah and his going to exile in 1941 created a wave of vigour and enthusiasm in various areas of Iranian social life, particularly, in the spheres of politics, which was regarded as the Shah’s exclusive domain, and then culture and religion. As touched upon previously, many Islamic institutions and associations were established, particularly by the educated and young activists, for spreading Islamic views and accomplishing social reforms. The early institutions were in the form of centres run by individuals, rather than consisting of groups. One of these centres was Kanoon-e Islam, or the Islamic Centre, where a series of lectures were presented, and a magazine called Danesh-Amooz, or Student, was sponsored. The Centre was founded by Ayatollah Mahmood Taleqani. The close friendship between Ayatollah Taleqani, Bazargan, who already knew each other through their parents, and Yadollah Sahabi began when they were producing the Student.157 Alongside Kanoon-e Islam, there were other Islamic institutions, such as Anjoman-e Tabliqat-e Islami, or the Society for Promoting Islamic Teachings,158 with branches in Tehran and some other cities, set up by Dr Mahmood Shahabi. Another centre was Kanoon-e Haqayeq-e Islami, or the Centre for Spreading Islamic Truth, established by Mohammad Taqi Shari’ati in Mashhad. Academia, in 1942, witnessed the establishment of Students’ Islamic Associations, first in the medical faculty and then in other faculties at the University of Tehran. Bazargan and Sahabi played a vital role in the expansion and activities of these associations, which were the first Islamic intellectual groupings in Iran, although they stayed aloof from politics and concentrated on cultural and social issues. The constitution of the Students’ Islamic Association, for instance, stated their aims as follows: (1) reforming society on the basis of

62 The Iran Freedom Movement Islamic teachings, (2) encouraging friendship and unity among Muslims, and, particularly young people and intellectuals, (3) spreading Islamic truth, particularly through the press, and (4) eradicating superstitions.159 The leaders and members of these associations were mainly from religious families, who were concerned about the spread of nonIslamic views, particularly among young and educated people. They were trying their best to provide rational and scientific answers to young people’s questions and needs, with regard to Islam, and to show that there is no incompatibility between modern scientific achievements and the Koran.160 Magazines such as Forooq, ‘Elm, Hekmat, Ganj-e Shayegan and Fars [Province] Students’ Weekly, were published with this intention by the above-mentioned associations. Although until the end of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry in 1953 these associations avoided involvement in politics as groups, their leaders and members took part in political activities as individuals, and mainly supported Jebhe-i Melli, or the National Front, and the government of Mossaddeq. In the discord between Mossaddeq and Ayatollah Kashani, members of these associations as well as their leaders, such as Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleqani, sided with the former. After the 1953 coup, the National Resistance Movement was in the vanguard of opposition to the Shah’s regime. The Movement was formed of nationalists as well as moderate Islamists, such as Ayatollah Taleqani, Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi and Rahim ‘Ataii, who played a significant role in the leadership of the Movement. Whereas, before the coup, Islamic associations had refrained from involvement in politics, afterwards they became politically active and cooperated with the National Resistance Movement.161

MAHDI BAZARGAN Bazargan was the most influential figure in founding and leading Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran throughout the years. He was born in Tehran in 1907. His father, originally from Tabriz, in the north-west of Iran, was an important businessman in Tehran’s bazaar. Bazargan finished his primary education at a maktab, or traditional religious school, and completed his secondary education at a modern school. After taking part in a nation-wide examination for the award of scholarship to study in Europe, he went to France, where he obtained a degree in mechanical engineering.162

History

63

Like any other Iranian visiting Europe, he was influenced by the Western civilization, but for reasons different from those that influenced many others. According to him, he was not impressed so much by wide and clean streets or multistory buildings, running water, twenty-four-hour electricity, interesting clothes, cinemas, theatres or parks, as by the behaviour and manners of the French people. What attracted his attention were the high level of church attendance among the French people, their and their prime minister’s resistance during the First World War and the existence of various associations for cooperation and for serving others. He also admired the adherence of the French to values and practices, such as honesty, cooperation and trust, moderation, and the recognition of the value of all people, particularly those who have served others. He recalled that Unlike the early generations of Iranian students studying in Europe and intellectuals such as Taqi-Zadeh, who were terrified by the splendour of the West, became self-alienated and believed that Iranians should be Westernised from head to toe, some of us no longer thought that we should imitate Europeans. We believed that we should follow the principles, which are universal, and everybody should submit to them.163 After seven years, Bazargan returned to Iran to see the opposite of everything he had seen in France. Having completed his military service, he started to work as a university lecturer at the University of Tehran, while working for two companies. In 1942, he began cooperating with Kanoon-e Islam and some other Islamic associations, and joined Kanoon-e Mohandesin-e Iran, or the Centre for Iranian Engineers. His first article, under the title of ‘Religion in Europe’, was published in the magazine Student. He also gave several lectures on Islam and science, in meetings organized by the Iran Party, which was founded by some members of the Centre for Iranian Engineers, although Bazargan himself was not a member of the Party. One of his main concerns in this period was to challenge intellectually the fastgrowing Marxist Toodeh Party.164 Most of his articles were written with this purpose in mind. For a while, he served as the Dean of the Engineering Faculty at Tehran University. During the nationalist government of Mossaddeq, he was first appointed as the Deputy Culture Minister and then as the Head of the Board of Directors of the newly nationalized petroleum industry. His nine month’s work in the latter job ended because of his differences with Hossein Maki, a prominent member of the National Front, who later opposed Mossaddeq.165

64 The Iran Freedom Movement He was then appointed as the head of Tehran Water Supply Department. Apparently, in the last months of the Mossaddeq government, he was nominated as the Minister for Higher Education, but due to his religious inclination was not appointed to the job.166 Before the 1953 coup, Bazargan was mainly regarded as a technocrat and a religious intellectual figure, rather than a political activist, a role he consciously declined to play. However, after the coup and the overthrow of the Mossaddeq government, he became active in the opposition,167 as a prominent member of the Executive Committee of the National Resistance Movement. After signing a petition calling for free parliamentary elections, he resigned from his post in the Tehran Water Supply Department. His participation in signing a letter of protestation, against oil contracts between Iran and foreign parties, led to his dismissal from Tehran University, although he was later readmitted to his job. In 1955, he was imprisoned for five months for his political activities. In prison, he came to the conclusion that ‘after love and worship [of God], the most crucial duty is education for democracy and cooperation . . . . Hence, we have to educate ourselves for social activities’.168

FOUNDATION OF THE IRAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT In 1960, the National Front II was established as an umbrella group for opposition parties and figures. Bazargan, Yadollah Sahabi, another Western-educated scientist, and Ayatollah Taleqani, as well as the representatives of the Iran Party, People of Iran Party and Nation of Iran Party, were members of the Supreme Council of the Front. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, from the beginning the Front faced internal disputes over the tactics to be used in the struggle against the Shah’s regime. The members of the Iran Party, who had the upper hand in the Front, were very conservative in their tactics. Hence, Bazargan and Sahabi decided to establish a party whose doctrine was based on Islam.169 Many members of Islamic associations and ordinary activists of the National Resistance Movement, which had practically been dissolved long ago, urged them to form such a party. Bazargan and Sahabi invited Ayatollah Taleqani to join them to establish Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, or the Iran Freedom Movement, in 1961.170 Other people involved in the group’s formation included Rahim ‘Ataii, Hassan Nazih, Manssor ‘Ataii and ‘Abbass Sami’i. It should be mentioned that the Movement was established during the government of Dr ‘Ali Amini, who had a programme of political,

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economic and social reforms, inspired by John F. Kennedy’s doctrine of immunizing third world countries against communism.171 The group in its inaugural meeting announced that We are Muslim, but do not think that Islam is confined to the acts of praying and fasting. We regard Islam as a progressive school of thought and a comprehensive way of life that meets the spiritual as well as material needs of human beings, and as a social system according to which the struggle for the prosperity of the dispossessed masses is a sacred struggle. We are Iranian patriots. However, this does not mean racism [or chauvinism]. We recognize others’ value and rights, as well as our own defects. We are committed to the independence of our country and its dignity and progress. We fight colonialism and imperialism. We also follow Mossaddeq, since his government has been the only popular and elected government in the history of Iran, a government that followed the wishes of the Iranian people, and defeated the colonialists [by nationalizing the petroleum industry].172 The Iran Freedom Movement, since it was considered to be too radical as a group, was not accepted in the National Front II.173 During the government of Assadollah ‘Alam, who succeeded Amini as prime minister, the founders and some activists of the Iran Freedom Movement were arrested. This was because, in an announcement, the group criticized the Shah’s reform plan called the White Revolution,174 and described it as a foreign plot.175 In 1962, subsequent to the enactment of a controversial bill on local and provincial councils,176 some segments of the Iranian clergy, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, became active in protests against the government. Their activities reached a climax in June 1963, when in protest to the arrest of Ayatollah Khomeini, large demonstrations were held only to be crushed by the government. Soon afterwards, the National Front II collapsed. Later on, the National Front III was formed by the Iran Freedom Movement, People of Iran Party, Nation of Iran Party and the Society of Socialists. However, following the arrest of its leaders, the National Front III soon became inactive. In September 1962, the first group of the leaders and activists of the Iran Freedom Movement were put on trial, and sentenced to between four and ten years imprisonment. During their trial, they, and particularly Bazargan, expressed their political, social and religious views, including the need for a return to the 1906 Constitution and for the Shah’s abstinence from politics. Bazargan was pardoned by

66 The Iran Freedom Movement Mohammad Reza Shah and released from prison in 1967. He kept away from politics, but continued his religious activities, and was regarded as a respectable figure. He was also in contact with opposition religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Taleqani, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Zanjani.177 The Iran Freedom Movement resumed its political activities on the verge of the 1979 Revolution. Some of its leaders were members of the Revolutionary Council hand-picked by Ayatollah Khomeini. Bazargan was appointed, by Ayatollah Khomeini, as the first Prime Minister after the Islamic Revolution. After nine months in office, Bazargan resigned in November 1980, a day after radical students occupied the American embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis began.178 He was accused of being too moderate and conciliatory towards the enemies of the Islamic Revolution. Nevertheless, he was elected as a member of the first Parliament after the Revolution from the Tehran constituency. For the rest of his life, he remained an opposition figure, who was subject to sporadic persecution. He died in January 1995.

6

A new approach to Islam A worldly Islam

The founders and some members of the Iran Freedom Movement have written widely, mainly on topics related to Islam. Ayatollah Taleqani’s and Bazargan’s works are the most important writings by the members of the group. Ayatollah Motahari, a leading Islamic writer and philosopher, assassinated in 1980, believed that the two were the vanguards of introducing Islam to the new generation of Iranians.179 While Taleqani endeavoured deeply to re-examine the Koran and other religious texts, Bazargan tried to utilize new sciences, in which he was educated, in his approach to Islam. In this book, as said before, I focus only on Bazargan’s works, since they are more representative of the views of the Iran Freedom Movement. It should, nevertheless, be remembered that neither Taleqani’s nor Bazargan’s works were presented as the ideology of the Movement, but rather as attempts at providing a new approach to Islam, in order to attract the new generation of educated Iranians to the religion. Many of their writings, as a matter of fact, were published before the formation of the group. Given the extent of Bazargan’s works and, more importantly, his new approach towards Islamic teachings, he can be called the founder of Islamic intellectualism in Iran. According to Hamid Algar, an Orientalist and Iran expert, Bazargan was the most influential and prolific writer of religious modernism in contemporary Iran.180 In order to examine Bazargan’s new approach to Islam, I first consider his critique of the traditional understanding of Islam. Then, I assess his own account, including his new interpretation of Islamic concepts and his scientific construal of Islamic teachings. CRITICIZING THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF ISLAM AND THE CLERGY Pretence of religiosity was a main target of Bazargan’s criticism. He argued that instead of following the practical teachings of Islam, as

68 The Iran Freedom Movement a dynamic and live religion, Muslims confine themselves to religious formalities. He believed that Muslims ignore the truth and meaning behind religious concepts, which are mainly expressions of love and gratitude, and whose purpose is to recommend acts of charity. Instead, they focus solely on reciting the Koran, pronouncing Arabic prayer words181 or reciting special prayers for the recovery of the sick or for keeping accidents away from themselves.182 Bazargan was critical of a common behaviour among Iranian Muslims whereby a believer attends to the minor details of religious formalities, while not paying any attention to educating and serving other people or even violating their rights and entitlements.183 As we will see later, Bazargan did not regard the target of his criticism to be Islam as such, but Muslims and the common attitude towards Islam in society. It is crucial to note that the crux of his argument was social rather than intellectual criticism. His objection was to the tendency to pretence in Iranian society, where people combine religiosity with sinfulness, pray to God in full humility while committing sins and violating others’ rights. He argued that We Iranian converted to Islam and Shi’ism, which is the nub of Islam, and developed them within the context of our own attitude. We regard religion as an instrument of salvation for our personal benefit, or as a mechanism through which the sins and cruelties that we cannot help not committing can be forgiven. Philosophically, we have brought fatalism and abstention from action to Islam.184 Bazargan criticized the Sunnis for their disregard for the Prophet’s Household and its teachings.185 On the other hand, he argued that though the ordinary Shi’a recite the Koran, they do not understand it, and in practice do not learn from it. His complaint was that the ordinary Iranian Shi’a do not endeavour to understand the Koran, which is in Arabic, to any depth, and that their main concern is with reciting it mechanically.186 He also pointed out that followers of religions, including Muslims and the Shi’a, have a tendency to exaggerate about their early religious leaders and saints, and ascribe God’s attributes to them, even though, as he stressed, the Koran is opposed to the worship of individuals.187 However, Bazargan was critical, more than anything else, of what he called Muslims’ inaction. He argued that Muslims do not make sufficient effort for this and the next world, as if they regard themselves as God’s spoiled children. They want to solve every

A worldly Islam 69 difficulty through prayers, and think that the self-sacrifice of their early religious leaders is sufficient for their salvation.188 He maintained that, for many Muslims, prayer is not so much the glorification of God as a way of utilizing God’s will for fulfilling their petty worldly wishes. According to him, the ordinary Shi’a think that mourning for Imam Hossein is sufficient for them to have their sins forgiven by God, and consider themselves as exempt from any sacrifice or resistance against oppression. They are waiting for Imam Mahdi, who is promised to come to save Muslims and to restore justice in this world, to emerge and do the job for them; hence, they are in a status of stagnation and inaction,189 and practise taqieh, or hiding one’s true beliefs in fear of persecution.190 Thus, Bazargan argued that some religious concepts, such as praying, remembering and loving the early religious saints, awaiting and practising taqieh, are interpreted by the common Shi’a in a way that justifies their abstention from action and from making efforts to change their lives. Nevertheless, he considered such an interpretation as a distortion of the true Islam and Shi’ite faith, and as a reflection of the society’s own inclination towards inaction and fatalism.191 He attributed the latter features of Iranian society to its agricultural mode of life. In the part of the world where Iran is located, the climate, the shortage of water and the unpredictability of life give rise to a lack of self-confidence and a sense of powerlessness before the forces of nature.192

Religion’s dual role For Bazargan, religion193 is a double-edged sword, which can be used for the benefit of people or to their detriment. It can give rise to a sense of arrogance and supremacy, stagnation and submission, ignorance and excessive concern with religious formalities, disregard for sciences and the worldly life, or even hypocrisy, abandonment of virtues, rigidity and ill-temperedness, hatred, and individual and social corruption. In this way, religion might finally lead to turning one’s back on God.194 Deficient religiosity based on ignorance can bring about prejudice and disregard for new thoughts. Believers might disregard nonbelievers, and absolutism and rigidity might cause lasting disputes over minor issues.195 On the other hand, Bazargan believed that religion can be a source of value for people, as Islam has never been against knowledge and thinking, and has never had the institution of Inquisition. In Islam, politics and religion have never been separated from each other, and had magnificent outcomes. Moreover,

70 The Iran Freedom Movement social movements in the East have always had religious roots.196 Bazargan concludes that the causes of problems in his society, as well as their solutions, have always been in religion, and the positive impact of religion has, of course, been dominant. Hence, through public education, this positive side should be reinforced, and the negative side should be opposed.197

The clergy In principle, Bazargan opposed the idea that a group of people, that is, the clergy, should spend all their life in religious education or deal with religious issues, as their vocation. According to him, in the early days of Islam, it was not the case that a group of people made a living of religious issues and ceremonies, such as ‘promoting virtues and preventing vices’, which is a duty for all Muslims. There is, however, a verse in the Koran that reads, ‘From any group of believers, some people should go and learn the knowledge of the religion, and in their coming back should caution their people not to oppose God’s rules.’198 In Bazargan’s view, this verse does not mean that a group of people should devote themselves exclusively to religious issues, as their vocation. Moreover, it requires an understanding of the religion in all its dimensions, not just one part of it, such as feqh,199 which is what is usually taught in clerical education. He was critical of the fact that the clergy spend most of their time learning and teaching feqh, which is merely about Shari’a law and ways of performing religious ceremonies and formalities. Bazargan’s main criticism was that the clergy mostly concentrate on individualistic religious practices rather than on those with a social dimension. He argued that the clergy pay attention to the minor details of prayers, fasting, hajj, religious taxes such as zakat, and inheritance law, but issues of defence and jihad are talked about very briefly, and less attention is paid to the principle of ‘promoting virtues and preventing vices’. Moreover, he scorned the clergy for not examining the issues of government and politics, upon which other issues in this and the next world are dependent.200 Bazargan criticized the religious leaders of his time for losing touch with the realities of life, disregarding new sciences and developments and abandoning ijtihad, which means working out solutions for new problems on the basis of Islamic principles. He considered the religious rigidity of the clergy as well as the blind imitation of the West by the European-educated and Westernized elite to be the causes of the failure of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906. On the other hand, he praised the European clergy for having knowledge of

A worldly Islam 71 nonreligious topics, such as sciences, mathematics, history, law and politics, as well as for being involved in professions such as engineering and even acting. He claimed that in Europe, there is a close contact between the church, on the one hand, and the population at large, real life and the evolving civilization, on the other. He asserted that, in Europe, the appointment as a clergyman is subject to regulations and discipline; the clergy are moderate and do not make exaggerated claims about their saints; and there is no room for deception and arrogance.201 In these claims, it seems that Bazargan was not so much concerned with describing factually the nature of the Christian clergy as with drawing attention to the weaknesses of the traditional Iranian clergy. Elsewhere, he criticized the clergy in all religions for following the masses and their wishes, rather than trying to guide them.202 However, Bazargan contradicted himself by accusing the traditional clergy of following the masses and, at the same time, scorning them for losing touch with people. Nevertheless, it is not the case that Bazargan totally denied the positive roles played by the traditional clergy in Iranian society. He argued that not only has the Shi’ite clergy functioned as a source of learning for people, but also their houses were considered as a refuge for those persecuted by governments and oppressors.203 On the basis of his criticism of the traditional clergy, he described the attributes of his ideal type of cleric: knowledgeable, considerate, wise and sincere in God’s way, a good orator, a person who earns his own living, does not run from challenges and is aware of, and a leader in, both worldly and religious issues.204 Bazargan called on the clergy to write theoretical, social, economic and political books, on the basis of new developments and new issues and needs, and to teach and interpret the Koran.205 He maintained that Islam is a religion of action and usefulness, and the clergy should be useful to society and meet its needs; otherwise it will become extinct. This is because, he believed, truth is whatever is to the advantage of people, whereas falsity is whatever is hollow or fruitless or has only transitory impacts. It was on the basis of this account that he emphasized the importance of ijtihad, as a method of responding to new needs and developments.206

REINTERPRETING RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS We have already seen that Bazargan maintained that some Islamic conceptions are distorted. Hence, it is crucial to see how he himself defined these conceptions. These new definitions are now established

72 The Iran Freedom Movement in Iranian society, not only by the efforts of Muslim thinkers, such as Bazargan, Ayatollah Motahari and ‘Ali Shari’ati, but also through the course of the Islamic Revolution. However, Bazargan was the first thinker to introduce these new interpretations, in a relatively systematic way, to a completely traditional society of more than half a century ago. It is important to note that Bazargan believed his reinterpretation was mainly a rediscovery of what had been forgotten by the traditional approach. In the following, his views on some of the most important Islamic conceptions are considered. ‘Amal, which literally means action or deed, is an important concept in Islam. It encompasses any action that has a religious connotation. This word is referred to very widely in Bazargan’s works. According to him, in the Koran ‘amal is not merely an action that we do for the next world; whatever entails effort and has a useful purpose is a religious action. A builder, smith, policeman, teacher, preacher, whoever endangers himself by saying the truth in front of a tyrant or whoever thinks and tries to solve a scientific dilemma does a worthy deed.207 Bazargan acknowledged that he had been influenced by William James’s pragmatism. Citing James’ view that whatever is true is useful and whatever is useful is true, Bazargan argued that the Koran implies the same, when it compares the truth to the water in a river, and falsity to a passing and useless bubble on the water.208 Such an approach to religion might have significant implications, if several issues were clarified, such as the criteria of usefulness, but Bazargan did not address these issues. An important question is whether an action can be good per se, or good only when it is endorsed by God. Bazargan argued that when a good deed is carried out in order to comply with God’s will, it is valuable and worthy of divine reward. However, if such a deed is carried out for itself and religious convictions are merely seen as subsidiary confirmation, the deed cannot be regarded as a sincere action. Moreover, if a worthy action is not performed for God, it loses its meaning.209 It can be argued that although Bazargan tried to reconcile religion and pragmatism, he did not address the contradictions that arise from combining the two, and ultimately tilted towards religion. Another word that, alongside ‘amal, is repeatedly used in Bazargan’s work is iktesab, which literally means ‘to earn’. By referring to various Koranic verses about iktesab,210 Bazargan aimed to show the relevance of pragmatism to religious actions. In this way, he tried to bridge the gap between action and reward, in religion. Hence, he rejected a common view among Muslims that the mechanical recitation of a prayer results in divine reward. The point is that reward or

A worldly Islam 73 punishment is a consequence of action and is related to what a person earns by his or her action.211 For Bazargan, just as ‘amal is not merely oriented towards the other world, so, too, reward is not confined to the other world. Virtuous actions improve and strengthen one’s personality, and have an impact on one’s individual and social life.212 The contradiction that we have already seen in the concept of good deeds reappears in Bazargan’s concept of divine reward, as he said, ‘Praying and fasting, which are self-oriented and do not involve serving other people, are necessary, but not sufficient for salvation and reward. Nobody achieves paradise by them. They are educational, teaching us to avoid cruelty and evil and to strive for virtue, reminding us of God, and directing us towards Him.’213 The difficulty is that Bazargan did not explain whether being directed towards God, on the one hand, and avoiding cruelty and striving for virtue, on the other, are the same, and which one is the signifier of the other. Regarding the concept of ‘awaiting’, Bazargan argued that the Shi’ite belief that Imam Mahdi will emerge to save the world is an advantage of the denomination, since it keeps alive the hope of a bright future for humanity, and entails making as much effort as possible, in order to expedite the arrival of the day of salvation.214 Through virtuous actions, believers should help others to open their eyes, and should prove the truth of their beliefs in practice.215 This is because Imam Mahdi will not rise up individually,216 and all believers should help expedite and realize his arrival. Bazargan defined praying as aspiring, which is related to our wishes and hopes. The latter are the only capital that human beings possess in order to achieve other things.217 With respect to hajj, by referring to Koranic verses that call on the ‘people of a book’218 to unite,219 he explored a new dimension, and regarded the Ka’ba220as the house of all people, irrespective of their colour, race and language, and as the house of global peace and security.

