The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People, Concise

THE ENDURING VISION A Hist ory of the American People Concise S1xth Edition I Salsbury I Sltkoff I Woloch The End uri...

Author: Paul S. Boyer | Clifford E. Clark | Sandra Hawley | Joseph F. Kett | Andrew Rieser

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THE ENDURING VISION A Hist ory of the American People Concise S1xth Edition

I Salsbury I Sltkoff I Woloch

The End uring V ision

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A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Concise Sixth Edition PAU L S. BOYER u,,j,:.-nity o{\f!isconsin, Madison CLIFFORD E. CLARK, JR. OJrlrton Collw SANDRA MCNAIR HAWLEY Sa. }aciNlO Collt"g JOSEPH

F. KETT

u.;,.m.y o{V"'fini4 ANDREW RIESER Slo~k UniJn-sity ofNew

York, Dutr;h~ss Commtltttty Coli~

NEAL SALI SBURY Smilh College HARVARD S ITKOFF Unit-'i'Ni~ ofNnt~

Hampshire

NANCY WOLOCH

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Colonmngc.n.d.l 31 Engl.&nd and thr Ad.11nric: World.

~bps ... Cl=u, Gr2plu, 111bles xh

Prtf~

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ISS8· 160.l F.adurc and Suc.ccss in Virginia, 1603-1625 ll

u:J

New England lkgins. 1614-1625 lS A • New Nee hetland"' on th~ Hudson.

1609· 1625 l4

Native Peoples of America, to 1500 1 11u~

Fin-t Americans, c. JJ,000- 2500 a.c. 2 l'ropling New Wortds 2

3 The Emergence of Colonial Societies. 1625-1700

Arc-hale Sodct'icll 2

1 Cultur.al Oiwrs.ity, c. 2500 u..c.-A.D. 1500 S MCJO;lJTicria and South Amtrica 5 The Sourh•"t".sr 6 lllc Euttrn Woodbnds 7 NonfJ.rming Sociuirs 10 I North Amr:rican ~pks on rht: E"'l': of Europnn ContJit't 11 Kmslup .and Ci«ndrr 11 SpmtwJ and Sod.~ol \'alut:S 13

2 The Rise of the Atlantic World, 1400-1625

16

I Afrk.an and European Backgro unds 17 West Africa: "l'radirion and Change 17 European Culn u-r :md Society 19 RcligJOWI Uphe:tv;tb 22

The Rcform:ulon in Engl.md, 1533-1625

2~

I Europe and chc Adanric World, 144D- 1600 25

Purtup.l and chc AtUnric, I~ 1600 25 ll'lc • New Sl~ry" and R.3cism 25 lOAmcric:aand Bqooncf.l49l-IS41 26 SfWn's Conquisudon. 1492- 1526 2S The Columbun E.uf=g< 29 I Foothokb m Nonh Amnia. 1512-1625 30 Sp.am's Northern Frontier 30

38

I Cha.;apcalu: Sociery 39 Scacc: and Churdl in Virgini;~. 39 Scat.t: and Churdl in Maryland 40 Or:ath, Gcndtr. and Kinship ,.1 ll!bo«o SNp<S • "'gicn. l&l0-1670 41 S;amn'J R.dx:Ltion. 1675-1676 ,.3 From Sc:nuudt to Sbvuy 44 I Pununu:m In New England ..s AOtyuponsHttl.1628-1631 45 Nrw England \\'~ 4& lbwn"- Familitt.. :tnd f.l.rm Uf~ 48 EconomiC and R£1igious 1t:ns:ions 49 Expamion and NatiVl': Amc.ricans SO S:akm \V1tchcr:at"t. 1691- 1693 52 I The Sprt.nd ofSI:l\'e.•·y: Th ~ Caribbean and Carolina 53 Sugu•·and S l:l\~$: 1'hc Wesc Indies 54 Rice and S l:&\~ll: C:uolina S.. 1 The Middle Colonies S& Prccursci"J! New Neth~rl:md and New Swt-dc:n S&

Engl1sh Conquem: Nnv York and Newjrncy S1 Quake< l'mnsylvmu sa I Riv".&la for Nonh Amrria: Fr.ma and Sp.tin 60 trance O.UmJ :1 Conrirw:nt 60 N~ Mu:teo! 11w 1\xblo Rnolt 61 ..1orida and Ta.u: 62

v

4

The Bonds of Empire, 1660-1750

65

I Rebellion and War, 1660- 1713 66 Royal Ccmralizacion, 1660-1688 66 The Glorious Rc\'Oiution in England and America, 1688- 1689 67 A Generation of War, 1689- 1713 69 I Colonial Economies and Sod ecie:s, 1660-1750 70 MercanciJis t Empires in America 70 l:topularion Growth and Diversity 71 Rural White Men and Women 75 Colonial Farmers and che Environment 75 The Urban Paradox 76

Slavery

n

The Rise of che Colonial Elites 78

I Compcring fo raComincnt, 1713- 1750 79 France and chc American Heartland 79 Nati\'e Americans and British Expansion 80 Brit ish Expansion in che Sout h: Georgia 80 Spain's Borderlands 81 The Rcrurn of War, 1739- 1748 82

6 Securing Independence, Defini ng

I Public Ufe: in Bricish America, 1689- 1750 83 Colonial l'olitics 83 The Enlightcnme:m 84 The Great Awakening 86

5

Roads to Revolution, 1750- 1776 I lriumph and 1tnsions: The Britis h Empire, 1750--1763 91 A Fragile Peace, 1750- 1754 91 The Seven Years' \l'ar in America, 1754-1760 92 The End of f rench North America, 1760- 1763 94 Anglo-American f riction 94 Frontier 1Cnsions 9S I Imperial Authority, Colonial Oppo.sicion, 1760-1766 96 The Writs of Assistance, 1760- 1761 96 The Sugar Ace, 1764 97 TheScamp ActCri.sis, 1765- 1766 97 The Declaratory Act, 1766 100 ideology, Religion, and Resistance 101 I Resistance Resumes, 1766- 1770 102 O pposing the Q uartering Act, 1766- 1767 102

Crisis ow~r che 1 0wns hend Duties, 1767 102 l 'he Colonists' Reaction, 1767- 1769 IOJ Women and Colonial Resistance 104 Cusroms .. Racket eering,'' 1767- 1768 105 Wilkes and Uberty, 1768--1770 106 1 1'he D«pcning Crisis, 1n0--1774 107 l'he Boston Massacre, 1770 107 l'he Committees of Correspondence, 1n2- 1773 10s Conflicts in lhe Backcountr}' 109 l'he TeaAct, 1773 110 1 10"''llrd Independence, 1774-1776 Ill Uberty for African-Americans Ill l'he "Intolerable Aces" Ul l'he First Conrinencal Congress U2 From Resistance co Rebellion 113 Common Sense 114 Declaring Independence us

Nationhood, 1776-1788

90

1 1'he Prospects of War U9 l.o)'alists and Ocher British SympathizctS lt9 l'he Opposjng Sides 120 I War and Peace, ln6- 1783 122 Shifting Fortunes in lhe Nonh, 1n6- 1778 122 l'he War in the West, 1n6- 1782 125 American Victory in che Sout h, 1ns.-1181 126 Peace at Last, 1782-1783 127 1 1'he Re\'Oiurion and Social Change 128 Egalitarianism Among White Men 128 White Women in Warcime 129 A RC\'Oiurion for Black Americans 130 Na tive Americans and lhe Revolution 131 I Forging N ew GO\wnmmts, 1776- 1787 13'2 From Colonies to Scates 132 Formalizing a Confederation, 1776- 1781 134 Finance, Trade, and the Economy, 1781- 1786 134 l'he Confederation and the Wesc, 1785- 1787 135 1 10"''llrdaNcw Constitucion, 1786- 1788 137 Shays' s Rebellion, 1786- 1787 137 l'he l' hiladdphia Com-emion, 1787 138 l'he Struggle O\'cr Ratification, 1787- 1788 141

118

co.rmns

7 Lau nching t he New Republic, 1788-1800 1 ConstitubONI Ga.unmmt l"akcs Sh~pt. 1788-1796 1<46

lmpkmc:nring GO\'i':mmrnt 14& The Ft.-dcral j udidary and the lUll of Rights 146 1 Hami.lron's Oamt"Stk Policies., 1789- 1794 M8

Hanulton md His Obj«tnu 1-t& Esublashlng rht Nation's Credit 1-49 Crea.dng a National Bmk ISO Emerging P.utisa.nship lSI The \Vhhkry Rtbcllion 151 J 1bc United Sur~ in a Wide•· World, 1789- 1796 ISl Spamsh l'<wt"r-r in Wtstcrn Norrh Amt:rica 1$3 Ch.lllcnging Am
vii

Tbc Emb;argo Act of 1807 180 j ames M:~dison and the F.J.Ji u~ of Pc~cc;~blc Coercion 181 1t:runuch :and the Prophet 182 Congrus Votts for W.u 183 1 1'htW.uo(IBI2 1&4 On to Carud:. 184 11le Bntljh Offionsi"-e 1&4 11lc1'rc:uy ofGhmt, 18 14 18& 111e Hnrttord Com-ention IU 1 Tht< AwHmlng of American Nation.tlism 181 M.aduon•s N.uion.Uism .and the En. of Good Fttling:s. 1817- 1824 117 john Marshall .and the Suprtmt Coun IU 1'11e M1~souri Compromblc, 1820- 182 1 189 Fordgn l>olicy Under Mom'Oc 190 l"he Monroe Doctrine, 1823 191

1189- 1792 15-4

9

Frana and Faa:ional l'bhda. 1793 1§.4 Diplomacy and War. 1793--1796 IS6 1 Parties and J)Qiitics, 1793- 1800 157 ldcologic.1l Confrontation, 1793- 1794 157 The Rcpublic:an Party, 1794-1796 153 111< El«rion of 1796 ISO 11w: Jon:nchCrisis, 1198- 1799 1&0 The Allen and Sedition Acts, 1798 160 llle Elccrion of 1800 162 1 Economic and Social Change 163

The Transform ation of A m erican

Society, 1815 -1840 1 urtstWMd Expansion 194 l'btS•upWts~: t94 U'atcm Society and Cust:onU t94 11lc Far West 195 The Feder.tl Go\~m m enl :md the West 196 111e ftcmovJl of the Jndb.ns 196 11lc AgrictJitu.ral Boom 1<;14

Produc:h1g for Markets 163 Wh1tc Womm in tht' Rc:pubbc 164 Lmd and Cultutt: Nuivt' AmUic:ans 145

I Tht Grorwth of tht Matbt Economy 199 F
Afnan·Am
8

Jeffersonlanism and the Era of Good ~elings, 1801 - 1824 1 11le Age ofj efferson 111 Jcffurson andjeffersoni~nism 171 jefknon·~ .. Ra'Oiution" tn j rffcrson :and ttk judici~ry en l'1w: Loulsiu\a Purch.;u(' 174 1'b< Elc o n che Home Fronr 177 Tbe Suppression of Americ:m 1'r-.lde and lmptUJtnmt 179

193

I lndustri>lll 204

170

Causes ofJndusuWiutlon 104 1UtiJc 1'tw.ns in New England 205 Anasans and Workers in M1d·Atlant:ic C ities 206 1 Equalit}' ancl lncquality 206 Growing J n~uality: The IUch and cht Poor 207 frrt Bl.xlts in cht North lOS l'hc •Middling Cl.u.scs-. 209

I The Rc\'Oiurion in Soc:bl Relationships 209 11lc Attack on dv Proresslons 210 The Challenge to Famaty Authority 210 Wh•cs and Husbands 211 Horlzont:al Allegiance$ :a.nd the Rise: of Volunury Associations 212

viii

C!Jfi'TtJm

DtSUK :and Health 244 Popular Health Movt:mcnts 145 Ph 1-cnology 24S

10 Democratic Politics. Religious Revivol. end Reform, 1824- 1840 214 I 1~ Rise ofDtmocr:mc Politics, 1824-1832 115 Drmocratic Fummc 115 "'bt EJKtion of 182-4 115 john Quincy Adams as Prtsident 216 1'he Rise of Aodrcw Jackson 216 1'he Election of 1828 218 j nckson in Office 218 Nullificacion 119 1'he Bmk Vdo and the Eltaion of 1832 221 I Th< o.nk Qmt...,..ny and rh< Sr1y s~um, 1833-1&40

m

"'bt War on the Rank

I Dcm ocrnt'ic P.lstimcs 246 Newsp.1pers 246 The 1'heatu 247 Mmsnd Sha-'S 247 P. 1', &unum 2~ I Tb~ Quae (or N.1rionality m Uter-J.rurc and Arc 2<4& Roors o( the American R~n:aJU.10 Ce 249 Coopel\ emerson, Thoreau, Fullrr, nnd Whlrmnn 249 H:Lwt horne, Melville, and Poe 251 Uter:acurc in rht: Moulutpla« 15'2 Amcnon Landsc.apr- P.lintmg 2:53

m

The Rise of Whig Opposition 223 11le Election of 1836 223 11le l:tanic of 18J7 124 111e Search for Sohuions 2'2<1 11le Election of 1840 2'25 1'ht: S«ond Party Systnn M.uurts n5 1 1bn n&

12 The Old South and Slavery. 1830- 1860 I Kang Conon 1S6 1'bc: Lur't': of Conon 251 Tics, lkC'M':tn the Uw.'l'r ~nd

Tht S«ond Greal A•'2ktning 216 Eastt:rn Rtm•.J.IS 1V Critics of l«vi~J: 1'he Unitarians 111 111e Rise o f Mm·m onis m 228 111e Shakers 228 I 1lle Age of Reform 129 1'bt: \"<~ar on Liquor 229 Public-School Rd'orm 230 Abolition U l Women's Righu 13) llroitentiaries and Al)1ums 234 Utopian C-om munfcics 23S

II Technology, Culture. and Everyday Life. 1840- 1860 I 1~chnology and Econo mic Growth 238 Agricultural Adv.mcement 238 1«hnology and Jndustri.l.l Progress 1:38 1'b. R.lilrv.d Doom 24
1 Th
255

237

Upper South 258 111e Nonh and Souch Oiwrgc 158 1 1'he Socl.al Gro ups of thr White South 260 Pl.anrers and Plantation Mbncs.us 261 lbc Snull Si.wdwld
CONTENTS

l l 'he Emergence ofAfrican·American C ulru.re 274 The Language ofSia\'es 274 African·Amcrican Religion 275 Black Music and Dance 276

13 Immigration. Expansion. and Sectional Conflict , 1840-1848

278

I Newcomers and Nati\'tS 279 Expectations and Realities 279 The Germans 280 The Irish 281 Ami-Catholicism, Nativism, and Labor Protest 282 Immigrant Policies 283 I 11le Wesc and Beyond 284 The Far Wesc 284 Far Western Trade 284 The American Settlement of1t:xas ro 1835 286 The Texas Revolution, 1836 286 American -Secd emencs in California. New Mexico, and Oregon 287 The Ow.rland Trails 287 1 11le Policies of Expansion, 1840- 1846 288 The Whig Ascendancy 289 Tyler and the Annexation of1t:xas 289 The Election of 1844 290 Manifest Destiny. 1845 291 l'olk and Oregon 292 1 11le Mexican-American War and Its Aftermath, 1846- 1848 293 The O rigins of the Mexican-American War 293 The Mexican-American War 294 The \'(tar's Effects on Sectional Conflict 297 The Wilmot Proviso 297 The Election of 1848 298 The California Gold Rush 299

14 From Compromise to Secession. 1850-1861 1 11le Compromise of 1850 302 Zachary 1'a ylor at che Hdm 30J Henry Clay Proposes a Compromise 304

301

iX

Assessing the Compromise 305 EnfOrcement of the f ugitive Sfa't't Ace 306 Uncle 10m's Cabin 306 11le Election of 1852 308 I The Collapse of the Second Party Syscem. 1853- 1856 308 11le Kansas-Nebraska Ace 309 11le Surge: of Free Soil 309 11le: Ebbing of Manifest Destin}' 310 11le: Whigs Dis ince:grate, 1854- 1855 310 11le: Ris.e and Fall of the Kno~A•·Nothings, 1853--1856 311 11le Republican Party and the C risis in Kansas, 1855- 1856 312 11le: Election of 1856 313 1 The Crisis of the Union. 1857- 1860 314 11le Drt:d Scott Case, 1857 314 11le Lecompton Conscirution. 1857 315 11le Uncoln-Douglas Debates, 1858 316 11le Legacy of Harpers Ferry 318 11le South Contemplates Secession 319 I The Collapse of the Union, 1860- 1861 319 11le Election of 1860 3t9 11le Mo\-cment for Secession 321 11le Search for Compromis.e 322 11le Coming of War 322

15 Crucible of Freedom: Civil War. 1861-1865 1 Mobilizing for War 325 Recruitment and Conscription 315 Financing the War 327 Political leaders hip in Wartime 328 Securing the Union•s Borders 330 l in Battle. 1861- 1862 3JI Annies. Weapons, and Strategies 331 Stalemate: in the East 332 11le War in the West 335 11le Soldiers' War 335 Ironclads and C ruisers: lhe: Naval War 336 11le: Diplomatic War 337 I Emancipation Transforms che War, 1863 338 From Confiscation to Emancipation 338 Crossing Union Unes 339 Black Soldiers in che Union Army 340 Sla\'try in Wartime 340 11le 1Urning Point of 1863 341

324

I War and Sodecy, North and South 3-JJ The War's Economic lmpacc: 1'he North 3-JJ The War's Economic lmpacc: 1'he South 344 Dealing "''ich Oissenc 345 The Medical \'t1ar 346 The \'t'ar and Women's Rights 347 l l'he Union Victorious, 1864-1865 347 The Eastern l'heacer in 1864 348 The Election of 1864 348 Sherman's March lhrough Georgia 349 Toward Appomatcox 350 The lmpacroftheWar 351

16 The Crisis of Reconstruction, 1865 - 1877 I Reconstruction Po litics, 1865- 1868 354 Lincoln's Plan 354 l're.sidenrial Reconstruction Under j ohnson 356 Congress Versus j ohnson 357 The Fourceench Amendment, 1866 357 Congressional Reconstruction, 1866- 1867 358 The Impeachment Crisis, 1867- 1868 359 The Fifteenth Amendm ent and the Question of Woman Suffrage, 1869- 1870 360 I Reconstruction Governments 362 A New Electorate 362 Republican Rule 363 Counterattacks 364 l lhe Impact of Emancipation 366 Confronting Freedom 366 African·American lnscirutions 366 Land. l abor, and Sharecropping 368 Toward a Crop·Uen Economy 369 I New Concerns in the North, 1868- 1876 370 Gramism 370 The Uberals' Re\'Oit 371 The l'anic of 1873 3n Reconstruction and the Constitution 373 Republicans in Recrcac 373 I Reconstruction Abandoned, 1876- 1877 375 .. Redeeming" the Souch 376 The Election of 1876 377

353

17 The Transformation of t he Trans-Mississippi West, 1860- 1900

379

I Nacivc Americans and the Trans·Mississippi West 380 l'he l'lains Indians 381 l'he Assault on Nomadic Indian life 382 Cuscer's Last Stand. 1876 384 «Saving" the Indians 385 l'he G host Dance and the End of Indian Resistance on the Grear Plains, 1890 386 I Seeding the Wesc 388 l'he First 1hnscominental Railroad 388 Settlers and che Railroad 388 Homesteading on the Greac Plains 390 New Farms, New Markets 391 Building a Society and Achieving Statehood 39'2 l'he Spread of Mormonism 392 I Southv.-escem Borderlands 393 I Exploiting the Wescem Landscape 395 l'he Mining Frontier 395 Co\llboys and the Cattle Froncier 396 Cattle TO'I'-'ns and Prostitutes 397 Bonanza Farms 397 l'he O klahoma Land Rush, 1889 398 I 1'he West of Life and Legend 399 l'he American Adam and the Oime·Novcl Hero 399 Revitalizing the Frontier Legend 400 Beginning a National P.uk.s Mm-ement 401

18 The Rise of Industrial America. 1865-1900 1 1'he Rise: of Corporate America 405 l'hc Character of Industrial Change 405 Railroad lnno\•ations 406 Consolidating che Railroad Industry 406 Applying the Lessons of the Railroads co Steel 408 l'he Trusc: Creating New Forms of Corporate Organization 409 I Stimulating Economic Growch 410 l'he Triumph ofTechnology 410 Specialized Production 411

404

CONTENt$

Ad\~rrising and

Ma.rbting

Modrrnism ln Arduttetu~ and P.airuing 444 From Victon.an Lady eo NtW "0m.an 446 Public Edua.bon as :an Atm.l of a.us Conftocl ...

4Q

Economic Growth: Costs ;and Bmcfiu <412 I 1'h< New Sou :md the Work Force 416 F'rom Workshop to Factory <416 l'he l-lnrdships ofln dustria.l Labor 416 lmmigr;mr Labor 417 Womtn and Work in lndusui~ America 418 Hard \l'ork :md tbt Gospt":l of Succas 418 I Labor Unions and Industrial ConftJCt 4l'9 ~nizing Worb:rs 410 Sen led and labor VIOkna: 422 Sodallbinktn Probt for Alt«:m.J.ti\'a 411

20 Politics and Expansio n in an Industrializing Age. 1877- 1900

Pattuns of Patty Strntgth 4S4

R
426

I 1'hc: N~ Amuican City tpanmenr Stores 434 The 1'r.tnsfo rmarion o f Higher Sducafion 435

urm.o

1 Working-Class Politics and Reform <436 l'olitical Bosses and Machine Po litics 436 llatrllng J'ovr.rcy 437 New Appro;achts to Sod.l.l Reform 4l8 l'ht Moul Puriry Ca.mp~gn 434 ,.,. Social Gospd 439 '1"hr Sttdmwnt· Hot:ISf." MO't"C"mmc <439 1 Worktng
443

I Cultlll'tli in Confl ict 444 1'he GencrcJ Tradition and Its CritiC!! 444

451

1 Party Politics in :u1 EnofUphu vJ.I, 1877- 1884 45'2 Conttstcd Pohtkal Visions <452

19 Im migration, Urbanization, and Everyday Lif e. 1860-1900

Xi

I Politics of Prmlqte, Poliria of Exclusion. 1884--1892 4$7 A Dt:mocr.l.l mlht White Houst:: G:t'O\'tf d eveland, 188Sa 1889 45'9 Big Business Sr~·ikcs lbdt: lknjamin Harrison, 1889- 1893 459 Agrarian l'rott:llf and the Rise of the People's PMty 459 African-Americans After Reconstruction 461 I Tht- 1890s: Politics in a Depr«:ssjon Dtc:ade 1M 1894: Protest Ciron I.Duder 466 Sil\-a J,d\ocacct Caprurt tht Dmlocr.a.dc Parry 467

1896: Republians 1'riumpll:mr 467 I Expansionist Stil·ringJ nnd War with Spain, 1878- 190 1 469 Roots of E.xp:.n:l.ionin Sentiment 469 Pacific E.xpmsion 4 70 Crisis O\'U Cuba 471 11\c: Sp;uush--Amcric:an Wlt, 189 8 4n

Critics ofEmpiK 473 Guurill.a W.u m dw Phitippint"S, 1898-1902 473

Roos~l r and 1Mt AssC~:rt U.S, Pow\'r in Larin

21 The Progressive Era, 1900- 1917

4 76

I Progn$sMs and Tbd.r Jdus .-n 1b< Faas or Pn>grrssMsm •n lntdJ«tu;als Offt:r New Social Views 430 No\-tlisu, joumalisu, and Anbu Spod ighc Socinl Problems 481 I Start: and L.oaJ l,rogrcssivism 481 Reforming chr: Poli tical Procw -412

M,.,.

~ng BusirltS.So Pmnning U'Orkers 43 M01king Cirfcs Men l.ivl:.bl.r 44 Prognssivi.Jm and Social Concrol 485 Moral Concral in the Ciri.rs 484 Bartling Alcohol and Drugs 487 lmmigr.uion Restriction and Eugrnics 487 R.acism .and l"rogressi'vism .sa

I 1\Lads.,. Womm, and UUhrs Orpn1u 490 A..fric.m~Amcnc.m Leadtts Orpru:u Against Racbm 490 Revival o( rhc Woman..Suffr:~gc Mo~..:mcnr 491 Enlarging "Woman's Sphere" 03 Workers Org~niu; Socialism Ad\'anccs 494 I N.ation.al Progrcunism Ph.ut t Roos.ndt .and l:.ft. 1901- 191J 495 ~Jr·s Path to tht W'hire f-foux 495 labor Disputes, Trustbusting, Railroad Rcgulnrion 4-95 Cons.um.rr Protect ion 496 Envimnmenr.aJism Progreniw·Sryk: 497

Taft in d'l!r Wlutt: Houst,1909- 19U 499

America and Asia 509 Wilson nnd Latin Americ.l SU I War in Europc. I914-1917 512 lbt Coming of\l'ar SQ 11>< Jmb orNnanlilf Sl! 'Tht: Unnrd Statts Enttn r.M W;~r su I Mobiliring at Home, Fighting in France, 19 17- 1918 SIS Raising. Training, and 1'csring an Ar m)' SIS O rganb:lng the Economy for Wu 516 Wirh rhc Amman Exptdirionary fora in France Sl7 Turning the Tidt 519 I Promoting rhc War and Supprcss.ng Dissent 519 Adw nilling t he War Sr9 Wa rtime Intolerance a nd Disscnt S20 Suppra;slng Dissent by L:tw S2J I Economic and SocW Trmds in \l'.utirnr Amn'JCa 512 Boom 1'imrs m Industry and AgricuJrure S22 Blacks Mlgnatc Norchw:ard SU Women In Wartime 52.. Public Health Crisis: 1 'he 1918 Influenza P.andemic 52.. 11>< ll'M and l'rogres1Msm Sl4 I Joyous Atmlstic:t, Bitttr Afcmn.uh, 1.918-1.920 Sl:S Wilson•s Fourceen Points; 111c Armis tice S25 11le Versalllc:s Peace ConfercnGc, 1919 526 11le Fighr over (he League of Nations 527 Ra.dsm :tnd 1UdSc..m:. l9 19- 1920 S28

lbt B«don of 1910 529

TbtFour·"".ayEkttiooofl912 500 I N.arion:aJ Progrusivism Ph.ut H: \\'ood.rml• Wilson. 19 13---1917 SOl Tariff and nanking Reform SOl Regulating Hu&iness: Aiding Workers and F.umers 502 Progress:Mim md lht Corurirurion 502 1.916: Wilson Edgn our Hug.ha: S03

22 Global Involvements and Wortd War I, 1902- 1920

505

I Defining America's World Role, 1902- 1914 506 The "Open JJoor'': Com ~ring fi.>1' the C hina Market 506 lbc Pansma Ca..zu.J: Hardball Dlplom.acy 508

23 The 1920s: Coping with Chang e, 1920- 1929

532

I A NN' Erononuc On:ft:r Sl3 Booming Busm~. Ailing Agrindtun" 533 New Modes of l'rodudng, Ma1u.ging. and Selling 534 Women In the NC\l• Economic tir.a S36 Struggling Labor Unions in a Business Age Sl6 1 lbt' Harding ilnd Coolidgt- Adminutn.dons 537 St:mdp;tr Politics in a DK:adt of Changt: Sl7 Rt'publk.Jn PoHcy Maki ng in a ~~business Era 538 lnde~ndem l nccrnation:tlism SJa

CONTENTS

l'rogressi\'f: Stirrings, Dem ocratic Party Divisions 540 Women and Politics in che 1920s: A Dream Deferred 540

I The: New Deal C hanges Course, 1935- 1936 567 Expanding Federal Relief 567 Aiding Migrants, Supporting Unions, Regulating Business, Taxing t he Wealthy 563 11le Social Security Act of 1935: End ofche Second New Deal 569 11le 1936 Roosc\'f:lt landslide and che New Democratic Coalition 570 11le Environ ment and che West 571

I Mass Society, Mass Culcure S41 Cities, Cars, Consumer Goods 541 Soaring Energy Consumption and a Threatened Environmenc 542 Mass-l'roduce:d Ence:rtainmenc 543 Celebrity C ulru.re S44 I Culcural Fmne:m and Creativity 545 The j an Age: and the Postwar Crisjs ofValue:s S45 Alienated \'t1rice:rs S46 Architects, Paince:rs, and Musicians Celebrate Modern America 546 The Harlem Renaissance 547

I The: New Deal's End Sta~. 1937- 1939 573 FOR and che Supreme Court 573 11le Roosevelt Recession 573 Final Measures, Growing O pposition 574 I -Social Change: and Social Accion in t he 1930s 575 11le Depression's Psychological and Social Impact 576 Industrial Workers Unionize 577 Blacks and Hispanic-Americans Resist Racism and Exploitation 579 A New Deal for Native Americans 580

I A Society in Conflict S48 Immigration Restriction S48 Needed Workers{Un"''Clcome Aliens: Hispanic Newcomers S49 Nativism, Anciradicalism, and the Sacco· Vanucti Case 549 Fu ndamentalism and the Scopes Trial S50 The Ku Klux Klan 551 The Garvey Mo\-emenc 552 l'rohibition: C ultures in Conflict S52 I Hoo\'f:r at the Helm SSJ The Election of 1928 5S3 Herbert HOO\>er's Social Thought SS4

I The: American Cuirural Scene: in the 1930s 581 A\-enues of Escape: Radio and the: Movies 581 11le later 1930s: Opposing Fasdsm, Reaffirming Traditional Values 582 Streamlining and a World's Fair: Corporate: America's Utopian Vision S84

25

Americans and a World in Crisis, 1933-1945

24 The Great Depression and t he New Deal, 1929- 1939 I Crash and Depression, 1929- 1932 SS8 Black 11lursda)' and the Onset of the: Depression SS8 Hom--er's Response 560 Mouncing Discontenc and Protest S60 The Election of 1932 561 1 11le N ew Deal Takes Shape, 1933- 1935 562 Roo.sewlt and His Circle: 562 The Hundred Days 563 l'roble:ms and Contr()IICrsie:s Plague the Early New Deal 56S 1934- 1935: Challenges from Right and Left 566

Xi j j

557

I The: United States in a Menadng World, 1933- 1939 588 Nationalism and the Good Neighbor 588 11le Rise of Agg:ressi\J'C Scates in Europe andAsia 589 11le American Mood: No More: War 590 11le Gathering Stonn: 1938- 1939 591 America and the: jewish Re:fugtts S91 l lntotheScorm, 1939- 1941 592 11le European War 592 From Isolation co Intervention 593 Pearl Harbor and che: ComingofWar 59-J I America Mobilizes fo r War 595 Organizing for Victory 596 11le War Econo m}' 596 ..A Wizard War" 598 Propaganda and l:tolitics 598

587

l lhe Bactlefrom, 1942-1944 599 Liberating Europe 599 War in the Pacific 601 The Grand Alliance 603 I War and American Society 603 The G ls' War 604 The Home Fronc 604 Racism and New Opporrunities 606 War and OiV\'.rsity 607 The lncernmem ofj apanese-Americans 603 I lriumph and Tragedy, 1945 609 The Yalta Conference 610 Victory in Europe 610 The Holocaust 611 The Acomk Bombs 612

27 America at Mid- Century, 1952- 1960

26 The Cold War Abroad and at Home, 1945- 1952

616

1 lhe l'oscwar l'olitical Sctcing. 1945- 1946 617 OemobiJizacion and ReconV\'.rsion 617 The G l Bill of Rights 618 The Economic Boom Begins 6t9 Truman's Domestic l'rogram 620 1 Anticommunism and Containment, 1946- 1952 621 l'olarization and Cold War 621 The Iron Curtain Descends 622 Containing Communism 623 Confrontation in Germany 624 The Cold War in Asia 626 The Korean War, 1950- 1953 627 I l 'he Truman Administration ac Home, 1945- 1952 629 The Eightieth Congress, 1947- 1948 629 The l'olitics of Civil Righcs and che Election of 1948 630 The Fair Deal 632 I lhe l'olicics of Anticommunism 632 Loyalty and Security 632 The Anticommunist Crusade 633 Alger Hiss and che Rostnbergs 634 McCarth)i sm 635 The Election of 1952 635

638

1 1'he EisenhO'I'--er Presidency 639 ..Dynamic Consen•atism" 639 l'he 00'1'-·nfall of j oseph McCarchy 640 jim Crow in Court 641 l'he Laws of che Land 642 I 1'he Cold War Continues 643 Ike and Dulles 643 CIA Co\-ert Actions 644 l'he Vietnam Domino 645 Troubles in che Third World 645 l'he EisenhoY~Cr Legacy 646 1 1'he Affluenc Society 647 l'he N ew Industrial Society 647 l'he Age of Computers 648 l'he Costs of Bigness 649 Blue-Collar Blues 649 Prosperity and the Suburbs 650 I Consensus and ConseJVatism 651 1bgctherness and the Bab)•Boom 651 Domesticity 652 Religion and Education 653 l'he Culrure of the Fifties 653 l'he Television Culru.re 653 1 1'he Ocher America 6S4 Povercy and Urban Blight 655 Blacks' Struggle for juscicc 656 Latinos and l acinas 656 Native Americans 657 I Seeds of Disquiet 658 Sputnik 658 A Different Beat 658 Portents of Change 659

28

The Liberal Era, 1960- 1968

662

1 1'he Kennedy J:~csid ency,1960- 1963 663 A New Beginning 663 Kennedy's Domestic Record 664 Cold War Activism 665 1b the Brink of Nuclear War 666 l'he Thousand-Da)' Presidency 667 I 1'he Struggle for Black Equality, 1961- 1968 668 Nomi olence and Violence 668 l'he African-American Rc\.'Oiution 668

CONTENTS

The March on Washingcon, 1963 669 The Civil Righcs and Voting Rights Aces 670 Fire in che Streets 671 "Black PoW'Cr" 6n I Liberalism Ascendant, 1963-1968 673 j ohnson Takes Over 674 The 1964 Eleccion 674 Triumphant Liberalism 675 The Warren Court in the Sixcies 676 I Voices of Protest 676 Nati\'t: American Activism 677 Hispanic-Americans and Asian-Americans Organize 677 A Second feminist Wave 678 Women's Liberacion 678 l l 'he Liberal Crusade in Vietnam, 1961- 1968 679 Kennedy and Vietnam 679 Escalation of the War 681 The Endless War 682 Do\'es Versus Hawks 682

Law and Order 70J l 'he Southern Strategy 704 I The: Crisis of the: Presidency 704 11le Eleccion of 1972 704 11le Watergate Upheaval 70S A Presidenc Disgraced 706

30 Conservat ive Resurgence. Economic Woes, Foreign

Challenges, 1974- 1989

29 l l 'he Youth Movement 686 Toward a New Left 686 From l'rotest to Resistance 687 Kent Stace and jackson Stace 688 Legacy ofStudenc Frenzy 689 l l 'he Counterculture 690 Hippies and Drugs 691 Musical Revolution 691 The Sexual Revolucion 691 Gay Uberation 69'2 I 1968:The l:toliticsofUpheaval 693 The l'ct Offensi\-
709

I Cultural Changes 710

I

A Time of Upheaval. 1968- 1974

XV

685 I

I

I

Personal l'ursuits and Diversions 710 Changing Gender Roles and Sexual Behavior 712 11le Persistence of-Social Activism 713 Grass-Roots Conservatism 714 Evangelical l'rotestancs Mobilize 715 Economic and Social Changes in Post- J960s America 716 A Changing Economy 716 11le 1\vo Worlds of Black America 717 Brightening Prospects for Native Americans 717 New Patterns of Immigration 718 Years of Malaise: Post-Watergate Policies and Diplomacy, 1974-1981 719 11le Carecaker !'residency of Gerald Ford, 1974-1977 719 11le Oucsider as Insider: President j immy Caner, 19n-1981 no 11le Middle East: Peace Accords and Hostages n1 1roubles and f ruscration as Carter's Tmn Ends 712 T he: Reagan Revolution, 1981-1984 n2 Roocs of the Reagan Re\'Oiution n 3 Reaganomics n4 11le «Evil Empire" and Crises in the: Middle Ease 725 Militar}' Buildup and Ancinude:ar l'rotest n7 Reagan Reelected 728 Reagan's Second 1trm, 1985- 1989 n9 Supreme Court Appointments, Budget Oeficics, the Iran-Contra Scandal n9 Reagan's Mission ro Moscow 730 11le Middle East: Tensions and 1Cnorism 731 Assessjng the Reagan Years 731

xvi

COttTIHft

31 Beyond the Cold War: Charting a New Course, 1988- 2000

734

1 'fb< Bush Yun: Global R<sck-., Oo
'fb< ~~delle East: S
FUnding SocW S<curiry ;and li<>lth c.u. as th~ Federal Ddicit SoU'S 719 Hurria.nc Katrina Tests the Uush Adminbrrarion 780 Extending Republican Influence: Prom che Supreme Coun to K St~ct 781 Otb.u:ing lmmigurion 7Sl:

Nuck.tr ProUfu:ttion, 1(-:rronsm, and Peacckc:cplng Cha llenges 749 A New World Order Painfully Emergu 750 1 Tht: C linton En. Ends: Domouc Pblirics, hnp<•dun
Confronting the Ent:my in Afglunisun 762 Tightening I lome-Front SCC\11'11)' 763 l 'hc Cam paign in Iraq, 2()0J- 2()04 764 1 Politics and the Economy in Bush's First 1l'rm., 2001-200S 765 Eronocmc llcwtst:S and Corpon.tt: Sand.t.l.s 76S 'fb< Republican Dom<snc Ai<"d> 767 Campaign Fmanct: Rtform and 1 ht Elocrion of 2004 767 1 Foreign Policy In a 1'hreatming Era 769 11w: Contmulng Struggle in Irut~ Sagging Homr-Front Support 71,9 Nudeu Proliferation Thrtats m A Widemng 1'tadt Gap and Clnna•s Gr~ing P'Owtr 773 Environ mental Hazards Become a Glob;al Concern n4 1 Social and Cultural Trmds in Conmnporaty Amnia. TIS An Inausmgty Oi\use: Ptople m Upward Mobility and SocW Problems in a Muh:icthnlc Soci«y n6 l 'hc "New Econom}"' and tht Old Economy ns 1 DomtStic Polley Sinct: 2004 179

750

Scandal Gr•ps tht White House 751 Election 2000: Bush Versus Gore 7Sl 1 CulturaJ Trwcb: :u Crmury"s End 754 Affiumct and a Starch for Heroes 7.54 Outbun.:cs ofViolmcr Stir Con«m 7S5 Culruf(': \t'&n: A Brnadt:r VL~' 7S6

'fb< Eltttlons ol1006 md 2008 7&3 Condw.on 715

App 9ndix A.-.1 Declaration ofrndcpt"ndencc A-1 Constitution o( tht: Unittd Stares of America A-4 Prtstdt:ntul Ek<:tions. 1789- 2008 A-K

Photogr•ph Crodits

32

Global Dangers. Global Challenges, 759 2001 to the Present 1 America Under Artack: Stpct:mbr.r 11. 2001, nnd Its Aftcmtath 760 The Bush Administration lkgln.s 760 O.ayofHorror.St:ptt:mbcr ll,ZOOI 761

lndQx 1-1

C-1

l'h~ Prophns o( rhr Amrric.ts 4

l..oabons o(Scka«< Nariw Amtric.an ~ples. A.o.ISOO Q Europe; Africa. and Sourh....oesct:m Asia in 1500 20 M
l000-1587 27

11u: Sp.a_nb.h and Portugurst Empires, 1610 29 European Imperial Claims and Settlements in Easc~rn Noi'Ch Amel'ka, 1565- !625 32 Chcsapulc.c E•panJiion, !607- 1660 40 Englis h Migr.ufon, ltii0- 1660 45 The C11.rtbbcan Colonir.s, 1660 SS European Coloniution in the Middle and North Atl:antac, c. 1650 S1 Afric:m Origins o(Slaws Shipp«< by British, 1692- 1807 lmmigntaon and British Colon.W Eqwlsion. to 1755 7l Fmxh >nd Sp;lnbh Ourc:lmsr and thr Exploration of t he Wes.t 175 M..J.jor8:attJesoftheWarofl812 185 Thr Mi.ssourl Compromise, 1820-1811 189 Thr RrrncwJ.I of rht: NuM Americans co the Wesc, 1810.1840 197 M.l.jor Riw:rs, Road.s.tnd C:uuts. 1815- 1860 20'2 l'hr E~10n of IW 21& l'hr Ekct10n of 1&40 m !Wln>od Growth, 1850-IUO 141 DistnbutJOn of'SI~ 1790 :and 1860 259 Jntrrn.a1Sb\
n

Ti2lb to lht: \l'al~ 1840 2&S M.IJOI" S<iCJ tn dw 'lms Rrwlurion., 18.)5- 1836 217 01\"'gon Bounc:hry Oispu:rr 292 M~Jor Batdr:s of 1hr Mc=xic.tn·American W.u 296 11u'! Compromise of 1850 lOS S«:wlon 321 The War in the E:lsr, 1861 - 1862 333 TheWar intheWc:l>t,l861- 1862 315 The War in the !!.'1St~ 1863 l-41 The Fmal Virginia Camp.1.ign, 1864-1865 350 The Rcconacruerlon ofrhc South 359 Southr:m Sh:arrcropping, 1880 369 M:ap lndlm~Whlre Cl.uhtS in tht Wt:.St 384 TrmJCorldnmt~ R:~ilroads and Ft:dma.l Land Gr:anrs, IBS0-1900 ll9 Thom.L>ndRush, 1889- 1!106 398 AsLin :and Europa.n Immigrants living in the \ICsr«n Hcmlsphrtt and Hawaii in 1900 428 ~rcmtaif o( Fordgn·bom Whi.us .t.nd N.lri\"t': \1'1utrs of Fordgn or Mixtd Pannrage in Total IJopubttOn, by Counties, 1910 410 l'hr: EJ«tion of 1896 46& U.S. 1 f=rritori:l l t-:x-p1nsion in du: Lace Ninc:t~e:n l h Century 470 ' ''oman Suffr:.gc DefOre the Ninctt:~n•·h Amend m rm 491 The Election of 1912 500 U.S. Hl"SCmony inch.:= Caribbean and lat in America, I !100- 1941 509 Tht: Umtcd Scac:cs on lht: Wrsum Front, 1918 518 l'ht: Election of 1928 SS-4 l'h~ Oust Bowl 566 \lOrld \l'.u llln Europt and Africa 600 \\~orld \l'.u II in cht PuifK &02 Tb~ Postwar DMs.ion of Europt: &15 1bc Kocnn W.u, 1.950- 1953 62& The El«taon o( 1948 611 l'he El«t100 o( 1960 604

xvii

)(Vj jj

MAPS

Voter Registration ofAfrican·Americans in che Souch, 1964 - 1968 671 The Vicmam War, to 1968 680 1'he1tc Offe nsivc, januar}'-~bruary 1968 693 The Elcccion of 1968 696 The Elcccion of 1980 nl

The United States in latin America and the Caribbean n6 The Mideast Crisis, 1980-2000 739 The Election of2000 7S3 The Election of2004 768

l"h< Ekruon of 1&24 216 Gnwo"th ofConoo Production :and the Sla.\~t Population. 1790· 1860 151

1bc Afrlcan·Amtnc:an and Chi~ Pbpul.u:ion in \l'cstcm Sr.ucs and 1Urirori~ 1880-1900 390

V.a.luc of Cotton ~ns u a Pt-:rcencagr: of AU U.S.

Vrb.m Growth: 1870- 1900 -427

Export~..

1800- 1860 25&

Sl.m:: 0~11c.nl1l l)• 1860 264 Germ.an, lrial1, and 1br.t.l lmmigr:uion. 1830- 1860 2M Opposing Al'mles o(the Civil W.u 326 Comp:u·.nh't l:lopul:uio n and Economic Resources of the Union :.nd che Confc:der.tcy, IS61 329

lron ~Steel Production. 1875-1915 408 lmm•gr.ataon to •he lJnitc:d Suets., 1870-1930 ..as 11u'! Ul'ban :tnd Rur.;al Populatio n ofcbe United St.atcs, 1900- 2000 541

Major Mt:IUIUCC:S Enncrrd During the "Hundred l);ay$"

(Mnrch 9-June 16. 1933) 563

N;~tion lll l)cfcnJ(e Spending, 1941-1960 618

The R«onstruaion Amendmenrs 361

Inflation, I 965- 2006 702 Women in che Wo1•k Fore~. 1950-1992 713

Major Rcronstn1cdon Ltgisl:u:ion 37,.

Ptrtrntagc of U.S. Popul.nion on Welfare.":,

The Our.u.ion of RcpublicJ.n Rult: in the

Ex·Confnkrarc Sons 37S

1960

zoos

7. .

Oungang PJ.rtcrns of work. 1900--2000

ns

xix

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ud'l hu dunF in Am.t:ric.a ;and the wortd SUxt' " "C' bcg.an planning nr £~ V'idoll more man tvo"' doc.acks ago. Sorm of thac dnodopmena ha\'C been Vi'Clcomt and positive: otht:rs dec"ply unscttllng. 11us new Con· d.sr Su::th Edition fully documents all of these changrs, as \lo"C'II as the continuities that offer rcwuranec for t~ fu rure. l'hc Condsc Sixth Edition builds on the underlying stratt'gy th.u hu guidtd us from the beginning. We want o ur history to be not only comprdu:nslvc and illumi·

M

nating, but al~o ll\•cly, n:.ndnble., and cruc to chc liwd experience of earlier genera· d ons of A m erican!~. Within a clear political and chrunologic.1.l f1·:uncwork, we integrate the bcsr recent J.Cholarship in all areas of American history. O u••lnrcrelit in sod;aJ an d culrurul hisrory, which shapes our o....., teaching and scholarship, h.u suf· fu.sed 11w l:'!Ult.rmg Vision from the outset, and it remains central. We tnrcgfllrc the historical upcrlmcc of women and men of all regions, rthnk groups, and sod:al cl..u.scs who ll\.'l.kc: up the: American m.os.Uc.

NEW INTERPRETATIONS,

ExPANDED COVERAGE

In rrant ~ A.rncrian hismri.lns h.n~ c:mpb.uiud ho-· d«ply our hbcocy is un· btdlkd .,.,thin a t.arpr gloOOl conlUL In du• C~ Sinh Editxm ·~ ha\'t undtt· scored the: wkttr corndt o{ Amtricm history throughout the rwn.rn't. From rhc: onp.ns o( agricuhuiY nr.o millennia. ~go ro the: imJ»Cl of globallution tocby, --c: haw c:mpl\ulr.ed h~· rhc: soc:W, c:conomic, and political dt'-clopmous ccnrnl to our Justo rial cxperimcc: c:mugt with frtSh new cbritywbtn \'lend within a bro.1dc:r Y.."Orld framework. As in e,:u11c:r edi tion~ coo.'l'r.tgc: of environ mental history, the land, and d~ c: Wen is fully integrared into the narrath'l', and treated analytically, not simply ..caekcd on" co :1 tl'.1ditionnl aecounr. We also incorporate che best of the new polftic:~J hlsrory, stn:ssing the JOcinl, cultural, and economic issu es at stake in political dcdslons and debates. We: ag11.ln oO"c.r cxrc:nsivr cO\"'trage: of medicine and disca.se, from the epidemics brought by Europc:m cxplo~Yn and ~ctlers co coday's AJDS crisis, b1orchia: debates, and cont:roVCUitJ ow.r ~31rh-care financing. We also gh>t c:~.rcfulllttcndon co ~Yii· gious history. from rhr spirim;al Y.t.lues ofpre-Columbiom commumdcs roth«" poliri· cal act1vum ofconumporary collStt'YUi\'t Christian groups. VISUAL RESOURCES AND AIDS TO THE STuDENT Tb~ byout

of 1hu C!dirion has changtd from ptt'rious rdldom. A ncw onc:
xxi

xxii

Pur...a

questions are: brit:fl}' answered at the: end of r.he chapter in r.he ..Chapter Summary." Throughout the chapters, srudcms get assistance from key terms r.hat are: boldfaced in the te:xc and defined in the: margins.: ..Checking In'" boxes at che: end of each section summarize the: key poines in chat section.

SUPPLEMENTARY RESOU RCES A wide array of supplements accompanies this text co hdp students master che ma· tcrial and guide instructors in teaching from 1'bi! Enduring Vision, Concise Sixth t.J:Jiticm. For details on viewing or ordering these materials, please consult your Cengage Learning sales rcpresentariw. The Instructor Website: (found at www.ce:ngage:.c.om/ historyjboyu j enduringconcise6e) offers the Imtructcr's Guidr, an online manual including Instructional Techniques and Resources, Historicallm~stigations for students, and for each chapter, chapter them ~ lecture suggestions, prim and nonprint resources, and a guide co using the En during Voices document sees. Also available on the: Instructor Website: arc primary sources with instructor notes, Po~Awl'oinc slides for classroom prese:nta· tion, and personal response S}'Stem slides. A computerized testing program, avail· able on CD-ROM, provides flexible test-editing capabilities. Instructors who adopt 1'bi! Enduring Vision, Condse Sixth Edition also recciw access to HistOt'}'Finde:r, a po~A'Crful search engine: and primary source repository that helps instructors create rich and exciting classroom presentations. lhis online tool offers thousands of online resources, in cluding art, photographs, map~ primary sources, multimedia content, and Associated !:tress interacci\J'C modules. HistoryFinder's as· sees can easily be searched by kC)'\N'Ord or from pull-down menus by topic, media type:, or by Wadswonh/Cengage: Learning textbook. Instructors can then bto~A'Se, preview, and dO'I'-'nload resources scraighc from che W'Cbsite.

lltdrudor Tools

The Student Website: (found ac www.ce:ngage:.c.om/ historyjbo)'et/ mduringcondse6e) concains a variety of tutorial resources including ACE quizzes with practice feedback, i nce:racti\~ maps, primary sources, chronology exercises, flashcards, and MP3 chapter summaries. The American HistOI'}' Resource Cmte.r offers hundreds of primary sources such as speech~ letters, legal documents and transcripts, poems, maps, simulations, rimelin('S, and additional images that bring hiscor}' to life-along with interacci\J'C assjgnablecxe:rcises. A map feature: using Google Earth coordinates helps scudents learn ~ograph}' by comparing traditional textbook maps wir.h an aeriai Yie:w of the loc:a· rion today.

student Toots

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Any book, and chis one in particular, is the result of the hard ~A'Ork of many people. As always, the editorial staff at Houghton Mifflin has been outstanding. Particularly deserving of thanks are: Ann West, Usa Kalner Williams, and Bob Grciner.

Pctm.a S:a.ndrlll'i.twlcy eh:a.nlu her d;wghre:r, Ltt Anne Hawley, who~ cw.r, has been in· val\.l.l.blc 1n muJnpk ways. Grrar thm.k:s art OOAYCI as •~U to Lis;&. Lal).ay Moni.s, P.ttri· cU. Piper, Oorochy U'hiu, Lany Kallus, Eric johnson, Mr.La.nic u.·r.Uv!r, and 1·ony Sisk fOr thar condnuing suppon. Ancftw Rinn' uk:noa1fti~ Sandra McN.t.ir H~wtq mel the co-auchors for twdmg h1m a IUpt.tb rut f'iom which ro whitdt dcw.n thr xcond -.,lum~ and ht dunh P.tul S. Bo)ou for his suppon .and friendship.

xxiii

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The End uring V ision

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A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VoLUME ONE: To 1877

Concise Sixth Edition PAUL S. BOYER Unit'n'fity of\Visconsin, Madison CLIFFORD E. CLARK, JR. c.rlrt.. e«r.,. SANDRA MCNAIR HAWLEY S#n )Atinte Col/~

J OSEPH

F. Km

Unir~r"Sil)' o[Viryjnia

ANDREW R IESER

Stau Uni1't"rsity ofM:rv York, Dutcbrss Community Collrg11 NEAL SALI SBURY Smith College HARVARD SITKOFF UnitYn.iry ofNnv Hampshirt NANCY WOLOCH &tman/CdkfJt

• WADSWORTH ~. - CENGAGE lumi:ngAu1tnlu . a ntl l . J'pan . Korea . Mu.tc.o . s•• t •P•" • I pUll · Uftllt' cl IUnalllo• • United sutu

; # WADSWORTH t •

CENGAGEl earnll\g·

[ditor-in..O.itf: P. J- Bo11rdm.1n

Cl:o-.oWIId$worth, Ct'l'lpge ~rnire

PubliVoer. Suunno: Juns

All RIGI-OS R£SfRVEO. No p4tt or this-" ~tel by lht
~~ Spon$.0til!& [clitor. ~~

Ann W~

DeYC!bpmenl,. [ditor: Li~o1 K.:llnet"

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Colonmngc.n.d.l 31 Engl.&nd and thr Ad.11nric: World.

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Cl=u, Gr2plu, 111bles xi Prtf~ ail

»

ISS8· 160.l F.adurc and Suc.ccss in Virginia, 1603-1625 ll New England lkgins. 1614-1625 lS A • New Nee hetland"' on th~ Hudson. 1609· 1625 l4

Native Peoples o f America, to 1500 1 11u~

Fin-t Americans, c. JJ,000- 2500 a .c. 2 l'ropling New Wortds 2

3 The Emergence o f Colonial Societies. 1625- 1700

Arc-hale Sodct'icll 2 1 Cult ur.al Oiwrs.ity, c. 2500 u..c.-A.D. 1500 S MCJO;lJTicria and South Amtrica 5

I Cha.;apcalu: Sociery 39 Scacc: and Churdl in Virgini;~. 39 Scat.t: and Churdl in Maryland 40 Or:ath, Gcndtr. and Kinship ,.1

The Sourh•"t".sr 6 lllc Euttrn Woodbnds 7 NonfJ.rming Sociuirs 10 I North Amr:rican ~pks on rht: E"'l': of

Europnn ContJit't 11 Kmslup .and Ci«ndrr 11 SpmtwJ and Sod.~ol \'alut:S 13

2 16

West Africa: "l'radirio n and Chan ge 17 European Culn u-r :md Society 19 RcligJOWI Uphe:tv;tb 22 2~

I Europe and chc Ada nric World, 144D- 1600 25

lOAmcric:aand Bqooncf.l49l-IS41 26 SfWn's Conquisudon. 1492-1526 2S The Columbun E.uf=g< 29 I Foothokb m Nonh Amnia. 1512- 1625 30 Sp.am's Northern Frontier 30

I T he Sprt.nd ofSI:l\'e.•·y: Th ~ Caribbean

and Carolina 53

I Afrk.an and European Backgro unds 17

Purtup.l and chc AtUnric, I~ 1600 25 ll'lc •New Sl~ry" and R.3cism 25

ll!bo«o SNp<S • "'gicn. l&l0-1670 41 R.dx:Ltion. 1675- 1676 ,.3 From Sc:nuudt to Sbvuy 44 I Pununu:m In New England ..s AOtyuponsHttl. 1628- 1631 45 Nrw England \\'~ 4& lbwn"- Familitt.. :tnd f.l.rm Uf~ 48 EconomiC and R£1igious 1t:ns:ions 49 Expamion and NatiVl': Amc.ricans SO S:akm \V1tchcr:at"t. 1691- 1693 52 S;amn'J

The Rise of the Atlantic World, 1400- 1625

The Rcform:ulon in Engl.md, 1533- 1625

38

S ugu•·and S l:l\~$: 1'hc Wesc Ind ies 54 Rice and S l:&\~ll: C:uolin a S.. 1 The Middle Colon ies S& Prccursci"J! New Net h~rl:md and New Swt-dc:n S&

Engl1sh Conquem: Nnv York and Newjrncy S1 Quake< l'mnsylvmu sa I Riv".&la for Nonh Amrria: Fr.ma and Sp.tin 60 trance O.UmJ :1 Conrirw:nt 60 N~ Mu:teo! 11w 1\xblo Rnolt 61 ..1orida and Ta.u: 62

v

4

The Bonds of Empire, 1660-1750

65

I Rebellion and War, 1660- 1713 66 Royal Ccmralizacion, 1660-1688 66 The Glorious Rc\'Oiution in England and America, 1688- 1689 67 A Generation of War, 1689- 1713 69 I Colonial Economies and Sod ecie:s, 1660-1750 70 MercanciJis t Empires in America 70 l:topularion Growth and Diversity 71 Rural White Men and Women 75 Colonial Farmers and che Environment 75 The Urban Paradox 76

Slavery

n

The Rise of che Colonial Elites 78

I Compcring fo raComincnt, 1713- 1750 79 France and chc American Heartland 79 Nati\'e Americans and British Expansion 80 Brit ish Expansion in che Sout h: Georgia 80 Spain's Borderlands 81 The Rcrurn of War, 1739- 1748 82

6 Securing Independence, Defini ng

I Public Ufe: in Bricish America, 1689- 1750 83 Colonial l'olitics 83 The Enlightcnme:m 84 The Great Awakening 86

5

Roads to Revolution, 1750- 1776 I lriumph and 1tnsions: The Britis h Empire, 1750--1763 91 A Fragile Peace, 1750- 1754 91 The Seven Years' \l'ar in America, 1754-1760 92 The End of f rench North America, 1760- 1763 94 Anglo-American f riction 94 Frontier 1Cnsions 9S I Imperial Authority, Colonial Oppo.sicion, 1760-1766 96 The Writs of Assistance, 1760- 1761 96 The Sugar Ace, 1764 97 TheScamp ActCri.sis, 1765- 1766 97 The Declaratory Act, 1766 100 ideology, Religion, and Resistance 101 I Resistance Resumes, 1766- 1770 102 O pposing the Q uartering Act, 1766- 1767 102

Crisis ow~r che 1 0wns hend Duties, 1767 102 l 'he Colonists' Reaction, 1767- 1769 IOJ Women and Colonial Resistance 104 Cusroms .. Racket eering,'' 1767- 1768 105 Wilkes and Uberty, 1768--1770 106 1 1'he D«pcning Crisis, 1n0--1774 107 l'he Boston Massacre, 1770 107 l'he Committees of Correspondence, 1n2- 1773 10s Conflicts in lhe Backcountr}' 109 l'he TeaAct, 1773 110 1 10"''llrd Independence, 1774-1776 Ill Uberty for African-Americans Ill l'he "Intolerable Aces" Ul l'he First Conrinencal Congress U2 From Resistance co Rebellion 113 Common Sense 114 Declaring Independence us

Nationhood, 1776-1788

90

1 1'he Prospects of War U9 l.o)'alists and Ocher British SympathizctS lt9 l'he Opposjng Sides 120 I War and Peace, ln6- 1783 122 Shifting Fortunes in lhe Nonh, 1n6- 1778 122 l'he War in the West, 1n6- 1782 125 American Victory in che Sout h, 1ns.-1181 126 Peace at Last, 1782-1783 127 1 1'he Re\'Oiurion and Social Change 128 Egalitarianism Among White Men 128 White Women in Warcime 129 A RC\'Oiurion for Black Americans 130 Na tive Americans and lhe Revolution 131 I Forging N ew GO\wnmmts, 1776- 1787 13'2 From Colonies to Scates 132 Formalizing a Confederation, 1776- 1781 134 Finance, Trade, and the Economy, 1781- 1786 134 l'he Confederation and the Wesc, 1785- 1787 135 1 10"''llrdaNcw Constitucion, 1786- 1788 137 Shays' s Rebellion, 1786- 1787 137 l'he l' hiladdphia Com-emion, 1787 138 l'he Struggle O\'cr Ratification, 1787- 1788 141

118

co.rmns

7 Lau nching t he New Republic, 1788-1800 1 ConstitubONI Ga.unmmt l"akcs Sh~pt. 1788-1796 1<46

lmpkmc:nring GO\'i':mmrnt 14& The Ft.-dcral j udidary and the lUll of Rights 146 1 Hami.lron's Oamt"Stk Policies., 1789- 1794 M8

Hanulton md His Obj«tnu 1-t& Esublashlng rht Nation's Credit 1-49 Crea.dng a National Bmk ISO Emerging P.utisa.nship lSI The \Vhhkry Rtbcllion 151 J 1bc United Sur~ in a Wide•· World, 1789- 1796 ISl Spamsh l'<wt"r-r in Wtstcrn Norrh Amt:rica 1$3 Ch.lllcnging Am
vii

Tbc Emb;argo Act of 1807 180 j ames M:~dison and the F.J.Ji u~ of Pc~cc;~blc Coercion 181 1t:runuch :and the Prophet 182 Congrus Votts for W.u 183 1 1'htW.uo(IBI2 1&4 On to Carud:. 184 11le Bntljh Offionsi"-e 1&4 11lc1'rc:uy ofGhmt, 18 14 18& 111e Hnrttord Com-ention IU 1 Tht< AwHmlng of American Nation.tlism 181 M.aduon•s N.uion.Uism .and the En. of Good Fttling:s. 1817- 1824 117 john Marshall .and the Suprtmt Coun IU 1'11e M1~souri Compromblc, 1820- 182 1 189 Fordgn l>olicy Under Mom'Oc 190 l"he Monroe Doctrine, 1823 191

1189- 1792 15-4

9

Frana and Faa:ional l'bhda. 1793 1§.4 Diplomacy and War. 1793--1796 IS6 1 Parties and J)Qiitics, 1793- 1800 157 ldcologic.1l Confrontation, 1793- 1794 157 The Rcpublic:an Party, 1794-1796 153 111< El«rion of 1796 ISO 11w: Jon:nchCrisis, 1198- 1799 1&0 The Allen and Sedition Acts, 1798 160 llle Elccrion of 1800 162 1 Economic and Social Change 163

The Transform ation of A m erican

Society, 1815 -1840 1 urtstWMd Expansion 194 l'btS•upWts~: t94 U'atcm Society and Cust:onU t94 11lc Far West 195 The Feder.tl Go\~m m enl :md the West 196 111e ftcmovJl of the Jndb.ns 196 11lc AgrictJitu.ral Boom 1<;14

Produc:h1g for Markets 163 Wh1tc Womm in tht' Rc:pubbc 164 Lmd and Cultutt: Nuivt' AmUic:ans 145

I Tht Grorwth of tht Matbt Economy 199 F
Afnan·Am
8

Jeffersonlanism and the Era of Good ~elings, 1801 - 1824 1 11le Age ofj efferson 111 Jcffurson andjeffersoni~nism 171 jefknon·~ .. Ra'Oiution" tn j rffcrson :and ttk judici~ry en l'1w: Loulsiu\a Purch.;u(' 174 1'b< Elc o n che Home Fronr 177 Tbe Suppression of Americ:m 1'r-.lde and lmptUJtnmt 179

193

I lndustri>lll 204

170

Causes ofJndusuWiutlon 104 1UtiJc 1'tw.ns in New England 205 Anasans and Workers in M1d·Atlant:ic C ities 206 1 Equalit}' ancl lncquality 206 Growing J n~uality: The IUch and cht Poor 207 frrt Bl.xlts in cht North lOS l'hc •Middling Cl.u.scs-. 209

I The Rc\'Oiurion in Soc:bl Relationships 209 11lc Attack on dv Proresslons 210 The Challenge to Famaty Authority 210 Wh•cs and Husbands 211 Horlzont:al Allegiance$ :a.nd the Rise: of Volunury Associations 212

viii

C!Jfi'TtJm

DtSUK :and Health 244 Popular Health Movt:mcnts 145 Ph 1-cnology 24S

10 Democratic Politics. Religious Revivol. end Reform, 1824- 1840 214 I 1~ Rise ofDtmocr:mc Politics, 1824-1832 115 Drmocratic Fummc 115 "'bt EJKtion of 182-4 115 john Quincy Adams as Prtsident 216 1'he Rise of Aodrcw Jackson 216 1'he Election of 1828 218 j nckson in Office 218 Nullificacion 119 1'he Bmk Vdo and the Eltaion of 1832 221 I Th< o.nk Qmt...,..ny and rh< Sr1y s~um, 1833-1&40

m

"'bt War on the Rank

I Dcm ocrnt'ic P.lstimcs 246 Newsp.1pers 246 The 1'heatu 247 Mmsnd Sha-'S 247 P. 1', &unum 2~ I Tb~ Quae (or N.1rionality m Uter-J.rurc and Arc 2<4& Roors o( the American R~n:aJU.10 Ce 249 Coopel\ emerson, Thoreau, Fullrr, nnd Whlrmnn 249 H:Lwt horne, Melville, and Poe 251 Uter:acurc in rht: Moulutpla« 15'2 Amcnon Landsc.apr- P.lintmg 2:53

m

The Rise of Whig Opposition 223 11le Election of 1836 223 11le l:tanic of 18J7 124 111e Search for Sohuions 2'2<1 11le Election of 1840 2'25 1'ht: S«ond Party Systnn M.uurts n5 1 1bn n&

12 The Old South and Slavery. 1830- 1860 I Kang Conon 1S6 1'bc: Lur't': of Conon 251 Tics, lkC'M':tn the Uw.'l'r ~nd

Tht S«ond Greal A•'2ktning 216 Eastt:rn Rtm•.J.IS 1V Critics of l«vi~J: 1'he Unitarians 111 111e Rise o f Mm·m onis m 228 111e Shakers 228 I 1lle Age of Reform 129 1'bt: \"<~ar on Liquor 229 Public-School Rd'orm 230 Abolition U l Women's Righu 13) llroitentiaries and Al)1ums 234 Utopian C-om munfcics 23S

II Technology, Culture. and Everyday Life. 1840- 1860 I 1~chnology and Econo mic Growth 238 Agricultural Adv.mcement 238 1«hnology and Jndustri.l.l Progress 1:38 1'b. R.lilrv.d Doom 24
1 Th
255

237

Upper South 258 111e Nonh and Souch Oiwrgc 158 1 1'he Socl.al Gro ups of thr White South 260 Pl.anrers and Plantation Mbncs.us 261 lbc Snull Si.wdwld
CONTENTS

l l 'he Emergence ofAfrican·American C ulru.re 274 The Language ofSia\'es 274 African·Amcrican Religion 275 Black Music and Dance 276

13 Immigration. Expansion. and Sectional Conflict , 1840-1848

278

I Newcomers and Nati\'tS 279 Expectations and Realities 279 The Germans 280 The Irish 281 Ami-Catholicism, Nativism, and Labor Protest 282 Immigrant Policies 283 I 11le Wesc and Beyond 284 The Far Wesc 284 Far Western Trade 284 The American Settlement of1t:xas ro 1835 286 The Texas Revolution, 1836 286 American -Secd emencs in California. New Mexico, and Oregon 287 The Ow.rland Trails 287 1 11le Policies of Expansion, 1840- 1846 288 The Whig Ascendancy 289 Tyler and the Annexation of1t:xas 289 The Election of 1844 290 Manifest Destiny. 1845 291 l'olk and Oregon 292 1 11le Mexican-American War and Its Aftermath, 1846- 1848 293 The O rigins of the Mexican-American War 293 The Mexican-American War 294 The \'(tar's Effects on Sectional Conflict 297 The Wilmot Proviso 297 The Election of 1848 298 The California Gold Rush 299

14 From Compromise to Secession. 1850-1861 1 11le Compromise of 1850 302 Zachary 1'a ylor at che Hdm 30J Henry Clay Proposes a Compromise 304

301

iX

Assessing the Compromise 305 EnfOrcement of the f ugitive Sfa't't Ace 306 Uncle 10m's Cabin 306 11le Election of 1852 308 I The Collapse of the Second Party Syscem. 1853- 1856 308 11le Kansas-Nebraska Ace 309 11le Surge: of Free Soil 309 11le: Ebbing of Manifest Destin}' 310 11le: Whigs Dis ince:grate, 1854- 1855 310 11le: Ris.e and Fall of the Kno~A•·Nothings, 1853--1856 311 11le Republican Party and the C risis in Kansas, 1855- 1856 312 11le: Election of 1856 313 1 The Crisis of the Union. 1857- 1860 314 11le Drt:d Scott Case, 1857 314 11le Lecompton Conscirution. 1857 315 11le Uncoln-Douglas Debates, 1858 316 11le Legacy of Harpers Ferry 318 11le South Contemplates Secession 319 I The Collapse of the Union, 1860- 1861 319 11le Election of 1860 3t9 11le Mo\-cment for Secession 321 11le Search for Compromis.e 322 11le Coming of War 322

15 Crucible of Freedom: Civil War. 1861-1865 1 Mobilizing for War 325 Recruitment and Conscription 315 Financing the War 327 Political leaders hip in Wartime 328 Securing the Union•s Borders 330 l in Battle. 1861- 1862 3JI Annies. Weapons, and Strategies 331 Stalemate: in the East 332 11le War in the West 335 11le Soldiers' War 335 Ironclads and C ruisers: lhe: Naval War 336 11le: Diplomatic War 337 I Emancipation Transforms che War, 1863 338 From Confiscation to Emancipation 338 Crossing Union Unes 339 Black Soldiers in che Union Army 340 Sla\'try in Wartime 340 11le 1Urning Point of 1863 341

324

X

COHI'II'ffS

I War and Sodcty, Norrh :and South 343 Tbc W.ar's &onomk lmp.lCt: The Nonh 343 l'hc u·.ar's &onomic lmpKt: 1'ht South 344 Onlmg with Oi.s.unr 145 •l<doal \l'.u 346 Tht u·.u and "Q;'omm·s Righu 347

n..

l l'bt limon Viaonous_ 180-4- 1865 W The Eutcm l'hcucr in 18&4 348 1'he tl«rion o( 186-4 l43 Sherm.a.n's March l'hrough ~a 3-t9

Grantasm 370 111c Uber.als' Rnolr 311 11lc l'.anic of 1873 Jn RcoonSL-nacrlon and t he Constitution 373 Republicans In Reru:u 373 I Reconstruction i\b:mdoncd. 1876- 1877 375 "Rc:dc.cmini( the South 376 111c Eltcrlon of 1876 377

16 I Recorutructaon Politics, 1865- 1868 35-4 Unc:oln's PWl l$.4 Praadmt1.al R«onstruction

UnderJohmon lS• Congrus Vmus johnson 357 Tht kJurtrmth Amtndmmt, 1866 357 Congru:IIOMI R«onarucrion. 1866- I!G7 lSI

1'he lmpeachmcm Crisis, 1867- 1868 359 l'hr: Jo'a (t«.nth Ame.ndmcnr and the Qua;tion ofWoman Suffragr:, 1869- 1870 lOO

Countcnnacb 36.4 l l'h
U..d, Ubo<, and Slwumpping 308 lO.'Ud a Crop-Uen Economy 369 I N~Cona::msmd1eNorrh, 1868-1876 370

Toward Appomanox 35-0 l'hc Impact o(rhe War 351

The Crisis of Reconstruction, 1865-IBn

I Rrconstrumon GCM"rnmcnts 362 A Ntw Elccror:ac:c 362 Rtpublaan Rule 3&3

353

Appendix A-1 On:l:~.rmdon oflndtpcnde:nu A-1 Corut:kution of tht Unirtd Suus of Ammc:a A.-4 PruadmtiaJ Ekaions. 1189-2<108 A-H

Photoaroph Credits e-1

Index J..l

l'h~ Prophns o( rhr Amrric.ts 4

l..oabons o(Scka«< Nariw Amtric.an ~ples. A.o.ISOO Q Europe; Africa. and Sourh....oesct:m Asia in 1500 20 Mnd Sp;lnbh O
Ti2lb to lht: \l'al~ 1840 2&S M.IJOI" S<iCJ tn dw 'lms Rrwlurion., 18.)5- 1836 217 01\"'gon Bounc:hry Oispu:rr 292 M~Jor Batdr:s of 1hr Mc=xic.tn·American W.u 296 11u'! Compromise of 1850 lOS S«:wlon 321 The War in the E:lst. 1861 - 1862 333 TheWar intheWc:l>t,l861- 1862 315 The War in the !!.'1St~ 1863 l-41 The Fmal Virginia Camp.1.ign, 1864-1865 350 The Rcconacruerlon ofrhc South 359 Southr:m Sh:arrcropping, 1880 369

1787- 1790 142 lndianl.a.ndCcllsiOn$, 1768- 1799 166 The Loub"lllnn l>urc:lmsr and thr Exploration of t he Wes.t 175 M..J.jor8:attJesoftheWarofl812 185 Thr Mi.ssourl Compromise, 1820-1811 189 Thr RrrncwJ.I of rht: NuM Americans co the Wesc, 1810.1840 197 M.l.jor Riw:rs, Road.s.tnd C:uuts. 1815- 1860 20'2 l'hr E~10n of IW 21& l'hr Ekct10n of 1&40 m !Wln>od Growth, 1850-1UO 141 DistnbutJOn of'SI~ 1790 :and 1860 259 Jntrrn.a1Sb\
xi

Tb~

Ekcbon of 1Slo4 1:16

Gr~1h

of Con on l'roduaion :~nd the SUvr: Population. 1790--1860 2$7

Value of Coeton Expo«:& 3$ a ~rcenuge of AU U.S. Exports, 1800- 1860 251 Sl;l\'e Ownmhip, 186() 2.6-4 Gernun, l rish, and 'lbul rmmigmrion, 1830-1860 280 Opposing Armirs of tht Civil W.u 326 Compana.t1w: Population :~nd Economic Resouras of tht Union and the Confedtnq, 1861 129

xii

ud'l hu dunF in Am.t:ric.a ;and the wortd SUxt' " "C' bcg.an planning nr £~ V'idoll more man tvo"' doc.acks ago. Sorm of thac dnodopmena ha\'C been Vi'Clcomt and positive: otht:rs dec"ply unscttllng. 11us new Con· d.sr Su::th Edition fully documents all of these changrs, as \lo"C'II as the continuities that offer rcwuranec for t~ fu rure. l'hc Condsc Sixth Edition builds on the underlying stratt'gy th.u hu guidtd us from the beginning. We want o ur history to be not only comprdu:nslvc and illumi· nating, but al~o ll\·ely, n:.ndnble., and cruc to chc liwd experience of earlier genera· d ons of Am erican!~. Within a clear political and chrunologic.1.l f1·:uncwork, we integrate the bcsr recent J.Cholarship in all areas of American history. O u••lnrcrelit in sod;aJ an d culrurul hisrory, which shapes our o....., teaching and scholarship, h.u suf· fu.sed 11w l:'!Ult.rmg Vision from the outset, and it remains central. We tnrcgfllrc the historical upcrlmcc of women and men of all regions, rthnk groups, and sod:al cl..u.scs who ll\.'l.kc: up the: American m.os.Uc.

M

NEW INTERPRETATIONS,

ExPANDED COVERAGE

In rrant ~ A.rncrian hismri.lns h.n~ c:mpb.uiud ho-· d«ply our hbcocy is un· btdlkd .,.,thin a t.arpr gloOOl conlUL In du• C~ Sinh Editxm ·~ ha\~ undtt· scored the: wkttr corndt o{ Amtricm history throughout the rwn.rn't. From rhc: onp.ns o( agricuhuiY nr.o millennia. ~go ro the: imJ»Cl of globallution tocby, --c: haw c:mpl\ulr.ed h~· rhc: soc:W, c:conomic, and political dt'-clopmous ccnrnl to our Justo rial cxperimcc: c:mugt with frtSh new cbritywbtn \'lend within a bro.1dc:r Y.."Orld framework. As in e,:u11c:r edition~ coo.'l'r.tgc: of environ mental history, the land, and d~ c: Wen is fully integrared into the narrath'l', and treated analytically, not simply ..caekcd on" co :1 tl'.1ditionnl aecounr. We also incorporate che best of the new polftic:~J hlsrory, stn:ssing the JOcinl, cultural, and economic issu es at stake in political dcdslons and debates. We: ag11.ln oO"c.r cxrc:nsivr cO\"'trage: of medicine and disca.se, from the epidemics brought by Europc:m cxplo~Yn and ~ctlers co coday's AJDS crisis, b1orchia: debates, and cont:roVCUitJ ow.r ~31rh-care financing. We also gh>t c:~.rcfulllttcndon co ~Yii· gious history. from rhr spirim;al Y.t.lues ofpre-Columbiom commumdcs roth«" poliri· cal act1vum ofconumporary collStt'YUi\'t Christian groups. VISUAL RESOURCES AND AIDS TO THE STuDENT Tb~ byout

of 1hu C!dirion has changtd from ptt'rious rdldom. A ncw onc:
xiii

xiv

Pur...a

questions are: brit:fl}' answered at the: end of r.he chapter in r.he ..Chapter Summary." Throughout the chapters, srudcms get assistance from key terms r.hat are: boldfaced in the te:xc and defined in the: margins.: ..Checking In'" boxes at che: end of each section summarize the: key poines in chat section.

SUPPLEMENTARY RESOU RCES A wide array of supplements accompanies this text co hdp students master che ma· tcrial and guide instructors in teaching from 1'bi! Enduring Vision, Concise Sixth t.J:Jiticm. For details on viewing or ordering these materials, please consult your Cengage Learning sales rcpresentariw. The Instructor Website: (found at www.ce:ngage:.c.om/ historyjboyu j enduringconcise6e) offers the Imtructcr's Guidr, an online manual including Instructional Techniques and Resources, Historicallm~stigations for students, and for each chapter, chapter them ~ lecture suggestions, prim and nonprint resources, and a guide co using the En during Voices document sees. Also available on the: Instructor Website: arc primary sources with instructor notes, Po~Awl'oinc slides for classroom prese:nta· tion, and personal response S}'Stem slides. A computerized testing program, avail· able on CD-ROM, provides flexible test-editing capabilities. Instructors who adopt 1'bi! Enduring Vision, Condse Sixth Edition also recciw access to HistOt'}'Finder, a po~A'Crful search engine: and primary source repository that helps instructors create rich and exciting classroom presentations. lhis online tool offers thousands of online resources, in cluding art, photographs, map~ primary sources, multimedia content, and Associated !:tress interacci\J'C modules. HistoryFinder's as· sees can easily be searched by kC)'\N'Ord or from pull-down menus by topic, media type:, or by Wadswonh/Cengage Learning textbook. Instructors can then bto~A'Se, preview, and dO'I'-'nload resources scraighc from che W'Cbsite.

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The Student Website (found ac www.cengage.c·omf historyjbo)'et/ mduringcondse6e) concains a variety of tutorial resources including ACE quizzes with practice feedback, i nce:racti\~ maps, primary sources, chronology exercises, flashcards, and MP3 chapter summaries. The American HistOI'}' Resource Cmte.r offers hundreds of primary sources such as speech~ letters, legal documents and transcripts, poems, maps, simulations, rimelin('S, and additional images that bring hiscor}' to life-along with intcracci\J'C assjgnablccxe:rcises. A map feature: using Google Earth coordinates helps scudents learn ~ograph}' by comparing traditional textbook maps wir.h an aeriai Yie:w of the loc:a· rion today.

student Toots

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Any book, and chis one in particular, is the result of the hard ~A'Ork of many people. As always, the editorial staff at Houghton Mifflin has been outstanding. Particularly deserving of thanks are: Ann West, Usa Kalner Williams, and Bob Grciner.

PltEFAa

S:a.ndrlll'i.twlcy eh:a.nlu her d;wghre:r, Ltt Anne Hawley, who~ cw.r, has been in· val\.l.l.blc 1n muJnpk ways. Grrar thm.k:s art OOAYCI as •~U to Lis;&. Lal).ay Moni.s, P.ttri· cU. Piper, Oorochy U'hiu, Lany Kallus, Eric johnson, Mr.La.nic u.·r.Uv!r, and 1·ony Sisk fOr thar condnuing suppon. Ancftw Rinn' uk:noa1fti~ Sandra McN.t.ir H~wtq mel the co-auchors for twdmg h1m a IUpt.tb rut f'iom which ro whitdt dcw.n thr xcond -.,lum~ and ht dunh P.tul S. Bo)ou for his suppon .and friendship.

XV

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The End uring V ision

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A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE VoLUME Two: FRoM

1865

Concise Sixth Edition PAUL S. BOYER Unit'n'fity of\Visconsin, Madison CLIFFORD E. CLARK, JR. c.rlrt.. e«r.,. SANDRA MCNAIR HAWLEY S#n )Atinte Col/~

J OSEPH

F. Km

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ANDREW R IESER

Stau Uni1't"rsity ofM:rv York, Dutcbrss Community Collrg11 NEAL SALI SBURY Smith College HARVARD SITKOFF UnitYn.iry ofNnv Hampshirt NANCY WOLOCH &tman/CdkfJt

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16 The Crisis of Reconstruction. 1865 - 18n I Reconstruction Politics, 1865- 1868 35<4 Lincoln's l>l
Tht Foun«mh Ammdmcru, I~ l$7

353

I Nat'iVl: Americans and rhe 1'raru·o\•1 ississippi Wesr 380 11lC: P.l~ns Indians 381 1'be Ass.ault on Nomadic lndi.an Ufe J.&2 Custa-·s L.ut Stand. 1876 384 "5.mng" th. Indians 3aS l'hc Ghost O.;tn« and che End of 1ndi.m Ruistance on the Great Pl;uns., 1890 186 I Setrling the \l1cn Ja& 11lc First 1)-anscominent:.l Railroad 388 ScLtlcrs and tht" Railr~d 381 liomC'stead.ing on rhe (ity;at Plains 390 New F.a.nns. Nt
Bwldmg a Sociuy and Adlkvmg Scuehood

Congrn.siorul R«<nstruction. 1866-1867 35$ The lmput.hnuntCrisi~ 1867- 1868 359 The Fifteemh Amendment and che Question of Woman Suffrage,

1869- 1870 360 I R«onsuuction Govt:rnmems 3&2 ANtwEkaontc 342 Rq>ublian Ruk 363 Countt:r.;muk.s 344

I Tlle Impact ofEmandp.uion 366 Confronring Prc.cdom 366 African-Amerfc.1n lnstiltltions 366 Land, Labor, :and Sh;uccropping 368 T~·a.rd a Crop-Uen Economy 369 I Ntw Concttns ~nthc North. 1868- 1816 l70 Granti:sm 370 111< Ub.nb' Ravlt 371 The Panic of 1873 3n Reconstruction and the Constitution 373 Rcpublic:tnll in Retreat 373

I RC'construction ,\bandontd.l876- 1877 375 •Redeeming- d't South 376 Tht Elmion oi 1876 Jn

17

The Transformation of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1860- 1900

379

m

1"'he Spread of MOfT'I"'INsm 392

I Sot11hw~uern Botderlancb: 393 I Exploiting the Wcnern l.andliC.lpc 39S 11lc Mining Frontier 395 Cowboys and tht' Can le t-r ontit'r 3-96 O.ttle 1~ns .md Pr~rhuccs 397 Bocwu..a Fums 197 111. Oltl.ahom.t Llnd Rwh, 1889 31l3

1 1'ht Wn.t of Lift' and ltgmd 399 l'hc American Adam and the

-

Oime·Novel Hero J~ Revitalizing the Frontier Legend 400 Bl'ginning a National P.uits Mm~ment <401

18

The Rise of Industrial America. 1865 - 1900

404

1 1'he R.ilol: ofCorporate America 405 1'bc ChMutttoflnduuriaJ Chan~ 405 IW!t"Nd lnnCJil•uions 406

v

vi

CO«TtJm

1 Workmg-Ous Ltisurt in the lmmigrmr City 4-41 Strtttl snd Saloons «I 111c RJsc o f llrofcssional Sports 442 V.1udcvlllr. Amusement P.1rltll1 and Ooancc Halls 442 Ragtlmr 443 1 Cuh:um in Conflict 444 1'hc Gamd Tradition md. lis Critics 444 Modcmb.:m in Archit«tUrc md Painting 44& From Vicrori:an Lady to New Woman -«6 Public 1-::ducation as an ArcnJt of Cla~JI Conflict -448

Consolidating the R.1droad Industry 406 Applying the WION of the Railroads ro Stttl 403 1'hc Trust: Crtating New Forms of Corporate O rg.tnlution 409 1 Scimubcing EconomiC Growth 410

1'bt: l"riumph of'1fchnology 440 Spociiliud Production
20 Politics and Expansion in an lndustrlali
I Party l:toll1ics in nn EraofUphcavJ.I. 1877- 1884 45'2 Co ntc~rrd Policical VisionJI 4$2 P.a.ttV"JU of Patty Strtngth 4$4 Rqubring rht: Monty Supply 455 Civt.l&rvitt Reform 454 1 f\lolaucs of Pri\lilqte. Politics o( Exclusion. 1884--- 1892 4S7 A Dcmoc:r.u in the \Vh1tc I IOu$c: G ro\'f':r Cl~..-wl a n d, 1885- 1889 459 Big U u~incss Strikes Back: Benjamin Harrison, 1889- 1893 459 Agnrian Proltsl and rhc RiK o( rhr

19 Immigration. Urbanization. a nd Everyday Ufe, 1860-1900

P9

426

I 1'he N t w American Ciry 411 Migrants and lmmigr.m rs 428 Adjuscing to :an Urban Sod ery 434 Slums and G hcnOJ 431 F.uhionablc A\'Cnucs and Suburbs -432 I Middlt-- and Upptt>Cl.ts.s Socitty and Culture 413 t-ian..t.ltrS ;md. Morals 433 Tht Cult of Oomnridty 433 Dtpanmmt Stores 434 1'hc Transfonnndon of Higher Education 435 I Working-dass Politte" a nd Reform 436 llolitical Bosses and Muhint PcUtics 436 B:m :ling Povf.rty 437 Nav Approaches ro SocW Rt:form 431 Thdlonll'lonty~gn <33

•»

Th< Social Gospd The Settltmcnt·Housr Movtmt:n t -439

451

African·Americ.uu After Rtconaruction 461

1 The 18901:: J'olir:ics in a De:prusion Dtt.adt: 444 1892: t>opulis ts Challenge the Sta rns Quo 404 C.1 plra lism in Crisis: l'he Dep•'f':ssion of 189.1-1897 #.4 Busines' Lcadt:rs RL-spond 465 189-fc PrOltSl Gro'I''S Louder 466 Sllrm' A.chocatts Capron" thr Odnocruic P.rry <67 1896: R.tpublic.ms liiumplunr 467 I ExpaiUIOni$r Stirrings and War wit h Spain, 1878- 1901 -4-69 Root~ o( Expansionist Scnrimrm 469 P~lfic Expansion 470 Cruis c:Mr Cuba 471 l'he Spanish-Amtrictn \l'u, 1898 -m

cndcsofEmpin"
vii

COHrons

21 The Progressive Era. 1900- 1917 I Pmgr<ssiws .00 l"bcir ldus

•n

lbt Many fXt"SofProgrc»Msm

476

•n

lnrrllcaua.ls Offt:r NN" Socb.l Vinvs -taO

Nowlins. Joumalists. and Anuts Spodighr Sodnl Problems 481 I State :tlld l.oa.l Progrcssivb;m 481 Rt:rorrmng the Politic.tl Process 482

RtgubnngBwiness, PnxKting \t'orb:rs ..a1 ~laking Catics Mott livlblc *+ Progrcss.vum and Social Control 485 Mor.al Control in the Cirlc:c 4U Barding Alcohol and Dn•gJ -487 Immigration Rt:srricdon :and Eugmics 487 R.Jrism a.nd Progressivism 448

Thr Pan.m1.a. Can:a!: H:ardbalJ Diplomacy SOa Roo"ewlt and Taft As~rc U.S. Po.....-cr in latin America ~d Asia 509 Wibon ~n d Latin Amerioa 511 I Wuin Europr.l914-1917 512 Thr Conung oru·.u sn l'hr PullJ ofNnur.tliry Sr2 The Umtrd Stares Enrcrs ttk War 514 I Mobilh:lng at Hom e, Figlning fn France, 1917- 1918 SIS Raising. li'aining. .and 1'ntmg an Ann)' SIS Orga.nwng tht: Economy for W.a.r 516 Wirh rhc Amttian Exptd.at•orwy Foret: in Fnnct 517 'l\1rnlng thr Tide 519

I Promorlng the War and Suppressing Diss.tm 519 Ad\~rtbing the \'t'ar St9 w.nrfmc lntolt:rana and Dissnu S20

Supprmmg Dissent by La"· SlJ

I BLlcb, Women, and ll'orlc
R.eviv.1J of the Woman.Suffrngc MO\'emenr 491 Enl:u
Consumrr Protection 496 EnvironmcntaJism Progrus:w~·StyJc 497

Tafr in chc White Hou.st.1909- 191l 499 l1w Four-U'.ay Ekction of 1912 500 I N.u:ion;aJ Progrtssivism Ph:tK II: Wood.roo.l• Wibon. 1913-- 1917 SOl 13riffand Banking Rcfom1 SOl Regularfn~ Busin ess: Aiding Workers and Fumcrs 502 l'rogr<mvum .00 lh< C<>rucltution SOl 1916:: Wilson Edges our Hugha S03

I Economk and Socioal Trmcb: 1.n Wa.rtirnr America S22 Boom 1'1mcs in Industry and Agriculture Sl2 Blacks Migrate Northward 523 Women in Wan:ime 524 Public Haith <:ns;s: lllc 1918 lnftucn.r.a P.a.ndmtic Sl4 Tht W.u and Progrtssivism 514 I Joyous Armistice, Bic~r A(rrrm.a.th, 1918- 1920 S2S Wibon•• tlourtec:n Point$; 'l1u: Arm istice S2S 11le Vcua1Ues J,eace Confcn:nce, 1919 526 111e Fight ovcr che Wgur of Nations 527 IUd""wdR
m

23 The 1920s, Coping with Change. 1920-1929

532

I A New Economic Order 533 Booming Business, Ailing Agriculture 533 New Modes of l'rodudng, MJ.naging.

22 Global Involvements and World War I, 1902- 1920

and Selling S34

SOS

I De-fining Anlcftc.l's World Role, 1902- 1914 SO& The "Open Door": Competing for rhe China Markt't 506

Women in tht: Ntw Economic Er~ S36 Suugghng Labor-lh1ions in a Business AfF SJ6 I Tht H;uding and Coolidge Admini.sttuions 537 Scandp:at Politics in a Otcade ofChanp- 537 RrpubHClln J'olicy Making In a l'robusiness

Em U S

I

I

I

I

Independent Internationalism 538 l'rogressiw: Stirrings, Ocm ocracic Party Divisions 540 Women and Politics in che J920s: A Dream Deferred 540 Mass Society, Mass Culrure S41 Cities, Cars, Consumer Goods 541 Soaring Energy Consumption and a l 'hreacened Environment 542 Mass-l'roduced Encertainmenc 543 Celebrity Culru.re 544 Culrural Fennem and Creativity S45 The j an Age and the Postwar Crisis of Values S4S Alienated Writers S46 Architects, Paincers, and Musicians Celebrate Modern America S46 The Harlem Renaissance 547 A Sociecy in Conflict S48 Immigration Restriction S48 Needed Workers/Unwelcome Aliens: Hispanic Newcomers 549 Nativism, Antiradicalism, and the SaccoVanucti Case 549 Fundamencalism and che Scopes Trial SSO The Ku Klux Klan 551 The Garvey Mow:menc 552 l'rohibition: Cultures in Conflict SS2 Hocm:r at che Helm S53 The Election of 1928 553 Herbert HOO\-cr's Social Thought SS4

1

1

I

1

25

Americans and a World in Crisis, 1933-1945

24

The Great Depression and t he New Deal, 1929-1939 I Crash and Depression, 1929- 1932 558 Black 11mrsday and che Onsec of the Depression S58 Hom-er's Response 560 Mouncing Discontent and Protest 560 The Election of 1932 561 l lhe N ew Deal Takes Shape, 1933- 1935 562 Roosevelt and His Circle 562 The Hundred Days 563 l'roblems and ContfOV\'_rsies Plague the Early New Deal 565

1934- 1935: Challenges from Right and Left 566 1'he New Deal Changes Course, 1935- 1936 567 Expanding Federal Relief 567 Aiding Migrants, Supporting Unions, Regulating Business, Taxing the \1/ealchy 563 l'he Social Security Act of 1935: End of the Second New Deal 569 l'he 1936 Roos........-elr Landslide and che New Oemocracic Coalition 570 l'he Environmenc and the West 571 1'he New Deal's End Stage, 1937- 1939 573 FOR and the Supreme Court 573 l'he Roosevelt Recession 573 Final Measures, Growing Opposition 574 -Social Change and Social Action in the 1930s 575 l'he Depression's Psychological and Social Impact 576 Industrial Workers Unionize 577 Blacks and Hispanic-Am ericans Resisc Racism and Exploitation 579 A New Deal for Nati\-e Americans 580 1'he Ame rican Cultural Scene in the 1930s 581 Aw:nues of Escape: Radio and the Movies 581 l'he Later 1930s: Opposing Fasdsm, Reaffirming Traditional Values 582 Streamlining and a \l'orld's Fair: Corporate America's Utopian Vision 584

557

1 1'he United States in a Menadng World, 1933--1939 588 Nationalism and the Good Neighbor 588 l'he Rise of Aggressii,!'C States in Europe and Asia 589 l'he American Mood: No More War 590 l'he Gathering Storm: 1938- 1939 591 Am erica and the j~·ish Refugees 591 l lntotheStorm, 1939- 1941 592 l'he European War 592 From lsolacion co lnten·ention 593 Pearl HaJbor and the Coming of War 594 I America Mobilizes for War 595 Organizing for Victory 596 l'he War Economy 596

587

CONTENTS

A Wizard War"' 598 l'ropaganda and Politics 598 1 11le Barrlefront, 1942- 1944 599 Uberating Europe 599 War in the: Pacific 601 The Grand Alliance 60J I War and American Society 603 The G ls' War 604 The Home Fronc 604 Racism and New Opport unities 606 War and Diw rsity 607 The Jnce:mme:ntofj apane:se-Americans 608 I Triumph and Tragedy, 1945 609 The Yalta Conference 610 Victory in Europe 610 The Holocaust 611 The Acomk Bombs 612

27 America at Mid- Century, 1952- 1960

638

I The: Eisenhawer Presidency 639

26 The Cold War Abroad and at Home, 1945- 1952

iX

616

1 11le Posrwar l'olicical Setting. 1945- 1946 617 Demobilization and Reconwrsion 617 The G J Bill of Rights 618 The Economic Boom Begins 6t9 Truman's Domestic l'rogram 620 I Anticommunism and Containment, 1946- 1952 621 l'olarization and Cold War 621 The Iron Curtain Descends 622 Containing Communism 623 Confrontation in Germany 624 The Cold War in Asia 626 The Korean War, 1950- 1953 627 I 11le Truman Administration ac Home, 1945- 1952 629 The Eightieth Congress, 1947- 1948 629 The l'olitics of Civil Rights and che Election of 1948 630 The Fair Deal 63'2 1 11le Policies ofAnticommunism 632 Loyalty and Security 632 The Anticommunist Crusade 633 Alger Hiss and che Rose:nbergs 634 McCarth)ism 635 The Election of 1952 635

..D)'t'lamic Consen •atism " 639 11le DO'IIm fall ofj oseph McCarthy 640 Jim Crow in Court 641 11le LaW'S of che land 642 I T he: Cold War Continues 643 Ike and Dulles 643 CIA Co\'ert Actions 644 11le Vietnam Domino 645 Troubles in che Third World 645 11le EisenhoY~Cr Legacy 646 I The: Affluenc Society 647 11le New Industrial Society 647 11le Age of Computers 648 11le Costs of Bigness 649 Blue-Collar Blues 649 Prosperity and the Suburbs 650 I Consensus and ConseJVatism 651 1bgcthe:rness and the Bab)• Boom 651 Domesticity 652 Religion and Education 653 11le Culwre of the Fifties 653 11le 1Cil'\i sion Culwre 653 1 T he: Other America 654 Pm-ercy and Urban Blight 655 Blacks' Struggle for j uscice 656 Latinos and latinas 656 Native Americans 657 I -Seeds of Disquiet 658 Sputnik 658 A Different Beat 658 Portents of Change 659

28

The Liberal Era, 1960-1968

662

I The: Kennedy l'reside:ncy. 1960- 1963 663 A New Beginning 663 Kennedy's Domestic Record 664 Cold War Activism 665 1b the: Brink of Nuclear War 666 11le 11lousand-Da)' Presidenq• 667 I T he: Struggle for Black Equality, 1961- 1968 668 Non\i olence and Violence 668

The African-American Revolucion 668 The March on Washington, 1963 669 The Civil Righrs and Voting Rights Acrs 670 Fire in t he: Stree:rs 671 "Black PoW'Cr" 6n I Uberalism Ascendant, 1963- 1968 673 j ohnson Takes 0\·er 67-J The 1964 Election 67-J Triumphant Liberalism 675 The Wa.rrcn Court in the Sixties 676

A Troubled Economy 702 Law and Order 70J l 'he Southern Strate:g}' 704 1 1'he: Crisis of the: Presidency 70-J l'he Eleccion of 1972 70-J l'he \'t1atergate: Upheaval 70S A President Disgraced 706

I Voices of Protest 676 Nath>t: American Activism 6n Hispanic-Americans and Asian-Americans Organize 677 A Second Feminist Wave 678 Women's Liberacion 678 I l 'he Liberal Crusade in Yie:cnam, 1961- 1968 679 Kennedy and Vietnam 679 Escalation of the War 681 The Endless War 682 Do\·es Versus Hawks 682

30 Conservat ive Resurgence. Economic Woes, Fo reign

Challenges, 1974- 1989 I Cultural Changes 710

I

29 A Time of Upheaval. 1968- 1974 I lhe Youth MM'mle:nt 686

I

I

I

I

Toward a New Left 686 From l'rotest to Resistance: 687 Ke:nr State: and jackson State: 688 Legacy ofStudent Frenzy 689 lhe: Counterculcun: 690 Hippies and Drugs 6'91 Musical Revolution 691 The Sexual Revolucion 691 Gay Liberation 692 1968: The l:tolitics ofUphea\•al 693 The Tct Offensive in Vie:mam 693 A Shaken President 694 Assassinations and Turmoil 694 Conscrvati\J'C Resurgence: 695 Nixon and World l:tolitics 6'96 Viemamization 6'97 LBj's War Becomes Nixon's War 698 America' s Longest War Ends 6'98 Detente: 699 Shuttle: Diplomacy 700 Domestic Problems and Divisions 701 The Nixon Presidency 701

709

685 I

1

I

Personal Pursuits and Oi\J'Crsions 710 Changing Gender Roles and Sexual Behavior 712 l'he l'trsiste:nce ofSocial Activism 713 Grass·Roors Conscrvacism 71-J Evangelical Jlrotestanrs Mobilize 715 Economic and Social Changes in Post· 1960s America 716 A Changing Economy 716 l'he Two Worlds of Black America 717 Brightening Prospects for Native Americans 717 New Patterns of Immigration 718 Years of Malaise:: Post-Watergate: Politics and Diplomacy, 1974-1981 719 l'he Caretaker Presidency of Gerald Ford, 1974- 1977 719 l'he Outsider as Insider: President jimmy Career, 1977- 1981 no l'he Middle East: Peace Accords and Hostages n1 1roubles and f rustration as Carter's 1tnn Ends 721 1'he: Reagan Revolution, 1981- 1984 rn Roors of the Reagan Re:\-olurion n 3 Reaganomics n4 l'he "Evil Empire" and Crises in the Middle: East 725 Militar}' Buildup and Ancinude:ar l'rotest n7 Reagan Rttlected na Reagan's Second ltrm, 1985- 1989 n9 Supreme Courc Appointments, Budge:c Deficits, che lran..ContraScandal n9 Reagan's Mission to Moscow 730 l'he: Middle East: Tensions and 1Crrorism 731 Assessing the Reagan Years 731

co.rmns

31 Beyond the Cold War: Charting a New Courn. 1988- 2000

734

1 11le Bwh Yurs: Global Raol"" Oom<stic Dnf~ 19SS-1nl m The Election of 1988 73S The Cold W.u Ends 736 The Persian GulfWa.r, 1991 737 Home• Front Problems and Oonxsnc Pblidt:s 139 199l:. Oamon \'t'tSUS Bush. and a 11tird·IJ;Jny Challenge 741 1 l 'he C linl'On Ern l~cgins: Od>.111ng Domestic Poliq•, 1993-1996 741 Shaping a Domestic Agend.a 742 ASI=p Riglu1Um: 1994- 19ll6 741 1 11le Econonu< Boom ohh< 1990s 745 An Un~ Prosperity 7<45 Amena :and the Global Economy 7~ 1 Clinton's Fortign Policy: DcAnlngAmerica's Role in a Post+Cold War World 747 The: B.1.lkruu, Russia, and Eun~rn Europe in the

POsc.scMer En. 747 Tbr ._hddk E.ut: Sttking an Elusi\~ 1\>att, Combanng a Wily Fot 7<41 Nuclear Proliftr.ttion, 1Crrorhom. and

Pc:acckceping Chalh:ngtll 749 A New World Order Painfully Emerges 750

I 1M Clinton En Ends: Oormsric Politics, 1mpexluncn~ Disput
Election 2000: Bush V!!rsWI Oore 753 1 Culcural l'rtnds :u Ct:ntury's End 75<1 Afflumcc 2nd a Sun::h for HcrotS 754 OutbuMS o(Violt:net Star Conttm 7SS Culture W.us:: A B~ V&C1'' 756

Da.yofl-lorror:Stptt:mbr:r lt, 2001 761 Confronring rht: Enemy in A(ghanistan 762 Tightening Home-front Sct\ll'ity 763 10c C1.mp3.ign in Iraq, ZOOJ- 2004 7/A 1 1\:)litia and rlv Economy 1n Bush's First lftm. 2001-2005 705 EconomiC R.nusts and eorporart: Sc.anda.ls 7&5 11lc Republican Domntic Age.OOa 767 . Cam j»Jgn l-1 nance Reform and cht: Election of2004 767

1 Foreign Pohcy in a Thrc.Ut"'ling Eu 769 _ l"'hc Conrinuing Suuggk In lr:tq; ~ng Home-- Front Support 7119 Nudur Prolifaarion 11lrc.ats m A Widcmng Trade Gap and China•s Growing Powcr 773 Envirotuncmal Hazards Become a GloNI Concern 77.,

1 SocU.l and Culrural Umds ln ContemporMf Amtrica 77S An lnctt.asingly Dh'tf'K People 775 Upward Mobility and Soc:l:ll l"oblt:ms in a Muldcchnic Society 776 10c "'New Economy" and rhc Old Economy m 1 llot1-.c l'Olicy Sin« 2004 779 Funding SodaiS«unty ,a.nd Hutch~ as the Fcck.r.tl Defidt Soars 779 Hurricane Katrina 1bsts the Bush

Admlnisrr-.ltion 780 Extending Republican l ntlucna: From tht Supmnc Coun to K Stfftf 711

()d,;a.c:ing lmmignrion m l'br: Elccdons of 2006 ~nd 2008 783 Condusion 715

Appendix

A·l

Otc:l:&r;~rion

oflndcpcndcna A-I Conslirudon of the United Sotts of Amc:ric.:J. A-4 Pres1denrial ElectiOttS, 1719- 2008 A- 1-t

Photograph Credits " '

32

Global Dangers, Global ChaUenges, 2001 to the Present 759 1 America Under Attack: Scpcc.mbc.r I 1. 2001, and Irs Afrermach 760 11lc BWih Administration lkgins 760

xi

~~ ~

Tb~ R«orutrua:JOn o( tbt South 359 Southern Slur«rrppong. 1880 369 ~bjor lnd.u.n-Whirc Cl.uh~ in the Wen 134 TranscontinmuJIUUroad.s and Ftdera.l Land Grants. 1851)..1900 3&9 Tht Oklahom.a Land Ru~h, 1889- 1906 398 Asian and Europr:anlmmigrants U\'ing in th~ Wtstcl'n Hc.mlsphcrc and Hawaii in 1900 428 l'i:rccntagc ofForcfgn·born Whircs nnd Native Whites of Foreign or Mixed J>.wemage in l Ocal Population. by Counties, 1910 430 The El«tion of 1896 4&a U.S. Tcmtorlal Exp:an,ion in the lone Nandcrnth Cc:nnn'Y 470 Woman Sutfn.gc: Before dv Nmd~mth Amrndmrnr 491 Th~ Elutaon oll912 SOO U.S. Hqm'IOC'If an tht Canbbc;an and Latin Amnia, 1900-19-41 S09 Tb~ Umml Statca: on tht u•dU':m front, 1918 518 11'U' Election of 1928 S$.4 Tht Dust ~·I 566 World War lim Europe md Africa 600 World War II an d1c P.1ci6c 602 1 'ht J~stw.u OMJion of Europe 625 T he Korean W:1r, 1950 1953 628 The El«tion of 1948 631 The El«tion of 1960 664 Voter Regbcrarion of Afriam-Amcric:ms in the Souc.h, 1964- 1968 671 The Vietnam War, ro 1968 640 1·he 1C:t OffcnJivc, j:anu:ary- Frbru.uy 1968 693 The Elutaon of 1968 696 Th~ E!utaon o( 1980 nl Th~ Unital Statu ln Latin An'luica md the Caribbran Th< M;dc.u< Crisl~ 1980-2000 7l9

n'

The EL«bon of2000 7Sl The Ekcuon of2004 761

xii

Iron~

Sr«< Produaion. 1875- 1915 408

Urban Gro'olo1h: 1870- 1900 427 Jnunigration co chc: Unirc:d Srat~s. 1870-1930 4a8 The Urban an d Rural Population ofrhe United States, 1900- 2000 S41 Major Mca,:urcs E1u.cred During rhe " Hundred Days'' (March 9 ~J un e 16. 1933) 563 N.;~.t10na.l

Ocft.nK Spending. 1941-1960 618

lnRat:ion., 1965-2006 102

\l·omm 111tht Work Fortt. 1950-1991 713 Pr:rcmtlgt of U.S. Population on Wdfot«, 1960-lOOS 744 Changing P.anmu o(\l'ork, t 900--2000 nB

xiii

udt tw du.ngai in America md lht> •uid sina: Yi'l' bcpn planning 7lrt

M

£"*""' V',.,. mon= than rv.u decades ago. Somt: of thac dc\~opmc:nts

h.11\<~: b«n "~komt" and positivt; otbt:rs dttply unsctrlmg.. 1'his new Con· dM' SlXth editiOn fully documents all of these changt:s, as w\•.11 as the c:onrinulries that offer n=auurJ;ncc for r~ furure. The Condu Sixth Edition builds on the underlying strategy tlut Ius guided u.s from the brginning. \Vc want o ur history to be not only comprchcnswc and llhuninating, but ab o Jiyely, re"'dable., and true co the u...ro experience of earlier genera· tions of Amcricn_n.s. Within a dear political and dtro nofogica l f•·;amcwork, we integrate the besr I'CCCm $Cholnrship in all areas of American history. O lll' inrcresr In

social and cultural hls.rory, which shapes our ow'tl teaching and scholarship, has $Uf· fused 1M l.!'l•ilNrmg Visum (rom the o utset, and it remains central. We mtcgrncc the historical upcrkncc of women nnd men of all regions, ethnk groups, and soci:al d..u.Ks who ~kc up tht AmuicJ.n mos.tic.

NEW INT(RPRETATIONS,

ExPANDED COVERAGE

In rumt yun., Amcric;an historilns h-aw tmpb.uiud ha-· dttply our hlll:ory b em· btddal.;thm a brga' glob.tl contttt.. ln tbt Concist: Sixth Edition~ h.nor under· scorN the wackr context of Am«ican history throughout the rW"n&:h~ F'rom rht oripm of agrtrulrurc rA'O millmnia '-go to the imp.Kt of gtob.a.lr.ution today, -'t have emphu1ud how cht: socW., economic, and political dn"t:lopnxnts ccnrn.J ro o ur historic.tl cxpericn« em~ wirh frtsh nf'w clarity whm \i.eww:d within a broader 'A'Orld frAme.,..'Ork. As in e:u'lkr edil'lon5, CO\orr.tgc of environmental history, the land, and rhc \Vcn is fully intcgl',lted into the nnrrnri\'c, and tre-ated analytically, not simply • tllCked on" co a cr.1ditionnl account. We :!lso incorporate the best of the new political hlsrory, scrcss.ing the soclnl, cuhural, and economic issues at stake in political d«i:don~ and debates. V:<'e again afTer cxrcnJ'ivr coverage of medidne and disea.sc, from the cpldcmks brought by Europc:;m explorers and s.!tders co roday's AJDS crisis, b10dh1cs ckbatrs, and controw:rsirs 0\'tf lualrh-carc finandng. Wt: aJ.so gi\..: careful attention co rcli· gious hbtory, from rhc spiritual v.tlun of prt:-Columbim commumtics to tht poliri~ caJ. acbvum ofconrcmponry consnvui\..: Christian groups.

VISUAL RESOURCES AND AIDS TO THE SnlDENT The Layout of dus tdJnon has ctungm from previous editions.. A n<W oncepns wirh Focus Qut:Stions dw cornspond to the mi.JOr i«· dons of the chapccr ro gn.~ srudrnts .1 prnitw of dv key topics to be CO'o'tted. 1'bcsc

xiv

PltEFAa

XV

questions art briefl}' answered at the end of the chapter in the ..Chapter Summar}'·" Throughout the chapters, scudems get assjstance from key terms chat art boldfaced in the text and defined in the margins.: ..Checking In" boxes at che end of each section summarize the key points in char section.

SUPPLEMENTARY RESOURCES A wide array of supplements accompanies this text co hdp students master the ma· terial and guide instructors in teaching from 1'bi! Enduring Vision, Concise Sixth t.J:Jition. For details on viewing or ordering these material~ please consulc rour Cengage Learning sales representative. The Instructor Website (found at ~ww.cengage.c·omj historyjboyerjenduringc·ondsll!6e) offers the Imtructor's Guide, an online manual including Instructional Tech· niques and Resources, Historical lm~stigations for students, and for each chapter, chapter themes, lecture suggestions, print and nonprint resources, and a guide co using che Enduring Voices documenc sets. Also available on the Instructor Website are primary sources with inscructor notes, Po~Awl'oinc slides for classroom presenta· tion, and personal response S}'Stem slides. A computerized testing program, avail· able on CD-ROM, provides flexible test-editing capabilities. Instructors who adopt 1'bi! Enduring V"tsion, ConciS4' Sixth Edition also reccivc access to Histoi'}'Finder, a poW'Crful search engine and primary source repository that hdps instruccors creace rich and exciting classroom prescmacions. 11lis online tool offers thousands of online resources, including art, photographs, maps, primary sources, multimedia content, and Associated !:tress interacci ~ modules. HistoryFinder's assets can easily be searched by kC}""'urd or from pu ll·d~·n menus by topic, media type, or by Wads"'urth/ Cengage Learning cextbook. lnscructors can then bro~A'Se, preview, and d~·nload resources scraighc from the W'Cbsite.

lnltrudor Tools

The Student Website (found at ~ww.cengage.c·omj historyfbo)'erfenduringc·ondse6e) contains a variety of tutorial resources including ACE quizzes with practice feedback, inceractiw maps. primary sources, chronology exm:ises, flashcards, and MP3 chapter summaries. lhe American Histol'}' Resource Center offers hundreds ofprimary sources such as speoches, lette~ legal documents and cranscripts, poems, mal'S> !Umularion~ timelin~ and additional ima&\"S chat bring history to life-along with inceracci\~ assignable exercises. A nup feature using Google Earth coordinates helps studencs learn g.."'gra· phf by comparing traditional textbook maps with an aerial view of the location coda}'·

student Tools

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Anr book, and chis one in particular, is lhe result of the hard work of manr people. As always, the editorial slaff ac Houghton Milllin has been outstanding. Particularly deserving of thanks are Ann \l'esc, Lisa Kalner Williams, and Bob Grciner.

xvi

PmACI

Sandra H.awlcy ehanlu h~r daughrtr, La' Annt: Hawley, who ;u tvt.r, has been In· ••aiU-l.blc in muhaplc ~nys.. Grt3.t rh:mks art: 0\\-N as 'A'dl to Lisoll.llfr~y Morris, P.ltri· d.t Piper, Ootothy Whlrc. Llny Kallus, Eric johnson, Md..tnic u.·~bvlr, and 1"ony Suk for c-httr continuing support. And~ RHscT ad:noa1«1grs S3.nc:lra McN.Ur H~ mel tht co-authon far h.and.Jng ham a superb ICXI from which ro wbitdt dcnm thr K'rond ..,aumc:: and ht th.ank.s P.aul S. Bo)w foe his suppon and frimdship.

CHAPTER I

TO

1500

C HAPTl R PR l VI l W

Til< Rrst Amoric.lns, c. n,ooo-2soo s.c. HowdHJ ~MUICIII d!a~~Jr slfape. th~ tnr...WO.. from Pw*o-btt:lint ro AtdttJic tiii)'S

off/
·("tiRIDMnity, C. 2500 I.C.- AD. 1500 W1lot: wtr rM ~ difftttncts .,-~ tAe /'WtrM Amtriat1t Nltvm thot tmt.f'J1dg{tt.r-

zsoo •.c.?

- · No1thAmericon P"'''les on the EVl! of

European Contact

W1tot etmlmcM w.rlun did Natill't Amedrons sho,. dnpi14 thf'ir MUt diwnity?

T

he hisrory of the Americas beg;an thous:mds o ( )'l.'atS bt:fore Christo· phcr Columbus's firsr voyage. 0\'tt that time, an Indigenous American history un·

Hohobm Ceramics. ca.. A.D. 1000

folded, .scpararc from rhat of rhe Old World of Africa, Asia, :r.nd Europe. Some N:adft Amuicans ektd out thcir n:iscm« in precarious cnvironmau:s, whnn.s others mjoy«t pros· prriry. some livtd in sm.aU ~ bur orhus 9-dt in Lugt dries; .somt bdin'N that rht- first humans came (rom ~ sky, and odwn thought dut rhry origm.uplcs tognhtt nwl< Norrh Amttica a humoan ha.b1t.at a.nd g.J\"r it a history.

(ff) This icon oMII direct )
t nduringc:onciseee

1

2

OfAPlER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES OF A llltrUCA, TO ljOO

THE fiRST AMERICANS, C. 13,000-2500 B.C. How did environmen WI cMnge slt4f16 the transition from Pahw-lndHm to Archaic ~ys oflife? Precisely how and when the \'('estern Hemisphere 'A'llS sctded rcrnains uncer· tain. Although many Indians believe chat their ancestors originated in the Americas, most scientific theories poinc to che arrival of peoples from norcheastern Asia during the last Ice Age (c.. 33,000- 10,500 a .c.), ~Ailen land linked Siberia and Alaska. As the Ice Age waned, Native Americans adapted to environments char ranged from tropical co frigid and developed d iverse cultures that nonetheless had many d emc:ncs in common. Sciemiscs no"'' bdie\-e that the: earliest migrants from Asia

Pellpilnl New Worlds traveled by boat along che coastline around 13,000 a .c . Re·

IMontVenlt. Ciile

Site of bum.tn habitation by 12,000 u:.

114rioc........ link b<. tWft'll Northeast Asia aod f.u Northw1•.n Nord!. America during. late Ice Agt'

1

l

~ae.an..lilns Eal'lieJt peoplt.s of the- Amerias, 13,000~0

•.c.

recipf.aty mutual beJtowing.

l

ofgifts and (;won; r;~.tlle'r man rompe'.'lirioo Rlr R'SOUI'n'5

cent a.rchaeological 6nds at Monte Verde, Chile, re\·eal evidence of human habitation by 12,000 tl.c. latermigrants reached the Americas b)• crossing che Bffing land bridge and fanned out in che interior as melting glaciers opened the way for eastward and southward migration. Most Native Americans descend from these early migraci on~ bur a later surge of migration brought Athapaskan (ath·a.·PAS-bn)·speaking peoples to the Americas about 7000 u.c. lheir descendants include the Apaches and Navajos. The arrival of non -Indian Inuits, Aleuts, and Eskimos after 3000 u.c. completed che peopling of the Americas. Mosc Paleo (PAY·I«-oh)-lndJans lived in sma ll bands of fi fteen co 6fty people. The band lived cogecher fur the summer buc split into smaller groups of one or two families for fall and winter. Although they mo\·ed constantly, they remained ~Aithin informal boundaries except when they traveled co favored quarries to obtain jasper or tlim for making tools. Here they encountered other bands, ~Aith whom they traded and joined in religious ceremonies. Mosc Paleo-Indians practiced redprodry, the mutual bestowing of gifts and fa\'ors rather chan competition for resources. By 9000 B.c . many big-game species, including mammoths and mastodons, had \'llnished. (:talco-Indian hunters contributed co this extinccion, as did a warming climate and environmental changes. Human beings ~A'ere major beneficiaries of these changes. dima ric warming continued until about 4000 B.c . ~Aith dramatic effects for Norch America Sea levels rose, flooding the shaU o~A' continental shelf, and glacial runoff filled the Grear Lakes, the Mississippi River basin, and other w.u-crs. As the gtaders receded nonhward, so did the cold, icy arccic or subarctic en\i ronments char had co..-ered much of what is now the United States. Treeless plains and C'\o-ergreen forests yielded to deciduous forests in che Ease, grassland prairies o n the Plains, and desert in much of the West. An immense range of planes and animals covered the landscape. The Archaic (ar-KAY-kk) peoples, as archaeologists term naci\J'C North Ameri· cans fro m 8000 B.c . to sometime after 2500 u.c., lh-ed off wide varieties of smaller

Arcblk Societies

I

ThE R .rtSl AM ERICANS, c. '], OOO- :tjOO 8.C.

3

People present in Ameri:a Paleo-Indians spread lhtooghool We~Em Hernisph"" Emnction of big.game mammals Archaic era begirtS Alhapaskal-speating peoples arrive il Nor1tl America Frn domesticated pli!lliS grown Fnt maize grOMI i1 Mesoamerica Eskino and Neut peoples arrive in North Ameri:a Archaic societies yield before diverse ctllures; fi'st maize gro\\fl in North America Powrty Poirt nourishes in louisiana Adena cubure flotrishes in Ohio Valley Hohol:am arlull! bejjro il SoUIIr..~ Anasazi arlull! bejjns il SoUIIr..~ Hopewell rulllrre thrM!s il Midwest Rise o1 chieldorns on Nor1tl..~ Coa~ and in C.lifomia Teotiwadln flourishes i1 Mesoamerica MayMI tingdoms Holl'isfl Mississippian rultt.re begils; An.asazi ewpartsion begins Urban certer arises at UhoUa Norse attempt and fail. to colonizeVilland Anasazi and Hohokam peoples dispem in Soothwest C.holria dodines; i l h - disperse Rise of Aztec empire Rise of Inca ~e Christopher Colurnlxrs reaches We~n Hemisphere

mammals, fish, and wild plants rather chan big game. Greater efficicnq • in hunting and gathering permitted l~r populations to inhabit smaller areas. In rich areas, such as the Ease and Midwest, large populations Lii,!'Cd in villages for virwally the en· tire rear. For example, a )'tM·round village that flourished near present-day Kamps· ville, Illinois, from 3900 to 2800 a .c. supported JOO to JSO people. lcs residents procured fish and mussels from local lakes co supplement the deer, birds, nuts, and s«ds available in the surrounding area. Over time, Archaic Americans sharpened distinctions becwccn women•s and men's roles. Generally men fished and hunted ~Aililc ~A
ARCTIC

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

PACI FIC

OCEAN

D

E)!O!fj Ol

lltCI, c. :U,OOO-IO,!iOO llC.

Map 1.1 Tht Poopliog of 1111! Americas Scie ntists postul o:~te two prob:~.ble routn by which the eMii"'" peoples 1'\";.lc:hed AmeriQ. 6y 9500 B.C., they h~ setded throughout the Western H etni,ph~.

4

how to cultivate some plants and t hen developed cools for d igging and grinding, as W'CUas effectiw methods of drying and scoring seeds. The most sophisticated of t hese carl)' farmcrs li~d in highland valleys in Mesoam.eric.a. pardculartyTehuacin (ttl'l·wha·CAHN) . By 3000 a.c. chey were cultivating squash. gourds, beans. chili peppers. and fruits. Ac the same time Tehuacin furmers began che long process ofdomesticating a lowlands plane called teosime. "'ilich ulti· maccly became maize (matt}, or corn. Maize agriculture spread rapidly; by 2500 ll.C. maiu: "''as cultivated as far north as modern New Mexico and as far sout h as t he Amazon basin. At the same time. Indians in the Andes were already cultivating potatoes. while their counterparts along t he l':tci6c coast harvested squash. bean~ and peppers. lni· tiall)' these domesticated plants constituted only a small pare of che Native Ameri· can diet. essentially a supplement to meat. fish, and wild plants. Centuries would pass before stable societies based primarily on agriculture emerged.

CU LTURAL 0JVERSI1Y, C. 2500 B .C.- A. D . 1500

l

~a Rougbly, laod utmding from modem Mtlrico to Colombia; Q,ntl'lll Amtri:a plus Maico

Hi$tori.anJ belie'~ th.at mo$t Nati\'C' Am«iC'.uu d6rC'ndC'd from nor the.a't .o\$i.ut p<eO'" pk$ who arri~d in the' AmC'rio:.a$ !Tom around 33,000 ro 9000 a.c. Pa.IC'O'-Indiaru, the' e.arli6t pC'ople'-J of the' Am.eric;u., liv~d in JmaU g,oup$ ;md wnC' m.ainl)' huntC'rJ. Clim.uir wanning u~-atC'd favorable' C'nvlron mt'-nu fOr np.:mJion, ind u ding the' C'm C'rge.nrC' or agriru1tui'C' by 5000 II.C.

What ...,nt the prin
Mesoamerica and s.lb America

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6

OfAPlER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES OF A llltrUCA, TO ljOO

As Tcocihuacin declined, che Maya (MY-uh) rose. l iving in kingdom-states that flou rished fro m south· ern Mexico to Honduras, the Mayade\~loped a highly accurate calendar; a numerical system.: and a system of phonetic, hieroglyphic writing. Ma)'an codices (sin· gular, codex)-fonned from bark paper glued inro long fOlded strips- recorded religious ceremonies, his· torical traditions, and astronomical obseJVations. In the fifteenth century tv10 powerful empires emerged: the Aztecs of Mexico and the Inca of l'r.ru. In 1428 the Azcecs began asserting control 0\'Ct Lake Texcoco in the Valley of Mexico and its surrounding communities. After 1450 Aztec expansion became in· creasing!}' bloody, as Aztec priests maintained that their gods demanded to be sen~d human blood and hearts; ~A>arriors sought capti\~S fur human sacrifice. Tenochtid 3n (teh-knowtch-tHt·LAN). the Aztec Built 0\"C:f sever;al eenturiu , th is pyr~id 1"\"crn;ai:ntd capital, at its peak had some rwo hundred thousand tht l:ugeR struetui"C' in the Amerie;u until ;after the inhabitants. At the cencer of the city was a massh~ Sp;u~is;h ;arril.•td . tem ple complex. The Aztecs borro~A'Cd freely from ocher Mesoamerican societies, taking writing from l"cotihuacin and the calendar from che Maya. lb support che capital's population, the Aztecs developed intensi..-e agriculrure based on artificially created islands anchored in LakeTexcoco.: Aztec engineers developed an elaborate irrigation S}'Ste-m co provide fresh water for boch people and crops. The Aztecs collected taxes from conquered peoples living wichin a hundred miles of the capital.: from chose farther awa)', they exacted tribute. Aztec trading net· works extended far from 1tnochtitl:in, reaching as far norch as the American South· west. HO\l'C\'Ct, by the early sixteenth century rebellions had flared up within the Aztec empire. Far to che south, the Inca empire was expanding as u~ll. After 1438 Inca con· quest created an empire that screeched along che Andes and its adjacent areas. The Inca v.'Cre highly su ccessful farmers, producing enormous quantities of pocaroes, maize, beans, and meats. 1'hey constructed terraced irrigation systems on their un· C'\-cn terrain, perfected freeze-drying and other preservation techniques, and built a vase netwo rk of roads and bridges. The arrival of the Spanish ~A'Ould descroy both empires.

The Southwest (the modern American Southwest and most of northern Mexico) is an arid region of d iverse landscapes; hO\l~\~r. various peoples managed to establish stable supplies of water and to become farmers. Although maize had reached the Southwest as carl}' as 2500 ll.c., noc until the introduction of drought-resistant strains of the plane around 400 s.c . did large agriculrural societies emerge. l'he two most influential of these V.'Cre che Hohokam (ho-HO-kum) and the Anasazi

The Soutllwest

£arty i~Jrkulwnl Soutltv.'l'st

IHohoob..or socit
Ani:Azi Puc-blocultun' that domin.tted SoothW'C':St rmm

I

100 ..c..-A.o. 1200

(an-\lh·SAW·ZH).

I OJUVItAL OJVtltSitY, c. lSOO 8.C.-A.O. 1$00 Hohokam culru.re emerged in the chird cencury B.c. when ancescorsofPima and 10hono O'odham Indians began farming in the Gila (HEE-Ia) River and Salt Rh-er \'alleys of southern Arizona. The Hohokam people built elaborate canal systems for irrigation thac enabled them to han-est two crops each year. The construction and maintenance of the canals demanded large, coordinated work forces.1'he Hohokams therefore built permanent villages of SC\o-eral hundred res iden~ and many such com· munities u-ere joined in confederacions linked by canals. The central village: in each confederation coordinated labor, trade, and religious and political life for all. The Hohokam ~A'llY of life drew on Mesoamerican materials and ideas. From about rhe sixth cenrury A.D., the l~r Hohokam \tillages had ball courts and plat· form mounds like those in Mesoamerica,. and ball games became major public events. Mesoamerican arr influenced Hohokam artists, ~Ailo used d ay, stone, turquoise, and shell. Archaeologists haw found Mesoamerican items, such as rubber baJis, maca"' feathers, and copper bells, ac Hohokam sites. Anas.u:i culrure originated during the 6rst renrury a.c. in the Four Corners area ......tlc:t'C Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah moec.. Although they adopted village life and agriculture: late, the Anas.u:is expanded rapid!)' in the eighth renrury ,,.o. and came co dominate a wide area. Modem Pueblo Indians are descendants of che Anas.u:L The Anasazis had a distinctiw architecture. l 'hcy conscructed their early d....-ell· ings, round pit houses, in the shape of ltivas (KE£-vahs), che pard)' underground, circular scructures ~Ailere Anasazi men conducted religious ceremonies. Anasazi·style aparcments and kivas are characteristic of the architecture of the mode:rn~a}' Pueblo Indians of the Southwest. From the cemh through the mid-twelfth cenrury, an unusual!)' ~A'rt period. the Anasazis expanded O\'tr much of today's Ne~A' Mexico and Arizona. Village popula· tions grew to a thousand or more:. In Chaco (CHAH-ko) Canyon in northwestern New Mexico, a duster of rwdw: villages forged a pO\l--erful confederacion numbering fifteen thousand people. Perfecdy straight roads radiated fro m the canyon to satd· lite pueblos up co sixty·fiw miles away. l 'he builders carved out stairs or footholds in the sides of sceep cliffs. The can)'On 'A'llS a major crade center, imporcing and exporr· ing a wide range of materials from and to Mesoamerica, the Great Plains, the Missis· sippi Valley, and California. Oe\'astating droughts in the late cwelfth and thirteenth centuries destl'O)''td classic Anasazi culrure. Suddenly, the amoum of farmland was drastically reduced fora population chat had gro~A'tl rapidly during che precedingcenrurie:s. 1'he Indians abandoned the great Anasazi centers and scattered. Other farge agricultural communities, su ch as chose of the Hohokam, also dispersed when droughts came, dearing the wa}' for the arrival of che non-farming Navajos and Apaches at the end of the thirrecmh cenrury.

tin

7

A latgoe chun~r, oftto

wbolly or partial)y under.

grouod, io
a... c.n,.o em~""

I

~ful Anu.u:i con~cltn.tion, .t.O. 900-A.O. 1200

long before they developed agriculture, Indians of the Eastern Woodland~ che vast forests from the Mississippi Valley co che Aclantic coast, experimented with village life and political centralization. By 1200 B.c. about 6vc thousand people had concentrated in a single ' tillage at Pm-eny l'oinc on the Mississippi Ri\'ct in Louisiana Two farge mounds flan ked the village. and six concentric embankments-the largest m-er

Tilt Elsll!l'll Woodlands

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8

(f"f')

OfAPlER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES OF A llltrUCA, TO ljOO

Primary Source:

~ C.holcia

........,.iH.,01bre Eutrm Woodbnds 110cirtir.s, whid!. Ooutisl!ed IZOO •.c.......o. 1400; indudl'ld Ptwttty Point, Ad~ Hopr-l'll, ;and MiJ~SiJ~Sipian

Cahokia M~or mound.

I

building "supt:m'nter," A.D. 900-A.O. 1200

half a mile in diameter- surrounded iL During che spring and aurumn equinoxes, a person standing on che larger mou nd co uld "''lltch the sun rise direcd)' 0\'Cr the village center. Solar observations formed the basis for chese: Indians• religious beliefs as wdl as for their calendar. l'overcy l:toinc Ia)' at che center of a farge political and eco nomic uniL It imponed quartz, copper, obsidian, cr}'Stal, and other sacred materials from long distances and distributed them co nearby communities. These communities almost certainly sup· plied che labor for the earthworks. The Olmcc peoples of Mesoamerica d early influenced the design and organization of Poverty l:toinL The settlement flourished for only chrec centuries and then declined, for reasons that are unclear. A different mound-building culture, che Adena, emerged in the O hio Valley in chc fifth centur}' a.c. Adena villages rarely exceeded fo ur h undred inhabitants, but che Adena people spre-ad ow~r a wide: area and builc hundreds of mounds, most of chem con· taining graves chat retlecce:d an individual's sodal standing. During the first century a.c., Adena culcure- cvoto.-ed inco a more developed and widespre-ad culture known as HopewelL Hope'l'--ell ceremonial centers, larger and more-elaborate chan those of the Adena. mushroomed along the Ohio Ri\'ct and llli· nois River valleys. Some: ce-nters contained cwo or chrec dozen mou nds wichin cndo· sures of SC\-eral square miles. 1'he: grave-s of the: elite contained elaborate burial goods: freshwater pearls, copper ornaments, mica, quartz, and other sacred substances. Hopewell artisans used raw materials fro m chroughouc America cast of the Rockies. Through crade networks Hopewell influence spread to communities as distant as places in modcrn·day Wisconsin, f1orida, and New York. The people who created the sophisticated Hopewell culture were primarily hunter-gacherers, noc farmers. Although they did grow some crops. agrkulru.re became a dietary mainstay for Woodlands peoplconl)' betv.rce:n the SC\-enth and cwelfth centuries A .D. The 6rs.t full·time farmers in the East were the Mississippians, who lived on che: flood plains of the Mississippi River and irs major cributaries. Their culcure, begin· ning sometime around A . D. 700, blended clements of the: Hopewell culture and ideas from Mesoamerica wich their o"''tl traditions. Mississippian t~·ns, concaining hundreds or e\-en chousands of people:, W'Cre: built aroun d open plazas like chose of cen· tral Mexico.. Religious cemples and elite residences scood atop farge mounds next ro the plazas. Religious ceremonies focused on worship of the sun as the source of ag· ricultural fercility. Chiefs claimed to be related to che sun, and "'then cheydie:d. wi\--es and servants "'"re killed co accompany them co the afterlife. Artisans produced so· phisticatcd work in d a)', stone, shell, copper, and wood, largd )' for religious and funeral rituals. By the: tenth cenrury most Mississippian cencers were pare of larger confederacies based on trade and shared religious beliefs. Po"'wfuJ «supercenters" and chcir chiefs dominated these confederacies. The most po"''l'-rful confederacy J'C\'01\-ed around the magnificent city of Cahokia (ka -HO-ku-t.~h), near modern SL Louis; its influence extended from the Appalachians to the edge of the Plains and fro m the: Great Lakes to the G ulf of Mexico. After ,,.o. 1200 Cahokia and other valley centers experienced shortages of food and ocher resoun:es. Densely concentrated societies had taxed a fragile environment with a fl uccuaring climate. Competition for suddenly scan:e resources led ro debili-

8

(f"f')

OfAPlER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES OF A llltrUCA, TO ljOO

Primary Source:

~ C.holcia

........,.iH.,01bre Eutrm Woodbnds 110cirtir.s, whid!. Ooutisl!ed IZOO •.c.......o. 1400; indudl'ld Ptwttty Point, Ad~ Hopr-l'll, ;and MiJ~SiJ~Sipian

Cahokia M~or mound.

I

building "supt:m'nter," A.D. 900-A.O. 1200

half a mile in diameter- surrounded iL During che spring and aurumn equinoxes, a person standing on che larger mou nd co uld "''lltch the sun rise direcd)' 0\'Cr the village center. Solar observations formed the basis for chese: Indians• religious beliefs as wdl as for their calendar. l'overcy l:toinc Ia)' at che center of a farge political and eco nomic uniL It imponed quartz, copper, obsidian, cr}'Stal, and other sacred materials from long distances and distributed them co nearby communities. These communities almost certainly sup· plied che labor for the earthworks. The Olmcc peoples of Mesoamerica d early influenced the design and organization of Poverty l:toinL The settlement flourished for only chrec centuries and then declined, for reasons that are unclear. A different mound-building culture, che Adena, emerged in the O hio Valley in chc fifth centur}' a.c. Adena villages rarely exceeded fo ur h undred inhabitants, but che Adena people spre-ad ow~r a wide: area and builc hundreds of mounds, most of chem con· taining graves chat retlecce:d an individual's sodal standing. During the first century a.c., Adena culcure- cvoto.-ed inco a more developed and widespre-ad culture known as HopewelL Hope'l'--ell ceremonial centers, larger and more-elaborate chan those of the Adena. mushroomed along the Ohio Ri\'ct and llli· nois River valleys. Some: ce-nters contained cwo or chrec dozen mou nds wichin cndo· sures of SC\-eral square miles. 1'he: grave-s of the: elite contained elaborate burial goods: freshwater pearls, copper ornaments, mica, quartz, and other sacred substances. Hopewell artisans used raw materials fro m chroughouc America cast of the Rockies. Through crade networks Hopewell influence spread to communities as distant as places in modcrn·day Wisconsin, f1orida, and New York. The people who created the sophisticated Hopewell culture were primarily hunter-gacherers, noc farmers. Although they did grow some crops. agrkulru.re became a dietary mainstay for Woodlands peoplconl)' betv.rce:n the SC\-enth and cwelfth centuries A .D. The 6rs.t full·time farmers in the East were the Mississippians, who lived on che: flood plains of the Mississippi River and irs major cributaries. Their culcure, begin· ning sometime around A . D. 700, blended clements of the: Hopewell culture and ideas from Mesoamerica wich their o"''tl traditions. Mississippian t~·ns, concaining hundreds or e\-en chousands of people:, W'Cre: built aroun d open plazas like chose of cen· tral Mexico.. Religious cemples and elite residences scood atop farge mounds next ro the plazas. Religious ceremonies focused on worship of the sun as the source of ag· ricultural fercility. Chiefs claimed to be related to che sun, and "'then cheydie:d. wi\--es and servants "'"re killed co accompany them co the afterlife. Artisans produced so· phisticatcd work in d a)', stone, shell, copper, and wood, largd )' for religious and funeral rituals. By the: tenth cenrury most Mississippian cencers were pare of larger confederacies based on trade and shared religious beliefs. Po"'wfuJ «supercenters" and chcir chiefs dominated these confederacies. The most po"''l'-rful confederacy J'C\'01\-ed around the magnificent city of Cahokia (ka -HO-ku-t.~h), near modern SL Louis; its influence extended from the Appalachians to the edge of the Plains and fro m the: Great Lakes to the G ulf of Mexico. After ,,.o. 1200 Cahokia and other valley centers experienced shortages of food and ocher resoun:es. Densely concentrated societies had taxed a fragile environment with a fl uccuaring climate. Competition for suddenly scan:e resources led ro debili-

10

CHAPtER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES Of' A llltRICA, TO ljOO

Along the Pacific coast, from Alaska to sout hern Cali for· nia,. impnwements in the production and storage of food enabled Indians to develop more: settled wa}'S of life than their Archaic forebears. f ro m the Alaskan panhandle co northern California. nativ-es spenc brief periods each y-ear catching salmon and other fish . The Northwest Coast Indians dried and scored enough fish to fast the year, and their seasonal movements gradual!)' gai,!'C way to settled life in pennanenc villages of cedar· plank houses. On the Columbia Plateau, Indians built villages of pit houses and ace: salmon through the summer. They left t hese: communities in spring and fall for hunting and gathering. By ,,.o. I many Nonhwcsc Coast villages numbered se:w~ral hundred people. lnteracti\•e Map: Culture Areas of Trade and warfare strengthened che po~A'cr of chiefs and other leaders, whose: fami· Native Americans lies had greater ~A'ealtb and prestige: than commoners. l eading families proclaimed and lo<.ations of Selected their scacus in elaborate totem poles depicting supernatural beings linked to chcir Tribes, A O. 1500 ancestors and in podacches, ceremonies in which the Indians gave away or destro)·ed much of their mawial we:alch. The arcisric and architeccural achiC"t-e:mencs of Nonh· west Coast Indians a\1.-ed Europeans. At about che same rime, Indians farchersouth, along the coast and in the interior valle)'S of ~Ailac is now California,. began co live in villages of one hundred or more people. Acorns dominated thcir diet, supplemencing game, fish, and planes. After che fall harw~st, Indians ground che: acorns into meal, leached chem ofbictcr cannic acid, and then roasted, boiled, or baked che nucs before eating or scoring them. The end of the Archaic period produced lictle change in the forbidding arid· ity of che: Great Basin, encompassing present-day Nevada, "-\".Stern Utah, southern Idaho, and eastern Oregon. l 'he area continued to su pport small huncing·and· gathering bands. 1b the ease of the: Great Basin Ia)' the: grasslands of che Great I' lain~ too dry to su pport large: human settlements but ideal for herds of game animals CHECKI NG I N su ch as antelope, deer, and elk. Primar}' among che Great Plains animals Pu~~rful states, ' uch :u th~ M.l)'ll; u.-e:re the buffalo, which sen --ed nomadic hunters as an ambulator}' super· Au«, and I nc~ tmpires, dt \'doptd ma.rket. In addition to meac, buffalo provided hides for clothing and tipis, in Mtwamerica and J~ru. bones and hom for cools and arrowheads; Indians used most other buffalo Pueblo wci.ety, ftaturing Jophi$1i· parts as welL Follo~A'ing the great herds on fooc, nomadic t ribes killed indi· catcd ;a_griru.ltur~ and irrigation, de\~loped in the" Southv.\"$t. \'idual animals ~A'ith spears and arrows, but also stampeded hundreds at a time over cliffs. Tht Eouttrn \Voodl:uwb ' aw an i nc~$C' of mound bu ildcn in Mil· During and after the: Mississippian era, some Eastern Woodlands cribes si,i pp~n ctntcr~ Juch ;a, D h okia. migrated to che 10'\1.-e:r ri't-e:r valleys of the Plains, where t hey established per· Along t ht Pacific co:uc, non fa.nning manem \'illages and relied upon fanning as ~A'CU as huncing. soci «i ~ llou ri, htd. In tA'CStern Alaska,. the Aleucs arrived around 3000 a.c., bringing ~A'ithin t hem sophisticated tools and "''c apons from chcir S iberian homeland. Most imporcand)', the Aleuts introduced che bo~A• and arrow to the Americas. 0\"tr st\'cral thousand years, t hey spread eastward across Canada as far as Greenland. Nww abo koown .u Vikings. The firsc "-erified concacts betv.r'C'e:n Europe and America came ~Ailen the Norse: Wl'n' a wa:rriof cultute (rom colonized Greenland in the 980s. 11le Norse traded with che Aleuts for furs and ~A'lll· Xandin:n>ia rus ivory. In 1001 lcif Ericson led a group of Norse who planted a small sectlemmt V'.UH ,itt of' tint kno-
I I

I NOIUW AMERICAN PEOPI.ESOM THE E\'E OF EuROPEAN ContACt

11

Yin land sctclemenr, although the: Greenland scrtlemcnts endured almost until t he end of the 6fte:ench century.: it would be Lacer Europeans ~Ailo wo uld reap, ac the expense: of the: nacive peoples, che fruits of a "-new world.'"

NORTH AMERICAN PEOPLES ON T HE EVE OF EUROPEAN CONTACT What common values did Ntfflve Americans shan1 despit6 their vast dill8rsity? In 1492 t he Western Hemisphere: numbered about 75 million people, clustered

thickly in Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean islands, and Peru. Between 7 and 10 million Native Americans li\\_-d north of Mexico. Sparse nomad populations inhabited the Grear Basin, t he high plains, and che northern forests. Denser concent rations, hC>'~'-"f:'\'ef, thrived along t he l':lci6c coast, in cheSouthW'CSt and Southeast, in the Mississippi Valley, and along the: Atlantic coast. Speaking manydh-erse languages and dialects, these people constituted several hundred Indian nations and t ribes. Despite the vast dh-ersity of Native American culru.res, they shared many char· acteriscics. Kinship, reciprocity, and communal control of resources Lay at the base of Indian sod ecies, "'ilile era de ensured that the bOY! and arrow, ceramic pocte::ry, and certain religious practices existed in almost all Indian socie::cies.

Kinship and gender cemented sod ecies nort h of Meso· america cogechcr. T ies co cousin~ aun~ and uncles ere· ated complex patterns of social obligacion. Kinship bonds were more imporcanc in Indian society chan t he bonds wichin nuclear families; that is, among married couples and chcir children. Indians did not necessaril)' expect spouses to be: bound co~chcr forever, buc kinship lasted for life::. Cusco ms regulacing marriage \'aried, buc strict rules prevailed. In most culru.res young people married in t heir teens, generally after a period of sexual expe:rimenca· cion. Strong cies of residence:: and deference bound each couple to one or boch sets of parents, producing what social sdencists call extended famiUe:s. In some:: Naci\J'C American sode::cies su ch as che Iroquois, che extended families of "''Omen cook precedence 0\'Ct chose: of men. A new husband moved in with his wife's extended famil)'· The:: mochcr's olde::sc brother was the primat}' male: aut hority figu re in a child's life. In man}' ways, a h usband and father "''lls simply t he:: guesc of his wife's family. Other Indian sode::rie::s recognized men's extended families as pri· mat)', "'ilile:: sciU ochcrs did not d istinguish sharply between the status of male: and female family lines. In addition, kinship was che: basis for arm ed conflict. Indian societies typically considered homicide a macte::r co be resolved by t he: extended families of t he viccim and the perpetracor. If the pcrpecrator's famil)' offered a gift that the:: victim' s famil)' considered appropriate, t he quescion "''lls setded. If not, the:: victim's kin might avenge the:: killing by armed retaliation. Chiefs or other leadcrs intel"W:ned co resolve disputes within the:: same:: village or tribe::, but disputes btrwecn members of different groups could escalate into "''llr. Densely populated societies that competed for scarce::

Man~d cooplo .utd tbeir dtildrm

l...deatr-iSes

utendedlllllilies

Familit.S that cons.ist or~ral goeot:r.a.

l

tioru tiviog togtthc-r

lnteraai\oe Map: Locations of Selea ed Native American Peoples. Jt.O. 1500

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12

CHAPtER 1

NATIVE PEOPlES OF A llltRICA, TO ljOO

-

PACI~fC

OCEAN

-

,.,.._ •Wa ho G.~£AT S.SN lllollllt

I*

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Mop 1.2 l.oations of S.ltcttd Nitivt Amtrita• Ptoplts, A.D. ISOO Tod;ay's lnd ~:ltl n;ationswer~ W\"U en;ablished in homd;ands ;acrou the con tinMn.,+u:n Europe;ans first ;vrived. would combt:ne with CKh~rs or m01o~ in l;atu centuries, o:itho:r vofun t;vilyor bo:a.uso: tho:yW\"re fof'c:o:d .

M:at~y

resources, as on the California coast, and centralized societies that attempted co dominate crade networks chrough coercion, such as the Hope:W'CII culcure, cxperi· enced frequent and intense warfare. H~\....,-er, ~A'llrfare remained a low-lew.l affair in most of Norch America. An exasperated New England officer, writing of his efforts to win Indian allies in the early sewmeench cmrury, described a batde between two Indian groups as "more for pastime than to conquer and subdue enemies."' He con· eluded chat .. they might fight sewn )'eatS and not kill se:vm men.'"

I NOIUW AM ERICAN PEOPI.ESOM THE E\ 'E OF EuROPEAN ContACt

13

Among almost all agricultural Indians except chose in chc Souchwcst (where men and women shared chc "''Ork), women did most of che cultivating. With wo men producing most of the: food suppl)', some: communities gave women more: pc>"~r chan European societies did. Among the Iroquois of what today is upstate New York, for example:, women collecti..~ly o"''lled che fi elds, distributed food, and played a major role: in seleccing chiefs. In New England, women sometimes sen~d as u rbnns, or chiefs.

Nati\~ American religions rC\'Oivcd around chc co nviction chat narure "''lls au ..~. pulsating with sp irirual powcrMtmitou (MAN·ih·too) in chc Algonquian language. A mysterious, awe-inspiring force chat affected human life: for both good and evil, such po·wer united all nature in an unbroken web. Manitou encompassed ..every thing which chey cannot comprehend," wrote the English l'uritan leader Roger Williams. Belief in supcrnarural poW'Cr led most Indians to seek constand)' to co nciliate all the spiritual forces in nature: living chin&!"> rock~ water, the su n and moon, e\'en ghosts and witches. Native Americans had Sf:'\'cral "''ll)'S of gaining access to spiritual J>O""'t:r. One "''lls dreaming; most Native Americans took seriously the vi· sions that came to them in sleep. They also soughc access co the: su per· natural by using physical ordeals co alter cheir consciousn ess. Young men gained recognition as adults through a vision quest- a solitary \'enture chac entailed fasting and waiting for che appearance of a spirit that "''Ould endow them with spedal f>O""'t:rs. Girls "''Cflt through comparable rituals ac the o nset of menstruation, co initiate chem into the spirirual world from which female reproductive po"''« tiO'I'--ed. Entire communities often engaged in collective f>O""'t:Heeking riruals, su ch as chc Sun Dance (sec Chapter 17}. Indians nonnally relied on chose: wich spedal poW'Crs co co mmuni· catc with unseen spirits. These: medicine men and "''Omen "''Cre healers who used medicinal planes and magical chants to cure illnesses. They also interpreted dreams, guided \i sion quests and other ceremonies, invoked war or peace spirits, and figured pro minently in community councils. Native American sodeties demanded cooperation. From early child· hood, Indians learned to be accommodating and rescn -ed-carcful not to rC\•cal their feelings before they could sense chose: of others. Indian par· ents generally punished b)• shaming. Communities made de
Spiritual and Socii! Values

PoWI'S'ful spirit~l fon:t tlvt Algonquil~spaking lod.i.\ru bdic"d pti'Y.ldtd ;all of nature Othtr Nll.mU'llhlt ttrm.s.

INIIIIitou

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Ki1uhip tiu baund virtu..llly .lll N.l~i \>e Amc-ric.uu.. tn mo't N.u:iv~e Amcric..ln soei« ie':l, gender roles wnc- ckar: wume"n fume-d and ltW'n hunt«!. N.lti\>e Am«ic.uu li~d in .ll wolid ptrmuttd by ,ptritual pow~e.r that they could tap imo through \';uiou' ri ruab. tnd i..ln soei« ic-J ~ ntral ly dtmand ed cooperation and order fTom t he-ir mc-mben:. Rccipcocity dom in..ltc-d politic.U and soci..ll n-btion, h iP' among indMdu,l}, and betw~e<.n lt adtrJ and the-ir follO'>\"'n:.

maintenance of equilibrium and interdependence among individuals of unequal J>O"""er and prestige. Most leaders' authority depended on t he obligations they bestO'II.~d. rather than on coercion. The distribution of gifts obligated members of t he community co support chcm and to accept chcir auchority. In the same way, po"'wful communities distributed gifts to u.-eaker ncighbors "'tho recipro· caced wich tribute in the form of material goods and submission.

Chapter Su 0 0W'NLOAO THE

MPJ AUOt O R LE O F THE CHAPTER SUMMARY TO

LISTeN TO ON THE CO.

How did environmental change shape the transition from Paleo-Indian tc

I

Ardiaicways o{Ji{e? (pa!'J' 2)

Ancestors of most Native Americans reached Nort h America from around 33,000 to 10,500 a.c. The earliest known human scctlcmems date to around 12,000 IJ..C. P:tleo-lndians and cheir Archaic descendants developed diwrsc soci· ecics, with agriculture appearing in Mesoamerica as cady as 5000 B.c.

What were the principal differenas among the Noti1~ American cultures that emergpi after 2500 B.c.? (PO!'J' 5)

I

From 2500 IJ..C. tO A.D. 1500 di~-erse Native American societies based on agri· culture proliferntcd and adapted to widely varying environments. Among the most pcominent were the centralized Mesoamerican sociecics, such as t he Ma)'a and che Aztec; t he Jnca of che Peru\•ian Andes; the Pueblo societies of what is now t he southwestern United States; and t he Eastern Woodlands mound build· ers of HoJ'C""~U, Adena, and Cahokia. N'onf.trming societies like t hose of the Pacific N'otthlh~t also prospered. Th e vast grasslands of che Great Plains were home to nomadic hunters dependent on che great buff.llo herds.

K EY TERMS

Monte Verde. CJ1ile (p. 2) B«ing land bndge {P. 21 Pale
Me.,.merica (p. S) Hohotam (p. 6) AnalaZi (p. 6)

ijva (p.J) Cllaco Canyoo (p. 1) moond-buildllg culture (p. 8) (allotia (p. 8) Norse (p. tO) Vinland (p. 10) nucl<ar famiy (p. tt) mended tanily (p. tt)

manitoo (p. l3)

What common volws did Native Antfrlcons short despite tMir vast diversity? (P•IJ' 11)

I

lkspite their di-wcrs-ity, the: majority of chc$t soclcun stund 5n\"t:ll com· mon chanctcrisucs. In most, knuh1p pb.yrd a Ctttic.\1 JOCW :t.nd political tolt, with cxtmdtd f~ilio wummg grt"..&rct impomanct than nuckat f.uniJjn.. Gtndt:r also pb.ytd a major rolt 1n Otga.mzing most soc:mlu, with 'll'Omtn d~ mg tht f.umi.n:g md mtn pttm.&rtly huntmg. Jndl.ms bdJtvrd rhu narua w;u spitiru.al ;u nll as physicil :md sought to hwln accotd ,.,1h rht suptmarun.l M05t propln sought ooicrly SOCKtia and ttllftl on mipromy ro m.ainuin

subiluy. N.uiYt Amtrictns nrYtr uw thtnudws as: singk ptapk. lr ns EutOpnns who nnplwu.td chfrutnen bdwun tht:mst:.ha md dw lndu.ns, a rumr bt...,.«1 br Chnsrophr< Columbus, who ohoo he hod Lind«! in ohc lndi<s. llus rww Ammca, 10 wtuc:h propk weft acqorimi ICCOf"d..ng m continnual anasrty, •-.u c-.ldaa.lly daffumt (10m the one thu lloutuh«l fiot rhousmds cf 1492.

,...,.l>cfo«

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C HAPTER 2

1400-1625

CHAPTER P R EVIE W

-

Alrican and European Bac:tgrounds W1tot mOJOt' chongn wtn mhoping tht African ond European worlds in the Ffteenrh 41nd six.tec.nth t'fnrwrltsl Europ.,.nd the Atlantic IV
•mupl -

Fooei04ds In Notlll America. 1512- 1625 How dJ EM"'ffttJtJ etp/omriotl; COtllj'WSt* tJnd ........,... o{HMtA.Anvm btfjo?

A•

ten o'clock on a moonlit night the 1enSt crtw sponed a glimmering

hglu. Ar rwo o'clock r.he next morning came

the a: hour "L:and! Land!,. It was Octobco:r 12, B.artholomt w Ootwlld Tr~ding with Wam~noag lndt.ans at MartN 's Vineyard.. Massachusetts (New Engtand, 1602). by Theodore Ot Bry, 1614

16

1492. Ar d11ybrrak Christopher Columbus w~nc ashon; the ruyal .si'J.ndn_n:lo(S~in Ouncring,knclt to give r.h.mks,

and rosc to claim fur S~n chc island tl\:u he named San Sal\•ador. Columbus 's m.•w quidcly began trading wirh the local Taino In· d ians for golden om~cnu. 10 the 1'otinos their trade with the Spanish was an exch~gc bd~ttl cqu:al partners. Bur Columbus be· lie\'Cd that tht Sp.ani.Jh w.:rc cndded to n 1le rhe Indians and to pro· vidt tbt:m •ith Chriltl:&nary and Europran civilization whnht':r chq •·:uut':d t.hnC' thlnss or noc. Columbus's mttbng whh dw Thinos VI"U a critical sup in tht formuion of an AtbnDC world. A(ur 1492, pt':s of tr.adt, colocuuno n , ft:ligion. :and •"U.. l'bt":St: inttr· changes consuncly dullmgod cuoronu.y ways of thinking and acting. They .Uso led to f.ar-n:.achmg mvironmenral changt":S• .as not only people but also pt.~.nrs and animals crosstd tht: Ad antic in both

I AfiUCNf A~O Eui!OPEAN BACKGitOUNDS

17

diroccions, a process knM'"n as the ..Columbian exchange." European nations sought to increase their wealth and power by conquering and exploiting the inhabitants of the Americas, whom chcy deem ed nonciviliud.

In much of what is now Latin America, che: arri\•al of the Europeans led to con· quest. In the: future United States and Canada, ho"''CW.r, European ma.Htf}' came

more: slo"'•ly;. more chan one hundred re-ars would pass before self-sustaining colonics "'-ere established there.

AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN BACKGROUNDS What majtN dlangtts ...,,.. n1shaping the A[ric4n and European WfNids in tM fi(teenU. 4nd sixteenrll centuries? Ew:n before the emergence of the Ad antic world in the fifteenth and sixtrench centuries, the four continents bordering the Adancic were changing. In che Ameri· ca.s, societies rose and fell (set: Chapter 1). In Africa and Europe, the growth of long· distance trade enabled some states to flouris h as a marker economy dc'ldoped alongside older social and religious customs. In Europe, am bitious monarchs joined forces wich merchants co propel terrirorial expansion, che population nearly doubled, societies grew unstable, and an intcllcccualf\.•·volution, the Renaissance, spawned a religious re\'Olution, che Reformation.

Before the beginning of Ad antic tra'ld, t he onl}' link besub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean was a broad bdc of grassland, or s avanna, which separaces the desert from the forests to t he sout h. Here caravan trade scim ulated the rise of king· doms and empires whose size and wealth rivaled chose of an}' in Europe. The richest grassland kingdoms rose in Wesc Africa, with its ample scores of gold. Chief among these in the fifteenth cenrury was Mali, whose Muslim rulers en· jored access to a network of "''Calthy Muslim rulers and merchants. Mali's wealth rested on che careful culcivation of trade, and its fame extended throughout Africa, Europe, and the Middle Ease. Irs best-known dey, 11mbukru, was famed for its intd· le<eual and academic vitality and irs beautiful a.rchitecrure. Mali feU victim co internal strife early in the fifteent h cencury, hO'I'-"f:'\'et; a successor state, Songhai ( SOti.G-~gtl), prospered for less chan a cencury before it was absorbed by Morocco. To the south of the savanna empires lay a region of small scates and chiefdoms. During the fi rst millennium A.O ., coastal Wesc Africa was relati'ldy insignificant. During the firsc millennium A. D., Islamic states arose in Sencgambia (seh-nuh·GAM· bft;h), ac Africa's westernmost bulge, and in Guinea's (GII'I.N--t>t>) coastal forests. 1'he besc-knO'I'-ll state v.-as Benin (BEH-nin), where artisans fashioned magnificent ironwork fur centuries. Near che Congo RiV\'.r sciU farther south, four major kingdoms had arisen by the fifteench century. 1 'he most po""-~rfu l of these kingdoms was Kongo. When most European nations adopted gold as the standard for their currency in the fifteent h cenrury, gold· rich Guinea's population soared. Thousands of N~n

I

Rich gr;wlands wbm West Ahian ciril~ns

Sb"'ffM

pn.'lilpt~d

lnte~"aai\'e Map:

Aftic.a and Its

Pl!oples, <. 1400

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18

CHAPtER l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWORID, 14j00- 16lj

lnteracti\oe Map: Westem Africa and Atlantic Slave Trade

Mali Hors.all, <. 11111- l&tluentury This terr;~ ·~tt:.f.gure origin;~u:d in M;~.li, o n.e of st'\'er.ll pO'Wl'rful empil'\':$ in West AfriC~~ bc:fol\': the ;~,rn,.;~.l of Europe;~.ns.

newcomers from che: savanna and Central Africa surged inco Africa's "Gold Coast," and new states emerged to capitalize on che: precious metaL None was as extensive or powerful as Mali or Ghana ac their height. We:sc African leaders wielded sharply different amounts and kinds of political power. Grassland emperors claimed semigodlike smcus, which they only thin !)' dis· guistd if adopting Islam. Rulers of smaller kingdoms d e:· pende:d on their ability to persuade, to conform co custom, and sometimes to rediscribute wealth juscl)' among chcir people. In West Africa, kinship groups knit societies together. Parents, aums, uncles, distant cousin~ and those who shared clan ties formed networks of mucual obligation. In centuries to come, the tradition of strong extended fami· lies would help enslaved Africans to endure che breakup of n uclear families by sale:. The region's high mortality race: fro m famine and cropical d isease epidemics was a driving force: behind marriage:. Children were an essential pare of the labor force, contributing co a family's wealth by in· creasing its food production and theamountof land it cui· tivated. Men of means frequentl}' married more than one: wife in order to produce more children; wo men generally married soon after puberty. Both men and women farmed. The high ratio of land to people enabled African farmers to shift their fields peri· odically and thus maintain high soil quality and produc· tivity. In areas of coastal rain forest, food crops such as )'ams, sugar cane, bananas, and ~plant flourished; so, too, did cotcon. On the grasslands, catcle: raising and fishing complemented che: culti\•ation of millet, sorghum, and rice:. By che: fifteenth century the: marker econom}' took in many small farmers, who crade:d surplus crops for other food and d oth. Artisans "''OW cotton or raffia palm leaV\'S, made clothing and jewelry, and crafted tools and religious objects. Religion permeated African life:. People bdiC"".-ed that anocher world fay beyo nd the one they perceived through chcir five sens~ a world co which che: souls of most people passed at de:arh. Deicie:s spoke to mortals through a variety of means, including priests, dreams, ..speaking shrines;'' and magical charms. \'('esc African religions emphasized che importance: of continuous m-elations; co nse· quently, there was no fixed dogma or hierarchy like those char characterized both Is· lam and Christianity. African religion also emphasized ancestor "''Orship, venerating ancestors as spirirual guardians. Religious motifs saturated African art. West Afri· cans used chcir ivory, cast-iron, and wood sculptures in ce remonies rce:naccing ere:· arion myths and honoring spirits. A strong moralistic scre:ak ran thro ugh African fol kcales. Oral reciters transmitted these stories in d ramatic public presenta tions with rirual masks, dance:, and music of complex rhychmic structure. West African art and music powerfully influenced twcmicrh-cenrury art and jazz.

I AfiUCNf A~O Eui!OPEAN BACKGitOUNDS

19

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C- I.S00-1600 C- I.SOG-1600

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European Renaissance Coaslal We~ African kilgdoots rise and expand Portuguese ~... lrade in Wesl Africa begins Banolomoo IJCas roaches lhe cape of Good Hope Christian "re
Dirtier attempts to colonize eastern canada llizallolh l becomes queen ol lng~nd SLAu&IJSiile lounded by Spanish Inglish colony of Roanoke eslabished.lhen disappear< E~nd deleals lhe Spanish Armada Ollalelounds Now Met James I revokes Virginia Company's charter

Among African~ Islam appealed primarily to merchants trading wich Muslim Norch Africa and co grassland rulers eager to co nsolidate their pO'wer. By 1400, Islam had just begun to affect the daily lives of grassland culcivators and artisans.

When Columbus reached the Americas in 1492, Europe was approaching the height of a cuirural revival known as the Renaissance, a rebirch of dasskal Greek and Roman culru.re. l ntdleccuals and poers bd ie\-ed that their age ma.rked a rerum to the ideals

&npHn Culture -Sodely

ll.eniissao! "Rc-bin:h" of daPiul G~dt and Roman culturt tlvt J11'1'pt Europe"

from tbt fifttrnth to tbt k'YI't'ltffl~C.h cmtuty

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NOR TN

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0 C £AN

I AfiUCNf A~O Eui!OPEAN BACKGitOUNDS

21

of the: and em Greeks and Romans. The writings of Muslim, Eastern Onhodox, and Jewish scholars prO\idcd a creasure trm-e of ancicm tcxrs in philosophy, science. medicine, geography, and ocher subjects. Scholars stnwc to recondlc Christian faith and ancient philosophy, to explore the mysteries of narure, to map the .....-orld, and to explain che motions of the: hea\'CflS. Renaissance painters and sculpcors created works based on close obscrvacions of nature and attention to perspective. Ac che same rime, European socictyqui.,.ercd "'ith tension. l 'hc era's artistic and

intellectual creativity stemmed partly from intense social and spiritual scress, as Europeans groped for stability by glorifying order, hierarchy, and beauty. A concern for power and rank, or "degree," dominated European life in the fifteenth and six· tecnch centuries. Gender, ~A'Calth, inherited position, and political power affected every European's stants, and few people lived beyond the reach of some political authority's claim co tax and rule. But chis order 'A'llS shak)'· Conflkcs becween ranks, beNttn religions, and bct\1/een rich and poor threatened che balance, making Euro· peans ding aU the more eagerly to order and hierarchy. Change lay at che heart of chese: conflicts. By the end of the fiftecnch ce:ntUr)', strong national monarchs in France and England had unified chcir realms and reduced che power of both the nobility and the Catholic church. O n the Iberian 1\-:n· insula, che marriage of King ~rdinand of Aragon and Queen lsabdla had created the Spanish monarchy and a unified Spain. Seventy to eighty percent of Europeans were peasants. Taxes, rents, and other dues co landlords and church offidals were heavy. Poor harvests or "-'M dto'IC' even well-to-do peasants to starVation. By 1600 dramatic growth 'A'3S driving up che populacion to 100 million. Food supplies, however, did noc rise as rapidly. l'casant families s mvived on pitifully low yields of wheat, barley, and oats. l'lowing. so~Aing. and harw:sting cogcther, they also grazed livestock on jointly owned "commons." But wich new land ac a premium, landlord~ especial!)' the Englis h gcncry, began to "enclose" the commons, thus making chem pri\•ace property. Peasants wich no wrirten ride to their lands ~A'Cre particularly vulnerable. land scarcity and populacion growth ~A'Orsened peasants' drcumstanc~ as did a «Uctle Ice Age" that lasted more: chan four ccncuri~ drasticall)' reducing the food supply. Hunger and malnutrition were: widespre-ad, and full-scale famine struck in some areas. Population growth led to increased demand for wood and thus to de:for· estation of large: areas; the subsequent disappearance: of~Aild foods and game acedcrated the exodus of rural Europeans co to~A'tlS and cities. Alchough numerous. European towns usually contained only a few thousand inhabitants. London, a great metropolis of 200,000 people b)• 1600, was an e:xcep· cion. Large or small, tO'IIt'ns ~A'Cre d irty and disease ridden, and townspeople li'led closely packed with chcir neighbors. l'rople of the rimes saw tO'IIt'OS as centers of op· porcunity, and immigration from the countryside swelled urban populations. The consequences of rapid population growth ~A+ere acute: in England, ~Atbcre: the population doubled from 2.5 million in 1500 to S million by 1620. Some members of che gcncry grew rich selling wool, but because of technological stagnation, per capita output and household income among ce:xtile workers fell. In effect, more workers competed for fewer jobs as European markets for English d oth diminished and as food prices rose. Land e:ndosut'f: aggravated unempiO)'lllCnc; Large numbers

MdettUre English pr:.c:tioe of fmcing off w"- h.ul belen common glUing b.nd; leftmany pc'asou1t$ imp!M"l'i~

I

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22

OfAPlER l

joiot--

l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

Fo~N~

ot:r oftoodem corpor.M:ion; -.>;~.y

to t.aiSl' ~Mgt :runu or mooney by Sl'Uiog~:r io .an m~rprist

of unemployed workers and displaced farmers ~A'llndered the countl')'Side, seeming to chreaten law and order. A handful of English writers began to speculate char 0\'Cf· seas colonies could serve in effect as a safety valve. As in che New World and Africa, traditional society in Europe rested on long· term, reciprocal relationships. Reciprocity required the upper classes to act wich selfrestraint and dignity, and the lower classes to show deference to their "betters."' It demanded strict economic regulation, too, to ensure char sellers charged a ..just" price-one that C()'I.!'Cred costs and aiiO""-oed the seller to profit but barred him from taking advantage of buyers' and borro'l'-oers' misfortunes or of shortages co make "excessive"' profics. Yet the ideals of traditional economic behavior had been ~Aithering for centuries. By the sixteenth cmrury, noching could stop the practices of charging interest on borro~A•ed money and of increasing prices in response to demand. New forms of business organization, such as the joint-stock company, the ancestor of che modern corporation, steadily spread. Demand for capital investment grew, and so too did che supply of accumulated wealth. Gradual!)', a new economic oudook arose that justified the unimpeded acquisition of~A'ealth and unregulated economic com· petition. Its adherents insisted that individuals owed one anocher only the money necessary to setd e each marker transaction. l 'h is «market economy" capitalism stood counter to traditional demands for che strict regulation of economic activity to en· sure social reciprocity and co maintain "just prices."' Sixteenth· and seventeenth--century Europeans were ambivalent about eco· nomic enterprise and social change. A restless desire for opportunity kept life sim· mering ~Aith competitive tension. Ho\1/C\"Cr, even those who prospered sciU sought the security and prescige of traditional social distinctions, and the poor longed for the a~·old values chat they hoped ~A'Ould restrain irresponsible greed. Fundamental change in European society could also be scm in the rising impor· tance of the n uclear family. Each member of the famil)'- facher, mother, childrenhad specific roles. The father exercised supreme authority; che wife bore and reared children, and assisted her husband in che unending labor of providing for the fami· ly's subsistence. Children u.oere laborers from an early age. The family 'A'llS thus the principal economic unit in European society and che househ old, the primary social organization. Those ~Ailo lived oucside a household were vil""'·ed with extreme suspi· cion and became easy targets for accusations of theft- or e\oen witchcraft Although a father m jO)oed full authority over his family in theory, his dependence on his wife's work often lim ited his authority in praccicc.

Sixteemh-ccncmy Europeans believed in the biblical cxpla· nation of the origins of the world and its peoples. Chris· tianity caught thac jesus Christ, God's Son, redeemed !Unners through His crucifixion and resurrection. As real as God co European Chris· rians was thedevil, Sacan, ~Ailo lured people to damnation by tempting them to do evil. Man)' sixtecnth-<mtur}' Europeans also believed in ~Aitchaaft, magic, and astrology. Although j ewish and Muslim European minorities shared Christians' worship of a single supreme being, based on the God of[he Old 1·esramc:nr, hatred and vio· lence often ma..rred their shared hiscory. European Christians had conducted Cru-

lllgiDIII Upheavals

I

AfiUCNf A~O Eui!OPEAN BACKGitOUNDS

sades against Muslims in che Middle Eastj each side sa"'' the conflict as «holy war" or "jihad'" and labeled the ocher "-infidel." At the same cime: as che Catholic empires of Spain and Portugal d ro\'f: Muslims from their territory, the: Islamic Ottoman empire conquered much of the Balkans and menaced Central Europe. In 1492 che Spanish completed the "reconquest"' of r.he Iberian peninsula from Muslims and forced jews co com-en or lea\'e. The medieval Chriscian church mught that Christ had founded the: church to save sinners from helL Ever}' cime: a priesc said Mass, Chrisc•s sacrifice: was repeated, and divine grace flO""--ed to sinners through sacraments that priests alone could administer- especial!)' baptism, confession, and che Eucharist (YOU·k..r-ist), or com· munion. In most of Europe the "church" was a huge netWOrk ofclergymen set apart from faypeople by ordination into the priesthood and by the fact that chey did not matr}'· l 'he pope, the .,vicar (representative) of Christ," copped this hierarchy. His authority reached throughout most of central and ~A'CStern Europe. The papacy wielded a~A'CSOme spiritual poW'Cr. Fifteenth· and sixteenth~cemury popes daimed the authority to dispense extra blcssin&S> or ..indulgences," co rtpencanc sinners in return for .,good works;" such as donating money to the church. In· dulgences also promised time off from future punishment in purgatory. Given people's anxieties ~r sjn, indulgences wert enormously popular. But the sale of indulgences prO\'Oked charges of materialism and corruption. In 15 17 Marrin Luther, a Gcnnan friar, attacked che practice. When the papacy tried to silence him, luther broadened his criticism to include the Mas~ priests, and the pope. His r...-....'Oit sparked che Protestant Reformation, which changed Chris· cianity fort\·er. To Luther, the selling of indulgences was evil noc onl}' because it bilked people but also because the church d id harm by falsd}' assuring people that they could "earn" salvation by doing good wocks. Luther believed instead that God alone chose whom to save and that believers should crust only God's IO\'C, not the "-'Ord of priests and the pope. luther's 0'1'-'n spiritual struggle and experience ofbcing "-reborn" con· sticuted a classic com'ersion experience-the heart of Protestant religion as it would be preached and practiced for centuries in England and North America. later reformers also abandoned Catholicism. For example, the french cheologian john Calvin insisted on the doctrine of prcdestinacion, in which an omnipo· tent God .,predestined" most sjnful humans to hell, saving only a few to exemplify his grace. Boch Calvinists and Lutherans, as the foiiO'I'-'Crs of che two Refonnarion leaders came to be called, W\'.re horrified by radical Protestants, such as the Anabap· cisrs, who criticized the rich and powerful and restricted bapcism to adults who had undergone a conversion. Despite such differences, Protestants shared much common ground. Reading the Bible became an essential element of faith; translations into living languages made che Bible accessible, and the newly invented princing press allo~A'l'd for wide circulation. l'rotescamism rhus fostered education. Protestants also rejected the idea that priests had special powers; each individual had co assume responsibility for his or her own spiricual and moral condition. Finally, many l'rotescams felt dis· placed b)• the rapidl)' changing European world and )'earned for greater sjmplicity. Thus Protestantism condemned che replacement oftraditional redprodtyby market· place values.

23

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1

J.... C..M• N rly Pmttsunt

I

thtoklgiln •·ho bdi~ in ~cks.tinuion"

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24

OfAPlER l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

Challenged by the rise of Protescancism, che Catholic Church displayed re:· marl;.able resilience:. Indeed, the papacy vigorously attacked church corrupcion and combated Protestant viewpoints. 1'his Cacholic revival, known as the: Counter· Reformation, created the modern Roman Catholic church. The Reformation also split Europe geographically. Many northern and ~A'CStern European areas, including England. most of the: Gmnan states, the: Netherlands, and pares of France, became predominantly Protestant; most southern European states- l'orcugal, Spain. and Italy- and mosc of f rance remained Roman Catholic.

England's Refo nnarion began when King Henr)•VIII. anx· ious for a male heir, tried to annul his marriage to Catherine: of Aragon. When the: pope refused co do so. Henry persuaded Parliament to annul the: marriage and then to proclaim him «supreme: head" of the Church of England (che Anglican church). Religious scrife troubled England for O'ler a century after Henry's break with Rome. Under his son Edward VI (ruled 1547- 1553), hO\l'f:'\'er, the English church veered sharply to~Aoard Protestantism . Then Henr)"S daughter Mary assumed the: throne in 1553 and tried to restore Catholicism. in part b)•burning several hundred l'rotesrancs at the: stake. The reign of Mar)"S su ccessor, Elizabeth I, who became quem in 1558. ma.rked a crucial watershed. Mo.sc English people: were now Protestant; bow l'rocestant 'A'llS Pwbas English bllooa~n of the question. A militant Calvinist minority. che Puritans. demanded wholesale «pu· D:lvin, dium~n from otllb. ri6cacion" of the: Church of England from «popish abuses." As Calvinists, they aflisbtd Cbun:h of England firmed salvation by predestination, denied Christ-'s presence in the: Eucharist, and bdiC"t·e:d that a learned sermon was che heart of true worship. l'hcy ~Aished to free each congregation from outside interference and encouraged lay mem bers to partie· ipate in parish affairs. l'tlritanism appealed mainly to the growing middle sectors of English societythe gentry, university-educated cle:rg}men and incellenuals, merchancs, shopkeep· ers, artisans. and ~A'Cil ·to·do farmers. Se:lf~ isdpline had become central to boch the: worldly and the spiritual dimensions of these people's lives, and from chcir ranks v,:ould come che seeders of New England (see Chapter 3). Puritanism attracted few of the titled nobility, ~A•ho enjo)'ed their wealth and privilege, CHECKI NG I N and few of the desperately poor, who were struggling for mere: survival. tn the firtunth c:enrury t he \t'ut Qu«n Elizabeth distrusted Puritan militancy until the pope declared Arri ~n uvann.lh rr.a_gmencC'd politi· her a heretic in 1570 and urged Catholics to O\'erthro"'' her. By courcing in· c:.:.lly• .:.nd l.d .un g.ained .:. foothold. fluenrial Puritans and embracing milicanc anti-Catholicism, Elizabeth main· From the IOurtemth to ,;ewnt~nth tained mosc Puritans' IO)'lllty. But after her death. religious tensions came co centuries, Europe w:u undtrgotng major c:ha ngu. T1W" Jknai.u.an«, the a boil. ri'e of n.ltion~$t.lt~ popuLnion Under Elizabeth. most l'tlritans expected to transform the Church of gi'O'>\·th, t he emerg,nc:co of.:. m.:.rMt England into inde:pende:ntcongregacions of"saincs.'" Ho~A'CVCr, Scuarc monC"Conomy, and the Rdarmation .Sft the $tol_got for territoria l up.uuion a.rchsjames I (ruled 1603- 1625) and Charles I (ruled 1625- 1649) bittcri)'OP· .:.nd contlia . posed Puritan efforts to eliminate: the office: of bishop. Recognizing that tn the throu of rd igiouJ tr.anJfiw.l'tlritan attacks o n bishops ....-ere a direct chrear to his thro ne, j ames snapped, mation, Rtformation fingbnd Jaw "No bishop. no king." Nonetheless. he: quietly tolerated Calvinists who did the rUe of Puritanism. not dissent loudly.

I

J EUROPE AHO trtE AT......."tlC WOilLO, 1.4410- 16oo

25

EUROPE AN D THE ATLANTI C WORLD,

1440- 1600 What ~s tlt6 Atlantic world, and how did it 61'1Hftge? At chc scare of the: fi fteenth century, European ~A'Caltb was conccncratcd in the Mediterranean dty--stace:s,such as Venice. B}' che: scvc:nteemh ccnrury, much of this ~alth had shifted co che: Atlantic stat\".S, where monarchs were: consolidating thcir pOW\'.r oo.-ervasc territories in Europe and che: Americas. l'orrugal and Spain emerged as the first great Adamic f'O"''C!S• driving a new European imperialism across che: oceans ofthe world. From this imperialism would emerge: both a transadanric slave trade: and the colonization of new lands; these in tum would lead to a new Ad an ric world.

Merchants re-alized char they could increase their profits by trading directly with Asia and Africa. Leading the shift from a Mediterranean co an Adancic ~A
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Member of Portuguot royal f.amity -.flo encou:.1gtd apkw;a.. tioo ofA&ica, st..\rd!td for I'OUII':CIO & ia

Slavery was ~A'CII established in 6ftecmh-century Wesc Af· rica. as elsewhere. The grassland emperors as ~A'CJI as indi· vidual families depended on slave labor. But most slaves or chcir children were absorbed inco African families over rime. First Arabs, and then Europeans, h()\1/(!'\o-er, rurned African sla\-tr}' inco an interconcinental business. The Portuguese exploited existing African commercial and social patterns, often crading slaves and local products to ocher Africans for gold. The local African kingdoms u-ere too strong for the l'orcuguesc to attack, and black rulers traded- or chose not to trade-according to their own self-interest.

Tilt "New Slaver( 1M Racism

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26

....,......-

OfAPlER l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

..... ""11'V, ...-

~~ H.usb mnn of ·~ry b»cd oo nu:ism; MOJc"

as ;a tc"suk oCPortug...~~~' ,;l:n.'l' trade •itb MM.

1

lnteraai\oe Map: Major Transatlantic Explorations. 1000-1587

@

The: coming of the Po rtuguese slai,!'Crs changed West African societies. Small kingdoms in Guinea and Senegambia expanded co "service-" che trade, and some of t heir rulers became rich. Farther south, in modern Angola, the kings of Kongo used t he slave t rade: to consolidate their power and adopted Christianity. African kings and their communities used the sla\-e: t rade to dispose of"-undesirables,'" in· eluding t roublesome slaves, lawbreakers, and persons accused of witchcraft. But most slai,!'CS were simply victims of raids or "''llrs. Muslim and European slave trading greatly stimulated conflicts among communities in Africa. Europeans had used slaves since ancient Gr~ce and Rome, buc ominous changes took place in European slavery once the l'ortuguese began making \'0}'· ages to Africa. First, the new sla't-e: trade was a high·\'Oiume: business that expanded at a steady rate as Europeans colonized the: Western Hemisphere and establis hed plantation societies there. Between 1500 and 1600, perhaps 250,000 African slaves would reach the: N ew World, and 50,000 would perish en route. Between 1601 and 1621, 200,000 more U.'Ould arrive. Before the Ad antic sla...-e: trade ended in t he nine:· teent h centUr)', near!}' 12 million Africans would be shipped across the sea. Sla\-e:ry o n this scale had b~ n unknown since t he Roman Empire. Second, African slaves recei\·ed exceptionally harsh treatment. In medieval Europe:, slaves had primaril)' performed domestic service, but by 1450 the l:tortuguese and Spanis h had created large sla\,!'C·labor plantations o n chcir Atlantic and Mediterranean islands. Using African slaves who toiled until death, these plantations produced sugar fo r Eu.ro· pean markers. Enslaved Africans became property rather than persons of lo"'' sta· rus, consigned to endless, exhausting, mindless labor. By 1600 the: "newslawt'}"" had become a brutal link in an expanding commerce t hat ultimately "''cmld en· compass all major Western nations. f inal!)', race became: the: explicit basis of the ..new slavery."' Africans' blackness and alien religion dehumanized them in European e)'CS. As racial prejudice harde ned, Europeans found it easy to justify black slai,!'Cry. European Christianity, moreover, made few attempts to soften sla't'tr}"S rigors. Because t he: victims of t he: ..new slavery" u.-e:re physically distinctiw and culturally alien, sla\-e:ry became: a lifelong, hereditary, and despised status.

The fascinating. contradictor}' figure of Chriscopher Co· lumbus ( 145 1- 1506} embodied Europeans' varied moti\--e:s [Beyond. 1492-1541 for expansion. l 'he son of an Italian "''C-aver, Columbus be:· came obsessed by the idea t hat Europeans could reach Asia b)• sailing "''C"Stward across the Atlantic. Combining an O\'CreSt imarion of Asia's easN'llrd t hrusc with an underestimation of the earth's drcumfcrence, he conduded t hat t he: "''Orld "''lls much s maller t han it actually is and that the open·sea d istance from Europe: to Asia was roughly three thousand miles, noc the actual N'Cive thousand miles. Religious fervor led Columbus to dream ofcarr}i ng Christianity around the globe:, but he: also hungered for "''Calth and glory. Europeans had \'enturcd far into the Atlantic before Columbus: besides the earl}' Norse, fifteenth-<entury English fishing boats may have reached Nonh America's coast. Whac distinguished Columbus "''lls his persistence in hawking his "enterprise of t he Indies'" around Europe's royal courrs.. ln 1492 che rulers of newly united Spain,

iTo Amerka and

J EUROPE AHO trtE AT......."tlC WOilLO, 1.4410- 16oo

27

EINloi:M4o;l~

EIEf'GI$114~ EIFfl\0:11~""~ E ISp.ll1$114t;f011r.1

ATLANTIC OCEAN NOQ TH AMEQ ICA

AFQ I C A

Mip 2.2 Mijor Tr11sadantic EJploratiOI S. 1000-1517 FoUowing Colu mlxa' s 1492 voy.:~ge, Sp;ain' s riv.:~b $00n btg:~n lo~~ying d;aim to p.:~rts oftht New WOf'ld b;tstd on thot voy:.gu ofC;abot for Engl:~nd, C.abr.ll for Portug.ll, ;and Verr;tz;ano for Fr.:~n~e. L:.ttr Engtis;h .and Frtnc:h uplor.:~tion focustd on hr.ding ;t p;u.s;tge to k<;a ;around or through C;art;ad.a.

Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon, accepted Columbus's offer, hoping to break a chreatened Portuguese monopol)' on Asian trade. Picking up the wester!)' trade ~A'inds, Columbus's three small ships made landfall wichin a month off the Norch American coast at a small island that he named San Salvador. Word of Columbus's disco\'er}' fired Europeans' imagination. Jc also induced the Spanish and Portuguese co sign che TrearyofTordesillas (tor~day·SEE·yuss) in 1494, dividing all future discoveries becwecn chemseto.·es. Columbus made three furcher voyages, in the course of ~Aohich he established Spanish colonies but nc_;.-er fui6Ued his promise of reaching Asia Meanwhile, England's Henry VII (ruled 14851509) ignored the Treatyoflbrdesillas and sent an Italian navigator known as John Cabot W'CStward across the norchern Atlantic in 1497. Cabot claimed NMoa Scocia, Newfoundland, and the rich Grand Banks 6sheries for England, but he vanished at sea on a second \'Oyage. Eighty }'cars would pass before England capitalized on CaboFs voyage. The more: Europeans explored, che more apparent ic became that a \':l.SC land· mass blocked the western route to Asia. In 1500 the Portuguese claimed Brazil, and

of-

Truly Ap~ mtot in which Pomtpl ~nd Sp.Un dnickd bttwte"o tbem all futu"' disocM-rio in me Dan· ChriJ!ti.m v.'Cirtd

J.... Cl•.t l.todiao apkl~r

I

wbo estolblisbtd English clainu to the Ntw World

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28

OfAPlER l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

other voyages oudined a continuous coascline: from rhe Caribbean to Brazil. In 1507 a publisher brought ouc a collection ofVO)'agcrs' rale:s, in cluding one from the Italian Amerigo Vespucd (vn-POO-ch~~). A shre:....-d marketer, the: publisher devised a catchy name for che new continent: America. Geeting past America co Asia remained the early explorers' goal. In 1513 the Spaniard Vasco NUI"'ez de Balboa crossed the narraw isthmus of l:tanama and chanced upon the l':lci6c Ocean. In 1519 the: Pon:ugue:se mariner Fmli· nand Magellan, sailing under the: Castilian flag, began a voyage around the: world through the stormy straits at South America's souchern tip, now named che Scr.Uts of Magdlan. He crossed the Paci6c to the: Philippin~ onl)' co die 6ghcing ~Atich nam·es. One of his 6w~: ships and 6fceen emaciated sailors returned co Spain in 1522, the 6rs.t people co have sailed around the: ~A'Orld.

Columbus was America's 6rsc sla\J'C trader and the: 6rs.t Spanish ronquistador (coM·KEES·ta·doh~), or conqueror. O n Hispaniola he ensta..~d native people and created tncrr 1412- ISl& miendas (en-cohmct-E'I·dah~). granrs for both land and the labor of the Indians who lived on it. From che beginning, tnc:omittukros, those gi\-en the encomiend~ harshly exploited the native people. As disease, 0\'crwork, and malnutrition killed thousands of Indians, Pon:uguese sla\J'C traders supplied shiploads of Africans to replace them. Alchough shocked Spanish friars scm to convert che Naci\J'C Americans reported the: Indians' exploitation, and King ~rdinand attempted to forbid che practice, no one: worried about African slaw~s' fate. Spanish settlers were soon fanning ouc across the: Caribbean in pursuit of slaves and gold. In 1519 the }'Oung nobleman Hernan Cortis (cort-TEZ) ( 1485- 1547) led a small band ofSpaniards to rhe Mexican coast. Dtstn,)'ing his boats and enlisting Indian allies, he marched inland co conquer Mexico. Upon reaching che Aztec capital ofTenochcirlin (see Chapter 1), the Spanish u.~re stunned by its size and weaJ[h. The Spanish raided the imperial palace and treasury, melting do~A'tl all the gold they could 6nd. But che Aztecs regrouped and recaptured the: city. l 'he:n an epidemic of smallpox, which the Aztecs and other lndi· ans were ill equipped to resis[, plus reinforcements from Cuba, enabled Con:Cs to defeat the Aztecs. By 1521 the: Spanish had begun to build Mexico Ciry on the ruins of Tenochcitlin. Within N"Ccnt}' )~ars, Cencral America Jay at che Spaniards' feet. Thus was New Spain born. Over the: remainder of the: sixceench cenrury. conquistadors and officials estab· lished a great Spanish empire scre:[ching from Mexico to Chile. The Inca empire rep· resented che most imporcanc conquest, thanks to smallpox and Jnca unfamiliarity

Splln's C1 1 ' Lldors,

Hemin C.tis 5pani$h. ~

I

queror ofAxtec empi"'

Primafy Source:

Spanish Monk Pleads for Beuer

Treatment of the k\dians

J EUROPE AHO trtE ATUI•i'tlC WOilLO, 1.4410-16oo with European weapons. The: human cost of the Spanish empire was enormous. When Cortfs landed in 15 19, cen· tral Mexico had been home co bet\1/Cen 13 and 25 million people. By 1600 the population had shrunk co 700,000. 1\:ru and ocher regions wime:sscd similar devastation in the greatest demographic disaster in world hiscory.

29

OCEAN

The Spanish conquest came at enormous human cost. Disease, I*ACIHC noc war or slavery, "''lls the: great· OCEAN est killer. Nath-e Americans lacked resistance to European and African infections, especially che deadly, highly com· municable smallpox. From the fi rst years of contact with Europeans, cerrible epidemics decimated Indian communities. In the: West Indies the: naci\J'C population vanished within a half-century, and disease opened the: mainland for conquest as u-ell. The '"Columbian e:xchange:·" -the biological encoun· cer of the Old and New Worlds- wcnc beyond deadly germs. M•p 2.J Tho Spooisll and Po
Tilt ca•

bian

..,,..

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tn tfwo fift«nth cenrury, Portupl und«rook MTic.ln t.xplor;a.tion, beginning tht. cn-.uion of tht. AdantK wmld. By 1600, .l "'nt.w Jl;~.wry'' b:l$td on rue- .li'O!IC'. ~rlye~eplorC'rJ0 Juch .lJ ColumbuJ, Billbo.l, ;~.nd M.l&'l'-lb n, ruchtd thcAmtrieu.

Tht. SpanU.h conqu t.n-d Mexico. T ht. ·columbi;~.n e~erh.lngt.'' tt.uuporttd food, ;mim.liJ, drug;s, ;~.nd &'1'-rrw in Eu ropc-, tfwo AmiC'-Mr:u, ;~.nd MTic.l.

bent on dominating Europe, Spanish kings needed even more silver to pay for chcir ships and armies. Sew.ral rimes they ~A'Cfltbankrupt, and in che 1560s t heir efforrs [0 squeeze more taxes from their subjects pro\'Oked revolt in Spain's Dutch provinces. In the end, gaining access to American wealth cost che Spanis h dear!)'·

FOOTHOLDS IN NORTH AMERICA, 1512-1625 How did Europetm exploration, conquest~ tmd colonization ofNorth Americ4 begin? Spain's New World wealth attracted other Europeans. Throughom the six· teemh cencury, chey sailed the North American coast, exploring, fishing. crading fo r furs, and smuggling. But, except for a Spanis h fort ac St. Augustine, ..1orida, all sixteemh-cenrury attempts at colonizing Nonh America failed. Unre-alistic dreams of easyweaJ[h and plianc Indians brought French, English, and Spanish actempts co grief. Only the ravaging of the Indians b)• disease, declining Spanish po~A'Cr, and ris· ing French, Dutch, and English po~A'Cr finally made colonizacion possible. In 1607- 1608 t he English and French esublis hed permanent colonies. By 1614 the Dutch had followed. Within a generacion, North America' s modern histor}' took shape as each colony de\~loped an economic orientation and its own approach co Nati\-~ Americans.

Spain's Norlllem frollller

The Spanish built cheir New World empire by subduing the Az.tecs, Inca, and other Indian states. The dream of fi nding even more wealch drew would-be conquistadors co

lands norch of Mexico. Earliest came Juan Ponce de leOn (wat.n PON-say d~h In-OWN), the conqueror of Puerto Rico, who trudged chrough Florida in search of gold and slaves twice, in 1512- 1513 and in 152J, and chen died in an Indian skir mish. T he most astonis hing earl)' expedition began when three hundred explorers left Florida in J 527 co explore the Gulf of Mexico. Indian attacks whittled their numbers until onl)' a handful survi\-~d. Stranded in Texas, the survi\'OI'S, led by Cabeza de Vaca (cuh-BAY-zuh deh VAH-c.ah}, moved fro m Indian tribe co cribe, ac first as sla\~S, later as traders and medicine men. They 6nally made chcir ~A'3Y south to Mexico in 1536. As de Soco roamed the Southeast, t he Southwcsc drew others with dreams of conquesc, lured by rumors that the fabled S.:\~n Golden Cities of Cibola (SEE-bow· lah) lay norch of Mexico. In 1538 an expedition sighted che Zui'H (ZOO-nyee) pueblos and assumed them to be the golden cities. For decades after these failures, Spain•s principal interest in the lands nonh of Mexico lay in establishing a few strategic bases in Florida to keep ouc intruders. In 1565 Spain planted the first successful European setdemem on mainland North America, the for cress of St. Augustine. Spanish missionaries mo\~d norch from t he fortress to establish re-ligious missions as far nort h as the Chesapeake (CHESS-uhpuk) Ba)', but Indian resistance and epidemic disease ended their efforts shortly be· fore 1600.

I

FOOTHOLDS IN NOilTH AMEIUCA, ISI2- L61S

31

Navajo V"oow of sp..isll Coloniztn This p iaogr.aph-;l p~inting o r dr~~~ng on rod(-W.U sketched i:n the: c::vlycoloni:.l period in C;aliOn dc:l Muc:rto, A,;;ron;a. C:abu:a de: V:ac~ inspired other woukl·lxo: conq-uc:~. In 1S39-IS43 Hc:rn:a~o de: Soto :at~d his p;arty dered from T:.mp.:. B:~.y to the: App:~.l:.chi:a.'" :a~ b:ack co south· un Tex.u, scouring the: ta.nd fot. gold :at~d h:.rrying the: lndj:~.ns. Although de: Soto died without lind ~ gold o r eonquc:ring ;u~y l ndi:~.ns, his .:.nd other expedit ions touehed offepidemics dt:at de$U'OY\"d most of the: !'l'm:~.i ning Missi ssippi:~.n soeic:ties.

Meanwhile, in the 1 580~ the Spanish had returned to the southwestern pueblo country, preaching Christianity and scouting for wealth. In 1598 Juan de Oi'late (ohflrtYAH·tH) led 6ve hundred Spaniards into che upper Rio Grande Valley, where: he proclaimed che royal colony of Ne:w Mexico. When Acoma Indians refused his demands for proYisions in Oe:cember J 598, Oi'late ordered massive: retaliation. In j anuary,Spanish troops captured the pueblo, killing more chan eight hundred inhabitants. 0!'1ate chen forced surviving men to have one foot cut off and sene them, along ~Aith women and children, to become sen•ancs. The new colon}' bare!}' surviw:d. In 1606 the Spanish replaced Ofl.ace because of his exce:ssjvc brutality. Determined to succeed, by 1630 Franciscan missionaries had established more chan fifty pueblo missions stretching along the Rio Grande and had convened about 20,000 Indians.

France made its 6rst attempt ac colonizing North America in 1541, ~Aohen ten ships sailed into the St. l.a~Arrcnce Valley. Having alienated many of the Indians along the St. lawrence in two previous e:xpeditions,jacques Carder built a fortified settlement on In· dian land and rhus e:nded all possibility of peacefullndian-fre:nch relacions. Steady Indian attacks and scurvy (for which the Indians could have shown chem a cure) drove the French off within cwo )'ears. This fi asco underlined one Spaniard's view that .. this ~A•hole coast as far (south) as florida is utterly unproductive." In 1562 French Huguenots (HYEW-gutl-nots) (CaMnists) made the next french attempt at colonizacion, establishing a base in modem South Carolina. 1U:o }'Caf"S later they founded a settlement in florida, which

Primafy Source: How the Savages Roast Their Enemies

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32

OfAPlER l

f>'

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

the: Spanish quickly de:stre))'ed. These: failures, as ~A'CU as a civil war btrween French Cacholics and Huguenots, ended France's first attempts ac colonizacion. Me:an~Ailile, Frmch and other European fishermen worked the: teeming Grand Banks off che coa.sc of New· foundland. Going ashore to dry their catch, Frmch sail· ors barce:red ~Aith Indians for beaver pelts; by the face: sixteenth cencury, as European demands for beawr hats soared, a Frmch·dominace:d fur crade blossomed. Most craders, unlike: explorers or colonizers, recog· nized che need for reciprocity in dealing with Nati.,.e Americans; consequend)', trade: flourished. Glass btads were a mainstay of this crade, fur Indians belic..-ed that the: beads possessed spiricual J>O'I'""er comparable co that of quar~ mica, and other sacred substances. To deter po· tcmial compe:citors, the French dispatched Samuel de: Champlain to establish the: colony of New France: at Que:· bee in 1608. Familiar ~Aith Indian policies and d iplomacy, Champlain builc alliances wich the Montagnais (MON· tan-yay) and Algonquins (il.I-GON-kwins) of the St. latA'· renee and ~Aith the: Hurons of che lower Great Lakes by promising to help chem defeat chcir enemies the: A TLANT/C OCEAN

~~--

,___

.;, 1~

'0.:.. •m

I 0 IOIIICI'I$il;~l l0l~h$litlkl!lll!l

I 0 ISplrf$11 $lllllll!
.,., . ...... "" ®•..,c:- ···--

~$~lloo!P'••cno • $(1G

Ef'gi$11C:Iill"'l

Moha~Ai.s.

In July 1609 Champlain and Indian allies encoun· tcred a substantial Mohawk force ncar che southern rip of Lake Champlain (which che explorer had named fo r himself) . In the: msuing Batcle: of Lake Champlain, more: than fifty Moha~Ai.s died and a dozen wcrecapcured. 1'he: batde marked the beginning of a deadly era of crade, di· plomacy, and warfare. Through their alliance: with the: Hurons, the Frmch gained access co the thick beaw~r pelts of the interior in exchange for European goods and protoccion against the: Mohawks and other Iroquois. 1"'he:se economic and diplomatic arrangements defined the: course of New France•s history fur the resc ofche sev· e:nteentb century.

OI!Ip.flldC::IIf~

D &glilrodl andl FrM~ell OI!Ip.flldGif~

D Ef'glilrodl llndllhllhlllnll!lilrd$

o ...,.......

Map 2..& Earopun Imperial Clo~ims o~nd S4!ttltmtnts in Eastern Norftl Amtric.a. 1.565-1615

.-

By 1625, four-Europe:~~~ n;ttiOJn contended fOr territory on North Amtric;t's Atl:~~~ tic:co;tst. Except forS-t. Augu.uine, FIOf" id;t, ;tll $O:ttlements cst.1blishcd before 1607 h:ld be-en :~b:~~~· doned by 162S.

I

FOOTHOLDS IN NOilTH AMEIUCA,ISI2- L61S

When Elizabeth I became queen in 1558, Engtand, a second-rnnk power, stood o n the sidelines as Spain and Allintic World, France grappled for European supremacy. Religious diYi· 1558-1&0] sion and domestic instability preoccupied the English. They hoped to cure the countl)"s economic ~A
33

EIIIIMd and tile

l

ll.oanob

5itl' or lirst English attemp: u New World coloniu. tioo; f.a.ihtn"

l"'Oe\'ents opened che wa}' fo r English colonization: peace Spain and the emergence of the: joint-stock compan}'· VlrJinla. 1603- 1625 with In che peace betv.r'ee:n England and Spain, conduded in 1604 by Elizabeth's successor,) ames I (ruled 1603- 1625), the Spanish nor only agreed

FIIMe and Success in

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34

CHAPtER l

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWORID, 14j00- 16lj

v.p.;. c..op.oy c1 PI,... wth

RtceiYI'd d!.vttt to t.nabli%h colonio from OleA.· pt
v.p.;. c..op.oy c1....,..

l

RtceiYI'd d!.uttt to t.nabliW

cokln"'' &om Cbtupukt &y

soutbv.•ud; foundedJamestooaTI

~ f'"mt SUCCl'5Joful

I

English colony, csuhlishtd in 1607

JOas..ith

Sold.ierolfortunc' who "saYtd" Jatnc'-'n by

I

t.nabli~ orde-r, good rt'la. rioru with Indians

JOa I.Jh

I

Srougllt eol»c.co to

~motown, thw tmuring it'

ro.momic surviVill

to peace but also renounced their claims to Virginia, leaving England a free hand. At the same time, thede\-elopment ofjoim·stock companies, "'flich could amass money through sales of stock, created a way for potential colonizers to raise: farge sums of money "''ith limited risk for the individual inV\'.scor. O n April 10, J606, james I granted charters to two separate joint·stock co mpa· nies, o ne based in London and che other in Plymouth. The Virginia Company of Plymouth rece i\'ed a granc extending fro m modern Maine to the Potomac Rh-er; the Virginia Company of london received a granc from Cape Fear nonh to the Hud· son River. 11le grants 0\'etlappcd, with the land in quescion to go to the firsc success· ful colonizer. Both companies dispacched colonists in 1607. The Virgin ia Company of Plymouth sene 120 men co Sagadahoc at che mouth of the Kennebec RiV\'.r in Maine. The following )'eat, che colony disincegrated, the \ictim of Indian hoscility (generally pr01o'Oked) and the hard Maine winter. The com· pany subsequently became dormant. The Virginia Com pan)' of london d ispatched lOS seeders to a site on the j ames Rh·er near Chesapeake Ba)' that chey named james· town. Buc che first coloniscs, who induded many members of che gentry, hunced for gold and failed co plant crops. \t'hen relief ships arrived in januar)' 1608, they found only 38 suni \'o rs. Near anarchy reigned acjamesto"''tl until September 1608, when desperate coun· cilors, representatives of the Virginia Company of London, curned co a brash soldier of furcune, Captain John SmJtb. Onl)' t"--enty+cight, Smith found that his experi+ ences fighting the Spanish and the 1\.uts had prepared him ....-ell to assume concrol in Virginia By instituting harsh discipline, organizing the sctd~ and requiring them to build houses and plane food, he ensuredjamescown's survivaL During the winter of 1608--1609, Smich lost just t"-~lve men out of two hundred. Smith also became the colony's besc diplomat. After local indians caprured him late in 1607, Smith displa)•ed such impressi\-e courage that l'owhatan (pow+uh+TAN), the leader of the nearby P<>'l'"hatan Confederacy, arranged an elaborate ceremony in which Pocahontas, his daughter, "saved" Smith's life during a mock execucion. This ~Sture was meant to remind the English that Powhatan's people "'"re the stronger fo rce and chat reciprocity rather than fol\':e should go\~rn their dealings with one anocher. l:to\l•hatan expected that the English wo uld become his allies against local tribal enemies. Smith maintained sacisfactory relacions with the PO'I'-'hatan Confed+ eracy pard)' chrough his personality and partly through calculated demonscrations of English military scrength. \t'hen serious injuries fo rced Smich co rctum to England in 1609, discipline again crumbled. Expecting the Indians to fu rnish co m , che seeders had not laid a"''llY eno ugh food for "''inter. One colonist reponed that jamestown residents ace dogs, cacs, ra~ and snakes in order to survive.. He gruesomely added chac "man)' besides fed on che corpses of dead men." Of the 500 residents at jamescown in Sep· tember 1609, only 100 lived to May 16 10. An influx of new recruits and rhe imposi+ tion of militar)' rule, ho~~r. enabled Virginia to win the First Anglo-Po"'flatan War ( 1610- 1614) and, by 16 11, co expand "''est to modern Richmond. The English popula+ tion remained small- only 380 by 1616- and produced nothing of value for the stockholders. Tobacco saved Virginia John Rolfe, an Englishman "'flo married Pocahoncas, perfected a salable variety of tobacco for planting there, and by 1619 Virginia was ex+

I

FOOTHOLDS IN NOilTH AMEIUCA, ISI2- L61S

porcing large, profitable: amounts of the crop. T hereafter che Virgin ia Company poured supplies and seeders into the: colon}'· To actracc Labor and capital, the: compan)' awarded fifty·acre: land grants ("head· rights"') to anyone paying his or her own passage or that of a laborcr. By financing the passage of indentured servants, planters could accumulate large: tracts of land. Thousands of single young men and a few hundred ~A'Omen became indencured ser· \'ants, choosing the uncertainty of Virginia ow~r pow~ny in England. In rcturn for their passage, they ·worked a fixed term, usually four to st\'en years. In 1619 the: Virginia Company ended military rule and provided for an d e:cted assembl)', che House ofBurge:sse:s. Alchough the company could veto che assembly's actions, 1619 ma..rked the beginning ofrepre:sencacii,!'Cgovcrnment in North America.. Ho~A'ewr, Virginia still faced chrec serious problems. First, local officials syscemad· call)' defrauded shareholders, in the process sinking che company deeply into debe.. Second, the colony's de:ach rare soared. Malnutrition, salt poisoning, typhus, and dys· cntery (from dr inking polluted river ~A'llcer) , killed thousands of immigrants. Third, Indian relations "-'Orsened. After l~·hatan•s death in 1618, the new leader, Opcchan· canough (oh·peh·CVl·CUH·noo), worried about the rdende:ssexpansion of the Eng· fish colony. In 1622 the Indians killed 347 of the 1,200 scrd e:rs in a surprise attack. With their liV\'Stock destroyed, spring planting impossible, and disease spreading through crowded scockade:s, hundreds more colonists d ied in the ensuing monchs. The Virginia Company sent more men, and Governor Francis Wyatc took the offensive. Using caccics developed during the: Irish war, Wy.m destroyed che Indians' food supplies, conducted wincer campaigns to drive them from their homes ~Aohen they would suffer most, and fought (according to john Smith) as if he had ..just cause co destroy chem by all means possible."' By 1625 the English had "-'On che Sec· ond l"'"'·hacan War, and the Indians had lost their besc chance of forcing out the intruders. Buc the struggle bankrupted che Virginia Company. After receiving complaints about its management, james I re\·oked its charter and made Virginia a ro)'al colony in 1624. Only 6\·e hundred Old \l'orld settlers lived there, including a handful ofAf· ricans who had been brought in since 16 19. With its combination of fabulous prof· its, unfree labor, and massii,!'C mortality, Virginia was cruly a land of contradictions.

After Virginia. che next pmnane:m English setdemcms appeared in New England. Along the: coast, a cerrible e:pi· 1614-1625 demic had devascaced che Indian population by about 90 percent in 1616- 1618. In 1620 the Virginia Company of london granced a pacem for a settlement co a group of English me:rchan~ who dispatched eighteen families ( 102 people) in a small. leaky ship, the Mttyjlou't'r. 11le colonists promised to send back lumber, furs, and fish for seven }'cars, after ~Aoh ich they would own the tract. The expedition's leaders, and half its memb~ bdonge:d co a small religious community from the norchern English tD"-'n of Scrooby. Separacist Puricans, they had earlier fled to the Netherlands to practice their religion fred)'· Fearing that their children were adopting Dutch wa)'S, they decided co immigrate to America. In Nm~mber 1620 the Mayflouvr landed at Plymouth, outside che: bounds of Virginia. Because they had no legal right to be there:, the leaders forced the adult

Primafy Source: A V.wginia Case

lryyol\oing Runaway Indentured Servants

...... ., .._

""'

tltcnd ~smtatiw ltgi5b. tu~ in No:w World, in Virginia; 6nt m« in 161.9

1

New Enctand Begins,

I,.,........ m

Colony t$Ublidltd

by PilgrimJ

t.b.u:u:hUJttU

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

36

I

OfAPlER l

~ c..,...

ThE RlSf Of THE AllAA"flCWOitiD, 14j00- 16lj

•sr«·

ment signed by Pilgrim' to F "m them.fi:'(Wl'J;

NN Antenin Dun:h

males in the: group to s ign the Ma)'Ao-.wrCompact before: they landed. By this doc· umc:m they consticuce:d themselves a "civil bod)' policic"-acivil go\~rnme:m-unde:r j ames l's SO\~rdgnty and established che colony of Plymouth Plantation. \'t'e:ake:ned by t heir journey and unprepa-red for wince:r, half the Pilgrims, as they were later called, died within four monchs. l\1..'0 Indians helped the: ochers ro survive: Squanto, a local Pacuxe:c, and Samose:c (SAM.OO·sttt), an Abenaki (aah-beh·NAH· by) from Maine who had traded ~Aith che English. 10 stop che l'ilgrims from steal· ing chcir food. t he: Indians taught t he: nc:~A•comers ho~A' co grow corn. Squanto and Samoset also arranged an alliance berwecn che Pilgrims and the: local Wampanoag (wahm-puh·NO·ag) Indians, ~Aoho u.~re headed by C hief Massasoic (MASS·ufl·soyt). l'lymouch's relations ~Aith che Indians soon \N'Orsene:d. Learning of the Virginia massacre of 1622, the Pilgrims militarized chcir colony and t hreatened their Indian "allies'" with chcir monopoly of firepower. Within a decade, Pl)mouch had accracced sc..'e ral hundred colonists and had become: economically seJf.suffide:m. After chey abandoned communal farming for individually 0'1'-'ne:d plots, prosperous farmers produced corn surpluses chat they crade:d for furs. Prosperity aiiO'I'-~d l'lymout h's elite to bU)' out che: colony's london backers. l'lymouch colony had chree fasting influences. ltconstiruted an oucpostofPuri· tans dissenting from che Church of England, pro\·ed chat a self·g~rning sodecy could exist in New England, and foreshadowed the aggressive me:chods that would giiJ'C Europeans master}' over che Indians. Plymouth represented che vanguard of a massi\J'C migration of l'uritans to New England in the 1630s (set: Chapter 3) .

.-A "New Nelher1and"

The Dutch·speaking provinces of che Netherlands were: among the most fen-endy Calvinist regions of Europe. on tilt Hudson. Ruled b)• che Spanish during che sixtct:nth century and l&ot-1&25 alienated by high taxes and religious intolerance, t he: Dutch rebelled in 1566. More chan forty )~ars later, in 1609, Spain and che Ducch Republic signed a cruce. By t hen the Ncthc:rlands 'A'llS a wealth)' commercial PO\l~r ~Aohose em pire screeched fro m Brazil co-S outh Africa to Taiwan. It ~A'Ou ld play a key role in colonizing Nort h America. In 1609 Henry Hudson sailed up t he: broad, deep ri\~r chat toda)' bears his name:, and in che next year Dutch ships sailed up che Hudson to trade Pu, h ing northward !Tom rheir Ne.,,: ~Aith Indians. In 1614 chey began their New Netherland colon}' by establish· World <'-mpire, SpaniJh explon'fJ ing Fore Nassau at che site of modern Albany, New York, and in 1625 planted ro:un ed t he Ameri ~n Southwut, a nd conquistador~ conqmred the another fort on an island at the mouth of the Hudson. Within tu.'O years, Pueblo lndianJ. ~cer Minuic, d irector-general of the colon)', boughc che island from local Earl)' French colonit:~ b.l$Cd on Indians, named ic Manhattan, and began a settlement christened New ag riculture bard)' JUI""\'i '~• but the Amsterdam. Fren<'-h fur u ade ~i th lndia nH K' the Furs, parcicularly bea\~r pelts, became: t he: New Netherlanders' chief interio r pmspe.red. economic staple:. The Mohawks, as wdl as the ocher nations of the Iroquois The 6r:~t En_gliJh colony, Ro;ano&:'"> (.ailed, bu t J a.mcJtown a nd Plymouth Confederacy, became che Dutch colonists' chief suppliers of furs and soon .\UI""\'i''«< despite h .lrdship. found themselves em broiled in competition ~Aith the Fre:nch·supporced The Dutdl ~t.WIUhcd New AmJterHurons.

I

coklny tlut voo uld become New York

I

P:l\

d.lm .n the mouth o( the HudJon Ri.,"-r a nd relied on th<'- fur rra.-de.

Chapter Su (ff)

0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AU Ot O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D

~

LISTEN TOITONTHEGO.

K EY TERMS

Whot major changes were reshaping the African and European worlds in the fifteenth and sixteentil centuries? (page 17)

I

The fiftoenth and sixteenth centuries were times of tumultuous change in both West Africa and Europe. In the West African savannah, pov.wful king· doms such as Mali g<&\ 'e wa}' to more fragmented political structures.ln Europe. the Renaissance, the Reformation, a population boom, and the emergence of the market economycreated new tensions as well as new oppottunities. ln Eng· land, the Reformation led to the rise of Puritanism, which found itself in a tense relationship "'ith the monatehy.

I

What'"" the Atlantic world, and how did it emetge? (po!'J' 25)

The Atlantic world began to open as Portuguese exploretS trawled along the African coast; one sad result of this was the "new slavtt}';'' based primarily on race. Spanish explorers such as Columbus, Balboa, and Magellan opened thr way for che creation of an empire that would encompass both the Aztecs and the Inca in the Americas. J)lanrs., animals, drugs, and diseases crossed the Atlan· tic in both directions in thr ..Columbian exchange...

How did European exploration, conque5t, and colonization o{North America begjn? (po!'J' 30)

I

The Spanish explored large parts of North America, conquered the Pueblo Indians of che Southwest, and incorporated chem into their empire. Although France attrmptcd to plant agricultural colonies, irs ptimar}' succrss lay in establishing thr fut trade with thr Indians of thr interior. After failure at Roanoke, Englishmen succrssfully planted colonirsat jamrstown in Virginia and at Plym· ouch in Massachusetts.. The Dutch establishrd New Amsterdam.

savarma (p. 17) Rooaissance (p. 19) ondost<e (p. 21) joint.stock company (p. 22) Prol2stanl Relorma1ion {P. 23) John CaMn (p. 23) Pt
www.cengoge.com/hltt ory/boyer/endurlngcot~cfsd e

Chapter Su (ff)

0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AU Ot O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D

~

LISTEN TOITONTHEGO.

K EY TERMS

Whot major changes were reshaping the African and European worlds in the fifteenth and sixteentil centuries? (page 17)

I

The fiftoenth and sixteenth centuries were times of tumultuous change in both West Africa and Europe. In the West African savannah, pov.wful king· doms such as Mali g<&\ 'e wa}' to more fragmented political structures.ln Europe. the Renaissance, the Reformation, a population boom, and the emergence of the market economycreated new tensions as well as new oppottunities. ln Eng· land, the Reformation led to the rise of Puritanism, which found itself in a tense relationship "'ith the monatehy.

I

What'"" the Atlantic world, and how did it emetge? (po!'J' 25)

The Atlantic world began to open as Portuguese exploretS trawled along the African coast; one sad result of this was the "new slavtt}';'' based primarily on race. Spanish explorers such as Columbus, Balboa, and Magellan opened thr way for che creation of an empire that would encompass both the Aztecs and the Inca in the Americas. J)lanrs., animals, drugs, and diseases crossed the Atlan· tic in both directions in thr ..Columbian exchange...

How did European exploration, conque5t, and colonization o{North America begjn? (po!'J' 30)

I

The Spanish explored large parts of North America, conquered the Pueblo Indians of che Southwest, and incorporated chem into their empire. Although France attrmptcd to plant agricultural colonies, irs ptimar}' succrss lay in establishing thr fut trade with thr Indians of thr interior. After failure at Roanoke, Englishmen succrssfully planted colonirsat jamrstown in Virginia and at Plym· ouch in Massachusetts.. The Dutch establishrd New Amsterdam.

savarma (p. 17) Rooaissance (p. 19) ondost<e (p. 21) joint.stock company (p. 22) Prol2stanl Relorma1ion {P. 23) John CaMn (p. 23) Pt
www.cengoge.com/hltt ory/boyer/endurlngcot~cfsd e

made these two other migrations possible. Epidemic disease did much of the work ofdestn))ing the Indians, but warfare played an important role as well. About I mil· lion Indians had died as a result of contact ~Aith Europeans b)• 1700. Indian depopulation and European and African immigration transfonned Norch America in che seventeenth cencury. Europeans expanded their territorial domains and established colonial sodeties from che St. lawrence RiV\'.r co the Rio Grande, increasing the concinem's culcural diw~rsity. English immigrants, and English capital, ensured chat England would domi· nate the East Coast as wdl as che Caribbean.: by 1700 the English ~A'Oul d force out the Dutch and lea\-e: France and Spain with lands less attracth-e: to colonists. Four dis· tinct regions emerged ~Aithin England's mainland colonies: New England. che Chesapeake. Carolina, and the Middle Colonies, each shaptd by its environment, the motives of white immigrants, and the concentrations of ensla't-e:d Africans.

I

CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY

How did toNcco shape tile Ches4peake colotties?

Thanks to the tobacco boom of the J620s, the English colonies on the Chesapeake Bay- Virginia and Mar)bnd- \l-e:re che 6rst in Norch America to prosper. T he)' shared similar economies, populations, and patterns ofgrowth chat gave chem a dis· tinct regional idencity. Chesapeake society was highly unequal and unstable. life for mosc colonists was short and living conditions poor. Not uncil English colonists seized large: amouncs of Nati\'e American land to grow tobacco and shifted from white indentured servants co black slaves did they 6nally achie\'e scability.

James I planned to rule Virginia through appointed officials, but Virginians petitioned repeatedly for che restoration of their elected assembly, the 6rst in the New World. James J>s successor, Charles l, grudgingly relented in 1628, but only to induce the assembl)' to tax tobacco exports so as co transfer che cosc of go\-e:mment from the crown to Virginia's taxpayers. After 1630, seeking more taxes, Virginia's royal governors called regular assemblies. During the 1650s the asse:mbl)' split inco two chambers, the elected House of Burgc.s.ses and che ap· pointed Go'lemor's CounciL

V'MW of J.iflltStOWII,. 162S /1:$ Virginia's cobac:eo prodi.Ktion boomed,

upi c~ exp:u~ded beyond t he

the

fort that h.ad

originally eonf'ined it .

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Primafy Source: 11\dentured Servant's Confession

D

AIN$$11I"de,'l660

D.,_·~""t,-'100

V

Map 3.1

Local government officials were appointed, rather than elected, during Virgin· ia's first quarter-<entury. In 1634 Virginia adopted England's co unty-co urt system. Appointed b)•the royal g~rnor, justices of the peace acted as judges, set local tax rntes, paid co unty officials, and ~rsaw the construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, and public buildings. 11ms unelectcd county courts became the basic unit of local g~rnment south of New England. In comrasc to Puritan New England, Virginia had che Church of England as its established church. Anglican \'estries g~rned each parish; elected \'CStr)men handled church finances, determined poor relief, and investigated complaints against the minister. Taxpayers were legally obli~d to pay fixed rates co the Anglican church. Because of the large d istances berwecn settlements and ch urch~ as well as a chronic shortage of clergymen, few Virginians regularly attended services. In 1662 Virginia had just ten ministers to sen-e its forty·6\-e parishes.

·-r

R

o ....,.... (Jpiosioo. 1607-1100

The Cheupe~ke: colonie~ exp.:~nded ~y be(o~ midcen tl.lry. 6y 1700, Artglo·lndi:an W.lll"$-1 ~risi ng Englis.h populnion, .:~nd ;an inRux olens.l;aved Afri. C::ltl$ pei'TTiitted s.etden to spre~d throughout the tidew;tte r.

Beginning in the 1630s, grants by the crown to reward English politicians replaced joint-stock co mpanies as the primar}' mechanism of colonization. 1'he 6rs.t such grant, or proprietorship, u-ent in 1632 ro Lord Baltimore (Cecilius Calvert)j he named the large tract east of Chesapeake Bay ..Maryland"' in honor of England's Queen Henrietta Maria Lord Baltimore enjoyed broad pou-er, lessened only by che stipulations chac an elected as· sembl)' had to appro\'€ allla\l'S and that the ctO\l'tl wo uld co ntrol both war and trade. With Charles l's consenc, Baltimore intended to make Maryland a refuge for England's Catholics, who could nei· ther worship in public nor hold political office and who had to pay tithes to the Anglican church. To make Mar)'· land a haven, Baltimore tried to install the old English manor S)'Stem. In theor)', a manor lord wo uld empiO)' a Catholic priest as chaplain and allow others to hear Mass and co reccive the sacraments on the manor. In practice, chis arrangement never worked, for rclacii,!'Ciy few Catholics settled in Mar)1and, which was O\'erwhdmingly Protestant fro m che beginning. Cheap Land lured settlers who did not need to become tenants on the manors, and Baltimore's scheme fell apart. By 1675 all sixty of Maryland's nonpro· prietary manors had become plantations. Religious tension gradually de\-eloped in Maryland society. The Protestant majority dominated che elected lou·er house of government, but many Catholics had be· co me large Land"'"'·ners, held high public office, and domi· nared the appointive: upper house. Until 1642, Catholics and Protestants shared the chapel ac St. Mary's, the capital, but they began to argue ~r its usc. As antagonisms in·

,~~

~ 1628 1610-1642

MassachtMIIs B colon foonded "Great migration" to North Ameri:a

1633

Frn En&lish SE!tfemonls in ConneclicUI

1634

Lord Ballinore founds Maryland Roger Williams founds ProW!ence, Rhode Island; Harvard Coff.,e estlllished Antinomian aisis in MassacOOsetts Bay; Pequot War in Connecticut New Sweden I!Stabli!lled Engli!ll Civil w.r Third Angio-Powhat.lnwar inYirpniil Maryland's Ad for REligious Toler>lion; King Cha~es Ibeheaded New Neth«land amexes New~n Resloralion in Enllland; Cllarles II becomes lling Maryland defines slavery as a liEiong. inherilable racial slaiUS Half.way Cownanl adopted Engli!ll conquer New NEihl!lfand; estlllish Nl'WYorl: and New lmey Charles Town, C.rolina,I!Stabli!lled; \l'q inia defines slavery as a lifElong. inherbllfe racial SlaiUS King f'lliip~ warin New En&tand Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia Pueblo Rewl begins in New Mexico William Penn &oll1ds Pennsylvania La Salle daims Louisiana for France Spain I!Stabli!lles TOMS Salem Mchcraft lrials Spain "reconquers" New Mexico Fnt Frt!f'ICh settk!mem in looisiana

1636

1631 1638 16!2-1648 16.!4-1646 1649 1655 1660 1661 1662 1664 1670 1675-1676 1675-1676 1680 1681 1682 1691 1692-1693 1692- 000 1698

tcnsi6ed. Balcimore d rafted, and the assembl)' passed, the Act for Religious Toleration ( 1649). Unforcunacely. the toleration act did not secure religious peace. In J6S4 the Protestant majority barred Catholics from vocing; ousted GOV\'.rnor William Stone, a pro-tolerance l'rocestam; and repealed che 1bleration Act. Scone raised an army, both Protestant and Cacholk, to regain the gM>crnmmt but met defeat at the Bacrle of the Sew:m RiV\'.r in J65S. 11le victors imprisoned Scone and hanged chree Cacho lie leaders. Maryland remained in Protestant hands uncil 1658. Although Lord Balti· more: ~A'llS restored co control that rear (ironically, at che command of English Puri· tans), Procestant resistance to Catholic political influence continued to cause problems in Maryland.

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Primafy Source: Marcy Freeman H ead~one

So few women immigrated to the Chesapeake that, before: 1650, only one-third of male servants could 6nd brides .... llllsblp and then only after completing their indencure. Female scarcity ga\J'C "-"Omen an advantage in negotiating favorable: marriages. Man)' female indc:ncured servants married prosperous planters who paid off their remaining rime of service. Death ra\•aged Chesapeake sodecy and left domestic life exceptionally fragile:. In 1650 malaria joined the killer diseases typhoid, d)'Sencer)', and salt poisoning as che marshy lowlands of the tidewater Chesapeake became: fertile brttding grounds fo r the: mosquitoes that spread malaria. Ufe expectancy in rhc: J600s was twenty years 10"-l:r in the: Chc:sapeakc: than in Nc:~A' England. Servants died at appalling rates; 40 percent were dead within a decade: of arrival and 70 percent before reaching age 6fcy. Chesapeake ~AidO\l•s often enjoyed substantial property rights. 1'he region's men wrote ~Aills giving their wives perpetual and complete concrol of their estate, so that their own children could inherit it. Although a widO\l' in such circumstances had a degttt of economic independence, she faced enormous pressure to remarry. particularly a man who could produce income: by farming her 6dds. The: lopsided sex ratio and high death races contributed co slow population growth in che Chesapeake. Although perhaps 100,000 English immigrated to the Chesapeake: betv.~en 1630 and 1700, the white population was just 70,000 in 1700. In contrast, the benign disease environment and more balanced gender ratio of New England all oY~Cd chat region•s 28,000white immigrants ro burgeon ro 9 1,000during the same time period. Change came gradually as children acquired childhood im· munities, life spans lengthened, and the sex racio C"".-cncd out. By 1720 most Chesa· peake residents ~At>re natiw born.

1111111. Cender,

Chesapeake sett lers Y~Cre scattered across che landscape. A typical community included only twenty-four families in a tv.rency-6vc-square-milc: area, a mere six people per square mile. (In concrast, New England often had fiiJ'C hundred people squttzed onto one square mile.) Most Chesapeake inhabitants lh-ed in a "'-orld of few friendships and considerable isolation; typical 'A'llS Robert Boone, a Maryland fanner, who died at age s.......,-enty·nine ..on the same Plamacion ~Ailere he was born in 1680, from which he nC"".~r u-ent 30 miles in his Life." Isolated Chesapeake settlers shared a life gm~rnc:d by one 0\'l'rriding factor: the price of tobacco. After an initial boom, cobacco prices plunged 97 percent in 1629 before stabilizing at JO percent of their original high. 1bbacco ~A'llS still profitable as long as ic 'A'llS grown on fcrcile soil near navigable water. As a re.sulc, 80 percent of Chesapeake homes u-ere located along a ri..~rbank. Wealthy planters built whan-es that sen·ed as depots for tobacco exports and distribution centers for imported goods. Consequently a merchant class was slow co materialize, and towns grew pain· fully siO\l·ly; by 1678 St. Mary'~ Maryland's capital, had just thirty scattered houses. Chesapeake society became increasingl)' unequal. A few planters used the headright system co build up large landholdings and to profit from their servants' labor. Wrecchcdl)' exploited- and poorl)' fed, clothed, and housed- sen•ants faced a bleak fucure cw:n ~Ailen chcir indc:mure ended. Although some ~A'Cre able to claim fifty

acres of land in Mar)tfand, the majority who W'Cnc co Virginia had no such prospects. Indeed, in Virginia after 1650 mosc riv~rfront Land was held by large planters and speculators, and upward mobility became virrually impossible. In 1660 Chesapeake tobacco prices plunged SO percent, setting off a depression thac fasted fifty years.. Despite losses, large planters earned some inco me from rents, interesc on loans, and shopkeeping, and man}' landowners scrambled to sell corn and catd e in che West Indies. A typical family in this depression era lived in a small wooden s hack, slepc on rag~ and ate mush or stew cooked in chcir single pot. Ex· sen•ancs in particular became a fruscrated and embictered underclass chat seemed destined to remain landless and poor.

By che 1670s these bleak co nditions had locked most Vir· ginia landowners into a losing bactle against pm.wty and ~1676 had left the colon}"s freedmen in despair. Both groups W\'.re capable ofscriking our in blind rage if an opporrunity to stave offeconomic disaster presented icself. In 1676 this human powder keg exploded in violence. Virginians had been free: of serious contlicc with the Indians since t he end of t he Third Anglo-Powhatan War in 1646. By 1653 cribes encircled b)•English settlements had begun agreeing to remain wichin boundaries sec by the government-in effecc, on reservations. Whice settlement co ntinued co expand norch\l.>ard to che Potomac !liver, and by 1675 whices oumumbered Indians by a ten-eo-one ratio. In j une 1675 a dispute betWeen some Doeg (Oohg) Indians and a Virginia fanner c..scalated. A force of Virginia and Maryland militia pursuing che Doegs murdered fourteen friendly Susquehannocks (soss-kweh-HAN-nocks) and facer executed five of cheir chiefs. The violence was no""' unstoppable. Alchough Gm--ernor William Berkeley proposed defending the fro ntier \l.ith a costly system of funs, small farmers preferred the cheaper solution: a war of extermination against the Indians. So me three hundred seeders elected Nathaniel Bacon, a distant relati~ of Berkeley and a member of the Royal Council, to lead chem against nearby Indians in April 1676. The expedition found o nly peaceful Indians but slaughtered them an)>how. Rerurning to jamestO'I'-'n in j une 1676, Bacon asked for authority co wage \l.'llr "agains t all Indians in generaL'" The legislature voted for a program desjgned co ap· peal to both hard-pressed taxpayers and landless ex-sen>ants. All Indians who had left their village without permission (C'\o-en if fleeing Bacon) W\'.re declared e nemies, and t heir lands were forfeited. Bacon•s troops could scize any "enem}"' property and ensla\J'C Indian prisoners. But Go\-ernor Bcrkelcy soon had second thoughts about che slaughter and recalled Bacon and his thirteen hundred men. Forbidden to attack Indians, Baco n's forces corned against the g()'IJ'Crnmenc and burned jamestO\I.'tl. The rebels offered freedom to any servants or sla\-e:S owned by Berkeley's allies who would join them, and then looted enemy plantations. What had begun as Indian warfare was now a social rebellion. Before the uprising co uld proceed further, hO\l'f.'\·er, Bacon died of dysentery in fate 1676, and his fo!IO'I'--ers d ispersed. Bacon•s Rebe:llion revealed a society u nder deep internal stress. Begun as an effort to d is place escalating tensions among ...,flites omo the Indians, it became an excuse to plunder other whites. This rebellion was an outburst of pent-up

Blain's Rebellioa,

-·-lho

Uprioing tb.u dlo-~d dc-tp J trt$$t.S

1within die' VirginU colooy

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44

CHAPtER 3

ThE EMERGENCE Of COlONIAL SOOtnts, L6;tS- 1700

fruscracions by marginal taxpa)'ers and cx·scrvants driven to desperation by the to· bacco depression.

Chesapeake whites drew racial boundaries between them · seto.·es and the region's growing African population and tried to avert class conflict by substirucing black slaves for white servants. Racial slavery developed in three scagcs. From 16 19 to 1640, Anglo.Virginians carefully d istinguished becween whites and blacks in official documents but did not assume thac e\·cry African sold ~A'3S a slave for life. Some Africans gained their free· dom, and a few e\-en 0\\"ned their own farm. By 1640 blacks and some Indians were bcing created as slaves, and their children inherited chcir stacus. Thus their siruation had become inferior to that of inden· tured ~Athite se!Vants. In the linal phase, after 1660, laws deli ned slavery as a lifelo ng, inheritable status based on color. B}' 1705 scrict legal codes defined the place of sla\-es in society and set standards of racial eciquecte. Slaver}' was a system for blacks and Indians only. Whites ne\'ct enslaved chcir white enemies; rather, they resen-ed che complete denial of human righrs for non· whites. 1b stabilize: Chesapeake society and to defuse the resentment of poor whites, planter elites created a caste system based on race. This system simultaneously de· lined nonwhites as u nlit for freedom and created a common, exclusive identity among "''hites. Slaver}• grew slowly in the Chesapeake, ~A'ith fC""--er than a chousand sla\'eS in Vir· ginia and Maryland as late as 1660. By 1680, hO\\--e\-er, che sta..-e population had grown to rwelve thousand; by 1700 sla..-es would make up nearly one-fourth of the Chesapeake population and much of the labor force.

Prtpariog a Sla.. Voyagt A.hiaLn s w~o:p .n rd;~.ti~s or &io:nds ;t.l'\' t;~.kc-n to ;~. "';t.\ 'e

vend.

I

The rise of a direct sla\'f: trade with Africa increased che growing gap bern-een whites and blacks. Before 1690, most blacks in the Chesa· peake, having spent long periods in Wesc African ports or ocher Ameri· can colonies, ~A'Cre familiar with English ways and spoke some English. They could carw out space for themseh-es as free landO'I'-'ncrs. After 1690, as slaV\'S poured into the Chesapeake dirocd)' from the Wesc Afri· can interior, language and culcure became barriers r:uher than bridges, reinforcing increased racism among ~Ailires. Racism was enforced by the changing composition of the ~Ailite pop· ulation, increasingly American-born and evmlydistributcd bern-ecn male and female. Whites shared a sense of common racial identity vis·i·vis an increasing!)' fragmented and see-mingly alien black population. By 1700 the Chesapeake had been transfonned; profi rs had fallen, buc life e-xpectancy had risen. As nonwhites• condition deteriorated, Virginia and Maryland expanded their territories, and their white colo· nists flou rished.

A euh-crup«<nomy $t't dlC' CbeJol.ptal:e colon.iu ~" from Ntw Cngllnd.. Maryhnd w;u intt ndc-d ;~J a nofugt' fUr Utholia but became' mainly Prut6tant. Tobacco Jhapcd tbC' «anomy and living o:ondic:ioru in Che:~a.peal:e colonies. lhcon•J lte"bdlion bC'gan ;u an anti· Indian nmpaign but be"nmt a wri.al a nd C'C'onomic moo.~nwm aJ wdl Sla\~1")' dC'\~Iopcd in gradual Jtage.' in t ht Che'.Qpt-akC' rolonie':l, C'\'C'n rually b«oming a lifdong, inbe"ric-abk :1toatw baJC'd on coiOC'.

I

PURITANISM IN NEW ENGLAND

What ~s tM ~wew England Way, ••and wMt challenges d1d 1t endur6?

As England's reli&lous and pohncal envuonment grew worse for the 1\mtans m the- 1620s, many ofchcm became- interested in colonizing New England. large-scale Puritan migration would begin in 1630, as che intensely religious Puritans builc a community based on religious ideals, chc- first utopian so· d ecy in America. In almost every way- che place of religion, economies, class strucru.re, local communities, and living standardsNew England contrasted sharply with che Chesapeake- col· onies. Both, hO'I'-~\-er, shared English nationality and a determinacion co e-xpand at Nati\~ Americans' expense.

Upon ascending the chrone in 1625, Charles I scrapped james's l&ll-1632 policy of tolerance toward che Puritans and began a systemacic campaign to eliminate Puritan influence within the Church of England. In re· sponse to continual harassment, in 1628 seve-ral Puritan merchants obtained a charcer to settle- north of the Sc-pa· racist colony at Pl)'tllOuch. Organized as chc- Massachusetts Bay Company. they moved the seac of chc-ir colony's gO\'· ernment to New England, paving the wa}' for Massachusetts to be self·gOII'Crning. In 1630 the company d ispatched a "great tleec,'" de\-en ships and seven hundred passengers, to New England. As

A Cly upoa a Hil~

Encls~ Migratioo. 1610- 16&0 During c-ht h~ p h:ue of&lglis;h tr~uu.:~d:u~tic mi~ gr.:~ Uon, the \'llnt lndin attncted more th;~n tw!ct ;~J manycoloniu~ ;~.~ ~nt to th-e Ches;;apt-;ake, ;~nd 0\'tr four time~ ;~.~ m:u~y ;u; $Cttled in New Engl;~nd.

M•p 3.2

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

• I

city .... a liil Jolm Win. tbrop'hisiao of' the- PuriWl ~ulemrnt io New England .u a modd for the v.'Cirld

the ships crossed che Adancic, Gm--ernor john \'1/inthrop d eli\--ered a lay sermon, ..A Model of Christian Charity;'' in which he explained how and ~Aily the new colon}' would d iffer from England itself. Winthrop boldly announced that .."-'e shall be as a dry upon a hill, che eyes of all people are upon us.'"11le setd ers wo uld build a godly community whose compel· ling example wo uld shame England. The English government wo uld then truly re· fo nn the church, and a revival of piety would create a nation of saints. Denouncing economic jealous}~ Winthrop explained thac God intended "in all cimes some m ust be rich and some poor:'' The rich would practice charity and mercy, and che poor show their faith in God's will by practicing pacience and forcirude. In a godly state, the government would prevent the greedy among the rich fro m exploiting che poor and che Lazy among the poor from burdening their fellow citizens. By 1631, thirteen hundred more setd ers had arrived, and the colony was moving toward both economic and political stability. Most of the new colonists were landowning fann families of modest means, ~Ailo had ncither indencured servants nor slaw~s . M ore than fifteen thousand colonists had sctded in N ew England by 1642. Massachusetts established a broad-based political system, permitting e\"er}' adult male church member to vote; the widespread suffrage contrasted sharply with England itself, ~A•here property requirements restricted the vote co less than 30 per· cent of adult males. Within a few years of their arrival, the colonists had established abicamerallegislacure, che General Courc, with an appointed Go\·ernor's Council as the upper house and two delegates from each to~A'tl as the lo~A'Cr house.

Self-go\·eming l'uritan congregations ignored the auchority of Anglican bishops. Male "saints,'" as Puritans termed those who had been saw~d. ran each congregation. By ma· jority voce they chose: ministers, elected a board of elders to handle financ~ and decided who "-'ere saints. 1'hus concrol of New England churches was broadl}' based. The dergy quickly asserted its po'-''Cr in New England's religious life. In England, l'uritans had focused on lheir common opposition to Anglican practices. In Ame.r· ica, hO\l'f.'\'et, lhcological d ifferences began to undermine che harmony chat Win· throp had envisioned. l'tlritan ministers struggled to define o rthodox practices- the "New England Wa}'"' - [hac scrcngthened their authority at the expense of the Ia}'· persons (nonclergy). Education was a key means of establishing orthodoxy. Like most l'rotestanrs, l'uritans insisted on familiarity with [he Bible and. th u~ literacy. Education should begin in childhood and be pro moted b}•each colony. In 1647 the Massachusetts Bay colony passed [he Old Oe.luder Act because ..one chief project of that old deluder, Satan (is) to keep men from k no~Atfedge of the Scriptures.'" E\'f.'ry tO\l'n of 6fty or more households ~A'llS to appoint one reacher from ~Ailom all children could reccive instruction, and every tO'A'tl of one hundred households or more 'A'llS to maintain a grammar school with a teacher capable of preparing students for univcrsity·IC'\o-ellearning. This latA•, echoed by other Puritan colonies, was New England's first step CO'A'ltrd public education, although acten· dance remained optional and boys were more likely to be taughc reading and writing than girls.

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J PvRnAIOSW IM NEW ENGLAND An educated clergy was essential, so in 1636 Massachusetts founded Harvard College to produce learned ministers. In irs 6rst thirty-five: rears, che college turned ouc201 graduates, I I I of chem ministers. 11lescalumni made N ew Engtand thconl}' American colon}' wich a collcgHducated e:lice: during che scwmecnth century. Although agreeing char the church muse be free of state: control, Winchrop and other Massachusetts Bay leaders insisted thac a holy commonwealth required coop· cration betv.r'een church and state. Therefore, checolon}' required all adults to attend services and pay tithes co support their local church. Massachusetts thus had a state· sponsored or "established" religion. Some Puritans, hO""-'t:\'U , dissented from their leaders' vision of social order and rd igious conformity. Roger Williams, who arriw:d in America in 1631, argued chat civil government had co remain absolutd}' uninvolw~d with religious matters. Williams opposed compulsor}' church seJVice and interference with private religious beliefs because: he: feared t hat che scate would eventual!}' corrupt the church and its saints. Believing chat the purpose of t he: colon}' was to protect true: religion and to pre· \~nt heresy, political authorities declared Williams's opinions subo.~rsh~ and banished him in 1635. Williams wenc south to the edge of Narragansett Ba}' co a place char he later named l'rovidence:, which he: purchased from the: Indians. A stead}' scream of dissenters drifted to the group of settlements ne-ar Providence, forming Rhode: Island in 1647. The only New England colony co practice religious toleration, Rhode: Island gn..""'' to eight hundred sctders by 1650. Anne Hutchinson presented che second major challenge co che: New England Way. ..A ~A'Oman of ha ughty and 6e:rce carria~. of a nimble wit and active spirit;'' Hutchinson maintained chat her fe:IIO\l' l'uritans were: too certain char chey could cell wheeher or not a person was a sainc o n the basis of his or her behavior. S he reminded t hem char their creed stressed predestination, not good works, and argued char New England' s ministers had gone astray. Hutchinson's ideas dirccdy attacked che clergy's authority to ince:rpret and reach Scripru.re; critics charged char her bd ie:fs would d elude individuals into imag· ining char chey were accountable: only to themseh·es. Her followers W\'.re labd e:d "an· cinomians,'" meaning chose: opposed to che rule of law. Anne Hucchinson bore t he additional liability of being a woman challenging traditional male roles in church and state. Her gender made: her seem an especially dangerous foe. "You have stepped our of your places; )'OU (would) rache:r ha\~ been a husband than a wife, a preacher chan a hearer. . .... one of her foes railed against her. Massachusetcs Ba}' split into pro- and anti-Hutchinson forces. Her opponents prevailed, bringing Hucchinson to trial for sedition in 1637 before the Massachusetts Bay le:gislaru.re (the: General Court) and then for heresy before a pand of minis· cers. Hutchinson's kno""le:dgc of Scripture was so superior co chat of her inquisitors char she mighc W'CII have been acquirted had she nor claimed to communicate direcdy with che Holy Spirit. Because l'uritans bdi e:\~d char God had ceased to make matce:rs of faith known by personal m-elacion since Ne:wlescament rimes, Hutchin· son 'A'3S condemned by her own words. Banished from the colony along ~Aith other antinomians, Hutchinson settled in Rhode lsland and chen m o\~d to New Necherland, where she was killed in that colony's war with Indians in 1643. Her banishment effective!}' ended che last challenge capable of splitting congregacionalism and en· surcd che survival of t he New England Way for two more generations.

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New restrictions on \N'Omcn's independence and on equality within l'uritan con· gregations followed antinomianism's defeac. lncreasingl)', women ..w .re pro hibited from assuming the kind of public religious role claimed b)• Hucchinson and were C'\\':n required to relate their conversion experiences in private co their minis ter rache:r than publicly, befo re their congregation.

To ensure that colonists \N'Ould settle in communities with congregations, all New England colonies prO\ided for t he: a.dflnlllfe establishment of CO'-''tlS by a~A>arding a granc of land to several dozen landO'I'-'ning church members. These: men laid our che scrd e:mcnc, orga· nizcd its church, dis tributed land among themselves, and establis hed a town meeting. Ac the center of each tO'I'-·n was t he meetinghouse, which scn~d as boch church and tO'I'-·n hall. Local administration fay in the hands of the tO'A'tl meeting, which resu lted in a highly decentralized authority m-er policical and economic decisions. Each tO'-''tl d etermined its own qualifications for \'Odng and for holding office; most aJIO\l~d all male taxpayers, induding nonsaints, to parcidpatc. Mosc tO'I'-n s attempted co maintain communities of t ightly dustered settlers by distributing only as much land as was necessary for each family co support itself. The remaining land u'Ould be d istributed to fururc generations as needed. Forcing residents co H..-e d ose together was an attempt co foster sodal reciprocity. New Eng· land' s generally com pace system ofsetd e:mcnc made people interact ~Aich each other and established an atmosphere of mutual watchfulness that promoted godly order. Despite the restriction of chcir public roles after che antinomian crisjs, women remained a social force in their communities. Remaining at home while husbands and older sons tended che families, fi elds, and business, ~A'Omen exchanged goods- a pound of butter for a se<eion of spun wool, for example-advice, and nl"''-'S. Women confided in o ne another, creating a community of women that helped enforce mor· als and protect che poor and vulnerable. l'uritans defined matrimony as a cont ract, not a sacrament; they were thus mar· ried by justices of the peace rather chan min is ters. As a civil institution, marriage could be dissolved by t he courts in cases of desertion, bigamy, adultery, or ph)'sical cruelty. HoYIC'\o-er, N ew England courts saw dh·ol\':e as a remedy only for cxtremd)' wronged spouses, such as the Plymouth woman who found char her husband also had ~AT.~s in Boston, Barbados (bar-BAY-dos~). and England. New England ~A·i\~s enjorcd sjgnificant legal protections against spousal vio· lcnce and nonsupport and had more freedom co escape a failed marriage chan chcir English counterparcs. But they suffered the legal disabilities borne by all women under English law. A wife had no pro perty rights independent of her husband except by premarital agreement. Only if cherc 'A'et'C no other heirs, or if a will so spedfied, would a ~AidO\l' reccive control of household property, alchough Law en tided her co lifet ime usc of onHhird of the estate. New England's families enjO)"ed greater stability and lived longer li\~S than cheir English counterparts. l 'he region's cold climate lim iced t he impact of d isease, espe· ciall)' in winter when limited t rawl betW'tf:n tO'A'tlS siO'I'-·ed t he spread of infection. Easy access to land cont ributed co a health)' dirt, which strengthened resistance co

Towns. Families,

J PvRnAIOSW IM NEW ENGLAND

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disease and lowered death races associated ~Aith childbirth. Life expectancy for Purl· can mm reached sixty-five, and women lived nearly that long. These life spans ~A'Cre em rears or more longer than those in England. More than 80 percent of all infants survived long enough to marry. Because so many of the rwmty thousand immi· grants who arrio.-ed in New England berw«n 1630 and 16 42 came as members of families, an f.'\ 'tO sex racio and a rapid natural increase of population foiiO'I'--ed. Families were cconomicall)t interdependent. Male: heads of family managed the household's crops and livestock, conducted its business transactions, and repre· senced it at to~A'tl m~cings. Wives bore and n urru.red childrm, and performed or oversaw wo rk in che house, garden, and barn. Sons depended on parents to provide them with acreage for a farm, and parents e ncouraged sons co star at home: and work in rerum for a bequest ofland Iacer on. Young males often tended their father's fields until their late rwmties before receiving their O'A'tl land. The a..-erage famil)', raising four sons to adulthood, could count on thirty co forty )'tat'S of work if their sons d e:tared marriage until a~ twemy-six. There u.-ere other benefits. Prolonged dependence for sons e nsured that the family line: and property ~A'Ould continue in che hands of capable, experienced men. Although daughters performed vital labor, they would marry imo another famil)'· Young women with man)' childbearing )'tat'S ahead of them ~A'Cre the most valuable: potential wiV\'S, and first-generation ~A'Omm tended co marry br che age of N'Cflt}'·OnC.

Saddled wich a short gro~Aing season, rock)' soil salted with gra\-el, and an inefficimt srstem of land distribution chat forced farmers to culrivace wide:l)t scattered strips, the colonists ncvcrrhdess managed ro feed their families and co keep ahead of their debts. Few grew ~A'l'a! thy from farming. For wealth, N ew Englanders rurned lumbering. shipbuilding. fish ing, and rum distilling into major industries char emplO)'-ed perhaps one--fi fth of aU adults full rime. As its economy diversified, New England prospered. While most Puritans shared Winthrop's view ofcommunity, self-discipline:, and mutual obligation, a farge minority had come co America for prosperity and social mobility. The most visibl)t ambitious colonists were merchants, whose activities fueled Ne~A' England's economy but whose wa}' of life challenged its ideals. Merchants fit uneasily inro a religious sod«y char equated financial shre~A•dness with greed. New England ministers attempted to curtail che acquisitive impulses transforming England icself. Merchants clashed ~Aith policical lead~ who u-ere cry· ing to regulate prices so that consumers ~A'Ould not suffer from the chronic shortage of manufactured goods chat afflicted N ew England. In 1635 the: Gmeral Court for· bade the sale of any item aboi.'C 5 percmt of its cost Led by Roberc Keayne, merchants protested chat they needed ro sdl some goods at higher rates co offset losses in· curred by shipwreck and inflacion. In 1639 authorities fin ed Ke:arne: for selling nails ac 25 percent abo'le cosc and forced him to apologize in fronc of his congregation. Keayne S)mboliud the fear char a headlong rush for prosperit)' would lead New Englanders co forgct char cher were chcir brothers' keepers. ConttoV\'.rsie:s like: these were pare of a struggle for the New England souL At stake 'A'llS che l'uritans' ability www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

HII-W.ry Coweu.. law to admit noruaint$ to chuttb mcmbm.hip: major Wow eo Ntw Engbnd Way

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to insulate their dty upon a hill from a market economy that threatened co strangle: the spirit ofcommunity within a harsh world of frantic competition. Other changes further undermined Winthrop's vision. All-er 1660 farmers voted themselves larger amounts of land and consolidated their scattered pan::els of land. Farmers began to leave town centers to live on their outlying tracts. Friction grew betv.rcen tO\\<-nspeople and "oudivers;'' whose distance from the town center limited their influence ow~r town affairs. j ohn Winthrop's vision of a society sustained b}• reciprocity was slO\\<·Iy giving way to the: materialistic, acquisitive society that the: original immigrants had fled in England. As New England struggled for stability and conformity, old England fell inco chaos and civil ~A>ar. Alienated by years of religious harassment, Puritans gained con· trol of the: re\-olt, beheaded Charles I in 1649, and gMwne:d without a king for more: than a decade:. In 1660 a provisional English gM•ernment recalled the Stuarts and re· stored Charles II to the throne. The Stuart Restoration left American l'uritans without a mission. Having con· qucred a wilderness and built their city upon a hill, they found that the: eyes of the: world were no longer 6xed on them. An internal crisis also gripped New England. First-generation Puritans had be:· licvcd that they held a cm-cnant, a hoi)' contract, with God co establish a scripcurall)' ordained church and co charge their descendants with its pre:sen>ation. HO\\<·e\~r. underscandabl)' reluctant to submit co a public rt:\icw of chcir spirituality, rdacivcly few second--generation Puritans were willing to join che elect by making the required conversion relation before the congregation. This generation also rejected the ritual of publk conversion relation as an unnecessary source of division and bitterness that unde:nnined Christian fellowship. Because Puritan churches baptized onl)' babies born to saints, first-generation l'uritans faced the: prospect that their O'A'tl grandchildren u-ould remain unbaptized unless the standards for church membership ~A'cr'C 10\\<~red. They solved their di· lemma in 1662 through a compromise: known as che Half-Way Covenant, which permitted the children of all baptized me:mbcrs, including nonsaims, to be baptized. Church membership would pass down from generation to generation, but nonsaints would be "half-wa}"" members, unable to take communion or to voce: in church af· fairs. When forced to choose: be:rw«n a church system founded on a pure member· ship of the: elect and one chat embraced che entire: community, New Englanders opted for world!)' poW'tr m-er spir itual purity. The Half-Way Co\~nant marked the end of the New England Way. Most adults chose to remain in "half-wa}"" status for life, and the: saints became: a shrinking mi· nority in the third and fourth generations. By the 1700s there ~A'Cre more female: than male: saints in most congregations. But because: ~A-omen could not vote in church affairs, religious authority stayed in male hands.

In contrast to the settlement ofVirginia,. the Puritan colo· nization of New England iniciall)' met little resistance from Native Americans, whose numbcrs had been drasti· callyreduced by disease. Between 16 16 and 1618 an epidemic had killed 90 percent of New England's coastal Indians, and a second epidemic in 1633- 1634 inflicted com·

&p.slonand Nlllwe Americans

J PvROAIOSW IM NEW ENGLAND

51

parable casualties on Indians throughout the Nonheasc.. By 1675, N ew England's Nati~ American population had shrunk fro m 125,000 in 1600 to about 10,000. During t he 1640s, Massachusetts Ba)' passed laws prohibiting Indians from practic· ing t heir 0'1'-'n religion and encouraging missionaries to convert t hem to Christianity. The Massachusetts Indians surrendered much of chcir independence and mm-ed into "praying to"''tls," such as Natick, a reservation established by the: colon}'· The expansion of English settlement farther inland. h()\JJ'(!'\-er, aroused Indian resistance. As settlers moved into the Connecticut Rio.-er Valle)', beginning in 1633, friction dC"<-elope:d with t he Pequots, "''ho controlled t he trade in furs and "''llmpum with New Netherland. After tensions escalated into violence, the English waged a ruthless campaign against the l~uots, using tactics similar to those: dC"
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courts. 1Cnsion was especially high in che Plymouth colony, where Puritans had en· gulfed the Wampanoag tribe and forced a series of humiliacing concessions from their leader, Mecacom (MEH·tt.lh
No"'•here in New England did the conflicts dividing white: New Englanders converge more forceful!}' than in Salem, Massachusetts. Trade made Salem prosperous but destroyed the relatively equal society of the 6rst generation. Such dhi sions were espe· dall}' sharp in Salem Village, an economically stagnant district norch of Salem TO'I'-'n; those who lived in the eastern section farmed richer soils and benefited from Salem Town's commercial expansion, whereas those in the less fertile W\'Stem half did not share this prosperity and lost che political influence that they had once held. In lace: 1691 several Salem Village girls encouraged an African slave woman, 11· tuba (TEE-too--bah), to tell forrunes and talk co them abouc sorcer}'· When che girls began behaving strangd}', villagers assumed chat chey were victims of witchcraft. l'ressed to identify cheir tonnenters, they named two local "'>bite: women and T ituba. To chis point the inddenc was not unusual.: "'itchcraft beliefs remained strong in sevence:ench·cemur}' Europe and its colonies. Generally, "'itches "''Cre women whose: greed, pride, envy, or d iscontent su pposedly drove them ro sign pacts with the devil and use his supernarural power ofevil to rormem neighbors by causing illness, destroying property, or ...possessing" their \i ctims' minds and bodies. Witnesses also usuall}' accused these women of unfeminine behavior. A disproportionate number ofche 342 accused witches in New England were: women who had inherited or stood to inherit more property than the usual one:-chird of a husband's estate:. In ocher words, mosc accused "'itches "''Cre as.sertiw women who had or mighc ha\'e more: economic po'I'-'Cr and independence chan many men. To New Englanders, who felt it necessary to limit both female independence and economic indhidualism, the)' were: dangerous. In mosc earlier witchcraft accusations, there: wasonl}•onedefendanr, and the case: ne\-er wem to eriaL However, che Salem witchcraft trJals would lead to a colon)""ide panic.

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By April 1692 the: girls had denounced two prosperous farm wives long consid· ered saints in the local church and idencifie:d the ...illa~ 's former minister as a wizard (male witch). Fear of witchcraft soon O\-errode doubts about t he girls' credibility and led local judges to ignore legal bans o n «spectral evidence,'" testimon}' that a spirit PMwy Source: resembling the: accused had been s«n tormenting a victim. Thereafter, charges mulConon Mather on tiplied unci! the jails m•e:rflO\l-ed ~Aith accused ~Aitches. the Education of The pattern of hysteria and accusations reflected Salem Village's internal divi· His Children sions. Most charges came from the: ~A'CStern side of the: village and "''ere lodged against people from the eastern village and in Salem 1b~A'tl . lU.'O·thirds of all accusers ~A'Cre girls aged eleven to twenty, and more than half of them had lost one or both par· ents in conflkLS bet"V~een Indians and settlers in Maine:. They and other survivors had fled to Massachusetts, where most worked as servants in other families' households. l 'he:y most frequently named as ~Aitche:s middle-aged wives and widO\l's- wome:n who had escaped the poverty and uncertainty that chey them.seh-es faced. Those fo und guilty of~Aitchcraft tried to staw off death by implicat· John Winth rop prod.lim.M that ing ochers. As the: pandemonium spread, fear d issolved tics of friendship Purit.uu would build a "city upon a and family. A minister was condemned by his granddaughter, a mother by hill" in t he New \l'orld, a godly commun ity that \\>ould be- an ex· her st\'en·ycar-old daughter, and a h usband and father b)• his wife and ample ro the world. daughter. Fifty saved themselves by confessing. but twenty u-ere con· Thrt-at,: ro Purir.ln orthodoxy, the demne:d and executed. ''New Engl.md W;1)', '' included reli· By late 1692, doubLS about the: charges were surfacing. Clergymen obgiou,: d i,:$tn t<'l., Rogu William,: and Anne liutch iruon and the growr.h or jected to che emphasis on spectral evidence, crudal to mosc convictions. a marl<:ct «onomy. By accepting such evidence in court, minister Increase Mather warned, che: Wh ire Up.lnJion studilyd iJp]actd Puritans had fallen victim co a deadly game: of"blind man's buffet" set up Ntw fingl.md',: N.lcivt- American,:; by Satan and were «hod)' and madly mauling one another in che dark." In Ntw Englmdeu cekbrated the October, G()I.'Crnor William l' hips forbade any further imprisonments for ma.sl~rt oft he Pequau, .md later resi,:tln«, culm inating in tfwo btrter witchcraft. One hundred ~A'Cre still in jail, and two h undred more stood acand costly King Philip's \'(lar, pru'lt'd cused. In early 1693 Phips ended che terror by pardoning all those who futile. W\'.re convicted or suspected of practicing witchcraft. Ttw- H.llr-W.a}' CCM'n.ln t rdaxed The ~Aitchcraft h)'Steria marked the: end of Puritan New England. Col· 'ttnd..lrds: for ch urch mC'Ul ber:~hip onisLS reaching macurity after 1692 would reject che ideals of earlier gen· and m.uktd the beginning ofthe end or the New England W.ly. erations and become «Yankees"' who shre'Ndly pursued macerial gain. True Ttw- Sile'm witc:hcr.ll't hpteria ddj,.•. to their Puritan roots, chey ~A'Ould re:cain their forceful convictions and ertd the lin.ll blow to the New Eng· self-discipline, giving Ne~A' England a distincciw regional idencity that l.md W;1)', U'lo>eiling d ll"otp ,:oci.U would endure. divi,ions.

THE SPREAD O F SLAVERY: THE CARIBBEAN AND CAROLINA Wiry and hptthe West Indies. Between 1630 and 1642 ncarl)' two·thirds of t he English who emigrated to che Americas V.\':nt to che Caribbean. Beginning in the: 1640s boch

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the f rench and the English follo\IJ'Cd che Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch in using sla\'t: labor to produce sugar on farge plantations. After 1670 large numbers of English islanders migrated to the Ches.apeake and to Carolina,. carrying wich chem the habits and prejudices of plantation slaveholding. B}' 1710 che population of Carolina, like that of the Caribbean colonies, 'A'llS predominantly black and enslavcd.

lnteracti\oe Map: The Senlements of the lower South

Jniciall)', the: English West Indies dewloped along lines sim ilar to Virginia, ~Aith tobacco the dominant crop. Jk:. cause a single: ~A'Orker could tend onl)' chree acres of to· bacco, tobacco farming demanded a large populacion. By 1640 more colonists lh
In 1663 Charles II bestO\l't:d the swampy coast berween Virginia and Spanish Florida on sC\o-eral English support· ers, making it the 6rstof SC'\-eral Restoracion colonie:s.1'he: proprietors named their colony Carolina in honor of Charles (Carolus in Larin). Settlers from New England and che West Indies had established outposts along the northern Carolina coast in che J6SOs.: che proprietors organi.zed chem inco a sep· arate district wich a bicameral legislature. In 1669 one of the: proprietors, Anthony Ashley Cooper, accelerated settlement by offering immigrants 6ft)'·acre headright grants for C'\OCr}' family member, indentured sen •ant, or sla\'t: they brought in. T he: next )'t:ar, two hundred white Barbadians and their slaves began the: setd e:menc of

I TH:t SClll.EAO Of SLA\'EIIY:. nu CArua.aEAN AND CAAou:w.

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Mop 3.3 Tht Caribbeoo Colooiet 1660 By 1660 ne
southern Carolina near modern Charleston, "in the \-ery chops of the Spanish." In the settlement they called Charles 1bwn, they formed the colony's nucleus, with a bicameral legislature distinct from that of the northern d istrict. Cooper and his secrctar)', j ohn locke, devised an intricate plan for Carolina's settlem ent and gm-emment. 11leir Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina at· tempted co ensure the colony's slabilicy by decreeing that political power and social rank should accurately reflect settlers' landed wealth. Thus the)' invented a threetiered nobility chat would hold two·fifths of all land, make Ia~A'S through a council of nobles, and d ispense justice through manorial courts. In che early years. Carolina's population consjsted mainly of smalll ando~A'tlers who saw little reason to follow the complex system dra~A'tl up on the other side of the Atlantic. Southern Carolinians raised li'o'estock, and colonists in northern Carolina exported robacco, lumber, and pitch. In neither north nor south d id che people real· iu: enough profit to maintain slaves, so self-sufficient white families predominated. But southern Carolinians eagerly sought a cash crop. In the early 1690s they found www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

it- rice. Rice culcivacion enriched the few sctrlers with capital enough co acquire: t he: dikes, dams, and slaves necessary co grow iL By earning annual profits of25 percent, successful rice planters ~Aithin a generation became che only colonial mainland elite: whose: wealth rivaled that of the Caribbean sugar planters. Treated inhumand)', white indenru.red servants d id nor survive in che humid rice paddies swarming ~Aith malaria-<arr}i ng mosquitoes. Thus planters imported an ever-growing force: of African slaves, who possessed cwo major advantages. First, some had culcivated rice in Africa and possessed expercise vital to teaching whites ho~A' to raise che unfamiliar crop. Second, many Africans were: immune to malaria and }'eUo~A' fever, which ~A'Cre endemic in coastal regions of West Africa, and which they carried to Norch America. ( rragically, t he anribod}' against malaria also rends to produce the sickle-cell trait, an often-fatal genetic condicion.) These two faccors made commercial rice: produccion possible in Carolina. The typical rice planter, with 130 acres in cultivation, needed sixty·fiw slaV\'S. Demand dr01o-c the proporcion of sla\'es in southern Carolina's population from 17 percent in 1680 to 67 pm:ent in 1720, when t he region officially became South Caro· !ina. By 1776 the colony, wich at least 100,000 slaves, ~A'Ou ld have more bondsmen than any other mainland colony in t he cighceench century. It "''Ould be Britain' s only eightcenth-cenrury mainland colon}' wich a black majority. As the black majority increased, whites relied on force and fear to con· trot their slaw~s. In 1696 Carolina adopted che galling restriccions and grue· 1~\ some punishments of the Barbados sla\'C code. Bondage in che mainland The Engli"h Culbbt an oolaniel colony grew as cruel and harsh as in the \l'esc Indies. bu ame d epencknc on .sugar, which White Carolinians' atticudes toward Nacivc Americans likewise hard· l'l'qu inod ;l large b bor rorct . ened. 11le most vicious result was the crade in Indian slaves. White Carotin· Pl.:m tltion" ap~ud in the' Caribbt a n, and JJa,..,ry .spcC'ad. ians armed allied Indians, encouraged them to raid and capru.re unarmed Sou th Carolina btcoune wedded ro a Indians co che south and wcsc, and sold the capciV\'S to the West Indies dur· c.u h crop (rice"), pbn t.uioru., and ing the 1670s and 1680s. A recent study estimates char the Carolina traders Sla'"''l'· enslaved cens of chousands of Indians. O nce shipped to t he West Indies, Nonhtrn C:uulinUru C':Xpcnud most Nati\'t: Americans died because they lacked immunit ies co European toNcco, lumbtr, ;md pi u~h. and cropical diseases.

THE MIDDLE COLONIES

I

How dtd diverstty drshng1mh the Middle Colomes?

I

11le Dutch and che SwedJSh established small commerc1al outposts berwcen the Chesapeake and New England. The Dutch took over New Sweden, and in turn England seized New Netherland in 1664; by 1681 England had used this territory as the basjs for New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, creating a fourth colonial re· gion, the Middle Colonies.

Precunon: New Nelllet1and and New SWeden

New Netherland became North America's 6rst multi· cchnic society. Barely half the sctders ~A'Cre: Ducchj mosc of the rest comprised Germans, French, Scandinavians, and African~ both free and slave. In 1643 t he population in·

I eluded Protestants, Cacholks, j e'I'-'S, and Muslims, speaking eighteen European and African languages. Religion counted for little (in 1642 che colon}' had SC'\-cnteen caverns buc nor a single place of worship). The trading company thac had established the settlement struggled to concrol the setd ers, ~Ailose gct-rich-quick atcirude sapped company prolits as private individuals craded illegally in furs . Even· tually, the company legalized the private crade. Privacization rapidly increased the number of guns in the hands of New Netherland's Iroquois allies, giving them a distinct ad\•ancage O\'er other tribes. As ow~rhunring depleted local fu r supplies and smallpox epidemics raged, che Iroquois encroached on Huron territor}' for pd ts and cap· tives (~Ailo were adopted into Iroquois families to replace the dead). After 1648 che Ducch-armed Iroquois attacked French sectlements along the St. Lawrence. Although che Dutch had allied ~Aith the inland Iroquois, relations with the nearer Indian neighbors W\'.re terrible. With greedy settlers and militar}' weakness, New Nether· land largely had itsdf to blame. In 1643 an all-out war erupted ~Ailen Governor Willem Kieffi- ordered the massacre of previously friendly Indians. By 1645 che Ducch had temporarily prevailed, but only by enlisting English help and inflicting atrocities. The lighting rut Ne~A' Netherland's Indian population from sixreen hundred to se\-en hundred Another European challenger, Sweden, distracted che Dutch in their war ~A>ith the Native Americans. In 1638 Sweden had planted a small fur-crading colony in the lower Delaware Valley char was d ii,!'Crting fu rs from New Nether· land. In 1655 che Ducch colony's stem soldicr-go\·ernor, Peter Sruyvcsanc (STV-wtl-un;), marched against New Sweden, whose four hundred residents peacefully accepted Dutch annexacion. Bur New Netherland paid dearly for irs victor}'· Although tiny, the Dutch and S~A'Cdish colonies were significant. Abm-c all, chcy bequeathed a religious and cthnic dh-ersity char ~A
Ellllllll Collquests: New York and New Ieney

THE M IOOU COLONIES

57

M•p u Ellropeoo Colooiutioo io tilt Middle 11d North Atllntk. c. 1650 North olSp~sh FIOf'id :~., four Europe:u~ pOWI:rs eompectd for ctnitory :u~d tn.dt with N~tiVl' A.mtriQ n s in tht e~rly StVl'nteenth ecntu ..y. Swedish ~nd Dutch eo1ona~tion w.n the fou nd~tion on which Engl~nd's Middle ColoniC':$ Wl:re built.

Like the Carolin~ Ne~A' York and New jersey originated with Resroration~ra proprietors hoping to grow rich from rents collected from setd ers wichin a hierarchical society. New York marginally achieved this dream, but New

jersey did nor. In 1664, at war with the Dutch Republic,. Charles II attacked the Dutch colony of New Netherland. Four hundred poorly anned Dutch civilians under Gm-emor Peter StU)'\"Csam surrendered peacefull)'· Charles II made his brother james, Duke of www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

York, proprietor of the new English colon}' and renamed it New York With j ames's ascension co the throne in 1685, he converted New York into a royal colony. B}' 1700 immigration had S\I.'Ciled the population to twenty thousand, of whom just 44 per· cent were descended from che original Dutch sctders. New York's gm-·e:mors re'll.arded their influential political supporters wich large land grants. By 1703 five: families held J.75 million acres, which they carved into manors and rented co tenants. By 1750 the enormous income che}' earned from rents had made the Ne~A' York estate owners a landed dice: second in wealch only co the: Carolina rice planters. Ambitious plans collided with American realities in New jersey, also carved out of New Ne:cherland. In 1664 che Duke: of York awarded a group ofsupporce:rs New j ersey, at the: rime inhabited b)•a few hundred Dutch and Swedes and several thousand Delaware Indians. Wichin a decade chousands of troublesome Ne~A' England l'uritans settled in New jersey, and the proprietors sold che region to Quakers, who split the: territory into Eas.t and \l1esc j ersey. The jerse)'S' Quakers, Anglicans, Puritans, Scottish Presbyterians, and Ducch Calvinists quarreled ~Aith one: another and got along e\-e:n worse with lhe propri· etors. l 'he: go\·emme:nts collapsed betv.rcen 1698 and 1701, and in 1702 the disillusioned proprietors surrendered their political powers co the crown, which made: New j ersey a royal colony.

In 1681 Charles II paid off a huge debt by appointing a

Willi• PeMt

Quaker wbo

tritd to t:~~tabtish ~~i.l as a "ptauable kingdom" that R'lkctrd Qu.tker idu ls of tolt:r.anct'

QUIUr Pennsylvania supporter's son, \t'UUam Penn, as proprietor of the: las.t unallocated tract of American territor}' at the king's dis· posal. Penn, a Quaker, thus founded the: colon}' as a "hoi)' experiment" based on the: teachings of che English preacher George: Fox. Penn also hoped for finan cial gain. Q uakers in lace-seventeenth-<encury England stood wdl beyond the fringe of respectability. Challenging com-e:mional foundations of social order, they appealed to chose at the bottom of the economic ladder. But che)' also attracted some: u-e:ll· educated, W'CII·to·do individuals disillusioned by che qua..rreling of rival religious faiths, including significant numbers of merchants. 11le: members of this radical religious sect, which had been born in war-torn England during the 1640s and 1650s, called themselves the Society of Friend~ but most olhers dubbed chem Quakers. At the hearc of che:ir founder George Fox's lhcology was the belief that che: Holy Spirit, or "Inner Ughc," could inspire c-.-er}' souL Mainstream Christians found chis claim highly suspicious. In their religious services ( ..meecings"), Quakers sac silcncl)' until the: Inner Light prompted one of them to speak. Quakers believed thac the In· ncr Light could "speak in the female as wdl as the male,.. and they rhus accorded women unprecedented equality. Q uaker behavior often seemed d isrespectful to gO\wnment and to che: social elite, and thus aroused hostility. For example:, Quakers refused to tip their hat co their social betters, insjsting that spiritual state, noc u-e:alth or slatus, de:scn-e:d rec· ognition. Their refusal to bear arms appeared unpatriotic and cowardly, ret che)' faced persecution and imprisonment with courage:. Care and planning made: che: Quaker migration co Pennsylvania one of che: most successful initial transplantations of Europeans in any North American colony. After

sending an ad\•ance party, Penn arriw~d in 1682. He: named his new capital Philade:l· phia, the "City of Brother!)' l..o'le.'" Within 6 ..e rears, eight thousand Englis h Quakers had joined him. Quakers migrared in family groups, and their high birthrate: led to rapid population growth. (Pennsylvania's religious toleration attracted not onl)' Quakers bur also many other religious groups: l'resbytcri an~ Baptists, Anglicans, and Cath· olics from England, and luche:rans and radical seccarians from Germany.) A victim of persecution, l:tccnn hated incolerance and aJbicrary gmernance. He offered Quakers che oppornmity co make: Laws according to t heir ideals. His Frame of Government (constitution) featured a strong execuriw branch (a gM>crnor and gmemor's council) and a IO""-er chamber (the assembly) ~Aith limited power. Friends, a majority in the: colon)', dominated che assembl)', and Penn generally named Quakers to other positions. To prcvcnc ~A'T:lngling and to achiC\'C an orderly disposition of property, Penn pcrsonally o ..ersaw land sales. He: also designed a grid plan for Phila· delphia, che ..cityofbrorherl)' !me,"' reserving park areas to keep it a ..greenecoumry towne::'' Penn soughc peace: with Nati\'e Americans by reassuring the Indians that the Quakers ~Aishe:d "co lii,!'C together as Neighbours and Friends" and b)• bu)ing land from chem fairly. Pennsylvania seemed an ideal colony- intdligendy organized, ~A'CJ1 6nanced, tol· erant, open co aUindustrious se:rclers, and at peace wit h the Indians. Rich lands and a lengthy growing season produced bumper crops. West Indian demand for grain generated ~Aidcspre:ad prosperity. By 1700 Philadelphia had become a major pore. In I 704 councie:s along the lo\1/Cr Delaware Ri..er, where Swedes and Dutch had sercle:d long before Penn, gained the righc to elect t heir own legislarure and became: t he: colony of Delaware. Ho~A'CVC.r, by chis rime Penn's ..peaceable kingdom" had bogged dO""-·n in human bickering. In 1684 l'r:nn had returned to England, and d uring his 6fteen-ycar absence the settlers had quarreled inccssand)'· Struggles between pro- and anti-Penn forces deadlocked che gM•ernment. Penn's return in 1699 rescored some: order, bur before leaving again in 1701, he: made: t he: legislaru.re unicameral (one chamber) and aliO""-ed it co initiate measures. Meanwhile:, religious contrOII'ersy erupted in t he: 1690s, when promi· nenc Quaker preacher George: Keith urged the Quakers to adopt a formal religious creed. Doing so would ha..e changed the democratically li.mc· tioning Quakers into a com~mional clergy-dominated church. In 1692 a The Dutch 6t~bti,h«< NeYI Ntthtrmajority of Quakers rejected Keith' s views, and he joined the Church of bnd (lattr calLed NeYI Yo rk) and England. Keith's departure began a major decline in t he: Quaker share of rook O'o\"f Swtdish coJon~ to tht 1\:nnsylvania's population. In 1748 l'r:nn's sons, who inherited the pro· wuth.. prictorship, would become Anglican, and Anglicans t hereafter would hold The Dutch roloniel,le"-ix.td by England in !66.,., brou.sh r a tr~dition of the highest political offices, although Friends ~A'Oul d still dominate t he: rdigiou' and tthmc d i\U$ity and colony's asse-mbly. rol«.mct to tht EnglUh tmpirt. Before chcyu.~re a quarter-<enrury old, the Middle Colonies had dem· Willi~m J~nn utahli, htd tht l~nn· onscrated thac English America could benefit by encouraging pluralism. $}'1\':lni~ rolon)' ;u ~ rtfugt for Qu~k- New York and New Jersey successfull)' integrated Dutch and Su.edish popu· tu., who lufftrtd pc'I'$C'C"Ution.. lations; l:tr:nnsytvania, New Jersey, and Delaware refused to require residents Pffln tritd co trutt a " peacublt kingdom" in PC"muylv~nia, tnrou r-to support any official church. But the virtual completion of English claim agingjtO()d rd~tiorn: with Jndiaru scaking along the Adancic Coast had sec England on a collision course u.ith and rdigiow tukr~nce. France and Spain, which u.ere: also vying for American rerricory.

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RIVALS FOR NORTH AMERICA: FRANCE AND SPAIN How did tM Fnndl and Spanish empires develop in the uwnteenth c:entury ? Unlike: England, wich irs compact seacoast colonial sertlements in Nonh America, France and Spain had cast enormous ne:rs of widely separated trading posrs and

missions across the interior. The rwo Catholic nations had com-ertcd many Indians to Christianity and made chem trading partners and allies. By I 720, scattered mis·

sionaries, fur trad~ and merchants had spread French and Spanish influence: across rwo-chirds of coday's United States.

After briefly losing Canada to England (1629- 1632), f rance: resumed and extended irs colonization there. Initial!)' a privately held compan)', the: Company of New France is· sued extensive traces to large landlords, who in curn imported indentured servants or rented out small tracts. None:cheless, Canada's harsh winters and shore growing season sharp!)' Limited their numbers. More: successful were the traders and missionaries ~Ailo spread beyond che setd e:menrs and relied on stable relations ~Aith the Indians to succeed. l 'he lucrati\'e op· porwnicie:s offered by trade: convened many would-be fanners inco traders. j esuit missionaries follo~A'Cd the: traders into the interior, spreading f rench in· fluence westward to the: Great Lakes. Ursuline nuns ministered to Nati\'e American women and girls nearer Q uebec, ensuring that Catholic piety and morality reached all members of Indian families. Under King Louis XIV (personally reigned 1661 - 1715), France sought to subordinate its Am erican colony to French imeresrs, following the: doctrine of mi!TCdtUil· ism. According to this doctrine, colonies should serve as sources of raw materials and as markets for manufactured goods so chat the: colonial power did not have to depend on rival nations for trade:. The French hoped that New France ~A'Ould increase the fur crade, provide: agricultural surpluses co ship to France's West Indies colonies, and export cimber for those colonies and for the French navy. 10 achieve chis, the: French governmenc transfonned New France into a royal colon)', confronted and sought to scifle che Iroquois, and encouraged French immigration to Canada. The Iroquois had long limited French colonial profits by incercepting com'O)'S of fur pelts. In the 1660s louis XIV had dispatched French croops to New France. The French army had burned Mohawk villages. Sobered by the dcscruction, che Ito· quois Confederacy had made: a peace that pe:nnitted New f rance's rapid expansion of fur exports. The French cro~A'tl energetically built up New France's population, primarily b)• sending indentured se!Vants to New France; army members stationed chere were en· couraged to stay, become: farmers, and mart}' the: "king's girls;'' female orphans shipped over with dowries. After 1673, hO'I'-'e\'tr, immigration dwindled. Colonists who rerurned to f rance-more than two· thirds of the immigrants-told horrifying tales of disease, Canada's hard winter, and ..savage" Indians. Natural increase wo uld

Fnnm Clllm 1Contlllent

I Rl\'AlS fOil. NOI!lH AMEIIJCA: ~AHCE AXO SPAIN r~:place immigration as the chief source of population groo•ch, guaranteeing slow dcvd opmcnc for New France. Even male immigrants ~Ailo stared did not always fulfill the: French vision of sturdy farmers. Man)' of them struck out westward from the St. l.a~Arrencc Valley, becoming COI4ffllrsrk bois ( Koo-RUHR duh BWAH), independent and sometimes dis· n:putable fur traders. These French traders obtained furs fro m the Indians in exchange for European goods, including guns. The cou.reurs lived and married among rhc Indians, forging for France: a precarious em pire based on alliances with Canadian and Great Lakes Indians. Alarmed b)• chc rapid expansion of England's colonies, France sought ro contain che: English colonies and prew~nt Spain from linking Florida "'ith New Mexico by dominating che Nonh American heartland. As carl}' as 1672, fur trader Louis jollier and Jesuit missionar}' Jacques Marquette became che first Europeans kno"''tl co have reached the upper Mississjppi; they Later paddled rweh't: hundred miles downstream to the Mississippi's junction wich the Arkansas. Ten )'tat'S Iacer, the Sieur de La Salle, an ambicious dreamer and advcncurcr, descended the encire Mississjppi to the Gulf of Mexico, ultimately claiming the enci.re Mississippi basin- half the territory of the present-day United Scares- for Louis XIV. Having asserted citle co Louisiana, as La Salle christened this empire, the French began sctding its southern gate'\1.-ay. The firsc colonizers arrived on the Gulf Coasc in 1698; within a year, the French had erected a fort near modern Bi· loxi, Mississjppij in 1702 che French fou nded a trading post where DeSoto had faltered and called ic Mobile. But Louisiana's growth would be delayed for another decade.

61

COrOr'N'J" ft lois

Frmcb fur tl'lldt:rs whcuprtad tbroughaut tht Fn-od!. tmpirt in Noftb

I

~iu

After 1625 Spanish colonization in Norch America expanded on early bases in N ew Mexico and Florida. Although the colonies needed tics with friendly Nati\'t: Americans to obtain land, labor, and security, su ch friendly relations pro..·ed hard co come by. The Spanish soughc to rule New Mexico by subordinating the Pueblo Indians to their authority. Franciscan missionaries established churches in the native communities (pueblos) and tried co force the Indians co attend Mass and observe Catholic ricuals and morality. Spanish lando"''tlcrs recei\
New Mexico: Tilt l'lleblo Revon

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IPope

l.eadtt of Pueblo l«dt ag;Umt Spani5h in 1680

CHECKI NG I N fr.an« cru~ a New W«ld cmpin" tNt cncompas5ed North Amnica from the App.\Lach.i;a.n.s t o the Rockiu . The french empin" n"$ted prim.ui1y on tr.lde with Nati\'C' Am«ic.uu r.uhtr d u n on conqul':lt .lnd di.spl.lct mwt. Sp;an ls.h policiuled to t he Putblo l'e\'Oit in 1680, but the- Sp.:mi.sh n-e-Jt.lb!iJhcd control b)· 1700. T he Sp;mi.sh t ritd tOC'.Jl..lbli.sh frontitn: in Tex:u .lnd Aorid.:., bu t thC'ir pn"$tnce the-n- w.u: wu.k and SC.lftC'r«<.

spiritual balance and bring rainfall and peace. Determined to suppress this "witchcraft;'' Franciscan missionaries entered sacred ki v~ destroyed religious objects, and publid)' whipped naci\J'C religious leaders and their followers. In 1675 Go\~rnor j uan FrandscoTrcvi!'1o ordered the kiv:ts sacked and religious leaders arrested. Three leaders went co the gallows; a fourth hanged himself; forty· three others u~re jailed. whipped, and sentenced co be: sold as slaV\'S. Indian resentment against the Spanish blazed, and Pueblo leaders began plan· ning co overchrow the Spanish. At che head of the 1\.'VOit \l'llS Popi (po~· PAY), who had been a.rresced in 1675. Other leaders included disillusioned Christian com~rts and individuals of mixed Pueblo-Spanish ancescry. Mosc had tried to reconcile Chris· tianity and Spanish rule with their Indian idencity, but the deteriorating conditions and Spanish intolerance had turned them against Catholidsm. The 1\.teblo Revolt began in August 1680 as !:tope: and cohorts attacked Spanish colonists residing near Taos and killed sixty-eight of che sc-.-cnty who li\~d chere. j oined by Indians from neighboring pueblos, they laid siege to New Mexico•scapital, Santa Fe. T he rebels descrO)~d the churches and killed near!}' four hundred colonists and missionaries. The Spanish fled, not to rerurn for tv.'Civc )'Cars. They left behind them large numbers of li\~Stock and horses, around which many Nari\'e Americans would build new ways of life. Led by a new govcrnor, Diego de Vargas, the Spanish rerurned in 1692, using both violence and threats of violence co reestablish their rule. Spanish concrol of Ne~A' Mexico remained lim ited as che Europeans abolished the encomiendas and reined in the Frandscans. Pueblo suspicion ofche Spanish rema ined. but chere were no more re\'Olts. Instead. the Indians accepted che limited Spanish control and sus· tained their culcural identity within che boundaries of colonial rule.

The Spanish fared no better in Florida. 1\'.riodic rebeilions swept the Spanish setd emencs, and beginning in the 1680s, Indian sta..'C raid~ allied with the English, killed or capcured thousands of Florida natives and sold chem to English sta..'C traders. Even before a new round of warfare erupted in Europe at the turn of the century, Spain was ill prepared co defend its beleaguered North American empire. English expansion threatened Florida,. while the French establishment of loui· siana dashed Spanish hopes of linking Florida to New Mexico. To offsec the French, Spanish authorities proclaimed the pnwince oflCjas (l'exas) in 1691, but no perma· ncm Spanish setdemcms appeared there unrill716.

Rirkll 1M Texas

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTO ITONTHEGO.

I

KEY TERMS

How did tabaa;o shape the Chesapeake rolonies? (pege 39)

Unlike New England "ith irs diversifi ed economy, the Chesape-ake colonies became dependent on a single cash crop, tobacco. lbbacco shaped the Chesa· peakc region by leading to che plantation system and dependence on African slavery, which dcvrloped gradually in the scw:ntttnth ccntuty.

What IWIS the "New England Woy, • and what challenf1S did it endure? (page 45)

I

Puritans rscablishcd "a city upon a hill" in Massachusetts Bay to serve as a model to the world The ''New England Way"- a society based on ttligion- ""'as thl'tatencd by dissenters Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson and by the rise of a market economy. Whitt' expansion steadily displaced New England's Native Americans, and from the rtquoc War to the bitter and costly King Philip's War resistance V.'.lS crushed. The Half· Way CO\·cnant markro the beginning of the end for the New England Way by relaxing standards for church membmhip, and thi: Salem witchctaft hysteria ddiwred the final blo~·, rew:aling deep social dh•isions..

Bacoo'sRebellion (p. 45) acity upoo a hil (p. 46) tile "NMEngland \Vir( (p. 46) Old O.ludor Act (p. 46) Roger Williams (p. 41) Anne H.-chinson (p. 41) Half.Way C01•nant (p. SO) Kilg Plilip~ war(p. 51) Salom llitchaaft tria~ (p. 51) William Penn (p. 58) courrors de bois (p. 61)

Pope(p. 61)

Why and how did plantation agriculture shape sla•~ry in the caribbean and Carolina? (page 53)

I

CX:pendent on sugar cane, the Caribbean colonies evoi~\."CC a harsh form of plantation sla\-ery, while rice creared a similady harsh system in southern Catolina, which became the only mainland colony"'i th a black majority population. Carolinians also ensla\'ed tens of thousands of Indians..

I

How did diversitydistingpish the Middle Colonies? (page 56)

The Middle Colonies tOLIO\Ir\."d yet another path of deve-lopment. The Dutch New Nethertand colony, conquered and incorporated t,· the English, contri~ uted a strong histor}' of religious and ethnic diversity. William Penn's '"holy ex· perimcnt" in Pennsylvania flourished, although it gradually mo~'ed away from some ofits founder's ideals. Nonetheless, it, too, maintained both religious and economic divl':rsity.

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How did the Frtnch ond Sponish empires develop in the """nt..:nth aniJiryl (J10t160)

I

In rontr.Ut to dx f.l.ltly compx:t English stttltmmrs, thr Fcmch anpltt bt-W.Rung Wfb amdung from tht: AppWcb.ims to tht Rcdics. ckpm· dmt .dmosl uduJiYdy an tt:tdt and thus on gpod ctb.uons wnh N.liM Amtnc:ms.. Aft« suppc-cmng rht Pumb Rmlll in tbt: b.tt ~ cm.tuty, tbt Spmuh t:rKd to csubluh mrit impuW fi'Otlticn in Tau .md 1-lond.&. but both <mWnocl only lisJ>tly sntltd. camt a

CHAPTER4

1660-1750

CHAPTlR PRlVI l W

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Rebdlion and IYar, 1660-1713 How tlitJ tM C".JoricKd: Rno/Jiriolf slwpt. rtl.1fio1U brnwft,.. ~tWJ fMtl irs NtJttA AwtU.. mltHval

(olcriol Eall- and So
'~ ... ciN,., ,·~ C.OOtqW~~mo( Bntish mctafiUtNJm (or tM m~~inhnd rololtltfl

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Con¢ing tor a Conlinerl, 1713-1750 \IV1rol /PtUJrs ~xplaln riM relotive SIKMS oftM Bdthh, Frendt, 4nd Spanish empires in North Amllrit4J?

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Pubic Ute in British America, 168cr 1750 How d1d polllk\ eM &Ji~tntme.nt, 11M rtlitjotn tN cololtia?

mowt'J'MittJ sMpt pubic ~ itJ

T

(ff) This icon oMII direct )
tnduringc:onciseee

wo men, George \Vhitcficld and Ben· J:unin Fr.lnklin, exemplified the rna·

jor cultural Clii'Unts that SW'Cpt across the Atlantic from Europr to the colonies in the mid·cigtnrcn«h ctntu.ry. The t:mbodi.mmt of the pow-erful rniv.al of pi«)' tb.ar rrinvig~ OfliUd Procaunrism on both sidts of dw: ocun, W'hiccftdd also dtmoostn.tai .and Rmforcrd the d«* rirs th.u bound Engb.nd md the cokmsa Franklin. considt:rcd the luding American .scientist of h11 rime., pt;rsonifitd the faith in rc:a.· MMl knmm as the EnJighcC"nmenc, Rom on opposite sides of the Ad antic. both men m o\~d easily In English and colonial sodcl}'• leaving behind provincialism for ca· ue•·s t hat brought them renown on both sides of t he Adantk. Their llw.s illustrate the incre:uingty close rics between England and her

65

66

OfAPlER 4

ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o-1no

mainland coloni~ tics that strengthened as the policical and economic bonds of the empire grew cighter. This new imperial relationship enabled the: Anglo-American colonies co achieve a le:•..-e l of growth and prosperity unequalled elsewhere in the: Americas.

REBELLION AND WAR, 1660-1713 I-Iow did tM Glorious Revolutiott sMpe nla6ons betwHn England and its North Americ4n colonia? After the: Restoration, England undertook a concerted effort to expand overseas trade: and to subordinate its colonies to English commercial interests and politi· cal auchority.1'he fall of the Stuart dynasty in 1689 and a succession ofinternacional wars hindered but d id noc halt this effort.

The sons of a king executed by Parliament, the: last Sruart monarchs, Charles II and James II, disliked reprcsentati\'e 1&&1-1&18 government. Beginning in che mid-J670s, they tried co rule: England as much as possible ~Aithouc Parliament and eyed American colonial assemblies suspicious!)'· As Duke of York during his brother Charles's rule, James showed his disdain for colonial assemblies alm ost as soon as he: became che proprietor of New York. Calling e:lecred assemblies "of dangerous consequence," he: forbade: legislatures to meet from 1664 to 1682. In Charles's t"-\':nty·li..-e·)'ear reign, more than 90 percent of the: gover· nors whom he appointed W\'.re anTI)' officers, a serious violation of the: English tradi· tion of holding che military accountable: to civilian a uthority. When James became: king. he continued che policy. E..\':r resentfu l of outside: meddling, New Englanders resisted su ch centralization of po~A•er. In 1661 the Massachusetts assembl)' declared its citizens exempt fro m all English laws and royal dec~s except de:darations of war. l'rm'Oked, Charles mo\-ed to break che Puritan establishmenc•s poW'Cr. In 1679 he can -ed a new ro)'al territor)', Ne~A' Hampshire, from Massachusetts. In 1684 he: dedared Massachusetts a royal colony and ri!VOked its charter, the wry foundation of the l'uritan cit)' upon a hill. James II ~A'Ccnt further. In 1686 the new king merged 6 ..\': separate coloniesMassachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pl)'lllOuth- inco the Ootttln.ion of New England, Lacer adding New York and che Jerseys. Under the: new S)'Stem, chcse colonies' legislatures ceased to exist. Sir Edmund Andros, a former army officer, became the Dominion's go\·ernor. Andros's arbicrary actions ignited burning hacred in Massachusetts. He limited t~ns to o ne annual meeting and jailed prominent citizens to crush protests. He: forced a Boscon Puritan congregation to share its mee:cinghouse ~Aith an Anglican minister. Confronted by o utraged colonists, he snapped ..You ha..-e no more privileges left you than nor to be sold for slaves.'' Tensions also ran high in New York, where Catholics held high political and milirar}' posts under che Duke of York•s rule. Anxious colonists feared that these

lloyll Cl!lllrlliDilon,

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~mo IPJ ~ttmtpt eo rigtln-n

roy.d control ofcokmitJ by cruring a oew poliOO:ll entity

1 REanuoN AND WArt, •66o-•ro

67

,~~

~ 1651- 1713 1660 1686-1689 1688-1689 1689 168~1697

1690 1101

1701- 1713 1711 - 1713 1715- 1716 1716 1718

17ll 17l5 17l9 1139- 1740 1139- 1748

174) 1750

land enacts n Ads Restoratiln of the English monarchy Dominion of New &l.gland Glonous Rewlulioo il England Upn!ings in MaS. war ollhe league ol A!rgsburg) John Loeb. Essay CorrcM>ing Humon llnd<Jstonding IroquoisConfederacy agrees to remain neutral in twJre wars between Enfand a1d France Qtr,.n Ame~ wac (il Europe, wac of lhe Spanish Succession) TLtSCarora WM in carolina Yamasee war in carolina S.n Antonio de 90rar founded New Orlearo founded Georgia founded John Peter Zenger acqutted of sedDJuslibel in NewYort; Jonathan E<Mards leadsrt!Wval i1 Nonhalfllkln. Massachusetts Great Awakenilg begins with George Whitefield's arrival in Brii!ll colooies; Siano Rebellion in Soulh carolina Angto.Spani!ll war Kilg George~ war (in Europ<>. the war ollhe AUSirian SUcces1ion) Beniamil ffanijilfounds American Philosophical Society Slavwy ~··d il Georgia

Catholic offidals would bet ray the: colon}' to France:. When Andros's local deputy al· lO'wed harbor forts to deteriorate, New Yorkers suspected che worse..

---

l'he: Protestant majority in England also "''Orriedl)' mon-

lilt ClorloiiS Revolution itored Stuart displays of pro-Catholic S)'lllpachie:s. 11le

In Ell&l..t llld Ameri
Duke of York himself became: a Catholic in 1676, and Charles II com-erted on his deathbed. Both rulers vio· laced English law by allowing Catholics co hold high office and to worship openly. In 1688 James's second wife bore a son, "''ho wo uld be raised- and perhaps would rule- as a Catholic. Aghast ac che idea,. Englis h political leaders asked James's Protestant daughter Mary and her h usband, William of Orange (t he: Dutch Republic's leader), co intem:ne. When William and Mary led a s mall army to England in November 1688, ro)'al troops defected co them, and james II fled to France. This nearly bloodless coup, t he: "Glorious Revolution, .. created a "Limited monarchy" as defined by England's Bill of Rights of 1689. The: monarchs promised to summon l'arliament annually, to sign its bills, and to respect civil Liberties. Neither

th.,.. ofj;a.meJ 0 in f.avor of

1WiUiam ;and - ""'' Bill ollliPt> D~ri<•lly ~ry

I

limited kingly powa; rindi. ut~"d limited ""Pft"Sl'Utati~ JO'"mtnc'nt

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68

OfAPlER 4

ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o- 1no

B OS~ O N: .AJ<.~ ~w.

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i' Ecbnuod Aldos •nd Boston BI'Oidsido lk:ing Him to

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SaT-. 1689

News of the Glorious Revolution in Engl:at~d q-uiddyunderrnintd A l\di'O$' S ;authority mthin the Dominion of New Engl:at~d. Shortly ;after tOWI\ ;authoritits iu ued this public w.uning co Andros, Boston's milit i;a ;ar~sted hi m ---

the English nor Anglo-Americans ~A'Oul d ew~r forgct this vindication of limited rep· rescntariw: government. News of the Glorious RC\
ers, many of whom Leister had arrested, packed the jury, and both he and his son·in· law were convicted and hanged. Arbitrar}' go\·cmment and fears of Catholic plots had also broughc curmoil to Maryland b)• 1689, ~Ailere the l'rocestant·dominated lower house: and che Cacholic upper chamber ....-ere feuding. When che Glorious Rcvolucion coppled James ll, Lord Baltimore, a~A'llY in England, dispatched a courier to Maryland, commanding obedi· ence to William and Mary. But che courier died en route. Jlrotescanc rebel John Coode organized the Protestant Association to secure Maryland for William and Mary. In July 1689 Coode and his coconspirators seized the capital, remow~:d Catholics from office, and requested that the CTO'A'tl take m-er the colony. Maryland became a I'O)'al pnwince in 1691 and made the Church of Eng· land its established religion in 1692. Catholics, making up less than one-fourth of the population, lose che righc co vote and co worship in public. In 1715 the fourth lord Baltimore: joined the Church of Engtand and regained his proprietorship. The rt\'olutionar}' C'\o-ems of 1688- 1689 reestablished the colonies' legislati..-e gm-emmem and ensured Protescanc religious freedom. William and Mary all""'-ed colonial elites co reassert local control and encouraged Americans to identify their interescs with Engtand, la)ing che foundation for an empire based o n voluntar}•alle· giance, not raw force.

The Glorious Revolution ushered in a quarter-<encury of war chac convulsed both Engtand and the colonies. In 1&8-17U 1689 England joined a European coalirionagainsc France's louis XIV and plunged into che War of the: League of Augsburg (1A>hich Angto· liogwiE..,..,_ E""'!'= Americans called King William's \t'ar). w~r tbat spilltd OYI'f inro Nortb In 1690 che: ~A'llr spread co Norch America, as New Yorkers and New Englanders ~ia (1689.1697) launched an invasion of England's enemy, New France. The invasion dece:riorace:d QIIMn laWs W.r Europtm into crud buc inconclusive border raids b}' both sides. The Iroquois, allied to the w~r tbat spilltd OYI'f inro Nortb English, bore the brunt ofche war. French fol\':~ enlisting che aid of \irtually C'\o\!r}' ~ia other cribe from Maine: to the Greac Lakes, plared ha\'OC wich Iroquois land and peoples. B}' 1700 one-fourth of the Iroquois ~A'llrriors had been killed or taken pris· oner, or had fled co Canada. B}' comparison, English and Ducch casualcies 'A--ere fl""-er than nine: hundred, and the: French probably lost no more: than fou r hun· dred. In 1701 che Iroquois agreed to lee Canada's governor sectle cheir dis· putes with other Indians and to remain neutral in future Anglo· Fr~:cnch wars. 1'he:rcafter, pla)ing French and English offagainst each other, the lr· Afl:tr the- fteltor.uion, Brit~in ~t· oquois maintained control of cheir lands, rebuilt chcir population, and tempttd to tighte"-n conuol o'A'r tht hdd the balance of power along the Great lakes. t oloni6. In 1702 a new European war pitce:d England against France and Spain. Tht Gloriou$lk\
A c-naoa of War,

l I

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70

OfAPlER 4

ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o-1no

These "'':us had a profound political consequence. Anglo-Americans, realizing how much they needed the protection of the: Ro)'al Navy and idencifying ~A'ith England's leadership in the Protestant cause, became more IO)'lll than C'\-er to the English crown.

COLONIAL E CONOMIES AND SOCI ETI ES,

1660- 1750 WMt wmt the most important cottuquen<.es ofBritish merc11ntilism for the m4inland colonies? l 'he arrival of peace in 1713 shifted the competition among England, France, and Spain fro m the military to the: economic. Britain and France soughc to integrate their colonies into single colonial empires; Spain attempted to do so but fou nd its power norch of Mexico and the Caribbean se\-erd)' limited.

.......&n Pblux.t{ ro.momic theory that Jc"lf. sufficiew:y w.u tbc v.•;ay to oariOIUI prw;ptrity: titd colo. oial tconomie:c w the mothe-r coootry

NMipti• Ads Series or b...,. mc"ant to make IXIkmiC's conrorm to the- ideas or meiT.lntilism

A set of political-eco nomic assu mptions known as mer· candlism supplied the framC""--ork for the new imperial economics. 11le term refers to Euro pean policies aimed at guaranteeing prosperity by making the European country (England, France, or Spain) as self-sufficient as possible by eliminating ics dependence on foreign su ppli· ers, damaging its foreign co mpetitors' commerce, and increasing the national stock of gold and sih-er by selling more goods abroad chan it bought. A series of Navigation Acts governing commerce be~-een Britain and its colo· nics embodied mercancilism . ln 1651 the English Parliament passed the 6rs.t Naviga· tion Act co exclude the Dutch fro m English trade. During che Restoration, l':lrliammt enacted che Navigation Acts of 1660 and 1663; they barred colonial merchants from exporting su ch co mmodities as sugar and tobacco to arl}""·herc but England and from imporcing goods on non-English ships. Another major measure, che Molasses Act of 1733, sought to integrate Caribbean sugar gro\I.I'Crs imo che imperial economy by slapping heavy import taxes on non-British imports and thus creacing in effect a protecriw cariff. By 1750 a long series of Navigation Aces 'A'llS affeccing the colonial economy in fo ur major ways. First, the laws limited imperial trade to British-~·ned ships whose crews were three-quarters British (broadly defined co include all colonists, even blacks). This new shipping restriccion helped Britain to beco me Europe's foremost shipping nation and laid the foundacions for an American merchant marine. By the 1750s Americans ~·ned one-third of all imperial ..-esscls. 1'he s~A'ift gro~A'th of the merchant marine di\-ersi6ed the colonial econom}' and made it more self-sufficient. The expansion of colonial shipping hastened urbanization. By I 770 New York, Phil· adelphia, Boston, and Charleston had become major ports. Second, the Navigation Acts barred the colonies' export of.,enumerated goods" unless they first passed through England or Scotland. Among these were tobacco, rice, furs, indigo, and naval stores (masts, hemp, tar, and rurpcmine). l':lrliammt did nor restrict grain, lh·estock, fish, lumber, or rum, "''hich constituted 60 percenc of

MerunUiist Empires Ill America

I COLONI.-L fCONOY.lESAND SOCI ETIES, L66o-t?SO

71

colonial exports. To sweeten che deal, Parliament gave American cobacco a monop· oly in British markers; it also eased che burden of cuscoms duties on both tobacco and rice. Despite the rescricti\'f: laws, planters' profi ts dropped o n!}' 3 percent. Third, the navigacion system encouraged economic dh·ersificacion. Parliament paid modest bouncies to Americans producing silk, iron, d)'eS, hemp, lumber, and other products chat Britain wou ld otherwise have had to import from fo reign countries. Parliament also erected protective tariffs against forcign goods. In addition, the tntde laws forbade Anglo-Americans from co mpeting with British manufacturing of certain products,espcd allydothing. There "-ere no rescriccionson the production of iron, and by che e\'f: of the Revolution, 250 ironworks 'A'C:tc in production. Finally, the Navigation Acts made che colonies a protected market fur low-priced co nsumer goods fro m Britain. As a result, the share of British exports bound for America rose from just 5 percent in 1700 co almost 40 percent by 1760. Mercantilism ga\-e rise to a «consumer re\'Oiution" in British America. Britain's fellow mercantilists in f rance and Spain enjO)'f:d no such growth or prosperity. France's Canadian colonies had few materials other than furs to export, and they imported primaril)' wine and brandy. The f rench go\-ernment accuall)' lost money in the fur trade b)• sending sizable amounts of doth, firearms, and other manufactured commodities co irs Indian allies; the large arm)' chat France kept stationed in Norch America ~A'a.S also a drain on the French treasury. French Canada co ntinued co lack the private im-estmenc, commercial infrastructure, co nsumer mar· kec, and manufacturing capacity that British North America was rapidly developing. The French did achiC"t·e some economic success in the West Indies, ~Ailere sugar planters (in defiance of mercantilist principles) turned their cane into molasses and then sold much of the molasses to New England merchants. Louisiana remained unprofi table, a drain o n French resources. Spain's economic record was e\'f:n more dismal. The revival of the Spanish and Latin American economies during the cighceench cc:ncur)' did not extend north of Mexico, " 'here many Spanish colonists turned to smuggling goods co and from Spain's rivals as a source ofincome. These economic successes and failures mirrored what 'A'llS happen ing in che Euro pean mother countries. In both France and Spain , most wealth 'A'llS in che form of land held by the nobility and the Cacholic Church.: there was almost no liquidity. In contrast, England's economy was a commercial· mercantile one. More and more ~A'Cal th was in the hands of merchants, ~Ailo used it as capital co invcsc in commercial enterprises, tntde, and manufacturing. Britain's navy protected thac crade, while the Bank of England ensured a stable moncysuppl)'· Great Britain was ~A'CII on the way to beco ming the world's fi rst industrial nation, and its colonies benefited accordingly.: indeed, the colonies' per capita income from 1650 to 1n0 rose cwice as fasc as that of Britain.

Demographic differences reinforced Britain's economic advantages. By 1750 the British North American colonies boasted more than 1.1 million inhabitants; the French colonies, 60,000.: and the Spanish colo nies, an almost negligible 19,000. Potencial Spanish immigrants generally chose the wealthier latin American col· onies as their destination. Spain saw irs setd emenrs north of Mexico primarily as a

Popullllon CrowU! IMDiwenlty

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72

OfAPlER 4

Prima:ry Source: Main Sources of African Slaws

ThE BONDS Of EMPIRE, t66o- 1no

buffer against French or English expansion and consequently maintained a hea'i)' militar}' presence there. l:toveny kept most French people from immigrating, and cates of harsh Cana· dian ~A'inters and wretched Louisiana conditions often deterred chose who might otherwise ha\-e: cried chcir luck in the New World. French Canada's population growth was primarily the result of natural increase; to populate louisiana, the French gm--e:rnmcm dispatched paupers and criminals and encouraged the I~· scale importation of slaves. By 1732 two-thirds of lo\1/Cr Louisiana's 5,800 people were slaves. Unlike their French and Spanish rivals, the Bricish colonies could offer poten· rial immigrants ample fannland and a healchy imperial economy. Equally impor· tam, the Bricish ~A'illingly accepted no n-British immigrants- as lo ng as they \l"t:tc not Catholics- including a handful of jews. Thus British North America had a much dttper pool of potencial immigrants. Natural increase fueled population growch. After 1700, ~Ailen life expectancy and family si.ze in che South rose: to parallel chose: of the North, Anglo-America's growth far outpaced Britain 's. In 1700 England's population oumumbered che colonies' b)•

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M.lp 4.1 African Origios of 5lavts S~ippocllly Britis-. 1692-1807 Vutu~y 311 s.l3\'t:S. brought

co &!glls.h North Americ.~ ume from w~ A&ia., b.:~'t:el'l Mon were c.~ptu~ or bought lnl~nd ;u~d m:u-ched to the co:~st, wh tre they wert sold to A&ic02n merch3nb who in tum ro.ld them to Europe~n sl02vt' tnders.

S.:raeg~mbi~ ~nd Wen.Ceratnl A(ric~.

I COLONI.-L fCONOY.lESAND SOCI ETIES• L66o-t?SO twenty to onej b}• 1775 the ratio would be only chree co one. Nevertheless continuing immigration contributed significantly to colonial population gro"''th. In the forty )'~ars after Q ueen Anne's War, 350,000 newcomers had reached the colonies. Between 1630 and 1700 approximately cwo thousand English settlers arri\·ed in the colonies annually,conscituting 90 percent ofall European immigrants. Aftrr 1713 the flood slO'I'-~d co a trickle of 6\'f: h undred English immigrants a )'f:ar. Rising em· piO}ment and wages in England made emigracion less attraccivc, but economic hardships elsc'""here in the British Isles and on the Continent guaranteed a steady stream of immigrants, greatly increaUng cthnic dh-ersity among white Norch Americans. More than 100,000 newcomers in this era "''Cre fro m lreland.1\l'O-thirds of chesc were «Scors-lrish," the descendants of sixtecnch-century Scottish Presbyterian set· tiers of northern Ireland. 1'he Scors-lrish generally im· migrated as complete families. In concrast, 90 percent of Irish Catholic immigrants "'~re unmarried males who, once in America,. often abandoned their faith co marry Protesr.o-... tanc women. Germany contributed some: 125,000 seed ers, che ma· jorit)' seeking escape from desperate pm--eny. O ne-third were «redemptioners" who had sold themselves or their children as indenrured seJVants. Lucherans and Calvinists predominated, but a significant minority belonged to small, pad fist seers that desired above all to be left alone. Indentured sen•ants had to work one co four years for a master who might exploit chem cruelly. Servants could be: sold or rcnced our, beaten, kept from marrying, and sexually harassed; attempted escape usually meant an extension ofservice. At the end of their cerm, most collected «freedom dues," which helped them co marry and acquire land. The piedmont, a broad, rolling upland stretching along the eastern slope of the Appalachians, drew man}' immigrants seeking open Land. Upper New York, Pcnnsyl· \'ania, and Maryland attracted large numbers of Germans and Scots-Irish. Charles Town became a popular garcwa}' for immigrants who later moved "''f:SN'llrd to the Carolina piedmont to become small farmers. In 1713 few Anglo· Americans u..~d more than fifty miles from che Atlantic, buc by 1750 one-third of the: colonists resided in the: piedmont.

73

Primary Source: Excerpts of Virginia Law on k\dentuted

Servitude

ATLANTIC OCEAN

To ChM'IN Town: Nl'lt'IRi, Gt.mwos..

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lmlliCI'ition alld Brililll Colooial E~~P"ISioo. to 1755 Bla.ek mo:~jori tin emerged i:n much of the Chts.;,peo:~kt tickwo:~ter ;u~d thot C:irolina·Georgia lowcoutltry. lmmigr;u~a from Germo:~ny, l rdo:~nd, a.nd Sc:otlo:~nd p~ominated among the $ettl~ in the piedmont. /\ si:gniflG~nt JC"YMh population emerged in the $eaports..

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74

OfAPlER 4

Middle P.ssace

I

ThE BONDS Of EMPIRE, t66o-1no

Brutal .md ofuon Utal ,;l:ro" journey &om Mriu to tht Alnc'rieu

Noc all of the white immigrants came: voluntarily. Between 1718 and 1783 some: thirty thousand English convicts arri\·ed in Norch America; some: were murderers, most 'A'cre poor petty criminals. l 'hcy were sold as servants. Rdarivel}' few commit· ted crim es in the colonies, and some established t hemselves as successful backcountr}' fanners. There: were no volunteers among che 140,000 e:nslaw~d Africans who constituted the largest single group of newcomers. Mosc 'A'cre fro m Africa's wcsc coasc, and all had surviw~d a sea crossing of sickening brutality kno~A'tl as t he Middle: Passage:. Ship captains closely calculace:d ho~A' many slaves they could jam inro their vessels. Kept below deck in ncar-darkness, surrounded b)• 61t h and sce:nch, numbed by depression, the: Africans frequently fell viccim to disease. By mid-<encury blacks conscituted 20 percent ofche North American colonies' populacion. Alchough slavery remained primarily a southern inscirurion, JS percent of all slaves liw~d north of Maryland.: by 1750 one in st\'en New Yorkers was a slaw. West Indian and Brazilian slave buyers o utbid Anglo-Americans, who of neces· sity not o nl}' bought a higher proporcion of female slaves buc also procecce:d t heir in· \'estments by maintaining sla\'es' health. As a resulc, slaves in British mainland colonies, more often than t heir Caribbean or Brazilian counterparts, formed fami·

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ArdtiiMfs Plan o1 a 5lavt S-ip This pi;~." gr;2phiully d~pi~ts the erowd~d. ;~.nd tr~$p0rt~d ;~.~ross th~ Ad~tic:.

uns;~.ni~')' conditions u nd~r¥otl i~h ~nsl;t\·~d A&ia.n s w~l'l': p.ac:k~d

like a.rgo

I COLONI.-L fCONOY.lESANO SOCIETIES, L66o-t?SO lies and lr.~d longer. Natural increase among African· Americans almost equaled chac of white~ and in some places American·born slaves oumumbf.'t'Cd those born in Africa.

