The First Miracle Drugs: How the Sulfa Drugs Transformed Medicine
JOHN E. LESCH
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
The First M...
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The First Miracle Drugs: How the Sulfa Drugs Transformed Medicine
JOHN E. LESCH
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
The First Miracle Drugs
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THE FIRST MIRACLE DRUGS How the Sulfa Drugs Transformed Medicine
JOHN E. LESCH
1 2007
3 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright © 2007 by John E. Lesch Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lesch, John E. [date] The first miracle drugs : how the sulfa drugs transformed medicine / John E. Lesch. p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13 978-0-19-518775-5 ISBN 0-19-518775-X 1. Sulphonamides—Therapeutic use—History. 2. Antibacterial agents—History. I. Title. [DNLM: 1. Sulfonamides—history. 2. Bacterial Infections—drug therapy. 3. History, 20th Century. 4. Sulfonamides—therapeutic use. QV 265 L625f 2006] RM666.S88L47 2006 615'.32938—dc22 2005036136
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For Paula
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Preface
e live in an age of powerful medicinal drugs. Antibiotics cure or prevent bacterial infections, diuretics and other medicines help to control hypertension, antiretrovirals add years to the lives of those infected with HIV. The list of substances that cure or palliate our ills is very long and getting longer every year. This book is one historian’s attempt to understand how we arrived at such a place, which is unprecedented in the long history of medicine and humanity before the twentieth century. I have concluded that the answer lies in the industrialization of science and medicine, and that within this historical process the introduction of the sulfa drugs in the 1930s was the event that did most to set us on our present course. My path to this conclusion was not a direct one. This book had its origins in reflections on the relationships of industrialization and science that began in graduate school with my reading of Jerome R. Ravetz’s Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems. What did it mean to say that science became industrialized, I wondered, and what were the ramifications and limitations of such a line of analysis? Joined to my prior interest in the relationships of the laboratory sciences and medicine, such questions drew me eventually to the history of medicinal drugs and the pharmaceutical industry. I chose to work on the sulfa drugs because their study promised to allow exploration of issues surrounding industrialization of science and medicine, because their importance seemed out of all proportion to the slight attention they had received in the historical literature, and because it was clear from the very beginning of the project that the crucial role played by research in several national settings would permit, indeed would require, comparative analysis and study of transnational connections in medicine and science. As I moved further into the research and writing, the pivotal role of the sulfa drugs in initiating the modern era of medicinal drugs emerged with increasing clarity.
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viii preface Little did I know what I was getting into. I am an admirer and sometime reader of Charles Dickens, but never thought of myself as a Dickensian character until I read David Copperfield and discovered Dr. Strong. Headmaster of a school that David attends, Dr. Strong works at compiling a dictionary of roots—not, as David at first thinks, of the botanical kind, but rather of the etymological variety. What caught my eye was not the nature of the project, but the pace at which it was prosecuted. Taking note of this, one of Dr. Strong’s students does a simple calculation and finds that his dictionary will likely be completed in one thousand six hundred and forty-nine years. While I suspect that, from time to time colleagues, family and friends have performed similar calculations on my book, I am glad to report that it has come in substantially ahead of the figure projected for Dr. Strong. In the course of this work, I have accumulated many debts (another Dickensian motif?) that I can only begin to acknowledge here. Funding for research, and for the invaluable leaves from teaching that make it possible, has come at different times from the National Science Foundation (SES 81-11985 and SES-8409848), the National Institutes of Health (NIH-R01 LM04231), the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, and, on two occasions, University of California–Berkeley Humanities Research Fellowships. I have also benefited from research assistantship support from the Center for German and European Studies at UC Berkeley and from numerous small grants from the UC Berkeley Academic Senate’s Committee on Research. Parts of this book have been published in different form. I am glad to have this occasion to thank the editors Seymour H. Mauskopf, Chemical Sciences in the Modern World (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), and Gregory J. Higby and Elaine C. Stroud, The Inside Story of Medicines: A Symposium (American Institute of the History of Pharmacy, 1997), for invitations to the conferences that gave rise to these books and for their help in bringing my contributions to publication. This book would not exist without the resources of numerous archives and libraries and the skills and generosity of their staffs. These include, more or less in order of their appearance in the notes, the Alan Mason Chesney Medical Archives of the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, with special thanks to Nancy McCall; the Bayer Archive in Leverkusen, Germany, where I was assisted during my visit by Peter Göb, and subsequently by Michael Pohlenz; the Nobel Archives in Stockholm; the Hoover Institution Library in Stanford; and the Archives of the Institut Pasteur, Paris. In London, Malcolm Goodson and Robert J. Moore facilitated my research at the Medical Research Council Archives. At the Royal Society Archives, I was helped by Mary Sampson and Sandra Cumming; at the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, by William F. Bynum; and at the Contemporary Scientific Archives Centres in London and Oxford, by J.G.A. Sheppard and by Margaret Gowing and J.B. Alton, respectively. My visit to the May & Baker Archives at Rhône-Poulenc-Rorer (now Sanofiaventis) in Dagenham, United Kingdom, was greatly facilitated by Peter J.T. Morris, who first made me aware of its collections, and by John Salmon (then of RhônePoulenc-Rorer), who also helped to put me in touch with individuals who had been involved in research and development on M&B 693. Jeffrey Sturchio helped
preface ix to arrange my visit to the Merck Archives in Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, where Joe Ciccone and Amber Olterzewski responded readily to my various requests for information and documents. Many people assisted my research at the National Archives in Washington, DC, among them notably John Taylor and George Wagner at the Modern Military Branch. Thanks are due also to Michael G. Rhode at the National Museum of Health and Medicine, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, DC, for location of a photograph used in chapter 10. Finally, I am grateful to the staff of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, for their help with the Donald Devereux Woods papers. I have depended heavily on other libraries, not for archival materials but for their rich collections of published sources and skilled and responsive staffs. Especially important for this project have been the libraries of the University of California–Berkeley, the Lane Medical Library of Stanford University, the Kalmanovitz Library of the University of California–San Francisco, and the National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, Maryland. The Department of History of the University of California–Berkeley has been a wonderful intellectual environment in which to work, and I am grateful to a succession of chairs of the department for their steady support of this project. No less important has been the intellectual community and material support provided by UC Berkeley’s Office for History of Science and Technology. I am especially grateful to its directors, John Heilbron, Roger Hahn, and Cathryn Carson, and its excellent administrator, Diana Wear, for their assistance in a myriad of ways over the years. Margaret Anderson, John Parascandola, John Swann, and Paula Fass read the whole manuscript of this book in its penultimate version and offered detailed and valuable comments that have made the final version better than it might have been. I have not been able to incorporate all of their suggestions, but I am grateful for their insights and, in several instances, for their corrections of errors. The faults that remain are, of course, entirely my responsibility. Many others have had a hand in this book, by reading and commenting on parts, by helping to locate sources, or in other ways. Among them are Matthew Bailey, Marcel H. Bickel, Gert Brieger, Glenn Bugos, Adele Clarke, Gerald D. Feldman, Tore Frängsmyr, Robert Frank, Jordan Goodman, Mirko D. Grmek, J.F. Hodgson, Ernest Hook, Thomas P. Hughes, Jeffrey Alan Johnson, Jonathan Liebenau, Patrick Malloy, Maria Mavroudi, Michael Miers, Harry M. Marks, E.W. Parnell, Scott Podolsky, Karen Reeds, Wolfgang Sadee, Arlene Shaner, Judy Slinn, Doreen Strang, Molly Sutphen, Andrew Taylor, R.F.B. Welford, and Christine Woollett. My thinking on the problems and themes of this book has been developed and sharpened in countless classroom presentations and discussions, and for that I am glad to thank my students. It is something of a cliché in academia that teaching and research should benefit one another. In this case there is no doubt of the fact. Students have contributed to this project in a more direct way, as research assistants or by helping to enter my longhand drafts on the computer. My thanks go to Jesse Berrett, Renee Coury, Ki Won Han, Marianne Miller, Julia Rechter, Jonna Van Zanten, and Alex Wellerstein. For typing and other crucial tasks, I am also
x preface indebted to Department of History staff at different stages of the project, especially Nadine Ghammache and Sherrill Young. Going from a manuscript to a book is in itself a process of many stages, and I am indebted to the people at Oxford University Press who have made it happen. Special thanks go to Jeffrey House, who first welcomed the manuscript; to my editor, Carrie Pedersen, who managed its progress with diplomacy, skill, and good feeling; to Regan Hofmann, who with energy and tact kept me focused on the task at hand; to my copyeditor, Trish Watson; and to Keith Faivre, who managed the book’s production. More important than anything else has been the support of my family. My daughter Bibi and my son Charlie literally grew up with this project, and their presence has made the journey a wonderful one at every stage. In numerous conversations around the dinner table, Charlie urged me to find ways to make the book more accessible, and Bibi has inspired me with her own enthusiasm for science and medical research. Paula Fass has been there from the beginning, encouraging, admonishing, reading, and criticizing drafts and accommodating my work in many other ways in the midst of our family life and her own very busy career. We have made this trip together, and I gladly dedicate this book to her.
Contents
Introduction 3 Part I 1 2 3
Beginnings 15 A System of Invention 40 Prontosil 51
Part II 4 5 6 7 8
The Making of the First Miracle Drugs
Into the Maelstrom 71 Accommodation and Survival 92 Pathways of Recognition 122 M&B 693 158 Acclaim and Expansion 184
Part III 9 10 11 12
The Industrial Origins of Prontosil
Practice and Theory
At War 207 Trial by Fire 222 A Mechanism Revealed 251 The Sulfa Drugs and Twentieth-Century Medicine 269 Notes 293 Index 349
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The First Miracle Drugs
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Introduction
n Christmas Day 1932, the German chemical combine I.G. Farbenindustrie filed a patent application on behalf of a red dye that its medical researchers and chemists had found to have a remarkable ability to cure certain kinds of bacterial infections in mice. By the time the patent was awarded just over two years later, the dye, now called by the trade name Prontosil, had been found to have the same curative powers in humans. Announced in a brief publication in a German medical journal in February 1935 by Gerhard Domagk, the medical researcher responsible for the work, Prontosil went on the market and became available to doctors in April 1935. In retrospect, it is clear that the introduction of Prontosil marked a turning point in the history of medicine. As the first of the compounds called sulfonamides or, more familiarly, sulfa drugs, Prontosil initiated a revolution in the therapeutics and management of bacterial infections. Within a few years, feared diseases such as streptococcal infections (including childbed fever and septicemia), pneumonia, meningitis, dysentery, gonorrhea, and urinary tract infections, were brought under a substantial measure of control by chemotherapy. The medical success of the sulfa drugs gave a powerful impetus to the expansion of the international pharmaceutical industry and of the research and development enterprise within it. The same success contributed heavily to the opening of what was widely referred to as an era of miracle drugs, with its attendant optimism and raised expectations of medicine, accelerated appearance of new medicines as a result of increased levels of research, regulatory dilemmas, and unanticipated therapeutic problems. Finally, the sulfa drugs proved extraordinarily fruitful as starting points for molecular modifications that led to new drugs or classes of drugs not only for bacterial infections (eventually including tuberculosis) but also for leprosy
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4 introduction (Hansen’s disease), diabetes, hyperthyroidism, gout, heart disease, and hypertension. The reach of research based on the sulfa drugs extended beyond human into veterinary medicine and even to the discovery of new herbicides. Other writers have used the phrase “therapeutic revolution” to refer to the discontinuity in the history of medicine initiated by the introduction of the sulfa drugs. In this usage, the therapeutic revolution is a compact denotation of an aggregate of events, including rapid expansion of pharmaceutical research, development, and production, that issued a steady and, in quantitative terms, unprecedented flow of new medicines onto the market and into medical practice, a flow that has continued from the late 1930s to our own day and that has transformed the practice of medicine.1 If the sulfa drugs were the first act of the therapeutic revolution, they were also a culminating event in a larger historical process stretching back to the 1880s, which may be called the industrialization of pharmaceutical innovation. Behind this process was the rise of a fine chemicals industry (that is, one that manufactures products such as dyes, pharmaceuticals, and photographic products) based on synthetic coal tar chemistry beginning in the 1860s, especially in Germany, and the industrialization of invention within this industry between 1880 and 1914. For all human history until the 1880s, medicines had been derived almost exclusively from natural products, plant, animal, or mineral. Among these sources, plant extracts were by far the most important. The first great medical achievement of analytical organic chemistry in the nineteenth century was the isolation of active principles of plants, including morphine from opium and quinine from cinchona bark, and their characterization as members of a new chemical class, the alkaloids.2 With rapid development of analytical, synthetic, and structural organic chemistry in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, chemists moved beyond isolation of natural products to their synthesis. More important, they began to recognize the potential medical usefulness of organic compounds prepared in the laboratory. A crucial turning point came in the 1880s, with the realization by German chemists that certain coal tar derivatives have powerful fever- and painreducing properties. One of these compounds, phenacetin, introduced in 1887, was manufactured by the German fine chemicals company Bayer and found widespread use in medicine. Recognition of the pharmaceutical potential of coal tar derivatives, joined with increasing industrial connections to academic organic chemistry and legal and economic incentives for diversification, propelled companies such as Bayer, which were already in possession of extensive knowledge of coal tar chemistry through work on synthetic dyes, into pharmaceutical research. One of the important early products of the Bayer pharmaceutical laboratories, established in the 1890s, was acetylsalicylic acid, marketed in 1899 under the trade name Aspirin.3 The same decades that saw the establishment of research within the German fine chemicals industry also witnessed spectacular developments in bacteriology and the germ theory of disease. By the early 1900s, microbial parasites had been associated with more than a score of serious human and animal diseases. Synthetic
introduction 5 organic chemistry and the germ theory were joined in Paul Ehrlich’s program for chemotherapy, which aimed to identify compounds that would destroy infectious organisms without harming the host, and in the 1910s the German chemical industry took another major step by incorporating Ehrlich’s research program into its own pharmaceutical research effort. From 1900 through the 1920s, a variety of new medicines came out of German industrial pharmaceutical research, including barbiturates, local anesthetics such as Novocain, the sleeping sickness medicine Bayer 205 (Germanin), and the antimalarial Atabrine.4 Meanwhile, France, Britain, and the United States lagged behind in building up industrial research and development in pharmaceuticals. The 1914–1918 war shocked other countries into recognition of their dependence on Germany for imports of fine chemicals, including drugs. In the 1920s and 1930s, efforts were made in France, Britain, and the United States to develop synthetic organic chemicals manufacturing and industrial, or industry-linked, pharmaceutical research. In areas of drug innovation that were not so dependent on medicinal chemistry in the sense of molecular synthesis and molecular modification, but rather on the isolation, purification, and chemical and physiological characterization of naturally occurring compounds such as hormones and vitamins, much important work was done outside of Germany between 1900 and 1935. In many cases, the development of such research for medical and commercial purposes entailed academic–industrial cooperation and stimulated expansion of industrial–pharmaceutical research. By the late 1930s, when the sulfa drugs arrived on the scene, the beginnings of industrial pharmaceutical research and the links of such research to academic science were in place in France, Britain, and the United States, although none of the these countries could yet challenge German leadership in medicinal chemistry.5 This situation was transformed first by the response of French, British, and U.S. industry to Prontosil and its effective component, sulfanilamide, and then by a new World War. The sulfa drugs helped to spark an expansion of pharmaceutical production and research and development that began before World War II and that was accelerated by it. The war removed German pharmaceutical manufacturing and research from serious competition, at least until postwar recovery began. The result was the emergence after the war of a larger and more truly international pharmaceutical industry in which the United States had replaced Germany in a leading position.6 The sulfa drugs therefore stand at a pivotal moment in the history of twentieth-century medicine. They are at once the culminating event of the first major phase of the industrialization of pharmaceutical innovation, and the initial event of the second great phase of that process, the therapeutic revolution that continues in our time. Those who witnessed the introduction of the sulfa drugs into medicine recognized that a major break with the past was under way. One of the earliest attempts at an appraisal was made by F. Sherwood Taylor, whose book The Conquest of Bacteria: From Salvarsan to Sulphapyridine appeared during the war in 1942. Writing for a lay audience, Taylor presented the sulfa drugs as the triumphal outcome of long research based on Ehrlich’s program and ultimately on the bacteriology and synthetic organic chemistry of the late nineteenth century. Looking to the future,
6 introduction he called for more substantial public support of research in chemotherapy. Also written for a general audience, although in this case by a physician, Iago Galdston’s Behind the Sulfa Drugs: A Short History of Chemotherapy (1943) presented the sulfa drugs as the “crowning achievement” of curative medicine, with antecedents much like those described by Taylor.7 Neither Taylor nor Galdston mentioned penicillin, which was the object of a crash wartime Anglo-American development project when their books appeared. By the time that American medical researcher Boris Sokoloff published The Miracle Drugs in 1949, again for a general audience, the sense of dramatic change persisted, but its content had been reshaped to take into account penicillin and other antibiotics, substances with powerful antibacterial action that, unlike the sulfa drugs, were derived in the first instance from living organisms. Sulfa drugs still counted as miracle drugs in Sokoloff ’s account, but his book allotted them a relatively small proportion of its pages and included information on toxicity and bacterial resistance.8 For the most part, those who wrote on the sulfa drugs in the 1930s and 1940s, including Taylor, Galdston, and Sokoloff, focused on their importance as antibacterial agents and their role in reviving interest in chemotherapy. As penicillin and other antibiotics displaced sulfa drugs from news headlines and medical practice, popular awareness of the historical role of the sulfa drugs in initiating a new era in medicine receded. Nevertheless, by the late 1950s and 1960s, it was clear to some observers more intimately familiar with pharmaceutical research that the importance of the sulfa drugs extended well beyond the chemotherapy of bacterial infections. By the 1960s, chemists and medical researchers, often working in industrial laboratories enlarged or created in part because of the earlier success of the sulfa drugs and exploiting knowledge or insights gained in research on the sulfa drugs, had employed molecular modification to develop new drugs or classes of drugs for a variety of diseases and conditions most of which were not infectious. Among the most articulate commentators on these developments was Max Tishler, who served as director of the Merck, Sharp & Dohme Laboratories from 1957 to 1969 and president of the American Chemical Society in 1972, and who reflected on the recent history of medicinal chemistry in a series of papers and talks in the late 1950s and 1960s.9 By the 1980s, perceptive writers on the history of medicinal drugs began to describe the sulfa drugs as the leading edge of what was increasingly seen as a wider therapeutic revolution embracing bacterial chemotherapy, antibiotics, and the many other new kinds of drugs that followed, but also rapid expansion of pharmaceutical production and research, new precision manufacturing methods, and new drug evaluation and regulatory problems.10 In 1988, Daniel Bovet, a Nobel laureate in Physiology or Medicine for work on synthetic curares and antiallergy medicines, and himself a participant in a crucial early episode in the development of the sulfa drugs, published Une chimie qui guérit: histoire de la découverte des sulfamides (A Healing Chemistry: History of the Discovery of the Sulfonamides). This wide-ranging, informative, and often engaging study did justice to the international character of the sulfa drugs story, with discussions of developments in France, Germany, Britain, the United States,
introduction 7 and Switzerland and of cross-national influences. On a number of points, Bovet departed from conventional accounts, for example, in his emphasis on the role of the chemists in comparison to the medical researchers in the collaborative work that resulted in the early sulfa drugs, and in his revision of usual descriptions of research at the Pasteur Institute in Paris based on his own participation in events. Above all, Bovet called for recognition of the historical and medical importance of the sulfa drugs and greater public appreciation of the complex and difficult research behind the achievements of modern therapeutics.11 In the same year that Bovet’s book appeared, Marcel H. Bickel, a pharmacologist and medical historian, published a concise overview of the history of the sulfa drugs that emphasized both their role in effecting “a true revolution of chemotherapy” and some of their principal consequences for drug research and pharmacology. He subsequently explored the latter topic in more detail in the context of his study of Johns Hopkins pharmacologist Eli Kennerly Marshall, Jr.12 Since Bovet’s and Bickel’s overviews, other historians have examined facets of the sulfa drugs story. Several of these studies have brought out the ways in which the introduction of the sulfa drugs directly or indirectly played a role in the passage, content, and implementation of the landmark U.S. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Other work has examined the reception of the sulfa drugs in the United States prior to U.S. entry into World War II, emphasizing changes in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and in the attitudes of physicians and patients.13 In spite of these valuable efforts, the pivotal role of the sulfa drugs in the history of twentieth-century medicine is not yet sufficiently appreciated by historians or by the wider circles of those interested in medicinal drugs, including the vast majority of the public who make use of them. My aim in this study is to build upon existing scholarship, to extend and revise it with new research and interpretation, and above all, to show how the development of the sulfa drugs resulted from the long process of the industrialization of pharmaceutical innovation and at the same time effected a significant change in the direction of medicine. My perspective is primarily that of a historian of science and medicine interested in the process of innovation in medicinal drugs. I emphasize the development and study of sulfa drugs by researchers and physicians and the crucial role of industrial research. My perspective is also international. The story of the sulfa drugs cannot be confined within national boundaries, and one of its advantages as a historical subject is the opportunity it presents for national comparisons and for study of the cross-national traffic of ideas, research programs, and people. I have selected for detailed examination some of the more important episodes in the history of the sulfa drugs, but I am aware that the path I have taken is not the only way to approach the sulfa drugs story. Scholarship in the history of medicine has emphasized the need to examine medical innovations at the level of day-to-day therapeutic practice or from what John Harley Warner has called the therapeutic perspective. The sulfa drugs offer a wide field for such investigations, but one that I have not entered except incidentally in this book. Other aspects of the story, including the technology and engineering dimensions of manufacturing processes; the business and commercial problems of finance, marketing, and
8 introduction distribution; and the economic impact of the new drugs, also invite closer scrutiny by historians. I hope that the present study, by underlining the importance of the sulfa drugs for twentieth-century medicine, will encourage historians to take up these and other problems.14 This book has three parts. Part I, “The Industrial Origins of Prontosil,” shows that an industrial research setting was crucial to the success of chemotherapy. It examines the background of the first sulfa drug in Paul Ehrlich’s program for chemotherapy and in the embedding of chemotherapeutic research in an industrial research organization, that of Bayer and I.G. Farbenindustrie. Efforts to enact Ehrlich’s program in nonindustrial institutional settings often met with limited success or failure. This is illustrated by the vogue for mercurachrome, an antiseptic developed at Hugh Hampton Young’s Brady Urological Institute at Johns Hopkins and touted by Young as a chemotherapy for bacterial infections. The failure of mercurachrome suggests the limitations of U.S. institutional arrangements for chemotherapeutic research in the 1920s and places in relief the strengths of the I.G. Farben organization. Prominent among these strengths was the institutionalization of an interdisciplinary approach to research that associated medical researchers and chemists in long-term collaborative work, supported by the vision of research managers who were not averse to risk. Prontosil emerged from such an industrial research program. Part II, “The Making of the First Miracle Drugs,” shows how differences in national political and institutional circumstances shaped the reception of the first sulfa drugs and the ways in which the initial discoveries were extended in new research. It traces the reception of Prontosil, the recognition of sulfanilamide as its effective component, and the beginnings of the development of other sulfa drugs in the late 1930s. The break with the past effected by the introduction of the sulfa drugs was not immediate but was spread out over several years. The transition also occurred differently in different countries. In the case of Germany, the coincidence of the introduction of Prontosil and the further development of the sulfa drugs with the Third Reich and World War II means that the stories of the sulfa drugs and their makers provide one window on the fate of science and medicine under National Socialism. At the same time as it continued its research and development efforts, the I.G. Farben establishment came under multiple pressures from the National Socialist regime and related organizations. One of the first challenges came from the German antivivisectionist movement, which made a determined effort to end the use of animals in I.G. Farben pharmaceutical research by harnessing antisemitic and ultranationalist ideologies in harsh attacks on the chemical combine. The regime’s programs of autarky and rearmament were felt in the I.G. Farben pharmaceutical research establishment in the form of secrecy rules imposed on research results and compulsory participation in weapons development. Hitler’s decree forbidding Germans to accept Nobel Prizes resulted in jail time and subsequent Gestapo surveillance for Gerhard Domagk, I.G. Farben’s leading medical researcher on the sulfa drugs. Finally, the war brought attrition of staff, materials shortages, and subordination of research to war production. These challenges were met by Heinrich Hörlein,
introduction 9 leader of I.G. Farben’s pharmaceutical research, with a mixture of combativeness and accommodation that aimed to preserve the organization he had built. Through all of this, and despite a significant measure of hostility to scientific medicine within the National Socialist movement, the sulfa drugs were widely accepted by German doctors, and their production and use on a substantial scale continued through World War II. Outside of Germany, in France, Britain, and the United States, medical researchers, physicians, and the public recognized the importance of the new medicines by the middle of 1937, but the path to recognition was markedly different in each case. Comparison of these three national settings reveals important differences in the closeness with which pharmaceutical developments in Germany were followed, the degree of skepticism greeting claims for new drugs in general and those from Germany in particular, procedures for evaluating new drugs, relations between the medical community and the pharmaceutical industry, the status of foreign (in this case, German) patent law, and the roles of professional and popular media in publicizing and creating demand for new medicines. General recognition of the medical and commercial value of Prontosil and sulfanilamide touched off an international competition in the pharmaceutical industry to discover and market derivatives of sulfanilamide that would be effective in treatment of infections not influenced by the first two sulfa drugs, or that would carry less risk to the patient. By the mid-1940s, some 5,000 sulfonamide derivatives had been synthesized, and a small fraction of these had made their way onto the market and into medical practice. Much of this work was done in industrial laboratories. The first major success of this effort came with the introduction of sulfapyridine (or M&B 693) in 1938 by the British company May & Baker. Of outstanding medical importance as the first effective chemotherapy for pneumonia, sulfapyridine also merits closer study as a product of industrial innovation typical of the generation of sulfa drugs that followed Prontosil and sulfanilamide. Although initially received with reservations by some medical researchers, especially in the United States, sulfapyridine found a strong positive response among physicians, stimulated in part by enthusiastic coverage in newspapers and other media. In the United States, sulfapyridine was the first important new drug to be reviewed under the U.S. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Its medical and commercial success encouraged British and American pharmaceutical manufacturers to expand their research and development establishments, an undertaking that began well before U.S. entry into World War II. By the early 1940s, the sulfa drugs were in wide use, but researchers were just beginning to understand how they worked. Part III, “Practice and Theory,” documents the substantial impact of the sulfa drugs on the American war effort. It also shows how researchers finally arrived at a successful theory of their mechanism of action and how that theory in turn became a basis for discovery of new medicinal drugs in the 1940s and 1950s. Sulfa drugs were used extensively in treatment of casualties at Pearl Harbor, and physicians credited them with the minimal morbidity and mortality from infection among the wounded in that attack. U.S. preparation for wartime production and use of the sulfa drugs began long before Pearl Harbor, however,
10 introduction and that circumstance enabled a rapid deployment of the medicines in the months that followed American entry into the war. In parallel with preparations for production and use came large-scale U.S. government–sponsored organization of medical research, including research on the sulfa drugs, that continued for the duration of the war. During the war, the U.S. military used sulfa drugs in treatment or prophylaxis of a variety of diseases and conditions, including pneumonia, gonorrhea, meningitis, bacillary dysentery, hemolytic streptococcal infections, and wounds and burns. In addition to control of bacterial infections in the wounded, sulfa drugs also contributed to the saving of millions of man-hours of active service that would otherwise have been lost to gonorrheal infections, to the prevention of epidemics that might otherwise have disrupted large-scale mobilization by the U.S. Navy in the middle of the war, and to control of dysentery in field conditions where good sanitation was difficult or impossible. It was in the context of extensive use of sulfa drugs by the U.S. military during the war that bacterial resistance to chemotherapeutic agents first emerged as a serious problem. U.S. government–sponsored wartime research on the sulfa drugs eventually led to changes in the ways the medicines were used by doctors, although for the most part these changes took effect only after the war. Finally, this study shows that penicillin, introduced into military medicine relatively late in the war, entered a field of practice already occupied by the sulfa drugs and tended to supplement rather than to replace the older medicines. The sulfa drugs were in widespread use in medicine for years before any consensus emerged in the medical and scientific community as to how they worked, that is, their mechanism of action. By the mid-1940s, such a consensus did develop around a theory proposed in 1940 by British bacteriologist Paul Fildes and British biochemist Donald D. Woods. Joining to the work of other investigators elements from their own training and research backgrounds, Woods and Fildes concluded that sulfanilamide and, by extension, other sulfa drugs acted by competing with and displacing a compound utilized by a bacterial enzyme to produce a needed nutrient. Unable to grow or reproduce, pathogenic bacteria were then destroyed by the defenses of the human or animal host. Fildes generalized this result by suggesting that other antibacterial agents could be found by identifying compounds similar in structure to substances needed by the bacterial cell and that would therefore competitively inhibit the cell’s use of the needed substance. By the mid-1940s, other investigators had further generalized Fildes’s formulation beyond the realm of bacteria in the concept of antimetabolite, defined as a substance that interfered with the action of an essential metabolite in a living cell. The antimetabolite concept inspired a number of efforts at rational drug design from the 1940s to the 1960s. None of these resulted in medicines of stature comparable to that of the sulfa drugs, but notable successes with drugs for treatment of leukemia and of tuberculosis and other bacterial infections demonstrated the long-term value of the approach. Even after they had been relegated to secondary status in the therapeutics of bacterial infections by penicillin and other antibiotics, the sulfa drugs continued to give impetus to pharmaceutical innovation not only through application of the
introduction 11 antimetabolite concept but also through the direct or indirect roles that they played in the development of other new drugs and classes of drugs. By the 1950s, the therapeutic revolution that the introduction of the sulfa drugs had done so much to initiate was in full swing. With the flow of new medicines, and in part precisely because of their number and power, came also a rising awareness of their costs and limitations. Criticisms and reassessments of the more extravagant hopes and expectations of the age of miracle drugs began to emerge. An early cloud on the horizon was the appearance of bacterial resistance to sulfa drugs, then to antibiotics, a problem accentuated by overuse and indiscriminate use of the medicines. Close behind followed recognition of widespread iatrogenic illness associated with recently introduced drugs, or what American physician Robert H. Moser pointedly described as “diseases of medical progress.” Most fundamental, perhaps, was Rene Dubos’s critique of medical utopias associated with recent successes of scientific medicine. Dubos, a prominent microbiologist at the Rockefeller Institute in New York, rejected the notion that medicine would ever be able to eliminate all disease, or even necessarily reduce the overall burden of disease carried by human societies.15 By 1981, when physicians began to puzzle over the first cases of what would later be termed AIDS, even strong partisans of the therapeutic revolution had come to recognize that it had problems and limitations. The unfolding of the AIDS pandemic in the decades since has driven home that recognition, as has increasing public awareness of problems such as bacterial resistance to antibiotics and the sometimes fatal consequences of medical error, including misuse of powerful medicinal drugs. In the enormity of its impact, its complexity, and its human costs, the AIDS pandemic is unmatched in its challenge to late twentieth- and early twenty-firstcentury medicine. Despite the best efforts of the world’s biomedical researchers, as of this writing there is no cure and no vaccine. Nothing has been more revealing of the insufficiency of a narrowly biomedical model of disease, that is, one that focuses exclusively on the identification of specific therapies for specific biologically defined pathologies. As a disease, AIDS has been incomprehensible except as an entity with demographic, political, cultural, and economic dimensions as well as biological ones. Attempts to come to grips with it have reinforced increasingly holistic understandings of disease and underlined the need for multifaceted preventive efforts.16 All of this said, it cannot be denied that the AIDS pandemic has also thrown into relief the continuing strength of the premises that have driven the therapeutic revolution. Underlying the AIDS activist movement of the 1980s and 1990s was the conviction that the disease is caused by a specific virus and that a specific therapy could and would be found if only the right resources (scientific, clinical, organizational, financial) were marshaled in the right way. Sustained by this view, AIDS activists effected important changes in the U.S. system for developing and approving new drugs.17 The ongoing search for more effective drugs and vaccines and efforts to improve the delivery of existing drugs to affected populations at manageable costs remain prominent components of the worldwide struggle with AIDS. The therapeutic revolution started by the sulfa drugs continues. The idea that
12 introduction one important task of medicine is to find specific therapies for specific diseases is alive and well and is periodically reinforced by the perceived promise of new lines of investigation, such as those opened by the human genome project and stem cell research. Medicinal drugs comprise a significant fraction of the American health care system and are likely to do so in the future. The pharmaceutical industry continues to lead innovation, even as it is challenged for its contribution to the financial burden of health care. We need to come to terms with this ongoing revolution in all its promise, complexity, limitations, and costs. Part of the insight we need will surely come from historical understanding of the medicines that first set us on this path.