RELIGION, SOCIAL LIFE AND POLITICS Bazargan was one of the first modernist Islamic thinkers in Iran who stressed that there is no separation between religion and the worldly life. He pointed out that whatever is related to our worldly life is also a religious issue. Islam is not indifferent to worldly matters, as it has rules for eating, sleeping and even cutting one’s nails as well as for other minutiae of life. Hence, he maintained that feqh should be a thorough picture of various aspects of material and spiritual life.221

74 The Iran Freedom Movement He argued that when Muslims worked for both this world and the other, they dominated the world. However, alas, since the Ummayads and Abbasids222 separated these two worlds from each other, the situation had changed. God was moved from bazaar to mosque, and paradise, which once was considered to be under the shadow of fighters’ swords and under mothers’ feet, was sold for the price of performing formalities.223 According to Bazargan, the consequence of the separation of religion and the worldly life is that the truthful abstain from worldly, social and political issues, leaving them to the rascals. From his point of view, the decline of Islamic societies has mainly been the result of the fact that prominent religious leaders have not been concerned so much with action and the realities of life as with the appearance and words. They have concentrated on philosophy, literature and feqh and left political activities to the mean.224 Bazargan thought that the separation of religion and worldly issues has not only brought about the decline of Muslim societies in this world, but also distorted their religion. This is because a true understanding of Islamic teachings requires engagement with real life and long-term education and experience. Superficial following of moral instructions is not enough, and sanctimoniousness accompanied by ignorance leads to rigidity, hard-heartedness, selfishness and arrogance.225 From Bazargan’s point of view, Islam presents a comprehensive social system that has answers to all social problems. Nevertheless, the ‘ulama have mainly neglected those parts of the Koran and other Islamic texts that deal with social issues.226 With regard to the Shi’ite clergy, Bazargan believed that Since for centuries the Shi’a have been in a minority, and had no say in politics and khilafat, the authority of Shi’ite faith did not go beyond family and friends. So, the Shi’a were not concerned with governance and the management of Umma [that is, the Islamic society], but with the private sphere of life, and issues such as worship per se. The Shi’ite clergy considered social issues, like marriage, trade, adjudication and waqf [that is, endowment], to a minimum extent. However, even when the Shi’a became a majority in Iran [during the Safavids], the ‘ulama did not abandon their tradition of ignoring public issues. Hence, there is no part of feqh that deals with the governance of Umma, public properties and issues.227 From what has been said, it is clear that Bazargan did not believe in the separation of politics from religion. He arrived at this conclusion

A worldly Islam 75 by reference to the Koranic verse ‘ruling belongs to God’228 and Prophet Mohammad’s remark that ‘if obeying humans entails disobeying God, it is disallowed’.229 Bazargan argued that domination of politics over religion results in the destruction of religion, while domination of religion over politics reforms the latter.230 According to him, politics should be for God. However, he went on to say that, in many Koranic verses, ‘for God’ is tantamount to, or at least entails, ‘for people’, in the sense that politics should aim at people’s happiness and salvation. What is more important is that happiness in this world and salvation in the other are not regarded as separate issues in the Koran.231 Bazargan’s rejection of the separation of religion and politics was not merely a theological argument, but had also a pragmatic dimension. He argued that such a separation might be beneficial in European and Christian societies, but it is harmful in Muslim states where despotic and corrupt governments under foreign influence are dominant. In these countries, in order to safeguard the native identity and a sound lifestyle, and to neutralize the threat of self-alienation, politics should not be separated from religion.232 In this regard, Bazargan quoted Nehru’s saying that in the East, the revival of nationalism and fight against colonialism inevitably has a religious form.233 Bazargan also pointed out that the history of Iran has shown that any significant social or political movement has been inspired by religion.234 From Bazargan’s perspective, the involvement of religion in politics is not without qualification. First, religion and religious feelings should not be used as instruments for achieving even legitimate political purposes. Religious actions should not be performed but for God, and social or political purposes should only be derivatives of this aim.235 Here, once again, the tension between pragmatist and intrinsic approaches to religion reappears in Bazargan’s works. Second, religion should only have a supervisory role at a higher level. It only determines the fundamental principles and general purposes of the government, not the details of its functions.236 The means of achieving these purposes is not determined by divine revelation, but by reason on the basis of existing circumstances.237 Moreover, Bazargan thought that religion should not be involved in the process of the appointment of political authorities or in routine issues. Religious leaders should not be allowed to use their position to impose their views on political leaders.238 Bazargan, at least once and cautiously, implied that Muslims should be led by someone who is familiar with Islam. This is, however, compatible with his view that the role of

76 The Iran Freedom Movement religion is limited to the supervision of politics at a higher level. Interestingly, Bazargan expressed the above view in the context of the partition of India. When talking about the disputes between Muslims and Hindus, he argued, ‘. . . Muslims, too, were wrong, since they had chosen a person as unfamiliar with Islam as Mohammad ‘Ali Jinah, . . . and involved sectarianism into political and national agendas.’239 However, the question arises as to how much familiarity with Islam is necessary for a politician, from Bazargan’s point of view. Such a view in its extreme requires a theocracy, which apparently he rejected. Third, involving religion in politics should not undermine toleration. Although political parties and associations may choose their direction and principles on the basis of Islam, their activities should not be fanatical or be presented in the form of religious propaganda.240 Bazargan, later in his life, reassessed his position on the extent of the involvement of religion in politics. In his last article, he wrote that the prophets’ main mission has been to guide people with regard to issues that they cannot understand through their rational faculty. These issues are mainly about the Creator and end of life, about God and the next world. Politics, on the other hand, is an issue about which people can reason and find their own way. According to Bazargan, the prophets were not directly concerned with politics, although, in fulfilling their mission, they sometimes had to address political issues. Therefore, politics is not a domain where specific divine guidance should be sought.241 Bazargan believed that the prophets did not involve themselves in politics or establish a state in order to fulfil their mission of promoting faith and challenging atheism. Their mission in itself did not require political power, which might be used to supervise people’s moral and religious conducts.242 Although for most of his life Bazargan argued that religion should not be regarded as merely related to the afterlife and distinct from everyday life, he later remarked that We want to renounce all short-sighted ideologies whose purposes are limited to this world. A religion or God that is made for worldly desires and sufferings, or any account of the next world, heaven and divine reward that is to achieve worldly wishes, are no religion, God, heaven and next world. Such an account is another form of polytheism and perdition.243 In response to his critics who had detected a turn in his thought, Bazargan denied that he had revised his views.244 He argued that he

A worldly Islam 77 did not believe that Islam is silent about political and worldly issues, or that it is indifferent to the improvement of people’s lives in this world. He went on to say that although the prophets’ main mission was providing people with guidance about God and the other world, in fulfilling this mission, they addressed some other issues, such as politics, that happened to be relevant.245 Whether Bazargan revised his views or merely rearticulated them in more detail, it seems that the rationale for making such an attempt was the experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran, of which he was the first Prime Minister, but later became one of its critics. Bazargan’s last work indicates a move towards the autonomy of politics, but he did not live long enough to articulate this view. To sum up, for Bazargan, politics and religion should neither be separated nor be considered as one issue. There is a boundary between the two.246

EQUALITY, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY In his various discussions on social and political systems in Islam, Bazargan stressed concepts such as equality, and particularly freedom and democracy. He even sometimes argued that humanism is acceptable, if it is in line with a belief in God.247 Although he did not clarify what he meant by humanism, it appears that his concern was human dignity. He believed that religions emphasize human dignity, revitalize humans’ selfhood and call them superior creatures,248 while cautioning them not to take themselves as God and not to be selfish.249 Islam does not accept unconditional humanism, since, for Islam, man should follow God’s path and emulate His attributes.250 Bazargan maintained that, long before the French Revolution’s call for liberty, equality and fraternity, Islam denounced any privilege on the basis of colour, race, sex and status, and paid special attention to the predicaments of slaves, the subjugated and the excluded.251 He argued that justice means the prevention of tyranny, and the guarantee of equal and fair treatment for everybody, on the basis of divine universal law. It requires giving everybody what he or she is entitled to. The Koran requires justice, and Imam ‘Ali’s khilafat was a full realization of such justice.252 Nevertheless, Bazargan described communist equality, which negates individuality and requires uniformity, as the ‘equality of donkeys’, or equality in stupidity and ignorance. Such a form of equality provides a favourable climate for dictators.253 He remarked that mankind, in all their efforts and revolutions, have been looking for a just world. Social developments from feudalism to

78 The Iran Freedom Movement monarchies and parliamentarian governments and nationalist, democratic and socialist revolutions have all been attempts at decreasing oppression. However, none of these changes have brought about justice for humanity, and when one type of oppression is ended, another is started. Now, the only hope for humanity to end tyranny and war is to establish a sole global government, which is promised by Islam when Imam Mahdi emerges to rule over the world.254 In Bazargan’s view, only through a theistic Weltanschauung, love of God and a belief in the next world, can love and justice replace antagonism and exploitation, and full humane socialism be realized.255 What attracted Bazargan more than equality was freedom. The Iran Freedom Movement at its inauguration stated ‘To obey God entails refusing to worship any other entity; and glorifying God requires gaining freedom in order to achieve justice and to serve people.’256 Bazargan pointed out that although the word ‘freedom’ cannot be found in the Koran, its concept, dimensions and consequences are emphatically and clearly expressed in it. Moreover, the term freedom was frequently mentioned in the Prophet’s and Imams’ remarks.257 The statement ‘there is no god, but God’,258 which symbolizes Islam, conveys the point that humans are under no authority but God’s. Human freedom is confirmed in the Koranic verse that states that there is no compulsion in religion,259 and in another verse that calls on people to listen to various ideas and choose among them.260 Bazargan mentioned another verse, where God advised the Prophet, who was upset with the unwillingness of some nonbelievers to convert to Islam, to be calm, telling him that if He willed it, all people could become believers. God, then, asked the Prophet whether he wanted to force people to believe in Islam.261 Bazargan also referred to the manner of the Prophet and Imams in not compelling people to accept their authority, and not insisting on some of their views, if others had a different idea. Moreover, Bazargan argued that those Koranic verses in which the creation of Satan or man’s free will are mentioned prove that Islam recognizes freedom. According to the Koran, God created man, although He knew that humans would cause bloodshed on the earth; and He provided mankind with free will that enables them either to achieve ‘great salvation’ or to fall into ‘manifest deception’. As it can be seen in his discussion of freedom, Bazargan was mainly concerned with free will. This is the case with most religious thinkers, and particularly Christians since Saint Augustine. According to Bazargan, what distinguishes humans from other creatures is free will. Faith and salvation do not make sense, except because of free will. He pointed out that, as a matter of fact, it is God’s will that humans have

A worldly Islam 79 free will and willingly choose salvation.262 Freedom is a divine gift, entailed by creation and a requirement of man’s prosperity and eternal salvation.263 Bazargan maintained that although man can choose to obey or disobey God, and to have or not to have faith in true religions, it is not the case that these options are of equal worth. What God wants for humankind, and towards which the prophets had a mission to direct people, are faith and worship, when they are chosen willingly.264 It is not the case that, for God, believers and nonbelievers, sinners and innocents are equal.265 Finally, Bazargan summed up his interpretation of freedom in the Koran as follows: 1. In the relationship between God and man, full freedom is given to man, as stated in the verse ‘there is no compulsion in religion’,266 while he has been provided with the opportunity of salvation, and cautioned by God. 2. In the relationship between man and himself, there is no freedom, but responsibility, limitation and cautiousness. In the pursuit of their beliefs, love and will, humans may sacrifice their freedom, property and existence. 3. In the relationship between man and others, freedom is limited; inflicting harm and injury on others, on the basis of the principle of ‘La Zarara va la Zerar fi al-Islam’,267 is prohibited; and the need for social care and responsibility is stressed. 4. In the relationship between the state and man, democracy and public scrutiny of government actions are required; while the state should observe people’s rights and freedoms, people should comply with social contracts and rules and regulations.268 Bazargan regarded the reign of Prophet Mohammad and his four successors, particularly that of Imam ‘Ali, as the best example of democracy and freedom.269 Bazargan also emphasized that even after them, there had never been an inquisition in Islamic society, and the Sunni or Shi’ite clergy had not normally scrutinized people’s private acts and beliefs.270 He did not deny that there had been some cases of prejudice, narrow-mindedness and scrutiny of people’s private beliefs, such as the hanging of Manssour Hallaj271 and even the killing of Ahmad Kassravi,272 but he regarded them as remnants of pre-Islamic bigotry.273 He also asserted that the Islamic world had never witnessed the burning or banning of books, violence and censorship to the level experienced by Christian societies during the Middle Ages.274

80 The Iran Freedom Movement Bazargan argued that Islam supports diversity of views, which leads to the flourishing of talents. He regarded Islam as a humane and freedom-loving religion, and maintained that tolerance is one of causes of the vitality and dynamism of Islam.275 Hence, he denounced any type of dictatorship, whether religious or monarchical.276 With regard to the form of government in Islam, Bazargan argues that nowhere in the Koran and sunna, or Prophet Mohammad’s remarks and practice, are the form and features of Islamic government stated. Similarly, neither in Sunni nor in Shi’ite feqh, or jurisprudence, is there a rule in this regard, whereas extensive rules are provided about praying and fasting, or about laws of inheritance and trade. The reason for abstaining from expressing specific rules is that believers are allowed to decide these matters for themselves, on the basis of the varying circumstances of their own societies and eras. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Islam ignores the crucial issue of governance.277 In general, Bazargan argued that, from the Koran’s perspective, government belongs to people, in the sense that they should run the government, and elect office-holders.278 He did not see much difference between Islam and democracy.279 In support of his claim, he referred to several Koranic verses and hadith. For instance, Sura Ar-Ra’d, verse 11 states ‘God does not change the conditions of a people, unless they change their own conditions’, meaning that people are in charge of their own destiny. In Sura Al-i-‘Imran, verse 159, God calls on the Prophet to ‘consult them [that is, people] in the affairs [of moment]’. Sura Ash-Shura, verse 38, reads, ‘[The believers] conduct their affairs in consultation with each other.’ There is also a hadith from Prophet Mohammad that states ‘You all are as shepherds and hence responsible for your subjects.’ With regard to his appointment as the fourth khalifa, Imam ‘Ali said, ‘When ‘Othman280 was killed, following three days of consultation, people who had sworn allegiance to Abu-Bakr, ‘Omar281 and ‘Othman swore allegiance to me. The survivors of Badr282 and the elders of Muhajereen and Ansar283 were among those who swore allegiance to me. The difference was that the process of swearing allegiance to me was accompanied with public consultation, while the other three khalifa were appointed without such consultation.’ Bazargan argued that although Prophet Mohammad had the privilege of divine revelation, and all believers willingly obeyed him, he consulted people on social issues, and on many occasions, he followed the view expressed by the majority, rather than his own.284 That is why Bazargan described the early Islamic society, under the Prophet, as the best example of democracy. For him, the process of the

A worldly Islam 81 appointment of Imam ‘Ali as khalifa, when, despite his reluctance, the public and the elite asked him to accept the office, was the best example of free election.285 Bazargan stressed that political leaders should be elected by all Muslims, and not merely by an elite or the wise, in Islamic terms,286 because an Islamic government is not a type of moral or religious aristocracy. Nevertheless, he envisaged the possibility of a two-level election, whereby, in the first stage, candidates would be nominated by an elite group, such as the Muhajereen or Ansar. It can be said that this elite group is tacitly elected by the public, since they are trusted and regarded as the authority by the people. In the second stage, the public can freely choose one of the nominees.287 Generally speaking, Bazargan argued that although there is no explicit and specific rule about Islamic government in the Koran, it can be understood that such government is divine, free and elected. It is based on popular support and consultation, while being concerned with guiding people. It has the advantages of socialist and liberal democratic forms of government, while being different from them.288 Bazargan believed that the view expressed by some ‘ulama and religious writers, according to which democracy is inconsistent with Islam, is rooted in some misunderstandings. They think democracy entails decadence as seen in Western societies and oppressive actions as carried out by Western states. They assume that democracy means absolute individual freedom, and that in democracies even truth and falsehood are determined by the majority vote. However, in reality, voting is used only for settling issues such as the appointment of politicians, decisions on public expenditure, taxation, war or peace or conclusion of contracts with foreign countries. Moreover, public elections are carried out on the basis of the principles that are not themselves determined through public vote, but are the outcome of a revolution or grounded on settled beliefs, such as religious creed.289 Hence, Bazargan tried to reconcile unchangeable and universal principles of religion with changeable and varied circumstances, and with people’s wishes. Finally, it is necessary to see the limits of individual freedom and government authority from Bazargan’s point of view. He pointed out that, first, the Imam and the political leader of the Islamic society must be obeyed. When a person is recognized as the legitimate leader of the Islamic society, opposing individuals or groups are not allowed to disobey him or to cause disruption and disorder, though they can verbally protest against him. Second, in cases of fundamental difference between the leader and others, such differences should be referred to Islam. Third, if an elected government violates the

82 The Iran Freedom Movement principles of truth or justice, in the first place, it should be subjected to the principle of ‘promoting virtues and preventing vices’. This means that it should be verbally advised to take right actions and to avoid wrong courses of action. If obeying the government is incompatible with obeying God, the government must be disobeyed, and if, in this process, the government is engaged in brutality and large-scale corruption, rising up against it, as done by Imam Hossein, is authorized or even required.290

A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO RELIGION The most important feature of Bazargan’s thought is his utilization of empirical sciences, and particularly thermodynamics, which was his own specialism, in his approach to Islam. No other Iranian thinker has drawn upon new sciences in the study of Islam as widely as he did. It seems that sciences had two functions in Bazargan’s works: confirming the truth of Islam, and helping to understand and to interpret Islam.

Confirming the truth of Islam on the basis of sciences Bazargan made extensive efforts to prove the truth of certain Islamic beliefs by referring to empirical sciences. For this purpose, in his works, he usually first explained a scientific notion, and then found an Islamic teaching that reflects such a notion, and finally concluded that the relevant teaching is grounded on sciences. For instance, in the introduction to the book, Love and Worship, he said that the book consists of two parts. The first part, which is the main text, is about what he called the ‘thermodynamics of man’, and is an examination of love, the need for love, various types of love and the like, on the basis of thermodynamic concepts and formulae. Bazargan believed that all people, whether religious or not, who appreciate sciences could accept the views he expressed in this part. When, in the main discussion, certain scientific points were thought to correspond with some Koranic verses or Imams’ remarks, this was explained in the footnotes, which form the second part of the book.291 Bazargan maintained that the two parts of the book were independent of each other, and a rejection of one part did not amount to the denial of the other. However, his main intention was to prove that what he called the ‘thermodynamics of man’ corresponds with many religious beliefs, particularly the worship of God, or the infinite entity, as described by Islam.

A worldly Islam 83 Following a similar method, Bazargan elsewhere first compared the effects of two types of force in physics, namely expulsion and gravity, and went on to say: Forces of the type of expulsion, such as internal forces in liquids, gases and solids, are so strong that they can result in the explosion of the container. However, after the explosion, there is disintegration, and then everything comes to a halt. Only forces of the type of gravity that, from outside, pull human beings towards themselves, are good and enduring, particularly if the centre of the gravity is in infinity, so there is never any union, and consequently no ending. Those beliefs and doctrines that are based on the discontent with material conditions, and have materialistic or nationalist characteristics, or aim at dissolving despotic or colonial bondage, work like forces of the type of expulsion. Hence, they have temporary impacts, rather than providing human beings with ultimate solutions. Ideals should be beyond the reach of human beings in such a way that, while resolving existing difficulties, they create permanent solidarities and movements. ‘Self’ cannot be the source of such a force, but ‘God’ can.292 Such an account is congruent with Islamic views that call on humans to embark on a perpetual move towards God. In his book, The Infinite Particle, Bazargan argued that nature has provided human beings with less means to survive, and has left them on their own and more independent, compared with what is provided to solids, plants and animals, which are less independent. Humans’ needs are infinite; hence, humans are infinitesimal,293 or in mathematical terms, ␧, which equals 1/⬁. However, such an infinitesimal being has the capability of reaching the infinite (⬁). That is why Pascal saw mankind between two infinites, ␧ and ⬁. Now, if we examine the Koran and some other Islamic texts, we will find that a similar picture of human beings is portrayed.294 The Koran employs, however, its own terms, which are easily understood by all people, while conveying the concepts of ␧ and ⬁ effectively and clearly.295 A conviction shared by most religions is the idea of the Judgment Day and the next world, in the sense that one day the dead will be resurrected to life, and will be judged and rewarded or punished accordingly. Convincing people of the truth of this belief has been one of the most difficult tasks that theologians of all ages have faced. In the past two centuries, in which nonempirical beliefs have been undermined, the belief in the other world and Doomsday has, more than ever, been

84 The Iran Freedom Movement questioned. Bazargan, however, tried to prove that such a conviction can be justified by reference to new sciences. He began by examining the conditions for the possibility of resurrection, according to empirical sciences, and then compared these conditions with the signs given about resurrection in Islamic scriptures. He wrote: Thermodynamics might be able to say, though very vaguely, if there is going to be a resurrection and another world, how this may occur and what the other world may look like . . . . In this way, we may be able to examine to what extent the signs of the other world, as provided by the prophets, are plausible. If these signs about the resurrection, paradise and hell form a reasonable and sensibly related collection that new sciences, to some extent, affirm, then such beliefs are not baseless.296 Bazargan maintained that since, in Prophet Mohammad’s era, mankind had a very limited knowledge of nature, it cannot be said that he, on the basis of his own knowledge, provided us with the signs consistent with modern sciences. Therefore, the only plausible explanation is that these signs have been provided by the infinite source of knowledge, or the omniscient God. For Bazargan, the principle of mass–energy conservation denies the impossibility of the existence of the next world, and presents those who see death as the destiny of the world with the evidence of the feasibility of resurrection through evolution. He argued that although it cannot be said that the principle of mass–energy conservation and the law of evolution prove resurrection, as described by religions, it can be said that the law of evolution gives us some clues about resurrection, and the principle of mass–energy conservation rejects its impossibility. Hence, if we come back to life in the course of natural developments, it can be argued that in future circumstances, that is, in the next world, we will be more developed creatures.297 Bazargan pointed out that, given the discovery of life in microscopic objects, such as microbes, bacteria and viruses, the question arises as to why, if life can retreat to such invisible and safe corners, it cannot be imagined that it returns to the open after death.298 Moreover, the discovery of genes and chromosomes, which contain inherited parental and ancestral attributes of each individual, amounts to the affirmation of the permanence of personality and the revival of selfhood.299 With regard to the Islamic conviction that humans carry the results of their deeds in this world to the next world, where they will be subjected to divine judgment, Bazargan provided the following

A worldly Islam 85 explanation: good deeds are achieved by giving away one’s possessions, in the form of donation and self-sacrifice, through which mass turns into energy and energy into will. Such will, which is abstract and the purpose of creation, on the one hand, goes towards God, where it finds its home, is provided for and proliferates. On the other hand, and this is easier for us to understand, in our body, the will is combined with, or deposited in, our cells, perhaps in special cells. After our death, the will is conserved in its delicate, though strong, material shield, like plant seeds, and on the Day of Judgment, it resurrects and grows anew.300 Two issues mentioned in the Koran that attracted the attention of Bazargan, due to his field of expertise, that is, thermodynamics, were wind and rain. After examining the Koranic verses about wind and rain, he remarked that there is an interesting and precise correspondence between these verses and the findings of meteorology.301 Hence, he argued that this proves the truth of the Koran, and concludes that the same person who revealed the Koran to the Prophet orders the rain to fall and the wind to blow. This is because, before recent scientific findings, there was no writing by man where such an exact account of the phenomena of wind and rain could be found. Only a person who had full knowledge of such phenomena could talk about them in this way, somebody who was not constrained by his temporal or geographical circumstances, and who could observe the earth from above with accurate equipment.302 Bazargan argued that science explains the world on the basis of two concepts of mass and energy. However, these two factors cannot explain the beginning and end of the world, the coming into existence of life and humans and the coming of the prophets and their miracles. Hence, there must be a third element, which can be called ‘will’, which ultimately belongs to an infinite entity, or God, who is the Creator of Existence.303 Bazargan pointed out that there are some issues in various religions, including Islam, that might appear to be inconsistent with sciences, but they can be interpreted in such a way that inconsistencies are avoided. For instance, it is mentioned that the universe was created in a few days. However, in religious scriptures, a ‘day’ might mean a geological period. Also, religious scripts do not state that Adam and Eve were created all at once. On the contrary, the Koran mentions various stages of the evolution of man, and goes beyond natural scientists, stating that God first created man from clay.304 Bazargan argued that believers should not be worried, since unclear points and unknown issues in religion would gradually come out from behind the clouds of ignorance and prejudice, and shine.305

86 The Iran Freedom Movement Bazargan maintained that man has now found, through his own experience and thinking, the truth of most of what the prophets had said thousands of years ago. In his The Established Way, he referred to monotheism, religious practices and resurrection as three stages of the way towards which the prophets have directed human beings. He argued that man, with many difficulties and efforts, has reached the stage of accepting monotheism. With regard to religious practices, three types can be identified. First, some practices are beneficial to the practising individual, such as fasting, male circumcision, abstinence from alcoholic drink, and hygiene rules. Second, some practices are beneficial to others, such as charity, promotion of virtues and prevention of vices, benevolence to parents, reconciliation of differences between people, nondeception in business and morality. Third, some practices are performed purely for God. Man has now accepted the need for the first two types of religious practices, though not yet the last type. Towards the third stage, viz., the acceptance of resurrection and the next world, man has gone some way, and now recognizes that reward and punishment are necessary for certain actions. History has proven that man, through his own efforts, is going in the direction towards which the prophets guided him centuries ago.306 Bazargan went on to say that man today is much closer to the truth of religions than ever before. Ironically, those who, on the basis of science, deny religions are unwittingly going in the direction whose end is God and religion. They may even be closer to understanding the truth of religions than many superstitious religious people are.307 Nevertheless, Bazargan maintained that, just because, in the days of the prophets, the time was not ripe for their message to be understood by people, we should not assume that there was no point in the prophetic missions. On the contrary, over the centuries, religions have worked as beacons for humans in their journey through the treacherous desert of the world.308

Understanding and interpreting Islam by reference to sciences Bazargan believed that, with the progression of human knowledge, there would be a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of Islam. He maintained that: The Koran is not a book whose verses and words are yet fully understood. As knowledge advances, and our discoveries and needs expand, the Koran provides us with new responses. After

A worldly Islam 87 the Prophet’s death, so many Sunni and Shi’ite scholars have come, contemplated and researched, but now we can see how far from the truth and comprehensiveness of Islam they have been.309 Bazargan argued that, although God and religion do not change, the method through which we understand them depends on the knowledge of the day. Thus, such a method should be updated with the development of human knowledge.310 Human thought can never fully comprehend the Koran, but in the course of its development, Koranic verses become more lucid and understandable.311 One’s way of being a Muslim, or one’s understanding of Islam, is a combination of ‘Islam’, as it is, and one’s ‘humanity’, and since humans and their thoughts develop in the course of history, one’s way of being a Muslim changes too, though Islam is invariable. That is why one’s way of being a Muslim is subject to defect, deviation and development.312 Bazargan expressed his intention of utilizing modern scholarship in understanding religion as follows: I will try to examine old concepts, such as the soul, jini and resurrection, from a new perspective, in the hope that new windows will be opened for scholars and beleivers, and that some answers will be provided for our questions. Through science and reason, I try to shed some light on these issues. However, given that these concepts are mentioned in the Koran, and given my belief in the Prophet’s Household, I will try to conduct the study through Koranic verses and hadith, in order not to divert from Islam and not to innovate anything myself, while utilizing sciences.313 Now, let’s see how Bazargan applied his method of shedding the light of science on old issues. To begin with entities such as angels and jinn, whose existence is mentioned in Islamic scripts, he argued that the attributes or actions ascribed, in the Koran and hadith, to angels correspond, in some way, with forces of nature. Angels might be regarded as sources of energies. In his view, angels work as agents between the Creator and the created, as according to Islam, they bring down the rain, command the wind, boost holy warriors’ morale, bring tranquillity and God’s blessing, bring His message to the prophets, carry out His orders and take human lives.314 Referring to Sura Ar-Rahman, verse 15, and Sura Al-A’raf, verses 11 and 12, which state that jinn and Satan are made of fire, and that before disobeying God, Satan was an angel, Bazargan pointed out that ‘angels are made of energy, though jinn are apparently are made of a lower form of energy, which is heat’.315

88 The Iran Freedom Movement For Bazargan, thermodynamics, like any other form of knowledge, was another window to the mysteries of the Creation. Hence, he utilized it for understanding religion, and since the discipline was his own field of expertise, he referred to it more than to any other discipline. In the article, ‘The Youth’s Islam [Islam-e Javan]’, he discussed a thermodynamics formula, W ⫽ U ⫺ TS, and replaced W, or effective energy, with the human power of movement and production, U, or initial internal energy, with desire, need and love, T, or temperature, with the value of possessions, and S, or entropy, with the amount of possessions. Then he tried to apply this formula to some Islamic moral teachings, and concluded that Islam intends to increase the human power of movement and production.316 For instance, he argued that Islam emphasizes donation in various forms, such as zakat, khoms, fitriya,317 charity, alms, giving a party and the like. The impact of all these is the reduction of personal possessions (S) and creation of need (U), and consequently on the basis of the above formula, W, or the human power of movement and production increases. In this process, those who receive these donations get some possessions to work on, while some needs are created for the donor to come out of stagnation and have an incentive for work.318 It should, however, be mentioned that in the above account, Bazargan contradicts himself, because if the donor, by losing some of his possessions (S) and having more needs (U), according to the formula, will have more productive energy (W), the receiver, through getting some possessions and having some of his needs met, will have less productive energy, and this is not a desirable conclusion for Bazargan. Bazargan believed that sciences cleanse religion of superstitions.319 He talked about the need for a transformation in understanding religion in order to revive the notion of resurrection. He believed that resurrection should be understood by reference to the evidence from nature. He thought that Muslims’ current view of resurrection is different from what Islam provides. Bazargan said that one set of Islamic teachings that can be better understood in the light of sciences is the rules on cleanliness.320 According to him, there have been many discussions among the clergy about these rules, but these have mainly been discussions on the wording of the rules, rather than deep and rational debates. As a result, Islamic cleaning rules have had the opposite effect, and Muslims are not considered as clean people. Some Muslims have a difficult time in the obsessive implementation of these rules, while some others deny them as nonsense.321 Bazargan tried, on the one hand, to show that these rules are based on the laws of nature, and concluded that they are provided by somebody who is fully familiar

A worldly Islam 89 with such laws;322 on the other hand, he tried to arrive at some subrules of cleaning in Islam by reference to sciences. One of the issues that Bazargan addressed in the book, Cleaners in Islam, is the issue of ‘estehala’, or ‘transformation’ of things, which according to Islamic rules can turn an unclean item into a clean one. He argued that the word ‘estehala’ in the hadith corresponds to chemical transformation, and can be defined as such. However, the ‘ulama have not paid attention to the scientific definition of the word, and this has caused some difficulties. For instance, oils or some other things that are made of unclean substances, having gone through the process of chemical transformation, are clean. However, these things are taken as unclean by the ‘ulama, since the latter do not take into account the scientific definition of the word transformation. By giving this example, Bazargan sought to illustrate how modern empirical sciences can be employed for extracting rules from Islamic texts.