Because the vase majority ofcoloniallandO\l-'ners had a.~wamen just enough acreage for a working farm, most could not pnwide land for chcir children when they married MoreO\'et, wich longev· icy increasing, children often did not re:ce:i\~ chcir inheritances until middle age or later, and because families were large, a farmer's wealch was typicall}' di· Yided into small pon:ions. Under chese circumstances, a )"Oung man typically "''Orked from about age six· teen to age twency·three as a field hand to sa\~ money jusc to buy farm equipment, and a young husband generally had to rent land uncil he reached his mid-thirties. The payment of mortgages was slaw. A farmer could expect to e:arn 6 percent cash income per rear, which barely equaled mon:gage interest. After mak· inga do"''ll payment ofone-third. a husband and wife generally paid the next third through their inheri· mnces. 11le final third "''Ould be paid "'then che chit· Poor f..,..s Houst dren reached their teens and hdpcd co double the M;~nypoor Ches;~pe:do:e f.um~ li\-ed in;~ single room regular farm income. Most colonial parents found ....-ith ;~dirt Aoor, no i:nteriOf'w.:.Us, :Ltl ungl;ued ....-indow, them.sel\~s free: of debt only as they reached their lace ;u~d minim:.! furn isnings. fifties. Rural families depended somewhat on barcer and much more on what wives and daughters manufactured: soap, prescn~d food, knitted goods, )':tm, and the products of dair)', orchard, and garden. Ho"''Cver, lcgal constraints bound colonial women. A "''Oman's most independent decision was her choice of a husband Once: married, she lost control of any goods or money she brought into the marriage. Nevertheless, widows controlled substantial propertyan estimated 8 to 10 percent of all property in e:ighteenth-cencury Anglo-Americaand some ran farge estates or plantations.

.... Whitt Men

As English settlement expanded, the environment e:ast of the Appalachians changed rapid!)'· Eighceenth~cemur}' settlers cleared forest land to plant crops in its fertile soiL New England farmers also deare:d from their land innumerable farge rocks, debris from the last Ice Age. The felled trees provided timber to construct houses, barns, and fences and u~re burned as fuel for cooking and hearing. Urban dwellers bought their 6rcu.-ood and construction timber from farmers and planters.

Celonlal Famers a.l lbe Envlroament

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76 llefw

l

CHAPtER 4

ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o-1no

IMiot1 RmlO\'<'I or tt«s

tbat bad dt'Y
import

Removal of trees (deforestation) deprived large forest creatures, such as bears, panthers, and wild turkeys, of thcir habitat, while che planted land provided free lunch for rabbits, mice, and possums. Deforestation remo\-ed protection from ~A'ind and sun, producing warmer summers and harsher winters, and, ironically, reinforc· ing che demand for fire""-uod. By hastening the runoff of spring waters, deforesta· tion led to heavier flooding and, where water could noc escape, to larger swamps. Volatile temperaru.res and water levels rapidl)•reduced che number offish in colonial streams and lakes. Deforestation also dried and hardened che soil; colonial crops had evecn more drastic effeccs. Nath-e Americans had rotated cheir crops to protect against soil depletion, but many colonial farmers lacked enough Land to do so-and many more were unwilling to sacrifice short-term profits for long-cenn benefits. Tobacco yields in the Chesapeake region declined in fields planted only thr«: or four consecuti\-e )'CatS. As Chesapeake tobacco growers abandoned ridC~A'llter fields and mo\-ed to the piedmont, chey hastened erosion. By 1750, to remain productive, man}' shifted from tobacco to wheat. Well·tt>do Europeans had alrcad)' turned to consen •arion and «scientific farm· ing.'" North American colonists ignored such techniques. Some could not afford co implem ent them, and virtualI)' all believed chat America's \'ast land~ including chose: still held by Indians, would sustain them and future generations indefinitely.

Cities ~A'Cre colonial America•s economic paradox. AI· though chey shipped the lt...·escock, grain, and lumber that enriched the countl)'Side, at the same time they were caught in a do.....,ward spiral of declining opportunity. After 1740 man}•among che 4 percent ofcolonists in d ries fou nd economic success elusive. l'hiladelphia, New York, and Boston faced escalating po\-erty. The cities' poor rolls, morco\·et, always bulged with the survi\'ors of mariners lose at sea; unskilled, landless men; and women (often wi do~A>s) and childrm from che countr}'· side. High population dmsity and poor sanitation left colonial cities vulnerable co the rapid spread of contagious diseases. As a result, half of all city children died before age N'Cnty·one, and urban adults a\-eraged ten fewer )'Cars of life chan rural residents. Even the able-bodied found cities economically treacherous. Traditionally, arti· sans trained apprentices and employed che-m as journeymm until they could open their 0\\·n shops. After 1750, hoW'CV'Cr, more employers released cheir workers when business slo~A•ed. And from JnO onward, recessions hit frequently, creating longer spells of unempiO)menc.. After 1700 urban po\-erty became a major problem. In Boston, for example, the proportion ofche population too poor to pa)' taxes climbed steadily. Ne"'' York did noc build irs first poorhouse: until 1736, buc 4 percem of irs population needed public assistance by 17n. The pm:mtage of Philadelphia families listed as poor jumped from 3 percent in 1720 to II percent by 1760. \'t'ealch remained highly concentrated New York's wealthiest 10 percent 0\\·ned about 4S percent of the property throughout che cighteenth cemur}'; Boston and l'hiladelphia foiiO\\-ed similar patterns.

The Man ,_IdOl

I COLONI.-L fCONOY.lESAND SOCI ETIES. L66o-t?SO

77

In the Souch, most cities W\'.re little more: than farge t~ns, although Charles 10wn was North America's fourth·largest ciry. South Carolina's capital offered gra· d ous living to W'Calth)•plantcrsduring the months ofheat and insect infestations on their plantations. But s hanties on che city's o utskirts sheltered a growing crowd of destitute whites. Like t heir counterparts in northern port dries, Charles 10wn's poor ~Athites competed for work wich urban slaves whose masters remed out their labor. Racial tensions simmered. Middle·class urban women faced less manual drudgery than their rural coun· tcrparts. Nonetheless, they managed complex households, often including servants and other non family members. Although they sewed, knitted, and raised poultry and vegetables, urban women generally purchased their d oth and most of t heir food. Household servants, usually }'Dung single women or wido·ws, helped with cooking, cleaning, and laundering. Wives also "-'Orked in family businesses, usually located in the owner's home. Widows and less affluent wives cook in boarders and often spun and 'A'O\'l' d oth for local merchants.. As grim condit ions in Boston forced many widows with children to look to che community for relief, more prosperous Bostonians scorned chem.

Masters could usually afford to keep slaV\'S healthy, but they rarel)' made their human chattels comfortable. Slave upkeep generally cost 60 percent less than the mainte· nance of indentured sen•anrs. White servants ate t"-'0 hundred pounds of beef or pork a re-ar.: slaves, 6fty pounds. A master ~A'Oul d spend as m uch providing beer and hard cider for a servant as food and clothing for a slaw. Adult slaves received eight quarts of corn and one pound of pork weekly and W\'.re expected to grow w:getables and raise poultr}'· Slaves worked for a longer portion of chcir lives chan ~Athites. Slave children worked part time fro m the age of SC\o\'!n and full cime as early as dC'\"Cn. African· American wo men performed hard work alongside men and tended tobacco and rice crops c-.-en when pregnant. Most slaves roiled unciI they died, although chose: in their sixties rarely did hard labor. As the number of Creole (American·bom) sla..-es grew, sharp differences between them and African-born blacks arose. Creoles enjo)'ed che advantage of knowing t he Englis h language, che local environment, and t he 'A'll)'S of t heir masters. They often t ranslated chis advantage into greater autonomy. Wealthier planters in particular used African-born slaves as 6eld hands while training Creoles co perfonn household duti~ such as repairing and driving carriages, preparing and serving meals, sewing, and caring for their children. Both Africans and Creoles maximized opportunities within chis harsh S)'Stem. House slaw:s demanded that guests rip them for shining shots and stabling horses.: they also expected gifts on holida)'S. In the Carolina and Georgia rice counay, the task S)'Stem ga\'l' sla'A'S some control of their work. Under tasking, each sla\'l' spent half a da)' caring for one-quarter acre, after which his or her duties ended. Ambitious sla..-es used the rest of the day to keep hogs or to gro~A' vegetables for sale in Charles 10\Ntl. The gang system used on tobacco plantations gave Chesapeake sJa,-es less free time t han their counterparts in Carolina. Ho~A'cwr, despite Carolina sla\-es' greater www.c.engoge.com/history/ boyer/enduringconcisde

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SGIIG ll.I!MIIi• Faik d South ~mlioa ~uprising

autonom)', racial tensions ran high, especially as blacks began co o utnumber whites. For example, a Ia"'' of 1735 imposed SC\'ere restrictions on slai,!'C dothing. Of far greater concern were large gatherings of blacks uncontrolled by "'ilites.. In 1721 Charles TO'I'-'n enacted a 9:00p.m. curfew for blacks. Slaves responded with increased instances of arson, theft, flight, and violence. By mid-<encury, sla\'es constituted 20 percent of New York City's population and formed a majority in Charles 10"''" and Savannah. Skilled urban slaw:s hired themselves out and kept part of their wages. By 1n0 one-tenth of Savannah's slaw:s were living in rented rooms away from their 0'1'-'ncrs. Despite substantial personal freedom, they remained slaves. Tensions erupted in 1739 when a slai,!'C uprising known as the Scono Rebellion jolted South Carolina Stealing guns and ammunition from a store at the Stono River Bridge, one hundred slaw:s headed for Florida crying, "liberty!" Along the "''ll)' they burned s........-en plantations and killed cwenty whites. Within ada)', hoW'CVCr, mounted militiamen surrounded the runaways, cut them down, and spiked a rebel head on ewry milepost back co Charles Town. Whites expressed their fears in a new sla\'e code stipulating constant sul'V\'.iUance and discipline for slaw:s, and requiring lcgi.slativt: appr01o'lll for manumission (the frecing of individual slaves). The Stono Rebellion thus accelerated South Carolina's emergence as a racist and fear-ridden sodety. Racial tensions wracked cities as \'-\'!II as plantations. In 17 I 2 rebellious slaves in Ne"'' York City killed nine whitesj as a result, thirteen slaw:s were hanged, one "''lls starwd to death, three "''ere burned at the scake, one was broken o n the wheel, and six committed suicide. In 1741 a wave of thefts and fires attributed to slai,!'CS in New York led co the torture and hanging of thirteen slaw:s, che burning of thirteen more, and che sale of SC\'Cnt}' to the West Indies.

For "'ilite colonial Americans, "''Calth defined starus ...A man "'rho has money here, no matter how he came by it, he is e\>t:rything," wrote a Rhode Islander in 1748. Once wealthy, a man was expected to be responsible, dignified, and generous, and co act as a community leader- co act like a gentleman. His wife was expected to be a skillful household manager and a refined, respectful hostess- a lad)'· Before 1700 class scrucrure in che colonies was relati..-ely invisible; the rural elite spent its resources o n land, servants, and sla\\'!S instead ofo n con· CHECKI NG I N spicuous luxuries. A tra\'t:ler visiting o ne of Virginia's richest planters noted After 171J,comp«ifion We North that his host o"''tled only "good beds but no curtains and instead of cane Amtri e~~:~hi ft-td from fht military chairs ... srools made of "''OOd." After 1720, hO'I'-'f:'\'f:'r, the displa)' of wealth to the ttonomic re~m ;u Brit~i.n became more ostentatious. 1'he greater gcntr)'- the richest 2 percenc of the cmbu«d merc.:mtili:~m. population- built splendid estate homes. The lesser gentr)', or the second· Ptospc"rity boomtd in fht EngiUh colon iu. \'-'f:'alchiest 2 co 10 percent, lived in more modest fidd-srone or wood-frame houses, and middle-class farmers typically inhabited o ne-story ......-ooden Tht Engl i:~h coloni.es uw r;r.pid popul.uioo gi"OWf.h, in p;~.rt £Tom buildings with four small rooms. immig r;r.tion. l'he gentry also exhibited cheir wealth after 1720 by imitating European The differtn«-J bttwun ruril ~nd "-refinements." They "''Ore cosdy English fashions, dto\\'! carriages, and u rban lift :~harpentd, and tbt num· bought expensh't: china, books, and furnit ure. They pursued a gracious life btr orcoloni..U d itu aru$C". by studying foreign languages, learn ing formal dances, and cultivating po· SUVt'ry buamt more import~nt lite manners. both tconomicall}' and soci~Uy.

The Rise of tilt c.lolllll Bites

I COMPETING f Oil A COMTINENT, 1]1}~0

79

COMPETING FOR A CONTI NENT, 1713- 1750 What factors 6Xpl4in the relatiw success oftl!e British$ French, and Spanish empires in North America? Europeans cransformed North America in che first half of the: cighte:ench cen· cury as chey expanded cheir territorial claims, opened new areas for setd e:menc, and engaged in more: intensive crade and ~A'llrfare with Nati~ Americans. In tum, Nati~ Americans often ~A'Cicomed trade but resisted Europeans who tried to se:rd e nearby.

l nter~cti\·~ Map:

lmm•grabon and Frontier Expansion.

to 17SS

louisiana became a principal focus of France's imperial efforts. New Orleans, established in J7J8, became the col· ony's capital and pore. France hoped to use the Choctaw Indians as allies, but by the J730s che tribe: had become: bitterly d ivided be:rween pro· English and pro-French factions. louisiana's sluggish export economy forced setcle:rs and slaves to 6nd other means of support. Uke: the Indians, chey hunted, 6she:d, gathered wild plants, and culth'llte:d gardens. And Indian, white:, and black Louisianans traded with one another. Indians provided corn, callow, and, abm--e all, deerskins to merchants in recurn for blankets, ax~ chickens, guns, and alcohol. Indians fro m W'CSC of che Mississippi broughc horses and cactle, usually stolen from Spanish ranches in 1t:xas. \l'esc Afri· can sla..-es, familiar ~Aith cactle from their homelands, managed many of Louisiana's herds; some became rusd ers and illicit craders ofb«f. French settlements in Upper louisiana, usually referred to as Illinois (but also including parts of Missouri), W'Cre somewhat better off. Wheat became: Illinois's ma· jor export, a more stable and pro6rable: crop chan che plantation commodities grown farther souch. HoW'Cver, che colony's remote location limited exports and actracce:d few whites. lc concinued to depend on Natr.-e American allies to defend it from In· dian enemies. French attention also ru.rne:d to the O hio Valley, which, chanks to Iroquois neutrality, had become: a refuge: for dislocated Nacii,!'C American cribe:s, such as che Kickapoos, Shawn«s, and Delawares. To counter gro~Aing English influence and to secure commerdal and diplomatic tics ~Aith che Indians, the f rench expanded their trade. Several French posts, including De:croit, ballooned into sizable villa~s of Indian, French, and mixed-ancestry residents. Although the French u.-ere generally more successful chan the English among the Indians, cheyncvcr wo n over the Carolina·backe:d Chickasaws, and waged brutal warfare: against the Mcsquakies at Detroit and the Natchez in louisiana. The French sold captives seized in chest wars as slaves in their mainland colonies and in che West Indies. By 1744 f rench craders had explored as far W'CSt as Norch Dakota and Colorado, buying beaver pelts and Indian slaves on the Great Plains. These traders and chcir competitors spread trade: goods, including guns, to Nacii,!'C Americans throughout central Canada and the Plains. Mean~Aflile, Indians in the southern Plains and the Great Basin had acquired horses from the thousands left behind by flecing Spaniards after the: Pueblo Revolt of 1680. Horses and guns enabled tribes su ch as che lakota Sioux and the Comanche to mm--e onto the Plains and build a new, highly mobile wa}' of life: based o n the pursuit of the

Frana! and llle American HearUand

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buffalo. By 1750, France claimed an im mense territory but their domain ~A'llS precari· ously dependenc on relacions with Natii,!'C Americans. The depopulation and dislocation of Natii,!'C Americans

Native Americans made possjble the colonies' rapid expansion. Epidemic and Brltisll Expansion

(-cJy;o

T"""'bf

which lroqoois <1grNd to rdo. eat~' dispbad tribc-.s to thl' peripht!y ofIroquois bnd.s

1

lnteracti\•e Map: The Indian Confederacies

diseases, environmental changes, war, and political pres· sure opened new Land for Europeans. In Carolina, imperial wars and the trade in In· dian slaves soon produced violence. Between 1711 and 1713, clashes between the Tuscaroras and white scrd ers led to che deach or enslavement of about o ne-fifth of the tribe:; mosc survi\'Ors migrated norch~A'llrd ro upstate New York to become the sjxth nation of the: Iroquois Confederacy. Settler abuses against Indians co ntin ued, leading the Yamasees and several allied nacions to attack English sctdemems in 1715 and 1716. Only by relying on che aid of the Chero kees and by arming four hundred slaw:s did the colony crush the u prisjng. The defeat of the Yamasees in wrn left chcir Catawba allies ~A'edged uncomfort· ably between the English to che souch and the: Iroquois to the north. They curned co the English for hdp. In recurn for land and promises co defend che colo n}' against ocher Indians, che Catawbas received guns, food, and clothing. Although chis ga\'t the Cata~Abas at least temporary security, the rapidly increasing "''hite population and che competition for resources sharply limited Catawba auconomy. To che North, che Iroquois tried to accommodate the: English and consolidate: their own pO\l-e:r. late in the SC"t'e meemh cenwry, the: Iroquois had entered into a st· ties of agrttmenrs, known as che Covenant Chain, co relocate Indians whose lands the colo nists desired. These: tribes were: moved to areas of New Yo rk and l'r:nnsylva· nia, on che pe:ripher}' of che Iroquois ho meland, where rhey s~d as buffers against English expansion. In that way, and by incorporating che Tuscaroras inco chcir con· federacy, the Iroquois created a center of Native American po~A'Cr distinct from, but cooperative ~Aith, the Bricish. In sim ilar fashion, Pcnns)1Vania coerced the: De:la~A'llres inco selling more chan 6fty thousand acres bern-e:en 1729 and 1734. Then che colon},.S leaders produced a fraudulent treaty, dared to 1686, char required the Delawares to cede cwelve hundred square miles of land. The Iroquois forced the De:la~A'llres to mm--e co che upper Ohio Valley ~Ail ile the proprietors made a h uge: pro fi t b}' selling the De:la~A'llres' land. Indians elsewhere along the v.~sN'llrd·mO\ing fro ntier faced pressure from seeders on one side and che Iroquois on the O(her. In 1732 Parliament chartered a new colony, Georgia. It was to be: a refuge for de:bco~ whose st(d ement wo uld buffer South Carolina against attacks from Spanish Florida. Further, che new English colony wo uld export cxpensii,!'C commodities, su ch as wine and silk. James Oglethorpe, who dominated the: provincial board of truste~ shaped Georgia's earl)' )'l'atS. He established rhe port of encry, Sa\•annah, in 1733. B}' 1740 near!)' three thousand colo nists resided in Ge:orgia. Almost half ~A'CTC non·Engtish immigrants fro m German)', Switzerland, and Scotland, and most had chcir 0\'l'rstas passage: paid by the gm-~rnmenc. A small number of Jews ~A'l're among the early set· ders. l h us Georgia began as che Lase English colony.

Brltlsb Expansion in tilt Soutll: Ceorgia

"""""'"" cokmy 1-GtorgiaOsled!orpe

I COMPETING f Oil A COMTINENT, 1]1}~0

81

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Frtoc~ ..d S,.oilll OcOJpition of North Alntriclo. to 1750 French oceup~tion dependC"d on ties with N~tiVl" Americ::u~s.. 6y contr.:.st, British eolo nius h;ad di~p01oses~d N:~.t~Ye peopln ~nd den$dy setded the unern ~:1-bo.:.rd. Sp:u~ is;h ~nd

Idealism and concerns about security led Oglethorpe to ban slavery from Georgia. Oglethorpe chought that slavery degraded blacks, made whites lazy, and presemed a terrible risk. Parliament thus made ~orgia the only colony where slavery was forbidden. Oglethorpe's ..w JI·incemioned plans failed. n:w debtors arri\'€d because of Par· liamenr-'s restrictions on their release from prison. Limitations that Oglethorpe had secured on sctders' rights co enlarge or sell their holdings discouraged immigrants, as did the ban on slavery. Georgia exported neither wine nor silkj o nly rice prm-'€d profi table. After a decade of struggle against economic reality, Oglethorpe yielded. In 1750 slavery became legal, and restrictions on landholdings ended. As a rcsulc, Georgia boomed.

lnteracti\•e Map:

European Claims in North America

While trying co maintain an empire in the face of Native American, French, and British advcrs.uies, Spain spread its language and cultureo\~r much ofNorth America, ('Specially the Southwest. To repopulate Ne~A' Mexico ~Aith settlers after the Pueblo Revolt (see Chapter 3), Spain handed our huge land grants and constructed forri6carions, primar· il}' for defense against,. 6rsc,. the Apachc:s and Iacer, the Comanches (cuh-MAN-chtrst:}.

Spain's Borderlands

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li\-estock-raisjng rttncbos (ranches) monopolized vast amounts of land along the Rio Grande and blocked theest:tblishmcnc of further co"''ltS. On these ranchos, mounted herders of cattle and sheep (r>1q.ueros) (vah·CARE·ohs) created the wa}' of life Later ad· opted b)•the American cowboy, featuring lariat and roping skills, cattle drives, and roundups. By 1750 New Mexico numbered about 14,000, more chan half of them Pueblos. Integrated into New Mexico society, most l'ueblos practiced boch Cacholicism and their traditional religion and helped to de-fend che-colony. Mosc Apaches had fled co Mexico or made peace wich the Spanish to gain support against raids by Utes (yoou) and Comanches from the north. To counter grO\\<·ing French influence among che- Comanche-s and ocher Nath-e Americans on the southern plains, Spain colonized Texas. in J7J6 the Spanish e-stab· lished four missions. The most succe-ssful of the missions was at S.an Antonio de Bexar (day tMh·HAR), "'there friars constructed a fortified build ing known as the AI· amo. lhe Spanish presence in 1Cxas remained light, hO\l'e\'CT, by mid-
Ill

1~\

T he' Funch rt.~"JUinC"d lighdy $C,n· t«C'd 0\'C'r their Non:h A.m.trican tmpii'C' and dtptndtnt an mai nt~i n· ing good 1\"btion$ with the Jndi.:uu. Brit i$h "-Xp.lnJion continued ro pwh Jndi~nJ wutw~rd.

Sp;ain C'Xttndtd iu control in tht Sou th~'t and utahli, hed a ligh t p~"C".W-nct in TtxaJ. Early in tht <"-igh t«nth ctntu ry, contintntil Europun warJ again $pi'C'..lld to North Aml'ri e~~.

Imperial rivalries berwecn England o n the one hand and f rance and Spain on the other prevailed 173t-1748 after 1713. In 1739 Britain launched a ~A'llr against Spain. jame-s Oglethorpe led a massh-e but u nsu ccessful assault on St. Au· guscine in 1740; Spanish croops and refugee slaves from South Carolina like· wise failed in a counterattack on Cif:orgia rwo years later. By chen, the Anglo·Spanish War had merged with o ne in Europe, the War of che Austrian Succession (1739- 1748), k no~A'tl as King George's War to the colonists. In this conflict, four thousand New Englanders besieged che French fortress at louisbourg, at the mouth of the St. la~A'fcncc, and capru.red it after seven in· tense weeks of fighting. But the war was inconclusive, and in 1748 Britain re· turned Louisbourg to che French under terms of the peace treaty ending the conflict.

The Return of War,

I Pvauc UJE IN BAmSH MERICA, •6~o

83

PUBLIC LIFE IN BRITIS H AMERICA, 1689-1750 1-/ow did politics, the fnlighUnment, and relif)ous movements shape public lifo in the colonies? During the: earl}• and middle eighteenth century, the ties linking Britain and its colonies extended far be)'ond the movcme:nt of goods and peoples. England's new Bill of Rights 'A'llS the foundation of government and politics in the colonies. Eng· fish thinkers inspired the: Enlightenment, and English preacher George White-field ('NHIT-tield) sparked a generation of colonists to transform che practice of Protes· cancism in British America. Significantly, these dC"t·elopme:nts involved many more colonists than before: as accive participants in politics, in intellectual discussions, and in new religious mm-cments. This wider participation signaled che emergence of a broad Anglo-American ..public;''

The most important political dC"t-elopment after 1700 was the rise: of t he: assembl}' as the dominant force in colonial go\-ernme:m. Except in Conne:cticuc and Rhode: Island, the cro~A'll or proprietors chose colonial governors, who in curn named a council, or up· per legislative house. Onl}' in che lower house, or assembly, could me:mbct'S of the gcncry asserc chcir interests. Until 1689 gm-crnors and coundlsdrafced laws, and the assemblies generally follo~A'Cd passi\-ely. Thereafter, assemblies assumed a more central role in politics, as colonial leaders argued chat their legislatures s hould cxerdse the same righcs as Parliament's House of Commons, believing that colonial go\·er· nors should be as restricted as England' s monarchs ~A'Cre. Parliament's victory in the Glorious Rt:\'Oiution convinced Americans that their governors should defer to the assemblies. The lower houses refused to permit meddling in their procedures, cook control over taxes and budge~ and kept a tight rein on the: salaries of go\·ernors ~Aoho recei.,.~d no salary from Britain and remained vulnerable to such finan cial pressure. This po~A•er of che purse often forced gm-ernors to sign laws opposed by the crown. Moreovcr, Britain's lack of interest in colonial politics aliO'I'--ed the assemblies to cake considerable poo-er. The Board of1'rade, established by Parliament in 1696 to monitor American affairs, had ncither the: scaff, the energy, nor che vision to main· cain royal aut hority by supporting embattled gm-crnors. 1'his political vacuum al· 10'1'-·ed the colonies to become sdf-go\-eming in mosc respects except for regulating trade:, printing money, and declaring ~A'llr. Colonial autonomy, reinforced by seJf. assertive assemblies, would haunt British aut horities ~Aohen chey attempted to exercise: more direct rule after 1763 (sec Chapter 5). The colonial elite dominated policies as ~A'CJI as sodety. Governors appointed members of the greater gentry to serve on coundls and as judges in t he: highest courts. The upper gencry, along with militia majors and colonels, also dominated among che: representati\--es elected to the legislatures' lo\1/Cr houses (the assemblies). Members of the lesser gentr}' sat less often in the: legislator~ buc chey common!}' scn -ed as justices of the peace in the county courts. Outside New England, property restrictions barred 80 percent of white: men from running fo r rhc assembly. In any case, few ordinar}' citizens could ha..-c afforded

eoa.lal Politics

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JMn Peter .re.,_ Q,otral

I

m.u- optotd die'

6gun" in ... ui.\1

Wllf for fmedom oftbt Pfl'""

the high costs of d eclive office. Assembl)men received meager living expenses, which did not cm-er the cosc of staying at the capital, much less make up for six co cen weeks of missed ~A'Ork . Consequentl)', political leadership feU to a small number of wealchy families with a tradition of public service. The colonies generally sct liberal qualifications for male \'Oters, but all excluded women, blacks, and Indians from \'Oting. In SC'\o-en colonies, 't'Otcr"S had to own land (usually forty to fifty acres), and in the others they had to hai,!'C enough property co furnish a house and co ~A'Ork a farm. Mosc of che 40 perccnc who could not mect these requirements were indentured servan~ single sons living with parents, or )'OUng men just beginning famil)' life. Most white males in Anglo-America could vote b)•age fOrty, whereas across the Atlantic, two·thirds of all Englishmen and 90 percent of Irishmen could never \'Otc. Ruralvocing participation was lo~A', a\'etaging 45 pen::ent. Governors called elections randomly so that after }'tat'S without an election, one could be called on short notice. Voters in isolated areas often did not know of an upcoming election. Voting took place at che county seat, and many \'Oters did not risk traw:ling long distances m-er poor roads co reach the \'Oting place. In many colonies \'Otcr"s stated their preference publicly, often face to face ~Aith t he candidates, a practice that discouraged dissenters. l 'here were: no political parties to stim ulate popular interest or to mobilize voce:rs. Candidates nominated themse:l\'i:s and ran on t heir reputation, not on the issues. In view of these factors, political indifference 'A'llS widespread. For example, co a\'Oid paying legislators' expenses, many Massachusetts cowns refused co elect as· semblymen. f rom J73 1 to 1760, one-third of Souch Carolina's elected assemblymen neglected co take chcir seats. Apath)' mighc have been even greater had not candi· dates plied \'Otcr"S with alcohoL George Washingcon dispensed alm ost two quarts of liquor for each \'Oter when he 'A'llS firsc decce:d to Virginia' s assembly in 1758. Competitive politics firsc developed in the northern seaports. Wealthy colonists aligned chemse:to.·es with or againsc royal and proprietary g()I.!'Crnors. To gain advan· tage m'i:r rival~ some factions cource:d artisans and small shopk«pers whose for· tunes had stagnated or declined as che distribution of wealth favored che rich. In 1735 N ew York became che site of a celebrated eriaL Newspaper printer John Peter Zenger was charged with seditious!)' libeling the colony's g01ownor. Zenger's acquittal on the charge: broadened political d iscussion and participation beyond a small circle of elites. It also established t ruth as a defense against t he charge of libel, opening t he way CO~A'ltrd greater freedom of the press in the future.

If property and \l'i:alth \l'i:re keys to political participation and office--holding, literacy and education enabled Anglo· Americans to participate in che transatlantic world of ideas and beliefs. Eighteenth-<entury Anglo-America was probably the \N'Orld's most literate society. Ninety pen::ent of New England's adult ~Afiite males and 40 pm:ent of its women could write well enough co sign documents. In other colonies t he liter· acy rate varied from 35 to 50 percent. In contrast, in England it stood at jusc 01/'er 30 percent. Nevert heless, ordinary Americans' reading encompassed only a few books: an almanac, a psalter, and che Bible.

The Enll&htenment

I Pvauc UJE IN BAmSH MERICA, •6~o

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Members of the gentry, v.-ell·to-do merchants, and educated ministcrs lived in a world of prim culture. Although costly, books and writing paper opened eighteenth· centur}' European civilization to men and ~A'Omen of chest classes who could read. And a rich, exciting ~A'Orl d it was. Great advances in natural science seemed to explain the laws of nature, human intelligence appeared poised to triumph o ..-er igno· ranee and prejudice, and life itself would surely become more pleasant. For those with time to read and think, an age: of optimism and progress had dawned: the &lfctil&w.e• Jntrlkc:tml m'Oluric:ln that dC"V;~.ted muon, EnUghcenm.enr. :~~:it:~X~~:, and logic Enlighcenmcm ideals combined confidence in reason ~Aith s kepticism about be· liefs not based on science or logic. Enlightenment thought drew on the worl;, of the Englis h physicist Sit Is aac Newton ( 1642- 1727), who explained how gravitation Sir lsi• Nrwton Briti$h :~~:it:nriJit •flose idt.U lay ;~.ttbt ruled che uniV\'.rse. Newton' s work demonstrated the harmony of natural laws and bC'.Ut ofthe Enligbtentnc'nt stimulated others to search for rational principles in medicine, law, ps)'Chology, and gm-emmcnt. No American more: embodied che: Enlightenment spir it than Benjamin Franklin lenjanri• Fri... Amerieln wbo embodied Enlightentnc'nt ( 1706- 1790). Born in Boston, f ranklin migrated co Philadelphia at age: seventeen, bringing considerable: assets: skill as a primer, ambition, and ins.uiable: curiosity. In J. .Locb British philosophe-r 1732 Franklin began publis hing !-\lor RidJdrd'r Almanack, a collection of pro\~rbs wbo explained haw muon that made him famous. By age forty·N'O he had sa..~d enough money co retire from funcrions priming and dC:'\o'Ote: himself to sdence and community senice. To Franklin, sdence and community service tA•ere inter· Nined.: true science would make e\'el")'One's life more: com· fonable. For example, his experiments in flying a kite during a thunderstorm pro\~d that lighming was electricity and led to the inV\'.ncion of the lightning rod. In 1743 Franklin organ· iu:d the American Philosophical Society co encourage ..all philosophical experiments chat let light into the: nacure: of things, tend to increase the po'l'-'tr of man ()I.!'Cr matter, and multiply the: com-enknccs and pleasures of life." By 1769 the: society had blossomed into an intercolonial network of ama· teur sdemisrs. Although some: plantationo~A'tlers, among them Thomas Jefferson, championed the Enlightenment, it flourished in the seaboard dties, where che latest ideas from Europe circu· laced and ge:nrlemen and arcisans mct in small societies to investigate nacure:. To these individuals, the: Ro)'al Society in London, the fOremost learned society in the English· speaking ~A
I I

l"'=

I

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ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o-1no

Deists ltuiaoaW.t, who io. siltrd d!.u die' uni~t opn.atl'll

I

bynawral Ill»'

hannony and order of nature provided the besc argumcm for God, a rational Crt:· ator. A handful insisted that ~Ailere the Bible conflicted wich reason, o ne should fol· low reason. Those- including Franklin and Jefferson- who cook the argument funhest were called Deists. They concluded that God, having created a perfect uni· \'Cf'Se, did nor miraculous!)' inten -ene in its workings but instead left it alone co operate according to natural law. Mosc coloniscs influenced b)• the Enlightenmenc considered themseh·es Chris· tians but feared Christianity's excesses, particularly persecution in the name of reli· gion and "enthusiasts" who emphasized emotion m-er reason. Mindful of locke's caution that no human can be: absolucely cercain ofanything but his or her own exis· tence, they distrusted zealots and sectarians, and believed that religion's value lay in the encouragement ofvirrue and morality, not in theological hair splitting. In 1750 the Enlightenment's greatest contributions co American life fay in the future, when Anglo-Am ericans wo uld draw on the Enlightenment's revolutionar}' ideas as they declared independence and created a new nation. In the meantime, a series of religious revivals kn~·n as the Grear Awakening would challenge che En· lightenment's most basic assumptions.

Rationalists vil""'-ed the ~A'Orl d as orderly and predictable.

The Creal Awakening Many Americans, ho~A•cvcr, had ncither worldly goods nor

._._..,... ""''0""' l't'\iv<'l mcn~mtottlut empba. sil:td Neb penon'J wgnu nttd

1for u lv.arion by God

Jlftltlt.a &hlards Rtvi~tut prucbn •·tw.. Sl'nooo ~sm. ons in die' J.bndJo(aollng:ry God• 5UtiUIUriud Grut Av.•.ak. rniog bd:it&

CeofiO W!Wtefiel~ EngJab

I

prucbn •·ho tou.ttd tbt colo. nit:s .and plll)'ed .a major rolt in

tbt Grut Av.·.aktniog

orderly and predictable lives. The resu lt was a spiritual longing that neither traditional religion nor Enlighcenmcm philosophy could satisfy. A quickening of religious fervor in scattered places in the 1730s became passion· ate revivalism thro ughout Anglo-America in 1739. This "Gnat Awakening" cut across lines of class, scarus, and education. AbO\"'! all, the Great Awakening represented an unleashing among ordinary people of anxiety about sin and longing fo r assurances of satvation. Some rcvivalists u-ere steeped in Enlightenment ideas but for all, religion was primaril)' a matter of emotional commitment. In comrasc to rationalists, who strc.s.sed the h uman potencial for bcrcermem, the ministers of the Great Awakening emphasized the corruption of human narure, the fur}' of divine wrath, and the need for immediate repentance. Congregationalist minister Jonathan Edwards of Northampton, Massachusetts drO\'C home chis mes· sage ~Aith breathtaking clarity. In 1735 during a revival Edwards preached his great sermon ..Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God:'' ••The God thac holds you O\'er the pit of Hell, much as one holds a spider or other loathsome insect o ..-er che fire, ab· hors )'OU," Edwards intoned... His wrach tO~A'llrd you burns like fire; He looks upon )'OUas ~A'Orchy of nothing else buc to be cast into the fi re !' Other colonial min isters- Presbyterian William 1tnnenc and Dutch Reformed Theodore Frelinghuysen- had anticipated Ed~A'llrds•s themes. l'tdling the d iverse: threads of re\'i\•al together 'A'llS the arrival in 1739 of the charismatic English cleric George \t'hite.field. A man of O\-erpowcring presence and a booming \'Oice, White· field attracted some crO'I'-'ds exceeding 20,000. O n a tour through the colonies, Whitefield inspired thousand~ mainly }'Oung adults, to seck satvation. Whitefietd•s poo-erful allure awed even his critics. But divisions m-er the revivals developed in Whitefield 's ~A'llke. For example, after leaving Boston in October 1740,

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Whitefield invited Gilbert1tnnem (\'~lilliam's son) co follow "-in order to blo"'' up the divine flame latel}' kindled there." Denouncing Boston's established dergy as "dead Drones" and lashing our at elites, Tennent built a foiiO'I'-'ing among the poor and dO'I'-·ncrodden. Exposing colonial society's divisions, 1tnnenc and other radicals corroded sup· pore for revivals among established ministers and officials. Increasingly, lines hardened berw~n the revivalis~ che "New Lights," and the rationalist clergymen, or "Old Ugh~" who dominated the Anglican, l'rcsb)tterian, and Congregational churches. In 1740 Gilberc Tennent hinted char most Jlresbycerian miniscers lacked saving grace and were bound for hell, and he urged parishioners to abandon them for the New Ughts. By sowing doubts about ministers, 1tnnem undermined one of the foundations of the social order: if people could nor trust their ministers, whom could they trusc? Old Lighc rationalists 6red back. In 1742 Charles Chauncy, a Boston Congregationalist, condemned revivals as an epidemic of che "enthusiasm " char enlightened imellectuals so hated. Chauncy especial!)' blasted enthusiasts "'tho mistook the ravings of their overheated imagination for direct communications from God. The Great Awakening thus split American Jlrotescancism. In 1741 Old and New light l'resbyterians fonned rival branches chat reunited in 1758 when the revivalists emerged victorious. The Anglican church lost many members to New Light Jlresb)'· tcrians and Baptists. Congregationalists also splintered badl)'i b)• 1760 New Lights had seceded from one--third of aUchurches and formed separate parishes. The Great A"''llkening peaked in New England in 1742, but New Lights made steady gains into the J770s, and the revi'o'al's long-term effects far exceeded its im· mediate impact. First, che revh'lll started a decline in che infl uence: of older sects, such as rhe Quakers, Anglican~ and Congregationalists. In wrn, the number of Presbyterians and Baptists increased after 1740, and char of Methodists rose steadily after 1770. 1'hese churches haw since dominated American Jlrotescancism. Second, the Grear Awakening stimulated the founding of new colleges unscarred by religious wars. The College of New Jersey (Princeton, 1746), King's College (Columbia, 1754), the College of Rhode Island (Brown, 1764), Q ueen's College (Rutgers, 1766), and Dartmouth ( 1769) trace their roots to chis era. Third, the revival drew many AfricanAmericans and Native Americans to Protestantism for the 6rst time. Its oral and communal nature, and its emphasis on piety racher than learning, incorporated aspects of both groups' traditional culwres. The Gre:ac Awakening marked the emergence of black Protescancism as New Lights reached out co slaw:s. Meanwhile, a few New Lighc preachers, Indian as "'ocll as white, became missionaries to Indians. SciU, nonwhices faced discrimination, ew:n among Ne"'' Lights. The Great A"''llkening, moreM'Ct, gaw: women added prominence in colonial tc· ligion. For several decades, ministers had praised "''Omen- the majority of church members-as che embodiment of Christian picry. Now some New Lighc sects, main!}' Baptise and Congregationalist, granted women the right to speak and \'Ote in church meetings. Some "''Omen, like Anne Hutchinson a cemur}' earlier, presided o\·er prayer meetings chac included women, men, and sometimes even slaves. Alchough some of these women's activities "''ere suppressed, none was prosecuted, as Hutchinson had been. The Great A"''llkening also fostered religious tolerance by blurring theological differences among New Lighcs.. Indeed, re.,.ivalism's emphasis on inner experience,

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ThE BONDS OF EMPIRE, t66o- 1no

E1uttd .ulo:m.bliu, dominated b)· colo n ial dit<."$, bec.uno: incre.uingly powe.rful. Poli ti ~! p;~.rti ci p.uion and compo:ti· cion wne mort' C'\•id em in cifi<."$ fhan in f he counttyJido:.

The Enligbto:nmem, \\ith iu o pti· mUm and .suong emph.ui.s on r:uio-nality, sprt-ad widd)' among coJon~l

rather chan on doctrinal fine poinrs, emphasized Protestants' common experiences and promoted che coexistence of denominacions. Historians disagree abouc whether che Great A~A'llkening had political effects. Although New Ughts fla)'ed che wealth)', chey neither advocated a social rcvolucion nor de\-eloped a political ideology. Vee, by empO\l-ering ordinat}' people co criticize those in authority, the 1\.'"Yivals helped co lay the groundwork for political revolutionaries a generation Iacer who would preach that royal gM>ernmem had gro~A"n corrupt and unworthy of obedience.

tlitu. At tbc -Arne time, che Grt-at Awako: n-ing o:xprel.so:d widt$pctad rdigiou.s longings, and no:w Proto:.stlnt do:nominnion.s cb.lllenged old« oo u .

C hapte r Su D OWNLOAD THE

MPJ AVOt O A LE O F THE CHAPTER SuMMARY TO

LISTEN TO ON TH E CO.

How did the Glon'ous Re\'Oiution shape relations between England and its

I

North American rolonies? (page 66)

After the Restoration of the Stuart kings to England's throne, che British gM-emment attempted co tighten control o~w the colonies with measures such as the Na\•igation Acts and the Dominion of New England. When the Glorious Revolution di'O\I'C)ames Jl from England, the colonies regained control ofcheir O~A'n legislatures. England's wars on the continent of Europe spread to the New World. raising colonists' recognition of their 0\l'n military " "'akness and strengthening their bonds to England.

KEY TERMS

Dominion of New England {p. 66) "Glorious Rovolutioo"O>. 61) Bil of Rlghls (p. 67) Kilg William~ war {p. 69) ~.,.Anile~ war(p. 69) morcilfllilism {p. 70) Navigation Acts {p. 70) Middle Passage {p. 74) dolorestalion {p. 76) Stono Rebolion {p. 78)

Cooienant Chain {p. SO)

Whot were the most important ronsequences of Bn'tish mercantilism (or the mainland rolonies? (page 70)

I

The Navigation Acts, passed in response to a quickening sense of mercantil· ism in England, sought to control colonial trade. The primary effect was to in· crrase colonial prosperity. Rritain•s colonies welcomed immigrants, and cheir population soar\."<1. Slavrry became increasingly widespread. as did fears ofslaw rebellion. Population grov.th was a major factor in deforestation, which in turn stimulated wesrn-',l rd movement away from depleted soils.. lncreas..--d prosperity also contributed co the rise of colonial elites, but the po~wty rate rose among ordinary city dwe-llers.

James Ogl«horpe {p. so) John P
What {ocwrs tJ<(Jiain the n:lab-.. $UCC<SS o(the British, French, and Spanish empiros in North America/ (pof179)

I

l he first half of the: f:ightre:nth cc:nrucy JJW rrnc~A
How did politic, the fniltJrknment, and rrliyj<Ju< mo•'l!lrnmts •ltope public B(o in tile colonie
I

1bt sunt o.mc fi"UDC .ww an uploslon or colonb.l mtrtar in poliric.s and cxh« dt· maus of pubbc hk, such as mrr:ll«tww ducuuion and new tr:bpous mcM:mmu. Poti· ria •..as far moR' an urtwa th.m a tur.t.l phenomenon: ics dud' butt •-n rhr rut oltht rolonul usnnbly. 11>< Enl•sJ>•cnm• 1h< ~h or nriooulwn and rh< m;. pou:s mowmmt kno-'11 JEJ Drum. At the wrM nnw. Procr:SUJU mtni:sttts_ such as Jon. than &:hr.uds. sousht to mtotr: tdlgow: mthUJU:Jm. N,.. dMOnuruOor:u. such u Umwwu, ~ ond Mrthod- appaml. Wom IJttw n>lt in ..Upon, .and dU' qutsrioning ofaulhonty .-~ rnc.'OUtlgd.

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CHAPTERS

1750-1776

CHAPTER PREVIEW

T...,.., and Tensions: The Briish Empire. 1750• 176! How did Bn'toln 111td its colo.nittS l'itw r.beirjoint vlct«yOi1!1' Fronre In ~ S~n~n Yean War?

lmp
RemtanceRtsu""" 1766-1710 ,. .Nc *'J' N mist""" to dlt Towrtsltnwldtltits

di((
. . .,..,. d;d-.W.t(p«fi4"""""'-. ~ 1770? Toward lnclependenee, ln4-m6

Vtt1tot Jed mcnr coiMihts in 1776 to ttbandon their 1opfrJ rQ Britain 11nd choose Mrjona/ indtptndence! A View of the Town ot Concord. 1775

B

y 176J Brit:un h.ld dtft.urd Fl'llna. its chid competitor for

pr«:minmcc in North America. and stood at tht: ht:ighc of eighrttnth-cmc:ury impm.&l powu. British ruLt r.an undispuc«< from rM Ad.antic scxout to the Mwusippi Rivtt :and from nottht:m· most c.a.sud.a to thC' florkb JlnJCS.IroniaJly, this grnttst ofBritisb uiumphs •'OUld tum anco one o( tht: grtutsr of British ddeus. 11lt impm.alrtOrgm&Udon dur •""J.r md COI.lCJUSl nude noo,os. suy .after 1763 rWalty altered Briuin's tt:Luionship v.ith its Ameri· can colonies. ConRICt arose bcl"'ttf'l Brinin and tht: colonies wbm Parliament, as it xardl~ for 'A"a)'1 ro p:ty off the m ormous debt

90

I 'niUMPH N>:O TtNsloMS: THE BRITISH EMPlitt, ·~-1]6]

91

accumulated during che war, attempted co cighcen control ()IJ'Cf colonial affairs. l 'h e colonists, accustomed co lcgislacing for themselves, resisted chis effort co cemraliu decision making in london. American leaders interpreted Britain's clampdown as

calculace:d antagonism, intended to depriw them of both prosperity and relative independence. Conflict spilled out beyond constitucional issues. In port cities, crowds of poor and working people engaged in direct, often violent dcmonscrarions against Brit ish authority. Settlers in the backcountr}' invoked chc ideas of urban radicals when re-

sisting large landowners and distant colonial governments dominated b}• elites. These movements reflected political and economic tensions ~Aithin the colonies as wdl as gto~Aing defiance of d ites by ordinar}' colonists. l 'he growing parcicipation of white ~A'Om en reflected impatience with rescraints imposed by traditional gender norms. Nonwhites, both Afrkan·American and Native American, often perceived the colonists as greater threars to chcir liberty than the British. Within Britain itself many opposed the government's colonial policies. Colonial resistance co Bricis h policies also reflected democratic stirrings in America and throughout the North Ad an ric world. Among the products of this dem· ocratic urge were both the American Revolution, which erupted in 1776, and the French Rcvolucion, ~A•hich began in 1789 and sparked unrest m-er much of Europe and the Americas. Despite their apprehension, colonial politicians expressed their opposition peacefully from 1763 to InS through legislative resolutions and commercial bo)'· cotrs. Even after 6ghting erupted, the colonists agonized for more chan a }'cat about whether to sever their political relationship ~Aith England- which co.·en natiw~:·born Americans sometimes referred to affectionately as ..home;'' Of all the world's colonial peoples, none became rebels more reluctantly than Anglo-Americans d id in 1776.

TRIUMPH AND TENSIONS: THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1750-1763 How did Brit4in 11nd its colonies view theirjoint victory over France in rile Seven Years War? King George' s War (sec Chapter 4) did nothing to avert a showdov.'n between Britain and France. The conflict resumed in 1756 and ended in 1763. Known as the Seven Years' War, it 'A'llS a major turning point in both American and European history.

SewftYur(W.r M:cjor Fmu:IW:nglid!. con.flic:t known in North Amcriel.u the Frmcb aod lndi.u!.Wu

I

Because neither Britain nor France emerged from King George's War as the dominant power in North America, each prepared for another ~A>ar. l 'he Ohio Valley became the t inderbox for conflict. When f rance slarted building a chain offorrs ro regain concrol of the Virginia and Penns)1vania Indian trade, Virgin ia scm a rn·enty·one·)'ear-old survq'Or, George Washington, to demand that chc French abandon their forts . In 1754 French troops dro\-e Wa.shingron and his militiamen back co their homes.

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RoAOS TO RtvOI.UhON. I]jG-17J6

N

E W

o~CI-5 B

B!tllrl!:t0115

a -0Bitllrll:tl

ATLANTIC 0

C E A N

o -"'

III•-...., III-_, l.oTE: ~Fhi!U's!XI.Itr!wy "'II'IM>Iflllo ~Hwrprthl, iltr! li;w YO'( \1.11$ UI'OII1.1'1-

Map5.1

TheS.venYears'War ~

Nor111Am
175~1760

Afttr C'.J(ptr itncing m:.jor dcfuts e:.rly in tht w.u, Anglo-Americ:.n forec:J turn.ed thot tide :.g.li:n.M the French by t:.king f Ot"t Ouqu eu~e ;u~d LouiJbourg in t758. Aftter C:.n;ad:. fell in 1760, W lighting shifted to Sp:.in' 5 C:.ribbe:.n eolonies..

In mid·l754 SC'\\':n colonies sent delegates to Albany, New York, to coordinate: their mutual defense: with British officials. The Albany Congress persuaded the wary Iroquois to support t he British and endorsed a plan for a colonial co nfederation, t he: Alban}' l'lan of Union, often seen as a predecessor to the federal S}'Stcm under t he: Consticucion. However, t he: plan collapsed because no colonial legislature: wo uld su rrender control over its pc>"'t:rs of taxation.

Although France and Britain remained at peace: in Europe:

lbe Sewn Years' war until 1756, Washington•s unsuccessful conflict wit h t he: Ill Alnlllra. 175'-1760

French had created a vin:ual state of ~A'llr in Nonh Amer· ica. In 1754 Britain d ispatched General Edward Braddock and one: thousand regu· Iars ro take Fore Duquesne (doo· KAIN), at the h e:ad~A'lltetS of the Ohio Rivet.

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'niUMPH N>:O TtNsloMS: THE BRITISH EMPlitt,

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Kilg George~ war Albany COn!Je" s.ven Year<' war George lllb
Scornful of colonial soldiers and friend!}' Native Americans, Braddock expected his disciplined regulars to make short work of che french. O n July 9, 1755, about 850 French and Indians ambushed Braddock•s 2,200 Britons and Virginians near Fort Duquesne. After three hours of steady fire, the British regulars broke and retreated, leaving Washington's Virginians to cowr che withdrawal. Nine hundred reg· ular soldiers and colonists died, including Braddock. In 1756--1757 New France's daring commanding general, Louis Joseph Mont· calm, maintained the offen.Uvc. Anglo-Americans oumumbered Canadians twenty to one, but Montcalm benefited from large numbers of f rench regulars, Indian sup· pore, and full-scale mobilization of the Canadian population. The Anglo-American colonies supported the ~A'llr grudgingly, providing few and usually poorly trained troops. French-anned Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingos struck hard ac settlers in \'1/escern Pcnns}ivania, Maryland, and Virginia. lhese attacks halted English expansion and Pl\.'"\o'ented che three colonies from joining the ~A'llr against f rance for three years. Ho~A•cvcr, 1758 prm-'ed a rurning point for rhe British. First, Indian su pport for the French evaporated. (Preferring compeciciw crade ro warfare, most Indians hoped thac neither European po~Aw ~A
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RoAOS TO RtvOI.UhON, I]jG-17J6

Britain to capture Fort Duquesne easily and ~Ain concrol of the Ohio Valley. Second, Bricish minister William Pin took 0\'Cr Britain's military affairs. The imaginati\'t: and sjngle-minded Pin reinvigorated the militar}' Campaign. Hard pressed in Europe by f rance and its allies (which after 1761 included Spain), Pitc believed char mobiJiz. ing colonial forces was the key co crushing New France. Keeping fewer than 4,000 British regulars in North America, he promised that l':lrliament would bear the cost of maintaining colonial troops. l'itc's offer to free Americans from the war's 6nandal burden generated unpr«· edented support. In 1758 and again in 1759 checolonies organized 40,000 croops. As a result, Britain took the offensi\
lreoty of hris of liQ Tuo
l

by which Ft.ana mltd vittw.lly i~ enn,.., Nortb Alnc'riQn tmpirr to Stitain .and SpUn

In the TftatyofParisofl763, f rance ceded all ics terri to· ries on the North American mainland. Se\'t:ral thousand tatll ~ca. French coloniscs, scauered from Quebec to louisiana, beIM-1761 came British or Spanish citizens. Ho~A'C\'Cr, one group, the: Acadians (uh-KAY-dte-t.tns) of Nova Scotia, suffered tremendous dislocation. T he: Bricish deported the: Acadian~ nearly 5 percent of Canada's French population, co more southerly coloni~ such as l'r:nnsylvania and Maryland. Impoverished and facing intense anti-French, ami-Catholic prejudice, most fled co louisiana, ~Athere chey b«ame known as the "Cajuns." Under the: 11-eacy of l':lris, Britain reccived all French lands cast of the Missis· sjppi; Spain acquired the pore ofNe:w Orleans and all French lands "-'t:St ofche Mis· sjssippi. Spain traded Florida to Britain in return for Cuba. Thus Spain's New World empire acruall}' increased in size, but France's virtually vanished, shrinking to a handful of islands. Britain's Norch American empire quadrupled in size. The ef'fec:cs of King George's War and the SC"t-e:n Years' War were mixed. On one: hand, shedding their blood in a common cause led British and Americans to rel}•on each other as new.r before. Ho~A'C\'Cr, the: conclusion of both wars led to misunder· standing, suspicion, and hostility becween che: former compatriots.

lbe End of Frendl

During rhe war, British officers complained chat colonial troops not only fought poor!}' but also tended co return home, even in che midst of campaigns, ~A•hen their term was up or when their pay lag~d. In rurn, colonial soldiers complained thac British officers treated rhcir troops .. litd e: becter than sta..-cs." Tensions flared as well bern
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'niUMPH N>:O TtNsloMS: THE BRITISH EMPlitt,

·~-1]6]

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amounted to less than £2 million. Staggering u nder debt and taxes, the British chought it outrageous to tepa}' the Americans for defending th emsd~s. Coloniscs fete equally burdened. Wartime pro6ts had gone co pay for British goods accelerating che "consumer revolucion" chat had been underway for se\-eral decades (sec Chapter 4). The wartime boom ended ~Athen peace returned. NO\\' accustomed to a new middle·dass lifestyle, colonists went into debt, and British creditors obliged by extending repayment terms from six months co a full year. Newly prosperous coloniscs found themselves in debt and even bankruptcy, and man}' began to suspect Britain of plotting to "ensla\-e" che colo nies to protect its O'A'tl mer· chants and manufucrurers. The new revenue measures fo!IO'I'--ed the ascension to the British chrone of George Ill (reigned 1760- 1820). lhe new king was determined co pia}' a major role in gO\wn· ment, but he pfO\'Cd ill suited co the cask of building politi· cal coalitions or pursuing consistent policies. Until 1774, George Ill made frequent abrupt changes in gm·ernmem leadership that destabilized politics in Britain and exacer· bated relations ~Atith the colonies.

Worse, Britain's \•ictor}' over the French generated new AngloIndian conflicts that dro'le the Map 5.2 EarOpNI Ttrritorii l Clai""' 171;3 British debt even higher. No longer able co play the two TheTre:nyofP:~ris ( 1763) divid~d Fr:u~ee'$ North imperial pO\l-ers off against each other, Indians feared the Atn~ri~:~n empire~~., Brit:~in .md Sp:li:n. Brit:li:n consequences. The}' ~A'Cre right. 1b cut costs after the ~A<ar, in 1763 est;ablis.hoed d irect imperi;al :~u thority wnt the British had stopped distributing food and ammunition of the Proc:l:~muion line. to their Indian allies. Meanwhile, colonial squatters ~A'Cre moving onto Indian lands, raising both fears and tensions. In carl}' 1763 che Oelawa.re Indian religious prophet Neolin called for Indians to Pontiac Ottllw~ chiefwho repudiate European culture, goods, and alliances. Pon tiac, an Otcawa Indian, and cruad sbort..tiYI'd anri.Briri~ other leaders forged an anri·Bricish coalition char sacked eight British forts and be· co.Uition ~mong NuMsieged British posicions at Detroit and Pittsburgh. Short on food and ammunition, ~iuns suffering a smallpox epidemic (deliberatel}' spread by che British), and recognizing thac the French would noc return, the Indians surrendered in early fall. Buc the British victory ()'I.!'Cr the Indians ~A'llS indecisi\-e. Hoping to end the frontier 6ghting. the British government issued the Prod a madon of 1761, which l'nld...U.."' 1m An aurmp: to end Jodiao pmllkmJ asserted royal control of land transactions, sctdemems, and trade of non· Indians by pm"oring ..l'.stward mCJV\1. W'CSt of the Appalachians, and recognized existing Indian Land tides everywhere meot by wlonisu W'CSt of che «proclamacion line,"' which ran dO'I'-'n che crest of the Appalachian Moun· cains. Although the policy calmed Indian fears, it angered the colonies by sub· ordinating chcir western land claims to imperial authority and slowing colonial expansion.

Frallller TI!IISions

I

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IN

In 175-1 the colonic:~ ron:~i cknod and rcj«tcd tiW' Alb.l.n)' Plan or u n ion.. Tbc Curope.ln Sc'A'n Yuu' W.lr pined tiW' f"Tcn~h .lnd tfwoir Indian allies .lgairnl the British in North America..

Tbc Trt-atyor P.lriJ or 1763 e nded t he french f'mpino in Non:h Amc"ric-~ a nd cnonnou:~ly cni:'-!'Std Brit
Pontiac's rebellion also led che British go\'ernment co stacion ten thousand regular troops in North America to occupy the western lands that France had ceded and to intimidate the Indians. The cost of administering British North America reached almost £440,000 year!)'· Britons belie..-ed it perfoccly reasonable for the colonists to help offset this expense. 11le colo· nists, hD'I'-\....,-er, struggling wich their own posrwar economic recession, sa"'' it as none of t heir responsibility. Alchough partially offseuing the colonies' unfavorable balance of pa)'· ments "'ith Britain, these t roops raised fears of a peacetime "standing army" chac could threaten American liberty. With t he French menace gone, increas· ing numbers of colonists viewed Indian lands co t he wesc as the key to future prosperity. The British troops that enforced the l'rodamarion Act of 1763 chus became, not protectors, but chreats to t hat future.

IMPERIAL AUTHORilY, COLONIAL OPPOSIT ION, 1760- 1766 WMt t~MS imperial reorganiution$ and how did it change nlahons between Britain and tM Norlll Ant6rican colonies? Even as the Sa-en Years' War wound down, tensions developed between Britain and its colonies, largdy the result of Britain's plans to finance irs gready enlarged em· pire by a series of 1\.'-cnue measures "'those enforcement bypassed local authorities and s...~med a dangerous extension of Parliamentary pO'I'--ers. The success of protest and opposition mM>c-ments after the Stamp Act 1\.'-ealed a "'idening gulf bern-em British and colonial ideas about the proper relationship bern-em che empire and irs colonies.

To hale American crade with the enemy in the f rench West

The Writs of Indies during t he Seven Years' War, Britain had cracked Asllslance. 176G-1761

wrilel usistanc:e A gmcnl

l

Sl'.ln:h •'Uf.mt of dulliclus leplity

do"''tl on colonial smuggling. In 1760 the rO)'lll go\-ernor of Massachusetts authorized the use of che writ of assJstance to seize illegall)' im· ported goods. A general search warrant, the writ permitted customs officials ro encer any ship or building "'there smuggled goods might be hidden. Because it required no evidence of probable cause for suspicion, t he writ was considered unconsticucional by mosc English legal auchorities. The writ of assistance pr~ a po"'wful w~apon against smuggling. Merchants in Bo.sron, checolonies' smuggling capital, hired j ames Otis co challenge the device's constitucionality.1'he former prosecuting attorne)' for Bosco n'svice--admiraltycourt, Oris had resigned to protest the use of che writ. Before Massachusetts' highesc court in J76J, he argued that "an act against the Constitucion is void"-t"\'efl an ace of Par· liamenc.. But che court, noting che use of an identical writ of assistance in England, ruled against the merchants. Despite having lost his case, Ocis had stated wit h clarity che colonial conception of Parliament's role under [he British constitucion. Most British politidans assumed that Parliament's la"''S themselves v.-ere part of che unwritten conscirution and that l':lrliammt could in effect alter the constitution at wilL But, like most colonists, Otis

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believed chat t:tartiament had no authority to violate the traditional ..righrs of Englis hmen" by authorizing illegal searches and scizurcs in private homes.

TIIe ~Ad. 1164

In 1764, chrec )'~ars after Oris's courc challenge, l':lrliamcnt passed the Sugar Act to office part ofBritain•s North

American military expenses. In ending the: longstanding exemption of colonial trade: from rew~nue-raising measu re~ the Sugar Act triggered new tension becwccn Britain and t he colonies. The Navigation Acts, in concrast, had been intended not to raise revenue but co benefic the imperial cconom}' by controlling cradc. The Sugar Act amended the Molasses Ace of 1733, which consciruted a 6-pcncc· per-gallon tariffon French-produced molasses. Colonists commonly bribed customs inspectors I Mt pence per gallon co look the other way when t hey unloaded smuggled molasses. In designing the Sugar Act, British officials, well aware of the ~Aidcspread briber)', wrongly assumed chat the colonists would ~Aillingly pay a lower, 3-pencc--pct· gallon tax. Colonists found other feacures of t he Sugar Act equally objectionable. The act stipulated char the colonists had co export certain raw commodities rbrouglJ Brit
Sop Ad Aa """"' by Bri.Uh

I

P.arli.unnu tb.u plaad nt'W

taxt:S aod ti':IUicrioru on colo.

ni..u' tr.uk

Revenues raisrd by t he Sugar Act did little to ease Britain's

Tilt stamp Ad Crisis, financial crisis. Britons groaned under the second-highest 1755-IH6

cax rates in Europe and looked resentful!)' ac the lightl)' taxed colonists, who paid an aV\'.ragr of one shilling per person compared co their cwenty-six shillings per pctSOn.

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Stlnlp Ad IUIIOI"lWe musu~ tbat p~td apm opposition by cokmi.!.t5

I

NowHimp
ni;11l c itie5 ;~.nd cown5 would p;~.r.1de ;~.n ;~.gent's effigy through the stl'\"et5.

In March 1765, co force colonists to pay a larger share: of imperial expenses, Parliament passed the Scamp Ace. The law obliged Americans to purchase and use spe· ciall)' marked or stamped paper for newspapers, customs documents, ~Aills, contracts, and other public legal documents. Violators faced prosecution in vice-admiralty courts, without juries. Unlike che Sugar Act, which 'A'llS an rxttrntt.l tax levied on im· ports, the Stamp Ace was an inU'rnal tax levied dire:crl)' on property, goods, and ser· \i ces in the colonies. External taxes regulated crade and fell primarily on merchants and ship captains, buc internal taxes were designed co raise rew~nue and had far wider effects. The Stamp Act would tax anyone who made a will, bought or sold property. purchased nC""-'Spapcrs, or borrowed money. William Pitt and ochers objected to such an internal tax, arguing that the colo· nies taxed themselves through their elected assemblies. Buc co Grenville and his supporters che tax seemed a small price for the benefits of empire, especially because Britons had paid a similar tax since 1695. Grenville agreed with Stamp Act oppo· ncms that Parliament could not tax British su bjects unless they enjo)'ed representation in that bod)'· He contended, ho~A'cwr, chat the col onis~ like many ocher British adult males who did not voce for members of Parliament, were virtual[y repre· semed. According co the theory of virtual representation, t\-ery member of Parlia· mcnc considered the ~A'l'lfare of ttl/ subjects, not jusc his conscirucms, in deciding issu es. Whether or not they voted in parliamentary elections, all imperial subjects, including Americans, could depend on each member of Parliament co protect chcir well-being. Grenville and his su pporters also held that the colonial assemblies u-ere local go\-emments, with no poY~ers ocher than those Parliament all oY~ed them. This view clashed directly wich che stance of the many colonists ~Aoho had argued for decades that their assemblies exercised legislath-e po~A'l't equivalem to chat of Britain's House of Commons. The Stamp Act caused many colonists co believe that they had to confront par· liamencary taxation head on or surrender any claim co meaningful sdf·gm--ernmem.

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However much chcy admired Parliament, few Americans thought that it represcmed them.. Although vircual representation might apply to England and Scotland, they argued, it certainl)' did not extend across the Atlantic. In chc American view, unless a lawmaker shared his consciruents' interests, he ~A'Oul d have no personal stake in opposjng bills contrary to their welfare. T hus chc colonists favored «lUd/, rather than virtual, representation. To che colonists, the Stamp Ace demonstrated boch Parliament's indifference to their interests and chc shallowness of vircual representation. Nonetheless, they con· ceded chac l'arliament possessed limittd poo-ers of legislation, and they accepted the parliamentar}' regulation of imperial trade. In a speech opposing the Sugar Act, j ames Ocis had expressed Americans' basic argument: "that b)•(the British) Conscirution, C\-ery man in the dominions is a free. man; that no parrs of His Majesty's dominions can be taxed without consent; that every part has a right co be represented in the supreme or some subordinate lc.gisla· cure;'' In essence, the colonists saw the empire as a loose federation (union) in which their legislatures pos.sessed considerable autonomy. Patrick Henry, a tvA':nty·nine--ycar·old Virginia lawyer with a gif[ for fiery ora· tory, expressed the risjng spirit of resistance in late May 1765. He persuaded Virgin· ia's House of Burgesses to adopt four relative!)' mild resolutions den)'ing l'arliament's J>O'I'"'t:C to cax chc colonie~ buc che House rejected three stronger ones. Garbled ac· counts of Henry's resolutions and spec.ches- he probably never said, "Give me liberty or giiJ'C me death"- electrified ocher colonists. Meanwhile, actiw: resistance cook shape outside dite political circles. In Boston by late summer, middle-class artisans and businessm en had creaced che loyal Nine co 6ghc che Stamp Act. They recogni.zcd chat the stamp distributors, who alone could sell the spedally watermarked paper, represented the law's weak link. If public pressure could force them to resign before the cax "-'t:nt inco effecc on Now~mber I, the Stamp Act would not work. Boston's preeminence in opposing l'arliament was no acddenc. Bostonians li\--ed primarily by crade and d istilling, and in 1765 they "-"ere not living well. The heavy tax on molasses burdened rum producers, and the Sugar Ace's trade restrictions dried up the ~A'ine import business and interfered wich che din~t export of New England products to profi table 0\t>rseas markets. Moreover, irs shipbuilding and fishing industries were declining; taxes, unemployment, and po\-erty had skyrock· cted.: and the cicywas rc.covering from a disastrous 6re that had left e\·cry tenth fam· ilyhomd ess. This ~A'idespread economic distress produced an explosi\J'C sjtuation. It was eaS}' to blame British policy for hard rimes. Furchcnnore, poor and ~A'Orking-dass Bosto· nians "-"ere accustomed to gathering in large crO"--ds co express themsd vcs poliricall)'· The morning of August 14, 1765, found a likeness of Boston's stamp distributor, Andrew Olh-er, s~A'inging from a crec.. Oliver did not take the hint co resign, so at dusk SC"t·eral hundred Bostonians demolished a new building of his ac the dock. l 'he mob then surged tO"-ard Oli\-er's house and vandalized it. S un-eying his dcvascaced home the next morning. O liiJ'Cr announced his resignation. Anger against the Stamp Act unleashed spontaneous, contagious violence. For example, in late August, rioting Bostonians demolished chc elegant home of Ueu· tenant Go\·ernor and ChiefJustice Thomas Hutchinson.

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RoAOS TO REVOI.UhON. IJjG-17J6

S.OS of lJJety Group• m

I

I'OiJt &.:Imp Act; fcwmtd by tlitn in ~n ~tumpt to curb violrnn"

I

SbnpAct~ As~mbly

where ~pnosm~s from nine colonies mc."t to dUcuu I'Oistanno to Stamp Act

PrWnaty Source: Charleston, Sooth Carolina, Sons of t..1>erty

At the same time, groups calling themselves Sons of Uberty W\'.re forming throughout the colonies. Elite leaders of these groups sought co curb violence, fearful that attacks on one set of elites could lead to attacks on all elites. 11le Sons of liberty focused their actions against property and careful I)' left a\~nues of escape fo r their victims; they forbade their members co carry u~apons in order to avoid harm· ing royal soldiers or officials. In October 1765 representatives from nine colonies met in New York City in the Stamp Act Congress. 11lcre the colonies agreed on, and boldlyaniculated, the prin· ciple chat Parliament had no authority co levy taxes o utside Britain or to deny any person a jut}' eriaL The united front of che Stamp Act Congress was far more effccm·e than che one earlier intercolonial meeting. the Alban)' Congress of 1754. Bur although chey emboldened and uni6ed the colonies, dcclaracions of principle like the Scamp Act Congress resolucions seemed futile to many colonists, in view of Parlia· mcnc•s earlier refusal to consider their objections co che scamp duties. By late 1765 most stamp distributors had resigned or fled, and wichout the water· marked paper required by Ia"'• most customs officials and co urt officers refused co perform chcir duties. In response, legislators compelled chem to resume operations by threatening to withhold their pay. At the same time, merchants obtained sailing clearances by insisting that they would sue if their cargoes spoiled while dda)'ed in port. By late December che colonial courcs and harbors " 'ere again functioning. In these ways colonial elites assumed control of the public outcr}' against the Scamp Ace. Respectable gentlemen kepc an explosive situation u nder control by tak· ing O\~r leadership of local Sons of Liberty, by coordinating protest thro ugh the Scamp Act Congres~ and by having colonial legislatures resume normal business. Buc the Stamp Act remained in effect. To force its repeal, New York's merchants agreed o n October 3 1, 1765, to bo)'COct all British goods. Others follo\l'Cd. Because: the colonies purchased 40 percenc of England's manufactures, this nonimportation strategy criggcred panic wichin Engtand•s business community.

The Marquis of Rockingham, who had succeeded George Grenville as prime minister, hesitated to advocate repeal, mi6 but parliamentary support for repeal gradual!)' grew- the result of practicali t)~ not principle. In March 1766 Parliament 1\....,-oked che Stamp Act. Simultaneously, hO\l-\....,·er, l'arliament pass.ed the Declaratory Act, affirming parliamentary pou--er to legislate for the colonies .. in all cases whatsoever." Because Americans interpreted the Declaratory Act as merel)' a face-saving meas· u.re on l'arliamenr's part, they ignored it. In truth, hO\l--e\~r. the House: of Commons intended that the colonists cake the Declaratory Act literal!)' to mean that they were noc exempt from etny parliamentat}' starute, including a tax law. The Stamp Act cri· sjs thus ended in a fundamental disagreemenc between Britain and America over the colonists' policical rights. Although philosophical d ifferences bct"A'C'tn Britain and America remained unresolved, most colonists put che events of 1765 behind them. Still lo)'al to «QJd England,"' Anglo·Americans concluded chat their resistance to the Ia" ' had slapped Britain's leaders back to chcir senses, buc cheyu-ould examine fucure British policies and actions more deeply.

The Dedal'lloly Act.

Dedw•ry Ad P.arli.unentlll')'

I

autrtion of right tokgidiltl' for tbc colcmitJ;

The Stamp Act crisis had 1\.'-ealed a chasm between the colonies and Great Britain. For che 6rst rime, some Anglo· Americans saw a sinister quality in che imperial relation· ship with Britain. To understand chese perceptions, some educated colonists turned to philosophers, historians, and political writers. Many more looked co religion. Educated colonists were familiar with j ohn Locke and other Enlightenment po· licical chinkers. Locke argued that, in a state of nature, people enjoyed the: .. natural rights"' of life, liberty, and property. To form g<M!rnmencs to protect these rights, people entered into a ..social contracc." A g<M!rnmenc thac encroached on natural rights broke its contract ~Aith the people. In such cases che people could resist their go'lemmem. 10 many colonial readers, Locke's concept of natural rights jusri6e:d opposition to l:tartiamenr's arbitrary legislation. Colonists also read European ~Ariters who portrayed concencrations ofexecuti'le J>O'I'""er as lhrcats co liberty. Some: balanced Locke's emphasis on che rights of the: in· dividual with an emphasis on subordinating individual interests co che good of the people as a whole. Looking to lhe Greeks and Romans, chest ..republican" theorists admired che sense of civic duty of the Roman republic. Uke: che carl)' Romans, tht)' maintained lhat a free people: had to praccice "-public .,;rrue."' An elected leader of a r~:public would commend obedience "more by che virtue of che people: lhan by the terror of his power." The political writers read most widely in the: colonies in cluded a group known as oppositionists. According to john 1'renchard and 1'homas Gordon, among others, Parliame:m- the: freely elected represencacives ofche people-formed the: fou ndation of England's unique: political liberties and protected lhem against che inherent corruption and tyranny of executive pc>""er. Most members of Parliame:m, lhey held, no longer represented lhe crue interests of their conscituencs; instead, lhcy had sold chcir souls for financial gain and joined a ..conspir· acy against liberty." The-young British lo:ing~rg<' Ill Influenced b)•such ideas, a number ofcolonists believed they detecled w~.s iU .sui ted to t he job. a diabolical conspiracy underlying British policy. joseph Warren of Massa· \'(l~r ~nd imper~l t Kp.:m.sion le(t chuseccs obserw~d chat the Stamp Act "induced some to imagine that the: Britain with .st~~ring
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RESISTANCE RESUMES, 1766- 1770 In wllat ways did 1'8sisUmc.e to the Townshend duties diffcrr from ~~~r/ier coloniil/ resistance efforts? Repeal of the Stamp Ace temporarily quicted colonial protescs, but Bricain's search for new rew~ nue soon rtYived them. Most colonists became co nYinced that the Stamp Act had been not an isolated mistake, but part of a deliberate desjgn co undermine colonial self-government. Meanwhile growing numbers of English peo· pic likewise: protested their gm•e rnmenc's polides.

.--Oppolilg tile

-rior Ad

R
coklni.ll l~latuno:s to p«<\idt

1suppli-1'5 to Briri5h U'OOPJ

In August 1766 George Ill d ismissed the Rockingham gO\'· ernmenc and summoned William Pitt, an o pponent of Qllll'lennc Act. taxing the colonies, co form a cabinet. HD'I'-·e\'tr, Pict·'s 17&6-1767 healch collapsed in March 1767, and Charles Townshend, the chancellor of che exchequer (treasurer), became the effecti\'t leader. j usc as 10wnshend took office, a conflict arose wich the N ew York legislarurt m-er the Quarce.ringAct of 1765, which ordered colonial legislaru.res to pa)' for ccr· tain goods used by British soldiers stationed wichin their borders-candle~ windo"''· panes, mattress straw, and a small liquor ration. The act applied only to croops in seeded areas, not co chose: o n the frontier, and it did not force citizens to accept sol· dicrs in private homes. The law aroused resentmcnc, ho"''CW.r, because ic co nstituted an indirtd tax. In other words, although ic did not empower rO)'lll officials to collect money directly fro m chc colonists, it obligated as.semblies to raise: revenue b)•"''hat· ewr means chey co nsidered appropriate. 11le act felllightl)' on all che colonies except Ne"'' York, where more soldiers were stationed chan in any other province. Ne"'' York refused to granc the supplies. N ew York's resistance unleashed a torrent of anti-American feeling in Parlia· menc, still bitter after revoking the Scamp Act. 10wnshend responded b)•drafting the New York Suspending Act, which chreatened to nullify all laws passed by the col· ony after October I, 1767, if it refused to \'Ote che supplies. By the cime George JJJ sjgned the measure, N ew York had already appropriated the fu nds. Nonetheless, the conflict 0\'er the Quartering Act demonstrated chat British leaders would not hesi· tate co defend Parliament's authority through che most drascic of all seeps: imerfer· ing with American self·gm-ernmenc..

This new WJW of British resennnem coward che colonies coincided "'tith an outpouring offruscrarion O\~r the SO\'· ernmenc's failure to cut taxes from "''llrtimc le\-els. Dis· 1767 .._ content seethed among che landed gentr)', whose members took ad\•antage of chcir domination of the House of Commons co slash chcir 0"'11 taxes in 1767. This mm-e cost che gM>crnment CSOO,OOO and prompted 10wnshend to propose: laws that would tax imports entering America and increase colonial cus· toms n.......-enucs. Townshend sought to cax che colonists by exploicing a loophole in their argu· mencs against the Stamp Tax. Americans had emphasized their opposition to inWr·

Crisis over tile Townshend Dutits~

I RESIStANCE RESllllES, •76~70 naJ taxes but had said nothing abouc t-xuormtl t.axes- Parliamenc's righe to cax imports as chey entered the colonies. Townshend interpreted this silence as evidence that the colonists accepted Britain's right co impose external taxes. Parliament passed 10wnshend's Revenue Act of 1767 (popularly called che Townshend dudes) in t he su mmer. The new law taxed glass, paint, lead, paper, and tea imported inco t he colonies. On che surface, 10wnshend 's case for external taxation was convincing, as t he colonists had long accepted parliamentary regulation of trade and had in principle ackno~Atfedged taxation as a form of regulation. But the Townshend duties dif'fcred significantly from what Americans considered a legitimate wa}' of regulating t rade through taxation. To the colonists, charging a duty was a la~Atful wa}' for British au· thorities to control crade only if it excluded foreign goods b}•making them prohibi· tiwly expensii,!'C. The R.c-.-cnue Ace of 1767, however, sec moderate races chat did not price goods out of t he colonial marker; dearly, its pu rpose was to collect money for the treasur}'· Thus, from the colonial standpoint, 10wnshend's duties we re caxes just like the S tamp Act duties. TO\\-'nshend had an ulterior motive for establishing an American source of rcve· nue. Traditionally, colonial lcgislaru.res set colonial royal governors' salaries and of· ten refused to pa}' chcm until che go\-ernors signed bills that the}' opposed. 10wnshend hoped t hat the R.c-.-enue Act wo uld establish a fund co pay go\·crnors' and other royal officials' salaries, freeing them from che assemblies' concrol. In ef· feet, he ~A
l

103

~dobes Mo~ P.arli.unmwy .attl'mpt.s to n1illl' m"nueJ from the colc.'llllieJ

Primary Source: Wilfiam Shepherd Attempts to Collect Customs Duties

Resistance to che R.c-.-cnue Act remained \I.I'Cak until De· cember I 767, when j ohn Dickinson published Letwn from tt F.:lrml!r in J\onnS)~t>tnid. 1'hese rwelve essa}'S, ~Athich ap· pcared in nearly every colonial ne~A'Spapcr, emphasized chac Parliament had no right co tax t rade for che simple purpose of raising revenue. No tax designed co produce revenue could be considered constitutional unless a people's elected representatives \'Oted for it. Dickinson's writings convinced Americans chat their arguments against the Stamp Act also applied to the R.c-.-enue Act. In early 1768 the Massachusetts assembly asked Samuel Adams to draft a «dn:u· lar letter" co o ther legislaru.res. Possessing a flair for the push and sho\'e of local poli· tic~ Adams had helped organize the Sons of Liberty in Boston. Adams's circular letter denounced taxation without representation and the threat to self-gOV\'.rnance posed b}• Parliamcnc's making gm-ernors and royal officials independent of t he www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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legislatures. Ne\·crtheles.s, the documenc acknowledged Parliament as the «supreme legislative l:tml·er 0\'Cl' che whole Empire" and advocated no illegal activicies. Virginia's assembly ~A'llrmly approwd Adams's eloqumt measure and scm ouc a more scrongl)' "-'Ordcd lcrcer of its own, urging all the colonies co oppose imperial policies chat "-'Ould "haw an immediate tmdcncy to ensla\'f: them..'" But most colo· niallegislatures reacted indifferently to these: letters. In face, resistance might ha\'f: disintegrated had noc the British g01o•crnmmt overreacted to the circular letters. lnd«d, parliamentary leaders saw even che mild Massachusetts letter as «Jitd e better than an incentive co Rebellion:'' Disorganized because of1b~A'tlshend•s sudden de-ath in 1767, the king's Privy (PRIH·'Ift) Council (advisers) directed lord Hills· borough, the 6rst appointee to che new post of secretary of state for the colonies, to express che governmcnc•s displeasure. Hillsborough ordered the Massachusetts assembly co d isown its letter, fo rbade all O'IICrseas assemblies to endorse it, and com· manded royal governors to dissol\-e any legislarure that violated his instructions. The taccic backfired. Protesting Hillsborough's bullying, many legislaru.res previously indifferent to the Massachusetts letter adopted it enthusiastically. The Mas· sachusctts House of Rcprescmacivcs ..'Oted ninecy-two to Sl'\'l'fltem not to recall its letter. The number 92 immediately acquired symbolic significance for Americans; colonial politicians on more than one occasion drank 92 toasts in tipsy salutes co Massachuscrcs• accion. RO)'lll gm-crnors responded b)•dismissjng legislarures in Mas· sachusctts and elsewhere, playing into che hands of Samuel Adams and ochct'S who wished co ignite widespread opposicion co che 10wnshmd duties. Increasingly oucraged, che colonists still needed an effecti\-e means of pressuring Parliamcnc for repeal. Nonimportation seemed especially promising because it offered an alcernath-e to violmce and would d istress Britain's econom}'· Thus in Au· gust 1768 Boston's merchants adopted a nonimportation agreement, and the taccic spread south~A'llrd. «save )'OUr money, and )'OU save )'OUr country!" crumpeced the Sons of Uberty, who reorganized after t'WO )'f:ats of inactivity. HO"-'e\-er, not all colo· nists supported nonimportation. Many merchants contin ued to imporc British goods until early 1769. The bo)'COtt probably kept ouc about 40 percent of British imporcs, while encouraging colonists to resist British policies more acth-cly.

Nonimporcacion convinced the British- and the colo· nists-thac all Americans were determined to sustain resis· Resistance tance, and ic demonstrated chac the American cause rested on foundations of impeccable morality and sensible moderation. lc also pr01oided a unique opporrunity for wome-n to join che protest. White women had been gradual!)' widming their participation in public affairs fors.e\'f:ral decades. For example, women fat outnumbered men among white church members, and chey ~A'ct'C hailed as superior to most men in piety and morality. During the Stamp Ace crisis, upper~dass womm had attmded policical rallies and expressed chcir political opinions in discussion and correspondence. Calling themselves Daughtct'S of liberty, upper-class female patriots assumed a highly \i sible role during the l'o•wnshend crisis. Convinced chat colonial women could exert a pcrsuasi\'C moral influence on public opinion, American leaders en· couraged them to protest the Rco.\":nue Ace's tax on tea. Accordingly, in earl)' 1770

Wometl and Colonial

I RESIStANCE RESllllES, •76~70 mort than three hundred "m istresses of families" in Boston denounced the consumpcion of the bC"t·eragc. In some ways nonconsumpcion was more effecci ~ chan nonimportation, for che colonists' refusal co consume imports ~A
1OS

llo..t of c.-.. c.n.;~ si..ers Officials sent toO\~r. tolkrtion olflOO'.S; tbtir ronupcion a r.ug« b rolonial aogr:r

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1'()'1.'.-nshend also sought to increase revenues by extending Bricish surw~ illance of colonial trade. In 1767 1767- 17&8 he induced Parliament co create the American Board of Customs Commissioners to strictly enforce the Navigation Acts. The new law increased the number of port officials, funded a colonial coast guard to catch smuggl~ and provided money for secret informers. The law quickly drew protests because of the ways it was enforced and because it 1\':versed the traditional legal process by assuming the accused to be guilty until prO\'efl otherwise. The ace also included new provisions that awarded an informer one--third of che value of all goods and ships appropriated through a conviccion of smuggling. The face chac fines could be tripled under cercain circumstances provided an cw:n greater incentive to scize illegal cargoes. Smuggling cases were heard in vice--admiralty courts where the probabil· ity of conviction was extremely high. The prospect of accumulating a small furcune prO'V'Cd too tempting to most commissioners. Revenue agents commonly pem:rted che law by filing charges fo r technical violations of the Sugar Act, e\'en when no evidence existed of intent to conduct illegal trade. They mosc often exploited che proYision that dcdared any cargo illegal unless it had been loaded or unloaded with a customs officer's ~A'fitcen authorization.

CUstoms "Racbteering.•

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Customs commissioners also fanned anger by invading sailors' traditional rights. long·standing maritime cusrom allowed crews to supplement chcir income by making small sales betv.-een porrs. An)tthing stored in a sailor's chest '-''llS considered private property, cxempc from the Navigation Acts. But after 1767, revenue agents treated su ch belongings as cargo, thus establishing an excuse co seize the en· tire ship. Under chis policy, crewmen saw arrogant inspectors break open chcir trunks and chen lost trading stock worth st\'eral monrhs' wages. Sailors waited for chances to get e\-e:n. Not surprising!}~ after 1767 inspectors increasingly fell victim co riots dominated b)•vengeful sailors. In these wa)'S che commissioners embarked on a program of "customs racketeering" char consticuted legalized piracy. l 'h is program fed an upsurge in popular \iolence. Above aU, customs commissioners' use of informers pro\'Oked retaliation. The PtnriSJir~nia jourMI in 1769 scorned these agecnts as ..dogs of prey, thirsting after the forrunes of U'Orthy and wealth)' men." Nowhere were customs agenrs and informers more detested chan in Boston, where citizens retaliated in j une 1768. When customs agents seized colonial mer· chanc john Hancock•s sloop Libtrty on a technicality, a crowd tried to prevent the to""ing of Hancock's ship and then began assaulcing customs officials. S~A'CIIing co se"/eral hundred. the mob dto't-e all revenue inspectors from the dty. To appease angry colonists momentarily, Bricish officials dropped the charges against Hancock.

JOa Wilbs

Britj,.h oppanrnt Df King G~ JJI whel became a bero eo Amerian eokmi.m

I

In addition to colonial opposition to the Revenue Act, British merchants and arcisans, hit hard by che exclusion of 40 percent of impor~ also demanded repeal of the Townshend duties. Their protests became pan of a larger mO\>c-mem in che I 760s against the policies ofGeorge Ill and a l'arliament dominated by wealthy lando~A'tlers. john \t' Ukes, a 6ery london editor whose newspaper regularly and irre\o-erendy de-

---~l ~~~!i~~~~~~--I Ull 11bi \ The Qu.:u-taing A« :~h0\\'«1 coloni:~t:~ that P.:ui~ment w:l$ willing co in«'-rf«co with the-ir :~d(·p'i'rnment. The TowtUhend dutiu f.aited to r.:tiuo f'l'\'i'nu~ but their intent to dow angtl'l'd colon i:~t:~ e'A'n maceo. Colonia l rt-achon to Pa.rliarMnt un ite-d in the procco.su ofJo hn Dick· inwn, the Ma:~uehu$1'1:0 c ircular lett«, and nonimportation a_gl'l'ement:~; wome-n pbf"d ;m importlm public ruk in implementing nonimportuion.. The Bo.ud of Custom:~ CommU· siOOC"r~ ~ent to Ho:~ron co o'A'rs« collection of t.Utl ~reo often corrupc and became a target lOr colon ial a nger. John Wi:U.: u became a ~rmbol of thedanger~ poJC'd b)· a too·~'i'rful

nounced the king, became both leader and focal point of the protest. A member of Parliament, Wilkes ~A'3S tried for seditious libel and acquicted, ro great popular acclaim. George Ill's government chen shutdown his newspa· per and persuaded membcrs of the House of Commons co deny Wilkes his seat. After publishing anocher slashing artack on the king. Wilkes fled to l'aris. In 1768 Wilkes rcrurned to England. defying an arrest warranc, and again ran fo r Parliament. By then, governmcnc policies, including the Townshend Aces, had unleashed a flood of protests against che "obnoxious .. gO\'· ernment ministers. Manufacturers, merchants, and artisans all rallied around the cr}' «Wilkes and Liberty." When the ne"-'ly elected Wilkes 'A'3S once again arrested, twenty to forty thousand angry "Wilkesites" massed on St. George's Fields, outside the prison where he 'A'llS bcing held. Soldiers and police opened fire on rockthro~Aing demonstrators, killing eleven. The "massacre ofSt. Gcorge•s Fields" furnished martyrs to the protesters, and Wilkes reccived enormous outpourings of public support from rhe North American colonies as well as from Britain. From his prison cell. Wilkes maintained a regular correspondence with Boston•s Sons of Liberty, and Bostonians cheered his release from prison in April 1770 with a massi\J'C celebration.

I ThE Df:EPENING CllJSIS. IJ70-17JI,

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The Wilkes furor sharpened the political ideas of g()I.!'Crnmenc opponents on both sides of che Adancic. English voters scm petitions co t:tarliament proclaiming thac its refusal to seat Wilkes was an affront to the electorate's will and calling "vir· tual representation'" a sham. Emboldened by che ..Wilkes and Liberty" mo\-emenc, William l'itt and others forcefully denounced the government's colonial policies. The coloniscs themsdvesconduded that Parliament and the gO\'emmem represented a small but po~Awful minority whose auchority they could legicimatd)•question.

THE DEEPENING CRISIS, 1770-1774 In what ways did colonists' views ofparliamentary authority changt~4{ter 1770? After 1770 the imperial crisis took on ominous new dimensions. Coloniscs and British croops d ashed on the screecs of Boston. Resistance leadcrs in checolonies de\'tlope:d ways to systematically coordinate their actions and policies. After the: de6ance manifested in the: Boscon 1ta (:tarry, Britain was detmnine:d to subordinate the colonies once and for aU. Adding to che general tension 'A'Cre SC''Ieral violent conflicts thac erupted in the western backcountry.

Tile B

Mas .

Bricish authorities responded to the violence d irected at customs commissioners by dispatching four thousand Bricish troops co Boscon in 1768. But che violence only escalated, intersecting with intracolonial tensions and extending the crisis bc)'ond che port cities. Crackling with tension, Boscon took on T u-r."'""· v_.. the acmosphe:re of an occupied city. Anne:d sol· --: dicrs and resentful civilians traded insults, and off-duty soldiers undercut local laborers by working fo r loW\'.r wages. Man)' of the soldicrs W\'.re Irish Catholi~ especially galling to che mainly Protestant Bostonians. Bostonians' resentment of British author· ity boiled O\'tt on February 22, I 770, when a customs informer 6red birdshoc at st\'cral chil· dren throwing rocks ac his house and killed an dt\'tn·rear-old boy. Samuel Adams organized a burial procession to maximize the: horror 0\'Ct a child's deach, relying on grief to unite che com· munity in opposition to British policies ...My Eres nC!"t·e:r behdd su ch a funeral,'" wrote his cousin john Adams. ..A vase Number of Boys walked before the Coffin, a \'ast Number of Women and Men after it. ... 11lis Shows there are man}' more Lives to spend ifv..-anted in che Engr;tving by P;aul Reven-. Service of chcir countt}'·"

mo oston

saae.

~.

L.

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RoAOS TO REVOI.UhON, I]jG-17J6

Prima:ry Source: Boston Gazette Describes the

Boston Massacre

loslioftllasslae Confnmta. tion bttWft'n ooloni,u ~nd Briti$h trooPJ in wbicb "'" wklnisu Wl'n' d!ot ~nd killtd

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Although the: ann}' had played no part in che shooting. it became a target fo r Bostonians' rage. A week after the: funeral, tension erupced ac cheguard post protect· ing t he customs office:. When an officer tried to d isperse a crowd led by C rispus At· tucks, a seaman of African and Native American ano:str)', che mob responded ~A'ith a barrage of fl)ing objects. O ne soldier, knocked down by a block of ice, fired, and then t he others opened 6re:. Thcir volley killed fii,!'C people, including Acrucks. Royal authorities mm--ed quickly to defuse che crisis by isolacing che army o n a fortified island in che harbor and purring soldiers who had fired on trial. l'atriot leader j ohn Adams defended the: accused Bricish t roops by claiming char chey had been provoked by a «morley rabble," an accusation chat resonated with Bosto n's "n· spectablr' middle:·and upper·dass dices. Only two soldiers ~A'Cre: fou nd guilty; chey received the relarivel)' mild punishment of branding on their thumbs. Burning hatred underlay che Boston Massacrt"-a name designed to invoke the St. George's Fields massacre cwo }'tars earlier. For the firsc rime colonists had to con· front the s tark possibility thac a tyrannical Britis h go..-crnmenc ~A'3S determined co coerce and suppress them t hrough armed force:.

In t he fall of 1n2 Lord North prepared to implement Townshend's goal of paying royal governors from customs n......-cnucs, freeing chem from the control of che colonial 1711-1773 assemblies. With representati\·e go\-ernmem deepI)' threat· cned, Samuel Adams persuaded Boston's cown meecing to rcquesc thac every Massa· chusctts co mmunity appoint people co exchange informaci on and coordinate measures co defend colonial righrs.. Wichin a rear, most Massachusetts communities had establis hed committe:c>s of C·orre:sponde:ncc>, and the idea spread t hrougho ut Nc~A' England. The committees of correspondence, t he colonists' fi rst attempt to maintain close political cooperation 0\'er a ~Aide area, allowed Samuel Adams to conduce a campaign of policical education for all New England. He sent messages for each local committee to read at ics cown meeting, which debated the issues and adopted formal resolutions. 1'he S)'Stem made tens of thousands of citizens consider evidence that their rights were bC'ing endangered and committed them to cake a stand. Adams's most successful \·enture in whipping up public alarm came in j une 1773, when he published leners from the gow:mor of Massachusetts, 1"'homas Hutchinson, obtain ed by Benjamin Franklin, ad\-ocacing "an abridgement of what are: called Eng· !ish liberties" and "a great restraint of nacurallibercy." The Hutchinson corre:spon· dence confirmed Americans' suspicions t hat a plot was afooc to destroy their basic freedoms. l:tatrick Henr)', Tho mas j efferson, and Richard Henry Lee had proposed in March 1773 that Virginia establish committees of correspondence:, and b)•earl)' 1774 a communications W'Cb linked leaders fro m all the colonies. In concrast to t he brief, incense Stamp Act crisi~ the dissatisfaction spawned b)• the Townshend ducies persis ted and gradually poisoned relations bl't"Attn Britain and America. In 1765 strong cies of loyalty and affection had d isguised che dept h of the d ivision ~r taxation. By 1773, ho~A'C\"Cr, colonial allegiance: was becoming tenuous.

The Commlllees of Clnesponden(t ,

c.....it~Hs Gl otfft5iPM4ace Lout committl't.S t.SUbli~

I

throughout cokmit:c to coonli. nate ;a.nri.&itish xrionJ

I ThE Df:EPENING CllJSIS, I]l0-177~ On the: Appalachian frontier, tensions among natives, recent settlers, and colonial authorities underlined a con· tinuing sense ofemergency. Rapid population growth had spurred the: migration of people and capital to che frontier where colonists sought access to Indian lands. Tension flared imo violence in Pennsylvania's backcouncry. Settlers in and around the: t()'l.'.· n of Paxton blamed the l'r:nnsylvania assembly, which 'A'llS domi· nated by Quakers, for failing to provide milicary protection and for denying them equal represcmacion in the assembly. 11le "Paxton BO}'S;'' as chey were kn()'l.'.·n, believed aU Native Americans ~A'Cre rheir racial enemies. After laying waste ro two villages of peaceful Conestoga Indians, killing and scalping men, women, and childr~:cn, in ~bruar}' 1764 about 200 l'axron Bo}'S headed for l'hiladdphia with plans to kill Christian Indian refugees there. A gow:mme:nt delegation headed by Benjamin Franklin met the anne:d mob on the outskirts of the: dty and promised lhat the: assembl}' would consider their grievances. Appeased, che Paxton Boys returned home:. l and pressures and lhe lack of adequate m-enue from the: colonies left the British government helpless to enforce the Proclamation of 1763. Speculators, squat· t~ hunt~ and thie:\'tS trespassed on Naci\J'C American lands, often leading Indians to respond violently, while che British withdrew troops char might have maintained order. Under such pressures, Britain and the Iroquois, in che Treaty of Fort Stan~A1x ( 1768), curned land along the: Ohio Ri\J'Cr that was occupied by the: Shawnees, Delawares, and Cherokees m-er co che Virginia and Pennsylvania g()I.'Crnmenrs, resolving lhe two colonies' o\-e:rlappingland claims in Ohio ac the: Indians' expense. 11le Shawnees assumed leadership among che Ohio Indians, who, with the Cherokees, ~A'Cre convinced that appeasement would nor stop colonial expansiorL The treaty heightened rather chan cased frontier tensions, especially in the Ohio country. Colonists moving W\'Srward into what they called Kencucky collided with Shawnee and Mingo Indians, and in 1774 Virginia Launched lord Dunmore's War. After Virginia's victor}' at Point Pleasant, Virginia gained uncontested rights to all land south of the Ohio River in exchange for giving up all claims north of the: ri\-e:r. Resentment continued to fester on both sides, and 6ghting would resume: when ~A'llr broke our betw't't:n Britain and the colonies. Other froncie:r disputes led to conflict among the colonists themselves. Seeders in ~A'CStern Massachusetts in the: early 1760s, for example, fOund their tides challenged b}• New Yorker Landlords. In 1766, threatened with cviccion, the New Eng· landers staged an armed uprising. And in 1769 Ne~A' Hampshir~: settlers calling lhem.sel\-e:s the Green Mountain Boys began guerrilla warfare against other New York landlords. 1'he: independent g()I.'Crnmcnc cht}' fonned ultimately became: that ofVmnont. Expansion also prO\>oked conflict between frontier settlers and their own colo· nial governments. In North Carolina,. W\'.Sterners, ~Atho u.-e:rl' underrepresented in the assembl}', found themselves exploited by dishonest officeholders appointed by east· ern politidans.1U.-e:my·fi\'t hundred anne:d 'A'l'Sterners, known as Regulators, dashed with thirteen hundred North Carolina militia on May 16, 1771, at lhc battle of Alamance Creek. Although lhc Regulator uprising d isintegrated, it crippled the: colony's subsequenc ability co resist British authority. A Regulator mo\'l!lllem also arose

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lnteracti\•e Map: Indian Land

Cessions. 1768-1 799

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in South Carolina, in t his case co counter the g01ownmmt's unwillingness co prose:· cuce: bandits ~Ailo terrorized t he: seeders. Fearful t hat the colony's slave population might re:\'Oit if lhe milicia ~A'aS dispatched, South Carolina's government yielded to t he: Regulators b}' establishing new courts and allowing jut}' trials in rccendy seeded areas. Although unrelated, t hese episodes reflected che tensions generated b}' a land· hungr}' ~A•hi tc population willing to usc violmcc against Native: Americans, ocher colonists, and British officials.

Smuggling and nonconsumption had taken a heavy roll on Britain•s East India Company, the: holder of t he: legal monopol}' on importing rea inco che Bricish Empire. B}' 1773, as tons ofte:a rotted in ~A'llrehouses, the East India Company was trece:ring on the brink ofbankrupccy. Bur Lord Norch could nor lct t he: company fail because:, by maintaining British authority in India at irs own e:xpmse:, t he East India Compan}' had become a vital componmt in t he British imperial structure. If the compan}' could control t he colonial market, Norch reasoned, it could in· crease its profits, and its survival ~A'Ould be guaranteed. Americans consumed vast amounts of tea but by 1773 W\'.re: purchasing just o ne:·quarce:r of it from che com· pany. In Ma}' 1773, to save t he: beleaguered East India Company, Parliament passed TN Ad Am'mpt to ~I out the Tea Act, which eliminated all import duties on tea entering England and rhus East lndia Comp.:tny tt.. lowered the selling price: co consumers. To reduce the price furcher, the Tea Act also btiglltrned trnsicnu bttween permitted the company co sell tea direcdy to consumers racher than chrough whole:· Engbnd and colon.isn salers. 1'hesc provisions reduced che cost of East India Company tea in the colonies to "-'ell below the: price of smuggled rea. Parliament expected economic self·interest to overcome American scruples about bu)'ing taxed tea. But the: 1C:a Act alarmed many Americans, who recognized that che rev· enues raised by che law"-'Ould place: royal go,wnors' purses be:rond the: reach CHECKING I N of che colonial assemblies. The law also t hreatened co seduce Americans inco accepting parliamentary taxation in return for a fri\'Olous luxur}'· 11le: com· A(ur th"' Boston M.ulun", coloni$1$ confronted the pc;wibllicy th:u mittres of corre:spondmcc decided co resisc the: importation of tea by pres· England would \Uit ;umed for« suring che East India Company's agmts to refuse: acceptance: or by pm-eming again.u them. t he landing of East India Company cargoes. Lord North auempc:~ partiU con· In Bosco n on Nm-embe:r 28, 1773, che: 6rsc ship came under jurisdiction ciliacion b)· n"pt:.Ulng mo~t of th"' of che customhouse, to ~Ail ich duties ~A'Ould ha\\'! to be: paid wichin cwcnt}' Town,h«Mt d u ti6, but in'i't«< on r«a.ining th"' c.;ax on tu. days, or che: cargo \l'Ould be seized from the captain and rhc tea ~A'Oul d be: Undu S.;am Ad..lm''' leackr~hi p, the claimed by the compan}"s agents and placed on sale. When Samuel Adams, coloniu formed committcu o f j ohn Hancock, and others asked customs officers co issue a special clearance: corre~ponde"-nte to t()()rdin.;ate int«-for the ship's departure {to a\'Oid the: seizure: and sale), Gow~rnor Hutchin· colon ial actionJ. son refused. T he Tea Acto( 1773 w.u intended On t he c-.-ening of December 16, 1773, Samuel Adams com-encd a meet· primuily to aid BritiJh impcri.;ali' m in India buc arowed coloniil ing in Old Souch Church, ac ~Ailich he told 6\+e: thousand citizens about opposit ion. Hucchinson•s insjstcnce o n landing che tea, warned chem thac the grace pe:· Coloni'u applauded the Bo~ron Te~~ riod ~A'Oul d expire in a few hours, and proclaimed that «chis meeting can do P:u ')·, but it arou~ "'normow no more co save t he: councry." About 6fty )'Oung men disguised as Indians anger in Brir.;ain, whe-n" it wa' viewed "'a pcot6t aga.irut the Tu An. and armed with "tomaha~Atks'" headed for t he wharf, followed by t he crowd.

The Tel Ad. 1773

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Thousands lined the: waterfront co watch chem heave: forty·6\'t: tons of tea O\'CT· boardi for an hour the only sounds echoing through che: crisp, moonlit night ..w .re the stead}' chop of hatchets breaking open wooden chests and the soft splash of rea on the water. Their work fin is hed. che parcicipanrs left quietly. The cown lapsed into a profound hush- .. nC'\o-er more still and calm ," according to one observer.

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, 1774-1776 What led most colonists in 1776 to abandon tMir loyalty to Britain 11nd choose Mtional independen<s? The calm that follo\1/C'd the: Boston 1ta Parcywa.s the: calm before: the sconn.1'he: Britis h go\·crnme:nt was more: determined chan f:'\'ct co quash colonial insu bordina· don, whereas colonial leaders 'A'Cre e:quall)' determined co defend sd f-go\'trn ment and liberty. The e mpir~: and irs American colonies were on a collision course, but the colonists hesitated at a declaration of independence. In che meantime, AfricanAmericans, both free and slave, pondered how co realize cheir 0'1'-'n freedom.

for

Throughout the imperial crisis, African-American slaves quickly responded co calls for liberty and equality. In 1772 1. a British court decision d ectri6ed much of the black pop· ulation. A Massachusetts slave, j ames Somerset, ~Ailose master had taken him to Eng· land, sued for his freedom; Lord Chief justice William Mans6eld ruled that Parliament had m:...'e r explicitly established slavcry and thac therefore no courc could compd a slaw to obey an order depriving him of his liberty. Although the decision applied o nl}' in Engtand, Massachusetts slaves petitioned the legislature to appl)' it in their colony as wdl In the Chesapeake: area, dozens of slaves ran away from their masters and sought passage: o n ships bound for England. As Anglo-American tensions mounce:d in 1774, many slaves began co anticipate the arrival of British troops as cheir path co liberation. White Chesapeake colonists began co fear chat war would lead to sla\'t rebellion. Bearing o ut such fears in 1775, Virginia•s ro)•al govunor, Lord Dunmore, prom· ised freedom co any slave ~Ailo enlisted in the cause of restoring royal authority. Ncarl}' a thousand slaves responded co D unmore's proclamation before angr}' colonists forced him to flee the colon}'· l'r.rhaps more important, boch whites and blacks began to see a dear link between British forces and sla\'t liberation. 1

._..,

~!!!!~ ··~A ~!!!!Iricans

. . . a....... """" I

8"""""

of Virginia wbo promistd

fmedom toJI.we:c-.·ho IOugilt to ti':IIWI't' roy;d <~.utbority

Boston's ..Tea Parry" enraged the British. Only "New Eng· land fanatics" could imagine chat cheap tea oppressed them, fumed Lord North. A Welsh member of Parliament declared that "the to~A'tl of Boston ought to be: knocked about by the ears, and destroy'd." The great oracor Edmund Bu rke: pled in vain for the one action that could end the crisis: .. Leave America ... to tax herself.'" Buc the British go\-ernment swiftly as.scrted its authority through the passage of four Com:ive Acts, known as www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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RoAOS ro RtvOI.UhON, I]jG-17J6

tmdtd topuni~ - ...... Mau.dlu~u.s ·~ for Bo5wo lta ~rty .md 1smoogthm royal authority

the Intolerable Acts to the colonists, which, along with the Quebec Act, became known to man}' colonists as che '"Intolerable Acts."' The first Cocrci\J'C ACl, the Boston Port Bill, was passed on April I, l n4. lc ordered the navy co close: Boston Harbor unless the tO'I'-'n arranged to pa)' for the ruined tea by j une I. 11le impossjbly short deadline was meant to ensure the harbor's closing, ~A•hich would plunge Boston inro economic distress. The second Coerch't: Act, che Massachusetts Go'lem mem Ace, 1\.'-oked the Massachusetts charcer and made the colony's government less de-mocratic.1'he upper house ~A
In response to the Intolerable Acts, the commictees ofcor· respondence of C'\o"Cr}' colony but Georgia sent delegates to a Continental Congress in Philadelphia. l 'he fifty-six delegates who assembled on September 5, 1774, induded che colonies' most prominent policidans: Samuel and John Adams of Massachusetts; John j ay of New Yo rk; j oseph Gallowa}' and John Dickinson of Pennsylvania; and Pacrick Henry, Richard Henry

The Flnt Contillent.ll

c...-llt.ll C...,.ess

t.b; ar Sttp tow~rd tt:r.:istllnu to Britain and unity among colonio

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ll74-1nfl

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Lee, and George Washingto n of Virginia. 1'hey were determined to 6nd a "''llY to defend American rights without war. The Continental Congress endorsed che Suffolk (SUFF-uk) Resolves, extreme statements of principle that proclaimed chac the colonies o"'•ed no obedience to the Coercive Aces, advocated a pnwisional gm--ernmem until restoration of the Massachusetts charter, and \'0'1'--ed chat defensive measures should follow M)' actack by royal troops. The Continental Congress also voted co bo)'COct British goods after December 1, 1774, and to stop exporting goods co Britain and its \l'esc Indies possessions after September 1775. This agreement, called the Continental Association, would be enforced b)•locally elected committees of "obseJVation" or "safety." But not all che d elegates embraced such bold defiance. ) a)', Dickinson, Galloway, and other moderates who dominated che contingent from che Middle Colonies feared that a co nfrontation "'ith Britain wo uld spa"''ll internal colonial cunnoil. They \'ainly op· posed nonimporcacion and unsuccessful!)' sought support of a plan for an Ameri· can legislaru.re that "''Ould share wich Parliament the auchority to tax and go'lern the colonies. Finally, che d elegates summarized chcir principles and d emands in a petition to George IlL They conceded to Parliament the f>O"""tr to regulate colonial co mmerce but argued chat parliamemar}' effo rts co impose taxes, enforce laws chrough admi· rahy co urts, suspend assemblies, and re\'Oke charters were unconstitutional. By addressing the king racher than Parliament, Congress was imploring George Ill to end the crisis by dismissing the ministers responsible for passing the Coercive Aces.

Fralll Remtance to

IIebe• an

Most Americans hoped that resistance would jolt l'arlia· menc into renouncing irs claims of authority over the colonies. But tensions bctween American radicals and

moderates ran high. To solidify defiance, American resistance leaders used coercion against waverers and loyalists (..Tories"). Committees elected to enforce the Continental Association became vigilantes, compelling merchants to burn British imports, bro'''beating clergymen who preached pro-British sermons, and pressuring Americans to free them· selves of d ependence o n British imports by adopting simpler diers and homespun clothing. In colony after colon)', morCO"t-er, the committees assumed go\-ernmemal functions by organiz.ing \'Olunteer military companies and extralegal legislarurcs. By spring 1775 colonial pacriots had established provincial «co ngresses" that rivaled existing royal governments. In April 1775 armed conflict erupted in Massachusetts. Citizens had collected arms and organized militia unirs ("-minucemcn") co respond instantly in an emergency. l'he British government ordered Massachusetts's gm-·ernor, l'homas Gage, to quell the "rude rabblr' and to arrest the patriot leaders. Aware that most of these had fled Boston, Gage, on April 19 , Jns, scm 700 British soldiers to sciu: colonial military supplies stored ac Conc·ord. 1\vo co uriers, William Dawes and Paul Re\-ere, alerted nearby towns of the British troop mOV\'.ments. At Lex.Jngton o n the road to Concord, about SC\-enty minutemen faced the British on the tO'I'-'n green. After a co nfused skirmish in "'ohich eight minutemen d ied and a single redcoat was wounded, the British marched to Concord. They fo und few municions but encountered a swann of armed Yankees. When some minutemen mistakenly concluded chat the

ClnCIN'd 5\irmi.Jh ~l'll'tm coklni.Jt.s aod British ti"I:IOp5 ;~. ftw hou:ts anr:r Coooord

I l

One offin~t umed ronftirt5 bc.or.'tm &iuin ;and coklni.Jt.s

l.ai.p

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114

CHAPtER S

RoAOS TO REVOI.UhON, I]jG-17J6

tO'I'-'n was being burned, they exchanged fire with British regulars and touched off a running battle char continued most of the sixteen miles back co Boston. By da),.S end the redcoats had lose 273 men. 1'he:se engagements awakened the co untryside:. \'t;'ichin a day, some 20,000 New Englanders were: besieging the British garrison in Boston. Three: weeks later, the Concine:ntal Congress reconvened in Philadelphia. Most delegates still opposed independence and agreed to send a "loyal ml'SSagr' co George: Ill. lhe resulting Olive Branch ~titi o n presented chrce demands: a cease--6re: in Bos· ton, repeal of the: Coerci\J'C Acts, and negotiations to establish guarantees of Amcri· can rights. Yet che same delegates who pleaded for peace \'Oted to establish an "American continental army" and to appoinc George: Washington as commander, measures chat the Bricish could only sec as rebellious. The O liiJ'C Branch Petition reached London along wich news of che Continental Army's formation and of the bacd e:s of Breed's Hill and Bunker Hill just oucside: Boston. Although che British d islodged che Americans in the dashes, chey suffered 2,200 casualties, compared co colonial losses of only 311. After Bunker Hill the: Brit· ish public wanted retaliation, not reconciliation. In August, George Ill proclaimed New England to be in a state of rebellion and in December, Parliament declared all of che colonies rebellious, o utfa"''ing all British trade with them and subjecting chcir ships to seizure.

Mosc Americans still d ung to hopes of reconciliation. Even John Adams, who believed separation inevitable, said that he was ..fond of recondliation, if"-\! could reasonabl)' cnce:rtain Hopes of ic on a constitutional basis." The majority of Americans "''ho rtsisted independence blamed evil ministers, rather than che king, for unconscirutional measures and expected saner heads co rise: to po'l"\!r in Britain. On both counts they were wrong. Americans exaggerated the in· flu e:nce of Pin, Burke:, Wilkes (who finally took his scat in Jn4), and their ocher friends in Britain. In Ma.rch JnS, when Bu rke: proposed that Parliament acknowledge the: colonists' right to raise and dispose of taxes, a thumping majority of Parlia· menc voted him down. In August, George Ill declared the colonies to be in «open and a\'OW'Cd rebellion," and in December Parliament outlawed aUtrade: wich them. Americans' sentimental auachmcm to the king, the last e motional barrier co independence, crumbled in January 1776 "'1th the: publication of Thomas Paine's CAmmon Sense. l'ainc had immigrated co the colo nies fro m England in 1774 with a penchant for radical politics and a gift for plain and pungent prose. l'ainc [Old Americans what they had been unable: to bring thcmseh·es to say: that at the: root of the conspiracy against American liberty was noc corrupt politicians but che w:ry in· stitutions of monarchy and empire. Further, America did noc need ics British con· nection. "1'he: commerce b)• which she (America) hath enriched herself are the: necessaries of life, and will always ha\'e a market while: caring is the cuscom in Eu· rope," Paine argued. And, he pointed out, the: e\'ents of the: preceding six months had made: independence a reality. Finally, Paine linked America's awakening nation· alism "'1th a sense of religious mission: «We have it in our f'O"''Cr to begin the: world m\!r again. A situation, similar to the: present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now." America. Paine wrote, \l'OUld be a new kind of nation, a model re· (I I II aI

COIIMtOft seMa Btilli.uu

I

j»mphl« by lbomas P.aint tlvt sumnuriud pm..ifldcopendmn" argutnc'nts

Sense

l lbWAAO INOEPENOENCE, ll74-1nfl

115

public free of o ppressive European bd ie:fs and cor· rupt institutions. Common Strut, "a landflood that s~ps all before it,'" sold more chan 100,000 co pies in three: momhs, one: copy for every fourth or 6fth adult male: in the colonies. By spring I 776 !':tine's pamphlet had dis· solved lingering allegiance co George: Ill and removed the Last psychological barrier to independence.

Even as colo nists absorbed Paine's vi e:~ the military co nflict bcrween Britain and the: colonies escalated, further diminishing che prospects of reconciliation. In May 1775 colonial troops captured Fore Ticonderoga and Cro"''tl !'oint on che key route connecting New York and Canada. Six months Iacer Washingto n ordered Colonel Henry Knox, in civilian life a book seller and in war che army's senior arcilh~r}' officer, ro bring the: cannons captured at Ticonderoga to rcinfon::e the siege: of Boston. Usjng crude sleds, Knox and his men hauled 6fty·ninecannons through dense: foi\"St and ()'IJ'C1 snowTllom.IS P~iftt rovc.l\."<1 mountain~ one of the Re:\'Oiurion's great feats H.:.\'ing .:l~d in the coloniC':$ len th:.n two yNrs c;~.rl i-er, of endurance. The: 11conderoga cannon forced the P.:linc beC';lti'IC ;~. bC':$('1;dli ng .:.uthor....;th the public.:.tion of British ro ev-acuate: Boston on March 17, 1776. CIM!mcmSC'IIn! (1776). Regrouping, the: British planned an assault o n New York to dri\'f: a v.~dge bern-een New England and the ocher colonies. Washington countered by moving his forces there in April 1776. Other militar}' mo\'f:Squickened che drift to"''llrd all-ouc war. A two-pronged assault on Canada by the colonists failed, as did a British offensjve in the southern colonies. Stimulated by Paine's soaring rhetoric, local gatherings throughout che colo· nics, ranging from town meetings to militia musters, passed resolutions fa\'Oring American independence. Most of New England was already in rebellion, and Rhode Island dedared itself independent in May 1776. l 'he Middle Colonies hesitated to support re\'Oiurion be· cause: they feared, corroccl)', chat the "''llr would largely be fought O\'et co ntrol of Philadelphia and New York. The South began co press for separa-tion. In April, North Carolina authorized its congressional d elegates to vote for independence, and in june:, Virginia follo"''Cd suit. On july 2 the Continental Congress formally adopted the Virginia resolution and created che United States of America. The drafting of a statement to juscif)' the colonies' separation from England fell to Virginia's 1'homas jefferson. Congress made tv.'O important changes to Jefferson's first draft: it inserted the: phrase .. pursu it of happiness"' instead of .. property" in the document's most famous sentence, and it deleted a condemnation of George Ill for fordng the slaw trade on unwilling colonists. Congress then approved Jefferson's manuscripco nJuly4, 1776. Even chough parliamentary a uthority had been che focal

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Ded.atioll Gfl•.&e,aM.c.e

poinc of dispute: since 1765, t he: Declaration of Independence new.r mentioned l':lrliament by name because: Congress "''aS un...,illing to imply that Parliament held any authorityO\'ct America. jefferson instead focused on George Ill, citing ..repe:ated injuries and usurpations'" against the: colonies. Like Paine:,jeffctSOn elevated colonial grievances to a struggle of universal di· mensions. In the tradition of Enlightenment t hought, j efferson argued that Britain had violated its contract wich the: colonists, giving chem the righc to replace: it \l.ith a government of their own. His emphasis o n t he: equality of all individuals and chcir natural entideme:nt to justice, liberty, and scJf.fulfillmenc expressed the Enlighten· menc•s deep longing for government that reseed on ncither legal privilege nor t he: exploitation of the majority by t he few- and de:liberatd)' ignored t he e:xis· tence: of slaw~ry. CHECKI NG I N jefferson addressed the: De:daration of Independence as much to Am cri· The Coerci \~ (or lntnkr~ble) Aco cans unce:rcain about che \l.isdom of independence as to world opinion. puJhtd the colonie:~ to t he brink Abow all, he: wance:d to convince his fellow Americans chat social and politi· ofwar. cal progress was impossible \l.ithin t he British empire. But the declaration MemberJ oft he Fin:tCon tinental did noc address the status of blacks, poor white: men, and women. All th ir· Caogl'<'-$$ prod.Umed th~t parli.11· menta l")' t.11:ution of the colonie:~ teen of the new states counce:nanced slaver)', st\'ctdy restricted t he: rights of w;u unconJtirutional but ltopped free blacks, used property qualifications to determine \'Odng rights, and rei· $hort ofd«la ri ng i ndeptn~n«. e:gared women to s.e:cond·dass stacus. je:ffctSOn also put Indians beyond t he: The battle,: of Lexington ~nd Con · pale when he accused the: ki ng of having unleashed ..che merciless Indian cord t r;tn$for med colonUI reJi$t;mCe savages" o n innocent colonists. from '>\'OrdJ into ~n ~rmed sc:ruggle. l 'hus t he declaration expressed che sentiments of a minority of colo· Tho~$ P~i ne•$ Cmm.,cm Srott un i\'t'r:r.alixed Amc"ri ~n ide.ili: nists ac the same time chac it sec out the: hopes of thousands upon thou· and prodded colon ie:~ f()';\'atd sands more. The struggle: for independence: from Britain had merged wich a i ndeptn~n«. quest fur equality and personal independence chat would ew~ntually tran· In the D«l.11r~tion of ln~pendtn«, scend class, race, and gender. The declaration nt:\'ct daimcd char perfecc jus· T homa$ Jeffer:r.on pcodaimed the tice and equal opporrunity existed; instead, it challenged the: rl'\'Oiutionar}' colon ie:~ robe dtfend ing uniwrJil natur.:..l righ u.. generation and all who follo\I.'Cd co bring t his ideal closer to reality. Documrnt dnfud primouily by 11lomu Jtffioi"JJ((Il proenring Arnc-0011 Rti!Oiucion .u mugglc' for unMnod principlt.s

Chapter Su 0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AUOl O R LE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND LISTEN TO IT ON THE GO.

K EY TERMS

s.v.n YeiiiS' W.r (p. 91) How did Britain and its colonies view their joint victory over France in the

I

SIM?n Years War? (page 91)

Great Britain emerged \•ictorious in the Se-.'i:n Years• War ag.tinst France; in 1763 France ceded almost aUof her North American empire to Britain, quadru· pling the size of the British empire in North America. Ironically, chis t riumph \l'OUid also p!'O"ide the framcwotk for friction between England and its colonies.

Tmaly of Paris of 1763 (p. 94} PootiiK {p. 95) Prodamalion ol 1763 {p. 95) "'~ ol assiltlnce ,P. 96} SUgar Act {p. 97)

CHAPTER SUMMAAY

What nt'ls imperial teO!f11nization, and how did it change relations between Britain and the North American colonies? (page 96)

I

Attempts :u imperial n:org.:mization in the early 1760s lh~re intended to help defray the enormous costs of England's victory by incn:asing 1\_"\/l!nUcs from the colonies, but che attempts succeeded primarily in alienating che colonists. After open resistance boiled ovrc in che Stamp Act crisis, P.1tliament backed down a bit but insisted that it had complete authorityowr the colonies. /n what ways did resistance to the Townshend duties differ (rom earlier colonial resistance efforts? (page 102)

1 Cont:to\-er.sy between England and che colonies continued with measures such as che Quattcdng Act and the 1bwnshend duties. Colonial protests found shape in the work ofjohn Dickinson and a hero in the person ofJohn Wilkes. Jn an -attempt co increase tax revenues, Britain created a Board of Customs Commissioners, but many of the commissioners V.\' J'C corrupt, and the boatd became che target of colonial anger.

in what ways did colonists• views ofparliamentary authority change after 1110? (page 101)

l The Boston Massam brought

3 tcmpor.uy lull in conflict bct\lo'een England and the colonies, but l otd North's attempt to aid che East India Company led to the Boston Tea Patty. Colonists defied Britain's continued rew:nue·raising measures.

117

KEY TEilMS con tinued

Stamp AdO>. 98) Soos of libl!lt'( {p. 100} Stamp Ad Congre" {p. Joo) Dl!daratory Ad {p. Joo) QllarteringA£1 {p. 102) Townsllend ooties {p. JOJ)

Board ofCustoms CoiMlissioners {p. 105)

John Wilk. Ill) Intolerable Acts 0>. 111) Cootinental Coogress {p. m) Coocord (p. IIJ) l.ailgtoo {p. 1/J) Commoo Sense (p. 114) Dedarationof Independence {p. 116)

What led most colonists in 1116 to abandon their loyalty to Britain and choose national independence? (page 111)

I

In response to the 1Ca P.1rty, J)atliament passed 3 series of Coetri~'t Acts-

known to the colonists as che lntolcmble Acts- which spawned the First Conti·

nental Congress and the beginning of fully coordinated colonial resistance. In 1775 the batdes of Lexington and Concord ttansformed the friaion between England and the colonies into armed conflict. Thomas Paine's Common Smw ridiculed che arguments against independence and portrayed the colonial struggle as one of universal principles on ~·hich Thomas jefferson elaborated in che Declaration oflndependence.

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CHAPTER

Securing Independence. Defining Nationhood

6

1776-1788

C HAPTER PREVIEW

-

Tilt PrOipecl> of Wat W1tol ~ rN CXHI'tporotive odwntagts ofthe

Bnth, tmd th~ colonists whm the RtvoiiJtjon bcgpn?

-

war and Ptac., 1n6-178l How dJ th1 WDr unfokl?

_

Tilt Rtvollllon and Social Change HQw dJ til. er o/frClt?lar.ionships ttmOIIX

Amtritom o(tli{fcrr11t c.1crssn. rom. 11Mgrulm?

-

-

rup.g- Gowrnmonts. rm-1781 .-dJ-..r"""""R'WJiotiDnmJ ,.,....,.. r..qr.,u..,...,....,.,.? -

d. -

ConoliiWon, 1786-1788

'"""' ...,. m. pri..ap.linwt diowmg wpporttn

•.w _.., o(rlN-{r«MM c..tsrirur.ioo?

T

he Raolurion:uyt:ra ..,lould reach Amcricanll n h:ll'd lesso1t: chat prrx:l.aiming a new n:u:ion, :1$ they had done so proudly in 177&., w:u much usicr rh:an making a new n.;a.r:ion, whkh rhcy nruggltd to do from 1776 to 1188. Befort InS the outlook ofinh.ahinnts of cht difft:rmt colonial rtgions had bttn narrow. With bu:lt opportunity 3nd ltss n«tsSity ro •wk tog('thu, each coklnlJt h.ad ttpnkd his <M'll colony as su~ rior to all othtu. But ciJhc yean o( w:u rn.nsformtd me colonisu' narrow virN and tunKd thrm Into Arnuicm drizms.. 1nckpmdcrl« md prau In 1181, ho.nu, P'" Americm.s .a fa1.st' security. ).bjor problcms rcmainrd unsolwd. Americans Yt1."'1\" divided 0\otr h OWl• to dbtnbucc polioc.ll po'A'l'l'. Nor until 1787 would thq begin to cn1'roomc tht$c challenges.

118

I T HE PltOSJIECIS Of \A'AII

THE PROSPECTS OF WAR What ...,nt the contpQrative advantllf;I'S oftM British 11nd tiNt colonists wlten tile Revolution beflln? The Rt\'Oiution was boch a struggle that pitted Americans against Britain and a dvil war between Americans. 1"'hose opposed to independence represented one of several fuctors in Britain's favor as the ~A'llr began.: ochers included a larger population and superior military resources and preparation. The colonies, on the: other hand. wen: far from Britain and enjoyed che intense commicment co independence from patriots and the Continental Army.

When independence came: in july I 776, many colonists remained unconvinccd of its necessity. About 20 percent of all whites acri\·ely o pposed the rebellion or supported it only when threatened ~Aith fi nes and imprisonment. These opponents of the Revolu· don called t hemselves loyalists, buc \t'higs (supporters of che Re\'Oiution) labded them Tories. loyalists, like Whigs, typically o pposed parliamentary taxation of the colonies. Many loyalists thus found the mscto.~s fighting for a cause: wit h which t hey d id not entirely agree; as a result, many switched sides during the war. But lo)'alists be!iC"t-ed char separation was illegal and was nor necessary to preserve the colonists' consdcu· donal rights. Above all, che)' revered che crown and equated any failure to defend their king wich a sacrifice of personal honor. The murual hatred bct.....-een Whigs and Tories was intense. Each side sa"'' its cause: as sacred, and chose: who opposed it as traitors.. The worse atrocities of the "'':tr were committed by Americans against each ocher. loyalist strength in an area depended on how u.-ell promin ent local Whigs had co nvinced voters chat the king and Parliament were endangering representative go\'· ernment. f ro m 1772 to 1776, elites in New England, Virginia, and South Carolina mobilized citizens by organizing public meetings and repeatedly explaining the is· sues. The majority opted for resistance.: by 1776 10)'lllists co nstituted barely 5 percent of whites in chest: areas. In contrast, d ites in New York and New Jersey remained reluctant to declare allegiance to either side, and their inde
Lopllsts and Olher llrltlsb Syllpalllilers

..,.,. Colonist ··ho SUfi• 1porttd tht British

IW\ic

Supporkrortht R.tYolurion

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12 0

CHAPtER 6

SECURING INOtPt.NOENCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

outbreak of war. During the war itsd f, at lease 20,000 slaV\'.s would run away from southern plantations to sign on as labon:rs or soldiers in the Royal Arm}'· Deep!)' alienated from white society, souchern slaves realized chat che Revolucion would not benefit chem. In comrasc, most African-Americans in che North supported the reb· els in hopes of hastening their O'-''tl liberacion. Finally, most Indians, recognizing che chrea.t chat cxpansion·minded colonists posed, likewise supported the British. Of che handful of tribes char sided with the colonists, the most prominent "'~re cwo Iroquois tribes, che Oneidas (oll-NIE·duhs) and che Tuscaroras (tuss-ltuh-ROR-uhs).

Britain enten~d che war 'A'ith whac should haw~: been two majoradv.mtages. First, Britain's II million people grm ly outnumbered the 2.5 million colonists, one-third of whom were cither sla\'eS or lo)'aliscs. Second, Britain possessed the world's largest navy and one of its best armies. During the 'A'llr, che army's size more chan doubled, from 48,000 co J J 1,000 mm , and Britain hired 30,000 Hessian (HESH-un) mm:maries and mlisted 2 1,000 lO)'llliscs to su pplement irs O'-''tl fighting force. Despite a smaller population, the new nation mobilized about 220,000 troopscompared to the 162,000 Britons, loyalists, and Hessians who se.-..~d in the British army. H oW\....,~r. most Americans scn~d only a short tenn; the nation would ha\'e been hard pressed wichout che comribucions of ics Frmch allies in the lace: stages of the war. Further, peacetime budgec cuts after 1763 had weakened British sea pO\l-er and thus Britain's ability to crush che rebellion. Midway through the war, half of Britain's ships languished in dry dock, a'A'lliting repairs. In addition, during the war U.S. Navy ships and privateers would capture: more chan 2,000 British merchant \~S· scls and 16,000 crewmen. Seriously overextended, the nary- bard)' kept the army sup· plied and never effectivcl)' blockaded American ports. Maintaining public support presented anochcr serious problem for Britain. T he war more than doubled the British national debt, adding to che problems of a people alread)' paying record taxes. Resmtful of this tax burdm, che politically influential landed gentry would not voce against their pocketbooks forever. The new United States faced d iffermt but equal!)' st\-ere problems. First, one· fifth ofics population was open!)' pro· British. Second, stace militias lacked che train· ing to fight pitched batdes. Their hit-and-run guerrilla tactics could not bring victory, nor could avoiding major battles and allowing the British to occupy population cen· tcrs. MoreM'ct, rhe U.S. depcndmce on guerrilla warfare: would convince potential European allies that the Americans could not dri\-e out rhe British and 'A
lbe Clpp4Killg Sides

Brii!lllroops evacuate Bosmn; Brilish d -Amencan forces under C.orge W.shingkln in fighlilg aroond NewYOOc Ciy; American ~dory in Bald• d Tll!rton Brii!ll surr•ndlion

Francetormallyrec•es the~ States; France declares war onBrilail; British wacuate ~ia;

Brii!ll oocupy Savannah; Josoph Brart ~ads Iroquois i!lt.l
Artides of Confederaoon b~ome law; Battle of Yorklown; British General Charles Cornwallis siJTenders

Paris peace negotiations begin J>eac:• ol Paris; NowburJitl Conspiracy Spain doses New Ofteans toAmerican trade; Economic depression begins Ol'dinaOO! oi178S Con111•ss rojoos Jay-Gardoqui Troaty; Joseph Brant organjzes hlian resislaOO! 10 U.S. •xpansion; Yirgjlia adopts Thomas JEI1mon's SlatUIO lor Rl!liJiious Froroom Sl1ays's Rl!bl!llion il MassadiUSE!lS Nonlrtlosl Ordinanco; Pli~delphia Convmlion; h!doral Constil!rlion s;g.ro Al<'landlifiod

1Tle-.

. . ._.,. . . .,.. l

cnccd officers in 1775. In t he: v.ar's earl)' years, it su ffered heartbreaking defeats. c_ However, co ~A'in, the Continentals did noc have to destroy the British arm}' but only mander ofthe Continental to prolong t he: rebellion until Britain's taxpayers lost patience. Until t hen, American Atmy; m~in fx:wr in AmeriGo victory depended on the: ability of one man to keep his army fighting despite w =o defeat- George: Washington. Few generals looked and acted the role: as much as Washington. He: spoke wich authority and comported himsdf~A'ith dignity. At six feet two inches, he stood a half.foot taller chan an average: contemporary. Po~A'Cr· At the w~r'.s .sttrt, t he British C'n· full)' built, athletic, and hardened by a rugged outdoor life:, he: could in· io>'«~ ~jor ~\'.lO t.lgu in popul.:.· spire t roops to heroism. t ian, eo:onomic dt"Vdopment, :md m ilit.uy p~parcdnesl. Washington's military experience: had begun ac age twenty-two when H~'A'r, Brit i.sh supply linel wne he had commanded a Virginia regiment raised to resist French claims in long and popular .su pp«t for the the O hio Valley (sec Chapter 5). Vasdy outnumbered, he had lose his first war shorr-li,'<'d. battle. A year later, at Braddock's de:fe:ac, Washington had assumed t he: Ame'-Mca.ru had no maintd ;army point of gre-atest danger, had two horses shot out from under him, and whC"O the war beg;an. had his hat shot off and his coat ripped by bullets. Buc Washington's mis· AmeMca.rn: dtd not ha'~ ro dtfeat takes and lost battles had taught him lessons that easy victories mighc not the Britim; thq· ju.st h ad to prolong the n
12 2

CHAPtER 6

SECURING INOtPt.NOENCE, D EFINING N ATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

Burgesses, "''here o thers respected him and sought his opinion. An carl}' Opponem of parliamentary taxacion, he had also serwd in che Continental Congress. In the eyes of the many who \'alued his advice and his military experience, Washingcon "''lls the logical choice to head the Continental Army.

I

WAR AND

p""'· '77'-''''

How did the WQr unfold?

Each stde m•nally "''On tmportant Vlccones 10 the North. West of che Appalachians, revolutionary forces pi\."Vailed M'Cr t he British and their Indian allies. Ho"''· C'ler, it was the American and French viccory at Yorkco"''ll in 1781 that decided the war and gained British recognition of American independence.

In March 1776 che Britis h evacuated Bosco n and mo\·ed south co New York, which they "'i shed to use as a base for lilt Norlll. 1776-1778 conquering New England. Under cwo brothers, General \'1./illiam Howe and Admiral Richard, Lord HO'I'-\!, 130 "''llrships carried 32,000 troops to New York City in che summer of 1776. Defending the city were 18,000 poor!}' trained soldiers under Washingcon. On August 27, J 5,000 British croops ncar!}' annihilated 10,500 American t roops o n Long Island, just across the ri..\!r from New York City. Bur Washington executed a masterly night cvacuacion, saving 9,.500 t roops and most of his artillery from capture. In mid~Sepcember t n6 che Continental Army numbered 16,000 men. Ow~r che next three months che British killed or took prisoner one-quarter of t hese t roops and dro\'e che survivors across New Jersey. By carl}' December, when Washington re· treated fro m New Jersey inco Penns}1vania, he commanded fewer chan 7,000 men 6t for duty. With the British "'ithin striking distance of Philadelphia. Washington took the offensi\\! be-fore military and national morale coUaps...--<1. O n Christmas night t n6 he atracked a Hessian garrison at Tftncon, New Jersey, and captured nearly 1,000 Germans "'ith the loss of only 4 men. On January 3, 1777, Washingcon attacked l'rinceton, New Jersey, killing or capturing one-third of his I ,200 Bricis h opponents and losing only 40. The American victories ac Trenton and Princeto n had important consequences. Firsc, they boosted civilian and milicary morale. Second, they under· mined the HoW'CS' plans to rall)' IO)'llliscs and skeptics to Britain's cause and forced the Bricish e\'acuation of New Jersey in early l 7n. New Jersey's milicia meanwhile drm\! thousands of New )erst}' IO)'llliscs, who had been plundering W hig property. into B rirish~h tld Ne"'•York, where many joined the RO)'lll Army. The New jersey militia became a police force dedicated to rooting out political dissenc. ltdisarmed knO'A'llloyalists,jailed their leaders, and consrand}' watched s uspecced Tories. Facing constant danger of arrest, most loyalists who re· mained in New Jersey bo"''Cd co che inevitable and swore allegiance co che Continen· tal Congress. Shortly after the batdes of Trenton and l"rin ccton, the Marquis de L.afaycrce (mu-KEE dr:h l ah-fay~ETI), a )'Oung French aris tocrat, joined Washingcon's staff.

Slllftinl Fortunes in

Primary Source: VV...shington Crossing the Delaware

TreMoll New jer.rc"y b.lttk where Wuhington wok a tbou.und Ht.Ssim priS~.meD on Christma.s Night, 1776; ~tal to imp~ tvtion.ll mor.ale

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123

BRI11SI-I NORTI-I AMERICA

(CANADA)

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Map 6.1 The War in tilt Nortll, mS-17111 During the e:orty yNn of the w.u, most of the fighting took pbce &om Philadelphi:o northw.ud.

Lafa)'trte 'A'llS rwcnty )'tars old, idealistic, brave, infectiously opcimistic- a nd closel}' connected to the French court. His arrival indicated thac France might recognize Am erican independence and declare war on Britain. HO'I"\...,...er, che French firsc wanced proof that the Americans could win a major batcle. Thac victor}' came quick!}'· In summ er 1777 the British planned a rwc>pronged actack to crush New York State and isolate New England. 1\vo British columns, one from Montreal and the other from Quebec, were to link up ncar Alban)'. Noching ~A>cntaccording co British plans. 1'he firsc British column, mO\ing south from Montreal under Lieurenanc Colonel Barry St. Leger, encountered a Continental

lnteracti\•e Map: The War in the North, l n6-1779

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124

CHAPtER 6

SECURING INOtPt.NOENCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

I

s.nt.p Amtrieln vittory in 1n1 th.lt nmrinad tht Frmcb to Jupport tbt rt'*'l:llutiomrie:c

V.IIty ......

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Winttrampor

Contintnul Army, 11n- In8; 1.111t of lo-T.St point:c ofW'M

force holding a chokepoint at Fore Stanwix. Unable co defeac che rebels after a thr«:· week siege, the British recreated north. Mean"'ilile, the second British column, led by General j ohn BurgO)'tle, became stranded in W\'Stem N ew York, his supply lines m-erextended and his 8 ,300 croops depleted by combat and hunger. General Horatio Gates of che Continental Ann)' gathered a force of 17,000 rebels and anacked Bur· goyne near Saratoga. Burgoyne's troop~ surrounded and outnumbered, surren· deredon Ocrober 17, 1777. Saracoga was che war's rurning point, as important diplomatically as militarily. Already pro-American and favorabl)' impressed by che shr~-d diplomacy of Benja· min Franklin as American ambassador, che French court reccived news of che vicrory at Saracoga as proof chat che Americans could win the war and chus desen-ed d iplo· marie recognition. In February 1778 f rance formally recognized the United States. Four months Later, France: "''em to "''llr "'ith Britain. Spain and Holland ultimatel)' joined che "''llr as French allies. The colonies' allies made their presence fete. Bct\1/een tn9 and 1781 Spanish troops prevented the British fro m caking the Mississippi Valley, and beginning in 1781 French croops contributed to rebel victories. Moreover, Bricain sent thousands of soldiers to Ireland and the West Indies to guard againsc a f rench invasion, further stretching already depleced manpo\I.I'Cr reser'les. The French and Spanish navies, which together approximatel)' equaled the British fl«c, won st\-erallarge bactles and punccure:d the Royal Nary·s blockade. In late August l7n British General Ho"'" landed eighteen thousand troops near Philadelphia. Wich Washington at their head and Lafayette at his side, sixt«n thousand Continentals paraded through che imperiled city. The armies collided on September II, l 7n, ac Brand)wine: Creek, Pennsylvania. After the Continentals crumbled in the face of superior Bricish discipline, Congress fl ed Philadelphia, allowing Howe to occupy it. In early October Howe de-feated the: Americans a second cime, at GermantO\\-'n. In four blood)' "'-eeks 20 percent of the: Continentals \I.I'Cre killed, wou nded, or capcured. In December l7n the: elcwn thou· sand Continental survivors marched to their "'inter headquarters at Vall t)' Forge, chilled to the bone and shore e\·en of shoes. Washington later recalled, "You might ha\-e cracked the arm}' from White Marsh to Valley Forge by the blood of their feet;'' As the: British rested comfortably in Philadelphia, eight«n miles awa)', the Conti· nemals huddled, exhausted and hungry, in crude: hurs.. The army slo"'tfy regained irs strengch but still lacked training. Ac Saratoga the Americans had enjoyed 0\'crwhelming numbers. But meeting HO\\--e on an C'\\':n basis, che Continentals had lost badly- N ice:. 1'he: kC)' skills of marching and maneu\-ering "-\':re nonexistent. Then in February 1778 a German soldier of forcune: and drillmaster, Friedrich \'On Steuben, reached Valley Forge:. An administrative ge:· nius and immensel)' popular with an am:u.ing ability to s\I.I'Car forcefull)' in several languag~ he alm ost singlehandcdl)' turned the: U.S. anny into a formidable fight· ing fo n::e:. j usc how formidable became d ear in june 1778 at Monmouth Coun House, New jersey. lhe batcle: blazed fo r six hours, with the Conrinencals thro"'ing back Britain's finest troops. The British fi nally bro ke off contact and slipped away under CO\'et of darkness. NC'\-e:r again would chey win easy victories against the Continen· tal Ann)'·

12 6

CHAPtER 6

SEC\HUMG IM OtPt.NOEMCE, D EFINING N ATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

expeditions had burned most Chero kee towns and forced the: Cherokees to cede: most of their lands in So uth Carolina and large cr.tcrs in Norch Carolina and 1Cn· nessee. Kenrucky saw fierce fighting as rebels under Colonel George Rogers Clark es· tablished concrol of the: Ohio Rh·er Valley from Pittsburgh to che Mississippi after defeating both the Bricish and Naci\J'C Americans. In the Ease, pro-British Iroquois under the gifted Moha....-k leader joseph Brant devastated the Ne"'' York and P€nnsylvania frontiers in Jn8. General john Sullivan led a Continental force:, "'ith Tuscarora and Oneida allies, against the Iroquois. VKtorious at "'ilac is now Elmira, New York, in 1779, Sullivan and his forces burned rwodoun lr· oquois villa~s and dc:stroycd a million bushd s of corn. The Iroquois fled north co Canada, and hundreds starved to death. Sullivan had d escroycd the heartland of che: Iroquois; che:ir population dedined by one-third during the RC\olutionat}' War.

After I 778 che British focus shifted to che Souch. France: and Spain's entry had embroiled Britain in an interna · lilt Soutll. 1778-1781 tional struggle that raged from India to Gibraltar and from the: Wesc Indies to the North American mainland. If che British co uld secure the South, they co uld easily shuffle: forces between the: \'('esc Indies and the main· land. And the South looked like an easy target: Clinton expected a souchern invasion to tap a huge reservoir of loyalist support. Bricish scrategy called for scizing key souchern pons and, aided by loyal militiamen, moving back norch, pacifying one: rt:· gion after anocher. At 6rst the plan unfOlded smoothl}'· Sailing from New York with 4,000 men, General dinton captu red Charles 1b"''tl, South Carolina, in May 1780. He left the: mopping~up o peration to Lord Charles Cornwa!U.s. Clinton's miscalculation of loyalist strength rapidly became apparent. Southern 1brics used the Bricish occupa· tion to take: revenge for their harsh treatment under rebel rule, and patriots scruck back. 11le: war engulfed the: IO""-·er South and became: intensely personal, "'ith indi· viduals choosing sides not fur political reasons but fur sjmple revenge. The: souchern campaign also sparked a rene:W'Cd exodus ofsla\·es; 25,000 Georgia and South Carolina sla\J'Cs soughc freedom in Bricish-hdd territory. The British had no intention of emancipating sla\J'Cs and made t:\-e:ry efforc to rctum them to chcir O'A'tlers. Nonetheless, fear of sla\J'C rebellion caused many former loyalists to abandon their Bricish tics and "''Ckome che rebd s' return co poY~er. Meanwhile, battles between British troops and Continental regulars led co a string of Continental de:fe:ars.. America's "''Orst loss of the entire war came at Cam· den, -South Carolina, in August 1780. General Horatio Gates's co mbined fo rce: of professionals and militiamen faced Cornwallis's army. 11le militiamen fled after the: 6rst volley, and the badl}' outnumbered Continentals "''Cre overrun. Washington scm General Nathanael Greene: co co nfront Cornwallis. Under Grce:ne, the rebels lose three major battles in 1781 but "''On the: campaign nonetheless. Greene ga\-e: the: patriot militiamen the protection chat they needed co hunc dO""-·n IO)'llliscs, stretched British suppl}' lines until chey snapped. and inflicted heavy casualties. Greene's dogged resistance fo rced Cornwallis to abandon che Carolina backcountr}' and co lead his battered troops into Virginia. Still secure in New York, dinton wanced Cornwallis to rctum to Charles Town, but Corn.,.,'llllis established a base: at Yorktown, Virginia, where che York and James

Aalerlcan VictQry in

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Briti$h gmtral •flost sui'Tt'ockr at York.town in l781 df~ly mdtd I«Yalution;uy W.ar

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Map 63 Tht War in lilt Soutll, 1778-1781 The South wu the 5-etting for the

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dea,.n,.e ph;~.5C': ol the w.u, culmin:u:ing in the Bo-i!Uh

5U~nder :u Yorktown

in October 1781.

ri\-ers empty into Chesapeake: Ba)'· He hoped to fan out into Virginia and 1\-:nnsylvania but nC"t-er got the chance. On August 30, 1781, a French fleec dropped anchor and Landed croops ncar Yoria own. Lafayette joined them, and Washington led his Concine:ntal Army souch to righce:n che noose. Trapped and besieged at York· town, Corn"''llllis's 6,000 troops surrendered co 8,800 Americans and 7,800 French on October 19, 1781.

"Oh God!" lord North exclaimed on hearingofYorktown. "It's aU O\'er." Indeed, Cornwallis's surrender had e:xtin· guis hed Britain's O\'ertaxcd people's will to figh t and forced the go\-ernme:nt to begin peace negotiations. Talks opened in Paris in june

lnteracti\•e Map: TheWar W'I the SO<J1h, 1178-1781

Primary Source: Socioeconomic

Profie of Loyalist Oaimants

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tnifial ruu nW oft he war wuco fOught mainly in fhe Norfh, with mixed 1'6ulu . T he Ameri ~n victory ;u Sar:uop repcesentC'd a major turning poin t, b«aUSC" it dreY~ thco funch into the w;u on the AmC"-rieans' .side. Su ~ in the W~t al~d the tt'\'Oimionu ies to daim the MiJ:si.s:sipp i ;u: their wut· ern boundary.

tn 1178 thco focuJ oft he war shifted to the South. litrt; the BritiJh wo n incond w M victories and wen- then foi'I:C'd to :su rn-.nd« at Yori:tOINU. T ht T ruty ol'P:ui:s of 1783 t nded thco w;~.r and confi rmt d the ind ependenet of the eolon ic:s.

1782, with j ohn Adam~ Benjamin f ranklin, and john ) a}' as America's principal diplomats. Military realities largel)' d ictated the terms of the peace macy. Britain rocog· nized American independence and promised the evacuation of aUrO)'lll troops from U.S. soiL The British had little choice but to award the new nation the vase cerritory cast of the Mississippi, for by I 783 rw~ncy chousand Anglo-American setdct'S lh·ed wesc of the Appalachians, and George Rogct'S Clark's victories had gi.,.~n Americans control of the Northwest. The settlement- the Peace of Paris- favored the United States but left some problems unresolved In a separate treaty Britain transferred East and West Florida back to Spain, but the d esignated boundaries ~A'Cre ambiguous. Further, although the United S tates prom ised to urge state legislatures to co mpensate loyalists fo r property losses, several states would later refuse to comply. Completely left out of the tre-aty- a nd on their own- were the Naciw Americans ~Ailo had su pported the British. Indian leaders were outraged; many d id not ack no~A•ledge the new nation's sm·~rcigncy owr their territor}'· Independence carried a heavy price. Ac least S percent of free males- white, black, and Na tiw American- aged sixteen to forty·fi\'t: had died fighting the British. And che peace left two important issu es u nsectled: what kind o f society the United States would become and what sort of gm-ernmenc it wo uld possess.

THE REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE How did the W4r affec.t relationships among Americans ofdi{fftrent c./asses~ and g6nders?

races~

1U:o forces sha ped the Rcvolucion's social effocrs: the principles arciculated in the Declaration o f Independence and the dislocations caused by the war. These fac· tors co mbined to force questions of class, gender, and race into public discussion. l'opular atcirudes about the rights of non-elite white men and of white women and the fucure: o f slavery sh ifted somewhat. Excepc for slai,!'CS in norchem state:~ there was little prospect of substanth't: change in their status; nt:\'erthdess, che discus· sions ensured chat these issu es ~A'Ould be debated in the future. HO'I'-\'!'\-er, for Nath't: Ameri can~ the Re"lolution was a step backward.

Betw't'tn 1700 and I 760 social relations be~-een dites and common people had grown more formal, discanc, and re· Among White Met1 strained. Members o f the colonial gentr}' lh·ed su mptu· ously to emphasiu: thcir posicion. By rhe late 1760s, howe\-er, man}' in the upper class ~A'ere ~A'Caring homespun clothing in supporcof boycotrs of Bricish goods. When the Virginia planters organized militia companies in 1775, they dressed in plain hunting shires so that even che poorest farmer wo uld not find his humble a ppear· ance too embarrassing for him to enlist. Elites maintained the a ppearance, if noc the subs tance~ of cqualicy. The war accelerated the erosion of dass differences b)•forcing gencry-of6cers co respect ordinar}' men serving as privates. Indeed, che soldiers d emanded to be: created

EplltariMism

I Tht RtvOtunOH Af(O SOat.t OfANGE

129

with consideration, especially in light of the ringing statem ent of che Oecfaracion of Independence chac "all men are creaced equaL'" The men who expected officers co recognize: cheir V.'Orth as individuals carried their new sclf~cecm and insistence: on respecc back imo civilian lifr. Personal pride gradual!)' cranslared into political brhavior and bdicfs, and candidate-s took care not to scorn che common people. Thr war thus fundamentally dcmoaati:zcd Americans' political assumptions. 11le gmtr}"s scnsr of social rank also diminished as they m« men ~Ailo rose through ability and observed middle-class farmers and artisans han· dling duties previous!)' thought abol.~t thcir station. In shon, revolurionat}'· generarion Americans insisted thac virrue and sacrifice, not \l'f~alth , defined worth. They came to sec the "natural aristocracy"- those ......no demonstrated fimess for gM~tm ment service by their personal accomplishments-as ideal candidates for political office. This natu· raJ aristocracy included self-made men such as lknjamin Franklin. The wealthy could scill br elected to office, but not if they fla unted thcir wealth. This new empha.Us on equality did noc extend to propenytcss men, women, or non~Ailites, but it undermined the assumption that birth and ~A'l'aith confc:rrcd a special claim to public office:. Nor did che war change che distribution of wealth in che nation.: thr American uppc:r class seems to h:l'V'C ()\!,' ned about as much ofche national wealch in 1783 as it did in 1786.

White: women broadened cheir involvement in the: anti· Bricish cause:, creating a wide range ofaccivities during t he war. Female "camp fOllowers;" many of them soldiers' wives, cookrd,laundered, and nursed the wounded fur both sidrs. A few women disguised chemsdves as men and joined che fighting. Women who remained at ho me managed familie-s, housrholds, farms, and businrs.srs on chcir own. Despitr-and becausr of-enormous struggles, women gainrd confidence: in chcir ability co chink and act on mactcrs tradicionally reserved for men. Although ~A
Women in w.time

Whitt

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130

OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

The wartime condition ofAfrican-Americans concradicced the ideals of equality and jus· rice for which Americans fought. About 500,000 black persons, composing one-6fth of the total population, inhabited che United States in 1776. AU bur 25,000 were: slaves. Free blacks could not \'Ote, liw~d under curfews, and Lacked che guarantees of equal justice afforded co t\'en rhe poorest white criminal. The war ne\·ertheless presented new opporruniries co African-Americans. Some slaw~s cook advancage of che confusion of ~A'llr to run off and pose as fr«men. A I775 ban on black soldiers was collapsing by 1777. All states buc Georgia and South Carolina c.vcnrually recruited blacks. Approximately 5,000 African-Americans, mainly from che North, served in the Continental Army. Most were slaves serving with their mas· cers' consent, usuall}' in radall}' integrated units. Manpower demands, not a white commitment to equal jus· dee, largely opened chese opportunities. In fact, until the mideighteenth cencury, most in che \'('estern ~A'Orld sawslaV\'.ry as part of the nacural order. By che 1760s, however, some American opposition to slaV\'.ry had blossomed. 1'he Quakers led che wa}'i by ln9 most Quaker sl aveo~A'tlers had freed their slaves. The Declaration of Independence's broad assertion ofnarural rights and human equality spurred a Larger actack on sla\'ety. By 1804 all the stares from l'r:nnsylvania nonh, except New Hampshire, had begun phasing out slavery. The andslavery movtmmt rdlocced the Enlighcenmenc's emphasis on gradual change. By priming public opinion to fa\·or a weakening of the insticucion over rime, leaders sought to bring about its dem ise. Most state abolition laws provided fo r gradual emancipation, typically declaring free: all childr~:cn born of a slave woman after a certain date, ofcen july 4. Furthermore, re\'Oiutionary leaders did not press for decisive action against slavery in the Souch, where the institution was embedded in the economy. Although slaV\'.ry gnawed at Whig consciences evecn in the Souch, no state south of l'r:nnsylvania abolished slavery. Most, ho\IJ'C\o-er, passed Laws making it easier co free slaves. Be~-een 1775 and 1790 the number of free: blacks in Virginia and Mat}'· land rose from 4,000 to 21,000, or about 5 percent of all African-Americans residing there. These .. fre:e persons of color" faced a furu.re of destitution and second-
A Revolullon lor IUadl AmericMs

P~illis WIINtlty. Alrica~n-A~Wric••

Pott

Though :. slaV\':, Wh.c:atley w.n the but-k"own poec in A.meric:;a :.c the time of the RC'YOiu tion. Oupite her hme, she died i:n po\'l'rty in 1784 .

-..., ..0pposirion eo sbvery tb.tt btg;an sl.,.ty during rt'*'l:lhl·

1riomry period

I

Tht RtvOtunOH Af(O SOat.t OfANGE

131

One: of the most prominenc free blacks co emerge during the Rc"'olutionary pc· riod was Prince Hall of Boston. After gaining his freedom in 1770, Hall took a leadingrole: among Boston blacks protesting slavery. During che war he fonne:d a separate African-American Masonic lodge:, initiating a movcmmt that spread co other north· ern communities and became an imporcanc source of community support for black Americans. In 1786 he petitioned the Massachusetts legislature for support of a plan thac would enable interested blacks "to rerum to Africa, our native countr}' ... where we shalllr.-e among our equals and be: more comforcable and happy than we can be: in our present sicuation:'' later activists ~A
Revolutionary ideology held out at least abscract hope for African-Americans and ~A'Omm , buc it made no proYisions for chc many Indians who soughc co maintain political and cultural independence:. Moreover, in an m--erwhdmingl}' agrarian society, the Revolution's promise of equal economic opportunity for all set the sta~ for cerrito· rial expansion be:)'Ond settled areas, chereby threatming Indian lands. Evm where Indians retained land, che influx of seeders posed dangers in the form of deadly diseases, farming practices hoscile: to Indian subsis· tmce, and alcohoL Indians were all the more vulnerable because: d uring Eg.aliu.ri.:mi$m 0\mong whirt mO\k.s in«t.:1$td ;u a !'e.'ult of tbt WO\r. the wars bctWem 1754 and 1783, their population east of the Mississippi The- WO\r offion-d (r« A(.ri ~n · had fallm by about half, and man}' .,;ua~s had been uprooted. In the: face of these uncertainties, Natiw Americans continued co in· corporate: aspects of European culture into their lives. From the: carl}' co· lonial period, they had adopted Europe-an-made: goods of cloth, metal, and glass while: retaining some: of their cradirional doching, tools, and weapons. Indians also panidpated in the American economy b}•occasionally working for ~A'llgcs or selling food, craft items, and other produces. Thus Nari\-e Americans did not hold srubbornly to traditional ways, buc chcy did insist on retaining concrol of their communities and ways of life. In the RC\o'Oiution's aftcrmach, it remained doubtful that the new na· tion would accommodate Native Americans on these cenns.

Americaru .somt gairu in opporrunifi<."$ and righr,:, but mosc ~td 0\ futun- orun«.naincy and $tCOnd•d.lu citin n$hip.

,uu

No"h«n ,:tatu pcovidtd (o.r tbt and 0\n anti$l~ry lnO\'tmcnt beg;an. \'(lomen built on thtir conrributionJ du.ring tht w;u ro pby 0\ largtr publicrok Native American,: we.n- ltft- in ;m ambiguow 0\nd thrutencd po$ilion. C\"-nru~ end of $)aw ry,

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132

OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

FORGING

NEW GOVERNMENTS,

1776-1787

I-Iow did Am,-icans tnmslate fl1VO!utionary principles into effective gowrnments? Despite their unity against British authority, the revolutionaries differed sharply among chemseio.-es O\'et bask questions of social and political order. Elite republicans feared democracy as «mob rule;'' and urban workers feared char elites profited at their expense. Rural colonists empha.Uzed decencralization of power. The revolutionaries' early actempts at creacing stare and national governments rdlecced these: conflicts.

l'olitical conflicts within the nc"'' states magnified the prewar struggle between more: radical democratic elements stales and elices who wanted co minimize popular participation. While the new state constitutions retained colonial precedents favoring che wealchy elites, they also laid the foundations for republican gowrnment in America. In establishing che revolutionary state g()I.'Crnments, the patriots relied heavil}' on che colonial experience. For example, most fa\'Ored bicameral lcgislacures. Colo· nial legislatures in che ro)'al provinces had consisted of two houses: an appointed upper chamber (council) and an elected lo~A'cr chamber (assembly). l 'hese rn'O·part legislatures resembled Parliamenc's division into che House of Lords and the House: of Commons, and S}'lllboliud the assumption that a gowrnment should represent aristocrats and commoners separately. Eleven of the thirteen new legislatures in the: 1780s ....-ere: bicameral. Likewise. few questioned the long-standing practice of setting property requirements for votcrs and elected officials. Property O~A'llership, most people argued. enabled \'Oters and officeholders to chink and act independently. Americans generally agreed, too, that their elected represcncaciVI.'S should exercise independenc judgment racher than simply cart}' ouc the popular will. l 'he idea of political parties as instruments for identifying and mobilizing public opinion 'A'llS alien co the: Revolmionary era, which equated parties with ..factions"- selfish groups that advanced chcir interests at che expense: of the: public good. Candidates cam· paigne:d on che basis of their reputation and quali6cations, not the issues. In gen· e:ral, they did not present voters with a clear choice between policies calculated co benefit rival interest groups. Thus votcrs did not know how candidates stood on spedfic issues and found it hard co influence government actions. As in the: colonial era. most legislative d istricts were bicameral, and most were divided equally among all counties or towns, regardless of population d istribution. A minority of\'Otcrs normally elected a majority of assemblymen. l 'he most radical constitution, l:trcnnsylvania•s, tried to establish election d istricts roughly equal in population so that a minority of \'Oters could nor elect a majority of legislators. Nine: states reduced property requirements for \'Oting. but none: abolished them. In most states the majority of officeholders continued to be appointed. The pcrsistence: of these fuarures should not obscure the: pathbreaking naru.re of the state: constitutions. First. their adoption required raci6cation by che people. Second, chey could be: changed only by popular \'Ote. Abm--e aU, counter to the Brit·

"'- Colc*es to

strte c.astibrtiHs Writtl'o

l

fnmt"Vo'Cirlu ofgOIII':I'nmmttlw.t ddintd the people' .u III(M'ftign

ish view of a constitucion as a body of customary practices, the: scare constitutions

W\'.re "'rittrn compacts that defined and limited rulers' powers. As a final check on go'lemmcm power, the revolutionary constitutions contained bills of rights outlin· ing fu ndamental freedoms beyond go\-ernme:m concrol. GO\>crnmmts ~A'Ould no longer sen-e as the final judge ofchc constitutionality of their activities. Contrary to political elites' predilections, chc imperial crisis of chc 1760s and I nOs had pulled them into a democratic tide. The assemblies, the mosc dem ocratic parrs of colonial gMwnmcnt, had led the 6ghr against British policy. Colonists had cmbarla~d on chc Revolution dreading executive officeholders and convinced that they could not crust f:'\ 't:O elected governors. lheir recent experience seemed to con· firm chac those in poW'tr tended to become corrupt or dictatoriaL According!)', the state consticutions scrictly limited executive po~A'Cr. In most staces the gM>crnor became an d ecced official, and elections were held far more fre. quendy than before-usual!)' e\-ery rear. In the majority of stat~ legislatures, not go'lemors, appointed judges and ocher offidals. Stripped of the 'ICto and most ap· pointiw pO\l-ers, go\-emors became figureheads. Having W'takened the execuci\J'C branch and \'eStcd mon: pO\l-er in che legisla· tur~ the state constitutions also made the legislaru.res more responsive to the ~Aill of the people. NO\l•here could che governor appoint che upper chamber. Eight states aliO""-\!d \'Oters co select bolb houses of the legislaru.re. l'tnnsylvania and Georgia abolished the upper house and subsciruted a unicameral (onecrnment would be entrusted to leaders chosen for their talents and wisdom. Most republicans believed that gm-ernment should balance the interests of different classes to pre\-ent any one group from gaining absolute PO\l'er. 11lcy also rejected monarchy- having blasted o ne king in the Declaration of Independence, they were not about to enthrone another. Nonechdess, republicans had difficuhy recondling their preference for strong. dite leadership with most Americans' pervash-e d istrust of executi'le f>O""'tr. Initially, elites had to accept state gm-emmems dominated by elected legislatures. Gradually, hO\l't\'tr, ~A'CJI-to·do landO\l'ners, m erchan~ and la"'ytrs reasserted their desire for centralized authority and the policical prerogatives of"'-ealth. For example, in 1780 an elite-dominated convention in Massachusetts pushed through a constitution ~Aith stiff property qualifications for voting and holding office and a strong go\>crnor ~Aith considerable appointment and veto po~Au Georgia and l'tnn· sylvania had f\.·•wrted to bicameral legislatures b}' 1790. Other states raised propert}' qualifications for the upper chamber to mah room for men of ..\'trlSdom, remark· able ince:grit)', or chat Weight which arises from property:" Troubled far less by differences among social dasses and restrictions o n the expression of popular ~Aill than by che prospect of cyranny, some elites nevertheless feared chat deep-seated and permanent sodal divisions could jeopardize republican liberty. In Virginia benwen 1776 and 1780, 11lomasjefferson drafted a series of bills to promote equality.

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l

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OfAPlER 6

SEC\HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, D EFINING N ATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

These rears also witnessed che end of most state-established churches. Religious!)' conservaci\J'C New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts resisted this reform unti11817, 1818, and 1833, respectivel)~ but in f.'\~rystate where che Anglican church ~A'llS established, su ch starus was abolished by 1786. jefferson•s Starute fo r Religious f reedom (1786) resoundingly defended religious freedom. "1ruch is great," he proclaimed, .,and will prevail if left to itsdf:'' In 1782 Thomas Paine wrote that the American Re\'Oiution 'A'llS intended co ring in "a new era and give a new tum co human affairs." In this ambitious declaration, Paine expressed che heart of the republican ideal: that d/1 political inscirutions would be judged by ~A•hecher they served che public good, noc the interests of a po~A'· erful few. More than anything else, this way of chinking made American policies revolutionary.

Americans' first national gOIJ'Crnment retleal, nor could it regulate ince:rstace: or O\'et'Seas commerce:. The Arcides prMided for no exe:cuci\J'C branch. Rather, congressional committees O\~rsa~A' fi nancial, diplomatic, and militar}' affairs. Nor was chere a judicial sysce:m by which the national gOIJ'Crn· ment could co mpel allegiance: to its laws. Disputes 0\J'Cr state claims to ~A'eStcrn lands, chcir co ntributions to Congress, and their representation delayed racificacion of the Articles for four )~ars. Only in February 1781- six months before: Cornwallis's su rrender at Yorktown- d id the last state, Mar)1and, agree ro ratification.

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AAde of c.fHIRti.• First Amtriu.n narional gwemmmt;

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l'r.rhaps the greatest challenge facing che Confederation was putcing the nation on a sound financial footing. Win· llldllle~. ning che war cosc $ 160 million, far more chan taxation 1781- 1786 could raise. The government borroW'Cd fro m abroad and printed paper money, called continentals. But from I 776 to 1791 lack of public faith in the gOIJ'Crnmenc d estrO)'ed 98 percent of che continentals' value- an inflationar}' disaster. Congress turned to Robert Morri~ a v.-ealchy Philadelphia merchant who be
Fllllnte, Trade.

In 1783, hoping to panic t he countr}' inco creating a regular source of national revenue, Morris and New York congressman Alexander Hamilton engineered a dangerous gamble, later known as the Newburgh Conspiracy. They secretly persuaded some army officers, encamped at Newburgh, New York, co threaten a coup d'Ccat unless che treasur}' obtain ed the caxation authority necessary to raise: funds for their pay, which was months late. George Washington forestalled the conspiracy by ap· pealing to his officers' honor. When peace came in 1783, Morris found it impossjble to fund che gow~rn ment adequately. After New York blocked another congressional tax measure sent co t he states, state comribucions co Congress fell steadil)'· By the lace 1780s t he states lagged 80 percent behind in pro...iding the funds chat Congress requested Nor could t he Confederation pr}' trade concessions fro m Britain. Before independence, New England had depended heavily on e:xporcs to che West Indies. After independence, Britain had slapped strict limitations on U.S. commerce, all~·i ng British shippers to increase their share of t he Adancic trade at American expense. This loss of trade contributed co an economic depressjon t hat gripped the nation beginning in 1784. New Englanders suffered gread}' in these hard times. While facing high caxes to pay off war debts, they also confronted tightening credit and t he loss of major O\'U· seas markets and C'\-cn whaling grounds. Despite opening new rouce:s and smug· gling, by 1791 che number of seamen in fishing and ~Ailaling had fallen by more chan 40 percent. Southerners also faced major problems as t he marke:cs for tobacco and rice failed to rebound to their pri!War levels. As a result chey ~A'Cre left with thousands of undere:mplored slave Laborers.. On che other hand. mid-Atlantic farmers acrually gl\.""' more prosperous fro m exporting grain co famine-stricken areas of Europe, and the region quickly rec()'IJ'Cre:d from the Re\-olution•s ravages.

The postwar settlement and administration of western lands posed anocher formidable challenge: to the new go\-ernment. Settlers and speculators W'tre: determined to 1785-1787 possess chese: lands, and Native Americans were equal!)' determined to keep them ouc. Ac t he same time, Britain and Spain sought tocomain the new nation•s territorial expansion. After the states surrendered claims to more than 160 million acres nonh of t he Ohio Rh-er, Congress, in che Ordinance of178S,established uniform procedures for surveying the region. The law made the basic unit of se:td emenc a township six miles square:, subdivided into chirty·six seccions of 640 acres each, ~Aith o ne seccion rescn-ed as a source of income for public schools. A subsequent law, the North\11-est Ordinance of 1787, defined t he land nonh of t he Ohio Riwr as che Norch~A'CSt Ter· ritory, pnwidcd for its later division into state:~ and forbade slavery in che territor}'· The Norch~A'CSt Ordinance outlined chre:e steps for admitcing states to the Union. Firsc, Congress would appoint a territorial go\-ernor and judges. Second, as soon as 6\-t thousand adult males lived in a terriror}', the people ~A'Ould write a tem porary constitucion and elect a legislature. Third, when the populacion reached sixty thousand. t he seed ers \\o'Ould wrice: a state constitucion, which Congress \\o'OUid apprm-e before granting statehood.

N..Hrgh CoaspiriCJ 11nutrntd mutiny that sho-d haw dt.eply somt V.'tl'l' roooemtd about wukom; or n.u:ional gcn>trntnc'nt

Primary Source: Gouverneur Morris VVams Against Democratic Revolution

Tilt c.ledel'llion a.JibeWest.

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OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

The Ordinance of 1785 and the NonhW\'.sc Ordinance became the Confederation's major contributions co American life.1'he)'Set the principles for surveying the frontier, allowed territorial sdf-go\·crnment at an carl)' stage: of scctlemmt, and pro· vided reasonable standards for statehood. 1"'hey became models for organizing terri· tories west of the Mississippi River and established precedmts for banning sla\-ery from certain territories. The North\l-est1trritory offered enough rich land to guarancee future citizens landownership, thus satisfying the republican belief that opening che West would prcvcnc che rise, cast of che Appalachians, of a I~ class of te:nam farmers and poor laborers lacking the property needed to \'Ote. Such a development would poison pol· itics through da.ssconflictand undermine republican equality. HO\l'CWr, standing in the wa}' of su ch republican dreams W\'.re some 150,000 Nariw Americans already in· habicing the \l'CStcrn territories and struggling co preserve chcir "''llY of life. At postwar creaty negotiations, U.S. commis· sioners told Native Americans, "You arc a subdued people.... We claim the country by conquest."' Un· der threat of continued warfare, some Indian leaders initial!)' yielded. T hrough creacies the Iroquois lost abouc half their land in New York and ~nns)tf· vania,and the De:la\l'llres and Sha\l'tlets were obliged to recognize American sovereignty owr their Lands. But most Indians repudiated che treaties, denying that their negotiators had che authority to gi"e up their nations' lands. 1"'he Indians' re:sjstance also scemmed from their confidence that the British \l'Ould pro'tide the anns necessar}' to defy the Americans. Bricain had refused co abandon SC\'tn forcs along che nation's northwestern froncier, ostensibly because 1brics re· mained uncompensated for property losses. In April 1784 che British colonial office sccrecl)' ordered Canada's governor to hold omo the forcs, hoping to rttsmblish Britain's claim to the Norch\l'CSt Territory. 1"'he Mohawk joseph Brant inicially sought co lead Indian resistance to white: settlement. Coura· geous, skilled in diplomacy, and \l'CII educated, he organized the northwestern Indians into a military alliance in 1786 to kttp ouc " thite se:td ers. But Brant and his followers, who had relocated be)'Ond Ameri· can reach in Canada, could not win support from Nath-e Americans on U. S. soil. Militia raids launched by Kentuckians and ochers gradually fo rced the In· 1ostp11 Bnllt.l>y Cill>trt SW.rt. 1186 d ian evacuacion of southern Indiana and Ohio. In The youthful Moh;t\'oi( luderw:~s ;t s~uneh ;tlly of thoe British spring 1788, some fifty New Englanders sailed do'A'tl during the Revol:ution;tryW;tr, ;u~d thel'\';~~fter rnill'ted U.S. the Ohio R.i\'CT in a bulletproof barge symbolical!)' exp;tnsiOtl in the Northwest. named the Md)'flOU't'r to found the town of Marietta.

A few months later a second group oflatter-day pilgrims established a sctdemem on the Ohio at the site of modern Cincinnati. The Confederad on faced similar problems in the Southeast, ~Ailere Spain and its Indian allies worked to block American encroachmenc on their land. The Spanish Air.uoder Mteihoy c.,.. found an ally in the shrewd Creek leader Alexander McGUUvray. who 'A'llS deter· k:.dtt dttermintd 10 ~tain his mined to regain Creek territory held by Georgia. McGillivray negotiated a secret peoplr 's tttritory treaty with Spain chat promised che Creeks weapons to protect chemseto.·es "from the Bears and other fierce Animals:'' In 1786, after Creeks expelled occupants of the disputed lands, Georgia quickly accepted McGillivray's offer of a cease·firc. Individu.ll st:n u, in dr.lfting their The Spanis h also attempted to pre\·ent American infiltration by den}'· .stlt t constitutioru,sc•nd ;u work· ing western sctders pennission to ship crops down t he Mississippi Rh·er shops for tfwo aeo:.u ion of neY~ rtpub· li ~n forrru ofp"-mmc"nt. co New Orleans. After t he Spanish closed New Orleans to Anglo·American commerce in 1784,j ohn ) a}' ~A'Cnt to Spain co negotiate trading privileges AmeMca.ru m ack thtir ll r.st n.u:ion.ll go'A'rnment undtr the Artidu of ac New O rleans. Although he failed to win concessi on~ he rcrurned with Con kckration ddibeF.ttdy weak, a treaty that opened Spanis h markers to eastern merchants at the price of lt.wing most J'OW"C' ro tht: statu. relinquishing American export rights through New Orleans. In 1786 Con· N.ahon.ll lina.ncu rem.:..in«l shaky, gress rejected chis j ay-Gardoqui Treaty, but westerners and southerners, but prolperic:y recu rn«f quickly to whose imcresrs s~med co hai,!'C been sacrificed to benefi c nort hern com· the mid·Atllntie. merce, felt betrayed. Ttw- Ordin.lntt: of 1785 and Northwen Ordina n« n'pn"lltntC'd tht new Consequently westerners talked openl}' of secession; man}' accepted go'\'<'-mment's major ~piUhmmt. Spanish gold, although most pocketed the badly n~ded cash in exchange Indi.:m ~ist.:mtt and Sp.lin•s do:~· for vague promises of goodwilL As the young Andrew jackson (the future ing of the port at' New Olk.:uu U.S. president) noted, making some arrangement with the Spanish seemed h:.mpc"-nod Amc"ricoans• mc:M"mffit "the only immediate way co obtain peace ~Aith the Savage {Indians)." we.uw:ud.

I

T OWARD A N EW CONSTITUTION, 1786-1788 What wen the pt'in
Thejay-Gardoqui Treary revealed deep·seated tensions be· neath the surface appearance ofAmerican national unity. 1716-1787 New England, which had nC'\o-er rcco\~rcd from the loss of irs West Indies markers, remained mired in che depression thac had begun in 1784. Dominated b)•commercially minded elites, the Massachusetts legislature \-oted in 1786 to pay off its 1\.'"\o-olutionary debt, necessitating a huge tax hike. Compounding

Slllys's Rebelioa.

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138

OfAPlER 6

SEC\HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING N ATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

!hoyt's I.W&oo Upn.;ng by

I

mar:

M.~gchu:sC'tU f.umtrs convinud many Alnc'OOnJ tbtir g"M'ntmnu was toO'IIUk

these difficulties was a shortage: of the: specie (gold and silver coin) demanded b}• bankers, merchants, and cax collectors. Thousands of sma ll famil)' farmers groaned under this cycle: of debt. In contrast, the mid·Adamic and southern states enjored rising prosperity, thanks to increased tobacco and food exports, and were easily pa)ing off their war debts. Despite: this general prosperity, a gro"''ing minority of nationalists were un· happy "''ith the Confude:ratiorL Me:rchancs and shippers "''llnted a strong central gO\'· ernmenc that could secure trading privileges abroad and ensure America's standing in an Atlantic econom}' that was still dominated by Britain. land speculators and u.~stem settlers wanted a more activist policy against Spain, Britain, and Nari\'e: Americans. Urban artisans hoped for a stronger national gO\•ernment that would protect chem from foreign competition by imposing high tariffs. This tindcrbox flared 6rs.t in Massachusetts. Farmers in the u.~stern part of the: state, already struggling with a narrow profit margin and facing demands for pa)'· menc in specie, which they lacked, held public meetings to discuss "the: Suppressing of tyrannical gm~rnmenc.'" l 'his rime:, hD'I'-\....,-e:r, tyranny stemmed from the state: house in Boston. late in 1786, Daniel Shays, a Rt\'Oiutionary War officer and hard· pressed farmer, led two thousand angry men in an attempt to shut down the courts and prcvcnc foreclosures and tax auctions. Although routed by the state: militia, Shays's follo"''Crs won control of the Massachusetts legislature: in 1787, cut taxes, and secured a pardon for Shays. Although Shays•s Rebellion caused litd e: bloodshed and ne:..·er raised a serious threat of anarch)', critics of the: Confederation painted it and similar. less radical mm-ements else".ohe:re as a taste of the disorder to come under the: "''t"ak national gow~m me:nt. By threatening co seize: weapons from a federal arsenal at Springfield, Massachusetts, the Shaysites had unintentionally reminded nationalists how vul· nerable to ..mobocracy'" the: United States had become. Meanwhile, rumors that Spain had offered "''CStcrners export rights at New Orleans if they "''Ould secede from the Union sowed fears that the: United States was on the: \-erge of coming apart. Instead of igniting a popular uprising, Sha)'S's Rebellion encouraged aggressh-e: nationalists co push for wholesale reform of the Republic•s legal and institutional structure:. De: legates from five states had met ac Annapolis, Maryland, intending co discuss "''llys to promote ince:rscate commerce. With chaos looming in Massachu· sec~ they called instead for a general convention co propose amendments to the Ar· rides of Confederation. Congress asked the states co appoint d elegations to meet in Philadelphia

In May 1787 6fty·five delegates, from t\'ety state: but Rhode Island,. began gathering at the: l'r:nnsylvania State: c.ventloll, 1787 House (later called Independence Hall) in Philadelphia. Among chem "''ere men of established reputation-George Washingron, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris- as well as talence:d newcomers, such as Alexander Hamil· ton and james Madison. Most were we:alchy, were in their thirties or forties, and had legal training. Nineteen owned slaves. Most important, they shared a ..continental" or "nationalist" pe:rspccti\-e:. Thirty·nine: had sen-e:d in Congress and knew 6rs.t· hand che: weaknesses of the: Articles. They "''ere cominced that, without a scrong na·

The Pblladelpllia

J lbWArtD A NEW CONSlTTUtlOK, 1786- gS.S

139

donal g~rnmenc, the country would fall victim to foreign aggression or simply disimegrace. The com~ntion immediately d osed its sessions co the press and public and kept no official journal. Chapero nes W\'.re appointed to accompany the aged and calkati\~ Ben Franklin to dinner parcies lest he disclose what was happen· ing. Although chest measures o pened the conwntion co charges chat it was accing undemocracically, even conspira· torially, the delegates tho ughc secrecy essential to ensure freedom ofd ebate. 1"
I

The New Jersey Plan exposed the conwncion•s greatest problem: che quescion of rcpresentation. l 'he Virginia Plan gaw the four largest states- Virginia, Massachu· setts, New York, and Ptnns}ivania- a majority in both houses. The New Jersey Plan aliO'I'-\!d the seven smallest states, wich only 25 percent of che U.S. population, to control Congress. By early j uly the com-cntion was stalemated. To end che impasse, the delegates appointed a «grand committee"' dedicated to compromise. This panel adopted a pro posal by the Connecticut delegation: an equal \'Ote for each scace in the upper house and proportional represcmacion in the lo~A'ct house. The co m·ention accepted che compromise on july 17 and in cwo months 0\'Cl'Came che rcma in ing hurdles. As finally apprm~d on September 17, 1787, the Constitution of che United States was an extraordinary documenc.. In addition co reconciling the: interests offarge and small states, it balanced the: delegates' desire for a strong national go\~rnme:m against their fear of t}'t'anny and interference wich che states' sm\!rcignty. It increased national authority in SC\o\!ral ways. It vested in Congress the authority co levy and

I

propos.ll tiCI V'"Jiniol Pbn tlvt f.aororcd sm.lll st.ltr:s

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140

l

OfAPlER 6

sep~rb• d '"""'

SEC\HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, D EFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

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tb.u tb~finlu ofJlaYt:C "'"~ to bt rounttd in dttermining rong:rt:r~~ion.al ~prtllll'ntllrian

collect taxes, co regulate interstate commerce, and to conduce diplomacy. Under che Constirucion, all acts and treaties ofche United States would become "the supreme Ia"'' of the land;'' State officials would have to uphold the Constirurion, even against acts of chcir 0'1'-'n state. The national gm•e rnmem could use military force against any state.. The Constitution's framers restrained che new nacional go••ernmenc in cwo key ways. First, they established a separation of powers among the three distinct branches within che gm-ern ment- the legislati\-e, the cxecutii,!'C, and the judiciaLSec· ond. they designed a S)'Stem of ch~teks and balances to pn..""\-ent one branch from dominating the others. States' equal representation in the Senate offset propor· tional representation by population in the House, and each chamber could block measures passed by the ocher. Further, the president could \"eto acrs of Congress, but to Pl\."\o'tnt capricious use of the presidentiaii,!'Cto,a cwo·chirds majority in each house could o\-erride a veco. The president "''Ould conduct diplomacy, buc only the Senate could ratify treaties.. The president appointed his cabinet, but only with Senace ap· proval. Congress could, b}•joint \'Ote, remo\-e the president and his appoint~s from office, but onl)' for "high crimes;" not for political disagreements. To further guarantee the independence of each branch, the Conscirurion pro· vided that the members of one branch would not choose: those of another, except judges, whose: independence was protected b}•lifecime appointments. For example, an electoral college, composed of members chosen by the various state legislatures, would select the president. State legislatures would also elecc senators, whereas pop· ular voce "''Ould determine delegates to the House of Representatives. In addicion to checks and balances, the Constitution embod ied a form of federalism- a system ofshared poo-er and dualla"'making by che state and nacional gow~m ments -co limit cencral auchority. Noc only did che state legislatures have a key role in electing the president and senators, buc the Conscirution could be amended b}•che voces of chrtt·fourths of che state legislarures. Federalism assumed that the national go\>ernment would limit irs acrivicies co foreign affairs, nacional defense, regulation of commerce, and coining of money. Most ocher political mat· ters were left to the states. The states could otherwise ace autonomously on purely internal matters, including slaver}'· The Philadelphia Convention faced a dilemma: were sla\-es property or persons? In general, southern states regarded slaves as property; hO'I'-'t\'er, because sta..-es con· sticuced substantial portions ofthe southern population. southern delegates "''llnted to count them as persons in determining representation in the 10'1'--er house.. Many northern delegates from che states chat u-ere abolishing slavery hesitated to gi'o-e somhern states a political edge by counting as persons sla\·es who had neither civil nor political rights. At the same rime, northern delegates, themselves property own· ers, balked at questioning somhern notions of property rights. Thus they agreed co the thNe·6fths clause. aiiO'I'-·ing three-fifths of all slaves to be counted forcongres· sional representation and forbade any state•s people from taking accion to prevent the recurn of runa"'ray sla\'eS to anocher stace. The Constitucion did limit sla\'er}' b}• noc repudiating che Northwest Ordinance•s restriccions on sla\'er}' and by permit· ting Congress to ban che importation of sla\'eS after 1808. Although leaving much authority to the states, che Constitucion established a national gm·emment d early superior to the states in se\-eral spheres and abandoned

J lbWArtD A NEW CONSlTTUtlOK, 1786- gS.S

the notion of a confederation ofvin:ually indcpendcm scares. HaYing thus scrcngchcned nacional authority, che convention faced che: issue of ratification. Two factors argued against submitting the Constitucion co che scare: legislatures for ratification. First, t he scare: legislatures would probabl}' re-ject t he Constitution, which shrank their power relati\'t: to chat of the national gm·ernmem. Second. most of the framers

141

mifiatio.

I

Approval by Jtate conYmOOns of.- kdtnl ConJititution

believed that che go'lemmem had to rest on the consent of the American people chcm.selw:s. The Constitucion's opening ~Aernment co operate. Under the Constitution, the framers expected t he nation' s "natural aristocracy" to continue exercising political leadership.: but d id they also intend co rein in the democratic currents that the Re\·olution had set in motion? In one respect che}' did- by curtailing che po"''Cr of popularly elected stare legislat ures. However, the Constirution did not try co control faction and disorder by suppressing liberty- a "rcmed}•,'" wrote Madison, that "''Ould have been ""''Orse than the discast";'' The House of Representatives did proYide one crucial democratic d eme:nc in the new gMt>rn· ment. Equally important, the Constirution recognized t he American people as the ultimate: source of political legitimacy. B}' making t he: Constirution amendable and by dividing political power among competing branches of government, the: framers made it possible for the national gM•ernment co be: slowI}' democrariu:d.

;_

Ac 6rst the Constitution had little national support. Many Americans hesitated to accept che idea of a radical I}' 1788 restructured gM•ernment. 10 quiet fears of centralized national authority, the Constitution's supporters shr~!"-'dl}' dubbed themselves Federalists, a term implying that the Constitution successful!}' balanced the: relationship betv.rcen state: and national go\-ernme:nts. The Constitution's opponents became: known as Ancifederalists, a negative· sounding name chat COO\'e)'ed little of their fears that the: Constitution "''Ould tJIJt balance the po"''et of t he: state and national gm--emments. Antifede:ralisc arguments reflected the: deep-seated Anglo-American suspicion of any concent ration of po"''Cr, a suspicion char had driven events from the Stamp Act Congress t hrough the War of Independence and the early }'ears of the new r~:public. Unquescionably, the Constitution gave the national gO\"Crnment unprecedented authority in an age when mo.sc writers on politics agreed chat che sole means of pre· \'enting despotism was restraining t he pO\l-er of go\-ernment officials. Distant from the people, especiall}' in an era when news crawled sl0\\-•1}', t he national go\-ernment would be far less responsive to the popular will than state go\-ernments "-'Ould be. Furthermore, no one could be sure chat che untried scheme of checks and balances would work. And t he Constitution contained no guarantees chat the new gM>ern· ment "''Ould protect t he liberties of individuals or t he states. T he absence of a bill of rights prompted Madison's nationalist ally and fellow Virginian George Mason, the author of the first state bill of righrs in Jn6, to oppose the Constitution. The Antifederalists confronted several major disadvantages. For one ching. the Federalists included most of the countr}"S "''talthiesc and mo.sc honored men,

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= "881<

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142

OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IMOtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

Mop 6A Foderalislillld AnlifoderalisiStroogllold~

1787- 1790 Fed~r.iliu~ d._.. their pri·

rn:uy b~ki"g &om de'"ety popul;tted ;tl'\";t~ while Antifedc:r;tlt,.( ~uppo" w.u nrongnt ;ttnong Stn;tll (;vmei"S in i "t~rior regions. Howc
some wntern~rs

;uivoc;tted ;t stTOng centr;tl g01o<ernment th;t( would pu~h b~k N;tti\<e Americ:;u~s.

ATlANTIC OCEAN

t:lult ot AIOXICO

lnteracti\•e Map:

Federalist and AntifederaJist Strongholds, 1787-1790

including Washington and Franklin. In addicion, the majority of newspapers were Federalist and d id not hesitate to bias their reporting. Finally, che Amifcderaliscs, largely drawn from state and local leaders, lacked their opponents' contacts and t:X· perimce at the national le\·el. Ulcimately, hO\l'f.'Wt, ~deralist superiority in funds and political organi.z.ing prow~d docisio.·e. The Antifederalists failed to creace a sense of urgency among their supporters, assuming that mosc would automatically rall)' to chem . H o~r, only one-quarter of the \'OtetS curncd out to elocc delegates co the state racifying com-emions, and most had been mobilized by Federalists. Federalist delegates prevailed in eightstatecol'l'W:ncions between December 1787 and May 1788, in all cases but one by margins of ~'0-thi rds or more. Such lopsided voting in favor of the Constitution rdlecced Federalist aggressiveness more than popular support. In a l'r:nnsylvania Amifederalist's ~A'Ords, the Federalists rammed through approval in some scates «befo re it can be digested or deliberate!)' consid·

ered."' Only Rhode Island and North Carolina rejected che Constitucion; Rhode: Is· land "'-auld not enter the Union untill790. But unless the large scares of Virginia and New York ratified, the new govern· ment "-auld be unworkable. Antifede:ralism ran high in both, especially among small farmers, who be:licwd that the Constirution fa\'Ored city dwdle:rs and moneyed in· tercscs.. l'rominent Antife:deralists induded New York's governor George Clinton and Virginia's Richard Henry lee, George Mason, Patrick Henr)', and furure: prcsi· dent james Monroe. On june 2 1, 1788, the Constirurion became: the law of dw: land when t he: nimh state, Ne~A' Hampshire:, rarified. Debate: continued in Virginia, where: rhe Federalists won \Nide: support from settlers in the "~stern part of rhe state ~Atho ~A'3Jttcd a strong na· rional gow:rnment capable of ending Indian raids along the Ohio River. Western Vir· ginians' voces, combined with Madison's logic and ride~A>atcr planters' support, ruled t he: day. O n june 25, the Virginia delegates rarified by a narrow 53 pc:nxnc majority. The struggle was even hotter in New York. Antife:deralists controlled che state com·ention and probably would have voted down the Consticucion had not news arri\-ed of New Hampshire's and Virginia' s ratification. Federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton and john jay, hinted strongly chat, if the com'efltion rejected t he: Consticu· ofe -..yJ cksigptd to apll.in cion, New York City would secede and join the Union alone, leaving upstate New oew COI!l$ritutioo, romiooe York a landlocked enclave. Alarmed, a number of Antifederalists switched sides, and people to 5Upport it New York ratified on july 26 b)• a 30 co 27 \"Otc. Despite the: defeat, che Antife:deralists left an important legacy. At An· rifede:ralisc insistence, che Virginia. New York, and Massachusetts com-cntions rarified t he: Consrirution with rcquescs that the new charter be: For m..ln)', Shay~·~ Rebdlion Coul d allow a single: economic or regional imeresc to domi· R;u:ificuion a( the ConJtitution w.u nate. In the most profou nd ess.l)' in the series, Federalist No. 10, Madison won, bu t not aurom;u:iuJiy, "ith argued that the nation' s size and d iV\'.rsicy would neutralize the attempts Antif~~raliJo \'Oicing loud oppoJ~Uon. of factions co steer unwise laws through Congress. The ratification Jtruggle kfc an Madison's anal)'sis was far too optimistic. howe..-cr. The Constitution did important IC'g;tty in U.r r'C'du"lid indoe:d afford enormous scope for special intc:r'l'Sts to influence government. ~p«.r, which helped Jhapt' t he The great challenge fur Madison's ~ne:rarion ~A>ould be maintaining a govern· Ame'-rit:m philoJophyor go'A'rn ment. ment chat pi'O'tided equal benefi ts to all, but special pO...ilegcs ro none.

,.,..,.,.,,.,... """ I

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144

OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IM OtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

Cha pte r Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

~

USTENTOITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOt O

R l E O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND KEY TERMS loyali~ {p.

Whot were the comparative odwrntages of the British and the colonists when the Re~.,lution began? (page 119)

I

Although the British enjoyed huge advantages in military prepamlness and manJ'O"'W at the war's start, their supply lines Wl!1l! long and their population, tax weary. 1'he colonists cvrntu.tlly forged a professional atnl}' and defeated them. The most important key to American victory was George Washington•s leadership, especially hisdctennination to continue to tight.

I

How did the war unfold? (paf!' 122)

Initial!}'• the Continental Arm}' suffered sevrral defuats. Saratoga was the turning point of the war, because the colonial victory there convinced the Ftcnch to support the Revolution with mont'}'. men, and ships. When the Brit· ish surrendered at Yotf
How did the war a{fed relationships among Americans ofdifferent classes, races, and fJ'nders? (page 128)

I

Most wars bring major soda! changJ:s; che Revolution was no exception. By wars end, white males enjoyed considerably more equality, slave!)' was clearly being rejected in che northern states. and women had played a significant public role. HOWI!\'er, che war only worsened the position of Nati\>e Americans.

How did Americans translate revolutionary pn·nciples into e{fedil~ gavernment.?(pa!JI' 132)

I

In creating chcir constirurions, the new states sctved as wotfohops tOt expeti· mmring with various tOnnsof l\.1>ublican government Ar. the narionallewJ cheAt· tides of Confederation matl:d a weak government that almost immediately fuccd ttcmmdous ttonomic and diplomatic problems. Howcwt, the Artides succeeded in tOnnulating che Northwest Ordinance, a blueprint tOr furure expansion.

What 11~re the principal issues dividing supporters and opponent. ofthe new federal Constiwtion? (page 137)

I

The new Constitution represented the triumph of nationalism and provided a strong central govrtnment, although its framC'\Irnrk of federalism seemed to lca\'l' considerable po'A'er in the hands of the states. Jts ratifi cation was fat from assured, but it enjoyed the support of respected men such as Franklin, JetTer· son, and Washington; in the end, the Federalists achieved ratifi cation. The most imponant leg.tC}' of the struggle for ratification was Thr Fttkralist papers, which Laid a foundation for an American philosophy of SM'etnmcnt.

119)

Whig {p. 119) Trmton (p. 112)

Saratoga (p. 124) \!alley Forge {p. 124} lord Charles Cornwallis {p. 126) illllis~very 1110\''""'111 (p. 130) s1at2 constiltrtions (p. 132} "d<moaacy" {p. IJJ) ""!KKblkilllisrrl' {p. IJJ) Articles ot Coolecler- (p. TJ4) NE'Wburlll! Conspiracy (p. IJS) O..dilanco ol 17a5 {p. 135) Northwest Ordinilllce (p. IJS) Alexander McGillimy (p. 137) Sllays~ Rebellion (p. TJ8) Virginia ~an (p. 139) N<'W Jersey ~an (p. 139) separation ol pm\
144

OfAPlER 6

SEC\ HUMG IM OtPt.NOEMCE, DEFINING NATIONHOOD, 17]'6-1788

Cha pte r Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

~

USTENTOITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOt O

R l E O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND KEY TERMS loyali~ {p.

Whot were the comparative odwrntages of the British and the colonists when the Re~.,lution began? (page 119)

I

Although the British enjoyed huge advantages in military prepamlness and manJ'O"'W at the war's start, their supply lines Wl!1l! long and their population, tax weary. 1'he colonists cvrntu.tlly forged a professional atnl}' and defeated them. The most important key to American victory was George Washington•s leadership, especially hisdctennination to continue to tight.

I

How did the war unfold? (paf!' 122)

Initial!}'• the Continental Arm}' suffered sevrral defuats. Saratoga was the turning point of the war, because the colonial victory there convinced the Ftcnch to support the Revolution with mont'}'. men, and ships. When the Brit· ish surrendered at Yotf
How did the war a{fed relationships among Americans ofdifferent classes, races, and fJ'nders? (page 128)

I

Most wars bring major soda! changJ:s; che Revolution was no exception. By wars end, white males enjoyed considerably more equality, slave!)' was clearly being rejected in che northern states. and women had played a significant public role. HOWI!\'er, che war only worsened the position of Nati\>e Americans.

How did Americans translate revolutionary pn·nciples into e{fedil~ gavernment.?(pa!JI' 132)

I

In creating chcir constirurions, the new states sctved as wotfohops tOt expeti· mmring with various tOnnsof l\.1>ublican government Ar. the narionallewJ cheAt· tides of Confederation matl:d a weak government that almost immediately fuccd ttcmmdous ttonomic and diplomatic problems. Howcwt, the Artides succeeded in tOnnulating che Northwest Ordinance, a blueprint tOr furure expansion.

What 11~re the principal issues dividing supporters and opponent. ofthe new federal Constiwtion? (page 137)

I

The new Constitution represented the triumph of nationalism and provided a strong central govrtnment, although its framC'\Irnrk of federalism seemed to lca\'l' considerable po'A'er in the hands of the states. Jts ratifi cation was fat from assured, but it enjoyed the support of respected men such as Franklin, JetTer· son, and Washington; in the end, the Federalists achieved ratifi cation. The most imponant leg.tC}' of the struggle for ratification was Thr Fttkralist papers, which Laid a foundation for an American philosophy of SM'etnmcnt.

119)

Whig {p. 119) Trmton (p. 112)

Saratoga (p. 124) \!alley Forge {p. 124} lord Charles Cornwallis {p. 126) illllis~very 1110\''""'111 (p. 130) s1at2 constiltrtions (p. 132} "d<moaacy" {p. IJJ) ""!KKblkilllisrrl' {p. IJJ) Articles ot Coolecler- (p. TJ4) NE'Wburlll! Conspiracy (p. IJS) O..dilanco ol 17a5 {p. 135) Northwest Ordinilllce (p. IJS) Alexander McGillimy (p. 137) Sllays~ Rebellion (p. TJ8) Virginia ~an (p. 139) N<'W Jersey ~an (p. 139) separation ol pm\
146

OfAPlER 7

l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN8UC, q88-18oo

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT TAKES SHAPE,

1788-1796 WMt role did George Washington p14y in trrms/4ting the Constitution from words into g<Wernnt6nt? Gii,!'Cn the social and political di...isions among Americans, compounded b}• their fears of centralized authority, success at implementing the new Consticurion was anything but guaranceed. Would Americans accept che results of a national election? Would che three branches of the new government function effectiv-ely? Would a Bill of Righcs, which several states had made a condition of ratification, ammd the Constitution?

The first order of business in putting the newgMwnmmt into practice was che election ofa president and Congress. These firsc elections sW'tpt the Federalists into po"''Cr with eight«n ofN'l'flt)' seats in che Senate and fifty-four of fifty-nine in the House. T he doctoral college unanimously chose George: Washington as the first president and j ohn Adams as che vice president. The choice of Washington was hard!}' a surprise. His leadership during che Revolutionary War and the Constitutional Col'lW:ntion had earned him a reputation as a national hero. Gi...-cn his reputation, Washington was able to calm Americans' fears of presidential power. Traveling slowly m·er the new nation's miserable roads, che men entrusted "''ith launching the federal experiment assembled in New York, the: new national capital, in March 1789. Washington did not arriv-e unci! April 23 and took his oath of office a "''ttk later. The Constitution "''lls vague about the cxecucii,!'C deparnnents, mmtioning only in passjng char the: president muse obtain the Senate's "advice and consmt"' to his nominees to head these bureaus. Otherwise, Congress was free to determine the: or· gani.zation and accountability of whac became kno"''tl as the: cabinct. The first cabi· nee consisted of five deparnnems, headed by the: secretaries of state, treasur}', and war and by the attorney general and postmaster gmeral. l 'he Senate narrow!}' defeated a proposal to forbid che president from dismissing cabinet officers without its approval. lbis outcome reinforced the president's authority to make and carry out policy; it also made the president a more equal partner of Congress by strengthening the separation of poW'trs.

The Conscirution authorized Congress to establish fed-

lbe Federal Juclciary eral courcs bd ow the level of the Supreme: Court but pro· ... tile Bill ol Rights vided no plan for chcir structure. In 1789 many citizens feared char federal courts would ride roughshod ovcr local customs. E...-er}' state had a blend ofjudicial procedures suiced to its needs, and M}' attempt to force the scares to abandon their legal heritage would hai,!'C produced councerdemands fo r narr~·l}'

Frn eleclions """'r the Conslil!llion Fnt Congress oonvmes i1 New York; George washington sworn in as fi'st president; Judiciary Act; Frlified; Slave uprising begils in Frmdl colony of Saint Domingue; Hamihon submits his Report on Manu&actures to Congress W.!llilgton reelected president Fugiive Slave Law; Chi!holm v. Gootgio; French planters flee ~ave rebellion in Saini Domingue for lhe United Stales; FrancedOOares war on Bricain and Spain; Oizen ~arrives in Unied States; W.!llilgton~ Netmlily Pfodamalion; First O.lllOmlic socieliesi!Siablished Whislte'( Rl!beflion; Bailie of Falen rmbers Treaty of CreenYI~; Jay's Treaty John Adams ~edl!d president; Treaty of San Lorenzo (l'inctney's Treaty) ratified W.!llilgton~ Far-IA
restriccing federal justice. In passing t he )udidary Act of 1789, Congress quieted popular apprehensions b}' establishing in each state a federal districc court char op· crated according co local procedures. Asche Constitution stipulated, the Supreme Court exercised 6na l jurisdiction. Congress's compromise respected state t raditions while offering ~Aide access to federal justice. Behind che movement for a bill of rights lay Americans' long-standing fear that a strong central go\'trnment would lead co tyJanny. Many Ancifederalisrs beliC'\o-ed that the best safeguard against tyranny would be to strecngthen the powers of the state g()'I,!'C_rnments at the expense of the federal go\-ernment, but man}' more Ameri· cans wanted simply to guarantee basic personal liberties. From the House ofRepre· sentarives, James Madison pla)'ed the leading role in drafting che ten amendments that became kn"'"'· n as the Bill ofRights ~Ailen rarified in December 1791. Madison insisted that the 6rst eight amendments guarantee personal liberties, not strip che national government of authority. The First Amendmenc safeguarded the most fundamental freedoms of expression- religion, speech, press, and political activity. The Second Amendmenc ensured that each state could form irs "'"'· n militia. Like che Third Amendment, it sought to protect citizens from what Americans saw as che most sinister embodiment of tyranny: standing armies. The Fourth chrough Eight h Amendments limited the police po~A'cr'S of the scaces by guaranteeing fair treatment in legal and judidal proceedings. T he Ninth and Tench Amendments

lodWary Ad of 1719 . ......

l

tubo Ftdt:r.al coott J}'Stem

lill.tliPts

Fin.t k n ammd.. menu eo the Constitution; J"at'illltrecl pt:rsCIIIl.ll lillertie5

l

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148

OfAPlER 7

l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN8UC, q88- 18oo

resct'V'Cd to che people or co che states powers not aUocaced to the federal g()IJ'Crn· menc, but Madison headed off proposals co limit federal power more explicitly. In general, the Bill of Rights imposed no serious check on the Framers' nationalist objecri\·es. The ten amendments were submitted to che states and racified by Decem· ber 1791. With the Bill of Rights in place, che federal judkiar}'escablished its authority. In the case of Chisholm (CH ZZ-um) v. GrortJ·a ( 1793), the Supreme Court ruled that a nonr€sidenc could su e a scace in federal court. In 1796 the Courc de· CHECKI NG I N dared ics right to determine che constitutionality of federal starutes in Hyl· ton (Hill·ton) v. Unifl!d St4lt.s and to strike down state laws in \VatT v. HJIWn. Amtrieuu rtm;aimd .uupiciou.s of t.lfll:'c:uti'A' powt"r, ;md thu.s of tht. But in 1794, Congress decided chat the Chisholm case had encroached too far pi"C'$idt.ncy. on states' auchoricy and ovcrcurned che decision chrough a consticucional Gtorg-:' \l':!$bington w.u un.lni· amendment. Ratified in 1798, che Elevecnth Amendmenc revised Article Ill, mou.dy ~ho$C'n p~idC"-nr b)· the' Section 2, so chat privace citizens could not undmnine states' financial au· llr.st duror;L) coUC'8f'· tonom}' b)• using federal courts to sue another state•s gm--ernmem in civil Although the' Con.stitution did cases and claim money from that state's creasury. O ()( ~pdl ou r r.ht org.lni.1:uion a( the' C'X«u tivC' br;an~h, \V.l~hing;ton By endomng the Elcvench Amendm ent, Congress expressed ics recogni· n;amtd 11"" dtp;~.rtmtnt htad.s: who tion that federal po....-er could threaten ...;tal local interests. The same aware· formtd hU ll r.st cotbintr. ness had ruptured chc nacionalistcoalition that had "''litem che Conscitution, The Judiciary Acr o( 1789 hdp«< secured its ratification, and dominated che firsc Congress. Alexander Hamil· .llby .st.l«' fe.l.u : com~t.rning l«kr;al ton had embarked on a bold program that alienated many nationalists by C'OUI"U. demonscraring that federal policies could be shaped to t\."'\l.>ard special The Bill of Rig;ht.s gu.lr;ancC'C'd ptrson.ll libtrciu. interests.

HAMI LTON' S DOMESTIC POLICIES, 1789-1794 WMt WMI' the major components ofl-lamiltOtt's blu6print for the new nation?

I

HI--

Aiu.~.der Wuhing. ton."ll chief:uhistr, uchitl'ct of majclr plans fOr Alnc'riun

"'"'~

Washington's reluctance to become im'Oived "'ith legislation enabled Secretary of the Treasur}' Alexander Hamilton co sct domestic prioricies. Hamilton emerged as an imaginaci\J'C and dynamic statesman by formulating a sweeping program co strmgchm the federal go••ernmenc and promote nacional economic dC"t-elopmmt.

lllmlltoll and His ObJectives

Born in the West Indies in 1755, Hamilton had arrived in New York in 1772 to enroll ac King's College (now Colum·

bia Uni\J'Crsicy), where he had passionatd}' defended Amer· ican rights. He entered the Continental Arm}' in 1775 and rose quickly to become a member of Washington's staff and a confidante of che commander in chief. 1'he bril· liant Hamilton gained extraordinary influence m--er the fucure president. He "''3.S a forceful ad\'Ocace of a scrong national gm-emmem and an economic en\ironmmt arcracth-e to invesnnem. Hamilton's finan cial policies had two goals: co screngthen che nation against foreign enemies and to lessen the threac of disunion. The possjbiliry of war "'ith Britain, Spain , or both presented the most immediate danger. 10 finance a "''ar, the

Republic wo uld ha\~ to borrow, but because Congress u n· dcr the Articles had failed to redeem or pay interest o n the revolucionary debt, the nacion had little credit. Hamilton also feared chac che Union mighc disintegrate because he believed that Americans tended to chink first of local loyalties and interests. 1b him, the Consciru· tion represented a dose victor}' of national O\~r state au· thoricy. NotA' he worried thac che states might reassert pD""-~r over chc new go\~rnment. If chey succeeded, he doubted thac the nation could pm\!nt ruinous crade discrimination berwcen states, deter foreign aggression, and avoid civil war. Channing and brilliant, vain and handsome, a nocori· ous womanizer, chirsty for fame and power, Hamilton ex· cmplified che worldly dci.zcns ~A•hosc forcunes he hoped to link to the Republic's future. lb his opponents, however, Hamilton embodied the dark forces luring che Republic to doom-a man ~Aoho, Jefferson wrote, believed in .. the nee~ sity of either force or corruption co gOIJ'Crn men."

Ale"'oder Hamilton by Jolll Traonbull 1792 H;2rnil ton' s $df·conf.dent p ride s.hinu through durly in this. pon:r.2it, p~nted ;2t the height of his inAuence in the W:ishington ;1dmi nistr;2tion.

In 1789 Congress directed the Treasury Department co f:'\'aluatc the re\·olutionar}' debt. Hamilton seized the opporrunit}' to devise policies to strengthen the nation's credit, enable it to defer paying its debe, and entice the upper d ass to place irs prestige and capital at the nacion's service. In January 1790, Congress received his R'llorcon th~ Public C~dit. It lisced SS4 mil· lion in U.S. debt: $42 million o\IJ'Cd to Americans and the rest co foreigners. Hamil· ton estimated that, on cop of the national debt, the states had debts ofS25 million thac the Uniced States had promised to reimburse. Hamilton recommended that the federal government "fund" the nacional debt by raising $54 million in new securities to honor the rcvolucionary debt. Purchasers of chese securities could choose: from se\~ral combinations of federal "stock'" and W'CStem lands. 11losc who ~Aishcd could rttain chcir original bonds and earn 4 pet· cent interest. All these o ptions ~A'Ould reduce interest pa}'ll'lenrs on the debt. Credi· tors would apprOIJ'C this reduccion because chcir investments ~A'Oul d become more \'aluable and secure. 11le report proposed that the federal gM>crnment usc the same means for che ..assumption" of state debts remaining from the Revolution. Hamilton exhorted the gOIJ'Crnmcnt to use chc money earned b}•selling federal lands in the West to pay off the $12 million O""-\!d to Europeans as soon as possible, buc he suggested that che re-maining $42 million 0\l~d to Americans be made a pet· mancnc debt. If the go\~rnment paid only the interest on its bond~ im~stors would hold them for long terms. The sole burden on taxpayers wo uld be che small annual interest. Thus the United States could uphold its credit at minimal expense without ever having to pa}' off the debt itself. A permanent debt, Hamilton beliC".\!d, would tie the economic fon:unes of the nation's creditors co the go\'ctnment. In an age of notorious!}' risk}' invesuncnrs, the

._. ..........w;,et..a J.bmikoo's plan eo e!mU'C' support for tht ntw F"rnmeot by moUnuining pC'f'mil.. nmt debc:

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150

CHAPtER 7

l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN 8UC, q88-18oo

federal govcrnmenc ~A'Ould protect the savings of wealthy bondholders through con· servacii,!'C policies but still pa)' an interest rate competitive ~Aith that of the Bank of England. The guarantee of future interest payments would link the interescs of the moneyed class to those of the nation. Hamilton's proposals prO\'Oked contro\'cr'S}'· Many members of Congress ob· jected that those leas.tdeseJVing reward ~A'Oul d gain the mosc. The original owners of more than 60 percent of che debt certificates issued by the Continental Congress had long since sold them at a loss, often ouc of dire necessity. 10 Hamilto n's su r· prise, Madison became a chief opponent of reimbursing current holders ac face: value. Se:nsing disapproval of the plan in Virginia, Madison tried but failed to obtain compensation for original owners who had sold their certificates. Hamilto n's policy generated widespread resentment by rewarding rich profiteers while ignoring war· rime sacrifice by ordinar}' citizens. Opposition to assuming the state debts also ran high, especially in the Souch. But Hamilton saved his proposal b)•exploiting Virginians' desire to relocate che na· tiona! capital in their region. They hoped that moYing the capital would keep Vir· ginia the nation's largest, most influential state. Essentially, Hamilton craded the \'Otes necessary to locate the capital along the Potomac for enough \'Otes to ~Ain his bactle for assu mption. Enactmenc of the Report o n che Public Credit re:\-ersed the nation's fiscal stand· ing. By 1792 che United States' soaring fiscal reputation allo~A'Cd some U.S. bonds co sell at 10 pen::e:nt above face value.

... ...........................

Having restored full faich in greatly u nden•alued ce:rtifi· cates, Hamilton had in effect expanded the capital avail· able for investment. Now he intended to direct that money toward projects to dh-ersify che national economy through a federally chartered bank. In his Report on the National Bank in 1790 Hamilton proposed that the Bank of che United States raise S 10 million through a public stock offering. Full)' fo ur· fifths of the control of the bank would fall to private hands. l'rivate investors co uld purchase shares by paying for three-quarters of their value in government bonds. In this wa}' the bank would capture a substantial portion of the recend)' funded debt and make it available for loans.: it "-'OUid also recei't'e steady incerest payments from the treasury. Shareholders would profit handsomely. Hamilton argued chat che bank ~A'Ould cost taxpa)<ers nothing and greatly bene· fi t the nation. It would provide a safe place for federal d eposics, make incxpensr.-e loans co the government when taxes feU short, and reliC'\o-e che scarcity of hard cash by issuing paper notes.. Further, che bank ~A
ONIIng a Natiollal

!

tumikon's propo,..] w crutl' tbc B.mk oftbt UnitC'd St.attll

........... .. tumikonian plan b lllrif&, encout~t of

1indusui.lliaOOn

thac the Bank of England had undermined the integrity of the go\-ernment in Brit· ain. Shareholders of che Bank of the United States could just as easily become: cools of unscrupulous politidans. Members of Congress who 0'1'-'ned bank stock would likely \'Ote in support of the bank even at the cost of che national good. Constitutional issu es presented che bank's opponents with chcir strongest argu· ment. 11le: Conscirution did not authorize Congress co issue charters of incorporation.: in face, the: constitutional com-ention had rejected such a proposal. Unless Congress adhered to a «strict interpretation" of che Conscirution, critics argued, the central go\·ernme:nt might oppress the states and trample individual liberties. Congress appro'led che bank b)•only a thin margin. Dubious about its constitu· tionality, Washington asked Jefferson and Hamilton fo r ad...ice. Jeffe:rson d istrusted banking and d id not wane to extend government power be)'ond the: letter of the Conscirution. But Hamilton urged Washington to sign the bilL Because: Article l, Section 8, of r.he Constitution specified that Congress could mace all measures "necessary and proper,'" Hamilton contended that the only unconstitutional activities W\'.re those forbiddtn co the national government. Washington accepted Hamilto n's argument, and in February 1791 the Bank of the United States obtained a rn-enty· )'ear charter. Washington's acceptance of a ..loose: ince:rprctation" of the Constitution marked an important victor}' for advocates of an actt...·e, asse:rti~ national go'lemment.

=.....,...

Hamilton built a political base by appealing to people's economic self-i nterest. His "rescue-" of che national credit provided huge gains for speculators, me:rchan~ and other urban "m one)-ed men'" ~A•ho by 1790 held most of che re\'Olutionary debt. As holders of bank stock, these same: groups had reason co use: their prestige o n behalf of na· tional authority. Moreover, fed eral assumption of state de:bcs liberace:d taxpayers from crushing burdens in New England, New Jersey, and So uth Carolina, while Hamilton's promotion of industry, commerce, and shipping won favor ~Atith the Norcheast"s budding entrepreneurs and hard-pressed artisans. Hamilton's economic program SO'I'-oe:d dissension in areas where it provided litd e advantage:. Resentment ran high among those who fete thac the go\-emment was tc· warding special interests. Southerners espedally detested Hamilton's program.. Southern stares had generally paid off their r......._'Oiutionary debts, and few souchern· ers still held f'C\'Oiutionary certificace:s. Moreover, the Bank of the United States had few southern stockholders and allocated lictle capital for southern loans. Hamilton's plan offered little to the West, ~Athere agriculture pro mised excep· tiona! profit once the right of exporc through New Orleans "-'aS guaranteed. E\'efl in New Yo rk and l'r:nnsylvania, Hamilton's policies generated some dissatisfaction. Re· sencme:nt of a supposedly national program that benefited eastern "-mont)-ed men" and Yank« s who refused ro pay their de:bcs gradually united ~A'CSterners, southern· ers, and man}' people in the mid-Adamic into a political coalition. Challenging the Federalists for concrol of the: go\-ernme:nt, these o pponents called for a return co true Republicanism. Wir.h Hamilton presenting his measures as " ~deralist," Jefferson, Madison, and their supporters began calling themselves «Republicans."'1'hcy reached o ut to fo nner www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Anrifcderalisrs whose ranks had been fatally ~A'Cakened after the election of 1788. In 179 J they supported the establishment ofan opposition ne'l'--spaper, 71Je NatioMI Ga· ~l'tte. The paper's editor, Philip f reneau, attacked Hamilton relenclessly, accusing him of try to create an aristocracy and a monarchy in America. In response Hamil· ton, using pseudonyms, attacked je-fferson as an enemy of President Washington. Although partisanship incensjfied as the d eccion of 1792 approached, there ~A'llS no organized political campaigning. Most voters saw organized factions, or parties, as inherently corrupt. The Constirution's Framers had neither wanted nor planned for political parries. In addition, Washington, b)•appearing to be abol.'l' partisan dis· putcs, remained supreme-ly popular. Washington ~A'aS unanimousl}' chosen for a se-cond cerm; by a fairly d ose margin, john Adams was again chosen vice president.

W\isby leWiioa lU protr.st

by W't.nr:m f.umtrs mar: g;a~ ~on ;and N.unilwn tbt opportun.ity to .wtrt tbt pov.'tr

The Whiskey ltbelllon

Hamilton's program helped to ignite a dvil insurrection called the Whisk~· Rebellion. Severely testing fede-ral authority, this uprising posed che young republic's firs.t

serious crisjs. To augment national m-cnue, Hamilton had proposed an excise tax on domesti· call}' produced whiskey. He maintained chat such a tax would noc only d istribute the expense of financing the national debt e\'efll}' but also improve the country's morals by 10'1'-~ring liquor consumption. Although Congress passed Hamilton's program in March 1791, many doubted chat Americans, who d rank an average of six gallons of hard liquor per adult per year, would submit tamely to sobriety. \'('\~seem l'r:nn.sylvanians found the new taX espe-ciall}' burdensome. Unable co ship thcir crops co world markets through New Orleans, most local fanners habitu· ally distilled chcir rye or corn imo alcohol, which could be carried across rhe Appala· chians at a fraction of the price charged for bulky grain. Hamilton's excise tax, equal to 25 percent of whiskey's retail value, would wipe out frontier fanners' profit. Be-cause the law speci6ed, in addition, that fede-ral courts would try all cases of alleged tax e-vasion, an}' western l'r:nnsylvanian indicted for noncompliance would ha\'f: to trawl three hundre-d or so miles to Philadelphia. Not only ~A'Ould the accused face a jury of uns)mpathe-tic easterners, bur he ~A'Oul d also ha..~ to shoulder the cost of a long journey and lost earnings, as well as 6nes and penalties if CHECKI NG I N convicted. Alexande.r H.unilton de\·i,td :m In a scene reminiscent of colonial protests against Britain, large-scale re· .unbifiaw: pbn tonNft a $trong sjstance erupted in july 1794. Roving bands torched buildings, assaulted tax « ano my and :. n ru ng central p •· collectors, and raised a flag S}'ll'lbolizing an independent country that che-y ernment. To ch i' end, he prupw«< hoped co create from six western counties. federal funding of the n.uion.al debt from fht novulutionary pc"-Mod and Echoing dices' denunciation of colonial proces~ Hamilcon blasted the cn'.ahon of .1 ptml.antnt debt. rebellion as simple la~Atfcssnes.s. Washington concluded that a federal failure Hamilton p~ and :.chi ll"\~ a to respond strongly would encourage outbreaks in ocher frontier areas. The national b.:mk. president according!}' mustered 12,900 militiamen to march west under his To em~ourage m.mufacruring, Ham· command, but opposition evaporated once the troops reached the Appala· ilron a-dvac.attd a protttfi~ tariff'. chians. Of ISO suspects Iacer scizcd, 20 were sent in irons co Philadelphia. The \Vbi.do:e.y RWdlion Sfl''~" \'(l;u}t. lhe Whiskey Rebellion was a milestone in de-termining the limits of ingtun and liamittan an oppacru· n it:y to noin iOnot national au thoritr. public opposition co federal policies. In the e-arly 1790s many Americans as· Dfnarional ~mtnt

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sumed that it 'A'llS still legitimate to protest unpopular latA'S by using the methods thac they had employed against British policies. By firml}' suppressing che first ma· jor challenge to national auchority, President Washingcon served notice that cicizcns could change the law only through constitutional procedures-by making their dissat· isfucrion known to cheir elected representatives and, if neceSsat)', by eleccing new representatives.

THE U NITED STATES IN A WIDER WORLD,

1789-1796 1-/ow did th.r new nt~tion detJI wi-th France, Spain, and Britain? By 1793 disagreements m-er foreign affairs had become the primary source of friction in American public life. l 'he diYision crt~aced by contr~rsy owr Hamilton's economic program hardened inco idoologicall)' oriented factions thac disagreed vehemently 0\'\'.r ~Ailether American foreign policy should fa\'Or industrial and mm:antile interests or those of farmers, plancers, and small businessmen. Complicating American policy making was the French Revolution, which had eloccri6ed all Europe in 1789 and touched off a series of wars bctWeen France and ics neighbors that would last unci! IS IS. As part of the Adamic world, the United States could not a\'Oid entanglement in chese wars, despite the desire of most Americans to remain uninvolved. Increasingly, foreign policy became caught up in domestic policies, intensifying the emerg· ing partisanship.

Spain enjo)'ed a brief resurgence of imperial success in the fate eighteenth cencury. Stimulated by its acquisition of louisiana, the Spanish built new presidios in nonhero Mexico, New Mexico, and 1Cxas at ~Ailich they stationed more: troops and coordinated the actions of civilian and militar}' authorities. By 1800 the Apaches, Na\'ajos, and Comanches had agreed co cease chcir raids in New Mexico and 1Cxas, but the success of the truce depended o n Spain's ability to strengthen and broaden its imperial position in North America. These reforms were part of a Larger Spanish e-ffort to counter potencial rivals for Norch American territor}' and influence. Russian fur traders had made su bstantial inroads along the Northwest Coast as early as the 1740s, and British and American traders follo\1/C'd in the 1780s. All chrec nations used American furs in the rapidly burgeoning and hugely profitable China trade, and their mounting influen ce threat· ened Spain's northwestern fro ntier. To counter these threacs, Spain fl ung colonists and missionaries northward along the Pacific coast. Efforts to encourage large--scale Mexican immigration to "Alta California» failed. The colony became a chain of religious missions, SC\-eral presidios, and a few farge ranches. Franciscan missionaries tried to convert coastal Indians co Catholidsm and «dvilizr' them by imposing harsh discipline and putcing them to ~A'Ork in vineyards and ocher enterprises. HO'I'-\....,-er, epidemic and venereal

Spanlsll Power in Western Nol1h Amerkll

"AAta Ca5fwllir"

I

SJUnidl coklny on P¥ilk co.ut, domi. nattd by miJ~~;ioru

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diseases carried b)•t he: Spanish raged among the native: coastal t ribes; betv.~en 1769 and JSJO che Indian population plummeted fro m about 72,000 to about 18,000. Having strengthened ics positions in 1C:xas, New Mexico, and Californ ia, Spain turned irs actencion to the area Lacer kno""n as Arizona in hopes of dominating Nonh America from the: Jladfic to Louisiana Howf.'wr, resistance from Nati\-e: Americans such as t he: Hopi (HOE-pH) and che Yu ma (YOU muh) ch~A•aned these hopes. 4

. .