PART I The Industrial Origins of Prontosil
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CHAPTER 1
Beginnings
n 1913, Paul Ehrlich stood before an audience of the Seventeenth International Medical Congress in London and predicted substantial progress in the chemotherapy of bacterial diseases within the next five years. His optimism was based in part on confidence that the combined efforts of many researchers would be bent to the task. The principle of viribus unitis (with united forces) was happily borne out, he said, by the international congress where thousands, gathered “from all countries of the world, have come to bear witness that in science all boundaries between nations have fallen.”1 In the short run, at least, neither form of optimism proved justified. Within months of Ehrlich’s speech, the nations of Europe had embarked on a long and terrible war that would weaken or efface the internationalism of science. Achievement of an effective bacterial chemotherapy was to require not five years but more than two decades. Yet Ehrlich’s talk gave voice to a burst of optimism and activity in chemotherapy in the years before and after World War I that his own work both exemplified and had a powerful role in creating. In another speech seven years earlier, at the inauguration of his Institute for Experimental Therapy in Frankfurt, Ehrlich had introduced the term “chemotherapy” to stand for the destruction of disease-causing microorganisms in the human or animal host by means of chemical compounds introduced into the host organism. Ehrlich’s persuasive formulation of the theoretical basis of chemotherapy, derived in part from earlier work in biological staining and immunology (for the latter he received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for 1908), and still more his striking practical success with the introduction of Salvarsan and Neosalvarsan against syphilis in 1910 and after, played a major role in the initiation of other research in the next two decades. Early successes were scored with the finding of chemotherapies for diseases
I
15
16 the industrial origins of prontosil caused by spirochetes, such as syphilis, and for others caused by protozoans, such as leishmaniasis (kala-azar) and trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).2 The chemotherapy that Ehrlich held up as the promise of the future was born of the confluence of two great historical movements of the half century before the first World War. One of these, the bacteriological revolution in medicine, transformed scientific understanding of the causation of many diseases by associating them with specific microbial parasites, including certain species of bacteria or protozoa and the vectors (e.g., insects) that carried them to their human hosts. The other, the rise of a hugely successful fine chemicals industry based on synthetic organic chemistry, brought with it not only vast numbers of new chemicals not found in nature, with multiplying uses as dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, and other products, but also, and more important, the appearance of some of the first industrial research laboratories. By the early 1900s, the newly defined field of infectious diseases loomed as a major challenge facing Western societies and their colonies. In the three decades between 1875 and 1906 alone, investigations including and following on the pioneering work of Louis Pasteur in France and Robert Koch in Germany identified causative agents for more than a score of diseases. Among these were such major scourges as typhoid fever, malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, diphtheria, pneumonia, plague, bacillary dysentery, sleeping sickness, and syphilis.3 Despite public health measures and rapidly advancing knowledge in bacteriology and related fields, bacterial infections still took a heavy toll in lives and health. The ten most significant causes of death in the United States in 1900 included pneumonia, tuberculosis, infections of the gastrointestinal tract, and diphtheria, all of them caused by bacteria, which together accounted for more than a third of all deaths in the American population.4 Pneumonia, to take only one example, was described by Johns Hopkins professor William Osler in the 1899 edition of his authoritative The Principles and Practice of Medicine as “the most widespread and the most fatal of all acute diseases” and second only to tuberculosis as a cause of death in the United States. Hospital statistics indicated a mortality for pneumonia of between twenty and forty percent. In patients sixty or more years of age, mortality ranged from sixty to eighty percent, leading Osler to remark that “in this country at least . . . one may say that to die of pneumonia is the natural end of old people.” Possible complications of pneumonia, especially meningitis (an infection of the membranes enclosing the brain and spinal cord) and endocarditis (an infection of the membrane lining the heart), increased the danger still further.5 In the face of these threats, there was little that physicians could do for patients beyond provision of good nursing care and appropriate diet. As Osler put it, “pneumonia is a self-limited disease, which can neither be aborted nor cut short by any known means at our command.” He gave his readers a skeptical survey of various measures then in use in treatment of pneumonia patients, including bleeding, drugs, serum (“still in the trial stage”), and methods for symptomatic relief. But he warned that “the young practitioner may bear in mind that patients are more often damaged than helped by the promiscuous drugging, which is still only too prevalent.”6
Beginnings 17 Knowledge of microbial agents did not in itself affect these facts. It did bring sharply into focus the paths that practical measures might take. In the domain of prevention, public health could look beyond filth, miasmas, and bad water to more precise targets, microbial pathogens and their vectors. Vaccines could be developed to maximize resistance to specific infective agents. In therapeutics, surgeons could apply antisepsis and asepsis, opening up new fields for surgical practice. Medical researchers could develop serums or antitoxins based on immune reactions of animals and humans to specific microbes. Finally, researchers could imagine the creation of a chemotherapy in which molecules prepared in the laboratory could attack infecting microbes without serious harm to their human hosts.7 For the emergence of chemotherapy, the prior development of synthetic organic chemistry and of the industry based on it was decisive. Rapid growth of organic chemical analysis early in the nineteenth century made possible the appearance of structural and synthetic organic chemistry after the mid-nineteenth century. After William Perkin’s introduction of the first synthetic dye, aniline purple (mauve) in 1856, strong worldwide demand drove the expansion of synthetic dyestuff synthesis and manufacture, especially in Germany, from the 1860s to 1914. By the beginning of the twentieth century, thousands of dyes, and extensive expertise in dye chemistry, were available to researchers.8 Connections between the new synthetic dye chemistry and medical research began early. By the 1870s, microscopists were using dyes to develop improved techniques for staining tissues and cells. In the 1880s, researchers in the chemical industry realized that some synthetic dyes, or the intermediate compounds used to prepare them, had medicinal qualities. Interest in chemical therapies for microbial infections spurred research at the founding centers of bacteriology, the Pasteur Institute in Paris and Robert Koch’s Institute for Infectious Diseases in Berlin.
Ehrlich and Chemotherapy t was Paul Ehrlich who, in this context, most clearly grasped the historical opportunity and who most clearly defined a program for chemotherapy. Born in comfortable circumstances in Upper Silesia in 1854, Ehrlich followed his Gymnasium education with study of medicine at several universities, finally taking his medical degree at Leipzig in 1878. After nearly a decade of service as physician at the Charité Hospital in Berlin, and two years in Egypt recovering from a bout of tuberculosis, Ehrlich returned to Berlin and accepted a position at Koch’s Institute. There he helped Emil von Behring develop effective therapeutic serums, especially the new diphtheria antitoxin.9 Serums, or antitoxins, were prepared by extracting the liquid part of the blood, or serum, from animals inoculated with a specific bacterium. This serum contained antibodies produced by the animal in response to the infection and could be used to treat humans infected with the same type of bacterium, a kind of therapy called passive immunization. In 1896, recognizing Ehrlich’s skill in devising methods to test serums, the Prussian government made him director of its new Institute for the Investigation
I
18 the industrial origins of prontosil
Figure 1.1. Paul Ehrlich (1854–1915) in his laboratory (© Bettman/Corbis).
and Control of Sera. In 1899 this institute, with Ehrlich still in charge, was transferred to Frankfurt-am-Main. Finally, in 1906, Ehrlich became director of a second institute, set up beside the Serum Institute with private funds and devoted to research in chemotherapy.10 From the time that he completed his M.D. thesis on the theory and practice of histological staining in 1878 to the end of his career, Ehrlich’s research was closely bound up with the new synthetic dyes and their selective affinities for living tissues. Taken in one direction, this interest led him to develop new staining techniques such as those he applied to a definitive classification of white blood cells. Taken in another direction, the same interest led him to reflect on the therapeutic potential of dyes. He had shown, for example, that methylene blue selectively stained cells of the peripheral nervous system. Would it also alleviate pain associated with those nerves? Therapeutic experience confirmed that it did have such an effect, although a temporary one.11 Ehrlich further reasoned that, just as with dye compounds, where part of the molecule attaches to the substance to be dyed while another part is responsible for the color, so too with therapeutic compounds: one part will attach to a specific
Beginnings 19 tissue while another part is responsible for the therapeutic effect. Applying this concept to the problem of parasitic infection, Ehrlich reasoned that the goal should be to identify a compound with a selective affinity for the parasite but not for the cells of the host. To this compound should then be attached a toxic component that would kill or disable the parasite. Such a compound, prepared in the laboratory and administered in the right way, should disinfect the host organism by eliminating the parasites. In Ehrlich’s memorable phrase, it would be a “magic bullet” in the same sense as those substances (antibodies) produced by the natural process of immunization, that is, compounds that selectively seek out and destroy the parasites.12 Ehrlich’s first major effort along these lines focused on diseases caused by trypanosomes. Among these was sleeping sickness, which devastated large areas of central Africa. Alphonse Laveran in France had opened the way to chemotherapeutic research by showing how to create and maintain experimental trypanosome infections in mice. Now, Ehrlich and his collaborator, Japanese physician Kiyoshi Shiga, vied with Pasteur Institute researchers in Paris to find effective compounds to treat such infections. Both research teams tested hundreds of synthetic dyes, with Ehrlich relying heavily on help from dye chemist Arthur Weinberg, and the Pasteur Institute investigators drawing on the resources of the Bayer chemical company. Beginning in 1904, both teams reported promising results, with trypan red the best compound from Ehrlich’s laboratory. Although neither group produced a cure for sleeping sickness, Ehrlich judged that even the limited successes achieved by 1906 “should encourage us to continue, without deviation, along this path.”13 As it happened, Ehrlich was prompted to deviate from his path by a report from the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine that atoxyl, an organic arsenic compound, was more effective than inorganic arsenic in the treatment of trypanosomal infections. Ehrlich set his chemists to synthesis of organic arsenicals, and they soon produced hundreds. Two of these, numbered 418 and 606, seemed especially promising.14 Meanwhile, Ehrlich’s attention had been drawn to syphilis, for which the causative organism, a spirochete, had been discovered in 1905 by German zoologist Fritz Schaudinn. Schaudinn’s opinion that the spirochete was related not to bacteria but to trypanosomes led Ehrlich to test his organic arsenical compounds against syphilis. Fortunately for this endeavor, an animal experimental model for syphilis had already been developed by Sahachiro Hata, a Japanese bacteriologist who joined Ehrlich’s laboratory in 1909. Subjecting Ehrlich’s compounds to tests on experimental infections in rabbits, Hata found that compound 606 was highly active.15 Ehrlich devoted the next few years, until his death in 1915, to the development of compound 606 into an effective chemotherapy for syphilis. Marketed in 1910 by the German chemical company Höchst under the trade name Salvarsan, compound 606 (also known as arsphenamine), transformed the treatment of syphilis. Although plagued by problems of toxicity and difficult to administer, Salvarsan and the related compound Neosalvarsan represented the first clear practical triumph of chemotherapy.16
20 the industrial origins of prontosil Behind the fervent optimism of Ehrlich’s 1913 speech, therefore, lay a theoretical formulation of the rational basis of chemotherapy and a practical research program that had already achieved notable successes. To these Ehrlich added a broad historical appreciation of changes in medicine since the 1860s that highlighted the potential role and opportunities of chemotherapy. Looking at the sweep of medical history since the 1860s, Ehrlich easily discerned a broad pattern of advance. Isolation of pathogenic bacteria; study of protozoa; discovery of filterable viruses; recognition of insects as intermediate hosts and transmitters of disease; study of immunity, antitoxins, immunology, and sera; and the development of new diagnostic tests all contributed to an increasingly effective prevention, control, and therapy of infectious diseases. The place of chemotherapy was, wherever possible, to “fill gaps in the lines of attack, particularly, by curing diseases in which the natural powers of the body are inadequate.” Since, to Ehrlich’s mind, the scientific foundations of chemotherapy were in place, he felt confident in asserting that “the way lies in full view before us, a way which will not at all times be easy to follow, but which, nevertheless, it will be possible to follow.”17 The chemotherapy of bacterial infections proved even more difficult and elusive than Ehrlich had predicted. By the end of the war, the five-year mark set in Ehrlich’s optimistic 1913 prediction had come and gone without a major breakthrough in bacterial chemotherapy. If Ehrlich’s hopes had not yet been realized, the urgency of the problem and belief in the possibility of a solution persisted, and the 1920s opened with ample evidence of international response to his program and example. In the minds of many leaders in relevant fields of biomedical science, the question was not whether there would be a chemotherapy of bacterial disease, but when and through what mix of research organization, theory, models, and methods it would be accomplished.
The Vogue for Mercurachrome he felt need, the optimism, and equally, the limitations of chemotherapeutic investigation in the 1920s are well exemplified by the vogue for mercurachrome that rose, peaked, and fell within the space of a decade. Its initiator was Hugh Hampton Young, a surgeon who had joined the faculty of the Johns Hopkins University Medical School in 1898, after coming to Johns Hopkins for postgraduate work in 1895. Young was an innovator in the surgery of the genitourinary system, and in the 1910s was in the early stage of a career that would bring him fame as a founder of urology as a medical specialty. In that career, chemotherapy played a small but noteworthy part. Young was in the audience when Ehrlich spoke on chemotherapy to the International Medical Congress in London in 1913. He later remarked, “I returned to America greatly impressed by the magnitude of Ehrlich’s researches, and the remarkable character of his results inspired me to add to the Brady Urological Institute, then in the course of construction, a laboratory for chemical investigation.”18 Creation of the Brady Institute, to which Young added facilities for chemotherapeutic research, was an episode in the flow of private wealth into scientific
T
Beginnings 21 medicine in the United States in the decades around 1900. In 1912, Young had operated on James Buchanan (Diamond Jim) Brady for a urinary obstruction caused by a chronically enlarged prostate. The flamboyant Brady had been turned away by other doctors because of complications: he had, among other things, diabetes, Bright’s disease (nephritis), infection of both kidneys, inflammation of the bladder, and severe heart disease, from which he later died. Surgeons in New York and Boston had told him that an operation would kill him. Young successfully removed the obstruction with a new instrument he had invented, without need for the general anesthesia that concerned others he had consulted. Brady was enormously relieved and grateful, though he continued to suffer from his other conditions and remained a patient of Young’s until his death in April 1917.19 Reflecting on the vast sums Brady had spent—and in Young’s view squandered—backing plays, actors, and actresses and on lavish entertainments, it occurred to Young that the fortune of the Standard Steel Car Company’s head of sales might more profitably be employed elsewhere. Since soon after his arrival at Johns Hopkins in 1895, Young had been developing the field of urological surgery, initially at the prompting and with the support of William Halsted. By 1911, Young had become convinced of the need for special research facilities in urology, not only to extend urological surgery but also to devise new diagnostic methods and laboratory tests. In that year, he had drawn up plans “with the firm conviction that someone could be persuaded to erect a building for this purpose.” That someone was now before him in the person of Brady. Young’s pitch proved persuasive, and the James Buchanan Brady Urological Institute was dedicated on the grounds of the Johns Hopkins Hospital on May 4, 1915.20 Young’s firm intention to integrate research and practice in urology was embodied in the design of the building. The institute’s eight floors formed a sandwich, with research facilities at top and bottom enclosing clinics and patient rooms in between.21 The dual mission of the institute was reflected in its bifurcation of staff into clinical and research divisions. A good part of what made the institute special in Young’s eyes was its nature as a “complete unit for a special subject,” namely, urology. In this sense, it was an institutional embodiment of this new field of medicine. Henry Wade, a visiting English surgeon, agreed, calling Young’s creation “undoubtedly . . . the most complete Institute of Urology that exists in any part of the world.”22 Even before the institute was built, Young, moved by Ehrlich’s ideas and example, had begun his own search for effective urinary tract antiseptics, and this work had brought him into a cooperative relationship with the Baltimore-based pharmaceutical company of Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning.23 A strong supporter of American entry into the war, Young quickly volunteered his services. In May 1917, General John Pershing commissioned him as a major in the American Expeditionary Force Medical Corps, and Young sailed with Pershing to France. In July, Young was put in charge of all urological and venereal disease work in the expeditionary force, with the official title of Director of the Division of Urology. He played a leading role in organizing the force’s programs for control and treatment of venereal disease. In 1918 he was promoted to colonel, and in
22 the industrial origins of prontosil
Figure 1.2. Hugh Hampton Young (1870–1945) c. 1918 (Munsey’s Magazine).
1919 he received the Distinguished Service Medal. Along the way, he co-authored The Manual of Military Urology. For the duration of the war, Young set aside a yearly civilian income that ranged from $100,000 to $250,000.24 The war gave fresh urgency to the problem of urinary tract antisepsis as the incidence of venereal disease rose and with it the need for prophylactic and therapeutic measures. Young later recalled that his wartime experience reinforced his conviction of the value of antiseptic therapy and of the search for new compounds. After the war, Young’s institute continued to focus on preparation and testing of compounds as possible new urinary tract antiseptics.25 In notes for a 1920 report on Brady Institute research activities, Young highlighted the institute’s development of a new compound called mercurachrome220, “for use in gonorrhea, chancroid, and other infections of the urinary tract and elsewhere.” The steps leading to mercurachrome-220 provide a window on the nature of chemotherapeutic research at the Brady Urological Institute.26 Young and his collaborators laid down six criteria to be met by a compound destined for local use as a urinary antiseptic. It should readily penetrate the tissues in which the infection existed, be nonirritating to the tissues, have high germicidal activity, be readily soluble in water, not precipitate in urine, and be of sufficiently low toxicity to be harmless if absorbed into the system.27 To satisfy the first criterion, the researchers decided to seek a penetrating dye. The substance did not need to be a germicide itself, but merely to serve “as a carrier in which a germicidal group could be substituted.” Citing both clinical
Beginnings 23 experience and chemical reasoning indicating that basic dyes were more irritating to tissues than acid ones, Young and associates narrowed their search to acid dyes. Among these, eosin was attractive because of its use as a cytoplasmic stain. Chemical scrutiny, however, revealed that the sites on the molecule where substitution might occur were already occupied by bromine. The researchers found that the same was not true of the closely related compound dibromofluorescein, which “could undergo substitution by the germicidal group we chose” while retaining much of the staining power of eosin.28 As the “active germicidal principle to be substituted in the dye molecule,” Young and his collaborators chose mercury. If the long history of mercury as a specific agent against syphilis played any role in this choice, it was not revealed here. Instead, the researchers referred exclusively to general antiseptics. They viewed the inorganic salts of mercury as highly irritating, toxic, and probably of low ability to penetrate tissues. Substituted in an organic compound, however, the metal generally lost much of its irritating quality and toxicity while preserving the greater part of its germicidal power. The collaborators thought that these traits, together with the great variety of possible combinations, made organic mercury compounds promising candidates in the search for local antiseptics of the genitourinary tract.29 Edwin C. White, who had joined the Brady Institute in 1916 as full-time chemist, prepared some 265 compounds. Of these, only three (nos. 205, 220, and 253) were considered by Young, White, and Swartz to merit further testing. One of these, number 220, stood out in test-tube, animal, and, eventually, clinical trials. It was a deep red dye obtained by substituting one atom of mercury in the molecule of dibromofluorescein. For the benefit of clinicians, the Brady Institute team set aside the unwieldy chemical name, dibromooxymercuryfluorescein, replacing it with the generic term mercurachrome-220, reflecting the series number of the compound. Eventually the number was also dropped, and the trade name became mercurachrome.30 In early clinical use, Young and his associates found mercurachrome to be an effective antiseptic for local use in the genitourinary tract. They did not seek to use it in systemic bacterial infections. By Young’s later account, it was the failed experiment of a Philadelphia physician that provoked the Brady Institute team to try intravenous use of mercurachrome. Dr. Edmund D. Piper had tried to save the life of a woman suffering from puerperal septicemia (childbed fever) with intravenous injections of one percent mercurachrome. He had failed in this and four other cases. Hoping for greater success with increased dosages, he had visited Young in Baltimore.31 On December 30, 1922, a man was admitted to Young’s clinic complaining of pain in the kidney. Young introduced a catheter into the ureters, finding pus on both sides. The man developed a chill and fever, his temperature rising to 103.4°F. On January 2, he was irrational, with continued high temperature, and a blood culture showed a high concentration of colon bacilli. Consultations confirmed the diagnosis of general septicemia, and Young and his colleagues estimated that the man had four hours to live. In this desperate circumstance, Young decided to try intravenous mercurachrome. After the patient received 34 cc of a one percent
24 the industrial origins of prontosil solution in an arm vein, his temperature first rose to 104 degrees, but then fell to normal within six hours. By the following morning, Young reported, the man’s condition was “completely transformed,” and he said that he felt quite well. Blood and urine cultures were found to be sterile and remained so, and the patient was well and discharged six days later. “In this case,” Young remarked, “which was the first positive demonstration of the value of mercurachrome as an intravenous germicide against septicemia and urinary infection, the research, which had been commenced six years before, in an effort to produce a new urinary germicide, was concluded.”32 A number of other successful cases followed, and in October 1923 Young made his first public report on the intravenous use of mercurachrome at a meeting of the New York Medical Society in Buffalo. The following year, Young and a colleague, the bacteriologist Justina H. Hill, published a paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) recommending use of intravenous mercurachrome in both local infections and general septicemias. In October 1924, Young spoke to the Academy of Medicine of Cleveland, Ohio, summarizing 255 clinical cases in which mercurachrome had been used intravenously. The examples were collected from the Brady clinic, personal communications from other physicians, and a handful of published cases.33 Surveying the array of clinical cases, Young seemed to waver between slightly abashed recognition that there was still little he could say with certainty about the therapeutic value of mercurachrome, and a barely restrained enthusiasm. He admitted that all intravenous medication required great care, that mercurachrome could produce violent reactions, that mercurachrome could not be effective without help from the body’s defenses, that mercurachrome therapy frankly failed in many cases, and that in many others it could not positively be credited with the recovery. “In therapeutics,” he conceded, “it is so easy to confound propter hoc with post hoc and also so easy, in the enthusiasm of a new idea, to view facts in a biased way that the exact truth is difficult to get.” Nevertheless, by his most cautious reading of the evidence, he believed that mercurachrome had “cured or contributed largely to the cure” of an astonishing variety of conditions, including twenty-five cases of septicemia, two of meningitis, two of epidemic encephalitis, twelve of pneumonia, one of general peritonitis, one of retroperitoneal and one of perinephritic abscess, four of erysipelas (a skin infection), and one of furunculosis (boils). He thought its use in venereal infections to be “most promising.” “Making every allowance,” he concluded, “I believe I can safely say that [mercurachrome] has already saved many lives, and has assisted the body’s defences in throwing off grave local and general infections. Intravenous therapy does not supplant surgery, but it may be of vast assistance and turn the tide for the patient.”34 The tone ofYoung’s speeches and publications on mercurachrome is expansive and leaves the impression that in the mid-1920s many physicians were using, or at least trying, the compound in a variety of conditions. Young himself later called the work with mercurachrome “the first important effort to apply Ehrlich’s principles of chemotherapy.” Such a statement reveals an ignorance of the chemotherapy literature of the 1910s and early 1920s, and perhaps also a misapprehension of Ehrlich’s principles. By 1913 Ehrlich was moving away from the general antiseptic model
Beginnings 25 and was emphasizing the search for specific therapies. Young’s whole program, in contrast, was emphatically an embodiment and extension of the general antiseptic model. He referred to the general antiseptics mercuric chloride and mercuric cyanide in describing his decision to use mercury as the toxic element in the organic compounds he had synthesized. He called mercurachrome a “germicide” (i.e., a topical or local antiseptic) even after it was being used to treat systemic infections. Most important, in his presentation of the many different pathological conditions for which mercurachrome treatment might be effective, there was no trace of a recognition that chemotherapeutic agents were typically, or even occasionally, specific in their action.35 Young and his team did not rely on correlation between in vitro (test-tube) tests and therapeutic effectiveness. They carried out test-tube and animal tests— the latter mostly to assess toxicity—but gave these little weight in the assessment of new compounds. Instead, they tried out mercurachrome in a more-or-less hitand-miss way in clinical practice. They did not do controlled studies, either did not report failures or discounted them, and drew freely on the testimonials of other physicians. On this basis, Young was willing to draw tentative but sweeping conclusions. “In many cases it is difficult to interpret the clinical results,” he noted, “and the skeptical will decide that nature cured them while enthusiasts, like myself, may attribute it to mercurachrome.” Even later, when evidence accumulated against the effectiveness of mercurachrome, Young persisted. He was still using it in 1942, seven years after the introduction of the sulfa drugs. Led on by his enthusiasm, Young established an early commanding lead over his evidence, and never lost it.36 The emphasis Young placed on clinical case reports, versus in vitro and especially animal trials, was in part a consequence of the aims and structure of the Brady Institute. Young’s overriding purpose, perhaps best expressed in the first issue of the Journal of Urology, was to build a new medical specialty. The work of the journal and the institute was to bring together contributions of whatever sort to urology as a specialized field. Chemotherapeutic research was a part, but only one part, of the larger project. The Brady Institute seems to have embodied in microcosm the Johns Hopkins ideal, combining medical teaching, clinical practice, and research, in close proximity and interaction. Of the three, clinical practice and, to a lesser extent, clinical research dominated both architectural space and action. The same aims and distribution of resources explain the institute’s nearly exclusive concentration of effort on organic mercury compounds against urological and related general infections. The institute’s goal was to find an efficient antiseptic for the genitourinary tract. Mercurachrome appeared to be such a compound. In addition, it seemed to have the unexpected virtue of working against many systemic infections. Young and his colleagues did not envision or put into practice a long-term research effort to examine other groups of compounds in other kinds of infections. They established no system of innovation in chemotherapy. With mercurachrome in hand, and within the framework of goals they had set, they felt no need for one.37 Concentration on mercurachrome was also reinforced by the institute’s perennial shortage of research funds. Small and uncertain budgets prevented the
26 the industrial origins of prontosil expansion of chemotherapeutic research much beyond the handful of mercurial compounds from which mercurachrome emerged. At the same time, the need to show dramatic results to attract and retain private support led Young and his staff into inflated hopes for mercurachrome and its promotion beyond what could reasonably be justified by laboratory and clinical results. In 1934, Young wrote to a correspondent that, despite the institute’s excellent design and facilities, it had “never had sufficient funds for research, and for maintenance of the laboratories.” The problem was there from the beginning. James Buchanan Brady’s annual contribution during his lifetime fell far short of expenses, and a promised increase in the endowment that would solve the problem was never written into his will. Young struggled to make up the difference by contributions from his private income and by soliciting donations from grateful patients and philanthropic sources. Young put it candidly when he wrote that “we have faced yearly the necessity of begging and borrowing and going into our own pockets to continue the active work in our laboratories and clinical departments. Being poor—as compared with richly endowed institutions—has made us work harder to produce more in order to impress philanthropic men with the value of our work.”38 One of the men whom Young struggled to impress was Francis P. Garvan. A millionaire and Yale graduate, described by one source as “a positive, intense, short stocky man, a resolute, aggressive fighter,” Garvan had worked in the office of the Alien Property Custodian during the war. There he had become acutely aware of the strategic importance of the synthetic dye industry and of previous U.S. dependence on German industry for its products, which could include high explosives and poison gases as well as dyes. The death of one of his children from rheumatic fever brought home to him in addition the connection between synthetic dyes and medicines. In a statement prepared in defense of U.S. protective tariffs on coal tar chemicals, Garvan later wrote that “the American coal tar chemical industry is indispensable to the health, the prosperity and the national defense of the American people. Coal tar dyes are indispensable also in research into the cause, prevention, and cure of human diseases.” Garvan concluded his statement by quoting Julius Stieglitz, a University of Chicago chemistry professor who had chaired the National Research Council’s Committee on Synthetic Drugs during the war. “The pitiful calls from our hospitals for anesthetics to alleviate suffering on the operating table, the frantic appeals for the hypnotic that soothes the epileptic and staves off seizure, the almost furious demands for remedy after remedy, that came in the early years of the war, are still ringing in the ears of many of us,” Stieglitz had written.39 At the end of the war, Garvan set up the Chemical Foundation, a semipublic organization, with himself as president and stockholder. Acting as Alien Property Custodian, he arranged for some 4,500 German chemical patents to be sold to the Chemical Foundation for the low price of $250,000. Personal gain was not a motive, for Garvan and his associates drew no salary and received no dividends from their stock, which conferred only voting privileges. Their aim was to prevent both the return of the patents to Germany and their direct acquisition by American private interests that might create a monopoly. Instead, the Chemical Foundation leased patent rights to any American chemical manufacturer, in the hope that a thriving and competitive American chemical industry would emerge. Royalties
Beginnings 27
Figure 1.3. Portrait of Patricia Garvan. Her death from rheumatic fever helped motivate her father, Francis P. Garvan, to found the Chemical Foundation to promote the expansion of the American chemical industry. Frontispiece to Chemistry in Medicine: A Cooperative Treatise Intended to Give Examples of Progress Made in Medicine with the Aid of Chemistry (New York: Chemical Foundation, 1928).
from lease of the patents were directed by the foundation into chemical and medical research.40 By early 1925, Hugh Young had met with Garvan on several occasions, describing the Brady Institute’s work on antiseptics and warmly praising the Chemical Foundation’s efforts on behalf of American chemistry and pharmacology. Contacts continued through the spring and summer. In June, Young submitted a report on the institute’s current research and, on the basis of this, received in October the first quarterly installment of an annual subvention of $10,000 from the foundation. Acknowledging the check, Young wrote to William Buffum, the foundation secretary, that “it lifts a load of anxiety which was bearing us down and will enable us to continue work which I hope will be even more successful in the immediate future than in the past.”41
28 the industrial origins of prontosil Chemical Foundation support, though welcome, placed Brady Institute research under a spotlight and lent new urgency to the push for tangible results. The foundation required occasional reports, which Young supplied. When, in 1928, his report was delayed because of his wife’s and his own illnesses, foundation funding was temporarily suspended. On at least two occasions, foundation contacts brought invitations for Young to speak to chemical industry and professional chemical groups. Young’s rising reputation as American representative of chemotherapy is reflected in Charles H. Herty’s letter inviting Young to speak to the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association of the United States in 1926. Herty was “very anxious that at this meeting which brings together so many representatives of this industry there should be presented the all-important subject of the contribution that chemistry can make in the further advancement of medicine.” Young seemed the obvious choice. “We all feel,” Herty continued, “that you better than any other man in the country can speak on this subject with authority and in a manner which will not only inspire those who hear you but will reach a wider field through the press and thus serve to concentrate public thought on this subject which is so intimately bound up with the good of the nation.”42 Between 1925 and 1930, the year when Chemical Foundation support ceased, a firm association existed, at least in Young’s mind, between the success of mercurachrome and the continuing flow of checks from the foundation. Also keenly interested in mercurachrome’s fortunes was the Baltimore pharmaceuticals firm of Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning, which manufactured the drug and with which Young had a close cooperative relationship based on mutual interest. From 1925, Young became aggressive in his advocacy of mercurachrome in both local and intravenous treatment of a variety of bacterial infections. He chafed at criticism and impatiently awaited general recognition of the drug’s value by the medical profession. Acknowledging receipt of a Chemical Foundation check, Young wrote to William Buffum in 1927 that, as you know, we have had great difficulty in getting this work across to the medical profession, which is very skeptical, and requires a continuous stream of papers, and hundreds of experimental and clinical cases before they will admit new and fundamental truths of great value, but our day of justification is rapidly approaching, and I think we will undoubtedly get the recognition which this work deserves. In case Buffum had missed the point, Young made it explicit: “In the meantime,” he concluded, “the continued assistance of the Chemical Foundation is of the greatest value; in fact without it we would have to greatly curtail our work.”43 At least through the end of 1930, Young worked closely with Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning to supply samples of mercurachrome, and literature on its use, to interested practitioners. To Young, each letter, reprint, or sample sent out was a shot fired on behalf of wider recognition of mercurachrome.44 Hostile fire was not lacking. In December 1927, for example, Young wrote to H.A.B. Dunning complaining of an item in JAMA. In reply to a doctor’s inquiry, a member of the journal’s editorial staff had advised against intravenous use of mercurachrome in gonorrhea because of risk of kidney damage. “What in the devil
Beginnings 29 is the matter with these people?” Young exploded. “Why do they take this attitude when all of us know it is absolutely untrue and has proved to be many times?” Young urged Dunning in reply to take a full page in the journal to present “all the facts in the literature of intravenous therapy with mercurachrome.” In 1928, Young worked closely with Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning and with an independent investigator favorable to mercurachrome, W. Dandridge Reddish, to confront criticisms of the drug that again appeared in JAMA. This time the critic was a Major Simmons. Reddish, urged on and advised by the company and by Young, arranged with the JAMA editor, Morris Fishbein, to publish a reply to Simmons alongside the latter’s article.45 At least through the end of 1929, Young’s hopes for mercurachrome and efforts on its behalf continued unabated. He wrote to William duPont about the latter’s use of intravenous mercurachrome in veterinary cases and, perhaps with visions of financial support in mind, invited duPont to visit the institute. He tried to persuade his former student John W. Churchman, now a professor of experimental therapeutics at Cornell University Medical College, to come to Baltimore to inspect the institute’s records on mercurachrome and to include the information in a book Churchman was writing on synthetic dyes. When phenolsulfonphthalein and mercurachrome were used to treat the King of England, Young discreetly but eagerly sought to get all details of the case. For all that, there is a plaintive note in Young’s remark to H.A.B. Dunning about the same time: “ ‘per aspera ad astra.’ Sometime we will get our work recognized by all the medical profession.”46 The general recognition that Young sought for mercurachrome never came. By the early 1930s, his efforts in this direction had been defeated by the dual blows of a precipitous decline in institute research funds brought on by the Depression and accumulating criticism of mercurachrome from medical and scientific sources. Chemical Foundation support ceased in 1930. After 1930, the Brady Urological Institute continued to use mercurachrome both as a topical antiseptic and in intravenous treatment of bacterial infections. The institute’s scarce research money ceased to flow into chemotherapy, however, and little new work was done. In a list of sixty-nine publications by Young and other institute staff that appeared between 1934 and 1939, only one included mercurachrome in the title, and that referred to its use as topical antiseptic. No new compounds were synthesized and tried. By 1937, institute staff were experimenting with sulfanilamide in the treatment of gonorrhea, but that, like other sulfa drugs soon to follow, came to the institute from other sources. The days of the Brady Urological Institute as a site for the development of new chemotherapeutic agents had passed.47
Mercurachrome in Decline ow many physicians made use of mercurachrome in their practices is not known. What is certain is that already by the mid-1920s Young’s work was being criticized, at least implicitly, by researchers whose aims were to develop rigorous methods for the evaluation of new chemotherapeutic agents and, if
H
30 the industrial origins of prontosil possible, to establish a rational basis for chemotherapy. These investigators shared Young’s optimism and sense of urgency regarding bacterial chemotherapy, his appeal to Ehrlich as an inspiration and model, and his focus on mercury dyestuffs, including, but not exclusively, mercurachrome. Where they differed from Young and his associates was in the priority they gave to methods of evaluation and fundamental principles over clinical applications, the emphasis they placed on controlled animal experiments and attention to biomedical variables, and their embrace of concepts of specific or semispecific action. In April 1925, George W. Raiziss, M. Severac, and John C. Moetsch discussed their work on bacterial chemotherapy using mercury dyestuffs before the American Chemical Society’s Section on Chemistry of Medicinal Products. The speakers held positions at the Dermatological Research Laboratories in Philadelphia, which was part of the pharmaceuticals company Abbott Laboratories. Raiziss and his associates noted the intense interest of chemists and physicians in bacterial chemotherapy. They pointed out that a decade of effort by chemists, pharmacologists, and physicians had produced hundreds of new compounds, some of which “gave rise to great hopes and were used extensively in medicine only to be abandoned because of their toxic effects upon the patient or disappointing curative results.” Yet the need was, if anything, more urgent, since, as the speakers pointed out, serum therapy appeared to have “exhausted its efforts in an attempt to combat such diseases as tuberculosis, pneumonia, and various types of septicemia.” The speakers saw a basis for optimism in the successes of trypanosomal and spirochetal chemotherapy but viewed bacterial infections as more difficult targets, perhaps because they were “in most cases acute, causing greater amount of damage to the vital functions of the body.”48 Raiziss and his associates were convinced that the path out of the uncertainty and failure that had prevailed so far lay in controlled animal trials. They gave close attention to choice of type of bacteria, its virulence, the quantity of the bacteria to be injected, and timing of administration of the compound. Partly with the Brady Institute work in mind, they selected four compounds for comparison: mercurachrome, metaphen (synthesized by the authors), benzurin (benzuchrome), and a compound called simply preparation number 565. They established experimental infections of Staphylococcus aureus in white rats and rabbits. A key variable in their tests turned out to be the timing of administration of the compound. At first they treated rabbits one, two, or three hours after infection. The result was that treated animals died even earlier than controls. Puzzled, Raiziss and his colleagues delayed administration until forty-eight or seventy-two hours after infection. Although at a loss to explain the much more favorable results obtained through the delay, they welcomed the finding because the greater interval between infection and treatment seemed to better approximate clinical conditions. They speculated that the delay occurred because the drugs acted not directly on the microorganisms, but indirectly through “mobilization of immune bodies.”49 Summarizing their results in a table, Raiziss and his colleagues concluded that organic mercury compounds did increase the chances of survival of experimentally infected animals. Of the four tested, they said, benzurin appeared the most promising in therapeutic efficacy and to have lower toxicity than mercurachrome.