7

The methodology of working out the new approach

Having discussed Bazargan’s approach to Islam, it is important to examine on the basis of what criteria he criticized the traditional approach to Islam, reinterpreted some religious concepts and highlighted certain concepts at the expense of others. It should also be considered on what basis these criteria themselves are grounded. The discussion of methodology is important because it provides us with the key notions that formed Bazargan’s approach.

RETURN TO THE KORAN: ISLAM AS A COMPREHENSIVE RELIGION One of the main features of Bazargan’s approach to Islam is his extensive reference to the Koran, to a much greater extent than other reformists have done. In an article in which he expressed his view on religious education, he stressed that the best way of teaching Islam is by referring to, and understanding, the Koran.323 As we have already seen, Bazargan criticized the Shi’a for not paying sufficient attention to the Koran and for not going beyond reciting it.324 In this regard, he wrote The Koran introduces itself as a clear book, free from ambiguity, a book sent to be thought about by sensible people, and intended to persuade people to think and reason.325 However, we treat it as if it were prohibited to be understood. While in a sura, it is several times repeated that the Koran is made easy in order to be understood and remembered,326 we regard it as a difficult book, beyond people’s comprehension. So, the Koran is mainly used for bringing luck, or as the music for religious ceremonies and the like.327

Methodology 91 Elsewhere, referring to the verses that mention the Koran is made easy in order to be understood, Bazargan criticized a belief among some Shi’a that not ordinary people, but only Imams, should attempt to write commentaries on the Koran and clarify its meaning. He argued that the Koran is made easy not only for Imam Sadeq,328 but for everybody. He maintained that, nevertheless, just as we should not travel without a guide at night in the desert, so we need the help of the Prophet, Imams and scholars to understand the Koran.329 In general, it can be said that Bazargan in his works referred to hadith less than most other Shi’ite writers usually do. In response to the question of how to prevent the influence of nonIslamic views on Muslims, Bazargan said there is no way other than returning to the Koran, as the Prophet has said, ‘In ambiguities and disputes, which entangle you like a dark night, refer to the Koran.’ The Scripture can be preserved by itself.330 It can be concluded that Bazargan, like most other activist Muslim thinkers during the past two centuries, found a return to the Koran as the way of overcoming the theoretical and practical difficulties with which Muslim societies are faced. According to him, a return to the Koran means that we should try to extract our rules and the answers to our problems from the Scripture. Understanding the Koran with the help of Prophet Mohammad’s sunna, or his way of life, and that of his Household can provide us with the answers to our problems in this and the next world.331 The need to return to the Koran is based on the view that it is a comprehensive book, as every Muslim believes it is. Bazargan argued that since the Koran was revealed by the Creator, it does not need any complement and change; otherwise, its value would be in doubt. God preserves it eternally unchanged. However, it is the task of the believers to extract from the Holy Scripture the answers to new issues and needs.332 According to Bazargan, although monotheistic religions, including Islam, have come in a specific era and location, they are beyond the needs and thoughts of their contemporary people in that location, and their teachings, with the exception of some terms and proverbs, which are the requirements of expression, do not have the flavour of those specific nations and circumstances.333 He claimed that, for instance, in the Koran there is not much talk of the features of the way of life in the Arabian Peninsula, such as the desert, camels, date palms, oases, nomads’ tents and the like.334 After studying the timing of the revelation of Koranic verses and the actual events in Prophet Mohammad’s life, Bazargan concluded that it was not the case that upon the occurrence of an incident, there was

92 The Iran Freedom Movement a divine revelation about it, but that revelation was made on the basis of a preplanned agenda. For instance, the first war with the nonbelievers happened in Year 2 after the migration of the Prophet to Madina, while from the early years of the revelation of the Koran,335 there were verses about jihad, in order to prepare the Prophet and Muslims for it and for martyrdom. Also, after the first war, there were fewer verses about jihad. According to Bazargan, there was a pattern in the way verses about specific issues were revealed, in the sense that, first, the way was paved by certain verses, and then, during a specific period, a large number of verses were revealed. Hence, it can be said that the Prophet’s mission was fulfilled gradually and according to a plan.336 A corollary of the above discussion, to which Bazargan did not pay attention, is the abstraction of Koranic verses from their historical contexts. This might indicate that the Koran is beyond historical and geographical constraints, but it also undermines a method, used in ijtihad, according to which verses are analysed by reference to their historical context, in order to arrive at the rationale of Koranic rules and requirements. With regard to the Koranic statement that nobody can provide a book superior to the Koran, Bazargan had two comments. In his early works, referring to the eloquence of the Koran, he said that many people had denied the truth of Islam, but they had had no doubt that, in terms of eloquence, the Koran is superior to all other books.337 However, in his later works, he stressed that the superiority of the Koran is due to its comprehensiveness.338 Hence, he argued that to concentrate on merely one aspect of the Scripture, such as feqh, and to ignore its ethical, economic, social and scientific aspects, or to follow only one part of its instructions, amount to betraying the Koran.339 Comparing Islam and Christianity, Bazargan pointed out that the latter covers only a small part of its believers’ lives, and is no more than a set of demanding moral imperatives that, though cherished, cannot be fulfilled in practice. Christianity lacks a comprehensive system of rules and criteria for distinguishing wrong from right in various aspects of life.340 Islam, on the other hand, has rules and instructions for each human act, and provides Muslims with principles that should be complied with in all dimensions of life. Even when Islam does not have explicit instructions for some issues, Muslims can deduce the necessary instructions, on the basis of the provided principles and criteria.341 Regarding the comprehensiveness of Islam as its advantage, Bazargan maintained that if Muslims knowingly follow its rules, they will achieve happiness in this world and the next. However, he said, if

Methodology 93 they follow these rules superficially and ignorantly or for pretence and deception, as most of us do, superstitions become prevalent, and prevent the development of Muslim societies and the establishment of constructive relationships with the outside world. On the other hand, he pointed out that the incomprehensiveness of Christianity has not been without an advantage, since it has paved the way for freedom and progress of thought. Relying on their own intellectual capabilities, Christians have researched and arrived at conclusions and rules, which they have followed consciously, and have thereby enjoyed positive results that Muslims, despite their advanced religion, have not had. Nevertheless, Bazargan stressed that the rules and laws adopted by Christians not only do not take into account God’s will, but also entail particularities related to certain geographical locations, historical eras and national or personal tastes, which ultimately lead to disputes among people.342

UNDERSTANDING ISLAM IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT The corollary of Bazargan’s belief in the comprehensiveness of Islam is that Muslims, in order to understand their own religion, in principle, do not need other schools of thought or scientific and social theories. He himself remarked that we should not get some ideas or theories from other schools, and ascribe them to the Koran, using various interpretive techniques.343 He regarded synthesizing human ideas with pure and true divine beliefs as subscribing to polytheism,344 because the Koran does not accept impurity and nondivine ideals, even if they are worthwhile, such as science, justice and service to people.345 Bazargan argued that each religion or ideology has interlinked purposes, principles and rules. Hence, borrowing one idea from another ideology entails accepting some of its other ideas and assumptions, and results in creating a contradictory set of beliefs. He denounced those who try to do so as not having sufficient knowledge of Islam.346 Despite his denunciation of borrowing from other ideologies, Bazargan on many occasions maintained that Western thought and sciences, in general, have worked to the advantage of Islam, and added to our understanding of, and faith to, the religion.347 Hence, he advised Muslims to utilize these thoughts and sciences, and stressed that no society, particularly the Islamic Umma, can or should isolate itself from others and their thought and knowledge.348 He criticized

94 The Iran Freedom Movement Muslims for denouncing rather than welcoming the newly arrived Western culture, and for not utilizing the latter to complement and clarify their own culture.349 As we have already seen, Bazargan made a distinction between the early generations of European-educated Iranians, such as Taqi-Zadeh, who imitated Europeans, and his own contemporaries who followed principles recognized by Europeans.350 Bazargan believed that the translation and spread of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world between the late eighth and mid-ninth centuries351 had positive effects for Muslims, since it helped the spread of knowledge among them and the provision of a theoretical background for their theology. Nevertheless, in his view, Greek philosophy, due to its emphasis on abstract philosophical methods, distracted Muslims from nature and observation, which is the basis of new sciences, and was the root of some deviations in Muslims’ understanding of their religion. Having groups such as the People’s Mojahedin Organization352 in mind, Bazargan was keen to denounce the employment of what he called the principles, terms and arguments of second-rate Western schools of thought, such as Marxism, in understanding Islam.353 It is clear that there exists a contradiction, or at least an ambiguity, in Bazargan’s thought, to the effect that he sometimes objected to borrowing from other theories, whereas at other times and under another name, he found the utilization of other schools of thought to be necessary. The problem is that he did not provide a criterion to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate use of other schools of thoughts in Islamic thinking. Nevertheless, one point is clear: he opposed the superficial imitation of the West. In his introduction to the translation of André Siegfried’s L’Âme des Peuples, Bazargan argued that every European nation has found its own particular way of dealing with its problems, but some Iranians, despite many geographical, ethnic and historical differences between Iran and Europe, want to borrow European ways of reform, as if they were borrowing dressmaking patterns.354 For him, innovation is the foundation of independence, and imitation is allowed, only if what others have done is understood properly, and if there are some attempts at originality. More importantly, imitation is justified with regard to ‘principles and sciences, not human or social issues’.355 Although the latter sentence is very vague, it might mean that Bazargan made a distinction between two types of non-native thought: empirical sciences, and social and political theories. In his view, it is legitimate to use empirical sciences, but not social and political schools of thought, for purposes such as understanding Islam.

Methodology 95 UTILIZING EMPIRICAL SCIENCES As mentioned earlier, the most interesting feature of Bazargan’s approach is his method of utilizing empirical sciences in understanding and interpreting Islamic rules. Such a feature is particularly prevalent in his early works. Although he did not explicitly distinguish between empirical and nonempirical, or natural and human, sciences, his emphasis was mainly on empirical sciences and, specifically, thermodynamics and mathematics. Nevertheless, it appears that, given the limitations and difficulties of drawing upon these sciences for understanding Islam, Bazargan became much more cautious in implementing this method in his later works. According to Bazargan, the utilization of sciences in secular as well as religious activities is not only rational but also supported by the Koran.356 He argued that since, in our daily lives and ordinary activities, we accept the authority of sciences, it is untenable not to recognize their relevance in the domain of religion.357 In a discussion about divine revelation, he explained his method by saying that, unlike previous theologians, ‘I do not argue that due to the defects of human rationality and the need for him to be guided, God had to send some messengers, free of mistake and worldly desires, who can directly receive His commands! However, using the method of new sciences, I rely on observation and experience, and consider events as they occur.’358 In the book, Love and Worship, he tried to show that applying thermodynamics formulae and concepts to human and social issues is justified. He argued that humans are made of matter, not only according to materialists, but also according to God, who says that He created man from clay. Bazargan went on to say that because of the involvement of the elements of heat and movement in the human body, rules of thermodynamics, alongside those of physics and chemistry, apply to humans. Moreover, just as humans are made of matter, so society is made of humans; therefore, it should be possible for thermodynamics to explain various social actions, to some extent. However, Bazargan acknowledged that human society is different from a collection of objects, particularly gases, to which thermodynamics rules apply. In particular, the existence of thought and senses in humans might make them incomparable with objects. Also, human societies involve intentions, which may distort scientific analysis. Nevertheless, since objects do not have any intention or attitude, it is easy to search for the optimum conditions of their existence, which by analogy may simplify complex issues in human life.359 As

96 The Iran Freedom Movement we can see, Bazargan conceded that because of having thought, feelings and intentions, humans are different from objects, but he did not consider such differences as fundamental, and believed that applying thermodynamics formulae to human issues may merely simplify complicated matters. Later in the book, Love and Worship, Bazargan tried to apply thermodynamics formulae, with a slight alteration, to human issues. He wrote, ‘When dealing with human societies and humans with free will, thermodynamics law and formulae require a coefficient, which can be called a “balancing coefficient” and is less than 1 in unbalanced societies and more than 1 in societies governed by true religions and affections.’360 As can be seen, according to Bazargan, only by adding a ‘coefficient’ can thermodynamics formulae be used for analysing human and social issues and for understanding the impact of religion and affection on societies. In the above book, he wrote, ‘I will try to discuss morality from the points of view of thermodynamics and [scientific] natural law. Such a task is very difficult. Nevertheless, doing it is better than not doing it.’361

Limitation of utilizing empirical sciences Despite emphasizing the compatibility of science and religion and applying scientific formulae and conceptions in understanding and interpreting Islam, Bazargan acknowledged the limitations of such application. He argued that while religion and science are linked and need each other, they must preserve their autonomy. First, this is because the purpose of religions is not to teach sciences to people.362 For instance, it has not been the aim of the Koran to establish laws and principles of physics.363 Bazargan’s argument that Islam does not intend to teach empirical sciences to its followers, and that its references to scientific issues are exceptional and contingent on the context, logically restricts the application of sciences in understanding and interpreting Islam. Nevertheless, such an argument does not amount to denying that interpretation of religious texts would be better carried out with reference to scientific criteria. Second, Bazargan maintained that there are always anomalies to scientific theories, and sciences are developing. Therefore, science cannot be regarded as a reliable ground for understanding religion, and religion should not be restricted by the knowledge of the day.364 If empirical sciences are regarded unconditionally as instruments of understanding religion, due to their changing and evolving nature, religion must also change, whereas the thrust of religion is stability.

Methodology 97 Therefore, we should not tailor Islam to our knowledge, desires and actions, and make our conviction and faith contingent on our own small world.365 Nevertheless, the difference between the stable nature of religion and the changing nature of science does not mean that there cannot be any link between the two. The developments of sciences are mainly evolutionary, and new findings usually complement, rather than undermine, previous knowledge. According to Bazargan, scientific developments move towards clarifying ambiguous parts of religion and revealing the depth of religion.366 Hence, Bazargan did not regard science as the only and unconditional instrument for understanding or even establishing the truth of religion. He believed that we should not expect science to shed light on all aspects of religion, or religion to reveal all the secrets of science. This is because, although the principles and creeds of religions may partially be established through reason and observation, there are many issues in them that are out of reach of human understanding, such as the concept of Satan, the prophets’ miracles and the afterlife.367 When trying to establish the compatibility of Islamic requirements of cleaning with rules of hygiene, Bazargan maintained that we should not think that anybody could have discovered these requirements. According to him, even Europeans, who are well ahead of others in science, civilization and tidiness, have not yet realized the significance of many of these requirements, some of which are considered to be trivial by Muslims.368 Bazargan believed that though many religious beliefs, such as the resurrection of humans after death, the prophets’ miracles and the virgin birth of Jesus, have not yet been proven, their impossibility has also not been established.369 In Bazargan’s view, science should not be considered as a magic key. If it does not affirm a religious requirement, we should not abandon the religion or the requirement, but we should stay positive and openminded, observe the world, explore the mysteries of religion and be hopeful that scientific discoveries will finally establish the truth of religion.370 Given the shortcomings of human reason and sciences, Bazargan argued that it is necessary for humans to appeal to divine rules, and that sciences cannot replace divine revelation.371 According to him, human selfishness and short-sightedness affect man-made laws. Therefore, divine revelation should come to assist humans, because only the principles and injunctions issued by the highest source of knowledge can be impartial to all, and free of defect and harm.372 In his debate on Islamic economy, Bazargan pointed out that if we try to deduce Islam’s view through reasoning, we might arrive at

98 The Iran Freedom Movement contradictory conclusions; thus, the only reliable and valid view is that expressed through divine revelation or by the Prophet’s Household.373 With regard to the purpose of life, or as he put it ‘the secret of ages’, he maintained that only through divine revelation can we know this purpose . . . . We have no option, but to appeal to, and follow, the prophets, whose sincerity we cannot doubt. However, since they have advised us to reflect on their remarks, we assess these remarks with our knowledge in order to have a better understanding and better deeds, and to increase our faith and certitude.374 Although Bazargan acknowledged the limitations of empirical sciences in understanding and interpreting religion, his approach in utilizing sciences for such purposes was too simplistic and problematic. Nature and religion are two distinct domains and require different research methods. Although Bazargan applied the law of thermodynamics to religion, scientists do not apply the rules of one discipline to another, unless their applicability is established. Bazargan himself admitted that his extrapolations might not be justified. In the book, Love and Worship, he warned readers ‘not to expect undisputable mathematical conclusions in such half-scientific, half-literary discussion.’375 As well as making unjustifiable extrapolations, in applying thermodynamics formulae to the study of religion, Bazargan chose the equivalents of the variables very arbitrarily. For instance, as we have seen, in the formula W ⫽ U ⫺ TS, he considered possessions as the equivalent of S, or entropy, needs as the equivalent of U, or initial internal energy, etc. On the basis of this formula, he examined the impact of generosity on human life, and on the basis of the difference between two types of force in mechanics, namely expulsion and gravity, he argued that ideologies with infinite and out-of-reach ideals are preferable to those with material and worldly ideals. Perhaps, it was because of the looseness of such arguments that they featured much less in Bazargan’s later works. Such criticism, however, does not mean that the utilization of sciences, and particularly empirical sciences, for understanding religion is totally unjustified, so much as that such utilization should be well thoughtout. In the book, Cleaners in Islam, Bazargan proved that it is possible to employ empirical sciences in understanding and interpreting religion. Appropriate and justifiable utilization of sciences for these purposes can open a new era in Islamic theology.

Methodology 99

Reference to the Koran for utilizing sciences Bazargan justified employing sciences in understanding Islam primarily by reference to the Koran. He argued that, unlike other religions’ scriptures, the Koran calls on, or even requires, people to ponder on various issues of this and the next world and to reflect on its verses and injunctions.376 The Koran regards knowledgeable people as the witnesses of its truth,377 and stresses that the learned and the ignorant are not equal.378 Alongside many other verses with a similar message, Bazargan referred to the remarks of the Prophet and the Shi’ite Imams praising knowledge and learning, and calling on Muslims to learn various types of knowledge. Those Koranic verses that refer to nature, and call on humans to search their selfhoods and nature, particularly attracted Bazargan’s attention. He wrote, ‘Unlike the [abstract] method adopted by Islamic scholars in following Greek philosophy for more than a thousand years, the Koran itself, using simple language, frequently refers to nature. It refers to various natural phenomena, from the sky to the earth and inside it, from solid things and plants to animals and humans, in the Creation, in the individual and society, and in history.’379 Bazargan argued that it is a feature of the Koran that, ten centuries before Francis Bacon and René Descartes, it emphasized the method of observation and experience. The Koran always gives examples of natural phenomena, and calls on people to reflect on the movements of the sky and the earth and the sequence of day and night as signs of God.380 Alongside reference to the Koran, Bazargan gave another reason for employing sciences in understanding religion. He argued that, since the universe was created by God who revealed the Koran to Prophet Mohammad, there must not be any incompatibility between the universe and the Koran, and the knowledge of one should help us in understanding the other. Bazargan maintained that God speaks in two languages, namely, the language of nature, which is reflected in the laws of nature, and the language of revelation, which is reflected in the Koran and the Scriptures of other religions. The second language is imperative, whereas the first one is in the form of creation.381 Finally, Bazargan argued that man is entitled to ask prophets to give reasons and provide witnesses for their claims: It cannot be convincing for people, if the prophets merely say that, according to God, there will be resurrection and the other

100 The Iran Freedom Movement world. Mankind needs to see more signs in order to be sure about the truth of these messages, as Prophet Abraham did. According to the Koran, Abraham requested God to show him how He would resurrect the dead. God asked him whether he did not believe in resurrection. Abraham replied, ‘Yes, but I want to be certain from the bottom of my heart.’ Hence, God ordered him to dissect a bird and put various parts of its body in different places, and then ask the bird to come to him in order to see how this was possible.382

Philosophy As we have seen in the previous section, Bazargan was very suspicious of philosophy, and believed that the Koranic methodology is observation and experience. According to him, although Greek philosophy, for a while, facilitated the progress of knowledge in the world and among Muslims, later it turned into an impediment to intellectual advancement. He argued that philosophy is abstract reasoning grounded on axioms, definitions and assumptions that are not necessarily concrete and objective. Hence, unlike scientific views, philosophical opinions vary in different eras and among philosophers.383 Bazargan even criticized the practice of drawing upon philosophy in religious education, and scornfully wrote, ‘Our theologians insist on grounding intuitive and clear religious beliefs on a shaky and complex philosophical basis.’384

8

Formative factors in Bazargan’s approach to Islam

Analysing the social and intellectual factors that shaped the Iran Freedom Movement and particularly Bazargan’s approach to Islam, we come across issues similar to those already considered in the discussion of the Socialist Theists. This is, however, not surprising, because the Iran Freedom Movement was established less than two decades after the Society of Socialist Theists was founded. It is true that the latter was formed and was active in the relatively free circumstances of 1941–53, whereas the former was established in the post-1953 coup era, when a relatively suppressive atmosphere prevailed. However, the views of the founders of both groups were formed in the same era, that is, from the last years of Reza Shah’s reign to the 1953 coup. Moreover, the leaders of both groups, with minor differences to which I refer later, belonged to the same social group, that is, the highly educated and intellectual social class. Thus, it is expected that similar social circumstances and schools of thought influenced their views. Nevertheless, it can be seen that such similar factors had different impacts on the groups’ ways of thinking. In order to avoid repetition, in this chapter, what has already been mentioned with regard to the social circumstances and intellectual factors influencing the views of the Socialist Theists is not restated. However, the intention is to show how these circumstances and factors specifically influenced Bazargan’s thought, and what differences can be detected between the ways in which the founders of the Iran Freedom Movement and those of the Society of Socialist Theists were influenced by identical circumstances. As was done with the Socialist Theists, in this chapter, an attempt is made to look for the formative social and intellectual elements having an impact on Bazargan’s approach through analysing his own writings.

102 The Iran Freedom Movement SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Domestic tyranny and foreign influence For the Iran Freedom Movement, the fact that Iran, for most of its history, has experienced tyranny was the most significant issue. No other political factor was regarded to have had so much impact on Iranian society. Bazargan argued that even foreign interventions, and particularly Western influence, in Iran’s internal affairs, since the midnineteenth century, were a result of the domination of tyranny in Iran. He wrote Why does the Iran Freedom Movement, more than other groups and people, emphatically regard challenging tyranny as being more important than challenging colonialism and foreign domination? . . . The ancient as well as modern history of Iran have shown that European and American domination is a relatively new phenomenon, while for thousands of years, tyranny has cast its evil and bloody shadow on our cities, religion and government, and has spread throughout our lives and culture. Wherever colonialism has succeeded, it has had the cooperation of tyrants; and wherever it has been resisted, it has been due to patriotic movements and the existence of freedom. Tyranny and foreign domination are two enemies of freedom and national sovereignty. Where the latter are achieved, the former are defeated. In our past, whenever our country was occupied by foreigners or internal rivals defeated the ruling group, it was because the aggressors did not face any force but government troops, while the nation, because of lack of freedom or the absence of sovereignty of people, abstained from any involvement.385 From Bazargan’s point of view, since foreign intervention is merely a side effect of tyranny, the main objective of the national struggle in Iran should be the destruction of tyranny. Hence, the Iran Freedom Movement, in challenging the Shah’s regime, targeted tyranny and endeavoured to destroy it.386 Bazargan went so far as to stress that fighting colonialism is a misleading slogan inspired by the former Communist block.387 It was because of his account of the devastating impact of tyranny that Bazargan highlighted the concepts of freedom, public consultation [shovra] and the voluntary act of swearing allegiance to rulers [bei’at], in Islam, and from anywhere possible in Islamic texts and

Formative factors in Bazargan’s thought 103 history, he deduced the notion of democracy. He wrote From the point of view of the Koran and divine will, freedom is crucial for mankind. Tyranny destroys freedom, and is the obvious example of taghoot.388 In Scripture, taghoot, or idolatry, is against the divine rule, and entails oppression, darkness and wrongdoing. The Iran Freedom Movement has directed its efforts to eradicate tyranny under any name. Loving freedom and challenging tyranny are the two faces of a divine and patriotic coin.389 Bazargan believed that tyranny is rooted in society and reproduces itself. Hence, in tyrannical systems, alongside the king, all officials have absolute power over their own domains; and even schools and families are run in a tyrannical way.390 That is why Bazargan repeatedly referred to the Koranic verse ‘God does not alter the conditions of a nation, unless they change their own selves’,391 or the hadith attributed to Imam ‘Ali, stating that ‘your illness is from yourself and its remedy is also in yourself’.

Social and economic backwardness and corruption Bazargan, in his defence statements before the military court, in 1962, argued that one of the reasons that Iranian youth had become politicized was the spread of social and economic corruption in Iranian society. He maintained that it was common knowledge that society was imbued with corruption and discrimination. Individual success was dependent on nepotism and connections, rather than on merit. Companies won big contracts, not because of their expertise, capabilities and innovation, but because of their connection with high-ranking officials.392 He attributed Iran’s undesirable social and economic conditions, primarily, to political tyranny and, to be more specific, ‘lack of justice, freedom and a lawful government’.393 It is interesting that, unlike many of his contemporaries, Bazargan did not diagnose class division as a serious social problem in Iran. This was probably because of his class background and his belonging to a relatively wealthy merchant family. Hence, unlike the Socialist Theists, he did not make a serious attempt to work out egalitarian and anticapitalist conceptions in Islam. Bazargan believed that the answer to all these problems can be found in Islam, which as a comprehensive religion provides today’s civilized people with the only reliable set of solutions for their difficulties.394 He disagreed with those who, witnessing the superiority

104 The Iran Freedom Movement of the allegedly irreligious West over their own society in sciences, economy, power and even morality, argued that Islam was the cause of the backwardness of their society.395 Bazargan maintained that the roots of these social difficulties are to be found in the noncompliance with the rules and principles of Islam.396 His account of Islam was, however, different from the apolitical Islam that tyrants promoted and was merely dedicated to the other world. He advocated a version of Islam proactive in addressing social problems.