East of che Mississippi Ri\-e:r, on t he t rans·Appalachian fron rier,ri\•alrie:s also multiplied. Spain, Britain, the: United Scates, and Natii,!'C Americans jockeyed for advantage in an area that all considered central co thcir ime:rests. l'resident Washington tried to keep tight control of foreign policy. Recognizing that the complex western problems wo uld not easily yield, he: pursu ed patient d iplo· macy to «preserve t he countr}' in peace if I can, and co be prepared for war if I cannot.'" 11le prospe:cc of peace im prm~d in 1789 when Spain unexpectedly opened New O rleans to American commerce. Secessionist se:ntimcm subsided. In t he 1790s the Spanish bribed many W'CII-known political figures in 1tnnessce: and Kentucky, including James Wilkinson, one of Washington' s former generals. The admission of Vermonc (1791), Ke:muck}' ( 1792), and Tennessee ( 1796) as scares was meant in part co strengthen t heir flickering loyalty to the: Union. Washington then moved co W'Caken Spanish influence in t he: West by neutraliz· ingSpain's most important all)', the Creek Indians. 11le Creeks numbered more: chan twenty t housand, including perllaps five thousand ~A'llrriors, and were fiercel}' hostile: toward Georgian settlers, whom they called "the greed}' people who want o ur lands." Under the terms of t he: 1790 Treacy of New Yo rk, American settlers could occupy t he: Georgia piedmont but not other Creek territory. Washingron insisted t hat Georgia restore to the Chickasaws and Choctaws, Creek allies, a vast area along t he Missis· sippi Rii,!'Cr that Georgia had already begun selling off to land speculators. Washington tried to force peace through military accion against Britain's In· dian allies in t he NonhW'Csc. Buc two military campaign~ in 1790 and 1791, failed co force peace and cost che United Scates eleven hundred men. Washington's frontier policy was in shambles. Matters worsened in 1792 when the Spanish persuaded the Creeks to renounce t he Treaty of New York and resume: hostilities. Ultimately, che damage to U.S. prestige from these setbacks convinced many Americans that only an alliance wit h f rance could counterbalance the com· bined strength of Britain, Spain, and the: Indians.

~~~~;:~

O ne of che most momentous eve:ms in history, the: French Rc"lolurion, began in 1789. Man}' Americans watched S}'lll· pathetically as t he French abolished nobles' privileges, wrote a constitution, and repelled invading armies. In 1793, after becoming a republic, f rance proclaimed a war of all peoples against all kings and u nleashed a .. Reign ofTerror,'" executing not only the king bur also dissenting re\'Oiutionaries. Americans were bitter!}' divided in t heir views of the French Re\'Oiution and how the United States should respond to it. Republicans such as Jefferson supported it as an assault on monarchy and tyranny. Federalists like Hamilton denounced France

I THE U~o~lftO STATES IN A. WIDEll. WOIUO, 1~6 as a "mobocracy"' and supporced Grear Britain in resisting efforcs to so"'' re\'Oiution abroad. White southern sla\'t: owners "''ere among France's fiercest supporters. In 1791 sla..-es in che French colony of Saint Domingue (s.n doh-MIN-geh) rebelled against sla..-er}' and against French rule, a blood)' uprising that took a heavydeach toll among French plancers and sent thousands fleeing to che United States. Fearful southern whites bdie\'t:d that the British had intentionally sparked the bloodshed and would do che same in che American South. Northern Federalists damned 1\.''Volutionary France as an abomination. Conser\'ative and religious!)' orienced, New Englanders detested the French government's disregard for civil rights and its adoracion of reason over the worship of God. Middle Atlantic businessmen, perllaps less religious but no less consewativc, condemned French leaders as evil radicals who incited che poor against che rich. After 1790, economics sharpened differences be~-e:en northern and southern reaccions co che French Revolucion. Growing antagonism toward France among norchcrn merchants reflected their a"''llreness that their prosperity depended on good relations with Britain. Northerners argued chat che United States could win \'aluable concessions by demonstrating friendly intcncions coward Britain. Southerners had no such reasons to favor Britain. They perceived American reli· anceon British commc:n::e as a menace to national self-determinacion, and rhey wished to diw~n most U.S. trade to f rance. Southern spokesmen, such as jetTerson and Madi· son, demanded discriminatory duties o n British cargoes. 11tese recommendations threaccned ties with Britain, "'flich sold more manufactured goods ro the United States than to an}' other country. If Congress ado peed trade recaliation, Hamilton pre· dieted, «an open war be~\."l'O the United States and Great Britain" "''Ould result. Pro-french feelings "-'t:re also high in the "''eStern scares, especially after France wcnc to "''llr against Spain and Greac Britain in 1793. \l'esterners hoped that a French victory "''Ould remm-e Spanish and Bricish roadblocks to expansion, puc an end to Indian wars, and open the Mississippi for navigation. After declaring war with Spain and Britain in 1793, f rance sought to embroil the United States in the war and to strengchen che treaty of alliance betv.r'Cf:'n the two nations. France dispacched Edmond Genet (zhe-NAY) as minister to lhe United States with orders to recruit American mercenaries to conquer Spanish territories and co attack British shipping. Much to France•s d isgust, Jlresidem Washington is· sued a proclamation of neutrality on April 22, 1793. Meanwhile, Citiun Genet (as he "''lls known in French revolucionary scyle) had arri\.'ed on April 8. He found n umerous souchern volunteers for his American for· eign Legion despite official U.S. neutrality. Making generals of George Rogers Clark of Kentucky and Elisha Clarke, ~nee ordered chem co seize New Orleans and Sc. Augustine. Clark open!)' defied che neucrality proclamacion by ad\·errising for recruics, and Clarke drilled three hundred soldiers along che Florida border. HO""-\....,'t:r, the French failed co provide adequate funds for either campaign, and in 1794 boch expedicions disintegrated. Ho"''CVI.'.r, Gen~t did not need funds co out6c privat«rs, whose crews "-"ere paid from caprured plunder. By summer 1793 near!)• one chousand Americans were at sea in a dozen ships flying the French flag. These privateers seized O\'er eighty British ships and towed them to American ports, where French consuls sold the ships and cargoes at auction.

155

Citizen Cietlit Fmu:h minUtr:r to Unittd Statl'$whel ~d U.S. nc'Utrality ;and ~c:rui ml ~iuru to fight Bririlh aod Sp.u~ish

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Although Washington swiftly d osed the nacion's harbors to Gentc's buccaneers, che episode pnwoked an Anglo· 179:1-1796 American crisis. Britain decm ent for the tm.siaru with Spain..

Diplollacy IIICI War,

!

"""'"

I PNmESANOPoUTICS, l;o,}-1800 Washington administration, Jay's Treacy also stim ulated American crade as British go'lemors in the \l'est Indies used the treaty's ratification as an excuse: co open their harbors co U.S. ships. Within a few y~ars of 1795, American exports co the: British Empie~: had shot up 300 percent. On the: heels of)a}"s Treacy came an u nqualified d iplomatic triumph engineered by Thomas Pinckney. Rarified in 1796, the: 1795 Treaty ofSan Lo~nro (also called Pinckney's Treaty) with Spain gave westerners unrestricted, duty·free access to world markets .,;a the Mississippi River. Spain also pro mised to recognize the thirty· first parallel as the United States' southern boundary. co d ismancle all fortifications on American soil, and to discourage Indian attacks against western settlers. By 1796 che Washington administration had defended the narion•s territorial integrity, restored peace to the frontier, opened the Mississjppi for w~stern exports, reopened British markets to U.S. shipping, and kept the nation out of a European war. Howevcr, as the o utcry O\ 'et Jay's Treaty showed, foreign policy had left Ameri· cans far more divided in 1796 than in 1789.

157

T...ty of Son l.raiD l'in
PARTIES AND POLITICS, 1793-1800

I

w,.

and lww did politicalparties emerge by 1800?

By the rime of Washingto n's reelection, contro'lersies o'ler domescic and for· cign policy had led to the formation of two disrincc political factions. During the presidem •s second tenn, chese factions became formal political parries, Federalists and Republican~ which ~A'3ged a bitter battle culminating in the d eccion of 1800.

The French Revolution led many Americans co reassess their political \'alues. The revolution's radical turn in 1793- 1794, which sent thousands co che guillotine, polar· ized public opinion, generally along regional lines. Feder· alisrs trembled at the thought of"mob rulr' in the nation's future. Citizen Gen~t's recruitment of hundreds ofAmericans co fighc for France reinforced their fears. Fed· eralists ~A'Orried char all of this ~A'3S just the tip of a re\-olutionary iceberg. By the mid· 1790s n:deralist leaders had concluded char it was dangerous to in· \'01\-e the public deeply in policies. l 'h e: people ~A'Cre u ndependable, coo easy a prey for rabble-rousers like GenCc.. n:deralists saw democracy as ..go\-ernmem by the passions of the: mulritudr' and argued that personal merits, not policy, sho uld decide dec· tions. Elected offidals, rhcy maintained, should rule in the people's name buc be in· dependent ofd irect popular influence. A \'l'ry different perspeccii,!'C on gMwnment and politics surfaced in urban areas and in the South, Republicanism. Republican ideology stressed che corruption in· herem in a poW'Crfu l go\·crnment dominated b)•a fc'A• highly "isible men. Southern Republicans insisted char only the: distribution ofpO\l-er among virruous, indepen· dent dtizens would protect liberty. lc mighr seem strange to see southern slave 0\l<·ners embracing Republicanism , with ics emphasis on equality and libercy, but southerners saw no such anontal)'· www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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They understood that the liberty and equality that they advocated "''ere intended for white men only, no matter how uni\-ersal the terms in "'flich the ideas "'-ere expressed. With chcir own labor force consisting of enslaved blacks, not free wage workers, southern elites did not fear popular participation in politics. Ambition also dl'llV'C Jefferson, Madison, and like-minded Americans co rouse: ordinary citizens' concerns about civic affairs. Although the aW'C in "'flich Washing· ton "''lls hdd precluded open criticism of him or his policies,Jefferson, Madison, and ocher Republicans hoped to hold the Federalists accountable to a public that could remove them fro m office for misguided or unpopular policies. Jefferson's increasing frustration prompted him to resign from Washington's cabinet in 1793, widening the political split. Each side saw itself as the guardian of republican virtue: and the other as an illcgicimate .. faction.'" ln t793- 1794opponents of Federalist policies began organizing Democratic (or Republican) societies.: these: societies formed primarily in seaboard cities as u-ell as in the rural South and \'('est. They drew into their ranks planters, small farmers and merchants, artisans, distill· ers, and sailors.

Th • -•bli

Party

Neither Jefferson nor Madison belonged co a Democratic society. HO\l-\'!'\-er, che dubs' criticism of che administration galvanized into political activity many "'flo would later suppore Jefferson's and Madison's Republican party. In 1794, party de\-elopment reached a decisi..-e stage. Shore!)' after Washington aligned himself with Federalist policies, supporters of Jefferson who had begun co call themselves Republicans won a slight majority in the House of R.eprescmacivcs. The election signaled their transformation fro m a faction to a broad-based party, the Republican party, capable of coordinating nation-wide political campaigns. Federalists and Republicans alike: used the press co mold public opinion. Ameri· can journalism came of age in che 1790s as the number of newspapers multiplied from 92 to 242. B)' 1800 newspapers had perhaps 140,000 paid subscribers (about one-fifth of the eligible voters), and chcir secondhand readership probably exceeded 300,000. Newspapers of both camps cheerfully engaged in fear mongering and character assassination. Republicans stood accused of plotting a reign of terror and scheming to turn the nation o\-er to f rance. Federalists faced chatg\!S of favoring hereditary aristocracy and planning to establish an American d)'tlascy by marrying off John Adams's daughter to George Ill. But despite the mutual distrust chus created, newspaper warfare stimulated citizens to become politically acth-e. Accusations that he se:cred)' supported a plot to establish a monarchy enraged Washington. Alarmed by che furor over Jay's Treary, Washington dreaded the nation's polarization imo hostile factions. Lonely and surrounded by mediocre: men after Hamilton returned to private life, Washington decided in spring 1796 co retire after rwo ce:rms and called on Hamilton co giiJ'C a sharp political twist to a farewell address. In his farewell message Washington vigorously condemned political parties. l':lrcisan alignments, he insisted, endangered the Republic's swvival, especially if they became entangled in foreign policy disputes. Aside from fulfilling existing treaty obligations and maintaining foreign commerce, the United States had co avoid "po· litical connection" with Europe and its "''llrs. If the United States gathered its

u:..-~ can

6

•

I

PNmESANOPoUTICS, l;o,}-1800

159

strength u nder "an efficient gOII'ernmenc,'" it could de-fy any foreign challenge-; but if it was drawn into Europe's quarre-ls and corrupcion, the republican experim ent would be doome-d. Washington and Hamilton thus turned the ccncral argument of Republicanism against chcir Republican critics. They also evoked a vision ofa United States virruousl}' isolated from foreign intrigue and power politics, an ide-al that would remain a potent inspiration for long thereafter. Washington left the pre-sidency in 1797 and died in 1799. He ~A'rot out amid a barrage- of criticism. The nacion's policical division into Republicans and Federalists meanwhile hardened into a rwo·part}' system.

Asche- cle-ccion of 1796 approached, che- Republicans cui· tivated a large, lo)'al body of vo t~ the first time- since the Revolution chat che political elite had effective-1}' mobi· lized ordinary Americans. 1'he Republican constituency include-d the Dem ocratic societies, workingmen's dubs, and immigrant-aid associations. Immigrants became a prime target for Republican re-cruiters. During the 1790s the United States absorbed t\W:nty thousand French refugees from Saint Domingue and sixty thousand Irish. Although few immigrants could voce, the Irish exerted critical influence in l\':nns}ivania and New York, where public opinion was sodoscl)•divided that a fe~A' hundred \'Oters could tip the balance. In 1796 che presidential candidates were Vice Pre-sident john Adams, whom the Federalists sup· ported, and che Republicans' Jefferson. Republican strength in che- South offset Federalist strength in New England, leaving ~nnsyl\•ania and New York as crucial StAting states whe-re the Irish voce might tip the scale-s. In the end jeffe-rson carried l\':nns}i· \'ania but not New York and lost the presidency b)• thre-e ele-ctoral votes. The- Federalists kept control of Congress. But jefferson became vice president under the conscicutional provision (later changed by the 1\ve-lfth Amendm ent) chat che candidate receiving the most ele-ccocal voces ~A
Tilt Eledlon of 1796

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French pro\·ocacions produced a sharp anti-Republican backlash. France had alread}' recognized ) a}"s Treaty as an mNI-1799 American attempt to assist the British in their ~A'llr against France. Learning of jefferson's defeat, che French ordered the seizure of American ships.: ~Aithin a year chey had plundered more than three hundred U.S. wssels. The French also ordered thate\'er}' American capru.red on a British naval ship, even chose im·oluntaril)' impressed, be hanged. Seeking to avoid war, Adams dispatched a peace commission to France. The French foreign minister, Charles de Tallcyrand (sha.rt duh TAL~e-rahn), refused co meet wich the Americans, instead promising through chree unnamed agents ("X, Y, and Z'") chat talks could begin after he recei..-ed $250,000 and France obtained a$ 12 million loan. l 'h is barefaced demand for a bribe became k no~A'tl as the XYZ Affair. O utraged Americans adopted che batcle cry ..Millions for defense, noc one cent fo r tribuce." The XYZ Affair discredited Republican fo reign policy vie'I'-'S.. l 'he party's leaders compounded the damage by refusing to condemn French aggression and opposing Adams's call for defensive measures. While Republicans tried to excuse French behavior, che Federalists rode a 'A'll\"e of pacriotism to an enormous victory in the 1798 congressional elections. Congress responded co che XYZAffair b)•arming 6fty-fourships co protect U.S. commerce. l 'he new warships joined what became knO'I'-'n as the Quasi (KWAH· zu)War-an undeclared Franco·American naval conflicc in che Caribbean from 1798 to 1800, during which U.S. forces seized ninety-three French privateers while losing just one s hip. By earl}' 1799 che f rench no longer posed a serious threat ac sea. Meanwhile, che Federalist-controlled Congress tripled the regular army co ceo thousand men in 1798, with an automatic expansion of land forces to 6fty thousand in case of war. But the risk of a land war with f rance was minimaL What Federalists acruall}' 'A'llnted 'A'llS a strong militar}' force ready in case of a civil war, for the crisis had produced near-hysterical fears that French and Irish malcontents were hatching treasonous conspiracies.

The Frtndl Crisis,

m

Afbir Pttnd!. dtmand mr briM from Amtrk

v.p.;. •niC.entodly ......_

tiHs Jdffnon's and t.bdison'5 R'$Oiurioru smouingJUtl':c'

or

rights and tbt pcno'tr nullifi. ution in roponR' to Alim and Sedition Atu

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l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN8UC, q88-18oo

National leaders acced as if a crisis were imminent. Vice President Jefferson hinted chat events might push the southern states into secession from che Union; !'resident Adams hid guns in his home. The election of 1800 would take place in an atmosphere charged with tension.

In the election campaign, che parties once again rallied around che Federalist Adams and the Republican Jefferson. Moderate: leadership in boch parties ensured that the nation ~A'Oul d survive che tumultuous eJection. Jefferson and Madison discouraged radical activity, while Adams rejected demands that he ensure victory by deliberately sparking an insurrection or asking for a declaration of war against France. "Nothing buc an open war can save us;'' declared a high (extreme) Federalist. But when the president discOVI.'.red the French willing to seek peace in I 799, he proposed a spedal diplomatic mission. Adams obtained Senate approval for his en\'O}'S only b}• Prima:ry Source: threatening to resign and thus making Jefferson president. High ~deralis.ts cried Jefferson Campaign unsu ccessfully to dump Adams. Hamilton denounced him as a fool, but t his tactic Poster backfired when most New Englanders rallied around the president. Adams's negotiations with France did not achie\'e a settlement until 1801, but the expectation of nonnal relations pre..·ented ~deralists from exploiting charges of Republican sympathy for the enemy. With the immediate thre-at of ~A'llr removed, voters grew resentful that, in just two years, taxes had soared 33 percent to support an army that had done \i rtually noching. As. the danger of war receded, voters gaw~: Federaliscs less credic fo r scanding up to f rance and more blame for ballooning the national debt b}•$ 10 million. High Federalists spitefully wichhdd the backing that Adams needed co win the presidency. Republicans successfull}' mobilized voters in Philadelphia and New York who were ready to forsake che Federalists. Vocer turnouts more chan doubled chose of 1788, rising from JS percent ro 40 percent, and in hotly comes-red New York and Pennsyl\•ania, more- than half the eligible lucian \\ith ~Llrm, but Jdfeuon \'Oters participated. Com~niendy O\'erlooking Adams's. ~·n unconi,!'Cntional :.nd h iJ Jupporul'lli ini fi~ll}' ''ie....'<."d religious vie'I'-'S, Federaliscs urged citizens to \'Ote for ..GOD-AND A RELI· it optimi,Qca.JI}'. G JOUS I'RESIDENT"' and rejected «JEFFERSON- AND NO GOD!" None· T he XYZ Af&ir a lien.ued many Amcri ~nJ and turdened p.lr ty theless, thousands of Baptiscs, Methodists, and other churchgoers \'Oted for linu between Fcda:.IUu :.nd j efferson. Repub1i ~ru. Adams lost the presidency by just eight electoral ..'Otes, but j efferson's Jcffio.rwn'J JuppoRel'lli ~me the election was not assured. Because all se•;cnty·three Republican electors voted Rcpub1i ~n paR)' b)· the mid· 17'Xb; the dcn :ion of 1796 w:u the lir.st for j efferson and his running mate, Aaron Burr of New York, the Electoral pa"')"b:l$cd cl«tion. College deadlocked in a j efferson· Burr tic. T he deadlock put che eJection tn the .-\lien ~nd Scdifiao Acu, the into rhe House of Representatives, ~Ailere six days and chircy·6ve ballots pro· fcder;aJl.st.s :.ucmpCC'd to 'upprel$ duced no result. Burr, notA• dreaming of becoming president himsd f, looked the ltepublt<.":m pmy. for ~deralist support buc was ch~A'llrted b}•Alexander Hamilton, who sa~A' Jtffio.rwn'J ''ietol'}' in the den:iao af j efferson as "by far not so dangerous a man;'' One ~deralis.t abandoned 1800 "hm\."d th:.t the p:.rtr ')'sctm w.u lirml}' enttcncbed. Burr and ga\'e Jefferson che presidency by history's. narto~A'CSt margin.

The Eledlon of 1800

I

ECOKOMIC Af(O SOOAL OfANGE

163

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE

I

What maJOr ec.onomte and soCJ4/ cMnges cMra(.tenzeJ the new republic?

Dunng the new natton's firsc twdve years, che spread of economic production for markets cransformed the li\-es of many Americans in wa}'S ~Ailose outcome remained uncertain in 1800. Ac the same rime, many Americans v.-ere rethinking questions of gender and race in American society. The fierce political struggles char cook place during this period primarily in· \'01\-ed white males, those ~Ailo had che right to vote and the guarantee of at least minimal civil righcs.. For those not boch white and male, the struggle was co achiC"".-e minimal rights or ac least co sunT.-e.

For centuries che family household had been che scene of virtually all economic production. Family members, ap· prenrices, seJVants, and even slaves ~A'Cre all pare of chis household economy; nearly C"."er)'One ~A'Orked at ~Ailat was either temporarily or per· manend}' «home;'' In the late eighceench century, the vast majority of ho useholds co nsisted of a farmer and his family, which usually included seven children. Hus· band and sons worked in the fidds ~A•hile wives, daughcers, and )'OUng sons main· tained the barns and gardens ncar che house: and proYided food and clothing fo r the family. Women bore and reared the children as W'CIL Mosc families produced o nly what they needed and a small surplus fo r barter. After che American Re\'Oiution, this began to change in heavily settled regions of the Northeast. Prosperous farmers began to sell chcir surplus-produce, meac, and dairy products-to urban customers. 10 imprM>e milk }idds, many farmers began to co ncentrate on breeds ofcactle knov.'n as good producers. Farmwomen, often re-ferred to as "dairymaids.'' focused o n milking the cattle and churning butter, much in demand by urban consumers. Poorer farmers found other wa}'S to produce for commercial markets. Young men and )'OUng couples mm--ed tA'eSt, while unmarried daughters frequently remained at home and spun and ......-m-e d oth. Enterprising merchants began catering to an emerging urban marker for d oth as ~A'e-ll as selling co southerners ~Ailo wanted the cheapest possible material for sla\J'C doching. Merchants would supply raw flax (for linen). wool, and cotton to mochers and daughters in farm household~ rcrurning in a few u-eeks to pa}' che women cash for their handi~A'Ork. A similar system emerged in the shoe industry, where prosperous shoemakers began supplying leather to others and paying them for the fin ished produce. Numero us other enterprises emerged,. empl0)1ng both men and women ro sat· isfy needs, su ch as making nails, chat sdf-comained households co uld not ha\-e mec. Spurring on these new industries was an ambitious, aggressi\J'C dass of business· men, originally merchants, who invested their profi ts in factories, ships, gMTrn· ment bonds, and banks. l'rivace banks appeared in l' hiladdphia, Boston, and New York d uring the J780s. English arcisans ~A'Cre: encouraged to immigrate co the United States, bringing ~A'ith them knowledge of che latest industrial technologies. In 1791 New York and Philadelphia merchants established che Society for the

PIMIKint for Marlwls

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164

CHAPtER 7

l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN8UC, q88-18oo

Encouragement of Useful Manufactures, which attempted to dem onstrate the po· tential of large-scale industrial enterprises by building a factory cown ac Paterson, New Jersey. The 6rs.t formal association for trading gowrnment bonds appeared in New York City in 179 I.: it ultimately became che New York Stock Exchange. For many Americans, che choice between manufacturing and farming was moral as wdl as economic. Hamilton's aggressive support of entrepreneurship and indus· trialization embodied his larger vision for America- and contradicted char ofJeffer· son. While Hamilton admired efficientl}' run factories in which a few managers supervised farge numbers of ~A'Orkers, Jefferson idealized white landowning famil}' farm~ che "yeomen;'' as bulwarks of republican virtue and liberty. for Hamilton, capital, technology, and managerial discipline were the surest roads to national or· der and wealch. O n the other hand, Jefferson saw land as che key to prosperity and liberty for all. The argument O\'tr the relative merits of these :?n lll•.··-rr.1 r u:r.$. two ideals would remain constant in American politics for at least another two cencuries.

Along with the growing importance of ~A
Willie Women ia the

Ad¥0c.ltiog Wuml!ll's Ricllt~ 1792 In chis lllusb':u1on &om :~n Americ.:at~ maguine for women, the "Genius of the Ladies M:~ga.· zine" :~nd the ~Genius of Emulation" p.-nent l ibenyMth a petition b.:~nd on British feminist Ma.ryWollll'tonecraft's VindiG~tion of the RightS' ofWom:at~ .

I

ECOKOMIC Af(O SOOAL OfANGE

ingly cited lack of muruality as che: cause for divo rce:. A few women also challenged the d ouble standard that allowed men to engage in extramarital affajrs while: con· dcmning their female: parmers. The subordination of ~A'Omen co men increasingly became che: subject of debate. Poec and essayist judith Sargent Murray wrote that both genders had equal in tel· le<eual ability and deserved equal education. "We can only reason from what v.-e know;'' she argued, «and if an opporrunity of acquiring k no~Aicdge hath bten denied us, che inferiority of our sex cannot fair!}' be deduced fro m there." Women should not rush into marriage: bur should 6rst imprOIJ'C their minds so char they could in· still republican ideals in their children. The idea of «republican motherhood" emphasized the necessity of educating ......tlite: women so that they could inculcate republican vi.n:ucs in cheir children, male as wcll as fumalc. In the J780s prh•ate academics for women began to em~ in cities. In 1789 Massachusctcs forbade any town to cxdude girls from its elemc:ntar}' schools. By itself the expansion of educational opportunities for white women had a limited effect, because women were generally still co nfined to «the narro"'' circle of domesticity." Republican assertions of male and female moral and imelle<eual equality provoked scattered calls for political equality, although che great scruggle for women's political rights v,:ould begin only in the next century. Women could indttd be: virtuous wives and mothers, but the world outside their home offered them few opportu nities to apply their education.

Und and CUlture: Nltlvt Amerkllns

165

l

l..&thSqeot ......, t..Wiy flominist

Native Americans were excluded from the benefi ts brought

by growing prosperity. By 1795 most eascern Indian tribes

had su ffered severe: reductions in population and terri· tory, o"'ing to barth~, famine, and disease. From In s to 1795 the Cherokees dedi ned from sixce:en thousand to ten thousand and the Iroquois, fro m nine thousand to four thousand. Between JnS and 1800 Indians forfci ted more land than the area in· habited b)• "'ilitcs in 1775. Seeders crowded Indians onto reservations (often ille· gally), liquor dealers and criminals trespassed on Indian lands, and go\-ernmem agents and missionaries pressured Indians to abandon their lands and culcures. De· moralized and unable to scrike back, Indians often sank imo alcoholism, and their settlem ents were plagued by despair and violence. While not hesitating to usc force against Native Americans who resisted U.S. authority, Washingto n and his Secretar}' of War, Henry Knox, sought co use the go\'· ernment as an imcrmediar}' bmwen Indians and non-Indians. Congress enacted this policy gradually in a series of Indian Trade and Jnu•rc.ourse Acts ( 1790--1796), which became penn an em in 1834. The aces prohibited the rransfur of tribal lands to outsiders unless authorized by Congress or in formal tre-aties; the aces required that traders be licensed by the federal gOI.'Crnmenc, defined murder and ocher abuses by non-Indians as federal crimes, and promoted programs that would "promote civilization'" among Naci\J'C Americans. "Ci,ilization" meant Anglo-American culture, pri· \'ate property, and a strictly agricultural way of life. By abandoning communal land ownership and seasonal migrations for hunting, gathering, and fishing, Knox argued, Indians would no longer need most of the land they "''ere tr}ing co protect, thereby making it available for whites.

.._TraM iiMIInb!nlcMirse Ads Series oflaws ckJigned 10 promoao btttr:r rdarioru bt. tWft'n fnc!Uns and ,.·hitt:e

lnteracti\•e Map:

Westem land Claims after Alnerican lndependence

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166

OfAPlER 7

l.AUMCHIMG THE NEW REN8UC, q88-18oo

Mop 7.1 llldiloo Land Cmions. 1168-INt During the lau third of the e ighteenth century, NatiVl' Amerie.;uu W\"rc: forced to gi\~ up ute'"'\'e home· land:; dvoughout the e;~~st· em b.ukc:ountry ;u~d furthoer west in th-e Ohio ;u~d Tennessee river v;~~lley:o.

Among che: most dt\':IStated tribes in the I 790s were che Seneca Iroquois. A rna· joricy of surviving Iroquois had mow~d to Canada after che Rt\'Oiurion; those who stayed "-'ere pressured to sell their land. or were simp!)' defrauded of it, leaving them isolaced from one another on tiny reservations. Unable ro practice: their traditional occupations, Seneca men frequently resorted to heavy drinking that led to \i olmcc. Beginning in 1799 a Seneca Iroquois prophct. Handsome Lake, led his people in a crcati\.'e effort to resolve che crisis. He preached against alcoholism among che Ito· quois b)•appealing to their religious traditions. He welcomed Quaker missionaries who taught Euro-American agricultural methods to Iroquois men who ~A'Cre: no longer able to hum and crade. Many Iroquois men welcomed the change. Iroquois women who resisce:d because they stood ro forfcit their collectt...·e ownership of farm· land. chcir concrol of the food supply, and chcir place in tribal councils were accused of~Aitchcraft. Among the: Iroquois. as wich most Indians. che conflict be:cwecn tradi· tion and new ways proceeded 6cfully.

The Republic's 6rst years marked the high tide: of African· Americans' revolutionary~era success in be:ccering chcir loc.. Although racism persisted, j efferson's eloquent u'Ords "all men arc created equal" awakened many white consciences. In 1790.8 percent of

Alrlran-Americ• Singles

I ECOKOMIC Af(O SOctt.LOfANGE African-Americans enjoy~d freedom. By 1800, II percent ~A'Cre free. State reforms meanwhile: attempted to improve slaves' conditions. In 1791 che Norch Carolina leg· islacure: declared char the «distinction of criminality bctVteen the murder of a white pcrson and one ~Ailo is equally an human creature, bur merd)' of a different complex· ion, is disgraceful to humanity"' and authorized the: execution of "''hites ~Ailo mur· dcred sla\·rs. By 1794 most states had outlawed the Adanric slave crade. Hesitam measures to ensure free blacks' legal equality appeared in the 1780s and early J790·s.. Mosc states dropped restrictions on chcir freedom of mow~menc, protected their property, and allowed them co enroll in the militia. All but three scares either pennitcrd free blacks to \OOte or made: no specific atce:mpcs to exdude them. Bur before the 1790s ended, the: trend tO'I'-ard lessening the: social and legal discances betv.r'Ce:n the races ended. Abolitionist sentiment ebbed, slavery became more: entrenched, and ~A•hites demonstrated reluctance to accept free blacks as fellow citizens. Federal law led the way in restricting the rights of African-Americans. In 1790 congressional procedures for naturalizing aliens limited eligibility co foreign ~Ailitrs.. The federal militia law of 1792 aliO'I'--ed scares to exclude free: blacks. The navy and marine corps fotbade nonwhite enlistments in 1798. By 1807 Delaware, Maryland, Kencucky, and New Jersey had stripped f ree blacks of the vote. Although free blacks enjoyed rights in some areas, the number of places treating them as the political equals of whites dropped sharp!)' in the early J800s.. Some: free blacks rose abcm: these disadvantages, and a few gained recognition among whites. One ofche best·kno~A'tl was Benjamin Banne:ker of Maryland, a seJf. caught mathematician and astronomer. Banneker ~A'llS one of three surw:)-ors ~Ailo laid out the new national capital in Washingron, D.C., and after 1791 he published a series of widely read almanacs. Sending a copy of one co Thomas j efferson, Ban· neker chided che furu.re president for holding views of black inferiority that contra· dieted his ringing u-ords in the Declaration of Independence. Faced with gro~A'ing constriction of che:ir freedom and opportunities, free African-Americans turned to one another for supporc, especial!)' through religious channels. During che J780s Richard Allen and Absalom j ones formed the Free Afri· can Society of Philadelphia, whose: me:mbcrs pooled chcir resources to aid one an· other and other blacks in nerd. When che white-dominated Methodist church cht:)' attended restricted black ~A'Orshippe:rs to the gallery, Allen and Jones and their fot. loo·ers formed their O'A'tl congregation. Comparable dewJopmcms in other norch· ern communities would lead to theestablishmem ofthe African Methodist Episcopal Church (sec Chapter 9). In 1793 a yellaw few~r epidemic, swept Philadelphia, leaving about fou r thou· sand dead. Mosc affluenc whites fled. Allen and jones organized a relie-f e-ffort in which African-Americans tended to che-sick and buried the de-ad of both races. l 'he:ir only 1\."'A'llrd ~A'llS a \'id ous publicity campaign wrongly accusing blacks of profiting at whites' expense. An cspe:d all)' revealing symptom of changing attitudes occurred in 1793 ~Ailen Congress passed the: Fugitive Slaw Law. The: latA' required judges to award posses· sion of a runaway sla"-e on a formal request by a master or his represcmacive. Ac· cusrd runaways 'A'ct'e denied jury trials and sometimes were- refused permission to present evidence. Slaves' legal starus as property disqualified chem fro m claiming these: conscirutional privileges, but the Fugiti\'f: Slave latA•denied e\-enfrre blacks the

167

lnteracti\•e Map: African American Populatioo. 1790

FtoPm Sin. L.. "'•"'""

I

ITtutn oftu:n.lr.l)' Jl.na; denitd

bladt:c wy con.stitutiCII!l.ll protec:tiO!l$

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legal protections guaranteed to them under the Bill of Rights. White Americans dearly found it cas}' to forgct that the Conscitution had noc limited citizenship co their race. The bloody slave rc\'olton Saint Domingue undermined t he: trmd toward aboli· tion and reinforced the kinds of fears that spa"''tled radsm . Reports of the: slaughter of french slaveholders made: white: Americans more reluctant co criticize slaver}' and helped to transfonn the: image of blacks from chat of victims of injustice to one: of CI....,.s f"'!!»e>li• F~ikd sbnpotencial menaces. In August 1800 a planned insurrection of more chan one: thouR"bC'Uion io Yuginiol sand slaw~s in Richmond, Virginia, kindled smoldering ~Ailice fears. l 'he: militia put cotlln gin hwmOOo that down the: conspiracy and executed thirty·fiw slaves, including the: leader, Gabriel. madt dtaning ofsouthern cotton f.ut ;and dwap Gabriel's rebellion fanned fears of fucur~: 1\.'VOits. Isolaced uprisings occurred in t he: United States for years after, and rumors persisted that a massive ri!\'Oit 'A'llS brewing. Antislavery sentiment diminished rapidly. The: antisla\•cty mm-e· CHECKI NG I N mem ~A\·Ir In 1793 a New Englander, Eli Whicne:y, inwme:d a cotton gin which effi· toward tnding '~ry, but tht ,.)a\'C' revoh on Saint Domingue and cienrly cleaned short-staple: cotton. lm pro\~d b)•others, Whime:y's machine: Gabrid',: 1\"bdlion in Virgini.l halted removed a major obstacle: to co£Con cultivation, ga\~ plantation sla\•cty a progf\":1$, new lease: on life, and undermined t he: doubts of those who considered slavThe irM"ntion o( the cotron gin in er}' economically outmoded. Thus, by the: rime Thomas jefferson became: 179J tran.dOcmed ,;outh«n agricul· president in 1801, free blacks had suffered a subtle erosion of their political tuno and tntuncbed .sb'A"fr lirmly in t he South.. gains, and sla\~S scood no closer to freedom.

I

l

Chapter Su 0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AUOl O R LE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND LISTEN TO IT ON THE GO.

What role did Georze Washington play in translating the Constiwoon (rom words intogovernment? (page 146)

I

As pn:side:nt, Washington worked hard to lessen te-ars of the ga.·crnme:nt by balancing his cabinet among competing sectional interests. He also established the precedent of serving only two terms. The: Judkiar}' Act of 1789, which left room for state practice, and the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed pccsonalliber· t ies, underscored his commit ment to the ideals of the Revolution.

KEY TERMS

Judicial)' Art of 1789 (p. 147} Bil of Rlghls (p. 147) Alexandor Hamiton (p. 148) Report on""' Public Credo (p. 149) Report on the National Bank (p. ISQ)

Report on Manufactures (p. ISO)

CHAPTER SUMMAAY

What were the major components o{Hamiltcn 's blueprint for the new nation? ({!<Jge 148)

I

Alexander Hamilton, as Washington's scctetary of the treasury, devised a blueprint for America's future; among other things, Hamilton advocated erearion of a petmancnt debt, cstablishmcm of a national bank, and strong support for industrial deve-lopment.

I

How did the new nation deal with France, S{!<Jin, and Britain? ({!<Jf11 S3)

Spain artemptcd to expand its North American holdings. but Washington countered by neutralizing its Indian allies. The French Re~-olu ti on proved a source of contention in the United States, especially with the arrival of Citizen Genet and his scheme to enlist Americans to tight on France's behalf. 1b cry to relieve tensions, Americans undertook diplomatic missions. Jay's Treaty sol\'ed tew problems but stimulated the American cconomy by opening American trade with the British Empire. Pinckney's Treaty teSolwd tensions with Spain.

169

KEY TEII.MS c«otin ued

Whi!l:•y R./60}

Ai
Judith Sargool Murray (p. 16S) fndian Trade and fntercourse Acts (p. /6S)

Fu~ Slave Law O>.

I

Why and how did political {!<Jrties emew by 1800? ({!<Jge 151)

The emergence of political parties clarified -and intensifi ed debate m-er the shape of the nation's future. Frightened t,· JdTmon•s Republican supporters, tht Federalists supported cht Alien and Sedition Acrs.. T'h e split 0\I'Cf the French Revolution was only one of a series of major issues on which the twO parties disag!l'cd.

Gallri
161} (p. 168)

cotton !lin (p. 168)

What major economic and social dlallfiS characterized the new republic? (page 163)

I

The market economy began ro cransfonn society. White women enjO)'ed modest gains in educational but not political opportunities, and NatiVl' Amefi· cans saw their condition continue to deteriorate. There \l
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CHAPTER SUMMAAY

What were the major components o{Hamiltcn 's blueprint for the new nation? ({!<Jge 148)

I

Alexander Hamilton, as Washington's scctetary of the treasury, devised a blueprint for America's future; among other things, Hamilton advocated erearion of a petmancnt debt, cstablishmcm of a national bank, and strong support for industrial deve-lopment.

I

How did the new nation deal with France, S{!<Jin, and Britain? ({!<Jf11 S3)

Spain artemptcd to expand its North American holdings. but Washington countered by neutralizing its Indian allies. The French Re~-olu ti on proved a source of contention in the United States, especially with the arrival of Citizen Genet and his scheme to enlist Americans to tight on France's behalf. 1b cry to relieve tensions, Americans undertook diplomatic missions. Jay's Treaty sol\'ed tew problems but stimulated the American cconomy by opening American trade with the British Empire. Pinckney's Treaty teSolwd tensions with Spain.

169

KEY TEII.MS c«otin ued

Whi!l:•y R./60}

Ai
Judith Sargool Murray (p. 16S) fndian Trade and fntercourse Acts (p. /6S)

Fu~ Slave Law O>.

I

Why and how did political {!<Jrties emew by 1800? ({!<Jge 151)

The emergence of political parties clarified -and intensifi ed debate m-er the shape of the nation's future. Frightened t,· JdTmon•s Republican supporters, tht Federalists supported cht Alien and Sedition Acrs.. T'h e split 0\I'Cf the French Revolution was only one of a series of major issues on which the twO parties disag!l'cd.

Gallri
161} (p. 168)

cotton !lin (p. 168)

What major economic and social dlallfiS characterized the new republic? (page 163)

I

The market economy began ro cransfonn society. White women enjO)'ed modest gains in educational but not political opportunities, and NatiVl' Amefi· cans saw their condition continue to deteriorate. There \l
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I THE ACE Ofj EfFERSON

171

bled che size of the United States. And his su ccessors, j ames Madison and James Monroe, ruled under his belief that govcrnments were strong only co the excent that they earned the affection of a contented people. The ~deralist party, deserctd by \'OW's, collapsed and disintegrated. Buc harmony proved elusive. E..-cms in Europe continued to roil American poli· tics. Even ending all trade with Europe did not allow the Unictd Statts co remain d ear of European wars; the policy, in fact, led co war berween Britain and the United States in 18 12. Wich the ~deralist party a declining force, factionalism tore at che Republican party. Ominously, in 18 19 and 1820 Republicans split along sectional lines 01/'Cr the extension of slaw~ry inco Missouri.

THE AGE OF jEFFERSON 1-/ow did)11{ferson's philosophy sMpe policy toward public expenditutVs, the judiciary, 11nd Louisiana? Narro~Aiy docced, Jeffcrson saw his popularity rise in his 6rst cerm as he scaled d~'n seeming!}' u nnecessary gMwnment expenditures. Increasingly confident of

public support, he ~A
Jllfawwand Jllfa anlanism

s.Jiy """""~' j
l

nuoomlro be hU mi.niT.Ss aod moc.her of si'!'*Tnl of his dtildrm

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172

CHAPtER 8

jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO Fl:UIMGS, 18o1- 1b4!

j efferson did not believe that blacks and whites could live pmnanently side by side, and he greacly feared a race war so vicious that it could be supprcs.sed onl)' by a dictator. Only by colonizing blacks in Africa, he bdiew:d, could America aV\'.rc m'O· lution and chaos. High caxes, standing annies, and public corruption could also threaten Ameri· can liberty, he believed, by making government the master rather than the servant of the people. To Pl\.'"lent che United States from sinking into cyrann}~Jefferson ad..'O· cated char state gowrnments retain great authority because they ~A'Cre immcdiatd)' responsiV\'. to popular will. l'opular liberty required popular vircue, he believed, vircue being the disposition to place public good above private interest and to exercise vigilance in keeping gO\'· ernmenc under controL 1b j efferson, the most vigilant and virtuous people were ed· ucaced farm~ accustomed to acting and thinking wich sturdy independence. least vigilant were the inhabitants of cities, which he saw as breeding grounds for mobs and as menaces co liberty.

Jefferson described his election as a revolution, bur the m'Oiucion he sought was co restore the liberty and tran· quilicy that he thought the United States had enjoyed in its earliest years and to rew:rse ~Ailac he saw as a drift inco desporism.1'he $10 million growth in chc national debt under the n:deralists alarmed Jefferson and his secre· tar}' of the treasur)', Alberc Gallatin. They rejected Alexander Hamilton's argument that debt strengthened the ga..·ernmenr by giving creditors a stake in its health. Just paying interest on che debt "''Ould require taxes, ~Ailich would su ck money from in· dustrious farmers, the backbone: of che Republic. The money \N'Ould then fall inco the hands of creditors, parasites who leeched off interest payments. Increased tax rcw:nues might also tempe the go\-ernme:nt to escablish a standing army, always a threat co liberty. l b jefferson and Gallatin, federal economy ourwcighed che importance ofm ili· tar}' preparednessj Gallatin calculated that, b)• holding the line on expenditures, the: go\-emme:nt could pay off the: national debe in sixteen )"ears. A lull in the war be· tw't-l'n France and England chat had chreatene:d American shipping in che 1790s convinced Jefferson chat minimal military preparedn ess was a sound policy. While cutting back funds for the army, Jefferson was ready to use the navy co gain respccc for the American flag. In 1801 he ordered a naval squadron into action against che so-called Barbary (BAR-burr·« ) pirates of Nonh Africa. Jefferson calcu· laced that going co ~A'llr ~A
In his 6rsc inaugural address, jefferson reminded Ameri· cans that they agreed on far more than they disagreed abouc. "We arc all republicans;'' he: proclaimed, "we are all federalists:" Ho\IJ'C\"Cr, conflicts 0\'er the: judiciary derailed jefferson's hopes of con· ciliation ~Aith moderate: Federalists. The first sticking point was cheJudidary Act of

I THE ACE Ofj EFFERSON

173

TOOmas Jefferson's inauguration Repeal oldie ludidary Aa:go Aodlvord; McCulloch v. Morylond Monroe eiKted to a second term Missouri Co"1!fomis.e Monroe Doclrine

1801, which reduced che sjzc of t he Supreme Court and cre-ated sixteen new federal judgeships, all ofwhich john Adams had filled ~Aith Federalists in last·minuce «mid· nightappoincmcrlts:'' Giw~n t he bictcrness m~aced by ~deralist zeal in enforcing t he Alien and Sedition Acts, to jefferson this 'A'llS furcher proof that his opponents saw the court system as a battering ram to artack Republicanism. C hief justice j ohn Marshall, an arch· Federalis t appointed b)•j ohn Adams and the repuced author of t he judiciary Ace of 1801, did little to erase jefferson' s suspi· d ons. In MtJrb,.ry v. M•rlison ( 1803), Marshall and the Court ruled chat Congress had exceeded ics conscirutional auchoricy in writing t he judiciary Act of 1789. This decision was che 6rsc time that che Court had ~rru rncd an ace of Congress, an im· porcant step on t he way to establis hing t he principle of judicial review. j efferson accepted chis principle, which was destined to become highl}' influential. Even as the Marbury decision was pending, Republicans had cakcn the of'fcnsivc against che judiciary, moving to impeach two ~dcralist judges, john Pickering and Samuel Chase. l'ickering was quickl}' rem~d fro m office, but Chase presented difficulties. He was an ardent Federalis t who had zealously enforced che Alien and

I

l

...,~- S..p~m< Coutt dtcisicln that ~~ tbt fnmtvo'Cirlt lOr judici.ll ~w ~icill r.Wew Ptinciplt tbat Su~mt Coun: Qfl l'l'!'ritw and ITji'Ct mc'asun'5 ~

by

Con"'~

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.....

Sedition Acts. Nonetheless, the Constitution speci6ed that judges could be impeached only for treason, briber)', and "high Crim es and Misdemeanors:'' Was impeachment a so· lution for excessive political partisanship, Chase's funda· mcneal sin? Ultimately Chase ~A'llS impeached in 1804, but the Senate narrow!)' failed to convict him, in pan because moderate Republicans had begun to doubc that impeach· menc was the cure for judicial partisanship. Chase's acquittal ended jefferson's skirmishes with the judiciary. Unlike his radical follow~ jefferson objected nei· ther to judicial r...--vi e~A' nor to an appointed judiciary; he merely challenged Federalist use ofjudicial poW'Cr fo r poliri· cal goals. Yct there 'A'3S alwa)'S a gray area between law and politics. To Federaliscs, chere was no conflict between pro· tecting the Conscirution and advancing chcir party's cause. Nor did Federalists use their domination of the courts co undo jefferson's "revolution" of 1800; che Marshall Court, for example, upheld the constitutionality of che repeal of the judiciary Act of 1801.

Jefferson's goal of avoiding foreign entanglements would remain be· Purdllse yond reach as long as European powers held large territories in North America. In the Treaty of San Jldefonso (san ~d-duh-FON· soh) ( 1800), a ~A'Cakened Spain had returned che vast Louisiana 1trritory to France, which, under Napoleon Bonaparte, was emerging as Eu· rope's strongest military power. j efferson 'A'llS appalled. The president had long imagined chat che inevitable expansion of a free and vir· tuous American people would create an «empire of liberty:'' Spain was no obstade, but Napoleonic f rance posed a real dangerjjefferson knew chat Bonapan:e's capac· ity for mischief was boundless. If Bonaparte ga\'e England a free hand in the Medi· terranean in exchange for a license for French expansion in North America, the United States could be sandwiched between British Canada and French Louisiana. Bonaparte's real goal was d ifferent but no less dangerous to American interests. Sure of his destiny as a conqueror, he dreamed of re-creating a French New World empire bordering the Caribbean and che Gulf of Mexico. l 'he island of Saint Domingue (modern Haiti and the Dominican Republic) would be the fulcrum of the empire, and Louisiana its breadbasket. Before chis dream could become reality, ho~A'CW.r, the French would have co subdue Santo Domingo, where a bloody slaw~: re· bellion had led co the creation of a gm-crnmenc under the black statesman 1bussaint L'Ouverru.re (too-SAN loo-wr-TOOR). Napoleon accordingly dispatched an army co reassert French control and to reestablish slawry, bur )"CIIow fcwr and 6erce resis· tance b)• the former slaves doomed the French forces. In che short run, jefferson worried most about New O rleans, the only o udet for farmers along the Mississippi and Ohio ri\-er systems. Spain had temporaril)'

Dl Loulllalll

Moo of tilt Ptoplt Jefferson thought ol t.im· sd( ;u ;a wo'*ing poli tici:u~ :u~d m;an or the people, I'\Ot ;u ;an ;aristocr.ttic f'igu~ he;ad. Foreign diplom;ats in the United St;atcs we~ o(ten sh~ked Men Jeffet-son greeted them dnossed in C"o
174

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jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO Fl:UIMGS. 18o1- 1b4!

.....

Sedition Acts. Nonetheless, the Constitution speci6ed that judges could be impeached only for treason, briber)', and "high Crim es and Misdemeanors:'' Was impeachment a so· lution for excessive political partisanship, Chase's funda· mcneal sin? Ultimately Chase ~A'llS impeached in 1804, but the Senate narrow!)' failed to convict him, in pan because moderate Republicans had begun to doubc that impeach· menc was the cure for judicial partisanship. Chase's acquittal ended jefferson's skirmishes with the judiciary. Unlike his radical follow~ jefferson objected nei· ther to judicial r...--vi e~A' nor to an appointed judiciary; he merely challenged Federalist use ofjudicial poW'Cr fo r poliri· cal goals. Yct there 'A'3S alwa)'S a gray area between law and politics. To Federaliscs, chere was no conflict between pro· tecting the Conscirution and advancing chcir party's cause. Nor did Federalists use their domination of the courts co undo jefferson's "revolution" of 1800; che Marshall Court, for example, upheld the constitutionality of che repeal of the judiciary Act of 1801.

Jefferson's goal of avoiding foreign entanglements would remain be· Purdllse yond reach as long as European powers held large territories in North America. In the Treaty of San Jldefonso (san ~d-duh-FON· soh) ( 1800), a ~A'Cakened Spain had returned che vast Louisiana 1trritory to France, which, under Napoleon Bonaparte, was emerging as Eu· rope's strongest military power. j efferson 'A'llS appalled. The president had long imagined chat che inevitable expansion of a free and vir· tuous American people would create an «empire of liberty:'' Spain was no obstade, but Napoleonic f rance posed a real dangerjjefferson knew chat Bonapan:e's capac· ity for mischief was boundless. If Bonaparte ga\'e England a free hand in the Medi· terranean in exchange for a license for French expansion in North America, the United States could be sandwiched between British Canada and French Louisiana. Bonaparte's real goal was d ifferent but no less dangerous to American interests. Sure of his destiny as a conqueror, he dreamed of re-creating a French New World empire bordering the Caribbean and che Gulf of Mexico. l 'he island of Saint Domingue (modern Haiti and the Dominican Republic) would be the fulcrum of the empire, and Louisiana its breadbasket. Before chis dream could become reality, ho~A'CW.r, the French would have co subdue Santo Domingo, where a bloody slaw~: re· bellion had led co the creation of a gm-crnmenc under the black statesman 1bussaint L'Ouverru.re (too-SAN loo-wr-TOOR). Napoleon accordingly dispatched an army co reassert French control and to reestablish slawry, bur )"CIIow fcwr and 6erce resis· tance b)• the former slaves doomed the French forces. In che short run, jefferson worried most about New O rleans, the only o udet for farmers along the Mississippi and Ohio ri\-er systems. Spain had temporaril)'

Dl Loulllalll

Moo of tilt Ptoplt Jefferson thought ol t.im· sd( ;u ;a wo'*ing poli tici:u~ :u~d m;an or the people, I'\Ot ;u ;an ;aristocr.ttic f'igu~ he;ad. Foreign diplom;ats in the United St;atcs we~ o(ten sh~ked Men Jeffet-son greeted them dnossed in C"o
176

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jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO FtUIMGS, 18o1- 1b4!

I.Hisiana h rc:Use }dft:r.$CIIII."s

I

purdl.uc" or ioterior of Nofth

Amtriu from Fran~ virtw.lly doobltd Jiu oCUnited .x..tts

so he dedded to sell all of Louisiana. The American commissioners and the French go\-emment seeded on a price of $ 15 million. l 'h us che United States bought this immense, uncharted territory. No one knew its exact sjze, but the Louisiana Pur· chase virtually doubled the area of the United States. j efferson found himself caught between ideals and reality. He bdie\-ed in strict construction-the doctrine that the Constitution should be interpreted according to its letter- but recognized that doubling che size of the Republic would guarantee: land for American farmcrs, the backbone of the nation and the true guardians of liberty. Stricc construction was noc an end in itself buc a means to promote repub· lican liberty. If that end could be achie\·ed in some 'A'llf ocher than b}• strict con· strucrion, so be it. l'olitical considerations also 6gured in Jefferson's calculations. Federalists generally opposed the Louisiana Purchase: because it would decrease t he relative importance of their strongholds on t he eastern seaboard. As the leader of the Republican party, che president saw no reason to hand the Federalists an issu e: by dall}ing O\'er ratification of t he rreacy.

The main chre:at co j efferson's reelection in 1804 was not the n:deralists, who u-ere d ispir ited and lacked a popular national issue, but Aaron Burr, his own vice president, who had tried to take advantage of a tie: in the Electoral College co gain che presi· dency in 1800. 11le 1\l-elfth Amendmenc had d ari6ed the electoral process but had noc e:liminace:d Burr's conniving: he had spent much of his vice presidency in in· trigue with the Federalists. The Republicans d ispensed ~A'ith the chreat by uncere:mo· niously d umping him from the cicke:t in 1804 in favor of George Clinton. In t he e:lecrion che Federalist nominees, Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, carried onl}' two states. Jefferson's 0'1/Crwhelming victory brought his 6rs.t ce:rm co a fitting dose; betv.rcen 1801 and 1804 t he United States had doubled its territor}', starred to pa}'Off its debe, and remained at peace:. President Jefferson basked in the sun of success.

'lilt Eledlon of 1804

louisiana dazzled Jefferson's imagination. Americans knew virtually nothing about the immense territory, not even its western boundary. A cas.e: could be made for t he l':lci6c Ocean, but Jefferson was contenc co claim that Louisiana extended at least co the mountains west of the Mississippi, mountains chac few Americans had seen. Thus che Louisiana l'urchase: 'A'llS boch a bargain and a surprise package. Even before che purchase, Jefferson had planned an explorator}' expedition. He had chosen Lieutenant Meriwether U:wi~ his personal secretary, as commander and had sene him to l'hiladdphia for a crash course in zoology, astronom}'• and bocany. Lewis was to trace: the Missouri River to its source, cross the western highland~ and follow the best 'A'llter route to che Pacific.. Although Jefferson stressed commercial possibilities in requesting congressional fu nding for the expedition, he probably cared more abouc advancing scientific knowledge. Leaving St. Louis in Ma}' 1804, U:wi~ his second-in-
111e Lewis and oart Elpelllon

bonneau (SHAR-bun-noh), as guide and interpreter. Charbonneau proved less chan ideal, but his shon-c omings were offset by his wife, Sacajav.~a (sock-a·ja·WAYilh), a sixcttO·)'~ar-ol d Shoshone (show-SHOW-flee) stolen by a rival cribe: and then mar· ried to Charbonneau. D ur ing che expedition, the presence of Sacajawea's newborn son helped to persuade: skeptical t ribes o f l ewis and C lark's peaceful intent_:she also showed the whites how co forage: fo r wild plants, often t heir only food, b)•raiding t he IAwis ood a.t apH;Ooo dens where rodents sco red them. lWo.yur nploration of newly Despite t his establish ment of t heir peaceful incem, l..t:wis and Clark faced obacquiffll terriwry;a IICimtific scades. The expedition bro ught them into contact wich numerous cribes, each ~Aith IR'..UU~ I~ a history o f warring on other cribes and carrying on its own internal feuds. Rdiant on Indians for guides, packers, and intcrpreccrs, LC'"'-·is and Clark had co become diplomats as well as explorers. Jefferson had inst ructed t hem to asserc American SM'Creignty 0\'Ct the Purchase. They distributed P~Ji ckm Jtfferwn feared too Jc:rong medals and uniforms co chiefs read}' to su pport American authority and a ttn tral g'0\'1'-rnmmt and uw t d u· staged military parades and displays of t heir weapons, which included cattd farmtu aJ t ht bad: bone of cannons. But no cribe had a sjngle chief, and l..t:wis and Clark sometim es Repub litaniJm. miscalculated, t hinking a minor chief co be head of an entire tribe. Yet Tht jeffer:~on admini.M:r;ation ~ j.ee'ted the Ham iltonian id u o( a t heir diplomacy was general!)' successful, less because they were sophisti· pennanent national d tbt and downcated eth nographcrs chan because th ey a\·oided violence. p lay'td milifa.rr prepa~dm1a. After reach ing the l':lci6c in Nm-·ember 1805, t he expedition rcrurned t:H.spice q u..llmJ about it5 t onJt icu · to St. louis. The explorers had co llected vast amounts o f scientific inforc:ion.Uity, Jeffer:~o n eag«ly t arried mation, including che disturbing fact that more t han 300 miles of mounou t the t.ou iJiana Pu rth~ cains separated the Missou ri from the Columbia Nonetheless, t he Lewis With appau nc JU«~J in both d omati ~ and ro~tgn policy, Je(ftrand Cla rtc upOO.itio n s rimulated interest in the West. l 'h e expedition also w n t:aJilr won reel« tion in 1804. produced a sprinkling of tall cales abouc gigantic Indians, a mountain The L:-w U and d aD: apedition co mposed o f salt, and soil too rich to grow crees. 11-agically. M erh"~cher coll« ted large amQUn u: of :~cienti fic ~·is would die of gunshoc wounds, pcrllaps self-inflicted, wicho ut t:\'et d.n~ and spark«! intereJt in returning to Washingto n. c:he \VC'.Sl.

I

I

THE GATHERING STORM How did tiNt United Stat~ slide into war with Great Britain?

In gaining L.ou isjana, the United Scates had beneficed from the Euro pean powers' preoccupacion with t heir own struggles. But between 1803 and 1814, t he Napo· Ieonie Wars rurned rhe United Scares into a pa~A'tl in a chess game played by others and made Jefferson's second term far less successfu l t han his fi rst. Europe was not Jefferson's onl}' problem. He had to deal ~Aith a ploc to d is man· d e t he United States, hatched in t he im--enti\~ and perverse mind of Aaron Burr, as W"CUas face d own challenges from wit hin his own party.

="Ff:.t•

Aaron Burr suffered a scring of rew~rses in 1804. Dropped fro m t he 1804 ticket, he began to scheme wit h a faction o f h igh Federalists who W"Cre plotcing to form a ..Nonhero Confederacy" that wo uld indude NO\'a Scotia, New England, New York, and even 1\:nnsylvania. Toad\•ancc chcir plot, th e Federalis ts helped Burr co gain the Federalist

the

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nomination for gOV\'.rnor of New York. Alexander Hamilton, who had chwarced Burr's grab for the presidency in 1800 by supporcing j e-fferson, naw foiled Burr a second time by allowing publication of his ..despicable opinion'" of Burr. After his defeat in t he New York cleccion, Burr challenged Hamilton to a dud and morcall)' wounded him ac Weehawken , New jersey, on jul)' II, 1804. Indicted in two states for murdering Hamilton, Burr next hatched aschemr so audacious that not c-.-en his opponents could believe that he was capable of such treach· cry. Burr allied himselfwith General james Wilkinson, the unsa\'ory military go\'crnor of the Louisiana 1Crrirory, who had been caking Spanish money sincr the J780s. Thcir plot had SC\~tral d imensions: they would creatr an independent confederatyof \\'eStern stares, conquer Mexico, and im•ade Wesc F1orida lhe sche-ming duo prcsentrd the plot imaginatively. lb wcscerncrs thC)' said that it had che roverc support of the jefferson administration; to che British, that it was a "'ll)' to attack Spanish lands; and to t he Spanish, that it would open the way to dividing up the United States. In the fall of 1806 Burr and some sixty foiiO'I'--ers made their way down the Ohio and Mississjppi rivers to join Wilkinson at Nacchcz. (NATCH~eu). Wilkinson was not there. In October j efferson, who described Burr as a crooked gun that nt\'er shot straight, denounced chr conspiracy. Wilkinson abandoned t he conspiracy and pro· claimed himself a lo)•al j effersonian. Fonner vier president Burr panicked and cried to flee co \l'est Florida, but was captured and rcrurned to Richmond to stand trial for treason. Chiefjustice john Marshall presided and advised t he jury that the prosecution had to pro\-e accual crcasonable acts-an impossible task because the conspiracy had ne\-errcached fru ition. lhe jury returned a "not pro\'ed"'t-erdict, which Marshall encen~d as "not guilty." SciU under indictment for t he murder of Hamilton, Burr fled to Europe, ~Ailere he tried but failed co irn'OI\-e Napoleon in a grand scheme that would be the prelude- co a proposed Angl o~Frcnch invasion of t he United States. j e-fferson also faced a challenge from a group of fellaw Re-publicans knawn as the Quids (kwids)." Their leader ~A'lls john Randolph of Virginia, an eccencric man of acerbic wit. Randolph still subscribed to the "country ideology'" of t he 1 770~ which ce-lebrated the wisdom of the fanner against rulers and ~A'ltmed against governments' tendency to encroach on liberty. O riginally, j efferson had shared t hese beliefs, but he had recognized them as an idcolog}' of opposition, not of power, once in office, he therefore compromised. In contrast, Randolph remained frozen in the 1770s, denouncing e\-ery change as decline and proclaiming that he \l'OUld throw aU politi· dans to the dogs, but he- had too much rcspecc fo r dogs. Not surprising!)', Randolph rurned on jefferson. First, he blasted the president for backing a compromise in che Yazoo land scandal. In J795 che- Georgia lcgislacure: had sold che- huge Yazoo tract (35 million acres composing most ofprcsent-da)' Alabama and Mississippi) for a fraction of its value- to land companies chat had bribed virtually the en eire legislacure. l 'he next legislature cance-led che-sale, but many im-es· tors had already bought land, some of t hem in good faich. In 1802 a federal commis· sion compromised wi[h an a~A'ard of 5 million acres to the Yazoo im·estors. 10 Randolph, the compromise- was icse:lf a scandal- fu rt her evidence: of che- decay of re· publican vircue.

·Quid: A n.lme l
I ThtGA.THEIUNGSroltM

Burr's acquittal and Randolph's taunts shattered the aura of invindbiliry that had s urrounded jefferson. Now for· cign affairs posed e''e n sharper challenges. As Britain and France resumed chcir war, che United States prospered at Britain's expense by carrying sugar and coffee from che French and Spanish Carib· bean colonies co Europe. This crade not only provided Napoleon wich supplies but also drove dO\I.'n che price: of sugar and coffee from British colonies by adding to the glut of these commodities on che \N'Orld marker.. l 'he British concluded that their economic proble-ms stemmed from American prosperity. Fuding this boom was the re-export trade, which created conflicts wit h Britain. According to the British Rule of 1756, any trade closed during peacetime could nor be opened during ~A'llr. For example, France usually restricted the sugar trade to French ships during peacetime and thuscould noc open it co American ships during war. The U.S. response to che Rule: of 1756 was che "broken \'O)'llge,"' by ~A•hich U.S. ships ~A'Ould cart}' french sugar or cof'fce: co American ports, unload it, pass it through cuscom~ and chen re·export it as AmtTicdl'l produce. Britain colerated chis dodge for nearl}' a decade but in 1805 initiated a policy of total ~A'llr coward f rance. including the: strangulation of French crade. In the Essex case ( 1805). a British court declared broken VO)'ages illegaL Nexc came a series of British crade decrees ("'Orders in Council"), t hrough which Britain intended to blockade part of continental Europe: and thus staunch the flow of any products that mighc aid the French war effort. French counte:rdecre:es follO\I.-e:d. proclaiming che British Isles blockaded. In e-ffect, if Americans obeyed the British regu lation~ chcy would violate che French rules, and vice \-ersa. In cotal war, hoW'Cver, there: was no room for neutrality, so both Britain and f rance seized U.S. ships. To these prO\'OCations the British added impre::ssmtnt. At issue was Britain's sei.z.ing purported Royal Navy de:serce:rs from American mcrchanc ships and subse· que:ndy fordng chem back imo service. Britis h sailors had reason co be discontented with che:ir navy. Disdpline on the: Ro)'al Na...y's "floating hells" was often brutal and che pay low.: sailors on American s hips earned up co five times more chan chose: on British ships. At a rime: ~Athen war raised che demand fo r sailors, the Ro)'al Navy suf· fered a high rate of desertion to American ships. Impressed sailors led harrowing li~s chat included frequent escapes and re· captures.. One seaman endured impressment eleven times. Another, facing his third recaprure, drowned himself rache:r than spend another day in the Royal Navy. lm· pressm e:nt w~ moreover, galling to American pride, fo r C".-cn though man}' deserters had become American ciciuns, the Bricis h impressed t hem anywa)'. The Britis h also impressed U.S.·born seamen, including chose who could pro..-c their American birth.: betw«n 1803 and 1812, six thousand Americans were impressed. The Cbtupt
179

Tilt SUppressioa of erklm Trade 1M ent

'

~Ill Bti.Wb prx:ticle of ulting dc-JotiUI"iC ;and othl'r.c from t\mlerian 11hips for lll'n'iu in cl!e Roy..! Noavy

(Ff) Primary Source: ~

British Impressment

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

I ThtGA.THEIUNGSroltM

Burr's acquittal and Randolph's taunts shattered the aura of invindbiliry that had s urrounded jefferson. Now for· cign affairs posed e''e n sharper challenges. As Britain and France resumed chcir war, che United States prospered at Britain's expense by carrying sugar and coffee from che French and Spanish Carib· bean colonies co Europe. This crade not only provided Napoleon wich supplies but also drove dO\I.'n che price: of sugar and coffee from British colonies by adding to the glut of these commodities on che \N'Orld marker.. l 'he British concluded that their economic proble-ms stemmed from American prosperity. Fuding this boom was the re-export trade, which created conflicts wit h Britain. According to the British Rule of 1756, any trade closed during peacetime could nor be opened during ~A'llr. For example, France usually restricted the sugar trade to French ships during peacetime and thuscould noc open it co American ships during war. The U.S. response to che Rule: of 1756 was che "broken \'O)'llge,"' by ~A•hich U.S. ships ~A'Ould cart}' french sugar or cof'fce: co American ports, unload it, pass it through cuscom~ and chen re·export it as AmtTicdl'l produce. Britain colerated chis dodge for nearl}' a decade but in 1805 initiated a policy of total ~A'llr coward f rance. including the: strangulation of French crade. In the Essex case ( 1805). a British court declared broken VO)'ages illegaL Nexc came a series of British crade decrees ("'Orders in Council"), t hrough which Britain intended to blockade part of continental Europe: and thus staunch the flow of any products that mighc aid the French war effort. French counte:rdecre:es follO\I.-e:d. proclaiming che British Isles blockaded. In e-ffect, if Americans obeyed the British regu lation~ chcy would violate che French rules, and vice \-ersa. In cotal war, hoW'Cver, there: was no room for neutrality, so both Britain and f rance seized U.S. ships. To these prO\'OCations the British added impre::ssmtnt. At issue was Britain's sei.z.ing purported Royal Navy de:serce:rs from American mcrchanc ships and subse· que:ndy fordng chem back imo service. Britis h sailors had reason co be discontented with che:ir navy. Disdpline on the: Ro)'al Na...y's "floating hells" was often brutal and che pay low.: sailors on American s hips earned up co five times more chan chose: on British ships. At a rime: ~Athen war raised che demand fo r sailors, the Ro)'al Navy suf· fered a high rate of desertion to American ships. Impressed sailors led harrowing li~s chat included frequent escapes and re· captures.. One seaman endured impressment eleven times. Another, facing his third recaprure, drowned himself rache:r than spend another day in the Royal Navy. lm· pressm e:nt w~ moreover, galling to American pride, fo r C".-cn though man}' deserters had become American ciciuns, the Bricis h impressed t hem anywa)'. The Britis h also impressed U.S.·born seamen, including chose who could pro..-c their American birth.: betw«n 1803 and 1812, six thousand Americans were impressed. The Cbtupt
179

Tilt SUppressioa of erklm Trade 1M ent

'

~Ill Bti.Wb prx:ticle of ulting dc-JotiUI"iC ;and othl'r.c from t\mlerian 11hips for lll'n'iu in cl!e Roy..! Noavy

(Ff) Primary Source: ~

British Impressment

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

I ThtGA.THEIUNGSroltM

181

lacion. Unable to export produce or co sell it at a decent price: in the cili~ furmers su ffered as well. New England suffered mos.tj in Massachusetts, which accounted for a third of foreign crade, che embargo ~A'llS a calamity. Ye:c there: were benefits. Unable to export good~ merchants used chcir capital to begin manufacturing. In 1808 the United Stares had o nl)' fifteen cotton textile mills.; by che end of 1809 eighty·sevcn more had been built. But merchants already ruined or seamen driven to soup kitchens cook lirtle comfort. Nor could New Englanders forget that the source of their misery was o ne of the "Virginia lordlings," "Mad Tom" Jefferson, who knew little about New England and loathed cicie~ the foundation of the region's prosperity.

Wich Jefferson's blessing, che Republicans nominated James Madison and George Clincon for the presidency IMibe Feilure of and vice presidency in 1808. The Federalists renominated PucHMe Coerdon Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King. the same cickec that had failed in 1804. In 1808 che Federalists. staged a modest comeback, but Madison handily .....-on the presidency, and che Republicans continued to control Congress. The Federalists' revival, modest as it 'A'llS, rested o n two factors. First, the Em· bargo Act gave them the national issue char they had long lacked. Second, younger Federalists. had abandoned their elders' gendemanly disdain for campaigning and deliberately imitated such vote·winning techniques as barbecues and mass meetings, which had worked for rhe Republicans. To some contemporaries, ..Little Jemmy" Madison, five feet four inches call, seemed a weak figure compared to Jefferson. In face, Madison's intelligence and ca· padty for systematic chought equaled j efferson's. He had che added advantage of being married co Dolley Madison. A striking figure in her turbans and colorful dresses, Dolley arranged receptions at the White House in which she charmed Re· publicans, and even some Federalists., into sympathy with her husband's policies. Like Jefferson, Madison bdic-.-cd chat American liberty reseed on the virtue of the people and char virtue was critically cied to che growth and prosperity of agriculture. Madison also recognized char agricultural prosperity depended o n crade- furmers needed markers. The British \1/est Indies, d ependent on the United States for m uch lumber and grain, struck Madison as both a natural trading parmer and a cempcing target. Madison reasoned chat the United States could force: Britain co irs knees be· fore Americans would suffer st\•ere losses. The American e mbargo, howew:r, 'A'llS coercing no one. Increased trade between Canada and the West Indies made a shambles. of Madison's plan co pressure Britain. On March I, 1809, Congress replaced the Embargo Ace with the weaker, face·saving Non·lnrercourse Act, ~A•hich opened U.S. crade to all nations exce:pc Britain and France and authorized che president co restore trade with either of chose nacions if it stopped violating neucral rights. Bur neither nation complied. Meanwhile, Ameri· can shippers kept u p cheir profitable trade with the British and French, despite the restrictions.. In May 18 10 Congress substiruted a new measure, Macon's Bill No. 2, for the Non·l ntercourse Act. This legislation reopened trade with both belligerents., France and Britain, and then offered a clumsy bribe to each: if cither nation repealed irs restrictions on neutral shipping. the United States "-'OUld halt aU trade with the

Madisoa

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hnb" Mt mbtn of Cong:rl':ll' d«ttd &om •T.str:m sto~ttsin

1810wbo•'illlmi•w

wi d! Stitllin

ocher. None of these steps worked. France and Britain believed that, when great po"''· ers (like: themseh·es) wmt to war, there could be no neutrals. Weak nations like the: United States should stop babbling about moral ideals and neutral righrs, and seek the protection of a great power. As peaceable coerdon became a 6.asco, Madison came under fire from militant Republicans demanding more aggressive policies. Primarily southerners and west· erners, che militants were infuriated by insults to che American flag. In addition, economic recession between 1808 and JSJO had convinced che firebrands chat Brit· ish policies were: wrecking their regions' economies. The election of 1810 brought s......._·eral )'Oung militants, christened • hawks,'' to Congress. L.e:d by Henry Clay of Kentucky, "'rho preferred war to the ..putrescent pool of ignominious peace," the war hawks included j ohn C. Calhoun of South Carolina, Richard M. johnson of Ken· tuck)', and William R. King of Noeth Carolina-all future vice presidents. day "''lls e:lecce:d Speaker of the House.

._'at'

More: emotional and pugnaciously nationalistic than Jef· fcrson or Madison, the war hawks called for expelling lilt Prophet Britain fro m Canada and Spain from the Floridas. Thcir demands merged wich "''esterners' fears chat the: British in Canada were recruiting Indians to halt che march of U.S. settlement. In reality, American policy, not British meddling, "''lls che source of bloodshed on the: frontier. j efferson believed chat Indians and whites could liw: peacefully together o nly if the Indians became farmers-and fanners required far less Land than nomadic hunt· ers. Ho"''evcr, the: march of white: settlement 'A'llS steadily shrinking Indian hunting grounds, and some Indians were willing to sign away land in return for blanke:rs, guns, and liquor. No American was more eager to acquire Indian lands chan \'t'illiam Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana 1trritory. Harrison realized chat Indiana wo uld not be:· come a state without more residents, and the best way co attract more residmts was to offer them Indian land. In September 1809 Harrison rounded up a delegation of half-sta.rVed Indians who ceded millions of acres of land along the Wabash (WAH-huh) Riw:r for two cenrs an acre.: none: of the Indians actually lived o n che land.

Tecumseh and

No fully ;,.uthtn Uc;:tted ponr.~.it ofTecumn h exists, but Mites him ;:tS h;:tnd rome ;and domin:uu. Bd it-Ang tho:~t l nd ~:ltl l;ands were not tht pontssiOM ofinditM/u;:tl t ribes to negoci;ate :.w;ay, but c:ollectivdy belonged to ;,.ll lndj;ans, Tecumsth w:~s:. fOf'mido:~bte oppontnt of white tllp:~t~~n. d~bc:d

This treaty, the 1·reary of Fort Wayne, outraged numerous tribes. Among the angriest were Tecumseh (tuh.CUM-suh), the Sha"''tlee chief, and his brocher Lalawethica (.1a·la-WAY-th~o~h-kuh) .l n 1805 Lala"''fthica had had a frightening dream, a vision ofdrunken Indians who"A'et'e tormented for eternity. 0\~rnighc he "''lls transfo nned from a drunken misfit inco a preacher. He ga\J'C up liquor and began beseeching surrounding tribes to return to the old ways and avoid contact wich whites. No"'' known as the l'rophet, he cook a ne"'' name, 1tnskwata"''ll (ttns·KWAH-tah·w•h), the "open door" through "'ilich Indians could achieve salvation. Shawnees responded co his message. In the meantime, Tecumseh had tried to build a coalition of several cribes to stem the tide of "''hite setdemcm. He insisted chat Indian lands belonged coUecrivel}' to all the tribes and could not be sold b}• splinter groups. Failing to reach a sectlement with Tecumseh or che Prophet, Harrison concluded that it was cime to atcack the Indians. His target was a Shawnee encampment ncar che mouch ofche 11ppecanoe (TIP-pee-
Sb~~t lt..tdtr wbo tritd eo build ~ aulition of

lean:Mh

l

k'Y«;al V.'l'sttm aibt~; ;allied

wi d! Stitish in War of 1812

By spring 18 12 President Madison had concluded that war was inevitable, and he sent a "''ar message to Congress on June I. Ironically, an economic slump prompted Brit· ain co repeal its Orders in Council on June 23, but by chen Congress had declared "''ar. Neither the war hawks nor "''csterners held the key co the \"Ote in favor of war.: the voces of Republicans in states like Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia ....-ere the decisive force in propelling the declaraIn h i' $ttood ttrm, Jeff"r~QO ~td tion of war through Congress. Opposition came mainly from n:deralist th.lllt.nges from Aaron BuiT and strongholds in New England and New York. John Randolph. Madison, in his war message, listed imprtssm em, the presence: of Brit· l mpno:s:smtnt btnmt a major i..ul.K' b~t n tht Unit«i M.ltes and Gno.lt ish ships in U.S. waters, and British \iolation ofneucral rights as wrongs Britain.. thac justified "''llr. None of these complaints fully explains "'ilYAmerica Jtfftr:~on uitd "pe.l«-abk to«t ion" declared war in 1812. Neither do continuing Indian problems (blamed on through the Embargo Ac-t; it w.u ~ the British) along the frontier. A more important underl}ing cause for the F.Uluno. war "''3S the economic recession chat affected the South and \'t1esc after "War h.lwk, .. hom tht w-e:st«n 1808. Finally, it was critical chat Madison, rather chan Jefferson, was presi· :stun, with theirq'U on Canad.l, d em.lndtd mou .lggrel:siw polities. dent. Jefferson had bdic'led that Britain was motivated primarily by its Jam.es Madiwn ultim.ltdy :uktd desire to defeat Napoleon; time was on America's side, Jefferson chought, Congresl for~ d«Jar.uion ofwu for once the war in Europe ended, the provocations "''Ould stop. Madison beo:au'e he $.lW Gre.lt Brit.lin ~:s .l hdd thac Britain's re:al moti'IJ'C was to strangle American trade and chus co long-tenn thrt-at to the Unittd elim inate the United States as a trading rivaL St .u<-l.

caapess Voles fw Wv

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THE WAR OF 1812

I

Wlwt WMI' the most important consequences ofthe Warof1812?

Although American warships .....-ould win a few sensational duels ~A'ith British men-of·war, the U.S. Na'i)' simply could not challenge: the Royal Navy on the high seas, or f:'\>t:O prevent a British blockade of the American coast. Madison thus shifted his sights to Canada, whose small population made it seem an easy mark. j efferson, for example, saw the conquest of Canada as "a mere matter of marching." Little justified such optimism. Although the: British remained preoccupied with the Napoleonic wars in Europe, they enlisted Native Americans as their allies-and used fear of these: .. uncontrollable savages" to force American surr~:cnders. American militias u-e:rc: often Sunday soldiers who ..hollered for 'A'ltte:r half the time, and whis· key the other." Few unders.tood ~A•hat the war was about, and ~orr still cared.

From the summer of 18 12 to the spring of 1814, the Amc:r· icans launched a series of unsuccessful attacks on Canada. They began in j uly 18 12 when the sixty·}~ar-old general William Hull led an American ann}' from De:uoit into Canada. 1"C'cumseh cut his supply line~ and Hull, unnen -e:d, retreated to Detroit.. The British commander played on Hull's fears b)• ~A'llming that he might not be able to control the Indians, and Hull prompd)' surrendered two thousand men to thirteen hundred British and Nati\-~ American uoops. In two other thrusts in 1812, the United States fared no bene:r. American forces were defeated by the British and their Mohawk allies at the Battle of Quee:nston, and plans to attack Montreal collapsed when the New York militia refused to advance: into Canada. R.c:nC'\l-e:d U.S. offensives and subsequent re\·et'SCs in J8J3 convinced the: Ameri· cans that they could not retake Detroit while the British controlled Lake Erie. Our· ing ~A'intcr 1812-1813 U.S. capcain Oth-er Hazard ~rry built ships and outfitted them with captured cannons, and on Septem ber 10, 1813, the homemade Amer ican fleet destrO)>t:d a British squadron at Jlut·in·Bay on the western end of Lake Eric:; 0 \l>t: ha\>t: met the enemy, and they are: ours," l'r.rry triumphantly reported. T he British then pulled out of Detroit, but American forces under ~neral William Henry Har· rison 01/'ertook and defeated a combined British·lndian force at the Battle of the Thames (thaymes) on October 5. 1"C'cumseh, a legend among ~Ailites, died in the bat· de. Perry·s and Harrison's victories cheered Americans, but efforts to invade Canada continued to falter.

With fresh reinforcements from Europe, when: Napoleon had abdicated in April, Britain took the offensi\J'C in the spring of 1814. Britain's main offensive thrust 'A'llS meant to split the NC'\l' England states, ~A•hich were skeptical of the war, from the rest of the country. General Sir ~orgc: Pre\·ost headed a force of ten thousand British veterans, the largest and best-equipped British force a-~r sent to North America. They advanced

I THEWAf!Ofl81l

185

BRITtSH HOATH AMERJCA (CANADA)

..

\ ATLANTIC OCEAN

j 3Amorie>)n lorcO$

B

Bribh lorc:or.

0Amorie>)n~clocy

[!] Qibh vi:toty m~sffo

Mop a.2 Mojor Botllts of tilt WM o11112 PENNSYlVANIA OHIO

MCKC: of the w;~.r"s m;:,jor enpgements oc· CUITtd o n o r t~e:u- the United St:.tes' northem fron titr, but the Royal N;tvy btocb.dtd the entire Ad;~.ntic co:.st, ;:,nd the &itish ;vmy pet~etr.:.tcd ;tS f:.r routh ;u W;~.sh ington ;u~d New O rleans.

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rcadil)' down Lake: Champlain until chey reached t he: entrenched American forces at l'larrsburgh; after his fleer mct de:feac on September II, Pre\.'Ost abandoned t he: campaign. Ironically, Britain's most spectacular success began as a d iversion from Prevost's offensive. A Bricish army thac had come up from Bermuda ence:rcd Chesapeake Ba}' and o n August 24, 1814, met a larger American force: at Bladensburg, Mar}tfand. The: Battle of Bladensburg dece:riorace:d into t he "Bladensburg Races" as che Amer ican troops fled, virtually ~A'ithout firing a shot. The British then descended on Washing· ton, D.C. Madison, who had ~A'itnessed t he Bladensburg fiasco, fled into t he: Virginia hills. His wife, Dolley, loaded her carriage: before: joining her husband. Bricish t roops ate the: supper prepared for che Madisons and then burned che presidential mansion and ocher public buildings in the capital. Beyond embarra.ssing and angeringAmeri· cans, t he: Washington raid accomplished little, for after a failed arrack on Baltimore, the British broke off the operation.

Napoleon's abdication had made Britain's primar}' goal a lasting European peace:, and thus the British had little co Client. 1814 gain b)•prolonging a minor war in America. 11leTn>atyof Ghent, signed o n C hristmas E\oe, 1814, restored che SldlHsquo ttnlebtllum:· che United Scates neither gained nor lost territory. lhe fixing of the Canadian-American border was referred to a joint commission for future settlement. Impressment was left hang· ing, but t he: end of t he: European ~A'llr made neutral rights a dead issue. Ironically, America's mosc dramacic viccocy came onjanuar}' 8, 18 15, two ~A>ce:ks after the ue:ary had been signed but before word of it had reached America. A British force: had descended o n New Orleans. U.S. t roops commanded by ~ neral Andrew ("'Old Hickory") jackson, legendary as a fierce Indian fighter, shredded che line of ad\•andng redcoats, inflicting more than two t housand casualties while suffering only thirteen of their own.

The Trolyof

Treaty .t C3.e.t 1·R'al)' tlw.t

mdtd War or 1812,rtstOring

!

!Utws 9'"' olllt.t bdflfJJI

Hll'tf.rd CAMwentioe NdtraJ. iJt ml'll'ting tlvt Jbowo:l sttm· ing dUJoy;all)' in rirnt orv.·u: btg;a.n do-,rau oftht p;ul)'

I

Although it meant nothing in terms of t he war, che Batcle: of New Orleans prOII'Cd devastating for t he: ~deralist party. The Federalists' comeback had continued into t he: election of 1812, when chcir candidate, DeWitt Clinton, an antiwar Republican, had carried all of New England except Vermont, along ~A'irh New York and New jersey. American military setbacks had intensified Federalist disdain fo r Madison. He: seemed to epitomize: a decade: of Republican misrule at New England's expense. The: louisiana Purchase, conscirutionally dubious, had reduced che importance: of New England, t he: Embargo Act had nearly destroyed the region's commerce, and "Mr. Madison's War" had brought fresh misery in the form of the: British blockade. A few New England ~deralists began co calk of secession fro m che Union. In late 18 14 a special Federalist comoention mer in Harcford, Connecticut. AI· though some supported secession, mode:rare:s cook control and passed a series of resolutions expressing New England's grievances. Convinced that New England 'A'llS

• StlltrfJ qwct (,llfft

btllrflw: Lu in for ''tht .st~te of~(fain: bdOct t ht war."

I TI-lE AWAJ:ENIKG Of' Aw.trtiCA~ NAOONAUSM becoming a permanent minority in a nacion dominated by southern Re· publicans ~Atho failed to understand the region's commercial interests, the Hartford Conwndon leaders proposed a series of constirurional amendments: to abolish the three-fifths dause, which allowed southerners co count slaves as a basis for representation; to require a two-thirds \'Ote of Congress to declare war and to admit new states into the Unionj. to limit the president to a single tmn.: to prohibit the election of two successiw: presidents from the same state; and to bar embargoes lasting more than sixty days. 11lese proposals were as bold as their riming was disastrous. News of the peace and ofJackson's \'ictor}' at New Orleans dashed Federalist hopes of gaining popular support, while the states' rights emphasis of the corn-emion smdled of creason to many delegates. T he restoration of peace stripped the Federalists of their primar}' grievance. In the presiden· tial election of 1816,james Monroe, Madison's hand-picked successor and another Virginia Republican, swept the nation over negligible n:deralist opposition. Four )'tat'S facer he would reccive every electoral \'Ote but one. The n:deralists were fi nished as a force in national politics.

187

The Un ited St~tel r~lled in iu ~t· tempt:l to inv.uiC' c~n~d~.

WhC'.n t he' war in Europe' C"-ndC'd, Britain l~und1C'd ~ major offC'nJiv-e in the UnitC'd St~teJ, which induckd the' r;a.nudo:.ingo rW.u.hingron, D.C. Thc- Trc-~tyor Ghtnt C'nckd the war ;1 rut oration or the $t~tHI ~rr.o

with

•lllll' bdlun•.

At the' H~rtford Conv'tmion, diuatisfiC'd fC'dC'-r;t]isu toy-ed \\ith th e' i ck~ or S«Ulion, ~ mc:M' u l ti m.:u:dy fu.U ro tbe'm .u ~ poli ti ~l P'l"Y·

The' war produC'C'd a hC'ro in Andre'YI $C'nJC' or n~tion.UiJm ~nd conficknC'e throughou t the" nuiao.

j~dwn and~ n'-llC'WC'd

THE AWAKENING OF AMERICAN NATIONALISM What wen the major d6Velopments in domestic and foreign affairs during the «&a o{Good Feeling;'? The United States emerged from che War of 1812 bruised but intact. In its first major war since independence, the American republic had demonstrated that it could fight on even tmns against a major poo~r and chat republics could conduct wars without becoming despotisms. 1'he war also produced several major S)mbolsof American nacionalism: the presidential mansion, whitewashed to hide smoke dam· age, became the White House; Britain's failed attack on Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor inspired Francis Scott Key's «Star-Spangled Banner>.: and the Battle of New Orleans made Andrew Jackson a national hero and reinfOrced legends about the prO'I'-~ss of Am erican froncier people and chcir "long rifles." Much of the legend spun around the Battle of New O rleans was untrue, but Americans lm~d it nonetheless, especially because it confirmed their conviction thac amateur soldiers and mili· tiamen could o ur6ghc a professional arm}'·

l'he War of 1812 had three major political consequences.

...._.s Nllloaalism Firsc, it eliminated the Federaliscs as a national political a.llbe Era of Cood fOrce. Second, it ~A'efl t far toward convincing the RepubliFellin , 1111- 182A

cans chat che nation was scrong and resilient, capable of fighting a war ~Athile maintaining liberty. T hird, with political rivals remM'Cd, the Republicans began to embrace some Federalist ideas. Both President Madison and Henr}' Clay became advocates of federal support for internal improwmems, tariff protection fur new induscri~ and che creation of a new national bank; Clay chris· tened chese ideas the American Syscem and proclaimed that they would make the www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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"&o CJI Co..

I

jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO FtUIMGS, 18o1- 1b4!

r.e...... ..,;..

ofQIUI·JUrt)' politicS during administntion ofJamt.S

Montot

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w.•n

Supn-mc' Coon dtci.Jion tlvt Jtrengthmtd c:h.uteD, corpot.ations

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--~-, Su~mt Coun: dtc:Uioo tbat bak1ertd broad coosuurtioo; n•.s tllttd narional Juprtmou:y twt'r

sunos

nation economical!)' self-sufficient. In 1816 Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States and enacted a moderate tariff, but federally supported internal improvements were more difficult. Madison vetoed an internal impro\·emems bill in 18 17, believing that a constitutional amendment was necessary to authorize su ch improvements. As Republicans adopted positions they once had disdained, an "''E ra of Good Fulings'' dawned. Coined by a Boston ne"''Spaper editor, che tmn describes bcnh ofjames Monroe's presidential administrations. Compared to jefferson and Madison, Monroe "''3S neither brilliant, polished, nor wealthy, but he wanted co heal America's political di visi on~ and he tried to avoid political controversies. Yet the good feelings were paper-chin, and Madison's veto of the internal imprOVI.'.mcnts bill sho\1/C'd thac disagreements lingered about the role ofche federal gMwnmmt under the Constitution. The continuation of slaV\'.ry "''lls arousing sectional animosities that no phrase could paper OVI.'.r. Not surprisingly, the postwar consensus unr.n·eled rapid!)'·

In 18 19 Jefferson's old antagonist John Marshall, still chief justice, issued two opinions that srunned Republicans. l 'he 6rst case, DdY'fmQulh College v. Woodu'dt'd, fo· cused on New Hampshire's attempt co transform a private corporation, Dartmouth College, into a state university. Marshall concluded that Dartmouth's original charter "''lls a contract and thus was protected under che constirutional prohibition against state interference in contracts. Marshall's ruling had enormous implka· tions. In effect, Marshall said that, once a state had chartered a college or business, that state su rrendered its power to alter the charter and, in large measure, irs author· ity to regulate che beneficiary. A few "''ttks later, the chiefjustice handed d~·n an c-.-en more momentous deci· sion in M cCullotb v. MtJt)'ldnd. At issue "''lls whether the state of Mar)iand had the power to tax a national corporation-specifically, the Baltimore branch of the Sec· ond Bank of the United States. Marshall focused on cwo issues.. f irst, did Congress ha\'f: the poW'Cr to charter a national bank? The Consdcution, Marshall conceded, did not explicitly grant chis po....-er, but the broad s....-eep of enumerated pD"~rs im· plied the power to charter a bank. 1'his was a dear enunciation of a broad, or "loose," construction (interpretacion) of the Consdcution.1'he second issue re\'01\·ed around whether a state could tax an a~ncy of che federal gOVI.'.rnmenc that was located within its borders. Marshall argued that an}' pO\l-er of che national gm-ern mcm, enumerated or implied, was supreme within its sphere. States could not interfere "''ith the exercise of federal po....-er; thus Maryland's attempt to tax the bank was plainly unconscirutionaL The McCulloch decision disma)~d many Republicans. 11le bank, initially sup· ported by Madison and Monroe, had triggered the Panic of 18 19 by tightening credit. Distressed "''estern farmers angrily blamed the bank for their dilemmas. And now Marshall's decision placed the hated bank beyond che reach of any state govern· mcnc.. The Constitution, Marshall said, was che creation not of scace go\·ernments but of the people of all the states and thus O\-errode state laws. The decision was as much an attack on scate sovcreignty as a defense ofche bank irsdf.

John Mmhalland lilt SUpreme Court

I TI-lE AWAJ:ENIKG Of' Aw.trtiCA~ NATKINAUSM

189

Like: Jefferson, most Republicans considered the Union a compact among states and saw state governments as che guarantors of popular liberty. In Republican e)'CS, the Dttrtmoutb and MrCuJioc:b cases stripped state governments of the J>O'""·er to im· pose che "''ill of their people: on corporations and thus threatened liberty.

The concrO\'ct'S}' over statehood for Missouri highlighted the fragility of che Era of Good Feelings. Carved from the louisiana Purchase, Missouri had attracted many souch· lll0-1121 erners who expocce:d co use: slaves to grow cotton and hemp. By 18 19 slaves made up 16 percent of the: territory's inhabitants. In ~bruar}' 18 19 che House: of Re:pre:sencacives considered a bill to admit ~tis· souri as a slave scate. A New York Republican offered an amendment that prohibited the fu rther introduction of slaves into Missouri and prM'idcd for the emancipation, ac age twemy·fi't-e, of all slave offspring born after Missouri joined che Union. Fol· lowing rancorous de:bace:, the House: accepted the amendment and che Senate re· jocce:d it. Both chambers voted along scccional lincs. Before this, slavery had not been a major source ofthe nation's sectional divisions, which tended to pit New England against the Souch and \'1/est. But che Missouri

Tilt Missouri CGIIIprollist,

l~era~•e Map: M•ssoun Compromise, 1820-1821

UNORGANIZED TERRITORY

..........

r ....., a...18111

Mip 8..3 The Missouri Comprolist. 1810-1121 The Missou ri Corn.promi5C' tempor.:~rily queUed conUO'-"'UY O'-"'r 5l;wery by .:~dmitti ng M ;aine ;u ;a free $(;ate' .:~nd M issou ri .115 ;a 5l.xvt' K;t.te .:~nd by prohibiting 5l;a\•ery in the nom;ainderofthe Loui si .:~n;a Purdl.:~se north of36•JO'.

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Missouri eo..pr..ise

jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO FtUIMGS. 18o1- 1b4!

An

aurmpc: eo end ,;l:n.'l'ry conao. wny by bringing Miuouri '".d t.bioc ioto Union, dr.noiog lint limiriog ,;l:n.'l'ry acrw.s tbc Louisiana PurdiVC"

question, which jefferson called «a fire bell in the: nighc (which) awakened me: and filled me with terror;'' chrust slavery inco the cence:r of long·slanding national divisions. s~ral factors drm-e the sla..-ery issu e: to che forefro nt. In 1819 che Union had eleven free and e!C"t-en sla\'t: states; che admission of Missouri would u pset this bal· ance co che advantage: of the: South. Equally imporcanc, northerners worried that admitcing Missouri as a sla\-e state would set a precedent for che: extension of sla\'t:r}' into che northern part of the Purchase. The sla\-e stares of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, already ca.-..-ed from the Purchase with little contrm-ersy, were: south of Missouri, which was on the: same lacirude as che free stares of Ohio, Indiana, and Jl. linois. Finall}', the disintegration of the Federalists as a national force reduced the: need for u nity among Republicans, leaving the room to heed sectional pressures more than calls for parry loyalty. Vircually ~ry issue that "''Ould wrack the Union in the: nexc forty rears was pres· enc in the Missouri contrm-ersy: southern charges chat the North was conspiring co destroy che Union and co end slavery; northern accusations chat souche:rners "'-ere: conspiring to extend sla\'t:r}'· For a "'flile,lcaders doubred that the Union \N'Ould su r· viw the crisis; the: "''Ords disunion and civil u~r were: freely uctered, Henry Clay "'rotc. A series of co ngressional agreements kno"''ll collecti\
"Good feelings" also characterized American foreign pol· icy from 18 16 to 1824. The end of the: War of 1812 and of the: Napoleonic Wars had removed most Federalist· Republican disagreemencs O\ 't:t forcign policy. MoreM>er, t:~esi de:nr Monroe had as his secrctary of state: an extraordinary diplomat, j ohn Q uincy Adams, a tough negociator and an ardent nationalist. The only Federalist in the Senate co support the Louisiana Purchase and the son of che las.r Federalist president, Adams had backed the: embargo, joined che Republican party, and helped to negotiate the: Treacy of Ghent. Adams mo\
Fonlp Polley IInder Monroe

Adams was equally successful wich the Spanish, who sciU ()\\.'ned East Florida and claimed \'('esc Florida It had ncvcr been d ear "'ilcther the louisiana Purchase included West Florida. Acting as ifitdid, the: United States in 18 12 had simply added a slice of West Florida to the: state of Louisiana and another piece co the Mississippi Territor}'· Using che prece:xt that it was a base for Seminole Indian raids and a refuge for fugici\J'C slaves, Andrew jackson, now a militat}' commander in the: South, in· \'ade:d West Florida in 1818, hanged two Britis h subjects, and captured Spanish forts.

Although Jackson had acted without explicit orders, Adams supported the raid, guessing correctly chat it "'-auld panic the: Spanish inco further concessions. In 18 19 Spain agref:d to che: Adams-On is (or1'ranscontincmaf) Treacy, ceding East Florida to the United States, rmouncing all claims to West f1orida, and agreeing to a border thac ran north along the Sabine Rh-er (separating Spanish Texas from Louisiana), then u-est along t he: Red and Arkansas rivers co the Rockies, and then along the forty·second parallel to the l':lcific. Finally, che United States had a legitimate claim to che Padfic coast.

John Quincy Adams be:li~d chat God and naru.re had or· {ff) Primary Source: dained chat t he: United Stares would evmrually span the ~ Monroe Doctrine 1123 entire concine:ntof North America. While negotiating the purchase: of f1orida. he made it d ear co Spain chat the United States mighc seize what it could not purchase-including Texas and Mexico. Besides, Spain had other concerns, primaril)' anticolonial re:\·olutions that had erupted in Sout h America.. Ho~A'CWr, Britain' s forcign minister, George Canning, proposed a joint U.S.·British Moeroe DodriM &olttmmt srace:menc opposing European ince:rferencc in South America and pledging that nd· that pnxb.imtd US. prirnolq in ther nation would annex any pare of Spain's New World empire. thtNtw~ Adams shared Canning's opposition to European inten -enrion in the New World buc rejected his insistmce on a joint Anglo-American pledge nC'\o-er co an· ncx an}' ofSpain's former territories. Adams ~A'llnted the United States co declare policy on its own rather than ..come: in as a cock boat in che wake: of che British man-of·~A'llr.'" In addition, the American scc:retary of stare: A~ t he f'cd«.lli.u pMtf f.l-dtd ;u a n.u:ion.ll forcco, Monroc"'J }'tan: in thco wanted to keep open che possibility of annexing 1t:xas or Cuba. Wh ite HOUJ<" btnmt )mown ;u thco This was the: background of the: Monroe: Doctri ne, as l'residmt Era o f Good ftdings. Monroe's message to Congress on December 2, 1823, became knawn. Joh n Man:hall ':~ Supctmt Coun Writtm largely by Adams, the message announced three key principles: Jti'C'ngthtn«< tht pow~-r of d.t an· thac U.S. policy was to avoid European wars unless American interests tr;t] p "-m mtnt with cri tin l rulintp o n tht nawrco o f charttr~, th<" W<' were invoto.-ed, that che "American concine:ms" wen: nor .,subjects for futun: ofimplit d po~"-n:, a nd tht limiu: colonization by any European power,"' and thac che United Stares would o( Jl:l-'<' p<)\""-r. construe an}' European attempt at colonization as an .. unfriendly act."' Tht M i:~souri Compromi:~t Europeans ~Aide:ly derided che: Monroe: Doctrine as a unilateral proJh
Tile Mon

roe

Dodri

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I

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

192

CHAPtER 8

jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO Fl:UIMGS. 18o1- 1b4!

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

~

USTENTO ITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOt O

R lE O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND KEY TERMS

Sally Homilgs (p. m)

How didJefferson's philosophy shape policy tcward public expenditures, the judiciary, and Louisiana? (pafJ! 171)

I

Jeffroon brought with him to che White House a well-defined set of ideas about the necessity for rightly controlled centml govcrnmem, payment of the national debt, and downsiz.:ing the American military. Nonetheless.. when of· feted the chance to buy Louisiana, an action not specified in the Constitution, jeffi:rson eagerly jumped at che chance to rid che New World of France. His sponsorship of che Lewis and Oark expedition exemplified his interest in sci· ence and his hope for practical results from science.

I

How did the United States slide into war with Great Britain? (paf!'

111)

Despite the success of his first term, Jefferson struggled throughout his sec· ond term. He faced problems with both Aaron Rurr and John Randolph, and saw relations with Great Britain steadil}' worsen. His attempts at ..peaceable coercion" '"'X':re fruitless, and "war hawks» from che western st.ues became increasingly vocal and powctful James Madison, jefkrson's successor, saw Britain as a continuing threat to the United Staces; his dedaration of war was based much more on chat long·term fuat than on s hort·term problems such as impressment.

Whot were the most important ronsequences of the War of 1812?

I

(pafJ! 184)

The War of 1812 saw few American successes, but in che Treaty of Ghent, Great Britain essentially restored che Sfal{IIS quodi!U hrllllm. Nonetheless, the war produced at le-ast one major hero, Andrew Jackson, and s pawned a renewed sense of confidence and nationalism. With the Federalist party evaporating as a political force, the nation entered what was kno"''n as che "-Era of Good Feelings.."

Whot were the major de.-elopments in domestic and foreign affairs during the "Era o(Good Feelings"? (page 187)

I

During the Monroe administration, the United States consolidated irs norchem and southern borde~ saw a broad interpretation of the Constitution put in place by the Marshall court, and confronted and then dodged che issue ofslavrty ~.~rith the Missouri Compromise. Final I}'• the Monroe Doctrine repre-sented a major step toward American domination of the Westem Hemisphere.

Mar/NJry v. Afodisoo (p. m) judicial rl"oWWv (p. m) louisiana Purchase (p. 176) lewis and Clark~ion (p. m) ~"""'nt (p. 179} &nbargo Art 0>. ISO} "'~ar hawks"(p. 181} Tood\I. 191}

192

CHAPtER 8

jEFrERSOMIANISM AXO THE ERA Of GoOO Fl:UIMGS. 18o1- 1b4!

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

~

USTENTO ITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOt O

R lE O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND KEY TERMS

Sally Homilgs (p. m)

How didJefferson's philosophy shape policy tcward public expenditures, the judiciary, and Louisiana? (pafJ! 171)

I

Jeffroon brought with him to che White House a well-defined set of ideas about the necessity for rightly controlled centml govcrnmem, payment of the national debt, and downsiz.:ing the American military. Nonetheless.. when of· feted the chance to buy Louisiana, an action not specified in the Constitution, jeffi:rson eagerly jumped at che chance to rid che New World of France. His sponsorship of che Lewis and Oark expedition exemplified his interest in sci· ence and his hope for practical results from science.

I

How did the United States slide into war with Great Britain? (paf!'

111)

Despite the success of his first term, Jefferson struggled throughout his sec· ond term. He faced problems with both Aaron Rurr and John Randolph, and saw relations with Great Britain steadil}' worsen. His attempts at ..peaceable coercion" '"'X':re fruitless, and "war hawks» from che western st.ues became increasingly vocal and powctful James Madison, jefkrson's successor, saw Britain as a continuing threat to the United Staces; his dedaration of war was based much more on chat long·term fuat than on s hort·term problems such as impressment.

Whot were the most important ronsequences of the War of 1812?

I

(pafJ! 184)

The War of 1812 saw few American successes, but in che Treaty of Ghent, Great Britain essentially restored che Sfal{IIS quodi!U hrllllm. Nonetheless, the war produced at le-ast one major hero, Andrew Jackson, and s pawned a renewed sense of confidence and nationalism. With the Federalist party evaporating as a political force, the nation entered what was kno"''n as che "-Era of Good Feelings.."

Whot were the major de.-elopments in domestic and foreign affairs during the "Era o(Good Feelings"? (page 187)

I

During the Monroe administration, the United States consolidated irs norchem and southern borde~ saw a broad interpretation of the Constitution put in place by the Marshall court, and confronted and then dodged che issue ofslavrty ~.~rith the Missouri Compromise. Final I}'• the Monroe Doctrine repre-sented a major step toward American domination of the Westem Hemisphere.

Mar/NJry v. Afodisoo (p. m) judicial rl"oWWv (p. m) louisiana Purchase (p. 176) lewis and Clark~ion (p. m) ~"""'nt (p. 179} &nbargo Art 0>. ISO} "'~ar hawks"(p. 181} Tood\I. 191}

Tocqueville: and Beaumonc had come: at a time when f:'\'er)'thing seemed to be: changing for these: rcsde:ss Americans who appeared ro live in che middle of«an alwa)'S moving stream."' lmpro'lemmts in transportation W\'J'e srimulacing inter-regional trade: and migration to the trans-Appalachian u.-est, encouraging an unprecedented development of towns and dties, and transforming social relacionships. Farmcrs in· creasingty raised crops to scll in distant markeu, while the: new urban dwellers formed a market for £ann products as ~A'CI) as the products of the new factories chat were springing up in the industrializing Ease.. To 1bcqucviUe:, Americans s~me:d to have only o ne: goal: ..that of gcrcing rich." White Americans u.-ere an indu.scrious and democratic people, but they treated nonwhites harshly. While recognizing sta..-er)' as a blot on American society, 10cque:ville: noted that whites created one another as equals and that they aU shared a passion for gctting ahead.

I

WES1WARD ExPANSION

WMt caused tM surge ofwestward mlfi'06on4{t6r tM Warof1812?

l

In 1790 che vast maJOrity of che non-l ndJan population of the Umted States lh·ed east of the Appalachian Mountains; by 1840 one-third were living berw~n che Appalachians and the Mississippi River, defined as che \'t;1esc.. These Americans rap· idly developed a discincci..-e u-estern culture. Mosc Americans came west d reaming of a better \-ersion of che life they had known in che East. Several factors fed this dream: che growing power of the: federal go\-emme:nt, its often-ruthless remM>al of Indians from the path of ~Ailite se:cd e:ments, and a boom in the prices of agricultural commodities.

This wesrward mm-ement occurred in s......,-eral thrusts. Americans leapfrogged the Appalachians after 179 1 co bring fo ur new states into che Union by 1803: Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. From 18 16 to 1821 momentum carried setdcrs farther west, even across the Mississippi Rr.-er, and six more states entered: Indiana, Mississippi, Hlinois, Alabama, Maine, and Missouri. Ohio's population soared from 45,000 in 1800 to more chan 1.5 million by 1840, and Michigan's from 5,000 in 1810 to 2 12,000 in 1840. l'ion~rs usually migrated as families.. 1b get their crops co market, at 6rs.t most clustered along the Ohio-Mississippi river system. Only when canals spread in the: 1820s and 1830s did they w nrure an)• distance from ri•;ers. In addition, pion~rs often clustered wich people: who hailed from the same region back ease.. For example, when N ew Englanders found southerners already ~A'CJI entrenched in Indiana, chey chose ro setde: in Michigan.

'llle SWeep West

These new westerners craved sociability. EV(!n before towns sprang up, farm families joined their neighbors for sports and festivities. Men mec for games chat tested st::rength and agility: wresding, lifting ~A'cights, pole jumping (for distance, not height), and

WesWn Society ... CUstoms

I \VlStwArtO EXPAHSION

195

Samuel Slater opens his 6rsl Rhode Island nil Eli Whitney invents the («tofl gin Roben R. lMngslon and Robert - n introduce !he stearrl>ool Cl«rnont on 1he Hudson Rlwr Constructiorl ollhe Natiooal Road begins ill CUmberland. Maryland Est.lbli!lunent ollhe Basion Maoolacturing Company S«ood Bank ollhe United Slales (stem ol produclion by inl
hammer throwing. Women usually co mbined V.'Ork and play in quilting and sev.'ing bees, carpet cackin&S> and even goose and chicken pluckings.. At "hoe-downs'" and "frolics;'' the seed ers danced co a 6ddler's rune. Western farm households usually practiced a dear gender division oflabor. Men performed t he heavy work, such as cutting down t rees and plowing 6c:lds. Women cooked, spun and "''OW , and tended chcir large families. l hcy also often helped ~Aith the butchering, scooping ouc che innards, and hanging hearts and lh·ers to dr}'· There was noching dainty about the work of pionttr women. Most western spores and cuscoms were eastern cransplants, but che West dcvel· oped a character of irs own. Eastern elegance yielded co ~A'eStcrn lack of refinementand made westerners cargcts for easterners' contempruous jibes. Westerners responded that at least they ~A
Exploration carried some Americans even farther ~A'CSt Ze· bulon Pike explored the Spanish Souch~A-esc in 1806. B}' 18 1I, in lhe ~A'llke of l..e'Ais and Clark, the New York mer· chant John Jacob Astor had founded a fur-trading post at the mouth of t he Columbia

1'111 ~West

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Riv~r in the: Oregon Country. At first, whites relied o n the: Nati\'f: Americans for furs, but in che 1820s su ch "mountain men'" as Kit Carson and j e:dediah Smith penetrated dttp beyond che Rockies. Smith typified chese: men and their exploits. Originally from wcsce:rn New York, he had m~d west as far as Illinois by 1822. That )'f:ar he: signed on ~Aith an expe:di· tion bound for the: upper Missouri River. In the: course: of this and Lacer explorations, Smith nearly feU victim to a grizzly bear in Souch Dakoca's Black Hills, crossed che: Mojaw: Desert into California and explored the San j oaquin Valley, and hiked back across the Sierras and the Grear Basin to the: Great Salt Lake, a forbidding crip. His thirst fur adw:nture led to his death just before: his thirty-third birthday at the hands of Comanche Indians. Biographies popularized the exploits of Smith and ocher mountain men, transfonning them into legends in their own da)'·

The federal go\'ernme:nt's growing scrength spurred w~st· ward expansion. Under che Articles of Confederation, CMe1..ent st'\'f:ral states had ceded western lands to the national &0\'· -'tile West ernmenc, creating a bountiful public domain. The l.ouisi· ana Purchase had brought che: entire Mississippi Rt...·er under American controL Six million acres of public land had been promised to ...oluntttrs during the: War of 18 12. The National Road, a h igh~A'll)" begun in ISJJ in Cumberland, Maryland, stretched farther "-'eSrward, reaching Wheeling, Virginia, in 1818 and Vandalia,llli· nois, by 1838. ~ople cf'O'I"'de:d along it. The same: gO'V\'.rnmental strength that aided whites brought misery to the lndi· ans. Virtually all the forcign policy su ccesses of the Republicans worked to the: Na· tr.·e Americans' disad\•ancage. The Louisiana Purchase and the Adams-On(s Treacy had scrippe:d them of Spanish protection. l...c'Ais and Clark blund)' cold che Indians that they must ..shut their ears to the: counsels of bad birds" and listen only to che "Grear Father" in Washington. The: American victory in the War of 18 12 deprived the tribes of British protection. Early in the negotiations leading to the: Treaty of Ghent, the: British had insisted o n the: creation of an Indian buffer state in the Old Norch~A'CSt, bur they facer dropped this demand and abandoned the Indians to their face:.

Tile Federal

N.... lloiod F""""r sponsottd bighw:l)' tt.. miUII'd tbt App;a.bdlioam ~nd opmtd tbt v.·~y for f.unilie:c w

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\'('esrward·mO\ing white scrd e:rs round in their path siz· able numbers ofNative Americans, especialI)' in che Souch, lltllllllans home co the ..Five: CiviUzOO TrJbe::s"- the Cherokees, Creeks, ChoctaW'S, Chickasaws, and Seminoles. Years of commercial dealings and in· termarriage ~Aith Europeans had created in these tribes influential minorities of mixed-bloods who had embraced Christianity and agriculrure. The Chero kees had adopted Anglo·American culru.rc to a greater extent chan any other tribe. Among them ~A'Cre farmers, millers, and even slave owners; they also had a ~A'litten form of their language, written Ia"'~ and their O'A'tl bilingual nC""-'Spaper, che: Cbtrokl:t Ph«nk. Such ..civilization" made: litd e: impression on southern ~Athites, ~Atho vie:......-ed the: Ci\iliud Tribes with contem pt and their lands with envy. A handful of tribes had sold their lands to the federal gm-emment and accepted remo\•al wesc of the Missis·

lbea-alof

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"TtmcM"d" in 18J05 w md:.t wq fur whitt Jctdemmt

Primary Source: Three Celebrated Ball PlayersChoctaw, Sioux. and

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The $O+C'02IIed Tr.:~il olTeo~~rs, foil~ by the Cheroke~. w;a~ one ol $C'YC'r.lll route~ .~~long whidl v:viou~ tribn mig:lted on their fo~ed ~rnov.:~l to rnel'\'a.tio '" Wl'St of the Miniuippi.

sippi River by 1830, but most clung to chcir land and rustoms. \'t'hen che Creek mixed-blood chief William Mdmosh sold most of the Indians' land to the federal go'lemmem, the cribal council executed him. In che 1820s white squatters mm--ed onco tribal lands; southern legislatures, loath to restrain white scrd ers, mo'led to expropriate Indian lands. State laws extended scare jurisdiccion O\-er the tribes and excluded Indians from serving as ~Ait· ncsses in court cases involving whites, ~Ailich effccci'ldy made it virtually impossible for Indians co collocc debts 0'1'--ed them by whites. President Andrew j ackson relished such measures. Himself a fro ntiersman con· tc-mptuous of Nariw~ Americans, jackson bdic..-ed that the- tribes must be su bject to the laws of the states, not exisc as inde-pendent nations. j ackson's belief spelled doom for the Indians, who could ncither \'Ote nor hold office. In 1834 Cherokee chiefjohn Ross got a taste of what state jurisdiction meant: Georgia, wichout consulting him, put his house up as a prize in the state loctery. In 1830 President jackson serured passage of chc- Indian Removal Ace, authoriz· ing him co exchange u.-escern territory for criballands. Thus, during j ackson•s eight )"ears in office, the federal gm-·ernmem forced Indians to exchange JOO million acres of their eastern lands for 32 million acres of public lands. The Choctaws, Creeks, and Chickasaws began their"volumary" migracion in the late 1820s. ln 1836 Creeks ~Ailo clung to their homes were forcibly re-mm-·ed, often in chains. The bitter war to remO\"C the Seminoles fro m their Florida lands lasted seven }'eat'S and cost the federal go'lemmcnc $20 million.

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Tqji .. Tt.-s 1'htduthor L'IIUC'·thinl m mott ortht Cbt:f'O. ktt tribe upon tbeir "rml(JY
I

Ironically, che: Cherokees, often considered the "mosc civilized'" tribe, suffc:red che: mosc. Pu.rs.uing thcir claims btfure: che: Supreme: Court, they V.'On N'O favorable ded· sions from Chiefjusrice j ohn Marshall. In Chrrolt.~Nt~tkm v. G~ (1831), Marshall recognized the Cherokees as a "domestic dependent nation" with a legitimate daim co thcir lands in Georgia. A rear later, in Worct'stn'''·G~ Marshall declared them a "discincr" political community entitled to federal protection against Georgia•s daim.s. !'resident Andrew jackson reportedly sneered, ..John Marshall has made his de· cision.: no"'' lee him enforce ir" and ignored the ruling. 11lcn in 1835 the U.S. g()I.'Crn· menc negociated chefraudulentTreacyofNcw Echota "'ith a handful ofunauthorized individuals. It ceded most remaining Cherokee lands to the United States fo r $5.6 million and che Indians' transportation "''eSt. The prin cipal signers were killed by other Chero k«s in 1839, but by chen che tribe's face was scaled. Sixt«n thousand Cherokees straggled "''CSt to the Indian 1Crritory between 1835 and 1838 along the so-called Trail ofTears. A total of perhaps d ghc chousand died during and immedia.tel}' after che hard journey. Indians in the Norchwest Territor}' fared no btcter after che}' signed land-cession treatics.1\vo upri.Ungs marked theirwescward removal. The6rstwas quickly crushed, but the second, led by a Sac and Fox chief, Black Hawk, raged along the frontier in Illinois umil federal troops and stan· militiamen \ircually annihilaced the Indians in 1832. After Black Hawk's defeac, the ocher northwestern tribes agreed to remM'llL BrN•cen 1832 and 1837 the United States consequently acquired nearly 190 million acres of indian land in che Norch"''CSt for $70 million.

In dearing the Indians from their territor}', the federal government was responding to whites' pressures for Land. Depicted soil and overcro"'•ding had long driven fanners wesc, but after the War of 1812 soaring agricultural commodity prices and rising de-

lbe Aplalllullll loom

mand fo r western foodsruffs sharpened the: land hunger. Engtand and France, exhausted b)•~A'llr, "''ere importing su bstantial amouncs of Ameri· can wheat and corni New England needed food for its burgeoning indus· trial population. In short, federal Indian policy, although devastating co Nati~ Americans, made: farming possible in the: \'('esc, and high prices and high demand made it attractt...·e. Cotton and Eli Whitney's cotron gin provided the: impetus for setd e:ment of the Old Souch~A'l'St, especially Alabama and MississippL Indeed, the explosi\J'C westward chrust of southern fanners and planters after che: War of 18 12 resembled a gold rush. By J8 17land prices had shot up from $30 co $50 an acre. By 1820 Alabama and Mississippi produced half the: nation's cotton. With a seeming!)' unlimited British market for raw cot· con, production tripled be:cw«n 1816 and 1831. Betv.r"Cen JSJI and 1836 the value of cotton exports rose 300 percenc, and cotton accounted for rwo-chirds of U.S. expores..

11w- \tl;u- of 1812 o ptn«< tht war for $1"\111'-r.d thnuu of\\'eltward migration that car Mtd the' Am tri.ean popula· t ian acro:r.$ tht MWWippi Ri \'C'r. W6tC"-m $0Ci.etyC'\ooh'C'd iu 0\\'n J« of value'.' and pridtd it$C'If on it$ de"mocratit nnuu. Exp.lnJion multip)N-d the' pcobiC'm$ ofNati\'C' Amaitaru,culmin.lting in tht "rtmov.ll" oftrib6 in tbt South· C':l..it and the' Old Northv.'C'$t. An agriculrural boom fudtd tbt drM-wu t. In tht Sou th, tht torton gin tom· bin«! with r ith Yt'C'$tC'-m land$ to t reo:a tC' a h u~ mrgC' in tor ton pro· dun:ion and apoR.

THE GROWTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY What dlangats ...-n linked to the rise oftlte ma'*.et «.onomy? The high prices ofagricultural commodities, such as wheat and cotton, tempted a growing number of farmers co add a cash crop, thus \~nturing into commercial agriculture or the marker e:c·onomy. In the South, the: sale ofsla\~S from older states to the: new Cotton Belt accelerated rapidly after JSJS. However, farmers often launched inco the: market econom}' without ..w Jghing che risks. The new commercial farmers encountered serious problems, including wildl)' fluctuating markets. They also roucinely had to borrow money co CO\~r che long in· terval be~~en harvest and sale of commercial crops. This debe 'A'llS frequencl)' worse than expected, particularl)' because many ~A'CStern farmers had also borro~A'Cd money to buy their land. T he rooc of this indebtedness was the federal go\·emment's inability to transfer the public domain directly to small farmers.

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r.ubtr tbao consumption

Federal Land policy floundered in this period. In che face of partisan and sectional pressures, che federal gowrnmenc passed \'arious land laws in quick succession, each intended to undo the damage caused b)•its predecessors. The Ordinance of 1785 had aimed to ensure the orderly settlement of the public domain by creating t~nships of 36 square miles, divided into 640-acre sections. Ordinar}' farmers could nor afford such large: purchases, but it was assumed that they would pool their money co buy sections. Fede:raliscs, wich their political base in the East, were reluctant to encourage W'CStem settlem ent but ~A'Cre eager to sell land to raise re:\~nue for che go\~rnme:nt. They reconciled chcir conflicting goals by selling huge: traces of land to speculators who waited for its value to rise and chen sold offpa.n:els to fanners. By 1796 the minimum purchase: was 640 acres at $2 an acre. Jefferson and the Republicans, sure: thac the small farmer ~A'llS the backbone of the

Fellel'll Land Policy

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Republic, took a different tack. 11le land law of 1800 dropped the minimum purchase: to 320 acres. By 1832 the minimum purchase had shrunk to 40 acres and the price to $1.25 an acre. Long before then, speculators V.\":re alread)' selling land in 40-acre: par· eels, a siu: that the small farmer could handle both financially and physically. The growing availability of credit after the War of 1812 fed speculation. T he chartering of the Second Bank of the United States in 18 16 increased the amount of money in circulation and stimulated the gto~A'th of state banks. Between 18 12 and 18 17, bank notes in circulation soared from $45 million ro $ 100 million. Srockhold· ers and officers saw banks less as investments chan as agencies that could lend them money for land speculation. lhe result was an orgy of speculation; b)• 18 19 the dollar value of sales of public Lands was more chan 1,000 percent greater than the average from 1800 to 18 14.

Despite these problems, most of the public domain found its wa}' into the hands of small farmers. 11le desire to re· _. tlie Squatter coup il'l'Vestments led speculators ro sell quickly, as d id the proliferation of squatters. Squatters had long helped themseto.-es to western land. Proud and independent, they hated land speculators and pressured Congress to allow «preemption'" rightsthat is, che right to purchase: at the minimum price the land that they already lh-ed on and had improw:d. After passing a series of limited preemption Ia~ Congress acknowledged a general righc of preemption in 1841. But for farmers who had to purchase land from speculators, interest rates ranged as high as 40 percent. Many ~A'CStern fanners, drowning in debt, had to skimp on food and plant cash crops in che hope of paying offcreditors. Having moved west co fulfill dreams of self-sufficiency, chey found themselves caught in the cash·crop economy, ~A•hich quick!)' exhausted their soil and forced them to mo\'e farther west· ward in sea.rch of new land. The phrase "the moving frontier"' refl't'S not only to the obvious face that che line of settlement shifted farther west with each passing dec· ade, but also to che fact that che same people kepc moving, chasing their elusi\'t: dreams. 1}'pical was Abraham lincoln's family, ~Ailo migrated from the East through sc...·eral farms in Kentucky and chen on to Indiana.

The Speculator

In 1819 the land boom collapsed, the victim of a 6nandal panic caused in Large pare by state banks chat issued chcir O'A'tl bank noces, little more than a promise: to pay the bearer a certain amount of specie (gold and silver coin) on demand. 11lese plentiful noces had helped fuel the land boom after 18 15. Farmers also borrowed to buy more: land and plane more crops, depending on sales to Europe, to enable them to repay loans. But t\-en as they did so, bumper crops in Europe combined with an economic slump in England to trim forcign demand for U.S. crops. The result was a cascade of economic catastrophes. In the summer of 1819 the Bank of the United States, holding farge amounts of state bank paper, began ro in· !Ust that che scate banks re:dttm chis paper in specie. lb pay these: debcs, state banks demanded that farmers and land speculators repay chcir loans- in specie. Credit

The Panicof 1119

I

ThE GG:OWtll OffHE MAAJ:ETECONOl&Y

201

contracted sharply throughout the nacion, particularly in che WcsL Prices for com· modities like ~Ailcat, corn, cotton, and tobacco sank by 50 perccm or more. Hardpressed farmers could not pa)' their debrs, speculators could nor collect their money, and land values collapsed from nearly $70 an acre to bard)' $2. The significance of the Panic lay nor only in irs economic bite bur also in the

conclusions many Americans reached. First, the: l':lnic left a biner casce: abouc banks, especial!)' chc Bank of che: United States, ~A'iddy blamed for the crash. Second, it

de-monstrated ho~A' dependcnc farmers had become: on distant markets and the: extent to ~Ail ich farmers had become entrepreneurs. This in rurn accderace:d the search for better, cheaper ways to gtt crops to market.

The transportacion S}'Stcms available in 1820 had serious weaknesses. The greac rivers wesc of the Appalachians ran ~: primarily north co souch and hence could noc by themSlumbOils. canals. selves connect ~A'CStern farmers to eastern markets. Roads a.lllllroads were expensive to maintain, and horse-dta~A'tl wagons ~A'Cre slow and limited in range. Consequentl}', after 1820 atcention and invcsnnent shifted to the development of watcr~A'll}'S, beginning ~Ailat became known as che Trans porta·

Tilt l'rlmpol1lllon

don Revolution. In 1807 Robert R. livingston and Robert Fulton introduced the steamboat Clermont on the Hudson Ri.,.er. They soon gained a monopol}' from t he New York legislature to run a New York- New jersey ferry service. Spectacular profits lured competitors, who secured a license from Congress and then filed suit co break the livingston-Fulton monopoly. In 1824 Chief justice john Marshall, in Gibbons v. Og· drn, ruled chat Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, ~Ailich empowered Congress to regulate interstate commerce, applied to navigation as ~A'CII. In chis case, he: wrote, the power of Congress co regulate interstate commerce had to prevail m-et the po'l'-'tr of New York.: thus the livingston-Fulton monopoly was \'Oid. In the aftermath of this decision, other state-granted monopolies collapsed and steamboat traffic in· creased rapidly. l 'he: number of steamboats operating on ~A'eStern rivers jumped from 17 in 1817 to 727 by 1855. Steamboats assumed a vital role: along che Mississjppi·Ohio river system.. Tht}' W\'.re far more useful than rafts, which journeyed only one: ~A'lly, or keelboats, which took up to fou r monrhs to tra\'tl upstream from New Orleans to Louisville.: in 18 17 a steamboat made the identical trip in just twcnry-fi ve da}'S. The dcwlopme:nt of long. shallow hulls permitted navigation of t he: Mississippi-Ohio system e\-en ~Ailen hot, dry summers lo~A'ered the river leveL Steamboats became more ornate as ~A'CJI as more practical, offering luxurious cabins and lounges, called saloons. For example, the saloon of the: &lipw) a Mississippi Ri\-e:r steamboat, was the length of a football field and featured sk}tfigh~ chandeliers, a ceiling crisscrossed with Gothic arches, and velvet upholstered mahogany furniture. While steamboats prm-ed their value, canals replaced roads and turnpikes as the focus of popular enthusiasm and financial speculation. Although che cost of canal construction was mind-boggling-Jefferson dismissed the idea of canals as ..litd e short ofmadncss"- canals offered the possibility of connecting the Mississippi-Ohio syscem ~Aith t he: Greac Lakes and t'\o'tn t he: East Coast.

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IUpid exp.lruiao ofQoa!J, Sttamsl!ips, md r.Uirwds

c:J.ntto.f

F"lltst or the- Jltl'am. baau dut ttvolution.iud "'"r

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1

..

,..:

ATlANTIC OCEAN

E:::jcarool5 ~ AMEs

D

),bjor toads

Map 9.2 Major Ri,..., Roads, ..d C - . 181S-1160 R;ail ro;ad:r; a nd can;al:r; i ncl'\";~~singly tied the economy o f the Midwest to th ou of the NOf'thu.n .

Erie CaNI

t.b.jclt QNI that linked G rut 1A:.t:c 10 NtwYorlt City, opming upper Midv.<esr: to widt:r dc-IIOI"lopment

I

A canal boom fo llowed the: completion in 1825 of che ErJt: Canal, which stretched 363 miles fro m Buffalo to Albany. For example, Oh io built a network of canals that enabled farmers to ship ~Aileat by ~A>acer to Lake Erie; che: ~Ailcat was then

shipped co Rochester for milling and finally tra\-elcd via the: Erie Canal and the Hudson Riwr to New York City. Shipping costs via the canal network wen: 10 percent of costs via road.

Erlf C•M( by John William Hill, 1831 Construction ol the Erie Canal w.n a rc:mMbbie k :u, :~U thoe more so beG~use the Uni ted Sutn did not h.we :~ny eragi· neering 5Chool :u the time. The pt'Oject' s heroC':$ were bwycn :~nd merdt:..nt:r; who u.ugh t themsd\'C's eragiraeering :1.~ br.awn worio:men, oftera r,;sh i:mmigr;2nts, who h:~d:cd :a w:~terw.ty through the fornt:r; :~radv:alleysofNew York.

Railroads were soon co mpeting with canals and gradually overcook them. In 1825 che 6rs.t railroad for general transportation began operacion in England. 11le new technology quickly reached the United Scates, and by 1840 chcre were 3,000 miles of railroad track, equal to the cotal canal mileage. Faster, cheaper co build, and able to reach more places, railroads enjoyed obvious advantages O\'er canals, but Americans realized their potential o nl}' slow!}'· Early railroads connected eastern cities rather than crossing che mountains and carried more passengers than frcighc. Noc until 1849 did frcighc n:wnue exceed pas· senger revenue, and not until 1850 d id railroads link the East Coast to Lake Eric. There were two main reasons fo r this slo"'' pace of de\-elopment. Firsc, unlike canals, mosc railroads "''Cre builc by private companies that tended co skimp o n coscs, and as a result produced lines requir ing conscanc repair. In co ntrast, canals needed litd e maintenance. Second, shipping bulky co mmoditi~ su ch as iro n, coal, and grain , was cheaper b)•canal than by raiL

The cransportarion n......_'Olucion accelerated the growth of to"''tls and cities. Indeed, the forty )'eats before the Ci\il War, 1820 to 1860, saw the most rapid utbanizacion in U.S. history. By 1860 New York City's popula· cion had rockeced from 124,000 to 800,000. Even more spectacular was the transformation of sleepy \i llages into bustling CO'A'tlS. Urban growth "''lls particular!}' fast in che West. 11le War of 1812 stim· ulated manufacturing and transformed ...;uages inco cowns, as did the ag· riculrural boom and the introduction of steamboacs after IS IS. Virtual!}' all the major western dries "''etC river ports. Of these, l'ittsburgh, Cincin· nati, Louisville, and New O rleans "'"re the mosc prominent. Pittsburgh was a manufacruring center, but the ochers "-ere commercial hubs flooded by people eager to make money.

For farmer.s, tb"' m:uker economy "'~'alluring b ut ,;,ky. Feder~ll.~nd policyw:l$ ~i m.ed ~t 'mall fanner.s bu t hdprd («d .ll ~pecui.Jtive boom. Whe.n rhe Jpeculari'"" bubble bur.st, the P.:mic 18 19 created «ono mic b.lvuc ~nd intenJi.fied the Ameriran di, trwr of N nlu..

or

The tran$portoahon revo1ution$te:tmboat,;, comalJ, and r~il ro:.W plarc~d ~ major roJe in ~~tw:trd expam:eon.

\'(lesre.m cities muJhroomtd, firsc along ri' ""r.s omd then o n tb"' Gre:.t Lakes.

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lnteracti\•e Map: Major American Cities in 1830 and 1860

What the transportation re\'Oiution ga\'e, it could also take awa}'· The comple· tion of the Erie Canal gradually shifted the center ofv.-estem economic activity away from che river dries and to"''llrd the Great Lakes; Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Chi· cago, and Milwaukee v.-ere che ultimate bene6ciarics of che canal. In 1830 nearl)' 75 percent of W\'.Stern d ry d"''Cllers li\-ed in che riw r ports of New Orleans, Louiso.ille, Cincinnati, and l'itrsburgh, buc by 1840 the proporcion had dropped co 20 percent. The advent of modern manufacturing would multiply the effect of the transporta· tion m'Oiucion on the: growch of d ries.

INDUSTRIAL BEG INNINGS

I

Why did mdustrialization begin to take hold?

S.MI Slabr British "me. dt.1..niC' whel utritd plans fOr tutile mill to Unimf Sates;

I

btg;a.n Amt:ricao ttxtile indwtry

lndustnahzacton gave an added boost to the growth ofcines and cov.ns In any way possible, Americans soughc to counter Britain's full-generation lead in building factories; Britain in tum banned che emigration of its skilled mechanics. Hov.'t:\'er, one of those m echanic~ Samuel Slater, "''lls able to re-ach the United States in 1789. He: helped design and build the 6rsc cotton mill in the: United States the: following )'tar. l 'he mill's work force mushroomed from nine: to one hundred, and his mills multiplied. The pace of industrialization quickened in the: 1810s and 1820s, espe· d all)' in cotton textiles and shoes. Industrialization was uneven. l 'hcre was lirtle in the Sourh, "'there: planters pre:· ferrcd to im-esc in land and sla\'~ and much in New England, where poor soil made: agriculture an even poorer im-esrment. Generall)', industrialization involved three steps: the subdivision of casks, the gathering of workers in large factories, and the: use of high-speed machines to replace handv.'Ork. Industrialization changed lives. Many benefited from industrialization as for· mer luxury goods became: cheaper. And while: cheap machine-made goods brought luxuries "'ithin che reach of"''Orking people:, they also undcnnine:d skilled arcisans. Most early factory workers were: recruited from fanns, where: tht:)' had sec their own pace: and taken breaks as tasks were completed. In contrast, machines and the: clock dictated the: faccory v.'Orker's pace. Finally, industrialization led to specialization; farmers could now concentrate: on farming and bU)'C loch~ shoes, and other produces they had PI\.'Viousl)' made:.

Multiple: factors stimulated industriali:zation. Merchants barred from foreign trade by the Embargo Act of 1807 redirected rhcircapital into factories. After rhe War of 1812, acceptance of tariffs was widespread. l'rocected from foreign competition, New Eng· land's textile oucput rose: from 4 million yards in 18 17 to 323 million )'llrds by 1840. And the transponacion revolution gave manufacrurers easier access to markets in the Souch and West. l'roble:ms in New England's rural economy also stimulated industrialization. Many farm families had alwa}'S engaged in small-scale manufacru ring. and many of these gradually deserted farming "''Oro-our soils for full-time manufacturing.

l 1-'l0US11UAJ. BEGIK.NIMGS

2 OS

Technology plared a major role. Lacking craft organizations that tied an:isans to a single trade, Americans could fred)' cxperimenc with machines outside chcir own craft. Americans also improw:d on foreign ideas and techniques. For example, in 1798 Eli Whitney, ino.-cntor of the cotton gin, gained a government contract to pro· duce: ten chousand muskets within a two-rear period b)•using interchangeable parts, an idea originally developed in f rance. Although \'t'himey missed his deadline by more than a decade, his idea captured che imagination of man}' American leaders and foreshadowed the rise of a full-scale industrial economy.

New England became America's 6rst industrial region. The trade wars leading up co the War of 1812 had de\'as· raced the Northeast-'s traditional economy and stimulated capital invesnnem in manufacruring. New England's man}' swift-flowing rivers 'A'Cf'C ideal sources of ~A'llterpo~A•er for mills. The wesN'llrd migration of New England's )'Oung men, unable to wrest a living from rocky soil, left a surplus of young women who supplied cheap industrial labor. 11le establishmenc of che Boston Manufacturing Com pan)' in 1813 opened a new chapter in U.S. manufacturing. Backed by ample capital, lhe Boston Com pan)' built cexcile mills in the Mas.sachustcts rowns of Lowdl and Waltham; by 1836 lhe company employed more than six lhousand workers. Unlike Slater's mills, the Waltham and l.o\1/CU factories turned out more finished produces, chus dbo~A'ing aside S later•s cottage industry. Slater had tried to preserve tradition b)• hiring entire families co ~A
&..wel Walillrlun ~gcbu. Sl'tU tcra,J 'll' hel'\" 1'11'0 ~Mgt tc.xtile mills V.'C'I'\" e.ubli.bed .u urly e..ptrimmt$ io flctory manufM:wriog

Mil Gi ~ Aroond 1850 This gi rl mcmly llkdyworked in ;t M;us;tchusetts textile mill, ;u either ~II o r W;t/th:~m. Her swollen ;~.nd rough h:~n
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Conditions in t he mills ..w .re dreadful. 10 pi'C"t·e:m threads from snapping. t he factories had to be kept humid_: win dows 'A'Cre nailed shut, and water 'A'llS sprayed in the air. Flying d ust and deafening noise were constant companions. In the 1830s conditions ~A'Orscned, as competition and recession led mill owners co reduce wages and speed up V.'Otk schedules. l 'he: system's impersonality intensified che harsh-

ness of r.he 'A'Otk environment. Owners rarely visited factories; chcir agents, all men, gave orders to the ~A'Orkcrs, main!}' women. In 1834 and again in 1836, ~A'Ome:n at the Lowell mills quit work to protest low wages. The largest strikes in American his tOf}' to that point, chcy noc only pitted ~A
The size of the mills was not typical of industrial dC"t-elopment in th is era; as lace: as 1860, the: aV\'.rage industrial e:scablis hmcnt employed only eight workers. «out·

I ---~~l~~!l~~!,]m,~~ ! \ ___

work" characterized most industries ocher than ce:xciles. For example:, prior co the introduction of sewing machines in the 1850~ women often sewed parts of shoes ac home and then sent che: piecework to factories for finishing.

~

Multiple fa.ctou: stimul.u~ indu$· ttUiiution, including pron-cti\'C' tariff.s, ;:wai labl~ capifal, and :.d· vancu in tuhnology.

.-Artisans and Workers

lhe: s killed artisans of New York City and Phila· delphia tried to protect their interests by forming Ill Mld-AIIIntic Cities trade unions and .."'urkingmen's'" political par· tics. Initially, they sought co restore privileges and W'Orking conditions that artisans had once: enjoyed, but gradual!}' they joined forces with unskilled workers. When coal heaw~rs in Philadelphia struck for a ce:n-hour da}' in 1835, carpenters, cigar makers, leather \N'Orkers, and other artisans joined in what became t he 6rsc general strike in the United States. The em~nce: of organized W'Orker protests underscored the mixed blessings of economic de:\'Ciopmenc. Whereas some people prospered, others fo und their economic position de:ce:rioracing. By 1830 many Am ericans ~A'Cre questioning ~Athcthe:r t heir nation was truly a land of equality.

T~Kti1t milU m:.ck N"' finglmd Amcri e~~'' 6,.,t indu.u:rial rtgion.

Mii!J like fho:~~ .n \V.Uth:.m ;md t..owdl rdi~d ht..wilr on the l:.bor of)'Oung wom en. "'Ou h\'Ofio:• dominattd e.ulr ind u.sttUiiution out,ick fht t~Kti lt ind ustry. tnd u,ui.Ui.1:uion bcought mixed 1'6ulu; .l$ m.lnr wockt ,.,• uonomic po,ition dtter1orated, newquc,horu U0$1' abou t tqtulicy in the United Stat6.

I

EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY

In wllat MtlfS dtd me.qualrty actually mcreau?

l 'hat o ne (white) man was as good as another became the nattonal creed mAn· tebe:llum (pre-Civil War) America. SeJVants insis ted on being called t he "help," not permanent subordinates. Merchants bowed co no one. Polir:icians nc:•..-e:r lost an op· portunicy to proclaim artisans and fanners t he equal of lawrcrs and bankers. Howc·'lcr, the: market and transportation revolutions were placing new pressure on the idea ofequality. At the same rime chat impro,...c d t ransportation enabled some: easeern farmers to migrate co the richer soils of t he West, ic became more difficult fo r those left behind to compete wich t he: cheaper grain notA' carried east b}•canals and milroads. Many eastern farm ers had to mOV\'. to cities to take ~Athatewr W'Ork they could 6nd, often as casual da}' laborers on the docks or in small ~A'Orkshops. Thcir willingness to work for low wages undm:uc t he position of skilled artisans. E\·cn as he bdie'lcd that che wide: distribution of land and individuals' insistence on being treated as equals created more real equality in America chan in France, Alexis de:

I fQOAUlY AND INEQOAUlY

2 07

10cqucville: worried that che: lower classes in the major cities W'Cre becoming "a rabble more: dangerous even chan chat of European cowns."

The gap between rich and poorconcinued co widen in t he first half of the nine:ce:ench cencury. Although striking in· equalities separated rich and poor farmers, t he: inequalities W'Cre: far greater in che d ries, where: a small fraction of the people O~A'tled a huge: share of che wealth. In Boston the richest 4 percent of t he people ()'~.'.'ned alm ost 70 pe:rce:m of che ~A'Calth by 1848, whereas 8 1 percenc of t he population owned o nl}' 4 percent of the: wealth. Ne~A' York and other major cities mirrored t hese statistics. Although commemacors celebrated che self-made: man and his rise: "from rags to riches,"' fe\l• actually fie chis pactern. Less than S percent of che wealthy had starred life pootj. almost 90 percent ofv.·d l-offpeople had been born rich. Clearly, che oldfashioned way to W'Calth was to inherit it, to marr}' more of it, and to im·est it wisd}'· Qccasjonal rags-co-riches stories like char of john jacob Astor and his fur-trading empire sustained the m)'th, bur it was mainly a myth. Splendid residences and social dubs also sct the rich apart. In New York half t he city's wcalchy families liw:d on o nly cighc streets, and chey belonged to che same dubs. 10cqucviUe: noced these facts and also obserw:d chat che: rich feigned respect for equality, at least in public. They rode: in ordinary carriages, brushed dbo~A'S ~Aith the less privileged, and avoided che conspicuous display of we:alch that ma.rke:d their prh•ate lives.. Ac t he opposite end of che social ladder were t he poor. By today's standards mosc ance:bellum Americans ~A'Cre poor; they depended on their children's labor to meet expenses, had little money for medical care: or recreation, and suffered frequent unemployment. In 1850 an estimated three o ut of eight males m-er tv.rcmy owned little more t han their clothing. in dealing ~Aith economic statistics, it is important to remember chat che accumulation of wealth cakes place: over a life:cime:. Wit h its high birchrate, America ~A'3S a nation of young people ~Aith little: property. Bur many of them \N'Ould gain v.-ealch as they grew older. Antebellum Americans distinguished berwee:n po..-erry, a common condition, and pduptrism, which meanc both f'O\'trty and dependency-the inability to care for oneself. The elderly, t he ill, and t he wid()'l.'.-ed often fell inco che categor}' of pauperis m. Such people: were known as che "de:scning" poor in contrast co the ..undeserving'" poor, loafers and drunkards whose poverty 'A'3S seen as self-willed. Most moralists assumed t hat since po\-e:rty resu lted either from circumstances beyond anyone•s conn'OI, such as age or in6nnity, or fro m \'Oiuncary decisions to squander money o n akohol, it \N'Ould not pass from generation to generation. lc was a comforting but misleading assumption. A class of people who could not e.sc:ape poverty was emerging in t he major cities in che first half of the nineteenth ce:mur}'· O ne source 'A'llS immigration. As earl}' as 1801 a New York newspaper bemoaned che arrival of boatloads of immigrants ~Aith large families but with neither money nor health. The poorest white immigrants v.-ere fro m Ireland, where English landlords had evicted peasants from the land in che cighce:ench century. 11lese Irish immigrants

Cnlwln( Inequality: llltRkfiiM 1111 Poor

{('f) Primary Source: ~ Chimney

Sweep

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played key roles in canal construccion; others clustered in the Fi\-e Points area of New York City, "'ilich bc.
l'rcjudice against African·Americans "''lls deeply ingrained in white society chroughouc the nacion. Although sla\'f:r}' lilt Norlll had largely disappeared in che Nort h by 1820, discrimina· tory la"''S rm1ained. T he voting rights of African-Americans were st\'f:rd)' restricted; for exam ple, New York eliminated property requirements for "'thites but kept t hem for blacks. There W\'.re: attempts to bar free blacks from migrating. And segregation prevailed in northern schools, jails, and hospitals. By 1850, blacks could \'Ote on equal terms with "'ilitcs in only one dty, Boston. Most damaging of all to fret: blacks was the social pressure chat forced them into unskilled, low·pa)ingjobs throughout the northern cities. Although a few free blacks accumulated moderate: wealth, free blacks in gtncral were onl)' half as likdy as other city dwellers to own real estate. O ne im portant black response co discrimination was the establishment of chcir o"''tl churches. When a group of free blacks was ejected from a Philadelphia church, they ulrimatcl)' established the 6rst black-run Protestant denomination, che African Methodist Episcopal ChUJ'Ch, in 1816. The A.M.E. rapid!)' expanded co encom pass a ce:rritOC)' bounded by \'t'ashington, D.C., Pittsburgh, and New York City. Its members campaigned against s la\\':ry, provided education for black children, and formed murual-aid societies. just as northern African-Americans left white churches to form their own, free blacks gradually acquired some con· trol O\'ct che educacion of chcir children. Northern city gO\'· emments made little pro.,ision for the education of free persons of color, at 6rst leaving northern blacks dependent on che philanthropy of S)'ll'lpachctic whites to educate chcir childr~:cn. But the 1820s and 1830s witnessed an explosion of black self-hope societies de\'Oted to encouraging black education and run by graduates of t he African Fr«: School.

Fne lllacb In

A!ruao Modo""" E,;sco,ai Ouch Fint Amtrieln dmom.

I

in.:l.OOn t.SUbli,.htd by and lOr Mrir..uw\rntrir..ul$

RicuniAI... Fi~ b is;f'M)p of tht Afric;ul Mtthodist Episc:op;al Churdl, l&h;ard Alltra 'P'tnt mueh of his time tnvding, org-:~niting soc:ietits of bl;ack Methodjus, pra:;~~ching on Sund:~y:;, ;u.d euuing wood on othtr d:~ys to t;arn his living.

Tilt "Middling Classes"

Most antebellum Americans v.-ere neither fabulous!)' rich

nor grindingly poor bur pare of the '"middling dass~s...

Even though t he: wealthy owned an increasing proportion of wealth, per capita income grew ac J.S percent annually between 1840 and 1860, and the: standard of living generally rose after 1800. Americans applied che term m;dd.Jingcld.sm co farmers and artisans who held the ideal of sd f-employmcnt and were considered stead}' and dependable. Often, however, farmers and artisans led lives considerably less stable: than this ideal Allan Mel· ville, t he: father of nM-elist Hennan Melville, was an enterprising import merchant who did well until che late 1820s, when his business sagged. By 1830 he was "de:sd·

•........ l

duse• Fum'"•

arrilaru, prof'Cs.s:ionals- otitber

rid! nor poor

cuce: of resources and without a shilling." Despice: loans of 53,500, Melville's dO\I.'O·

ward spiral continued, and he died cwo )'tat'S Lacer, broken in spirit. Artisans shared che perils oflife: in che m iddling classes. During the colonial pt· riod man)' had attained che ideal ofsdf·em ploym e:nt, owning chcir cools, caking or· dcrs, making their produces, and training chcir children and apprcnciccs in the craft. By 1850 t his seJf.suffident artisan class had split into two distinct groups. l 'he few artisans who had access co capital became entrepreneurs who hired journeymen to do the actual work Without capital, most remained journeym en, ~A'Orking for the arcisans·turned·entrepreneurs wich litde: prospect of sdf·em ploym e:nt. The em erging m iddling classes shared with the poor a high degree of t ransience. Even professionals, su ch as judges and latA')·~ spent pare of each rear riding from one: county courthouse to anocher. The itinerant The gap bttw«n rich and poor widentd, Upt(:i:tll}' in ti ti ~. d e:rg)man m o unted on an old nag and riding che countryside: to visit che Amerie'a.rn: goentr.Uiy bl.untd tht faith ful was a familiar 6gure. poor ror bting poor. Transience ~A
THE REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 1-/ow did the rise oftile nt4rk6t «<nomy and industrialization cMnge relationships within families and communities? Following the War of 18 12 the growth of interregional trade, commm:ial agri· culture, and manufacturing d is rupted t raditional social relationships and forged new ones. Two broad changes took place. First, Am ericans began to question tradi· donal forms of authority and to em brace individualismj once the cenn had m eant nothing more than selfishness, buc now it connoted positive qualities such as seJf. reliance and the ability of each person co judge his or her own best interests. Wealth, education, and social position no longer reccived automatic deference. Second, Americans created new foundations for aut hority. For example, women dcwloped the idea that they possessed a «separate sphcrr' of authority in che hom e, and indi· viduals form ed voluntary associations to influence the: d irection of society.

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Intense: criticism of Ia"'')'~ ph}'Sicians, and ministers exemplified the assault o n and erosion of traditional authority. Between 1800 and 1&40 the "''llve of religious revivals known as the Seco nd Great Awakening (sec Chapter 10) sparked fierce attacks on the professions. Revivalists blasted the dergy for creating complex theologies, drinking cxpensi\J'C wines, and fleecing the people. One revivalist accused physicians of im·enring fancy Larin and Greek names for diseases to disguise their inability co cure chem. These attacks on the learned professions peaked between 1820 and 1850. Sam· uel l'homson led a successful mm·emenc to eliminate all barriers co emry into the medical profession, including educational requirements. By 1845 C".'er}' state had repealed laws requiring licenses or education co practice medicine. In religion, minis· ters fo und little job security as finid ,'Y congregations dismissed clergymen whose theology displeased them.. In turn, ministers became more ambitious and more: in· d ined co lea\'t: poor, small churches for Large, wealthy ones. The increasing commercialization of the economy led to both more professionals and more attacks on them. In 1765, America had one medical schoolj I>}• 1860 there ....-ere sh:ty·fi.\'t:. l he nt:'"'·ly minted doctors and fa"'')'t:rs had neither d«p roots in che towns where they practiced nor convincing claims to social superiority. «Men dropped down into their places as from clouds,"' one critic "''COte. «Nobod}' knew who or what chey \l't:CC, except as they claimed." This questioning of auchoriry was particularly sharp on che frontier. Easterners sneered that cwry man in the West daimed to be a "judge," ..general," "colonel,"' or "squire." Would·be gentlemen substituted an exaggerated sense of personal ho nor for legal or customary claims of authority. Obsessed with their fragile scacus, these "gentlemen" co uld react tescil}' to the slightest insult; consequently, duels wen: com· mon on the frontier. At a Kentucky militia parade in 1819, an officer's dog jogged onto the fi eld and sat ac his master's knee. Enraged by this breach of military deco· rum, another officer ran the dog through "'ith his sword. A ....-eek later, the two men met with pistols at ten paces. One was killed, the ocher maimed for life.

The Attack oa lilt Profesliolls

Meanwhile, children quietly questioned parental auchor· ity. The era's economic change forced many )'Oung people to choose becw«n Sta}ing at home to help their parents and \'enturing out on their o"''ll. l 'h is desire for independence: fueled westward mi· gration as "''CIL Restless single men led che way. 1U:o }'Oung men from Virginia put it succinctly: "All che promise of life naw s«med co us to be at the other end of the rainbow- somewhere else-anywhere else but o n the farm.... All our youthful plans had as their chief object the getting a"''llY from the farm.." As )'Oung antebellum Americans cried to escape d ose parental supervision, courtship and marriage patterns also changed. No longer dependent on parcnrs fo r land, young people wanted to choose their own mate. Romantic low, rather chan parental preference, increasingly determined marital decisions. O ne sign of )'Oung people•s gro"Aing control over courtship and marriage "''lls the declining likelihood chat the )'OUng "''Omen of a family wo uld marry in chcir birth order. 11'aditionally, fathers "''llnted their daughters to marry in the order of

The Cballl!llge lo Flllllly Autllorily

I

THE REVOWOOH IN SOCIA.l RELAlJOMStUPS

211

their birth co a\'Oid an}' suspicion that there: was something wrong wich one or more of them. By the: end of che cighcecnth cemur)', daughters were making their own decisions abouc marriage, and che custom of birth order vanished. Another mark of the times 'A'llS the growing popularity of long engagements; )'OUng women were reluccanc co cie: the knot, fearing char marriage .....-ould snuffout their independence. Equal!)' striking was the increasing number of )'OUng ~A'Omen ~Ailo chose nor co marry. Thus )'OUng people lived more and more in a ~A'Orld of their own. Moralists reacted wich alarm and flooded the countr)' with books of advice co )'OUch, which stressed the same message: newly indcpendcm )'Oung people should d twlop selfcontrol, and "character:'' l 'h e self-made: adult began with the self-made )'OUch.

Another class of advice books counseled wives and husbands about chcir rights and d uties. 1'he:se books were a sign that relations be:rw«n spouses were also changing. Young men and women accustomed to making their own decisions would undcrscandabl)' approach marriage as a compact among equals. Although inequalities within marriage remained-espe:ciall)' the legal tradition that married women could not own property-the crend was toward a form of equality. One: soun:e of this change: was the rise of the doctrine of separate: spheres. l 'h e traditional \i cw of women as subordinate in all ways yielded to a separate-but-equal doctrine char portrayed men as superior in making money and gow:ming the world, and women as superior in exerting moral influence on family members. Mosc impor· tanc was che shift of responsibility for child rearing from fathers to mothers. Advice books instructed mothers to discipline children by "'irhdra"'ing IO\'e rather than US· ingcorporal punishment. A whipped child might obey bur would remain sullen and bitter. The gend er methods ad\·ocare:d in manuals promised to penetrate the child's heart, to make the child w.nt to do che right ching. The idea of a separate women's sphere blended "'ich the image of family and home as seduded refuges from a disorderly society. Popular culture painted an alluring portrait of the pleasures of home in such semime:mal songs as "Home, Sweet Homr' and such poems as ..A Visit from St. Nicholas."' Even che physical appearance: ofhouses changed; one: prominent architect published plans for peaceful sjngfe--family homes co offset the hurty-burly of dail)' life:. ..There should be something to love;'' he: wrote. "lhere muse be nooks about ic, "'there one: would lm-e co linger.: "'indO'I'-'S, where one: can enjoy che: quiet landscape ac his leisu re; cozy rooms, where all fi reside joys are: invited ro dwelL" Bur reality divc~d far from chis ideal. Ownership of a quiet sjngle· family home: lay be)'ond the: reach of most Americans, even much of che middle class. Farm homes, far from tranquil, were beehives of activity, and dty du.-elle:rs often had to sacrifice privacy b)•taking in boarders co supplement family income. The decline of cottage industry and the gr~·ing number of men (merchants, lawrers, brokers) who worked outside che home ga..-e women more time to Lavish on children. Married "''Omen found these ideals soun:es ofpo'l'--er: che doctrine of sepa· rare: spheres subtly implied char women should control not only che discipline bur also the number of children. In 1800 the United Stares had one of the: highest birthrates t:\'cr recorded. Sea· ciscically, the: a\-erage woman bore 7.04 children. Children were valuable for che labor

Wives and Husbands

_ .... sploens """'"'

doctrine thu emphuiud

womc"n'5mol'illity;md<~.utbo~

1tlltivt" role • ithin the hamt

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Prima:ry Source: Portrait of a Woman and a Man

they provided and for the: relief from the burdens of swvival that they could bring to aging parents. The more: children, che better, most couples assumed. However, the: growth of che market econom}' raised quescions about children's economic value. Unlike a farmer, a merchant or lawyer could not send his children to work at the: age of seven or cighc. 11le birthrate gradually dropped, especially in towns and citi~ so that statiscically by 1900 che ai,!'Crage woman ~A'Ould bear 3.98 children. Birthrates re· mained higher among African-Americans and immigrants and in the rural West, where land was plentiful. Abstinence, roitus inJerruptus (the ~Aithdra~A'lll of the penis before ejaculation), and abortion were common birth--control methods. Remedies fur «female irregularity"unwanted pregnanC)•- werc ~Aidcl)' ad\·ertised. The rubber condom and the: vaginal diaphragm 'A'Cre familiar co many Americans by 1865. Whatever che method, hus· bands and wives jointly decided to limit family size. Economic and ideological con· siderations blmded together. Husbands could note that che economic \'alue: of children was declining; wi\·~ char having fewer children ~A'Ould give them more time: to n urru.re each one and thereby to carry out their wo manly duties. Mosc supporters of che ideal of separate spheres did not advocate full legal equality fur ~A'Om l'fl. Indeed,. che ideal of separate spheres was an explicit dlk'rnafir.'t to legal equality. Bur the concept enhanced women's power within marriage by giving chem influence in such vital issues as child rearing and the frequmcy of pregnancies.

As some: fOrms of authority weakened, Americans devised new tA'llfS by which individuals could extend their influAUeat-es a.d lhe ence over others. The antebellum era wicne:sscd che widesuperior.5Uflordit»tl' ft'larion. lise ol Volunllry ship) or iod.ividu
volultarr us.O.OO.

Hori.

wmod
IIM'Il.ollll

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

KEY TERMS

What caused the surge o(west¥o'llrri migration after the War of 1812? (page 194)

I

An agricultural boom luted people west, as did the swelling demand for cot· ton ctcatcd by the cocton gin. Wcst\l.•ard mow.mcnt carded the American popu· lation across the Mississippi Rivet by 182!), raising both hopes and problems.. A new societ}' was rising in che West, one that vic.,.,'Cd itself as more democrntic and mon: egalitarian than the East. Native Americans v.~re ruthlessly pushed aside or '"re-located~ to make room for white settlers.

I

What changes were/inked tc the rise of the market economy? (pa!'J' 199) Western farmers soon entered the market economy, which was both lucta·

t i\-e and \'Olatile. They began to plant cash crops and to pucchase manufactures.

Although federal land policy was meant to sell parcels to small farmers, specu· Lators snapped up much of the land. The spcculatiV!: boom collapsed in the P.mic of 1819, but the movement wrsrn'.lrd continued, with the ttansportation revolution opening the way for srttlrts and products. And cities mushroomed, rspcciall}' in the Grrat Lakes area.

I

Alexis de TocquE'I'ill• (p. 19J) National Road (p. 196} "F"" CMiz•d Tnbes" (p. 196} C/teroll.ee Notion v.Gecxgio (p. 198) IVO«t'
Why did industrializaoan begin to take hold? (pa!'J' 204)

Pto(ectiw tariffs, technology, and the rrady availability of capital stimulated industrial dcvrlopmrnt, rspecially in New England, where the textile industry lrd the way. Young womrn formed the primary \l'Otk forcr at many New Eng· land mills, but elsewhere a pircemeal system of '"'n rk predominated. Rrsults of this early industrialization werr unC\'en, particularly in tenns of equality and inequality.

l

in what ways did inequality aaua/ly increase?(pa!'J' 206)

In America's cities., the gap between rich and poor 'olidencd; most people hrfd the poor responsible tor their po~oert}'· Whilr the "middling d assrs" in· crrased, free blacks saw even more of their tights slip away.

How did the n·se ofthe morket econon!Y and industrialization change relationships within families and communities? (page 209)

I

lndi\•idualism increasingly characterized American society, while most Americans questioned authorit}' in general and vi~\_"<1 the professions with skepticism. Young people more and more defted or ignored familial authorit}'· Women both bcndited from and were harmed by che doctrine of "'separate spheres.." Yoluntar}'• horizontal organizations thri\'ed.

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Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

KEY TERMS

What caused the surge o(west¥o'llrri migration after the War of 1812? (page 194)

I

An agricultural boom luted people west, as did the swelling demand for cot· ton ctcatcd by the cocton gin. Wcst\l.•ard mow.mcnt carded the American popu· lation across the Mississippi Rivet by 182!), raising both hopes and problems.. A new societ}' was rising in che West, one that vic.,.,'Cd itself as more democrntic and mon: egalitarian than the East. Native Americans v.~re ruthlessly pushed aside or '"re-located~ to make room for white settlers.

I

What changes were/inked tc the rise of the market economy? (pa!'J' 199) Western farmers soon entered the market economy, which was both lucta·

t i\-e and \'Olatile. They began to plant cash crops and to pucchase manufactures.

Although federal land policy was meant to sell parcels to small farmers, specu· Lators snapped up much of the land. The spcculatiV!: boom collapsed in the P.mic of 1819, but the movement wrsrn'.lrd continued, with the ttansportation revolution opening the way for srttlrts and products. And cities mushroomed, rspcciall}' in the Grrat Lakes area.

I

Alexis de TocquE'I'ill• (p. 19J) National Road (p. 196} "F"" CMiz•d Tnbes" (p. 196} C/teroll.ee Notion v.Gecxgio (p. 198) IVO«t'
Why did industrializaoan begin to take hold? (pa!'J' 204)

Pto(ectiw tariffs, technology, and the rrady availability of capital stimulated industrial dcvrlopmrnt, rspecially in New England, where the textile industry lrd the way. Young womrn formed the primary \l'Otk forcr at many New Eng· land mills, but elsewhere a pircemeal system of '"'n rk predominated. Rrsults of this early industrialization werr unC\'en, particularly in tenns of equality and inequality.

l

in what ways did inequality aaua/ly increase?(pa!'J' 206)

In America's cities., the gap between rich and poor 'olidencd; most people hrfd the poor responsible tor their po~oert}'· Whilr the "middling d assrs" in· crrased, free blacks saw even more of their tights slip away.

How did the n·se ofthe morket econon!Y and industrialization change relationships within families and communities? (page 209)

I

lndi\•idualism increasingly characterized American society, while most Americans questioned authorit}' in general and vi~\_"<1 the professions with skepticism. Young people more and more defted or ignored familial authorit}'· Women both bcndited from and were harmed by che doctrine of "'separate spheres.." Yoluntar}'• horizontal organizations thri\'ed.

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I THE RtSE OF Otw.OCRAnc Pouncs, tb 41 -18]2

215

fiefs, often the produce of e\'angelism and nontraditional seccs, impelled reformers into chest and other crusades, and they soon discovered that their su ccess rested on their ability to influence politics. Both the political and the reform agendas of the J820s and J830s diverged from those of che nacion's founders. Those leaders had feared popular participacion in politics, left an ambiguous legacy on slaver}', and displa)'td little interest in "''Omen's rights. Vee f:'\'en as Americans shifted their political and sodal priorities, rhcyconcin· ued to \>tnerate the Fou nders.

THE RISE OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, 1824-1832 How did Americ4n politics becom.r more democratic in the first halfofthe nineteenrll untury? In 1824 Andrew j ackson and john Q uincy Adams u-ere both members ofjeffcr· son's Republican parry; by 1834 jackson was a Democrat and Adams, a Whig. Ten· sions spawned by industrialization, the rise of the Cotton South, and westward expansion splic j efferson's old party. Generally, supporters of states' rights joined the Democrats, and ad\'Ocaces of national supporc for economic de\-elopment be·

came \t'higs. Democrat or Whig, leaders had co adapc to the rising nocion that politics should be an expression of the will of the commo n people rather than an activity that gen· demcn conducted on the people's behalf. Americans still looked up co cheir leaders, buc the leaders could no longer look down on the people.

0eeocnts Mtmbt:rs or tht JUrty tb.tt ~d rrom Jdfer. son's Rtpublian p;uty u OUC' ofi'II'O dominmt ~ in ~oond p;uty systrm

WIIip JniWJiy a lltd NWanal

I

Rtpubliaru; mtmbtn ofebt

othtr dominant JUrty

Democratizing forces in politics took sC'\o-eral forms. One of the mosc common was the abolition of the requirem ent that voters o"''tl property.: no western states had such a re· quirement, and eastern scaces gradually liberalized their laws. MorW't-er, written bal· lots replaced the custom of voting aloud, which had enabled elites to influence others at the polls. And appointiw offices became elccti\--e. l 'he sdeccion of members of the Electoral College shifted gradual!)' from state legislatures to rhe voters, and by 1832 only South Carolina follo"''Cd che old cuscom. The 6m:e tug of war betv.r'Cen Republicans and Federalists in the 1790s and early 1800s had caught both parties to court \'Oters and listen to their will. Ac grand party· run barbecues North and South, potential \'Otcrs washed down free d ams and oys· tcrs "'ith fret: beer and whiskey. The pace of policical democratization was u nC'\o-en, ho"''CW.r. The parries "''ere still run fro m the top do'A'tl as late as 1820, "'ith candidates nominated b)•caucus; thac is, a meecing of parry members in the legislaw.re. And political democracy did not extend to allowing cither \\'Omen or fret: blacks the right to vote.

D

aD'lllc Fennent

Sectional politics shattered the harmony of the Era ofGood Feelings. In 1824, 6vc candidates, all Republican~ batd ed for the presidency. john Quincy Adams emerged as the New England favorite. j ohn C. Calhoun and William Crawford fought to represent

1'111 Eledlon of 1824

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2 16

OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

the South. Henry Clay of Kentucky hoped for support from the: East as wdl as his nath>t: West. 1tnnesscan Andn:w Jackson stunned the four by emerging as a favorite: of frontier people, southerners, and some northerners. A paralyzing stroke soon removed Crawford from the: race. Impressed by Jackson' s support, Calhoun ~Aithdrew co run unopposed for the vice presidency. Jackson won t he: popular and electoral \'Ote but failed to win the majority of the electoral \'Ote required by che Constitution. When che election ~A'Cflt to the House of Repre· scmacivcs, Clay threw his support, and thus t he: presidency, to Adams; Adams then promptly appointed Cia}' secretary of scate. Jackson's supporters raged that a "corrupt bargain" had cheated chcir candidate, "'ld Hickory," of t he: presidency. AI· though no evidence of any outright deal was uncM'Ct'Cd, che ~Aidespread belief in a corrupt bargain hung like a cloud O\>t:r Adams's presidency.

Failing to undcrstand the changing political d imace, Ad· ams made se\·eral other miscalculations that ~At: m'Oiutionaries. Instead of building new bases of support, Adams dung to the increasingly obsolete view of t he president as custodian of the public good, aloof from partisan politics. ldealiscic though his view 'A'llS, it guaranteed him a single-term presidency.

John Quincy Adams

As Adams's popularity fell, Andrew Jackson's rose.. His vic· tory m--er the British ac the Battle of New O rleans made him a national hero, and soucherners admired him as a Tennessee slaveh older, a ren~·ned Indian fighter,and an ad..'Ocateoflndian rcmM'llL Also, southerners praised Jackson's demand that they be all~-e:d a free hand in pushing the Indians u>t:stward as a noble application ofJeffersonian ideals of states' righcs-and a way to satisfy their Land hunger. Veccran politicians distrusted Jackson' s notoriously hoc temper and his penchant for duels, but ordinar}' people seemed

T WE ElfCTION Qj: 18 24 Eu:CTORAI. VOTE

Poi•UUill VOTE

PEit.CE.~TAGl! O F

John Quincy Adams

Democratic-Republican

84

108,740

30.5

Andrew Jackson

Democratic-Republican

99

153,544

43.1

CANOJD,\TE

p,,.-no

Poruua. Von:

William H. Crawford

Democratic-Republican

41

d6,618

13.1

Henry Clay

Oemocraric:-Re:publican

37

47,136

13.2

I THE RISEOF Otw.OCRAnc Pouncs, t b 41 -18]2

217

John Quincy Adams elected president by lhe House d I!PIIf...m.tives Ameri:an TemperanceSociety oreanized Andrt'W J- n elected president; •Tariff of Abominations"; John Calhoun anonymoiJStfwriles South Caro/ino Exposition ond Protest Jackson~ M~ Road Bill voiD; Indian Rem01lal Art Charles G. fin~ Roche!ll!r n!Wval William lloyd Garrison starlS 1/w liberator Jackson V1!4oes redlarter d the Bart of lhe United States; Jackson reelected president; Soulh carolina Nullification Proclamation force Bill; Compromise Tarif; American Anti-S~,.ry SD
to have no such objections. As the: o nl)•candidace: in 1824 not linked to the Monroe administration, j ackson was also in a posjtion co capitalize on discontent after t he Panic of 1819. To man}' Americans, jackson, "''ho as a boy had fought in che Revolution, was a living link to a more virruous past. By 1826 cowns and villages across checountr)'buzud wich political activiry. Be· cause: su pporters of)ackson, Adams, and Cla)' all still called themselves Republicans, fe~A' realized t hat a new political S)'Stem was being born. The man most alert to t he new currents was Marrin Van Buren, ~At.o would be: j ackson's vice president and then president. Van Buren exemplified a new breed of policician. A taw:mkee:pcr•s son, he had worked his way up chrough New York politics and creace:d a powerful slatewide: ma· chine:, the Alban)' Regency, composed of men like: himself from the middling and lo•wer ranks. A genial man who befriended even his political rivals, Van Buren lm-ed the game of policies. The election of 1824 had con...inccd Van Buren of t he: need for two-party compe· tition. Without the discipline: imposed by parry competition, the Republicans had splintered inro sectional fuctions. 11le: country would be better served, he thoughc, by redudng che shades of opinion in the: country to just two so that parties could

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218

CHAPtER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

d ash and a dear winner emerge. jackson was the logical leader and che presidential nominee, of one new party, becoming known as the Democratic party; its opponents, calling themselves National Republicans, nominated Adams. l 'he second Ameri· can party S)'Stcm ~A>as taking shape.

The 1828 campaign was a vicious, mud-slinging af· fair. The National Repub· licans artacked j ackson as a murderer, a dr unken gambler, and an adulterer. He had in fact killed sev· eral men in d uels and had several more executed militarily, and in 1791 he had married Rachd Ro· bards, erroneously believing chac her divorce from her first husband had become final. jackson sup· porcers retaliated that Adams ~A'3S rich and in debt, had tried to gain f.w or ~Aith the Russian tsar by pro· viding him wich a beautiful American prostirute, and- perhaps worse of all to westerners-wore silk

'lilt Eledon of 1818

-Yolo

"'

soo.an

..

Map IOJ TIM Btdioo of 1821

under~A'Car.

Primary ~ource: Canvasstng fot • Vote

The Adams supporters' charges chac jackson was an illiterate backwoodsman backfired and endeared "'ld Hickory" co ord inary people. jackson's mudslingers proclaimed chat jackson was the common man incarnate- his mind unclouded by learning. his morals simple and true, his ~Ai11 6 erce and resolute. Adams, in contrast, was an aristocrat, a scholar whose learning obscured the truth, a man who could write but not 6ght. The d ecrion swept jackson inco office with twice Adams's electoral voces. T he popular \'Ote, much closer, rdlecced the scrong sectional bases of the new parties. Adams doubled jackson's \'Ote in New England, while j ackson doubled Adams's voce in che South and nearly tripled it in che Southwest.

Jackson rode to che presidency on a wave of opposition to corruption and privilege, and one of his first mm--es was co institute .. rotation in office"- the remo\•al ofoffice· holders of che rival party. Nearly half of the higher-ranking dvil servants were sum· marily 6red. Although his opponents called it the "spoils system,'' jackson defended rota· tion in office on the basis of democracy: the duties of most officeholders ~A'Cre so sjmple thac as many plain people as possible should ha\'f: the chance to work for the go\-emment. j ackson's use of che spoils S)'Stcm ruffled feathers, but che issues of internal im· provemmts and tariffs ignited real concro\'f:rS)'· Like most southerners, j ackson be· licved that federal support for internal improvements 'A'llS simply a lavish giveaway. He thought that such funding violated the Constitution, which stared chat Con·

JKkson In Oflke

•spoistySIW' P<.roaor

l

mo•uding polirial 5Uppofttn wi th publicoffiee

I THE R ISE OF Otw.OCRAnc Pouncs, t b

41 -18]2

219

gress could appropriate money onl)' for national pur· pos~ not for the bene6c of particular sections or interests. Accordingly, in 1830 jackson \"etoed a bill to pnwide federal supporc for a road in Kentucky between Ma)'Sville and Lexington. The Maysville Road Bill veco and che almost· simultaneous Indian RemO\'lll Act enhanced jackson's popularity in the South. l 'he cariff issue, howe"\-er, ~A'Ould test southern loyalty. In 1828, ~Ath ile Adams was still president, Congress passed a high protective tariff favor· able co western agriculture and New England manufacturing. Southerners fumed ac the cariff, ~A•hich raised the price of manufactured goods and also created the threat of rcraliacory tariffs against southern cotton ex· porrs. To the surprise of jackson and his foiiO'II.~rs. he. racher chan Adams, bore the brunt of southern ire.

The 1828 tariff, che "Tariff of AbomJnations, •• laid the foundation for a split between jackson and his vice president, john C. Calhoun. AI· though he had entered Congress as a ..war ha~Atk" and had championed nationalism early in his career, Cal· J;u:luon duri"g the Nullifi ution Cri5i5, looki"g serene houn had gradually become a states' rights scctionalist. in the uni-fOrm of ;a ma.jor-gener:d .:~nd decenni"ed co f.tct down che grutt:it d\:dlenge to h i5 p re5idency. He had supported che tariff of 1816 but would 6m:ely oppose that of 1828. Calhoun burned with ambition to be president. "Tariff jackson had stated that he would serve only one term and as vice presidenc Calhoun Protl'ctiYC' toUiiT of 1828 1lut assumed chac he would succeed j ackson. lb do so, he needed co maintain the sup· infuN1td wutbemtn: pore of the South, ~Athich 'A'llS increasing!)' taking an anti tariff seance. Calhoun's own sp-d nullilkation crisis state, South Carolina, had suffered economic dedine throughout the 1820s; its citi· zens blamed protective tariffs. Calhoun also accepted the Virginia and Kencucky Resolucions of 1798- 1799, which defined che Union as a compact among the scates, an association conferring only limited po~A'cr'S on che cencral go\·ernment. He insisted that the o nly consticu· donal tariff was one char raised money for che common nacional defense, not o ne that favored a panicular seccion at the expense of ochers. Calhoun expressed chesc views anon}'ll'IOusly in the widely circu lated South CArolina Exposili.on and Proust -Mlllhlttst c.....r..bpofi6oo John C. D;Jboun'J ( 1828), which argued not o nl)' chat the 1828 tariff was unconstirucional buc also l't'.Stlltr:mmt ofVJtginU. ;and that states had the right to nullify that tariff wichin their borders. Kmwcky RC'Jolutions tlw.t juJri&td nulti6ation More was at stake chan the price of manufactured goods. Southerners feared that a government capable ofpassing tariffs fa\'Oring one section over another might also pass laws meddling with slavery. Although this idea seemed far.fecched- j ackson himself was a slawholder-South Carolina's ~Athites were edgy about the safety of slaver}'· African·Americans were a majority of their state•s populacion. the slave Nat Turner's bloody rebellion in Virginia in 1831 raised fears of a similar threat co Souch

I

of_.........

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

Carolina. and William lloyd Garrison's new newspaper, Tbt Lfbt.rator; advocated immediate abolition. To man}' South Carolinians, these wen: ominous signs warning chat a line had to be drawn against tariffs and possible future interference wich sla\-ery. Uke Calhoun, jackson 'A'llS strong-willed and proud. Unlike Calhoun, he alread}' "-'aS president and the: leader of a national parcy chat in cluded supponers of the tariff. To mollify both protariff and antitariff forces, he devised cwo policies. First, he: distributed surplus federal re\-enue, de:ri\·ed largd}' from che tariff duties, ro the stares, hoping to remOV"e che taint of sectional injustice from che tariff. Sec· ond, he tried co case tariffs down from the sky~h igh 1828 rare:~ and Congress passed slight reductions in 1832. But these measures did lictle ro satisfy Calhoun and the South Carolinians. By che rime the some'""har 1()\l,~r tariff was passed, other issues had ruptured relations between the: president and vice president. j ackson learned that in 1818, the:nSecretar}' Of War Calhoun had urged that jackson be punished for his unauthorized raid into Spanish Florida. In JoM c Cl!lllow.lly Cllalles Bird Kine. L 1825 The mo:.gl\etic C;~~lhoul\, jaduon's ~e presidc:l't, 1829 j ackson's secretary of war, john H. Eaton, married broke with Jaekson oVI:'r nul lif'iauiol\ ;u~d the Peggy O'Neale: Timberlake, the widoW'Cd daughter of a Peggy E;~~ton ;af'f.tir, ;a.l\d rnigl\ed the vic:e pn":Sidency Washington ravcrnke:cpe:r. While still married co a naval in 1832. officer away on ducy, I~ had acquired the rl'putation of flirting with Eaton, who boarded ac her father's tavern. After her husband's death and her marriage to Eaton, she: and Earon W'tre snubbed sod all}' by Calhoun's ~A'ife: and his friends in che cabinet in ~Arhat became known as the "petticoat war:'' j ackson concluded chat Calhoun had initiated the petcicoar war to discredit him and ad\'llnce his own presidential aspirations. A j efferson Day din· ner in April 1830 fcarured a symbolic confrontation be~n jackson and Calhoun. j ackson proposed the: toasr "Our Union: lr must be preserved." Calhoun responded, "1'he: Union ne:xr co Liberty the most dear. Ma}' "-'e alwa}'S remember that it can onl}' be preserved by distributing equally the benefits and burdens of the Union." N'll&fic:.UO. Crisis Cootro. The stage was sec for the Nullification Crisis. In Nm~mbe:r 1832 aSomh Cam· l'l'n)'OO'I'f nullific:aticm tlu:t !ina convention, citing Calhoun's scares' rights doctrine, nulli6e:d the tariffs of 1828 pitted Jac:k.son ag.Urut Calboon and 1832 and forbade: the collection of customs duties within the: scare:. j ackson re:· aod led to talk ofsta".Ssion by Southemt:rs acted quickly. He despised nulli6carion as an "abominable doctrine:" that would reduce the gM'l'rnment ro anarchy and denounced the South Carolinians as «unprincipled men who would rather rule in hell than be: subordinate: in hea\-en." He: sent anns to Unionists in Souch Carolina and issu ed a proclamation that lambasted nullification as unconstitutional; the Constitution, he emphasized, had established "a single nation," not a league of states. In March 1833 the crisis eased as Jlrcside:mjackson signed "the olive branch and the sword,"' in one historian's words. T he Compromise Tariff of 1833, the: olh-e branch or peace offering, pr01oided for a gradual but significant 1()'11,-ering of rariff duties from 1833 ro 1842. The Force Bill, che: sword, authorized the: president to use:

arms to collect cus toms duties in South Carolina. Although Souch Carolina did not abandon the principle of nullifi cation-in fact, ic peculancly nullified t he Force Billit accepted the Compromise: Tariff and rescinded its nullifi cation of che cariffs of 1828 and 1832. This so-called Compromise of 1833 grew out of a mixru.re of partisanship and statesmans hip. Its chiefarchitect was Henry Clay of Kcncucky, who had long favored high tariffs. day not only fca.red che outbreak of civil war but also wanced co keep co ntrol of the tariff issue away from the Jacksonians, even if that meam a 10'1'--er tar· iff. The nullifiers, recognizing char no other states had supported chem, preferred giving Clay, nor j ackson, credit for defusing the crisjs.: they therefore supported t he Compro mise Tariff and rescinded the Nullification Proclamation.

Jackson recognized char t he gap bCN~n rich and poor was widening. Although he d id nor object to wealth earned by hard ~A'Ork, he beliC'\o-ed that the wealth)' too often en· jo)'ed privileges granted by corrupt legislatures. Additionall)', disastrous speculation early in his life had led him to discrusc all bank~ paper money, and monopolies- and I.Wtotithe Bank of the UnJted States ~A'llS guilty on all counts. N;~.tional &nk c~d by The Bank of the United States had recei..-ed a cwenty·rcar chan·cr from Congress Ak.u.ndcr H;unilton in 18 16. As a creditor of state banks, the: Bank of the: United States in effect re· strained their princing and lending of money by its ability to demand the: rede:mp· cion of state: notes in specie (gold or silver coin). Many o ther aspects of t he bank made it controversial. For example, it 'A'llS ~A'iddy blamed for the: Panic of 1819. Sec· ond, as the official depositor}' for federal revenue:, it was a privileged institution ac a cime when privilege was coming under fierce attack. l 'he bank had far greater lend· ing capacity chan state banks and chus dominated them. l 'hird, although chartered by the: federal go\~rnmem, the: bank was co ntrolled by its stockholders, who 'A'Cf'C pri\•ate cicizens-«moneyed capitalists" in jackson's \'il'W. f inal!)', its location in Phil· adelphia, rather than Washington, S)'tllboliud t he bank's independence of super· vision b)•the national governmmt. 11le: bank's president, the: aris tocratic Nicholas Biddle, ~Ailom Jackson loathed, saw himself as a public scn•ant duty·bound to keep the bank aboi.'C politics. Aware ofj ackson's opposition, Biddle sought an carl)' rechartering of the bank, urged o n by Hmry day, who hoped to ride the probank band· wagon into che White House in 1832. Congress passed, and jackson During the' 1820~: polities bC'um.cprompdy vetoed, the recharter bill. The president denounced che: bank as intua$ingly dC'-motr .u K, ;~.nd vutc>.r a private and privileged monopol)' chat drained the \'('esc of specie, 'A'llS p.lrt~i p.u:ian intUa$C'd dumatiully. immune to taxation by states, put inordinate po~A'Cr in che hands of a fe:~A' AndreY~Jaekw~ C'm C'rg«l ;u "the' men, and made "the: rich richer and the potent more PO\l~rful." common man By 1832 j ackson had made clear his vi e:~A'S on major issues. He was si· A~: prui ckm, J ~kwn oppwC'd the' W C' offeckr;~.l fund~: for intC'rnal multanoousl)' a strong defender of states' rights and a scaunch Unionist. impi'O\'C'mC'nt~:. Although he cherished the Union, jackson bdi e:\~d the states far coo di· 11wNuUilit.r National Republican ticket,. st ressing his American System of protecti\~ of the' Bank of the' Uni t«! Stares a~:;~. vitrory for the' comm on man. cari~ national ban king, and federal support for internal impro\·emcms.

lilt Bill VeCo Mid lilt Eledlon of 1832

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

j ackson's O'lerwhelming personal popularity s"''llmped Clay,219 to 49 electoral votes. Secure in office for another four years, jackson "''3S ready co fi nish disma ntling t he: Bank ofche United States.

THE BANK CONTROVERSY AND T H E SECOND PARTY SYSTEM, 1833- 1840 WMt wmt the major {OctON in tM rise oftM second party syst•m? jackson's bank 'ICCO ignited a scaring controversy that chre:atme:d co engulf all banks. One: major problem was that the United States had no paper currency of its 0"'11. Instead, private bankers (widd )' vie'l'-~d as sinister figures) issued paper notes, which t hey promised to redeem in specie. These: IOUs fud e:d economicde:w~lopm mt by making credit easy. Bur if a banknote depreciated, wage earners paid in paper would suffer. Furcher, paper money encouraged speculation, "'>hich multiplied both profie and risk. For example, farmers could now buy land on credit in the belief that its value: "''Ould rise; if ic did, they could sell che land ac a profi t, but if its \'alue: fell, the farmers became mired in debt. Would the: Unice:d Scace:s embrace swift economic development at the price: of aiiO'I'-'ing some people co gtt rich quickly "'>hilc others languished? O r wo uld the nation undergo more modesc growth in traditional molds, anchored by "honest" manual work and frugality?

Jackson could have aUO'I'-·ed the Bank of the United States, "-t he: monster;'' as he cermed ic, to die a natural death when its charter expired, but he and his folloW'Crs belie'V'Cd that if che: bank escaped with a breath of life, «ic will soon recm-·er irs "''Onted scre:ngth." When Biddle: began calling in bank loans and concraccing credit to forestall furche:r mm-~s by j ackson, jacksonians saw t heir darkest fears confirmed. The bank, jackson said, "is tr)ing to kill me, bur I will kill it." So t he president began remo\ing federal deposits from the Bank of t he: United Scares and putting chem into privace: banks chartered by individual states, which became: known as «pee banks:'' In rurn, chis policy raised new problems. State: banks that were depositories for federal funds could usc chest moneys as che basis for issuing more notes and extending more loans. j ackson hoped to head offche danger of a credit-fueled speculath't: economy b)•limiting che number of state banks used fo r federal revenue. Bur he dis· covcred that doing so was impossible:j indeed, by che md of 1833 chcre were cwmty· three: pet banks, chosen in part for chcir IO)'lllty co che Oemocracic party. jackson could not stem the rapid economic expansion fueled by paper money and b)•foreign specie fl owing in co purchase cotton. The Ocmocracic parry split be:tV~em advocates of soft money (paper) and hard money (specie). l he N 'O Ocmocracic camps agreed that rhc Bank of che United Scates was e:vil, but for different reasons. Soft-money Democra~ especial I)' strong in the Wcsc, resented the bank's rescriction of credit and wanted more: paper money. Hard-money Dem ocrats, typically wagHaming urban "''Orkers, disliked the speculati..~ econom}' based on paper money and easy credit, and t hey de:cpl)' feared inflation.

The War on lite Bank

Jackson himself bclie\·ed char paper money sapped "public virrur' and "robbed honest labour of irs earnings to make kna\'es rich, powerful, and dangerous." Trying co stem che proliferation ofsoft money, in 1836Jackson issued a proclamation called the Specie Circular, ~Ailich provided char only specie-gold or silver- could be accepted in payment for public Lands. During Jackson's second term the National Republicans changed their name to the Whig parry and broadened their base: of supporc in both che North and the South. As Jackson's policies became d earer and sharper, the opposition atcracced people alienaced by his positions. For example, Jackson's crushing of nulli6cation led some southernl't'S to the Whigs, as did his waragainsc che bank and opposition to federal aid for incemal im· prowments. Most of the Souch remained Democratic, but the Whigs made substantial inroads. And supporters of Henry Clay's American Syscem joined advocates of public education and te-mperance in seeking a more activisc, intl'n\':ntionist national go'lcmment. Meanwhile, social reforml't'S in che North 'A'l'l"C infusing new vitality inco the op· posicion to Jackson. 11lese re-formers wanced to end slavery and the sale of liquor, improve public education, and cll'\>ace public morality. While most Democrats op· posed any gm\':rnmenc attempt to impose uniform standards on che dh·erse American society, Whigs cended to accept acti\'f: go\-ernmem intl'l"W:ncion, and thus reformers gravitated to the Whig party. Reformers, afmosc aUProtestants, d istrusted immigran~ esp«ially the Irish, who .,;ewcd drinking as a normal recreation and who, as Catholics, suspected (correctly) that public schools favored by reformers would reach Protestant doctrines. At the same time, reform agitation and its as.socia· cion with che Whigs drO'V'C Irish immigrants into the arms of the Democratic party. In turn, many nati\·e--born Protestants, contempruous ofche Irish, rurned Whig. The mosc remarkable source of Whig strength was Ami-Masonry. Masonry had long provided prominent men, including George Washington, with fellowship and c.xocic rituals. 1'he sp.ll'k char ignited the Anci-Mason crusade was the abduction and disappearance in 1826 of William Morgan. a Ne~A• York stonemason ~Ailo had threat· ened co expose Masonic secrcts. Efforts to soh.\': the mystery of Morgan's disappear· ance failed because local offidals were themscl~s Masons, seeming!)' decennined to thwart the inV'l'Stigacion. Rumors spread thar Masont}' was a po~A'l'lful anti-Christian conspiracy of che rich in order to suppress popular liberty and an exclusive retreat for drunkards. lme-nsdy moralistic small farm ers and artisans from the Northeast flocked co che Whig party as a bulwark against Masonry. By 1836 che Whigs had become a nacional partywich widespre-ad appeal. Whigs everywhere assailed Andrew Jackson as an imperious dictator, .. King Andrew l,'" and the name "Whigs" evoked memories of the American pacriots who had opposed George Ill in 1776.

Tile lise of Whig

Andrew Jackson was a hard act to follow. Oemocracs nom· inated Martin Van Buren, proclaiming that he and the Democratic party wereJackson's heirs, the perfect em bodi· ment of the popular will. The Whigs ran four candidates from different sections of

Tile Election of 1836

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R!Vt\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

Prima:ry Source: Jackson's Farewell Address

the country. l 'he: Democrats accused the Whigs of attempting to split the vote and throw the: election into che House, "'there: chey could "'ilttl and deal as in 1824. But in fuct che Whigs had no strategy, much less such a de\'ious one, and Van Buren car· ried the popular \-etc. His margin was narrow, hO\l'f:'\'f:'r, and in an ominous sign, the: Democrats carried barely half che souche:m vote-they had "''On two·thirds of it only fo ur rears earlier. Jackson left office in 1837 in a burst of glor}'· Yet he: be:· qucathe:d to his successor a s~re: depression. In the speculari\·e boom of 1835 and 1836, born of j ackson's policy of placing federal funds in state: banks, the coral number of banks doubled. the value of bank noce:s in circulation nearly tripled. and both commodity and land prices soared skyward. But che overheated economy began co cool rapid!)' in May 1837. Prices tumbled as bank after bank suspended specie payments. l 'he: en· suing depression was far more severe and prolonged than the Panic of 18 19. Wages fell by one·third betv.r'Cen 1836 and 1842. The prolonged depression had multiple: roots. Domescically, jackson's Specie: Circular of july 1836, declaring chat only specie, not paper money, could be used co purchase: public lands, dried up credit. Global ew:nts played a major role: as "''l'll. In the 1820s Americans had used freshly·mined sil\-er imported fro m Mexico co buy tea,. silks. and other goods in China. By the early 1830s the: Chinese W\'.re usjng in· creasing amounts of this sil~r co pa)' for opium grt>'l'"n in India and peddled by Brit· ish merx:hanrs.. In tum, large amounts of siio.-er flo"''Cd out of British coffers to invest in canals and other American projects. \'1/orried chat British investors were ovcrex· tended in the: United States and determined to keep specie at home. in 1836 the: Bank of England d rasticall)' mised interest rates. To continue co attract foreign in· \'estmenc, American banks then raised their interest rates. Making a bad situation much "''Orse. the price paid for American cotton by Brit· ish merchants plummeted in 1837. Bumper harvests in England had led to cheap food for \N'Orkers, who chen used more of their funds to buy goods spun from Ameri· can cotton. But in che years 1836 through 1838 poor harvests drove up the cost of food and left "''Orkers "'ith little to spend on dothing. lOpping things off. in 1839 the Unice:d States brought in a record cotton han-est, lowering cotcon prices even further. To pay for imported foodstuffs, the Bank of England raised money by rais· ing interest rates. Soaring British interest rates meant chat money flo"''Cd into Eng· land, money that Americans had optimistically assumed would be a\•ailable co continue: 6nandng canals. British im-estmenc in che United States dr ied up, leaYing the American Landscape littered with half·6nished canals to no"Ailere:.

The Panic of 1137

Van Buren, kno"''ll as "the sly fox" and "-the: lictle magi· dan" for his political craftiness, would nttd those skills co confront the: depression, "'ilich was battering ordinar}' citizens and the: Democratic party alike. The: president called for the creation of an independent treasury chat would hold government revenues and keep chem from the grasp ofcorporations. When Van Buren finally signed the Independent Treasur}' Bill into law on july 4, 1840. his supporters hailed it as a second Declaration of Independence.

The Seardl for Solullans

The Independent Treasury reflected che basic Jacksonian suspicion of an alliance: between the federal govcrnment and banking. Howc'ler, the Independent Treasur}' Act failed to address banking on the state IC'.o-el, where newly chartered state ban ksmore chan nine hundred in n umber by 1840- lent money co f.trmers and businessmen , fueling the speculati'le eco nomy feared by jacksonians. Whigs and Democrats differed sharply in thcir approach to the multiplication of state banks. Whigs, convinced that Jackson's Specie Circular, not banks themsdve~ had brought on the depression, sup· ported policies alJoo.ing any group to start a bank as long as its members met state requirements. Democrats, who tended co blame banks and paper money for the depression, adopted the hard-money position favored b)•Jackson and his advisers. After 1837 the Oemoc:ratS W\'.re in effect an antibank, hardmoney party.

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Despite the depression, the Democrats renominated Van Buren. Avoiding the mistake of 1836, che Whigs nomi· oared a single candidate, O hio's William Henry Harrison, and ran Joh n 1}'ler of Virginia for vice president. Early in che campaign che Democrats made a facal mistake, ridiculing Harrison as "Old Granny,.. who desired only to spend his declining years in a log cabin sip· loc .... Symbol of Whig JUrty in 1840 "bumlh" am. ping cider. In so doing. they handed che Whigs the most famous campaign symbol JUig:n fot the pl't'.Sideocy in American histor}'· The Whigs saluted Harrison as a rugged frontiersman, the hero of the Battle of Tippecanoe (tip-Pft- and ladling o ut log cabin cider. Instead of a platform, they trumpeted, ..11ppecanoe and 1}'ler, too!" and attacked Van Buren as an aristocrat who lived in «regal splendor... Harrison was elected in a d ear victory. The depression \l'OUld haw: made it difficult for any Democrat co win, but many of Van Buren's prob· lems stemmed from his style of campaign. While the Whigs ran a rousing race aimed directly at the «common man,'" Van Buren quietly wrote leners Then- W'hig p.lrtr indu
Tilt Eledlon of 1840

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The stro ng co ntrasts between the two parties and che sharp choices they presented jolted the American electorate. Nearly 2.4 million people \'Oted in 1840, up an astonishing 60 percent from 1836. Prior to 1840 the proportion of white males who voted had ranged from SS to 58 percent; in 1840 it rose to 80 percent.

the .ldminiJttuion ol'M.lrtin V.m Bunon ;md g,TC'adr $tl't-ngtb wed the Wh ig,. The election of 18-Kl, th~ fiDt rul "hurr;ah.. Q mp;aign, g.l\" the Wh ig' the Whi t~ HouJe lOr t he lir-M t ime. After 18-10 the $C'COnd p,;arty lptem W.l$ finnly in pia~

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DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R!Vt\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

Both che depression and the frenzied log cabin campaign had bro ught ...ocers co the polls in 1840, bur ...ow· rurnouts stayed high even after prosperity rerurned. The second party S)'Stem reached a high plateau in 1840 and remained there for O\~r a de
THE RISE OF POPULAR RELIGION

I

Wlwt dwnges rook pltw1 m Amencan religrous life?

In Dmwcracy m AmtrK~ Alexis de 1ocquev1lle called rehg10n ..che foremost of the political institutions" in the United States. Tocqueville was referring to the way religious impulses reinforced democracy and liberty. just as Americans demanded that policies be accessible co average people, they insisted that ministers preach doctrines chat appealed co ordinary men and ~A
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The SecondGre.atAwakenlng 6rst flared up in Connecticut in che 1790s, and during che following half<encury it sec ablaze o ne section of the nacion after another. As the rcvi\•als m01o'Cd westward, chey under~A'efl t striking changes typi6ed by the rise of camp meecings. Here che members of se\~ral denominations gathered together in sprawling open-air camps to hear revivalists prodaim chat the Second Coming of jesus 'A'lLS near and that the rime for repentance was now. l he most famous camp meet· ing took place at Cane Ridge, Kentucky, in August 1801. A huge cr""'d gathered on a hillside co listen to thunderous sermons, sing h)mns, and experience divine grace. These frontier revivals featured "exercises" in which men and wo men rolled around like logs,jcrked their heads furiously, and grunted like animals. Crirics blasted the froncier frenzy for encouraging fleshly lust and complained that .. more souls were begot than saved" ac the camp meecings. But although chese early fron tier revivals challenged traditional religious customs- indeed, che most successful preachers were farmers and artisans ~Ailo had experienced pO'I'--erful conversions and scorned those whose religion came from books-the rC\T.•alists promoted law, order, and morality. Methodists, the most successful froncier denominacion, became che largest American Proceslant denomination, soaring from 70,000 members in 1800 to more than I million in 1&44. l 'he Methodists emphasized that religion 'A'llS a matter of the hearc rather than the head and relied on itinerant circuit riders- )
I T HE RlSf Of PoPUI.AA R U IGION

227

"'-ttkly ..classes" to provide mucual encouragem ent and to chascisc members for drun kmne:s~

fighcing, gossiping, fornication, and C'\o\'!n shre:'Nd business practices.

By the: 1820s the Second Great Awakening had begun to shift back co the: East. The: honest rl!\tival fires blazed in an area of western N ew York knov."n as the Burned.O..-er Dis· trict. No longer a frontier, v.-escern New York tttme:d with people d rawn by che hope of·we:alth after the completion of the: Erie: Canal. It was a fertile fi eld of high e:xpecca· dons and bincr d iscontent. The man who harnessed chese anxieties to religion was Charles Grandison Finney, a lawycr-turned-Presbycerian minister. His greace:st "har'lcsc" came in che chriving canal d ry of Rochescer in 1830- JSJI. Finney's innM>arions at the Rochrstcr J'C'\oi\•al justi6ed his reputation as the "father of modern revivalism." First, he pioneered in generating cooperation among Protcs· cants, and all denominations participated in his revivals. In addition, he introduced such no'ldties as rhe "anxious seat;'' a bench ~Ailere t hose ready for conversion could be made objects of special prayer, and rhe «protracted meeting," ~Ailich ran nighd)' for a ~Attk or more. f inal!)', although a Presbyterian, Finney rejected che Calvinist doct rine of total depravicy, humankind's irresistible inclination to sjn. Instead, he pro· claimed, sin was a voluntar}' ace, and those ~Ailo willed t hemselves rosin could just as readily will t hemselves nor to sin. In t heory, men and wo men could li\'f: perfect Lives, free of sin. 1"'hose com-ertcd by Finney or other evangelists (te·VAN-juh.Ji.sts) beliC"t-ed thar chey "-'ere cle-ansed of past guile and ~A'Cre beginning a new life. .,1ha'le been born again;'' a )'Oung conwrr wrote. "I am three da)'S old ~Ailen I write chis lecter." Originally controvcrsial, Finney's ideas came to dominate "evangelical" (etl-vanJELL·ih·culll) l'rotescantism, ~Ath ich focused on che need for an emotional religious com·ersion. He succeeded because he told people ~Ailat chey 'A'llnted to hear: that their destiny 'A'llS in t heir O'A'tl hands. A sociecy chat celebrated the self-made individual embraced Finney's assertion thac, even in religion, people could make ofrhemselves what they chose. Finney multiplied his su ccess by e mphasizing rhe role of women, who o umumbered male converts nearly cwo to one. Finney encouraged women to giw public testimonials of cheir conversion, and he often com-ertcd men by 6rsc winning over chcir tAi\.'es and daughrers. Although some praised 1\.'Vivals for saving souls, others doubted t heir lasting effects. The UnitarJans were a small, buc influential group of cricks. Although their basic doctrine-thatj esus Christ was less than full)' divine-had gained acceptance among religious liberals in che eighteenth century, Unitarianism became a formal denomi· nation only in the early nineteenth century. Unitarians won few com·ercs outside New Engtand, buc their tendency to atcract t he "-'f:althy and educaced ga"'e them in· fluence beyond their numbers. Unitarians criticized revivals as uncouth emotional exhibitions and argued that "character building" ~A'a.S more effecciw than sudden e motional com·ersion. Yet they and t he revivalists agreed in rejecting the Calvinist emphasis o n human ~Aickedness. Christianity had only one purpose, a Unitarian leader proclaimed: ..the perfection of human nacure, the elevation of men imo nobler beings."

Crllla of Revivals: Tbt Unitarians

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

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wi tbdr;po•;al from soci«y. known forcrlllb:nu nship

Far more contro\'Ct'Sial than che Unitarians \l'€re che Mor· mons and chcir church, the: Church of Jesus Christ of Mormonism l.atte:r-daySainrs, another new denomination ofthe 1820s. joseph SmJth, its founder, grew up in the heart ofche Burned-Over District. Con· flicc among the various religious denominations that chrio.·ed in the: regionMethodists, Presbyterians, Baptists- left Smith confused. He wondered who \l'llS righc and who was wrong or whether they \l'Cre «aUwrong together:'' Smith resolved this conflicc, which was not uncommon in the Burned-Over Dis· trict, in a unique "''llf. He claimed that an angd had led him co a buried book ofl\.'•te· lation and to special scones for use in translating ic. The Book of Mormon, which Smith translated, tells che: story of an ancient Hebrew prophet, lehi, "those descendants migrated to America and created a prosperous civilization. Jesus had appeared and performed miracles in the New World, but lehi's dc.scendanrs had departed from the Lord's wa}'S and quarreled among themseh'€s. God had cursed some: of these defectors with dark skin.: these \\'ere the American Indians, "tho had long since: forgotten chcir history. Smith quickly gathered folloW\'.rs. Mormonism's appeal lay partly in irs placing America at the center of Christian history and pard}' in its resolving che conflicting claims \lithin l'rocestamism by additional re\'€lations be:)'ond those in the Bible. T he: Mormons mm-ed stcadil}' \l'€St, both to escape persecution and to dra"•closer co the: Indians, whom they wished to convert. Smich's claim of a new revelation guaranteed a hostile reception for the: Mormons wherever they went, because ic undermined the: authority of the Bible, which, along wich the: Conscirurion, contained che ideals on which che American republic rested. In 1843 Smich added fuel co che fire by proclaiming )'tt another rcwlarion, chis one sanctioning polygyny, che practice: of taking multiple: wives. S mith's claims that he was a prophet, che «Second Mohammed," also intensified controversy. Smith called himself "Prophet of the Kingdom of God" and announced his candidacy fo r the presidency of the: United States. But in 1844 the state of Illinois charged him with treason and jailed him in che cown of Carchagc. There, in june 1844, a mob murdered Smith and his brother. Mormonism is one: of the few religions to originate in che: United States. Smith initially hoped that Americans would respond to his call, but hostility from non· Monnons soon convinced him that the future of Mormonism lay in separation from sodcty. In this respect it mirrored the efforts of s......,-eral religious communal societies, among them che: Shakers, whose members likN is.e: set che:mseh'€s apart from society.

The Rise of

The founder of the: Shakers (whoderi'o'€d their name from a convulsive religious dance that was part of their cere· mony) was Mocher Ann Lee, the illiterate daughter of an English blacksmith. Lee and her foUo\I.I'Crs had established a series of rightly knit agricultural-artisan communities in America after her arrival in 1774. Shaker arti· sanship, particularly in furnirure, had quickly gained renown for its simple lines, be-auty, and strength. Shaker advances in che development of new farm tools and seed varieties would be a boon to the g~·ing market cconom)'· HO\l'€\'€r, che Shakers u'€re fundamentally O(her\l'Orldl}' and hostile co materialism . Lee had insisted that her follo.....-ers abstain from sexual intercourse, believed that the end of the world

I was imminent, and derr.·ed many of her doctrines from trances and \1· sions. She had also caught that at che Second Coming. jesus would take the form of a woman. Shaker missionaries took advantage of revivalism's appeal. At Cane Ridge and other revival~ Shaker prosel}tiZers attracted converts whom the revivals had loosened from their traditional religious moorings. By che 1830s the Shakers numbered abouc six chousand. Alchough che Shakers and the Mormons lived aparc from traditional society, most evangelicall'rocestants taught that religion and the pursuit of "-\':alch "''ere compatible as long as people were honest, temperate, and bound by conscience. By encouraging im-oh·emem in society, evangelism pr0\1ded a powerful stimulus to che mulciple social reform movements of the 1820s and 1830s.

ThE AGE OF REFORM

2 29

''IH.m~Kr~nnnJ" n-aeht d rdigion ;u ~u aJ polinu.

Tht Stcond G rt-at Aw~ktning t m · p h;ui.xt d tbt tmac:ional u pu u o f religion. MtthodU:m t m«g«l ;u a major Prutl'-Jt~nt ~no min~tion.

Cbu~h and tht Shale· born amid t he' f\o\'C'-r o f uvi,•aJUm, but t htlr mtmbt.n: liv«l apan from $0Ci.ety.

Tht Mormo n C' U \'t\"fC'

Dupitt Juch mw Jtc-tr, rC'\'i'·aliJu gc-ner;a.lly tnCour;agtd invo~mtnt in wcicty ~nd wert- ;11 poY/"rfuJ Jtimu· luJ to reform mo~ enu.

THE AGE OF REFORM In what ways did reform movements attempt to {orgtt 4 more orderly society? Democratic fermenc spilled out beyond policies and religion. During the 1820s and 1830s unprecedented numbers of men and "-omen joined organizations aimed ac improving sodecy. The abolition of slavery, women's rights, tem perance, better treatment of criminals and the insane, public education, and ew:n the establishment of perfecc, utopian communities were on the various reformers' agenda At a rime "'then women and blacks alike could not \"Ote, the major parties sidestepped such contfO\'Ct'Sial issues as slavery and women's rights. Refonn m()IJ'Cments offered both groups the opporcunity to influence public issues. White male reformers generally vil!"'-ed politics as a sort}' speccad e that rewarded the sacrifice of principle with victory ac che polls. Although they occasionally cooperated "'1th political par· ties, espedally the Whigs, reformers g.n-e their loyalty co their causes, not co parties. Religious revi\•alism incensified che righteousness of reformers, who beliC"t-ed that chey were on God's side of an}' issue. Abolitionists and temperance reformers tended co com e from e\•angelical backgrounds, but others, school reformers and women's righrs acf..-ocates particular!)', were often hostile or indifferent to revivals. Vee co.·en reformers opposed to revivalism borrowed €\'angelical preachers' Language and psychology by painting dr unkenness, ignorance, and inequality as sins calling for immediate repencance and change. Reform mo\-emenrs lacked a national scope. New England and those parts of the Midwest seeded by New Englanders were hotbeds of reform, while southern· ers acth-ely su ppressed abolicion, displa)•ed only mild incerest in temperance and educational refonn, ignored "-"Omen's rights, and saw utopian communities as proof of che mental instability of northern reformers.

Agitacion for temperance (TEM-per-enss) intensified during the second quarter of the nineteenth ccncury. Alcohol abuse was a gro"''ing problem: per capita consumption of rum, whiskey, gin, and brandy had risen steadil)' until it exceeded seven g.Ulons per rear

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

by 1830, m<:arl}' 1:riple coday's rate. The a\-erage adult male downed half a pint of liquor a da)~ and reformers saw alcohol excess as a male indulgence whose bitter consequences (for example, spending money on liquor instead of food) fell on ~A
Like- temperance- crusaders, school reformers ~A
Pllllk-School Reform

I

Horace MaM lmpom.nt pubtie.Jebool ttb mer

I ThE AGE OF REFORM

Primary Source: He That Ne'er learns

matching children against cheir peers would stimulate che competitiveness needed in an induscriali.z.ing society. Children would read the same books and absorb the same moral lessons. 1'he McGuffey read~ which sold 50 million copies between 1836 and 1870, pre-ached industry, honesty, sobriety, and patriotism. Mann's reforms took rooc primarily in che North, despite challenges from farm· ers satis6ed with the d istricc school, from Catholics objecting to anti·Cacholk and anti-Irish barbs in the textbooks, and from the working poor, "''ho "''idel)' saw com· pulsory education as a menace to families dependent on children's wages. He and other school reformers prevailed in pare be
Ancislai,!'Cry sentiment had flou rished among whites during che 1\.''Volutionary era but faded in the early nineteenth century. lhe American Colonizacion -Society, founded in 18 17, was che main antislavery organization of chis period. It proposed gradual emancipation, compensacion for slave owners when slaves became free, and che ship· ment to Africa of freed blacks. Although these proposals attracted some support from sla\'f: owners in the Upper South, chey were unrealizable. 1'he gro"''ing cotton econom}' had made slavery more attractive than e\'f:r to most southerners, and few owners would ha\'f: freed their slaves, e\'f:n if compensated. lhe U.S. slai,!'C popula· tion, fed by natural increase, soared in the early nineteenth cenrury from 1.2 million in 18 10 to more than 2 million by 1830, buc only 1,400 blacks migrated co Africa, and most were alrcad)' free. Radical antis!aver}' vie"''S flourished primarily among African-Americans chem· sdvcs. Opposing coloni:zation in Africa- for most American blacks "''Cre native born- they formed scores of abolition societies. One free black, David Walker of Boston, e\'en called for a rebellion to crush slaver}'· In 1821 Benjamin Lundy, a white Quaker, began a nN'Spaper, che Cri'ni.UJ of Unif,'l('f"fa/ Emancipation, that trumpeted repeal of the Constirution•s chree-6fths clause, the oudawing of che internal slave trade, and che abolition of slavery in U.S. territories. Seven years later Lundy hired a )'OUng New Englander, William Uoyd Garrison, as an editorial assistant. The prematurely bald, bespeccaded Garrison would become a potent force in che ancislai,!'Cry movement. In 1831 Garrison launched a nl"''-'Spaper, Tbt Liberator; to spread his radical antislai,!'Cry message. .,1 am in earnesc,'" he wrote. "I "''ill not equivocate- ! "'ill not excuse- I will not retreat a single inch- AND I WILL BE H EARD;'' His battle cry was "immediate emancipation"; his demand, civil and legal equality for African-

2 31

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Owpol.m ndiul oppooent ofJiaYI'f')'

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R!Vt\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

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Americans. However, C'\-en Garrison did nor believe that all slaves could be freed m-ernight. People: first had to realize char slaV\'.ry "''3S sinful and irs continued exis· tence intolerable. Black abolitionists supported Garrison; in its carl}' years three--fourths of 11tt libtra:or"s subscribers were African-American. Other blacks "''ere emerging as f'O"''Cr· ful writers and speakers. Frederick Douglass. an escaped slave. could rivet an audi· ence with an opening line: «J appear before the: immense assembl)' chis ew:ning as a thief and a robber. I stole: chis head, these limbs, this body from my master, and ran off with t hem:'' Relations bmwen "'ilite and black abolitionists "-"etc often stormy. Man}' white abolitionists called for legal, but not civil and social, racial equality; preferred light· skinned to dark-skinned blacks.: and hesitated to admit African-Americans co anrislavet}' societies. And "'idespread white prejudice made the life of any abolition· ist precarious. Mobs attacked abolitionists oftenj one: angr}' crowd in Alton, Illinois, murdered the: abolitionist editor Elijah Lm•ejo)• in 1837. Abolitionists drew on the language of revivals to describe sla\"et}' as sin. but l'rotescanc churches did not rally solidly behind abolition. L)man Beecher roared against t he evils of strong drink but whimpered about chose of slaV\'.ry. As if external hostility were not enough, abolitionists d iffered passionately "''ith one another. l 'he largest national abolition group, the: American Anri...Sla\'f.'r}' Soci· ety, founded in 1833, "''lls split by disagreements O\'f.'r whether abolitionists should fonn their own political parry and about what role women should play in antislav· ery. Abolitionists from the Midwest and from t he: Burned.O..-er District. most with ties to Charles Grandison Finney, formed the: amislaV\'.ry Liberty party in 1840 and ran a presidential slate. In contrast. Garrison increasingly rejected aJ/ Iaws and &0\'· ernmenc. Like sla\-ery. Garrison and his extremist follo"''et'S argued. aUgO\wnment depended on force, and because force was the opposite of Christian 1m-e. Christians should refuse to \'Ote, to hold office. or to ha\'f.' anything to do with gm'f.'rnmem. Equally divisive to t he: abolitionist cause "''etC questions 0\'cr the role of women in the movcmenc. In 1837 AngeUna and Sarah Grimkt (GRJM·kft), the daughters of a South Carolina sl.n-eholder. made: an ancisla\-ery lecture tour of New England. The: Grimke sisters wc:re contrm-ersial bocau.se they spoke to audiences of both men and women at a rime when it was t hought indelicate: for "''Omen co address male: audienc(>S. Clergymen chastised the GrimkCsisters for lecturing men rather than obeying them. Such critidsm backfired, rurning t he: Grimkfs and ochers to rhe cause of\N'Om· en's rights. In 1838 Sarah "''tote Lttwrs on rbt Condition ofWomtn and rbt Equalit;)• ofrbt Sexi!S; Angelina penned her equally classic Uuers to GtlharitJI! E. Bttcbtr (a militant opponent of female equality). Many male abolitionists tried to dampen the feminist flames. including t he: poct j ohn Greenleaf Whittier. "'tho dismissed women's griev· ances as «paltry" compared co the "great and dreadful "''tOngs of slavery." Garrison, "-"elcoming the controversy, promptly espoused \N'Omen's rights and urged equal treatment for "-'Omen in the American Anti-Slaver}' Society. In 1840 the election of Abb)• Kelley to a pi\.'"Yiousl)' all·male committee split t he: society. "''ith man)' profemi· nists splintering off co form t heir own groups. O ne of t he: most disrupti\-e abolitionist tactics "''lls to flood Congress with peti· tions calling for an end to slavery in the District of Columbia. In 1836, sout herners secured passage of the gag rule:. which automaticall)' tabled abolitionist petitions and t hus pm-emed congressional d iscussion of t hem. It was not lifted unti11845.

I Ho~A'C\'t:r, the importance of the gag rule: was enonnous. It shill-ed the issue from che: abolition of slavery to che: constitutional is· sues of free speech and the right ro petit ion Congress. Members of Congress with litd e: sympathy for abolition attacked the South for suppressing the right of petition. In ef. feet, the gag rule: fight vindicated Garrison's mccic of stirring up emotions on the sla\'t:r}' issue. By holding passions 0\'l'f sla\'t:r}' at che: boiling point, Garrison kept the South on the defensive. The: less secure southerners fd t, the more: they blundered imo dumS}' 0\'cttcactions like: the gag rule.

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ThE AGE OF REFORM

Women occupied a paradoxical position in che: 1830s. They Wo1Mn'S Rlglds could not \'Ote and, if married, had no right co 0\l.'n prop· cnyor to keep their own wages. At t he same: cime:, reform movements ga\'t: ~A'Ome:n unprecedented opportunities fo r public activity within their own «sphere:"; for example, by suppressjng liquor, "-'Omen could claim chat cht:}' were: transforming ~A'fetche:d homes inco nurseries of happiness. The argument chat women were natural guardians of family life: 'A'llS double· edged. It justified refonn act ivities on behalf of t he famil}' but undercut women's demands fo r legal equality. So deeply ingrained was sexual inequality that most "-'Omen came: reluccancl}' to the issue of women's rights as a resu lt of their experience: in other reform mowme:nts, especially abolitionism . Among che early "-'Omen's rights advocates ~Ailo scarced their reform ca..reers as abolitionists were the: Grimkt: sisters, Lucrecia Qoo·CREE-shuh) Mott, Lucy Stone, and Abby Keitt}'· Like abolitionism, the ~A'Om e:n's rights cause emphasized that differences of race and gender were unimportant. "Men and women,'" wrote Sarah Grimkf, «arc CRE· ATED EQUAL!" The: most articulat e and aggressjve advocates of \\'Omen's rights tended to gravitate to William Lloyd Garrison, who stressed the degradation of women u nder s lavery; the: entire Souch was a vast brothd , Garrison wrote, in which slave U'Omen were "treated wich more indd icacy and crudt}' than cattle.,. The discrimination within che abolition movement infuriated women and drove them to make u'Omen's rights a separate cause. When Lucrecia Mott and other American ~A'Omen attended chc World Anti-Slaver}' Coll'VCncion in London in 1840, they were rd e:gatc.d to a screened-off section. 1'he: incident made: a deep impression on Mote and o n Elizabeth Cad}' Stanton. In 1848 they organized a "-'Omen's rights com·ention at Se:nec.a (SEN-ih-cuh) Falls, N ew York. The convention issued a Dec· laracion of Sentiments that began, "All men and all women are created equal;'' The participants passed a series of resolutions, including a call for the right of women ro vote, which would become the centerpiece ofu'Ome:n' s rights activity after the Civil \'t'ar. The dose assodation ofwomen's rights with abolitionism hampered the \\'Omen's mM'Cffient, however. Women would not secure the right to \'Otc throughout che: nation until 1920, lifcy-livc )~after the Thirteenth Amendment had abolished sla\~try. But

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n;~.tur;l\ opponena of $l;~..vy, ;~.bolitionists pro· duced "'ntU!;~,~ry toys, g;lltnn, ;~.nd, .n we see luno, ;l(ph;J~bet boob.

Smea ~Is. New 'York Sin' of

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6nt •umm'll rig~ oom"ntioo in 1848

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2 34

CHAPtER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

chcre W\'1'l" some victories. In 1860, New York met the: demand of che early feminists for greater equality in marriage by passing a com prehe:nsi\~t law aUO\Ning married won1oen to 0\\11 property. Many women \l.'f:rt: satisfied ~Aith such piecemeal refunns.

Nineteenth~centur}' reformers operated from radkall)' new assumptions abouc the causes of poverty, crime, and insanity. Rather than secing su ch deviant behavior as the result of defects in human nature, as earlier Americans had, ches.e re-formers concluded that ic stemmed from drunken fa· chcrs and broken homes. Ac the root of all evil lay che failure of parental discipline, not the will of God or the wickedness of human narure. T hus secular refonners,like religious revivalists, concluded that the right combination of moral influences could change human narure. To cure crime, for example, reformers cre-ated highly orde-red and disciplined penitentiaries (pen-ih-TEN-char-ftl:) as substirutes for failed parental d iscipline. Sincere reformation, llizabttll Cody Staoton with SoliS, IIlLI rather than simple incarceration, became the goal. Solitar}' This d:~guerreotype $hOW$ Eli:;~beth C;~dy would purge offenders' violent habits, re-formers confinemcm St;anton ;u she looked the yNrofthe Senec:1 believed.: at new prisons in Auburn (AW-bum) and Ossining F;~lls ConV\"ntion. Her c:~n:er ;u :1 rt"former, (AWSS-ih·nfng), New York, prisoners could neither speak nor which a.rried her into temper:~.nce, :~nUs.l:l\
I

The bdief in t he perfect ibility of human nature and con· duct found irs most ext reme expression in the ..utopian" (yoo-TOH·pee-ehn) communities that flourished during the reform years. Most of these, founded by imellectuals, v.-ere meant to be alter· nati\'CS to che pre\•aiJing comperiti\'f: economy and models whose success would inspire others. American imeresc in utopian communities began in che 1820s. In 1825 British industrialist Robert 0\l-e:n founded che New Harmony community in Indiana As a NewltM1nHy 0nt or mOJt importllnt utopim communi. mill owner, Owen had imprOV"ed his wo rkers' living condicions and educational op· tk~ foundtd in lndiouu by porcuniries; he was convinced that the problems of t he early industrial age were: soRolwtOwm cial, not political. Vice and misery wo uld vanis h if social arrangements were perfected, he chought. The key '-''llS the creacion of small, planned communiries- ..Villages of Unity and Murual Cooperarion"-~Aith a perfecc balance of occupational, religious, and social groups. New Harmony 'A'llS co prcwide a modd for the Uniced States. But by 1827 the com· municy, a magnet for idlers and fanatics, had fallen apart. However, 0\l-e:n's bdief that environment shaped character and that cooperation was superior co competition survived and influenced urban ~A'Orke:rs in particular throughout the nineteenth cenrury. Experimental communities wich hopeful names such as Fruitlands and Hope:· dale proliferated amid t he economic chaos of che late 1830s and 1840s. Brook Farm, the best-k no~A'tl of t he ucopian communities, which was fo unded near Boston in lnlnsu.dellti&sts AmcOOm R'ligiou:s philosophtn•·ho 1841, was che creation of a group of religious philosophers called transunde:n· bdic"d in tbc elp.lcity oltbt talists (tnn· stn-OEN-tuh-lists). Most transcendentalists, including Ralph \'t;'aldo buman spil-it; included nu:ny Emerson, had scarred as Unitarians but chen tried to revitalize Christianity by pro· R'OOWntd writl"n claiming the infin ite spiritual capacities of ordinary men and women. Brook Farm, like other utopias, was boch a retreat and a modeL Sure: that the compeciri\·e commercial life of che dries 'A'llS unnatural, philosophers JkJorm moY\"Ulenu, irwigorucd b)· spent chcir e\-enings in lofty musings after a day perspiring in che cabbage: revi,·:.Ji.un, ~pc o~r the North patch. Brook Farm attracted several re:no~A'tled '-'Titers, including Emerson and \l'ut, but h.ad litde imp;~.ct in and Nachaniel Hawthorne, and its lice:rar}' magazine, 1bt Dial. disse:mi· the Sou th. nated transcendentalist ideas about philosophy. arc, and literature (see: The tempc"r:.ne~t moY\"Ulenc Chapter II). t~rg««< wori.:en: and enjo}'i'd con· sickr:.ble sut«lll. The most contrm-ersial of the antebellum experiments in communi· Edue.:u:ian:.l reform aim«! b
utepiln Communities

I

com·entional notions abouc religion, property, gender roles, sex, dress, and motherhood. Renouncing prh•ate property. Oncidans practiced communism. NO)>es insisted chat men perfonn kitchen duties and allo\I.I'Cd women co ~A
u i:.li.xi.ng «<nomy :.nd co reinfor« Prott-Jt~nt American c:ulture; reform.f'n: :.IJo u tablls.hcd new i.n:~UruhonJ to d.e.U with the poor, cri.min:.ls, and the i.n:~anc.

The antisl.mory mO\'C'-mtnt gained momen tum bu t w.u: split b)• diugrN mtnts. The struggle for women's righu tmt.!JM from women's p.lrticip:.· t ian m the ant:isJa,..-ry m0\'11'-mtnc and other re Mcm effort:~.

Reformen: esubli:~h«< a v.tricty of utop4an communi ti ~ (u:~u.ll.ly un · sue«l:~ful), whi.eh sought to create a mudd for ide:.! $0C~ty.

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OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AV Ot O R lE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D

~

USTEN TO ITON THEGO.

KEY TERMS Oemoaa~

How did American politics become more democratic in the first hal{of

I

the nineteenth cenwry? (fld!'! 215)

Starting in the 1810s, restrictions on \'Oting for white males dwindled, and politics became increasingly indusive. AndrewJackson, seen as the incarnation of democratic politics, ~'On the White House for two terms and fought for what he sa"'' as the causes of the common man, especially in his crusade ag.tinst the Bank of the United States. Ho...,·e~-er, the Nullification Crisis I'C'\Iealed sharp dif· ferences between North and South.

Whot were the mojor {octors in the rise ofthe second porty system? (fldge 222)

I

In waging his ''war" ag.tinst the bank,Jackson intensifi ed differences between the Democrats and the Whigs. This war he-lped to solidify the second party system but led to the Panic of 1837. 11le resulting depression engulfed and deStro)<ed the presidency of Marrin Van Buren and handed the White House to the Whigs in 1840, putting the second party system firmly in place. Ne'ol.' styles of campaigning emerg~ with the "log cabin" campaign of 1840, and \'OIW pat· ticiparion soared.

I

What dtanges wok place in American religious life? (fld!J' 226)

l

society? (fld!'! 229)

Rcviv.llism dominated religion for man}' Americans during the Second Great Awakening; emotionalism and emphasis on personal responsibility became more important. The Monnon Church, the fi rst American·bom religion, rose amid the fer\'Or of reviv.l lism. Revi\•alists genemlly emphasized the need for in· volvement in society and thus became a p<J'A'erfu1 stimulus to reform movrmcnrs.

{p. liS)

Whigs (p. liS) "!I)Oi~ S'l'f2m"{p. 118) "TanH of Abominations" (p. 119) Sooth Carolina fxpasiljM ond Prol& {p. 119)

Nullification Crisis (p. 220) Sri ol ltle Unill!d States (p. 111) log cabin (p. 11S) Second Gloat Awal:ening {p. 226) Metliodists (p. 226) Cllarles Grandison F11111ey (p. 227)

Unitarians {p. 117) Mocmons {p. 228} Josep~ Smiltl {p. 228) Sltakors {p. 228} te~rance {p. 229) Horace Mam {p. 210) William lloyd Garrison {p. 1JI) Frederick Ooog~ss {p. 212) Allg
in what ways did reform mm~tments attempt to forge a more order~ Reform mo~-em ents targeted a wide range of society"s issues>including alcohol consumption, education, the treatment of the mentally ill, prisons, slavrr}'• and women•s rights. Often reformers \\<ere participants in sevl':ral crusades si· multancously, and one mO\-ement frequently led to another, as antisla\-ery spawned the dri\'e for ~'Omen's rights.. Utopian communities appeared and col· lapsed with litd e long-term effect.

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2 36

OfAPlER 10

DEMOCitAllC PoUTICS, R U IGIOUS R£\'t\'A~A~O REFORM, 18l41· 1i4o

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AV Ot O R lE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D

~

USTEN TO ITON THEGO.

KEY TERMS Oemoaa~

How did American politics become more democratic in the first hal{of

I

the nineteenth cenwry? (fld!'! 215)

Starting in the 1810s, restrictions on \'Oting for white males dwindled, and politics became increasingly indusive. AndrewJackson, seen as the incarnation of democratic politics, ~'On the White House for two terms and fought for what he sa"'' as the causes of the common man, especially in his crusade ag.tinst the Bank of the United States. Ho...,·e~-er, the Nullification Crisis I'C'\Iealed sharp dif· ferences between North and South.

Whot were the mojor {octors in the rise ofthe second porty system? (fldge 222)

I

In waging his ''war" ag.tinst the bank,Jackson intensifi ed differences between the Democrats and the Whigs. This war he-lped to solidify the second party system but led to the Panic of 1837. 11le resulting depression engulfed and deStro)<ed the presidency of Marrin Van Buren and handed the White House to the Whigs in 1840, putting the second party system firmly in place. Ne'ol.' styles of campaigning emerg~ with the "log cabin" campaign of 1840, and \'OIW pat· ticiparion soared.

I

What dtanges wok place in American religious life? (fld!J' 226)

l

society? (fld!'! 229)

Rcviv.llism dominated religion for man}' Americans during the Second Great Awakening; emotionalism and emphasis on personal responsibility became more important. The Monnon Church, the fi rst American·bom religion, rose amid the fer\'Or of reviv.l lism. Revi\•alists genemlly emphasized the need for in· volvement in society and thus became a p<J'A'erfu1 stimulus to reform movrmcnrs.

{p. liS)

Whigs (p. liS) "!I)Oi~ S'l'f2m"{p. 118) "TanH of Abominations" (p. 119) Sooth Carolina fxpasiljM ond Prol& {p. 119)

Nullification Crisis (p. 220) Sri ol ltle Unill!d States (p. 111) log cabin (p. 11S) Second Gloat Awal:ening {p. 226) Metliodists (p. 226) Cllarles Grandison F11111ey (p. 227)

Unitarians {p. 117) Mocmons {p. 228} Josep~ Smiltl {p. 228) Sltakors {p. 228} te~rance {p. 229) Horace Mam {p. 210) William lloyd Garrison {p. 1JI) Frederick Ooog~ss {p. 212) Allg
in what ways did reform mm~tments attempt to forge a more order~ Reform mo~-em ents targeted a wide range of society"s issues>including alcohol consumption, education, the treatment of the mentally ill, prisons, slavrr}'• and women•s rights. Often reformers \\<ere participants in sevl':ral crusades si· multancously, and one mO\-ement frequently led to another, as antisla\-ery spawned the dri\'e for ~'Omen's rights.. Utopian communities appeared and col· lapsed with litd e long-term effect.

Copyri,gh4 2010 Ceng2gc Learning. Inc. All RiShiS Reserved. M:t)' not be copied. .sc:mood. or duplicated. in whole or in pcut.

2 38

OfAPlER u

ltOfHOl.OGY, CULTVIIE, AND E\'OMMYlJil:, 1&.io -.86o

TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH WMt t«hno/Of)cal improvements brought about Am8rican economic fJ"'""f'' beMen 1840 and 18601 10 optimistic Americans, technology was both dem ocratic and progressive. Machines would advance civilization because they could perfonn the work of ten people without needing food or clothing, Daniel Webster contended. The technology thac transformed life in antebellum America included the steam engine. the cotton gin, che reaper, the usc of interchangtablc parts in manufacturing, the s~ing machine,. and the telegraph. Some of these im~tmions originated in Europe, but Americans had a flair for investing in ochers' inventions and perfecting thcir own. Sadly, chesc advances did not benefit e\'er)'OfiC. 1'hc cotton gin, for example, riv· ctcd slavery firmly in place by inrensifying southern dependence on cotcon. Noncchelc.ss, the imprm\."<1 transportation and increased productivity that technology made possible raised the living standard of many free Americans bet\l-ecn 1840 and 1860.

Although few seeders vcnrured onto che treeless, semiarid Great Plains before: the Civil War, setd emem edged ~A'CSt after 1830 from the ~A'OOdlands of Ohio and Kentucky into parts of Indiana. Michigan, and Hlinois ~Athere flac grasslands (prairies) alter· nated with forescs. The prairies' matted soil 'A'aS difficult to break for planting. but in 1837 John Oe:ert: invented a steel-tipped plow that hah·ed the Labor required co dear prairie for planting. 11mber for housing and fencing 'A'llS available ncar the prairies, and sectlcmmt occurred rapidly. As wheat quickly became the Midwest's major cash crop, technology eased the task of ha..rvc.scing. The traditional hand sickle consumed enormous amounts of time and labor, and collecting and binding che cut ~Atheac consumed even more. Experimencs with horse-drawn machines co replace sickles had failed unci! Cyrus McCormkk of Virginia de'ldoped the mechanical reaper. In 1834 McCormick pat· cmed his machine; in 1847 he opened a factory in Chicago, and by 1860 he had sold 80,000 re-apers. During the Civil War, McCormick made immense profits by selling 250,000 reapers. The mechanical reaper, which harvested grain seven times faster than traditional mechods with half the labor force, guaranteed char wheat would dominate che mid~A'CStern prair ies. Ironically, just as Connecticut Yankee Eli Whir:ne)"s cotton gin had created the O ld South's economy. an il'lV(!ncion by Cyrus McConnick, a pro-sla'ler)' Democrat, would help che Union win che Civil War. Northern agriculrure took ad\•antageofhis reaper and copies of it co raise agriculrural production.: southerners, relianc on sla\-e labor, had little reason to mechanize. The reaper would keep northern agriculruraJ production high despite the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of northern men. Although Americans generally remained wasteful farmers-abundant cheap land made it more ..practical" to mO\"C ~A'CSt than to try co impro'le played-our soil- a mo'lemcnt for more eflicicnc culti\•ation de..·doped before the Civil War, primarily in the East. Because eastern soils could not compete ~Aith fertile western lands, eastern farmers had little choice.

Aplalllurll Advanl8Mtlt

IJft

Dette flwtootoroftbt

Stttl plow

CynallcCGmlick lnYmtorof

I

tbt mtdlanieal R'aptr

I ltCHNOlOGY Af(O fCONOlUC G ROWTH

2 39

l'lliadeil>lliil comple4es lhe fim tl'ban water-wpply system; James Fminore Cooper. The Pion..,. Cooper, The lost of/Ire Molrkons The New York SIN!, lhe fist penny newspapEr, is eslablished Cyrus McCormick pateln the med\anical reaper James Gordon Bennett eslabli!lles l!le New lbrt Herald Ralph Waldo Emersoo. 1be AmErican Sdlolar" Edgar Allen Poe, "The FaUd lhe Hoose d Usher" P. l Barntl'n opens lhe AmErican """""" Samuel F. B. Mo<se palerrtS lhe lelei>'aph; Poe. •The Raven" William l G. Morton successfully uses aneslhesia; Eias H...._ Jr. pall!flls lhe sewi1g machine Second major cholera epidemic Nadlaniol H-.me. The Scarlet Letter Hawlhome, The House of/Ire se... Cables: Herman MeMUe, Moby-Dict; Erie Railroad co~s its 1iw to lheWest P
Frederick Law Olmsted is aPI'OiUed ardited-i~iellor Central Pari:

Virginia wheat gro~A'Ct'S fertilized their soil with plaster left ow:r from construction of t he j ames River Canal and raised their aw:ragc yield 250 percent between 1800 and 1860. In t he 1840s cotton plamers began importing guano (GWAH-no), the droppings of sea birds on islands off Peru, for usc as a fert ilizer. By applying fert ilizers, eastern cotton growers could close t he gap created by the superior fertiliryof soils in the Sout hwest.

The early growth of U.S. manufacturing relied primarily on imported technology. That dependence lessened during IIIUirlal Progress the J830s as American industries became more inno\•ariw:. Eli Whitney had pioneered in t he application of interchangeable parts in t he United Scates in 1798, but t he manufacture of guns and other products using inter· changeable parts sciU required a great deal of handwork before che components could be 6cted rogecher. By t he 1840s, hoW\.....-er, American factories had eliminated the need for hand-6tting by improYing che quality of machine cools.

Primary Source: Anonymous Endorsement of Scientific Agriculture

llcllnoloft and

iottadw!lleillle p«ts

Jdm. tint rompoom~ mack by machiot roots., :c:pttding manufM:wriog protl'.S.S; pioottrcd by Eli Whitnty

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Woman at Singtr S.wiog Ma
used i:n factories, some h:ld rn:~de (h~ir w:~y into househol
The American system of manufacturing offered multiple advantages. Damaged machines no longer had to be discarded but could be repaired simpl)' by installing new parts.lmpnwed machine tools allowed entrepreneurs to rapid!)' mass-produce new invcncions. By the 1850s Connecticut 6rms, among them Smith & Wesson, ~A'Cre mass-producing che revolving pistol, which Samuel Cole had invcnced in 1836. Sophisti· cared machine tools made it possible to increase production "b)• confining a ~A'Orker co one particular limb of a pistol until he had made two chousand." Elias HO'I'--e's sewing machine, invented in 1846, entered mass produccion only two y~ars later. After Samuel F. B. Morse transmitted the 6rs.t telegraph message, Americans eagerly scized on che telegraph's promise to eliminate the constraints of rime and place. lhcy formed telegraph companies and strung lines with srunning speed. By 1852 more than fifteen thousand miles of line connected cities as distant as Quebec, New O rleans, and St. Louis. 1'he 6rs.t transconrinencalline was completed in 1860. A facer historian .....-ould christen the telegraph che "Victorian lncernec" because of the ~A'llys it changed busjness and personal communication.

Even more chan che telegraph, the railroad dramatized technology's democratic promise. In 1790 even European royalty could tra.,-el no faster than fourceen miles an hour and then only ~A'ich frequenc changes of horses. By 1850 an ordinary American could travel three rimes as fast on a train. The S~Aift, comfortable transportation that American railroads provided for che common person dramatized technology's democratic promise. U.S. railroads offered only one class of cravel, in contrast co the several classes on European railroads. With the introduction of adjustable upholstered scars that could serw as couches at night, C'\o'Cr}' American in effect tra..-eled 6rs.t dass~xcepc for African-Americans, ~Atho often ~A'Cre forced to sir separately. Americans loved railroads "as a lM'Cr IOV\'S his mistress,"' one Frenchman ~ATOte, but chere ~A'as little co lm-e about the earliest railroads. Sparks from l ocomotiv~s shoW'Cred che passengers riding in open cars, which w~re common. Trav~lers some· times had co gee out and pull trains to stations. Lacking lights, trains rarely ran at night. Before the introduction of standard time zones in 1883 (see Chapter 18), scheduling was a nightmare.: at noon in Boston it was tw~l.,.~ minutes before noon in New York City. Delays ~A'Cre frequent, for crains on sjngle-track lines had to waic on sidings for other crains to pass. Because a train's location was a mystery once it had left che scarion, these ~A'llits could seem endless. Betv.r'Cen 1840 and 1860 the size of the rail network and the po~A'Ct and com·~· nience of trains ~A'Cre stunningly cransformed. Railroad track ~A'Cnt from chree thousand co chircy thousand miles, flat-roofed coaches replaced open cars, kerosene lamps made nighc tra\'e) possible, and po~A'Crful engines let trains dimb steep hills. Fifty thousand miles of telegraph wire enabled dispatchers co communicate ~A'ith trains en route and chus to reduce delays. Nonechelcss, problems lingered. Sf«pingaccommodacions remained crude and schedules, erratic. Because individual railroads used different-gauge track, frequent changes of train were necessar}': chere ....-ere eight changes be~-een Charleston and

Tile Rllroad Boom

I ltCHNOlOGY Af(O fCONOlUC GROWTH Philadelphia in the 1850s. Yet nothing sloW'Cd the ad\•ance of rail· roads or cured America's mania for them. By 1860 the United States had more track than aUthe rest of the "''Orld. Railroads spea.rheaded the second phase of the trans porta· don rC\'Oiution. Canals remained in use, but railroads, both faster and less vulnerable to winter freezes, gradual!)' m-ercook them , first in passengers and then in freight. By 1860 che value: of goods transported by railroads greatly exceeded chat carried b)•canals. During the J8SOs the nation's rail net grew by 22,000 miles, with most of the expansion ease of che Mississippi River. Cities such as Chicago, Chattanooga, and Atlanta boomed because of the railroads. Most important, the railroads crossed che Appalachian Mountains to link the Ease and the Midwest. Chicago's growth illustrates che impact ofchese rail links. In 1849 it was a village of a few hundred people "'tith vin:ually no rail service. B}' 1860 it had become a metropolis of 100,000, sen~d b}' de\~n railroads. Farmers in the upper Midwest no longer had to send their grain, li\'estock, and dair)' products d~·n the Mi.ssis· sippi to New Orleans; they could now ship thcir produces direcd)' cast. Chicago su pplanted New Orleans as che interior's main com· merdal hub. The cast·u.~st rail lines stimulated the settlement and agricultural dC".-elopme:nt ofche Midwest. B}' 1860 Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin had replaced Ohio, l'r:nn· sylvania, and Ne"'' York as the leading "'theat-growing states. Enabling farmers to speed chcir produce co the East, railroads increased the value of farmland and promoted additional settlement. In turn, this population growth stimulated industrial dC\•dopmenc in dties such as Chicago and Minneapolis, for the new settlers needed lumber for fences and houses and mills to grind wheat into flour. Railroads also spurred [he growth of small towns along their midwestern routes. For example, the Illinois Central Railroad, which had more track [han an}' other railroad in 1855, made money by hauling cargo and by real estate speculation. l'ur· chasing land along its path, the Illinois Cen[raJ laid out entire towns around its sta· dons. The railroad used a template for all such towns, laying [hem out on a grid "'tith cast-west streets named after mes and north-south streets numbered. Soon one rail town looked like any other. As the nation's firsc big business, railroads transformed the conduct of business, particularly in finance. State money had helped co finance many lines, but by the 1840s it began to dry up. Federal aid would not be widely available until the Civil War. Although local and county governments cried to 611 che \'Oid, the d ramatic expansion of the rail nee in the: 1850s required new sources of finan cing. l'rivace: inVI.'S· tors had long purchased railroad stock, but the Large trunk lines of che 1850s needed far more capital than small in~scors could generate. Thus the railroads curned to the capital market in New York Cit)'. lhe railroad boom helped co make Wall Smec the nation's greatest capital market, as the securities ofall the leading railroads "''Cre traded on the floor of [he New York Stock Exchange:. New York also became che cen· ter of modem il'lV'estment firms. These companies evaluated securi[ies issued by rail· roads in 10ledo or Chattanooga and then found purchasers in New York, Paris, London, and Amsterdam. Controlling the flow of funds co the railroads, inVI.'Stmem

241

Mop 11.1 R.li~Oid Gnlwtll. 1850- 1860 R~ tin lx-:twetn tht East ;u~d thot Midwnt gn-.:uty incrc::uoed during the r.2ilro3d b oom of the

1850..

lntera~·e Map: Populat•on

Distribution,

1790 & 1850

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bankers soon influen ced chcir internal affairs. A \'t'all Streec analyst noted in 1851 that railroad men seeking financing "-muse m n embcr chat money is power, and that the (6nander) can dictate to a great extent his own terms.'" Technology also improved life by lowering prices. Clocks t hat cost SSO to make by hand in 1800 could be made b}• machine fo r 504 by 1850. Widespread use of steam power led co a 25 percenc rise in t he: aw~rage ~A'Orker•s real income (purchasing po~Aw) be:~n 1840 and 1860; unlike wacer whe:d s, steam engin es could run in all seasons, so ~A
1111111 Prosperity

I

THE QUALITY OF L I FE

In wllat ways did technology transform tile lives ofon/mary Americans?

Subtle but cntical changes m the: quahty of dally ltfe accompame:d the: 1~ scale transformations in transportation, production, and income in the cwode:cade:s before t he: Civil \'t1ar. These changes occurred within the home and affected su ch routine activities as caring, drinking. and washing. Americans became far more comfortable as machine-made furniture, stO\'CS, and fresh food entered che home. But change occurred une:\-enly. Technology made: it possible for the middle: class to enjoy luxuries formerly reserved for the rich, yet it widened the gulfbct"-'t:'en mid· die dass and poor. As middle-class homes became increasingly lavish, che urban poor cro~A•ded inco cramped tenements. And some: critical elcme:nts- mcdidne, for example- lagged far behind in the: technological explosion.

I THE QUAUTYOF IJFE During che carl}' J800s the unattached and discinccive wood-frame houses dorring colonial urban skylines yielded toquicklyconscructcd, uniform-looking brick to"'' houses. In response co rising land values, row houses W\'.re cypicall}' built "'ith narraw fa· cades, and chey were often N ice as long from from to back as they "''Cre from side to side, a design chat cended co shuc ouc light. As land \'alues soared (as much as 750 pe:n::ent in Manhattan between 1785 and 18 15). renting. rarher than o"''lling, homes became common. By 1815 more chan half of the homes in large cities "''Cre rented. Skyrocketing land values also led to the subdivision of row houses for occu· pancy by several families. The wors.t ofchese, known as tene-ments, W\'.re usually the home to Irish immigrants and free blacks. Fashionable ul'ban residences usually faced small parks and boasted a Atrk: or Squalll address, not che plebeian Strret. T he "''Calthy enjored elegant doors, curved staircases, carved columns, and fanciful!}' shaped rooms, all beyond the reach of the middle class. Ho"''cvcr,theriseofmass-produced furniture broughcfurnishings in the elaborately ornamented French style known as rococo (roh-COH-<:oh) into middle· class homes by 1860. Technological advances in furniture making cended to levd tasce between t he middle and upper classes while ma.rking chose: classes off from CW.r)'One else. In rural areas, the quality of housing depended as much on che date of scctle· ment as on social dass. In recendy scrd ed areas, the standard dwelling was a one· room log cabin wich split-log floors that aUo\1/C'd in draf~ a roof that let in sn ow, a crude chimney made of scicks and day, and windO\\-'S cm--ered by oiled paper or d oth. As rural communities matured, log cabins gaw way co cheap and simple frame houses of N'O or more rooms with glass windo"''S and better insulation.

243

Dwelllnp

PMwy Source: Bowen House. View from the Road

To us, everyday life in the 1840s and 1850s was primitive; buc co contemporaries it was constantl}' impnwing. Sto\-es lllalmll!lllences made ic possible to cook sc-.-eral dishes at once, and rail· roads brought fresh vegetables to the dry, an unobtainable luxury in che 1830s. Ur· ban waternurks carried fresh "''llcer from rivers and reservoirs to hydrants. In 1823, Philadelphia compleced the 6rs.t urban water-supply system; by 1860, sixty-eight public "''acer systems were operating in t he United States. Such new conveniences existed side by side with squalor. Coal stm-es belched our sooc to pollute the air and blacken new-fallen sno"''· Only the rich could afford fruic our of season. And so few homes had iceboxes that sale remained the principal means ofpreserving meatj Americans ate more pork than beef because salt destrot-ed the tla\ur of beef more than that of pork. Alt hough public "''acer·works u.-ere engi· neering man -els, their impacc was uneven.: fc"'' urban houses had running "''llter, so families carried water from street hydrants into their homes. Because hot running water "''as ra.re, the water had to be heated on the stO\'C before one could take a bath. Not surprisingly, people rarely bathed. Infrequent baths meant pungent body odors, but chey mingled "'ith a multi· tude of other strong seems. Even fashionable residential streets contained stables backed by mounds of manure. Street cleaning "''lls left to prh•ate contraccors, "'tho often d ischarged their ducies casually, so urban Americans rdied on hogs, which they let roam freely to scaw:nge, to d ean public t horoughfares. Stables backed by

caa-lences and

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I "''All A:>lO PEAcE, 1']';>6-1]8)

125

o :=r..m D '"'

B1WIIla!ltCW'f,

E I Amllllt!nl:foiiS

B

a1111t!b!co$

8Foll [ ! ] Amlllltin¢101)'

ATlANTIC

OCEAN

N. CAAOli~IA

Map 6.2 Tilt W• io lho Wtst. m' -1112 The w:.r"s Wl'SWn front w.u doJelyUtd to N:.~ Amuic::~n's defenJe of their homd:~.nds <1g:~.inst exp;uWoni-u sttden.

The Battle of Monmouth ended the contest for the North. Clinton occupied New York, which che Royal Navy made safe fro m attack Washington kept his anny on watch nearby, while Whig militia hunted d~'n the last few lbry guerrillas.

West of the Appalachians and along N ew York and 1\'.nn·

Tilt Wlr In tile Welt S)ivania's tA'eStcrn borders, a different kind of war un· 177&-1712

folded. The numbers engaged along che fro ntier ~A'Cre small, but the stakes ~A'Cre enormous. In 1776 few Anglo·Americans had any d ear idea of the country's western boundaries. By 1783, whe-n the Peace of l:>aris con· eluded the war, chc- new nation v,:ould claim the Mississippi River as its western bor· dcr. So, although the frontier campaigns would noc deccnnine the war's outcome, chc-y ~A'Oul d significantly shape the future of the United States. Frontier fi ghting first erupted in che South when Cherokees had begun attack· ing frontier settlements fro m Virginia to Cif:orgia in 1776. Within a year, retaliator)' www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

244

CHAPtER u

ltOfHOl.OGV, CULTVR£, ANO E\'OMMVlJil:, •!.io-46o

mounds of manur~: and o utdoor privies added to the stench. Flush toilets were: rare: outside cities, and within citi~ se:W'Cr S}'Stems lagged behind water systems. Boston had o nl}' 5,000 fl ush toilets in 1860 for a population of 178,000, a far higher ratio of toilets to people t han most cities. Expensive col'l'W:niences like running water and flush toilets widened the gap bl't"A~n che haves and the ha\'f:·nots. They also sharp· ened gender differences. Freed fro m making articles fo r home consumption, women were naw expected to achiC"".-e fulfillment b}•obsc..ssi..-ely making C".\!r}' house a «gJori· ous cemplr' of spotless floors and gleaming furniture.

epiclnit disase

Dist..Ut,

such ~ dwkra, )'dlow m~r, and othrr diSl'aSl'.S, that spread.s rapidly and is difficult eo control

Despite the slowly rising living standard, Americans remained vulnerable to disease. Epidemic diseases swept t hrough antebellum American cities and fdled thousands. Yellow fe\'f:r and cholera (CAH-Iuh-u.h) killed one--fifth of New O rleans's population in 1832- 1833, and cholera alone killed 10 pen::entofSt. louis's population in 1849. Ironically, t he transporcacion m'Oiution increased the danger of epidemic dis· eases. The cholera epidemic of 1832, t he fi rst truly national epidemic, follo\IJ'Cd ship· ping routes: one branch of the epidemic ran from New York City up che Hudson Rh-er, across che Eric Canal co O hio, and down chc Ohio Ri..-er co the Mississippi and New Orleans; lhc other branch followed shipping up and do"''" the Ease Coast from Ne"'•York. Major outbreaks of cholera or yellow fC"".-er intensified public calls fo r che estab· lishmcnc of municipal health boards. However, even when such agencies u-ere formed, they were oflen J>O'""'e rless to require the reporting of diseases. The inabilityofph}'Sicians co explain epidemic diseases led to general distrust of the medical profession and to making public health a low-priority issue (set: Chap· ter 9). No one u nderstood that bacteria caused cholera and yellow fe\'f:r. Instead, doctors debated the «contagion'" thl'Or}' vusus lhc «miasm" (MY·az-um) theory of disease. Contagionists, who believed that touch spread disease, called for quaran· tines of affected areas. Supporters of the miasm theory argued that poisonous gases (miasms) emitted by roHen \'f:~cation or dead animals carried d isease t hro ugh t he air. They concluded t hat swamps had lObe drained and streets cleaned. It qukkl}' be
Diselse •d Health

I THE QUAUTYOF I.JFE fC'\o-er among women giYing birth, but disinfection 'A'llS accepted only graduall}'· Op· erations remained as dangerous as the: conditions chey tried to heal. lhe mortality race for amputations ho\~red around 40 percent, and during the Civil War, 87 per· cent of soldiers who suffered abdominal wounds died from chcm.

Doubcful of medicine and skeptical of the bcne6rsof public health, antebellum Americans turned to various therapies that promised a longer, healthier life. H)•dropath}' (higtl-DRAW-puh-thee:), the "-.A'ltcer cure," offered "an abundance of water of de"''Y sofmess and crystal transparency, to cleanse, renovate, and rejuvenate che d iseaseworn and dilapidated S}'Stctn." \'1/ell-co-do women flocked to hydropathic sani· coriums both to reliC"".-e pain and to enjoy relaxation and exercise in a con~nial gathering place. Sylvester Graham, a temperance reformer curned health advocate, popularized dietar}' changes as the way to better healch. He urged Americans to eat less; to substitute \-egctables, fruits, and whole-grain bread (called Graham bread) for meat; to abstain from spices, coffee, tea, and alcohol; and co avoid scxual "excess" (b)' which he meant most sex). Reformers became enthusiastic proponents of Graham's ideas. Abolitionists and others agr~d ~Aith Graham that Americans' unnatural cravings, ~Ailether for red meat or for sex, stimulated \iolence and aggressi\~ impulses. But Graham's doctrines also artractcd a broad audience berond che reform mo..~ments. His books sold well, and his public lectures were thronged. His commonsense ideas appealed to Americans war}' of octhodox medicine, and he: used familiar religious rerms co describe disease, which was hell, and health, which amounted to a kind of heaven on earth.

The belief chat each person 'A'llS master of his or her own destin}' underla}' nor onl}' evangelical religion and health mo\-ements but also rhe most popular of rhe antebellum scientific fads: phrenology (free--MHL-uh-j«). Created by a Viennese physician, Franz}. Gall, phrenology rested on the idea char rhe human mind comprised thirty· seven distinct faculties, or "organs," each localized in a different parr of the brain. Phrenologists thought chat the degree of each organ's de..~lopm ent derennined skull shape, so char rhcy could accurately analyze an indhidual's character by examining the bumps and depressions of the skull. In the United States rwo brothers, Orson and Lorenzo F~·l er, became the chie-f promoters of phrenology in the 1840s. Orson Fowler opened a publishing house (Fowlers and Wells) that ma.Jteted phrenology books e\·ety''"hctc. The Fo~Aiers met criticisms that phrenology 'A'llS godless by pointing out a huge organ called "Venera· cion" co prove that people ~A'Cre nacurall}' religious, and tht}' answered charges that phrenolog}' 'A'llS pessimistic by claiming char exercise could improve every desirable mental organ. Phrenology appealed ro Americans as a "practical" sdcnce. In a mobile, indiYidualistic society, it promised a quick assessment ofochers. Merchants sometimes used phrenological charts co hire clerks, and some )'OUng women C".\':n induced chcir 6ancis ro undergo a phrenological anai)'Sis before marriage.

245

{("'f) Primary Source: ~

Mourning Picture

plnnolory lklie(that OIUC' an read ;a penon·s d!.u.1ettr by

I

tx.tmining bumps on tbt skull

Pllrenolon

"Tht l lustntocl P~r01ological AIN..< 1859" By dividing the bt-;~.in i:nto :. l~rge numbtrof~f.tcul4

tin," p hrenologisu like Lorenzo fowl:-er, editor of the Phrt.~!AirnalliK fOr 1859, m~de the point that e.:.eh person, reg:u-d· len o f whether bom high or low, h~d ;~.n ~bund;~.nte ofimprov.:.bl-e t:~lcnb.

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Easily underscood and pracciccd, and liUed ~Aith che promise of univcr·

CHECKI NG I N

sal bertcrmcm., phrenology was ideal for antebellum America. just as Ameri·

cans had invented machines to btcter their lives, they could in.,-em "sciences" that promised human betterment.

Hom:ing gentully i.mprO\'«< in

the mid·nimteenth untul)'• but d.lu di..M:inctio ru bec:une m ore'

pronoun«d. tm pctAA'm ent:l in u rb.:m li,•ing con· dihonJ, Juch a.s .stu~ and w;at« J;)'.Jtem .s, wert Jomewh.u oA'~tr by i nc~$C'd polluhon.. Epickm ic d iHa$C':I :~till llouri.shed, but ant.stbesi.'l c:une into we, ;md

imC'no.st in

;mti..Jc,p.si:~ .stin 'l'd..

Ht-alth faW like' h)'dropathr

prolifff.n«<. Phnonolotp• became a popular

phtnameno n.

P"IIY PftSS Chup oe-'J. JUpc'l"iC dt'YI'klpcd by jatnc'5

I

Gordon !knnm:

DEMOCRATIC PASTIMES In what new W")'S did Americans pass their free ti1m1 during this period? Between 1830 and 1860,tcchnology cransformed recreacion into a com·

modiry chat could be purchased in che form ofcheap newspapers and now~ls and equally cheap tickcts co plays, museums, and lectures. Forcunes a~A'llite:d entrepreneurs who could sense whac kind of entertainment people 'A'lUlted and ~Ailo could use a\•ailable technology co sacisf}' t hem. james Gordon Benne:ct, one of the: founders of the: pe:nrl}' press, and P. 1·. Barnum, the greatest showman ofche century, made the public want what they had to sell. Technology also began the process by which individuals became: speccacors rather chan creators of t heir own amusements. Americans had also fo und ways co enjoy th e:msel~s-.:\·en che gloomiest Puritans had enjO)'i:d games and spores. After 1830, h o~r. che provision of encercainmenc began to shift from individuals to the: encreprene:urs ~Ailo s upplied wa}'S co entertain t he public..

In 1830 the typical American nl"''-'Spaper was four pages long. ....;ch t he front and back pages 6Ue:d almosc com· plctd}' with adw~rcisemcncs. The interior pages contained editorials, reprints of policical speeches, notices of political e\'efl~ and informa· tion about shipping. Even che most prominent papers had a daily dn::ulacion of only one chousand co two thousand; subsidies from political parties or factions sup· ported chem. Because chcy could be profitable: ~Aithouc bcing popular, most early nl"''-'Spapers had limited appeal. Priced at six cencs an issue, the average paper was coo expensive for a worker who earned less than a dollar a day. Moreover, with few eye-catching nl"A'S stories or illustrations, papers seemed little: more than bulletin boards. In che 1830s ce:chnology began to t ransform nl"''-'Spapers. Cheaper paper and steam-driven presses drastically 10'1'-·e:red production costs, and ence:rprising journal· ists, among chem james Gordon Bennett, saw che: implications: slash prices, boost circulation, and reap vase pro6cs. In 1833 N ew York's eleven dail)' newspapers had a combined daily circulation of only 26,500. Two later, che combined dn::ularion of che three largest "-penny" newspapers had soared to 44,000. From 1830 co 1840 national nl"''-'Spaper drculacion rose from 78,000 co 300,000, and che number of weekly nc~A'Spapers more chan doubled. The penn}' press also re\·olutionized the marketing and fOrmat of newspapers. Ne~A'Sboys hawked the penny papers on busy strce:c corners, and reporters 611ed the: papers ~Aith gripping nl"A'S stories designed to attract readers. As sociologis t Michael Schudson observes, ..The penny press im-e:nted the modern concept of•news'." Poli·

Newspapers

rears

I DtwOCft.t.nc PASnM ES

247

tics and economics yielded place to human interest stories: rape, robbery, murder, and abandoned children. The penn}' papers also used the telegraph to speed boch news and human·interest scories to readers. Some penny papcrs were litd e more than scandal shects, but others, such as Bennett's Nrw York Hmtld and Horace Gr«ley's NNI' York Tribune, pioneered modern financial and political reporting. l 'he HtraJd feacured adaily .. moneyarticlr' thac an· alyzed and imerpreted financial f.'\>ents. "1'he spiric, pith, and philosoph)' of com· merdal affairs is what men ofbusjness 'A'llnt," Hennen wrote. Like ne'I'-'Spapers, theaters incre-asingly appealed to a mass audience. Antebellum theatcrs ~A'Cre large and cro~A•ded.: cheap seats drew a democratic throng of lav.ycrs and mer· chants and chcir wi..-es, artisans and clerks, sailors and noisy boys, and a sizable body of prosticuces. The presence of prostitutes in che audience was only one of many fac· tors chat made theatcrs vaguely disreputable. l'heater audiences were- nocoriously to'l"-dy: they stamped chcir free, hooted ac villain~ and threw potatoes and garbage at the stage when cheydisliked the characccrs or the accing. The plays themscl..-es were as dh-erse as the audiences. Melodramas, whose plots resembled those of sentimental no..-els, were popular; vice was punished, vin:ue was rewarded, and the: heroine married the hero. Vee the single most popular drama· tisc was William Shakespeare. In 1835 l'hiladdphia audiences ~Aitnes.sed sixcy·fi'/e performances of his plays. Shakespeare himself might not ha\-e recognized some of these performances, adapted as they ~A'Cre for popular audiences. l'heacrical man· agers highlighted s.....-ordfights and assassinations, cue long speeches, and changed tragic endings co happy ones. Producers arranged for shon: performances or demon· scrations between aces. In the middle: of Macbttb, the audience mighc see an imper· sonacion of 1Ccumseh or of Aaron Burr, jugglers and acrobacs, a drummer bearing twelve- drums ac once, or a three-year-old who "-"eighed one hundred pounds.

1bt Theater

The minst~l sbo~'S chac Americans flocked to see in the 1840s and 1850s forged enduring stereotypes that but· tressed white Americans' sense of superiority by d im inish· ingblacks. The shows arose in nonherncities in the: J840·sas ~Athite men in "blackface" took the stage: to present an e\-ening of songs, dances, and humorous sketches. Although the performances feacured dements of African·American culrure, es· pecially dance steps, most of the: songs 'A'cre from white culture. Stephen Foster's "Camp·town Races" and "Massa's in the: Cold, Cold Ground;" first perfonne:d in minstrel shows, reflected whites' notions of how blacks sang, not authentic black music. l'he: images of blacks projected by minsmlsy catered co the: prejudices of the working·dass ~A•hites who dominated the audiences. Minstrel troupes depicted blacks as srupid, dumsy, and obsessr.·ely musical, and emphasized their Africanness.. At a time of intensil}i ng political confl icc O"t-er race, minstrel sho~A'S planted images and expectations about blacks' behavior chrough stock characters such as Unde Ned, che tattered, humble, and docile: slavej and Zip Coon, the: arrogant urban free black who paraded around in a high hat and long·tailed coat and u..-ed off his girl· friends' money.

llllinslnl slrtow

Blld:f.la sbow

or~Nc-p" song
Minstrel Shows

O.o Bryan~. Ill• Miostrtl Bty.:!nt w.u. one o f m:~ny ;mttbdlum popul:~,;~:r; of black minstn:b y.

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~

By the JSSOs cicies from New York to San Francisco had minstrel theaters, and touring professionals brought minstrels}' co small cowns and villages. 11le c:r.u:e fo r minstrelsy even brought minstrels to the White House to entertain l'residentsjohn 1)'1er,james K. l'olk, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce.

P. 1. BlrMM Showman whel t.dtibittd "1»1\U'.ll wonders," R'.ll and odltrwist

I

No one understood becter than P. T . Barnum how to turn the public's craving for entercainmem into a profitable business. He was simultaneousl}' a hustler ~Atho cheated his customers before they could cheat him, and an idealist ~Atho founded a newspa· per to attack wrongdoing and ~Atho thoughc of himself as a public benefactor. After moving to New York City in 1834, Barnum began his career as an entrepreneur of encertainmenc.. His first w:ncure exhibited an African-American ~A'Oman, j oyce Heth, whom Barnum billed as che 169-ycar-old former slaw: nurse of George: Washingcon. In Barnum's mind, the cruch or falsehood of the: claim was irrelevant. Whac mactered was that people ~A'Ould pay to see her. It v.as che start of a lifelong game between Barnum and the public. In 1841 Barnum purchased a run·d~·n museum in New York City, rechristened

P. T. Barnum

_ _ _J.~!![!!~!!!!!!~~~-~it-th ~e American Museum, and opened a new chapter in the history of popular enter· tainmem. Avoiding the educational slant of other museums, Barnum concentrated on curiosities and faked exhibits; he wanted to interest people, Stt\\ff.n 1830 and 1860,~n ntprt· not to educate them. lhe American Museum included vcncriloquiscs, magi· nC'ur~ round nt'W bu.~i.nu,: opportu· cians, albinos, a five-year-old midge:c named 1bm 11lumb, and the "Fec-jce nitiu with popuUr~ntC'rt.Unmtnt. Mermaid," a shrunken oddity ..taken alive in the Fcejee Islands:'' By 1850 j.unel Gordon lknnett rtvulution· Barnum's ence:rtainmenc emporium 'A'llS the best-k no~A'tl museum in the i.1:cd th~ nC'W$pa.pc"r world with th e pt nny prel$. nation. A genius at publicity, Barnum recognized that ncv.-spapers could invent T hut« ~mt .II m;~.j« JIOUITt or C'ntC'rt;~.i nmtnt for d ivuse ;~.nd o r«'.n as wdl as reporc ne~A'S. 11lus he frequently wrote lecters (under various 1'0'>\>dr :md~n«$. names) to newspapers hinting that the scientific world 'A'llS agog over some P. T. B:.rn um introduc«< AmerK:uu astonishing curiosity that che public could soon view at che American Mu· to th~ wonden: o( th~ FC'C'jtt Mcrseum. Barnum's success rested on more than people's curiosity, ho~A'C\'\'.r. A m;~.id :.nd ac:h« oddities. temperance ad\'Ocace:, he provided leccures on the evils of alcohol and ga\'t: Bl;~.ekf.t~ min:~ttd ,:how~ pi'O\·ided the place a reputation as a center for safe family amusement. In addition, populu tntcrt
THE QUEST FOR NATIONALITY IN LITERATURE AND ART How did the work ofAmerican writers and artists berome distinctly Ant6ric~m? Europeans paid no actemion to American po«r}' or fiction before the 1820s. Alchough Americans could point ~Aith pride to Washington Irving's tales of Sleep)' Hollow and Rip Van Winkle, they also had to admit that Irving had done most of his work while living in England.

I THE QuEST FOil. NATIONAUTY IN lJTO!AllJil.E AND All.t After 1820 the United States experienced a literary flo"''Cring known as the "AmtrJcan Rtnalssance."'Leading figures of this burst of creativity included james Fenimore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henr}' David Thoreau (theh·ROW), Mar· garct f uller, Wale Whitman, Nathaniel Ha"''thorne, Herman Melville, and Edgar AI· lan l:toe. In 1830, 40 pm:entofbooks published in che United States were written by Americans; by 1850 this had increased to 75 percenc. This renaissance proYided Americans opporrunity to usc their nation in boch literature and arc. 11le quest for a discinccivdy American literature shaped the writ· ings of Cooper, Emerson, and Whicman.lt also n:vcaled itself in che majestic paint· ings of the Hudson River school, the firsc home·gro"''tl movement in art, and in the landscape archicecru.re of Frederick Law O lmsted.

24 9

AMeriCMI Reuissutce liter. ary tlloCM'me'nt that Ooutihd anr:r 1820

I

1"'0 broad mM'mlents,oneeconomic and the ocher philo· sophical, conu ibuted to this devcJopment. f i.rs.t, the trans· porcation rt\·olution created a nacional market for books, especial!)' ficcion. First to benefit from this new market was Sir Walter Scott, a British author whose historical nM>els became wild!)' popular in che United States and showed that there was a huge marker for ficcion. Scott be· came a model for man}' American authors, including j ames Fenimore Cooper. Second, a new philosophical movement, romanticism, saturated the American Renaissance. Romantics emphasized emotion and inner feelings, focusing on the in· dividual and his or her unique response: co narure and emotion. lbis new emphasis on emocion created a more democratic literature, accessible to virruall)' everyone (unlike earlier classicism, which demanded a knowledge of ancient history and my· thology). Women entered the fi ction market in large numbers; although barred from higher education and che classics, they could easily access their emotions and tweak theemocions of chcir readers. Harriet Beecher Stowe's massh'C best·seller, Undt Tom's Cabin, illustrntes how successful V.'Omen authors ~A'Cre in tugging at their readers' heartstrings. Novels also possessed a subversive quality, a freedom of ploc and char· acter not 3\'ailable to the ess.t}ist. Authors could create: unconvcncional characters, situacions, and outcomes, and left more: room for interpretation by the reader, ~Ailo was far more likd)' to focus on plot and characters than moral sentiments.

James Fenimore: Cooper was a trailblazer in che dew~lop· menc of a national literature wich distincti\'ely American Tlloreau, Faler, themes. In his frontiersman Natty Bumppo, "Le::acher· a.JWbltniM stocking.'' Cooper created an American archetype. Natty first appears in 1'bi! Piontt>n ( 1823) as an old man, a former hunter, who blames the farmers for wanconly destrO)ing upstate New York's game and corning the silent and majestic forests into deserts of rre:e stumps. As a spokesman for narure: against the march ofcivilization, Natty became a high!)' popular fi gure, and his life unfolded in several other enormous!}' popular nO\"Cis, such as 11Je1Ast ofthe MoJJirans (182-6), Tbt rwJJfinkr (1840), and 71Jt Dtt>rs./ayr( l841). During the 1830s Ralph Waldo Emcrson emerged as che most influential spokesman for chose: who sought a nationalliteraru.re and art. Emerson, who served briefly as a Unitarian min ister and then became a popular lecrurer, \'Oiced American

caoper, Emenon,

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intdlecrual ambitions in his 1837 address ••The American Scholar;'' which called on American ~A'fiters to break free of European slandards. As the leader of [ranscendentalism, che American offshoot of romanticism, Em· erson contended char ideas of God and freedom were innate, not the result of reason. Kno""ledge ~A'llS like: sjght- an inslanlaneous and dirocc perception of cruch. Anyone, ~Athether a learned unh·crsity professor or a common farmer, could glimpse: truth by following the promptings of his hearc. l 'hus the: United Stare:~ young and democratic, could produce as noble a literature and arc as any tradition-bound European nation. "Our day of independence, our long appre:nciceship to the: learning ofother lands dra~A'S to a d ose,.. he proclaimed. Let "the single: man plant himself in· domitabl)' on his instincts and . .. the huge: world will come around to him:'' Although he admired Cooper's fiction, Emcrson expressed his O'A'tl version of literary nationalism in ess.l)'S characterized by a homely reliance on the: individual as wdl as an interest in broad philosophical questions. l 'he: true scholar, he scre:ssed, must be independenc. Emerson's essays did not rely on S)'Stcmatic arguments and evidence:j with his conviction chat truth was inruith·e and individual, he: relied on a sequence of vi...id if unconnected assertions whose: cruch the: reader V.'Ould inscand)' see. O ne: of his readers remarked char listening to Emerson was like: trying to see: the: sun in a heavy fog; one could see light buc nC"t-er the: sun itself. Emerson had a magnetic attraction for )'Oung imdlectuals ill at case in convcntional society. Henry David Thoreau, born in 18 17, typified the: )'Ounger Emersonians. Unlike Emerson, whose adwnrurousness was largd )' imdlectual, Thoreau 'A'llS both a thinker and a doer. At one point he went to jail rather than pay poll caxe:s that V.'Ould su pport the Mexican War, a conflict char he sa~A' as pare of a southern conspiracy co e:xce:nd slavery. 1'he: experience ofjail led Thoreau to write Civil Disobrdknao ( 1849). in which he: defended disobedience of unjust laws. In spring 1845 Thoreau moved a few miles from Concord, Massachusetts, into che woods near Walden Pond. He constructed a simple cabin on land owned b)• Emerson and spent the next two )'eats pnwiding for his wants away from civilization. T horeau's stared purpose for his retreat co Walden ~A'llS to write a book about a canoe trip that he: and his brother had taken, but he soon discowred a larger purpose and undertook a much more: imporlant book. Wetlde-n {1854}, alchough ic abounded ~Aith descrip· cions of nature: and ~Aikllifc, carried a larger, transcendentalist message. Thoreau proclaimed chat his ~A'OOdland recre:ac had taughc him that only a few weeks' ~ANr's 101'\"ign COITnpondent. There mately related as they liked to think. she met ;v!Uu ;and writers, ob5C'rYtd One: of che most remarkable figures in Emerson's circle was Margaret the ReYolutions of 1848, and m;vried Fuller, an intdlecrual whose scarus d islanced her from com·entional soci· ;an lt;~.li:~n nobtem;~.n. On 1'\er retur n to cty. Her father, although disappointed that she ~A'a.S not a boy, ga\'e her the: Americ:;~. in 1850, she, hC"r 1'\usb;~.nd, sore of education a young man might have re:ce:i\'ed at HaJVard; she read ;and inf;ant son d ied in;~. :ohipwruk Larin and Greek, che: modern German romantics, and the English literary off long l:o1and. classics. Transcendentalism, with its emphasis on the free: life of the spirit

I THE QuEST FOil. NATIONAUTY IN lJTO!ATlJil.E AND All.t

2 51

and the: need for each person to discowr truth on his or her own, opened a new world fo r Fuller. For fi\'f: rears she supported herself by presiding 0\'Cr "conwrsations" by Boston's elite: men and women. 1hnscendcmalism also reinforced her feminist ide:asj in Womt'n in rbt Ninete-tnth Century (1845) she case aside the doctrine of".separate: spheres"' and contended that no ~A'Oman could achiC'\o-e personal fulfillment without de:\-eloping her intellectual abilities and 0\'ercoming her fear of being called masculine. Another uncorn•e:mional thinker with whom Emerson sympathized was the poet Walt Whitman, self-taught, exuberant, eanhy, outgoing, and in love wich ever)'· thing American except slawry. A journalist and fen·ent Dem ocrat, Whitman had an intimate, affectionate knO\\"Ie:dgc of ordinar}' Americans. His reading of Emerson nurtured his belief that the: United States would be the cradle of a new citizen in whom natural virtue ~A'Oul d flourish. 11le threads ofWhitman's early car«r came: to· gcthe:r in his major ~A'Ork, Lt
Three major writers of the: 1840s and 1850s strayed far from Emmon•s ideals. Nathaniel Ha~Atthorne, Herman Melville, and Edgar Allan l'oe wrote fiction char paid little heed co Emerson's call for a literarure treating the: ewryda)' experiences of ordinar}' Americans. Ha~Atthorne, for example, sec Tbt Surll!t l.dttr ( 1850) in New England's Puritan past, Tbt Houstofthe Ser·'tn Gabll!s ( 1851) in a mansion haunted by memories of the past, and Tlw Marbl-t Faun ( 1859) in Rome. Poe .set .several of his short stories in Europe; and Melville's nm-els 1)ptt (1846), Omoo (1847), and Mardi ( 1849) took place in che exocic South Seas, whereas his masterpiece, Mob.)'·Dkk ( 1851), 'A'llS set aboard a whaler. In part, these three writers felc chat American life lacked the: materials for great fiction. Ha~Atthorne bemoaned the: difficulty of ~Ariring about a councry "where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no m)'Stery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong."' Psychol· ogy. not socie:cy, fascinated chest writers. Each probed the depths of che human mind rather chan the: intricacies of social relationships. 11le:ir work displayed an underlying pessimism abouc the: human condition and the fundamental irrationality of human nacure. Pessimism led them to create characters obsessed by pride, guilt, a desire for rew:ngc,. or a quesc for perfection and then to set che:ir stories along che: byways of .society, where chcy could explore the complexities of human motivation ~Aithouc the jar· ring intrusions ofcvcr)'da)' life. For example, in Tbt Srarltt Ll!tttr Hawthorne: returned co the: l'uritan era to examine che psrchological and moral consequences of the adultery committed by Hester Prynne (prin) and the minister Arthur Dimme:sdah;

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2 52

OfAPlER u

ltOfHOl.OGY, CULTVIIE, AND E\'OMMYlJil:, 1&.io-.86o

although he de\'Oted little attention to depicting the Puritan village in which the action cakes place. Melville, in Moby·Dkk, created the frightening Captain Ahab (AY· hab), whose: relentless pursuit of a white whale fails co 611 the chasm in his soul and brings death co all his crew except the narrator. Poe, in his short story ••The Fall of the House of Usher" ( 1839), interwove the S)'tllbol of a crumbling mansion with the mcneal agony of a crumbling family. Although chese three: authors ignored Emerson's call to write about the ordinary life of their fellow Americans, they fashioned a distinctively American 6ction. Their ~A'Orks, preoccupied with analysis of moral dilemmas and psychological states, fulfilled Tocquevillc's prediction that ~A'Titcrs in democratic nations, while rejecting traditional sources of 6ction, would explore the abstract and universal questions of human nature.

The suspidon chac commercialism \\o'Ould corrupt arc did not entirely vanish in nineteenth-century America, but it certain!}' ~Atithcred. The brilliant poet Emily Dickinson made little or no attempt to publish her work at aiL But ocher authors, hard strapped for cash, entered che marketplace. Poe, for example, scratched out a meager living writing short stories for popular magazines. Thoreau craved recognition and cried to martec his poe-ms in New York City; failing chat, he curned to detailed narratives of nature chac sold wry welL Emerson helped to promote the lyceum (lyt·SEE-(Jm), a new institution aimed at bringing culture co a broader public. local organizations for sponsoring lectures, l)'ccums blossomed rapidly betv.r'Cf:'n the late 1820s and 1860. Taking advancagc of the emergence ofche railroad, Emerson worked che lyceum circuit, presenting most of his essays as lecru.res before publishing them, and relied on lecru.re fees as his principal source of income. Newly built railroads and cheap newspapers that announced his comings and goings enabled others to follow in his path. Although few women crawled the lyceum drcuit, they discovered other wa}'S co tap into chc growing market for literature. Writing 6ction was the most lucrative OC· cupation open to women prior co che Civil War. Scncimental novels, written mainl}' by women for women, dominated popular 6ction in the 1840s and J8SOs. Susan Warner, one of the most popular writers, used such tearjerkers co elevate herself from po~owty to luxury. In her Tht Wide, Wide World, the heroine wepc, on the average, every other pa~ for two \'Oiumcs. Women's fiction could also be subversive, challenging che image of men as steadfast providers and \\-'Omen as delicate dependents. In a typical novd, a fe-male orphan or a spoiled rich girl was thrown inco hard times by a drunken father and learned to prt\'aiL The moral was dear: \\-'Omen could overcome trials and improve chcir lives. Warner and other writers benefited from technology chat drasticall)' lowered the price of books. Before 1830, the enormously popular books of Sir Walter Scoct had b«n issued in three-volume sets that retailed for as much as thirty dollars. By the 1840s, papel'backs costing as little as seven cents flooded the martecplacc. This sea of popular culture threatened to swamp Emerson, Ha~Atthornc, Poe, and Melville. Emerson competed on the lecture circuit against 1'. 1'. Barnum; Ha~A'· thorne complained bitter!}' about "female scribblers""; and Poe maintained that the public's judgment of a ~A'fitcr's meric was nearly always ~A'fOng. Nonetheless, sodcty

by and large did not ignore: these major writers. Emerson's lectures made him famous, 71Je Srarltt Ulltr enjo)'ed strong sales, and Poe's "T he Ra\-en" was so popular that some suggested that the raven replace the eagle as America's national bird.

American painters between 1820 and 1860 also sought to develop nationality in their work. Lacking a mythic past of gods and goddesses, they subordinated historical and fig· ure painting to Landscape painting. l 'he American Landscape, though barren of the "poetry of decay" that Europe's ruined castles and crumbling cemples proYided, ~A'llS fresh and relari..-dy unencumbered by the human imprint. T hese conditions posed a Sdoool l.ond. challenge co the painters of the Hudson Rh·er School, which flourished from the :~~:ape pain ting tlu:t empbas.il:td 1820s to the 1870s..lts best-kn~·n represcntath-es- Thomas Cole, Asher Durand, and gr.wdtur, tmorion Frederic Church- painted scenes of the unspoiled region around the Hudson River. Although all three men compared the majesty of the Hudson to that of the Rhine, none was exclusi\--ely a landscapist. Some of Cole's most popular paintings W\'.re allegories, such as i1tt Coune ofEmpire, a sequence of6..-e canvases depicting the rise and fall of an ancient city; it implied that luxur}' doomed republican virtue. The works of Washington Irving and the opening of the Erie Canal had piqued interest in the Hudson during the J820s. Then, after 1830, Emerson and Thoreau lauded primitive naru.re; "-in ~Aildnc.ss is che preservation of che world;" T horeau wroce. By this time, much of the original American Wrest had already fallen to pio· nttr axes, and one writer urgcncl}' concluded that "-it behom--es our artists to rescue from (civilization's) grasp the lictlc that is left before it is too late." The Hudson River painters did more than preserve a passing wilderness; the}' also emphasized emotional effect. Cole's rich colors; billowing clouds; massii,!'C, gnarled trtts; towering peaks; and deep chasms so heightened che dramatic impact of his paintings that poet William Cullen Br)'llnt compared them to "acts of religion."' In poY~Crful , cvocati\-e canvases, American arci.scs aimed to capture the natural grandeur of their land. Like Cole, George Catlin tried co preserve a vanishing America through his art. His goal 'A'llS to paint as many Nath-e Americans as possible in thcir pure and «savage" state. By 1837 he had created 437 oil paintings and thousands of sketches of faces and customs from ncar!}' fifty tribes. Cat· Rom.anti.·i~m combintd with th"' lin's romantic view of the Indians as noble savages was a double-edged t«.hnological ft'vulution to product an "Amtric.an Rtn.aWanct.• sword. His admirers delighted in his dignified portrayals of Indians but shared his fOreboding chat the march of progress had already doomed AmC"-rican liter.uurt too\: on nation · a.listic theme:~ withj.unel l'tnimore these noble creatures to oblivion. Cooper and his: talel ofthe frontier. landscape: architects tried to create small cnda\-es of nacure to pro· Ralph \'(la)do Em"'r~on w.a$ the vide spiritual refreshment to harried dty dwellers. «Rural" cemeteries with cent« of the- uanKenden t.ali.u pastoral names like Harmon}' Gro\-e, placed near major cities, became moo."-men c, which indudtd Henry D~d Thoreau and Marguet Fuller. tourist attractions, designed as much for the li...ing as fur che dead. On a grander scale Frederick law Olmsted and Cal\'ert Vaux (lf'Oh) designed AmC"-rican wri t"'r:s $Ueh ;u Poe, liaw· thorn"'> and MdviUe plumbtd the New York City's Central Park to look like undisturbed countr)'side. Drain· d epths: oft he h uman PJ)'Cbc-. age pipes carried water to man-made lakes, and trees screened out the surTht Hud.'lon R.ivtr School of pa.im· rounding buildings. Central Park became an idealized version of naru.re, ing roman ticiud the- American meant to remind visitors of landscapes that they had seen in pictures. l.md.s;cape and d f't.nthcd it in em()(I On. Thus narurc was made to mirror art.

............ I

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254

CHAPtER u

ltOfHOl.OGV, CULTVR£, AND E\'OMMV lJil:, •!.io-46o

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD TH£

~

USTEN TOITONTHEGO .

MPJ AVOt O

R LE O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

Whot technologicol imprm<ements brought about American economic

I

growth behveen 1840 and 1860? (po)1238)

Rapid technological growth tt~-olu ti oniud agriculture and greatly increased productivity in the manufucturing sector as well. Railroads pla)'-"CC a vital role, linking cicie.s, spawning new cities, creating markets, and providing a new busi· ness model. Prices fell, and prosperity rose.

in what ways did technology transform the li11tS ofordinary Americans?

l

(poge242)

As cities gre~·, housing and living conditions improved for bccter-off resi· dents, but squalor and pollution persisted. and dass distinctions sharpened. l 'h e inability to control epidemic distast fcd such populat fads as h)·dropathy and phrenology.

in what new IWIJS did Americans pass their free time during this period?

l

(poge246)

Popular entertainment became the realm of entrepreneurs such as James Bennett Gordon with his ..penny press" and P. T. Barnum with his stable of 'ol'Onders.. Theater flourished, drawing divuse and rowd)' audiences, and black· face minstrel shows reinfotced negative sterroq•pes.

How did the work ofAmerican wn't.ers and artists become distinctly

I

American? (page 248)

The disappearing frontier elicited a distinct!)' American literature from )ames Fenimore Cooper. An "American Renaissance" produced such ..democratic"' writers as Whitman and Emerson, as well as chose fascinated by che darker side of human nature, such as Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. The Hudson Riwr School emphasized the grandeur and emotion of the American landscape.

KEY TERMS

te
254

CHAPtER u

ltOfHOl.OGV, CULTVR£, AND E\'OMMV lJil:, •!.io-46o

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD TH£

~

USTEN TOITONTHEGO .

MPJ AVOt O

R LE O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

Whot technologicol imprm<ements brought about American economic

I

growth behveen 1840 and 1860? (po)1238)

Rapid technological growth tt~-olu ti oniud agriculture and greatly increased productivity in the manufucturing sector as well. Railroads pla)'-"CC a vital role, linking cicie.s, spawning new cities, creating markets, and providing a new busi· ness model. Prices fell, and prosperity rose.

in what ways did technology transform the li11tS ofordinary Americans?

l

(poge242)

As cities gre~·, housing and living conditions improved for bccter-off resi· dents, but squalor and pollution persisted. and dass distinctions sharpened. l 'h e inability to control epidemic distast fcd such populat fads as h)·dropathy and phrenology.

in what new IWIJS did Americans pass their free time during this period?

l

(poge246)

Popular entertainment became the realm of entrepreneurs such as James Bennett Gordon with his ..penny press" and P. T. Barnum with his stable of 'ol'Onders.. Theater flourished, drawing divuse and rowd)' audiences, and black· face minstrel shows reinfotced negative sterroq•pes.

How did the work ofAmerican wn't.ers and artists become distinctly

I

American? (page 248)

The disappearing frontier elicited a distinct!)' American literature from )ames Fenimore Cooper. An "American Renaissance" produced such ..democratic"' writers as Whitman and Emerson, as well as chose fascinated by che darker side of human nature, such as Poe, Hawthorne, and Melville. The Hudson Riwr School emphasized the grandeur and emotion of the American landscape.

KEY TERMS

te
2 56

OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~ O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

Natloner By noon Turner's ;vmy, v.t.ich h;ad grown co sixty or seyenty fOJIO'WI."rs, ha d murder~d ;about sixty M ites. As word of uoubl~ spru d , militia ;and "gf· l;antes:, thousands stTOng, pour~d into Southampton Ftom :.uoss the border in North C;uolln;a ;and &om other eountics in Vugini:..

were killed, whether or not they had actually bem involved. Mosc of 1Urner's folio"''· ers were cither shot on sight or jailed, tried, and hanged. 1Um er himself eluded cap· ture until late October; after a trial he, too, was hanged. White Virginians were: srunned. What had gone wrong? SlaV\'.ry in Virginia, chey belie•..-e d, was rd atiw:ly mild, certainly in comparison to the harsh conditions in Alabama and Mississippi. And Nat Turner's background at firsc glance offered no answers- he did not claim chat he had bem mistreated by his owners. Far more "''as known abouc Na t Turner than an}' other black slave because of his ..Con· fessions;'' recorded b}•his court-appointed atco m ey. What che «confessions" did m-eal "''lls in many wa}'S more troubling than a simple litany of mistreatment and resencmmt. The Nac Turner of the "Confessions" "''lls an incelligcm and deeply religious man who had learned co read and write in childhood. Although Virginians, like mosc southerners, thought that Chriscianit}'"-"Ould make sla\-es more docile, Na t 1\Jrner had fo · cused o n biblical passages threatening death to an)-one who "stealeth" a man, a fair description of slavery. A mystic and prophet, Turner claimed that in his childhood he had seen hea\-enly visions of black and whice spirits fighting each ocher. A solar edipse had bem, he thought, God's signal that the rime had come fo r him ro lead his people co freedom by killing slaveholders. Asked shord}' before his death whether he had bem mistaken, Na t 1\Jrner re· plied, "Was noc Christ crucified?" White southerners read his confessions and shudderedj many concluded thac they were living on a "smothered volcano:" In che short tmn, Nac Turner's rebellion criggere:d a fierce debate O\'er emanci· pation ofslaves in the Virginia legislaru.re of 1831- 1832j in che long run, it hardened the hold that slavery had o n che South. O nce Virginia rejected emancipation, the: word all but disappeared fro m the southern vocabulary. As nonhero stares one b}• one jettisoned slavery, southern stares dung to it more fi ercely. Although the Upper and lo"''er South differed tremendously, slaV\'.ry forged che two sections into a sjngle: encit}' known as the: Old South.

I

KING COTTON

I-Iow did tM nu ofc.otton culti~Mtion 11(fect tM Solltll?

In 1790 the South "''lls essenc1ally stagnant 1obacco, its pn mary cash crop, had lose irs economic vitality evecn as it had depleted che o nce--rich southern soils, and neicher rice nor co£Con could replace tobacco's economic imparlance. 1'hree out of fo ur southerners still u..-ed along the Atfamic seaboard, specifically in che Chesapeake and che Carolin as. One of chre:e resided in Virginia alone. l'he contrast be:cwccn chat South and the dynamic South of 1850 "''lls stunning. By 1850 southerners had mo\-ed souch and west- no"'' only one ouc of St'\'en south· erners lh-ed in Virginia-and cocton reigned as king, shaping this new South. The: growth of the British textile: induscry had created a huge demand for cocton, while: Indian removal had made: "''llY for southern expansion inco che "Co£Con Kingdom," a broad swath of land chac screeched from South Carolina, Georgia, and northern Florida in the east chrough Alabama. Mississippi, central and "-'estern Tennessee, and Louisiana, and from chere on to Al'kansas and Texas.

I KING ConoN

257

Gabriel Prosser plans a sSave rebellion in Virginia Con111e" Pfollibils e
Southerners extolled King Cotton. A warm climate, wee springs and summ~ and relativel}' dry aurumns made the l.o\1/Cr (or Deep) South ideal for cultivating cotton. A co£Con farmer needed neither slaw:s nor co£Con gins nor che capital required for sugar cultivation. Indeed, perhaps 50 percent of fanners in the: «cotton Belt" owned no slaves, and to process their harvest, they could turn to the widely available com· mercia! gins. In short, cotton pro6ted c.vcr)'one; it promised ro make poor men pros· perous and rich men kings. Yec large--scale cocton cultivation and slaver}' grew together as the southern slave population nearly doubled be:rn'€en 1810 and 1830. Three·founhs of all southern slaves worked in the co£Con econom}' in 1830. Owning slaves enabled a planter to harvest vase 6elds of cocton speedily, a crucial advantage because: a sudden rain· storm at harvest time could pelt cotton to the: ground and soil it.

1'111 We of Cotton

~.alQ,000~1o$ol

l::tS

!IlE H !llllvo~ Ill Ill Ill AH j Ill Ill Ill u * AH !Il!Il!Il AH H ~ Hi !Il!Il!Il AH H A !IlEI3EI3 U A !Il!Il!Il U A U A g AU EI3EI3EI3 AH !Il!Il!Il AH

colton pro6.1ood

' • aKI,OOO Jl in tho U.S.

4,000

697.897

1790

73,222 1.538.098 1820

....

l,3.t7,640

2,487213

3.841,416

liog C.UOO 1ttm a,.,a;ng

l

southern belid'm.u-u.s. ;and BritU.h tconomic-5 dcpc-ndtd on cotton

Crowtll of Colloo Production aod lilt Slavt Popcllatioo. llllll-1160 Cotton ;md si;~V\'ry ro~t togechtr in the O ld South.

3.967,760

1860

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2 58

OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

Yiluo of Colton Exp«ts

... ...,,..t>gt of All

U5. Exports. 18011-1160 6y 1840 cotton xcounttd for more th:.n tl;~.lf ol ;!.lJ

u.s. C'llp()rt~. 1800

lnteracti\•e Map: The legal Status of Slavery, from the

Re110lutioo to the Civil War

1820

1...

1860

Cotton offered an added advantage: it v.as compatible wich corn production. Corn could be planted either earlier or later than cotton and harvested before: or after. Because: the cost ofowning a slave remained che same regardless of whether he or she v.as working. corn production aliOYICd slaveholders to shift sla\'f: labor betW't'en corn and cotron. By 1860 the acreage: devoted co com in the Old South acruall)' rxrfflltd that devoted to coHon. Economically, corn and cotron gave the South che best of two worlds. lntmse: demand in Britain and New England kept cotton prices high and money flov.-·ing into che South. Because of souchem self--sufficiency in growing com and raising hogs that thrived on che corn, money did noc drain away to pay for food. In 1860 the rweh-e wealthiest counties in che United Stares 'A'C!C all in che South. Two giant cash crops. sugar and cotton, dominated agri· cult ure: in the: l..o~A'Cr South. l 'he: Upper South, a region of tobacco, vegetable, hemp. and wheat gro~A'cr'S, depended far less on che gre-at cash crops. NC"".-erthd ess, a common dependence on slavery unified che Upper and the ~-er Souch, and made the Upper Souch identify more with che ~-er Sourh than with the nation's free: scates. A range of social, political, and psychological factors promoted chis unity. First, many settlers in the LO'I'--er South had come from the Upper South. Second, all whire: southerners benefited from the Constitution's three-fifths dause, which let them count slaves as a basis for congressional representation. lhird. abolitionist attacks on slavery stung aU southerners and bound chem coge:cher. Fourth, economic cies linked the two Souths. The profitability of cotton and sugar increased the value of sla\'f:S throughout the Souch. The sale of slaves from chededining plantation scares of the Upper South to the booming Lower South was a huge business.

lies Between tile a- llld Upper Saldll

I..-.. ,."""""' "'~~'

dtwot.ed to ;a c;,Jh crop, 5UCb .u cotton or to!Ncm

Ho\1/C'\-er, the changes responsi ble for the d)'tlamic growth of the Souch widened the distance becwce:n ic and the North. The South remained predominancl)' rural as the Nonh became more and more: urban. Lack of industry kept the South rural; by 1850 it had one-third of the U.S. pop· ulation but accounted fo r onl)' one-tenth of the nation's manufacturing. In 1850 the industrial output of the entire South was less than one-third that of Massachu· setts alone. Some southerners ad\'OCated and creare:d factories in the: South, but they "''ere a minority. By 1860, cotton-ce:xrile mills ~A'Cre: scattered throughout the Sourh, and Richmond boasted the nation•s founh-largesc producer of iron products, the Trcde·

lbe Nortll and Saldll Diverge

I KING ConoN

259

lm• nat :t.nil:ablte due to cqryrigbl restrictions

gar (TREH-du-gur) Iron Works. Despite these success~ industrial output in the South trailed far behind that of the N ew England and mid-Adamic states. Most southern factories were sma ll, produced for nearb}• ma.rkets, and ~A'Cre closely tied to agriculture. In rhe north, factories turned hides into tanned leather and leather into shoes, or cotton imo threads and threads imo suits. In contrast, southern factories turned grain into flour, corn inco meal, and logs into lumber. Slawry posed a major obscade to southern industrialization, but not because slaves wen: unfit for factories; the 1redegar Iron \l'orks was among many factories that employed slaves. H()\1,\...,..·er, the prospect of industrial slaver}' troubled sla\~hold ers.. Away from the strict discipline and supcnision possible on a plantation, slaves sometimes behaved as if they u~re free, shifting job~ working O\"crtime, and C\o\':n negotiating better working conditions. But the chief brake on southern industriali:zation was money, not labor. 10 raise the capital needed to build factories, planters wo uld haw had to sdl rheir slaves. They seldom did. Cash crops, such as cotton and sugar, u~re pro\~n. but the benefits of industrialization u~re remote and doubtful. Successful industrialization also ~A
2 60

OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~ O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

attracting abolicionists. As long as southerners believed char che cash-
THE SOCIAL GROUPS OF THE WHITE SOUTH

I

WMt nta)OT social dtviSJons segmented the wlttte South?

11lere was ~Aide d•vcrs1tyW1t hm and becween the South's sla.,-eholdmg and non·

slaw~holding classes. Although some planters ()'\.',· ned hundreds of sta..-es and li"·ed lavishly, most lived more: modestly. In 1860 one-fourch of aU ~A•hi te families in t he

Sourh owned slaves; nearly half of chose owned fewer t han five sla\'t:S, and three:· fourths had fewer chan ten slaves. O nly 12 pm:e:nt O~A'tled twenty or more: slaves, and only J pe:rcenr ()'\.',· ned a hundred or more:. Nonslavcholde:rs were: equal!)' di\-e:rse:. Most O~A'tled farms and drew on che labor of family members, but other ~Ailites squat· ted on land in t he pine barrens or piney woods and scratched out a li\'ing by raising lh-e:stock, hunting. fishing. and planting a few acres ofcorn, oars, or s"'ttt potatoes.

J ThE SOOAL GI!OOPS Of THE WHITE SOUTH

2 61

Planters, small slaveholders, family farmers, and pine--barrens folk composed the Sout h's four main white groups. Many southerners-lawyers, ph)'sicians, mer· chants, and artisans-did not fall into any of these: four, but chey cended to identify their interests with one or another of t he: agricultural gro ups.

The: plantation, with irs porticoed mansion and fields teeming with sl.n-es, stands at the cencer ofthe popular image of the Old South. This romanticized view, reinforced by now~ls and mO\ie:s like: Gone wifJJ the Wint4 is not entirely false:, for the South did contain plancations that travelers found ..supctb be:)'ond description." Abundant slaves, the dhi· sion of labor they afforded, and plentiful land allo~A'Cd farge plantations co gener:ue: incomes of$20,000 or more: a }"ear, an immense sum in those )'~ars. In the dghce:enth century during t he initial flush ofsetd emenc in the piedmont and t rans-Appalachian Sout h, even well-off plancers general!)' had liw~d in humble fog cabins. After 18 10, ho\N'C\"Cr, elite planters compe:ced with one: another to build scacely mansions. Yet most planters counted their we:alch, not in grand mansions and d e:gant furnishings, but in the value of their slaves. A fidd hand was ~A'Orch as much asS 1,700 in the: 1850s, and few planters sold their sla..-es to buy furniture and sito.-e:r plate. But in t heir constant "-'Off}' abouc profit, planters enjo)'Cd ncither repose norsecurity. High fixed costs- housing and feeding slaves, maintaining cocton gins, hiring O'V\'.rseers-led chcm co search for more and better land, higher efficiency, and gre:acer self-sufficiency. Because cotcon prices tended to tlucw are seasonally, planters often assigned thcir cotton to commercial agents in d ries who held the cotcon until the: prke: was right. The: agents extended credit so t hat che: planters could pay t heir bills before the: cotcon was sold. Indebtedness became part of the: plancation econom}' and intensified the: planrers' quest for profi tability. Psychological strains compounded economic "-'Otries. Frequent moves disrupted circles of friends and relam-es, parrku· farl)' as migration to che: Southwesc (Alabama and Mississippi) carried families into less sctded, more desolate areas. Until 1850 this area was still che: frontier. Migration co the Southw~st often deeply unsctded plantation ~A'Omen. Tht)' suddenly found themselves in frontier conditions ~Aith neither friends, neighbors, nor relatives nearby and surrounded by sta..-es. Frequent absences by husbands, whechcr they wert: looking for new land, supervising o utlying plantations, or con· ducring business in the city intensified wi..-es' lonelin ess. Planters and t heir wi..-e:s found various ~A'llys of coping with cheir isolation. Em· piO}ingo\·crscers to run che: plantation, some lived in d ries; in 1850 half the planters in t he: Mississippi Delta lived in New Orleans or Natchez. Most planters acted as their own 0\'Ct'St:ers, ho~A•cvcr, and dealt wit h che problems of harsh living conditions by opening chcir home: to visitors. The responsibility for su ch hospitality fell heavil)' on wives, who mighc have co entertain as many as fifteen people for breakfast and at· tend co t he: needs of visitors ~Ailo stay~d for days. l'lamation wives also bore: the: burdens of raising their children, supervising house slaves, making clothing and carpets, looking after smokehouses and dairie~ planting gardens, and, often, keeping t he plamacion accounrs.. Among che heaviesc sorrows of some plantation mistresses was t he presence of mulatto (moo-LOT-oh) children, constant reminders of their husbands' infidelities.

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2 62

OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

Prima:ry Source: APlan of Mulberry Plantation

Charlestonian Mary Boykin Chesnut, a famous diarist, observed tardy, "An)' lady is ready to tell )'OU who is the father of all the mulatto children in C'\o"Cr)bod)"S household but her 0'1'-'rL 11lesc, she seems co chink, d rop from d ouds.'"

In 1860,88 pm:ent of all sla\-eholders 0'1'-·ned fe'\1.-er than twenty slaves, and most possessed fe·wer than ten. One o ut Sllnbolders of every th-e slaveholders worked outside of agriculture, as a la"'ytr, physidan, merchant, or artisan. Small slaveholders experienced conflicting loyalties and ambitions. In upland regions they absorbed the outlook of che more numero us yeomen (YO-men), who O'A'tled o nly a few slaves and rarely aspired co become large plancers. In contrast, in the plancacion-dominated low countr)' and delta regions, small slaveholders often aspired to planter status. There someone wich ten slaves could rcalisticall)' look for· ward co owning thirty. And ambitious, acquisitive individuals equated success ~A'ith O'A'tling more slaves. 11le logic of sla\-ery remain ed che same: the only way to justify the im·estmenc in slaves was co set them to work on profitable crops. Such crops demanded more and better land, and boch che planters and the small slaveholders of the delcas "'-ere restless and footloose. The sodal structure of the deltas 'A'3S flu id. In che early ancebellum period, large planters had been reluctant to risk transporting chcir hundreds ofvaluable slaves in a sciU-curbulem region. It was small slaveholders who led che initial 'A'CStward push into che Cotton Belt in che 1810s and 1820s. Gradually, large plancers, coo, mo\-ed westward, buying up the land chat the small sla\-e O'A'tlers had developed and rurning the region fro m Vicksburg co Natchez into large plantations. Small slave owners took the profits from selling their land, bought more slaves, and mo\-ed on. They gradual!)' transfonned che region from Vicksburg to Tuscaloosa (rusk-uh·LOO-suh}, Alabama, into a belt of medium-sized fanns with a dozen or so slaves on each.

The 5111111

I

J'"IU• lndtpmdmt JmaU f.armt r, u:su.tlly nonslllYI'holding

Nonslawholding famil)' farmers, or )'OOmen, composed t he largest single group of southern whites. Most 0'1'-·ned land, and many hired slaves to help at harvest. In areas of poor soil, such as eastern Tennessee, yeomen ~A'ere typically subsjsrcnce farmers, but most )"COmen grew some cash crops. Their landholdings were comparari\-ely small, ranging from 6fty to two hundred acres. Yeomen generally inhabited uplands, su ch as t he piedm ont of the East or the hilly upcountr}' of the Souch~A'CSt, far from the rich coastal plains and deltas. Above aU, che )'OOmen valued self-sufficiency. Unlike plamcrs, who ~A'ere driven to acquire more land and co plane more cash crops. che yeomen dt\'Oted much of their acreage co subsistence crops, such as corn, S'A'CCC potatoes, and oats. 11le plant· er•s ideal was profit with modest self-sufficiency; che )'OOman' s goal, self-suffidcncy with modest profit. Yeomen living in planter-dominated regions u-ere often dismissed as «poor white crash,"'but in t he upland regions that they dominated, chc )'OOmen W\'.re highly respected. Upland slaveholders tended co own only a few slaves; like t he )'eOmen, chey u-ere essentially famil)' farmers.

The Yeomen

Unlike souchern planters, yeomen ma.rkeced their cash crops locall)', trading cotcon, wheat, and tobacco for goods and services fro m nearby artisans and mer· chants. In some areas }'COmen sold their surplus corn to dro•..-e:rs and herdsmen "'tho specialized in raising hogs. Along the f rench Broad River in eastern Tennessee, for example, twenty thousand to thirty chousand hogs a )'ear "'"re fattened for markec. At peak season a travder would sec one: thousand hogs a mile:.1'he: hogs were penned ac nighc in huge stock stands-\·critable hog mocels- and fed with corn su pplied by the local yeomen.

Independent whites of che wooded ..pine bar· rens" were one of the most controversial groups in the O ld South. About 10 percenc ofsouthern whites, they usually squatted on the: land; put up crude cabins; cleared some acreage, where thC)' planted com between tree stumps.: and grazed hogs and cattle in the woods. They neither raised cash crops nor engaged in the daily routine of orderly "''Oft thac characterized family farmers. With their ramshackle houses and handfuls of srump·smwn acr~ they appeared lazy and shiftless. Abolitionists dte:d the pine-barrens people as proof chac slaver}' degraded "'>hires, buc southerners responded that, although the: pine-barrens folk were poor, chey could at least feed themselves, unlike: the paupers of norchern cities. In general, the people: of the pine barrens were boch selfsufficient and 6cn::ely independent. l'ine-barrens men were: reluctant co hire chc-mseh·es out as laborers to do "'Slave" tasks, and the "''Omen refused to become: servants.

Tilt People of the Pille Barrens

11w- white' South C'On:r.i..sle'd or four main :r.oe"i.al grou p$: pl.mtoui.on OWnC'u., :r.maJI $1a\'C'ho)dC'-n:, )'I:'OffiC'n, and tbC' peopk o( th~ ptn~ ba""'n:r.. Plant.uion own<"rs, who owne"d mO!It or the- :r.l~:r., \\'~ell' .u th~ rop or thcWC'i.al $1ructu r~. Sm.lU.dawholde"rs, indud ing pro· (C":r.:r.iona.l:r. ;u wdl a:r. F.lnne"r.s, mosc oft-C"n owne"d rev«r than t~n :r.la'A":I. YC"om<"-n l'arm<"r.s, who gena:dl)' owne"d no $1a''e.'• w«~ the' largut $C'gmC"nt al the- wh ite" populu:ion.

11w- fi e"R"dy proud .lnd ind.C'pe"ncknt "peopk o( th~ ptn~ barnn:r.•· C'om· pwe'd 10 p«C'C'nt or the- white' population.

SOC IAL RELATIONS IN THE WH ITE SOUTH 1-/ow did slawry affec.t wcial relations in the South? Antislavery northerners often charged thac sla\"er}' warped che South's cncire social structure. By creating a pe:rmancnc black undcrdass of bond scn•ancs, they al· lege:d, slaver}' robbed lower-class whites of the ince:nth-e to work, reduced them to shiftless misery, and rendered the Souch a premodern thro"'back in an otherwise progressive era. Southerners retorted chac che real center of white inequality "''lls the Norch, where mcn::hancs and 6nancie:rs paraded in 6ne silks and ne:\-er soiled their hands "'ith manual labor. In re-ality, che white South mixed ariscocracic and democratic, premodern and modem fcaru.res. Although the South fcaru.red considerable class inequality, prop· crty ownership was widespread. Rich planters dominated sodal life and the: legisla· ture, but they did not ne:ce:ssaril)' gee their way, and often chcir political a~nda paralleled thac of other whites. Like white northerners, "''hitc southerners were: rest· less, acquisitive, ea~r to make money, and skillful at managing complex commercial enterprises. Yet such practices as sla\-eholding and dueling chrr.-ed in the: Souch when they were dying o ut dsc"'there:.

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264

CHAPtER 11

ThE OLD SOUTH A~O SlAVERY, 18]o -186o

Collftld Md C.SeiiSus in the Willie Soutll

l'lantcrs cangtcd ~Aith )'OOmcn on sC'\-eral issues. With ex-

tensive economic dealings and need for credit, planters in· dined toward the Whig party, ~Ailich generally supported economic de\-elopmcnt. 11le independent )'COmcn, cherishing their self·suflicicncy, tended co be Democrats.

Yet few conflicts arose br~n these: groups. An undcrl)i ng political unity reigned in rhc South. Gcograph)' ~A'llS in pare responsible: plant~ small slawholders, }"f:Omcn, and pine-barrens folk tended co du.scer in differmt regions, each independent of the others. There was somewhat more geographical intermingling of groups in the Upper South. With ~Aidespread land ownership and few factories, the O ld South 'A'llS not a place where ~Ailites worked for other whites, and this tended co minimize friction. The white Souch's political scrucru.re was suflidenclydemocra ric to pre\'ent an}' one group from gaining exdusi\J'C concrol over politics. Planters dominated stare legislator~ but they 0\l.~d their election to the popular \'Otc. And the democratic currents that had su.~pc northern politics beru.~en 1815 and 1860 had affected the Souch as well; ne\1/Cr souchem states entered the Union with democratic constitu· tions char included uni..~rsal ~Athite manhood suffrage- the right of all adulc white males to vote. Although )"eamen often voced for planters, che nonsla..~hol ders did not gi\'f: thcir elected representatives a blank check to gOio"Crn as they pleased. During the 1830s and 1840s, Whig planters ~Atho favored banks faced incense and often successful opposi· rion from Democratic yeomen. 11le nonsla\J'Cholders got their way often enough co nu.n:ure thcir belief thac they, noc the sla\J'Cholders, controlled policies.

~ned20

NC'\-enhcles~ considerable pownlidl existed for conflict between sta..~hol ders and nonsla..~holders . The southern white carpenter who complained in 1849 that «unjust, oppres· si..·e. and degrading" competition from sla\'f: labor depressed his wa~s surely had a poinc. Bern-een 1830 and 1860 che slaveholding class shrank in size in relation to the toea! white population, bur its share of total wealth increased As a Louisiana ediror wrote in 1858, ..The present tendency of supply and demand is to concentrate aU the slaves in che hands of the few, and thus excite the envy rather than cultivate che sympath}' of the people... Yet alchough pockets of opposition dotted the South, sla\'f:r}' did noc create profound or lasting d ivisions beru.~en sta..~hol ders and nonslaveholders. For example, antagonism to sta..-ery flou rished in parts of Virginia up to 1860, but proposals for emancipating the slaves dropped from che state's political agenda after 1832. Kenrucky had a histor}' of antisla\'f:r}' activity dating back to the 1790s, but after calls for emandpation su ffered a crushing defeat in an 1849 referendum, sla\-ery ceased to be a political issue there. The rise and fall of pro-emancipation sentiment in the South raises a key question: as mosc white southerners 'A'Cre nonslaveholders, why did they nor attack sla..·cry more consistently? 10 look ahead, "''hy ~A'ere so many

or more &laves

..1--<+r--- ...

Owned 5-9 slaves 5.5%

Owned

1·4 &laves

12.5%

,....

Owned no slaves

Slaw Ownonlip, 11&0 In combin;~.tion with the irnp;1et of Hinton R. Helper's T~ l~ndin& CrimoftM So11tlt( 1857), v.+.ich c;~.lled on nonsl;t.\•eholders to ;~.bolish the insti tution o f slo:~Vt"ry in their own int~u. this decline left sl;:nt\"holdel'5 worrie d ~ut the loyo:~lty of nonsl.wt'ho.lden; to slo:~\'cry.

I

SOOAL RELATIONS IM THE WHITE SOUTH

2 65

southerners willing to fight ferociously and to die: bravdyduring the CiYil War in de:fc:nsc of an inscirution in which they apparcntl}' had no real stake? There are st"\-tral reasons. First, some nonsla\·eholdcrs hoped to become slaveholders. Second, most southerners accepted the racist assumpcions on which slaV\'.r)' rested.: chcy dreaded the likelihood that emancipation would e:ncoura~ .. impudent" blacks to cntcrcain ideas of social equality with ~Afiites. Third, no one knew where: the sla\'~ if f reed, would go or what chcy "-"OU!d do. ColoniUng fr~d blacks in Africa was unre-alistic, southerners conduded, but chcyalso beliC"t·e:d that, without colonizacion, cmancipa· cion would lead to a race war.

Becwccn J830and 1860 southerners constructed a defense of slaw~ry as a positive good rather chan a necessary eviL Sc. Paul's injunction chat servants obey their mastcrs became a biblical jusrificacion for some. Others looked to the classical past to argue thac sla\'C1f was both an and cnc and a classical institucion; the sla\J'C society of Arh· ens, chcy said, had produced Arisrode (AIR-i ss-U.ht-t.~l) and Plato (PlAY-~h), and Roman slaveholders had laid the foundations of\l'estern civilization. George Fitz· hugh of Virginia comrasced che plight of the norchern ••wage slaves,'" callously discarded when they became too ill or too old co work, wich the lot of southern slaves, cared for by masters who attended to chcir health, their clothing, and their discipline. Ac che same time, southerners increasingly suppressed M}' open discussion of slaver}' within the Souch. l'rosla..-er}' writers warned that abolitionists 'A'llntcd to destroy che family as ~A'CJI as slavery by undennining the ..natural" submission of children co parencs, wives to husbands, and slaves co masters. in chc 1830s prosJa,.'Cr}' soucherncrs seized abolicionist literacure from the southern mail and burned it. AI· though Kemuck}' abolitionist Cassius Marcellus Clay protected his press with two cannons, in 1845 a mob dismantled ic anyway.

l

posiiM pod Sou""m argutnc"nt that sbrt'ty bmefitC'd bath bladt and whitr

The Nf1ro i• His Owl! Cou•try illld tilt Ht:ro in Aontri<• Prosl ~ry prop.:~g;~.l'\dists eontn.$ted wh.:~t t ht'y bdi-t'Ytd to bt tht bl;1ck's Afriul'\ 5;1V:18t'l)' with tht blt:$-sings of civiliz:.tion on ;10 AmtriG~n pl;1nt:.tion.

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OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

The riseofche proslaver}'argumem coincided with a shift in sou them churches' position on slavery. During the 1790s and early 1800s, some Protestant ministers had assailed slavery as immoral, but b)• che 1830·s most clergymen had convinced themselves thac slaver}' was both compacible with Christianity and necessary for t he proper exercise of Christian religion. Slavery, chey proclaimed, displarOO Christian responsibility tO'I'-ard one's inferiors, and it helped African·Americans to dl'VI.'.Iop Christian virtues, such as humility and sdf·controL Sout herners increasingly at· tacked antislaw:ry evangelicals in the Nonh for disrupting che "superior" social ar· rangement of the South. In 1837, southerners and conservative northerners had combined forces co driw: antislavery New School Presbyterians out of that denomi· nation's main body; in 1844 che Methodist Episcopal Church split into northern and souchern wings; and in 1845 Baptists formed a separate Sout hern Com-enrion. In effect, southern evangelicals seceded from national church organizations long before the South seceded from the Union.

Throughout che colonial and antebellum periods, vio· lence deeply colored che dail}' lives of white southerners. In che 1760s a minister described backcountry Virginians "biting one anochers Ups and Noses off, and go"''ging one another- that is, thrust· ing out anothers E)'t:S, and kicking one anocher on t he Cods (genitals), to the great damage of man}' a l'oor Woman." Gouging ouc e)'es became a spedalty of sorts among poor southern whites. O n one occasion a Souch Carolina judge entered his court co find a plaintiff, a juror, and rwo witnesses all missing one eye. Stories ofe)'e gougings and car bitings be
VIolence In llle Willie Soutll

Ac the rooc of most violence in che white Souch lay inten· sified feelings of personal pride that reflected che incscap· able presence of slaves.. White sout herners sa"'' sla...-es degraded,. insulce:d, and po'l'-'erless to resist. In tum, whites reacted violently to C"t'en trivial insults co demonstrate: chat they had nothing in common with sla\'eS. Amongge:ndemen this exaggerated pride cook t he form ofa code of honor, with honor defined as an extraordinary sensitivity to one' s reputacion. Nort hern moral· ists celebrated a rival idea- character- the quality that enabled an individual to be· ha\'e in steady fashion regardless of ho"'' ochers acted toward him or her. In t he honor culture of the O ld Sout h, hO\l'e\'et, l'VI.'.n the slightest insult, as long as it "''lls perceived as ince:ntional, could become the basis for a d uel. Formalized by French and British officers during the Re\ulucionary War, dueUng gained a secure: niche in che Old South as a means by which gentlemen dealt with af· fronts to chcir honor. Seemingly trivial incidents- a harmless brushing against t he side of someone at a public C'\"Cnt, a hostile glance- could trigger a d ud . Vee dueling did not necessarily lead co violence. Gend emen viewed dueling as a refined alterna·

The Code of Honor llld Duelng

IMiinc

Formoal man~n 6gtlt O'*Tr a matttr of honor

l llFEUM OERSlAVERY

267

tive to the: random violence oflowe:Hlass life. Instead of leaping at his antagonist's throat, a gendeman remained cool, settled on a weapon with his opponent, and agreed to a meeting place. In the: inmval, friends of the parties negotiated to d ear up che «misunderstanding" that had provoked the challenge:. Most confro ntations ended peaceably rather than on the: field of honor at dawn. But many ended violentl}'· Many southerners saw recourse co the: Ia"'' as a "''aY to settle personal disputes involving honor as ciWI'ardly and shameless. Andrew jackson's mother cold the fucure: president, ••The Ia"'' affords no remedy chat can satisf)' che feelings of a true man:'' Dueling reseed o n the assumption that gentlemen could recognize each other and kno"'' when to respond co a challenge. Nothing in the: code of honor compelled a person co dud with someone: who "''lls not a gentleman, for such a person's opin· ion hardly mattered. An insolent porter who insulted a gentleman mighe get a whip· ping but d id not merit a duel. Yct it was often difficult to determine "'tho "''lls a gentleman. Indeed, the: Old Souch teemed with .....-ould-be gentlemen.

With its emphasis on che personal redress of grie:..•ances and its inclination tO"''llrd violence, the ideal of honor conflicted "'ith the: values preached by the southern evangelical churches, notably the Baptists, Methodists, and l'rcsb)tterians. 11lese denominations stressed humility and self-restraint, vircues chac sharply contrasted with the culture of display chac buttressed the extravagance and \i olence of the Old South. So uthtrn politicJ bec.lme mo~ By che 1830s, ho"''CVCr, southern evangelicals had begun to change. d emocr.ltic. They no longer made an efforc to reach ouc co women, blacks, and the: Wh ite .southernen:, <'-\'en t hole who poor:; instead, women W'Cre now expected to remain silent in church, while: owne-d no ila''U., un ite-d in ' u p port of ila \'t-1)'. urban blacks increasingly formed chcir own churches. Both Methodists Ttwo ddenuo a( .:la\'C'-1)' ;u .l "positiv~ and Baptists began to atcracc the: v.~ll·to-do, a tendency chac increased good • comtrgc-d afte-r lSJO. with the opening of colleges such as Randolph-Macon and Wake Forest. Wh ite "~ndc-men" h.ld .ln cou_w-,.. More and more, southern gentr}' and evangelicals shared values, including uc-d Jenuo o f hQOQr, whic.h ofte-n kd a prick!)' regard for their honor and reputation. By che 1860s che South rodudJ. counted many gendem e:n like the Bible-quoting Prcsb)'terian general Souther n f'l,';mgdtcal, be'COlmc> ' up· Thomas J. "Stonewall" jackson, 6e:rce in a righteous "''ar but a sworn op· po1u n: of u :i,ting lptem.s., includ · ing'Ll'A"fr. ponent of strong drink, gambling. and d ueling.

Tbt Soutllern Evangelicals and Whitt Yalues

LIFE UNDER SLAVERY

I

1-/ow dul sltMtS 11nd fru blacks respond to their circumstances?

Slaver)~ che 1nsCIWrion at che root of the: code of honor and ocher d!Stmctt\~ feacures of the Old South, has long inspired comrovct'S)' among historians. Some ha..~ seen sta..~r}' as a benevolent insciwtion in "'thich African-Americans lived con· tented!)' under kindly masters; ochers, as a brutal S)'Stem chat drm~ slaves into con· stam rebellion. Neither view is accurate, but both contain a germ of truth. There W'Cre kind masters, and some slaves developed genuine affection for thcir o"''tlers. Yet

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OfAPlER 11

ThE OLD SOUTHA~O SlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

Blick Wome1 ind Mtn on a Trek Homt, SoUOI CaroliM Hel'\" A&ia.n·A.meria.n women lo:.ded down with cotton join thoeir men on the m:m:h home :.fter:. day in thC' fi elds. (CColleaioaofTht Ne•'fotlt Wimriu.l Secielf, ID tl!U.)

slaV\'.ry inhcrend)' oppressed its AfricanAmerican victims by forcibly appropriating cheir life and labor. EV\'.n kind masters exploited blacks in order to earn profits. And kindness 'A'llS a double-edged sword; che be:· ne\'olent master expocced grateful affection from his slaves and incerprcted chat affection as loyalty co slaw~ry itself. When northern croops descended on che plantations d uring che: Civil War, masters were genuinely surprised and d ismayed to 6nd man}' of chcir most crusted slaves deserting to Union lines. The kindness or cruelty of mascers ~A'llS important, but three other faccors primaril)' determined sla\-es' experience: the kind of agriculcure: in which they worked, ~A•hecher cht)' resided in rural or urban areas, and what century they lh-ed in. The experiences of slaves ~A'Orking on cotcon plantations in the: 1830s differed radically from chose of slaves in 1700, fo r reasons unrelated co the: kindness or brutality of masters. Slaver}' changed significantly between 1700 and 1830. In 1700 the typical slaV\'. was a man in his twenties, recend)' arrived from Africa or che Caribbean, who worked on an isolace:d small farm. Drawn from different regions of Africa,. few sla\>eS spoke the: same language. Because slave ships carried ru·ice as ntan}' men as women, and because slaves u.-ere ~Aidd)' scatcercd, blacks had difficul ties finding parcners and creat· ing a semblance of famil)' life:. Severe malnutrition sharp!)' limited the number of children slaV\'. women bore. Without contin uing importations, the number of sla\>eS in Norch America ~Ae declined between 1710 and 1730. In comrasc, by 1830 the: typical North American slave was as likely co be: female: as male, had been born in America, spoke English, and worked beside numerous ocher slaves on a plantation. The rise of plantation agriculture in the eighteenth century was at the hearc of the change. l'lantation slaves fou nd maces more casil)' than slaves on scattered farms. The ratio betVtem slaV\'. men and women feUinco balance, and marriage be:cwecn slaves on the same or nearby plantations increased. T he: nath-e-born slave population soared after 1750. l 'he importation of African sla...-es declined, and in 1808 Congress banned it.

The Malll'lnc of tile Pllntatloll SysiNI

In 1850 the typical sla't>e worked on a large farm or planta· tion with ac least ten ocher slaves. Almosc three-quarcers of P~on Slaves of all slaves belonged co masters ~Aith em or more slaves, and just over one-half lived in units of tvtenty or more slaves. Thus understanding the life of a typical sla\·e requires examining plantacion routines. O n smaller units, sla\>eS usually worked under the task S)'Stcm, a daily or ~Attkly quota of work. On large cotcon and sugar plancations, slaV\'.s ~A'Cre generally more: closely supeJVised and regulaced under che gang labor S)'Stem.

wart_. Discipline

l llFEUMOERSlAVEin'

269

An hour befon: sunrise, a hom or bell awakened the sla\'eS. After a sparse: breakfast, chey marched co the: fields. Slave men and women worked side by side in the fields. Those: female slaves who d id noc labor in the fi elds remained busy. A fo nner sla..-c, John Curry, described haw his mother milked CO'WS, cared for children whose mothers worked in che fields, cooked for field hands, ~A'llshed and ironed for her master's household, and looked after her own st\'en children. l'lantations nC'\o-cr lacked tasks for sla..-es of either gcnder, and in an}' season the slai,!'C'S da}' screeched from dawn to dusk. When darkness made field \N'Ork impossible, sla..-es toce:d cotton bales to che ginhouse, gathered wood for supper fires, and fed the mules. Weary from their labo~ they slept in log cabins on wooden planks. Although vircuall}' all ance:bellum Americans worked long hours, no ochers experienced the combination of long hours and harsh discipline that slave field hands endured. Nonhero factor}' ~A'Orkers did noc live in fear of dri..-ers ~A'lliking among them with a whip. Repulsiw brutality pe:n'llded American slavery. For example, pregnane sla\-e ~A'Omen ~A'Cre somecimes forced to lie in depressions in the: ground and endure whipping on their back~ a practice: chat supposed!}' protected the fecus while abusjng the mother. Masters often delegated discipline and punishment to white O\'ersecrs and black dri\-ers. 11le barbaric d iscipline meced ouc by others cwinged che conscience of many masters, but most justified it as their Christian duty to ensure: che sla..-es' proper «submissiveness:'' Despite the system•s brucali t}~ some slaves advanced- not to fr~dom buc to semiskilled or skilled indoor ~A'Ork. Some became blacksmiths, carpenters, or gin op· erators, and others se.-..-cd as cooks, butlers, and dining room attendants. These house slaves became legendat}' for their disdain of field hands and poor whites. Sla\'e artisans and house slai,!'CS general!}' enjo)'Cd higher sta· tus than the field hands.

Masters thought of slaves as naturally promiscuous and flattered chcmseh-es into thinking that chey alone held slai,!'C marriages cogcther. Masters had po~Awful ince:nti..-cs co encourage sla\-e marriages: bringing new sla\'eS into the world and discouraging sla..-es from running a~A'lly. james Henry Hammond, go\·ernor of South Carolina and a Large slaveholder, noted in his diary how he "flogged joe Goodwyn and ordered him co go back to his wife. Ditto Ga· briel and Molly and ordered them to come co~cher."' This picture ofbenevolent masters holding cogecher promiscuous slaves is misleading. Slavery itself posed the keenest challenge co slave: families. Conditions on small farms and new plantations d iscouraged the formation offamities, and cwn on farge plancaci on~ slaves W\'.re: often dispersed to different sites ~Aithouc an}' COn· sideration of marriage or family ties. Slave adults were far less likely than whites co mart}', and slai,!'C children

Tile Sllve Family

H. E. Hayward aod Sian Nontlooisa. 18JO Sb.\<etydid noc pn"Ytnt ....+lite chikln"cfl ;and thelr-sl;a\•t nui"Su from forming ;att01chments touch other.

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OfAPlER 11

ThE OLDSOUTHA~ OSlAVEilY, 18]o -186o

CHO IND.

Mop 11.2 lnteroal Slavt

ILL.

Tl'ildt. 1810-186«1 /VI i ntern~ s.l;al.'e u;ade devd~ o ped after the slo:M' tr;1de

....-ith Mriu ended in 1808. W ith the growth of coaon producOon, f.2rm~ in the Upper South fOund it profit· ;able to $dl their s.l;a\'C:S. to plo:.nters. in the ~r South.

..,..,, TERR.

""'"'

a

Sl:l\'0--t'ldng IOU»

c:::::J 811\
more likely to live wich a single parent or even with ncither parent. The: law proYided neicher recognition of nor protection for t he sla\'f: family. Masters reluccanc co break sla\'f: marriages by sale could neither bequeach t heir reluctance co hcirs nor a\'Oid economic hardship chat mighc force them to sell sla't'f:S. The reality, one: historian has calculated. was chat on average a slave would sec eleven famil)' members sold during his or her lifetime. Inevitably, che buying and selling of sla\'CS disrupted actempts co creace a stable: famil)' life. Poignanc testimony to the cffeccs of sale: on slave families appeared in ad· vcrtisements for runawa}' slaves. An 1851 Nort h Carolina acf..·erciscme:nt said that a parcicular fugiti\--e was probably «lurking in che neighborhood of E. 0 . Walker's, at Moore's Creek, who O'A'tlS mosc of his relatives, or Na than Bonham's who owns his moeher.: or perhaps, near Fletcher Bell's, at Long Creek, who owns his father." Small wonder that a sla\'e preacher pro nounced a couple: married «until death or dis.tttnct do )'OU part." Other factors disrupted sJa..-c marriages. The marriage of a sla..-c woman d id not protect her against che sexual demands of her master or, indeed, of any "''hitc. Sla\'f: children of white masters sometimes became targets for t he ~A'J'ath of white mis· tresses. Field work kept slave mothers from their children, who W\'.re cared for by t he: elderly or by the moehers of other children.

I LIFE UM OEilSIAVERY

271

Despite t hese eno rmous obsNc.lcJ, rcl nrion~hlp:c within sJ;w~ f:amilirs were often intimate and, where possible, long l.uling. Lacking leg.JI protection, sla..\!S devcloptd t heir own stand.ucb of f11.mity m or.Jllty. A sourhem white woman obstn'Cd chat sJ..t\'CS .,d1d not consider il wrong for n girl to h.n'C a child ~fon she married, but aftt:rWMds ·w~n extremely severe upon anything lila inliddicy on her part.'" Gh·m the opportumty. s.l..t\'I:J tolc:mnlud thdr m:ani.tgr:s bt(orc rmm.be:rs of tht- clergy. Wlutt dcrgymm who accompanird Union arm~ inro Mississippi :and marri:a~ rites for sbws Louisiana during the Civil \l:u conducted thOIJ.S,1,ndJ: who h..ad long vi...-'Cd thmudYcs u nurrifd and dcsltftl a fonn;aJ cnr:mony :and

or

rtgistrarion. On bol.ana, 54>< f.unolou chffi:rcd pn>bmdly rrom whirt f:unili<s. '""Y pl.tntus dMckd thftr holdmp 11\tO snW21 (;anns mel disrnburrd sbws among rbmt without ~ to nurnaar bcS. Condl:c10N on snulJ (.ums :and new pbna· dons discour.agtd tht fonna.t10n o( &mUla. SpoUia ~ :a~ vul:ntr.tbk ro ~

ingsokl Brood kinslup p.>ltcna-dot< r1<s lxcwftn duldrm .nd gnndpunus, aunts, md undcs. ;u wdlu p.umts- bad nu.tUd \1Qc Afrian culruru_ and thry Vi't:n" ~ inforttd by the scpu.U~on of duldrm and parents dur rourinr:ly occurttd under sf..twry. Fredaick Dougl.as.s ncYCr ~his (.uhcr and P¥' his morhc:r ratdy. but ht vividly rcmembr:red hu gr~mothc_r, In a.ddtdon. ib\U ol'rr:n creued • ficti\'t'"' kin nctvoorh, mmmg fncnds as th~lr uncb, aunts_ brofhcrs. or sisun.. In this way they hclpro. to protect thcmsc:lvcs.ag.a_uur the dlirupdon of f.1mily des J.nd r:srablished a bro.ader community of obhg.ation. W'hen pb.nrarion slli\U grttrcd each ocher u "brother," thq """" m.U.mg.a st.atcmcnt noc aboutl1Cn1.11kinship, bur about oblig;a-

Primaly Sou
rions to each other.

on Famiy Ties

:=

Of the 10 mlllaon ro 12 million Africans imported ro rhe New Worid bcN'Ccn rhc fifrccnrh and nineteenth cenru· ves ries, Norrh Amc..-lca rcech'Cd on I)• 550,000 of them {about 5 percent), whereas IJr.ual attcM:d 3.5 million {nc:uty 33 pcrccm). Ycr by 1825, 36 percent of all s l:t\'CS in the Western l lembphcrc 11-wd In the United St.ares, and o nly 31 percent in Urazil. The: l'c:IUOU thb difference h rh.ar sla\ll.'"S in t he United St.ares reproduced faster and lh•cd longer th~n t ho:ce In nra:dl and ci$Cwhere in the Western Hemisphere. SewraJ factors account for U.S. alawa' longcr 11-w!C a nd hightr rates of reproduction. f irst:, with t he ~ndca· r.uio am ong .sla..u cqualb;ing moat rapidly in Nonh Am erica, s i.J.\'l'S t here married earlaer and had more chlldrtn. Second, because raising com and li\'c-srock was com p1.t1ble whh growing conon, t he Old South produced plentiful food. SlaV\".5 gt"-nrr.aUy recc.i~ a peck ofcornmeal :and three to (our pounds of fatty pock a \\'Cek, whkh chey often supplcm.:ntcd wl1h w-gtt:ablu grown on sm:atl ploc:s and ""ith e.tdish and g;amc. Slans enjoytd grc;~tc:r immunacy from malarl.a and ytllow ra~r dun whirrs but suffcrul mort from chol~ dysentery, :md dl.t.rrhc~ L:ac.king priviu, sl:t\n usually rd.ico.~d rhcmschn bflund bushc:s: c:onscqumcty, urine and (n:rs conr.tminl.tcd tht: sources of their drinkmg w;akf, Sb\'1: mnccha for J«)rrw:h :ailmr:nr.s, although com· monty ridiculed by wfUt~ often •'Orkm. For cump&c-. slaves !Itt whi~ d..ty ro curt

Helllll.

n.w

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CHAPtER 11

ThE OLDSOUTHA~ OSlAVERY, 18]o-186o

dysenter}' and diarrhea.. We: now know that white cia}' contains kaolin, a remedy for these disorders. Noneche:lcss, slaves suffered a higher mortality rate than "'thitcs. The ver}' )'OUng suffered mosc; infant mortality among slaV\'.s was double: that among whites, and one in three: African-American children died before age: em . Plantations in the: disease--ridden lowlands had the: worse O\'erall morcality race:~ but 0\I'Crworked field hands often miscarried or bore "''Cakene:d inF.tms e\'l'fl in healthier arc-as.

Greater freedom from supe:C\ision and greater opportuni·

Slaves off Plantations tics awaited slaves "'tho worked off plantations in towns and cities. Most southern whites succumbed to the: lure of cotton and established small farms; the resulting shortage: of white: labor created a stead}' d emand for slaves outside the plancacion economy. Driving wagons, wo rking as stC'\o-e:dores on the: docks, manning ri\'er barges, and coiling in mining and lumbering gave sla\'t:S an o pportunity to work somewhere- other chan che cocton fields. O ther African-Americans served as engin eers for sawmills or artisans fo r iro nworks. African-American "''Omen and children conscirutcd the main labor force: for the: Souch's fledgling textile: industry. The: draining of potencial white laborers from southern cities also provided op · portunicy for slaves to become: skilled arcisans. Slaw: or free, blacks found it easier co pu rsue skilled occupations in souchern cities than in northern ones, where immi· granc laborers competed wich blacks fur work. Despite slaver)"S stranglehold, urban African-Americans in the: Souch enjo)'ed opporrunities denied chcir counterparts in the: North. Generally, sla\'t:S "'tho wo rked in factories, mining. or lumbering were hired out by their masters rather chan 0'1'-'ned by t heir employers. If \N'Orking conditions for hired-out slaves deteriorated badly, masters would refuse: to prO\ide employers wit h more sla\'t:S. Conscquendy, wo rking conditions for sla\'t:S off the: plantation generally Sta)'cd at a colerable leveL

Free blacks were likelier than souche:m blacks in general to live in dries. In 1860 one-third of che free blacks in the: Upper South and more than half in the LO'I'-oer Souch were: utban. Urban spe:dalizacion aUawed free blacks che chance to become carpenters, coo· pers (barrel makers), barbers, and sma ll crade:rs. Most of the meat, fish, and produce in an antebellum southern martec "''lls prepared for sale b}• free blacks. Urban free blacks formed their o"''ll fraternal orders and churches; in New Orleans free blacks also had chcir own o pera and lite:rar)' jou rnals. In Natchez, a free black barber, Wil· liam 111er johnson, invested che profits of his shop in real estate, rented it out, bought slaves and a plamacion, and hired a white O\'ct'SCer. Despite su ch successes, free blacks u.-e:rc- vulnerable: in southern society. They continued to increase in absolute: n umbers (a little more than 250,000 free: people of color lived in the So uth in 1860), but the rate of growth of t he free black population slo"''Cd radically after 18 10. FC\I.oer masters freed chcir sla't't:S after that cime, and fol· lowing lhe Nat 1hrner rebellion in 1831, staces legally restricted che liberties of free

Lie •lbt Margin: Fne lllacb In lbt Old 5GIIIb

I liFE UM OER SlAVERY

273

blacks. By the mid- J830s most southern scares made it a felony to teach blacks to read and write. E"-ery southern state forbade free blacks co enter, and in 1859, Al'kan· sas ordered aU free blacks co leaw~. Although a free-black culture flourished in certain cities, that culture did not re-fl ect the conditions under ~Ailich che majority of blacks liw~d. Most free blacks dwelled in rural areas, ~Ailere ~Athites lumped them together ~Aith slaV\'S, and a m uch higher percentage of blacks were free in the Upper Souch t han in the Lower Souch. Many free blacks were mulattos, the produce of white masters and black women, and looked dO'I'-'n on "darty" field hands and laborers. Buc as discrimination against free people of color intensified during the late antebellum period. many free: blacks realized that whacew~r future they had was as blacks, not whites. Fed ings of racial solidarity increased during che 1850s, and after the Civil War, che leaders of the exslaves were us ual!)' blacks who had been free before the war.

Fear of slave ins urrection haunted the O ld Souch. In lowland and delta plantation areas slaves oft en o utnumbered whites. In t he cities, free: blacks could haw provided leadership for rebellions. Rumors of s lave- conspirades fl ew within the southern white co mmunity, and all whites knew of che massive black revolt that had descrored French rule in Saint Domingue. But Nat Turner's n..--volt remained the o nly slai,!'C rebellion that actually resulted in ......tlite deaths. Most sla\~t rebellions were conspiracies that never materialized For example, in 1800 a Virginia slave named Gabriel Prosser plotred an uprising but was be· crayi:d by ocher slaves and executed. In 1821 Denmark Ve.sey(VEE·S«) and his followi:rs planned co attack Charleston. South Carolina. and seize che citfs arms and ammuni· cion. but other slaw:s informed che a uthorities, and the conspirators ~A'C:re executed. Several factors explain t his apparent tranquility. First, although s laves formed a majority in Sout h Carolina and a few other areas, t hey did noc co nstitute a large ma· jority in any state. Second, unlike Caribbean slave O~A'tlers, most sout hern masters lived on their plantations; they possessed armed force and ~A'Cre ~Ailling co use iL Third, famil)" des among U.S. slai,!'CS made them rduccanc to ris k death and thereby co orphan their children. f inal!)', sla\'es ~Ailo ran awa}'Or plotted rebellion had no al· lies. Southern Indians routinely captured runaway s la\'es and claimed rewards for them.: some Indians even owned slaves. Unable co rebel. manr slai,!'CS tried to escape co freedom in the Nonh. Some light mulattos who passed as whites succeeded. More often , sla\"CS borro\1/Cd, stole, or forged passes from plantations or obtained papers describing them as free. Frederk k Douglass borrO'I'--ed a sailor's papers co mah his escape from Baltimore co New York City. Some fonner slaves, induding Harri« Tubman and josiah Henson, returned co che South to help ochers escape. Despite legends of an "-underground rail· road" of abolitionists helping slaves to freedom, fugitiw slaves o\l.l'td litd e to abolitionists. The "safe houses" of white sympathizers in border scaces were better knO'I'-·n to sla\'f: catchers chan to runawa)'S. Escape to freedom was a dream rather than a realistic altemati\'e fo r mosc blacks. Out of millions of s laves, probably fe\1/Cr chan a thousand accuall)' escaped to t he Norch. Slaves who did run awa}' often were seeking. not freedom, but the chance to

SIIve Resistance

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CkAPtER 11

ThE OlD SOUTH AHO SlAVERY, 18)o-186o

visit spouses or escape punishment; most rcrnained in che Sout h. D ur ing che cigh· teenth century, African slaves had often run awa}' in groups and tried to create che sort of villages they had known in Africa. But the American acquisition of Florida deprived potential runaways of their major haven, leaving them few uninhabited places co ~Ailich they could flee. Despite poor prospects for pmnanent escape, slaves could disappear fur prolonged periods into the i"ree·black communities ofsouthern cities. Slaves enjoyed a fair degree of pracrical freedom to dri..e wagons to market and to come and go when they u.ere off plantations. Slaves sent to a city might 0\'\'.rs.tay their lea\'e and pass them.setves offas free. 11lis kind of praccical ~dom did not change sla\'er)"S underlying oppressiveness, but it did gr.-e slaves a sense of ha...i ng certain Pl.:mtuion lld d hand' o rto:n bbo nod righ~ and it helped to channel sla\-e re:Ustance into activities thac "-ere furcivc undtr b rutal condit ions, whtrea:r. and relatively harmless, rather chan open and violenc. Theft, for example, was ..hou,u, :r.l:t\'6.. Cu ed bettt.r. so common that planters kepc tool~ smokehouses, and closets under lock and Nuclt-ar .da'-e ramiliel wn~ pc~ key. O ;erworked field hands might leon-e cools out to rust, feign illn~ or sjm. cu iou!S, bu t tht :r.~ cultuno o r t.nt.nded r.Jmiliu off#t fh is to ply refuse to ~A'Ork. Sla...-es could not be fired for such malingering or negli· SOme' t'Xt<:nt. genre. And Frederick Law Olmsted even found masters afraid to punish a slave Although sla\'t.' in fht United Sta tt.J "lese [he or she] should abscond, or take a sulky fie and not work, or poison gentullr liw d longtr fh:tn :r.Ll'lt':r. some of the family, or sec fire to che dwclling." Indeed, not all furtive resistance t.l.it.wht.no in tbt Wt.:r.f~m Hemi· was harmless. Arson and poisoning, both common forms of \-engeance in Af· .spht-no, th~ mortollicy r.Jt~ of.da'-e ch ildren u nder th~ :1.8," or t~n w.u rican culture, flourished in che Old South. So did fear. Masters alllicted by 35 pen-tnt. d)'Sentcry ne"o-er knew for sure chat they had not been poisoned free blad:J had opportunihu but Arson, poisoning, t heft, work sroppage, and negligence acted as alterna· al:r.o ~ed :r.titling re:r.u1ctionJ. th·es to \i olent rebellion, but their goal was not freedom. Their object was Although tbt Nat Turnt.r rt.bdlion mere!)' co make sla\-ery bearable. Most slai,!'CS ~A'Ou ld have preferred freedom w;u a not.Jblt. txception, :r.law rt.Ji!S· but seeded for less. «White folks do as chey please," an ex-slave said, "a nd che toln« gentrallr w;u subdt., rurt:ive, and widnpread. darkies do as cheycan."

T H E E MERG ENCE OF AFRICAN -AMERICAN CULTURE WMt WMt the distinctive {<ures oftiNt culture Mat developed among sla~s?

Enslaved blacks combined elements of African and Am erican cultures to create a distincth-e culcure of their O~A'll, giving a distincth-e twisc to bo(h the African and American components of slai,!'C culcure.

Before sla\'es could de"o>elop a common cuicure, they needed a common language. During che colonial period, African· born slaves, speaking a variety of languages, had de\-el· oped a '"pidgin,. (PIO-jin}-that is, a language t hat has no native speakers but in which people ~Aith different native languages can communicate. Man)' African-born sla\'es spoke English pidgin poorl)', but their American·born descendants used it as their primary language. Like all pidgins, English pidgin was a simplified language. Slaves often dropped the \'crb to bt ('Ailich had no equh•alem in African tongues) and ignored or confused

The Llnguge of Slaves

I

·~ Common languagt spokrn by diaYl'.S wbo Jpokt many diffionont tonguc'5

genders. Instead of saying «Mary is in che cabin;'' t hey typically said, «Mary, he in cabin:'' 1'hey subscitutcd M for not~ as in "He: no "'i ckcd." Some African "''Ords, among them IMnjo, mm-ed from pidgin to standard English, and ochers, such as goobtr ("peanut'"), entered sout hern "'flite slang. Although many "'flites ridiculed pidgin and black house: servants scruggle:d to speak standard English, pidgin prow~d indis· pensable: for communication among slaves.

Rdigion play~d an equally imporcanc role: in forging an African-American culcure. Africa contained rich and di\ 'e tse religious cusco ms and beliefs. Despite che presence of a few Muslims and Chris tians in the: early sla\'e population, most of che slaves bro ughc from Africa follo"''Cd o ne: of many native African religions. Most of rhese: religions drew little distinction be:cwcen che spirirual and nacural worlds - sconns, ill· nesses, and earthquakes were: aU assu med to stem from supernatural forces. Ho"''CVCr, African religions did not unify American slaves. African religions dif· fered gread)', and the majority of sta...cs in the: colonial period ....-ere young men "'flo had not absorbed this religious hericage. Remnants of African religion remained, however, in part because, before the: 1790s, "'flites made few actempts to com-en sla\'CS to Christianity. E\•angelical Chris tianity, like: African religions, drew few dis· t inctions betWeen the sacred and che worldly. just as Africans beliC\-ed thac droughts and plagues resulted from supernatural forces, revivalists knew in chcir heart that every drun kard who fell off his horse: and ewry Sabbach breaker scruck by lighming had experienced a deliberate, dirocc punishment from God. By the 1790s African-Americans formed about onMluarter of the membership ofche Methodist and Bapcis t denominations. l 'he f.tct that com-ertcd s la ..·es plat-ed significant roles in t he South's rhrec sta...c rebellions reinforced "'flites' fears that a Christian sla'/C would be a rebellious sla\'e. These sla\'e uprisings, esptdall)' che Nat Turner rebellion, spurred l'rotestant missionaries co intensify their efforts among sta ..-es. 1 'hey pointed co the self-caught 1Urner as proof that s laves could learn about Christianity and claimed t hat only organized efforts ac com-ersion "''Ould ensure thac the sla\'es were taught correct '/ersions of C hriscianity. Chris tian blacks' experience in the: Old South illustrates che concradiccions of life under sla\"Cr}'· Urban blacks oft en had chcir own churches, but rural blacks and sla'/es "''Orshipped in che same churches as whites. Alchough African-Americans sat in segregated sections, they heard the same scni ce as "'flitcs.. Churches be
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276

CHAPtER 11

ThE OLDSOUTHA~ OSlAVERY, 18]o -186o

Primary Source: Henson Recalls Broken Families and Personal Opponunity

masters or minis ters, African-American preachers repeat ed the familiar biblical command «obe)')'OUr master."' Often, hO'I'-"f.'\~r. s laves met for services apart from whites, and chen che message changed. Some slaves privatd)' interpret ed C hris tianity as a religion of liberation, but most recognized t hat their prospects for freedom were: s lighc. Generally, Christianity neicher curned blacks inco rC\'Oiutionaries nor made them model slaves. It did, ho~A'CW.r, provide slaves with a view of slaver)' different from their masters' outlook. Masters argued that s lavery was a benign and d ivinely ordained inscirution, but Chris tianity told slaves chac che institution was an affliction, a terrible and unjust S)'Stem chac God had allowed in order to test chcir faich. For having endured sla\·ery, he wo uld reward slaves. For having created ic, he would punish masters.

African-American culru.re expressed blacks' feelings. long after white ricuals had grown sober and sedate, che con· gregation in African-American religious services shouted "Amen" and let their body movements reflect t heir f«lings. Sla\~S also expressed their emotions in music and dance. Souchern law forbade t hem co own "drums, horns, or ocher loud instruments, ~Ath ich rna)' call together or giiJ'C sign or notice co one anocher ofchcir wicked designs and intentions."' Instead, sla\·es made rhythmic clapping, called "patting juba" QOO-buh), an indispensable accom paniment co dancing. Slaw:s also played an African inscrument, che banjo, and beac tin buckets as substit utes for drums. S lave music was tied to bodil)' mowmem; slaves expressed themselves in a dance chac 'A'llS African in origin, emphasizing shuffling steps and .,;.w """ m;g;~ '""" tbat sm'U~ed libentioo from bodii)'COntortions rather than quick footwork and erecc backs as in whites' dances. diffirult situarionJ Whecher at ~A'Ork or prarcr, sla\J'Cs liked to sing. Work songs usually con· s is ted of a leadcr"s chant and a choral response. Masters encouraged su ch CHECKI NG I N songs, believing that singing induced sla\J'Cs co v.'Ork harder and thac t he innocent content of work songs proved t hat slaves were happy. H O\l~\~r. SU""' d e~o..-l oped " pidgin"' .u ;:.w~ Frederick Douglass, recalling his own past, observed that «slaves sing most ofcommuni~ni ng. when they are most unhappy. The songs of che sla\·e represent t he sorrows After 1800 mwt sJ.a.,~ 1.\-\"ft of his heart; and he is relieved by t hem, only as an aching heart is rdie\·ed Ch riJti.m. by its tears."' M.utc-r~ tried ro usc- Ch .Uti.mit)' to encour;:.ge $Ub¢niu:iv~_nc-u., but Blacks also sang religious songs, later known as spirituals, ~A•hich re· sJa\'e$ SJW it as a faith th.n promiMd fl ected the PO\l~rful emphasis that s lave religion placed on deliverance from rtwar&.: for the-m ;:.ncl puniJh ment earchly travails. Whites took a d im vietA' of spirituals and cried to make sla't~S for tbti r I'I'UJttn. s ing «good psalms and hymns" instead of«che cxtr:waganc and nonsensical SU'It' muJi ~ ;md d anct inrorpor.attd chams, and catches, and hallelujah songs ofchcir 0\l'n composing."' Buc enmany African dc-mmt:l. s laved blacks dung co their spirit uals, dra~A'ing hope fro m t hem rhat ..we will Sptriwals rdl « ttd tbt Jl~·u· W ire for dtJi,..-r.an«-. soon be free, ~Ailen t he Lord will call us home," as one spiritual pro mised.

l

Chapter Su {ff)

0 0\Y'NLOAO THE MPJ AUDI O R LE OF THE CHAPTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LIST'ENTOITONTHEGO.

I

KEY TERMS

How did the rise o{rotton cultiWJtion affect the South? (pafj! 2S6)

By the 1830s cotton production dominated the South, and southerners spoke proudly of.. King Cotton... Although it brought great prosperity, the cot· con economy also s)O\Ir\_"CC down che dcvrlopmcnt of industry and education. And it made slavery seem mon: vital than 1!\'et.

Nat Turner (p. 255) kilg Cotron {p. 257) plillllation (p. 258) yroman {p. 262) positive good (p. 265} duelilg (p. 266} "pidgin" (p. 274} spiritual (p. 276)

What major social divisions segmented the white South? (page 260)

I

Geography and economics dh•idcd \l•hite southcmm into tOur distinct groups: plantation 0\l'Orts, small slaw O\l'tltts, yeomen, and che people of the pine barrens. Yeomen, the latgcst group, generally O\lll ed no slaves, nor did the people of the pine barrens.

I

How did sla•""Y affect social relations in the South? (page 263)

Whites, although divided politically, \l~re united in defense ofslavery, 'olthich gaVl' all whites an automatically supcdor positiorL lhC)' defended slavery as a "positi\'e good,.. and southern churches became supporters and defenders of sla\-ery as well

How did sla1'tS and free blacks respond to their circumstances? (page267)

I

Field hands labored under harsh conditions. Nuclear f.tmilies ~-ere always threatened, but the f!lldition of utendcd f.tmilies sonlC"''hat offset this. Free blacks faced a life bounded by sevrrc restrictions. Rebellion ag.tinst sla~wy, despite the spectaculat example of Nat Turner, was usually subtle, emerging in the form of pretended ill n~ cactlcssncss, or feigned stupidity.

Whot were the distinctive features ofthe cultJJre that de1~/oped among sl01<es? (pafJ! 274)

I

Whites tried to usc Christianity to preach submission and obedience, but slaw:s saw it as a faith of hope and liberation. Slaw music and dance frequently incotporntcd African elements, and spirituals expressed the sla\<e desire tOr delivrrancc.

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

Chapter Su {ff)

0 0\Y'NLOAO THE MPJ AUDI O R LE OF THE CHAPTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LIST'ENTOITONTHEGO.

I

KEY TERMS

How did the rise o{rotton cultiWJtion affect the South? (pafj! 2S6)

By the 1830s cotton production dominated the South, and southerners spoke proudly of.. King Cotton... Although it brought great prosperity, the cot· con economy also s)O\Ir\_"CC down che dcvrlopmcnt of industry and education. And it made slavery seem mon: vital than 1!\'et.

Nat Turner (p. 255) kilg Cotron {p. 257) plillllation (p. 258) yroman {p. 262) positive good (p. 265} duelilg (p. 266} "pidgin" (p. 274} spiritual (p. 276)

What major social divisions segmented the white South? (page 260)

I

Geography and economics dh•idcd \l•hite southcmm into tOur distinct groups: plantation 0\l'Orts, small slaw O\l'tltts, yeomen, and che people of the pine barrens. Yeomen, the latgcst group, generally O\lll ed no slaves, nor did the people of the pine barrens.

I

How did sla•""Y affect social relations in the South? (page 263)

Whites, although divided politically, \l~re united in defense ofslavery, 'olthich gaVl' all whites an automatically supcdor positiorL lhC)' defended slavery as a "positi\'e good,.. and southern churches became supporters and defenders of sla\-ery as well

How did sla1'tS and free blacks respond to their circumstances? (page267)

I

Field hands labored under harsh conditions. Nuclear f.tmilies ~-ere always threatened, but the f!lldition of utendcd f.tmilies sonlC"''hat offset this. Free blacks faced a life bounded by sevrrc restrictions. Rebellion ag.tinst sla~wy, despite the spectaculat example of Nat Turner, was usually subtle, emerging in the form of pretended ill n~ cactlcssncss, or feigned stupidity.

Whot were the distinctive features ofthe cultJJre that de1~/oped among sl01<es? (pafJ! 274)

I

Whites tried to usc Christianity to preach submission and obedience, but slaw:s saw it as a faith of hope and liberation. Slaw music and dance frequently incotporntcd African elements, and spirituals expressed the sla\<e desire tOr delivrrancc.

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I NrwcOMERSA~o NAnVES

279

Expansion and immigration were linked. Most immigrants gravitated to the ardently expansionist Democratic party. In curn, Democrats concluded char more expansion was the solution co widening sectional and echoic conflict. By bringing more: land inco cultivation, they believed, America could recapture: its j e-ffersonian ideal as a nation of self-sufficient fanners. And expansion would offer something for cvcr)'one: Oregon would gracify che North; 1t:xas, che Souch; and California, every region. lc didn' t ~A'Ork ouc chat wa}'· In face, expansion heated sectional antagonis ms to the boiling point, split the Dem ocratic party along se:ccionallines,and sec che nation on the path co che Civil War.

NEWCOMERS AND NATIVES 1-/owdid tiNt massiw immigrtsrion oftM 1840s influence rile balance o(JXIW6r betwun Whigs and Democrats? Be-tv.r'C'e:n 1815 and 1860, S million European immigrants reached the Unice:d States. Of these, 4.2 million arrived be-tv.r'Ccn 1840 and 1860, and 3 million crO'I'--de:d in from 1845 to 1854 alone, the: largest immigration relative to population in U.S. history. The Irish and the Germans dominated this wa\'e: of newcomers; by 1860 three-fourths of forcign-born Americans ~A'ere Irish or German.

lnteracti\•e Map: Origin and Settlement of Immigrants. 1820-1850

Alchough a desire: for religious fr~dom drew some: immi· grants to U.S. shores, hopes ofeconomic betterment lured the majority. Trawlers' accounts and relatives' letters assured Europeans that America 'A'as an ideal world, a utopia. Yet, typically, immi· grants faced hard times. Their problems began at European pons, where hucksters hawked worthless tickets and ships scheduled co lea\J'C in june might not sail until August. Coundcss immigrants spent chcir pr«ious savings in ware-rfronc slums awaiting departure. The ocean \'O)>age itself could be ce:rrifying. Mosc immigrants sailed on cargo ships as steerage passengers, crowded inco quarters as cramped as slave ships for six weeks or more. For many, the: greatest shock came after Landing. In t he: depression years of the 1840s, immigrants quickly discovered that farming in America was a perilous pros· pect, radically different from ~Athat chey had knO'I'-·n in Europe. Unlike: the compact farming communities of Europe, American agricultural areas featured scattered farms, and Americans' individualism led t hem to speculate: in land and co mm-c frequently. Clear patterns emerged amid che s hocks and dislocations of immigration. For example, most Irish immigrants lacked the: capital co purchase land and consequently CJ'O'A'ded into urban areas of New England, New York, Nt~A' jersey, and l'r:nn· sylvania, where they could 6nd jobs. German immigrants often arrh-e:d at souchern ports, but slaver)', climate, and lack of economic opportunity gradually drove them norch to se:ctle in Illinois, O hio, Wisconsin, and Missouri.

Elplddons and llllllles

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OfAPlER I]

IMMIGRATION, f Xl'AHSION, AN OSEcnOIUL COKIUCT, 18
Cities, racher than farms, actracced most antebellum immigrants; by 1860 Ger· man and Irish newcomers constituted half or more of the population of Sc. Louis, New York, Chicago, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Detroit, and San Frandsco. These fast· growing cities needed people ~Aith strong backs ~Ailo were willing to work for low wages. In addition to jobs, cities proYided immigrants with the community life lacking in farming areas.

In 1860 chere ~A'llS no German nation-state, only a collection of principalities and kingdoms. Immigrants from this area thought of themselves as Bavarians, Westphalian~ or Saxons, not Gennans. German immigrants spanned a ~Aide spectrum of class and occupation. Most were farmers, but professionals, artisan~ and tradespeople made up a sizable minor· ity. For cxample,LA:vi Strauss, a j ewish tailor from Ba\'aria, reached che United States in 1847. When gold ~A'llS discovered in California the ncxc rear, Scrauss gathered rolls of doth and sailed for San Francisco. There he fashioned tough work ow~ralls from canvas. Demand soared, and Strauss opened a factory to produce his cheap O'leralls, later knM'"n as blue jeans or Levi's. A common language transcended the differences among German immigrants and bound chem together. They clustered in the same neighborhoods, formed chcir O'A'tl militia and fire compani~ and established German-language parochial schools and newspapers. l 'he diversity of the German--speaking population further fos. tercd solidarity. Because Germans supplied their 0\l.'n lawyers, docco~ teachers, and

'llle eer.RS

fiprt 11.1

c.rm.o.

400

1810-1160

350

369,980

Iris~. alld Toul lmmigratiot~,.

his!\ ;and Cerm;an i:mrni· gr~ts led

the mol\': th:~n

ten fol.d gi"''Wth o flmrni· gr~tion becween 1830 :~nd SC11.1'0e· U.S.~uf lhe

1860.

c.:.r-. u.wm s~ o1~ IJ.o;Ued S!rlftt Co.br.id r.-.s:c

mo.

8i!l:tormnirll Icllion1(\'lnbirc'JOn. D.C,.lm.,)

I I

Other immigrams

•2 e

""'

r

"'~ j ,_

250

200

Total

164,004

150

153,640

Tolal

100

84,066 48,637

Irish immigrants 50

Total

78....

23,322 2,721

German immigranl&o 0

1830

54,491

29,704

£:1,978 1840

1850

1860

I NrwcOMERSA~o NAnVES

281

Stephen F. Al.l5tin foonds the fi'st American community i1 Texas Molico doses T..., ID ltr1her American invnigralioo Santa Anna irwades Texas Texas declares its independence from Mexico; Fal of the Alamo; Goliad massacre; Battle of San ladnto William Herry Harrison eiKted president Harrison dies; John Tyler becomes president Websler-Ashburton Treal'( James It l'olk eleded president Congress votes byjoim. resolution to annex Texas; MeOco rejects Slidell mission The Unhed Stlles dedares war on Ml!lico; Jol1n C. Fromont proclaims lhe Bear A~ REil<Jbli: il Caifomia; Congn>Ss votes ID accept a sl!lllemert of lhe OJegon boundary issue wilh Briail; Tariff of 1846; Colonel Slephen Kearny ocrupios Si!flla F<; Wilmot l'f<Mso illroduced; Taylor lakes Monte•ey Taylor defeals Sarto Anna at lhe Bailie of Buena Yisfa; ll!ra Cruz fals 10 Winfield S
merchants fro m their midst, they had no n«:d to go outside rheir neighborhoods. Native-born Americans simultaneously admired German industriousness and re· semed ~nnan sclf·suffi ciency, which they interprered as clannishness. In a vicious cycle, the Germans responded by beco ming e-.>ccn more dannislt. In e-ffect, they iso· lated the-msdve-s from gaining the political influence- chat Irish immigrants acquired.

The-re "''e re thr«: wa\'eS of Irish immigration. Berween 1815 and che- mid·1820s, most Irish immigrants ~A'Cre Protesranrs, small landowners, and tradespeople-drawn by enthusiastic veterans ofrhe War of 1812 who reported that America 'A'llS a paradise where- .,all a man neede-d 'A'as a gun and sufficient ammunition to be able- to live like a prince." From the mid·l820s to the mid·1840s, Irish immigration became boch more: Catholic and poorer, co mprising primarily tenant farmers evicted by Protes· cane landlords as "superfluous." Rich or poor, Protestant or Catholic, nearly a mil· lion Irish crosse-d the Aclanric to the Unite-d States be-tv.r'Cen 1815 and 1845. Then, betWeen 1845 and che e-arly 1850s the character of Irish immigration change-d dramacically. In Ireland, blight destroyed harvest after harvest of potatoes, vircuall)' the: onl)' food of che- peasantry, and triggered one- of che- mosr gruesome famines in history. The- Great Famine killed a million people. 11lose who survh·e-d. a landlord ~A'fote. ~A'Cre ..famished and ghastly skd e:ro ns." 10 e-scape- suffering and de-ath, 1.8 million Irish emigrated to the Unite-d States in che- decade- after 1845. Ovcr~Aildmingty poor and Catholic, these ne:wesr Irish immigrants entered the work force- at the: bottom. While Irish me-n dug strcers and canals and railroads, Irish

l'llllrtsb

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282

OfAPlER I]

IMMIGRATION, f Xl'AHSION. AN OSEcnOIUL COKIUCT, 18
women worked as maids and tcxcile: ~A
Hostility toward Irish immigrants often took che funn of anri·Catholidsm , a lacent impulse among American Prot· Nlllvi-.IM estancs since early Puritan da)'S. 11le: surge of Irish immi· Labor Pnllesl grancs in the second quarcer of the: nine:ceench centur}' revived anti·Catholic fever. A groundswell of anti-Catholic publications climaxed with Maria Monk's best·sdling Awfol Disdosurtfoj'the HOll!l Dii!U Numwry in MotUrta~ which vividly described wild sexual relations betv.r'ee:n nuns and priests. Although she: claimed to be: a fo nne:r nun, Maria Monk ~A'llS accually a former prostitute. The surge of Catholic immigration in the 1840s also had political ramifications fueled by nativism. Protestants formed anti·immigrant societies wich names like the American Republicans and the: United O rder of Americans. One such secret so· dery, the Order ofche Star·Spangled Banner, would become: the: .. Know·Nothing,"' or Amrrican, patt)',a major political force in the 1850s. In the 1840s, nativist parcie:s prospered during tlare· ups 0\'ct local issues, such as whe:chrr the: l'rotescant or Cath· olic version ofche Bible should be used in predominantly Catholic schools. In 1844, for example, the "Bible: Riots" in Philadelphia, spurred on by the d e:croral su ccess of American Republican party candidates, led w lhe deaths of sixteen people and the: destruction of thirty buildings at the hands of Protestant mobs. An explosive mixru.re of fears and discontcncs fu eled nativism. Protestants ~nerall)' sa~A' their doccrin~ such as che responsibility of each individual w inter· prct Scripture, as far more democratic than Catholicism, which made docltine the: province of che pope and the hierarchy. Nati't-e·born arcisans and journe)'men, alrcad)' hard pressed by the subdivision of tasks and the aftermath of the Panic of 1837, feared chac desperately poor Catholic immigrants represented a threat co their jobs. Many Irish immigrants, refugees from an agricultural society, belic...-ed that che)' could gain more through unions and strikes than chrough farming. E't-en women workers organized unions in these years; the le:adcr of a seamstresses' union pro· claimed. "1bo long ha't-e "~been bound do~A'tl b)•tyrant emplorcrs." l'robably the: most important development fur ~A
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Ethnic and religious tensions also split the antebellum "''Orking dassduring the 1830s and 1840s. f riction bctv.~en nati\'f:·born and immigrant workers inevimbl)'

became intertWined wich the policical d ivisions of the second party S}'Stem.

Few immigrants had voced before reaching America, and even fe"''Cr had fled political pcrsccution. Political uphea\'· als had erupted in Austria and some German states in the turbulent year of 1848, but among the I million German immigrants to the United States, only 10,000 "''Cre policical refugees, or "Forcy-Eighters." Once seed ed in the United States, hC>'~'-'e\'f:r, many immigrants became policically acth-e. 1'heydiscovcred thac urban political organizations could help them find housing and jobs- in return for votes. Both the Irish and che Germans identified O\'erwhdmingly with the Democratic party. By 1820 the Irish controlled Tammany Hall, the New York City Democratic organizationj. Germans became staunch Democrats in Milwaukee, Sc. Louis, and ocher cities. Immigrants' fears about jobs partly explained their widespread Democratic sup· pore. Former president Andrew Jackson had gii,!'Cn the Democratic party an antipri\•· ilege, antiaristocratic coloracion, making the Democrats seem more sympathetic than the Whigs to che common people. In addition, antisla.,~ry was linked to the Whig party, and the Irish loathed abolitionism because they feared that freed slaves would become their economic competitors. Moreover, the Whigs' moral and religious values seem ed to threaten those of che Irish and Germans. Heany~rinking Irish and German immigrants shunned cemperance-crusading Whigs, many of whom "'~re also rabid anti-Catholics. EI,!'Cn public-school reform, championed by the Whigs, was perccived as a menace to the Catholicism of Irish children and as a chreac to che integrity of Gmnan language and cuicure. The Bible Riots illustrate boch the interplay of nacivism, religion, and politics, and the wa}' in "'ilich local issues shaped the immigrants' political loyalties. Boch Democrats and Whigs became adept at atcraccing \'Oters initial!)' dra"''tl to politics by su ch local issues as liquor regulations and school laws. Nativists usually \'Oted for Whig candidates rather chan chose of m~rcly nativist parties, whereas im migrants foUO'I'-·ed the Democratic parcyfrom local battles inco national politics. The Democratic party schooled immigrants in broad national prin· u top4an dn"a.nu.. cipals: vcnerace George Washington, rl!\-ere Thomas Jefferson and Andrew German immigrant,: tC"-ndtd ro Jackson, and see «monied capitalists"' as par.ujtes who \l'OUld tremble when clu.~tu tophu, cutt ing off their the people spoke. By identifying chcir party "'ich all thac chey thought best ao.:Ul to polit icil pawn. about the Uniced States, the Democrats helped gh-e immigrants a sense of Irim imm i~ran u, paor and uJu..lll)' C.uholic, mggtrtd an <ethnic and themsel\-es as Americans. rdi~i ?U,: backl..uh known a,: Democrats also introduced im migrants co national interests, redirect· n..ltwum. ing local political loyalties to national politics. In the 1830s, the party had lmmigunt,: ofl:tn ,:p<earhudtd <early persuaded immigrants that national measures such as che Bank of the union~mmt:l. United States and the tariff, seeming!}' remote from chcir daily lives, were German and JrUh immigr,;an u viral to them. Now, in che 1840s, the Democrats would try to convince im· generally beamt Otmacr;a_t,:; moJt nativUu Wt'fC' Wh igr.. migrants chac national expansion likewise was in their interest.

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THE WEST AND BEYOND How did Americans exp4nd into the Soutlrwnt and to tile Pacific roast in ""'1840.1 As late as 1840 the American West meant the area betWeen the Appalachian Mouncains and the Mississippi RiV\'.r or just beyond. Wcsc ofthac lay the inhospita· ble Great Plains. A semiarid, treeless plateau, che Plains sustained hu~ buffalo herds and t he: nomadic Indians who lived off t he buffalo . Because che Great Plains pre:· scmed would-be farmers ~Aith formidable obstacl~ public interest shifted toward the Far \1/est, the: fcrcilc region beyond the: Rockies.

By the: Transcontinental (or Adams-Onis) Trtary of 1819, the United States had relinquished to Spain its claims co Texas "''est of the Sabine RiV\'.r, and in rerum Spain renounced its daims to the Oregon Country nonh of California. Two years later, t he: Mexican Rt\'Oiution had brought Mexico independence: from Spain and possession of all North American territory claimed b)•Spain- Tex~ California, and the south· west quadrant of the continent. In 1824 and 1825 Russia yielded its claims to O re:· gon south of Alaska, and in 1827 t he: United Scates and Great Britain r...--vived an earlier agreement for the joint occupation of che Oregon Territor}'· Texas, New Me:x· ico, CalifOrnia, and Oregon screeched over an area larger than Britain, f rance, and Germany combined. Although this vast region should haw: cempced them, in t he: 1820s Mexico, the United States, and Britain aU vie:"''Cd che Far \'('est as a remote and shado"''Y frontier. lhe American line of sctrleme:nt reached only co Missouri, a 2,000· mile trek (allo-wing for mountains) from the West Coast.

The Far West

After sailing around South America and up the: l':lci6c coast, early merchants had established American and Brit· ish outposts on the West Coast. Becwtf:n the late 1790s and the J820s, for example, Boston merchants had built a chriving trade:, exchanging goods from che eastern United States for western sea-otter fur, cattle, hides, and tal· low (rendered from cattle fat and used for making candles and soap). T he: British Hudson's Bay Compan}' developed a similar trade in Oregon and northern Cali· fornia l 'he California trade generated little friction wich Mexico. Californians were: as eager co buy as che traders "''e re: co sell. Traders who seed ed in California, such as the Swiss-born john Sutter, learned to speak Spanish and became assimilated into Mexican culture. Also d uring che J820s, trading links developed be~n St. Louis and Santa Fe. Each spring. Mid"''CSterners loaded wagon crains with tool~ clothing, and house· hold sundries, and rumbled "''CStward to Santa Fe, where t hey traded their goods for mules and silver. Mexico ....-clcomed che trade. By the: 1830s more chan half t he: goods trucked "''CSt along the Santa Fe Trail trickled into the mineral-rich Mexican provinces of Chihuahua and Sonora, and "''ere exchanged for Mexican sil.,.er pesos, which be
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Some: Americans \'eOturcd north from Santa Fe co trap beaV\'.r in what is coda)' western Colorado and eastern Utah. Americans from St. Louis soon found themselves competing with both the Sanca Fe traders and the: agents of the Hudson' s Ba)' Compan)' for lucrative beaver pdcs.. Gradually, the St. Louis traders wrested t he: bea\'er trade from chcir Santa Fe competitors. Although silk hats 'A'cr'C Olo"Crtaking beaver ones in popularity b)• 1854, more: than half a million beaver pelts ~A-ere auctioned off in London that rear. For the most part, American traders and trappers operating on che: northern Mex· ican frontier in che: 1820s and 1830s proYided a service: to Mexico's provinces. 1'he Mexican people of New Mexico and California depended on American cr.ule for manufactured goods, and che Mexican go\-emment in both provinces needed m.wues from customs ducies. 1'he New Mexican government often had to wait until the caravan of American traders arri\~td from St. Louis before it could pa)' its officials and soldiers. Ye:c, despite the mutually beneficial relations bern-een Mexicans and Americans, the potential for conflict was always present. Spanis h-speaking, Roman Catholic, and accustomed to a hierarchical society, the Mexicans fonned a striking contrast to the Protestant, individualistic Americans. Furt hermore, American t raders returned to t he: United States ~Aith gl o~Aing reports about che fertility and climate: of Mexico's northern provinces. Conse:qum dy, by che J820s American settlers were moving into eastern 1t:xas. At the same: t ime:, the tics binding Mexico's government to its north· ern provinces "-'ere fraying.

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Spain and, later, Mexico recognized chat the key to controlling their frontier proYinn~s lay in promoting settlement Sllllemenl of Texas there by Spanish-speaking people-Spaniards, Mexicans, to JIBS and Indians ~Ailo had embraced Cacholicism and agriculture. l 'hus, by the early ninececmh cencury, Spanish missions, which had long b«n the chief instrument of Spanish expansion, stretched up the California coast as far as San Frands.co and into che interior of New Mexico and Texas. The Spanish missions combined policical, economic, and religious goals. Paid by the gow~rnment, che Franciscan priests who staffed the missions cried co com·ert Nati\-·e Americans and to settle chem on mission lands. By 1823 more chan 20,000 Indians lived on the lands ofche rwenty-one California missions, most of them pro· tccced b)•a fort, or prr.ridio, like rhac at San Frandsco. In the late 1820s the mission syscem began to dedine, theviccim of Mexican in· dependence and the new go\-ernment's decision to secularize the missions by dis· tribucing thcir lands co ambitious gm--ernment officials and pri\•ate ranchers. Man}' of the Naci ~ Americans ~Ailo fled the missions joined the nomads who had alwa}'S resisted conversion; lawlessness surged, and few Mexicans vencured into che vast and threatening emptiness of che frontier. In 1824 the Mexican government began co encourage American colonization of the region as a way to bring in manufucru.red goods and to gain proceccion against Indian attacks on lands farther sourh and west. T he gM>crnment besco\1/C'd generous land grants on agents k no~A'tl as N1!pTI'Sarios (t"m·pn·SAR·C!f:·ohs) to recruit peaceful American settlers for Tex~ as the Anglo region of Coahuila-1C'jas (koh-ut.-WHEEL· uh TAY-has) became k no~A'tl. Srephen F. Austin, the mosc successful of the empresarios, broughc in three hundred families by 1825. By 1830 seven thousand Americans li\'ed in Texas, more than double the Mexican population there. Trouble quickly dewloped. Most of the American sctders ~A'Cre southerners, many of them slaveholders. Mexico abolished slavery in 1829j. che next rear it dosed its borders co importation of sla\'es and to further American immigration. Neither ban ~A'Orked. Americans continued to pour into Texas: b)• J8361Cxas contained thirty thousand Anglo-Americans, 6..-e thousand black sla\-es, and onl}' four thousand Mexicans. At the same rime, Mexican politics grew more and more: unstable. When Anto· nio LOpez de Santa Anna became president of Mexico in 1834, he restricted the power of the individual states, induding Coahuila-1Cjas. His actions ignited a series of rebellions in the Mexican states, the most important of which became the 1t:xas Revolution.

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At 6rst che insurgent Anglo-1t:xans sought greater auton· omyfor1t:xas,notindependence. ButSancaAnna'sbrutal treatment of the rebels alarmed the initially moderate Auscin and ochers. When Santa Anna invaded 1Cxas in fall JSJS, Austin cast his lot with the radicals who wanced outright independence. Santa Anna's armies mer wich initial success. In ~bruary 1836,4,000 ofhis men laid siege to San Antonio, where 200 rebels had recreated into an abandoned mis· sion, che Alamo. O n March 6- four da)'S after 1Cxas had declared its independence, although they did not know about it-the defenders of the Alamo were 0\Tr~Aildm ed

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by Mexican troops. Under Santa Anna's orders, the Mexican army killed aU the Alamo's defenders, in cluding the wounded A few "-\!eks later Mexican croops massacred 350 Texas prisoners at Goliad (GO-ft.add). Even before the Alamo and Goliad, Texas delegates had met to proclaim Texas independent of Mexico. l 'hcy chose Sam Howton, already a militar)' leader, as their first presj. dent. Houston retreated case to pick up recruits, many of them Americans ~Ailo had crossed che Sabine (suh-BEEN) Rio.\!r border to fight Santa Anna. On April 2J, 1836, Houston's army turned and surprised the complacent Mexican forces under Santa Anna, which had encamped on a prairie jusc co che east of whac is now rhe city of Houston. S hout· ing. .,Remember the Alamo!" and .,Rem ember Goliad!'" Houston's army of 1):00 tore through the Mexican lines, killing nearly half of Santa Anna's men in fi fteen minutes and capwring the general himsdf. This engagement, the Battle of San jacinto (juh-SIN-toh), gave 1Cxas its indepen· dence from Mexico, alchough che Mexican govcrnmc.nc never ratified the t reary that Santa Anna signed.

REPUBLIC OF TEXAS

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5.1m Houston'~ \'ic:tory ;u S.:~n J.:~ci nto wa.~ the Before 1840, California and New Amerlam Settlements Mexico, both less accessjble chan d~ci,.A.•e :~Won of the wa.r .:~nd a.V\"cnged the In Cdlomla. New m:~na.cres :~t the Ala mo .:~nd Goli:~d. Texas, exerted only a mild acrracMexllll. a.d Oregon tion for American settlers. 11lat S.. IIHstH Miliwy
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Whether bound for California or Oregon, Americans faced a four-mont h ordeal crossing certain litd e knO'I'-'n in reality but vividl)' depicted in ficcion as an Indian killing ground. Caucious pioneers stocked up on enough guns co equip an anTI}' in jump· off towns such as Independence and St. Joseph, Missouri In face, they were more likely to shoot one another chan co be shot by t he usuall}' cooperati\'f: Indians and much more likdy to be scalped by Independence or St. j oseph merchants sdling their goods at inflated prices.

Tile OVerllnd Traits

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Along the: Overland Trail che cmigrancs faced hardships and hazards: o rnery mules char kicked, bit, and balked; oxen char collapsed from chirsc.: and overloaded wagons thac broke dov.'n. 1hils were difficult co folio"'' and too often marked by the: ....,..;= debris of broken "''llgons and the: bleached bones of oxen. Guidebooks were more like guessbooks. In 1846 the: Donner Part)~ following one: such book, CHECKI NG I N lose so much time that it became snowbound in che High Sierras and sur· viw:d by turn ing co cannibalism . Emigrancs met che challenges of the 0\'er· By t he 1820~: AmiC'-Mc.:ms V.\"fe d«pl)' ifMllvcd in uade along Mexico'~: land crail b}•d ose cooperation with one another, traveling in huge "''llgon northtrn rron fi«s. trains rather than alone. Men )'Oked and un)'oked the oxen, drO\'e the "''llgons tn the 1 820~: the Mexican goY\"fn· and scock, and hunted. Women packed, cooked, and assisted in childbirths. mtnt invif«< American~: ro uttk in BctWem 1840 and 1848, an estimated J 1,..500 pioneers follov.-ed an 0\'er· Ttx:.u ;u .11 buffi..r apin.Jt Indians; land trail to Oregon, and some 2,700 reached California. Such small num· wifhin .11 d«..lde more fhan t h irty thowand Amtrieuu liwd in Ttx;u. bers made: a difference, for che British did not scctle Oregon at all, and the: Ttx:.lnJ n'bdlcd ag.linJt Mexioo in Mexican population of California was small and scattered. By 1845 Cali· 18J6 and won their in& ptndenCJt. fo rnia "''lls clinging co Mexico by the thinnesc of threads. The cerritor}"s His· tn the J840.s Amtri ~nJ beg.~~n panic population, the: Ctdifornios, felt little allegiance to Mexico, "'rhich chey .stn-o~~ming into On-gon and concempwousl)' called "che: other shore:'' Some of them "''anted indepen· ca:tirorni:a. dence from Mexico, whereas others concemplated British or French rule. B}' Moll' tho~~n (ou neen thou.sand the mid·l840s these caJifornios, wich their tenuous allegiances, faced a grow· Amtri ~ru followed fht 0\'<'-lhnd tu.iiJ~.Jt. ing number of American settlers wich definite policical sympathies.

I

How did «Manifsst Destiny" influence American politics? Westward expansion raised the question of whether the: Uniced States should annex Texas. In che 1840s the 1Cxas issue sparked political passions and became en· tangled wich other unsettling issues about the: West. Betv.rcm 1846 and 1848, a war

I THE Potmcs oF EXPM"SION. •941o- •8.(6

28 9

with Mexico and a dramatic confrontation with Britain seeded chesc questions on tcnns favorable to the United States. Ac che stare of the 1840s, tA'CStern issues reccived little attention in a nation con· cerned primarily with issues relating to economic rccm-cr}'- tariffs, banking, and in· cernal imprm-cments. Onl)•after politicians failed co address the economic problems coherendy did opportunistic leaders thrust expansion-related issues co che cop of the political a~nda.

The election of 1840 brought the: Whig candidate William Ht:nt}' Harrison to the presidency and installed Whig majorities in both houses of Congress. 11le: Whigs proposed to replace Van Buren's Independent Treasury (see Chapter 10) with some sore ofna· donal fiscal agency, such as the: Bank of the: United States. The Whig party also fa\"Ored a revised tariff char would increase government revenues buc remain low enough to permit che importation of foreign goods. According co the Whig plan, the stares ~A'Ould then recei\-c tariff-generated revenues for internal imprm-cments. The Whig program might u.-cll ha\'t: breezed into law. But Harrison died after only a month in office, and his successor,john 1}1er, a Virginia aristocrat puc on the ticket for his souchern appeal and the: first man co assume: the presidency after the death of an incumbent, provcd a disaster for the Whigs. A funner Democrat, lfle:r continued co favor che Democratic philosophy of states' rights. As president, he used the: veco to shred his new party's program. In August 1841 a Whig measure to creace a new national bank fell to lfler's veto, as did a subsequent modification. lfle:ralso pla)•ed havoc with Whig tariff policy b)•\'etoing one bill to lo~A•er tariffs to 20 percent in accord with the Compromise Tariff and rejecting another to distrib· ute revenue from a higher cariff to the: states. Whig leaders were understandably furiousj some Whigs calked ofimpeaching l}'le:r.ln August 1842 che president, needing money to run the go\'t:mme:nt, signed a new bill chac maintained some cariffs abm-c 20 percent but abandoned distribution to the: states. lfle:r's erracic course: confOunded and disrupted his party. By maintaining some tariffs abo\·e 20 percent, che tariff of 1842 satisfied northern manufaccur~ but by abandoning distribution, it infuriated soucherne:rs and ....-escerners. The issue cut across party lines. In che congressional elections of 1842, the Whigs paid a heavy price for failing co enact chcir program.: they lost control of the House: to the Democrats. Now the nation had one: party controlling the Senate, another controlling the House, and a president who appeared co belong to neither.

Although diso~A'tled by his parry, 1}1er ardently desired a second term as president. Domestic issues offered him lie· de hope of building a popular foll~·ing. but foreign pol· icy was another matter. In 18421}1er's secretary of state, Daniel Webster, concluded the Webster·Ashburton 1'reary ~Aith Great Britain, settling a long-festering d ispute over the: Maine-Canada border. lfle:r reasoned char if he could follow che treaty, which was highly popular in the North, wich che annexation ofTcxas, he could build a national follo"Aing.

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The issue of slaV\'.ry clouded every discussion of 1Cxas. Antislavery norchemers saw proposals to annex 1Cxas as part of a souchern conspiracy to extend American territory into Mexico, Cuba, and Cencral America. Thus an unlimited number of new sla\'e slates could be created. but British Canada "-"OUld eliminate the possibility of free states' expanding co the north. And some southerners talked openl}' of carving Texas into fo ur or 6w slave states. New~rthdess, in summer 1843 Tyler launched a campaign for1t:xas annexation. He jusci6ed his crusade by reporting that he had learned of an attempt co make 1Cxas a British. rather chan an American. ally. In spring 1844, 1}'1er and john C. Calhoun, ~Ailo became secretary of state in 1844, submicted to the Senate a treaty annexing Texas. Accompanying the treaty 'A'llS a teeter from Calhoun to che British minister in Washington, defending slaV\'.ry as beneficial co African·Americans, the onl}' way co protect them from ..vice and pauperism."' Abolitionists now had evidence that the annexation oflCxas was linked co a conspiracy to extend slavery. Consequently, both Whig and Democratic leaders came out in opposition to the annexation of 1Cxas, and the creacy went down co crushing defeat in the Senate. But ho~A'CVCr ostensibly decisive, the Senate voce sim· ply dumped the annexation question into the upcoming presidential election.

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Tyler's inepcirude cumed che presidential campaign into a free-for-alL Unable to gather supporc as an independent, he dropped out of the race. Henr}' Clay had a secure grip on the: Whig nomination, but Marcin Van Buren's apparently d ear path co the: head of the Democratic ticket vanished as the issu e of annexation split his party. A deadlocked Oemocracic party finally curned co j ames K. Polk ofl'ennes.see, the first "dark horse" nominee in American histor}'· j eering «Who is j ames K. l'olk?" the Whigs derided che nomination. Howew~r. l'olk, a ~A'ily campaigner, convinced many norcherners chat annexation of 1t:xas would benefit chem.. In an imaginative scenario, Polk and his supporters argued that, if Britain succeeded in abolitionizing 1Cxas, slavery u-ould not be: able to mo\'f.' westward, racial tensions in existing slave states would intensify, and the chances of a race war would increase. HO\l'f.'\'er far-fecched, this argument plared e:ffeccivdy on northern racial phobias and helped Polk to detach annexation from Calhoun's nar· row, prosouchern defense. In contrast to che Democrats, whose position was d ear, day and the: Whigs wobbled. After several shif~ Clay finally came out against annexation, but not until September. His wa\'f.'ring alienated his southern supporters and prompted some: of his northern supporters co bolt che Whigs for the antislaver}' Liberty party, formed in 1840. The Whigs also infuriated Catholic immigrant vocers b)•nominatingTheo· dore Frdinghuysen (ti'•y·ling-HIGH·zun) for the vice presidency. A supporter of tem· perance and an assortment of ocher cause~ Frdinghu}'Sen confirmed fears that the Whigs "''ere the orthodox Protestant party. Catholic immigrants curncd ouc in large numbers to vote for che Democrats. O n the eve of che election in New York Ciry, so many Irish marched to the court· house to be qualified for 't-oting chac the windows had co be: opened to aliO\l' people to enter and leave.. l'olk ~A'On che dectoral ..-oce 170 co 105, but his margin in the pop·

The Election of 1844

1THE Potmcs OF f XPAA-s•oN, .e,.o- •&.i6

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ular vote was only 38,000 out of 2.6 million votes cast. A shift of 6,000 votes in New York, "''here the immigrant voce: and Whig defeccions to the: Liberty party had hun Clay. ~A'Ould ha\'f: gi\-en Clay che state and the: presidency.

The election of 1844 dem onstrated the: strength of na· donal support for che anncxacion of1txas. The surging 1845 popular sentiment for expansion retlecced a growing convicd on char America's natural destin}' was to expand inco 1Cxas and all the way to the Pad6c Ocean. Expansionists emphasized extending the "area offreedom" and calked of«repel· ling the comaminacing proximity of monarchies upon the soil that we have consecrated to the: rights ofman;'' Americans needed only a phrase: co capture this e:bulliem spirit. In 1845 John L O'Sullivan, a New York Democratic journalist, supplied that phrase when he: wrote: of "our manifest destiny to 0\'Crspread and to possess the whole of the: continent which ProYide:nce has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and federated sd f-go\·cm me:nt entrusted to us:'' Because most champions of Manifest Destin)' W'Cre Democrats who favored annexing Texas, northern Whigs dismissed Manifest Destin)' as a smoke: screen to conceal an eYil ince:m to cxce:nd s.law:ry. In face, many expansionists supported nei· ther s.la\'cty nor annexation. Most had their C)'eS, not on Texas, buc on Oregon and California Blaming the: post-1837 depression on the failure of Americans co find markets for their agricultural surplus., they saw California and Oregon as solutions.. An Alabama Dem ocrat praised California's «safe and capacious harbors," which "-in· Yite to their bosoms the: rich commerce of the East:'' More than trade was ac stake:. To man}~ expansion presented an opporrunity to preserve the agricultural character of the American people and thus co safeguard dcmocrac)'. Fundamental!)' j effersonian, expansionists equated industrialization and urbanization wich social stratification and class strife. 1b avoid the: "bloated wealth'" and "-terrible misery" that afflicted Britain, che United States bad co expand. Democrats sa"'' expansion as a logical complement to their support of low tar· iffs and their opposition to centralized banking. High tariffs and banks. tended to "favor and foster the: factory S)'Stcm," but expansion would provide: farmers with land and with access to foreign markets. Americans "''Ould continue to be farmers, and the: foundations of the: Republic would remain secure. This message, trumpeted by the penny pres~ made sense co the "''Orking poor, many of the-m Irish immigrants. Expansion would open economic opporrunity for the common people and thwart British plans to free American slaves, whom the poor viewed as potential competition for already-scarce: jobs. Expansionism drew on the ideas oflhomas Jefferson, john Quincy Adams, and other leaders of the early Republic who had proclaimed the: American people's right to displace any people:, uncivilized or European, from their westward path. Early expansionists had feared that O'lerexpansion might create an ungovernable: empire, but their successors had no such qualms. Although they pointed with alann to the negative effects of industrialization, the expansionists also relied on the technology of industrialization. 11le: railroad and the telegraph, they said, had annihilated the problem of distance: and made expansion safe.

Manlfe5t Destiny,

Mlnilest DesliiY Phrast

I

~ to dtJ;cribt bdit6 of ardent apm.sionisn

Primary Soorce: California Dream Railroad Poster

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IMMIGRATION, f Xl'AHSION, ANO SEcnOIUL COKIUCT, 18
The growing spirit of Manifest Destiny immsi6ed the Oregon is· su e. 10 soften norchern cricicism of the pending annexation of1t:xas, the Democrats had in· eluded in their 1844 placform the assertion that American citle "to the ~Ailole of che TerritO!}' of Oregon is dear and unquestionable." Taken literally, this statement, which Polk repeated in his inaugural address, pressed an American daim to the entire Oregon TerritO!}' between California and 54. 40', che southern boundary of Alaska, a claim new~r before advanced. Polk•s objectives in Oregon were far subtler than his Language. He knew that it would rake a ~A'llr with Britain for che United States to claim che encire: Oregon 1Crritory. and he wanted co a\-oid v..ar. He hoped the belligerent language: ~A'Ou ld persuade the British to accept whar they had previously rejocre:d, a diYision of Oregon ar the forty-ninth parallel. This se:rd emenr would gii,!'C the United Stares che superb dee:p-~A'lltcr harbor of Pugct Sound and rhe southern tip of VancoU\~r Island. The British had long held out for a divi· sion along rhe Columbia Ri\~r. which entered the l':lci6c Ocean far south ofrhe forty-ninth parallel Potk•s position roused furious interest in acquisition of rhe entire territor}'· Mass meetings adopted su ch resolutions as "T he Whole or None:!" and "Fifty-four Forty or Fight!" Each )~ar brought new American settlers into Oregon. john Quincy Adam~ although no supporter of the: annexation of 1Cxas or rhe 54" 40' boundary for Oregon, bclie"o~d dur American settlements gave the United Stares a stronger claim than d iscM'Cf}' and exploration had given the British. The United Stares, Adam preached, was the nation bound "to make rhe wilderness blossom as the rose, co establish laws, to increase, multiply, and subdue the earth atl«at rhe: 6rst behest of God Almighty.• In April 1846 Polk forced the issue by notifying Britain that the United Stares was terminating the joint BritishAmerican occupacion of Oregon. In effocr, this message ~A'llS that the Bricish could eirher go ro 'A'llf over the American claims to 54 • 40' or negotiate. They chose co negociate. AI· though raging against that che "ill-regulated, O\~rbearing, Polk a.d Oregon

l .:acking ch:~rm, Polk bored ~~n t.i~ fri-ends, but kwpnosid~nts eould m;~.tch his ruord ol :~cqui ring l :~nd for the Unit~d Sutt•s.

a 0

I!MS$111Nill)'h. 1818 fools o! ct5plbl. l iU8

1- -IOOrrf!ltm.. b . l &$8

COUNTRY

•

and aggressive spirit of American democracy;'' Britain faced too man}' other problems to wage war 0\'Ct "a few miles of pine swamp.'"lhe ensuing creary divided Oregon ac the forty-ninth parallel, alchough Britain re· rained all ofVancoU\'Ct Island and tempotar}' navigation rights on the Co· lumbia Rh·er. On june IS, 1846, che Senate raci6ed che creacy.

The duth a( \l' illiam Henry li a-ITi· wn th!'l'w Wh ig eontrol of th e na.* t ion.U go'A'mmenc imo turmoil. Atumpu to bring Texou imo the Union ra.Ued the \'Oia.tile i.~,ue of 'l~ry.

THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH, 1846-1848

D a.rk hofl'l' c.mdid..u e and upa.n· ' ionist Ja.mt.$ K. F\)lk ~'On the !SH eketion.

What wen the results ofthe Mexic~m-American War?

"M.:mik-Jt OC'$tinr" bua.me the $logan ofC'Xpa.n$ionist.J..

Betv.r't'tn 1846 and 1848 the United States su ccessfully fought a war thac cost Mexico its claims to Texas and the provinces of New Mexico and California. Although many Americans rejoiced O\'tr this victOr)', others foresaw thac questions O\'tr the status of slavery in the newly acquired ter· ritories boded ill for the future.

Polk won a t~tr divKiing the Or-egon Territory with Gl'l'a.t Brit
While Polk challenged Britain ovcr Oregon, the United States and Mexico moved toward war. l 'he conflict had both immediate and remote causes. One long-standing grievance Ill)' in the failure of the Mexican gm-'trnmcm to pay $2 million in debrs o\1/ed to U.S. citizens. Bitter memories of the Alamo and of the Goliad massacre, moreover, reinforced American loathing of Mexico. AbO'II'e aU, the issue of Texas poisoned relations. Mexico still hoped to regain Texas or to keep it independent of the United States. Still politicall)' unscable-its presidency changed hands N"Ccnty rimes from 1829 to 1844- Mexico was afraid that an aggressive United States-«the colossus of the Norch"-would trample on an)'one in its path while d isguising irs intentions with high-sounding phrases. Once in control of1t:xas, Mexicans feared, the United States might seize other provinces, or e\'tn Mexico itself, and treat Mexicans as it maced slaves. Po lk's election increased the strmgch ofthe pro--annexationists, as his campaign had persuaded many northerners that Texas's annexation would bring national ben· e6ts. In February 1845 both houses of Congress responded to popular sentiment by passing a resolution annexing 1Cxas. HO\l'f:\'er, Texans balked, in pare be
Tilt Orlefls of lhe Melfcan-Americ• Wlr

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troops under General Zachary Ta)tfor deplo)'ed ac Corpus Christi, south of t he: Nueces Rii,!'Cr, in ce:rritory still claimed by Mexico. California and its fine harbors influenced Polk's accions, for he had entered t he: White House ~A'ith t he: 6rm intencion ofextending American control over chat province, too. If Mexico v.-em to war wich lhe United Scares o\•ct 1Cxas, Polk's supporters claimed, "-the: road lO California will be: open lO us." Reports from American agents com'inced Polk lhat che way Lay open for California to join che United Scares as Texas would-b)• re:\-olution and lhen annexacion. Continued tunnoil in Mexican policies further complicated this complex situa· tion. In early 1845 a new Mexican gow~m me:nt agreed lO negotiate ~A'ith the United Scates, and l'olk decided co gi.,.e negotiacions a chance. In November 1845 he dis· patched john Slidell lO Mexico Ciry wich instructions to gain Mexican recognition of the: annexacion of1t:xas wit h t he: Rio Grandeborde:r. ln exchange, lhe U.S . g()I.'Ctn· menc would assume: the debto\l.l't'd by Mexico to American citizens. Polk also autho· rized Slidell lO offer up lO $25 million for California and New Mexico. HO'I'-l:'\-er, b)• the time Slidell reached Mexico Ciry, che government there had become: too weak co make concessions and refused to negotiate. Polk lhen ordered Taylor to mm-e south· ward lO the Rio Grande, hoping co provoke a Mexican attack and unite: lhe Ameri· can people behind war. The Mexican government, hO'I'-\....,-er, dawdled O\-er caking the: bait. Polk 'A'llS about co send a war message co Congress when word 6nally arri•;ed that Mexican forces had crossed che Rio Grande and attacked the U.S. arm}'· '1\meriun blood btU brtn shed em Amerkan soil!" Polk's foiiO'I'--ers jubilantly proclaimed. On Ma)' II, 1846, l'olk informed Congress chat ~A'llr «exists by the ace of Mexico herself' and called fo r $10 million lO fight the war. l'olk's disingenuous assertion lhac the: United Stares was alrcad)' ac war pro· voked furious opposicion in Congress. For one: lhing, lhe Mexican attack on Taylor·s troops had taken place on land never before claimed by che United States. Equall)' grievous, in announcing chat war already existed, Polk seemed to undercut congres· sional povter to declare ~A'llr. He was using a mere border incident as a pretext co plunge the nation into a general war to acquire more slave territory. Buc Polk had backed the Whigs into a corner. They could not afford to appear unpatriotic- they remembered \'ividl)' whac opposjtion to lhe War of 18 12 had cost the Federalists-so they swallowed chcir outra~ and supported ~A>ar. l'olk's single-minded pursuit of his goals had prevailed. A humorl e:s~ austere man who banned dancing and liquor from t he: White House, he inspired little: per· sonal warmch, e\·en among his supporters. Buche triumphed ()I.'Cr all opposicion, in pan because of his opponents' fragmentation, in pare because of expansion's popu· lar appeal, and in pare because of his foreign antagonists' v.-eakne:ss. Reluctant co 6ghc over O regon, Britain had ne:gociated. Too \l-eak co negociate, Mexico chose co 6ghc O\-er letritor}' chat it had already lost (Texas) and ~Aohere its hold 'A'llS feeble (Cali· fornia and New Mexico).

Mosc European obsen -ers e:xp«ted Mexico lO win the war. lcs anTI)' was four times lhe sjze of lhe American forces, and it 'A'llS 6ghting on home ground., Having botched its one previous attempt co invade a ncighbor, Canada in 1812, the United Stares now

had to sustain offensi\-e o perations in an area remoce from American se:td emencs. American expansionists, ho"''CVCr, hardly expected lhe Mexicans to fighc at alL Racism and arrogance convinced man}' Americans t hat lhe Mexican people, degraded b}' lheir mixed Spanish and Indian population, were "as sure co melt away ac lhe ap· proach of(American) energy and enterprise as sn ow before a southern sun;'' as o ne newspaper publis her insisced. In face, che Mexicans fo ughc brawly and stubbornly, although unsuccessfully. In Ma}' 1846 Taylor, ..Old Rough and Re::ady," rouce:d the Mexican army in Texas and pursued it across t he Rio Grande, cvcnruall}' to capcure: the: major ciry of Monterrey (mon·t~r-RAY) in Sepce:mber. War enthusiasm surged in the: Un ited States. Recruit· ing posters blared, "Here's to old Zach! Glorious T imes! Roasc Beef, Ice Cream, and Three Months' advance::'' Taylor's conspicuous!}' ordinar}' manner- he went into battle "''eating a st raw hat and a plain br~·n coac- endca.red him to rhe public, which kicked up its heels in celebration co the: «Rough and Ready l'olka" and t he "General Ta}tfor Q uick Seep:'' After taking Monterrey, Taylor, starved for supplies, halted and grance:d Mexico an eight·"-~ek armistice. Eager to undercut Taylor's popularity- chr Whigs u-ere alread}' touting him as a presidential candidace- Polk st ripped him of half his forces and reassigned them to General Winfi eld Scotc. He was to mount an amphibious anack on Vera Cruz (VEHR-t.~h-krooz) and proceed on to Mexico City, following t he pach of Cortfs and his conquistadors. E\'f:nts out· st ripped Polk's scheme:, however, when 1·aylorde:feace:d a far l~r Mexican army at lhe Battle of Buena Vista (BWAY·nuh VEES..tuh), on February 22- 23, 1847. Farcher north, American fo rces took advantage of che shakiness of Mexican rule to scrip awa}' New Mexico and California. In spring 1846 Colonel Stephen Kearn}' led an arm}' from Fore leavenworth, Kansas, toward Santa Fr. Having owrcome: im· mense nacural obstacles to reach New Mexico, Kearn}' took the: territory b}•a combi· nation of bluff, bluster, and, perhaps, bribery. The Mexican governor, who had said lhac "it is better co be t hought brave lhan to be so," fled at Kearny's approach. Once he had suppressed a brief rebellion by Mexicans and Indians, Kearny controlled New Mexico securely enough chac he could dispatch part of his army south into Mexico to supporc Taylor ac Buena Vista. California also fell easily inco American hands. In 1845 l'olk had ordered the Pa· cific Squadron under Commodore: john D. S loat to occupy California's ports in the evcnc of war. l he president had also dispatched a co urier m~rland "''ith secre:c orders for lhe colorful John C. Fremont. A Georgia-born adwnrurer, Frimom had caken advantage: of his marriage to chr daughter of a powerful senator to ha\'f: accounts of his explorations in lhe Nonh"''CSt publis hed as official go\-ernme:m documents, and lhen basked in glor}' as «chr Gre:ac Pathfinder." Polk's courier caughc up with FcC· mom in Oregon. Instructed co proceed to California and "watch O\'f:r lhe ince:rests of lhe United Scace:s;'' Frimom ince:rpreted his orders liberally. In June: 1846 he ro unded up some: American insurgents, capcure:d chr t~·n of Sonoma (slii-NOH-muh), and proclaimed the: independent .. Bear Flag Republic." The combined efforts of FcC· monc, Sloat, and Kearny (who had co ntin ued on to California after his successful New Mexico campaign) established U.S. control over California. The war's fi nal and most important campaign brought Winfield Scott, known as " 'ld Fuss and Feathers," to glory. In March 1847 Scott carried out a successful amphibious landing near Vera Cruz, pounded lhe city imo submission, and mm-ed inland co atcack Mexico City. 11le U.S. army encountered a Mexican force under

J.... C. m..o.t Acfrtooturer who pbym ;a rnk in CaliiOmU.

I

l't'beUioo ;apiost Mt.rico; bttr ;a fon:r io o.triON.I politics

{F'f) Primary Source: ~ Mexican News

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Mop IJA Mojor Ballios of the Ml!xican.American Will The Me»c;~.I'I·Americ;~.n W:u-·~ decisiV\' ump;~.igl'l beg;~.l'l with Gel'ltr.ll Winhtld Xou:'~ G~pwtt ofVer:~

Cruz

:~nd ended mth h i~ conqutst

of Muic:o City.

E3=.-a . . . . . .....

rn .............w:.y (jJ.,...__....,

Ell!o.Moyol~cocWt.,~ • -

(f'f) lnteracti\•e Map: ~

The Mexican W-at

' ""'of ......... ~Ia> Ag:rttmc'nt ending: Mexiun.

Amtriu.n W.ar; oedtd Y'iUl amolmt o(b.nd to United

....,,

Sama Anna ac the: seemingly impregnable: Cerro Gordo (SERR·oh GQRO-Qh) Pass, but a )'Oung captain, Robert E. Lee, helped to 6nd a trail that oucflanked the: Me:xi· cans and led to a small peak m--e:rlooking che pass. l he Americans planted howitzers there:, sconned rhe pass, and routed the Mexican army. On September 13, 1847, Mexico City fell to Scott, and he joined Zachary Ta)ior in the pantheon of new American heroes. The Mexican army had o umumbe:re:d che U.S. forces in vircuall)' every barth~. American soldiers died like flies from yellow fe:w~r. and they carried into battle the: agonies ofwne:rcal disease, which rhcy picked up (and left) in every Mexican tO'A'tl they captured. Bur rhe Mexican forces could not match the superior artillery and unprecedented u.-e:aponry or the superior logistics and organizacion of the: ..barbar· ians of the Norch.'" By the: Tn-aty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (gwafl.dl.ih·LOO.p.l.y ee--OOll·go) (Feb· ruary 2, 1848), Mexico ceded 1Cxas with the: Rio Grande boundary, New Mexico, and Californ ia to the United States_: from the: Mexican cession ~A'Ould come: che stares of New Mexico, California, Nevada, and Utah, most of Arizona, and pares of Colorado and Wyoming. In turn, che United States assumed chedaims of U.S. citizens against the Mexican gm-·ernmem and paid Mexico SIS million. Although some rabid ex· pansionists denounced che treaty because it failed to indude aU of Mexico, Polk, like most Americans, was sacis6ed. Empey terrirory 'A'llS 6ne:, but few Americans wanted to annex the: mixed Spanish and Indian population of Mexico itself and incorporate imo rhe United States "ignorant and indolcm half-civilized Indian~"

in one "'rriter•s words. The virulent racism of American leaders allowed the Mexicans to retain pare of their nation. On Ma.rch 10, 1848, the Senate rati6ed the m~ary by a \'Ote of 38 to 10.

Despite wartime patriotic enthusiasm, sectional conflict sharpened bmwen 1846 and 1848. Q uestions related to territorial expansion intensified this conflict, but so, too, did !'resident Polk's uncompromising and literal·mindedjacksonianism. Polk had rescored the Independent Treasury. co che Whigs' d isnta)', and had eroded Democratic unity by pursuing j acksonian policies on tariffs and internal im· prowments. Despite Polk's campaign promise to combine a rew~nue mriffwich mild protection, his administration's Tariff of 1846 slashed duties to the minimum nee· cssary for rcV'(!nuc. Having alienated his northern supporters, Polk chen disappointed wcstem Democra~ thirsting for federal aid to fund internal improvements, by veto· ing che Rivers and Harbors Bill of 1846. Important as these: issues were, territorial expansion generated the l:tolk admin· istration's major battles. 1b Jlolk, ic mactered little whether new territories "''ere slave or free. Expansion .....-ould meet its purposes b)•dispersing the population, "''takening dangerous tendencies tO'I'-ard centralized government, and ensuring the agricultural and democratic character of the United Scates. Focusjng attention on slaver}' in the territories struck him as ..noc only unwise: but "'ticked." To Jlolk, the Missouri Com· promise, prohibiting slaver}' north of 36"30', embodied a simple, pmnanent solu· cion to che question of territorial slavery. Buc man}' northerners were: coming to sec slavery in the territories as a pro· foundly disruptive issue that neither could nor should be solved simply by extending the 36• 30' line. Abolitionist Whigs. "'tho opposed any expansion of slaver}' On moral ground~ posed a lesser threat to Polk than northern Democrats who feared that ex· tending slavery into New Mexico and California "''Ould deter free laborers from set· d ing those territories. 11lose Democrats argued that competition with slavery degraded free labor, that the westward extension of slavery .....-ould create a barrier to the v.oesrward migration of free labor, and chac such a barrier V.'Ould intensif)' social problems alrcad)' evident in the Ease: exccssi\-e concentration of population, labor protest, class strife, and social stratification.

Tilt Wlr's Effeds on Sedlollll Collflld

A }'Oung Democratic congressman from Ptnns)tf\•ania, David Wilmot, galvanized these disaffected nonhero Democrats. In August 1846 he introduced an amendment to an appropriations bilL 11lis amendment, which became kno"''tl as the Wilmot Proviso, stipulated chat slavery be prohibited in any territory acquired by the nego· tiations. Wilmot represented the Democrats who had supported annexing Texas on the assumption chat it "''Ould be the last slaw scace. like other northern Democrats, he believed that Polk had made an implicit bargain: Texas for sla\-eholders, California and New Mexico for free labor. Buc Polk and southern Democrats opposed an}' bar· rier to the expansion of slavery south of the Missouri Compromise line; they be· lieved that che v.oesrward expansion of slavery would reduce che concentration of sla\oes in older southern regions and chus lessen che chances of a slave revolt.

Tile Wlllot Proviso

W'iltn.t PtooWso

I

Atumpt to

b.u!. JlaYtry from ..ny tr:rriwry acquir
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The pnwiso raised unsetding co nstitutional quescions. Calhoun and ocher southerners contended that, because sla\'eS were pro perty, the Constirurion pro· te
The Whigs ~A'lltched in dismay as prosperity returned un· der Polk's program of an independent treasur}' and low tariffs. NC"t-er before had Henry Cla}"s American System of national banking and high tariffs seemed so irrele..•ant. But che Wilmoc ProYiso ga\-e the Whigs a political windfall; originacing in che Democratic party, it allowed the Whigs to portray themselves as che South's o n I}' dependable friends. These co nsideracions inclined che majority of Whigs toward Zachar}•Ta}tfor. As a louisiana slaV\'.holder, he had obvious appeal to che Souch. As a political newcomer, he had no lo)•alty to a discredited American System. And as a war hero, he had broad national appeal. Nominaring1'aylor as presidential candidate in 1848, the Whigs presented him as an ideal man "without regard to creeds or principles" and ran him wichout any placform. The Democrats faced a greater challenge because David Wilmot was one of chcir O'A'tl. They could not ignore che issue of slaver}' in che terrirories,but ifthC}' embraced the positions of either Wilmot or Calhou n, the party ~A'Ould split along soccional lines. When l'olk dedined to run for redeccion, the Democrats nominated Lewis Cass of Michigan, who had formulated che doctrine of «squatter SO\'erd gmy,"' or popular SO\'eteignty, as it was Iacer called. Cass argued that Congress should let the question of sla\-ery in the territories be decided by the people who seed ed chcre. Squatter sOV\'.reignty appealed co many because of its arrescing simplicity and vague· ness; it neatly dodged the explosive quescion of wheeher Congress acttJally possessed power co pro hibit territorial slavery. In the campaign, both parties tried co a\-oid the issue ofsla\-eryin the territories, but neither succeeded. A pro-Wilmot faccion of che Dl'tnocraric party linked up ~A'ith the abolitionist Liberty parcy and amislaV\'.ry "Conscience'" Whigs to form the Free:· Soil party. Declaring their dedication w "free Trade, f ree Labor, Free Speech, and Free Men,'" the Frce:-Soilers nominated Marrin Van Buren on a platform opposing any extension of slavery. Zachary Taylor bene-fited from the opposition's alienacion of key northern scaces m~r the tariff issue, from Democratic disu nity OV\'.r the Wilmot l'roviso, and from his ~A'llr·hcro slaturc. He captured a majority of eloccoral votes in both Norch and South. Although it failed to carry any slate. the Free...Soil party ran u-ell enough in the North to demonstrate the grassroots popularity of opposition co the extension of sla..·cry. By sho~A'ing that opposition to the spread of sla..-ery had far more appeal

The Eledlon of 1848

_..,-.,.ly ""'"'"''

tbat Sl'ttltn in ntw tr:rritoritll should ckcidt imle' orJbYery

1rortbcom~

than outright abolitionism, the fre~Soilers sene both Whigs and Democrats a message chat they ~A'Ould be unable to ignore in future elections.

When \l:lilmot had introduced his proviso, che issue of slaver}' in the Wesc 'A'llS more abstract than immedi· ace, for Mexico had not yet ceded any territory. The picture quickly changed when an American carpenter discovered gold while building a sa~Amill in the foo thills of California•s Sierra Nevada only nine da}'S be-fore che Treaty of Guadalupe--Hidalgo was signed. A frantic gold rush erupted. A San Francisco paper co mplained that all California .. resounds wich the sordid cry co GOLD, GOLD, GOW! ~Ailile the field is le-ft half·planced, the house half-built, and everything neglected buc the manufacture of shm-cls and pickaxes."' By December 1848 pamphlets wich ti· des like Tlw Emigrttns-'r Guide w t1w Gold Miner had hit che streets of New York City, and che gold rush was on. Overland emigrants to California increased from 400 in 1848 to 44,000 in 1850. "Uoion'" Woodcut lly Thomas W. Stroftl, 1148 Arriving by land as ~A'CII as by sea, gold-rushers swelled Cali· This 1848 c:~p.:~ign poster for Z;ach:uy T:.~r fomia's population from 15,000 in the summer of 1848 co nomindcd A~T~otric:..•u ofhil rniliuryvictoriel, 250,000 by 18 52. l hcy came fro m ew~rycorner of the world.: one unmitit.1ry ~:.ring (note the civili:u~ dres-s :.nd journalist reported chat, when she walked chro ugh a miners' str.tw h;u), :u~d ddiber.~tdy v.tgue promisu. camp, she heard English, Italian, French, Spanish, German, and Ha~A'lliian. Clashes b~n Anglo-Americans and Hispanics were frequent. Anglc:>Americans particularly resented the Chinese ~Ailo flooded into California in the 1850s as contract laborers. Rampant prejudice did not stop Americans from hiring Chinese workers, hoW'C'.o-cr. The gold rush transfonned the Hispanic hamlet of Yel'ba Buena (VAIR-buh BWAY·nah) inco the ..pandemonium" city of San Francisco; population soared from ISO co 50,000. No other American city boasted The- United St~tel enten"d inro the people from more parts of the world. The ethnic and racial tensions of the Muican·Amtric:.n \'(lar b)· choia gold fields spilled over into the dty, and in 1851 merchants organized a r:.thtr than b)· n~:sity. Committee of Vigilance to patrol che streets, deport undesirables, and tr}' Afl:t r lwing the w~r, Mtxioo ctdtd and hang alleged chievcs and murderers. to the United M.uu the" Southv.\"$t qu~drantoftht presm t United The gold rush made che issue of slaw~ry in the West an immediate, St.uel ~nd r«ogn iud Ttx.u's practical concern. 11le newcomers to California included Mexicans, fret: in~pcndtn«. blacks, and slaves brought b}•souchem planters. White prospectors loathed V~tory in tht war apin ral$C'd the the idea of competing with these groups and wanced co drive them from que'.Slion o r the' upansion o r :sl~ry. the gold fields. Violence mounted, and demands grew for a scro ng civilian The- elution of IS.fS rt>~aled tht gm-cmmem to replace the ineffecti\'f: militar}' goo.-crnmenc left m-er from gi"O\Ning SUC'ngth or oppo:si~i on tO tht exp;an:sion ofsla'A'ry. the ~A'llr. Polk began co fear that without a sacisfuctor}' congressional solu· The- diKCM"ryofgold in California cion to the slavery issue, Californians might organize a gm-emmem inde:· gu~r,;ame"C'd th~t,dnp itt politici;an:s' pend em of the United States.. The gold rush guaranteed that the: question wi:shu to sKiutep tht i:s:sut, the of slavery in the Mexican cession "-'OU!d be che 6rsc icem on the: agenda for txpansion of sJa,..,ry would ri$C' ro Potk•s successor and the nation. tht topoft ht nationaJ ~gc-nd..l.

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IMMIGRATION, fXl'AHSION. ANOSEcnOIUL COKIUCT, 18
Chapter Su (ff)

DOWNLOAD THE

~

USTENTO ITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOt O

R lE O F THE

Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND KEY TERMS

nativism {p. 282}

How did the massive immigration ofthe 1840s influence the balance of power bet»•en Whig> and Democrats? (poge 219)

I

As Getman and Irish immigrants poured into the United States, they gra\i· tated to the Democratic party. Meanwhile, nativism grew stronget among Whigs.

How did Americans expand into lhe Southwest and to the Pacific CI)(JSt in the 1840s? (pogp 284)

I

Americans had begun trading along Mexico•s northern frontiers early in the nineteenth century. In the 1820s Mexico invited Americans to settle in 1Uas, which sought irs independence in the 1830s. In the following decade thousands of people foliO\Io'ed the overland trails to California and Oregon.

I

How did "Manifest Destiny• inPuence American politics? (pogp 288)

I

What ...,. the results a{tho Mexican-American War? (page 293)

The issue of annexation of1Cxas stalled because it raised the wxatious issue of the expansion of sla~-ery. But the pro-expansion sentiment known as Mani· fest Destiny helped bring ardent expansionist james K. Polk to the White Hoose in 1844 and fueled support for Texas annexation despite the slaver}' question.

In che Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States gained one-fourth of irs present territory, and Mexico recognized Texas•s independence. Ho.,.·e~-er, once again the question of che expansion of sla\-ery came to the forefront of American politics. despite politicians' attempts co sidestep it.

"Know-Notllilg" party {p. 282} Stejlhen F. Austin (p. 286} Sanla Anna (p. 286) Alamo {p. 286} Sam Hoo~on {p. 287} Ol•~and Trail {p. 288} Manilest Destiny (p. 291) John C. Frlmont (p. 295} Tmaty ol Guadalupe Hidalgo

{p. 296}

Wilmol Proviso (p. 297) popw r soverei~Jlly {p. 1!JB)

CHAPTER 14

1850-1861

CHAPTlR PRlVI EW

-

Til< Cornj>
-

Tbt Collp!t tA ...Party Sys1em. 18SJ.-..I ' I.,. N 1M Wll~ f""'1 Fmnt'fiOU, ood"""' wtt'W the COitStqW-NrS!

-

The Crisis o1 the Union. 1857-1860 \IV1tot mojor inws dominatedAmen'con poliliu from 18571• 1860?

-

Til< Collapse ol tlt Union, 1860-1861

lrM,SC not :avllil~blc doo to copyrigJII ~)ll'lcdcwu,

Wily dW thr CMI Wo.r ultilfJf1t.ely tU'IIpl in 18611

I

(ff) This icon oMII direct )
t nduringc:onciseee

n urty July 1859 a man calling himsdf b.u.c Smith rcnred n dilapidated furm· house a few miles from Harpers Ftrry. Yi1.. gin ia, the site of" a federal armory. Before long. ochr.n arrivM, including cwo young 'A"Omrn; soon they -.wrc busy unloading 6f"rttn bons of wb..u Smith rrrm«l •hm:t.~.. Although the mm SHmtd rttl~ thf: young womm ~tut: :mti.ilik, c.h.tmng • 1th thdr nrighbors, ro whom nuy~ thing Sftmt'd nonn.aL ln bet. nodtingvtu nornu.l. •smhh• w.tSUI.'W.llyj ohn B.rown, 2 brooding abolitionist with ;I price on his head foe m~ murder of proslll\~ry sealers in Kansas thrN )'CUS e:uiier in the Portaw.uonuc (f uh-WAIT-uh-mtoe) MotS.~>acre. Drown bclievtd due God had ordained him ro •purge chis land wtth blood"' ro eradicate the l'\'il of ,slavery. j oining him were a dauglucr, a daughter-in-law, three of hill sons, nnd a mixed crew of white lde:dl1it11. free blacks, and fugiti\'t

301

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OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

Sdf~ppoiottd agmt oCGod to dn troy11l:ro"ry; tT.Sporu:iblt for Pottaw<1t:Wmit Mug,:~ zs wdl as Harpers Fcny raid

J..t.. ltoWII

Primary Source: Garrison Justifies John Bro•Nn's Raid

slaw~s. The «hard~A'llrr' consisted of rifles and revolvers, which Brown and his follo~A'· ers intended to use to raid che Harpers ~rry arsenal- and ignite a slave insurrection throughout the: South. Although he: was in many~A'llys a marginal figure in che abolitionist mo•lemem he had written no stirring tracts against slavery-Bro~A'tl fascinated many eastern abolicionists, chemsdves pacifists, who W'Cre: beginning to suspect that only violence: would end slavery. They knew nothing of his plans for Harpers Ferry and accepted his disavo~A'lll of an}' role in che Kansas massacre. With chcir contributions, they endorsed Bro~A'tl's plans to carry on the fight against those who ~A'Ould forcibly turn Kansas into a slave state, in effecc accepting the use: of \i olence. O n the moonless evening of October 16, 1859, Brown and his army of eighteen seized the: arsenal and armory at Harpers ~rry and waited for slaw~s co rail}' around them and begin a massive rebellion. 1\.o.to days later, a contingent of marines under the command of Colonel Robert E. Lee stormed the armory and killed or mortally wounded alm ost all of Bro~A'tl's follo\I.I'Crs. A handful escaped but ....-ere cw:ncuall}' caprured and executed. Bro~A'tl himself v.as seriously wounded and capru.red. The anticipated- and feared- slave rebellion never happened. Although the northern abolitionists who had supported him tried co distance: themselves from the evcnc, correspondence unearthed at the farmhouse dear!}' linked chem to Bro~A'tl. During his trial, Brown rejected his 0'1'-'n fa~A')>ers' claims that he was insane and instead told his captors that he had rendered to God che "greatest seni ce: man can:'' Gradually northern opinion became more and more sympathetic to Brown, secing him as a martyr. Such opinion reached its apotheosis with the respected Ralph Waldo Emerson, who said that Brown's execution \N'Ould "make the gallo~A'S as glorious as the cross:'' Soucherners saw matters quire: differently. Brown may have botched the opera· tion, but his plan to pro\·oke a sla\>e insurrection was reminiscent of Nat 1\Jrner·s rebellion a generation earlier. 1b slaveholders, Brown's vision of uniting nonsla't>e· holding ~Afiites, free blacks, and slaves 'A'llS aUcoo plausible.: Brn'l'"n was not a lunatic bur a cool of the abolition mO\>emem that would drench the South in blood.

THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

W¥,r did tiNt Compromise of 78 50 only tempomri~ res.ohle the crisis facing tiNt Union? Ralph Waldo Emerson's grim prediction chat a U.S. \i ctor}' in the Mexican War would be like swallowing arsenic prm·ed disturbingly accurate. When the war ended in 1848, che United Statescomained an equal n umber (fifteen each) offree and sla\>e states, but the vast territory gained by che ~A'llr threatened to upset chis balance. Any solution to che question of slaver}' in che Mexican cession- a free-soil policy, extension of che Missouri Compromise line, or popular SO\>ereigmy- cnsurcd comrO\•ersy. The prospect of free soil angered souchern~ whereas extension of che Missouri Compromise line antagonized free-soil northerners as W'Cll as southern extremists who proclaim ed chat Congress could not bar slavery's expansion. l'opular SO\'er· eigmy offered che greatest hope for compromise b}' taking the question of sla\>er}'

I

TH E COMPIIOlllSE Of 18so

3 03

Treaty of c.r.dalup..Hidalgo l!flds Mexican Wllf; rr...Soi party lormed; Zachary Tay\1>' eleded president california seEts admission to the Union asa free state Nashville corwention assemb~ 10 discuss the South's wievances; Corlllf'OOlise of lB.SO Harriet Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom's Cobin; Franklin Pierce elected president Gadsden Purchase Ostend ManitesiO; Jansas-N
John BrDMI's raid on Harpers Ferry Ab"""m Lincoo ~- Pf'sidenl; South Cllfolina socedes from the Union The r<maining Lo..r So.-11 slales Sl'Cede; Conlederale Slales of Amenca est.lbished; Critenden compromise plan collapses; LincOO takes office; Fling on Fort S11111er. Civi war begins; Upper Sotrlh secedes

ouc of national policies and handing it to each territory, buc chis notion pleased nei· ther free-soil nor proslavery excremists. As the rhetoric escalated, t:\-ents plun~d che nation imo crisis. Utah and then California, both acquired from Mexico, sought admission to the Union as free states. Tex~ admicted co the Union as a slave state in 1845, aggravated matters by claiming the eastern half of New Mexico, thus potentiall)' Opcning the door to sla\'er)"S exten· sion into other newly acquired territor}'· By 1850 other issues had become intertwined ~Aith territorial questions. Norcherners had gro~A'tl increasingly unhappy with slaver}' in the District of Columbia, within the shadow of the Capitol; southerners complained about lax enforcemenc of the f ugitive Sla\J'C Act of 1793. Any broad compromise would ha\-e to take boch mat· ters imo account.

President Zachary Ta)1or believed that the South must not kindle the issue of slavery in che territories, because neicher New Mexico nor Californ ia was suited for slaver}'· Taylor's position differed significand)' from che thinking behind thestill-
Zldllry Taylor lillie Hell!

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CHAPtER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

California to apply for admission as a free scare, bypassing che territorial stage, and hinted that he expected New Mexico (where che Mexican g~rnmenc had abolished sla\~ry) to do che same. This strategy appeared to offer a quick, practical solucion co the problem ofextending slavery. 1'he North would gain cwo new free states, and the: Souch would gain acceptance of the righc of the: individual state to bar or pmnit sla\~ry as it chose. 1'his was che: very fou ndation of che South's defense of sla\~r)', its armor against the onslaught of the: abolitionists. Nothing in the: Consticucion for· bade a state to act one: ~A>ay or the ocher on slaw~ry. But southerners rejected Taylor's plan. Notonl}' would ic )i dd che Wilmot Pro· viso's goal- the banning of slavery from the lands acquired from Mexico- but it rested on che shak}' assumption char slavery could never cake root in California or Ne~A' Mexico. Southerners also protested the addition of two ne:~A' free states. "If"~ are to be reduced to a mere handful .. . wo, wo, I sa}' to chis Union," j ohn C. Calhoun warned. Disillusioned with Taylor, a slawholder from ~Athom they had expected bet· ter, nine: southern states agreed co send d elegates to a convecntion co meet in Nash· \i lle in june 1850.

Had Taylor held a stronger position in che Whig party, he: mighc have blunted mounting southern opposition. But man}' leading Whigs had never accepted this political nO\'· ice, and in carl}' 1850 Kenrucky senator Henry Clay challenged Ta}tfor's leadership by forging a compromise bill to resolve the: whole range ofcontentious issues. Clay pro· posed (J) che admission of California as a free scare; (2) the d ivision of the: remainder of the Mexican cession into two territories, New Mexico and Utah, without federal restrictions on sla\'ety.: (3) che settlement of rhe 1t:xas-New Mexico boundary dis· pute on terms favorable to New Mexico; (4) as a pot s"-eetener for 1Cxas, an agr«:· menc that the federal gm--ernmem ~A'Ou ld assume the: stare's large public debe; (S) continuation of slavery in che District of Columbia but abolicion of che sla\~ trade; and (6) a more effective fugitive sla\~ Law. Clay rolled aUchrse proposals into a single "omnibus" bilL The debates 0\'Ct the: compromise bill during late winter and early spring 1850 marked the last major ap· pcarance on the: public stage of day, Calhoun, and Webster, che crio ~A•ho had stood at the: cencerof American political life since the: War of 18 12. Clay, ever the condlia· tor, warned the Souch against the l'\i ls of secession and assured the: Norrh that na· ture would check the spread of slavery. Gaunt and gloomy, the d)ing Calhoun listened as another senator read Calhoun's address for him, a repetition of his warn· ings char only if the: Nonh treated the: South as an equal could the Union survive. \l'ebster spoke \i vidl)' in fa\'Or of compromise, «not as a Massachuscrts man, nor as a Northern man, bur as an American;'' and chided the North for tr}ing to «reenact the will of God" by excluding sla\~ry from the Mexican cession. Strident voices countered these attempts at conciliation. 1'he: ancislavery Whig William Seward (SOO-urd) of New York enraged southerners b)• talk ing of a "higher law than the: Consdrucion"- namely, che will of God against the extension of slavery. e..-en as the Union faced its \l'Otstcrisis since 1789, cvcncs in summer 1850 cased the way toward resolution. When the Nash\i lle com~mion met in June, only nine of the 611-een sla\~ stat~ primarily in the l.oY~Cr South, sent delegates. Despite the:

Henry Clay Proposes 1 Compromise

I

THe COMPIIOlllSE Of 18so

3 OS

Map IU Tht Compromise ol1850

VJ""~AIIOIIY

·~

The Compromi5oe of 1850 ;admitted C~forni;a ;a5- ;a ff't'e st;Ue. Ut:~h :~nd New Mcxic:o~f't' left open to sl ~ry or ff't"t'dom ;)«Ording to the principle of popul :~r $0'o'Cf't'igtlty.

reckless pronouncements of the «firHatcrs"' (extreme advocates of «southern rights"'), moderates dominated. Then Zachary Taylor celebrated coo extravagantly on j uly 4 and d ied five days facer of a stomach ailment. His successor, Millard Fill· more: of New York, supported Cla)"S compromise. f inal!)', Senator Stephen A. Doug· las of Illinois took o\·er su:wardship of the compromise. He broke the omnibus into a series of individual measures; to secure Democratic support, Douglas proposed that popular SO\"C.reigntysettlc the sla\'f:r}' issue in Nt:~A' Mexico and Utah. These tac· tics worked. By summer's end the CompromJse of 1850 had become reality.

,. . . . . ..,,aso ,__ l

dio:h ott.Umpt to p>~per OlfTX the Wue or~ty ap;am.:ion; ulrimatdy ~ f.Uiure

Although President Fillmore hailed the compromise as a fi nal settlement of soccional issue~ it failed to bridge the u ndcrl)ing differences bern-ecn North and South. South· erncrs had \'Oted against the admission of California and northerners against the Fugitive: Sla\-e Ac[. Each section could claim victories fro m the compromise. Northern victories \1/Cre: d ear: admission of California and abolicion of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Ho~A'CVCr, southern victories, such as the stricter fugitive sla\J'C Law, ~A'Cre clouded b)•the legislators' failure to resolve che issue ofcongressional authority o•..-e:r slaver}' in territories o utside the Mexican cession. Southerners therefore reacted ambivalcnd)' to theCompromiseof JSSO. In scate elections during fall 1850 and JSSJ, procompromisc candidates generally thrashed the fa~A"s opponents. At the same time, even Unionists in Georgia wrote the cdc· brated Georgia platform, which threatened secession if Congress pro hibited slavery in the Mexican cession or repealed the Fugiti\J'C Slave Act. And the South•s one d ear victory, the passage of a new, more stringent fugitive slave: latA', quickly prm•e:d a mixed blessing. Few sla\·es had b«n taken imo the Mexican cession, so the question of slaver}' there had a hypothetical quality. But the issu es raised by the new fugitive slave latA' were concrete:: real southerners ~A'Ould pursue real fugith·es-on northern

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OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

soil. Average nort herners to whom slaver}' had been an abscraction would respond co this new reality wir.h fur}'·

ftgitive Slrft Ad

Northern moderates accepted t he Fugitive S lave Act of 1850 as the price of saving che Union, but the law out· raged antislaw~ry norchcrners. lc denied alleged fugitives the right of trial by jut)', forbade them co testify at their ()'l.'.· n trials, permitced chcir rerum to slavery merely on che testimony of a claimanc, and enabled court-appointed commissioners to collect ten dollars if t hey ruled for che slaveholder but o nly 6ve if they ruled for che fugicivc. As one commentator noted, lhe latA' threacened to turn the North into "one vast hunting ground:'' It targeced all runaways, putting ac risk €\'eO fugitives who had lived as free: blacks fo r thir ty }'ears or more. Abo\-e all, lhe law brought home to northerners t he uncomfortable truth of t heir own complicity in slavery's concinuarion. By legalizing lhe activities of slave-catchers on norchcrn soil, t he law re· minded northerners that slavery was a national problem, not merd)' a southern inscirurion. Efforcs co catch and recurn runa~A'llys inflamed emotions in bo(h Nonh and Sout h. In 185 4 a Boston mob aro used by antislavery speeches killed a counhouse guard in an abortive efforc to re.sc:ue fugith-e slave An· thony Burns. Determined to enforce t he law, !'resident Franklin Pie:n::e sent federal croops to escorc Burns to che harbor, where a ship carried him back co slavery. As five platoons of lroops marched Burns to the ship, fifty thousand people lined t he streets. The Burns inddenc shattered the com· placency ofconscrvath-e supporters of the Compromise of 1850. «We ~A'Cfl t to bed one night old fashioned conservative Compromise Union Whigs," -Doa&toss lCXtile manufacru.rer Amos A lawrence wrote, "and waked up scark mad Born i:nto $l;a..vy, Fr~derid( Oougl:us bec;~me :. eomm:.t~di ng Abolitioniscs.'" or:.to r :.nd v.Titer in the 1840~ ;and Northerners devised ~A'llys co interfere wich lhe e nforcement of t he Fu18 50s.. He bitterly ;ttUd:td the gitive Slave Act...Vigilance" committees spirited endangered blacks to Can· f ugitive Sl;tvt' Aet. The onlyw.:.y ada, la~A')'ers dragged out hearings to raise slave-catchers' expenses, and co m:.k the law ;a "d ea d lette r," "personal liberty laws" hindered state officials' enforcement of che law. hevow~d , w.n to make "na ir:. These obstruccionist tactics convinced southerners that che ..victory" rep· donn o r more dud kid napper~... resented by lhe passage of the Fugitive Slave Ace was increasjngl)' illusory.

H;u-,.h me.uul't' ~lklwing rt&:.lpWR' of t.suptd slaW$; putolCompm. mile of 1850; alimo~.ttd lllll't b. emt:rs and southc-men ;alilt

fltt
l

abaut ~ry. had enormous political imp;~«

Prima:ry Source: Harriet Beectter

Stmw Portrays Slavery's Brutality

Harriet Beecher Sto~A'l''s no\-el Uru16 Tom's CtJbin ( 1852) drummed up wide nort hern suppon for fugicive slaves. Sto\1/C, che daughter of famed evangelical Lyman B~cher, greeted the Fugiriw Slave Act with horror. In one of che n()I.'CI's most memorable scenes, she depicted lhe slave Eliza,. clutching her in fane son, bounding to freedom across ice floes o n the Ohio Ri\•ct. Slaver}' itsdfwas StO'I'-·e's main mrgct. Much of her nm--el's po""-·er deri\-es from its view chat good intentions mean little in che fuce of so evil an insticucion. The good intentions of a kindl)' slaw owner die ~A'ith him, and Unde Tom is sold to lhe vicious Yankee Simon Legree, who whips 1bm to deach. Sto\1/C also played effcccivdy co che emocions of her audience by demonstrating how sla\-ery ripped slave families aparc.

llllde Tom's Clbin

3 06

OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

soil. Average nort herners to whom slaver}' had been an abscraction would respond co this new reality wir.h fur}'·

ftgitive Slrft Ad

Northern moderates accepted t he Fugitive S lave Act of 1850 as the price of saving che Union, but the law out· raged antislaw~ry norchcrners. lc denied alleged fugitives the right of trial by jut)', forbade them co testify at their ()'l.'.· n trials, permitced chcir rerum to slavery merely on che testimony of a claimanc, and enabled court-appointed commissioners to collect ten dollars if t hey ruled for che slaveholder but o nly 6ve if they ruled for che fugicivc. As one commentator noted, lhe latA' threacened to turn the North into "one vast hunting ground:'' It targeced all runaways, putting ac risk €\'eO fugitives who had lived as free: blacks fo r thir ty }'ears or more. Abo\-e all, lhe law brought home to northerners t he uncomfortable truth of t heir own complicity in slavery's concinuarion. By legalizing lhe activities of slave-catchers on norchcrn soil, t he law re· minded northerners that slavery was a national problem, not merd)' a southern inscirurion. Efforcs co catch and recurn runa~A'llys inflamed emotions in bo(h Nonh and Sout h. In 185 4 a Boston mob aro used by antislavery speeches killed a counhouse guard in an abortive efforc to re.sc:ue fugith-e slave An· thony Burns. Determined to enforce t he law, !'resident Franklin Pie:n::e sent federal croops to escorc Burns to che harbor, where a ship carried him back co slavery. As five platoons of lroops marched Burns to the ship, fifty thousand people lined t he streets. The Burns inddenc shattered the com· placency ofconscrvath-e supporters of the Compromise of 1850. «We ~A'Cfl t to bed one night old fashioned conservative Compromise Union Whigs," -Doa&toss lCXtile manufacru.rer Amos A lawrence wrote, "and waked up scark mad Born i:nto $l;a..vy, Fr~derid( Oougl:us bec;~me :. eomm:.t~di ng Abolitioniscs.'" or:.to r :.nd v.Titer in the 1840~ ;and Northerners devised ~A'llys co interfere wich lhe e nforcement of t he Fu18 50s.. He bitterly ;ttUd:td the gitive Slave Act...Vigilance" committees spirited endangered blacks to Can· f ugitive Sl;tvt' Aet. The onlyw.:.y ada, la~A')'ers dragged out hearings to raise slave-catchers' expenses, and co m:.k the law ;a "d ea d lette r," "personal liberty laws" hindered state officials' enforcement of che law. hevow~d , w.n to make "na ir:. These obstruccionist tactics convinced southerners that che ..victory" rep· donn o r more dud kid napper~... resented by lhe passage of the Fugitive Slave Ace was increasjngl)' illusory.

H;u-,.h me.uul't' ~lklwing rt&:.lpWR' of t.suptd slaW$; putolCompm. mile of 1850; alimo~.ttd lllll't b. emt:rs and southc-men ;alilt

fltt
l

abaut ~ry. had enormous political imp;~«

Prima:ry Source: Harriet Beectter

Stmw Portrays Slavery's Brutality

Harriet Beecher Sto~A'l''s no\-el Uru16 Tom's CtJbin ( 1852) drummed up wide nort hern suppon for fugicive slaves. Sto\1/C, che daughter of famed evangelical Lyman B~cher, greeted the Fugiriw Slave Act with horror. In one of che n()I.'CI's most memorable scenes, she depicted lhe slave Eliza,. clutching her in fane son, bounding to freedom across ice floes o n the Ohio Ri\•ct. Slaver}' itsdfwas StO'I'-·e's main mrgct. Much of her nm--el's po""-·er deri\-es from its view chat good intentions mean little in che fuce of so evil an insticucion. The good intentions of a kindl)' slaw owner die ~A'ith him, and Unde Tom is sold to lhe vicious Yankee Simon Legree, who whips 1bm to deach. Sto\1/C also played effcccivdy co che emocions of her audience by demonstrating how sla\-ery ripped slave families aparc.

llllde Tom's Clbin

3 08

OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

would conV\'.rc two million people to antisla\'er}', it did push many wa\-erers coward a more aggressively antisouthern and antislavery seance and forced others at lease co look at this uncomfortable issue.

CHECKI NG I N The Comprumiu- o( 1850 brough t Cilif'orn ia inro the Un ion and at· t<"mpted to postpone' any fu rther dealing with the exp.an,ion of .da'"''l'· T he compcomi.se w.u p:u,ed by a seriu o( coilihoru, not a united

Coni"*""· T he compcomi.se did not """olw deep divU:ioru, and the n -, Jtrin· gent Fugiti"" Sla\>e Act wmuoned North·South rdation, ,

Unrlr 10m's CAbin h ad an tnor mou' impact on non:h«n popular opinion again't dav~-1)'. The \l' hig pan:y fugmm ttd o'A'r the campromi't a nd lo-M tht dtchon of 1852 b)· a widt 1t1argin..

lhe Fugitive Slaw Ace fragmented the Whig party. Northern Whigs took the lead in defying the law, and southern \'t1higs had a difficult time explain· ing away the power ofvocal free--soil Whigs. In 1852 the Whigs' nomination of Mexican-American War hero General Winfield Scott as their presidential candidate widened the sectional split in the party. Although a Virginian, Scott O""-'ed his nomination co the northern free-soil Whigs. His single, feeble statement endorsing che Compromise of 1850 undercut southern Whigs crying to portray che Democrats as the party of disunion and themselves as che party of both slavery and the Union. 11le Democrats bridged their o"''tl sectional division by nominating Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, a dark-horse candidate whose: chief at· traction was chat no faction of the party violently opposed him. Northern and southern Democrats alike mllied behind the Compromise of J8SO and behind the ideal of popular sowreignty, and Pim::e won a smashing victory. In che most one-sided election since 1820, he carried ~'enty-scvcn of the thirty-one states and collected 254 of 296 electoral voces.

Tile Eleclioll of 1152

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SECOND PARlY SYSTEM,

1853-1856 W¥,r did tiNt Wb;gparty disint6fPk, and what Wl!'nt the consequencn?

. . . . .. pM1y P.vty, oppo$C'd to JbYery expamiao, tbat tmttgl'd afttr Whig party's diJintegraricm;Jtrong io North, llOUC'XiJII.I'nt in South

Franklin Pim::e was the last presidential candidate co carry the popular and electoral vote in both Norch and South until Franklin D. Roose:vdts\l-epc into office in 1932. Pierce also became the lase president co hold office under che second party S}'Stem- Whigs against Democrats. Within four years of Pierce's election, the Whig party would disintegrate, to be replaced b)• ~-o ne'\1.-comers, the American (Kno"''· Noching) party and che RtpubUc.an parry. Unlike che Whig~ the Republican party "''lls a purely sectional, northern party, dra"''ing its support from both former Whigs and discontented Democrats. T he Democrats survived as a national party, but wich a base so shrunken in the: North that the nN·born Republican partycaprured rwo-chirds of the free scares in che election of 1856. For decades the second party system had kept the conflict over slavery in check by providing Americans olher issues to argue about- banking. internal imprm-·e· mencs, tariffs, and temperance. By the 1850s the debate O\'er slaV\'.ry extension owrshado"''l'd such issues and exposed raw divisions in each party. Whigs, "'1th chcir larger, more aggressive free-soil wing, were much more vulnerable to disr uption than the Democrats. 11m~ when Stephen A. Douglas put forch a proposal in 1854 co or· ganiu the vast Nebraska Territory with no restrictions on slaver}', he ignited a 6re· storm that consumed the Whig parry.

I ThE COUAPSE Of THE SECOND PAJUY SVSTtM, 185J- 18j6 Signed in fate .N1a)' 1854, the: Kansas-Nebraska Act shat· cered the: alre:ady-~A'Cakene:d second party S)'Stem and trig· gered renewed sectional strife:. The bill's roots Ia)' in t he s~mingl)' uncomrM'Ct'Sial desire of farmers to organize: t he: large: territory ~A'CSt of Iowa and Missouri. Railroad ent husiasts who dreamed of a rail line linking the: Mid· W'CSt to che Pad fic also ~A>anted che territory organized.

I

3 09

~ Ad t\m'mpt to ;allow popubr SO\"no:ig:nr.y in oe-tyorpni:t.ing tr:rriwM

In january 1854 Democratic senator Seephen A. Douglas of Illinois proposed a bill co organize Nebraska as a territory. Douglas beliew~d thaca railroad co the Pacific ~A
a railroad-based western expansion ~A
Amid che clamor 0\'et his bill, Douglas ruefully obsen~d that he could now travd co C hicago b)• the light of his own burning effigies. Neither a fool nor a political novice, he was the victim of a political bombshell- fru soil- that exploded under his feet. Support for free soil united many "'tho agreed on little d se. Many free-soilers W\'.re racists who opposed allowing any African-Americans, slave or free, into t he West. Ochers repudiated slavery on moral grounds and rejected blacandy racist leg· islation. Although split 0\'Cr the morality of slavery, most free-soilers agreed that slaver}' impeded whites' progress. Because a slave U'Orked for nothing, free-sailers claimed, no free Laborer could compete with a slaV\'.. If slavery secured a toehold in Kansas, free-soilers warned, Minnesota \l'OUld fall to slavery as "''Cll. The Kansas-Nebraska Act, in free--sailers' opinion, was «a pare of a continuous mOV\'.ment of slaveholders to ad\•ance sla\~ry O\~r the entire North." Free-soilers saw southern planters, southern politicians, and chcir northern dupes, such as Stephen A. Douglas, entangled in a gigantic conspirac}' to extend slavery.

lnteracti\•e Map: The KansasNebraska Act,. 1854

MI.Wl':mrnt appo~d 10 any e:qqruion of11l:ro"ry

llrMstil

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OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

The Ebblnt of Mlnllest IJestily

The uproar m-er the Kansas-Nebraska Ace embarrassed the l'ierce administration. It also doomed Manifest Des· tiny, the: one issue that had held the Democrats cogecher

in the J840s. Franklin Pierce: had come to office championing Manifest Destin)', but increas· ing sectional ri\•alries sidetracked his efforts. In 1853 his emissar}' j ames Gadsden negotiated che purchase ofa strip of land south of che Gila River (now souchern Ari· zona and part of southern New Mexico), an acquisition fa\'ored by achrocates of a southern railroad rouce: to the Pad6c. f ierce opposicion to the Gadsden Purchase: CCV\':ale:d mounting frct:·soilers' suspicions of expansion, and the Senate: appro\·ed the treaty only after slashing nine thousand square miles fro m the purchase. The: sectional rivalries beginning co engulf the Nebraska bill d early threatened any pro· posal to gain ne~A' territory. Cuba provided even more .,;\'id proof of the change in public attirudes toward expansion. In 1854 a former Mississippi governor, j ohn A. Quitman, planned a fili· buster (an u nofficial militar}•expedition) to seize Cuba from Spain. Pierce wanted co acquire Cuba and rna}' first have encouraged Q uinnan's plans, but che president backed down in the: face of nonhero opposition. Northerners sa~A' the filibuster as anocher manifestation of the Sla\'t: Po~Aw's conspiracy to grab more territor}' for the: South's ..peculiar institution.'" Events, however, slipped out ofPien::e:'s controL In October 1854 che American ambassadors co Great Britain, France:, and Spain, two of them southern~ met in Belgium and issu ed the unofficial Ostend Manifesto, calling on the: United States co acquire Cuba by an}' means, including force. Despite che Pierce: administration's dis.wowal of the Ostend Manifesto, che idea of expansion inco the Caribbean continued to attract southerners, including the: Tennessee-born adventurer William Walker. Between J8S3 and 1860, the)'c at a firing squad in Honduras (hahn·OURE-uss) executed him, Walker led a succession offili· bustcring expeditions inco Mexico and Nicaragua (nee·ka·RAH·gwa). Taking advan· tage of civil chaos in Nicaragua,. he made himself the: chief political force there, reinsciruted slaver)', and talked of making Nicaragua a U.S. colon}'· Although some: southerners were against expansion-among them the Louisi· ana sugar planters who opposed acquiring Cuba because Cuban sugar would com· pete with their product-souche:m expansionists stirred up enough commotion co worry antislavery northerners that the South aspired to establish a Caribbean sla\'t: empire. Like a card in a poker game:, the threat of expansion southward 'A'llS all the: more menacing for not being plared As long as che debate on the extension of slavcry focused o n the continental United States, prospects fo r expansion ~A'Cre limited. HoW'L'VCr, adding the wild card of Caribbean territor}' chan~d all calculacions.

While straining Democratic u nity, che: Kansas-Nebraska Act ~A'fecked che Whig party. Although Democrats lost ground in che 1854 congressional elections, che Whigs 1154-1855 failed to benefit. No matter how furious the freMOil Dem· ocrats ~Aocre ac Douglas for introducing the ace, chey could not forget that southern Whigs had supported him. Northern Whigs split inro two camps: antisla\'t:r}' ..Con· science" Whigs, led by Senator William Se'A'llrd of New York, and conse.vatives, led

TbeWblp Dlslntearate.

I ThE COUAPSE Of THE SECOND PAJUY SVSTtM, 185J- 18j6

311

by former president Millard Fillmore. Theconscwarives believed that che Wh ig party had to adhere co che Compromise of 1850 to maintain itself as a national party. This deep divis ion within che Whig party repelled antisla..-e:r}' Democrats and prompted anrisla\~ry \'t'higs to look fo r an alternative party. By 1856 the new Republican party "''Ould become home for these ancislaV\'.ry refugees.: howc'lcr, in 1854 and 1855 the American, or Know-Nothing, party e merged as t he: principal alternative to the faltering established parties.

Tilt lise and Filii of

1111 ~otlliags. 1153- 1156

The Know-Nothings t'\'01\·ed o ut of a nativist organ· izacion, the Order of the Star~Spangl ed Banner (sec Chapter 13). (T he: party's popular name: deri.,.ed from its

l

~incs N;~.ci\ist polrty that mjo)otd brkf Slltgll' of pc-.r in t..Uiy 18505

members' standard response: co inquiries about its activi· ties: .. , know nothing.") It was one of many such societies that mushroomed in response to the unprecedented immigracion of the 1840s. It sought to rid che United States of immigrant and Catholic political influence by pressuring che exis ting par· ties to appoint only native--born l'rotestanrs co office and to extend che naturalization period before immigrants could vote. Winfield Scott's campaign for che presidenq• in 1852 had alienated many nati\'· ists, who had previously \'Oted Whig. Trying co revitalize: his badl)' split party, Scott had courted che tradicionall)' Democratic Catholic vote. Most Catholics had voced for Franklin Pierce, but many nacivists bailed out of the Whig party. The KansasNebraska Ace cemented nativist allegiance co the Know-Nothings, opposed boch to the extension of slaver}' and to Cacholicism. An obsessh-e fear ofconspiracies u nified the Know-Nothings. lhcy simultaneousl)' deno unced a papal conspiracy agains t t he American republic and a Slaw Po~A'Cr conspiracy reaching its temades throughout the United Stares. The Know-Nothings enjo)'Cd a meteoric rise: and an equally rapid fall. For exam· pie, in 1854 they capcured t he governorship, almost the encire state: legis lature, and all the congressional sears of Massachusetts. Such Kno~A•·Nothing successes wrecked Whig hopes of capitaliting on hostility to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. By 1856 t he Know-Nochings had become a falling star soon ro plummet below the horizon. They proved as vulnerable to se<eional conflicts over slawry as t he Whigs. In 1855 sout hern Kno~A•-Noching~ main!)' proslawry former Whigs, combined with northern conse:rvacives to make acceptance: ofche Kansas-Nebraska Ace pare ofthe Know-Nothing placform, blurring the attraction of Kno~A•-Nochingism to norchern voters who were more antislaver}' chan anci.Catholic. Chief beneficiary of the Kno~A•-Noching dilemma 'A'llS the emerging Republican party, which had no southern wing to blur irs antislaver}' message. One Whig refugee, Illinois congressman Abraham Lincoln, asked pointed!)', "How can anyone who abhors che oppression of negroes be in fa\'Or of degrading d asses of white people?'" «We began by declaring;'' Lincoln continued, "-that •au men are created equal.' We: now practically read it 'all men are created equal except ne· groes.' When the Know-Nothings get control, it will read ' all men are created equal, except Negroes and Foreigners and Catholics.'" E\-en most Know-Nothings concluded thac ..neither the Pope nor che foreigners ever can govern che councry or endanger irs libercies, but the slavebreeders and slavNnders do govern it, and chreaten to put an end to all government but theirs."' Consequently che Know-Nothings prm-'ed www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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CHAPtER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

vulnerable to the: challenge posed by the emerging Republican Party, which did not officially embrace nativism and had no southern "'1ng to placate.

Born in the chaotic aftermath of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, che: Republican party "''Ould become che main opposi· tion to che Democratic party b)• 1856 and would win each ~. 1155-1856 presidential election from 1860 until 1884. In 1855, ho"''· C\-er, few "-'Ould have predicted such a bright furure. Although united in opposition to the Kansas·Ne:braska Act, the fledgling party "''as host co conservati\'e:S who wanted co restore che Missouri Compromise:, radicals "'oho had been part of the Ub· erty party abolitioniscs, and a si:zable middle of free--soilers. Building organizations at che scare: IC\-el was esse:mial, for state issues often shaped voters' allegiances. 11le Know·Nothings, for example, linked support for temperance, strong at the: state le:\·el, "'1th anti·Catholidsm and antislawry. f re· qumdy, ancis lavery ..ucers were also protcmperance and anti·Cacholic, believing that addiction to alcohol and submission co che pope W\'.re boch forms ofensla..-ement co be eradicated. Competing "'1th che Know-Nothings for these intensely moralistic voters at the state level, Republicans faced a dilemma: if tht)' attacked the Kno"''· Nothings for stressing anci-Cacholicism 0\'\'.r antisla\'e:r)', chey might W'CII alienace the voters, but if they compro mised "'1th the Know·Nothings, they might "-'ell lose their own identity as a party. Alternately attacking and condliating. che Republicans succeeded in some scare deccions in 1855 but lost ground as popular ire against the Kansas-Nebraska Act cooled. By che start of 1856 they "''l'J"e organized in only half che northern states and lacked any national organizacion. The: Republicans desperatd)' needed something co make vocers more concerned about the Slave PoW\'.r chan abouc rum or Catholicism. Salvation for che nascent party came in che form of violence in Kansas, "'ohich quick!)' became knO"-·n as .. Bleeding Kansas."'This violence united the party around its free· soil center, intensified antisla..-er}' feelings, and boosted Republican fortunes. In the "''llke: of the Kansas-Nebraska Ace, Boston abolitionists had organized a company to send antisla..-er}' seeders into Kansas, but most of the territory's carl)' seeders came from Missouri or ocher pares of che Midu-e:st. Ftw of these opposed sla\-e:ryon moral grounds. Some supported sla\'ety; others wance:d co keep all African· Americans ouc of Kansas. Despite most seeders' racist leanings and hatred of abolitioniscs, Kansas became: a battleground bmwe:n prosla..-e:ry and antisla..-er}' forces. In March 1855 thousands of prosla..-er}' Missouri «border ruffians" crossed into Kansas to vote illegally in the: 6rs.t elections for the territorial legislature. Drawing rt:\'Oh'et'S, they quickly silenced judges who challenged their right to vote in Kansas. Ironically, prosla..-er}' forces probably would haw won an honest election. But the: proslave:r}' legislature estab· lished in 1855 in Lecompton, Kansas, operated under a cloud of fraud. 1'he l.ccomp· ton legislature shredded what little good reputation it had b)• passing a series of outrageous laws, punishing che harboring of fugitive slaves with em )'cars' imprison· menc, and making che dn::ulation ofabolicionist literature: a capital offense. The legislature's actions sec off a chain reaction. In summer 1855 free--staters, including many who had been aroused ro oppose che Lecompton legislature, organ· ized a rival go..-e:mme:nt at Topeka. In May 1856 the: Lecompton gMunmmt dis·

Tbe lleplbtiCM Party •!be Crisis In

I ThE COUAPSE Of THE SECOND PAJUY SVSTtM, 185J- 18j6

313

parched a posse to la"''frcnce, where some fre~scacers were organizing a militia. Antis lavery minister Henr}' Ward Beecher had urged char rifles would do more chan Bibles to enforce morality in Kansas, and che militias christmed cheir guns "Beecher's Bibles:''l'he Ltcom pton posse, bearing banners emblazoned «Southern rights" and «Let Yankees tremble and abolitionists fall;'' tore through Lawrence, burning buildings and destroying two priming presses. There "''Cre no death~ but Republicans immediately dubbed the inddcnc "the sack of la"''fencc." The next mm-e belonged co j ohn Bro"''tl• a Connecticut-born abolitionist "'ith an O\'trpo"'wing sense of divind}' ordained mission. The "sack'' of lawrence con· vinced Brown chac God now beckoned him «co break the jaws of che "'i cked." In late Ma)', Bro"''tlled st\'l'fl men, including his four sons and his son-in-law, ro"''llrd Pot· tawatomic Creek near lawrence. They s hot to dcach one man associated with the Ltcom pton g()'IICrnmcnc and hacked four others co picces wich broadswords. Brown's "l:tottawatomie Massacre" cerri6ed souchcrncrs and transformed Bleeding Kansas into a batd eground becwcen North and South. Popular sovereignty had failed in Kansas. Instead of resolving the issue of the extension ofs lavery, popular sm-ercigmy had institutionalized the d ivision m-er sla\'· cry by creating two ri..•al gm-ernmencs. lhe l'icrcc administration com pounded its problems, and Kansas's, by denouncing the antisla't'tr)•l'o peka gMwnmmt and recognizing the proslaver}' Ltcom pton g()'IICrnmcnt, t hus forcing northern Democrats into the awkward appearance of supporting the «Bogus l.cgislacurr' at Lecompton. Nor did popular sm-·ereigncy keep che slavery issue out of politics. On the day before the proslavery attack on Lawrence, Republican senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts delivered a wrathful specch, "1'he Crime Against Kan~" in "'thich he \-erball)' lashed the Senate for its complicity in slavery. Sumner singled out Smator Andn..""\l' Butler of South Carolina for making "the harlot, slavery" his mistress. 1\vo days Iacer, a relative of Buder, Democratic representative l'resron Brooks of South Carolina, strode into the Senate chamber and beat Sumner wich a cane. The hollow cane broke after 6...-e or six blows, but Sumner, who required stitches, took three years to recuperate. Brooks immediately bccamc a hero in che South. Fragments of his cane W\'.re prized as relics, and the City of Charleston presented him a new cane inscribed "Hit him again."' No"'•"Bieeding Kansas'" and "Bleeding Sumner'" united the Nort h. The«sack"of lawrmce, President Pierce's recognition of che prosla\-ery Lecom pton go\-ernmcnc, and Brooks's actions seemed to dinch the Republican argument that an aggrcssi\-e sla\-eocracy was in power and holding "'thite northerners in concempc.. By denounc· ing the Slave l'ml-er racher than s la\'cty, the Republicans sidestepped the divisi\-e question of slavery's morality. Instead, chey focused on portraying planters as arrogant arisrocra~ the naruralmemies of chc laboring people of the North.

The presidential race of 1856 r~:VCal ed the scope of the political realignmmt of che preceding few }'tars. l'he Rc· publicans, in their 6rst presidential contest, nominated John C. Frtmont, the "pathfinder" of California .. Bear State'" fame. Nort hern KnowNothings also endorsed Frtmont, while southern Kno"'•· Nothings nominated Millard Fillmore, the last Whig president. The Democrats dumped the battered Pim:e for James Buchanan (b)'oo-CM-un) ofPcnns}1Vania, "'tho had had the luck to

Tile Election of 18S6

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CHAPtER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

be our of the countr}' (as min ister to Great Britain) during the Kansas.-Nebraska fu· ror. A signer of the Ostend Manifesto, Buchanan was popular in the: South. CHECKI NG I N 11le campaign became: two separate races: Fremont \~rsus Buchanan in the free states and Fillmore: \'Cf'S.US Buchanan in the slave: states. Buchanan The Kan,;u ·Nebr;~.do:..l Act $t't offa was in effect the only national candidate. Although Fremont attracted wide ll re"·scor m of con u'O'o'C'-11')'. su pport in the North and Fillmore equal supporc in the South, Buchanan The free-Soil mO\'C'-men t $ti'C'-ngth· carried enough voces in both Norch and South to win the presidency. C"ned ;u the" Whitp 'plin tered 0\\"f the~t. 11le election of 1856 made chree faces d ear. f irst, the American party The "'KnOYI"N
THE CRISIS O F THE U NION, 1857-1860

I

Wlwt major issues dominated American politics from 1857 to 1860?

Noone C\o-cr accused james Buchanan of impulsiveness or fanaticism. Although a moderate ~Aoho wished to avoid comrO\•ersy, Buchanan would preside O\'et one of the mo.sc comrovet'S}'·ridden administrations in American history. A Supreme Court decision concerning Dred Scott, a Missouri slave who had resided in free territor}' for SC\~ral )~ars; the creation of the prosla\'ety l.ecompcon conscirution in Kansas; the raid by j ohn Brown on Harpers ~rry, Virginia; and secession itself would wrack Buchanan's administration. 11le fo rces driving the nation aparc were spinning out of control by 1856, and Buchanan could not scop them. By his inauguration, south· erners saw cr«ping abolitionism in the guise of free soil, and northerners detected an C'\o-cr more insatiable Slai,!'C PoW\'.r. Once: these potent images took hold in the minds ofche American people:, politicians could do litde co erase them.

l'ledged to congressional "noninterferencr' ~Atith sla\~f}' in che territories, Buchanan looked to the courts fo r reso· lution of che \~Xatious issue of sla\'ery's extension. A cas.t that appeared to promise a solution had been ~Atinding its wa}' through the courts for )'tatS; o n March 6, 1857, two da)'S after Buchanan's inauguration, the S upreme Court handed down its decision in Dred Srottv. Sttndford. During the 1830s his master had taken Dred Scotc, a sla\~, from the sla\'e stare of Missouri into Illinois and the \'trlSconsin 1trri tor}~ both d osed co slavery. After his master's death, Scott sued for his freedom on the grounds of his residence in free terri[ory.

I

THE O IStSOFlNE UIOOK, 185~86o

The Court faced two key questions. Did Scott's residence in fret: territory during the 1830s make him free? Did Scott, again enslaved in Missouri, hai,!'C the right co sue in the federal courts? The Supreme Court could haw neatly sidestepped conmm~rsy by ruling that Scotc had no right co sue, but it chose not to. Instead, Chief j ustice Roger B. laney, a st\~nty·nine-year-old Marylander, handed down a S~Attping decision char touched off another fire-storm. First, laney wroce, Scotc, a slave, could noc sue for his freedom. Further, no black, whcthcr a slave or a free descendant of slaves, could become a U.S. citizen. Contin uing his incendi· ar}' opinion, Taney ruled chat e\~ n had Scott bct:n emid ed to sue, his residence in free cer.ritor)•did not make him free, because che Missouri Compromise, whose pro· visions prohibited slaver}' in che Wisconsin Territory, was itsd f unconstitutionaL The compromise, declared Taney, violated che Fifth Amendment's protection of property (including slaves). The Dred Scott decisJon, instead of settling the issue of expansion of slaver)', touched off another blast of controversy. 11le antislaver}' press fla)~d it as .,willful pcn-ersion" filled "''ith "gross historical falsehoods."' Republicans sa"'•the decision as further evidence that the fi endish Slaw ~-er gripped che nation. Like Stephen A. Douglas after the Kansas-Nebraska Act, james Buchanan now appeared as another northern dupe of an evil sla.,-eocracy. Republicans restrained themsel\~s from open defiance ofche decision only by insisting that it did nor bind the nation; Taney's comments on che constitutionality of the Missouri Compro· mise, they contended, were opinions unnecessary to settling the case and therefore technically not binding. The savage reaction to the decision provided more proof that no .,judicious"' or nonpartisan solution to s)ai,!'Cry was possible. Any doubter needed only to read the fast-breaking news from Kansas.

315

DnJScddtcisi• 11u~out MiJISOOri Comprom~ crutl'd poliriul nu-moil '

While the Supreme Court wrestled with the abstract issues raised by the expansion of slavery, President Buchanan sought a concrete solution to the problem of Kansas, where the free-state go\-ernmenc at Topeka and the of6d all)' recognized prosta..-ery gm-emmem at Lecompto n regarded each other with profound distrust. Buchanan's plan for Kansas looked simple: an elected territorial coni,!'Cntion "''Ould draw up a constitution that "A'Ould either prohibit or pennit sla\"er}'; Buchanan wo uld submit the constitution to Congress; Congress "''Ould chen admit Kansas as a state. Unfortunately, che plan exploded in Buchanan's face. Popular so•..-ercigncy, the essence of the plan, demanded fair pia)', a scarce commodity in Kansas. 1'he cerrito· r}"s hiscoryof fraudulenc elections left both sides reluctant co commie their fortunes co che polls. In j une 1857 an election for a constitutional coni,!'Cntion took place, but free-staters, by now a majority in Kansas, bo)'COcted che election on grounds that the proslawry forces would rig it. A constitutional com-emion dominated by prosla.,-ery delegates chen met and dri!W up che Lecompton constitution, which protected the rights of sla\-eholders alrcad)' residing in Kansas and pnwided for a referendum to decide "''hecher co allow more slaves into the territory. Buchanan faced a dilemma. A supporter of popular sOV\'.reignty, he had fa.,
Tbt Lecompton CAiastitution, 1157

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dra"''tl up b)•a com·emion chosen by less than 10 percenc of the: eligible voters. Ho"''· C'\-er, there were compelling reasons to accept the: Lecompton constitution. T he: Souch, which had provided Buchanan's winning margin in che 1856 election, sup· ported it. To Buchanan, the "'Tangling O\-e:r sla\-e:ry in Kansas "''lls a ca.s.e: of cxcrem· ists' turning minor issues inco major on~ especially because only about two hundred sla\-e:s resided in Kansas and because prospects for sla..-er}' in che remaining cerrito· rics u.-ere slighc. The admission of Kansas co the: Union as free or sla\!'C seemed the: quickest way to end the commotion, and so in December 1857 Buchanan endorsed the Lecompton conscicurion. Stephen A. Douglas and other northern Democrats broke: with Buchanan. 10 them, the Lecompton constitution, in allowing voce:rs co decide onl)' "'ohe:the:r more: sla\-e:s could e:nce:r Kansas, violated the: spirit of popular sm-ere:ignty. "'I care not whether (slavery) is \'Oted down or \'Oted up," Douglas dedarccL But refusjng co allow a vote on the constitution itself, with irs protection of existing slave property, smacked of a ..S)'Stem of trickery and juggler}' to defeat the fair expression of the will of the people.'" Meanwhile, in Kansas, che newly elected ce:rritoriallegislature called for a refer· endum on che Lecompton constitution and chus on sla..-er}' itself. l iA'O elections followed. In December 1857 the referendum called by the constitutional convention took place. free-staters bo)'Cocted it, and the: Lecompton conscirution passed overwhe:lmingl)'· Two u.-e:eks later, the election called by the cerrirorial le:gislaru.re took place. 11lis rime: proslavcry forces bo)"COtted, and the constitution u.-em dov.'n co crushing defeat. Buchanan cried to ignore this second election, but when he: at· tempted to bring Kansas into the Union under the: Lecompton constitution, Congress blocked him and forced }"t:C another referendum. In this third election Kansas could accept or reject the entire: constitution, wich the: proYiso that rejection would dela)' statehood. Ho\1/C\"Cr, Kansans voted do"''tl che Lecompton constitution. Buchanan simultaneous!)' had failed to tranquilize Kansas and alienated north· erners in his own party, who now more than C'\-er bdiC"<-ed that che southern Sla\-e: IW-e:r pulled all the imporcanc scrings in the Democratic party. Douglas emerged as a hero for northern Democrats but sa"'' his cherished formula of popular sovereignty become a prescription for strife rather than harmony.

...-The LIIKOin-Douglas

Despite the: acd aim that he recei..-ed for his stand against the: Lecompton conscirurion, Douglas faced a stiff chalDebltes, 1151 lenge in the: 1858 Illinois senatorial deccion. Of his Re:· publican opponent, Abraham Lincoln, Douglas remarked, "I shall ha\-e: my hands full. He is che strong man of his party-full of wit, faces, and dates-and the best stump speaker with his droll ways and dr)' joke:~ in che West." l'hysicall)' and ideological!)', the: tu.'O candidates presented a striking contrast. Tall and gangling ac 6'4", Lincoln possessed energy, ambition, and a passion for selfeducation chat had carried him from the Kenrucky log cabin where he was born inco Ia"'' and politics in his adopted Illinois. First elected as a Whig, he joined che Republican party in 1856. T he: New England- born Douglas stood a foot shorter than lin· coin , but to the small farmers ofsouthern origin who populated che: Illinois flatlands, he was the "little giant;'' the personifi cation of the Democratic party in the West. The campaign quickly became more than just another Senate race, for it pitted the:

I

Oougt;u's politics were fOunded on his un Ai:nchi:ng con~tion th:u most A.meriG~ns hvored nuion~ up.:~nsion :and would support poputM 50\'ereignty :as the f.tstnt :and le:ut con tro· ~i o1l w.ty to :achi t'Ye it. Dougl:as's sdf·:assur:anec b linded t.im to rising northern nn timent fOr frtt solJ.

THE O IStSOFlNE UIOOK, 185~86o

317

Abrallo~• U1co-. de:an·sh:t.\'C'n :at the time of his f;unous deb :ates ....-ith Oougl:u, Lincoln would soon grow :. be:ard to gi'A': himself o1 more distinguished :appc::ar:anc:c.

Republican parry's rising star against che: Senate's leading Democrat, and, thanks to the railroad and t he telegraph, it reccived unprecedented nacional attencion. Opening his campaign wich his famous .. House: Divided" speech ("-this govern· ment cannot e ndure pe:rmanencl)' halfslaw and halfftrt>"), Lincoln stressed che gulf be:Nttn his free-soil position and Douglas's popular SM'ereignty. Douglas dismissed the house:-di...ided doctrine: as an invitation to secession. Whac mattered to him was not slaver}' but t he: continued expansion of white settlement. The high point of t he campaign came in a series of s......._·e:n debates held from Au· gust co October JSSS. Douglas used the: debates co portray lincoln as a virtual abo· licionist and ad\-ocace of racial equality. Lincoln replied that Congress had no constitutional auchority to abolish slaV\'.ry in che South. He also asserted that «J am

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318

CHAPtER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

noc, nor f:'\'eC have been in favor of bringing about the social and political equality of the white and black man." In the debate at Freepon, Illinois, Lincoln cried to make: Douglas squirm by asking how popular SOV\'.re:ignty could be reconciled with che Drrd Scott decision. lin· coin maintained that ifCongress had no authority to exclude: slavery from a territory, then it scemingl)' follo"''Cd that a territorial legislacure created by Congress also lacked the po'l'-"er to do so. Douglas responded that, although the Supreme Court had ruled chac Congress could not exclude sla\'er}' from the territories, the \-oters in a territory could do so by refusing to mace laws thac ga..-e legal protection co sla\'e property. This "Freeport doctrine:" salvaged popular sm-ercigmy but d id nothing for Douglas's reputation among southerners, "'.flo preferred the guarantees of DrnJ SCOl/. to che uncertainties of popular SO\'Creignty. Tt)ing to mo..·e be:rond debates on free soil and popular sm-ercigmy, lincoln shifted in checlosing debates co atcacks on sla\-ery as "a moral, social, and political evil."' He argued chat Douglas's view of slavery as merely an eccentric and unsavory southern custom "''Ould dull the nation's conscience and facilitate: the: legalization of sla\-ery everywhere. At the same rime, hO'A'CVI.'.r, Lincoln compromised his o"''tl position by rejecting both abolition and equality for blacks. Neither man scored a dear victory in the debates, and the senatorial election, which Douglas u-on, se:ctled no major issues. Noneche:less, che candidates' contest was crucial. Jc solidified che sectional split in the: Democratic party and made lin· coin famous in the: North- and infamous in the: South.

Although lincoln explicitly rejected abolitionism, he: called free soil a step coward the «uttimace: extinction" of slavery. Many southerners ignored the differences berwee:n free soil and abolitionism and sa"'' the entire North locked in the grip of de:mcnce:d leaders bf:'m on dvil war. Two chings reinforced southerners' d ire image of che North: the: evidence of northern complicity in the Harpers ~rry raid in 1859 and the virtual canonization of john Bro"''tl by northern preachers. Convinced that man}' northerners endorsed the usc ofviolence co end sla..-ery, some southerners began refusing to associate "'>ith northerners and northern institutions. For example:, about 250 southerners srud)'· ing medicine in Philadelphia withdrew from che dty's medical schools and enrolled in southern medical schools. Although lincoln and Seward condemned che raid, southerners suspected that they regretted the conspiracy·s failure more: chan the at· tempt itself. Brou-·n's aborti\'C raid also rekindled souchern fears of a slave insurrection. Rumors flew around the: Souch, and vigilantes rurne:d out to battle conspiracies that existed only in their o"''tl minds. Volunteers, for example, mobilized to defend nonheaste:rn Texas against thousands of abolitionists supposed!)' on their way to pillage: Dallas and its l'fl\>irons. Elscu-·here, vigilantes rounded up chousands of slaves, tor· tured some inro confessing to nonexistent plots, and then lynched chem. The hyste:· ria generated by such rumors pla)'ed into che hands of the extremists known as fire-eaters, who encouraged the: witch hums in order to gain political support. Although fears ofa sla\'C insurrection pfO't.-ed groundless, they screngrhcned south· ern anxieries about abolitionism. More and more: southerners concluded that r.he: Re:·

I

ThE COUAPSE Of trtE UMIOM, 186o461

319

publican party itself directed abolitionism and dc.serw:d blame for john Brown•s plot as well. After all, had not influential Republicans assailed slaw:ry. unconstirutionall)' tried to ban it, and spoken of an ..irrepressible conflict" bc~n slavcry and freedom?

A pamphlec published in 1860 embodied a growing souchern conviction: ~ Srn~tb Alotu! SIJrn~ld G01\'1'n rbt Srn~tb. CAiatemplales Most southerners, however, reached this conclusion gradSecession ually and reluctantly. In 1850, insulated from the main tide of immigration, southerners choughc themselves the most American of Ameri· cans. l 'he f:'\'ents of the JSSOs led growing numbers of southerners to conclude that the North had deserted che principles of che Union and had virtually declared ~A'3r on the South by using such headline-grabbing phrases as ..irrepressible conflkc" and ..a higher law.~ 10 southerners, the North, noc slavery, 'A'3S the problem. As sectional ties frayed, john Brown's raid electrified southern opin· Jn the' Dml Scort ckci..sion, wh ich ion. Secession made no sense as a tactic co ~Ain concrete goals, but logic nullified t he' Miuouri Campromi,C', had yielded to emotion in much of the South. Fury ac what southerners the' Sup~me Cou" «U$C'd :. bomb· considered che irresponsible, unconstitutional course taken by Republi' hdl in to Am«ic.m polihc,:. cans in attacking sla\-ery drow the talk of secession, and so did the belief Tu r moil a nd blood,hed continuC'd char the Nonh treated the South as inferior, f:'\'en as a slave. ..Talk of Negro in Kamo.u. slaver)'," wroce one angry southerner, ..is not half so humiliating and dis· Although he lose the' 1838 $C'n.l«
Tbt Soutll

THE COLLAPSE OF THE UNION, 1860-1861

I

w,.

did the CIVIl WQr ultunat~rly erupt in 1861?

As long as the phant James Buchanan occup1ed che Wh1te House, southerners only talked of secession. However, once Buchanan dedi ned to seek reelection, they anxiously awaited che next presidential election. By 1860, \'Oters ~A'Cre deciding not jusc an election but also che face of the Union. lincoln•s election began the parade ouc of the Union by southern states. lniciall)' only the LO\l-er South seceded, encouraging moderates to search franticall)' for a compromise co save the Union. But the time for compromise had passed.

Republicans had done wdl in the elections of 1856 as a single-issue, free-soil party. but chey had to broaden their base to win in 1860. Republican leaders needed an economic program co complement their ad\'OCaC)' of free soil. A severe economic slump

Tile Election of 1860

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3 20

OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