Beginnings 31 Since mercurachrome had “sometimes been employed in the treatment of patients suffering from streptococcic and staphylococcic septicemia,” they recommended extended clinical trials for benzurin.50 More directly critical of Young’s claims were Ernest Linwood Walker and Marion A. Sweeney, collaborators in chemotherapeutic research at the University of California Medical School in San Francisco. In work published in 1926 and 1927, Walker and Sweeney lamented the uncertainty surrounding recent therapeutic claims for mercurachrome and other compounds. Noting that “the indiscriminate intravenous use of these substances has become prevalent in clinical medicine,” they pointed out that little weight could be given to the “favorable and even enthusiastic” reports so far made of them. They allowed that “single patients or small groups of patients, suffering from local or general infections with staphylococci, streptococci, gonococci, colon bacilli, or what not, have been treated and recovered,” but pointed out that whether these recoveries were “in consequence or in spite of the treatment, it is impossible to say in absence of controls or larger series of cases.”51 Walker and Sweeney saw two ways out of the impasse. The first was to make a fresh evaluation of the main chemotherapeutic agents currently in use against bacterial infections. To do so, they needed to establish standard methods of testing compounds against experimental bacterial infections, methods that could then be applied to any future compound. In their view, components of such a standard testing procedure would have to include choice of experimental animal, choice of pathogenic bacteria, standardization of the virulence of the bacteria, characterization of chemical compounds used and their sources (e.g., pharmaceutical companies), and methods of infecting experimental animals. In this case, the compounds they tested were ones that had come into clinical use during or just after the war: acriflavine, gentian violet, and mercurachrome. Walker and Sweeney chose the mouse as their experimental animal, and among the pathogenic bacteria they used was Streptococcus pyogenes hemolyticus. They specified as their source of mercurachrome the Baltimore firm of Hynson, Westcott, and Dunning, which also supplied the Brady Institute. Walker and Sweeney emphasized the gulf that separated in vitro tests and animal trials, pointing out that many compounds found to be germicidal in the test tube failed entirely in infected animals. At the same time, while they acknowledged the difference between mice and men, they held that tests on mice did bear comparison with intravenous treatment of human infections and, in any case, provided the best available methods for comparing the chemotherapeutic action of different compounds.52 On the basis of their controlled experiments, Walker and Sweeney were willing to give qualified endorsement to therapeutic use of acriflavine, gentian violet, and mercurachrome. The qualifications, however, were substantial. Chief among these was that each substance was “more or less specific in its chemotherapeutic action.” Gentian violet acted only against staphylococcal infections. Mercurachrome was more effective in streptococcal than in staphylococcal infections. Acriflavine was more effective in staphylococcal than in streptococcal infections. Also telling against claims made for the three compounds was that none appeared to act more than feebly unless brought into direct contact with the pathogenic bacteria.
32 the industrial origins of prontosil That is, the substance had to be introduced into the body at or near the site of infection. Walker and Sweeney allowed only a weak action of mercurachrome against streptococcal infections when the compound was introduced intravenously, as suggested by Young and his associates.53 Evaluation of mercurachrome and other compounds was, for Walker and Sweeney, a means to an end. Part of their purpose was, as mentioned above, to establish rigorous methods of evaluation for new chemotherapeutic agents. Even more was at stake. Chemotherapy had been empirical. It needed to become rational, to be based on fundamental principles. Thus, the second path they offered out of the impasse of bacterial chemotherapy was “to establish so far as possible the relation between chemical constitution and therapeutic action, in order that research might proceed in a scientific manner.”54 The problem, they thought, could be approached analytically or synthetically. That is, investigators could start with compounds already in use in chemotherapy and try to determine what it was about their chemical makeup that made them work. Or researchers could begin with a relatively simple molecule and study the therapeutic consequences of variations in its constituents or structure. Walker and Sweeney chose the latter course, laying down the requirement that the simple compound chosen “be capable of extensive chemical modification without destruction of its fundamental structure and that it contain a definite bactericidal group.” As their starting molecule, Walker and Sweeney chose the benzene ring, with an atom of mercury substituted for one of the carbons. They produced variations on this mercurated benzene by substituting other elements or radicals for other carbons on the ring or by joining other elements or radicals to the mercury. They held the mercury content constant in the various derivatives, with the mercury present in preparations given to experimental animals measured by reference to mercuric chloride as unity. They made their tests on mice infected with a standardized fatal dose of Staphylococcus aureus following the procedures developed in their evaluation of mercurachrome and other compounds.55 Walker and Sweeney gauged the effectiveness of each compound they tested by percentages of animals saved. In a first series of trials, they brought the compound being tested into direct contact with the bacteria by injecting a single dose into the peritoneum of the mouse immediately after intraperitoneal infection. From these trials, they concluded that chemotherapeutic activity depended “not only upon the chemical groups introduced into the ring, but also upon the relative positions of these groups to one another and to the mercury in the ring.” They realized that the value of these conclusions was limited, however, by the lack of correspondence between experimental conditions and the conditions of practical chemotherapy. In clinical conditions, the action of a compound was often blocked by organotrophism, which Walker and Sweeney defined as “any action or condition in the animal body that tends to divert the chemotherapeutical from the invading microorganisms.” Such conditions might include, for example, “slow absorption of the chemical, failure to penetrate the foci of infection, fixation of the tissues, decomposition into inactive substances, or rapid excretion from the body.” A second set of trials of the same compounds began to address this problem by following intraperitoneal infection of the mice by subcutaneous administration of
Beginnings 33 each compound, so that contact between bacteria and chemical agent could be achieved only via the bloodstream. As they had expected, these trials showed a dramatic drop in therapeutic action for the compounds tested, compared with the first series.56 Recognizing that development of effective chemotherapeutic agents required a combination of low toxicity with therapeutic action, Walker and Sweeney conducted a separate set of trials in which healthy mice received intraperitoneal injections of the same mercuribenzene derivatives. Their findings pointed to a complex relationship between toxicity and chemical constitution.57 Walker and Sweeney concluded that two chemical factors were principally involved in the action of organic mercurial compounds on staphylococcal infections. One of these was the bactericidal mercury group, or toxophore; the other, the therapeutic-action–enhancing or chemophore groups in other positions in the benzene ring. Referring to similar studies of other kinds of infections that they intended to publish later, Walker and Sweeney ventured that while a toxophore group, like mercury, might be effective against all bacterial infections, the chemophore groups appeared to be more or less specific for each type of infection. This conclusion, if true, would be of fundamental importance, for it “would render any attempt to prepare a panchemotherapeutical for bacterial infections futile.” It meant that “a chemotherapeutic treatment for the various bacterial infections, if such be possible, must be developed for each independently.” It also told against the view, prevalent in the 1920s, that chemotherapeutic agents acted indirectly by stimulation of the body’s defenses rather than directly on specific kinds of bacteria.58 Raiziss and colleagues and Walker and Sweeney were not alone in their reservations about mercurachrome or in their call for more rigorous standards of research in chemotherapy. The spectrum of expert opinion on both sides of the Atlantic in the late 1920s and early 1930s ran from cautious endorsement of mercurachrome as a local or topical antiseptic, through suspended judgment pending further investigation, to outright dismissal. Possibly with the vogue for mercurachrome in mind, the author of a major American textbook on chemotherapy complained in 1926 that, unfortunately, many investigators, probably the majority, have not systematized their work or stuck long enough to any one group of compounds to permit them to study these fundamental relations, a feverish desire to evolve remedies of striking properties quite generally preventing the less spectacular, but nevertheless highly desirable, systematic studies devoted to a painstaking and persistent study of chemical constitution in relation to toxicity and parasiticidal activity and employing the simplest biological methods in order to render all tests strictly comparative with the minimum of experimental error, which will permit the influence of minor alterations in chemical constitution to be properly evaluated.59 In an article published in the Chemical Foundation’s volume Chemistry and Medicine (1928), and intended to paint a bright future for chemotherapy, Carl Voegtlin included a carefully worded statement allowing that mercurachrome appeared to
34 the industrial origins of prontosil be of value in treatment of urinary tract infections and might also be useful as a prophylactic in preparing patients for genitourinary operations. He passed over in silence claims made for mercurachrome as an agent against systemic infections.60 The best shots of its critics failed to kill mercurachrome. Instead, it appears to have entered a slow decline. The more extravagant claims were abandoned, the more modest ones were hedged with qualifications, and some clinical use continued. In the seventh edition of their well-known textbook of bacteriology, published in 1934, Hans Zinsser and Stanhope Bayne-Jones mentioned the great research and therapeutic activity surrounding organic mercury compounds since 1920 and, in particular, the extensive use made of mercurachrome both as topical antiseptic and as chemotherapeutic agent in many infections. They took note of, but kept at arm’s length, the many reports of favorable results from use of mercurachrome. “In our opinion,” they remarked, “the claims for it have not been extensively substantiated. . . . We would place it just below tincture of iodine as a surface antiseptic.”61 Evidence of decline is more marked in an important British textbook published five years later, the second edition of G.M. Findlay’s Recent Advances in Chemotherapy. Findlay stated flatly that “mercurachrome has unfortunately failed to fulfill the hopes which were at first entertained of it as an antidote to septicemia.” Citing studies indicating that the bactericidal properties of organic mercury compounds were neutralized by their binding with serum protein, Findlay pointed out that sterilization of the bloodstream with mercurachrome would require administration of many times the fatal dose. Although he mentioned reports that questioned the value of mercurachrome even as a germicide, Findlay was willing to allow that “as antiseptics for such purposes as cleansing the skin before operations [mercurachrome and other organic mercurials] possibly possess some value.”62
The Prospects of Chemotherapy ooking back in 1955 at what he called “the immense vogue” for mercurachrome in the 1920s, British physician Lawrence P. Garrod marveled that so many people seriously believed the compound to be an efficient intravenous antiseptic. His own explanation, that the episode was a case of therapeutic fraud, is surely mistaken. The vogue for mercurachrome emerged from, and placed in sharp relief, several features of the medical world of the 1920s. It expressed the intense desire of researchers, physicians, and patients alike for some defense against the relentless suffering and death associated with bacterial infections. It expressed even more clearly an optimism, motivated in part by Ehrlich’s program, in part by other successes of chemotherapy, and in part perhaps by the spectacular impact of insulin against a very different kind of disease, that such a thing as bacterial chemotherapy was even possible. And it expressed, or was made possible by, a lack of settled consensus on principles, methods, and standards of evaluation in chemotherapy. Mercurachrome rose on a wave of need and expectation. When it declined, the need remained, but expectations inevitably cooled as well. For some, by the early 1930s, the failure of mercurachrome and countless
L
Beginnings 35 other compounds warranted an increasing pessimism where bacterial chemotherapy was concerned. For most of those engaged in research, it meant not so much pessimism as a new sobriety, a concentration on methods and standards of investigation, and a sense that bacterial chemotherapy would emerge not from a quick victory but from long, steady, and determined effort.63 The pre-sulfa drugs decade of the late 1920s and early 1930s has sometimes been portrayed as a time of increasing gloom over the prospects for bacterial chemotherapy.64 A survey of leaders of the scientific and medical communities in Europe and America, however, found little evidence of genuine pessimism. More evident are varied assessments of the achievements of chemotherapy so far, a proliferation of diagnoses of its shortcomings, and prescriptions for its future success. At the Toronto meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1924, the president of the association’s section of physiology, Henry H. Dale, spoke on the “progress and prospects in chemotherapy.” Dale was both critical of the current state of chemotherapeutic theory and expansive on the practical achievements and future prospects of the field. On the theoretical side, he questioned Ehrlich’s views on the mode of action of chemical agents on microbes as ad hoc and insufficiently precise in a biochemical sense and called for greater attention to the interactions of synthetic compounds with host organisms. He pointed to the need for such knowledge, and of knowledge of microbial physiology, if chemotherapy was to be put on a rational basis. At the same time, just because of the limits of theory to date, he expressed wonder and admiration that so much of practical value has already been achieved—the treatment of spirochetal infections, syphilis, yaws and relapsing fever, revolutionized; leishmania infections, kala-azar and Baghdad boil and bilharzia infections which crippled the health of whole populations in countries such as Egypt, now made definitely curable; trypanosome infections, such as the deadly African sleeping sickness, after years of alternating promise and disappointments, brought now at last within the range of effective treatment. And the end was nowhere in sight, he continued, for “if such results have already been attained, in a period during which practice has inevitably and often outrun theory, we may well be hopeful for a future in which fuller understanding should make for more orderly progress.”65 Although Dale nowhere mentioned bacterial chemotherapy, his optimism seemed to embrace prospects for treatment of all infectious disease. The author of the foremost American textbook of chemotherapy, John A. Kolmer, was much more explicit in his hopes for bacterial chemotherapy. Kolmer, a professor of pathology and bacteriology at the University of Pennsylvania medical school, devoted most of his Principles and Practice of Chemotherapy (1926) to syphilis. Not only had chemotherapy’s greatest successes been scored against syphilis, he argued, but the treatment of syphilis provided a model for laboratory and clinical investigations of the chemical therapy of other infectious diseases. Among these, he gave bacterial infections a prominent place. Some 140 pages of the 1,000-page
36 the industrial origins of prontosil text were devoted to chemotherapy of bacterial diseases, a figure that reflected both the relative lack of progress of the subfield and Kolmer’s close attention to what had been done.66 Kolmer was aware of the difficulties. He referred to “the skepticism so frequently expressed in regards to the future of the chemotherapy of bacterial diseases.” He noted that while the bacteria, because of their relative simplicity and greater distance from mammalian organisms, might have been considered easier targets for chemotherapy than protozoa or metazoa, exactly the opposite had been the case. He even suggested that the discovery of spirochetes and trypanosomes and of the means of conducting large numbers of inexpensive experimental infections with them “was a wonderfully fortunate circumstance, for had the early experiments in chemotherapy been conducted with the bacteria, disappointments would probably have extinguished enthusiasm by a lack of sufficient success and encouragement as subsequent events have amply indicated.”67 Whatever the problems, Kolmer thought that grounds for optimism could be found in recent work in bacterial chemotherapy that had produced drugs of practical value. Among the latter, he included the work of Young and his associates on mercurachrome and that of himself, J. F. Schamberg, and Raiziss on synthesis of other mercurial compounds, including mercuraphen. Kolmer brightened the picture of recent work and future prospects considerably by loosening his definition of bacterial chemotherapy to include local as well as systemic treatment.68 Kolmer’s broad-ranging optimism was echoed two years later by Voegtlin, a pharmacologist with the U.S. Public Health Service’s Hygienic Laboratory, in his chapter for the Chemical Foundation’s Chemistry and Medicine. Voegtlin’s tone, as befitted the volume as a whole, was forward-looking, militant, and upbeat. He pointed to the real triumphs of chemotherapy against protozoal diseases and to promising beginnings in bacterial chemotherapy. Although Voegtlin regarded these successes as “a sufficient demonstration of the practical value of this new science,” he, like Dale, lamented the contemporary lack of knowledge of mechanism of action of drugs and of microbial physiology. Such ignorance, he thought, blocked establishment of a scientific foundation for chemotherapy and slowed discovery of useful drugs.69 A cooler view of the state of the field, and especially of bacterial chemotherapy, was taken by Findlay in the first edition (1930) of his major British textbook. Findlay was acutely aware of the tendency for hope to triumph over experience in a field with potentially enormous impact on medical practice. “In perhaps no other department of science,” he remarked, “is there psychologically so great a will to success as in chemotherapy.”70 In Findlay’s view, bacterial chemotherapy had so far proved a failure in both local and systemic infections. He regarded all chemical antiseptics then in use as general protoplasmic poisons. As such, they killed bacteria but at the same time weakened the body’s defenses by inhibiting phagocytosis by leukocytes and weakening the leukocytes’ bactericidal action. Only their rapid elimination from the body, he thought, prevented them from seriously compromising the body’s defenses. He pointed out that, even when applied locally, as in infected wounds, known antiseptics quickly lost effective concentrations and, while present, interfered with the action of leukocytes. Findlay’s strictures applied to
Beginnings 37 mercurachrome as well as to many other compounds. From them, he also drew the conclusion that in vitro tests of an antiseptic’s action could throw little or no light on its effectiveness in vivo.71 Failure so far did not preclude future success, however, and Findlay had no hesitation in listing the properties of an ideal compound for use in bacterial infections. It should have a well-marked bactericidal action when brought into contact with bacteria in the presence of tissue fluids; it should be non-toxic to tissue cells; it should stimulate the bactericidal powers of the leucocytes; it should retain its bactericidal powers for a prolonged period when present in blood or tissue fluids; and it should readily diffuse from the blood into serous cavities and tissue spaces. Such a compound had not yet been found, but the very act of defining its ideal properties affirmed the possibility.72 Findlay’s prescription for cure of chemotherapy’s troubled state emphasized more rigorous research methods. At the base had to be experimental infections in appropriate laboratory animals. In vitro tests alone were unreliable, Findlay held, and the chemotherapeutic activity of powerful compounds such as the arsphenamines in syphilis, Bayer 205 (Germanin) in sleeping sickness, or Plasmoquine (chloroquine) in malaria “could hardly have been determined” without trials on infected animals. Chemotherapeutic action in animals did not guarantee chemotherapeutic action in humans, he admitted, but “broadly speaking, it may be said that any drug which is devoid of action in experimental animals will also be devoid of action in man.” Passing through the sieve of animal trials was therefore a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the success of a compound as chemotherapeutic agent. Clinical trials were also required. To ensure the value of animal trials, Findlay specified six criteria to be satisfied regarding kinds and numbers of animals used and the experimental conditions. He offered the clinician a parallel list of eight measures to be taken to establish credible results in tests of chemotherapeutic agents on humans.73 The most novel aspect of Findlay’s exhortation was his call for application of statistical methods to chemotherapy. Findlay urged laboratory researchers and clinicians to familiarize themselves with simple statistical concepts. Not only could use of such methods save considerable time and energy, he argued, but “little solid progress can be made in chemotherapeutic research until both the laboratory worker and the clinician realise the errors into which lack of elementary statistical knowledge may lead them.” With statistical thinking would come “a healthy skepticism,” to be applied to a researcher’s own work as well as that of others.74 A cautious and critical reserve was also the keynote of the 1934 edition of Zinsser and Bayne-Jones’ Textbook of Bacteriology. The authors devoted a chapter to “the effects of chemical agents on bacteria” but restricted its coverage almost entirely to antiseptics or disinfectants. They did not formulate a program for research, did not mention Ehrlich’s program, did not issue a call for more effort in bacterial chemotherapy, and thought that any results claimed to be achieved so far
38 the industrial origins of prontosil against systemic bacterial infections were at best unproven, at worst unsuccessful. All of this added up to a relatively passive and expectant optimism. Not pessimism, surely, but equally not a posture that was likely to drive innovation.75 Finally, more than a decade after Dale’s optimistic remarks, a note of frustration and resignation was struck by Max Gundel in his German textbook on infectious diseases. Gundel, a physician and medical researcher at the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin, aimed the multiauthored anthology at practitioners. Following brief introductory sections, the first, longest, and most elaborately subdivided portion of the text covered bacterial infections. Gundel himself contributed the first subsection, on streptococcal infections. He regarded most chemotherapeutic agents as having failed in streptococcal infections. He looked grimly ahead to a long struggle in which chemotherapy did not play an explicit, let alone a prominent, role. “If one looks over the whole field of the streptococcal infections of humans,” he reflected, “then one comes in every respect to an ever more resigned attitude.” Neither the biology of streptococci nor the specific therapy of streptococcal diseases had made any essential advance in recent decades, Gundel believed, and “only the most intensive common work of all disciplines will perhaps bring progress, which is all the more urgent and to be desired, as with the streptococcal infections it is a matter of diseases of the greatest significance for public health.”76 Gundel’s emphasis on sera and vaccines at the expense of chemotherapy, an emphasis evident elsewhere in his text, reminds us that more was involved in the status of chemotherapy than the record of its own past achievements or lack of them. Other approaches to infectious disease competed for the attention and energy of investigators and the institutions that funded them. By the mid-1930s, vast effort had been expended on the development of sera alone. Major successes had been scored in serum treatment of diphtheria and pneumococcal pneumonia, and pharmaceutical companies and clinicians continued to test sera against other bacterial infections. Serum therapy of streptococcal infections was frustrated in part by the large number of varieties of the target organism, Streptococcus pyogenes. It would be a presentist fallacy, however, to see something inevitable in the triumph of chemotherapy and to fault investigators of the early 1930s for failure to anticipate it. In the struggle with bacterial infections, it was by no means obvious in what direction success might be found.77 Whatever their views on the most promising path to be taken, several investigators of the pre-1935 decade called for major new efforts in the search for treatments of bacterial disease. A common theme in these appeals was a perception that previous efforts had been inadequate in both quantity and quality. Gundel thought that only research “of an entirely other extent” from that of the present, “put in motion from the most various directions and focuses,” would improve the prognosis for streptococcal infections. Kolmer made his optimism on the prospects for bacterial chemotherapy conditional on a tremendous expenditure of brains and money not yet thrown into the struggle. To these would have to be joined “hard, conscientious, and unremitting, but systematized toil coupled with the ever alluring chance of making a ‘lucky strike.’ ”78 The most emphatic, and the most carefully thought out, call to action came
Beginnings 39 from Voegtlin. Commenting on the treatment of tuberculosis, he remarked ruefully that “it is very likely that if but half of the energy and money which has been spent in the search for a serum, had been devoted to chemotherapeutic investigation, greater progress might have been recorded.” In this context, he ascribed the disproportionate emphasis on sera and vaccines to physicians’ lack of chemical training: “There are few Paul Ehrlichs in medicine.”79 In mentioning Ehrlich, Voegtlin had in mind not only the need for chemically trained doctors. More fundamental were the commitment of resources and the organization of research exemplified by Ehrlich’s institute. Voegtlin conceded that valuable discoveries had been made in laboratories not organized specifically for chemotherapeutic research. He pointed out, however, that work in such locales was often hindered by inappropriate use of personnel and equipment, by lack of financial resources, or by unwillingness of laboratory directors to wait the years often necessary for practical results. Ehrlich’s institute embodied a formula for success that should be adopted in the United States, Voegtlin argued. The essential ingredients included mobilization of substantial financial resources and their long-term commitment to chemotherapeutic research. With these resources laboratories should be organized that embodied cooperative associations of chemists, pharmacologists, bacteriologists, and other specialists, all working full time on problems of chemotherapy. Equally important, in Voegtlin’s view, was the close association of such a laboratory with the fine chemicals industry. “The secret of the success of the immense organic chemical industry in Germany,” he remarked, “is to a great extent due to their policy of establishing within the works true research laboratories which, as far as personnel and equipment is concerned, are not surpassed by the chemical departments of German universities.” The same industrial laboratories also maintained consulting arrangements with leading academic chemists. Voegtlin lamented that, despite its growth since the war, the U.S. organic chemicals industry did not yet encourage fundamental research, still preferring to exploit existing knowledge.80 That Voegtlin’s blueprint for chemotherapeutic research was not yet realized in the United States despite the availability of its separate ingredients points to the limitations of American optimism about the field. The venture into chemotherapy that resulted in mercurachrome embodied the optimism, but also the constraints of funding, focus, and organization that characterized many efforts in the field in the 1910s and 1920s. What Voegtlin did not take note of was that in Germany the fine chemicals industry not only cooperated with institutes like Ehrlich’s but also had long ago incorporated Ehrlich’s program into its own research organizations. By the time Voegtlin’s comments were published in 1928, the pharmaceutical research division of one such company was already embarked on work that would produce a major breakthrough in the chemotherapy of bacterial infections.
CHAPTER 2
A System of Invention
n 1939, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Gerhard Domagk, a medical researcher employed by the German fine chemicals company I.G. Farbenindustrie. Domagk was cited for his “recognition of the antibacterial activity of Prontosil,” by that time recognized as the first of a new class of antibacterial agents, the sulfa drugs. Domagk’s first findings related to Prontosil were dated 1932, and the first publication, 1935. In fact, the research program from which Prontosil emerged had been initiated in 1926. And the successful result of that program depended heavily on Domagk’s close collaboration with two of the company’s chemists, Fritz Mietzsch and Joseph Klarer, whose roles the Nobel award passed over in silence. Indeed, contrary to the impression conveyed to the world by Domagk’s Nobel Prize, the research that produced the first sulfa drugs was a collaborative effort in which biomedical researchers and chemists played distinct and complementary roles. Behind their association were the vision and experience of a company research manager, Heinrich Hörlein. Hörlein approached the problem of bacterial chemotherapy with an expansive view of the potential uses of chemistry in medicine and a systemic approach to innovation, and as director of a research organization with a record of recent successes in work on closely related problems. Behind Hörlein was I.G. Farben, for which the venture into antibacterial chemotherapy was among the latest in a series of steps in a diversification that led from synthetic dyestuffs through pharmaceuticals to chemotherapy. Involvement of the German fine chemicals industry with pharmaceuticals stretched back to the 1880s, long antedating even Ehrlich’s early work in chemotherapy. The industry’s attention to pharmaceuticals increased at the same time that it was expanding its commitments to research. As Georg Meyer-Thurow
I
40
A System of Invention 41 has shown for Bayer, one of the major component companies of I.G. Farben, the establishment of research and its contribution to Bayer’s success were the results of an evolutionary process in which legal and economic as well as scientific developments played important roles. Major components of this process included the opening of a main scientific laboratory in 1891; the building up of a research infrastructure to support the main laboratory, including a library, a literary department, a patent bureau, a control laboratory, a training laboratory, and an experimental dye house; and the increasing focus of management on the organization of research and on the introduction of related managerial techniques, including labor contract regulations, financial incentives, conferences, regular progress reports, and creation of the role of research administrator. Research became increasingly differentiated, specialized, and decentralized with the setting up of new laboratories, including, by 1902, a pharmaceutical and a bacteriological laboratory. Largely in place by the beginning of World War I, the establishment of research within Bayer had as one major consequence the industrialization of invention, as technical innovation at Bayer became a bureaucratically managed, routinized process carried out by teams of cooperating specialists.1 It was within such an industrial research setting that the first compounds effective against bacterial infections in humans were developed. Their story is therefore more than that of the two or three individuals most directly engaged in the research and most visible in the historical record. It is also the story of a particular kind of organization and of the ways in which it shaped the careers, research programs, and working relationships of investigators who were part of it. An internal company report of 1930, prepared for the information of higher management, is revealing of the aims, organization, and system of innovation of I.G. Farben’s pharmaceutical division. The report was strictly confidential and distributed in numbered copies to a small group of high executives. It was intended to familiarize its readers, especially those in the other divisions of the company, with the inner workings of the pharmaceutical division. The occasion for the report was completion of the fusion of the pharmaceutical parts of I.G. Farben’s component companies into a single organization, a process begun in 1925 with the formation of I.G. Farben. The most important components of the new entity so far as pharmaceuticals were concerned were Bayer and Höchst, and the leaders of their pharmaceutical divisions, Rudolf Mann and Alfred Ammelburg, respectively, were singled out for special thanks. The report was also meant to be a critical stock-taking, for its authors conceded that in spite of the overall success of the merger, there was still room for improvement.2 All five component companies of the unified division—Bayer, Höchst, Kalle & Co. of Biebrich, Leopold Casella & Co. of Frankfurt am Main, and Agfa (Aktiengesellschaft für Anilinfabrikation) of Berlin—had begun as producers of synthetic dyes and had later expanded into pharmaceuticals. The continuing pressure for diversification in this direction is visible in a section of the report on the “significance and use of our bacteriological dyes in medicine.” The authors reviewed current uses of dyes in diagnosis (including pathology), in therapy (including chemotherapy), in surgery as markers of lines of incision, as indicators of acidity and alkalinity, in botany, and in nutritional chemistry. They saw a wide field of
42 the industrial origins of prontosil
Figure 2.1. A 1900 Bayer advertisement showing factories at Elberfeld and Leverkusen (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
use for dyes in medicine, but one that was so far more impressive in its potential than in its realization. They conceded that “surprises are always possible in the field of dye therapy.” The keynote of the relationship of dyes to medicines was therefore unpredictability, but an unpredictability that the authors chose to read in an optimistic way.3 One of the more striking features of the report was its effort to convey to its executive readers the typical cycle of development of a new pharmaceutical product
A System of Invention 43 within I.G. Farben. Drawing upon the component companies’ nearly half-century of experience with pharmaceuticals, the authors were able both to take a long view and to abstract from particulars. They recognized a periodicity in the development of pharmaceuticals in which times of relatively quiet stability alternated with periods of rapid or revolutionary change. They noted that new scientific ideas usually did not have an immediate payoff in the manufacture of new products, but that it was precisely in the lag time between new ideas and new products that purely scientific work became most important. Steady scientific research was necessary, they argued, in order to meet practical needs with new products that would replace existing ones. The relatively rapid turnover of pharmaceutical products required a permanent source of innovation, and this source was scientific research.4 At the same time, the report conceded, the company’s scientific laboratories needed to keep in touch with the needs and desires of medical practice. One source for such contact was the medical literature. Another was reports by scientific or medical people in external service, who made regular personal visits to clinics. From these sources came ideas and stimuli that helped to shape guidelines for research within the company.5 The authors pointed out that rational drug design, that is, the deliberate search for medicinal drugs of definite effect, was possible only in a very limited way because of lack of knowledge of the relation between chemical constitution and pharmacological action. Thus, the route from chemical laboratory to new product was not direct or predictable. An elaborate series of steps intervened, at any one of which a promising compound might be eliminated. A compound was first subjected to pharmacological scrutiny in the form of “wide-ranging animal tests” in company laboratories at Elberfeld, Höchst, or Mainkur. If these tests gave reason to believe that the compound might have some definite therapeutic action, it was sent on to Leverkusen and referred to the central testing site. Here, pharmacological data were gathered to arrive at a statement of indications, dosage, and standards to be set for the preparation. At this stage, the substance would be subjected to preliminary clinical testing on a restricted basis, presumably either within the company or under its close supervision. The immediate goal of the preliminary clinical tests was to establish tolerance. If the substance appeared to be well tolerated by human subjects, dosages were increased to establish optimal dosage levels. Only after these steps had been completed would the compound be released for further clinical tests by qualified individuals outside the company, who were supplied with scientific information on the preparation and adequate quantities of samples.6 The testing period for new preparations averaged one year. Within this time, the pharmaceutical division had to gather, compare, and judge results from its various sources. Typically, problems or complications arose, due, for example, to failure to follow guidelines, overdosing, or intolerances in individual cases. Such difficulties were treated with special care, since an understanding of them often improved knowledge of the compound. Evaluation involved ongoing exchanges of information and ideas with the research laboratories, including regular discussions in Elberfeld and Höchst and larger conferences that brought in scientific people in external service. The whole process might have one of three outcomes:
44 the industrial origins of prontosil introduction of the preparation into commerce and medicine, its discontinuance, or further testing. A decision taken by a major conference to introduce a compound triggered a number of technical preparations, including manufacture in quantity and creation of packaging, prospectuses, and advertising, all in cooperation with the appropriate parts of the company. In all of this, a central coordinating role was played by Leverkusen.7 The report also assessed costs and profits of the pharmaceutical division in recent years. It identified major problems facing the division and came to a judgment on its future prospects. Not surprisingly, the authors gave pride of place to the need to maintain profitability. This could be achieved in the first instance, they argued, by increasing volume of business. Business volume, in turn, could result either from an increase in numbers of “truly promising products” or through participation in companies whose activities were closely related to those of the division. As to the first goal, the authors noted that “our gaze is confidently directed to our research laboratories.” In general, the authors insisted, costs had to be lowered through “the closest contact between factory, laboratory, and marketing, which we fortunately may affirm is already long established.”8 The report concluded that, all things considered, the future looked bright. Conceding that the critical situation of the world economy had created uncertainty, they still admitted to “a healthy optimism” and looked forward to “a constant development with increasing improvement of profits.” The key to this success, the authors affirmed, would be leadership: “As everywhere, so also here, the choice of the right leading personalities will be decisive.”9 Of the leading personalities referred to in the 1930 report, perhaps the most important was Hörlein, who was principal architect of that part of I.G. Farben’s pharmaceutical research organization contributed by the former Bayer company. Like the German fine chemicals industry itself, his early career had moved between dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals. Born in 1882, the son of a vineyard owner in Wendelsheim, Rheinhessen, Hörlein was educated at Realschulen. He studied chemistry first at the Technische Hochschule in Darmstadt, and then at the University of Jena, where he took his doctorate in 1903 under Ludwig Knorr, an organic chemist and the discoverer of antipyrine. At Jena, Hörlein studied physics and political economy as well as chemistry, and his doctoral examination was awarded summa cum laude in all three subjects. From 1904 to 1908, Hörlein was assistant and collaborator to Knorr and concentrated on the chemical structure of morphine. In 1908, Carl Duisberg, himself a chemist and by then director of Bayer, was looking for a new chemist for Bayer’s pharmaceutical division. At that year’s Jena meeting of the Society of German Chemists, over which he presided, Duisberg put the question to Knorr, whom he knew from earlier days in Munich. Knorr pointed out Hörlein and subsequently wrote to Duisberg that “Hörlein has a very intelligent, clear head, and is an outstanding, skillful chemist. He possesses extensive knowledge of chemistry and political economy, is a swift and reliable worker, and has the most important characteristic for a technologist [Techniker], a tenacious, systematic energy.” Hörlein got the job.10 After joining Bayer in 1909, Hörlein worked for several months in dyestuffs chemistry with the aim of deepening his knowledge of its methods. He then
A System of Invention 45 returned to pharmaceutical chemistry and in 1910 was instrumental in introducing Luminal (phenobarbital), a sedative that came to play an important role in the treatment of epilepsy.11 By this time, Duisberg had ample evidence to confirm Knorr’s judgment of Hörlein’s energy and talents. In 1910, he placed him in charge of Bayer’s pharmaceutical-scientific laboratories, and Hörlein thereby joined the governing body of the pharmaceutical research division in Elberfeld. Under Hörlein, and with Duisberg’s support, the pharmaceutical research division at Elberfeld began a long-term expansion. To the existing chemical, pharmaceutical, and bacteriological laboratories, a new chemotherapeutic laboratory was added in 1910, with a student of Ehrlich’s, Wilhelm Roehl, as first director. Through the 1910s and 1920s, Hörlein expanded the existing laboratories and added others. When I.G. Farben was formed in 1925, the company controlled not only the Bayer laboratories at Elberfeld and Leverkusen but also others at Höchst and Mainkur. Of these, the Elberfeld establishment was the largest and had the most subdivisions. As of 1927, Hörlein presided over seven laboratories, with a total staff, including assistants, numbering eighty-two. There were two chemical laboratories, one of which included among its staff Domagk’s collaborators Klarer and Mietzsch. There was one special laboratory, one chemical trials room, one physiological and biochemical laboratory, and one chemotherapeutic laboratory. Domagk’s laboratory of experimental pathology, which became the eighth unit under Hörlein’s direction, was inserted into a carefully constructed, large-scale, ongoing co-
Figure 2.2. Heinrich Hörlein (1882–1954) c. 1920 (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
46 the industrial origins of prontosil operative research effort. Duisberg in 1934 described the Elberfeld research establishment as a “rounded whole” that comprised “the collected theoretical fields of a medical faculty.”12 Hörlein’s rise in the company paralleled his building up of its pharmaceutical research division. In 1914 he was named Prokurist, in 1919 deputy director, and in 1921 deputy member of the executive board of Bayer. In 1931, he became a regular member of the executive board (Vorstand) of I.G. Farben, member of the technical committee (TEA, technische Ausschuss) of I.G. Farben, and director of the pharmaceutical and plant-protection divisions in Elberfeld. Hörlein took over direction of the Elberfeld works in 1933 and in 1935 became chairman of the pharmaceutical major conference of I.G. Farben, in which the directors of all pharmaceutical units, including those for research, manufacture, advertising, and marketing from Leverkusen, Höchst, and Elberfeld, took part. Without exaggeration, Hörlein may be called the leading figure in the management of pharmaceutical research and development at Bayer and I.G. Farben between the world wars.13 His position is reflected in an admiring bit of doggerel penned by Walther Wolff, who visited the company in March 1930: The car brings me quickly To the I.G.’s entrance First the announcement, then up we go To the I.G. Farben main office, Therein Bonhoeffer and Hörlein preside, In order to make dividends. — Long ago, in narrow ways, I earlier saw the work bestir itself, Small buildings, the air was filled With the scent of chemicals, The ground green, violet, blue The whole building wrapped in steam. Yet today the ways are broad, The huts defy time, And newly arisen, where once the dye House earned fame for Friedrich Bayer Is many a structure of pharmacy As an ornament of chemistry. — On the other side of the Wupper A new edifice grows out of nothing, Erected by pure science: Concentrated pharmacology! Shall I praise the building That unveils the philosopher’s stone?