Fruitlessness of imitating Europe As said before, the superiority of the West in many aspects drew a group of influential people to renounce the native culture of Iran. This group mainly consisted of the nobility and courtiers, the upper class and those educated in Western-style institutions. For them, copying Western models was the only way of overcoming the problems of their society. The process of copying Western models, or shallow modernization, began before the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and intensified after the Revolution. Iran’s administration and military services, as well as governmental, judicial and educational systems, one after another, went through radical changes, and adopted European models. Bazargan wrote European-educated superficial modernists on the basis of their shallow knowledge, and irrespective of the complex nature of social issues, began the process of childish imitation of European methods and embarked on a flawed translation of Western laws, while each society should be regulated according to its own requirements.397 When Reza Shah came to power, the process of the Westernization of public institutions continued more vigorously. According to Bazargan, in this era, Iranian society was obsessed with modernization and reform. It was the fashion to follow European principles and methods. Many people believed that Iran’s social problems could be solved if Iranians educated themselves to higher levels of expertise, built factories and fashioned their lives and public affairs on European patterns.398 Reza Shah established a professional army, founded the first Western-style university and built Iran’s south–north railway, but no real and deep improvement occurred. The superficiality of these changes became evident when, with the Allied invasion in the summer of 1941, Reza Shah’s regime collapsed. In reaction to the unsuccessful imitation of the West, some intellectuals re-examined the

Formative factors in Bazargan’s thought 105 mechanical adoption of Western models. Bazargan had started such a re-examination long before. He remarked There were many people for whom civilization and modernism were no more than Western-style hats and ties or tall and nice buildings. They thought that justice can be achieved by building a multi-story building for the Judiciary and establishing formal arrangement for the courts, such as special hats and uniforms for judges. They assumed that it is sufficient to coin pure Persian terms [in order to purify the Persian language from Arabic, which was considered as a cause of backwardness], and to establish new organizations and laws, in order to recover overnight from a thousand-year-old backwardness. Many people, including me, were deeply worried about such a view, and wished to be able to change it.399 Bazargan expressed his disappointment that many Iranian intellectuals and activists still looked for guidance from outside Iran.400 He did not renounce the West in its entirety, but its shallow imitation by some Iranians. According to him, we should abandon the view that we do not need others’ findings and views, while at the same time, in adopting Western ideas, we should select only truth and principles which do not belong to a particular civilization, but to mankind. Modernism is desirable if it is in the form of ‘development and evolution, not imitation’. He believed that copying superficialities does not lead to development, but deepens backwardness. Hence, Bazargan concluded that Iranian society should revive the true Islam,401 as he conceived it. In his analysis of the liberation of India, from which he recommended all third world activists to learn, he maintained that the movement for the liberation of India began with a revolution against Westernization, when some people returned to native philosophical and spiritual sources of Indian culture, and particularly the religious sources of Veda.402

CONCERN ABOUT THREATS AGAINST ISLAM We have already seen that Islam and the Shi’ite clergy were accused of causing the backwardness of Iranian society. Bazargan and his friends exerted intellectual and later political efforts to counter such accusations. He said, ‘For me, the denial and hatred of religion, spirituality and morality on the ground of reformism and modernization was very

106 The Iran Freedom Movement painful.’403 Such a reaction can be attributed to three factors: first, Bazargan’s faith in Islam, which was mainly the result of his religious upbringing. The founders of the Iran Freedom Movement were all from families with a strong religious inclination. The other two factors were the failure of the Westernization process, as it is conceived by Bazargan, and the view that only the true Islam can provide solutions for various problems of Iranian society. The founders of the Iran Freedom Movement were concerned with the challenge posed by the Westernized elite to Islam. With regard to the activities of Ahmad Kassravi, they wrote ‘Ahmad Kassravi believed that the only way to save Iran was to purify Islam, but he was actually undermining Islam and the Shi’ite faith. He had many advocates among the educated people; and his Society of Freemen [Jam’iyat-e Bahmad-e Azadegan] was the meeting place for students, bureaucrats and army officers.’404 Moreover, the leaders of the Iran Freedom Movement saw a political dimension to the challenge to Islam. They stated ‘Colonialism and imperialism, in order to reinforce their domination over Iran through cultural means, tried to alienate the youth from Islam, and encouraged them to be irreligious, antireligious or morally unrestrained.’405 In response to such challenges to the religious faith, Bazargan and his friends tried to introduce the ‘true’ Islam to the educated as well as the public. They considered it as necessary to relocate Islam from the graveyards and decoration shelves into people’s real lives, and to treat the Koran as a book for learning from, rather than for praying and making an augury.406 The best and most effective way of defending Islam among the educated people was through utilizing new sciences, as Bazargan tried to do. Rhetorically he asked, ‘While Western sciences and civilization with their splendour and by posing various questions are threatening the morality and faith of our youth and educated people as well as the independence of Islamic countries, is there any way of defending Islam other than using a similar language and terminology?’407 Bazargan saw Marxism as the most serious threat to Islam. As mentioned earlier, after the occupation of Iran in the summer of 1941, Marxists became the most powerful intellectual and political force among Iranian youth and intellectuals. It was in reaction to Marxism that university students with Islamic tendencies formed Students’ Islamic Associations with the help of Bazargan and others. The purpose of the Islamic Association of Students at the University of Tehran was to hinder the increasing influence of the Marxist Toodeh Party at the University.408 Bazargan was very suspicious of the Marxists, and on many occasions clashed with them. When he was a lecturer at the Engineering

Formative factors in Bazargan’s thought 107 Faculty at Tehran University, and particularly when he was the Dean of the Faculty, the Marxists were very active. They organized many demonstrations and strikes, which consequently led to their confrontation with the management of the University and that of the faculty. Hence, Bazargan had many bad memories of the Marxists. The policy of the Toodeh Party during the years of the movement for the nationalization of the petroleum industry added to such suspicion.409 The Party at the beginning opposed the nationalist Prime Minister, Mossadeq, but later allied with him, an alliance that provided Mossadeq’s opponents with another excuse to justify his overthrow. Bazargan went as far as to call Marxism ‘the great Satan’.410 His account of the Marxist threat to Islam and his and his friends’ reaction to such a threat is as follows: The ideology of the Toodeh Party was not only against the government, but also against all our thought, convictions and traditions. This situation was not tolerable for some people, particularly [dedicated] Muslims, whose views were fundamentally different from communism with regard to the worldview and the beginning and end of life. This was despite the fact that there were some similarities between Islam and Marxism, such as supporting the oppressed and workers and advocating equality and justice. . . . It is not necessary to explain how the Toodeh Party influenced all aspects of our country between 1942 and 1955 . . . . Our family, religious, administrative and national institutions were under threat. Three ways of confronting such a destructive wave were conceivable: (1) by force, or militarily, which was pursued by government forces, particularly after the 1953 coup; (2) by political means, such as establishing political parties and spreading patriotic views, which was not followed [by anybody]; (3) by intellectual means and introducing a rival and superior way of thinking, which was what we chose to pursue. Our religious and patriotic duty required us to fight Marxism by our beliefs and reason, without being told or funded by anybody. The Iranian government and the Western anti-Soviet block did not take notice of our early insignificant actions. We pursued this objective, firstly, through serving [people] and, secondly, through publishing materials and giving lectures in the Islamic Association of Students after 1943, in response to communist and materialist views.411 Hence, Bazargan presented his approach to Islam as a progressive and politically and socially active school of thought that is democratic

108 The Iran Freedom Movement and compatible with new sciences, in response to the challenges to Islam posed by the Westernized elite and Marxists.

Weaknesses of the clergy and traditional approaches to Islam Anti-Islamic groups highlighted the weaknesses of the traditional approach to Islam in order to recruit educated people and the youth into their ranks. Many Islamists and some of the clergy acknowledged that such weaknesses did exist, that superstitions permeated the religion, that because of strict religious requirements hypocrisy was prevalent and that most of the clergy were indifferent to social and political problems. The undesirable record of some socially active clergy was even more discouraging, because they lacked the sincerity of the ordinary apolitical clergy and were mainly concerned with their personal interests. Bazargan wrote ‘An important factor in turning people away from Islam is their bitter memories of the actions and behaviour of some religious leaders, whom people consider to be hypocrites or impostors, or at least have been suspected of being so. As we know, ordinary people do not usually make a distinction between the religion as such and those who pretend to represent it.’412 Moreover, anti-Islamic groups tried hard to highlight and exaggerate such behaviour among the clergy. A weakness of the clergy was that their response to Western civilization was primarily to boycott it and forbid its products. The clergy’s resistance to the invasion of European civilization, however, did not prevent the new generations from being attracted to the West, in the long run. Bazargan said ‘Our clergy and religious people came up with only one solution for protecting our independence, pride and faith, and that was closing the gates of the society and turning our back on European civilization, thought, sciences and modernity.’413 He argued that the clergy’s lack of interest in intellectual activities had contributed to the youth’s drifting away from Islam. ‘The vulgar and fanatical clergy who present Islam in old fashioned forms, and prevent [the discussion of] scientific views and social issues are responsible for the fact that the youth are turning towards foreign schools of thought.’414 Bazargan pointed out that the ‘ulama could have welcomed new sciences and civilization, discovered their roots, distinguished between their truth and falsity and even furthered them, as the early Muslims did by translating knowledge from the four corners of the world and spreading and developing it. If the ‘ulama had done so, they would have helped the intellectual development of Muslim societies and the improvement of their economic and political conditions, and this, in

Formative factors in Bazargan’s thought 109 turn, could have prevented colonialism. In this way, the clergy could have preserved their position as the leaders of Muslims, and they, rather than Westerners and their internal allied groups, could have taken the initiative in spreading Western ideas. Therefore, they could have prevented the entrance of those rotten products of the West and the spread of corruption and depravity, Bazargan argued.415 It was with this account of the weaknesses of the traditional Islam and the clergy in mind that Bazargan introduced his approach to the religion, trying to refine Islam from superstition and to utilize the scientific products of Western civilization. In the book, Liberation of India, he scorned Indian statesmen for turning their backs on their religion. He was of the opinion that they should have seen the difficulty not in religion as such, but in superstitious beliefs and customs ascribed to religion. Bazargan argued that Indian leaders should have found the remedy in introducing right approaches to religion and in supporting open-minded religious leaders.416 It was for a similar purpose that the Islamic Association of Students was established, in order not to allow ‘a selfish and ignorant group to present a set of superstitions as Islam, and on the other hand, a lascivious group to draw people away from Islam by referring to these superstitions’.417

EMPIRICAL SCIENCES AND WESTERN SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT As we have seen, Bazargan was deeply influenced by empirical sciences, not least because of his education as an engineer in France in an era when it seemed that the key to all human problems could be found in the sciences. He tried to express whatever he found as true in scientific terms and in the form of formulae and diagrams. He intended to employ the scientific method of observation and experience in debates on economy, society, politics and even religion, and to take into consideration facts as they are.418 In this regard, he was influenced by scientists such as Blaise Pascal (1623–62), the famous French mathematician, physicist and religious philosopher.419 It seems that Bazargan’s disregard for philosophy was rooted in his obsession with sciences. Like the European positivists of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, he attacked Greek philosophy, which ‘denouncing senses, experience and observation, turned knowledge into rhetoric, and consequently blocked the way of progression’.420 Nevertheless, Bazargan criticized scientism for its disregard for emotions and spirituality, which has led to war and colonialism.421

110 The Iran Freedom Movement Bazargan was also influenced by Western liberal thought, again most probably because of his education in Europe in a period when liberalism was the dominant school of thought. In this regard, Bazargan himself pointed out that ‘We and some generations before us, who took part in the Constitutional Revolution, were influenced by the Renaissance, modernism, nationalism and liberalism in Europe.’422 He maintained that liberalism had been the reason for Britain’s power in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,423 and praised the liberal principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. It was probably because of such influence that Bazargan was keen to explore the similarities between freedom in Islam and in liberalism, and highlighted the equivalents of the principles expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Islamic texts.424 Nevertheless, he found a liberalism that disregards God as objectionable, leading to capitalism and imperialism.425 Although, as we have seen, Bazargan was deeply opposed to Marxism, it is possible to trace Marxist views in his book, The Concept of Work in Islam and Iran. In categorizing societies on the basis of ‘labour’, his discussion is similar to that of Marx. Such an influence, however, might not have been direct, but through Western thinkers inspired by Marx. Probably, not much more can be said about the impact of Marxism on Bazargan’s thought. Under the influence of these schools of thought and in the abovementioned social and political circumstances, Bazargan and his friends introduced their new approach to Islam. In this approach, there was an attempt to construe Islamic teachings and values in a way that was compatible with new sciences. Their intention was to present what they considered to be the true Islam to the educated and younger people, who were the target of antireligious groups. For the founders of the Iran Freedom Movement, the artificial separation of politics and religion needed to be ended, and while Islam should enter the public domain, such as the universities, politics should enter mosques. Presenting this approach, the Iran Freedom Movement expedited the process of politicizing Islam. As a consequence, the political struggle against the Shah was revitalized by religious motives and values.426

CONCLUSION It may be suggested that Bazargan’s intellectual life can be divided into three periods. His intellectual interests began with a concern for the

Formative factors in Bazargan’s thought 111 compatibility of Islamic teachings with new sciences. Despite his extensive efforts in this field, it is obvious that his belief in Islam was not contingent on proving such compatibility. Far from it, he was a faithful believer all his life, and empirical sciences for him were no more than another way of confirming the truth of what he already believed. Perhaps it can be said that he employed such sciences as instruments for proving the truth of Islam to others, rather than to himself. Later in this period, Bazargan showed an interest in social issues, such as the importance of ‘work’ and a type of pragmatism,427 but avoided involvement in politics. In public life, his attempt was to work as a committed technocrat, in his various middle-ranking governmental posts. The title of his book, Youths’ Playing with Politics [Bazi-e Javanan ba Siasat], written in the climax of the movement for the nationalization of the petroleum industry in 1952, symbolizes his attitude towards politics at this stage.428 In this period, he even discouraged students with a religious inclination from participating in politics. His works, then, took a political turn when he started to participate actively in politics as an opposition figure, after the 1953 coup. The titles of his works such as Revival and Ideology [Be’that va Ideology] (1956) or ‘Islam; Religion of Challenge and Productivity [Islam; Maktab-e Mobarez va Movalled]’, (1961) symbolize this stage of Bazargan’s thought. After 1953, the thrust of Bazargan’s thought was the politicization of Islam. However, he stopped short of introducing Islam as a radical political ideology, as the People’s Mojahedin Organization did later, or as a fundamentalist ideology, as the radical clergy did later.429 Later in his life, a new turn can be identified in Bazargan’s thought. At this stage, having seen the experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he expressed some reservations regarding the unity of politics and religion. His last work, ‘The Prophets’ Mission: The Other World and God [Akherat va Khoda: Barname-i Be’that-e Anbia]’, represents this third stage of the development of his thought. In this work, Bazargan considered the main mission of religions to be providing guidance with regard to the issues of God and the next world. He argued that political power is not necessary for such a mission, and politics per se is not considered in religion, but is addressed so far as it is relevant to the main thrust of the prophetic missions. This indicates a move towards the autonomy of politics in Bazargan’s thought. However, it is not certain that the logic of his worldview points to this direction. More importantly, this re-articulation ultimately undermines, rather than affirms the autonomy of politics by making it dependent on otherworldly issues.

Part III

The Society of the Devotees of Islam Jam’iyat-e Fada’iyan-e Islam, or the Society of the Devotees of Islam, a Shi’ite militant group, was established in 1945. Although having enormous political impact during the years of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry, it never gained popular backing, and up to the end remained a small group. It was not even welcomed within its natural base, that is, the religious schools and among the ‘ulama. Neither had it the intellectual articulation to attract the younger generation of Iranian society. Its activities were effectively ended in 1955, following the execution of its founder and leader, Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi. The foundation of Fada’iyan-e Islam was the first organized attempt to break away from the traditional quietism of the Shi’ite clergy in Iran. It opened the way for the next generation of radical clergy who finally succeeded in overthrowing the Shah’s regime and establishing an Islamic government. The legacy of Fada’iyan [the Devotees] can visibly be seen in today’s Iran, as there is a striking similarity between their views and those of the present-day hardliners, though the former were less articulated. This is not surprising, given that many younger members of Fada’iyan later joined Hey’at-hai-e Mo’talefe-i Islami, or the Coalition of Islamic Groups, which is considered to be the core hardline group in post-Revolutionary Iran. In this part, Fada’iyan-e Islam’s fundamentalist version of politicized Islam is analysed. For this purpose, first a short history of the group, which includes a brief biography of its charismatic leader, Navvab-e Safavi, and an account of the group’s main activities during the years of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry, is presented. Then, the group’s religious and political views are examined. Finally, the social and, in particular, political problems that

influenced the formation of these views are analysed. As in the other parts, the aim is to work out Fada’iyan’s views and the formative factors influencing their thought through their own words, published in their works or expressed by the survivors of the group in interviews conducted for this study.

9

History

NAVVAB-E SAFAVI Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi was born in 1924 in Khani-Abad, a poor area in the south of Tehran. His father, Seyyed Javad MirLovhi, was at first a Muslim clergyman who, when Reza Shah forced people, including the clergy, to wear Western-style clothes, had to abandon clerical costume and work as a lawyer. Because he challenged Ali-Akbar Davar, the then Minister of Justice, he spent three years in jail. Seyyed Mojtaba’s mother was a descendent of the Safavid dynasty, to which his surname, Navvab-e Safavi, referred. He lost his father in his youth, and was under the guardianship of his maternal uncle, who was also a lawyer. Consequently, Seyyed Mojtaba was brought up in a lower middle class family. Seyyed Mojtaba studied at the German Technical College in Tehran, while taking religious courses at a seminary. When the British and the Soviets occupied Iran during the Second World War, he was in his final year at the College. In that period, because of economic hardship and the occupation of their country, Iranians manifested their dissatisfaction in various ways, to which Navvab contributed by organizing a demonstration in the College. After graduation, he started working in the British-dominated petroleum industry in Abadan, in the southwest of Iran. There, when an Iranian worker was beaten up by his British employer, Navvab organized a strike and demonstration leading to confrontation with the police. Fearful of the consequences, he fled to Najaf in Iraq, the centre of Shi’ite religious education.430 In the holy city of Najaf, Navvab attended courses by Ayatollah Kashef al-Gheta and Ayatollah ‘Abdol-Hossein Amini.431 During this period, he came across a book written by Ahmad Kassravi, the Iranian historian who criticized Islam and Shi’ism, and promoted his idea of ‘the noble religion’ [Pak-Dini] after establishing the Society of

116 The Devotees of Islam Freemen [Bahmad-e Azadegan]. Scorning the Shi’a, Kassravi intended to revive the pre-Islamic customs of Iran. Angry, Navvab asked for the ‘ulama’s view on Kassravi, and was told that such a person deserved to be killed, according to Islamic law. Apparently, some of the ‘ulama even encouraged and financially supported Navvab in making such an attempt. After three and a half years in Najaf, Navvab returned to Iran. In order to get to know Kassravi and his views more closely, Navvab attended his meetings and tried to persuade him to abandon spreading his views. It was clear that their dialogue was not going anywhere, and when Kassravi asked his followers to prevent Navvab from attending their meetings in the spring of 1945, the latter made an unsuccessful attempt on Kassravi’s life. Navvab and his accomplice were arrested, but, under pressure from religious institutions, after a while released. Some time later, with the help of his friends, he founded the Society of the Devotees of Islam, or Jam’iyat-e Fada’iyan-e Islam.432

FOUNDATION OF FADA’IYAN-E ISLAM The establishment of Jam’iyat-e Fada’iyan-e Islam was announced in 1945 in a statement entitled ‘Religion and Revenge’, written by Navvab. In the statement, he said that Islam was under attack, and promised to ‘avenge’ such attacks.433 The first activities of Fada’iyan were against Kassravi, whom they considered as a foreign agent trying to set up another Bahai-style religion. In March 1946, Seyyed Hossein Imami and some other members of Fada’iyan killed Kassravi, while he was attending the court on a charge of challenging Islam. The assassins were arrested, but under the pressure of religious circles and following representations by the ‘ulama in Qom and Najaf, particularly Ayatollah Seyyed Abol-Qassem Kashani, they were acquitted and released.434 After this incident, Fada’iyan became more involved in politics and started cooperating with Ayatollah Kashani, who was the only prominent member of the Iranian clergy to believe in the unity of religion and politics. While resident in Iraq, Kashani challenged the British rule in the country and, hence, was sent into exile in Iran. During the Second World War, he spent 28 months in British jails in Kermanshah and Arak. He was elected as a Member of the Iranian Parliament, but exiled to Qazvin in 1946.435 Fada’iyan’s activities up to 1948 included protesting against Kashani’s exile by the government in 1946, launching a campaign against women without Islamic hijab being allowed

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into an important mosque in Tehran, that is, Masjid Shah in Tehran’s bazaar, making fiery speeches in the northern city of Sary, attacking shops for selling alcohol, converting a girls’ school in the city back to a religious seminary, protesting against ‘Abdol-Hossein Hajir, the then Prime Minister, and enrolling volunteers for fighting in Palestine. Meanwhile, Navvab several times visited tribal areas in the west and north-east of Iran.436 Although he probably made these trips for political and religious purposes, he did not achieve much. This was because Iranian tribes were mainly ruled by their own tribal leaders, and sometimes had relationships with foreign forces; hence, it was difficult, if not impossible, to mobilize them for Navvab’s purposes. During this period, he was arrested at least three times. In early 1949, Fada’iyan helped Kashani to establish his Majma’-e Mosalmanan-e Mojahid [the Association of Mojahid Muslims]. However, an attempt on the Shah’s life by an alleged member of the communist Toodeh Party led to a short-lived era of suppression of political parties and freedoms. Kashani was once again imprisoned. Fada’iyan protested against Kashani’s imprisonment and against a proposal for amending the Constitution in order to remove the provision according to which Islam was the only official religion of Iran, and to give more power to Shah. Later in 1949, and particularly when the Supplementary Bill for Exploiting Petroleum, which was believed to strengthen British domination over the Iranian petroleum industry, was put before the Parliament, opposition groups became more active in Iran. In a parliamentary election marred by irregularity and fraud, government candidates won. Among the activities of the opposition, the most important single action that led to the annulment of the Tehran election was the assassination of Hajir, the then Minister of the Court and the former Prime Minister, by Fada’iyan-e Islam. The assassin, Hossein Imami, was executed five days later. In the renewed election, Fada’iyan supported those candidates endorsed by Jebhe-i Melli, or the National Front, and Ayatollah Kashani. Nonetheless, they were unhappy that some of the candidates were not ‘100 per cent Islamic and did not seek to establish an Islamic government’. Interestingly, Kashani reminded Fada’iyan that the candidates’ focus should not be on performing night prayers,437 but on nationalizing the petroleum industry dominated by the British.438 This problem shows the nature of the differences between Fada’iyan and Kashani, which developed in the later stages. Whereas Fada’iyan’s members were religious devotees and did not care about the complexities of politics, Kashani, although a religious leader, was a shrewd politician.

118 The Devotees of Islam An event that led to the confrontation between Fada’iyan and the highest Shi’ite religious authorities, particularly the Grand Ayatollah Hossein Boroojerdi, was the objection of the former to the funeral of Reza Shah in Qom, after his body was returned home from his exile in South Africa. During this event, Fada’iyan’s supporters were beaten up in the famous religious school of Faiziya in Qom.439 Apparently, Fada’iyan decided to assassinate high-ranking government officials during the funeral, but changed their minds out of fear that a power vacuum could be to the benefit of foreign forces. In 1950, a government attempt to ratify the aforementioned Supplementary Bill, which was opposed by the National Front and public opinion, led to a political crisis. In order to overcome the crisis, the Shah appointed the army’s Chief of Staff, General ‘Ali RazmAra, as the Prime Minister. Although the Shah personally did not like Razm-Ara, the latter was supported by the United States. Also, the British thought that such a powerful person might be able to end the crisis to their advantage. Having the backing of London and Washington, Razm-Ara tried to gain Moscow’s support as well; hence, he arranged for some leaders of the Communist Toodeh Party to escape from jail. Nevertheless, the crisis was intensified when the opposition proposed a draft for the nationalization of the petroleum industry. In March 1951, Khalil Tahmasebi, a Fada’iyan’s member, assassinated Razm-Ara. The consequent environment of fear among the pro-government Members of Parliament,440 alongside the public support, led to the approval of the draft by the Parliament, and finally to the appointment of the nationalist Mohammad Mossaddeq as the Prime Minister. The assassination of Razm-Ara was supported by Kashani and approved by the National Front, which apparently promised Fada’iyan to implement Islamic rules if Mossaddeq came to power.441

DIFFERENCES WITH MOSSADDEQ AND KASHANI Although Fada’iyan supported Mossaddeq and were regarded as the National Front’s hitmen,442 the beginning of Mossaddeq’s government was also the beginning of Fada’iyan’s differences with him. In the early days of Mossaddeq’s government, Navvab was in jail because of his involvement in Razm-Ara’s assassination and the attacks on shops selling alcohol. What was more important was the different political stances of the two sides. Fada’iyan advocated a revolutionary struggle to topple the Shah, while neither Mossaddeq

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nor Kashani favoured this idea. Fada’iyan were eager to implement Islamic rules, but Kashani told them that the situation was not ripe for the realization of this wish.443 Mossaddeq, on the other hand, told them that his government would not last forever, so they could ask for Islamic rules in another government.444 Fada’iyan also opposed the presence of some ministers from previous governments in Mossaddeq’s administration and his policy of improving relations with the United States and allowing the Communist Toodeh Party to increase its activities during his second term of office.445 In Mossaddeq’s first term, Fada’iyan were twice attacked by the police: first, during a Fada’iyan demonstration and then during a sitin protest for the release of Navvab. Apparently, after these incidents, Fada’iyan plotted to assassinate Mossaddeq, but Navvab rejected the idea. Fearful of Fada’iyan, Mossaddeq did not leave the Parliament building for a while. Later, Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, a young member of Fada’iyan, made an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Hossein Fatemi, the Foreign Minister of Mossaddeq’s government. Fada’iyan, including Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, said that Navvab, who had been in jail at that time, had known of the attempt, while ‘Ezzatollah Sahabi, who was Navvab’s cell-mate in the last days of his life in 1956, argued that Navvab had not been informed of the attempt. Sahabi believed that some infiltrators had influenced Fada’iyan to plot the assassination of the Foreign Minister.446 Fada’iyan also criticized Ayatollah Kashani for his early support of Mossaddeq and what they considered as his moderate political stance. Nevertheless, during the clashes between the police and Fada’iyan, Kashani asked the government not to treat the group inhumanely, since the latter helped the nationalist government to come to power and supported the movement for the nationalization of the petroleum industry. Kashani believed that the government’s harsh behaviour towards Fada’iyan might reinforce their fanaticism, whereas the group should be supported.447 Thus, in Mossaddeq’s first term of office, Fada’iyan came into confrontation with both him and Kashani. In Mossaddeq’s second government, relations between Fada’iyan and the government improved. Navvab was released and his newspaper, Manshoor-e Baradari, or The Charter of Brotherhood, was published. There were some meetings between ‘Abdol-Hossein Vahedi, a Fada’iyan leader, and Hossein Fatemi, Mossaddeq’s Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, the main difference between them, that is, their contrasting views on the implementation of Islamic rules, remained.448 At the same time, as the relations between Mossaddeq and Kashani deteriorated and the relations between the Shah and

120 The Devotees of Islam Kashani improved, Fada’iyan distanced themselves from the latter.449 In the complexities of the political situation, Fada’iyan were sidelined and preferred not to support any side. After his release from jail, Navvab announced that since the dispute between Mossaddeq and the Shah was over power, rather than over Islamic rules, he would keep silent until the situation was clarified.450 Later, some of the supporters of Ayatollah Kashani were expelled from, or left, the group.451 ‘Abdol-Hossein Vahedi, Fada’iyan’s number two, left the group for unknown reasons, but rejoined after two months.452 In April 1953, Navvab travelled to Jerusalem in order to participate in an Islamic conference attended by representatives of Muslims worldwide. Then, he travelled to Iraq and Egypt, on the invitation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. There, he unsuccessfully tried to reconcile the Muslim Brotherhood with revolutionary army officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who had recently seized power in Egypt.453 When the August 1953 coup occurred, Navvab was in Iraq, and apparently in an interview expressed his satisfaction at the fall of Mossaddeq. However, it has been said that during the coup, ‘AbolHossein Vahedi informed Mossaddeq that his group was ready to support the latter’s government.454 On returning to Iran and seeing the situation for himself, Navvab decided not to work with the new administration and rejected a government invitation to cooperation. Nevertheless, Fada’iyan’s first public announcement after the coup did not contain any significant criticism of the new government. Navvab even decided to run for Parliament, although he soon changed his mind.455 Later, Fada’iyan protested against the new petroleum contracts signed by Fazlollah Zahedi’s coup government. It has been said that they were in contact with the National Resistance Movement, consisting of all groups opposing the coup, including the National Front, and even plotted to assassinate Zahedi.456 Nevertheless, they publicly continued their activities until 1955, without any obstruction from the coup government. During the negotiations for signing the Baghdad Pact, which was a part of the chain of US-initiated security and military pacts surrounding the Soviet bloc, Fada’iyan objected to the Pact. In November 1955, Mozaffar-‘Ali Zolqadr, a member of Fada’iyan, during a memorial service for Kashani’s son, attempted to assassinate the then Prime Minister, Hossein ‘Ala, but succeeded only in wounding him. This was a turning point for the government’s policy towards Fada’iyan. Navvab, Khalil Tahmasebi, Mohammad Vahedi and Mozaffar-‘Ali Zolqadr were arrested, and later executed, in

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January 1956. Many others were arrested and received long jail sentences. ‘Abdol-Hossein Vahedi was killed during interrogations. Thus, the life of Jam’iyat-e Fada’iyan-e Islam, which had been established primarily on Navvab’s charisma, came to an end. After the protests of 1963 led by Ayatollah Khomeini, some survivors of Fada’iyan joined Hey’at-hai-e Mo’talefe-i Islami, or the Coalition of Islamic Groups. With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the remnants of Fada’iyan tried to regroup, but they failed. Nevertheless, most of them cooperated with the Islamic government in various positions.