following the Panic of 1857 provided them an opening. T he depression shattered a decade of prosperity and chrus.t economic concerns co che fore. In response, the Re· publicans developed an economic program based on support for a protective tariff, federal aid for internal improvements, and granrs to settlers of free 160-acre homesteads carved from public lands. To broaden their appeal, che Republicans chose Abraham lincoln as chcir presi· dencial candidateow:r the: bctter-knO'I'-'n William H . Se:ward. Lincoln offered a stron· ger possibility of carrying such key states as Pcnns}ivania and his home scare of Illinois., and projected a more moderate image than Seward, whose penchant for phrases like "-irrepressible conflict" and ..higher Law" made him appear radicaL In contrast, Lincoln had repeatedly said that Congress had no constitutional right co interfere wich slavery in the South and had rejected che .. higher law" doccrine. The Democrats, still clinging co national party stacus, had to bridge chcir O'A'tl sectional divisions. The Drtd SCOff decision and the contlia 0\'cr the Lecompton constitution had V.\':akened norchern Democrars and strengthened southern Demo· crats. While Douglas still desperately defended popular sOV\'.reignty, southern Demo· crats smtched Drrd Srott tocondude that Congress now had co protect slavery in the territories. The Democratic party's im ernal wrmoil boiled O\'tr at its Charleston com-cntion in the spring of 1860. Failing to win a platform guaranteeing the federal protec· tion of slavery in che territories, delegates from the l.o~A'Cr South stormed ouc.. The: convention adjourned to Baltimore, where a new fight erupted O\'er ~Ailethe:r co scat the pro-Douglas d elegates hascil)' chosen co replace the absem delegates from the: Lower South. When the convention voted to scac these new delegates, represema· m·es from Virginia and che Upper South walked out. Whac remained of che original Democratic com-ention nominated Douglas, but the seceders marched off to )'tC anocher hall in Baltimore and nominated Buchanan's vice presidenc, john C. Bee< kin· ridge of Kenwcky, on a platform calling for the congressional protection of sla\-ery in the territories. lhe spectacle: of two different Democratic candidates for che presi· denc:y signaled the complete disruption of the party. The South still contained a sizable: number of moderates, often former Whigs. In 1860 these southern moderates joined former northern Whigs in the newCons.ti· tutional Union party. They nominated john Bell of1tnnessee, a sla\-tholder who had opposed che Kansas--Nebraska Act and che Lecompton constitution. Calling fo r the Union's preservacion, the new party took no stand on sla\-try's extension. The four candidates presented a relatively dear choice. At one end of the spec· trum, Lincoln conceded that the -S outh had the: constitutional right to presen -t sla\-ery, but he demanded that Congress prohibit its extension. At che other end, Breckinridge insisted chac Congress had to procecc slai,!'Cry anywhere ic existed. In the: middle ~A'tre Bdl and Douglas, che latter still trying to salvage popular so•;ercigmy. In the end, Lincoln won 180 electoral votes.: his chree opponems,onl)' 123. HO'I'--t\-tr, lincoln's popular \'Otes, 39 percent of che tocal, came almost completely from the Nonh. Douglas, che on I)' candidate to run in both sections, ran second in the popu· lar voce buc carried only Missouri. Bell ~A'On most of the Upper South, and Brc
I ThE COUAPSE Of trtE UMIOM, 186o461 Southerners faced a dilemma. The prcsident-clecc was so unpopular in the South that his name had not evm ap· Seuulon pcared on the balloc in man}' souchern states. Lincoln's Yictory struck many southerners as a calculated insult. The North, a South Carolina plancer said, «has got so far toward being abolicionized as co elecc a man avowedl)' hostile to our institutions:'' Few southerners bdie\-ed chat lincoln would fulfill his promise to protecc sla\'· ery in the Southj most feared that he "-'OUid act as a mere front man for more john Bro~A'tl.S. "Now chat che black radical Republicans ha\J'C the poo-er I suppose they ~Aill Bro~A'tl us all," a Souch Carolinian lamented. Some soucherners had threatened secession at che prospect of Lincoln's election, and now the momenc of decision had arrh-ed. On December 20, 1860, a South Carolina convention voted unanimously for secession; in shore order Alabama, Mississippi, F1orida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas foiiO'I'-~d. O n February 4, 1861, delegates from these sco.-cn states met in Montgomery, Alabama, and established the Confederate Staces of America. Buc uncercaincy colored the secession mo\-emenc. Many souchern~ e\-en in che Deep South, had resisted the fire-caters' call to lea\\': the Union. j efferson OaYis, inauguraced in February 1861 as president of the Confederacy, 'A'llS a reluctant secessionist who had remained in the Smate two u-eeks af. ter his own scace of Mississippi had seceded. At first che Upper South rejected secession complecdy. More cconomicall)' depen· dent on the North, ic had proportionately fuu.\':r slaves and more non-sl3'\"C-holders, whose loyalty in case of secession was dubious. Finall)', if secession precipitated a ~A'llf, the Upper Souch 'A'llS the likely bacrleground. Consequmdy, the secession

3 21

Tilt Movtmetlllor

D CIFortSttnlill

Primary Soorce: Southern Opposition

to Secession

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OIFortSttnlill

Four kC"yst.ne~Virgi:ni;a, Ark;atu.:~s, Tennuste, ;and North C;arolin;a-did noc secede un til ;ahC"r the (;all of Fort Sumter. The border sl;a\tt st.1tC':$ of M:~ryl:~nd, Dtl;aw:~re, Kentucky, :~nd Missouri $t;t)'C'd i:n the Union.

D .....,

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F"rwSIIIlOCIIII'I!III"f

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3 22

OfAPlER 14

!="ROW COMPROMISE tO SEaSStOH, 18~861

mo'lement that South Carolina had begun so boldly in December 1860 seemed to be: falling apart by March 1861.

The lack of southern unity con6nned the view of most Republicans that the secessionists were more bluster than e substance. Seward described secession as the "''Ork of ..a relatively few hotheads,"' and Uncoln bdiC"t·ed that the loyal majority of southerners would soon "''fest control fro m che 6rHating minority. This perception sciffened Republican resolve to resist compro mise. Moderate j ohn J. Crittenden of Kemuck}' suggested compensation for owners of runaway slaw~s. repeal of nonhero personal-liberty laws. a constitutional amendment to pro· hibit the federal gow~m ment from interfering with slavery in southern states, and another amendment to restore the Missouri Compromise line. But in the face of ad· amant Republican opposition, che Crittenden plan collapsed. Lincoln's faich in a ..loyal majority" of southern ers exaggerated both cheir num· hers and their dedication to che Union. Many southern opponents of che fire-eating secessionists sat on the fence, "''lUting for major concessions from che North; thcir allegiance co the Union was conditional. But compromise would have meant the abandonment of free: soil, a basic principle of the Republican parcy. and Uncoln, who misread southern opinion, resisted BC)'Ond the issue of compromise, the precipitous secession of the LO'II.-er South had changed the question chat Lincoln faced. The issue no longer rc\'olved around sla\~ry's extension but around secession. 11le lower South had left che Union in the face of losing a fair deccion. For Lincoln to ca\~ in to su ch pressure would violate majority rule, the sacred principle o n which the nation had bee:n founded

The Seardl for

Crittenden plin

I

Atumpt to

6od ;a compromiR' tbat wauld P'"'*"t Union &om ,;plitring

ftrt Sunner Fecltral fort in Chuloton. Sootb Carolina, barbar, when- 61"11t Jhou of Civil War •Tre finod whm Union attr:mpttd tortsupply troops

By the rime Lincoln cook office in March 1861, o nly a spark was needed to set off a war. Lincoln had pledged in his in augural address to "hold. oc· cupy. and possess" federal property in the stares that had seceded, a scare:· mem chac committed him to che defense of Fore Pickens in Florida and Fort Sumter in the hatbor of Charleston, Souch Carolina. Accordingly. che presi· dent informed South Carolina•s gMwnor of his intention to suppl)' Fort Sumter with provisions buc neither reinforcements nor ammunition. Shorcl}' before: dawn on April 12, 1861, Confederate shore batteries bombarded the fort, which surrendered the next day. Proclaiming an insurrection in che lower South, Lincoln called fo r 75,000 militia to suppress the rebellion. 11le outbreak of hostilities ended fence--sitting in the Upper South ... 1am a Union man;" one southerner "''tote, "but when they (che lincoln administration] send men south it will change my nations. I can do noching against m}' own people.'" In quick su ccession Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas. and 1tnnessee: joined the Confederacy. Acknowledging that «J am one of chose: d ull c:reacures that cannoc see the good of secession," Robe:rc E. Lee resigned from the U.S. Army rather than lead troops against his nath~ Virginia

Tile Comlnl o1 war

Lincoln'" vietorr in cht 1860 pl\"$i· dtnti.U dtction brought m.nter:~ co a htad. fta ring thq· ""'""' now a t tht meny of abolition istr, :~tatu in the l.a.\>tr South btgan to .stetde. Modtratel Jou_gh t a eompromUe, but Rtpub ltca.ru rt-Jisted. An attem pt to ft':lu ppl)' Fon Sumttr. a («!tral fort in Charle.uon harbor in South Ca.rolina, met with umed l\"$ista.nce. \l' hen President Lincoln called (or militia to Juppceu an in:~u rr«tion, tht :~tat6 o( tht Upper Sou th S«tded..

The North, coo, was ready for a figh t, less to abolish sla\~f}' than to punish secession. Stephen Douglas, exhausted by his efforts to find a peaceable solucion to the is· sue of slavery extension, assaulted «the new system of resistance: by the s\N'Ord and baronet co the results of the ballot-box" and affirmed, .. 1depre<:ace: war, but if it must come I am with my country. under all circumstances, and in C'\-ery conrin~nc:y."

Chapte r Su rFT)

~

0 0\VNI.OAO THE

MPJ AUOt O FILE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND

LISTeNTOITONTHEGO .

Why did the Comprom~e o{1850 on!;' temporarily resoM: the crisis {acing the Union? (page 302)

I

Unlike: the Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 1&50 was a medley of different bills supported b)' shifting coalitions. It temporarily averted disunion, but it tailed to resol\'e unde:riying di\•isions bCN~en North and South. In pat· ticular, the new Fugiti\~ Sla~~ Act alienated the North because of its harshness and the South because: of northern resistance.

Why did the Whig party disintegrate, and what "~re the consequences? (pop 308)

I

KEY TERMS

H"l"!" Forry {p. 301) /ohn Bro\\11 {p. 502) Comllfomise ol1850 (p. 505} Fugjlive SlaveAct {p. 306) Uncle Tom's (aiJjn {p. 506} R'I'Ublicilfl party (p. JOB) K.lnsas.Nellra!l:a Act {p. 309) ,,•• .,. (p. 509}

Know.No!hings (p. 511) Ored ScoU dedsion {p. 515) Crittenden ~an (p. m ) Fort S<Jmter (p. 522)

The surprising strength of the Know·Nothings and the fn:e-soil mowment both undmut the Whigs. at read}' bartmd into sectional fragments t,· the Com· promise of 1&50; the Kansas-Nebraska Act deli~woo the final blow. 1Cmporarily the Oe:mocrars \l~I'C the only major political patty, and when the Republicans emt:tg\---d as a counterpart, thty"-\':I'"C a sectional rather than a national patty.

Whot major issues dominated American politics (rom 1857 tc 1860? (pop 314)

I

The last rears of the 1850s saw se~~ral cumultuous political issues emerge: the Deed Scott decision, Bleeding Kansas, and John Brov..n•s raid on Harpers Ferry. Each one fmyrd the political fabric of the nation a bit further.

I

Why did the Civil War ultimately erupt in 1861? (page 319)

Southerners, almld}' feeling besieged. saw Abraham Linroln•s dec:cion as a sign that they had lost all inOuence at the nati onal i C\~l lo'ol.oer South states seceded quick!)', but the Upper South rtmaincd in the Union until Uncoln order.,_"CC the"'-"" supplying offott Sumtt'c, a federJ.I fore in the hacbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and shooting erupted. Emotion f.1t more than reason dictattd these m<M'!S.. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisd e Copyri,gh4 2010 Ceng:a,;c Learning. Inc. All RiShiS Reserved. M:t)' not be copied, .sc:mood. or dup1ic:tte:d. in whole or in pcut.

The North, coo, was ready for a figh t, less to abolish sla\~f}' than to punish secession. Stephen Douglas, exhausted by his efforts to find a peaceable solucion to the is· sue of slavery extension, assaulted «the new system of resistance: by the s\N'Ord and baronet co the results of the ballot-box" and affirmed, .. 1depre<:ace: war, but if it must come I am with my country. under all circumstances, and in C'\-ery conrin~nc:y."

Chapte r Su rFT)

~

0 0\VNI.OAO THE

MPJ AUOt O FILE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND

LISTeNTOITONTHEGO .

Why did the Comprom~e o{1850 on!;' temporarily resoM: the crisis {acing the Union? (page 302)

I

Unlike: the Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 1&50 was a medley of different bills supported b)' shifting coalitions. It temporarily averted disunion, but it tailed to resol\'e unde:riying di\•isions bCN~en North and South. In pat· ticular, the new Fugiti\~ Sla~~ Act alienated the North because of its harshness and the South because: of northern resistance.

Why did the Whig party disintegrate, and what "~re the consequences? (pop 308)

I

KEY TERMS

H"l"!" Forry {p. 301) /ohn Bro\\11 {p. 502) Comllfomise ol1850 (p. 505} Fugjlive SlaveAct {p. 306) Uncle Tom's (aiJjn {p. 506} R'I'Ublicilfl party (p. JOB) K.lnsas.Nellra!l:a Act {p. 309) ,,•• .,. (p. 509}

Know.No!hings (p. 511) Ored ScoU dedsion {p. 515) Crittenden ~an (p. m ) Fort S<Jmter (p. 522)

The surprising strength of the Know·Nothings and the fn:e-soil mowment both undmut the Whigs. at read}' bartmd into sectional fragments t,· the Com· promise of 1&50; the Kansas-Nebraska Act deli~woo the final blow. 1Cmporarily the Oe:mocrars \l~I'C the only major political patty, and when the Republicans emt:tg\---d as a counterpart, thty"-\':I'"C a sectional rather than a national patty.

Whot major issues dominated American politics (rom 1857 tc 1860? (pop 314)

I

The last rears of the 1850s saw se~~ral cumultuous political issues emerge: the Deed Scott decision, Bleeding Kansas, and John Brov..n•s raid on Harpers Ferry. Each one fmyrd the political fabric of the nation a bit further.

I

Why did the Civil War ultimately erupt in 1861? (page 319)

Southerners, almld}' feeling besieged. saw Abraham Linroln•s dec:cion as a sign that they had lost all inOuence at the nati onal i C\~l lo'ol.oer South states seceded quick!)', but the Upper South rtmaincd in the Union until Uncoln order.,_"CC the"'-"" supplying offott Sumtt'c, a federJ.I fore in the hacbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and shooting erupted. Emotion f.1t more than reason dictattd these m<M'!S.. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisd e Copyri,gh4 2010 Ceng:a,;c Learning. Inc. All RiShiS Reserved. M:t)' not be copied, .sc:mood. or dup1ic:tte:d. in whole or in pcut.

I

M081Ull r
325

founded on slaV\'.ry. The Nonh, "''hich began the "''llr wich the objective of ovcrcom· ing secession, explidcl)' disclaiming an}' intention of interfering with sla\'er)', found thac, co win, it had to descroy slavery. For politidans as wdl as soldiers, the war defied exp«cations and rurned into a series of surprises. T he inseparable connection of Union "''llr goals and the emancipation of slaves was perhaps the most momen· tous surprise.

I

MOBILIZING FOR WAR

What maJOr advantages did eodl Side possess 4t the start oftiNt Gvil War?

Neither Norch nor Souch was prepared for "''llr. In Apnl 1861 most of the Union's small army, a scant sixteen thousand men, was scattered across the Wesc. One-third of its officers had resigned co join the Confederacy. The nation had not had a scrong president since james K. l'olk in the 1840s, and many viewed the new president, Abraham Lincoln, as a yokeL It seemed doubtful thac such a go\-ernment could marshal its people for war. The Confederacy was even less prepared: it had no tax struccure, no navy, only two tiny gunpowder factori~ and poorly equipped, unconnected railroad lines. During the first cwo )'ears of war, both sides would haw co overcome these deficiencies, raise and supply large armies, and finance the war. In each region, mobilization would expand the pov.oers of the central go\-ernment to a degree chat few had antidpated.

The Civil War annies u-ere the Largest organizations C~.-er crcaced in America; by che end of the "''llr, more than 2 mil· lion men had sen-ed in the Union army and 800,000 in the Confederate army. Ac first che raising of armies "''3S a local, racher than a national or stace, efforc. Regiments usually consisted ofvolunteers from the same locale. Southern cavalry· men proYided their 0\l.'n hors~ and unifonns were left co local opcion. In both armies che troops chemseto.oes elecced officers up co the rank of coloneL This informal, democratic way of raising and organizing soldiers reflected the nation's politi· cal traditions buc could not long "'ithstand the stresses of the Civil War. As earl)' as Jul)' 1861 the Union began examinations for officers. With casualties mounting, morem-er, military demand exceeded che supply of\'Oiunteers. The Confederacy felt the pinch firsc and in April 1862 enacted the first C·onscdpdon law in American his· tory, requiring all able-bodied white men aged eighteen to thirty·fi\'e co se...._-e in the military. (By war's end the limits would be seventeen and fifty.) lhe Confederacy's Conscription Act aroused little enthusiasm. A later amendment exempting o"''tlers or OV\'.rseers of twenty or more slaves e\'Oked complaints about «a rich man's war but a poor man's fight." Despite opposition, the Confederate draft became increasing!)' difficult co evade, and this fact stimulated volunteering. Only one soldier in five was a draftee, buc four ouc of e\'ery five eligible white southerners served in che Confederate army. An 1862

cGMCripb. Or.uring mm 10

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in tht ~rmy

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•

u•1on rorets

•

Collltderwte rorets

fiprt 15.1 Opposing Annits of tht Civil War N. this gr.:~ph "1\ows, the

C ivil WM h;ad profound human ce».u. In both the North .:~nd South, 1\vdly :. f:..mi}y d id not grieYC' for :. lost rdo~~ O\'C' or fri-end . lnjun"d YC'u:r;ans ~c;aiTOC' :. common ~gtu in citin, towns, :.t~d r ur;al d istr icts W\"ll i:nto the tw-entieth cen wry.

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DesEO!es uugll •

104,000

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H0,070

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latA' requiring aU soldiers to serve for the duration of the war ensured chat a high proportion of Confederate soldiers "-"OUld be batde·hardened veterans. O nce the army 'A'llS raised, the Confederacy had to supply it. Ac 6rst the South imported arms and ammunicion from Europe or relied on weapons taken from fed· era! arsenals and captured on che batde6eld. Graduall}'• the Confederacy assigned contracts to prr.•atdy O~A'tled factories, such as rhe Tredcgar Iron Works in Rich· mond; pro\ided loans co establish new plants.: and created go\·emment·owncd in· dustries, such as the giant Augusta Powder \l'orks in Georgia. The South lose few, if any, bactles for want of munitions. Supplying croops with clothing and food pl'O\"td moredifficul[. When the South invaded Maryland in 1862, chousands of Confederate soldiers remained behind be· cause chey could not march barefoot on Mar)1and•s gra\'el·surfuced roads. Late in the war, Roberr E. Lee's Arm}•of Northern Virginia ran our of food but n e\'et out of ammunition. Supply problems had st\-eral sources: railroads char fell into disrepair or were caprured, an economy that grew more: cotton and tobacco than food, and Union capture of the livcscock· and grain·raisjng distTiccs of ce:ntral1tnnessee and Virginia. dose to desperation, rhe Confederate Congress in 1863 passed che lm· prcssment Act, authorizing ann}•officers co take food from reluctant farmers at pre:· scribed rates and to impress sla\-es into labor for the army. The industrial North more easily supplied its troops with arm~ clothes, and food, but keeping a full arm}' was anocher matre:r. When the initial tide: of enrhusi· asm for enlistmem ebbed, Congress turned to conscription with che Enrollment Act of March 1863. E\-ery able·bodied ~Ailite male cir:i.u:n aged twenty ro forty·fi\'e faced the draft. The Enrollment Act proYided some cxe:mpcions and offered rn-o ways of c.scap· ing the draft: substiwtion, or paying another man ro sen-e; and commutation, or paying a$300 fee ro the government. Democrats denounced conscription as a viola·

I M081Ull r
327

l'fesident Ab,.m Linses S. Grant ~,.n command ol all Union armies (March); Battle olthe l'lllderness (Mal'); Bailie of Cold Harbor (June); SUrrender ol Allanta (Seplember); Lincoln reElected (Novtmber); William Tec:urnsEII Sherman~ march lo the sea (Nowmber-OI!CE!Ilber) C0n111eSS passes the Thirteenth Amendml!fll (January); Sherman mo... through So.-11 (arolina (January-March); Grant lalrA!s Richmond (April); Robert E. lee surrenders at Appomalkll (April); Lincoln dios (April)

don of individual liberties and states' rights, and ordinary citizens resented the substitution and commutation privileges, leveling chcir OtA'tl "-poor man's 6ght" charges. Ncvercheless, as in the Confederacy, the law stimulated \'Oiuntecring: onl}' 8 percent of all Union soldict'S were d raftees or subscirutes.

The recruinnenc and supply of huge armies lay far beyond the capacity of American public finan ce at t he start of the war. During the J840s and 1850s, federal spending had a\'· eraged on I}' 2 percent of the gross national product. • With su ch meager expenditures, the federal gO\wnmem mct its revenue needs from tariff duties and in come from t he sale of public lands. During the war, however, as annual federal expenditures rose to IS percent of t he gross national product, che need for new sources of rew~n ue became urgent. When ncither additional taxes nor war bond sales produced enough rew~nue, the Union and che Confederacy began co prim paper money. Early in 1862 Presi· dent Lincoln signed into law t he Lc.gal1tnder Ace, authori.ting che issue of$150 mil· lion in paper "greenbacks ... Alt hough the North•s financial officials distrusted paper money, chey resorted co it because, as the Union's treasury secretary bluntly put it, "Tix Trras.ury is n.tarly empry."' Unlike gold and silver, ~Athich had established market

Fllllndnl the War

l

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www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

values, the \'alue of paper money depended o n che public's con6dence in the go'lern· menc thac issued it. To bolster thac con6dence, Union officials made che grNnbacks legal tender (that i~ acceptable in paymenc of most public and pri\•ate debts). In contrast, che Confederacy nC!"t-er made paper money legal tender, so suspi· dons arose that che southern gOII'ernmenc had litd e faith in its 0"'11 money. The Confederacy raised litd e of its "''llrtime re\'ecnue from taxes, compounding the prob· lem. Northern invasions and poor incernal transportation made collecting taxes d if· 6cult, and ultimatd)' the South raised less than 5 percenc of its wartime re\'CflUe from taxes (compared to 2 1 percent in the North). Con6dence in the Confederacy's paper mone}'quickly e\'llporatcd, and the \'alue of paper money in relation co gold plunged. The Confederate response- priming more paper money- merely accelerated inflation. l"riccs in the Norch rose 80 percent during the war, buc chose in che South soared more than 9,000 pm:entj what cost a southerner one dollar in 1861 cost forty-six dollars by 1864. By raising caxes, fl oating bonds, and priming paper money, both North and South broke with che hard-money, minimal-government craditions of American public 6nance. In the North, Republicans cook advantage of che departure of south· ern Democrats to push through Congress a measure thac they and their Whig pre· decessors had long ad\'Ocaced: a national banking system. Passed in February 1863, the National Bank Ace allowed banks co obtain federal charters and to issue national bank notes (backed b)•the fed eral government). The North's ability to J'C\'Oiutioniu its S)'Stem of public 6nance rdlocced both ics long experience with complex 6nandal transactions and its political cohesion.

The Civil War pined ri\•al political systems as u.-ell as annies and economics against each other. The South en· tered the war with sl'VI.'.ral apparent policical ad\'llntagcs. Uncoln 's call for militiamen to suppress the rebellion had transformed southern wa\'cters into secessionists. Southerners had a strong leader in jeffct'SOn Davis, the president of che Confederacy, who possessed experience, honesty, courage, and what one commentator called "a jaw sawed in stret.• In concrast, the Union's list of political liabilities appeared lengthy. loyal but contentious norchern Democrats "''llnted no conscription, no national bank, and no abolition of slaw~ry. E\'Cfl wichin che Republican party, lincoln, "'ith lictle national experience, had trouble commanding respect. A small but vocal group of Republi· cans kn()'ll.·n as the Radicals- including Secretary of the Treasury Salmon 1'. Chase, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachus.ects, and Reprcsentati\--e lhaddeus Ste\·ens of lltcnnsyl\'llnia-.,igorously criticized lincoln. First rhey focused on his failure to make the sla'les' emancipation a "''ar goal, and later they u'Ould assail him for being too ea· ~r to readmir the conquered rebel scates into the Union. Lincoln's style of leadership both encouraged and disanned opposition "'ithin the Republican party. Kttping his counsel to himself unci! ready to act, he met criti· cism with homespun anecdotes chat chrew his opponents off guard. Caught be· ~n Radicals and conscrvati\-es, lincoln used his cautious reserve to maintain open communications wich both wings of the party and to fragment his opposition. He also co-opted some members of che opposition, including Chase, by bringing them into his cabinet.

"**eaa Ll!lldenhip Ill Wlrtille

~liJKoln Vvllen lineoln bec:~e p~den t in M;arch 186 1, he f:!c:ed more severe problems tha..n ;al'l)' pt>e· dec:euor. \V.uhington phCKogr.apher-M:nthew Br~ Qpwted th'i$ im;age of tile solemn pre5ident· deet.:. kwweeks :~fterthe !Onn:uion ol the Conkd· er:~c:y :~t~d 5h0t'tly befot-e Li ncoln's i:n:~ ugur:ttion .

I

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Factory proCIUctton Textile proCIUctton Rrearm proCIUctton

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Iron proCIUctton Coal proCIUctton

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co.n cotton

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Wealth proaoceo

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In contrast,jcJfcrson Davis had a knack for making enemies. A \\<'e st Pointer, he would rather ha\'f: led the army chan the government, and he used his sharp tongue to win arguments rather chan friends. Davis•s cabinet suffered frequenc re:Ugna· dons.: for example, the Confederacy had 6....-e: secretaries of "''llr in four rears. Relations bern-een Davis and his vice president, Alexander Stephens of Georgia, "''ere disastrous. Stephens left Richmond, che Confederate capita~ in 1862 and spent most of the war in Georgia sniping ac Davis as «weak and \'acillacing. cimid, pendant, ptt· vi.sh, obstinate." The d ash between Davis and Stephens im'Olvcd not just personalities but also the ideological divisions that lay at the heart of che Confederacy. The Confederate Conscirution explicitly guaranceed che SO\'etd gmy of the Confederate states and prohibited the go\-emment fro m enacting proteccive tariffs or supporcing internal improve-ments. For Stephens and other infl uential Confederate leaders, the Confederacy existed to protect slavery and to enshrine states' rights. For Davis, che ovcrrid· ing objec:ti\-e ofche Confederacy was to secure the independence of the South from the North, if necessar}' at che expense of states' righcs. This differ~:cnce bCNttn Davis and Stephens somewhat resembled the discord becw«n lincoln and the northern Democrats. Lincoln believed that "''inning the war demanded increasing the central go\-crnmcnc's power.: like Stephens, northern Democrats resisted cencralizacion. Buc lincoln could concrol his opponents more effectively than Davis controlled his. B}' temperament l incoln was more suited to reconciliation chan Davis was, and che different nacure ofpart}' policies in the two sections favored him as u-ell. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

In the: South, che Ocmocrars and t he remaining Whigs agrttd to suspend party politics for the war's duracion. Although intended to encourage unity, t his dedsion led co discord. As souchern politics disintegrated along personal and factional lines, Davis found himself without organized political su pport. In contrast, in the Union, nonhero Democrats' opposition co lincoln tended to unify the Republicans. After Democrats won control of five states in the election of 1862, Republicans swallowed a biner lcs.son: no matter how much chey disdained Lincoln, they had co rally behind him or risk being dri\--en from office. Ulcimatdy, the Union developed more political cohesion than che Confederacy, not because it had fewer di vision~ but because it managed those divisions more effectively.

Even be-fore farge.scale fighting began, Lincoln mowd co safeguard Washington, which was bordered by cwo sla\'t: larders states (Virginia and Maryland) and fi lled wich Confeder· are sympathizers. A week after Fort Sumter's fall, a Baltimore mob attacked a Massachusetts regiment bound for Washington, buc enough croops slipped chrough co protect che capital. Lincoln t hen dispatched federal troops to Maryland and suspended the writ of habeas corpus (HAY-bee-uss CORE-puss)i" federal croops could now arrest Mar}ianders ~Aithouc formally charging t hem with specifi c offenses.. Both Maryland and Od awa.re, another border slave state, \'Oted down secession. Next lincoln authorized che arming of Union S)'lllpachiurs in Kentuck)', a slaw~: state with a Unionist lcgislacure, a secessionist governor, and a thin chance of Sta}'· ing neutral. Lincoln also stationed troops just across che Ohio River from Kenrucky, in Illinois, and when a Confederate army invaded Kencucky earl}' in 1862, those croops drove it out. Officially, at least, Kenruckybecame che third slaw~: CHECKI NG I N state to de-clare for che Union. Four years of murderous fighting r:waged t he fou rt h, Missouri, as Union and Confederate armies and bands of guerrillas The North wjO)\"d tnormous m.ln· dashed. Despite the savage- fighting and the divided loyalties of its people, po~"-r ;and industri.ll adwm~g.:-s. Missouri Sta)'t:d in the Union. West Virginia 'A'llS formed in 1861 when thirty· Both sides I\"$Orttd ro conJaiption, although most soldiers w~·-"' five counties in che primaril)' nonsla\-eholding regions W'CSt of che Shenanvuluntt«s. doah Valley refused to secede; it became a state in 1863. The Union w:u f.lr more su«~:sful By holding che border sla't-e scaces in the Union, Lincoln kept open his in r.l.i:sing money co finance the war. lines to the free states and gained access ro the river systems in Kentucky and The Union could rdy on 6t.lblished Missouri chat led imo che- heart of the Confederacy. lincoln's firmncs.s, par· politic.:.!, militarr, ;and uooomK ticularl)' in t he case of Maryland, scotched charges that he was weak-willed. J;)':Stcom:s; che Conftdtuer, ;although politic.:.lly unifitd ;u dM' :sc..lr t, :suf· The crisis fOrced the president to exercise long-dormant po~A'Crs. In £1C P.trtt feud £Tom policinl divisioru and Millit;n ( 1861), Chiefjustice Roger B. Tane-y ruled that lincoln had exceeded conllicting ''iew:s of the Confeder;a.tC' his aut hority in suspending the writ of babtus corpus in Marytand. Uncoln, p..,rnmffit's rolt. cicing the Constitution' s authorization of che writ's suspension in "Cases of Abr.;ah.;am Lincoln pi"O\'«< to bt Rebellion" (Arcide I, Se-ction 9) insisted char he would determine whe-ther a a f..lr btuer IC'..ad« t han Jdl'trsan rebellion existed, and simply ignored Taney's ruling.

Slcurln&lbt Union's

Hil.be.u corpu.s: .,_court otder rcquirin$ t hat dw cktairwr of .,_ priSOOC"r bri.ng the penon i.n cu.smdy to cou rt a.nd show UUJo~e for h•:t: or hn deten tion.

IN BATTLE, 1861-1862 How MJS Ute Wm' fotlf!tt in ill earlyyeflr'l? l'hr Ci\<11 W.ar wu th~ 6rsr w;1r In which both su:ks relied cxtcnsrvdy on railroads. tht teltgr'.tph, mus·producM """C.lpotU, ,omr umy-na\y t~a. trOO·pl.utd w.uships.. rifkd guru md :tmll.::ry, 2.nd m:nch ....vr.uc. 11'1UJ thr:~ lJIOitl(' justi6adon fOr its de' scription as rhe tim mcxkm \li'M. Bu1 to its parrld~ts sJoggjng through mudd)' swamps and voriglvd dovin with equipment~ the •·.ar lwdly K't'mai mockm

~WI.,anl.

Cnmpomloo th< Cc>nkckr.acy·s 9 nulllon prop!<, OONhinl of them sl~Ycs. the Union had U mtllion propk m 1861.

-Siillqks l'bt Nonh also ~ J.S hma u nuny wfutc mm of miliary agr, 90 prrcmr of all U.S. indURrW Clf*'JIY, and two-thirds of its a.ilroad. md:.. Bur dw North f.aad acbunnngdu.lknp: bang the South b¥k into dv Union. l'bt" South, in conrr.uc. fought onty for lnckptndtncc. 1() subdw tht Confcduacy, rill' North ~uJd ~ ro sUSt;ain olfcrufw opmt.rionJO\ou an .uu. comparablt in siu co dw p.trt ofRus.sU. dur Nlpokon h,.,d invadal In 1812 Wlth dlsuc:row roults. Mnsutttl :against chis ch2.11m~ rhc Nonh's ad\';~nup in popuJ.uion and uchnology shfllnk. 1'he North twf mort mm but nudcd them co dcfmd long supply linn and ro occupy cprurrd arc;u. C011Kqumtly, 1t coukl commit a smJ..ller proportion of its ownll force ro comb;~t. 1'ht South, rY.Iying on sl.lVn for l.a.bor, could :assign a higher proportion of Irs white m.tJc popul.tt1on to combat. And although the Union had su~rior rallroadJ, ir h-lld 10 ~its troops and supplies huge dis· tantt~ whcrca.s the Conf«<en.cy could s hift its troops rclati~ly short distann-s within irs defense area without rnllr0o1ds. Finally, aouche.rne.r'J had an tdgc in morale, fOr Confcdeure rroops usually t"ougfu on home ground. The C ivil War witnessed upcrin1cnuc whh a v.arlccy of new \\o~apons, including the submarine, rhe rrpcaring rifle, and che multd>.1J'rclcd Gading gun, t he prcdeces· sor of the machine gun. \Vherc:u JOmooch·borc muJkcts h.1d an effccth-c range of SO yard~ the Springfield 01· Enfield rillc:s widely in UJIC by 18GJ \\o'CfC accur.ue at 400 yards. l'he rilll!'s de'Y\".Iopmcnr posed a challenge to long·accepted milir.uy tactics, which srrcsscd the mass infanrry charge. Armed v.ith muskets, defenders could fire only a round or two before bring ~rwhelml-d. Am1ed with rilles., however, defend· erscould tire SC\'Ctal rounds before clo.slng with the enemy. At~ckcr.s would ha\·c Far greater difficulry getting close enough to rlmut bayonets; fewer t han I percent of the casu:tlries in the Ci\•11 W.11' rcsulrcd (rom b:ayonct woun ds. As the fighting wore on, bo111sldes n:cognl~c:d the value of t:rcnches., which of· fend defenders prorecrion .:tg:~.ln.sr wi1her1ng r1fJe fire. l.n .addition, t he nRc: fbrud genc:r.tls to depend less on av:alry. 1hdllionally, cavalry had btc:n among the: most prtsrigious oomponc:nrs ot" an 11rmy, an parr becau~e cav.a.lry clurgts v.~rt oft:en dnc. :asur:ingly dl'ecrivr and in JWT becauJC che avalry hcl~ lo nu.int.a.in class distinc· tions within the: army. Morr aca..r.11c: rifJcs twlutXd the cav.Ury·s C'ff«tn~ness. fOr the bullet th~ missed a ridu could hi I hiS horse- and oftC'n the hor.st 1tsclf was the primary tatg«. 1bus the av.tlry wu mcrc:Uingly rc-:lcg.a.tnl to ruonrWssano.- ( ~· C ....., ) and r:aich.

PrWnary Source: Wounded Escaping from the Burning Woods of the Wi5derness

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......... pbo e..dy uo;~ su;aag.y to split Con~dts';ll:f down tbt MUsUsippi, (om,o sunmdt:r

1

lnteracti\•e Map: The Anaconda Plan and the Battle of

Antietam

Nonetheless, the introduction of che rifle d id not fundamcmall)' change mili· tar}' tactics. An attacking army sciU had a good chance of success if it su rprised its enemy, and che lush forests of the Souch offered abundant o pportunities for su rprise. l ack of the dement of su rprise could doom an attacking army. Ar the Batd e of Fredericksburg in December 1862, Confederate: forces virtually annihilated Union forces charging uphill ~r open terrain. Much like previous wars, the Civil War was fOught basically in a succession of battles d uring ~A•hich exposed infantry traded volleys, charged, and co untercharged. The side chat withdn..""A' first from the battlefield was considered the loser, C"t'tn though ic frequently sustained lighter casualties than the "viccor."' The defeated army usually moved back a few miles to lick irs wo unds.: the winners stay~d in place: to lick theirs. Politicians o n both sides berated generals for not pursuing a beacen foe, but was almo.sr impossible for a mangled \i ctor to gacher horses, mules, suppl)' trains, and exhausted soldiers for a new attack. Not su rprisingly, fo r much of the war, generals on both sides concluded chat the best defense 'A'3S a good offense. What passed for long-range Union strategy in 1861 was the Anac·onda plan, which called for che Union to blockade the southern coasc and to chrusc, like a h uge snake, down the Mississippi River. In theory, scaling off and scwring the Confeder· acy .....-ould make the South recognize che fucility of secession and end the war as bloodlessly as possible. However, che lack of adequate ships and men to seize the Mississippi in 18 61 prevented the implementation of this ambitious plan. Earl)' in the "-"at, the need to secure the border slaw stat~ especially Kentuck)' and Missouri, dictated Union strategy in the West, sending northern annies plung· ing southward from Kencucky into 1Cnnessce. The Appalachian Mountains tended to separate this western theater from the eascem theater, ~Ailere: major clashes took place: in 18 61.

East of the mountains, the Confederates' decision to lo· care their capital in Richmond, Virginia, shaped Union strategy. "Forward to Richmond!" became che Union's fi rst war cry. Buc before Union troops co uld reach Richmond, one hundred miles south....-esc of Washington, they would have co d islodge a Confederate army brazen!)' encamped ac Manassas (muh-NASS-suss) junction, Virginia, only rwenty·fiw miles from che Union capitaL Lincoln ordered General lnin McDowell to attack the rebel force:. In che resulting Flrst BatdeofBulf Run (or Firsc Manassas"), amateur armies clashed in bloody chaos u nder a blistering sun injul)' 1861 as well-dressed, pirnick· ing Washington dignitaries ~A'ltcched the carnage. The Confederates rouced the larger Union anny. After Bull Run, Lincoln appointed General George B. McClellan co replace Me· Dowell as commander of the Union's Army of the Potomac, its main figh ting force: in the ease. McClellan, a master of administration and training. transformed a rag· tag mob imo a disciplined fighcing force:. His soldiers adored him, but Lincoln became disenchanted. To the president, the key co victory lay in Launching simultaneous attacks on SC\-eral fronts so that the North could exploit its advantages in manpOIA-er

stalellllte in the East

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15.1 Tilt Wir in the 1861- 1852

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El Clollil.OIT..olllf ..0.1rlc:O EIOO:Ik~lf~•"a~

and communkacions. McClellan, a proslavery Dem ocrat, hoped for a series of rela· tivdybloodless victories chat would result in che readmission ofsouthern states into che Union with slavery still intact. In the spring of 1862 McClellan got a chance to demonstrate che value of his scrateg}'· After Bull Run, che Confederates had pulled back behind che Rappahan· nock Ri\'U co block a Union march toward Richmond. McClellan decided to go around the southerners by transporting his troops down the: C hes.:tpcake Ba}' to the tip ofche peninsula formed by che York and j ames rivers and chen ro attack Richmond from rhe rear. Ar first McClellan's l'r:ninsula Campaign unfolded smoothly. But after luring the Confederacy to the brink of defeat- Union forces were: less than 6w miles from Richmond- McClellan hesitated.: he refused to launch the: final attack without the reinforcements he expected. Confederate forces under General Thomas ..Scone· wall'" jackson had rurned back the: reinforcements . .As McClellan dela)'cd, General Robert E. Lee assumed command of rhe Confederacy's Ann}' of Northern Virginia. An opponent ofsecession, a man so courteous char he seemed almost too ge:mle, Lee ncwrcheless 'A'as McClellan's opposite:, bold and willing to accept casualties. ltt immediately took the offensive, attacking che much larger Union forces in the Sl'\'ecn Days' Battles Qune-july 1862). Raging chrough forests east of Richmond, the battles cost the: Confederaq• nearly cwice as many men as the Union, but Me· Cldlan, not Lee, blinked. Unnerved by mounting casualties, he sent a series of pan· k ky reports to Washington. lincoln, who cared little for McClellan' s peninsula strateg}', ordered him to call off the campaign and rcturn to Washingcon.

lttMrt L l.a Bold ..nd R"-souro:ful commaockr of Anrty of'Nortbem V'uginia

l

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334

CHAPtER 15

OUCII.U OF FREEDOM: CtviL "''All. 1861- 186j

l'Ff) Prima:ry Source: ~

Antietam Bridge

AMietaln

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Uniao victory io

Augm;t 1862 tbat pvt llncoln

tbt opportunity to anoounet tbt Emaocip;~.tion Prod.tmation

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Frttd ~u Jlavt~~ io Conftdtrate. bdd tft'ri.tory. d u:ngtd oaturt ofC"fril War

With McClellan out of the picture, Lee and his lieutenant, Stonewall jackson, pushed nonh, routing a Union army at the Second Battle of Bull Run (Second Manassas) in August 1862. Lee foiiO'II.-ed up this victor}' with a bold stroke: he took his army across the Potomac and north"'>ard into Maryland, hoping that the fall h~st could pnwide him wich desperately needed supplies. lhe scakes were enor· mous. By seizing western Maryland, Lee could threaten Washington, rdic-.-e pressure on Richmond, improve the prospects of peace candidates in che Norch' s upcoming fall election, and possibly induce Britain and France to recognize and support the Confederacy as an independent nation . McClellan met Lee at che Bartle of Antietam (all-TEE-tum), also called Sharpsburg. on September 17, 1862. Norch and Souch to· ~cher suffered 24,000 casualties in chis bloodiestda)' Of the war. Tacticall)', the bat· de was a draw, but strategically it constituted a major Union victor}' because it forced Lee: to withdraw south of the Poromac. Most important, Anciecam provided Lincoln the occasion to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing all slaves under rebel control. Lincoln complained that McClellan had "the slows'" and faulted him for not pursuing Lee after Antietam. McClellan's replacement, ~neral Ambrose Burnside, thought himself unfit for high command. He "''lls right. In December 1862 he led 122,000 federal croops against 78,500 Confederates at che Battle of Fredericksburg (Virginia). Burnside capru.red the tO'II.· n but then sacrificed his army in futile charges up the heights west of che tO'II.·n. The carnage shook evecn Lee. «Jt is well that war is so terrible- "''C should grow fond of ic,'" he told an aide during the battle. Richmond remained, in che words of a southern song, "a hard road co traw~l." The war in the East had become a stalemate.

Image not :av:aibblc doo to Cop)Tig.ht resuictioos

The Union fared be£Cer in the West. ltUOS Unlike the gcographicall}' limited eastern t heater, the war in the West shifted over a \'ast terrain that provided access co riV\'.rs leading diroccl}' into the South. The West also spawned new leadership in the person of an obscure Union general, Ulysses S. Grant. A West Point graduate ~Aith a reputation fo r heavy drinking. and a failed farmer and busjnessman, Grant soon prM'Cd one r n tii'Y.OIC."t MclmpiiiS of the Union's best leaders. In 1861- 1862 Grant had stabilized control of Missouri AAIWISAS and Kentucky and t hen mOII'ed sout h co attack Corinth (COREilnth), Mississippi, a major rail junccion. In early April 1862 Confederate forces staged a surprise attack on Gram's anny, encamped at Shiloh (SHY-lo.-) Church in southern 1 tnnessee. Driven back on t he 6rst day, Union fol\':es counterattacked on the second day and drOV\'. the Confederate army from the field. Of 77,000 men who fought at Shiloh, 23,000 'A'Cre killed or wounded. Defeated ac Shiloh, the Confederates evacuated lOIASIA.'IA Corinth. For che Corinth--Shiloh campaign, t he Confederacy had stripped Ne~A' Orleans of its defenses, leaving its largest ciry guarded by only 3,000 militia. A combined land·sea force: un· der Union general Benjamin Butler and Admiral David G. Far· ragut (FAIR·ufl·gut) cook advantage of che weakened defenses and captured New O rleans in late April. Farragut continued up the Mississippi as far as Natchez. When a Union fl otilla mOV\'.d d()'ll.·n che river in june and cook Memphis, che Nort h controlled t he great river except for a 200-mile screech between Port Hudson, Louisiana, and Vicksburg. Mississippi. In 1862 Union and Confederate forces also clashed in the Map 15.2 The War in tilt w.st. t rans-Mississippi \l1est, a \'ast region char stretched from the 1861- 1161 Midwest to t he J:taci6c coast. On the banks of the Rio Grande, 6y the end olt86Z the NOf"th hd d New Otle:uu Union \'Oiunteers and Mexican·American companies dro\'t a :and the entire Missinippi Ri..v except fOr W st~uh bttween Vidaburg :and Port Hudson . Confederate army from 1Cxas o ut of New Mexico. A chousand miles co the cast, opposing armies battled for control of che crucial Missouri River. ln l'ca Ridge, Arkansas, in March 1862, northern troops scattered a Confederate force of 16,000. I.Gysses S. Clr3ol L;ooolnThese Union victories changed the t rans-Mississippi ~A'ar. As t he rebel threat appoi.nttd head ofArmy of faded, u.-estern \'Oiunteers who had mobilized co c rush Confederates curned co 6ght· tbt Potonwc; ulrimatdy ing Indians. After 1865, federal t roops mM•ed west ro complete the roue ofche Jndi· clef'"uttd lee ans that had begun during che Civil War.

Tile War tn the West

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Civil War soldiers u.-ere typically volunteers from farms and small towns who joined companies of recruits from their area. Local IO)'lllcies spurred enrollment,espcdally in the South, as did ideals of honor and valor. Soldiers on boch sides saw military life as a transforming experience in which citizens became warriors and bo)'S became men.

Tile Soldters' War

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Recruits v.-ere meshed inco regiments and then sent co training camps. Military training was notoriously poor, and much of army life 'A'llS tedious and uncomfort· able. Union troops ate btans, bacon, salt pork, pickled beef, and hardtack- biscuits almost impossible co crack. Confederate forces ace bacon and cornmeal, and they often ran out of food, blankets, shoes, socks, and clothes. Both sides suffered from a multitude of lice, fl~ ticks, flies, and ra~ and from the diseases they carried. Dreams of militar}' glory faded swiftly. War broughc appalling casualci~ and soldiers quick!)' learned to inure themselves to che stench of death. The high casualcy rates came not from imprOIJ'l!d technology, such as the rifle, bur from the armies' inability to use such technology well. The deadly cost of battle fell most heavily on the infantry, in which at least three out of four soldiers served. A combination of in· experience, inadequate training. and barriers of terrain curbed their impact. Large masses of soldiers faced one another at dose range for long periods of time, exchanging 6re until one side or the other ga~ up and fell back. Armies gained in efficiency in battle through experience, and only face in the war. The moti\'tS of these soldiers varied widely. Some Confederates joined in order to prescrw slaV\'.ry, which they paired with liberty. As the war ground on, more and more Union soldiers came co sec emancipation as chcir goal, sometimes for humanitarian re-asons. "Since I am dO'I'-'n here: I ha..-c learned and seen more of what the horrors ofsla\'ety was than I ever knew before," an Ohio officer wrote from loui· siana. Ochers had more practical goals. By the summer of 1862 Union soldiers in the South had become agents of liberation. Many who had once damned the ..abolition· ist war" now endorsed emancipation as part of the ~A'llr effort. As an Indiana soldier said, "E..-ery negro 'A'C get strengthens us and weakens the rebels."

-.clads and Cnisers:

By plunging the navy into the Confederacy like a dagger, the Union exploited one of irs dearest advantages. T he North began the ~A>ar with more: chan fortyacti\'e warshipsthe South had none-and by 1865 northern industrial advantages had given the United States the largest navy in the world. Steamships could penetrate the Souch's river systems from any direction. Vee the Union na\y faced an extraordinar}' chal· lenge in irs efforrs to blockade che South's 3,500 miles of coastline. Sleek Confeder· ate blockade runners darted in and out of southern harbors wich litd e chance of caprure early in che war. Thcir chances of success gradually diminished, hO\l-e\-er, as the North tightened the blockade and began to capture key southern porrs. In 1861 almost 90 percent of blockade runners made it through; by 1865 the race had sunk to SO percent. Union seizure of rebel porrs and coastal areas shrank the South's foreign trade even more. In daring amphibious assaults in 1861 and 1862, the Union captured the excellent harbor of Pon Royal, Souch Carolina.: the coastal islands off South Carolina; and mosc of North Carolina's riV\'.r outlets. Na\•al pa· trois and amphibious operations shrank the South's ocean trade to one-third its prewar leveL Despite meager resources, the South made impressiV\'. efforts co offset the North's na\•al ad\•antages. Earl)' in the war che Confederates raised a scuttled Union frigate, the Merrim«; sheathed irs sides in iron; rechristened it the Virginia; and deployed it to attack wooden Union ships at Hampton Roads, Virginia The Virtjnia

The Nlnl Wlr

mct irs match o n March 9, 1862, when it tangled wit h the hastily built Union iron· d ad Monitor. ·nt first batdet:\'er fought bCN"Cen ironclads, t he engagement ended in a draw. The South constructed other ironclads and even the first submarine, which dragged a mine through che water co sink a Union ship off Charlesron in 1864. Un· fortunately, the "fis h" failed to surface and wenc down wit h its prey. 1'he Confeder· acy had more success o n the high seas, ~Ailere: ~A'OOden, sce:am-driven co mmerce raidcrs like the Alafuma and the Ftorida, both builc in England, ~ATcaked havoc on t he Union's mcrchanc marine. No matter how su ccessful, commerce raiding ~A'Ould not tip the balance of t he war in che.S out h's favor because the North, unlike its foe, did not depend on imports for war materials. The Souch ,,,.o uld lose: the naval ~A'ar.

While armies and navies dashed in 1861- 1862, conflict developed on a third front: diplomacy. At the war's s tart southerncrs had confidencl)' o pened a campaign to gain swift d iplomatic recognition for the Confederacy. They were sure of che support of Britain's and f rance's upper classes and even more certain that Britain, dependent on t he South for four-fifths ofitscotton, ~At:loped other bacclu. sources of cotton during the war, especial!)' in India and Egypt. Although In tht ~rly)..._au of th e eonlliet, the w~r in t he' Eut ""~'a .staltmatC'. the Souch's share of England's cotton imports plummeted from 77 percent TIW' South found a brilli;mt IN d« to 10 percent during the war, Britain 's text ile indusCJy nl'\~tr faltered.

Tilt D!pomatic War

The Sout h had exaggerated Britain's s take in helping t he Confederacy. As a naval poW'Cr thac had frequently blockaded its 0'1'-'n enemies, Brit· ain's diplomatic ince:rest lay in supporting the Union blockade in principle; from Britain's standpoint, to hdp che Souch break the blockade would sct a precedent that could easily boomerang. Finally, although France and Britain often considered recognizing che Confederacy. the riming ne\'t:r s~med quite right. lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Jlrodamation, freeing che sla~ cl'fecrivcl)' preempted any British or French m()'V'C CO'A'ard recognit ion

in Robtrt E. ltt, bu t LincoJ n cont inutd toJurch £Tuid6.sly for a compar.ililt Union gcon~r;aJ. Un ion foi'«S e.stabll.shtd .supc"-00rity "~t ofth~ MiJ.JiJ.sippi u rly in thew~r.

Dupitt hopu b.utd on t he' BritU.h teuile indu.stry'J nud for cotton, the' Confe'dtr~cy nC'\"-r .su ~«dtd in tnli,ting Gll'at Britain and France" :u ~uiu.

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of the Confederacy. By transforming the war into a struggle about slavery, lincoln won u.ide support among liberals and the working class in Britain. The prodamarion, wrore Henry Adams (diplomat Charles Francis Adams's son) from London, ..has done: more: for us here than all ofour fonner victories and all our diplomacy."

EMANCIPATION TRANSFORMS THE WAR, 1863 Why was emancipation important in the course ofthe war; and wlwt role did A(riCfJn·Americans play in the conflict? ..1 hear old john Brown knocking on t he lid of his coffin and shouting 'Let me: out! Let me: out!'" abolitionist Henry Stanton wrote to his wife: after rhe fall of fort Sumter. ..The Doom of Slavery is ar hand;'' In 1861 chis prediction seem ed wildly premaru.re. In his inaugural address Lincoln had stated bluntly, .. , ha\'l' no purpose, directly or indirectly, to incerfere with the: institution of slavery in the states where it cxisrs.'" Yet ~Aithin cwo years both necessity and ideology made emancipation a pri· mary nort hern goal. The rise of emancipation as a ~A'llr goal reflected the changing character of t he: conflict itself. As t he fi ghting raged on, demands for the prosecution of a "total ~A'llr" intensified in the: North, and many people who were unconcerned about the moral· ity of slaver}' accepted abolition as a militar}' necessity.

The Union's policy on emancipation developed in several sta~s. As soon as northern troops invaded the Souch, questions arose about captured rebel property, in· eluding slaV\'S. ~nerally, slaV\'S who fled behind Union lines were considered "contraband'"-e:netn}' property liable to seizure-and were: put to work for the Union army. In August 1861 Congress passed the: first Confiscation Act, which authorized the seizure ofall property, induding slaves, used in military aid of t he rebellion. lbis Ia~A' did not free slaves, nor did ic apply to those who had not worked for the: Confed· crate arm}'· Several factors determined the Union's cautious approach. For one: thing, lin· coin maintained that the South could not legally secede and thus argued t hac t he: Constitucion•s protection of property still applied. Second, Lincoln did noc want co alienate slaveholders in t he: border scaces and proslavcry Democrats. In December 1861 he: assured Congress chac t he war would noc become a ..remorseless re\·olution· ary struggle.'" At the same time, however, t he Radical Republicans pressured Lincoln to make t he: Civil War a second American Rt:\'Oiurion, one that would abolish slav· cry. T hey agreed wich African-American abolitionist f rederick Douglass that ..co fight against slaveholders wichout fighting against slavery, is buc a half-hearted business;'' Emancipation also cook on military significance with each Union setback, as nonherners began to recognize that sla\-ery permitted the South to commit a higher percentage of its white men to batcle. In july 1862, Congress therefore passed the sec· ond Confiscation Ace, which authorized che: seizure of property belonging to all reb·

els, stipulated chac slaves ~Ailo entered Union lines "shall be forever free;'' and authorized the use of blacks as soldil't'S. NC'\o-ertheles~ Lincoln continued to stalL "M)' paramount object in this scruggle is to save the Union, and is IWt either to save or destroy slaver}','" lincoln a..-erred. «Jf I could save the Union ~Aithouc freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could sa\J'C it by frecing ttl/ the slaV\'S, I would do ic; and if I could sa\J'C it by freeing some and Ita\'· ing others alone, J ~A'Ould also do chac." But Lincoln, who had always loathed slaver}', gradually came around to the view char the ~A'llr had to lead co abolition. Reluctant to push the issu e ~A•hile Union armies reeled in defeat, he drafted a proclamation of emancipatio n and waited for the right moment co announce it. After che Union vic· tory at Antietam, Lincoln issu ed che Preliminary Emancipacion Proclamation (Scp· tember 1862), which dedared aUslaves under rebel concrol free as ofjanuar}' I, 1863. The 6nal Emancipation Proclamation, issued on january I , 1863, declared "fon.......-er frel"" all sla\J'Cs in areas in rebellion. The proclamation had limited praccical impact. It applied only co areas in which it could not be enforced, those still in rebellion, and d id not touch slavery in the bor· der stares. But the Emancipacion Prodamacion ~A'llS a brilliant political stroke. By making it a militar}' measure, lincoln pacified norchern conse!Vati\·~ and by issu· ing the prodamacion himself, he stole the initiative from che Radical Republicans. Through the proclamation, moreO\'l't, lincoln mobilized support for che Union among European liberals, pushed che border states toward emancipation (boch Mis· souri and Maryland abolished slaver}' before the war's md), and increased slaV\'S' in· centi..-es to escape as Union troops neared. The Emancipation Proclamation did not end slaw~ry everrwhere or free "aJI the sla..-es;'' but ic changed the war. From 1863 on, the war for che Un ion was also a ~A'llr against slavery.

The attacks and counterattacks of the opposing armies turned man}' sla..-es inco pa~A'tlS ofthe war, free ~Ailen Union troops overran their area, slaves again if the Confederates regained concrol. One North Carolina sla\'t: celebrated his liberation twelve different times. By 1865 abouc 500,000 fo nner slaves were in Union hands. Alchough in the 6rs.t rear of che war masters could retrieve slaves fro m Union armies, after 1862 sta..-es ~Ailo crossed Union lines were considered free. The concin· ual influx of freed sla\'t:S created a huge refugee problem for army commanders. Many freed slaves sl'l"V'Cd in army camps as cooks, teamsters, and laborers. Some worked for pay on abandoned plantations or u.-ere leased o ut co planters ~Ailo swore allegiance to the Union. Whether in camps or on plantations, freedmen quescioned the \'alue ofliberacion. Deduccions for clothing and food ate up mo.sc of their earn· ings, and laborconcraccs bound them for long periods of rime. Morem-er, the freed· men encountered fierce prejudice among Yankee soldiers, who widely feared that emancipation would propel blacks northward after the war. The best solution co the widespread "question of ~Athat co do with the darkies;'' wrote one norchern soldier, "would be to shoot them."' Buc this 'A'as noc the whole story. Comrabands who aided the Union as spies and scouts helped co break down bigotry. "1'he sooner we get rid ofo ur foolish prejudice

Crossilg Union Lines

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340

CHAPtER 15

OUCI I.U OF FREEDOM: CtviL "''All. 1861- 186j

the better for us," a Massachusetts soldier "''rote home. In March 1865, Congresses· tablished the f reedmen's Bureau to prO\ide relief, education, and "''Ork for the for· mer sla\'tS. The same Ia"'' also prO\ided chat forty acres of abandoned or confiscated land could be leased to each freedman or southern Unionist, with an option to bU)' after three }'eat'S. This "''lls che first and only time thac Congress prO\ided for the redistribution of confiscated Confederate property.

{f'1) ~

Primary Source: Zouave Soldier

During che first year of the war, the Union had rejected African-American soldiers. Only after the Emancipation l'rodamation did che large-scale enliscment of blacks be:· gin. Prominent African-Americans, including Frederick Douglass, \N'Orked as recruit· ing age:ms in northern cities. Douglass dearly saw che link be:cwcen military se:nice and citizenship. «once lct che black man ~c upon his person the brass letters, U.S.; let him gee an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth "'ilich can deny that he has earned the right to citizenship." By the war's end 186,000 African·Americans had served in the Union army, one-cemh ofall Union soldiers. Half ofthem came from the Confederate states. White Union soldiers co mmonly objected co the new recruits on racial grounds. Buc some, including Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a liberal minister and fo nner john BrO'I'-'n supporter who led a black regiment, "''l'lcomed che black sol· diers. ••There is a fierce energy about them (in bacrle];" he exulted, "beyond anyching of "''hich I haw ever read, except it be the French Zouaves ((zoo·AHVZ), troops in North Africa)." Even Union soldiers who held African-Americans in comempc came to approve of "an}'thing that will kill a rebel." All African-American soldiers sen·ed in segregated regiments under white officers. For most of che war, black soldiers earned far less pay than whites. Not unci! june 1864 did Congress belatedly equalize the pay of black and white soldiers. African-American soldiers also suffered a far higher mortality race than whites. Seldom commined to combat, they "''ere far more: likd)' to die ofd isease in bacteria· ridden garrisons. 11le Confederacy refused to treat caprured black Union soldiers as prisoners of "'>ar; instead, they were sent back to che states from which they had come to be reenslaved or executed. In an especially gruesome incident, when Confed· crate troops under General Nathan Bedford Forrest captured Fore Pillow, Tennessee, in 1864, they massacred 262 blacks. Although fraught "'ith inequities and hardships, military seJVice symbolized citizenship for African-Americans. It proved that "black men can gi\'l' blows as well as take chem," Frederick Douglass declared. "Liberty wo n by white men "''Ould lost half its luster."' And che Union's use of African·American soldiers, especially former sla\'tS, scruck a militar}' as well as a psychological blaw at the Confederacy. "1'he}' will make good soldiers," General Gram wrote in 1863, ..and taking them from che en· emy "''Cakens him in the same proportion they strengthen us:''

Anxious white southerners on che home front felt as if they were perched on a \'Okano. «We should be practically helpless should che negroes rise," declared a louisiana planter's daughter, "since chere are so few men left at home." 10 maintain concrol

Slivery in Wartime

over their 3 million slaves, they tightened slaw patrols, spread scan: stories among slaves, and somecimes C\>ccn moved entire: plantations to re:laci ~ safety in 1t:xas. Some slaves remained faith ful to their o"''tlers, hiding creasured belongings from marauding Union soldiers. Others were torn becween loyalty and desire: for freedom; one body servant, for example, accompanied his master to war, rescued him when he "''lls wo unded, and chen escaped o n his master•s horse. Given the chance to flee to Union lines, mosc slaves did. Freedom was irresistible. The majority of southern slaves stayi:d o n chcir plantations under the nominal control of their masters. Despite the fears of southern whit~ no general slave uprising occurred, and the Confederate war effort continued co uciliu sla\·e labor. 11lousands of slaves worked in war pl an~ toiled as teamsters and cooks in ann}' camps, and se:rwd as nurses in field hospitals. Bur ew~n slaves with no chance of flight "''ere alert co the opportunity that "''llr pnwided and swiftly tesce:d the limits of enfol\':ed labor. Moreover, warcime condi· dons reduced the slaves' productivity. With most of the "'flite men off at war, the master-slave relationship weakened and the women and boys "'flo remained on plan· cacions complained of difficulty in controlling slavcs. Many refused to work, did their work inefficiently, or destroyed property. Whether slaves fled to freedom or merely scopped working. they e:ffcctivi:ly undermined the plantation system. Slavcry d isince:grated t:\'tn as the Confederaq• fought to preserve ic.. By 1864 a desperate Confederate Congress considered impressing slaves imo che army in exchange for their freedom at the war•s end. Although Robert E. Lee: himself favored making slaves into soldiers, others \1/Cre: adamantly opposed. "'If slaves will make good soldiers,» a Georgia general argued, "our whole theory of slavery is wrong.» In March 1865, ho"''C\>cr, che Confederate Congress passed a bill co arm 300,000 slave soldiers. Alchough the plan co ann the slaw~s n ew~r took effecc, the debate: over ic dam· aged southern morale by revealing deep internal divisions O\'tr war goals. Even before these conflkcs had become obviou~ the Souch's military posicion had deteriorated.

In summer and fal l 1863, Union forcunes imprO\"t'd dramatically in t:\•cty theace:r of the war. HO\I,\...,..·e:r, che spring had gone badl}'• as General joseph "Fighcing joe::'" Hooker, a "'indbag fund of issuing pompous proclamations co his troop~ suffered a crushing defeat at Chancellorsville, Virginia, in May 1863. Although Chancd lorsville cost the South dcarl}•-Stonl!"-·al) jackson was accidentally killed by his 0\l,·n troops- it humiliated the Norch, whose forces had oumumbered the Confederate: troops two to o ne. Reporcs from che West brought no better news: Grant "''as still unable to cake Vicksburg. and the rebels dung to a vital200.mile screech of the Mississippi. Union fortunes rose when l ee detmnin ed to invade the North. The decision provoked dissension "'ithin the Confederate gm-emmem, but l ee needed supplies char "''llHacke:d Virginia could no longer provide. He also hoped that Lincoln would move croops fro m Vicksburg back into the eastern cheater, and he bdie\·ed that a major Confederate: victor}' on northern soil could cip the balance: to propeace norchern Democrats and gain European recognition for the Confederacy. Lee led his 75 ,000 men into Maryland and then pressed forward into southern

Tbt Tul'lling Point ofll63

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342

CHAPtER 15

OUCII.U OF FREEDOM: CtviL "''Ail.•861-186j

Pcnns)ivania lincoln, rejecting Hooker's plan to attack a virrually unprotected Richmond, replaced him ~A'ith General George G. Meade. Early in july 1863 Lee's offensi ~ ground to a hale at a Pcnns)ivania road junction, Gettysburg. Confederates foraging for shoes in che cown scum bled into Union cavalry, and bcnh sides called for reinforcements. Thus began the war's greatest battle. 1'he Union fielded 90,000 troops against Lee's 75,000, and rhe struggle raged for che first three days of j uly. O n Jul)' 2, lee rejected advice to plant his army in a defensive position between Meade's force and Washington and instead attacked rhe Union flanks. But because Confederate assaults "-"ere uncoordinated, and some southern generals d isregarded orders and scruck where they chose, the Union was able to mo..-e in reinforcements and regain its earlier losses. On the afternoon of the third day, Lee ordered a d irect frontal assaulc on rhe Union lin~ and 15,000 men under General George E. Pickerc charged across che open field, flags bright in the brilliant sunshine. Union rifles poured volley after \'Olley into the onrushing Confcd erar~ whose line ~A'll..-ered and chen broke. More chan half of Pickert's force lay dead, d)ing, or captured. When Lee ~A'ithdrew co Virginia the next day,july 4, he had lost seventeen generals Map IS.J Tho War in tilt East, 1861 and more than one--third of his army. 10tal Union and Victorious atChanc:diOf'sville in May 1863, lee ag;~.in invadtd Union ttnitory but w.u dtci~\-dy Confederate casualties numbered 50,000. Although Meade stopped at Getty5burg. failed to pursue the retreating rebels, che Union men re· joiced that chey had parried l.ce's stab northward. Almost simultaneously, rhe North won a strategically Cettyslut Union \ic:tory th.u: \i ta! bactle in the West, at Vjcksburg. After arduous manew.-ering, Grant had bebalm! Conreder.ltl' invasion or sieged Vicksburg. che key to che MississippL After six weeks, during which southern Ptnn"flvmia; wrning paint in soldiers and civilians alike survi..-ed b)•caring mules and e•..-e n rats, the Confederate wuin E.ut commander surrendered his 30,000-man garrison to Grant on Jul)' 4, the day that y'Kir:sfl.l'l Union victory tbat l..ce began his withdrawal from Penns)ivania. Port Hudson, the lase Confederate IP"'" Nortb complttc conuol of stronghold on che Mississippi, soon surrendered. ..The Father of Waters flows unMi$1Eiu ippi R.Mr vexed to rhe sea,"lincoln proclaimed. A second crucial Union victory in the West soon foiiO\I."'O, as armies stormed back and forth across Tennessee. By November 1863 rhe Union forres had finally captured and held Chattanooga, and rhe wa}' lay open for a Union strike into Georgia. Coming on the heels of re\-erses char had d riven northern morale co its lo~A'CS.t poinc of the war, Union successes in rhe second half of 1863 stiffened rhe North's will to concinue fighcing and plunged some Confederate leaders imo despair. After the fall of Vicksburg, chief of ordnance josiah Gorgas lamcnced, "Ycsterda)' ~A'e rode the pinnacle of success- today absolute ruin scents our portion. The Confederacy totters to its destruction:'' Tocter it might, but che South was far from falling. Lee and his Anny of North· ern Virginia still defended Virginia and Richmond. Although the loss of Vicksburg

PA

I l

I \A'AII AND SOCIElY, NOIIlH ..XO SOUTH had cue the Confederacy in half, southern states W\'SC of the Mississippi could sciU prMide soldiers. And the heart of the ConfederaC)•-the Caroli· nas, Georgia,. Florida, Mississippi, and Virginia- remained in southern hands. Few thought che fate of che Confederacy scaled.

343

The Em.:mc:ip.:nian Prad:un..u :ion made th~ war .l conflia abou t Jl~ry, but it only rl'l'~d Jlaws in ubtl+hdd r~rrirocr.

The- pcod.unahon ktpt Brir.lin and Fr~nc:~ from recogn ixing th~

WAR AND 50CIE1Y, NORTH AND SOUTH

I

In what ways did the Gvil War affect the two sides?

The Civil War, engulfing two economics and societies, cxcended far be)'ond the bactlefidds. By 1863 che concrasts between Nort h and South W\'.re sta..rk: superior resources enabled the Union co meet warcime demands that the imperiled Confederacy could not. But both sides confronted similar problems: Labor shorcages, inflation, and disunity and dissent. Familie~ W\'.re disrupted and dislocated, csped all)' in the Souch. Women on both sides took on new roles ac home, in the workplace, and in relief efforts.

Con k&r~cy.

Co nk&rate .d aV\":1 poud a ufugtt p rubltm for Union armi<."::; tht ufugt<.":: Jufl't rtd d iJerimin.uian but pc"rfori'Md v~luablt toulu for thC' ftder~J UOOp.i. Dupitt urly ruiJtm«, 1~000 A&ic:.ut-Amerieuu Jtn~d :u Joldier~ in Union ~rmi e.s; th~ South ul ti· mattly au thocixtd tht UJC' ofbbdt tru<JPS> but roo l.u~ to taM effec:t. Union vKrociu .u Getl')'llburg and V~k,bu rg in ~rly July 1863 wu~ tht tu rning p<Mnt of tht war.

The war had a wildl)' uneven effect on the Union' s ocon· omy. Depriw:d of southern markers, the shoe industry in Massachusetcs dedined; deprived of raw cotton, the tcx· tile induscry wcnc imo a tailspin. Bur norchern industries directly related to che ~A'llr effort, such as the manufacture of arms and unifonns, benefited from hu~ gM>crn· ment concraccs. Railroads flourished. NotA' an ()'IJ'Crwhdming majority in Congress, and ~Aith no need to balance southern interests against those of the Norch, che Re· publican party carried chrough a \igorous probusiness legislative agenda. Congress hiked t he tariff in 1862 and again in 1864 to procecc domestic industries. In july 1862 it passed che Pacific Railroad Act to build a cranscontinencal railroad. l 'he go'lemmem chartered the Union Jladfic and Central l':lcific corporations and ga'le each large land grams and generous loans, a total of 60 million acres of land and $20 million. 11le issuance of greenbacks and the creation of a national banking sys· tern broughc a measure of uniformity to the nation' s finan cial system. The Republicans designed chese measures to help all social classes and partially succeeded. lhe Homestead Act (pas.sed in May 1862), embodying the party's ideal of "free soil, free labor, free men," granted 160 acres of public land co settlers after five )\!ars of residence on the Land By 1865 twenty chousand homesteaders occupied new land in the West, forerunners of a human tidal ~A'llVC 10 bring higher education within the reach of the common people, the MorTJlll.and Grant Act of)uly 1862 gaw: stares proceeds from public land to establish univcmries emphasiz.:ing "such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and mechanic arts (enginoering]." It spurred the growch of large state univcrsjri~ main!)' in the Midu.\!sc and West. Michigan State, Ohio State, Jo~A'll State, and l'urdue along with man}' ochers profi ted from the law. Despite the idealistic goals underlying such laws, che war beneficed che ~A'Cal thy more than the
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344 substandard merchandise, such as the: notorious «shoddy" clothing made: from

compressed rags, which quickly d isince:grated. Speculacors made millions in che gold market, profiting more: from Union defeats chan from Union victories. De:alcrs with access to scarce commodicie:s reaped astonishing profi ts. Manpcw.-cr shortages in ag· riculcural areas stimulated demand for C)'ft.IS McConnick's mechanical reaper. Me· Connick redoubled his profits by investing in pig iron and ~A>acching as warcime:

demand drOII'e the price of iron fro m S23 to $40 a ton. Ordinary ~A'Orkcrs suffered. Jlrote:cti\'e: tariffs, warcime: e:xdsc taxes, and inflation bloated the price of finished goods, and wages lagged 20 percent or more behind cost increases. As boys and women poured into gMwnmcnr offices and factories co replace men serving in the: army, they drew lo~A'Cr pay, and the threat char employers could hire more )'OUths and females undercut the: bargaining power of the men who remained in the labor force:. \l'orke:rs complained about their low wages, and a handful formed unions, a practice chat ~A'Ould accd e:race: after che ~A'llr. Emplo)'ers denounced work complaints as unpatriotic hindrances co the: war effort, and in 1864 troops were d iwne:d from combat to put down protesrs in ~A'llr indu.scrie:s.

The ~A'llrshatcered the South's ec:onom)'· In face, if both re:· gions are considered coge:cher, che war retarded Amtrican economic growth. For example:, the: U.S. commodicy out· put, which had increased 51 percent and 62 perce:m in the 1840s and 1850s, respec:· m·ely, rose only22 percemduring the 1860s. Even this modest gain depended wholl)' on the North, for during that same decade, commodity output in the Souch de
The War's E
llllpad: 1lle South

I \A'AII AND SOCIElY, NOIIlH ..XO SOUTH

345

In one respocc, the persistence of cotton growing aided the South, as cotton became che basis for the Confederacy's flou rishing trade ~A'ith the enem}'· In Jul)' 1861 the U.S. Congress virrually legalized this trade by all~·ing northern commm:e with southerners lo)•al to the Union. In practice, it prowd impossjble co tdlloyalists from rebd s, and northern traders happil)' swapped bacon, salt, blankets, and other ne<es· sities ~A'ith whoever ~A'Ould sell them southern cotton. By 1864 traflic through the lines was providing the: South with enough food daily to feed Lee's Arm}' of North· ern Virginia. A northern congressman lamenced that it seemed the Union's polic)' was ..to feed an army and 6ghc it at the: same time."

Both ~A'llrtime gow~rn me:ms faced mounting dissent and disloyalty. Within che Confederacy. dissenc assumed two basic forms. First, a ...ocal group of states' rights supporrers persistently attacked Jefferson Davis's go\·emme:nt as a despotism. Second, IO)'· alcy co the: Union flourished among the nonsla\-eholding small farmers ~A>ho lived in the Appalachian region. 10 chest: people:, the Confederate rebellion was a slave ~·n· ers' conspiracy. An Alabama farmer complained of the planters, "All they want is to get you pupt up and to fight for their infurnal negroes and after you do there 6ght· ing )'OU may kiss there hine parts for o they care;'' On the: whole, the South responded mildly co su ch popular disaffoccion. l n 1862 the Confederate Congress gave President Davis che po~A>cr to suspend the ~Arit of habeas corp u~ bur he used it sparingI)'· lincoln faced similar challenges in che North, where the: Democratic minority opposed both emancipation and che: ~A'llrtime gro~A'th of centralized pc>"'er. O ne faction, che "Peace Democrats" (called Copperheads by cheir opponen~ to suggest a resemblance to a species of easily concealed poisonous snakes), demanded a cruce and a peace conference. They charged that the: administration's war policy would "exterminate the South;" make reconciliation impossible, and spark ..terrible social change and m'Oiution" nation~A'idc. Strongest in the border states, the MidW\'St, and northeastern dries, the Demo· crats mobilized farmers of southern background and che urban working class, espe:· d ally recent immigrants, who feared losing their jobs co free blacks. In 1863 chis \'OlatHe mix of political, ethnic, radal, and class antagonisms exploded inco ami· draft protests in several cities. By far the most violent eruption occurred in Jul)' 1863 in Ne~A' York Ciry, where mobs of Irish \l'Orking·d ass men and \\'Omen roamed the streets for four days until federal troops suppressed them. The: Irish loathed che idea of being drafted co 6ght a ~A'llr on behalf of sla\'eS who, once: freed,. might compete with them for jobs. They also bitterly rescored the: provision of che draft law chat al· lO'wed the rich to purchase: substirutes. The rioters lynched at least a dozen blacks, injured hundreds more, and burned draft offices, che homes of ~A'ealthy Republicans, and the: Colored Orphan Asylum. Jlrcside:m lincoln's speedy dispatch of federal troops co quash chese riots typi· fied his forceful response to dissent. lincoln imposed martial law wich far less hesi· tancy than Davis; he suspended che writ of habeas corpus nationwide: in 1863 and authorized the arrest of rebels, draft resiscm, and anyone engaged in "any dislO)'lll practice:'' The responses of Davis and Lincoln to d issent underscored the d ifferences beNttn che two regions• wartime: political systems. lincoln and che: Republicans

Delllnl wtth Dissent

IC.,...Nds

Nord!em "Pc-,u'll' Dmlocnu" •·ho oppostd W'M

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346

CHAPtER 15

OUCI I.U OF FREEDOM: CtviL "''All. 1861- 186j

used dissent to rally patriotic fC"t-er against t he: Democrats, but Davis lacked the: in· stitucionalizacion ofd issent proYide:d by party conflict and chus had to crtad Ughd)' lese he be branded a despot. Yet lincoln did not u nleash a rcign of ce:rror against dissent. In general, t he: North preserved freedom of the press, speech, and assembly. In 1864 t he Union be:· came t he: 6rst ~A'llrring nation in history to hold a contested national d«cion. Moreover, most of t he 15,000 civilians arrested in t he North ~A'Cre: quick!)' released.

The Union and the Confederacy alike ~Aitnl'S.Std remark· able wartime: patriotism t hat propelled civilians, especial!)' women, co ~A'Ork cire:lessly co alleviate soldiers' suffering. The U.S. Sanitat')' Commission, organized in j une 1861 to assjst the Union's medical bureau, depended on women volunteers. The commission raised funds, bought and distributed supplies, and ran spedal kitchens to supplement army rations. The: legendary "Mother" Mar}' Ann Bickerd)tkt sen -ed sick and wounded Union soldiers as boch nurse and su rrogate mother. When a doctor asked her by whac auchority she: demanded supplies for the wounded, she shoe back, "From t he: Lord God Almighty. Do you have anything chat ranks higher than that?" Women also reached out co aid the battlefront t hro ugh che nursing corps.. Some: 3,200 ~A'Omen sel'VCd che Union and the Confederacy as nurses. Dorochca Dix, famed for her campaigns on behalf of che insane:, became head of che Union's nursing corps.. Clara Barton, an obscure derk in t he f:tatent Office, found ingenious ways of channeling medidne to the sick and wounded. Catching wind of Union mowme:nts before the Batd e: of Antietam, she showed up at the battle6e:ld on the eve of che dash with a wagonload of supplies. When army surgeons ran out of bandages and started to dress ~A'Ounds wit h corn husks, she raced forward ~Aith lint and bandages. In 1881 she: would found the American Red Cross. The Confederacy had its own legendary nu.rses. Sally 1bmpkins ~A'llS commissioned a capcain for her hospital ~A'Ork. Belle: BO)•d, both a nurse and a spy, once: dashed t hro ugh a 6cld co give Stonewall jackson information. Danger stalked nurses in hospitals far from che fronc. Louisa May Alcotc, a nu.rse ac the Union Hotel Hospital in Washington, D.C., concracted typhoid. WherC'\-er cheyworke:d, nurses "Ai tnl'S.Std haunting, nightmarish scenes. «About the: ampu· tating table," one wrote, "Ia)' large: piles ofhuman flesh-legs, arm~ feet, and hands . the stiffened mem branes seemed co be clutching oftentimes at o ur doching." l'ionee:red by British reformer Florence: Nightingale: in the 1850s, n u.rnng was a new \'OCation for ~A'Omen. In che t)'l'S of cricks, it marked a brazen departure from women's proper sphere. Male: doctors ~A'Cre unsure about ho~A' to react to female: nu.rses and sanitary workers. Some saw a potencial for mischie-f in women' s presence: in male: hospital wards. Buc other physidans viewed nursing and sanitar}' 'A-OO rk as usefuL The miasm theory of disease (see Chapter II) uoon wide respect among physi· dans and stimulated valuable: sanitary measures. In partial consequence, che ratio of disease to bacde deaths was much 10'1'--er in the Civil War chan in the Mexican·Amcrican War. Nonetheless, for every soldier killed during the Civil War, tv.'O died of d isease. The germ theory of disease was unknO'I'-·n, and arm and leg wounds often led to gan· gre:ne (GAN·green) or tetanus (TET-I.Ih·nuss). 1}'phoid, malaria. diarrhea. and dyscn· tery raged through army camps.

The Medical W.

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{ff) Primary Source: ~ The Women' s War

Prison camps posed a special problem.. l 'he two sides had far more prisoners chan they could handle, and prisoners on both sides suffered gravel}'· The ~A'Orst con· dicions plagued che southern camps. Squalor and insuffidem rations turned the Confederate prison camp at Andersonville, Gt:orgia, into a \irtual death camp; 3,000 prisoners a monch (out of a total of 32,000) were d}ing there by August 1864. After the ~A'llr an o utraged northern public demanded, and got, rhe execution of Andersonville's commandant.

Nurses and Sanitary Commission ~A'Orkers ~Awe not the only ~A'Omen ro Sel"Ve society in wartime. In North and South alike, women rook m--er jobs vacated by men. In rural areas, where manpo'l'-~r shortages 'A'cr'e most acute, women often plowed, planted, and han·ested. During the' war, noRhC'.m lkpu~ Northern women's rights ad\'OCaces hoped char che war would yield li ~ru pu.~h«< :IC'Y\"f'~ C'conomic equality for women as u.-ell as for slaves. A grateful North, chcy contended, d ~"-lopmC'nt mN:~ures through should n..·•ward women fur their wartime SCC\'ice and recognize the link be· Congru:s-t~rif'f':~, r.lilroad :~ub~idtu, n~t.ion~ banJ.:in~ .l.nd homC'lltC"-ad tween black rights and women's righrs. In 1863, fem inists Elizabeth Cady IC"-gi:~l.:u:ion-;md mdu:~ui..Ui.1:nion Stanton and Susan B. Anthony organized the Nacional Woman's Loyal t.hri,'«<. League. Its members principally gathered signatures on petitions calling 11W' ConfC"ckratC' «enamr, in confor a conscirutional amendm ent to abolish slavery, bur Stanton and An· t.r;uc, crumplC'd und« w;utimC' pnouurt; and C'.i\'i li~ru ~u(fC"rC'd chony used the organization to pro mote woman suffrage as u.-ell. Despite :~hoR.lgt'J and hanbhip . high expeccacions, che war did noc bring ~A'Omen significantl}' closer co Line".oln W.lll m m h qulckC'r th.m economic or policical equality. Nor did it much change the prevailing defiD~ to ~uppnou di.ue"nt. nition of women's sphere. Men continued co dominate the medical pro· 11W' W.lr stim ul.ue'd t he' U:IC' of fession, and for the rest of the centur}' the census classified nurses as womC"n .lll nu rlZ' .lnd led to ad· domestic help. V.ln«-~ in anuth~ia ;md :~anitaf)' This failure to win che voce for women by capitalizing o n che rising coodihoru. senciment fo r abolition keenly disappointed ~A'Omen 's righrs advocates. \'(lam C'.n like' filiu bC't.h U dr St~nton pointC'd towume"n':~ W.lrtimC" :IC'rvicC' The North had co mpelling reasons co abolish slavery, but northern poliri· to p romote' wom e".n':~ righu; how· d ans saw little praccical value in woman suffrage. 1'he Ntw York Herald, C''"-r, in the' C'nd, t he' war d id not which supported the loyal League's attack o n slavery, dismissed its call bring accC'pt.lnC'.C' of wume".n':~ po]iti· cil o r economic c-qua lit)·. for \\'Oman suffrage as "-nonsense and comfooler}'·"

Tilt Wlr and Women's RI&IIIS

THE UNION VICTORIOUS, 1864- 1865

I

How dill the Umon finally wm tile war?

Successes at Gctcysburg and Vicksburg m 1863 notu.'ithstanding, the Union stood no closer to taking Richmond at che start of 1864 than in 1861, and most of the lower South remained under Confederate control. The North's persistent in· ability to destn)}' che main Confederate armies eroded the Union's will to attack. War u.~ariness strengthened the Democrats and jeopardized Uncoln's reelection in 1864. The )'eat 1864 was crucial for rhe North. A Union anny under Gt:neral William Tecumseh Shennan captured Adanca in September, boosting northern morale and helping co reelect Uncoln. Sherman chen marched unimpeded across Georgia and www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

348

CHAPtER 15

OUCII.U OF FREEDOM: CtviL "''All. 1861- 186j

into South Carolina and devastated the stares. In Virginia, Grant backed Lee inco trmches around Petersburg and Richmond and forced the evacuation of both cities- and ultimately the Confederac:fs collapse.

Earl}' in 1864 Lincoln made Grant the commander of all Union armies and promoted him to lieutenant general. At 111 1864 6rs.t glance, the scon)'·faced, cigar-puffing Granc seemed an unlikdycandidace for so exalted a rank, held previously only b)•George Washing· ton. Gram•s only distinguishing characteristics were his evcr-presmt cigar and a penchant for whittling sticks imo chips.. ••There is no glitter, no parade about him," a contemporary noted. But Granc•s successes in the \l'esc had made him the Union's most popular general He mOII'ed his headquarters co the Army of the l'otomac in the East and mapped a strategy for 6nal victor}'· Grant shared lincoln's belief that the Union had to coordinate its artacks on all fronts to exploit its numerical advantage. He planned a sustained offensiw against lee: in the East while ordering Sherman to attack rhe rebel army in Georgia. Sher· man's mission was «co break it (the Confederate army) up, and co get imo the interior of the enemy's counrry . .. inflicting aUthe damage )'OU can.'" In early May 1864, Gram led J 18,000 mm against l..«'s 64,000 in a forested area near Fredericksburg, Virginia, called the Wilderness. l 'he Union army fought the ArmyofNorchern Virginia in a series ofblood)•engagemmts in May and June. These battles ranked among the war's fiercest; ac Cold Harbor, Grant lose 7,000 men in one hour. Instead of recoiling from such an immense «butcher's bill,.. Gram pressed on, forcing Lee to pull back to trenches guarding Petersburg and Richmond. Once entrenched, Lee could noc threarm the Union rear with rapid moves, as he had done for thr«: years. Lee sene General Jubal A. Early on raids down the Shenan· doah (sheh-nan-OOH-uh) Valley, which sen~d che Confederacy as a granary and as an indirect "''ll}' co mmace Washington. Grant countered by ordering General l'hilip Sheridan co march dO'I'-'n che valley from che north and Ia)' it waste. By September 1864 Sheridan controlled the dev:maced \'alley and boasted that a crow fl)ing O\~r the once-prosperous area ~A'Oul d ha\~ to carry its own lunch. While Gram and Lee grappled in the Wildernes~ Sherman led 98,000 men into ~orgia. Opposjng him with 53,000 men (later reinforced to 65,000), General Joseph Johnston slo~Atfy retreated coward Adanta, consef\ing his strmgch for a defense of the d ry and forcing Sherman co elongate his supply lines. Oismat~d by this defensive strategy, President Davis replaced Johnston wich the advmturous John B. Hood. He gave Davis what he wanted, a series of attacks on Sherman, but Sherman pressed relendcs.sly for~A'3rd against Hood's increasingly depleted army. Unable to de-fend Atlanta, Hood evacuated theciry, which fell to Sherman onSeptem· ber 2, 1864.

The Eastern TbNter

Atlanta's fall came at a rimely momenc for lincoln, in the thick of a tough campaign for reelection. Radical Republicans opposed his renomination, largely because of his desire: to rescore occupied parts of the Confederacy co the Union, and rallied around

The Eledlon of 1864

I THE UNION VlCTOIUOOS, •8&.!-•86s Secretary of che 1)-easury Salmon 1'. Chase. The: Democra~ meanwhile, had nC'\o'Cr forgiven Lincoln for making emancipation a war goal, and now the: Copperheads demanded an immediate armistice: follo"''Cd by negotiations. lincoln, howcwr, be:ne6te:d from his own resourcefulness and his foes ' problems. Chase's challenge failed, and by che rime: of the: Republican convention, lin· coin's managers comrolle:d the nomination. 1b isolate: the Peace: Democrats, t he: Republicans fonne:d a tempornr)•organization, che Nacional Union party, and chose a southern Unionist, Democratic se:nacoc Andrew j ohnson of1Cnnc.ssce, for the vice presidency. 1'he: Democrats nominated George B. Mcde:Uan, former commander of the Army of che Potomac, "''ho advoc:aced militaryviccory and t ried to distance him· sdf from the: Democratic platform, which called for peace wichout victory. lincoln doubted thac he: \N'Ould be: reelecced and even arranged furloughs so thac Union soldiers, most of whom supported him, would be able co \'Ute in states lacking absentee ballots. The fall of Atlanta provided an enormous boost and saved lincoln's presidency. With 55 percent of the popular vote and 212 out of 233 e:l«· coral voces, he: swept to victor}'· The com·ention that nominated lincoln also endorsed a conscirutional amendment to abolish slavery, which Congress passed carl)' in 1865. The: Thlrteen th Amendment "''Ould be: raci6ed b)•the: end of the: )'Car.

34 9

I-""""'-

sboTty in ;dl u .s. tl'rfi toryEnd
Meanwhile:, Sherman gave the: South a lesson in total "''llr. Refusing to chase: Hood back imo 1tnne:ssce, he decided to abandon his own suppi)' lines, to march his army across Georgia co Sa\•annah (sull-VAN-uh), and co live offche countr)'Sidc. He would break the South's will to 6ghc, terri f)' its people:, and ..make war so terrible: . .. that generations would pass before they could appeal again to it;'' Sherman began b)•burning much of Aclanta and forcing the: evacuation of its civilian population. This harsh measure: freed him of che need to feed and garrison the dty. Then he led che bulk of his army, 62,000 men, out ofAdama toward Savannah. Four columns of infancry, augmented by cavalr)' squads and follo\IJ'Cd by chousands of jubilant slaves, moved on a from sixty miles wide: and ac a pace of ten miles a day, de:scroying e''e r)'thing that could aid che Confe:deraC)·- arse:nals, railroads, munitions planrs, cotton gins, crops, and livestock. This ruin far exceeded Sherman's orders. Although told noc to destroy civilian property, foragers ransacked and demolished homes. Indeed, ha\'OC: seemed a vital pare of Sherman's strateg}'· By t he time he occupied Savannah, he: estimated that his army had destrO)'Cd S 100 million worch of property. After caking Savannah in December 1864, Sherman's anny wheeled north toward South Carolina. the: 6rst state to secede and, in his view, one ..that deserves all that seems in store for her... Sherman's columns advanced unimpeded co Columbia, where: 6res set b)' looters, slaves, soldict'S of both side:~ and liberated Union prisonct'S razed the: d ry. Sherman headed for Norch Carolina. B)' spring 1865 his army had left behind four hundred miles of ruin. Other Union armies controlled che encire Confederacy, except 1txas and Florida, and de:scrO)'t:d its ....-ealth. "War is crue:lry and you cannot re-fine: it." Sherman WTOte:. "lhose who brought war inco our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour o ut;''

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...._..Appomattox

While Sherman headed north, Grant rene'l"-ed his assault on the: entrenched Arm}' of Norchcrn Virginia. His main

objective was Petersburg, a railroad hub souch of Rich·

lnteracti\•e Map: Grant's Campaign Against Lee

IAI>P-" " ' - '"' of l«'J sumoo~ to Gtm t

mond. l 'he fall of Adama and the dcvastacion wrought b}• Sherman's arm}' took a heavy toll on Confederate morale. Desertions reached epidemic proportions. Late in March 1865, Gram, reinforced by Sheridan, S~A'tlng his army around the ~A'CStern flank of the Petersburg defenders. Lee could noc srop him. On April 2 a courier brought the grim news to Jefferson Davis, attending church in Richmond: ..General J..ce telegraphs that he can hold his posicion no longer." Davis left his pew, gachered his gO\'mlmenc,. and fled. On the morning of April3, Union troops entered Richmond, pulled do~A'tl the Confederate flag. and raised the Scars and Stripes 0\'Ct the capital. Explosions sct b}•retreating Confederates left the cicy ..a sea of flames:'' Union croops liberated the jail, which hdd slaves a~A'llici ng sale, and its rejoicing inmates poured into the streets. On April 4lincoln rourcd the city and for a few minutes sac ac Davis's desk with a dreamy expression on his face. Lee led a last-ditch effort co escape ~A'CStward to Lynchburg and its rail conn«· tions. But Granc and Sheridan choked off the route, and on April 9 l ee bowed to the inevitable. He asked for terms of surrender and met Granc in a pri\•ate home in the village of Appomattox (app-oh-MAT-tux) Court h ouse, ease of Lynchburg. As stunned troops gathered outside, Lee appeared in full dress uniform, complete ~A'ith s·word. Grant entered in his customary disarray, smoking a cigar. The 6nal surrender came fourda}'S latcr,as Lee's troops Laid down their arms between federal ranks. «on our part;'' wrote a Union officer, «not a sound of t rumpet ... nor roll ofdrum; not a cheer ... but an a~A'Cd stillness rachcr."' Grant paroled l.ce's 2-6,000 men and sent them home wich the horses and m ules «co ~A'Ork chcir lictle farms:'' Within a momh the remnants of Confederate resistance collapsed.

Grant headed back co a jubilant Washington. O n April 14 he turned down a theater date with che lincolns; his "'ife found Mrs. Lincoln OII'Crbearing. Thac night at Ford's T heater an un· employed pro-Confederate actor, j ohn Wilkes Booth, encered lincoln's box and shot him in the head. Shoucing the Virginia scace motto, "Sic Semper 1}'rannis'" (Such is always the fil~ of tyrilnts), Booth leaped onto the stage and fled. Assassination at· tempcs on che secrctary of scate and vice preside-nt failed, and Hooch escaped. Within two weeks Union croops hunced him dO'I'-'n and shot him to death. Four accused accomplices were hanged, and four more: were imprisoned. On April JS Lincoln died, and Andrew johnson became preside-nt. Six days Later, Lin· coin's funeral train left Washington on its mournful journey to Springfield, Illinois. Cro"'•d s of thousands gachercd ac stations to "'ttP as the black·draped train passed.

The Ci\il War took a larger human toll than any other "''llr in American his· tory. More than 620,000 soldiers died during che tragic four years of war, nearly equal che number Exuding decermin:n:ion :~t~d competence, of American soldiers killed in all che nacion's earlier and later Cener:..l Ulyue~ S. Gr:..nt pos.ed in ffont of wars. The death counc stood ac 360,000 Union soldiers and his cent in 1864. W ithin :1. )'\":ll', Gr.2nt"~ fin:~l 2-6 0,000 Confederates_ Most families in che nation suffered :..u:~.ul t on Peter.oburg :~t~d the Union :..rmy's losses. Vivid reminders remained well into che twentieth cen· triumph:~n t m:m:h i:nto Richmond would cury. For many years, armless and legless veterans gathered at b ring the W:ll' to :1.11 end. regime-ntal reunions, and thousands of communities built mon· umencs to the dead. The war's costs were staggering, buc only che southern econom}' "''lls destroyed. By "''llr's end the Norch had most of che nation's "''c alth and in· dustrial capacity. Spurring economic modernization, the war provided oppon:unities for industrial developmenc and capital investme-nt. No !on· Lin~ol n finally found che ~ntral he needed in Uiyuel S. Gunt, who gcr the largest sla\'Hiwning po""-~r in che world, the United States "-"OUld reali.1:ed that the South could not become a major industrial nation. with,tand the enormow ca,ualt~ The war had political ramifications as well. States ne\'er regained chcir of rdentk.sl combat. antebellum range ofpo""-·ers. The national banking S}'Stem gradual!}' sup· Shtrm.:m brought cotal war co the planced state banks, and greenbacks provided a national currency. The South with h is march through Georgi.a and the C.arolinas.. war also promoted large-scale organization in both che business world Lin~ol n'' triumph in the 186-f and public life. ekction rellcaed in~ll'ouing Union Finally, the Civil War fulfilled abolitionists' prophecies as well as conliden« in \'ictory. Union goals, producing the \'cty sort of radical upheaval wichin southern Forced to lea'-e RKh mond uncle· society that lincoln had tried to a\-oid. Beaten Confederates "'-ondered fended, Le-e mrll'ndcred in April whecher blacks and Yankees "''Ould pe:rmanend}' cake O\'er the Souch. 1865, eff«tivdy ending maj« comb.u. "Hello, massa," an African-American Union soldier called out whe-n he In the linal mo nths oft he war, spotted his former owner among Confederate prisoners whom he "''lls Cong!'C'.$.'1 pa,,;ed che Th irtte nth guarding. "Bottom rail cop dis time." The nation now shifted its attention AmC'-ndmC'-nt, abolishing 'b""ry, b ut to the reconstruction of the conquered South and the face of 3.5 million the .lJ.~;ulinahon o( Lincoln left-che newly freed sta..~s. po.uwar furore in limbo. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Chapter Su (ff)

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R lE O F THE

Cl-lAPTER SUMMARY, AND

KEY TERMS

conscription (p. 315)

What major atfo
I

The Union had enom1ous manpo\lt'er advantages, as well as a strong indus· trial base. The South's advantages '"'\'J'e few. Although at fi rst the Confederacy was politically unified. political divisions devrloped o-.·er the role of national go-.-ernment in the Confederacy. lincoln was a fur bccte:r political leader than Oa\•is..

I

How was the ~wr (outftt in its earfyyears? (page 331)

Although new \lt-eapons, such as the rifle. appcatl'd, the Civil U'ar was basi· cally fought as a traditional war, with mass infunt!)' chatgrs and large battles. 1b serun.- independence. the South needed only to defend itselfand tight dose to its own I\'.SOUrccs, whereas the northern atmies had co invade and occupy a vast region. The war in the East quickly became a stalemate. but the Union es· tablished supremacy west of the Mississippi earl}' in the war. Man}' Confeder· ate leaders assumed that the British textile industty's need tOr southern cotton would force Britain to become an ally, but the British remained aloof.

Why was emoncipatJon 1mportant m the rourse of the war, and what role dtd A{ncan-Amencons play in the con{ltct? (page 338)

I

•greenbild<s" (p. 327) Anaconda p~n (p. 331} First Battle of Bull Rlln {p. 331} G...-ge B. Mca.llan (p. 331) Robert E. Lee (p. 333) Antil'lam (p. 334) &nandpation 1'1-oclamalion {p. JJ4) Ulysses S. Grant (p. JJ5) Ge
The Emanc1paoon Prodamar1on ttansformed the Clv1l War from a con01ct 0\~t steesslon mto a war about sla~-ery, and it cffu:ti\-ely P"'-""Vmtcd Great Britain from openly supporting the Confederncy. Whencvet possible, slaves strove to escape from slavrt}'· Sla\'e refugees posed problems for Union -atmies but also performed valuable tasks tOr federal troops. Near1y200,000 Afdcan·Amedcans fought in Union armies., and manpowu shortages drow the Confederacy to authorize use of black troops as well

l

in what ways did the Civil War affect the t»-o sides? (page 343)

Outing the war, the federal Congress passed major bills promoting economic dcwJopment: tariffs, railroad subsidies, national banking law-s, and l~brion to cncournge homesteading. HO\l\_'\lf:t, the war de-.•asta.ted the South's economy, with resulting shortages and hardships for civiliJ.llS._ Women assumed nl'\'' roles as nurses and hoped that theirsM•ice would ad· vance the cause of women•s rights.

I

How did the Union (mallywin the war? (page 341) Lincoln found tht- gJ:nrral he had bern searching for in Ulys:sesS. Gmnt, who was willing ro absorb cnonnous casualties

to innict the losses he knew the South could not afford. Shetman•s capture of Atlanta gua.mnteed Uncoln's reelection in

1864 and boosted northern deccrminarioJL By Apri11865 Lee was fon:ed ro abandon the defense of Richmond and sum-:n· de(\_"CC at Appomattox Coutthouse. The Thirteenth Amendment. passed in the final momhs of the war, ended sla\-ery. However, Lincoln's assassination left the postwar furun.- in limbo.

CHAPTER 16

1865-1877

C HAPTER PREV I EW

-

Reconstruction Poliilics, 186S- t9G8 On whot II'Nijor issu~ did RMica/ Rl'publkon.s 11ml Prn•'dMt johnson rtfllggM over RecoMlwdion pallcyl

-

Reconstruction c.overnments Wltot lmp«l Qjd {tdtral RtromtnKtiorJ polky how 0t1 Ute {ormtr GN!(trlemcy and a·CfJtl~fkratM?

Tho ~CI ol Emandpation

r-,•..,....,....-~fmd ......,.,..,.Jna~Tf'Jitlll~

101oyill _ in _ __ __ - c.nc.ms 1ht North. 1868-1876 . . .MM1

-

· Recomlruclion libandom!d, 1876-urn \~t Itt/lite Nortlt ro •bottdatt Rto:HISf1TKfjon?

T

he end of the Civil \l1ar was a t ime of

uncharted possibilities-and unrc·

aolvtd conflicts. While former slaves txultcd ~r rhcir freedom, their fOrmer owners wc:rt

ofrcn u grim :LS the ravagOO southun l.tnd· scape Sn'Uid tho~nd f1rd co Brnil, Muico. or Europt, but most rmWntd. Afur most onn, vktoD e:uY link for rhc mood of tht v;m. quishtd, but dw C.vd u·u wu diff'tmu. 1'ht Union lud sought not merdy vktwy bur rh< mum of nuion.\1 unil)'. 1h< r.d...t gavemmmt &ad unpr~adcruul qut5rions. H0111• could rht Union lx rt:Srored md the South rcinrrgr.trrd? Who •--ould control tht proccss-Cong.n:"SJ or chc prcsidc:rul Should Confederatt leaders M Olt lmporr:mr, what \o\'OUld happm to tht

be rritd for treuon?

353

3.5 million former sla\-es? l 'h e: freedmen's future was the crucial post"-at issue, fo r emancipation had sct in motion the: most profound upheaval in the nation's history. Slavery had been boch a labor system and a means of racial concrol; it had determined the: South's social, economic,. and political structure. l 'h e: end of the Civil War, in short, posed two huge challenges that had to be addressed simultaneously: readmitting the: Confederate scares to che Union and defining the: status of free blacks in society. Betv.r'Cen 1865 and 18n the: nacion faced major and often d ivisive challenges and crises. Conflict characterized congressional debar~ che: fo nne:r Confederacy, and the: industrializing postwar North. These crises of Reconstruction- the rcsrora· tion of the fOrmer Confederate states and the fate of the fOrmer slaves- reshaped the: legacy of the: Civil War.

RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS, 1865-1868 On wMt major issues did RJJdical &publicans 11nd Presidentjohnson strug1}e orl6r Reconstruction policy?

bl&ull...~&c.ns ..,_,

l

abalirionisn ,..ho oontrolkd Cong:rl':ll' aod R«o~:uuurtioo in b te 186Qj

11le end of the Civil War offered multiple possibilities fur chaos and vengeance. The federal go\-ernmem could have imprisoned Confederate leaders; former rebel troops could ha\·e become guerrillas; freed slaves could have waged a racial war against their former masters. None of chis happened. Instead, incense politicd.l con· flier dominated the immediate postwar period. 11le political upheaval, sometim es auended by violence, produced new constitutional amendments, an impeachment crisis, and some of the most ambitious domestic legislation C'\-er enacted by Congees~ the Reconstruction Aces of 1867- 1868. It culminated in something that few expected, che enfranchisement of African·American merL In 1865 only a handful of RacUcal Re:pubUc.ans advocated African-American suffrage. Buc in the complex political battles of Reconstruction, the Radicals won broad sup pore for their program, including African-American male enfranchisement. j usc as the Civil War had led to emancipation, so Re:construcrion led co AfricanAmerican suffrage.

Conflict O\'er Reconstruction began e\-en before the: war ended. In December 1863, !'resident lincoln issued the: l'rodamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, ~Ailich allowed southern states co fonn new governments if ar lease 10 percent of those who had voced in the 1860 elections swore an oath of allegiance co the Union and accepted emandpatiorL This plan excluded most Confederate officials and militar}' officers, who ~A
Llllcoln's Plan

I RECOMSTIUJcnoN Potmcs •86s-•868

3 55

1\'esidentAb,.m Linses S. Ctant ~edl!d presidl!nf Transcontinental railroad completed Con111ess rea«~ Resu..,cion Ad Di!ll<Jied fl'esidential
each former Confederate state and chac ac least half of che eligible \'Otcrs ~A
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3 56

OfAPlER 16

ThE CllJSIS Of RECOMSTRucnoN.

At 6rst gfance,Andrew johnson seemed a likely ally for che: Radicals. 11te only southern senator to remain in Congress when his state seceded, johnson had taken a strong anti-Confederate stance, proclaiming that «treason is a crime and muse be made odi ou~" and had served as military g01ownor of1tnnessce: for cwo years. Self-educated, an ardent jacksonian, a foe of the planter d ass, a sup· porter of ema ncipation- johnson carried impeccable credentials. HO'I"~\·er, as a lifelong Democrat he had his own political agenda, sharply d ifferent from that of the: Radicals. He: neither adopted abolitionist ideals nor challenged racist sentiments. He: hoped mainly chat the fall of slaver}' would cripple: southern aristocrats. In May 1865, with Congress o ut of session, j ohnson shocked Republicans b}• announcing his own program, A Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, co bring che southern states still without Reconstruction gm-·emmems- Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississjppi, Norch Carolina, Souch Carolina, and 1Cxas- back imo the Union. VircuaU}' all southerners who cook an oath of allegiance wo uld receiv-e pardon and amnesty, and all chcir property excepc slaw~s ~A'Oul d be rescored to them. Confederate dvil and military officcrs would still be disqualified, as would ~A'CII ·tO· do former Confederates (an)
l'ftsldentlal lltalnslrudlon lllder lollmon

"Wack codes'"

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l.n'J p;wtd by soutbem sutr.s to limit tbt rigbt5 or frttdmm

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I RECOMSTIUJcnoN Potmcs •86s-•868 To man}' northern ers, both the black codes and the election of former Confederates co high office reeked of southern defiance. When the Thircy-ninch Congress com·ened in December 1865, it refused to seat the southern delegates and prepared to dismantle che black codes and to lock ex-Confederates out of power.

3 57

Primary Source: Louisiana B&ad

Code

Southern blacks' status became the major issue in Congress. \'(lith Congress split into four blocs-Dem ocrats, and Radical, moderate, and consen•aci\J'C Republicans-a politically adroit president could ha\J'C protected his program.Jnepd)',Johnson alienaced the moderates and pushed them into the Radicals' arms by vt"toing some key moderate measures. In Lace 1865 Congress voted to extend the life of the f reedmen's Bureau for three more rears. Staffed mainly by army officers, che bureau provided relief, rations, and medical care; built schools for fOrmer slaves.: put them to work on abandoned or confiscated lands.: and tried to protect their rights as laborers. 10 strengthen the bureau, Congress had voted co allow it to run special militar}' courts that would settle labor disputes and invalidate labor contracts forced on African-Americans under the black codes. In February 1866 j ohnson vetoed the bill; the Constitution, he declared, neither sanctioned military trials ofcivilians in peacetime nor supported a S)'Stem to c.are for "-indigent persons."' Then in March 1866 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ~Ailich made African-Americans U.S. citizens wich the same civil rights as other dci.zens and authorized federal intervention to ensure African-Amer icans' rights in court. johnson veroed this measure as well, arguing that it ~A'Ould "operate in favor of the colored and against the white race."' In April Congress overrode his \'i:to, and in july it enacted the Supplementary Freedmen's Bureau ActO\'er another presidential \'i:to. These: vetoes puzzled many Republicans, for che new laws did not undercut the basic scrucrure of presidential Reconstruction. Although che \'i:toes gained support for j ohnson among northern Democrats, they cost him dearly among moderate Re· publicans, who began ro all)' with the Radicals. Was Johnson a political incompe· tent, or was he merely crying. unsuccessfully, to fOrge a centrist coalition? Whatco.-er the case, he dro\'i: moderate and Radical Republicans together tO~A'llrd their next step: the passage of a constirutional amendment to protect che new Civil Rights Act. In Aprill866 Congress adopted the Fourtt•e:nthAme:nd· ment, its most ambitious attempt co deal wich che problems of Reconstruction and the freed sla\'l'S. In che first clause, the amendment proclaimed chat all pcrsons born or naturalized in che United States were citizens and chat no state could abridge their rights without due process of latA' or deny them equal protection under che latA'. Second, the amendment guar· an teed that, if a state denied suffrage to an}' male citizen, its repre.se:ntation in Congress would be proportionally reduced. Third, che amendment disqualified from state and national offices all prewar officeholders who had supported che Confederacy. Finally, it repudiated the Confederate debt and maintained the validity of the federal debt. In effect, the Fourteenth Amendment n ullified the t:>nd Scott decision, threatened southern states chat deprived African-American men of the right to \'Ote, and invalidated most of the pardons that President Johnson had ladled out.

Ammdmmt tlutdc-6nes ciri.

-rqual um.hip ~nd gw.tmtl't.S 1protl'crion under tbe bw

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3 58

OfAPlER 16

ThE CllJSIS Of RECOMSTRucnoN.

1&6~•&n

(:tassage: of the: amendment created a fi re-storm. Abolitionists said that it did not go far enough to protect African-American \'Oting rights, southerners blasted it as vmge:ful, and President Johnson denounced it. The presidenc•s unwillingness co compromise solidified the: new alliance be~n moderate: and Radical Republicans, and transfonne:d the congressional elections of 1866 into a referendum on the fou rteenth Ame:ndmenc. Over the summer johnson sec off on a whistle-stop train tour campaigning against the amendment. Humorless and defensive, che: president made: fresh me:mies, however, and doomed his hope of creating a nc~A' political party, the National Union party, opposed co the: amendment. Meanwhile, the: moderate and Radical Re:· publicans defmde:d the amendment, condemned l're.side:nt Johnson, and branded the Democratic party "a common sewer ... inco which is emptied ewry element of treason, Nonh and South." Republicans carried the congressional elections of 1866 in a landslide, winning near!)' rwo-thirds of the House: and three-fourths of the: Senate. They had secured a mandate for the: Fourteenth Amendment and their own Reconstruction program.

The congressional debate ~r reconstructing the: South began in December 1866 and lasted three months. Radilllalnslrudlon. cal leaders, anxious to stifle a resurgmce of Confederate: 11&6-1867 po~A'cr, called fur African-American suffrage, federal sup· port fur public school~ confiscation of Confederate estat~ and extended militar}' occupation of che South. Moderate Republicans accepted part of this plan, and in February 1867, after complex policical maneuvers, Congress passed the Reconstruction Ace of 1867. Johnson vetoed it, and on March 2, Congress passed the law ow:r his wto. lhree more Reconstruction acts-passed in 1867 and 1868 0\'er presidential \ttoes- refine:d and enfOrced the first act. The Reconstruction Ace of 1867 invalidated the state: g~rnmenrs formed under the: l incoln and j ohnson plans; only 1Cnncss«, which had already rarified the Fourteenth Ame:ndmenc and had bem re-admitted to the Union, escaped fu rther Reconstruction. The new law divided the other ten former Confederate states into 6\'t: military districts. It provided thac \'Oters- all black men, plus whites noc disqualifi ed b)• the: Fourteenth Amendment- could elect d elegates ~Ailo u.'Ould write a new state constitution granting African-American suffrage. After congressional approval of the state constitution, and after the state legislature's ratification of the: Fourteenth Amendm ent, Congress ~A
c.aresa-1

I RECOMSTIUJcnoN Potmcs •86s- •868

_ _ _ _ j_

359

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Mip 16.1 TIM RKoostrudio• of tilt Sou111 The lkconstTUetion Act ol 1867 di"-cled the former COJ'ifeder.tte su.tes, ueept Tennenee, into live disui eu :.nd 5oe't forth the step$ by which new st.1te gO\'ernments could be cn-.a.ted.

Tampering ~Aith property rights in the South might well jeopardize chem in the Norch, they argued, and could endanger che entire Reconstruction program. Thus Congress rejecced the most radical parts ofche Radical Republican program. Congrusional Reconstruction cook effect in spring 1867, buc Johnson im· peded its implementation by repladng pro-Radical milit:U}' officers ~Aith conscr· \'ative ones because Reconstruction could not be enforced without milimry pc>"\!r. Furious and more suspidous chan ewr of the president, congressional moderates and Radicals again joined forces to block Johnson from further hampering Reconstruction.

In March 1867, responding to Johnson's obstructionist tactics, Republicans in Congress passed two laws co re· Cllsls. 18&7-1168 strict presidential po~Au. 1'he Tenure of Office Act prohib· iced the president from remO\i ng civil officers ~Aithouc Senace consent. Its purpose was co protect Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, a Radical ally needed to enforce the Reconstruction acts. The other law banned che president from issuing military or· dcrs excepc chrough the commanding general, Ulysses S. Granc, who could not be retnO\'ed without che Senate's consent. Not satisfied with d ipping the president's wings, Radicals also began to look for grounds for impeachment and conviction to remo\-e all possible obstacles to Reconstruction. Intense invescigacions b)•the House

m ilit;~.ry

( f f ) lnteracti\•e Map:. ~ The Reconsuuction

,_..,;-1..........,;.. l'be (our RtcOIUtrucrion ;~CU that Cong:rl':ll' impostd on tbc South in 1867

1

lilt lillpelchment

-~ prer.:idmt - """"' n"mCM" from..offia; attr:mpttci but f:.ikd in C::.Jl' of

1Andmo> Johnson

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3 60

OfAPlER 16

ThE CllJSIS Of RECOMSTRucnoN.

1&6~•&n

judkiar}' Committct: and pri\'ate detectives turned up no impeachable offenses, but j ohnson himself soon provided the charges that his opponents needed. In August 1867 johnson suspended Stanton and in February 1868 tried to re:mm-e him. The president's defiance of the 1Cnure of Office Act drO\'C moderate Re· publicans back into alliance with the Radicals. l 'he House apprm-ed de-.-en charges of impeachment, nine: of them based on violation of the: Tenure of Office Ace and the: ocher two accusing johnson ofbcing "unmindful of the high duties of the: office,.. of seeking co disgrace Congress, and of not enforcing the Reconstruction acts. j ohnson's erial by the Senate, which began in Ma.rch 1868, riwtcd public acten· tion for eleven weeks. SC\o-cn congressmen, including leading Radicals, sel'VCd as prosecutors, or "managers." j ohnson's lawyers maintained that by violating che 1Cn· u.re of Office: Ace, he was merely seeking a court test of a law that he believed to be: unconscirutionaL They also contended that che Law did not protect Seamon, because Uncoln, notj ohnson, had appointed him. And they asserted that johnson was guilty of no crime indictable in a regular courc. CongressionaJ«managers" countered that impeachment was a political process, noc a criminal trial, and that johnson•s «abuse of discretionary power" constituted an impeachable offense. Some Senate Republicans wavered, fearful that the: removal of a president would destroy the balance of po....-er within the: federal go\~rnment. They also d istrusted Radical Republican Benjamin Wade, the president pro tempore of the Senace, who, since che:re was no vice president, would become president if j ohnson were: thrown ouc.. Ulcimacely, despite intense pressure:, seven Republicans risked policical suicide by \'Oting with the Democrats against remo\•al, and the Senate failed by one voce co convict johnson. In so doing, the: legislators set cwo critical precedents: in che furu.re, no president ~A'Ou ld be impeached on political grounds, nor would he be impeached because two·thirds of Congress disagreed with him. In che short term, nonetheless, the anti-johnson forces achieved their goals, for Andrew johnson had no future: as president. Republicans in Congress could now pursu e their last major Re:construc· tion objective: guaranteeing African-American male suffrage.

African-American suffrage was the: linchpin of congres· sional Reconstruction. O nly with the support of AfricanAmerican voters could Republicans secure concrol of the: southern states. 1'he: Reconstruction Act of 1867 had ~.--1870 forced southern states to enfranchise black men in order to reenter the Union, bur most northern stares still refused co granc suffrage co African-Americans. The: Fifteenth Amendment, dra~A'll up by Republicans and ap· prO'II'Cd by Congress in 1869, aimed to protect black suffrage in the Souch and co t:X· tend it to che northern and border scares on the assumption that ne:~A'ly enfranchised African-Americans would gratefully vote Republican. l'he: amendment prohibited the denial of suffrage b)•the: scates to an}'One on accountof"-race, color, or previous condition of servicude." Democrats opposed the amendment on the: grounds that it violated states' righcs, bur they did notconcrol enough states to prevent its ratification. Ho~A•cwr, co some southerners, the: amendm ent's omissions made it acceptable; as a Richmond

lbeFIIIeSb a ldment and lbe Queslloll ol w-an

_.,. _ _ A.mtndmmt guar;,nttcing

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T WE R ECONSTRUCTION A M ENDMENTS AUEKOUENT AKD DATE OF CONGRESSIONAl PASSAGE

PROVISIONS

RATIFic.\TION

Thirteenth Qanuary 1865)

Prohibited slavery in the United States

Oecem~r 1865

Fourteenth Qune 1866)

Defined citizenship to include all persons born or naturalized in the United States

july 1868, after Congress made ratillcation a prerequisite for readmission of ex--Confederate states to t he Union

Provided proportional loss of congressional representation for any state that denied suffiage to any ofits male citizens Disqualified prewar officeholders who supported t he Confederacy !Tom state or national office Repudiated the Confederate debt Fifteenth (February 1869)

Prohibited the denial of suffiage because ofrace, color, or previo us condition ofservitude

March 1870; ratillcation required of Virginia, Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia for readmission to dle Union

newspaper pointed out, it had "loopholes through which a coach and four horses can be driven." Indeed, the new amendment did not guarantee African·American office---holding, nor did it prohibit restrictions on suffragr, such as property require· ments and literacy tests, both of which might be used to dm)' African·Americans the \'Otl'. The debate O'ler black suffrage drtw new participants into the fray. Women's rights ad\'OCates had tried to promotr both black suffrage and V.'Oman suffrage, but Radical Republicans rejected M)' lin kage between the two, prd"erring to concentratron black suffrage. Supporters ofv.'Omen•s rights Lin~ol n'.'S wm~wh;lt ltnient pl~n for were chc-mset...·es di...ided. f rederick Douglass argued chat black suffrage R«on.'Sttuction di.ed with h im. had to rccei'le priority. "If the d eclive franchise is not extended to the Ne· Pn-.'SickmJohnwn·J noen mo~ gro, he is dead;'' explained Douglass. "Woman has a thousand ways b)• rola.un pl~n for Rtconstrun:iao which she can attach herself to the ruling poY~er of the land that we haw: in furi~ttd R.ldical Rtpublican.'S. not." Women's rights leaders Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. An· Congres:s 0\'C'-JTodt preJidential thony disagreed. If che Fiftecnch Ame-ndment did noc include v.'Omen, ~QI'.S o( RtconJcrnction mc:uun":~ .'Such ;u the' Fr«dme'-n'.'S Bun-au and they emphasized,. it V.'Ould establish an "aristocracy of sex"' and increase p..ul«i it.'S own hanh« v\·uion of the disabilities under ~Ailich v.'Omen already Labored R«onJttuction ltgi..dation. The battle O't-er black suffragr and the Fiftemth Amendment split Tht Faurtctnth Amtndment dtwomen's rights advocates into tv.'O rival suffrage association~ both fincd citiuruhip and gu.u.unttd founded in 1869. lhe Boston·based American Woman S uffrage Associa· tqu.l! pmn-ction unckr the' bw, ~nd tht Fifteenth Amtndment gu.u.:uttion sought state·by·state suffrage, whereas the more radical National teed cht righ t oHr«dmtn, bu t not Woman Suffragr Association, based in New York and led by Stanton and of wume'-n, to \\l\' western stat~ Wroming and Utah, excended the ..'Ote to \\'Omen, but the margin. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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suffrage mo'lement had little to do with it. In 18n Susan B. Anthony mobilized about sc"'e:nty women to cry to voce: nacionwide; she was indicted, convicted, and fined. In 1875 the Supn:m e: Court ruled chat a state could deny women the: right co vote. Woman suffrage advocates braced for a long struggle. By che rime the Fifteenth Amendment was rarified in 1870, Congress could look back o n 6\·e years of momentous achi e:w~ menc. 11u-ee constitutional amendm ents had broadened the scope of democraq•by abolishing sla\'ety, affirming the rights of cicizcns, and pro hibiting the denial of suffrage on the basis of race. Congress had re:· admitted the fonner Confederate: scace:s into the Union. At the same time, momen· tum had slo\1/C'd at the fe:deral lew~l. In 1869 che center of action shifted to t he: Souch, where tumultuous change was under wa}'·

RECONSTRUCTION GOVERNMENTS WMt imfMCt did federal Reconstruction policy btMt on the former Con(wkracy 11nd ex-ConfoJerates? During t he: )'tat'S of pre:sidencial Reconstruction, 1865- 1867, che sout hern states faced formidable tasks: creacing new governments, rl!\iving war-torn econo· mies, and dealing wich t he: impact of emandpacion. Radal tensions flared as freedmen organized political meecings co protest ill creacme:nt and demand equal rights, and deadly race riots erupted in major souchern cities. In May 1866 ~Ath ite crowds at· tacked African-American 'lece:rans in Memphis and rampaged chrough AfricanAmerican neighborhoods, killing fo rty-six people. Congressional Reconstruccion, supeJVised by federal t roops. began in spring 1867 wich the: dismantling of existing gow~m me:nts and t he: formation of new state: gow~m me:nts dominated b)• Republicans. By 1868 mo.sc former Confederate scace:s had rejoined che Union, and wichin two years the process 'A'llS complete. But Republican rule d id not lo ng endure in the Souch. Opposition from south· ern Democrats, che: lando~A'tling elite, vigilantes, and most white voters prow~d insu rmountable. NC"".-enhd e:s~ these Reconstruction gO'VI.'.rnments were: unique: because African·American men, including former sla~s. participated in che-m. Slawry had ended in other societies, too, but only in the United Scace:s had freedmen gained dem· ocratic political rights.

The Reconstruction laws of 1867- 1868 transfo nned t he: southern d e:ctorace: by temporarily disfranchising IS percent of potential white voters and by e nfranchising more than 700,000 freed slaves. Black voters oucnumbe:red whites b)• 100,000 overall and held voting majorities in five states. This ne~A' de:crorate prm-ided a base for the Republican party, which had nt:\'et existed in the Souch. To scornful Democra~ the Republicans comprised three types of scoundrels: norchcrn "carpetbaggers» who had come south for wealth and poW'Cr; southern sc.alawags. poor and ignorant, 'A'ho sought to profit by supporting Repub· lican rule; and hordes of uneducated freedmen , ~Ailo W'Cre: casil)' manipulated. In

ANew Electorate

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~ Nm•lxmtt who nloCM'd liOUtb after Chil War, supportl'd RtpubliaRS

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lscalawac

Southtmtr.tlo supportl'd R«omuuetion

I

RECONS11!UCTION Go'vEilKlltHTS

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face, the hascil)' assembled Republican parry. crossing racial and dass lines, consti· toted a loose coalicion of diwrse faccions with often~comradictory goals. To northerners who moved south after che war, the former Confederacy was an undeveloped region, ripe ~A'ith possibilities. l 'he carpetbaggers included many for· mer Union soldil't'S who hoped to buy land, open factori~ build railroads, or simply enjoy the warmer climate. Holding almost one in three scare offices, they ~A'id ded disproportionate political pc>"'er. A handful of scalawags were old \'1/hig~ but most ~A'Cre small farmers from the mouncain regions of North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Arkansas. Rlnner Unionists ~Ailo had 0\l.'ned no slaves and who fdt no loyalty to che old plancation elite, they wanted co im prow~: their economic position and lacked commit· ment to black rights or suffrage. Mosc came from regions with small black populations and cared little whether blacks \'Oted or not. Scalawags hd d the most political offices during Rcconscruction, but chey proved the least stable clement of the souchern Republican coalition; cvcncuall)', man}' drifted back to the Demo· cratic fo ld. Freedmm, the backbone of southern Republicanism, provided dghc out of ten Republican votes. 11ley sought land, education, civil rights, and political equality, and remained loyal Republicans. «We know our frimds) " an elderl)' freedman said. Although Reconstruction governments depended on African-American \OOtes, freedmen held at mosc one in 6\·e policical offices and constiruted a legislative majo· rity onl)' in Souch Carolina, whose population was more than 60 percent black. No African-Americans won che office of gQI.!'Crnor, and only moo serwd in the U.S. Senate-the same number as served during the twcnciech cencury. A mere 6 percent of southern members of the House were African-American, and almosc SO percent came from Souch Carolina. Black officeholders on che state levd formed a political elite. They often differed from black voters in backgroun d, education, wealch, and complexion. Many ~A'Cre lit· crate blacks who had b«n free befo re che Civil War. In the South Carolina legisla· ture, fo r example, most black members came from farge tO\I.-ns and cities; many had spent time in che North; and some 'A'ct'e well-off property owners or evm fonner slave owners themselves. Color differences W'Cre evidmt as well; 43 pm:entof South Carolina's black legislacors W'tre of mixed race, compared to just 7 percent of the state's black population. Black officials and black \OOters often had different priorities. Most freedmen cared mainly about cheir economic future, especially abouc acquiring land, while black officeholdl't'S cared mosc aboucattaining equal rights. Still, both groups shared high expectations and prized enfranchisemmt. "We'd walk fifteen miles in wartime to find ouc abouc the battle," a Georgia freedman declared. "We can walk fifteen miles and more to 6nd ho~A' to vote."

large numbers of African-Americans participated in go\'· ernment for che first time in the state conscirutional con\'l'ntions of 1867- 1868. The South Carolina com·mtion had an African-American majority, and in Louisiana half the delegates W'tre freedmen. In general, these com-entions instituted democratic changes, such as universal

lllpubllran Rule

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364 manhood suffrage and public-school S}'Stems, almost nonexistent in che antebellum Souch, but chcy failed co provide eit her integrated schools or Land reform. When proposals fo r land co nfiscation and rediscriburion arose in the scare: con\'mtions, they fell to defe:ac, as they had in Congress. Southern Republicans hoping

to attract northern investment hesitated co threaten property rights or co adopt land-reform measures that norchern Republicans had rejected. Souch Carolina did sec up a commission to buy land and make it available co freedmen, and several states changed cheir tax scructures co force unculcivared land onto the market, but

in no case 'A'llS ex .Confederate land confiscaced. O nce civil power shifted to the new state gow~rnmems, Republican administra· tions began ambitious public-works programs. They built roads and bridges, pro· moced railroad dewJopment, and funded institutions ro care for orphans, the insane, and che d isabled. Republican regimes also expanded state government and formed state militias in which African-Americans often were heavily represented. 11lese re· fo nns cost millions, and state debts and taxes sk-yrocketed. During the 1860s, taxes rose 400 percent. Although northern tax rates still exceeded southern tax rates, southerners, particular!)' landowners, resented the new levies. O pponents of Reconstruction viewed Republican rule as wasteful and corrupt, the ..most srupendous system of organized robbery in his tor}'·" Indeed, corruption did permeate some state govcrnmen~ as in louisiana and Sout h Carolina. The main profiteers were government officials who accepted bribes and railroad promot· ers who doled them o ut. But neither group 'A'llS exclusively Republican. In fact, cor· ruprion increasingly characterized gM>crnment nationaf.{y in these )'eat'S and was both more flagrant and more lucrati\'C in t he Nort h.

For cx..Confcderaces, African-American enfranchisement and the "horror of Negro domination'" created night· mares. As soon as congressional Reconstruction began, it fell under attack. Democratic newspapers assailed delegates to the North Caro· !ina constirutional convention as an "Ethiopian minstrelsy ... baboons, monkeys, mules . .. and ocher jackasses.'" But Democrats delayed an)' political mobilization until the readmission of the southern states was completed l hen they swung imo action, often calling them· selves Conservatives to attract funner Whigs. Ac first, they pursued African-American votes, but when that initiative failed, t hey s~Aitched tactics. In every southern scate che Democrats contested elections, backed dissident Republican factions, elected some Democratic legislators, and lured scala~A'llgs awa}' from the Republican party. Vigilante efforts co reduce black voces bolstered Democratic campaigns to ~Ain white ones. Antagonism toward free blacks, long present in southern life, grew in· creasing!)' violent. As early as 1865, Freedmen's Bureau agents itemized a variety of outrages against black~ including shooting. murder, rape, arson, roasting, and "se:· \'ere and inhuman beating.'" White vigilante groups sprang up in all parts of the for· mer Confederacy, but one organization became dominant. In spring 1866, six )'Oung Confederate ~A'llr \'ctcrans in Tennessee formed a social dub, che Ku Klux Klan, distinguished by elaborate ri rual~ hooded cosrumes, and sec:rct pass~A'Ords. New Klan dens spread rapidly. By the election of 1868, when African-American suffrage

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(F'f) Prima:ry Source: ~

Mr. Sofid South

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I'N$Ublish wbin" supno:macy

had beco me a reality, che Klan had become: a terrorist movem ent di· recce:d against potencial AfricanAmerican voce:rs. The Klan sought to suppress black voting, reestablish white supre-macy, and topple: the Reconstruction governments. It targeted Union J..eague officers, Freedmen's Bureau oflidals, white Republicans, black militia units, economicall}' successful blacks, and AfricanAmerican \'Oters. Concentrated in areas where white and black popu· lacions ~A'Cre nearl}' e''e n and racial tensions greatest, Klan dens ada peed their tactics co local co nditions. In Mississippi, chc- Klan targeted black schools; in Alabama it co ncentrated on Republican office- holders. In Arkansas terror reigned in 1868, while it peaked in Georgia and Florida in 1870. Some: Democrats denounced Klan me-mbers as "cut· throats and riff-raff;'' but some prominent Confederate leaders, in· eluding General Nathan Bedford Forrest, who had commanded Confederate t roops at chc- Fort Pillow mas· sacre, (see p. 340) W\'.re acti\'t Klansmen. Vigilantism united sout hern whites of different social classes and drew on t he energy of many Confederate \'Cterans. Republican legislatures tried to outlaw vigilantism, but when stare: militias could not enforce t he laws, state officials curned to the: federal government for hdp. In response, betWeen May 1870 and Februar}' 1871 Congress passed three E.nfornme:nc Acts, each progressively more st rin· gene. The f irst Enforcement Act protected African-American vocers. The: Second Enforcement Act prO\ided fur federal supe:ni sion of sout hern elections, and che Third Enforce-ment Act (also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act) authorized the use of federal troops and the: suspension of ha· beas corpus (HAY·bft·us KORP-us), the require-ment chat cause for detain· ing a prisoner be shov.•n in courc. Although tho usands were arrested under the Enforcement Acrs, most terrorists escaped conviccion. By 1872 chc- federal g~rnmenc had effecti\-e:ly suppressed the Klan, buc vigilantism had served its purpose. A I~ military presence in the: South could ha...-e: protected black rights, but instead federal troop le\-e:ls fell steadily. Congress allov.-e:d chc- Freedme-n's Bureau co die in 1869, and the Enforcement Acts became dead letters.

IOall Mtmbtr in Dtscutst The mertacing di58,uitse ch:~,.. ;acterized the Ku KIIJ.l( IOa rt's umpaign o f Intimidation d uring ReconKruaion. The Kl:u~ strow: to e nd Repub+ liG~n rule, n:store white supn:m.:tcy, ;and obliterate, in :1 southern ed itor'$ words, "'the preposterous .:lnd Mcked dogma of t~egro eq uality.,.

Serit.S or b.ws to pn:ua t\.friem.Amtrie.UI Yattn; ~nned tbt Kb:n ;and simibr grouPJ

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TI.e lkpublie.:m p;trty, with ;11 large blot o( fTeedmen, tc-mpocarlly dominated the South..

R«on,:ttuetion go'-'1'-mment,: in,:ti· ruted $U ch re(ornu ;l$ publie--,:choo) $f$tem,:. To m.m)' southerntr~ suth rdOnn,: $Cemc-d :~ cmtlr wutc- a( mo ney, :.gguv.ued byp'l'-mment t acru ption. TI.e Ku Khu Kl.ln ;md oc:h« grou PJ uJed teJTorism ;ag:..in,:t (noedmtn and their wh.ite supportc-rJ in an effort ro p rtwnt blr l voting ;and reslOrt white su pi\"Ul¥y. The (edel";l] goo.'l'-mment p.lued bwJ ;ag.Un,:t suth :.a ivitic-s b ut ldt roo fe-w ttoopJ in pl.:l« to pmc«t fTeedmen.

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THE IMPACT OF EMANCIPATION In wllat ways did newfy freed sltlves reshape th.rir lives after emancipation? ••The mascer he sa}'S we: are all free,"' a South Carolina slave declared in 1865. "But it don't mean we is white. And it don' t mean we is equal;'' Vee despite the daunt· ing handicaps they faced - illiteracy, Lack of property, meager skills- most former slaw:s fou nd che e:xhilaracion of freedom overwhelming. Emancipation had gi.,.e:n them the righc co chcirown labor and a sense of autonomy, and during Reconstruc· tion they asserted their independence by casting off white control and shedding the vestiges of slavery.

For che ex-slaves, mobility was often liberty's 6rst fruit. Some left che slave quarters; others fled the plantation completely. Emancipatio n stirred waves of migration within the former Confederacy. Some slaves headed to the Deep Souch, where des· perate planters would pay higher ~Atages for labor, but more moved to tOtAcr, by Reco nstruction's end, many African· American wo men had rejoined the ~A'Ork force o ut of economic nece:ssjty, cither in the fields or as cooks, laundresses, and domestic sen•ancs. (White wo men often sought empiO)mem as well, for the war had incapacitated man}' white bread~A'inners, reduced the supply of furure husbands, and left families destitute.) Former slaves continued to Yiew stable, independent domestic life, especially che right to rear chcir own children, as a major blessing of freedom.

Coafrontilg Freedom

The freed blacks' desire: fur independence also led co che growth of African-American churches. The African Meth· llslllulioas odist Episcopal Church, founded by Philadelphia blacks in the 1790s, gained thousands of new southern members. Negro Baptisechurches, thcir roots often in plantation ..praise meetings" organized by sla\'t:S, sprouted C\-erywhere.

Alrlcan-Americllll

I Tin IMPAct oF Ei.IA~O.PATlON

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Tbt Frtedmti'S Scllool Su ppOt"ted by the Fr~edme"'s Bureau, nOf'thern 11-etdrne"'" ;aid soOtties, ;and African· Americ.;an dtnorninations, &c:~drne"'s schools re;achtd ;about 12 p~~ent of school· agt A⁣an·Am~ric;~n ehil· dl'\"n in tht South by 1870. Htl'\" ;a nOf'them t~;acher posts with htr stvdtnts ;at ;a Khool in rural North Carolina.

The influence of African-American churches extended far berond religion. Tht:}' pnwided relief, raised funds for schools, and supported Republican policies. African· American ministers assumed leading political roles until Reconstruction's end and then remained che main pillars of authority within African-American communities. Schools, too, pla}•ed a crucial role for freedmen as rhe ex-sla\·es soughc literaq• for themselves and abo\>t: aUfor their children. Ar emancipation, African-Americans organized their own schools, which the f reedm en's Bureau soon supervised. Norch· ern philanthropic organizacions paid the: ~A>ages of instructors, half of ~Aohom W\'.re women. In 1869 the bureau reported more than four thousand African· American schools in the: fo nne:r Confederacy. \'t'ithin three: mon: years each souch· ern state had a public-school S}'Stcm, at least in principle, generally wich separate schools for blacks and whites. l 'he Freedmen's Bureau and ochers also helped to establish Howard, Aclanta, and Fisk Universicies in 1866- 1867 and Hampton lnsti· cute in 1868. Noncrhd es~ African-American education remained limited. Fe~A• rural blacks could reach the schools, and those who tried 'A'cre sometimes che targets of vigilance attacks. l 'hus, by the end of Reconstruction, more than 80 percent of the African-American population remained illiterate, although literacy was rising among children. Not onl}' school segregation but also ocher forms of racial separation 'A'ere taken for granted. Whecher by Ia"'' or by custom, segregation continued on strtttcars and trains as ....-ell as in churches, the:at~ and reslaurants. In 1875 Congress passed the Civil Righrs Act, banning segregation except in schools, but in the 1881 Ci&1il Rights CAst's, che Supreme Court threw che law out. l 'he Fourteenth Amendment d id not prohibit discrimination by individuals, the Courc ruled, only that perpetrated by the state. White southerners adamancl}' rejected che prospect of racial integration, which they insisted would lead to racial amalgamation. .. If we have social equality, 'A'l' shall have intermarriage," one white souchemer contended, ..and if 'A'C have incennar· riage, we shall degenerate." Urban blacks occasional!}' protested segregation, but

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most freed blacks were less interest ed in «social equality" t han in African-American liberty and community. Morcow~r. the new black elite-teachers, min is ters, and politicians-served African-American consciruend es and thus had a \>tsted interest in separate black institutions. In addition, rural blacks had little desir~: to mix with whites; rather, they sought freedom from white control. Above all, they wanted co senu-e personal independence by acquiring land.

"The sole ambition of che freedman," a N ew Englander wrote from Souch Carolina in 1865, «appears to be to be· come che ()'l.'.· ner of a lictle piece of land, there to erect a humble home, and to d~A'CU in peace and security, at his own free will and pleasure." Indeed, to free blacks C".OCr}where, "forty acres and a m ule" (a phrase: that originat ed during the war as General William T. Sherman sec aside land on t he South Carolina sea islands for black sctdemem) pro mised emancipation from plantation labor, white domination, and cotton, t he «slave crop." But che freedmen's visions of lando~A'tlership failed co materialize, for large-scale land reform nevcrocrurred. A few s la\·es did obtain land, wit h the hdp of the Freedmen's Bureau or sometimes by pooling resources. The federal gm-ernmenc also sought co provide former slaves ~Atith land; in 1866 Congress passed che Sout hern Homest ead Act, which sec aside 44 million acres of public land in 6v~: sout hern states for freedmen and poor whites. Buc che soil 'A'llS poor, and few former sla't>es had che resources co survive until t heir 6rst harvest. About four thousand blacks seeded on homesteads under the law, but mosc u.-ere unable co establish farms-and poor whites fared lictle better. By che end of Reconstruction, o nly a small minority of former sla~s in each scace O~A'tled ~A'Orking fanns. In Georgia in 1876, for exam ple, blacks controlled a mere 1.3 percent of total acre-age. Witho ut Large--scale land refo nn, barriers to African-Am erican landownership remained 0\'crwhdming. Three: obscades impeded African-American Land()'l.'.·nmhip. Freedmen Lacked capital co buy land or tools. f urthermore, ~Athite southerners generally opposed selling land co blacks. Most important. planters soughc to prescrw a cheap labor force and forged laws co ensure that black Labor would remain available on the plantations. The black codes written during presidential Reconstruction were: desjgned co pre.stl"V'I! a capth·e labor force. Under labor concraccs in effect in 1865- 1866, freedmen received ~Atages, housjng, food, and clothing in exchange fo r 6dd work. But cash was scarce, and wages often became a small s hare of che crop, typically one-eighth or less, to be divided among t he entire ~A'Ork force. Freedmen's Bureau agcms encouraged African·Americans to sign the contracts, seeing wa~ labor as a step toward economic independence. ..You must begin ac the bottom of t he ladder and dimb up," t he head of the Freedman's Bure-au cold Louisiana freedmen in 1865. l'roblems arose immediately. f reedm en d is liked che new ~A'llge S}'Stem, especially the use of gang labor, which resembled t he work pattern under slavery. Morco\-er, postwar planters had to compete fo r labor even as man}' scorned African-American workers as lazy or inefficient. One l ando~A'tler estimat ed chac wo rkers accomplis hed only "rwo-6fths of what they did undcr the old system." As productivity feU, so did land values. Plummeting cotton prices and poor han·ests in 1866 and 1867 combined ~Atith t hese ochcr fuctors to create an impasse: Landowners lacked labor, and freedmen Lacked land.

I

Tin IMPAct oF Ei.IA~O.PATlON

3 69

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Southerners began experimenting ~Aith new labor schemes, including the division of plantations into small tenancies. Sharecropping was the most ~Aidespread arrangement. Under this system, landowners subdivided large plantations into farms of thirty to fifty acres and rented them co freedmen under annual leases for a share of che crop, usually one-half. Freedmen liked t his decentralized syscem, which let t hem use t he labor of family members and represented a seep toward indepen· dence. Plant~ meanwhile, recained control of their land. 11le most produccive land thus remained in the hands of a small gro up of owners; in effect sharecropping helped to preserve the: planter elite. Although the wage S}'Stem continued on sugar and rice plantacions, by 1870 t he plantation tradition had yielded to sharecropping in the cotton So uth. A severe depression in 1873 drow~: many blacks and independent white farmers into sharecropping. By 1880, sharecroppers, white and black, farmed 80 percent of the: land in co£Con-producing states. In fact, white sharecroppers outnumbered black, although a higher proportion of southern blacks, almost 75 percent, ~A'Cre involved in the sys· tern. Changes in marketing and finan ce, meanwhile:, made: the: sharecroppers' lot in· creasingly precarious.

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The postwar South's hundreds of thousands of tenant farmers and sharecroppers needed a local credit system to Economy see them thro ugh the gro~Aing season until they could harvest their crops. Rural merchants ad\•anced supplies to tenants and sharecrop· pers on credit and sold thcir cro ps to wholesalers. Because renters had no property to serve as collateral, merchants secured their loans wit h a lien (leen}, or claim, on each farmer's next cro p. Exorbitant interest races, 50 percent or more, quickly forced many tenants and sharecroppers inco a cycle of indebtedness. The sharecropper might "'~II O'We pan of his crop co the landov.'ne:r and another part (the: rest of his ~d a Crop-lien

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ThE CllJSIS Of RECOMSTRUcnON,

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cnp &e. Borrooaing <1p in•

crop, or more:) to lhe merchant. Jllite:race: tenants who could not keep lrack of chcir financial arrangements were at t he: mercy of sometimes-unscrupulous merchancs. O nce a tenant's real or alleged debts excct:ded t he: value of his crop, he was t ied to t he: to Jlurttr1.1pping land, to co£Con, and ro sharecropping. By lhe end of Reconstruction, sharecropping and crop liens had bound the South to easily marke:cable cash crops, such as cotton, and pm-ented crop dr..·ersification. Soil depletion, land erosion, and outmoded equipment Ttru o( thou.AndJ offnotdn~n stranded capital-short planters in a cycle of po\'erty. Trapped in perpetual sought miu:ing (;unil)' m<"-mhl'n, debt, tenant fanners became: the: chief victims of the new agricultural order. and fonntr :~bVt':~ ha:~tened to ltg.U· Co£Con remained lhe only survi\•al route open lO poor farmers, regardless of i.1:c- tht m:.rri.ageJ thq· h.ld ma~ undtr JI-<1YI'ry. race, but low income from cotton locked chem into sharecropping and crop Bl.aekJ formtd thti.r own commun i· liens. African-American tenants, for whom neither landov.'nership nor eco· hu, churc.hu, .and sc.hooiJ ;u Jtgrt" nomic independence: ever materialized, sa~A' chcir political rights dwindle as g.nioo btnmt 6rmlr ut.abliJhtd i.n rapidly as t heir hopes for economic frttdom. When Reconstruction ended, the South. neither state gO"t-e:rnments nor the national gOV\'.rnment offered them pro· Ftw (ormtr Sl;a\'C'.$ achit''C'd land teccion, for northern politicians were: preoccupied with their own problems. owntrJhip, .and sh.uecropptng bt-camt tht domin.ant fOrm of .agricul·

I

future cro~; of't to moatrd ;~. ryde ofdtbc: d!.u ritd tt'IWin~

tur.al l.abor for bllclo:J .and m.my poor wh iteJ.

NEW CONCERNS IN THE NORTH,

\l' ithout «enomic nuuJ, bbclu:: quickly :~aw thtir po1itiC.ll right"

r868-1876

..,.....

~did northern concern 11bollt Reconstruction

begin to wane?

1'he: nomination of Ulysses S. Grant for president in 1868 launched a chaotic era in national politics. His eight years in office: featured political scandals, a party m'Oit, a massi\J'C depression, and a steady retreat from Reconstruction. B}' t he: mid· l870s nort hern \'Oters cared more about economics, unemployment, labor un· rest, and currency problems chan about lhe «southern question." Eager lO end sec· tional conflict, Republicans turned their backs on the: frct:dmen.

Republicans had good reason co nominate General Grant. A ~A'llr hero, he was endorsed by veterans, admired chrough· out the North, and unscathed by lhe bitter feuds of Re:· construction politics.1b oppose Grant, the Democracs nominated Horatio Seymour, ardHritic of the: Lincoln administration and an opponent of Reconstruction and greenbacks. Grant ran on his personal popularity more chan on issues. Although he: carried aU but eight states, the popular \'Ote was dose; newly enfranchised freedm en provided Grant•s margin in che: South. Grant's presidential leadership prO\"t'CC as weak as his war leadership had bct:n strong. although he lacked Johnson's instinct for disaster. He had little political skill; his cabinet appointmencs were at best mediocre; and a string of scandals plagued his administration. In 1869 financier Jay Gould and his parcne:r Jim Fisk at· tempced ro corner che gold market with t he: help of Granr•s brolher-in-law. When gold prices tumbled. invcsrors were ruined, and Grant's reputation was tarnished. Near che end ofGrant's first term, his vice president, Schuyler Colfax, got caught up in che: Cftdit Mobilier (CRAY-ckr MOH-bill-yay) scandal, an elaborate: scheme co

Crllllism

Cri&t ~ier Scbtmt w slim prn6ts from tht Union PMi6c RaiiRNd; one oht'*Tral suocbh eo engutr Gr.mt administration

I NEW COKCEIOlS IM TH E NORTH. 1868~876

371

skim offthe profitsofche Union Padfic Railroad. Then in 1875 Grant's pcrsonal secretary, Orville Babcock, was found guilty of accepting bribes from che ..whiskey ring,"' distillcrs who preferred bribery to pay· ment of federal taxes. And in 1876 ...otcrs learned that Grant's secretary of war, William E. Belknap, had takm bribes to selllucrati\-e Indian trading posts in O klahoma. Although Grant ~A'llS not pcrsonally invol11ed in the scandals, he did little to restrain such activities, and "Grantism" came ro stand for fraud, briber)', and corruption in office. Such evils, hO'I"-e\-er, spread far beyond Washington. The New York City press in 1872 re\-ealed that Democrat boss \'t1illiam M. 1\l·ccd led a ring thac had looted che city treasur}' and collec:ccd some $200 million in kickbacks and bribes. When Mart. 1Wain and Charles Dudley Warner published chcir satiric no\-el "T« Gildl!d Age" in 1873, readcrs recognized che book's speculators, sclf·promocers, and opporrunists as familiar figures in public life. (The term "Gilded Age"' has subsequmdy been used to refer to the decades from the J870s to che 1890s.) Grant d id enjoy some foreign policy successes. In JSn his admin· iscration engineered the settlement of the Aldb.:sma daims with England: an international tribunal ordered Brimin to pay SIS.S million to the United States in compensation for damage inflicted b)• Confederate· owned but British-built raiders.. But the administration ~A-ent astray Thoma.s N:.st"s c:.rtoon$ in Harptr'• when it tried to add nonadjacent territory co che Union. In 1867 the ~~ htlped topple ~York johnson administration had purchased Alaska from Russia at the bar· Oemoer.ttic bMs w'ill~:un M. T~d, who, with his ;uaoci:.te:s, embodied gain price of S7.2 million. lhe purchase: had rekindled expansionists' corruption on ;a l:.rge K;al.e. The hope, and in 1870 Granc decided co annex che Caribbean island nation T~d Ring h;ad gr:.nted lucruNe of Santo Domingo (the modern Dominican Republic). The presidenc fr:.nchis.c:s to comp;u~ies they con· believed that annexation would promote Caribbean trade and pnwide trolled, p.:.dded construction bills, a haven for persecuted southern blacks. Despite spcculacors' hopes for pt';t.Cticed gr:.ft ;and extOt'tion, ;and uploited ~ry oppOt'tunity to windfall profits, the Senate rejected the annexation creaty and further pl.under the city's funds.. diminished Gram's reputation. As the d ecrion of 1872 approached, d issident Republicans feared thac «Grandsm" ~A'Ould ruin the party. Former Radicals and ocher Republicans left ouc of Granc's ..Great Barbecue" formed chcir 0'1'-·n party, the Liberal Republicans.

The Liberal Republican 1\.'"IOit split the party and under· mined Reconstruction. Liberals demanded civil senice re· fonn co bring the "best men" inco g()I.!'Crnmenc.. In the South chey demanded an end to "bayonec rule" and argued chat African·Americans, now enfranchised, could fend for themscl11es. Corruption in gMwnmmt posed a greater chreat than Confederate resurgence, the Uberals claimed, and they demanded thac the "best mm" in che South, ex.Confederates barred from holding office, be re· turned to go\-ernmem. Nru' Yor* Tribunl! editor Horace Greeley, inconsjstmtly supporting both a strin· gent Rcconscruccion policy and lenimcy toward the ex·Confederatcs, received che Ub· cra1 Republican nomination, and the Democracs endorsed GrNiey as ~A'CJI. Republican

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reformers found themseh·es allied with the party chat they had recend)' cascigace:d as a ..sewer" of treasonable: sentiments. Oe:spite Greeley's arduous campaigning (he literally ~A
The postwar }'Caf"S brought accelerated industrialization, rapid economic expansion, and frantic speculation as in· \'CStors rushed to take advantage of seemingly unlimited opporrunities. Railroads led chespecularive: boom. The transcontinencal line: reached completion in 1869 (see Chapter 17), and by 1873 almost four hundred railroads crisscrossed the: Northeast. But in addition to transforming the: northern economy, the railroad boom led entrepreneurs to O\~rspeculare, with drastic results. In 1869 l'hiladdphia banker Jay Cooke took over a new transcontine:malline, the Northern Pacific. For four years Northern Pacific securities sold briskly, but in 1873 construction costs outran bond sales. In September, Cooke, his bank vaults stuffed wich unsalable bond~ defaulted on his obligations. His bank, the: Largest in the nation, shuc do~A'll. 11len the stock marker collapsed, and smaller banks and ocher fi rms fo!IO""--ed; the Panic of 1873 plunged che nation into a devastating fiverear depression. Thousands of businesses ~A'rot bankrupt. By 1878 unemployment had risen to more than 3 million. labor protests mounted, and industrial violence: spread (set: Chapter 18). The: depression of the 1870s demonstrated rmhlcssly that conflicts born of industrialization had replaced seccional divisions. The depression also fed a d ispute: m-~r currency that had begun in 1865. During the Civil War, Americans had used greenbacks, a paper currency not backed b)•a spe:· cific ~A'cighc in gold...Sound-money"' supporters demanded che withdrawal ofgreen· backs from circulation as a means of stabilizing che currency. Their opponents, "e:aS)'·money"' ad\'Ocace:s, such as farmers and manufacru.rers depende:m on easy credit, wanted co expand che currency by issuing additional greenbacks. The deepen· ing depression created e\'en more demand for easy money, and the issue splic both major parties. Controversy over the type of currency was compounded by the question of ho~A' to repa)' the federal debt. In wartime the Union gO\"Crnment had borrQ\.\.-ed astro· nomical sums through the sale of war bonds. Bond holders wance:d repaymenc in "coin,.. gold or silver, C\'ro though many of them had paid for che bonds in greenbacks. The l'ublic Credit Ace of 1869 promised paymenc in coin. Senator John Sherman, the author of the Public Credit Ace, put together a series of compromises to satisfy both "sound-money" and "e:aS)'·moncy"' advocates.. Sherman's measures, exchanging Civil War bonds for new ones payable owr a longer pe:· riod of time and de-fining ..coin" as gold only, prcs~d the public c:.redit, the currency, and Republican unity. His Specie Resumption Ace of 1875 promised co put the nation back on the gold standard by 1879.

The Panic of 117l

Buc Sherman's measures, hO\l'f:'\'f:'t ingenious, did not placate the Democrats, who gained control of the House: in 1875. Many Democrats, and a few Republicans, W\'.t t

«free-silvcr" ad\'OCates who wanted the: silver dollar restored in order to expand

the currcnq• and end the depression. 1'he: Bland-Allison Act of 1878 partially re· stored sih·cr coinage by requiring che go'lcrnmcnc to buy and coin sc"/cral million dollars' ~A'Orch of silver each month. In 1876 ocher expansionists formed the: Green·

back party to keep the: paper money in circulacion fo r the sake of debtors, but cht:}' enjoyed little success. As the depression receded, the: clamor for .. eas}' money"' subsided, only to rerum in the 1890s (see Chapce:r20). Although never sctded, the contro\'ct'Sial .. money question" diverted attention a~A'llf from Reconstruction and t hus contributed co irs demise.

During the 1870s the Supreme: Court also played a role in weakening northern support for Reconstruction as new 1111 ConsUiullon constitutional questions surfaced. Would che Court sup· pore laws to protect freedmen's rights? The decision in Ex P.uw Mill®m ( 1866) had suggested not. In Millifpn, the Court had ruled chat a military commission could not t ry civilians in areas where civilian courrs \l'€CC functioning, thus dooming che spe:· d al militar}' courts that had been established to enforce the Supplementary Freedmen's Bureau Act. Would the: Court sabotage the congressional Reconstruction plan? In 1869, in Ttxas v. White, che Court had lee Reconstruction stand, ruling that Congress had the power co ensure each state a republican form of go\·emme:nt. Ho~A'l"'o'€r, during che: 1870s the Supreme Court backed a~A'llyfrom Reconstruction. In che: SldSI!J>lerbcust decision of 1873, the Court ruled chat the: Fourtcench Amendment protecred the: rights of national citizenship, such as the righc co interstate travel, but thac the: federal government did noc ha\'€ co safeguard su ch rights against viola· cion by the stdR'S. The SldSI~st decision effcccivcly gutred che: Fourteenth Amendment, ~Athich was intended to secure freedmen's righrs against slate encroachment. The Supreme Courc retreated even further from Reconstruction in two cases in· \'Oiving t he Enforcement Ar:.c of 1870. In Unittd Statts v. Rmt ( 1876), the: Court threw ouc che indictment of Ke:ntuck}' officials who had barred African-Americans from \'Odng. Another decision that same year, Unikd Stam v. Cruiksb
l 'he Republicans gradually disengaged from Re:· construction, beginning with the clocrion ofGrant as president in 1868. Granc,likr mosc Americans, hesitated to approve the u.se: of federal auchority in state or local affairs.

Court nrnck dO'INU b:uie legi.dation prutteting &eedmen',: righu. Mo,:t Radin ! Republi ~n INden h~d died b)' the e-~liy l870s, and eommucial .:md ind ustrial in terut,: began to domin:ue the Republin n p.lrty.

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MAJOR R ECONSTRUCTION LEGISlATION lAW ANO DATE O F CONGRESSI ONAl PASSAGE

PltOVISI ON:S

Pu RPOsE

Cit,11Rights Act of1 866 (Ap,i1 1866)'

Declared btad:s citizens and guaranteed them equal protection of tfle laws.

To invalidate the black codes.

Supplementary Freedmen·s Bureau Act (luly 1866Y

Extended the life of the Freedmen's Aid Bureau and expanded its powers.

To invalidate the black codes.

Reconstruction Act of 1867 (March 1867Y

Invalidated state governments formed under Lincoln and johnson. OMded the formet Confederacy into fi\-e military districts. Set forth requirements for readmission of ex-Confederate states to the Union.

To replace presidential Reconstruction with a more stringent plan.

To enforce the First Reconstruction

Supplementary Reconstruction Acts

A
Second Reconstruction Act (March 1867Y

Required military commanders to initiate voter enrollment.

Third Reconstruction Act Quty 1867Y

Expanded military commanders' powers.

Fourth Reconstruction Act (Macch 1868)'

Prot,1ded that a majorityofvotets, howt'Vl'f few, could put a new state constitution into force.

Army Appropriations Act (March 1867Y

Declared in a rider that only the genetal of the army could issue military orders.

To preve.nt President johnson from obstructing Reconstruction.

Tenure of Office Act (March 1867Y

Prohibited the president !Tom removing

any federal official without the

To preve.nt President johnson !Tom obstructing Reconstruction.

Senate's consent. Omnibus Act (lune 1868)t

Readmitted sewn ex-Confederate state:s to the Union.

To restore the Union, under the term ofthe First Reconstruction Act.

Enforcement Act of1870

Provided for the protection ofbfad: \'Oters.

To enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.

Second Enforcement Act (February 1871 )

Prot,1ded for federal supervision of southern elections.

To enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.

Third Enforcement Act (Ku Klux Klan Act) (Ap,il 1871 )

Strengthened sanctions against those who impeded bfad: suffi'age.

To combat the Ku Klux Klan and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.

Amnesty Act (May 1872)

Restored the !Tanchise: to almost all ex-Confederates.

Effort by Grant Republicans to depriw liberal Republicans of a campaign issue.

Cit,11Rights Act of1875 (March 1875)§

Oudawed racial segregation in transportation To honor the late senator Charfes Sumner. and public accommodations and preve.nted exclusion of btad:s from jury smi ce.

(May 1870)1

• P'i:IJM!d O...U}ollr1$0tl' $Vl'tO. w:l5 ~n rC!tl.rmed to milit:.tytule. The l;u:t fou rsuta wrn ~:.dmi ttC'd in 1870. 1Secrion5 of the l:.wdC'CbrM unCOr1$litution
J RECOMSTRUcnON AIIAXOOKtO, t &;r6- 18]7

375

In the J870s Republican idealism waned. Instead, commerdal and induscrial in· tcrescs dominated both che Uberal and "regular"' wings of the party, and few wanced any further sectional strife. B}' 1875, moreOVI.'.r, the Radical Republicans had virruall)' disappeared. The Radical leaders Chase, Stevens, and Sumner had died, and others had grown tired of "waving che blood)' shirt," or defaming Democratic opponents by reviving warcime animosit)'. lt seemed poindcss to prop up souchern Republican regimes chat even Presidenc Granc fOund corrupc. Finally, Republicans general!)' agreed with southern Democrats. that African-Americans 'A'Cre inferior and chat to insist on black equality would quash an}' hope of reunion between Norch and South . The Republican retreat sct che stage for Reconstruction's e nd in 1877.

RECONSTRUCTION ABANDONED, 1876-1877

I

What events led the North to 4btJndon Reconstrud1on?

"We are: m a ''elY hot pohtical contest JUSt now,"' a MisSJss1pp1 planter wrote hLs daughter in 1875, "wich a good prospect of curning out the carpetbag thieves by whom we: have been robbed for the past six to ten re-ars." lnd«d,an angry ~Ailitc majorit}' had led a Democratic resurgence chroughouc the South in the 1870~ and by 1876 Republican rule survived in only thrtt southern states. Democratic victories in stace: elcccions that }'tar and political bargaining in Washington in 1877 ended ~Athat lictle remained of Roconscruction.

lm:ase: oot ~vail:lblte due 10 tq)yrigbt reslrictions

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376

OfAPlER 16

ThE CllJSIS Of RECOMSTRucnoN.

After I Bn the Republican collapse in che South accel· crated. Congressional amnesty enabled virrually all ex· lilt Soutll Confederate officials to regain office, divided Republicans lose their grip on the southern electorate, and attrition diminished Republican ranks. Carpetbaggers returned norch or joined che Democrats, and scalawags de· scrted the Republicans in large numbers. Tired of northern interference and seeing the possibilityof"home rule," scalawags decided chac staying Republican meanc go· ing down wich a sinking ship. Unable to win ne~A' white votes or retain the old ones, the fragile Republican coalition crumbled. Mean......tlile, the Democrats mobilized funncrty apachecic ~Ailite voters. Although still faccion-ridden - bu.Unessmen who dreamed of an industrialized "New South" had little in common with the old planter elite, the sOm em among African-Americans. Nearly fifteen thousand African-American "exodusters" from the Deep South mo\·ed to Kansas and set up homesteads. But scarce resources left most of the freed slaves stranded. Not until che twentieth centur}' ~A
"'edeemlnl"

lo.rl.as Soutbtm ditl' who R'tutotd eo pov.<er u Rtcon. suucrian wound down

l

lrede. . .

Bourbon tl'rm lOr rqpining control of'South

1&6~•&n

By autumn 1876, wir.h redempr.ion almost co mplete, both parties moved co d iscard the animosi ty le-ft by che "''llr and Reco nstruction. The Republicans nominated Rucherford B. Hayes, the governor of Ohio, for president. Popular with all factions and untainted by the Granc scandals, Hay~ a "moderate;'' favored "home rulr' in the South and civil and political rights for all-dear!}' contradictor}' goals. l 'h e: Demo· crats nominated Go\·ernor Samuelj.1'ilden of NewYork, a political re-former known for his assaulcs o n che Tweed Ring thac had plundered New York City's treasur}'· Both candidates "''ere fiscal conseJVati\·~ fa\'Ored sound money, endorsed civil service reform, and decried corru ption. Tilden "'"'n the popular voce: by a small margin, buc the Republicans challenged pro-Tilden electoral voces from South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and the Democrats challenged o ne: electoral vote from Oregon. Souchern Republicans managed to chrow ouc enough Democratic ballots in the contested states to proclaim Ha)'t:S che "''inner. The nation now faced an unprecedemed dilemma. Each party claimed victOr)', and each accused the other of fraud. in face, both sets of southern votes were fraudulent: Republicans had discarded legitimate: Democracic ballocs, and Democrats had illegalI)' prewm ed freedmen from vocing. In January I Bn, Congress created a special electoral co mmission co resol~ the conflict. The co mmis sion originally consisted of scw:n Republicans, scw:n Oemocracs, and one: indepe:ndenc, but when the: indepen· dent resigned, a Republican replaced him. The commission gave the: Republican Ha)'t:S the election by an S-to-7 \'Ote. Congress no"'' had co certify the: new electoral \'Otc. But che Democrats controlled the: House, and some: planned to forestall approval of che e:loccoral ..'Ote. For many souchern Democrats, regaining control of their states was far more important than preventing the: election of a Republican president-if the new Republican administration u'Ould le:a\-e: the: Souch alone. Republican l ead~ fo r their part, "''Cre c..,......use., 1m DtaJ that IP""' nortbtm Republic.ms willing to bargain, for Ha)'e:S "''llnted not just victory buc also southern approval. In· tht prt:r.:idc'nty .and ft'swmcl formal negotiations followed, with both parties exchanging promises. Ohio Repubsoutbem Ot-moer.ltJ' to vo-l'r, licans and southern Oemocracs agreed chat, if Ha)'e:S \N'On che e:locr.ion, he \N'Ould rnding:Rc-ronmucrion rrmo\-e: federal croops from all southern states. Ocher negotiations led co the understanding chac southerners would roccive federal pacro nage:, federal aid to railroads, and federal su pport for internal imp~ments. In turn, southerners pro mised co accept Ha)'e:S as president and to cre:at the: The Jtcopub lic.:m rolllP't in tht freedmen fairly. South ~ul erattd after tsn. Congress rhus ra rified Ha)'es's election. Once: in office, Hares fulfilled t:Hmorr~u rtg.Un<."d ronttol of many of the: agrce:mencs made: by his colleagues. Republican rule: toppled wuthem .stuu. in Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida. But some of the: bargains scruck ''R«<etmtr.s" ended rtform.s and limited o r dimi.nattd bl.lrk righu. in che s!Xalled Compromise: of 1811 fell apart, particularly Democratic The dtccion of 1876 I\*$Uh«< in promises co treat the: freedmen fair!}' and Hares's pledges co ensure: the: rh.lllt.nges to JO~t~oe dtctoul votes freed slaves• rights. ..When }'OU rurned us loose, you turned us loose to the: and t hargu of fraud on both .sidu. sky, to the scorm, to che: whirlwind, and worst of aU ... to the "''l'ach of o ur The pcitt or Re-publican vtr«JC'r in infuriated masters,"' Frederick Douglass had ch~d at the 1876 Republitht dtction wa.s cht end of Rtroncan convention. "l 'h e: question now is, do you mean co make good to us .stru rtion ~nd tht ''inual ab.u.donmtntoft ht fn-<."dmtn.. the promises in your Constitution?" By 1877 the: ans"'•er was dear: ..No."'

Tilt Eledlon of 1876

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Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOtO R l E O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

On what major issues did Radical Republicans and Presidentjohnson slmggle over Reconstruction policy? (page 354)

I

Radical Republicans saw johnson as coo lenient on Reconstruction and

passed a stringent congressional Reconstruction progmm mw his vrco. They cw:n attempted to impeach the president for policical n:asons, but failed. 1'he Fourteenth and Fiftttnth Amendments, which johnson opposed, were major triumphs tOr che Radicals.

What impact did federal Reconstruction policy have an the former Confederacy and ex-Confederates? (page 362)

I

tx:moctats and ex-Confederates were Latge-ly excluded from political powu

in the South, "''hich fell to Republicans and fn:edmcn. The Reconstruction gov· cmmenrs passed costly reform m easun:~ most of which were Iacer abandoned

or scaled back. Terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan flourished bridl}'· They wen: outlawed by the federal government but had already intimi· dated freedmen.

l

in what ways did newtf freed slaves reshape their lives after emancipation? (pap 366)

Former slavrs sought missing family members, lega.lih---d marriages made undet slavl':ry, and cceatcd schools and chuoches in large numbers. But without land reform most remained poor and ultimately were caught in the pernicious sharecropping system; their righrs were soon eroded.

I

Wiry did northern com:em about Reconstmction begin w~~ne? (page 370)

I

What led the North to abandon Reconstruction? (pap 375)

Othet concerns soon began to preoccupy Republicans. Corruption, epitomized by the Grant administration, permeated the nation. The Panic of 1873 led to-a major depression. TheSupreme Court thi\-"W out most impottant measures intended to protect freedmen's rights.. Finally, with most Radical Republi· can le-aders gone by the early 1870s, commercial and industrial interests began to dominate the Republican part}'·

Republican control of the South began to collapse in the early 1870s. As Democmts "redeemed" southern states, they curtailed refomtS and eliminated black rights. The price of the Republican victory in the disputed presidential election of 1876 was the end of Reconstruction and the return of the South to Democmric control.

KEY TERMS

Radkal R~blicans (p. 354) "blo:k codes" (p. 356) rr..dmon~ Bt<"" (p. 356} Fourt- h Amondmelll (p. 3!il)

congressiollal ~onstruction (p. 359)

in1>oo:hmenl (p. 359) Fiftoen!h Amondml'fll (p. 360} "carpotb.1ggor" (p. 362} scaliWiag (p. 362) Ku Klux Klan (p. 364} &lforc""'nl Ads (p. 365} 1883 CMI Ril}hls Cases (p. 361} sharooowing (p. 369} crop l ~n (p. 370) Cn!dit Mobilier (p. 370} Bourbons (p. 376} redorr¢on (p. 376) Compr001ise ol1877 (p. 377}

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOtO R l E O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

On what major issues did Radical Republicans and Presidentjohnson slmggle over Reconstruction policy? (page 354)

I

Radical Republicans saw johnson as coo lenient on Reconstruction and

passed a stringent congressional Reconstruction progmm mw his vrco. They cw:n attempted to impeach the president for policical n:asons, but failed. 1'he Fourteenth and Fiftttnth Amendments, which johnson opposed, were major triumphs tOr che Radicals.

What impact did federal Reconstruction policy have an the former Confederacy and ex-Confederates? (page 362)

I

tx:moctats and ex-Confederates were Latge-ly excluded from political powu

in the South, "''hich fell to Republicans and fn:edmcn. The Reconstruction gov· cmmenrs passed costly reform m easun:~ most of which were Iacer abandoned

or scaled back. Terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan flourished bridl}'· They wen: outlawed by the federal government but had already intimi· dated freedmen.

l

in what ways did newtf freed slaves reshape their lives after emancipation? (pap 366)

Former slavrs sought missing family members, lega.lih---d marriages made undet slavl':ry, and cceatcd schools and chuoches in large numbers. But without land reform most remained poor and ultimately were caught in the pernicious sharecropping system; their righrs were soon eroded.

I

Wiry did northern com:em about Reconstmction begin w~~ne? (page 370)

I

What led the North to abandon Reconstruction? (pap 375)

Othet concerns soon began to preoccupy Republicans. Corruption, epitomized by the Grant administration, permeated the nation. The Panic of 1873 led to-a major depression. TheSupreme Court thi\-"W out most impottant measures intended to protect freedmen's rights.. Finally, with most Radical Republi· can le-aders gone by the early 1870s, commercial and industrial interests began to dominate the Republican part}'·

Republican control of the South began to collapse in the early 1870s. As Democmts "redeemed" southern states, they curtailed refomtS and eliminated black rights. The price of the Republican victory in the disputed presidential election of 1876 was the end of Reconstruction and the return of the South to Democmric control.

KEY TERMS

Radkal R~blicans (p. 354) "blo:k codes" (p. 356) rr..dmon~ Bt<"" (p. 356} Fourt- h Amondmelll (p. 3!il)

congressiollal ~onstruction (p. 359)

in1>oo:hmenl (p. 359) Fiftoen!h Amondml'fll (p. 360} "carpotb.1ggor" (p. 362} scaliWiag (p. 362) Ku Klux Klan (p. 364} &lforc""'nl Ads (p. 365} 1883 CMI Ril}hls Cases (p. 361} sharooowing (p. 369} crop l ~n (p. 370) Cn!dit Mobilier (p. 370} Bourbons (p. 376} redorr¢on (p. 376) Compr001ise ol1877 (p. 377}

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ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE 'nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

18~00

!'resident j efferson's emissaries Meriwether Le"-'is and William Clark had win· tered among the Hidatsas in 1804 and had been impressed by cheir horsemanship and hunting ability. The Hidacsas in the J840s had joined ~Aith two neighboring tribes to build a new village called Like·A·Fishhook. Initially che new secdement prospered. But, after the Civil War, as white: settlers crowded onto their lands, Buffalo Bird Woman and her tribe: ~A'Cre pressured by a nearby militar}' garrison inco signing a~A'llY more and more of chcir territory and fo rced co scatce:r on co small farms. Buffalo Bird Woman and her tribe abandoned their village in 1885. Buffalo Bird Woman's experience was all too common. l 'h e sttd emenc of the trans·Mississjppi \'("~est began ~Aith the removal of native peoples. This peaceful or, more common!)', brutal relocation of the Indians on co rese:n'lltions opened up vast tracts of land for settlement and dC"".-elopment. M in~ farmers, land speculators, and railroad dC"".-elopers in che 1850s flooded onto the fercile prairies of lo~A'll, Min· nesota,. and Kansas, carving che land inco farms and communities. 1"'hen, in the 1860s, d rawn by the earlier discowry of gold in the Rocky Mountain~ these same seeders swarmed onco che Great l'lains and the semiarid regions be)'ond them. Sc.m:dy a decade later, the trans-Mississippi West became a concested terrain as Natio.·e: peoples fought co protect their homeland fro m these ne'l'--comers. The transformation of che West left a mixed legaq•. Although man}' white fami· lies prospered on che High Plains, the heedless pursuitofland and profit threatened noc o nly che Native: Americans, but the environment, and sometimes the scrd ers themselves.. Unscrupulous ~A'CSterners exploited white:, Native American, Chinese, and Mexican laborers alike. Hunters slaughtered millions of bison for their hides, and farmers plo~A•ed up the prairie sod to build fanns. Although ~A'esterners attrib· uted their economic achievements to American individualism and self-reliance, the development of che trans-Mississippi West depended heavil)' on the federal gOio'Crn· ment. 1"'he gOio'Crnment sene troops. fresh from their victories in che Civil War, co su bjugate che Indians. It pro moted the: acquisition of fann land through the Home· stead Act (1862) and subsidized the construction of transcontinental railroad lines. Eastern banks and foreign capitalists prO\ided i~scme n t capitaL In their scramble for new economic opportunities, many Americans chose to view the destruction of the Indian wa}'S of life as the necessary price ofcivilization and progress.

NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI WEST How was Indian lifo ott rile Great P14ins transformed in tile second llalfofthe nineteenth century?

(F"f) Prima:ry Source: ~

Hopi Snake Dancer

No aspect of the transformation ofthe West was more visible and dramatic chan the assault on the traditional Indian way of life. Caught between a stampede of min· ers and seeders who took chcir land and che federal gow~rn mem that sought to force: them omo rese:n'lltions, Native Americans resisted and fought back. By the 1890s confinement on inferior reservations had become the fate ofalmostC""."Cr}' Indian na· tion. Undaunted, Nath-e Americans struggled co presenT chcir customs and rebuild their numbers.

I N.t.nVE AMEIUCA:>lSANO THE TltA~S·MISSISSIPPI WEST

381

Homestead Act; Morrll Anti-Bigamy Act; Padfic Railroad Act N"'ada admilled 10 lhe Union; M.macre ol Ch'!'!nnes al Sand Creel; Colorado; Geo
massacre Desert land Act John Wesley Powell /leporl on the lands of/Ire Arid Regions of the United Stoles United Stoles v. Rl!fllolrls Helen Hurt Jackson. ACMIIrf olDishonor Women's Nalional lndian Rlghls Association lounded; l'llliam ("Bullalo Bill") Cody organizes Wid W.~Show

Helen Hurt Jackson. lltJrnono Severe drou-.1 on lhe Plains destroys cattle and grain Dawes Severally Act; !<munds-Tucker Act

White caps raid ranches in northern New Mexico Oldahoma Terrlory ..,.ned lor settlernl!fll Ghosl Dance m""'"""' Sllfeads lo lhe Black Hills; Massaae of Telon Sioux al Wounded Kn... Soulh Dakola John Muir organizes Sierra Club Curtis Art

The Indians of the Great Plains inhabited thr«: major subregions. The: norchern Plains, from che Dakotas and Montana sout hward to Nebraska, were home co SC\'tral large tribes, most notably the: Lakota as wdl as Flac·head~ Blackfe:ct, Assiniboins (ah·SIN·ih·bw~ons). norchcrn Cheyennes (sl'I)'·ANNS), Arapahos ( I.·RAP·a-ho~). Crows, Hidatsas, and Mandans. Some of t hese o,w _re allies, but others u.-ere bittcre:ne:· mies. In che Central Plains, the: so-
1'111 PIIIM IIMiians

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OfAPlER 17

ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

~~ .,_~ !Ji"'::~~L~a_tive

I,.,.,.

.......-.u.n JOCIC'tle'.$ .........mng tbt ""iion from tht O.Ucus to

WII&.., f. "loollilo Bil' c.4y

I

RmCM-ntd srout, fnditn 6gbter. aod showman wbo q mbalil:td tbt • WaJd \Ve$t*mytbOJ

18~00

seeded tradition characteris tic of l'lains river \'alley culture. O n the: southern Plains of western Kansas, Colorado, eastern New Mexico, and Texas, lhe Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyenn~ southern Arapahos, and Apaches still maintained a migrator}' life appropriate to che arid environ menL Considerable di..-ersity flourished among the Plains peoples, and customs \'aried c-.-en "'ithin subdivisions of t he same tribe. For example, che Dakota Sioux (soo) of Minnesota led a semisedentary life based on small·scale agriculture, deer and bison hunting, and wild rice ha..rw.scing. In contrast, many Plains cribes- che Lakota Sioux, Blackfeet, Cro"''S• and Cheyennes- using horses obtained from the Spanish and guns obtain ed fro m traders, roamed the High l'lains to che \l't:St and foliO""--ed the bison migrations. For all the P lains Indians, life r........'Otved around extended family ties and tribal cooperation. Families and dans joined forces to hunt and farm, and reached dcci· sions by consensus. Religious and han-est celebrations provided che cement for vii· lage and camp life. Sioux religion was complex. 11le Lakota Sioux thought of life as a series of cirdes. living within the dail)' cycles of the sun and moon, L.akotas were: born into a circle of relath-es, which broadened to the band, che t ribe, t he Sioux Nation, and on to animals and plants. The Lakocas also bd icwd in a hierarchy of spir· its whose help could be: im'Oked in ceremonies like the Sun Dance. On t he semiarid High Plains, where rainfall averaged less than t\1/enty inches a rear, both che bison and the Nati\·e peoples adapted to t he environment. 1'he huge bison herd~ which at their peak contained an estimated 30 million animals, broke into small groups in the winter and dispersed into rh-er valll')'S.In t he summer, they returned to che High Plains in \'ast herds to mate and feed on the nutritious short grass.es. Like the bison, the Indians dispersed across the landscape co minimize t heir impaCl o n any one place, wintering in t he river valll')'S and returning to the High Plains in summer. The movement of miners and settlers omo the eastern High Plains in t he 1850s threatened the Native American way of life. In the 1860s, the whites began syscema· tically to hunt t he animals to suppl)' t he eastern market with carriage robes and in· dustrial belting. William F. ••Buffalo BUI,. Cody, a famous scout and Indian fighter, killed nearly forty· three: hundred bison in 1867- 1868 to fee:d construction CT'C"A'S building t he Union Pacific Railroad. Arm}' commanders also encouraged che slaugh· ter of buffalo to undennine Indian resistance. The carnage that resulted was almost inconceivable in its scale. Between 1872 and 1875, hunters killed 9 million buffalo, taking onlyche skin and leaving the carcasses to rot. By the 1880s, t he oncc-.thundering herds had been reduced to a fe"'' thousand animals, and the Nati\\': American "''llY of life dependent o n the buffalo had been ruined.

In the 1850s, Indians who fete pressure from the declining bison herds and deteriorating grasslands faced the on· slaught of t housands of pioneers lured by t he discOV\'.ry of gold and sito.·er in the Rocky Mountains. The federal go\-ernmem's response was co reexamine its Indian policies. Abandoning the previous position, "'>hich had created much ofche West as a vast Indian reserve, che federal government sought to intro· duce a S}'Stcm of smaller t ribal rescrvacions where the Indians were co be concen· traced, by force if necessary.

lbe Assault 011 NOIIIIdk Indian Life

I

N.t.nVE AMEIUCA:>lSANO THE TltA~S·MISSISSIPPI WEST

3 83

Some: Native Americans peace-fully adjusted to their new life-. Others, among them che Navajos (NAH-vuh-hohs) of Arizona and New Mexico and the eastern Dakota Sioux, opposed che new policy co no avail. By 1860, eight western re:sen•arions had been established. Significanc segments of the: remaining tribes o n the Grear Plains, more than a hundred thousand people, fought against re-moval for dccades.. Between 1860 and 1890, the: western Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahos, Kiowas, and Co· manche:s on the Grear l'lains; che: Nez PercCs (nn p!et· SAY) and Bannocks in the norchcrn Rockies.: and the: Apaches in che Southwest- faced che U.S. anny, co ugh· ene:d by its experiences in the Civil \'t;'ar, in a series of final battles for the: West (sec Map 17.1).

Misunderstandings, u nfulfilled promises, brutality, and butcher}' marked the conflict. Near Sand Creek, Colorado in 1864, soldiers fro m the: local militia who had replaced regular army troops fighting in the Civil War, destroyed Cheyenne and Arapaho camps. lhe Indians retaliated wich a fl urry ofattacks o n crawlers. 11le go\'· ernor, in a panic, authorized Colorado's whice: citizenry to kill hostile: Indians on sight. He: then accivared a regiment ofcroops under Colonel john M. Chivington, a Methodist minister. Ac dawn on November 29, Chivingcon's troops massacred a peaceful band of Indian~ induding terrified women and children, camped at Sand Creek. This massacre and others that foiiO'I'--ed rekindled public debate O'ler federal in· dian policy. in response, in 1867 Congress sent a peace: commission to end the: fight· ing and set aside: two large land rtserves, one north of Nebraska, the ocher south of Kansas. Behind the federal gowrnmenr's persuasion fay the: threat of lOree. Any Native Americans ~At.o re-fused to relocate, warned Commissioner of Indian Affairs EJy S. Parker, himself a Sencca Indian, "would be: ... treated as friendly or hostile as circumstances might juscify." At first the: plan appeared co ~A'Ork. Representatives of

Primary Source: Helen Hunt Jackson's Account ot Sand Creek

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384 sixty-eight thousand southern Kiowas, Comanches, Chey· ennes, and Arapahos signed che Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 and pledged co (j i,!'C on land in present-day Oklahoma. 11le following )'tat, scattered bands of Sioux, representing nearly fifty-four chousand northern l'lains Indians, sjgned

the: Fort Laramie Tftaty and agreed to ffi()IJ'C to reserva· rions in whac is now South Dakota in rerum for money and provisions. Indian dissatisfaction ~Aith che creacie:s ran deep. In Au· gust 1868, war parries of defiant Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Sioux raided frontier settlements in Kansas and Colorado, burning homes and killing whites. In retaliation, arm)' troops attacked Indians, C'\"Cn peaceful ones, ~Ailo refused confinement. That aurumn, lieutenant Colonel George: Annstrong Custer's raiding parry auacked a sleeping Cheyenne: village, killing more lhan one: hundred warri· ors. Other Cher~nnes and Arapahos "''ere pu.rs.ued, captured, and rctumed to resewations. JIEXICO In 1869, spurred on by Christian reformers, Congress established a Board of Indian Commissioncrs co refonn abuses on che reservations by Indian agencs.. But the new and inexperienced church-appointed Indian agents quickly Map 17.1 Mojor 1odian-Wiitt aaslles io 11M w.st encountered problems. As conditions on the resewations Although ~r reeo&".ized ;u sueh in the populo:~r decerioraced. Indians left in large numbers. Ocher agents press, the b.:ude:l- beCW\"C'n N:~ti~ Amc:ric;~.n5- ;~.nd were unable ro restrain scheming "''hites who fraudulend}' the U.S . Army on the Gl'\".:lt Pl:~ins ;unounted to:~ purchased reservation lands from the Indians. Frustrated m:~jor unded:ued W:~r. by the manipulation of Indian treaties and irritated b)• the ineptness ofche Indian agencs, Congress in 1871 abolis hed ftrt t.....ie Treaty A~ treaty making and replaced treaties "''ith execuri~ orders and acts of Congress. In ment tlut m~ thaugnds or the 1880~ the federal gm-crnmem ignored che churches' nominations for Indian Plait~$ l.ndiow.s to R'RI'Y.ltioos in agents and made its own appointments. Caught in the scicky v.-cb of an ambiguous South D.tkot.a in 1867 and decepti\OC federal policy, defiant Native Americans scruck back in the 1870s. On the southern Plains, Kiowa, Comanche, and Cheyenne raids in che 1t:xas Panhandle in 1874 set off the so-
l

Of all rhe acts of Indian resistance against che new reser· \'3Cion policy, none aroused more passion or caused more: llmi bloodshed than che batd es waged b)• the w~stern S ioux tribes in che Dakotas, Montana, and Wyoming. l 'he 18681'reaty of Fore laramie had sec aside the Great Sioux Rescrw "in perperuit}'." But not aU che Sioux bands had fought in che "''llror signed the tre-aty.

c.trs Last~

I

N.t.nVE AMEIUCA:>lSANO THE TltA~S·MISSISSIPPI WEST

In 18 73, skillful!)' playing local officials against che federal go\~rn m em, Chief Red C loud' s Oglala band and Chief Spotted Tail's Brule (BROO-fay) band won the concession of Sta)ing on their traditional lands. 10 protect their huming grounds, they raided encroaching non·lndian setclemenrs in Nebraska and W)'oming. imimi· dated federal agems, and harassed anyone who w:ncured onto their lands. Non-treaty Sioux fou nd a PO\l~rfulleader in the Lakota Sioux chief and hoi)' man Sjtting Bull. Broad·shouldcrcd and po~A'Crfully built, Sitting Bull led by ex· ample and had considerable 6ghting experience. In 1874, General William Tecumseh Sherman sent a force under Colonel Gt:orge Armstrong C uster into che Black Hills of South Dakota, near che western edge of the Grear Sioux Resen·e. Lean and mus· cachioed, the chircy·four·}'car·old Custer had been a celebrit}'Since his days as an im· petuous young Civil War officer. Custer's original mission was to extrace concessions from the Sioux. Bur when ne· gotiations broke do~A'tl in Novem ber 1875, Custer now sought to drive che Indians out ofthe Black Hills. In june 18 76, leading 600 troops of che Se\~nth Cavalry, Custer pro· reeded co the little Bighorn River area of present·da)' Montana, a hub of Indian resis· tancc. On the morning of june 25, underestimating the Indian enemy and unwisd )' dividing his force, Custer, ~Aich 209 men, recklessly advanced against a large compan)' of Chcyc:nne and Sioux warriors led by Chief Sitting Bull, who had encam ped along the Utcle Bighorn. Custer and his outnumbered troops u~re ~Aiped ouc. Americans reeled from this unexpected Indian victory. Newspaper columnists groped co assess the meaning of "Custer's last stand." Some questioned che wisdom ofcurrent federal policy toward the Indians. Ochers worried that an outraged public would demand retaliation. Most, hO""-\....,~r. endorsed che federal gM>crnment-'s decer· mination to quash the Native American rebellion. Defeac at lictle Bighorn made the ann}' more determined. In Montana, croops harassed various Sioux bands for more than 6w years, attacking Indian camps in the dead of winter and destroying all supplies. E\~n Sitting Bull, who had led his band to Canada to escape: the army, s urrendered in 1881 for lack ofprovis ions.1'heslaugh· ter of the: buffalo had wiped o ut his tribe's major food source. Similar measures 'A'l'fl' used elsewhere in the \'('est against Chie-f)oscph and his Nez ~rcCs of Oregon and against che: northern Cheyennes. Chief Dull Knife led the rem· nants of his t ribe norch to join rhe Sioux in September 1878. Bur the annycha.sed chem down and im prisoned them in Fort Robinson, Nebraska On a frigid nighc in j anuary 1879, Dull Knife: and his follo~A'crS shot t he: guards and broke for freedom. Soldiers 6red and gunned dO""-n half of them in the sno~A~ including women and children as well as Dull Knife him.sclf.lhcsc brutal tactics sapped the Indians' \Nill to resist.

A gro~A'ing number ofAmericans were outraged by the fed· era! go\~rn mem's flagrant violation of its Indian t reaties. The Women' s National Indian Rights Association, founded in 1883, and other groups took up che cause. HeJt:n Hunt Jackson of Colorado published A Ctntury• of Disbonor in 1881 co rally public opinion against che gM•ern· mcnt's record of broken treaty obligations. "It makes lictle d ifference ... where one opens t he: record of che his tor}' of the Indians,'" she 'A'fOte; ..C\>cry page and evcry )'~ar has its dark stain."'

Sittios Bdll

3 85

ludtr or the

Sioux •Wfion wbo •iptd out Gt0f'81" Al'm$Uong CuJitl'r'J ron:t <11: the littk Bigllom in 1876

lnteracti\•e Map: Major lndian·White Clashes in the West

"'5n1111" the Indians

HeleoH. . lodoHn Humm;. tllri.tn •·ho popuLuiud wrongs dont to JndianJ

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ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE 'nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

0 . - Senralty Ad ...,., inn'ode'd to "c:ivitiul' lndians

by distributing ui~ lands to

1indi~ab

18~00

To help Indians abandon hunting and nomadic life, refonners like jackson advocated the creation of Indian boarding schools. Richard Henry Pratt, a retired mili· tar}' officer, opened such a school in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1879. Pratt bdie\·ed that che Indians' customs and languages had halted cheir progress coward white dvilizacion. His motro therefore became "Kill che Indian and sa\'t: the man;'' Modeled after Carlisle, ocher Indian boarding schools taughc fanning, carpentry, dressmaking, and nursing. Despite the reformers' best efforcs, the actempt to scamp out In· dian identity in the boarding schools often backfired. Forming friendships ~A>ith Indians from man}' different tribes, boarding school scudents forged their own sense of Indian identity. In addition co their ad\'OCacyofboarding schools, well-intentioned humanitari· ans concluded chat the Indians' interests would be best sen·ed by breaking up the reservations and gradually incorporating individual Nam·e Americans inco main· stream society by giving them che rights of citizens. In short, they proposed co elimi· nate the "Indian problem" by eliminating the Indians as a culcurall)' distinct entity. Inspired b)•this vision, chey supported the Da\ll'tS Stveralty Act, passed in 1887. The Dawes Ace was designed co turn Indians into landowners and farmers. T he latA' emphasized sew.ralty, or the creatment of Indians as individuals rather chan as members of tribes, and called for the distribution of reservation land plots co each head of an Indian family ~A>ho accepted che fa~A"s provisions. The remaining reserva· tion lands (often the richest) were co be sold to speculators and seed ers, and che in· come thus obtained would go coward purchase of farm tools. After rwenty-6vc years, those Indians who had accepted allotments would also be declared citizens of the United States. The Dawes Ace pr~ co be a boon to speculators, who commonly evaded its safeguards and obcained che Indians' best land. By 1934, che act had slashed Indian acreage by 65 percent. Much of >A>hat remained in Indian hands was too dry and gravdl)' for farming. Although some Nath't: Americans who received land under the Dawes Act prospered enough co expand their holdings, countless others struggled just co su.rviiJ'C.. Alcoholism, a continuing problem exacerbated by che prevalence of whiskey as a crade item, became more prevalent as Nath't: Americans strove co adapt to the constraints of reservation life.

Living conditions for che Sioux worsened in the fate 1880s.

lbe QIOSI Dance and The federal gO'V\'.rnment reduced their meat rations andrelit End Ill Indian stricted huncing. When disease killed a chird of their catd e, lllslstlnce on tile they became desperate. 1'he Sioux curned to Wovoka. a CrNI Plllm. 1190

C1.ost Dance

Ritu..l that tht propbtt ~a promiSC"d would R'stOre JndianJ w control

I

of' thcitlaod.s

new visionary prophet popular among the Great Basin In· dians in Ne'o•ada Wovoka foresaw a cataStrophic C'\\':nt chat ~A
Wouodod Ko... Piot Ride• R""'Mtioo. Soatll Dai
rwo policem en pulled che chief from his cabin, a scuffle ensued, shots rang o ut, and Sitting Bull was morcallywounded. W...,..tdlo.. M~or 1"'0 ~Attks later, one of the bloodiest episodes of Indian-white strife on the thn:e hundrrd Indians by U.S. Plains occurred. On December 29, the: Seventh Ca\•alry was ro unding up 340 scan·· Atmy: last d upttr ofb.:tttk for Gn:atPiai.tl$ ing and freezing Sioux at Wounded Knu, South Dakota. when someone fired a gun.1'hesoldicrs recaliated wich cannon fire. Within minutes 300 Indians, including 7 infanrs, ..w.re slaughtered. Asche frozen corpses at Wounded Knee were: dumped into mass graves, a ~ncrarion of lndi an·~Ail in· conflict on the Great Plains shuddered co a d ose. lOt dc-Jtrnchon of the Grear PLlinJ Many NatiV\'Sdid cry co adapt co non-Indian ways, and some succeeded bufh.lo hcrdJ opened the w.:ay for fully. Goodbird, the son of Buffalo Bird Woman, became a Congregational the dutrua:ion of the- Pl.airu minister, a prosperous fanner, and a leader of the Hidatsa tribe. Others d id Indi.uu.. less ~A'CJI economically. Driven onto rc.servacions, many Plains Indians be:· Ttw- boatde for control of the- P l.ai ru came dependent on governmental support. By 1900, che Plains Indian p itted nom.:a.dic Indi.uu who rejected I"C'.SC'-1""\'.nion life .:ag.ainJt the U.S. population had shrunk from nearly a quarter·million to just 0\'\'.r a hun· Army. dred thousand. New~rthd ess, the population began co increase slowly after CuJter',; l..aJt Su.nd, in which lnd i· 1900. Against 0\'\'.r~Aildming odds, the pride, religious traditions, and cui· ;an$ "iped OUt 209 UV.:t.Jr)' UOOJM> cural identities ofche Plains Indians surviw~d all efforcs at eradication. infuri.ned Ameri.e.:.nJ .:and inc:rc:ued Ju pport fon•iolence .apinJt th e Unlike the nomadic u.-estem Sioux, the more seeded Navajos of the P l.ai ru tribes.. Southwest adjusted more: successfully to the reservation S}'Stem, prescrv· Ttw- 0.1'.\>l'J Act w ught to ''civilix.c,. ing traditional ways while incorporating elements of the new order. By P l.airu Ind i..:.nJ b)· diuolving trib.ll 1900, the Navajos had tripled their rescrvacion land, dramaticall}' in· bondJ .and distributin~ trib.lll..:.nds: creased their n umbers and chcir herds, and ca..-..-ed o ut for themselves a .among indi,•idu.al lnd •..:.nJ .and Jpecul..:.ron:. discinet place in Arizona and New Mexico. Ttw- m.uJ.acrc of 300 n..:.rving lndi· These excraordinary changes ~A'Cre forced o n che Indian population by .anJ oat Wounded Kn« Jign..:.kd t he' the ad\•anceof non·lndian setclement. In the name ofcivilization and prog· end of .armtd co nOin on the Gre.:.t ress, non · Indians in che generation after che Civil War pursued a course: P l.ai ru ;md t he end of Pl..:.inJ Jndi..m that im·ol\·ed a mixru.reof sincere: (if misguided) bene\-olcnce and outbursts cu lture.

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ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

18~00

of naked violence. Many white Americans felt toward the Indians only concempt, ha· tred, and greed for their land. Others vil!'"'~d them.seh~s as divinely chosen instru· menrs for uplifting and Christianiz.ing Naci\J'C peoples. Both groups, h~"f:'\~r. v.-ere blind co the value of Nath-e American life and traditions. And both ~A'cre unsuccessful in their attempts co shatter proud peoples and thcir ancient cultures.

SETTLING THE WEST WMt roles did tile (edM~Igovur~ment, tile anny$ and tile railroads play in tM settlement ofthe West? l 'he succcssr."f:' defeats ofche Native Americans opened a vast territor}' for set· dem ent. After 1870, railroad expansion made the trip from the East to Oregon and California faster and considerably easier than f:'\·er before. In che next chree decades, more land was parceled out imo farms than in the previous 250 }"f:'ars of Amer ican history combined, and agriculrural produccion doubled. l':tsscd in 1862, the Pacific Railroad Act authorized the construction of a new transcontinental link. The ace pro· vided grams of land and ocher subsidies to the railroads for each mile of track laid,. which made them the largest landholdct'S in the West. More chan an}' other factor, the expansion of these rail· roads accelerated the transfOrmation of everyday life wesc of the Mississippi. Building che railroad took backbre-aking \N'Ork. Searching for incxpensr.~ labor, the railroads turned to immigrants. 11le Cencral l':tci6c emplO}"f:'d Chinese workers to chip and blast rail bed out of solid rock in the Sierra Nevada. Nearly twelve thou· sand Chinese graded the roadbed while Irish, Mexican-American, and black workers put down che track. O n Ma}' 10, 1869, Americans celebrated che complecion of the 6rsc railroad spanning Norch America. As the cwo sets of tracks- the Union Paci6c-'s, stretching westward from Omaha, Nebraska, and the Central P:tci6c's, reaching eastward from Sacramento, California- met ac Promontor}' Poim, Utah, beaming officials drow in a final ceremonial golden spike. 1'he nacion's vast midsection was now far more ac· cessible than ic had e\·er been. The railroads quick!}' pro\·ed cheir usefulness. In che bactles against Nath~ American~ che army shipped horses and men 'A'es.t in the dead of winter co attack the Indians when chey were: most vulnerable. f rom che same crains, hunters gained quick access co the bison ranges and incre-ased their han-esc of che animals. Once Indian resistance had been broken, che railroads hastened the arrival of new setclers and prMided access for che shipment of cattle and grain to eastern urban markers. In short, the railroads accelerated che dcwJopmenc of the West.

The Flnt TranKontinental llllnlld

During the decade after the passage of che l':tcific Rail· road Act, Congress a~A'llrded che railroads 170 million acres, llllnlld worth 01/'er half a billion dollars. By 1893, Minnesota and Washington had also deeded to railroad companies a quarce:r of their state: lands. As

Sllllers and tile

I

SE11UNG THE WEST

389

0~' C A I~ A 0 A

MEXICO

•lh •

m-•

o.o.,-o o +-r+'__,__.c;,

Jc.,__..

Mi p Ill T,_ooti-1 R.lilroids ..d H
mighty LandO'I'-'ners, the railroads had a unique opportunity to shape sctdemem in the region- and co reap enormous profits (see Map 17.2). The railroads set up Land sales offices and sent agents co the Ease Coasc and Eu· rope to recruit seeders. l 'he land bureaus offered prospeccive buyers long· term loans and free transportation. Acknowledging that life on the Great l'lains could be !ond)', the promoters advised roung men to bring their wives (because «maidens are scan::r') and to emigrace as entire families and wich friends. The railroads also hdped bring nearl)' 2.2 million forcign·born settlers co the crans-Mississippi West betv.r'Cen 1870 and 1900. Some agems recruited ~Ailole villages of Germans and eascem Europeans to relocate to the North Dakota plains. The railroads influenced agriculture as wd l. To e nsure quick repayment of the money o\l.l't'd co them, che railroads urged new immigrants to spedalizr in cash crops- "Aileac on che northern Plains, corn in Iowa and Kansas, cotton and tobacco in Texas. Although chest: crops initially brought in high rewnues, many farm ers grew depend em on income from a singtc. crop and became vulnerable to flu ccuacing marker forces.

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Liberalized land laws were another f'O"''Crful magnet pull· ing sctd ers wcscward. l 'he Homestead Act passed in 1862 reflected the Republican party's belief that free land would enable the poor to achie\·e economic independence. Jc offered 160 acres of land co any individual who would pay a ten-dollar registration fee, live on the land for 6\>t: )'tat'S, and culti\•ate and improve it. HO'I'-'f.'\>t:r, the law did not function as Congress had envisioned. Unscrupulous speculators filed false daims fo r che choicest loca· tions, and railroads acquired huge landholdings. 1'he rcsulc was chac only one acre in every nine wem to the pioneers for whom it was intended. A second problem resulted from the 160-acre limit specified by the Homestead Act. On che rich soils of Iowa, a J60.ac:re farm was ample, buc in che drier areas "''est ofche hundredth meridian, a fanner needed more land. In 1873, to rectify this prob· lcm, Congress passed the l imber Culture Ace, which gave homesteaders an addi· tiona! 160 acres if chey planted trees on 40 acres. For scaces wich little rainfall,

TABLE f7. 1 1 T wE A FRICAN- A MERICAN AND 0-uNESE PoPULATIO N IN WESTERN STATES AND TERRITO RIES, 1880 - 1900

BtAO<s

STAlE OR TERRrTORV

Arizona TeiT. Califomia Colorado Idaho Kansas

CHINESE

ISS

1,846

1,630

1,419

6,018

11,045

75,132

45,753

2,435

8,570

612

599

53

293

3,379

1,46 7

43,107

52,003

19

39

Montana

346

1,523

1,765

1,739

Nebraska

2,385

6,269

18

180

488

134

5,416

1,352

1,015

1,610

57

341

Nevada New Mexico Terr. North Dakota

113

286

NA

32

Oklahoma Indian Terr.

NA

56,684•

NA

31

Oregon

487

1,105

9,510

10,397

288

465

NA

165

393,384

620,722

136

836

South Dakota Texas Utah

232

6 72

510

572

Washington

325

2,514

3,186

3,629

Swm: U.S. 8-oJil fJ(t flt C~'m~&S,'*f!O~~~lol!iuniritho U..iUdSI.oltts, 1790-WIS (Wuhing.ton, D.C.: U.S. GO\'t'mmtnt Prinlint; Offic:~ 1918), 43, 44; Miclwod Oor;an, "Popui;Uion St:~tistinofNint'kcntfa Century llndi;an Ttrritoty," Clcfrlrlidnfi(Okltsl!t.ll116 S3 No. 4 {'1\'intu 1975}, 501; ;and Jllt Tl'tlt&G!IIWJ, 188~ ~· tiorl, o~ndT-..d/lfiG>nwf, 1900, ~~~lol!iun {'IV;uhington, D.C.: U.S. Goo.trnment Printing Office, 1883 &1901). "Combined toul fOr lndi;an .;tncl Okl;ahom.o\ ttnitoricl.

I SrnuNG THE WEST

3 91

Congress enacted the Desert Lnnd Acr in 1877, which made 640 :acres available at SI.2S an acrl! on cond1tion t hat t he owner trrig.ne pan it wlrhin rhrtt )'· the: fidds.,. and pLun the 6n.r crop, t~ pionrrn pur in an ao.'Cragr: ofsuty~ght houn ofbKic.~tnak:mz work a wt"t-k. For bl:adcs •'ho cmigr.trtd from tht- South to Kanw.s and ocher paru of the Pt.aJns 2ftcr the Civil W.1r, p«judia compoundtd dv burdms of ~JUA:tng to a dlffnm1 h(c- (S« Clupttr 16). M.tny •'Omm fOund ad.aptabOn to PWns: (ronda bk !:Sp«i.tUy diffirok. At k-.ast inid.tlly, sonw wt:~ mch.mtnl by the Uncbapt.. But ru mott 'fttt smd by rhc'"hom'bk m'brs of Mo:squieoa-'" and the: crude sod huts dut Stt'Wd as tbrir early homt:s lxnusc of chc saroty o( drnbtr. One woman bunt mro run upon 6rsr .stt--

or

ing her n<W sod houw. l'h< I"""S bride ongrily lnfixm
lnteracti\oe Map: Settlement of the

Trans-Mississippi

w.s.. 1860-1890

farmc.rs on rhc J>lalns cook adv:t nrt~gr of adv:tnces in farm mcchan h:arlon :md t he d~lopm tnt of improved n uins ofwhcnr and corn co bocm pi'Oduction dramarically. Efficient steel plows; specially d ellign cd wheat pl:tnrcn;; a nd improved grain binders., threshers, and windmills all :t.II0"-\."<1 t he typical Qrenr l>laln.s fnnncr of rhe late nine· tccnrh ccnttJry to incrtasr: the b.nd's yfcJd tenfold. Barbed wire, patented in 1874, w.u nn othcr crucial inwmion rhat permitted farmers to keep roving livestock out of their cropJC. Hut i.:n dng t he lnnd touched off violent dashes between farmers :md cnrtlc l".lnchc.rs, who d rmanded the right to let t hc.ir herds roam freely until the roundup. Generally che f.11'11ltf'S won. Tht im'Cntion of l~r-~ving marhlncry t~rhe.r with increastd dem;md for wheat, milk, and other farm productJ cr~.atcd rhc impttSSion char f.:uming \l':lS en· tuing a period of unpv-.l.llded prospcnry. llut few fully undrrnood rht perils of pursuing agricuJtu" as alm:~hhood. F;accd with huge st.art·up cosrs and s ubstantial mong• poa.yment~ m;any fa.rrnc:n h.td co sp«i:ahze In 11 crop :such as wheat or corn that wouJd fetch high pncca. 11us apcc:t.thz.ulon made chrm dcpcndtnt on rhe rail· roads for shipping and put them at the mercy o( the lnrcrn;uional grain nurktt's shifting priers. High dmund could brin& prosperity, bur v.· hm world ovt:rproduction focud. gnam prices dawn, the havsty indd:Kcd gf'O\l'« W:cd ruin. Confronttd www.cengog~.com/binoty/b<Jy~r/~ndvringcondst:'~

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with these realities, many Plains farmers quickly abandoned che illusion of frontier independence and easy "''Calth. Unpredictable rainfall and weacher conditions furcher exacerbated homestead· ers' difficulties ....-esc of the hundredch meridian, where rainfall aV\'.raged less than tv.rcmy inches a year. Farmers in such places used specialized "dry farming"' tech· niques, built windmills, and div~rted creeks for irrigation. Buc t he onset of unusu· ally dry )'~ars in the 1870s, togcther wich grasshopper infescacions and t he major economic depression thac struck che United States betv.r'een 1873 and 1878 (see Chapter 16), made t he plight of some midwesterners desperate.

Despite che hardships, man}' remote farm settlements blossomed inro thriving communicies. Among the firs.t institutions to appear, churches and Sunday schools be· Slllb!IIOOd came humming centers of social activity as "-"ell as of wor· ship. Neighbors readily lent a hand roche farmer "'those barn had burned or whose famil}' was skk. Cooperacion was a practical necessity and a form of insurance in a rugged environment where e''tr}'One was vulnerable to instant misforrune or C'\o'tO disaster. When the population increased, local boosters lobbied co rurn che territory into a state. Kansas entered the Union in 1861, follo"''Cd by Nevada in 1864 and Nebraska in 1867. Colorado joined in 1876. Not unci! 1889 did Norch Dakota, South Oakoca, Montana, and Washington gain statehood. Wyoming and Idaho came into t he Union the foll~·ing }'c ar. Utah finally entered in 1896. With Oklahoma's admission in 1907 and Arizona's and New Mexico's in 1912, che process of creating permanent political institutions in the trans-Mississippi West was complete. Although generally socially conscrvacive, che new state gow:mments su pported "''Oman suffrage. As territories became states, pioneer women CHECKI NG I N batcled for the \'Ote. Success came firs.t in the Wyoming1trritory. "''here men The completion of the llr$t mm$· outnumbered "''Omen 6 ro I. l 'he tiny legislature enfranchised women in continenti! r;a_i)~d in 1869 opened 1869 in che hope that it would actracc women, families, and economic the Gre.n Pla.iru for white settlement. growth. The Utah 1Crritory foiiO"--ed in 1870. Nebraska in 1867 and Colo· R;ailro.ld comp;aniu encouuged the rado in 1876 permitted women to \'Ote in school elections. Alt hough these settlement o f the Pl.;ain$, recruiting su ccesses "''ere significant, by 1910 only four states-Idaho, W}•oming. Utah, settler~ ;and offering lo.lru ;and fTC"C' and Colorado- had granted "-'Omen full vocing rights. tt.uuport;ation.

Bulldlnta Society a.dAdlle¥1nc

The Home.ue.ld Act, offering fru l.;and ro people who would (.;arm it, lured ten$ a( thow;andJ of would·be settler~ to t he Pbin$. Horn.esle.llkr.s pc'-l'llt'A'rcd in the face ofJmh m.ljor obst:tdu ;u iJol.uion, drought, ;and the ptrils: of the com· me~i;al muket. T he Monnon$, per.sccuted dJC'whcrt; found .l home in the \V~ .lnd he-lped Ut;ah ;aeh ie'A' Jutehood in 1896. By 19J2 ill \\'C".Slern terrirorie':l h old been brought into t he Union ;a$ $tltu.

Persecuted in Illinois, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latcer~ay Saints, kn~·n as Mor· moo~ had mo\-ed co che Greac Salt Lake Valley in 1847. Led b}•Brigham Young, cheir prophet·presidenc, they soughc to create the independent councry ofDeserec. l 'heir faich emphasized self-suflidenc:y and commitment co family. In the next two decades, recruitment boosted their numbl't'S to more than 100,000. Increasing!}', chese Mormon commu· nitic.s conflicted with non-Mormons and wich the U.S. gm-ernment, which disapproved of the church's invoh.-ement in politics, its communal business practices, and its support of pol)-gamy.

Tile Spread of Mannonism

I

SOUTHWESTtRN BollOEIUANDS

3 93

The Monnons sought at 6rst to be economically indcpendcm. In 1869, chcydc\~lope:d their own railroad lines out ofSalt Lake City. But a series of federal acrs and

court dedsion~ starcing with t he: Morrill Anci-Bigamy Act in 1862, challenged the authority of their church and their pracciccof polygamy or plural marriage. In United

Statts v. Reynolds (1879), the Supreme Court declared plural marriages unlawfuL Then, in 1887, chc Edmunds-Tucker Act dissolved the church corporation and put irs properties and funds into recei..-ership (control by the courts). In response, in 1890 the church president publkl}•announced the official end of pol}'gatny. The church supported che applkacion for statehood (Utah), which was granted in 1896. Confiscated church properties were rerurncd, and jailed pol)-ga· mists ~A'Cre pardoned, bur the balance between sacred and secular had permanentl}' shifted. Mormon settlements ~A'Ou ld continue in the twentieth ccmur}' to d raw new mem bers and co influence dew~lopment in "-'eStern communicies.

E
I

l'
con6scarion ofMormon chun:h propc'rty lO pn'5$Utt it to W~ don prutiu of palypmy

SOUTHWESTERN BORDERLANDS 1-/ow did ranch.rrs t~nd satlers displt~ce Spanish-spet~king Americans in the Southwest? The treaty chat ended che Mexican-American War in 1848 ceded co che United States an immense territor}'• parr of which became lCxas, California, Arizona, and New Mexico. Ac the rime, Mexicans had controlled vast expanses of the Southwest. They had built their O'A'tl churches, had maintained large ranching operations, and had traded ~Aith the Indians. Although the United States had pledged to protect the liberty and propercy of Mexicans ~Ailo remained on American soil, m-er the next three decades American ranchers and settlers cook conrrol ofrhe territorial govern· ments and forced much of the Spanish-speaking population off the land. Mexicans who Sta)-ed in che region adapted to the new Anglo society with varying degrees of success. In 1Cxas, the struggle for independence from Mexico had left a legacy of bitter· ness and misunderstanding. After 1848, Texas cotton planters confiscated Mexican lands and began a racist cam paign char Labeled Mexicans as non~Ailite. Mexican bandies retaliated by raiding American communities. In 1859, a Mexican rancher named Juan Cortina attacked t he border communityofBrownsville, 1t:xas. He continued to harass the U.S. anny for years until the Mexican gm·emmem, fearing a U.S. im•asion, imprisoned him in 1875. Mexican-Americans in California in rhe 1850s and 1860s faced similar pressures. A C)'Cie of flood and drought, together with a slumping cattle industry, had ruined many of che large southern California ranches O~A'tled b}• the californior, Spanis hspeaking descendants of che original Spanis h sctders. The collapse of rhe ranch econom}' forced many of them co retreat into segregated urban neighborhoods called barrios. Maintaining a tenacious hold on chcir traditions, man}' Spanish-speaking people in Santa Barbara and other towns surviw~d by working as day laborers. In California, che pattern 'A'llS similar. At 6rst, the number of new "Anglos" was small. As che number of ~Athites increased, they idemi6ed minority racial, cultural, and language differences as ma.rks of inferiority. White state legislators passed laws www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf, 18~00

Santa Ft Pliza. Ntw Mtxico, io lilt 1180S,IIy fBII
that made O~A'tlership of property difficult for non·Anglos. Relegated co a migracory labor force, non ·Anglos ~A'Cre tagged as shiftless and irresponsible. Yet chcir labor made possible increased prosperity for the fanners, railroads, and households that hired them. The cultural adaptation of Spanish·speaking Americans to Anglo society ini· tially unfolded more smoothly in Arizona and New Mexico, where Spanish setd e:· mc:m had been sparse, and a small d ass of wealthy Mexican land~'ners had long dominated a poor, illiterate peasantry. Morco\-er, since che 1820s, ~A'CII ·to·do Me:xi· cans in Tucson, Arizona, had educated their children in the United States and had fo nne:d trading partnerships and business alliances with Americans. WIIitt Caps Mcxiun.Amt:ric.m Such examples of successful cooperation between Hispanic and white Amc:ri· vigilante group in ooftbcom cans helped moderate American sctde:rs' antagonistic attirudes. So, too, did the work New Mmco tbu proa-.strd tbco mcklsut"C orgr.u:ing LtndJ of popular writers like Helen Hunc j ackson. By sentimentalizing lhe gracious colo· nial Spanish pasc,jackson increased public sympathy for Spanish·speaking Americans. jackson's 1884 romance &mo~ a tale of che doomed IM'l' of a Hispanicized mixed·blood (Jrish ·lndian) ~Ac,t\liC'C'n m'e N·hdmc:d by che onrushing tide: of Anglo civilization, was enormous!}' Angltu: ;~nd MtxiC and railroad workers.

I

I

EXPt.OtnKG THE WlistEIIH I.Af(OSCA.PE

3 95

Violence and discrimination against Spanish-speaking citi.zcns of rhe: South ~A'eSt escalated in the 1890s, a time of rising racism in the United States. Rioters in Beeville and Laredo, Tex~ in 1894 and 1899 attacked and beat up Mexican-Americans. Whites increasing!)' labeled Mexican-Americans as violent and lazy. For Spanish· speaking citizens, the battle for fair treatment and respect would continue into the twentieth century

ExPLOITING THE WESTERN lANDSCAPE

I

1-/ow did mining, ranching. and farming shape the Wsst?

The displace:menc of Mexican-American and Native peoples from their lands opened che wa}' for the exploitation of the narural environment in the trans· Mississippi \'('est. White boosters had long promoted the region as a land of bound· less opponuniry. Betv.r'Ce:n 1860 and 1900, a generation ofAmericans soughc to scrike it rich by joining the: ranks of m in~ ranch~ and farmers intenc on making a for· tune. Some succeeded; but others W'Cnc bankrupt or barely survived. Of aUthe groups thac surged into the nation's midcontinent in the: late nineteenth century, none had to revise thcir e:xpeccacions more radicall)' than the: speculators and adwnru.rers looking for quick fonunes.

In the half-ce:ntUr}' that began with the California gold rush in 1849, a series of mining booms swepc from the Southwest northward into Canada and Alaska. In 1853, a )'tar after gold 'A'llS discovered in California's Sierra Ne\•ada, pro.speccor Henry Com· stock scumbled on che rich Comstock Lode along Nevada's Carson RiV\'.r. later in the same: decade, prospectors unco\-e:red deep vcins of gold and siiV\'.r near present· day Denvcr. OV\'.r che next 6\'t decades, gold was d iscovered in idaho, Montana, Wyo· ming. South Oakoca, and, in 1896, in the Canadian Klondike. By 1900 more than a billion dollars' worth of gold had been mined in California alone:. The early discoveries of ..placer'' gold, panned from streams, attracted a )'Oung male population chirsting for W'Calth and reinforced the: myth of mining country as "a poor man's paradise." In contrast to che Great Plains, where: ethnic groups re· creaced cheir own ethnic enclaves, "~stcrn mining camps became: ethnic melcing pots. In che California census of 1860, more than thirt)'·three: thousand Irish and thircy·four thousand Chinese had staked out early claims. Alchough a few prospectors became fabulously wealthy, the: experience: of Henry Comscock, who sold out one: claim for eleven thousand dollars and anoche:r for two mules, was more typical. Because che: larger gold and siio.-e:r deposits Ia)' embedded in \'tins of quaru: deep within the earch, extracting chem required huge irr..-e:stments in workers and expensh-e: equipment. No sooner had the major disco\-e:ries been made, therefore, than large mining companies backed by easce:rn or British capital bought them ouc and rook chem m~r. life in the: new mining tO'A'tlS was vibrant but unpredictable. During the hC)'-d3)' of the Comstock Lode in the 1860s and 1870s, Virginia Ciry, Nevada,. erupted in an

lnteracti\•e Map: Natural Resources and the Oew~pment of the West

Tile Millilg Frontier

(..modi; bde Pabu.lou.sly rich JiiVI':f d,is((M";fy tlu:t oprntd mining bonanu io We-st

I

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OfAPlER 17

ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE 'nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

18~00

orgy of speculation and building. Men outnumbered women three to one. Money quickly earned was even more rapid!)' lost. The gold rush mania also spurred the growth of settlement in Alaska Small strikes "-\!remade there in 1869, two rears after che United States had purchased the territory from Russia Buc ic 'A'llS the discO\'· cry ofgold in the Canadian Klondike in 1897 that broughc thousands of prospectors into che area and cvcncuall)' enabled Alaska to establish its own territorial g()I.!'Crn· menc in 1912. Word of new ore deposits like the ones in Alaska lured transienc populations sali\•acing co get rich. Miners who worked d«p within che earth fo r large corpora· tions typically earned abouc $2,000 a year at a time when teachers made $450 co $650 and domestic help $250 co $350. But most prospectors at best earned only enough to go else'""hetc, perhaps bU)' some land, and cry again. l'rogress came at a price. The long-term cost to the environment co extract these: metals was high. Hydraulic mining turned creeks brown, and flushed millions of tons of silt into valleys. lhe scarred landscape chat remained was littered with rock and gr:wel lilled wich traces of mercury and C)'llnide, and nothing would grow on it. Smelters spewed dense smoke containing lead, arsenic, and other carcinogenic chemicals on those who lived nearbr. l 'he destruction to che environment is sciU evidenc today.

utll. mw.es

MillionJ of bt..d olQttk mcn'ed from Texas gr.u:ing lands eo the n.iltoad tr:rmin.W in K.uu;,u in tht

18705 ;and 1880J

Like the few~rish expansion of the mining froncier during the 1860s and 1870s, open-range catcle ranching boomed in these same decades. In chis case, asrute businessm en and railroad entrepreneurs, eager to fund their new im-estments in miles of crack, promoted cattle herding as the new route co fame and forcune. The co~Abo)•, once scorned as a ne'er-do-well and drifter, 'A'llS now glorified as a man of rough-hewn in· tcgrity and self-reliant strength. In 1868, joseph G. McCoy, a )'Oung catcle dealer from Springlidd, Illinois, shrewdly transformed the catcle industry into a new mone}'·maker. With the forced relocation of the l'lains Indians onto resen•ations and the extension of the railroads into Kan~ McCO)' realized that cattle dealers could no"'' amass enormous forrunes b)' raising steers cheaply in Texas and bringing them north for shipment co eastern 01ban markets. McCoy built a new stockyard in Abilene, Kansas. 10 make the 0\'erland catcle drives from 1t:xas co Abilene easjer, McCO)' also helped su.-..\.1' and shorten the Chisholm Trail in Kansas. Ac che end of his first year in business, chirty-6:...-e thousand steers were sold in Abilene; the follo~A'ing )"ear the number more than doubled. The greac cattle drJves of the 1860s and 1870s rurned inco a bonanza for herd owners. Steers purchased in Texas at nine dollars a head could be sold in Abilene for tv.r'Cnty-eight dollars. But the cattlemen, like che grain grO"-oers farther north on the Great Plains, li\·ed at the mercy of high imeresc rates and an unstable ma.rket. During the finan cial panic of 1873, catcle dro•..-ers feUimo bankruptcy b)' the hundreds. Little of the money made b)' che largMCale cattle ranchers found its "''ll}' into the pockets of the cowboys themselves. The typical CO'A'Puncherendured long hours, low pa)', and hazardous work, all for a mere: thirty dollars a month, abouc the same as common laborers. They also braved che gangs of catcle thiC\o-es-most nombl)'

I EXPt.Otn KG THE WlistEIIH I.Af(OSCA.PE

3 97

William H. Bonney, better knO'I'-'n as Billy t he Kid-that operated along che crails. Most cowboys were men in their teens and cwmties who worked for a rear or two and then pursued d ifferent lii,!'Ciihoods. Of the: escimated 35,000 to 55,000 mm who rode the trails in these years, ncarl}' one--6fth were black or Mexican. Ba.rred b)•discrimina· cion fro m many other trades, blacks enjoyed the freedom of Life on the: trail. The cattle bonanza, which peaked betv..-een 1880 and 1885, produced more chan 4.5 million head of cactle fur eastern mMke:ts. l"rices began to sag as early as 1882, however, and many ranchers plunged heavil}' into debt. In 1885 and 1886, cwo of t he coldest winters o n rt~cord combined with s ummer droughts and 1 t xas fever co de:· st rO}' nearly 90 percent of the cattle in some regions, pushing chousands of ranchers into bankruptcy. l 'he cactle indust r}' lived o n, but railroad expansion brought t he days of che open range and the: great cattle drives co an end.

One: legacy of che catd e: boom '-''llS the: gro~A'th of cities like Abilene, Kansas, which shipped steers co Chicago and Pnstllules eastern markecs. like other catcle: towns, Abilene went through an early period of violence that sa~A' co~Abo)'S pulling dO'I'-·n t he walls of t he jail as it 'A'llS being built. But che cown quickly established a police: force to maintain law and order. City ordinances-enforced by t he legendary tO'I'-·n marshal james B. "Wild Bill" Hickok- forbade carrying firearms and regulated saloon~ gambling. and prostitution. Transient, unrul}' types certainly gai,!'C a disrincciw flavor to cattle tO'I'--ns like Abilene:, Wichita, and Dodge City, but the Olo'Crall homicide rates t here " 'e re not unusuall}' high. lfcactle towns 'A'et'e neither as violent nor as la~Atfess as legmd wo uld have it, they did s till experimce a lively business in prosticution. Gi..-en che large numbers of un· artached young men and n umerous saloons, prosticution th ri ~d. Some became prostitutes as an escape: from domestic violence or because of economic hards hip. Others, like che Chinese, ~A'ere fo n::e:d into the crade:. But whate\-e:r the reasons for en· cering the business, proscirutes risked venereal disease, physical abuse, and drug and alcohol addiction. As western towns became more scrcle:d, che: numbers of women in other occupations increased.

Clllle Townsand

The enthus iasm chat permeated mining and ranching in the 1870s and 1880s also percolated inco agriculcure. Like rhe gold rushes and cattle bonanzas, the: wheat boom in the Dakota 1trritory started small buc rapidly artracced large capital investments thac produced the nation's 6rsr agribusincs.ses. The boom began during rhe Panic of 1873, when the: failure of n umerous banks caused the price of Northern l:taci6c Railroad bonds to plummet. The railroad re· sponded by exchanging land for its de:pre
lonlnD Farms

PMwy Source: Bonanza Farming and Its Impact

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18~00

equipment. On the Cass-Chency-Oalr)mple farm near Fargo, Norch Dakota, fifty o r sjxty plo"''S ru mbled across the flat landscape o n a typical spring da}'· Cass's firs.t hatVI.'.sc earned a huge pro fit. The publicity generated by the tremendous success of a few large: investors. like: Cass and Oliver Dalrymple: led co an unprecedented wheat boom. North Dakota's population tripled in t he J880s, and wheat produccion sk}'· rocketed. Buc che: profits soon evaporated. By 1890, some Red River \'alley farmers were des.ticuce:. The "'ileac boom collapsed for a variety of reasons. 0\·crproduction, high im-est· menc costs, coo litcle: or too much rain, excessive reliance on one c rop, and d epressed grain prices on the: international market aU u ndercut fanners' earnings. Large-scale: farmcrs who had im-ested in hopes of getting rich fult luck}' just co suf\•i\-e. Large-scale farms proved mo.st successful in California's Central Vallt:}'· Using canals and ocher irrigation systems to water their crops, farmers "''Crc growing higher-priced specialty crops and had created new cooperatiw marke:cing associations for cherries, apricots, grapes, and oranges by the: mid·l880s. Led by t he Californ ia Citrus Gro\.1/Crs' Association, which used the "Sunkist"' t rademark fo r chcir oranges, large-scale agribusincsses in California were shipping a variety of fruits and vegetables in refrigerated crain cars to midW'Csce:rn and eastern marke:cs by 1900.

As farmers in the: Dakotas and Minnesota endured hard times, "''Ould-be: homesteaders greedily eyed t he Indian lusb,IIH Territory, as prcsent-da}' Oklaho ma "''lls chen knO'I'-'n. The: federal government, considering much of this Land virtually "A'Orthl es~ had resen-ed it for the Five Civilized Tribes sjnce the 1830s. Because: chesc tribes (excepc for some Cherokees) had sided wich che Confederacy during the Civil War, Washington had pu nished them by seeding chousands of Indians from other cribes on lands in the u.~ste m pare of the territory. Citing this past betrayal, non-Indians in che 1880s d emanded more land.

The Oldllloma Land

Mop Ill The Ok,.kom Land RUlli. 1889-1906 Unds in Okl Miom:~ not settled by ~sooners" ""'re sold by lo tteries, a llotmen ts, :~t~d sealed·bid :~uaions. 6y 1907, th-e m:~jo r l'e$etV:Itions 1-.:~d ~en broken up, :~nd uch N:~ti\<e Arneric:~n h rnily h:~d ~en gi\1\"cn .11 srn:~.ll f:.rm .

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In 1889, o ..-er the Native Americans' protests, Congress cransfcrred co the federally owned public domain nearly 2 million acres in the central pare of the O klahoma 1Crritory that had not been s.peci6cally ass.jgned co any Indian tribe. Ac noon o n April22, 1889, thousands. of men, v.'Omen, and children in buggies and "''llgons stampeded inco the new lands to slake out homesteads. (Other sctders, the so-called Soon~ had illegally arrived earlier and v.~re: altcad}' plo"'ing che fields.) Nine weeks. Iacer, six thousand homestead daims had been filed. In the next decade, the Dawes Severalty Ace broke up the Indian rescn•ations into individual allotments and opened the surplus co non-Indian sctdement (see Map J7.3).1'he Curds Actin 1898 dis.solw:d the Indian Territory and abolished tribal gMwnments. The Oklahoma land rush demonstrated the continuing pov.~r of the frontier myth, ......tlich tied ..free" land to tbe ideal of economic opportunity. Still, v.ithin two generations a combination of exploitative farming, poor land management, and sporadic drought "''Ould place Oklahoma at the desolate center of what in the 1930s would be called che dust bov.·l (see Chapter 24).

M ining boonu p«iodiully tl.lred in the' Wt.sl, producing a baom--and· bust qdC' that ~nri ehC'd a feY~.

The' fabled C'r.:l or the' g~at catde' d~,: b$tC'd a

sc.lm c:wenty)'C'.lr~.

11W' I"C'.ll·lifC' lmv par ;md haurdouJ wolio: ofCO'>\·bo)'ll and the" $C'tdC'd mo norony o f cow town,: w~~ m uch 16.' exciting cha n the' fictionaliud and rom.lnticiud \~Dion. Whe.lt f.lrming be'c.lmC' "ag r ibus:i· nUl• in North DaJ.:oQ, but Y.'l."-athtr and mukC't w~u d eflate-d th~ baom in f.lCWf)' fannJ.

The' Okla ham.ll:..nd nuh, in which homc,:tcackr~ Jt:.kC'd dainu w 2 m illion oM!\":I affl'l'C' land, t pitomixC'd the' pown or the" £Ton tier myth.

TH E WEST OF LIFE AND LEGEND l-/ow\to\1s the Wild West image ofcowboys and Indians cnated, and what tk~~elopmen ts prompted the Bstablishment ofMtional parks? In 1893, a young \'trlSco ns.in historian, Frederick j ackson Turner, deli..-ered a lecture entitled ..The Significance of the Frontier in American History." «(T)he fron· tier has gone," declared 1Urner, ..and wich its going has dosed the 6rs.t period of American history." Although Turner•s. assertion that the frontier was dosed was based on a Census Bureau announcement, it was inaccurate (more western land would be settled in the N'Cfltieth ce:ntUr}' than in the nineteenth). But his linking of economic opporrunitywith the transformation of the crans-Mississippi West caught the popular imagination and Launched a new school of historical inquiry inco the effects of the frontier on U.S. history. Scholars now recognize chat many parts of 1\Jrner·s «frontier thesi~" pa.nicularly its ethnocentric omission of Nati..-e Americans' d aims to che land, were in· accur:ue. Yet his idealized view of the Wesc did refl ect ideas popular among his contemporaries in the 1890s. A legendary Wesc had taken deep root in the American imagination. In the nineteenth cemur}', this m)'thic West was a produce of nM>els., song~ and paincings. In the twentieth cenrury, it would be perpetuated by movies, radio programs, and television shows. The legend merirs attention, for its t:\'Oiution is fasci nating and its influence has been far-re-aching.

I

Cwtis Ad DiJISOhd the lndi:.n lfnitory and abolished ui!Nl JO'"mtnc'nt5 in 1898

Mid-nincteenth-cenrury writers, presented the frontiersman as a kind of mythic American Adam- simple, vircuIMIIbe DIM-Novel ous, and innocent-untainted by a corrupt social order. Hero For example, at the end of Mark 1Wain 's Huddtbt-rry Finn, Huck rej«ts theconstraints.of settled society as represented by Aunt Sail}•and heads W'CSt with the declaration, "'I reckon I got to lighc out for the territor}' ahead of the

Tilt American Adam

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..IW'_il.

Wl!st Show Wii!Um F. "Bu:ffillo Silf" Cody's atl41\'a· pnt Wtsttm-thtmtd tl'llYI'ting

rest, because Aunc Sally she's going to adopt me and sivilize me, and I can' t stand it. I been there before." In chis version of the legend, the West is a place: ofadvenw.re, romance:, or contemplation where o ne can escape from society and irs pressures. But C'\-en as this conception of the myth was being populariud, another po"''Cr· ful theme had emerged as well. The authors of the dime no\·els of che 1860s and 1870s offered che image of the western frontiersman as a new masculine ideal, the tough guy who fights for truth and honor. l n Buffalo Bill: King ofthe Bordtr Mtn ( 1869), a dime nowJ loosely based on real-life William F. «Buffalo Bill" Cody, Edward j udson (pen-named Ned Bundine) created an idealized hero who is a powerful moral force: as he dri.,.es off treachero us Indians and rounds up villain ous cattle rustlers. Cody himself, pla}ing upon the public fascination "'ith co"'bo}'S, organized his o"''tl Wild West Show in J883. 1n the show, which toured the Ease Coast and Europe, c()'ll,·boys engaged in mock battles with Indians, reinforcing che dime--now: I image of the \l1esc as an arena of moral encounter where virtue al"''llfS triumphed.

Eastern writers and artists eagerl}' embraced boch \'t:rsions of the myth- the West as a place of escape from sodety Fnl!ller Legend and che West as a stage o n which che moral conflicts con· fronting society "''ere played out. Three )'OUng members of the eastern establish· menc, Theodore RoosC'\-elc, Frederic Remington, and Owen Wister, spent much cime in che West in the 1 880~ and each was intensely affected by the ad\·enturc. Each man found precisely what he was looking for. The frontier that Roos...--vclt glori6ed in such books as i1tt U1.nning oftlx Wi>st (four \'Oium~ 1889- 1896), and chat Remington porcra)-ed in his statues and painrin&S> was a starl;, physjcal and moral e:n· \ironment chat stripped away all social artifice and reseed each individual's character. Roos...--vcltand Remington exalted the disappearing frontier as the proving ground for a new kind of .,;rile manhood and the last outpost of an honest and true social order. This \'t:rsion of the frontier myth reached its apogee in 0-.wn \t'isu•r's enor· mously popular nm-el Tlw Vitginidn (1902). In Wister's rate, the environment of the Great Plains produces individuals like his unnamed co'Abo}' hero, «the Virginian." The Virginian is one of nature's aristocrats-ill-educated and unsophisticated but tough, steady, and deeply moral. The Virginian sums up his own moral code in de· scribing his view of God's justice:: «He pla)'S a square game with us."' For Wister, as for Roosevelt and Re-mington, che cowboy was the Christian knight on the Plains, indifferent to material gain as he upheld \irtue, pursu ed justice, and attacked eviL Needless to say, the "'~see m mych was far removed from che reality of the West. The idealiud ..-ersion of the West also glossed m-er the darker underside of frontier expansion- the hard physical labor of the cattle range, che forced remO\'lll of the In· dians to resen•ations, the radst discrimination against Mexican-Americans and black~ and che boom-and-bust mentality rooted in the selfish exploitation of natu· rat resources. Further, the myth obscured the complex links between the sctdemem of the frontier and lhe emergence of the United States as a major industrialized nation increasing!)' tied co a global econom)'. Eastern and foreign capitalists controlled large-scale mining. cattle, and agricultural operations in the West. Without the railroad- the brainchild of "''Cll·financed im-e:mors, not rough-and-tumble cowboysthe transfo nnation of the West would haw been far slower.

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I ThtWUtOFUFEN>:OUGilliO

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Cnlld ca.yoo of Yollowstoot,

by ThoiiWIS Morin Dnxled by the monument~ be.:autyofthe scene, p;aintel'5 suovt' to portr:~y the wester n l;andu;~pe ;u one o f God's wonders.. In the p~en-, they nim ul;ated ;t new popul;ar int~st i:n prnei'Ying the speet;aeul;ar 1\o;~~wrn of the !;and.

Despite: its one--sided and idealized vision, 0"'-e:n Wister's celebration ofche ~A'estern experience reinforced a growing recognition chac many unique fcarure:s of che western landscape were being threatened by 0\'Creager entrepreneurs. One important b)'· produce of che western legend 'A'llS a surge of public supporc for creating national parks and che: beginning of an organized consen•ation mM'fflle:m. Those who wem west in che 1860s and J870s to map the rugged terrain of the High Plains and the Rocky Mountains were often awed by the natural beauty of the landscape:. Major John Wesley Po\11-eJl, the one-armed veteran of the Civil War who charted the: Colorado River through the: Grand Canyon in 1869, waxed euphoric about irs tO"--e:ring rock formations and po....-erful cataracts. ..On coming nearer,"' he: wroce:, «we find fountains bursting from the rock, high O\'crllcad, and the spray in the sunshine forms the gems ~Ailich bedeck the way." In his important scudy, Rl!port on rbt Lands oftbt Arid Rrgions of~ United SltiU'f ( 1878), JlO'I'-~11 called for public M~<'n· ership and governmental conrrol of watersheds, irrigation, and public lands, a request that went Largely unheeded. Around che time Po....-ell 'A'llS educating Congress about the arid nature of che far West, a group of adi,!'Cncurers led by General Henry D. Washburn visited the hoc springs and ~"'fSCt'S ncar the: Yellowstone Ri.,.er in norch~A'CStern W)'oming and east· ern Montana. Ow~rwhelme:d by the: view, the: Washburn explorers abandoned their plan to daim the: area for che Norchern Pacific Railroad and instead petitioned Congress to protect it from se:rtlcment, occupancy, and sale. Congress responded in IBn by creating Yellowstone: National Park to "-provide: for che preseJVation ... for all time, (of) mineral deposits, narural curiosities, or wonders within said park ... in their natural condition." In doing so, they excluded the Native Americans who had long considered the area a prime hunting range. These: 6rs.t steps co conscn~ a few of the: West's unique natural sites reflected the beginning of a changed awareness of the: environment. In his influcnrial study Man etnd Nettun in 1864, George: Perkins Marsh, an a.rchicect and politician from

llelinlllng 1 Nillional Plrlls Movement

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Attbittc:c ;and politidiw. from Vermont •flo d!aDmgtd the

ootion thu natuoe oi!.trd merl'-ly tobeuploiml

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40 2

OfAPlER 17

ThE nAA'SFOIUMOOHOF THE nAif:S·MISSISSI.PPI WUf,

18~00

Vermont, had attacked che view that nature existed to be tamed and conquered. "Man," he "''rote, .,is everywhere a disturbing agent. Wheri!VI.'.r he plants his foo t, t he hannonies o f nature arc turned to discords." Marsh' s plea fo r conservation found its mosc eloquent su pport in che wo rk of J.t.. Mllir Conservationist john Muir, a Scottish immigranc who had grown up in Wisconsin. 1 tmporaril)' who pbyrd a mo~.p, role- in blinded by an accident, Muir left for San f rancisco in 1869 and quickly feU in lo\>t: wildemt.u pn'RI'Y.ltioo with the redwood forests. fo r the next fo rty )>t:ars, he tramped chc rugged mountains of chc \l1est and campaigned for t heir prescJVation. A romantic at heart, he r eamed to experience che wilderness at its mosc elemcm ai!C"".·el. Once t rekking high in t he Rockies during a summer storm, he d imbed t he tallest pine he could CHECKI NG I N fi nd and swayed back and forth in the raging "'1nd. Hi$tori~n flnoderid:J.ld:Jon Turntr Muir became che lace ninct«nth n~ntUr)"S most aniculate publicist fo r link«! t he frontitr ro uonomic wilderness protection . .,Climb che mountains and get chcir good tidings," he opportun ity bur ig:nor«< the land'J advised dty·dwdlers. .,Nature's peace will flow into yo u as the sunshine inco n~tiw O«Up.ln u. t he trees;'' Muir's spiri ted campaign co protect che "'1lderness contributed strongly to the establishmcnc of Yosemite National l':lrk in 1890. 1\l-o )>t:ars ....infon-ed the mrth of th e \l't't iU .l mor.ll .l.rtn~ whtre virtue' alw~-,: later, t he Sierra Club, an organization c reated to encourage the enjoyment ttiump htd. and proteccion of t he wilderness in che mountain regions of t he l':lcific \l'ritt rJ likt lntod oft' ltoo$t'\'l'lt and coast, made Muir its first president. Owt n \Vi$tt r tultt d tht t owboy .u Ironically. desp ite t he crusades of Muir, l'ml>t:ll, and Marsh to educate .l Christi~n knigh t on a pim o pony. t he public about conscn •ation, t he campaign for wilderness prescn •ation re· John WeJky 1~11 1«1 t ht war in affirmed t he image of the West as a unique region whose magnificent landntoUing t he "''*"tern Un~pc-, ~i le Jtll'$$ing tht need to ton$1'.-vr scape produced tough individuals of su perior ability. Overlooking t he senseless violence and ruthless exploitation o f t he land, contempotary"A'fi t· John Muir pby~d a major mit in ers proclaimed that che scctlement of t he final frontier marked a new stage t ncour.lging pll'$C'Iv.ltion o r t he' in t he histor}' of civilization, and chey kept alh>t: t he legend o f the "''CStern V.\"$tC'-m v.i kl«neJll ~nd t ht eu :n ion of national puk$. frontier as a seedbed of American virrues.

I

Chapter Su 0 0\YNI.OAO THE MPJ AV Of O A LE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D LISTeN TO IT ON THE GO.

How was Indian life on the Great Plains transformed in the second halfof the nineteenth cent~ry? (p<1ge 380)

I

Aftet the Ch•il \'t'ar, t he Great J>Jains became a battleground bcrn\_-en che nomadic Plains Indians and the U.S. Anny. The destruction of the buff.tlo hetds on which t hey depended for subsistence opened t he way for the destruction of t he Jndians. Wd l·inrentioned Americans tried to ,.,civiliu ,. the Indians t hrough measures such as che Dawes Act, but it was the mass.acre at Wounded Knee that finally macked t he end of conflict on t he J>Jains.

KEY TERMS

Plains ~d ians {p. 382} William F."Buffao Bill" Cody {p. J82} Fort laram~ !reilly {p. 384} Silting Bul {p. 385} Helen Hunl Jacksoo {p. 385} Oawos Severalty N:t (p. 386} Ghost Oaru:e {p. 386}

CHAPTER SUMMAAY

What roles did the federal go,.rnment, the army, and the railroads play in the seWement ofthe West? (page 388)

I

Aided by federal subsidies and che protection of the U.S. Army, the transcon· cinental railroad was completed in 1869. The tailroad companies actiW-1}' recruitro settlers. Homesteaders faced obstacles they had not foresoen- isolarion, drought, che perils of che commctdal agricultural market- but many pcrsew:~'Cd. The Mormons. persecuted elsewhere, found a home in che West and helped Utah achil!\'c statehood in 1896. B}' 1912 all of the W\'Stem lands had been brought into the Union.

How did ranchers and settlers displace Spanish-speaking Americans in the Southwest? (pof!' 393)

I

In California and 1Cus chere were frequent dashes between Anglo and Mu:i· can populations as the Mexicans gradually lost control of their lands; many

403

KEY TEflMS cOf'ltin ued

Wo111ded Kn,. (p. JUl)

Edmunds-Tuckor Art (p. 393) Whit• caps (p. 394) Comllod< lodo (p. 395) cattlo dlil.s (p. 396) CUrtis Art (p. 399)

Wild Wost Show(p. 400) ()mn Wister (p. 400) lohn \\~!loy Po\\011 (p. 401) Yollows!Dno National l\lft (p. 401) GI!OQio Perkins Marsh (p. 401) lohn Muir (p. 402)

Spanish-speakers ended up in utban barrios. In New Mexico and Arizona, adaptation went somc"'tflat more smoothly. :Nonetheless, Mexicans gradually lost status, and most became labours.

I

How did mining, rand!ing, and (armingshope the West? (page 395)

All three of chese sectors of the economy t:njO)'l'd periodic booms in the West, from the Comstock l ode to the great cattle driw:s to the bonanza wheat furms of :North Dakota. Howevrr., these booms often led to busts, and they did serious harm to the environment

How was the Wild West imor; ofcowboys and Indians created, and what de~>elopments prompted the establishment ofnational parks? (paf!' 399)

I

Dime novels and Wild West shows reinforced the idea of the West as a mom! arena in which good triumphed; Theodore Rooseve.lt, Owen Wister, and other writers portrayed the co~·boy as a heroic figure. john Wesley Powell and j ohn Muir J'O"'Wfuli}' described the western landscape and urged its consetVarion, leading to the creation of a national park system.

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CHAPTER 18

1865-1900

CHAPTER PREVIEW

-

The Rise ol Corparate America How did Urn~. Rorkt{tlkr. om! othtroorporote leodm tonsolrdott conr.ro/ 01~r rlteir indu.wies?

-

Slimulatlng Economic Grow1h Who! lnntMrtitms in t«ltnology 1md business df'OtY ittaN11S in llfduuriol prodiKtion after 1865?

The flow South

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n October 21, 1892, before t\\o-o hundred thous.md o nlooke:rs, prts· 'tdcnt~ c.wdid.ue Gf'OII'e:r Cleve.Und proudly opr.ncd rhc World•s Columbian Exposition m Chicago. "t'lv Chicago lllo'Odd's f.Ur nopr~ smrtd tht triumph oi fifty ytars o( indusrri.aJ dn'tlopmmr. Tht counuy's Lupst cocpontions dbpbym thrir n~'Y:Sl product:s, in· duding Wtsrmghow< Campony's dy.umos, Am
I THE RISE Of' COI!PO~ATE AW.UICA

405

role in che ~A'Orld economy. Five decades facer, the United States now produced 35 pm:ent of the world's manufactured goods- more than England, Germany, and France combined. It had become one of the world's greatest induscrial po'l'-"ers. By 1900, new enterprises both large and small, supponed by im-estmenc bankers and using a nationwide railroad distribucion system, offered a vast arra}' of goods. This stunning industrial growth came at a high cost. New manufacturing pro· cesses transformed che nature of ~A
THE RISE OF CORPORATE AMERICA How did Canreg;e, Rocke{tt/Jgr, and other corporate leadgrs c-onsolidate control owr their industri.s? In the early nineteenth ccmur}~ the corporate form of busjness organization had been used co raise: large amounts of start·up capital for transportation enter· prises su ch as rurnpikes and canals. By selling stocks and bonds co raise money, the corporacion separated the compan)"S mana~rs, who guided its da)'·to--da)' opera· cion, from its 0'1'-'nct'S. After the Civil War, American business leaders pioneered new forms of corporate organization that combined innovatiw technologies, creati\-e management struccures, and limited liability should the encerprise fail. 11le rise of the gianc corporation is astor}' of risk·taking and innovation as v.-ell as ofconspiraq• and corrupcion. Six fearu.res dominated che world of large-scale manufac· turing after the Civil War: the exploitation of im mense coal deposits as a source ofcheap energy; che rapid spread of technological innovation in transporcacion, communkacion, and factOf)' S)'Stems.: the need for enormous numbers of new ~A
lilt Clllncter of IIIIUirlll CI!Mge

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wrn, mounting demands for consumer goods stimulated heavy industr}"s production of capital goods- machines co boose farm and factory oucpuc even funher. Together with the railroads, che corporations that manufactured capital good~ refined petroleum, and made seed became driving forces in che nation's economic growth.

Competition among the aggressi•• and inno,•ative eapitalisrs who headed American heavy industr}' was imensc,especiallyamong the nation's railroads. By 1900, 193,000 miles of railroad crack crisscrossed che United States-more than in all of Europe including Russia. These: rail lines connected e\~r}' stare: in the Union and opened up an immense new internal market. Railroad entrepreneurs su ch as Collis P. Huntington of the Central Pacific Railroad and Jay Gould of the Union 1':1· cific faced enormous financial and organizational problems. 1b raise the: staggering sums necessar}', railroads obcained generous land and loan subsidies fro m the gQI.!'Crnment and borrO\l~d money from the public (in the form of stocks and bonds). By 1900, the )~arty incerest repayments required by the combined debt of all U.S. railroads (which stood ac an astounding $5.1 billion-nearly five times that of che federal government) cue heavily into their earnings. In addition to dc..·d oping "''ll}'S to raise large amounts of AbcJsiw Mooopclly......,. capital, che railroads created new S)'Stcms for collecting and This Puckc;~.rtoon depicts fin :u~ciers J:~yGould using information. Railroads relied heavily on the magnetic (left) ;~.nd Cornelius V:u~dcrbil t (right) ;~.nd telegraph, im~med in 1837. 10 impr""'~ efficienC}', the rail· suggeK:$ th;~.t thti r m:u~ipuluion of m;ubts :~nd their ownership ol r.ailro;~.ds, td-cgr.aph roads set up dearly defined, hierarchical organizational scruccomp.:~nies-, :~nd new~p.:~pers is powerfu l wrcs and u.sedelaborateaccounringsystcms. Railroad officials e nough to str:u~gle Uncle S;un. could set rates and accurately predict profits as early as che - - - 1860s, a rime when most businesses had no idea of thcir total J-r Clptain or indu:stry profit umil they closed their books ac ~ar's end. Railroad management innovations and owner ortilt Union P:ld6c thus became a model for many other bu.Uncs.scs seeking a national market.

lllllnlad lilllovatioas

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IUitro.:ut

The expansion and consolidation of railroading reflected both the ingenuity and the dishonesty flourishing on the corporate management scene. Despite advances in organi· zational technique, the industry remained chaotic. Hundreds of small companies used d ifferent standards for rails, track width, and engine size. Huntington, Gould, and others devoured these smaller lines co create large, integrated track netWOrks. \'('esc of the Mississippi 6vc companies controlled most of the track by 1893. Huntington, Gould, and the other larger-than-life figures who reorganized the milroad industr}' in the: 1870s and 1880s were often depicted I>}• chcir contempo·

C..OIIdlllnllbt lllllnlld Industry

I T HE RISE Of' COI!PO~ATE AW.UICA

407

Frn oil ..ll drilled i l -. -sylvril National labor Union founded Transcootinrotal railroad to fodr 0/lrw; lestl!r Frn Ward. D)namic Sodology Ameri
raries as villains who manipulated stock markecs and company policies to line their own pockets. Rccem historians, hoW\.'•/er, haw~: pointed ouc chac the greac indust rial· ists 'A'cr'e a diverse group. Although some were ironfisted pirates who engaged in fraudulent practices, others were upstanding bu.Unessmen who managed chcir com· panies wit h sophiscication, originality, and inventiveness. The massi.,.e systems created by these e ntrepreneurs became the largest business enterprises in che world. They standardized aU basic equipment and facilities. In 1883, independend)' of che federal governmenc, the railroads corrected scheduling problems by dividing che countr}' into four time zones. In May 1886 all railroads shifted simultaneously to che new standard 4' Slh • gauge track. Finally, cooperative billing arrangemencs enabled the railroads co ship cars from other roads at uniform races nationwide. Buc che systemization and co nsolidation of the railroads had its costs. Heavy in· debtedn ess, o•;erextended systems, and crooked business practices fo rced che rail· roads to compete recklessly with each other for traffic.. Competition and expansion drow some QI.!'Crbuilt Lines into bankruptcy. They also faced oppo.Ution from unlikely quarters. Stung by exorbitant races and se
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-c..n.-ulod Fil"'lt lfllcor.ll
midW'CStcrn slate legislatures responded by outla"'i ng rate discrimination. Initially upheld by che: Supreme Court, these and ocher decisions were negated in the J880s when the Court ruled char states could not regulate ime:rscace: commerce. in response in 1887, Congress passed the lnte:rstau Comm.eru Act. A 6\
In 1893 a nacional depression forced a number of railroads inco the hands of J. ....... IIorpn

I

fm'l'smlC'Ilt bwl.er •·ho btlptd

cruao

u.:;. Strd,otber huge

corpor.ltiOIU

J. Pierpont Morgan, who reorganized their administration, refinanced their debrs, and built intersystem alliances. By 1906, rhanks to the bankers' centralized manage· menc, seven giant nerworks controlled cwcHhirds ofche nacion's rail milca~.

The dose connections between railroad expansion and the growth of corporate organi:zation and managemenc are well illustrated in che carttr of Andrew Carnegie (CAR· immigration c.r..p. •·ho build ""''""' l"lWC· neh-gee). Born in Scodand, Carnegie immigrated roAmermow Sttd company ica in 1848 at che age of rwclw. His firsc job as a bobbin boy in a Jlitrsburgh textile mill paid only $1.20 a "'ttk. After enrolling in a night course to learn bookkeeping, ornmttolling ;all pb.ut.S or Carnegie became a Western Union mcssen~r boy. He soon became the d ry's fustcst production, e:rtruring m;u:i. telegraph operator. 1'he job gave Carnegie an insider's view of railroad operacions. mumpro6t Carnegie's big break came in 1852 when 1bm Scott, superintendent of the P€nnsyl\•ania Railroad's "''CStern di40.000 \ision, hired him as his sccretar}' and personal telegrapher. Later promoted co d ivision chief, Carnegie cut cosrs while 35,000 doubling che road's mileage and quadrupling its traffic. By 1868 Carnegie was earning more than $56,000 a rear 30.000 from his investmcn~ a subscancial fortune in chat er.:t. In the early 1870s Carnegie decided to build his own 25,000 steel mill Carnegie's philosophy was dccepcivcly simple: .s "Watch the costs, and the profits "'i ll take care of them· 20.000 selves.'" Using rigorous cost accounting and limicing wage increases co his work~ he 10'1'--ered his production costs ~ 15,000 and prices bdow those of his competitors. His adoption of a new produccion technique named after irs English im-en· 10,000 tor, Henry Bessemer, ensured a high quality produce. As output climbed, Carnegie d isco..-ered the benefits s.ooo of vertical integration- that is, controlling all aspects of manufacturing, from extracting raw materials to selling 0 ,~ the finished product. By 1900, Carnegie Sted had become the world's largest industrial corporation. Carnegie's Figurtl8.1 I,.. and Stttl I'Todadioo, 187S-191S compecitors, worried abouc his dominacion of the ma.rket, New teoc:hnologin , improV\"d pt:uu Mpniz::~tion, decided ro buy him out. In J90J, j. Pierponc Morgan pureeonomie~ of sc:;~~le, ;u~d thoe '-"'rtic;~.l inugr.~tion of chased Carnegie Stttl for nearly half a billion dollars and pt"Oduction brought :1 dr.~m;~.tic: spurt in iron and consolidated it with Federal Steel to form the United States sted prodi.Ktion. Seed Corporation, the first business capitalized at more J.l:ur:W.:rtloa•:,.O::O pCIIn&. So1.1tt· Wimriul S\6:6:$ol iflt ~hod~ than Sl billion (sce Figure 18.1).

Applylncllle Llssans of tile llllnllds to Steel

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I THE RISE Of' COI!PO~ATE AW.UICA Carn egie consistently portrayed his success as che resu lt of sclf·discipline and hard wo rk. He also cultivated a reputation as a philanthropist, giving awa}' more than SJOO million to libraries, uni~rsiti es, and incern ational-peacecauses. HO""-\....,-er, the full story 'A'llS more complex. Carnegie's success came not just from his work· ethic, but also fro m his opportunistic tempcramenc and callousness in keeping wages for his workers as low as possible. 1 0 a public unaware of corporate manage· ment techniques, hO\l'f:'\'et, Carnegie's success kant credence to t he idea chat anyone might rise fro m rags co riches.

Bern-em 1870 and 1900, the same fi erce competition that had stimulated consolidation in the railroad and steel in· dustries also S~At>pt the oil, sale, sugar, tobacco, and meat packing industries. The evolucion of the oil induscry illus· crates che process by which new corporate suuccures C\'Oived. After Edwin L Drake drilled the first successful petroleum (or "crude-oil") wcll in 1859 ncar 1i tusville, Pcnnsyl\•ania, competitors rushed into the business. Pecro· leum 'A'3S distilled into oil, which soon replaced animal tallow as the major lubricant, and inco kerosene, which became the leading fuel for household and public lighting. By the 1870s che landscape near l'itcsburgh and Cleveland 'A'llS littered wich rick· cty drilling rigs. In this rush for rich~ John D . Rockefeller, a young dC"t-eland merchant, gradual!)' achie..·ed dominance. Rockefeller opened his first refinery in 1863. Like Carnegie, Rockefeller had a passion for cost rutting and understood t he benefits of 't-ercical integration. In 1872 he purchased his O'A'll tanker cars and ob· rained a JO percent rebate from the railroads for hauling his oil shipments. When new pipeline technology became available, Rockefeller set up his O'A'll massi\'f:' inter· regional pipeline network. Like Carnegie, Rockefeller aggrcssi\-ely forced out his competitors. When local re-fineries rejected his offers to bU)' chem ouc, he priced his products beiO\l' cost and strangled their businesses. When rival firms teamed up agains t him, Rockefeller sec up a pool-an agreement among st\'eral companies- that establis hed production quotas and 6xed prices. B}' 1879 Rockefeller had seized concrol of90 percent of t he country's oil-refining capacity. Worried about competition, Rockefeller in 1882decided co eliminate itbyestab· lishing a new form of corporate organization, the S[andard OJ! Trust. In place of the ..pool," which lacked legal starus, the cruse created an umbre-lla corporation that ran chem all. Wichin chree years the Standard Oil Trust had consolidated crude-oil buying throughout ics member firms. In this way Rockefeller integrated the petro· leum industry both wrticd.lly and borizPnt411)~ b}' merging che competing oil compa· nics into one giant system. Taking a leaf from Rockefeller's book, companies in the copper, sugar, ~Ailis key, lead, and other industries establis hed their own trust arrangements. Their unscru· pulous caccics, semimonopolis tic control, and sky-high earnings provoked a public ouccr}'· Boch major political parties denounced chem in the presidential election of 1888. Fearful that t he trusts would stamp out aU competition, Congress passed t he Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890. The Sherman Act outlau'f:'d crusts and M)' other

409

Primary Source: Carnegie Sceel and Black Diamond Steel

Compan;es Mills

lilt 1i1lsl: Cruting Nlwfonls of Cerplrale nllllloll

John D. Rocbleller

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of'Suod.trd Oil ;u.d nustr:r of tht u:st o(pools <1Ud UUJt.s to mooopoliu ~n iodu:stry

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brd la orgaoiurioo offorty tompanits tonaOikd tbt U.S. oil indwtry

mar:

Mli-TnostAd La- ~rut tnl$!ll;; initi.tlly 1 UIUUtcl'u:ful

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410

OfAPlER 18

ThE RlSf Of I KOUSTIWoLAMEIOC.\,186j-1900

CHECKI NG I N tm mC'-n$e C'-oal dtpoliu, r;~.pi d t«h· nologic.:.l in novation, and tht lpn-ad of the factory .S)'l'tC'-m comb ined with other C.:.aol'lli to gi'>c- birth ro mod· trn induJtr1.:.1 AmC'-riu. Railro.:.W, conJalidattd into C'-normouJ trun k linu, \\>c-rt .5)'mbols: of industria l prognou .:.nd labor.uories Cor ntw bu.Jinesl tuhniquu a nd org,;mixation. Andnow C..:.rnC'-gie wa.s tht 6r~t to tt.uufer IC'-uon.s k arned from the railro.:.W to a nach« ind u.stty, .sttd, :.nd to UJC' \'Crtic.:.l integration on :. l..:."i"Jnle.

monopolies that 6xed prices in restraint of trade. But the act failed to de-6ne clearly cither rrus-t or rrstraim of m.uk. When Standard O il's strucw.re "''lls challenged in 1892, its lawyers simply reorganized the trust as a gianc hold· ing company, which simpl)•owned a controlling share of[he scock of one or more firms. The new board of direcrors for Standard O il (New j ersey), the new holding compan)', made more money chan e\~r. l 'he Supreme Court funher hamstrung congressional antitrust e-fforts by interpreting the She-rman Ace in "''ll}'S sympathetic co big business. In 1895, fur example, the federal gowrnment brought suit against the sugar trust in Uniwd Slalf!f v. E. C Knit}t Company- and lost. T hus vindicated, cor· porace mergers and consolidations surged ahead. B}' 1900, these mammoth 6rms accounted fur nearly rwo.fi fths of the capital invested in the narion's manufacturing sector.

john D. Rocl«o.fdltr kd tht W.l)' in dC'-,~Ioping ntw Kwm.s o( buJinC'J.S org,;mixation, espui..:.llr the tnut.

STIMULATING ECONOM I C GROWTH

B}' t he' C'nd of the' n inC'tunth cen·

What intWVQtiom in technology and business drove in
tUI)'• conJolidation had relulted in the Kwmation or hugt corporahonJ.

large--scale corporate enterprise "''lls not the only cause of the colossal growth of che U.S. economy. Other factors pr~d equally imporcanc, in· eluding new inventions, specialty production, and innovations in ad\~rtising and marketing.

New im~n tions not only streamlined rhe manufacture of traditional producrs buc also stimulated consumer de· Technolop mand b)•creating entire-I}' ne"'' product lines. The develop· menc of a safe, practical "''llY co generate eloccricity, fur example, made possible a vast number of electrical motors, household appliance~ and lighting systems. Many of these im~ntions were- intended fur use in factor}' production. H O\.\o~\~t, three: new domestic technologies had a dramatic impact on the patte-rns of cwryda}' life. l 'he sewing machine, mass--produced by che Singer s~·ing Machine Compan}' beginning in che- 1860s (see Chapter 16); the te-lephone, developed b)•Alexander Gra· ham Bell in 1876; and the lighc bulb, perfected by Thomas A. Edison in 1879, cased household dr udgery and reshaped social interactions. The advent of inexpensh~ mass.·produced clothing chus led to a considerable expansion in personal "''llrdrobcs. Meanwhile, the- spre-ad of telephones transformed communication while- the light bulb made it possible to shop after work. In che eyes of man}~ Thomas A. Edison epitomized the inventive impulse. Born in 1847 in Milan, Ohio, Edison, like Andrew Carnegie-, had little formal education and goc his start in rhe telegraphic industr}'· He- also "''lls a born salesman and se-lf· promoter. Edison, moreo'ler, shared Carnegie's vision of a large, imerconnocced in· dustrial system rescingon a foundation of technological innovation. Edison's first major invention, a stock~quotati on printer, in 1868, earned enough money to sct up his fi rst «in'lention factor}"' in Newark, Ne"''j ersey, a research facility

The 1'rluqlll of

n.o...s A. EdisM

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ln~tor,

founder o ( the'- fi:tst indusuial R'.$Urd!

llboratory

I snuui.An HG ECONOlUC GROWTH

411

Thomas Ediso1's Uborilories

io M@llo P•rtc. Now lorwy, C.l..l Alw:~~ ;a sdf·promCKer,

Edison used this depletion of his "'in'-"'rltion f;actory" to suggest th:~ t his ckvdopment of.:. dur.2ble light bulb i:n 1879would h;ave ;an i:rnp;act on life :~round the glolxo:.

char he: moved to nearby Menlo Park in 1876. Edison boastfully predicted "a minor inve:mion C'\o-ery ten days, and a big one C'\o't:C}' six momhs:'' BuO)'Cd by the success and popularity of his invcncion in 1877 ofa phonograph, or «sound ~A'fiter" (pboJUY. «sound";grapb: "wricerj, Edison sec out co develop a new filament for incandescent (in-can-OESS~Mt) light bulbs. Edison realized chat practical de:ctricallighcing had to be: pare of a complete system containing generators, regulators, and wir ing. In 1882, the: Edison Illuminating Company opened a po'l'-"tf plane in che heart of New York City's financial district. In the following rears, Edison and his researchers pumped our ino.ention after in· \encion, including the mimeograph machine, the microphone, the mocion picture: camera and lilm, and the stora~ battery. By the: rime of his death in 1931, he had pat· c:nted 1,093 ino.entions and amassed an estate "-'Orch more than S6 million. Edison's Menlo Park laboratory demonstrated thac the systematic use of science: in support of industrial technology paid Ia~ dividends. lnV'Ctlrion had become big business.

Along with inventors, manufacturers of custom and spe· cialized products such as machinery, je'l'--e:lr)', furniture, and women's doches dramatically expanded economic oucput. Keenly acrune:d co innovations in technology and design, they constantl}' created new produces tailored to che needs of individual buyers. Uncil the rurn of che rwcntiech cencury, when ready co-wear cloches came to dominate the market, most "-'Omen's apparel was custom produced in small shops run b)• women proprietors. Unlike che tenement S~A'C"atshops that produced men's shirts and pants, d ressmakers and milliners paid good wages to highl)' skilled seam· stresses. l 'he small size of che shops cogecher wich che skill of the: "-'Orkers enabled them to shift styles quickly to follow the latest fashions . Thus, alongside of the increasingly rationalized and bureaucratic big businesses like seed and oil in the late nineteenth cenrury, American productivity ~A'aS also scim· ulaced by small producers ~Atho provided a variety of goods char supplemented the bulk-manufactured staples ofeveryday life:.

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41 2

CHAPtER 18

ThE RlSf Of I KOUSTIWoLAM ESOCA,186j- 1900

As small and farge factories alike spe:W'Cd o ut an amazing array of new products, busjness leaders often d iscm-ered Marllelinl that their outpuc exceeded what the markec could absorb. Strategies for whetting consumer demand represented a critical component of in· dustrial expansion in the post-Civil War era. The growth of the flour industry illus traces both the spread of mass production and the emergence of new marketing concepts. In the 1870s, the nation's flour mills installed concinuous-proccss machines that graded, deaned, hulled, ground, and packaged the: produce in one rapid operation. These companies, ho~A'C'V'C.r, soon pro· duced more flour than they could sell. 1b unload this exces~ the: mills thought up new product lines such as cake flours and breakfast cereals and sold chem using easy-ro·remember brand names like Quaker Oats. Through the use of brand names, slogans, endorsements, and other gimmicks, manufacturers built demand for chcir products and won enduring consumer IO)'lllty. For instance, Americans bought 1\·ory Soap, first made in 1879 by Proccer and Gam· ble of Cindnnari, because: of the absurd!)' o ..-erprecise but impressive pledge chat it was "99 and percent pure." In che 1880s, George Eascman de\~loped a paper-based photographic fil m as an alternative to the bulky, fragile: glass plates chen in usc. Manufacruring a cheap camera for che masses, the Kodak, Easnnan introduced a system whereb)•customers rerurne:d the 61m and the camera to his Rochester factory. There, the 61m 'A'llS dew~l oped and primed, the camera reloaded, and C'\"er)'thing shipped back. Easnnan had revolutionized an induscry and democratized a visual medium pi\.'Viousl)' confined to a few.

Admtlsinl and

Prima:ry Source: The Genius of

Advertising

By 1900, the chaos of earl)' industrial competition, ~A+ten thousands ofcompanies had struggled to enter a nacional markec, had given way co the mosc produccive economy in che ~A
&:111111 ~ CrowUJ: Costs llld Benefits

l•dastrial Pollulioo Although some Americ;~.n;s cdebr~ued f;,.ctory smoke ;~.s;,. sign ofinduwi:.l growth, those who li~d downwind, wch .u the longshor~m.:tn i:n this Thom:.s N:.st c:;uo-toon, oft~n sufkr~d from rc:spir;,.tory dt,;e;ues :.nd othoer ;,.ilmcnts. For him ;u; W\"ll :.s fot. othoer Am~ria.ns, the price ofi:ndustri.:al progl'l:'ss w:u often pollution.

oil or chemical waste, skies filled with d ouds of soot, and a landscape lit· cered ~Aith reeking garbage: and toxic materials bore mute ~Aicness to che relentless dri\'f: for efficiency and profit. For chose: who fell by che wa}'Side, the cost could be measured in bank· rupted companies and shattered dreams. john D. Rockefeller puc things with characteristic blunmess when he said he wanted "onl}' the big ones, only chose who have alre-ad}' prO\'Cd chcy can do a big business" in the Standard O il Trust. "As for the och~ unfortuna.tel}•thcywiU have to die." The cost 'A'llS high, too, for millions of American workers, immigrant and native-born alike. The vase expansion of new produces was builc on che backs of an army of laborers ~Ailo u-ere paid subsistence wages and who could be fired o n a momenc's nocicc. WhateVer the final balance: sheer of social gains and costs, one thing was dear: the United Scates had muscled its wa}' onto the world stage as an in· dusaial citan. The ambition and drive of countless inventors, financi ers, managerial innO\rators, and marketing wizards had combined to lay che groundwork fur a new social and economic order in the cwencie:th century.

Tec.hnolagy crt-;a ed new wa)'ll o f man ufacturing and new prod ucu t hat :~timuJ.aud demand. Man)' in\l\"nhons, such a:~ t he tde"+ phon~ and dec.tric ligh t, changed d..lily life. Edison ~ubiUhed th~ first m..ljor ~rc.h laboratory at Mmlo P.:uk, N...wj C'rsey, calling it "'an im..,mion ~to ry."

Compani.es dC'vdop«< br.md·n..lmC' pruducu and mafi.:C'ted thC'm h~avily.

Rapid «onomic gi'O'>\·th, with both n~gati"" and po~iti"" dl'uu, propdkd th~ Un itC'd St..lt6 to t he' forefront of the global uonomy.

THE NEW SOUTH Wiry did the South's 6Xp6rience with indu.strializatiott di{fer from tlwt ofthe North and the Midwest? The Souch enu~red che industrial era far more: slO'I'-'1}' than the Northeast. As lace: as 1900, toea! southern cotcon·mill oucput, fo r example, remained little more than half that of the mills within a chircy·mile radius ofPrO\idence, Rhode Island. The reasons for the South's lace: economic blossoming are: not hard co discern. The Civil War's ph)'sical de\'asmcion, racism, che scardcy of southern towns and cit· ies, lack ofcapital, illiteracy, norchern control of financial markets, and a IO'W rate of technological innovation crippled efforts by southern business leaders co promote industrialization. Economic progress ~A'llS also impeded by che m}'th of che Lost Cause:, which, chrough its nostalgic portrayal of pre-Civil War society, perpetuated an image of the South as traditional and unchanging. As a resu lt, souchem induscri· alization inched forward haltingly.

Much ofche South's difficulty in industrializing arose: from its lack of capital and the dev:tstacion of che Ci\il War. Economic During the war, the federal gO\•ernment required anyone Dewelap•ent wishing to start a bank to have: fifty thousand dollars in capital. Few southerners could meet this standard. With capital in short suppl}', country merchants team supplies racher than cash to local farmers in rerum for a mortgage on their crops. 1'he burden of paying those mortgages trapped fanners on their own land and created a shortage: of the labor needed for industrial expansion. The South's chro nic shortage of funds also lim ited che resources available for education. During Reconstruction northern philanthropists together ~Aith various relief agencies had begun a modest expansion of public schooling for both blacks

Obstacles to

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41 4

CHAPtER 18

ThE RlSf Of I KOUSTIWoLAMESOCA,186j· 1900

and whites. But Georgia and many other southern states operated segregated schools and refused to tax property for school support until 1889. As a result, school attendance: remained low, St:\'crely limiting the number of educated people able to staff technical and managerial positions in business and industry. Souchern stat~ like: those in che North, often contributed the modest funds they had to war veterans' pensions. In this way, southern state gow~m m ents built a white patronage system for Confederate \'eterans. As late as 191I, \'etcrans' pensions in Georgia ace: up 22 percenc of the state's entire budgec, leaving little for economic or educational dC"t-e:lopment. Des pin• chese: obstacles, energetic souchern newspaper ed-

Heooy w. CtUy ..,..,, "'""

I

At.f.llnt.f ~ aod tirdt.Ss bao.nr:r ofhis city ~nd tc"gjon

Tbe New Sootll Creed itors su ch as Henry \t'. Grady of che Alldm-a Constitulion llld Southern championed the doctrine that became known as the New llldllslrilllzation

Souch creed. The South's rich coal and timber resources and cheap labor, chey proclaimed in cheir papers, made it a natural site for industrial development. The mowment to industrialize the South gained momentum in the 1880s. 10 attract northern capital, souchem states offered tax exemptions for new businesses, sec up industrial and agriculrural expositions, and leased prison convicts to serve as cheap labor. Florida, 1t:xas, and other states gave huge traces of lands co railroads, which expanded dramatically throughout the South and in turn stimulated the birth of new co"''lls and villages. FoiiO'I'-'ing che lead of cheir northern counterparts, che southern iron and steel industries expanded as wdL Birmingham, Alabama. founded in 1871 in the heart of a region blessed "'ith rich deposits ofcoal, limestone, and iron ore, grew in less than three decades to a bustling cit)' wich noisy railroad )'ards and roaring blast furnaces. By 1900 it was the nation's largesc pig-iron shipper. As large--scale recruiters of black \N'Orkers, che southern iron and seed mills con· tribuced to the migration of blacks to che cicies. By 1900, 20 percent of the southern black population "''lls urban. Southern industry reflected the patterns of radal seg· rcgacion in southern life. 1bbacco companies used black "''Orkers, particularly women, to d ean the tobacco lea\'eS while white "''Omen, at a different location, ran the machines char made cigarettes. The burgeoning textile mills were lil}white. In the iron and steel industry, blacks, "'tho comprised 60 percem of che unskilled "''Ork force: b}• 1900, had practical!}' no chance of advancement. Black miners were also recruited by the West Virginia coal induscry chac lured them with free transportation, high wages, and company housing. Still, economic opporruniries for blacks remained st\-erd}' limited In the lumbering industry, wages for black workers could bl' better than chose offered co farm laborers. HO'I'-~\-er, during economic downcurns "''Orkers were laid off or confined to work camps by vagrancy laws and armed guards. Unlike che u.rban·based southern iron and sted industry, the cexcile mills chac mushroomed in the souchern countr}'Side in the 1880s often became catalysts for che forma· tion of new cowns and villages. In the mill towns, country "''llys and values suffused the new induscrial \N'Orkplacl'.

The Soutllem Mill koaomy

I TH:tNEWSOUTH

415

The cotton-mill economy grew fargd )' in the l'iedmont, che highland country of central Virginia and northern Georgia and Alabama. The Piedmont had long been the South's backcouncry. But postwar railroad conscruction opened the region to textih··mill expansion. By 1920 the -S outh was che nation's leading textile-mill cen· tet. Augusta, Georgia, with 2,800 mill workers, became known as the lowell of the South, named after the mill town in Massachusetts where induscrialization had flourished earlier. Sharecroppers and tenant farmers at first hailed the new cotton mills as a wa}' ouc of rural pow~rty. Buc appearances were deceptive. 1'he chief cotton-mill promot· ers were drawn from che same ranks of merchants, Ia"''}~ docrors, and bankers who had profited from che commercializacion of southern agriculru.re. Cotton-mill entrepreneurs shamelessly exploited their work~ paying jusc s...""\o-e:n co dC"t·en ccms an hour, 30 percent to 50 percent less than "'that comparable mill workers in New England W'tre paid. The mills dominated mosc l'iedmont textile communities. l 'he mill operator not onl)' built and 0'1'-'ned the workers' housing and the com pan)' store: but also sup· porced the village church, financed the local elementary school, and pried into the morals and be:haYior of che mill hands. Because they v.-ere often paid in scrip-a cer· tilicate redeemable onl)' in goods from che company store-workers frequend)' "''ere drawn into a cycle of indebtedness very much like thac faced by sharecroppers. Since fann families shared responsibilities as a unic, souchern mill su perinten· dents accommodated themselves to local customs and hired whole families, indud· ing the children. Mocherscommonly brought babies into the mills and kept chem in baskets nearby while rending their machines. As nonhero cotton mills did before che Civil War, southern textile companies exploited the cheap rural labor around them, settling transplanted farm people in paternalistic company-run villages. Using chese caccics, the industr}' underwent a period of steady gro"''th.

lnduscrialization occurred on a smaller scale and at a s!O'I'--er rate in the South than in che Norch Industrial Lag and also depended far more on ourside finan cing. technology, and expertise. l'he late· nineteenth·century southern economy rr-mained essentially in a colonial scacus, subject co domination by norchern industries and financial syndicates. An array of factors thus combined to rccard industrialixacion in the South. Banking regulations requir ing farge reserves, scarce capital, absencee ownership, unfavorable railroad rates, cautious state governments, wanime debts, lack of induscrial experience, a segregated labor force, discrimina· tion against blacks. and control by profit-hungry northern enterprises all hampered che rcgion•s economic development. Dragged down by a poorly educated white population and by a fargd)' unskilled black populacion, souchern industry languished. As in the Nonh, industrialization brought significant enYironmemal damage, including polluted rivers and streams, decimated forests, grimy coal-mining cowns, and soot-infested steel-making dries. Although Henry Grady's Yision ofa New Souch may hai,!'C inspired many southerners co work

Tbt Soutllem

Lack o(capit~l pc~d .l m~jar ob$tade to Jouthtrn indWlriallution. An un
Corton tutllt mills blcwomed urcw tbt South !"rom the !880" onw.lrd. Oup(te sucb ;ui,•;mcu, tht South la_ggtd F.tr bthind the- rut or the nation in indu$1ri~liution and «onomic dt'"-lopm.en t.

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416

OfAPlER 18

ThE RlSf Of I KOUSTIWoLAMEIOC.\,186j-1900

toward industrialization, economic growth in cheSouth, limited as it was by oucside: forces, progressed in its own distincd)' regional way.

I

FACTORIES AND THE WORK FORCE

How dtd foctory workers rsspond to the c#Jangtng naturs ofwork?

lndustnahzatJon proceeded unc·'lenly nac1onWide:, and most lare--nmececmhcentury Americans still worked in small shops. But as che century unfolded, large: factories ~Aith armies of workers sprang onto the: industrial scene in more and more: locales. The pattern of change: 'A'llS evident. Be:rwe:en 1860 and 1900, rhe number of industrial ~A
The transition to a factory economy came nor as an earth· quake: but rather as a series of seismic jolts varying in strength and duration. Changes in factory production had a profound impact on artisans and unskilled laborers alike. The impact of these: changes can be seen b)• examining the shoe industr}'· As Late as the 1840s, almost C''ICr}' shoe was custom-made b)•a skilled anisan who worked in a small, independent shop. Shoemakers were aristocrats in the ~A'Orl d of labor. They cook pride in chcir work and controlled the quality of chcir produces. A distinctive working·dass culture subdi\ided along ethnic lines cvol'led among these shoemakers. Foreign-born English, German, and Irish workers sec up ethnic trade organizations and joined affiliated benevolent associations. Bound together by religious and ethnic ties, chey observed weddings and funerals according co oldcountry traditions and relaxed together at the: local saloon after ~A'Ork. As early as che 1850s, changes in the ready-made: shoe trade had eroded the Sta· tus of skilled labor. The manufacturing process was broken down into a sequence of repetitive, easily mastered tasks. l 'hus instead of crafting a pair of shoes from start to fi nish, each ream member specialized in only one: pare of the process, such as at· taching the: heel or polishing the leather. In the 1880s, shoe factories became larger and more mechanized. and tradi· tional skills largd )' vanished. Shoe companies replaced skilled operatives ~Aith lo~A'Cr· paid, less-skilled women and children. By 1890 women made up more than 35 percent of the ~A
The expansion of the: factory system spa~A'tled an unprece:dence:d demand fo r unskilled labor. By the 1880s near!}' one-chird of the 750,000 workers empiO)•ed in the railroad and seed industries, for example, ~A'cre common laborers. In che construction trades and the ganne:m-making industries, the: services of unskilled laborers were procured

The llanlshlps of lillllllstrlal Labor

I FAClO~lESA~O THE WORK FoG:CE

417

under che so-called contract system. Large: companies negotiated an agreement ~Aith a subcontractor who supervised gangs of unskilled day laborers, who were hired in times of need and laid off in slack periods. Notoriously cransie:nt, unskilled laborcrs drifted from city to city and from in· dustry to industry. In che late 1870s unskilled labon:rs earned $1.30 a day, while bricklayers and blacksmiths earned more than $3. O nly unskilled southern mill workers, ~Ailose wages ai,!'Crage:d a meager eighty-four cents a day, earned less. Unskilled and skilled workers alike nor o nl}' ~AA
As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 19, factor)' 0\\-·n· ers curned to u nskilled immigrant >A
....,.nt Labor

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418

CHAPtER 18

ThE RlSf Of I KOUSTIWoLAMESOCA,186j·1900

WGmell and Work in IIIIIIIIStrlal Amerkil

Women's work experiences, like chose of men, were shaped

by marital smcus, social class, and race. Upper·d as.s white

married women ~Aidd)' accepted an ideology of "separate spheres" (see Chapter 19) and remained at home, raised children, and looked after the household. l 'he well·to--do hired maids and cooks to ease their burdens. \'t1ork:ing·dass married ~A'Omen , in contrast, nor only lacked such assistance but also often had to contribute to the 6nandal support of the family. In fact, working for wages ac home b)•sewing. button·making, caking in boarders, or doing laundry had predated induscriali:zarion. In chc late nineteenth century, unscrupulous urban entrepreneurs exploited this captive work force. In the doching industr)', manufac· turcrs hired our 6nishing tasks to loW'tr
Horatio Alger

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Autbor or mort tban OUC' bundnd ''n gs eo richt.S" books for bo)•s

Although women were generally excluded from the: equa· tion, influential opinion molders in these years preached that any man could achiC'\\': success in the new industrial era. In Retgged Dick ( 1867) and scores oflatcr tales, Horatio Alger, a Unitarian minis· tcr rurned dime: no-.-elist, recounted t he: ad\·entures of poor bur honest lads who rose: through initiative and self discipline. T he career of Andrew Carnegie was often of· fe:red as proof chat che United States remained che land of oppon:unity and ..rags co riches.'" Some critics d id nor accept chis bdie:f. In an 1871 essay, Mark 1Wain chided che public for its naivete and suggested that business success was more likdy co come co

those who lied and cheated. What are che facts? Carnegie's rise from abject poverty to colossal v.-ealch was the rare: excepcion, as studies of nearly two hundred of the largest corporations reveal. Ninety-five perccnc of the induscrialleaders came from middle- and upper~dass backgrounds. The best chance of success for immigrants and nacii,!'C-obom working class Americans was in mastering a skill and rising to the top of a small company. Although only a few reaped immense fon:unes, many at· mined subscancial incomes. The opporrunities for advancement for unskilled immigrant workers ~A'Cre considerably more limited. Some did mo\·e co semiskilled or skilled positions. Vee most immigran~ particularly che Irish, Italians, and Chinese, mm-ed far more slowly chan the sons of middle-and upper-class Americans who began with greater educational ad\•ancages and family financial backing. lhe up· FMto;ny work w:u: a n umbing ward mobility possible for such unskilled workers was generally mobility romine with no plate' for d :i!IC'd within the working class. Immigrants who got ahead in the late nineteenth wofi.:C'u.• cencur}' went from rags to respectability, noc rags to riches. Un,kiUC"d wofi.:C'r~ n-«i'A'd IOYI M' One posith·e economic trend in these )~ars 'A'llS the rise in real ~A'llgcs, fur long hour:~ and l.~bore'd u nder representing gains in actual buying power. A\-erage real wages climbed 31 h.uardou' ronditioru; ch ildun ;u young .u <"ighr work«~ in coal mines pm:ent for unskilled workers and 74 percent for skilled \N'Orkers between and cotton milb . 1860 and 1900. Overall gains in purchasing power, hoW'C'.o-er, u~re often Immigrant,: WC'.n' the mairuuyof undercut b)• injuries and unempiO)menc during slack times or economic the" indwuiallabor fon'C', anJ\\'i'ri ng slumps. During the depressions of the 1870s and 1890s, wa~ cuts, exthe' nC'C'd for uru.kilkd labor and oftC'n paid IC'.',: chan nati\'C'--born tended la)'offs, and irregular e-mployment pushed those at the bottom of wofi.:C'u.. the industrial work force to che brink of starvacion. \'(lomen entC"-n-d the' indu,:tri.ll work Thus the 0\>crall picrure of lare-ninec«mh·century economic mobil· force t hrough the' lonifltand ing ity is complex. Ac che top of the scale, a mere 10 perccnc ofAmerican fami· pr.tcti ~ or working at home' lOr lies O'A'tled 73 perccnc of che nation's wealth in 1890, while less chan half wages; many Jingle woltW'n ~d into the" f.anory wofi.: IOn'C' and thC'n of induscrial laborers earned more than the 6~-hundred dollar poverty into office' job,:. line annually. In bern~en the ~ry rich and the wry poor, skilled immi· Re.ality ol'l:C'n tontradined che " rail' grants and small shopkeepers impro\~d their economic position signifi· ro rid.c-,:• mythology, :1$ lt1oC»l indu,:· canrly. So although the standard of living for millions of Americans rose, trial bborC'u freque"ntl)' ronfronte'd the gap bern·een the poor and che wcU+off remained a )>awning abyss.

I

lABOR UNIONS AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

In the 1890s how did corporate «XXttOtiws underwt labor's bargaining power?

A~A>are chac the gro~A'tb of large corporations ga..-e industrial leaders unprecedented pou~r to control the workplace, labor leaders searched for tA'llfS to protect their members. Buc che drive to create a nacionwide labor mo\~menc faced man}' problems. EmpiO)•ers deliberately accenruated ethnic and racial d ivisions within the work force. Skilled crafts ~A'Orkers, moreo\~r. felt little kinship ~Atith lo~A•·paid com· mon laborers. Because of these divisions, unionizacion efforts mm-ed forward slowly and experienced setbacks. 1"'0 groups, the National labor Union and the Knights of Labor, struggled to build a mass labor mOV\'.ment chat \N'Ould unite: skilled and unskilled workers. After impressive inicial growth, hoYA.'"\o-er, both efforts collapsed. Far more effecciw 'A'llS the

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wilckat sbWe Spontaneow suikt5 not ~uthariud by a bbor union; 110me tumed violmt

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American ~deration of Labor (AFL), which represented skilled "-"Orkers in po"'wful independenc craft unions. The AFL survived and gri!W, but it represented onl)' a small portion of the tocal labor force. With unions weak, labor unrest during economic downturns reached crisis pro· portions. When pa)' rates were cue or "-"Orking conditions became intolerable, labor· ers walked off lhe job without union authorization. These: actions, called wildcat strikes, often exploded into violence. l 'he bloody labor dashes of the 1890s "-"OU)d increase che demand for scace regulation and C"".-cntually contribute to a mOio'Cment for progressive reform.

From the eighteenth cenrury on, skilled workers had or· ganiud era de unions to 6ght wage reductions and proYide benefits for chcir members in times of illness or accident. But the effocciwness of lhc.se: organizations was limited. lhe challenge: chat labor leaders faced in t he poscwar period "''lls how co boost che unions' clout. Some be· licved lhat lhis goal could be achiew:d by forming one big association that "'-ould transcend craft lines and pull in lhe mass of unskilled "''Orkers. In 1866, Philadelphia labor leader \'t'illiam H. Sylvis called a col'l'W:ntion in Balti· more lO form a new organization, che National labor Union (NLU). 11le NLU en· dorsed the eight-hour-day movement, which insisted chac labor deserved eight hours for work, cighc hours for sleep, and eight hours for personal affairs. lc also endorsed immigration restriction, especially of Chinese: migrants, whom nati\-c-born workers blamed for undercutting prevailing wage: levels. 11le NLU supported che cause of working women and urged black "-"Orke:rs to organize as wdl, though in raciallyse:pa· rate unions. After a failed strike: against iron foundry ()'\l,' ners in lhe "''inter of 1866--1867, S)i · vis turned lO national political reform. He invited a number of refonners to lhe 1868 NLU convention, including u-oman suffra~ advocates Susan B. Anchon}' and Eliza· beth Cad)' Stancon. But "'>hen Sylvis su ddenly died in 1869, the NW faded quickly. The dream of a labor movement that combined skilled and unskilled "'-orke:rs lh·ed on in a new organization, che Knights oflabor, founded in 1869. Led by Uriah H. Stephens of Philadelphia, che Knights welcomed all wage earners. The Knights demanded equal pay for "''Omen, an end to child labor and convict labor, and che co· operati\'e emplo)'eNmployee ownership of factories, mines, and other businesses. At a time when no federal income tax existed, they called for a progressiw mx on all earnings, graduated so thac higher-income earners "'-ould pa)' more. The Knighcs grew slowly at 6rst. But membership rocketed in the 1880s after the doquent1Crence V. PO""-'derly replaced Stephens as the organization's head. Our· ing its growch }'eat'S in che early 1880s, lhe Knighcs of Labor reflected boch its ideal· is tic origins and PO""--derty's collaborative vision. Po"'>derl)' opposed strikes and urged temperance upon the membership. ~-derlyadvoc:ated the admission of blacks inco local Knights of labor assemblies, although he aUoW't'd souchern focal assemblies co be segregated. The Knights welcomed "''Omen members.: by 1886, "''Omen made up an estimated 10 percent of t he union's membership. l'owderly supported restrictions on immigration and a total ban on Chinese immigration. In IBn, San f rancisco u-orkersdemonstrating for an eight-hour work·

Orpnlzllll Wolllen

N....... t.loorU... QiW)

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Early attempt to e.uabli5h a

single lWitiCII!l.ll union

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~ ol t.•or o.-g,o;u,..., tbat took up .tlere the NLU left- ofF, enj~ coruiderabk SU«ll'U lOr a wbik

I LAIIOI! UtOCIN'S AND I N OVSTIUAt CONFUct

421

day destroyed tv.-enty·fi.,.-e Chinese:· run laundries. In 1880 both major party platforms included anci·Chinese immigration plans. Two years facer, Congress passed che C hinese Exclusion Ace, placing a ten·rear moratorium o n Chinese immigration. The ban v.as extended in 1902 and nor repealed untill943. G£0. DEE. Di)lon.lllino's ~-derty's greatest triumph came in 1885. In that )'tat, j ay Gould tried to gee rid of the Knights of Labor on his Wabash railroad b)• firing active union members.. Po~A•derl)' instructed all Knights o n the Wabash line to ~A>alk off che job and those o n other lines to refuse to handle Wabash cars. This accion crip· pled the Wabash's operations. 1 0 the nation's amazement, Gould mct wich l:tov.·derty and canceled his campaign against the Knights of Labor. Membership in the Knights of Labor soared. By 1886,more than SCV\':n hundred thousand workers were organized in nearly six thousand locals. The Knights mounted campaigns in nearly cwo hundred towns and cicies nationwide that fall, electing several marors and judges. Business executives warned that the Knights could cripple the economy and cake over the country if they chose. Buc che organi:zation's s trength soon waned. Workers be-came disillusioned when a series of unauthorized strikes failed Ethnic..d Alociill Haired in 1886. By the late 1880s, the Knights of Labor 'A'llS a shadow COM$etV:!tive ~ns owntn us.td r.atist of its former self. Ne\-erthelcss, the organization had sl'l"V'Cd as adwrtising. such ;u; this tr.adt urd Wgm:~tiMg a major impetus to the labor mm-ement and had awakened in Chi:nnt lau ndry wolio:c:rs, to promote their own thousands of workers a sense of group solidarity and potencial products ;and to :~ssoci ;~.tt thtir comp:~ny....; th strength. As the Knights of Labor weakened, ano(her national labor organization was gaining strength. The skilled craft unions had long been uncomfortable ~Aith labor organizations like che Knights char wei· History in Focus: Ethnic a nd Racial corned skilled and unskilled alike. They were also concerned char the Knights' broad Hatred reform goals would undm:ut the interests ofthcir particular crafts. 1'he break came in May 1886 when che craft u nions left the Knights of labor co form t he Amerkan Federation of Labor (AFL). t.~o... -s.\ilkd................. am uniclns united The AFL replaced the Knights' grand visions ~Aith practical tactics aimed at uockr koldtrship or 5.unud bread·and·butcerissues. 11lis philosophy 'A'llS vigorously pursu ed by Samuel GompGompers 1 ers the immigrant cigar maker who became head of the AFL in 1886 and led it until S..Ooel......... Al'1. '""" his deach in 1924. Gompcrs believed in ..t rade unionism, pure and simple." Gom pers wbo fixullled on pl'ilrtial als argued that if labor ~A'ct'C co stand up co the corporations, it ~A'Ould have to harness like w~, haun, ;and warring condiOOns the bargaining power of skilled workers and concentrate on t he practical goals of raising ~A'llges and reducing hours. To persuade workers from the various ltades co join forces without violating their sense of craft autonomy, Gompers organized the AFL as a federation of crade unions, each rccaining control of its own members but aU linked b)• an exccuti\-e council t hat coordinated strategy during bo)'COCts and strike actions. Gompers at firsc sidestepped d ivisive policical issues. The new organizacion's platform did, ho~A'CVC.r, demand an eight~h o ur workda)', emplo)-ers' liability for

~,~~~~,:I!~&Ntl

I

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Prima:ry Source: The Home of the Union Workma:n

workers' injuries, and mine safety la"''S. The AFL did little co recruit women workers after 1894 because Gompers and others bdie\·ed that "''Omen "''Orkcrs undercut men's wages. By 1904, the AFL had grO'I'-'n to more chan 1.6 million strong. Despite these advances, labor organizations before 1900 remained weak. Less than 5 percent of the "''Ork force joined union ranks. Split between skilled arcisans and common laborers, separated along ethnic and religious lines, and d ivided ow~r tactics, the unions battled "'ith onl}' occasional effecciw:ness against the growing power of corporate enterprise. 11ley typically watched from the sidelines when unor· ganiud workers launched wildcat strikes that sometimes rurned violent.

Americans had li.,.ed with a high level ofviolence from the nation's beginnings. 1trriblc labor dashes toward cheend VIolence of the century "''Cre part of this continuing pattern, but they ne\-ertheless shocked and d ismayed contemporaries. From 1881 co 1905, close to 37,000 strikes erupted, in which ncar!}' 7 million workers participated. The first major wave of strikes began in 1873 when a Wall Street crash triggered a major depression. The tension turned deadly in 18n d uring a "'ildcat railroad strike. Ignited by a wage reduction on che Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in Jul}'• the strike spread across the country. Rioters in Pittsburgh torched Union Depot. By the time troops could arrive to quell the strike two weeks Iacer, ncar!}' one hundred people had died. The railroad strike stunned middlr"-er grew terrified of mob violence from the bottom ranks of sodecy. Employers capitalized on the public hysteria to crack dO'I'-·n on Labor. Many required their workers to sign "yellow dog'" contracts in "'thich they promised noc to strike or join a union. Some hired l'inkerton agents, a private police force, to defend their factories and turned to the U.S. army to suppress labor unrest. Although the economy recovered, more strikes and violence foiiO'I'--ed in the 1880s. On Ma}' 4, 1886, Chicago police shot and killed four strikers at che McCor· mick Harvester plant. Ac a protest rally che next C'\-cning in the city's Haymarket Square, someone threw a bomb from a nearby building. killing or facall}' "''Ounding seven policemen. In response, the police fi red "'ildly into che crowd and killed four dem onstrators. l'ublic reaction was immediate. Business leaders and middlr
SlriHs 1M Labor

HcnestieadSrile Comp.:~ny lodt.out tlut SfUrhd ;a strikt and \ioknee .at ;a C;arncog)t llltl'tl plant in 1892

I

I LAIIOI! UtOCIN'S AND I N OVSTIUAt CONFUct

came: to protect the plant, a batd e: bro ke out. Seven union members and three Pinkertons died. A ~Attk Iacer t he go\-ernor se:m eight thousand National Guardsmen corestore order. The union crushed, che mills resumed full operation a month later. The most systematic use of troops to smash union power came in 1894 during a strike: against the: !'ullman Palace: Car Company. In 1880 railroad car manufacturer George !'ullman had constructed a factory and t~n. called Pullman, ten miles south of Chicago. When t he depression of 1893 hit, he slashed workers' wages with· ouc reducing chcir rents. In reaction thousands of workers went o n strike. Led b}' their fiery )'Oung organizer, Eugene: V. Debs, union members working for che na· tion's largest railroads refused co switch Pullman cars, paralyzing rail traffic in and ouc of Chicago. In response, top railroad executh-es sec out to break the union. The}' imported strikebreakers and asked U.S. attorney general Richard O lney, who sat on che board of directors of t hree major railroad networks, fo r a federal injunction (court order) against the strikers for allegedly refusing co mo\-e railroad cars carrying U.S. maiL Olney, citing t he: Shennan Ami-Trust Act, secured an injunction against the union, arrested Debs, and se:m fede:ml troops in. During the ensu ing riot, workers burned seven hundred freight cars and t hirteen people died. By july 18 che strike had been crushed. In 1895, the U.S. Supreme court upheld Debs's prison sentence and legal· iud t he: use of injunctions against labor u nions (!11 rr Dtbs). There were: some successes. In 1897, the: feisty Irish-born Mat}' Harris jones, kn~·n as Mother jones, succeeded in persuading coal miners in Pennsylvania co join the United Mine Workers of America. By 1900, their numbers had climbed to 300,000. Ho~A•ewr, despite t he: achievements of t he: United Mine Workers, the successi\'e attempts by the National labor Union, Knights of l abor, American n:dera rion of Labor, and American Railway Union to build a national working-class Labor m~ ment achieved o nl)' limited su ccess. l ne:ffecti\-e in t he political arena, blocked by state: oflidals, divided by ethnic differences, harassed b)•empl o)"~ and frustrated by court decis ions, American unions failed co expand their base of support. Post· Civil War labor turmoil had giwn it a negative public image that it would not shed umil t he 1930s.

Widespread violence sparked a new debate ~r t he social meaning oft he new industrial orde:r. Atstakewasa fraught fw Allemltlves issue: should government become: the mechanism for helping the poor and regulating big business? Defenders ofcapitalism preached the Laissez.faire: (LESS-ay fan), or .. hands-off' argument, insis ting that g()'l.t'Crnmenc should never attempt to control business. In his essay ..The Gospel of Wealth" (1889), Andrew Carnegie jusdfie:d laissez-faire by applying the C~.'Oiurionary t heories of British social scientist Herbert Spencer to human society. ..The law of competition,'" Carnegie argued, "ma)' be sometimes hard for the individual, [but) it is best for lhe race, because it insures the survival of t he fitt est in every department."' Yale: professor William Graham S umner shared Carnegie' s disapprM'lll of go\'· ernment interference. His combative book \Vba.tSocial CLust"SOU>eW Each0tber (l883) applied the C~.'Oiutionary theories of British naturalis t Charles Darwin to human

423

~ Y. Delts Unioo org;toiur, ol.trtllttd .u kadtr ofJtril:ing Narioml Raih•oay Uoioo; voould btcomc- Soci.llist

"'""

Slcllllllinkers Probe

w.JU.. c:...... _

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lOugt..mindcd Y~lt pro(.-:uor aod thtorist ofSoci.ll D.vwinism

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SGciil o.wilis• llltory th;lt

society. In an early statcmc:m of what became known as Sodal Darwinism, Sumner asserted chac inexorable: narural fa"''S controlled the social order. T he state:, declared Sumner, owed its citizens nothing but law, order, and basic political rights. As to the: question of whe:rher society should help rhe less fortunate, Sumner wrote: famously: "A drunkard in che gutter is just where he ought co be:."' Sumner's argument did not go unchallenged In Dynamic Sodolog (1883), Lester Frank Ward, a geologist, argued char contrary to Sumner's claim, che supposed "laws" of narure: could be circumvcnce:d by human will. just as scientists had applied their knO\\<·Ie:dge to breeding superior livestock, gow~rnme:nt experts could use: the: power of che scare: co protect society's weaker members and prew~nt che heedless exploitation of narural resources. Other social theorists offered more: utopian solutions to rhe problems of pM'· e:ny and social unrest. Henr}' George, a self-caught San f rancisco ne"''Spaper editor and economic theorist, proposed to soh-e: the nation's uneven distribution of wealth through what he called the single tax. In Prvgrm and A.lt't'Try ( 1879), he: argued that land should be taxed and the: funds used to mitigate the: misery caused by indusrri· alizarion. George's program was so popular that he only narrt>'l'"ly missed being e:locre:d nta)'Or of New York in 1886. The vision of a harmonious industrialized society was ...ividl)' expressed in rhe: utopian novcl Looking &tt:kwrd ( 1888) by che Massachusetts ne'I'-'Spaper editor Edward Bellamy. Case as a glimpse: into che future, ikll.amy's OO\'el emisioned a completely centralized, stare-run economy and a society in which everyone works for the common welfare. Bellamy's vision so inspired middle-class Americans fearful ofcorporate f'O"''« Mlnin Bd:itftlvtcapitlllism and working-class violence:: that near!)' five hundred local Bdlamyite organizations, wookl intviui!IC' ckmoy it:wif called Nationalist dubs, sprang up to cry co rum his dream into reality. in a viole-nt dau Jtruggk,. dwJ Ward, George, and Bdlam}' did not deny the benefits of che existing industrial ~ wqfotM~,com. munist uwpia order, rht)' simply sought to h umanize it. T hese utopian reformers envisioned a hannonious society whose members all "''Orked cogcrher. Marxist socialises advanced a different view. Elaborated by che German CHECKI NG I N philosopher and radical agitator Karl Marx ( 18 18--1883) in DIU Kapittd (da:ss cop-ee-TALL.) ( 1867) and ocher works, Marxism rested on che labor cheor}' E.Jrlyorgani.l':tr~ antmpced ro cn-..ut of \'alue: a proposition chat the labor required to produce a commodity was illl·tncomp.u.sing union:~, n ecb ;u tfwo N..uion..ll Labor Union, with the only true measure of chat commodity's value. Any profit made b)• the: gr,;and palitic.U aimJ. capitalist employer was ..surplus value"' appropriated from che exploited The Knight:~ of Labor, which wd· workers. The essence of modern history, according co Marx, was the class corned all wofi.:tn, tn~d con:~idtr struggle between the: bourgeoisie: (capitalists) and the imp()IJ'Crished prole:· ;Wle JUCI'esl but C'VNIIU..ltly li:a:Jed. tariat (the workers). 11le cvcnrual vicrors of this re\'Oiutionar}' struggle:, acThe mo~ tighdr focuJed craft cording to Marx, would be: che \l'Ork:ers. 11le:ir rriumph "''Ould usher in a un ion ltlO\..-mtnt u nder AFL ltadtr Samud Gampc'l'lli pro:!pc'-n"d by classless, communist uropia in which aUexploitation would cease. conanmui.ng an lunchbox Wuu Despite Marx's keen interest in the: United States, Marxism prM'Cd co likt w:lS"'· have lirtle appeal in late+nincreenrh·century America other than for a rin)' Violtncco, .sueh ;u the HaymarS.:ec group of primaril)' Gmnan-born immigrants. More alarming to the: public Squ.ll\" riac, rurned many American:~ at large was the handful of anarchists, again mosd)' immigran~ who re::· again.u Ubac u n KmJ and ma-de t he U JC' of violtnct :.gain.M thtm JC'tm jected Marxist discipline: and preached rhe destruction of capitalism, the vi:.cce ptahle. olent m•e nhrow of che state, and the: immediate inrroducrion of a stateless tdt..u lilo:e SCKUI DarwiniJm and the utopia. In 1892 an anarchist attempted to assassinate Henry Clay Frick, the: Go~pd al'\l'ta.lth d:uhed with the manager of Andrew Carnegie's Homestead Seed Works. His act confirmed bdidJ oft hose" who critici.ud ind uJ· ttUI $0Ci.ety'.s ucesles. the busjne:ss scercorype: of ..labor agitators'" as lawless and violent.

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"Jutvival of tbt titusf' com~ tion btot!n soci«y by ..~ing out the- un6t

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOtO FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTEN TOITONTHEGO.

KEY TERMS

How did Come?Je, Rockefeller, and other corporate leaders consolidate control Ol'tf their industries? (page 405)

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Abundant n:soutce.s and technological innovation combined with other fac· rors to fud industrial g.ro~·th . Railroads pioneered new business techniques; Carnegie, Rockefeller, and othm successfully transferred these techniques to ocher industries, such as stee-l and oil. J>ools were crrat~ to limit competition but "'\' J'C replaced by morr efficient crusts and, ultimately, holding companies, leading to huge corporations.

Whot innovations in technoloy and business dro1'e increases in industrial production after 1865? (pap 410)

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Technology contributed ncwwaysof manufacturing as wdl as new produces ro stimulate growth. Many inventions, such as the telephone and electric light bulb, changed daily life. Advertising and marketing stimulated demand for the gro~ing output of produces..

Why did the South's experience llrith induslrialiliJoon differ from that of the North and the Midwest? (pop 413)

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lack of capital and a poor ~ucati on .system hamstrung southern dewlopment Major growth came with the establishment of cotton textile mills and a handful of heavy industries, such as steel, but the South lagged far behind the rest of che nation.

Jay Gould (p. 406} lntornato Comm<m 1>1:1 (p. 41!8} J. Pierpool Morgan (p. 408) AndrewC.mogio (p. 408) vwlkal into11Jalion (p. 408) John D. Rockofelor (p. 409) Standard Oil Trust (p. 4<19) Sllorman Ant>Tru~ 1>1:1 (p. 4<19) Thomas A. Edison (p. 410) Hoory W. Grady (p. 414) Horatio Alger (p. 418) \\ideal strit.< (p. 4lQ) National Labor tnon (NLU) (p. 4lQ)

Knights of Labor (p. 4lQ) A.meri
Sartlllol Gompers (p. 421) Homestead Strike (p. 4ll) Eugeno V. O.bs (p. 423) William Gtaham Surmer (p. 423) Sodal Dninism (p. 424} Marxism (p. 424)

How did facwry~~rl<ers respond to the dlan?Jng nawre of"~rl
I

Factory work depended on unskilled ~·orkm who performed mind·numbing routine tasks, often hautdous, for lOW' pa}'· Immigrants became the mainstay of the industrial work force:, but children as young as eight worked in coal mines and cotton mills. Women worked out of their homes and entered both the factory and the office work force.

l

in the 1890s how did corporate executives undercut labor's ba'fj1iningpower? (pop 419)

Workers tried to create all-encompassing struccutrs,such as the National Labor Union and the Knights of labor, ro protect ..m rkcrs' tights, but these artcmpcs failed. The Ameri· can Federation of Labor, focusing on skilled v.n rkers and practical issues. was fat more successful. Violence flared, used by strikers and strikebreakers alike; SM~mmcms genet· ally Wl!11! willing to use violence against strikes.. Social D.l.!"'inism and che Gospe-l of Wealch were attempts ro rxplain and justifY the hatshne5S of the new industrial order, al· though a numbet ofutopian chi nkc~ notably Marxists and anarchists, protested. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

CHAPTER 19

1860-1900

C HAPTER PREVIEW

The New American City HowdKJ th~ inflwx t(imm;ypnts bt(ore 1900 tl'fltJte on owomMU ofnhnic ond doss differences? Midd ~· •nd

Upper·Ciass Society and Culture

How duJ VIctorian momlity shape middl~·doss $1Jtifty t~nd cwltun?

Wotllng·Ciass Pditics and Reform HQw dJ politJul mtKhiMs and sociol111td rrliyjo11s

n{ormm «ldm.s ~~~ pot'trfY? ~Class ltioR in tilt lmrnigJilll ay . - N tlw ..... -'"'ldossd~Mgt-.Jcs r-dlr.................. "' 1900?

-

Back.yud 8.1Mblll. 6o1ton. 1906, by lewis Hlnt

'CUltures In C4nlla HowdiiJ..nrm. 11rtisu, 11'1'111~ rT(ormm oddrru issws ofat/hmJJ ron/lia?

I

n the e.:arly twcnricrh cencury, the jazzy,

ayneop:ued dance music known as rag· time became a nt.n rluMc wll11}oplin's talent, could not emu

or

426

I THENEWAMERECANCnY

427

the fidd. As Joplin's experience ~ale:d, radal discrimination could reinforce the barriers of sodal class. Joplin's thwarted dreams ~A'Cre similar co countless others who tried to mow up the economic ladder. American society 'A'llS sfO'I'-'Iy shifting from a rural producer econom}' that stressed .....-ork and t hrift to an urban consumer economy in which new forms of mtercainmmt,le:isu.re activities, and material possessions ~A'Cre becoming the hallmarks of personal ident ity. These: changes, rogeche:r wich the expansion of salaried, white-collar occupations such as teaching and accounting, fostered growing class a~A'llrme:ss. No~Ailere: was the class awareness more: pronounced chan in che cities crO'I'--de:d with immigrants. The working class in America' s bustling dties created its O~A'tlvig· orous culru.re of dance halls, saloon~ vaudeville t heaters, social dubs, and amuse:· ment parks. MiddiHfass reformers who scro\'e co remake this working-class culrure into their own image of propriety ~A'Cre soon frustrated. In che long run, the culrure ofche masses "'-auld pro\'t: more influential in shaping modern America.

THE NEW AMERICAN CITY How did tiNt influx ofimmigmnts before 1900 create tm awargness ofethnic and class differences? Ewryday life 'A'llS t ransformed most dramatically and visibl)' in dties. Between J870and 1900 New Orleans's population nearly doubled, Buffalo's t ripled, and Chi· cago's increased more than 6VI.'.fold. By 1900, Philadelphia, New York, and Chicago all had more than a million residents, and 40 percent of all Americans lt...-ed in cities (see Table 19.1).

TABLE 19.1

U RBAN GROWTI-I : 1870- 1900

Cnv

Boston Chicago Cincinnati Los Angeles Milwaukee New Orleans New York Philadelphia Pittsburgh Portland, Oregon Richmond San Francisco Seanle ~ Thirt~nth

1870 PoCJULATIO N

1900 PoPUlATION

250,525 298,977 216,239 5,728 71,440 191,418 1,478, 103

560,892 1,698,575 325,902 102,479 285,315 287,104 3,437,202

647,022 86,076 8,293 51,038 149,473 1,t07

1,293,697 321,616 90,426 85,050

342,782 237,194

Puam lt«:REASE 123.88 468.12 50.71 1,689.08 29937 49.98 132.54 99.94 273.64 990.38 66.64 12932 21326.73

Ul'l$us ohhoe Unitoed St:!tl'$ (W~d'lington, O.C . U.S. GOVl'rnmcnt Prin tint; Offie:c, 1913).

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This spectacular urban growth, fueled by the influx of ncarI)' J J million immi· granrs, stimulated economic de\-elopment. Mushrooming cities created new jobs and markets that in curn dramatically stimulated national economic expansion. Uke che frontier, che city symbolized opportunity for all comers. The citfs unprecedented scale and diversity threatened traditional expectations of community life and stability. A medley of immigrant groups contended with one anocher and with natiw-born Americans for jobs, pc>"~r, and influence. Rapid growth strained ciry services, genera ting terrible housjng and sanitation problems. Natiw-born American city dwellers complained abouc the noise, stench, and congestion of this transformed cil)'Scape. 11lcy fretted about che ne"''comers' squalid tenements, fondness for drin k, and strange social customs. When nati\~·born refo nners set abouc cleaning up the city, they sought not onl)' to improve the physical en..ironmenc but also co destroy the discincti\-e customs that made immigrant cultures different from their own. The late nineteenth century rhus witnessed an in· tense struggle to control the ciry and to benefi t from its economic and cuirural potentiaL

lnteracti\•e Map:

Percentage of foc'eign-bom Whites and Natiw \\'bites o f Foreign or Mixed Parentage in Total

POJMJiations. 1910

i

0 ·,

·~

·.:z..-

...

Because the new industries thac were concentrated in urban settings required thousands of new work~ the promise of good wages and plentiful jobs attracted many rural and small-to"''" dwellers to the cities. Young farmwomen led the exodus to che cities. With the growing mechanization of farming in the late nineteenth cencury, farming "''lls increasingly male "-'Ork.

.0...-

"""""'- ., •

'~

Map 19.1 Asiloo ..d wroptaal...iJr•ols living in tilt W.slero Hetnisplltrt illld Hawilii in 1900

I THENEWAMERECANCnY

429

VassM College loonded Bo" William Marcy T..l!d gains conlrol ol New York's Tanvnany Hall political madlile; firsl intercollegi.ll
Mail"rder sales of factor)'·made goods meanwhile reduced the need for ~A'Omen 's work o n subsistence tasks. So, young fann\N'Omen flocked to the cities, when: they competed fo r jobs wich immigrant, African-American, and city-born ~A'Omen. From 1860 to 1890, the prospect of a better life also attracted nearly 10 million norchern European immigrants co American d ries. Their numbers included 3 mil· lion Gmnans.: 2 million English, Scorrish, and Welsh; and L5 million Irish. More· O'V\'.r, b}• 1900 more chan 800,000 French-Canadians had migrated southward to work in the New England mills, and close to a million Scandinavians n e~A•co mers had pur do~A'tl roots in the rich farmlands of\'trlSconsin and Minnesota (see Map 19. 1). In the 1 890~ these earlier immigrants from northern and ~A'CStern Europe ~A'Cre joined by swelling numbers of«newimmJgrants"'-Jcalians, Slavs, Greeks, and jews from southern and eastern Europe, Armenians from the Middle Ease, and, in Ha· waii,Japanese from Asia (see Map 19.2). In che next three decades, these new immi· gran~ man}' from peasant backgrounds, would boost Amer ica's forcign·born population by more than 18 million. The O'V\'.rwhdming majority of both old and new immigrants sctded in cities in the northeastern and norch-cemral states. The effect of their numbers was stagger· ing. In 1890 New York City contained twice as many Irish as Dublin, as many Ger· mans as Hamburg, half as man}' Italians as Naples, and rwo and a half times the Jewish population of Warsaw. Four our of 6w people in New York City had been born abroad or ~A'Cre children of foreign·bom parems. Ow~rpopulaci o n, crop failure,

"'~"· ............. immigranu aftr:r 1880 coming mainly Joud!em and ustl'rn

1Europt

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Map 19.2 Ptrt"'t of fortip-llclnl Wllftts and N..i,. W~ites ol Foroigu or Miud Pi ,..IJCO in Total Popototioo. lly Countiot 1910 As this m;~.p lndie:nn, new immigr.~n a. r;vdy 5ettled in the South. Soume:D.W.Mcini; n.,. ~otAwMn!-A c~~olsro Ko:m: o/MS!oly. 1\C!w""- "drUriwmi!rPrm, ••

V:.l&mt l.

famine, and industrial depression had dr iven some: of these immigrants from chcir homelands. Ac the: same cime, the: promise of high wages lured more: than 100,000

j apanese co work on Ha"'>aiian sugar plantations. Man)' people, especially single young men, immigrated in che belicfr.hat the United States held a bctcer future than thcir homeland. Wiw:s and childrm waited in t he: old country until che family breadwinner

had secured a job and saved enough money to pay for thcir passage to America

dlis lslft

I

Immigrant pnxt'.$5-

ing «nt« io New York City

b:crba' througt. which millions P"Rd

The transadamic journey, cramped and often stormy, fcarured poor food. litcle privacy, and rudimentary sanitary facilities. Immigrants arrived tired, fearful, and in some cases sick. Then customs officials examined them fur physical handicaps and contagious diseases. After 1891 those wich a .. loachsomr' infeccion, such as leprosy, or a sexually transmitted disease "'~re deported. l mmigrancs who passed the physi· cal examination had their names recorded. If a customs official had difficulty pro· noundng a foreign name, he anglicized it. One German Jew became fluscered when asked for his name and mumbled, "Schoyn vcrgess.en (I fo rgec)."' The inspector, who did not kno"'' Yiddish, "''rote, ..Sean Ferguson.'" In 1892 the federal govcrnmenc established a facility for admitting immigrancs on EUis Island, replacing a nearby facility run by the state of New York on Castle Garden. Angel lsland in San Francisco Bay on the West Coast sen -ed a sjmilar purpose after

I THE NEW AMERICAN CitY

431

19 10. Ac the immigrant processing centers, America's nC""--esc residents exchanged foreign currenC)' for U.S. dollars, purchased railroad cicke~and arranged lodgings. Those ......-ho arrived ~Aich enough cash, including many Gcnnans and Scandinavians, com· monl)' tt:l'V'C.Ied W\"St co Chicago, Milwaukee, and che prairies beyond. But mosc of the Irish and Italians, largd}' from poor peasant backgrounds, stayed in eastern dries, such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, where chey filled the lO'A-·est·payingjobs.

Immigrants tended to cluster together co ease the t ransi· tion to life in a new society. In 1890 a reporter observed that, if a map of Ne~A' York City's streets were colored in b}' nationality, it «would show more stripes than on the skin ofa zebra, and m ore colors than an}' rainbo~A•." late--nineceenrh-century social commentators often assumed chat each nationality dumped cogecher for reasons of national clannis hness. But settlement patters W\'.re far more complex. Most newcomers preferred co lhcrnment and church organizations. 11lis eased the path for chcir fdlow immigrants and made adjustment to American society m ore difficult for members of smaller groups. English and German dominance of the building t rades, for example, enabled those nationalities to limit che numbers of Italians hired Not all immigrants intended to remain in che United States. Exp«t· ing onl)' a brief stay, they made little effort to learn English or understand American customs. Of che Italians who immigrated co New York before 1914, nearly SO percent W\'.nt back to Italy. Ho~A'CVCr, most immigrants stayed. As the number of foreigners in U.S. cities ballooned tO'A-·ard rhe rurn of the century. all immigrant groups faced increasing hostilit}' from white nam·e-born Americans ~A•ho disliked che ne-'1'--com ers' social customs and ~A'Orried about their growing influence. Fearing che loss of the privileges and status that \l't:re associated ~Aith their white s kin color, natiV\'.·born whites often stigmatized immigrants as racially d ifferent and inferior. The experience of discrimi· nation helped co create a new common ethnic identit}'for man}' groups. Immigrants from the same hom e country forged a new sense of ethnic distinctiV\'.ness as Iris hAmerican, German-American, or jewish-American that helped them compete for political power and C'\-entually assim ilate inco mainstream society.

E\'t:r}' major city had run~o~A'tl, O\'t:rcrO'A-'ded slum neigh· borhoods, created when landlords subdivided old buildings and packed in too many residents. The poorer che renters, the worse the slums. Slums became ghettos when Ia~ prejudice, and communit}'

5-..s -.1 Gltettos

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Prima:ry Source: The Tenement Question-Inside and Out!

w. E. B. 0. Bois Slad: wc:iolo. gilt, lattr OUC' or foundtn or NMCP

l

pressure prew~nted inhabitants from moving out. During the 1890s, ltalians in New York Ciry,African·Americans in Philadelphia and Chicago, Mexicans in Los Angeles, and Chinese: in San Francisco increasingly became locked imo segregated ghettos. Life in t he slums ~A'llS particularl)•difficult for children. j uvenile diseases, such as whooping cough, measles, and scarlet fever, took a fearful toll, and infant mortality was high. In o ne immigrant ward in Chicago in 1900,20 percent of infants died in their 6rs.t year. Because tenements often bordered industrial districts, residents had co put up with t he noise, pollution, and fOul odors of tanneries, fo undries, factories, and pack· ing ho uses. Reliance on coal for steam engines and heating released vase quamicies of soot and coal dust to drift 0\'Ct the: slums. As smoke tin~d the atmosphere a hazy gra}', buildings took o n a dingy. grim}' patina. Mosc immigrants stayed in the shabbiest cenementsonly until they could afford better housing. Blacks, in contrast, were trapped in segregated districts. Driwn o ut of the skilled trades and excluded fro m mosc factory work, blacks cook menial jobs whose low pay left chem little income for housing (see Chapter 18). Radst dey dwell· ers used high rents, real estate C()I.!'Cnancs (agreements not to rem or sell co blacks), and neighborhood pressure co exclude them from areas inhabited by ~A•hi tes. Never· thcle:ss, as W. B. B. Du Bois, a black sociologist, pointed o ut in 71Je Pbilatklpbia Nr· gro(l 899), wealthy black entrepreneurs ~Aithin these: neighborhoods built their own churches, ran successful businesses, and established charitable organizations to help their people.

The same cities chac harbored slums, suffering.. and vio· lence also boasted neighborhoods of dazzling opulence. The wealthy built mon umental residences o n exclusi..-e thoroughfares jusc outside t he dO'I'-'ntown, among t hem Fifth Aw:nue in N ew York, Common~A'Calth Avenue in Boston, and Euclid (VOO-did) Avenue in Cle:\·dand. Middle-
I M.JOOI.i;· A~O UPPtR·ClASS SOOttY AXO CUllVIIE

433

MIDDLE- AND UPPER- CLASS SOCI ETY AND CULTURE How did Victorian momlity shape middle-cl4ss s.«iety and c.ultun? Spared the: struggle for survival that co nfronted most Americans, che middle and upper classes faced a differcnc challenge: explaining and racionalizing t he: mate· rial benefits of the emerging consumer society. 1b juscif)' che achievements of sod· cty's wealthiest members, ministers, advice-book writ~ and ocher commentators appealed to Victorian morality, a set of social ideas intluencial among che privi· leged classes of England and che United States during the rcign ( 1837- 1901) of Brit· ain•s Queen Victoria. Proponents of Victorian morality argued that the success of the middle: and up· per classes rested o n their su perior talent, imdligence, morality, and self-controL Women were identified as che driving force fur moral improvement. While men en· gaged in che ~A'Orl d 's wo rk, women provided t he: gentle, elevating influence that would lead socie:cy in its upward march.

V"Kbriu .....&ty Saic:t code' ofgmtility that permt..ltl'd btt. ninttft'ntb.cmnuy society

I

Several fundamental assumptions shaped t he Victorian world view. First, human narure was malleable; people could impro"'e themselves. Thus Americans in the: Victo· rian era pursued reform wich intense: moralism. Second. hard wo rk developed per· sonal self-disdpline and also fostered national progress. Finally, good manners and "culture'" in che form of literature and the fine: arts were hallmarks of a t ruly civilized society. Victorian morality after the Civil War was marked by a preoccupation wit h man· ners and social rituals. Behavior as well as income defined social standing. Good manners, including a kno~Aiedge: of proper etiquette in all social occasi on~ especiall}' dining and entertaining, became: a badge of status. Meals cvolw~:d into rituals that differentiated che social classes. They presented occasions for d is pla)i ng t he dabo· race silver and china chat middle:· and upper-class families exclusively possessed. and they provided telltale dues to a family's level ofrc-.fine:menc and sophistication. The Victorian code. with its emphasis o n morals, manne:rs,and behavior, height· ene:d class differences and created visible: distinctions among social groups. Promi· nenc Victorians might claim their sincere interest in helping others to imprm-e them.sel\-e~ but more often than not their self·righceou~ intensely moralistic out· look simp!)' widened the: gap created by income disparities.

Minner's and Morals

Victorian vie'I'-'S on morality and culrure, coupled ~Aith ris· ing pressures on consumers to make d«isions about a mountain of domestic produces, had a subtle but impor· cane impact on middiHfass expectations abouc a wo man's role within the home. From che J840s on~A'ard, t he home had been idealized as "che ~A'Oman's sphere,"' a protected retreat where she could express her sp«ial maternal gifts, including a sen· sitivity toward children and an aptitude for religion. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Victorian advocates of the cult ofdomestidty added a new obligation for women: to foster an arcistic environment char would nurru.re the famii)"S cultural impro'IC· mc:nc.. Houses became statements of cultural aspirations, ~Aith rarely used front parlors chat were cluttered ~Aith ornate furnishings and curios, and elaboratd)' orna· mc:nced architectural styles gained popularity. Excluded from che world of business and commerce, women d irected their energy to transforming chcir homes into ..a place of repose, a refuge from the cxcitemenc and d istractions of outside. .. , pro· \ided ~Aith e\·cry actainable means of rest and recreation." Not all middle-dass women pursued this domestic ideal. For some, the dr udg· cry of house\N'Ork and of running the family ow~rwhdmed any concern for artistic accomplishment. For others, the artistic ideal itself was noc to their caste. In the 1880s and 1890s, ~A
Although Victorian chought justified the privileges of the well-tCHto, many people found it difficult to shake the thriftiness of their carl)' )'tat'S and accept the new preoccupation with accumulation and displa)'· In the 1880s merchandisers encouraged Americans to loosen their purse strings and enjo)• prosperity by emphasizing the high quality and IotA' cosc of their goods. Key to changing atcicudes about consumption was the department store. In the final quarter of che nineteenth cencury, entrepreneurs like Roland Macy, john

............. Stores

•ep•tl.e.. slloft

Empotium dtdGtrd to convincing middle. and upper.da5lJ womm tholt consumption attl'llctiYe ;u,d tT.Sptrtllhlc

w•

Monll•l Field's o.p.nmollt Start, Oicago, 1890 Dep.:~rtmc:nt

uon:s sec the

n;u~d;ard IOrmen·s.:~nd

women·s f.uhions.. Brightly lit store windows d:rew crowds of onlookc:I"S e:~ger to disc~ the l:~test f.!briu ;u~d styles.

I M.JOOI.i;· A~O UPPtR·ClASS SOOttY AXO CUllVIIE

435

Wanamaker, and Marshall Field made the department score an urban inscirution and transformed the shopping experience fo r their middle- and upper-class pacrons. Merchants like Macy and Wanamaker OV'Crcame middle· and upper·dass rduccance to spend b)• advertising produces ac «rock-bottom" prices and by waging price ~A'llrs to validate their claims. They also cried to make shopping an exciting activity. The stores became more and more ornate, wich stained-glass skylights, marble: staircases, brilliant chande· licrs, and plush carpets. 11le large urban department store: functioned as a workplace for the lo\1/Cr
Ac a time when relaciV\'.ly few Americans possessed C'\o-en a high·school education, colleges and universities repre· senced another stronghold of che business and profes· sional d ite and of the: moderately well-to·do middle: class. Wealthy capitalists gained scacure: and a measure of immorcalityby endowing colleges and uni\·crsjties. In 1885 Leland Stanford and his ~Aife: launched Stanford UniV\'.rsity wich a bequest of $24 million.: in 1891 john D. Rockefeller donated SJ4 million to found che UniV\'.rsityof Chicago. Industrialists and businessmen dominated che boards of crusce:es of man}' educational institutions, and colleges were vie'l'--ed as a training ground for furure business and professional leaders. The athletic 6e:ld as well as the: classroom prepared affluent young men for busi· ness and the professions. Football, adapted from English rugby. became an elite spore played by college ce:ams. Because Social Darwinism emphasized stTuggte, foot· ball seemed an ideal arena for impnwing the: strength, courage, and self-discipline of youth. Some defenders of the spore insisted that foot· ball could funccion as a surrogate froncie:r experience in an increasingly urban society. By 1900 football had become: a popular fall spore, stimulating alumni giv· ing and building goodwill for chose elite: institutions that ochct'Aise remained far outside: che experience of the a\-erage American. More than JSO new colleges and universities appeared between 1880 and 1900, and enrollments more than doubled. 11lis expansion of college education led co the: expansion of wome:n•s roles. Coeducational pri· \'ate colleges and public universities enrolled increasing numbcrs of women. Some: colle:~s-for instance, Vassar ( 1865) and Br)'tl Mawr ( 1884)-W'Cre founded solely for "-'Omen. At chese: institutions, participation in college organizations, athletics, and dramatics en· agar-Box label. c. 1910 able:d female students to learn traditionall)' «mascu· Y.tn;2r College, 10\mdtd in 186S, promotl'd the new line" strategies for gaining power. By the turn of the: i:m;2ge ofwom;2nhood by str\"Ssing the int~~OJ\I'Itetions ce:mur)', ~A'Omen made up more: chan one-third of the: ;2mong ~duG~tion, ;2thletics, ;u~d tthia. total college:·student population.

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CHECKI NG I N The Viaori;ln middk d .:..u h.ad u pper-d.:.JJ ;utitudu t hat facu,;ed on mor;llicy ;lnd soci;ll com-.en tiao. The ~cult o(domut~i ty" Jh;lped the li\l\":1 o r m tddJe·cl.uJ women, who wue expect«! to focw: on the home and iu cuhur;L) rl'finemem. Oep.vtml'-nt Jtol'<e:l Qt«ed to t he middle ;lnd upper danu, and m;lde Jhopping atuaai\-.e and rn peaable. football bu a mC' the dominant collep' Jpor t bec;lUJe it w.u thought to build characte r. High« education llouriJhed; new co-educational policiu allowt>d women to ;lequin- coUege ed ucuion .u ne\'<e-r beiOn; the r~rc.h u n i'A'u:it)• emerg«l.

lnnovati\'l' presidents such as Cornell's Andrew 0 . White and Harvard's Charles W. Eliot sought to change the focus of higher education. The change was most evident in medical education. Using che experimental mcthod de\'l'lopcd by German scientis~ American medical professors insisted that all medical students be cra.ined in biology, chemistry, and ph}'Sics, including working in a laboratory. New educational and professional standards, simi· !arty. were: established for architects, engin eers, and la~A')'ers. 11lese changes were pare of a larger transfonnarion in h igher education that produced a new inscirution, che research universJty. Unlike antebel· lum colleges, which taught Little beyond classical Languages, thcolog}',logic, and machematics, the new research uni,..ersicies offered courses in a wide variety of subjects, established professional schools, and encouraged faculty members co pursue basic resea.rch. Cornell, che University of Wisconsin at Madison, johns Hopkins, Han•ard, and ochers laid the groundwork for the: central role that U.S. universities would play in the incdlcctual, cultural, and scientific life ofche twentieth centUr}'·

WORKING-CLASS POLITICS AND REFORM resatdi ..Mrsity New t)llr

I=u""

ofuhool offi:ring wick variety ofJu.ll;ect.s, l"l!CCIA'.aging

l

"'loss"'

Utl»n polioo.J lt.uler;

How did politico/ nwchines and social and religious reformers address urban poverty? 11le comra.sc betv.r'een the affluent world of the college-educated middle and upper dasses and the: gritty lives of the working class was graphicall}' displayed in the nation's growing urban centers, where immigrant newcomers reshaped political and social institutions co meet chcir needs. If department scores furnished new so· cial spaces for the middle and upper dasses, saloons became the poor man's dub, and dance halls became single women's home away from home. While the rich and the well-born looked askance ac 10'11.-er-cfass recreational activities and soughc co force the poor to change their ways, ~A'Orking~dass Americans, the immigrant newcomers in particular, fought co preser\'l' their own way of life. Indeed, the late nine· teenth cenrury witnessed an ongoing batde co eradicate sodal drinking, reform " boss» politics, and curb lower-dass recreational activities.

bt.uiC'd the nwcbine, of'ttll ~up<

pol;bcal .....!Ooe """"

I

politiul orpniation that controlk d ~·· manipu.. bttd immigt.lntll

Earlier in che cemur}'• che swelling numbers of urban poor had gi\-en rise to a new kind of politician, the «boss,'" who presided O\'et che dty's poUdc.al machine-an unoffidal policical organization designed to keep a particular party or faction in office. Whcche:r officially serving as mayor or not, the boss, assisted by local ~A'llrd or precinct cap· tains, wielded enonnous influence in city gOVI.'.rnmenc.. For better or worse, the political machine 'A'llS America's u nique contribution co municipal go\-ernment in an era of pell·mdl urban g~·ch. 1}'Pified b}•Tammany Hall, the Democratic organization that dominated New York City politics from the 18 30s to che J930s, machines emerged in a host of dties during the Lace nineteenth century.

1WOilJ(tNG·Cws PouncsAN O REFORM By the turn of the century, many cities had experienced machine rule. Working through the local ward captains to turn out unusually high numbers of voters, the machine rodr herd on the tangle of municipal bureaucracies, controlling who was hired for the police and fire departments. It rC""-ardcd irs friends and punished its enemies t hrough its concrol of taxes, licenses, and inspections. At the ndghborhood level, t he ward boss often acted as a "''Cifare agent, hdping the need)' and protecting che troubled. Apparenc ~nerosity enhanced che bosses' image, at little cosc: ten dollars co pay a ce:nemcnt dweller's rent meant a lot co t he poor but was small change co bosses who raked in millions from public concraccs and land deals. Although the machine helped alleviate some suffering, it entangled urban social scnices with corrupt politics and often prew~ntcd dty gow~rn mem from responding co che real problems of che dey's neediest inhabitants. Under New York City's boss William "Magear'' 'IWeed, t he Tammany Hall rna· chine sank to newdepchs ofcorrupcion. Between 1869 and 1871, 1\veed dispensed 60,000 patronage positions and pumped up che dey's debe by S70 million through graft and inflated contracts. 11le details of the 1U.·ecd ring's massive fraud and corruption were brilliantly satirized in Harpt>r'r W«~' by German immigrant cartoon· ist Thomas Nast. Convicted of fraud and extortion, 1"ttd was sentenced to jail in 1873, served cwo years, escaped to Spain, was reapprehended and reincarceratcd, and died in jail in 1878. By the turn of the century, che bosses were facing ~A'CU -organ iud assaults on their po~A'Cr, l ed by an urban elite whose members sought to restore "good govern· ment" (see Chapter 2 1). In chis atmosphere the bosses in cre-asingly forged alliances with civic organizations and reform leagues. 11le results, although never entirely satisfactory to any of the parties involved, paw~d the way for new sewcr and cranspor· mcion system~ expanded parklands, and im prow~d public services- a record of con· siderable accomplishment, giw~n the: magnitude: of che problems created by urban

437

w&.. "Mipll" r-.t

l

Conupt bo.ss of the 1Mnnuny tbll orpnizlrion that l'llll Ntw YorltC"IIt)'

gro~A'th.

In cont rast to the bosses' piecemeal attempts co aid t he urban poor, middle-class reformers sought comprehensi\'e solutions. jacob Riis and other reformers beliC"t'f:'d thac immigrants' lack of sdf-concrolled to t heir miseries. Thus reformers often fo. cused on t he: moral imprO\"C.ment of the poor while: ignoring the: crippling effect of low wages and dangerous wo rkingcondicions. Humanitarian campaigns co help t he destitute often cumed inro crusades to Americanize the immigrants and eliminate their "offensive" and "self-destructive" behaviors. Jlowrty relief W'Orkers first targeted che young, considered the: most malleable. Early Protestant social reformers scarred charitable societies to help t ransient }'OUchs and screct ~A'llifs. In 1843 Robert M. Hardey, a fo nne:r employee of the New York Temperance Society, fou nded the New York Association for Improving the Condi· cion ofche Poor to urge poor families to change their ways. Hardey's \'Oiuncaristic approach was supplemented by the more coercive tactics of Charles Loring Bran; who fOunded the New York Children's Aid Society in 1853. Wor· ried thac t hey might join the city's "dangerous classes,"' Brace S\l't:'pt orphaned children off the streets, shipped che:m to rhe: country, and placed them ~Aich families to work as

Battling Powrty

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fann hands. Where Brace gave adolescents an alternative to living in che slums, che Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Young Women's Christian Assoda· rion (YWCA} provided housing and wholesome recreacion for councryboys and young women ~Atho had migrated to the dty. Both organizations subjected cheir members to curfe""-'S and expelled chem for drinking and ocher forbidden behavior. By 1900, more than fi fteen hundred YMCAs and YWCAs served as hai,!'CnS fo r nearly a quarter-million young men and women. But YMCA and YWCA leaders reached only a small porcion of che }"Oung adulc population. 11le str:uegy was too narro~Aiy focused to stem che rising tide of urban problems.

Sil..ti• Amy Rtligiow

I"'""

group t$Ublidltd 10 aid tbe

I -..,~ '"'"'"•' Mor;al Purity awadt ~pinst urbm l'ia, coiTuprieln

The inability of relief organizacions co cope ~Aith the ex· plosh-e gro~A'tb of the urban poor in the 1870s and 1880s convinced man}' middle-dass Americans that urban pt'>\'· erty had reached dangerous proportions. Social reformers began to dcvclop new strategies to fight poverty. One of the earlicsc and most ef'fc\'erty, and that the "-pro miscuous charity"' ofO\'erlapping "-elfarc agcn· des undermined the desire co work, the COS tried to foster sclf-sufficienq• in its charges. Critics justly accused the COS and similar groups of seeking more to concrol than to help the poor. More often than not, che friendly visitors \l-ore cultural blind· ers, misundentanding the real source of the difficulties faced by the poor and ex· pecting to e:f'fc
Other re:fonners pushed for tougher measures against sin and immorality. In 1872 Anthony Comstock, a pious )'Oung dr)'·goods clerk, fo unded the New York Society for the Suppression ofVice and demanded that municipal authorities d ose do~A'tl gam· bling and locter}' operations and censor obscene publicacions. Nothing S)'tl'lbolizcd the contested cerrain between middle· and lo~Att·d ass cui· ture becter than the fighc over prostitucion, socially degenerate to some and a source of recrcacion to others. Brochels- houses of proscirution--expanded rapidly from the time of the Civil \l'ar until the JSBOs, ~A>hcn saloons and cabarets, often con·

I WOilJ(tNG·Cws PouncsANO REFORM

43 9

trolled by political machines, r~:placed them. Rrformct'S assumed, incorrtccl)', that immigrant ~A
Meanwhile, in the 1870s and 1880s a handful of Protcs· ram ministers explored radical alcernati\>eS for aiding im· pOV\'.rished dry du-ellers. Appalled by slum condicions, they argued that the rich and well-born deserved part of the blame for poverty and thus had a responsibility co do something about it. William S. Rainsford, the minister of New York Ciry's St. George's Episcopal Church, pioneered che scxalled inscirutional church mo\-emenc, whereb)• large dO\l-'ntO\l'll churches in once·elice districcs no"' m•e rnm by immigrants provided their new ncighbors with social services as u-ell as a place co worship. Supported by his wealthy church warden,). Pierpont Morgan, Rainsford organized a boys' dub, builc recreacional facilicies on rhe Lower East S ide, and escablished an industrial training program.. Another efforc within Protestantism co right contemporary \\Tongs "''as the Social Gospel mM>cm ent, Launched in che 1870s by Congrcgacional minister Wash· ington Gladden of Columbus, Ohio. Gladden insisted chat t rue Christianity com· mirs men and women to fight social injustice. If Gladden set t he cone for the Social Gospel, \'t'alter Rauschenbusch, a minister in New York City's notorious Hdl's Kitchen neighborhood, articulated its philosophy. Educated in Gmnan)', Rauschenbusch argued that a truly Christian society \I.'Ould unite all churches, reorganize the industrial system, and work for international peace. Alchough t he Social Gospd at· tracted onl)' a handful of l'rotestams, their earnest voices blended wich a grO\l-·ing chorus of cricks bemoaning che nacion's urban \I.'IXS.

By the 1880s many concerned citizens had become convinced that reform pressure applied from che cop down, hO\l-\.''Vt.r wcll intentioned, was ine-ffocci\-e and wrong-headed. A new approach to social work \l.'llS needed. A )'OUnger generation ofcharity \l'Orkers, led b)•Jane Addams, de\·eloped a new weapon against desticution: the settlem ent house. Like rhe Social Gospelers, these: reformers recognized that che hardships of slum life u-ere often bt)'Ond individuals' control. Stressing the environmental causes of crime and poverty, setd emenc-house reliefu:orkers themselves m~d into poor neighborhoods, where, in Addams's words, they could see firsthand «the struggle for existence, ...,.Jlich is so much harsher among people ncar the edge of pauperism."

S.O.. c..pel •~~'

I"""""'

doctrine diu W'C'.l.!tby mu:st :cid

- o.....d"in Sl'ttlemmt..hCJWt~ 1bttr won Nobel Pe:ltt Priu

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440

Gorbagt Box. Fim Word. Cllic•go. c. 1900 l..:ldo:ing sp;1ce for recrc:;~.tion , immig;~.nt ehildnn pl:~y ;,.cop g;:ub:~ge b oxn in crowded :~11-eys. Coneuned fOr thoeir he;alth,J:~ne Add:~rn.s \'oTOh" th:~t "this sla.ughu:r of in nocents, this inAiction ol suffermg_ o n the newborn, is so gr;~.tuitous ;md so unf;~.ir, th;~t it is o nly ;~. q uution of time until ;an oub':~ged s.ense ofjull'tiee sh:~U ~ ;an:n.t$ed on bef.;~.lf of these children ."

The youngest daughter of a successful Illinois businessman, j ane: Addams purchased a dilapidated mansion in Chicago in 1889. After 0\'ct'Se:eing extensive re· pairs, she and her co~At: and self-sacrifi cing. Addams ru.rne:d Hull House into a social center for recent immigrants. She invited ne:wl}' arri\·ed Italian immigrants to plays; held d as.se:s in English, civics, cooking, and dressmaking: and en· Urban policie~ w:.s often domin.:ned couraged them co preserve their traditional crafts. She sec up a kindergarten, by coiTupt boslC'S and the m.a(hinel a laundry, an employment bureau, and ada}' nursery for ~At:rnme:m officials. The S;dvation Anny ;~.nd t:n::ome. wdl~born to hdp the poor. But in their attempt co promote class cooperation and social harmony, SttdC'Ulent hou$e$ brought m iddJesettlement houses had mixed success. Although immigrants appreciated the: d .u.,: women into t he .durru to provide :~ervicu and ;tttadt urban settlement houses' resources and activity, they widely felt chat the reformers probknu.. cared little fo r increasing immigrant political po""-"er.

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WOilJ(tNG·ClASS U ISUitt IN TH EI MMIGRAA"f CllY

441

WORKING-CLASS lEISURE IN THE I MMIGRANT CITY 1-/ow did the urNn working dtUs clwnge at6t41des toward leisure and re~11tion by 1900? In colonial America the subject of leisun: time had general!)' arisen o nl)' ~At.en ministers condemned "idleness" as the 6rst step CO~A'llrd sin. In the rural culture of the early ninetttnth cenrury, the u nremitting routines of farm labor had le-ft lirtle rime for relaxation. Family picnics, horse races, county fai~ rl!\i\•als, and holidays like the- Fourth of july and Christmas had proYided permissible diversion, but C\o\':n in relaxation earlier generations had guarded against "laziness."' As urban populations and factories multiplied after che Civil War, new patterns of leisure and amusement eme-rged, especially among the urban ~A
No segment of the populace had a greater need for rec:.re· arion than che urban working class. Hours of tedious, high!)' disciplined, and physically exhausting labor le-ft workers tired but thirsty for excitement and escape from their cramped living quar· tcrs. In 1889 a banner carried by a carpenters' union summed up thcir needs: ..eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and eight hours for what we ~Aill."' City scrects provided some recreation. Relaxing after a day's ~A
Slreets and Saloons

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The Rise of Professloul Sporls

As an English game called rounders, baseball had existed

sin ce the sC\o-ence:ench cmru.ry. If Americans did nor create:

baseball, they nevert heless cook t his informal children's game: and rurned ic into a major professional sport. In 1845 t he New York Knicker· bock~ t he: first organized baseball team, was established. In che 1860s, rules were: codified, and che sport assumed its prescm form, fearuring m--erhand pitching, fi elders' gim--es, nine-inning games, and bases spaced ninety fe:ct aparc.. In 1869 t he

Cincinnati Red Stockings, che fi rst team to put its players under contract for the whole season, toured the country and ended the season with fi fty·sC"".-cn wins and no losses.

J. . L Slllhan Nuvyv.>eight

I

boxing champion

Team O'A'tlCrs organized che National League: in 1876 and took control of t he game. Crowds of ten thousand to twdve thousand fans flooded imo ballparks each game, creating enonnous profits for t he O'A'tlers. Newspapers thrived on baseball. Jo· scph Pulitzer introduced the 6rsc separate sporrs page ~Ailen he bought the NNI' Y<Jrk World in 1883, and baseball dominated the paper's sports reporting. By t he 1890s baseball was big business. The working class in particular took baseball co heart. 1'he most profitable teams came fro m industrial cities with Large working·dass populations. HO\I.~\'er, if baseball helped build solidarity among some ethnic gro up~ ic also fostered discrimi· nation against blacks. At least 6fty·fh·e blacks plared on integrated teams berw«n 1883 and 1898. Increasingly thereafter, blacks were banned from playing on profcs· sional teams and banished co their own league. Although no other organized spore att racted as large a follo~A'ing as baseball, horse racing and boxing alsodre~A' I~ cro....-dsof spectators and reccivcd wide press CM'etage. But whereas races such as Louisville•s Ken tuck)' Derb)•became social t'\'ents for the rich, professional boxing aroused passionate devotion in the working class. Bare· knuckle prizefighting 'A'llS alread)' a popular amusement for working-class men. The boxing rings became an arena where l o~A'Cr·dass men could assert chcir indh'idu· aliry and ph)'Sical prOIA-ess. The hero of nineteenth-century professional spores was heavyweight fighcer john L. Sullivan. Of lrish·immigrant scock, Sullh•an began boxing in 1877 at age nineteen. With his massi\J'C physique, handlebar mustache, and arrogant swagger, Sullivan was enormously popular. Barnstorming across the country, he \'anquished a succession of local stro ng men, invariably wearing his trademark gr«n righrs with an American flag wrapped arou nd his middle. Sullivan alread)' refused co fight black~ supposedly in deference to che ~A'is hes of his fans. lhis policy convenientl}' aJ. IO\l·ed him to avoid facing the fi nest boxer of the J880s, che Australian black, Pecer Jackson.

Vludtvlle. Alllusemelll lifts,

IIIII O.Ct Halls

In comrasc co the male presen-e of saloons and prize· fighrs, the world of vaude\'ille sho~A'S, amusement parks, and neighborhood dance halls u-elcomed all com~ re· gardlcss of gender, and prO\"t'CC particularl)' congenial co

working·dass wo men. Vaudeville (VAWD--vill), with roots in ancebdlum minstrel sho"A'S t hat featured white comedians made up as blacks (s« Chapter II), offered a succession of acts

designed for mass appeaL l 'he vaudeville show typically opened with an animal act or a dance number, follo"''Cd by a musical interlude. Then came: comic skits ridiculing the trials of urban life, satiri.z.ing police and m unicipal ineptitude. poking fun at the d ifferent accents in che: immigrant city, and mining a rich vein of ethnic humor and stereotypes. After more musical numbers and acrs by \~ntriloquists and magicians, the: program ended with a "flash" final e: featuring tl}ing·trapcu artists or the: like. By the 1880s vaudeville was drawing Larger crowds than any other form of cheater. lc provided an evening of inexpensr.~,ligh thearted entertainment and let immigrants Laugh ac their 0"'11 experiences, as translated into slapstick and caricature. Whereas \'audeville offered psychological release from the stresses of working· class life, amusement parks provided physical escape:. The fun houses, thrill rides, and games of Ne:"'' York's Coney Island o pened in 1895 as the: prorocype of urban amusement parks, sprawled along the Brookl}'tl waterfront. By 1900 as many as 500,000 people "''Ould thro ng the: beach, the boardwalk, and the: amusement parks on a summer Sacurday. Young couples rode thro ugh the: dark Tunnel of Lo\·e, sped d~·n the diuying roller coaster, and "''lltched belly dancers in che sideshow~ mo· mentarily surrendering to the spirit of exuberant pia}' and losing chcmse:to.-es in fan· easy. For immigrant V.'Omen, in particular, the exciting musk and the warm spell of a summer night could seem like a magical release: from the: drudgery of daily life.

Primary Source: Vaude\lille Poster, Majestic Theater

Nothing more: vividly illustrates the differences between the culcure:s of the middle class and the working class than the: comrascing styles of popular m usk that each fa· \'Orcd. Whereas the middle class preferred hymns or songs "'ith a moral message, the working class embraced ragtime, che product of African·American m usicians in the saloons of the South. Ragtime developed ouc of che: rich tradition of songs through "'ilich black Ameri· cans had eased the burdens of their life. Like spirituals, ragtime used syncopated rhythms and complex harmonics, but it blended them with marching· band musical structures to create a disrincti\-e style. A fa\'Orite of" honk}'· tonk'" piano pla}•ers, ragtime was introduced to che broader public in che Saloon$ b«-.ame polifinl a$ wdl ;u 1890s and became: a national sensation. wcial u n ten: (or immig rant men. The reasons for chc sudden ragtime craze were complex. Inventive, Pru(...,$ional $pofU, such a$ bueb.U~ playful, with catchy synco pations and an infectious rhythm in the bass appe-aled $trongly ro urban clef, the music displa)-ed an originality that had an appeal aUirs own. Part immigr,;an u . of ragtime's popularity also came from its origin in brothels and its asso· Boxing produ ced ht~ lik.-Jo hn L dation with blacks, "'rho were "'idel}' stereotyped in the: 1890s as sexual, Sullivan. sensual, and uninhibited by the rigid Vicrorian social conventions that re:· V,;aud t'Ville a nd dan« hills: pcovided cheap popular entertoainment, ,;and stricted whites. Hence, ragtime's greac popularity prm-~d a mixed blessing u .Wn amw<'-rMnt parl:$ 11ke Coner for blacks. While: it helped break down the barriers faced by blacks in the: bland atu-acted huge CI'O'>\'(k music industr}', it also co nfirmed some whites' sre:rcocype of blacks as Ragtime brought A(tie,;an·American primiti..-e and sensual, a bias char underlay the racism of rhe period and m w:ic into whife communifi'-"" C'\'C'-n helped justify segregation and discrimination.

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444 CULTURES IN CONFLICT How did writers$ artists~ and educationt1l refcwmers address Usun ofc.ult.urt1l conflict? Even ~Aithin the: elite and middle classes, Victorian morality and genteel cultural standards were nC\o-er totally accepted. As 1900 d.t~A'tled, quescions about Victo· rian morality and new cultural scirrings intensified. At che center of the: cuirural turbulence stood women, incrtasingl)' dissatisfied with the restrictive code of femi· nine propriety. The growth of women's clubs and "-"Omen's colleges, and c' 'e n the bi· cycle fad of the 1890~ aUcontributed to the emergence of'A•hat some began to call the "new woman."' At the same rime, a widening chasm divided the ~A'Cll·to·do from the mass of im· migranc Laborers. In no period of American histot}' have class conflicts been as open and raw. Nervously eyeing the noisy cultun: of city scrects, saloons, boxing clubs, dance h all~ and amusement parks, middle-class leaders pcn::eived a massii,!'C, if un· conscious, challenge to chcir own cuirural and social standing. Some middiHfass reformers promoted public schools as a means co impose middle< lass values on the: ul'ban masses, and others batcle:d urban ..vice" and "-immorality." By 1900 the: Victo· rian social and moral echos was crumbling on every fro nt.

What was this gcme:d culru.re that aroused such opposi·

The Genleel ... Its CrttksTradition tion? In che J870s and 1880s, a group of upper·dass ~A'fit·

I

~ T•aift Writl'r, humoriJit, crUX of gmtc"cl u ;u;iition

ers and editors, led by Charles Eliot Norco n of HaJVard and E. L Godkin ofTbt 1\tasion, codified standards for writing and design, and cried to create: acohcrenc national artistic culru.re. joining forces with allies in Boston and New York, these elites lobbied to .. impto\"l!" American caste: in interior furnishings, textiles, cerami~ wallpaper, and books. Godkin and editors of other "quality" peri· odicals created an important forum fo r serious ~Aritcrs in 11tt J'>lation and Tbt Adantic Monthly. Now: list Hent}' j ames, ~Ailo published vin:ually all ofhis work in the Alldnsic, reflected the vie'I'-'S of this elite lite:rar}' establishment. .. It is arc that m4kts life," he: wrote. Although chese: genteel magazines provided an important forum for new au· thors, their editors' strident elitism and imperialistic desire co concrol national liter· ary standards bred opposition. Samuel Langhorne Clemens, better known as Mark TWain, spoke for man}' young writers when he declared as early as 1869 that he was through wich "literaru.re and all that bosh." Attacking aristocratic literary com-en· tions, 1\l•ain and others who shared his concerns ~A
I

CVUVRES IN CONFUct

445

South. O thers, among them William Dtan Hcw.-ells, focused on a truthful, if optimistic, depiction ofthe commonplace. Another group, called naturalists, stressed economic and ps)'chological determinants and often examined che dark u nderside of life. In Af<~grfr: A Girl o{tlx sm.-:s ( 1893), a bleak stor}•of an innocent girl's exploitation and sui· cide in an urban slum, Stephen Crane wrote "'that is gecnerally consid· ered the first naturalist American nM-el. l abels aside, all these writers shared a skepticism about literary conventions and an intense desire to understand the society around them. The careers of Mark 1Wain and Theodore Dreiser highlight che changes in che publishing industry and the evolution of new forms of writing. Both were products of the Midwest, outsiders to che East Coasc licerar}' establishment- 1\vain fro m Missouri and Dreiser fro m Indiana. As young men, both worked as ne""-'Spaper reporters and traveled widely. 1"'llin and Drciser called on their own experiences to write about the human impact of the wrenching social changes that surrounded them: the flow of people to che expanding cities and the relentless scramble for power, wealth, and fame. In Adt:e-ntun.s of HMckltbtrry Finn ( 1884), lV.ain uses the riwr journey of two runaways, the rebel· Mlrk Twiin lious Huck and che slaw: jim, to explore che nature of contemporary Tw.~i n " ot o nly broke &om highbr~d American society by contrasting the id)ilic life on the raft with che li t~r.vy sbnd:an:ls but ;al:;o ere;~~ted :1 unique p~rwn;al styf-c: through h is tawdry, fraudulent "-"Orld of the small riwrfront towns. Dreiser's Sir studi-ed prose ;a~ disti netiV\" ;attil'\':. ter Carrit' ( 1900) traces che journey of Carrie Meeber, an innocent and actracciw girl, from her Wisconsin farm home to Chicago. Seduced by a traveling salesman, Carrie moves in wich Hurst"--ood, che mar· ried proprietor of a fancy saloon. Driw n by her desire for cxpensi\'e department· store clothes and lavish entertainment, Carrie follows Hurst"-uod to New York, abandons him when his money runs out, and pursues her own ~r in the cheater. 1"'llin and Drdser broke sharply with che genced tradition's emphasis on man· ners and decorum. Ctmury magazine readers complained that HU coupled "'ith www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

the economic depression and seething labor agitation of the 1890s, made it increas· ingl)' difficult for tum+of·the-cemury middle-dass Americans co accept the smug, sclf-saris6ed belief in progress and genced culture that had been a hallmark of the: Victorian outlook.

...llemisnl

l 'R"nd in t.Uly

twmrieth~otury tbought ;and

aotbmc'll tt.. R'jecttd Viefo. No formodis:m in f.owor of nt'W

mock:c or~rima ;and t.qH'C'Uioo

- u.,.IWricht Nd>;,a 1who ttjccud V"ICU!ri.ul fuuini':U

The challenge: to the: genteel tradition also found support among architects and paincers. Architects fo!IO""-\!d the: lead of Louis Sullivan, who argued that a building's form sho uld follow its fun ccion. In their view, banks, for exam · pie, should look like 6nandal institutions, not Greek temples. Rejecting elite preten· sions, architects looked to the future-to modernism, a quest for new modes of expression-for inspiration. Frank Lloyd Wright's "prairie--school" hous~ first builc in the Chicago suburb of Oak l'ark in the: 1890s, represented a typical modernist break with the: past. Wright scorned the bulky Victorian house, ~Aith ics large attics and basements; his designs, fe:acuring broad, sheltering roofs and low silh ouettes harmonious with the flat prairie landscape, used open, interconnecting rooms co create a sense of spaciousness. Modernism's rejeccion ofVictorian gentility influenced fate--nine:teench-centur}' painting as ~A'CU. Winslow Homer's warm:olors pictured nature as brutally tough and un.sentimencal.: in his grim, d e:mencal seascapes, lone men struggle against mas· sivc wa\'l'S that threaten to m--erwhe:lm them. Tho mas Eakins's canvases of swim· mers, box~ and rO""-\!rs (such as his well-known Tbt Chttmpion Singlt Sculls, 1871) captured moments of vigorous ph)>sical exertion. Mary Cassatt shared Eakins's in· terest in C''ICt)•day life, bur she often took as her su bject che bond between mocher and child, as in her painting Tht Bath (c. 1891). l 'he architects' and painters' rt \'Oit was symptomatic of a larger shift in middle-class thought that resulted from funda· mcneal economic changes. As one minister obs~d in 1898, che transition from muscle co mechanical poW'Cr had "separated, as by an impassable gulf, the: simple, homespun, individualistic world of the ... pasc, from che complex, d osel)' associ· ated life of the present." Viccorian placirudes about proper manners and graceful arts seemed our of place in the big. glittering, electrified cities of iron and glass. Distrusting idealistic Viccorian assumptions about social progress, the middle: class ne\-erthdess disagreed over how co replace them. Nor until the: Progressive Era would social reformers draw on n t~A' expertise in social research wich an enlarged conception of the federal go'lernmcm•s regulator}' power to break sharp!)' with chcir Victorian predecessors' social outlook.

The role of middle:·dass ~A>omen in the rt\'Oit against Yic· torian refinement ~A>as complex and ambiguous. \'t1omen's dissatisfaccion with the cute of domesticity did noc neces· s.uil)' lead to chcir open rebellion. Although they chafed against the constraints of the genteel code: and che assumpcion chat chey should limit their acti\i tie:s co the: home, many ~A'Ome:n remained committed to playing a supportive role ~Aithin the: famil)'· in fact, earl)' advocates of a ' idene:d sphere" for \NOmen often fused the tra· dirional Victorian ideal of womanhood ~Aith a firm commitmenc to political accion.

"'- VldDriM Lady loNewWoman

I The career of temperance leader Frances Willard illustrates how che cult of domesticity co uld evolve inco a broader view of wo men's social and political responsi· bilities. Willard believed char by nature women wen: co mpassionate, nurruring. and sensitive to others; she was equally co nvinced thar drinking encouraged men to squander their earnings and profound!)' threatened family life. In 1874 Willard resigned her positions as dean of wo men and professor of English at Northwestern University tod t\'Ote her energies completely to che temperance cause. f ive years Lacer, she became presidenc of che recently funned Woman's Christian Temperance Union

CVUVRES IN CONFUct

447

Franoes W'.a.d Atririst in

I

tr:mpc-nnu, W"C~me~~.'ll i5$UC'II

(WCTU).

Willard cook the traditional bd ief chac women had unique moral virtues and transfOrmed it into a racionale tOr poli tical action. The domescicacion of politics, she: asserted, would protect the famil)' and improve public morality. Choosing as her badge a ~Athite ribbon, symbolizing the purity of che home, in 1880 Frances Willard launched a crusade to win wo men's right co vote so chat they could oudaw liquor. Willard also expanded the WClU's activities to include ~A'Clfare work, prison reform, labor arbitration, and public health. By 1890 the WCrU, with a membcrship of 150,000, had become che nacion's 6rst mass organization of ~A'Om en. Its members gained experience as lobb)ists, organizct'S, and lecrurers, undercutting the assump· cion of ..separate spheres.'" An expanding netWOrk of women's dubs offered another means by which middle- and upper-dass ~A'Omen could ho ne their skills in civic affairs, public speaking. and incelleccual analysis. Club women became irrtOlw:d in social-welfare proj· eccs, public~libtar}' expansion, and tenement reform. By 1892, chc General Federa tion of\'~lomen's Clubs boasted 495 affiliates and a hundred thousand members. Middleclass black women, exduded fro m many ~Ath ite dubs, funned their 0'1'-'n National As· sodation of Colored Women's Clubs in 1900. A bicycling vogue that swepc urban America ac the end of the cenrury further loosened Victorian co nstraints o n ~A'Omen. Fearful of waning vitality, middle- and upper-class Americans sought new means of improving their vigor, ranging from such health products as cod-livcr oil and sarsaparilla to enthusiastic parcidparion in basketball (invented in 1891 by a physical education instructor ar Springfield College: in Massachusetts). Bicycling. which could be e njoyed individually or in groups, quickly became the most popular spore tOr chose ~Atho wished to co mbine exerdse with recreation. Biqding especially appealed to )'OUng ~A'Omen uncomfortable with restrictive Victorian ideas, which included che \i cws thac pro per you ng ladies must nc:\'tr swear, the female body must be fully CO\'Cred at all times, and ph)'Sical exercion should take place in private. Pedaling along ~Aithouc corsets or padded clothing, the woman bi· cyclist implicitly broke ~Aith genteel com-entions. Changing arcirudes about femin inity also fOund expression in shifting ideas about marriage. Charlotte ~rl
lft,e Chopi• n-minisc:autbor: plodint.S or her ncn'l'llk

l

~~violam!Joci.ll

conYmtimu

@

Prima:ry Source:

Serena Berenson Asserts the Vatue of Adapted Women' s . ••

Accepting such arguments, co urts frequentl}' awarded ~A'iw~s alimony, a monetat}' settlement pa)'able: b)•ex-hus bands to supporc their former s pouses. \'('omen ~A'fiters generally welcomed the new female commitment to sdf· suffide:ncy and independence:. Mary Wilkins Freeman's short s tories, for example, compare \N'Omen's expanding role: co the: frontier ideal of freedom. Her characce:rs fighc for their beliefs without concern for society's reaction. Feminist Kate: Chopin pushed che debate co che ext reme b)•having the married heroin e: of her 1899 no\·el "nJe A&t'.tktning violate: social conventions by falling in low~ ~A'ith another man and then raking her life when his ideas abouc \N'Omen prOV"e as narrow and traditional as those of her h us band. Noneche:lcss, attitudes changed slowly. The enlarged concept of women's role in society had its greatest influence o n middle-dass wo men ~Ailo enjoyed che privilege of higher education, possessed some leisure rime, and could hope for success in journalism, education, social wo rk, and nursing. For shop girls who wo rked sixty hours a week co make ends meet, su ch opportunities remained a discanc goal.

Controversy OV"er t he scope and function of public educa· tion e ngaged Americans of all socioeconomic levels and highlighted class and cultural divis ions in lan·-nine:teenth· cenrury society. Viewing public schools as an instrument for indoct rinating and controlling the lower ranks, middle-class educators and civic leaders campaigned co expand and centralize public schooling. Not surpris ingly, the: reformers' efforts aroused considerable opposition from ethnic and religious groups whose o udook and interests d iffered sharply from theirs. Thanks to the crusade: for universal public education started by Horace: Mann, most norchern stares had public-school S}'Stems by che Civil War. More chan half the: nation's children received some formal education, but most attended o nl}' a few )'tat'S, and few went to high school. In che 1 870~ middle·dass activis~ co ncerned that man)' Americans lacked sufficienc knowledge co partidpace ~Aisdy in public affairs or function effectively in t he labor force, \N'Orked to raise the ()~.!'Crall educational lC\o-el and co increase the number of )'tars spent in school. O ne such reformer was federal commissioner of education William Torrey Har· ris. Harris urged teachers to insciU in chcir students a sense of order, d ecorum, selfdiscipline:, and ci'tic loyalty. Believing thac modern industrial society depended on citizens' confonni ng co t he timetables of the factor)' and the t rain, he envisioned the: schools as models of precise scheduling: ..The pupil muse have his lessons ready at the appointed rime:, muse rise at the tap of t he bell, mM'l' to the line, return; in shore, go through all che evolutions with equal preds ion;'' To achieve t hese goal~ reform -minded educators like Harris ~A'fcsted cont rol of schools from neighborhood leaders and ward politicians by stressing punctuality and order, compulsor)'· atcendance: latA'S, and a cenure: S)'Scem to insulate reachers from political favoritism and parencal pressure. By 1900 thirty-one: states required all children from eight to fo urteen rears of age to attend school. Bur che steamroller methods of Harris and o thers co srstematiu public education prompted protescs. New York pediatrician Joseph Ma)'tr Rice, after intervi C~Aing twdve hundred teachers, lashed our at the schools ' singsong memorization and prisonlike discipline.

Plllllk ~calion as • Alai of oass Clllllld

Rice 0\'\'.rlooked real advances.: for example, the nacional illiteracy rate dropped from 17 percent in 1880 to 13 percent b)• 1900, despite the influx of immigrants. He was on target, ho•"..e\~r, in assailing many ceachcrs' rigid cmphaUs on silence, d ocil· ity, and unquescioning obedience to rules. By the 1880s SC\~ral different groups u~re opposjng rhe centralized urban public· school bureaucracies. Working~dass families char depended o n chcir children's meagcrwages for survival, for example, resisted atcempcs to fo rce chcir sons and daughters to attend school past che elem emar}' grades. Although some immigrant families sacri6ced co give their children an educacion, many wichdrew their offspring from school as soon as they had learned che rudim ents of reading and writing,. and scm them to work. Catholic immigrants, moreo\~r. objected co the public schools' O\'CT· whelmingly Protescanc orientation. The Catholic church chus established separate parochial syscems and rejected federal aid co public schools as a ploy to .. fo rm o ne homogeneous American people after the N ew Engtand Evangelical type.'" Meanwhile, upper~dass parents, espedall)' in the Northeast, co mmonly did not wish to send chcir children to the immigrant-thronged public schools. Many therefore enrolled their children in private seminaries and boarding schoo l~ like St. Paul's in Concord, N ew Hampshire. These institutions rcinforced the elite belief that higher education should be the preserve of the W'CII·ro·do. Cuhur;a.J con flict piutd Viaorian The pro liferation of private: and parochial schools, along ~Aith contro· gc-mility ;1ga.iruc 1'0\l.>dic-r immigunt \~rsies over co mpulsor}' education, public funding. and classroom deco· lire. rum, re\~als the exce:m co which public educacion had become entangled M..uk Tw;1.in ;and Tbtodano On-i$C'r in ethnic and dass differences. Unlike W:nnan}' and j apan. which stan· ltd th~ ;l t~k o n "gtm~l .. litC'f .Jtun'. dardiu d and centralized their national educacional systems in the nineLouU SuJii\'.;an, Fr.:mk Lloyd \'(lright, teenth century, the Uniced States created a d iverse: system of locally run and other .;ard\itt co ;and ani' u public and private inscirutions, a system that al lo~A'Cd each segmem of so· cr~;l t«l ''mcxkrnU:m." d ecy some influen ce O\~r irs schools. Amid che disputes, school enrollWomen Jtrnggkd .;ag;1.in' c tbt baocb ments expanded dramatically. In 1870 fewer than 72,000 scud ems attended or goemed tr.;adicion.. the nation's 1,026 high schools. By 1900 the number of h igh schools had Public Jehaal$ "~"' in~noouinsdv jumped co more than 5 ,00 0 and the number o f scudents to more than $C'C'n ;l$ a w~ to inculeue mickik· d ;l$$ va luco,:. 500,000.

Chapter Su 00\YNI.OAO THE MPJ AU Ot O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D LISTEN TO IT O N THE GO .

KEY TERMS

S
How did the influx ofimmigrants before 1900 creote an ant1reness of ethnic and class differences? (/1<1f!' 421)

I

A flood of immigrants jostled against natiVI.'·born Americans who feared and disliked them; the immigrants u~re crowded into ghettos. 1'he wealthy e:reated fashionable rnclaVI.'s, the middle class mO\-ed to the suburb~ and the physical

new immigrants (p. 429) Blis ls~nd (p. 430} W. [B. Ou Bois (p. 432} Victorian fllO(ality (p. 43J}

450

QtAPUI It

IMMIGIU.TION, UltiWillAOON.ANO E\'EII.YUAY liH, t86o-lf00

chango m catits Jhatpen«f cl.tss :~wacmtu. 10 furthe:r distinguuh dtmuchu from thoc nn.wmcrs. na.rM-bom Amtric:ms st:tl'SStd. thdt comrrutmcnc to YK.tonm motal&ry

Huw did V"Kt
I

womtn m.a.inuin c:ullut~ly rt.:ftnrd homC'S. Lavish dt:pattmmt stortS and w .. dc.ally da.ign~ hoU!U «lim~ rht middle-and uppeH:Ia.u faith that tht ron· sumptwn or m.arct1lll goocb tndic:uM good tastt. 10 taist srandMd~ the prosperou~ dii..\K$ ap:mdcd rhe number of high schools and cttatM J new n:• starch unh
How did political mochlnM and S()(ial and religiousre{om1ers addt"e$$ urbon fJO'I'flyl (pogo 436)

I

ln cont~t to the" upptr cl..uMs, immigr.mr ~WA1:ome:rs cctattd that own poltncll m.achmn. Pobnal bossts.u dmt:s suppotttd by gta.ft ;md CO«UptJon., handtd out Jobs and helped m.my consriromts faa probkms of sad:nos .and mbJOrtunc. \\!bdc jacob Rits. j;lnt Adcbms, and otbt:r ttf~XmttS wcxbd to •mprow ....,.-.~..s howlng>nd dmg=w ......t.mg coodio- AndoonyC<>m· stock md oc.htr b1 i)'ft'IPUhtric ftformm .anacbd immlgr.ant vMua .and cul.tuRs ID .aJI d'fon to uphft mcf Amtric:.lniu thmt.

Huw did rht urbon ""tting d4ss
I

Urban imm1gr:tnts chrongrd saloons, dance balb, v.audtvillc the;ak:n., and amusement p:uts. l'hcy ligcncd avidly to ragd~ and chttrtd on pcorcumnnJ bastb.all cums and ipotU hetoes such as box-er john L SuUi\•an. The elite vision ofsport M a vth1clc fbr ln~>ul ling self·diJOcipline and se-lf·control w:t5 tr;~rurowttd into .a new eonunirmem ro sporn; as specrade and rmertainment. Spotf:l h,.d become: big businw and an tmpon.anr pan of the new con.sumc:cism,

How did writus. artiSts, and tducotional re{om1ers address issues of

I

a~lwr•l CXJO/fial (poy;e444)

Gc:ntttl Vtetori.anum fbund itsdf pitttd ag;tinsl immignnt CO'Il-dtna.s .and

spinL M.uk 1\r.un and «hrn du.Dm~ tht: '"gmttd ttadiuon• 111 btmru.rt, •-hilt a<doind Fnnk t.qd Wright mh>p nucuus -.'Otbng
UY TtAMS continued ~!lln(p.
-lliomily (p. 456} ,..... (p.4J&) poliicalmadine (p. 456} -~-(p. m} SalvJiion Anny (p. 6 8)

Al1lhony Comsloct (p. 438} Sodal Go!J)OI (p. 4J9} Jw Mdams (p. 69} John L Sullivan (p. 442} Mark Twain (p. 444) modernism (p. 446) rrant LI
450

QtAPUI It

IMMIGIU.TION, UltiWillAOON.ANO E\'EII.YUAY liH, t86o-lf00

chango m catits Jhatpen«f cl.tss :~wacmtu. 10 furthe:r distinguuh dtmuchu from thoc nn.wmcrs. na.rM-bom Amtric:ms st:tl'SStd. thdt comrrutmcnc to YK.tonm motal&ry

Huw did V"Kt
I

womtn m.a.inuin c:ullut~ly rt.:ftnrd homC'S. Lavish dt:pattmmt stortS and w .. dc.ally da.ign~ hoU!U «lim~ rht middle-and uppeH:Ia.u faith that tht ron· sumptwn or m.arct1lll goocb tndic:uM good tastt. 10 taist srandMd~ the prosperou~ dii..\K$ ap:mdcd rhe number of high schools and cttatM J new n:• starch unh
How did political mochlnM and S()(ial and religiousre{om1ers addt"e$$ urbon fJO'I'flyl (pogo 436)

I

ln cont~t to the" upptr cl..uMs, immigr.mr ~WA1:ome:rs cctattd that own poltncll m.achmn. Pobnal bossts.u dmt:s suppotttd by gta.ft ;md CO«UptJon., handtd out Jobs and helped m.my consriromts faa probkms of sad:nos .and mbJOrtunc. \\!bdc jacob Rits. j;lnt Adcbms, and otbt:r ttf~XmttS wcxbd to •mprow ....,.-.~..s howlng>nd dmg=w ......t.mg coodio- AndoonyC<>m· stock md oc.htr b1 i)'ft'IPUhtric ftformm .anacbd immlgr.ant vMua .and cul.tuRs ID .aJI d'fon to uphft mcf Amtric:.lniu thmt.

Huw did rht urbon ""tting d4ss
I

Urban imm1gr:tnts chrongrd saloons, dance balb, v.audtvillc the;ak:n., and amusement p:uts. l'hcy ligcncd avidly to ragd~ and chttrtd on pcorcumnnJ bastb.all cums and ipotU hetoes such as box-er john L SuUi\•an. The elite vision ofsport M a vth1clc fbr ln~>ul ling self·diJOcipline and se-lf·control w:t5 tr;~rurowttd into .a new eonunirmem ro sporn; as specrade and rmertainment. Spotf:l h,.d become: big businw and an tmpon.anr pan of the new con.sumc:cism,

How did writus. artiSts, and tducotional re{om1ers address issues of

I

a~lwr•l CXJO/fial (poy;e444)

Gc:ntttl Vtetori.anum fbund itsdf pitttd ag;tinsl immignnt CO'Il-dtna.s .and

spinL M.uk 1\r.un and «hrn du.Dm~ tht: '"gmttd ttadiuon• 111 btmru.rt, •-hilt a<doind Fnnk t.qd Wright mh>p nucuus -.'Otbng
UY TtAMS continued ~!lln(p.
-lliomily (p. 456} ,..... (p.4J&) poliicalmadine (p. 456} -~-(p. m} SalvJiion Anny (p. 6 8)

Al1lhony Comsloct (p. 438} Sodal Go!J)OI (p. 4J9} Jw Mdams (p. 69} John L Sullivan (p. 442} Mark Twain (p. 444) modernism (p. 446) rrant LI
45 2

OfAPlER lO

PoUTICS AND f Xl'AHSION IN AN

(MOVS~UZIKGAGE, 187;>-1900

ordinary people. The obscure Guiteau, a lorat part)' member who had supported Garfield, expected to be rewarded with a high diplomatic post. When chis failed co materialize, his delusionary mcneal stare: worsened. Vie"-'ing Garfield's death as ..a political necessicy;'' he belic'led that the public would hail him as a hero. 1'he jury re:· jected Guite:au' s insanity plea, and in june 1882 he was hanged. While contemporary critics like Henry Adams vil""~d Garfield's a..ssassjnation as an example of the absurdity of face:-nineteenth-ccruur}' poliri~ historians coday see it as a sign of how doselyconce:sted political battles wcre. The expansion oflarge cor· porations, the settlement of the trans-Mississippi West, and che surge in urban growth put incense pressure on the political process. At stake was the gM'Cffimem's proper role: in the stimulation and regulation of America's explo.siw industrial growth. This incense debate im·olved nothing less than contending visions of how in· dustrial growth should or should not be regulated and ~Atho should bene6t 6nancially. T he: struggle: to control economic expansion reached its peak in the 1890s when a new chird party, che: Populists, joined ~Aith che Democrats to challenge cor· porace: control of the economy. Representing the opposite position, the Republican l':ucy's support for high cariffs and the gold standard rcpre:sence:d a commitment co encouraging che growth of large corporations, to freeing industry co expand ~Aith· out regulation, and to dl'W.Ioping new markets. From the mid- 1870s to che: mi d-1890~ no parcy was able to control t he: political process. But in 1896, chee:lection of President William F. McKinle}•ushered in a ge:neration of Republican domination of national politics. Elected in a campaign fo. cused on t he rcscoration of prosperity, McKinley stumbled into war ~Aith Spain, substantially increased U.S. territory, and established new outposts from which American corporations could gain access to l')V'C_r.se:as markets.

PARTY POLITICS IN AN ERA OF UPHEAVAL,

1877-1884 How did political parties build c011li6ons out oftheir divet'SI1 .rtlmic and ngWnal constiwendes? Bct\IJ'Ce:n ISn and 1894, four presidents squeezed into office: by t he narrowest of margins; control of the House: ofRepre:sentati\~s changed hands fi\~ times; and .st\~n new western states 'A'etC admitted into the Union. Amid intense competition, no party could muster a working majority. Republican~ Democracs, and third-parq• leaders sought desperately to reshape t heir political organizations co win OV\'.r and cement the lo)•alty oftheir foiiO\l~rs. Not until 1896,in the aftermath of a massi..~ depression that hie when t heir opponencs were in office:, did the Republicans build a coalition that would control Congress and the presidency for che next 6ftecn )'CatS.

Betv.r'Ce:n 1876 and 1896, the incense competition bmwen parties produced an incredible curnouc of \'Oters. At t he same rime lhat \'Oter rurnouc shoe up, hO"-'t:'\~r. political parties sidestepped many of the issues created by industrialization, such as caxation

c.lesled Political VlsiDas

I PAf!lYPotmcs IN A~ ~A. OF UPHEA.VAL, 18J7'-I8i4

453

Congress requires U5. Treasury 10 purcl\ase silver James GarfiTrust Ad; M
Am-

of corporations, supporc fur t hose injured in factory acciden~ and pow~rty rd ief. Excepc for the: lnterstace Commerce Act of 1887 and che largely symbolic Sherman Anci-Trust Ace of 1890, Washington generally ignored the: social consequences of in· dustrialization and focused instead o n encouraging economic gro~A'th. Ho~A' can 'A'C explain this refusal and, at the same: cime:, account for che enor· mous popular support for parties? The ans~Arcr lies in the political ideology of t he period and che cwo major symbolic and economic issues chac preoccupied lawmakers national!)': tariffs and dvil service reform. Political parries in t he: face nineteenth cenrury energized votct'S noc o nly b)•ap· pealing to economic self-interest, as in support for induscrialization and pensions for Civil War veterans and their wido·ws, but also by lin king chcir programs co deeply hdd beliefs about the narure ofche family and t he: proper role: of gc:wernment. In its pre""-ar y~ars, the Republican parcy had enha nced economic opporcuniries fur common people by using governmental aut hority co expand railroads, increase tariff protection for industr}~ and prO\idc land subsidies co fanners. It had also espoused a belief in female moral superiority and a willingness to usc government as an in· strumcnc to protect family life. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

454

liisset..f.ire

CHAPtER lO

PottriCS AND f Xl'AHSION IN AN

Bd"'ftbatp·

emmmt sbould not intl'rfiono wi d! tbt waflinp o( fn'll'

lm""'

me

(MOVS~UZIKGAGE, 187;>-1900

After che Civil \'t'ar, chest positions hardened into political ideologies. Republicans justified their support for the tariff and defended their commitment co Union widows' pensions as "-'J.YS to protocc the famil)' home: and female wage earners. Men in particular associated loyalty to party with a sense of masculinity. Democrats countered, using metaphors of the seduction and rape of white women by external forces and labeling Republican programs as classic examples of che perils of exces· si\'C govcrnmenc force. High tariffs imperiled the famil)' and threatened economic disaster. Despite their diffe:recnces, neither Republicans nor Democrats believed that the: national go\·ernme:nt had any righc to regulan• corporations or to proce:ct che sodal welfare of workers. Members of both parties, particularly among the: middle and upper classes, embraced the doctrine of laissu-faire- che belief chat unregulated competition recpresented che best path to progress. According to this view, the: federal government should promote economic dC'\o-elopme:nt buc not regulate the industries that it subsidized. Rather than looking co Washington, people: rurned to local or scace: authorities. O n the: Great Plains, angry farmers demanded that their state legislatures regulate: railroad races. In the cicie:~ immigrant groups competed for political poY~er while: nati\-e:-born reformers periodicall)' atce:mpce:d to oust che political machines and clean up corruption (see Chapter 19). Meanwhile:, dty and state goo.-ernmcncs vied with each other for control. When Chicago \l.'anted to issue: permits to screct pop · corn vendors, fo r example, the: Illinois legislature had to pass a spocial act. Both parries in the Nonh and the South e ngaged in election fraud by rigging elocci on~ throwing o ut o pposition ..'Otrs, and paying for "fl oaters" who mowd from precinct to precinct to vote. Accusations of fraud invigorated party loyalty as mem · bers ofeach party developed a sense of moral outrage at the ocher's behavior chat in· vigorace:d party spirit. By linking economic policy to family values, both national parcirs encouraged the ac:ti\'t: role that"-'Omen pla)~d in politics in this period, although most could not vote. Frances Willard and her folla'l'-~rs in the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), for example, helped create a Prohibition and Home: Protoccion Party in the: 1880s. A docade later, western "-'Omen Populists won full suffrage in Colorado, Idaho, and Utah.

In the 1870s and 1880s, each party had its own ideological appeal and centers of regional strength. The Democrats S1nn&l!! ruled che Souch, southern soccions of border states like: O hio, and northern cities ~A'ith farge immigrant populations. They campaigned fo r minimal go\-e:rnme:nt expenditures. o pposed tariff increases, and attacked "gOII'ern· mcneal interference in che economy." In addition, Democrats staunchly defended their immigrant foUo\I.I'Crs. On state and local ll"V\'.Is, chey fierce!)' opposed attempts to limit alcohol use, ad\·ocace:d support for parochial schools, and o pposed attempts to require English-only schooling. The Republicans rcigned in rural and small·ta'l'-'n New England, Pennsyh>ania, and the upper Mid"-'t:St, and drew support from the: Grand Arttt)' of the Re:pubUc (GAR), a social and political organization of northern Civil War wterans. Republicans often ,>a,.~d the blood)• shirt," invoking the South's responsibility for starting

hllensofParty

...,.w;.

CnNI Amoy c1 a.• (GAR) Unicnn<eter.ans' group tbat sought to broade-n pen. sionJ ;and C'JGI'n:i.-d political ~ by ..,.'ilYing t:he bloody shirt"

I PAf!lY Potmcs IN A~ ~A. OF UPHEA.VAL, 18J7'-I8i4 the Civil War as the: reason to keep Democrats out ofpc>"~r. TheRepublicans ran a series of former Union anTI}' generals for presidenc and voted generous veterans' bene6rs. Alchough issues of gm·emmemal a uthority dominated on the federallC'\o-el, family tradition, ethnic tics, religious affiliation, and local issues often determined an individual's voce. O utside the: South, cthnkicy and religion \l'f:re che most reliable: predictors of party affil· iacion. Catholics, especially Irish Catholics, and Americans of Ger· man ancestry cended to voce Oemocracic. O ld·stock Protescanc northerners and immigrants from northern Europe, in concrast, \'Oted Republican, as d id African-Americans, Norch and South. AI· though incoleranc of racial differences, the Democrats ~A'Cre gene:r· ally more accepting of religious dh·ersity than ~A'ere the Republicans. Electoral skirmishes often centered on cuirural differences, notably the perennial Republican attempt to force prohibition on Irish whis· key drinkers, Ge:nnan beer drinkers, and Italian ~Aine drinkers. In this era of locaJI}' based policies and a diminished presidency, the state leaders who controlled boch major parcie:s tended co favor appealing but pliable: presidential candidates. Rutherford B. Ha}'CS ( 1Sn-J881) 6t the mold perfectly. Hares, a Civil War general, had won admiration as an honest Ohio go\-e:moc, and his major presi· den rial achievement was restoration of respect for che office after the Granc scandals. The bene:\'Olem, bearded Hares bro ught dignity to the White: House. His wife, lucy, a highly intelligent, college·educated woman of great moral earnescne:s~ acti..-ely supported the \l'oman's Christian Temperance Union {WClU), and Ha)'f:S banished alcohol from the: White House. After one presidential d inner, the secretary of state grumbled, "It 'A'llS a brilliant affair. The water floY~ed like champagne::''

45 5

hstor Annouocinc GAR Eoca111f101ont

Olicap. 1900 In

:~dditi on to thoeir nos~lgic ;~.nnu ;2l

~nions, Union :~rmy\~tc'r:uu-, org:ltl·

i%C'd ;u the Gr.2nd Army o hhe Republic, In the J870s,politiciansconfronted a tough we~ ;a poten t forc:e in Rc:publie;u~ p~rty problem ofeconomic policy: how to create politiu, lobbying for p<:n5ions :~nd CKher a money supply adequate for a growing bend'its. econom}' witho ut producing inflation. Americans' almost supersci· tious reverence for gold and silver added co the: d ifficulty of escabUshing a coherenc monctary policy. Man}' believed chac the only truscworchy money was gold, silver, or cerri6caces exchangeable: for chcse scarce metals. All antebellum federal currency consisted of gold or silver coins or U.S. Treasury notes redeemable in gold or silver. There were ocher issues. Bankers, busin ess leaders, and politicians believed that economic stability required a striccl}' limited currency suppl}', which ~A'Oul d dri\'f: in· tcrcsc rates up and prices down. Debtors, especiall}' manufaccurers and southern and western farmers, 'A'llnted co expand the money supply, a policy that ~A'Ould help them to pay off chcir debts. The: moncrar}' debate focused on a specific question: Should the: Civil War paper «greenbacks" still in circulation be retained, or should they be eliminated to leave a currency backed by gold (see Chapter IS)? The hard times associated with che Panic of 1873 sharpened this dispute.

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

456

OfAPlER lO

PoUTICS AND fXl'AHSION IN AN

CreeoiNd!- Soogh« o

I

maintoa.in intbtiomry cutrew:y through printing ofmooq not lw:kd by gold

-sm.......... Ad

Uw p.luai in 1890 in l't'.Spo¢1SC' to f.ltmers' a ils lOr in.flatielnary mlmi'QI')' policit:c

1

(MOVS~UZIKGAGE, 187;>-1900

The Greenback patty (founded in 1877) called for an expanded money suppl)' and other measu res co benefit workers and farmers. In che 1878 midterm elections, Greenback candidates re:ccived more: than I million \'Otes and "''On fou rteen seats in Congress. As prospericyrerurned, che Greenback party faded, but the money issu e did not. An e\-en longer-lasting contrm--ersy surged O\'et t he: coinage of silver. In 1873 Con· gre:ss instructed the U.S. Mint to cease making sito.-·er coins, t hus "demonetizing" sil· ver. But new disco\-eries in Nevada (see Chapter 17) soon increased the sil\-er supply, and debcor groups now dema nded that t he governmcnc resume coining silver. Enchusiastically backed by t he silver-mine owners, sil\·er forces won a parcial vic· tory in 1878, "'then Congress required the: treasury to buy and mint up to S4 million wonh of sih-er each mont h. But the t reasury, dominated b)•monetary conservatives, sabotaged t he: law's incem by refusing to circulate the sil\·er dollars chac it minted. Frustrated siio.-er ad\'OCates tried a new approach in che Sherman Silver Pur· chase Act of 1890. lbis measure inscructed che treasury to bU)' 4.5 million ounces of sil\·er monthly and issue: treasury notes, redeemable: in gold or silver, equivalenc co the costofthe:se sito.-er purchases. 1'he: money supply increased, but only slightly. 1'he: contrm--ersy m-er silver dragged on.

For decades, successful candidates had rewarded su pport· ers and contributors with jobs ranging from cabinct seats to lowly municipal posts. Defenders called the: system "ro· tation in officr' and daimed t hac it was a democratic "''llyoffillinggMwnment posi· tions. Critics, hO\l-e\W, dubbed ic the spoils system after the old expression ..To t he: victor belong che spoils." 1bo often, the: new officeholders were ill prepared or just incompetenc, and once in office they had ro continue: making cam· paign contributions to their patrons to keep their jobs. CHECKI NG I N For years, a small but influential group of reformers had campaigned La te·n inC'teenth·cC'nrury RC'p ubli· for a merit-based civil service. Wdl-bred, "''ell-educated, and u-ell-heeled, caru strC"-s:sed probusi.ne.ss me:uurC"-s, these reformers called for a civil service staffed by «gende:men.'" They had a such as t he' touiff, and dainwd t hC'y wnC' prot«ti.ng Ame"rican &miltu. point. A professional dvil service "''as needed as the go\-ernme:m' s functions 0C"mocrats di'!Cried p~rnmffit grew more complex. in«"-rf«ence", such :u the' tari ff, and Cautiously embracing the civil service cause, l'resident Hares in IBn ~id chC'r wnC' t he' o ne'$ proc«ti.ng launched an im-estigation of the corrupt New York City customs office and familieJ. demanded t he: resignation of rwo high officials. O ne:, Chester A. Arthur, had Repub1i ~ns llourish<."d in Ntw plared a key role: in passing out jobs. Hares's willingness ro confronc factions Engla nd .:md the' M idWI'st, whe"re;u 0C"mocr ats dominattd the' South wit hin his o"''tl party won praise from civil-seJVice re-formers, but critics ridi· and u r ban a.re"as. culed "snivel service'" and "Rut herfraud B. Hat-es." BartleJ 0\~r gree"nbadu: and t he' When Congressman James A. Garfield "''On t he: 1880 Republican presi· coinage" ofsllv'l'.r-mt-a.sul'l:'-s that dencial nomination, the delegates, to appease t he: opposing New Yolk fac· wauld fa,
Cllfi..Senlce RefonD

I Pouncs OF PAA'ItEGe, Pouncs OF ExClLISIOM, •884-•89:

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1 '"' • " "'

I

457

"'Wtttrf! is tht Difftrttlc•r

Byequ;tting crimin;al p:~yofr~ to (ht police ....-ith c:orpor.~tc

con tributions to sen:~tors, this C:V'toon in Pu&. m:agnine suggest$ th;at corrupcion pel"\':adu soOety ;u~d need:; to be stopped.

Garfield's assassination in 1881- which brought to the White: House Chester A

Archur, chc very symbol of the corrupt patronage: S}'Stem - gavc a f'O"''Crful emotional boost to dvil service reform, as re-formers painted Garlield as a martyr to che spoils sysce:m. In 1883 Congress enacted che Pendleton Civil Suviu Act, drafted by t he Civil Service Reform League chat had been created two years earlier. The act sct up a commission to prepare competicive examinations and establish standards of merit for a variety of federal jobs.: ic also forbade: political candidates fro m solkiring con· t riburions from gm-·e:rnmem workers. The creacion of a professional dvil service thus helped bring t he federal gow~rnmem in step with t he modemi.ting trends cransforming society. As for Chester A. Archur, the fact that he prow~d to be a mediocre president pleasantly surprised those who had expected him co be an utter d isaster. Archur supported civil-service reform and proved quite independent. Fed up wich the feuding Republicans, in 1882 the \ 'Otet'S gave the Democrats a strong majority in the House of Representatives. In 1884, for the 6rst cime since 1856, che)' would put a Democrat in t he White House: Gro\'et Cleveland.

lleHI-CMIS...UeAd

l

Nttmpt to end spoils I}<Jtem and m'ate ;a profe:uioml civil RMa

POLITICS OF P RIVILEGE, POLITICS OF ExCLUSION, 1884-1892 What factors prompted the riS41 ofthe Grange and tile Farmers' A/lian<s ntOVM'Iet!lS?

The stalemate becwcen che cwo major parries in their battle to establish t he standards for economic gro"''th continued u nder !'resident Clew.land. Although no radical, Grover Cleveland challenged powerful imerescs by calling for cues in the tar· iff and veterans' pensions. After Cltwland sen~d a single term ( 1885- 1889), o ne of www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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the most corrupt elections in American history put Republican Benjamin Harrison ( 1889- 1893) in the White House- and rescored big business and che veterans' lobi>}• to the driver's sear. Simultaneously, debt·ridden farmers mounted a spirited protest mo'lement. And in t he South, the white majority used lhe machinery of politics co strip black citizens oflheir basic rights.

At a rumulruous Chicago convention in 1884, che Repub· licans nominated their best·kno""n leader, James G. Blaine. Willie "-se: Grover Oewllnd, 1115-11189 Blaine was a gifted oracor, but his name had been stained by lhe r~:W.I ation t hat he, as Speaker ofche House, had of· fered policical fa...ors lO a railroad company in exchange for stock. For reformers, Blaine epitomized che hated pat ro nage syscem. To E. L God kin, he ..wallo~A'Cd in spoils like a rhinoceros in an African pooL"' Sensing Blaine's vulnerability, che Democrats chose a sharply contrast ing nomi· nee, Grover Clevdand of New York. In a meteoric rise from reform ma}'Or of Buffalo to go'lernor, Cleveland had fought t he bosses and spoils men. 11le shrewdness of t he Democrats' choice became apparent ~Athena number of prominent Republican re· fo nners bolted co Cleveland. They ~A'Cre promprl}' nicknamed M ugwumps, an AI· gonquian term for a renegade chief. UnfOrtunately, as a )'Oung man ClC\o-eland had fathered an illegitimate child. He admitted lheindiscretion, but t he Republicans still jeered at rallies:: "Ma, Ma, where's my pa?" (co which Democrats responded, ..Gone to the White House ha ha ha"). Fac· ing opposition fro m lhe New York City Democratic machine that he had fought as gow~mor, Cleveland risked losing his O'A'tl scare. The ride rurned in No\·ember when Blaine alienated Catholic votcrs b}•failing to rebuke a New York City Protestant d er· gyman who denounced che Democrats as the parry of"'Rum, Romanism, and Rebel· lion."' dC'\o-eland carried New York State by 1):00 voces and wit h it t he election. The corpulent Cleveland settled comfortably into t he shadowy role expected of Gilded Age presidents. Embradng che belief lhat gm-·ernmem must nor meddle in the economy, he a.s.sen:ed che power of che presidency mosdy chrough his \"Ctoes and displared a limited grasp of industrialization's impact. Vetoing a bill chat wo uld ha\'f: pnwided seeds to drought-stricken farmers in 1Cxas, he warned lhat people should not expect the government co soi\J'C lheir problems. O ne matter did arouse C le\-eland: che cariff, an issue entangled in conflicting economic and political interests. Since it 'A'llS a major source ofre\-enue in t he era be· fore a federal income cax, che tariff was real!}' a form of taxation. Bur which im· ported goods should be taxed, and ho"'' much? Opinions differed radically. l'roducers of commodit ies like coal and wool demanded cariff protection against foreign com· petition, as did many manufacturers, joined by workcrs in these industries. Other manufacturers, hC>'~'-'f:'\'f:r, ~Ath ile seeking protection for chcir finis hed produces, ~A'lUlted low tariffs on the raw materials chey required. Mosc farmers hated all tariffs for in· flating farm-equipment prices and making ic hard co sell American farm products abroad. lnitiall)', Cleveland called for cariff reform largd }' because che high protecth-e tariffs of lhe era v.-ere creating huge federal budget surpluses. In his 1887 annual message to Congress, Cleveland argued lhac lo"A'Cr tariffs not o nl}' ~A'Ould cut t he

A Demoaat iltbe

........., Rdbmwn, iodud.. ing E. L Godlcio "nd Carl Sd.urx, whe! Stritchtd from thcRq~ublian totbe OtmcKratie P-arty in 1884

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federal surplus but also would reduce prices and slow che de:\·elopmcm of trusts. AI· though politicians paid litcle: actention, corporate leaders found C le:\-eland's talk of 10'1'-·e:r tariffs threatening. CIC'\o-eland stirred up another horner's nest by opposing t he ro utine payment of \'ecerans' disability pensions. No one opposed pensions for the: deserving, but fraudulent claims proliferated; o ne \'eteran colle:cced a disability pension for poor eyesight caused, he: said, by warcime: diarrhea. Cleveland, unlike his predecessors, personally investigated these claims and rejected many. He also vetoed a bill chac ~A'Ould have pensioned all disabled veterans and their dependents, whether or noc the: disability occurred in military service. The: pension roll should be an honor roll, he scressed, not a refuge for frauds.

By 1888 some: influen tial groups had concluded that Clevdand had to go. Republican kingmakcrs nominated lllcl: llelljamln 111m-. 1889-189] Benjamin Harrison, a corporate lawyer and former sena· tor. In a new style: of electioneering. instead of sending t he candidate around che: councry, his managers brought delegations to his Indiana home, where he: hammered ac the tariff issue. Harrison warned thac only a high tar· iff could ensure: business prosperity, decem wages, and a healthy home: market for farmers. The: Republicans amassed a S4 million campaign fund from worried busi· ness leaders. This ~A'llr chest purchased not only postcrs and buttons but also voces. Despite su ch fraud, dC'\o-eland reccived almost 100,000 mor~: votes chan Harri· son. But Harrison won che key states ofNe:w York and Indiana and won t he electoral \'Otc. Once in office, Harrison swiftly rewarded his supporters. He: appointed as com· missioner of pensions a GAR official ~Ailo, on caking office:, declared "God help t he surplus!" lhe: pension rolls soon ballooned from 676,000 to nearly a million. This massh'!! pension S)'Stem, coupled wich a network of \tterans' hospitals, became: America's 6rsc farge public-welfare program. In 1890 the criumphanc Republicans also passed t he McKinley Tariff, ~A•hich pushed rates to an all-time high. Rarely has t he: federal government been so subservient to e:ncre:nched economic interests and so o ut of couch wich the: plighc of t he d isadvantaged as during t he 1880s. But inaction bred discontent. l 'he 1890 election awakened t he: nacion co a tide: of political actiYism in t he agrarian South and \'t'est, spawned by chro nic problcnts in rural America.

1111 Bulilless Strikes

Plains farming had long been a risky venture (sec Chap· tcr 17). Between 1873 and 1877, terrible: grasshopper in· 1111 Rise ol tile fe:scacions consumed half t he: midwestern wheat crop. ,.-sPirly After 1870, production rose: and prices fell. Wheat cumbled from $ 2.95 a bushel in 1866 to $1.06 in 1880. Farmers ~Ailo had borrowed co fi. nance: chcir homesteads and machinery went bankrupt or bard)' survh-ed. In 1867, midwestern farmers formed the: Grange:, oc «Patrons of Husbandry." Membership climbed co morl' than 1.5 million b)•the early 1870s. Offering education, emotional support, and fellowship, che Grange maintained a library ofin fonnation on planting and lh-estock, and organized cm-ered-dish dinners and songfescs. l 'he ~lllan Protest and

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Fint nujor f'.ltmeD' politiul mcM-mnu

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Prima:ry Source: The Farmers'

Movement in the \Vest

farMers' AIUace Suea"uful

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Urm prote« ~

sp- d Populist p;uty

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Grange's central concern was farmers• economic plight. Grangers shared the:jackso· nian belief chac che products of the soil formed the: basis of aUhonorable wealth and that the: producer dasse:s- people who ~A'Orked with their hands-formed the true: backbone: of sode:cy. The Grange negotiated discounts from farm·machiner}' dealers and established "cash-only" cooperatiw stores and grain de:varors to eliminate the: "m iddlemen"- bankers, grain brokers, and merchants ~Ailo grew rich at the farmers' expense. And the Grangers attacked che railroads, which gave d iscounts to large: shippers, bribed state: legislators, and charged higher races for shore runs chan fo r long hauls. Midwestern Grangers lobbied state legislat ures fo r laws sctcing maxi· mum races for frcighc shipmencs. The railroads appealed these "Granger laws" to the Suprr-me: Court. Buc in Mtmn v. 1/liJWis ( IBn), che Court ruled against the railroads and upheld an Illinois latA' fixing a maximum rate for grain storage. The case of Wetb.asb v. IflitJOis ( 1886), however, prohibited states from regulating intmlalt railroad races. T hen in 1887 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, establishing a new agency, the Inter· state Commerce Commission, to investigate and o•..-ersce: railroad operations. T he: commission did lictle to curb the: railroads, but it did establish the principle of fed· eral regulation of interstate transportation. Despite promising beginnings. the Grange mowmcm soon faltered. By 1878, through lobbying ac che state level, railroads had won repeal of mosc scace: regula· tions. The cash-onl)' coopcrati.,.es failed because few farmers had cash. The Grange ideal of 6nandal independence proved unrealistic because conditions prevailing on the Plains made ic impossjble co farm without borrowing money. When che prices of corn, wheat, and cotron briefly re\iw~d after 1878, many farmers deserted the: Grange. For aU its weaknesses, ho~A'CW.r, the Grange laid che groundwork for an even more powerful wave of agrarian protest. The: problems that drOIJ'C mid~A•cstern and Great Plains farmers. co form the: Grange d ro\'e: southern and western farmers. co be:· gin the alliance mo..-ement. The Farmers• AWance mM'ffllt:nt began in the: 1870s when Texas farmers gachered to discuss their problems, and it spread eastward across the lower South. Like: Grangers, alliance members. initial!)' advocated fanners ' coop· erarives co purchase equipment and supplies and to markct their cotron. And, as had the Grange cooperatives, these generally failed for lack of capital. In 1887 a farsighted 1Cxan, Charles W. Macune, assumed leadership ofche alii· ance mm--e:menc.. By 1889 Macune had merged several regional groups into the: Na· tional Fanners' Alliance and Industrial Union, or the Southern Alliance. A parallel organization of black farmers emerged, the National Colored Farmers' Alliance. By 1890 the Souchern Alliance boasted 3 million members and ics black counterpart anocher 1.2 million. As they attended alliance rallies and picnics, read the: alliance nc~A'Spaper, and listened co alliance speakers, hard·hic farm families became incre:as· ingl)•aware of their political potencial. An Arkansas member wroce: in 1889, "Reform nc·,...er begins ~Aith the: leaders, it comes from the people."' Meanwhile, alliance: fever also hit the: Great Plains, where alliances sprang up in Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Min nesota in the droughc·plagued years of 1880 and 1881. After ren~-e:d rainfall nourished a brief boom, drought returned to rekindle: the alliance spirit in 1886- 1887. From 1887 to 1897, only N'O Great Plains wheat crops were: worth harvesting. 10 make matters worse, wheat prices fell as world pro· duccion increased. Innumerable MidW'CStem families packed up and returned East.

I Pouncs OF PAA'ItEGe, Pouncs OF ExClLISIOM, •884 -•89: Some: deparcing families sc:r.t"''led a sad refrain on their "''llgons: "In God "'-e trusted, in Kansas "''C busted."' Reformers ac first cried co create a biradal mo\-emenc. Southern Alliance leaders 10m Warson ofGeorgia and Leonidas Polk ofNorch Carolina urged southern farm· ers, black and white:, to act together. For a time, chis message of racial cooperation in the interest of reform offered promise. Women "''ere im·olved in the mm-ement as welL Mary E. Lease, a Wichita law)'-er, burst on the scene in 1890 as a fi ery alliance or· acor. Ocher women rallied to the: new cause, founding the National Women's Alii· ance (NWA) in 1891. As the mm-ement s"''CIIe:d, the: opposicion curned nasty. jerry S impson, a Kansas alliance leader, mentioned the: silk stockings of a conservative politidan in his district and noce:d that he had no such finery. In response, a hostile newspaper editor labeled him ..Sockless jerry" Simpson, che nickname he carried co his grave. When Mary Lease advised Kansans co ..raise less corn and more hell,'" a conseJVath·e ne·wspaper sneered, ..(Kansas) has started co raise hell, as Mrs. Lease advised, and (the scate:) seems to ha..-e an overproduction.'" All this accivity helped shape a new political agenda. In 1889 the: Southern and Northwestern alliances arranged a loose merger and supported candidates "'tho agreed wich them. They focused on increasing government action on behalf of farm· ers and workers, and sought tariff reduction, a graduated income: tax,. public 0'1'-'nership of railroads, federal funding for irrigation research, a prohibition on landO'I'-·nership by ali en~ and .. the free and unlimited coinage of sih·er."' The 1890 elections revealed che strength of agrarian discontent. Southern Oem· ocr:us who endorsed alliance goals won four gm'e morships and control of eight stare: legislatures.. O n the Great Plains, alliance-endorsed candidates controlled Kan· sas and Nebraska and gained che balance of power in Minnesota and South Dakota. Three alliance-backed senators and fifty congressmen went to Washington in 1890 as angr}' "''inds from the: hinterlands buffeted the: political system. Regional differences, "''hich threatened to divide the: mo\'tmenc, "'-ere soon o\·er· come by shared economic grievance. In February 1892, alliance leaders organized the ~opl e:'s Party of the United State:~ generally called the Populist Party. At the party col'l'W:ncion in Omaha, Nebraska, char August, cheering delegates nominated for president che fonner Civil War general james B. We-avcr of lo"'oa. T he: Populist platfonn called for the direct popular election of senators and other electoral reforms. It also endorsed a subtn.asut')' p lan by which farmers could score chcir nonperishable: commodities in government warehouses and then sell the scored commodities when m:uitet prices rose. Ignacius Donnelly's ringing preamble called for a return of the gm-e:rnmem "co the: hands of' the: plain people' with "'ilich class it originated:"

461

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plan Clu do Mxunt's plan eo bring p'trn. mtnt ~id to struggling f~l'ml'n

As populists geared up, a group of citizens with far more profound grievances suffered rcnl"''o-ed oppression. With Aller Reconstruction lhe end of Reconstruction in 1877 and lhe restoration of J>O"'"e:r to "'ilite elites, southern whites sought an end to "Negro rule"' and tried to suppress the black voce: (see Chapter 16). Initially, whites relied on intimidation, ce:r· ror, and fraud to limit black voting rights, but in 1890 Mississippi amended its state constitution to exclude most African-American voters, and other southern states foiiO'I'-·ed suit.

Allericans

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trwdinc

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Vigilanteh.mgingof tbOJt ;aawtd ofa itnc's; used prinurity .aprut bladt:c

l

(MOVS~UZIKGAGE, 187;>-1900

Because the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) had guaranteed all male dtizens' righe to \'Ote, "''hite southerners used indirect mean~ such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and property requirements, co d isfranchise African-Americans. To ensure chat these measures e:xduded onl)' blacks, whites emptorcd su ch devices as the grandfather clause, "'>hich exempted anyone whose ancestor had \·oted in 1860. African-American disfranchisement proceeded erratically, but by the early twencieth cencury it "''lls effective!)' complete. Disfranchisement was the keystone of an arch ofwhite supremacy chat stretched across the South as state after state passed la"''S strictly segregating man}' realms of life by race: (see Chapter 21). African·American caterers, barbers, contractors, bricklayers, carpenters, and other artisans lost chcir white clientele. Blacks "'rho wcnc co prison- sometimes for minor offenses- faced the convict-lease system, which aJ. lowed cotton planters and others to ..lease" prison gangs and to puc chem to "''Ork under slave-labor conditions. Thousands died under che brutal convict-labor sys· tern. It survived in to the early decades of che twentieth century, ultimately succumbing to h umanitarian protest and to economic changes that made it unpro fi table. L)'nChing became the ultimate enforcer ofwhite supremacy. 11lrough che 1880s and 1890s, about a hundred African-Americans W\'.re: l)'l'lched annual!)' in the United States, mainly in the South. Rumors and unsubstantiated accusation~ frequently of rnping a white woman, unleashed this mob violence:. (The vague charge of "at· tempted rapr' co uld mean a wide range of behavior unacceptable to whites, such as questioning authority or talking back.) The l)'llCh mob demonstrated whites' absolute pc>""er. In the South, more than 80 percenc of the lynchings irn'Olw:d black \i ctims. Lynchings most commonly occurred in the Con on Belt, and they tended to rise ac times ofeconomic d istress when cotton prices were falling and competition between poor whites and poor blacks "''lls most incense. Noc surprising!)', lynching reached ics highest point in 1892 as man}' poor African-Americans joined che agrarian protest and rallied co the l:topulist party banner. The relationship between southern agrarian protest and "'>hite radsm was com· plcx. Some l:topuliscs, among them Georgia's Tom Wacson, cried to build a genuind )' interracial mo\-emenc and denounced boch lynching and the convict-lease system. When an African-American Populist leader pursued by a lynch mob took refuge in Watson's house during the 1892 campaign, he summoned rn'O thousand armed white Populists co defend him. But most white Populis~ encouraged by such rabble· rousers as .. Pitchfork Ben" Tillman of South Carolina, held fast co racism. And the white ruling elite, eager co drive au-edge in the protest mo..-ement, inflamed lo"''Cr· class white racism. O n balance, the rise of southern agrarian protest deepened radal hatred and "-'Orsened blacks' situation. Mean"'>hile, the federal g~rnmenc d id noth· ing. A generation of northern politicians paid lip service to egalitarian principles and failed to apply chem to African-Americans. The Suprem e Court similarly abandoned African-Americans. 11le Court ripped gaping holes in the Fourceench Amendment, which guaranteed equal protection of the Ia"''• and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which outlawed racial discrimination. In the Civil Rights Ca~s ( 1883), the Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment pre:· vented goo.-ernmencs, but not indi vidual~ from infringing on civil rights. In Plessy v. Ferguson ( 1896), the Court upheld a Louisiana law requiring segregated

railroad cars. Racial segregation was legal, the: justices ruled, proYided that equal facilities were made: available to each race:. \'(lith che Supn:me: Courc•s blessing, the South also segregated irs public schools, ignoring the caw~ar chat separate facilities must be equal White children studied in nicer buildings, used newcr cquipmcnc, and ..w.re caught by bctcer-paid reachers chan black children. Nor unci! 1954 would the Court abandon the: «separate but equal" doccrine. Rounding our a dismal re· cord. the justices in 1898 upheld the poll tax and literacy rests. Such racisc and scpa· racist policies affected blacks nacionwidc, Mexicans in 1Cxas,and Asians in California among other groups. Few norchcrners protested the South's whice:-supremadst sociecy. l 'hc restora· cion of seccional harmony came at a high price: norchern acquiescence in the ucter debasement of a people whose freedom had cosc the liw:s of thousands of norchern men. Blacks responded to their plight in various wa)'S. The nation's foremosc AfricanAmerican leader from the 1890s until his deach in 1915 was BookerT. Washington. lnding bLlck 6gu"" of ian' Born inro sla\'C1f in Virginia in 1856, the son of a slai,!'C ~A'Oman and her ~Athin· master, ninttft'ntb o:ntury. ,;tnol!Md Washington enrolled at a freedman's school in Hampton, Virginia, and in 1881 ortducarion and acoomrnodation ganized a state vocational school in 1Uskegee (tuu-KEE·ghte), Alabama. which became Tuskegee Unh·ersjty. Washington attained prominence in 1895 ~Athen he gave an address in Atlanta insisting chac the 6rst task of African-Americans must be to acquire vocational skills. O nce blacks prowd their economic value, he predicted, racism would ebb.: meanwhile. they must accept their Joe.. Washington leccured ~Aidd)', and his autobiography, Up From Slaw.ry ( 1901), recounted his rise from poverty thanks to honesty, hard work, and kindly pacrons- themes familiar from Horatio Alger's books. Other blacks responded resource-fully to racism. Black churches provided emotional support, as d id black fraternal lodges. And a handful of African-Americans established banks and successful businesses, such as insurance companies and barbershops. Meanwhile, voices of black protest ne\-tr wholly died out. Frederick Douglass urged thac blacks press on for full equality. "Who would be free, them.sel\-es muse scrike the first blow," he proclaimed in 1883. But foroth· ers, che solution was to le-ave the South. In 1879 SC\-tral chousand mo\·ed Grover Ck'A'Lmd ;Ute"-mpted t..lri ff to Kansas, and ten thousand migrated co Chicago be-~n 1870 and 1890. l'<'for nu and t ried to g;ain com.-ol of Blacks who u-ent north, hou-t\'et, discO\"C.red that public opinion sancthe ptruion S)'Jl<'m. tioned man}' forms of de facto discrimination. Big bu:~ine':lll and tbe GAR combined to ddut Ck.o\'C'I..lnd in 1888. The rise of che-so-called solid South, firmly established on racist founThe- Grange mc:M"ment ru:IC' ;u an dacions, had important political implicacions. The Republican Parcy had at«"-mpt b)· fumeu ro rt-;ul«t con · practicall)' no presence in che--S outh. For ncarI)' a centur}'• the only impor· trul O'.IU t heir li'A"$, which $C'C'med to cane deccion in most southern scates was the Democratic primary. Furbe at the m «cyo( r~il ruads, m tddJe· thermore, the large bloc of souchern Democracs in Congress accumulated men, a nd banker~. seniority and poW'Cr, and helped shape public policy. Finally, southern The- Alliance JuperSC'
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Describing her girlhood in the turn·of·che:-cenrury South, white no\-elist Lillian Smith wrote, «J Je:arned it is possible co pray at nighc and ride a j im Crow car the next morning; ... co glow when the word democracy was used, and to practice sla\'ef}' from morning to night."

THE 1890s: POLITICS I N A DEPRESSION DECADE

I

W1!r did William }11nnings Bryan fail to win the presidency in 1896?

In the 1890s smoldering discontenc ~Aith che: major parties and chcir support for unrestricted business enterprise: burst imo flames. As banks failed and railroads went bankrupt, the: nation slid imo a grinding depression. The crises of che 1890s laid bare the paralysjs of the: federal government- dominated by a busjne:ss elitewhen confronted by the: new social realities of fuctorics, urban slums, immigrant workers, and desperate farmers. In response, irate: farm~ laborers, and their sup· porters joined a new party, the l:topuli.scs, to change the system.

The Populist Party platfonn adopred in jul)' 1892 offered a broad vision of national refonn. That same month, chir· ~:T.otbt t«n people died in a gun battle bct\l."ee:n strikers and strike:._ breakers at the Homestead steel plant near Pittsburgh, and rtresidenc Harrison sent federal troops ro idaho, where a silver-mine strike: had curned violent. Events s«mcd to justify che Populists' warnings of chaos ahead. The 1892 campaign for the White House was a replay of 1888, Harrison versus dc..-eland, but this cime Cleveland \N'On b)•more than 360,000 votes, a decisi..-e margin in an age: of dose: elections. A public reaction against labor violence and the McKinley Tariff hurt Harrison. Meanwhile, a solid shO'I'-'ing by l:topuli.sc candidates sparked great hopes for che furure. 11leir presidential candidate, james B. Weaw~r. got more chan I million votes, 8.5 percem of che total, and the Populists elected 6\>t: scnaco~ ten congressmen, and chre:e: gm-·ernors. But the party's strength was spotty; it made no dent in New England or the urban Ease and little in che Midwest. In che South, racism, Democratic IO)'lllty, distaste: for the former Union general \'(Ieaver, and widespread intimidation and voter fraud kept the Populist tally under 25 percent. 11le party's failure killed the prospects for interracial agrarian reform. After 1892 southern politicians seeking to appeal to poor whites- including a disil· lusioned Tom Watson- stared ~Aithin the Democratic fold and faced their populism with radsm .

1812: Populists

dc..-eland soon confronted a major crisis: an economic collapse: in che railroad industry chac quickly spread. RailTbeDepmsionof roads had led the a~A'l'SOme industrial growth of the 1880s, ~:s-1m triggering both im>t:stmenc and speculation. In the earl)' 1890s railroad growth slO'I'--ed, affecting ocher i nduscrie:~ including iron and steel. The 6rsc hincofcrouble flared up in February 1893 when che l'hiladd phia and Reading Railroad failed.

capllall• in Crisis:

I THE •8,os: POlmcs l rf A OEPitESSIOM DECADE This bankruptcy occurred at a moment of weakened con6dence in the govern· ment's ability to redeem paper money "'ith gold on demand Economic problems in London in 1890 had forced British investors to unload millions of dollars in Ameri· can stocks; $68 million in U.S. gold reserves flowed across the Adancic to Britain. At the same cime, heavy spending on pensions and pork-barrel projects had subscan· tiall)' reduced the federal surplu~ while paying for siio.'er purchases under the S her· man Siio.'er Purchase: Act was scraining the gold reserve. From january 1892 to March 1893 (the month Cleveland was inaugurated), che gold rcscrw had fallen to $100 million, the minimum considered necessary to support the dollar. This dedine alarmed those: who viewed the gold standard as rhe only sure evidence of che gM>crn· ment's 6nandal stability. Wich the collapse of che Philadelphia and Reading. fear fed on icself as panicky investors conwrced their stock holdings to gold. Stock prices plunged, the gold resen 'e plummeted, and by the end of the y~ar scw:my-four railroads, six hundred banks, and 6fteen thousand businesses had failed. The Panic of 1893 set off four y~ars of hard times. By 1897 one-third of the nacion's railroad mileage v.as in bankruptcy. The railroad boom had spurred the prosperity of the 1880s, and che railroad collapse of the 1890s battered the economy into a full-scale depression. Thecri.Us took a hea..y human roll. Industrial unemployment soared to as m uch as 25 percent. Millions of factor}' workers had no money to buy food or heat their homes, and jobless men tramped the stTNts looking for work. Unusually harsh win· ters in 1893 and 1894 aggravated the misery, especially in major dcies. In New York Ciry, where che crisis quickly swamped local relief agencies, a minister reponed actual starvation. Rural America, alread)' hard hit b)• dedining agricultural prices, faced ruin. Corn plummeted from SOc to 21 c a bushel and wheat from 84( to 5 14. Conon fell to sc a pound. Some desperace Americans curned to procest. In Mas.UIIon, O hio, self-caught monetar}' expert jacob Coxey proposed as a solucion to unempiO)menc a S.SOO mil· lion public·"''Orks program funded with paper money. Coxcy organized a march on Washington to lobb)• for his scheme. lhousands joined him en rouce, and st\'eral hundred accuall)' re-ached Washingcon in late April 1894. Police arrested Coxey and other leaders when they attempted to c:ncer the Capitol grounds, and his «army" bro ke up. Although some considered Coxcy eccencric, his proposal closely resembled programs that che gm'ernmcm would adopt during the depression ofche J930s. As unrest intensified, fear dutched middle-class Americans. A church magazine demanded that croops puc "a pitiless stop" to o utbreaks of unrest. To some obsen·· ers, a bloody upheaval seemed imminem .

h•it ., 11!0

I"""'"""'

465

W;l1J Sm-tt

collapst tlvt wu~ offa oariOU'IIicL: rrooomit

In rhe face of suffering and curmoil, dC"t·eland rctreaced imo a laissez-faire forcress. Boom-and-bust economic C)'· d es were inevitable, he in.Ustcd, and government could do nothing. Missing the larger piccure, Cle\'eland focused on a single peripheral issue, the gold slandanl. In August 1893 he persuaded Congress to repeal the Sherman Silw r Purchase: Ac[, which he blamed for the dwindling gold rc.sei"V'C.. NC"t-erthdes~ the gold drain continued. In early 1895, "'ith the gold rese..-..-e dov.'n co $41 million, dC"t'eland turned to Wall Street. Bankers J. P. Morgan and

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August Bdmonc agreed to lend the government $62 million in exchange for dis· counted U.S. bonds. The government then pu.«:hased gold to replenish the resl'l"Ve, and Morgan and Belmont resold their bonds fora substantial profit. l 'he deal helped to restore confidence in the go•• crnment's economic stability. HO\I.\'!''er, Clevdand's gambit to sa..-c the gold standard came at a high price. His deal ~Aith Morgan and Belmont, and the handsome profits the)' made, confirmed radicals' suspicions of an unholy alliance between Washington and Wall Street. As the cariffbattle made dear, corporate interests held the whip hand. Although dc..-cland fa..-ored tariff reform, the Oemocrac-controUed Congress of 1892-1893 ~nerall)' yielded co high·cariff lobbyists. The Wilson-Gorman Tariff of 1894 made: so many concessions to special interests chat a disgusted president aUo~A'Cd it to be· come law without his signature. O ne fearure of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff suggested an enlarging vision of gO\'· ernmenr's role in an age of tO\I.·ering forrunes: an income tax of 2 percent on all in· come m-er $4,000 (roughly $40,000 in present·d.ty purchasing pcw.-cr). But in 1895 the Supreme Courc dedared the tax unconstitutional. Thus, whether one looked at the executive, che legislacure, or the judiciar)', Washington's subordination to the corpor:m elite seemed nearly complete. The depression also helped reorient social chought. Middle-class charitable workers, long convinced that indiYidual character flaws caused pm-crcy, now realized that even sober, hard-working people could succumb to economic forces beyond their conrrol. Laissez.fai re ideology weakened in the 1890s, as depression-worn Americans adopted a broader conception of gm·emmem•s proper role in dealing with the social consequences of industrialization. This new perspectiw: would acti· vate: po~Awful policical energies. The depression, in short, not only brought suffer· ing: it also taught lessons.

Republican gains in the 1894 midterm elections m-caled popular tc\oulsion against Clt\-eland and che Democrats, who ~A'Cre blamed for the hard times. As 1896 approached, the monetary question became the OII'Crriding symbolic issue. ConscrvaciV\'.s dung to the gold standard, buc ad\'OCates of "free silo.-cr'' triumphed at the Oemocracic convention when a )'OUng champion of silver. Williamjennings Bryan, secured the nomination. Despite Bryan's eloquence, Republican William McKinley emerged vic· torious. His triumph laid the groundwork for a major political realignment that would influence Amer ican politics for a generation. The midterm election of 1894 spelled Democratic d isaster. lmmigrancs, who u.-cre battered by the depression, abandoned their traditional Democratic allegiance, and Republicans gained control of Congress and st\·eral key states. l'opulisc candi· dates won nearly J .5 million \'Otcs, 40 percent 0\'er their 1892 total. Most Populist gains came in the South. The serious economic conflict that split Americans focused on a symbolic issue: free siiV\'.r. Clt\-eland•s rigid defense of the gold scandard fo rced his opponents inro an exaggerated obsession with sih·er, obscuring the genuine issues dividing rich and poor. creditor and debtor, and farmer and city dweller. Conservati\--es tirelessly up· held the gold scandard. and agrarian radicals- urged on and sometimes financed b)• u.-cscem sih-er·mine owners-extolled sil\-er as a uni\-ersal cure-aiL

18M: Protest Crows l.ollder

Wi&IM SHii-cs llry• Orator.clw.mpion orf.arm intt!T.St~ omri-irnpcri.llist. m~r. time Ot:mOCl'llrie p~T.Sidrncial

c:andiel.m"

I THE•8,os:POlmcs l rf A 0EPitESSIOM DECADE

At the 1896 Democratic convention in Chicago, western and southern delegates adopted a platform demanding capture tile the free and unlimited coinage of siiVI.'.r- in effect, repudi· Demoaati( Party ating the Clcw.land administration. An ardenc advocate of the silver cause captured the party's nomination: William jennings Bryan of Nebraska Only thirty-six, the young la"''}'cr had already s~d western agrarian inter· csts during cwo terms in Congress. Joining Christian imagery "'ich economic anal}'Sis, Bryan gave his major conVI.'.n· cion speech during the debate over che platform. His booming ..'Oice carried his rousing \N'Ords to che highest galleries of the convention hall. Praising farmers as the nation's bedrock, Br)'an roared to the cheering delegates, "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold." Thesilvcrites' capture ofthe Democratic party le-ft the Populists with a dilemma. Free sih·er was only one reform among many that they advocated. If they jumped aboard the Bryan band"''llgon, they would abandon thcir ~·n program. But a scpa· rare Populist tickct would siphon votes from Bryan and guarantee a Republican vic· tory. Reluccand}', the l'opulists endorsed Br)'an. Meanwhile, the Republicans nominated former Ohio go\-ernor William McKinley on a platform endorsing the high protecti\-e tariff and the gold standard.

467

Siver Advocales

Primary Source: The Sacrilegious Candidate

Bryan d id his best co sustain the momentum of the Chi· cago conVI.'.ntion, crisscrossing the country by train to deli\-er his free-silver campaign speech. O ne skeptical editor compared him to Nebraska's notoriously shallow Platte RiVI.'.r: six inches deep and a mile wide at the mouth. Mark Hanna, a Cleveland industrialist, managed the Republican McKinley's campaign. Dignified and aloof, McKinley could not match Br)'lln's popular touch.

Willilom MdOnloy's "FrooiPort~·

(OIIIfl"igtl. 1896

Md
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According!)', Hanna built che campaign not around the candidate: but around postcrs, pamphlets, and newspaper editorials. These publications ~Aoarned of the dangers of free silver, caricatured Bryan as a radi· cal, and portrayed McKinlt:)' and che gold standard as cwin pillars of prosperity. Drawing on a war chest possibly asIa~ as$? mil· lion, Hanna spent lavish!)'· J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller together contribme:d $500,000 to che Me· Kinley campaign, more than Br)'an' s total campaign E::!] Drt1IICI contributions. McKinley himself stayed home in Can· ton, Ohio, emerging occasionally to read speeches co P$tc:t1'1!19J EI$CioraJ visiting delegations. All told, some 750,000 people: 01 ~~\':"' trekked co Camon to take part in McKinley's d everl)' 7,t02,246 su 'Ailll:!l organized ..front-porch campaign." Dllmoc...uo 6,l~2,SSQ ,1.1 O n deccion day, McKinley be:ac Br)oan b)' 0\'l'l' six WJW!I.LBiyoWI hundred thousand votes (sec Map 20.1). He swept t he: MlnorpuiJH 31~306 Northeast and the Mid~A'CSt and C'\\':n carried thrct: Map 20.1 Th• Eltdio• of 1196 fann states be:)'ond the Mississippi as wdl as Cali· fornia and Oregon. Br)'an's strength v.as limited co che South and the: Grear Plains and mountain states. Why did Bryan lose despite protesc spiric abroad in che land? His core conscirucncy, while: passionately 10)'31, was limited. Seduced by free silver, t he: Democrats had upheld a platform and a candidate with lirtle appeal for facPupuli't:l pollC'd m ort than a mil· lio n voco: in the' !892 pl\"$idC'ntial tory workers. Urban \'Oters, reali.ting thac higher farm prices also meant C'l«tion.. higher food prices, ~A'Cnt heavily for McKinley. Cultural differences were: also The' Panic of 1893 hardC' ncd into a in pia)'· To urban Catholics and Jews, t his teetotaling Nebraskan thundering dC'C'p dtpi\"$Jio n; w:tnt and JuffC'ri ng like a l'rotescam revival preacher seemed utter ly alien. Finall)', the l'opuliscs' WUC' wickJpno.ad. efforc to de6ne: a democratic al ternati~ relied heavily on visions of a pre· COltC')''J Army ' howe'd th~ dC'pth of modern economic order of independent farmcrs and entrepreneurs. AI· di.Kom~m with the' political Jf$1C'nt; though appealing, this vision bore little relationship to the new corporate: nC'\'C'n:hdC'U., corporal~ im~re'u continut'd co dominae~ n.uion..ll order caking shape: in America. politiu.. 11le McKinley administration translated its conservative: placform inco T he' m idtum dC'ction' o( 189-1 law. The Dingley Tariff ( 1897) pushed rates to aU-time highs, and che Cur· Jho~\"d revubion again't th~ ~Xmo· rency Act of 1900 committed the Uniced States to the: gold standard. Jk:. cr at:l, whom voc~l'lli b laltW'd for the' dC'pn-u:ion WlloY.ring t he' panic of cause of returning prosperity, rising farm prices, and rhe discO\"Cry ofgold in 189J. Alaska, t hese measures roused little opposition, and McKinley easily detn 1896 th~ txmocrat:l ~...d to feared Bryan again in 1900. free·,ih'C'r intC'resu ;mel nominatC'd 11le deccions of 1894 and 1896 produced a Republican majority chat, \Villiam jC'nn ingJ Bryan aft~r he' except for Woodraw Wilson's presidency (19 13-1921), ~A'Ould dominate natl«trifiC'd the- conwm ion with h iJ "cro~' o( gold" ~ptC'th. tional policies until the deccion of Franklin D. RoosC'\-elc in 1932. Populism RC'publi ~n \Villiam MtKinlC'y collapsed, but an emerging new reform mo\~menc, progressivism, would dC'k-;UC'd Bl)·an on a C'OnJav;U:ivC' bring many populist reform proposals to fruition.

...

•=:.: c=J ., 0 "'

plnfor m . PupuliJm C'oUap$C'd, pa,.. ing the' w:ar for a Rt p ublitoln m.ajority th at would damin.n~ nation.ll politio: for the- next fifl:C'C' n )"C'af'll.

":'

..,

ExPANSIONIST STIRRINGS AND WAR WITH SPAIN, 1878-1901

w,.

did the United SWtes go to war with Spain and bec.ome an imp~rial power? The same: corporace: elite t hat dominated late-ninctccnth-
politics influenced U.S. foreign policy as ~A'CII , contribucing co surging expansionist pressures. Business leaders, politicians, statesmen, and editorial writers insisted that national greatness required chat America macch Europe's imperial expansion. Fanned by sensationalistic newspaper cm--eragc of a Cuban struggle for indepcn·

dmcc and by cJitc calls for greater American international as.serri\'Cfless, war btrween the United States and Spain broke o ut in 1898.

Ever since: the 6rs.t European seeders had colonized North

IIIIIs of Expanlionist Amcrica•s Adamic coasc, chc newcomers had been an exSenllllenl pansionist people. By t he 1840s t he push ~A'CStward had acquired a name: Manifest Destiny. Directed inward after 1865 toward the scrtle· ment of the t rans·Mississippi \'('est (see Chapter 17). this impulse turned oucward in the 1880s as Americans fo!IO""--ed rhe imperial example sct by Great Britain, f rance, Belgium, Jcaly, ~rman}~ and japan. Furthermore, many business leaders bdic..-ed thac concinued domestic prosperity required o\·meas markets. Foreign markers of· fered a safety vah.-e for potenciall)' explosive pressures in the U.S. economy. National greacness, it appeared, demanded an empire. Proponents of a strong navy contributed to the expansionist mood. In The Influence ofSea 1\nn•rupon History• (1890), AlfrMThayer Mahan equated sea power ~Aith national greacness and urged a rapid U.S. naval buildup, ~Athich required ow~rseas bases. Meanwhile, some religious leaders proclaim ed America's mission to spread Christianity, an argument with racist tinges. One ministera..-errcd t hat"God is t rain· ing rhe Anglo-Saxon race: for irs mission"- a mission of bringing Christianity and civilization co rhe ~A'Orld 's "weaker races:'' A gro up of Republican expansionists, led by Senacor Henry Cabot Lodge, diplo· mat j ohn Hay, and Theodore Roosew~lc of New York, preached imperial greatness and military might. .. , should welcome almost an}' war;'' declared Roosewlt in 1897; "... t his country needs one" (see Map 20.2). Such advocates of expansionism ap· plied Social Darwinist rhetoric of the da)' co argue that war, as a vehicle for natural sd ecrion, would test and refurbish American manhood, honor, and civic commit· ment. This gendercd appeal both counterbalanced concerns about women's politi· cal activism and helped forge the disparate: arguments for expansionism imo a simple, \i sceral plea that had a broad appeaL A series of diplomatic skinnishes in the mid·l890s revealed the newly asscrti\-e American mood. In the mid·l880s, quarrels berwcen the United States and Great Britain had flared ow~r fishing rights in rhe Norrh Atlantic and North Pacific, re· awakening latent anri·British feelings and the old dream of acquiring Canada. In 1898 a compromise seed ed che fishing rights dispute, buc by chen attention had shifted co Larin America. In 1891 tensions had flared betWeen che United States

Allred l'Myw MIU• leading

I

proponmt or imperialism, ~,,...,

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RJSSIA

- ·-· ·~

...,._ •••

PACIFIC OCEAN

..... . •••

·_

.-

...... l

·-

._ -!5o-

D

AtQIJI(ICII1f 111-a!, OCCUIJII(~ orul1\ll~nudw:n

l:::lkq.II'IICI~ Cl.lrtn-oriDI-.y

Mop 20.2 U.S. Ttnitorial EJpwio• io lht Lltt Nilltlttlltll Cttlblry The major p~riod of U.S. u:rritori:~l exp~nsion ;abro~ QmC' in :. short bul'\( o f :.etivity in the l.ate 1890s, whera ncwsp;aper5 ;and some politici:~ns be;~.t the drums for empire.

lnteracti\•e Map: U.S. Territorial Expansion in the late 19th Century

and Chile: after a mob in Valparaiso (val-puh-RYE-zoh) killed two American sailors on shore: leave. War ft\'ct subsided after Chile apologized and paid an indemnity of $75,000. Another Lacin American conflict arose from a boundary dispute betv.r'een Vent· zuda and British Guiana {ghoee:·AHN-uh) in 1895. When the British rejected a U.S. arbitration offer, a livid GW't-er Cl ew~land asked Congress to sec up a commission co settle rhe disputet:\'Cfl without Britain's approval. As patriotic fen·or pulsed through the nation, rhe British in 1897 accepted che commission's 6ndings.

Mean"'thile, che U.S. Navy focused on the Samoan (suh· MOH-"n) lslands in the South Paci6c, where it sought che pore of Pago Pago (I'ON-go PON-go) as a refueling station. In March 1889 che United States narrowly 3\'0ided a naval dash with Germany over the islands when a rimd)' hurricane wrecked both fleets. Ultimatcly, America established a rhree--way protoccorate over rhe islands "'ith German}' and Great Britain.

Pldlk Elplnsion

The Hawaiian Islands. with chcir economic and strategic signi6cance, also beckoned U.S. imperialists. American missionaries and merchants had been active in the islands since che end of the eighteenth cmrury. American-o~A'tled sugar plantations ~Aaiian econom}'· Under an 1887 treaty, the: United States built a naval base at Pearl Harbor, near Ho· nolulu. Then in 1891, angered by American economic domination, islanders welcomed Uliuokalani (I J..«-oo-oh-ka-LAW-nee:) to the Hawaiian throne. Strong-willed and hostile tO'I'-·ard Americans, she became queen amid a crisis sec off by a U.S. ded· sion in 1890 to tax Ha~A>aiian sugar. Hawaiian sugar prices plunged 40 percent as a result. Facing ruin, t he: planters deposed che queen in january 1893, proclaimed the independent Republic of Hawaii, and requested U.S. annexation. The grab for Hawaii croubled dC'\o-eland, cspedall)' ~A•hen an emissary whom he sene case doubt on whether the: Ha~A'lliians desired annexation. Buc when McKinlt:)' succeeded CIC\o-eland, annexation moo.~d rapidly forward, and in 1898 Congress pro· claimed Hawaii an American ce:rritory. S ixty-one )~ars facer, it joined the: Union as the 6ftie:ch state.

Hllllliaalslands

lndtptodttu i.Jiand tvtion in Puific O..:Un a~ by U.S. in 1898

I

In 1898 Amer ican attention shifted to Cuba, where a re· bellion against Spanish rule had erupted in 1895. Ameri· can businessmen had $50 million invested in che: island and annually impon:ed SJOO million in sugar and other produces from Cuba. Revo· lutionary turmoil would jeopardize these interests. Neither the Cleveland nor the McKinley administration supporced the: rebellion. Buc che rebels' cause aroused popular S)mpachy in t he: United States. This sup· pore increased with n:wlations chac t he: Spanish commander in C uba, Valeriano Wcyler (vah.jaiHe:·AH·no WAY·Iot'l-), was herding vast numbers of Cubans into squalid camps. Malnutrition and disease turned these camps into hellholes in which perhaps two hundred thousand Cubans died. Fueling American anger v.-ere sensational scories published by two competing New York newspapers, William Randolph Hearst's journal and joseph Pulitzer's World. The journals color comic strip ..The Yellow Kid" provided a term for Hearst's debased editorial approach: )'~llow journalism. In the cutthroat battle for readers, both editors exploited che Cuban crisis, t urning rumor imo fact and detailing "Burcher" We:yler's atrocities. In 1897 a new, more liberal Spanish government sought a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis. Buc Hearst and Pulitzer continued to inflame public opin ion. On February 8, 1898, Hearst's }Mrnal published a private letter from a Spanish diplo· mat describing McKinley as "v.-eak" and "a bidder for che admiration of the crowd." Irritation O\"er this incident turned to outra~ on February IS, 1898, when an explo· sion rocked t he: battleship Maint in Ha\•ana harbor, killing 22-6 American crewmen. Scholarly opinion abouc whac caused the explosion is still divided, but a careful re· view ofche evidence in 1998 concluded that a mine most likely sct off the ammuni· cion explosion char sank che ship. Newspaper headlines at the rime: blamed the: same cause: and war spirit flared high. Despite furcher Spanish concessi on~ on April J J McKinley s.em a war message to Congress, and legislators passed a joint resolution recognizing Cuba's inde:pen· dmce and auchori.z.ing force co expel the Spanis h. The 1CIIer amendment introduced

crtsls- Cuba

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by Senator Henry M. 1CIIer of Colorado declared thac the United States had no de· sjre for ..so'lercigmy, jurisdiction, or concrol'" in Cuba and pledged that America would lea'le the island alone once independence was assured.

The war wich Spain im·olvtd onl)' a few days of actual combat. Action began on May I, 1898, ~Ailen a U.S. fl ect under Admiral George Dewey steamed imo Manila (muh· Nlll-uh) Bay in the Ph ilippines and destroyed or captured all ten Spanish ships an· chored chere, at che cosc of J American and 381 Spanish lives.. In mid-August, U.S. troops occupied che capital, Manila. In Cuba. che war·s only significant land engagement took place on jul)' J when American troops seized two strongly defended Spanish garrisons on El Caney Hill and San j uan (sahn w.t.hn) Hill m-e:rlooking che Spanish militar}' stronghold of San· tiago de Cuba (sahrHH·AH-go cbycue-bah). Leading the \-olunteer ..Rough Riders" at San juan Hill 'A'llS Theodore Roosevdc, gctcing his taste of war-and abundant publicity- a t fast. 1\l-o days later, the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba made a gal· lant but doomed break for the open sea. Blockading American ships sank the s........-e:n ancient wssds, killing 474 Spaniards and ending four h undred years of Spanish em· pire in America. j ohn Ha)' chought that it had aU been ..a splendid little war," but many who served in Cuba found it far from splendid. They ~A'rot into bactle in the tropical mid· summer "-"taring heavy wool unifonn~ received ab)'Smal medical care, and died in drO'V'es from yellow fe\·er, food poisoning. and malaria. The United States lost more than 5,000 men in Cuba, only 379 of them in combat. The thousands of black troops who fought in Cuba. encountered jim Cro~A• rae· ism ac assembl)' poims in Gt:orgia and chcir embarkation port in 1·ampa. Florida. In

TbeSplllisbAIIIerlran W•. 18!18

{ff) Primary Source: ~War Oead

Akkllo-Amtric.lo Soldiers of tilt Ttltll U.S. C.v.1lry io Caba.luly 181141 Thue men po5oed shortly ~tr the u pturt ofS-:u~ J u:u~ Hill. Bt~k troo p~. known ;u bu~lo 501diers, pb.yed :u~ impon:u~t role in tht Sp~sh·Americ;an \V;ar, but theyWt"re subjtc:c: to har.tn· ment :~nd d t.seri mination .

Tampa, taunted by whites and re-fused scwicc at restaurants and bars, some black troops exploded in riotous rage: on june 6j white troops from Georgia restored order. The transport ships that carried troops to Cuba were segregated. wit h black croops often confined to the 1~-esc quarters in stifling heat and denied permission to mingle on deck with other units. Despite such encounters with racism, African-American troops scn·ed with honor in Cuba, playing key roles in the battles of San juan Hill and El Caney Hill.

The Spanish sought an annisrice: o n Jul)' 17. In the: peace: cre:aty signed that De· ce:mbcr in Paris, Spain recognized Cuba•s independence and, after a U.S. payment of $20 million, ceded the Philippine:~ Puerto Rico, and the: Pad6c island of Guam to the United States. Americans now possessed an island empire strctching from t he Caribbean to t he Pacific. From 1898 co 1902 the U.S. Anny governed Cuba under che command of Gen· eral Ltonard Wood. Wood's administration improwd public health, education, and sanitacion but violated t he spirit of t he 1898 Teller Amendment. The troops cvcncually withdrew, although the so-called Platt Amendmtnt (1901), requested by t he War Departmenc, authorized the wit hdrawal only after Cuba agreed not co make any creaty "'ith a foreign pov.-cr limiting its independence and not to borro"'' beyond its mtans. l 'he United States also resen-cd tht right co ime.-..-cne in Cuba and to establish a naval base there, Guanc.inamo (gwan-TAHN-\olh-moh) Ba)', ntar Santiago de C uba, which it still maintains. The l'latc Amendment remained in fo rce until 1934. U.S. invcstmtms in Cuba, some$50 million in 1898,soared co $500 million b}' 1920.

Somt Americans had opposed imperialism for more chan a decade, and che victories in Cuba and che l' hilippines did not bring uni\·enal praise. Alt hough few in number, che critics "''Ct'C' influenciaL Som e of them, like Carl Schurz and E. L Godkin, "''Cre former Mugwumps. Ocher anti-imperialists induded William j ennings Bryan, settlem ent-house fo under j ane Addams, om-elise Mark 1Wain, and Harvard philosopher William james. Steel king Andrew Carnegie ga\'t: thousands of dollars to t he cause. In 1898 these critics of empire had formed che Anti-I.mperialisc Lugue. For che United Scates to rule other peoples, cheanci-imperialists believed, was to violate che principles of che Declaration of Independence and che Consciw rion. 11le military fever chac accompanied expansionism also disma)-cd t he anti-imperialists. In February 1899 che anci-imperialiscs failed by one ...oce to pre\>ecnt Senate raci· 6cation of the expansionist peace creary wich Spain, and McKinle)''S O\'erwhelming victory in 1900 m·er anti-imperialist Br)•an eroded t he cause. Ne\•erthelc.ss, ac a rime of jingoistic rhctork and militaristic poscuring,. the opponents of expansion had upheld an older, fin er vision ofAmerica..

Plott-""' '

All"<mm< to•itbduwU.S. troops from Culla; U.S. nuinuined ~ noaval

Crtlla of Empire

I

..

~

IA!-

Snull but inllumrial group that oppOJC'Id impe-rialism

Events in che Philippines confirmed che anti-imperialists' worse fears. When che Spanish-American \'t'ar began, few Americans knew what or where the Philippine Islands -1102 wert. American business, chough, sa"'' them as a stepping· scone to the rich China markct.

CUenllla War in 1111 PbUipplnes,

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474

CHAPtER lO

PottriCS AND f Xl'AHSION IN AN

(MOVS~UZIKGAGE, 187;>-1900

McKinle)~ reflecting the prevailing mood as alwa)'S, reasoned char the Filipinos were unready for self-government and "''Ould be: gobbled up if set adrift in a .....-orld of imperial rivalries. He further persuaded himself that American rule would enor· mously benefic a people he called ..our lictle brown brothers:'' A de\'OUt Methodist, he explained that America's mission "''lls "ro educate the Filipinos, and ro uplift and d"ilize and Christianize: them, and by God's grace do che very best "''C could b)• them." (Most Filipinos were already Christian, a legaq•of centuries ofSpanish rule.) Having prayerfull)' reached his decision, McKinley instructed che American peace negotiators in Paris to insisc on U.S. acquisition of the l'hilippincs. r..i&o Ap;oaldo ......,.;a "Uplifting" che Philippines pr()I.'Cd d ifficult. In 1896 )'Oung Emilio Aguinaldo koadtt of Filipino war apirut (eh·MEEL-et>-oh ah·gwin·ALL·doh) had organized a Filipino independence mm-·e· A.mtriu.n oco.tparion menc to dr i..-e our the Spanish. In the summer of 1898, with arms supplied by Admi· m1 01!"--ey, Aguinaldo's forces captured most of Luzon (loo·ZAHN), the Philippines' main island. Aguinaldo proclaimed Filipino independence and drafted a democratic constitution. In 1899, feeling betrayed by the U.S. decision to take possession of his country, Aguinaldo ordered his croops to fighc the occupying American army. lc took the United States four y~ars to crush the Filipino independence IDO\'f:· ment, which waged a guerrilla war against che U.S. forces. More than 125,000 Ameri· can troops ultimate!)' served in the Philippine jungl~ and 4,000 died. As many as 20,000 Filipino independence fighters perished. As in the later Vietnam and Iraq Wars, casualties and suffering ra\'aged the civilian population as wdl. Historians estimate thac at least 200,000 civilians died in che conflict. Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901, but large--scale guerrilla fighting continued through the summer of 1902. In 1902 aspedal Senate committee heard tescimon}' from veterans of the Ph ilip· pines war about executing prisoners, torcuring suspects, and burning villages. T he humanitarian mood of 1898, when Americans had rushed to sa\'f: Cuba from the crud Spani ard~ seemed remote indeed. In reuospect, the American troops' atcicude toward che Filipinos, although deplorable, is noc hard to understand. The cauldron of immigration, imperialism, and the «winning of che \l'esr" immnixed racist con· cerns O\'f:r ..bad,'"'A'llrd" and «useless"' peoples "'ith rhetorical pleas for supervision and stewardship. In the process, as was evident in the creacment of American lndi· ans, u-ell·meaning paternalism ofcen degenerated inro deadly domination. lhe )'ears of expansionism and the subjugation of the Philippines had CHECKING I N proclaimed America's debut on the world stage. Ne\-erthdcss, most Americans remained ambivalent about the acquisition ofcmicory. While anri·imperialist Exp;an:~ionist, e'\'C'-n wulike JC"nh· m ent A..ued in tbC' 1890s.. Mark 1\vain acidly condemned «the Blessings of Civilization Trusc," labor T he United StoatC':I took a.'C'-r H.lwaii leader Samud Gompm warned that ..an inundation of Mongolians" might ilier Ameri.e.ln pbnten: de'pC)S«< the steal jobs from "'thice labor. White Americans recoiled from making the ..bar· rightful quee"n. barian peoples" of these territories a pare of the United States. Not fit co T he Spani.sh·Am«ic.ln \'(lar w.u a manage cheirown affairs, Filipinos u-ere placed in a protective starus chat de· populu ;u:~ertion of rising Am eri· c.ln po"\..,r. nied their independence but kept them under U.S. control In 1902 Congress passed the Philippine Organic Ace, under which a A :~mall but \'OC.U grou p critic ix.ed impc"riali:~m ;u: .a betr~ or Am«i· presidentially appointed go\-ernor would rule the islands and a Filipino as· c.lnvaluu. sembly would be docced. 11le Ia"'' also promised cvcncual sdf·gm--ernmenc. Acquisition or the Phili ppinu!Tom l'rogress toward chis goal inched forward, "'ith inten •als of semimilitar}' Sp;ain k d to a gue"-rrilb war a nd the rule. In 1946, nearly half a cencur}' after Admiral OC'\l-ey's guns had boomed C'-xp.lnJion ofAmerieoln c mpino into in Manila Ba)', independence finally came to the Philippines. the wescer n Pacific.

l

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

KEY TERMS

How did political parties build coalitions out of their diverse ethnic and regional constituencies? (pall' 452)

I

Both major national parties pursued centrist courses, v.ith Republicans supporting big business and Dcmocr.us warning against government interference. GI'CCnbacks and the coinage ofsii~W Vr\'J'C major issues, and Ci\•il Scn•ice reform emerged. As the parties struggled to achieve political dominance, they were fon::ed ro deal with ethnic, cultural, and racial issues that included prohibition, church schools, and segregation.

Whot {acrors prompted the rise of the Grange and the Formers' Alliance mo,.ments? (page 451)

I

In the competition for new \'Otcrs, the needs of rur.U A.mcdcans wrn: often m\':rtooked Farmm fonncd a succession of mM-emcnrs, including chc Gmnge and the Alliance, to tty ro reassert control 0\'et theirlivts; these led to thi: Populist patty in 1892. Afri can-Americans were increasingly exdudcd from political lite.

Why did William }enning< Btyan fail tc win the presidency in 1896? (pall' 464)

I

Corporate interests continued to dominate politics. Populists won more than a million votes in the 1892 election, rtftecting deep dissatisfaction among western and southern farmers. 1'he Panic of 1893 and che subsequent depression devastated indh•iduals and led co political unrest, such as Coxcy"s Arm}'· l'he victory of Republican William McKinley M-er William jennings Bryan in the 1896 presidential election undermined Populism as an org.tnized move· ment. Man}' of ideas '"'\ 'J'C incotpotared into the cwo larger parties. The Republican coalition that put McKinley in the White Hoose would control national politics for the next fiftttn )'ears.

laissoz-faire (p. 454) Grand Army of the Republk (GAR) (p. 454)

Gr..nback party (p. 456) Sherman st.-er Purchase Act (p. 456)

Pendleton CMI S«Vice Act (p. 451) MtJg\IUfTlllS (p. 458) Grange (p. 459) farmon' Alliance(p. 460) Popt~list Party (p. 461) stl>lrnawry plan (p. 461) lj11Ching (p. 462) PII!Ssyv. FelrjusM (p. 462) Book« l Washingtoo (p. 463) Panic of 1893 (p. 465) William Jenri ngs Bryan (p. 466) Alfred Thayer Mallan (p. 469) Hawaiian Islands (p. 471) P~tt Amendment (p. m ) Anti-lmp
Why did the United States go to nt~r with Spain and become an imperio/ power? (page 469)

I

The 1890s saw a sutgt of expansionist and warlike (jingoistic} sentiment. l'he Spanish-American War g.aw the United States control in che Caribbean and expanded American pOW"Cr far into the western Pacific '"'i th che acquisition of the Philippines. A bitter guerrilla war in the Philippines showed American determination to kttp the new U.S. empire, despite angr}' criticism from a vocal group of anti-imperialists. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

KEY TERMS

How did political parties build coalitions out of their diverse ethnic and regional constituencies? (pall' 452)

I

Both major national parties pursued centrist courses, v.ith Republicans supporting big business and Dcmocr.us warning against government interference. GI'CCnbacks and the coinage ofsii~W Vr\'J'C major issues, and Ci\•il Scn•ice reform emerged. As the parties struggled to achieve political dominance, they were fon::ed ro deal with ethnic, cultural, and racial issues that included prohibition, church schools, and segregation.

Whot {acrors prompted the rise of the Grange and the Formers' Alliance mo,.ments? (page 451)

I

In the competition for new \'Otcrs, the needs of rur.U A.mcdcans wrn: often m\':rtooked Farmm fonncd a succession of mM-emcnrs, including chc Gmnge and the Alliance, to tty ro reassert control 0\'et theirlivts; these led to thi: Populist patty in 1892. Afri can-Americans were increasingly exdudcd from political lite.

Why did William }enning< Btyan fail tc win the presidency in 1896? (pall' 464)

I

Corporate interests continued to dominate politics. Populists won more than a million votes in the 1892 election, rtftecting deep dissatisfaction among western and southern farmers. 1'he Panic of 1893 and che subsequent depression devastated indh•iduals and led co political unrest, such as Coxcy"s Arm}'· l'he victory of Republican William McKinley M-er William jennings Bryan in the 1896 presidential election undermined Populism as an org.tnized move· ment. Man}' of ideas '"'\ 'J'C incotpotared into the cwo larger parties. The Republican coalition that put McKinley in the White Hoose would control national politics for the next fiftttn )'ears.

laissoz-faire (p. 454) Grand Army of the Republk (GAR) (p. 454)

Gr..nback party (p. 456) Sherman st.-er Purchase Act (p. 456)

Pendleton CMI S«Vice Act (p. 451) MtJg\IUfTlllS (p. 458) Grange (p. 459) farmon' Alliance(p. 460) Popt~list Party (p. 461) stl>lrnawry plan (p. 461) lj11Ching (p. 462) PII!Ssyv. FelrjusM (p. 462) Book« l Washingtoo (p. 463) Panic of 1893 (p. 465) William Jenri ngs Bryan (p. 466) Alfred Thayer Mallan (p. 469) Hawaiian Islands (p. 471) P~tt Amendment (p. m ) Anti-lmp
Why did the United States go to nt~r with Spain and become an imperio/ power? (page 469)

I

The 1890s saw a sutgt of expansionist and warlike (jingoistic} sentiment. l'he Spanish-American War g.aw the United States control in che Caribbean and expanded American pOW"Cr far into the western Pacific '"'i th che acquisition of the Philippines. A bitter guerrilla war in the Philippines showed American determination to kttp the new U.S. empire, despite angr}' criticism from a vocal group of anti-imperialists. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

I PI!OGAE.SSIVESANOThOR IOEAS

477

and the: chree men fell to their deaths. Dozens of workers leaped from the: ~Aindows to certain death below. Sunday's headlines summed up the grim counc: 141 dead. The Triangle: fire offered horrif)'ing evidence of whac man}' dtize:ns had long recognized. Industrialization, for aU irs benefits, had taken a heavy toll on American life. Immigrants in unsafe factories often endured a desperate cycle: of poverty, ex· hausdng labor, and early deach. After the: Triangle traged)', New York passed a series of laws regulating factories and protecting ~A'Orkcrs. Growing concerns about industrialization, urban gro~A'th, and the rise of great corporacions prompted a ~A'll..-e of re:fonn that came to be called the progrcssi..-e movement. The progressi\J'C mm-ement ~A'3S a response to \'asc changes char had erased che familiar contours of an older America. In concrast to the rural Populists (sec Chapter 20), progressives concentrated on the social effects of the new urban· industrial order. Emerging in the 1890s at the: city and state IC"<-els, an array of organizacions, many led by women, pursued varied refonn objectives. As journalists, novelists, reli· gious leaders, social chinke:rs, and policicians joined in, these grass·roots efforts cvoi'IJ'Cd into a national mo\·emcm. By 1917, when refonn ga\'t: way co ~A'llr, America's political and social landscape had been cransformed. New laws, organizacions, and regulator}' agencies had arisen to address the consequences of helce:r·skelce:r urban· ization, industrial expansion, and corporate gro~A'th. The progressives could be maddeningly moralistic. Tht:)' had their blind spots (especially on such subjects as immigration and race:), and their reforms d idn'c atwa)'S work as planned. But, on balance, their achievements lefc a po'l'-'t:rful legacy for future generations.

PROGRESSIVES AND TH EIR IDEAS How did intellectuals, n<W6Iists, and jount41ists inspi111 tM progressille nt(WMJ61Jt? As the: ~-emicrh cenrury dawned, local groups across che nation, from workers to women's clubs co expert ino.-estigaci\J'C commissions, grappled with the problems of che new urban·industrial order. Workers protested unsafe and exhausting jobs. Expcrrs investigated social conditions. Women's dubs embraced reform. lntelleccu· als challenged the ideological fo undations of a business-dominated social order, and journalists publicized municipal corruption and industrialism's human toll. Acth·· ists cried co make: gm-ernmcm more democratic, eradicate dangerous conditions in cities and faccories, and curb corporate pO\l>t:r. Alchough historians group aU chesc efforts under a single Label, «progressivism " was in face never a single: mm-ement. It is perhaps best understood as a ~Aidespre:ad )'taming for re:fonn and an cxcicing sense: of new social possibilities.

=:t:es

Who u>t:re the: progressive~ and ~Arhat reforms did they pur· sue? To ans~Aw these quescions, "''e need to look at the: pat· tern of mban growth in the early rn>t:micrh centur}'· Along with immigration, a rapidly gro~Aing middle class cransfonned U.S. cicies. From the

of

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478

CHAPtER ll

ThE PllOCiR~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

men and women of this dass-mosc of them nati\--e-born, ~Ailitc:, and Protc:scanccame many of the progressive mo\-emenc's leaders and foot soldiers. From 1900 co 1920, the white-collar work force jumped from 5.1 million co 10.5 million, rwice the growth race for the: work force as a ~Ailole. This new middle class included such dh-erse groups as skilled technicians and desk ~A'Orkers, bureaucrats, local business O~A'tlers and managers, law)'ct'S, physicians, and teachers. Ambi· tious, wdl educated, and valuing self-discipline and social stability, members of the nc:~A' middle class ~A'Cre eager to make chcir influence felt. For middiHiass women, the: city offered both opportunities and frustrations. Some became public-school teachers, secretaries, clerks, and telephone operators, pushing the number of women in ~Athite-
Tll• C..dorinK of l..lbor i1 Corporltt Am«i
fem:d-e "typ~wri t~n... ;u the ht~dqu;u-t~ of the Mttropolit;~.n Lift ln sur;u~et Comp :.nyin New York City.

I PI!OGAE.SSIVESANO ThOR IOEAS

479

lnlmlalional Ladies' Garment WoRm' Union QLGI'AJ) founded; came Chapman Call becomes president ollhe Nalional Amencan Woman SUffrage Association (NAWSA) Assas.inalion ol Md
C01f4!011Y Jane Addams. Democrl]()' ond Social Elllia W. E. B. Du Boi~ The Souls of /lladi Folk; W!ighl ll<~' fliglt Theodore ele
created; louis Bra~is appointed to Supreme Court

Ejghleenlh Amencment (nalional )ll'ohilition) Nineleenlh Amendment (WOman suffrage)

Ac the mosc basic lewl, then, progressivism was a series of political and cultural responses to industrialization and its by·products. In contrast to populism, pro· gressivism•s strength lay in the dtics. Finally, most progressi\'tS wen: reformers, not radicals. They ~A'ished to make the new urban·industrial order more humane, not ovcrcurn it mtird)'· But which parts of t he urban· industrial order most needed attention, and ~Ailat remedies W'Cre required? Reaching d ifferent answers to these key questions, progrcssi\-e refo nners spawned an array of activities thac sometimes O\'f:rlapped, sometimes diverged. Man}' reformcrs wanted stricter regulation of business, fro m local transit co mpanies to che almighty t rusts. Others focused o n protcccing workcrs and the ur· ban poor. S till others cried to reform che struccure of gm--ernmcm, cspeciall)' ac t he municipai iC"".-el. Finally, some reformers fought for immigration restriction or \'ari· ous social-control strategies to combat urban immorality and disorder. Jlrogressi..-es had a high regard for science and expert kno""ledge, and tended to believe that, ~Ailen channeled through organized effort, such expertise, which had www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

480

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

produced the: new indus1:rial order, would solve the social problems spawned b)•in· dustrialism. Progressives marshaled resea.rch data, expe:rc opinion, and statistics co supporc their various causes.

A group of cum-of-the-century chinkers helped co reori· ent American social tho ughc and laid the ideological foundation for progr€ssivism. As we: have seen, some: Gilded Age intdlecruals had argued that Charles Darwin's theory of evolution justifi ed unrestrained economic competition. In che 1880s and 1890s, sociologist Lcscer Ward, utopian n ow~list Ed~A'llrd Bellamy, and leaders of che sectlemmt-housc and Social Gospel mo\·emcms had all attacked this harsh version of Social Dar~A'inism (see: Chapters 18 and 19). This attack intensified after 1900. Economise 1'hors.tein Veblen 'A'llS among the: sharpest critics of the: new business order, satirizing the lifest)1CS of che captains of industry and their ..conspicuous consumption'" (see Chapcer 19). In Iacer WTitings he argued thac engineers, molded by the: stern discipline of the machine, were better fi tted than the: business class co lead society. Han•ard philosopher William james, in an influential 1907 book called Pragma· tism, argued chat cruch emerges not from abstract cheorizing but from the cxperi· ence of coping with life. By emphasizing the: importance ofpraccical action, james's philosophy of pragmatism deepened the refonners' skepticism coward the older generation's entrenched ideas and strengthened che:ir belief in the necessity of so· cial change. Herbert Croly shared chis faith that new ideas could transform society. In 'T1tt Promist ofAmrrican Ufr ( 1909), he called for an activist government of the kind advo· cated b)• Alexander Hamilton, che first secretary of che treasury. But racher than serving the interests of the business das~ as Hamilton had proposed, Croly argued that this activist government should promote the welfare of all. In 1914, Croly fo unded the 1\~w Republic magazine co promote progressii,!'C ideas. Few argued chose ideas more effcccivdy than settlem ent-house leader jane Addams. In her books Demccrary ttnd Soria/ EUJirs ( 1902) and Twe119 Yean as- HN/1 Houst ( 1910), Addams rejected the daim that unrestrained competition offered che best pach to social progress. Instead, she argued, in a modern industrial society, each individual's well· being depends on the ~A'CU -being of alL Teaching by example, Addams made her Chicago social setd emenc, Hull House, a center of social activism and legislativereform in itiatives. With public-school enrollment gro~A'ing from about 7 million in 1870 to more: than 23 million in 1920, philosopher john Dewey saw schools as potent engines of social change. Banishing bolted~own chairs and desks from his model school ac the University of Chicago, DN'C}' encouraged pupils to interact. The ideal school, he said in Drmocrttry dnd EdUCd.tion ( 1916), ~A'Ould be an "embr)'onic community" ~Ailere children ~A'Oul d learn to live as members of a social gro up. O liwr Wendell Holmes, Jr., of Harvard law School focused on changing judicial thinking. In these rears, most judges interpreted the law in ways thac protected corporate interests and struck down reform legislation. In 71w Common lAw ( 1881), however, Holmes had insisted that latA' m ust C'\o'Oh-e: as society changes. ..The life of

lllllleduals Oller NN Sodll Views

the law has not been logic; it has bten experience," he argued. Appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1902, Holmes often dissented from the conser\'ativc Court majority. As the new social chinking cook hold, the courrs slow!)' grew more open to refonn legislation.

While incelle<euals reoriented American sodal thoughc, {('f) Primary Soorce: novelists and journalists roused the reform spiric by chron- ~ Muckrakers icling corporate wrongdoing. municipal corruption, and slum conditions. Advances in printing and phoco repro· duction ensured a mass audience and sharpened che emotional impact of the message. In his now~I 71Je Odopus( 1901), f rank Norris ofSan Francisco porcrayed the epic Joum•li
NeHIIsls. Journalists,

_, Alllsls Spotlight 5edll Problems

·-bn"

-----

STATE AND LOCAL PROGRESSIVISM

How did state and local progressives seek to tV{orm cities and the new industrial order?

Middle-dass re-aders also obsen -ed 6rschand, in their own communities, the problems bescrcing urban-industrial America. In fact, che progressive movement began ~Aith grass-roots campaigns at the: locallc'ld from New York co San Frand.sco. www.c.engoge.comlhistory/boyer/enduringconcisde

482

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

Beginning in the: 1890~ nati\-e-born elites and middleclass re-formers battled corrupt city governments (see Chapter 19). New York City experienced a succession of reform spasms in which l'rote:stam clergy rallied against Tammany Hall, the city's entrenched Democratic organization. In Detroit, the reform mayor Hazen Pingree (sel'\"Cd 1890- 1897) bro ught honesty to city hall, 10'1'-'ered transit fares, adopted a fairer tax structure, and provided public baths and other services for the poor. In San f rancisco in 1907, the original prosecutor in a case against the city's corrupt boss, Abe: Re:uf, \1.'3S gunned down in court. Attorney Hiram j ohnson took O\'ct the case, and Reuf and his cronies 'A'Cf'C convicted. Full of refonn ual-one: obsen -er called him ..a \'Okano in perpetual e:ruption"-johnson rode: his newly won fame co the California governorship and the U.S. Senate:. In 10ledo, O hio, the colorful eccentric Samuel M. "Golden Rule:" jones led the reform campaign. A self-made busi· nessman com·e:rced co the Social Gospel (see Chapter 19), j ones introduced profit sharing in his factory; as mayor, he established playgrounds, free kindergartens, and lodging houses for homeless transients. The political re:fonne:rs soon mo\'ed be:)·ond simp!)' "-throwing the rascals out" to probing the roots of urban misgovernment, including the private monopolies that ran municipal "-'ater, gas, electricity, and transit systems. Reformers passed latA'S regulating the rates that utilities could charge-, taxing them more: equitably, and curbing their political influence. Some a(h'Ocace:d public O~A'tlership of utilities. Reflecting the Progressive Era vogue of expertise and e:flidcncy, a number of municipal reformers sought co substirute professional managers and administra· tors, chosen in citywide elections, fo r mayors and aldermen elected on a \l.'ard-b)•· ward basis. Supposedly above politics, these experts 'A'ere co run the city like an efficient business. Municipal reform attracted different groups depending on the issue. The: nati\'f:· born middle dass proYided the: initial impetus for urban beautification and political reform. Business leaders often supported city-manager systems and citywide e:lec· tions, ...,fiich diminished the po\I.U of the: ward bosses and increased that of the cor· porace: elite. On practical matters, su ch as municipal services, immigrants and C'\o'f:n political bosses supported re-form. The mm\!ment for cle:ccoral reform soon expanded co the: slate leveL By 19 10 all states had instiruted secre-t ballots, making it much harder than before: to rig elections. Another ~Aidd)' adopted reform 'A'3S che dire<e primary, in which parry mem · hers, rather chan leaders, selected candidates for public office:. And some: \I.'CStern states inaugurated che initiative, referendum, and recalL By an initiath-e, voters can instruct the legislature to consider a specific bill. In a referendum, they can actually enact a law or, in a nonbinding referendum, express their views on a measure. By a recall petition, \'Oters can remove an official from office: by gathering enough signatures. While these reforms aimed to democra tize voting, parry leaders and interest groups soon learned to manipulate the new electoral machin e:r}'· Ironically, the new procedures rna}' ha\\! ""'c akened party loyalty and reduced voter interest. Voterparticipation races dropped steeply in these )'f:ars, while political acthi ty by organ· ized imcrcst groups increased.

I StATE AND lOCAL PII:OGitESSIVISM The lace:-nine:ce:ench-ce:mur}' corporate consolidation that produced giams like: Carnegie: Seed and Standard Oil continued after 1900 (see Chapter 18). FoiiO'I'-'ing che: U.S. Steel pacce:rn, j. P. Morgan in 1902 combined six competing companies into che In· cernational Hat'V\'.sce:r Company, which dominated the farm-implement business. The General Motors Company, formed in 1908 by William C. Ouram, bought up \'arious independent automobile manufacturers, from the inexpensive Che\'role:t to the luxury Cadillac. Many workers benefited from this corporate growth. Industrial ~A'Orkers' a\'etage annual re-al wages (defined, chat is, in terms of acwal purchasing pO'I'--er) rose from $532 in the: late ninet~mh cenwry to $687 by 1915. In railroading and ocher unioniu:d industries, ~A>ages climbed still higher. Still, such wages could barely support a family. To survii,!'C, entire- families went co ~A~o'mlmenc polid('S as high protective tari~ reformers reasoned, t hey should also be subject to go\·ernme:nt supervision. Of the many states chac passed laws regulating railroads, mines, and other busi· ncsses, none did so more a"idly than Wisconsin under GQI.!'Crnor Robert La FoUeue ( ah FAU-m:). As a Republican congressman, La Follette had feuded with the state's conservative party leadership, and in 1900 he: ~A'On t he: ga...·e:rnorship as an inde:pen· dent. Challenging the scare's long-dominant business i nterest~ La Follette and his administration adopted the direct-primary sysce:m, set up a railroad regulatory com· mission, increased corporate taxes, and limited cam paign spending. Reflecting progressiYism's faith in e:xper~ La Follette: met regularly with reform-minded professors ac the UniwrsityofWisconsin and set up a legislati"-e reference library so lawmakers would not have co rely on corporate lobbyists for factual information. lfeleccoral reform and corporate regulation repre:sence:d the brain ofprogressi\'· ism, the im pulse: to improve conditions in factories and mills represented its hcarc. This movement, too, began at che local and scate IC\o-el. By 1907, for example:, thirty

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Prop:r~~i~ polirici.t.n; W'OIU W"ISOCiosin JO""monhip a.s iodtpmdeot aod ~ ~ral R"fomu; bttr ;a U.S. Snuror

ltMert Ll Folkolte

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484 states had oucla"''Cd child labor. A 1903 Oregon Ia"'' limited women in industry to a ce:n-hour "''Orkday. Campaigns to impr()IJ'C industrial safety and otherwise: better conditions for the laboring masses won support from political bosses in cities "'ith farge immigrant populations. New York state: senator Robert F. Wagner, a leader of 1ammany Hall, headed the investigation ofthe 191 J Triangle: fire. l 'hanks to his committee's efforts, New York passed fi fty-six worker-protection laws, including required fire--safety inspections of factories. By 1914, spurred by che Triangle: disaster, rwe:nty·fiw~: scates had made emptorcrs liable for job-related injuries or deaths. Florence Kclley, a Hull House: resident and che daughter of a conservative Republican congress· The Triallllt Rrt man, helped launch the drive: to n:medy industrial The bodin ofTri;~.rtgle Shi:nw.2ist haory wori<ers tio: on the sidcw.llk :~ftertheyjurnped (rom the burning building. abuses. In 1893, Kelley persuaded the Illinois legis· larure to ouda"'' child labor and limit "''Orking hours for "''Omen. In 1899,she became general sec· rctaf)' of the National Consumers' League, which mobilized consumer pressure for imprM'Cd factory conditions. Campaigning for a federal child-labor Ia"''• Kelley asked, "Why are: seals, bears, reindeer, fish, wild game in the national parks, buffalo, (and) migratory birds all found suitable for federal protection, but not children?" Like many progressi\'e reforms, che crusade for workplace safety relied on expert research. Alice: Hamilton, for example, a pioneer in the new field of "industrial h)'· gie:ne," taught bacteriology at Nonhwesce:rn Uni\'crsity while also working at Hull House. In 1910 she conducted a major scudy of lead poisoning among industrial workers. Appointed an im-e:stigaror by che U.S. Bureau of Labor in 191 J, Hamilton b«:ame an expert on and campaigned against work-related medical hazards. Workers chcmse:h-e:s prMided furchcr pressure for reform. For example:, when new power drills created a fine: dust chat granite workers inhaled, the Grotnite Cuttm' journot.l warned of ..stone cutters' consumption" and called the new drills ..widow makers." Sure enough, investigators soon linked the dust to a deadly respiratory dis· ease, silicosis-another industrial hazard that "''Orker-safe:ty ad\'OCace:s sought co remedy.

In the early twentieth centur)', America became an urban nation. By 1920 the urban population passed the: SO per· Mire Livable cent mark, and sixty-eight U.S. dries boasted more chan 100,000 inhabitants. New York City grew b)•2.2 million from 1900 to I 920, and Chi· cago by I million. As manufacturing and businesses grew, a surging tideofimmigrants and nati\'t· born newcomers engulfed the dries. 0\-e:rwhelmcd by chis rapid growth, many cities b«:ame dreary, sprawling human warehouses lacking such basic d\ic amenities as parks, municipal services, and public-health resources. Unsurprisingly, as the: pro· gre:ssjve movement rook shape:, urban problems loomed farge.

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Building on the achievements of Frederick law Olmsted and ochers (see Chap· ter II), reformers campaigned for parks, boulevards, and street lights, and proposed laws against billboards and unsjghd)' O\'Cl'head eleccrical wires. These crusaders had faith that beautiful cities and imposing public buildings would ensure a Law-abiding and civic-minded utban populace. An influential voice for city planning and btauti· 6cation was Daniel Burnham, chief architect of the 1893 Chicago world's fair. Burnham de'ldoped be-autification plans for Washington, D.C., Cleveland, San francisco, and other cicies. Many l'rogressiw: Era urban planners shared Burnham's faith that more beautiful cities and imposing public buildings would produce order!)', Lawabiding cicizcns. lk:yond urban beautification, reformers worked for such practical goals as decem housing and better garbage collection and street cleaning. ProYiding a model for ocher cities and states, the New York legislarure passed latA'S imposing scrict health and safety regulations on tenements in 1911. l 'he discovery in che 1880s that germs cause dise-ases like cholera and typhoid fC'\o-er made municipal h)-giene and sanitation high priorities. Progrcssi'le reformers called for imprm-ed water and SC\1.-er syscem~ regulation of milk suppliers and food handlers, school medical examinations and vaccination programs, and campaigns to spread public-health information co the urban masses. Thc.se efforts bore fruit. From 1900 to 1920, infant mortality (de-fined as death in rhe 6rsc }"Car of life) dropped from 165 per 1,000 population to around 75, and the tuberculosis deach rate full b)• nearly half. The municipal healch crusades had a social-class dimension. Middle-class reformers set the ..sanitat}' agenda," and the campaigns often targeted immigrants and the poor as the sources of contagion. When Mat}' Mallon, an Irish-immigrant cook in New York, 'A'llS fou nd to be a healthy carrier of the typhoid bacillus in 1907, she 'A'llS confined for years by dry healch authorities and demonized in che press as ..Typhoid Mary." Urban reformers also shared the heightened enYironmental consciousness of thc.se )'eatS (see Chapter 17). The barde against air pollution illustrates both the promise and the frustrations of municipal environmentalism. Coal-fueled steam boilers in factories produced massive amounts of soot and sm oke, ~A•hich by the carl)' 1900s ph)'Sidans had linked to respiratory problems. As with other progrcssi\-e reforms, the resulting antismokecampaign combined expertise wich activism. Civil engineers formed the Smoke Pre\-emion Association in 1906, and resea.rchers at the Unh-ersity of Pittsburgh documented che hazards and costs of air pollution. As women's dubs and other civic groups embraced the cause, many cities passed smoke abare-mem laws. Buc coal still pnwided 70 percent of the nation's energy as late as 1920, and railroads and corporations fought back in the courts and often won. Not until }'cars later, ~Aith the shift to other energy sources, did municipal air pollution signi6cand)•d iminish.

Progressives' bdiefthac theycould impro\'e society through rc.search, legislation, and aroused public opinion sprang from their con6dence chac they knew whac was best for other people. While municipal corruption, unsafe factories, and corporate abuses captured thcir attention, so, too, did issues of personal behaYior, particularly the behavior of immigrants. The problems chey addressed desen -ed attention, but their www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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self·righteous rhetoric and the remedies they proposed also betrayed an impulse co impose cheir 0'1'-'0 moral standards b)•force of law.

Earl}' cwentieth~ccntury urban life 'A'llS more than crowded slums and exhausting labor. For all t heir problems, cities llli~ also offered fu n and d iversion. Department stores, vaude· ville, music halls, and amusement parks (see Chapter 19) continued to flourish. AI· though some vaudeville owners stro"'e for respectability, raucous and ba....-dy routines full of sexual innuendo were popular wich working-class audiences. New York City's amusement park. Coney Island, was drawing as many as a million visitors a da}' by 19 14. For fami li~ amusement parks provided escape from tenements. For female gar· ment workers or department store clerks, they pf'O"ided an oppon:unity to spend rime "'ith friends, meet young men, and show off new ourfits. With electrification, simp!}' riding the streetcars or taking an e\-ening stroll on u-ell-lit dO'I'-·ntO\l-'n strrecs became leisure activities in themselves. The introduction of Hen'Y Ford's Model Tin 1908, which transformed the automobile from a coy of the rich to a vehicle for the m.a.sses, heighrened the sense of exciting changes ahead, with cities at the heart of t he action. j aunty popular songs u-ere introduced in the musk halls and produced in a dis· trict of Iau-er Manhattan called 11n Pan Alley. joining ragtime (sec Chapter 19), t he blues, rooted in che chants of sout hern black sharecroppers, reached a broader pub· lie with such songs as W. C. Handy's classic «st. louis Blues" ( 19 14). These years also brought a new medium of mass entertainment- the mO\i es. Fi\-e-cent halls called «nickelodeons" appeared in immigrant neighborhoods with 'nJe Gn~ttTrain Robbtry (1903) and A Fool 11.H!re Was ( 1914), ~Athich ~Aith its famous line "Kiss me, my fool!" made Theda Bara t he 6rst female mo\ie star. The British musk· hall performer Charlie Chaplin emigrated to America in 1913 and appeared in some sixty short comedies between 1914 and 1917. Like: amusement parks, che movies al· lou·ed immigrant youth to briefly escape parental supcf\i sion. The di\--ersions that cased d ry life for the poor struck some middle-class reform· crs as moral t raps. Fearful ofimmoralit}' and social disorder, reformers campaigned to regulate: amusement parks, dance hall~ and t he mO\ics. l 'he darkened nickclode· ons struck many middle-class men and v.'Omen as potential dens of \i ce:. Warning of "n ickel madness," reformers demanded film censorship. Se\-eral states and cities set up censorship boards, and rhe Supreme Court upheld such measures in 19 15. Building on the moral purity crusade of t he Woman's Christian 1Cmperance: Union (WCTU) and other groups in the 1890s (see C hapter 19), re-formers also tar· ~ce:d prostitution, a major urban proble-m.. The paltr}' wages paid women for faccory \l'Ork or domestic service diverce:d many co chis more lucrative occupation. As prostitution came co symbolize t he larger moral dangers of citie:~ a "white: sla\-e'" hysteria gripped che nation amid warnings of farm girls' being kidnapped and forced imo urban brothels. In the usual progressh-e fashion, investigators gathered statistics o n what chey called «the social C'-il." The American Social Hygiene Associa· tion ( 1914), financed by john D. Rockefeller, Jr., sponsored medical research on sexu· ally transmitted diseases, paid for «yicc investigations" in various cities, and drafted model municipal statutes against prostirution. l 'he federal Mann Ace ( 1910) made it