A System of Invention 47 Whose bright windows give Light to the strivings of young researchers? — Here is fought the curse of the tropics. Malaria in microscopes, Anopheles and Tsetse flies. To conquer the devil’s effects Is Heinrich Hörlein’s great deed, Blessings to suffering humanity, To the envy of the universities! Trypanosomes, spirochetes, Amoebas and leukocytes, Shortly they will be dead! At home, filled with gratitude, I propose a toast to Heinrich Hörlein!14 One of the roles that Hörlein took upon himself as director of the pharmaceutical research division and company manager was liaison between the company and the scientific and medical communities. By his own account, he saw the care of scientific societies within Germany as part of his life’s work. At one time or another, he was associated with the German Chemical Society, the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft for the Advancement of Science, the Society of German Scientists and Physicians, the Adolf Baeyer Gesellschaft for the Advancement of Chemical Literature, and the Emil Fischer Gesellschaft (financed by the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin-Dahlem). He also served as chairman of the Justus Liebig Society for the Advancement of Chemical Instruction, which distributed stipends to graduated chemists and to chemistry students.15 In his capacity as liaison to the scientific and medical worlds, Hörlein gave several talks to professional meetings in Germany and Britain between 1927 and 1937. In two of these, presented in 1927 and 1932, he gave an expansive picture of his views on the goals, achievements, problems, and prospects of pharmaceutical research. These talks yield insights into the institutional structure of innovation at Elberfeld, and the vision on which that structure—and, not incidentally, Bayer/I.G. Farben’s willingness to commit substantial resources to research over a long period—were based. The keynote of both lectures, and indeed of Hörlein’s posture as manager of pharmaceutical research for I.G. Farben, was a robust confidence in the future of research-based medicinal drugs. Hörlein’s was not merely the optimism of a salesman speaking to potential buyers, but was based on a well-informed and well-articulated vision of pharmaceutical research as a domain of rational engineering or science-based technology, a synoptic view of the scientific basis, successes, and unrealized potentials of chemically oriented medicine, and a systemic approach to innovation.16 Hörlein viewed the pharmaceutical industry as a branch of chemical technology, historically derived from the production of synthetic dyestuffs and distinguished by
48 the industrial origins of prontosil its partial incorporation of and dependence upon experimental and clinical medicine. He underlined its importance as an element of the German economy and as one source of the scientific, technological, and medical reputation of Germany abroad. Like Thomas Edison, a manager of innovation in a field Hörlein compared to synthetic medicines, he considered his goals and problems from a technical or scientific and an economic point of view simultaneously. He paid close attention to such matters as the cost of selecting one compound out of hundreds for clinical trials, and gave patenting precedence over publication.17 Hörlein’s explicit and implicit definitions of the fields central to pharmaceutical research emphasized their character as rational engineering rather than as basic science. However much it may draw upon or contribute to knowledge in chemistry, physiology, microbiology, or pathology, research in pharmaceutical chemistry, physiological chemistry, and chemotherapy as Hörlein thought of them was organized around and subordinated to the practical goal of production of medically useful and commercially viable products. Pharmaceutical chemistry harnessed the methods and concepts of organic analysis and synthesis to produce new medicines. Although Hörlein was well aware of the scientific breadth of physiological chemistry as pursued in academic institutes, his own interest narrowed to the “decisive” finding that some compounds produced or taken in by the body—he thought especially of vitamins and hormones—are pharmacologically active and can therefore become medicines. As even its name indicates, chemotherapeutic research had as its primary goal the finding of chemical agents effective against systemic microbial infections. To this practical goal even its aim to understand how the chemical agents work was subordinated. Hörlein’s emphasis on the ability of imperfect or deficient animal experimental models to produce valuable results was one expression of this pragmatic or engineering attitude. Hörlein’s attitude was based not simply, or even primarily, on the situation of any particular area of research considered in isolation, but on his comprehensive overview of advance in areas in which chemistry and biomedicine intersected. These areas shared a number of generic problems and solutions, for example, the need to isolate a substance (natural product, synthetic product, body substance) in chemically pure form, the need to synthesize the substance and to do so economically if it was to go on the market, and the need for pharmacological, chemotherapeutic, toxicological, and clinical testing of the substance. Hörlein’s efforts to translate success in certain areas (vitamin deficiency disease, chemotherapy of protozoal infections) into optimism about possibilities in other areas (cancer, antibacterial chemotherapy) was characteristic. He regarded the chemical attack on disease as a many-fronted battle in which there was a generally advancing line but also many points at which advance was slow or arrested. In this sense, Hörlein might be said to have thought—as Thomas Hughes has shown that Edison did—in terms of reverse salients and critical problems. Reverse salients are areas of research and development that are lagging in some obvious way behind the general line of advance. Critical problems are the research questions, cast in terms of the concrete particulars of currently available knowledge and technique and of specific exemplars or models (e.g.,
A System of Invention 49 insulin, chemotherapy of kala-azar and malaria) that are solvable and whose solutions would eliminate the reverse salients.18 Hughes describes the components of Edison’s electric lighting project as forming a system in the sense that they are interrelated and mutually dependent parts of an integrated whole. The technology that Hörlein describes does not form a system in this sense but is fragmented into distinct and not necessarily related aspects of the relation of chemistry and medicine in its practical manifestations. Hörlein has a synoptic or comprehensive view of these manifestations, but they themselves do not form a system in Hughes’s sense. What was systemic in Hörlein’s way of thinking was his concept of the organizational pattern or patterns that will best facilitate the production of valuable results in the areas in which medicine and chemistry interact. A valuable outcome is a result that has practical importance for clinical or preventive medicine and, implicitly, commercial value for industry. Hörlein perceived a need for a set of mutually complementary institutions and trained personnel whose interaction produces the desired results. The organizational pattern that emerges more or less clearly from Hörlein’s lectures is closely associated with his view of the typical phases or cycles of development of research in chemotherapy or physiological chemistry. He saw a need for friendly and mutually supportive relations between industrial research and development organizations, academic institutions, and clinicians. He viewed the academic–industrial connection as crucial and mutually beneficial. Underlying this view was his definition and differentiation of the relevant disciplines and his belief in their generally excellent condition in Germany. He saw a need for government support of appropriate institutions, especially research institutes in universities. Within industrial research organizations—and, implicitly, within academic ones—Hörlein called for special institutional arrangements to encourage appropriate interactions between chemistry and biomedicine. An element of crucial—and to Hörlein, personal—importance in these interactions was the role of the research manager or “team leader.” When Hörlein spoke of the research done under his direction as “our work,” he used the possessive advisedly to convey a strong sense of his own participation. The research manager had to be active in defining goals, in marshalling means and resources, and in assessing success or failure. He had to intervene where necessary to minimize friction between chemists and medical researchers, an especially important task for chemotherapy as a composite entity. He had to publicize the company’s successes—a necessity for what was ultimately a commercial enterprise—and act as liaison between company laboratories and the academic and medical communities. Through it all, he had to take a long view of the value of research, not insisting on immediate results of medical or commercial value. As a research manager with training and experience in pharmaceutical chemistry, a lively interest in medicine, and rapport with the medical community, Hörlein was well positioned to survey the field where chemistry and medicine joined battle against disease. He could spot the points where the enemy’s line was broken, and the reverse salients in his own. What he could not do—or could not do alone—was to direct the day-to-day operations of his troops, that is, to define the critical problems to be solved, to identify the terms of their solution, and to do the
50 the industrial origins of prontosil work that would carry the day. In the case of chemotherapy, these things could be effected only by the medical researcher and the chemist, each working on his own domain, and cooperatively. For his attack on one of the most important reverse salients—the chemotherapy of bacterial infections—Hörlein called upon the medical researcher Domagk and the chemists Mietzsch and Klarer.
CHAPTER 3
Prontosil
n Christmas Day 1932, I.G. Farben applied for a German patent on procedures to prepare a red crystalline powder with the formidable chemical name of 4-sulfonamido-2,4-diaminoazobenzene. Little was said of the compound’s properties, little hint given of the momentous consequences for medicine that might follow from its introduction. Jealously guarded by a small circle within the company, the compound’s secrets would not be proclaimed to the world for more than two years. In February 1935, less than two months after the patent was granted, Gerhard Domagk announced the new compound, now called by the trade name Prontosil, in a short communication to a German medical periodical. From that time on, the fate of Prontosil was inextricably bound up with its reception, particularly by the international medical, scientific, and industrial worlds. Before February 1935, however, its history is largely enclosed within the company. That history is an instance of industrial invention. Prontosil emerged at Elberfeld as the result of a boldly conceived and carefully executed research program carried out in a setting favorable to its realization. The chief architect of the program, as of the setting, was Heinrich Hörlein. In his 1932 lecture on medicine and chemistry, Hörlein had referred to the “endless work” that still lay before researchers on infectious diseases. “The field of bacterial illnesses and those caused by filterable viruses,” he had remarked, “still lies absolutely open for a collaboration of medical men and chemists.” Five years earlier, Hörlein had already begun to act on that sense of possibility. Against a background of increasing sobriety and even skepticism in the medical and scientific communities on the likelihood of successful bacterial chemotherapy, Hörlein had decided to mount a major effort. He anticipated eventual successes, but was prepared—as he later admitted— for at least ten years of unrewarded labor. Requisite for the success of Hörlein’s
O
51
52 the industrial origins of prontosil plan were the selection of key personnel—chemists and medical researchers— and definition by both of critical problems, methods, and strategies in their respective domains.1
Building a Research Team or the chemical part of the work, Hörlein turned to two men, one a veteran of several years with the company, the other newly recruited. Both Fritz Mietzsch and Joseph Klarer came to chemotherapeutic research from dye chemistry. Born in 1896 in Dresden, Mietzsch proceeded from a Dresden gymnasium to studies in that city’s Technische Hochschule, which he entered in 1915. Mietzsch’s training was interrupted by war service. He returned to finish in 1922 with work completed under Walter König. König, who was director of the Dresden Laboratory for Dye Chemistry and Dyeing Technology, left a lasting impression on Mietzsch: in later life he kept at hand in his desk, and consulted, his notebook of König’s lectures.2 Following a short period as assistant in König’s laboratory, Mietzsch, on his mentor’s recommendation, joined Bayer at Leverkusen in early 1923. As a newly hired dye chemist, Mietzsch took the mandatory professional development course directed by Richard Kothe and Oscar Dressel, with whom Hörlein had collaborated in his early work at Bayer on dye chemistry. Among the results of the course for Mietzsch would have been a lively awareness of the importance of the azo dyes and their initial and intermediate products. In 1924, a year after Mietzsch joined Bayer, the company’s search for a “better quinine” reached a first culmination with the synthesis by the Elberfeld team—Werner Schulemann, Fritz Schönhöfer, and August Wingler—of the compound later termed Plasmoquine, the first purely synthetic antimalarial. By that time, Mietzsch was working in the company’s triphenylmethane dye division in Leverkusen. It occurred to him that substances resembling quinine and therefore possibly having antimalarial action might be synthesized from a particular class of dyes. The suggestion caught the attention of Hörlein, and in the fall of 1924 Mietzsch made the decisive move from Leverkusen to Elberfeld, and from dye chemistry to pharmaceutical chemistry. At Elberfeld, Mietzsch concentrated at first on extension of the approach already used by other Bayer researchers in the synthesis of Plasmoquine to other classes of compounds. This led him first to a compound with a promising action on malaria, and then in 1930 to synthesis of the powerful antimalarial later known by the trade name Atabrine. Klarer, the son of a Munich manufacturer, was twenty-eight years old when he came to Elberfeld. Following studies at a Munich Oberrealschule, he was called to the army in 1916 and served until wounded in 1918. In 1920, he entered the Technische Hochschule in Munich and began his studies in chemistry. Even before his diploma examination, he became an assistant to one of his professors, Hans Fischer. Klarer caused a sensation and impressed his teacher when, in his doctoral examination, he succeeded in synthesizing actioporphyrin, which had been shown by Richard Willstätter to be a high-molecular-weight breakdown product of both
F
Prontosil 53 hemoglobin and chlorophyll. Fischer proposed that Klarer continue his studies with him. Klarer decided instead to accept Hörlein’s offer to join the pharmaceutical research division in Elberfeld. Almost as soon as he arrived in 1927, Klarer began work with Mietzsch on a systematic study of the basic alkylated azo dyes. The compounds they prepared were submitted to a variety of in vitro (test tube) and animal trials in the laboratories of Elberfeld medical researchers.3 Domagk, recruited by Hörlein in the same year as Klarer, came to chemotherapy via medicine and experimental pathology. Born in Lagow in the province of Brandenburg in 1895, the son of a teacher, Domagk was educated at a scientifically oriented grammar school in Liegnitz (now Legnica, Poland). He made an early decision to study medicine but was interrupted in his first term of studies at the University of Kiel by the outbreak of war. A member of a grenadier regiment, he served first on the western front, in Flanders, and then in Russia, where he was wounded in 1915. Transferred to the medical corps, and back to the western front, he was appalled and moved by the helplessness of the medical authorities in the face of epidemics and infections among the troops. Of the thirty-three medical students mobilized with Domagk, only three were still alive when he resumed his studies at Kiel at the end of the war. Domagk himself never fully recovered from his leg wound.4 In 1921, Domagk took the state medical examination in Kiel. His M.D. thesis, under the direction of the internist Max Burger, addressed a problem in physiological chemistry, the precipitation of creatinine in humans after muscular exercise. By this time, Domagk felt himself called to medical research, though always, as he later insisted, with the ultimate aim of making medical practice effective by strengthening its scientific foundations. While still at Kiel, he served as assistant to the chemist Ernst Hoppe-Seyler and the pathologist Emmerich, joining his chemical and pathological studies in an analysis of the composition in disease of heart muscle, liver, and kidney. In 1922, he joined Walter Gross as Privatdozent in the pathology institute at the University of Greifswald. By this time, Domagk had embraced Rudolf Virchow’s injunction that “pathological anatomy must become pathological physiology,” and a dynamic or physiological conception of pathology emphasizing the chemical aspects of health and disease became the hallmark of his research. Among his early efforts were studies on the alteration of tissues after exposure to X-rays and experimental investigations of tumors.5 An early expression of his movement toward pathological physiology was Domagk’s habilitation essay, which examined the defensive role of the reticuloendothelial system—large, white cells that engulf and digest foreign particles in the blood, lymph, or tissues, a process termed phagocytosis—in infections. In a paper published in 1924 based on this research, he described experiments in which mice were injected with living or killed bacteria. Domagk was able to show that, within a few minutes of injection, amyloid precipitates could be detected around the endothelium cells involved in phagocytosis in the liver, spleen, and lungs. He concluded that the amyloid was a degradation product of the phagocytosis, and he was able to strengthen the phagocytosis by sensitization. Several characteristic features of Domagk’s later and better known investigations can
54 the industrial origins of prontosil already be discerned in this work. One of these is his interest in infection as a process, to be analyzed into a discrete set of physiological and pathological events that compose the host organism’s response to the pathogen. Noteworthy also is his choice of bacteria, especially staphylococci and streptococci, as pathogens and his use of experimental infections in mice as an investigative model. Much later, just before he died in 1964, Domagk recalled the profound impression of these early studies. His independent observation of phagocytosis—the phenomenon was known but he was not yet aware of it—had moved him almost to tears, fortified his confidence, and directed him toward his future work on bacterial infections and tuberculosis.6 This activity in the common area between medicine and chemistry drew the attention of Hörlein, and in 1927 Domagk accepted an offer by I.G. Farben to direct a laboratory in experimental pathology in the company’s pharmaceutical research division at Elberfeld. He was thirty-two years old. Domagk, who had followed Gross from Greifswald to Münster in 1925, had already taken the first steps toward an academic career. At first, the connection with I.G. Farben was tentative. He signed a renewable two-year contract and retained his association with the University of Münster, where he was named extraordinary professor of general pathology and pathological anatomy in 1928.7 Unlike Mietzsch and Klarer, whose training as dye chemists had prepared them for industrial careers, Domagk began his stint at I.G. Farben with the idea that he was “on furlough” from his academic post. The tensions between his academic values and the realities of his industrial workplace are clear for at least two decades after he began the job. Especially in his first few years at I.G. Farben, Domagk expressed an intense desire to be free to pursue his research and to publish his findings during and after his term of employment. This desire ran head on into the company’s need to control the knowledge it produced.8 In August 1927, Domagk received from his superiors a document stating his contract period (two years) and his salary (10,500 marks in the first year, 11,500 marks in the second, plus five percent bonuses). The document also specified that he was not to discuss his income with anyone but his immediate family and was not to discuss any matters related to the company with anyone. This was vague enough and does not seem to have frightened him. Ten months later, though, in June 1928, Domagk received a contract supplement listing more than twenty-one kinds of industrial processes. He was asked to agree that for a period of three years after termination of his contract, he would not communicate information about these processes “directly or indirectly, in word or in deed, in any fashion whatsoever, to any establishment in Europe, North, South, or Central America, the British and French dominions, colonies, and protectorates, the Dutch colonies, China, Japan, or Asiatic Russia.” This specimen of legal and Germanic thoroughness did alarm him. In a long letter written a few days later, he told the management that he feared his work freedom would be jeopardized if he signed. He had taken a two-year “furlough” from his academic position, he said, only because he was convinced that he could pursue his research and creative work in complete freedom. Under no circumstances could he renounce his right to continue that work and to publish his results after his return to the university. He therefore
Prontosil 55 asked for written guarantees of his research freedom and that universities and research institutes be excepted from the “establishments” with which he could not communicate in the three-year period after leaving I.G. Farben. He wished to be able to negotiate freely in case he received an academic call while under contract to I.G. Farben. Domagk also asked the company to define in writing his relationship to it in case he made a significant discovery and no new contract was concluded at the end of his period of employment. Or, in the event that he did sign a new contract, he wished to know what his share in discoveries would be. The latter questions were astute and show that the secrecy issue had forced him to think through all the implications of his company position.9 The records show that the company stalled a bit, but responded within two months with a new work contract. This extended Domagk’s employment by another two years but also spelled out his obligations to secrecy in much more detail. Domagk was to make known all results of his work immediately and freely to the company for the company’s exclusive use. He was to keep all his findings secret, including to other people in the company except as authorized. Article 4 stated, in part: All written materials, . . . especially regarding your own notes relating to business, . . . you will treat as the exclusive property of our firm entrusted to you by us, and you will hold all of this material, together with any copies of it, strictly secret, and turn it over to us at the latest by the end of your period of service, but also at any time earlier on demand.10 This document did not respond explicitly to all the questions Domagk had raised. It did put his relationship with the company on a firmer basis and seemed to open the door to a long-term connection. In any case, Domagk signed it. But a year later, in 1929, the company had to draw up a formal letter of clarification. Among other things, this letter made an explicit distinction between Domagk’s laboratory notebooks and papers related to his business activity, on the one hand, and “notes on findings resting on his own creative activity,” on the other. The former were to be the exclusive property of the company. The latter were to be presented to the firm for inspection at the end of Domagk’s term of service but were then to be returned to him for his own use. Exactly what the distinction was is not clear. Whatever it was, it seems to have satisfied Domagk, for the issue never arises again in the existing records.11 Particularly after his discovery of Prontosil, the company was eager to keep Domagk, and he gained significant royalties from the sale of sulfonamides. Yet his sense of being “on furlough” from academia seems never to have entirely dissipated. On at least two occasions—in 1937 and 1946—he came close to accepting offers from research institutes and universities. In the end, he got his way on some things, such as research staff and facilities, and resigned himself on others, such as lack of academic status and freedom. In the end, Domagk, the scientific professional, came to an uneasy accommodation with his industrial environment.12 Domagk took up a variety of research problems in his first years at Elberfeld. One of these began as an assignment to test an antitumor organ extract prepared by the Italian pathologist G. Fichera. Results were negative, but it was characteristic
56 the industrial origins of prontosil of Domagk that the failure provoked him to further intensive study of cancer. In the near term, this resulted in work showing the possibility of producing resistance in mice to Ehrlich’s vaccination carcinoma and to Jensen’s sarcoma, using latent infection and cell-free tumor extracts. In the longer term, it set Domagk on a course of cancer research from which he did not waver through the rest of his career and which included studies of the metabolism of tumors, the effects of analogs and precursors of nucleic acids in tumor growth, and action of quinone derivatives on tumors. Also in the domain of experimental pathology, and of Domagk’s early research, were studies of the origins of anaphylactic shock and of glomerulonephritis, of the effects of X-rays and of vitamin A overdosage on tissues, and of new techniques for tissue staining.13
The Invention of Prontosil mong these several lines of work, research in the chemotherapy of bacterial infections took an early and prominent place. Domagk was evidently moved in this direction by a convergence of personal inclination and institutional circumstance. His war experience had brought home to him the awful power of infectious disease and the medical profession’s helplessness in the face of its ravages. His habilitation research and first publication had examined aspects of bacterial infection and the nature of host responses. By his own later account, the theoretical possibilities of the field had been opened to him by his conviction of the known and potential specificities of bacteria. The early successes of chemotherapy had been won against infections caused by protozoans and spirochetes. In Domagk’s view, this was because the former kinds of organisms were relatively more differentiated “and the further developed such a pathogen is, the more points of attack it appears to offer to chemotherapy.” Since bacteria could also be differentiated on morphological, physiological, chemical, and physical grounds, however, a bacterial chemotherapy could be imagined. “All of these considerations gave me the certainty,” he remarked, “that a chemotherapy of bacterial infections was also in the realm of possibility and that it must be worthwhile to intensively take this field of work in hand, although all prior investigations made this field appear rather hopeless.” On this point, Domagk and Hörlein surely concurred, and his superior’s enthusiasm for the project both sanctioned and reinforced Domagk’s own tendencies.14 Expansion of Domagk’s activity in bacterial chemotherapeutic research was also made possible, and to some degree impelled, by personnel changes in the Elberfeld research establishment. In March 1929, a year and a half after Domagk’s arrival, the director of the laboratory of chemotherapy, Wilhelm Roehl, died suddenly and unexpectedly of a streptococcal infection. Roehl, a medical doctor and student of Paul Ehrlich, had been hired by Hörlein in 1910, in one of Hörlein’s first acts as head of pharmaceutical research at Bayer. His task had been to direct the company’s newly founded laboratory of chemotherapy. He had since conducted research in several areas, including the chemotherapy of tropical protozoal diseases, leprosy, tuberculosis, and streptococcal infections. Domagk took over
A
Prontosil 57 temporary direction of Roehl’s laboratory. With the arrival of Roehl’s successor, Walther Kikuth, a medical researcher from the Tropical Institute in Hamburg, in the fall of 1929, the research territory was redivided. Work on the chemotherapy of streptococcal infections went to Domagk’s laboratory, while other areas previously part of Roehl’s domain remained with Kikuth. Finally, with the retirement of Georg Wesenberg in 1931, Wesenberg’s laboratory of bacteriology, which had been charged since 1914 with studying the antiseptic and disinfectant properties of synthetic compounds, was dissolved. Domagk henceforth directed a renamed Laboratory of Experimental Pathology and Bacteriology.15 One of Domagk’s first steps was to establish a suitable experimental model. The essential requirement was that host and pathogen be matched in such a way that the investigator succeeded “in infecting animals with certainty in a high percentage of cases.” In addition, “the course of the infection must be as much as possible the same in all animals, so that from the observations on the treated animals and the untreated control animals we can draw reliable conclusions.” Domagk found that his specifications were best met with streptococcal infections of mice and rabbits, which were almost invariably fatal.16 To narrow the field of compounds to be submitted to animal trials, Domagk relied in part on in vitro experiments, in which the target strain of bacterium was methodically exposed to a variety of chemicals. Wesenberg, the director of the Elberfeld laboratory of bacteriology, had been conducting such tests since his laboratory was created by Bayer in 1900. For Domagk, however, they had a different meaning. Such “orienting” test-tube trials, he held, could yield at best “general clues” as to which classes of bodies might contain compounds effective against certain bacteria. Domagk emphasized that they could not substitute for animal tests and could even be misleading in the sense that they could not distinguish disinfectants that would kill or damage the hosts as well as the pathogen from true chemotherapeutic agents harmless to the host.17 Domagk’s target was a deadly one. Streptococci—immobile, spherical bacteria occurring in chains—were known to be causative agents in the most dangerous and common wound infections, childbed fever (puerperal sepsis), tonsillitis, endocarditis, many kidney and joint conditions, appendicitis, and other diseases. For some of these diseases, the mortality was high, as was the cost in human suffering. Domagk described the type used in his animal trials, Streptococcus pyogenes hemolyticus, as the most dangerous cause of wound infections in humans. The strain was taken from the blood of a patient who died of blood poisoning, or streptococcal sepsis. To ensure that all the untreated control animals died in twenty-four or, at most, forty-eight hours, he gave 10–100 times the mortal dose of the bacteria to all experimental animals.18 With his experimental model established, Domagk proceeded in collaboration with the chemists on a search for chemotherapeutically effective compounds. Selection of classes of compounds for animal trials was not random but was guided—according to Domagk—by “orienting” in vitro tests and by a review of the literature. One line of investigation was prompted in part by Domagk’s earlier work on the reticuloendothelial system. The idea was to extract from tissues constituting part of the body’s natural defenses substances that would be therapeutically active
58 the industrial origins of prontosil against streptococcal infections. This effort reached the stage of clinical trials but was defeated by side effects produced at therapeutically effective dosages. One of the initiators of this line of attack was Adolf Feldt, who in 1926 had also begun publishing results of treatment of experimental streptococcal infections with organic gold compounds. Feldt had recommended as effective two of these. Domagk confirmed the effectiveness of organic gold compounds but found that, in severe streptococcal infections, they could not be used for extended treatment in high enough doses without danger of gold intoxication, sometimes accompanied by skin conditions and kidney damage. He recommended their use in local treatment of streptococcus-infected wounds.19 By Domagk’s account, the disadvantages of the gold compounds had led him and his collaborators to consider classes of purely organic substances. Among these were hydroquinine compounds such as the commercial preparations Vucin and Eucupin. These were already known for their effectiveness against streptococci in vitro and were used in deep antisepsis, the local treatment of infected tissues such as joints. Unfortunately, Domagk had to report, they failed completely in systemic infections. Much the same had to be said of a group of acridine compounds that surpassed known acridine compounds in effectiveness against streptococci in vitro but lost most of this action in infected animals.20 While Domagk was pursuing those early efforts, his chemist-collaborators Mietzsch and Klarer were involved in separate investigations, first with Roehl, then with Kikuth, that would eventually be brought to bear on bacterial chemotherapy. By Mietzsch’s account, the most important of these was the search for compounds that would complement or improve upon the natural alkaloid quinine in the prevention or treatment of malaria. The search for “a better quinine,” as Hörlein put it, had begun during the war and was a major focus of the Elberfeld research effort throughout the 1920s.21 A crucial early step in the Bayer antimalarial work had come when the medical researcher Schulemann and chemists Schönhöfer and Wingler had the idea of converting methylene blue—a compound known to be effective in quartan malaria—into a stronger basic derivative. Part of the inspiration for this move had been the prior success of the technique of basic alkylation, in which an alkyl group (general formula: CnH2n + 1) was substituted for a hydrogen, in the derivation of pharmacologically active compounds. Among the early products of basic alkylation were Novocain and other local anesthetics and various compounds with action on the heart and uterus. Schulemann, Schönhöfer, and Wingler’s variant of methylene blue had proved more effective than the parent compound. In Mietzsch’s view, this work had “thereby opened the era of synthetic antimalarial drugs in Elberfeld.” The next step was transfer of basic alkylation to compounds structurally related to quinine, the aminoquinolines. It was by this path, Mietzsch pointed out, that Schulemann, Schönhöfer, and Wingler, working with Roehl, had arrived at the first major synthetic antimalarial, Plasmoquine.22 Roehl was aware that neither Plasmoquine nor Quinoplasmine—the other synthetic antimalarial available by 1924—provided a complete solution to the malaria problem. This was because these agents acted on the sexual but not the asexual forms of the parasite. The task therefore was to find a chemical effective against the
Prontosil 59 asexual form. In his work with Ehrlich, Roehl had become familiar with trypaflavine, an acridine compound used as an antiseptic. He conceived the dual ambition of finding another acridine compound effective as an antimalarial— “malaflavine” is the name he coined in confident anticipation—and a third active against streptococcal infections. Roehl’s early death prevented his personal achievement of either goal.23 Mietzsch collaborated with Roehl on the acridine series from 1924, and in 1926 they were joined by the chemist Hans Mauss. The chemists sought to improve the antimalarial action of acridine compounds by modeling them on selected structural features of quinine and Plasmoquine and by making a systematic study of the effects of changing the nature and positions of substituents in the acridine ring. The compound that emerged from this work in 1930 proved to have an action qualitatively similar to quinine but quantitatively superior. This was Atabrine, a major new synthetic antimalarial, introduced into commerce and medicine in 1932.24 By the time that Atabrine was synthesized in 1930, research in bacterial chemotherapy at Elberfeld was moving decisively toward concentration on the azo dyes. Several circumstances favored this direction of work. Roehl’s training with Ehrlich predisposed him to the use of dyes as chemotherapeutic agents, and in 1927 he had found an azo dye with activity against malaria in birds. A considerable body of literature from the 1910s and 1920s pointed to the antibacterial effects in vitro of azo compounds. By the early 1930s, several azo compounds had been recommended for use in urinary tract disinfection. The azo compounds were also appealing on strictly chemical grounds, since numerous variants could be prepared. Mietzsch recalled that when he began this work with Klarer, they believed that compounds of this type would find chemotherapeutic applications, “without of course at first being able to predict the specific indications,” that is, which compounds would act on which pathogen. Azo dyes and the means to prepare them were readily at hand in an industry engaged in their production and sale.25 As early as 1927, Mietzsch and Klarer began to prepare azo compounds for chemotherapeutic testing, in close collaboration first with Roehl and Wesenberg and later with Domagk and Kikuth. From the chemists’ point of view, the search was an organic chemist’s puzzle. “Here also the law of the right man at the right place holds,” Mietzsch wrote, “that is, translated into chemical language, the right substituents in the right position on the azo group, when it is a question of bringing out the slumbering chemotherapeutic characteristics in these systems.” To narrow the field of possibilities, Mietzsch and Klarer relied on the example of known effective compounds of a different type. The model of Atabrine was especially important and led to the preparation of azo compounds with chemotherapeutic action on trypanosome infections, bird malaria, rat leprosy, and other infections.26 At the end of 1931, Mietzsch and Klarer applied for a first patent, in the text of which they noted that “it has been found that it is possible to obtain compounds active against protozoa and bacteria.” By that time, they had prepared 300 azo compounds, which they had turned over to Roehl, Wesenberg, Domagk, and
60 the industrial origins of prontosil Kikuth for in vitro and in vivo testing against a variety of pathogens. Of these substances, fourteen had been singled out because they showed activity in at least one of the biological tests. The latter included trials against experimental erysipelas and tuberculosis in animals as well as the tests against trypanosomal and streptococcal infections, bird malaria, rat leprosy, and other infections.27 The results with azo dyes obtained by the Elberfeld researchers by the late summer of 1932 were encouraging in that they appeared to lend additional weight to Robert Koch’s and Ehrlich’s views on the relationship between the staining properties of molecules and their antiparasitic action. The findings to date also suggested a tentative relationship between molecular structure and therapeutic action: placement of radicals in certain positions on the azo compound appeared to enhance activity.28 It was just at this juncture that Mietzsch’s and Klarer’s training in dye chemistry, and the accumulated experience of the Bayer/I.G. Farben research establishment, entered the investigation in a particular and, as events were to show, decisive way. Klarer later recalled that the chemists’ working hypothesis was based on the idea of finding compounds that had a selective affinity for fibers and cells and that would thereby damage bacteria either directly or by attacking the conditions of their existence. “In this we could build on the experience of dye chemistry,” Klarer noted. Such experience indicated that very definite groups played an important role in this affinity. Accordingly, the chemists systematically built such groups into compounds.29 “As we tested in this way all the available substituents,” Mietzsch recalled, “we remembered the earlier sulfonamide-containing azo dyes, which had also come out of work at Elberfeld.” In one of his earliest research projects at Bayer, Hörlein had collaborated with the chemists Dressel and Kothe in substitution of a sulfonamide radical in azo molecules, thereby improving their qualities of resistance to washing, to weaving, and to light when used to color woolens. The resulting supramine dyes were still in use.30 In September 1932, Mietzsch sent Klarer a quantity of an intermediate containing the sulfonamide radical “with a view to synthesis of azo compounds” that were “to be the object of trials on leprosy and tuberculosis.” By the end of September, Klarer had reported to his colleagues the synthesis of the first sulfonamide azo compound. Labeled KL695 and turned over to Domagk, who gave it number 3920, this substance was subjected in Domagk’s laboratory to test-tube and animal trials against streptococcal infections, tuberculosis, and tumors. KL695/D3920 failed against test-tube cultures of streptococci. In laboratory trials dated October 25, however, the compound showed a striking therapeutic action in mice infected with streptococci. These results were confirmed in Domagk’s laboratory on October 31, “and thereby,” Mietzsch later noted, “the way to sulfonamide therapy was opened up, a way along which moved all later work at home and abroad.”31 Domagk and his collaborators now shifted the emphasis of the investigation to the sulfonamide-containing azo compounds. Klarer synthesized a number of these substances. Variations on the new theme began to distinguish what was essential to the therapeutic action from what was not, and in Mietzsch’s words, “the
Prontosil 61 path that previously had led from the simply-constructed chrysoidine to the complicated aminoazobenzenes would be retraced backwards.” Recalling the known bactericidal action of crysoidine in vitro, Klarer synthesized a new molecule very close to it in structure but with a sulfonamide radical substituted in the paraposition. Labeled KL730 by Klarer, the compound was turned over to Domagk. Relabeled, D4145, this otherwise undistinguished red dye proved ineffective against streptococci in the test tube but extraordinarily active against streptococcal infections in mice. In his first published article on this research, Domagk included a table showing the dramatic results of one experiment, dated December 20, 1932, in which the dye was administered to infected mice. Most of the untreated control animals were dead within forty-eight hours of infection, while all treated animals survived.32 By now, the magnitude of the breakthrough achieved by Klarer, Mietzsch, and Domagk was apparent. The company added KL695 to the patent taken out at the end of 1931. On Christmas Day, 1932, I.G. Farben applied for a new German patent, No. 607537, on the red dye that Domagk was showing to possess such striking properties. Under the name Streptozon, and later Prontosil, this substance was to open a new era in the chemical treatment of bacterial infections.33
The Nature of Chemotherapy or Domagk and his chemist-collaborators Mietzsch and Klarer, the invention of Prontosil was a momentous event, marking a watershed in their careers as much as in the history of medicine. It is not surprising that all three subsequently wrote accounts of the investigations that resulted in Prontosil. Domagk and Mietzsch, in particular, each wrote about their early collaboration, Domagk in several articles of the mid-1930s, and Mietzsch in a series of publications of the early 1950s. These articles are useful not only for reconstruction of the process that led to Prontosil, but still more for what they reveal about how each party, medical researcher and chemist, viewed the nature of chemotherapeutic research and for what these views, in some ways contrasting and contradictory, tell us about the nature of chemotherapy as an entity and its place in the system of industrial innovation that had emerged at I.G. Farben. For Domagk, the essential aims of chemotherapeutic research were practical, not theoretical. Though informed by science, its primary goal was not creation of new knowledge of nature but identification of compounds effective in the treatment of bacterial infections. He acknowledged the largely empirical character of the research, in the face of inadequate knowledge of the biology of parasites and hosts. The practical character of the goals shaped the field, for example, leading Domagk to adopt divergent classifications of bacteria and to emphasize those aspects of the biological specificity of bacteria that might suggest targets for chemotherapeutic agents.34 Chemotherapeutic research was also, for Domagk, a distinctly medical and biological endeavor. This meant that the researcher needed to focus on the complexities and specificities of the interactions among hosts, the microbes causing
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62 the industrial origins of prontosil disease, and the chemical agents used in treatment. The aim of the physician in chemotherapy was to come to the aid of the body’s defenses against infection, not to replace them. Explorations of these interactions required, in Domagk’s view, a three-tiered methodology comprising in vitro, animal, and clinical tests of prospective chemotherapeutic agents. One aspect of this methodology was Domagk’s conviction that failure of a compound in vitro did not mean that it would necessarily fail in the animal or human host, a view that was crucial to the discovery of Prontosil. Domagk recognized the essential role of chemistry in chemotherapeutic research but tended to assign to chemists a subordinate role. For Mietzsch, this order of things was reversed. While he conceded the necessary place of medical researchers in the development of chemotherapy, Mietzsch’s view of the field is better captured by Hörlein’s description of pharmaceuticals as “a branch of chemical technology.” Put differently, Mietzsch thought that the primary engine of chemotherapeutic research was chemistry. He characterized all of the major turning points in the field’s history in chemical terms. In particular, in Mietzsch’s story the sulfonamides emerged from study of basic alkylated compounds and from use of azo dyes in chemotherapy. Azo dyes were appealing to Mietzsch and Klarer above all for a chemical reason, their ease of variability. The “decisive turning point” for Mietzsch came when a sulfonamide group was introduced in a definite position in the azo dye molecule. Thus, Mietzsch characterized the decisive turning point in the invention of the sulfonamides chemically and located it in the chemical side of chemotherapeutic research at Elberfeld.35 Mietzsch was at pains to display the mental effort behind the chemical side of chemotherapeutic research. The research process is not merely trial and error, the blind grinding out and testing of one compound after another. Patterns emerge. A new chemical procedure or phenomenon is found that leads to a useful result in the sense of an effective chemotherapeutic agent. The finding is then applied to other classes of compounds in the hope of getting such a useful result with them. In one series in which it is tried, a promising compound is identified. That leads to more systematic work on that series, which in turn may lead to finding a successful chemotherapeutic agent. Thus, the research process on the chemical side is not random, although it does have a trial-and-error quality. The trial and error takes place within certain boundaries that are determined by some combination of what it is possible to do chemically and previous experience with certain chemical processes or certain classes of compounds regarding identification of successful chemotherapeutic agents. The trial-and-error process appears to have two phases: an initial, relatively loose phase in which promising leads are sought within a fairly broad domain of possibilities, and a second, more intense and systematic phase in which a lead that has been identified is followed up, for example, within a well-defined class of compounds. For Mietzsch, the search for a chemotherapeutically effective compound therefore involved a narrowing down to the right kind of chemical specificity: the right series, the right position on the compound, the right substituent. For the chemists, the problem was one of chemical variation and chemical specificity, with the goal of achieving a precise match with the target organism.