10 A militant approach to Islam

Fada’iyan’s members were mostly men of action rather than thought. So although their activities had a significant impact on the developments leading to the coming to power of the nationalist government of Mossaddeq and the nationalization of the petroleum industry, they did not write much about their views. Other than various public announcements and short essays in their newspapers, the only first-hand source about their views is Ettela’iy’i az Barname-i Enqelabi-e Fada’iyan-e Islam (Rahnamai-e Haqa’eq) [An Announcement of the Revolutionary Programme of Fada’iyan-e Islam], a short book written by Navvab-e Safavi. In the book, Navvab called on Muslims ‘to rethink about their religion and their surrounding world in order to salvage their thought from the valley of ignorance, . . . and to try to uncover the shining truth of Islam which is covered by sinister clouds of politics’.457 These statements show that Navvab found some common views of his contemporary co-religionists about Islam objectionable, and hence called on them to ‘rethink’ about their religion. Nevertheless, compared to those of the Socialist Theists and the Iran Freedom Movement, Fada’iyan’s reformist views were much more limited, and the latter group was much more committed to the traditionalist approach to Islam. Fada’iyan regarded the existing understanding of Islam as being mixed with superstitions. Navvab-e Safavi wrote ‘For many years, the shining truth of Islam has been covered by political deceptions . . . . And not only ordinary Muslims but also some Islamic scholars are ignorant of it.’458 Fada’iyan were critical of the use of Islam as an excuse for complacency and inaction towards political and social vices, whereby the masses were pacified by the idea that it is the duty of the promised Imam Mahdi to come to change human life for the better and for ever. Islam was also abused by some clergy and businessmen [bazaari] for their own benefits.459 Hence, for purifying Islam, Navvab, for instance, called on religious authorities to monitor

A militant approach to Islam 123 religious ceremonies, and, in particular, those for the mourning of the Imam Hossein. Apparently, Navvab’s intention was to prevent the expression of exaggerated views about Prophet Mohammad’s Household, to whom some Shi’a attribute superhuman features.460

CRITICIZING MUSLIM CLERGY FOR THE SEPARATION OF RELIGION AND POLITICS Fada’iyan-e Islam thought that the Shi’ite culture is owed to the endeavour of the ‘ulama, and that the latter has the ability to implement Islamic rules and to realize Islamic ideals.461 Hence, the clergy took priority in their agenda. Nevertheless, Fada’iyan regarded the ‘ulama as the main group responsible for permeating superstitions in Islam. Navvab accused them of helping the oppressors, implementing the plots of the enemies of Islam, distorting Islamic rules, bringing illegitimate innovations into Islam,462 and damaging Islam.463 Fada’iyan’s main criticism of the ‘ulama concerned the latter’s abstention from politics, and their other criticisms were rooted in this problem.464 They believed that this problem was the cause of indifference towards social issues and, particularly, the tyranny of governments. Navvab wanted to replace the frozen and inactive environment of the religious seminaries in Qom with activity and militancy.465 Attacking the complacency and worldliness of the clergy, Navvab recommended that the religious authorities purify their ranks of those clergy who did not deserve their status due to lack of religious knowledge or morality. According to him, it was because of these people that the Shi’ite clergy, as a whole, was targeted by ill-intentioned people. He also suggested that local clergy and their preaching be monitored closely in order to prevent the spread of poisonous opinions under the name of religion. Moreover, Navvab proposed that there should be strict regulations for the ordination of the clergy.466 He called for reforms in teaching and learning methods and the classification of courses in religious schools, which at that time suffered from lack of discipline and regulation. He also advocated that subjects such as the history of Islam and interpretation of the Koran be added to clerical education programmes. In those days, such topics were not commonly taught at the seminaries, where feqh was the popular subject. More importantly, Navvab called for the reform of the clergy’s means of living, in order to enable the seminaries to be self-sufficient, and to be financially independent of lay people.467 Nevertheless, his views did not go beyond general ideas.

124 The Devotees of Islam ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC ECONOMY Fada’iyan believed that Islam is not confined to private issues such as prayer, hajj and religious taxes, but is supposed to rule over all aspects of Muslims’ lives. They argued that the Islamic instruction of ‘promoting virtues and preventing vices’ as well as Islamic judicial rules, such as hodood and diyat,468 require political power. Hence, the separation of politics and religion was regarded as absurd. They maintained that if Islamic rules are to be implemented, there must be a government to enforce them.469 In theory, the ‘ulama did not oppose such a view, but found its realization impossible, in practice. They believed that the realization of such an ideal must be postponed until the awaited Imam Mahdi comes to purify the earth from injustice and to establish the true Islamic state. Rejecting this argument, Fada’iyan raised the question, if the realization of Islamic rules must be postponed until the reign of Imam Mahdi, what was the point of revealing them to Muslims before that time? Thus, the fact that Islamic rules were given to Muslims through Prophet Mohammad and Imams means that they should be implemented by an Islamic government.470 In order to support their views, Fada’iyan drew upon the history of Islam and the political and social endeavours of Prophet Mohammad’s disciples as well as Shi’ite Imams.471 Although Fada’iyan’s leaders had much to say about the need for an Islamic government, they never delineated their blueprint for such a government. Navvab only mentioned the role of the ‘ulama in adjudication, though he argued that the executive power must be ready to follow their instructions.472 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii argued that, according to Fada’iyan, the clergy and religious authorities must give directions to the government.473 Seyyed Mohammad ‘Ali Lavasani, another survivor of Fada’iyan-e Islam, reported that Navvab believed that a leading faqih should head the government,474 as was later delineated in Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of Islamic government. Although, given Fada’iyan’s approach to Islam, attributing this view to them is plausible, Navvab himself did not express such a view explicitly. The reason might be that Fada’iyan never attracted the attention of any contemporary grand ayatollah who might have been regarded as such a leading faqih. Also, since Fada’iyan’s members did not have high levels of clerical education, they probably lacked theoretical tools for articulating their views of the Islamic government, even in the language of feqh. A significant feature of Fada’iyan’s political thought was their reluctance to refer to public participation. They argued that the votes and views of the majority of people, who do not have proper Islamic

A militant approach to Islam 125 education, are irrelevant. In their view, ‘The public that for centuries has been under the influence of the colonial culture cannot distinguish good from bad. Hence, people should be directed towards the true path through the establishment of an Islamic government and implementation of Islamic rules.’475 Fada’iyan believed that the masses follow power rather than reason; thus, wise people should not be much concerned with what the masses say.476 Navvab argued that there must be a free parliamentary election in order to elect Islamic, Shi’ite, pure and competent representatives. According to him, non-Islamic, impure and antireligious people have no right to be elected.477 Fada’iyan believed that the right of legislation belongs exclusively to God, and any law that is against Islam or wisdom is void. In their view, Parliament was not a legislative body, but a consultative body for finding ways of dealing with problems on the basis of Islamic principles. They believed that such a process must be conducted under the supervision of the clergy and the leading ‘ulama in order to prevent any deviation from Islam.478 In Fada’iyan’s view, whereas the judiciary is the exclusive domain of the clergy, there is a role for the public in the executive and legislative powers.479 It should, perhaps, be concluded that not only did Fada’iyan not have a clear view of the Islamic government and its structure, but also they could not combine Islamic principles and public participation in a coherent approach. Believing that Islam responds to all human needs, Fada’iyan argued that only Islamic economic principles can meet humans’ economic needs and bring about welfare and happiness.480 Although their comments on Islamic economics were very brief, it seems that they had a good understanding of both communist and capitalist economic systems. For instance, they argued that the Soviet economy was based on state capitalism, leading to lack of individual freedom. In such a system, according to them, human economic activities were similar to the work of hard labour prisoners. On the other hand, they saw capitalism’s unlimited freedom as leading to the creation of a class society and harming the population at large.481 They argued that an Islamic economy is fundamentally different from capitalist and communist economies. Fada’iyan believed that, under Islamic economic rules, people are free to exploit their talents and labour, but as soon as their wealth reaches a certain level, it will be reduced, through Islamic taxes, such as khoms and zakat.482 They argued that Islam provides all the means necessary for public and individual prosperity, while preventing the exploitation of others and destitution.483 They stressed the need to combat poverty and polarization of society, and thought that their

126 The Devotees of Islam goals could be achieved by following Islamic rules, such as prohibition of speculation and usury.484 In their view, the existing poverty in the society was a consequence of breaching Islamic economic rules.485 With regard to more practical issues, Navvab, denouncing the wealthy, even advocated the confiscation of uncultivated lands, which he believed were illegitimately owned by large landowners.486 Fada’iyan were among the persistent supporters of the nationalization of the oil industry, which was under the British control. They also advocated the boycott of foreign goods.487 From Fada’iyan’s writings it can be deduced that, unlike many traditionalists, they did not have any objection to the use of new sciences and technologies, and even considered them to be necessary, particularly for the promotion of the religion. For instance, contrary to their contemporary clergy, they regarded the film industry as acceptable and outlined plans to utilize it in what they saw as an appropriate way.488 Unlike the contemporary clergy, they also used the press to promote their views. Navvab regarded primary education for all people as necessary, and recommended the development of new teaching methods. He was in favour of what he called ‘appropriate cultural relationships’ with the outside world.489 Nevertheless, Fada’iyan rarely mentioned the Western source of new sciences and technologies, or when they mentioned such a source, they emphasized that the West had adopted its knowledge from Muslims.490 More importantly, they rejected any imitation of the Western way of life, culture and morality. Arguing that all Muslim denominations share 90 per cent of their beliefs, Navvab was adamant that Muslims should be unified in enforcing Islamic rules and resisting their enemies.491 However, he merely advocated unity among Muslims at the political level. In his view, any attempt at unity of Islamic denominations should not aim at the eradication of denominational diversity, because this can lead to more disputes within the Islamic world. Hence, he was not very happy with the idea of ‘Bringing Islamic Denominations Together’.492 This shows that Navvab had a good understanding of the nature of the centuries-long sectarian disputes in Muslim societies. He proposed an entity consisting of representatives of Muslim governments as well as Muslim nations in order to resolve disputes among them, to help their industrial and military development and to implement common rules of all denominations.493 During his trip to Egypt, he recommended pursuing Islamic unity and abandoning pan-Arabism. He thought that unity on the basis of nationalism would not only be short-lived, but also was a part of the enemy’s plot against Muslims.494

11 Social and political factors influencing Fada’iyan’s thought

Having seen Fada’iyan’s political activities and thought, it is important to examine what social and political factors shaped their ideas. The Society of the Devotees of Islam, the Society of Socialist Theists and the Iran Freedom Movement were formed in, more or less, the same period of time. Hence, it is expected to see similar factors influencing their political and religious approaches, whereas their responses to these factors were different. An important consideration that probably caused such differences was the social background of the leaders of each group. Whereas the founders of the Iran Freedom Movement were from wealthy or middle class families and those of the Socialist Theists had middle class backgrounds, members of Fada’iyan-e Islam mainly belonged to the lower class of Iranian society. Navvab himself, due to poverty, was under his uncle’s guardianship, from his youth. Tahmasebi was an unskilled carpenter. Imami was a bazaar worker. The Vahedi brothers were from a clergy family. All came from the poverty-stricken masses.495 Another difference between Fada’iyan and the other two groups was the educational backgrounds of their members. Whereas the members and leaders of the Iran Freedom Movement and the Socialist Theists were educated in the West or in Western-style institutions, Fada’iyan’s leaders were educated at religious schools, and their lower ranks were not highly educated.

DECLINE OF ISLAMIC SOCIETIES Fada’iyan were very much concerned with the decline of Islamic societies in recent centuries, which was seen in the form of military defeats, colonialism and lack of political self-determination, as well as economic, scientific and technological backwardness. Muslim societies were experiencing deep crises, were getting weaker and had

128 The Devotees of Islam become peripheral societies. This situation was an important formative factor in Fada’iyan’s thought. Unlike the other two groups, Fada’iyan were more concerned with the Islamic world at large than with Iranian society. They were pan-Islamists, but the Islamic world was torn apart and in deep decline. They construed this situation as the result of disputes among Muslims and their increasing distance from the true Islam, which they considered to be a political religion in the first place. They saw forces at work within Muslim societies, spreading the poison of corruption, immorality, ignorance and antagonism towards religion.496 In their view, a return to the true Islam and unity among Muslims could solve these problems. The domination of Westerners over Muslim societies was particularly painful for Fada’iyan. They believed that ‘after Muslims’ success in the Crusades, Jewish and Christian Freemasonry plotted to deprive Muslims of their superiority’.497 British and Russian influence in Iran during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the occupation of Iran during the Second World War by the Allies and their interference in Iranian politics brought about a deep sense of hatred against the West among Fada’iyan. That was why they were unhappy with Mossaddeq’s occasional rapprochements with the United States and the former Soviet Union. They tried to assassinate Hossein ‘Ala, the then Prime Minister, in order to prevent Iran from joining a USbrokered military pact. Their demand for the return of Bahrain from the British Empire and the Caucasus from the Soviet Union498 to Iran should also be construed within this context, rather than as a nationalistic agenda. They wanted a version of Islam that did not require complacency and indifference towards foreign domination, but ordered militancy and resistance. Fada’iyan’s other concerns was social and moral decadence. Describing their society, they wrote Lust and indulgence in desires, which are the products of the colonial and non-Islamic culture, have poisoned the environment. Meanness and moral decline, which are the result of forgetting Islamic ethics, can be seen everywhere . . . . At our schools and universities, corruption, antagonism to the religion and promiscuity are taught . . . . Our politicians are the sources of cruelty, lust and selfishness . . . . The wealthy build their palaces on the bloods of orphans and widows. The state and statesmen are ordered by their colonial masters to make people ignorant of Islam; and the majority of people are left to live in destitution. These two factors are the causes of theft, murder and many other crimes in society.499

Influencing social and political factors 129 To this list of social problems, Fada’iyan added bureaucratic corruption and bribery, the prevalence of crimes in society, starvation of people and lack of professionals, such as doctors. However, what was more painful for the group was that ‘society is begging everything it needs, even needles and buttons, from the West’.500 Fada’iyan regarded the government, which prevented the realization of Islamic instructions, as the main cause of corruption. They condemned tyrannical states, not for violating freedoms, but for not implementing Islamic rules. In their view, as no being can breach laws governing its existence, a violation of Islamic rules, which constitute the laws governing human life, leads to corruption and destruction. Fada’iyan’s believed that the only solution to this predicament is a return to Islam and realization of its rules, which can turn Iran into ‘a paradise on the earth’.501

RELIGION UNDER THREAT As mentioned in the other parts of this work, since the early twentieth century and particularly during Reza Shah’s era, religious institutions in Iran came under heavy attack from the government. The Shi’ite clergy lost much of their power, particularly in the education and legal systems of the country. On the other hand, those intellectuals who were influenced by the West, in particular Kassravi, were criticizing the theoretical foundations of Islam, while Marxists were doing the same on another front. Fada’iyan-e Islam, due to their religious education and family background, considered it to be their duty to remove these threats. They regarded the threat from the government and its intellectuals as more serious than the danger posed by the Marxists. Hence, they assassinated Kassravi, and challenged the government up to the end. During his interrogation following his final arrest, Navvab said For a long time, I had noticed that Islam’s instructions are not implemented, and since it is a Koranic command that every Muslim is obliged to defend Islam, I decided to eliminate those at the top of the government who inhibit the implementation of Islamic rules. The reason for establishing Fada’iyan-e Islam, which I personally founded, was to implement these rules.502 Navvab saw the influence of the Western culture as an aspect of foreign invasion of Islamic countries, including Iran. In a speech in the

130 The Devotees of Islam early days of his movement, he said, ‘In our era, foreign invasion, and particularly Western culture, is threatening all our religious foundations.’503 Elsewhere, he characterized the imitation of the West, the loss of wisdom and intelligence before the glitter of the West and the borrowing of morality, economy and industry from the West as the main threats to Eastern societies.504 Hence, Fada’iyan called on Muslims to put aside Western customs and fight against the West and its culture. Fada’iyan mentioned that since many superstitions are introduced as religious beliefs, pseudo-intellectuals are given an opportunity to attack Islam.505 Fada’iyan were frustrated with the existing passivity among the clergy. As said earlier, most of the clergy not only avoided any involvement in politics, but also challenged those of their colleagues who were interested in politics, since they believed that religion should not be used as a political instrument. Many times when Fada’iyan were expressing their views in mosques, which they saw as the natural place to do so, they were confronted with the objection that mosques are places for religious, rather than political, activities.506 That was why, with the exception of a few, such as Ayatollah Sadr od-Din Sadr, Ayatollah Amini and Ayatollah Khansari, the ‘ulama, in particular Grand Ayatollah Boroojerdi, were not supportive of Fada’iyan. Even the execution of Navvab did not create much sympathy among the clergy.507 Fada’iyan thought that their contemporary clergy did not do enough to confront attacks on Islam, and that they were more concerned with their worldly interests, which provided the critics of Islam with another excuse to scorn the religion. Addressing this group of clergy, Navvab wrote, ‘I swear by God, you have not done for the protection of Islam a thousandth of what you have done for your own authority and position. If you feel any threat to your worldly position, you are ready to do anything and even to excommunicate people, even if such an act endangers the foundation of Islam.’508 It was in response to this situation that Fada’iyan’s views, particularly their ideas of the unity of religion and politics and the reorganization of the Shi’ite clergy, were formed.

INFLUENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD Unlike the other two groups, Fada’iyan’s thought was not influenced by new Western sciences or philosophical schools of thought. This

Influencing social and political factors 131 might be due to two reasons. First, as said earlier, most members of Fada’iyan were not highly educated in Western-style institutions. They had not even attained high levels of clerical education. Navvab himself was an exception, having graduated from a technical college, that had a good reputation during that era. Second, given their sincere belief that Islam is a comprehensive way of life, they did not see any reason to borrow from other schools of thought. Nevertheless, it has been said that Fada’iyan were influenced by a contemporary political and religious movement within the Islamic world, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna. Similarity in thought and actions of the two groups gives rise to such a suggestion. Nonetheless, Fada’iyan were never able to match their Egyptian counterpart in their political and intellectual impact. Regarding the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Fada’iyan, Hossein Khosh-Niyat argued, ‘Before his trip to Egypt and Palestine, Navvab had read about the Muslim Brotherhood’s enthusiastic activities against imperialism and its regional puppets, and he always respected and admired the group. However, during the trip, he came to know their struggle and self-sacrifice closely. Hence, afterward, he talked about them more deeply and passionately.’509 On the other hand, ‘Abd-e Khodaii and Lavasani, in interviews with the present author, mentioned that before Navvab’s trip to Egypt, they had never heard him talking about the Muslim Brotherhood, and there was no contact between the two groups. Hence, they ruled out the possibility of Fada’iyan’s being influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood.

CONCLUSION Despite their activism and religious devotion, Fada’iyan lacked articulated views. Their thought did not go much beyond simple criticisms of the traditionalist clergy and, particularly, the denunciation of the separation of religion from politics. What made them different from traditionalists was not their intellectual approach to Islam, but that they viewed Islam primarily from a political angle. They politicized Islam as an ideology for political struggle. They were, however, ready to embrace some aspects of new Western technologies. Their religious and political views may be explained by a reference to their social background, that is, their religious education and their upbringing in families from the lower class of Iranian society. They were deeply influenced by what they conceived as the predicaments of

132 The Devotees of Islam Muslim societies, such as their social, economic and political decline and the threat of Westernized intellectuals to the Islamic culture. Fada’iyan’s political approach to Islam and their resolution in action were the sources of their achievements on the political scene. The Iranian nationalist movement of the early 1950s owed as much to Fada’iyan as to other political nationalist and religious groups of that era. Because of lack of public support, Fada’iyan could not enjoy the benefits of their actions, and lack of a coherent theoretical approach prevented their having constructive impacts on Iranian society. Nevertheless, they provided the next generation of Iranian Muslim devotees with a pattern, which is now followed in a somewhat more articulated form by the hardliners in Iran.

Conclusion

The most important factor that led Iranian Islamic groups of the 1940s to 1960s to rethink religion was Western civilization. The West played such a role through its political and military domination over Muslim societies, the presentation of its superiority in various dimensions of life, particularly economy and technology, and the introduction of persuasive schools of thought. The power and progress of the West brought to light the weaknesses of the Muslim world. There have always been dual feelings of fascination and hatred towards the West among Iranians. Probably, such feelings are among the few things that almost all Iranians, from various walks of life and of different ideological inclinations, share. Despite the fact that Iran was never colonized, because of the explicit influence and interventions of Western powers in the country in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the resentment against these powers has never subsided in Iranian society. Such resentment was a crucial factor in bringing about various political developments, not least the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Iranian Islamic groups discussed in this book justified their attempt to adopt new approaches to Islam by referring to the facts of the decline of their society, such as the influence of Western powers, as well as despotism, corruption, backwardness and poverty. These groups were also concerned with the need to respond to the doubts posed by modern thinking about religion, to eradicate superstitions that had permeated religious beliefs and to resolve the incompatibility of some religious teachings with new scientific findings. Their membership consisted of faithful people who wanted Islam to be capable and effective in responding to the challenges of modern life. In general, it was thought that these purposes could be realized in three ways: first, the utilization of sciences in understanding religion; second, a return to the original sources of Islam, that is, the Koran and reliable

134 Conclusion and authentic ahadith; and, third, ijtihad, or developing Islamic rules through reasoning and by taking into account the requirements of any particular situation.510 To this extent, these groups, like most other modern Muslim thinkers, shared similar views, but beyond this and when the interpretation of these three methods was at issue, each group went a different way. The groups discussed in this book all were critical of the account of Islam prevalent in their contemporary Iran, and attempted to introduce approaches that they considered to be more true to the genuine Islam. Nevertheless, they adopted different approaches. This was because they conceived the facts of the decline of their society differently and, more importantly, were influenced by different intellectual trends. Two factors were probably determinative in how various thinkers conceived the predicaments of their societies and what solutions they sought: social class and education. Although these two factors worked separately, there was some correlation between them. In the Iranian society of those days, people of higher and middle classes tended to have higher levels of modern education. This was because only families of these classes could afford to send their children abroad or to higher education institutions in the country. Having higher levels of education, on the other hand, meant being more exposed to Western schools of thought. Disillusioned with Western models of development, the Socialist Theists sought a native school of thought, that is, Islam. They believed, however, that the traditional account of Islam is permeated by superstitions and is unable to respond to the needs of the modern age and to the questions posed by new branches of knowledge. They blamed the Muslim clergy for these shortcomings. They wanted a version of Islam that did not abstain from involvement in politics. The chronic problem of tyranny in Iranian society led the Socialist Theists to emphasize the concepts of freedom, democracy and public debate. They criticized Western liberal democratic theories, however, for their individualism and neglect of social justice and redistribution. They thought that in their contemporary society, which was in the grip of social and economic backwardness, poverty and class division, the justice required by Islam could be achieved through adopting socialism. Although being influenced by the Marxist account of egalitarianism and social justice, the Socialist Theists rejected Marxism as the theoretical foundation of socialism, which, for them, was grounded on a belief in God. In the Socialist Theists’ attempt to work out a new approach to Islam, two main methodological points can be identified. First, they tried to employ new sciences. However, it can be said that

Conclusion 135 in this attempt they were unsuccessful since not many references to new sciences can be found in their works. Second, they made a distinction between two parts of their beliefs: the theoretical foundation, which was Islam, and the social system built upon that foundation, which was socialism. They believed that the requirements of each age determine which social system should be adopted, as the Islamic principle of ijtihad requires. Similarly, the Iran Freedom Movement was critical of the traditional approach to Islam and particularly the inclination of people to a pretence of religiosity and to fatalism, which discouraged them from taking action to change their situation. In response to the realities of social decline and the domination of foreign forces alongside domestic despotism in Iran, Bazargan, the leader of the group, reinterpreted religious concepts, such as deed, reward, prayer, awaiting and hajj. Scorning the inaction of the clergy, he emphasized the social and political dimensions of Islam and extracted the concepts of freedom, equality and democracy from Islamic texts. Bazargan’s reinterpretation, in which empirical sciences played an important role, was partly a result of his exposure to Western scientific theories as well as political ideas, such as liberalism. His method of arriving at a new approach to Islam had two main features, namely, referring to the Koran as the main source of understanding Islam and employing new science. What made Bazargan’s views distinct from those of many other Iranian Islamic reformists was his extensive utilization of empirical sciences in understanding and reinterpreting Islamic instructions. Although he recognized the limitations of employing empirical sciences for such purposes, he did not articulate the criteria for determining how and to what extent reference to these sciences is legitimate. In a nutshell, his expectation of empirical science in the area of religion was too high. The differences in the approaches to Islam adopted by the Iran Freedom Movement and the Socialist Theists can be attributed to the groups’ social base. The founders of the former were mainly from the wealthy families of merchants, whereas those of the latter belonged to the middle classes of Iranian society. Moreover, the two main founders of the Iran Freedom Movement, that is, Bazargan and Sahabi, were educated in the West, whereas the leaders of the Socialist Theists were graduates of Iranian higher education institutions. Fada’iyan-e Islam, too, believed that the account of Islam prevailing in the Iranian society of their time was permeated by superstitions. They censured the majority of the clergy for their abstention from involvement in political issues and a minority of them for being merely

136 Conclusion concerned with their own worldly interests, and hence called for reorganization of the clerical education system. Distressed by the subjugation of the Islamic world and infighting within it, Fada’iyan saw politics as inseparable from religion and put forward the idea of the political unity of all Islamic denominations. They talked about the Islamic state and Islamic economics, which according to them prohibits the accumulation of wealth and combats poverty. Unlike the majority of their contemporary clergy, Fada’iyan did not oppose new technologies and were eager to find Islamic ways of utilizing them. Moreover, they abandoned the complex language of their colleagues, which was full of Arabic jargon, and adopted a language easily understood by the man in the street. Nevertheless, Fada’iyan did not make much effort to articulate their views. Their main difference from the traditionalists was that they viewed Islam mainly from a political perspective and highlighted whatever in Islamic teachings has a political implication. Fada’iyan were not so much concerned with despotism as with foreign domination and colonialism. Thus, the notions of freedom and democracy did not figure significantly in their works. The leaders and members of the group mainly belonged to the lower classes of Iranian society. They were not influenced by Western schools of thought as much as the members of the other two groups were, perhaps because the former did not attain higher levels of education at Westernstyle institutions. More importantly, Fada’iyan believed that Islam is a comprehensive religion with its own political, social and economic systems. Their leaders studied at religious seminaries, but even in that system, they were not highly educated and were not considered as religious scholars. Among the groups and people discussed in this book, Bazargan was the only one to revise his views, particularly with regard to the issue of the link between politics and religion. He lived long enough to see the experience of the total combination of religion and politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran, an experience in which he personally was a participant, but which he did not find appealing. In his later views, his position moved towards the autonomy of politics. He argued that politics per se is not a matter of concern for religion, but is addressed in so far as it is relevant to the main mission of religion. This mission, he believed, is mainly about guiding people with regard to the issues of God and the next world.