~~~ CAintrolln

I StATE AND lOCAL PII:OGitESSIVISM

48 7

illegal to transport a "''Oman across a state line ..for immoral purposes."' Amid much fanfare, re-formers shut down the red-light districts of New Orleans, Chicago, and other cities.

Temperance had long been pare of the American reform agenda, but reformers' tactics and objecti\'es changed in the Progressive Era. Most earlier campaigns had urged in· dividuals to gi'o-e up drink. The poW'Crful And-Saloon League, fou nded in 1895, shifted the emphasis co legislating a ban on the sale of alcoholic bC"".·erages, and its presses produced propaganda touting prohibition. As the ASL added irs efforts to chose of the WCl'U and various church bodies, many localities banned the sale of al· coholic beverages, and the campaign for national prohibition gained strength. This was a heavy-drinking era, and alcohol abuse d id indeed contribute co do· mestic abuse, health problems, and work injuries. Buc like the antiprostitucion cru· sade, the prohibition campaign pitted native-born citizens against new immigrants. Although it raised legitimate issues, the ASL also embodied l'rotestant America's impulse to control the immigrant city. These re-ars also saw the fi rst sustained campaign against drug abuse- and for good reason. Many easj(y obtained medicines contained opium and its deri\•atives, morphine and heroin. Cocaine was widely used as u-ell. Coca-Cola contained cocaine uncil about 1900. As reformers focused on the problem, the federal government backed a 1912 creary aimed at halting the international opium trade. The Narcotics Ace of 1914 strictly regulated opiates and cocaine. In their battle against drugs, as in their envi· ronmental concerns, the progressives anticipated an issu e that would remain impor· cane into the twemy-6rst cenrury. But here, coo, racist undertones colored antidrug crusadcrs' warnings about Chinese ..opium dens" and ..drug~cr.u:ed Negroes'" "'tho imperiled white: womanh ood.

lllllllnl Alcohol -..Drop

Aftb..Salooft leapt Politia l :uh
Although many of the new city d"''Cllers came from farms and small tO'I'-'ns, the main source of urban growth contin· ued to be immigration. More than 17 million newcomers arrived from 1900 to 1917, and mosc settled in cities. As in the 1890s (sec Chapter 19), the influx came main!)' from southern and eastern Eu· rope, but some 200,000 japanese, 40,000 Chinese, and thousands of Mexicans also arrived between 1900 and 1920. The ob\ious ans\l-er co the threars posed by the immigrant dty, some reformers concluded, lay in excluding immigrants (sec Figure21.1). The man}' progressives who supported immigration restriction documented chcir case "'ith alleged scientific ex· pcrt:isc. In 19 11 a congressjonal commission produced a scacistical srudy "prm-ing" the new immigrants' innatedegenetaC)'.ln 1914 the progrcssi\J'C sociologist Edward A. Ross described recent immigrants as "hirsute, low-broo-ed, big·faccd persons of obvious!)' low mentality."' In 1896, 1913, and 19 15, Congress passed litetaC}'·test bills aimed at slowing immigration, buc they feU victim to \'f:CO by a succession of presi· dents. In 19 17, hoW'CV!.'.r, such a bill became law over President Wilson's veco.

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Fiprt 11.1 lmligl'ltion to tilt Unfttd Sl.ltts,

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(1907)

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( 1882--1886)

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Anti-immigrant fears helped fuel the eugenics (you·JEN-icks) movement. Eu· is the control of reproduction co alter a plant or animal spedes, which some: U.S. eugenicists belic'led could be used co impro\·e human society. A leading e:u~ni· cisc, the wologisc Charles B. Daw~nporc, urged immigration restriction to keep America from pollution by "inferior" genetic stock. In Tbt Awing oftbt: Oreal Rau ( 1916), Madison Gram, a prominent progressi.,.e and eugenics ad\.-ocate, used bogus data to denounce: immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, e:spedally Jews. He: also vie"''Cd African-Americans as inferior. Anticipating the program of Adolf Hider in the J930s (see Chapter 25), Grant called for radal scgrcgacion, im migracion restriction, and the forced sterilization of the: "-un6c,'" including «....-onhless race types." T he: ..-ague of eugenics ga'le «scientific" respectability to ami-immigrant sencime:nt, as "''CII as the racism that peJVaded white: America in these )'tat'S. Inspired b)' eugenics, man)' stares legalized the sterilization of criminals, sex offenders, and persons adjudged mentally defi cient. ~nics

l'rogressivism arose at a cime of significanc changes in African-American life-and also one of intense racism in white: America. 1'hese racial realities are crudal co a full understanding of the movement.

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StATE AND lOCAL PII:OGitESSIVISM

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In 1900 more than two·thirds of the nation's 10 million blacks liw~d in the South as sharecroppers and tenant farmers. By 1910 the cotton boll W'tt:Vil and ruin· ous floods had drh·en20 pen::ent of t hese southem blacks into cities. Urban African· American men took jobs in factori~ mines, docks, and railroads or became carpenters or bricklayers, and African-American women became domestic sewancs, seamstresses, and laundr}' or tobacco workers. B}' 19 10,54 percem of America's black women held jobs. Across che South, legally enforced radsm peaked in the early twentieth cemur}'· Local"j im Crow" latA'S segregated streetca.rs, schools, pa.rks, and e\'en cem eteries. 11le facilities for blacks, including che schools, were invariably inferior. Man}' southern cities imposed residential segregation b}' latA' until the Supreme Court restricted such measures in 1917. Most labor unions excluded black ~A'Orkers. Disfranchised and trapped in a cycle of povert}~ poor education, and discrimination, southern blacks faced bleak prospects. Fleeing povert}' and racism, and d rawn b)• job opportunities, 200,000 African· Americans migrated nort h beN~n 1890 and 1910. World War I drew still more (see Chapter 22), and b}' 1920, 1.4 million African-Americans lived in the North. North· ern blacks encountered conditions similar to t hose in the South. Segregation, al· though noc legally imposed, existed everywhere and was supported by social pressure and occasional violence. Blacks li\·ed in run-down ..colored districts,"' attended di· lapidated schools, and took low-paying jobs.. Even t he movies preached radsm. 0. W. Griffith's 191Siilm classic nJe Birtbo{aN.:flion glorified the Ku Klux Klan and vilified and ridiculed African-Americans. Smoldering racism sometimes exploded in violence. Antiblack rioters in Adama in 1906 murdered twcnry·6'/e blacks and burned man)• black homes. L)'llChings con· tinued,. an average of about SC'\\':nty-6'/e yearly from 1900 co 1920, often as reprisal for assertive behavior or economic aspirations that angered whites. Some l)'flchings involved incredible sadism: with farge crOtA-'ds on hand, the victim's bod)' 'A'llS muci· laced, and graphic postcards ....-ere sold Iacer. Authorities rarely inten-ened. At a 19 16 lynching in Texas, the mayor warned the mob not to damage che hanging cree, as it was on cit)• property. In the face of such hostilil)', African-Americans dC"<-eloped scrong social insticu· tions and a vigorous culcure. Black religious life, centered in the African Methodist Episcopal church, provided a bulwark of support for man}'· Black colleges and uni· \'t:rsities, among chem Fisk in Nashville and Howard in Washington, D.C., surviYed against hea..y odds. The urban African-American communit}' induded black-owned insurance com panies and banks, and boasted a small dice of entrepreneurs, teach· ers, ministers, and sports ligures, including Texan jack johnson, who won rhe heavy· weight boxing championship in 1908. Although major league baseball excluded blacks, a thriving Negro l..f:'ague attracted many black fans . In chis racist age, progressives compiled a mixed record on radal issues. Muck· raker Ray Stannard Baker documented radsm in his 1908 book FoiiM~Iing the Color Lin!!. Setdemcm-house ~A'Orker Mary White Ovington helped found the National As· sociation for che Advancement of Colored People in 1909 and wrote Half a Man ( 1911) about che emotional scars of racism. Buc most prog.ressi\'t:S keptsilenc as blacks' rights werl' trampled, viewing blacks as inferior and prone to immoralit}' and social disorder. White progressiYes gc.nerall}' www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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CHECKI NG I N PrO{ti\"$Si \~ m.:.de signific.:.nt prog1\"$$

in

poli ti ~l uJonn .:It state and

l oeall~ls, battling cocru ption and

inuod uci.ng denor;al l'l'form. At th~ stat~ kvd, prugn'.SlMs achi e~o'ed som~ succus i.n th~ n"gu· l.ation o(bu.~i ncu and th~ rdOnn ofwork-ing conditions. Progl\"$si \~ also sought to i.mpro'\"" urban condicioru by buu til)·ing ci t~ .mel «eating better public· hu lth systems.

At irJ wurJt, prugi'U.'Ii.vism endea\" or«! to i.mpo$C' middle-d:us mor;al· ityon immigrants, :u it did with the temperan« ~ment. M.anr progl\"$si \~ suppcmtd im· mi.g:r;~.ti.on l'l'Stt~tions and often tolerated racism.

supported segregacion and che strict moral owrsighc of African·American communities, occasional!)' ad\·oc:acing. at best, paternalistic efforcs co «up· lift" chis supposed!)' backward and childlike people. Vidously radst south· ern politidans like G~rnor James K. Vardaman of Mississippi and Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina also supported progressh>t: reforms. At the national levd, President Theodore Roosevdc's record on race "''lls marginal!)' better than that of ocher policicians in this racist age. In a S)'lll· bolically important gesru.re, he d in ed with Booker T. Washingcon at the White House. In 1906, hO\l't:\'Ct, he apprm--ed che dishonorable discharge of an emire regiment of black soldiers, including Congressional Medal of Honor winners, in Brownsville, 1Cxas, because some me-mbers of che unit, goaded by racist taun~ had killed a local dvilian. The "Bro""nsviUe l nci· denc" incensed black Americans. Under Presidenc WoodrO\l' Wilson, racism became rampant in Washing· ton. A Virginia naciw reared in Georgia, Wilson displayed at best a pacro niz· ing attitude to"'>ard blacks, praised the racist movie 11Je Birth of d Nation, appointed southerners co his cabin ec, and aUo"''Cd racial segregation in all lc'lels of the gM>ernment.

BlACKS, WOMEN, AND WORKERS ORGANIZE How did progressives try to control mort~lity, tmd how did they view immigrants and blacks? l 'he organi:zarional impulse so imporcanc to progressivism generally also pro\·ed a useful strategy for groups char fou nd chcmseto.·es d iscriminated against or ex· ploited,such as African·American~ middle·dass "''Omen, and "''llge workers. All three: groups organized co address cheir grievances in these: years.

With racism on che rise, Booker T. Washington's accom· modation ist message (see Chapter 20) seemed increasjngl)' I.Nders Orglllize unrealiscic, particular!}' to educated northern blacks. In Against Racism 1902 o ne edicor of a black ne'I'-'Spaper called Washington's go--slow policies "a fatal blow .. . to che Negro's political righcs and Iibert)'·" Anocher opponent was the black journalisc and activist Ida \t1e lls-Barnett. Moving to Chi· cago from Memphis in 1892 after a white mob destre))'l'd her offic~ Wells--Barnett mounted a national antilynching campaign. Washington's mo.sc potent challenger was \t'. E. B. Ou Bois (1868- 1963). After earning a l' h.O. in hiscory from Han>ard in 1895, Du Bois caught ac Adanta Uniwr· sjty. Opc-ni)' Cricid zing Washingco n in 71tt SoulsofBiac.k Folk (1903), he rejected Wash· ington's cmphaUs on pacience and manual skills. Instead, Du Bois demanded full racial equality and called on blacks co resist all forms of radsm . Du Bois's militancy signaled a new era of African·American activism. Beginning in 1905 in Niagara Falls, under his leadership, blacks who fa\'Orcd vigorous resis· tance to racism held annual conferences for the next few years. In 1909 a group of

Alrlcan-Americllll

l

id~ Wtlls-klletl Eloqumt spulcer, •Titer, and civil rig~ ac:tivist.tlo charnpiootd anti.

lyud!.ing legisla.tieln

W. E. B. 0. Bois A&ic.m.

I

Amtriu.n scholar and civil rigbt5k adt:r; authclr or 1k Scwlt

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I

__

BlACKS• WOlltN, MID WOIUERS OG:c.A~IZE

white reformers who also re-jected Washington's cautiousness joined Du Bois and other blacks from che Niagara Move-m ent to form the National Assodadon for the Ad·nnument of Co lored People (NAACP). 1'his new organization called for vig· oro us activism , including legal challenges, to achie'le political equality for blacks and full integration into American life. Attracting the urban black middle class, by 19 14 the NAACP had six thousand members in fifty branches.

491

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rigbt5orpni.zl.OOo (ooodtd during the Progrt:ss:il." En

By 1910, follo~Aing six failed state referenda on woman suffrage in 1896, wo men could vote in only fo ur thinl}' populated western states: W}'Oming, Utah, Colorado, and

Revtval ol tbt

Woman-Suffrage Movemetll

Ida ho (see Map 21.1}. But the accivc role of women in the progressive reform mM'mltnt !\.'Vitalized the suffrage cause. Thac rccend)' arri\--ed immigrant men could voce and t hey could not espedally galled middle-class women. A vigorous suffrage mm-cment in Great Britain reverberated in America as "-OCII. The suffrage campaign in California illustrates both the strengths and che limi· cacions of the revived mOVI.'.mmt. B}' the early 1900s California's women's dubs had e\'Oived into a potent statewide organization active in m unicipal reform and public-school issues. This activism convinced many members chat full citizenship meant the righc to \'Ote. A state woman·suffrage referendum lost in 1896. The leaders bounced back to form alliances with labor leaders and male progressi\--es, built on a shared commitment to "good gOVI.'.rnment." But while joining fo rces ~Aith male reformers, these woman-suffrage strategists- mostl}' d ite ~A•hi te ~A'Omen who marginal· iu:d or excluded women of color- insisted on the unique role of «organized

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Beginning with Wyoming in 1869, worn:~n wf'fr.age m:ide nudy g;~.ins in W\".5t~rn sutes btfOf"e 1920. F;~.rthoer e:uc, k~y m tories c;~.me in N.e:w Yo'* ( 1917) :~nd Mithig:~n ( 1918). But much oftht Eut r~m;~.intd .:an "'n tiwom;u~ w«r.agt b.:tstion th roughou t tht p~riod.

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4 92

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

Piradi•g for WOm.11 Suffract SYffr.tge le;~~ders built sup · port for the a.u se by u sing modern ad~g a nd publicity techniq un, ind ud· ing ~utornobiles fntoon~d ....;th A:.gs, bann~rs, :.nd-in this a.se-smill:ng litde girls.

c.m. a.,.-.""' """'" of'111:1mm-'s miM'mrnt: driYe

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for '111:1man suffrage in u rly twmtieth eenwry

Primary Source: Gi\•e Mother the Vote

womanhood" in building a bctcer society. Success came in 1911 when California \'Ot· ers appr~d woman suffrage. N ew leaders built che momencum in California and ocher states inro a rcvital· ized national mo\-emenc.. When Susan B. Anthony recired from che presidency of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in 1900, Carrie Chapman Cart of Iowa succeeded her. Under Catc's shrewd direction, NAWSA adopted the so· called Winning l'lan: grass-roots organi:zation with tight ccncral coordinacion. Suffragiscs shrewdly deployed techniques drawn from the new urban consumer culcure. lhcy not only lobbied lcgislacors, but they also organized parades in open cars, held photo opportunities, and de\'ised catchy slogans that chey used in news· paper ads and posters; they d istributed fans, playing cards, and other items cmbla· zoned ~Aith the su ffrage message. Gradually, state after state feU into the suffrage column. A key \'ictor}' came in 19 17 when N ew York voters appr~d a woman· suffrage re-ferendum. As in California (and like progressive organi:zations generally), NAWSA's mem · bership remained largd }' white, native- born, and middle dass. Som e upper-dass women opposed the refonn. 1'he leader of the "Antis,'" "-"C:althy josephine Dodge of New York, argued thac ~A'Om en already had behind-the--scenes influence and that to invade the male realm of electoral politics would tarnish their moral and spiri· tual role. Not aU suffragiscs accepted Can-'s strategy. Alice Paul, ~Ailo had obse..-..-ed the British suffragists' militant tactics while studying in England. gre:w impacient ~Aith NAWSA's state-by-state approach. In 19 13 Paul founded che Congressional Union for \l1oman Suffrage, renamed the National Woman's party in 1917, to pressure Con· gress for a ~A'Oman-suffrage amendm ent. In 1917- 1918, ~Aith che United States at

I BlACKS• WOlltN, MID WOIUERS OG:c.A~IZE

4 93

war, the suffrage cause won key victories in New York and Michigan and advanced coward 6nal success (see Chapter 22).

The suffrage m~men t did not exhaus[ American ~A'Om· en's talents or organizational energies. Women's dub Spllere" members,sctd emenc-house lead~ and individual fema le activists joined in various campaigns: co bring playgrounds and da}' nurseries to the slum~ to abolish child labor, to improve conditions for ~A'Omen workers, and to ban unsafe foods and quack n:-medies. Cultural assumptions about«woman's sphere" crumbled as women became active on many fronts. Katherine Bement Davis set\"Cd as the innovariw: su perintendent of a woman's reformacor}' before becoming New York City's commissioner of corrections. Anarchist Emma Goldman crisscrossed the country ddh·ering rivecing lectures on poli[ics, feminism, and modern drama ~Athilecoediting a radical monthl}', MotlJf'r Edrtb. A vanguard of pioneering ~A'Om en in higher education included Marion Talbot, 6rst dean of women at the Unh·ersjty of Chicago. In Wome-n and Economics (1898) and other wo rks, femin ist incellectual Charlotte 1\:rkins Gilman explored che historical and culrural roots of female subordination, and linked women•s inferior status co their economic dependence on men. Con6ning women to the domestic sphere, Gilman argued, was an evolutionary throwback thac had become outdated and inefficient. S he advocated economic independence for ~A'Omen through equality in the wo rkplace; the collectivization of domestic chores; and state--run da}'·care cencers. Some l'rogressi\'t' Era refonners chall en~d federal and state laws banning the distribution of contraceptives and birch-control informacion. Although co undcss women, particularl}' che poor, suffered health problems from frequent pregnancies, arci6dal contraception was ~Atiddydenounced as immoraL In 1914 Margaret Sanger of New Yo rk, a practical n urse: and socialist whose mother had died after bearing d e\'t'n children, began her crusade for birth concrol, a term she coined. When the authori[ies proscribed her journal i1tt Wom~tn Reb.-/ on obscenity charges, Sanger fled to England. She recurned in 1916 to open the nation•s 6rsc binh·control dinic in Brookl}'ll. In 1918 she founded a new journal, the Hirth Conrro/ Revitw, and three )'t'ars Lacer she fou nded che American Birth Control League, the ancestor of today's Planned Parenthood Federation. Meanwhile, another New Yorker, Mary Ware Dennett, a fcminisc and activist, had also emerged as an advocate of birth control and sex education. Her 1919 pam· phlct for youch, Tht St'x Silk ofLifo, discussing human reproduction in dear, straight· forward cerm~ was long banned as obscene. Dennetc fou nded the National Birth Concrol League (Iacer the Voluntary Parenthood League) in 1915. While San~r championed direct action co promote che cause, Dennett urged lobb)ing efforts to change the law. Sanger insisted that o nl}' physidans should supply contraceptives; Oennctt argued for widespre-ad discribution. The emergence of the birth-
Elllarglnc "Woman's

lnteracti\•e Map: Woman Suffrage 8ef0t'e 1920

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4 94

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

In this a~ of organization, labor unions continued to ex· pand. 1'he American Federation of Labor (AFL) grew from Sodalism Aclvan<es less than half a million members in 1897 co 4 million b)• 1920-but this was only 20 percent of the nonfarm labor force. With immigrants hungr}' for jobs, union accivities could be risk}'i bosses could easily fire an "agitator" and hire a nl"''-'Comer. judicial hoscility also plagued the labor mo\~menc.. In the 1908 Dttnbury Hattm case, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled thac boycotcs in sup· port of scrikes violated the Sherman Ami·l'rusc Ace. 11te AFJJs strengch remained in the skilled trades, noc in the factories and mills where mo.sc immigrnms and women worked. A few unions d id try to reach these laborers. In 1900 immigrants in New York City fo unded the lncernarional Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), which conducted successful strikes in 1909 and 19 11. The women on the picket lines found these strikes both exhilaracing and frightening. .......,;.tw..bnoltht The Industrial \t'orkus of the World (JWW) , or \'1/obblies, founded in Chi· (fWW) Oceuionally cago in 1905, also targeted the most exploited workers. Led by che colorful and com· radial union d.isci'Mittd by pdling William D...Big Bill" Ha)'W'OOd., the JWW was ne\~r large and was corn b)• USl' of'viclkn« dissent. lc peaked at around 30,000 members, mainly "''CStern miners, lumbermen, fruit pickers, and itineranc laborers. The IWW led some mass strikes of miners and timber workers, buc its greatest &l&'e11t Y. Dells Socialist bbor success came in 19 12 "'>hen it won a rancorous textile strike: in la"''fence, Massachu· kadtt whose surprising sbow. sects. The victory o"''Cd much to Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, a fer\!'Cnc lrish·Amer ican ing in tbt 1.912 prt:r.:ickntW orator, and Margarct Sanger, "'.flo publicized the cause by sending strikers' children eltcrion illum .u.ed tbe gRNing frusu;~.tiom olm;my wafl.tn to Nc"'' York sympathizers for temporary care. 11te \l'obblies had a reputation, much exaggerated, for violence and sabotage, and they faced unremitting government harassment, especially during World War L By 1920 the JWW's strength "''lls broken. Ochers appalled by capitalism's human toll, induding some in the mid· ln pur:~uir o( polifical righ u, wme dle class, turned to socialism. Socialists advocated an end to capitalism and Afri ~n·Am.ericans, led b)· W. E 8. Ou Boi..s, rtcjut«< Hool:e.r T. W.Uh· demanded public ownership of factories, uciliries, railroads, and communi· ing.t~ n's gr;~.du..lliJm ;~.nd bec;~.me cacions systems. Buc American workers general!)' rr-jectcd the rC\'Oiurionar}' ideology of German social theorist Karl Marx in fa\'Or of democracic social· The wom;~.n ·sufrr;~.ge mO'o"-m.tnt ism achi e\~d at che ballot box. In 1900 democracic socialises fonned the So· emer~.~ a m.;~.jorcompone.nt of ciali.sc J:tarty of America (SPA). Eugene V, Debs, the Indiana labor leader, progl'l':lsl\'lsm. became the SPA's mosc popular spokesman and its candidate for president \l'omen liM Emma Goldman and M..lrg;trtct Sanger push«! bq'Ond the 6\!'C times betv.r'een 1900 and 1920. bound.;~.rie':l o( the tr;~.dition.;~.l "'worn· 11te pinnacle of sodalist strength came in 1912 when the SPA counted an'J Jphe.no,• promoting «enomic 118,000 memb~ Debs recei.,.ed O\~r 900,000 (about 6 percent) of the voces inde.pen& n« and btr tll controL for president, and the Socialists elected a congressman along "'ith hundreds T he AA.. gnow l.uge.r .;~.nd Jtronger of municipal officials. but remain«! fOcused on the d:illed

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I N.t.TJONAJ. PltOCirtE.SSIV&SM Pw.st 1: RoosEVt:Lf AND TAn, '9ot-t5~1J NATIONAL PROGRESSIVISM PHASE RoosEVELT AND TAFT, 1901-1913

4 95

1:

What strategies did A(rican-Ame.ric~ms, women, and industrial workers use to improve their lot? By 1905 localized reform mm-·emcn rs had coalesced imo a nacional effort. Sym·

bolically, in 1906 Robert La Follcrce: became a U.S. senator. Fi..-e )~ars earlier, progres· sivism had found irs 6rs.t national leader, Theodore Roosevelt. Bombastic,. self-righteous, and jingoistic- but also brilliant, politically master· ful, and endlessly intcre:sdng-Roosc\-elt, "TR;'' becam e: presidenc in 1901. He made

the White House a cauldron of political activism. Skillfully orchestrating public opinion, the popular young president pursued his goals: labor mediation, consumer protection, conservation, business virtue, and activism abroad. Roosewlt's activist approach permanencly enlarged the powers of the presi· dmcy. TR's hand-picked successor, William Howard Taft, lacked his master's polit· kal genius, however,and h is administration floundered amid sniping amon g fo nner allies. Wich the Republican Party split, the Democrat Woodto'A' Wilson, holding a some""hat different vision of progressiw: refonn, won che presidency in 1912.

Theodore Rooseftlt Youthful suCCII'uor to WiUi.un McKinley

!

in 1901; pushed m .-gmda of

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On September 6, 190 1, in Buffalo, an anarchist s hot l're.si· den t William McKinley. On September 14 McKinley d ied, 1111 Whitt House and forcy-tWO·)'eat·old Vice President Theodore Roosew:lt becam e presidenc. Reflecting the view o f many politidan~ Republican kingmaker Mark Hanna exclaimed, «My God, thac damned co~Atboy is in the White House!"

lllasevtll's Patb to

Rooscw:lt was the son of an aristocratic New York family and sick ly as a child, but he had used a bod)•-building program and acti\'f: summers in W}'oming to become a model of physical 6 cness. later, two years on a Dakoca ranch helped him to struggle pasc g rief m-er his )'Oung wife's death in 1884 and nurcu red the p h)'Sical and mental toughness that he ~A'Ou ld later extol as .. the strenuous life."' Plunging into politics when m ost of h is social class considered it unbe6tcing gcnclemen, Roosevelt held \'arious posts in New York State before leading the Rough Riders in C u ba (see Chapter 20). He was elected New York's gMwn o r in 1898. 1\vo )'ears later, Republican bosses, eager to be rid o f him, arranged for his nomination as vice president. Unexpected))' thrust into che White House, TR energized the presidency. Roo· scwlc enjO)'f:d public life and IM•ed the limelight. As a relative wryl)' obsen·ed, he wanted to be the bride at cwry "'-edding and che corpse at cwry funeral Am ericans were fascinated by their rambu nctious young president, wich his toochy grin, machine-gu n speech, and passion for the outdoors.

The new p residen t's political skills ~A'Cre quick!)' tested. In May 1902 the United Mine Workers Union (UMW) called Tnaslbustfng. a scrike co gain higher wages, s horter h o u rs, and recogni· llallraad RestJiillion tion as a u nion. The mine owners refused to talk to UMW leaders. After 6 ..-e months, ~Aith coal resen -es dwindling. TR su mmoned the

Llllor Dtspules,

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4 96

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-1917

tte,No Ad L.u sm"ngdlrntd SO""mtnc'nt pc-.r co "'SUb.tl' rai!~.s

l

deadlocked parties to the White: House. Threatening co take 01/'er the mines, he .....-on reluctant acceptance of an arbicration commission to settle the dispute. In 1903 the: commission granted miners a 10 percent wage hike and reduced their ~A'Orkday from ten to nine hours. 11t approached such labor disputes ''crY differently from his predecessors, who had called ouc federal croops to break strikes. Although not consistently prolabor, he: defended labor's rig he to organize and derided as «arroganc stupidity" business own· ers' resistance to arbitration. With his elite background, TR neither feared nor much liked business tycoons. Conservaci\J'C ac heart, he had no desire co abolish big corporations, but he embraced the progressive philosophy chat corporate: behavior must be carefully regulated. A strict moralist, he believed chac corporations, like indi vidual~ must m«c a high standard of virtue. J. P. Morgan•s formation in 1901 of che U.S. Steel Company, the nacion•s first billion+dollar corporation, deepened public uneasiness over business consolidation. His 1902 State of the: Union message gave: high priority co breaking up business mo· nopolie:s, or "trusrbusting." Roose:\-elt's attorney general soon filed suic against the: Northern Securities Company, a mammoth holding compan)' fo nne:d to concrol railroading in che Northwest, for violating the Sherman Anci·Trust Ace. 11t called for a "squa.re deal'" for aUAmericans and denounced spedal treatmenc for capitalists. "We don'c wish to destroy corporations," he: insisted• .,but we do wish to make: them serve che public good;" In 1904, by a 5 co 4 vote, the Supreme Court ordered the: Northern Securities Company dissoh-ed. The Roosc\-elt administration fi led furty·chrec other antitrust fa~A'SUits. In two key cases in 19 11, the: Court ordered che breakup of the Standard Oil Company and the reorganization of the American 10bacco Company to make: it less monopolistic. As che 1904 presidential election approached, Roosevelt made peace ~Aith the: Republicans' big·business wing. When the: con\J'Cncion that u nanimousl)' nominated Roosevelt adopted a conservative, probusiness placform, $2 million in corporate: campaign contributions poured in. The conse!Vative-dominated Democrats mean· while: nominated New York judge Alton B. Parker and wrote a platform fi rmly em· bradng the gold standard Winning easily, Roosc...·e:lt turned to one: of his major goals: railroad regulation. He: saw regulation, rachcr than ancitrust fa~A'SUits, as the most promising long·tenn strategy. His work fo r passage: of the: Hepburn Act (1906) reflected chis shift in outlook. This measure em po~A'Cred the Jnce:rstate Commen::e: Commission to set maximum railroad races and to examine railroads' financial records. Although the: Hepburn Act d id not fully satisfy reformers, it did increase the: gMwnment's regula· tory powers.

No progressive re-form prm•e:d more: popular than the fight against unsafe and falsely labeled food, drugs, and me:di· cine. Upton S inclair's stomach-rurning The jungle (1906) described che foul conditions u nder which sausages and cold cues W\'.re: produced. In a vivid passage, Sinclair wrote, «[A) man could run his hand o•;e:r these piles of me-at and S~A'C'tp off handfuls of dried dung of rats. These: rats W\'.re: nuisances, and the: packers ~A'Ould puc poisoned bread ouc for chem, they would die, and then racs,

C.Sumer Protection

I N.t.TJONAJ. PltOCiltE.SSIV&SM Pw.st 1: RoosEvnr AND TAn, '9ot-t5~1J bread, and meac would go into the hoppers co~chcr."' Women's organizations and consumer groups rallied public opinion on this issue. Other muckrakers exposed useless or dangerous parent medicines, man}' laced "''ith cocaine, opium, or alcohoL One tonic "for treatment ofche alcohol habit"' contained 26.5 percent alcohoL (\.'-((. dlers of these nostrums fred)' claimed that they could cure cancer, grow hair, and rescore sexual vigor. Sensing ehe public mood, Roosew~lt supported the Pure Food and Drug Ace and the Meac Inspection Ace, both passed in 1906. 1'he formeroudawed the sale of adulterated food and drug~ and required accurate: ingredient labels; the latce:r imposed strict sanitary rules on mearpackers, set up a quality-racing system, and created a program of federal meat inspection. On racial mate~ Rooscw~lt's record was marginally better than that of other politicians in chis radst age. He appointed an African-American as ehe head of the Charleston customhouse and closed a Mississippi pose office rather than )'idd co demands that he dismiss the: black poscmi.scress. In a gesture of symbolic imporc, he dined with Booker T. \'t'ashington at the White House:. 1'he worst bloc on his record came in 1906 wich the aforementioned .. Brownsville lnddenc,'" when he apprm--e:d the dishonorable discharge of an entire regiment of black soldiers in Bro"''tlS\'ilh; Texas for che crimes of a few. (In 1972, when most of the men were long dead, Con· gress remo••ed the dishonorable discharges from their records.)

In his first State of the Union message:, Roosevelt singled our conservation as .. the most vital internal question." By 1900 decades of urban-industrial growth and wescern expansion had taken a heavy coli on rhe land. In rhe Wesc, land use disputes raged as mining and timber i meres~ farmers, ranchers, sheep growers, and preseJVationiscs advanced competing claims. Western business interests and boosters preached exploitation of che region's resoun::~ and farmers pushed for irrigation projects, but organizations like che Si· erra Club bard ed co presen -e: large "''ild areas for their pristine beauty. After Congress in 1891 authorized the president to designate public lands as forest reser'les, l'resi· dents Harrison and Cle\-e:land set aside 35 million acres. A wilderness \'ogue swept the United States in the earl)' twentieth cenrury. From congested cities and clanging factories, Americans looked to che "''iklerness for cran· quilityand spiritual solace. l'opular writers evoked the lure of the primitive, and the Boy Scouts ( 1910) and Girl Scours ( 1912) ga\'t: city children a taste ofrhe outdoors. Berw«n the wilderness enthusiasts and the de\-e:lopers stood gMwnment pro· fessionals like Gifford Pinchoc, who sa"'' the public domain as a resource co be man· aged wisd)'· Named by Roosevelt to head the new U.S. Forest Service in 1905, Pinchot campaigned nor for preservation bur for conservacion-the planned,. regulated use of forests for public and commercial purposes. Ac hearc Roosevelt "''lls a prc.servationisc, a champion of wilderness and wild· life preservation. H ~-e:\-e:r, Roosevelt che politician backed che conservationists' call for planned dewlopmenc. He supported the National Reclamation Act of 1902, which eannarked the proceeds of public-land sales for water management in the arid western regions and established che Reclamation Se:f\'ice to plan dams and irri· gation projects.

497

Primary Source: The Patent Medicine Fraud

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I

Sold public land .md UJat tht m"nueJ lOr watr:r manap:mmt aod dam projtcu

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4 98

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

PresidHt Thl!oclon Roosewtt 11d Frimds Comnua wittl Nitun, 1901 ~rfed by ;an
The Reclamation Act, according to some: historians, ranks with the Norchwest O rdinance for promoting the dewJopmenc of a vast region of Nonh America. For example:, the: Roosevelt Dam spurred che growch of Phoenix, Arizona, and the: Snake: Ri\'et project convened thousands of barren Idaho acres imo fertile fann land. The latA' required those who benefited from reclamation projects to repay the g()IJ'Ctn· mcnc for construction cosrs, thus establishing a re\'Oiving fund for ocher projects. It made possible che transition of the West fro m a series of isolated "island setd e· mcnrs" inco a thriving, interconnected region. The competition for scarce water resources in the West sparked bitter political bartles. The Los Angeles basin , for example, with 40 percent of California's popula· tion in 1900, found irsdf ~A'ith only 2 percent of the state's surface ~A'lltct. In 1907, the City of los Angeles derailed a Reclamation Service project incendcd for che farmers of California's Owens Valley, more than 230 miles co the north, and d iverted the pre· dous "-'ater to los Angeles. Meanwhile, President Roose:\'Clt backed Jlinchot's program of multiuse land managemenc and sct aside more than 200 million acres of public land as national forests, mineral resen-es, and potential wacer·po\I.I'Cr sites. But because of opposition in the West, Congress in 1907 rescinded the president's pO\l-er to create national for· esrs in six cimber·rich states. Roosevelt signed the bill- only, how...••;cr, after designat· ing t"--enty+one new national forests totaling 16 million acres in those six states. Congress established the Narional l'ark Service in 1916 to manage them.

I N.t.TJONAJ. PltOCiltE.SSIV&SM Pw.st 1: RoosEvnr AND TAn, '9ot-t5~1J

4 99

With Roosew.lt-'s blessing, Pinchoc organized a White House conservation con· ference for the nacion's go\-ernors in 1908, but j ohn Muir and other wilderness pres· e!Varionists were not invited. Ho\I.I'CWr, preservationists won key victories in t his era.. lniriatio.-es by pri\'ate citizens sa\·ed a large gro\-e of California' s gianc redwoods and a lo\-ely stretch of the Maine coasdine. The Sierra Club lost a major batd e to sa~ the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park when Congress in 1913 appro\-ed a dam on the Tuolumne Rh-er to pnwide 'A'lltet and hydroelectric power for San f rancisco. The controversy focused artemion and publicized che environmentalist cause, as Americans for the 6rs.t rime weighed the aesthetic implicacions of a major public-works project.

Roose\-elt had pledged not to run for a chird term in 1908, and to t he disappointmenc of millions, he kept his prom· Hause, 1109-1913 ise. The Republicans' most conservath-e wing regained control Although t he)' nominated Roosc'ldc's choice, William Howard Taft, for president, they selected a conservaci ~ vice presidential candidate and drafted an extremely consen•aci ~ placform. l 'he Democra~ meanwhile, nominated William jen· nings Bryan fo r a third and 6nal t ime. l 'he Democratic platform called for a 10'1'--er tariff, denounced the trusts, and embraced the cause of labor. Wich Roosc'ldt's endorsement, Taft coasted to victory. But che Democrats made gain~ and progressive Republican state candidates outran the national ticket. 0\·er· all, che outcome suggested a lull in the reform mO\"Cment, not its end. Taft differed markedly from Rooscvclt. Whereas TR kept in fi ghting trim and loved boxing, Taft was grossly O'lerweight and pla)•ed golf. TR lo'led dramatic public donnybrooks against the forces of evil and greed, but Taft disliked cont ro\-erS)'· His happiest da)'S ~A'Ou ld come later, as chiefjustice of the Supreme Court. Pledged co carry on TR's program, Taf[ supported the Mann-Elkins Act ( 1910), which strengthened che Interstate Commerce Commission's race-setting poY~ers and extended its authority co telephone and telegraph companies. The Taft White: House filed more antitrust suits than the Roosevelt administration had, buc its lack of fan· fare left most people consideringTR the quimes.sentiat«crustbuster." The reform spodight, meanwhile, shill-ed co Congress. During the RooSC"t·elt administracion, a small group of reform-minded Republican legislators, nicknamed the lnsurgen~ had challenged chcir party's conservati'le congressional leadership. The Insurgents, who included senators La Follette of Wisconsin and Albert lk\'· eridgeof lndiana and congressman George Norris of Nebraska turned against l"resi· dent Taft in 1909 after a tariff struggle. Taft had originally believed that the tariff s hould be lowered, bur in 1909 he signed che high Payne-Aldrich Tariff, praising it as "-t he best tariff bill thac t he Re· publican party ever passed." The batd e bctV~een conse!Vative and progressive Republicans was on. The so-called Ballinger-Pinchoc affair widened che rift. Richard A. Ballinger, Taft-'s secretary of t he interior, was a Seatd e lawyer ~A>ho favored the unregulated pri· vate development of nacural resources. Ballinger approved the sale of st\-eral million acres of public land in Alaska in 1909 to some Seatde businessm en, who prompdy sold it co a banking consortium char included J. P. Morgan. When a Depart ment of

Till In tilt Wllile

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5QO

OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

Interior official protested. he was fired. In true muckraking style, he immediatd)' published an anide in Collitr's blasting Ballinger's accions. When Gifford Pinchoc of the Forestry Service publicly criticized Ballin~r, he, coo, got che ax. TR•s supporters seethed. When Roosevelt returned to the United Scates from an African safari in june 1910. Pinchoc mct the boat. In the 1910 midterm doccions, Roost\'dt campaigned for Insurgent candidates. In a speech that alanned conscrvariw:s, he attacked judges who struck down progressive Ia~A'S and endorsed the radical idea of reversingjudidal rulings by popular vote. Borrowing a term from Herbert Croly's 'T1tt Promise ofAmeri· un Lifo, 1'R proposed a ..New Nationalism" chat would pO'I'--erfully engage the federal gow:mment in reform. Democrats captured the House of Reprc.sentath-es in 1910, and a coalicion of Democrats and Insu rgents controlled che Senate. As fervor for refonn rose, Roo· SC"t'e lt sounded more and more like a presidential candidate.

,.ts.Sift

In February 1912 Roosevdc announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination. In state primaries and conEJedlon of 1911 w ntions, Roosevelt beat Tat[ handily. But 1'a ft controlled the party machinery. At che Republican convention in Chicago, Taft's forces dis· W..... W'ds.• Oemoamt p,.-,;idm t .tlose dtrtioo in qualified many of Roosevelt's delegates. Outraged, 11t>s backers left the convention 1912 udtei'M in~ stomd •'ilYl' and formed the ProgressJve Party. What had been a general term for a broad reform ol pcug:reP:iYe tefcwms em the movement now became the offidal name of a political party. oaricnul kYd .. 1fed fit as a bull moose," Roosevelt trumpeted, thereby giving his organization its nickname, the Bull Moose Party. The convention platfOrm endorsed virtually every reform cause: of the day. The charismatic Roosevelt attracted a diverse following to the new parcy. Meanwhile, the reform spirit had infused the Democratic party ac state and local levels. In New jer· scy, voters elected a political novice, Woodrow Wilson, as governor in 1910. A «Wilson for President" boom soon arose, and when the Democrats assem· bled in Baltim ore in j une 1912, Wilson won the nom · ination, defeating several established party leaders. The Republican Taft essenciall)' gaw:: up. Eugene V. Debs ran on the Socialist platform, demand~=~ ing an e nd co capitalism, and Roosevelt and Wilson 6.29:0.517 .n.9 'i~N'AIII:In vied for the moderate refonn vote. TR preached his ~U.Ot(8UI1 Moowl 4,US,S11 Thllo=t A:
l

Tbe"--Way

":'

-- o D

D

" •

The 1912 election identified the criumphanc Democrats with reform (except on the issue of race), launching a tradicion on which Franklin D. Roose\-elt ~A'Ou ld build in the 1930s. 11le breakawa}' Progressive panydem· onscrated the support for reform among grass--roors Republicans while leaving che Republican party in the grip of co nservaci~s.

NATI ONAL PROGRESS IVISM P HASE WOOD ROW W I LSON, 1913-19 17

II:

As progessivism became 4 tk1tional mCMtment, wh/Jt issues proved most important? The son and grandson of Presbyterian ministers, Wilson grew u p in souchern cowns in a church!)' atmosphere chat shaped his oracory and moral oudook. He graduated from Princecon, earn ed a PILD. in political science from j ohns Hopkins Unh-ersity, taughc at Princeton, and became president chere in 1902. He lost support at l"rinceton because of his un· willingness co compromise and ld [ the academic .....-orld for the political arena in 1910. Three years later, he was president of the United States. Wilson was an eloquent orator who excelled ac policical d eal making. But he could also recreac into a fortress of absolute certicude that toler· aced no opposition. During his }'eat'S as president, all these facets of his personality ~A'Ould come into pia)'· Wilson pr01o'l'd ready co use gMwnment co address the problems of the new corporate order, and che nacional pro· gressi\'e mM•ement gained poo~rfu l new momentum.

Theodace Roose\11'-lt'.s u nprece· d ented pre.sickntia l aaivi.sm apc:i· vated the American people. TR became knOYm a.s ..t he great tnutbwter'" fOe h i.s ''igorou.s e n· forcem ent o f the She-rman Anti· Trust Act and .stricter reg:uluio n a( railroads.. P rute"Ctian of the- pub lic t hrough .'luch me.uurel a.s the Pu re f-ood a nd Drug: An and t he Me-at ln.speaion Act wue comc"n rone.s ofRoo,.,.vdt·.s prellickntia l prog:l\":l.'livi.sm. TR'.s admini.sua tion .se-t a.'lick m il· lion' of aau for presel""\•at ian but al.'lo promoted pUnned dc-wlopm entofthe-Wutthrough the Nahon.ll Jtcodam.nion Act. Anil'-red by what he .saw :u bt-tr~ by h is: chwen .succel.'lor, T aft, Roo$C'VC'It and hill.supponen form ed the Bull Moo,.,. ( Prugreslive) p.:u-tr in 1912; with Republican' divided, the I:Hmocr atic and icbte, \'(loocfrow Wilwn, won the- d«tian.

Tariff refonn- long a goal of southern and agrarian Democrats- headed Wilson's agenda. A 10'1'-··cariff bill llelwm passed the House but bog~d dO'I"·n in che Senate. Showing his flair for drama. Wilson denounced tariff lobbyists, and his censure led to a Senate investigation of lobb)ists and of senators who profited from high tariffs. Snmg by che publicity, the Senate slashed tariff rates C'\o\':0 more chan the House had done. The Undef\'-'OOd·Simmons Tariff reduced rates an average of JS percent. In j une 19 13 Wilson called for banking and currency reform. The nacion•s rotall)' decentralized banking system dear!)' n~ded overhauling. Buc no co nsensus existed on specifics. Many refonners wanted a publicly co ntrolled central banking S)'Stem , buc che nation's bankers favored private concrol. Some opposed any central banking authority, public oc private. No banking expert, Wilson insisted that the momur}' S)'Stem ulcimatdy be publicly concrolled. As the bargaining went o n, Wilson pla)•cd a crucial behind-the· scenes role. 1'he result ~A'as the Federal Reserve Act of December 1913. A co mpro· mise measure, chis latA' created tweh-e regional Federal Reserve ban ks under mixed public and prh•atc control. Each regional bank could issu e U.S. dollars, called Federal Reserve notes, co the banks in its district to make loans. O.~rall control of the sys· cern 'A'as assigned co the heads of the twelve regional banks and a Washington·based

llrllland Banking

-..-.. I

Ad """"'

~~ttp tow<\rd e:IIWIIUhing .solid oariotUI bw.king .systr:m

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OfAPlER ll

ThE PllOCilt~SSIVE ERA, tjOG-19'7

Federal Rcsel'V'C Board (FRB), whose members ~A'Cre appointed by the president fo r fourteen-year cerms. (The se
Ftderal Tride c-nissioft

I

Agency to msurr f.Ur tr:uk

and pr.lrtitts

In 1914 Wilson and his congressional allies curned ro that perennial progressio;e cause, business regulation. 1\vo kC)' regulator}' laws resulted, embodying different approaches. l 'he Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) reflected an administrative approach by creating a «watchdog" agency, t he F I'C, wit h poY~er co im·estigate suspected violations, require regular reports fro m corporations, and is· sue cease-and·desisc orders against unfair methods of competition. The Clayton Amir:ruscAcc ( 19 14) rook a legal approach. It remedied cheSherman Anti-Trust Act's vagueness by spelling out a series of illegal practices, such as selling at a loss to undercut competitors. With che added d ouc ofrhe Clayton Act, rhe Wilson administra· tion filed antitrust suits against dose to a hundred corporations. The Democrats historical!)' identified ~Aith W'Orkers, and Wilson supported t he American Federation of Labor, defended ~A>orkers' right co organize, and endorsed a dayron Ace clause chat exempted strikes, bo)'Cotts, and peaceful pickering from "n· straim of trade" injunctions. In 1916 (a campaign )'tar), Wilson and congressional Democrats enacted t hree important W'Orker-proceccion laws. The Kearing..0\1/Cn Act barred from interstate commerce produces manufacrured by child labor (Lacer declared u nconscirutionaf). 1'he Adamson Act established an eight-hour workda}' fo r interstate raii~A'llY ~Ah ich allowed farmers to secure long-tcrm,low-incerest federal loans US· ing land or crops as security. The Federal Highway Ace ( 1916) macched federal funds with smce appropriations for highway construction, benefiting the new automobile industr}' as well as farmers plagued by bad roads.

letiUJiliiiiBusiness; Aldlnl \'lloners llldFuwrs

The late-ninetcentb·cenruryprobusiness bias of t he courts moderated in t he Progressive Era. In 1908 rhe Supreme lilt t.satution Court in Mulltr v. Orr§'n upheld an Oregon law setting maximum hours for "-'Omen laundry ~Aorkers. 1'he Court's acceptance of the "Brandeis brief" marked a breakthrough in rhe legal sys· tern's responsi\'e ness to new sodalrealities. In 1916 Wilson nominated Brandcis to the Supreme Court. Many consen'llcivcs, including Republican leaders in Congress, disapproved of Brandeis' s inno\•atiw ap· proach to the law and protested. Anti -Semites opposed him because he ~A>as a Jew. But Wilson stood by his nominee, and after a fierce batd e, che Senate con6rmed him..

l'nllnulvl• and

............... ,~;-··ho piontercd Ullll' of scxielklg.y and l:ltbc-r 110cial Jcienco in arguing k plClUII':c

1

These: )'tat'S also produced four constitucional amendments. The Sixceemh Amendm c:m (raci6ed in 1913) granted Congress t he authority co tax income:. An earlier income tax measure had bee:n declared unconstitucional, spurring advocates to campaign for an amendm ent. Quickly exercising irs new authority, Congress in 19 13 im posed a graduated federal income tax wich a maximum rate of7 percem on incomes in excess of SSOO,OOO. Income: tax revenues helped pay for t he government's regulator)' act ivities under Progressive Era legislacion. The SC'\-cmecnth Amendm ent ( 1913) compleced a l'opulisc crusade by mandating rhe direct popular election of U.S. senators. The Eighteenth Amendment ( 1919) esrablis hed prohibicion of"-incox· icating liquors." The N in ereench Amendment (1920) granted ~A'Omen rhe vote. This array of amendmenrsdemonscrated how profoundl)' progressivism had transfonned the political landscape.

In 1916 Wilson easily won renominacion. The Republicans nominated Charles Evans Hughes, out Supreme: Cour t juscice and former New York go'lemor. Urged by Roose\~lt, ~A>ho was obsessed ~Aith drawing t he United States inco t he ~A'3r thac had broken out in Europe in 1914 (see Chap· tct 22), che Progressi\J'C party endorsed Hughes. With t he Republicans more or less reunited, rhe eleccion 'A'3S extremely dose. Wilson won t he popular \'Ote, but che Electoral College ouccome rem ained in doubc for ~ks as che California tally secsau~d back and forth. Ultimatd)', Wilson carried che state by less chan four thousand votes and, with it, che election. The progressi\J'C mm-cment lost momentum as attention curncd from re-form co war. Final s uccess for che prohibit ion and woman·s uffragecam· paignscame later, in 19 19- 1920,and Congress enacted a few reform meas· ures in the 1920s. But, overall, che mm~menc's zest and dri\·e dearly waned as Am erica wcnc to war in 1917.

1116: Wlson Edges

llu&bes

Wilw n di ~'«
achiC'\"'mc"nt.

The d arton Ami·Trwt Act $tu ngthtned govunmem'$ rc-gu· latCH)' power~.

Wilwn hdp«l $ht phad (our con:~ti · rution.:.l arMndm.c"n u to t.:.tilication: d ir«t popu.l.lr d«tion of:~en.lron:, the income tax, prohibition, and wom.:.n $Uf'fr.l_g>e. The outbr.c".:..lo: o(World W;llr t rurt.liltd and t'Vl'ntuaUyendtd the fir~t gi'C'.lt surgt of prngi'C'$livU:rn.

Chapter Su D OWNLOAD TH E MPJ AV Of O FILE O F THE C l-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D

KEY TERMS

LISTEN TO IT ON THE GO .

How did intel/ect~ols, no,e/ists, and journalists inspire the progressi1~ mo,.ment? (/1<1f!' 411)

I

The ptogi\'SSi\'c movrmcnt began as preachers, no~dists, journalists, photographers, and painters highlighted appalling conditions in America•s cities and factories. lntdlcccuals offered ideas for reform t hrough t he creative usc of gm-ernmcnt. Primarily middle dass, progre.ssi\<eS sought co im prove urban lite and "''otking conditions, eliminate political corruption, and curb t he excesses of t he new urban, industrial societ)'·

"111llckrak0!<" (p. 481) Robort La Follette {p. 48J) Anti-Saloon League {p. 487) Ida \\~IIH!ame
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5 04

CHAPUI 11

T\olf PROGllfSSI\'E ERA,

19oo-1917

How did state and local p~ seek to reform cities and tire MW ind•51rial onJ.,l (pat! 481)

I

AI. tJv kx:&l and IC¥~ kw:l, tdbnners likr M.lyot" H..um Plngttt of Odtolt and W"uc:on:un g.cwtnot RDbttt M. La Follertt. rognhtt wtth a host or tdOtm orpnw.uons. wotbd co comNr potiric:.ll CO«Uption. nuh aries wht .and mo« bt.wutul, "PJLW' corpota~ and impn.wt' conditions for '"'orkft'l.

UY TtAMS continued

CMril!

a..-n Ult (p. 4fJ1)

MatJan! Sqor (p. m} - - o l l h ol'btd ~(p.f91)

Wtont v: Ds (p. f!H} How did progesslves rry to conln>l morality, and how did thq view

I

immigmnts and bl«::cs? (fK111490)

l'rogm;sivism had nscoerch·r sidt. Somt refonnt:rsconc~nttared on rtgulat· ing urban amusrmems :and b.lnning alcohol consumption. R.adsm md ho~ti l • it:y to immigrnnlll c:ompri~c a p;tn of cht progressiw ltgacy as well. lkcau$C of t he refusal orprogrcuivc reformers ro substantive-ly address the pcoblrm or rn· cial inju.l>hl'c, Mrlcan·Americnns bccamt nlO(l' politically actm>;, fOunding the National Amldatlon tOr the Advancement of Colon:d J'roplr.

- . R- 0 > . 4fJ5}

Wl1lam lbvard Taft 0>. 4fJ5} H'llbum Aa O>. 496} Natklnal R«lamation Act (p. 497)

Progross;v. Patty O>. 500} WOOdrowWilsoo (p. 501}

Foder.ll R"""' Aa 0>. 501) rfderal Tradl) Commission (p. 502}

What strategies did A/iitan-Americons, KOmen, <md indu.strial workers use to improvr rhtlr lot?(pat! 495)

I

l'bt •'Omen's momnmt fOCl.tWd on rht ach.i.ewmmr: or sufftagJ. A tundful ofwomm,ltk.r bstth<...• Thod rcsularioo, <Sablish
As progrrssivl$m b«amt a notional movement, what issues proved most importanll (pat! SO/)

I

Wllson's ptuKicncy lt1W' monnous srtidts in incre.uing gow:mmcnt's ~u·

latory po'o'~ts. for rxamplc, tht CL:tyron Act sttmgr.hend antittust lzw, md the Frot:ral Rcsrtw: Ace etnrt:alizrd banking. Fouca.mmdmmu to thrConJt1turion tmboWrd m;a.ny pf'OS«SSM goili:: dicta popular tLtction ol srmron., the tn• rome t.u, ptolubDOn, :and Mlm:ul sutT~ HCWt-nu, progttsstvum brg..an co •';U'1(' as attmiJOn 1umrd m Wotld 'l'u L Tbt nat gceu tdocm mowmmt. d~oe Nnr DuJ olthc l9JOs. wrouJd draw on prog.tt:ssMsnts kguy.

IDuis Br.ll'odois (p. 502}

5 04

CHAPUI 11

T\olf PROGllfSSI\'E ERA,

19oo-1917

How did state and local p~ seek to reform cities and tire MW ind•51rial onJ.,l (pat! 481)

I

AI. tJv kx:&l and IC¥~ kw:l, tdbnners likr M.lyot" H..um Plngttt of Odtolt and W"uc:on:un g.cwtnot RDbttt M. La Follertt. rognhtt wtth a host or tdOtm orpnw.uons. wotbd co comNr potiric:.ll CO«Uption. nuh aries wht .and mo« bt.wutul, "PJLW' corpota~ and impn.wt' conditions for '"'orkft'l.

UY TtAMS continued

CMril!

a..-n Ult (p. 4fJ1)

MatJan! Sqor (p. m} - - o l l h ol'btd ~(p.f91)

Wtont v: Ds (p. f!H} How did progesslves rry to conln>l morality, and how did thq view

I

immigmnts and bl«::cs? (fK111490)

l'rogm;sivism had nscoerch·r sidt. Somt refonnt:rsconc~nttared on rtgulat· ing urban amusrmems :and b.lnning alcohol consumption. R.adsm md ho~ti l • it:y to immigrnnlll c:ompri~c a p;tn of cht progressiw ltgacy as well. lkcau$C of t he refusal orprogrcuivc reformers ro substantive-ly address the pcoblrm or rn· cial inju.l>hl'c, Mrlcan·Americnns bccamt nlO(l' politically actm>;, fOunding the National Amldatlon tOr the Advancement of Colon:d J'roplr.

- . R- 0 > . 4fJ5}

Wl1lam lbvard Taft 0>. 4fJ5} H'llbum Aa O>. 496} Natklnal R«lamation Act (p. 497)

Progross;v. Patty O>. 500} WOOdrowWilsoo (p. 501}

Foder.ll R"""' Aa 0>. 501) rfderal Tradl) Commission (p. 502}

What strategies did A/iitan-Americons, KOmen, <md indu.strial workers use to improvr rhtlr lot?(pat! 495)

I

l'bt •'Omen's momnmt fOCl.tWd on rht ach.i.ewmmr: or sufftagJ. A tundful ofwomm,ltk.r bstth<...• Thod rcsularioo, <Sablish
As progrrssivl$m b«amt a notional movement, what issues proved most importanll (pat! SO/)

I

Wllson's ptuKicncy lt1W' monnous srtidts in incre.uing gow:mmcnt's ~u·

latory po'o'~ts. for rxamplc, tht CL:tyron Act sttmgr.hend antittust lzw, md the Frot:ral Rcsrtw: Ace etnrt:alizrd banking. Fouca.mmdmmu to thrConJt1turion tmboWrd m;a.ny pf'OS«SSM goili:: dicta popular tLtction ol srmron., the tn• rome t.u, ptolubDOn, :and Mlm:ul sutT~ HCWt-nu, progttsstvum brg..an co •';U'1(' as attmiJOn 1umrd m Wotld 'l'u L Tbt nat gceu tdocm mowmmt. d~oe Nnr DuJ olthc l9JOs. wrouJd draw on prog.tt:ssMsnts kguy.

IDuis Br.ll'odois (p. 502}

5 06

OfAPlER l l

GtOilAL IM'OLVEMEr.TS AN O WOAID WAlt 1. '90'l--.,lo

Now America had entered che war, and Addams had to take a stand. Man}' of her friends, including john Oe:"'-'cy, were lining up behind Wilson. Despite t he pressures, Addams heeded her conscience and opposed the war. The reaction 'A'llS swift. Edito· rial ~A'liters who had earlier praised her sectlement·house: work now criticized her. For years after, the American Legion and other pacriotic organizations actacked Ad· dams for her ..disiO)'llhy"' in 1917. Addams did noc s it our t he war on the sidelines, hC>'~'-\...,...er. She gave speeches across America urging increased food production to aid refugees. In 1919, she ~A'llS decced 6rsc president of t he Women's lncernarional League for ~ace and Freedom. In 1931, s he: ~A'On the Nobel Peace Prize. Addams' s experience underscores ho~A' deeply World War I affected Amer ican life. Beyond its immediate effecrs, the ~A'llr had long-lasting social, eco nomic, and po· litical ramifications. In the late nineteenth century, America had become an indus· trial poY~Crhouse seeking markers and talA' macerials worldwide. In che early twentieth century, these broadening economic imeresrs helped giiJ'C rise to a new internacional role for the nation. This expanded role: influen ced home-from devdopme:ms, and it has continued to shape American history to the present. These broader global reali· ties, culminating in World War l, are t he focus of t his chapter.

DEFINING AMERICA'S WORLD ROLE, 1902- 1914 WMt goals underlay Am8rica's 8arly-twentietl~-e8ntury in\'0/wments in Asia and Latin America? As we saw in C hapter 20, the: annexation of Hawaii, the Spanis h-American War, the occupation of the Philippines, and other dC"t·elopme:nts in t he: 1890s s ignaled America' s growing invoh-emenc abroad. These fo reign engagements refl ected a d e:· sjre co assert American power in an age of imperial expansion. This process of for· eign e ngagement continued under Presidents Theodore Roosevdc, William Howard Taft, and Woodto'A' Wilson. America's dealings with Asjan and Latin American na· tions in these years "-ere shaped by both economic and ideological considerations.

{Ff) ~

lnteracti\•e Map: Imperialism in Asia

As che campaign to suppress che Philippines insurrection dragged on (see: Chapter 20), Americans shifted their fo . cus co China. Their aim ~A'llS not cerritorial expansion but rather protection of U.S. co mmerdal opporcunicies. 1 t:x· tile producers dreamed of clothing China's millions of people:j investors envisioned Chinese railroad construccion. As China's 250·)"rat·old Manchu Ch'ing empire grew weaker, U.S. businesspeople watched carefully. C hina's "-eaknrss had dr.t~A'tl other imperialists- including Russia, Germany, and Great Britain- who had won major concessions of land and trading rights. In Septem ber 1899, fearful of American bus inesses bcing shuc out of China, Sr
Frn u.~ Open Door -

seekilg iKCess to China martel; 8olll!f Rebellion erupts il China

S«ood U5. Open Door note

Roo...,.

l'fesident ThEOdore RoosEWII proc~ims" COadu!d revolwon il Nicaragua U.S. Marines occup'f Nicaragua U.S. troops occupy Veracruz, Mexico; Panama Conal opens; WDfkl war Ibegins; President Wilsoo proclaim American newality U.S. Marines occup'f Haiti and the Dominican Republic; Woman's Peace Party organized; British liner Lusionio sllllc by German U-boal; Wilson permits U.S.bank loa'"lo Allies U.S. pllliiw '"l"'dilion invodesMI!Oiico, seeijng Pancho V'llla; Germany pledges nDI Io . -merdl.>nl ~ 1\iihoul wamilg; Wllson reeleded U.S. troops Mhdraw from Mexico; Germany resumes unrestricted U-boat warfare; United Scares declares war; li!II!CIM! leM<e Art sols up national
mittal answers, Hay blithely announced that lhcy had accepted lhe principle of an "Open Door" to American business in China. Hay's O pen Door note shO'I'-'ed how commercial considerations were increasing!}' influencing American foreign policy. It reflected a quest for what has been called "-in· fonnal e mpire," in contrast co the formal acquisition of o\·erscas territories. In 1899, even as chc Open Door notes were circulating, an antiforeign secret sa. d ecy known as the Hannonious Righteous Fisrs (called "Boxers" by Western journal· ists) killed thousands of foreigners and Chinese Christians. In j une 1900 the Boxers occupied Beijing (BAY-jing), China's capital, and besieged che discrict housing the foreign legations. The United Scates contributed twemy-five hundred soldiers co an international ann}' that marched on Beijing, quashed the Boxtt Rebellion, and rescued the occupants ofche threatened legations.

..... I!Mol&oo

F....oo.l Chioex iruUrgt'fXY ag.Unlt ChriJ!tiaru omd Rlno:ig:nt~ clef'"uttd by an intemarional ,~,

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5 08

OfAPlER l l

GtOilAL IM'OLVEMEr.TSANOWOAID WAll. 1. '90'l-..,l o

0,.0 oof-Ameriun - ""'"""" sto~ttmmt policy eo 1kttp tt.ack opto in Cbina

The defeat of the: Boxer uprising further ~A'Ca.kene:d Ch ina's go\~rnme:m. Fearing that the: regime's collapse: would allow European poW'Crs to carve up China, john Ha)' issued a second, mon: imporcanc, series of Ope:n Door notes in 1900. He reaffirmed che principle of open crade in China for aUnations and announced America's determination co pre.serv'C Ch ina's territorial and adminiscrati\'e integrity. In general, China remained o pen to U.S. business interests and Christian missionaries. In the 1930·s, ~Ailen japanese expansionism menaced China, Hay's polk)' helped shape the American response. Along with U.S. economic expansion in China came missionary activity. Ameri· can Protestant missionaries had come coAsiaasearlyas the 1820s. By 1900 some 6.\~ thousand U.S. missionaries u~rc acci'V\! in China, Africa, India, and elsN>here. As they preached their religious message, the missionaries also spread American influence globally and blazed che way for U.S. economic expansion.