Prontosil 63 Central to Mietzsch’s message was the conviction that he and other Bayer/I.G. Farben chemists were pursuing not merely a chemical, but a specifically chemotherapeutic research program. Their role was not simply instrumental but involved deliberate judgments and choices based on rational and goal-directed considerations, chemical reasoning in the service of chemotherapeutic goals. Mietzsch saw the chemotherapeutic research process from the standpoint of a chemist’s—specifically, a dye chemist’s—training, a chemist’s way of thinking, and a chemist’s vivid intuitive sense of the creative process in the chemical as distinct from the biomedical side of the research.36 Taken together, the images of chemotherapeutic research presented by Hörlein, Domagk, and Mietzsch yield a sharper picture of the development of Prontosil as a case of industrialized invention. Among the most important elements of this picture are a systemic approach to innovation, continuities between dyestuff chemistry and pharmaceutical chemistry and between the different chemical lines of pharmaceutical research, and the robust optimism of the Bayer/I.G. Farben industrial team in the midst of a general atmosphere of caution and resignation. Hörlein viewed bacterial chemotherapy as a reverse salient in a broadly advancing front along which chemistry and medicine joined battle with disease. Working within and expanding a well-developed industrial research organization, he embraced a systemic approach to innovation. He expected technically and scientifically novel results to emerge not from individuals working alone but from groups of specialists working cooperatively under a team leader and supported by a strong research infrastructure. He saw and expected patterns in the work, with innovation occurring in typical steps or phases depending on the fields or kinds of problems involved. He acted the role of research manager to the fullest: setting aims, concentrating resources and personnel, assessing results, and representing his organization’s efforts to the medical and scientific communities. It was Hörlein who brought Domagk, Mietzsch, and Klarer into the pharmaceutical research division, and it was in close association with him that their research program in bacterial chemotherapy was formulated and conducted. For Hörlein’s program to succeed, however, critical problems had to be defined and solved by the medical researcher and the chemist, each working in his own domain and with his own concepts, methods, and habits of thought. Both medical researchers and chemists confronted the problem of specificity. The difference was that in one case the specificity was biological, while in the other case it was chemical. Biological specificity meant identification of the difference between host and pathogen, such that a means was available to attack the pathogen without harming the host. It meant, in addition, definition of differences between the kinds of bacteria, differences that could manifest in subtle metabolic, nutritional, or other aspects of the organism. Chemical specificity meant conceiving and synthesizing all possible variants on a given kind of compound, that is, by starting with a nucleus of some sort and building around it; or, in a more general sense, the division and subdivision of chemical compounds—in this case, mainly or exclusively organic ones—into classes and subclasses. Both the medical researcher and the chemist ostensibly had the same goal: to identify a specific compound that would attack a specific pathogen that was
64 the industrial origins of prontosil harming a specific host. But to reach the goal, two complementary but distinct efforts had to be mounted in which each investigator wrestled with his own problems of specificity. The medical researcher had to find an experimental model that was adequate to the pathogen in the sense that experimental infections could be consistently produced with that type of pathogen, and that was adequate to the host in the sense that it was the same pathogen that attacked the human host and against which a chemotherapy was sought. He also had to take into account the reaction of the host organism, both to the pathogen and the changes it induced and to any chemical agent introduced as a therapeutic measure. The medical researcher also had to consider specificity in the sense of the particular locale (tissue, organ, cells) attacked by the pathogen and the pattern of distribution of the chemical agent in the host organism. The chemist had to decide—with or without the aid of the medical researcher—which class or classes of compounds to try against the kinds of infections in question. His criteria for doing so might be chemical, for example, ease of variability by changes in coupling components or substituents, or prompted in some way by prior experience with living organisms, such as in vitro activity against bacteria. Once a promising compound was identified by the medical researcher, the chemist’s task was to produce variations around this starting point with the aim of increasing the specificity of the match between the chemical agent, the pathogen, and the host. Here, indeed, was a signal difference between the two components of chemotherapeutic research. Whereas the medical researcher took the variability given in nature, tried to analyze it in detail, and identified points where chemical therapy might find a purchase, the chemists produced variability by synthetic manipulation. Chemotherapy so conceived and practiced cannot be regarded as a unitary scientific discipline in the academic sense. The nature of its problems necessitates cooperation between chemists and medical researchers, the latter variously identifying themselves as pathologists, bacteriologists, physiologists, or in other ways. Neither the chemist nor the medical researcher by himself has the necessary experience to conduct research in the field. Chemotherapy in Hörlein’s conception therefore is defined not as much by a move for autonomy vis-à-vis other disciplines—for example, physiological chemistry or biochemistry vis-à-vis physiology—as by the necessary cooperative linkage of two or more disciplines that continue to retain distinct identities while interacting at specific sites on their boundaries. That is, chemotherapeutic research can be characterized as a permanent cooperative association of two or more disciplines around certain problems. The problems were first defined by Ehrlich. To some degree, as Hörlein pointed out, Ehrlich embodied in himself the two necessary components of the field, the medical and the chemical, although even in his case he relied on chemists for part of the work. But the fine chemicals industry, because of its prior commitment to pharmaceuticals, already had in place one of the institutional arrangements required by Ehrlich’s program, that is, an organization in which chemists and medical researchers were in cooperative association. What was needed was the addition of a new component that would emphasize the particular aspect of the medical–chemical interaction defined by Ehrlich. At Bayer, for example, this
Prontosil 65 took the form of the new chemotherapy laboratory added in 1910, or of Domagk’s laboratory established in 1927 and expanded in 1930. In the setting of the fine chemicals industry, the components of Ehrlich’s program were more clearly differentiated in both methodology and organization. Thus, the primary aim of chemotherapeutic research—essentially an engineering goal—could be most effectively realized in a setting that was interdisciplinary, in the sense of juxtaposing more than one field in a single institutional setting, and industrial, because of the massive resources that could be brought to bear to set up and maintain a differentiated research infrastructure and—in the case of the fine chemicals industry—to make available thousands of synthetically produced chemicals and the expertise to vary these compounds in determinate ways to achieve the ends in view.
The Industrialization of Innovation harmaceutical research at Bayer/I.G. Farben, and chemotherapeutic research in particular, was a product of, and was incorporated into, a system of innovation elaborated over several decades in the German fine chemicals industry. The research and development enterprise of Bayer/I.G. Farben consisted of an aggregate of devices, artifacts (e.g., compounds), organizational structures, trained personnel, and other resources in which substantial capital had been invested. The direction of the research enterprise was a product both of goals imagined and set by researchers and managers and of responses to opportunities opened up by the results of prior research and development efforts. The endeavor was driven in part by economic motives that favored diversification to maximize return on capital investment and to cushion fluctuations in demand for any one kind of product. As Georg Meyer-Thurow has shown, the perceived need for diversification was one factor behind the institutionalization of research within Bayer from the 1880s.37 Finally, a powerful component of the momentum of the research enterprise within Bayer/I.G. Farben was the culture that had developed around it by the early twentieth century. Many individuals and institutions in the medical and academic scientific communities were committed in one way or another to its goals, methods, and products. The movement from synthetic dyestuffs to pharmaceuticals to chemotherapy to bacterial chemotherapy may be regarded as a series of steps in the diversification of an industrial enterprise and its research establishment. Continuity from dyestuffs chemistry was expressed in personnel, in concepts and methods, and in the use of specific products. Hörlein, Mietzsch and Klarer were trained in dyestuffs chemistry and practiced it before moving to pharmaceuticals. On its chemical side, chemotherapeutic research involved methods of synthesis and concepts of specificity and variability taken over from dyestuffs chemistry. Hörlein drew a direct analogy between the natural/synthetic dichotomy in dyestuffs and the natural/synthetic dichotomy in medicinal substances. The azo dyes were tried as medicines, and one of them became Prontosil. According to Mietzsch, there was a thread of continuity in the research at Elberfeld running from the basic
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66 the industrial origins of prontosil alkylated compounds through the sulfonamides to the later sulfones and thiosemicarbazones, with each development drawing on previous ones. Hörlein was acutely aware of the need for a culture of pharmaceutical research both in the sense of a network of supporting institutions and in the sense of a strong constituency in the medical and scientific communities, a constituency that he worked assiduously to build. Analysis of pharmaceutical research at Bayer/I.G. Farben in terms of such an industrial system of pharmaceutical innovation goes far to explain the optimism about bacterial chemotherapy that prevailed within the Elberfeld group in the 1920s and early 1930s. That mood is in need of explanation since, as described here, the prevailing attitude in the medical and scientific communities by the early 1930s ranged from cautious optimism coupled with critical scrutiny of research goals and methods, to outright frustration and resignation.38 Hörlein could be optimistic because he approached bacterial chemotherapy not as an individual working on a discrete problem within a single discipline, but as a manager of a well-developed research organization with a systemic approach to innovation, a wide-ranging vision of the possibilities of chemistry in medicine, and a record of success with closely related problems. Comparison of Hörlein’s research organization with that of Hugh Young at Johns Hopkins is revealing.39 There are a number of similarities. Ehrlich’s ideas and optimism played a role, direct or indirect, in the initiation of both research programs. Both employed a variety of trained personnel, including medical doctors, bacteriologists, and organic chemists, working cooperatively in spatial proximity to one another. In both cases, individual leadership was important in initiating the research, mobilizing resources, and mediating between the research effort and the larger organization of which it was a part. There the similarities end, however. And the differences are telling. The Brady Institute was committed to a general disinfectant model of chemotherapeutic research, while the Elberfeld group took over a specific therapy model already institutionalized in the pharmaceutical research division and extended and refined by Domagk. The Brady Institute team gave little weight to in vitro trials, and even less to animal tests, instead relying heavily on uncontrolled clinical trials. The Elberfeld group, in contrast, relied heavily on controlled trials of compounds against experimental infections in animals, in fact, on carefully designed “experimental models,” with auxiliary use of in vitro trials. Hugh Young’s emphasis on clinical case reports flowed in part from the aims and structure of the Brady Urological Institute. The work of the institute and of the Journal of Urology, which Young founded and edited, was to contribute to the building of urology as a specialized field of medicine. Chemotherapeutic research was a part of this larger project. Clinical practice dominated architectural space and action. Whereas chemotherapeutic research at Elberfeld enjoyed stable and generous funding, such research at the Brady Institute had lower priority than clinical practice and teaching, a fact placed in stark relief when endowment income or private donations declined. Young and his co-workers did not set up a continuous or broadly based program of chemotherapeutic research and did not establish a system of innovation in chemotherapy.
Prontosil 67 It was just such a system of innovation, embedded in a corporate setting, that shaped and sustained the research on bacterial chemotherapy at Elberfeld. Hörlein’s overriding purpose was to identify compounds that were at the same time effective medicines and viable commercial products. He saw and encouraged possibilities for developing such compounds across a broad front that included vitamins, hormones, and various antimicrobial chemotherapies, including those aimed at bacterial infections. Such a setting ensured concentration and continuity of effort on the search for effective compounds without pressure for immediate clinical application. It allowed for and facilitated transfer of expertise and of synthesized compounds from one research program to another, and full exploitation of any positive results obtained. These comparisons indicate that Carl Voegtlin’s criteria for successful research in chemotherapy had much to recommend them, especially as amended by the Elberfeld model.40 When he decided in 1927 to mount a major research effort in bacterial chemotherapy, Hörlein had expected to reach his goal in ten years. That he succeeded in less than six is testimony not only to the energy and talents of his research team but also to the effectiveness of the system of invention he had built. By the time I.G. Farben applied for a patent on Prontosil in December 1932, that system seemed firmly in place. It was not. Within two months, one of its essential elements would be seriously challenged from a new and unexpected direction by the National Socialist accession to power.
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PART II The Making of the First Miracle Drugs
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CHAPTER 4
Into the Maelstrom
ittle more than a month elapsed between I.G. Farben’s application for a patent on the compound that became Prontosil and Adolf Hitler’s assumption of office as Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933. By the time that Hitler took his own life in his Berlin bunker in April 1945, Prontosil and its descendants of the second generation of sulfa drugs, produced by an international effort of research and development, had transformed medical management of bacterial infections. Gerhard Domagk had been awarded a Nobel Prize. Both Allied and Axis armies had made extensive use of sulfa drugs, with considerable impact on morbidity and mortality on both sides. With the entry of penicillin into the Allied war effort in late 1943, the sulfa drugs began to be displaced from a central position in treatment of bacterial infections, a process that was to continue after the war with the introduction of other antibiotics. Never entirely eclipsed, and still in use today, sulfa drugs henceforth enjoyed a secondary status in the physician’s armamentarium. Chronologically, therefore, the heyday of the sulfa drugs corresponds almost exactly to the rise and fall of the Third Reich. The global story of the sulfa drugs in this period comprises several distinguishable but closely related stories, among them the laboratory and clinical testing of Prontosil, the recognition and early testing of Prontosil’s first offspring, sulfanilamide, the reception of both medicines by the medical community and their introduction into medical practice, the development of a new generation of sulfa drugs as derivatives of sulfanilamide by the pharmaceutical industries of several countries, the mobilization of production and use of the sulfas in World War II, and the first efforts to understand how the sulfa drugs worked. Among these stories, there is reason to begin with, and to consider separately, the fate of the new medicines under the Nazi regime. Prontosil was developed in
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72 the making of the first miracle drugs Germany, and Germany was the site of its initial laboratory and clinical testing, patenting, and the first efforts to develop related compounds. Consideration of the first sulfa drugs and their makers can contribute to our developing picture of the place of the sciences, in particular, the biomedical sciences, in the Third Reich. Several questions, some of them recently under discussion by other scholars, may be addressed anew in the light of the sulfa drugs story. What was the content of the National Socialist critique of scientific medicine, and of pharmaceuticals and chemotherapy in particular? What effects did this critique have on the conduct of research or on therapeutic practices in the German medical community? What effect did the regime’s patent policy have on pharmaceutical research and development? What measures were taken by the regime to intervene in or suspend the internationalism of science, including its international reward system, and what degree of success did they achieve? What forms were taken by the use of human subjects in medical research, and in what ways did these forms break with prior practices in the medical and scientific communities? In what ways and to what degree were biomedical scientists and research establishments involved in development of weapons for gas or biological warfare? Finally, what were the modalities of the relationships established between scientists, doctors, biomedical research institutions, and the Nazi regime?1
Medical Research under Attack art of the answer to the last question may be found in the struggle over use of animal experimentation in medical research that spanned much of the regime’s first year in power. On one side were Nazi zealots and animal protection societies for whom scientific medicine was, at best, of dubious value and, at worst, part of a vicious conspiracy to rob and corrupt the German Volk. On the other side were representatives of German science, medicine, and industry, including, notably, Heinrich Hörlein, for whom the threat of a total ban on animal experimentation struck at the foundations of medical research. In the middle, ostensibly listening to both sides and in possession of final decision-making authority, were Hermann Göring as Prussian Minister of the Interior and officials of the Prussian Interior Ministry’s medical division. Opening rounds were fired in the winter of 1932. Almost on the eve of I.G. Farben’s filing of a patent application for Prontosil, the National Socialist contingent of the Prussian Landtag moved to entirely prohibit vivisection and to make it punishable. Exception was to be made only for three scientific institutes to be named by the government and whose activities were to be placed under permanent public supervision. Had it been enacted, such legislation would have gone beyond existing Prussian ministerial regulations issued in 1930, which already confined experiments on animals to important research under prescribed conditions.2 Hörlein saw in such proposals, which were soon followed by the National Socialist takeover of power, the possibility of an imminent end of animal experiment and thus of the whole medical research enterprise in Germany. Later, he recalled that “as leader of the largest German pharmaceutical research establishment
P
Into the Maelstrom 73 I held it to be my duty to combat these tendencies, and therefore tried to make contact with people in the party who I assumed had direct contact with Hitler.” The local Gauleiter, one Florian-Düsseldorf, was not interested. Two local officials of the SA (Sturmabteilung or Storm Troopers), on the other hand, put Hörlein in touch with Julius Uhl, one of SA leader Ernst Röhm’s adjutants. In the spring of 1933, Uhl visited Elberfeld and was given a tour that included demonstrations of the I.G. Farben pharmaceutical Germanin (Bayer 205), a medicine against sleeping sickness, and the antimalarials Plasmoquine and Atabrine. Uhl seemed friendly and recommended that Hörlein take the matter up with the Generalarzt of the SA, whom he thought to be the most influential physician in Germany. When he traveled to Munich a few weeks later to follow this advice, Hörlein found Uhl “as if transformed.” Uhl “explained to me in the most unfriendly way that he wanted to have no more to do with us, that we were not only an international Jewish enterprise, but also simply traitors, since in spite of the taking away of the German colonies by the treaty of Versailles,” I.G. Farben had introduced Germanin, Plasmoquine, and Atabrine, products that exclusively benefited Germany’s former enemies. It was fortunate for I.G. Farben that all of this had happened before 1933, Uhl continued, adding ominously that in future such cases the company would be dealt with in other ways. Finally, Uhl stated that animal experiment as well as ritual slaughter was to be forbidden, and that Hörlein would hear more about it soon.3 Hörlein was convinced that Uhl’s newly hostile attitude came directly from Hitler. That view is made plausible by our knowledge of a clash that occurred in May 1933 between Hitler and Carl Bosch, chairman of the executive board (Vorstand) of I.G. Farbenindustrie. Bosch, who opposed Nazi antisemitism, had by his own account tried to convey to Hitler the damaging effects of official racism on German science, industry, and trade. Furious, Hitler had lectured Bosch on the latter’s ignorance of politics and on Germany’s ability to “work one hundred years without physics and chemistry” if necessary, and had shown him the door.4 Uhl’s prediction of imminent action seemed to be fulfilled on August 17, when Göring issued an order to go into effect immediately that vivisection of animals of whatsoever species is prohibited in all parts of Prussian territory. The chairman of the cabinet has instructed the ministries to present to him without delay the text of a law incorporating this provision. Until the promulgation of this law, persons who engage in vivisection of animals of any kind will be removed to a concentration camp. By this time, Bavaria, too, had adopted similar prohibitions. It was understood at the time that Göring’s edict was to be in effect temporarily, pending issuance of a federal animal protection law. In the meantime, routine diagnostic and other tests using animals would be allowed, but medical research would be suspended. An Interior Ministry statement promised that “consideration will be given to the requirements of science.”5 I.G. Farben’s whole research and development effort in pharmaceuticals and pesticides was now placed in question. Hörlein recalled that this, together with simultaneous attacks on mineral fertilizers in favor of “biological-dynamic” or
74 the making of the first miracle drugs organic fertilizers, made him temporarily so discouraged that he considered immigration to the United States. On his second American visit, in 1932, Hörlein had been offered the directorship of the scientific laboratories of the Bayer Company in Albany, New York, in the event that revolutionary change occurred in Germany. The offer came from W.E. Weiss, general manager of Sterling Products, which had purchased the Bayer Company in the United States from the Alien Property Custodian after the war. American Bayer had already acquired one of its leaders, Wilhelm Hiemenz, from among the Elberfeld executives. “But finally I decided,” Hörlein reported, “to remain in Germany and to take up the fight for freedom of science.”6 The chance to fight came almost immediately. Acting in Göring’s name, an official of the Prussian Interior Ministry, Frey, convened a meeting on August 29 that included representatives of German animal protection societies and representatives of German science. Prominent among the former were an SS doctor from Hannover, Albert Eckhard, who was chairman of the Association of German Antivivisectionist Physicians (Verband vivisektionsgegnerischer Aerzte Deutschlands), and Caesar Rhan, chairman of the Association of Antivivisectionist Organizations (Verband vivisektionsgegnerischer Vereine). Eckhard had a special standing in the animal protection movement. Not only was he a medical doctor and member of the SS, but he also was in possession of a personal letter from Hitler promising support for his cause. In 1929, Hitler had written to Eckhard, “Many thanks for sending your animal protection brochure, which I have only just read! As you might think, with deep indignation. . . . You can be sure that in the coming National Socialist state these conditions will be very quickly ended!” Among the representatives of science were leaders of state medical and scientific institutes in Berlin, and Hörlein. Some sense of the confrontational quality of the meeting may be gathered from the partisan accounts published after it by Eckhard and by an antivivisectionist organization to which Rhan reported.7 The ostensible purpose of the meeting was to allow a full airing of the positions of both sides so as to inform the ministry in its preparation of a draft of the Reich animal protection law. Discussion went on for seven hours. It was presided over by Minister Frey, who, Eckhard conceded, tried to be fair to all. Both Eckhard and Rhan, however, found reason to be dissatisfied with the proceedings. By Rhan’s account, Eckhard, who as a medical doctor found himself doing most of the work for the animal protectionist side, was in an extremely difficult position. Faced with some twenty or twenty-five opponents, “he resisted bravely, but the odds were too uneven.” Most difficult for the animal protectionists was the issue of the animal trial (Tierversuch) in medical research. Eckhard and Rhan had wanted to challenge the effectiveness of serums and toxins (Giften [sic], perhaps a deliberate substitute for antitoxins) and to argue that they could be dispensed with in favor of natural treatment in both human and animal diseases. Not only did everyone else present take the effectiveness of these agents as given, but the animal protectionists could not bring in an antivivisectionist veterinarian to challenge conventional treatments of animal diseases. Frey would not give a definite answer to Rhan’s question whether animal protectionist groups would be given a role in the final drawing up of the new law, and an official of the Agricultural
Into the Maelstrom 75 Ministry rebuffed the animal protectionist demands to have a role in oversight of vivisection sites.8 Reflecting on the meeting several days afterward, the opponents of animal experiment found other cause for complaint. The heads of at least seven German animal protection societies had not been invited to the meeting. The group to which Rhan reported, the World League for the Protection of Animals and Against Vivisection (Weltbundes zum Schutze der Tiere und gegen die Vivisektion), was also excluded by Frey on the grounds that it was an international organization and that its views would be well represented by Eckhard. Members of the World League, which regarded itself as a leading German antivivisection organization, were indignant and promptly voted to change the group’s name to German Reich League for Animal Rights and Against Vivisection (Deutscher Reichsbund für Tierrecht und gegen Vivisektion). Rhan attacked press reports of the meeting that described it as an “agreement” or “reconciliation” (Vereinbarung). Not only did the meeting expose irreconcilable differences, but his understanding was that it was a nonbinding discussion, for which minutes were not taken. He was also disturbed that members of the animal protection societies were scattered around the meeting hall and so were unable to consult on points under debate.9 Both Rhan and Eckhard reserved their harshest language for Hörlein. Hörlein had taken a prominent part in the discussions, several times launching “extremely irritating attacks” on the animal protectionists, to which both Rhan and Eckhard had to respond. Among these were Hörlein’s energetic rejection of Rhan’s proposal to prohibit use of large animals in research, his charge that Eckhard had deliberately made false statements, and his prediction that prohibition of animal experiment in research would cost the jobs of 800–1,000 workers at I.G. Farben. In their written accounts of the meeting, neither Eckhard nor Rhan addressed the substance of Hörlein’s remarks on medicine, but instead made every effort to delegitimize Hörlein as spokesman on such matters by political and racialist innuendo. Hörlein was not a real physician but only an honorary doctor of medicine who had received that title “during the time of the Marxist government,” Eckhard wrote, playing misleadingly on the name of the Center Party leader, Wilhelm Marx, whose government was in place during part of 1926, when Hörlein received his honorary degree from Munich. Hörlein, the “handsomely paid member of the executive board of I.G. Farben,” had questioned the veracity of Eckhard, who described himself as the leader of “a great idealistic movement.” Before threats of job losses were made, Eckhard insisted, the salaries of I.G. Farben leaders and the monies going to foreign representatives of I.G. Farben should be investigated. The initials I.G., Eckhard claimed, stood for “internationalen Gesellschaft für Farbenindustrie [sic],” a false assertion that played on the negative valuation of “international” in National Socialist ideology. Eckhard also found “interesting and informative” the names of members of the executive board listed in I.G. Farben’s 1932 report. “I believe it would be rewarding to look a bit into the ‘Aryan’ descent of these men,” Eckhard remarked. “Thus it was generally noticeable in our meeting in Berlin,” he continued, “that Prof. Dr. Hörlein so warmly supported the Jewish professor Rosenfeld.” Eckhard immediately went on to call for takeover of the pharmaceutical industry by the National Socialist
76 the making of the first miracle drugs state as the best and swiftest way to reduce animal experiment to the unavoidable minimum and to separate the practice from capitalist profit interests.10 Animal protectionist fears were soon confirmed. On September 5, 1933, less than a week after the Berlin discussions sponsored by the Interior Ministry, Göring issued temporary regulations to govern vivisection pending issuance of the federal law. Referring to “agreements” reached in the Berlin discussions, the statement of interior regulations drew a sharp line between vivisection, which was to be prohibited, and the use of animal experiments in “serious scientific research, in the interest of the health and life of men and animals.” Animal experimentation would not be regarded as vivisection if certain conditions were met. Experiments were to be performed “only in institutes under scientific management, and only on the responsibility of the director of the institute.” There had to be prospect of definite and original results. Discomfort of the animal subjects was to be minimized, with use of local or general anesthetics whenever possible. Use of higher animals was to be avoided, and the numbers of animals used were to be kept to the minimum necessary. To conduct animal experiments, scientific institutes were either to have a concession from the state, commune, or municipality or to obtain special ministerial approval. Animal experiments for purposes of instruction would be permitted only under special circumstances and with state permission.11 The issuance of the interior regulations so soon after August 29 and the simultaneous statement that a draft of the federal animal protection law was already in existence suggest that these documents were drawn up in the wake of and under the influence of the Interior Ministry debates. Such was the recollection of Clemens Giese, an Interior Ministry official closely involved in the discussions of the draft law. By Giese’s report, the “thoroughly moderate” character of the interior regulations, which then became the basis of the federal law, was heavily indebted to Hörlein’s vigorous arguments at the August 29 meeting. Whatever the restrictions placed on animal experiment by the regulations, Hörlein and his allies, including Giese, felt that they could live with them. Animal protection groups, in contrast, felt that their demands had been only partially met, and this by a state that they presumed to be highly sympathetic to their cause. This divergence, together with the uncertainty created by the interim character of the regulations, opened the way for a heated polemical and legal struggle during the two and one-half months between September 5 and the promulgation of the Reich animal protection law on November 23, 1933.12 Hörlein and I.G. Farben now came under violent attack in National Socialist publications such as Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden! and Nazioriented animal protection journals. In these assaults, hostility to scientific medicine, including but by no means limited to use of animal experiment in research, was fused with antisemitism and attacks on international big capital. Under the title “What Is Up with ‘Germanin’?” one article in Deutsche Volksgesundheit lambasted the famous remedy for sleeping sickness. Citing Hitler’s letter to Eckhard, the author predicted that the sufferings inflicted on animals in “so-called scientific investigations” would soon be ended by law. Adduced by representatives of I.G. Farben as their “trump card” showing the necessity of animal experiment, Germanin was no such thing, the writer claimed. Far from being “nearly miraculous,”
Into the Maelstrom 77 “reminiscent of Biblical cures,” “unprecedented,” or “staggering,” the author warned, Germanin might well go the way of other “shimmering illusions” such as tuberculin, the diphtherium serum of “the Jew Behring,” or the Salvarsan of “the Jew Ehrlich.” Citing the failure of Germanin against a St. Louis outbreak of a disease resembling sleeping sickness but apparently caused by a filterable virus, the author mocked the pretensions of pharmaceutical research. Even if the “causative agent” were isolated in pure form, he asked, would this mean there was a certain remedy? “Certainly the bacteriologists of I.G. would bring it out! For variety, and in honor of the spirit of the place, as ‘Americanin’? And certainly at once it will have effects ‘reminiscent of Biblical cures’!” In any case, the author warned, a dubious medicine such as Germanin should not be invoked in defense of vivisection or in attacks on its critics as traitors to the German economy or even as traitors to the country. The representatives of the pharmaceutical industry “should not confuse the economy of their business with the economy of the German Volk!”13 Cartoons conveyed this kind of vitriol in its most concentrated form. One series that appeared in Deutsche Volksgesundheit in the fall of 1933 under the title “The Life and Deeds of Isidor G. Färber” (a fiction whose name plays off the company name I.G. Farben, a contraction of Interessengemeinschaft Farbenindustrie, or dye industry combine) portrays a grossly caricatured Jewish businessman as the manipulative power behind a large chemical industry that produces pharmaceuticals such as serums and vaccines. He acts through boards of directors, doctors, and so on, but the real power is in his hands. His medicines are tested on hapless animals and human patients. He wields powerful influence on the government from behind the scenes. He feels threatened by natural healers and by National Socialism, which is represented as “the spirit of the times.” In another cartoon, not part of this series, a figure looking like Isidor G. Färber but labeled “stockholder” is shown with his foot on the neck of a prostrate man labeled “natural healing.” In the background, beneath a Star of David labeled “Jewish-influenced medicine,” stand two men in laboratory coats. One holds a bottle labeled “chemical medicine,” the other a huge hypodermic needle. The cartoon’s caption asks, “How long will the Jewish spirit suppress German reform?” The associated article is headed “Stop the Thief: The Role of the Jews in Medicine.”14 The same blended motifs of hostility to scientific medicine, antisemitism, and more or less direct attacks on the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, are visible in the animal protectionist literature. In the lead article of the December 1933–January 1934 issue of The German Friend of Animals (Der Deutsche Tierfreund), the editor, Finus, identified the primary enemy and target of his movement as I.G. Farbenindustrie. Applauding the swift action of the National Socialist government in outlawing ritual slaughter, Finus lamented that the same undiluted success had not accompanied action against vivisection. Although at the time he went to press he did not yet know the wording of the Reich animal protection law, Finus feared that, along with restrictions on animal experiment, the law also contained compromises. The greatest user of animal trials, “chemical big capital,” had, he thought, created difficulties for the government, which he presumed to be otherwise sympathetic to a complete ban. Failure to achieve such a
78 the making of the first miracle drugs ban meant that the movement would have to continue its struggle and especially try to reach the younger generation.15 Finus was particularly incensed because I.G. Farben had brought against him a formal document of complaint (Klageschrift) in which he and his cause were denied the attribute of idealism. I.G. Farben had accused Finus of striking at the very existence of the pharmaceutical industry, which, it maintained, could not operate without animal trials. Finus reported derisively that the company had asked that he be forbidden to assert that “Jesuitical and Jewish capital” was behind I.G. Farbenindustrie, that the chemical industry was the mortal enemy of helpless animals, that vivisection at I.G. Farben was driven by insane seeking for power and profit, and that I.G. Farben produced narcotic medicines and other preparations dangerous to health, propositions that he evidently considered to be self-evident. He singled out Hörlein, the well-paid head of the division of I.G. Farben making most use of animal trials, for special censure. “If the inheritance of the German race is to be saved, then we will forbid the use of poisonous medicines and the injection of serums alien to the species into healthy German blood. Then, to be sure, there would be fewer dividends to distribute, but we would get a flourishing of the people’s health as a blessing to the nation!”16 As Finus’s angry denunciations indicate, Hörlein had not remained idle in the face of attacks on I.G. Farben. Always pugnacious, he opened a running battle with the offending publications on two fronts. With the help of company counsel Schramm, he took several journals, including Finus’s, to court. So as to give courage to the judges, “who were at that time already somewhat anxious,” Hörlein worked through a local party legal official, the Gaurechtsführer for Düsseldorf, Schroer. The company was able to get from the courts temporary decrees, confiscations, and other measures, which brought about a gradual diminishing of the slander campaign. Other tactics were necessary against Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden!, which was published first by a Nuremberg party physician, Gauärtzteführer Will, and subsequently by party-influential Julius Streicher. Schroer advised Hörlein that legal action against Streicher would be impossible and that he should work through high representatives of the party or the state. This route proved successful. Hörlein was able to get one prohibition of offensive material through Reich Physicians Leader Gerhard Wagner, who was the highest medical official in the Nazi government, and a second and final one through Joseph Goebbels’s medical advisor in the Reich Propaganda Ministry, Dr. Curt Thomalla.17 Finus’s fears of government “compromise” were borne out by the text of the new law, which was firmly based on the interim regulations. By early 1934, the Interior Ministry had published detailed instructions, to become effective on February 1, on the permits to be issued to scientific laboratories and how the law was to be administered. Each laboratory receiving a permit to conduct experiments on animals would be subject to semiannual inspections, which would be unannounced and would be conducted jointly by physicians and veterinarians. Irregularities were to be reported immediately to the competent ministry. Penalties for infractions of the law were stiff and could include fines and imprisonment of up to two years. In conjunction with the new law, the Reich Interior Ministry moved to bring