Afterword

From the discussions of this book it can be concluded that although the Iranian Islamic groups of the 1940s to the 1960s believed that Islamic teachings should be reinterpreted in the light of the requirements of their time, they did not make systematic and continuous efforts to do so. Their theoretical works were imbued with inconsistency, whereas Islamic traditionalists, Marxists and Westernized theorists presented more coherent theories. Nevertheless, with the increasing resistance of the Shah’s regime to democratic reforms, society became more and more receptive to the ideas put forward by Islamic groups. In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini led mass demonstrations that were harshly suppressed by the regime. Some survivors of Fada’iyan-e Islam joined Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement. In 1965, the People’s Mojahdin Organization, as the most influential militant Islamic group, was established by some younger members of the Iran Freedom Movement. In the 1970s, the works of ‘Ali Shari’ati, a member of the Socialist Theists, who later became the most famous Iranian Islamist intellectual, gained popularity among young and educated Iranians. In that decade, several Islamic militant groups were established in various parts of Iran. All Islamic groups during the period under consideration in this book agreed on the implausibility of the separation of religion and politics in Islam. There was a consensus among them on the point that Islam is not indifferent to the problems of society, and as a comprehensive religion addressed political, social and economic issues. Although there were many discussions about the need for engaging Islam in the political sphere, they did not go beyond expressing general points, such as the need for combating foreign domination, corruption and poverty, establishing justice and implementing Islamic rules. There was not much substantive talk about the way that Islamic rules should be implemented. Nevertheless, political Islam was on the

138 Afterword rise in Iran. By the late 1970s, the political quietism of the Shi’ite denomination had given way to political radicalism in the hearts and minds of young and educated Iranians. With the intellectual elite having been fascinated with the idea of political Islam, the masses moved under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The project of political Islam, whose origin went back to the activities of Islamic groups from the early 1940s to the early 1960s, was completed in 1979 by the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under whose Constitution the Shi’ite highest religious authority is granted the highest political position in the country. The fact that all groups discussed in this book shared the idea of engaging Islam directly in politics should not blind us to the vast diversity among their views. The discussions of this book point to the diversity of political theories presented in the name of Islam. In the Iranian context, Islamic activists inclined towards various socialist, liberal and fundamentalist tendencies. Moreover, Islamic activism in Shi’ite communities has always lived in the shadow of the more dominant tradition of quietism. Although not all these accounts can be, to the same extent, true to the genuine Islam, and some of them might be out of tune with Islamic Scripts, they show that the Islamic culture is too resourceful to yield only one interpretation, inflexible to the requirements and innovations of each era.511 In response to the predicaments of their society, Muslim intellectuals have adopted various approaches, which although not properly articulated, address issues of modernism, justice, democracy, freedom and the relation between religion and politics differently. The history of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows not the absolute domination of one interpretation, but the competition and coexistence of several interpretations of Islam.

Glossary

‘Ali Prophet Mohammad’s cousin and son-in-law, the fourth khalifa of Islam, according to the Sunnis, and the first Imam, according to the Shi’a. Awaiting See Mahdi. Bahai A religious sect established in the 1840s in Iran by ‘Ali Mohammad, the Bab [Door]. The Bab’s claims of being the promised twelfth Imam and a receiver of divine revelation contradicted the Shi’ite convictions and led to his execution for blasphemy. Ever since, Islamic circles in Iran have regarded it to be their main duty to prevent the sect from spreading. Anti-Bahai activities have had a significant impact on religious discourse in the country. Bei’at The voluntary act of swearing allegiance to rulers in Islamic and Arab history. Faqih An expert in Islamic jurisprudence, or feqh; an ‘alem. The plural form of faqih is foqaha. See feqh and ‘ulama. Feqh Islamic jurisprudence or the part of Islamic teachings that deals with Shari’a law and Islamic rules in various aspects. Hadith Prophet Mohammad’s remarks. For the Shi’a it also includes Imams’ remarks. The plural form of hadith is ahadith. Hajj Annual pilgrimage to Mecca that every Muslim must perform at least once in his or her lifetime, if he or she can afford it. Hijab An Islamic requirement according to which women should cover most parts of their bodies in public. Hossein The third Shi’ite Imam, who rose up against the brutality and corruption of the Ummayads, under Yazid, and was killed in an uneven battle in 61 Lunar Hijri (680 AD). Imam Hossein’s martyrdom is of paramount importance for Shi’ite identity and faith, and is mourned annually by the Shi’a. Ijtihad A main principle of Islamic jurisprudence, according to which Islamic rules appropriate to new circumstances, or

140 Glossary particular situations unanticipated in original Islamic texts, should be worked out through reasoning and by taking into account the requirements of the situation on the basis of Islamic principles. The principle of ijtihad is considered as having paramount importance in Shi’ite feqh and some Sunni schools. Imam The successor of Prophet Mohammad, according to the Shi’a. Imams are regarded as religious and political leaders of the Shi’a. Khilafat The traditional institution of government in Islamic society. Khalifa was the title of an Islamic ruler, or a holder of the position of khilafat. Khalifa literally means successor. In Islamic terms, it means a successor of Prophet Mohammad. Since the Ummayads, the institution of khilafat was mainly dominated by Sunni rulers. Khoms A type of religious tax, equivalent to one-fifth of each adult’s annual surplus to be given to religious authorities, under Shi’ite rules. Mahdi The twelfth Shi’ite Imam, who, according to the Twelver branch of the Shi’a, is hidden from people, and when the time is ripe, he will come to save the world from injustice. Hence, he is also called ‘the Awaited’, and the concept of ‘awaiting’ is of paramount importance in Shi’ite theology. Movement for the Nationalization of the Iranian Petroleum Industry The political movement leading to the nationalization of the British-dominated petroleum industry in Iran and to the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossaddeq. It can probably be argued that the movement began when, in July 1949, the Supplementary Bill for Exploiting Petroleum was put before Iranian Parliament. The bill was based on a contract between Britain and Iran, and was believed to expand British domination over the Iranian petroleum industry. The parliamentary opposition, which consisted of only four members, namely, Hossein Maki, ‘Abdol-Qadir Azad, Abol-Hassan Ha’eri-Zadeh and Hossein Baqaii, objected ardently to the bill. This triggered more political developments. Gradually the opposition became active and strong. A bill for the nationalization of the petroleum industry was approved in 1951, and the nationalist government of Mossaddeq came to power. The 1953 coup organized by the CIA can be considered as the end of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian the petroleum industry. National Front (or Jebhe-i Melli) The umbrella coalition supporting the Mossaddeq government during the years of the movement for the nationalization of the Iranian petroleum industry. Its

Glossary 141 formation goes back to 1949 when twenty political figures, led by Mohammad Mossaddeq, began a sit-in in the Royal palace in protest against vote rigging in the parliamentary elections and demanded the election results be annulled. National Front II The umbrella coalition of opposition parties and figures loyal to Mossaddeq’s ideas that was formed in 1960 and disintegrated in 1964. The name National Front was used in order to show that the National Front II was a continuation of the National Front. National Front III The umbrella coalition of more radical opposition parties formed in the summer of 1965. The Front, however, soon became inactive when its leaders and activists were arrested one by one. National Resistance Movement The umbrella organization of parties and figures opposing the 1953 CIA-brokered coup that overthrew the nationalist government of Mossaddeq. People of a book Jews, Christians and Muslims, or Abrahamic religions. Some Muslim scholars also regard Zorostarians as people of a book. Promoting virtues and preventing vices (or Amr-e be Ma’roof va Nahy-e az Monkar) A duty of all Muslims regarded to be carried out through their actions and remarks. Prophet Mohammad’s Household (or Ahl al-Bayt) Includes the Prophet himself, his sole daughter, Zahra, and twelve Shi’ite Imams, that is, the Prophet’s cousin as well as his son-in-law, ‘Ali, and ‘Ali’s two sons, Hassan and Hossein, and the other nine Imams descending from Hossein. The Prophet’s Household is of paramount importance to the Shi’ite theology. Their remarks and teachings are a part of the Shi’ite jurisprudence, and their love is a significant part of Shi’ite folklore. Shah The title of kings of Iran. Shi’ite The Shi’ite branch of Islam is the second Islamic denomination, after the Sunna. The Shi’a, or the followers of the Shi’ite denomination, form about 15 per cent of all Muslims. The main difference between the Shi’a and the Sunni is that the latter believe Abu Bakr, ‘Omar, ‘Osman and ‘Ali were respectively the four successors of Prophet Mohammad, or khalifa, while the Shi’a believe that the Prophet had twelve successors or Imams, beginning with ‘Ali and his two sons and nine others descending from Imam Hossein. Shovra The equivalent of ‘public consultation’ in Islamic terminology. It refers to the consultations of Prophet Mohammad with various

142 Glossary segments of Muslim society when making certain types of political decisions. Sunna Prophet Mohammad’s way of life, remarks and practice. Taqieh A practice among the Shi’a, according to which in circumstances of extreme danger, under non-Shi’ite rules, they can hide or even deny their beliefs in order to prevent their persecution. ‘Ulama The clergy, usually the high-ranking clergy who are regarded as being more knowledgeable. The singular form of ‘ulama is ‘alem. Umma The Islamic society at large. Waqf (or endowment) An important voluntary institution in Muslim societies for sponsoring religious, charity or educational activities. Zakat An annual Islamic tax on certain goods, such as wheat.

Notes

1 History 1 Habibollah Peiman, ‘Andishe va ‘Amal-e Bazargan dar Bestar-e Tahavolat-e Ejtema’i [Bazargan’s thought and practice in the context of social developments]’, Name [Letter], New Course, no. 5 (2002), 23. 2 Gozashte Cheragh-e Rah-e Ayande Ast [The Past is the Beacon of the Future] (Jami Publication), 135. 3 Jalal ad-Din Ashtiyani, Ideal-e Bashar, Bakhsh-e Nakhost: Tajzie va Tahlil-e Afkar, Joz-e Yek: Materialism [Mankind’s Ideal, Part One: Analysis of Thoughts, Section One: Materialism] (Chap-e Ettehad, 1st edn 1948; 2nd edn 1979), 3. Hereafter, Ashtiyani, Materialism. 4 A religious sect established in the 1840s in Iran, and bitterly opposed by the Shi’ite religious circles. See the Glossary. 5 Ibrahim Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist [The Movement of the Socialist Theists]’, in Yadname-i Sevomin Salgard-e Shahadat-e Dr Kazem Sami [The 3rd Anniversary Commemoration of Dr Kazem Sami’s Martyrdom] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapakhsh, 1370 [1991]), 86. 6 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 11. 7 Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 88–9. 8 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 4. 9 Jalal ad-Din Ashtiyani, Ideal-e Bashar: Tajzie Va Tahlil-e Afkar: Modiriyat na Hokoomat [Mankind’s Ideal: Analysis of Thoughts: Managing, Not Ruling], 2 vols in one book (1358 [1979]), 381. Hereafter, Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat. 10 Ashtiyani, Materialism. 11 Ibid., 6–7. 12 Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 95. 13 Author’s interview with Hossein Razi. 14 For more information about Students’ Islamic Association, see ‘Formation of Islamic Associations’ in Part 2, 61–2. 15 Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 94–7. 16 Gholam-Reza Nejati, Jonbesh-e Melli Shodan-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran va Kodetai-e 28 Mordad 32 [The Movement for the Nationalization of the Iranian Petroleum industry and the 1953 Coup] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1365 [1986]), 84.

144 Notes 17 ‘Tarikhche-i Mobareze-i Zedd-e Este’mari [A short history of the anti-colonial struggle]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 17 (1/1/1332 [1953]), 6. 18 Author’s interview with Razi. 19 ‘Moroori ba Seir-e Harakat va Moze’-giri-hai-e Jonbesh-e Mosalmanan-e Mobarez az Aghaz ta Emrooz [A review of the activities and stances of the Movement of Militant Muslims]’, Ummat, Year 3, no. 117 (29/4/1360 [1981]), 8 and 10. 20 Nejati, Jonbesh-e Melli Shodan-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran va Kodetai-e 28 Mordad 32, 89. 21 Author’s interview with Razi. 22 Gozashte Cheragh-e Rah-e Ayande Ast, 587. 23 Author’s interview with Hormoz Momayyezi. 24 Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 101. 25 ‘E’lamie-i Afrad-e Mosta’fi az Hezb-e Iran – Shiraz [The announcement of those who resigned from the Iran Party – Shiraz branch]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 13 (12/12/1331 [1953]), 2. 26 Nejati, Jonbesh-e Melli Shodan-e San’at-e Naft-e Iran va Kodetai-e 28 Mordad 32, 89. 27 ‘Peyam-e Hei’at-e Tahririyye va Karkonan-e Roozname-i Javanan-e Iran [The message of the editorial board and employees of the daily, Youth of Iran]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 11 (Bahman 1331 [1953]), 4. 28 Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 102. 29 Gholam-Reza Nejati, Tarikh-e Siasi-e Bist va Panj Sale-i Iran (Az Kodeta ta Enqelab) [The Twenty-Five-Year History of Iran (From the Coup to the Revolution)] (Tehran: Mo’assese-i Khadamat-e Farhangi-e Rasa, 1371 [1992]), 99 and 108. 30 See ibid., Chapters 5 and 7. 31 Be Yad-e Hamaseh Afarinan-e Davazdah-e Moharram [In the Commemoration of the Heroes of the 12th of Moharram], 21. 32 Khalil Maleki, Khaterat-e Siasi-e Khalil Maleki [Khalil Maleki’s political memoirs], 2nd edn (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1368 [1989]), 151. 33 ‘Dr Mohammad Nakhshab: Bonyan-gozar-e Mobareze-i Siasi bar Mabnai-e Jahan-bini-e Islami [Dr Mohammad Nakhshab: The founder of political struggle based on Islamic Weltanschauung]’, Ummat, Year 1, no. 22 (21/6/1358 [1979]), 7. 34 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 463. 35 ‘Dr Mohammad Nakhshab: Bonyan-gozar-e Mobareze-e Siasi bar Mabnai-e Jahan-bini-e Islami’, 7. 36 ‘Yad-e Dr Mohammad Nakhshab Gerami Bad [Commemorating Dr Mohammad Nakhshab]’, Ummat, Year 2 (19/6/1359 [1980]), 16. 37 Ahmad Habibi, ‘Sar-Cheshmehai-e Shakhsiyat-e Fekri va Siasi-e Shahid Sami [The origins of the intellectual and political personality of the martyr, Sami]’ in Rasool Dad-Mehr (ed.), Yadname-i Dovomin Salgard-e Shahadat-e Dr Kazem Sami [The 2nd Anniversary Commemoration of Dr Kazem Sami’s Martyrdom] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapakhsh, 1369 [1990]), 81–2.

Notes

145

38 ‘Seir-e Tarikhi-e Jonbesh-e Enqelabi-e Mardom-e Mosalman-e Iran (JAMA) [The historical developments of the Revolutionary Movement of Muslim People of Iran (JAMA)]’ (Daftar-e Entesharat va Tabliqat-e JAMA), 17 and 30. 39 Author’s interview with Razi. 40 The Iran Freedom Movement’s acceptance of monarchy, in principle, in the pre-1979 Revolution is an example of the group’s pragmatism. 2 Reforming Islamic thought: reconciling Islam and socialism 41 42 43 44

45

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62

Author’s interview with Habibollah Peiman. Ashtiyani, Materialism, 13. Author’s interview with Peiman. ‘Be’that-e Payambar-e Ma, Bozorgtarin Monadi-e Democracy va Socialism [The mission of our Prophet, the most eminent herald of democracy and socialism]’ Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 20 (22/1/1332 [1953]), 4. ‘Mardom-e Iran Mottahed Shavid ta Rejim-e Zalemane-i Konooni ra bar Sar-e Baniyanash Kharab Konim [People of Iran! Unit in order to destruct the present oppressive regime]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 12 (4/12/1331 [1953]), 4. ‘Editorial’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 57 (26/5/1332 [1953]), 4. Author’s interview with Peiman. Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 378. Ibid., 189. Mohammad Nakhshab, Neza’-e Kelisa va Materialism [The Clash of the Church and Materialism] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Shive-i Now and Soroosh, 1358 [1979]), 17. ‘Angize-i Degargooni-e Toode-ha Chist [What is the reason for changes in the masses?]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 16 (24/12/1331 [1953]), 1 and 4. Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 38–9. Ibid., 87. Ibid., 189. Ibid. Ibid., 378. Ashtiyani, Materialism, 11. Nahjolbalaghe is very dear to the Shi’a, and, in particular, all Shi’ite reformists widely refer to it in their works. Habibi, 83. Author’s interview with Peiman. Mohammad Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, be Zamime-i: (1) Neza’-e Kelisa va Materialism, (2) Hezb Chist?, (3) Iran dar Astane-i yek Enqelab-e Ejtema’i, (4) Farhang-e Vaje-hai-e Ejtema’i [The Material Mankind, and Four Other Papers: (1) The Clash of the Church and Materialism, (2) What is a Party?, (3) Iran on the Verge of a Social Revolution, (4) A Dictionary of Social Terms] (Nashr-e Karavan, 1398 Lunar Hijri calendar [1978]), 12. Hereafter, Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi. Author’s interview with Momayyezi.

146 Notes 63 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 25 (17/2/1332 [1953]), 1. 64 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 23 (3/2/1332 [1953]), 4. 65 ‘Leisa lel-Ensana Ella ma Sa’a’ (Sura Najm, verse 39). 66 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 23, (3/2/1332 [1953]), 4. 67 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 27 (28/2/1332 [1953]), 1 and 4. 68 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 199. 69 ‘Mardom-e Iran Mikooshand ta be Nirooy-e Khod Majlesi ke Nemayande-i ‘Amal-e Melli va Ejtema’i-e Mardom-e Iran Ast be Vojod Avarand [Iranian people are trying to establish a parliament that is the representative of their national and social ideals]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 37 (15/4/1332 [1953]), 2. 70 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 189. 71 Ibid., 185. 72 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 320. 73 Ibid., 323. 74 Ibid., 35. 75 See ibid., Chapter 1. 76 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 215. 77 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 325. 78 Ibid., 321. 79 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 26 (24/2/1332 [1953]), 2. According to Marx’s theory of surplus value, the value of a product is more than what is needed to replace the energy used to produce the good, or the wage given to workers in a capitalist system. 80 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 326. 81 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 193. 82 ‘Nazar-e Ma dar Bare-i Malekiyat [Our view on ownership]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 22 (27/1/1332 [1953]), 4. 83 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 173. 84 Habibi, 84–5. 85 ‘Ma va Hezb-e Toodeh [We and the Marxist Toodeh Party]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 17 (1/1/1332 [1953]), 3. 86 ‘Maram-Name-i Jam’iyat-e Azadi-e Mardom-e Iran [The Constitution of the Society for the Freedom of People of Iran]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 11 (27/11/1331 [1953]), 4. 87 ‘Ma va Hezb-e Toodeh’, 3. 88 Kazem Sami, ‘Socialism-e Mardom-e Iran [The socialism of the people of Iran]’, in Yadname-i Sevomin Salgard-e Shahadat-e Dr Kazem Sami [The 3rd Anniversary Commemoration of Dr Kazem Sami’s Martyrdom] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapakhsh, 1370 [1991]), 9–10. 89 Nakhshab, Neza’-e Kelisa va Materialism, 52. 90 Ibid., 54. 91 See ibid. 92 Author’s interview with Peiman. 93 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 226.

Notes

147

94 Ibid., 226, footnotes. 95 ‘Editorial’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 21 (27/1/1332 [1953]), 4. 96 ‘Editorial’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 23 (3/2/1332 [1953]), 3. 97 See Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], nos 34–9. 98 Habibi, 76–7. 99 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 313. 100 Author’s interview with Peiman. 101 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 223. 102 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 39. 103 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 353, footnotes. 104 Ibid., 304. 105 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 205. 106 Rasool Dad-Mehr, ‘Interview with Dr Nezam ad-Din Qahari’, in Rasool Dad-Mehr (ed.), Yadname-i Dovomin Salgard-e Shahadat-e Dr Kazem Sami [The 2nd Anniversary Commemoration of Dr Kazem Sami’s Martyrdom] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapakhsh, 1369 [1990]), 10. 107 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 144–5. 108 Habibi, 91. 109 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 380–1. 3 The methodology of reforming Islamic thought 110 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 10. 111 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 14. 112 M N [Mohammad Nakhshab], ‘Dar Astane-i Donyai-e Fekr va Andishe [At the threshold of the world of thought]’, Name-i Foroogh-e ‘Elm, Year 1, no. 2 (1329 [1950]), 19. 113 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 57, footnotes. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid., 13. 116 Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 463. 117 Habibi, 84. 118 Sura Al-Ma’dah, verse 3. 119 Author’s interview with Peiman. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. 122 In Islam, it is believed that the true religion since the first prophet, Adam, has been Islam, but according to the developing circumstances of human life, it was gradually revealed to the prophets, and ultimately completed by Prophet Mohammad’s mission. 123 Ashtiyani, Materialism, 14. 124 Ibid., 15. 125 Kazem Sami, ‘Rah va Ravesh-e Ma [Our way and method]’, in Rasool Dad-Mehr (ed.), Yadname-i Dovomin Salgard-e Shahadat-e Dr Kazem Sami [The 2nd Anniversary Commemoration of Dr Kazem Sami’s Martyrdom] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Chapakhsh, 1369 [1990]), 32–3. This paper was originally published in Peikar-e Andishe [The Struggle of Thought] (1340 [1961]).

148 Notes 126 The Socialist Theists were the first group of Muslim intellectuals in Iran to use the term Weltanschauung, or worldview in English and Jahan-Bini in Persian, in theoretical discussions. See Yazdi, ‘Nehzat-e Khoda Parastan-e Socialist’, 87–8. 127 Habibi, 83. 128 Author’s interview with Momayyezi. 129 Author’s interview with Peiman. 130 ‘Moroori ba Seir-e Harakat va Moze’-giri-hai-e Jonbesh-e Mosalmanan-e Mobarez az Aghaz ta Emrooz [A review of the activities and stances of the Movement of Militant Muslims]’, Ummat, Year 3, no. 118 (5/5/1360 [1981]), 5. 131 ‘Yadi az Mohammad Nakhshab [Remembering Mohammad Nakhshab]’, Ummat, Year 3, no. 123 (16/6/1360 [1981]), 12. 4 The historical and intellectual context of the formation of the Socialist Theists’ views 132 This was not surprising, since Stalin’s Soviet Union had long ago forsaken ideological views for national interests. 133 See, for instance, ‘Mojazat-e Anhaii ke az Behesht Farar Mikonand [The punishment of those who escape from paradise]’ Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 12 (4/12/1331 [1953]), 4. 134 Nejati, Tarikh-e Siasi-e Bist va Panj Sale-i Iran, 153. 135 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 380. 136 ‘Basij-e Niroo-hai-e Enqelabi-e Khavarmiane: In Ast Rahnamai-e Peikar-e Ejtema’i-e Mellat-hai-e Asir va ‘Aqab Mande [The mobilization of revolutionary forces of the Middle East: This is the way of social struggle for backward and subjugated nations]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 12 (4/12/1331 [1953]), 1–2. 137 ‘Shabahi Iran va Khavarmiane ra Fra Migirad [A ghost over Iran and the Middle East]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 17 (1/1/1332 [1953]), 1, 2 and 5. 138 The parties to the coalition agreed to cooperate and form a government, in September 1920, in Baku, then a part of the Soviet Union. 139 Ashtiyani, Modiriyat, na Hokomat, 378. 140 ‘Editorial’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 57 (26/5/1332 [1953]), 4. 141 See Gozashte Cheragh-e Rah-e Ayande Ast, Chapter 3, ‘Qesmat-e Ovza’-e ‘Omoomi-e Keshvar: Varshekastegi-e Eqtesadi va Shoyo’-e Qahti, Bimari va Faqr-e ‘Omoomi dar Sarasar-e Keshvar [General situation of the country: Economic bankruptcy and the spread of famine, disease and poverty throughout the country]’. 142 ‘Moqayese Mian-e Vaz’-e Movjood ke Khaste-i Siyast-hai-e Este’mari Ast va Anche Mardom-e Bidar Fekr-e Iran Mikhahand [A comparison between the status quo, which is what colonialists want, and what the awakened people of Iran want]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 12 (4/12/1331 [1953]), 2. 143 ‘Ma va Hezb-e Toodeh’, 3. 144 ‘Be’that-e Payambar-e Ma, Bozorgtarin Monadi-e Democracy va Socialism’, 4.