Dreams of a canal across the ribbon offand joining North and South America dated back co the: Spanish conquest. lllreall Diplomacy Yellow fever and mismanagement brought a French com· pany's late-nincteenth-<enrury actempt to build a canal to disaster and left a halfcompleted waterway. To recoup some of the $400 million loss, the company offered to sell its assets, including a concession from Colombia, which chen controlled the isthmus, to the United States for S 109 milliorL America was in an expansionist mood. In 1902, after the French lowered chcir price to $40 million, Congress auchorizcd President Theodore Roosevelt to accept the offer. The U.S. negotiated an agreemenc with Colombian diplo mat for a ninety· nine·)~ar lease on che proposed canaL But ~Ailen the Colombian Senate rejecced the deal, s«king a btcter offer, RoosC'\-elc private!)' denounced the Colombians as ..greedy litd e anchropoids."' Roosevelt found a willing coUaboraror in Philippe Bu nau-Varilla (fih-LEEP boo· NAW vah-REE-yuh), an offidal of the bankrupt French com pan)'· Disnta)'ed chat his company mighc lose its $40 million, Bunau-Varilla organized a .. revolution" in Pan· ama from a NN• York hotel room. While his ~Aifc stitched a flag, he wrote a declaration of independence and a constitution for the new natiorL On NMtember 3, 1903, the ..revolution"' erupted o n schedule:, wich a U.S. ~A'llrship anchored offshore. In short order, Bunau-Varilla gained American recognition of the ne~Atfy hacched nation and signed a treary guaranteeing che United States a ten-mile-wide strip of land across Panama "in perpetuity" in recurn for S 10 million and an annual payment of $250,000. Roosevelt later summarized che episode: .. 1 took the Canal Zone, and lct Congress debate, and ~Ailile the debate goes on, the canal does also."' Before completing the canal, the United States 6rsc had to co nquer )~llow fe\'Ct. After Dr. Walter Reed recognized che mosquito as its carrier, che U.S. Army car· ried out a prodigious d rainage project that eradicated the disease-bearing pm. Construction began in 1906, and in August 1914 che 6rsc ship sailed through the lbePa~~~~~~aC.al:

{ff) Primary Source: ~

Panama Canal

h . . . c...l

W...tl'....'ilf bttwtll'll tbt Puific ~nd Atlaotic O«.ms, compktrd by the U.S. in 191A

l

Panama Canal. A technical wo nder, che canal also symbolized an arrogant American imperial· ism. The ill feeling generated by Theodore Roosevelt's actions, combined wich ocher instances of U.S. intcrwntionism, v.'Ould long shadow U.S.-Latin American relations.

509 While t he Panama Canal rema ins chis era's best-known

llnsewelt and Tall Assai U.S. Power In l.alln Amerkll

foreign-policy achievement, other U.S. actions underscored Washington•s growing determinacion co assert U.S. power and protect U.S. busjness interests in latin America

-Asll

(sec Map 22.1) and Asia. l 'heodore Roose\~lr beliC"t-ed that

the United States must strmgchcn its ~A'Orld role, protect U.S. imeresrs in Latin America, and preserve the balance of power in Asia In 1904, ~Ailcn SC\-eral European nations threatened co invade the Dominican Republic, a small Caribbean island na· don char had defaulted o n its debts, Roosevelt reacted swiftly. If any nation inter· \'ened, he bd iew:d. ic should be che United States. In December 1904 Roosewlt declared that ..chronic wrongdoing" by any Larin American nation would justif}' U.S. inten'Cfltion. This pronouncem ent became known as the Roosevelt Corollat}' co the Monroe Doctrine. ( l'hc original ..doctrine,"' issued in 1823, had warned European powers

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U.S. HfltniOIYin tllt carillbNI ind litin AlniH'iCi. 1900-1941

Through m:u~y inten.\'Ontion~. ter ritori;d ;acqu is-ition~. :u~d robust economic exp;ansion, the Uni ted Sntn beaune the predomin:~n t power in Luin Am.c:riu in the e:~rty ~ntieth centu"Y. Acting o n Theodore RooK'I.'dt's :~s5ertion of ;a U.S. right to comb;at "wrongdoing" in b tin Arneriu ;al\d the C;aribbe;an, the Uni ted St;ates d isp;atched b"'op$ to the region, where they mec n;ation;alill't o pposition.

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CHAPtER ll

GtOilAL IM'OLY'UIEr.TSANOWORIDWAII.I. '90'l--.,lo

against meddling in latin America.) 11le Roou\-elt Corollary announced that in some circumstances the United Statts had the: right ro meddle. Suiting actions co u.'Ords, the United States ran the Dominican Republic's customs service for two )'ears and took over the management of the country's forcign debt. RoosC'\o-elc summed up his foreign· policy approach in a 1901 speech quoting ~Athat he said was an old Afri· can pro\-erb, "Speak softl}' and carry a big stick." In 191 J a U.S. -su pported revolution in Nicaragua brought to po~A'Cr Adolfo Dfaz, an officer of an American-owned Nicaraguan mining property. U.S. bankers loaned the Oiaz gm--ernmem $ 1.5 million in exchange for control of the Nicaraguan national bank, the customs service, and chc national railroad. When a n......_'Oit against Diaz broke out in 1912, Taft scm in che marines to protect the bankers' investment. Except for one brief inten•al, they remained until 1933. In Asia, too, both Roosevelt and Taft sought to project U.S. power and advance: the interests of American business. In 1900 Russia exploited the chaos unleashed b)• the Boxer uprising b)• sending troops to oCCUP}' Manchuria (man-CHQO.re~\lh), China's nonheasce:m province. In February 1904 a surprise Japanese attack de· strayed Russian ships anchored at Pore Arthur, Manchuria. Japan completely domi· nated in the Russo-Japanese War that folloW't'd. Roosevelt, while pleased to sec Russian expansionism challenged, believed that a Japanese victor}' U'Ould d isrupt the Asian balance of po""-'Cr and threaten America's position in the Ph ilippines. According!)', he invited Japan and Russia to a peace conference ac Portsmouth, New Hampshire. In September 1905 che two rivals signed a peace: creacy. Russia recognized Japan's rule in Korea and made other territorial concessions. After chis outcome, curbing Japane.se expansionism became America's major objecth-e in Asia. For his role in ending the ~A>ar, Roosevelt recti\'ed che Nobel l'cace l'rize. In 1906, U.S.·Japanesc relations soured when the San f rancisco school board, reflecting \'t'esc Coast hoscility co Asian immigrants, assigned all Asian children to segregated schools. Japan angrily protested chis insult. Roosc\-elt per· suaded the school board to reverse this discriminator}' policy. In rerum, in 1908 the administration negotiated a «gendt· men's agrNmenc" ~Aith Japan b)• which 10kyo pledged co hale Japanese emigration to America. Racist attitudes con· cinued co poison U.S.·Japanesc relations, hou.-e\-er. In 1913, California prohibited Japanese aliens from owning land. As Californians ~A'Orried about the ")'Cllow peril;" Japa· nescjournalists watching America's gro~Aing military strength tA'fOte of a "white peril." In 1907 Roosevelt ordered sixteen gleaming white battleships on a "training operation" to Ja· Woodrow Wilsoo. Sc~ooltN"""ing na\•al might. righteousnen o f W ilson's ;a.ppt'O;ach co Lltin Under President Taft, U.S. forcign policy in Asia con· Amuia~ th;at pl;a.nted the seecb oflongo-term cinued to focus on promocing U.S. commercial interests. A plan for a U.S.·financed railroad in Manchuria did not ~A
ouc, ho"''C'V\'.r. Not onl}' did U.S. bankers find the project too risky, but Russia and Japan signed a creary carving up Manchuria for commercial purpos~ freezing out che Americans.

In 19 13 the Democrat Woodrow Wilson repudiated his Republican predecessors' expansionism and pledged that lhe United States would " new~r again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." But he, too, intervened in Latin America.. In 1915, after bloody uphea..•als in Haiti (HAY·tft') and the Dominican Republic, Wilson ordered in the marines. A Haitian (HAY-shun) constitution favorable co American commer· d al interests was raci6ed in 1918 by a \'Ote of 69,3n to 355- in a marine-supervised election- and marines brutally suppressed Haitian resistance co American rule. They remained in lhe Dominican Republic until 1924 and in Haiti until 1934. The mosc serious crisis Wilson faced in Latin America "''lls the Mexican Revolution. Mexico had won independence from Spain in 1820, buc the nation remained divided becween a landowning elite and an impoverished pcasancry. In 1911, rebels led by the democratic reformer Francisco Madero had ended lhe thirty·)'eat rule of President Por6rio Diaz, who had defended the interests ofche "''Calthy elite. Early in 19 13,jusc as Wilson took office, Mexican croops lo)'al co General Victoriano Huerta, a full-blooded Indian, overthrew and murdered Madero. Amid the chaos, Wilson cried co promote good gOV\'.rnment, protect U.S. invest· ments, and safeguard U.S. citizens living in Mexko or along its border. Reversing the long-standing U.S. policy of recognizing all governments, Wilson refused to recog· nize Huerta's regime, which he called "a gOV\'.rnment of bucchers." Wilson author· iu:d arms sales to Venusriano Carranza (kuh-RC».·zuh), a Huerta foe, and blockaded Vera Cruz (VAIR-uh krooz) co Pl\.''"'e nt weapons fro m reaching Huerta An· nounced Wilson, .. , am going to teach the Souch American republics co elect good men.'" ln April 19 14 s.......,-en thousand U.S. troops occupied Veracruz and engaged Huerca's fol\':es. Sixty-6w Americans and approximately Tht Open Oaor note:~, UlC'-rt:ing 6\'t: hundred Mexicans W\'.re killed or wounded. Bowing co U.S. might, that U";lde with China mu.~t be open ro all n.uioru, n-pruented an imporHuerta abdicated.: Carranza cook power, and che U.S. troops withdrew. t-ant part or the American quc't fOr But the turmoil continued. In Januar}' 1916 a bandit chieftain in north· ''in f'mmal empirt." ern Mexico, Pancho Villa (PAN-choh VEE·)'Uh), murdered 16 American min· Tht P.:mama Canal wa' boc:h a m.ajor ing engineers and then crossed the borderj burned Columbus, New Mexico; ao.:ompliJhmc'nt and a -'rmbol of and killed 19 of its inhabitancs. Sharing the public's outrage, Wilson sent Amuican imperi.a)i,m. inco Mexico a punitive expedition char c_;.enruallytocaled 12,000 U.S. troops. Tht Rowe\-dt Comll.ary, announcing t hat tht United Stoate:~ would ace When Villa brazenly staged another raid across the Rio Grande (REE-00 ;u an intC"-mational policeman in GRAN·day) into 1~ Wilson ordered 150,000 National Guardsmen inco Latin Ameri e~~, wa' meant to guarducy along the border-a massio.e response chat stirred anti-American feelantee Ameri.ean prtc'mine"nCe m theC-aribbean. ings among Mexico's poor, for whom Villa "''lls a folk hero. Although soon 0\'Ct'Shado"''Cd by World War I, these involvements in Wilwn intC'-r.'t-ned in t he Mu:i~n ~

Wilsall llld Latin

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CHAPtER ll

G tOilAL IM'OLY'UIEr.TSANOWORIDWAII.I. '90'l--.,l o

they confidend)' promoted America's global interests while viewing wich pacro niz· ing condescension che «back-ward" societies they sought co manipulate. The vision of a u.'Orld order based on U.S. ideals would soon 6nd expression in \1/oodrow \l:tilson' s response: co the crisis in Europe.

Considering bod~ immediate and long-term («tors, why did the United States go to war in 1917? When ~A'llr e ngulfed Europe in 1914, most Americans wished only to remain aloof. For nearl)' three years, the United States officially stayed neutral But by April 1917 cultural cies co England and France, economic considerations, visions of a world remade in America's image, and German violations of Wilson's defini tion of neutral rights all combined to draw the United States inco che maelstrom.

With Europe at peace through much of the nineteenth centur)', some concluded that war was a thing of the past. HoW'C\'\'.r, a series of ominous developments suggested otherwise. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy signed a mutual-defense t reaty in 1882. In 1904 and 1907, Great Britain signed treaties with France and Russia. Meanwhile, the slow-motion collapse of the o nce--powerful Ottoman Empire, centered in Turkey, left in irs wake such newly independent nations as Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Sctbian pat riots dreamed of expanding cheir boundaries into Bosnia-Hcn:egovina, Serbia's neighbor to che west. Russia su pported thcst: ambitions. Meanwhile, the Auscro-Hungarian Empire also saw opportunities fo r expansion as Ottoman power faded. In 1908, Austria-Hungar}' annexed (took m--er) Bosnia-Herzegovina, alarming Russia and Scrbia. Gennan)', ruled by Kaiser Wilhelm ll, also displayed expansionist impulses. Germany had achieved national u ni6cacion o nly in 1871, and man}' Germans bdiC\o-ed that their nation had lagged in the race for empire. Such 'A'lLS the context when Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria made a state visit co Bosnia in june 19 14. As he and his wife rode in an open car through Sarajc-.'0, the Bosnian capital, a )'Oung Bosnian Serb gunned them do~A't'l. In response, Austria declared war on Serbia. Russia, aligned with-S erbia by a secret treaty, mobilized for war. Germany declared war on Ru.Wa and France. Greac Britain, linked by t reaty to France, declared war on Germany. An assassin's hullers had plunged Europe inco war. Thus began what contemporaries called the Great War, which .....-e know as World War LOn one side ~A'Cre Great Britain, Russia, and France, called the Allies. O n the ocher side were che Central Pou.-ers: Germany and Austria-Hungar}'· Italy, initially neutral despite its alliance with che Central Pou.-ers,join ed the Allies in 19 15.

The C.ilg of War

l'roclaiming U.S. neutrality, President Wilson urged the nation to be neutral «in thoughc as well as in accion." Mosc Americans fervcnd)' agreed. A popular song summed up che mood: "'I Didn' t Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier.'"

Neutrality proved difficult, hoYIC'\o-er. Noc only economic cies but also a common language, ancestry, and culture linked many Americans to Brimin by strong emocional bonds. Still, not all Americans shared chese ties. Because millions W\'.re: of Ger· man origin, many sided with Germany. Irish-Americans speculated that a German victory might free Ireland from British rule, ~Ailile some Scandinavian immigrants identified more with German}' than with England. Neutral in 1914, America went to war in 1917. What caused this turnabout? Fundamentally, Wilson•s vision of a ~A'Orl d order in America's image conflicted with his neutrality. An international S}'Stem based on democracy and capitalism ~A'Oul d be impossible, he believed, in a world dominated by imperial Germany. 1b shape the peace, America ~A'Ou ld haw~: co fi ght the war. These underlying ideas influenced Wilson's handling of che immediate issue thac dragged the United States into the conflict: neutral nations' rights on the high seas. When che war began, Britain intercepted U.S. merchant ships bound forGer· many. Wilson's protests intensified in fate 1914 and early 1915 ~Ailen Britain declared the North Sea a war zone and planced it with explosi\-e mines. Britain 'A'llS decer· mined to exploit its naval advantage, even if it meant alienating America. Buc Germany, not England, ultimate!}' pushed t he United States into ~A'llr. If Britannia ruled the waves, German}' controlled t he ocean depths ~Aith its torpedoequipped submarines, or U-boats. In ~bruar}' 1915 Berlin proclaimed the waters around Great Britain a war zone and warned off all ships. Wilson responded: Ger· many would be held to "st rict accountability" for any loss of U.S. ships or H..-es. On May J, 1915, in a small ad in U.S. nl'\\o'Spapers, the German embassy caucioned Americans against trawl on Britis h or French ..-essds. Six da}'S later, a U-boat sank the British liner Lusitania off the Irish coast, with the loss of 1,198 lives, including 128 Americans. (The Lusitania, historians later d iscovered, had carried munitions destined for England, a se
The Siokinc of tilt Cmord liner Lttrll..l#. M.ly 7. 1915, off tlltlris~ Coast The dntruction of the C.IIU· t1111i11 by.:. Germ::~t~ U·bo.u, portr.lY\"d here i:n .:.n illusb'.:l· tion from :~n English nt'W$· p.:.per, took 1\ol'.:.rly 1,200 liV\"s, including 128 AmeriQns. This ('Y('nt oub'.:.ged U.S. public: opinion .:.nd 1-e:d to build·up in mltit;uyprep.:lt' edneu. But :~s Preside"t W ilson pur5Ued diplom.:.tic: exch:~ngc:s m th Genn.:.ny, 1\ol'.:.rlytwomorc:Yl".l"~td

p:u.s before the United St:ites entered the w:~r.

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OfAPlER l l

GtOilAL IM'OLvtMEr.TSANO WORlD WAll. I, '90'l--.,lo

The Lusitania disaster exposed deep diYisions in U.S. public opinion. Man}' Americans were ready for war. l 'heodore Roos.......,-elt, strongly pro+British, condemned Wilson- who had counseled pacience after t he attack- for "abject cowardice and weakness." T he National Security League, a lobby of bankers and induscrialisrs, led a "-preparedness'" mM>em em, stirring up patriocism and promoting an arms buildup and military training. By lace 1915, Wilson himself called for a militar}' buildup. Other citizens, hO\l'f:'\'er, deplored the drift coward war. Some progressi\--es warned that ~A'ar fe\'er 'A'3S eroding support for reforms. jane Addams lameneed that the internacional movements co reduce infant mortality and impro\'f:' care for t he aged had been "scattered co the winds b)• the war."' OiYisions surfaced even ~Aithin the Wilson administratiorL Secrctar}' ofStace William jennings Br)'an, belie\'ing that Wilson's l.Msitem ber 1916.

In January 1917, facing stalemate on cheground, German}' resumed unrestricted su bmarine warfare. Germany's mili· 11111rs the war tarylcaders believed that even ifthe United Scates declared war as a result, full-scale U-boat warfare could bring victor}' before American troops reached the fro nt.

The lllllled States

Events now rushed for~A'llrd. Wilson broke diplomatic relations on ~bruat}' 3. During February and March, U-boats sank live American ships. A coded telegram from the: German foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, co Gmnan}"s ambassador to Mexico promised char if Mexico would dedare ~A'llr on che United States, German}' ~Aestmenc in t he: gram, sugu-Jting ;:~ Gtnn.ln·Mtxicom Allied cause, and American culru.ral links to the: Allies, especially EnglandaJii.lnCJt, g;:~~ th"' Un ittd Sr.ltt-J th"' final pu'h imo \l'orld \l'ar I. had propelled the United States into the war.

MOBILIZING AT HOME, FIGHTING IN FRANCE,

1917-1918 1-/ow did Washington mobiliz.r the nation for war; and what role did U.S. troops play in the war? Compared to its e-ffects on Europe, the war only gr.u:ed che- United States. Rus· sia, ill-prepared for ~A'llr, suffered heavily. f rance, Great Britain, and Germany fought for more chan four years and su ffered casualties of 70 percent or more; the U.S. casualty rate was 8 pm:cnt. The 6ghting left pares of f rance and Be-lgium brutal!}' scarred; Norch America was physically untouched. Ne:\-ertheless, the: war profoundly affected America.

A \l'Oefull}' unprepared American military faced war in April 1917. The regular ann}•of 120,000 enlisted men had vircually no combat experience:. An aging officer corps was dozing a~A'ltY the }'ears uncil retirement. 11le:re 'A'llS enough ammunition fur on I}' tv10 days of fighting, and the War Departmenc was a sna kepit ofjealous bureaucrats. Raising an army and imposing order on t he: War De:parcmcnt posed a dauncing challenge. Wilson's se:cre:cary of war, Newron D. Baker, skillful!}' implemented the Selective Service Act, passed in May 1917. Baker de'lerly made t he: first draft regis· trarion day a «festival and patriotic occasion.'" Thanks co a care-fully orchestrated public-relations campaign and local civilian draft boards' deft handling of the: draft, 24 million men registered byNo\-ember 1918, ofwhom nearly 3 million 'A'CTC drafted.

SeledM Service Ad Draft

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ac:t 10 r;Wt .vmy during World Wul

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OfAPlER l l

GtOilAL IM'OLVEMEr.TSANO WOAID WAll. 1. '90'l--.,lo

In addir:ion, following a preccdem-breaking dedsion by the sccrctary of the navy, II ,000 women sen~d in lhe navy during the v..ar. Although nor assigned co combat, they perfonned crucial support funccions as n u.rses, clerical workers, and telephone operators. Some rwclw chousand Native Americans sen·ed in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). While some reformers eager co preserve Indian culture ar· gued for aU-indian uni ~ militar}' officials integrated Native Americans inro che general ann}'· Some ob· servers predicted char che warcime experience would hasten the assimilacion of Indians inro mainstream American life. The War Oeparnncm monitored the off~ uty behavior of )'Oung men cut off from family and com· m unity. The Commission on Training Camp Activi· des presented lilms, lcccures, and posters on the dangers of alcohol and prostitution. Beginning in December 19 17, all recruits also underwent incelli· gence tescing. Psychologists eager co demonstrate the usefulness of cheir new profession claimed that lests 61 :~& troops of the 369th lnf.mtry Regiment i" the measuring recruits' "-intelligence quotient" (IQ) could treraehe5- rae;~~r M:~f~ou rt, F~nc:e i" 1'l18. Most Aftic:;,_n. A.meria~n ro.ld iers were .:1uigned to nonc:omb:u duty, help in assigning their d uties. In fact, che tests moscl}' sueh .:l5- unlo:ading sup plies :a~ equiprn.ent. revealed that many recruits lacked fonnal education and culcural sophistication, while reinforcing radal and ethnic stereotypes. &pet&Dooaryr.m. In April 1917 W. E. B. Du Bois urged African-Americans lO support che war. 11lt'C't million t\.rnc'riu.n mm Most did. More than 260,000 blacks \'Oluntecred or v..~re d rafted, and 50,000 went Wl'n' dnftrd into .:l bftt to to France. Hov..~\·er, rnd sm pervaded the military; the navy assigned blacks only co 6gllt in Europe during WWJ 1 menial positions, and the marines excluded them completely. Blacks in training camps endured crude racial abuse. One racist senator from Mississjppi warned that the sightof"arrogant, scrutcing" African·Am erican soldiers would trigger race riots in the United States. 1Cnsions reached the breaking point in Houston in August 1917, when some black soldiers, endlessly goaded by local whites, seized weapons fro m the armory and killed SC\~nt«n whites. After a hasry erial ~A'ith no opportunity for an appeal, chirlccn African-American soldiers v..~re hanged, and forty-one wcnc lO jail for life.

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The war )'Cat'S of 1917- 19 18 helped shape: modern Amer· ica. The war's adminiscrati\'e innovations sped up longer· term processes of social reorganization. The war furthered many key de\·clopments of che 1920s and beyond- including the spread of mass production; the collaboration btNttn go\~m ment, busjness, and labotj. and the growth of new professional and managerial elites. The war led lO unprecedented govcrnmenc oversight of the economy and the regulation of corporacions, something progressives had long urged. The War Indus· tries Board (WlB) was established in 1917 lO coordinate military purchasing, co

I MOBIUlJNG AT H OME, FlGKhKG IM FRANCE, 191?'-19t8

517

fight waste, and co ensure chat the military received che weapons, equipment, and su pplies it needed. Especial!)' under che wealth)' Wall Screct speculator Bernard Baruch (bah·ROCM(), ~Athom Wilson appointed ro run che WID in Ma.rch 1918, the agency exercised enormous control ovcr rhe industrial sector. In addition to atlocat· ing talA' materials, the board established production priorities and introduced all kinds of efficiencies. The Fuel Administration controlled coal o utput, regulated fuel prices and consumption, and in March 1918 introduced da)tfight savings time as a wartime co nservation measure. Baruch's counterpart on the agrk ulrural from was Helbert H()()VC.r, che head of the Food Administration. A mining engineer who had amassed a fortune in Asia, Hoover O\-ersa~A' the production and allocation ofwheac, meat, and sugar to ensure su pplies for the army and the food-sho rt Allies. The War Industries Board and che Food Administration represented only the tip of che regulatory iceberg. Nearly five thousand government agendes supervised home--from activities. When a railroad tie--up during the winter of 1917- 1918 threat· ened che flow of supplies to Europe, the Railroad Administration stepped in and transformed che thousands of miles of crack operated by competing companies into an eflidem national transportation S)'Stem. The war accelerated corporate consolidation and economic integration. In place of rrustbusting, the government notA' encouraged cooperation among businesses. Overall, the: war was good for business. Despite added taxes imposed by Congress, profi ts soared. After· tax pro fi ts in the copper industry, for example:, jumped from 12perccmin 19 13to24percent in 1917. The old laissez.faire suspidon of gm-ernmcm, which 'A'llS already eroded, now suffered further blo·ws in 19 17- 1918. In the 1930s, ~Athen the nation faced a different kind of crisis, che gm-emmenr activism of World War I "-'OUld be remembered.

American troops 6rs.tsawaction in the: campaign ro throw back German}"s spring 19 18 offensi\J'C in the: Somme: and Aisne:·Marne: secrors. The next heavy American enga~ment ln ~e came chat autumn as part of the: Allies' Meuse--Argonne offensi\J'C that ended the war. When the: United States entered the war, Allied prospects had looked bleak. German U·boat attacks had caken a horrendous toll o n Allied shipping. A failed French offensive in the: spring led co an army mutiny, and an almost equally d isas· rrous Bricish·Fre:nch offcnsh-e in No\-ember cost 400,000 casualties to gain just four miles. Russia had suffered serious setbacks, contributing co che re\'Oiutionar}' up· hcaval. The communist faction of che re\'Oiution, che Bolshe\'iks, gained strength when its top leaders, induding Vladimir lenin and Leon Trotsky, returned from ex· ile abroad. O n No\-ember 6, 19 I 7, a Bolshevik coup m-enhrew Alexander Kercnsky's prO\'isional gO\>ernment and effectively rcmO\'ed Russia from the: ~A'llr. Early in 1918, the Bolshe\'iks signed an armistice ~A'ith German)', che Treacy of Brest·litO\'Sk, free· ing chousands of German troops on the: Russian from for fi ghting in France. The firsc U.S. croops reached f rance in October 1917. Evcnruall)' about 2 million American soldiers served in France as me:mbcrs of che American Expeditionary Force (AEF) under General John}. Pe.rshing. Most men oflhe AEF ac 6rs.t found the: ~A'llr

Willi tile AD!rican Expedlticlury Force

lnteracti\•e Map: The War in Europe,

1914-1918

John

l"""""" Com"""""

ofAmerican Exptdition.uy Foret tlvt fought in Europt

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518

CHAPtER ll

GtOilAL IM'OLY'UIEr.TSANOWORIDWAII.I. '90'l--.,lo

GERMANY £.\IGL/SH CHANNEL

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Map 22.2 Tilt Unfttd Statts on tilt W.stero Froo!. 1918 AtneriG~n uoop~ fiNe

uw :~«ion in the e:~p:lign to throw b:ack Genn:any's Spt'ing 1918 ofkn~\'e in the Somrn.e SC"Ctors. The nut he:!\)' Am-eric:an eng:agement e:~e th:~t :autl.nnn ;t~ p :~rt of the Allies' Meu se·Argonne offensi~ th:~t ended the w:ar. :~nd Ai~ne·M:arne

a great ad..-cnture. Plucked from towns and farm~ they sailed for Europe on crowded freightersj a lucky few tra\'i:led on captured Gennan passenger liners. The African-Americans with t he AEF in France worked mainly as mcss·bo}'S (mealtime aides), laborers, and stevedores (ship-cargo handlers). The fatter assign· mencs, t hough t he)' were discriminatory, vitall)' aided the \l.'ar effort. Except for ~'0 segregated divisions, African-Americans did not engage in combat. Only in death was che AEF integrated: graves in militar}'CCmeteries \I.'Cf'C noc segregated by race. In desperate circumstances, f rench and British commanders wanted to incor· porate AEF t roops imo Allied units already ac the front. But l'trshing and his su pe· riors in Washington insisted that the AEF be ..distinct and separate," in pare because he scorned the defensi\'i: mentality of the Allied commanders and in part because separate combat would strengthen che U.S. voice at che peace cable. American forces saw chcir 6rst real combac in Ma.rch 1918 \I.-hen a Ger man offensjvc chreatened France's English Channel pores. 1'he Allies creaced a unified command under French general Ferd inand Foch (fohsh), and American troops were: thrown into lhe fighting around Amiens (AH-mee-ehn) and Annemih'es (are-men· TEE-air) chac stemmed che German ad\•ance. In Ma)' 1918 Germany launched the second phase of its spring offensive. B}' the end of the momh, the Germans had broken through the Allied lines and had secured a nearly open road to Paris, onl)' fift}'

I PII:OMonKG rntWAII.ANDSUPPil£SS1NG D lsst:r."t

519

miles away. At this critical moment, Americans spearheaded the forces t hat finally stopped the ~nnan advance at t he town of Chiteau·1'hierry(shah·TOE tH·AIR·ee) and nearby Belleau (BELL·oh) Wood (see Map 22.2). Eighcy·6ve t housand American troops helped to staunch the fi nal German offensive of the ~A'llr, a thrust at the an· d em cathedral city of Rheims (reems). Germany's desperate attempt to take the of· fensi\-e had failed. Now it was the Allies' rurn.

On july 18, 19 18, the Allies launched their coumeroffen· si\'e, and the ~A>ar's Lase great batd e began on September 26 as 1.2 million Americans joined t he struggle to drr.-e t he Gmnans from the Meuse Rivcr and the dense Argonne Forest nonh ofVer· dun. Poison gas hung in che air, and rats scurried t hrough the mud,gorg· ing on h uman remains. Americans now endured the filth, vermin, and dysentery familiar to veterans of the trenches. Some welcomed injuries as The U.S. go"-'1'-mmt m irutiruttd t ht a ticket out of t he bactle zone. Ochers collapsed emotionally and ~A'ere hos· dr;a.(t to fill m~nJ'OW"r n~ pimliud for ..shell shock.'" Ga.'t-mmtnt ug:ul.nion o( tbt tcon-Four black infantry regiments served ~Aith distinction under French omr, 0\'1'-l'llight orresou~u. and command. One encire regiment, the 369th, was honored with the French t:olh.bOC'ation with bwinel' rt:.lo:htd into Am«ic.ln hou,thoiW :.nd Croix de Guerre (awAh duh gair), and sc'leral hundred indhidual black b«~mt ar's brutality offtn,iw. would shape the literatun· ofrhe 1920s, as writers like Ernest Hemingway Ame"-Mt:.m troOJn the-n Jpt:.rhtoadtd stripped awa}' the illusions obscuring the reality of mass slaughter. By early tht Allitd counttro((tnJiVt' th~t ltd November, the AEF had fulfilled its assignment, at a cosc of 26,277 dead. to the- AtmistiCt: in NO\'C'mb« 19 18.

PROMOTING THE WAR AND SUPPRESSING DISSENT 1-/ow did Americ~ms respond to propagtJnda and suppression ofdissent? In their own ~A'lly, the war's domescic effects 'A'ct'e as important as its battles. Spurred by government propaganda, patriocic fervor gripped America. The war fe. \'f:r, in curn, encouraged incelleccual conformity and intolerance of di.ssem. Fuding the repressive spir it, govcrnment a uthorities and private vigilante groups hounded socialists, pad 6s~ and other dissidents, crampling dcizcns' constitutional rights.

l'o President Wilson, selling che war ac home was crucial to success in France. "'It is not an army"'" muse shape and t rain for war, it is a nacion," he declared. The administra· cion drew o n the new professions of advcrrising and public relacions co pursue chis ~IM!rlisltftl tbt war

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c...-e. .,. ,..._

~ W.artime prop;~

pnd.a ~ o tablibd in April l.917; k d by journalist Gt0f'31"C11'td

goal. Treasury Secretary McAdoo orchcnratcd a series of gm-ernmenc bond driV\'S, called l iberty Loans, that financed about rwo·thi.rds ofche $35.5 billion (including loans to the Allies) char the war cost the United States. l'oscers exhorted citizens to «fight or Buy Bonds.'" !':trades, rallies, and appearances by moYie starts all aided the cause. l'atriotic war songs reached a large public through phonograph recordings. Beneach the ballyhoo ran a note of coercion. O nl)' "a friend of ~rman)'," McAdoo warned, would refuse to buy bonds. 1'he balance of the government's war costs came from taxes. Using che pO'I'--er granted it by the Six· teenth Amendment, Congress imposed wartime inco me taxes that reached 70 per· cent at che top levds. j ournalist George: Creel headed che key 'A'llrtime propaganda agency, the Com· mitree on Public Information {CPI). While claiming merely to co mbat rumors with faces, the Creel committee in reality publicized the go\-ernment's \-ersion of e\-ents and discredited all who questioned that \"Crsion. Posters, news relcas~ advertise· mencs, and mO\i es aU trumpeted the goo.-ernmenr's sanitized \-ersion of cvcncs. The Cl' l poured fo reign-language publications into the cities to ensure the lo)•altyof recent immigrants. Creel also organized the "four-minute men": a netWOrk of 75,000 speakers throughout che nation who ga\J'C patriotic talks to audiences of all kinds. Teachers, writers, religious lead~ and magazine editors overwhelmingly su pported the war. These custodians of culture viewed the conflict as a scruggle to defend threatened values and standards. Alan Seeger, a )'OUng HaJVard graduate who volunteered co fight for France in 1916, ~A'fote highly popular poems romanticizing the war. An artillery barrage became "the magnificenc orchestra of war." The ..sense of being the instrument of Desciny,'" wrote Seeger, represented the ..supreme cxperi· ence" of combat. He was killed in action in 1916. l'rogressr.-e reformers who had applauded Wilson's domestic progr.un notA' cheered his war. Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, and ocher imellcctuals associated with the New Republic magazine zealously backed the war. According to educator j ohn Dt\1/C)', che war presented exciting ..social possibilities."' l'he gOV\'.rnment's wartime activism , he argued, could be channeled to reform purposes ~A•hen peace rerurned.

Responding to this dr umfire of propaganda, some Ameri· cans became almost hysterical in their hatred of all things IIIII Dl~enl German, their hostility co aliens and dissencers, and chcir stridenc patriotism. Isolated actions by Gennan saboteu~ including the b!O'I'-·ing· up of a New jcrs.ey munitions dump, fanned the flames. In Collinsville, lllin oi~ a mob of 500 lynched a )'Oung Gcnnan-born man in April 1918. When a jury exonerated the mob leaders, a j Ut)' member sho uted,. "N obod)' can sa}' "-"e aren't loyal now.'" German books vanished from libraries, tO'A'tlS wich German names changed them, and «liberty sandwich"' and .. liberty cabbage"' replaced "hamburgers"' and "saucrkrauc" on rescauranc menus. l'he Philadelphia Orchestra banned all German musk except for Bach (bahkh), BeethOV"en {BAIT-hoh-vun), Mozart (MOATS-.ut), and Brahms (brawms). l'opular e\'angelisc Billy Sunday proclaimed... Ifyou turn hell upside do'A'tl )'OU will find ' Made in Gennany' scamped on che bottom." l'he zealots also cargcted ~A'llr critics and radicals. A Cincinnati mob horsewhipped a pacifist

Wlrlille lntolei'IIKe

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521

minister. T heodore Roosevelt branded anti~Aoar Senator Robert La Follette .,an unhung traitor.'" Despite the persecution, many Americans persisted in opposjng the: ~A'llr. Some W\'.t e immigrants with ancestral tics to Germany. Ochers were: religious pacifists, in· eluding Quakers, Mennonites, and jehovah's Wimesses. Ofsome sixty·lh-e thousand men ~Ailo registered as conscientious objectors (COs), tv.rcncy-one chousand ~A'Cre drafted. The army assigned most co noncombat d uty, su ch as cleaning lacrines. Those ~Ailo rejected this altcmari\'C were sent to military prisons. Socialist leaders such as Eugene Debs denounced the war as a capitalise scruggle

for ma.rkets, wich che soldiers as cannon fodder. l 'h e U.S. declaration of.,.,>ar, they in· sisted, mainl)' re-flected Wall Strecr's desire co protect irs loans to England and f rance. But other socialists supported the war, dividing the parry. l 'he war split the "''Omen's m()I.'Cment as welL While som e leaders joined j ane Addams in opposition, others en· dorse:d che "''llr while keeping their own goals in view. Draft resistance extended beyond t he ranks of conscientious objectors. An esd· mated 2.4 to 3.6 million young men failed to register for chedraft, and of those that did, about 12 percenc did not appear when drafted or deserted from training camp. The rural South sa"'' high levels of draft resistance, especiall)' because t he: urban dites "'rho ran draft boards were m ore likely to defer roung men of chcir own class than poor farmers, white or black. Of southern blacks who registered, one-chird were drafted, compared to one· fourth of whites. White draft boards argued that low-income black families could more casil)' spare a male breadwinner. But che dynamics of race \N'Orked in complex ways: some sout hern whites, fearful of arming black men even for military service, fa\·ored drafting only whites. The war•s m ost incisi\'e crick was Randolph Bourne, a )'OUng journalisc. AI· though Bourne m uch admired j ohn D~'ty, he rejected his hero's prowar posicion. He dismissed the: contencion that reform ers could direct the war to their own purposes. «Jfthe war is too strong for you to pm\'!nt,"' he: asked, " how is it going to be weak enough for )'OU to .. . m ould to rour liberal purposes?" Eventually, many pcowar intdle:cruals came to agree. By 1919, Oe:YIC')' conceded chac che war, far from promoting reform, had encouraged reaction and intolerance.

Wartime intolerance also surfaced in federal laws and official actions. 11le: Espionage Act ofj une 1917 set fines and byllw prison sentences for a variety of loosely defi ned anti"''llr activicie:s.1·he SeditionAmmdment to the Espionage Act (May 1918) imposed sciff penalties on an)'One: convicted of using "d is loyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive lan· guage" about che governmenc, the: Constitution, the: flag, or che militar)'· Wilson's actorney general, Thomas W. Gregory, used t hese laws to scamp out dissenc. Opponents of the war should expect no mercy "from an outra~d people and an ai,!'Cnging go\·crnme:nt;'' he said. Under this sweeping legislacion and similar scace fa"''S• some fifteen hundred pacifists, socialises, and war opponents V.\'!re arrested. Kate Richards o •Hare, a mid"''CStern socialise organizer, spent more than a rear in jail for declaring, "11le: \N'Omen of the United States are nothing m ore chan brood sows, to raise children to get into the army and be made inro fertilizer." Eugene s.,rtu~nc Dissent

IEsfduce

Ad Criminalil:td

vimW.Iy ~nr .mti• w utivity

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c~.

tllikd Fin t Amendment tighu in criricixing • w ot JO'"rntllC'nt

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nm"\

I

T he \l'ilson MlminiJttnion drt'w SUC'C'C':IJ(ully on advntUing tedtniquel to populariu tbt war and toJdl bor~k Georg-:" C~l he-a-ded tbt JfutMpropaf'nd..l c~mpaign of the \l'iiJOn admim.u:ration. \l'art:ime tmotion kd to imoiC"-ranee; virtually all thintp ~rl'l\an buoun.e raboo. Although moJt progresli~J Ju p· port«! the w.u, theu ""-"'a (ew criticJ, Juch aJ Randolph Bourne. The Elpionage Act and the Sedition Amendment Juppresled ~ ~pe«h and led to C'Xtrt'me rt'actionJ, a~ h undrt'W ~nt to ~i.son.

Debs was imprisoned for chreerears (19 18--1921) for a speech discussing che: economic causes of che "''llr. 11le Espionage: Act also auchoriud the poscmaster general co bar sus· pect materials from che mail- a pnwision enchusiascicall)t enforced by Wil· son's postmaster general, Alben S . Burleson, a reactionary superpatriot. Upton Sinclair protested co President Wilson that no one of Burleson's "childish ignorance" should wield such poo~r; but Wilson did litcle: to re· strain Burleson's excesses. 11le 1917 Bolshevik takco\·er in Russia sharpened the attacks on domcscic radicals. In 1919, che U.S . Supreme Court upheld Espionage Ace convictions of war critics. In Scbtnd! v. United Stain, Justice Oli..~r Wendell Holme:s,jr., "''fit· ing for a unanimous court, justified su ch repression in cases where a person's exercise of the First Amendment right of fret: speech posed a "dear and pres· em danger" to the nation. It also upheld Debs's conviction. Although t he: war was over, a vindictive Wilson refused to commuce: Debs's sentence. lhe early wartime mood of idealism had degenerated inro persecution of all who failed to me:ctthe zcalocs' notions of" IOO percent Ame:ricanism." lhis climate: of conformity and suspicion "''Ould linger long after the war's end.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS IN WARTIME AMERICA WMt was the war's ec.onomic, political, and social imp4ct on tll6 American hont6 front? While the war affected the lh~s of millions of Ame:ricans- induding industrial workers, farmers, V.'Omen, and blacks- anocher of che war's byproduccs, a deadly in· fluenza pandemic, took a grie-.'Ous toll. Some Progressi\J'C Era reforms advanced in 1917- 1918, buc overall the war and its aftermach weakened the reform mo\·emem.

For all its horrendous human toll, \'t;'orld War I brought glowing prosperity to che American economy. Facror}' production climbed about 35 percent from 1914 to 1918, and the civilian V.'Ork force grew b}• J .3 million from 1916 to I 918. Prices rose:, buc so did wages.. E..-cn unskilled v.'Orke:rs enjO)~d wartime wage: increases a\J'Craging ncarl}' 20 percent. Samuel Gompe:rs, head of t he: American Federation of Labor, urged "''Orkcrs not to strike during t he: war. Wich the: cconom}' booming, most "''Orkers obsen~d the no-strike requcsc. The war's social impact took many forms. Job seekers pouring into industrial centers strained housing, schools, and municipal services. The consumption ofciga· rettcs more than tripled. Reflecting warcime: prosperity, automobile production jumped from 460,000 in 1914 to 1.8 million in 1917. Farmers profited, coo. With Eu· ropean farm production d isrupted, U.S. agricultural prices more chan doubled be:· ~n 1913 and 19 18, and farmers' real income rose signi6camtr.

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ECONOMIC AKO SOOAL TIU:N:OS IM "''AI!TIME AW.ERICA

5 23

This agriculrural boom proved a mixed blessing. Farmers who borrO'I'-·ed heavily to expand produccion faced a credit squeeze when farm prices fell after che war. In the 1920s and 1930s, hard-pressed farmers .....-ould look back to the war rears as a golden age of prosperity.

The war sped the exodus of southern blacks. An estimated half-million African·Americans moved north during t he war, and most seeded in cities. Chicago's black population S~A'Clled from 44,000 in 19 10 co 110,000 in 1920 and Cle\~land's from 8,000 co 34,000. Wich European immigration disr upted by t he ~A'llf, booming industries hired more black .....-orkers. Labor agents along with African·American newspapers like the Chkago Dtfonkr spread the .....-ord. O ne sout hern black, newly settled near Chicago, wrote: home, ..Nothing here but money, and it is not hard to get." lm po\~rished southern blacks welcomed the prospect of earning three dollars a day or more: in a region where racism seemed less intense. By 1920, J.S million African-Americans W\'.re working in northern industry. This vase populacion mM'Cm ent had widespread social ramifications.. New city churches and storefronc missions met che spir irual needs of deeply rd igious mi· grants from che South. The Nacional Association fo r the Advance:menc of Colored 1\:ople (NAACP) grew fro m 9,000 members before: the war to nearly 100,000 by t he early 1920s. Heightened race: consciousness and activism of the war )'Cat'S helped ere· ace: the groundwork fo r the civil·rights mm-·emenc char La)' ahead. l 'he concent ration ofblacks in New York City also prepared che 'A'llf for rhe cultural flO\l~ring knO'I'-·n as the Harlem Renaissance: (see Chapter 23). SciU, t hese African-American newcomers in northern cities faced scwre chal· lenges. White ~A'Orkers re:sence:d the labor competition, and ~Ailite home()'ll,·ners lashed

llllds Mlcrate Nlrlllwanl

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GtOilAL IM'OLvtMEr.TS AN O WOAID WAll. 1. '90'l--.,lo

out as jammed black neighborhoods spilled 0\'\'.r inco surrounding areas. 1tnsions sometimes sparked deadly riots. An outbreak on July 2, 1917, in East St. Louis, Illinois, led to che deaths of thirty-nine blacks. A few v.-eeks Iacer, an NAACP proresc in New York City included one banner chat echoed Wilson's phrase justifying U.S. imoh'f.'· ment in the war: "Mr. !'resident. Why Not Make AMERICA Safe for Democracy?"

The war affected women profoundly. Feminist leaders like Carrie Chapman Catt hoped thac the war would lead co full equality and greacer opporrunity for u'Omen. For a time, these goals seemed actainable. In addition to the u'Omen in the AEF and in wartime \'Oiunteer agendes, about I million women worked in industr}'· Thousands more hdd other jobs, from screctcar conductors to brickla)-ers. As the woman-suffrage mO\'mlem gained momencum, a key victory came in Nm-·ember 19 17 when New York \'Oters amended the state conscirution co pcnnit women co vote. In Washington, Alice Paul and members of her National Woman's l'arty (see Chapter 21) picketed the \'t1hite House. Se\'f.'ral protesters v.'f.'re jailed and, when they wcnc on a hunger strike, they were force-fed. Under growing pressure, Wilson declared chac women's war service had earned them che righc to vote. In 1919, the House and Senate m--erwhtlmingl}' passed the N jnette:nth Amendment grancing women the voce. Ratification follo\1/C'd in 1920. Beyond this victory, however, the war did litcle co better women's status penna· nendy. Rdati\'f.'ly few women actually encered the work force for the 6rst time in 1917- 19 JSj mosc simply mo..-ed co btcter-pa)ingjobs. As for che women in the AEF, che War Oeparnnenc refused their requests for military rank and benefits. At che war's end, manyv.'Omcn lost theirjobs to rerurning \"eterans. In 1920, the percentage of U.S. V.'Omcn in the paid labor force was actually slightly lo"''Ct than it had born in 1910.

Woalell il Wartilae

Prima:ry Source: Women in Various Occupations

Nintteetdh AMeHn.at Wilson t<W~rdc-d wamc"n (or tbtir wartime JerViu ;and supporkd tbr ~mrnt gr.u1ting womrn tht \'Ott; ~ inl920

Amid battlefield casualties and home-front social changes, the nation in 1918 coped wich global outbreak of influThe 1118 Influenza enza,. a highly contagious viral infection. l 'he influenza Pandemic pandemic killed as many as SO million people worid"'ide. Moving northward from its origins in souchcm Africa, the epidemic spread from the war zone in f rance co U.S. military camps and quickly advanced co the urban population. The flu hie the dries hard. In Philadelphia on September 19, the day after 200,000 people had curned out for a Libtrcy Loan rally, 635 new influenza cases v.-ere reported. Many dties forbade all public gatherings. The worse came in Occober, when the flu killed 195,000 Americans. 1'he cocal U.S. death toll was about 550,000, more than six times the total of AEFbartle deaths in f rance. In more recenc rimes, research· ers haw found alarming similarities bl't"A'ttn che 1918 flu virus and che avian (bird) virus of che late J990s and early rn'f.'nty-firstccntury. The disc()'IICry prompted public· health agencies worldwide to take measures to prevent another global pandemic.

Plllllk Heallll Crisis:

~(N...- O..tht btds ofdlt ~ o( World Wu t. mort' tlun ~ lw.J( million Amt:riaru ditd or inllumz~.in 1918

1

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Estolbtubtd national prohibi. tion to rncourag" and "'iulatr morality during w~rtime

The war had mixed effects on Progressi..-e Era reform mo\'f.'ments. The "''llr strengthened the coercive, morall'nl&nml• control aspect of progressi\ism, including the dri..-e fo r the prohibition of alcohol. When the Eighte:e:nth Am.mdment establishing na-

TbeWar iM

donal prohibition passed Congress in December 1917, it 'A'llS widely seen as a ~A'llr measure. Ratified in 19 19, it V.\':nt inco effecc on j anuary J, 1920. Similarly, the ~A'llr strengthened the l'rogressive: Era antiprostitution campaign. 11le War Oeparcment d osed red·light discricts ncar militar}' bases, including New Orleans's famed Stor)'· ville. (As Stor)"'ille's ja:a. musicians mow:d north, jazz reached a national audience.) Meanwhile, ..protecth-e: bureaus" urged women co uphold standards of sexual morality. War t.aer ao.nl Warrimt agmcy that rncuuragrd uniao. Along wich woman suffra~, other reforms advanced as well. The War Labor i.mOOo and colk ttiw ba~ Board (WLB) pressured factor}' 0'1'-'ners to introduce the eighc·hour workday and ing u a mans ofavoiding bbor recognize unions' right co bargain ~Aith management. Under these fa\'Orable condi· dillltOrd dons, union membership rose from 2.7 million in 1916 co more than S million by 1920. Another wartime agency, the United States Housing Corporation, built housing projects for workers. 11le Bureau of War Risk Tht war produ ced boom timel for Insurance (BWRJ) provided direct aid co soldiers' families. By che war's F.umer:s and manuf.;Kturt.r:s bu t left end, the BWRJ was sending regular checks to 2.1 million families. F.umer:s in a ~~dit $<JUttu l.n«. Overall, hO'I'-\....,-e:r, the war u-e:akened che progressive: social·justice: im· BUd: migration to northern eihu pulse. While che war broughc increased regulation of the econom}'-a key :uxtlerattd, but raei.U ttn, ion' a b o u:wded north. progressive goal- business interescs often dominated che regulatory agen· \'(lomen Mi\".ln«d in the wofi.: w~e d es, and chey were quickly disma ntled after che war. In addicion, the gov· in large number:s but wne $C"C'n only ernment's repression of radicals and anti~A'llr dissencers fractured the :u ttmpor:uy repl.lttment:l l'or men. progressive coalition and ushered in a decade of re-action. T he 1918 mid· Tht war bolsttrtd wme progrtu:i~ tmn election signaled che shift: the Democrats lost both houses of Con· goak grt.ner p't-mmtnt rc-gub· gress co a deeply conservative: Republican party. t ion of the economy, woman , uf· fuge, and l.WOr laws. Reform energi~ after diminishing in che 1920s, would reemerge in In 'Pite oft he prog~u:i\" ad\'an~u., the depression decade of the 1930s. And as Franklin D. Roosevelt's Ne~A' the war u ndermined the soci.ll· Deal took shape (sec Chapter 24), the memory of such \'t;'orld War I agen· ju,ticc- mO\'t.mc-m, ;u ~on,trvativu d es as che War labor Board, the United States Housing Corporation, and gaintd _ground amid t he w.:mim e rt.prt.l$10n. the Bureau of War Risk Insurance provided ideas and inspiration.

jOYOUS ARMISTICE, BITTER AFTERMATH, 1918-1920 1-/owdid the League o(N11tions begin, and why did the Senaht reject U.S. membership in the League? In Nm·e:mber 1918, che ~A'llr finally ended. 11le peace conference thac foiiO'I'--e:d stands as a high point of America's growing internationalist im'Olvc-mem, but it also triggered a sharp domestic reaction against thac im'Olvemcnt. Woodrow Wilson dom· inaced the peace conference but failed in his most cherished objccti'V'C-Amc:rican membership in the League of Nations. At home, che elector:ue repudiated Wilsoni· anism and in 1920 sent a conscrvaci ~ Republican to the White House.

President Wilson planned to put his personal stamp on the peace. American involvement, he bdie\·ed, could crans· form a sordid J>O'I'"·e:r conflict into something higher and finer-a crusade for a new, more democratic world order.

Wilson's Fourleetl Points; The Amistice

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fwrleen Points Wibon's

l

blueprint mr il Mttr worl~ tmph.u;iud sdf.ckttrminou:ion

In a speech to Congress in january 1918, Wilson summed up U.S. "''llr aims in fourteen points. Nine: of these spelled ouc Wilson's bdie:f chat the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires should ha\>e: the freedom to choose: their 0\\-'n political futures. The remaining 6:...-e: poincs offered Wilson's larger post· war vision: a world of free navigation, free trade, reduced armamencs, o penly negoti· ared creacie:s, and "a general association of nations" to resoh-e: conflicts peacefully. The Fourtttn Points helped solidify American support for the war, especially among liberals. 1'hey seemed proof that the United States had entered the war not for selfish reasons but out of noble motives. In early October 1918, reeling from the Allies' advances, Germany proposed an armistice based o n Wilson's fo ur teen Points. The British and French hesitated, but when Wilson threatened to negotiate a separate peace, they agreed. Meanwhile, in Berlin, Kaiser Wilhdm U had abdicated and a German republic had been proclaimed. In the early morning of NO\'e:tllber JJ, 1918, the Allied commander Marshal Foch and his German counterparts signed an armistice ending hostilities at II :00 A. M. Rockets burst m-er the front that night, noc in anger buc in relief and celebration. Back home, cheering throngs filled the streers.. "E..-er}'thing for "'flich America has fought has been accomplished," Wilson proclaimed

The challenge of forging a peace treaty remained. Wilson opted personal!)' to lead the U.S. delegation to the peace conference. This decision was probably a mistake, for Wil· son's oratorical skills outstripped his talent for negotiation and compromise. The president compounded his mistake b)• selecting only one Republican peace commis· sioner, an elder!)• d iplomat. In the N()I.'Cmber 1918 congressional eleccions, Republicans gained control of bcnh houses of Congress, an ominous sign for Wilson. Wilson recei..-ed a hero's welcome in Europe. Shouts of"Voodrow Veelson'" rang out in Paris, in Britain children spread flo"''l'rs in his path, and in Italy an exuberant official compared him to Jesus Christ. The euphoria faded when the peace co nference began on january 18, 1919, at the palace of Versailles (wth-SK.H) ncar Paris. A Council of Four, comprising the heads of smce of the Allied powers: Italy, France, Great Britain, and che United States. Oapan participated as well.) The European statesmen at the Versailles Peace Con· ference were determined to avenge their nations' horrendous wartime loss~ which they blamed d irectly on Ge:nnan aggression. Thcir goals bore little relation to Wilson's liberal vision. As the French leader Georges Clcmenceau rl:'marked, "God ga\>e: us the 1Cn Commandments and "''C broke them. Mr. Wilson has given us the fo urteen Points. We shall see:" Differences surfaced quickly. Ital}' demanded a pore on rhe eastern Adriatic Sea. j apan insisted on keeping the trading rights it had seized from Germany in China. Clemenccau "''aS obsessed with m\':nge. Ac one point, an appalled Wilson threatened to leave the conference. Refleccing chis toxic climate, the peace creacy signed by a sullen German ddega· tion in j une 1919 was harshly punitiw. Germany "''lls d isarmed, stripped of its colo· nies, forced to admit sole blame for the wa.r, and saddled "'ith reparacion payments of $ 56 billion. f rance regained che provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and cook con-

The Versailles Peace c.terence, 1919

Venailes-. c..~e..... NtgotiaOOns fi.1r il pt...u Jmk. mtnt in FnllCle; tbt no:rulting ~ttltmmt lw.ubly pun.ishtd Gtl'miUl.y, 111)-ing tbt Sl'l:d5 of future Cl.'llll.l1.iet

I JOYOOSi\lUllSllcE, BmtRAFrtRMAnt, .,.e- •910

trol for fifteen years of Germany's coal·rich Saar Basin. 11le: treaty demilitarized Ger· many's western border and transferred a slice of eastern Germany to Poland. Ital)' received land.: j apan goc che economic concessions it wanted. All told, the m~ary cost Germany one:· tenth of its population and o ne·cighth of its ce:rritory. These: harsh tcnns, bitterl}' resented in Germany, planted the seeds of an cwn more devastating furure war. Some: treaty proYisions did reflect Wilson's themes of democracy and seJf. determinacion. 11le cre:ary recognized the: independence of Poland and che Baltic scace:s of Estonia, latvia, and lithuania Separate treaties provided for the inde:pen· dence of CzechosiO\'llkia and YugoslaYi:t, new nations ca.t"VCd from the Austro· Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Palestine, a part of Turkey's collapsed Ottoman Empire, went to Great Britain under a mandate: arrange-ment. In 1917, the British had issued the: Balfour Declaration supporting a je~Aish "national home" in che re· gion while also acknowledging the righrs of the non·Je~Ais h Palestinians. Nor did the peacemakers come co terms with revolutionar}' Russia. In August 19 18 a fourteen·nation Allied arm}', including some sewn thousand U.S. troop~ had landed at various Russian ports, osce:n.s.ibly to secure them fro m ~rman actack and to proce:cc Allied ~A>ar equipment. In fact, che aim was co m-enhrow the new Bolshevik regime, ~Athose communist ideology stirred deep fear in che capitals of Europe and America. Wilson and the other Allied leaders agreed to support a Russian military leader waging a lasc~ i tch struggle against the Bolshe:Yiks. Not unci! 1933 would the United Scace:s recognize: the SOYie:t Union.

Wilson focused on his one shining achievement at Versailles- the creation of a new international organiza· tion, the League: of Nations. 1'he agreement to establish the League, written inco the cre:acy, embodied Wilson's vision of a new "'-orld order of peace and justice. But Wilson's Uague faced major hurdles. A warning sign had come in Februar}' 1919 when chircy·nine Republican senators signed a lecter reject· ing che Uague in its present form. When Wilson sent the cre:ary to the Senate for ratification in jul}' 1919, Henry Cabot Lodge bottled it up in the Foreign Relations Committee. Convinced that he could rally popular opinion co his cause:, Wilson left Washington o n September 3 for a speaking cour. Covering more chan nine thousand miles by crain, Wilson defended the League in chirty·st\'en speeches in twenty·two da)'S. People wept as Wilson de· scribed his visits to American war cemeteries in France: and cheered his vision of a new "'-orld order. Buc the trip exhausted Wilson, and on Ocrobcr 2. He su ffered a stroke that for a rime left him ncar death. He spenc rhe res-t of his ce:nn mostl}' in bed or in a wheel· chair, a reclusi\'e invalid, his mind clouded, his fragile emotions betraying him into Yindicci't-e actions and tearful outbursts. He broke with dose advisers and dismissed Secretary ofState lansing, accusing him of disloyalty. In j anuary 19 20, his physician advised him to resign, but \'t'ilson refused. Wilson's first wife, Ellen, had died in 1914. His scro ng·~Ailled second wife, Edith Gale, plared a crucial role: behind the scenes during lhis crisis. She hid Wilson's con· dition from the public and decided who could see him. Cabinet me:mbe:rs,diplomars,

527

lnteracti\•e Map: Postwar Boundary Changes in Europe and the Middle East

l.ape .t Natioes Wilson's plan fM ;an intenutional delib-

tratill't body, '\Y.-M u nttt:s· $iU'f to keep the pc-;a; rtjtrtrd by the U.S. Smo~.tl'; tbt U.S. oi!'*Trjoinrd

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OfAPlER l l

GtOilAL IM'OLVEMEr.TSANO WOAID WAll. I, '90'l--.,lo

and congressional leaders were barred from the White House. Because the 1"'mty· fifth Amendment, dealing ~A'ith issues of presidential disability, was nor adopted until 1967, the impasse contin ued. The league drama unfolded against chis grim backdrop. On September 10, 1919, che Foreign Relations Committct: at last sem che treaty co the Senate, but with a series of amendm ents. lhe Senate split imo three groups. First were Demo· crats ~Ailo su pported che League C()'IJ'Cnanc without changes. Second were Republican .. lrreconcilables," who opposed che League absolutd )'· They feared chat League membership \N'Ould dangerous!}' restTicr U.S. frct:dom of action and entangle America ~Aith foreign powers they viewed as corrupt. Finally, a group of Republican "Resen•ationists;" led by Lodge, demanded amendm ents as a condition of chcir support. Had Wilson accepted compromise, rhe Senate u'Ould probably haw~: rarified the Versailles creaty. But Wilson's illness aggravated his tendency tO~A'llrd rigidity. lso· lated in rhe White House, he instructed Senate Democrats to ..'Oce against che creacy, which now included lodge's rescr\'lltions. Although incernationai-Law specialists ar· gued that ches.e: reservations would not significantly weaken U.S. participation in the l..cague, Wilson rejected them as "a knife thrust at the heart of the treaty." Despite \1./ilson's speaking tour. the public did not rally behind rhe League. On Nm-ember 19, 1919, pro-League Democrats obC)ing Wilson's instructions and anti· League l rreconcilables joined forces to defeat the \'et'Sion of the Versailles treaty that included Lodge's reservations. A second \'Ote in March 1920 produced the same result. T he United Stares would not join rhe League. A president who had bct:n elected amid high hopes in 19 12, cheered when he called for war in 1917, and adulated in Europe in 19 18 now lay embictered and impotent. Whac might haw: been Wilson's crowning achievement had rumed to ashes.

The 'A'llrtime spirit of "100 percent Americanism" left an acrid aftertaste as 19 19- I 920 saw racial violence and fresh Scire, 1919-1910 antimdical hysteria. L)'tlCh mobs murdered se-.'Cflty-six African-Americans in 1919, including ten military \'eterans, se-.ual still in uniform. The bloodiest disorder occurred in 1919 in Chicago, ~Ailere an influx of southern African-Americans had intensified tensions. On a hot july afternoon, whites at a Lake Michigan beach threw stones at a black )'OUth s-Aimming offshore. He sank and drowned A rhirtct:n·day rcign of cerror fOllowed, as white and black marauders roamed the strct:ts, randomly attacked innocent victims, and torched buildings. The \iolence left fifteen ~Ailites and tv.r'Cnty-three blacks dead, and more chan five hundred injured. Wartime antiradical panic, reinforced by che fear and hatred of bolshevism, crested in che Red Scare of 1919- 1920. Such emotions dct:pened as a rash of strikes broke ouc, represencing an accumulation ofgrievances. When Seattle's labor unions organized an orderly general ~A'Ork stoppage early in 19 19, the ma)'Or accused the strikers of tr)ing to "duplicate rhe anarchy of Russia" and called for federal troops. In April, mail bombs ~A'Cre sent to various public officials. One blew off the hands of a senator's maid, and another damaged che home of AttOtnC)' General A. Mitchell l':llmc.r.

lllclsmand Recl

The mounting frenzy M'Cr supposed radicals took policical form. In N()I.!'Cm ber 19 19 the: House: of Representatives re-fused to seat Milwaukee socialist Victor Berger. The New York legislawre expelled se\-eral socialist mem bers. lhe justice Depart· ment established a countersubvcrsive division under young). Edgar HOO\'Ct, the future head of t he: Federal Bureau oflm-estigation, who arrested hundreds ofsuspected communists and radicals. In December 19 19, che: gM'mlment deporced 249 Russian· born aliens, including Emma Goldma n, a prominent radical and leader of the birchcontrol movement. On january2, 1920, in a justice Department d ragnet, federal marshals and local police raided the homes of suspected radicals and the headquarters of radical organ· izarions in thiny-rwo dries. \'t'ichout search or arrest ~A'arrants, authorities arrested more: chan four thousand people: and ransacked homes and offices. l 'he:se lighm ing raids grossly violated civil rights and sim ple decency. Marshals barged into o ne woman's bedroom to arrest her. In Lynn, Massachusetts, police arrested thirty-nine men and women who W\'.re meeting to discuss forming a cooperacii,!'C bakery. The ra· bidl)' antiradical and politically am bitious actomcy general, A. Mitchdl J:t almer, coordinated these "'Red raids.'" Palmer had succumbed co che anticommunis t hysteria ofthe early postwar period He ominous!)' predicted a "blaze of rt:\'Oiurion . .. burning up the: foundations of society." The Red Scare subsided as Palmer's irrational predictions failed co materialize. When a bomb exploded in Ne~A• York Ciry's 6nandal district in September 1920, killing thirty·cighc people, most Americans saw the deed as the work of an isolated fanatic, noc evidence of approaching revolution. Wamlll C. Kanli-s EkctC'd in 1920; the- wdl-mi'..1Uing but con•~ aod undi_$rin. guishtd 5UCO::r~SM to Woodmw

In chis unsettled dimate, the election of 1920 approached. Wilson Wilson, our of touch wich political reality, considered seeking a third term, bur was persuaded other· wise. Few heeded his call to make the election a «solemn referendum'" on the L.e:ague. When che: Democrats convened in San Frandsco, thedtlcgares nominated james M. Cox, the mildly progressh>c gM'Ctnor of Ohio. As Cox's running mare they chose: the young assistant secretary of t he: navy, 11w- Faurtttn Point$ spuch Franklin D. Roosewlt, who possessed a potent political name. ' ummcd up \ViiJonUn ickal'; The con6denc Republican~ moecing in Chicago, nominated Senator Eu rOpc'.ln lt-a-dtu wue $ktpc:in J. Wan'ttl G. Harding of Ohio, an amiable politician of lirde di.srina'ion. For Wilwn w.u haittd by t he Europtan vice president, t hey chose Massachusetts gM'mlor Calvin Coolidge, ~Atbo had publi ~ but could not conuol tht Versa.ille:~ Mgoti.uiom:. won attention in 1919 with his denundation of a Bosron policemen's strike. Although it t-Jt.lb)iJhcd the l t-a_gue Harding's vacuous cam paign speeches reminded one: critic of "an anny of of Nation,, t he VtnaiUes ue.uy pompous phra..ses IDO\ing 01o-er che landscape in search of an idea.'" But his wh'C'd none of the pc:oblem' that reassuring promise of a rerum to "normalcy" resonated with mal'l}' vocers, h.ld led to \l'orld \l'ar I; imttad, it bid tbt groundwofi.: Cor \Vorld and he \l'On by a landslide:- 16 million \Utes against 9 million for Cox. \'(larlt. The election dashed all hope for American entry into the League of 11w- Senate ultimatdy rtfuJcd to Nations. During the cam paign, Harding vaguely endorsed some form of ratil)· dw- trt-aty, and tht Unittd "international organization;" but once e:locred he bluncly declared t he: St.:u:eJ did not join the U.a_gue. League question "dead.'" The sense of high purpose: thar Wilson had 11w- dution of 1920 w:u inttrpc:ctcd evoked so eloquently in April 1917 seemed remote indeed as Americans ;u a rejection o(thc ~tu.Ad.ing Jpirit, b()(h at home and 0\'C'I':IC.l.J. turned to a new president and a new era

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OfAPlER ll

GtOilAL IM'OLVEM Er.TS AN OWOAID WAII.I. '90'l--.,l o

C hapte r Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

~

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MPJ AVOtO R tE O F THE Cl-lAPTER SUMMARY,

AND

Whot goals underlay America's earb'-twentieth.antury involvements in Asia and Latin America? (pat; S06)

I

The early t\lo'cm:ieth century saw intensif)•ing U.S. invol\-ement abroad. This new globalism arose from a desire to promote U.S. business intetcsrs imetna· tionally while exporting American v.tlues to other societies. Americans demanded an «open Door" to the China ttade. 1'hcodore Roosevrlt seized Panama and built the canal, then dedatcd the Caribbean to be under American domina· tiorL Wilson intef'V\_"flcd in the Mexican Revolution in an attempc to shoehorn Mexican politics into an American mold.

Considering both immediate and long-term (actors, why did the United States go wwar in 1917? (fJOf!' S12)

I

Wilson attempted to maintain neutrality, but issues of neutral rights on the high seas and loans to the Allies made neutrality almost impossible to attain. l 'he deaths ofAmericans on British ships, such -as Lusilania; poisoned U.S. tela· tions with Germany, and the Zimmermann telegram, suggesting a Getman· Mexican alliance, ultimately pushed the United States into the war.

KEY TERMS

Boxer Reb~lioo (p. SOl} Open Door notes (p. SOB) Panama canal (p. SOB) S.IO
war lndtfitries Board (WIB) (p. Sl6)

John J. P""hing (p. Sll)

Committee on Public Information (p. S20)

E
6ghteen!hAmendmoot (p. S14) war Llbor Board (p. S1S) fourteen Poi n~ (p. S16} \~rsailk!s Peace Conference

(p. S16)

How did Washington mobilize the notion for ntu; and what role did U.S. tfO()ps play in the war? (page S1S)

I

During the war, the federal gM-ernment inOuenced che lives of Americans as the draft and called 3 million men into se!\•ice. G<M':rnmem regulation of che economy and che nation's resoutccs, f!X· emplitied by the War Industries Board and che Food Administration, greatly in· ctcased, as did govemment-busin('jS collaboration. 1\1.'0 million Americans fought in France, arriving just in time to stop Germany's 1918 summer ofTen· sive and lead che Allies' counte:roffensi\-e. ne~w bcfore. 1'he United States initiated

How did Americans respond to propaganda and suppression ofdissent? (pat; S19)

I

The Wilson administration dtc~· successfully on the techniques of modern ad~wtising co "sell" the war and conducted massi\'e campaigns ro sell war bonds. l'he all ·too·dTecti~'t anti-Getman propaganda led to intolerance and distrust of

almost everything German, including frankfurters (hot dogs}, sauerkraut, and German· Americans. Some Americans criticized the V.'.lt, but to do so was risk}'· l'he Espionage Act and che Sedition Amendment intensifi ed che eli mare of in· tolerance and \\'ere used to jail hundreds ofdissenters.

League of Nations (p. S17}

warren G. Harding (p. S19}

What IWIS the war's eronomlc1 politico/, and soda/Impact on the American home front? (page 522)

I

World Warllwla profound im~t on chr United St:ac·c:s. F.11m producrion and pros·

pt::rity soaml. as d1d i.ndustty, but filrmr.rs tt.lrd a (f~du squrttr :afur rhr WM. largt: numbers ofblacks kft the South to hw 1ft notthcm clnrs; r.uum fOIIo'llYd them. Womm ad.vancfli m the ~Avck f01tc m l.1.tp: numbm. but mo:R lost rhtir posinons ro tmtming troops. Some progcusivr gwl.s be:rw:tl.trd ftom the wu- gowmmrnr nguluicn, \l'Om.an suff~ and Labor 101•'$- but tht w-u ultunardy t'n"iWd consnv.tttw urirudn and nrin· gui.shro thf!' progttss~ sp1nt fot a pnn'lltJOn.

Hc1w did tM l.e4f}l< o(NtttJottsfl
I

Wilson's ph.~ m the fouttftn

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sp«adin' ckmocrxy :and

ctfunnmg dw: inttm.auonal pobtaal Jfllmt. EacnnaDy, lw Vl"';lntrd m Amrrianitt dw wockl. Hownu, hc nnu ¥hk'W'd mOll of tbaot gwll. Nrputton.S u \'ffW!ks •w-t domirutM by Europun k.adm" thlacy fat ~.a.ntc. and thr \'« Udks 1'te1ty guuantttd fututt conJbtt Ewn patbOpaliOO 10 the~ ofN~nom, wtudt Wilson SIW as tht em~ orhu nn.•.-odd onkf, dudtd hiS grup bca~ of R.rpublian opposi~ tion ;and tht prrs.dmt's o-'11 stubbomnrs.L

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CHAPTER 23

1920-1929

CHAPT5R PRl:VIEW

Afl<w Ecooomk Ore!« ~ ClltiMlfC llf.IICM;Itiotu CIJnte ilf che 19205, ...."""- ti!WI/f
The Hard01g WI Cooldgt Aduiii1Jifu6 ..,.,,.._ •"" S«UUIdt.os Wp
I-• M<6s Sodoty,MMS Cultu"' \111rot del'fl/opnKIIIS MndtrloJ 1920s' moss cult11r1, ond hv.v did &M)' 4ff«t ArMriam life ond ltisurs?

1-•

Gullullill r.mtenl and Creatil'ity W1tat social d.wtopmenrs conr.ribuud to th1 CMftvrul CA'#tiVIC)' o(tM J920!?

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th""l/ol d,ff,rfrom th.lo(H4rdi"! and CooiWfF?

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mong 1hc thousands of immigrants

who 2.rri~ at Ellis Island in 1.913

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rfil

V.aknrino'"-heappumf in fiftttn $J)Ort 6tmsin 1919- 1910. For thC' next ~ix )'~'.a.rs.. Valentino reigned as J.toUywood's most popular maJc

n. Icon >Mil direc1 you 10 lhe lll'ebsile

~ whore you can Prepare tor Cla&s, lmprOYI Your Grade, and Me lhe Test

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Jr:lr. \'t' ith his smoldt:ring good looks and pirrdng dark eyes, he: ex· udcd sex nppcal. In August 1926, ar only 1hin y-one., Valentino died alh ••s urgery for a perforated ulcer. Liru:sofftmalc funs stretched for blocks around the funeral home..

I ANtW ECOKOMICOIWER

533

The popularity of che movies and their larger·chan·life stars was onl)' one no\'· dty in a turbulent decade. 11lese rears also saw a rising tide of consumerism, chang· ing cultural values, creativity in the arts, and bitter social co nflicts. 11le decade soon acquired a nickname, "the Roaring1"'Cflties."' Man)•feacures of contemporary Amer· ican life first became dearl)' evident in che 1920s. 1'his chapter explores ho"'' different groups of Americans responded to technological, social, and cult ural changes that co uld be boch exciting and deeply t hreatening.

A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER What ec-onomic innoWJtions cam• in tiNt 1920s, and wMt was tlt.ir •!feet ott different social groups? With consumer products aplenty, sophisticated advertising, and innovative forms of corporate organization, t he economy raced forward in t he I 920s. Some key industries declined, and farmers relapsed into chro nic economic problems. Still, t he overall picrure seemed rosy, and mosc Americans celebrated the nation's t hriving business culture.

*'*

A recession scruck in 1920 after the government canceled wartime defense: contracts and returning veterans recn· cered che job market. Recovery came in 1922, howc·'ler, and for che next few rears che nonfarm econom}' hummed. Unemployment feU to as low as 3 percent, prices held steady, and che gross national product (GNI') grew by 43 percent from 1922 to 1929. Wich che growth ofcities, new consumer goods, including home electrical prod· ucts, fed the prosperity. Many factories alread)' ran o n d ectrid ry, but no"'' manr ur· ban households joined the grid as well. By che mid·l920s, with more than 60 percent of the nation•s homes electrified, new applianc~ from refrigerators and vacuum cleaners to fans and razors, filled the stores. Their manufacture provided a potent economic stimulus. The automobile helped fuel che boom. Introduced before the war (s«: Chap· cer 21), the automobile came into its own in the J920s. By 1930, some 60 pm:entof U.S. families 0\\"ned cars. 1'he Ford Motor Company led t he market until mid-decade, when General Motors (GM) spurted ahead by touring greater comfort and a range ofcolors. G M's lowest-priced car, named for f rench automotive designer Louis Cht\'· rolec, pr~ especially popular. Meeting the challenge, in 1927 Henry Ford intro· duced t he stylish Model A. Br the end of t he decade, che automobile industr}' accounted for about 9 percent of all wages in manufacruring and had stimulated such industries as rubber, gasoline and motor oil, adw~rcising, and highwa}' construcriorL The business boom had a global impact. To supplr overseas markets, Ford, GM, and other corporations built production facilities abroad. U.S. meatpackers built planes in Argentina; Anaconda Copper acquired Chile's biggest copper minej t he mammoth United Fruit Company established plants across latin America. U.S. pri· \'ate im~stmenc abroad also increased as American in'lescment 6rms loaned Euro· pean nations moner co repay war debts and modernize t heir economics.

1111 Business, 11n1 Ap!CIIIIure

Hetlry r.nl Pa-~cud

I

aU~eml!ly.line manufxwring technique:c ~nd dem~ the ~utomobile

{ff) Primary Source: ~ Model T ford

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But the era of economic globalizacion sciU lay far in the future. Economic nationalism pre\•ailed in the 1920s, as the industrialized nations, including the United States, eJttted high tariffbarriers. lhe Fordncy· McCumber Tariff ( 1922) and the Smoot·Hawley Tar· iff(1930) pushed U.S. imporc ducies to all·cime highs, benefiting domestic manufaccurers but stifling fOreign trade. The percentage of the GNP represented by exports actually fell becwcen 1913 and 1929. Manu· facrurcd goods increasing!)' replaced agricultural com· modicies in U.S. exports, hoW'Cver, rising co 6 1 percent of the total by 1930. While prosperity lifted overall wage races, \N'Ork· ers benefited unequally. The \'ariation between North and South loomed largest. In 1928, unskilled laborers in New England earned an average of forty·s.......,-en cents an hour, in contrast to twenty·dght cents in the Souch. African·Americans faced special difficulties. "last hired and 6rst 6red;'' they generally held the "'lollfY. Whert Did You P•rk tilt most menial jobs. Hut\d~:r; ol identiG~I Fords j:un N;,1nt.uket Be
carr

The J920s sa~A' striking increases in productivity. New assembly-line techniques boosted the per capita oucpuc of industrial ~At: and forbade calking or laughter. Fordism became a synon}'lll for American induscrial might and eflidenc assembly·line: me:th· ods. Business consolidation, spurred by the: war, continued. By the lace 1920s, m-er a thousand companies a )'eat \'anished through merger. Corporate giants dominated the major industries: Ford, GM, and Chrysler in automobiles; ~neral Eleccric and \ 1/escinghouse in e:leccridty; and so forth. Samuel Insult presided over a multi· billion+dollar empire of local and regional poo-er companies and eleccric railroads. By 1930, one: hundred corporacions controlled nearly half the nation's business. As U.S. capitalism matured, management structures evolved. Giant corpora· tions sec up separate divisions for produce devcJopmenc, market research, economic forecasting. and emptor« relations. The mode:rnizacion of busjness also affected wage: policies. Rejecting the: old view that employers should pa)' the lo~A'CSt wages pos· sjble, business leaders now concluded that higher wages ~A'Oul d improve productivity and increase consumer buying po~A'Cr. Henr}' Ford had led the way in 1914 b)•paying

I ANtW ECOKOMICOIWER

535

Postwar recession; warren G. !larding eleird-Towner Ad; Shuffle Aloog, al~dr llllsical rMw

W.!llilgton NMI Alms Conlerence S<Jpreme Coun de'ation restriction) calvin Coolidge eleory /Jiues Til
his workcrs 6\'f: dollars a day, well abm--e the a\'ctage for factor}' workcrs. Other com· panies soon followed suit. New systems for distributing goods emerged as wdl Automobiles reached con· su mers through dealer networks. By 1926, nearl}' t en thousand Ford dealerships dotted the nation. The A&P grocer}' chain boasted 17,.500 stores by 1928. Chain scores accounted for about a quarter of all retail sales by 1930. Departmenc stores gi\."'A' more: inviting, with remodeled interiors and atcraccive d is pla}' ~A'indO\l'S. Air co nditioning, an early-rwenticth-
l:tarticipation in this fantasy "-'Orld came ac a price. Americans of the J920s in· crtasingl)' bought major purchases on credit. B)' 1929, credit purchases accounted for 75 percent of automobile sales. What some ha..-e called "t he cult of business" saturated 1920s' U.S. culru.re. "America stands for one idea: Business... ,'" proclaimed che !m:kpmdrtu-magazine in 1921.: ••-rhru business, .. . the human race is finally to be rtdttmed.'" Prtsidencs Har· ding and Coolidge: praised business values and hobnobbed with corporate leaders. A 1923 opinion poll ranked Hc:nr}' Ford as a leading presidential prospect. In Tbl! Mdn 1\rcbody Knct.~:s ( 1925), ad man Bruce Barton described jesus Christ as a managerial genius who ..picked up N'Clvc men from che bottom ranks of business and forged them into an organization chat conquered the world."

Although the ranks of "''Omen e:mplo)'ed outside the home increased in che 1 920~ chcir share as a proportion of t he EalaallllcEra total female population hardlychange:d,hm·e:ringatabout 24 pm:ent. Male workers dominated the auto plants and other assembly-line facto· ries. Women who did enter che workplace faced wage discrimination. In 1929, fo r example, a male trimmer in the meacpacking induscry recei..-ed fi fty·N'O cents an hour; a female trimmer, t hirty-sewn cems. Mosc women workers held low-paying, unskilled posicions. By 1930, hO\\-'f:'\"e:r, some 2 million women "''Cre "-'Orking in corporace: offices as secretaries, typists, or filing clerl.s, although rarely at higher ranks. As for higher education, nearly fifty thousand women re:ccived college degrees in 1930, almost triple che 1920 figure. Of t hose: who entered the workplace, most took clerical jobs or entered such tradicional ''Omen's professions'" as nursing, librarian· ship, and school teaching. With medical schools imposing a 5 percc.nc quota on female admissions, the number of "''Omen ph)>sidans actually declined from 1910 co 1930. A handful of women, hO\l'e:\'et, following the lead of l'rogressh·e Era feminist trailblazers, pu.rs.ued postgraduate education to become faculty members in colleges and unto.·ersities. While marginalized in che workplace, women were courced as consumers. In t he decade's ad..-ercising. glamorous "''Omen smiled behind the steering wheel, swooned m-er new appliances, and smoked cigarettes in romantic sctcings. One ad man pro· mote:d cigarettes for women as "torches of freedom.,. In the advertisers' dream "-'Orld, house"'
w-lllbeNew

O rganized labor faced tough sledding in the 1920s. Union membership fell from 5 million in 1920 to 3.4 million in 1929. Several factors underla)' chis decline. For one thing, despite: inequities and regional variations, overall wage: rates rose in che decade, reducing the incentio.-e to join a union. Further, che union mm-ement's strength lay in older industries like printing, railroading, mining, and constTuccion. 11lese unions "''Cre: ill suited to che new mass-produccion factories.

Sb"'JJIIellllor IIIIDas Ina llllillm AJe

Management hostility further weakened organized labor. Henry Ford hired chugs to intimidate union organizers. In 1929, anri ~uni on violence flared in Nonh Carolina, where textile ~Aagcs, long hours, and appalling work conditions. In Marion, deputy sheriffs shot and killed six striking .....-orkers. In Gas· tonia, a sniper shot and killed strike leader and balladeer Ella May Wiggins en route

to a union rally. In che end, these: strikes failed, and che: tcxcile: industry re· maincd nonunion.

As the wartime antiradical mood continued, opponents of labor unions often smeared them with the«communisc" label, whether accurate: or not. 1'he: anci-union campaign took subtler forms as well. Manufacrurers' associations renamed che: nonunion shop t he: "open s hop" and dubbed ic che «American Plan" of labor relations. Some corporations provided cafeterias and recreacional facilities for emplorres. Corporate publicists praised "1A'Clfare capitalism" (the term for this antiunion strategy) as evidence of employers' bme\'Olem concern for their workers. Black membership in labor unions stood at only about d ghry-two thousand by 1929, mosd)' miners, dockworkers, and railroad porters. T he American Federation of Labor officially prohibited racial discrimination, bue most AFL unions in face barred African-Americans. Corporations ofem hired jobless blacks as strikebreakers, increasing organized labor's hoseility toward them.

tconomit boom in th~ twi'mi ~; f.umer:s \\"'"' 161:- out. M.l"" pcoduction ;md th~ .l$$tmbly line ume or .lgt. Ad\"'n:i,ing pi;~.)~;~. m;~.jor rol ~ in "timubti.ng conmmpcion. Mou vromen g;r:td.u;~.ttd from tol· l~goe and ~nt~rtd the' offite work force', b ut reYI Wt'U in h igh-wa.gt i.ndu$1ri.ll jobs.. Labor union" "uugglt'd, in p;~.rt btC;tU$C' or gtnC'-r;L) pro~pc"-rit)', in p.lrt ~UJC' of m.an;~.gemi'm mt-ouurt" to undam in~ the-m.

THE HARDING AND COOLIDGE ADMINISTRATIONS What political 4nd social ideas shaped the 4dmini.strations ofPresidents /-larding and Coolidge? l:tolieics in the 1920s retlecced t he: decade's business orientation. Republicans controlled Congress and supplied presidents who mirrored the prevailing corporate oudook. In this dimatc, fonne:r progressi\-es, "''cmld·be: reformers, and exploited groups had few political options.

While t he: white: Souch and the immigrant dties remained heavily Oemocracic, t he: Republican parry continued to at· t ract norche:rn farm~ businesspeople, naci ~J'C--bom white· collar ~A'Orkers and professionals, and some skilled blue-collar u.'Orke:rs. l 'he GOP also bcne6ted from che antiradical mood that had produced the early posrwar Red Scare (see Chapter 22) and fed ehe decade's anti~uni on scneime:nt. Wieh Republican progressiV\'S having weakened their influence in the parry by bolting to T heodore Roosevelt in 1912, GOP conservatives conerolled the 1920 con· \'ention and nominaee:d Senaeor Warren G. Harding of Marion, O hio, for presidcnc. A genial backslapper, Harding enjo)•cd good liquor, a good poker game, and at lease one long~term extramarital relationship. In the ele
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Charles Evans Hughes, former N ew York go\~rnor and 1916 presidential candidate, secretary of scace; Andrew Mellon, a Pittsburgh financier, tre:asur}' secretary; and Herbert Hoover, che "''llrtimc food czar, secretary of commerce. Harding also made some disastrous appointments, including a "''llrtimc draft dodger, Charles Forbes, as Veterans' Bureau head. Such men set the low ethical cone of Harding's presidency. By 1922, Washingron rumor hinted ac corruption in high places . .,1ha\~ no trouble with my enemies... ," Harding told an associate; .,(b]uc . my goddamn friends . .. k~ p me "''lllking the floor nights." In jul}' 1923, vacation· ing in che West, Harding suffered a heart attack; on August 2 he died in a San Fran· cisco hoteL In 1924 a Senate invescigacion exposed che full scope of the scandals. Charles Forbes,comi cted ofstealing Veterans' Bureau fund~e\•aded prison by fl eeing abroad. The bureau's general counsel committed suicide, as did an associate of Attorney General Daugherty who had b~n accused of influence peddling. Daugherty himself, fo rced from office in 1924, escaped conviction in two criminal trials. 1'he seamiest scandal, known as Teapot Dome, involved interior secretary Albert Fall, who went to jail for secredy leasing gowrnment oil rese1V\'.s in Elk Hills, California,. and 1tapoc Dome, Wyoming, ro cwo oilmen while accepting .,loans" fro m them rocaling $400,000. Like "Watergatr' in the 1970s, "1tapot Dome" became a shorthand label for a tangle of scandals. With Harding's death, Vice President Calvin CooUdge, o n a family visit in Vcr· mom, took che presidential oath by lantern light from his father, a local magistrate. Elected Massachusetts g()IJ'Crnor in 19 18, he secured the Republican vice-presidential nomination in 1920. Coolidge's image as "Silent CaJ," a prim Yankee embodiment of old-fashioned virrues, was carefully crafted. The advertising executive Bruce Bar· ton guided Coolidge's bid for national office in 1919- 1920. Barron marketed his candidate as o ne "''Ould a soap or an automobile. Wrote an admirer of Barton: "No man is his equal in (anal)tzing) che middle-dass mind and directing an appeal to it." O ther than in style, Coolidge's ad ..-cnt meant litde change. Tariff rates reached all-time highs, inco me caxes for the rich fell, and the Supreme Courc owrrurned several pro· l'rtllulness En gressi\J'C measures. Coolidge rejected a request for aid from Mississippi flood victims with che reminder chat government had no duty to protect citizens «against the hazards of the elements:'' Anocher test of Coolidge's views came when hard-pressed farmers rallied behind the McNat'}•· Haugen BiU, a price-support plan under which che gMwnment ·would annually purchase the su rplus of basic farm commodities. Coolidge twice vetoed the McNary·Haugcn Bill, in 1927 and 1928, warning of "the tyranny of bure-aucratic regulation and co ntroL"' These ve-toes led man}' angr}' farmers co voce Democratic in 1928. In the 1930s, New Deal planners would d raw upon the McNary· Haugen ap· proach in shaping farm policy (sec Chapter 24).

ltpublkan Polley Mlklnlln I

Although the United States participated informall}' in some League of Nations acthi cies in che 1920s, the countr}' refused to join the League or the World Court. Nonetheless, the United States remained a world power, and Republican presidents

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The 1917 Mississippi Rivtr flood A ftwof the 700,000 peopl.e d is.pl:~c:ed by the r.tging w .uers of the Missin ippi ;,wa.it ~uue, t hei r p :~rti :~lly submerged f'M)mn i" the ba.do:ground . President Ca.tvin Coolidge ~sisted Ql ~ for kder.ll a.id, i:ns.isting th;,t t he go..vnment ha.d no obliga.tio n to help citiUcru slrl'rering from "the hU<:~rcb of thot dements."

pursued what they saw as the national incercst-an approach historians haw called independent internationalism. President Harding's most notable achiC\o-emcm v.as the Washington Naval Arms Conference. After chc "''llr ended, the United States, Great Britain, and japan edged toward a dangerous (and costly) naval·anns race. In 1921, Secretary of State Hughes called for a conference in Washington and o udined a specific ratio of warships among the wortd•s naval po....-ers. Great Britain and Japan, together with Ital}' and France, accepted Hughes's plan and agreed to halt all batd eship conscruction for ten }'c ars. Although chis treaty ulcimatdy failed to pre'lent "''lll, it did represent an early arms-concrol efforc. Another U.S. peace iniciatiw "''3S main!}' symbolic. In 1928, che United States and France, cvencually joined by sixty other nations, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing aggression and calling fur the outlawing of war. Lacking enforcement mechanisms, this high-sounding document accomplished little. The Republican administracions of these )'Cal'S used diplomacy to promote U.S. economic interests. For example, chcy vigorously sought tcpa)'menc of $22 billion in Allied "''llr debts and German reparation pa)'tllencs. A stud}' commission in 1924 sharply reduced these daims, but high U.S. tariffs and Europe's economic problems, including runa"''llY inflation in ~rman)', made repayment ofeven che reduced claims unrealistic. Meanwhile, the Harding and Coolidge administrations aggressi\-ely pro· moted American business interests around chc "''Orld.

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The reform spirit survi\-ed feebly in the legislati\-e branch. Congress staved off Andrew Mellon's proposals for c'•e n deeper tax cuts for the rich. And in 1927, Congress created the Fi:dcral Radio Commission, extending the regulacor}' principle to chis new industry. In the 1922 midterm election, an alliance of labor and farm groups helped de-feat some conservaci\J'C Republicans. In 1924, this alliance re:· \T.-ed the Progressive Party and nominated Senator Robert La Follette-who also re:· ccived che endorsement of the Socialist Parcy-for president. The 1924 Democratic corn-emion in New York City sp lit evenly betWeen urban and rural wings. By one \'Ote, the delegates defeated a resolucion condemning the Ku Klux Klan. While the party's rural, Protestant, southern ~A'ing favored former Treasur}' Secretary William G. McAdoo, che big·city delegates rallied beh ind New York's Catholic governor Alfn-d E.Sm.ith. The De-mocratic split mirrored dee-p divi· sions in che nation. After 102 ballors, the exhausted delegates nominated an obscure: New York corporation lawrer,j ohn \'t~ Davis. Calvin Coolidge-, aided by his media adviser Bruce Barton, easil}•won the Repub· lican nomination. The GOP platfonn praised the high protecth't: tariff and urged tax cuts and reduced gove-rnment spending. Coolidge- polled ncarl}' 16 million votes, about cwice Davis's total. La Follette's 4.8 million \'Otes cut into the Dem ocratic to· tal, contributing to the Coolidge landslide.

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Suffragists' hope thac \'Otes for women ~A'Ould transform policies survived briefly after che war. Polling places shifted from saloons ro schools and churches. The 1920 major· party platforms e-ndorsed several measures proposed b}• the lt-agueof\'t'omen Voters. The Women's j oint Congressional Co mm i tt~. a coali· ~oi-T,_Ad APP"'· tion of activist groups. backed the Shtppard·Towntr Ace, which fundtd rural pre· pri.lted $1.2 millicln fot' tural natal and bab}•·care centers staffed b}•public-health n urses. pren.u;a.l ~nd baby.a.rc un~n Overall, ho~A'C\>cr, tht Nintteenth Amendmtm, though a historic achitvc-mem, in 19ll had litde shorH enn political ef'fe
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laws. A 1924 consticurional amendment banning child labor passed Congress, but few states rarified it. The Sheppard·TO\\-'ner Act, d enounced by the American Medical Association as a threat co physicians' monopol)•ofhealth care, expired in 1929.

MAss SOC IETY, MASS

CULTURE

What d6Velopments underlay 1920s' 1'1?4SS culture, and how did Uley a(fea American life tmd leiSI.Ire? As a conscn•ative reaction dominated U.S. politics, major cransformacions "''l'f'C' reshaping society. Asscmbl)' lines, new co ns umer produc~ advertising. the spread of mass encertainmenc, and innovations in corporate organization all signaled profound changes in American life. Some citizens found these changes exciting; others recoiled in fear and apprehension.

In chc 1920 census, for che first rime, chc urban popula· cion (defined as persons living in co mmunities of twenty· five hundred or more) surpassed the rural (sec Figure 23.1). The United Scates had become an urban nation. Urbanization affected different groups of Americans in d ifferent ways. African· Americans, for example, migrated cityward in massiw n umbers, especiall)' after t he 1927 Mississippi Ri\'ct floods. By 1930, more chan 40 percent of the nation's 12 mil· lion blacks li~d in cities. The first black congressman since Reconstruction, Oscar De l'riest of C hicago, "''On election in 1928. For many "-'Omen, dty life meant eased houSC"A
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The urb :~nizo:~tion ofAmeriu in the twentieth eentUI')' h:~d profound politi· c;~.l, tc:onomie, ;u~d soei;~.l oonsequenc:u. Sroruo: CeMu5 B:mu, HUtotQf Sl
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comment: ..Why ... do you need to study "''hat's changing chis councry? I can tell )'OU... in just four letters: A·U·T·O." The A·U·T·O's sodal impact was decidedly mixed, including traffic jams, park· ing problems, and highway fatalities (more than twecnty·six thousand in 1924). In some waY'S> the automobile brought families cogecher. Family vacations, rare a gen· cration earlier, became more co mmon. 1burist cabins and roadside restaurants served vacationing families. Buc che automobile also eroded family co hesion and pa· rental authority. Yo ung people could borrow che car to go to the movie~ attend a distant dance, or simpl)' park in a secluded IM>crs' lane. Middle- and upper-class \N'Omcn ~A'Clcomed the a utomobile. They could no"'' drive to work, attend meetings, visit friends, and gain a sense of personal cmpo~AU· mcnc. Stereotypes of feminine delicacy faded as ~A'Om en mastered chis new technol· og)'· Asche editor of an amomotivc magazine wrote in 1927, «(E)w~r)' cime a woman learns to drive, .. . it is a chreat to ycsterda)"s order of things."' For farm families, the automobile offered easier access to neighbors and to the city, lessening rural isolation. The automobile's country cousin, the tractor, pro\·ed instantly popular, wich nearly a million in use in America by 1930. Yec increased pro· duccivity did not always mean increased profits. And as farmers bought tractors on credit, che rural debe crisis worsened. Ads celebrated the freedom the automobile offered, inconcrast to the fixed rome:s and schedules of trains and streetcars. Yct the a utomobile and other forms of mocor transport in man)' ~A'llfS fun-her standardized American life:. Neighborhood grocer)' stores declined as people drM'l' to supermarkets served by trucks bringing commer· cia! foods from distanc facilities. With the amomobile came the 6rst suburban shop· ping center (in Kansas City), and the first fast-food chain (A&. W Root Beer). Even at S300 or S400, che automobile remained too expensive for many. The "a utomobile suburbs" that sprang up be)'Ond the streetcar lines attracted mainly the well-co-do, widening dass divisions in American society.

Electrification and the spread ofmotorized \'ehicles placed heavy demands on the nation's natural resources and the environment. As electrical usc soared, generating plants consumed growing quantities of coal. In 1929, ~A'ith 20 million cars on the road, U.S. refi neries used over a bil· lion barrels of petroleum to meet the demand for gasoline and lubricating oil. Rising gasoline consumption underlay Washington•s efforts to ensure: U.S. ac· cess to Mexican oil; pla)'ed a role in che 1tapot Dome scandal.: and triggered fC"".-ered acth'iry in the oi16dds of Texas and Oklaho ma In short, heavy fossil-fuel consump · tion, tho ugh small by Lacer standards, alread)' characterized America in che 1920s. The wilderness that had inspired ninece:cnch-centUr)'attists and ~Ariters became more accessible as cars, improved roads, and tourist facilities gave \'acationers e:as· icr access to the national parks and once-pristine regions. This development, coo, had mixed effects. On o ne hand, it created a broader constituency for wilderness preservation. On the other, it subjected the nacion's parks and wilderness areas to heavy pressures as \'lsi tors expected good highwa)'S, service stations, restaurants, and hotels.

Soarillg Energy C.Sumption and alllrutaed Envlronmetd

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The Sierra Club and other groups worked to procecc wilder· ness and wildlife. In 1923, a group of recreational fisherm en per· suaded Congress to halt a priYace:-dC'\o-elopmenc scheme to d rain a vast stretch of wetlands on che upper Mississippi. Jnscead, Con· gress declared this beautiful wacerway a wildlife presen·e. Aldo Leopold of the U.S. Forest Service warned oftechnolog}' run amok. For too long, leopold wrote in 1925, .,a stump was our S)mbol of progress:'' However, few Americans in che cxpansiw: 1920s \N'Or· ried about the environmental issues chac wo uld occupy future generations.

G~·i ng prosperity and roucinized work stimulated interest in leisun: actiYicies in the 1920s. In their free hours, Americans sought the fulfillment man}' found missing in the workplace. Mass-circulation magaz.ines pnwided div~rsion. By 1922, ten U.S. magazines boasted dn::ulacion of more than 2.5 million. The \'tnerable Saturday Ewning Post, with its Norman Rockwell co\·~ specialized in nostalgia. Rtadtr"s Digrst~ founded in 1921, offered condensed \'crsions of arcid es fi rst published elsewhere. A journal· istic equr.•alem of the Model T, the Digs.t offered standardized fare for mass consumption. Book publishers broadened their marker b)• selling through department scores or directly to the public via the Book"f-theGiving ;:~ modern twist to ;m ;~.ncient symMonth Club, launched in 1926. While cricks accused such massbol, this ;~dvertising ut;~.log of the 1920s marker vcncures of debasing literary casce, they did help sustain a ofrel'\"d ;~n entieing ;~rr;~yof new dearie products for the home. common nacional culture in an incre-asingly diverse society. In an age of standardized consumer goods, radio and the movies offered standardized culcural fare. The radio era began on No\'tmbcr2, 1920, when l'itrsburgh station KD KA reported Warren Harding's election. In 1922, five hundred new stations began operations, as radio fever gripped America. The firsc radio network, the National Broadcasting Company (NBQ, formed four )'tars later; the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) foll o....-ed in 1927. Testing pop· ular taste through marker research, che networks soon ruled broadcasting. Ameri· cans e\-erywhere laughed at the same jokes, heard the same news, and absotbed the same commercials. Some commentators ad\·ocace:d preserving radio as a public educational and cuirural medium, free of advertising.. but commercial sponsorship soon won ouc. The first network comedy show, Amos 'n' Antfy ( 1928)-which included sce:rcocyped caricatures of African-American life-enriched its sponsor, Pepsodent toothpaste:. Fe-aturing stars like Valentino, the movies expanded from che nickelodeons of the immigrant wards into elegant uptown pleasure palaces with names like Majestic, Ritz.,. and Orphe:um. In deference to the consen•atism of this new audience, in 1922 HoiiY""'OOd enacted a new code of standards for moYie: contenc. Charlie Chaplin, who had played anarchic, anti-authority figures in his prewar comedies, now softened his characcer in su ch feature--length fi lms as Tlw Gold Rush ( 1925). Tbt Ttn Commandme-nts

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( 1923), directed by Cedi B. De Mille, warned of the consequences of breaking moral taboos. Technical innovations kept moYiegocrs coming. Aljolson's 71Je)a;,zSingrr ( 1927) introduced sound. Walt Disney's carcoon Sttttmbo.:aWIIO' ( 1928) not only marked t he: debut of Mickey Mouse but also sho\IJ'Cd t he: poce:mial of animation. Like advenis· ing, the moYies created a dream world o nly loosely tethered co reality. One ad prom· ised "all the advrorure, .. . romance, ... (and] excitemenc you lack in )'OUr daily life." The movies also stimulated consumption ~Aith alluring images of che good life. Along with departmenc scores, mass magazines, and advertising. the)' opened new \istas of consumer abundance. For all its influence, the new mass culture penetrated society unevenly. It had less impact in rural America, especially among evangelical Christians. Mexican· Americans generally preferred traditional festivals and leisure activities. Local radio stations broadcast not only network sho~A'S, but also fann reports, local news, and religious programs, community announcements, and ethnic or regional musk. In short, despite the new mass culture, America still had room for diversity in the 1920s.

l'rofessional sports and media-promoted spectacles pro· \ided diversion as ~A'CU. In 192 1, Atlantic City promoters launched a bathing-beauty contest they grandly called the Miss America Pageant. Celebrities dominated professional sports. fi:w Americans were more famous chan Babe Ruth of the New York Yankees or1}' Cobb, the Detroit 11gc.rs' pla)'tr/ manager. Ruth was a heavy-drinking wo manizer.: Cobb, a borderline psrchotic radst. Yet the alchemy of publicity transformed them into heroes ~Aith contrived nicknames: "the Sultan of Swat" (Ruth) and ..the Georgia Peach" (Cobb). CUries A.li•clbe,P CdebThis celebrity culture illuminates the stresses facing ordinary Americans in these rity he-ro; fi:tst to lty5UklllCfOJS rears of social change. For young women uncertain about society's shifting cxpecta· tbt Atlan tic rions, the beauty pageants offered one ideal to ~Ail ich they could aspire. For men grap· piing with unsettling de\'Clopmems from feminism to Fordism, the exploits of sports heroes like Ruth could help restore damaged self-esteem. Celebrity worship reached a crescendo in the response to Charles Und· be.rgh, a daredevil scum pilot who flew solo across the Atlantic in his small The .:mtomobik h.ld a m.ljor im pact in t\'t-1")' $C'CWC' at Amtri ~n lik. single-engine plane, 1'bi! Spirit o{St Louis, on May 20- 2 1, 1927. His success gripped the public's imagination. In Ne~A' York, thousands rurned ouc for a Entrgy consumption warC'd with lirtle coneern about environmtn· ticker-tape parade. Radio, newspap~ magazines, and movie newsreels ofttl imp.ut. fered saturation cO\"Crage. Presidenc Coolidge praised the fl ight as a triumph The dtwlo pm.c"nt of r;adio network,, of Amer ican business and corporate technology. Others saw Lindbergh as l.l't"·cirru.l.uion mag;ui.nu, a nd proof chat despite mechanization, the individual still counted. To conserna u on.ll movie diJu1bmion c:n"a ted :. Jh ut'd m..lU culrure. \'3tives, Lindbergh's solid virtues proved that the old verities survi\'ed. Over· all, the new mass media had mixed social effects. Certainly, they promoted The 19Ub ~u the 6rn d uack in which cdWritr culrul\" OouriJh«<; cultural standardization and uniformity of thought. But mass magazines, Babe Ru th and C h:uks: Lindbergh radio, and movies also introduced new viewpoints and COO\'i.')'ed a potent wnt twO noud ctkbri ti ~ of message: a person's immediate su rro undings need not limit his or her hori· thec:ime. zons. If the larger world they opened for ordinary Americans 'A'3S often suProfe"uion.ll ~port:~ a nd :nhltn"$ bu am.e highly popuUr. perficial or tawdry, it could also be exdting and liberating.

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CU LTURAL fERM ENT AND CREAnVITY

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Whatsoa11/ de~lopments contnbuted to the cultuml m"4h"vto/ ofthe 1920s?

Amen can life m the: J920s mvolved more than pohr:~es, assembly hnes, and celebrity V.'Orship. As writers, arcists, and musicians co ntributed co t he: modernist spirit of culcural innovation, African-Americans creare:d a cui rural tlov.-ering known as t he: Harlem Renaissance.

The war and its sour afte:nnath s harpened the cultural restlessness of t he: twenties. The: postwar crisis of values took many forms. 11le: )'Ounge:r generation, espe:dally college students, boisterously assailed older com-emions of behavior. Seizing t he: freedom offered b}•the automobile, they threw parties, drank bootleg liquor, flocked co jazz dubs, and danced che Charleston. Yo ung people also discussed sex more: fred )' than their eldet'S had Sigmund Freud, che Viennese: physician ~Ailo explored che sexual aspects of human ps)'chol· ogy, enjo)'ed a popular vogue: in a poscwar climate that encouraged challenges to old taboos. Despite m uch calk about sex and charges of rampane immorality, ho~A'C'V'C.r, t he 1920s' "sexual re\'Oiution" is hard co pin do~A'tl. Premarital imcrcourse: remained cxce:pcional and widely disapprow~d. What can be documented are changing courtship pacterns. «courcing" had once been a fo nnal prelude: co marria~. The 1920s brought the more casual praccice of «daring." through which )'OUng people gained social co n6dence: and a degree of sexual experience without ne:ce:ssaril)' conce:mplacing marriage. For women, chesc postwar changes in some ways prM'Cd liberating. Female sexuality was more o penly acknowledged Skin lengths crept u p; makeup became more acceptable; and the daborace: armor of petticoats and corsets feU away. The so-called flapper, with her bobbed hair, defiant dgarecte, lipstick, and s hort skirc, similar!)' epitomized youthful rejection of entrenched ste:rcocypes. Bur this image also objccti6ed young v.'Omen as decoratiw sexual objects. Further, the: double: standard, which held ~A'Omen to a stricter code of conduce, rm1aine:d in force. Young men could boasc of sexual exploits, buc )'Oung v.'Omcn reputed co be "fast" risked damaged reputacions. In some ~A'llys, in shore, 1920s' popular culrure worked against full gender equality nearly as effeccivdy as had the older Victorian stereotypes. Around 1922, according to F. Scott Firz.~rald, adults m1braced che rebelliousness of the )'OUng and «r:he orgy began." But su ch S~A'eeping gene:ralizations can mis· lead. During t he: }'Cat'S of Fitzgerald's alleged national orgy, the d ivorce rate rm1aine:d constant, and many Americans adhered co traditional standards, rejecting alcohol and wild parties. Most farmers, industrial workers, blacks, Hispanics, and rccenc im· migrants found economic survival more: pressing than t he: latest fads and fas hions. Bur if the: jazz Age stereotype obscured che complexity of the 1920s, it did cap· ture a pare of t he postwar scene, espe:ciall)' che brassy new mass cult ure: and che hedonism and materialism of r:he ~A•dl -to·do as they basked in t he: era' s prosperity.

Tilt 1m Ace and 1111 Postwar Crisis of Values

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Like Fitzgerald, man}' other )'Oung ~A'Ti tcrs found che cui· tural turbulence of the I 920s stimulating. They forged a remarkable body of "''Ork equally hostile to the moralistic pieties of the old order and che: business pieties of the: new. In M din Sfn't't ( 1920), the: nm--elist Sinclair le wis saciriud t he: smugness and cui rural barrenness of Gopher l'rairic, a 6ctional mid·W'CStem town based on his nariveSauk Centre, Minnesota. In Babbirt (1922}, Lewis skt!'"'-ered a ffi}'thic larger city, Zcnich, and the ride character George: F. Babbitt, a real-escate: agent trapped in middle-class conformity. H . L. Me:ncke:n, a journalist, editor, and critic, in J924launchcd the iconodas·

Alienated Writers

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ric Amrrican Mmury magazine, an instant success wich t he decade's alienated incel·

lcctuals and young people. Mencken championed writers like L~·is and Theodore: Dreiser while ridiculing politicians, small-town America. Protestant fu ndamental· ism. and the middle-class "Booboisic." Asked why he stared in America, Mencken re:· plied, "W hr do people visit zoos?" For t he no\'tlist Ernest Hemingway, seriously wounded in 1918 while serving as a Red Cross \'Oiume:er in nort hern Ital)', World War I 'A'llS a watershed experience. In 192-6 , now an expatriate: in l':lris, Hemingway published 71Je Stm Also Rim, portraying a group of American and English )'OUng people:, variousl)' damaged by che war, as they drift around Spain. His A F.:lrn~.\'.11 to Arms (1929), loosely based on his 0\\-'n ex· perienccs, depicts che war's futility and politicians' e:mpt)' rhetoric. Although ~A'fin·rs like: Lewis and Hemingwa)' deplored t he inflated rhetoric of the war and t he vulgarity of poscwar cuicure:, t hey remained American at heart, striv· ing to cre-ate a more amhencic national culru.re. Even F. Scott Ficz.~ rald, himself caught up in Jazz Age excesses, 'A'llS fundamentall)' a moralist. Fitzgerald 's master· piece, n,e Gn~tt Gatsby (1925), portrayed not only che pa.rty·fillcd lives of the decade's moneyed class, but also cheir decadence, selfishness, and heedless disregard for t he: less forcunate.

The creative- energies of che 1920s found many outlets. A burst of architectural acriviry, for example:, transformed the sk)tfines of larger cities. B)' che: end of the decade, New York Cit)' boasted fo ur buildings more than 6ft)' stories talL The decade' s leading painters cook America as t heir subject- either che real na· tion around them or an imagined one. While Thomas Hare Benton evoked a past of cO\\-·boys, pioneers, and riverboat gambl~ Edward Hopper portrayed faded towns and lond )' cicie:s of che: present. Hopper's painting Sunday ( 192-6), pkruring a man slumped o n rhe curb of an e mpty strecc of abandoned stores, conveyed boch t he: bleakness and potential beaut)' of urban America. A similar fascination with che in· dustrial city pervaded the: work of artists Georgia O' Kecffe and Charles S he:d e:r. Though O' Kecffe is stereotrped as a painter of New Mexico, she earlier painted sig· nificam urban scenes in her New York da)'S. The creative ferment of t he: 1920·s inspired composers as W'CIL Of all t he: musical inno\•arions, jazz best capcured the modernist spirit. The ~Athite bandleade:r l:taul Whiteman offered watered-down "jazz" \'trsions of standard tunes. Aaron Copland's

Arthlteds. Paillers, IIIII Mullcilns Celellrate Modem Alllerlra

Musk forTIJerttrF ( 1925) and George Gershwin's Rb<tpscdy in Blut (1924) and An Ameri· ran in J.''osris ( 1928) revealed strong jan influences. Meanwhile, black musicians preserved aut hentic jazz and explored its potentiaL The 1920s recordings of trumpeter Louis Annstrong dedsii,!'Ciy influenced the furure of jazz. The composer and bandleader Duke Ellington performed to sellout audi· ences at Harlem's Conon Club. Meanwhile, the piano's jan potential 'A'llS demon· strated by Fars Waller and Ferdinand "Jell}' Roll" Mon:on. Although much of 1920s' popular culrure faded quick!}', jazz endured.

Intera~·~ Map: Urbanaabon, 1890 & 1929

Jazz was only one of many black comribucions co 1920s' American culcure. The social changes of chesc years ener· gized African·American culrural life, especially in New York City's Harlem. An elite white suburb before World War I, Harlem actracced many African-Americans during and after the war, and b}• 1930 most of New York's 327,000 blacks lived within its boundaries. T his concentration, plus the proximiryof Broadway cheaters, record companies, book publishers, and t he NAACP's national headquarters, all contributed co t he Harlem Renaissance. This culcural flo....-ering took varied forms. The Mississippi-born black composer William Grant Still, moving to Harlem in 1922, produced many works, including Afro AmeriCdn Symphony (1931). The painter Aaron Douglas and the sculptor Au· gusta Savage \N'Orked in che visual arts. l 'he multitalented f:taul Robtson ga\'e vocal concerts; made films.: and appeared on Broadway in Eugene O'Neill's i1tt Emperor jonn and other plays. Among a host of writers, poet Langston Hughes drew upon southern black oral traditions in Tht Weary Blun (1926), and t he j amaican-born poet and novelist Claude McKa}' evoked Harlem' s vibrant, sometimes sinister nighdife in H&mt w Harltm ( 1928). Nella larsen, from t he Danish West Indies, cold of a mulatto woman's strug· gle ~Aith her mixed echnidty in the 1928 nOII'CI Quirktttnd. In The NNI' Ntgro ( 1925), Alain locke, a philosophy professor ac Ho~A'ltrd University, assembled essaY'S> poems, shore stories, and reproductions of artworks co convey Harlem's rich cui· rural life. The white cultural establishment cook notice. Book publishers and magazine editors courted black writers. Broadway producers mounted The J;u:x A$t, -'rmboliud br tht black shows. Whitescr~·ded Harlem's jaudubs. DuBose Ht)"A'llrd's 1925 bold bth.tVWr o("ft.lm ing)'OUth• nO\-el Porgy offered a S}mpathctic picture of Charleston's African-American and tht tl..lmbor.lm $C'.lN.Uityo( tl.lpptr:~, Jhocktd tr.ldition.l!iJu. community. George Gershwin's musical version, lbrgy and lkss, premiered App.llled b)· \l'orld \l'ar 1, .Uiconattd in 1935. writer:~ aitiei.1:td Am.erieom Jocitcy; The Harlem Renaissance reached bt)'Ond America's borders. Jan won m.lny tlcod to Puis: .lnd d~no a following in Europe. Langston Hughes and Claude McKay were admired abi'Oild. in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. 1'he dancer and singer Josephine Aft.hitcocu and a r tiJu C'fUttd .l Baker, after dcbucing in Harlem, mow~d to l':lris in 1925, where her highly n.u:ion.U ...;,u;a_l eulrun-; jux, with it:~ (TtnetiC' !b)•thm' and Jt:o:ua l 0\'C'rcrocic performances created a sensation. ronu, dominattd tht tr.l'' musiC' Along wich white support came misunderstanding and attempts at among whitt.J .l$ wdl ;u: bl.lckJ. control Rebellious )'OUng whites romanticized Harlem nightlife, ideal· The H.lrltm Rcn.lUJanct w:tJ pr i· izing che spiritual or .. primiti\'t:" qualities of black culwre ~A•hile ignoring mar ily ;a_ litcora.ry moo.'C'-m.com that ignortd politio: ;and r..lci.Jm. che community's social problems. Nor did it bother chem that the popular www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

Cotton Club, controlled by gangst~ featured black perfonners but barred most blacks from che audience. When Langsto n Hughes's poems confronted the gritty realities of black life in America, his v.-ealchy white patron angrily wichdrtw her support. The hard times of the 1930s ended the Harlem Renaissance. Nevertheless, this burst of creativity stands as a memorable achi~ment. Future black writers, artists, mu.sidans, and performers ~A'Ould owe: a great debt to their predecessors of the 1920s.

A

SOCI ETY IN CON FLI CT

WMt events or mowments re.<eal the nt4jor social4nd c.ult.uTI11 conflicts of the twenties? 11le social changes ofche 1920s produced a backlash, as a series of divisi\'t: epi· sodesand social movements highlighted che era's tensions. While Congress restricted immigration, highly publicized court cases in Massachusetts and 1Cnncssec under· scored the nation's social and cultural divisions. Millions of whites embraced the racist bigotry and moralistic rhetoric of a n.."'Vivcd Ku Klux Klan, and man}' newly ur· banized African·Amcricans rallied to Marcus Garvey, a magnetic black leader with a riveting message of racial pride. Prohibition scirred furcher concro\-e:rsy in chis conflicc·ridden decade.

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Fed by wartime efforts co enforce patriotism, che old im· pulse to remake America into a nation of like· minded, culturally homogeneous people revived in che 1920s. The National Origins Act of 1924, a revision of the immigration law, restricted annual immigration from any foreign councry to 2 percent of the number of persons ofthat"national origin" in the United States in 1890.Since the greac influx of south· ern and eastern Europeans had co me after 1890, the intent of this provision was dear: co reduce the immigration of these nationalities. As Calvin Coolidge obsen-e:d on signing the Ia"''• «America muse be kepc American:'' This quota system, which survi\'ed co 1965, represented a strong counterattack by nati\-e:-born Protestant America against che immigrant cicies. Total immigration fell from 1.2 million in 1914 to 280,000 in 1929. The law excluded Asians and South Asians entird)'· Court rulings underscored the nativist message. In O~uu v. Unifl!d StdWs (1922), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a citizenship request b)• a japanese--born scudent at the Uni..-ersity of California. In 1923, che Supreme Court upheld a California Ia"'' limiting the right of j apanese immigrants to own or lease farmland. 1'hat same )'ear, the Su preme Court rtjened an immigration application by a man from In· dia ~Atho daimed that he was "Caucasian" and thus eligible for entry. Onl)' chose ••f rom che Bricish Isles and northu-e:stern Europe" would be so dassi6ed. according to che court.

I A SOCIETY IN CONFUct

54 9

Most proponents of restriction regarded Asia and souchern and eastern Europe as sources of .. undesirables;'' and L....,...k Newcomers the la\N'S rdlocced chis bias. No rcstTicdons, hC>'~'-"f:'\'er, "''Cre placed on immigracion fro m the Western Hemisphere; consequently, immigration from French Canada and Larin America soared during the 1920s. By 1930 ar least2 million Mexican-born people lived in the United States. California' s Mexican-American population quadrupled, from 90,000 to nearly 360,000, in the decade. Many of chese newcomers became migrator}' workers in large-scale agribusiness. Mexican migram labor sustained Californ ia 's citrus industry. Cooperatives like t he Southern California Fruit Gro"''Crs Exchange (Sunkis t) hired workers on a seasonal basis and provided substandard housing in isolated setd emencs t hat che workers called colonid.J (ko-lo-NEE-as). The grO'I'-~rs bitter!}' opposed attempts to form labor unions. Noc aU Mexican immigrancs "''Cre migratory "''Orkers; many sctded into U.S. communities. Although still emotionally linked to ..Mi.tico Litulo'" C'Beautiful Mex· ico'"), chey formed local suppon networks and cultural institutions. Deep!}' religious, Mexican-Americans found litd e support from the U.S. Catholic church. Earlier Catholic immigrancs had atrmded ethnic parishes and wor· shipped in their o"''tl languages, but by t he 1920s church policy had changed. In "Anglo" parishes wich non-Hispanic priest~ the Spanish·speaking newcomers faced discrimination and pressure to abandon cheir language and culture. Attitudes toward Mexican immigrancs "''Ctc deep!}' ambivalmt. 11leir labor "''lls needed, bur thcir presmce disrurbcd naciviscs eager co presl'1'V'C a "white'" and l'rotestanc nacion. Would-be Mexican immigrants faced strict literacy and means tests. 1'he Border Parrot was creaced in 1925, deportations increased, and in 1929 Congress made illegal entr}'a criminal offense. New~rthdess,an estimated 100,000 illegal Mexi· can nl"''-x:omers arrived annual!}' to 6U pressing demands in the U.S. labor market.

Needed Workers/ ~ ~~~Aliens:

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The immigration-rcstTicdon movcmmt reflected dttp strains of ethnic, racial, and religious prejudice in 1920s' America. Anti-Semitic propaganda filled the Dtarborn In· 1111 Sauo-Vanretti dtptnde-nt, a weekly nl"''-'Spaper owned by Henry Ford. At irs peak, rhe Dta.rborn Indrpmdnu- reached 600,000 readers. Sued for defamation by a California Je"''ish atcorney, Ford in 1927 issued an evasi\~ apology (drafted by a pro minem j ewis h leader in New York) blaming subordinates. Nativis t, antiradical prejudices emerged starkly in the Sacco·Vanurti case, a Mas· sachusetrs murder case that began in April 1920, whm robbers shoe and killed t he paymaster and guard of a shoe faccory in South Braintree, Massachuserts, and stole rwo cash boxes. In 1921, a jury fo und two Italian immigrants, Nicola Sacco and Bar· rolomco Vanutti, guilty of the crime. After many appeals and a review by a commis· sion of notable citizens, they W'Cre: electrocuted on August 23, 1927. These bare facts hard!}' convey t he: passions che case aroused. Sacc·o and Van· ze:tti "''Cre anarchists, and the prosecution harped on their radicalism. The judge barely concealed his hostility co the pair, "'thorn he privately called "-t hose anarchist bastards." While: many conse!Vati\·es supported the deach smtcnce,liberals and socialists rallied to their cause.

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Later rese-arch on Bo.scon's anarchist community and ballistics tests on Sacco's gun pointed to their guilt. But the prejudices that tainted the trial remain indisput· able, as does the- case's symbolic importance in exposing the d eep fault lines in 1920s' American sodecy.

Meanwhile, an equally ce-lebrated case in Tennessee high· lighted another from in the cultural wars of the J920s: the gro~Aing prestige of science. While many Americans welcomed the ad\•ance of science-, some religious bdi ew~rs found it threatening. Their fears had de-epened as scholars had subjected the Bible to critical scrutin)', pS)'· chologists and sociologists had srudied su pernatural bd ief systems as human social constructs and expressions ofemotional needs, and biologists had embraced Charles D.t.Nin's naturalistic explanation for the variety of Life fonns on Earth advanced in OriOn ofSJW
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I A SOCIETY IN CONFUct

551

a gigancic cleccric score-board to illus.trace the triumph ofgood ow~r eviL Her followers, mainly cransplanted mid"''eSterners, embraced her fundamentalist theolog}' while enjoying her mass-entertainment techniques. At her death in 1944, her Inter· national Church of che Foursquare Gospel had mon: than six hundred branches in the United Staces and abroad.

The tensions gnawing at American society of the 1920s also emerged in a resurrected Ku Klux Klan (KKK). 11le original Klan of che post-Civil War South had faded by the 1870s (sec Chapter 16), buc in 1915 hooded men who had gathered at Stone Mountain, Georgia, revived it. D. W. Griffith's glorification ofche Klan in his 1915 movie Tbt Birtb ofa Ntttion provided furcher inspiracion. The movement remained obscure until 1920, when two Atlanta entrepreneurs organiu:d a national membership drive co exploit the appeal of the Klan•s ritual and irs narivisc, white--supremacist ideology. Their wildly successful scheme involved a ten-dollar membership fee divided among the salesman and their managers at the state and national lew.l- with a rake--off to chem.selw~s . 11le sale of Klan robes, masks, horse blankets, and the boctled Chatta· hoochee Ri\'tr "''llter used in iniciarion rites added to the take. Under che umbrella tmn "100 percent Ameri· canis m," the Klan demonized noc onl)' AfricanAmericans buc also Cacholics,)t'A~ and aliens. Some Klan groups targeted whites suspected of sexual im· morality or prohibicion~law violations. Membership estimates for the KKK and its women's auxiliar}' in the early 1920s range as high as 5 million. From its souchern base, the Klan spread through che MidW'CSt and across the coumr}' from Long Island to the West Coast. Most of its members came from bluecollar ranks. Alchough corrupt at che top and basicall)' a money-making scam, the Klan was not a haven for criminals or fanacics . Obsen-ers commented on members' ordinariness. The Klan's promise to restore the nation's lost purity appealed to many economicall)' marginal old-stock Protestants disoriented by social change. Some citizens upset by changing sexual mores welcomed t he Klan's defense of«[he purity of white womanhood." Klan membership, in short, gave a sense of empowennem [0 people "'tho felc adrift in a The Ka Klux Kill• io Washiogto•. D.C. new social order of great corporations.: a raucous In :. br.u~n display of power, the Ku Klux Kl:~t~ org:.ni:ed mass culture; and immigrant-filled d ries. T he ri[uals, :. m:.reh in the n;uion's c::.pit:~l in t926. By this Orne, parades, and cross burnings added drama and a sense h~·tr, the Kla.nw.u :.lr~;1dy ln decline. of camaraderie co lonely, unfulfilling lives.

Tile lu K111X Klan

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But the Klan's menace as a mass movement 'A'llS real. Some KKK groups em· played thrca~ bearings, and lynching in their quest to purif)' America. In several states, the Klan ~A'On political po'l'-"er. In Oregon, the Klan elocced a gowrnor and pushed through legislation requiring all children to attend public school, an at· tempt to descroy the slate's Catholic schools. The Klan collapsed ~Aith shocking suddenness. In March 1925, 1ndiana's Grand Drago n, David Stephenson, brutally raped his )'OUng se:crecary. When she swallowed poison, Stephenson panicked and refused to call a physician. The wo man died several weeks later, and Stephenson ~A'Cflt co prison, where he m-ealed sordid details of political corruption in Indiana. Its moral pretensions in shreds, the KKK faded. It did not disappear, howc-.-er, and when African-Americans demanded equal rights in the 1 950~ the Klan again reared its head.

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Among African-Americans who had fled southern rural pm-ercy and racism only to experience discrimination and racism in the urban Nonh, che decade's sodal strains pro· duced a different kind of mass mm-ement, led by the spellbinding Marcus Garvey and his Uniwrsal Negro lmpro\-emenc Association (UNlA}. Born in jamaica in 1887, Garvey founded UNlA in 19 14 and N 'O re-ars later moved to Harlem, which became the movement-'s headquarters. In a ~Ail it~ominated society, GarVC}' glori6ed all things black. Urging black economic solidarity, he founded UNlA grocer)' stores and ocher businesses. He summoned blacks co return co ..Motherland Africa" and estab· lished the Black Star Steamship Line to help them get there. An estimated eighty thousand blacks joined UNlA, drawn by the appeal of the vision of economic self-sufficiency and a glorious furure in Africa. Garvey's popular· ity unsettled the NAACP's middle-class leaders, "''ho advocated racial integration rather than separation. W . E. B. Du Bois 'A'llS among Garvey's sharpest critics. In 1923, a federal cou.rtronvicred G-arvey of fraud in the management of his Black Star Steamship line. In 1927, after two )'tars' imprisonment, he 'A'llS deported co Ja· maica. and the UNIA collapsed. Buc this 6rsc mass movement in black America had revealed both the social aspirations and the activist potential of African-Americans in the urban North. 11le NAACI', meanwhile, remained active C'\\':n in a reactionary decade wich racism rampant. In some 300 branches nationwide, members kept the d"il·rights cause alive and patiently laid che ground~A
A bitter co ntrm-ersy 0\'er alcohol further exposed the fis. sures in American society. As noted in Chapcer21, che Pro· gressivc Era prohibition campaign was both a legitimate effort co address social problems associated wich alcohol abuse: and a weapon in the struggle of nati't-e-born Americans to concrol the immigrant dties. These tensions persisted in the 1920s. When the Eighteenth Amendment cook effect in 1920, pro hibitionists rejoiced. Saloons d osed, liquor ad\-ertising vanished, and arrests for drunkenness dedi ned. In 1921, alcohol consumption stood at abouc one--third the prewar level. Yet pro hibi· tion gradual!)' lost support, and in 1933 it ended.

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What went wrong? Essc:ntiall)~ prohibition's failure illuscrates che: difficulty in an open society of enforcing a ~Aidclyopposcd law. The Volstead Act, the 1919 prohibition law, 'A'llS underfunded and ~A'Cakl)' enfOrced. Would-be drinkc:rs gn:w bolder as e:nforccmenc faltered. For rebellious youths, alcohol's illegality increased irs appeal Challenging the prohibition Ia"''• declared one college student, M;ln)' AmeMca.ru found F.tpid rqmscnted "the narural reaction of youch to rules and regulacions."' ch.lnge diwrienting and frightening, Every city harbored speakeasies ~Athere customers could buy dr inks. which ltd to re.uc:ion and prot6t. 1\:ople concocted home: bn..""A' and sacramental wine sales soared. By 1929, lmmigr.uion restria ion wall a n :uttmpt to kttpout the "'wrong alcohol consumption reached about 70 percent of pre~A'llr l e:w~ls. wrt'' of pc'Ople. Organized crime: hdpcd drcumvcnc t he law. C hicago, where rival The- S~co·V.uu:cui c.ue h ighlighttd gangs batded to concrol che: liquor busine:s~ wim e:ssed 550 gangland kill· ings in the J920s. Speakeasies comrolle:d b)•Chicago gangster AI Capone: generated annual profits of $60 million. Although noc typical, Chicago's crime w:we underscored prohibition's fail ure. A reform designed co im· prow the nation's morality was turning cicizcns into la....-brcakers and mobsters into cd e:bricie:s. Thus prohibition, roo, became a battleground in the decade's culwral wars and policies. The .,drys"'-usuall)' nacive--bom Protestants- praised it. The .,wcts"-liberals, j azz Age rebels, big·city immigrants-
a rt-Ju~nce of nati,•iJm :md t ht culwul d ivide btt\\'«n the coun · uy'.s conJav.ui'A'll and libeuk

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HOOVER AT T H E HELM 1-/owdid 1-/erbert Hoover's social and political thought differ from tllatof l-/11rding and Coolidge? Herbert H ocm~r, elected president in 1928, appeared well fitted to sustain t he nation's prosperity. No stubborn conscrvati\-e like Harding and Coolidge. his social and political philosophy reflected his engineering background. In some: wa)'S, he s~med the ideal president for the new technological age.

A Hollywood casting agent could noc ha\'e chosen two in· dividuals who better personified America's d ivisions chan the 1928 presidential candidaces. New York gowrnor AI Smich easily ~A'On t he De-mocratic nomination. A Catholic and a .,wet," his brown del'by pe:rpewally askew, Smith exuded the flavor of immigranc New York. Originally a machine policician, he had impressed reformers by backing social-welfare meas· urcs.. Herbert Hocm~r U.'On t he: Republican nomination wit h equal case. An Iowan or· phane:d early in life, Hocm~r had pm himself through Stanford University and made a fortune as a mining engineer in China and Australia. His service as ~A'llrtime food administrator saved millions oflives in Europe and earned him a place in chc- Hard· ing and Coolidge cabinets..

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Eschewing che handshaking and baby kissing of the campaign crail, Hoover deliw~ rcd radio speeches in a boring monocone. Smith campaigned spirited!)' throughout the country- a strategy chat nta}' ha\'t hanned him, for his big-
-"

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Americans looked hopefully co their new presidenc, whom admirers dubbed "the: Great Engineer." Although a sd f· made man himself, he did noc uncritically praise big business. His Quakerism, humanitarian activiti~ engineering experience, and Rt:· publican loyalties combined co produce a unique social oudook. Like l 'he:odore Roost\'tlt, Hoo\'tr opposed cutthroat capitalist competition. Ra· tional economic dcwlopme:nt, he: insisted, demanded corporate cooperation in mar· keting. wage: policy, raw·material allocation, and product standardization. T he economy, in shore, should operate like an efficient machine:. Bur abO'V'C all, he: advo· cated \'Oiuntarism. The smoothly function ing, sociall)' responsible economic order he envisioned must arise from the \'Oiuntary action of capitalise leaders, not gO'V'Crn· menc coercion. Hoo\'tr as secretary ofcommerce had COI'lV(!ned more chan 250 conferences with business leaders. He urged higher wages co increase consumer purchasing pO'A-e:r. During che 1927 Mississippi Ri\--er floods, as President Coolidge remained in Wash· ington, HoO'V'Cr had rushed to the stricken area to mobilize private relief efforts. Hoo\'tr as secrctary of commm:e had pushed for a number of environmental latA'S. l:tollucion, he: ~A'llrned in 1924, "-is de:stn,)ing ... our 6she:ries . .. (and) beaches

and endangering our harbors.'" In 1922, he negotiated a compacc among Western scaces for a d ivision of Colorado River water. This agreemenc, implemented in 1929, opened the "''aY for a dam on the Colorado to pnwide hydroelectric power and wacer for irrigation. Construction began on Hoover Dam in 1930. (In an act of petty politics, Democrats changed che name co Boulder Dam in 1933, but Congress restored the original name in 1947.) Hoover' s ideology had limitations. He showed more enthusiasm for The dution of 1928 pitttd urban immigrant ch.lmpton AI Smith cooperation among capitalists than among consumers or "'"'rkers. His beagai n:~t :~df·made million-lin" lief chat capitaliscs "''Ould voluntarily embrace enlightened labor policies H e!Wn HOO\'t'-r. overestimated the role of altruism in business decision making. And his S mith':~ Catholi ci:~m ~amt a « n· opposition co gow:mment economic intervention brought him griefwhen u-;aJ i.uut in tht n mpaign.. such interw:nrion became urgently necessar}'· HCXM'r':~ vKwl)· carne \\ith ~·i cknce Hoover' s presidency began promisingly. Responding to the farm ofpoliticall't'.llie'mc'nt, ;u urban vocen WC'nt h~lr for Smith. problem, he persuaded Congress to create a Federal Farm Board co pro· HCXM'r btlit\'td :~ttongly in \'Oiun· mote cooperati\'t markecing. Thi~ he hoped, would raise farm prices while t.lriJm and v.·df.lu capit.Ui.un, but preserving che voluncarisc principle. But while Hom-er applied his social hi:~ ide".u wne limittd b)· hi:~ appo:~i· philosoph)' to the business of gm·emmc:m, a crisis was approaching that tian ro din-ct go'A'rnm.ent economic would m-erwhelm and ultimately destroy his presidency. inteNI'ntion.

Chapter Su 00\VNI.OAO THE

MPJ AVOt O FilE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

LISTEN TO IT ON THE GO.

What economic innovations came in the 1920s, and what was their e{fed on different socialgroups? (page 533)

I

The assembly line and mass produccion created the consumer economy with t he automobile -at its center. Advertising flourished. Fanners \l'tre left out of the general prosperit}'· More ·women graduated from college. but fc\l' held high· wage industrial jobs. 1'he labor union movement struggled.

What political and soda/ ideas shaped the administrations ofPresidents Harding and Coolidge? (page 531)

I

The Harding administration was stained by corruption. Boch administra· tions \l'tre staunchly probusiness and wanted nothing to do with progtcSsiv· ism. Internationally, t he United States followed an isolationist course but pursued its own national interest chrough independent internationalism. A split between rural and urban winS$ roiled the Democratic patty, and the v.n m· en•s mO\Tmcnt also splintered.

K EY TERMS

Hooty Ford {p. 5JJ) T"'l'll Dome O>. 5JS) CaMn Coolidge {p. 5JB) M. 5JS) Waslington Naval Arms Confer' "" {p. 5J9}

Ku Klux Klan {p. 540) Alfred t Srnilh (p. 540} Sheppard-Towner Art {p. 540) Cllarles l.ildbergh (p. 544) H.l Mendu!n (p. 546) National Origins Art {p. 548) Sacco and l
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What dmlopmenu und
I

Tht automoblk twis rN.JOt JDCiJ:l :lS wt:U as mmomic im~. l-Ws cuku~T gnwfrom dwckw:topmrnr oft3(bo nm.~l~ nupunu.and .,_,._ Gdd>rity CUIN. and ptOfMOpon> llouruh
Who! soda/ dmlopmenn conlributed to the wltural creaNvity of the 1920s?(pal!l 545)

I

The open 5uunllty ofrhc j :u2 Ase-, j.u:z music, and the f!appcc shockro mnn)'•

Young propk, frttd from p:attnral authority t,· the automobile, bch:avcd in

ways chat .seemed llccnricm5 ro rheir t:lders. Alienated writf:cs fled ro l:taris,and a liter~ry n:nainnnce .:tmong African-Americans flourished in Hadem.

What events or movements revtal the major social and cultural conflicts ofthe lwrntia? (f!OI!I 548)

I

lb.p•d dunp 1UC:If wu disoritnting. lmmigtarion f't.SttK1ions 50Ught to

kttp ouc thl' ·wrons son'" ot propk; dw 5.1ca>VJlltttti case ckmonstr.&ttd the caurgmtt ol naci'vum and dv ruJrutal cfividt in tbt n.uion; .mel tht Ku klwt Klan f\uxnonl'd as an aJI·pu:tposr h.ut gtou:p. Prohibition «pasorn«d .111 unsucct:Siful .uudt on utbm, unnugnnt cultut\>. lllt Scopes tn.al fdl«ttd dw li.Jncbmmt.alJj( tqccdon of rnodrm scitna.

How did Htrbett HO
I

In mmy w:aya1 the detrlon sum~d up thf: conflicts of the 19l0s..lt pitttd AI Smuh, the epitome of urban immigrant rulrure, against Ht rbctt Hoowr, who seemed to be du: embodimem of a Horatio Alger scory. Smith's C.athohclsm dominated much of the pohrial discussion. HOO\I'C1""'s ..ictory reprtscnted a l:a11r humh for the. rurnl rr..dl ti onali~m ofcht Republican patty and puc into the

White House a man whe>st political philosophy pi"O'II!d inadequ.atc to the de. mands ol the Grtal Deptt,ion.

CHAPTER 24

1929-1939

C HAPTl R PR l VI l W

C,., and Oopmslon, 1929-1932 W1r« tauml ciN CotNt IRpas:siOf\ aM how did

,.,.,,_mpcnd?

Tbt- Oullattslllapo. 1933-1935 I~ Jtmtvpo.Jod riot - t Ntw o...J, ..J w.~~.,r probtt-nu •Nl dutlk-llfl!S ".rose m 193<1- 19351

The New Ileal Chang« Cou.,., 1935- 1936 \IV1tot by meosuru and setbodcs marlt.td the c.wrse o(lhl New Deal from 1935 ot~? The -Ileal's End Slagt. 1937-1939 How d1d lll~ Nlw DwJI tttd?

- · Sociol <1111110 alld Social Action in tho 19305 ,.,_,..riot MpmJiM .w111c NN o.m .nm '~'«¥<-,...,. io riot u.itniSUml

Tbt American CUI!urallce1t in tho 19305 Wlwt h:fd~nu Wped Arn«iotzn wltllrw in rht 1930s ~

Younc F.-m wortet in Western l'lonnoyi.W.. 09lOs.bJW>ll:e<Ewns

(ff) This icon oMII direct )
t nduringc:onciseee

Fr:~.nkhn

Othno Roosn'dt stt:med to h.l.."YC m:rything. Charming. h.mdsonw, .and thr scion of a ...:0-ro-do family, ht h.-:1 tOwd lifr usy. Nor )U fony, ht tw1 a rwd as :wisnnt stCf'tUl)' of the n.avy during World Wu I ~ had been rht Otmoc:ratic vic:t-pru&· dmrial andidatt: in 1920. But in Augusr 1921 an actaek of polio left him par.tlyud from thl.': waist down and unablt co walk. lbe iUnen ittmrd du end ofhiscarccr, but n_in:r e:nduringycars of therapy, he was ready ro rttmer politics in 1928. By rhe rime he nominactd AI Smlrh :u the 1928 Democratic convt"nrion, Franklin Roosc~l t'a long struggle had changed him

557

5 58

OfAPlER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW D EAL, 19l~J'

from a superficial, f.'\'tO arroganc, man who relied on charm imo a person of greacer compassion and far more understanding of che disadvantaged. "If you had spent two years in bed trying to wiggle your big toe,"' he once: said. "after that cvcryching else would s«m easy!" T he charm remained, but it was now backed up by determi· nation and fortitude. He was decced governor of New York in the fall of 1928. Eleanor RoosC\'l'lt had de"o'Oced herself to her husband•s care, ultimately encourag· ing him to rerum ro politics. At che same rime, already involved with social issues, she herself joined che cxccuti\~t board of the New York Demoaacic party and edited the women's division n~'Sietter. Painfully shy, she forced herself to make public speeches. The Roo.sewlts u'Ould soon need the qualities of characcer they had acquired. Elected president in 1932 amid the worst depression in U.S. history, Franklin Roosewlt dominated U.S. politics umil his deach in 1945. The early years of Rooscvclr's long presidency spawned a dizzying array of laws, agencies, and programs. from 1933 to 1935, the first phase of the New Deal emphasized rdief and recm-'tr}•through a united national effort. In 1935 Roo.sewlt charted a more radical course. l 'he so· called Second New Deal ( 1935 and after). placed less emphasis on unity and more on business regulation and on policies benefiting workers, small fanners, sharecrop· pers, migrant l abor~ and others at che 10'1'-~r e:nd of the scale. This chapter dew.lops two themes. The first is the New Deal's expansiw view of the government's role in promoting economic and social ~A'Clfare. The second is the response of the American people to the Depression. From factor}' workers, urban black~ and Hispanic migrant laborers to moviemakers, artists, writers, and photog· raphers, diwrse groups met the crisis with resourcefulness, creativity, and organized social action.

I

CRASH AND DEPRESSION, 1929-1932

WMt caused the Gn!'4 t Depression, 4nd lww did Pnrsid6nt l-ltXWer r6Spond?

I

11le prospenty of the 1920s collapsed m Ocrobcr 1929 With the stock-market crash. lhe crash, and the deeper economic problems that underlay it. launched a depression thac reached into e\'l'ry household. President Hom-er•s commitment to pri· vace initiath't and his horror ofgm-·ernmental coercion handcuffed him. In Nm~mber 1932 a disillusioned nation gave an O\"ctwhdming electoral mandate to the Demo· cratic party and Franklin D. Roosevelt. 1'his election set the stage for a \'ast expan· sion in the federal go\-ernmem's role in social and economic issues.

Scock prices had climbed l hroughout che 1920s. Begin· ning in 1928, optimism turned into fren.t.}' as specularors plunged into che market. In 192.5 the marker. value of all stocks stood at $27 billion; by Occobcr 1929 it had hit $87 billion. Nine million Americans "-plarcd the market;'' often with borrO\l-ed funds. Stockbrokers loaned specula lors. up to 75 pm:ent of a stock's purchase price, and credit bu)i ng became the rule. Treasur}' Secrecary Andrew Mellon's pressure for tax cues increased the money available for speculation. In 1928- 1929, construction declined b)•25 percenc, but few heeded the warning.

IIKII Tllundly llld

lit Onset olllle Dlpressloll

Stod: market aash; onset of depression ReconstrucOOn FinanceCorporation; Veterans' booos march; Franklin 0. Roosew!lt eiKted president Repeal ol EOghteenthAmencml!fll; Civilian ConseMiion Corps (CCC); federal Emergmcy Relief Act (liRA); Tl!fllles,.. Valley Atrthofiy (TVA); Agricultural AdjJstment Admilistration (AAA); National Recovery Admirislralion (NRA); Publi: Works Adminislri!lion (J'WA) S«urities and Exchange Comnission (SIOC); Tallo< Grazing Ad; Indian Reorganization Act SUil<es by Mexican-American all>'iculu"' wor\ers in the West S<Jpreme Coun declares NIRA Ufl(Onslitutional; Worts Progress Admilistration (\WJI); Resettleml!fll Administration; National Lallor Relations Act (WaiiJI'"" ol Wluslrial Ofganizalions (00) formed; cam.,;e Hall concert by Benny Goodman Orthestra Haleh Act; Marian Anderson concert at Lincoln Memorial; John Steinbeck. 1/w Grapes olltroih Emesl Hemingway, For IWlom the Bel/lOlls

In j uly 1928, and again in September 1929, the Federal Reserve Board tried to dampen speculation b}' increasing interest rates. Buc with speculators paying up to 20 percent incerest to buy more stock, lending inscirutions continued to loan mont}' freel}'-an ace akin to dumping gasoline on a raging fire. The collapse came on Occobc.r 24, 1929- .. Black 11lursda}'·" As prices feU, some stocks found no bu)'ers ac all: they had become worchless. On Tuesday, October 29, a record 16 million stocks changed hands. In the ensuing weeks, feeble upswings al· tcrnated ~Aith further plunges. !'resident Hom-er, in the first of many opcimiscic stacemencs, pronounced the c.conom}' "sound and prosperous:'' Indeed,. a weak up· swing carl}' in 1930 suggested lhat lhc. worse might be m-er. Instead. che econom}' W'Cnc imo a long tailspin. producing a full·scale depression. Whac caused the d epression? Structural ~A'taknc.sses in the American economy made the 1920s' prospcrit}' unstable. The agriculrural sector remained depressed through the decade. Rises in producti\i ty led not to higher wages but to high corpo· race profits. In 1929 the 40 percenc of Americans at the lowesc end of the economic scale received o nly 12 percent of the national income. 1'his reduced co nsumer pur· chasing poW'Cr. At the same cime. assembly-lin e methods encouraged owrproduc· don. B}' summer 1929 the aucomobile, housing, textile, eire, and other durable·goods industries were seriously overextended. Furcher, important sectors of industry-

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OfAPlER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW DEAL, 19l~J'

including railroads, steel, textiles, and mining-lagged technologically in the 1930s and could not attract the i~stment needed co stim ulate recm-er}'· All analyses link the: U.S. depression co a global economic crisis. Enfeebled by massi\'l' war-debt pa)ments and a huge trade imbalance with che United States, European economies crashed in 1931. T his larger crisis depressed U.S. exporcs and fed panic. Statistics tdl che bleak story of depression America. The gross national product slumped from $104 billion in 1929 to $59 billion in 1932. Farm prices, already low, fell nearly 60 percent. More: chan 5,500 banks dosed their doors by early 1933. Un· employment reached 25 percent in 1933; 13 million Americans had no jobs, and many who worked faced cuts in wages and hours. Some cities were far worse off. In lble:do in 1932, for example:, unemployment hit 80 percent.

Historical!)', Americans had viewed depressions as aces of nature: litde could be done: other than ride out the storm. l'reside:nt HOO\'l'l', "''ith his activist impulses, disagreed. Drawing upon his experience as U.S. food administrator in World War I and ass«· rctaryof commerce, Hoo\'er in itially responded boldly. But his belief in localism and in private initiati..-e limited his options. Business leaders whom Hom-er summoned co che White: House pledged co maintain wages and em ployment. Seeing une:mpiO)'Illent as a local issue, HOO\'er called on municipal and state gow~rnme:nts to cre:ace: public·"''Orks projects. In Octo· ber 1930 he established the: Emergency Committee for Employment to coordinate: voluntary relief efforts. In 1931, he: persuaded the: nation's largest banks to set up a privace: lending agency to help hard·pre:sscd sma ller banks make business loans. The crisis only intensi6ed, and public opinion turned against Hoover. In the: 1930 midterm d e:ction, che Republicans lost eight Senate scacs and control of the: House: of Representatives. Unemployment mounted, and in 1931 U.S. Seed, General Motors, and other farge corporations broke their pledges and announced large: wage: cues. Public charities and local welfare agencies faltered. In 1932, a presidential d e:ction )'Cat, HOO\'er swallowed his principles and took a bold step. In january, at Hoover's recommendation, Congress set up a new a~ncy, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), co make loans co banks and ocher lending instirutions. By j uly the RFC had pumped S 1.2 billion into che ccon· omy. But HOO\'l'r gained little: political bene6t. H oow~rsupported chest measures rductamly, warning of" socialism and collcc· rivism." He blamed global forces for lhe depression and argued that onl}' interna· tional measures would hdp. He ad\'OCated a ont·)'Cat moratorium on "'oar-debt and reparations repa}'ll'lents, a sensible plan but one chat seemed irrelevant to hardpressed Americans. ~~~Mer's Response

(F'f) Prima:ry Source: ~ Unemployment

~

.......

, . ,...... (RIQ Ap
Umu-.ana comJUnir.s

An ominous mood spread as hordes ofche jobless "''llited in breadlin~ slept on park benches, trudged the: streets, and rode freight trains seeking "''Ork. Americans reared on the ethic of hard work and self-ldiance experienced chronic unemployment as a shattering emotional blo"''· 11le families ofche jobless suffered as wdL

Newspapers humanized the: crisis. T he: Nrw l'Ork Timl!f described a section of Cencral Park where jobless men lived in boxes and packing crates. In wince:r cht:)' wrapped t hemselves in la)'ers of newspap~ which they called HOO\'et blankets. Vio· lence threatened in some cicie:s when people unable to pay chcir rem wen: evicted from homes and apartments. Hard rimes battered the nation' s farms. Man)' farms underwent mortgage foreclosures or fo rced sales because: of tax de:linquenc)'. At some: forced farm auccions, neighbors boughc che: foreclosed fann for a trivial sum and returned it to the evicce:d famil)'. In 1931, midwestern farmers organized the Farmers' Holiday Association to force: prices up by withholding grain and livestock from the: market, and dairy farm· ers dumped thousands of gallons of milk. The most alanning proce:stcame from World \'t'ar I veterans. In 1924, Congress had voce:d veterans a bonus stretched 0\'er a rn·ent)'·)'~ar period. In june 1932, some: ten thousand veterans, many jobless, descended on Washington co lobby for imme:· diate: payme:m. When Congress refused, most of the "bonus marchers" "''mt home, bur abouc tv.'O thousand scaycd on, building makeshift shelters on che outskirts of Washington. President Hom-·ercalled in the: army. On j ul)' 28, one chousand armed soldiers under General Douglas MacArchur, equipped with tear gas, tanks, and machine guns, drove the: veterans from cheir en· campment and burned it to the: ground. As a journalist described che: aftermath, vctc:r· ans and che:ir families "wandered from screet co street or sat in ragged groups, the men exhausted, the women with w~c handkerchiefs laid 0\'et che:ir smarting C)"C'S> the: chil· dre:n "''aking from sleep to cough and whimper from che: rear gas in che:ir lungs." For many, the incident symbolized the HOO\~tr administration's utter bankruptcy. Marching rhe mood of the: time, American fiction of rhe earl)' depression exuded disillusionment and despair. In Tht 42nd P!lralltl ( 1930),John Dos Passos drew a dark panorama oftv.-entieth-century America as money-mad, exploirii,!'C, and lacking spirirual meaning. As one character says, «Everything )'OU've "''anted crumbles in )'Our fingers as you grasp it."

Republicans renominated the unopposed HoOII'Cr at an intensely gloomy 1932 com-encion. The Democra~ in contrast, scented victory and drafted a placform to appeal to urban immigrants, fanners, and fiscal conse:rvacivc.s. Rejecting AI Smith, che: delegates gaw Ne:"'' York's governor, Franklin D. Roosewlt (FOR), the: nomination. Breaking precedent, FOR accepted t he: nomination in person, with a rousing speech promising «a ne:"'' deal for the American people." But his campaign pfO\ided no dear program. He: called for «boJd, persistentexperi· mentation" and promised more attention to "the forgotten man" while: at· tacking Hoo\-er's "-reckless" spending. Bur Roose:\-elt exuded confidence, and above all he "''lls not Hoo\-er. On NM>embe:r 8, FOR and his running mare:, john Nance Garner ofl'exas, received nearly 23 million ..'Ores; t he: Republicans mustered fl""-er chan J6 million. Boch houses of Congress wenc heavily Democratic.

1'111 Eledlon of 1932

A \'Miety of uooomic problemJ, rMlging from Jtock·m.uket lpeculll· t ian to gl~l uonom~ pcoblem $, ltd to t he cruh and deprcu:ian. HCXM"r turned to \'O]un tuU:m to cope with the dep""'Jion. The R«onJttuction Finance Corpo· r:.tion waJ creat«< to funnd monq• to bankJ and railro.lW, nac: di~tly to people.

Ame.Mcaru grew incu:uingly angry f.lilurc to 1'1:'-lpond to their plight; the banuJ marrh of 1932 illuJtrated the depth of~p.li r.

.lt HOO\-er'J

In the dea:ion of 1932, Ame.Mc:uu rejea:td lioovu and pvr t he W'hite HouJe a nd CongreJJ to Roose\'dt and the Democrau.

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OfAPlER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW D EAL, 19l~J'

THE NEW DEAL TAKES SHAPE, 1933- 1935 WMt stnl~ guided the early New Deal$ and what problems and cltalknges arose in 1934-1935? l 'he Rooscw.lt rears began in a whirl of activity. An array of emergency mea· sures proposed by Roosco.-elt and passed b)•Congress reflected three basic goals: in· dustrial rcc()I.'Cry through busincss-gm-ernmem cooperation and pump-priming federal spending; agriculcural recm-er}' through crop reduction.: and shorc·term emergency relief distributed through state and local agencies when possible, but di· rccdy by the federal gMwnment if necessary. Presiding m-er this bustle, a confident FOR symbolized hope.

FOR's optimistic inaugural address dedicated his admin· istracion to helping a people in crisis. "The only thing we have co fear," he intoned, "is fear itself:'' In an outpouring of support, half a million teeters d eluged the White House. Roosevelt seemed an unlikely popular hero. Like his distanc cousjn l 'heodore, he was of the social elite, fro m a long line of merchants and landed aristocrats. His Harvard-Columbia background highlighted his social status. But as a state sena· tor and gow~rnor of New York, he had allied with the Democratic Party's urban· immigrant ~A'ing, and when the depression hit, he had introduced such innovati\'t measures as unemployment insurance and a public·~A'Orks program. lntenc on rcviv· ing the economy while preserving capitalism and democracy, Roos.......,-elt had no de· tailed agenda He encouraged competing proposals, compromised (or papered m-er) d ifferences, and then backed the mea· sures he sensed could be sold to Con· grc.ss and the public. Roosco.-elc brought to Washington a circle of advisers nicknamed the brain trust, many of them from u niversities. But no sjngle ideology or sct of ad...isers controlled the Ne~A• Deal, for FOR sought a broad range ofopinions.

1eosewe1t and lis Circle

Eleanor RoostvtM Visits ~ Wtst Vii'Jinii Cool Milo, tm A tkw Yo'*« c02rtoon of 1933 portr:l)'c-d one oo;~.l miner exd02iming co :u'lothc-r, MO h migosh, here- come-s Mr:;. Roosevdt. • But re;~.lity $001'1 u ught up mth humor :.s the First L;ady immer~d herself in the- plight of the poor 02nd uptoited.

I THE Nrw OE.-L TAl:ES SHAPE, 19}]-19lS Eltanor Roosevelt pla)'ed a key role. A nieceofThcodore Roosevelt, she had expressed her keen social conscience in sectlcment-house work and Florence Kelley's National Consumers' League. Through her, FOR mct reformers, social "'-orkers, and advocates of minority righrs. Mrs. RoosC'\o-clc crawled ceasdessl)', observing depres· sion America firsthand for her wheelchair-bound husband. Roosewlt's cabinet reflected the: New Deal's diversity. Secrctar}' of Labor Fran· ces Pt'rkins,chc 6rsc woman cabinec member, had served as industrial commissioner of Nc~A' York. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes had organized liberal Republicans for Rooscw~lt in 1932. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenrhau, jr.• FOR's neighbor and political all)~ chough a fiscal conscrvati\--e, tolerated the spending necessary to 6nance New Deal anti-depression programs. A hose of ne'l'--comcrs poured into Washington in 1933- former progressives, liberal-minded profes.so~ bright)'Oung la~A')'Ct'S-Who drafted bills, competed for in· fluence, and debated recm-er)' strategies. f rom this pressure-cooker environment emerged the Ia~ programs, and agencies that became the New Deal

Berwccn March 9 and june 16, 1933, a period labeled the "Hundred OafS>" Congress enacted more than a dozen major bills (see Table 24.1). Rooted in the Progrcssi\-e Era, World War I , and the Hom-er presidency, these measures sharply expanded federal involw~menc in che national econom)'· The failure of thousands of banks by carl)' 1933 had broken people's faith in the entire S)'Stcm, and che banking crisis was FOR's most urgent challenge. On March S he ordered all banks to dose for four days. At the end of this s!Xalled bank holida)', he proposed an Emergency Banking Ace, which permitted healthy banks co reopen, set up procedures to manage failed banks, increased government m-ersight, and required chat banks separate savings deposits from their inV\'.scment funds. Congress also created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank deposits up co $5,000. In the first of a series of radio talks dubbed "fireside chats,"' FOR assured Americans chac they could again trust chcir banks.

5 63

bW"'o( FOR; tbt roltoCFil"'lt nodtfintd Udy Mid influmad JOCial policy during tht Nt'W Oto:.ll

1

frana5 Mils Former Progn":Ssino rdOI'ml'r and 6rst wom;a.n QbiO« mtmbt:r; ltd the committre th.u: •wte the- Social Sto:urity""

Tile IIIMred Days

TABLE 24.1

March 9 20 31

May 12 18

27 j une 13 16

Primary Source: FOR's First Fireside Chal

MAJOR MEASURES ENACTED D URING THE " H UNDRED D AYS" ( MARCW 9-JUNE 16, 1933)

Emergency Banking ReliefAct Economy Act Unemployment ReliefAct (Civilian Conservation Corps) Agricultural Adjustment Act; Federal Emergency ReliefAct Tennessee Valley Authority Federal Securities Act Home Owners' Refinancing Act Farm Credit Act; Banking Act of1933 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); National Industrial Recovery Act (National Recovery Administration; Public Works Administration)

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CHAPtER l 4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AH OTHE Ntw0EAL,I9l~J'

564

I

CM&.o

C.O..""'"

C..,. (CCC) Agency dut employed millionJ oryoung mtn

_ , &loerJ""Y leW Ad Ktysnme of udy New Oal that provided rditf funds eo citiC'.S

1and statr:s

Aoriculbnl A
Mwi.a.aao.

Agleocy"'"r·

Rriog d'!Ort to bdp F.u-mers

by rtducing production, r.Us. ingpri«'ll

NatioN.~ Rtcowry Alhi•isAttc'mpt topo coop. traricm io i'KO\"I')'dToru among F"mtnc"ot, bu.sioo~ bborlt..1Kkn

1111tioe

Other Hundred Days measures dealt with relief-addressing the urgent plight of Americans struggling to su rvive. 1\vo new agencies assisted those who were losing their homes. The Home Owners Loan Corporation helped city dwellers refinance their mortga~s. The Farm Credit Administration prO\ided loans co rural Ameri· cans to mect their farm pa)mcnts. In another relief measure, on March 31 Congress created the CiviUan Consuvadon Corps (core) (CCC) to employ jobless youths fo r reforestatio n, park maincenance, and erosion controL By 1935 half a million }'Oung men, some from families ~Aith no income at all, were earning $35 a monch in CCC camps-a Godsend to d esperate families. l 'h e principal relief measure of the Hun· dred Days. the Federal Emergmq• ReUef Act, prO\ided $500 million co fiJI the empty relie-f coffers of scaces and cities. While supplying immediate relief, the early New Dtal also faced the longer-term challenge of promoting recow~ry in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Some New Dealers ad\·oc:aced reduced production as a means of raising farm prices. As a first step co cutting production, the gO\'Crnme-nt paid southern cotton planters co plow u nder much of their crop and midW'CStern fanners to slaughter some 6 million piglets and pregnant sows. Killing pigs ac a time of ~Aidespread hunger prO\'ed a public-relations nightmare. l'urs.u ing the same goal more syscemarically. Congress passed the Agricultural Adjusnnem Ace in May 1933. This law set up a program b)• which producers of the major agriculrural commodities, such as hogs and wheat, received payments, called s.ubsidft.s, in rcrurn for cutting production. A tax on food processors (a tax ultimately passed along to consumers) fina nced these subsidies. A new age-ncy, the Agricultural Adjustment AdmJnistration (MA), supervised the program. The other key recovery measure of the Hundred Days, the National Industrial Recovery Act appro priated $3.3 billion for hcavy-~ utygow~rnmcnc public·~A
I THE Nrw OE.-L TAl:ES SHAPE, 19}]-19lS A few measures adopted during the Hundred Da)'S, hO\l'f:'\'ct, took a tougher ap· proach co business. The 1929 crash had produced a scrong antibusiness reaction. A Senate irr..-esdgacion of Wall Street in 1932- 1934 discovered chat none ofche rwcnty parcnersof the Morgan Bank had paid any in come tax in 1931 or 1932. l'roplc jeered when the president of the: New York Srock Exchange cold a Senate comminee con· sidcring regulator}' measures, "You gcndcmen an: making a big mistake. The Ex· change is a perfect institution." Rctlcccing the public mood, Congress in 1933 passed che ~dc.ral Securities Act requiring corporations to inform the governmcnc fully on all scock offerings. This law also made exccuti\--es personally liable for an}' misrepresentation of securities their companies issued. (tn 1934 Congress curbed the purchase ofscock o n credit- a practice that had contributed to che crash- and created che: Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) co enforce the new regulations.) The most innovative program of the: Hundred Days ~A'llS the Tennessee: Vallf:)' Authority (T VA). 1'his program advanced che economic and social de:\'tlopmentof the entire 1C:nncssce: Rh-er valley, one of the nacion's poorest regions. 10 help remedy substandard living conditions, a series of TVA dams supplied cheap hydroelectric f>O"''tr, bringing d e:ctricicy, industry, and jobs co the: region. The TVA also reduced flooding and soil erosion, and pro\·ed one of che New Deal's most popular and en· during achie:\-emencs. The mind·boggling bursc of laws and the "alphabet-soup" of new agencies during the: Hundred Days S}mboli:zcd both the dynamism and che: confusion of che: New Deal How these new programs and agencies ~A'Ould work in practice remained co be seen.

5 65

Teo...,.. Volley Aoldoority (IVA) AmbiriooJ pUn of romomic
@

lnteracti\•e Map: The Tennessee Valley Authority

As che depression persjstcd, several earl}' New Deal pro·

Pnlllems and grams faced difficulties. As the unity of the Hundred Days Cealml!nies Plague faded, corporate America chafed ac NRA regu lation. Small 1111 Early New Deal

business objected chac che codes favored big corporations. The agency itself bogged d~·n in drafting crivial codes. Corporate trade associations used the codes co scifle competition and fix prices. In May 1935 the Supreme: Courc unanimously declared the NRA unconstitu· donal. The Courc ruled chac che act gave the: president regulatory pO\l-ers that belonged co Congress and that ic regulated commerce wichin states, violating the Conscirution's limitation of federal regulation to commerce between or among states. As a rcc()'V'Cry measure, the NRA had failed. The AAA fared better but also generated comrowrsy. Farm prices d id rise as produccion declined; in 1933- 1937 M>crall farm income: increased by SO percent. But the MA's crop·reduccion pa}mencs actually hurt southern tenants and sharecrop· pers because cotton gro\1/Crs remM'l'd acreage fro m produccion, evicted che sharecroppers, and banked the subsid}' checks. While some New Dealers focused on raising total agricultural income, others took a more class-based approach and urged attention to che poorest farmers. 11leir cause was strengthened as a parching drought centered in che: Oklahoma panhandle region turned much of the Great Plains into a dust bowl (see Map 24.1). Each summer from 1934 through 1939, douds of dusc spread across the nation, darkening cities from Chicago to Boston and Savannah before biO\l•ing out co sea. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

5 66

OfAPlER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW DEAL, 19l~J'

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Map 24.1 Th• Dust Bowl from the D.lkot:.s SCKltl-rw;atd to the Muia.n border, f:.rmers in the Gre;tt P*;tins suffered from ;t l;aekof r;ai nf;all ;and 5C:YC're soil erosion in the 1930s, wo"ening the hMCiships of the Gre;~~t Oepi'\':$Sion.

Hlny Hopkiu A IOrmtt ;administntor ofNC"W York SUt.e d u ritolble ~ni.utioru; tmergtd a.s ont oltbt most ~ful 6guiT.S in the

No:w Ot.U

Battered farmers abandoned the land in drOV\'S. Some: migrated to che dtiesj ochers packed t hcir few belongings into old cars and headed west. Although from different states, they aU bore t he: derisi\-e nick· nameOkics. Ri\•alries and policy d ifferences also plagued t he: New Deal relief program. While Harold Ickes, head of t he: Public Works Administration, was super· cautious, HatTy Hopkins was impatient to gct money circulating. As unempiO)menc continued, Hopkins convinced Rooscw.lt to su pport direct federal relief programs, rather than channeling funds through state and local agecncics. Late in 1933, FOR named Hopkins to head a tempotar}' public-works agency, t he: Civil Works Administration (CWA), which through the winter expended nearly a billion dollars on short-term ~A'Ork projects for the jobless. When warm weather returned, FOR abolished the: CWA. Like his conservativl' critics, he: feared creating a per· manenc undm:Las.s living on relief. But persjstenc unemployment that swamped local relief agencies made furt her federal programs inevitable.

Despite t he: New Deal's brave beginnings, t he: depression persisted. By 1934 national income stood 25 pe:rcem abow~: Ollllages lroe 1933 le:wls but still far below 1929 figures. Millions had IIJ&Idandleft been jobless for three or four years. T he: rising frustration found expression in 1934 in ncarl}' two thousand strikes, some of t hem communist· led. With che: NRA under attack, conflict flaring over farm policy, and reliefspending growing rather chan declining. criticism mounted Con.servatt...·es attacked the New Deal as socialistic. Anti-Roosewlt jokes circulated among t he: rich, many of whom denounced him as a traitor to his class. But the New Deal remained popular, and FOR commanded the public stage. l'ursuing che narional-unicy theme, he urged co.·er)'One to join che battle for eco· nomic tcCO'ICr)' as they had united in 19 17 against a forcign foe. Although Republican newspaper publishers remained hostile, FOR enjoyed good relations ~Aith t he: working press, and journalists responded ~Aith favorable stories. FOR also savored public appearances and took nacurall)' to radio. His easy mastery of radio proYided a model for his successors in the television era. The 1934 midterm election ratified t he: New Deal' s popularity as the: Democrats increased their majorities in the House: and Senate. Kansas journalist William Allen White observed of FOR that «he's been all but crowned by the people.'" Still, the political scene was highly unstable:. ConseJVatives criticized the New Deal for going too far, and critics on the: left attacked it for not going far enough. Socialises and communists ridiculed Roosewlt's efforts to indude big business in his "all-American team;''

1154-1135:

Demagogues peddled more radical social and economic programs. Thr Decroit Catholic pries-t and radio spellbinder Charles Coughlin at· cackrd FOR as a «great becrarcrand liar," made anti-Semitic allusions, and called for nationalization of the banks. For a cime, CoughJin•s followers, the main!)' 10'1'-~r-m iddl e·d ass Nacional Union ofSodal Justice, sremed a potenc fo rce. Mranwhile, California physician Frands E. Townsend proposed that the government pay $200 momhly co all retired citizen~ requiring them to spend it within thirty days. l 'his plan, T()'l.'.n srnd insisted, would hdp elderly Americans, stimulate the economy, and create jobs by encouraging early retirement. Although the scheme "''Ould have quickly bankrupted the nation, many older citizens embraced it. FOR•s wiliest rh•al "''lls Huey Long of Louisiana. A countr}' la"'')'ct elected governor in 1928, Long built highways, schools, and public hous· ing. Hr roared into Washington as a senator in 1933 and preached his "Sharr O ur Wealth" program: a 100 percent tax on annual incomes ex· ceeding S I million and appropriation of all fortunes ow~r SS million. Ev· cry American family, Long promised, could enjo)•a comfortablr income, a house, a car, old-age benefits, and a frer college education. "E..~ry man a king." proclaimed Long. By 1935 he boasted 7.5 million supporters and d early had his e)'e on the White Housr. An assassin's bullec cut him do"''tl thac September, but Share O ur Wealth survived.

FOR':~ 0\\'n o ptimism, (ambined with his ;Wilityco (anveyit to th"' AmerWan people, W;lll prub;~.bly hi:~ :~i nglo: mo't im pon;1nt ;I.SlC't.

The- m;~.jor go;1b of tbC' NeYI Ot..U """"' indwtri.U ruo'lt'ry, ;~._gri(ul n~ul r«CM'ry, ;~.nd short· te nn n"1io:f. Dur ing t ho: " Hundred D;lY',.. Con· g!'e$:1 rwho:d thruu_gh m;~.jor mN· ' u rn, :Ill cho: f'tdo:r.U Emo:~n(y RdN-fAt-t, cho: N;~.tion.U l ndu$1ri;~.l R«o\'i'ry Act, tho: AgrWulrur~l Adju:~uno:nr Aet, ~nd cho: Ci,•ili;1n Con:ll'rv.uion Corp,.

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THE NEW DEAL CHANGES COURSE,

1935-•936 What key measures11nd utbadcs marked th.r rours.r ofth.r New Delli from 1935 on? Roosevelt responded vigorous!)' to his challengers. With the spirit of national unity fading. he shelved the unity cheme and \'«ted leftward. His 1935 State of the Union address oudined sjx initiaciV\'S: expanded public·"''Orks programs, assistance to the rural poor, support for organized labor, benefits for retired work~ tougher business regulation, and heavier taxes on che wcll·co·do. These: priorities cranslated imo a bundle of reform measures some called «the Second New Deal." FOR's land· slidr victory in 1936 solidified a new Democratic coalition.

With unemployment sciU high, Congress in April 1935 passed the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act. FOR swiftly es.tablished chr Works Progr~ss Administration (WPA). Like the CWA of the prior winter, che WI'A funneled relirfdirecdy to individ· uals,and FOR insjsted chat the program provide work, not handouts. O..~r its eight· )'ear life, chc WI'A empiO)'ed more than 8 million Americans and constructrd or improved \'llSt number'S of bridges, roads, school~ post offices, and ocher public facilities.

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Prima:ry Source: Memories of a BrutaJ ln~itution

The WPA also assisted ~A'fiters, performers, and arcists. The ~deral Writers' l'roject employed out-of·~A'Ork authors to produce state guides and histories of eth· nk and immigrant groups. In the South they collected the remin iscences of ex· slaw~s. Under the ~deral Music Project, unemployed musicians gave free concerts, often featuring American composers. By 1938 more than 30 million Americans had attended these events. The Federal Theatre Project (F1T') employed actors. One PTP project, the Living Newspaper, d ramatized contemporary social issues and 'A'llS criticized as New Deal propaganda. Pr P drama companies touring small·town America gave man}' chcir 6rs.t taste of theater. Artists ~A'Orking for che ~deral Arts Project designed posters, offered school courses, and decorated pose offices and courthouses with murals. Anochcr 1935 agency, the Nacional Youth Administration (NYA}, provided job training for unemployed youth and part·time work to enable college students to re· main in school. Eleanor Roosevelt, viewing young people as the hope of the furu.rc, took parcicular pride in che NYA. Harold Ickes's Public \l'orks Administration now picked up steam, expending more chan $4 billion over its life span. PWA workers completed some 34,000 construction projects, including New York City's Tribor· ough Bridge and Lincoln 1\.mnt:l, and the awesome Grand Coulee Dam on che Co· lumbia River. Monumental relief spending brought monumental budget de-ficits, cresting at $4.4 billion in 1936. The government borro~A'Cd to CO'V\'.r the deficits. British econo· mist john Ma)'tlard Kl')'tles had advocated de-ficit spending on public works d uring a depression to increase purchasing poY~Cr and stimulate recover}'· Ho~A'cwr, the New Deal was not Keynesian. Because all the money spmt on public·~A'Orks programs 'A'llS withdrawn from che econom}' by taxing or borr~·ing, che stimulus effect was zero.

The second phase of the New Deal more frankly focused on che interests of workers, the poor, and the disadvan· taged. Social-justice advocates like Frances Perkins and Eleanor Roose"'dt helped shape this program, buc so did hard· headed politics. Looking to 1936, FOR's political ad· visers feared that Coughlin, Townsend, and Long could sjphon off mough votes co cost him the: election. The Second New Deal's agricultural policy addrcs.st:d the plight of sharecrop· pers ('-''Orsme:d b}' che AM) and other poor fanners. The Resettlem ent Administra· tion ( 1935) made loans to help tmant farmers buy chcir own farms and co enable sharecropp~ tenants, and dust·bo~Ai migrants to mO'V\'. ro more productive areas. The Rural Electrification Administracion, also started in 1935, made low·intercs.t loans to ucility companies and fanners' cooperaciV\'.s, to extend electricit}' to the 90 percent of rural America that Lacked it. B}' 1941, 40 percenc of American farms enjo)'ed dectridt)'. The agricultural-recO'V\'.ry program suffered a setback in january 1936 when the Supreme Court declared the Agricultural Adjusnnem Act unconsticurional. T he processing tax that funded che AAA's subsidies, che Court held, was an illegal usc of the gO'V\'.rnment's tax po""-'er.10 replace the AAA, Congress passed a soil-
Aiding Ml&rants, Supporlilg Unions, Regulating Business, Tulng tbt WHitby

I

THE NEW DEAL CHA:>IGESCOURS(, 1!»$- 19)6

Organized Labor won a key victory in 1935, again thanks to Senator Robert Wag· ncr. Despite FOR's opposjtion during the: New Deal's nacional-unity phase, Wagner builc support for a prolabor law. In 1935 the: Supreme: Court ruled the: NIRA uncon· sticurional, including Section 7a protecting union members' rights, and FOR called for a labor law char would stand up. The National Labor Relations Actofjuly 1935 guaranteed collcctivc·bargaining righrs, ptnnitted dosed shops (in ~Ailich all em· piO)ttS must join a union), and outlawed such management tactics as blackliscing union organizers. l 'hc law created the National labor Relations Board (NLRB) to supervise shop elections and deal wich labor·law \i olarions. A 'A'll\\! of unionization soon followed. The Second New Deal's more class-conscious thrusc shaped other 1935 mcas· urcs. The Banking Ace strengthened che Federal Re:sen-e Board 's control 01/'Cr the na· tion's financial system. lhe: Public Utilities Holding Company Act, cargcr"ing the public-utility empires of the: 1920s, restricted gas and electric companies to one: geographic region. Also in 1935, Roose\-elt called for steeper caxes on che rich. \l'ith the Wealth Tax Act, Congress raised taxes on corporations and on che ~A•dl -to-do to a maximum of 75 percent on incomes abow $5 million. Although this law had man}' loopholes and was not quite the ..soak the rich" measure some believed, it did express the Second New Deal's more radical spirit.

The Social Security Act of 1935 stands out among New

Tbt Sodal Security Deal laws for its long-range significance. Drafted b)• a Ad of 1935: End ol committee chaired by Frances Perkins, chis measureestab· llle SecOIId New Deal

lished a mixed federal-state sysce:m of workers' pensions, survivors' benefits for victims of industrial accidents, unemployment insurance, and aid for disabled persons and dependent mothers and children. Taxes, paid in part by employers and in part by wa~s withheld from wocke:rs• paychecks, funded pensions and survi\'ors' benefits. Payroll ~Aithholding made sense politically because: workers would fight the repeal of a pension plan co which they had contributed. As FOR put it, "With chose taxes in there, no damned politician can e\'et scrap my social security program.'" The initial Social Security Ace paid low benefits and bypassed farmers, domestic workers, and the: sdf-emplo)'ed. How'Cver, it established the: principle of federal responsibility for social welfare and laid the foundation for a \'astly expanded wel-

5 69

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By September 1935, when Congress adjourned, the: Second New Deal was com· pletc. Without embracing che panaceas preached by Coughlin, Townsend, or Long, FOR had addressed the grie\•ances they had exploited. Although conservatives called this phase of che New Deal ..antibusiness,'" FOR always insisted chac he had sa't-ed capitalism by addressing che social problems it spawned. Business remained influen· tial in the 1930s, buc as the New Deal t:\'olved, the federal government acted increasingly as a broker for all organized interesc groups, including organized labor, not just corporate: America. And in 1935, ~Aith an election looming, New Deal strategists addressed the troubles of poor and needy Americans who had rarely concerned poli· ticians of the past. In the process, the New Deal vastly expanded the: role of the federal gOII'Crnment, as well as che: poW'Cr of the: presidency. Americans began to expect presidents to offer www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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CHAPtER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE Ntw0EAL,I9l~J'

national "programs" and shape che terms of public debate. This decisively altered the balance of po"''Ct between the White House and Congress as the New Deal rcde· fined the scope of the executive: branch and, more broadly still, che social role of the state.

With the Second New Deal in place and unemployment declining, FOR faced che 1936 election confidently. ..There's one issue ... ," he told an aide, "-it's myself, and people must be either for me or against me." l 'he Republican party nominated progressive gover· nor Alfred Landon of Kansas, who proved an inept campaigner. When Republicans lambasted Roosewlt's alleged dictatorial ambitions and charged that "'-orkers "'-ould soon haw to wear metal dog tags engraved with their social security numbers, FOR struck back with typical zest. Only the forces of "selfishness and greed'" opposed him, he told an dection·cvc rail)' in New York. "1"'hey are united in their hatred for me- and I welcome their hatred." In the most crushing electoral victory since 1820, FOR carried C\o-ery state but Maine and Vmnont. 1"'he Democrats increased their alre:ady·large majorities in Con· gress. Roosc...·e:lt also buried candidates of the Socialist and Communist parties, as "-"ell as ofthe Union party(acoalition ofCoughlin,10wnsend,and Share Our Wealth enthusiasts). FOR's 19361andslide announced the emergence of a new Democratic coalition. Since Reconstruction, the Democrats had counted on three bases of supporc: the white South, pans of the West, and urban white ethnic voters mobilized by big·city Democratic machines. FOR retained these cencers of scrength. He rarely challenged state or local party leaders who produced the voces, "'ilether they supported the New Deal or not. FOR carried the nation's twe:to.·e: largest cities. Not only did New Deal relief pro· grams aid cicydwe:Uers, but Roosevelt u-oocd chem persuasiw l)'· He appointed many from urban·immigrant group~ including Catholics and j ews, co New Deal positions. Expanding the Democratic base, FOR reached out to four parci all)•ow~rlapping groups: farm~ union memb~ northern blacks, and .....-omen. Mid"''CStern farm· ers, long rock·ribbed Republicans, liked the N ew Deal's agriculwral program and switched to Roosew~lt. The unions pumped money inco Roosevelt's campaigns (al· though far less chan business gaw the Republicans), and union members \'Oted M>cr· whelming!}' for FOR, whose reputacion as a .. friend of labor" proved unassailable. Although most southern blacks remained disfranchised, northern blacks voted in growing numbers. As late as 1932, t"--o-thirds of chem "''Cflt for Hoo\·er, leading one exasperated African·American editor co advise his readet'S to .. turn Lincoln's picwre to the "''llll. 1"'hat debt has been paid in full." The New Deal saw a historic shift. In 1936, 76 pm:ent of black \'Oters supported FOR. In economic term~ this shift made sense. Owing mainly to racial discriminacion, blacks' unemployment races in che 1930s surpassed those of the work force as a whole. 1'hus jobless blacks benefited heavily from New Deal relief programs. On issues of racial juscice, ho"''CVCr, che New Deal's record was mixed at best. Ra· dall)' discriminatory clauses in some NRA codes led African·American activists co

The 1936 Roosevelt Landllide and the New Democratic Coalltloll

I

THE NEW DEAL CHA:>IGESCOURS(, 1!»$-19)6

571

dismiss the agency as ..Negroes Ruined Again;'' and other New Deal agencies toler· aced racism. RoosewJt kept aloof from an NAACP campaign co make l}nching a federal crime. In 1935 and 1938 he remained passi\-e as antilynching bills were narrowly defeated in Congress. In limited "''ll}'S, FOR did address racial issues. He worked cautiously co rid New Deal agencies of blatant racism. He appointed more than one hundred AfricanAmericans to polk)··level and judicial positions, including educator Mary McLeod Bethune as d irector ofminoriry affairs in che National Vouch Administration. Bet· hune led the "black cabinet" that served as a link between che New Deal and African· American organizations. In addition, the .. Roost\'f:lt Supreme Court" chat cook shape after 1936 issued antidiscrimination rulings on housjng, \'Oting rights, wage discrimination,jur}' selection, and real-estate transactions. The New Deal also supported racial justice in symbolic "''llfS. In 1938, when a meeting of an interracial wdfare group in Birmingham, Alabama, was segregated in compliance wich local statutes, Mrs. Rooscvdc pointedly placed her chair halfway beNttn the white and black d elegates. In 1939, when the Daughters ofche Ameri· can Revolution barred a performance by black cont ralto Marian Anderson in Washington's Conscirution Hall, Mrs. Roosevelt re:Ugned from che organization, and Harold Ickes arranged for an Easter Sunday concert by Anderson at the Lincoln Memorial. The Roosevelt administration also courted women voters. Molly Dewson led the effort as head ofche Democratic party's women's division. In 1936 she mobilized fif. teen t housand women who wem door ro door discributing flrers describing New Deal programs. Oe\\o'SOO did not push a spedficall}' feminist a~nda. New Deal pro· grams of economic recovery and social "''Cifare, in her view, sen-ed the best interests of both sexes. FOR appointed che 6rs.tu.'Oman cabinet member, the 6rstwoman ambassador, and more female federal judges than an}' predecessor. l 'hrough Dewson's efforts, the 1930 Democratic platform comminee had a 6fry-6fty gender balance. Despite such symbolic gesru.res and FOR's appoincment of a few blacks and women, racism and sexism sciU pervaded American society in the 1930s. Roosevdc, preoccupied wich che economic crisis, did rdath·-ely little to change things. That challenge would await a later t ime.

FOR's commitment to consen •ation ran dttp. As early as 1910, he had tried to regulate logging that t hreatened .tlbeWest wildlife in Ne"'' York. Under his prodding. che Civilian ConseJVation Corps thinned forests, built hiking trails, and planted trees. Soil conservation emerged as a major priority. l h c Great Plains dust storms resulted not onl}' from drought but also from overgrazing and unwise farming practices. For decades settlers had used C".-er more pO\l-erful machines to cultivate more land on the Great Plains. They had plowed up lhe native grasses that anchored the soil, exposing the topsoil co parching "''inds when drought struck. By che 1930s ero· sion had destl'O}"C'd 9 million acres of farmland, wit h more in jeopardy. In response, the Dcparcmem of Agriculture's Soil Conservation Service sec up projects across the nation to demonstrate the value of comour plowing, terracing, crop rocation, and soil-screngthcning grasses. l 'he Taylor Grazing Act of 1934

Tbt Environment

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restricted che grazing chat had compounded the problem on public lands. l 'he lVA helped control floods that worsened soil erosion. New Deal planners promoted che national park mo'lement. Washington state's O l)mpic, Virginia's Shenandoah, and California's Kings Canyon all became nacional parks in the J930s. The adminiscration also established some 160 new national ~Aild· life refuges. The ~Aildernes.s-prescrvaci on mowmem kepc pace. In 1935 Robert Marshall of the U.S. Forest Service and environmentalist Aldo Leopold helped found che Wilder· ness Society. Pressed by wilderness a(h-ocaces, Congress sct aside a large wilderness area in Kings Canyon Nacional Park. By Iacer standards, the New Deal's environmental record was spocty. The dec· ade's massive hydroelectric projects, while necessary at a time ~Ailen many rural fami· lies still lacked electricity, had ecological consequences lictle noted at che time. The Grand Coulee: Dam, for example, destroyed salmon spawning on much of the Co· lumbia Ri:vcr's tributary S)'Stem. Ocher New Deal dams disrupted fragile ecosystems and adversely affected local residents, parricularl)' Nati'le American communities, who depended on these ecosystems for their livelihood. Vit:"'-ed in context, hO\l'f:'\•et, the New Deal's environ· memal record remains impressh-e. While coping ~Aith a gra'le economic crisis, the Roos...""\o-elt administration focused on environmental issues in a wa}' not seen since the Progressive Era, and not to be seen again for a generation. In the American West, the depression profoundly affected hordes ofhard-hit citizens, including dust-bowl refugees who soughc a fresh stare, especially in Cali· fornia. Continuing a long trend, the West Coast's share of the population spiked upward in the 1930s, and los Angeles jumped from tench to 6fl:h among U.S. cities. With the federal go\'f:'mment 0\l'ning a third or more of the land in eleven \l'f:'Stern states, che New Deal had an espedall)' big impact. New Deal agencies and latA~ such as che AAA, the Soil Conservation SerYice, and the 1a)1or Grazing Act, sec new rules for ~A'CStern agriculture, from grain and catcle to cicrus gr()'IJ'CS and truck farms dependenc on migrant Labor. Some of the largest IY\'t'A and WPA projects u-ere built in the West, including chousands of public buildings. Ab()'V'C all, che PWA in the West builc dams- Grand Coulee (KOO·I« ) and Bonneville (BAHN-~h-vi I) on the Columbia, Shasta on the Sacramenco, Glen Can)-on on the Colorado, and others. Boulder (later Hoo\·er) Dam ...,_IDtllthoplt on the Colorado, auchoriud by Congress in 1928, ~A'llS The New [k,~'s m;lui'lo'e hyd:rodenric projects were completed by che PWA Despite chcir ecological dO\l'n· cdebr;tted in thi.s 1937 "'Living Newsp;1per" production side, these great undenakings- among che largest engi· by the WPA's Feder:.! The.:.tr-e Project. neering projects in human histor)•- su pplied eleccric

I ThE NEW DEAL'S fN:O SrACE, '937-1939 J>O'I'""er co vast regions while also contribucing to flood control, irrigation, and soil conservacion. A New Deal initiaci\J'C particularl)' important to the West was Harold Ickes's National Resources Planning Board, established in 1934. This agency facilitated state and regional planning for such nacural resources as water, soil, timber, and minerals. Despite the West's celebrated «rugged individualism," Ne"'' Deal planning, in tandem "'ich che JlWA's dams and infrastructure dewlopmenc, reshaped the public life of the region.

THE NEW DEAL' S END STAGE, 1937-1939 1-/ow did the N6W De11l end? Buoyed by his enormous victory in the 1936 election, Roosevelt launched an abortive attack on the Supreme Court chat weakened him politically. In the wake of chis fight, FOR confronted both a srubborn re· cession and a ncwl)' energized conservative opposirionj a few final meas· ures in 1937- 1938 brought the New Deal co a dose.

573

The (ocw o( th e Suond New Deal sh il"ttd to induck :~ocial ju:~tice concern:~ a nd ;u~ks on, rather than coopcr.u:ion with, bu:~ine:r.s. Enonnous rdtc-( projuu likco t hOJe unden.:.l:en by thco \'(larks Progrels Admi ni:~trati on ehar.:.c-tC"ri:ud t he Second NC'w Deal. Org:miztd labor won a majon,ietory with thco p;ulagC' o( thC' National L.lbor Re-lation:~ Act, which guaran-teed rolknivt b.:.rgaining a nd pC'rm intd dOJC'd shop~.

Ttw- Sac:ial Secu rity k t :IC't the (umework (or :m C'XpandC'd $0Ci..:.l· wdf.u't sutco. In the' 19J6 dC'c-tion, a new OC'mocrnie coalition comc"rgC'd th.:.t would dominate national politio (ordtade:~.

FOR and Congrel:~ continuC'd to dug che'ir (eet o n racia l matter,;, :~ueh ;u lynching, but t hC'r prnmactd con$C'rw.tion and fe'(ormC'd Indian policy.

In 1937 the: Supreme Court comprised nine el· derl)' men, four of them arch-
After sho"Aing signs of recm-er)', the economy d ipped omi· nously in August 1937. lnduscrial production slumped. Soaring unemployment again dominated che headlines. This "RoosC\-elc recession" resulted in part from federal policies that reduced

Tilt loosevtlt lleuulon

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ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW DEAL, 192~3,

A Co~~~«•'s-lyt Viow ol Dep<mio11-&a Amtric.1 This 1937 image: by Dorothe:. hnge, :. photogr;2pher....-ith thoe F;nm Security Adrninistntion, piaul'\'s migr:.nts from chtTu::.s dust bow1 gathered a.t a. ro:.dsidt c:a.mp nt:.rCa.Jip.:.· tri a. in southern C:.lifomi:..

consumer income. Social-security payroll taxes wichdrew some $2 billion from cir· culacion. The Federal Rescn-e Board had raised interest rates to forestall inflation, further concraccing che money su ppl)'· FOR, meanwhile, had seized on the signs of recovery to cur back che New Deal relief programs. Echoing H()()\"Cr, FOR assured his cabinet, "Ewryching ~Aill work our all right if we just sir tight and keep quiet."' Some New Oealct'S, though, took che Keynesian view char deficit spending was the key to recovery. 11leir warnings of a political back· lash ifbreadlines and soup kitchens rerurned convinced FOR co authorize new relief spending in April 1938. WPA ~A'Ork-rdief checks soon rained down on che parched economy, and rhe PWA received a new lca.s.e on life. By late 1938, unemployment de· dined and industrial output increased. As late as 1939, hoW'Cver, more chan 17 per· cent of the labor force remained jobless.

r~ooccupied b)• the Supreme Courc fight, che recession, and menacing t'\"ents abroad (see Chapter 25), FOR offered Crowlnt Oppolilion few domestic initiatives after 1936. Congress, hO\l-e\-er, en· acted sew~ral significant measu res. The Farm 1tnanC)' Act of 1937 created the Farm Securit)' Administration (FSA) to replace rhe Resetd ement Administration. AJ. though the FSA did little to help the poorest tenants and sharecroppers, whom it considered bad credit risks, irs more than $1 billion in short-term loans b)• 1941 had enabled thousands of tenant farmers and sharecroppers co buy their 0'1'-'n fam· ily fanns. The FSA operated camps offering dean, sanitary shelter and medical services co migrant farm workers living in wretched conditions. The FSA also commissioned

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gifted photographers to record che lives of tenants, migrancs, and uprooted dust· bowl families. T hese FSA photographs helped shape a slal'kly realistic documemar}' scyle that pervaded 1930s popular culture. Other late New Deal measures set precedencs. T he Housing Act of 1937 appropriated SSOO million for urban slum clearance and public housing. The Fair Labor r.;, ~·or Staotl. .Ad Mitral ~subrion lll'tring ... Standards Act of 1938 banned child labor and established a national minimum oaricnul minimum ·~ and wage (initiall)' 40 cencs an hour) and a maximum workweek of forty hours. Despite a ma.rimum wod:WI'tk many loopholes, the law improw~:d conditions for some and underscored the govern· ment's role in regulating empiO)•ers' abuses. In a final scab at raisjng farm income, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 created a mechanism by which the gOio'Crnmenc, in years of big harvests and low prices, would make loans to farmers and warehouse their surplus crops. \'t'hcn prices rose, fanners could tepa}' their loans and sell their commodities. This complicated system set the framework of federal farm price support for decades. Overall, New Deal farm policy produced mixed results. Large-scale: gto'l"·ers benefited from subsidy paymencs, but the cumbersome price-support mechanisms involved problems thac would worsen wich rime. The New Deal's siO'I'-·er pace after 1935 also reflected the: rise ofan anti-New Deal congressional coalition of Republicans and conservative southern Democracs. In 1937, this coalition rejected FOR's proposal to reorganize the executive branch. l 'he conservative coalition also slashed rdief appropriations, cue corporate taxes, and killed che Federal Theatre Project, a conservative target because of its radicalism. Suspecting chac FOR used WPA staff members for poliri· cal purposes, conservatives in 1939 passed the Hatch Ace, forbidding fedAft:cor nodtaion, FOR suffi.rcod ;11 m;~.jor $C'tb.uk in h is: · coun·p.ld:ing" eral ~A'Orkers from participating in electoral campaigns. ll.ign .l.ff.lirs.

I

SOCIAL CHANG E AND SOCIAL ACTION IN T H E 19305 How did the depression 11nd the New De4/ affwrct specific S«ial groups in the United St4tes? American life in the J930s im'Oived more than policies. T he depression affected mosc Americans, including che jobless and their families; U'Orking women; and all age groups. For industrial workers,African·Americans, a growing Hispanic community, and Native American~ lhe crisis brought hard times, but the activist climate of the era also encouraged organized resistance to exploitation and brought new legis· lacivc initiatives.

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The depression brought untold human suffering. Unem· ployment ne\-er fell below about 14 percent, and for much l'sy(holo&tcll and of the decade it ran considerabl)' higher. T hose who were SodallmPad emplored often had co cake jobs bd ow chcir qualifica· tions. College alumni pumped gasj business-school graduates sold furnit ure. Bank· ruptd es, foreclosur~ and abandoned farms multiplied. A quarter of all fann families had to accept public or private assistance during the 1930s. l"sychologists described "unempiO)'ll'lenc shock": jobless persons ~Aoho walked the scrects seeking ~A'Ork and then lay awake at nighc ~A"-'th in the 1930s to a scanc 7 percent, in contrast co an average of20 percent per decade berween 1900 and 1930. t:tarents in the 1930s often struggled co make ends mect and hold the famil)' to· ~cher. They patched cloch~ smtched food, and turned to public assistance when necessary. In homes ~Aith a tradition of strong male authority, the husband's loss of a job often eroded self-esteem ~Ai th de\'astaring psrchological effect. "'I would racher turn on the gas and put an end to che whole famil)' chan let my ~Aife support me,"

The Depression's

I SOCIAL CHANGE AKO SOOAL ACTlON IN THE 1930S

57 7

one man told a social inV\'Scigator. Desertions increased, and t he divorce race, after a dip in the early and mid- J930s, edged upward, hitting a then all-time high b}• 1940. As for young people, one obsen~r compared them to a team of runners ~A>aicing for a starting gun that m:\~r sounded. High-schoolenrollmcm increased sharpl)', because many youths, seeing no jobs in view, simply Sta)~d in school. T he marriage race: dedi ned as )'OUng people facing bleak prospects postponed this step. Out of necessity, many families rediscovered traditional skills. They painted their """·n houses and repaired chcir own cars. Home baking and canning 1\.'VivecL Many would look back on che 1930s as a cime: ~A•hcn adversity encouraged coopera· don, sa\'Oring of simple pleasures, and sharing of scanc resources. For che neediest-among them blacks, Hispanics, and souchern sharecroppersthe depression imposed added misery on po\~rty·blighted li\'CS. In his nO'V\'.1Ntttive Son ( 1940), Richard Wright vividly portrayed the desperate conditions of family life in Chicago's black slums. Yct not all ~A'3S bleak. Emotional resilience: and patterns of mutual aid and survival s kills developed chrough )~ars of oppression helped man}' black families cope.

Be:cwccn 1900 and 1930, t he: ranks of factor}' workers had soared from 3.7 million to 7.7 million. Yet most of these workers remained unorganized. Major industries like: sted, automobiles, and texciles had resisce:d attempts co unionize t heir ~A'Orkers. The prosperity and probusiness mood of t he: J920s had furcher ~A'Cakene:d t he: labor mO'V\'.ment. Buc hard cime:s and a favorable gO'V\'.rnment climate bred a ne~A' Labor militancy in t he: 1930s. l 'he: Wagner Ace's guarantee of ~A'Orkers' right to organize energized some American Federation of labor (AFL) leaders. In Nove-mber 1935 john L. lewis of the United Mine Workers (UMW) and Sidney Hillman of t he: Amalgamated Cloching Work~ chafing at the AFL's slowness in organizing faccory work~ started the Committee for Industrial O rganization (CJO) within the AFL. C JO activists preached unionization in Pittsburgh's steel mills, Detroit's auto pl an~ and sout hern texcile factories. Unlike: the craft-based, raciallye:xdusivcAFL,. t he: C JO unions welcomed all workers in a particular industr)', regardless of race:, gender, or dcgrct: of s kill. In 1936 a CIO-sponsored organizing committee geared up for a major scrike to win union re:cognicion by chested induscry. (In face, Lewis had alread)' Sec:rctly nego· dated a se:td e:menc wit h the head of U.S. Seed, and in March 1937 U.S. St«l recog· nized che union, granted a "-'a~ increase:, and accepted a forty-hour ~A'Ork~k.) Other sted companies follo\1/C'd, and soon 400,000 steelworkers had signed union cards. Meanwhile, organizers led b}• the 6cry, socialist+orie:nted Walter Reuther (ROOth~r), mapped a campaign to organize deeply antiunion General Mocors. In December 1936 empl o)~es at GM's rwo body plants in Flint, Michigan, stopped work and peacefully occupied che factories, paralyzing GM's produccion by their "sit-down strike:." GM's management responded b}•calling in local police to harass the sit·dl)'ll.·n strik~ sending spies to union meetings, and threatening to 6re scrik· ers.. Ajanuar)' 1937 showdown wich che police ac one of the body planes led to the formation of the Women's Emergency Brigade:, whose members, on C'A'l'flt}'·fourhour alert for picket duty, pl.t)''td a key role during the rest ofche scrike:.

IIMM!rlal Worlu!rs Unionize

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GM asked che Roose\'i:lt administration and the: go'lernor of Michigan to send troops to expel the: strikers b)• force. Both officials declined. Although FOR disap· pr~d of che: sit-down caccic, he refused co inter'lene wich troops. On February II, GM signed a contract recognizing the United Automobile Workers (UAW). As Chrys· ler fell into line also, the UAW soon boasted more: than 400,000 members. Unioniza· tion of the cleccrical and rubber industries mo'led forward as ~A'CJI. In 1938 the Committee for Industrial Organization left the AFL co become t he: Congrus oflndustrfal OrganJzadons, a 2-million-member association of indus· trial unions. In response to t he: CIO challenge, che AFL began to adapc to the: changed nature of the labor force. Union membership shot up from under 3 million in 1933 to more chan 8 million in 1941. Some big corporations fought on. Henry Ford hace:d unions, and his tough lieu· tenant, Harry Benne:tc, organized a squad ofunion-buscing thugs to 6ght the: UAW. In 1937 Hennen-'s men beac Walter Reuther and other UAW officials outside Ford's plant near Detroit. Noc untill941 did Ford yield to union pressure. The Republic Steel Company, headed by union ene:tn}' Tom Girdler, also dug in. Even after U.S. Steel signed wich the CIO in March 1937, Republic and ocher smaller companies, known collecti\'i:ly as .. Litcle: Steel," resisted. In May 1937, workers in tv.rcnty-se:\'i:n lictle Steel plants, including Republic's facto ry in South Chicago, walked off the job. On May 30, Memorial Day, strikers approached O\'i:r 250 police: officers guarding the plant. Someone: chrcw a large: stick at che police, who opened 6re, killing four strikers and ~Aem e:nt bypassed low-paid ~Ae. But most rank-and-61e \N'Orkers had no desire to O\'i:rthrow che capitalist sys· tern. Indeed, man}' held back from striking, fearful for their jobs. Buc once the CIO's

I

SOCIAL CHANGE AKO SOOAL ACTlON IN THE 19JOS

5] 9

Labor Org.oizioc, 19lOS-Siylt ~Iter Reuther (left) ~nd Rich~rd Fr;~.llkenueen of the United Auto W~, ;~.ftu their ~:u:ing by Ford Motor Comp ;lny seeurity gu~s, 0\-:troit, fvhy 1937.

militant minority shO'I'--ed chat picket lines and sit-down strikes could ~Ain union contracts and tangible gains, workers signed up by the chousands. As they did. the radical organizers lost influence, and the unions became more conseJVati\'e.

The depression also brought social changes and acti\'· ism wichin the African-American and Hispanic communi· ties. Black migration to norchern cities continued in the 1930s, although at a slower race chan in che 1920s.. Some 400,000 southern blacks moved co northern cities in the 1930s, and by 1940 nearly one quarter of che nation's 12 million blacks li't-ed in che urban North. Rural or urban. life was hard. Black tenant farmers and sharet: of the group 'A'ere again convicted, however, and served long prison terms. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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OfAPlER l4! ThE GAUl DEPitESSION AHO THE NEW D EAL, 19l~J'

But rising activism signaled changes ahead. The NAACP battled in courts and legislatures against lynching. segregation, and che: denial ofvoting rights. l 'he Urban l..caguecampaigned "'ith boycotrs and picket lines against businesses in black neigh· borhoods that employed o nl)' whites. In March 1935 hostility coward whitc-~·ned businesses in Harlem, fueled by general anger 01/'er racism and joblessness, ignited a rioc that caused an estimated S200 million in damage and left- three blacks dead. The Communist party publicized lynchings and racial discrimination, and sup· plied lawyers for che «Scottsboro Boys," as part of a depression~cra recruitment effort in the: black community. But despite a few notable: recruits (including the: nm--elisc Richard Wright}, few blacks joined the: party. Other minority groups also faced discrimination. California continued its ef. forts co pre:\-ent Japanese-Americans from owning land In 1934 Congress sec an annual limit of6fty on immigrants from che Philippine:~ still a U.S. possession-lower than that for an}' ocher nation. Congress also offered fret: tra't-el "home" for Filipinos long settled in the: United States. The more chan 2 million Hispanic-Americans faced trying rimes as v.-ell. Some: were citizens with ancestral roots in the: Southwest, but most "''ere recent arrivals from Mexico or Caribbean islands, su ch as Cuba and Puerto Rico (a U.S. holding whose: residents "''ere and are: American citizens). Whereas the Caribbean immigrants seeded in Ease Coast cities, mosc Mexican newcomers worked as migrator}' agricultural Laborers in the So uthv.-est and elsewhere, or in mid"''CStern seed or meacpackingplants. As the depression deepened, Mexican-born residents faced mounting hostility. The influx of «Qkies" fleeing the dust b~'l worsened the job crisis, and by 1937 more than half of the conon workers in Arizona were ouc"f·stacers who supplanted Mexican-born Laborers. With their access co migratory work d isrupted. Mexican· Americans poured inco the barrios (Hispanic neighborhoods) of southv.-estern cit· ics. Lacking work, half a million Mexicans returned to chcir native land in the J930s. Some did so voluntarily. but immigration officials and local authorities expelled thousands. Mexican-American farm workers who remained faced appalling condi· tions and near-starvation wages. A labor organization called the ConfedcraciOn de: Unione:s de: Campesinos )' Obreros Me:xicanos (Confederation of Unions of Mexican Workers and Farm Laborers) emerged from a 1933 strike by grape: workers. More strikes erupted in 1935- 1936 on farms across che scace. O rganizations like rhe California f ruir GrD'I'--ers Exchange (which marketed it citrus under the Sunkist brand name) fought the: unions, sometimes "'ith violence. In one incident in 1933, rwo workers died when buUe:cs ripped into their striking cotton pickers' union haiL Undeterred, the strikers won a 20 percent pa)' increase, and ochers achiC"<-ed a fe:"'' su ccesses, coo. Their strikes also a"''llkened some Amcri· cans to the plighc of one of the: nation's most exploited groups.

The 1930s also revived attention co the: nation's 330,000 Nati\-e Americans, mosc of whom endured po\-erty. scant Nlllwe Americans education, poor health care. and bleak prospects. The: Dawes Act of 1887 (see Chapter J7) had d issolved che tribes as legal entities, allo· cated some tribal lands to individuals, and sold the: rest. By che earl)' 1930s, whices owned about rwo-chirds of the land that Nati\'C Americans had possessed in 1887,

ANew Dol lor

including much of the mosc valuable acreage. 11lat Indians had been granted full citizenship and vocing rights in 1924 did litcle: to impro'le their lot. In the 1920s a refonn mo..-emcnt arose. One reformer, john Collier, who had li..-e d among che l'ueblo Indians of New Mexico, founded the American Indian De· fensc Association in 1923 co preserve the spirirual beauty and harmony chat he saw in traditional Indian life. Appointed commissioner of Indian affairs in 1933, Collier cadged funds from New Deal agencies co build schools, hospitals, and irrigation syscems on Indian resewarions and co prcscn-e sices of cultural importance. 11le Civilian Conscwarion Corps emplored tweto.-e thousand Indian )'OUths co work on Roorpniuboo M. projects on Indian lands. Effort dtu'ing tbe New Dtoal to Pursuing his vision of renewed tribal life, Collier drafted a bill to hale che sale of ~T.Store die' SO\"no:ignc:y and viahilityoCiod.ian trillc-.s tribal Land, rescore the rm1aining unallocated lands to tribal control, create new rcseJVations,and expand existing ones. It also envisioned tribal councils with broad go\~rn ing po""--ers and required Indian schools to teach Nati\~ American hiscory and handicrafts. The bill sparked opposition. Some In· dian leaders criticized it as a plan to transform the reservacions inco livThe- diC'pi\":IJion profOundly, ;and ing museums and to treat Natii,!'C Americans as exotic and backward. neg..uivdy, affected womtn in thiC' wolio: fortiC'. Successful Indian property owners and entrepreneurs rejected che bill's Familtu Jtruggled ro COpe' «onomi· tribalist assumptions. The bill d id, indeed, reflect che idealism of u~ll c
'"""' I

I

TH E AM ERICAN CU LTURAL S CEN E I N T H E 19305 What key developnt6nts shaped Am6rican culture m the 1930s?

Hard times and the New Deal shaped Amer1can culcural bfe m the 1930s. Wlule radio and che mc:wies offered escapist fare, no\·dists, arcis~ playvlrights, and photographers responded to the crisis as ~A'CJI. Asche decade wore on, a more positi\-e and affirmariw tone in culru.ral expressions reflected boch the renewed hope of the New Deal and apprehension about C'\-ents abroad.

The slandardizarion of mass culture continued in the 1930s. Eache..~ning millions ofAmericans gachered around their radios to listen to news, musical programs, and com· ed)' shows. Radio humor flourished when the real world was grim. So, coo, did che fifteen-minute afternoon dramas kn~·n as soap operas (because soap companies sponsored them). Despite their assembl)•· line quality, chese

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daily dollops of romance and melodrama won a de\'Otcd audience, mostly housewives. Identifying wi[h che troubled radio heroines, female listeners gained at least temporar}' escape: from their own difficulties. The moYies were also cxcremd }' popular, and most people could scill afford t he tv.rcncy·6~cem admission. In 1939, 65 percent of Americans V.\'!nt to the mc:wics at least once a V.\'!ek. The motion piccure, declared one Hollywood cxecucivc, had be· come «as necessary as any other daily commod ity." A few mO\i es dealt realistically wich such social issues as labor unrest and t he sharecroppers' plight. Two New Deal documentaries, Tht Plow nJttt Brokl! tbt Plains, on the origins of che dust bO'I'-'1 , and Tbl! RiPCt; on erosion and floods in the Missis· s.ippi Valley, evoked the h uman and environmental toll of westward expansion. War· ncr Brothers studio made a series ofmoYies in 1934- 1936 celebrating the New DeaL And in Mr. Dmls Cots to Town ( 1936) and Mr. Smith Cots to Washington ( 1939), direccor Frank Capra, the son of Italian immigrants, offered the: idealistic message that "-t he: people" would always triumph 0\'cr entrenched interests. Gangster movies, inspired by actual criminals like Al Capone and j ohn Oil· linger, sen -ed up a different scyle: of lilm realism. Films like Littlt Gu-sar ( 1930) gritcil)' portra}'e d an urban America of looming sk)'SCrapers and dark, rain-swepc screets shredded by the: rac-cat·tatofmachineguns as rival gangs battled When civic groups protested t he glorificacion of crime, Hollywood made police and ..G-men'" (federal la~A'·enforcement agents) t he heroes ~Ail ile retaining the \iole:nce. The movie gang· sters played b)• Edward G. Robinson and j ames Cagney u-ere variants of t he Horatio Alger hero struggling upward against ad\·mity. Thcir portrayals appealed co depression-era moviegoers facing equally heavy odds. Abot.-e all, OlOYies offered escape- the chance to briefly forget the depression. Mu· s.icals like Gold Diggm of19J3 (\Nith its theme song, ..W'e •re in the Money") offered dancing. music, and cheerful plocs im'Oiving the criumph of pluck O\ 'et all obstacles. When color mO\ies arriwd in the late 193~ they seemed an omen ofbcrrer times ahead The Marx Brothers provided the decade:•s zaniesc movie moments. In comedies like Animal Crdl:km ( 1930), these vaudeville t roupers created an anarchic world that satirized auchority and demolished all logic. Amid cynicism abouc che collapse of 1929, the Marx Brothers• mockery marched the: American mood. African·Americans appeared in 1930s• moYi~ if at aU, o nl}' as scercocype:s. Un· der che denigrating screen name Stepin Fctchit, black acror Lincoln Perry plarcd t he: slo~A'·Wi tted buffoon in many movies. In representing ~Aman Rl!btls ( 1936). Mae Wesc, bras.sy, openly sexual, and fiercd}' independent, mocked com\'!ncional stereotypes in I'm No Angtl (1933) and other 1930s' hits.

As the 19 30s ended, man}'Americans vie'
fa,orably. It had suJVi\~td the depression. The social fabric remained .....-hole:; tl'\'Oiurion had not come. As othc:r sodcties collapsed inco dict:atorshi !'S> American democracy endured. Wri te~ composers, and ocher culrural creators reflecred the changed mood, as despair ga\\'! way to a more upbe:ac and patriotic ourlook.

I

THE AMEIIJCAH CUUVRA.l SCENE IN THE 19JOS

A m()I.!'Cment known as the Popular front influenced this shift. In 1935 Russian dictator j oseph Stalin (STAHL·in), fearing actack by Naz.i (NAHT·zee) Gerntan)', called fora worldwide alliance, or Popular Front, against Adolf Hider and his Italian ally in fascism (FASH·i.sm), Benito Mussolini (ben·EE·toh moos-soh·lEE·nee). Par· roting the new SoYi« line, U.S. communists who in the earl)' 1930s had anacked FOR and the New Deal naw praised Roosevelt and summoned writers and intdlec· tuals to the antifascist cause. Many noncommunists, alarmed by dew~lopments in Europe, responded to the call. The high·water mark of the Popular Front came during che Spanish Civil War of 1936- 1939.Jnjuly 1936 Spanish fasdst~neral Francisco Franco re\'Oited against Spain's legallyelec:ced left-wing gow~m ment. With militar)•aid from Hitler and Mus· solini, Franco ~A'On backing from Spanish monarch is~ l ando~A'tlers, and industrial· ists, and from che Roman Catholic hierarchy. In America, writers, artists, and intellectuals ~Ailo backed the l:topular Front ral· lied to support the anti· Franco Spanish Loyalists (those loyal co che elected govern· ment). l 'he novelist Ernest H eming~A'ay, who visited Spain in 1936- 1937, expressed a newfound sense of worthwhile purpose in For Whom the Bell Tolls ( 1940), the srory of a young American volunceer who dies while fighting with a LO)'lllisc guerrilla band. The Popular Fronc collapsed on August 24, 1939, when the SoYiet Union and Nazi Germany signed a nonaggression pace and divided Poland bctv.~en them. En· thusiasm for cooperating with the communists under the banner of"antifasdsm " quickly faded. The New Deal's achiC"<~ments also comribuced co che culrural shift of the Lacer 1930s. The sacire and C)'llicism ofche 1920s and early 1930s yielded to a more hope· ful view of grass-roots America. In john Steinbock's best·selling now~l 71Je Graptr of wrath ( 1939), an uprooced dust·bo""l family, thejoads, make chcirdifficult "'aY from Oklahoma co California, rew~aling rhe strength shO\I.' n by ordinary people in depres· sion America. As Ma joad tells her son 10m, "1"'hey ain' t gonna wipe us out. Why, W'C're the people- we go on." In 1936 writer james Agee and phocographer \'t'alker Evans spent weeks living with Alabama sharecroppers co research a magazine article. 1"'he result was Lrt Us Now Praise Famous Men ( 1941). Enhanced by Evans's unforgectable photographs, Agee's masterpiece e\-oked the strength and decency of chose: living on sod etfs margins. Composers also reflected this spirit of cultural nationalism. In Hii!J rJJe Kid ( 1938) and ocher compositions, Aaron Copland drew upon American legends and folk melodies. George Gershwin adapted a popular 1920s play about black street life in Charleston, South Carolina, fo r his opera 1-\l'X}' and lkss (1935). jazz flourished in rhe later thirties chanks co swing,. a danccable style popular· iud by the big bands of Benny Goodman, Count Basic, Duke Ellingron, and others. Clarinetist Benny Goodman challenged the color line in jazz, including black musi· d ans like pianist Ted d)' Wilson and vibraphonist Lionel Hampton, along ~Aith white performers, in his orchestra. A turning poinc in the acceptance ofjazz came in 1938, when Goodman's band performed at New York's Carnegie HaiL The later 1930s also sa"'' a heightened incerest in regional litcrawre and arc. Zora Neale Hurston's nm~l Tm-ir Eyts Werr Watching God ( 1937), exploring a black woman's search for fulfillment, was sec in rural Florida. In Absalcwn, Absalom! ( 1936) William Faulkner continued che saga of his mychic Yoknapacawpha County in

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Mississippi. Painters Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, j ohn Sceuart Curt}' ofKan· ~and Gram Wood of Jo"''ll struck strongly regional notes in their work.

Galleries displayed folk paincings, Amish quilts, and New England weacher vanes. A 1938 show at New York's Museum of Modem Art introduced Horace l'ip· pin, a black Philadelphia laborer whose paintings, such as jobn Broum Going w His Httntfn& m-ealed a genuin e, ifunwtored, talent. In 1939 the same museum fea tured s...-.....·emy-nine-ycar-old Anna "G randma" Moses of Hoosick Falls, New York, whose memory paintings of her farm girlhood enjo)·ed great popularity. This cultural nationalism generated a fascinacion "'ith the nation's past. Amcri· cans flocked co historical re-creations, such as Henry Ford's Grecnfidd Village in Michigan and Colonial Williamsburg in Virginia In 1936-1939, Texans restored the Alamo in San Antonio, the ..Cradle ofTcxas Liberty." Historical nO'V\'.ls like Margarct Micchdl's epic of che Old Souch, Gone wiiJJ the Wind (1936), became best-sellers. These re-creations and 6ccions often presented a d istorted view of history. Sla\"ef}' was blurred or sentimentalized at Colonial Williamsburg and in Mitchell's nm-e:L "1t:xas l iberty" had a different meaning for the state's African-American, Indian, and Hispanic populations than ic d id for those who wrned the AJamo inco a tourist shrine.

A design style called streamlining also shaped the \i sual culture of the lace 1930s. This style originated in the 1920s when industrial designers, inspired by the airplane, intro· duced smoochly flo"'ing curves into che design of com· mercia! produces. Streamlining appealed to consumers- a \i ta! business consideration during che depression. When Sears Roebuck screamlined its Coldspot refrigerators, sales surged. As products ranging from house trail· ers to pencil sharpeners and cigarette Ughcers emerged in slttk new forms, streamlining helped corporace America rebuild its image and present itself as the benevolent shaper of a betcer future. Under the theme"l·he World ofTomorrow,"' che 1939 New York World's CHECKI NG I N Fair represented the high point of the streamlining vogue and corporace Duri ng the deprt-J:~ion, radio and America's public·relacions blitz. Inside the fair·s hallmark 1\'.risphere, a gi· the m(Wi<."$ offered t$Upilt (au to ant globe, visitors fou nd "Oemocradty," a diorama sh~·ing a harmonious miUion:~ of Ameri.e.:mJ. dcyofche fuwre. The Pbpul.1r front britlly lint.:ed l 'he hit of the fair was General Motors' Fuwrama, which ga..-e \i sitors a noncommuni:~t .:and communi:~t imdlecruak \i sion of the United States in the distant }"ear 1960-a nation of complex A pwiti~ mood tmc"rgtd by the' multilane highwa}'S with stacked interchanges. Futurama builc public sup· l.ltC' 19JOJ in worfu liM 1M Gmpa port for the incerstate highway S}'Stem that "''Ould soon become a reality. {IfWroth. Also featuring such wonders as television and a utomacic d ish"''llshers, the The' SUCCt:l$ of the' Ntw [)re.l) and \'t1orld's Fair epitomized corporace capitalism 's \-ersion of the pacriorism and IQQming imtr n.ltionil probiC"-nu hopefulness chat pervaded American culw.re as che 1930s ended. ftd into .1 rUing JC'-n$C' of culrur.d nation.1l i:~m. 11le hopefulness was mixed with muced fear. The nacion had survh·ed By 1939 American$ looked to the' the worst of the depression, but danger loomed m'Crscas. The anxiety crig· future with opc:imi$m, C"-mbodlc-d in gercd by the menacing world situation surfaced on October 31, 1938, when the Worl d'$ Fair, but the"iropc:imi$m CBS Radio aired an adaptation of H. G. Wells's sdence-6ccion story \Var of w.u mixtd with anxitt)' abou t wocld affairs.. the U'orlds, d irected by Orson Welles. In realistic decail, che broadcast reported

the landing of a spaceship in New Jersey and the advance of aliens with d eadly ra}' guns toward New York. The show sparked a panic as horrified listeners believed the end 'A'llS at hand. Beneath the terror lay a more: rational fear: of approaching war. For alchough Americans had coped with the d epression, the international situation had drterioratcd. By October 1938, radio news bulletins warned of an impending war be:· cwccn German}' and England. B}' che time the New York \l"~orld's Fair offered its vi· sion of "10morrow," the actual world of 1939 'A'llSvery scar}' indeed.

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What caused the Great Depression, and how did President Hoover respond? (page 558)

I

HoO\~r•s emphasis on voluntarism prm\_"<1 inadequate to the: magnitude of problems caused t,· che Great Depression, but he: would not mO\Il: bryond thou to exte:nd direct aid to pooplc. Disenchanted Arnrricans sneered at .. Hoovrn•ilk s" and were: appalkd t,· the: way thr administration responded to the: bonus march.

What stratef,Y gJJided the early New Deal, and what problems and challenges arose in 1934-1935? (page 562)

I

lnitiall)'• Roosf!\·d t we:lcomrd big business in his deptcSsion·fighting coali· tiorL The first hundred days of FOR's term saw passage: of measures intended to achieve industrial recm-ery, agricultuml rt<:O\~ry, and short-tcml relief: thr Federal Em~rge:ncy Relief Act, the National Industrial Rccm-ery Act, che Agri· cultucal Adjustment Act, the Tennessee Valll':)' Authority, and the: Civilian Con· ser\'ation Corps. The: New Deal also fratured rrform measures, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and thr ~ eral £X:posit lnsurancr Corporation.

ROOJnstruction FiBance Corporation (p. 560} Boanor Roosoveh (p. S6J) frances P
fodoral Emorgoncy Rolil'f Act (p. 564}

AgricultlJral Adjustmont Admilistration (p. 564} National Recovery Adninistration (p. 564}

T'""""' """'Aulllorily (p. 565}

Harry Hopkins (p. 566} Works Progress Adninistration (p. 567)

National Labor Rotations Act (Wagnor Act) (p. 569} Social S.curity Act (p. 569) Farm Security Mniniwa!ion (p. 574)

What key measures and setbacks marked the rourse o{lhe New Deal from 1935 on? (page 561)

I

From 1935 on, during the s~callrd Second New Oral, fude:ral policirs brcame more: concerned with social justice: and less intrtCSted in cooperating with business. Relief projects, such as thosr of the Works l>rogress Administtarion, gavr jobs to millions of pooplc, and the: National Labor Relations Act opened the: way foe the succrss of industrial unionization. l'he Social Security Act cstablishrd che framework for the modrm social-welfare state. FOR's smashing

fair Labor Slandards Act (p. 575) ConiiJOSS of Industrial Orlfilrilations (p. 578} Indian ReorganizationAct (p. 581) Popolar front (p. 581)

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0tAPUI 14

'On Glt.U DEPA.USION AH OTHE NEW DEAL, I,I,..,J9

culrct:ion VICtory m 1936 soliddi«l tht Dtmocnric coalition he h;ad totpd. lndudmg the whJtc: Sourh, f;trmrrs. ucb.m nhnics, umon mcmbc:ts. and AfriaJl..AmMQN.

I

Howdidthtl*wO..Ittrd?(l"'t1573)

Tbt WluA"ofFDR's .,COUrt·pading"' schtmt mel tbt .unv.U of1. rt'ttUIOn 1n 1937 slDII''td the momentum of thc Nnw- Dell. and ;a cong.res:siocul ro.ahhon of

R.tpublkuu a.nd coruet'\'liM lkmocrus madt passagr: of m.apr lq;ul&oon Vlt• nu.Jiy 1mpol1,1bk, 11'le riSt of f.lSCl.Sm and Nui.sm in Europt", md )1.pan~ ag• grtss10n in Alila. took center ' ragt.. By 19 38, f.lcing rising constn•;attVt oppoll1h01l and mmatu abroad, the Nrw Deal's u:fonnist entrgits fadtd.

How did the depression and the New Deal affect sperific sodalf!Vups in th
I

Familu:$ struggl«:d economically and psychologically during the dcpmsion. lndll..SfrW •·otlu,.,rs., with 1he backing ofrhe:administtarion,orgamud unions in prtVlOusly unw~Uml c uaon, such :u auromobiks. Womm and Afric11.n• Amcttcms contmucd to fJCc discrimination, whilt: migcant wor\crs " l!A" also hard tut. for N;UI\1! Amt"ric:aru, Nrw tktl ~.arion mtotrd tttba' kg,d SU;• tus, bying the groundwotlc: tOt fururY tntttpriws a.nd ttYaty cl.ums.

WI>Jr U, dM/opm
I

Amman cukurY tn rhr 1930s reAtcrtd t:M dtc.adt"s «
CHAPTER 25

1933-1945

CHAPTlR PRlVI l W

Til< U!Wted Stales in a Menacing \Vortd. 1933-1939 Howdol 1M Am«ric.. p.opk""'11"""""'"' mf>'>M,.IMW.n»fimMmwso(U.. t9JOs?

. -

..,..;~;,.~·,- ,.. "

lrllo lilt SIDrm. 1939-1941 \'\1111Jt .Jrr:w dN Uft;retl Slatn .in~D Vhrld ~r Ill

<~- ,A..,ric.l

Mobilizes lor Wll. Howd1d wor mobiliration rransform the Amtn'QI'n

ceot~omJ onrJgtii'M'!mffnt?

Til< S.lllelrOfll, 1942-1944 W1tat wwn tiN ltt4f'jor aspects ofAllied mjliwry .s.tnrttg M EW'Opt ~w:l A.Jio? •-t.,....t._ w., and Amorkan lodfty ,.,.. ...,..,.,.,..., o(>\l>rld-....

........... .....,,loodudioJ.....,_..>I_? TrUnpl! and Trag
~!~~:~:J~~- W1rot nn~lssurs drd rhe U.S. f"'U''tt'ltnt COI{ront in tk(N&mg CtrmtJny ~tndjapon in 1945?

O kiNWI. tiMS

T

•th~t

o mosr Americans, World W,u ll Wl.S good war;'" Unhkt tht nations of&La. ;md Europe, fm Unitni Scuts sufftnd no inns:ion of its homdmd. no bombinJ o(irs dtks, no m.us killing of irs d\,_l:i.ans. 1'bt war lifta:l tilt United Sates ow- of dlt Gre.u J)r.. prenkln and propt:Ucd m.my into the middle c:bss, mod it g,~vt un·

prtttdmted opportunitia to m111ions of minorities and women. 11l:u "Good War,"' hO\\'t\'«, had little co do with E. B. Sledge's erpc"ri·

(ff) This icon oMII direct )
t nduringc:onciseee

cncc fighting in rhe South l'adAc, E. B. Sledge's harrowing W'llrtlme experiences drM'l' him to writt: a memoir of unrelenting hon'Or, \Vitl1 tlw Old Bm~d. Describing t he bardes of~ld iu and Okinawa, Sledge depicts a brurallandscapc of

587

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AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4 S

war wichout mercy. He o nce saw a fellow marine use a knife to t ry to extract the gold tcech of a .....-ounded Japanese soldier, even as the man t hrashed in pain. On Okina· wa's Half Moon Hill, he dreamed chat the decomposed bodies of marines sprawled about him sl~'lyrose, unblin kingly scared at him, and said, "'It is m-er for us who are dead, but you muse struggle, and will carr}' the memories all your life." The warcime experiences of few Americans matched those of Sledge. Yet World War II fundamentally changed nacional inscirutions and t ransformed individual be· havior. It also created a new world order t hat left t he United States at the pinnacle of its poY~Cr and so~A'Cd the seeds of a postwar crisis. It 'A'llS indeed, in Eleanor Roo· s......._·elr's .....-ords, ..no ordinar}' rime...

THE UNITED STATES IN A MENACING WORLD,

1933-1939 How did tM Ant6rjcan people and g<Wernnt6nt 111spond to tM inurna6onal crises oftile 1930s? Apart fro m improving relations with l atin America, the early administration of !'resident Franklin D. RoosC'\o-elc (FOR) remained fargd}' aloof fro m the crises in che world. Americans reacted ambi\•alemly as Italy, Germany, and Japan grew more ag· gressivc. Millions of Americans, determined not to stumble into war again, sup· ported neutrality. Only a minority wanted the United States co hdp embattled democrades abroad. All che ~Aohile, t he: ~A'Orld slid toward the precipice.

!'resident RoosC'\o-elc at 6rsc put American economic inter· esrs abol.>c all d se: and showed little interest in free t rade: c:.INI!ilbbor or internacional economic cooperation. He: did, h~'f:'\'f:'r, commit himself to an internationalist approach in Larin America, where bitterness m-er decades of "Yankee imperialism " ran high. In his 1933 inaugural, he: had an· nounced a "Good Neighbor'' policy. renouncing any nation' s righc to intervene in the affairs of another. Under this policy Roosewlt withdrew the last U.S. t roops from Haiti and the Dominican Republic, persuaded American bankers to loosen their grip on Haiti's cencral banking S}'Stem, and reduced the U.S. role: in !':mama· nian affairs. C uba and Mexico provided major tests of the Good Neighbor policy. In Cuba, an economic crisis in 1933 bro ught to po~A>cr a leftist regime that the: United Stares opposed. Instead of sending in che marines, che United States pnwided indirect aid to a conseJVariw revolt led by Fulgencio Bacista in 1934 t hat ovcrchrew the: radical go\-emme:nt. American economic assistance would chen allo~A' Batista to rctain power until his m-erthrow by Fidel Castro in 1959. In Mexico, a refonn gc:wernment came: to p~·er in 1936 and prompt!)' nationalized several oil co mpanies O'A'tled by U.S. and British corporations. While: insisting on fair compcnsacion, the United Scares refrained fro m military inten-ention. The Good Neighbor polk)' did not end U.S. interference in l acin American af· fairs. But it did substitute economic le:\-eragc for hcavy·handed intervecnrion and

NlliiiiiiiMI and 111e

"Good He..... ,...,

I

FOR's k u intr:rvenrionist policy t..........u'd Utin t\rncoria

J THE UMITtO STATES IM A MEMACIMG WOAlO, 19)]-1939

589

Japan ill\lades Manchtria and ames a puppet gwernmert AdoW Hitler bocomes chancellor ofGermany and asstJmes diily Am Japan ill\lades Chi1a Germany an..'"" Austria; Munich Pact g;..s Suclet
Unfl'e<edmll!d lhirloymmtl'\'actices Commission (Fl!PC); Germany invades the loWe! Urion; Japan anacn Pea~ Harbor; lhe United Slates l!f1lffi World war It war Po..rs Act Ballles of Coral Sea and Midway hahJapanese offensive; lnlemmenl of Japanese-Americans; Revenue Act "'flandS i>'adualed incomo.~ax~; Allies invade Norlh Africa (Operation TORCH); First successful atomK
military occupation. The: be:rter relacions fostered by FOR would help the United States pursue hemispheric solidarity in World War II, and Lacer in the Cold War.

Me:anwhile:,po'"-~rful forces raged across much of the world. As early as 1921,Italy's economic problems and sodal unrest had opened the way for Benito Mussollni and his Fasdst party to seize: powcr in Rome. The regime: swiftl}' suppressed dissent and imposed one--party rule. The rise: of Adolf Hider in Germany prOII'ed more menacing. Hitler's National Socialise, or Nazi, parry had gained broad support as a result of the: depression and Gcrman resentment of che harsh Versailles tre-aty. and Hider became: Germany's chancellor in january 1933. Crushing opponents and ri\•als, Hider imposed a brutal dictatorship o n Germany and began a program to purify it of Jcws- "'thom he con· sidered an "inferior race" responsible: for Germany's defeac in World War I. Violating the: Versailles treaty, Hider began rearming Germany in 1935. A year Iacer, German troops reoccupied che Rhineland, a region between the Rhine Riwr

lilt lise of AaJ'eS51vt States in &npta.dAsla

IBenite Absoliilli

lndtrof luly. foonder oCf.ascis:m

Adolf lifer

I I

Dieuw.UI k:.dtt

oftt~C'JCp;ul$iOI!l.ist

Gtrm;a.ny Nazi p11'ty Hitltr>s politial

JUrty; SQ't'J.:roed f.asc:ism, anri&mitism

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AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4 S

lnteracti\•e Map: German and Italian Expansion, 1933-1942

l

appN:Sen~fftt British policy 1o

war by giving in loGer. man tttriuwial dtmaod.s lbr control or Cucho.dOY~iil a"O'Oid

and France: specifically demilitarized b}• the Versailles treaty. In 1938, Hider pro· claimed an Anschluss (C»t·sh ooss) (union) between Austria and Germany. Mean· while:, Mussolini, intenc on building an empire in Africa, had invaded Ethiopia in 1935. London, Paris, and Washington murmured their disapproval buc took no ac· tion. An emboldened Hitler then claimed Germany's right to the Sudetenland (soo· DATE·un·land), a pan of neighboring Czechoslovakia (chtck-<~h ·slch ·VAH·kee·uh) containing 3 million ethnic Germans. British prime: minister Neville Chamberlain and his French counterpart, insisting chat chcir countries could not endure anoche:r war like that of 1914- 1918, yielded to Hitler's demands in return for his assurance: that Germany had no further territorial ambitions-a policy dubbed appe:awmentat a conference in Munich in September 1938. In Tok)'O, meanwhile, nacionalistic militarists had gained control ofJapan's gO\'· ernmenc and Launched a fateful course of expansion. In 1931 Japanese troops in· vaded che Chinese province of Manchuria, installed a puppet government, and forced China co sign a treaty re:cogni.z.ing Japanese control of the province. In July 1937 Japan launched a full·scale: war against China itself.

The American response: reflected a 1\.'"Yulsion against war. By the mid· l930s millions of Americans beliC'\o-ed that the: United States' decision co enter World War I in April 1917 had been a ghastl)' mistake:. In mid+de:cade: a series of books reinforced this condu· sion, arguing chat banking and corporate interests had dragged the United Scates into \l'orld War I. l'ublic concern over che «merchants of death" issue led co a special Senate inves· tigarion headed by Republican Gerald Nye: of North Dakota, ~Aohich conduded that banking and municions interests had tricked the: United States into war to protect loans and ~Aocapon sales to the: Allies. A january 1937 poll showed that an astonishing 70 percent of the: people believed chat the: United States should have stayed out of World War I. By the mid·l930s an m-erwhe:lming majority of Americans thought chat che «mistake" of intcn-cn· tion should not be repeated. In 1935- 1937 a series of Neutralit)' Acts echoed the longing for peace. To pre:· \·ent a repetition of 1917, these: measures oudawed

lbe ~c.~n Mood: No More War

Neutrality Acts Ll.ws paslllll'd in

I

mid..tbittio to ltl'l:p tbr Unitrd State:c out ormy European w~rs

lsolatiooism vs. lnterwttionis• In front oftht White Houle in t941, :ltl Arnerie:m 501djt:r gr.2bs :. :cign from :.n ii$0.1:~tionist pirketing :.g;~.inst the United States enteri ng thr w..r in Europe. l sof:~tion ius ~n the g:.mut from p:~rifists who oppond :Ill W:ll'5, to pro· grr:csivt:s who fe:~rt:d tht growth ofbusineu :.nd c:entr..l· ixrd power. to ul t~righllus v.+.o :cymp;uhiud with f;ue;srn Of' s;h:~rt:d Hider·s :.nti·St:rnit ism.

arms sales and loans co nations ar war and forbade: Americans to travt:l on the: ships of belligerent po"''Crs.. Wirh the public 6nnl)' isolationist and American companies like- IBM heavily invested in Nazi Germany, confrontation with fascism came: solely in sports. Ac the 1936 Olympics in Berlin,jesse- Owens, an African-American, made-a mockery of Nazi theories of racial superiority by winning four gold medals. When the black j oe louis knocked out German Max Schmeling in the 6rs.t round of t heir "''Orld heavyweight championship bout, Americans cheered- but still opposed any policy chat might in· \-olw: chem in war.

The interlude of reduced tension chat follow~d che Mu·

lilt Cltllerlnc S!Mm: nich Pact pr01o'Cd tragically brief. ..~ace in our timr' Lasced llll-1938

a mere S'h months. Ac 6:00am.. on March IS, 1939, Nazi troops thundered across the: border into Czechoslovakia. By CV(!Oing t he: Nazj flag flew 0\'CC the Czech capital of Prague (pr
Hider and the Nazis had translated their hatred ofjcws inco official polky.l'he Nurem berg latA'S of 1935 stripped jews of the rights of German

citizenship, and increased restrictions on jews in all spheres of German educational, social, and economic life. This campaign of hatred reached a violent crescendo on NO\"C.mber 9- 10, 1938, when the Nazis unleashed KrirtaJit~acbf (Night of the Broken Glass), a frenzy of arson, dc.scruction, and loocing against jCY.'S chroughouc Germany. No longer could anyone mistake Hider's malignant incent. jCY.'S, who had been leaving Germany sjnce 1933, screamed out b}•the tens of thou· sands, s«king haven. Between 1933 and 1938, 60,000 fled co t he United States.

In general the United States proved rtluccanc co grant sanctuary co the mass of Hider's jewish victims. Most Americans, according co public· opinion poll~ condemned t he je'I'-'S' persecution, but only a minority fa. \"Ored admitting more: refugees. Congress re-jected aU efforts to liberalize the immigration law, wirh its d iscriminatory quotas. FOR bears some:

M u.~wli ni established a (.l$CiJt state in lttly in 1922; liitkr ;and the Nuis rook oo.u Germa ny in l9JJ and purJued ;an exp;aruioni:~t cours-e in Europ:;jap.ln buame inaellllingly militui..slic and a_ggn-u:i~ in Asi.11.

Americ:uu: generally rem.Untd Uo1a· t ioniJt; the Neu tr;ality Acu rdl«ted thU s-entiment. When war eru ptcod in Eu rop:, FOR wught incrt-astd milifarr runding and wa)'' to ~·a~ tht Neu u-alitr Aco. The Amerie.m peopk and goo."-rnmcnt basi ~lly ignored the pligh t of JcowJ ntempc:ing to llee liitler.

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AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]-19 4 S

responsibility. While deploring Hider's persecution oflhejews and helping to establish the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees in 1938, he did little else co translate his sympath)' for the j r""-'S into political efforcs to relax restrictions on immigration. The consequences of su ch atcirudes became clear in June 1939, when the St. Louis, a German liner jammed with 900 j ewish refugees, asked permission co puc its passengers ashore at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Immigration officials refused this request and. according to the Neu: lO'* Ttmrs, a Coasc Guard curter scood b)•"to preventpossibleatcempcs b)•refugees to jumpoff and swim ashore.'' 1'he St. Lmlis rurned slo~Aiy away from the lights of America and sailed back co Germany, ~Ailere more than 700 of ics passengers "''Ould d ie under Nazi brutality.

INTO THE STORM, 1939-1941

I

WMt dnrw the United States mto World War II?

1

After a decade ofcriscs-woridwtdedcptc.SSion and regional confhccs-war erupted in Europe in 1939. FoUO\\<·ing the lighcning German victories in western Europe in the spring of 1940, President Roosevelt's policy of neucraliry gave way to a policy of economic intervention. He knew chat extending aid to those resisting aggres&on b)• the so-called Rome-Berlin -10k)'O Axis, as w-ell as his toughening conduct tlWiard Germany and Japan, could, as he said, «push'" the United Stat('S into the crisis of ~A'Orld wide war. Japan's attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor proYided the fi nal push.

Adolf Hider precipitated war b)•d emanding chac Poland rcrurn to Germany che dty of Danzig (Gdansk) (dansk), lost after World War I. When l'oland refused. Nazi armies poured into Poland at dawn on September J, 1939, and the Luftwaffe (LOOFr-vahfth) (~nnan air force) dc\'astated Polish cicies. 1Wo days later, Britain and France, honoring commitments co Poland, declared ~A>ar o n Germany. Although FO R in· voked the Neutrality Acts, he "''Ould noc ask Americans co be impanial in thought and deed. Tailoring his actions to the public mood, which fa,.'Orcd both pre\-enting a Nazi victory and Sta)'ing out of war, FOR persuaded Congress in November co amend the Neutrality Acts to allow the belligerents to purchase weapons from che United Stares if lhcy paid cash and carried the anns a~A>ay in their O'A'tl ships. But «cash-and carry" did noc stop che Naz.is. In sp ring 1940 Hider unleashed blitzkrieg (BLITS-kretg) (lighcning ~A'llr) against western Euro pe; che Nazi Wehrmacht (VAIR-mokt) (war ma· chine) swepc all lhe way to che English Channel in a scam N 'O months. In early June the British eYacuated most of cheir army, but no ne of its equipment, from France. And o n j une 22 France surrendered. Hitler then turned his fury against Great Britain, terror-bombing British cicies in hopes of forcing a surrender or, failing chat, preparing the ground for a cross· channel imasion. With Coventry destroyed and much of london in smoking ruins, !'rime Minister Winston Churchill pleaded fur American aid.

The European W•

--1 w~rtimt

s.;u.h

Primt MiniSttr; dost

friend of FDR; :sUunch ~uy of tbt United Statr:s

1

l l r-i'tO THE StOIU&, 19~41

In che United States in 1940, news of the "Bactle: of Brit· ain'" competed ~Aith speculation about whether FOR lllllrvHtlon would bre-ak wich tradition and run for an unprecedented third cenn. Not until the e\'e of t he Democrats' july com-ention did he m\':al chac, given the world crisi~ he would consent to a "draft" from his party. lhe: Axis chreat forced conservati\--e anti-New Deal Oemocracs to accept both the third term and the nomination of ultraliberal Henry Wallace as vice president. Republicans bowed to the public mood by nominating Wendell Willkie of Indiana, an all-out incernation· alisc who championed greater aid co Britain. Roosewlt adroitly pla)>ed che role of a national leader too busy ~Aith defense and diplomacy to engage in partisan policies. He appoinced Republicans Henr}' Stimson and Frank Knox as secretaries of war and che navy. Rooseve-lt apprO'V'Cd a peacetime: d raft and a d ramatic increase in defense funding. In September he: engi· neered a "descrO)>ers-for-bases" swap wich England, sending 6fty \intage American ships to Britain in exchange for leases on British air and naval bases in the Western Hemisphere. Ami-incel"V'Cncionist critics accused Roosevelt of scheming co entangle: the United States in che European conflict. lsolationiscs organized the Committee to Defend America f irst, ~Ailich fcarured Charles Lindbergh as its most popular speaker and proclaimed chat "Fortress America'" could stand alone. Most Americans sup· porced Rooseve-lt's atcempc co aid Britain while avoiding war. Heartened by FOR's pledge:-.. ! will nc-.\':r send an American boy to fight in a foreign 'A'llr"-55 percent of Americans voted him into a chird term. Roosewlt now called on the United States to become "-t he arsenal of democracy.'" He proposed a "lend-lease" program to supply ~A'llr materiel to the cashscrapped British. Despite bitter opposition by the isolationists, Congress apprm--ed lend-lease in March 1941, and supplies began to flow across the Atlantic. When Hit· ler's armies invaded the Soviet Union in june 1941, FOR d ispatched supplies to the Soviets, despite: American hostility toward communism. 10 defeat Hid er, FOR said, "I "-'Ould hold hands ~Aith t he Devil:'' To councer the menace of German submarines that threatened co choke the transad antic supply line, Roosevelt authorized the U.S. Navy to help che British track U-boats. By summer 1941, t he U.S. Navy had begun COO\'O)ing British ships, with orders to destroy enemy ships if necessary. U.S. forces also occupied Greenland and Iceland to keep t hem out of Nazi hands. In August, Rooseve-lt mec wich Churchill aboard a warship off Newfoundland. They issued a document, the Atlantic Charter, thac condemned aggression, af. finned national self-determinacion, and endorsed the: principles of colle:cth-e security and disarmament. After a German submarine 6red ac an American destro)'er in September, Roosevelt auchoriud naval patrols co shoot on sight all Axis vessels op· crating in the: western Adancic. On October 3 1, 1941, aU-boat torpedoed and sank the destro)'\':r Reubtn}aml!s, killing I 15 American sailors. NotA' on a collision course: with German}', Roosevelt pcnuade:d Congress in NO'V'Cmber to pennit the arming of merchant ships and to allo~A' the: transport of lend·lease: supplies to bdligerenc pores in ~A'llr zones. Unprepared for a major ~A'llr, America was ne:\-erthcless fighcing a limited one, and full·scale: war seemed imminent.

5 93

Frallllsollllon to

"~eM lase• Program to "lo;a.n" v.•u matr:rid eo ~ltiell to :ro'Oid Nt'uu;ality Arts

I

World w.u 11 rquivakot of Wilson'J Fau.um Point:~;; signo:d by FDR and ChutdliU

AtbW Chaner

I

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AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4 S

Hitler's triumphs in ~A'eStern Europe: encouraged Japan co

Peartllalllor and 111e expand farther into Asia. The United States opposed Japa· c-11g o1war

nese expansion vircuall)' alone. Seeing Germany as Ameri· ca's primar}' threat, che Roose\~lt administrntion tried to apply enough pressure: co deter the Japanese ~Aithouc provoking 10kyo co ~A'llr before the United States had built the "two-ocean navy"' authorized by Congress in 1940. The Japanese, too, hoped co avoid war, but they would not compromise. Japan's desire co create the Greater Ease Asia Co·l'rosperity Sphere (an empire embracing much of China, Southeast Asia, and che western l':tcific) matched America's insis· tence o n the Open Door in China and che status quo in the rest of Asia. Japan saw America's scand as a ploy to block its rise to pc>"~r. and Americans viewed Japan's talk of legitimate national aspira tions as a smoke screen to cloak aggression. De· cades of "yellow-peril" propaganda had hanlened U.S. actitudes toward Japan, and even those who were isolationist toward Europe tended co be imel"W:ncionist toward Asia. The two nations became locked in a dcadl)' dance:. In 1940, believing that eco· nomic coercion \\o'Ould fol\':e- the Japanese out of China, che United States ended a long·slanding trade treaty with Japan and banned the sale of aviation fuel and scrap metal to it. Tok)'O responded by occup)ing northern Indochina, a French colony, and signing che Tripartite l':tct with Germany and Ital)' in September, creating a militar}' alliance, che Berlin-Rome-Tok)'O Axis, that required each gm~rnmenc co help the ochers in che evecnt of a U.S. attack. When the Japanese then 0\'erran the rest of Indochina, Roose\~lt in 1941 froze all Japanese assets in the United States and d amped a total embargo on trade with Japan. 1bk)'O had t\\-'0 choices: submit to the United States to gain a resumption of trade or conquer new lands to obtain vital resources. In Occober, expansionist war minister General Hideki Tojo (hih·DEH· bt" TOH-joh) became Japan's prime minis· ter. Tojo set the fi rst w~k in December as the deadline for a preemptive strike if the United States d id noc yield. By face Nm-ember, U.S. incelligcnce's deciphering of Ja· pan's top diplomacic code alerted the Roosevdc administration thac war was immi· nem . Negotiators made no concessions during elcw:nch-hour negotiations under way in Washington. \'(far ~A'llrnings went o ut to aUcommanders in the Pacific,. advis· ing that negotiations were deadlocked and that a Japanese attack was imminent. U.S. offidals believed chat che Japanese \\o'Ould strike British or Dutch possessions or ewn che l' hilippines- but che Japanese decided co gamble o n a knocko ut punch. They hoped chat a surprise Japanese raid on the American naval base ac Pearl Harbor \\o'Ould destrO)' the U.S. l':tcific Fleet and compel Roosevelt, preoccupied with Ger· many, to seek accommodation with Japan. Waves of Japanese dive--bombers and torpedo planes thundered across the Ha· waiian island of Oahu on the morning of Decem ber 7, 1941, bombing ships at anchor in 1\:arl Harbor and strafing planes parked wingcip to wingtip at ne-arby air bases. American forces suffered their mosc devascacing loss in hiscory. In less than three: hours, 8 battleships, 3 light cruis~ and 2 destl'O)'-ers had been sunk or crip· pled, and 360 aircraft descro)~d or damaged The attack killed more than 2,400 Americans and opened the ~A'llY for j apan's advance to the chreshold of Australia in April 1942. Shocked Americans h uddled by their radios co hear news of what Presi· denc Roose\~lt called a "date which ~Aill li vc in infamy."

Critics later charged that Roosewlt knew the attack on Pearl Harbor was com· ing and delibcrarel)' left the fleet exposed in order to bring the United States inco the war against Germany. There. is no condush't: e\'idencc. to support this accusation. Roosc\'t:lt and his advisers knew that war was dose: but did noc expect an assault on 1\:arl Harbor. Americans underestimated the. resourcefulnes~ skill, and daring of the. japanese. At the same time., japanesc. leadc.rserred in counting on a paralyzing blow at Pearl Harbor. That miscalculation assured an aroused and united nation detmnined to avenge: che attack. On December 8, when Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on japan, onl)' one dissenting voce was cast. But FOR still hesitated to request a declaration of"''llr against Germany. Hitler resoto.·ed the. president's dilemma. He went before. a cheering Rc.ichstag (RYKH-shtag) on December I I co dedare war on the "half Judaized and the. other half Negrified" Americans. Mus.solini chimed in with his declaration of war, and Congress reciprocated chat same afternoon. America faced a global "''llr that it was not ret ready to fight. After 1\:arl Harbor, U-boats wreaked havoc in the North Atlantic and pr~·l ed the Caribbean and the East Coast of the United States. Ever}' twenty-four hours, five more: AUied vessels wcnc co the bottom. By the. end of 1942, U-boat ""'ulfpacks" had destroyed more chan a thousand AUied s hips, offsetting the pace. of American ship production. l 'he United States was losing che battle of che Atlantic. The. "''llr news from Europe and Africa was, as Roosc.vdc admitted, "all bad." Hider's rule covered an enormous swath of territory, from t he out· skircs of Moscow, deep in Russia, to che Pyrenees (PEER-~h-nt~s) on the The w~r in Cumpc" wm t b;ad]y (or a dek-ated Funeco and a Nutrtd French-Spanish border, and from nonhero NoN'aY to the Libyan (LIB· Br iu .in.. «-un) desert. In spring 1942, Nazi armies inflicted more than 250,000 ca· FOR Jtepped u p t he Am.ericom sualcies on che Soviet army in Crimea (cry·MEE-uh), and Hider launched responJe to t he war with c:uh and a poo-crful offensiw to seize the Caucasian oil fidds. German forces mo\·ed <'OUT)", ltnd lt :ue, and n:eva l u t ian relentlessl)' east"A'ard in North Africa. threatening the. Suez (soo-EZ) Ca· ap inJt GC"-nnan U~u. nat, Britain's oil lifeline. bol.uionUm 1\"Ul.li.ntd strong. The. Japanese inflicted defeat after defeat on Allied Padfic forces. Tojo lOt Aclantic C ha rter summed up foJIO"-·ed Pearl Halbor "''ith a rampage across the Jladfic t hat puc Guam, the Anglo-Americom ''ision o(a h.lrmoniom: pm!Vr.ir world. Wake: Island, Hong Kong, Singapore:, Burma, and t he Netherlands East Jap.mue aggr~lon in .o\$i..l in· Indies under Japan's concrol by the end of April 1942. American fol\':es in crt:.utd; it became dear war was the Philippines, besieged for months on che is land ofBacaan, surrendered imminm t. in May. j apan's rising sun flag blazed 0\"C.r hundreds of islands in che cenThe Jap,mesc, ;ut;uk on Pt'..lli H..ubor tral and "-"CSce:m Pacific, and M'cr che entire eastern perimeter of the Asian shad«! Americans and d now t he Un ited St .:u:e l into the war. mainland from the border of Siberia to che border of Ind ia.

AMERICA MOBILIZES FOR WAR 1-/ow did war mobilization transform the American eumomy and government? In December 1941 American armed forces numbered only J.6 million, and "''llr production accounted for jusc IS pe-rcent of U.S. industrial output. Pearl Harbor changed c''t:r)'thing. Within a "''«k of the artack, Congress passed the War Powers

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OfAPlER l5

AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4 S

Act,grancing che: president unprecedented authority. Volunteers and draftees swelled the army and navy. By war's end, IS million men and nearly 350,000 .....-omen had served. The fur·re:aching domescic changes u nder way would outlasc chewarand sig· nificandy alce:r the: nation's atcirudc:s, behavior, and institutions.

.--

To direct the: militar}' engine, Roose:w~lt formed che j oint Chiefs of Staff, made up of repre:sencacives of the: army, Vldory navy, and army air force. The changing naru.re of modern warfare also led to the creation of the: Office of Scrategic Services (OSS), foreru nner of che: Central intelligence Agency, co conduct the: espionage required for strategic planning. Roosevelt established che War Production Board (WPB) co allocate materials, to limit the production of dvilian goods, and to discribute contraccs. lhe newly ere· ated \'t'ar ManJ>O""-er Commission (WMC) su pervised che mobilization of men and women for the: militar)', 'A':U industry, and agriculcurej the Nacional War l abor Board (NWLB) me:diaced disputes be:cwcen mana~ment and labor; and che OfficeofPrJce Administtadon (OPA) imposed stricc price controls to check inflation. In 1942 the United States achie:\·ed a miracle of war production. Car makers re· tooled co produce planes and canks; a pinball-machine: maker conwrced to armor· piercing shdls. By lace 1942, 33 percenc of the: economy was committed to war production. Whole nc:~A' industries appeared \irtually ow~rn ighc.. With almost all of the nacion's crude--rubber supply now in Japanese-controlled territor)', the g()I.'Crn· menc builc some fi fty nc:~A' synthecic-rubber plants. By che end of the war, the: United Scates had become che ~A'Orld 's largest exporter of S)'tlthetic rubber. America also became the ~A'Orl d 's greatest u.-eapons manufacturer, producing more ~A'llr materiel b)• 1945 chan its Axis enemies combined- 300,000 militar}' air· craft, 86,000 tanks, 2.6 million machine guns, and 6 million tons of bombs. The: United States built more than 5,000 cargo ships and 86,000 warships. Henry J. Kai· ser (KYE-zer), who had supervised the construction of che: Boulder Dam, incroduced prefabrication to cut the cime: needed to build ships. In 1941 the conscruction of a liberty-class merchant ship took six momhsi in 1943, less than rwo weeks. By 1945, Kaiser and ocher shipbuilders were complecing a cargo ship e\-ery day. Such breakneck production had costs. The size and powers of the government expanded as defense spending zoomed fro m 9 percent of gross national product (GNP) in 1940 to 46 percent in 1945.: rhe federal budget soared from $9 billion co $98 billion. Federal civilian employees mushroomed from 1.1 million to 3.8 million. An alliance formed between the: defense industry and che: milicary. Because the &0\'· ernmenc soughc the: maximum production in che shortesc time, it encouraged cor· porace profits. 1"'0-chirds of all war production dollars went to the: hundred largest firms, and trends tiWI'ard economic concencration accelerated.

Orpnlzlnc tor

---·.. .t c;. . emmmt ~grncy llu:t011tts~ transition from peaaritnc' eo

1

w~rtimt economy

I

OffiteoiPri
inllarioo clowo through rari~ ing ;and JUict pric.e COilltrol.l;

The United Scates spent more than $360 billion ($250 mil· lion a da)') to de:feac the Axis, ceo limes the cost of World War I. Wartime spending and the: draft not only van· quished une:mpiO)menc, but also stimulated an induscrial boom that made most

The War Economy

I AMEIUCA Moamzts FOR \A'AII

597

Americans prosper. It doubled U.S. industrial oucput and the: per capita GNP, ereaced 17 million new job~ incrca.s.e:d corporate after-tax profits by 70 percent, and raised the re-al ~A'llges or purchasing power of industrial workers by SO percent. The federal government poured S40 billion into che: West, making it an economic po'l'-·erhouse, the: cencerof massive ain:raft and shipbuilding industries. Cali· fornia alone secured more than 10 percent of all federal fu nds.: by 1945 nearly half the personal income in the state came from the federal go•;ernmem. A dynamic Sun Bd t, screeching from che coastal Southeast co the coastal Souchwcst, ~A'llS the recipient of billions spcnc on military bas.es and the needs of che: anne:d forces. Full employment, a longer workweek, larger paychecks, and the: increased hir· ing of minoricie~ women, and the: elder!)' broughc a middle-class standard of living to millions of families. l 'he: war years produced the: only significant shift coward greater equality in the distribution of income in the cwenriech century. large-scale comme:rdal farmers prospered, beneficing from higher consumer prices and increased productivity chanks to improved fertilizers and more me:chani· zarion. As sharecroppers, tenan~ and small furmers left che land for better-paying industrial jobs, the o•;erall agricultural population fell by 17 percent. Farming became: «agribusiness," and organized agriculture ~A'iclde:d poW'Cr equal co organized labor, big government, and big business. Organized labor grew mightier as union membership rose from 9 million to 14.8 million workers, in part be: consumer prices W'Cnt up onl)' 8 percent in the war·s last two )"tars. The Ol'A also instituted rationing to combat inflation and co consen -e: scarce materials. Under the slogan ..Use it up, \~/Car it ouc, make it do, or do without,"' the O I'A rationed such products as gasoline, sugar, cheese, and meat. Mosc Americans cheerful!)' formed car pools, planted victory gardens, and recycled paper, fats, and scrap metal. Buying ~A>ar bonds furcher curcailed inflation by decreasing consumer purchasing po'l'-"e:r, while giving civilians a sense of involvement in the d istant ~A'llr. Small in· \"e:Stors bought $40 billion in "E" bonds, and ~A'Cal thy individuals and corporations invested nearly ru·ice that amount. Bond sales raised almost half the money needed to finance the war. Roosevelt sought co raise the rest b}' drastically increasing taxes. Congress refused the president much of ~Athat he sought. Still, che Revenue Act of 1942 raised che top income-tax rate from 60 percent to 94 percent and imposed in· come taxes on middle-and 10'1'--e:r·income Americans for the firsc rime. Beginning in 1943, the pa)TOll-de:duccion system automatically wichhdd income taxes from wages and salaries.

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Recognizing wartime scientific and technological de\~Iopments, Winston Churchill dubbed World \'t;1ar II "a wiz· ard war." Mathemarkians went to .....-ork deciphering enemy codes, psychologists devised propaganda, and, as ne\'ct beforl!, the major combat· ants mobilized sdemisrs into virrual armies of invention. In 194 1 FOR created the Office: ofScientific Research and Dtwlopment (OSRD) for the development of new weapons and medkines.1'heOSRD spent more than $1 billion co produce impro\·ed radar and sonar, rocker "'-eapons, and proximity fuses fo r mines and artillery shells. It also funded the dC"".-elopment ofjet aircraft and high-altitude bombsights. Ocher OSRD resea.rch hastened the widespread use of insecticides, contributed to impro\·ed blood transfusion~ and produced .. miracle dru&S>" such as penicillin. The demand for greater accuracy in artillery required che kind of rapid. detailed calculations thac only computing machines could supply. By 1944 navy personnel in the basement of Harvard 's physics laboratory u~re operating IBM's Mark I, a cum· bcrsome device: fifty-one feet long and eight fttt high that "'-eighed five tons. A seco nd· generation computer, ENIAC, soon reduced the time to multiply two temh·place: numbers from Mark l's three seconds to less chan three--thousandths of a second. Nothing saved the lives of more ~A
•A Wi:Drd War'"

Minlt.tb• Pre;ect

I

Code mme

for prog:r;un IOdt'lo't'lop the

atomiebomb

da~A'tled.

l'rople as ....-ell as science and machin er)' had to be mobilized. To sustain a spirit of unity, the Roosc\~lt adminis· tration carefully managed public opinion. The Office: of Censorship, established in December 1941, examin ed alllettct'S going overseas and worked wich publishers and broadcasters to suppress information chac might dam· age the war effort, su ch as details of croop m o\~menrs.

To shape: public opinion, FOR created che: Office of War Informacion (OWl) in June: 1942. l 'he: OWl e:mptorcd more chan four thousand writers, artists, and ad\·cr· tising specialists co explain the war and co counter enemy propaganda The OWl depicted t he: war as a moral struggle between good and evil-t he: enem}' had to be destroyed, not merely defeated Hollywood films highlighted the: heroism and unity of the: American forces, "''hile indcing hatred of t he: enemy. Films about the war porcrayed chc Japanese, in particular, as treacherous and cruel, as beasts in the jungle, as «sJam-cycd mrs." While the Roosewlt administration concentrated on chc war, Rcpub·

lican critics scizcd the: initiative in domestic politics. Full employment and high wages undcnnine:d the: Democrats' class appeal, and man}•of the ur· ban and ~A
f'R)

Primary Source:

~

Propaganda in Films

JnduJtrial mobiliution w:u kq· to AUN-d ''ictory, and the Unittd St.:u:~ arhir\"«1 a mirade ofwar prudurtion. \'(lartim.e ~ptnding lifttd tht U.S. ou t o( tht Gn"at OtpruJion.. Goo."-mmtnt inccorwnrd in the tronomy to d ircon produ ction ;and ronttol infl..ltion.. Sritn~t and ttrb nologr pla)'C'd a m.;ajor role in t hr war e((ort, with thr dtvtlopmrnt o( r.ld..lr, sonar, (he fil'llt romputc-rs, .lnd t hr .:u:omic bomb.

Tht war grt-.ltly in~n":urd govern· mrnt pown in Jh.;aping p ublir opinion.

THE BATTLEFRONT, 1942-1944

I

What wen the maJOr aspects ofAllied m1litary Sfnltegy m Europe and Asia?

Amen ca's industrial might and Sovtet manpawer turned che ctde of war. Dtplo· macy followed che forcunes of war, wich Allied uniry gradually diminishing as Ger· many and j apan weakened, and as the: United States, Britain, and the Sovie:c Union each sought wartime strategies and postwar arrangements best suited co its own interescs..

After ~arl Harbor, British and American officials agrttd co concentrate first on defeating Germany and then on smashing Japan. Bur they differed on "'there co mount an actack. Joseph Stalin demanded a second fronc, an im•asion of western Europe to force Hider co transfer troops west and thus co relieve pressure on che Russians, "'tho faced che full fury ofche Nazi armies. Prime Minister Churchill insisted on clearing che Mediterranean before: invading f rance. He feared that a premature landing in France: could mean slaughter, and he "''llmed American aid in North Africa co procecc che Suez Canal, vital to che British. Over Sovie:c protests, Churchill persuaded Rooscw~lt co postpone che "second front" in "''estern Europe: and co invade Norch Africa instead. In Now~mber 1942, in Operation Torch, American and British croops

Uber'ltlnl Europt

IJ.seplt Stalil

Dicuwr of

So.>itt Union

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ATl.ANT1C OCEAN

I.IOAOCCO

-..

FRENCH N O RT H AFFII C. (VICNf Fllii'U) ~

......

~

UBVA (Y.)

Map lSJ

Wo~d War II in

E
Europo and Africa

The momentous Germ;an defuu. ;u St:~lingr.ad :~nd in Tu ~s.i;t e;~~rty in 1943 marked t he w rni:ng point i:n the w;~.rapinM the Axis. 6y 1945 the Allied conquutofHider's "thoul.:~nd ye.:~r" lkic:h w:~s immi"ent.

under General Dwight 0 . Eisenhower landed in Morocco and Algeria. Pushing east·

ward, they trapped the German and Italian armies being driven westward by t he: British, and in Ma)' 1943 some 260,000 German-Italian croops surrendered. Left alone to face: two·thirds of t he: Nazi force, cheSoviec Union hung o n and, in the corning poim of the European war, defeated Germany in t he protracted Batd e: ofStalingrad (STAll-in-gr
Alchough Stalin renewed his plea for a second from, Churchill again objected, and Roosevelt again agreed to a British plan: t he: invasion ofSicil)'· In summer 1943 Anglo-American forces gained concrol ofSidly in less than a mooch. Italian military leaders deposed Mussolini and surrendered co the Allies on September 8. As Allied

forces mo•..-ed up the Italian peninsula, German troops poured inco Jcaly. Facing elite Nazi d ivisions in strong defensive posici on~ che Allies spent eight monchs inching their way ISO miles to Rome and "-'etc sciU battling t hrough northern Italy when t he

war in Europe ended. In 1943 and 1944 che Unice:d States and Britain rurned che tide in the Atlantic and scm thousands of bombers 0\"C.r German}'· To the east, Soviet t roops kept t he Nazis in re:creat. At the scare of 1943, British and American air forces began roundthe-dock bombardment, raining chousands of tons of bombs on Gennan cities. In raids on Hamburg (HAHM-boorg) in july 1943, Allied planes dropping incendiar}' bombs created terrible 6restonn~ killing at least 35,000 people and lewJing the city, much as chey had done earlier at Cologne (koh-LOHI'It) and wo uld do to Dresden in February 1945, where an escimated 60,000 people died. Meanwhile, in 1943, as the Soviet offensive reclaimed Russian cities and t~ns from the Nazis, t he German annies fell into perpetual retreat. Ad\•andng swiftly, t he Red Army drow the Germans o ut ofSoviet territory by mid- 1944 and plunged into Poland, "'there the Soviets set up a puppet government. Late summer and early fall sa"'' Soviet troops seize Romania and Bulgaria and aid communist guerillas under Josip Broz Tito (TEE-toh) in liberating Yugoslavia. As rhe Soviets swept across eastern Europe, Allied forces 6nall}•opened the long· delayed second front. On june 6, 1944-0.Day- nearl}•200,000 Allied t roops landed in Normandy in northwestern France, gaining a toehold on French soil. Within six W'C'eks, another million Allied t roops had waded ashore. Under General Eisenh~-er, the Allies liberated Paris in August and reached the German border by the e nd of summer. HO\l'f:'\'f:'r, in che face of supply problems and st iffened German resistance, the Allied offensive ground to a halt. In mid-December, as che Allies prepared for a full-scale assault on the German heartland, Hitler in a desperate gamble t hrew his last resen -es against American po· sitions. The Batdt ofthe Bulge- named for the "bul~'" eighty miles long and 6fty miles wide that Hider's troops d ro\'f:' inco che Allies' lint- raged for nearly a mont h, and when it ended American t roops stood on che banks of the Rhine. lc had cost t he United States 55,000 soldiers dead or "-'OUnded and 18,000 caken prisoner. Bur t he way to Germany Lay open, and tht end of tht European "''llr was in sight.

dw....,. ""'"'=

-Gtnnoa.n clcountl'rofftosin';

bunched Otc.ember 1.944: f.a.iltd toJtop tbr AII~d
The day after che Philippines feU co Japan in mid-Ma}' 1942, U.S. and Japanese fl~cs confronted each other in the Coral Sea off northeascem Australia, the 6rsc naval battle in history fought entirel}' from aircraft carrict'S. Both sides cook hea'1' losses, buc che Batd e of the Coral Sea stopped t he Japanese advance on Australia. Less chan a mont h later, a japanese armada turned tO\l'ard Mid"''llY Island, the crucial Ameri· can o ut-pose between Hawaii and Japan. Because: the U.S. Signal Corps had broken the japanese naval code, japan's plans and t he locations of her ships were known. American carriers and t heir planes consequently .....-on a decisive victor}', sinking four

W1r tn the Pacific

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SOV I ET

UN I O N

PAC I F IC

O CE A N

J.tp-$11.cot!bci~Qd

D

-l.Aug.1W

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A'Iod Po\r.I;IS SO...ln\Jn~;wtll lb llllla

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BA'IOdll~ II!Mijortotr~l INOtAN OCEAN

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A1ef!'fe !XI't()~

Map 25.2 World War II in lilt hdfi< A.meriG~n

$hips and pl :~nes nemmed t he J a p :!IH"SC' ofkrW:ve at t he Batdes o f the Coral Se;a ;and Midw.:~y Island. the J;,p:uw:s.e wen': on the dekn~ve ag~st American amphibious ;u.sault$ ;md a ir u.Okn.

Then-.~er,

j apanese carriers and destroying sl'\-eral hundred ene-my planes. Sudden!}' on the- de:· fe:nsi..-e, the stunned j apanese could no"'' only cry co hold what they had altcad)' "-'00. O n che offensive, U.S. marines waded ashore ac Guadalcanal in the Solomon ls·

lands in August 1942. facing fierce resistance as well as tropical diseases like malaria, the Americans net:ded six months to take t he: island. a bitter prc\'icw of chc batcles to come. As the British mow:d from India to retake Burma, che United States began a cwo-pronged advance to"''llrd Japan in 1943. T he: army, under General Oougtas MacArthur, advanced north on che islands betv.r'Ce:n Australia and the Philippines, and the navy and marines, under Admiral Chester Nimitz, «island-hopped" across the central Pacific co seize: strace:gic bases and puc 1bkyo in range: of American bomb· ers. In fall 1944 the navy annihilated what remained of the japanese fleet at the: bat· des of t he: Philippine Sea and Le:yte Gulf, giving the United States control ofjapan's air and shipping lanes and leaving the j apanese: home islands open to invasion (see Map25.2).

Tilt Crand Alllan<e

1"'0 primary goals underla)' Roosevelt's wartime scrate· gies: the: total defeat of t he: Axis at che lease possible cost in American li\-es and the establishment of a world order

strong enough co preserve: peace, open trade, and ensure nacional sdf~e:cennination in the: postwar era Bur Churchill and Stalin had other goals. Brimin sought co retain its imperial possessions and a balance of poY~Cr againsc t he Soviet Union in Europe. 11le SoYict

Union wanted a permancndy \l'f~aktned Germany and a sphere: of influence: in east· ern Europe to protect itself against fucure: atcacks fro m the West. 1b hold together this uneas}' alliance, FOR used personal diplomacy to mediate conflicts. In j anuary 1943 Roosc'ldc and Churchill met at Casablanca. Morocco's main pore, where chcy resolved co attack Italy befo re invading France and proclaim ed that the war ~A'Ould continue until che Axis accepted .. unconditional su rrender:'' In chis proclamation chey soughc to reduce Soviet mistrust of the Wesc, which had deep· ened because of the postponement of the second front. In 1943 FOR and Churchill had traveled to 1C:hran, Iran's capi ta~ co confer ~Aith Stalin. Here they had sct che invasion of France for j une 1944 and agrttd to d ivide Germany into zones of occupation and to impose: reparations on che Reich. Most imporcanc to Roosewlt, at l C:hran Stalin Ttw- Anglo·Amaie.ln dt(:iJion to had also pledged to encer che Pacific war after Hitler's defeat. inv~-dt North MTi.e.l mNnt ch~t Roosewlt then rurned his attention co domescic politics. Conserva· RI.Ulia would rem.lin th~ only b:u· ti'lle gains in both the Republican and che Democra tic parties drow: FOR cltfrunt in Europt, wh~ll' th"' SovtC"t vinory .lt Su!i ngr~d w:u th"' tur n· to dump che liberal Henry A. Wallace fro m the tickec and accept Harry S ing point in cht war. Truman as his vice presidential candidate. A moderate senator from Mis· On D·Oay,J un"' 6, J9.f.f, the AUiu souri, Truman was not strongl}' opposed by any major Democratic faction l.lunehcd .ll ao1a·dunnd inv;uion and was called ..the new Missouri Compromise!' He rescored a semblance into Funct; chtlr offtnJi'"" Jtalk d until Ame'-rican victory in th"' Bntk of unity to the parcy for che 194 4 campaign. l 'he Republicans, hoping that o f the Bulge in latt 19-1-1 optned th"' unity ~A'Ould carry lhn7l to victory, nominated moderate New York gowr· p.lth co vKc«r. nor Thomas E. Dewey. 11le campaign focused more o n personalities than Ame'-rica.ru w-:n t o n th"' offio.nJi\''C' in on issues, ~Aith the Republicans harping o n FOR's failing health and FOR tht P.lcifi~ in AuguJt 19"2, rdying touting American military victories. primarily on i.dand·hop.,tns .lind cOUTitr~; b)• l.lt"' 19-l.f, Amencan In November the American electorate handed FOR an unprecedented forces \\o\"f"' poi$C"d .lt tht frinS'" of fourth term, but with his narrowest margin ever- only 53 percent of the tht J ~p;an6t homt iJLlnds: popular vote. A ....-cary Roosewlt, secretly suffering from h}'Pertension and [)...,pice thtir .l!lianct , th"' Un ittd heart disease, notA' directed his waning energies toward defeating the Axis Sc.:u:e l, Gll"..l t Britlin, a nd tbc- So\•i« and constructing an international peacekeeping S}'Stem . Union h..ad '""I)' difftll'nt war goal.'!.

WAR AND AMERICAN 50CIE1Y What wen the major effects ofWorld War II on American society$ including minorities and women? The crisis of ~A'llr altered the mosc basic patterns of American life, poW'Crfull}' affecting those o n the home front as "'~II as chose who served in the armed forces. Few families ~A'ere untouched: more chan J S million Americans ....-enc co war, an equal number were on the move, and unprecedented numbers of women ....-enc to work ourside the home. Also, the ~A'llr opened some doors of oppon:unity for African· Americans and ocher minorities, although most remained dosed. www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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Mosc Americans in che anned forces griped about rcgi· memacion and were more interested in dr}' socks than in ideology. They knew little of the big strategies and cared less. 11ley "''llnted to defeat Hitler, avenge Pearl HaJbor, and return to a secure, famil· iar United States. But che Gls' "''llr dragged on for almost fou r years, transforming its part icipants. Millions who had never been far from home t raveled to unfamiliar cities and re-mote lands. Sharing tents and foxholes wich fellow Americans of diffcrenc religion~ na· tionalities, and social backgrounds helped to erase deep-seated prejudices. l'hysical misery, chronic exhaustion, and intense: combat left psychological as wdl as physical wounds. In che Pad6c, both American and japanese t roops saw t he ochcrs in racist cerm~ as animals to be excenninated. Both sides sometimes beha\·ed brutally, machine-gunning pilots parachut ing from damaged planes, torturing and killing prisoners, and mutilating enemy dead. Atrocities also occurred in che war against ~rmany, although on a lesser scale. A bactalion of the Second Atmored Di· vision calling irse:lf .. Roosewlt's Butchcrs"' boasted that it shot all che German sol· diers it captured.

The Cis' war

Nothing t ransformed che social topograph)' more than the vast internal migration of an already-mobile people. Americans swarmed to the cemcrs of war production, es· pecially the l':tci6c coast states, which manufactured half of che nation's wartime ships and airplanes. Six million people left farms to work in cici~ and st\'cral mil· lion southern "'ohites and blacks migrated northward and wesN'llrd. Lifestyles became freewheeling as Americans moved far from t heir homet~·ns, leaving behind their t raditional \'alues. Housing shortages left millions living in converted garages, tent cities, or cars. Owrcr~-ding as W'CU as wart ime separations strained family and community life. High races of dh'Orce, family violence, and juvenile delinquency reflected the disruptions. Rewrsing a decade ofefforts to exclude women from the labor force, the federal go\-emment in 1942 urged "''Omen into war production. More than 6 million women encered the labor force during the war, bringing che number ofemplored "''Omen co 19 million. Less than a quarter of the labor force in 1940, women constituted well over a chird of all workers in 1945. Before the war most female "'oage carncrs had been young and single. By con· trasc, 75 percent of che new women workers were married. 60 percent were O\'er thirty·6\-e, and more than 33 percenc had children under che age of fourteen. Women tended blast furnaces, operated cranes, drove taxis, and worked in s hip)'llrds. ..Rosie the Riveter."' her muscular arms cradling a gun, symbolized t he woman war worker; she was, as a popular song puc it, ..making history "''Orking fo r victory." Yet tradicional attitudes and gender discrimination existed throughout the war. \'t'omen earned only about 65 percent of whac men earned for che same work, and they v.~re often denied equal seniority rights. Labor unions often scipulated that women had co give up their jobs to men on their return from militar}' service, and go\-emment propaganda portra}'ed women's war work as a temporary response to an emergency. ..A woman is a subscirute,'" asserted a War Deparcment brochure, ..like

The Home Front

Primary Source: lntema.J Migration in the U.S. During V\'orldW-at ll

-olwomm• . ...."mm'J -·ho .u~d - wlu1 bad wa.t•m v.·u 1indusaieJ ~

plastic instead of mctal." Traditional notions about a woman's place also shaped go\-ernment resistance co establishing child-<are centers for women employed in defense. "A mother's primat}' duty is co her home and children,"' che Labor Department's Children's Bureau scared. Funds for federal child-care centers covcred few defense workers' children, and the }'Oung suffered. New terms, such as eifPt.JJour orphans and l.atchkey chi!· drrn, described children forced co fend for th emsel~s. Feeding the fears of chose who believed that having women ~A'Ork outside the home would cause the family to disintegrate, juvenile delinquency increased fivefold, and the d ivorce rare nearly doubled. The impact of war on V.'Omen and children was multifaceted and even contradictor}'· Oi\'on::e races soared, but so d id marriage races and birthrates. Three: hundred and fifty thousand women joined the armed forces and for the first time ser'led in positions there other than nurse. female workers gained unprece· dented employment opportunities and public recogni· cion. Alt hough man}' eagerly ga'le up their jobs ac che end of che war, just as man}' d id not relish losing chcir income and newfOund independence. 0\-erall, the war ga\-e ~A'Omen a new sense of t heir potential. Most women still hoped to be wi ~s and moth~ but che Rosio tilt Rimor war had widened women's ~A'Orlds and challenged tra· Memori:~tiud in song "'nd story, .,Ro5ie the Riveter" ditional notions as nothing before C"".-er had. symboli ud the women w.~r WOt"kl'r5 who :~numed The loss of srudems to the armed services and war job5 in hoc:;avy industry to t;akl' up (he sl~k for the ;ab5e:nt t S million men in the ;armed $~U. H~re ;a production forced colleges to admit large numbers of \'try re"'l Rosie the R.n."C:ter-is doing her job in April women and to contract chemseh-es out co the military. 1943 ;at d\e B:~ltimore m:u~ur;aeturi:ng pl o:~nt ror M;artin Military training programs sene near!}' a million seiVicePM6,\bri n.ers. men and ~A'Omen to college campuses to acquire skills in engineering, forcign languages, economics, and che sciences. Higher education became more dependent on the federal government, and unh·crsities competed for federal contracts and subsidies. The war profoundl)' affected American culrure. Spending on books and theater entertainment more than doubled. More t han 60 million people (in a population of 135 million) attended movies weekly. Hoii)'W'Ood rurned our a spate of war films that reinforced t he image of Nazis and Japanese as fiends, portrayed Gls as freedom· loving heroes, and intensified Americans' appetite for unconditional viccory. But as the war dragged on, people tired of propaganda, and HoiiY""'Ood reemphasized ro· mance and ad\-enturc. Early in t he war, popular musk featured patriotic t hemes. "Goodb)•e Mama, I'm {Ff) lnteracti\•e Map: Off co Yokohama" was t he first hit of 1942. Asche war continued, chemes of lost lm-e ~ The Home Front and loneliness dominated songs. By 1945 bitterness pervaded the l)'fics ofbestsell· ing records, and such hits as ..Sacurda)' Night Is the Loneliest Night of the Week" re· \'ealed an impatience for che ~A'3r's end. www.c.engoge.com/history/ boyer/enduringconcisde

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In bookstores, non6ction cro'l"·ded che shdvcs, and e•..-er}' nC""-'Smagazine in· creased its circulation. Wendell WiUkie's Ont World ( 1943) became the fastest-selling title in publishing hiscory co chat time, ~Aith 2 million copies snapped up in two )'tat'S. A vision of a world without militar}' alliances and spheres of influence, this briefvolume expressed hope that an intcrnacional organization "-'OUld extend peace and democracy through che postwar world. Americans also stayed glued co chcir radios d uring the war. The quest for up-to· date informacion kept radio audiences at record levels. Net"-urks increased chcir nc~A'S programs from 4 perccnc co nearly 40 percent of their daily schedule. Daycime serials, like those featuring Dick Tracy tracking dawn Axis spie~ reached the height of their popularity; a platoon of new comk book superheroes, including Captain America and Captain Marvel, saw action on the battlefield. Even Bugs Bunn}' put on a uniform to combat America's foes.

Realizing char the gm-emmcm needed the lo)'alcy and work of a united people to win the war,African·American Opportunllles leaders saw new pathways co securing equal rights. In 1942 d"il·rights spokesmen insisted chat African-American su pport of the war hinged on che United States' commitment co radal justice. They demanded a double cam· paign: to gain victory m·er racial discrimination ac home as well as over chc Axis abroad. Membership in the: National Association for the Advancement of Colored l:teople multiplied ncar!}' ten cime:~ reaching 500,000 in 1945. The: association pressed fo r ami-poll tax and antilynching legislation, decried discrimination in defense industries and che armed seJVices, and sought to end African-American dis· franchisement. The: campaign for black vocing rights gained momenrum when the: Suprrme Court, in Smith v. Allwrigbt ( 1944), ruled 1Cxas's ali -~Atbite primary unconstitutional. This decision eliminated a barrier char had existed in eight states, although these: states prompt!)' resorted cootherdcvicestominimize African-American voting. A new d"il·rights organization, che Congress of Radal Equality (CORE), 'A'llS fo unded in 1942. Employing the strategy ofnonviolenc resistance to challenge jim Cto~A', CORE sought co desegregate public facilities in norchern cities. Also propos· ing nonviolent direct action was A. PhiUp Randolph, president of che Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. In 1941 Randolph called for a "-thundering march" of 100,000 blacks on Washington .. to wah up and shock white America" He had warned Rooscvdc that, if the: president did noc abolish discriminacion in the: armed SCC\i ces and che defense industr}', African-Americans would besiege the nation's capital. FOR agreed to compromise, and in june 1941 issued Exocucive Order 8802, the 6rsc presidential directive on race since Reconstruction. It prohibited discrimi· natory empiO)menc practices by federal agencies and all unions and companies engaged in war-related work and established the: Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) co enforce chis policy. Although the FEPC did noc apply co che armed forces and lacked effe
llclsm llld New

A. Ploip Roodolpll """'

k:ultt-.flo.se 1brut1'otd nuuh on W.ubingtoo k d co tbe erurion ortht F~ir Employ. mem Pt~s Commiuioo (FEPC)

ers cripled. Average earnings for blacks in creased fro m $457 to $1,976 a re-ar, compared co $2,600 fo r "'flites. About I million African-Americans served in che anned forces. Wartime needs forced che military to end policies of exduding blacks from combat units. 11le allblack 761sc Tank Battalion gained distinction fighcing in Germany, and che 99th Pursuit Squadron won cighcy Distinguished Flying Crosses in combat against t he Luftwaffe.Although t he anny and na")'bcgan cxperimencs "'ith imegracion in 1944, mosc blacks served in segregated unics under white officers. 1'he failure of military authorities to procecc African-American servicemen off the pose and the usc ofwhite military police to keep African-Americans «in their placr' sparked conflict on many army bases. At least fi fty African-American soldiers died in warcime racial encounters in the United States. Violence "'ithin the military mirrored growing racial tensions ac home. As African-Americans militantly protested agains t discrimination, manywhi[es resisted all efforcs by blacks to improw their economic and social status. Numerous dashes occurred. In mid-1943 scores of cities reported pitched battles becween whites and African-Americans. The bloodiest race riot exploded in Detroit that june. By irs end, cwenty-6ve blacks and nine whites lay dead, more than s.......,-en hundred had been in· jured, and more t han S2 million in property had been destrored. Vee the "''llr brought significant changes that .....-ould C'\o-emually result in a successful drive for black civil rights. 11le migration of 01/'er seven h undred thousand blacks from t he South curned a southern problem into a national concern. Despite the continuation of racial discrimination, most who left the rural Souch fo und a more: abundanc and hopeful life than the one they had left behind. As the growing numbers of blacks in norchern cit ies began to vote, morem-er, African-Americans could hold a balance of poW'Cr in dose elections. l b is prompted politicians in boch major parcies co pa}' more attention to civil-rights issues. In addition, the horrors of Nazi racism discredited America's D'l'-'n "'flite supremacist attitudes. A fonner go\-ernor ofAlabama complained, Nazism has ..wm:ke:d the theories of the master race with which"'" ....-ere so contented so long."' A plural· ist vision of American society now became part ofofficial rhecoric, and of the liberal· left agenda In a massh·e study of race problems entitled An Aml!rican Dilrmmtt ( 1944}, Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal conduded char «not since Reconstruction had there been more reason to anricipace: fundamental changes in American race relations." Returning black veterans, and African-Americans "'flo had sen·e:d t he nation on t he home fronc, resolved as never before to gain all the rights enjoyed by "''hitcs.

Wartime "'inds of change brought new opportunities, and problems, co ocher American minorities. 1U.-ency-fi:..-e thousand Nati"-e Americans senoed in the armed forces, including Na\'ajo "code:·talkers"' "''ho confounded t he Japanese b)• rela}ing secret messa~s in an unbreakable code: based on their native tongue. Anocher fifty chousand Indians left reseJVations co work in defense. for most, it was che first experience of living in a non-Indian "''Orld, and after the war some would remain in t he cities. Continued discrimination, h~\....,-cr, "''Ould force a majority back to cheir resen•ations, which suffered severely from budget cuts during the war and the immediate: post· war years.

'War and Diversity

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JrnJoeros "GUC'st workers";

I

~ Llbon-n kg.ally brought in10 United Sutu

To relieve agricultural labor shortages, the federal government negotiated an agroe· menc with Mexico to import t emporary workers called brac.eros (brah-SARE-ohs). Classified as foreign "'-orkers, not immigrants, an estimated 200,000 braceros recei\·ed short-term contracts. Farm owners frequend)' violated t hese contracts and also en· courage:d an influx of illegal immigrants. Unable: to complain about prejudice and t he way they were trtated without risking deportation, hundreds of t housands of Mexicans ~A'Cre exploited b)•Anglo plant· ers and ranchers. Atthc same rime, large numbers of'iMexicans and Mexican·Americans mo'led co Los Angcle~ Chicago, and other large citi~ ~Ailere they found jobs in garment factories, ship)'llrds, and st«l mills. Ew:n as chcir occupational status and material conditions imprm--ed, most Mexican-Americans remained in segregated communities. Much of the hostility tO""-ard Mexican·Americans focused on )'Oung gang members who u-ore broad-shouldered jackets called "zoot suits." After a sum· mer of concern about the so-called "Mexican Crime Wa\-e," bands of sailors from nearb)•bases and soldiers on leave in los Angeles rampaged through che city in earl)' june 1943, stripping Chicano }"OUth wearing woe su i ~ cutting t heir long hair, and beating them . Military authorities looked t he: other way. City police imen-ened onl)' to arrest Mexican-Americans. In the military itself, Spanish-speaking American~ like blacks, suffered discrim· ination. Ne:\-en-heless, nearly 350,000 Chicanos served in the armed forces, earning a disproportionate number of citations for distinguished service and Congressional Medals of Honor. And much like black and Indian veterans, Mexican-American vet· erans organized new groups to press for equal rights. Thousands of gay men and lesbians ~Ailo sel'V'ed in the armed forces also found new wartime opportunities. Like other minorities, man}' gays sa~A' the war as a chance to prm--e chcir worth under fire. Yet some suspected of being gay "-'ere dishonorabl)' discharged, sent to psrchiarric hospitals, or imprisoned in so-
Far more chan an)' other minority in the United States, Japanese suffered grit:\'Ously during che ~A'llr. l 'he intern· llplnese-Amerkans ment of J 12,000 japanese-Americans, rn·o-thirds of them natr.-e-born U.S. ciciuns, in relocation centers guarded by military police, ~A'llS a tragic reminder of the: fragility of civil liberties in ~A'llrtime. The internment ofjapanese-Amerkans policy reflected forty years of anti· Japanese sent iment on the: \'('est Coast, rooted in racial prejudice and economic rivalr)'· Self-serving politicians and farmers who wanced Japanese-American land had long decried the "yellow peril," and after t he: attack on 1\:arl Harbor they whipped up the rage and fears of many white Californians. In ~bruary 1942 Roosevelt gaw in to che pressure and authorized t he: evacuation of aU japaneseAmericans from che West Coast, despite che fact that not a single japanese-American had been apprthcnded for espionage or sedition and neither the Federal Bureau of lrr~estigation nor militar)' intelligence had uncowred any disloyal behavior by j apanese-Americans. Interestingly, only j apanese-Americans on t he: mainland fell victim to the: in· ternment policy. The Hawaiian Islands were home: to approximately 160,000 people:

The Internment of

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Alaeric.~~~s Wuritnc' policy to tvacwa" from Wot Coli.« and in(..1..fttratr ;all tbost witb ~pmot ~itagr, U.S. tim:tns indudl'ld

A lapaiii!St-AmeriOlll Cllild Beine Ev.uaattd from Los Anples io April 1M2 It d id noc m;mo:r th ou ~o:. ~ng with wm.e 80,000 otho:r Niu:i, wo:ro: Amerio::~ c:itiu ns. "A j;2p'$ :. J :~p," $;2id Cio:no::r-:..1 Jo hn Do: W itt, eomm:ando:rof Wo:st Co.:tst ckfo:nsn.

ofJapanese ancestr)', one-third of che entire population. Noncrhd es~ de· spite the potencial damage chat saboteurs could haw: inflicted, Hawaiian officials maintained their tradition of interracial harmony. Hawaii's Japa· nese committed no acts of sabocage; indeed, man}' became «superpatriots" in order to honor their obligations to the United States. Buc on the mainland. Japanc.se-Americans, forced to sell their lands and homes at whatever prices chey could obtain, ~A'Cre herded into barbed· wire-encircled detention camps in desolate areas of c.he \l1esc.. The Supreme Court, in KorNna:s.u v. Uniwd Stain (1944). upheld the consc.irutionalicy of the e\•acuation, stating that it would not quesc.ion gMwnment claims of military necessity d uring che war. By chen, however, the hysteria had subsided, and the government had begun a program of gradual release. In 1982 a special government commission would formally blame the Roo· scvclt administration's action on ..race pre-judice, war hysteria. and a fail· ure of political leadership" and ~A'Ould apologize to Japanese-Americans for "a grave injusc.icc." In 1988 Congress voced to pay $20,000 as compensa· don to each of the nearly 60,000 Japanese-American internees still alive.

\'(l;~.r triggtud inco:rn;~.l

migr.uiao, ;u po:ople w ught wu indu,try jobs wh tch, liko: the milit;~.ry, twscd tog«h« America.ru ofwiddy d if· fo:ro:nc ba dtgruunW. \'(lomo:n enten"d tbt wofi.: foru in luge n um bo:u but wen" Jten ;u "tempor~ry worko:.n:." Afrie:.n-Amtric;~.ru rtl;ldo: signifie:.nt ga.inJ ~nd $Ct the stago: for the ci,•il· r ights d""" ~Aer the w~r.

To toakco acfvant~ge ofwan:imo: work, Jndia.ru lo:ft l'l'$Crv;ltion,, a nd Mo::xi· c;ms tnttrtd tho: Unito:d Stoatts und o:r t ho: bnra-ro prognm.. Japa.no:se·Amtric;~.n,, into:rntd in

tamps,""""' ''it.tirru of prtcjud i« :.nd w~r hpteria.

TRI UMPH AND TRAGEDY, 1945 What rNW jssues did the U.S. government con(rottt in de(e11fing Germany 11nd japan in 1945? Spring and summer 1945 broughc scunning changes. In Europe, the collapse of the Nazj Third Reich saw a new balance of po~A'Cr emerge. In Asia, continued Japa· nese resistance and reluctance co surrender led to the use of the atomic bomb. And in the United States, a new president, Harry1ruman, presided over the end ofWorld War II and the beginning of a new, "cold" war.

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By the: time Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met ac t he: ~bruary 1945, the: military situa· tion favored the Sc:wiet Union. 11le Red Army had overrun l'oland, Romania, and Bulgaria; helped drive the N:u.isoutof Yugoslavia; penetrated Auscria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; and was massed only fifty miles fro m Berlin. American forces, in contrasc, ~A'Cre: still re:co\·ering from che Batd e: of t he Bulge: and faced stiff resistance en ro ute to Japan. 1'he: Joinc C hiefs of Staff, predicting char an im•asion of Japan would cost I million American casualties, insisted chat obtaining Stalin's help in Asia 'A'llS worth almost any price. The Yalea acc.ords mirrored t hese realities. Stalin again promised co declare war on Japan ''t wo or chre:e months" after Germany's surrcnder, and in rerum Roosevelt and C hurchill promised t he: Soviec Union concessions in Manchuria and the cerrito· ries char Russia had lost in che Russo-Japanese War forty years before. Stalin accepted the temporaryparcicioningof ~ nnan}' and che: poscponemmt ofdiscussions about reparations. O n t he matter dearest co FO R' s he:arc, Stalin approved plans fo r a United Nations conference co establish a permanent internacional organization for coll«ti~ security. Stalin, hD'I'-'f:'\'f:'r, pro\-ed adamant about Sovie:c domination in eastern Europe, parcimlarly l'o land. 1\vice in the twentieth cencury, German troops had used Poland as a pathway for invading Russia. Stalin would not expose his land again, and after the Red Army had captured Warsa~A' inJanuar}' 1945, he brutally subdued che noncommunise majority. Rooscw.lt and Churchill refused to recognize the communist Lublin regime:, buc they accepted Stalin's pled~ to indude noncommunist l'oles in the new governmenc and co allow free elections. They could do little else. Shore of going to war agains t the SoYiet Union while batding Germany and Japan, FOR could only hope thac Stalin would keep his word.

The Yllla Conference Soviet city of Yalca in

Yib atliOfds

1945 l8rl'll:mc'Ut5

in wbkb FOR mldt conttS· sionJ to Stalin eo indiKl' bim to join tht Plcific w;ar

I

Meanwhile:, Allied armies d osed the vise on Germany. In early March 1945, American troops captured Cologne and encircled Germany's industrial heartland. 1b counter t he: threat ofSoviec power in posN'llr Europe, Churchill proposed a rapid chrust to Bet· lin, but EisenhD'I'-~r, with Roosevelt-'s backing, m~rruled che British. Ins tead, to min· imize their casualties and co reassure Stalin, the Americans advanced methodically on a broad from unci! t ht:)' met t he: Russians at the Elbe Rii,!'Cr at t he: end of ApriL By t hen the: Red Army had O\'crrun Vienna and reached rhe suburbs of Berlin. On April30 Hider committed suicide in a bunker under the: ruins of Bcrlinj the city fell to the: Sc:wicts on Ma)' 2. A hasril)' assembled ~ nnan gMwnmmt surrendered unconditionally on May 8. Jubilant Americans celebrated Viccory in Europe (V·E) Day less than a month after they had mourned che deach of FOR. O n April 12 the exhausted presidenc died of a cerebral hemorrhage. His unprepared successor inh erited leaders hip of the most powerful nation in his tor}'- as W'CU as t roubles with che Soviet Union that seemed more intractable every day. Harry S Truman had little familiarity ~Airh ~A
Vktory il Europe

lnteracti\•e Map: The Fall of the Third Reich

I TIU\fllPHA~O TltAGEDY, 194S

611

ambassador V. M. Molotov that the United States was tired of ~A'lliting for Moscow to aUo~A' free d e:crions in Poland, and he chrearme:d to cut off lend-lease aid if the Soviet Union did not cooperate. l 'he Truman administracion chen reduced U.S. ceo· nomic assistance to the: Sovie:rs and stalled on their request for a Sl billion rocon· strucrion loan. Stalin consequcnd)' broke his Yalca promises and screngthened his control of eastern Europe. The Truman administration neichcr conceded the Soviet sphere of influence in eastern Europe nor cried to end it. 1 ·ruman still sought Stalin'scooperacion in estab· lishing che: Unice:d Nations and in defeating Japan, but Soviet-American relations deteriorated rapid!)'· By june I 945, when the Allied councrie:s framed che United Na· cions Charter in San Francisco, hopes for a peaceful nc~A' international order had dimmed,. and the United Nations em erged as a d iplomatic batd eground. Truman, Churchill, and Stalin met at Potsdam, Germany, from July 16 to August 2, to complete the postwar arrangem ents begun at Yalta. Each trying to presen·e and enlarge his nation's sphere of influence, the Allies could barely agree even to demilitarize Germany and to punish Nazi war criminals. All che major divisive issues were post· poned. Given the diplomatic impasse, military power would determine the contours of che postwar ~A'Orl d.

When news of che Holoc.ausc (HAWt-oh-cost)- che term Iacer gi\'tn to the Nazis ' excenninarion of European j ewryfirst leaked ouc in earl)' 1942, many Am ericans discounced the reports. Noc until Nowm ber did che State Department admic knowledge of the massacres. A m onth later, che American broadcaster Edward It M urraw,listened to nationwide, reponed o n the S)'Stem atic killing of millions of Jews, .. lc is a picrure of mass murder and moral depravity unequalled in the history of the world. It is a horror beyond what imagination can grasp. ... There are no longer 'concent ration camps'- we must speak now onl)' of' exterminacion camps!"' NC'\o-erthd es~ most Americans considered the annihilation of Europe's 6 mil· lion Jews beyond belief. 11lere u-ere no photographs to prove it, and, some argued, the atrocities attributed to che Germans in World War I had rurned out to be false. So few people took issue ~Aith the military's view that che wa}' to liberate chose en· sta..-ed by Hid er was by speedily ~Ain ning the war. !'leas by American j ews for che AI· lies co bomb che death cam ps and che railroad tracks leading to them fell on deaf cars. In fall 1944, U.S. planes flying over Auschwitz in southern Poland bom bed nearby factories but left the gas chambers and crematoria intact, in order, Am erican officials explained, noc to di\-ert air pc>""Cr from more vital raids elsewhere. Ho~A' much could ha..-e been done remains uncertain. Still, the U.S. go\'trnmem never seriously considered rescue schemes or searched fur a ~A'llY co curtail the Nazjs' "final solution" to the "J~·ish question." Irs feeble response was d ue to irs O\'er· whelming focus o n winning the war as q uickly as possible, congressional and public fears of an influx ofdestitutej~'S imo the United States, Britain's wish co placate the Arabs by keeping J~·ish settlers ouc of Palestine, and the fear of some )~·ish Am erican leaders that pressing the issu e would increase anti-Semitism at home. l 'he War Refugee Board managed to save the lt..-e:s ofjust 200,000 Jev.'S and 20,000 non· Jev.'S, but 6 million ocher Jews, about 75 percent of t he European jewish population,

Tile Holocaust

HGJ.u.st Extr:rmi.narion or 6

I

million ) l!'tl'll, 6 million othtn by Nuis in name of't.lria.l putity

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CHAPtER l5

AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4S

Berpll-a.lsttl Conctt~b'atio• Camp Enter ing Go:rm:u~y in 1945, Amerio::u~ troops d.i5eovo:red tho: l\orror1 th;~.t the N;~.xis h;~.d p<'~tr.:.to:d on Euro·

pt.:tn Jtws .:tnd otheno. Ho:re, Geno:r.:.l Eisenhower .:.nd U.S. $Oidiel'5 vio:w the bodjo:s vietims ;t.t 6o:rgen·6eb e n.

or

were gassed, s hoe, or incinerated. as were st\'eral million gypsies, communists, ho· moscxuals, Polish Catholics, and ochers deemed un6c co lt...·e in the Third Reich. "The things I saw beggar description,'" wrote General Eisenhower after visiting the 6rsc death camp liberated by the U.S. Army. He: sem immediately for a delegation ofcongressional leaders and newspaper editors to make su re Americans would nt\'er forget lhe gas chambers and human 0\"Cns. Only after viewing the photographs and newsreels of corpses stacked like cordwood and living skeletons wich their vacant, sunken eyes scaring through barbed wire, d id mosc Americans see chac lhe Holo· cause was no mych.

In lhe Paci6c, the war with j apan ground on. Earl)•in 1945, marines secured the: tiny island of I~A'O j ima (EE-woh JEE· muh}, 700 miles from Japan, at the: cost of 25,000 marine: casualties. A month later, Americans landed on Okinawa (oh·kff·NAH-wah}, a kC}' staging area for che planned invasion ofche Japanese home island~ onl)' 350 miles distant. In nearly three months of ferocious combat, U.S. fo rces sustained 40,000 ca· sualtics, whereas more than I 10,000 Japanese militar}' died and Japanese civilians took 80,000 casualties. If che capture: of chese small islands had entailed such bloodshed, military plan· ners asked, ~Aohat would lhe invasion of j apan itself be: like? Although a naval block· ade had strangled j apan's commerce: and its lands Ia)' defenseless to U.S. bombers, the imperial gO\"Crnment showed litd e: disposition co surrender. Truman scheduled an invasion ofK)'Ushu (kYOO-shoo), the 6rst of the: home islands, for late 1945.

Bur the successful test of an acom ic weapon at Alamogordo in mid-July pre· semed an alternaci\J'C. While at Pocsdam, Truman, on July 25, ordered char an atomic bomb be used if Japan did not su rrender before August 3. He publicly warned Japan to surrender u nconditionally or fuce "-pro mpt and utter destruction;'' When Japan rr-jected chis Potsdam De:claradon, Truman ga\'t: the militar}' the go·ahead. On Au· PotsU.. DedwatiH Ptt:r.ident 1·nmun'J v.• uning eo tbt gust 6, a 8·29 named Enola Gay dropped a uranium bomb on Hiroshima (he.-roh~p;lntJ;C, bdOno dropping ;an SHEE.muh), creating "a hell of unspeakable torments." A scaring flash of heat, a atomic bomb on Hirod!inu, to Jutf't'ndcor or fcr tfwo NuU in fiu ropr dropped. 11uoughout che ~A'llr Americans had relied on production and tranJitionrd quickly into a U.S.· technology co win the war with a minimum loss of American lift. E\-ery S(wirt confront..u Km.. new weapon 'A'llS used. ..Total ~A'llr'' induded the terror-bombing of masses Thr rnd o f thr w.u l'e\>calrd thc horrou ofthr Haloeolu.~t. of ci vilian~ and wit hin this concext the atomic bomb seemed simpl)' one more weapon in an arsenal chat had already wreaked enormous destrucAfl:rr atomic bomb~ """re drop ped on Hiroshima and N.lgau.lo:i, ~nd tion on che enemy. No responsible official suggested that the United Scares thr SO\•irt Union drd;a_nod war, japan accept the: deachs of thousands of Americans while not using a ~A'Capon Ju rrenden:"d. developed ~Aith 2 billion taxpayer dollars. Indeed, to the vase majority of Thr de~tc conti nu~ about whcther Americans, the atomic bomb was, in Churchill's ~A'Ords, "a miracle of delivuJe oft he atomic bomb~ w.u nece'-Jlary. erance" that shortened the war and saved lives.

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OfAPlER l5

AMEIUCNf:S AND A WORlD IM C~IStS, 19}]- 19 4 S

Chapter Su (ff)

DOWNLOAD THE

~

LISTEN TOITONTHEGO.

MPJ AVOtO R lE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND

How did the American people andgovernment respond to the internotional crises ofthe 1930s? (page 588)

I

As war loomed in Europe, a majoriryofAmericans we:redctennintd to a\'Oid becoming in~'Oi ved; che Neutmlity Aces lh\'J'e an attempt to pm't:nt invol\'t:ment. Isolationists fonncd America First, but FOR sought incttased militaty funding. Americans and chc U.S. SM't:tnmcnt turned thrir backs on Je"'ish refugtts try· ing co fltt Hitler.

I

What drew the United States inw World War II? (page 592)

France had surrendered, and Britain was barrlyclinging to life b}• the fall of 1940; despite strong isolationist sentiment, FDR drcum~-entcd che Neutmlity Acts with cash·and<arry and lend·leasc programs for Britain. In Asia, che Japa· nese became incttasingly aggressiVl' but saw che United States as a major obsta· cle to expansion; their decision co gamble on an all·out attack on American possessions, including Pearl Harbor, predpitattd American entry into the war.

How did war mobilization transform the American economy and government? (page 595)

I

Full mobilization of the industrial economy was the key co Allied victO!}'· U.S. V.'.lr production boomed as government spending ended the depression. l 'h e SM'etnment established tight control m't:r the econom}'• the pres~ and in· dustry. Research and dcvrlopment brought technology to be-ar on che war, in· eluding radar, sonat, the computer, and the atomic bomb.

Whot were the major aspects ofAllied military strateg in Europe and Asia? (page 599)

I

In Europe, the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the fighting; che battle of Stalingrad was che turning point of the war. 11le invasion of Fmnce on O.Day began the final push to Allied victory. In che Pacific, the United States relied Latgely on its carrier fleets and island·hopping campaigns.. By V.'.lr•s end, how· e\'t:r, che U.S.-Great Britain..Soviec Union alliance had seriously eroded because each nation had different war goals.

KEY TERMS

"Good N
_.,.111
Netmlily Arts (p. 590) Win11on C~urc~ill (p. 592} "IOOd·l_ . (p. 591} Allantic C~arfl>r (p. 591) war Productioo Board (p. 596) Office of PriceAdminiW'ation (p. 596}

Manllattan Project (p. 598} loS
llroceros (p. 608} intemiTlellt of Japa~se-Americans (p. 608)

Yalta accords (p. 610} Holocau~ (p. 611} Prudam O.c~ratioo (p. 611)

CHAPTER SUMMAAY

615

What ..,.,. the major eff« b o{World War II on Am
I

l be Sun Bdt prospered .. gtmtnmc:nc spcndmg the:~ soa.trd; mfll ions of Amtricans 'i'1:tc caught up 1n a Vl.U mtMl.&l mlgrulon. l~l.e of WKI.clydiwtSc bu:kgrounds came rogn hc:t 1n 'A' .It ,obs and the mlllt:uy. W gc num~ts of 'll-omm m teml the mdwtcW "''Otk fottC. as dJd subsranti.:tl numbtrs of African~Arntricms_ lndw1S~ :m d

Mc:riCaru. HO'*--cwt, WJ.tnme propag;tndJ. and

iong:su.ndmg pctjudn ltd to the lnt«nmcnt o( mote t han 100.000 jap.tnnrAmtrians soldy btcwK of thclt rue.

What new is.w
I

1bt Y.Uta conft«na: ~ ckq dMsaons among dw Altws;: FOR nudt subsu.na.al c.onas.saons to the Sovld UnJOn b«.uur ics hdp •-oukl bt rwckd <0 figJu ).ap.m. Yocnxy....- yqudly Nmcd IntO US.&Mn· u.rioo.. Tht Nil hom:n of dx H<*xaUA bc.amc appattnt to Amnic.ms who twl doubttd e&dJtr rtpOfU. 11x &ue of a'omte bombs ~·nsa: J.apanrsc dtit:s • -as .a m.ap- f.actoc" m COfl'\'ll'lOnSJ.tpan to JUI1mdct, bu1 rhr rva:u.iryofthrit usc is still being ckb.trcd.

www.nngog~.com/bi nocy/b4y~r/~lldvringcond.st:'~

CHAPTER 26

1945-1952

C HAPTER PREVIEW

Tilt Po!lwar Polilkal Setting. 1945- 1946 W1tol ~ rhf major COML'qUtllti!S o( tJte Gl Bill

o{Rjt)>ts?

Anticommunism and Containment, 1946-1952 How duJ lht polities ofthB United States and Sovi#l U"f011 ~ad ro rite bll§nnings ofthe CDid Wo.r~

The Trwnan Administratic::fl at HOOle, 1945- 1952 W1!« t{fwt (l!'d 1M f1lln Clii'IWtWti~ poliOOIJ dtm#u lwM CM Ttvmat~'s dottttsricprogam?

Thti'Oiidaa1An1ialmnuli!m How tJW/•h!!OrQWIImtflliJt smcimmr lt{fru A.lntrir.iM

-'11 ~and.,. Hollywood Witch Hunts, by Thomas Mlittand Oetand

L

~rsoniiled

ikt no one t:lsc, )2-cklc Robinson rhr: accelerating momcnttJm of the snuggle ag.1insr radal discrimination that emerged from t he Second World War, While serving in war, Robin· son ""'lls acquitted ofinsubordlnation in a court-martial for refusing to accept scgrev-tion on army buses. In 1947, he: accepted an offer to play baseball for thr: BrookJyn Ood~n. 1"'ht grandson of a sl:l\o-.:: h..td ~coml." tht: first African·Amcrlc.an ro play m:tjor lt.tgUI.' bast:b.all in tht N-mtit"th cmtury. He mduml racist insults and bun bills) fly· ing spiks and lut~ nw~ cwn doth thtt..tts, from fotns and otht:r pl.tyus. But his d.udmg pby and dlgJUfi«< rourag. h
616

Court chipped away at t he judicial foundations of segregacion; t he 1r uman admin· istration proposed civil-rights legislation.: and anti racism cook its place in che a~nda of liberalism. A new phase: in the struggle to end rncism in America had begun. Meanwhile, a Cold War rapidly emerged as che dominant dewlopmem of the postwar era. Abandoning its historical aloofness from events oucside t he Western Hemisphere, che United States now plunged imo a global struggle co contain the Soviet Union and stop communism. T he nacion that only a few years before had no military alliances, a small defense budget, and no troops on foreign soil created a gi· am militar}' establishment, directly intervened in the affairs of allies and enemies alike, built militar)•bases on every continent, and embarked on a see-mingly limidess nuclear-arms race. Containing communism abroad profoundl)' changed America at home as welL It cransformed che economy, shifted nacional priorities, expanded che powers of the executive branch, and spa"''tled a second Red Scare. The obsession "'ith subo.·e:rsion and the communist menace silenced the Left, stifled debate, and narrowed the range of what was politically acceptable. 1'he politics of deadlock, inherited from the Late 1930s, concin ued. An anxious )'t:t hopeful people looked to chcir own prosperity and family life for the joy and blessings denied them by Cold War fears of a nuclear world war.

THE POSlWAR POLIT ICAL S ETTING, 1945- 1946

I

What ...,nt the maJOr consequences ofth6 Gl Bill ofRights?

The cmergmg Cold War profoundly changed the Umted States for becter and for worse. It spurred a quarter-
When the: war ended, Gls and civilians alike wanced all those "'.flo had served 0\'Ct'Seas "home alive in '45." 1roops demanding t ransport ships barraged Congress with threats of«no boats, no \'Otes." On a singtc day in December 1945, sixty thousand postcards arrived ac the Whice: House with the message "Bring the BO)'S Home by Christmas:'' Truman bowed to popular demand, and by 1948 American military scrength had dropped from I 2 million at war's end co jusc 1.5 million. Rcrurning veterans faced rcadjustmcm problems ince:nsi6ed by a soaring di\'Otce rate and a drastic housing shortage. As war plants closed, moreover, veterans and civilians feared t he return of mass unemployme-nt and economic depression. Defense spending plummeted from $76 biUion in 1945 to under $20 billion in 1946, and more than a mi11ion defense jobs \'anished (sec Figure 26. I). By the-end ofthe decade morl' women "''Ctl' working outside: t he home chan during World War ILThey took jobs in traditional women' s 6dd~ especially office U'Ork and sales, to pay for famil)' needs. Although the postwar economy crt~ace:d new openings

lllmalllllotioaand llloMerslon

{f'f) PMwy Source: ~

Return of the Soldier

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CHAPtER 26

ThE COI..OWAAA81l0AO N>:O AT HoME,

S150

- - Tolal federal spending - - Defense spending 125

1 100 "e.