Into the Maelstrom 79 the animal protection movement under its control by officially merging its 679 societies to form the Reich Animal Protection League (Reichstierschutzbund).18 No doubt the regulations were an irritant, but Hörlein was satisfied that, with the help of Interior Ministry officials Giese and Frey, he had “succeeded in effecting the freedom of animal experiment to an adequate extent against hard resistance.” Even after the law was in place, opposition continued in the form of attacks on synthetic medicines and the pharmaceutical industry in the National Socialist press. The lead article in Deutsche Volksgesundheit for May 1935, for example, launched a vituperative assault on Emil von Behring and serum therapy under the title “Science as Business.” Beginning with a physiognomical analysis that purported to discern in Behring’s facial features a susceptibility to “Jesuitical and Jewish” ways of thinking, the author went on to portray the Nobel Prize–winning developer of serum therapy as a willing instrument of a Jewish plot to weaken and bring about the degeneration of non-Jews. The damage done to the German Volk through Behring’s serums, the author wrote, was boundless and not to be described in words. Countless numbers of people had been killed by serum who might have been saved by German folk healing, he maintained. Deutsche Volksgesundheit also ran a column “From the Medical World” that claimed to extract “from the specialized medical literature cases of damage which could have been avoided through treatment by German folk healing.”19 The battles surrounding animal experiment in medical research fought in the first year of the National Socialist regime place in relief one mode of the Nazi relationship to medical science that has been well discussed in separate studies by Michael Kater and Robert Proctor. This is the hostility of a substantial, vocal, and influential element of the Nazi movement toward laboratory medical science and its associated phenomena of chemical and surgical intervention and professional specialism. Opposed to this form of scientific medicine was the ideal of a “natural” or organic medicine drawing on traditions of German folk healing. On the philosophical level, Nazi medical writers articulating this ideal attacked what they saw as a mechanistic, reductionist, analytical, laboratory-based approach to the phenomena of life that strove to achieve a universal, objective, value-free science. In its place, they would substitute a holistic, synthetic vision of life that recognized and accepted a role for subjectivity and intuition in achieving medical knowledge. As one writer put it, what was needed was “more Goethe, less Newton.” Recognition of the role of subjectivity, they thought, would allow for development of a national medicine open to the specific ways of thinking and practice of the German Volk, conceived as a differentiable biological and cultural entity. Thus, the organic medicine favored by National Socialist thinkers would put an end to the “cosmopolitan internationalist” medicine fostered by both capitalist and socialist ways of thought and replace it with a truly German science of healing. On the level of practice, organic medicine favored the rural generalist physician over the urban specialist. In the domain of social policy, it merged easily with a wider movement to return the German people to more “natural” ways of living, which included such elements as discouragement of makeup for women, anti-tobacco and anti-alcohol campaigns, preference for midwifery over physicianassisted births, advocacy of whole-grain over refined white bread, support for
80 the making of the first miracle drugs conservation of natural resources and protection of rare or valuable species, and antivivisection sentiments. As Kater has put it, “volkisch physicians strove for a return, medically speaking, to a pre-industrial state, where the forces of nature such as sun rays or fresh air or herbs, rather than synthetic pharmacological products and the technology of a laboratory or operating room, were enlisted to aid the human body in maintaining or recovering its balance.”20 At every point, the organic medicine advocated by National Socialist writers embodied an antisemitism grounded in the doctrine of racial biology that was at the center of Nazi ideology. The alien Jewish presence held particular consequences for medicine, in this view. Philosophically, it was a “Jewishinternational” conception of science as objective, value-free, and universal that threatened to efface the ideal of a national medicine grounded in the Volk. Professionally, Jewish physicians represented the urban specialist, in contrast to the völkisch ideal of the rural general practitioner, or they represented the academic researcher standing aloof from the organic community of the people (Volksgemeinschaft). At several points, the Nazi critiques of scientific medicine drew upon, and gave fresh forms to, older currents of antisemitism. The association of animal experiment and ritual slaughter played on the ancient theme of Jewish sacrifice of the blood of the innocents. Accusations that synthetic pharmaceuticals, some developed by Jewish scientists (e.g., Paul Ehrlich) or by “Jewish-influenced science” (e.g., chemotherapy, serum therapy), were poisoning the blood of the German Volk took part of their force from resonance with old indictments of the Jews as poisoners who intentionally caused epidemics. Such accusations linked the National Socialist critique of synthetic pharmaceuticals to a more general preoccupation with blood purity, which also took the form of racial hygiene measures to protect the German race through sterilizations, marriage law, euthanasia, and, eventually, mass killings. Finally, the hostility of National Socialist medical writers toward big capital, most pointedly in the form of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, incorporated and exploited the notion of Jews as manipulators of international finance who were engaged in a hidden conspiracy to control the world.21 Several prominent Nazi leaders supported the natural health movement and organic medicine. Hitler was a vegetarian, did not use alcohol or tobacco, and endorsed antivivisectionism. Rudolf Hess favored homeopathy, while Heinrich Himmler backed organic medicine. Streicher, who published the violently antisemitic Der Stürmer, also put out Deutsche Volksgesundheit aus Blut und Boden! and headed the popular People’s Health Movement.22 Pharmaceutical research within I.G. Farben engaged, and was vulnerable to the attacks of, Nazi ideologues at many points. Its products were overtly and nakedly synthetic, not “organic” products of nature. At best, they were derivative of or were modeled on natural products, in the way that quinine served as the model for synthetic antimalarials. They were produced by laboratory science that relied on both synthetic organic chemistry and animal experiment, and in which animals were frankly a means to an end, although the end did include pharmaceuticals for use in veterinary medicine. The pharmaceutical division of I.G. Farben was indebted to Jewish scientists such as Ehrlich for part of its program and
Into the Maelstrom 81 for some of its products (e.g., Salvarsan) and included Jews on its research staff. The products and laboratory methods of pharmaceutical research dealt directly with the blood. Sera, vaccines, and chemotherapeutic agents introduced into the circulatory system could have toxic effects. I.G. Farben was perhaps the most prominent example of a huge capitalist combine joining several companies, with many international connections and interests. Its supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) included seven Jews early in the Nazi regime. To these ample grounds for hostility must be added Hörlein’s vigorous struggle with the National Socialist–oriented antivivisection movement over the Reich animal protection law, and persistent tensions generated by Nazi party fears that the pharmaceutical division might betray German technical and economic information to foreign enemies and competitors.23 It was in the midst of these tensions and struggles, in June 1934, that Hörlein joined the Nazi party (NSDAP). By his own later account and those of others who knew him before and after, his decision was based not on political conviction but on the calculation that party membership would strengthen his ability to protect the interests of his industrial group and of scientific research in Germany. Such a claim can be evaluated only in the context of Hörlein’s whole career, which I address further below. For the moment, several circumstances surrounding the decision must be noted. Prior to his application for membership in the spring of 1934, Hörlein had no connection to the NSDAP. He had been among the founders of the German Democratic Party in Wuppertal-Vohwinkel and, although not active in party politics, remained democratic in his views. He had resisted the NSDAP’s intensive recruitment campaign in the spring of 1933 but, despite this, had been named to the municipal council of Wuppertal. In 1934, he was notified by the mayor of Wuppertal that a new law required members of the council to be members of the NSDAP. Although not politically ambitious, Hörlein evidently believed that his position in local government gave him influence that was valuable in the protection of his company and research establishment. He later testified that he did not at that time foresee the violent directions in which National Socialism would develop, and that even then he recognized that there were some matters, for example, antisemitism, on which he could never agree with the party.24
A Corporate Cover-up? örlein’s struggles in the summer and fall of 1933 had helped assure enactment of a moderate animal protection law that allowed animal experiments, and therefore medical and pharmaceutical research, to continue in Germany. From November 1933, compliance with the law at Elberfeld was the responsibility of individual heads of institutes such as Domagk. Domagk’s laboratory, and that of Fritz Mietzsch and Joseph Klarer, his chemist-collaborators, was now heavily but not exclusively committed to research on Prontosil and related compounds. As far as the sulfa drugs are concerned, research at Elberfeld may be divided into two phases. In the first, running from the patent application of December 25, 1932, to Domagk’s first publication on Prontosil
H
82 the making of the first miracle drugs in February 1935, development was largely enclosed within the company. Apart from a few physicians with whom the company made arrangements for clinical trials, and French researchers who took note of Prontosil after publication of the French patent in June 1934, a policy of secrecy was successfully maintained. With publication of the German patent on January 2, 1935, and especially with Domagk’s first article of February 1935, the situation was fundamentally altered. Prontosil went on the market and was widely available for therapeutic testing and use. Interested researchers outside of Germany, notably in France, Britain, and the United States, began to plan and carry out independent laboratory and clinical trials.25 Within months came dramatic news from Paris that a team at the Pasteur Institute had shown a constituent of the Prontosil molecule, a compound later to be known as sulfanilamide, to be at least as effective as Prontosil in animal and clinical trials. The finding was of fundamental importance for several reasons. Prontosil, an azo dye, could have the unfortunate effect of turning the patient red during the course of treatment. Sulfanilamide was colorless. Sulfanilamide, a simpler molecule than Prontosil, could be manufactured more easily and more cheaply. Not the least important was that sulfanilamide, unlike Prontosil, was not covered by patents. Or rather, the process for making it had been patented by Bayer soon after its synthesis by the Austrian chemist Paul Gelmo in 1908, and Bayer had made use of sulfanilamide as an intermediate in the synthesis of dyestuffs, never suspecting its therapeutic potential; in due course, the patent had expired. Finally, recognition of the therapeutic efficacy of sulfanilamide demonstrated the irrelevance of the azo bond, and of the dye character, of Prontosil. Chemotherapeutic research could begin afresh, taking the sulfanilamide molecule as nucleus and building around it variations that might expand the therapeutic spectrum, reduce the toxicity, or improve on the intensity of action of sulfanilamide. Sulfanilamide opened the way for a new generation of sulfa drugs.26 Publication of the Pasteur Institute findings in November 1935 and the subsequent displacement of Prontosil by sulfanilamide in medical use, in the pharmaceuticals market, and as starting point for development of new chemotherapeutic agents have raised persistent questions about the actions of Elberfeld researchers between December 1932 and November 1935. Did the Elberfeld team know about the action of sulfanilamide before the Pasteur Institute publication but choose to conceal it because the compound could not be protected by patents and would therefore be less profitable? The question has been put most sharply by British bacteriologist Ronald Hare, who was strongly inclined to answer in the affirmative. In a book on penicillin published in 1970, Hare devoted one chapter to the sulfa drugs. He asked why there had been a delay of two years and three months between the discovery of the first effective compounds in 1932 and Domagk’s first publication in 1935. Hörlein had said in 1937 in a talk to British doctors that the time had been needed to complete intensive experimental and clinical trials. The problem with this, as Hare saw it, was that many clinical studies were already completed in 1933, and that Domagk’s February 1935 article did not say what animal studies were done after 1932, or when they were done. So Hare offered an alternative explanation. Bayer chemists, he reasoned, quickly realized that only a part of the Prontosil molecule was required for therapeutic action, and that part
Into the Maelstrom 83 was unpatentable. So the company feverishly set out—so Hare conjectures—to find a related compound that was equally or more effective and different enough to patent. Meanwhile, they stalled for time and refused to send samples of Prontosil abroad for outside testing.27 The plausibility of the Hare thesis, as this argument may conveniently be called, depends heavily on chemical reasoning. Hare gave four reasons why he found it “very difficult to believe” that the Elberfeld group did not recognize the therapeutic efficacy of sulfanilamide at an early date. One of these was that, by early 1933, the German researchers had not one but three compounds in hand that were chemotherapeutically active. One of these was the one eventually called Prontosil but at first called Streptozon in batches released to clinical investigators. The second was the compound Hare calls the precursor of Prontosil, the first sulfonamide azo compound synthesized by Klarer and Mietzsch. This substance, referred to as KL695/D3920, had been prepared by the chemists by September 1932. It was supplanted by Prontosil and did not go into clinical use. The third was Prontosil Soluble, at first known as Streptozon S, which was available for clinical trials by early 1933. Also a sulfonamide azo compound, it had a more complex structure than Prontosil but was more soluble. Second, Hare pointed out, inspection of the structural formulas of these three compounds would have immediately revealed a common feature: Precursor of Prontosil (KL695/D3920)
Prontosil or Streptozon
Prontosil Soluble or Streptozon S
In all three compounds, the left-hand benzene ring has a sulfonamide group attached in the para-position relative to an azo bond (⫺N苷N⫺) that links the ring to another benzene ring on the right.
84 the making of the first miracle drugs A third reason why, in Hare’s view, the Elberfeld team should have suspected that sulfanilamide was the therapeutically active component was that the synthesis of all these compounds began with operations on sulfanilamide. It was both a common structural element and the first building block of all these therapeutically active compounds. Finally, Hare reasoned, the Elberfeld chemists must have known that a simple reduction of any of these compounds in the animal or human body could break the double bond and release free sulfanilamide into the circulation. All of this made it very improbable, in Hare’s view, that the Germans had not known at an early date that sulfanilamide was the real chemotherapeutic agent.28 Despite the plausibility that commercial motives, timing, secrecy, and chemical reasoning lend to the Hare thesis, its conclusions have been rejected by Daniel Bovet, who was a member of the Pasteur Institute team that recognized the therapeutic efficacy of sulfanilamide and who published a history of the sulfa drugs. Bovet felt that he had incontrovertible proof that the Elberfeld researchers did not know of sulfanilamide’s therapeutic virtues until they read the Pasteur Institute team’s publication of November 28, 1935. Bovet’s strongest evidence comes from Mietzsch and Klarer’s monthly reports during 1935 and 1936. These show that the chemists were trying a number of ways to produce new chemotherapeutic agents by varying the Prontosil model, such as substitutions for the azo bond ⫺N苷N⫺, but that they did not begin to consider “colorless products,” including sulfanilamide, until March 1936. Equally revealing is Domagk’s laboratory journal, in which the formula for sulfanilamide appears, without comment, only in January 1936. Bovet points out that prior to the Pasteur Institute team’s publication, the Elberfeld group was committed to the idea that therapeutic activity was linked to coloring properties in the dye molecules under test. For this reason alone, Mietzsch and Klarer, who had prepared sulfanilamide in their own laboratories by 1932, saw it only as an intermediate in the preparation of dyes and did not send it to the bacteriological laboratories until 1936. I.G. Farben did not begin clinical trials of sulfanilamide until March 1936, and it went on the German market under the name Prontosil Album (the Latin-derived Album indicating its lack of color) only later in that year.29 For Bovet, the case against the Hare thesis is clinched by two personal recollections. One is that of Mietzsch, who in a 1955 article stated that the irrelevance of the azo bridge in the Prontosil molecule for its therapeutic activity had been demonstrated by Jacques Tréfouël and his colleagues. The other comes from Ernst Auhagen, who had joined the Elberfeld physiology laboratory in 1933. In a conversation with Bovet in 1981, Auhagen recalled that, apart from the quality and variety of tests to which prospective chemotherapeutic agents were submitted, the hallmark of the Elberfeld team’s research was the “myth and fascination of color,” the notion that a dye would be found with therapeutic activity. Auhagen recalled very well the shock felt in the Elberfeld group on learning of the action of the colorless sulfanilamide. He was indignant at the suggestion of a prior knowledge and a cover-up and stated categorically that Hörlein would never have stood for such a thing.30 Bovet’s evidence, if not the definitive proof that he considered it to be, adds weight to a strong case that can be made against the Hare thesis on other grounds. Domagk’s internal report on the activities of his laboratory during 1934, submitted
Into the Maelstrom 85 to the company in late January 1935, reveals a variegated research agenda that included vigorous attempts to follow up the success of Prontosil against streptococcal infections, but no indication that Domagk or his colleagues were aware of the action of sulfanilamide. Hörlein later told a British audience in 1937 that since 1932 the Elberfeld laboratories had synthesized more than 1,000 compounds related to Prontosil and that their action in various bacterial infections had been tested in “tens of thousands of experiments.” Domagk’s 1934 report makes clear that many of these compounds had been synthesized, and many of the experiments performed, before Domagk’s first publication on Prontosil in February 1935.31 In 1934, Domagk’s laboratory was occupied with a variety of problems, among which the most prominent were cancer research, disinfection, and the chemotherapy of bacterial infections. Nearly two-thirds of the 1934 laboratory report was taken up with results of animal trials of compounds in streptococcal, staphylococcal, pneumococcal, and gonococcal infections. Also important to Domagk, however, was the work on tumors, to which he devoted a long introductory section. Domagk believed that research to date had shown that active immunization of humans against tumors was possible. He also sought substances that would inhibit tumor growth, and to this end received in 1934 twenty-one sterol compounds from the organic chemist Adolf Windaus. In April, Christian Hackmann, a medical doctor, joined the laboratory and devoted all his efforts to tumor research.32 Domagk’s 1934 laboratory report weighs heavily against the Hare thesis. It contains no hint of an awareness that sulfanilamide is the therapeutically effective part of Prontosil. On the contrary, there is every indication that Domagk and his collaborators were vigorously pursuing, and expected to continue to pursue, work on azo compounds more or less modeled on Prontosil. The one clear success in this effort so far, Prontosil Soluble (Streptozon S), fell into this pattern. The numbers of active compounds sharing the sulfonamide group in the para-position relative to the azo bond evidently suggested to Domagk and his colleagues not that the intermediate product sulfanilamide was the active part, but that greater intensity and range of chemotherapeutic action was to be sought by variation of the rest of the molecule. Even then, the Elberfeld group did not confine themselves to azo compounds but extended their tests to include acridine, azo-acridine, and other types of substances, many with no relation to sulfanilamide. The scope of the research, and the time consumed by it, was being extended not only by the addition of hundreds of compounds but also by the decision to seek chemotherapies for bacterial infections other than streptococcal ones, and by the need to develop and refine animal experimental models. In the midst of this, Domagk was committing a part of his own time, and of the resources of his laboratory, to other problems, especially cancer research.
First Trials of Prontosil hile Domagk and his laboratory were so engaged, a handful of German doctors were quietly conducting the first clinical trials of Prontosil. In early 1933, selected physicians received from I.G. Farben samples of the compound
W
86 the making of the first miracle drugs under the label Streptozon or D4145. Patients suffering from streptococcal, staphylococcal, and other bacterial infections began to receive treatment with Streptozon almost immediately. Apart from mention of a single case at a medical society meeting in May 1933, however, no clinical results were published until February 1935. In that month, three clinical reports appeared in the same issue and immediately following Domagk’s first publication on Prontosil in the Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift. A fourth paper, also reporting results of clinical tests begun in 1933, appeared in the same journal in October 1935. Scrutiny of these reports permits evaluation of Hare’s claim that clinical tests of Prontosil had been largely completed in 1933.33 One of the first physicians to receive Prontosil was Philipp Klee, who headed the medical clinic at nearby Wuppertal Hospital and was also a professor at Munich. Klee and his assistant, a young physician named Herbert Römer, had used Prontosil in treatment of an unspecified but apparently substantial number of cases of streptococcal infection between early 1933 and February 1935. In “numerous preliminary trials,” they found Prontosil to be harmless and well tolerated. In one of these, a case of septic miscarriage that occurred not in the clinic but in Klee’s private practice, the cessation of fever and recovery had been so rapid and striking as to propel them into sustained testing of the medicine. Unfortunately, this success had not been repeated in serious septic infections of the uterus, they reported, and, “as expected,” Prontosil had not worked in cases of advanced septicemia. Undeterred, Klee and Römer had used Prontosil in treatment of streptococcal sore throats, tonsillar abscesses, tonsillar thrombophlebitis and lymphedenitis, jugular vein thrombosis, septic perimetritis, erysipelas, acute and ulcerative endocarditis, sepsis lenta, and acute and chronic polyarthritis. Confirmed cases of endocarditis lenta (inflammation of the interior lining of the heart) proved resistant to Prontosil. In contrast, Klee and Römer reported excellent results in treatment of septic sore throat and some of its most serious complications. In the past two years, they said, they had had no deaths from these conditions, a notable departure from previous experience. They did not feel that the precise role of Prontosil in treatment of septic sore throat and its complications was yet established, and urged physicians to attend carefully to the particulars of each case and not to neglect more conventional therapeutic measures. They did feel confident enough to recommend immediate use of Prontosil whenever the clinical picture suggested septic complications of sore throat.34 Klee and Römer gave details of three of their cases by way of example. One of these was offered as evidence that Prontosil also worked well in older patients: 62 year old engineer. Already in 1929 had severe thrombosis in leg after tibial fracture. Pain in swallowing and chills for 5 days. Temperature between 39 and 40 degrees. Gradually increasing difficulty of speech. In the last days pain in the neck on both sides over the jugular, then from today reddening and swelling. Hospitalization because of suspicion of jugular vein thrombosis. Threatening clinical picture. Confused. Dry tongue. Mucous membrane and throat edematous. Palatine arch in both sides arched outward and swollen. Entry to the throat narrowed. Tonsils
Into the Maelstrom 87 not visible. Slight lockjaw. Speech barely understandable. On the neck and over the jugulars on both sides a slight edematous swelling with very great sensitivity to pressure. Over the left jugular hand-sized redness and edema. Treatment 2 times a day with 10 cc., later once a day with 10 cc. Prontosil intravenously and 3 times a day 0.6 g. by mouth. Already on the third day considerable improvement, gradual decline of the swelling and fever, after a further 9 days completely free of fever, after a further 14 days free of complaints and discharged cured.35 Success came also with use of Prontosil in cases of erysipelas of the face and head. A streptococcal infection of the skin and subcutaneous tissue, erysipelas is characterized by a spreading inflammation and redness in the affected areas. “The critical cessation of fever in erysipelas cases and the rapid restoration of skin processes was in some cases so striking,” Klee and Römer reported, “that we could scarcely doubt a connection with the therapy, although the judgment in erysipelas is, as is known, always especially difficult.” Less certain was the effect of Prontosil on polyarthritic disorders, where the picture was clouded by use of Prontosil in combination with other modes of therapy. Uncertainty also surrounded the mode of administration. Klee and Römer believed that Prontosil was well absorbed in the intestine but had also found that better results often came from giving a much smaller dose intravenously, a procedure they recommended in all serious cases.36 Klee and Römer reported that Prontosil was “harmless, free of undesirable side effects, easily tolerated, and effective” and recommended its use especially in serious forms of streptococcal sore throat and its complications, and in erysipelas. Although they remained uncertain as to why intravenous administration was more effective, they had found that a suitable dosage was 10–20 cc of the 0.25 percent solution once or twice a day intravenously and 0.3–0.6 g. three times a day orally. They concluded that “we see in the use of the azo compound Prontosil an enrichment of our therapy.”37 Similar good results were reported by H.T. Schreus, director of the Düsseldorf Medical Academy’s Dermatological Clinic. In March 1933, Schreus and his assistant, Richard Foerster, had in their care an infant one and one-half years old on the verge of death from staphylococcal septicemia. The child suffered from serious weight loss and elevated temperature, and the whole body was covered with abscesses. Several weeks of treatment with existing chemotherapies had been to no avail. In these desperate circumstances, the doctors began to give the infant 0.05 g of Prontosil by mouth twice a day. They observed no immediate change, but on the third day the child’s temperature dropped from 40°C to 39°C in the morning, then suddenly to 37°C in the evening. Thereafter, the temperature fell gradually to normal, the abscesses softened and could be opened by incision, the skin improved, the child began to gain weight, and a fundamental change in the child’s condition was evident. Schreus reported that “the success in this case made an exceedingly deep impression on those who participated.”38 Deep impression or not, Schreus found that he could not replicate the dramatic results of the first case on other patients with staphylococcal infections. Nor
88 the making of the first miracle drugs could he get satisfactory results with use of Prontosil in gonorrhea, although in early 1935 he was still using Prontosil against both gonorrhea and staphylococcal infections. The real success came with erysipelas. The clinic treated an unspecified but large number of cases, mostly of facial erysipelas of various durations and severities. The standard measures before Prontosil included injection of the compounds Streptosan and Omnadin, and topical treatments. Most cases responded favorably in three to eight days, but some resulted in serious and even fatal complications. “Now, after the introduction of Prontosil treatment, a completely unmistakable change occurred,” Schreus wrote enthusiastically. In one and one-half years of Prontosil treatment, the clinic had not had a single case of therapy-resistant erysipelas. “The rule is that already on the next day, at the latest on the second day after administration of two to six grams of Prontosil by mouth, the temperature drops to normal and the erysipelas is brought to a stop. We have seen this striking success in cases that were already treated elsewhere for a long time without results,” he reported. Schreus was forthright in his conclusion, writing that “we have in Prontosil for the first time an agent that undoubtedly permits a causal treatment of erysipelas and indeed is to be spoken of as a true chemotherapeutic agent . . . [and] its specific action in erysipelas alone justifies its introduction into practice.”39 Puerperal (childbed) fever, too, was apparently yielding to treatment with Prontosil. Eugen Anselm, an assistant in Max Henkel’s University Women’s Clinic in Jena, had received from I.G. Farben ampules of 10 cc and 20 cc of 0.25 percent Prontosil solution and also containers of 20 tablets of 0.3 g Prontosil each. With Domagk’s animal trials in mind, he had used Prontosil as the exclusive therapy in two cases of bacteriologically confirmed streptococcal sepsis following miscarriage. Both patients were given intravenous doses of 20 cc Prontosil solution each day. In both cases, the temperature dropped after the first dose, and both patients were well and released after six doses, without evident side effects. Favorable results in what later proved to be mixed cases of streptococcal and staphylococcal infection led Anselm to conjecture that Prontosil not only exerted an elective action on streptococci but also had a general bactericidal action, or acted to mobilize the body’s defenses including the reticuloendothelial system. On this basis, he tried Prontosil in those cases of confirmed mixed streptococcal and staphylococcal infection and purely staphylococcal infection, all with successful outcome. After such “unequivocal success,” Anselm “henceforth as a matter of principle treated every case of puerperal fever immediately after admission exclusively with Prontosil without regard to the time-consuming and costly bacteriological confirmation of the infective agent.” Thirteen cases treated successfully in this way led Anselm to give “the best recommendation of Prontosil for treatment of every form of pueperal fever.”40 A more cautious but still positive evaluation of Prontosil in puerperal sepsis was published later in 1935 by Kurt Fuge, an assistant in L. Nürnberger’s University Women’s Clinic in Halle. The clinic had begun receiving Prontosil from I.G. Farben in 1933 and since then had treated 120 women for fever following birth or miscarriage, of whom fourteen were cases of sepsis, with very positive results. Given the background of skepticism in the medical community, however, Fuge
Into the Maelstrom 89 felt it necessary to justify even making a trial of Prontosil. “In view of the fact that the chemotherapy of sepsis has enjoyed the unlimited and perhaps justified rejection of all authors who have had the opportunity of testing the results of all medicines recommended against sepsis,” he admitted, “it may appear incomprehensible that we have nevertheless tried to improve the therapy of sepsis with this new medicine.” Fuge held that past failures did not justify the rejection of new medicines on principle, and that they should be tried provided they did the patient no harm. In his view, the latter condition, which Prontosil satisfied, was critical since the body’s powers of resistance had to be strengthened in every way possible: “the etiological treatment of sepsis [i.e., chemotherapy] is always only a support to this general treatment.” All this said, he conceded that he was not as optimistic about Prontosil’s prospects as some authors, and that his final judgment would have to await further clinical trials.41 The early German clinical trials of Prontosil fell into a clear pattern. Soon after filing its patent application on Prontosil, I.G. Farben began to release samples of the compound in liquid and tablet form to a handful of physicians, all of whom were on the staff of clinics independent of the company in which numbers of patients were treated for streptococcal and other bacterial infections. Clinical trials of Prontosil proceeded on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of individual physicians. Three of the four studies of Prontosil described above began with dramatic successes in one or two individual cases. These early successes appear to have played an important role in prompting continuation of the trials against a background of numerous previous failures of other drugs and some skepticism, a background sharply underlined by Fuge. Investigating physicians typically gave close attention to the particulars of their cases, including the precise nature of the illness, the patient’s tolerance of the medication, effective dosages, mode of administration, and failures. If patient consent to treatment with an experimental drug was asked for or obtained, the fact was nowhere recorded in any of these reports. None of the doctors mentioned large-scale or controlled clinical trials or appeared to be aware of their necessity or desirability. Lack of awareness of the utility of controls is all the more striking in view of the recurrent problems raised in the clinical trials. The physicians testing Prontosil confessed themselves unable to distinguish with certainty in all cases between the effects due to Prontosil and the ordinary variability in the course of untreated infections. Multiple therapies, including Prontosil, applied to the same case raised even more complex problems of interpretation. So, too, did cases of mixed infection, even where Prontosil was the sole therapy used. Given these sources of confusion, the number of different kinds of streptococcal infections, not to mention staphylococcal or other types, on which the action of Prontosil had to be assessed, and the atmosphere of skepticism in which they worked, it is hardly surprising that physicians carrying out the first clinical trials of Prontosil remained tentative or uncertain on many points. Nor is it surprising that the preliminary trials occupied the greater part of two years, although that time exceeded by about a year the average laid down in the company’s 1930 internal report for the clinical testing of a new compound. Hare’s contention that many clinical trials were completed in 1933 and his conjecture that the company
90 the making of the first miracle drugs simply sat on the results for an additional year or more therefore appear implausible at best. More remarkable is that, in spite of limitations of methodology and the complexity of the phenomena under study, the physicians testing Prontosil were able to confidently recommend its use in erysipelas, puerperal fever, and the complications of streptococcal sore throat and that the company was prepared to act on these conclusions, advanced by a small number of clinicians on the basis of a small number of cases, by early 1935.42 This account is consistent with the position taken later by Domagk. Speaking in 1961 to the French Society of Chemotherapy and Serology, Domagk responded indignantly to characterizations of the delay between the first laboratory results in 1932 and the first publication in 1935 as “incomprehensible and mysterious” and underlined the need to confirm the clinical results so as not to raise false hopes among doctors and patients.43 Despite its initial plausibility, therefore, Hare’s thesis is supported neither by the record of the laboratory development of Prontosil nor by that of its early clinical testing. Against Hare’s views, finally, we must place several errors in his reasoning and a number of characteristics of the Elberfeld research endeavor that are misconstrued or not taken into account by his argument. Hare appears to have little sense of the background of chemotherapeutic research at Elberfeld. Thus, the significance of such predominant ideas as the principle of basic alkylation, the kind of analogical reasoning that made Atabrine a source of inspiration to Mietzsch and Klarer, and the mystique of color referred to by Auhagen does not enter into his interpretation of the actions of Elberfeld researchers. At the same time, Hare imputes to these investigators questions and procedures of dubious relevance. So, for example, he supposes that the testing of intermediate products for therapeutic action was routine at Elberfeld, which does not appear to have been the case. Apparently determined to make recognition of sulfanilamide’s therapeutic qualities appear inexorable, he misrepresents the significance of what he takes to be Walter Jacobs and Michael Heidelberger’s 1919 finding in research at the Rockefeller Institute that a sulfonamide-containing azo-cinchona compound had antibacterial action in vitro. 44
The Mystique of Color n making his assessment of the time taken by Elberfeld researchers to bring Prontosil to market, Hare does not know of, or chooses to ignore, the background of skepticism regarding the possibilities of bacterial chemotherapy that was widespread in the medical community in the early 1930s. Nor, apparently, is he aware of Hörlein’s characteristic caution in introducing new drugs into medical practice.45 More seriously, Hare’s analysis reflects no awareness of the framework of thinking that guided Elberfeld researchers and that made it unlikely that they would even raise the question of sulfanilamide’s effectiveness. Part of this framework is captured in Auhagen’s reference to the “myth and fascination of color” that led the Elberfeld group to seek a dye with therapeutic action. Color in this context meant the azo bond, and the genealogy of Prontosil indeed placed it
I
Into the Maelstrom 91 among azo dyes with medicinal effect, such as chrysoidine, phenazopyridine, and neotropine. Even the member of the Elberfeld research establishment most likely to raise the question of sulfanilamide’s therapeutic qualities saw Prontosil in this way. Gerhard Hecht, a pharmacologist in Hörlein’s organization, recognized that, in general, the azo bond was not necessary for therapeutic action, citing as example the sleeping sickness remedy Germanin (Bayer 205), which was colorless. Hecht also emphasized the importance of using constituents and intermediate products of dyes in the synthesis of medicines. Nowhere, however, did Hecht suggest that dyes in general, or basic azo dyes in particular, became therapeutically active when broken down in the body. When he mentioned Prontosil up to 1935, it was as a basic azo dye related to chrysoidine but with a particular substitution that made it effective against septic illnesses caused by streptococci. Even after the Pasteur Institute publication and general recognition of the therapeutic action of sulfanilamide, the Elberfeld group continued to present sulfanilamide as a product of the breakdown of Prontosil, a “fragment” compound, an attitude given expression in the I.G. Farben trade name, Prontosil Album, or colorless Prontosil. This name has the form of a binomial, indicating that the substance is merely one species within the genus Prontosil. Such language suggests not only the temporal priority of Prontosil but also a way of thinking according to which the dye molecule was regarded as a whole, and sulfanilamide as a mere part. This is not a language or way of thinking that would have encouraged testing of sulfanilamide, although it could be and was adapted after the fact to acknowledge recognition of the “fragment” compound’s action. As late as 1937, Domagk was voicing doubts about the views “expressed by certain French and British authors” that Prontosil and related compounds were effective only when broken down by a reductive process in the body. That Domagk attributed this idea to the French and British and had to be convinced of its validity renders it unlikely that he had the notion independently or pursued its implications in laboratory or clinical tests.46 In the last analysis, the plausibility of the Hare thesis depends on hindsight, a capacity that may distort as well as illuminate. How could the German researchers not have realized what soon became common knowledge and the starting point for new generations of sulfa drugs? The answer to this question emerges when Prontosil is viewed not from the standpoint of later developments but as the product of an older research program both driven and bounded by the world of its own concepts and practices. By the time that Prontosil entered the German market and medical practice in 1935, the Elberfeld pharmaceutical research establishment had weathered early challenges from Nazi ideologues and had made a start at pushing beyond Prontosil to identify compounds with better or different qualities as antibacterial agents. In the next decade, it would continue its work in the face of new and varied pressures, first from the regime, then from a long and devastating war.