Notes

149

145 ‘ ‘Ali: Bozorgtarin Mard-e Socialist-e Donya [Imam ‘Ali: The most prominent socialist]’, Mardom-e Iran [People of Iran], Year 2, no. 29 (18/3/1332 [1953]), 1. 146 ‘Moroori ba Seir-e Harakat va Moze’-giri-hai-e Jonbesh-e Mosalmanan-e Mobarez [A review of the activities and stances of the Movement of Militant Muslims]’, Ummat, Year 3, no. 116 (22/4/1360 [1981]), 11. 147 Yazdi, 84. Also, see Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, Yad-Name-i Bistomin Salgard-e Ta’sis-e Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran [The Twentieth Anniversary Commemoration of Establishing the Iran Freedom Movement] (Tehran: Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, 1362 [1983]), 21. 148 Habibi, 77–8. 149 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 9. It should be mentioned, however, that by this statement, Nakhshab mainly intended to deomonstrate the division within Iranian society. 150 Nakhshab, Bashar-e Maddi, 20. 151 This categorization is based on a model provided in Nejati, Tarikh-e Siasi-e Bist va Panj Sale-i Iran, 217–18. 152 In the Shi’ite denomination, each grand ayatollah issues a handbook of religious practices, or tovzih al-masa’el, for his followers. These handbooks provide the faithful with the details of what a proper Muslim must observe and how religious requirements, such as praying, fasting or hajj, must be performed. 153 Author’s interview with Momayyezi. 154 Author’s interview with Peiman. 155 Hamid Algar, Enqelab-e Islami dar Iran, translated into Persian by Morteza As’adi and Hassan Chizari (Tehran: Qalam, 1360 [1981]), 35. This book is a translation of Hamid Algar, The Islamic Revolution in Iran: Transcript of a Four-Lecture Course Given by Hamid Algar at the Muslim Institute, London (London: Open Press, 1980). 5 History 156 This is not to deny that other members of the Iran Freedom Movement, and particularly Ayatollah Taleqani, have produced deep and influential works that deserve to be examined thoroughly, perhaps in a different monograph. 157 Mohammad Basteh-Negar, ‘Zendegi-Name-i Aboozar-e Zaman az Zaban-e Khodash va Digaran [Ayatollah Taleqani, according to himself and others]’, in Yadneme-i Aboozar-e Zaman: Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani [The Commemoration of Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani], 2nd edn (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhangi-e Taleqani va Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1360 [1981]), nine and ten. 158 Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, Yad-Name-i-Bistomin Salgard-e Ta’sis-e Nehzate Azadi-e Iran [The twentieth anniversary commemoration of establishing the Iran Freedom Movement] (Tehran: Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, 1362 [1983]),19. 159 Mahdi Bazargan, Modafe’at dar Dadgah-e Gheir-e Saleh-e Tajdid-e Nazar-e Nezami [Defence Statement before the Incompetent Military Appeal Court] (Entesharat-e Modaress, 1350 [1971]), 79. Hereafter, Bazargan, Modafe’at.

150 Notes 160 Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, 19. 161 See Be Yad-e Hamaseh Afarinan-e Davazdah-e Moharram [In the Commemoration of the Heroes of the 12th of Moharram], 46. 162 Ervand Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), 81. 163 Bazargan, Modafe’at, 65–6. 164 Ibid., 116–22. 165 Susan Siavashi, Liberal Nationalism in Iran (San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1990), 94. 166 Abrahamian, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin, 82. 167 Bazargan, Modafe’at, 74. 168 Ibid., 164. 169 Ibid., 208. 170 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Khesal va Sefat-e Enqelabi-e Taleqani [Taleqani’s revolutionary attributes]’, in Yadname-i Aboozar-e Zaman: Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani [The Commemoration of Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood Taleqani], 2nd edn (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar and Bonyad-e Farhangi-e Taleqani, 1362 [1983]), 200. 171 Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, 27–9. 172 Bazargan, Modafe’at, 31–2. 173 Gholam-Reza Nejati, Tarikh-e Siasi-e Bist va Panj Sale-i Iran (Az Kodeta ta Enqelab) [The Twenty-Five-Year History of Iran (From the Coup to the Revolution)] (Tehran: Mo’assese-i Khadamat-e Farhangi-e Rasa, 1371 [1992]), 212. 174 The White Revolution was an initiative, beginning in 1960, by Mohammad Reza Shah to fulfil some economic and social reforms (see Jan Palmowski, Oxford Dictionary of Twentieth-Century World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 292). With the White Revolution, the Shah wanted to take the initiative and sideline his reformist Prime Minister, ‘Ali Amini, whom he disliked. 175 Nejati, Tarikh-e Siasi-e Bist va Panj Sale-i Iran, 332. 176 Layeh-i Anjoman-hai-e Iyalati va Welayati. 177 Siavashi. 178 Mahdi Bazargan, Enqelab-e Iran dar do Harakat [The Iranian Revolution in Two Directions], 4th edn (Tehran, 1363 [1984]), 95, footnotes. 6 A new approach to Islam: a worldly Islam 179 Mohammad Basteh-Negar, five to twenty nine. 180 Mohammad Mahdi Ja’fari, Nehzat-e Bidargari dar Jahan-e Islam [The Reawakening Movement in the Islamic World] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1362 [1983]), 134. 181 Non-Arabs, particularly Iranians, have difficulty pronouncing some Arabic letters. Hence, religious people usually practise hard to learn such pronunciation, in order to be able to perform their prayers with an Arabic accent. 182 Within the traditional Shi’ite Islam, there are special prayers for keeping away some misfortunes, which have been criticized by Islamic reformists. See Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan [The youth’s Islam]’, Chahar Maqaleh [Four Papers] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar), 203–4.

Notes

151

183 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Nik-Niazi [The need for benevolence]’, in Nik-Niazi [The Need for Benevolence] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1347 [1968]), 24. 184 Mahdi Bazargan, Sazegari-e Irani [Iranian Adaptability] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Payam-e Azadi), 43–4. 185 For the Shi’a, Ahl al-Bayt, that is, Prophet Mohammad’s Household, is of paramount importance. The teachings of its members, after the Koran, form a source of Shi’ite jurisprudence, and their love is part of Shi’ite folklore. 186 Mahdi Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed [The Sole Global Government] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Payam-e Azadi), 79–81. This work was first published in 1962. 187 Mahdi Bazargan, Tawhid, Tabi’at, Takamol [Monotheism, Nature and Evolution] (Tehran: Dafter-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islami, [1958]), 24. 188 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Introduction’, in Rah-e Tei Shodeh [The Established Way] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1338 [1959]), 4–5. 189 Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan’, 204–7. 190 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Islam; Maktab-e Mobarez va Movalled [Islam; the religion of challenge and productivity],’ in Mazhab dar Oroopa [Religion in Europe] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1344 [1965]), 205. 191 Mahdi Bazargan, Kar dar Islam va Iran [The Concept of Work in Islam and Iran] (Tehran: Nashr-e Payam-e Azadi), 106. 192 Bazargan, Sazegari-e Irani, 41–2. 193 Bazargan usually used the term religion, rather than a specific religion or Islam, firstly because in the context of his writings, religion means Islam. Nevertheless, it can be said that he intended to emphasize the continuity of Abrahamic religions, from Judaism to Islam, and even the unity of all religions. In general, he was concerned with all religions or religion as such, and treated all religions, or at least the monotheist religions, as conveying the same message. For instance, in his book, Liberation of India, he praised Indian leaders for returning to the native philosophical and spiritual sources of Indian culture, and particularly the religious sources of Veda. On the other hand, he scorned Indian leaders, after Gandhi, for turning their backs on religion, rather than refining it from superstitions. 194 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Mazaya va Mazar-e Din [Advantages and disadvantages of religion]’, in Nik-Niazi, 101. 195 Mahdi Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari [Lesson of Religiosity] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Be’that [1965]), 101–2. 196 Bazargan, ‘Mazaya va Mazar-e Din’, 145. 197 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 144. 198 Sura Al-Tauba, Verse 122. 199 Bazargan, ‘Mazaya va Mazar-e Din’, 121. 200 Mahdi Bazargan, Marz-e beyn-e Din va Siasat [The Border between Religion and Politics] (1962), 50–1. This article was originally presented in the form of a lecture. 201 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Mazhab dar Oroopa [Religion in Europe]’, in Mazhab dar Oroopa [Religion in Europe] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1344 [1965]), 23–4. 202 Mahdi Bazargan, Gom-Rahan: Hadithi Mofassal az Qoroon-e Wostai-e Masihiyat dar Ertebat ba Sure-i Hamd [The Misled: The Long Story of

152 Notes

203

204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236

Christianity’s Middle Ages in the Light of the Koranic Sura of Hamd] (Tehran, 1362 [1983]), 47. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Entezarat-e Mardom az Maraje’ [People’s expectations of the religious authorities]’, in Bahsi dar Bare-i Marja’iyat va Rovhaniyat [On the Religious Authority and the Clergy] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1341 [1962]), 114. Ibid., 117. Ibid. Ibid., 126–7. Bazargan, Kar dar Islam va Iran, 79–82. Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 32–3. Bazargan went so far as to call Islam a pragmatist religion (ibid.). Mahdi Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid [What Might Damages Monotheism] (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islami [1958]), 53. For instance, Sura Az-Zumar, verse 48, Sura Al-i-‘Imran, verse 25, Sura Al-Jathiya, verse 22, Sura An-Nisaa, verse 32. Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 84. Ibid., 47. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 176, footnotes. Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan’, 206–7. Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 39–40. Ibid., 38. Mahdi Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar [The Infinite Particle and Free Will] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar), 25–6. Jews, Christians and Muslims. See Mahdi Bazargan, Khane-i Mardom [People’s House] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar). The cubic building that Muslims regard as God’s house, and which they walk around during the hajj ceremony. Bazargan, ‘Entezarat-e Mardom az Maraje’ ’, 104–5. Two dynasties that respectively ruled the Muslim world after the four successors of Prophet Mohammad. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Serr-e Aqab Oftadegi-e Melal-e Mosalman [The secret of the backwardness of Muslim nations]’, in Nik-Niazi. This article was first published in 1949. Siavashi, 94–5. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 20, footnotes. Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 84. Bazargan, ‘Entezarat-e Mardom az Maraje’ ’, 110. Al-hokmo lellah’. Mahdi Bazargan, Din va Tamaddon [Religion and Civilization], 2nd edn ([Tehran]: Entesharat-e Be’that), 63. Bazargan, Marz-e beyn-e Din va Siasat, 41. Ibid., 48. Siavashi, 95. Mahdi Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind [Liberation of India] (Tehran: Entesharat-e Mohammadi), 189. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 142–3. Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan’, 207–8. Bazargan, Marz-e beyn-e Din va Siasat, 47.

Notes 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244

245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267

153

Siavashi, 95–6. Ibid., 96 Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 192–3. Bazargan, Marz-e beyn-e Din va Siasat, 52. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Akherat va Khoda: Barname-i Be’that-e Anbia [The Prophets’ mission: The other world and God]’. Ibid., 83. Ibid., 85. See Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, ‘Akharin Nazar-e Bazargan: Bim-ha va Hoshdar-ha [Bazargan’s last view: Hopes and warnings]’, Name [Letter], New Course, no. 5 (2002), 69, and Seyyed ‘Ali Asghar Gharavi, ‘Sobat dar Andishe va ‘Amal-e Bazargan [Constancy in Bazargan’s thought and actions]’, Name [Letter], New Course, no. 5 (2002), 52. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Naqd-haii bar Akherat va Khoda: Barname-i Be’that-e Anbia [Critiques of the Prophets’ mission: The other world and God], 231–3. Siavashi, 96. Bazargan, ‘Nik-Niazi’, 56. Bazargan even argued that Islam is a humanist religion (Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’ [Four ‘ism’s]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha [Reviving Values] (Tehran: Mahdi Bazargan, 1364 [1985]), iii. 437). Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Biganeh Parasti [Xenophilia]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, i. 92. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Enqelab va Enqelabi [Revolution and revolutionary]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, i. 127. Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, iii. 445. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Ensan va Khoda [Man and God]’, in Chahar Maqaleh, 128. Mahdi Bazargan, Be’that va Ideology [Revival and Ideology] (Mashhad: Entesharat-e Toloo’), 143. See Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Az Khoda-Parasti ta Khod-Parasti [From worshiping God to worshiping oneself]’, in Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed. See Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed. Mahdi Bazargan, Bar-resi-e Nazariye-i Erich Fromm [An Examination of Erich Fromm’s Theory] (Tehran: Daftar-e Nashr-e Farhang-e Islami), 196. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Azadi: Khaste-i Abadi [Freedom: The eternal wish]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, iii. 364. Ibid. ‘La Elaha Ella Allah’. Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 256. Sura Az-Zumar, verse 18. Sura Yunus, verses 98 and 99. For instance, see Bazargan’s, following works: Be’that va Ideology and ‘Azadi: Khaste-i Abadi’. Bazargan, ‘Azadi: Khaste-i Abadi’, 385. Ibid., 382. Ibid., 383. Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 256. Prophet Mohammad’s hadith, according to which inflicting harm on others is prohibited in Islam.

154 Notes 268 Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, 410–11. 269 Bazargan, ‘Ensan va Khoda’, 128. 270 Bazargan, Gom-Rahan: Hadithi Mofassal az Qoroon-e Wostai-e Masihiyat dar Ertebat ba Sure-i Hamd, 109. 271 A tenth-century mystic poet who was hanged for believing in a type of pantheism, and uttering ‘Anal Haq’ [I am the Truth; I am the God]. His real name was Hossein, but known by his father’s name, that is, Mansoor Hallaj. 272 The Iranian historian who, criticizing Islam, intended to revive the preIslamic customs of Iran. As we will see later in this book, in March 1946, he was killed by members of Fada’iyan-e Islam [the Devotees of Islam], while he was attending the court on the charge of challenging Islam. 273 Bazargan, Gom-Rahan: Hadithi Mofassal az Qoroon-e Wostai-e Masihiyat dar Ertebat ba Sure-i Hamd, 109–10. 274 Ibid., 100–1, footnotes. 275 Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 192. 276 Siavashi, 97. 277 Mahdi Bazargan and Gholam-’Ali Bazargan, Be’that va Dowlat, be Zamime-i Kheirat va Khadamat dar Jomhoori-e Islami Iran va Be’that dar Ejtema’ [Revival and State; Good Deeds and Services in the Islamic Republic of Iran; and Revival in Society] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar, 1359 [1980]), 21. 278 Mahdi Bazargan, Piroozi-e Hatmi dar Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Islam [The Doomed Victory of Islamic Global Government] (Tehran: Jahan-Ara), 52. 279 Bazargan, Be’that va Ideology, 116. 280 The third khalifa after the Prophet. 281 Respectively, the first and second khalifa after the Prophet. 282 An important war between Muslims and nonbelievers, in which Muslims were defeated and many of them were killed. 283 Two groups of early Muslims. Muhajereen, or the immigrants, were those who, due to their persecution by nonbelievers in Mecca, immigrated to Madina. Ansar were those who welcomed Muhajereen to their city, Madina, where the first Islamic society was established. 284 Bazargan, Bar-resi-e Nazariye-i Erich Fromm, 198–9. 285 Ibid. 286 In Islamic terminology, this group is called Ahl-e Hal va ‘Aqd. 287 Bazargan, Be’that va Ideology, 153. 288 Bazargan and Bazargan, Be’that va Dowlat, be Zamime-i Kheirat va Khadamat dar Jomhoori-e Islami Iran va Be’that dar Ejtema’, 13. 289 Bazargan, Be’that va Ideology, 116, footnotes. 290 Ibid., 160–71. 291 Mahdi Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan [Love and Worship or Thermodynamics of Man] (Tehran: Chap-e Sepehr, 1335 [1956]), 2–3. 292 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Khoda dar Ejtema’ [God in society]’, in Chahar Maqaleh, 90–1. This article was first published in 1949. 293 In mathematics, a quantity less than any finite quantity, yet not zero. 294 See Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar. 295 Ibid., 12. 296 Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan, 159.

Notes 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322

155

Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 216. Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan, 157. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 234. Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar, 134. Mahdi Bazargan, Bad va Baran dar Qur’an [Wind and Rain in the Koran] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar [1964]), 15–16. Ibid. See Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar. Sura As-Sajda, verse 7. Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 123. Ibid., 121–2. See Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh. Ibid., ‘Introduction’, two and three. Ibid., 150. Bazargan, ‘Khoda dar Ejtema’ ’, 68. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 93. Ibid., ‘Introduction’, six. Bazargan, ‘Introduction’, in Nik-Niazi, 2. Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar, 8–10. Ibid., 69–70. Ibid. See Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan’. Various types of religious taxation. See the Glossary. Bazargan, ‘Islam-e Javan’, 182. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 77. Ahkam-e Taharat, in Arabic and Persian. Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Introduction’, Motaharat dar Islam [Cleaners in Islam], 8th edn (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami-e Enteshar [1943]), 2–4. Ibid.

7 The methodology of working out the new approach 323 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Ba’zi Nazariyat-e Pishnahadi dar Zamine-i Ta’limat-e Dini [Some suggestions about religious education]’, in Ehtiaj-e Rooz [Today’s Need] (Qom: Nemayeshgah va Nashr-e Ketab, 1358 [1979]), 59–61. This book was first published in 1947. 324 As mentioned eariler, Bazargan was mainly concerned with the Iranian Shi’a, who may be able to read Arabic, but do not necessarily comprehend it. More importantly, the target of his criticism was mainly the Shi’ite community of his own time, rather than the Shi’ite faith as such. This and similar other criticisms by various other Shi’ite thinkers are taken seriously by the community, particularly in Iran. Hence, since the day that Bazargan, among others, criticized his co-religionists for neglecting the Koran, a development in order to bring the Koran back to the centre of religious discussions has begun, and the number of books and commentaries on the Koran has dramatically increased. 325 Sura Sad, verse 29. 326 Sura Al-Qamar, verses 17, 22, 32 and 40. 327 Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 81. 328 The sixth Shi’ite Imam, who had the most scholarly impact on the development of Shi’ite feqh, or jurisprudence.

156 Notes 329 Mahdi Bazargan, Bazgasht be Qur’an [Returning to the Koran], 4 vols (Tehran: Bongah-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab, 1360 [1981]), 81–2. 330 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Elteqat [Synthesizing Islam with non-Islamic views]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, i. 55–6. 331 Bazargan, ‘Elteqat’, 56. 332 Bazargan, ‘Introduction’, in Bazgasht be Qur’an, i. 14–15. 333 Bazargan, ‘Khod-Jooshi [Initiation]’, in Chahar Maqaleh, 222–3. 334 Bazargan, Bazgasht be Qur’an, i. 141. 335 Prophet Mohammad migrated to Madina, in 622 AD, which is the first year of the Islamic calendar. The revelation of the Koran to Prophet Mohammad began ten years before his immigration to Madina, when he was still in Mecca. 336 Bazargan, Bazgasht be Qur’an, i. 101–3. 337 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Del va Demagh [Heart and mind]’, Name-i Foroogh-e ‘Elm, vol. 1, nos 7, 8 and 9 (1329 [1950]). 338 Bazargan, Bazgasht be Qur’an, i. 339 Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid, 67. 340 Bazargan, ‘Mazhab dar Oroopa’, 29–37. 341 Ibid. 342 Ibid., 31–9. 343 Bazargan, Bazgasht be Qur’an, 17. 344 Bazargan, ‘Elteqat’, 48. 345 Ibid., 50 346 Ibid., 49. 347 Ibid., 55. 348 Ibid., 56–7. 349 Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, 418. 350 Bazargan, Modafe’at, 65–6. 351 For a short account of the influence of Greek philosophy on Islamic thought, see under ‘Islamic Philosophy’, Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 419–21. 352 As touched upon eariler, the People’s Mojahedin organization was founded by young and radical members of the Iran Freedom Movement, in 1965. The group was involved in urban guerrilla warfare with the Shah’s regime, until most of its leaders and activists were executed in May 1972. In their theoretical works, founders of the group relied heavily on Marxist terms and arguments. The group was not alone in adopting such an approach to Islam. As we have seen, the Socialist Theists and even more important thinkers, such as ‘Ali Shari’ati, adopted a more-or-less similar approach. 353 Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid, 61. 354 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Introduction’, in Andre´ Siegfried, Rooh-e Mellat-ha [The Spirit of Nations], translated into Persian by Ahmad Aram, 3rd edn (Fajr, 1354 [1975]), 6. The original title of the book in French is L’Âme des Peuples. 355 Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Sar-Cheshme-i Esteqlal [The origin of independence]’, in Nik-Niazi, 187. 356 Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, 436.

Notes

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357 Bazargan, Gom-Rahan: Hadithi Mofassal az Qoroon-e Wostai-e Masihiyat dar Ertebat ba Sure-i Hamd, 149. 358 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 2–3. 359 Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan, 67. 360 Ibid., 87. 361 Ibid., 105. 362 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 4, footnotes. 363 Bazargan, Bad va Baran dar Qur’an, 15–16. 364 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 79, footnotes. 365 Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 131. 366 See ibid. 122; Bazargan, Hokoomat-e Jahani-e Vahed, 38–9, Bazargan, ‘Be’that va Rah-hai-e Iman’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, ii. 205–6; and Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh. 367 Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid, 56–7. 368 Bazargan, Motaharat dar Islam, 56. 369 Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 120; also see Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan. 370 Bazargan, ‘Be’that va Rah-hai-e Iman’, 204. Bazargan refers to the Koranic verse where God says ‘We explain verses to people who deliberate.’ 371 Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, 436. 372 Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid, 41. 373 Bazargan, Be’that va Ideology, 196–7. 374 Bazargan, Eshq va Parastesh ya Thermodynamic-e Ensan, 181, footnotes. 375 Ibid., 2–3. 376 Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha be Zamime-i Ekhtiyar, 5–6. 377 Sura Saba, verse 6. 378 Sura Az-Zumar, verse 9. 379 Bazargan, Tawhid, Tabi’at, Takamol, 19–20. 380 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 68, footnotes. 381 Bazargan, Kar dar Islam va Iran, 3. 382 Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 140. 383 Bazargan, ‘Be’that va Rah-hai-e Iman’, 208. 384 Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 11, footnotes. 8 Formative factors in Bazargan’s approach to Islam 385 ‘Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Azadi: Khaste-i Abadi [Freedom: An eternal desire]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, iii. 373. 386 Bazargan, Enqelab-e Iran dar do Harakat, 20. 387 Bazargan, Afat-e Tawhid, 62–3. 388 In the Koran, the term taghoot symbolizes idolatry, ignorance and arrogance. 389 Bazargan, ‘Azadi: Khaste-i Abadi’, 373. 390 Bazargan, ‘Biganeh Parasti’, 97. 391 Sura Ar-Ra’d, verse 11. 392 Bazargan, Modafe’at, 169–70. 393 Bazargan, Kar dar Islam va Iran, 124 and 128.