I~S-19jl for women in the labor market, many public figures urged ~A
l'he: Servicemen's Re:adjuscme:nt Ace of 1944, commonly called the Gl E Bill of Rights or GJ BiU was designed to forestall the: 50 expected recession by easing \'eterans back imo the: work force, as well as to reward che "soldier boys" 25 and reduce their fears of female competition. The Gl Bill gave veterans priority for many job~ occupa· tiona! guidance:, and, if n«d be, 6fty-cwo ....-eeks of 1955 1959 '61 unemployment benefits. It also escablishe:d veterans' hospitals and provided low-ince:rest loans to re:curnFicare M-1 NlrtiONI Dtfttlso Sptoding, 1941- 1!160 ing Gls ~Ailo were starting businesses or buying In 1950, the defense budgecw;ls S 13 b illion, len th;ln ;l third o f the cobl feder.~.l outl;ly. In 1961, defense s.pending homes or farms. Almost 4 million veterans bought reached S47 b illion, fully h;llfof the feckr;ll budgec ;and homes with government l oan~ fueling a baby boom, ;lltn(X( 10 percent ol the gros.s na tion;ll produet. suburbanization, and a record demand for new Soui«:H«nAtntrir4YihwRife \'ol 1, . . td.ltyhm:sA.Her:tt-tu d .t goods and services. lkpmltd v.~ pmriWon d lkd'ordJ5t. Mutin'l. Most vitally in rhe long run, the: gMwnment pro mised ro pay millions of \'eterans for up to four Cl lill Aa c.h.u allo-~ for )'tatS of funher education or job training. Yet some Americans opposed it as open· tducarion ~nd home ownership ing the door to socialism or ro demands by minorities co special entidements. Many forYt'tft';I.U$ university administrators, fearing che influx of riffraff, echoed the complaint of the: University of Chicago president chat their learning instirucions would become "educational hobo jungles:'' In 1946, flush ~Aith generous stipends, 1.5 million \'ete:rans were attending col· lege, spurring a huge increase in higher education and che creacion of many new state and community colleges. Veterans made: up O\'er half of all college students in 1947. Often married and the fathers of young children, they v.-ere less inn·resced in knowledge than in a degree: and a higher-paying job. To accommodate them, colleges featured accelerated programs and more vocational or career-oriented courses. To make room for the millions ofGJs pursuing higher education after che war, many colleges limited the percentage of women admitted or barred students from out of scate. 1'he: percentage of female college graduates dropped from 40 percenr in 1949 to 25 percenc in 1950. By then mosc potential women students were the work· ing wives of the \'etetans who rook ad\•antage of the: Gl Bill to go to college. The G J Bill democratized higher education. It allo....-ed many more Americans (most of them che 6rs.t in their families to attend) co go to college. Later those Gls expected their children to follow suit, and higher education became an accepted part of the: American Dream. No longer a citadel of privilege, uni..-ersitie:s awarded almost half a million degr«s in 1950, more chan ru·ice as many as in 1940. The cost was h uge, but ~A'CU spent. The $ 15 billion thac \'etctans received sent them to school, helped them buy homes, and finan ced their new businesses. It pro· 75

&

I

1'111 Cl Bill ol Rigllls

Servicemen's Readj-ent AcJ. (CI Bl) Postwar smlu!....., begils. Employmenl Act; George Kennan's "long ll!le!ram•; Wi1ston Ch~; Federal ~ Loyoly Program; lame Robinson lif..ts maio< loa&~~• basebah color lin<>; Taft.Hartloy A<J.; National Security A<J.; President's Convnitll!e on CMIRiillls issues 10 SroNP m.selliglrts; HUAC holds hearings on Hollywood Convnurist coup in Czechoslovakia; Slale of IsraEl foondl'd; Berlin airlift; Congll'Ss 'I'Prople~ Repubic ol China estlblished; SoviEI Union dEionaleS an ammi:bomb Soviet spy ring at los Alamos uncovered; Joseph McCarthy ~undies anticorrmunist crusade; Korean War begins; Mccar"" lnlernal Sl'Ctrriy Ad; Tr~Wnan accepls NSC-6a; China enlers the Korean w.r Julius and £1hEIRosrollerg convicted of espionago Frrst hydrogen bomb eJplodl'd; Dwiglt D. Eisenhower elected president; Repolllicans win conlrol of

Congress

pelled millions of veterans into middle-class, heightening che postwar demand for goods and SeJVicCS.

In addition co the assistance gi..-cn co rerurning servicemen, a 1945 tax cut of S6 billion spurred corporate in..-est· menc in new factories and equipment, and helped produce an economic boom that began in late 1946. Wartime savings and a pe:m·up demand for consumer goods further kindled postwar growth and prosperity. 11le men and women who had endured the Great Depression and the: Second World War cra..-cd the«good life,'" and b)• the end of 1945, they possessed SJ40 billion in bank accounts and go\-ernme:m bonds co purchase it. Adwrcise:menrs promising"a Ford in your futurr' and an "all~lectric kitchen-of-the:-fucurr' became reality as sales of homes, cars, and appliances skyrocketed. New producrs-tde:visions, electric cloches dr)'CI'S, freezers, and hi-6 stereos~merged as hallmarks of the: middle-class lifestyle:. The Bretton \'(foods agreement ( 1944) among che Allies had set the stage for the United States to become economic leader of the noncommunist world. In addition to \'aluing ("pegging") ocher currencies in relacion to the dollar, Bretton Woods ereaced sC".-eral institutions to 0\t>rsee international crade and finance: che International Mone:cary f und (IMF), che ~neral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GA1T), and the World Bank Wich man}' nations in ruins, American 6rms could import raw materials cheaply; with lirtle competition from other industrial councri~ they could incre-ase exports

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OfAPlER 26 ThE COI..OWAAA81l0AO AXO AT HoME,

I~S-19jl

to record lewis. Wartime advances in science and technology, which led to rcvolutionarydtwlopments in su ch industries as electronics and plastics, furcher bolstered visions of limidcss growth and the dawn of "the American centur}'·'"

Americans' hunger for the fruirs of affluence left them lit· de appetite for extension of the Nc~A• Deal. 1ruman's only major domestic accomplishmcnc in the SC"".-cncy-ninth Congress was the EmpiO}mcm Act of 1946. It committed the federal gm-crnment co ensuring economic growch and established the Council of Economic Advisers co confer with che president and formulace policies for maintain ing empiO)menc, pro· duccion, and purchasing power. Congress, hO\l'f:'\'er, gutted both the goal of full em· ploymenc and the enhanced cxecutio.-c PO\l'etS co achieve chat objective. Congressional eagerness to d ismantle wartime controls .....-orsened the nation's chief economic problem: intlacion. Consumer demand o utran the suppl)' of goods, putcing intense pressure on prices. lhe Office of Price Administration (OI'A) comin· ued co sec price controls after the war, but food producers, manufacrurers, and retailers opposed controls strenuously. Many consumers favored preserving che OPA, but ochers sa~A• che agency as a symbol of irksome 'A'llrtime regulation. In june 1946, when Congress passed a bill chat extended the OPA's life but remm-cd its poW'Crs, Truman vetoed the bill. Within a ~A>cek, food cosrs rose 16 percent, and the price of b«f doubled. Congress passed, and Truman signed, a second bill excending price controls in weakened form. Protesting any price concrol~ ho~A'ewr, fanners and meat producers threatened to withhold food from the market. Observing thac ..meatless voters are opposition vot~" Truman lifted controls on food prices jusc before the Nm-cmber 1946 midterm eleccions. Democratic candidates fared badly ac the polls anyhow. By che cime Truman lifted all price controls, shord}' after the election, the consumer price index had already jumped nearly 25 percent. Sharp price rises and shrinking pa)'Checks goaded organized labor to demand higher ~A>ages. In 1946 alone, more chan 4.5 million men and women u.-cnc on scrikc. After a United Mine Workers walkout paral)ud the economy for forty days, President Truman ordered gm-crnment sei· rure of the mines. A ~A'rek later the miners returned co work, after Truman had pres· suredowners to grant most ofthedemands. Six months Later the drama repeaced itself. In spring 1946 railway engineers and President Tm- with Uoio• Supporters cra.inmen struck, shutting down the railFoUowing hQ \'C:to of the T;aft·H~rtley biU ~nd 1948 election "-ctory, "''ll}' S)'Stem. Truman exploded. "If you won, in l:ltge p~rt. by th.e strong b~cking olorg;aniud !~bOt', ~ smiling chink I'm going to sit here and let )'OU cie Tru m~n dons ;a h;ard h;atwith copper minen in Butte, Mont.1n;t, up chis ~A-hole councry;'' che president

shouted at the: heads of the two unions, "you•re crazy as hell;'' In May Truman asked Congress for authority to draft workers who struck in vital in· dustries.. Only when the rail workers ga\'e in did the Senace: reject Truman's proposals. His threat alienated labor leaders. By fall 1946 Truman had angered most major interest groups; polls showed chat less chan onc-chird ofAmericans appro'led of his performance. "To err is Truman," some gibed. Summing up public discontent, Republi· cans asked, "Had enough?" In the 1946 elections they captured tv.r'Cnty-6w: go'lernorships and, for che firsc time: since 1928, won control of Congress. The public mood reflected more than just economic disconcem; it also revealed a deep currcnc of fear. An NBC Radio program depicted a nuclear attack on Chicago in which mosc people died instancl)'· School· children wore dog tags in order to be identified after an acomk actack, and practiced crawling under their desks and putting cheir hands O\'et chcir heads-"Duck and CM>cr"-to protect themsdi,!'C.S from the bomb. The e nd of World War II had brought an uneasy peace.

min ion

to 1.5 thr«~;U':I.

million in lesl th.ln

Tiw- G J Bill SC"-nt m illion' to colltg\" and hdpc'd pcopd C\'C'-n mono into the' m iddk cl.u,:. Pffit·up ~ma.nd t r iggenod a. con · ' um C'r boom and, :u w:ut:imC' priCJt contto'-' ~u liftC'd, intl.ltion.. Truman could not gC't m o't o(hi' propwal' through CongrC".S:S. RC'pub iK:a.ru ma.ck majOC' ga.iru in the' 19-16 dC'aion,, uking con nol or CongrC".S:S.

ANTICOMMUNISM AND CONTAINMENT,

1946-1952 How did tiNt policies oftile United SWtes and Soviet Union /~ad to tlls b6t)nnings oftile Cold War? By the: end of I 946,sm oldering antagonisms between Moscow and Washington had flared up. With the Naz.is defeated, the: ..shotgun wedding" between the Uniced States and the Soviet Union dissolved inco a scruggle to fill che poW'Cr vacuum left by the defeat of Germany and Japan, the exhaustion and bankruptcy of Western Europe:. and the crumbling of colonial empires in Asia and Africa Misperception and misunderstanding proliferated as che rwo nations sought security, each feedi ng the other's fears. The Cold War was che resu lt.

The destiny of Eascern Europe, especially Poland, remained at rhe hearc of U.S. ..Soviet contention. Wanting ro end the SMict Union's vulnerability to invasions from the: wesc, Stalin insisted on a demilicarized Germany and a buffer of nations friendly co the So\iet Union along its wescern flank He considered a Sovie:c sphere of influence in Eastern Europe essential co nacional security, a just n..·•ward fur the: Soviec Union's bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, and no different from che American spheres of influence in Western Europe, japan, and Latin America. Scalin also believed that, ac Yalta, Rooscw.lt and Churchill had impliciclyaccepced a Soviet zone in Eastern Europe. Wich the: Red Army OCCUp)ing half of Europe at the war's end, Stalin installed pro-Soviet gm-ernmenrs in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania,. while communist gm-emmems independent of Moscow came: to power in Albania (al-BAY-nee-uh) and Yugoslavia. Ignoring the Yalta Declaration of Uberated Europe, the: Soviet Union barred free elections in Poland and brutally suppressed l'olish democratic parties.

Pollrll.ltloa and CGidWir

fFf) ~

lnteracti\•e Map: The Global Cold W-at

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OfAPlER 26 ThE COI..OWAAA81l0AO AXO AT HoME,

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Stalin's insistence on dominance in Eastern Europe collided "'ith Truman's unwillingness to concede SoYiet supremacy bE:)'Ond Russia's borders. Whac Stalin sa"'' as cricical to Russian security 1ruman viewed as a violation of the right of nacional self-determination, a betrayal of democratic principles, and a cover for communist aggression. Truman and his advisers bdi ew~d that the appca.semenc of dkcarors only fed their appecite for expansion. O nly a new world order based on the sdf· determination ofall nations \l'Orking in good faith within che United Nations could guarantee peace. Truman also thought that accepcing the "enforced soviecization" of Eastern Europe would betray American war aims and condemn nacions rescued from Hider's cyrann}' to another totalitarian diccatorship. Domestic political considerations also shaped Truman's response to Scalin. Truman unders.tood that che Democratic party \l'OUld inYite political disaster if he reneged on the Yalta agreements. The Democrats counted on "'inning most of the votes of the 6 million Polish-Americans and millions of other Americans of Eastern European origin, who remained keenl}' imcresced in the fates of their homelands. He resolved not to appear«soft on communism."' Combaciw:ness fit the temperament of the feisty Truman. Eager to demonstrate that he was in command, the president matched Stalin's intransigence on Polish deccions with his own demands for Polish democracy. Emboldened b}' America's monopol}' of atomic bombs and its undisputed position as the \l'Orld's economic superpower, the president hoped thac the United States could control the terms of postwar settlement.

Truman's assertiw:ness inflamed Stalin's mistrust of the \'('est and deepened SO\ict obsession "'ith chcir own secuDIKI!IIds rit}'. Stalin stepped up his con6scacion of materials and factories from occupied territories and forced his s.udlite nations to d ose thcir doors co American trade and influence. In February 1946 he warned that cherc could be no lasting peace with capitalism and vo•wed to m-crcome the American edge in "-capons. Two W'Ce-ks later, a sixteen-page telegram from Goorge F. Kmn.an, the American charge d'affaires in Moscow, reached Washington. A leading student of Soviet politics, Kennan warned chat the only way to deal with SO\iet intransigence "''lls "a long· term, patient but finn and vigilant C·Ontairunent of Russian expansive tendencies." Truman, who had already insisted that it was time ''t o ~c cough "'irh Russia," accepted the idea of containment, as did many others in Washington who wanted "no compromise" with the communists. Containment soon bE:came gospel. In early March 1946, Truman accompanied Winston Churchill to Westminster College in Missouri, where the former British prime minister warned of a new threat to democracy. Stalin, he said, had drawn an iron curtain across the eastern half of Europe. Churchill called for an alliance of the English-speaking peoples against the Soviet Union and the maintenance of an Anglo-American monopoly on atomic u.-capons. ConYinced thar American firmness could check SO\iet expansionism, Truman in the spring of 1946 threatened to send in American combat troops unless the Soviets withdrew from oil-rich Iran. In june, 1ruman submitted to the United Nations an atomic-energy control plan requiring the Soviet Union to stop aUwork on

The Iron Curtlin

C..,.. F. Keto... ""'"'""

I

diplomat in Mosww, .u~:bi tm of the- Cold W.ar policy of rontainmnu

contai•.t

Oocuint of rontinuow ronfn.murion in t'lf'dcor eo stop Soviet apouu:ion

l

I A/."tlCOMMUKlS.W A~O CONTAIMMU•"f, 19416-19Sl

623

nuclear weapons and co submit to UN inspections before t he United States would destroy its O'A'tl atomic arsenaL As expected, t he SO\i cts rejected che: American pro· posal and offered an alternative plan equally unacceptable to t he United States. As mutual hostility escalated, che Soviets and Americans rushed co develop doomsda)' weapons. In 1946 Congress established t he Atomic Energy Commission (AEQ to

regulate n udeardC'\o-elopment. By J950, one AEC adviser reckoned, the United States "had a stockpile capable of somc~Ailat mor~: chan reproducing World War II in a sin·

gJe day.• Thus, less than a )'eat after American and Soviet soldiers had jubilancl)' met at the Elbe River co celebrate Hider's defeat, the Cold War had begun. Economic pres· sure, nuclear incimida tion, propaganda, and subl.>crsion, racher chan militar}' con· frontation, characterized chis conflict. Nonetheless, it would affect American life as decisiw~ly as any military engagemcm that the nation had fOught.

In early 1947 America fOrmally stated its commitment to combat Soviec po"'w. On Fcbruary21 the British infonned the United States that t hey could no longer afford to assist the govcrnmcnts of Greece and Turkey in chcir struggles against communist· supplied guerrilla insurgencies and against SoYiet pressure for access co t he Mediterranean. Britain asked the United States to assume the coscs. The harsh European winter, the mo.sc Se\'Cre in memory, heightened the sense: of urgency in Washington. 11le economies of \'(·\~seem Europe had ground to a halt, famine and tuberculosis plagued the Continent, and colonies in Africa and Asia had risen in rebellion. Communise panics in f rance and Ital)•appeared read)' to topple democratic coalition gow~rn m ents. Truman resoh·ed co meet the SO\i ct challenge. He first had to mobiliu supporc fur a radical deparrure fro m t he American t radition of avoiding entangling alliances. In a tense White House: mttting on ~b ruary 27, the new secretary of state, form er army chief of staff George C. Marshall, presented che case: fur massive aid to Greece and Turkey. Congressional leaders balked, more: concerned about U.S. inflation than about civil war in Greece. But Dean Acheson, the nC"'·I)' appointed u ndcrsecnur}' of state, sciud the moment. l 'h e issue, he: said, "''as nor one of assiscing the repressive Grttk oligarchy and Turkey's military diccacorship-it was, rather, a universal struggle of freedom versus cyrann}'· The fal l of Greece or Turkey, he warned, would open Asia, Western Europe, and t he oil fields of the Middle East to che Red menace:. Shaken, che congressional leaders agreed to support the adm inistration's rcquest- ifTruman could "scare hell out of the country." Truman could and did. On March 12, 1947, addressing a joint session of Congress, he painted global politics as a stark confrontation be~n liberty and oppres· sion, and asked for military aid for Greece and Turkey. Outlining what became kn~·n as the Truman Doctrine, the president declared that t he United States must supporc any free people: "resisting attempted subjugacion by armed minorities or by oucside pressures."This unilateral declaration proclaimed the national intention to become a global policeman ever)where o n guard against advances by the SoYiet Union and irs allies. Endorsed by the Republican Congres~ the Truman Doctrine laid che foundation for American Cold War policy that wo uld endure for much of the next four decades.

y...., Dodrioe

l

lmpkmm ~

tioo ofcc.'llllQ.inmme U.S. wauld support m y P"rntnc'nt facing communist cluikogt

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Mlnfal Plla Aid to rd!uikl

Westtm Europe-, induding Gel'miUly

To back up che new international initiative, Congress passed the: National Security Ace of 1947, unifying che armed fol\':es under a single Departmenc of Defense:, creating che National Security Coundl (NSC) co advise: che president on strategic mate~ and establishing the: Cencral lntdligence Agency (CIA) to gather informa· tion abroad and engage in covert activities in support of the nation's security. In j une the administration proposed massive U.S. assistance for European recO\'cty. First proposed by the secretary of state and chus called che M arshall Plan, such aid would become another weapon in che arsenal against che spread of communism. Truman wanted co end che economic de\'astation bdit\'ed to spawn communism. Truman correctly guessed that che Soviet Union and its satellites would refuse co take part in the plan, because of the controls linked co it, and accurately foresaw that \'1/escern European economic recover}' would expand sales ofAmerican goods abroad and promote prosperity in che: United States. The Marshall Plan fulfilled its sponsors' hopes.. By 1952, industrial production had risen 200 percent in Western Europe:, and the economic and social chaos that communiscs had exploited had been O\'m:ome in the sixcee:n nations chac shared the: $ 17 billion in aid. Western Europe: rcvi\·ed. prospered, and achi e:w~d an unprecedented unity. U.S. business, not coincidentally, boomed.

The Soviet Union reacted to chc Truman Doccrine and the: Marshall Plan by tightening its grip on Eastern Europe:. Then in 1947- 1948 communise coups added Hungary and Cuchoslo\•akia co che Soviet bloc, and Stalin curned his sights on Germany. The: 1945 Pocsdam Agr~me:nc had divided W:nnan}' into fou r separate zones (administered by France, Gre-at Britain, the SO\ict Union, and the: United States) and created a joint fuur-poo-er administration for Germany's capital, Berlin, which lay 110 miles inside: chc Soviet-occupied eastern zone:. As chc Cold War intensified, the: Western nacions began co s~ a revived Germany as a buffer against SO\ict expan· sion, and they gradually united chcir zones. In june: 1948 Stalin responded by blocking all rail and highway routes chrough the: Soviet zone inco Berlin. Truman resol~d neither co abandon Berlin nor co shoot his ~A'llY into the dryand possibly criggcr World War Ill. Instead, he: ordered a massive- airlift co provide: Berliners wich che food and fuel necessary for suf\i \•al American cargo planes Landed in West Berlin e\'er}' three minutes around the: dock, carrying a mountain of sup· plies. Then in j uly 1948 Truman hinted chac he: would usc «the bomb" ifne:cessar}' and sene a fleet of B-29s, che only planes capable: of d e:lh-ering atomic bombs, ro Eng· lish bases.. As tensions rose, Truman confided co his diar}' chac "we are \'cty d ose co war."Thc Berlin airlift continued fur nearly a year. In May 1949 the: Soviets ended the blockade:. Stalin•s gambit had failed. The: air· lift highlighted American determinacion and technological prO\l-ess. re\-ealcd Stalin's willingness co use innocent citizens as pawns, and d ramaticall}' heightened anti· SO\iet feeling in che West. In lace 1948, U.S. public-opinion polls re\-eale:d an OVI.'.r· whelming demand for «firmness and increased 'toughness• in relations "Aich Russia." Continuing fears of a So\iet attack on Western Europe fostered support for a revitalized \l1esc W:nnan state and for an Atlantic colloccivc-s«urity alliance. Thus in May 1949 chc United Staces, Britain, and France ended their occupation of Germany and apprm-ed che creation of the: Federal Republic of Germany (West Gcr-

c.lranlltlon ill Clnlllny

(f'f)

lnteracti\•e Map:

~ Ofvided Europe

llfto .,;rt;ft

U>< oCU'J" plaoo to JuppJf Bertin, block. adtd by Stalin, •ith supplit.S in

l,...

625

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D . .~ISII'N

l'a:l 03o.dl'llo5

B IJO'IO;n•n

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SOVIE T U N I O N

ATlANTIC OC£A.N

Mi p 26.1 The ~r Divisioo of Ellropt The w.2rtirne d i,pute be:tween the Soviet Union :~nd tile \Vestern Allies 0\<er Pol;and 's fi.ture hardened ~er World W;ar II i nto~ Cold WM th :~t split Europe into competing A.meriG~n ;u~d So~et sphen:s ofinAIN:nc:e. Across ~n "iron eurt;ain," NATO ~untries f;ac:e d the W:!.n~w P;ac:t n ;ations.

many). A month earlier, ten nationsofWestcrn Europe: had signed the North Atlantic Tre-aty, establishing a military alliance with the United States and Canada, and de· daring that an attack o n any member ~A'Ould be considered an attack against alL For the first time in ics histor)', the United States entered imo a peacetime military alii· ance. After owr~Aildming Senate approval, the United States offidally joined the North Adandc TftatyOrgan..izadon (NATO). Truman ~A'llS convinced that if NATO had been in existence in 1914 and 1939, the world would haw been spared cwo disastrous wars. Accordingly, he spurred Con· gress to authorize $ 1.3 billion for military assistance to NATO nations and autho· rized the stationing of four American ann)•divisions in Europe as the n ucleus of the NAlU armed force. l 'he Soviet Union responded b)• creacing the ~ nnan Demo· cratic Republic (Ease Germany) in 1949, b)• exploding its O'l'o'n atomic bomb that same )'car, and by forming an Eastern bloc military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, in 19 5 5. The United States and Soviet Union had divided Europe into two armed camps (ue Map 26.1).

Nri Adaob< T....oy O.pni-

zmo. {NATO)

US...&td politi. e.ll aod mititary alli.lnee .-pinst Soviel Un.ion

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Mosco"'•· Washington hostility also ca.t'V'Cd Asia into con· tending militar}' and economic camps. The Russians ere· ated a sphere of influence in Manchuria, che United Stares denied Moscow a role in postwarj apan, and the two suptrpo"''l"rs partitioned a help· less Korea. As the head of che U.S. occupacion forces in j apan, General Douglas MacArthur oversaw t he: country's transformation from an empire in ruins into a prosperous dem ocracy. In 1952the occupacion ended, but a militar}' security lteaty allowed t he: United Scates to retain its j apanese bases o n che: Sovie:t·Asian perimeter and brought j apan under the: American «nuclear u mbrella." Both benefited: j apan could devore most of its resources to economic development, and the: United Scates gained a staunch anticommunist ally. The containment policy in Asia also led the United Scates co hdp crush a proco mmunisc guerrilla m()IJ'Cment in t he: Philippines and co aid French efforts co reestablis h colonial rule in lndochina- Yie:mam, laos (LAH· oss), and Cambodia (k
The Cold War in Asia

I

MIGZHo.tc Chint:Sl'm'Oiu· riomry wbmt fi.'lra's molt control or a.ma in 1949

Prima:ry Source: USSR's First Atomic Bomb

I~S-19jl

I M"flCOMMUKlS.W A~O CONTAI~t.IU•"f. '9416- 19jl

In April l950 a presidentially appointed committee issued a top-secret review of defense policy. The report, NSC-68, emphasized the SO\ict Union's aggressi\'t: intcn· dons and milimry strength. To counter the Soviets' "design for world domination;'' NSC-68 called for a \'ast American military buildup, a largr standing arm)', and a quadrupling of the drfense: budget to "''ll&C a global strugglr against communism. B}' chc end of 1950, Truman would order the implementation ofNSC-68 and criple the drfense: budget.

627

NSC-61 BlutprintbCold

I

W;u; Qlkd a mitiury buildup, H..bomb, worldwidt

rontainmnu

After World War II, the SoYirt Union and United States temporarily divided Korea ac the thirty·cighch parallel for 1150-1953 purposes ofmilicar}'OCcupacion.1'he dividing line had so· lidi6ed into a political frontier btrwecn the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Re· public in Norch Korea and che Amcrican·supported Republic ofKorta, each claiming the sole right co rule Korta. On june 24, 1950, North Korean troops sv.-epc across che thirty·cighch parallel to attack South Korea. Truman saw the inv.ujon as .SoYict·dirocced aggression. He never doubted char Stalin \1.'3S testing American wilL Mindful of the failure of ap· peasemcnc at Munich in 1938, Truman said that failure to ace would lead co a blood)' "third world "''llr.'" Having been accused of«srUing our" Eastern Europe and "losing" China, Truman needed to pr~ he could stand up to "'the Reds." ll.orel• W• War -.ith cxammu. Without consulting Congress, Truman ordered air and naval forces ro Korea niJ~t Nortb Koru totonta.in from chcir bases in japan on june 27. That same da)' he asked the United Nations to spread of oommu:n.Um in A..oU authorize accion to repel the invasion. The SO\ictdd· cgace was boycotting the Security Council to protest the UN's unwillingness to scat a represcncacivc from Mao's China, and Truman gained approval for a UN "police action'" to restore Souch Korea's border. He appointed General Douglas MacArthur to command the UN effort and ordered American ground croops into what now becamr the Korean \t1ar. 1'he Cold War had turned hoc. North Korean forces initially routed the disorgan· ized American and South Korean troops.. l'hen, in mid-September, "'ith UN forcrs cornered on the southeastern cip of the Korean peninsula, struggling to avoid being pushed into the sea, MacArthur's troops landed ac Inchon (in·CHAHN) in a brilliant amphibious maneuver. Within two week~ U.S. and South Korran forces drO\'l' the North Koreans back U5. a.ttliog fw Sooul, Stflotnbtr 195«1 across the chircy-eighth paralleL Basking in \i ctor)', MacArthur persuaded Truman to lct him go beyond on:ht:Kr.t.ted the North Kore~n £m..:ulon of South Koi'C';~~. the UN mandate co repel aggression and to cross the: He ste;~~dfudy mWt;~~ined th~t "if the RuW:an tCK;~.Ii tMian border to libcracr all of Korra from communism. sute w;u; intending to follow in the p;~.th ol tht dicntorAs UN troops approached the: Yalu River, the: ship of Hid-er :~nd Munolini, they (h~d to ) be met he~d Chinesr warned chat they would not «sc:and idly b)"" if on i:n Koi'C';~~." their border was chrtatene:d. Ignoring chis assertion,

Tilt Koran War,

l

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an ow~n::o nfident MacArthur deplored his forces in a chin line bdo"'' the river. On Nm--ember 25 thirty-three Chinese divisions (abouc 300,000 men) counterattacked, drh1ng scunned UN fol\':es back bd ow che chircy-eighth parallel. By March 1951 the Ka<,. fighcing was stabilized ac rough!}' che original dividing line between the two Koreas (see Map 26.2). Scalematcd, 1ruman re\-ersed course: and soughc a negotiated peace based on the objective of restoring the integrity of South Korea. MacArchur rocked the boac, ho~A'C'V\'.r, urging chat he be aiiO"-~d to bomb and blockade China, «unleash" Jiang jieshi's croops against Mao's regime, and seek a total vicrory C~.~n at che risk of an all-out war ~A'ith China Truman refused: "We are crying to Pl\.'"lent a ~A'Orl d ~A'llr-not to stan o ne." When MacArthur bluntl}' and repeatedly criticized Truman's limited war-the «appeasement of Communism"- the president fired che general for insubordination on April 10, 1951. To che president, the issu e was civilian control of che military, a control chat seemed threatened by MacArthur's public insubordination. Public opinion, however, backed che general. l 'h e ''el"f idea of Limited war baffied many Ameri can~ and a mounting casualty list added anger to the mix. It seemed so senseless. Despite warnings from che chairman of the joinc Chiefs of Scaff char MacArthur's proposals \N'Ould result in «the ~A'fong war at che wrong place in che wrong time and with the wrong enemy," a growing number of Americans listened S}'lllpachetically co Republican charges chat Soviet-directed agents controlled American policy. Truman, meanwhile, found himsd f bogged do~A'tl in Korea, unable to ~A'in che war or craft a peace. After two more }'eat'S of fighting, che t"-'0 sides reached an armistice in july 1953 that left Korea as divided as it had been at the stare of the war. The "limited" conflict cost the United States 54,2461ives (about 33,700 of them direct battlefi eld deaths) and SS4 billion. Following che patcern of World War II, massive U.S. "carpet bombing" killed O\'et2 million ci vilian~ and left North Korea looking like a moonscape. The Korean War had significant consequences. It accelerated implementation of NSC~S and the expansion of containment into a global policy. From 1950 to 1953 defense spending zoomed from one-third to cwo-chirds of che entire federal budget. The United States acquired new bases around the ~A
Primary Source: MacArthur Outlines His Objectives in

Truman's incervenrion in Korea preserved a pm:arious balance of J>O"'et in Asia and underscored che adm in istration's commitment to the anticommunist struggle. Comainmenc, original!)' ad\•anced to juscify U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey, had become the ideological foundation for a major war in Korea and, o minously, for a dttpening U.S. involvement in Yiecnam.. Truman's actions enhanced the f'O"''Crs of an alread}' powerful presidency and set the precedent for later undeclared wars. 1'hey also helped spark an economic boom, added fuel to a second Red Scare, and fostered Cold War attitudes that lasted long after the war ended.

The- Sa.·ic-t Union mOVI'd quick!)' ro utabli'h control 0\'er E;ultrn Cu· rope-, ~s Truman and Stalin·, mu tual distruJt gn-w. Th~ Truman ;ulmin i,tncion ;adopc:«< containme- nt ;u the- l:c-ptont orit:~ fore-ign po]icy. the Truman Docn·incin ~(fc-ct mack t he- Unite-d Statu a glob.ll po]ictm.ln.

The- M.ush:dl Pbn htlptd n-build

THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

\'(lestcm Eu rope-, including GC'rm.m)' but not th~ Sovie-t Union.

AT HOME, 1945-1952

The- Be-rlin t.risiJ brought the- Cold

What eff«t did th.r more conservative politico/ climate hQV6 on Trumt~n's domestic program?

NSC·68, a rop·.-crtt pUn., pc:opoJtd pun:ing the- United M.ltes on .l penn.lnt.nt war lOoting; it rt$ttd on the- ~lUumption th.lt n~goti.ltion with th~ Sovic-u w:l$ impoui.blt..

War ,..-ry dost to the- boiling point.

Since 1929 the nation had known little but che sufferings and short· ages of depression and war. Naw Americans wanted to enjoy life. WideThe- Kon"an W~r sec the- Cold War i.n conactc-, propdltd the- United spread posrwar affluence let dreams become reality as Americans flocked St.:u:el into Ni.m politiu, a nd in· to che suburbs, launched a huge baby boom, and rushed to buy stOII'es, re· t~nsific-d chargu ofSovit
Many Republicans in the Eightieth Congress, which con· \-ened in j anuary 1947, imerpreced the 1946 eloccions as a CGagress. le47- 1948 mandate to 1\."\o·erse the New DeaL Republican concrolled, Congress defeated Democratic bills to raise: che minimum wage and to proYide federal funds for education and housing. Truman and the consen•arives waged their major battle 01/'er che pro-union Wagner Act of 1935 (see Chapter 24). Postwar strikes had whipped up a national consensus for curbing union power. In 1947 Congress passed che Taft-Ha rtley Act (the Labor-Management Relations Ace), which barred che dosed shop- a workplace where only union membcrs could be: hired- and permitted the president co call a sixty-day cooling"ff period to delay an}' strike chat might endanger national safecyor health. Unions termed che law a "'slave Labor bill" and demanded a presidential veto. Truman d id vcto che m easur~. and Congress easil)' overrode che veto.. But Truman had taken a major seep toward regaining organized labor's support. l'his move

Tbt Eiptietll

llaft-tllnley

Ad Me;uun- tbat

limited pawn' of bbof unionJ

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rdlocced his recognition that his o nly hope for election in 1948la)' in refo rging the New Deal coalition. To chis end, he plared the role of staunch New Dealer co the hilt, proposing a series of liberal reform bills- federal aid to education, housing, and healch insurance; repe-al of Taft-Hartley; and high farm-price supports. Truman courced \'Oters of Eastern Euro pean ancestr}' by emphasi:z.ing his oppo· sjtion to che iro n curtain. He overrode the objections of che State Department, which feared alienating the oil-rich Arab world, to extend d iplomatic recognition co the new scare of lsrad immediately after it proclaimed independence. 1'his mm--e re· flected both his deep sympath)' toward Holocaust survivors who had immigrated co Israel and the strategic importance ofjewish-American voters.

The integration of baseball in 1947, spearheaded by the brilliant jadde Robinson, symbolized a new robusmess in the fight againsc racial segregation in the post-war era. As the- head of the NAACP noced in 1945, "World War II has immeasurably magnified the Negro•s a"''llrmess of rhe disparity between the Ameri· can profession and praccice of democracy." The war hcightened African-American Pmide.rs ec...n.it:t.e .. expectations for racial equality, and numerous blacks demanded a permanenc Fair CMI Iichts ln 1947, it ttcom. mcockd a IC'pl usauk on Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), the oud awing of l)'llChing. and the Rg:rtprion, dt:legttgation of righc to \'Ote. Voter-registration drt...·es raised the percentage of souchern blacks reg· tbc armtd foroe1, .and a pt"ma. istered to \'Ote from 2 percent in 1940 to 12 percent in 1947. nmt FEPC Fearful of black assertiveness in seeking the voce and ofother signs of a bold new spiric among African· Americans, some souchern whites reacted brutally. In 1946 in rural Georgia, "''hitcs killed se\-eral black ve-t· erans who had \'Oted that year, and in South Carolina whites blinded a black soldier for failing ro sit in the rear ofa bus. In Columbia, Tennessee, in 1946, whites rioted against blacks who insisted o n their righcs. Police arrested sC'\o-emy blacks and looked rhe ocher way as a white mob broke into the jail to murder ~'0 African-American prisoners. In September 1946 Truman met "'ith a delega· cion of civil-rights leaders. Horrified by their accounts, he \'0'1'--ed to act. Truman bd ie\·ed that e\"t:r}' American should enjor the full righcs of citizenship. He also understood che importance of che growing African-American vote, particularly in northern cities. The president re-alized, too, that white racism damaged U.S. relations with much of the world. After the 1946 eJections, Truman established the J.Kkit Robitson. 1917 Presidenc•s Comntittee on Civil Rights to im·esti· Robinson's bt-illia nt p lay for the Brooklyn Dodgen did not gate race relations. l'he commitcee•s report, To Sto~tt sa\'t' h im from racial u unts of fans a nd p layers o r exc:lu· 11Jtn Rit/Jts, published in 1947, called for che eradicasion from rest:~u rants and hotds that catered co hi:s white tion of radal discrimination and segregation, and proposed antilynching and anti-poll cax legislation.

lactie a.t.iascM~ Pint Ahia~ Amtriu.n to play major.IC'"'JJ..t

l"""''"

The Polilks of Civil IIJ&IIIs and lhe Election of IMI

I ThE lltUMA~ ADM I>'IIS11!ATIC»l AT H OME, I,..S- 19Sl Boldly, Truman in ~bruar}' 1948 sem a special message to Congress urging fa"'makers to enact mosc of the co mmittee's proposals. When southern segregationiscs denounced Truman's "stab in the back'" and warned of a boycott of the national Democratic ticket, Tru· man backtracked. He dropped his plans co sub · mit specific civil-rights bills to Congress and endorsed a "''Cak civil-rights plank for che Demo· cratic platform. Ac the Democratic co nwntion in jul}' 1948, r::::cl OtMCI3 liberals and urban politicians who needed African· American \'Otes rej«ted the president's feeble civil·righcs plank and committed che parcy co action on Truman's original proposals. l 'h irty· Domoc:,.uo [J IWiyS TII.IIIWI 6\'t: delegates fro m Mississippi and Alabama re· sponded by stalking out of the convention. They SU.IM ' IIIgi'!IS joined other southern segregacionists co fonn S'Xtfl tlliJT!!cncl the States' Rights Democratic party and nomi· MhOr~ll:llat nated Governor Strom Thunnond of South Car· olina for the presidency. The Dixiecrats placed their electors o n the ballot as che regular Demo· Mip 26J The Bt
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632

OfAPlER 26 ThE COI..OWAAA81l0AO AXO AT HoME,

I~S-19jl

Despite his narrow victor}' margin , Truman cried to trans· late his election into a mandate fo r liberalism. In his 1949 Smce: of the Union message, he: proposed an ambitious so· cial and economic program, che Fair Deal. He asked Congress co enlarge: New Deal programs in economic security, conseJVation, and housjng, and to go beyond the: New Deal in olher areas.

The Fair Deal

fair Dell

I

l 'runun'J unsuro".SJ. ful propo~ em-ruioo of NtwOtal

I ---~l~~!l~~~~~~--~

Tht Rtpubli ~n·conuollcd Eighti· C"th Cong~:~ blod:td Trnman'J propo:~al~: and n"duttd orgomixtd l..lbor'~: Jl'OW"r by paJJiog the T.lA-· Hartle')· An.. j.ld:it Robinwn broke' tht m..ljorINgue color barri« b)· becoming the' Brooklrn Dodgtr~· second b:utm.an; othe-r prof~ion.ll ~port:~ a bo imo:grutd. ConttCM"r~r Jplit the OC'mocruic paR')' in 19-JS aJ Truman mO\'C'd to utlarge cM I-Tighu proc«tioru and stg;n"gationi.sl wuthC'-mc"rll walktd out ro form t he' Oi.xiecrau.

To the .rurpriJt of many, Truman dtk-attd Th oma~: ~y to win n"dtction in 19-IS.

THE POLITICS OF ANTICOMMUNISM

T he Fair Deal w.u T rum..ln'J ;uumpc: to contin ue" and ml.lrg~~' th t NC'w 0C"-al; Congn"-J!: re"je"cttd ''irtually aU of iu mea,un"~:.

House IJD..ANtria• Activities

c...ut. Ca.IIC'd HUAC, "RC'd..bunting" Howt rommittrt

SeaiU Red Scare Pmhw anticommunist hysttri.l th.u: east a doud ofJwpicion oooer JO'"mmtnt, ac.ultmU, t'YI'n Hollyvoood

l 'he Eighty-first Congress complied with the: extension of existing pro· grams but rejected new measures. Lawmakers raised the: minimum wagei in· creased social-security coverage and benefi ts; expanded appropriations fo r public poW'Cr, consen•ation, and slum clearance; and authorized lhe con· struction of nearly a million low-income housing units. They also allowed hundreds of thousands of Holocaust survi\'ors and Europeans displaced by the war, both je'I'-'S and non-j ews, ro enter the United Stares. But they re:· jccted federal aid ro education, national health insurance, civil-rights legisla· tion, Larger fann subsidies, and the repeal ofTaft-Hardey. Congress•s rr-joccion of most fair Deal proposals stemmed from 1'ruman's o"''" lessening comminnent to domestic refonn in fa\-or of forcign policy, as well as from che strengthening of the congressional conservative coalition. And "'idesprcad prosperity sapped public enthusiasm for more reform.

1-/ow did antic.ommunist sentiment affect Americ4n society?

As the Cold War worsened, some Americans concluded that the roots of the nation's foreign difficulties Ia)' in domestic treason and subo.-ersion. How d se: could the communists ha..-e taken China and built an atomic bomb? Millions of fearful Americans u-ould C"t'e:ntually enlist in a crusade that u-ould find scapegoats for che nation's problems and e:quace: d issent "'ith dislo)•alty. Similar intolerance: had prevailed in the Red Scare of 1919- 1920 (see Chap· ter 22). Since 1938 the House Committee on Un ·American Activities- later called the House Un-Ame:rican Activities Comm.irree:, or HUAC (HYOO.ack)- had sen·ed as a platform for extn:me conseJVath·es' denundation of the New Deal as a commu· nist ploc.. After \l'orld War II, mounting numbers of mainstream Democrats andRe:· publicans climbed aboard the ami-Red bandwagon. The Second Red Scare influenced bcnh gow:mmental and personal actions. Millions ofAmericans were subjected to IO)•ahy oaths and security investigations af· ter the war. Anticommunist excre:mism destrO)'i:d the Left, undermined labor mili· tancy, and discredited liberalism. lc spawned a «silent generation" ofcollege srudenrs, and ensured anticommunist fo reign-policy rigidity.

The Cold War raised legitimate: concerns about American security. The U.S. Communist party had claimed cighty thousand members during World War II, and no one knew how man}' occupied sensitive go\'i:rnmem positions. In mid-1945 a raid of che of·

loyllty and Sealrity

I THE Pouncs or ANTtCOMMUNISM

6 33

fices of a procommunist mag:u.ine n:vcaled char classified documents had been given to the: periodical b}•two State Oeparnnent employees and a naval intelligence officer. Ten months Later, the: Canadian gM>rrnment exposed a major spy network that had passed American military informacion and atomic secrets to che SMi cts during the war. Republicans accused the administration of bcing "soft on communism ." In March 1947 Truman issued Execuci\J'C Order 9835 establishing the Federal Employee: LO)>alty Program to root ouc subo.-ersi\'e:S in the: government. The drive for absolute security soon overran concerns about rights, however, as civil servants suspected of disloyalty were allowed neither to face their accusers nor to require im-esd· gators to reveal sources. Mere criticism of American forcign policy could result in an accusation of dis· loyalty. People could lose chcir jobs if they liked forcign films, associated with radical friends or family members, or were past members of organizations no"'' dedarcd dis· loyal. Ofche 4.7 million jobholders and applicants ~Ailo underwent IO)'lllty checks by 1952, 560 were fired or denied jobs on security grounds, SC'\o-eral thousand resigned or ~Aithdrew chcir applicaci on~ and coundess more were intimidated. T he: probe unco\-ered no evidence of subversion or espionage, but it did spread fear amonggMunment emplO)-ees..

The very existence of a federal loyalty inquest fed mount· ing anticommunist hysteria. Federal im\".Stigarors promoted fears of communist infiltration and legitimized ocher efforcs co expose subl.>crsivcs. UniiJ'Crsities banned controversial speakers, and popular mag:u.ines ran articles like .. Reds Are After Your Child " By the: end of Truman's term, thirty-nine scates had creaced loyalty programs, most with \ircually no procedural safeguards. Schoolteachers, college professors, and scace and city empiO)ttS throughout the nation signed loyalty oaths or lost their jobs. In 1947 HUAC began hearings to expose communist influence in American life. HUAC's probes blurred distinctions betWeen d issent and disloyalty, becween radicalism and subversion. People who refused to answer HUAC questions often lose chcir liiJ'Ciihood. Labor unions expelled communist members and a\-oided progressh-e: cause~ concentrating on securing better pay and ThoRod Mtlla
Tilt Antkommunist cns.de

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

634

CHAPtER l6

ThE COI..O WAAA81l0AO N>:O AT HoME,

1fT) Prima:ry Source: ~

I'm No Communist

Al&wliss .... Wintaker

CUIIIAien HW w~ a majclr ligun" in 1'rnm;a.n .adminiSUil· rion coovictC'd or perjury for denying communiJII connte. rioru allcogtd by Cbambtn

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I~S-19jl

employment of an)'one with a slightly questionable past, chcreb}•silencing many tal· enced people. The 1948 presidential campaign fed nacional anxieties. Truman lambasted Henry Wallace as a Stalinist dupr and accused che Republicans of bcing «unwit· tingly the all)' of the communists in chis councry." In curn, the GOP dubbed the Democrats "the parry of creason."' A rising Republican scar, Richard M. Nixon ofCalifo rnia, charged chat Democrats bore responsjbility for «the unimpeded growth of the communise conspiracy in thr United States;'' To blun t chr force: of such accusations, the j uscice Department prosecuted eleven top leaders of the American Communist party under the S mith Act of 1940, which outlawed any conspiracy advocating the o•..-e nhrow of the gow:mment. In 195 1 the Supreme Courr upheld the Smith Act•s constitutionality, declaring that Congress could curtail freedom of speech if national security demanded su ch restrictions. Ironically, the Communist party was fading into obscurity at chr ver}' time that politicians werr magnifying thr threat it posed. By 1950 its membership had shrunk to less than thirty thousand.

Nothing set off more alarms abour the diabolical Red conspiracy in the federal gO\"Crnment than chr matter of Alger (AL·jurr) Hiss and WhJttaker Chambers. During the 1948 presidential campaign, HUAC conducted a sensational hearing in which Whittaker Chambers, a senior rditor at Time and a former SO\i et agcnc who had broken ~Aith the communists in 1938, idemi6rd Hiss as an underground parcymem· ber in the 1930s. In the hearing, Chambers appearrd a torrured soul crusading ro save the West from che Red peril. The e:leganc and cultured Hiss, in contrast, scemrd che very S)'ll'l· bol of the liberal establishment; a Han•ard latA• School graduate, he had scn-ed as a presidential adviser on foreign affairs (including the Yalta conference:). Hiss denied any communist affiliation and claimrd nor to know Chambers.. Most liberals be· lieved Hiss. They sa~A' him as the victim of consen •atives hem on rarnishing New Deal liberalism. To those suspicious of the Roos.......,-e:lt libcral tradition, Chambers's persistence: intensified fears that the Democ:raric administration 'A'llS teeming ~Aith communists. Under rigorous questioning by Richard Nixon, Hiss admitted that he had kno~A'tl Chambers buc denied having been a communist. Chambers broadenrd his accusation, claiming chac Hiss had committed espionage: in the 1930s b}•giving him secret Srate Department documents to be sent ro the Soviec Union. Hiss protested his in· noce:nce but in january 1950 was convicted of perjury, or lying under oath, and re:· ccived a 6vc--rear prison sentence:. j usr as the Hiss affair ended, another case shocked Americans. In early Fe:bruar}' 1950 the British arresred Klaus Fuchs (fooks), a German·born scientist irn'Oiw:d in the Manhattan Project, for passing atomic seCTC"ts to che Soviets. Fuchs's confessjon led to the arrest of two Americans, Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. as coconspirators. The Rosenbergs insisted thar they ~A'Crt: victims of anti-Semitism and were being prosecuted for their leftist beliefs. But in March 195 1 a jut}' fou nd chcm guilty of

AJeer Hlu and llle losenberp

I THE Pouncs or ANTtCOMMUNISM

6 35

conspiring co commit espionage, and on j une 19, 1953, che h usband and ~Aife: ..w .re executed, although they maintained their innocence to the end. SoYi« docum ents released in the: 1990s implicated both Hiss and julius Rosenberg.

Mcedyism

Ac this point, some Americans could not separate fact fro m fantasy. For them, only conspiracy could explain U.S. weakness and Soviet might. Frustrated by uncxpecced

fail ure in 1948, Republicans e:agcrl)' exploited t he: fearful mood and accused t he "Commiecrats" of selling out America. Then, in February 1950, Republican senator Joseph R. McCarthy ofWisconsin ,

desperate: for an issue on which co run for r«lcction in 1952, boldly cold a West Vir· ginia audience that communists in the: State Departmenc had betrayed America. "I have here: in my hand a list of205,'" McCarchy reported as he waved a laundry lise, "... a list of names known to t he: Secrcrar}' of State as being members of t he Com· munist party and who ne:\·crtheless are still ~A'Orking and shaping policy.'" Alchough he could produce no evidence to supporc his accusations, his senatorial stature and braun style ga\>t: him a national forum. McCart hy soon repeated his charges, t hough IO'wering his numbers and toning t hem down slightly. A Senate commictee found McCarthy's accusations "a fraud and a hoax;'' but he persjstecL .. Mc:Cart h)ism" be:· came: a synonym for personal attacks on individuals by means of indiscriminate: al· legacions and unsubstantiated charges. As t he: Korean War dragged o n, McCarchy's efforcs to «root o ut che skunks'" es· calated. He ridiculed Secretary ofState Dean Acheson as t he: ..Red Dean" and called Truman's dismissal of MacAnhur «[he greacest victor}' che: communists have ever won." 8 UO)>t:d by the parcisan usefulness of Mc:Carth}"s onslaught, many Re:publi· cans encouraged him. Mc:Cart h)ism espe:dall)' appealed to midwestern party mem· bt:rs opposed to t he: wdfare state and restrictions on business. For them, anticommunism '-''llS a weapon of 1\.'-e:nge against liberals and a means to regain t he controlling position chac conse:n•acism had once: held. McCarchy also won a devoced foll~·ing among blue-collar workers. His artacks appealed co t raditionally Carbolic cthnks, ~Atho wanted to gain acce:pcance as .. 100 percent Americans" through a show of anticommunist zeal. Countless Americans also shared McCarthy's scorn for t he "bright young men who are born wich silver spoons in t heir mouths.'" And his con· spiraC}' t he:or}' offered a simple ans"'-e:r to the: perplexing que:scions of che Cold War. Mc:Carth}"S political power rested on both the Republican establishment and Democrats fearful of antagonizing him. His GOP support made Democrats' con· demnation look like mere partisan criticism. In t he 1950 doccions, ~Athen he helped Republicans defeat Democrats who had denounced him, McCarchy appeared invincible. Over Truman•s veto, Congress in 1950 adopted t he: McCarran Internal Secu· rit}' Act, which required organizations deemed communist by t he: attorn ey general to regiscer wi[h t he Departmenc ofJustice. The: McCarran Act auchoriud the: arrest and detention d uring a national emergency of«any person as to whom there is rea· son to believe: might engage in acts ofespionage or sabotage.'" The: McCarran·Walce:r Immigration and Nationality Ace of 1952, also adopted O\>t:r a presidential \'cto, maintained che quota S}'Stem char ga\>t: immigrants from northern and western

l...,Jt I. M.C.rd!y R
l

l».iting JernW.'Ir from Wisrom:in

MtCMno .......ls.aorily Ad l«quirai liD alleged rom. munistorpni.ubOI!l$ totc"gi.nr:r

wid! the gcn~mtnc'Pt

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

636

OfAPlER 26 ThE COI..OWAAA81l0AO AXO AT HoME,

I~S-19jl

Europe 85 pm:ent of available: slors, although it did end Asian exclusion. T he new Ia"'' also screngthe:ncd the atcorne:y general's authority to exclude or deport aliens suspected of supporting communism .

In 1952 public apprehension about the loyalty of g()I.!'Crn· ment emplo)'i:es combined with frustration O\'U the Ko· rean stalemate to sink Democratic hopes to their lo"''eSt IC\o-el since the 1920s. Boch business and labor also re:senced Truman's freeze on wages and prices during che Korean conflict. Revelations of bribery and influence: peddling by some of Truman's old policical associates ga..-e Republicans ammuni· tion for charging the: Dem ocrats with .. plunder at home, and blunder abroad." With Truman too unpopular co seek rce:lcccion, dispirited De:moc:rats drafted G()I.!'Crnor Adlai E. StC'\o-e:nson of Illinois. But Stevecnson could not dissociate him· self from 11'uman, and his lofty speeches did not stir the: average voter. Abow all, Scew~nson could not ()I.!'Crcome the sencime:nt thac ~-e:my years of Democratic rule: was enough. 11le GOP nominated the hugely popular war hero Dwight D. Eisen· hoW\'.r. Although essentially apolitical, Eisenhower ansW'Cred the call of the: moderate wing of the: Republican party and accepted the: nomination. "'lkr' chose as his running mate Richard M. Nixon, che former HUAC Red T rum.m tstolblished t ht ~troll hunter. EmpiO)-et Lor~lty Progn m ro t n · ha n« S«Uri ty, but ~t the' C'lrpc'nSC' or EisenhD""--er and Nixon pl'O\"Cd unbearable. With a captivating grin and ci\•il righ u. an unimpeachable record of public service, Eisenhower projected both per· HUAC he-ld a u riu a( sptcracular sonal warmth and che vigorous authority associated wich military com· hC'ari ntp to "root o u c• com mun ism mand He symbolized the stability for which Americans yearned. At the same: in American lire; the htaring;s eoltol* time, Nixon kepc public apprehensions at che boiling point. Accusing the: pulttd to prumine"nce a )'Oung Cali· forni.l politici.m, Ri chard M. Nixon.. Democrats of treason, he charged that a Democratic victory would bring "-more Alger Hisses, more atomic spies." T ht c.lsu or Algn Hiu and the' Ro$C'nbergs, accustd ofspring for 11le GOP ticket stumbled when newspapers rcw~alcd the existence of a tbt S<wi~ incfe'.l$C'd t ht public's "'Slush fund" that California business leaders had created to keep Nixon in ftar a( commun ism at homt. "-6nand al comfort... But Nixon saw~d himsclfwich a hean·cugging celcvision Senato r joJtph R. McCanhy un· defense. He explained the: resulting gifts, which induded a cocker spaniel INshtd a red dus anticommunist c.unp.lign t hat m..ldt h im, fOr a named Checkers given to his daughters, as intended to benefit his family. whilt, the" molt fc.utd m..ln in His appeal worked. The Republican rickec won 55 percent of the popular Amcri e~~. \'Ote, cracked the solid South to carry chircy·nine states, and amassed 442 tn the" 1952 dcction, Dwigh t 0. eleccoral \'Otcs. Enough Republicans rode: Ike's coactails to give the: GO I' Ei$C'nhowet, a war hero and re-a.sJuring figure, w.u tbt t-.uy vicror. concrol ofboch houses of Congress by small margins.

The Eledlon of 1952

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

I

KEY TERMS

What "~re the majorconsequences ofthe G/ Bill ofRights? (page 611)

Demobilization brought home more chan 10 million men and ·women; the GJ Bill sent many of chem co college and propelled even more into the middle class.. 1'hc consumer economy boomed as Americans sought to make up for the depri\'ations of depression and V.'.lt. Most of Truman's proposals died in Con· grcss, and in 1946 the Republicans g.tined conttol of Congress.

How did the palicies ofthe United States and Soviet Union lead to the beginning< ofthe Cold War? (page 621)

I

The Soviet Union movrd quickly to consolidate its hold over Eastern Eu·

rope. 10 Stalin, t his policy was pd marily dctensi\~; to l"cuman. it was aggres-

sion. What V.'.lS left of the World War IJ coalition \'anishcd amid clouds of

mutual suspicion and distrust. Containment became che bedrock ofAmerican foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine proclaimed the United Stares to be a global policeman, while the Macshall Plan helped rebuild Westcm Europe. NSC·68 became policy as che Korean War caged. placing the country on a pee· manem war tOoting and radically increasing defense spending. 1'he Korean Wac thrust che United Scates squarel}' into Asian politics.

Whot effect did the more conservotil'e political dimote hm<e on Truman's domestic program? (page 629)

I

The Republican·contcollcd Eightieth Congress blocked mosc of Truman•s proposals; it dipped Laboc•s wings with the Taft·Hartley Act. Questions of discrimination rook ttntet stage when Jackie Robinson integrated major league baseball; in 1948 che civil rights issue split the Oemocmtic patty, "'i th segrega· tionist southerners forming their own "'Oixiecrar" party. Truman announced the Fair Deal, his attempt to continue and enlarge the New Deal, but virtually none of his new proposals became Law.

I

Gl Bill {p. 618) Goocge F. Kennan (p. 622} COr01111MI (p. 612)

Truman Doctrine {p. OlJ) Ma"llall ~an {p. 624) B
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) {p. 625} Mao Zedong (p. 626) NSC-68 {p. 627} KD<.,n War (p. 627) Taft-Hartley PI:! (p. 629) Iackie Robinsoo {p. 610}

President'S Comrriltee on Civi Righ~ (p. 610} Fair 0.,1(p. m )

Hot.tSe Un.American ActivUs Comnittoe {p. 632) S.cood Red l<are {p. 632) Algor Hiss and 1\llittalu!r Charril
Joseph R. Mc<arthy (p. 635} McC.rran Internal Securiy Act {p. 635)

How did anticommunist sentiment offect American society? (pog 632)

Fear ofcommunism permeated American life. Highly·publiciz.._--d HUAC heat· ing:s seemed co 1\-"Veal communists under e~\':1)' bed. and Truman compounded the fear with his Federal Employee Loyalty Program. The Hiss and Rosenberg cases, alleging betrayal of secret information to the SMiets, intensified the public's jittedness and sec the stage for the emetgcnce of Senator Joseph R. Me· Catth}' and his 1\-'Ckless accusations of communise penetration of the American go~wn mcnt. l'he Republicans would ride "McCatthyism" back to the scat of poow in Washington. It would be up to war hero ~ight D. EisenhO\Irw- who easily won che presidency in 1952-to restore unity and renew hopefulness. www.c.engoge.comlhistory/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

Chapter Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

~

LISTENTOITONTHEGO.

I

KEY TERMS

What "~re the majorconsequences ofthe G/ Bill ofRights? (page 611)

Demobilization brought home more chan 10 million men and ·women; the GJ Bill sent many of chem co college and propelled even more into the middle class.. 1'hc consumer economy boomed as Americans sought to make up for the depri\'ations of depression and V.'.lt. Most of Truman's proposals died in Con· grcss, and in 1946 the Republicans g.tined conttol of Congress.

How did the palicies ofthe United States and Soviet Union lead to the beginning< ofthe Cold War? (page 621)

I

The Soviet Union movrd quickly to consolidate its hold over Eastern Eu·

rope. 10 Stalin, t his policy was pd marily dctensi\~; to l"cuman. it was aggres-

sion. What V.'.lS left of the World War IJ coalition \'anishcd amid clouds of

mutual suspicion and distrust. Containment became che bedrock ofAmerican foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine proclaimed the United Stares to be a global policeman, while the Macshall Plan helped rebuild Westcm Europe. NSC·68 became policy as che Korean War caged. placing the country on a pee· manem war tOoting and radically increasing defense spending. 1'he Korean Wac thrust che United Scates squarel}' into Asian politics.

Whot effect did the more conservotil'e political dimote hm<e on Truman's domestic program? (page 629)

I

The Republican·contcollcd Eightieth Congress blocked mosc of Truman•s proposals; it dipped Laboc•s wings with the Taft·Hartley Act. Questions of discrimination rook ttntet stage when Jackie Robinson integrated major league baseball; in 1948 che civil rights issue split the Oemocmtic patty, "'i th segrega· tionist southerners forming their own "'Oixiecrar" party. Truman announced the Fair Deal, his attempt to continue and enlarge the New Deal, but virtually none of his new proposals became Law.

I

Gl Bill {p. 618) Goocge F. Kennan (p. 622} COr01111MI (p. 612)

Truman Doctrine {p. OlJ) Ma"llall ~an {p. 624) B
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) {p. 625} Mao Zedong (p. 626) NSC-68 {p. 627} KD<.,n War (p. 627) Taft-Hartley PI:! (p. 629) Iackie Robinsoo {p. 610}

President'S Comrriltee on Civi Righ~ (p. 610} Fair 0.,1(p. m )

Hot.tSe Un.American ActivUs Comnittoe {p. 632) S.cood Red l<are {p. 632) Algor Hiss and 1\llittalu!r Charril
Joseph R. Mc<arthy (p. 635} McC.rran Internal Securiy Act {p. 635)

How did anticommunist sentiment offect American society? (pog 632)

Fear ofcommunism permeated American life. Highly·publiciz.._--d HUAC heat· ing:s seemed co 1\-"Veal communists under e~\':1)' bed. and Truman compounded the fear with his Federal Employee Loyalty Program. The Hiss and Rosenberg cases, alleging betrayal of secret information to the SMiets, intensified the public's jittedness and sec the stage for the emetgcnce of Senator Joseph R. Me· Catth}' and his 1\-'Ckless accusations of communise penetration of the American go~wn mcnt. l'he Republicans would ride "McCatthyism" back to the scat of poow in Washington. It would be up to war hero ~ight D. EisenhO\Irw- who easily won che presidency in 1952-to restore unity and renew hopefulness. www.c.engoge.comlhistory/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

I TH:t Etsl:NHOWER PQESlOEMO'

639

as millions ofAmericans did so; and that she: ha\J'C a baby, in reality as well as on TV, ac the height of the: baby boom. Many Americans in later decades would look back at I Lot.'t' LMcy ~A'ith nostalgia, s~ing it as a symbol of the: tranquil ..nifty fi fties."' On the: su rface:, che show depicted a d izt.)' stay-at home housewife ~Ailosc husband 'A'llS master of che house, thus per· petuating a stereotype of female dome:sddty. Yet, simultaneousl)', the show skewered

the ideology of domesticity. Show after show depicted Lucy's pursuit of a paying job, epitomizing the restless aspirations of a generation of housebound women. I /...wtl Uk)'-like: t he J9SOs- was filled with contradictions and irony. Behind t he s tereotypes lay a reality far more complex, and often far darker. Americans did enjo}• che: fruirs of the decade' s consumer culture. Having survived a depression and global war, they reveled in prosperity. 1'he:y t rusted Owighc 0 . Eisen· howcr and welcomed rhe thaw in t he Cold War that came after the Korean War. Ar t he same time, che fifties saw the birth of the space age: and of hydrogen bombs. Senator j oseph McCarthy, che Warren Court, and Marcin Luther King, Jr. kindled intense policical passions. The arrival of an automated society and td e:vi· sion's growing power transformed life, as did the baby boom and mass su burbaniza· cion. Mid·centur}' America enco mpassed peace and a widening Cold War, prosperity and persistent f'O\'erty, d ...il·rights triumphs and rampant racism. Alt hough t he 1950s 'A'ct'e good years for man}' Americans, like: I Low Lucy they were hardly placid: both showed us whac we were and whac we would become.

THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY What domestic policies support the notion o(EisenltoWftr 4S a c6ntrist tN moderr1t6 politician?

Rarely in U.S. his tor}' has a pre:sidenc better fit the national mood t han D"ight David Eisenhower. Exhausted by a quarter-<enrury of upheaval- the: stock·markec crash, the Great Depression, World War II, che: Cold War- Americans craved stability and peace. And Eisenhower delivered. Elecre:d in I 952, Eisenhower gave people: wear}' of part isanship a sense of unity, and he ins pired confidence.

o..;pt o..;• &""'-"

War hero ~nd thirty.foutth pno:sidmt of tbt Unittd Stalt$ wbmle tw"O-Ittm piT.Sieltoey was m.ul.td by moderation <1tld stolbility; nickn.unoed • Jl,el'

='tlsm'"

The most lauded general of World War II, Eisenhower pro· jeered t he: image of a plain but good man. He expressed co mplicated issues in simple tenns ~Athile go'lerning a co mplex,. urban, technological society, and comforting an anxious people. Born on October 14, 1890, in Denison, 1Cxas, EisenhO""--er grew up in Abilene, Kansas, in a poor, religious family. More: achlecic than studious, he graduated from the U.S. Military Academy ac \'('est l'oinc in 1915. In directing the: Allied invasion of Norch Africa in 1942 and of wesre:rn Europe: in 1944, he revealed himself co be a bril· Iiane war planner, respected for his managerial ability and talent for conciliation. Eise:n ho~Au's approach to che presidency refl ected his warcime: leadership style. He concentrated on major matters, d e:legace:d authority, and worked co reconcile contending factions. His restrained view of presidential aut hority stemmed from his www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

640

CHAPtER l7

AMEIUCA.AT M.JO·CEI«l..II~Y, '951"-~0

respect for t he: constitutional balance of power and for the d ignity of che: Oval Qf. fice. EisenhoY~Cr rarely intervened publici)' in t he: legislative process and assured his cabine:c members that he .....-ould "sta)' out of (their) hair.'" T his low-key scyle:, com· bined wit h frequenc fishing and golfing vacations, led Democracs to scoff at Eisen· hower as a leader who "reigned but did not rule.'" The image: of passivity masked an active and occasionally ruthless politician. Dtce:rmine:d to gM>crn the nation on businc.s.s prin ciples, EisenhoY~Cr staffed his administration ~A'ith corporate cxe:cucivcs. ..Eight millionaires and a plumber," wroce: one journalist. Eisenhower initially ~A
Tile Downllll ol Joseph Md:lr1hy

Although he despised Joseph McCarthy, Eisenho~A'CT feared batding che senator. Instead, he alloW'Cd McCarthy to grab plenty of rope in hopes char the: demagogue ~A
himself. He did. In 1954 McCarthy accused che army of harboring communist spies, and t he: army charged McCarchy wich using his influence to gain pre:fe:r~:cntial treatment for a staff mem ber who had been drafted. 1'he resulting nationally televised Senate investigation, begun in April 1954, brought McCarth)' down. A national audience wit· nesscd McCarthy's boorish behavior firsthand on tde\'ision. His dark sco~Atf, endless interruptions, and disregard for the righcs of ochers repelled many viewers. In june, when McCarchy smeared t he: reputation of a )'OUng la\l')'~r assjsting joseph Welch, the army counsel, \l1dch struck back: «Until this moment, Senator, I chink I really ne-.-er gauged )'OUr cruelty or your recklessness. .. . Ha\-e you no sense of decency?" The gallery burst into applause. The spell of che inqui.Utor broken, che Senace: in December 1954 censured t he: Wisconsin senator for contempruous beha\'ior. 11lis po~Auful rebuke demolished

I ThE Etsl:NHOWER PQESlOEMO'

641

ENIAC.Ihe first electronic comptt«, begins operation ~New YOfl; dewlopmmt started Bel Labs develops llle ttamistor Asowaon NadMolMexico-Americana established Dwiglt D. Eisenhower elected pii!Sidmt Korean W111lnrce sjgned; Earl warren illlllOirted chief juslice; Oper>lion Wetbadc ~ns Army.Mccantry hearings; BToMfl v. Boord olEducrmon of Tapeta; Fall ol llienbienphu; Geneva Confe11!11C~; ~lither KnortS Best bejjns oo TV S.lk polio vacdne dewloped; AR-CIO merger, fnt postwar U.S.-Soviet s1111rrit meeting; James Dean !Bs inReb<>II<Wt/lout oCoose; Morrlgomery bus boycott bejjls lnterstale HillltwaY Act; Stroz aisis; Soviet illerwrrliorl ill'oland and Hungary Eisenhower Doctrine annoonced; Civi Rights Ad (first silce Reconstruction); Little Rock schoolde<egregation aisis; Soviet Union launches Sputnit; peakof baby boom (4.3 rritlion births); SoulllErn Christian leadership Coolerencelolllded Nabonal Defense Education A
McCarch)' as a political fore~:. In 1957 he died a broken man. But the fears he exploited lingered. Congress annuall)' funded the House Un-American Activities Committee. State and local g01ownments continued to require loyalty oachs from teachers. McCarth)ism also remained a rall)ing call of conservaciV\'S disenchanted with the postwar consensus. Young conservatives like William F. Buckley, Jr.., and t he Christian Anti-Communist Crusade co ntinued to claim thac domestic co mmunism was a major subi.'Ct'Sii,!'C chreat. l 'h e j ohn Birch Society denounced Eisenho~Aw as a co nscious agent of the communise conspiracy and equated liberalis m wich treason. Altho ugh few sa~A' all che lurking dangers that che j ohn Birch Society did. Barr}' Goldwater, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan, among others, used its ancicom· munist, an tigow~rnmem rhetoric to advantage. Stressing viccory over communism , rachcr chan its containment, che self-proclaimed "new consen•arives" (or radical Right, as t heir opponencs called t hem) criticized the ..creeping socialism" of Eisenhower, ad\'OCated a return to traditional moral slandards, and condemned the liberal rulings of the Supreme Court.

Led by a new chief justice, Earl Warren ( 1953). the Suprm1e Courc dt'C\l' consen•aciV\'S' wrath for defe nding t he rights of those accused of subw~rsi\·e beliefs. In a 1957 decision. t he Court hdd thac the accused had the righc to inspect gOII'ernmenc files used by the prosecution. and t hat same rear che justices 01/'ercurned convictions of

Crow In Cowl

brf wan. Cbierjwtiu

l

of

Su~me Coun: wbo bro:ulmtd

ronsritubOil.ll protrcrionJ for indiri:lual rightJ'

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642

CHAPtER l7

AMEIUCA.AT M.JO·CEI«l..II~Y, '951"-~0

-··-·1954 Supnome Coutt ckd~on tbat cltda~ •5tp.anh' but rqu.al" doctrine- uornrutiturioml; pzo~d v.•;ay for end of Rg:rtprion

SoldhemMaMest.

1956 stola'mmt of110utbern cong:rtu. mtn, oppm:ing tbt Bnww cltrision ;and dl'fiond.ing racial Rg:rtprion

Communist party officials under the Smith Act. Right-wing opponents plastered "'Impeach Earl Warren" posters on highway billboards. These condemnations paled beside those of segregationists after the Brown v. &.1rd ofEductJtion ofTopelta (May 1954) ruling. Unanimous!)' re\·crsing PltSJ] v. Ferguson and its separate but equal doccrine, the Court held that separating school· children "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority . .. chat may affect their heans and minds in a wa}' unlikely ever co be undone,.. thereby violating the equal-protection clause of che Fourtecnch Amendment. The justices concluded that ..separate educational facilities are: inherendy unequal... A year later che Court ordered the states to desegregate their schools "with all deliberate speed... The border states complied, but "''hite politicians in the South vowed resistance. Eise:nho"''Cr refused to force them. Although not a racist, he never publid)' endorsed the Broum decision, and privately he called his appointmenc of Earl Warren ..the big· ~st damn fool mistake: I ever made." l'olls indicated that 80 percent of white southerners were against che Broum decision and, encouraged by Ike's silence, opposition stiffened. White Citizens Councils sprang up, and the Ku Klux Klan 1\.'"ViiJ'Ccl Declaring the Brown decision "null, void, and of no effect," southern legislarurcs denied state: aid to school systems that desegregated or dosed them d~·n. They also permicted school boards to assign black and white children co differcnc schools. In 1956, more than o ne hundred members of Congress signed che Southern Manifesto, denouncing Brown as "a d ear abuse of judicial power... An Alabama gu· bernatorial candidate promised to go to jail to defend segregation, and his opponent promptly \'0\1/Cd to die for it. Segregationists also used violence and economic reprisals against blacks. At the end of 1956, noc a singte African-American attended school "''ith whites in the D~p South, and few did so in the Up · per South.

Southern resistancereached

1'lle Llws of the Land a climax in September 1957

litllt Rod.I9S1 Eliu.btth Eck(ord, :.gt IS, ont olthC" nint bl:.ck students to dc:KgC"g:.tt Ccntr.ll High School, c ndurn a bust o n htr w:ay to KhooJ,Stpccmbtr 4, 1957. Fo")'yc::ar:r; l.:.ttr, tht young white wom:an "houti ng Uuults .ukcd for rorgiVl'ness.

when Arkansas gow~mor O JVal Faubus mobilized the state's National Guard to bar nine African-American students from entering licd e Rock's Central High School under a federal court order. After anocher court order forced Faubus to wichdraw the guardsmen, j~ring whites blocked the black srudems' encry. Eisenho\1/Cr sought to avoid che dvil-rights issue, but he belil"\"l!d he had to uphold federal law. He also u nderstood that racism at home hampered American efforts to gain che support of nonwhite Third World nations. The president dispatched fed eral croops co protect blacks' righcs, and soldiers pacrolled Central High for the rest of the rear. Rather than accept ince:-

gration, Faubus s hut d own Little Rock' s public high schools for two rears. At the: end of che decade:, fewer than J percent of African·Ame:rican stu· dents in t he: Deep South attended de:scgregace:d schools. litd e: Rock only strengthened African·Americans' de:cmnination co end jim Crow. l 'hc crisis foreshadO'I'-·ed television's vital role in the civil· rights m()VI,'_me:nt by airing images of howling whites abusing resolute: black students. A 1957 public"pinion poll s howed that 90 pe:rcenc of whites outside the Sout h approved the use: of federal troops in Litde: Rock. Most norchem whites also favored legislation to enfranchise south· ern blacks. l 'hc Civil Rights Act of 1957, che first civil-rights law sinceRe:· construction, established a permanenc commission on civil rights with broad investigator}' po~A'Crs buc did litd e: to guarantee che balloc co blacks. The Civil Righcs Act of 1960 o nl)' slightly strengthened che first measure. Like the: Brown decision, however, chest laws implied a changing federal actitude abouc race and encouraged blacks co fight for their righcs.

THE COLD WAR CONTINUES

A~ pnosicknt, CiJmh~..-r Jtt"t'n-d a cmttUt cou~, whid. h~ ulltd dynamicconJerv.uism, with lim ited txpanJion of S()(i.JI program J.

McCarthy sdf:~truno:d, r~aling h is boorish nc"u in t ht tdrn.ud Army-McCaRhy huring;s.

Tht radiul Righ t '"nt.Wconstrvati""'" moo.-em.c-nt grew in spite of McCar thy'J ckmi.s.e. Although Eistnh~..-r nt.Y\"f publicly Ju pporttd tht Bmw" d~ision, the Littl ~ Rod: crisis for«\·a.rd rae~ iJsuel.

In what ways did Eisenhowucontinw Truman's (onign policy. and in wllat KWJS did he cltangp it ? Eisenho\1/Cr maintained Tru man's containment policy. Stalin's death in 1953 and Eisenh ower's resolve co reduce che risk of nuclear war brought a tha~A' in t he Cold War, buc t he: Uniced States and the Soviet Union remained deadlocked. Neit her the Cold War nor American determinacion to check communism ceased. Global fear ofa nuclear holocausc mounted in step wich both councrie:s' increasingly destructive weapons. After Stalin's death, t he uncertainty in che communis t world and EisenhO'A--er's \'tiled threat co usc nuclear weapons broke the: stalemate in Korea. The armistice signed in Jul)' 1953 set che boundary between North and South Korea once again at the t hirty-eighth parallel and established a panel from neutral nations co O\-e:rsee t he return of prisoners of ~A'llr. Some: Americans claimed that communise aggression had been thwarted and containment vindicacedi others condemned the truce as peace without honor.

Eager to case Cold War hostilities, Eis.e:nho~A'et 6rsc had to qui« the: GOP right wing's clamor to roll back the Red tide. To do so, he chose as his secretary of stace )ohn For te:r Dulles (DUll-us), a rigid, h umorless Presbyterian who advocated a holy ~A'llr against ..atheis tic communism;'' backed by t he: chreat of ..inseam, massi\-e: recalia· don" ~Aith nuclear weapons. Dulles called for ..liberation" of the captive peoples of Eastern Europe and for unle:ashingjiangjieshi against Communis t China. Believing that t he: Soviet Union understood o nly force, Dulles insis ted on t he: necessity of "brinksmans hip,'" che arc of never backing down in a crisis, f:'\ 'e:O ac the risk of war.

Primary Source: Korea-TheW-at that Could Ha\•e Se• Off

WorldW-at lll

llle and Dulles

EU~ bOWt.r's ~~«n'.Ury of-.at~ and anrirommunist hard.Jintr

John-Dillies

'

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

644 Such saber rattling pleased the Right, but Eisenhower pre-ferred conciliation, partly because he feared a nuclear war-the Soviet Union had tested its own hydro· ~n bomb in 1953. Eisenho\1/Cr refused co translate Dulles's rhetoric into action. Aware: of che limits of American poW'Cr, che United States did nothing to check the Soviet intcn~mions that crushed uprisings in East Germany (1953) and Hun· gary(l956). As mulrimegaton thermonuclear ~A'Capons replaced acomk bombs in U.S. and Soviet arsenals, EisenhO""--er worked co reduce the probability of mutual annihila· tion. He proposed ..atoms for ptace:;'' whereby both supcrpoo-ers would comribme: fissionable materials co a new UN agency fur use: in industrial projects. In the ab· scnce: of a posiriw: Soviet response, the government began construction of an e:lcc· tronic air defense syscem to provide: early warning of a missile attack \'t;'ork also began on commercial nuclear plants in the mid·J950s, promising deccriciry «coo cheap co meter." Ho"''CW.r, most money continued co go for nuclear research thac was military. Radioacci\J'C fal lout from acomic test~ espedall)' the 1954 U.S. tests that spread strontium 90 0\"Cr a wide area, heightened "''Orld concern about the nuclear-arms race. In 1955 EisenhO""-·er and Soviet leadrrs mec in Geneva for che first East·Wrst confrrcnce sjnce World War II. Discussions produced no concrete plan for arms con· trol, but mutual talk of" peac:eful coexistence'" led reporters to han the "spirit of Ge· neva.." In March 1958 Moscow suspendrd atmospheric tests ofnuclear weapons, and the United Statts followed suit. But t he Cold War concinurd. Dullrs negociated mucual-defensc paces "''itb forty·thrre nations. Thr United States' «New Look" drfmse: program guaranterd "more bang for che buck" by emphasizing nuclear weapons and reducing com-en· tional fo rces. It spurred the SO\'iets co seek "-more rubble fo r che rublr" by enlarging their nuclear stockpile. Meanwhile, the focus of the Cold War shill-ed from Europe to the Third World, the largely nonwhite dC'.o-eloping nations. 11lerr chr two suprrpo"''Crs "''llged war by proxy, using local guerrillas and military juntas. 11lere, too, chr Cmtral lncelli· ~nee Agency (CIA) fought CO\~rt wars against those thought co imperil Amrrican interests.

Established in 1947 to conduce foreign intelligence gath· ering. the CIA soon began co carry out unden::o..·er opera· tions to topple regimes friendly to communism. By 1957 half its personnel and 80 percenc of its budget "~rc de..·otcd co "co ..-crc action." 10 woo influential foreign thinkers away from communism, che CIA also sponsored in· tdlecrual confermces and jazz concerts. It bankrolled anticommunist c:ulru.ral c-.-ems, su bsidized magazines to publish arcid es supporcing Washington, and re· cruitrd college studmts and busjnessmen traiJ'Cling abroad as «fronts'" in dandescine CIA acth'itirs. In 1953 t he CIA orchescrated a coup co o\·erthrow the go..·ernment of Iran. Fear· ing chat the: prime minister, who had nacionalizrd oil fields, mighe open oil-rich Iran to che Soviets, the CIA rcplacrd him wich pro-American Shah Reza l':lhlavi (REH·u.h PAH·l.J.h-vee). T he Unitrd States thus gained a loyal ally on the So\'irt border, and American oil companies prospered when t he Shah madr low-priced oil available co

CIA Covert Actions

I

T HE

cow WAA Cor."tlMuEs

645

them. But Iranian haCJ-cd of America cook root- a hostility that would haunt the United Scares a quarcer-cemur}' later. Also in 1953 che: ClA inren-e:ncd in Philippine elections to ensure a pro-American gm-cmment. In 1954 in Guatemala a C IA-supported band of mercenaries O\>t:rthtc\l' the clocced communist-influenced regime:, which had scized land from che American· owned United Fruic Company. The new pro-Am erican govcrnment restored United Fruit•s properties and cr.unpled political opposition.

The mosc cxtensh-e: CIA C()IJ'Crt operations during the 1950s took place in Indochina. The United Scares vie'l'--e:d Indochina as a Cold War battleground. The Truman administration had provided f rance wit h large-scale: military assistance to fight the Yiecminh (YH-t>t-MIN), a broad-based Vietnamese nationalist coalition led by the communist Ho Chi Minh (hoe chH m n). But the French W\'.re: losing. In early 1954 the Vietminh besieged twelve thousand french troops in the valley of Dienbienphu (dee--ycn·bee-)'Cn·FOO). France appealed for U.S. intet'V'Cntion, and som e American offidals toyed ~Aith the idea of a nuclear strike, which Eisenhower flacl)' rejected. In Ma)' t he: French surrendered at Dienbie:nphu. An international conference in Gene:\'a arranged a ceasefire and divided Viemam at che seventeenth parallel, pending elections in 1956 to choose the go\·ernme:nt of a unified nation. Altho ugh unwilling co go to war, Eis.enho~A'cr would not accept a communist takeovcr of Viemam. In what became k no~A'tl as the domino theory. EisenhO'I'--cr warned that, if Viemam fell to the communists, then Thailand, Burma. Indonesia, and ultimately all of Asia ~A'Ou ld follow. lhe United States refused to sign t he: Geneva 1\:ace: Accords and in late 1954 created the Sout heast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a militar}' alliance patterned on NATO. In june 1954 the CIA installed Ngo Dinh Diem (woh din dee-EM), a fiercely anticommunist Catholic, as premier and then president of an independent Souch Vietnam. C IA agents helped him eliminate policical opposition and block t he: election to reunify Vietnam specified by the Geneva agreements. As EisenhO'I'--e:r Iacer admitted, "possibly 80 percent of che population v,:ould have voted for the com· munist Ho Chi Minh as chcir leader.'" Washington pinned ics hopes on Diem to maintain a noncommunist South Vietnam with American dollars rather chan Am erican lh-e:s. But che autocratic Die:m•s Carholidsm alienated che predominancly Buddhist population, and his refusal to institute land reform and end corruption spurred op· posicion. In Decem ber 1960 opposition to Diem coalc.sced in the National Ube:ra· don Front. Backed by North Viemam, the: insurgency attracted broad support and soon controlled half of South Viecnam..

Tile VIetnam Domino

....... drtefly lbt bdiefth.u i!Viii'.Uillm fell to tht rommu. 1niJ~tS, ~II of A.o:ia would follow

NaboNIUwriooR.ising rommuni.n in~ty in South Vittn.ltn, J Uppctrtrd by tht gcn~mmtnt of Nortb V'~otmam

Eis.enho~A'cr faced his greatest crisis in the Middle East, the Suez crisJs. In 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser (gu-MA'h"l AS. TNrdWorld dul NASS-er) came to power in Eg)'PC, determined to modernize his natio n. To woo him, the: United States offered financing for a dam at Aswan (AS-w.a.hn) to harness the Nile: River. But when Nasser purchased arms from

Traubles In tile

S...Z crisis Egyp: naOOnalmed

I

tht Sua Canal, prompting Britain, FrallCle, and brad to tllkt military action

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646

CHAPtER l7

AMEIUCA.AT M.JO·CEI«l..II~Y, '951"-~0

-Dodrioe Com. mittC'd tht Llnitrd Statr:s to

polky of in~tvmbon in the

1Middlt East (1957)

oni...,_."""""'l co..lu

I

Co.llitiootlut, .w:rording to Ei.Jenho-l'r, v.•u amau:iog

lhngerous po-l'r

CHECKI NG I N

Czechoslovakia, john Foster Dulles canceled the loan, and Nasser nationalized the British-owned Suez CanaL Vi~·ing the canal as the lifeline of its empire, Britain planned to cake it back by force. Supporting the British were: France, which feared Arab nationalism in chcir Algerian colony, and Israel, which feared the Egypcian arms buildup. The three countries, America's closest allies, coordinated an attack on Egypt in October 1956 without consulting Eis.enho~Au. lke fumed that che military accion would dri..-e the Arab "-'Orkl and its precious oil to the Russians. When MoscO'A' threatened co inter· vene, Eisenhower forced his allies co ~Aithdraw their troops. The Suez crisis had major consequences. It swelled lbird World ami~A'CStern sentiment, and che United States replaced Britain and France as the protector of wescem interests in the Middle East. Determined to guarantee che flow of oil to the \'('esc, in 1957 che president announced the Eisenho\llo't'r Doctrine, a proclamation that the United States would send militar}' aid and, if necessar)', troops to any Mid· dle Eastern nation chre:atened by ..Communise aggression." Such imcr..-emions imensi6ed anti-American feelings in lhird World nations. Angry crowds in Peru and Venezuela spac at Vice !'resident Nixon and stoned his car in 1958. In 1959 Fidel Castro m--ercumed a dictatorial regime in Cuba and con· 6scaced American properties without compensation. A rougher blow struck on May I, 1960, two "-"eeks before: a scheduled summit conference with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev (KROOSH-
OC':Ip(t~ hard-lint Dulk' rhrwcic, Ei$C'nho~~r pur~utd a m odrrac~ Cold \V.u cour:~t and avoidtd d irect confmntoahon with cht Savin Union.

T ht (ocw o f t ht Cold War ' hifttd ro "'d irnt$" in th~ T h ird \'(loci d. T ht Ctntral lnttlligtnCJt Agency conducted CO\..-rt operationJ in Ir:m and Guactmala to 0\..-rthmw t l«ttd p..-rnmtnl:l not fritnd l)' tnough to tht United St.:u:~. \l' hllt tht domino t hwry kd t ht Unittd Stoatu to d«pcr irNUh..-mtnt in South Vitm.lm, cht US.-$upporrtd ll'gimt ofNgo Dinh Ditm (.le«i.l gi'O'>\·ing insurgency. Tht Middlt E.ut rtmained a hot $pot afttr th~ Sue: ai.si,;, and tht Ei$C'nhawn Docuint committed t ht Unittd Stoatu to inc~rwnt th~ll' .lgainJt ''Communi:~t .l881l'-Jllion.•

Just before leaving office, Eisenhower offered Amer· icans a farewell and a ~A'llrning. 1'he demands of national security, he stated,. had produced the "conjunction of an immense militar}' establishment and a large arms industr}'·'" S\N'OIIen defense budgets had )Uked American economic healch to mili· tary expenditures, and military contracts had become the staff of life for research scholars, politidans, and America's largest corporations. 1'his combination of interests, EisenhO"-·er bdie'•ed, exerted enormous leverage and threatened che traditional subordination of the militar}' in American life. "We must guard againsc the acquisition of unwarranted influence ... by the miUtary-industdal C·omplex. T he potencial for che disastrous rise of mis· placed power exists and ~Aill persist.'" l'he moderate Eisenhower pleased ncither left nor Righc. His acceptance of New Deal social-welfare measures angered the Republican Right, while liberal Democrats faulted his passivity toward McCarchyism and radsm. But Ike had given the majority of Americans what they most wanted- prosperity, re· assurance, and a breathing spell in which co relish che comforts oflifc.

I THEAfFWENTSOOEtY

647

THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY What W8'1lt the main sources, and consequenc-es, ofeconomic prosperity in the 1950s? In 1958 economise john Kenncth Galbraith published The Afjlwmt Socitf)~ a study of posrwar America. The rid e reflected the broad-based prosperity char made the 1950s seem the fulfillmenc of the American dream. By the end of the decade, 60 pm:ent of American families owned homes; 75 pm:ent, cars; and 87 percent, at least one TV. Gm--emmem spending. a huge upsurge in productivity, and steadily increasing consumer demand pushed che gross national product (GNP) up 50 pen::ent. Three brief recessions and a rising nacional debt, almost $290 billion by 1961, evoked concern but did little co scifle economic growth or optimism. The United States had achieved the world's highest living standard ever. By 1960 che a\'etage worker's income, adjusted for inflation, was 35 percenc higher chan in 1945. With jusc 6 percent of the world's population, che United States produced and consumed nearl}' SO percent ofeverything made and sold on tanh.

Federal spending constituted a major source of economic growth, near!}• doubling in che 1950s to $180 billion. Federal expenditures, just J percenc of che GNP in 1929, reached 17 percenc by the mid·l950s. These: funds built roads and airporcs, fi nanced home mortgages, supported farm prices, and provided stipends for education. More than half the federal budget- JO percent of the GNP- wcm co defense spending. l 'he federal gow~rn ment re-mained the nation's chiefsponsor ofsdendfic and technologi· cal research and dC"t-elopment (R&D). Particularly for the West, it was as if World War II had nC'\o-er ended. l'oliticians from boch parties labored co keep defense spending flowing westward. By che Late 1950s, California alone received half the space budget and a quarter of all major mil· itary contracts. Denver had the largest number of federal employees outside Washington, D.C. Go\·ernment spending transformed the West of rugged individualists into a new \l'esc of bureaucrats, defense: contractors, and sdencists dependent on federal funds. GO\."Crnmenc funding and concrol transformed both che U.S. military and the industrial economy. Financed b}• che Atomic Energy Commission and using navy scientists, che nation's first nuclear power plane came on line in 1957. The chemical industry continued its wartime surge. As pesticides contaminated ground water supplies and plastics reduced landfill space, Americans -una~A'llre of che hidden pcrils-marwled at fruits and ..-egetables cO\."Cred ~Aith Saran Wrap and delighted in their Dacron suits, Acrilan socks, and 1Ctlon-coated pans. Electronics became the fi fth·largest American industr}'· Electricity consumption tripled in che 1950s as consumers bought all manner of appliances. Cheap oil fueled expansion. Domestic oil production and foreign imports rose: st«ply, and by 1960 oil had r~:placed coal as the nation's main energy source. Hardl}' anyone paid attention when a physicist warned in 1953 chat "adding 6 billion cons of carbon dioxide co che atmosphere each rear is warming up che Earth:''

Tbt New Industrial

Society

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648

CHAPtER l7

AMEIUCA.AT M.JO·CEI«l..II~Y, '951"-~0

P -o lino al Dooglos Aimaft Coolpany The Cold \V:u-stimut:ned ;u~ enOf'mous eoonomic boom in defense spending.. By mid· ccnwry, mo~ tho:~n 1\:Ufthe feder;~.l b udget, ;~.bout 10 percent of the GNP, went to defense contr.1ctors like Douglas Air~:nft, which 1\dped the economy of the South ;u~d the \Vnt to Aourisl\.

I ~

I•I,

J

l'lcnciful cheap gasoline fed the gro~A'th of the automobile and aircraft industries. Aerospace, the nation's third-largest industr}' in che J950s, depended on defense spending and federal!)' funded research. 11le automobile induscry. sciU t he nation's induscrial citan, also applied technological R&D. Between 1945 and 1960 automation hal~d the number of hours and workers needed co produce a car.

The computer ~A'llS a key to technological re\'Olucion. In late 1946 the militar}' devised ENlAC, the 6rsc electronic computer, co impr()'I.!'CarciUer}'accuracy. The unwidd)•ma· chine, wich eight«n thousand vacuum cubes, could perform 6~ thousand calcula· tions per second. Next came the dc..-elopmem of operacing inscructions, or programs, and rhe replacement of wires by primed circuits. Then, in 1948, Bell labs invented tiny, solid-state transistors that ended reliance on radio tubes and initiated the age: of computers. Sales of electronic computers to induscry rose from twenty in 1954 to more chan two thousand in 1960. Major manufacturers used them to monitor production lines, track im-emory, and ensurequaliry control In government, computet'S 'A'Cre as indispensable to lltcntagon strntegists playing war games and to che Census Bureau and the lnce:rnal Re\~nue Service. By t he mid-1960s more: than thir ty thousand mainframe computet'S would be used by banks, hospitals, and universities. The dewJopmcnc of the high-ce:chnology complex known as Silicon Valley be· gan in 1951. Stanford University ucilizcd its sdence and engineering faculties to design products for the Fairchild Semiconductor and Hewlett-Packard companies.

The Age of Collputers

{(11 Prima:ry Source: ~ Computers

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This relationship bCNttn uniV\'.rsiries and corporations became a modd follo\IJ'Cd b}' other high·tech firms throughout the Sama Clara valley. S imilar dcvclopmems would follaw along Ma.ssachuscrts' Rouce: 128; near Austin, 1t:xas; and in Norch Carolina's Research 1'riangle.

Rapid technological advances accelerated che growth and power of big business. In 1950, rn·enty-cwo finns had as· sets of more: than Sl billion; by 1960, fi fty did. By chen , one--half of J percent of corporations earned more than half the total corporate in· come in che United States. \l'ealth}' finns S\1.'3110'1'--ed ~A't"ak competitors and became oligopolies. Three television ne:rn-orks monopolized che nation's air~A'll'les; three au· romobile and three aluminum companies produced 90 percent of America's cars and aluminum.: and I~ corporations controlled the: lion's share of assets and sales in steel, petroleum, chemicals, and electrical machinery. Corporations acquired O\'CT· seas fadlities to become "multinational" enterprises. Growth and consolidation meant greater bureaucratization. "Executio.·es'" replaced "capitalists."' Success required conformit}' nor creariviry, teamwork noc individuality. According to sociologist David Riesman's 'mt Lon~ Crowd (1950), the: new «company people" were «ocher· direcce:d;'' eager to follow the cues from their peers. Changes in agriculture paralld e:d chose in industr}'· Farming gl\.""' increasingly scientific and mechanized. Between 1945 and 1960, technology halved che: ~A'Ork hours necessary to graw crops. Man}' farm families migrated to d ries. Meanwhile, heavily capitalized fann businesses prospered by using more and more machines and chemicals. Unci! the publication of Rachel Carson's Silmt Spring in 1962, few Americans understood che extent to which fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides poisoned the environment. Carson, a former rcsea.rchcr for the Fish and Wildlife Service, drama· dud the problems caused by the usc of the insecticide: DDT and its spre-ad chrough the food chain. Her depiction of a "'Silent spring" caused by the deach of song· birds from DDT coxidty led many states co ban irs use. The: federal go\-e:rnmem foJlO'I'-·ed suit.

The Costs of Bigness

Consolidation also transformed the labor mm-emem. In 1955 the AFL and CIO merged, bringing 85 percenc of union members imoasjngle: unit. Although leaders prom· ised aggressive unionism, organized labor feU victim to its success at the: bargaining table:. Higher wages, a shorcer u.-ork·week, paid vacations, health-care C()I.'Crage, and automatic wage hikes tied to the cosc of living led most workers to \i cw themselves as middle class rather than the proletariat. A decrease in the number of blue-collar u.-orke:rs also sapped labor's momen· tum. Automation cur membership in the: coal, auto, and stedu.-orke:rs' unions b}' more: than half. Most of the new jobs in che: 1950s ~A'C.re: in che service seccor and in public employment, which banned collecti\'e: bargaining by labor unions. In 1956, for the: first rime: in U.S. history, white-collar ~A
Blut-Col&lr Blues

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OfAPlER l7

i\MEIUCA.AT M.IO·CEI«<JI~Y, tj$1"-~0

job, few unions ~A'C>IJed ~A•hit~collar ~A
As real income (adjusted for inflation) rose:, Americans spent less of chcir income: on ncccssicie:s and more on Suburbs po~A'ered lawn mowers and air conditioners. They heaped their shopping carts ~Aith frozen, dehydrated, and fortified foods . When they Lacked cash, they borrow't
Prosperity llld tilt

tacky" houses in «discurbia," sub01ban life: embodied che American dream for many families who longed for their own home, good schools, and neighbors like: t he:mseto.-es. Americans also moved South and West, into the Sunbe:lt, lured by job oppon:unitics, the climate:, and the pace of life:. California, "'there:: the: pop· ulation u.-em from 9 to 19 million betv.-een 1945 and 1964, supplanted New York as the mosc populous state. Los Angeles boasted che highest per capita ownership of private homes and cars of any city. lnicially designed to lure shoppers downtown, che high"''ll)' system instead had become t he: road to a home in the suburbs. Orange: County, bordering Los Angeles, tripled ics population in the 1950s. lnduscry also headed South and Wesc, dra"''ll b}•low caxes,low energy costs, and anti-union right·to-work laws. Senior citi:u:ns headed to t he: easier climate. Both groups brought a conservati\-e outlook. By 1980 t he: population of the Surtbe:.lt, which stretched from the Old Confederacy across Texas to southern California, exceeded that of t he: Nort h and East. The political power of the: Republican party rose: according!)'·

Fedcra.l .spend ing, upccia.lt)' in deJen$e indu.~tties ;md military ruea.l'l:-h and developm.cn t, hdptd fud a den-de economic groYif.h.

or

Tiw- comput.cr indu.~tl)· bcg.:m a groYif.h $p urt ;u p'.f'rnment ;~.nd bw:ine.sl took ;~.dv;~.ntage o r the new t«.hno logy. Con.solid.:u:ion and bi~ eharaetcrizcd ;~.gricultu rc- ;u wd l a' indu$1ry; e-nvironmen tal dama~ w;~..s one- ruult. Un ioru Jol_wd bc-C
S..Mit StattsoCtbc-south.

CONSENSUS AND CONSERVATISM

I

~m

How accurate i.s the im11gt1 ofthe 1950s as 4 period ofconservotism 11nd conformity?

United Statt:e; inm'.u.

ingly popu.loo$ md W¢1$ft'\';lci\'.c'

in the 19Sib

Nor C''ICr)'one: embraced the conformity of 1950·s' consumer culcure:. lntdloccuals fou nd a wide audience fo r their attack on «organization men'" be:m on ge:ccing ahead b}•going along and on "starus seekers"' pursuing cxternalf\.•·w:uds to compensate for inner insecurities. Others cook aim at the consumerist middle dass: ..all items in a national su pe:rmarke:c-cace:gorizcd, processed, labeled,. priced, and readied for merchandising."' This critidsm OV\'.rsimpli6e:d reality. Jc ignored ethnic and class d iversity, the acquisicivcne:ss and conformiryof earlier generations, and che currencsof dissenc s"'irl· ing beneath the surface. Bur ic rightly spodighted t he: devacion of comfort m-er challenge, and of private pleasures m-er public affairs. It was, in the main, a rime of political passivity and preoccupation "'ith personal gain. In 1954 McCall's magazine coined the re:rm togetbernm to celebrate the: ideal couple: the man and woman who cen· tered chcir lives on home: and children. Americans in the 1950s tended to marr}' )>oung, co have babies quickly, and to haw: more of them. l 'he fertility rare {the number of births per I,OOOwomen) peaked at 123 in 1957, when an American baby was born every se:\-en seconds. New antibiotics subdued d iphtheria and whooping cough, and t he: Salk and Sa· bin vaccines eliminated polio. l 'he plunge in childhood mortality helped to raise American life expectancy from 65.9 )'tars in 1945 to 70.9 )"ears in I 970. Coupled "'ith the baby boom, this led to a 19 percent population spurt during the 1950s. By 1960 children under 14 consciruted one-chird ofche population.

N .. boeM

I

Enormow popub. tioo spun from 1946 to l 964

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OfAP1ER l 7

i\MEIUCA.AT M.IO·CEI«<JI~Y,tj$1"-~0

Dr. Betojn;, Spod "'''"""

I

and mdwr wbo tugtd rootbers to dt'YCitr thmuth-e:c fuUtimt m tbr v.-ethl't' ofthe-~ cbikhtn

The sheer size: o f the bab)•-boom generation (76 million Americans W\'.re: born between 1946 and 1964) ens ured its impact. In the 1950sschool co nstruction boomed, as did college enrollments in the 1960s. 11le J970s t hrough t he 1990s wo uld see: peaks in home construction, as the boomers had families, and in reciremenc im·est· menrs. In t he 1950s the: baby boom made child rearing a foremost concern and rein· fo rced the idea that women's place "''lls in the home. No one did more to emphasize chelink be:cwccn full-rime mothers and healchy children chan Dr. Benjamin Spock; only t he Bible outsold his Baby ~~:nd Cbild Can ( 1946) in the fi fties. Spock urged mothers noc co work outside che home, in order co create an atmosphere of warmth and incimacy fur t heir children. Cr}ing babies were: to be co mfo rted.: breast-feeding came back imo \'Ogue.

l'opular culture chroughouc the 6fcies glorified marriage and parent hood, paincing a v.'Oman's de\'Ocion to life in t he home "'ith her children as the most cheris hed goal. Television mostly pictured women as at-home mothers. Hollywood perpetuated the stereotype of ~r women as neurotic. As Debbie Reynolds declared in 11:Jto Ttndtr Trotp ( 1955), "A "''Oman isn't a "''Oman until she's been married and had children." Education reinfOrced these: ideas. Alongside academic subjec~ girls studied typing, eciquecte, and cooking. Guidance counselors cautioned )'OUng wo men noc co miss out o n marriage by pursuing higher education. More: men chan women .....-enc co college, and only one--third of college women completed chcir degrees. Howc·'ler, profou nd changes .....-ere: under way. Increasing numbers of women en· tered t he \l'Ork force. By 1960, rwke as many wo men \l'Orked outside t he home as in 1940. In 1960 one-t hird of the labor force was female, and one out of chrec married V.'Omen worked oucside t he home. Their median wage, ho"''ewr, "''lls less t han half that for men. Mosc "''Omen worked to augment family in come, not to challenge stcre:ocypc.s, and took low-paying, low-presri~ jobs. Yet man}' working women de\-eloped a heightened sense: of expectations and empoW'Crment. Transmitted co cheir daugh· ters, that experience would fuel a feminis t resu rgence in che late 1960s.

O..stldty

"1 0day in che U.S.," Timr claimed in 1954, "the Chris· tian faith is back in che center of things." Religious Edualtlon popularizers-fiery evangelise Billy Graham, riveting Ro· man Catholic bishop Fulton J. Sheen, and "positi'le-thinking" Protestant minister Nonnan Vincent Peale- had S}'tldicated newspaper columns, best-selling books, and radio and television programs. Holly\l'Ood religious extravaganzas like 11:Jto Ten Com· m~ni:S ( 1956) became box-office hits, and TV co mmercials pro nounced that "-the family that prays together stays together.'" Millions embraced evangelical fundamencali.sm and became "born-again" Chris tians- a trend that would escalate. Billy Graham and O ral Roberrs among oth· ers devdoped h uge: followings by preaching against che hedonism and secularism of modern life; they appealed mainly to Americans alienated b)• rapid cultural and so· cial change. Despice the aura of religiosity in che 6fti~ the inttnsity of faith dimin·

bllpmand

lilfr CtiU. Protl'swu C'\'mgoelal prtachl'r .and out. spokrn opponent ofhomo. Sl'X~Iity, rommuni.l.m, and

worling -.1\
ished for many people, as mainstream churches downplared sin and evil, and preached Americanism and fellawship. Similarl)', education SW'CUed in the 1950s }'ct seem ed less rigorous than in earlier decades. 11le baby boom inflated primary-school enrollm ent by 10 million. California opened a new school every week throughout [he decade and still faced a classroom shortage. The proporcion of college-age Americans in higher education climbed from IS percent in 1940 to more than 40 percenc b)• the 1960s. .. Progres· siw~:" educators promoted sociability and sclf-expressi o n -""'~11-roundedness "-o"er science, mach, and history. Sun\.')'S of college swdems found them consen•acive, conformist, and careerist, a "silent gecneration" seeking primaril)' security and comfort.

American culture reflected the spirit of a prosperous era as W'CII as Cold War anxiety. Enjoying more leisure rime and big~r parchocks, Americans spent one-scwn[h of the GNP in 1950 on entertainment. 1\:ople visjted nacional pa-rks in dro\'l'S. Spectator spores boomed, new S)'tl'lphony halls opened, and book sales doubled. New York replaced Paris as the capital of the art world. Uke the abstract can\'asts ofJackson l:tollock and che cool jazz trumpet of Miles Davis, che major no'lds of[he fifties displayed introspoccion and improvisacion. John Checver•s 'nJe U'apsbot Chroni
Tilt Clllure of the Fifties

No culwral medium cwr grew so huge soqukkl)•as television. In 1946 one in e\~ry eighteen chousand ho useholds had a TV set; b)• 1960,90 percent of aUhouseholds owned at least one TV, and more Americans had televisions than had bathrooms. Business capitalized on che phenomenon. The three main radio nerworks- ABC, CBS, and NBC- gobbled up vin:ually every TV station in the councry. n' Guide soon oucsold all ocher periodicals. First marketed in 1954, the ..lV dinner" changed the nation's eating habits. It seemed that TV could sell anything. By the mid-6fties the www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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CHAPtER l7

AMEIUCA.AT M.JO·CEI«l..II~Y, '951"-~0

three major networks each had l~r ad\-ertising rC\>ccnues chan any other communi· cations medium in che "''Orld Initial!)•, lV shO""-x:ased talent and creativity. Opcra performances appeared in prime cime, as did sophisticated comedies and dramas and dorumentaries like Edward R. Murro"'"s S« It /\'A•helming portrayal of a medium, changing poli ti ~ ;a$ wdl ;u concemed citizenry reinforced complacmcy and hid the realityof"the ocher en!On-ing conformity, con,umeri,m, America;'' and JtC'-n"Ol)'pU.

I

THE OTHE R AMERICA In wllat UIU4.! went then hto Americas?

«J am an imi sible man;" dedarcd the African-American narrator of Ralph Elli· son's /twisiblt Man; "I am invisible ... because people refuse to see: me." Indeed, few white middle-dass Americans of the fi fties perceived lhe cxtem of social injusd ce in the United States. "White flight"' from cities lO suburbs physically separated races

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655

and classes. Popular culrure focused on affluent white: Americans enjoying the ..good life.'" But po\~rty and racial discrimination were rife and dire, and the: scruggles for social justice imensi6e:d.

Alchough the: pe:rce:magc of poor families declined from 1947 to 1960,in 1960 some: 35 millionAme:ricans,onc--6fth of the: nation, lived belo~A' the poverty Line. Some: 8 million elderly had }'catty incomes of less than a thousand dollars. One-third of the: poor lived in depressed rural areas, and 2 million migrant farm workers liw:d in che: most abject poverty. Observing a Texas migratory-labor camp in 1955, a journalist reported that 96 percenc of che children had had no milk in the previous six momhs, eight o ut ofce:n adulrs had eaten no meat, and most slept ..on the ground, in a cave, under a tr«, or in a chicken house.'" The bulk ofche poor huddled in decaying in ne:r~dty slums. Displaced southern blacks and Appalachian whites, Native Americans fon::e:d off re:scrvacions, and newly arri\'ed Hispanics strained cicie:s' inadequate: fadlicie:s. Nearly 200,000 Mexican· Americans herded into San Antonio's Westside barrioj a local newspaper described them as living like: cattle in a stock)'llrd. As described by Michael Harrington in 71Je Other AmerU J.\n!erry in tht Unittd Statts (1962), the poor lived crapped in a C)'Cle of want and deprivatiorL Unable: to afford a nutritious diet or doctors, the: poor got sick more often and for longer than affluent Americans. Children ofche poor starce:d school at a disadvantage and rapid!}' fell behind; man}' dropped out. Living ~Aith nei· ther hope nor skills, the poor bequeathed a similar legacy co chcir childrerL The pressing need for low--cost housing went unanswered. S lum-clearance and urban-renewal projects shunted the poor from o ne ghetto co another to make: room for parking garages and culrural ce:mcrs. Bulldozers razed the Los Angeles barrio of Chaw:z Ravine to make wa}' for Dodger Stadium. Landlords, realtors, and bankers deliberately excluded nonwhites from decent housing. Half of the: housing in New York's Harlem predated 1900. There, a dozen people might share a riO}' aparcme:nt ~Aith broken ~Aindows, faulty plumbing. and gaping holes in the: walls. Harlem's rates of illegitimacy, in· fant de:arhs, narcotics usc, and crime towered above city and national a\~rages.

North Cllicago Sla11 Life w.u not the "nifty frfties" fot. ;all Ameri· c;ans. Ne;arlyone in four- INed below the poverty line, which w.u G~l cul :~ted by the feder.al gO
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i\MEIUCA.AT M.IO·CEI«<JI~Y, tj$1"-~0

The collision berwecn the: hopes raised by the: 1954 Brown decision and the indignities of persisce:m segregation sparked a new phase in che: civil-rights mow:ment. African· Americans dt:\'i:loped new taccics, founded new organizations, and foiiO\l'i:d new leaders. They used nonviolent direcc-action proce:st to engage large numbers of blacks in their own freedom 6ght and to arouse 'A•hite America's conscience. Racism touched even the smallest details of daily life. In Montgomery, Alabama, although the dry's black bus riders represented more than three-fourths of all pas· scngers, chey had to sit in the rear and give up their seats co any standing 'Ailite rid· e:rs. In December 1955, 'Ailen Rosa Parks, an officer of the: Montgomery NAACP, refused to gct up so chat a white man could sit, she: 'A'llS arrested. Montgomery's black leaders organized a massive bus bo)'COct. Martin Luther King, Jr., a N'Cflt)'· s......._·en·rear-old minister, articulaced che an~r of Montgomery blacks. The: time had come:, he declared, to stop being patient "wich anything less than freedom and jus· tice."' Accordingly, 6fty thousand black Moncgome:rians bo)•corted the buses for a )'tat, organizing car pools and often 1A'lllking miles to work. When dty leaders wo uld noc budge, blacks filed suit, challenging bus segregation. In Nm-ember 1956 the Su· preme: Courc affirmed a lo'A'Cr·court decision outlawing such segregation. The bus bo)'COct demonstrated black strength and determination. It affirmed the possibility of social change. And it \'aulted Or. King, whose oracor)' simultane:· ously inspired black activism and touched 'A•hite consciences, into the national spodight. King's philosoph)' of civil disobedience fused the spirit of Christianity with the: stracegy of nonviolent resistance. His insistence on nonviolence diminished the: threat of bloodshed. Preaching that they must lay their bodies o n the: line co provoke crises that would force 'A•hites to confronc their 0'1'-'n racism, he: u~d his foiiO\l'i:rs to love their enemies. The mm-emenr's triumphs rested not on its leaders but on the: domestic senrants who "A>alked instead of riding che buses, the children on the fro nt lines of the battle for school desegregation, and the: tens of thousands of ordinary people who marched, rallied, and demonscrated.

B'-cks' Struggle lor lustla!

..., - cw;' risl>" ""'tt who5t tc"fW.ll to gin' .l whitr man hrr bu$ sl'..llt triggertd tbr

1Montgomrrybw barcott ......, LudwiGor.lr.

Mriu.n..Aml'riu.n miniJUr who5t rmphas~ on nonviclkiU'II' c:atapulte'd bim to kadersbip olci"l..tightJ' mc.wrmmt

Hispanic-Americans initially made less headway in ending discrimination. High u nemplo)ment o n che Caribbean is· land brought a steady stream of Puerco Ricans, 'Ailo, as U.S. citizen~ could enter the mainland without restriction. B)' 1960 nearly a million li\'ed in El Barrio in New York City's East Harlem. In New York they su ffered from inadequate housing and schools, and from po· lice harassmenc.: they "-"ere denied decent jobs and political recognition. Family fric· tions flared in the transition to unaccuscomed wa)'S. t:tarents felt upstaged by children who learned English and obtained jobs that "-'ere d osed to them. The: relationship betv.rcen husbands and wives changed as 'A'Ome:n found readier access to jobs than did me:n. Mexican-Americans suffered the same indignities. Most were underpaid and segregated from mainscream American life. After World War II, new irrigation sys· tems added 7.5 million acres to the agricultural lands of the: SouthW\'St, stimulating demand for cheap Mexican labor. In 1951, co seem che: resulting tide of illegal Me:xi·

l..ltllos •d Latinas

can immigrants, Congress reintroduced the ~A>artime «temporary ~A
Native Americans remained the poorest, most Nltlwe Amerkans ignored minority. 11le:ir death rate: was three times the: national a\-erage, and unemployment on rese!Vations ran a staggering 70 to 86 percent fo r some: t ribes. Congress again changed course, mo\ing away from efforts co reassert Indian sovereignty and cultural autonomy and back toward the goal of assimila· cion. Bc~-een 1954 and 1962 Congress terminated tre-aties and withdrt'A' financial support from sixty-one resen •ations. First applied to the: Me:nom· inee:s (mth-NAH·m·h·CM!t'S) of Wisconsin and che Klamaths (ClAY~uths) of Oregon, ~A•ho 0'1'-'ned valuable timberlands, the policy was disastrous. Further impo'lerishing che tribes, it t ransferred more- than 500,000 acres of Native American Lands to non-Indians. By 1960 about 60,000 Indians had been relocated to cities. Some became: middle class, some ended up in run+down urban shant)'tD'I'--ns, and ncarl)' a third eventually rewrned to their re:sen•acions. The National Congress of American Indians vigorously opposed termination, and most tribal politicians ad\'OCated Indian sm-'ercigncy, treat}' rights, and federal trusteeship.

6nxero JlfO'IJ'iiM

Guo t

wod.er prngr.-n tlu:t brougllt

bundn'd5 or thouumb or Merieul llbol'l"n to the- United 5ute5 in tbe 1950s

M iehad lia.rrington'5 ~ Othrr A'''""·r;r caUtd a.rtention to tht po'\'C'R')' a nd depriv.uion th.n ui5ttd be'OC':nh the com.pl~tm 5urfaCJt of the' 1950:'1. M.m)' of the- poor nomaintd tr.lpped in decaying eitiu. With tbt $UC«l:'l of tht Montgom· try bu' bo)'C'Ott, M.utin Lu ther King,Jr., bcc:une tht dominant figure in t he c ivil· rights: mo\l\"ment. Po>.'C'-")' and disc:rimination, often ' ha r ptned by illeg.ll immigrant $tltuJ, eontinued to dog Mtxi ~n · AmC"-Mca.ru.. A' their popul..uion btc-..tmt moi'C' urb:m, ~""• Sp.miJh~puktrJ btpn to aueR thtir r ight.J..

NatM- Amer ican,• wdf.lre ' lipped further .l$ govt"rnmC"-nt policy toward .lJ,imilation a nd te.nniro.u:ion of tre.u:iu.

t\'C'-n

~C"-nod

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i\MEIUCA.AT M.IO·CEI«<JI~Y, tj$1"-~0

SEEDS OF DISQUIET WMt tK.tions ~minorities andyouth foretold the movements for social changtt to com6 in tile 1960s? Late in che 1 950~ apprehension ruffled the placid surface of American life. Q uestions about the nation's goals and values, periodic recessions, rising unempiO)'· menc, and che ballooning national debt made Khrushchev's boast that ;-our grand· children will lh-e under communist rule'" ring in American ears. T hird World anticolonialism, especially in Cuba, diminished Americans' national pride. So did the growing alienacion ofAmerican )"OUth and a technological breakthrough b)•the Soviet Union.

!pcaii F'"l'fst man-mack

l

5iUl'Uitr to orbit tbr tarth; bunched by S!wicot Union

Prima:ry Source: Wonder Why We're Not Keeping Pace?

O n Occober 4, 1957, che Soviet Union Launched the 6rs.t artificial satellite, Sputnik (.. Litd e Trai,!'C)er'"). Wcighing 184 pounds and only rwenty·rwo inches in diameter, it circled che eanh at eighteen thousand miles per hour. When Sputnik II, carrying a dog. "''e nt inco a more distant orbit on November 3, critics said chat EisenhO""-~r had allowed a "technological Pearl Harbor."' The EisenhO""--er administration disparaged the Soviet achie"'ement but behind the scenes pushed to ha\'e che American Vanguard missile readied to launch a sacel· lite. On December 6, wich millions watching on TV, Vanguard rose six free into the air and exploded. Newspapers wrote of America's "f1opnik.'" Eisenho\1/Cr didn' t laugh. Instead he more than doubled the fu nds for missile: development to $5.3 billion in 1959. He also established the Science Advisory Com· mittec, whose recommendations led co creacion of the Nacional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in july 1958. By decade's end, the United Stace:s had launched several space probes and successfully tesce:d the: Atlas interconcine:ntal bal· listie missile (ICBM). Spurred b)•Spumik, Americans em barked on a crash program to imprM'e Ameri· can education. l 'he: National Defense Education Act ( 1958) for the 6rs.t rime pro· vided dirocc federal funding co higher education, especial!)' co impro\'t: che teaching of the sciences, machematics, and forcign languages. Far more: funds went to uniw r· sity research to ensure national security. America no"'' banked on higher education to ensure national security. The num· ber of college students skyrocketed from 1.5 million in 1940 to 3.6 million by 1960. Thac )'eat, the: gO'V\'.rnment funneled S 1.5 billion co universities, a hundredfold in· crease m~r 1940. linked directly to the Cold War, this hike in educational spending raised unsecding questions. By 1960 nearly a chird of scientists and engineers on uni· versity faculties worked full rime on gm-ernment research, primarily defense projects. Some: obscn-ers feared that a military-industrial· educational complex was emerging.

Few adulrs considered the implications of affluence: fo r the }"Oung or the: consequences of having a generation of tcena~rs who could stay in school instead of working. Few thought abouc che effects of gro"'1ng up in an age "'>hen traditional values, su ch

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as thrift, had declining relevance among )'OUth ~Aith the leisure and money to shape their own subculture. And despite talk of togetherness, fathers were often too busy co gi\'t: chcir children much attention, and mothers sometimes spenc more time: chauffeuring adolescents chan listening to them. Much of ~Afiat adulcs knew about t«na~rs they learned from the: mass media, which focused on che sensational and the super6dal. Accouncs ofjui,!'Cnile: d elinquency abounded, por· cra)ing high schools as war zones, ciry streets as jungles, and teenagers as zip-gun-armed hoodlums. In truth, t«nage crime: barely incre-ased. Buc male: teenagers sporting black-leather mocorcycle: jackets, their hair slicked into «duck tails;'' aroused adult alann. Too, young Americans embraced rock and roll. In 1952 Cleveland radio hose Alan Fr«d, ha\ing obsen o-e:d white t«nagers dancing to rhythm-and-blues records by black performers, started a new radio pro· gram, "Moondog's Rock and Roll Party,'" to play«race music.'" In 1954 Freed took the popular program to New York, creating a nacional craze for rock and roll. White performers transformed black rhychm and blu~ with its heavy beat and suggestive lyrics, into "1bp Ten" rock and roll. In 1954 Bill Haley and the: Comets dropped some: of the sexual allusions from Joe Turner's "-Shake, Rattle, and Roll,'" added countr}'· In 1956 Eltk P!'l'sley *rr'ockl'u:d to rock-' n'·roll KMC!om. and·W\'.Stem guitar riffs, and produced the 6rst maHil wild, rebellious style C;:!p O\':ltcd young 3udicnc:C:$.. jor ~Afiite rock-and-roll hit. When Haley perfonne:d Girls scre3med :~nd f:..inted, 3nd boys tried to imit:..tc t.is "Rock Around the: Clock" in 11Jt Bldckbodrd Jundt, a gyr:~ti:ng hips.. 1955 lilm about juvenile delinquency, man}' parents linked rock and roll with disobedience and crime. Red-huncers saw it as a communist plot to corrupt youth. Segregationiscs claimed it was a piO)•.. to mix the races.'" l"s)'chiatrists feared it was ..a communicable: disease:" Some churches condemned ic as ..che devil's music:" Elvis Preslt:)' confirmed the worst fears. Born in 1Upelo, Mississippi, Elvis EMs Jll'esley rodt aod toll s:ingr;r bdO'*Td melded the l'r:ncecostal music of his boyhood with che po'l'-'erful beat and sexual en· among fOOilFr Arntriuru in ergyof rhythm and blues. In songs like "Hound Dog" and ..All Shook Up" he: seemed the 19505 to proclaim t«nage ..separateness.'" l'resley•s smirking lips and bucking hips shocked white middle-class adults. The more adults condemned rock and roll, che more teen· agers lo\o-e:d it. Record sales tripled between 1954 and 1960, and Dick Clark's Ameri· can Bandstand became the decade's biggest TV hit.

I

'""'"'ppi.l><>rn

In other genres, teens elevated rebellious characters like James Dean in Rebel \Vithout If Cause (1955) to cult starus for 0\WWrning respectable: mores. They delighted in Mt~d magazine's ridicule of lhe phony and pretentious in middle-
Portents of Change:

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660

OfAPlER l7

i\MEIUCA.AT MJO·CEI«<JI~Y, tj$1"-~0

lells l9SOs pottJ ;and writcon

customized cheir cars to reject Detroit's standards. All "''ere signs of their distinctive:· ness from the adult world. Nonconformist "''liters known as che Beats expressed a more: fundamental re:· \'Oit against middle-class society. In works like Allen Ginsberg's Hou1 (1956) CHECKI NG I N and j ack Kero uac's On tJJe Ro.:.u/( 1957), t he Beats scorned t he conformity and materialism of "square" America. They romamidzcd society's outcasts and The laum h o f Ruu:ia'J SpHhlilt :~atd· l it~ JpuiTtd c:r;uh pcogramJ in :~pace• glorifi ed uninhibited sexuality and spontaneity in the search for "It,.. the ul· re~tarch and «\'i'rt channt.led some admiring college youth cook up the Beat message. They re:ad poctr}' into cduc.uion; go""nmtnt·fundtd re~tarch thrtat<."OC'd to dominate' and listened to jazz, and some students t:\'en protested capital punishment and demonstrated against t he continuing im'i:scigacions of t he House Un· Rod: and roll took ant~r :~ugt in American Activities Committee. Ochers decried the nud ear·arms race. In ttll."n mw:ic, widc-ning a gi'O\\·ing rift 1958 and 1959 t housands parcidpated in Youth Marches for Integrated bct\\'i'C'n tctnagtr~ and their partnt.J.. Schools in Washington. Together with che Beats and rock music,. this vocal ElviJ Prult)' btnmt tht :~rmbol of ttii."O rtbC"Uion and th~ focu:~ of minority of t he "silent generation" heralded a youth mOV\'.ment char wo uld partntil ck~pair. explode in the 1960s.

l

who cririciud Amt:rian mattrilli,;:m

Nonconformi't writtr~ C'alkd "Beau'' btgan to que:~tion Am«ic.m cultu "' and :~ociccy.

Chapter Su 0 0\YNI.OAO THE

MPJ AUDI O A LE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

LISTEN TO IT O N THE GO .

Whot domestic policies support the notion ofEisenhower as a centrist or

I

moderate politician? {pofJ! 639)

EiscnhO\Irw refused to descend to McCarthy's levcl. Instead, he gave the Senator enough rope to hang himself, which he did in che televised Army· McCarthy hearings. The prrsident nl'\'er publicly supported the Bro,.,. decision, which declared segregated schools to be unconstitutional However, resistance to Hnntm in Little Rock forced him co use ftderal po""·er to achie\'i: integration t here. Ovuall, integration made litde progress in the South. Major civil rights legislation emerged fro m Congress in 1957 and 1960, suggesting a changing federal attitude to"'':lrd mce issues..

KEY TERMS

D11ight D.wid Eis<>nh.,._ (p. 6J9) ta~ Warren (p. 641) Brown v. Boord ofEdJKoOOn of li!peto (p. 642) Soothom ManilostD (p. 642) John Fo.W. Dulles (p. 64J) domino lhoory (p. 645) National liboralioo Fror< (NLF) (p. 645)

SUez cri!is (p. 645) Eis<>nhower Doctrine (p. 646) mlitary-industrial complex (p. 646)

l

in what ways did Eisenhower continue 7i'umon•s foreign policy, and in

SUnbl!lt (p. 651}

what ways did he cha11fj! i t? (pof!' 643)

baiYf boom (p. 651)

CX:spite t he hacd·line rhetoric ofjohn Foster Dulles, Eiscnh~w followed a moderate, nonconfroncational policy in dealing "''it h che Soviet Union. Armed

Dr. S....min Spock (p. 652)

C HAPTEitSUMMAJn'

connict dun-ed toScMc-:t and Amtncan •diems• in thr 1bird Wodd, wbetr Lhc domino thtoty ltd the lJmttd Stat~ to detpt:c im'Oimnmt in Vimwn. Tbt Sutz Ctbu undnhned the \'OI.uik md dangerous tutll1't of M•&Ut f...uum pohnc:s., and tht fUUlt~ng Eutnh<Mu Doctrintrommitud the Utttaf Sc.ue~ to ttSasnng SeMel anBumtt 10 tbt crpon.

W11ar ,.,. 1M ""'m JOVtm, and ronseqvenas, oftcOnomic f'ID'P'ni:J

I

in tilt 1950sl(;<>11641)

Adteadc: of1wu.incd prosperity gcn• in p;t.ct from m:t.UM ftdtnl spending. much of U llnkrd to dcf'cnst. The computer indusuy began to develop u busl· ness :and govtmftW':nt took up the nl!'w cechnology. Union nw:mbe15hip Ja~d. CM•mg ro pcospcctty. automouion, and cht: increasing proporrion of AmctKIUU ..oocking in whlrc-collar posttions. l'he suburbs boomed, a.s did rhe Sun belt.

661

llllr r..rwm (p. 652) IWI'm(p.. CJ&) Marlilll* ~ k (p. CJ&) IJriiOIIO Pt (p. &59} s..ts(p.660}

How actJJrote is the imoge ofthe 1950s as a pen·od ofcons.ervtntsm ond conformityl (f>'l!t 651)

I

1'hr baby boom put n=ncw«i emphasis on the family and lrd ro the cxaltl· don of mocherhood u a 'VI'Onun's prindpal role; "'rogt:rht:m~· blossomed,

Org.lnl.u-d tdJgjon Roun.dttd, as rud t'Y.angdir.alism. Tdniston b«:ame tht dominant med.tum, cmphui.nng contonnicy and consumtrism whtk du.npng pobna >nd ,.onlbmns "
l

lnMiatS<_...,.IM,.IWoAnt
Btnnr:h the Jhtcn or tht •afRumt sociuy- lly JKM1tY and majot sod.al problmu that Am~nc:uu g_tnt1'lllly tcitd ro ignoa. M.my of dw pooc mrwnrd tr:appaj 1n dtc:.tylng Clttn. Encrgizrd by rht Montgomt"ty bus boyrort, the dvtl· tighrll movnnmc g;amcd a dynamic ltadec in M.utin Lutht't King. Jt. Hbpank · Amerians and N.at:ivc Americans continut"d to srruggle.

What ocllons by minorities andyot~th fOretold the movements for social the 1960s? (page 658)

I

chant~ t~ co,. In

1'hr So\•lcl lJnion'1 ~uccwfullaunch of the Sp.wmik sardlitt shalutcd Amt,.. k J.n complacency. In ttsponsc, tht gml'cnme:m funneltd v.ur sunu lmo the Amrtican .s-puc prosr.un and mto education and univusiry rut:arch. A nrw kind of music, rock :tnd roll, cmcrscd- to idc:ntif)' a rcmagc subculrutt .Rpat1lt from JW'CilfS: • Elva the IJco:Ms• btamr: tht symbol of tttn ttbeUion and p.t.tm• W dtsJWt In rhnc nonronfonnist writings. tht Buts opt:nly qua~10Md Amr:,. .an mmtUJJ>m >nd JC-nnl rod; >nd roll in laying dx fotmd.ttion fot
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CHAPTER 28

1960-1968

CHAPT5R PRl:VIEW

-

is-

The ~nnedy P.-.cy. 1960-1963

To We cxttnt dHJ tM ~ ftdm;lfistnrtioll~s

-mod n/1«1

rlwtcric?

-

The5tnq:<lorlllacUqualiy.l961-1968 ...,., ... ..,............. •nd imnso(dlo dvil-rig!ttJ mowmMt P'om 1961 to 1968?

-

Liberalism As<endonl, 19GJ-J968 How did Lj•ndonjoltttUM\ Gnor Sode~ progrom exempli{/ "'• n11w libtra6sm ofthe 1960s?

-

Voices of Protest How dJ 1960s' Nbrmh'tm tJ{ftct tm'noritie.und

ltftii!C! ftOlllV:aibble dbe IO oopyrighiiUn&:hORII

WMlfll, tJnd viet wnsl

-

The lil
HowN Km-'f""'Jt>luowodnpm_,_ i1 oJ owntM ,......,.;,. Vtrlltcft!

0

n

t:~:bru:uy 1. 1960, four African·

AmcrtC.'U1 srudcms at North Caro· lina. AgricuJtur.aJ and 1~chnical CoUege in Grttruboro soar down at tht: lunch countu

tOt- cof· ftt .and dou&hnua. Wbm lht: ·~tn'SS an· nounad. "'Wt don't SU'\'\" rolomi hnY.• tfwo srudmts mn.Unf'd 5Ut·rd. .itzying until dle stort: dosed. By rht md of the •ttk. hun· at dv &ocal \l'oolwonh's :and :ub d

dred.s of srudmcs had joined the iolt· ln. R)' April 1960. sit-ins hoad

rfil

n. Icon >Mil direc1 you 10 lhe lll'ebsile

~ whore you can Prepare tor Cla&s, lmprOYe Your Grade, and Me lhe Test www.eqegt.comlhistory/boyet/ enduringconche&e

662

Jpte:td to sevt:nry~ight soutlxm communirin., and by Septembtr 1961 JOme seventy thousand African·American srudt:nts had tar· gctcd srgrtgated restaurants, d u u'Chrs, beaches, libraries, and movie 1hc:uen. Greensboro's civic leaden gn ulgingly allowed blacks to s it down at restaurants and be: served.

I nn KEMtOY~E.SIOENCY,•96o-•!t6J

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The sit-ins transformed che struggle for black equality and hd ped redefine liberalism. In managing the economy, liberals now placed greater cmpha.Us on cqualiz· ing opport unity and targecing benefits to chose: who had been ignored. liberalism was also redefined by others, including Ralph Nader, who sounded the alarm that many aucomobiles were "-unsafe at any speed"; Betty Friedan, who wrote The Feminine M)'flique to denounce ..the housc""ife trap".: and students "'tho protested whac t ht:)' sa"'' as an immoral war in Vietnam.

These: cndea\'Ors symbolized a spirit of new beginnings. The idealism of the young would lead ntan}' to embrace j ohn F. Kennedy's New Frontier and to rally behind Lyndon Johnson's Grear Society. Boch liberal administrations' rhetorical emphasis on social change and activism would generate fer\!'Cnc hopes and lofty expectations. Buc assassinations of cherished leadcrs, ongoing racial strife, and a deepening quagmire in Vietnam \N'Ould dampen optimism, ~Ailile a rcaccion b}• the majority ~Ailo opposed far-reaching change: \N'Ould curtail reform. A decade char began ~Aith bright promise would end in discord and disillusionment.

THE KENNEDY PRESIDENCY, 1960-1963 To what extent did the ~nnedy 4dministration's domestic record reflect its liberr1l rhetoric? l'rojeccing an image ofroutb and vigor, john F. Kennedy personified the selfconfident liberal who bdiew:d char an acthi st state could improve life at home and confront che communist challenge: abroad. His wealchy father, joseph P. Kenned)', seethed ~Aith ambicion and instilled in his sons a passion to cxcd and co attain polit· ical po~Au. Despite a severe back injury, john Kenned}' served in the navy in World War II, and t he elder Kcnned}' persuaded a popular nm-elist to write articles lauding John's heroism in rescuing his crew after their PT boac had been sunk in the South Pacific. Esteemed as a ~A'llr hero, john Kenned}' used his charm and his father's conneccions co ~Ain election in 1946 to che House of Representatives from a Boston district where he had nevcr lived. Although Kennedy earned little distinction in Congress, Massachusetts voters sent him to t he Senate in 1952 and ~rwh elmingly redecced him in 1958. Br chen he had a beautiful wife, jacqueline, and a Pulirur Prize for Profill!s in Courag ( 1956}, ~A'fitcen largd }' by a staff member. Despite the obstacle of his Roman Catholic faith, che popular Kenned}' won a first·ballor victory ac che 1960 Democratic convention. just fo rty·rwo rears old, he sounded t he theme of a Ne~A' Frontier co «get America moving again" b)t liberal acti\'· ism at home and abroad.

John F.

I

""'•NJ lSm p=i·

dentoftbt Unittd Stat~"~~; Cold Warrior who projrcnd )'OUthful d)-n.unism

"All at once )'OU had something exciting,"' recalled a Uni· \'ersity of Nebraska scudent. ..You had a guy who had little kids and ~Ailo liked co pia}' football on his front lawn. Kcnned}' was talking about pumping new life into the nation and steering it in new diroccions." Bur most voters, middle-aged and middle class, wanted the stability,

New Beglnnin&

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6 64

Mip 28.1

security, and continuation of Eisenhower's «middle: wa}"" that the: Republican candidate:, Vice !'resident Richard M. Nixon, promised. Although scorned by liberals for his McCanhyism, Nixon ~A'llS better k no~A'tl and more experienced than Kennedy, ide:nti· 6e:d wich the still-popular Ike:, and a Protestant. Nixon fumbled his oppon:unity, agreeing co meet Kennedy in cc:lcvised debates. More chan 70 million cuned in co the 6rsc televised debate: be:· tween presidential candidates-a broadcast chat st· cured the dominance of television in American policies. Nixon, swearing visi bly, appeared haggard and insecure; in striking contrast, che tanned, tde:ge:nk Democrat radiated con6de:nce. Radio listeners called the: debate: a draw, but television viC""--ers declared Kennedy the: victor. He shoe up in che polls, and Nixon nc\-er reco\-ercd. so~~ 0.1 Kennedy also be:ne6ced from an economic recession in 1960 and from his choice of a southern The 9edion of 1960 Protestant, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. johnson, as his running mace. Still, the: election was the: closest since 1884. Only 120,000 \'Otes separated the: two candidates. Kennedy's religion cost him millions of popular votes, but the Cath· olic \'Ote in chc closely contested midwestern and northeastern states de:liw~red crucial Electoral College vo t~ enabling him to squeak ro victory (sec Map 28. 1). Kennedy's inauguration sct the: tone of a ne:~A' era: "the: torch has been passed co a new generation of Americans:'' In sharp contrast to the: EiscnhO""-~r administra· tion's reliance on businessmen (sec Chapter 27), Kennedy surrounded himsdfwith liberal incellcccuals. Kennedy seemed more: a celebrity chan a politician. Aided by his ~Aife:, he adorned his presidency with che trappings of culture: and excellence, inviting distinguished artists to perform at the White: House and studding his speeches ~Aith quotations from Emerson. Awed by his grace: and wit, the media extolled him as a vibrant leader and adoring husband. The public knew nothing of his fragile health, frequent usc of mood-altering drugs to relie\'e pain, and extramarital affairs.

Media images obscured Kennedy's lackluster domestic record. lhc: conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats that had stifled Truman's Fair Deal doomed the: New Frontier. Lacking the votes, Kennedy rarely pressed Congress for social legislation. JFK made stimulating economic growth his domestic priority. lb chat end, he combined higher defense expenditures ~Aith investment incentives for pri\•atc: enter· prise. In 1961 he persuaded Congress to boost the defense budget 1>)•20 percent. He vasd)' in creased America's nuclear stockpile and strengthened the military's cono.~n · tional forces. Kennedy also convinced Congress to 6nance a ..race to the moon,"

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665

Si-ins lo proleSI ~regolion ~n: John F. Kennedy elected pn!Sid
which Americans ~A'Oul d ~A'in in 1969 ar acosc of more than $25 billion. Mo.sc impor· candy, Kennedy took his liberal ad\'isers' Keynesian advice to call for a huge cut in corporace taxes that would greatly increase che de6cic buc ~A'Ould presumably pro· vide capital for business to invest, stimulating che cconom}' and thus increasing tax revenues. When the Kennedy presidency ended cragically in NO'V'ember I 963, the proposed tax cut was botded up in Congress, but JFK's economic program had doubled the race of economic gro~A'th, decreased unemployment, and held inflation at 1.3 percem a }'car. The United States was in che midsc of its longest uninterrupted economic expansion. The boom would both cause furcher ecological damage and provide the affluence thac enabled Americans to care abouc cheenvironment. 1'he fallout scare of the 1950s raised questions about the ~A'Cil·being of the planet. The publication in 1962 of Rachel Carson's Sill!nt Spring (sec Chapter 27) intensified concern. Additional!}', with postwar prosperity, man}' Americans ~A'Cre concerned less ~A'ith increased production and more with the quality of life. In 1963 Congress passed a Clean Air Ace, regulating automotive and industrial emissions. After decades of heedless pollution, Washington hesitantly began to address environmencal problems.

In his inaugural address Kennedy proclaimed., ""-OC shall pay any price, bear any burden, ... oppose any foe: to assure the survival and success of liberry;'' He launched a major military buildup and surrounded himsdf>A'ith Cold Warriors >Atho shared his belief thac American security depended on superior force and che willingness to use it. At the same time, he gained congressional backing for economic assiscance to Third

Cold War AdMS81

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\l1orld councries to councer che appeal of communism. The Peace Corps, created in

1961, exemplified the New Frontier's liberal anticommunism. By 1963 6\'f: thousand llt-ace Corps volunteers W'Cre serving two·)'eat stints as teachers, sanitation engineers, crop spe
In mid·October 1962, aerial photographs revealed that the Soviet Union had builc bases for intermediate·range NlldearWir nuclear missiles in Cuba, capable of striking most U.S. soil. Smarcing from the Bay of Pigs disaster and believing his credibility at stake, Kennedy responded forcefully. In a somber televised address he announced that the United Scates \l'OUid «quarantine'" Cuba-impose a naval blockade- to prewm ddiv· ery of more missiles and '"-'OUld dis man de by force the missiles already in Cuba if the Soviet Union did noc do so. The world held its breach. The two superpoW'Crs appeared co be on a collision course tO\l'ard nuclear ~A'llr. SO\'ict technicians worked feverishly to complete the mis· sile launch pads, and Soviet missile·carr}'ing ships steamed toward the blockade; B·52s armed ~A'ith nuclear weapons took to the air, and nearly 250,000 troops as· sembled in Florida to invade Cuba. Secretary of State Dean Rusk reported, "We're eyeball co eyeball."' "'I think the other fellow just blinked;'' a relieved Rusk announced on October 25. Kennedy receio.-ed a message fro m Khrushchev promising co remove che missiles if the United States pledged never to invade Cuba. As Kenned}' prepared to respond posicivdy, a second, more bdligercnc message arrived from the SO\i et leader insist· ing that American missiles be withdra~A'tl from Turkey as pare of the deal. Hours later, an American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shoe down over Cuba. Robert Ken· nedy persuaded his brocher to accept the 6rst message and simply ignore the second

To 1111 Brink of

one. In the early morn ing hours of Occober 28, Khrushchev pledged to remove t he missiles in return for Kennedy's nonim•asion promise. Less publicly, Kennedy Later remow:d U.S . missiles from Turkey. Onl)' in januar}' 1992 were che full dimensions of the: crisis m-ealed: SoYiet forces in Cuba had possessed thirty·six nuclear warheads and nine: tactical nuclear weapons fo r battle6eld use. Soviet 6eld commanders had independenc a uthority to use chem. Worst of all, Kennedy did not know that the Soviets alrcad)' had t he ability to launch a nuclear strike from Cuba. C hastened by coming so dose to che brink of nuclear war, Kennedy and Khrush· chev installed a telephone «hot line" so chac che two sides could communicate in· scantly in future crises and then agrCf:d to a t reary outlawing annospheric and undersea n uclear testing. These: efforts signaled a new phase of che Cold War, Lacer called dhence (day·TAHNT), in which t he superpowers mo\·ed from confrontation to negotiation. Concurrendy, che Cuban missile: crisis escalated che arms race by convincing boch sides of t he need for nuclear superiority.

, . . . tnissJe uUU

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man.ship ~~m the- Unittd SUt.e:c .and Soviet Union <M"l' nueklt miJ~Sik:c in Cuba in 1962 tbat otMiy ltd eo nueklt•w

On Novcmber 22, 19 63, during a crip co 1Cxas to shore up his reelection chances, a sm iling JFK rode in an open car along Dallas streets lined ~Aith cheering crowds. Shots rang out. The president slumped, dying, his skull and chroat shattered. Soon after, aboard Air Rln::e One, L)'tldon B. johnson 'A'a.S sworn in as president. Grief and disbelief numbed the nacion as most Americans spent che next four days in from of their television sets staring at replays of the murder of accused assa.s· sin Lee Harvey Oswald; at the somber state funeral, wich t he small boy salucing his father's caskct; ac che grieving famil)' lighting an eternal flame ac Arlington Na tional Cemetery. Few who watched would forget. Kennedy had helped make TV central to politics; now, in death, it made him the fal len hero·king of Camelot. The assassination made a martyr ofJFK. The public ranked him as o ne of t he \'f:r}' few "great"' presidents, associating him ~Aith a spirit of energy and innM'lltion. Kenned)' loyalists haw scressed his intelligence and his ability to change and grow. His detractors, however, poinc to his unfulfilled liberal rhetoric and the d iscrepancy berwct:n his public image and his pri\'ate philander· Kenn«
lilt Thousand-Day Pnslllenty

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THE STRUGG LE FOR BLACK EQUALITY,

1961-1968 WMt wmt the major SJ«cesses and {Qihmn ofthe civil-rights mowm8nt from 1961 to 1968? Following the: lunch-
In the: spring of 1961, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) organized a ..freedom ride" through the Deep South to dramatize the flouting of a 1960 Suprem e Court edict banning segregation in interstate transportation facilities. It aroused white wrath. Mobs beat the freedom riders in Anniston, Alabama, burned a bu~ and mauled the protestors in Binningham. Yct o nl)' after fu rther assaulrs on the fr«:· dom riders in Montgomery did Kennedy deploy federal marshals to restore: peace. And onl)' after scores more freedom rides and the arrests of hundreds of protesters did the president prod che Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce: the law. O nl)' crisis, not moral suasion, forced Kcnned)' ro act. Many of the freedom riders were members of the: Student Nonviolent Coordi· nating Committee: (SNCC), formed in April 1960 b)• participants in the sit·ins. SNCC stressed both the nonviolent civil disobedience strategy of Martin Luther King.Jr., and the need to stimulate local, grass--roots activism . In fall 1961, it chose: Alban)', Georgia, as the: site of a campaign to desegregate public facilities. Wily local authorities avoided the O\'ert violence that had won the freedom riders national S)'tllpathy. In the absence of federal inten -ention, the Albany mO\'mlent collapsed. But the lesson had been learned by d vil·righrs leaders. It had noc been learned by southern whites. An angry mob rioted in fall 1962 when a federal court ordered the UniV\'.rsity of Mississippi to enroll james Meredith, a black air force veteran. Rallying behind Confederate flags, trouble-makers attacked the federal marshals who escorted Meredith to ..Ole Miss." The d ash left two dead, hundreds injured, and the campus shrouded in tear gas. Federal troops 6nall)' re:· stored order and upheld Meredith's righc co attend the university of his home state.

Namtolence and VIolence

so.leotllotMoleot ,_,..a.c """""""

Youth ~uxili»y of'the lm»dt:r civil rightJ' mc.wt"mrnt; im'OI'A'id in n.Jiie1, Jit..in~ and l'Oter ~uationdtM-:c

Mlrtin Luttw IG-r. Jr. &prise: ministtr whmie kadt:ubip tplwni.ud the modem,~ roou doil rights rlloCM'rnC'nt in tbt 19601:

Primary Source: Hosing OO'II't'l Civil-Rights Oemonstr.UotS

As television co\-erage brought mounting numbers of

The Altkan-American African·Americans into the suuggte for racial cquality, ci...il· ltvGIItlon

righrs leaders pressured Kenned)' to intervene. Disman· dingsegregation piecemeal would take generations, they realized.: onlycomprehensh-e national legislation, backed by the pG""Cr of the federal g01o•ernment, could guaran· tee full citizenship for African·Americans.10 get this they needed a crisis that ·would outrage the conscience of the white majority and force the president's hand.

Determined to e:xpose che violent extremism of souchern racism, Marcin Lucher King, Jr.• launched nonviolent marches, sit-ins, and pra)'·ins in Birmingham. Alabama. The most rigidly segregated big city in America, Binning· ham•s officials had t:\'en remo'led a book from the librar}' I thac fcarured ~Ailite and black rabbits. Few doubted Police Commissioner Eugene «Bull,. Connor's pledge that «blood would run in the streets of Birmingham before it "-"OUid be integrated... In Ma)', thousands of schoolchildren joined King's crusade. 1'hebigoced Connor lost his temper. He unleashed his men- armed wich eloccric catde prod~ high-pressure: wacer hoses, and snarling attack dogs- on the nonviolent demonstrators. lhe ferocity of Connor's attack~ caughc on camera and television, horrified che u-orld. When jailed for instigating che march, King penned the «Letter from Bir· mingham jaiL'" Jc detailed the humiliacions of segregation and justified civil disobedience to protest unjust laws. "l'he civil-rights mo\'tmenc should thank God fo r Bull Connor," JFK remarked. "He's helped it as much as Abraham Lincoln.'" Kennedy arranged a behind-the-scenes com· promise e:nding che Binningham demonstrations in re:curn Billlincraam. 1961 for desegregating stores and upgrading the status of Prnident Kenl\otdy s~id thQ photogr.2ph of ~n African-American ~A'Orkers. B}' mid-1963 the rallying cr}' A&ic~n·Am~ric;~n b~ing ~tn~kl'd by~ pol.ic:e "Frct:dom NotA'!" 1\.'Vt:rbtrated across the nation as the pro· dog during the protest demonstr.u:ions in Birming· tests gn.."""'· lncre:asingl}' concerned abouc America•s image h:un m~de him '"'s.ick." It helped g~v:~niu thoe abroad, Kennedy feared chac, if the federal go\-emment n:uion's c:onKi~nc:e, le;~~d ing Kennedy to submit did not lead che wa}' toward "-peaceful and construccilll!" ~ comp rehensi\1\': ci~l·rights. bill to Congress.. changes in race relations, blacks "'-auld rurn to milicanc)'. According!)', when Alabama go\'ttnor Gt:orge Wallace: in june 1963 refused to allow two African-American scudents to encer the Uni'lersicy of Alabama, Kenned}' forced Wallace to capiculate to a court desegregation order. On j une II,JFK went on television to define civil rights as "a moral issue" and to assert that "race has no place in American life or latA•.'" Describing the plight of blacks in jim Cro~A' America, he asked, "Who among us "'-auld be content to ha\'t the color of his skin changed and stand in his place? Who among us would chen bt con· tent ~Aith che counsels of pacience and d elay?" A week Lacer, Kennedy proposed a comprehensive civil-rights measure-which most mem bers of Congress ignored.

l'o compel Congress to act, ncarl}' 250,000 Americans converged on the Capitol on August 28, 1963. There they heard che ringing \N'Ords of Martin Luther King. Jr.• pro· claiming that he had a dream of brotherhood, of freedom and juscice, a dream that "all of God's children, black men and ~A•hite men,j e'I'-'S and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, ~Aill be able to join hands and sing in the ~A
Tilt Mardi 011 w.sblntton. 1963

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Neither Kennedy's nor King's eloquence could quell the anger of "''hite racisrs. O n the night of che president's address, Medgar Evers, the head of che Mississjppi branch of the National Association for the Ad\•ancement of Colored People, "''lls murdered by a sniper in Jackson. In September the bombing of a black church in Birmingham killed four girls. And still, southern obstruccionism kept the civil·rights bill stymied in Congress, wich little hope of passage.

CMII;,hts Ad M~or ltgi..sla. rioo tbat c:rtaml Equal Emplay. meot Opporllmity CommiPion

I

Kennedy's ass.assination brought to the W hite House a southerner, Lyndon Johnson, who knew he had to prow~: himselfon the race issue or the liberals ..would get me ... I had to produce a dvil righrs bill that was even scronger than the one che}•'d haw~: got· ten if Kennedy had lived." The resulting Civil RJghts Act, the most signi6cant dvil·righrs law in U.S. his· tory, banned racial d iscrimination and segregation in public accommodations. lt outlawed bias in federally funded programs, granced che federal go'lernmenc new powers to fight school segregation, and creaced the Equal Employmenc Opporcunicy Commission (EEOC) co enforce a ban on job discriminacion on che basis of race, re· ligion, national origin, or gender. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not address che right to \'Ote. So CORE and SNCC activists, believing thac the ballot box held the key to poW'Cr for southern black~ mounted a major campaign to register black \'Otcrs. They organized the Mis· sissippi Freedom Summer Project of 1964 co focus on the state most hostile co black righrs. O ne thousand college-student \'Oiuncecrs assisted blacks in regiscering co vote and in organizing «f reedom Schools" char taught black hiscory and empha· sjzed African·American self-worch. Harassed b}• Mississippi law enfon::emenc offi· d ais and Ku Klux Klansmen, the voluncecrs endured chc 6rebombing of black churches and civil·righrs headquarters as well as arrests and C"t'e n murders. The dvil·righrs "''Orkers enrolled nearly sixty thousand disfranchised blacks in the Mississippi Freedom Oemocracic Party (MFDP). In August 1964, they took chcir case co the national Democratic com-emion. But despite stirring testimony from ac· tivists like Fannie Lou Hamer, the MFDI' was not seated. Rejecting Johnson's offer of cwo open delegate seats as a ..token" gesture, the disillusioned members of the MFDP walked out of the convention. Determined to win a scrong \'Oting·rights law, the SCLC organized mass pro· tests in Selma, Alabama, in March 1965. Blacks were half the population of Dallas County, where Selma was locaced, but only 1 percent were registered to \'Ote. Selma county sheriffJim dart's men actacked black protesters and bystanders indiscrimi· nate!}• and brutally. Sho"''Ca.sed on TV, the attacks pro\'Oked nacional outrage and increased su pport for a vocing rights bill. Signed by the presidcnc in August, chc Voting Rights Act invalidated che usc of any tesc or device to deny the voce and authorized federal examiners to register \'Ot· ers in states chac had disfranchised blacks. The Vocing Rights Act of 1965 dramati· cally expanded black suffrage, boosting the number of registered black \'Otcrs in the: Souch from 1 million in 1964 co 3.1 million in 1968, and transformed southern poli· tics (sec Map 28.2). The number of blacks holding office in the South s\1/CIIed from fc\l-er chan ~'0 dozen co nearly ~·eto.·e hundred by 1972. l 'hat meant jobs for African·Americans,

POIIOirt:qJOI 81i1Ck Vel~ Pq!IIIU:tl Rlq$~

C lf'l'ci.YettlgRpAdoi i;.;S

D •'"'

Mop 28.2 Voter Rtgistratioo of Alri
former $-egreptionist potitici:.ns,

;unong them George W;~.ll:~ce, KMted t o court the A&iG~n ·AtneriG~n vote, :.nd m;~.ny southern whitu bepn to c;m their b;~.llou for Rc-pubti· c;~.ns, in.:augur.uing ;u~ er:. of 1'\":al two·p:.rty competition in the South.

l ll6' l'Ml:l'll'f40u!t! Am;trlm;rt ~lilal'$11'10 p:tiiU 1"1 llllldtr15 1:t IOIIO'M Ollt ll.

1Gr6' 0.11 Rlf!IS Atl ~IS t4 U.S. lat:mf(9'1Nillll0 9JII'.W!~II'IIIr\1!1 10vetO#l'll 115lolljlitlll$ iflJFIO Ertp.,m;nt OJpor);lloty CCttmWcn

@

lnteracti\•e Map:

African Americans and the Southern Vote. 1960-1971

IGr&S VOI!'Q Af!IS Atl proi'CIIS lbllt:'f $!lSI$, P'O"t::in lof ~"' ~ 10 Gl'lletl tlldS lh:9llf 1:11!:11:1 betfl '101119 Wid OJII!'NS ~~OI&c!etQ!f!tril!llgcr'lctrg.

contracts for black businesses, and improvements in facilities and services in black nd ghborhoods. Mosc importantly, as Fannie: lou Hamer recalled, when African· Americans could noc vote, "whice: fulks would d rive past )'OUr house: in a pickup truck ~Aith guns hanging up in the back and giiJ'C )'OU hate stares. . .. 1"'hose same people now call me: Mrs. Hamer."'

The dvil·rights movement changed, but did not rl!\rolu· tioniu, race: relations. It ended legal segregation and broke the monopoly on political power in the South held b)' whites. The: movement raised hopes for che possibilit)' of greater change. But its in· abilit)' to transfonn equality of opporrunit)' into equality of results underscored the limitacions of liberal change:. especialI)' in the: urban ghe:tro. The mo'lement did not bring African·Americans economic equality or material ~A'Cll·being. and che an~r bubbling belo~A' the: surface soon boiled 0\'Ct. On August II, 1965, lh-e da)'S after the Vocing Righcs Act had been signed, a confrontation between ~Ailite police and )'OUng blacks in Watts, the largest African· American discrict in Los Angeles, ignited the most destructive race riot in decades. For six days thousands of blacks looced shops, 6rebombed white·owned businesses, and sniped at police officcrs and 6re6ghters. When the riot ended, thir t)'·four people W\'.re dead, nine h undred injured, and four thousand arrested. The violence in 1965 pro'led to be just a prelude to a succession of«Jong hot summers."' In summer 1966 riocing erupted in more chan a score of northern ghe:t· tos, fordng ~Ai'!ites co heed the: squalor of the slums and the savage: behavior of police

Fin In tile Streets

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in the ghctco-problems that the civil-rights movement had ignored. The following summer brought ncar!}' ISO racial o utbreaks and 40 riocs, che mosc intense and de· strucci\J'C period of racial violence: that the United Stares had ever witnessed. In 1968 riocs would fl are again in more than one h undred dries after the assassination of Marcin Lucher King, jr. The 1964-1968 riot toll ~Ahite backlash, LBJ ignored the commission's advice, and most ~A>hitcs appto\"td of his inaction.

For many young African·Americans, liberalism's response to racial inequality pro'led ..too litd e, too late." The de· mand fur Black Power that sounded in 1966 paralleled the fury of the urban riocs; it expressed the eagerness of militant activists for mili· tam self~efense and rapid social change. Derived from a long tradition of black na· tionalism, Black PO'I'--er owed much to the militant rhetoric and vision of Malcolm X.

-aa.ck Power"

IlliG Power Milit;a.nt mD¥~eo ment lOr black .wnmomy and

sl'lf.rnptct; rejtctrd the- goal or inttg:r;~.tion

Black Power lkjeeti.,g the f.tith long held by Afric:;u-o·Americ~ns in the u.,ittd St~tes and j ., the professed i"tc.,tions of white AmcriQ to remedy inj uuices, bt~k power advoc;ttes insisted 0t1 c0t1· trotli"g their own mo~met~t at~d inWtu Uo.,s, st.~pi "g their own agc.,da at~d pro· gr:~tns, :11\d defi.,ing their own deman
A former drug addict and screet husder, Malcolm X had converted to the Nation of Islam, or the Black Muslim faich, while in prison. Founded in Detroit in 1931 b}• Elijah Poole (who took che Islamic name Elijah Mu· hammad). the Nation of Islam insisted that blacks practice self-discipline and self-respect, and it rejected integration. Malcolm X accordingly urged African-Americans co separate themselves from the "white deYil" and co cake pride in chcir African roocs and chcir blackness. Blacks, he claimed, had co rely on armed self-defense and had to seize their freedom "by any means necessary." Malcolm X's assassination b}• members of the Nation of Islam in ~bruary 1965, after he had broken with Elijah Muhammad, did not still his voice. nJe ANtobiograplry of Malcdm X (1965) became che main text for the rising Black Po"'w mO'V\'.ment. Inspired by Malcolm X, many young, urban blacks abandoned reformist strategies and became more militant. In 1966 CORE and SNCC changed from interracial organizations committed to achieving integra· tion to all-black groups advocating racial separatism and Black l'ower. Even more militant was the Black !'anther party, organized thac )'eat, which urged black men to o ..-crchrO'W their oppressors by becoming "panthers- smiling. cunning, sdenti6c, striking b}•night and sparing no one." Violent confrontations "'ith police left some Black Panthers dead and man)' more in prison. Black I"'"-ocr advocates had a real impact on African-American life. lhcy hclped to organize self-help groups, co establish black studies programs, and to encourage African·Americans co see chat «black is beautifuL"

L IBERALISM AsCENDANT,

JFK ;t\'Oidtd
but th~ abu.Jc, ofbl.ack.s :~uking th~ir risht:~ in the South ;and dtfi.ln« of ftdtr.U authority at tht uni,\"fsitit-J of Al.lb.lltl.;l a nd Milllli:~sipp i forced him to taM aaion.

Tht rivil·righu mO\"'mtnt gain«! morMntum with tht fOunding of CORE, tht U$C' ai nonviolent pro· t~u, ;md Mart:in Luther King's ~I lia'" a Ore.lm" llpt«h.

Tht Civil R.igh u kt of 1964 rsttb· liJhtd t ht Equ:d Employment Oppocrunit)' CommU:sion, and tht Voting Right:s Art of 1965 tran:~· formtd sou thtrn polities. Rut riou :~run ntd th~ n.ltion from 1965 to 1968. Radirille;a-dtu likt Mikolm X a nd grou pllik~ t ht Bl~k P;an thtr:s tmt.rgtd to prod:Um bl~k pow!'r ;and chilltngt th~ nonvtolen t ~ing of the moo."'mtn t.

1963-1968

1-/ow did Lyndon johnson's Great Sociriy progrt~m exemplify the new Jibef'lllism ofthe 1960s? Distrusted b}• liberals as ..a Machiavelli in a Stetson," regarded as a usurper by Kenned}' loyalists, Lyndon Baines Johnson had achieved his highest ambition through the assassination of a popular president in j ohnson's home state of Texas. Although jusc nine )~ars older than Kenncd)', he seemed a relic ofche past. a backroom wheder~ealer as crude as his predecessor was smooth. Vee johnson had substantial political assecs. He had served in Washington al· mosc continuously since 1932, accruing enormous experience and a dose associa· tion wich cheCapitol Hill power brokers who helped pass bills. He excelled at wooing alii~ neutralizing opponents, forging coalitions, and achieving resulcs. johnson's 6rsc three )~ars in office demonstrated his determinacion to prove himself to liberals. He deftly handled the cransicion of power, "''On a landslide \i ctor}' in 1964, and guided through Congress che greatest arra}•of liberal lcgislacion in U.S. history, surpassing che New Deal agenda Nevertheless, LBj's swollen )~t fragile ego could not abide the sniping of Kennedy loyalists and the press. Wondering aloud, "Why don't people like me?" johnson pressed to vanquish all foes ac home and abroad.

l

... ,....... , ...

~.polooa.;

Pno:sidmt of tbr Unittd State:s: du.mpion ofciril rigllts kgisb. tion md the- ....,u on povttty"

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Ironically, in seeking consensus and affection, j ohnson would divide che nation and lea..·e office repudiated.

Calling for carl)' passage of the: tax-cut and civil·rights bills as a memorial co Kcnned)', johnson used his legislati\'e skills co good effect, winning passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (discussed earlier) and a $ 10 billion tax-reduction bill, which produced a surge in capital im-escment and personal consumption that spurred economic growth and shrank the budget d eficit. More: boldly,j ohnson declared "-unconditional war on pove:tt)' in America..'" l argel)' invisible in an aftlue:m countr)', according co Michael Harrington's Tbt Otlwr AmtTicd ( 1962), some: 40 million people lived in a «culrure of pm--eny," tacking the: education, medical care, and e:mpiO)menc opporcunicie:s that most Americans cook for granted. LBJ championed a campaign to bring these .. internal exiles'" into the main· scream. Designed co offer a "hand up, noc a handout,"' the: Eco nomic Opportunity Act established the Office of Eco· nomic Opportunity to fund and coordinate a job corps co train young people: in marlau ble: skills.: VlSTA (Volunteers in Service: to America), a domestic peace corps; l'rojecc Head Start, to provide: compensator}' education for preschoolers The LBJ Treatmollt from d isadvantaged families; and an assortment of public· Not content unleu 1\e could wh ol ty domin;ate works and training programs. &iend ;as wdl ;as foe, L}"'don Johnson U$ed h'i$ S umming up his goals in 1964,j ohnson offered his vi· body ;as weU as hi$ \'Oic:e to bend othtn to t.is will sion of the GreatSodety. f irst must come: «an end co pM'· :~nd g.li:n h'i$ objtctives. e:rty and radal injustice.'" In addition, the: Great Sodety would be a place: where all children could enrich chcir .., on powrty Cmt«pitu of mind~ where people could renew their contact with nature, and where all wo uld be: 1LB]'J Gft'olt Society "-more concerned with che quality of their goals chan the: quantity of thcir goods.'" C".rNt Soc:irty LBY. dn'.lm of

Jolin- Takes OWr

I

.lfl AmC'OOn 110ciety of equality and oppommity

....,....._ """'"'

Senator ~nd Republinm wbose lo5$ in tbe 1.964 p~T.Sidmrial tltcrion unilitd c:oruti1Qtillll'$

1

Johnson's Great Society horrified the "new conservariw~~" su ch as William F. Bucklcy,jr., and the college students of Young Americans for Freedom. The most persuasi..-e critic was Arizona senator Barry Goldwater, an oucside:r fighting the: Washington estab· lishme:m, a fer-.-em anticommunist, and an ad\'OCace: of individual freedom. His op · position to big government, deficit spending, radallibe:ralism, and social·"''l'lfare: programs found recepth'l' audiences on Sunbelt golf courses and in u'Orking-dass neighborhoods. j ohnson's advocacy of civil rights frightened souchem segregationists and blue:· collar workers in northern cities who dreaded the integration of their neighbor· hoods, schools, and workp laces. l'heir support of Alabama's segregationist go\·emor

George Wallace in earl)' 1964 presidential primaries heralded a ••white backlash" against the: ciYil·rights movcmcnr. BuO)'Cd b}' this backlash, conservati\~s in 1964 gained concrol of the GOP. 1'ht:)' nominated Barry Goldwater for che presidency and adopted a platform total!)' op· posed to the new liberalism. Goldwarcre:xtolled his opposition to civil·righrs lcgisla· don and the: censure of McCarthy. He denounced the war on poverty and suggested scrapping social security, and he hinted that he might use: nuclear weapons against Cuba and Norch Yie:cnam.. Goldwater's stance appe-aled co Americans d isw.rbcd by the federal gc:wcrnmcnr's growing dedsion-making pc>"'et. His campaign slogan, "In )'OUt heart you know he•s right," allo~A'Cd his liberal opponents co quip, .. In your guts, )'OU know he's nuts." Goldwater's conservaci..-e crusade lee LBJ run as a liberal reformer but still be the more moderate candidate. LBJ and his running mate, Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, painted Goldwater as an extremist noc to be trusted ~Aith the nuclear trigger. l-Bj ~A'On a landslide viccory, 43 million voces to Gold~A'ltter's 27 million. l 'he GOP lose thirty·eight congressional and cwo senate seats. Man}' proclaimed the death of conservatism. But Goldwater's coalition of ancigMunment westerners, economic and religious conscrvacivcs, and anti· integrationist whites presaged con· sen•arism's future triumph. His candidacy transformed the Republicans from a moderate, eastern·dominaced party to one decided!}' conscrvam·e, southern, and western. It built a national base of 6nancial support for conservacivc candidates and mobilized fucure leaders of the parcy, such as Ronald Reagan. But in the short run, the liberals had a ~A
"Hurt}', boys, hurry," LBJ urged his aides. "Get that legis· fation up to the hill and out. Eighteen months from now ol' Landslide Lyndon will be Lame Duck Lyndon." john· son flooded Congress ~Aith liberal proposals, sixcy·three in 1965 alone. He got most of what he requested. The cighty·ninth Congress enlarged the war on po\-erty and passed another milestone ci\il·rights act. It enacted Medical'f: to provide health insurance for the aged under social security and a Medic.aid health plan for the poor. By 1975 the two would serve 47 million people and account for a quarter of che nation's health care expenditures. lhe legislators appropriated funds for public education and housing and for urban revitalization, and they created new departments of transportation and of housing and urban dC'\o-elopment, as ~A>cll as the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities. Of enormous future signi6cance, Congress enacted the lnu:nigradon Act of 1965, abolishing the national·origins quotas of the J920s. Annual legal immigra· cion would increase from about 2.50,000 before the act to W'CU0\'et I million, and the \'ast majority of new immigrants would come from Asia and Larin America Less than J percent of the U.S. population in 1960, Asian-Americans would be: ncarl}' 4 percent in 2000, and the Hispanic population ~A
rFf)

~ Source: ~Med1ca re

Me&c.ate

I

Gowt:mmmt htalth i.tml.:.ana lOr the tlckdy

Mediuid G"'"mmnu hulth plan for the- poor; liking with Meclinm', ~ key componrnt in

I -.I

Johnwn·s Gttat Sodety

Ad"' 1!165

Did a"ily wi d! narioml.origins quotas and incrustd kg;d immigration

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The Great Society also sought to protect the environmcm. ln 1964 Congress set aside 9.1 million acres of wilderness. lc established Redwood National Park and de:·

feared e:fforrs co dam the Colorado Rh-er and flood che lower Grand Can}'On; strmgchcne:d the Clean Water and Clean Air Acrs; and protocced endangered species. Responding to the uproar caused by Ralph Nader's re\-elacions about unsafe cars, Congress set the first federal safety standards for automobiles and required states [0 establish highway safety programs. The Great Society improw:d the lives of millions. The poor, 22 perccm of t he populacion in 1960, shrank to 13 percent in 1969. African·American family income rose from 54 percent [0 6 1 percent ofwhite family income, and [he segment ofblacks living below the poverty line plummeted from 40 pe:n::e:nt to 20 percent. But in part because johnson m-ersold che Grear Society and Congress underfunded it, liberal as· pirations outdistanced resulcs. For many in noed, the Grear Society remained more a dream chan a reality. lhewar against pow.rty was, in che words of Marrin Luther King,jr., «shot dO'I'--n on che battle· fid ds of Vietnam."' In 1966 johnson spent rw~nt)' rimes more to wa~ war in Viemam than ro fight poverty in the United Stares. Vee rhe perceived "ungratefulness" of rioting blacks "-'OUld alienate many middle· and woli
1

lhe Supreme Courc did much to promoce the: lib· eral agenda A liberal majority on the: Courc, led by Chiefjustice Earl Warren, acted to expand indi...id· ual rights to a greater extent than ever before in American hiscor}'· Kennedy appointed two liberals ro che Court, and j ohnson two more, including che Court's first black justice, lhurgood MarshalL In the resulting series of land· mark cases, the Court prohibited Bible reading and prayer in public schools, limited local po'l'-'er to censor books and films, and merrurned state bans on contraccptiw:s. It ordered states to apportion legislatures on che principle of "one person, one \'Ott,"' incrcasjng the representation of urban minorities. l 'he: Court's upholding of che rights of the accused in criminal cases, at a time of soaring crime rates, particularly incensed many Americans. Criti· dsm of che Supreme Courc reached a climax in 1966 "'then it ruled in MiramJa v. Arizona that police: must advise suspects of chcir right ro remain silent and to have counsel during questioning. In 1968, both Richard Nixon and Cif:orge Wallace "-'OU!d win favor by promising to appoinc judges who emphasized «Law and order" over individual liberties.

Tile Wanea Court In the Sixties

I l.BJ d«l.lr«l W.lr on poYUt)' and conl:trged Ntw Frontitr JOCi.JI go.lk

The Gn-..lt Society m..uk\ct WC'.Il' juJt a feY~ o f it,: lt1C':UUI'6.

Rule":~ to pcottct t ht e nvironmmt WUC' C':lt..lbJiJh«i.

The \l'uren Court conti.nut'd to pUDUC' ;t Jibtr.li, ~tivi.sl C'OU I':IC'. tncno;uing irwoh"'mc"nt in Vitm.un dooi'M'd t ht Grt-at Society.

I

VOICES OF PROTEST

How dtd 1960s' hbemfiSin affea minorities and women, and vice 116rsa?

11le aura of liberalism in che J960s markedly affected Native Americans, Hispanic·Americans, and women. With )'Ounger members pushing radical approaches, each followed the black example in demanding full and equal dr:izcnship righcs and in emphaUzing group identity and pride.

I VoiCESOFPitOTtsT

In 1961 representatives of sixty·sc\-en cril)ts drew up a Declaration ofl'urposes, and in 1964 hundreds of Indians assembled in Washington to lobby for recognition in the war on pOV\'.rty. Indians suffered che worse pOV\'.rty, chc highest disease and death races, and che poorest education and housing of any American group. President Johnson established the National Council on Indian Opportunity in 1965. It funneled more federal funds onto reservations than any previous program. Militant Nati..-e Americans, meanwhile, began to organize. By 1968 )'OUngcr In· dian activists, calling themscl..-e s «Native Americans," demanded ..Red l'oY~er." T hey protested the lack of protection for Indian land and water rights, and the desecration of Indian sacred sites. l 'hey established reservation cultural programs to reawaken spiritual beliefs and teach nati\-e Languages. The Puyallup (pyoo·AL-up) asserted old treaty rights to 6sh in the Columbia Rh-er and I\.!gee Sound. l 'he Navajo and Hopi protested strip-mining in the Souch~A'CSt. The most militant group, the Ame.rican Indian Mcn·ement{AlM), was fou nded in 1968 by Chippewas, Sioux, and Ojibwa living in and around Minneapolis. Among its goals was pre\-enting police harassment of Indians in urban "-red ghettos."' 1b dramatize chc Indian cause, in late 1969 an armed AIM contingent occupied Aka· tr.u Island in San f rancisco Bay, citing a treaty righc, and hd d the island for nineteen months. AJM's militancy aroused other Nath-e-Americans to be proud of their heritage. Many of the eight hundred thousand who identified themseh·es as Indians in the 1970 census did so for the 6rst time.

677

Nlllve Amerklln

The fastest-growing minority, Latinos, or Hispanic· Americans, also grew impatient with their establishment organization~ ~Ail ich had been unable to better the dismal conditions facing most Hispanic-Americans. Turning to the more militanc tactics of the dvil-rights mm-ement, Latinos found a charismatic leader in ahsar Estrada Chavez (SAY-zar SHAH-vu). In 1965 Chi..-e z led a strike by grape pickers of che San Joaquin Valley. Similar efforts had been smashed in the pasc. But Cha\J'CZ. and United Farm Worker (UFW) cofounder Dolores Huerta organized consumer boycotts of table grapes. They made l.d Gtusa both a community struggle and pare of che larger national mm-ement for civil rights and social justice. Chi\'eZ combined religion, labor militancy, and Mexican heritage to stim ulate ethnic pride and politidzacion. For the 6rst time, farm workers gained the right to unionize. Also in the mid·l960s, young Hispanic activists began using che former!)' pc-jo· rativc terms Cbic.Jno and Cbic.Jno to express a militant colle
·~

Group Aateric.M tlut·~uracnd - - utm OOn to problenu facing N01.til." ~iuns by oa:up)ing Al=u

Hispanic-Americans IMI As-.Amerkans Orpnlle

lctsarEs1radi of'Unittd

~ ludtt

F~rm Worltn

c:toi
Hispanic ac:tivisn

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Like their counterparts, young activists with roots in the Far East rr-jectcd t he: term OritntaJ and adopted Asian-Amtrkan to signify a new ethnic consciousness.

They, too, campaigned for spedal educational programs and fo r the: election of Asian-Americans. fonned ac the University of California in 1968, the Asian Ameri· can Political Alliance encouraged Asian-American students co claim chcir own cui·

tural identity. Other Asian-American activists worked to impro\'l' housing and working conditions for Asians in garment manufacturing and in hotel and restau· ram jobs. The Redress and Reparations Mowmcnr agitated to force t he: gMwnmcnt to make restitucion for the: wartime: incernmem. Although the fen·or of che late sixties would moderace, each of these: mm-e· menrs elevated the consciousness and nu.n:ured the confidence of che younger gen· eration. And each contributed to the politics of identity that would continue co grow in importance.

N......,c.pni..U.ofw

I

w.... ~ fmUniJit group

'-"
The rising tempo of activism in the 1960s also stirred new sclf-awarmess and dissatisfuction among educated women. Several e\~nts fan ned the embers of disconcent inco a flame. l 'he 1963 reporc of the l'rcsidmtial Commission on che Status of Women, es· t:tblished by Kennedy, docummted occupational inequities that were: comparable co those endured by minorities. Women reccived less pay than men for comparable work. And they made up only 7 percem of the nation's doctors and less than 4 per· cmt of its fa~A')~ts . The "-'Omen who served on the presidential commission success· fully urged chat the Civil Righcs Ace of 1964 prohibit gender-based as well as radal discrimination in employmem. Dismayed by t he Equal EmpiO)menc Opportunity Commission's rduccance co enforce t he ban on sex discrimination, these "-'Omen formed che National Organi· zadon forWomm (NOW) in 1966. A civil-rights group for "-'Omen, NOW lobbied for equal opportunity, fi led lawsuits against gender discrimination, and mobilized public opinion. NOW's popularity o....-ed much to che publication in 1963 of Beu.y Friedan's (free--OM-S) 11tt Feminine Mystiqut. Calling it "-the problem that has no name," Friedan deplored the narrow view that ~A'Om en should seek fulfillmenc solely as wi\-~s and mothers. Suburban domesticity- the "velvet ghcrco"- left man}' "-'Omen with feelings of emptiness, with nosmse of accomplishment, and afraid to ask «the silmt question-'ls chis all?'" Friedan wanced womm to establish "goals chat will penn it them to find their own idemicy." Still another catal)'St for feminism came from the imuh~menc ofyoung women in che dvil-rights and anti-Vietnam War movements. Womm activiscs gained confi· dence in t heir ()'l.'.· n potmtial, an ideology co describe oppression, and experience in the strategy and tactics of protest. l 'hey also became consdous of their second-dass status, as they were sexually exploited and relegated to menial jobs by male acti...is.ts.

In 1968 militam femin ists adopted «consciousness· raising" as a recruitment device and a means of t ransform· ing women's perceptions of themselves and society. 1Cns of t housands of"'umen assembled in sma ll groups to share their experiences and air

Womelr's Liberation

grie\•ances. Women learned from such m eetings chac t heir individual, personal problems W'Cre: in face shared problems wit h social causes and political solurions-"thc pcrsonal is political."' This new consciousness begot a sense chat "sis terhood is powerful." Radical fem inists sec up .. freedom trash cans'" into ~A•hich ~A'Omen could dis· card high-heded shoes, bras, girdles, and ocher symbols of subjugation. Tht:}' established healch collccti\'eS and day~carc centers and fought negative portrayals of women in che m edia, in advert is ing, and in language. 1Crms like male r~uvinist pig entered che Am erican vocabulat)', and chose like cbickJ exited.

The right to control chcir own sexuality and decisions whether to have children also became a fe minist rallying cry. In 1960 "-t he: Pill" cam e: o n che market, giving women greater freedom to be: sexually accii,!'C ~Aith· o uc the risk of pregnancy. Man}' wo men, aware: of the dangers of illegal abortions, pushed for chcir legalization. In August 1970 femin is t faccions put aside t heir differences to join the largest women's rights demonstration e:vcr. Com memorating t he: fifeie:ch anniversary of ~A'Ontan suffrage, the Women's Strike: for Equality bro ughc out t ens of thousands of women across the nacion to parade for the right co equal employment and to safe, legal abortions. By t hen t he: women's mo\-ement had alrc-ad}' ended nC""-'Spape:rs• practice: oflisting em· piO)'tnent opporcunities under "Male" and ..~male" he-adings and forx:ed banks to issue credit to women in t heir own name:. Guidd ine:s that req uired corporations receiving federal funds to adopc nondiscriminacory hiring and pay practices had been established.: and by 1970 more: than 40 percent of all wo m en held full-time jobs outside che home.

The Am«ic.m Indi.ln MO\'I'mtnt o«Up(td Alc..ltu.:t to d r..lYI ;mtmion to probltm:~ o( N.uiv"' Amtrieuu. Ltd b)· Ct:~ar Ch.:ivex, 1-ltino F.tnn wofittu pintd the right to unioniu.. Hi:~p;anK and A:~ian gTOUPJ organ · iud .lt colltge':l and un i,..,,.,jtiu_; tht)' dtmanded and oft"'" o bt\'n hi.story and cultu r"'.

1M r'fflli1lilf.t' Mystiqu~ "'ntrgiud tht "'Omtn·J mo\'l'mtnt and wonwn':~ liberation became .m impocunt (orce".

TH E LIBERAL C RUSAD E IN VIETNAM, 1961-1968 1-/ow did Kennedy and johnson deepen Am6rican involvem6nt in tlr6 WQr in Vi6trram? The activist liberals who boldly tried to uplift the downcrodden went to ~A'ar on the other s ide of the globe: to contain co mmunism. Kennedy escalated EisenhO\l-er's efforts in Vietnam to hold .. the cornerstone of the Free World in Soucheast Asia» johnson resolved, "I am noc going to be: t he president ~A•ho saw Southeast Asia go t he way China wcnc.." l 'he war in Vietnam pursu ed by liberals ended the era of liberal· ism. By t he: time: the: nation•s longest ~A'llr was over, the United Stat es ~A'Ould be more divided than at any time since the Civil War.

After the compromise in l aos, Kennedy, ~Ailo was re:soto.-ed noc to giYe: fu rt her ground in Southeast Asia,. ordered farge shipments of weapons to South Vie:cnam and in· creased the number of American forces there: from less than SC"t'tn hundred in early 1961 to m ore than sixteen cho usand by late 1963 (see Map 283). He accepted Eisen· hO\l·cr's "domino theory" and vie:W'Cd international communism as a monolithic force, a s ingle: global entity controlled by Moscow and Bcijing. He wanted to prm-e thac the United States was not the .. paper tiger" mocked by Mao Zcdong.

Kennedy and Vllllllm

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Mop 283 The Yoellwom War, to 1968 Wishing co gu;ar.2ntee ;an

independel'lt, noncotnmu · nist goV\"rnment in South Vietn;am, LyndonJohruon rem;~.rked in 1965, "We 6gtu b«;au5e we must llgtu if we ;u'\': to li\1\': in :. world where e~.'try cout'itry c;~n sh:.pe its own desti ny. To ....-ithdr;~w &om one b;atde· 6tld me;ans onty to p rep;are fOr the next. •

lnteracti\•e Map: The Vietnam War, 1954-1975

0 .,..,. __ B

I'O>Clllo!Mf...

To councercommunisr Vietcong gains in South Vicmam, the United States up·

rooted Yiemamese: peasants and mOII'ed chcm into fortified villages. But Souch Viet· namese president Diem rr-jcctcd American pressur~: to gain popular support through reform measures, instead crushing demonstrations by students and Buddhists. B}' mid-1963 Buddhist monks were sctting chcmsetves on fire to protesc Diem' s repres· sion, and Diem's own generals ..w .re plorring a coup (coo). Frustrated American policy makcrs concluded thac only a new government could Sta\'f: off a Vietcong victory and secretly backed che coup efforts. On Nm-em· ber J military leaders staged chcir coup, captured Diem and his brother, and shot them. Although che United States prompdy recognized che new g()'a.-emmcm , it made litd e headway against the Vietcong. JFK now faced two unpalatable altemari\·es: co use American combat fol\':es or to withdraw and seck a negociated settlement. What Kcnned)' v,:ould have done remains unknO'I'-'n. Less than a month after Di· em's death, john F. Kennedy himself fell to an assassin•s bullec. His admirers contend that by late 1963 he was favoring the ~Aithdrawal of American forces after the 1964 election. JFK publicly prodaimed in fall 1963 that«ic is chcir war . .. ic is chcir

people and lheir governmcm "''ho have to win or lose the: struggle.'" Skeptics note char rhe president fo!IO'I'--ed lhis comment wich a ringing restawn em of the: domino lheory and a promise chat the United States would not withdra"'' from the: conflict. Yirrually all his closest advisers held chat an American vicrory was essencial co check communism in Asia. 11lcy would counsel Kennedy's su ccessor accordingly.

While privatd )' describing Vie:mam as "a raggcdy·ass

Escllltion of tht War fourth·rate councry." LBj feared that an all-out American militar}' effort might lead to World War Ill. He foresaw lhar full·scale U.S. engagement in "that bitch of a war" would de:strO)•..che woman I really lM'l'd- the Great Society." Yet johnson rhought char only American resoto.-e would prevent a wider war. The president also worried lhar a pullout would le:a..-e him vulnerable: co consen•aciw attack and rhreaten his liberal programs. Trapped bmwen unacceptable alternatives, j ohnson expanded rhe war, hoping lhar U.S. 6repc>"-er would force Ho Chi Minh to the bargaining table. But lhe Norrh Yiecname:se calculated that rhey could gain more: by ouclas.ting the United States lhan by ne:gociating. In 1964 LBj took bold seeps to impress the: North Vietnamese "'ith American re· solve and lO block his opponent, Barry Goldwater, fro m capitalizing on Vietnam in lhe presidential campaign. In Ma)' his ad\isers drafted a congressional resolution authorizing an escalation of American military action, and in j uly LBj appointed General Max"'-elll:t)tfor, an advocate of greater American im-olvemem, as ambassa· dor lO Saigon. In early August, Nonh Yie:mamese: patrol boars reporcedly dashed with two U.S. de:strO)'et'S patrolling the Gu lf of 1bnkin (TAW""-kin). Evidence of the attack was unclear. Never admitting char the U.S. descroyers had been aiding lhe South

lBJ ..dY"..WII The Vietn;am \V;ar ~pd led Jolvnon' $ undoing. Hei"C', pe;aee demonMr.Uou upren their (eding~ ;~.bout the prc:~i· den t·~ role in t he w.uduring ;:~ m:usiV\" ;u~tiw;ar p rotest ;It the Pent:~gon in October 1967.

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lliMoiT....

l

a-1-

"Biank cbcd.. for LBJ to w"SI" w~r in

Vitmam

Viemamese: in dandescine raids against North Vietnam, che president condemned the actacks as unprovoked and called on Congress to pass the previously prepared resolution giving him che authority co "take aU necessary measu res to re:pd an}' armed attack against the forces of the United States and to pre'lcm fun-her aggres· sion:'' Assured chat this po'l'-"er would lead to no ..extension of che present conflict," the Senate passed che GulfofTonktn Resolution by a \"Oteof98 co 2and the House, by 416 to 0. l'ri\'atcly, Johnson called che resolution ..grandma's nightshirt- it cow~red C''ICr}'Ching:'' He considered ic a blank check to commie U.S. forces as he saw fit.

Earl}' in 1965 Johnson ordered the sustained bombing of North Vietnam. The United Scares dropped cighc hundred tons ofbombs daily on North Viemam from 1965 to 1968, three: times che tonnage used b)•all combatants in World War II. It neither convinced Hanoi to negotiate nor stopped the flow of soldiers and supplies southward from Nonh Viemam. Unable to turn the tide by bombing, Johnson committed U.S. combat troops. Adopting a "meat-grinder"' or attrition strategy,Johnson sought to inflict unaccept· able casualties on the communists to force them to the peace cable. Johnson sent 485,000 troops to Vietnam by the end of 1967. But Norch Vietnam had matched each American troop increase with irs O'A'tl, and there was no end in sight.

The Endless Wlr

Prima:ry Source: Le«ers Home from

Voecnam

First on college campuses and chen in che wider society, a

Deves Versus Hawks

gr~·ing number of Americans began to oppose che Viet·

nam War. In March 1965, srudenrs and facult}'at the Uni· \'Ct'SityofMichigan staged the 6rsc teach-in to raise questions about U.S. im-olvement. Later that spring, 25,000 people, main!}' sruden~ rallied in Washington co CHECKI NG I N protest the escalacion. In J966large-scale campus anci~A'llr protests erupted. Students demonstrated against che draft and uni\·ersjty resea.rch for the JFK incre.l$C'd th~ Amtri.e.ln milit~ry l't:ncagon. presence in Vietna m; t he Unittd lntd lecruals and clergy joined the chorus of opposition to the war. Stoat6 .suppact«l a mllic..uy coup again.u Ngo Dinh DiC'Ul. Some decried the massive bombing of an undeveloped nationj some doubted The GulfofTonkin Ruolucion, that the United States could ~A'in at any reasonable costj some feared the de· b:l$td on shaky t\·i~nce ofa N«th mise: of liberalism. In 1967 critics, who included Robert Kenned}' and Mar· Vi« nam.eu auuk, JC'C'Uled to autbo· tin Luther King.Jr., spurred hundreds of thousands to parcicipace in antiwar riu un limic«l war ;n tht pn"$idtnt':~ protests. d~rnion. Cricks noted that the war feUespecial!}' hard on the poor. Owing to col· A ma.slM bombing nmpaign begin· ning in 196-1 l".littd to alttr N«th lege de-fmnems, che use of influence, and a military-assignmenc syscem that Vi« nameu relol~; LBJ commiued shu need the better educated to desk jobs, lo~Att·cl ass )'OUths were: twice as ground comb;a;t for«-J in 1965. likel}' co be drafted and, ~Atben drafted, twice as likel}' co see combat duty as Amtri ~n ttoop sc:l\"ng th in Vietn.lm middle-dass )"OUths. tg_al.u«t t o ,.75,000 by thc n.ut of TV covcrage of the war further eroded support. Scenes of children maimed by U.S. bombs and of dying Americans, replayed in living rooms T he Unittd Stoatu ~mt incrt-;u· inglr pol.ui.xed btt\\w n hawks in nighc after nighc, undercut the optimistic reporrs of government officials. f:wor or roul vict ory and do'A':I Americans shuddered as they 'A'lltched napalm (a burning glue that dings co f:woring ntgoh.uion, with colltttt skin and clothing) and defoliants fay waste Vietnam's countr}'Side and lea\'t: eampU$1'5 often the- sitt' al m:ulii \'C' prott.st:l. thousands of civilians dead or mutilated. l 'hcy sa"'' American troops, sup·

,,.._

posedly winning the: hcarrs and minds of che Vietnamese, burn villages and dc.se:crate burial grounds. Vee most Americans s till either supported the war o r remained undecided. l 'h e desire to get out but not gi~ up became: a co mmon sentiment. They ~A'Cre not pre· pared co accept a communist vicco ry 0\'\'.r t he United Staces. Equally disturbing 'A'llS how polarized t he: nation had grO\\"n. " Hawks" would accept little shore of total victory. ~Ailereas ..dovu» insis ted on negotiating, not fighting. Civili ty van ished. Demonstrators paraded past the: White House: chanting, "Hey, hey, LBJ, ho"'' man}' kids d id you kill today?" By 1968 che president had be· co me a prisoner in che White: House, unable to s peak in public ~Aithouc being shouted dO\I.'n. So ended an era o f ho pe and liberalism.

..... . . Tenn lOr those •·ho supportc'd lllnc'riu.n ph in the Y~ttum War

..~ l fnn IOr oppooenu of ~iu:n military involYtmtnt 1' in VitU~.Un

Chapter Su rRI

~

0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AU Ol O FILE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AN D LISTEN TOITON THEGO.

To what extent did the Kennedy administration's domestic record reflect its liberal rhewric? (P"f!' 663)

I

In retrospect, t he :New Frontier appears co haV!.' been more St}'le: chan su~ stance. JFK got fc"'' domestic programs t hrough Congress, although t he Peace Corps captured American youth•s idealism. JFK took a hard line in the Cold War. Th e Cuban missile crisis proved a sobering moment and opened che: way to dftentc, as v.e ll -as to an accelerating arms race.

Whot were the mojor sua:esses and failures ofthe civif.rights mm-ement

I

(rom 1961 to 1968? (pag~< 668)

JFK tried to a~'Oi d dealing with civil rights but was dr.1wn into quelling violence ag.tinst black prote:stm and enforcing integration at the: universities of Mississippi and Alabama Martin luther King continued to lead nonviolent but often dramatic protests, and his "l HaV!.' a Dtcam,. speech provided inspir.trion for millions. Th e Civil Rights Act of 1964 established che: Equal Employment Oppottunity Commission, and che Voting Rights Act of 1965 revolutionized sout hem politics. In the second half of the decade, race riots swept che nation, and rndicals like Malcolm X and the Black Panthers emerged to challenge: King.

How did Lyndon johnson's Great Society pror;-om exemplify the new

I

liberalism o{the 1960s? (pafJ! 673)

The Grear Society spawned t he war on pM-erty, Medic:a.re, major d\•il·righrs legislation, and increased environmental protcction. 1'he Warren Court contin· ued its act i\•is t, liberal course. But increased in~'Oi vemem in Vietnam would spell doom for many Grear Society programs.

KEY TERMS

John F. Kl!flllody (p. 663} Cuban missile crisis (p. 667) Studont Nonviol
(p. 67S}

Immigration Act of 1965 (p. 67S} Afirond1l v. Arizona (p. 676)

A.merican Indian Movement (p. 677)

C6ar Estrada Ch.l\
Gulf of TonkinResolutioo (p. 682) "hallts" (p. 68J) "doves" (p. 683}

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684

OtAPUIJI 'OULJIUALfllA,.,6o-1'96a

How d;d 1960s' libtmlism a{ftct minorities and women~ and via vef'SII? (P"'il' 676)

I

N.a.tivf Amctkans Hrmlis:Nd thr AtnMClm Indian MO'i"f:mml, which dn· =uud that pn>l>lcnu II, Sloa Otp• nard Lacmo f.um wotktft. .and thry pintd rbt ri~~lt to uruonu.t. H.&SpUIIC and Asa.m studmts Otpniud .nd dtnundtd mOts< a:>UtSCS mel ckpu1m'mlftlL

How did ~ni!My andjohnson deepen American involvemMI in the war in Vietnam? (pai!J' 679)

I

JFK inei\"Jis((J 1he Amrttcan miliury p n:senc~ in Vietnam, and LBJ (dt com· mitred ro rondnuing II. 11te Gulfof1bnkin Resolution, obtained undcrsullpl• cious circumsunca, freed rhe pt"CSidenr ro escalate American in\'olwme:nt,llnd by 1968 then: wt:n: 475,000 Amrtic.tn combat troops in Vietnam. OppoSition 10 the 'ol'ar mounh'.d, cllp«lally on college c.tmpuscs.

CHAPTER 29

1968-1974

C HAPTl R PR l VI l W

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Til< You11l MOYft!ltnt

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1968- 1974 ptrit>4l

Wpe tlw

1968: Tbt Pdilia ol Upheaval \IV1rol Htr rM main C411W tMti COflseqL~enm of!he politks o(uphto1

- · l'lixon and WOrld Politics W1tat fi,ntdotMflf41 tha1f1JJS in American {ol'fipt polk] W~~n mtJdt by Ptrsi
tlw """''f"--IONI,__o(dOs «0!

Tbt Crilis ollho Prtsidon
D

'

orott.y

Burl.t~ grrw up in southa.st

1Uu, a proptr sourhtm bdlt: as v.-dl as ~ sclf·l'l'lWU •fronritr •'Oman.• Her Southem Baprisr p.umts l211ght htt to conform to tht cntlSI.'f'\'Ol..ti\..- v.alua of her old .sb.\'tholding commumty.

During her colt~ )~an. Burlagc·s •orid\ieo.>.• undf:f"''l'nt a dn.· m:tric cr:utSformarion. Ar t he UnwcNity of Texas she watched with

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likened ro a holy crusade. She left her llororiry and join ed t he Chris· ri:m P.lith-and-Life C-ommunity, a group committed to nonviolent radical change. The )'Oung activi:Ull of" rhc: civil rights movement

~ 'llltlere you can Pmpare tor Cla&a, t nduringc:onciseee

as black students her age: cn~gcd in :t civil-rights struggle she

685

686

OfAP1ERl1

Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At,~8-f174 became her political model, their ethos her moral beacon. Burlage attended the: founding conference of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) in 1962. It e:xhila· rated her to be: ~Aith like-minded idealists, all eager to create: a better ~A'Orl d Commitment and engagement would be characteristic of many of Dorothy's peers. 11le: baby boomers in college spawned a cumulcuous scude:nt m()IJ'Cment and convulsive counterculture chat gave che sixties its distinctive aura of upheaval. They exploded the familiar, well· kept world of the J950s and revived both the Left and Right. Then, disillusioned with che slow pace: of change:, many became preoccupied with themseh·es-which again transfonne:d the: nation. Both agent in and beneficiary of the: era's realignment, Republican Richard Nixon barely "-"On the presidency in 1968 and then gained an M'cr~Athdm ing ree:lection victory in 1972. N ixon ended U.S. involvement in Vietnam and inaugur:ue:d a period of dCteme, or reduced tensions, wich China and che Sovie:c Union. In 1974, however, having flouted the very laws he had pledged co uphold, N ixon resjgned in disgrace to avoid impeachment. His legacy ~A'Ould be a public disrespect for politics seldom matched in U.S. hiscory.

I

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT WMt wmt the nta)OT /4ndmarlu oftMyouth movement?

By che 1960s the number ofAmencan srudems pursumg h1ghe:r education had risen from I million in 1940 to 8 million. By then, more than half the: U.S. population ~A'llS under age chircy. Their sheer numbers gaw~: the: baby boomers a collecti\'e: identity and guaranteed that chcir actions \l-ould have an impact. Mosc baby boomers followed conventional paths in che 1960s.. If they went co college-and fewer chan half did-they typically took busjne:ss and other career· oriented degrees. Whether or not they went co college:. the: vast majority had chcir eyes 6xed on a good salary, a new car, and a traditional family. Many disdained long· haired proce:sce:rs and displayed ..My Country- Right or Wrong" bumper stickers. Tens ohhousands of baby boomers mobilized on the Righc, idoliz.ing BarryGolci'A'll· ter, supporting the war in Viecnam, embracing traditional values, and joining orga· nizacions like: Young Americans for Freedom (YAF).

O n the: other side of che political speccrum, an insurgent minority of liberal arts majors and graduate: srudems at prestigious universities got the lion's share of attention. These students ~A'Ckomed the idealism of che civil-rights mm--e:menc, the campaign against nudear testing, and che rousing call of john F. Kennedy for senice co the: nation. Determined nor to be a «silent generation,"' they admired such mavericks and outsiders of the: 1950s as beat poet Allen Ginsberg and pop
'--11 1 New Left

-

.... DetoocnOX

Society {SDS) Studnu group opposed eo milir.u'ism md l'llcis:m; Gllcd fot •poll'ricip>uoty clemocr.lcy"

I THEYoonl MOvt:MEr."t

687

Berkeley Free Speech Mowment; the Bealles arri,. in the United States Km Kesl"( and Mel!)' Pranllsters ~e first "add tesr Abolition of automatic Sllldent deferments kom the drak March on the Pem.gon; f!laei-Arab Six.l)ay Wllf Marti:l Luther Kl1g. Jr.•assassinated; race riots sweep nation; students take owr buiklings at Coluntlia University; Rob«t f. Kennedy assassinaled; Wo&roce mars Democratic convention i1 Chicago; Vietnam peace calks open in Paris; Richard Nixon elected president Apollo //lands first Americans on the rnooo; Nixon begils withdrawal d U5. ttoops kom Vietnam; Woodstoand; Earth Day first cetelifated United 5tJies invades Laos; Swoon v. Chortott.-g lkxJrd olfducorion; Nr.w York rmes publishes PM&agon Papers; Nil:on ilstiutes wagHnd-price fr~ze; Sooth Vietnam invades Laoswih the help d u.s.air s-n Nixon visits Chi1a and the Soviet Union; SALTI agreement approwd; break-in at Democratic National Committee headquaners in Walergate complex; Nixon reelected president Yiernam cease-fire agreement signed; Senace establishes special comrMtee to investigate Watergate; President Salvador Allende ousted and murdered in Chie; Vice President Sjliro ~ resiiiJls; Gerald Ford appointed vice president; Roe~ llllt; OPEC begins embargo of oil to the West; Saturday Night Massacre Ho'"' Juooary Committee votes to inpeach Nixon; Nixon resigro; Ford becomes fl'esident

violent )'OUch mm•e:mem transforming the United States imo a «parcicipacory dcmoc· racy"' in which individuals would directly control the decisions that affecced their lives and could end materialism , militaris m, and racis m. Many idealistic srudems never joined SDS and instead associated themsd~s with what chey vaguely called "-t he: Mo\-e:mc:nc."' No mactcr whac the label, a genera· cion of activists found its agenda in the: Port Huron Manifesto. Thousands of scu· dents became: radicalized in t he: sixties by what they saw as the impersonality and rigidity of campus administrators, the: insensitiviryof the: nation's bureaucratic proc· cs.ses, and mainstream liberalism's inability to achieve deep, swift change.

The 6rst wave of student protest washed across t he: cam· pus of the University of California, Bcrkdey. In fall 1964 civil-rights activists who were \'e:tctans of the Mississippi Freedom S ummer Project tried to solidt funds and to recruit volunteers near the: campus gace, a spot traditionally open to political activities. Prodded by local con· sen •atives, hC>'~'-'f:'\'t:r, the university suddenly banned su ch enterprises from che area. Organi.ting as the Berkeley F~e Speech Mo,•ement, a coalition of srudc:m groups insisted on t he: right co campus political activiry. l 'hc: arrest of one scude:nt led co the: occupacion of the: university administration building. more arrests, and a strike by nearl)' 70 percent of che student body. Mario Savio, a philosophy major, tried to

lle\eley- Speed~ Motrenltnl: First moljclt U~npu$ protr.st .u- Uni~ity of'Ciilil'omia, & d:tky

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688

OfAP1ERl1

ln:teracti\•e Map: Disturbances on College and Uni\•ersity Campuses.

1967-1969

Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At,~8-f174 place the f ree Speech MM'C:tllem in a broader context by claiming chac che uniV\'.rsity noc only greedily sen~d the interests of corporate America buc also treated scudents as incerchangeable robots. As unrest spread to other campuses, protest took many forms . Students sac in co halt compulsory ROTC (Reserve Officers' Training Corps) programs, rallied to pro· test dress code~ marched to demand fC\l~r required courses, and threatened to dose: down universities u nless they admitted more minority students and sropped re· search for che militar}'· industrial complex. 11le escalacion of the Vicmam War in 1965 gave che New Left an oppon:unity to kindle a mass social mo'lement. When the j ohnson administration abolished automatic scudent deferments for the draft in j anuary 1966, more chan two hundred new campus chapters ofS DS appeared. In 1966 SDS disrupted ROTC classes, organized draft<ard burnings, and harassed campus recruiters for the militar}' and for Dow Chemical Company, the chief producer of napalm and Agent O range, chemicals used in Vietnam to burn villages and defoliate forests. By 1967, SDS leaders were encouraging more pr01o•ocath-e acts of defiance, orchestrating dvil disobedience at Sdecti\~ Service centers, and counseling scudems to flee to Canada or S....-eden racher than be drafted. By 1968 SDS claimed o ne hundred chousand members on three hundred campus chapters.. Spring 1968 sa"'' at least 40,000 students o n one hundred campuses demonstrate against war and racism. Most, but noc aU, stayed peaceful. In April, militant Columbia UniV\'.rsicy srudcnrs took ()'IJ'Cr che administration building and held a dean capth~. The protest expanded, and I,000 students occupied ocher campus buildings co protest the war and university militar}' research. Galvanized by the brutality of the police who retook che buildings, the moderate majority of Columbia students joined a general boycoct of dasses that shut down che uni\'ersity. August I 969 saw che high point of che mo'lement, wich the NC\l' Mobilization, a series of huge anciwar demonstrations culminating in mid·NO\~mbc-r with the March Against Death in Washington, D.C. The 300,000 protesters who descended on the nation's capital marched single file through a cold drizzle, carrying candles and signs "''ith che names of soldiers killed or villages destroyed in Vietnam.

A crescendo of violence in spring 1970 marked the effecth~ end of the student mm-ement as a political force. On April30, 1970, !'resident Richard M. Nixon, lyndon johnson's successor, jolted a war-weary nation by announcing chat he had ordered U.S. troops to invade Cambodia, a neutral indochinese nation that had become a staging area for North Vicmamese forces. Nixon had decided to extricate the United Scates from Viemam by .,Vietnamizing" che ground conflicc and incensjfying bombing. Scudents lulled by periodic announcements of troop wichdrawals from Vietnam no"'' fdt becrared. At Kenc State Uni\·ersity in O hio, as elsewhere, these frustrations unleashed new turmoil. Radicals broke windows and corched the ROTC building. Nixon lashed o ut at them as .,bums:'' Ohio gm-emor j ames Rhodes slapped martial law on the univer· sjty and ordered chree chousand National Guardsmen to Kenc. On May 4, the day after the Guard's arrival, six hundred Kenc State students demonscrated peacefully against che Cambodian invasion. Sudden!}' a campus policeman boomed through a

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"My Cod. Tlloy'rt Killiog Us" Following r ioting downtown and the 111'\"bombing of the ROTC building. Ohio goVI:'morJo:~mn Rhodn e:.illed in the N:uion o:~l Gu:u-d co stop the antiwar pi'O(ests :lt Kent S-t:t.tt Uni\'C':rsity. On M:t.y 4 , :t.fter 1'\"tl'\":t.ting from rockthrowing WJ.dents, nen.
bullhorn, ..This asscmbl)' is unlawful! This is an order-disperse immediately!" Stu· dents shouced back, "l'igs off campus!" Some threw stones. With ba)'Oncts 6xed, the guanlsmen mo'led toward the rally and laid do~A'tl a blankct of tear gas. Hundreds of demonstrators and onlookers, choking and "'~ping. ran from the advancing troops. Guardsmen in 11-oop G, poorly trained in crowd control, raised their rifles and 6red a \'Olley into the retreating crowd. When the shooting stopped, eleven students lay wounded; fo ur W\'.re dead. None 'A'llS a campus radical. Ten da)'S later, Mississippi state patrolmen responding to a campus protest 6red imo a ~A'Omen's dormitory at historically black Jackson State College, killing two students and wounding a dozen others. Protests against such senseless violence, the war, and President Nixon thundered across campuses, and more than four hundred colleges and uni'lersities shutdown as srudents boycotted das.ses. The nation was polarized. Although most students blamed Nixon fo r ~Aiden ing the ~A'llr and applauded the demonstrators' goals, more Americans blamed the vic· tims for the violence and criticized srudents for undennining U.S. foreign policy. Un· derlying these attitudes were a deep resentment of privileged college students and an impatience for an end to the social chaos. Man}' Kenc townspeople shared the view of a local merchant ~Ailo asserted that che guanl had ''m ade only one mistake-they should have 6red sooner and longer."' A local ditty promised, "The score is four, and next time more."'

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The campus protests after Kent State and Jackson State represented the 6nal spasm of a fragmenting mo\-emenc.. When a bomb planted b)•three anti~A'llr radicals destl'O)''td a science building at the Uni\'ersity ofWisconsin in summer 1970, killing a graduate www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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student, most students deplored che cactic.. \l'ich the resumption of classes in the: fall, the: fad of ..streaking"-radng across campus in the nude- more reminiscent of the J920s lhan the 1960s, signaled a change: in the: srudent mood. B}' then, Nixon had significand)' reduced the number ofyoung men being drafted. Anti"''llraccivists turned lO other causes, or to communes, careers, and parenthood. A handful of frus· traced radicals went underground, engaging in terrorist acts chat justified che gO\'· ernmenc's repression of che remnants of the: anti'A'llr movement. T he: New Left fell \ictim to government harassment, co its o"''tl internal contradictions, and to Nixon's success in winding down lhe Vie:mam War. The consequences of campus upheavals oudivcd lhe Ne"'' Left. Student radical· ism had catalyzed the: resentments of millions of people: into a rejection of liberal· ism. Evangelical Protescanrs, white souchern~ and blue
THE COUNTERCULTURE

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In wllat Kt~fS did the count.rc.ult.ure shape tiNt 1968- 1974 period?

t-aetalbre Youd!. ~

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ment ltd by bippio; promotrd drup. belt orsocial n'$trktioru

11le alienation and hunger for change: that drew some youth co politics led oth· ers co cultural rebellion. In communes and tribes, these "hippies'" denounced indi· \i dualism and private property. and in urban areas like Chicago's Old 1b'A'tl or Ad anta's Fourteenth Screct, ..places where you could take a crip without a ticket," they experimented with drugs. Calling chem a counte:rcultun, historian Theodore: Roszack deli ned chem as "a culture so radicall)' disaffiliated from the mainstream assumptions ofour society chat it scarcely looks to many as a culrure at all, but takes on the: alarming appearance of a balbarian intrusion."'

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ThE COUNTEitCUl1VItE

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Hluscrati\>t: of the gap b~en che two cultures, one saw marijuana as «killer weed;'' a menace to health and life, and the ocher chought it a harmless social relaxant. In the absence of sdenci6c evidence that the: drug was dangerou~ at lease half the college students in chelate sixties cried marijuana. A minority used mind·altering drugs, es· pecially LSD. 1'he: high priest of LSD was 11moth)' Leary, a former Harvard psrchol· ogist 6red in 1963 for encouraging srudems to experiment with dr ugs-to "tune in, turn on, drop out:'' Many youths, distancing chc-mse:h,.es from middiHiass respecca· bility, flaunted outrageous pcrsonal styles. Theysho\1/C'd disdain for consumerism by wearing surplus military clothing, torn jean~ and cie·d)>t:d T·shirts. Especially gall· ing to adults, young men sported shaggy beards and long hair, che badge of the counterculture.

Hippies a.d Drugs

Popular music both echoed and de:\>t:loped a separate gen· erational identity, a discinct)'OUth culture. In the early six· ties, college scude:nts listened to folk m usic. In che carl)' 1960s folk songs protesting ~A'llr and racism mirrored the early decade's opcimistic idealism. Bob Dytan sang hope-fully of changes «blowin' in the wind" chat would transform society. Then in 1964 Beademania S~A'Cpt the United Scates. MoYing be· rond their early romantic songs, the: Beades gloried in the youth culcure's drugs ("I'd love to tum )'OU on"), sex ("Why don't we do it in the: road?"), and radicalism ("You say you want a m'Oiution"). They would soon be joined by the: Rolling Stones, the Mot"'"'· n rhychm-and-blues black performers, and eardrum-shattering add rock· ers-each extolling «sex, drugs, and rock-and-roll" for a gene:racion ac war. In August 1969,400,000 young people gathered fo r che Woodstock festival in New York's Catskill Mountains to celebrate their vision of freedom and harmon}'· For three days and nights they m-eled in the music of dozens of rock scars and openly shared drugs, sexual parme:rs, and contempt for the Establishment. l'he counterculture heralded Woodstock as the dawning of an era of !moe, peace, and sharing- the Age of Aquarius. In fuct, the: counterculture was d is integrating. Pilgrimages of"flower childre-n" to San Francisco's Haight·Ashbur)' discrict and to New York's East Village in the mid-sixties had brought in chcir wake a train of muggers, rapists, and dope peddlers. In December 1969, hippie: Charles Manson and his "family" of runa~A'llfS rirually murdered a pregnant moYie accress and four of her friends. l'hen a Rolling Stones concert at che Altamont Raccwa}' near San Francisco deteriorated into a violent me· 1«: in which four conccrtgoers died. In july 1970 che Searles disbanded. john Len· non sang, ..The dream is owr. Whac can I say?"

Mu*al Revolution

W..dstod h!stinl Ou.tdoor concert in upstlltr Nrw Ymk that aur.~ctC'd balla miUion or morr )'Outtg people 10 c.ddlr;m "xx, drugs, and rock and roll"

Primary Soorce: Amold Skolnick,. Woodstock,. 3 Days of Peace, Music. ...

The countcrculcure:'s "if it fe:ds good, do it" approach to sex 6t into an m-erall atmosphere of greater pmnis.sive· ness. 11lese shifts in acritude and be:haYior unleashed a sexual revolution that would flourish uncil che mid·J980s, when the AIDS epidemic and the "gra)ing" of che: youch mm-ement chilled the ardor of heedless promiscuity. Many commentators linked the sexual revolution to waning fears of unwanted pregnancy. In 1960 oral contraceptives reached the market, and by 1970, 12 million www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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RH v. w.f• Supn"me Court dtci.Jion tholt a •t'lman's right

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to .abortion iJ corutiwOOoal)y prottc:tc'd

women were taking "the Pill:'' Still other women used lhe intrauterine device (IUD, later banned as unsafe) or lhe diaphragm. Some scaces legalized abortion. In 1970 in New York State, one fcrus was legally aborted for every two babies born. The Supreme Court's Roev. Wade ( 1973) struck down all remaining state laws infringing on a "''Oman's right to abortion during the 6rs.t chree months of pregnancy. The Court also threw out most la"''S restricting «sexually explicit" art with "-redeeming social importance." Mass culrure quickly exploited lhe ne"'' permissiveness. Pla.Jbo)' magazine featured ever-more--explicit erotica, and "''Omen's periodicals encouraged lhcir re-aders to enjoy recreational sex. Hoii}""'Ood filled movie scre-ens with scenes of explicit sex; Broadway presented plays featuring frontal nudity and mock orgies.: and C\o-cn television presented frank discussions of once-forbidden subjects. Atcirudinal changes brought behavioral changes, and vice wrsa. Cohabitationliving together without marriage-became thinkable to average middle-d ass Americans. l 'hc: use ofconcracepti\'tS spread to women ofall religious backgroundsincluding Roman Catholics, despite the Catholic C hurch's stand against "artificial" binh control.

Stimulated by the other protest mo\·cmc:ms in the si xties, ga}' liberation emerged publicly in late june 1969. During a routine raid by New York City police, che homosexual patrons of the: Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Greenwich Village, unexpectedly fought back. The furor t riggered a surge: of«gay pride," a new sense of identity and selfpylk.U.. o.g,m;... aurmpc: to end diurimin.u:ion acceptance, and widespread activism. The gay liberation movement that emerged apimt hamoSl'X~Is asserted, "We are going co be who "-'e are." By 1973 eight hundred openl)' gay groups campaigned fo r equal rights for homosexual~ for incorporating lesbianism into lhe womc:n•s movcmc:m, CHECKING I N and for removing the: stigmas ofimmorality and depravity attached lO being li ippiu dC'OOuneed materia lism a nd gay. Thac )'tar the: American Ps)'chiacric Association officially ended its etas· $C'111Jtmu,: and ~n-ated a C"OUntersi6cation of homosexuality as a mental disorder. ~!tun- on C"Ommunu and in urban «nten:liM Haight·A,:hbury in San Simultaneously, st\'ctal cities and states began lO broaden chcir civilFrancU.:o. rights statutes to include «sexual orientation" as a protected status, and in Alienated young peoplt' openly 1975 the U.S. Civil SeJVice Commission officially ended its ban on lhe cmexpaimented with dtutp like plO)menc of homosexuals. Millions of gays had "come out," demanding marijuana and LSD. public acceptance of their sexual identity. Fol.k muJic, the 8<'-aclC':I, and acid The baby boomers transformed sexual relations as much as gender and rod: J)'mboli.ud t he countC'I"' ~!tun-, ~lminati.ng in the 1969 racial relations.1'he institutions of marriage and famil)' "-"ere fundamencall)' (<'.lcival at \l'ooWtcxk. aleered. But what some hailed as sexual liberation others bemoaned as moral The Pill and the legali:.r.ation of decay. Offended by ..topless" bars, X-raced cheaters, and "adult'" bookstores, aborhon hdp«llaunch the $C'XUil many Americans applauded politicians "'tho promised a war on immorality. n-vulu tion chat -'"''<'-Pt (rom the The public association of lhe counterculture, lhe sexual revolution, and ga}' C'Ountc~hun- into the main.u:n-am. liberation with student radicalis m and ghe£Co riots S"-'tlled the: tide of con· The G~ Libe.ration lnO\'<'-ment sen•atism as the sixties ended. ~.une mou :IJ$C'rti''<'-·

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l 1!t68: THE POlmcs OfUPH:EA\'AL

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1968: THE POLITICS O F UPHEAVAl What W8'1lt the main causes and conse.quttnces ofthe politics ofuph~ilval in 1968? The social and cuirural rurmoil of rhe 1960s unfolded against a backdrop of fruscrarion ~A'i th che Vietnam War and d isillusionment with liberalism. l 'he scormy cvcnrs of 1968 wo uld culminate in a cempcst of a political campaign and a curbulem

realignment in American politics, che 6rsc sjncc the New De-al.

In january 1968 liberal Ocm ocracic senator Eugene Mc~oppolled II.C.rdoyto ""'"""" Sl'oator VitUWn Carthy of Minnesota, a Viemam War critic, announced War -.flo chaDmged LBJ io char he: ~Aar and incensi6ed doubts that the United Scates could win at an acceptable cost. Public appro\•al of the pres· idenr's conduct of che war feU to just 26 percent in che im· mediate aftermath of1Cc.. \:'\ CAIIBOO IA After 1Ct, McCarth)"S critidsm of the war won many ~ (IWIPI.ICHEA) new sympathizers. Time, Nt'MifM·' «k. and t he Wttll Strrd jONr· naJ published editorials urging a negociated sctdemem. The nation's most respected newscaster, Walter C ron kite of CBS, observed chac "it seems now more certain than ever that the blood)' experience of Vicmam is to end in a

Tbt Tel Otlenlivt in Ylelllam

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Mop 29.1 Tht Ttl Olftlsivt,loo..ry-Ftbruary 1961 Although the Tet ofYensiv.: pt01o'ed :a m:ajor t:~etiG~I defu t for the communi$a, it cfkctivdy u ndcrmit\otd Americ;u~ public suppott for tht w:ar.

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OfAPlER l1 A llME Of UPH:EA\'Al, ~8-1174

stalema te."' "If 1'\
r---AShlken President

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.....,ltoooly llmd"" "

Jobn F. Kmntdy l nd formt r Aaomey Gentl'lll

Beleaguered. johnson pondered a change in American policy. \'t'hen the j oint Chie-fs of Staff sought an additional 206,000 men for Viecnam, he turned to old friends for advice. 11le funncr secretary of scare and a venerable Cold Warrior Dean Acheson told him. "the joint Chiefs ofStaff don't kno"'' what they're calking about." Meanwhile, nearly fi:'t-e thousand college srudcms swarmed to New Hampshire to stuff envelopes and ring doorbells for Eugene McCarthy in rhe nation•s fi rst pri· mary contest. McCarthy astonished the cxperrs by winning nearly half the popular vote in che primar}' contest of a scare: usually regard ed as conservative. After chis upset, Nice as many students converged on Wisconsin to canvass its more liberal voters. Expecting johnson to lose,Senacor RoberrKenne:dy, also prom· ising to end the war, entered the Democratic contest. Projecting che familiar Ken· nedy glamour and magnetism, Kennedy was the o ne candidate whom johnson feared could deny him renomination. Indeed, millions viC'\l
O n April 4, three days after the Wisconsin primar}', Mar· tin Luther King, Jr.• "''lls killed in Memphis, Tennessee, where he had gone to supporr striking sanitation workers. The assassin was j ames Earl Ray, a "'flite escaped convict. As the nl"A'S spread, black ghettos burst imo violence: in 125 cities. TW'Cnty blocks of Chicago•s West Side: "''l'flt up in flam es, and Mayor Richard Daley ordered police: co shooc to kill arsonists. In Washingto n, D.C.. under nighr skies illuminated by seven hundred 6res, army units sec up machine-gun cmplace:mcnrs o utside the Capitol and White House. The riot· ing left 46 dead, 3,000 injured, and ncar!}' 27,000 in jail.

Assassinations and TUriiOil

l 1!t68: THE POlmcs OfUPH:EA\'AL

695

Entering the race as che favorite: of the party bosses and labor chieftain~ LBj's vice president, Hube:.rt Humph.tt)', curned the contest for che nomination into a ltubetlll..,...., LJ&''"' pn":Sidmt •flo no lOr pl't'J,idmt three-cornered scramble:. McCarthy remained the candidate: of the "new politics" -a ag;;Umt Rithanl N®n in 1.968 moral crusade: against war and injustice directed co affluent and educated liberals. And Kenned}' campaigned as che tribune of the: less privileged,. the on!}' candidate who appealed to "'thite ethnics and the minority poor. But in earl}'june, after his vic· tory in che California primar}', the: brother of the murdered president was himself assassjnated by a l'alestinian refugee, Sirhan Sirhan, who loathed Kennedy's pro· Israel views. The deaths of King and Kennedy furcher estranged young activis~ convinced others of the futility of nonviolence, and devastated the already beleaguered forces of liberalism. l 'he dream of peace and racial justice rurne:d to despair. "I "-'On't ..uce;" one youth said. "Every good man we get they kilL" Kennedy's death cleared the way for Humphre:}"s nominacion, but Democrats "''Cre far from united. While Kennedy's death cleared che "''llY for Humphrey's nomination, increasing numbers of Democrats rurne:d to third·party candidate: George Wallace's thin!}' \~iled appeal for "'thite supremacy or to che GOP nominee Richard M. Nixon. Nixon promised to end che war in Viecnam wich honor, to rescore «taw and order;'' and to heed ..the voice of the: great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans, the nonshout~ che non-demonscrators, those who do noc break che law, people "'tho pay their taxes and go to work, who send their children to school, who go to their churches, ... who low chis country." George Wallace capped into the same "''Cllspring of angry reaction as Nixon. Wallace pitched his message to blue-collar "-'Orke:rs and souchern whites fed up with antiwar protesters, black militants, hippies, and liberal intellectuals. In August 1968, violence oucside: the Democratic National Convention in Chi· -v"wies"' l 'htYoothlmer. cago reinforced the appeal of both Wallace and Nixon. 11lousands descended on the oariotUI P.arty, pi'Otl':« group city to protest the Viemam War. Some radicals, ho"''CW.r, wance:d to prm-oke a con· kd by coontrmlltute guru frontation to discredit che Democrats. A handful of anarchistic "YjppJes" (the 1Abbie Hoffman Youth lncemational Party) sought to ridicule the political system by threatening to dump LSD in Chicago's water system and to release greased pigs in the dry's crowded Loop area. The T« offensiv-e, whi~h CQJt trl"· Dece:rmined co a\-oid the rioting chat had wracked Chicago after the: mendauJ U.S. c.uualti<."$1 umkrassassjnation of Marcin Luther King, Jr., .Nta}•or Richard Daley ga..~ police m in«< AmcrKan bc-Ji.-f in the a green light to attack "the: hippies, che Yippies, and the flippie:s:" The: Vit-tn.am W.ar. result was a police rioc, televised lii,!'C to a huge national audience. As pro· Sh.:.J.:en by Ttt .and opposition from Eugtnf' McCa n:hy .and Robert Ken· testers chanced, ..The whole "-"Orld is watching;" Chicago police dubbed nedy, LBJ .:.nnoun«d that he would demonstrators and bystanders alike. The brutality on the streets owr· not run fOr rC'C'lution.. shadO\l~d HumphrC)"S nomination, tore che Democrats further apart, The ;u:~;usi nati ons ofM..:.rtin Lu th« and created an enduring image of them as the: party of dissent and disor· King .:.nd Robert Kenntdr spuktd riots, ind u ding ont at t ht Otmoder. The real victor in Chicago "''llS conseJVatism.

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crnic N.:. tional Con\'C'-ncion.

Nixon capitalized on the tumult. His lV cam· CAiasenatlve paign commerdals flashed images of campus Re~~qence and ghetto uprisings. He porcrarcd himself as the representative of the Silent Majority, ..the "''Orking Americans who

R.ich.:.rd Nimn a nd Gtorgoe \l'alb« stoS.:td and ruck the con$tl'\':lti\'C'ba~kl.ash.

With Nixon's cluhon .:.:1 pruidcnt, lkpub JK:.:.ru f'mtrged ;u the neY~ ma.jority parcy.

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haw become forgotten Americans." He: castigated the Suprem e: Court for safeguarding criminals at the expense: of law-abiding citizens and told white: southerners chac «our schools are for educationnot integration.'" Also appealing to the: reaccion against liberalism, George Wallace stoked the: fury of the "'-orking class against "bearded anan:.hisrs, smart-aleck edito· rial writers, and poi my~headed professors looking do~A'tl their noses at us." l'romising to keep peace, he voo-ed that "if M}' demonstrator ever lays dO"-'n in front of my car, it'll bt the last car he'll ever lie do~A'tl OMUW in front of." Near!}' 14 percent of the electorate ..-a ted for Wallace in November. ==~:: 3 1,110.231 Nixon and Humphl\."f split the rest of the ..-ace Rcn:~= CJ almost evenly (see: Map 29.2). Nixon garnered onl}' OCmO
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NIXON AND WORLD POLITICS Wlwt fundamental changes in AnNtrican foreign policy wtl're made by President Nixon? A Californian of Quaker roots, Richard Milhous Nixon was elected to Congress as a navy \'etctan in 1946. He won prominence for his role in chc HUAC investigation of Alger Hiss (sec Chapter 26) and ad\•anced co the Senate in 1950 b)• accusing his Democratic opponent of d isloyalty. He sen·ed two terms as Eisenhowc.r•s vice presi· denc, but lose chc presidency to Kcnned}' in 1960 and the California governorship in 1962. Ignoring what seemed a political death scmencc, Nixon campaigned vigor· ously for GOP candidates in 1966 and ~A'On his party's nomination and the presi· dency in 1968. In office, Nixon focused mainly on foreign affairs. Considering himself a master of rr.ttlpolitik (ray-All-poJ.i.tnk)- a pragmacic approach stressing national interest rather chan ethical goals- he sought to check SoYi« expansionism and to reduce superpoo'er conflict, to limic the nudear·arms race, and co enhance the Uniced States'

I N IXON AND WOIU.O Polmcs economic v.-ell-bcing. He planned to mm-e the United States out ofVicmam and into an era of dCce:nte-rcduced tensions- with che communise world. To manage diplo· macy, Nixon chose Henry Kissinger, a refugee from Hider's Gmnan}' and a professor of international relacions, ~Ailo shared Nixon's penchant for secrecy and for the concentration of decision-making power in the White: House.

Nixon's grand design hinged on ending t he Vicmam War. The ~A'llr was sapping American military scrength, worsen· ing intlacion, and thwarting ditcnte. In August 1969 the president unveiled whac became kn()'ll.·n as the Nixon Docuinc, in which he rede· fined the Unice:d States' role in the Third World as that of a helpful partner rather than a military protector. The Nixon Doctrine reflected che president's recognition of the war "-'earincss of both t he: electorate and the: U.S. troops in Vietnam. johnson•s decision to ncgo· date rather than to escalate had left American troops wich the sense thac litcle mattered except swvival. Morale plummeted. Discipline: collapsed. Army desertions rocketed from 27,000 in 1967 to 76,000 in 1970. Racial contlicc became: common· place, and dr ug use: soared. T he: army reported hundreds of cases of "fragging"enlisted men killing officers. The toll of atrocities against the Vietnamese mounted. In March 1968 an anTI}' unit led by an inexperienced lie:utenanc, William Calley, massacred several hundred de-fenseless civilians in My Lai (n'K"t" it}. Soldiers gang·rape:d girls, lined up women and children in d itches and shot chem, and then burned the: village. Re:w:lacions of such incidents, and the: rising number of rcrurned soldiers who joined Victnam Vet· erans Against the: War, undercut the: already~ iminished supporc fo r che: ~A'llr.

697

H''"Y ......... H'"""' prof'Csw r chostn to be' Niwn'5

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My Ui v-..tnamoe 'ilbgt where Amerian troops m.uu.

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The My Lai Mossa
the men ofCh;arlie Comp:~ny ent~d the $ll'l:!ll vill;age of My Ll.i ln M:m:h 1968 to :nt;ac:k the VIetcong bdie\1\"d to be dul'\':. lnste;ad, they fOund un;anned ciWi:~ns, m<mty women :at~d children, :at~d m:..u.ured them. The milit;ary kepc the ineident $C'Cn't for ;a ye:..r, but when 1\ot'W$ ofthe it"M:idc:nt surf~ed in 1969, it bec;;ame symbolic of the w;ar'$ brut;aI· ity :~nd the fvtil:ity of the U.S. effort ln the Viem:un W;ar.

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Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At,~8-f174 Despite pressure co end rhc ~A'llr, Nixon ~A'Ould not sacrifice America's prestige. S«king «peace ~Aith honor,'" he acted on rhr«: froncs.. First was ..Victnamizacion," replacing American troops wich South Vietnamese. By 1972 U.S. fol\':es in Vietnam had dropped from half a million co thirty thousand. Second, Nixon bypassed -S outh Vietnamese leaders by sending Kissjngcr co negotiate secretly wich North Viecnam's foreign minister, Le Ducl'ho (l~oyduck tow).1'hird, co force the communists ro com· promise despite the U.S. croop ~Aithdrawal , Nixon escalaced che bombing of North Vietnam and secred)•orde:rcd air scrikes on North Vietnamese: suppl)' routes in Cam· bodia and laos.

The secret 8·52 raids against Cambodia neither made Ha· noi beg for peace nor disrupced communist supply bases. They did, ho\IJ'C\"Cr, undermine the stability of that ciny re· public. In carl)' 1970 North Viemam increased irs infiltration of troops inco Cambo· dia, both to aid che Cambodian communists, rhe Khmer Rouge (kmair rooj), and co escalate its war in South Viecnam. Nixon ordered a joint U.S.-Souch Vietnamese in· cursion into Cambodia at the end of April 1970. l 'he invaders seized large caches of arms and bought time for Viemamization. But the costs were high. The invasion ended Cambodia's neucrality, widened rhe war throughout Indochina, and prm'Oked massive American protests, culminating in the scudent deaths at Kenc State and j ackson State. In February 1971, Nixon had Souch Vietnamese rroops invade Laos ro destto}' communise bases che.re. The South Viecnamese "''ere routed. Emboldened, North Vietnam mounted a major campaign in April 1972- che Eascer Offensive-their Larg· esc since 1968. Nixon retaliated by mining North Viecnam's harbors and unleashing B·52s on its major cities. He \>oo-ed: ..The bastards have nC"".-er b«n bombed like chey arc going robe bombed chis rime;''

LBJ's War Becomes Nllon'sW.

O n Octobcr26,jusc da)'S before the t9n presidencial elcc· tion, Kissinger announced chat ..peace is ac hand."' T he Ceast·fire agreem ent that he had secretly negotiated re· quired the withdra~A'lll of all American troops, provided for the return of U.S. prison· ers of war, and allo~A'Cd Norch Vietnamese croops to remain in Souch Vietnam. Kissinger's negotiations had scaled Nixon's reelection, but South Viecnam's !'resident l'hicu (tyoo) refused to sign a cease·firc agreement permitting North Viet· namese croops to remain in the Souch. An angry Le DucTho then pressed Kissjnger for addicional concessions. !'resident Nixon again resorted co 0..52 raids. The 1972 Christmas bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, the most destruccii,!'C of rhe war, roused fierce opposition domescically and globally but broke the deadlock. l'he Paris Accords signed in late j anuary 1973, essenciall)' restated rhe terms of the October truce. The agreement ended hostilities be~-een che United States and North Vietnam bur left unresol\·ed the differences be~-een North and South Viet· nam, guaranteeing that Vietnam's future ~A'Ou ld )'et be settled on the battlefield. l'he war in Vietnam u.'Ould continue despite 58,000 American deaths, 300,000 wounded, and rhe expenditure of at least $ 150 billion. Yirruall)' all ~Atho survi..-ed,

I

N IXON AND WOIU.O Polmcs

wrote: one marine, rerurne:d ..as immigrants to a new "-'Orld. For the culture we: had knO"-'n dissoto.-ed while: we were in Viemam ... made us aliens "'then we rcrurned;'' lk')'ond media attention on the: ps}•chological difficulties of readjusting co civilian life:, which principal!}' fostered an image of chem as disturbed and dangero us, t he nation paid litde heed to its Viemam veterans- reminders of a "''llr that Americans wished to forget. Few Americans gaw~: much thought to the: 2 million Viemamesecasualties or t he price: paid by Cambodia In 1975, the fanatical Khmer Rouge: (Cambod ian communists), led by l'ol l'ot, took pO'wer and turned Cambodia into a genocidal ..killing field," murdering some 2 million, an estimated third ofche population.

699

lnteracti\•e Map: Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War

Disengagement fro m Vietnam helped Nixon co achiC"".-e a turnabout in Chinc.se:-Ame:rican relations and di cmce: ~ EtrorttottdUCle trnsioru ~o tbt U.S. ;md with the: communise superpo....-ers. 11lese developments, tht communist turiOIIl$ the most sjgni6cant s hift in U.S. foreign policy sjnce the: start of the: Cold War, created a new relationship among the United States, China, and the: Soviet Union. Presidents from Truman co johnson had refused to recognize che: l'roplc's Republic of China in 1949. The United States had ..-erocd the: admission of"Re:d China" co the: United Nations and pressu red Amcri· can allies to restrict uade with the communist giant. But by 1969 a widening Sino-Soviet split made the prospect ofimprow:d relations attractive co both Mao Ztdongand Nixon. C hina "''lUlted to end its isolation.: the United States wance:d to pia}' one communist f>O"'"tr against the: ocher, and both wance:d to thwart Soviet expansionism in Asia. In June 197 1, Kissinger began secret negotiations with Beijing, laying t he groundwork for Nixon's Image not available: doo to cappight restrictions historic February 1972 t rip to China "ro seck the: normalization of relations." The: first visit C".·er by a sit· t ing American president co the: largest nation in the world, it ended more: chan twenty }'eat'S of ChineseAmerican hostility. Full diplomatic recognition foJ. lO'wed in 1979. Equally significant, Nixon "-"tnt co Moscow in Ma}' 1972 to sign agreements "'ich che SO\i cts on t rade: and technological cooperation. 11le: Strategic Arms limitation 1·a1ks (SALT I) froze each side's offcnsi\-e: nuclear missiles for 6ve years and committed both supcrpo....-ers to strategic equaliry racher than nuclear superiority. Alt hough it did noc end che arms race:, SALT I moved both countries toward ..peaceful coexis tence'" and. in an election rear, enhanced Nix· on's stature:.

I

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OfAP1ERl1

Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At,~8-f174

Noc even btcter relations with China and che Soviec Union ensured global stability. In 1967 Israel, fearing that a mas· sive Arab actack was imminent, launched a preempti\'t: strike on its Arab neighbors, routing them in six days. Israel occupied the Egyptian· controlled Sinai (SI E-nte) and Gaza (GAH-zuh) Strip, theJordanian-ruled \'~/esc Bank and East jerusalem, and Syria's Golan (go-LAHN) Heights. Israel promised to gi\'t: up most of che occupied lands in exchange for a negotiated peace, buc the Arab states refused to negotiate with Israel or to recognize its right to cxisc.. Palescinians, many of them refugees, wrned to the Palescine Liberation Organizacion (I'LO), which called for Israel's destruccion. War exploded again in 1973 ~Ailen Egypt and S)'lia launched surprise atcacks against Israel on the je~Aish high holy day of Yom Kippur (yawm lop-POOR). O nl)' massive shipments of military su pplies from che United States enabled a reeling Is· rad to stop the: assault. In retaliation, the Arab states embargoed shipments of crude: oil to che Unice:d States and its allies. The: 6w--month embargo dramatized U.S. de:· pende:nce on foreign energy sources. Acute: oil shortages and soaring costs fed infla· tion and spurred the use of nuclear pc>"'er. The dual shocks of che ene:rg}' crisis at home: and renewed Soviet influence among Arab hardliners spurred Nixon and Kissinger to pursue "shuctle diplomac}'·" Flying from one Middle East capital to anocher for rwo )'t:ars, Kissinger negotiated a ceascfire, pressed Israel to cede: additional capwred Arab terricory, and persuaded the Arabs to end che: oil embargo. Although shuttle diplomacy left the Palestinian issu e: sciU festering, it successfully exduded the: Soviets from a major role in Middle: Eastern affairs. Nixon·Kissinger rr
Slllllllt Diplomacy

I

DoMESTIC PI!06tEMSA~O 01\'lSIOMS

701

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND DIVISIONS 1-/ow did IOchard Nixon ~s political strategy reflect the racial uphe11vals 11nd radia1/ism oftllis er4? Although Richard M. Nixon yearned co be remembered as an international statesman, domestic affairs kept intruding. He cried to reform che ~A'Clfare: system

and soto.-e complex economic problems. But r.he: underside of Nixon's personality ap· pealed to che darker recesses of national character and imm si6ed the: fears and divisions among Americans.

Tile Nixon Presidency

Richard Nixon the policician was highl}' intdligtnt buc also displared the rigid sdf-concrol of a man monitoring

his own f:'\'Cl)' move. When chc privace: Nixon emerged, he was suspiciou~ insecure, and filled with anger. Nixon's conviction chac enemies lurked everywhere, ~A'llicing to destroy him, verged on paranoia. He soughc co annihi· lace: his panisan enemies, especially che "eastern liberal establish mcnc" that had long opposed him.. Some: observers viewed Nixon as the: classic outsider: reared in pinched surroundings, ph}'Sicall}' awkward, unable: co rd atc easily to others. Alchough ac t he: height of nacional power, Nixon remained fearfu l that he wo uld nc-•..-er be: accepted. In the carl}' Nixon rears, che pre:sidcnc's scre:ngths ....-ere: most apparent. Nixo n spoke: of national reconciliation, took bold initiatives intcrnacionally, and dealt with domestic problems responsibl}'· Buc che darker side: ultimatd}' prevailed and dr01o>c him from office: in disgrace:. Symbolic of this positive start, the: nation joined the: new president in cdebrat· ing the: fi rst successful manned mission co the: moon. On Jul}' 20, 1969, astronaut Neil Armstrong descended from the: lunar lander EatJt co che surface: of the: Sea of Tranquility, and announced to enthralled television audiences back o n e:arch, "l 'hat's one small seep for man, one giant leap for mankind." Five more: lunar expeditions folloo·ed, but in 1975 t he: space: racee:sscmiallye:nded ~Aith the: United States and So· viet Union engaging in coopcrati\"e efforts co explore: the: rest of t he: universe. The first newly dccce:d president since: 1849 whose: party controlled neither house ofCongre:s~ Nixon cooperated ~Aith the: Democrats to increase social-security benefits, build subsidized housing, expand che Job Corp~ and grant the: \'Ote to d ghce:cn·rear"lds. Responding to the: growing environmental movement, which bro ughc out 20 million Americans for t he: first Earth Day in 1970, the: president ap· pr01o•ed new laws limiting pesticide: use:, protecting e ndangered species and marine: mammals, safeguarding coasta l lands, and co ntrolling strip-mining. Nixo n also signed bills c:reacing the Occupational Safety and Health Administ ration (OSHA), to enforce health and safe:cy standards in t he: workplace, and the: Environmental Pro tee· don Agency (EPA), requiring federal agencies to prepare an cnvironmcm al-impact analysis of all proposed projeccs. Conscrvacives grumbled as gow~rnme:m gi\."'A' larger and more: intrusive and as race-co nscious e:mpiO}'tnenc policies, including quotas, were mandated fur all federal contractors. Conscrvatiw~s gn..""'A' still angrier when Nixon unveiled the: Family

'

Neil~ F"mtmanto Sl't lOot on the moon

{F'f) Primary Source:

~ Man on the Moon

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OfAP1ERl1

Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At,~8-f174 Assistance l'lan (FAP) in 1969. A bold effort to overhaul the welfare S}'Stcm, FAP pro· posed a guarnm«d minimum annual income for all Americans. Caught bmwen liberals ~Ailo thought the: income inadequate: and conservatives who disliked it on principle, FAP died in the Senate:.

Nixon inherited the: fiscal consequences of Lyndon B. Johnson's effort to ~A'llge the Vietnam War and finance the: Great Society by deficit financing, to have bolh «guns and butce:r." Facing a large budget deficit of S25 billion in 1969 and an inflation rate ofS percent, Nixon cut government spending and encouraged che Federal Resen-e Board to raise imeresc rates. The result ~A'llS a combination of inflation and re
•

Economy

Avetage priced consumer goods {CPI} Annual percenlage change, all items

(righlscale)

f

"

i

15 ~

~ 10

Ftg~~n 29.1 loflalio•. 1965-2006 l nft;~.tion, whi.ch h:~d been moder:~te during th-e twodee.uk~ following the s~c:ond WOf'ld W:!r, beg:~n co ~o~r....;m the nc~l:~tion of the w:~r in Vietn;~.m in the mid·1960~. In 1979 ~nd 1980 the n:~tion ~tri-enc:ed doubit·digit in A:~Uon in twO c:onseeuti\1\':)'~~..., for the fii"S( time ~inc:e World \VM I,

I DoMESTIC PI!06tEMSA~O 01\'lSIOMS

7 03

Throughout 1971 Nixon lurched from policy to policy. Dcdaring, «Jam now a Keynesian;'' he increased dc6cit spending to stimulate the private sector. It resulted in the largest budget d eficit since World War II. Then Nixo n devalued che dollar to correct chc balance-of·pa)mcnc d eficit. Finally, he frou ~A'llgcs, pric~ and rems for ninety days, a Band-Aid that worked unci! after chc 1972 election. 1'he:n Nixo n again reversed course, replacing concrols wich \'Oiuntary- and ine:ffecti\
Despite: his public appeals for unity, N ixon hoped co di· vide che American people in ways chat would bring about a realignmcm in policies and create a new Republican ma· jority coalition. His ..southern strateg}"' soughc to atcract Dixie's white Democrats imo the GO I' fold, while his scands on crime, drugs, antiwar protestors, and black milicancs v,:ooed blue-collar laborers and suburbanites- voters whom political strat· egisc Kevin Phillips vividly described as "-in motion between a Democratic past and a Republican fucure." To combat the milicancs he despised, Nixon used full federal government resources. l 'he lncernal JtC"t·enue Service (IRS) audited cheir tax recurns; the Small Business Administration denied t hem loans; and the FBI illegal!}' wiretapped them . The FBI worked ~Aith local officials co disrupt and immobilize Black Panthers. l 'he CIA illegall}' investigated and compiled d ossiers o n thousands of American citizens. The Department ofjustice prosecuted antiwar activists and militant blacks in high I}' publicized trials. Nixon himself dri!W up an ..enemies list" of ad\·crsaries to be harassed by the gow~rnmem. In 1970 Nixon widened his offensive against che anci~A'llr mM>cm em by appro\'· ing the Huston Plan, which ~A'Ould use t he CIA and FBI in various illegal missions. The plan called for excensive wiretapping and electronic surveillance, break-ins to find or plane evidence of illegal accivity, and a new agency to centralize domescic co\'trt operations under White House: supeni sion. Buc FBI chiefj. Edgar Hoo\'tr op· posed the Huston Plan as a threat co the FBI's independence. Blocked, Nixon secretl}' creaced his O'A'tl White House unit co discredit his opposition and to ensure executive security. Nicknamed «che plumbers'" because of their assignment to plug go\'· ernment leaks, t he team was headed by ex-FBI agent G. Gordon Udd}' and fo nner CIA operacive E. Howard Hunt. The plumbers firsc targeted Daniel EUs berg. a former Defense Department analyst who had wrned m-er to the press che Pentagon Papus, a secret documentary history of U.S. involvement in Viecnam. On j une 13, 1971, che NNI' York Ttmts began publishing the Pentagon Papers, which m-ealed a long history of White House lies to foreign leaders, Congress, and the American people.. Although the papers con· mined nothing damaging about his administration, Nixon feared chat they would undermine public cruse in go\-ernment and establish a precedent for publishing classified material. The Supreme Court ultimate!}' ruled that the documents' publication was protected under che First Amendment. Livid, Nixon d irected t he j ustice Deparcment to indict Ellsberg for theft and ordered che plumbers co break into t he office of EUs berg>s psychiat rist in search of information against t he man who had become an instant hero to t he antiwar movcment.

L.w .cl Order

Group ~t up by N.ixan Whitt HouR" to ClUT)' out ditty tridtJ md undermine opposition eo the pn'sidtnt

pi•Mhrs

I

_ _ ,.,...

S.<m
ide' or pn-sicL:otiaJ li4'5 ttg;ud. ing U.S. irwoh~mmt io v-..toam pubtid!td by tbt Nt.w Y"'* TIMO

1

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704

CHAPtER l1 A llME Of UPH:EJ.\'Al, ~8-1174

Nixon especially courted "'ilites upscc by che drive for radal Slnleft equality. l 'he administration opposed cxcension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, sought co cripple enforcemenc of the Fair Hou.Ung Act of 1968, pleaded for the postponement of desegregation in Mississippi schools, and filed suits to prohibit busing childr~:cn to desegregate schools. T he scrategy of wooing white southerners d ictated Nixon's Supreme Court nominations. 10 re\'Ct'St: the Warren court's liberalism, he sought scrict conscruction· Driving ~ord ood Bockword ists, judges who "''Ould noc "meddlr' in social issues or Tooudl;ln\.: CitOf'ge W ;ill;att ;and win tht \'Otn of be «soft" on criminals. In 1969 he appointed Warren both southern whitn ;and blut·coU;ar workc" from Burger as chief justice. Nixon then tried co appoint a tht North, Nixon' s "'50udltrn Kr.ttcgy'' incl uded Deep South conscrvatiiJ'C, but the Senate rejected both of del;lying school ducgn-g;ation pl;an~ ;and strong his nominees. HO'I'-·e,~r. b)• 1972 Nixon had succeeded in opposition to busing chikll'\'n to ;achieo.-e r;aei;al appointing to the Supreme Court three justices "''ith b;a.l;ancc in tht schools. reputations as stricc conscructioniscs: Harry Blackmon of Minnesota,. ~·is JW-ell of Virginia, and William Rehnquisc of Arizona. l 'he Nixon appointees would steer the court in a CHECKI NG I N moderate d irection. Alchough ruling liberal!)' in cases invotving abortion, desegregation, and the death penalty, the Burger court would shift co the Onpite h is tnor mous polit in l skills, NiJmn was a dttpl)' flaWI'd right in rulings on civil liberties, community censorship, and police po"''«· m an- ;1 da.slic out:~idcr who worritd As the 1970 congressional elections neared. Nixon's vice president, about "'entm ic>s." Spiro T. Agnew, assailed the Democrats as «sniwling hand·wringers" and Early in h is prcsickncy N iwn ac· the news media as «natcering nabobs of negativism." Liberals deplored upc«< some mode'-Dte wci.;tl and tnviron ment.al·prot«tion mtouun-s. Agnew's alarming aUiteratiiJ'C allegations. The 1970 elections "''Cre a draw, with the GO I' losing nine House scacs and "''inning two Senate seats. Economic "stagflahon," inherited

The Soutllem

(rom che )>eau o(fundi.ng cht Vietnam War and t ht Gre-at Soci«y, kd NiJmn to autmpc a v;uitty o(unsuectu:ful cu res. Nilmn ordtred a $C'Cret and (rc-qul'-ndy illeg;tl camp.aig:n against h iJ opponffit:l, w:ing the FBI, Jlts_, OA, and Whi te Hou$1' "p1umbtr~. • NiJmn's ''sou th«n str attgy" cou rted whitt ton$C'Iv.lti\'U by oppo,i.ng busing and othtr dc>scgreption mc:uun-s a nd promoting law and orde-r; tht southern suattgy govtrnt~ N i~·s Supreme' Cou rt nom•nauom:.

THE CRISIS OF THE PRESIDENCY

I

What M!re tile tnQIII a1uses ofthe Wat~ts scandal?

In h1s second maugural, Ntxon pledged to make the next four y~ars "-the besc four )~ars in American history." lronically, they W'Ould rank among its sorriest. His \'ice president W'Ould resign in disgrace. his closest confi· dants would go to jail, and he W'Ould scn'C barely a )'Cat and a half of his second term before resigning co avoid impeachment.

Nixon's reelection appeared certain. He counted on his diplomatic successes and his winding down of the Viet· nam War to win 0\'Ct moderate \'Oters. He expected his southern strategy and law-and-order posture to atcract Wallace ..'Oters. Concinuing Democratic divisions boosted Nixon's optimism. His only major "''Orry, another third-parry candidacy by George Wallace, vanished on May 15, t9n when Wallace

I T Ht CRISIS Of TH E PQESlOEMO'

was shoe during a campaign scop and paralyzed from che waist down. He wit hdrew from che race, leaving Nixon a monopoly on the white backlash. The Senate' s most o utspoken dove, George McGovern of South Dakota, capi· calizing on the antiwar sentiment, blitzed the Democratic primaries. New party rules requiring broader inclusion ofminoriry, female, and )'OUthful delegates in scare

delegations aided the liberal McGovern. A disapproving labor leader complained about .. too much hair and not enough cigars at this co nvention;'' but McGovern

705

ee.,. McCoren libtl'lll SC'nator from South Dlllota

l

aod ~moa;~.tX Clllldichtt for

pn":Sidmt in 1972

won the nomination o n che first ballot. Perceptions of McG011ern as inept and radical drM'C away all but the most com· mined supporters. McG()'IJ'Crn dro pped his vice·presidemial running mace, Thomas Eagleron, when it became known char Eagleton had received electric-shock theraP}' for depression. Subsequently, several prominenc Democrats publicly declined co run with him. McG()IJ'Crn•s endorsement of decrim inalization of marijuana, immediate witbdra"''lll from Vietnam, and pardons for those who had fl ed t he United States to avoid the draft exposed him to GO I' ridicule: as the candidate of the radical fringe. Remembering his narro"'' loss co Kennedy in 1960 and tocHiim victory in 1968, Nixon left no stone unrurned. 1 0 do whatever was necessary co win, he: appointed his attorneygenera~ john Mitchell, to head the Committee to Re-Elect the t:trc.sident (CREEP). Millions in co ntributions finan ced a series of«dircy cricks'" against Demo· crats and paid for a special espionage u nit, led b)• Liddy and Hunt of t he White House plumbers, to SP}'On che opposition. Early one mo rning in june 1972, the Re· publican undercover team, wich Mitchell's apprO\'lll, actempted to wiretap telephones ac che Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington's Watergate co mplex. A security guard foiled che break-in. Arrested were j ames McCord, t hese· curicy coordinator of C REEP, and st\'cral other Uddy and Hunt associates. A White House cover-up began immediately. Nixon announced that "no one in this administration, presently emplo)'cd,. was im'Oivcd in this bizarre: incident." He: then ordered staff membcrs co expunge Hunc's name from the: White House cele· phone directory, to bU)' the silence of t hose arrested with $400,000 in hush money and hines of a presidential pardon, and co direct the C IA co hale the FBI's i~stiga· cion of the Watergat e: break-in on the prctcxc thac the inquiry would damage na· donal security. Wich the McGO\•ern campaign a shambles and Watergate seeming!}' contained, Nixon wo n the election O\-erwhelmingl)', amassing ne:arl}' 6J percent of the popular \'Ote and 520 electoral voces. Scrongl}' supported only by minorities and low-inco me \'Otcrs, McG()IJ'Crn carried just Massachusetts and che District of Columbia. The dec· cion solidified che 1968 realignment. Ho"''CV'Cr, cheGOPgained only rn-el\-e scars in the House and lost cwo in che Sen· ace. 1'he outcome demons traced the gro"'ing d ifficulty of unseating incumbents, t he rise: of cicket·spliccing, and the decline of both party loyalty and voce:r turnout. Only 55.7 percenc of digible voters went co t he poll~ do"''tl from 63.8 percent in 1960.

The scheme co conceal links between the White House and the accused Watergate: burglars had su cceeded during the 1972 campaign. But after the election, federal judge John Sirica (s'r·RICK-uh) refused to accept the de-fendants' claim that they had acted

Tilt Wllll!l pte Upheml

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706

OfAP1ERl1

Allt.1EOfUPH:EA\'At, ~8-f174

.,... n...r Sown.,, much ofjouma1Ut5 Wood..'ill'd aod Benutrin's aposutt' of

1Wattrg;m a imn

Prima:ry Source: Nixon Incriminates Himself

on chcir own. Threatening severe: prison sentences, Sirica coerced james McCord of C REEP into confessing t hat highly placed White: House aides knew in advance: of t he: break·in and that the defendants had committed perjury d uring t he: trial. 1\vo \l{ts,b. in!Jon Post n:porters, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, foiiO'I'-'ing dues furn is hed by "D«pThroat,"an unnamed informanc, wrote a succession of front·page stories tying the break·in co illegal contributions and "d irty cricks" b)• C REEP. (In 2005 Mark Felt, former second·in·command of t he: FBI, rew~aled that he had been Deep Throat.) In February 1973 t he: Senate established the Special CommiHe:e on Presidential Campaign Activities to investigace:. As t he trail of revelations led closer to che Oval Office, Nixon fired his special counsel, john Dean, ~Ailo refused to be a scapegoat, and announced the resignations of his principal aides, H. R. Haldeman and john Ehrlichman. Pledging to get to the bottom of the: scandal, he: appointed Se:O"Ctary of Defense Elliott Richardson, a Boston pacridan of unassailable integrity, as his new attorney general and, bowing to Senate demands, instructed Richardson co appoint a special Watergat e: prosecutor wich broad powers of investigation and subpoena. Richardson selected Archibald Cox, a Han•ard law professor and Oemocrac. In May t he special Senate committtt began a televised im·estigation. Chaired by Sam Ervin of North Carolina,. an experc on conscirutional law, che hearings revealed t he exis tence of the ..enemies list," the president's use of governmental agencies to harass his opponents, and adminiscration fa\'Ors in return for illegal campaign donations. Most damaging to Nixon, the hearings exposed t he White: House's active involwment in che Watergate cover·up. But che: Senate still lacked concrcteevidence of t he: president's criminality, t he: "smoking gun" that ~A'Ould prow~: Nixon's guilt. Then anocher presidential aide revealed that Nixon had installed a secret taping S}'Stem that recorded all conversations in the Oval Office. The: Ervin commiHe:e and Cox insis ted o n access to che mpes, but Nixon refused, claiming exccuti\'t: privilege. In Ocrober, when Cox sought a court order to obtain the tapes, Nixon ordered At· tornC)' General Richardson to 6re: him. Richardson resigned in proce:st, as did t he: depucyatcOrnC)' general, leaving the chird·ranking official in t he: Departmenc ofJus· tice:, Solidror General Robert Bork, to dump Cox. 11le: furor raised by the "Saturda}' Nighc Massact'C" sent Nixon' s public·approval rating plunging downward. As Nixon named a new spedal prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, che House j udiciar}' Committtt be:· gan impeachment procttdings.

Adding to Nixon's woes thac October, Vice: President Ag· new, charged ~Aith income--tax evasion and acceptance of bribes, pleaded no conce:sr-«che full equivalent of a plea of guilty," according to rhe t rial judge. Agnew left office wich a three--year suspended sentence and a $10,000 6ne. House minority leader Gerald R. Ford replaced Agnew. In Ma.rch 1974 ja~A
Nixon's sanitized version of che tapes sacis 6e:d neichcr Jaworski nor t he: House j udiciary Committee. Boch pressed for unedited tapes. In face: july the Supreme Cour t rebuffed the president's claim of executive privilege:. Chief justice Burger dtc.d the: prcside:m's obligation to provide: evidence: nccessar}' for the due: process of fa"'' and ordered N ixon to release: che: unexpurN ixon':~ rt'C'kction Jlrattgy irwo h'«< wirt tlpptng ~nd "dirty triclu.," gated tapes. ind u ding brt:.ll:ing in to Otmocr;a.ti ~ In late j ul}' the House j udiciar}' Committee adopted thr«: arddes of p.lrty ht.ldquarttr~ ~t tht \'(lattrp tt: impeachment, accus ing the president of obstruccion ofjuscice for impe:d· building to bug tdt:phont,:. ing the: \l'atergace: im·estigation; abuse: of po"''Cr, especially his partisan use Jnwsti8fltM- rt:poctt:n: Carl Ht:m· of the: FBI and IRSj and of contempt of Congress for refusing to obey a :~ttin ;md Hob \l'ood~rd unCO\'C'I'l'd li nk:~ b«wun tht: \V~tt:.tg.ltC' burcongressional subpoena for the tapes. glar~ ~nd tht: Whitt: HOU$1'. C heckmated, Nixon conceded in a televised address o n August S that A J«iu of liowt: ~nd SC'.n:ut: ht:.lrhe had wit hheld relevant evidence:. He: then surrmde:red the tapes, which ing:~I'C'-W.Utd tht C'll'ttnt al'ilkg.l! contained the smoking gun proving char the presidem had ordered t he: .l~tivitiu .lnd t ht: inwh'i'mtnt a( tht CO\~r-up, obstructed justice, sub\~rted one gm-·emmem agency co prevent prt:~i cknt and hi.s: ch itf ~idu. another from inV\'Scigating a crime, and lied about his role for more than Tht Su pum.co Cou rt ruled t hat

cwo )~ars . Impeachment and conviction u.~re now certain. O n August 9, 1974, Richard M. Nixon became the 6rsc American president co resign. Gerald Ford took office as the nation's first chief executive "'tho had not been d e:ctcd eichcr president or vice: president.

N ixon mu't rd.e.l$1' t .lped rorNtr~a· t iaru th.lt incriminated him in tht: CO'>'C'Mlp. R;uhtr than bt impuchtd, Nixon I'C'$ignt:d tht: pi'C'$idtncy in Augwr 197...

Chapter Su 0 0W'NLOAO THE MPJ AVOl O FILE O F THE CKAPTER SUMMARY, AND

K EY TERMS

LISTEN TO IT ON THE GO.

lor a 01!f110(Jalic Sociel'{ (SDS) (p. 686) Ba:kolo'{ "',. sp..ch ~lovtml!fll (p. 687) Jackson State Coll<>ge (p. 689) cotlll«rukure (p. 690) Wood~ock festival (p. 691) Roov.Wode (p. 691) gayi beration (p. 691} Eugene McCarthy (p. 69J) Tet offoosi'le (p. 69J) Robert Kerrwdy (p. 694} Hubert Humphrey (p. 695} "l'ippies" (p. 695) Studon~

I

What ..~,. the major landmarks ofthe youth mtMment? (page 686)

longing for meaning in t heir liw:s, as u.e ll as personal liberty, campus--based actl\•ist groups Like SDS and t he: Fl'tt Speech MOV\'.ment sought a more humane democracy, a less racist and materialist society, and an end co t he: war in Viet· nam. The New l eft mO\~m e:nt began to dissipate after che: shooting dearhs of students at Kent State: and jackson State, leaving a legacy of conser\'ative backlash.

l

in what ways did the caunten:ulture shapa the 1968-1974 period? (page 690)

The dissatisfaccion with the status quo that engendered protest pushed some )'OUng people: into cultural rebellion. Denouncing materialism and self· is h ness., hippies ..turned on and dropped out," seeking fulfill ment in sex, drugl.

www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringc.oncisde

and cock and roll. Woodstock trprtSmttd ~~high point of the countl"1"C\\Iturr 1111_. scxlUl rt"YOiucion and SJY hbtl'llrion both flot.l.t'ishtd.

Wfurt "'"" tht main CI1112J and

I

in 1968? (P"f1693)

""""'"'IICeS oftht po1itia ofuplw...,J

ShHm by tb< , ... offauiv<, '"" Amtricm p: assassitutaons ofMut.tn l.u·

thee King md Rolxn Kmnrdy SJWA'IlC:d rioa.. including one: at the Dc:mocnllt N.auorW CorM"'ulon. Richard N'i.xon and G~rgr W.all.ace capitalized on the conscrv.ath
\Nhat fimdam•ntal changes in American (oreifll fX>Iicy were rrwde by President Nixon? (fX>f1696)

Nixon and K.issinp:t, his chief:tdvi.sc:c, 1 pold:.lc. In addation to thully ending Amt':rican invoh't:lllCilt in Vietnam. tl'w:y considettd themsd~u m..astcc.sof~.J.

forgrd an opmtng to Ouna, c:nl.ugcd dktntt with the Savitt Union, md crkd to mcdu.tc MKidtc: Eutem pol•rics..

Huw dJd Ridoanl Nixl>n~ political 11mteg reflect tht radtll Mf>l-/s and n>dicaksm o(lllls m? (P"f1l01)

I

NlXOII wu pobtic&lly sk1Rcd. dttply 8.Jftd. .md cornincnl dw. ht •-u surrounded by mcrnia.. Ht' cndotstd stettt ~gns .against hu oppos::atlOn, using tht HIJ, IRS, CIA, .and Whitt House: plumbt:cs. Nixon courtrd "'' h.1tt .southc:rn conSC"f"Vadvcs by opposing school busing and other doq;cc:g.Won mc:.asurts.

\Nhat "~"' the main causes ofthe Watergate scandal? (fX>ge 704)

1 Nixon's 197Z I'C'Ciection nrnregy included wiretapping, ..dirty erich,"

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-/ll699J Nti Al1n!!nlo1& Ill 701}

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and cock and roll. Woodstock trprtSmttd ~~high point of the countl"1"C\\Iturr 1111_. scxlUl rt"YOiucion and SJY hbtl'llrion both flot.l.t'ishtd.

Wfurt "'"" tht main CI1112J and

I

in 1968? (P"f1693)

""""'"'IICeS oftht po1itia ofuplw...,J

ShHm by tb< , ... offauiv<, '"" Amtricm p: assassitutaons ofMut.tn l.u·

thee King md Rolxn Kmnrdy SJWA'IlC:d rioa.. including one: at the Dc:mocnllt N.auorW CorM"'ulon. Richard N'i.xon and G~rgr W.all.ace capitalized on the conscrv.ath
\Nhat fimdam•ntal changes in American (oreifll fX>Iicy were rrwde by President Nixon? (fX>f1696)

Nixon and K.issinp:t, his chief:tdvi.sc:c, 1 pold:.lc. In addation to thully ending Amt':rican invoh't:lllCilt in Vietnam. tl'w:y considettd themsd~u m..astcc.sof~.J.

forgrd an opmtng to Ouna, c:nl.ugcd dktntt with the Savitt Union, md crkd to mcdu.tc MKidtc: Eutem pol•rics..

Huw dJd Ridoanl Nixl>n~ political 11mteg reflect tht radtll Mf>l-/s and n>dicaksm o(lllls m? (P"f1l01)

I

NlXOII wu pobtic&lly sk1Rcd. dttply 8.Jftd. .md cornincnl dw. ht •-u surrounded by mcrnia.. Ht' cndotstd stettt ~gns .against hu oppos::atlOn, using tht HIJ, IRS, CIA, .and Whitt House: plumbt:cs. Nixon courtrd "'' h.1tt .southc:rn conSC"f"Vadvcs by opposing school busing and other doq;cc:g.Won mc:.asurts.

\Nhat "~"' the main causes ofthe Watergate scandal? (fX>ge 704)

1 Nixon's 197Z I'C'Ciection nrnregy included wiretapping, ..dirty erich,"

lLnd 11

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71 Q

CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

driven our of business by Wal-Mart's aggressii,!'C high-volume, price-slashing ap· proach co marketing. The Wai-Mart phenomenon was part ofa transformation of the American econ· omy in the I 970s and 1980s. lhe service sector grew rapidly as d iscount stores and fast-food outlets spread, and high-tech industries prospered. Bur the "old economy"'- steel mills, auto plants, and factories in the industrial hcardand- grew weaker, battered by imports. For many dependenc on the industrial economy, the American dream seemed to fade. This chapter, which traces American history from the Nixon resignation to the end of the second Reagan administration, 1974--1989, focuses on tbret: key themes: the continuing impact of the 1960s on U.S. culture and politics, as re-flected in the growing strength of conservatism; the rise and fall of the e-conom}' and long-term changes in the labor marker.: and the continuing importance of events abroad despite the end ofche Viemam War. Worsening Cold War tensions, Middle East crises, and terrorist attacks all underscored that America's furu.re could not be- separated from unfolding world events.

CULTURAL CHANGES WMt issues and trends helped spa'*. a gowing c.onservatiw mowm8nt in ""' 1910s? As personal pursuits and lcisure diversions shaped J970s' Ame-rican culru.re, women in large numbers entered che work fOrce. The sexual re\'Oiution continued, but the shadow of AIDS introduced a sobering note-. Although antiwar and Black !'ower protests faded,. some activist causes rooted in the 1960s gained momencum, nocabl}' environmentalism, the ~A'Omen 's m()I.!'Cment, and gay rights. A conscrvati\'t: turn; a rl!\i\•al of evangelical religion.: and sharp divisions o•..-er abortion, homosexuality, and other issues also shaped 1970s' culcure.

The Vietnam War shattered che early-1960s' liberal consensus, and the radical New left movement soon frag· mented as well, creating political curmoil on the left. The Watergate crisis, in ru.rn, temporarily disoriented conscrvati\'t:S. Wich politics in dis· array, personal preoccupations beckoned. Some young people practiced Transcendental Meditation or joined the Rl!\•er· end Sun M}'Ung Moon's Unification Church. Others embraced the lnternacional Society fo r Krishna Consciousn ess. Several thousand rural communes arose as some counterculture \'ctcrans sought to escape the urban-corporate world and live in harmony with nature. Most of these vcncures pro\'t:d shorc-lii,!'Cd. By the early 1980s, journalists discm-·ered the ..Yuppir' (young urban profes· sional), preoccupied with physical fitness and consumer goods. The stereotype- had some basis in face. Ph}'Sical we-ll-being became a middle-class obsession. Yuppies jogged and exe-rcised,. ate pesticide-free natural foods, and stopped smoking when medical evidence linked cigare-ttes to lung cancer, hearc d isease, and ocher ills. The

,._1 Pursulls - ' Dlvl!nioas

Rid\ard Nimn resigns presidency; Gerald Ford sworn il; Indian Sed-Determination Act Sooth Vietna"""" &OWfllmertlalls; Moyog/Je inddent Jinvny C.rter ~edl!d president Panama C.nal treaties ratified; introcllction ol Allllle II computer, Gay Pride parades in New Yorkand San Francisco carter atjflorizes &ederal funds to relocale low canal residents Menachem Begin af1d Anllar el-S.nislan; I"" hosl.lge crisis; Ronald Roaean pn!Sidl!fll Major cui< in taxes and domestic spending, coupled with large increases in military budget; AIDS fist diagnosed Equal Ri_,tsAmendmenl dies; CIA lundscootra- agains1 Nicaragua's S.ndiniltls; Cenbal Park rally for nuclear-weapons freeze 239 U.S. marines die in BEirut terrorist attack; U.S. deploys P«shing II and cruise missiles il Europe; ~ proposes Strategic D~ Initiative (St.lr Wars); U.S. invasion ol Grenada ~ deleals Waller Monda~ to .Wn second term Congress bars miliary aid 10 (ontras Rash ol airh hijadings af1d olherlmon~ acts Congress passes South African sanctions; lnwnigration Reform and Comol Act Congressilnal hearings on lra~ntra scandal; stock-market crash ~ 1r1> to Moscow

actress Jane: Fonda, earlier an anciwar activist, promoted a series of exercise videos beginning in 1982. In the: culwral arma, the: politically engaged songs of che 1960s ga\'t: way to disco, suitable for dancing bur carrying little culcural weight. Blockbuster movies like:jdWS ( 1975), Rock)• (1976), Star Wdrs ( 1977), and E. T. ( 1982) offered escapist fare. H<~PPJ' Days, lhe top lV show of 1976--1977, C"".-oked nostalgia for the 1950s. The TV series DaJI~ chronicling the steamy affairs of a Texas oil family, captivated millions in the early 1980s. Foocball's Super Bowl and other spores extravaganzas artracce:d \'ast 1·v audiences. Cable TV, introduced in lhe early 1970s, broadened viewers' options. By 1988, over half of U.S. homes had cable. lnno\•arions in consumer electronics also shaped lhe ern. By che earl)' 1990s, 70 percent of U.S. households had VCRs (vide:ocass.e:cte recorders), enabling users to tape TY shows for Iacer viewing and lOrene movies on ca.sse:tce:. In the: musk field, the compact disc (CO), introduced in 1983, offered high· quality sound. And che personal computer arci\
712

CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.l lVE R EWRGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974 ...,S1

The Ri,. of lilt Yuppie In 1984, Nr.,.~k m:~g:uine prod;~.imed "the Ye;~~rof the Yuppi-e,,. or young urban profusion~. :. r.2pidly growing group in the 1980s.

up, computer manufacturers multiplied, especially in California's Silicon Valley. In 1981 IBM launched its PC (personal computer) and quickly grabbed 40 percent of the marker, but computer entrepreneurs continued to proliferate. By 1997, 44 percenc ofAmerican households owned personal computers. American culrure in these years was not all escapism and technological now~lties, hO\l'f:'\'er. Bruce Springsteen's "Born in che USA" ( 1984) told of a young man "sent ... co a forcign land to go and kill the }'CIJO~A' man" who nO\\' 6nds himself with "(n)o~A>hcre co run ... no"'•hcre to go:'' The 1970s also saw the rise of punk rock, an aggressi\'f:'ly anti-establishment genre promoted b}•such groups as the Se:x Pistols, the Ra· moncs, and che Clash; of 1Cj ano music (rejtttJIJS is Spanish for '"l'exans of Hispanic descent"); and of rap or hip-hop. Rap, beginning in the 1970s in poor black New York City neighborhoods, and involving fr«:· fonn impfO\i sed recitations, gained a broad foiiO\l'ing in che J980s and be)'ond. Along ~Aith escapist fare, directors also produced some brilliant films exploring the darker side of American life in che 1970s. Robert Ah:man's Muhviflt (1975) offered a d isrul'bing vision of cynical massculture producers, manipulative politicians, and lonely, alienated drifters. Roman Polanski's Chinatown (1974) probed the personal and political corruption beneath the sunny surface of Southern California life.

Many ~A'Omen 's lh'f:'s chan~d dramacically in these years. Spurred b}• a resurgent "-'Omen's mO\'mlem as well as by inflation pressures, the number of women ~A'Orking out· lllllnlar side the home leaped from under 20 million in 1960 co nearly 60 million by 1990 (sec Figure 30.1). \l1omen's ~A'agcs still fagged behind those of men, hO\l·ever, and the ~A'Ork place remained gcnder-scgregaced. Women wen: concentrated in such 6dds as nursjng, teaching. retail sal~ and secretarial work, ~Aililc men dominated management posi· tions and the professions. But even this changed as "-'Omen entered che ranks of management. (1bp managemcnc remained a male preserve, ho~A>cWr, a phenomenon knO\l'n as the "glass ceiling.~ As women pursued higher education or careers, their median age at 6rst mar· riage rose from rn'f:'nty in 1960 co twenty-four in 1990. The birthrate fell as wdl, and by 1980 the scatisticall}' average U.S. family had 1.6 children, far below earlier levels. In the wake of the landmark Roe v. Wadt decision of 1973 (see Chapter 29), che num· ber of abortions rose fro m about 750,000 in 1973 to more than 1.5 million in 1980 and chen leveled off.

Oln&lll Cellder llales 1nd Sexual

140

Figurt JO..I Womtn i1 the Work Foret, 1950-1992 After 1960 the proponion of Arneric02n women who wei'C' g02infullyemplo~ surged upw:ard. As :a I'C'sult, young women coming of :age in the t990$ h:ad f.!rdifkr~nt expect02tions :about their l:ft..n til :at~ h:ad their gr.andmothen o r C"o'C:n their mothers. Sotln:n: ~A6strad oftfst IJnied Stcs.lef, mill (Yh!hir.pn,. D.C..: US. r.-mm:tot PrirtircOffi:t. til'l).nl; ~Alnmoe o.WI!ooto/f«1r, 19!19(NewYtd:Ptum ltoob. 19!8). IQ; S)u&ricofAbstrod oftht ~ r~ 19» (Yhlhio!pn D.C; u.s. GO'/l'!!IT!Itnl ftl+.fit.c Ofht, 199!). «:o, 401

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l'he environmental-protection movement, a legacy of the 1960s, grew stronger in the 1970s. Older organizations such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Societ}~ as well as new ones such as Greenpeace, won fresh recruits. Grecnpeace ~A'Orkcd to preserve old-growch forests and protecc the world's oceans. B}' 2000, it had 250,000 U.S. members. The Save the Whales campaign. launched in 1971, opposed che slaughcer of che ~A'Orl d 's largest mammals. Environmentalists also targeted the nudear-po~A'e1' industr}'· Adopting cechniques from the civil-rights and antiwar campaign~ activists protested at planned nuclear-pcw.-er plants. T he movement crested in 1979 ~Ailen a partial meltd~·n crip· pled che Three Mile I sland nuclear-power plant in Pennsylvania. A jane Fonda movie released at che same time, Chin.t S)•ndromt, portrayed a fictional but plausible nuclear-pcw.-er disaster caused by a California earthquake. 11le Three Mile Island accident deepened public concerns about nuclear po~A'Cr. Of the 1960s' many legacies, the 1\."Vitalizcd women•s mM'ement (see Chapter 28) pr01o•cd most enduring. The National Organization for Women (NOW), fou nded in

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714

OfAPlER JO

CONSEilVA.llVE R ESU'I!GENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

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1966, boasted nearly 6fty thousand members by 1975. Although NOW remained mainly white and middle class, African-American, Latina, and Asian women organ· ized as well. Women workers agitated for btcter wages and working conditions. With the mO\>cmem's gro"''th came political clout. l 'he National Women•s Po· litical Caucus ( 1971) promoted a feminist agenda. B}' 1972, many states had liberalized their aborcion laws and o uda"''ed gender bias in hiring. That same )'eat Congress passed an Equal Rights Amendment {ERA) co the Constitution barring discrimination on the basis of sex. 1\•.rcmy~ight states quickly rarified ic, and ultimate adop· tion seemed likdy. Conservatives worried that women's changing roles would weaken the family. \l1omen themselves conceded the scresses of balancing career and famil)', but fc"'' pined for che era when child care, housework, and \'Oiunteerism had dr6ned .,wom· en's sphere:'' As the 1980s ended, many American women cnjo)'ed unprocrdcmed opporrunities, buc barriers persisted, and complex issues rrmained. As we saw in Chapter 29, many gay men and lesbians came out of the doset in the 1970s, openly avowing their sexual orientation and protesting job discrimina· tion and harassment. In t9n, Ga)' Pride parades drew st'\o-enty-6..-e thousand marchers in New York Cit}' and threr hundred thousand in San Francisco, a center of ga}' activism. 1"'0 )'tars later, a national ga}' and lesbian civil-rights parade attracted one hundred thousand marchers to Washingron, D.C. In 1987 Massachuscrcs congress· man Barney Frank ackno'""ledged his homosexuality. O rganizations like chr National Gay Task Force, fo unded in 1973 (and later renamed the National Gay and lesbian Task Force), demanded the repeal of anti-ga}' la"''S and passage of legisla tion protocting homosexuals' civil rights. Responding co the prrssure, many states and cities repealed laws against same-sex rdations bl't"A'Cen consenting adults and barring job discrimination on thr basis of sexual orientation.

But a backlash was building, rooted in the: 1960s and car· lier. The sixtks was a polarizing decade. Man}' Americans, esp«ially blue-collar whites, deplored what they vil!'"''ed as the decade's radical excesses. As V.'e saw in Chapter 29, Richard Nixon exploited this disaffection to win the White House in 1968. The conservacivc re:surge:ncr had even deeper roocs. William F. BucklE':}' had launched the conservacivc J'V.ational RMe111 magazinr in 1955 and fOunded Young Americans for Frerdom in 1960. Barry Goldwater's 1964 presidential campaign alerted conservacivcs to chr importance of broadening their appeal bt)·ond hardcore consrtVatiw IO)'llliscs. The career of Ph)tflis Schlafly, de\'OUt Roman Cacholic, law-school graduate, mocher of six, and tirdess activist, illustrates the mO\•ement's post-1960 t'\o'Oiurion. Her Phyllis Scblaft.y Repqr; begun in 1967, atcacked the Nc"'' Left and che counterculture. In the 1970s, Schlafly and her organization, lhe Eaglr Forum, focused on hot· button m lrural issues such asabortion; ga}' rights; and the Equal Rights Amendment, which she fiercely opposed. In local communities, espocially in the: fast·gto"''ing South and Wrs.t (ser Chap· ter 27), conscrvati\'t:S found rach ocher and mobilized politically. l 'h is process "''lls espocially evident in souchern California's Orange County, whe:rr conservacivcs were

intensely anticommunist, d ismayed b)• 1960s' radicals, and suspicious of che «liberal intellectuals'" dominating the media and national politics. Foreshado"''ing changes ahead nationally, Orange County helped elect Ronald Reagan go\-ernor of California in 1966 and in 1978 helped pass Proposition 13, a scace referendum calling for deep cuts in property taxes. As Schlafly's campaigns illustrate, 1970s' conservatives mobilized around spe· cific issues, especially abortion. In the "''llke of Rot v. Wadt, a .. Right co Life" or «t'ro· life" movement led by Roman Catholic and conscrvati\-e Protestant activists rallied, signed petitions, and picketed abortion clinics and pregnancy--counseling centers. Responding co the pressure, Congress in 1976 ended Medicaid funding for most abortions, in effect den}ing chis procedure to the poor. Mo.sc feminists, by contrasc, adopted a «pro-choice'" stance, arguing that women and chcir physicians, not the government, should make reproductive decisions. Opinion polls reflected deep di· visions, although a majority favored the pro-choicr' position. The Equal Rights Amendmc:m, denounced by S.chlafl}' and other conscrvaci ~s. died in 1982, three states shore of the lhrct:-fourths required fo r ratification. Gay and lesbian activism parcicularly inflamed conse!Vatives, who saw it as evidence of society's moral collapse. TV evangelist)err}' Fal"''l'll thundered, ..God ... destrO)'ed the cieies of Sodom and Gomorrah because of lhis terrible sin.'" In 1977, singer Anita Bryanc led a campaign against a Miami ordinance protecting homosexuals' civil rights.. Thanks in part to Bryant-'s efforts, \'Oters repealed the ordinance. Other cities, too, 1\.'-ersed earlier measures favoring gay rights. In 1978, as the backlash intensified, a member of the San Francisco board of supen'isors fatally shot gay board-member Han\."'}' Milk and Milk's ally, Mayor George Moscone. When the killer received a lighc sencence, riols erupted in the city.

The consewatiw mm-emenc also found expression in the rapid growth of evangelical l'rocestantism, wich its em· phasis on stricc morality, biblical inerrancy, and a pet· sonal "born again" conV\'.rsion experience. Evangelical denominations such as the Assemblies of God and lhe Southern Baptise Com-ention grew explosively in the 1970s and J980s, as did independent suburban megachurches. Meanwhile, liberal denominations such as the Methodists, Congregationalists, and Unitarians lost members. Many e\•angdicals plunged into politics. As one obse!Ved in 1985, "I always thought that churches should stay out of politics. Now it seems almost a sin not to gee involved." Jerry Fal"''l'll's Moral Majority, founded in 1979 as a "pro-life, pro· family, pro-moral, and pro-America'" crusade, aceivdy supported conscrvati\--e candi· daees. Pac Robertson, head of che Christian Broadcasting Network and host of its popular 700 Club, mounted an unsuccessful presidential bid in 1988. While battling abortion, homosexuality, and pornography, often in alliance with conscrvaciV\'. Catholics, evangelicals also ateacked the Supn:me Coure's 1962 Engrlv. V'uol~ decision banning organized pra)'ct in public schools as a violation of the First Amendment. While pushing to reverse this ruling, evangelicals also advocated home schooling and private Christian schools, ro shield children from "'that they saw as che secularist (nonreligious) values.

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OfAPlER JO

CONSEilVA.llVE R ESU'I!GENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S,

CHECKI NG I N After 1970 pr;achcal go;al.'l ;and mate'· ria lism atuacud inert-a#<~ atten· cion; tc(.hnolagy brought the' VCR and t he' pC'rsonal computC'r. ErMronmC'ntilism, p.lrticularly con«rns abou t n uckar FJO"''C'r, upandC'd. FC'minism a-dvan«d, but womC'n still bumpC'd up agai rnl the' "'gLlu CC'iJing>< that hinden"d tbtm (rum rt-a.ching top corporate positioru. AIDS shan.OrcuitC'd the' $C'Jrual n"\-o1 uhon.. The' CORJC'f\'.l!Mo b.\ckJash Stn"ngth· C'n«<, al'l:C'n kd b)· td C'vangdi.'lu like' Pat IW.btr tson and jC'rry Falwdl.

For many evangelicals, Bible prophecy reinforced their policical mobilization. Hal Lindsey's 11:Jto LttW Gn-dt Pldtu:f Eanb ( 1970), a popularization of one system of prophecic interpretation, was tht nonfiction best seller of t he 1970s. Lindsey found the Soviet Union, communise China, the Arab-Israeli conflict, t he United Nations, and growing domestic wickedness all foretold in the Bible. He urged true believers co rally on che side of righteousness as t he End approached. Chriscian bookstores, radio stations, and TY evangelists fueled che re· vivaL Along with Falwell's Old 17mt Gos~l Hout; popular broadcasts included j im and Tammy Bakker' s PTL (Praise the Lord) program and Jimmy Swag· garc's telecasts from Louisiana. 1'he so-called electronic church suffered after 1987 amid sexual and financial scandals, but che evangelical resurgence concinued. In a world of change, evangelicals found certitude, reassurance, and a sense of community in their s hared faith. In the process, they pro· foundl)' influenced fate--twentieth-century American life.

ECONOM IC AND SOCIAL CHANGES I N POST- 19605 AMERICA WMt social and economic developments most affected AmeriO\'crt)'· Alt hough Nati\'t: Americans faced ad\
Dis wrbing economic dcwlopmems influenced U.S. poli· tics and shado~A'ed the lives of millions of Americans in t he 1970s. Largely owing co surging oil prices, che inflation race spiked to aro und II percent in 1973, d ipped a bit, and chen soared to almost 14 pm:ent by 1980. 0\
AClllnp.g Economy

I fCONOlUC AND SOCIAJ. CHAI(Gts t:N PoST~oS AW.ERICA however. As big operators bought failing farms, average farm size: grew from 375 to 430 acres berwNn 1970 and 1990. Federal su bsid)' programs encouraged che rise of

giant agribusinesscs. Industrial stagnation, or ddndustrlalization, worsened the era's economic woes. The steel and automobile industries were especially hard hit. As soaring gasoline prices boosted sales of mor~: fuel-efficient fon:ign imports, U.S. car

makers su ffered. U.S. purchases of foreign cars, mainly from j apan, grew from 2 mil·

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ing post-v.•u decline olhU\f indusay in urbul nortbt.Ut aod Mid..l'.U

lion in 1970 to 4 million in 1989. Facing se'lere produccion cutbacks, GM, Ford, and Chrysler laid off more than 225,000 ~A
Millions of blacks experienced significanc upward mobility in these rears, thanks to che civil-rights movement. In 1965, black students accounted for under 5 pe:rcenc of to· tal college enrollment; by 1990 che figure had risen to 12 percent, d ose: to their pro· portion in the general population. 1Y's Cosby SOOw, a late--1980s comedy in ~Ailich Bill Co.sb)• played a doctor married to a la~A')'t:r, ponrarcd t his up~A'llrdl)' mobile ~A
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Building on their occupacion of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Ba)' (see Chapter 28), members of the: militant American Indian Movement briefly occupied the Bureau oflndian Affairs in Washington in 1972. 1n response co spreading protests, the JndJan

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718

l

CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EtGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

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Sdf-Dnerminadon Act of 1974 granted tribes control of federal aid programs on the reservations and oversight of their own schools. The 1990 census recorded more than 1.7 million persons as American Indians, in contrast to some eight hundred thousand in 1970. 11lis upsurge reflected not only nacural increase: and echoic pride, but also economic ad\'antages associaced with tribal membership. Under a 1961 law permitting them to buy or develop land for commercial projeccs, tribes launched busjness venrures ranging from resorcs and gambling casinos to mining and logging operacions. Indian rribes also reasserced long-ignored treaty rights chrough the Indian daims Commission, a federal agency set up in 1946. In 1971, the Nacivc peoples of Alaska won 40 million acres and nearly S I billion in settlement of treaty claims. In 1980, the Sioux were awarded S 107 million for Souch Dakota lands taken from them illegally. High rates of joblessness, alcoholism, and discas.e: persisted among Indians. But the renewed pride, economic vcmur~ and progress in asserting treaty rights offered hope. In the popular cuh:ure, movies like Littll! Big Mdn ( 1970) and Ddncrs wilb Wolr·\!1 ( 1990), while idealizing Indians, n:presented an imprm-ement m-er che negative ste· reo types ofearlier 61ms.

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These )'eat'S saw a steady influx of immigrants, both legal and illegal Where-as most immigrants once arrived from \:I Ilion Europe, some 45 percent now came from the Western Hemisphere and 30 percenc from Asia. As in che past, economic need di\."'A' these ne~A•comers. In oil-rich Mexico, for example, falling oil prices in the 1980s worsened che nacion's chronic powny, spurring many to seek jobs in the north. But life in the United Stares was often harsh. In 1980, some 2-6 perccnc of pct'SOns of Hispanic origin in che United Scates liw~d in poverty, twice the national rate. Oespice ad\·mity, Hispanic newcomers presen·ed their language and traditions, influencing U.S. cultun: in the process. Millions of Hispanic immigrancs lacked offidal documentation. Man}' sweated in che garmem trades, cleaned houses, held low·pa)ing scnice· sector jobs, and labored in agricultural 6elds. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, an update of che 1965 Immigration Act (see Chap· tcr 28), outlawed che hiring of undocumenced immigrancs, but offered legal status co aliens ~A•ho had li\'ed in the Uniced States for 6vc ) 'eat'S. Immigration from Asia climbed as nl"''-x:omers arrived from South Ko· rea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The moti\'e, again, was primarily eco· nomic, though many Hmong (mong), the indigenous people of Indochina who had supported the Uniced Scares in che Viemam War, came for political reasons. Valuing education, man)' Asian immigrants ad\•anced academicall)' and economically.

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CHECKI NG I N fam ily &rmtr:~ b«.lmt .ln tnd .lngt-l'l'd spuie. .l$ ag ribw:ines:s boomtd.

Somt Afrit om·Ameritan' mack gre.lt ~in' in tdu c.u:iQO and economi ~. but many l'l'maintd trapped in po'A"rt)' in innt r-city slum' plagutd b)•drup: ;md b light. N.lti\'C' Am«ic.uu: continutd to pwh for tbtir righu and $Utc«dtd in ~ini.ng the c-nfol'l'tme'-nt of,omt A maj« ' h iA: in immigutiQO pat· t«nJ brough t .ln in Aux of liisp.lnic .l.nd A.ii..ln newcom«$. A .s\\\"lling numb« ol'iUc-g.ll immi· gr,;an u .lrrived from Mexico .l.nd Centul Ame'-Mca and fre-quently f.lctd h.,;ardship ;and exploituion.

I YEAAs OF M..UISE: Po.st·WArtll.c .ut PouncsAND DtPLOMAO', '974;98•

719

YEARS OF MALAISE: POST-WATERGATE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY, 1974-1981 What W8'1lt the major achi6V6ftl6nts 1md failures ofthe Ford 11nd C11rter prssid6ncies? In the: aftermath of the Viemam failure and Richard Nixon's disgrace, l're.si· dents Gerald Ford and jimmy Can-er grappled with domescic and foreign problems. Amid intlacion and industrial stagnacion, une-ase gripped the nacion. Globally, t he Iacer 1970s brought mostly humiliations, from the fi nal Vietnam withdrawal to a maddening hostage crisis. The confident 1950s and carl}' 1960s, when prosperous America had sa\'Otcd its role as t he Free World 's le-ader, now seem ed remote. A nation long convinced thac it was immune to the historical forces char constrained ocher soderies seemed prey to forces beyond its controL But cvcnrs made d ear that America could not t:\•ade global in ...olw~menc.

Gerald Ford became: president on August 9, 1974, after Richard M. Nixon's resignation. A Michigan congressman who had served as Republican minority leader before becoming vice president, Ford displa)'cd a likeable dccenc:y. Most Americans found him a wek ome relief after Nixon. The: honeymoon soon ended, ho~A'CVCr, when Ford pardoned Richard Nixo n for "an}' and all crim es'" com· mitred ~Ailile in office. Ford said he ~A'llnted to help heal t he body politic, but man}' Americans reacted wit h outrage. More conservative than Nixon on domestic issues, Ford vetoed environmental, social-welfare, and public-interest measures, but t he heavily Democratic Congress overrode most ofche \-ecoes. Economic problems dogged Ford's presidency. In 1973, oil prices had shot up as a result of an Arab oil embargo and price hikes by t he Organization of ~trole:um Exporting Countries (OPEC), a marketing consortium fonne:d in 1960. The United Stares, heavily dependent o n imported oil, felt t he shock as surging prices ofgasoline:, heating oil, and other petroleum-based produces worsened the inflationary spiral and produced long lines of angry drivers ac gas stations. In October 1974, Ford um-eiled a program of volumar}' price restraint dubbed "Whip Inflation Now" (WIN). but prices continued to worn. When the: Federal Re· sen -e Board tried to cool che cconom}' by raising interest rates, a severe recession resulted Unem ployment approached II percent by 1975. Americans for the 6rst rime since World War II struggled co curb energ}'Consumption. Congress set fuel-efficiency standards for automobiles in 1975 and imposed a national speed limic of 6fcy-6 ..-e miles per hour. National morale sank further in April 1975 when cheSouth Vietnamese govern· ment fd~ ending cwo decades of U.S. effort in Vietnam. The TV nccworks chronicled desperate helicopter evacuations fro m che U.S. embassy in Saigon (soon renamed Ho Chi Minh City) as North Vietnamese troops dosed in. A few weeks Lacer, Cambodia seized a U.S. merchant ship, the Ma.JddJtt.. A military rescue ordered by Ford

Ciet1W fGfd , .hiny.c"ighth Pno:sidmt of tbt Unittd Statt$; b~ ont term in offino c.wt"nb:ul. owm by his p>U'don of Nixon aod m economic R'CII'uion

Tbt C.ll!laM!r Prelldency of Gerald Ford, 1974-1977

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CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.l lVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

freed the thirty·nine Md)\1.glk:.crew membcrs but cost the lives of forty-one U.S. ser· \i cemen. Asche nation entered the election year 1976- also the bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence-Americans found little reason for optimism.

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Gerald Ford \N'On che 1976 Republican nomination. Jimmy Carter, a Georgia peanut grower and former gow:mor, swepc the Democratic primaries by stressing themes that appealed to post·Waterg.u-e America; his honesty, his sea· lm-1981 tus as a Wash ington o utsider, his Christian faith. Carter won b)•a natro~A' margin. The voce broke along class lines: the "-"ell·to.do went for Ford; the poor, ow:rwhdmingly for Carter. Despite the rising conscrvati\'e tide, popular revulsion against Nixon and \l'atergate temporarily interrupted the Republican advance. In office, Carter rejected the crappings of Nixon's «imperial presidency."' O n inauguration da)', he walked from the Capitol to the White House. Despite che populist symbolism, Caner ne\·er framed a d ear political philoso· phy. liberals and conservatives both claimed him.. He and Congress fought che rc_. cession with a ux cue and a modest publk·\N'Orks program, and the jobless rate fell to around 5 percent by fate 1978. But with public opin ion corning against«big &0\'· ernmenc,'" he offered few proposals to deal ~Aith inner·city powrty, industrial de· cline, and other major problems. Environmental issues loomed large for Carter. In 1980, Congress passed the Alaska Lands Act, which sec aside more chan JOO million acres of public land in Alaska for park~ wildlife refuges, and national forests. Energy companies hoping co tap Alaska's oil fields protested, and Laid plans co carry on the batd e. Carter confronted an emironmental crisis in Niagara Falls, New York. In a dis· trictcalled Low: Canal, schools, hom ~ and apanmmts had been built o n the site of a former chemical dump. In the J970s, "''hen residencs complained of odors and strange substances oozing from the soil, tests confirmed chat toxic chemicals were seeping inco basements and polluting the air and water. Medical researchers found elevated levds ofcancer, miscarriages, and birch defeccs among love Canal residents. In 1978 President Caner authorized federal funds to relocate LO\•e Canal families. In late 1980, as his term ended, Carcersjgned legislation creating a fedcral"Superfund" to d ean up the nation's mosc polluted induscrial sites. Overall, Carter's domestic record pl'O\"Cd chin. Congress ignored his proposals for g01o-emment administram-e reforms. His calls for a national health·insurance pro· gram, 0\"el'haul of the wclfatcS)'Stem, and reform of the income-tax latA'S fell flac. "Carter couldn'c gee the Pledge ofAllegiance through Congress,"' groused one legislator. Carter's forcign·policy record proved similar!)' mixed. As a candidate he had urged more emphasis on protecting human rights ~A'Orl dwi de, in contrast co Henr}' Kissinger's single· minded focus on U.S. national interests. His secretary of state, C)'fUS Vance, ~A'Orked to combat abuses in Chile, Argentina, South Africa, and else· where. In latin America, the president completed negotiations o n tre-aties cransfer· ring the Canal Zone to Panama by 1999. In a rare success for Carter, the Senate rntified the treaties. In dealing with America's Cold War ad\·ersaries China and the Soviec Union, Carter pursu ed che Nixon-Kissinger scrategy of seeking better relations. When Mao

Tbe Outsider IS lllslder: President Jimmy carter.

I YEAAS OF M..UISE: PoST·WATtii.C .UE PoUnCSAND DIPLOMAO', '974;981

721

Zedong's successor, Dtng Xiaoping, expressed ince:rest in closer ties, Caner re· sponded by restoring full diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979. Toward the So· viet Union, Caner 6rsc showed conciliation, but toughness ultimacely 'A'OO out. In 1979, Career and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT II t reaty, limit· ing each side's nuclear arsenals. The conciliatory approach d issolved in januar}' 1980 when Russia invaded Afghanistan. As U.S.-Soviet relations soured, Caner withdrew SALT II from the Senate and adopted a series of anci ~SoYi« measure~ including a borcort of che 1980 Summer O l)mpics in Moscow.

Carter's proudest achievement and his most bictcr sctback both came in the Middle East. In September 1978 he Peace Accords and hosted Egypcian leader Anwar el.Sadat (AN·wahr el-sah· Hostaces OAHT) and Israeli leader Menachcm Begin (meh·NAKH· em BAY--gin) at Camp David. "'there they agreed on a peace frame""-urk. The resulting Camp David Accords sec a timetable for giving more autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza,. occupied by lsrad since the 1967 war. In March 1979, the cwo leaders signed a fonnal peace treaty at the White House. The president's hopes for a comprehensi\J'C Middle East setd emenc collapsed as the Israeli govern· ment continued co build jewish sctdcmems in the occupied territories and Islamic fundamentalists assassinated Sadac in 1981. Nonetheless, Camp David "''lls the high point of Career's presidency. The low poim of his presidency also came in the Middle East. l'rotests against the repressi\--e regime headed by the shah of Iran, a longtime American diem and ally, s"''CUed throughout 1978 and dimaxed injanuar}' 1979 as the shah left Iran. A)'lltollah Ruhollah Khomcini (~·uh-TOll·uh roo-HOLL-ah ho-MAY·ntt}, "'tho had orchestrated the antishah mo'lement from exile in Paris, returned tTiumphantl}' to Tehran co impose strict Islamic rule and preach hatred of«che great Satan,'" the United Scates.

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like this ;at the U.S. emb;usy in Tehr;an for the TV c:;am· C'r;tS, Americ:;u~ frusb';alion $0.:1~ ;a~ President C;.lrter's politic:;al fortunes plunged .

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CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

When Career aliO'I'-\!d che shah to enter the United States fo r cancer treatment, Khomeini supporters sconned che American embassy in Tehran and seized more than fifty American hostages. For t he nexc 444 days the Carter administration 'A'llS virtually parai)'Zed as appalled Americans wacched TV images of blindfolded hos· tages, anti-American mobs, and burning U.S. flags. Noc until j anuary 20, 1981, t he day Carter left office, did the Iranian authorities release the hostages.

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Inflation reached horrendous l ew~ls as Career's cenn ~A'Ore on. As O I'EC boosted oil prices, U.S. gasoline prices edged fnlslratioll as toward che then-unh eard-of l ew~ I of $1 a gallon. The na· carter's Term Elld:s tional mood soured as inflation surged and as lines of fuming motorists again surrounded gas stations. As the Federal Reserve Board bat· ded inflation by raising interest rates, mortgages and business loans became prohib· icively expmsivc. Economic activity sla.lled, ~A
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scJVacion demanded high priority. As early as J9n Career had created a new Department of Energy and proposed higher oil and gasoline taxes, tax credits for conseJV.uion measui\'".S, and research on alrernariweoergysources. HO\l\...,cr, he failed ro resoh\! cither dw: hostage crisis abroad or the energy crisis at home. Americans t urned against the remote figure in the White House. Cart· er's apprO\'lll raring plummeted co 26 percmt in summer 1979. T he presi· dent delivered a televised address discussing ..national malaise" and "loss of confidmce,'' but che speech only deepmed the spreading suspicion that Carter himself ~A'as a large part of the problem. lhe Democrats glumly re· nominated jimm}' Carter in 1980, buc defeat in Nm-·ember loomed. Carter's suddm emergence in 1976 illuscrated how, in the lV era, a rela· th't: unknOtA'n could bypass party poW'Cr brokers and win a national foUo~A'· ing. Voters longing to see integrity restored to che presidency had embraced him. Keenly analytical, Carter idmtified many emerging issues, including en· vironmental protection.: energy conseJVation.: and refonn of the nation's tax, welfare, and health care systems. Buc he Lacked the political skills co build a consensus around his proposed solutions. A post-presidential career of pub· lie service restored Career's reputation, and brought him the Nobel Peace l:trize in 2002. But ~Aohen he left office in january 1981, few expressed regrecs.

...._...

Th<" Ford admin i,;tr~tion ,;trugglcd with continu<"d i ntl~tion, an atl cri' U, and th<" collap,;co al South Vi« nam. C;uu r w.u dect<"d ~"an ouuid<"r but fou nd it impo:r.,;ibl<" to p'"-m tha t wa)'· T h<" Ca1u r ~dmi ni,uati on <"-nio>'<'
I

THE REAGAN REVOLUTION, 1981-1984 Wlwt con beliefs most slwped ROM!d Reagan's presidency?

In 1980, with Carter"s popularity ab)'Smally low, Ronald Reagan, a Republican who promised a break wit h che past, won the presidency(sce Map 30.1). 11le Reagan era saw mixed economic dcvdopments. It began wich a recession, and ended with a

I THE REAGAif RE\'OWTION, t98•- •9i4 stock-market crash. In bCN~n. hoW'CV'Cr, inflation cased, business activity picked up, and the stock markec surged. While Reagan's program of tax cues, military spending, and busjness deregulation pro· Yided some economic stimulus, these polides also ga\>t: rise to mounting federal deficits. An avid Cold Warrior, Reagan in his firsc term blasted che Soviecs rhetorically, pursued a cosdy military buildup, and financed guerrillas seeking co ovcrchrow leftist regimes in Larin America. Uke other presidents before and since, he also grappled with crises in the Middle East.

723

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.....

Ronald Reagan grew up in Dixon, IUinois, the son of an alcoholic father and a churchgoing evangelical mother. He first came co the public e)>t: as a Holl)'WOOd actor and president of the Scr~n Actors' G uild. A New Dealer in che M.lp 30.1 TIM Eltdioo ol1980 1930s, Reagan had mo\·ed to the right in che J950s, Ji:mmyC:uter's unpopul o:~rity o:~nd Ron o:~ld Rto:~g:u~ 's and in 1954 had become the General Electric Com· td egenic: ~pt;~~l combined to give Re;~~g:u~ ;a crushing dectOf';al vietor-y. pany's corporate spokesperson. As governor of California ( 1967- 1975), he popularized conservati\>t: ideas and denounced campus demonstrators. In the 1980 Republican primaries, Reagan easjJy bested his principal opponenc, George H. W. Bush (facher of the later Presidem George W. Bush), ~Ailom he then chose as his vice·presidencial running mace. He faced a u>t:akened Jimm)' Carter in the general election. Benefiting from the erosion of Democratic strength in the South fostered by George Wallace and by Richard Nixon's southern strategy, Reagan carried e\>t:ry southern state except Carter's own Georgia. <.>vcr half of white bluecollar workers, once solidly Democratic, \'Oted Republican. Of FOR's New Deal coalition, o nly black voters remained firmly Democratic. Republicans gained e!CV(!n Senate seacs, giving them a majority for the first tim e since 1955. j erry Falwell and other politicized e\•angdkals helped Reagan's cause. Fal~A•dl 's Primary Source: First Success of the pro-Reagan Moral Majority registered an estimated 2 million ne~A' \'Oters in 1980 and Religious Right 1984. Populacion changes also contributed to Reagan's success. While Democratic strongholds in the urban Northeasc and Midwest had lo.sc population in the 1970s, 1b:~ California. Florida, and other more consen•ativc Sunbd t states had grown rapidly. Whac underlay Reagan's appeal? First, voters frightened b)•stagflation u>t:lcomed his seemingly painless panacea: a big cax cut thac would stimulate the economy. MoreO\'et, Reagan's praise of private initiative struck many \'Oters as preferable to the liberal ideology of«gm--e:rnmem handoucs.'" Reagan also em braced the cultural \'alues of che emerging conservati't-e: movement. Man)' Americans at all socioeconomic levels, disturbed by the excesses of the 1960s, longed for a rctum to a partly imagined time when traditional values prevailed.

••

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CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

Reagan, a seasoned actor, WO\'l' these essentially negative themes into an appeal· ing positive message of support for "traditional values.'" His unabashed patriocism, calls for military strength, and praise: of America•s greatness soothed the battered psrche of a nacion t raumatized by Yiemam and Watergate. Some thought Reagan glib and super6cial and his ideology fundamentally mean-spirited. Buc in 1980, a majority ofvocers found his upbeat message inspiring.

Reagan' s economic program. called Reaganomics b}' the media, boiled do~A'll to the belie-f that American capital· ism, freed of hea"Y caxes and gow~rn ment regulation, would achie\'l' wonders of productivity. Reagan's 6rsc budget message proposed a 30 percent reduction in federal income taxes over three years. Trimming the proposal slighd)', Congress in May 198 1 voted a 25 percent income-tax cut O\'er three )'tatS. To make up fo r the lost m-enues, Reagan proposed cuts in such programs as school lunches, student loans, job training, and UJban mass transit. Congress cut less than Reagan wanted, but it did s lash more than $40 billion from domestic spending in 198 1. Consen•acive Democrats supported the reductions. Although mainstream economists ~A'ltrned chat the tax cut would produce catastrophic federal de6cits, Reagan insisted that loY~Cr tax races ~A'Ould stimulate economic growth, pushing up tax rew:nucs. Reaganomics also involved less gO\"Crnment regulation of business. Deregulation had begun under Cane-r, but Reagan extended it into new are-as such as bank· ing. the- savings-and-loan industry, transportation, and communications. 1'he Federal Communicacions Commission cue fede-ral rules governing che broadcast industry. The secretary of t ransportation cue regulacions aimed at reducing air pollution and improving \-ehicle- e-fficiency and safcty. Secretary of the Interior James Wacc of Wyoming opened federal wilderne-ss areas and coastal waters to oil, gas, and timber companies, and cue back on endangered· spedes laws. Before coming to Washington, Watt had spearheaded the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion, a movement of ranchers, farmers, and mine O'A'llers aimed at shifting fede-ral lands in the \'t;1esc to state and county control. All-er petitions demanding his ouscer garnered more than a million s ignatures, and a series of public· relations gaffes, Wan resigned in 1983. Strongly pro-business, Reagan took a tough Line against organized labor. In 1981, when che Professional Air 1hffic Controllers Organizacion (I'ATCO) 'A'l'flt on strike, Reagan invoked che 1948 Tall--Hartley latA' against strikes b)• federal c-mpl~s. and ordered chem back co work When more than 11,000 PATCO members defied the or· der, Reagan 6red them and barred them permanent!)' from fede-ral employment. While implementing Reaganomics, the administration also faced che immedi· are- problem of inflacion. The Federal Rescrw Board led the: charge, pushing interest rates ever highe-r. This harsh medicine, coupled with a drop in oil prices, did its job. Jntlacion fell to around 4 percent in 1983 and held stead)' thereafte-r. The Fed' s high interest rates soon broughton a recession, hO""-\....,-er. By late 1982, unempiO)menc stood at 10 percent. The- Fed's policy also hurc U.S. exports. As foreign investors bought dollars to earn high U.S. interest rates, the dollar rose in \'alue: vis-3-vis foreign currencies, making U.S. goods more expensh-e abroad. With exports

ltap....-s

I THE REAGAif RE\'OWTION, t98•- •9i4

7 25

declining and U.S. consumers bu)ing cars, T Ys, and stereo S)'Stems made: in j apan and elsewhere, the U.S. annual trade de6dt shot up, reaching a whopping $1 J 1 billion in 1984. Soaring federal deficits added to the economic muddle. Reagan's cax curs reduced federal revenues ~Aithouc immediately producing che predicted business boom, ~Afiile increased military appropriations far exceeded domestic spending curs.. With che budgec and trade deficits mounting. Reagan in 1982- 1983 accepted areduced rate of military spending. less drastic cuts in social programs, emergency job programs, and various tax increases disguised as «revecnue-enhancement measures." The economy remained ~A'Orrisome through 1982. Like: other recent presidents, Reagan appeared headed for failure. In the 1982 midtmn deccions, the Democrats regained cwenty-six House: sears.. But 1983 brought an economic rebound. Encouraged by tax cuts, falling interest rates, and evidence that inflation had b~n tamed at lase, consumcrs went on a bu)ing binge:, and a booming stock markct e"loked memo· ries of the 1920s. Corporate: mergers proliferated. Chevron bought Gulf for $13 billion; GE acquired RCA (and its NBC subsidiary) for $6.3 billion. Banks and savings-and-loan companies, newly deregulated,. ladled our billions to developers planning shopping malls, luxury apartments, condominium~ and retirement villages. 11lrough it all, the stock market roared on. The Wall Street frenzy had an unsavor}' underside. Ivan Boesk)' went to prison after a 1986 conviction for insider trading. O n October 19, 1987, the stock market crashed. reducing the paper value of the nation's stocks by 20 percent ()I.'Crnight. 11le marker re<()I.'Cred. bur the collapse had a sobering effect o n giddy investors. Even during che great bull market, econo mic problems persisted. The trade gap widened; che deficit passed S200 billion in I 986j and man}' fanners, inner city poor, recent immigrants, and displaced industrial workers suffered through the boom rimes. But by 1988- just in rime for another deccion campaign- the o•..-e rall ceonomic picture looked brighter than ic had in )'Caf"S.

Unleashing blasrs of anri...Soviec rhetoric,. Reagan described the Soviet Union as an «evil empire" and ..the fo. cus of evil in the modem world."' Anti·SO\i ct sentiment crested in September 1983 ~Afien che Soviets shot down a Korean passenger plane that had strared into their airspace. killing 269. Obsession with the Soviets also influenced Reagan policy in El Salvador and Ni· caragua, two poor Central American nations caught up in revolutionar}' turmoiL The Reagan White House backed the Salvadoran military junta in irs brutal sup· pression of a lefcisc insurgency supported by Fidel Castro's Cuba. A U.S.-backed moderate wo n El Salvador's 1984 presidential election. but the killing of the regime's opponents went o n. In Nicaragua, the Caner administration had iniciall)' grance:d aid to the Sandinista rcvolucionaries who overthrew dkcacor Anastasio Somoza (a.hn-ah-STAHSS-et>·oh soh-MOH-zuh) in 1979. Reagan reversed chis policy, claiming char the Sandiniscas were turning Nicaragua into a procommunisc state like Cuba. In 1982, the CIA organized and financed an anci ~Sandi n ista guerrilla anny, called the con· eras, based in neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica. The contras, with links to the

Tilt "&&I Empire" a.l Crises In lbe Middle East

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CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

ATlANTIC OCEAN

VENEZUELA

PACJ~IC

OCEAN

GUYAtlA

COLOIABIA

BRAZIL

Mop lO.l The U.Htd Statts io lillio America and tilt Corilll>til Plagued by p01o<e")', popula tion pi'\':SSU""-~, reprc:ssi:\<e "'ltimes, ;and d rug tr:~Rieki ng, Latin A.meriQ s;aw turmoil ;u~d con Aict- but ;al:;o $Oint hopeful devdopme,.a--in tht 1980s ;and 1990:;.

lnteracti\•e Map: The U5. Wl the Caribbean & Central

America

hated Somoza regime. conducted raids, planced min~ and carried out sabotage in· side Nicaragua chac took a heavy toll of civilian lives. For Reagan, the campaign co O\~rthrow the SandinislaS and co concrol C'\"Cnts in latin America became an obsession (see Map 30.2). ..The national security of all the Americas is at slake," he somberly cold a joint session of Congress in May 1983. Fear· ing anocher Viemam, Americans grew alarmed as details of this U.S.-run war leaked out. Congress voted a yearlong halt in U.S. military aid co the contras in December 1982 and imposed a two-year ban in 1984. Despite these prohibitions, the White House continued to funn el money concributed by foreign gM>ernmmts and right· wing groups in che United Scates co che comras. Reagan's one unqualified success in l acin America invoh·ed the tin}' Wesc Indian island of Grenada, ~Aohere a 1983 coup had installed a radical pro-Castro gQI.!'Crn· menc.. In October 1983, t"''O chousand U.S. troops im•aded Grenada and sec up a pro-U.S. gm-·ernmem . Democrats grumbled, but most Grenadians, as wdl as ocher \l1esc Indian go\·emments, apprM'ed. The Middle East, so fruscrating to earlier administration~ also bedeviled Presi· denc Reagan. lace in 1980, Iraq under strongman Saddam Hussein invaded its neighbor Iran. l he incoming Reagan administration, hoping to slow the spread of Islamic fundamentalism as represenced by Iran's ami-American A)'lltollah Khomeini,

I THE REAGAif RE\'OWTION, t98•- •9i4

727

backed Iraq in this bloody cight·)'ear war. (T~A'O decades facer, under very different circumstances, the United States would invade Iraq to ow~rthto'A' Saddam Hussein (ue Chapm 32).) Meanwhile, che conflict among Israel, the Palestinians, and Israel's Arab foes dragged on. Many Americans felt a strong bond with Israel, and the United States ga\-e Israel large annual grancs in military aid and other assistance. Man)' Bible· prophecy believers saw Israel's fate as connected to God's end-time plan. At the same time, che United Scates also gave extensive aid to Egypt and relied heavily on oil from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states chac \l't:re scrongl)' ami-Israel. Whipsawed by conflicting pressures, Reagan enjoyed no more su ccess than other U.S. presidents in achieving peace in the region. In 1981 Israel and the l'alestine Liberation Organization (PLO) concluded a cease-fire. But the I'LO continued building up forces at its base in southern Leba· non. In june 1982, Israeli troops under General Arid Sharon, Israel's defense minis· tcr, im•aded Lebanon, defeated the PLO, and forced its leaders, including chairman Yasir Arafac, to e\•acuatelebanon. This invasion deepened tensions among lebanon's various Christian and Mus· lim factions. With Sharon's apprO\'lll, a Ltbanese Christian militia force entered tv10 Palestinian refugee camps near Beiruc to rooc out armed gunmen. Instead, in re· \
Convinced that the United States had gto'A'tl dangerously weak militaril)', Reagan launched a massiw military ex· L pansion. The Pentagon's budgec near!)' doubled, reaching more: than $300 billion by 1985. The buildup included nudear"-eapons. In 1983 the administration deplo)
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l

728

CHAPtER JO

CONSERVA.llVE RESU'RGENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

Sb'ntcit Deftue l•iitiltift

I

c:.mdy~sur Wars"

program m build a missiltdtfmst ")'JJtt'm

protestcrs packed New York's Ce-ntral Park in june 1982. Thac No\·ember, voters in nine states appr()I."Cd nudear·frecu resolutions. To councer the freeze campaign, Reagan in Ma.rch 1983 proposed the Strategic Defense lnJtiative (SOl), a computerized anri ~m issile system imutving space·based lasers and other high-tech components. Cricks quickly dubbed the scheme "Star Wars," and expe-rts ~A>arned of its monumental technical hurdles and che danger that it would furchcr escalate che nuclear-arms race. Nevertheless, Reagan prevailed. A costly SOl research program began, and the f recu campaign faded.