CHAPTER 5
Accommodation and Survival
eginning in 1935, research on sulfonamides at Elberfeld proceeded in a changed environment. With the wraps off Prontosil, I.G. Farben’s product was exposed to international competition both in the marketplace and in research laboratories. In France, where German patents were not recognized, a copy of Prontosil soon went on the market under the trade name Rubiazol. After the therapeutic action of sulfanilamide was made known by the Pasteur Institute team in November 1935, the new “fragment” compound could be used in place of its parent, and the way was opened for development of a second generation of sulfonamides no longer modeled on Prontosil. The search for new derivatives was taken up in France, Britain, Switzerland, the United States, and elsewhere, forcing the Elberfeld research establishment into repeated reassessments of the needs and priorities of research. A National Socialist regime that emphasized military preparedness and the push for autarky brought increasing pressure on industry to protect German commercial advantage and strategic interests by preventing access to vital technical and scientific information by potential enemies.1
B
Beyond Prontosil y 1935, enough clinical experience was available to show Prontosil effective against severe streptococcal sore throat, erysipelas, scarlet fever, puerperal sepsis, and other streptococcal infections. Striking as these successes were, they also put in relief the conditions in which Prontosil was useless or of uncertain activity, including infections caused by staphylococcal, pneumococcal, gonococcal, and anaerobic bacteria.2
B
92
Accommodation and Survival 93 Research continued at Elberfeld on the uses of Prontosil and related azo compounds, but by early 1936 Gerhard Domagk, Joseph Klarer, and Fritz Mietzsch were also turning to sulfanilamide and the other colorless compounds that could be derived from it. Sulfanilamide, described in chapter 4, is a relatively simple compound, with structural formula:
Researchers began with the premise that therapeutic action depended not only on the presence of the sulfonamide group, SO2NH2, but also on its location in the para-position relative to the amino group, NH2, or, in azo compounds such as Prontosil, to the azo bond, ⫺N苷N⫺. Starting with sulfanilamide, then, variation of the compound could proceed in three directions. Substitutions could be made in the sulfonamide group, in the amino group, or in both groups at once. Prontosil and Prontosil Soluble could be viewed as products of substitution in the amino group. It was in the other direction, however, through substitution in the sulfonamide group, that effective new compounds began to be identified. By some time in 1936, Klarer and Mietzsch had synthesized a compound, at first called DB90, that Domagk found in animal trials to be as effective as Prontosil or Prontosil Soluble against streptococcal infections and more effective against infections caused by staphylococcal, gonococcal, and some anaerobic bacteria.3 The apparent effectiveness of the new compound against staphylococcal, gonococcal, and some anaerobic infections made it an obvious candidate for patenting and clinical trials. In the ideological and legal circumstances of the Third Reich, however, the process could not be straightforward. Already in 1933, the regime had made betrayal of military secrets a crime punishable by death, and Heinrich Hörlein, as a representative of I.G. Farben, had heard the company castigated by party officials for its manufacture of medicines for tropical diseases, products that purportedly benefited only the former enemies of Germany. I.G. Farben had been attacked in the National Socialist press for its international interests and connections. By April 1934, legal changes introduced by the National Socialist government required I.G. Farben to submit to the Reich War Ministry any patent applications for a product that might fall under the definition of state secret. Until October 1935, the I.G. Farben patent office in Leverkusen dealt directly with the various parts of the military. Beginning in that month, the Reich War Ministry created a central office for patent secrecy questions, and I.G. Farben funneled these matters through its Army Liaison Office (Vermittlungstelle W) in Berlin. An exception was anything having to do with weapons, about which Elberfeld and Leverkusen dealt directly with the Army General Headquarters (Oberkommando des Heeres).4 Hörlein, who regarded the secrecy requirements as a mortgage (Hypothek) that had to be borne in order to continue scientific work at Elberfeld, felt himself forced into dependence on military authorities for protection. He found such a contact for pharmaceuticals in the Army Health Inspector (Heeressanitätsinspektor),
94 the making of the first miracle drugs a Prof. Dr. Waldmann, and for toxic substances, which might be viewed by the Army as potential weapons, in Army Ordnance (Heereswaffenamt).5 The new compound, which soon took the trade name Uliron, was the occasion of Hörlein’s first encounter with the Army Health Inspector. What made Uliron a potential secrecy problem was its action against anaerobic bacteria. Hörlein was aware that among these organisms were those responsible for gas gangrene, to which he attributed the deaths of 100,000 soldiers on the German side alone during the 1914–1918 war. Uliron was submitted for review and was not released for marketing and medical use until receipt of Waldmann’s approval on May 21, 1937.6 Success with Uliron reinforced a sense of urgency at Elberfeld that was already fueled by a keen awareness of international competition in chemotherapeutic research and a conviction that further breakthroughs in the field of the sulfonamides were imminent. Two months after the approval of Uliron, in July 1937, Hörlein wrote a letter politely declining an offer by Richard Kuhn to make Domagk director of the Pathology Division of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg. While conceding Domagk’s qualifications for the position, Hörlein was loath to see him removed from a collaborative effort that had already produced such substantial results in the field of bacterial infections, and from which still more was to be expected. Referring to Uliron, though not yet by name, he wrote that a medicine was soon to be introduced that shared the antistreptococcal action of Prontosil and Prontosil Album (sulfanilamide) but that was also a specific treatment for staphylococcal infections and was effective against gonococci and the causative agents of gas gangrene. Hörlein saw indications that the same or similar substances would be effective against all possible bacterial infections. “The whole world has been awakened by the success with Prontosil,” he noted, “and in America, England, and France, they are working feverishly in this field. I believe that we can remain in the forefront if we let the apparatus we erected work as quietly as possible.”7 Domagk stayed at Elberfeld, and the apparatus worked on. On March 29, 1938, Klarer sent to Domagk a compound for chemotherapeutic testing that differed from the Prontosil and Uliron groups of substances in breaking with the prior assumption that the amino group had to be directly bound to the benzene ring. In the new compound, in contrast, the amino group was joined to the ring with the aid of an aliphatic residue, CH2. On August 19, 1938, Domagk reported that the compound showed activity against blackleg or symptomatic anthrax (Pararauschbrand), an anaerobic bacterial infection. Since further chemotherapeutic tests went well, the company applied on January 27, 1939, for a patent on the procedure for making the compound (application number J 63 929; later patent number DRP 726 386). Since the new compound did not appear to show advantages over other sulfonamides in bacterial infections other than those caused by anaerobes, the patent application singled out the latter, which included gas gangrene.8 Mention of anaerobic infections set off the same alarm bells that had rung for Uliron, with the result that Army General Headquarters required the patent application for the new compound to be kept secret. Hörlein, who opposed secrecy for
Figure 5.1. Gerhard Domagk (1895–1964) at his desk (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
Figure 5.2. Fritz Mietzsch (1896–1958), one of Gerhard Domagk’s principal chemist collaborators in research on sulfonamides (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
96 the making of the first miracle drugs
Figure 5.3. Joseph Klarer (1898–1953), one of Gerhard Domagk’s principal chemist collaborators in research on sulfonamides (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
new pharmaceutical products on principle, urged the Elberfeld researchers to find applications for the new compound that would be important in peacetime and that would thereby improve the company’s chances for approval of the application. Animal studies in Domagk’s laboratory showed that the substance had activity against gonococcal infections. Mesudin, as the compound was called for testing purposes, was sent to H.T. Schreus in Düsseldorf and H. Löhe in Berlin for clinical trials. Löhe’s results were published in the Klinische Wochenschrift in 1940 but, because of the secrecy order, did not include the chemical formula of the compound. On February 9, 1940, Mietzsch and Werner Knauff, from I.G. Farben’s patent office in Leverkusen, met with officials of the Reich Patent Office in Berlin. I.G. Farben was asked to “enrich” the patent application with statements about animal trials in gonococcal infections in place of earlier statements on anaerobic infections, now declared secret. Domagk accordingly conducted new animal trials, and on the basis of these the company submitted a revised application for Mesudin on June 6, 1940. Even this was not enough, and over the succeeding months Hörlein appeared personally on several occasions before the Pharmacological Administrative Department (Pharmakologischen Dienststellen) at Army General Headquarters to petition for release of the application. Approval of the revised application, which now included the chemical formula, finally came
Accommodation and Survival 97 on October 7, 1941, and Klarer published the formula for the compound, now given the trade name Marfanil, in the Klinische Wochenschrift on December 13, 1941.9 Although Elberfeld researchers had recognized the special properties of the compound that became Marfanil long before the beginning of the war in September 1939, the war lent new urgency to the compound’s testing, to the patent and secrecy issues, and to specification of the conditions of its use by doctors. The war also had an increasing and largely detrimental effect on the wider research enterprise at Elberfeld. Before the war, and even in its early phases, Domagk’s laboratory benefited from an expansion linked to the present success and bright future prospects of the sulfonamides. A medical doctor joined the staff in 1934, and between 1937 and 1942 another medical doctor and two bacteriologists were added. In 1939, Domagk’s laboratory was expanding with the addition of more rooms. Domagk, his staff, and his chemist-collaborators pushed ahead with research on the chemotherapy of bacterial infections. Prompted by success with Mesudin, they placed special emphasis on anaerobic infections, but other targets were not neglected. Elected an honorary member of the German Society to Combat Sexually Transmitted Diseases (Deutschen Gesellschaft zur Bekämpfung der Geschlechtskrankheiten), Domagk used the occasion to call attention to experimental and clinical successes in the treatment of gonorrhea with Uliron and other compounds. By early 1940, the first favorable clinical reports on use of Mesudin against gonorrhea had come in. Research was also proceeding in Domagk’s laboratory on chemotherapy of pneumococcal infections, and Domagk was optimistic that compounds would be found to surpass sulfapyridine, which had been introduced with great fanfare in 1938 by the British firm of May & Baker. Domagk published two papers in 1939 on the chemotherapy of bacterial infections.10 Despite these positive notes, it is clear that already in 1939 the Elberfeld research establishment was beginning to feel the pressure of the war. In Domagk’s laboratory, turnover of personnel accelerated, leading to a noticeable slowing of the pace of work. The war accomplished in part what animal protection groups could not. There were now shortages of laboratory mice, and the deficiency could not be made up by the few mice produced in the plant’s own breeding facilities. “If the war should last longer,” Domagk wrote in early 1940, “we must try for a substantial increase [in production of mice] by next winter.”11 By 1942 the effect of the war, and of war-related activity, played a preponderant role in Domagk’s laboratory. The rapid turnover of personnel continued. Of twenty-three outgoing staff, eight, or more than a third, went to the military. The main effort of the laboratory was devoted to war-related tasks, above all the further development of the chemotherapy of wound infections. Intensive research on the treatment of gas gangrene centered on animal tests to determine the most appropriate use of Marfanil powder. So as to better approximate real conditions of use, Domagk and his staff induced experimental infections using bacteria-bearing soil samples received from the various theaters of war. In vitro and animal tests led Domagk to conclude that Marfanil was far superior to all other sulfonamides in the treatment of gas gangrene. On the basis of animal studies, he formulated guidelines
98 the making of the first miracle drugs for treatment of wound infections that were tested and confirmed in clinical trials on patients wounded by bomb or flak fragments or in serious traffic accidents. He prepared a report on these results for the Army Health Inspector and for distribution to military doctors and demonstrated some of his findings for military officials when summoned to Brussels in June 1942. Domagk’s report did not take for granted the acceptance of his recommendations by military surgeons. Pointing out that the treatment of serious wound infections constituted a major part of war surgery, he noted that although very few surgeons questioned the value of serum therapy for tetanus, the value of serum therapy in gas gangrene and of sulfonamide therapy of wound infections was still controversial. This was so, he thought, because practicing surgeons were not yet familiar enough with the experimental foundations of these therapies, and he very strongly urged conformity to the experimental experience embodied in the guidelines as a guarantee of therapeutic success.12 Research also continued during 1942 on chemotherapy of other kinds of bacterial infections, but under increasingly difficult conditions. Few new compounds were delivered for testing against streptococcal infections because Domagk’s chemist-collaborators were heavily occupied with production and patent questions and by ongoing work on compounds already in hand. Both new and old compounds were tested against staphylococcal infections, some of them wound infections. Domagk had little to report about research on typhus or paratyphus infections, except that sulfapyridine and sulfathiazole, both products of British research, had so far proved the most effective against paratyphus infections in mice. Animal trials of several compounds in typhus, paratyphus, and other infections had to be suspended in November 1942 because of a shortage of mice.13 Four months after submission of the annual report for 1942, in May 1943, Domagk’s frustration with the deteriorating conditions of research at Elberfeld boiled over in a letter he addressed to the directors of I.G. Farben via his superiors, Hörlein in Elberfeld and Max Brüggemann in Leverkusen. Evidently responding to questions raised about the value of research in wartime, Domagk emphatically rejected the idea that “further decisive work” be deferred until after the end of the war. Such work must continue, he wrote, even under difficult conditions, when no immediate financial advantage is to be gained from it, and when there are obstacles to the building of new institutes. He complained in very strong terms of the minute regulations placed by the company on the time of researchers under conditions of total war. Such regulations damaged not only morale but also productivity, Domagk asserted, since to be productive researchers needed to dispose freely of their time. Dangerous conditions had been created by the regulations in laboratories in which human pathogens were handled, Domagk wrote, because of the fatigue suffered by staff. Conditions were especially dangerous where tuberculosis was under study, he noted, pointing out that there had already been several accidental infections among the staff. He reminded the management acidly that “research laboratories are not factories.” Domagk was eager to push forward with research on the chemotherapy of tuberculosis, a project he had begun in 1941 and had proposed expanding in reports submitted to the company in January 1942, January 1943, and April 1943. His efforts had been hindered, he said, not only by the regulations on time use but also by the inability of the
Accommodation and Survival 99 chemists to hold up their end of the work, that is, the synthesis of new compounds, because of their absorption in efforts to improve production.14 One month later, the war intruded in a more direct and devastating way. On June 24 and 25, 1943, Allied bombers attacked Wuppertal-Elberfeld. The building housing Domagk’s laboratories was undamaged except for broken glass, but the division’s working strength was seriously affected. Sixteen staff members lost all of their homes and belongings. One of the staff was killed, and others wounded. Many weeks of staff time were lost. For six to eight weeks after the bombing, only the most pressing work could be done, since animal breeding facilities and incubators were unusable and there was no gas. The plant was not fully operational again until September.15 Despite the losses and delays, research continued during 1943. Domagk’s laboratory conducted animal trials of new compounds against streptococcal infections before and after the June bombing attacks. Studies proceeded on various disinfectants, and although apparently little new work was done on them in 1943, pneumococcal and staphylococcal infections were on the laboratory’s agenda. Chemotherapy of gas gangrene infections remained a high priority, with medicines composed of combinations of different compounds proving most effective. On October 6, 1943, Domagk presented results on the latest methods of treatment to an audience of 900 surgeons in Dresden, and a Marfanil-Prontalbin (Prontosil Album, Sulfanilamide) combination went into use in the German army.16 Domagk assigned increasing significance to tuberculosis, probably because of its threat to public health, and work on chemotherapy of the disease intensified during 1943. Through painstaking histological studies, Domagk was able to establish that a few sulfonamide compounds, including sulfathiazole, had a limited effect on tuberculosis. His major finding, however, one already included in a previous year’s report, was that the sulfonamide group was not necessary for the antitubercular effect, at least not by itself. In particular, Domagk established that the compound thiosemicarbazide had an antitubercular action without presence of a sulfonamide group in the molecule. Domagk had received the first thiosemicarbazide compound, prepared by the Elberfeld chemist Robert Behnisch, on November 28, 1941. At first slow to respond to Domagk’s finding, the chemists were now pursuing the lead more intensively. Unfortunately, Domagk noted in January 1944, research on the chemotherapy of tuberculosis was hindered by difficulties, several of which he had mentioned in his letter of May 1943. Animal trials were slowed by the lack of mice and consequent need to use guinea pigs and rabbits in their place. Space, including the room for dissections necessary in a full set of trials of antitubercular agents, was inadequate. Domagk pointed out that, in part because of the danger of the work, a room set aside for dissection of tuberculosis cadavers or animals should be set up like a large, well-lighted operating theater and should be capable of being completely disinfected. Staff should be well nourished and well rested. Under present circumstances, he reported, overwork and fatigue were common. He had proposed that food be set aside for staff working on tuberculosis, but the matter had not yet been decided. In spite of these problems, Domagk’s report indicates that more than seventy compounds had been tested for antitubercular action in his laboratory during 1943.17
100 the making of the first miracle drugs Domagk’s associate Christian Hackmann also managed to push ahead with his research on the chemotherapy of cancer. During 1943, Hackmann’s laboratory tested 247 compounds against tumors. Most were without effect, but a few had slight effect. Hackmann also continued earlier studies of tumor immunity.18
A Nobel Prize, and Jail Time ne of the complaints voiced by Domagk in his letter of May 26, 1943, to I.G. Farben management concerned credit for the development of Prontosil and thus for initiation of research on and use of the sulfa drugs. Domagk’s letter, and articles in the German medical press about this time, reflect tensions between Domagk, who insisted on the medical research findings as decisive, and Mietzsch and Klarer, who claimed at least an equal role as those responsible for the synthesis of the compounds. At stake were both reputation outside the company and monetary recompense within it. Although the war reduced the possibilities of both kinds of reward, the chemists already had ample grounds for sensitivity on the issue. By the beginning of the war, Domagk had gained the lion’s share of credit in the eyes of the world outside the company for introduction of the sulfa drugs. The outbreak of the war in September 1939 interrupted Domagk’s preparations to travel to Edinburgh in October to accept the University’s Cameron Prize and to deliver the associated lectures, and on October 26 he learned of the Nobel committee’s decision to award him the 1939 Prize in Physiology or Medicine “for recognition of the antibacterial properties of Prontosil.”19 Domagk’s Nobel award created yet another point of friction between the National Socialist state and the Elberfeld research establishment. In 1936, the German pacifist writer Carl von Ossietzky, then in a concentration camp for opposition to the regime, had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Infuriated, Hitler had issued a decree forbidding any German to accept a Nobel Prize. Ossietzky died in the camp in 1938, but the decree remained in force. In that year, Domagk was nominated by French and American scientists for the prize in physiology or medicine. At least in the case of the French nominator, P. Maré of the Pasteur Institute, a second, non-German name was also submitted in view of the widely publicized prohibition by the German government. The Nobel committee deferred a decision on Domagk, in part because of insufficient clinical documentation on use of the sulfa drugs in Sweden, in part in the hope that talks then under way between Hitler and representatives of other states would lead to an improvement in the international situation. Those hopes were dashed in 1939. The president of the Nobel committee, G. Liljestrand, sounded out German colleagues regarding the prohibition but received only private expressions of regret. The committee’s vice president, F. Henschen, who had known Domagk personally for fifteen years, wrote directly to Hermann Göring asking him to use his influence on Domagk’s behalf. The result of this appeal, and of news of the situation passed to the German ambassador in Stockholm, was a telegram from the German minister of education to the Swedish foreign minister stating that the
O
Accommodation and Survival 101 award of a Nobel Prize to a German citizen was “entirely unwelcome” (durchaus unerwunscht). After consulting the Swedish foreign minister, the Nobel committee met on October 26 and decided in spite of the position of the German government to award the 1939 prize to Domagk. Two Germans, Kuhn and Adolf Butenandt, also shared the 1939 Nobel Prize for Chemistry.20 Domagk learned of the Nobel committee’s decision the same day, first by a call from a Swedish journalist in Berlin, then by an official telegram from Stockholm. By his own account he was taken completely by surprise, as was the government. A few hours later the German Foreign Office called, asking whether he had indeed received the Nobel Prize and whether he had accepted it. Congratulations and messages from well-wishers began to flow in from all over the world. Only in Germany, where the news could not be reported, was there silence, with the exception of a few individuals who had heard of Domagk’s award from foreign radio broadcasts.21 Domagk now found himself in a dilemma. He consulted Hörlein, who reminded him of the prohibition against acceptance of a Nobel Prize, and who advised him how to apply to the Education Ministry. Domagk did so, asking the ministry if the prohibition applied to science prizes as well as to the peace prize. At the same time, acting as a member of the faculty of the University of Münster, Domagk informed the rector and the medical faculty of the award of the prize to him and within a few days received the faculty’s official congratulations. When, by November 3, he had no response from the Education Ministry, Domagk sent a carefully worded letter of thanks to Gunnar Holmgren, the rector of the Caroline Institute: I most gratefully acknowledge your telegram and the subsequent letter of confirmation from Professor Liljestrand informing me that the 1939 Nobel Prize for Physiology and [sic] Medicine has been awarded to me for my research in the field of the chemotherapy of bacterial infections. This recognition of my work has pleased me very much, and I warmly thank you and the members of the Caroline Institute in Stockholm. Since, so far as I know, existing law does not permit German citizens to accept the Prize, I must first inquire about the particulars, and attend to the exact basis of this law. Since this is taking longer than I hoped, I must ask you to excuse the delay in my reply. Apart from that, I still hope that at some time I will have the opportunity in Stockholm of speaking to Swedish circles interested in my field of work, and thereby rendering small thanks for the recognition accorded my work. Whether it will be possible for me to come to Stockholm already on December 10, I cannot now say. I will give you more information as soon as I am able. With best collegial greetings. Yours respectfully, G. Domagk22 Domagk had been warned by Hörlein that such a letter might have grave consequences but had not taken the advice too seriously and had written other letters of thanks to those who had sent congratulations. On November 17, his house was
102 the making of the first miracle drugs suddenly surrounded by Gestapo agents, with weapons drawn. Two agents entered the house, placed Domagk under arrest without explanation, and confiscated all his papers having to do with the Nobel Prize, including foreign newspaper clippings. Domagk was taken to the Wuppertal police station, his personal belongings were taken from him, and he was placed in an isolated cell. In the midst of his fear and anger, the absurdity of the situation was brought home by an incident that occurred during the first night of captivity. One of the jailers, making his rounds, asked Domagk why he was there. Domagk replied, “Because I have received the Nobel Prize.” The guard said nothing, but on meeting a fellow guard near Domagk’s cell, said to him “In that cell we have a crazy man.” The next day Domagk was interrogated at length, in the presence of a high officer of the SS from Düsseldorf, regarding the events leading up to the award of the Nobel Prize. Domagk spent a week in jail, during which he was befriended by the local police commissioner, who arranged for a more comfortable cell and for Domagk’s wife to bring him food. Hörlein worked with his usual energy to obtain Domagk’s freedom. He was released with only the vague explanation for his arrest that his letter to Sweden had been too friendly. Later he learned from a physician acquaintance with contacts in the NSDAP, a Professor Wirtz in Munich, that Hitler had been incensed by Domagk’s Nobel award. When none of his medical entourage could inform him about Domagk’s work, Hitler assumed that he had gained the prize through some kind of forbidden international connections and ordered his immediate arrest.23 The Gestapo was not through with Domagk. Shortly after his release from jail, he was arrested again as he arrived in Berlin to speak about his research to an international medical congress. In police presence, he was forced to sign a document forbidding him to give the lecture. His intended audience was told that the speaker was incapacitated by illness. To obtain his release he was also forced to sign a second document, this time a letter to the Caroline Institute refusing the Nobel Prize. This letter differed sharply from the first in wording and tone: 23 November 1939 In my letter of the third of this month I already mentioned that as far as I know German citizens are not permitted by law to accept a Nobel Prize. When I wrote this letter, however, the situation of this prohibition and the circumstances leading to it were not yet known to me. Only now have I become aware that in fall 1936 the Nobel committee in Oslo awarded the peace prize to Carl von Ossietzky, who had been convicted of treason, and that the international demonstration against National Socialist Germany contained in this award was the occasion for a special order of the Führer and Reich Chancellor in which the above-mentioned prohibition was made known. Under these circumstances I must ask that you look upon my letter of the third of this month, which was sent without knowledge of the actual state of affairs, as not having been written. I regret that I can no longer
Accommodation and Survival 103 view the decision of the Caroline Institute as an honorific recognition of my work, but must rather assume that the Institute, which was undoubtedly aware of the basis of the German prohibition, expected me simply to disregard this prohibition. Such a disregard would be for every German like an act of disloyalty, which I must obviously put far from myself. I therefore feel myself compelled hereby to refuse acceptance of the Prize. G. Domagk Although this letter was presented to Domagk in the Education Ministry in Berlin, he was required to post it in police headquarters in Wuppertal so as to preserve the appearance of a voluntary act. From this time until the end of the war, Domagk lived with the consciousness that he was always under surveillance and that further suspicions of his actions might endanger both himself and his family.24
Figure 5.4. Gerhard Domagk, oil portrait by his friend, the painter Otto Dix, 1953 (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
104 the making of the first miracle drugs
The Sulfa Drugs Enter Medical Practice fter the war, Domagk gave an interview in which he complained bitterly that in 1939 his contributions to therapeutics were more highly valued outside of Germany than they were in his own country. He attributed this disproportion to the serious difficulties experienced by scientific medicine under the Nazi regime, during which all possible types of mystical natural healing methods were propagated. The inability of Hitler’s medical entourage to describe the basis of Domagk’s Nobel award, the appeal of alternative healing methods of various kinds to high officials in the NSDAP, including Hitler himself, and the harsh attacks on scientific medicine, and on pharmaceuticals in particular, from certain quarters of the National Socialist movement, as described above, all lend credence to Domagk’s remarks. This picture must be compared, however, to an assessment of actual use of sulfa drugs in Germany during the Nazi era. Figures on manufacture and sales, the content and quality of reportage on the sulfas in the German medical press, and statistics on the effects of sulfas use on mortality are among the circumstances that need to be taken into account. The case of the sulfa drugs can be viewed as a litmus test of the fate of scientific medicine during the Third Reich precisely because, while they were effecting a revolution in therapeutics that could scarcely be ignored by practicing physicians, they were also the product of a scientific medicine that was, at least on occasion, the object of ideological hostility or indifference on the part of the National Socialist movement and state.25 Prontosil was a commercial success from the beginning. In 1935, its first year on the market, sales of Prontosil by I.G. Farben reached 175,000 marks. In 1936, sales rose steeply to more than one million marks, and in 1937 to five million. By 1937, Prontosil had risen to third place in sales, surpassed only by Neosalvarsan and aspirin, on the list of 464 pharmaceutical products offered by I.G. Farben.26 Use of Prontosil by physicians had evidently surged ahead of the attention given Prontosil in the German medical press. To take only one example of a periodical widely circulated among the German medical profession, the Klinische Wochenschrift, 1935 witnessed only about fifteen references to Prontosil, including articles, reviews, notices of articles in other German medical journals, and reports of the proceedings of professional meetings. The corresponding figures in 1936 and 1937 were nine and fifteen items, respectively. Only in 1938 did the volume of attention accorded Prontosil and more recently released sulfonamides begin to catch up with the volume of medical use of these compounds. From 1938 through 1940, the annual number of references to sulfa drugs in the Klinische Wochenschrift ranged from fifty to sixty. In 1941, it jumped to around 100. In each of the years 1942 and 1943, in the midst of the war, more than sixty items on the sulfa drugs appeared in this journal. A review of this material reveals a largely favorable response to Prontosil and later sulfonamides on the part of German physicians who made evaluations of the new medicines and who chose to speak or write about their views. Criticism and reservations were common but, as in the examples of early clinical reports described above, were characteristically directed to defining the limits of a medicine’s effectiveness under widely varying conditions of use, including assessment of possible side effects. If criticism of
A
Accommodation and Survival 105 bacterial chemotherapy based on the tenets of organic medicine or natural healing methods played a role in the reception of the sulfa drugs, its effects were at best muted, implicit, or indirect in the record of the Klinische Wochenschrift.27 One example among many of the early spread of use of Prontosil by German physicians may be added to those described above. It is the experience of A. Roth, a staff doctor at the General Hospital of the city of Hagen. Prompted by an earlier publication by L. Gmelin citing favorable results in erysipelas, Roth decided to try Prontosil in cases of streptococcal infection. Roth emphasized in his own published report that he regarded chemotherapy as merely an adjunct of surgical treatment of the foci of an infection, where this was possible. Nevertheless, he had tried Prontosil in a case of sepsis in which surgery was ruled out, with favorable results. He also reported success with use of Prontosil in cases of rheumatic endocarditis, erysipelas, and endocarditis lenta, and possibly also in a case of lung abscess in which other drugs were also used. Without changing his view of the priority to be given surgical treatment, Roth still concluded that “after what we have seen so far, we would not treat any serious streptococcal illness without Prontosil, since it appears to be superior to any chemotherapeutic agent available up to now.”28 About the time that Roth was reporting his results, Domagk himself had a harrowing experience that brought home in a personal way the uses of Prontosil. In the Klinische Wochenschrift for October 1936, he wrote: I will briefly describe only one case of a severe streptococcal infection following a wound, which I myself observed and treated, since it concerned my own daughter and I was able to follow the course of the illness in the most exact way. The child wounded herself on December 4, 1935 with a needle as she was occupied with a piece of Christmas handicraft. She came down the stairs with the needle in her right hand to have her mother thread it, so that when she fell, the large needle, eye first, went into the hand up to the wrist bone and broke off. A half hour later in the clinic the child was x-rayed and the needle was removed. The next day she had a rising temperature, which at first was attributed to the flaring up of a sore throat the child had had a few days earlier. When the dressing was changed after a few days there was marked swelling of the hand, and despite removal of all the stitches the fever continued to rise rapidly. In spite of numerous incisions the inflammation phlegmon extended to the under-arm. A serious worsening of the general condition and dizziness occurred, so that we were gravely worried about the child. Since further surgical intervention was not possible, I asked the permission of the treating surgeon to use Prontosil, after I had also established by culture that streptococci were the cause of the illness. At the beginning of the treatment on the morning of December 8 the axillary temperature was 39.3 degrees. The child was dizzy, and without her taking notice of it I pressed the Prontosil tablets into her mouth, and in the afternoon I gave her 15cc., and in the evening 10cc. of Prontosil Soluble rectally. Already the same evening the temperature fell to 38.7 degrees,
106 the making of the first miracle drugs on the morning of the next day to 38.2 degrees, and on December 10 to 37.7 degrees. On this day, after another incision when the dressing was changed, the temperature rose again in the evening to 38.2 degrees. In place of the previously diffuse serous fluid the operating surgeon now found “bonum et laudibile” pus. On December 12 the temperature had dropped to normal. When the temperature began to rise again on December 14, 15, and 18, Domagk responded with large doses of Prontosil and Prontosil Soluble. On December 19, the temperature fell to normal and stayed there and recovery proceeded. Domagk remarked that he varied the dosages according to his daughter’s temperature and general condition. When her temperature rose he gave larger doses until the temperature dropped and there was marked improvement. When her temperature dropped to normal he continued “for some time” with daily doses of three 0.3 g tablets. Domagk used the occasion of publication of the story to make general recommendations to clinicians on the administration of Prontosil under varied conditions.29 Some idea of the position of the sulfa drugs in German medical practice by the middle of World War II may be gained by a look at the leading textbook on infectious diseases, edited by Max Gundel, the second edition of which appeared in 1942. Domagk contributed a section on the foundations of modern chemotherapy of bacterial infections that painted a picture of success and promise in stark contrast to the resignation bordering on pessimism expressed by Gundel in the first edition of 1935. Very few physicians any longer doubted the value of sulfonamides in the treatment of erysipelas, Domagk reported. Septic sore throat was now usually cured with small doses of Prontosil or Prontalbin, and sulfonamides also helped prevent more serious complications resulting from these conditions that might otherwise prove fatal. Childbed fever, usually caused by streptococci, was “more and more losing its terrors,” Domagk wrote. He cited statistics gathered by Reichert showing that mortality from childbed fever had dropped by sixty-six percent between 1932 and 1938, thanks to chemotherapy. Domagk quoted advice now given to physicians by the Reich Health Office (Reichsgesundheitsamt) recommending the early use of Prontosil Soluble and Prontosil in tablet form in cases of childbed fever. He cited figures from British and American as well as German literature indicating that sulfonamide treatment had reduced mortality from pneumonia from twenty to thirty percent to five to ten percent. He referred to G. Säker’s survey of world medical literature to document an even steeper drop in mortality in epidemic meningitis, from around ninety percent to less than ten percent, again thanks to sulfonamide treatment. Citing a long list of predominantly German medical writers, Domagk reported the use of sulfas in treatment or prophylaxis of infections of the inner ear, gall bladder, and urinary tract, in arthritic conditions associated with bacterial infections, and in dentistry. Sulfas had also been used with some success, he noted, in treatment of Malta fever, actinomycosis, and dysentery, in conjunction with serum therapy in diphtheria, and in other conditions. All clinicians were now agreed, Domagk reported, that chemotherapy with sulfonamides had effected extraordinary progress in the
Accommodation and Survival 107 treatment of gonorrhea, which only a few years ago had been difficult and discouraging. Finally, on the topic “now of greatest interest” because of the war, Domagk wrote that wound infections could be effectively treated with sulfonamides. Citing clinical observations gathered by several German physicians, he formulated rules for treatment of wound infections, quoting with approval one physician’s recommendation to join surgical treatment with the use of a Marfanil-Prontalbin combination chemotherapy and serum therapy.30 Domagk’s section in Gundel’s textbook was one of thirteen of his publications on the sulfonamides that appeared between 1941 and 1943. Another of these, titled “The Sulfonamide Therapy of Bacterial Infections in Experiment and Practice,” originated as a talk to the teaching staff of the veterinary Hochschule in Hannover. Domagk was introduced to the teachers league, which was affiliated with the NSDAP, by one of its officials, a Professor R. Götze, who was also director of the school. Götze described the cultivation of research and scientific discussion as one of the purposes of the organization. His introductory remarks included a ringing endorsement of chemotherapy and of the industrial research that had produced much of it. He spoke of the breach opened by chemistry and medicine in the citadel of the pathogenic bacteria. He spoke of the sulfonamides as “true wonder drugs” and of Domagk’s “tireless experimental work” that had contributed to their development. Götze’s remarks were politically correct in a National Socialist sense in that he emphasized the importance of German contributions to chemotherapy and assigned its origins to Robert Koch but not to Paul Ehrlich, an elision of the role of the Jewish scientist that appears to have been common in medical writings during the Third Reich. Just for this reason, it is noteworthy that Götze’s statement betrays no trace of the hostility to scientific medicine, or to the chemical industry, voiced by earlier National Socialist writers on the basis of tenets of völkisch medicine or animal protectionist doctrines. Noteworthy also is that Domagk’s published article in the Deutsche Tierärztliche Wochenschrift was followed by three papers on the applications of sulfa drugs in veterinary practice. Among these was one by Götze in which he wrote that he had been in direct contact with the Elberfeld researchers since the first successes with sulfonamides had been made known and had worked in close cooperation with them to use the sulfas experimentally and clinically in veterinary medicine.31 Prontosil, Uliron, and Marfanil were made and sold in quantity. In the war years 1940–1945 alone, I.G. Farben took in more than 48.5 million marks on sales of Prontosil, exclusive of veterinary medicine; 21.9 million of this was profit. In the same period, the equivalent figures for Uliron were 10 million marks, of which 3.8 million was profit, and for Marfanil 1.8 million marks, of which 0.26 million was profit. The company manufactured Marfanil powder, which was used in the treatment of wounds, in quantities of up to ten tons per month. Some of this powder fell into Allied hands in North Africa, but before the chemical formula had been published.32 It appears that the war did not introduce any significant discontinuity either in the attitudes of German doctors toward the sulfa drugs or in their use of those medicines. If anything, medical attention to the capabilities of the sulfa drugs and use of them intensified as incidence of wound infections, gonorrhea, and other
108 the making of the first miracle drugs war-related infections rose sharply. On the whole, for the period 1935–1945, the sulfas appear to have been accepted by German physicians, including the medical press, on clear-cut utilitarian grounds and with little or no ideological debate or commentary about the relative virtues of natural healing methods. This is consistent with the conclusion, also suggested by Robert Proctor’s findings on the continuities in the German medical press from 1930 to 1950, that substantial areas of German medical research and practice proceeded without either affecting or being directly affected by the political and ideological currents of the Third Reich.33
On Trial at Nuremberg he Elberfeld research and production establishment survived the war largely intact. The German pharmaceutical industry, insofar as it can be separated from the chemical industry, had not been a major target of Allied bombing. Some facilities had been destroyed, but the overall damage was uneven. Even the June 1943 attack on Wuppertal-Elberfeld, mentioned above, had resulted in only temporary stoppages. More serious were indirect effects brought about by interruptions of supplies of basic chemicals through bombing of other chemical sites or by destruction of railroad or canal transport. When Leverkusen was bombed, for example, Elberfeld was deprived of supplies of sulfuric and chlorosulfuric acid necessary for manufacture of its medicines, including sulfa drugs. Such breakdowns in the system proved temporary, however, and the Elberfeld plant was able to maintain most of its production throughout the war.34 Occupation of the area by U.S. forces achieved what the war could not. All production was halted at Elberfeld. On May 16, 1945, Hörlein and his co-director, Clemens Lutter, appealed to the military government to permit reopening of the Elberfeld plant. They stressed the urgency of supplying dispensaries and military hospitals with pharmaceuticals, including aspirin, hypnotics, narcotics, sulfa drugs, scabies treatments, vitamins B1 and D, and disinfectants. To that end, they requested minimal supplies of fuel, raw materials, including especially basic chemicals, and transport. Perhaps prompted by this request, an Allied intelligence team from the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, CIOS Group 3, visited the Elberfeld laboratories and plant from May 21 through May 29. The CIOS team interrogated all members of the research staff, including Hörlein and Lutter, and gathered information on “factory methods of production of medicinals made at that plant, researches completed and in progress, testing methods and results on tropical diseases and a list of pending patents.” On May 24, the local commanding officer of the military government granted temporary permission to I.G. Farben to reopen the Elberfeld plant. Finally, on May 31, in response to a request from the office of the U.S. Army Chief Surgeon citing the urgent need for pharmaceuticals to treat prisoners of war and displaced persons, authority to resume production at Elberfeld was granted by the Production Control Agency of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.35 Pharmaceutical production was an urgent and uncontroversial necessity. Germany’s defeat meant, however, that the larger entity of which Elberfeld was
T
Accommodation and Survival 109 a part, the I.G. Farbenindustrie industrial combine, came under severe scrutiny by the Allies for its role in the war and in the crimes of the Nazi regime. As a member of the executive board (Vorstand) and a leading figure in I.G. Farben’s pharmaceutical and plant protection divisions, Hörlein was swept up in the net cast for those held to be responsible for I.G. Farben’s actions. In August 1945, he was placed under arrest by the U.S. military government. After two years of detention, he went on trial, along with twenty-three other high executives of I.G. Farben, before the U.S Military Tribunal VI in Nuremberg, charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. Each of the defendants in United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al., also known as the I.G. Farben case, was charged individually. Collectively, the accusations were staggering. They included planning of a war of aggression, coordination with military planning of the German High Command, directing mobilization for war, equipping the Nazi military machine, espionage, participation in plunder and spoilation of occupied countries, enslavement, and mass murder. Charges against the defendants and sentences passed on them varied widely. Thirteen were convicted of various charges and received prison sentences ranging from one and one-half to eight years. The remainder, including Hörlein, were acquitted of all charges.36 National Archives records of the I.G. Farben trial, one of twelve separate proceedings held before U.S. military tribunals at Nuremberg against citizens or officials of the Third Reich, occupy 113 rolls of microfilm. They include trial transcripts that alone fill forty-three bound volumes, prosecution and defense briefs and statements, prosecution and defense exhibits and document books, and other material. Even the small fraction of this material directly related to Hörlein is substantial. Among the issues raised in Hörlein’s trial were the nature of his relationship to the Nazi regime, its ideology, policies, and practices; the extent of participation of I.G. Farben pharmaceutical units in preparations for a war of aggression; the existence and extent of Elberfeld and Leverkusen managers’ knowledge of experiments on human subjects in concentration camps; and participation of Elberfeld in weapons research and development. Testimony evoked by the trial places in sharper relief aspects of Hörlein’s, and the Elberfeld establishment’s, relationships to the Nazi party and regime.37 Hörlein had joined the NSDAP in 1934. His party membership was bound to become an issue in his trial. It provoked the defense to gather extensive testimony to clarify Hörlein’s relationship to the regime, and especially to support a distinction between formal party membership and real attitudes and behavior. Those giving testimony, frequently in the form of sworn affidavits, were usually people who had known Hörlein over a period of years. They were not members of the Nazi party and often were its victims. Many were prepared to give witness to Hörlein’s humane character and liberal political inclinations, his inward hostility to many of the policies and practices of the National Socialist government, and his efforts to aid and protect individuals both inside and outside the Elberfeld research establishment from the consequences of these policies and practices. In its cumulative effect this testimony is persuasive and supports three conclusions about Hörlein. First, his party membership represented tactical accommodation rather than ideological conviction. He did not share the regime’s political goals
110 the making of the first miracle drugs
Figure 5.5. Heinrich Hörlein (reprinted courtesy of the Bayer Archive).