158 Notes 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419

420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427

Bazargan, ‘Ba’zi Nazariyat-e Pishnahadi dar Zamine-i Ta’limat-e Dini’, 58. Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 98–9. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 63. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 118–19, footnotes. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 41. Ibid., 93. Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 38. Bazargan, ‘Serr-e Aqab Oftadegi-e Melal-e Mosalman’. Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 34. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 96. Be Yad-e Hamaseh Afarinan-e Davazdah-e Moharram, 44–5. Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, 19. Be Yad-i Hamaseh Afarinan-i Davazdah-i Moharram, 44–5. It is a tradition among Muslims, and particularly the Shi’a, to recite the Koran for their dead in graveyards, or to use it for making an augury. Bazargan, ‘Be’that va Rah-hai-e Iman’, 200. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 458. See Mahdi Bazargan, ‘Enqelab-e Islami va Enqelab-e Marxisti [Islamic revolution and Marxist revolution]’, in Baz-Yabi-e Arzesh-ha, ii. Ibid., 180. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 82–4. Bazargan, Dars-e Dindari, 103–4. Bazargan, ‘Be’that va Rah-hai-e Iman’, 203. Bazargan, ‘Elteqat’, 49. Bazargan, ‘Serr-e Aqab Oftadegi-e Melal-e Mosalman’, 135–6. Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 191. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 80–1. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 2–3. See Bazargan, Zarre-i Bi-Enteha. Pascal was a French mathematician, physicist, religious philosopher and writer. He was the founder of the modern theory of probabilities. His ideas on inner religion influenced Rousseau, Bergson and the Existentialists. He invented the first digital calculator, and is an important figure in the history of mechanics and thermodynamics. His studies in geometry, hydrodynamics, hydrostatic and atmospheric pressure led him to invent the syringe and the hydraulic press and to discover Pascal’s law of pressure (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Micropaedia, 10 vols (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1983), vii. 780). Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 67. Bazargan, ‘Chahar Ism’, 424. Bazargan, Modafe’at, 165. Bazargan, Azadi-e Hind, 160. Bazargan, Rah-e Tei Shodeh, 116. Bazargan, Afat-i Tawhid, 40. Siavashi, 88–9. Although Bazargan was eager to employ empirical sciences in his approach to religion as well as in examining social and political issues, there are not many references to social sciences and philosophy in his works. This is mainly, but not solely, because of his professional and

Notes

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educational background. Not only was he trained as an engineer, but also, given the influence of positivism and empiricism in his era, he was doubtful whether nonempirical sciences and particularly philosophy are of any pragmatic use. This does not mean that he did not use social sciences or philosophical terms, but that a systematic use of the latter disciplines cannot be seen in his works. 428 Habibollah Peiman, ‘Andishe va ‘Amal-e Bazargan dar Bestar-e Tahavolat-e Ejtema’i [Bazargan’s thought and practice in the context of social developments]’, Name [Letter], New Course, no. 5 (2002), 22–3. 429 For a comment about this point, see ‘Abdol-Karim Soroosh, ‘Adai-e Dain be Bazargan [Paying respect to Bazargan]’, Name [Letter], New Course, no. 5 (2002), 45–9. 9 History 430 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 3 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 3]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 16 (29/10/1358 [1980]), 4. 431 The author of Al-Ghadir, an important reference book on Shi’ite views on the issue of the succession to Prophet Mohammad. 432 Hossein Khosh-Niyat, Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi: Andishe-ha, Mobarezat va Shahadat-e Oo [Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavai: Thought, Struggles and Martyrdom] (Tehran: Manshoor-e Baradari Publications, 1360 [1981]), 19–21. 433 Ibid., 21–3. 434 Mohammed Hassanein Haykal, Iran: Kooh-e Atashfeshan [Iran: A Volcano] (Qom: Daftar-e Nashr-e ‘Adiat, the date of the introduction: 1358 [1979]), translated into Persian by Mohammad Asfia’i, 81–2. 435 Hassan Ayat, Negareshi Kotah bar Nehzat-e Melli-e Iran [A Short Review of Iran Nationalist Movement] (Qom: Daftar-e Entesharat-e Eslami, 1362 [1983]), 28. 436 See Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 11 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 11]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 24 (25/12/1358 [1980]), 4; Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 14 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 14]’ Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 27 (23/1/1359 [1980]), 5; and Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 15 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 15]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 28 (30/1/1359 [1980]), 2. 437 Special prayers, not required but performed by very devoted Muslims. 438 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 29 [To know the martyr,

160 Notes

439

440

441

442 443 444

445

446

447

Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 29]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 45 (24/5/1359 [1980]), 5. Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran, Yad-Name-i Bistomin Salgard-e Ta’sis-e Nehzat-e Azadi-e Iran [The Twentieth-Anniversary Commemoration of Establishing the Iran Freedom Movement], 21; also see ‘Navvab-e Safavi Khatab be Mossaddeq: Ma Kakh Neshinan-e London ra Biroon Nakardim ke Kakh Neshinan-e Washington Jaygozin-e Anha Shavand [Navvab-e Safavi addressing Mossaddeq: We did not expel the British to give their place to the Americans]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 46 (1/6/1359 [1980]), 2. Fada’iyan claimed that they threatened Members of Parliament that if they did not approve the draft, they would be killed (see ‘Interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii: Yadvare-i Shahid Navvab-e Safavi [The commemoration of the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi]’, Ettela’at, no. 16337 (27/10/1359 [1981]), 13). ‘Asrar-e Ekhtelaf-e Fada’iyan-e Islam va Hokoomat Mossaddeq va Terore Hossein Fatemi [The secrets of the differences between Fada’iyan-e Islam and the Mossaddeq government, and the assassination of Hossein Fatemi]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 62 (6/10/1359 [1980]), 2. ‘Interview with ‘Ezzatollah Sahabi: Yadvare-i Shahid Navvab-e Safavi [The commemoration of the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi]’, Ettela’at, no. 16337 (27/10/1359 [1981]), 6–7. ‘Interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii: Yadvare-i Shahid Navvab-e Safavi [The commemoration of the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi]’, Ettela’at, no. 16337 (27/10/1359 [1981]), 2. ‘Imperialist-ha bar sar-e Gharat-e Ma Ekhtelaf Nadarand, Ekhtelafeshan bar sar-e Taqsim-e Ghanaem Ast [The imperialists do not have any dispute over plundering us, their dispute is over how to divide the booty among themselves]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 47 (8/6/1359 [1980]), 4. ‘Interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii’, Ettela’at, 4, and ‘Parcham-e Zolm va Setam Sarnegoon, Kakh-e Jenayat Viran, Fath-e Qat’i dar Entezar-e Ma Ast [The banner of cruelty may be fallen, the palace of crime may be destroyed, doomed victory is ours]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 9 (12/2/1332 [1953]), 4; and ‘Sarbazan-e Qur’an be Soy-e Nejat-e Din va Vatan be Pish [Oh soldiers of the Koran! Go ahead towards the deliverance of the religion and homeland]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 14 (3/5/1332 [1953]), 2. ‘Interview with Sahabi, Ettela’at’; and Gholam-Reza Nejati, Jonbesh-e Melli Shodan-e San’at-e Naft Iran va Kodetai-e 28 Mordad 32 [The Movement for the Nationalization of the Iranian Petroleum Industry and the 1953 Coup] (Tehran: Sherkat Sahami-e Enteshar, 1365 [1986]), 90. ‘Ayatollah Kashani ba Halat ‘Asabani be Yeki az A’zai Dovlat Nesbat be Feshar bar Fada’iyan-e Islam Jeddan E’teraz Kard [Ayatollah Kashani angrily protested to a Cabinet member because of government pressure on Fada’iyan-e Islam]’, Nabard Mellat [The Nation’s Struggle], no. 29 (4/7/1330 [1951]), 2.

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448 ‘Fada’iyan-e Islam va Hokomat-e Mossaddeq [Fada’iyan-e Islam and Mossaddeq’s government]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 70 (2/12/1359 [1981]), 2. 449 Nejati, Jonbesh Melli Shodan-e San’at-e Naft Iran va Kodetai-e 28 Mordad 32, 90. 450 ‘Imperialist-ha bar sar-e Gharat-e Ma Ekhtelaf Nadarand, Ekhtelafeshan bar sar-e Taqsim-e Ghanaem Ast’. 451 ‘Movqef-e Fada’iyan-e Islam dar Enqelab-e Islami [Fada’iyan-e Islam’s stance towards the Islamic Revolution]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 116 (13/11/1360 [1982]), 3. 452 ‘Abdol-Hossein Vahedi, ‘Be Soy-e Astan-e Fazilat Parvar-e Hazrat-e Navvab Bar Migardam [I return to his Excellency, Navvab]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 12 (20/4/1332 [1953]), 4. 453 See Khosh-Niyat. 454 ‘Interview with Ezatollah Sahabi’, Ettela’at, 6–7. 455 Khosh-Niyat, 57. 456 ‘Interview with Ezatollah Sahabi’, Ettela’at, 7. 10 A militant approach to Islam 457 Seyyed Mojtaba Navvab-e Safavi, Ettela’iy’i az Barname-i Enqelabi-e Fada’iyan-e Islam [The Announcement of the revolutionary Programme of Fada’iyan-e Islam] (1357 [1979]), 3rd edn, 77. 458 Ibid. 459 Hoori Khazra’i, ‘Khorafe: Moriyane-i Maktab-e Islam: Mazhab ‘alieh Mazhab, Mazhabi Now va Maktabi Jadid va Movhoom ‘alieh Haqiqat [Superstitions: Undermining Islam]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 28 (30/1/1359 [1980]), 6. 460 See Navvab, 17. 461 Khosh-Niyat, 217. 462 Bed’at, or bringing illegitimate innovations into Islamic teachings, is strictly prohibited in Islam. 463 Navvab, 83. 464 Author’s interview with Seyyed Mohammad ‘Ali Lavasani. 465 Khosh-Niyat, 52 and 217. 466 Navvab, 16–17. Traditionally, there is no ordination procedure for the Shi’ite clergy, and virtually anybody can become a clergyman, without being ordained by higher authorities or without going through a clerical education system. Nevertheless, there have been some reforms to regulate this process in recent decades, beginning with the introduction by Ayatollah Boroojerdi of written exams at various stages of clerical education. 467 Ibid. 468 Two ways of determining punishment for a violation of Islamic rules. 469 Author’s interview with Lavasani. 470 Ibid. 471 Author’s interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii. 472 Navvab, 17 and 25. 473 Author’s interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii. 474 Author’s interview with Lavasani.

162 Notes 475 Khosh-Niyat, 210. 476 ‘Pari-rooz va Dirooz va Emrooz: ‘Ebrati baray-e Farda [Today, yesterday and the day before: Lessons for tomorrow]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 14 (16/12/1331 [1953]), 1–2. 477 Navvab, 56. 478 Ibid. 479 Author’s interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii. 480 ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 0 [no. 1] (9/12/1331 [1953]), 1–2. 481 See ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 4 (1/1/1332 [1953]), 2. 482 Ibid. 483 ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 3 (23/12/1331 [1953]), 4. 484 See ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 5 (15/1/1332 [1953]), 3. 485 ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’ Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 6 (22/1/1332 [1953]), 2. 486 Navvab, 25–6. 487 Ibid., 78, and ‘Islam va Eqtesad [Islam and economy]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 5 (15/1/1332 [1953]), 3. 488 Navvab, the chapter on ‘The Ministry of Culture’. 489 Ibid., 18 and 23. 490 ‘Nejat-e Keshti-e Toofan Zade-i Iran Tanha dar Saye-i Parcham-e Islam va be Dast-e Farzandan-e Islam Khahad Bood [Only under the banner of Islam and by the strife of Muslims can Iran be saved]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 10 (19/2/1332 [1953]), 2. 491 Khosh-Niyat, 93. 492 Author’s interview with Lavasani. ‘Bringing Islamic Denominations Together’, or ‘Dar al-Taqrib al-Mazahib al-Islamieh’, was an initiative taken by Shiekh Mahmood Shaltoot, Egypt’s Grand Mufti. In Iran, Grand Ayatollah Boroojerdi welcomed the idea. 493 Khosh-Niyat, 148–9. 494 ‘Navvab-e Safavi va Ekhvan al-Muslemin [Navvab-e Safavi and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 6 (28/7/1358 [1979]), 4. 11 Social and political factors influencing Fada’iyan’s thought 495 ‘Interview with ‘Abd-e Khodaii’, Ettela’at, 5. ‘Abd-e Khodaii goes on to say, ‘After a division within Fada’iyan-e Islam, and when Navvab expelled some members from the group, only two persons remained who attended hajj. After a while, the two also left the group. Then, Vahedi ironically told Navvab that it seemed nobody who can afford to go to hajj could stay with us.’ In that period, lower class people could not afford to travel to Mecca. 496 Khosh-Niyat, 22, from Fada’iyan’s first public announcement. 497 ‘Nejat-e Keshti-e Toofan Zadeh Iran Tanha dar Saye-i Parcham-e Islam va be Dast-e Farzandan-e Islam Khahad Bood’, 1.

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498 For instance, see ‘Dar Hokomat-e Azadikhah!!! Shovravi, Pezeshkan-e Mo’alej-e Mardom ra ke dar Miyan-e Mellat-ha Movred-e Ehteramand, Shekanje Midahand [Under the freedom-loving Soviet regime!!! Doctors, who are respectable among all nations, are tortured]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 6 (22/1/1332 [1953]), 4. 499 ‘Shir-e Jiani dar Matam-kade-i Kakh [The lion in jail]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], no. 13 (27/4/1332 [1953]), 3. 500 Navvab, 6. 501 Ibid., 14, 59 and 72–3. 502 ‘Asnad-e Vezarat-e Jang: Yadvare-i Shahid Navvab-e Safavi [Ministry of War’s documents: The commemoration of the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi]’, Ettela’at, no. 16337 (27/10/1359 [1981]), 8. 503 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 3 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 3]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 16 (29/10/1359 [1981]), 4. 504 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 14 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 14]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 27 (23/1/1359 [1980]), 2. 505 ‘Chera Mossalahane Mijangidim? [Why were we engaged in the armed struggle?]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 2 (1/6/1358 [1979]), 2. 506 Mahdi ‘Abd-e Khodaii, ‘Shahid Navvab-e Safavi ra Beshenasim: Fada’iyan-e Islam az Aghaz ta be Emrooz – 29 [To know the martyr, Navvab-e Safavi: Fada’iyan-e Islam from the beginning to now – 29]’, Manshoor-e Baradari [The Charter of Brotherhood], New Course, no. 45 (24/5/1359 [1980]), 5. 507 ‘Interview with Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani: Yadvare-i Shahid Navvab-e Safavi [The commemoration of the Martyr, Navvab-e Safavi]’, Ettela’at, no. 16337 (27/10/1359 [1981]), 10. 508 Navvab, 83. 509 Khosh-Niyat, 140. Conclusion 510 Nevertheless, Muslim thinkers have usually cautioned Muslims about relying too much on reason and sciences. Afterword 511 In recent years, there has been a tendency in the West to take the current wave of Islamic fundamentalism as the only true representative of Islam. For instance, Roger Scruton, the British conservative philosopher, tries to find the roots of the events of 11 September 2001, in Islam itself. According to him, ‘Islamism’, that is, Islam embraced as an allencompassing ideology, is ‘not an accidental product of the crisis that Islam is currently undergoing’, but should be considered as the representative of

164 Notes something broader and older. He believes that ‘the fundamental tenets of the faith must be borne in mind by those who wish to understand the terrorist movements’. He diagnoses the problem of Islam as, on the one hand, the problem of excessive politics, that is, the politicization of everything, and, on the other, the ‘confiscation of the political’, viz. the subordination of politics to the divine law (See Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (London: Continuum International Publishing Group 2002)). The discussions of this book, however, show that even some advocates of political Islam do not believe in what Scruton attributes to Islam.

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Index

Abd al-Nasser, General Gamal 56, 120 ‘Abd-e Khodaii, Mahdi 119, 124, 131 Abu-Bakr 80, 141 Ahmad Shah 45, 46 Al-Ahmad, Jalal 43 ‘Alam, Assadollah 65 Amini, ‘Ali 20, 64, 65 Amini, Ayatollah ‘Abdol-Hossein 115, 130 angel(s) 87 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 16, 42 Ashtiyani, Jalal ad-Din 13–15, 24–6, 28, 29, 31–3, 35–7, 39, 44 awaiting/awaited 69, 73, 124, 135, 139 Azad, ‘Abdol-Qadir 16, 17, 140 Bacon, Francis 99 Bahai 14, 50, 116, 139 al-Banna, Hassan 131 Baqaii, Hossein 16, 17, 140 Bazaar 19, 51, 62, 74, 117, 122, 127 Bazargan, Mahdi 5, 6, 19, 20, 36, 37, 59–111, 135, 136 Behbahani, Seyyed Mohammad 53 Boroojerdi, Ayatollah Hossein 52, 118, 130, 161, 162 bourgeoisie 24, 48, 49 Britain 16, 42–5, 110, 140

capitalism/capitalist 11, 24, 29, 33, 55, 103, 110, 125 Christian(s)/Christianity 15, 24, 25, 32, 49, 71, 75, 78, 79, 92, 93, 129, 141 church 30, 36, 49, 63, 71, 134 class struggle/division 29, 46, 47, 51, 56, 103, 134 clergy 4, 19, 23–5, 31, 32, 35, 46, 48, 50–6, 59, 65, 67, 70, 71, 74, 79, 86, 105, 108, 109, 111, 113, 115, 116, 122, 123–7, 129–31, 135, 136, 142; militant 4, 51, 52, 71; royalist 14, 53; traditional 7 colonial 42, 83, 125, 128; colonialism 39, 65, 75, 102, 106, 109, 127, 136; colonialist(s) 43, 65 communism/communist 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 55, 56, 65, 77, 102, 107, 117, 118, 119, 125 Confederation of Iranian Students in the USA 20, 21 Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1906) 1, 2, 3, 4, 45, 46, 51, 70, 104, 110 Crusades 128 democracy 5, 11, 26, 32, 33, 44, 46, 55, 64, 77, 79–81, 103, 134–6, 138 Descartes, René 99 despotism 1, 3, 41, 45, 46, 133, 135, 136

174 Index determinism 28, 30 dialectic(s)/dialectical 30, 54, 55 dictatorship 45, 46, 80 equality 33, 44, 77, 78, 107, 110, 135 Europe/European(s) 17, 32, 37, 42, 43, 49, 54, 55, 62, 63, 70, 71, 75, 94, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110 faith 2, 14, 23, 28, 35, 49, 52, 56, 69, 74, 76, 78, 79, 93, 97, 98, 106, 108, 111, 133, 139, 155, 163 fatalism 4, 51, 68, 69, 135 Fatemi, Hossein 119 feqh 24, 70, 73, 74, 80, 92, 123, 124, 139, 140, 155 feudal/feudalism 24, 48, 77 First World War 45, 63 France 62, 63, 109 freedom 13–14, 16, 19, 20–1, 26, 32–3, 44–6, 49, 77–81, 93, 102–3, 110, 117, 122, 125, 129, 134–6, 138 French Revolution 77 fundamentalism/fundamentalist 1, 5, 53, 111, 113, 138 Gilan 45, 55 God 11, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 37, 46, 51, 56, 64, 68–80, 82–7, 91, 93, 95, 99, 100, 103, 110, 111, 125, 130, 134, 136, 152–4, 157 Ha’eri-Zadeh, Abol-Hassan 16, 17, 140 Hajir, ‘Abdol-Hossein 16, 117 hajj 70, 73, 124, 135, 139, 149, 152, 162 Hallaj, Manssour 79, 154 hijab 116, 139 Hossein, Imam 31, 51, 69, 82, 123, 139, 141 hypocrisy 50, 51, 69, 108 ideology 4, 7, 18, 22, 42, 43, 50, 67, 93, 107, 111, 131; political 4, 7, 111

ijtihad 38, 39, 70, 71, 92, 134, 135, 139, 140 Imam 25, 26, 31, 37, 48, 51, 69, 73, 77–9, 80–2, 91, 99, 103, 116, 117, 122–4, 127, 139–41 Imami, Hossein 116, 117, 127 imperialism/imperialist(s) 43, 50, 65, 106, 110, 131 India 76, 105, 109 individualism 33, 55, 70, 134 inquisition 69, 79 instruments of production 25 intellectual 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 14, 17, 18, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 50, 54–7, 59, 61, 63, 67, 69, 93, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106, 108, 110, 113, 129–32, 134, 137, 138, 148 Iraq 52, 53, 115, 116, 120 Iran Party 17–22, 44, 63, 64 Islamic economy 97, 124, 125 Islamic Republic of Iran 1, 77, 111, 136, 138 Islamic Revolution of Iran (1979) 1, 2, 4, 5, 21, 59, 60, 121, 133, 145 Jew(s)/Jewish 24, 25, 128, 141, 152; Judaism 15, 151 jihad 70, 92 Jinah, Mohammad ‘Ali 76 jinn 87 justice 4, 14, 26, 29, 31, 40, 44, 69, 77, 78, 82, 93, 103, 105, 107, 115, 134, 137, 138; social 5, 11, 33, 48, 56, 134; injustice 26, 124, 140 Kashani, Ayatollah Seyyed Abol-Qassem 3, 16–18, 53, 62, 116–20 Kassravi, Ahmad 49, 79, 106, 115, 116 Kennedy, John F. 19, 65 khilafat 74, 77, 140; khalifa 80, 81, 139–41, 154 Khomeini, Ayatollah Rohollah 1, 5, 20, 59, 65, 66, 121, 124, 137, 138 Koran 8, 24–6, 32, 35, 36, 38, 62, 67, 68, 70–5, 77–83, 85–7, 90–3, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 106, 123, 129, 133, 135

Index 175 Lenin 28, 29 liberalism 33, 44, 54, 55, 110, 135 love 64, 68, 78, 79, 82, 88, 96, 141, 151 Mahdi, Imam 69, 73, 78, 122, 124, 140 Maki, Hossein 16, 17, 63, 140 Maleki, Khalil 19 martyr/martyrdom 4, 92, 139 Marxism/Marxist 3, 6, 11, 13, 14, 17, 25–9, 35, 43, 47, 49, 50, 52, 54–6, 59, 63, 94, 106–8, 110, 129, 134, 137, 146, 156 materialism 11, 14, 18, 25, 28–30, 35, 47, 51, 55, 56, 83, 95, 107 metaphysics/metaphysical 24, 54 Middle Ages 36, 54, 79 miracle(s) 24, 85, 97 Mirza Kochek Khan 45 Modarres, Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan 45 modernism/modernist(s) 1, 2, 3, 5, 67, 73, 104, 105, 110, 138 Mohammad ‘Ali Shah of the Qajars 45 Mohammad, Prophet 8, 9, 23, 31, 37, 39, 79, 80, 84, 91, 99, 123, 124, 139–42, 147, 151–3, 156, 159 monotheism 30, 37, 40, 46, 47, 56, 86 mosque 48, 74, 110, 117, 130 Mossaddeq, Mohammad 16–18, 20, 42, 52, 53, 118–20, 122, 128, 140 Motahari, Ayatollah Morteza 53, 59, 72 Mozaffar ad-Din Shah of the Qajars 45 Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian Islamic Party 120, 130, 131 Nahjolbalaghe 26, 145 Najaf 115, 116 Nakhshab, Mohammad 3, 5, 11, 14–20, 25–31, 33, 35–7, 51 National Front 16, 18, 19, 31, 62, 63, 117, 118, 120, 130, 141; National Front II 19, 20, 21, 53,

64, 65, 141; National Front III 20, 21, 53, 65, 141 nationalism/nationalist 8, 13, 17–19, 31, 42, 44, 45, 62, 63, 75, 83, 107, 110, 118, 119, 122, 126, 128, 132, 140, 141 Nation of Iran Party 64, 65 Navvab-e Safavi, Seyyed Mojtaba 3, 5, 53, 113, 115–31 Noori, Sheikh Fazlollah 52 ‘Omar 80, 141 open market 33 ‘Othman 80, 141 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 53, 66 Pahlavi, Reza Shah/Reza Khan 1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 14, 42, 43, 46, 48–50, 52, 61, 101, 104, 115, 118, 129 Palestine 117, 131 Pan-Arabism 126 Pan-Islamist 128 Pascal, Blaise 83, 109, 158 patriotism 8, 24, 44; patriot(s) 49, 65; patriotic 8, 31, 102, 103, 107 Peiman, Habibollah 21–3, 26, 32, 38–40, 47 People’s Mojahedin Organization 5, 59, 94, 111, 156 philosophy 36, 54, 55, 74, 94, 99, 100, 109, 156, 158, 159; Greek 94, 99, 100, 109, 156; Islamic 14; philosophical(ly) 11, 14, 24, 26, 29, 34, 36–8, 50, 54, 56, 57, 68, 94, 100, 130, 151, 159 political Islam 4, 5, 7, 137, 138; apolitical Islam 104; politicized Islam 4, 7, 8, 56, 131 poverty 26, 33, 39, 40, 46–8, 125–7, 133, 134, 136, 137 progress 2, 17, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 35–7, 40, 47, 49, 54, 55, 65, 86, 93, 100, 107, 109, 133 proletariat 44 promotion/ing virtues and prevention/ing vices 53, 70, 82, 124, 141

176 Index Prophet Mohammad’s Household 68, 87, 91, 98, 123, 141, 151 Qajar Dynasty 50, 52 Qavam as-Saltane 17, 53 Qom 8, 116, 118, 123 quietism 3, 113, 138 radical 4, 5, 8, 20, 53, 59, 65, 66, 104, 111, 113, 138, 141 Razi, Hossein 15, 17, 18, 20–2 Razm-Ara, General ‘Ali 53, 118 reactionary 24; antireactionary 31 reform(s)/reforming 7, 11, 14, 23, 27, 33, 35, 47–9, 53, 61, 65, 75, 104, 123, 137, 150; reformism/reformist(s) 2, 3, 20, 60, 90, 105, 122, 135, 145, 150 reinterpret 7, 23, 25, 35, 59, 71, 72, 90, 135, 137 Renaissance 110 resurrect/resurrection 84, 85, 86–8, 97, 99, 100 revelation 75, 80, 91, 92, 95, 97, 98 revolution 28, 29, 44, 45, 47, 55, 59, 77, 78, 81, 105 Russia/Russian 29, 41–3, 45, 55, 56, 115, 120, 128 Russian Revolution of 1917 42, 55 Sadeq, Imam 91 Safavid Dynasty 3, 52, 74, 115 Sahabi, ‘Ezzatollah 119 Sahabi, Yadollah 19, 20, 61, 62, 64, 135 Saleh, Allah-yar 20 Sami, Kazem 21, 39, 64 Satan 78, 87, 97 sciences: empirical 36–7, 54, 59, 82–3, 89, 94–6, 98, 109, 111, 135, 158–9; social 37, 54, 158, 159 Second World War 13, 42, 43, 47, 115, 116, 128 self-alienation 26, 33, 40, 63, 75 Shahabi, Mahmood 3, 61 Shari’ati, ‘Ali 6, 11, 18, 72, 137, 156 Shari’ati, Mohammad Taqi 3, 61 Shi’a 48, 68, 69, 74, 90, 91, 116, 123, 139–41, 145, 151; Shi’ism 37, 68, 115; Shi’ite 3, 4,

25, 31, 38, 46, 51, 52, 69, 73, 74, 80, 91, 99, 105, 106, 113, 115, 118, 123–5, 129, 130, 138–43, 145, 150–2, 155 socialism 5, 11, 14, 18, 23, 25–31, 33, 37–41, 44, 47, 48, 55–7, 78, 134, 135 Soroosh, ‘Abdol-Karim 59 Soviet Union/Soviet 11, 17, 27, 42, 43, 47, 49, 55, 107, 115, 120, 128, 148 Sunna 38, 80, 91, 141, 142 Sunni 3, 68, 79, 80, 87, 139–41 superstitious 23, 35, 49, 51, 86, 109; superstition(s) 11, 23, 25, 30, 37, 50, 62, 88, 93, 108, 109, 122, 123, 130, 133–5, 151 superstructure 25, 28 Tabataba’i, Seyyed Zia’ 45 Tabriz 45, 62 taghoot 103, 157 Tahmasebi, Khalil 118, 120, 127 Taleqani, Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmood 3, 20, 53, 61, 62, 64, 66, 67, 149 taqhieh 69, 142 Taqi-Zadeh, Hassan 63, 94 technology 37, 39, 54, 126, 127, 131, 133, 136 Tehran 8, 14–16, 18, 19, 22, 44, 45, 50, 51, 61–4, 66, 106, 107, 115, 117 Tehran University 50, 61, 63, 64, 106 theocracy 32, 76 thermodynamic(s) 82, 84, 85, 88, 95, 96, 98, 158 Toodeh Party 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 43, 47, 49, 50, 52, 56, 63, 106, 107, 117–19 traditional/traditionalist(s) 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 23–5, 31, 35, 50–3, 59, 62, 67, 71, 72, 90, 108, 113, 122, 126, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 150 truth 3, 14, 26, 31, 32, 44, 46, 50, 54, 61, 62, 68, 71–4, 81–3, 85–7, 92, 97, 99, 100, 105, 108, 111, 122, 154; truthful 24 tyranny 2, 46, 77, 78, 102, 103, 123, 134

Index 177 ‘Ulama 3, 24, 51, 52, 74, 81, 89, 108, 113, 116, 123–5, 130, 139, 142 United States of America 17, 19, 20, 21, 43, 44, 118, 119, 128 unity of Islamic denominations 126 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 110

West/Western 1, 2, 8, 19, 27, 33, 34, 41, 42, 44, 47–9, 54, 55, 63, 64, 70, 81, 93, 94, 102, 104–10, 115, 126–9, 130, 131, 133–6, 163; Westernized 2, 3, 31, 49, 52, 106, 108, 132, 133 White Revolution 55, 65, 150

Vahedi, ‘Abdol-Hossein 119, 120, 121, 127, 162 Vahedi, Mohammad 120 virtue 30, 53, 69, 70, 73, 82, 86, 124, 141

Zahedi, Fazlollah 120 Zanjani, Ayatollah Abol-Fazl 53, 66 Zanjani, Ayatollah Reza 19 Zolqadr, Mozaffar-‘Ali 120