or racism and was primarily concerned to preserve the domain of research and production he had built. Second, he worked throughout the Nazi era to shield German science and scientists from the ill effects of the regime. Third, although not medically trained, he infused his research and development efforts with a medical ethos that gave priority to the welfare of patients in the introduction of new drugs. Hörlein had first joined the party as a condition for remaining on the city council of Wuppertal. Adelheid Schulte, a resident of Wuppertal-Elberfeld who had been retired from her job as student counselor in 1934 because of her political convictions, had known Hörlein as one of the founders of the German Democratic Party in Wuppertal-Vohwinkel in 1919. She had perceived no change in his “free and human attitude” after he joined the NSDAP and thought that party membership had enabled him to exert a strong influence in the economic affairs of the city. Hörlein’s influence evidently extended to other local matters, as well. When, after the June 1943 bombing of Wuppertal, the party moved to requisition the city’s churches for its own use, a local Catholic priest, Heinrich Rembold, had appealed to Hörlein for help. Hörlein had responded by renting Rembold’s church on behalf of Elberfeld workers whose homes had been destroyed and by contributing 10,000 marks toward its repair.38
Accommodation and Survival 111 Many of the professional employees of I.G. Farben at Elberfeld testified that Hörlein’s party membership should not be taken at face value. Thirty-two Elberfeld staff members who had not been party members stated that they had not thought of Hörlein as a convinced National Socialist but had always thought that he had joined the party so as to keep the damage to the Elberfeld establishment from party programs to a minimum. In weekly meetings, Hörlein had made no secret of his critical attitude toward party members, directives, and organization, they noted. Party representation in the plant was formally acknowledged but was always under a certain ridicule. Hörlein, they said, protected colleagues persecuted for racial or political reasons as long as he could or tried to establish them in comparable positions in other countries. In a separate statement signed by twelve other professional staff members, including Domagk and Klarer, the writers testified that they were astonished to learn of the charges against Hörlein. Describing themselves as opponents of National Socialism, the signatories thanked Hörlein for resisting the demands of party doctrine in the plant and for making it possible for them to avoid joining the party. They attributed the relatively good atmosphere of the Elberfeld plant to Hörlein’s actions, for example, his protection of colleagues from attacks by the party.39 Several witnesses attested to the persistence of Hörlein’s liberal, democratic political orientation and negative attitude toward Nazi policies and practices through the early years of the regime. Clemens Giese, the Prussian Interior Ministry official who had worked with Hörlein to achieve an animal protection law tolerable to medical science, described Hörlein as “anything but a National Socialist” and as someone who never made any secret to Giese of his negative opinion of the NSDAP.40 A similar impression was given by Irene Claasen Young, a woman of German origin who had settled in the United States with her American husband in 1931. Young had worked as secretary for German and English correspondence and translator for the Winthrop Chemical Company in Rensselaer, New York, an American partner of I.G. Farben. A large part of Young’s job involved handling technical reports from I.G. Farben pharmaceutical plants, especially Elberfeld but also others such as Höchst and Wolfen. Young recalled that several years before the war Hörlein had sent Winthrop directions for manufacture of the antimalarial Atabrine, “including the various steps of production, listing the raw materials required and giving detailed test methods for each intermediate as well as for the finished product.” Winthrop had decided for financial reasons to purchase one of the intermediaries from I.G. Farben but, after the war broke out, was able to move rapidly to manufacture “from the ground up” of the strategically important medicine because of the data supplied earlier by Hörlein. Hörlein had also supplied Winthrop before the war with all data required for manufacture of the various sulfa drugs. Young recalled a conversation she had overheard while taking dictation during a visit Hörlein had made to Rensselaer. Hörlein, she said, had expressed “disgust with the then existing Nazi regime in Germany.” His words had been “to the effect that we could be glad to be so fortunate as to be in the United States, that in Germany neither business nor life itself were any longer worthwhile since the Nazi government meddled in every single transaction and there was no freedom of action or thought.”41
112 the making of the first miracle drugs Paul György, a German biochemist who had immigrated to the United States in 1937, warmly recalled Hörlein’s “invaluable assistance” to himself and Kuhn in their studies that led to the breakdown of the vitamin B2 complex into its first two members, riboflavin and pyridoxine. György recalled that on the few occasions he and I discussed political matters, he struck me as a liberal, democratic individual. I saw him last time in 1937 in Cologne. He appeared to be very depressed and pessimistic with regard to Germany’s future and the reckless policy of the Nazi government. He appeared to be sincere in wishing me good luck in America and in expressing the opinion that the future is decidedly with the United States. György recalled Hörlein’s strong will and was convinced that “through all the war years he must have remained in his inner soul faithful to his old convictions.”42 Other testimony at Nuremberg revealed that Hörlein had actively intervened to protect individuals from actions of the party. Among these cases, one of the more surprising is that of Jacques Tréfouël, the director of the Pasteur Institute in Paris. Tréfouël had written a letter to the British doctor Leonard Colebrook in which he made violent remarks about Adolf Hitler. Colebrook had left the letter with other documents in Paris in June 1940. The Colebrook documents had reached the German authorities, who had passed them on to Hörlein to examine for their chemotherapeutic interest. Finding the letter in question, Hörlein had withdrawn it from the dossier and had passed it to Marcel Bô, assistant director of the Pasteur Institute, so that it would not fall into the hands of the Gestapo.43 Several German Jews testified to Hörlein’s lack of prejudice both before and after Hitler came to power, and in some cases to his help in making arrangements to safely leave Germany and to secure positions abroad. One such case was Erich Danziger, who had joined I.G. Farben at Elberfeld as a chemist in 1916 and who had eventually risen to head the Analytical Department there. Danziger recalled that Hörlein’s “kind and cooperative” behavior toward him had not changed in 1933 and that Hörlein had continued to trust him with confidential work. After the situation for Jews worsened in 1935, Hörlein arranged for Danziger to be hired by the Winthrop Chemical Company in the United States, where he began work in June 1937. Siegfried Thannhauser, a physiological chemist, had headed a medical clinic at the University of Freiburg before he was forced out of his position by the Nazi regime and immigrated to the United States in 1934. He recalled Hörlein as “a man of extremely high intellectual and scientific qualities” who was “very democratic and unbiased” and who, up to the time of his last personal contact with him in 1937, had “remained the same and was not touched politically by the Hitler poison.” Another prominent physiological chemist, Bernhard Zondek, recalled that in the twenty years he had known Hörlein he had never known him to be involved in any activity hostile to Jews. After his forced departure from Germany in 1933, Zondek stated, Hörlein had maintained friendly contact with him even though this could have placed Hörlein in danger. Ludwig Taub, a chemist who had worked with Hörlein at Elberfeld for thirty years before leaving in 1936,
Accommodation and Survival 113 recalled that Hörlein had treated all colleagues the same “regardless of person or race” and that this had not changed under the Nazi regime. In 1939, Hörlein had helped Taub immigrate to Palestine.44 A somewhat different situation was reported by Benno Reifenberg, who was dismissed from his job at the Frankfurter Zeitung after 25 years of work, under pressure from the Propaganda Ministry, because he was a “half-Jew” in Nazi terminology. In desperate circumstances and fearing for the safety of himself and his family in Frankfurt, Reifenberg accepted an unpaid post as assistant in Professor Oskar Vogt’s institute for brain research in Neustadt. Hörlein heard of Reifenberg’s plight and, having failed to secure funds in his capacity as treasurer of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, arranged for a stipend to go from I.G. Farben through Vogt to Reifenberg. Reifenberg credited his survival in the last year of the war to this support.45 Well before 1933, Hörlein had seen it as part of his task as research manager to support and encourage German science, especially chemistry and the medical sciences, both inside and outside of industry. This activity continued after January 1933, but with the added burden for Hörlein of frequently having to work against the policies or practices of the National Socialist state. Hörlein aided individual scientists in their difficulties with the regime, worked against politicization of academic appointments, and resisted pressures from the party and state to place excessive emphasis on utilitarian goals, including military ones, in research. When he went on trial at Nuremberg, a number of German scientists came forward to clarify his actions before and during the Third Reich. Among these were Nobel Prize winners Adolf Windaus, Otto Hahn, Heinrich Wieland, and Butenandt.46 Karl Freudenberg, who was professor of chemistry and director of the Chemical Institute at the University of Heidelberg, recalled Hörlein’s many services to German and international chemistry through his support of research, teaching, and publications. Hörlein’s scientific disposition and tireless activity on behalf of chemistry had won him the trust of academic chemists, Freudenberg noted. Freudenberg viewed Hörlein’s entry into the NSDAP not as an expression of inner convictions but as a sacrifice made for tactical reasons so that Hörlein could work against high party officials hostile to science, such as Julius Streicher. The chemistry professors, Freudenberg recalled, had increasingly looked to Hörlein to resist the “cultural bully” Rudolf Mentzel, an SS man in the Education Ministry, especially the latter’s efforts to place unqualified National Socialists in teaching positions.47 Hahn, a 1944 Nobel laureate, had known Hörlein for many years as the treasurer of the Emil Fischer Society, through which private funds were distributed in support of chemical research. The greater part of the society’s funds went to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, of which Hahn was the director in the 1930s and 1940s. In the last years of the war, the annual subvention had been more than 200,000 marks. Hahn testified that although most of this money came from I.G. Farben, neither Hörlein nor the company had made any attempt to influence the direction of the institute’s research. In particular, they had never given the institute war-related work, even after Hahn’s discovery of uranium fission in
114 the making of the first miracle drugs 1938. Hahn also recalled that Hörlein had helped him secure housing for Lise Meitner’s successor at the institute, Joseph Mattauch, after the latter gained the enmity of the NSDAP for opposing the regime in Vienna.48 Windaus, Hahn, and Wieland, a 1927 Nobel laureate in chemistry, signed other statements, in which Hörlein’s name appeared several times, attesting to the role of I.G. Farben in funding scientific research outside the company, in supporting freedom of research, in helping researchers persecuted for political or racial reasons, and in contributing to technical and medical progress for the benefit of humanity.49 The same themes were given more specific content by Butenandt, who from 1936 to 1945 had directed the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem before moving to the University of Tübingen as professor and director of the Institute for Physiological Chemistry. Butenandt, a 1939 Nobel laureate who had known Hörlein throughout the Hitler years, affirmed that Hörlein had used all his influence to maintain the German tradition of science and research and had resisted political encroachments on science from the NSDAP. As member of the board of the German Chemical Society, Hörlein had sought to preserve the purely scientific goals of the organization from party influence and to maintain traditional contacts with foreign scientists and scientific societies. He had tried to help scientists who were under pressure from the party or regime when he was convinced of the value of their work.50 As evidence for the last point, Butenandt described his own case. While teaching organic chemistry at the Technische Hochschule in Danzig from 1933 to 1936, Butenandt had experienced difficulties with the Education Ministry and the NSDAP because of his political views. At first, these were expressed in shortages of funds for his research. In 1935, when the government was on the point of closing the school entirely, Butenandt received an offer of a professorship at Harvard. When he asked the Education Ministry whether it could guarantee employment equivalent to his current position if he declined the Harvard offer, he was told that he should accept the offer because his political attitude made it impossible for him to receive such a guarantee. Hearing of this situation, Hörlein offered to set up at Elberfeld a well-endowed research section in which Butenandt and his assistants could proceed freely with their research without industrial obligations. That Hörlein was motivated solely by dedication to German science Butenandt concluded from the Elberfeld director’s knowledge that Butenandt had already made arrangements with a competing firm to make use of any industrially valuable results of his research. With Hörlein’s offer in hand, Butenandt declined the position at Harvard, and further negotiations with the Education Ministry led to his appointment as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry in 1936.51 In Berlin-Dahlem, Butenandt once more found himself the beneficiary of Hörlein’s support, this time in a direct financial way. In 1938, on Hörlein’s initiative, funds were provided by I.G. Farben to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biochemistry for the establishment of a division of virus research. Later, this unit was joined to a similar one in the Institute for Biology to form an interdisciplinary workshop (Arbeitsstätte) on viruses, which carried on significant research
Accommodation and Survival 115 through the war years. Butenandt doubted that the workshop would have been founded without the financial support arranged by Hörlein, and he cited it as one example of Hörlein’s commitment to basic research throughout the National Socialist period.52 Other witnesses who had been in a position to know Hörlein over a period of years testified to his humane motives and sense of responsibility toward patients and consumers of I.G. Farben products, a medical ethos that took precedence over commercial considerations. Eberhard Gross stated that Hörlein had given full support to occupational health activities at Elberfeld and had backed I.G. Farben’s medical-scientific personnel in placing limits on activities of the commercial divisions of the company, for example, by restricting the chemical content of foodstuffs. Paul Loth, who handled the quality control laboratory for pharmaceutical products manufactured at Elberfeld and Leverkusen, emphasized the importance Hörlein attached to his work in providing protection for users of I.G. Farben pharmaceuticals all over the world and in maintaining the company’s good name. Loth recalled the conclusion of a company meeting at which Hörlein had stated that he saw the meaning of his work in the help he brought to suffering humanity and that he expected the same attitude from his co-workers.53 According to Helmut Weese, who as head of pharmacology at Elberfeld was responsible for testing every compound for toxicity before releasing it for clinical trials arranged by Leverkusen, Hörlein insisted on personally scrutinizing all his reports before they were released. As partial evidence for Hörlein’s caution in releasing compounds for clinical trials, Weese cited the case of Helmut Thielicke. In 1933 Thielicke, a theology student, suffered damage to his parathyroid gland in the course of a goiter operation. As a consequence, his blood concentration of calcium fell below normal. At the time, it was not possible to obtain the needed compensatory hormone in Germany, and Thielicke was placed in mortal danger. Elberfeld had a compound, called AT 10, that in animal experiments restored blood calcium concentration to normal but that at high doses caused damage to blood vessels. Hörlein had not approved its release for clinical trials, fearing the same ill effects in humans. Hearing of Thielicke’s case, he met with the student, explained the hazards, and with the patient’s consent approved use of AT 10 under closely controlled conditions. An effective and safe dosage level was established, and Thielicke went on to lead a full life. Dismissed from his teaching position in 1940 because of conflict with the Nazi party in Heidelberg, Thielicke was forbidden to travel or speak publicly during the war. After the war, now a professor of theology at Tübingen, Thielicke gratefully recalled Hörlein’s humane and physician-like handling of his case.54 Testimony such as that of Gross, Loth, Weese, and Thielicke was evoked in part in response to charges by the prosecution that Hörlein, and others at I.G. Farben, had knowingly supplied medicines used in criminal experiments on prisoners in concentration camps during the war. In Hörlein’s case, special attention was given to his knowledge of one Hellmuth Vetter, a doctor in the Waffen-SS (combat arm of the SS) who before the war had been employed in the pharmaceutical scientific department at Leverkusen and who was convicted by the Nuremberg tribunal of crimes against humanity. Vetter had joined I.G. Farben in 1938, had
116 the making of the first miracle drugs worked in Leverkusen especially on matters related to hormones, and had left the company to join the SS in 1939.55 In January 1942, Vetter came to Leverkusen and spoke with Karl Koenig, who was then the director of the Pharmaceutical Scientific Department II. Koenig’s department was responsible for collecting, analyzing, and distributing information on the use of medicines manufactured by I.G. Farben in the treatment of tropical diseases, including typhus. Vetter explained to Koenig that he was a physician to SS soldiers at Auschwitz and that he was in urgent need of medicines to use in treatment of typhus, of which there were many cases. Vetter did not tell Koenig that Auschwitz was the site of a concentration camp or that Vetter was treating concentration camp inmates. On Koenig’s authority, Vetter was supplied with a compound called B 1034, which was then in clinical trials as a treatment for typhus and which had been developed and was manufactured at Elberfeld. Vetter reported back to Leverkusen on his results with B 1034 and another compound, Periston, also made at Elberfeld. It was not until December 1943, however, that Koenig inferred from the body weights of Vetter’s patients that he was treating concentration camp prisoners. What neither Koenig nor others suspected until it was brought out at Nuremberg after the war was that some of Vetter’s patients had been inmates deliberately infected with typhus, an act of murder for which Vetter was condemned to death by the tribunal.56 The prosecution tried but failed to establish Hörlein’s knowledge of, and indirect complicity in, Vetter’s criminal experiments on prisoners. The weakness of the prosecution case resulted not only from a lack of documentary or testimonial evidence but also from the convincing picture of Hörlein’s good character, humane concerns for patients, and rigorous standards for developing and testing new medicines that emerged from the defense presentation. One point of medical language became especially important in this part of Hörlein’s trial. In the translation of German documents, for example, Vetter’s reports on his results with new medicines, the term Versuch was routinely rendered as experiment. Thus, it appeared that Hörlein, Koenig, and others had been in possession of documents that explicitly referred to experiments on human subjects. In response, the defense brought forward a number of witnesses, including research staff at Elberfeld and Leverkusen, to explain that Versuch meant clinical trial and that the distinction was crucial to the case. The difference was put most clearly by Koenig, who stated that in the exclusive sense used by us, the term “Versuch” means a curative endeavor of a physician towards a patient, suffering from a disease, by the application of a new remedy which previously, and as a result of profound and extensive scientific research work, has been declared by the medical experts of the laboratories as non-toxic in the prescribed doses and as to the best of their judgment possessing a real curative effect. The disease of the patient in question must have been naturally contracted (not intentionally induced) and the exclusive aim, when applying the new medicine, is to cure the disease or to improve the conditions of the patient.
Accommodation and Survival 117 . . . In contrast to this, the characteristic of a medical experiment is the intentional creation of the experimental condition. That means that in an experiment the human being or the animal is an experimental object on whom the experimenter afflicts [sic] by willful intervention an alteration on his or its bodily condition, i.e. mostly a damage corresponding to a disease which in the further procedure of the experiment has to be influenced or simply observed in its further development. As examples of medical experiments, Koenig cited intentional infection with germs producing a disease, deprivation or excess of heat to change body temperature, or deprivation or abnormal consumption of food and drink. Vetter had indeed carried out medical experiments in this sense by deliberately infecting individuals with typhus, but had represented himself to managers at Leverkusen and Elberfeld as performing clinical trials.57 The prosecution also attempted to associate Hörlein with the production of Zyklon B, a granular vaporizing pesticide that was used in the mass killing of Jews at Auschwitz. Zyklon B, generically known as hydrocyanic or prussic acid, was manufactured by the German Pesticide Corporation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekamfungsmittel or Degesch mbH), a subsidiary of I.G. Farben, and had been widely used since World War I as a delousing agent in settings such as military barracks and prison camps. As owner of 42.5 percent of Degesch’s stock, I.G. Farben was entitled to three seats on the company’s administration committee. Hörlein formally occupied one of these starting in 1937. It came out in the trial, however, that Hörlein had not attended any meetings of this committee and had had no active role in the affairs of the company. The administrative committee itself had not met after 1940. Since Zyklon B was widely employed and was supplied by the company to many sites, its delivery to Auschwitz did not in itself reveal the murderous uses to which it was put. Rumors of mass killings at Auschwitz probably reached some members of I.G. Farben’s executive board in 1943, although no proof of first-hand knowledge was brought forward in trials after the war. If Hörlein came by such information, it was indirectly, as one member of I.G. Farben’s executive board, and not as a manager of a subsidiary who knowingly supplied poison gas to concentration camps for the murder of their inmates.58 Along with other I.G. Farben executives, Hörlein was accused of participation in planning for a war of aggression. His acquittal was based in part on records of meetings of I.G. Farben’s pharmaceutical major conference, of which Hörlein served as chair primus inter pares on the basis of seniority. At the seventyfifth meeting of the conference on July 19, 1939, for example, its members were discussing business in France as though peace would continue indefinitely. The same implicit view of relations with Russia was expressed in conference proceedings for the eighty-third meeting on October 11, 1940. Hörlein had tried to maintain international contacts almost to the eve of the outbreak of war. In late July 1939, for example, he had helped to host the visit to Cologne and Leverkusen of 150 staff from the London, Manchester, and Dublin offices of Bayer Products, Ltd. Five of this group visited Hörlein at Elberfeld. On June 30, 1941, only days after the German invasion of Russia, Hörlein resigned as director of the Elberfeld
118 the making of the first miracle drugs factory, while retaining his position on I.G. Farben’s executive board and his responsibilities related to research at Elberfeld. Later he cited as reason for his resignation his distaste for the whole internal and external political situation, with the invasion of Russia as the last straw. His secretaries recalled that he had also mentioned difficulties with the NSDAP.59 The prosecution at Nuremberg also attempted to show that Hörlein, and the Elberfeld research establishment, had participated in the development of gas weapons. Here there was some basis for the charge, although the extent of Hörlein’s and Elberfeld’s role was limited. In 1935, Hörlein and the then second director of the Elberfeld plant, Werner Schulemann, met with representatives of Army Ordnance (Heereswaffenamt), including Leopold von Sicherer. After this meeting, Hörlein was required to turn over to Army Ordnance information on toxic substances that were encountered in research and that met defined criteria. Much of the preliminary screening was done in Gross’s occupational hygiene laboratory in Elberfeld. Gross prepared reports on these substances and passed the reports to Hörlein, who sent them on to Army Ordnance, sometimes with copies to the parts of I.G. Farben from which the compounds had originated. The aim of the work at this stage was to identify compounds that might be of interest to Army Ordnance and to obtain that office’s clearance to proceed with patent applications and peaceful industrial use for as many of the screened compounds as possible, as quickly as possible. By this means, several substances were selected by Army Ordnance for further development as chemical weapons. Among these were two phosphorus compounds first prepared by the Elberfeld chemist Gerhard Schrader and subsequently developed as poison gases by the Army under the names Tabun and Sarin. From 1937 to 1944, Gross conducted animal experiments at Elberfeld on the effects of Tabun. As the German military position deteriorated by later 1944, Hitler seriously considered use of the nerve gas Tabun and was dissuaded only by the argument, later found to be mistaken, that the Allies also had the gas and could reply in kind.60 Screening of toxic substances was a routine part of peacetime research and development at Elberfeld. Compounds needed to be tested for toxicity because they might pose an occupational health hazard, and some of those identified as toxic might be sent to Leverkusen for further development as pesticides. That many compounds after 1935 had to be sent to Army Ordnance before they could be developed for peaceful uses represented both an additional burden on I.G. Farben’s research and development effort and a degree of participation, albeit compulsory, in weapons development priorities, and it appears that Hörlein tried to keep to a minimum Elberfeld’s association with Army Ordnance. Elberfeld never did directed research, held a contract, or received money from Army Ordnance, and no weapons were ever manufactured at Elberfeld. By his own account and by the separate testimony of two employees of the Army Ordnance research section (Heereswaffenamt Prüfwesen 9), the chemist von Sicherer and the pharmacologist Wolfgang Wirth, Hörlein saw weapons development as antithetical to his life’s work and to the fundamental mission of Elberfeld to supply medicines to the whole world. In September 1944, Hörlein ordered the destruction of all substances and documents in Elberfeld related to weapons.61
Accommodation and Survival 119 As the American army approached in March 1945, Nazi party officials threatened to destroy the works and research holdings at Elberfeld, in fulfillment of Hitler’s scorched earth policy. The works foreman, one Liebold, stated that when the Americans arrived they would find not a single stone of any building still standing. Hörlein ordered the head of works security, Amandus Hoffman, to billet his well-armed staff inside the works and to resist with force any attempt to destroy the buildings. Hörlein hoped that if it came to a fight he could delay the party’s action long enough to mobilize the whole staff in defense of its workplace.62 It did not come to a fight, and amid the ruins of a defeated Germany the Elberfeld research and production establishment remained standing. Its last-minute defense and persistence may serve as metaphor for Hörlein’s posture and actions throughout the Nazi era. Hörlein’s fundamental purpose was to preserve what he conceived of as the freedom of science in Germany and, in particular and especially, the existence and integrity of the pharmaceutical research and production establishment he had built. To this end, he was prepared to do whatever was necessary. On occasion, this meant fighting or preparing to fight, as in the struggle over animal experimentation at the beginning of the regime or the defense of the Elberfeld buildings at its end. On occasion, it meant quietly extending help to victims of the regime from the scientific or medical communities. Doing whatever was necessary also meant, for Hörlein, outward political accommodation to the regime and lack of resistance to it outside of the limited sphere within which he saw the vital interests of his life work at stake. It is in this light that his joining of the NSDAP in 1934 must be seen. Hörlein was not a National Socialist in any ideological sense. His overriding values were scientific, medical, technical, and commercial. His life work, to which he was intensely dedicated, was the building and maintenance of a pharmaceutical research and production organization in an industrial setting, with close ties to the scientific and medical communities. Politically, his own tendencies were liberal. He did not subscribe to party doctrine, did not envision a greater Germany, and did not think in racial hygiene terms. Once the regime was in place, however, he joined the party in order to gain leverage in protection of his own domain, which he identified with a high purpose. Whatever judgment is made of Hörlein must take into consideration the whole picture of his actions before and during the Nazi regime. Apart from the limited and compulsory role played by Elberfeld in the development of gas weapons, Hörlein did not initiate, endorse, or participate in the worst aspects of the Hitler regime, including militarism, expansionist aggression against neighboring states and peoples, domestic political repression, persecution on racial grounds, experiments on concentration camp inmates, or mass murder. Yet, once the regime was in power, he chose to stay in Germany, to create at least a façade of acceptance of the regime, and to try as far as possible to conduct business as usual. Hörlein said that he was working for the good of humanity. There is no reason to doubt that this was his view of himself and that such sentiments composed part of his motivation, along with career ambition, an entrepreneurial zest for institution building and the commercial struggle, and scientific and medical curiosity. Was it tenable for him to think that he could encapsulate a zone of scientific
120 the making of the first miracle drugs freedom and humane values within a society and regime that was militaristic, racist, and repressive? From our vantage point, knowing all that we know, the answer must be no. From the standpoint of 1933, or the years that followed before the war, the answer was not so obvious. As Alan Beyerchen has pointed out, perceptions of National Socialism both within and outside Germany were different before the war than they were during and after it.63 Beyerchen’s pioneering study of German physicists in the Third Reich and more recent scholarship have shown that Hörlein was far from alone in his determination to preserve German science in the face of a regime that he regarded as hostile to or destructive of its real interests. Perhaps the best known such case is Max Planck, who as head of the Prussian Academy of Sciences and the Kaiser Wilhelm Society worked quietly behind the scenes to help colleagues and to salvage what he could of the institutions of German science. John Heilbron’s study of Planck shows that, like Hörlein, the physicist practiced outward compliance with the regime, th