The 1984 Republican com·ention enchusiascically renomi· nated Reagan. 10 his admirers, the president had fulfilled his promise to revitalize the free-t:nterprise S}'Stem, re· build U.S. military might, and make America again "stand tall'" in the .....-orld. They applauded his tax cu~ his actacks on big go\·crnment, and his tough stance toward the Soviets. lhe booming economy further strengthened his popularity. Reagan's 1981 selection of Sandra Day O'Connor as the first "-'Oman jusrice on the U.S. Supreme Court had "-'On widespread praise. So had his jaunty response: in March 1981 when a ricocheting bullet fired 1:>}• a deranged young man struck him in the chest. Rushed co the hospital, Reagan had insjstcd on walking in. "Please tell me )'OU're all Republicans," he had quipped co physicians. The field of Democratic hopefuls included )esse)ackson, an African-American civil-rights leader and former aide co Marrin Luther King. Jr., ~Aoho proposed a

~IHpn Reelected

Josse lodctoo

I

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ltadtt -.flo.st •r;a.inbow nuli. tion• tamJUig:n fot prt:r:idtnt in 1984 gamtml J.S million votl'5

---~l ,._~~~~~~~~-~'·'~--I 00 Jw.:ll "' Rupn t nt"'"'d offic"' llttesling opc:imi:~m, p.u:rioti:~m, u x tut5, and cukural conJt.r...ati,:m. •Rtagilnomio:'' ltd to :~harp tax cu t,:, an t\l\"0 ,:harpc"r ri:~t in the kckral deficit, and 1\"du«d ftckral nogula~ cion o(bu,:intu and indu:~ur. A .se""r" r«eslion tarlr i.n t ht ad~ mini..strahon pve way tn boom timu and a JOaring .Mock m.ut.:«. Rupn dtpin«< t ht Sovitt UniQO ;u the u ltim.nt sour« of nil in tht W~!C'I d.

Ot:~pit"' a congreslion.al ban, th"' Rupn admi niJtration !P'~ aid tn tht conua:~ 6ghting tht Sandini:~t.l p..-rnmmt in Nicaragua.

Tht admin iJtration nearly doubk d milit.lry :~pt.nding. built u p th"' n uclear ar,;ena.l, and promottd th"' conti"O\~ni.al ''St.lr \l'ar,:• mi.»ilt dtftnst 5)'5ttm.

"rainbo~A' coalition" of African-Americans, Hispanics, displaced workers, and other groups hard~hit economically. jackson garnered 3.5 million voces and "-'On in five southern states. But fOrmer vice president Walter Mondale came in firsc overaLL His vice--presidential choice, New York congresswoman Geraldine Ferraro, became the first woman to run on a major-party presi· denrial ticket. Democratic campaigners criticized Reagan for runawa}' mili· tary spending, massive budget deficits, cuts in social programs, and assaults on che government's regulator}' poY~Crs. Reagan and Vice-President Bush ~A'On 59 pm:ent of the popular ..uce and carried e-.-cry state but Mondale's Minnesoca plus the District of Columbia. Many white .....-orking-d ass voters again defected to Reagan. Reagan's ideo· logical appeal and his master}' ofTV, combined with prosperity, had carried the day. The Democrats still controlled che House of Represencarivcs, but the Republicans' po.st-1968 dominance of the White House-interrupted only by j imm}' Career's single tenn- continued. Some frustrated De-mocrats sought to 1\...,.·erse their image as a «big gm•· ernmenr" and "tax-and-spend" party dominated by special interests. In 1985 Arkansas governor Bill Clinton, Senator Al Gore of 1Cnnessee, and ocher moderates formed the Democratic leadership Council (DLC) to scake out a more centrist party position. In the early 1990s Clinton ~A'Ould use: the DLC as a springboard fur a presidential bid.

REAGAN'S SECOND TERM, 1985-1989 What key domestic and internation11l dewlopments ma'*.ed Reaflln's second term? Economic problems persisted in Reagan's second term, and the president made cwo Suprem e: Courc appointments. But f:'\'ents abroad- and a major scandal related co the administration's forcign policy- dominace:d these years. An unexpected easing of Cold War tensions signaled che approaching end of chat long conflict. Continued

tensions in the Middle: Ease and a wa\J'C of terrorist attacks made clear, hO\I.\'!'\-er, that even a post- Cold War ~A
Sllprtme Court Appolnt.ents, llililpt Deftdts, lhe Inn-Contra S
Reagan's second cenn brought some legislative achieve· mcnrs, including the Immigration Refonn and Control

Act and a tax-reform law that spared some 6 million lowincome Americans from paying any income taxes. Reagan reshaped the Supre-me Court in 1986 b}•elevating William Rchnquist, a Nixon appointee, to che chief justice-ship upon the retirement of\1/arrm Burger, and appointing Amonin Scalia to replace him. Scalia "-'OU!d pnwe one-of the Courc' s most outspokenly conservative members. When another \'acancy opened in 1987, Reagan nominated Robert Bork, a judge and legal scholar whose abrasi\'f: pe-rsonality and rigid views led the Senate co re-ject him. A second nomination also failed, but Reagan's third choice, Anthony Kcnne-d)', a conse!Vatiw California jurist, "-'On quick confirmation. Federal budgctde6cits-a byproduct of Reagan's tax cuts and military spending increases- surpassed $200 billion in 1985 and 1986, and hovered at about $ 150 billion for che next cwo y~ars . lbis, coupled wit h the )'llWning trade gap and a savings· and-loan industry scandal relate-d to deregulation (see- Chapter 31), were Reagan's principal economic legacies. The worst crisis of Reagan's presidency, the so-called Iran-contra scandal, began obscurely late in 1986 when a Beirut newspaper reported that in 1985 t he United States had shipped, via Israel, SOB antitank missiles to Iran, America's a\'"'"'-ed enem}'· Admitting the sale, Reagan claime-d that the goal had btcn to encourage- ..mod· crate elements" in 1Chran and to gain t he release of U.S. hostage-s htld in Lebanon by pro·lranian groups. In Februar}' 1987 a presidentially appointed im-estigarive pane-l blamed Reagan's chief of staff, Donald Regan, ~A•ho resigned. More derails soon emerged, including the 1\....,-e:lacion that Lieutenant Colonel O l iver North, a National Security Council aide in t he White House, had secre-tly di· \'f:rted profits from t he Iran arms sales to the Nicaraguan contras at a time- ~A>hen Congress had forbidden such aid. To hide this crime, North and his secretary had altered and ddered scnsici\J'C computer Iiles and destrore-d incriminating documents. In May 1987 a joinc House-Senate investigative committee opene-d hearings on the scandal. The nation watched in fascination as Nonh, re-splendent in his ma· rine unifonn, boasted of his patriotism, and as National Security Adviser john l'oin· dexter cesti6e-d that he had de-liberately conceale-d the fu nd-diiJ'Crsion scheme from Reagan.

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IOW.

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730

OfAPlER JO

CONSEilVA.llVE R ESU'I!GENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

Prima:ry Source: Oliver North

Testimony

----·-

r.us (INF) TtNty lltk of 6 nt m";aty to b;ao .m enri"" dw of nudeu wtapow: m~or u.s..

!icNitt <1~1WtU

The committee found no positive proof of Reagan's knowledge of illegalities, but roundly criticized the lax management style: and conce:mpc for the fa"'' chac had pervaded the Reagan White House. In 1989, North was convicted of obstructing a congressional inquiry and destroying and faJsjfying official documents. (Theconvic· tion was later 1\.'-erscd on a technicaliry.) Although ultimately less damaging to the: presidency chan che Watergate scandal, che Iran-contra affair dogged the Reagan administration's 6nal )'tat'S as a serious abuse of cxecucivc power. Other scandals plagued Reagan's second term, including allegations of bribery in military·procumn e:nt concracrs. Atcorney General Edwin Meese resigned in 1988 amid charges that he had used his influence to pro moce ventures in "'+.ich he: had a 6nand al imeresc. ln 1989 came n:wlations chat fonner incerior secretary james Watt and other pro minent Republicans had been paid hundreds of chousands of dollars for using their influence o n behalf of housing devcJopers seeking federal subsidies. Reagan's popularity seemed unaffected by all this dirty linen. l 'he: veteran accor possessed an uncanny ability ro corn·ey warmth and sincerity and to shrug off dam· aging revelations "'ith a d isarming joke. Some dubbed him the Teflon presidentnothing seemed ro stick to him.. Moreover, a surprising turn of C"t-ents in Russia would end his presidency on a high note.

A dramatic warming in -SoYiet· American relations began early in Reagan's second cenn. At meet· ings in Europe in 1985 and 1986, Reagan and the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, revived the stalled arms-control process. Gorbachcv "'-orked to reduce superpower rensions to gain breaching space as he struggled wirh mounting cri· ses ac home:. His ambitious program im·olved nothing less than democratizing the Russjan gOII'Crnmenc and economy, ending the Communist l':uty's absolute power, and loos· ening Moscow's grip on the: satellite nations of Eastern Europe. In j une: 1987, speaking near the Berlin Wall, !'resident Reagan d ramaticall)' declared: "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" That December, in Washingcon, the rn-o leaders signed the lnterme:dJate-range Nuclear Forces (JNF) Treaty, eliminating 2,500 U.S. and Soviet missiles from Europe:. l b is creacy, in rurn, led to Reagan's hisroric visjt ro Moscow in May 1988, where the t"--o leaders scrolled and chatted in Red Square. The INF treaty and Reagan's trip to Moscow ma.rked the beginning of che end of the Cold War. Historians still debate the: rdati\'e imporrance of Reagan's military buildup \"etsus the: Sovier Union's own internal weaknesses in bring· ing about this outcome. Whatt\'et history's judgment, the: face that one of America's mosr dedicated Cold Warriors presided over che: early stages of its demise remains one of che ironies of recent American history.

lelpn's Mission ID Masalw

Prllident RNC"" Visits bd Squart Al. W Cold W:!rcrumb1td, President lk:.g;2n Aew co Moscow ln 1988 co cdtbr.ttt :~ nudt;2r-;~.rm~ reduction tre:~ty with Savitt pl'\"cmi-er Mikh:~il GOt'b:~ehev.

As relations ~Aith Moscaw improved in Reagan's second term, conditions in the: Middle Ease ~A and hostage-takings. In April 1986, after terrorists bombed a Berlin nighcdub popular with American Gls, !'resident Reagan ordered a retaliator}' air attack on Lib)'a, which had been implicated in the bombing. In che worse of the: terrorist incidents, a bomb exploded aboard a Pan Am jet m-er Scotland in December 1988, killing aU259 aboard, including many Americans. In 1991 the U.S. and British gm-emmems formally charged two Libyan officials in the: attack. In 2001, a special Scottish courc sitting in the Netherlands acquitted one of the men bucconvicted the other of murder and imposed a life sentence. This cycle of terrorism reflected profou nd divisions in the Middle Ease. Hatred of Israel gripped parts of the: Arab world, particular!}' among a growing Islamic fundamentalist mm-ement sparked by clerical calls for jihrt.d (holy war in defense of Is· lam) against a secular West. l 'he stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, as wdl as expanding JNish settlements in che Palestinian territories, also fed the: anger that fueled terrorist attacks.

After Nixon's disgrace, Ford's caretaker presi· dency, and Carter•s rocky tenure, Reagan's two full tcnns hdpe:d rescore a sense of stability co American politics. Reagan's domestic record was mixed: inflation eased, and che economy rurned upward, but federal deficits soared, and the: administration ignored festering social issu es, environmental concerns, and long· term economic problems. Reagan's critics dismissed his presidency as a time when self-interest trumped the public good. Apart from anticommunism and flag-waving patriotism, they contended, Reagan offered few goals around which all Americans could rally. Rcaganism offered little to the: poor beyond the: hopes that haw~: always been associated with freHnterprise capitalism. Building on Richard Nixon's strategy (sec Chapter 29), Reagan exploited the anxieties and resentments of middle-class white voters. To his admirers, such criticism was beside the: point. They credited Reagan for reasserting traditional \'alues of self-reliance and free enterprise; criticizing governmental excesses; and rescoring national pride with his infectious optim ism and patriotism. Reagan's militant ancicommu· nism concributed mightily co America's victory in the Cold War. Ronald Reagan died of Alzhe:imer•s disease in 2004, at nincty·three. But ideas un· derlying "the Reagan 1\....,-olution" liw~d on, and sciU influence American politics.

~g.:m won ltgi.d:uiv-e victmiu with t~ll' rd'onn ;md a neY~ immigration

law, but (t
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732

OfAPlER J O

C ONSEilVA.l lVE R ESU'I!GENCE, ECONOMIC WOES, FOil.EIGH CHALlENGES, t974...,S1

C hapte r Su (ff)

D OWNLOAD THE

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MPJ AVOt O R lE O F THE Cl-lAPTER SUMMARY, AND

Whot issues and trends helped spork a gowing conservative movement in the 1970s? (page 710)

I

Many of the issues tha[ had dominared che sixcics continued to rm-:rbccate [hrough American lite. Environmentalism, especially concems about nuclear power, expanded. Feminism advanced, but women found [hemsdw:s bumping up against the"glass ceiling" chat kept the coopemteelite a male presetVr. AIDS .shore
Whot social and eronomic developments most affected Amen·can life

I

between 1974 and 1989? (page 716)

Family fanns continued to diminish in importance and number, displaced by agribusiness. Some African·Americans made great gains, but many !an· guished in poverty, especially in inner cities plagued t,· drugs and decay. A ma· jor .shift in immigration patterns brought -an influx of Hispanic and Asian newcomers, but illegal immigration increased, especially from Mexico and Cen· [raJ America.

Whot were the major achievements and failures ofthe Ford and Carter

I

presidencies? (page 719)

Neithet administtation was -able to contain infiarion, made v.nrse t,· OPEC· cn:ated oil crises in 1973 and 1979. The Carter administration did enjoy some foreign-policy successes, notabl}' the Camp David Accords that the president brokered bctv.ttn Egypt and Jsracl. Ho.,.·c~w. [he nagging Jran hostage crisis grawly weakened the Carter administration.

I

What rore beliefs most shaped Ronald ReafjJn's presidency? (page 722)

Under Reag;m's e<:onomic policies, dubbed ..Reaganomics;•• sharp tax curs led to steep drficirs, and deregulation reduced go~-emmen t ovrr.sight of bu.si· ness, with mixed results. Calling the Soviet Union an "evil empirr," Reag-an supplied arms and other aid ro [he contras, -ami·Sandinista guerrillas fighting in Nicaragua, despite a congressional ban. Military spending soared, including funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative C'Star Wars'"), Reag-an•s controvrr· .sial missile-dcfrnse scheme.

KEY TERMS

AIDS {p. m) Three Mill> Island {p. m) Equal Rig!ltsAiool
What key domesUc and int.rnatlonal deV!!Iopr,.mU ma.Yd ReaWJn~ second term? (paf1729)

I

As chc: rcderal ddkit md ttadC' g.ap .soan!d~ the United Scares btc.unr adebrot naoon. Despite sccond-tcrm JCillld.ds,tncluding ltln•conrtJ., Rrag:;an ~m~1~d popul.u. Muung hu •tvll cmpt~" rh~rK. RugJ.n mer _,rh Mtkhail Gotbacbrv as thr-Cold Wu ~Avund down. Condtt.ons m thC' Mtddlc Eul dttrrior:u:td, hc:M·rw:r, as VlOima btt•-cm P.lk.stmwu .and lJ:rulincrcutd, and a su~ in mrorist attacks thct;atmtd Amrna and oc.hc:t Wcs~m nations.

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CHAPTER 31

1988-2000

C HAPTER PREVIEW

The Bush Yta..: Global Reso"". Domestic ~ill. 1988- ~

W1tot fo~ign ond domtsr.ic issues loomed larypt d11ring the &tsh odminktration, 1989- 1993?

The Olnlon Era Begins: Oebalilg Domestic l'oicy, 199)-Wfult domtStk po1ky iuun, political tvmts, ond .aw~omk 11rnds most shtlptd Clinton's forsl tmn?

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- · CUIIu"' Trends at Cenllry\ End W1tol (1.1/tural dr.telopments moNt/ the 1990s? Bill and Hillary Olnton on the

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fall the phytka.l mnlndffs of rhr Cold \\'.u, elk most notor'iou$ w;u thr lkrhn \l'.ill, built by thr R.ussi.a.ns in 1961. Sna.king around tht cky, thaJ concmr and twbtd·wiR" barrier wirb its v.'Uchta-us and .unwd guards tud stOOd as a stark embU:m of Cold WardMswns. Harty IWO hund!M JXCI'It had btm sho< trying to~ 01cross the W.all. On Octdx:r 18. 1.989, Euc Germany's communist- r~mt col· taps&. When East Bcr1inm nu:hcd ro rhr Wall. guards o pt:ntd tb(' gar~. As propk joyously pouml through, West Bt:rliotrS grttrtd

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them "'ith floW'Crs, tears, and shouts ofv.·dcome. Giddy )'Oung people danced on the Wall itself. By No\·embcr, the wall had practically disappeared. A hated Cold War symbol had faded inco hiscory. Americans sighed in reliefas che SoYi« Union collapsed, but dangers remained. While: U.S. leaders struggled "'ith post- Cold War disorders, an immediate crisis arose: in che Middle: East as Saddam Husscin•s Iraq invaded oil-rich Kuwait, fo rcing Reagan's successor, l'rcsidem George Bush, to respond. When Bill Clinton replaced George Bush in chc White: House in 1993, domestic issues took ce:mcr stage. As his cerm ended in scandal and impeachment, che Supreme Court intervened to resolve chc disputed 2000 presidential eleccion. Ostcma· tious consumption, undercurrents of violence, and deep culrural conflicts shaped American life as the cenrury ended.

THE BUSH YEARS: GLOBAL RESOLVE, DOMESTIC DRIFT, 1988-1993 What foreign and domestic issues loomed 14'1;1'st during the Bush 1989- 1993?

administrr1tion~

Ronald Reagan's vice president, George H. W. Bush, elected president in 1988, was a patrician in politics. The son ofa po~A'Crful Connecticuc senator, he had fought in World War II and attended Yale before: entering rhe 1t:xas oil business. He had sen -ed in Congress, directed rhe Central Jncelligence Agency (CIA), and foughc for the 1980 Republican nominacion before being tapped as Ronald Reagan's running mate in 1980. As president, Bush compiled a curiously unco.\':n record. Jncernarionally, he: re· acted de
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Vice President Bush easil)•won the 1988 Republican presi· dential nominacion. As his running mace he selected Sen· a tor Dan Quayle of Indiana, son ofa newspaper publisher. The 6eld of Democratic contenders evcnruall)' narro\1/Cd to Massachusetts gm\':rnor Michael Dukakis (doo·KAH·kiss), who ran wich Texas senator LIO)•d Bentsen. In the campaign, Bush stressed Reagan's achico.·emenrs.. He: pointed to better So· viet relations, low inflation, and the 14 million new jobs created during the 1980s. A TV commercial aired by Bush supporters, playing on racist stereotypes, fcaru.red a black convict who commicced rape and murder after his release under a Massachu· setts prisone:r·furlough program. Dukakis emphasized his managerial skills. '"l'his election is not about ideology, it's about competence,"' he insisted. But Dukakis seemed wooden, and his dismissal of ideology made it dHliculc for him to define his policical vision. Both candidates relied on TV·orie:nted "-photo opportunities;'' vague: slogans, and sound bites. Bush visited flag facrories and military plants. Dukakis prc,..-ed his toughness on defense by

1'111 Eledlon of 1981

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posing in a rank. Bush won, carr)'ing forcy states and garnering 54 percent of the voce. The Oemocra~ however, retain ed control of Congress and most stare legislatures.

Soviet power collapsed with breathtaking speed. In Ma}' 1989 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachevannounced that Mosco~A' wo uld no longer use its po'l'-~r to prop up East· ern Europe's unpopular communist regimes. One by one, chesc gowrnments felL Ne~A' de-mocratic gowrnments sprang up behind what had been the iron curtain. In Now~mber 1989 exuberant Germans celebraced the o pening of the Berlin Wall, and ~Aithin a }'cat Germany 'A'llS reunited for the 6rs.t rime since 1945. l 'he Baltic republics- Latvia, lithuania, and Estonia- forcibl}' annexed by che SO\i et Union on the ew of \'t;'orld War II, declared their independence. Ocher Soviec republics fol· lowed. Gorbachev, m-erwhelmed by forces he himself had unleashed, resjgned. In Moscow, Boris Ydtsin filled che J>O'I'""tr vacuum. Secretary of State James Baker, a longtime Bush all}'• proceeded cautiously as these t \-ents unfolded. Baker ~A'Orked to ensure the security of the N"Ccnty·SC".·en thousand nudear weapons based in Russia and in newly independenc Ukraine (yov· CRANE), Belarus (belt·.l.h·ROOS), and Kazakhstan ( Q.-ZAHK-scan), and to prevent rogue stares or terrorist groups fro m acquiring nuclear materials or know-how from these co untries. For decades, che superpoo-ers had backed chcir diem states and rebel insu~n · d es in the Third World. As the Cold War faded, prospects brightened for resolving some local d isputes. Despite some progress in Nicaragua, where the u.s..funded contra ~A'ar 6nall}' ended, pm-ercy and economic exploitation still plagued latin America. In 1989, Bush ordered a U.S. invasion of Panama to capcure the nation's ruler, General Manuel Noriega (MAN-wtl no-r~·AY--gutl). Fonner!}•o n che CIA pa}'· roll, Noriega had accepted bribes to pennit drugs co pass through l':lnama. Con\icted of drug trafficking, he received a life prison tenn. U.S. relations ~Aith the Philippines, a former colon}' and longtime ally, shifted as wdl. In 1991 che Philippines legislature ended an agreement permining N 'O U.S. na· \'lll bases in the islands. With che Cold War over, the Bush administration agreed co close: the bas.es. Meanwhile, South Africa's policy of racial segregation, called aparchcid, pro· \'Oked growing protests by U.S. black leaders and campus activists. In 1986, m-er a Reagan ..~co. Congress had imposed economic sanctions against white-ruled South Africa, including a ban on U.S. corporate im·estmenc.. l 'h e South African govcrnmenc in 1990 released black leader Nelson Mandd a (moJ.n·DEll·uh) after }'Ccat'S in prison. When South Africa scrapped its apartheid policy in 1991, Presidenc Bush lifted the sanctions. In 1994, underscoring the new political order in South Africa, Mandda ~A'llS elected presjdem . In 1989, Chinese troops bruta ll}' crushed a pro-democracy demonstration in Bcijing's Tiananmen ( ~e--yehn·.thn-men) Square, killing .SC\-eral hundred unarmed students and workers. A wave of arrests and public executions followed. l 'h e Bush administration curtailed diplomatic contacts and urged banks co postpone loans co China Bur Bush, committed to U.S. trade expansion, did not break d iplomatic relations or caned erade agreeme-nts with Beijing.

Tile Cold War Ends

lnteracti\•e Map: The End of the Cold War Changes the Map of Europe

I THe BuSH Yl.AIIS.: Gl08Al RESOLVE, OOMESllC OIUFl, 1988-1193

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George Bush Elected pii!Sidl!fll Massiw Alaskan oil spiii iYf Exxon IAlldez; Stlpr..,. Colli in sewrai S-10-4 dei
As lhe Cold War faded, l rade: issues loomed largr. America's trade deficit "'ith Japan stirred spedal concern. Early in 1992, fadng a recession and rising unemplo)'· ment in an eleccion rear, President Bush wrne:d an Asian trip into a trade mission. Joined by U.S . business leaders, he urged rhe Japanese ro bU}' more U.S. products. The crade gap continued. however.

One foreign crisis brought a forceful response. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded irs neighbor Kuwaic.Jraq's dicrator, Sad· dam Hussein, viewed Kuwait's ( Koo·WAITs) ruling sheiks as Western puppets and asserted Iraq's historic claims to Kuwait's vast oi1 6dds. Under Saddam, Iraq had pursued chemical· and nud car·....-eapons programs and lhreatened not only Kuwait but also other Arab nations and IsraeL During t he: Iraq· Iran "''ar ( 1980- 1988), however, t he: United Stares had favored Iraq, and e\-en as.sisred Saddam's military buildup (see Chapter 30). Now, ho"''C\>cr, confromed by Iraq's in· \'asion of Kuwait, Washington protested vigorous!}'·

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Kuwiit 1991 Bur ni ng oilhelds, set ~;ue by ~tno;~~ ting Iraqis, pt"''Vide ;u~ euie b.ukdrop to rnotOJ" ized U.S. troops p :.rtic:ipat· ing in Oper;ation Ouert Storm, the high pof:nt of the Bush pno:sidency.

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lntera~•e Map: Operabon Desert Storm: The Ground War

Avoiding L}'tldon johnson's mistakes in Vietnam, Bush built a consensus in Congress, at che United Nations, and among the American people for a dear objcc· tive: Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. Bush built a coalition ofthirty·four nations and deployed more than 500,000 U.S. troops to achieve char goal. The UN imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and insisted that Saddam withdraw from Kuwait byj anuary JS, 1991. O njanuar}' 12, theSenace and the House: endorsed milimry action. Most Oemocracs voted against war, favoring concinued economic sanctions. The air war began on january 16. For six weeks B.SZ and F·16 bombers pounded Iraqi troops, su ppl}' dcpocs, and command cencers in Iraq's capital, Baghdad. In re· taliacion, Saddam 6red Soviet·made Scud missiles against Tel A'tiv and other Israeli cities, as wd l as against the Saudi capital, Riyadh. On February 23 rwo hundred thousand U.S. troops under General H. Norman Sch~A'llrzkopf mow:d across che des· ere coward Kuwait (see Map 31.1). Iraqi soldiers fled or surrendered en masse. U.S. forces desm>)'ed thircy-sew:n hundred Iraqi tanks while losing only three. Wich Iraqi resistance crushed, President Bush declared a cease--6re, and Kuwait's ruling famil}' rcrurned co pc>""er. U.S. casualties n umbered 148 dead- including 35 killed inadvcr· tently by U.S. 6repo'l""er- a nd 467 wo unded. Iraqi military casualties ~A'Cre estimated to be 25,000 to 65,000. For !'resident Bush, the: PersJan Gulf War pr~d that Americans were again ready co use: military might co pursue national imerescs. .,By God, we've kicked the: Vietnam S}'tldrome o nce and for all,"' he declared. Some had urged Presidenc Bush co invade Iraq and O\'erthto'A' Saddam Hussein. Bush rejected this course. Invading Iraq, he reasoned, could in't'Oiw: an cxcended occupation and unleash sectarian con· flier. Saddam granted UN inspectors access to his u."eapons·production facilities. The UN also imposed "no·fl}' woes" on Iraqi aircraft, but Saddam's anny brutally suppressed uprisings by Shiite Muslims in che: south and ethnic Kurds in chc north.

739 In the early 1990s the im· pact of Reagan-era tax curs Pnlllems llld and deregulation began to Da•estk Policies hit home. First came: the collapse of the: savings·and·loan (S&L) industry, pl'O+ vider of home loans and a modesc but secure rerurn to depositors. As interest rates had risen in the late 1970s because of inflation, the S&l..s had offered higher interesc to attract deposits. Money freed up by the Reagan tax cuts flowed into S&Ls with their high races of rerum. Meanwhile:, in the deregulation femn, Congress eased the rules governing S&Ls, en· abling chcm to make loans on risky real·estate ven· torts. As recession hit, many of these invcsnnenrs W'Cnt bad. In 1988-1990, nearly six hundred S&l.s failed, wiping out many depositors' sa...ings. Because the: government insures S&L deposits, the Bush adminiscration in 1989 sec up a program co repay de:posicors and sd l off depred ated prope:rcies. Estimates of the: baUouc's cosc topped $400 billion. The federal de6dt, a b)'Product of Reagan's cax cuts and military spending, concinued to moun t. In 1990, Congress and Bush agreed on a de:6cicreduccion plan involving spending cuts and tax in· creases. Bush's retreac from his 1988 "no new taxes" pledge: angered many voters. Despite: the: agreement, the de6dt reached $290 billion in 1992. The Gulf War, theS&Lbailout,and soaring W'Cifareand Mcdi· c.a.rej .Me:dicaid payments sank che budgct·balandng effort. Making mactcrs "''Orse, recession struck in 1990. Retail sales slumped; housing starts felL The auto industry, battered by j apanese imports, fared disastrous!)'· GM cut its "''Ork force by more: than sC"".-emy thousand. B}' 1992 che jobless rate exceeded 7 per· cent. If 1984 was «morning in America," "''fotc a col· umnist, quoting a Reagan campaign slogan, this was ..the morning after."

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The recession worsened inner-cityjoblessness and despair. In April 1992, an out· break of arson and looting erupted in a poor black district of Los Angeles. The: im· mediate cause: 'A'llS black o utrage ovcr a jury's acquittal of four white police officers whose: bearing of a black motorist had been captured on videotape. The riors left some forty persons dead and millions in property dama~. underscoring the: desper· are co nditions in the inner cities. Bush's greatest domestic success came in 1990, ~Aith che passage of the: Amui· cans with DisabiUde:s Act, barring discrimination against disabled persons in hir· ing or education. In an echo of the: earlier African-American civil-rights campaign, Congress passed this latA' foll"'"'·ing dc-monstracions and lobbying b)• chc- disabled and organizations representing them. Thanks to this law, job oppon:u nities fo r handicapped persons increased, and the numbe-r of physically or cognitiwly im· paired children attending public schools rose: significandy. Environmental concerns surged in 1989 when a giant oil canker, the: &.wn Vetl· da.. ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound, spilling more than 10 million gallons of oil. l 'h e: accident fouled coastal habitats and jeopardized Alaska's fishing industr}'· A 1991 Environmental Proce:ccion Agcncyscudy found thac pollutants were seriously depicting the: atmosphere's ozone- layer, which reduces cancer-causing solar radiacion. Bush co mpiled a mixed environmental record. In a bipartisan effort, che Whice: House: and the Ocm ocracic Congress agreed o n a to ughened Clean Air Act in 1990. The government also began the: costly task of disposing of radioactive wastes from nuclear facilicie:s. On the: other hand, the administration scutd e:d treacie:s on global warming, backed oil e-xploration in Alaskan wilderness presc-n-es, and pro posed co open protected wetlands co de-velopers. !'resident Bush made two Supreme Court nominations. David Souce:r, a New Hampshire judge of moderate vic-'1'--s, wo n t:aS}' con6rmacion in I 990. With Clarence Thomas, however, Bush continued Reagan's efforc to shift che co urt sharply to the: right. Bush nominated 11lomas in 1991 to replace Thurgood Marshall, who had fo ught segregation as an NAACP lawyer. Thomas, also an African-American, sup· ported right-wing causes and opposed affirmath-e-accion programs. Noting his ~A'Cak qualifications, critics charged Bush with playing racial policies. In the- Senate j udiciary Committee hearings, a former Thomas associate: at the: Equal EmploymentOppon:u nity Commission, Anita Hill, accused him of sexual ha· rassmem . Thomas narrowly wo n confirmation, but Re-publican efforts to d iscredit Hill's testimony alienated many ~A'Omen. When ~A'Ome:n candidates d id very wdl in the 1992 elections, many obsen -ers concluded chat resentment over chc- 11lomas hearings had pla)
George Bush's approval racings soared after rhe Persian GulfWar, onl)' co fall below SO percent as the recession hit. lncimidated by Bush's post-Gulf War popularity, top Chlllenge Democrats stared out of che 1992 presidential race. But Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas took rhe plunge. ~nding off reporrs of marital .,._ Cete, Jr. Tenom;re Sl'NtOI' ;and notl'd t.q)C'R on infidelity, Clinton defeated ocher hopefuls in the primaries and won che nomina· ~~nuiU~s wbo don. As his running mare, he chose Senaror Albert Go~. Jr. , of1Cnness«. In his ..~ u O inton'n ioe acceptance speech, dinton pled~d action on environmental, healch care, and ecoprl':lidmt nomic issues. H. Ross lletot l tn.s billionain' President Bush quashed a primary challenge by conservati..-e columnist t:•at wbo r.t.n fOr prt5ident a.s third. JUrtyandidatr in 1992, 1996 Buchanan, but at che Republican party convention Buchanan and evangelist t:• at Robertson gaw divisive sp«ches scaking out deeply conservaci..-e posi· dons on contested cultural issues. Delegaces from Roberrson's Christian Coalition ch«red, bur moderate Republicans deplored che party's right· ward turn. The CoJd \l'ar ended Judcknlywith Political outsider H . Ross Pt'.rot (~ir-OH), founder of a 1t:xas data· the collapu of th~ Soviet Union in processing firm, also entered the race. 11le nation's economic problems lat~ 1991. W\'.re simple, l'trot insisted on TV talk shaws; only party politics stood in Wht.n &ldd~m HUJ$C'in invaded rhe way of solving chem. At his peak of popularity, nearly 40 pm:ent of the Kuwait, BuJh forged a coilition to drM- h im out; although dri,..-n from \'OW'S supported 1\'.rot. His eccentricities and thin-skinned response ro Kuwait, Sadd..lm n-t
Jill: Olnton Vtrsus llllsll, 1M I Tllird-

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THE CLINTON ERA BEGINS: DEBATING DOMESTIC POLICY, 1993-1996 What domestic policy issws, politicai6Wnts, and economic trends most shaped Clinton's first term? In contrast to Gt:orge Bush, a member of the World War II generation, William (Bill) Clinton was the first president from che baby-boom generation. Born in Arkansas in 1946, he: admired Etvis Presley and played che saxophone. He at· tended GeorgctO'I'-'n University, Oxford University (as a Rhodes Scholar), and Yale Law School, where he mer his future wife, Hillary Rodham.. He: returned to Arkansas after graduation and won che gm-ernorship in 1979, ac age thirty-two.

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C linton•s presidency began mergeticall)' buc soon e ncouncered setbacks. When disgruntled \'Otcrs gave t he Republicans a srunning victory in the 1994 midterm deccion, Clinton m ow~d to the right.

In contrast to Republican predecessors like Nixon and Bush, Clinton preferred domestic issues co foreign policy. Of course, like aU presidm~ Clinron confronted serious diplomatic chall en~s. for t he most part, ho\I.I'CWr, domestic policy dominated his attention. C linton and Vice President AI Gore were leaders ofche New Democratic Coali· tion, a gro up of moderates unhappy ~A'ith the party's ultra-liberal, "tax and spend" reputation. 10 win back middle-class and bluHollar \'OW'S, Clinton's campaign stressed Middle America•s concerns: jobs, he-alth care, soaring welfare costs. As he st«red the parry tO'I'-ard t he middle, t raditional liberals and black leaders expressed uneasiness. S«king middle ground on aborcion, he said ic should be "safe, legal, and rare." Clinton and Gore fi rmly endorsed enviro nmental proceccion, a popular cause: with \'Oters. Lending S)'tllbolic support to the women•s mO\'ffllenc, Clinton named V.'Omen co head several cabinet positions and ocher high offices. 1b fill a Supreme Court vacancy in 1993, he nominatedj ud~ Ruch Bader Ginsberg. In 1997 he named Madddne K. AlbrJghc as secretar}' of state-the highesc U.S. gO\•ernmmt office ever held by a V.'Oman. More controversial was Clinton's early effort co fulfill a campaign pledge co end homosexuals' exdusion from military services. Forced co retreat from his initial plan for full inclusion, Clinton agreed to a compromise summed up in che phrase: "Don't ask, don't cell.>• According to this policy, so long as homosexual soldiers do noc opml)' rew~al their sexual orientation, commanders may noc im~s rigare it. O n t he economic front, Clinton proposed milicary spending cuts and tax in· creases to ease che budget defi cit. 1 0 combat che recession, he recommended pro· grams to s tim ulate job creacion and economic growth. In August 1993, Congress adopted Clinton's spending cuts and tax increases, but the economic-stimulus package fell b)• t he "''ll)'Side. C linton also urged ratification of the North American F~e Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negodaced by the Bus h administracion. This pace admitted Mexico co t he free·crade zone created earlier by che United States and Canada. While cricks warned that U.S. jobs v.'Ould flee to Mexico, NAFTA backers, including mosc economists, predicted a net gain in jobs as Mexican markets opened co U.S. produces. Congress approwd NAFl.A in 1993, handing Clinton a ~A'Clcome viccory. With Medicare and Medicaid costs explod ing, health care reform stood high on Clinton's «co do" list. From 1980 to 1992,govcrnmenc payments for these programs ballooned from 8 percent to 14 percent of t he federal budget. Clinton appointed his wife Hillary to head a health care task force. 1"'his bod)', V.'Orking mainly in secret, devised a SW'Ceping plan for u niversal health ins urance, including caps on premiums and a national board to monitor costs. L.obb)'ists for doctors, the insurance industry, tobacco companies, and other groups ganged up to oppose che plan. Cricks attacked the secreti\'C way it had been formulated. By fall 1994, che Clincons' bill had died, and health care reform was stalled.

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J ThE CUNTOK ERA BEGir.~ Ot&AllNG DoMEme Poucv. '"J-un6 Crime: and welfare reform also ranked high among voter concerns. In 1994, Clinton pushed through Congress an anticrime: bill including a ban on assault weapons and funds for more prisons and police officers. That same )'eat, Clinton offered a welfare-re-form bill. It required able-bodied wdf.ue recipients to go to work after cwo )'tars. The: bill included job training and child-<are proYisions, as well as measures to force: absent fachers ("deadbeac dads") to support cheiroffspring. It also permitted states co deny additional pa)ments to wdfan: mothers who had more children. Congress delayed welfare re-form unci! 1995, hC>'~'-"f:'\'ef, when Republican majorities in both houses shaped their O'A'tl bill. By 1994, Clinton's popularicywas sagging. Exploiting the "character issue," crit· ks publicized the Climons' earlier involvement in a shady Arkansas re-al..:state: spec· ulation, the White'l"-ater Devdopmenc Company. l 'he 1993 suicide: ofassistant White: House: counsel Vincenc Foster, the: C lintons' dose: friend, attracted conspiracy theorists. In 1994, Paula jon~ an Arkansas state emplO)'-ee, lile:d a la"''Suit claiming that Clinton when governor had solicited sexual favors. Favorable economic: news helped Clinton "''Cather lhe setbacks. By 1994, the unemployment rate: had fallen to the: IO'II.~St levd in four )"ears, and inflation remained W'CU under control. The federal de:6dt dropped each )'eat from 1993 to 1997. Ne:\'er· lhdess, by mid- 1994 Clinton' s approval ratings had sunk to 42 percent. Sensing Clinton's vulnerability, the: opposition grew bolder. Radio commencalOr Rush Limbaugh won fans for his jeering attacks on liberals. By 1994, l'at Robe:rl· son's ChrJsdan Coalition controlled scwral scate: Republican parries. With its passion and organizational energy, the: religious Right represented an increasing!}' pote:nc political force.

Clinton had won in 1992 as a «New Democrat.'' but by 1994 many \'Olct'S saw him as an old Democrat of che «tax· and-spend" \'ariety. To critics, Clinton's failed health care plan embodied all che: flaws of the New Deal/Great Sode:cy style: of top·dO'II.·n refonn. Meanwhile:, a network of organizations, including lhe Christian Coalition, the Heritage Foundacion, and the: National Rifle Association, built on che: conse:rvati..~ movement dacing to the: 1970s (see Chapter 30) co orchestrate a sharp rightward swing in the body politic. An endless dr umbeat of conservati\-e radio commentary denounced the: "liberal elite" and inflamed differences m-er such hot-button issues as obscenity, abortion, gun control, gay righrs, school pra)-er, "-radical feminism," sex education, and an alleged erosion of«family values." Republican congressman Newt Gingrich (GING-rich) of Georgia mobilized the discontent. In a September 1994 cercmon}' on lhe Capitol step~ some three hundred Republican congressional candidates signed Gingrich's ..Contract with America" pledging to propose: lax curs, tougher crime laws, antipornography measure:~ and other reforms. In Nm~mber, voce:rs gave lhe GO I' concrol of both houses of Congress for lhe 6rst time since 1954. l 'he: ouccome signaled a significant rightward shift. Evangelical Christians, energized b}• policid zed preachers like Falwell and Robertson, turned out in large: numbers, mo.sd}' to vote: Republican. Republicans hailed the: election as a further step in a conservative resurgence: launched by Barry Goldwater in 1964. In the: House: of Represencarives, a jubilant

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CirisUonCN"- C=<~ ti~ ev.angtliul klbb)ing: group widl growing inft...nu (llo~r

Rqtublian p;uty in 19905

PrWnaty Source: Teenagers Against Abortion NNt CiqpO !Upubliun Gwrgia wbo btlptd bring his pany to pcno
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horde of 230 Republicans, 73 of chem newly elected, chose: Newt Gingrich as Speaker and set abouc enacting the Concracc with America. A constitutional amendment re· quiring a balanced federal budget passed the: House but narrO'I'-'1)' failed in the Senare. Fulfilling pledges co combat pornograph)', Congress passed a Communications Decency Ace sw:ngchening the gm--e:rnment' s censorship powers. (In 1997, t he Supreme: Court ruled t he law unconstitutionaL) The correnc of bills, hearings, and press releases recalled che heady da)'S of the: earl)' New Deal and Lyndon johnson's Great Society. Now, ho~A'C'V'Cr, t he activisc en· ergy came from che conservaci\J'C side of che policical spectrum. The architect of this 1\':\'0iution, Newt Gingrich, srumbled in 1995 ~Athen he first accepted, and chen curned down, a $4.5 million advance from a publishing house: O~A'tled by Rupert Murdoch, a media tycoon ~Aith interests in federal legislation. j ournalists also focused on Gingrich's network of political action groups. lhe 1994 election also signaled a go-it-alone: view of America's world role. The Concracc ~Aith America Largel)' ignored forcign policy. Republican leaders denounced the United Nations and re-fused to pay $1 billion in past UN dues. sa..'Ocing t heir elcccoral criumph, conservacivcs renC""-·ed the: battle for ~A'e-lfare: reform. They offered two arguments. 1'he: first was economic. AFDC, with 14.2 mil· lion u'Ome:n and children on its rolls, cost about S 125 billion in 1994, a sharp jump sjnce 1989 (see Figure:: 3ll). Though dwarfed by the other benefits enjored b)• the middle dass, chis 'A'llS still a hea..y budgetary drain. The second argument was ideological: the: belief chat welfare- had become a "lifelong entideme:nt" that en· courage:d irresponsible behavior and t rapped recipients in a cycle: of dependence. Though panially based on stereotypes rather than empirical data, su ch \i ews were: widely held.

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Flglft 31.1 hrttlltap ol U.S. Populltion on Wtlla1't, 1!160-lOOS From jim 1.7 puc~nt in 1960, the p~~~nt:.ge ofAmeric:;u~son wdf;ve cr~pc st~;1di ty upw.ud u ntil 1994, when it pe;~~ked ;~~t 5.5 percent, rep~sen ting mo~ th;~~n 14 million p~ople. The percent;age d~dined sharply thel'\";~~fter, ~Aecting both the booming eeonomy ;~~nd the imp;,1« o f the Wdf;ve Reform An of 1996. s~Jdrririis:llm:n fOf ct;ktc. end F.mlief, Oql.ltlmeft of J.kdfl W llliMa Scni:e~: ~lie Comn~ on \'i'ty~.:~nd ""-, Sllbcomn~ on 1-lmun ~" lltpor1. Fdl.l8, lOC6.

Wellnll.tfomoAclcl lt96 President Clinton's welfare reform proposal fa..·ored federally funded child care Clinnm joiotd Rq!ubliuru eo and jolHraining programs to case the trnnsjtion fro m "''l'lfare to work. Howc'ler, Re· rnd AFOC IC"rt mils these serYices. After \'C'toing two earlier welfare bills, in August Clinton signed the landmark \t'elfal'f: Reform Ace of 1996. Reversing sjxty years of welfare policy, the law ended the largest federal program, AFDC. In· stead, states "''Ould now recei'le block granrs co develop their own pro· grams within strict guidelines limiting most recipients to rwo years of continuous cm-eragc. Critics warned of the effects on inner-city welfare mothers lacking edThe dinton
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THE ECONOMIC BOOM OF THE 19905 What groups benefitN from the economic boom ofthe 1990s$and what groups did not? The J990s saw one of the longest periods of sustained economic growth in U.S. history. ProductiYity increased, unemployment fell, and intlacion remained low. Federal deficits dropped as tax rC\>ccnues increased. In 1998, for the first rime since 1969, the federal budget actually showed a surplus. For some, the surging stock market stimulated rhc urge co get rich quick, acquire more possessions, and enjoy the good rimes. But real wages fagged behind the stock nta.l'kec, and workers "'flo lacked the skills required by che emerging knowlcd~ based economy faced difficulties.

l'he economic boom of the 1990s had Yarious sources, but

An Uneven Prosptrity the new business opportunities associated with the per· sonal computer and the information revolution u.-ere certainly crucial (sec Chapter 32). Rising international trade, a low inflation rate, and low interest rates all helped sustain the boom. Unemployment, which stood at 7.5 pm:ent in 1992, fell co 4 pm:ent b)• 2000. Corporate earnings soared. The gross domestic product, a key economic indicacor, rose nearly 80 percent in the decade. Wall Strcec boomed as stock prices far ourran many companies' acruai Yalue or earnings prospects. From under 3,000 in 199 1, rhc Do"'' jones Industrial Average www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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edged toward 12,000 by early 200 1. N ew investors flocked into the market. By 1998, near!)' SO percent of U.S. families owned scock directly or through their pension plans. As earl)' as 1996 ~deral Resen 't: Board chairman Alan Greenspan warned of "-irrational exuberancr' in che stock market, but with little effect. lnformation-cechnology (111 stocks prm-ed especial!)' popular. 11le NASDAQ composite index, loaded wich technolog}' stocks, soared from under 500 in 1991 co over 5,000 by early 2000. Some scockofferings b)•n· start·up companies hit fantastic IC\o-els, turning young entrepreneurs into paper millionaires. Corporate mergers mul· tiplied as companies sought co improve their pro6tability. In che biggest merger of all, che Internet compan)' America Online (AOL) acquired Time·Warner (itself the product of earlier mergers) for$ 182 billion. The prosperity was very uneven!)' distributed, ho~A'CVC.r. From 1979 to 1996 the portion of total income going to the ~A'Calthicsc 20 percent of Americans increased by 13 percent, while the share going to the poorest 20 percent dropped by 22 percent. Adjusted for inflation, the buying po""-"er of che a\·erage ~A'Orker's pa)'check feU or remained flat through much of che period from 1986 to 2000. As corporations maintained pro6ts b)•"downsi.z.ing" and cost cutting. job worries gna~A'ed at man}' Americans. While many seJVice ~A'Orkers, teachers, and ocher ~AthitNollar groups belonged to u nions, only I 3.5 percent of the total labor force was unionized in 2000, v.-eaken· ing chis means by which ~A'Orkers had historically bettered their wages and job condi· tions. Unions' political clout diminished as ~A'CIL Congress raci6ed che 1993 NAFTA treaty, fo r example, despite protests from organized labor. j ob-market success increasjngly required special training and skill~ posing problems for high·school graduates, displaced industrial ~A'Orkers, and v.
, The 1990~ ~aw low infla tion, ri~ing stock l'flar~ts, and a booming infurmation·t«.hno lagr ind Wll)". tncomc" inequa.lihu "i~nc-d, :1$ glub.lliutiun ch ic-fly be".nc-fited those with C"duCOltion and cuh nologiCOll skills. Job ~tll in manur.ururing fed wacriel about «cmo mic S«Urity while labor un ions continued the-ir de-dine-. Clinton prumotcod NAFTA and othe-r free ua~ ag;rcoc-me"nt:l, C"\'<'n with countric--J with poor hul'flan rights r«
As che NAPl"A agreement made plain, foreign trade ranked high on Clinton's agenda When the U.S. trade deficit hie $133 billion in 1993, indud· ing a $59 billion trade gap wich japan, Clinton, like his predecessor, pressured the j apanese ro bU)' more U.S. goods. Clinton also presen
Allerica and the Clobal E
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cning to increase illegal migration northward, Clincon quickly granted Mexico $40 billion in loan guarantees. In 1997- 1998, when political corruption and other factors "''Cakcned the ccono· mics ofThailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and other Asian nations, t he: Clinton administracion worked to promote stability in the: region. As t he: Asian economic crisis spread, Japan' s banks faltered, the: Tok}'O stock market fell, and the yen lost value. When Brazil and Argentina also sank into recession, analysts quescioned how long the U.S. boom could continue. All these dcwJopmcnrs underscored how deeply the United Scace:s had become enm eshed in a complex global economy.

CLINTON ' S fOREIGN POLICY: DEFINING AMERICA' S ROLE IN A PoST-COLO WAR WORLD 1-/ow did the Clinton administration respond to political and ecotKJmic dB~Iopme.nts abroad? Bill Clinton preferred domestic issues to foreign policy. Yct Am erica could not withdra~A' from the world. When C linton•s attention curned abroad. he faced four

key challenges: procecting U.S. tradej using American poW'Cr ~Aisdyin t he: post-SoYiet era; promoting peace berwccn Israel and the Palestinians; and responding to security threats. including nuclear proliferation and terrorism .

The aftershocks of the SO\ict collapse unsectled che re· gion of sout heastern Europe known as the Balkans (BAll· IMI Eastern Ewope kuns). In YugoslaYia, an unstable nation comprised of In tile Post-Soviet Era Scrbia, Bosnia, Croacia, and other enda\-es. t he: ruling communist party ga\'e up power in 1990. In 1991- 1992, as Yugosla.,ia broke aparc, Serbian forces launched a campaign of "echoic cleansing" in neighboring Bosnia. This meant supporting Bosnia•s ethnic Serbs while killing or driYing out Muslims and Croats. Scrbian croops O\'crtan UN·designated "safe havens'" and slaughtered M uslims. When a UN peacekeeping force failed co stop the killing, a joint U.S. and NAlU operation launched air strikes against Bosnian Serb cargcts in August 1995. later in 1995, the Clincon admin istration flew che leaders of Bosnia's warring faccions to Dayton, Ohio, fur calks. T he: resulting Dayton Accords imposed a cease· fire and created a framework for governing the region. dinton committed twenty thousand U.S. troops to a NATO fo rce in Bosnia to enforce the cease-fire. In 1998, Serbian forces attacked Muslims in Scrbia's southern proYince, Kosovo. Early in 1999. NATO, under U.S. leadership, bombed Scrbian facilities in Kosovo and in Serbia icself, including Belgrade:. the capital. This reliance on air poo-er, wich minimal risk of U.S. casualties. becam e: Clinton's preferred form of military engage· ment. Haunted by Vietnam. Am erican public opinion wa\'etcd as wdl, appalled by the suffering and refuget: cri.Us in che Balkans as u.-ell as in che African nation of R~A'llnda.but waryof expanding U.S. involvement. In june 1999, ho~A'CVI.'.r, U.S. croops

Tilt IIaMs, Russia.

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Yugod.nU '\ic:timiBd by a Strbi~ tthnie.dt..m sing

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joined a NATO occupying force in Koso\'0 thac maintained peace and allowed rc-fu~es to trickle back.

U.S. diplomacy also continued to focus on che: safe disposal of nuclear "'-eapons in the fonner Soviet Union. In the 1993 Scrate:gic Anns Reduction Treaty (START H), t he: United States and Russia agreed to cut t heir long· range nuclear arsenals by half. This left man}' deacti\'ated nuclear "'-eapons in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Jk:. larus. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations used diplomacy, economic aid, and technical assistance to assure t he: secur~: destruction of these: ~A'c-apons . Despite U.S. disapproval of Russia's brutal war against re-bels in t he: breakaway republic of Chechn)'a (CHECH-n«-uh) and concern m-er Boris Ydrsin's alcoholism and incre-asingly erratic behavior, Clinton continued co support the Russian presi· dent. In 1999, hO'A-\...,-er, ow~r Russia's protcscs, NATO wich U.S. support admitted three new members from che: former Soviet bloc- Hungar)', Poland, and t he: Czech Republic. With Yeltsin's re:Ugnation in December 1999, Prime: Minister Vladimir Putin (VLAH-dee·me~ POO-wn), a former agcnc of the KGB, the Soviet secret police, succeeded him as president.

After hopeful beginnings, dinton's pursuit of peace in the Middle East fajled. T he 1987 Palestinian uprising, or Int ifada. against Israel' s military occupation of t he: \'('est Bank and G-aza (sec Chapter 30) continued into t he: ~Foe 1990s. Prospects for peace brightened in 1993, after Israeli and Palestinian ne:gotiarors meeting in Norwa}' agreed on a six-}-ear timetable for peace. lhe so·calle:d Oslo Accords provided for a Palestinian stare: in exchange for Israeli concessions. In 1994, !'resident dinton pre:Uded as Is raeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (YEET-shahk rall-BEEl'l..) and Yasir Arafat (YAH·H~r AHR-uh-fahr), head of t he: Palestine: Liberation Organization, signed the agreem ent at the White: House:. The bloodshed continued, howcwr, and in 1995 a )'OUng Jsradi opposed to t he: Oslo Accords as.sassinate:d Rabin. Israel's next d e:ction broughc Benjamin Netan· )>ahu (nec-al'ln·YA-hoo) of the hard-line Ukud (li-KOOD) party co po~A'Ct. Suicide: bombings by Palestinian extrcrnists in 1996--1997 killed some: eighty Israelis, trigger· ing retaliatory attacks. jC"'·ish scrd e:mcncs, ~Aith accompan)'ing highwa)'S, checkpoints, and infrastructure, spread across t:talesrinian territor}'· C linton brought Israel's next prime: minister, Ehud Barak (EH-hood but.-RAHK), to Camp David in july 2000 to meet with Arafac and ro tr}' to broker a new peace. Barak made major concessions; but Arafat rejected Barak's offer, and the summit failed. Palestinians launched a new Intifada against lsrad in 2000. As Clincon left office, the lsradi-Palescinian conflict raged on (sec Chapter 32). Iraq also demanded Clinton's attention. After t he: Persian Gulf War, the United Nations had imposed strict sanctions on Iraqi oil exports and sec up an inspection S)'Stetn co pre'lcnt Iraq from building chem ical or nuclear weapons. In 1997, when Saddam Hussein barred UN inspectors from certain sites, Clincon d ispatched t hirty thousand troops to che 1\'.rsian Gulf. He drew back after t he: UN secretary general, Kofi Annan (KOH-fee AHN-na.hn), secured Saddam' s agreement to open inspections. Saddam soon reneged, ho~A'!!Wr, and the: crisjs continued (see Chapter 32).

The Mickle East SeeUig an Elusive Peace, CGmblllng a

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CUHTON'S FoiUIGM Poua:. OtFIKING AW.ERICA•s RoLE I.N A PoST-COlO "''All WOIU.O

Nations char signed the: 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty pledged not co de:\-elop nuclear "'>c-apons. India and Pakistan, long at odds o•..-er che: disputed border region of Kashmir (KAHSH·meer), did nor sign, ho"''cwr, and in 1988 India tested a nuclear bomb. Despite: urgcnc pleas from the: United Stares and other powers, Pakistan folloY~ed suit. Boch the Bush and Clinton administrations imposed sanctions on the two countries, but the: spread of nuclear weapons in this region dttpene:d proliferation fears. Communist Norch Korea also roused concern. Despite having signed the: Non· proliferation Treaty, North Korea began a program of nucle:ar·"''Capons dc"ldopme:nt and missile testing. In 1994, facing UN economic sanctions, Norch Korea pledged to hale irs nuclear·"''e apons program.: five years Lacer, confronting famine and economic crisis, it suspended long·range missile: tescing in rerum for an easjng of U.S. rrade and crawl restrictions. 1'he: countr}"s nuclear intentions remained worrisome, however. Attacks by anti·Ame:rican Islamic extremists continued. In ~bruar}' 1993, a J>O'I'""erful bomb exploded in a parking garage beneath one of the rowers of New York's World 11-ade Center. Six pcrsons died in the blase and hundreds "''ere injured. Five Islamic militants were arrested and chrec giw:n life: sentences. In 1992, President Bush had committed some tv.rcncy-six thousand U.S. croops co a UN humanitarian mission to Somalia (soh·MAH·kot"·uh), an East African na· cion afflicted b)• civil war and famine:. As the "''llrring factions barrled, forty·four Americans "''Cre killed, including cighteen murdered in Mogadishu, Somalia's capi· cal. President Clinton withdre"'' rhe: U.S. force in 1994, and the UN mission ended a )"ear later. Later evidence implicated anri·Ame:rican Islamic extremists IO)>al to Osam.a bin Laden (oh-SAHM-uh b n LAH-dun) in the Mogadishu killings. A "''Caltby Saudi Arabian and Islamic fundamentalist militant, bin Laden had been expelled from Saudi Arabia in 1991 and taken refuge in Sudan, where he planned anti·Western rer· rorisc activities. 1"'0 bombings at U.S. military installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995- 1996 killed cwenty·four Americans. On August 7, 1998, simultaneous bomb blasts ac che U.S. embassies in Ken)>a and Tanzania (u.n.zuh-NEE-uh) killed 220, including Americans and many local people:. U.S. intelligence again pinpointed Osama bin Laden as the mastcnnind of the attacks. Expelled fro m Sudan in 1996, bin Laden had shifted his base of operations to Afghanistan, where he organized terrorist training camps. Clinton ordered cruise missile: strikes on one of bin Laden's Afghan camps as wdl as on a suspected che:mical·"'>c-apons facrory in Sudan allegedly financed by bin Laden. On October 12, 2000, a bomb aboard a small boac in the harbor of Aden (AH--den), Yemen (YEH-mun), ripped a gaping hole in che U.S. destrO)U Coli!, killing sC'\-cmecn sailors. Closer home, in Haiti, a Caribbean island·nacion wracked by po\·crty and disease, a militar}' junta o•..-enhrcw President Jcan·Bertrand Aristide (shawn be.v·TRAHN .lh-f'et:·STEEO) in September 199 1 and terrorized his supporters. The: Clinton ad· ministration supported a 1994 UN resolution auchori.z.ing militar}' action against the junta. With a U.S.·Ied invasion flotilla anchored offshore, the junta's leaders W'Cnt into exile, and Aristide:, backed by a U.S. occupation force, resumed the presidency.

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Osl• m Llillen bd.iul ldia.mic terrmi• •flo masnor.

minded munkrow amu:k.s apilat U.S. miliury .md civiti.ms

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The peaceful post- Cold War era that man}' had ancid · pared seemed an ever-receding mirage: as Americans of t he: 1990s confronted internacional issues of maddening complexity. 11le Soviet adversary had collapsed, and t he t hreat of global t hermonuclear war n~cde:d. but crises sciU flared around the "-"Orld. Like: fire-fighters bactling many small blazes rather than a single conflagration, policy makers naw "''1'estled "'ith a baffling tangle: of issues. Confronting su ch complexities, some: citizens simply gave up. In a 1997 poll, only 20 percent of Americans said chac they foiiO"--ed foreign news. dO"-·n sharp!)' from the: 1980s. Seeking to clarify t he: confusing "''Orld situation, analysts noted at least four large:.s,cale t rends in the: post- Cold War era:

A New Wottd Order Plln!UIIy Eme11es

CHECKING I N A5 the Balbn, uplod«< in ~thnic conflict. Clinton commiutd U.S. ttoop:~ and air pO'o\~r to a NATO ptactkuptng ~((on. Afri ~n conflict,: per.oiu«<; Clinton txp"*"$C'd concern but withdn"w Amtri ~n (ol'l:~ from Somalia and did not intet\\"OC' in the Rwanda goenocidt. Tht Unittd Stltu he-lped ntgotiatt the Odo .koocmh. pi'O\•idin.g fot a Pal6tinian $tan"• but P.d e.u:inian' rtje'ct«l a l.nt.r ''land·for-pe..lct'' deal, and progr6.' n.Uitd. Nuclt-ar proJiftt..ltio n remained a concern ;u tnd i..l and PaJ.:i,tln tuttd n ud u r w~..lpans., and North Kacu undtrrook dt\-dapmtnt prngr..lm$. A5 t« rori' m d irt ct«< at Amcric:uu and t ht \l'ut incno:utd, tht ouclint-' o( ..l ''neY~ world ordt.... becamt d u r.

First, economic considerations played an ever-greater role in internacional affairs. Multinational networks of trade and 6nance in· creasingly shaped America' s fo reign-policy interests. Second, a growing chasm divided the: prospero us, stable industrial· ized world fro m sod ecie:s marked b)•poverty, disease, and explosh't: population growth. 11lis vast gulf helped spawn re:sencme:nt and even terrorism. 1'hird, despite and parcial!)' because of a globalizing economy and mass culru.re, e:chnic divisions and religious fundamentalisms ince:n· si6ed. As many as a million people perished in genocidal violence in che: African nation of Rwanda (ruh-WA.~-duh) in 1994. Traumatized b)•t he Somalia 6asco, President Clinton failed to ince:rvene. Final!)', t he: United Nacions .....-orked to define its role in che new era. By 2000 more t han fo rty thousand UN peacek«ping forces and ci· .,;Han personnel were serving in 6ftce:n "''Orld cro uble spocs.. Despite t he: cou ntenre:nd~ opinion polls indicated t hat mosc Ameri· cans su pported ince:rnationalist approaches to .....-orld problems and \i cwed t he: UN favorabl)', despite its flaws. Wit h t he Cold War 0\'Ct• America's posi· tion as simply one: ptarer- albeit a major player- in a tnd)' global order became inescapably dear.

THE CLINTON ERA E NDS: DOMESTIC P OLITI CS, IMPEACHMENT, DISPUTED E LECTION, 1996-2000

W,. did political difforences beco,.. sharper from 1996 tc 20001 Straddling the: political ce:mer. Bill Clinton .....-on reelection in 1996. His second term saw \'arious batd es ovcr domestic and foreign policy. lc is mainly remembered, however. for a sex scandal that led to Clinton's impeachment- a crisis that furche:r poisoned a contencious political dimace:. A disputed pre:sidencial election in 2000 did little to heal the nation's divisions.

J TH:t CUNTOH ERA ENDS: DOMESTIC POlmcs. IMPEACHMENT, DISPUTED EtEcnON. t9j6- :ooo

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Bill Clinton had wo n the n ickname "-the Comeback Kid" after a long·shot Yictory in the 1992 New Hampshire pri· mar}', and after the 1994 Republican landslide he again hit the co meback traiL In 1996, Clinton got another luck}' break: a weak Republican o pponent. Bob Dole, a parciall)' disabled \'t'orld War II hero and widely-respected senator fro m Kans~ won the nominacion. Dole ran a lackluscer campaign, and Clinton ~A'On with 49 percent of the vote, to Dole's 41 percent. n ·he 1Cxas mavcrick H. Ross Perot garnered 8 percenc.) Tobacco regulation, a major public·health issu e, loomed large in Clinton's sec· ond term. In 1997, facing la~A'Suits by former smokers and b)• states saddled ~Aith medical costs linked co smoking·related diseases, the tobacco industr}' agreed co pa)' some $368 billion in scrtlements. l 'he agreement limited tobacco adw~rcising. espe· d ally when direcced at young people. Since the agreement required go\-ernment approval, the debate notA' shifted to Washington. Southern lcgislacors d ose to che tobacco companies defend ed che in· dustry, but che Clinton administration backed a bill imposing tougher penalties, higher d garene taxes, and stronger ancismoking measures. The induscry scruck back with a $40 million lobb)ing campaign and heary- contributions co key legislators, killing the bilL The Republican party, commented john McCain, Arizona's maverick Republican senator, appeared to be «in the pocket of the tobacco co mpanies."' In 1998, rhe tobacco industr}' reached a new settlement, scaled back co $206 billion, with forcy·six states. Hoping to appeal co progressi..-es without alienating moderates, Clinton in his January 1998 State of che Union address offered some initiacives co help the poor, such as e nrolling the nation's 3 million u ninsured children in Medicaid. Buche also introduced proposals attracth-e to the middle class (coUege·tuicion tax credits.: ex· tending Medicare to early retirees) and co fiscal conscrvacives (reducing the national debti shoring u p social security). Some liberals dismissed che speech as "l'rogressh·· ism Lite,'" but it had policical appeal, and under normal condicions would ha\J'C cerci· fied Clinton's political co meback.

Cllllpllp 11196 and Alief: aatt~lnc Big Talllcco; Balandng 1111 llucllfl

Buc conditions were not normaL Even as Clinton spoke, scandal swirled around the White House. Adultery charges Willie House had long dung to Clinron, and now he faced che Paula jones sexual·harassmcm suit, dating from his days as Arkansas go\-ernor. Seeking co show a pactem of sexual harassmenc, Jones's la~A'}'crS subpoenaed Clinton and quiued him about reports linking him to a )'Oung White House intern, MonkaLewinsky. The presidenc denied everything, as did l..ewinsk}'· As the rumors became public (Yia an Internet ~A'ebsi te devoted to political gossip), Clinton de· nounced rhem as false. Hillar}' Clinton blamed .,a vast right-wing conspiracy."' In face, political co nservatives u:~re digging for damaging information on Clinton. Clinton settled Paula jones's suit, but more problems awaited. In sccred}' taped cdc· phone conversacions, Monica l...c'Ainsky had described an affair with Clinton from 1995 chrough carl}' 1997. In January 1998, che tapes were passed co Kenneth Starr, an independent counsel appointed to inVl'Stigace the Clintons' murky real ~statc deal· ings in Arkansas.

Scandal Clips llle

. .ica Uwinsky

White H CXUII' i.nttm wbOJt brief'

liliw n with Bill Clinton was di~rcd by Whitewater in\OtJrip.ton

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BO'OMO THE COI..O WAA: CHAilTIMG A N tWCOOilSE, .,&8--1.000

Starr's i~scigaci o n now shifted co whether Clinton had committed perjur}' in HANGINGo• his l'aula Jones cestimony. In Augusc, after BrLLCUNTON' jail threats and a promise of immunity, l.ewinsk)' admitted the affair before Starr's grand jury. Soon after, in videotaped testi· mon)', Clinton admitted ..conduct that ~A'llS wrong'" with Lewinsky but denied a "sexual relationship" u nder his narrow definition of the cerm. Other presidents had pursued cxcramarital affairs, but by the 1990s changing stan· dard~ sexual-harassment laws, and the glare of media publicity had made such behavior more objectionable and harder to conceaL The Comtbild
Th<>-BvNGt::E CoRD

753

J ThE CUNTOH ERA ENDS: DOMESTIC POlmcs. IMPEACHMENT, DISPUTED EtEcnON. 1996-:ooo

Eledlon :zooo:

As che 2000 campaign got under ~A'lly, the Democrats,

boundng back from the impeachment crisis, confidently nominated Vice President AI Gore for the top job. As his running mate, Gore: chose Connecticut senator Joseph Lieberman, making him t he first jewish-American candidate: on a major party cickct. The Republican contest

llusb Venus Core

narrowed co Arizona senator john McCain and Texas governor George W. Bush, son of t he former president. Bush, with powerful backers and a folkS)' manner, won the nominacion. The Green party nominaced consumer ad\'Ocace: Ralph Nader.

Both Gore and Bush courted the center while crying to hold their bases. For

.... I

W. Ioslt 4.lniP=;.

denc; 5on or formc'r piT.Sidmt, promiJ.ed to ttlln'rt d.igAity to tht Whitt HOIIIM

Bush, chis meant corporat e: incercs~ religious conse:rvacivcs, and the: so.called Rea· gan Dem ocrats. Gore's base: included liberals, academics and professionals, union mem bers, and African-Americans. Gore: poime:d to the: nation's prosperity and pledged to extend health care coverage: and protect social security. In ce:lcvised debates Gore: was far more arciculate and displayed greacer mastery of de:cail than Bush. But many \'Oters fo und che vice president pompous and arrogant. Bush, wich an eas)-going manner but lictle national or foreign-policy experience, was widely scm as a lightweight wholly dcpe:ndcnc on family influence:. He pro mised to restore d ignity co che White House. Polls showed chat most ..'Oters agreed ~Aith Gore on the issues and preferred his economic policies. O minously for Gore, however, lhcy preferred Bush as a person. The election seemed a toss-up. The resulcing dispuced election (set: Map 312) worsened che parcisan rancor of lhc..se: years. Gore ~A'On lhc popular voce: by more chan 500,000, but the Electoral College remained up for grabs. The struggle narrowed to Florida, whose rwenty·fi\-e electoral \'Otes would decennine t he o utcome. FialA'S in F1orida's deccoral process quickly became apparent. In Palm Beach County, a poorly designed balloc led se\-eral chousand Gore supporters to \'Otc for che wrong candi· dace. In other counties ~Aith many poor and African-American voters, anriquaced \'Oring machines re:jecced t housands of ballots in which the: paper tabs, called "chads;'' u-erc noc (!JNIIN full)' punched o ut. \l'hen Gore supporters del manded a hand count of chest rejected bal· III Yl'll$!1f131cr!,O.C.. lo~ Bush's law)'et'S sued to stop t he recounts. Florida's secretary of state, Kachcrine: Harris (the co chair of Bush's f1orida campaign), re-fused to extend the deadline: for certifying lhe \'Ote. 27 On N()IJ'Cmber 2 1 che Florida Supreme Court, wich a preponderance: of Democrats, Map 11.2 111• El•
m"". ..

'"

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754

OfAPlER J l

BO'OMO THE COI..O WAA: CHAilTIMG A N tWCOOilSE, .,&8--1.0 00

CHECKI NG I N Clinron continutd to mo\'1' to tbt ctnttr, .lchit\·in.g tou cuu .lnd .l balanctd budget (~ith Jurplu$e$ by the" C"Od or hi' ttrm). Tht Monit.l Ltwiruky $C.lndal trupctd; Ktnncth M.ur bro.ldentd the" Wh it~er inYC'-Stig;ahon to i ndu~ the L.Mn,kr aff.lir .lnd other .l«U.Qtioru or$eXUaJ mUconduct. The Rtpublie.ln-conuolltd HouH impuchtd Clinton, bu t tht Stn.nt did not n"~h .11 'impk majoritY''Otl' to convict.. ~pi tt impcaehmtnt, Clinton'' popuJaricy l'l'-m..lined high. tn the 2000 dta ion, Gon" won the populu vact, bu t the el« toul vact rtm.llined undecided be'QU$1' or di.spu ttd b.lllau in Placida. The Suprtme Court inte""'n«<, in effioct aw.uding t he el« tion to lhuh.

Electoral College voce, the Florida Supreme Court ordered an immediate: re:· count of all suspect ballots. 11le U.S. Supn:m e Court heard an appeal, and on December 12, by a 5-to-4 \'Ote, halted the recount. Gore conceded the nexc day. Five Supreme Court justices (all Republican appointees) had made George W. Bush president. 11le election produced an C\'ml)' divided Senate. Each party had fifty senators, giving Vice President Cheney the deciding ,.'Ote. (The Republicans narro"''ly hdd che House of Representatives.) As he left office, Bill Clinton issued presidential pardons to 167 people, including his half-brother, in trouble on drug charges.: persons caught up in Clinton -related scandals.: and whice:-collar offenders who "''Cre big Democratic contributors. Dtspite Clin· ton's political skills and good intencion~ few expressed regret as he: left Washington. Would George W. Bush heal the nation's divisions and pursue a wise: foreign-policy course? Americans waited hopefully.

CULT URAL T REN DS AT C ENTURY' S END

I

What c~ltciT41 t'kwlof'11'6nts marked the 1990s?

Amencan hfc m che 1990s reflected both che decade's prospcntyand 1ts cultural conflicts. While the newly rich flaunted chcir "''Calth and Americans pursu ed leisure diversions, undercurrents of violence: also marked che decade:. As cultural disagreements deepened, the values of openness and tolerance for d iversity seemed under threat.

The economic boom of che I 990s produced inseam for· tunes for some and an orgy of consumption that set the decade•s cone. Wall Street and Silicon Valley spawned thousands of )'OUthful millionaires. Elegant rest-aurants offered obscenely cxpensh
Alftuence and a 5Hrdl for Heroes

1CVtru-uL n ENos ATCEmuiiY's &io

The

--(b.

755

1992: d. 2006)

A civili;2n '-"'r~ion of tM Hum~, ;a m.ilit;ary\-ehide U$ed in the Per~i;an Ciulf W;ar, Wse m :~nive g;a5-guuling behemoth~ bec;une ;t ~t;ttuS symbol duri ng the e
As in the: 1980s, the m ass media offered escapist fare. The 1997 blockbuster film Trtank, ~Aith spectacular special effects, grossed $600 million. The top-raced TV show of 1999-2000, WIJo Wants to B~ 11 Mi/lionairt? unabashedly celebrated greed. So-called reality TV sho~A'S like Sfmlir.»r; popular as the d ecade ended, offered viewers a ris k· free tasce: of the: hazards thac American life itsdf(ac lease for the: affluent) conspicu· ously lacked. Millio ns avid!)' followed lV coverage of che 1995 murder trial ofO. J. Simpson, a former football star accused of killing his former wife: and her friend. The Clinton sex scandals often seemed little more than another m edia diversion in a sensation· hungry decade. Again, as was true of the 1980s, other evidence fro m the: popular culture sug· gcscs a m ore complex picture. Some: critics interpreted Titanic, which sided ~Aith its working-dass hero in sce:erage agains t the: rich snobs in first das~ as a commenc on Am erica's widening d ass differences. l 'he Cline Eastwood western Unforgir•'ftJ (1992) seemed to express nostalgia for an earlier era ~Ailen life presented rugged challenges and hard moral choices. l 'he de
A popular 1999 fil m, Amtriran &aut)~ and TV's Tbt Sopra-

OUibunls of Violence nos, an HBO series about a m obster and his family, which SUr Colleen debuted in 1999, explored dark impulses and violenc un· dm:urrmts in American life. 11le violence 'A'llS not limited to poJHUiture fantas}'· www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

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OfAPlER J l

BO'OMO THE COI..O WAA: CHAilTIMG A N tWCOOilSE, .,&8--1.0 00

Primary Source: We Can Watch Clinton on MTV .. •

Old-.. City . . .... April l.995 bombingoh fioder.al building dut killtd 168 peopk by home..grown terroriJit limo. tby McVftgb

True, che overall crime rate feU nearly 20 perccnc beNttn 1992 and 2000. But bursts of violence punccuaced che decade. 1'he annual coli of gun deachs exceeded N"Ccnt)'· eight thousand in 2000. In 1999, two srudems at Columbine High School near Den· vcr facally shot tvtelvc students and a teachcr before committing suicide. After the Columbine massacre !'resident Clinton again called for stricter gun-control laws, but the firearms lobby fought such efforts. The violence: sometimes rdlocced the intensit)' of the narion•s culture ~A'llrs. In 1998, N 'O )'OUths torcure:d and m urden~d a gay studenc at the Uniw~rsity of Wyo· ming, Matthew Shepard, because of his sexual orientation. As che abortion contro· vet'S)' ra~d, some "pro-life" ad\'OCates curned violent. In 1997 bombers scruck abortion clinics in Tulsa and Adanta. lhe following year, a Buffalo ph)'Sician who performed abortions 'A'llS shot dead. O n April 19, 1995, in chedecade's mosthorrifyingburscof massviolence:,a rental truck packed ~Aith explosives demolished the nine-scocy Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The blase killed 168 people, including 19 children in che building's da)'·cate cencer. Police soon arrested Timothy McVeigh, a Gulf War veteran with vague links co secreti\'f: antigo\'c:rnment milicia groups obsessed with conspiracy theories. McVeigh, convicted of murder, was exocuced in 2001. The O klahoma City bombing came precisely N'O years after a government raid on the Waco, 1t:xas, compound of the Branch Davidians, an apocal)'PCic religious sect led by David Kore:sh, charged wich firearms \i olations. The raid ended tragicall)' when fires probably sec by Koresh and ochers erupted inside che compound as fed· eral ranks moved in, leaving some cight)• Branch Da\idians dead. T imothy McVeigh claimed that his Oklahoma City actack was in retaliation for the deachs at Waco.

CHECKI NG I N M.lu culruno in the 1990:'1 wa:'l marktd b)· gaudy commttci.ali,m, a hxation with JQndal, and a decline in civic parhcip:uion. Although crime dcdined, outbur.~l':l of,•iolenct :'lueh ;u tht CoJumbine m:u,.aat and tht O kl.lho ma City bomb ing prompted :mxieciu abou t public ,;afcoty. tn 1993, a p'trnme nt raid on tht \l'aoo, Tt-Xa.s, compou nd of th e Br;ancb O.Mdi.a~ an apocalypc:ie rdigiow: S«t, n'$Uittd in JOitlle tight)' duthJ. CO(Uit.r'\'ati\'C'-J1 through organiu· honJ likt t he Chri,.ti.an Co;alit ion, ~ined ground in tht "culrurt war.~'' 1n che 1990:1 and builc a m.lu cui· tur;al and political mO\'I'ment. \l'ell·ocganiud e\·angdied group:~ upouJtd an inttrpret:uion or cur1\"nl ~n u: ba:'lcd in btbliC.ll pcophtcy and called (or tht n.lcion ro l't-Jcono ''cr;a-dit:ional valuel."

Forcunardy, che decade's culru.rc. wars typically in· volvcd ~A'Ords and symbolic gesrures, not bullets and bombs. For example, the Smithsonian lnsti· tution canceled a 1995 exhibit marking the fiftieth anniversary of che atomic bombing ofj apan ~Aohen politicians and vecerans' organizations attacked it for docum enting the bombs' human coli and for pre:sencing differing viC"A'S of President 11'uman•s decision. But if the culcure wars, whose origins lay in the 1960s, did not often de· sccnd into violence, they did im'Ol\'l' fi erce: concests that some vil"''o-ed as nothing less than a struggle for the nation's souL 1'he Christian Coalition's attempted takl'O't-er of the Republican party was part of a larger campaign co n..-....-erse ~A•hat conseJVati\'l'S saw as America's moral decay. lhe struggle un· folded o n man)' fronts, from tdevangdiscs' programs and radio talk sho~A'S to school-board protests and bo)·cocts ofTV sho~A'S deemed immoral. As ga)'S and lesbians grew more vocal and \isible, conservative politicians continued to mobilize against their demands for equality. l'he Southern Bap· rise Com-ention, America's largest Proteslant denomination, urged a bo)'Coct of Disney World because it had unofficially sponsored "Gay Pridr' days. l'he fast·gr~·ing evangelical and charismatic ch urch~ including sub· utban megachu.n::hes with chousands of memb~ denounced society's wickedness and the gM'l'rnment's complicity in the nation's alleged moral

decline. In 1997 some st'\'en hundred thousand men represencing a conservative Protestant mm-ement called Promise Keepers rallied in Washington, D.C., for a day of prayer, h}mn singing. and pledges co reclaim moral leadership of chcir households. Presidenc Clinton's sexual misdeeds underscored for consen•atives the moral rot chey saw eating away at America. Pac Robenson's Jbto Nrw World Ordrr( 1991) sa"'' much of world histor}' as a vast conspiracy that will soon end in t he rule of the Antichrist. The besc-sdling Irft Bt· bind series of nO'V\'.Is ( 1995-2004), coauthored by the conscrvariw: activis t Tim La· Ha)'f: and loosely based on certain biblical prophecies, described an End Time apocalypse in which j esus Christ and an army of crue believers will destroy the sinis· tet forces of evil increasingly dominating che modern world. In Ont Ntttion After All ( 1998}, sociologis t Alan Wolfe reported on his incerviews with middle--class Americans, whom he fo und accepting of dh·crsity and suspicious ofexcremisc positions. 11le vircues of tolerance and live-and-lee-live, Wolfe suggested, still prevailed in Middle America. In its optimism and moderate tone, such a pet· specd\-e caprured a deep-seated pragmatic approach to culcural differences, and struck a cauciousl}' encouraging note amid t he dash of contending viewpoints as the cwenrieth century ended.

Chapter Su rRI

~

D OWNLOAD THE MPJ AVOt O FILE O F THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AND

K EY TERMS

LISTEN TOIT ONTHEGO.

What foreign and domestic issues loomed largest during the Bush administration, 1989- 1993? (page 735)

I

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, but new problems quickly replaced old ones. Saddam Hussein's im•asion of Kuwait provoked a c~ ordinated response by t he United States and its allies., driving him out of Ku· wait b utall~·ing him to remain in pO\Irw,and u p to mischief, in Iraq. The Bush administration tended to ignore domestic policy; recession struck hard, envi· ronmental concerns accclerntcd, and radal tensions exploded into riots.. Bush paid t he penalty tOr his neglect of domestic issues when Americans e-leck"'Ct Bill Ointon president in 1992.

Whot domestic policy issues, political e1ents, and economic trends most shaped Clinton's first rem1? (page 741)

I

A baby boomer and fiscally moderate ..New Democrat," Clinton pceferrtd to focus on domestic issues; he pushed a major economic refonn package t hrough Congress but filikd dismally in attempts ro achie~'t he-alth care reform. As con· sen•ative evangelists and talk-radio hosts denounced Clinton, t he political d i· mate turned poisonous. Conservative Republicans gained contcol of Congress

G...-ge H. W. Bush {p. 735} P"'i"' G
Qall!fl(elhomas (p. 740} AIJert Gore. Jr. (p. 741} H. Ross P«ot {p. 741} William Jeff"'on (Bll) Clinton (p. 741} Madoleine K. Alxight {p. 742}

North American Fr(ll(! Trade Air•'"""t (NAfTA) {p. 741} Cllristian Coalitioo {p. 743} Newt Ging,idl (p. 743} W.llare RetormAct ot 1996 (p. 745}

gtOOalization {p. 746) KOSOI'O {p. 747}

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758

CHI.P1 U

1

8tYOHD n.u: COlO WAA: CHAIITIHG A N EW COWH, tf.lt-JOOO

in 1994; ltd by Newt Ci ingrich. rhcy promised tadical chan~ bur achirwd hn lc. Ac:bpring ro a mote con5tn".a.tm' cUnu.tt, Oinron m.a.ru~ ro achirvr •'df.ttt ufonn_ but hi1 adrruniJU~on -.'OUI.d soon ~ ~ t, myriad sandals.

Wllar fi""P" b
I

Tilt smdt m.atbc -.d. Lu¢)' on tho: wings or ad>nology ,.oru, • ...,.. ploym
How did the Clinton administration respond to political and eronomlc

I

devt!lopments obro
Oinron eommhttd Amcricm fO«cs to rht Balkans as peactkupers. He ex· Africa but did not inrtn•cnr. His J.tremp111 ar forging 2n Js:rxii·P.aknima.~l pt.act f..alttrtd, as had so many ochers. Clmron connnutd 10 purwc thC' d1srn.mtling ofCold W.at nuckat usmals and nonpn>lifttanon ofnuck.v •upons. As ttrrorism dil'tCO!d .at Americms .md rht Wcgil'lCf"UStd. 10mt ft-~IW'a of a posr.cotd W.u •'Of'ld on:ltt btga.n to~ an· plwis on ttadt and gSob.ahubOO, .a gRNing sap bti'oA'tm rich and poot ru· ~:and rht riK o(and·Wattm tdag:ious fu:ndamtnutism. p~ conttn1:~bout conflicts m

W1ly did po/illtlll dJff
I

(pag, 750)

<>ncr ml«rtd, Cl1nton IDO\o'f'd nm mott to tht: cmttt, suppotnng nx cues :1nd ~ bab.nCfti budgtt, and actually ac:hlning a budgtt sutplus. Ho.~t. t-he" Montca Uwin~ky $Cllndallllld i.nOft by Stan, a pattisan House impCJchtd CUnron, bur Republic:anJC could not muster enough voces in rhe Senarc ro convicc him. In the f.tce or the Jand:al, Clinton's personal popularity remained high. In the disputed 2000 pm:idrnrilll election, fi nally resolvrd by rhe Supreme Courr, Ct..'OI'g.C W. Bush, son of1hc IOrmtt president Bush, dtfrattd Yitt President Al Gott.

I

W1!at culloral dtvtlopments marked the 1990s? (PIIfJ! 754)

Thr prohfer.tdon ofckrtromc medi.a., notably l+hoUJS nn..-s rdMSion and tht rurofrht lntctntt, ~'Kkd tht conun roc a fr.agmmrtd rulrunJ 1ittnt tn dlC' 1990s. Sa.nd.al (1ndudmg Omton~s impeadunmr dr.ama) md ~oltnet (school shoounp and b:t'nW1SC uucks) lilkd rbt .airv.·.JW:S .ttik AmMCI.ru filkd thrir ptaga wUh apcnsn'l' SlNs md r.htit homts with odvr consumtt goods. Ag;IISW dus k'ftnlng drb.auc:huy at'OSl" .m opposition mowmnu, motcd in <'nngdial Ch< Rl polina; vtrnd curmu: n'ftlts through dw: lms ofbiblkal proph«y. 3.nd atltd for tht nanon to rrstoR: trad.luon.al family v.tlun.. This mowmmc's well· otg;1ni:ud pobtiGtl.ann, led by the Christian Coalition, becarnt a po..-'l'tful voc· ing bloc in dtc Rcpublic:an party :~.nd hclptd to deer Grorgt W. Bush in 2000.

UY TEaM$ continued

Olomo l*ll.alm (p. 749} -lRM>!ly (p. m)

"""""l 'L Ollilloma

(p. JSJ) Cily bclnlq (p. ~

758

CHI.P1 U

1

8tYOHD n.u: COlO WAA: CHAIITIHG A N EW COWH, tf.lt-JOOO

in 1994; ltd by Newt Ci ingrich. rhcy promised tadical chan~ bur achirwd hn lc. Ac:bpring ro a mote con5tn".a.tm' cUnu.tt, Oinron m.a.ru~ ro achirvr •'df.ttt ufonn_ but hi1 adrruniJU~on -.'OUI.d soon ~ ~ t, myriad sandals.

Wllar fi""P" b
I

Tilt smdt m.atbc -.d. Lu¢)' on tho: wings or ad>nology ,.oru, • ...,.. ploym
How did the Clinton administration respond to political and eronomlc

I

devt!lopments obro
Oinron eommhttd Amcricm fO«cs to rht Balkans as peactkupers. He ex· Africa but did not inrtn•cnr. His J.tremp111 ar forging 2n Js:rxii·P.aknima.~l pt.act f..alttrtd, as had so many ochers. Clmron connnutd 10 purwc thC' d1srn.mtling ofCold W.at nuckat usmals and nonpn>lifttanon ofnuck.v •upons. As ttrrorism dil'tCO!d .at Americms .md rht Wcgil'lCf"UStd. 10mt ft-~IW'a of a posr.cotd W.u •'Of'ld on:ltt btga.n to~ an· plwis on ttadt and gSob.ahubOO, .a gRNing sap bti'oA'tm rich and poot ru· ~:and rht riK o(and·Wattm tdag:ious fu:ndamtnutism. p~ conttn1:~bout conflicts m

W1ly did po/illtlll dJff
I

(pag, 750)

<>ncr ml«rtd, Cl1nton IDO\o'f'd nm mott to tht: cmttt, suppotnng nx cues :1nd ~ bab.nCfti budgtt, and actually ac:hlning a budgtt sutplus. Ho.~t. t-he" Montca Uwin~ky $Cllndallllld i.nOft by Stan, a pattisan House impCJchtd CUnron, bur Republic:anJC could not muster enough voces in rhe Senarc ro convicc him. In the f.tce or the Jand:al, Clinton's personal popularity remained high. In the disputed 2000 pm:idrnrilll election, fi nally resolvrd by rhe Supreme Courr, Ct..'OI'g.C W. Bush, son of1hc IOrmtt president Bush, dtfrattd Yitt President Al Gott.

I

W1!at culloral dtvtlopments marked the 1990s? (PIIfJ! 754)

Thr prohfer.tdon ofckrtromc medi.a., notably l+hoUJS nn..-s rdMSion and tht rurofrht lntctntt, ~'Kkd tht conun roc a fr.agmmrtd rulrunJ 1ittnt tn dlC' 1990s. Sa.nd.al (1ndudmg Omton~s impeadunmr dr.ama) md ~oltnet (school shoounp and b:t'nW1SC uucks) lilkd rbt .airv.·.JW:S .ttik AmMCI.ru filkd thrir ptaga wUh apcnsn'l' SlNs md r.htit homts with odvr consumtt goods. Ag;IISW dus k'ftnlng drb.auc:huy at'OSl" .m opposition mowmnu, motcd in <'nngdial Ch< Rl polina; vtrnd curmu: n'ftlts through dw: lms ofbiblkal proph«y. 3.nd atltd for tht nanon to rrstoR: trad.luon.al family v.tlun.. This mowmmc's well· otg;1ni:ud pobtiGtl.ann, led by the Christian Coalition, becarnt a po..-'l'tful voc· ing bloc in dtc Rcpublic:an party :~.nd hclptd to deer Grorgt W. Bush in 2000.

UY TEaM$ continued

Olomo l*ll.alm (p. 749} -lRM>!ly (p. m)

"""""l 'L Ollilloma

(p. JSJ) Cily bclnlq (p. ~

76Q

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

English, enrolled in college, and tried- without success- co resume his teaching career. In 1991, che family moved to Milwaukee, where Bao's mother and father scarced a laundry ~Athile also ~A'Orking in factories. Despite their hard life, Bao Xiong's par· encs inspired her wich their love of learning. After high school, Bao enrolled in college and majored in dementar}' education. While pursuing her college degree, she also raised threedaughtl't'S and caught thirty hours a week in a local ESL (English as a Second l anguage) program. Bao graduated in 2004 and continued her career as a teacher in che Milwaukee school S)'Stc-m. "'I want co be a role model form}' Hmong students;'' she said; .. I very m uch wane to be an influence in their education and their lives." The Hmong experience is only one chapter in che larger stor}' of immigration in the contemporary United Stares. American histOC)' from the beginning has been shaped by immigration, volumar}' and involuntary, fro m che British Isles, Africa, Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and chis remains crue in the early cwc-nty-6rs.tcencury. This final chapter of 71Je Enduring Vision looks ac the t \'ents and trends shaping U.S. history today. While Americans adapted co unsctding social and economic changes, a consen•arivc administracion in Washington pursued its vision of the na· tion's future. l ooming m-er the period u-ere che shocking terrorist attacks of Sep· tember I I, 2001, and the administration's response, including a bitter!)' dhish-e conflict in Iraq. In troubling rimes, the nacion's capacity for ~rcoming adV\'.rsity offered promise for the future. Bao Xiong is o ne of millions of newcomers who will help shape that future.

AMERICA UNDER ATTACK: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND ITS AFTERMATH

l

How did tM Bush adminirtmtion respond to tiNt September 11 attacks, intent4tionally and domestically?

Although George W. Bush had campaigned as a centrist, his earlydedsions sug· gested a hard-line conservatiV\'. approach. On September II, 2001, a horrific attack by airplane hijackers on U.S. buildings and citizens riveted the nacion's attention. Targeting che mastermind of the attack, Bush mobilized a m ultinational coalition to invade Osama bin Laden's stronghold in Afghanistan. He also secured new latA'S and reorganized federal agencies co tighten homeland security. Then, insisting that Iraq's d iccacor Saddam Husscin had conspired in the 9/1I attacks and possessed u.-eapons of mass destruction, Bush launched an invasion of Iraq as u.-ell.

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George W. Bush, who turned 6fty-6ve in 2001, 'A'llS a presi· dent's son and a senator's grandson. After earning an MBA at Harvard, Bush entered the oil business in Texas. He was known for partying and drinking, bur a religious conversion and marriage to l aura \l1elch stabilized his life. Business and family con· nections helped him win the 1t:xas gm-ernorship in 1994 and the Republican presi· dencial nominacion in 2000. Richard (Dick) Cht-:nt-:y became his running mate.

I Aw.truCA UKOER ATTACX: StPTEJt8ER II, loot, ANO hS AITtrtMATH

761

Bu!ll administration repudiai<S Kyolo protocol on emission uandards; Congress passes Sm lrilion lax c~ bi; stock martel falls; Enron Corporation collapses; wave of COfJIOrate bankrupk:ies and scandals; Con111ess passes No Child 1St Bellild Ad; U.S. withdraws ~om ABM (Anti-Balistic r.tssile) Trealy and deployod mis!i~ defense system; l«rrrist altacks on WOOd Trade Cl!lll«, Per II); U5. and allied forces owrthrow Taliban regime in ~nistan; captured laliJan fighters and olhers irr¢soned at Guantlnamo Bay, Cuba; UIA-I'alriotAcl passed Bipartisan C.rrc»ign Rolonm Act (McCain-Feingold ~W); O.partml!fll of Homeland S.ctrity created; Sarbanes-Odey Act tiii!Uens busiless accounlilg regulalions; Bu!ll secretly a.-horizes National Security Admi1istration to spy without warrants; Republicans gain in midterm elections US. and co*ion klrces ill\lade Iraq (March 21); North Korea withdraws from Nudear Non-ProiHeration Trealy; p~n-drug benelitsaddediO Medicare Rew~tion ofabuses at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib jlfison; George W. Bu!ll wins second ll!rm, defeating John Kmy

Con111ess passes Energy Act; Bush signs bill barring "cruel. inllrman, and dell'ading" treatment of prisoners; trade ckficit and budget deficit hit record levels; Bush names John Roberts and Sallll6 Alio 10 SUpreme Court; Hurri:ane KatriM devastates New Orleans: lobbyist Jack Abramoft indicted on mu~ aimi1al charges

Tom Delay resigns House seat: congressilnal report doc1111ents govmvnent failures ill-lmicane Katrila response; radical HamasorganizaOOn wirtS Palestinian eiKtions; Iran resumes nuclear en001men1 program; U.S. sells India oodear fuel and reactor parts; GM and Ford annoooce major layoffs; Congress debates inmigration.Law changes; Hispanic inmigrants mar'dt in major cities; OemoaaiS gait (Ofltrol of both houses in midterm eledions; resi,.ation of Oeeense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

Bush named Colin Po\11-eU, former head of the joint Chiefs of Staff, as secrecary ofstate, making him the highest-ranking African-American to scm: in a presidential administration. Condolc.ezza Rice of Stanford University, also African·Amc.rican, became nacional security adviser. Other Bush appointees were, like Vice President Cheney, veterans of earlier Republican administrations wit h corporate ties. Sec:re· cary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had held the same post under Prtsidc.nc Ford and Iacer headed a pharmaceucical company. On issue after issue, Bush proposed measures thac rctlecccd che interests of the \Walthy;corporace America; and the religious righc. Bush'scon.servari\'t appointments and domestic policies troubled many moderate Republican~ including Vennontsena· tor james jefford~ who in May 2001 left che Republican Party to become an indc.pc:n· dent. By che summer of200J, Bush's approval raring had fallen to abouc 50 pen::enc. But all this faded as the administration and the nation faced an awesome crisis.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, chrtc. commer· cial airplanes hijacked by terroriscs slammed into t he l'r:n· tagon outside \'t1ashingcon, D.C., and t he twin tO'I'-'t'rs of New York's World Trade Cc.ncer. As Americans wacched in horror, the bla.z.ing cowers collapsed, carr}ing mort than 2,800 men and women to their deachs. 1'he Pentagon

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76 2

Amorita

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

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attack left 245 dead on the ground. A fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania when heroic passengcrs prewmed terrorists from hitting another target, possibly the White House. Ac the World Trade Center, nearly 350 firdightcrs and 23 police offi· ccrs perished. The hijackersdelibcratel}' targeted S}'tllbolsofU.S. economic and military power. The gow~rnmem soon identified chc hijack~ all Muslims from chc Middle East, and craced chcir movements before September II. Terrorism 'A'llS familiar elsewhere, and had taken many American lives, civilian and military, in che J980s and 1990s. Buc not since the War of 1812 had foreign me· mies attacked major cities on che U.S. mainland. As the nation mourned. political divisions faded. Flags appeared C\'Cl)'"'hcre. 11le World War II anthem «God Bless America'" enjoyed renewed popularity. When the damaged New York Stock Exchange: reopened after six da)'S, stock prices plunged. lhcy soon recovered, but consumer confidence remained fragile. In October, an editor at the NatioMI Enquirrr died of anthrax, a rare bacterial disease. contracted from spores mailed in a leHe:r. teeters containing anthrax spores next appeared in the offices of NBC news and two senators. Four ocher persons died from amhrax-tainted maiL As panic spread, scicncists traced the spores to a U.S. re· search laboratory, and investigators focused on finding a domestic perpetrator racher than a foreign terrorisc.

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l'reside:nt Bush on September 12 declared the actacks an "act of war:'' On September 14, the Senate unanimous!}' a uthorized Bush to usc "aU necessar}' and appropriate: force'" to retaliate and to prt\'Cflt fucure: acts of terrorism. On September 20 a somber Bush blamed che attack on a terrorist necwork called aJ Qae:da (al KYE4111) (...the base'') headed b)•Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bin Laden, the renegade son of a wealchy Saudi Arabian contractor, had long denounced America for supporting Is· rad and for scacioning ..infidel" troops on Saudi soiL (Ironically, che United Scace:s

I Aw.truCA UKOER ATTACX: StPTEJt8£R II, loot, AND hS AITtrtMA.lH had backed bin laden in the J980s, when he was 6ghcing Russian forces in Afghani· scan.) Though bin Laden daimcd to be defending Islam, most Islamic leaders repu· diaced him. Among t he poor in some Arab cities and Palestinian refugee: camps, however, che attacks produced cd ebracory dcmonstracions. Bush announced his determination to uproot al Qaeda. He also targeted al Qac· da's protectors, the Taliban, a Pakistan-based mo\-emcnc of scrict and militanc Mus· lims, which had concrollcd Afghanistan since 1996. 1'his phase of America's amicerrorisc effort enjoyed broad intcrnacional backing. On October 7, U.S., British, Canadian, Pakistani, and ocher forces launched the attack. For chc first rime, NATO forces fought in defense of a member natiorL A coalition of anci·Taliban groups within Afghanistan, called che Norchern Alliance, assisted in the campaign as "'-elL The Taliban soon surrendered Kabul, the Afghan capital, and other scro ngholds. By mid·De<ember, despite sporadic r€siscance, che United States and its allies claimed victory. Hundreds ofcapru.red al Qacda fighters "''Cre sene co the U.S. base in Guantanam.o Bay, C uba. In j une 2002, wich U.S. support, Afghan tribal leaders es· cablis hed a new governmenc and named an interim prime minister, Hamid Karzai. Osama bin Laden remained ac farge, howe'ler, and many a1 Qaeda IO)'llliscs retreated co mouncainous eascern Afghanistan and prepared co fight o n.

Bush•s September 20 speech also signaled a broader re· sponse to the attacks. America wo uld carget not only at Qaeda. he said, but"every terrorist group ofglobal reach:'' He also said that Americans mus t "give fa"'' enforcement the additional cools it needs co crack do"''ll terror here ac home." In o ne seep to shore up domestic security, Congress fate in 2001 created the Transporcacion Security Administration and federalized the nation•s 28,000 airport security personnel. But other aspects of the open·ended antiterrorism campaign hinted at by Bush prowd more co ntroV'ersiaL The j ustice Oepartmentdecained hun· dreds of Middle Easterners living in che United States, some for minor visa viola· dons, and held them without filing charges or even revealing their names. The USA-Patriot Act, the administration's sweeping antiterrorist bill passed by Congress in October 2001, extended the gm-ernment' s J>O"'"ers to monitor telephone and e-mail communications and library patrons' Internet searches. C ivil·liberties organizations protested Even some conservariw:~ cradirionally suspicious of big gm-emmem, questioned chis expansion of federal poW'tr. In November 2001, Bush signed an exccuti\-e order empo'"--ering the government co try noncitizens accused of fomencing terrorism in sccrct military tribunals rather than in civil co urts. In 2002, news media reported dis rutbing evidence of missed dues before the 9/ l J attack. Ad· ministration officials also ackno"''ledged that through the summer of 2001, l'resi· dent Bush's daily security briefings had included warnings of an al Qaeda plot to hijack a U.S. airliner. To coordinate antiterrorism efforts, Congress created a new cabinet·fewJ Department ofHomelandSecurityin Nm-ember 2002.11le new department absorbed the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Managemenc Agency (FEMA), che Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other agencies. 11le FBI and the CIA remained independent.

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764

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

In 2003 Bush named a blue-ribbon commission, headed by Republican 11lomas Kean, a former New jersey gm-ernor, and Democrat Lee Hamilton, a form er con· gressman, co examine pre-9/ 11 intelligence failures. 1'he commission's 2004 report pinpoinced a lack of communication between che FBI, the ClA, and other agencies, and called for a restructuring of U.S. intelligence operations. 1b che dismay of crit· ics, some of che commission•s recommendations were: ignored. Mosc incoming ship· ping concaincrs continued to go unchecked, for example, and U.S. chemical plants remained vulnerable.

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Although Afghanistan re-mained unstable and Osama bin Laden uncaprured, che administration's attencion shifted elsewhere. ln his January 2002 Scate of rhe Union address, r:tresident Bush idenci6ed Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as an "axis of eviL'" Of the three:, Iraq loomed largest. l raq's ruler, Saddam Hussein, had been a chorn in Am eri· ca's fles h since the ~rsian Gu lfWar, which had left him weakened buc still in power. In a barrage of speeches, Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secrecar}' Rumsfdd, and Nacional Security Adviser Rice accused Saddam of complicity in the 9/ ll at· tacks and of stockpiling or developing n uclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This shift of focus co Iraq ~A'llS orchestrated by a d ose-knit group of Republicans who su bscribed to a political philosophy called Neoc.onsen•atism.1'hisgroup advo· cated an aggressive foreign policy dedicated to spreading democracy in the Arab world and beyond. Skeptical of multilateral approaches, neoconservath-es bdie\·ed that the United Stau~s. as the world's su perpower, should act alone to pursue its goals. S uch a policy, they believed, would advance freedom and create a safer en\i · ronmenc for Israel, America's ally in che Middle East. For nooconservati..-es, demo· cratizing Iraq 'A'llS a first step in cheir ambitious agenda The call for invading Iraq proved concro\-etsial from chestart. Critics challenged the administracion to pto't-e its claims. A preemptive ~A'llr wo uld not only violate U.S. principl~ che}' charged, but could also d rag on for }'eat'S, unleash anger across the Arab world, and undermine the larger antiterrorist campaign. Gre-at Britain's Tony Blair backed the adm in istration, but ocher NATO allies, as ~A'l'll as Russia and most Arab leaders, objected. 10 councer lhe rush to ~A'llr, they called fo r a UN resolution demanding that Iraq readmit UN weapons i nspecco~ who had departed in 1998 when Iraq blocked their access to some sites. In October 2002, Congress passed a resolucion sponsored b}•the administration authorizing President Bush to "defend the nacional security of the United Scates against lhe continuing chreat posed b}• Iraq... While Republicans m-erwhelmingl}' supported lhe resolucion, Dem ocrats u.-ere dhi ded, fearful of opposing Bush on an issu e he called \tical to Am erican security. President Bush would Iacer use this resolution as che legal basis for im•ading lraq. As the Nm-ember2002 midterm eleccions approached, Presidenc Bush, enjoying post·9/ l l approval ratings d ose to 70 percent, campaigned tirelessly, stressing his leadership in the war on terror. Democrats hammered at the recession, corporate scandals, and Bush's en\ironmental record. With 9/ 11 memories sciU ratA•, Bush's talk of terrorism hit home. Republicans regained control of che Senate and increased their House majority. Political reshuffling after lhe de-feat led co a notable 6rsc:

Democrat Nancy Pelosi of California became che 6rst woman ofeither party to hold the posicion of House minority leader. Bolstered b)• che eleccion, the: adminiscration pushed its Iraq invasion plans. In November 2002 Baghdad agreed to lee in UN inspectors. 1'hey soon ~Aith · drew, h~"f:'\"f:'r, as U.S. and British forces assembled in the: Persian Gulf. In a February 2003 UN speech, Secrecary ofState Colin Po~A•eU, rel)ing on ev· The- September I I t«rori't ;nud:J idence supplied b)•the ClA, insisted that Saddam Hussein was de:\-eloping ~"-ll' compar.tble to l"".:u-1 H.:u-bor in weapons of mass de:struccion (WMDs). their ef&a on Amaic.:uu; a w:l\""' of The ~A'llr began on March 19,2003, as U.S. cruise missiles rained do~A'tl p.lttiotUm w.Tpc the country. on Baghdad. The land invasion commenced two days later. Securing t he: BuJh pcoda.imed Wolf on t<'r rurU:m; a U.S.·kd ~li t-ion inv~C'd Afgh.ln.i· oil 6dds around Basra. U.S. and British croops moved norch, encounter· $tln, routed the- pro-Al Qatda Tal· ing unexpected guerrilla resistance as they approached Baghdad. In early iban goVTrnln<'n t, and ~t.lblished .ll April, U.S. troops occupied Baghdad and roppled a large: scarue: of Sad· pru·Amaic.m d<'-mocracy. dam. As the regime fell and Saddam fled, widespread looting erupted. The- a dministrahon Cll'.lted a new, On May 1, after a navy jet had brought him to the aircraft carrier Abrd· c.Winet·lt"VTI I:Hp.uunent of liomel.md S«urity, and Congre11: p;uled b.:lm Unwin off San Diego, President Bush declared major combat opera· the P.uriot kt d espite 'eriou' contions O'V\'_r. A banner behind him proclaimed "Mission Accomplished."' Bush c«ru abaut civillibeRi<'-l. named L l':lul Bremer, a career Foreign Service officer, to administer civil af· In 2001, ll'fl«ting t he intluena of fairs in Iraq. Saddam was caprured in December, and later put on erial n~orua\·atiVT$1 8\Uh a nd h i' acfviwl'$ m~e the c:ue for pr«mp· Buc conditions in Iraq deteriorated Iraq's Sunni Muslims, though a ti\'e Wolf .llg.lin't Iraq; Congre1a minority, had long dominated lraqi politics and resented Bremer's deci· p..uled .l I\*$01u tion a u thorixing t he sion to d isband the: Iraqi army and dismiss all gm-·ernmem officials who uJe of fOrce. had served under Saddam. T he: resulting power \'acuum sparked sectarian The- U.S. mitital)' operation th.lt violence. Conditions worsened through 2004 as bombin&S> kidnappings, roppkd Sadd.::lm'J regime began in M..uch 2003 and wa' ao.\"f b)· April; and deadly highwa}' blasts caused by improvised explosive devices (lEDs) bu t .lldm.ini,tt.lti\'e mU,tep$ and occurred daily. ln .S eptember, the coli of U.S. dead in Iraq passed 1,000. other f.tcton $p.uk.ed a violent Vice President Cheney had predicted that che Iraqis would ~A'Clcome: t he: in,urgtncy that by l.QO.I thll'.ltened Americans as liberators. Naw reality blasted such wishful thinking. all U.S. goals: in lr;Jq.

POUTlCS AND THE ECONOMY lN BusH's FlRSTTERM, 2001-2005 Beyond security concerns, what economic and social issws did Bush address in !tis first term? Although che 9/11 attacks and t heir aftermath dominated Bush's 6rsc term, the administration also proposed a series ofeconomic and social initiati\-es. Debate O'V\'.r these measures unfolded amid a sharp recession and a cascade of corporate bankruptcies and scandals.

The prosperity and srock-markec boom of the 1990s (see Chapter 31) barely ouclasted the decade. In Ma.rch 2001, the stock market recorded its worstv.-eek since 1989, falling by 6 percent. The high flying Silicon Valley information· technology compani e:~ which had led the boom of che later J990s, u-ere especially

El:onomlc Reverses .... Corporate Scandlls

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766

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

hard hit. As the: market value: of the: surviving companies plummeted, inseam mil· lionaires watched their portfolios shriveL Few shed tears when luxur}' boutiques and pricey restaurants suffered 1\'!''erses. But che: recession thac began in Silicon Valley and Wall Street soon spread. Industrial production dropped, and every state lose jobs. By j une 2003, with the une:mpiO)'· menc rate ac 6.4 percent, 2.6 million workers had lost their jobs. The longest economic boom in American hisrory had ended ~Aith a thud. T he: Bush administration, having inherited a budge:c surplus, naw projected years ofdeficits. lb scimulace: the econom}', the Federal Reserve Board cut interest rates d ew~n times in 2001. A wave of corporate bankruptcies and scandals further eroded inves· tor confidence. Business deregulation, a culru.re of greed, and ow~rty complex corpo· rate strucru.res had created a situation that imited fraudulent practices. Houston•s Enron Corporation, with close ties to the: administration, 'A'llS an earl}' casualty. A marketer of electric power, Enron flou rished in the: 1990s and claimed revenues of $ 10 1 billion by 2000. lhe end came abruptly. l ace: in 2001 En· ron fil ed for bankruptcy and admicted to falsif)'ing profi t repons. More than fi\'t: thousand Enron ~A'Orkers lose both their jobs and their rt:tirt:menc funds. Shortly before the collapse, Enron foun der Kenne:ch Lay and ocher cop officials had sold chcir Enron stock, profi cing handsomely. In 2006, a Houston jury convicted Lay and for· mer Enron CEO j effrey Skilling on multiple: coums of fraud and conspiracy. T he: company's logo, a crooked "E;'' seemed all too appropriate. The parade continued. In 2002 WorldCom, America's second-largcsc telecom· municacions com pan)', admitting that ic had ovcrscated profits by billions, filed fo r bankrupccy. CEO Bernard Ebbers, convicted of securities fraud in 2005, recei\
I Pouncs AND THE ECONOMY IM BOSH'S Fl.rtSl Tl:RM, loot-J.OOS In ~bruar}•200 1 , fulfilling a campaign promise, J:trcsident Bush proposed a S 1.6 crillion cut in income taxes over a ~llallleslk ~~Age~nda ten·year period. Though the: measure reduced all rates, wealth}' taxparcrs received lhe highest percentage reduction. As lhe recession began, Bush argued chat the curs ~A'~'-'C\'er, exempt energy compa· nics from some- enviro nmental regulations and granc $ 14.5 billion in cax breaks to oil, natural gas, coal, and nucle-ar·pc>"~~.'Cr companies. It did not cighte:n vehicle fuel· d lide:ncy requirements, even on gas-gu:u.ling l rucks and SUVs. On education, Bush pushed a program he labeled "No Child Left Behind... Bush's plan called for standardized national tescs in grades four and eight to meas· ure reading and mach skills, with penalties for schools chac fell short. In 2001, Con· gress mandated annual testing. Some schools, focusing on raising test scores, cut back art, music, history, and other subjects. The massive federal intrusion in public education, historical!)' a local matter, troubled some conseJVati\'es. Christian conservacivcs ranked among Bush's strongest suppotlers in 2000. MoYing quickly to reward them, Bush in 2001 created an Office of Faith· Based and Community l nitiati..-cs to funnel federal granrs co churches for social programs. Un· der chis iniriaci..-c, grants went to anti-aborcion groups and prison ministries run by cvangdicals. Operation Blessing, a charity operated by tele\•angdist l'at Roberrson, rece-ived $22 million in dirocc grants and food surpluses. Bush's education plan also included a voucher system by which children could actend private or religious schools at taxpa}-ers' expense. Congress rejected this pro· posal, but some states introduced chcir 0'1'-'n \'Oucher plans. By 2006 some 4,000 pri· \'ate and church·sponsored schools ~A'Cre partially su ppon:ed by student \'Ouchers.. Some did well; others sho~A'Cd no becter rcsulrs chan lhe public schools.: and some 400 had d osed for various reasons. President Bush also soughc fa\'Or ~Aith Christian consen•acivcs, who owr~At.dm· ingly oppose aborcion, by restricting scem·ce-ll research. Stem cells arc valuable for medical resea.rch. But because they an: harvested from human embr)'OS (from the "su rplus" embryos stored at fertility clinics), some anti·abortion groups opposed scem-

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768

John""'

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

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In 2002 Jlresidem Bush signed a reform bill co·sponsored by Arizona Rrpubli· can j ohn McCain and Wisconsin Oem ocrac Russell Feingold. it banned soft·money contributions; barred fake TV .. issu e ads" designed to influence eloccions; and in· eluded ocher provisions co reduce che power of money in politics. As lobbying organ· izacions sought loopholes and challenged the law on free·spcech gro unds, its ultimate impact remained unclear. As che 2004 eJection approached, Howard Dean, a physician and former Ver· mom gMwnor, emerged as che early frontrunner for the Democratic presidential nomination. But ~Ail ile Dean's candor and antiwar position energized che Demo· cratic basr, ic also alienated many ...otcrs. In the campaign's 6rst tesc, che lo~A>a pri· mary, he came in a d isappointing third. His candidacy quickly faded. NC\wth elcss, Dean had blumly cricicized chr Iraq War and demonstrated che Internet-'s potential for fun drai.Ung and rallying supporc. Senator John Kerry of Massachuseccs, a decorated Viecnam War veteran, won the nomination. Bush brgan his reelection campaign wich a massi\-e ~A'llr chest of some $150 million from corporate sources and wralthy donors called "Pioneers." Bypassing chr McCain·~ingold restTiccions on organizational contributions, the l'ion«rs raised monry from friends and colleagues. Of246 "Pione~" 104 Later re· ccived appointments in thr Bush administration. In the campaign, Kerry criticized the administration's response co 9/11. AI· though he had su pported a Senate resolution approving the use of force in Iraq as a last resort, Kerry now accused Bush of misleading che nation abouc Saddam Hus· sein. President Bush defended both the Iraq conflict and chr Patrioc Ace as crucial co the ~A'llr on terrorism. Citing Kerr}"s changing positions, Republicans accused him of"fli(>-flopping" inded siwness. Highlighting Bush's less chan distinguished militat}' record , Kerry played up his tour in Viecnam.. (Anci·Kcrry TV commercials questioned his Vietnam record and emphasized his 1971 anciwar activities.) Ketr)', a Cath· olic, sought to councer Bush's edge with C\'llngdical Christians. T he candidates' positions on culrural is· sues reflected national divisions. Kerr}' opposed the death penalty.: Bush supported it. Kerry supported Rot v. Wadt; Bush favored a ban on aU abortions ex· cept in rare circumstances. Kerry backed stricter gun control; Bush opposed it. T hr divisi..-e issue of same·scx marriage loomed large d ur ing the campaign. As some cities and scares began experimenting with che legalization of same· srx marriage, opinion polls fo und 63 percent of Americans opposed. (By2006 that 6gure had dropped co SJ percent.) \'t'hile Kerry favored leaving this issu e co chr stat~ Bush endorsed a constitutional amend· St.O ment banning ga}' marriage. With rh~·\-en states add· ing referenda banning same-sex marriage to chr fall ballot, che i.ssur energized religious conseJVatives.1'he referenda passed by lopsided margins in all rh~·\-en states, and Bush won in nine of the dC'\o-en, including dosd )' contested Ohio.

... '·'

Map 32.1

On election day, Bush garnered 51 percent of the: popular vote to Kerry's 48 per· ce:m (see Map 32.1). Kerry won states in the Northeast, the Upper Midwest, and the coastal states of the West. In che rest of the: nation, the: majority went for Bush. Bush narrowly ~A'On the Electoral College vote, with Ohio che pivotal state. Republicans gained a net of four Senate scats and four House scats. A tax-cutting presi· dent seen as a leader in the: "war on terror" and a defender of embattled co nservative cultural values had eked o ut a narro~A' victory. Kerr}' had won che two largest states, California and New York, and 55 11w- Sc-ptcomb« I I ;ut;tekJ a nd thco bur:~Ungofthco tuhnology-Jtock percent of \'Otcrs under chircy \'Otcd Democratic.. In Illinois a charismatic bubblco brought t hco free-whet-ling young Democrat, Barak Obama, wo n d ecrion to the Senate. pru,p«ityofthco 1990:'1 to a n <"-nd. The election highlighted che political role of new technologies. A J~«' ofo:orporatco Jcomd..ll.s, somC" lnternet·based initiatives like Mot't'On.mg raised fu nds in support of lib· involving ja il t<'-nnJ for d iJgraccod CEO~ of m.ljor comp.mi ~ undcoreral causes. Hundreds of bloggers (independent website operators) sus· m in«< wnlidcon« in corporate" cained a freewh~ling flow of political commentary. While conservati\-e Am<'-t'i ca. organizations had long mobilized their supporters via direct mail, radio, BuJh and Congnou:iona.l R.epubli· and TV, liberals appeared to hai,!'C the ed~ in the: new arena of Internet· comJ p;l!a«< huge- t .u: cuts, .m coduca+ based activism. lnd~d. the popular culrure offered man}' challenges co t:ion b ill mand a ting 'tomd.lrdi:ud teJting, and .ln con<'-rgy biii i~C'O co nservati'I,!'C ideology. Michael Moore's 2004 documentar}' F.:lhren1Jeit9/ 11 with inunti\'C'$ for big o il mounted a witty critique of the administration's response to 9/ 11. com paniC':!. The 2004 election again underscored the: political role of organized Cultural .lnd rdigiouJ conccor nJ groups. Conservam-e organizations remained active. r•ar Robertson's druVt" Rcop ublicom o ppolihon to Christian Coalition and James Dobson's Rlcus on the Family mobilized ' tcom·«ll reJurdt and ~mco·,;ex marriagco. Bush's base of religious and cultural con.scrvatii,!'CS. Among evangelical St nou:ing nation.ll S«u rity .lnd Christians, hD""-'e \-er, support fo r Bush was not unanimous. Jim Wallis, mo ral iu:uu, HuJh d e(ut«< K<'-IT)' in founder of the evangelical Sojourners movement, sharply criticized the re· thco 2.QO.l d «tionJ; the Rc-publi.earu ligious right in his book God's Politics: Wiry• tht Rigbl~u ltWrrmgand the Uft inacoaJcod thcoir m.lrgin ofo:ont:rul in Doesn't Get It (2005). boc:h hoUSeJ ofCongfUl.

FOREIGN POLICY IN A THREATENING ERA What challenges {tued the United States in the Middle East t~nd elsewhere in me world oft.r 2000? By 2005, two years into the Iraq War, insurgent violence and sectarian conflict raged unabated. Home·front supporc eroded amid accusations of prisoner abuse, il· legal spying in the name of security, and deceptions in the administration's case for invading Iraq. The co ntinuing lsrad i·Palestinian struggle, threats of nuclear prolif· eration, and rising international concern about environmental hazards further chal· lenged U.S. policy makers.

In his second inaugural address inJanuar)•2005, Bush de· scribed the Iraq War as part of a global campaign to spread Saalill Hoee-front democracy, "with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our ~A'Orld:'' The speech echoed Woodto~A' Wilson's 19 17 Slpport war message proclaiming America's mission to make the world "safe for democracy" (see Chapter 22).

Tbt Collllnuing Slruale ill Iraq;

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770

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS, GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PlttSU•"f

U.~ Ctoood Troops in lr"'

U.S. ground troops, like those seen here, f:.c:ed thre:u:so(inwrgent :.tud(s ;u~d :.nti.co:.lit ionvio lenc:e through 2008.

In Iraq the conflict dragged on. Determined to prcvcnc a governmenc of Shiites (who comprised the majority of the population) allied with the Kurds of northern Iraq, Sunnis organized a campaign of disruption and violence. A Now~mber 2004 operation in FaUujah, im'Oiving more than 10,000 U.S. and Iraqi forces, left 38 Americans dead. 1)'pically, hO\l'f:'\'f:'r, the insurgents rerurned once the troops ~Aith· drcw.lnjanuar}•2007, General David 1\:traeus took O\'f:'r the command of U.S. forces in Iraq and was gi\'f:'n 20,000 additional troops to imprM'e the security conditions. The "surge" of American troops into Baghdad, combined with the strategy of arm· ing sectarian militia groups in the provinces, tamped do~A'll the ...iolence somewhat in 2007 and early 2008. Amid the turmoil, U.S. attempts co train an Iraqi arm}' faltered, as did the recon· struction effort. In Baghdad and other citie~ electricity and other bask seJViccs re· mained unpredictable. Oil exports, Iraq's major income source, remained belo~A' prewar levels. Bringing democracy to Iraq proved equally d ifficult. Sunnis boycotted ajanuar}' 2005 election to choose a National Assembl)'· The result 'A'llS an assembly and gM'· ernmcnc dominated by Shiites. Sunnis accused Shiite militias and even rogue Inee· rior Ministry «death squads" of cargeting Sunni leaders and detonating car bombs in Sunni neighborhoods. Sunnis participated in a second round of parliamentar}' voting in December 2005, but the \'Ote foiiO'I'--ed sectarian lines. In February 2006, suicide bombers destroyed a revered Shiite shrine, the golden-domed AI-Askariya Mosque in Samarrah, triggering anti.Sunni reprisal attacks. (1'hc Kurds in northern Iraq mo.sd}' remained aloof from the carnage.) Historical!)' a patchu.'Ork of ethnic and religious groups ruled by successive 1\'.r· sian, Greek, and Arab invad~ Iraq was go\'f:'tned by British colonial administrators

I

FOil.EIGH POUCY IM A THitEATtKING f RA

771

after World War I and became an independent nation onl)' in 1932. Whether it could avoid fragmenting into separate Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish enclaves amid the chaos thac followed Saddam's O'lerthrow remained deepl)' problematic. Over 160,000 U.S. croops were in Iraq b)•2007. 1'hey fought few open bactles, but casualties continued. By March 2008 more than 4,000 Gls had been killed in Iraq and more than 30,000 v,:ounded. Combined with operations in Afghanistan, the war's cost stood ac around $440 billion, "'ith billions more in prospect. (Some econ· omiscs predicted that the 6nal toll of the Afghanistan and Iraq "''ars would be mcas· ured in che trillions.) As other nations in the coalition "'ithdn:w their fore~ the burden feU more hca\ily on the United States. Opposition to the Iraq "''llr m()I.'Cd from the margins to the political center. In November 2005, Pennsylvania congressman j ack Murtha, a Vietnam veceran "'ith a ha"'>kish record on militar}' matters, urged immediate withdrawal from Iraq. A Sen· ace Intelligence Committee report along wich tell-all books by former administra· cion officials reached the same conclusion: the evidence supporting che case for war back in 2002- 2003 had been crumped up or even fabricated. The Pentagon's decision to go in with a minimum number of troops and lack of planning for post· invasion reconstruction also faced incense criticism. Another sign of che "mainscreaming" of ami"''llr sentiment, at least fo r Demo· crats,cameduring che presidential primary contests of2008. Senator Barack Obama's early opposicion to the war gaw: him the edge ow~r his chief Democracic rival, Sena· tor Hillary Clinton, "'tho had voted for che October 2002 resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Even some Republicans had turned against the war. Be· rwcen 2006 and mid-2008, Bush's national apprO\'lll racings by most polls hovered at or bdo"'' 30 percent. Evidence of prisoner mistreatment deepened home-front uneasiness and dam· aged U.S. prestige in Arab nations. In April 2004, re\·olring photographs surfaced sho"Aing che abuse and sexual humiliation of Iraqis hdd b)•U.S. forces at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison. 11le army democed che general in command of the prison and coun-martialed some participants. Further allegacions soon surfaced charging prisoner abuse in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and ac Guant.inamo Bay, where more than 500 men seized in Afghanistan "'"re hd d as «enemy combacancs.'" In 2004, the Jncemational Comminee of che Red Cross described interrogation methods ac Guant.inamo as «tancamounc to torrure."' Evi· dence also surfaced thac the CIA had secretly transported detainees co an uncertain fate in Egypcian and Eastern European prisons. UN agencies and officials in Grear Britain, Spain, and other countries called upon che United States to dose che Guan· c.inamo facility. In 2005, defying che White House, Congress passed an amendment proposed by Senator john McCain (himself a viccim of torture while imprisoned during the Viet· nam War) to a military appropriations bill. McCain's amendment outlawed «crud , inhuman, and degrading" treatment of prisoners. Bush signed the bill, but in an in· creasingly common praccice he issued a "signing scatement"' assercing. in effecc, that he was not bound to obey the McCain amendment. Deepening civil-libercies concern~ Americans learned in 2005 that President Bush in 2002 had secretly authorized che National Security Agency (NSA) to tap U.S. citizens' overseas phone calls and c.-mails wichout securing a warrant. Bush and www.c.engoge.com/history/boyer/enduringconcisde

772

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

Attorney ~neral Gonzales defended che sp)'ingas vital to catching terrorists. A CBS News opinion poll found that most Americans thoughc that Bush had exceeded his authority in approving warrandes.s NSA spying on U.S . citizens. Even man}' Repub· Jicans, traditional!)' suspicious of governmental excesses, found Bush' s actions disturbing. In j une 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the administration's claims that it could set up special military tribun als co try che Guant.inamo prisoners. Such tri· bunals, the Courc held, violated boch federal law and che Geneva Conventions gO\'· erning the treatment of prisoners of war. In a broader sense, the Courc rejected t he Bush administration's claim that it could pursue the war o n cerrorism wich litde re· gard for Congres~ the Consticucion, or international Ia"''· Adding co t he accumulat ion of disrurbing devcJopmems, Timl! magazine in March 2006 reported that in Now~mber 2005, U.S. marines had killed twenty-four unarmed Iraqi men, women, and children in the ta'l'-'n of Hadicha in Iraq's Anbar l'ro\ince after a roadside lED had killed a member of their unit. As military criminal· justice teams im-estigated chese alleged inddenrs, and subsequent CO\>er·ups, memo· ries of the Vietnam-era massacre at My L.ai stirred uneasily. Central to America's relationships wit h the Muslim world was U.S. supporc fo r Israel and for a "two state" solution recogniz.ing Palestinian interests. O n this from, prospects seemed bleak. When Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat rr-jected the Camp David peace plan and a second Palestinian Intifada began in 2000 (see Chapter 31), \iolence in the region escalated. Ariel Sharon, elected Israel's prime minister in Feb· ruary 2001, demanded an end to violence before talks could resume. Is rael also be· gan building a security barrier, parciall)' excending into che West Bank, to concrol access and pn.....,.-cm suicide attacks. l 'he prospects of a U.S.·sponsored «road map co peace," proposed in 2003, briefl)' brightened in November 2004 when Arafat died and Mahmoud Abbas, a moderate, replaced him. In August 2005 Israel withdrew all j ewish settlements from Gaza. But in chis contlicc, one step forward alwa}'S seems to be foiiO\l-ed by two seeps back. In januar}' 2006, Palestinian elections gave victory co the radical Hamas organ· izacion, which had perpetrated many attacks on Israeli civilians and C\o-cn denied Is· rad 's righc to exist. When Hamas refused co renounce violence, the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the UN halced its regular grams to lhe Palestinian Auchority. After Sharon su ffered a stroke in januar}' 2006, his deputy Ehud O lmen suc· ceeded him. Olmert asserted Is rael's unilateral right to keep settlements in disputed territories; set its borders wich the West Bank; extend the intrusi'A! security barrier; and determine the furureofjerusalem, a highly sensitive issu e. All Palestinian groups rejected these principles. Violence exploded in j une 2006 as Palestinian militants in Gaza killed two Is· radi soldiers on the border and kidnapped a third. Israel retaliated ~Aith heavy bomb· ing in Gaza. 1tnsions escalated as Hczbollah, a militant organization supporced b)• Iran and S)ria and based in southern Lebanon, killed three Is raeli soldiers and lobbed scores of rockets into norchern Israel. lsrael bombed noc onl)' Hezbollah bases but also the Bcirut airport and bridges and highwa)'S throughout Lebanon, re· suiting in heavy property damage and loss of life. As in Iraq, America's influence in mediating this deepening conflict seemed steadily to diminish.

I FOil.EIGH POUCY IM ATHitEATtKING fRA

773

Alchough the: end of the: Cold War had reduced fears of global thermonuclear war, nuclear-related issues re· Tbreals mained. !'resident Reagan's antimissile "Star Wars"' initia· tive (set: Chapter 30) was revived by George W. Bush. A missile-defense S}'Stem, defenders argued, could protect America against a missile attack from North Korea or ocher ..rogue states.'" Russian presidenc Vladimir Putin, eager for U.S. invcscme:nt and NA1'0 membership, agreed to abandon the: 1972 Ami-Ballistic Missile: (ABM) Tre-aty if both sides fu rther reduced their nuclear arsenals. 1'he: Bush adminiscration agreed. Soon after, NATO granted Russia a consultati\'e: relationship, chough not full membership. Meanwhile:, che adminiscration joined ~Aith ocher nacions co address the: specter of nuclear proliferation, espe:ciall}' in North Korea and Iran. Isolated and impo\'et· ished North Korea, ruled by an eccentric d ictator, Kim jong II, displa)\."Ons program ended four rears earlier.

lilllclear Proliferation

Asche pace of globalizacion increased, the most immedi· ate impact for che United States was a surging trade de6· cit, ~At.ich hie a record $794 billion in 2007. 11lis massive Crowlnc Power imbalance mainly reflected rising prices on imported oil.: surging foreign car sales; and a yawning trade gap with China Wich China's admis· sion to the World Trad~ Organization in 2001, ics exports boomed. In 2007, the U.S. trade de6dt wich China topped $256 billion. As imporcs grew, so d id protectionist pressures. U.S. manufaccurers complained that China artificially manipulated its currency, the }'llan, to make Chinese exports cheaper. T he situation was complex, hO\I.n·e:r. Cheap Chinese imports helped U.S. re-tailers keep chcir prices low. When U.S. textile manufacturers pressured Bush to impose: quotas on clothing imported from China. Wal-Mart and ocher d iscount chains fought the effort. Also, many Chinese imports were produced for U.S. compa· nics that reaped che profits "''hen these goods were sold.

A Wldenilg Trade cap and Cllina's

w.w trao1t ~..

l

Wo~ bady ~ming inter. natiOIUI tradt

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774

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

With a GOP exceeding $2 trillion in 2005, China was quickly O\'ertaking Japan and Ge:nnany for che tide of the ~A'Orl d's second-largest economy, behind the: United States. Some: economists predicted it would be: lirsc in twenty years. On a 2005 visit to Beijing. President Bush acknowledged China's centrality in che global market· place and in che U.S. econom}' while cricidzing the: regime•s reprcs.sivcncs.s and its restraints on religious freedom. Ochl't'S attacked China's poor mvironmmtal record, including massi\'C greenhouse-gas emissions. With 40 percent of its 1.3 billion people living ac the subsistence le:\-el, China urgend)' needs continued economic de:· \'Clopmcnt, and for thi~ the U.S. markec is crucial.

..--Envlroametdlll

Three Mile Island, Lm-e Canal, and the: Exxon Valdrz disas· tcr (sec Chapce:rs 30 and 31) all underscored modern tech· llallrds Bee- a nology's environmental risks. Wich the Cold War 0\'Cr, the: Clollal Concern United States helped Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan dispose of their nuclear-u.-eapons materials (see Chapce:r 31). America also faced the: task of disposing of ics own radioacti\-e 'A'llSCe: from nuclear-weapons facilities. In 2002, O\'er protests by local policicians, t:trcside:nt Bush designated Yucca Mountain in the Nevada desert as the nation's nuclear-waste disposal site:. ContrOV\'.rsy and technical snags d elayed the project, and che facility is not scheduled to open until u.-ell into the 2010s. Othe:re:nvironme:mal hazards threatened as welL Acid rain carrying sulfur diox· cjo~Nl"""""" ide and other pollucancs from U.S. factories and \-ehide: exhaust damaged Appala· sutge in .avr:~agt k mptratureJ chiao forests and Canadian lakes. As fluorocarbons depleted the atmosphere's ozone: mo.st Jci.conrilu aurillutr to pmhausr-ps tmi.ll'ioru layer, more solar radiation reached the e:anh•s surface, increasing skin-cancer risks. Abol.>c all, global warming posed a long-range hazard. I ____[,:!!!!!'!~~~'m, ~[). l 'he fact ofglobal warming is be:)'Ond dispute. The Earth's average: rem· fperarure rose by one: degree Fahrmh e:ic in the tu.-entieth cmrury,and the race: Violence in lr.lq incrr:ued betwctn of increase shoe up after 1970. Ncar!)' all sdenciscs also agree char carbon di· 200-1 and 2006 imo:. md« of oxide, me:chane, and other gases from fossil-fuel combustion in fuctories, violenee, .do\\ing politic.U ;and homes, and motor vehicles contribute: signilicandy co global warming. Sd · uonomic pcogrr--''· emiscs predkc a 40 perccnc increase in carbon dioxide: emissions by 2020, T he "'J urge• of UOOJ).' in 2007 im· prc:M'd J«~.~ri ty conditioru Jom.ewith a corresponding surge in global ~A>arming. If this happens, sdmtists wh:.c, but American opinion h;ad foresee not only hotter temperarures, but also still higher sea lC"<-els from turned :.g.Uruc tht w.ar, and HuJh '' melting polar ice, disrupted climatic conditions affecting crops, and fero· :.ppi'O\·.al rating;s plummeted. cious tropical stonns. T he :.bust of pri,ontl'lli .and deni.ll of l 'he United Stat~ with other industrialized and de:\-eloping nations, baJic right:~ co "enemy co¢nb;ac.antt• prompted mounting critici,m, "' was deeply implkace:d in chesc global environmental trends. With under 5 did n-Vt'btion' abou t a w:tiT.:mtksJ perccnc of chc ~A'Orld's population, America accounts for 25 percmt of global domeJcic lp)'ing pcogram. energy consumption. And this energy comes he:avil)' from the fossil fuels b rad·P.ak.slinian rdation' rcom.Uned that ligure prominently in global-warming discussions. A 2005 EPA srud)' ten.sc; in 2006 U:r.ad inv:.dtd LC'b.l· fou nd chat U.S. motor \'ehides ~A'Cre, on average:, significand)' less fud effi· non in :.n effoiT ro moe out Habollah. cimt than they had been in che lace: 1980s. Nuclear proJiferac:io n became ;a 11le Bush administration's mvironmmtal record was mixed ac best. On fowl oft he admini,u.ltion'' at«"-n· taking office, Bush halted the: EPA's implememacion of measures to reduce cion, while tht tr.ack deficit with carbon dioxide: emissions from po~A'Ct plants. Go\-emme:nt scientists who Chin .l and glob;al w.arming conC>trn' incen,ified. questioned administration policies ~A'Cre marginalized. Rejecting calls for

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I SOCIALANOCUUVRAL TltGlOS IM COI«EMPORAAYAW.ERICA stricter emission laws and fud·dlicienc:y standards, t he: administracion instead touted dist-ant and uncertain alternative energ}' sources, such as h)•drogen·poW'Cre:d fue:lcdls. A UN·sponsore:d conference: on global warming. held in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, drafted a protocol secting stricc emission targe:rs for industrialized nations. l'rcsi· dent Clinton signed it but did not submit it for Senate racification , fearing de:feac. Jlreside:m Bush r~:pudiated the protocol e:ncire:ly, charging that it ~A'Ould jeopar· diu America's standard of living. 1'he Kyoto Accords, as re\'ised in 2001, wem into eJfe:cc in 2005, with o nl)' the United Stat~ Australia, India. and China refusing to cooperate.

775

I:,..to Auonls Mast indumial oarioru, wi d! me o:cepriao of

tile U.S. and SC'\"I'lll otbers, aptd to arboiW'C'duc:rian p is SC"C by tbis ;&gn'll'meot

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA What d.rmographic 11nd economic trend.s have most shaped ccmt.rmport~ry America? In the Late: tv.rcntiech and carl)' cwenty·6rst cenrurie:s t he long· term migration from the: Northeast, Mid~A'eSt. and Plains states to che South and West continued, as did the flow of immigrants from Asia and Latin America. Fundamental economic changes affected millions ofAmericans, benefiting some but creating difficulties for others, including d isplaced industrial workers and inner-city residents.

The rapid growth, geographic mobility, and ethnic dh·er· sity long characteristic of U.S. sode:cycominued in t hese years, as did che historic shift to the South and West, re· fleecing both intcrnal migration and immigration patterns. The: West added 10.4 mil· lion residents in the 1990s, with California alone increasing by mor~: chan 4 million. Household arrangements continue: co evolve. The: proportion of "traditional" families headed by a married heterosexual couple fell from 74 percent in 1960 to SO pm:ent in 2004. l~ple living alone made: up 26 pm:e:nt of households in 2004, while 4.2 percent of households W\'.re: maintained by unmarried partnl't'S. The gra)ing of the baby-boom generation (those born be~-e:en 1946 and 1964) pushed the median age from around 33 in 1990 to 36 in 2004, che highesc in Ameri· can history. On the: public·he-alth from, avcrage: life expectancy at birth rose from scw:ncy·four to st".-cnty·seven betv.r'Ce:n 1980 and 2002. America is becoming increasingly diw~rse and mulcicultural. Growing immigra· don from Asia and Latin America in rec:em decades n:wr.se:d a long decline in t he proportion of fo rcign·born persons in the population. The population of some 305 million (as of2008) is about 13 percent Hispanic, 12 percent black, 4 pm:ent Asian, and 1 percem American Indian. Some 6 million Muslims, main !)' fro m t he Middle East and North Africa, add to che e:thno·re-ligious mix. The nation's Hispanics are ncarl)' 60 percent of Mexican origin, with l'uerco Ricans, Cubans, and Salvadorans comprising most of the balance. With their high birthrate, Hispanics are: predicted to comprise 25 pm:ent of the: population by 2050.

An Increasingly Diverse People

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776

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

AmtricMiilatiOI, Twtlty-

first Cotlwry Stytt lkctnt immigr;2nts

&om

Afgh~ni st:~n jofn ;t f'itnoen

d;tn in fl\"cmont, C;~~l i(orn i;a, in2001.

While these groups faced problems, opportunity beckoned. For African-Americans, median family income in Sodal Probl- in a 2003 approached SJO,OOO. While well below the median lllllllelbnk Sodety for non-Hispanic "'flite families ($47,777), this was 14 per· cent higher, in constant dollars, than che 1990 figure. Collcge..:ducated blacks en· joyed significantly higher earnings, while the number of black-owned businesses reached 1.2 million in 2002. l 'he subscancial black middle and professional classes, in shore, are growing and thriving. But blacks in che in ner dries, "'there the unskilled have few job prospects, school dropout rates soar, and drug trafficking is pen •asive, face a different reality. By age thirty-five, nearly a third ofblack males lacking a college education have sct'V'l!d prison time. Inner-city black women face risks as well. In 1970, unmarried women accounted for 37 percent of black birchs; in 2002, che figure stood at 68 percent. Many of these births "''Cre to teenage girl~ reducing their prospects for education and employment. But che inner d ries presenc hopeful trends as "''l'-11, as church leaders and com· munity actio.ists work to provide oppon:unir:ies and break che q'Cie of self-destructiw~: behavior. Bartling ul'ban violence, several d ries su ed gun manufacturers for injuries or deachs caused by unregistered firearms. Among Native Americans, renewed tribal pride and activism continued. Citing Ardde V1 of the Constitution, which describes aU U.S. treaties as «r:he supreme law ofche land,,. r:ribes sued to enforce the 33l lndian treaties ratified between 1778 and 1871. Indian gambling casjnos, appnwed by Congress in 1988, proliferated. Connecticuc's giant Foxwoods Casino, run by the Mashantucket Pequots, earned S6 bil· lion annual!)'· Many dr:i.u:ns deplored the spread of gambling. But casino income did enable tribes to supporc schools, museums, job training, and substance-abuse programs. The Hispanic population, too, resisted sweeping generalizations. Many Hispan· ics were "''CU educated, prosperous, and upwardly mobile. Hispanic households' me·

Upward MoiJility and

I SOCIAL AND C UUVRAL TltGlOS IM COI«EMPORAAY AW.ERICA

777

dian inco me rose: to$33,000 by2003, and unemployment among Hispanics dropped from 9 percent in 1995 co 5.5 percent in early 2006. In 2004,22 percent of Hispanics were: living in pm-·erty, man}' in inner~dcy ncigh· borhoods plagued by gang~ alcohol and drug addiction, teen pregnancy, and erratic school attendance. Religion and family loom large in Hispanic culrure, but scressful social conditions took their toiL Many unskilled Hispanic newcomers took poorl}' paid jobs as gardeners, maids, day Laborers, and migrant farm \N'Orkers. Hispanics, like other immigrant groups, mobilized co promote their interests. In 2005, more than 6..-e chousand Hispanics hdd elecci..-e public office, including los Angeles mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. che city's fi rst Hispanic ma)'o r since 1872. Though Hispanics ha..-e cended co \OOtc at lower rates than non-Hispanic white~ 7.6 million cast ballocs in 2004, making che-m an increasingly important constituency. Of the nacion's J3 million Asian-Americans in 2004, 75 percent had arrived since 1980. This group, too, presents a \'ariegated picrure, chough with certain com· monalicies. Prizing education and supported by famil}' nern-orks, many followed a trajectory of academic achie\·emem and up"''llrd mobility. In 2004 nearly SO percent of adult Asian-Americans held college degrees. After passage of che Im migration Reform Ace of 1965, many Indian doctors, en· gineers, and academics emigrated to America, often joined later by parents and other family members. As the scor}' of Bao Xiong illuscratcs (see: opening vignette), the Hmong comprise )~t another distincc Asian immigrant group contributing a new strand to American life. By 2050, demographers calculate, no singtc echno-radal group "''ill be a majority in America. Non-Hispanic whites, in other \N'Ords, "'+.ilc still a plurality, "''ill sim· ply be another minority. Many Americans of mixed origins, like the golfer Tiger Woods and policidan Barack Obama, resist bcing pigeonholed. From 1960 to 2000, the number of interracial married couples in the United States rose from 149,000 to 1.5 million. Recognizing these realicies, in 2000 the Census Bureau pennitted cici· zens to check more: than one racial category, or none at alL Noc e\~ryone welcomed the new diversity, and che phenomenon of"-1Athite flight" continued. Bern~cn 1990 and 1995 boch Los Angeles and New York lost more: chan I million native--born inhabicams,approximatelyequal co the new arri\•als from Asia and Larin America. language became a major bacd eground. While some campaigned to make English America's "official language,'' ochers called for school instruction in children's native tongue, or ac least bilingual classes. In an in creasingly dh~rse nation, some obsen~rs foresaw a sociecy divided pS)'· chologicall}' if not physically along lines of race, echnicity, religion, or national ori· gin. The 2005 movie Crash, winner of the Academy Award for best picrure, portr.l)'~d a society seething with radal and ethnic hostility. Many people dearly seek the reassurance of a dear-
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GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAl CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PlttSU•"f

doesn't work, ~Ailat will unite t his diverse society? Americans share a common iden· tity as consumers ofgoods and mass-culrure cmenainmcnL Is chis enough? Can t he: nation's ciYic culture match its commerdal and lcisure culcurt?11le: answer remains

unclear.

The "New k-v"

In Tbt Coming of Post-lndustrid.l Socitty: A Vtmurr in Soddl

Forrrasting( l973), sociologist Daniel Bell offered a remark·

IIIII llle Old Economy ably accurate: prediction of changes in the U.S. economy. In che late nineteenth and early twcncie:ch ce:murics, America's mainly farm economy gave way co one: driven by industrial production. As che rwe:nricth century ended, an equally profou nd cransformacion occurred: t he decline: ofinduscry and che rise of a

professional and service-based cconom}'· Fanning and manufacruring concinue:d, of 60

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55

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§ 45 ¥

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1 35

Cr;t.._"':!unM, IOtamlln. /
!• "'

1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

2000

This ch:u-t iii UKr.t.h"S the sweeping eh:~ngcs in the m:de U.S. b.bor forc:e in the tw\"ontieth cenwry. f;~rrni:ng.. fish, forntry, :~nd mining ind unry p;~.ttieip:uion fell dr;!.tl'l;ttie;~.lly while the number of wori(ers in the service, technia~l, rn:~n :~ge· ri :~l, ules, deri.c;~.l, ;~.nd prole:uion;~.l c;~.tegorie:s rose ste:~dily.

Scutt: J.lilloricd Stcltskl oflilt fJn.fed ~ CobU.:d rlllle$ t> mo (IYIS); St.ririul Abn~n ollht llhbod Sldn, lOCQ; , .,_, Wict\ •nd Y~ ~ Fin1 Mt'CIJWfd G-dury.All ibroJed CWt-111 Crmdrit A'lll'!'ktr {WirllmJ;tc. D.C..: ThtADftm.XOI).

course, but not as major sources of em ployment. A snapshot of che U.S. labor force in 2004 cells the story. In a work force of 140 million, 62 pm:mt held "'flite-
nounced major restructuring plans, including closing scores of facto ries and cutting tens of thousands of jobs. As gas prices hit $4 a gallon in 2008, sales of SUVs and light trucks, moneymakers for U.S. automakers in the 1990s, plummeted, worsening the crisis. General Motors, an icon of America's industrial might, having lost $10.6 billion in 2005 and watched its scock price rumble by SO percent, announced plans to Lay off 30,000 of its J 13,000 faccory workers. \'t'orkers willing co quit were offered buyouts of up to $ 140,000. Said one GM engi· n~r: "11lis once was the premier company. . .. 10day, you know chis com· pany is crumbling around )'OlL" One wit described GM as a health·care company chat also makes cars. In other countries wich national health· insurance plans paid for by taxes, go\·ernments rather than individual companies CO\'Ct chese costs. In these dn::umscances, che long dedine in union membership con· tinued, sinking co onl)' 12 percent of the v,:ork force in 2006. As unions grew weaker, ~A'Orkers had less bargaining power co resist wage cues and other concessions demanded by management. As if to rub sale in the wound, 1h)'Ota,. poised to O\'ertake GM as the world•s largest carmaker, was celebrating record sales and biring"-urkers for its nine manufacturing planes in sC'\o-en states. In auto making, as throughout the U.S. economy, globalization's effeces are complicated. One thing is d ear, hO\l'f:'\'et: the economic order familiar to the parents and grandparents of toda)"S )'OUth is gone fore\'Ct.

0\'i'raJllift txptcuncy in~n-:ued; tht Sun & It continutd to g,ow; and immigr.:nion ltd to growing d i\l\"fsi ty.

R.ui.al pcoblerru con c:inutd, especi.:.llr in urban ghettos; Nati'"' Amtric.uu .lJ.~C'ffC'd their tn"aty rights and buitr euinos; Hisp.:mic and Asian cammunitiu gn-w duma~lly. Widupre.Jd aweptance of mixed· uct Jpor ts: hC'm<::~ a nd public figures and inc~sing i.ncido:ncC' al'intetT.l· ci.ll m.lrriaS" him«! at a. ma.~nwnc away from fixtd notio ru of race. A~ rhe population grtw incll':uingly divuw tchnicilly, the "mdcing p()(• m«..lphor suggesting ,;.unoe.ntu ;md uniformity f.lded.

The $C'rvitC' economy vtp.lnckd r.lpidly, push ing many into lOIN" p.l}'ing jobs but cn-ating lua.uivC' job.,: for the eduC
I

DOMESTIC POLICY SINCE 2004

What wen the most pressing domestic issues after 2004?

!'resident Bush called for social·security reform and expanded prescriptiondrug benefits for seniors, but his domescic policies did little to lift his approval rat· ings. The administration's slow response co the de\'astation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 brought new charges of incompetence. Bush sought to prcsel'\"C his consen·· ati\J'C legacy chrough two S upreme Court appointments, but a mushrooming federal deficit, lobbying scandals, blatant congressional spending on pet projects, and soaring gasoline prices as oil companies reporced record profits fu rther soured the public mood, affecting the 2006 midterm elections and che 2008 presidential and congressional races.

Since social security ~A'3S introduced in 1935, conservati\-e Republicans haw argued for irs abolition or privatization. launching his second term, Bush called for a partial privaClre IS the Federal tization of sodal security, enabling workers co shift some Dellclt Soars of their social-security funds to private im'f:'stmenc accounts. Bush pushed this proposal heavily, but the public remained cool, and Demo· crats criticized it as a dangerous experiment.

FUndln&Sodal s.c.ny and Health

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CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0 N((;ERS, GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

In 2003, the: Republican Congress expanded the 1965 Medicare program (see Chapter 28) to CO\'er pare of seniors' prescripcion·drug expenses beginning in 2006. Drug costs worried older Americans, buc the plan proved exmmel}' complicated. "'I ha\'f: a Ph.D., and it's too complicated to suit me,"' said one:. Because retirees \'Ote in large numbers, chcir frustration u'Orrie:d GOP strategists. The prescription+drug bene6t further burdened an already costly program. In 2004, Medicare and Medicaid cost S600 billion, more than double the: 1990 6gure. These costs, along ~Aith social-security bcnefi~ will soar f:'\'f:n higher as bab)• boom+ ers retire. These entitlement programs, plus Iraq War costs and interest payments on the $9 trillion nacional debe, produced explosive federal deficits. lhe de6dt, S319 billion in 2005, 'A'llS projected co surpass S480 billion in 2009. Despite such numbers, Bush insisted thac his tax cues be made pennancnc.. This action, budget experts predicted, would driw the deficit owr $500 billion by 2015. As Washington issued bonds to COII'er the growing debt, China and ocher foreign go\-emme:nts a~A'llsh in dollars because of the U.S. erade: de6dt snapped them up. But economists warned that this mcthod of funding the debt u:ould evcncuall)' dry up, leaving the tab to future generations of Americans. \l1orscning the deficit crisis, Congress members continued the long-standing practice of quietly inserting imo spending bills special provisions known as ..car+ marl;.s'" that benefited their districts. A 2005 high"''llY bill included 6,000 cannarl;.s promoting pet projects, including ~'0 "bridges to nowhere'" proposed by Alaska senator l td Stevens.

Hurriuoe Kalriou "'""' natunl diQSter in U.S. hUtory;

I

~much ofNewOriC'aru and Gulf Co.~.« in August2005

In August 2005, HW'ricane Katrina struck the G ulf Coast, taking as man}' as 1,400 li..-es. Coastal areas of Alabama, Tests tile Bush Mississippi, and louisiana suffered massi\-e damage. Dis· Adallnlstntion ruptcd shipping on the Mississippi River hurt com and soybean growers far to the north. Katrina and a subsequent hurricane smashed oil re6nerie:s and offshore oil rigs. The most catastrophic damage: hit N ew Orleans, the lcge:ndary ..Big Eas}"" at the: mouth of the: Mississjppi. Much of the: city lies below sea level, protected by levees from the Gulf of Mexico and l ake: Pomchartrain. As h~·\'f:CS burst under Katrina's storm surge, rampaging water flooded New Orleans's 10'1'--er secti on~ populated mainly by poor blacks. Man}' residents drO'I'-·ne:d or d ied awaiting rescue. Thousands poured into New O rleans's Superdome:, ~Ailich soon became a squalid disaster zone. Some d ied of heat prostration as they waited along highwa)'S for rescue. Public school~ churches, and hospitals d osed their doors. In May 2006, New Orleans's population 'A'llS o nl}' about 40 percent of its pre-storm le:wl. As New Orleans endured the: \l'Orst narural d isaster in recent U.S. history, the go\-emme:nt response at alliC\-els was appalling!}' inadequate. FEMA head Michael Brown, a political appointee with no disaster experience, prm-ed hopelessly ineffectual. Though initially praised by Bush ("Heck of a job, Brownie:'"), he soon resigned. l'residenc Bush made token visits and ddivcrcd a TV speech in the city's historic dis· trict, but the administration's performance did not macch the president's rhetoric. The distribution ofemergency rd ie:f funds im'Oived massi\-e fraud. FEMA spent $900 million on 26,000 mobile homes, many of which sat empty and unused. Worse:,

lllnlcane KMrina

I Q().Y_tsnc PouCYSlNCE 10041

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Htw Orril!i ns in tllt Afttrmitll of HarricMt Kltriaa. Stptlmbtr I, 2005 Four d.:~ys

.:~fter the eil')"s

lntl"es bufS( ;~.nd Aood w.:~ten dt-Y:u.t;~.ted their homes, Ntw

Orte;~.ns l'l'siden ts ;~w;~.it ev;~.eu;~.tion to the Superdome, whieh quiddy becomes ;~ s~ene

o( nighttn;uUh condition s .:~s thouund:; ofde,per.lte people ~rowded i:n.

by summer 2006 no coherent plan had em~d fo r reconstruccing New Orleans's destroyed districts or bringing back the city's scattered residents. T he IC\"«S ..w .re hastily repaired, )'i:C no one knew how they ~A'Ou ld wichstand future hurricanes. Re· CO\'i:ry in the hardest-hit parts of che city remained stalled. As streets stood silent and empty, wich noelectricityand rows ofshattered and abandoned houses, sections of New O rleans resembled a ghost town.

When Supreme Court justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a Reagan appointee, announced her retirement in j ul)' 2005, lllluence: From tilt Bush nominated as her replacemenc federal appeals-court s.preme Courtlo judge: john G. Roberts, jr., ~Ailo had held posts in the Reagan K Slreel j ustice Department and White House. When Chiefj ustice William Rchnquisc died in Sepcember, Bush nominated Roberts as chief justice. He won cas}' Senate confirmation while rC\~taling lictle about his judicial philosophy. To 6U the second vacancy, Bush nominaced Samuel Alito, jr., a federal appealscour t judge enthusiasticall)' supporced b)• conservatives. As a justice Oeparcment lawyer in lhe Reagan adm inistration, and later as a judge, Alito had espoused a very

Exllncllnl Republican

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782

CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PlttSU•"f

broad view of the powers of the executive branch- a view embraced by the Bush administration to justify irs actions at home: and abroad after 9/ 11. Alito, too, won con6rmacion, though on a much closer vote chan Robe:rrs. T he Court now had 6\'t: Roman Catholic jusciccs, someching unthinkable in earlier eras of ami-Catholic prejudice. O n che subject of Roe v. Wadt, public opinion remained remarkably consistent, with mosc leading polls showing abouc 55 percent of Americans supporcing legal aborcions with ccrcain restrictions, 24 percent fa\'Oring no restrictions ac all, and 20 percent believing that aUabortion should be banned. As Supreme: Court politics drew che nation's attention, so d id the: growing influence ofWashingcon lobb}i sts. L.obb}ing has been a pare of American politics from the begin ning. 1bday, man}' Washingron lobb}i sts, often cx-lcgislacors or legislam·e aides, haw offices on K Strecc, near che White House. Lobbyists' influence gl\.""' enormously during the ascendancy ofCongressman 10m De:layof1t:xas, the Republican majority whip ( 1995-2003) and majority leade:r(2003-2005). T he: ranks of reg· istered lobb}iscs expanded from around 15,000 in 2000 to nearly 33,000 in 2005. A series of high-visibility cases in 2005 focused attention on lobbyists and the: role of money in policies. In September, Delay resigned as majority leader after his indictment by a 1Cxas grand jury for \i olating state election laws. In Decem ber, a federal grand jut}' indicced jack Abramoff, a high-flying Washington lobb}ist ~Aith d ose ties to DeLay. 1'he indictments of Abramoff and a cop aide alleged that they had obtained millions ofdollars from corporations interested in influencing legislation. Much of this money went as bribes or campaign donations to Congress membersmostly Republicans buc also some prominent Democrats. Pleading guilty ac his hearing early in 2006, Abramoff admined «a multitude ofmiscakes."' Delay and Abramoff emerged as symbols of a corrupt system by which lobb}•· ists influenced legislation through contributions, gifts, lavish dinners, expensi'o't: golfjunkets, and hiring politicians' relatives. As public d isgust mounted, policidans scrambled co rctum Abramoff's contributions, distance chemseto.-es from lobbyists, and regulate lobbyists' behavior more strictly. Whether the: fl urry of reform would reduce the po~Aw of money in go\
The thorny issue ofimmigration reform surged to promi· ne:nce in 2006. Attention fOcused on che: estimated 11 mil· lion illegal immigran~ 78 percent of them from Me:xko or els~·herc in Latin America, up from 3.9 million in 1992. Many worked for lo~A' wages in a ..shado~A' economy" as migranc agricultural laborers, motel clean~ jani· tors, gardeners, fast-food empiO)'l'CS, and nursing-home attendants, or in foodprocessing planrs. In 2001, President Bush had proposed a ..guest worker" program by which short· term immigrants ~A'Ould rccei\J'C temporary work visas requiring them to return co their 0'1'-'n coumr}' when che permit expired. When che administration introduced an immigration-reform bill fate in 200S, de:bace: abouc chis program again seized public attention. Emotions ran high. Some invoked America's cradition of u
Debllln11mmigration

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thac if undocumented immigrants working for lo"'' "''llges were excluded, che law of supply·and·demand would push up che wages for these jobs and U.S. citizens would take them, increasing oppon:unities for che unemployed. As the debate went on, private citizens in the Souch"''CSt organized the Minute· man l'roject in 2005 to monitor che U.S.·Mcxican border and report illegal entries to the Border Patrol. lace in 2005, the House of Representatives passed a tough immi· gration bill introduced by Wisconsin's j ames Sensenbrenncr. This bill required the deportation of illegal aliens, called for the construction of a 700-mile barrier along the U.S.·Mexican border, and made it a felony for anyone to help undocumented immigrants. Reaction co the Sensenbrenner bill was s"'ift. Catholic bishops denounced the criminali.ting of aid co illegal immigrants and advised priests to disobey such a Ia"''· In Ma.rch and April 2006, immigrant advocates organized protest demonstrations. Ovcr half a million marched in Los Angeles.: 100,000 in Chicago. Spanish·language radio stations and TV channels- an increasingly important segment of the mass media- supported che demonstracions. A backlash quickly erupted. "My first thought is anger, folk~" declared right·wing radio pundit Rush Limbaugh. In the Senate, mean"'•hile, a biparcisan bill provided for bttfed·up border control, but also established procedures by which undocu· mented immigrants could e''e mually secure citizenship. Wich opponents lining up to denounce this as a cown form of ..amnescy"' fur illegal immigrants, che bill failed. By mid·2008, che legislaciw outcome of immigration refOrm remained uncertain.

Mid·cerm elections often focus on local issues. In 2006, ho"''C\>cr, the voters rendered a scingingjudgment on the 11G61ftdl008 Iraq War, che Republican Congress, and che Bush admin· istration. E..-en President Bush admitted that his party had taken a "thumping.'" In the House of Represcntaciws, the Democrats won at lease 29 scars, to regain the ma· jority. l 'hcy also "''On concrol of che Senate, b}• che barest of margins, 5 1-49. l 'he number of women in the Senate inched upward, from 14 to 16, a record high. The results made d ear ...otcrs' discontent m-er che nation's direction, and espe· cially owr the Iraq War, from the deceptions "'ith which ic was launched to the di· sastrous "''llY it was conducted. Facing this reality, President Bush the day after the election announced the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, a chief architect of the war. Other issues influencing the outcome were massive federal budgctde6dts and a constant scream ofcorruption and pcrsonal scandals that dominated che news in the monchs before che election. Facing all chesc negatiw:s, the Republicans could not capitalize on favorable economic ne'I'-'S, such as a rising stock markct, lo"'w gas prices, and falling unemploymcnL In addition, new technologies loomed large in the cam· paign, including computerik--d phone banks, video cameras and blogs thac publi· cized candidates' embarrassing gaffes, and even che personal "''Cbsites on YouTube. The Oemocracic victories meant new Congressional leadership in 2007: Harry Reid of Nevada as Senate Majority leader, and Nanq • ~losi of San Francisco as Speaker of the House of Representati\-es, the first \N'Oman to hold that post. At a vic· tory party in Washington, D.C., Pelosi told her fellow Democrats: "1bday "''C have made histor}'· Now let us make progress.'" lhe Democratic victor}' in 2006 d id not

Tilt Eledlons of

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CHAPtER Jl

GlOBAL 0N((;ERS. GLOIIAL CHAUENGES, 1001 TO THE PltESU•"f

translate into rapid progress, hO'I'-'f.'\~r. Republican o pposition and presidential vetoes handed the Democrats a series of legislatiw defeats. Voter disgrundement reached new heights in 2007 and early 2008. Surveys sho'tN'Cd that most Americans had lost faith in both che president and Congress, and that they wanted che troops back from Iraq. Economic woes added to the d isnta}'· In 2007, it was re\~alcd that billions ofdol· Iars of securities backed by SOcteran with rwent}'·six rears ofexperience in Congress. Against him stood the cool and unflappable Obama, a former community organizer and Ia~A' pro· fessor. McCain took a risk in selecting the folks)' Sarah Palin, Gm-ernor of Alaska, as his vice presidential running mate. Obama made a comparaciV\'.1)' safe choice and part· nere:d with the seasoned Joe Biden, senator from Dda~A•:u~:. On the campaign trail, l:taJin hammered awa}' ac Obama's past Obama alld Bidttl. contact with a 1960s-cra radical named Prc:side,.t·d ect 6;2r:~c:k Ob;2ma., l-eft, with Jow:ph Biden Bill Ayers (they v.\'!re o nce on a charitable: ;u his d-ection night p.:.rty in Chiugo's Cir ;2n t Pa.rk, fou ndation together); McCain painted NoV\"crnbtr 4, 2008. "At u.is de6ning moment," sa.id Obama as dangerousl)' untested and e\~n Ob;ama., "ch;mge h.:.s come toA~T~otrica.." nal\'c. Unfazed, Obama repeatedly tied

McCain's \'Oting record and policies to che: de:epl)' unpopular l'reside:nt George W. Bush. Obama's soaring speeches "''"re laced with calls for common purpose and hope for a be:cterday. Chants of ..Yes W'C can!" resounded at his huge rallies. Po llsters initiall)' predicted a eight race. But chen, an economic calamity crans· formed che: eleccion and paw~d che way for a dccisiw and historic result. Ever since che collapse: of brokerage house Bear Stearns in March 2008, a \l'Otrie:d Wall Street struggled to contain the: damage from che subprime loan crisis. In early September, anxiety gave way co panic. Saddled with billions in worchless morcgagc-backe:d se:cu· rities, Fannie Mae: and Freddie Mac- holding about half of che nacion's mortgage debe- were placed under gm-·ernment control. Later char monch came the: bankrupt· d es of lehman Brothers and Washington Mucual.: che fire-sale acquisition of Merrill Lynch; and the: go..·ernme:nt bailoutof insurnnce giant AIG.1'he: news on Main Street was just as dire. The Do"'' j ones Industrial average:, a bellwether for retirement ac· counts, fell 35 percent; global markets sank; the job market tightened.: consumer confidence plunged.: and millions of homeowners faced foreclosure. Some econo· mists warned darkly of a ..second Grear Depression." President Bush cried to ease the global credit crisis wich a S700 billion financial rescue package. But conservati\-e Republicans in Congress opposed it and manyvot· ers saw it as a boondoggle: for corporate malefactors. In a moment of high political drama, john McCain abrupdy le-ft the campaign trail and "''Cnc to Washington to save the imperiled rescue package:. In the: end, both McCain and Obama voted for the bill, which passed. But che incident exposed McCain to attacks that he was "er· rncic" and linked him more dosdy co che unpopular George: W. Bush. Obama's poll numbers shot up. O n Election Day, Obama took 53%of che popular \'Ote and made deep inroads inco Republican strongholds, winning North Carolina, Vir· ginia, Florida, and Indiana. Democrats gained eighteen sears in the: House: and six in the: Senate, padding chcir lead in both chambers. While: Repub· Bu.sh'.s pUn to privui:u wciil:~eeu· licans lamented their bad luck, Democrats hailed the o utcome: as a re:pu· ricy faltertd; a new Medlcano drug diacion of Republican policies and a final \-erdict on the Bush years.. bendit pcog:ram,;added to tbe co:~t.s of the m iliwroperuion in lr;Jq, lk:)'ond partisan politics lay deeper meanings. Significandy, the topic relulted in b:.Uooning budg.,.t dfficiu. of race rarely appeared on the: campaign crail Fears that white Americans Hurricome Katrina obliterated mueh would refuse to \'Ote for a black president pro••ed largely unfounded. A ofNtw Orl~ru and the GulfCo.ut; majority of whites under the age of chiny and about rn'O·thirds ofall His· the ftderal relpon.se wa.s wieldy panics ..'Oced for Obama. It was no doubt coo early to condude that Amer· vitwtd ;u i n.l~ate. ica had entered a «post-racial" age:. But ic was also d ear that something 8uJh appointed two coruerv.:aivt.s, John Robert:~ and Samuel Alito,J r., rr-markable: had happened. Barack Obama- son of an immigranc from to the U.S. Suprtme Court; a .striel Kenya and a "'flite "''Oman from Kansas- had been chosen to lead che: of h igh·pcofilt poli ti ~l ~.mdal.s world's most po"'wful nation. Facing looming problems at ho me and di.sg u.sted vocen:. abroad, and with hope immnixed with fear, America prepared to inaugu· Variou.s pcopo~il.s to uform immi· gratio n polte'y failed, k aving tht race: its first black president on january 20, 2009- almost exactly one hun· Wue unrt$Oh'C'd; t:Hmocrau rt· dred years after che founding of che NAACP. claimed the' Hou.se and Sen.ltt in the 2006 midterm dtction.s.

In 2001, accepting the Nobe:l l'cace Prize a few wee-ks after 9/1I, UN Secretar)•General Ko6 An· nan said: "We: ha\-e entered the third millennium through a gate of 6 re.~ But Annan u-ent on to 1!\'0ke che vision that had inspired che: UN's fo unders in 1945. Despite che hatred and inequalities

Falling hou.sing valu6 and ri.sing ga.s pric6 deepened tht el« toutt '.s PftUI.mt mood; a )>e.lrning for cbangt m.mifelttd in the 2008 prt.sickncial prim.lriel, whe-n wt«J .shO'>\'td ;11 prtfe ren« for anti· c.stlbli.shm.c"nt candidatu.

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dividing nations and peoples, he: insis ted. t he fate: of all Earth's inha bitants is interconnected. l 'h e: task of the rn·m ty-6rst ccntur}', he said. is to achieve ..a new, more profound awareness of t he: sanctity and d ignity o f ever}' human life, regardless of race or religion .. . . Humanity is i ndivisible.'" As we: conclude: chis his tor}' of America and irs people, ~Athat is the "e n· during vision'" of our ride? 1'he:re is, of course, no single vision. but many. 1'hat is parr of America's meaning. Nor is t his a vision of a foreorda ined na· cional destiny unfolding efford e:ssl)', but rather of successive generations' laborious, often frust rating struggle to defin e: ~Athat chcir co mmon life as a people should be. For aU che failures, sccbacks, and wrong turns, the shared visions, at their best, are rooted in hope, not fear. In J980, jesse de Ia Cruz, a Mexican-American woman who fo ught fo r years to improve conditions for California's migrant workers, summed up t he: philosophy t hat kept her going: "Is America progre:ssjng toward the better? . . . We"re t he o nes chat are gonna do it.. \l'e ha\'f: to keep on struggling.. . . With us, chere' s a saying: La rsptranz.a mue:rr al ultimo. Hope dies last.. You can't lose hope. If yo u lose hope:. thar' s losing ew.rything."'

Chapter Su (('f)

~

0 0\VNI.OAO THE MPJ AU Ol O R LE O f THE Cl-lo\PTER SUMMARY, AN D USTEN TOITON THEGO .

How did the Bush administration respond tc the September 11 attacks, internaoonally and domestically? (pall' 760)

I

The 9/11 attacks catapul ted t he: United States into a shadowy war on terror· is m. An American-led coalit ion invaded Afghanistan to dti\'f: out aJ Qacda and m-e:rthto'a'' t he Islamic Taliban government. At home,a ncw, cabinet·le:w.l agenq•, t he Department of Homeland Security, was created; Congress enacted the con· trovrrsial Patriot Aa, which t he administration said was necessary to combat terrorism but ~·hkh critics consideml a danger ro civil liberties. Bush identified l mq as part of an "Axis of E\•il"' that also included Norch Korea and Iran. 1'he administration claimed chat Saddam Hussein was linked to aJ Qaeda and that he was building ~-e:apons of mass destruction (neit her turned out to be accu· rate). With little global support, Bush invaded Iraq and routed Saddam Hussein; a major insurgency foiiO\l't:d, fueled largely by sectarian conflicts among t he Jraqi poop! ~:.

Beyond security concerns. what eronomic and soda/ issues did Bush address in his prst term? (Pail' 765)

I

The collapse of the: technology sector of the: stock market triggered a recession. Th e spectarulat bankrupccyofthe En ron Corporation was only the litst ofa suc-

K EY TERMS

Richard (llict) Clienoy {p. 760) Colin Po110ll {p. 761) Donald Rwnsfeld (p. 761) September It 2001(p. 761) a1 Qaeda {p. 762)

Guantanamo Bay {p. m ) USA·Palriot PI:! (p. m ) 0'!'lrtmenl of Homeland SOOJriy {p. 763)

Neoconservatism {p. 764) Arctic National Wildlife (p. 767} "No Cllild Left Behind" {p. 767) John Kerry {p. 768) World Trade Organization (p. m ) ~lwaming(p. 774) Kyoto Accords {p. 775} Hurri
ttSSton orCO(poratt .scan
domestic rrom, Bush purwtd a conscrv.advc agenda, indudmg nus11ivr r.u: curs (which enlacgtd the budsct ddk1t}. edueatlon rdbrm labeled "No C1uld U ft lkhind," an enccgy bill that pcovuk:d w btab co energy compamu, and opposi· cion to sr:em--cdl 115Ca.tth. Bush won ceelrctlon in 2004 by .UtU1ing national .'S«lltity and ITlOl"';li i.»un. Reyublicans i.nctt-OUC'd c:hdc control in Congtess.

W1urt d>alknf1S (oa!d the Umkd SttiUS in t/v Middk aut and elslwhe,. in tlr< wMd after 2000? (pogt 769)

I

0omtsnc support fOe the • "M MJd(d afnld WOf"'Cf\IOS SKUtun wiolmcr in 1rnJ, mdulonso( .bw<s t,. lh< U.S. rruhwy and domnric SJ'!'ing on dx oum< of S«UUIJ, mel skpcxum aboul dx .adtrunUir:tll«li's CUt rot inv;~dms Iraq. Othtt troubbng •'Odd de. dopmcnls INluckd wonmans lsr.ub-P:ak::srtnil.n ~ btions; nudeu progr.vru an North Kotu and Inn. and Clufu•s growtng ta> DODUC and miloI1NJ1S and othct «M"""""'alluunis toUS
W1urt demognzphic and-" tnnds,.,.,. most shap
I

America? (pofF 775)

1\-U.jor soci.al ttmds m theM: )"".at'S mdudcd condnums m•gt2-tion to the Soulh and "i'est. chronic ann~ty pcoblc:nu..and inm.u:mg tehnic diwrsity u the Hispmic md AsWI populad01u grrw. Jnaeucd tmm•granon. tipro.ally from Latin Ameria .and Asia, igm1td 1 dr~tt abour ..-·hcrhrt such an influx could bt assimllued and whcthrr Amrnc-.an dlwtshy 'A'OUtd br 2 mdring pot or a salad bowl in • •htch cthmc tdc:n bdcs f'l':mamtd .u rong. On rhr ~onomic front, the long·tttm shtft from industtial procluo1on to :m tnrotmanon-Nsrd and sco•ice economy proardrd, and a musiw: dde orforr;lgn imporrs nirrcd unt;asint;SS, especially in the troubkd domtlltlc auto lndu!irty.

I

What"~" the most pressing do,..,tic Issues o(ter 20041 (page 779)

In hts 1roublcd second temt, Hush pc:rauaded Congltis co pass a cosrly prescdpcion-drug benefic ror Mtdioare rctlpl t:n~ aod :~ppoinred l\\'0 con.urvariw junsi'S 10 the Suprrm r Courr. Out he failed, ho-.·c~r. In his efforts ro partially pnv.acize Soci.;al S«urity and r.:.form hnmlgt.:tllon policy. 1'he admini.stracion's much--cnticizcd rc-.s;ponsc co Hurrianc Kauitu pmmprl-d questions about ti'Scompd:cn~ and further di'0\'1: dw>n Uu11h'11 approvll r:mngs. Riding a Y.'a\'C of\·ote( discontc:nt, Oc:mocrats ft.dauncd con1rol ofCongress in rhe 2006 midterm dcct:ioru. As thr ltuq W.ar dragged on, the housing matUr colb.psed, and gou prices spiked, the domirwu theme in the early st~\1 oftht 2008 ptfii· dcndal camp;tign \\'.l.S "ch.~ongr. • As Rcpublic:an primaty and aucus vow·s chost: as t:hdr candidate Arizon.a SC:nJ.lOtjohn McCain, a Vternam POW • •irh a ~puta· don as a ma-wccick, t:hC' Ocmocr.au opcrd fbt a young and chatismaric AftiCllJl· Amtrian scna.lor from JUmou, B.uack Ob.amJ.. Ob.una '*'On a tXdsrvc viaocy 1ft the gmu.t1 d«tion.

www.nngog~.com/binoty/b4y~r/~ndvringcondst:'~

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Appendix DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE INCONGRESS, jULl' 4, 1776 Tbt Unanimous Drcldralion ofthe Tbirtrtn United Stales ofArnrrica

When, in che course of human C\'ro~ it becomes nee· cs.sary fo r one people to dissolve the policical bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the: e:anh, the separate and equal scacion to which the laws of nacure: and of na· cure's God encirle them, a decent respect to the opin· ions of mankind requires that they should dedare the causes "''hich impel them to the separacion. We hold these cruths co be self-evident: l 'hat all men are created equal; that they are: cndO'I'--ed by their Creator with certain unalienable righcs; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.: char, to secure: these righrs, governments an: inscicuced among men, deriving their just po~Aus from the: consene of the: gowrncd; that whenever any form of go\'· crnmcnc becomes dc.scrucrivc of chese: ends, it is the righc of the people to alter or to abolish ic, and to in· sticuce: new go\-ernment, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as co them shall seem mosc likely co effect thei r safety and happiness. l"rude:ncc, indeed, will dictate chat go\'· crnmcncs long established should noc be: changed for light and cransicnc causes; and according!)' all expcri· cnce hath shown that mankind arc more d isposed to suffer, while: evils are sufferable:, than to right them· selves by abolishing rhc fo rms to which they are accustomed. Butwhen along train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design co reduce chem under absolure despotism , ic is their righc, it is chcir duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their furure security. Such has been che pacie:nt sufferance of chese: colonies; and su ch is no"'' the: necessity which constrains them co alter their fo nne:r systems of gm--ernme:nt. The his· tory of the present King of Great Britain is a hisrory of repeated injuries and usurpadons, all having in direct

obje:cr the establishment of an absolute tyranny O\'er these scares. To prow chis, let facts be submitted to a candid world. He: has refused his assent to laws, che most whole:· some and necessary for che public good. He: has forbidden his governors to pass la"''S of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and. "'then so suspended, he has utterly neglected to at· tend co them. He: has refused co pass ocher laws for the accom· modacion of large: d istricts of people, unless chose people would relinquish the: right of repre:scncacion in the legislature, a right inestimable co chcm, and formi· dable co tyrants onl)'· He: has called together le:gislati\-e bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the: deposi· tory of their public records, for the: sole purpose of fa. tiguing them into compliance with his measures. He: has dissoh-ed representath-e houses repeatedly, for opposing. with manly firmness, his invasions on the righcs of the people. He: has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected.: whcreb)• the legisla· m·e: powers, incapable ofannihilation, have returned co the people at large for cheir exercise; che state remain· ing, in the mean rime, exposed to all the: dangers of in· vasions from without and convulsions within. He: has endeavored to pre:\-ent the population of these scace:s; for chac purpose obstructing the la"''S of naturalization of fo reigners.: refusing to pass others co encourage che:ir migration hither, and raising the con· dicions of new appropriation of Lands. He: has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusjng his asscnc to Laws for establishing judidary powers.

A -1

He has made judges dependent on his ~Aitl alone, for the cenu.re of their offices, and the amount and pay· mcnt of chcir salaries. He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sem hither swarms of officers co harass our people and eat ouc their substance. He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power. He has combined with others ro subject us to a ju· risdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our latA'S, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation: For quartering large: bodies of armed troops among us; For prow:ting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which chey should commie on che inhabitants of these: states; For cutting off our trade with all pares of the world; For imposing taxes o n us wichouc our consent; For depriving u~ in many cases, of the: benc6cs of erial by jur}'; For transporting us beyond seas, co be tried for pretended offenses; For abolishing che free S)'Stem of English laws in a neighboring province, establishing therein an arbitrar}' go'lernmcnt, and enlarging its boundari~ so as to render it at once an example and 6t instrument for intro· ducing the: same: absolute rule into these colonies; For taking awa}' our charters, abolishing our most valuable latA'S, and altering fundamentally che forms of our go\-emme:nts; For suspending o ur O'-''tl lcgislacure:s, and declaring themselves in'lested with poW'Cr ro legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated go'lern mcnc here, by declaring us ouc of his protection and waging ~A'llr against us. He: has plundci\."Ct our seas, ra\·a~d our coasts, burned our to'\l.·ns, and destro)"L"Ct the lives of our people. He: is at this cime: transporting large armies of forcign mercenaries to complete che works of de:ach, desoLation, and tyranny already begun with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy of the head of a civilized nation. He has co nstrained o ur fello~A'·citizcns, taken cap· tii,!'C on the: high seas, co bear arms against chcir coun-

try. to become the: executioners of their friends and brethren, or ro fall th e:mse:l~s by their hands. He: has excited domestic insurrection among us, and has endeavored to bring o n the inhabitants of our fro ntiers the merciless Indian savages, whose kno~A'tl rule of "-atfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions. In every stage: of these oppressions \l'e ha..-e peri· tione:d for redress in the: most humble terms; our re· peated petitions haw been answered o nl)' by repeated injur}'· A prince, whose character is thus ma.rked b)•C\'· cry act which may define a tyrant, is un6c ro be the ruler of a free people. Nor have 'A'C been wanting in our attentions to our British brethren. \l'e have ~A'llrncd them, from time co time, of attempts by their legislature: to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction O\>er us. We ha\·e reminded them of the: circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We: have appealed to chcir natii,!'C jus· tice and magnanimity; and we ha\-e conjured them b)• the ties of our common kindred, co disa\'OW chesc usu rpations, ~Ailich ~A'Oul d inevitably interrupt our connec· tions and correspondence. 1'hey, too, have been deaf ro the \'Oicc of justice and of consanguinity. We: must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the: resc of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends. We:, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the: S upreme j udge of the world for the: rectitude: of o ur intentions, do, in the name and b)•the: authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, thac these United Colonies are, and of right ought CO be, FlUtE AND lNOEf'ENOENT STAT ES; char chey are absolved from aUallegiance co the: British crown, and that all political co nnection becwee:n them and the: state of Great Britain is, and o ughc co be, totally d issolved.; and that, as free and independent stat~ they ha'le full po~A'er co levy war, condude: peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all ocher acts and chings which independent states may of right do. And for che support of this declaration, with a finn rdiancc on the protection of Divine ProYidence, u-e m utually pledge to each other our lt..·es, our forcunes, and o ur sacred honor. JOHN HANCOCK (P>r.li
COttmtVnc:IN 01 JWil.NftO swu Of AMUICA

A·3

CONSTITUTION OFT H S UNITED STATSS OF AM SIUCA

PREAMBUi

~'f: ~ JXopk of dw Uniud Sr.ut'S, in on:kt to form a mOft prrfta umon, csr..:lblish JUSOCC. msu~ domestic rnnquilicy, provide for the common dtfmsr:, promocc tht: ge~ ~IF.l~t; a~ sec.urc 1iu~ blt:ssin~ ofhbmy ro ouneiVtl :md our polltt:rity, do orda~n and cstabl1s h thiS CONS11TlTI.IO N for the United States ofAmcric.1.

ARnCLEI

Scttion I. Alllegisb.t:Jvt ~<ers hc«:m gr.1mM shall bt \'ested In a Congress ofrhe United States, which shall

1U House of Rrprtsnlta.li\U shall c.hoou thrir

Spahr mel ....... officus: mel "'"'' h.a... the .... ~'ff of impeachment.

consist of" Senate and a House of Reprcsc:nc.uiw:s.

~cdon

S«tion 1. 1'ht House: of Rtprr:smtab'WS shill bt

composed of tvo'O Senators from ach Srarr, cJJosm by W ft#sUtwrt tbnro{. for six yun; and e.uh Stn.Uor shall

composul ofmembtrs chosen nuy .s«ond )Uf by the people of rlu sn
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in whkh he .sh:all be chosen. IUprutnutiws and c:Urut r.:.tXr.S shall bt :1ppor· rionrd among the ....ru Snres which our I>< mdudrd within tl11J Union, according to their r~ numbtrs, u·M s.h:t/1 bt dctrrmmM by adding lo 'M wOOl~ num· bt.r offr« fH'J"WJU, inc/lllil'll$ tiJO« bound to f('J"I/K(' for a t.r"" of]<.,, adodiog i.diJM Mt taml w..-fiftbs of .U tllb< =ck within th~tt )'eatS ~ttt the first m«ting of the Congress of t he United States, and within C\..:ry ~ubseq u tnt t~nn of W l years, in s uch manner as tht..-y s hall by law d1rtct. 111e number of !Upr~m:uiws sh:~ll not exctcd one for cwry rhiny chousmcl. but e.uh St~e sluU b't' a.t ltut one R.tpresent1th~ • ...a DlJ ,.m nurlfHT'.dMff .sb4ll bt matt.., tbt SIAtt DfNrw Hampshirr W/1 IN rntidrd w

••d

ti11W, Massacburelt1 rlfltt., Rhode IJI~wd and Prvvi· dena Plantalions onr, Qlrl 1tettiolt ji1.-r, New li)rk sbc, Ntw

rhotnt

fm9 f-, lb"'JU•"" tlf/1t. Dd_, - . M•ry/a.d ri>; v..pu. '"' N<11'tb fiDt, ~ Gonolnu """ •.d

G_ ....

c.,......

When V.lcandc.s happen in the rcprc.sc:nr.lfion from any St1Ut, t he Ettrutivc authority the~of shall issu e writs ofcl«tion to till such v:u:ancia..

l . 11le Sen:ue of the: United States shU be:

hr.~ on~ vot~.

lmmt.dialdy aftf'r they sb.:All fK 4Wtmbled in wnst.qucnn ofthe first tltrtitm, 1/)ry sbaJI be d111id1·d as f'qua/ly 41 m..y « ,.,. """cl.um. 'D< """ oft~>< S<""""' ofrh< jim c£us t~wa

"' """'.J "' "" ...,.......... of"" ,.,.,.J,.,. of"" """""

""'' .. II><.,.,..,... ofthe fooni>J•S. •.d ofth< rJ.rd d4SS

at tM txpinttimt of the sixth yt.:Jr. s.o that o~-tbinl m4)' bt cbos_rn m-ry u·roml y g ; and if 'ut.tncks !MpJhm by n-si$Jta.hOJS or odwrw11~, d.ring dtt rrc~SJ-ftiN ltfislat14n oft~ny St....
thmof ""!1 ......

-·ry .,... .

""""""ol II>< •m SONtiof.oftb<,.,........ 11MM

rl>no

fiB srKb ''"".snr.H'f,

No person 11hall be a Sen:. tor who shall nor ha\'i: attained to the age of thirty )~a.rs:, and btcn nine: )'e3tS a ririun of rhc Unimi Sta~ and who shall not whm drcttd. ~ m mlubitam of tha. Sraa: for h~ dl:.\11 be- chosen. l'he Vice: P1't5ident of the United States shall be l"reside:nt of the Senate, but shall ha\<e: no \'Otc, unless

whim

m< tqu>lly dovidrd. Tbt Sm&tc dull choose: their orbtr offi«n- :tnd also a Prtsidcnr pro rr.mport, in the absena ofcht Viet: IJresidt:nt, or when he shall exercise the office of t he l>reside:nr of the United Statu. l'be: Senate sh3.11 h.n'«.' rhr: sole powt:r to try aJI im· pc;adunmu.. Whm sitting for th.u pLlt'pOK. they WU be on o..r:h or affirm.ation. W'htn the President of th~ United States Is tried, the ChiefJustice shall prc~ide: and no J'(rson llhall be convicti."CC without t he concur· ~nee of two-thirds of the mcmbcn present. judgmmt In cases of impcuhmem shall noc: a· lntd funher dun ro mnav.a.l from m~ offitt. and dis· qualification 10 hoJd md CllJO)' >lin)' office' o( honor,

crust or profit under the United S tates; but the: party convicted shall new.rthe:lcss be: liable and subject co in· dictmcm., trial, judgmcm and punishment, according co law. Section 4, The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senaco rs and Represmtam-·es shall be prescribed in each Scate by the: le:gislarurc thereof: bur che Congress may at any cime by law make: or alce:r such regulations, except as to che places of choosing Senators. The Congress shall assemble: ac least o nce in C'\'er}' rear, and su ch meecing sbaJI bt on tht firrt Monday in Dt· cNnher. unlm the)' sbaillry /au' dppoint d diffirent day. Section 5. Each house: shall be the judge of che deccions, recurns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall co nstitute a quorum to do business; bur a smaller number rna}' adjourn from da}' co da}', and nta}' be authorized to co mpel che atten· dance of absenc members, in such manner, and under such penalcies, as each house rna}' provide:. Each house may determine che rules ofirs proceedin&!"> pu nish its members for disorde:rf)t behavior, and ~Aith the: concurrence of twc:>thi rd~ expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from rime co cime: publish the: same, excepting such parrs as mar in chcir judgment require secrecy; and che }'cas and na}'S of the: members of eicher house on anr question shall, at the desire of o ne-fifth of those present, be emered on che journaL Neicher house, during the session of Congress, shall, ~Aithouc the co nsent of the ocher, adjourn for more: chan three dars, nor co any ocher place than that in which the cwo houses shall be siccing. Section 6. The Senators and Repre:scncacives shall recei\-'e a compensation for their services, co be ascercained b)' law and paid out of the cre:asuryof the: Unice:d States. l hcy shall in all cases except creason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arresc during chcir attenda nce ac che session of chcir respe
office under the auchoricy of the: United States, which shall have been created,. or the emoluments whereof shall haw been increased, during such time_: and no person holding all)' office under the United States shall be a member of cither house during his continuance in office. Section 7. All bills for raising re:\·mue: shall originace: in the House of Re:prese:matives; but che: Senate rna}' propose o r concur with amendments as on other bills. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and che Senate, shall, before: ic become: a Law, be presented co the !'resident of che United States; if he: appro\'e he shall sign it, but if nor he: shall return it wich objections co that house in which it originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree co pass the: bill, it shall be scm, together with the: objection~ co the: ocher house, b)t which it shall like'Aise be rcconsidered, and, if apprm-ed b}• twcHh irds of that house, it shall become a law. But in aU such cases the: voces of bcnh houses shall be: determined br re:as and nays, and the: names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be: entered o n the journal of each house resp«· ci..-el}'. If any bill shall not be rerurne:d by che !'resident within em days (Sundays excepted) after it shall haw~: been presented to him, the: same shall be: a Ia"''• in like: manner as if he: had signed it, unless the: Congress b}• their adjo urnment pm-em its rerum, in ~Athich case: it shall not be: a fa"''· Every order, resolution, or \'Ote co which che con· currmce of the -S enate and House of Represmtati\-'e:s may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be: presented to che Pre:sidenc of the: United States; and before the same: shall cake effect, shall be: approved b}' him, or being disapprow:d b)' him, shall be: repassed b)t ~'0-thirds of che Sen ace: and House of Rep· rcse:ntative:s, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. Section 8. 11le: Congress shall ha\-e power To Lay and collect taxes, dutie:~ imposts, and excis~ to par the debts and provide for che common defense and general ~A'Ci fare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be: uniform chrough· out the United S tates_:

ComnTUtKIH oF THE Urmto St.t.rts or AMEillCA.

To borrow money on the credit of the United States; To regulate commerce with foreign nacions, and among the: several States, and with the Indian tribes.: To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies thro ugh· ouc the Uniced Stares; To coin money, regulate the \'alue thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix che standard of ~A'Cights and measures; To provide for che punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States.: To establish post offices and post roads; To promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times co authors and inventors the exclush
A- 5

forts, magaz.ines, arsenals, dock-yards, and ocher needful buildings;- a nd To make all latA'S which shall be necessar}' and proper for carrying inco execucion the foregoing po~A'· ers, and all other po~A'cr'S \'t:Sted by chis Constitution in the gO\wnment ofche United Stat~ or in any depart· menc or officer thereof. Section 9. 'Tht migration or importation ofs.ucb persons tU any oft1w StttWs IUHI' exisling shall think proper W admit shttll net bt prohibited b)' tiN! Congrrss prior W lbt )T.Itr 1808; but a tax or du:y m~t)' bt impowd on ruch importdtion, IWt rxui'd·

ing SIO for tttcb pt"rscm. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless ~Athen in cases of rebellion or inva· sion the public safety may require it. No bill of attainder or ex pose facto law shall be passed. No capitation, or other din~c. tax shall be laid, un· less in proportion co the census or enumeration herein before directed co be caken. No tax or duty shall be laid on arcides exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue co the: pores of one State O\'er those of another; nor shall \'t:sstls bound to, or from, one State, be obliged ro encer, d ear, or pay ducie:s in anocher. No money shall be drawn from che treasur}', but in consequence of appropriations made by Law; and a reg· ular statl':tncm and account of the receipts and cxpen· dicures of aU public money shall be published from time co rime. No ride of nobility shall be granced b)•the United Scates: and no person holding any office of profic or trust under chem, shall, without the: consent of che Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or rid e, of an}' kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. Section 10. No Scare shall emer into any treacy, alliance, or confederation; gram letters of marque and re· prisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and siJ..-cr coin a tender in payment of debts; pass an}' bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im· pairing che obligation ofconcraccs, or gram any title of nobility.

No State shall, without che: consent of Congress, lay any imposts or ducie:s on imports or exports, except ~Afiat may be absolutd}' necessary for executing its in· speccion laws: and the: nee produce of all duties and im· posts, laid by any State on imports or e:xporcs, shall be for the: use ofrhe treasury ofche United States.: and all such laws shall be: subjecc co the: revision and control of che Congress. No State shall, without che: consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in rime: of peace, enter inco M}' agreement or compact ~Aich anoche:r State, or ~Aith a forcign power, or enga~ in war, unlc.ss actually invaded, or in such immin ent danger as ~Aill not admit of delay. ARTICLE II

Section 1. The executi\'t: power shall be wsce:d in a Presidenc of the United States of America. He: shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, to· gethe:r wich the Vice !'resident, chosen for the same term, be d e:cced as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal co the "''hole number of Senators and Represencaciws co which the: State may be: entitled in the Con· gress; bur no Senacor or Representative, or person holding an office: of trust or profic under che United States, shall be appointed an d e:ctor. 71Jf' nrcwrs sbaJI mtd in thtir n-sptcsit't' Statts, ttnd tVJte by bttllotfor tu.VJ persons, ofu,.bom Ont' d.t ltdst shall not be an inhabitam of rbt Jdt1U' St4.te utitb tbemwiW$. And tbq shall make It list ofaJI tht pmons r,'Ofl:d for, and oftbt numbtr of r:ows for each; u:birb list they sba/1 sign and ctrU.b~ and lrdns· mit Sf'ditd llJ the stat ofgmw-nmtnt of tbt United Statts, dJ. rrctl!d to tbt Prr.sidl!nt of the Senttte. The Prr.sidl!nt of the Stnate sba/~ in the prnenu of tbt Sr-MW and tbt House of Rl'prt"Sent41ir-.l's, optn all tbt dn equ.tt.l numbtr of r:ows, tbm tht Houst of RtprrSf'ntatit't's shttll imml!didW!J cboost b)' bttllot oM of them for Prrsidmt; dnd if M ptrson have d mttjority, tbt'nfrom rJJe fiw bightst on rJJelistsaid house sba/1 in liM WldnMr t:boose the Prttidt'nt. &tin choosing the Prrsidmt lbt wtn sba/1 bt Mkrn b)' St4tts, the rrprrSf'ntati(m

from t.ach StdU' b
ComnTUtKIHOF THE Urmto St.t.rts or AMEillCA.

to grant r~:priC"<-es and pardons for offenses against che: United States, except in cases of impeachment. He: shall ha\J'C power, by and with the: advice and co nsent of the: Senate, to make creatie:s, proYided two· thirds of che Senators pre:senc concur.: and he: shall nominate:, and by and with the: adYice: and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of che Supreme Courc, and aU other officers of the United States, whose ap· pointme:nts are: not herein othe:rn-·ise provided for, and which shall be: established by law: but Congress may b}• law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they chink proper, in the President alone:, in the: courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall have power co 611 up all vacan· d es that may happen during the recess of the: Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire ac the: end of chcir next session. Section 3. He: shall from time to time give to the: Congress information of the: state: of the Union, and recommend to their consideration su ch measures as he: shall judge necessary and expedient; he: may, on CX· traordinar}' occasion~ convene: boch houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement be:rwecn them, with respect co the time of adjournment, he: may adjourn them to su ch cime: as he shall think proper; he: shall re:ce:iw ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take: care that the: laws be: faithfully executed, and shall commission all the: officers of che United States. Section 4. The: !'resident, Vice: President and all dvil officers of the: United States shall be: re:mo••ed from office: on impcachmenc for, and on conviction of, treason, briber}', or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

ARTICLE Ill Section 1. The: judicial pO'we:r of the United States shall be 't-ested in one Supreme Courc, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time co time ordain and establish. The judges, boch of che Supreme: and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated cime:~ reccivc for their services a compensation ~Ailich shall not be: diminished during their continuance in office:.

A-7

Secdon 2. l 'h e: judicial po'l'-'tr shall extend to all cases, in Ia"'' and equity, arising under this Consti· tution, che Laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be: made:, under their authority;to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public min· isters and consuls;- to all cases of admiralty and maritime: jurisdiction;-to contrO'II'Crsies to which the: United States shall be a pany;- to contro\-e:rsies be:tv.r'Cen two or more States;-betwren 11. Stall! and dtium ofanosbtr Stalf!;-be:c~Attn citizens of d ifferent States;bct"'-een citizens of che same: State claiming lands under grancs of d ifferent States, and betvteen a State, or the: citizens thereof, and foreign states, drizens or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consul~ and those in which a State shall be party, the: Supreme: Court shall ha\-e: original juris· diction. In aU che other cases before: mentioned, che Supreme Court shall have appellate: jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, ~Aith su ch exceptions, and under such regulations, as the: Congress shall make:. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach· menc, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State whe:r~: said crimes shall have: been committed; but when not commicted within any State, the: trial shall be: ac such place or places as che Congress may by Ia"'' ha\J'C directed. Se:cdon l . 11'e:ason against the: United States shall consist o n I}' in levying ~A'llr against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving che:m aid and comfort. No per· son shall be: convicted of treason unless on che: testi· mony of two witnesses to the same: O\'t:rt ace, or on confession in open court. The Congress shall have po~Au to declare che pun· ishme:nt of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood. or forfeicure: except d uring the life: of the: person attainted.

ARTICLE IV Se:cdon t . Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the: public acts, records, and judicial proceedings ofC'\\!r}' other Scate. And the Congress may b}•~n· era! laws prescribe the: manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be pr01o'l'd, and the effect thereof.

Section 2. The citizens of each State shall be emid ed co all privileges and immunities of citizens in che st\'· eral States. A person charged in any State with treason, felon)', or other crime, ~Ailo shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive authority of the Stare fro m which he fled, be delivered up, to be remow~d to che State having jurisdiction of che crime. No person btld w sentic..- or /dbor in one Stale, under the

in three-fo urths thereof, as the o ne or the other mode: of rari6cacion may be proposed by che Congress; pro· vided thttt no ame-ndmrnts u:birb f'1k!J bt madt prior W rbt )"'a Y ont fbo.us.dnd eitftt hundred and eidJt shall in any md:n· nl!r affoct rbt first and fourth cldust'S in the ninth stttion ofUJe first artide; and that no State, wichout its consent, shall be deprived ofics equal suffrage in the Senate.

la~n therrc£ t'St:aping inw ttnotbl!r. shtt/4 in amwqlll!nu of any ldw or regHiation UJt'fl'in, bt dischargtd from .<.Ncb mvice '" labor, but sbaJI ~ dtliwrrd up on claim of the p411)' to whom such rmrict or labor m~ ~ dut.

All debts concracce:d and engagements encered inco, before the adoption of chis Constitucion, shall be as valid against che United Scares under this Constirution, as u nder the Confederation. This Constitution, and the latA'S of the United States which shall be made: in pursuance thereof: and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be: the supreme: law of the land; and che judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anyching in the Constitution or latA'S of an}' State to the contrary norwichscanding. The Senators and Representati\'t:S before men· tioned, and the members of the several Stare lcgislacures, and all exrcucive and judidal officers, boch of the: United States and of the st\-eral States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious rest shall ever be required as a qualifi· cation ro any office or public trust under rhe United States.

Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Con· gress into this Union; but no new Stare shall be fo nned or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junccion of cwo or more States, or parts of States, ~A'ithouc the consenc of the lrgislarures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. The Congress shall ha\'e poo~r to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging co che Uniced States; and nothing in chis Constitution shall be so construed as co prejudice any daims of the Uniced States, or of any particular State. Section 4. The United States shall guaram«: to ewry State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall procect each of them against im•asion.: and on application of the legislature, or of che executh't: (~A•hen che legislature cannot be com>t:ned); against domestic violence. ARTICLEV The Congress, whenever t"WO·thi.rds of boch houses shall deem it necessary. shall propose amendments to chis Constitution, or, on the application of che legislacures of rwc>thirdsof che several Scares, shall call a con· vemion for proposing amendmen~ which, in either case, shall be valid to all incems and purposes, as pan of chis Constitucion, when raci6ed b)• the legislarures of threr--fourchs of the s.......,·eral States, or by com-entions

ARTICLE VI

ARTICLE VII The rati6cation of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of chis Constitution be~n che States so rarifying the: same. Done in Com·ention b}' che unanimous consent of the: States present, the: st\'enteenth day ofSeptember in the: )'t:at of our lord o ne thousand sewn hundred and eighty-sewn and of the Independence of the United States of America che tv.r'Cifth. In witness whereof \l't: ha\'e hereunto subscribed our names.

(Signed by} G • WASHI NGT ON

Prrsids- ttnd Ikputy from Virtjnia (ttnd thirty-eight otbtrs.)

ComnTUtKIHOF THE Urmto StArts or AMEillCA.

A-9

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AMENDMENT I*

AMENDMENT VI

Congress shall make: no law respecting an establish-

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy che righc to a speedy and public trial, by an imparcial jury of che State and district wherein the crime shall ha\'e been commicted, "'flich district shall ha\'t been previously ascertained by Ia"''• and to be informed of che na· ture and cause of che accusation; co be confronted with the wimesses against him_: co ha..-e compulsory process for obtaining "'imes.ses in his favor, and to have the assjstance of counsel for his defense.

ment ofreligion, or prohibiting che free exercise the:reo(; or abridging che freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of che people pe-ace-ably to assemble, and to petition the go\~rnmem for a redress of grievances. AMENDMENT II

A we:ll-regulaced militia being necessary co che security of a free Stare, the righe of the people to keep and btar arms shall noc be infringed. AMENDMENT IU No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in M}'

house without che consent of che 0'1'-'ne:r, nor in time of war, but in a manner co br prescribed b}• law.

AMENDMENT VII In suits ac common law, "'flere the value in comrM'Ct'SY shall exceed twc:my dollars, the righc of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried b)•a jury shall be ocherwise reexamined in any court of che United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT IV

AMENDMENT VIII

The right of the people to be secure: in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

Excessi\J'C bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warcanes shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things co be seized. AMENDMENTY

AMENDMENT IX Theenumeracion in che Consticucion, ofcertain rights, shall not be construed co deny or d isparage ochers retained by the people. AMENDMENT X

No person shall be held to ans"'-er for a capital, or ocher"'i se infamous crime, unless on a pre.sentmenc or in· dictmenc of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in che militia, when in actual service in cime of war or public danger; nor shall M)' person be subject for the same offense to be Nice put in jeopard)' of life or limb_: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wimess against himself, nor be depri\·ed of life, liberty, or property, without due process of Jaw_: nor shall private property be caken for public use without just compensation.

The po'l'-'trs not delegated to che United States by che Consdcucion, not prohibited b)•it to the States, are rt:· served co che States respocciiJ'Ciy, or co che people. AMENDMENT XI

The judicial po'"-"er of the Uniced States shall not be construed to extend co any suit in law or equity, com· menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. AMENDMENT XII

• The' lim tC'-n AmC'ndm.conts: (Bill a(R.igh u:) w~·-n1791.

~aptC'd

in

[Adopl<'d 1798)

[Adopl<'d 1804)

The deccors shall meet in their respecti..-e Stace~ and vote b)•ballot for !'resident and Vke President, one of

A -10

-

whom. ar Ie~t, shall not be an inhabitant of t he same

State with thcmsrlw:s; they #!hall name in rhcir baJiocs tbt: ptrson voted for as l'rci:ilknt. and in di,tinct hal~ lou tbt pmon \'Ottd for u Vaa Prt:s:idmt. and c:bq sh;aJJ motb dutin«: Hsa of:all persons went for as Prtsidenr, and of .:all persons voted tOr as Vice: l,rtsidcnr, and of the number of \'Otc:S for each, which lis.ts t hC)' shall sign :tnd certify, and transmit su~d ro the sur of gcM'f"n.tnmt of rht Unirtd Sc~a. cl.irecttd ro che P'rt:si·

dan of rhc Satu-r;-tht Praadmt of rhr Sm.au shall. in the presma: of the Sen:uc: .and House ofR.cprcscnta· rives, open all the ceni6carc:ll and the \'ate$ llhall then be-: counttd;- the person having thr: grc:u-esr number of voces for Prcaidmt shall be rhr Prtsidenr. if such nu_m. btt bt: a ITUjority of tbt whoK numb« of tl«tars appointed; and 1f no person h.a\'C such nujonty, then from rhc persons having rhc highest numbcn not ex-

ceeding three on the List ofrhollc voted for .u l,rr:sidcm, tht: Housr of Rt:p~rarives .t~~u choost imcmdi.atcl)', by b.tUot, the PruidmL But 1n choosing dw Pra~ tht- YOn"S shall be tahn by Statrs, tht rq>I"C.knt.J.aon from each Stoatc having one \'O(t; a quorum for this purpose shall consis t of a member or membc.rs from two-thirds of the States, and ~ nujority of:lll 1he. States shaJ.I bt flot'CU.SU)' to a cboitt. And if the Howe of Rtpnsmt:.uiws sha..U noc choose a Prtsidcm wtlcrwvcr rht right of choitt shall devo!W' upon them, bt:forc. tht founb tLy r>f MtJrrh next following, rhen the Vice. l'rcsi· dent sha.ll.tc.r as l,rc.sidt:nt, 2.s in tl1e case of the. de.nh or o
(AdopmllB&S(

Stttion 1. Neither sl<wcry nor ilwoluntary Jervitude, CXCC'pt as a purushmmr for CTI.rnt •-hereof I he put)' sh.ill h.aw bftn duly convicted. sh.t.D am widun tht Unirtd Starn., or any pJ;ta Sl.lb,J«t to thrir jurisdiction.

Section 2. Congn::ss shall haw P""~' ro t'nforcc chu article by approp1'iatc. legislation. AMENDMENT XIV

(Adoj>
S«tion 1. AJJ pcnons born or n.aturaliud in tlw United Statts, and s ubject to the jurisdiction r.hc.ti."'f, :art citizens of rhc. United Stta r~ a nd of the State wherein they reside. No Stare shall nuke or mforcc any r,., which shall abnd~ the prMltgn or immunities of dtb:cns of the United SW:es; nor sh~l any Sw-t ckpri\'e any person of life, Jibeny, or propcrcy, ~ir.ho ut due process of law, nor deny to any ptnon Wlthm Its jurisdiction rJu «
R.rpramtattves shall ~ apponionrd among the sn~r:al States according to their rtsp~h'C numbers, counting t he whole number of persons In e.3ch St.ate, exdudmg lndians not tuOO. Bur when I he right to \'CJU ar any ekaion for t:hc dloia of EJ«ttrs (« President and VIa: ~idmt o( the Unirtd Sur~ Rcprcsentatiws in Congru~ the exrcutiw: and jud1d.aJ officers of a Snue, or du.' membeu of the legislature the.n:of, is dtnied 10 any of du male inhabi~ts of such Sta.te, being l~'mty~nC' )~ of age and Clduru o( lhC' Unitrd Su.ta, or in any W3)' :abndgtd. acqx for pan1dp.J..rion in n:~lhon, or ocher almc, tht- b.ub of repn:sent.uion thercm shaU be reduCll:d in t he pmpor· cion which tht: number of such male citizens s hall bear ro the whole number of m.aJe citizens twenty~rv yean of 9 m such Succ-. S«tton 2.

Section J. No pei'Mln shall be a Senator or Rt:puStn· tatlvt: in Congres11 or Elc.aor of J1residcnt and Vice P l
St«
CONSTITUtKIHOF THE U rmtO StATtS Of AMEIIJCA.

vices in suppressing insurreccion or rebellion, shall not be: questioned. Buc neicher che United Staces nor M)' State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in· curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion againsc the United Staces, or any daim for che loss or emancipa· cion of any s lave; but aU such debcs, obligations, and claims shall bt held illegal and void. Section 5. The Congress shall have the poW'Cr co en· force, by appropriate legis lation, t he provisions of chis article. AMENDMENT XV (Adopttd 1870) Section 1. The righc of cicizcns of the United States co vote shall noc bt denied or abridged b}' t he United States or b)•any State on account of race, color, or pre· vious condition of servitude.

AMENDMENT XVIII

A-1 1

(Adopwd 1919/ rt'p
Section 1. A[krone J't-ttrfrom tJw rtttijiration ofthis arUdt tJw Jfldnufocturr, salt, or trttnspqrtation ofintoxicating liquors utitbin, tJw import4tion tbt!rt'Ofinto, or tbt! txportasion thrrrof from tbl! United Slalf!S ~tnd d/1 territory subfrd w rbt jurisdic·

tion thetTcj;for hn·'t't'agt: purposes, is hrrebJ• probibittd.

71Je Congrm and rbt Sfl•'t'l'.d Slam sbailhttt't wncumm- potl·'t't' w enforce this d:rticle by appmprialt ltgisld:tion.

Section 2.

Section 3. TbU rtrtidt shall bt inoptratiw unlrss it sh~tll httt't b«n ratified as an ame-ndmrnt w the Ccnstitution by rbt ltgisld:turtr of tJw mvmtl Sldks, as providtd by the Constitution, utitbin srtlf'n~ars from the ddte oflhe rubmirsionthrreof to the Slam by rJJe Congress.

AMENDMENT XIX (Adopttd 1920) Section 2. The Congress shall haw~: power to enforce this article by appropriate legislacion. AMENDMENT XVI

[Adopttd 1913)

The Congress s hall have power to Ia)' and collect taxes on incomes, from whace\'tr source derived, ~A'ithout ap· porcionmem among the st\'tral Stat es, and without regard to M)'Census or enumeration. AMENDMENT X\~1

(Adopttd 1913)

Section I. The Senate of t he United Stat es shall bt composed of two Senators from each State, elected b)• the people thereof, for six )'tars; and each Senator shall have o ne vote. The electors in each State shall have the quali6cations requis ite for electors of (\'OW'S for] the mosc n umerous branch of the State legislatures. Section 2 . \'t'hen vacancies happen in the represcma· cion of any Stat e in t he Senate, t he executive auchorit}' of such State shall issue wries ofelection to 611 such vacancies: l'rovided, that t he Legislature of M)' Stat e nta}' em po~Au the executive t hereof to make tem por:tr}' ap· pointments until t he people 611 the vacancies by election as t he Legis laru.re may direct. Section 3. This amendment shall not be so construed as co affect che cleccion or term of any Senacor chosen before it becomes valid as pare of the Constitution.

Section 1. The right of citizens of che United Stares to \'Ote shall not be denied or abridged by the United Scates or b)•any State on account of sex. Section 2. The Congress shall have the poo~r co en· force t his article b}' appropriat e legis lation. AMENDMENT XX

[Adopttdl933)

Section 1. l 'he terms of the President and Vice Presi· denc shall end at noon on the 20th day of januar}~ and the cenns of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day ofjanuary, of the years in ~Athich su ch terms would ha\'t ended if t his arcicle had not been ratified; and che t erms of chcir successors shall chen begin. Section 2. The Congress shall assem ble ac lease once in every year, and such meeting s hall begin at noon on the 3d da)' of january, unless they shall by Ia"'' appoint a d iffercnc day. Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of che tmn of t he President, the l'rcsident-elecc shall ha\'l' died, the Vice Presidem-dect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the cime fixed for the beginning of his cenn, or if the !'resident· clecc shall have failed to qualify, chen the Vice Presi· denc~lect shall act as President until a !'resident shall ha\'t qualified; and che Congress nta}' by law provide for

A-12 che case 'A'hercin neither a Presidenc~elect nor a Vice PresidenHlect s hall ha~ qualified. declaring who shall chen act as President, or t he manner in which one ~Ailo is to act shall be: selected, and su ch persons s hall act ac-

cordingly until a President or Vice: Pre:sidcm shall have qualifi ed. Section 4,

The Congress may b}' latA' provide fo r t he

case: of the deach of any of che pcrsons from ~Ailom the House of Rcprescncarivcs may choose: a President ~Ailcncvcr the: right of choice shall have dt\'01\·ed u pon che-m, and for che: case of the: de:ach of an}' of the per·

sons from whom che Senate may choose a Vice l'rcsi·

dent whcm:\'ct the: right of choice: shall have devoto..-ed upon them. Section 5. Sections I and 2 s hall take: e-ffect on t he JSth day of October following the: rarificacion of chis

ankle.

the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two ) 'eat'S of a t erm to which some o ther person was elected President s hall be elected to the office of President more than once. Buc this article shall not ap· ply to an)' person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall noc pr...·•.,tent any person who nta)' be holding the office of President, or accing as !'resident, during the term within ~Ail ich this article beco mes operatiw from holding che office of President or acting as President d uring che remainder of s uch rerm. Section 2. l'his artidc shall be inoperath-e unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment co t he Con· st icucion b)•the legislatures of three·fourths of the several States within seven )'tats from the date of its submission co the States by the Congress. AMENDMENT XXIII

Section 6. 1'his artide shall be: inoperative unless ic shall have been ratified as an amendment to t he Conscirution by t he Ltgislacures of three-fourchs of t he several Stares within sew:n )'Cat'S from t he dare of irs submission. AMENDMENT XXI

[Adopwd / 9JJ)

Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to che Conscirution of the United States is hereb)' repealed. Section 2. The t ransportation or importation into any Scare, Territor)', or Possession of the United States for deliver)' or use cherein of intoxicating liquors, in Yi· olation of t he laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. 1'his artidc s hall be: inoperative unless it shall haw been ratified as an amendment to t he Conscirution by conventions in the several Stare~ as pnwided in che Constitution, within se\-en years from che dare of submission thereof to the States by t he Congress. AMENDMENT XXII

(Adopttd 1951)

Section I. No person shall be elected co the office of President more than cwice, and no person who has held

(Adopttd /961 )

Section I. 1'he Dis trict constituting the sear of GO\'· ernment of the United States shall appoint in su ch manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice Presi· denc equal to che whole number of Senators and Rep· rcsentatives in Congress co which the Dis trict ~A'Ould be: entitled if it u-ere a State, but in no C'\"Cnt more than the least populous State; chey shall be in addition co chose appointed by t he Stat~ but they s hall be considered for t he purposes of the election of !'resident and Vice President, co be: electors appointed by a State.: and chey shall meet in t he Dis trict and perfonn such duties as provided by the cwd tfh arcide of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have the poY~Cr co en· force this article by appropriate legis lation. AMENDMENT XXIV

[Adopl<'d 1964)

Section I. 1'hc right of citizens of the United States to \'Ott in any primary or other election fur President or Vice President,. for elcccors for President or Vice President, or for Senacor or Representative in Congress, shall nor be denied or abridged by the United Scates or any State b)' reason of failure to pay any poll c.u: or other c.u:. Section 2. The Congress shall have the poY~Cr co en· force this article by appropriate legis lation.

CONSTITUtKIHOF THE U rmtO StATtS Of AMEIIJCA.

AMENDMENT XXV

(Adopted 1967)

Section 1. In case of che rr-mo\•al of rhe !'resident from office or of his death or resignacion, chc Vice l'rcs· idcnt shall become Jlresidem. Section 2. Whcne\-er there: is a \'acancy in che: office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate: a Vice President who shall take: office upon confinnation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section l . Whenever the l'rcsidcnt cransmirs to the: President pro tempore of the Senate and chcSpcakcr of

the House of Representatives his written declaration char he: is unable to discharge the po'l'-'efS and duties of his office, and unci) he transmits to chc-m a written

declaration co the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by chc Vice Presidcnc as Accing President.

Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the: executive departments o r of such ocher body as Congress ma}' b}• law provide, transmit to che President pro tempore of the Senace: and che Speaker of che: House of Repre:sen· caciV\'S chcir written declaration thac the: President is unable co discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediatd}' assum e: the: powers and ducie:s of the: office: as Acting President. Thereafter, when the: President cransmirs to the: President pro tempore of the: Senate and che Speaker of the Ho use of Representatives his written declaration thac no inabilicy exists, he: shall resume: the: po~A•ers and duties of his office unless che Vice President and a ma· jority of eicher the: principal officers of the executive: depan:me:nc(s) or of such other bod}' as Congress nta}' by Ia"'' provide, transmit ~Aithin four days to che l'resi· dent pro tempore of the Senate and che Speaker of the House: of Re:pre:se:ncaciV\'S chcir wrinen declaration that the President is unable to discharge the po~A'Ct'S and du-

A-13

ties of his office. 11lereupon Congress shall decide: che issue, assembling ~Aithin forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If che Congress, within twenty· one days after receipt of che la.teer written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, wichin twenty-one da}'S after Congress is required co assemble:, determines by two-chirds vote of both Houses thac che !'resident is unable to discha.rge the: po~A'Ct'S and duties of his office, the Vice Presidenc shall continue to discharge che sam e as Acting Presidenc; otherwise, the: !'resident shall resume the powers and dudes of his office. AMENDMENT XXVI

(Adopttd 1971)

Section 1. 1 'he right of ciduns of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to \'Ote shall not be denied or abridged b}• the United States or b}• any Scate on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have po~A'cr to enforce: this arcid e by appropriate legislation. AMENDMENT XXVW

(Adopt..d 1992)

No law, varying the: compensation for services of che Senators and Re:prescntacives, shall cake effect, until an deccion of Representatives shall have intervened.

• Origin.lUypcopliiC'd to win r.uilic.lhon .llong with tbC' othe-r put:l of wh.lt bu;~.m.e the' Hill of R.ighu. lio~~'C'r, t he' propo$C'd .lme'Odme"-nt cont;~.ined no dC'.ldlirw" lOr Dtilir;~.tion, .lnd tM'r the- )'l:'.ll':l other Jt.ltC'- legisl.ltul'l':l \'OtC'd to .ldd it co the' Corulitu tion; m.my :~uch r;~.cilir;~.tions O«Urn"d during the' 1980~ .lnd C'>lrl)' 1990:s a:~ public fTuJtra.tion with Congi'C'-Sl'J pC'rform.lnr.e mountC'd.. ln M>l)' 1992 th~ Archivisl of the' UnitC'd SutC'-J«RiliC'd ch;~.t, with the' Mieh ig.ln IC'gUbtun"'J r.ui.lie'Oltion, the- anidC' hold bC'C'n .lppi'O\'C'd b)· thru·four thJ of the- Jt.lte'-l ;~.nd thw ;~.urom.ltiully bC'r;~.nw put of the' Corulitu tion. But congn-u:ion.U k.ld.C'n: .lnd constitution:aJ speci.lli:~o: queltioncd whC'thC'r .ln >lmC'ndmC'nt th.lt took 202 )"'>ln: ro win r;~.tilie'Oltion V.'OU ,.:aJid, ;md the- U:o!uC' h.ad noc bC'C' n I'C'-lol'lt'd by the' time' ch is book w~-nt to pl'l':ls.

A-14

AIIPENOPC

PRESI DENTIAL ELECilONS, 1789-2008 STATES IN

YEAR

THE UN ION

1789

11

IS

16

16

69 34 35

No party designations

132 77

GEORGE WASHINGTON

so 5

JOHN ADAMS

Federalist

Thomas jefferson

Democratic·Republican

Thomas Pinckney Aaron Burr

Federalist

Democratic·Republican

THOMAS JEFFERSON

Democratic·Republican

Aaron Burr

Democratic·Republican Federalist Federalist

john Adams Charles C. Pinckney john j ay 1804 1808

17 17

PoPULAR VOTE

No party designations

Minor candidates 1800

PERCENTAGE O f

VotE

GEORGE WASHINGTON

john Adams George Clinton Minor candidates 1796

PoPULAR

Von

PAR11ES

john Adams Minor candidates 1792

ELECTORAL

CANDIDATES

71 68 59 30 48 73 73 65

64

Federalist

THOMAS JEFFERSON

Democratic·Republican

Charles C. Pinckney

Federalist

162 14

JAMES MADISON

Democratic·Republican

Charles C. Pinckney George Clinton

Federalist Democratic·Republican

122 47 6

1812

18

JAMES MADISON OeWnt O inton

Democratic·Republican Federalist

128 89

1816

19

JAMES MONROE Rufus King

Democratic·Republican Federalist

183 34

1820

24

JAMES MONROE j ohn Quincy Adams

Democratic·Republican Independent Republican

231

1824

24

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS Andrew j ackson William H. Crawford H enryOay

Democratic·Republ ic.an Democratic·Republican Democratic·Republ ic.an Democratic·Republican

84

I 99 41 37

t 08,740 153,544 46,618 47,136

30.S 43.1 13.1 13.2

1828

24

ANDREW JACKSON j ohn Quincy Adams

Democratic N ational Republican

178 83

642,553 500,897

56.0 44.0

1832

24

ANDREW JACKSON H enryOay

Democratic N ational Republican Anti-Masonic N ational Republican

219 49 7 11

687,502 530,189 33,108

55.0 42.4 2.6

WilliamWirt j ohn FIO)'d

Bteauw QJ'Idid~ta rt«iving k:u tNn I ptl'«'nt of tht popul~r v!Xt ;In' omiuf!d, lht pM:trm.J:t of popul~r \'Ott m~y not tot
PIIES10ENTIA.l EtEcnONS., 178 PRESIDENTIAL ELECilONS, 1789-2004

YEAR

STATES IN THE UNION

1836

26

4

-100

A -15

(continued) PERCENTAGEOf' PoPULAR VOTE

ELECTORAl

PoPULAR

CANDIDATES

PAitllES

Vcm

VoTE

MARTIN VAN BUREN William H. Harrison Hugh L White Daniel Webster W. P. Mangum

Democratic Wh;g Wh;g Wh;g Wh;g

170 73 26 14 11

765,483

50.9

739,795

49.1

1840

26

WILLIAM H. HARRISON Martin Van Buren

Wh;g Democratic

234 60

1,274,624 1, 127,781

53.1 46.9

1844

26

JAMES K. POLK

Democratic Whig

170 105

1,338,464 1,300,097 62,300

49.6 48.1 2.3

163 127

1,360,967 1,222,3.42 291,263

47.4 42.5 10.1

Henry O ay james G. Bimey 1848

ZACHARY TAYLOR

Liberty

Martin Van Buren

Wh;g Democratic Free Soil

1852

31

FRANKUN PIERCE Winfield Scott john P. Hale

Democratic Wh;g Free Soil

254 42

1,60 1,117 1,385,453 155,825

50.9 44.1 5.0

1856

31

JAMES BUCHANAN

john c. Fremont Millard Fillmore

Democratic RepubiKan American

174 114 8

1,832,955 1,339,932 8 71,731

45.3 33.1 21.6

ABRAHAM LINCOLN Stephen A. Oougfas john C. Breckinridge john Bell

RepubiKan Democratic Democratic Constitutional Union

180 12 39

1,865,593 1,382,713 848,356 59 2,9 06

39.8 29.S 18.1 12.6

30

Le~Cass

1860

33

72

1864

36

ABRAHAM LINCOLN Geor~ B. McClellan

RepubiKan Democratic

212 21

2,206,938 1,803, 787

55.0 45.0

1868

37

ULYSSES S. GRANT Horatio Seymour

RepubiKan Democratic

214 80

3,013,421 2,706,829

52.7 47.3

1872

37

ULYSSES S. GRANT

RepubiKan Democratic

286

Horace Greeley

3,596,745 2,843,446

55.6 43.9

1876

38

RUTHERFORD B. HAYES Samudj. Tilden Peter Cooper

RepubiKan Democratic Greenback

185 184

4,03.4,311 4,288,546 75,973

48.0 51.0 1.0

1880

38

JAMES A. GARAELD

RepubiKan Democratic Greenback-Labor

214

Winfield S. Hancock james B. Weavet

4,453,295 4,414,082 308,578

48.S 48.1 3.4

GROVER CLEVELAND james G. Blaine Benjamin F. Budet john P. St.john

Democratic RepubiKan Greenback-Labor Prohibition

219 182

4,879,50 7 4,850,293 175,370 150,369

48.S 48.2 1.8 1.S

1884

38

ISS

•\\titn Gn-clcy ditd $honly o11ftt r lht clt'«ion, his $1.1ppot'k~ di\'id«< their votes ;unor~g the ninor co:~nclid:.rt$. Bteau~ c:v~dido:~tc$ rt«i'ling leu tho:~n

I ptm:nt of tht populu

YOk' V'e omiut
lht ptrttntaSt o( populo:~r YOtt m11y not toul I00 pem:nt.

A-16

AIIPENOPC

PRESI DENTIAL ELECilONS, 1789-2004

(continued)

STATES IN

YEAR

1888

1892

1896

1900

1904

THE UN ION

38

44

4S 4S

4S

ELECTORAL

PoPU LAR

PERCENTAG E O f

CANDIDATES

PAR11ES

Von

VotE

PoPULAR VOTE

BENJAMIN HARRISON

Republican

Grover Cleveland

Democratic

233 168

5,477,129 5,537,857 249,506 146,935

277 145 22

5,555,426 5,182,690 1,029,846

O inton B. Fisk

Prohibition

Ansonj. Streeter

U nion Labor

GROVER CLEVELAND

Democratic

Benjamin Harrison ja.me:s B. Wea\'l'r

Republican

john Bidv.~ll

Pro ibition

WILLIAM McKINLEY William J. Bryan

Republican

WILLIAM McKINLEY William J. Bryan john C. Wooley

Republican

THEODORE ROOSEVELT Eu~n e V. Debs Silas C. SwaiiCYW

Republican Democratic Socialist Prohibition

Alton B. Parker

Peo~e ·s

Democratic

Democratic; Populist Prohibition

264,133

47.9

48.6 2.2 1.3 46.1 43.0

8.5 2.2

271 176

7,102,246 6,492,559

51.1

292 1SS

7,218,491

6,356,734 208,914

51.7 45.5 1.S

336 140

7,628,461 5,084,223 402,283 258,536

57.4 37.6 3.0 1.9

47.7

1908

46

WILLIAM H. TAFT William J. Bryan Eu~n e V. Debs Eu~n e W. Chafin

Republican Democratic Socialist Prohibition

321 162

7,675,320 6,4 12,294 420,793 253,840

51.6 43.1 2.8 1.7

1912

48

WOODROWW1LSON Theodore Roose\<eh William H. Taft Eu~n e V. Debs Eu~n e W. Chafin

Democratic Progressive Republican Socialist Prohibition

435 88 8

6,296,547 4,118,571 3,486,720 900,672 206,275

41.9 27.4 23.2 6.0 1.4

1916

48

WOODROWW1LSON Charles E. Hughes A L Benson J. Frank Hanly

Democratic Republican Socialist Prohibition

277

9,127,695 8,533,507 585,113 220,506

49.4 46.2 3.2 1.2

254

1920

48

WARREN G. HARDING jamesN. Cox Eu~n e V. Debs P. P. Christensen

Republican Democratic Socialist Farmer·Labor

404 127

16, 143,407 9,130,328 9 19,799 265,411

60.4 34.2 3.4 1.0

1924

48

CALVIN COOLIDGE john W. Davis Robert M. La Follette

Republican Dem ocratic Progressive

382 136 13

15,718,211 8, 385,283 4,831,289

54.0 28.8 16.6

1928

48

H ERBERT C. HOOVER Alfred E. Smith

Republican Democratic

444 87

21,391,993 15,0 16,169

58.2 40.9

1932

48

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT Democratic H erbert C. HoO\<er Republican Norman Thomas Socialist

472 59

22,809,638 15,758,901 881,951

57.4 39.7 2.2

Bteauw

QJidid~te

ffflei\'ing &es.s tNn 1 pt~ttnt oftht popul~r .,.0«" ;mo omiuf!d, tht ptnt ntase o( popul~r ,'Ott m~y nottot
PIIES10ENTIA.l EtEcnONS., 178

PRESIDENTIAL ELECilONS, 1789-2004

YEAR

1936

1940 1944 1948

1952 1956 1960

1964 1968

1972 1976 1980

1984 1988 1992

STATES IN THE UNION

48

48 48 48

48 48

so so so so

ELECTORAl

PoPU LAR

CANDIDATES

PAit'TIES

Vcm

VoTE

PERCENTAGE Of' PoPULAR VOTE

FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVELT Alfred M. Landon William Lemke

Democratic

523 8

27,752,869 16,674,665 882,479

60.8 36.5 1.9

FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVELT Wend ell L Willkie

Democratic

449 82

27,307,819 22,321,018

54.8 44.8

FRANKLIN D . ROOSEVELT T homas E. Dewey

Democratic

432 99

25,606,S8S 22,014,745

S3.5 46.0

HARRYS TRUMAN T homas E. Dewey Strom Thunnond Henry A Wallace

Democratic

303 189 39

24,105,8 12 21,970,065 1,169,063 1,157,172

49.5 45.1 2.4 2.4

442 89

33,936,234 27,314,992

55.1 44.4

457 73

35,590,472 26,022, 752

57.6 42.1

303 219 15

34,227,096 34,108,546 502,363

49.7 49.5 .7

486 52

43,126,506 27,176,799

61.1 38.5

301 191 46

31,770,237 31,270,533 9,906,141

43.4 42.7 13.5

520 17

47,169,911 29,170,383

60.7 37.5

297 240

40,827,394 39,145,977

49.9 47.9

489 49

43,899,248 35,481,435 5,719,437 920,859

50.8 41.0 6.6 1.0

525 13

54,451,521 37,565,334

58.8 40.5

426 112

47,946,422 41,016,429

54.0 46.0

370 168

43,728,275 38,167,4 t 6 19,237,247

43.2 37.7 19.0

Repu~ican

Uni on Repu~ican

Rep u~ican

Rep u~ican

States' Rights Progressive Repu~ican

DW IGHT D . EISENHOWER Adlai E. Stevenson

Democratic

DW IGHT D . EISENHOWER Adlai E. Stevenson

Democratic

Repu~ican

JOHN F. KENNEDY Richard M . Nixon

Democratic

Harry F. B)fd

Independent

L'mDON B. JOHNSON Barry M . Goldwater

Democratic

Repu~ican

Rep u~ican Repu~ican

RICHARD M . N IXON H u~rt H . Hu mph rey Geor~ C. W allace

Democratic American Independent

RICHARD M . N IXON GeorgeS. McGovern

Democratic

Repu~ican

JIMMY CARTER Gerald R. Ford

so

RONALD W . REAGAN jimmy Carter j ohn B. Anderson Ed Clark

Democratic Independent libertar ian

RONALD W . REAGAN Walter F. MondaJe

Democratic

GEORGE H. W. BUSH M ich ael Oukam

Democratic

so so

A-17

(continued)

so

so

-1004

s.

WIWAMJ. CLINTON Geor~ H. W. BU$h H . Ross Pl>.rot

Bteau~ Q.lldid~tes rt«iving lel.s th~n

Democratic Rep u~ican Repu~ican

Repu~ican

Repu~ican

Democratic Rep u~ican

Independent

I ptra'l'll of the populu Yotc' ;are omiut
A-18

AIIPENOPC

PRESIDENTIAL ELECilONS, 1789-2008 (continued) STATES IN

YEAR

1996

2000

2004

2008

THE UN ION

so so so so

CANDIDATES

PAR11ES

WILLIAM). CLINTON

Democratic

Robert Dole H. Ross Perot

Republican Reform

GEORGE W. BUSH

Republican

AI bert Gore Jr. Ralph Nader

Democratic n

c ...

GEORGE W. BUSH

Republican

john Kerry Ralph Nader

Democratic

BARACK OBAMA joh n McCain

ELECTORAL

PoPULAR

PERCENTAGE O f

Von

VotE

PoPULAR VOTE

379 159

47,401,185

49.2 40.7 8.4

8,085,294 271 266 286 252

Independent Democratic

Republican

Bteauw QJ'Idid~ta rt«iving k:u tNn I ptl'«'nt of the popul~r Ylltc' ;In' omiuf!d, lht

39,197,469 50,456,141

50,996,039 2,882,807

2.7

60,608,582

51.0

57,288,974

48.0 1.0

406,924 365 173

47.9 48.4

66,050,000. 58,010,000.

pM:<'~J:t of popul~r \'Ott m:.y not tot
s346-

I00 ptr«'l'lt.

Photograph Credits CbiJptt'Y I p. l : 0 Jerry J~ka. 2008; p. 6: Riehard Alexande.r Coo\:e Ill; p. 9: Cahok~ Mounds: Hi,roMc Site, painting b)· \'(liJliam R. l.se.minger; p. 13: Cou ne-'y of the Robe-rt Decbenc Collection, l:Hpartmenc of Special Collection,;, V.m Pdt/Dieuich Li bF.U)' C<"-nter, Uniwr~:ity of J>e.nruyl· ''.:m.ia, Phila-delphia CbiJptt'Y 2 p. 16: CoURes)' af the John Carter B~·n Library .:u Brown Uniwr~ity; p. 18: Courtuy af En twiJcle Gallery, London/Wernc"r Form.m A~hi,'<'-J/An Rewurre, NY; p. 26: Museum af Man\:ind 0 Tru,teu of the British Mu,eum; p. 28: Snafi.:/ Art Resou ~.-, NY; p. 31: 0 Gt>«got H. H. Huey

Ch!Jptw :J p. 38: Courtuy of Befi.:dey Ca,;tk Ch.lrit.lblt> Tru,t, GlouCt".Sler:~hi r.-, Engl.lnd; p. J9: "J.:unestown, l6l.f" b)· Sidney Ki ng. Colonial National HiJtorical Park; p. +1: Tht Granger Coll«tion, NeYI Yo'*; p. 61: Courtuy Mu· Jeum ofNtw Muico, Ntg. No. l l.f09 CbiJptt'Y 4 p . 65: CouRel)' tbt> lit>nl)' Fr;anci,; d u Pont Win· ttrthu r Mu,;eum; p. 68: M.l.uaebu$C'tU Hi,writal Saciecy; p. 7.f: Libcary of Congru,;; p. 75: Historic St. M.lry',; City; p. 85: CoURes)' of the Har\',;ard Uni,~Di ty Art Museum' (CoURes)' of tht H.lrvard Un i'A'u:icy Portr.lit CoUection, lkqut,t, Dr. Joh n C. WaiTtn, !856) CbiJptt'Y S p. 90: CoURt".$)' of t he Concord MUSC"um, Con· cord, M.ulachUSC"tt:r.; p . 9& Library of Congnou; p. 105: Joh n H.ln(IQ(k, !765, John Singl.-ton Copky, Am<"-Mc.m, 1738- 18 15. O il on e;mvou, IOO.Gl x ll-1.78 em (39-Y- x .f91/• in.) Mu$C'um of Fint Aru, lkuron. Otpo,ittd b)· the City of Bo~ton, L·RJO, 76d; p. 107: UbraryafCong"""'i p. US: Li· br.:uy of Cong"""' CbiJptt'Y6 p. l 18:T heMttropo1itan Mu$C'um alAn, lkquut of Chaliu Alkn Munn, !92-1 (l-1.!09.88), phorogr.lph 1:1 1989 The M«mpolit.ln Museum of An; p. J30: Ubr,;ary of Cong"""'i p. l36: ftnimono HOU$C' MU$C'Uin, New York St.ltt" li iJtoriuJ Auaci.ltion, COQpc'r~~·n, NY, photo by Ridurd \l'.lll«-.r; p. 139: Colonial \ViJiianuburg Foundation

Library; p. 182: P.ainting b)· M.lthai,; Nohtimtr, phOC'o by MPl/ Gtuy Jm.agot.'

Cb/Jpt",. g p. 193: Amerit.an Tt-.t:tile lii.M:ory Mu$C'um; p. 198: "'Trail ofTt:.ln• b)· Robe-rt Lindnt.aux.. Wool.lrcK MuJeum, &rtlt"-5\•ilk, OK; p. 203: 0 Colttttion of tbe Nt'W-Yofi.: Historic.;al SotiC"ty; p. 10.5: Jadt N,;a)•lar CoUtaion; p. 208: Mooli.md·Spinprn ltt$C'UCh Ctnter, Hwr.ud Uniwr~ic:y, \l':l$hington, DC Ch!Jpt",. 10 p. 2l.f: Gift of Mr:~. S.lmud T. Car"m• photograph 0 1991 Tht D«r<Mt Institute of Art; p. 2 19: MC'UlphU Broolu: MUSC"um of Art, MC'Ulph if, Ttnne':I$C'C', MtmphiJ P:trk Commiu:ion J>u~h:ut -16.2; p. 2.20: N.ation.al Portrait G.Uki)·, SmitbJoni.an ln,tiruhon/Art Resou rc.-, NY; p. 233: &»lon Athenaeum; p. .ZJ.f: Colint Jenkin,;jEJiubetb Cady Srancon Tru't Ch!Jpt",. Jl p. 237: \ViUiam B. Bttktr CoUtttion/ Amtriu n Mu.s.eumofPhotogr.:lphy;p. l.JO: Libr.uyofCong;reu; p. 2"'5: Historic CbC'rl)' JiiU. CH l963.2 19J, COURt".$)' .>\Jbany (n· sc:itu tt" of Hi,;tory and Art; p. 247: 0 Bm:m.lnn/CORBIS; p. 250: Constance' Fuller Threinc"n Ch!Jpt",.l2 p. 255: Libr.uyofCo ngno,;; p. .ZS6: GungerCol· l«tion; p. 265: Chin_go liUtoriuJ S
Ch!Jptw 7 p. l.f5: Ttrr;a Foundnion for Ameriu n Art, O.an· id J. TeiT.l Art kqui.M:ion Endowmtnc f"'lnd, 2000.6. Pho· togr,;aph Courtuy af Terr;a f"'Und.uion for Americ.ln Art, Ch iu go; p. 1-19: 0 Arch ivio Jconogu.bco, S.A.jCORBI.S; p. 159: Jteunion du MuJW Nationa ux/ AR Jkwur«, NY; p. 16-1: Libc.ur Comp,;any of Phibddphi.l

Ch!Jpt",. 14 p. J OI: (dtt.,;ail) Tht Metropolitom Mu,tum of Art, Gift of Mr. and MD. C.lli Stoeckel, !S97. (97.5). Phorogr,;aph 0 198:2 The Mt:tropolit.an Museum of AR, NeYI Yorlo:; p. 306: N.ltional Po rtr;ai t Gallerr, SmitbJoni.ln ltuli· tution/ Art tklour«, NY; p. 307 (top): Smithwni.an ltuli· tution, W.uhingron, DC; p. 307 (bouom): Library of Cong"""'i p. J l 7 Q..-ft-): N.ltional l'o rtrait Gal.lerr, SmitbJon ian lnJtirution, \l'.l'hington, DC/Art tklour«, NY; p. Jl7 (right): 0 fkottm.lnn/CORBI.S

CbiJptt'Y B p. 170: 1:1 Tht Granger Collta ion, Ntw York; p. 17-f: Library of Congnou; p. 180: \ViUi.lm L dtmtnt:r.

Ch!Jpt",.JS p. 324: Georgt E.l$tm.ln HouJc; p. 328: Library of Congno.s,;; p. 3J.f (tap): Antiet.,;am National &uldidd,

C-1

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Photograph Credits CbiJptt'Y I p. l : 0 Jerry J~ka. 2008; p. 6: Riehard Alexande.r Coo\:e Ill; p. 9: Cahok~ Mounds: Hi,roMc Site, painting b)· \'(liJliam R. l.se.minger; p. 13: Cou ne-'y of the Robe-rt Decbenc Collection, l:Hpartmenc of Special Collection,;, V.m Pdt/Dieuich Li bF.U)' C<"-nter, Uniwr~:ity of J>e.nruyl· ''.:m.ia, Phila-delphia CbiJptt'Y 2 p. 16: CoURes)' af the John Carter B~·n Library .:u Brown Uniwr~ity; p. 18: Courtuy af En twiJcle Gallery, London/Wernc"r Form.m A~hi,'<'-J/An Rewurre, NY; p. 26: Museum af Man\:ind 0 Tru,teu of the British Mu,eum; p. 28: Snafi.:/ Art Resou ~.-, NY; p. 31: 0 Gt>«got H. H. Huey

Ch!Jptw :J p. 38: Courtuy of Befi.:dey Ca,;tk Ch.lrit.lblt> Tru,t, GlouCt".Sler:~hi r.-, Engl.lnd; p. J9: "J.:unestown, l6l.f" b)· Sidney Ki ng. Colonial National HiJtorical Park; p. +1: Tht Granger Coll«tion, NeYI Yo'*; p. 61: Courtuy Mu· Jeum ofNtw Muico, Ntg. No. l l.f09 CbiJptt'Y 4 p . 65: CouRel)' tbt> lit>nl)' Fr;anci,; d u Pont Win· ttrthu r Mu,;eum; p. 68: M.l.uaebu$C'tU Hi,writal Saciecy; p. 7.f: Libcary of Congru,;; p. 75: Historic St. M.lry',; City; p. 85: CoURes)' of the Har\',;ard Uni,~Di ty Art Museum' (CoURes)' of tht H.lrvard Un i'A'u:icy Portr.lit CoUection, lkqut,t, Dr. Joh n C. WaiTtn, !856) CbiJptt'Y S p. 90: CoURt".$)' of t he Concord MUSC"um, Con· cord, M.ulachUSC"tt:r.; p . 9& Library of Congnou; p. 105: Joh n H.ln(IQ(k, !765, John Singl.-ton Copky, Am<"-Mc.m, 1738- 18 15. O il on e;mvou, IOO.Gl x ll-1.78 em (39-Y- x .f91/• in.) Mu$C'um of Fint Aru, lkuron. Otpo,ittd b)· the City of Bo~ton, L·RJO, 76d; p. 107: UbraryafCong"""'i p. US: Li· br.:uy of Cong"""' CbiJptt'Y6 p. l 18:T heMttropo1itan Mu$C'um alAn, lkquut of Chaliu Alkn Munn, !92-1 (l-1.!09.88), phorogr.lph 1:1 1989 The M«mpolit.ln Museum of An; p. J30: Ubr,;ary of Cong"""'i p. l36: ftnimono HOU$C' MU$C'Uin, New York St.ltt" li iJtoriuJ Auaci.ltion, COQpc'r~~·n, NY, photo by Ridurd \l'.lll«-.r; p. 139: Colonial \ViJiianuburg Foundation

Library; p. 182: P.ainting b)· M.lthai,; Nohtimtr, phOC'o by MPl/ Gtuy Jm.agot.'

Cb/Jpt",. g p. 193: Amerit.an Tt-.t:tile lii.M:ory Mu$C'um; p. 198: "'Trail ofTt:.ln• b)· Robe-rt Lindnt.aux.. Wool.lrcK MuJeum, &rtlt"-5\•ilk, OK; p. 203: 0 Colttttion of tbe Nt'W-Yofi.: Historic.;al SotiC"ty; p. 10.5: Jadt N,;a)•lar CoUtaion; p. 208: Mooli.md·Spinprn ltt$C'UCh Ctnter, Hwr.ud Uniwr~ic:y, \l':l$hington, DC Ch!Jpt",. 10 p. 2l.f: Gift of Mr:~. S.lmud T. Car"m• photograph 0 1991 Tht D«r<Mt Institute of Art; p. 2 19: MC'UlphU Broolu: MUSC"um of Art, MC'Ulph if, Ttnne':I$C'C', MtmphiJ P:trk Commiu:ion J>u~h:ut -16.2; p. 2.20: N.ation.al Portrait G.Uki)·, SmitbJoni.an ln,tiruhon/Art Resou rc.-, NY; p. 233: &»lon Athenaeum; p. .ZJ.f: Colint Jenkin,;jEJiubetb Cady Srancon Tru't Ch!Jpt",. Jl p. 237: \ViUiam B. Bttktr CoUtttion/ Amtriu n Mu.s.eumofPhotogr.:lphy;p. l.JO: Libr.uyofCong;reu; p. 2"'5: Historic CbC'rl)' JiiU. CH l963.2 19J, COURt".$)' .>\Jbany (n· sc:itu tt" of Hi,;tory and Art; p. 247: 0 Bm:m.lnn/CORBIS; p. 250: Constance' Fuller Threinc"n Ch!Jpt",.l2 p. 255: Libr.uyofCo ngno,;; p. .ZS6: GungerCol· l«tion; p. 265: Chin_go liUtoriuJ S
Ch!Jptw 7 p. l.f5: Ttrr;a Foundnion for Ameriu n Art, O.an· id J. TeiT.l Art kqui.M:ion Endowmtnc f"'lnd, 2000.6. Pho· togr,;aph Courtuy af Terr;a f"'Und.uion for Americ.ln Art, Ch iu go; p. 1-19: 0 Arch ivio Jconogu.bco, S.A.jCORBI.S; p. 159: Jteunion du MuJW Nationa ux/ AR Jkwur«, NY; p. 16-1: Libc.ur Comp,;any of Phibddphi.l

Ch!Jpt",. 14 p. J OI: (dtt.,;ail) Tht Metropolitom Mu,tum of Art, Gift of Mr. and MD. C.lli Stoeckel, !S97. (97.5). Phorogr,;aph 0 198:2 The Mt:tropolit.an Museum of AR, NeYI Yorlo:; p. 306: N.ltional Po rtr;ai t Gallerr, SmitbJoni.ln ltuli· tution/ Art tklour«, NY; p. 307 (top): Smithwni.an ltuli· tution, W.uhingron, DC; p. 307 (bouom): Library of Cong"""'i p. J l 7 Q..-ft-): N.ltional l'o rtrait Gal.lerr, SmitbJon ian lnJtirution, \l'.l'hington, DC/Art tklour«, NY; p. Jl7 (right): 0 fkottm.lnn/CORBI.S

CbiJptt'Y B p. 170: 1:1 Tht Granger Collta ion, Ntw York; p. 17-f: Library of Congnou; p. 180: \ViUi.lm L dtmtnt:r.

Ch!Jpt",.JS p. 324: Georgt E.l$tm.ln HouJc; p. 328: Library of Congno.s,;; p. 3J.f (tap): Antiet.,;am National &uldidd,

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C-2

PHOTOCiC!AJIH

Clt~OITS

Sh:tlp.'burg. MD; p. 3.H {botrom): Libr~ry o r Co ngl\"'-:~; p. JSI: Mu$eum of Fine Aft:~, 80$ron. G ift orM.uim Karo· Ilk ror the-M. and l\.L Karolik CoUC"aio ndAm.ericom \l'att rcolon: and Or;~.wing:~, 1800-1875, 6LJ62. Phocogr,;~.ph () 2007 Museum or Fint Art:~, Ho:~ton

C~tt'r 16

p. 3.53: Civil \l'ar Phocogr;a.ph ic Album, Loui:~i · an.11 and Miu:iu:ippi Valley CoUC'aio n, LSU Lib rariu, t..oui· si:ma Sutc• Uni\l\"fsity; p. 365:0 & tun.lnn/COR.HJS; p. l67: \l'illiam GladJronC'; p. J71: 81'0'>\'n BrothC'n:

Photograph Credits CbiJptt'Y 16 p. 353: Civil \l'.u Phorogra.phK .>\lbum, Loui..si· ~n.11 and MWiuippi ValLey CoUtction, LSU Libr~ri ~, Loui· Ji.:u\.1 Sutt UnivnJitr; p. 365:0 fkottmann/COR.BIS; p. 367: William Gl.adnQOC'; p. 371: 81'0'>\·n Brother~

Ch!Jpt",.24

CbiJptt'Y 17 p. 379: Gilcrt-;l.Sit MuJwm, Tuhoa, O)dahom.l; p. .l&l: Lib rary o r Congress; p. J87: Tht Hunt ington Sac:i· ety,San Marino,Californi.t,phoroCL 178 (3); p. 39-1: Pai nt· ing b)· Fr~nciJ X Grou.htnnty, CourtC'$)' Mu.~tum ofNC'YI Mtxiro, Ntg. 37916; p. -101: Smittuoni.an Amtri ~n Art Museum, \V.uhing;con, DC/An Ruouru, NY

Ch!Jpt",. 25

Clt4ptl!l' II p. ..fO.f: ChieolgoHiJtoric.ll Socitty; p. -Kl6: Frmk & Marit·ThtrelC' Wood Print Colttction.s, Akxandri.t, VA; p. -Il l: U.S. I:Hpart:mt m of the lnttrior, N.ation.U Pari: Str''i ~ Ediwn National lii.sloric Sitt; p. -Ill: 0 Btn:m.ln n/ CORBJS; p. -Ill: t.ibr~ry o r Congfe.':~

p. -126: Gt«got B.l:~tm.an Hou$C'; p. -IJ-l: O.i ~go lii.uoric<~.l Socitty; p. -135: 0 John Grou.m.ln, The John G.mum:m C.oll«cion of Antiqut lm.lgu; p. -1-10: O.i ~go lii.uorieoll Society; p. HS: No"h Wind Picruu Archi'~

CbiJptt'Y 19

p. 557: Libr;ary of'Congi'C'.S.'; p. 562: FO R Libr;ary; p. 572: Libruy of Cong~'i p. 57-1: Lib ra!")· or Congfe.':~; p. 579: Arcbi'~ o r Labor and U!ban Affaiu/ WJlffle StOlte' Uni,,..r~itr

p. 587: W. Eugtne Smith/Time·Lirt Pia u ru/ Gmy J ma~; p. 590: Thom;u McAVO)/ Timt·Lift Pia uru/ GC'tty lm.lgtJ; p. 605: N;ational Archiw,:_; p. 609: Libr.ltyof Co ng~J; p. 612: National Arcbi\1\"$ p. 616: &knhur:~t G.lll«y, loJ Angt~, Calirorni.l; p. 620: No"h \l' ind Pictuno Archi'~'; p. 627: 0 Btrtmann/ CORBIS; p. 630: Ph«o Filtj'MLB Ph«e»: viol Gtttr Image:~; p. 633: Tht Mich .ld Barwn Coll«tion/P.ul P«ftn

Ch!Jptw26

p. 638: Ptinttd b)· pc"rmiJ:~ion of tht N«man Roclo:'<\'C'Il fl~m ily Agtncy 0 1959 the" Nonn.an Roclo:'<\'C'Il Family Entitle'S) p. 6 .al: AP Wick \l'orld; p. 6-18: 0 Bm.. m.ln n/CORBIS; p. 630: 0 1992 Cindy LtwiJ. ALL RJGI-ITS RESERVED; p. 655: Ch ic.ago HiJtori ~l Soci.ety; p. 639: 0 fktun.ann/CORBIS

Ch!Jpt",. 27

p. 662.: D<~.n Budn ickf\'(loddlin C.amp & k · scxiate:r.; p. 669: AP Phot
Ch!Jpt",. 21

CbiJptt'Y U1 p. -lSI: Fr,;anlo: .lnd Muie-The~C' Wood Print Coll« tionJ, Alexandri.t,YA; p. -ISS: Chic<~.go Hi:~rorical So· ci«y; p. -157: Funk & Mu~ThC'-n'$C' Wood Print CoUtc· tionJ, Ala<~.ndri.t, VA; p. -167: N.ltio nal Mu:~tum of Am.f'rieoln H.i, tory, Smitluoni.ln lmtitution, Bth ring Ct.n· tt r; p. -172: Nationil Anobi'~' CbiJptt'Y Zl p. -176: Libr~ry o r Congrt-JJ; p. -178: Courtt$f Mtclife Archivu; p. -13-1: 81'0'>\·n IJ rothtr~; p. -192: Libu.rrof Cong nou.; p. -198.: The YC»C'mite Mu:~tum, YoJemitt N.l· tionil Puk CbiJptt'Y 22 p. 505: Oh io lii.uoricil Society; p. 5 10: Tbt Grangtr CoJkction, New Yolit; p. 5 13: T1w- Grangtr Col· lta io n, New Yo rk; p. 516: U.S. Annr Militill")' HiJtory In· n irute; p. 523: Tht Phillip$ Coll«cion, \l':uh ington, D.C. 0 l OOS Tht Jaoob .lnd Gwt.ndolyn lawrt.nct Found.lt ion, Suuk/Art:i:~t:~ Righ ts: Socic-tr (ARS), Ntw Yoli: CbiJptt'Y ZJ p. 532: Chi.e.lgo lii.uoricil Society; p. 53-1: Hin / GC'uy lm.lgu; p. 539: Un i'A'uityofChic.ago t.ibr~ry, Sptci.ll Coll«tion:~ Rt:~tarrh U m.c"r Sourn; p. 5·13: Cou"C'S)' of the Strong Mu$C'um, Roc.ht,ttr, Ntw York, 0 2008; p. 551: Libr;uy or Co ng~'

p. 6&5: AP Photo/ Henri liu«; p. 689: Jo hn fllo/ GC'tty lmai"'> p. 697: Ron H u~rl t(rimtLi k Pia u ru/ GC'tty Images; p. 699: W~llr McN.lmC'C'f\Voodfin Camp & Auac:iatu; p. 70-1: Cutoon NeYt:S ln t« n.atio n.U

Ch!Jpt",. 29

p. 709: !Job Da.emmrich Ph«og:raphr; p. 7 12.:0 198.-1 NtW$\\o't'.&, Inc. All righu no:~tr'A'd..lkpri nttd by ptrmU:~ion; p. 721: Sip;~. Pnou.; p. 730: AP Ph«o/lr,;a Schw~x

Ch!Jpt",.JO

p. 7J..I: Bob Daemmrich Photogr~phy; p. 738: Bruno &rbey/ M.agn um PhotoJ, Inc.; p. 752: Tribune' Mtdi.11 SC'-1""\•ic~. lne. All righ ts: rt-JC'f\'t'd. Reprin tt d \\ith ptrmWion; p. 755: 0 Did: RC'C'djCOR.BIS

Ch!Jpt",. 31

Ch!Jpt"" 32 p. 759: O.Md IJutO\N'"Rtdwc Picrufe.' IUr USN&\VR; p. 762: Don Tdloclt/ G.amma Pnou USA, Inc.; p. nO: U.S. I:Hputmem of EHftnJc; p. n6: M. Almtida/

1k New Ymi- li'mts; p. 781: 0 Micha.el Ain.wrort:h/Dall:u Morning NC'YI$/CORBIS; p. 78-l: 0 Scott Olwn{Geuy Image:~

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Index MA. S« Agriwltunl Adjtmmt:tn An llbb.u, M.lhrnoud, 77l llben.tli Indians. 36 llbiknt, K.m.s.u, 396, 397 llbolition and ro, 286: i.n Old South, US: R«1W Srown,John llbonion, 112,679, 742; Ror lo( W..W .:~00, 691, 712, ns. 740, 768, 781:.\lenHdl r~a«h and, 767: violtno:C' .:~00, 756 l1br.dl111 li»nabs (.lirw:nft utrier), 765 llbnmoiT, Juk, 782 11~ Afualomt! (Faulk.nu), S84 llb~noe. birtb control ;md,21l llbu Ghuib pl'i$on~r ab~.t~t, 771 ~. 69, 94. S« 1/1/JIJ NO\·a Stori.l lluoumi ngs,'$ttnl$, 406, 4011 lld~n, ~an, 6.24, 63S, 694 llco nu l ndi.tn~ 31 /let fbr Rtligiou.s 1blmtion (1649). 4 1 llcti'li.sm: Cold Wu, 66S-666: k minin, 678-679: HUp.uUt, 6n- 678: N;uM AmtOOn, 677, 717. Srw: .11111 Ci\il tight:~~ ~Nt10· 0Nl

llobms.Abigail, 129 llobms. Charlu Fnncis..U7 llobms. Hen.ry, 4S2 /ll;bms.Joh.n, Jll , 114, llS. 129, IS8:on Arri:k.sofConrtdtntion, 134: 60$ton Ma~.-erw: and, 107, IO&du lhof,l14: tknion o{ 1796 ;wd, 159: dtcrion or 1800 ;uld, 162, 170: Fedruli.su .u lli, 173: ;1$Vke.ptn.:idtm, l52; XYZ Mrait ;wd, 160 lldams.Joh.n Quinq·, 190-191, 291, 292.: tknion of 1824 ;wd, 215- l 16: dl'l:rion or 1828 .:~00, l iS lldams.Samutl, 107, 108, 110, lll: llnon.dltnddurit:l and. l03- 104 lldamwn llc1 (1916), SOl lldam~Onu (lhrucontim nu l) l 'rury, 191, 196,184 lldd.uru,J..tno:, 4.39-440,473,480, S40: W'o dd W'..tr I ancl,SOS-506, Sl4, Sl1 llddphiTII.!II11'1 ufHldJrbory Fin11 (1\ro;tin). 445

Ad\'C'rri.sing_, 535, 6 19, 650; m.uktcing and, 412: politial, 6S4;c n ndio, S:l~mi an or U bar Mrkol, 22: coloni:ution of, 131, 172, 231, 165: Eu.ropt.lll VO)'Oig>:'5 and, lO(m.1.p), 25: r' Dul and, S70-57l; Nt10·0r. kan~ 780, 781: .u: r;til.ro1W •»tttr Bbel: FIW: bl,.(k$; ~tdmtn: R
Agnt'V>·, Spiro 1:. iO
Agrinlhurt: .1duno:~ in, 138-139: boom in, 198-199: ap.m.sion .tnd, 291: Mu ia n labo.r fUr, 656- 657: Nou:ii.'C' Amtriun, 6, 13: Nt'V>' Oa l .1nd, S68: n ilm.ub md, 389, 398: W'odd W'u I boom and, 522-523. SN ..W Fumm .1nd r..uming: Plamers .1nd pbnutioM: Sh.11Teropping AgrinlhurC'• U.S.J:Xp.mmtm of', S71 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 474 Ahm1W Bombs and bombing Ai r poll ution, 1 (ship), H7, 371 Alamant<: Cn'd:, B.utk or, 109 Alamo, 286- 287, 5114 Al.u:h, IO, UI4,499:gold n.uh in, 396,468; natiYI' ptopk$ o(, 71& oil dtilling in, no, 767: ail Qlllr.er .spill in, 740: Rw!U wd, 371, 396 Al.u:h Und.s An (1980). 720 Al../ldarip. Mruqut, bombing or, 770 Alb.tny Congreu (1754). 92, 100 Alb.tny rnavenll:'nf (Gtotgi1W Prohibition: ltm. pel';I.UC't Altuu, 10 Alg>::
1-1

1-2

IN:OEX

ADic>.s ;md ;~.ll:i;~.n«,;: &i ti:!.h.Jndi;~.n, IS:Z, 18l, 184; Cold W;~.r, 62S(m;~.p)t Eutupt;lll· lndi;m, lS, 32, 36, 57, 61, 62, 79, 81: firmer.~, 459-461: "'"nrh-lltne'rir.m, 154-155: lndi;~.n, 95: l.roqooi:l Conftd.
Almun, Robo
tpm'fit <~mtJ~~t Atnl:'rkMI Ad;un, 399 Atnl:'rkMI Anti.SI.lloOUY Socii!!)', 2l2 Atnl:'rkMI Bdl 1ekphont, 40!1 Atnl:'rkMI Civillil-en:ie':S Union, 550 Atnl:'rkMI Coloniucion Sodtly. 231 A.. A111m'r..!11 0.\'tltiiOM (Myrd.U), 607 Atnl:'rkMI Ellptdi1ion.uy Fo!W$ (AEF), 517-519 Atnl:'rkMI Ft>:ltr.uion ofl..lbar(AI-1.), 420, 42l-422, 494,502, 522, 537, 577, 649 Atnl:'rk;m lndi;~.n ~ft:n$( Aiwci.1.1ion, 581 Atnl:'rkMI lndi;~.n Mowmtnt, 677,717 Atnl:'rkMI (Koow No1hing) p.my. 2.82, 3~, 3JI- 312,3l3, 314 Atnl:'rk;m lc>gion, 506 AIOKI'il'<~ll Mun.ry nugmnt, 5!16 Atnl:'rk;m Mull:'um, 248 Atnl:'rkMI Onli.ne' (AOL), 746 Atnl:'rkMI PhiJ.osaphiu l Socitl)', 85, 17l Atnl:'rkMI Ps.ydli.urk t\.uori.\tion, 692 Atnl:'rk;m Ren.Wunu, 249 Atnl:'rk;m Rtvnlu1ian. Sl'l' Rtwlu1ionuy

"'"

Atnl:'rkMI Saci.ll H)'gim< /waci;~.cian, 486 Atnl:'rk;ms •i1h Diubili1iu lin ( 1990), 740 Atnl:'rk;m Srsum (Cby), 187- 188.,221, 223,

,,.

Atnl:'rkMI Temper..nrt Sodtly. 230 Atnl:'rkMI 100.1.0:0 Comp;~.ny, 496 Atnl:'rk;m Wam;m Sulft.agt Auori.1.1ion, 361, 492 Atnl:'rk.u, 4(m;~.p1 26, 29. Sl'l' <~f14 Luin (Saudi) t\tnl:riu: Nonh Atnl:'l"iee Amnc>Ry Act ( 18721 372, 37~ 3i'6 Amustme'nl p.uks, 443, 486 An;~.b.lpWu, 2.3 An;~.rand~ pbn, 332 An;~.rdU~a, 422,424,493, 549-SSO An.lJOUi rnl.run-, 7 Anlk.m ptaplc>.s. 5. 5« >tCI4 lnu Andtnon, M;~.ri.tn, 571 Andtnonvilk prison u mp, 347 Andfl):!;, Edmond, 66- 67, 68 Anr.nhe':Si.l, 244 Angliuns. &r Chl.tf'dl ofEngl;~.nd

AngJo.l>o.il;u-;m W.lN, 3~ 35, 43 Anglo 50citly, in Sau1h~ 393- 394. Sl'l' <~fl4 ..Jrr Whift Anglo.Sj»nidl Wu, 82 Angol;~., 26, 700 Amun, Kofi, i48, 785 Amupali.s, 138 Anntnrian: of H01w~ii, 471; of l'u.u, lSS, 2.89- 290, 291, 293 A II$Cl\'N11 (union), 590 Ambony, Suun 8 .• 347, 361- 362,420, 492 Amh~x 5Un"(2001), 7&2 Ami .B;~.IJ:ilri: Mi.uik Tl'l:'.liY (19721 i73 Ami.Cubol»rum. 2JJ, 2&2, 283, 311, 312 Ami.rommunDm. 528-529, 641: polirin a(, 63U36. &r>tCS4 Cold W;~.r Amkum, Battk ;u, 333, 33~ 339, 346 Amift>:ltn li.sl.s.1<12(nup), 152: Can$1lm1ion ;md, L41- l!l3 Ami.lmperi.tli.sl Lugu<, 473 Ami .M.uat~l'}', 223 Aminomi;mi.sm, 47-48 Ami-S.aloon Lugu<, 487 Ami &mil:i~rn, 5!19, 567, Gil, 63!1 Amisl;r.,..ryrnawnle'nt, 130, 168;dlild.rm'l ~. 233: fugi ti'Y d.lV!' l.w.· ~nd. J06; K.lnJiis.Ntbr.ub An ~nd, 309: Kn010·· Naming$ ;~.nd, 312: 1n-.u ~nntx.nion ;md, 290: lhKir Tollf'i C116i11 ;md• 307-308. S« lllhtlllbolition AmiW'.lr m en\"mt m: V'IIC'm.lm Wu, 678, 682, 683, 6!18, 690, 695, 698; World W;u p;~.cifum, .SOS-506, 514, 521 Ap.dlr l.ndi.uls, 2, 61, 81, 82, 153, 382,383, .l84 Ap.u1hrid, in Sau1h M~.1, 736 Apuu lypcit: finian, 757 App;dxhi.m Mounuiru, 73, 194: ~ b.urit r in C'rvil Wu, l3l: lndi;~.n l;md.s w1•.n of, 95, 109: ~i1m.ub th.rough, 24l;snull f.ll'm$ in, 34S Appe.lll:'mtnt, afNu.i Gtrm..ny, 590 Appkcompu« r, 711 - 712 Appam.l.lti.U, LN"s surn-ndtr ~t, 350 Anb ail r mb.ugo( l973), 7l9 Anb •urld, 611, 731: tw.cion;ll:i~rn in, 646; oil ,.,..;~.l dl of,630. Sl'l' <~f14 Middlt E;~.,;t Anf..u, Y;~.lir, 727, i48,772 An~ha lndi;~.n.s. 381, 382, 383, 38<1 ArdlittciU"': An.u;u:i, 7; bOO;i(.lpC', 253; rnaderni"> 4<16; wb.ul ~ysc~pen, 546: Vietori~n, 434 Arnk Na1ion;~.l Wildlifr Rr fugr, 767 AT'min;~., 533, 720, 747 Arguin,sl;~.ving5Ucion u,2S Arinidc>,Jun.fkru;md, 749 Arir.an;~., 296, 392, 515: n.ltil.\" proplc>$ 7, 15!1, 383, 387; Sj»nidlo$pe~ktN in, 393, 394 Arlt.ms.u, 173, 363, 365: Civil W';~.r in, 335: ccxron in, 256: Kl01n i.n,365: rt.ldmilftd

or,

10 Un.ian, lSS, 375: .school de'$tg"'$.llion in, 6!1U4J: st«Pion of, 322 Armn, ~:s:i, US, 65!1 Armtd fUme,:, 393: Bril:idl, 96, 113-114, 120, 122- Jl~ 126. )27: in Olitu, 507; in Civil W'..r, 325-327, 3!19: Conlinc>nl.ll;~.rmy, Ill!. Jl0-127, I30; di.seriminuion in, 631: np;~.rnion of, 160: i.n F"'no:h Un. ;~..U, 60;g;ay,: ;md ltdli;~.ns in, 608, 742.: Gl Bill ;md, 618- 619: l.ndi.ul•'at'S .md, 198., 380, 382,383,384- 385, 387, 388: in I""', 738, 765, 770, 77l, 78!1: in Kortan W..r, 6.27- 628: LWon iolencr ~oo. 422,423: Mnieln, 286-2.87: in Mt xiun..Amniun W..r, 29!1- 296: in Mtxko, SJJ: NATO, GlS; Nxt.i Gnm;m, 592, 595, 599- 600, 601: P.m.lm.l C;~.n;~.l ;md, SOS: i.n Philip. pine':S wu, 474; QuM'ttring An ;~.nd, 102; Rough Riden, in Cub;(, 472, <195: i.n Soludi Anbi;~., 731; 5dlool dtll:'gttprian ;~.nd, 6<12, 643; Savit l (Rtd), 595, 600, 601,610, 6.21: nrike'$ ;~.nd, 464: in 1n-.u R.evulu1ion, 286- 287: U.S. m.uine'$, SIO, 51l, 612, 7V;'Yierm bonu.s m;~.rdlrn ;~.nd, SGl: in Vitm.un W;~.r, 682, 697: i.n Wuof 1812, l84- 186:in WotldW;~.r 1, 515- 516, 517- 519: W'orid W'.u II, 596, 599-600, 602,6()4. Sl'l' <~fl4 61;~.d: $1!!t.:l~n: Miliury Armtni;~.n immignnu , <1!9 ArmsU'ang.louis, 547 ArmsmH'lg.Ndl, 701 Army llppropri.llioru Acr, 374 Army of Nonhtrn Vi rgini..,326,3!1!, 345,

""

Army ofthr Po!omx,332,3<18 Ar1 ;~.nd u1iSI:', 253, 58!1, 6S3;Ashun Sdu:ool, 481: fron1in, 400; modr m Dm in, <146; 1920.s.546 Anhur, Cht~«r 11., 456,457 Anidc>.s of Conftdtn1ion, 134-llS, 196 Aniu.ns, 76, 84, 129, 209, 416: Engli.sh immignnu , 163: indu.sni.Uiu1ion ~nd, 20~205, 206: palitiul ;~.flili;~.cian of, 223: d..m-, 269,172: Wu1 Mrk.m, 17, 18.,26 Asi;a: Cold W';~.r in, 62~29: rommuni.sm in, 645: tronomkeri,;is in (1997.199S), 747: immignnl:$ from, 428(m;~.p), 510, 675, 7l8, 775 ; u ;ldt wi th, 25. Sl'l" <~fl4 tprrifit rr.wlltl]

Asi;m Ameriun Polrtiullllli;mu, 678 Asi;m Ameriuru, upa'Md mobility of, 777 ru- in.1.1ion, 7V: af F~m: F'trdin;~.nd, 512: ofWtfidd, 451-452, 4S7:ofJohn ~n . nt>:ly, 667, 6SO; of King, 672, 694, 695: of l inwt.n, 35 l, 355; of Long. 567: of M.U. rolm X, 673: of Mdinky. 495: a( R;~.bin, 748:of1Wbtn Kr mwdy, 695;ofSad;u, 721 M ll:'mbly: roloni.U, 39, 66, 83- 84: in ln q. no. S « . ltgid.lrnn-,:, colonill

I.NOEX

Mor, John J;acob, 1.95, 207 t\$uoi.Wt, 25 llril.:.p.uun spe~hN, 2 lld.ulu, 241, 551: in Civil W.u, 348, 349; t.-n' ricK in ( 1.906), 489 t1tlmt.t CIMJtilllt~ 4 L4 lld.ulu Un.i\'C'r.r:ity, 367,490 lld.ultic Ch;a.ur, 593 n'<' At!.tntir 444 lld.ultic O~nn: tronDrny, 138: Eumpun u~ruion in, l6-17, 25- 28 t\romic bomb, 598, 621: Sovil!t Union md, 622- 623, 625, &6.,644: wtd on J;~.p.u~, 613, 756. Sl'l" ~1111 Nuek.u•'<';apon5 t\romic Energy Commi»ion, 623, 647 llmt(k$, O i5§1us.10!1 lwdioupe,.; Climon ;and, 751: Nixon ;and, 706- 707

M411167,

lwgu$U;Gto~41S

/wgu$t.l l>v-xtn Works, 326 lwKI:w.iu:
lwtom.uion, of indwtry, 649 lwtomobik indu.my, 483, 534-535, 648, 778- 719: boom in, Sll,.SH; Fotd"ll Mod.:ll; 486, 534: lbn'ign $1\ue' of, 717, 739,778: fud dficimcy
~ (l.t-ai:l.), 5<16

&lxod:, O rvillt, 371

IJ.llb.Y .t.od C611d Co~rr(Spod1), 652 &by boom, 651- 652, 653: ;aging of, 775, 780: rounr.e«ulrun' ;and, 686: MW.uity .md, 692 B.lcllt, S;ally Ft;ankl:in, 129 fl.l(on, N;ath.mid, 43-44 8;a(on'5 Rlfldl:ion, 43- 44 &ghd.ld, bombing or, 738,765 &ktr,J.une:s, 736 &k.er,Jo~phi nt, 547 &Iter, JUy Sumutd, 489 &Un, Jim ;aOO T;unmy, 716 I:Wkr Y. tftlit:milpfC
B;ai!Our Otd.u.uion (1.917), Sl7 B;alhru, in•.Wility in, 747 Iilii, ludk,638~39, 654 B;all g;amu, N:uiw Amtriun, 7 B;all:ingn, ltidutd A , 499-500 & I tic n-publiN, 736 B;altimot'C', 320 B;altimot'C', l.ot'd (Ctdl:iw U lvtf't). 40, 4l, 69 B.tltimot'C' ;and Ohio R;ailm.ul, 422 B;anking An (19lS), 569 B;ank ofEngl;md, 7 l, l.SO, l51, l24 lilnk of d W: Uni1td Su1n, ISO-lSI, 283: J;ad:$1()n ;and, lll, lll.-22~ l);ank of 1819 ;and, 200, 201 lilnktuJKC)', (<WpOt.Ut, 766 B;anh ;and b;anktn.l63, 58!1; (Ufn'no:y $Upply ;and, 455: ~der;al R.e~M" .:~00, .SOI -502; go!.:! n-JC"M" ;and, ot65--466; l;and $J!C'nduion md, 200, 201: Ntw DtaJ
B.tptins.87, U6.,l67, 275, 756: Ntgro,366 Bu~, lbtd.l, 4116 Bu;ak, Ehud, 748 lilrb.ulru, 56 B.trb.uy pir.ut:$, 172 B;arbed win-, 391 &mum. P. T., z.t6, l4S.,lSl liln n , 75 Bmon, 6ruoe, S3~53~ 5!10 & n on, CLu;a, 3<16 B.truclt, Btm.ud, 517 B.utbilll, 426, <189, 5!14, 657, 709: in~.egr;a.. rion 6 16, 630: pmfulion;al, 442 B.uit, Counr, 583 B.uk.ed nll, 447 B.tu..m, scigt oC, 59S n"' B.ttb(C;aUoln), 446 Bui$f.1, Ful~ncio, 588 lilnlt ofcbt Bulge, 601 B.tnlu . Stl' Wu ;aOO •'.ltf.lno: 'P«ifo: !u:tft1 lil)• of Pip im·uion, 666 lk.u ~g R-epublic, 295 lk.ulenu:ni;a, 419 lk.tu, 660 lk.turnont, Gu$t.lvt ck, l93 Jk.tUl)' p.lgt.mU, $44 lk.tver fut tm.:, 3l, Sl, 79,285 &ed~r, Htn'}' W'
or,

736 lkbrus. 736., 7<18 lklgium, in World 'W';ar I, SIS lklgr;adt, 747

1-3

lkllm;ap, Will:i;am E., 37J lkD, Altxander GrMI;am, 410 lkD, D.mid, 778 lkD,John, 320 lkD;amy, Edw
7l6 Btrn$1rin, C;ul, 706 lk~, lknt)·, <WS lkdmnt, M;ary Md.tod, 571 lkveridg.:o, Alb nt, 499 Biblt, 23, 86, 7l6; Fund.l.mtm-.1liJm ;and, 550: Mormonim1 md, llS 6iblt ltion (Phil.ldtlphi;a), 2&2, 283 Biumer.llitpl;uuiT$, l32, l33 Bid:ttd)ic-, M;ary Ann, 3!'16 Bicydi:ng, •umtn ;and, 447 Biddk, Nkhol.u, 221, 222 BigbwimR, 410, Ji ll, 496: ;agribwincu, 397-398,597,649: fnud md $COIOI.hl in, 766: Ntw J:Ao;al md, 566: n'ptlarion <183. S« IIIIo CotpOmioru Bill oC Righu ( J79 l), 147- J
or,

745,776 Biwn. Str &.lff;alo l,bMn) hun1ing Bbd: .lbotitionim, 232. Sl'l" ~f111 Oougl;aR, Frtdtrkk l!.b d: ubintr, S7l 8bd: codu, l56, l57, 368, 374 8bd: (Uitun', 547-5!18 l!.b d: f;afrnl:'n_ 460. Str .. Slureeroppmg 8bd: 1-tu>i, 198 8bd:lins.in Cold War, 633- 634 l!.b d:mun, llirry, 71)4 8bd: P.tn1her p>~rty, 673, 703 8bd: Pbwn, 672-673 l!.b d:$. Scle Mric;an Ameriuru: Fttt blxl$; Frttdmtn: Sl;avr:s ;aOO $l;a•'tl'}'

w

1-4

IN:OEX

Bluk 'okiieu, 130, 167, 364. 490, 497,607: in Sp.lni.dl AmtOOn War, 472-473: in W'orid W'ul, 516, 518, 519 Bluk StvSit-.uruhip l int, 551 Bluk $UITt~gt. SN M~,m...,\tnC'~.m voting tigho: Bluk Thund.:~J• (l929), 559 Bl.lde~burg, B.lnlt of,l85, 186 BI.Unc, p ml'$ G., 4.58 BI.Uid.Ailiw n An ( IS78), 373 Blittkritg (lighming ··u),591 Bloehdl': Amnian Jk-.olurion, 120, 124: ofCub.l, 472, 666: ofj.lp.ln,612; of Somh, in Gil Wu, 332, 336, H7:oC Vt~ Crux, 511: W01rof 1811, 184, ISS,

186 Bo.ud of CU$Wnl$ Comm.i»iontn, 105- 106 Bo.ud of Indi.tn CommU!Wntn. 384 Bo.ud cn·m.: (Briuin), 83 Boedy. IV.ln, ns Boldlt"ik tevolurion, 517, 517 Boldlt"ilm, feu of, 528 Bomb:! ;and bombing, 731: ofbbd: r.hurw:h, 670: rolkgo:o umpu~,: .md, 689: improvist>:l uplruiVI'de'Yk"> 765, 772; in lr;I(J, 738,770: in hr;~tl, 748: in Ldl.lnott, 727, 772: by NATO, ofSC'rbi.:., 747;ofNordl Korea, 62& Old .lbonu O t}', 756: lkd Sure md, 528; JUkick bombtll, 7 Zl, 748, 770: of Vitnum, 681, 688, 698; W'orid lhdt G:mn, 749: Worid War 11, 592, 594, 601, 613. Stw: ~Is" Nuek.u 1>'e.'lpan5 Bon.m:u f..um.s, 397- 398 Bon.nty, Willi.un H. "Billy d:W: KW," 397 Book.of.d~.Momh Club, 543 Boont, Roll'C'rt, 4l Booth, }olin Wilke'$, lSI Booth, Willi.un, 438 Botde'r: with Briuin, 470: C.uud.l ;aOO, 186, 190,289: Mt xko ;md, l93, 29~ 296, 7BJ: On-gon.md,l92; whh Sp.tin, 157, 191: l'u.u..N!"V<' Muiro, 304 Botde'r P.lnol, 549, 783 Botde'r $UTt,:, in Gil Wu, 311(m.lp}, 330,

332 Botk, Ruben, 706, 719 BCI$ni.l· Htrxi')."'U¥i.n.:.,512, 747 BCI$100, 70, 87, 106, 209, 550: .lbolirioni!U in, 312; AndroJ .u~d, 68: ;unUI.lvery vtoknef: in, 306: eulnu;al t.lifC' 444: fi''e.'!llhy in, 431: •umen'll sufTngt group$ in, 361 BCI$lOO HouM:oflndu.suy. 234 BCI$100 ,\bnufuturing Comp.lny, 205 BCI$100 M.luu~ ( 1770), 107- 108

or,

BMI:cn Pon Bill ( 1774), Ill BMron lt:l P.lrry, 107, 110- 111 Bout.:ltr (H ~r) D:un, 555, 571 Bourbon,, 376 6outllC', R.:~OOolph, 511 &.n'iii,(Aiwlt (l>um;un), 754 Bour lkbd.lion (Chin;a), 507-508 Bmli.ng, 441, 489 ~us. 105, IIJ;tollt~ ,;rudmt, 689: roloni.tl eu, 100, 101, 104: CorutiV.ltiVI', 756: f..um worktr, 6n: oCM(I$(0V,• Ot,m. pies. 721 Boyd, Bdlt, 346 Boy Srouu, 497 B~et, Clwll'$l.oring. 437- 438 BT.smo prognm, 60~ 656- 657 Bmdod:, Edw;ud,91- 93, Ill B~dy, M.ud~w, 328 Bnin mm, 562 Bnndl O.:roidi.lru, 756 Bnndd :s, loui.s, 502 Bnndn~ 4 l2

Bnnd•i no: Crwl, &ult or,lll, 124 Bnm, joJC"ph, 126, 1.36 B~xil,l7, 700, 747: sl;aw trW in, 74, 171 Bnd:inridge,}ohn C., 320 Bll'!ed's Hill, B.ltdt of, 114 Bremer, L P;aul, 765 Brt:SI·lin.n>:Sk, Trc.ll)' of(I91S), 517 Brnron Woc~~;b;ag:r«mtm ( 1944), 619 Brl"'. tmtv, LC'onid, 711 Briuin, B.ltdt o(,59l....S93 Briuin (Engl.lnd), &~ 763: .llli.u~ef: with lndi.lns.182, ISJ, 196: t\tnl:~.m n'YC!Iu. ricm .lnd, 120: Ad.m.tk tronotn}' ;wd, 1.\8; bounduy di ~fC' ;aOO, 470:C.ln.l· di.u~ botdtr .lnd, 289: CU'ibbun rolo. nie,:, 55: eo«on no:toeb of,199, 258: dqw<S$ion o( 189011 ;and, 465; txploter.~ from, 27 wd m;ap: fidli.ngdi~ult •irh, 469; Glori ow R.C"volution in, 67- 68: gnin uparu w, 198- 199: immignnu from, JS- 39, 42, 45, 53, Sot, 119, 419, 431: induw-i.lliution in, 2D4;J;ay',Tre.tf}' .u~d, 155- 156: Jtwidl homt.l.lnd ;and, 527, 611; n;avy o£,513, 539: Ntw Nt1herb00i .u~d, 57-5!1; Nonh AmtOOn eolonitJ of, 31: opium ll'.ldt md, 224:O"'t,''O «rri· rory .lnd, 2~ 284, 292- 293: pe-ut • irh, 190: popuLu:ion growth in, 11 -22: lttlbr. m;ation in, 2
Worid Wu I pt..t~Ct .:~nd, 526. Set .o1W Briti.dl (RO)'.ll) N;avy; P.uli.ltllC'nt (Britidl) Stiri:lh AtnC'~;a,81(nup), IU: immigr;acion 10, 45(m;tp), 72, 73: N;ui"" t\tnl:~.m.s .lnd,SO, 95, 96: public !iff: in, 83. Sik rriumph .lnd ren, ioru in, 90- 96. &r .sf$1) Colonits; s]-'.aJ Stiri:lh..Amt riun Con\Oenricn of ISIS, 190 Stiri:lh Gui.m.:., 470 Stiri:lh (Royal) N.l\y, 70, 71, 124, 191, 513, 539: i.n Amt rian mulu tion, 119--120: impn'mntm of u ilon: by, 156, 179-ISO; in Wu oC1811, 184, IS.S(nup) Bro;uk.uring ntrv.ur!u, 543 Stokn.·, lbm, 755 Stook F.lrm, 235 Stooh , Prt,:ron, 31.3 Snxhds. 438-439,443. Stt $hi> l>nmirurion Stown, John, 313, 311, 338, 340, 584: H.lr· ptN Feny nid, 301- 302, 3L4, 318-319 Stown, M.iehul, 780 StowruYillt, lt.x.u, 393; biMk ,:o&dkn in, 490, 497 Stown UniYeNiry, S7 Brown Y. Jf4.olrJ II{P.M~ ofTtJPriA (1954), 642,656 Sty~n, W'illi.tm }mni.n~, 473, 514: ;u prt:Si· dmti.ll un.did;uco, 466- 46!1, 499; Sropes uU I .lnd, SSO Sty~m, Ani tol,71S

Sty.am, 001n, 247 Sty~m, W'illi.tm Cu.IIC'n, 253 Styn ~bwr Colltgt, 435 Buth.:~JUn,j.lmts. 313-314, 319: K.lnJOU a i.siJ .u~d, 315- 316 Buth.:~JUn, l>o!t, 741 Budd ry, Willi.lm F., Jr., 641,674. 714 Budgo:-1 b.lbnci.ng, 744 Budgo:-1 d:fid t. S« Odiorir spmdi.ng Butn.l \'i:lu, B.ltdt o(,29S, 296 B-ffolt> B.\'1: Ki11g, IJ{IW &mkrMtfl (Run dint), 400 Buff.llo Bird W'om.m,379-380, .\!17 Bufblo (bison) huming., 10, 184, 379,380, 383, 385, .\!16: r;ailto.lds .lnd, 3&2, 38!1 Buff.llo (cii)'), ZO~ 427 Bulg.l!U, SlZ, 601, 610, 611 Bull Moo~ Puty, SOO Bull Ru:n, B;ardes .lr, H2, 333, 334 Bumpo, Nmy "Le.uher.uodcing." 249 Bu.n.lu.VariiLa, llhilippe-. 508 Bunker Hill, &mk of, 114 Bu.ndint, Ntd, 400 Bu.t'C'.lU of lndi;m Afhill, 717 Bu.t'C'.lU ofW'u R.Uk l.n,un~, 525 Bu.cgtr, Wum~, ~ 707, 729 Bu.tgoYOt, john, 124 Bu.rk,}olln lhly, 161 Bu.rkt, Edmund, lll, ll4 Bu.rl~gt, Dor«hy, 6!15-686 Bu.rk:son, Aibtn S., 522

I.NOEX

Bumtd-0\'<'r Dim-in, 227, 228, 232 Bumh~m, O~nitl, :l, 776: boom ~nd buJt q'<:k' in, 405: rul1 of, 536; dnt:gub. cion, 723, 7211,766: i.nduwi~lir..ufun ~nd, 163: jelim.ju:d comp.tny, 22: nun~ ment in, 406: N ui"<' Atn.:~.m, 718: Nt'>l' Ou l ~nd, 564- 565: n-gul.ufun or,. 479, 48.3-484: 1990$ boom, 745. S« lllhtl Big bulii'IC'""; Mttclu.nu: 1bdt Bud tr, Andrr1>·, 313 Bud tr, Btnj.tmin, 33S

C.Wtu dt \'J~r.~, Ah·u NUflu, 30 C.Wi.nt l, 146,571 C.Wot,John, 27 C.Wr;d, Pffiro M·un, l7(m~p) Ctgnty,)~5,.S.Sl Cthoki~.8-9

Ctjun' of louUim.:., 94 Ctlboun,}olm C., 1 8l,l 1 9, l9~304:~kr. cion or 1&24 ~nd, 215-116:J..cbon Uld, 220: 1tx~, ;mnu.uion ;md, 290 Ctlifomi~,l78, 291, 297, 653, 690: Ameri. Qn ~nltn: in,l87, 28!k Con~n·Wm in, 7 1A-715; dtren~ i.nduwy in, 647:du". bo.mi fi'Iu~l'$ i.n,S72, S7>t~knionof 1916 ;md, 503: gold in, lSO, l99, 396: irriprtd f.uming in, 39S:J;ap~nt:St in, 510, SS0, 601k in Muiun.Amu iun W~r. 294, 295, 296: migr;mt wod:us i.n, 786; popul.uion inert:~~ in, 65 I, 775: Silicon Valley, 648, 712, 754, 765.-766: Sp.Un
Cundtn, a~ul~ of, l26, J27 Cunp IlwidA«onb ( 1978), 721, 71.7, 772 Cunp nll:'tcinp.226 Cmad.l, 156, 633, 76l: botdtrdi,puu5 with, 186, 190, 289; Bri.Wh .lndi;m ~llianoe in, 182: U1holiri~rn in, Il l: in Fftn
ClptoCGood Hopc-, 25 Clpiuli$11), 406,445: Lli5$e:t.f.lirt idtologr. 423; M.:lnist rri ciqu~ of, 424: :IOC'iali~rn ;md, 494; YOfum-.Uif'ln ~nd, 555 Clpont, t\l, 553, 582 Clpl';l, Fr.mk, mavil'$ or,. 58:! Cu;avd (ship), lS Cubon dioxide tm.i»ion,, n4-77S Cuibbun. SN W~.n lnd.it:S (Cuibbun) Cutidt lndi;m Sdlool, 386 Cu.ntgit, Andt<w, 4.08-409, 410, <118, 473; "GC»pd oCWe~ldt," 423: phil;mthropy o r,409 Cuntgit Srt~el Comp.tny, 421- <123, <1211, 4113 Cuolir.a,54- 56, 80,82: pie'dmont oC, II9: Rtgul~ton itt, 109- 110. Set o~(s.) North C~rolin.:.; South Uroli n~ Clrptlb.l~"'Ull,362-363, 376 Cur~n:a, Vmum~no,.SJJ ~. Ki t,l95 ~. R~ehtl,6!19,665

Cut.er,Jimmy, 7 19, 720-722,723,725 Cln:iu, J~r.qut:S,3 1

Cu)•, WiOi;un dt 1.:~ Monugnr, 379 Cu.WI.l.llu mttring ( 19<1.3), 593 Cull
389. Str o~($1) sptdfi< crop

C;u:inD$, N~ti"<' Anll:'rieln, 718, n6

Cl"", G~"'t W.,397,39S Cl"", l<wi,,l9S Cu:un , M.uy. 446 Cuuo, Fidd, S8S, 64~ 725: CIA plou and, 666,667 Cu-.:~wb.l lndi;m5, 80 Cuhtrint or A~n, 24 Cuholicl$m, l4, 94, 31 1: ~borrion righn ;md, 71S: AI Smith ;wd, S.S3, 554;;mri. C~tholid $11), Hl, 28l,283, 31 1,312: in C~li!Omi.l, 153, 286; in Culad~, 60, Ill: in
1-5

~nd, 73, 107, 159, 20~223, lSI: Ktn.ntd}• ~nd,663, 66!1; l;mdownmhip b}•, 71; in M.uyl;md, 40-41, 69: Mtxiun.Ameriun, 549; i.n Mo:ko, 285; p.uocl!UI Khool$, <149; Jlurblo lndi~n' ;md, 61- 62,82: in Supn-mt Court, 782 c~din, Gto~, 253 c~u. C.urie Clupnun, 492, 524 c~ult, 29,79, 391, 396-397 uc.e..u,677 C:~ulry; in 0\il Wu, 331,349; fOOitn v.·;~N ~nd, 38.5,387: Rough RideN in Cub~., <172,<195 CBS (Columbi.:~ Sroadc.uringSy~ltm},543, 584-5.85,653, 693, 772 CCC. SN Civilitn Conm~tion Corp5 Cdtbriry euhurt, 544 Cd l phoi'IC'£, 759 Ct~otship, <186, 598 Ct~w, 399, 541, 718, 1n. Str >~f$1) l>opuLa.. ri on Ctntul Amtriu, U.S. i.ll«'rvr:ncion in, 725 -726 ;md map Ctnu~l fm d ligmcf: Agtn.:y (CIA), .S96, 646, 703, 70S, 725,765: Su.th in, 735: Curro ~nd, 666, 667: Chil~ :~00, 700:<0\'C'rt ~nion' of, 644- 64.5: Hmong md, 759: Noritg~ ~nd, 736: 9{11 urrorUm md, 763, 764: torru.rt u~d by. 771 Ctnu~I P.-rilk R~ilro.ul, 343, 388, 406 Ctnu~I Pbwer.l, World w·~r I, S 12 Cot"? m.:~g.ui.nt, <145 A Cm.!III'J'of~Ox.hon), 3S.S Ch~ro Un)un l.ndi.ua, 7 Ch~in $101'1'$, 535 Ch~mberl~in, Nt>Yi0t,590 Ch~mber.l, W'hiruke'r, 634 1lr CIMmp.Yifl Silllfr St.11lfs (El.kin,), 4!16 Ch~mpl~i.n,»mud & , 32 Ch~naellom>illt, &mk or, 341 Ch~pli.n, Clurl ie', 486,543 Ch~rbonnuu, lbu.u~in t, 176- ln Ch~rity Org.miut:ion Socitty, 438 Ch~r!tJI (Engl.u~d), 2<1,39, 40,
""

1-6

IN:OEX

or,

Oltrok« lndian$;80, 109, 165: t~l 196. 198: in R.evolm:ionM}' JlS- J26 Oti"'WrN.ltiv»s 11 C~(1831 ), 198 C6a.fpr.drt inddtm, 179- 180 O!tgpukt r.o:gion, 39-45, 73(nup): Bacon'$ ttbtllian in, 43- 44: dtath, ~ndtr ;wd ki.nJhip in, 42: np.1.ruian in, 40(m.lp): tar or~l.l\te «L'tOion in, lli;JI.:ro'<'ry in, 44-45, 77: j;C,lf(' .lnd mu~h in, 39-41; tobacco in, 42-43, 76,77. 5« .els4 M.lry· bOO; Virgini.l OltM'lun, Muy Borkin,261 Olrvroln, louis. 533 Olt)'ffint l.ndi.ul~.381, 382, 3!13,384, 385 Ol.ic;~.ga, Z0'\13& blaclu in, 432, 46l, SZJ: H.lym.lr!ter ri« in, 422: Hull H aull:', 440, 480: immigr;um; in, 2SO, 431: otg.miud crimt in, 553: polic<: b rur.Uity in, 695; populuionof, 427, 484: llullm.ln wikt in, 423: l'.lrt riou in, 528, 694: n.ilro.l!b .md, 141; .d urn, in, 65S; $Ub urW or, 431: Wodd); F.m, 404,485 Oii'dJP DtftNu (I'IC'W~.lptr), 523 Ol.icanw, 60~ 677. &r <~($1) Hi.rptU~iu O!.ic.hJilw IOO.i.u~, 79, IS 4; ttrnaY.ll of, 196,

··u,

197 Ol.id'donu: i.n Artiu, 17; in MC'$o.umeriu, S. SN .els4 Nu:i\te Ameriuru Olild l.lbor, 22, 142, 344,449, 481,48.3: b.lnning 564, 575: m;uinioru on, 484, S40-S4I : ~I.lw chi!.:l«n, 272: in Tt:uilt milh , ZOS, 415,417 Olildrm, 211- 212: ;wWI.1...-ery 1oy5 and, 233: l»b}• boom ( l9SOs), 6SJ. 6S2: in ei\il tigho:' m.lrdt, 669:duth or. 76: teo. nomic V.llut o£,212: ht.1.llh insur;wcr fur, 751: ofimmignms. 654X lndi.1.n, 383: mul.1.uo, or pbmer diu-, 26l-162: :ldlool Mgn-guion .m.d,lJI: .d.lVl', 269- 27l, 272: u.tb.1.n d iliC'.lliC' .1.nd, 431: utb.ul poor, 437-438,440, 655; wi.kkmtJ$ .1.nd, 497; •urk.ing modWN .1.00, 605. SN .elM Birdtr.lft; ~·oUih Olilt, 470, Sl3, 720 O!inz CM'ttr .1.nd, no- nl:dilenTt .1.nd, 686: j.lp.ln .1.00, 526,590: Koru:n W'u ;wd, 627- 628: Open Door 10,506-508, 594: l>mpk'J Rrpubl.ic. or, 626, 699: Ti.ln.lnmrn m.ll$01Ct<' in, 736: u'.ldt •i1h, 153, 224, 746, 773-774, 780. SIT $ffl, Chi.ntll:' immgrmt:~~ Clill
or,

Choa;~.wfndi.lru,

79, 154; tun!W.ll

or, 196,

197 Choir~. 244, 271,485 Chopin, K.lTt, 448 Chrini.m Anti.Communi~1 O~.t~W, 641 Chrini.m CNlirian, 741, 743, 75~ 769 Chrini.m F.li th-.lnd·Li~ Community, 685 Chrini.mit}', ll, ll- 24, 656, 727: .1.bolition. Du ;md, 232: in Afriu,l6; in Chirw, 507; Columbu.s .1.00,26: Enlightenmtm and, 86: r.qmru:ion and, 469, 474; fund.tmen. Q)i"-550-SSI, 652- 653; N.uiw Amtti· uru .1.nd, 16, Sl, 196, 384,388:;~l.l\tef)' and, 266, 269, 275- 274X UniurianJ ;wd, 227. SN ..W .rpt:ocifr J«t Cht}~lrr rotpomion, 717 Chu~h, FJTolkrir, lSJ Chu~he,;: Arriun

Atnl:'ric.ut, 366-.367; .md $10d.ll ac1ivily, in We"-392: md ,;c.ut, in Ntw Engl.md, 47: .1.nd $1..ll~ ~p.1.mion 134.S«.eWR.digion Chu~hiU, Wi~UM'l, 592,598,599, 603, Glf>. 62l;;~.r Wodd Wu II confiorr:nce'$, 593, 6U, 613, 62J Chu~hoCEngJ.md (AngliunUm), 14, 59, 69: Purk.mJ .m.d, 36, 45: rtviY.lli~rn md, 87: in Virg:inil, 40 Chu~hoC}t:l~.t~ Ch.ti$1 orUrttr-O;ay S.Unt:~~. S« Marmon' CJA. &r Ct.nu;!.) I nttOi~nrt Agr.ncy Cincin.n.:~ri, 103, 2011, 520: immignnu in, 280 Cincin.n.:~ri Rtd Srod:inp, 442 Cirie'$ .1.nd wwru, 427- 432: bl.1.d: migr.lrian ro, 366, 414, Sl.\-524: bombing of, in Per.lian GulrWu, 738: bombing in World W;u 11, 592,601, 602,6l3: in coklni;!.) Nrw England, 48: rttt bbeh in, 272- 273, 274; growth or, 21,203- 2011, 242,427-428,484, 541: haUling in, 241.-243; immigr;um; in, 279-280, 429, 487; influtn.u tpidrmic in, 524: Mo:iun b-.lrriin; 393, 39'\S.SO, 655: N.lti'T Ameri. an, 8-9 ;wd illus., 51, 52: Nrw ~.ll md, 570: poliried m.ldlii'IC'J in, 436- 437: povmy in, 76-77, 207, 655; progrr.uivUm and, 482, 48!'1- 487; public ht.Urh in, 144; racr riou in ( 196S).694: r;lilro.lds .1.nd, 241; rur;aJ mign1ion I0, 20&~1umJmd ghtum in, 4.\l-431, 485: Sauthtm u nik milb .1.nd, 4)4-415: suburb:~, 541, 650, 651, 65!'1; Yioltr.« in iiUI('r, 717, 75~ 767; W.lltr' ;wd ~Wff.lt,"C' in, 24.\-244 ; wod:ing d.,u, culru« in, 427 Ciriu.nd!ip, 161,373, 591: b).l(k, J.\0, J.\J, 373, 630: denied G<mun Jrws, 591: lndi.1.n, 386, 581: sntt 1'1. n.uiotwl,373. S« 411Jo foUIUt:nth Amtndtnl:'nf Ciuu' G.f'OWUll' lwoci.u:ion, 398 Cil}' upon;~. hill, M.:~~xhu~m &y colony .:1$; 45-46, so, 66

or,

or,

Ci~il ~ll« (l'hore.tu}. lSO

Civilian Con~t"'.ltian Corp.s (CCC).564, 581,599 Civili:ution, 16, 165,380 Civil righu, 631: ofdi.r.Witd, 740: p,~ .1.nd Ir:sbi.tru, 715;G.W. Bush .lll Civil righn rnawmrm Civil R.ighn Art: l866, 357, 373, 374:or 18i5,374, 461; 1957, 643;or 1960, 643: 196'\ 670, 674, 678 Ci~il Gut'S (1883), 367, 462 Civil righu tna\'<'tnl:'nt, 668- 673, 685- 686, 717; M. L King .1.nd,6S6, 668, 669-670: ,;rudtm .sir-ins. 661--663 Civil ll:'rvict: tdbtm 453, 456- 457, 692: ~oiiJ synrm .1.nd, liS Civil W.lD: i.n Chin.:.,626: in Engl.1.nd, 50; in 1.-, 666: in SanW.i.1., 749: in Sp.1.in, 5.83 Civil Wu(U.S.), 3ll-323, 324- 3SI, lS3; .lrrn.ir:s, •'<'.lp!WIJ md $1:1'.lTtgy 315-317, 331- 332, 335-336: black sol. d itn in, 339,340: r.uu.Utit5 in, 145,314, 332- .136, 3118, 35 I: diplom.ll)' in, 337- 338; di~Mt~t in,345- l46: i.n E.u!, 332-.U~ 348: tconomic imp;l(t of, 343- 345, 351: tlt
or

or or

or RiJim

or,

or,

or

'"

CIMl, Did:, 659 CIMl, Gtotgr Rot,"'tN, 126, 128, 155 Cl.uk, Jim, 670 Cl.uk, Willi;un, 175, 176- 177, 380 Cl.ukt, Elid!-1, J5S Cl.us: ooloni;d, 78; mannrn and, 433: Rtvululio~W.ry ··u .m.d, Jl8.-J29:Klloob .1.nd, 448- 449:in ··hilt South,260. l63. SIT $lw Eli Tt,;; G<mq: Middlt d.lJ$; Upper d.1.~: Working d.,u, Cl;~.y, C;wiu' M.l~tllus. US Cl;~.y, Htnry, 182, l9f>.216,l2J . 22l:Amtti. un Syurm of, 187- ISS, 1l3, 29S;Com. promiJt or ISSO .1.00, 304,305: in tltcrian )844. 29()...291 Cl.lyton Anritf\1$1 Aet ( 1914).502 Clun Air An (1963), 665, 676 Clunlintu, d.Ui.nft
or

l.NOEX

OemencNu,Gto~, Sl6 Oemen,;, Samud L SIT TwJit (sr.e
4D4, 470, 497: tltcrion of 1884
nt.

min, Coal i00uJUy, 417, 542; bltW Spedt (coi1u) c~ i11:.err•Jml.\ 211 Co!.:l H
or,

""""

Cok. 1'hom;u, lSl c~ (ck!UOJYr), 749 Cotf.ur. smuyltr, 370 Co01'1:1hY b.ltt
Col~ of Ntv.• Jetwy (llrif'ICJtron), 87 Colk~ of lthodt b i.Uld (Bn.non), 87 Col~" Stt Univ.-Niti.eJ.Uld rolltgt:s Collin. John, 581 QJI,'Ju's m<tp int, 481 Colo mbi;.ine), I L4- 115 Ci.>.l:lllll411~ft6 f( f/.11111 ( 1841), 2&2 CommontJ, 710 Common iconio n J Dl'l:tiW)' An, 744 Commonl$m, 527: d.il, 69& collap5t or, 73~ conuinmen1oC, 617, 622- 62'\ 6 26,628- 629, 643: Grtar Otpe't5$ion .Uld, 566. Stt iJlJrJ Boldlt'\i~m; Sovitr Union CommonD1 p.ul')', 580, 6ll, 634, 641: in Sovitr Union, 730 Common rty. Sh
Comptrition, 41 2: t\\)lu1i on tls4 Pupulu $(WI':I'rignl')' CompromiJt of 1877, 377

1-7

Comprom.Ut 1·.uitrof 1833, 120-121 Compu ~tn, 648- 649: ptNQnal, 71 1- 711, 745;W'o rki Wufi,598.SIT~f~~>Silkon \';tilt)' Com~, Anthony, 438 Com~, Henry, 395 Com~ lodt, 395 Con.:otd, Budt
Olln'rw MC".tielnru, SSO Conft.dttuco Congrt:U, 326, 341, 345 Conft.dttuco Su~t,; o(1\mtriu.: .unno:Jty for offidili of,371, 374, 376: Al'ritk$ of Conft>:len1io n "Conft:Uio ru" (To m er), 256 ConfiK.lrion Am ( 1861. 1862). 338- 339 Congrtg
Congi'I'JJ (U.S.): :ltntt, 326, 341, 345; CoruttV
1-8

IN:OEX

Ccng:r<S$ (U.S.)(trnsti11.W) ;wd, 357, 358-359: Soudwm Homr.nt.ld An ;wd, 36lk r.uifTs ;rnd, 210: rerrirorUI Jl;r\ltf'}' ;wd, 291k Trum.m ;wd, 623-62~ 632; lfUIU ;wd, 409-410; WMil:.[);wiJ 6ill;r00,3SWS5: •·u h;rwlu in, 182: W'.lr in I"'!! Mid, 764: W;rroriSil ;wd, lltl: •umrn in, 741, 765, 783- 784. Ser.o~Cs
CoM'tnion, Chri" i;rnity ;rnd: orfOOi.tru, 31: or Lutbtr, 13; «Yivab ;rnd, 227 Convicn. !kr Pri:sonJ ;r:nd con'lit15 Coodt, John, 69 Cookt,J;ry. 372 Coolidgt, Calvin,S36, 538, 539, 54'\ 5!1& in d «tion or 1 92~5!10; MWi:ui-ppi RiYn flood, Mid, SJII, S.\9, 554 Cooprr,Ambony ll.dlky, 54,55 Cooprr,j.unc'J F'tMimore,249, 250 Cooprnri..,.,, r.umrr, 460 CopbOO, A;rron, 546, SSJ Copley, john Singltlon, 165 CopprrhNdJ, .\45,349 Coni Su, 6;rrtlrof, 60J,602{nup) CORE. S« Ccng:r<S$ oC R;rci;rl EqiUiity Corinth, &mk or, 335 Comrll Unn~r.r.:irr, 4.36 Com (m;rixr),S, 199,262, l7J, .\89,391; hog n.isi.ng ;wd, lS~ 263 Cormr.•;rllis, Ol.uk:s lord, 126- 127 Corpor;rcion.s: rooprnrion of, .SI7, 554: induw-i;rl dunge ;wd, <WS, 406; ~"'I'N ;rnd ronwl id.:~rion in, 4113, 517, 725, 746: rnaderninrion of, S.\4: progrtJsi\i~m. Mid, 496: K.loo..t ;rnd IT;wd in, 766; m'ikn: ;md,S78: nxatian of,569: cir:s with miliury, 646: 11'\1$1:$ ;rnd, 409-410, 496; un i"tnil}' rtse.:m:h ;rnd, 6!1U49. S«411111Bigbl..u:illt:S$ Comlptian, 36!1, 377, 456, 457; in Ci\til W.u, 343: congrtJ!ion;rl labbir:s ;rOO, 782.: in Gunt ;adm.inim';~.tion,3i'0-371, 375: in H.uding .:~dmi.ninratian, 5311: i.n Ku Klux KIMI, SSJ: politiul muhints ;rnd, 437; progrtJ.:r:il.i~rn ;wd, 481 Cords, Htrn.in,l8, 29 Corrin;r,Ju.tn, .\9.\ Cosby, Bill, 717 Ctn111 Judici;rry: Sup.rtme' Coun

Cou.ruhip, 110, S4S.S« ,.rs, M;rrri;rgr Covtn.un, 50 Covttum Ch;rin, SO C010~82, 396-397,400 Cox, Ardlill;rld, 706 Cox,J;rmts M., 519, 537 COXI'}·'ll umy, 46S Cr;rnr, Srrphrn, 445 Cnwfbrd, Wilti;rm, 115- 216 CI'Mir, 135, 222, 124, 372, 650: ton$Umtr rrooorny ;rnd, 535, S.\6: ta«on pUnter, 161: n-ilis i.n (2007}. 784; brmtN ;rOO, 100, 201, 534: H»nilwn ;rnd, 149-150: P;r:n.ic or 1819 ;rncl,lSS, l00-.201: Jh~. eropping;rnd, 369. SIT$hP ~bt Clidir Mobititr se.md;t], 370-J71 Cnrl: fOOi.tru, 82, 137, IS~ rtmaul of, 196, 197 Crffi,GI'O~, S20

Cl'ffik Jl.:r.~J, i7 Crimco; blulu ;rnd, 374;jU\"
C.tc!.rro, Fiidd

Cult ordomt,;ridty, 433- 4..\4 Cul.rutalN.tionali~rn,S46, 584 Cul.rul't: Afi'K".U1..AtnC'I'K".U1, 247, 273, l74-li6, 547-548: I'C'lebrity, 544: wn~r. uri~rn ;r:nd, 723: countc'mdrure (196~), 686, 690...692: Europr.m, 19, 11-12, JJJ: immignnt, 418: middlr ;rOO upper d..u,. 4..\l- 4..\6: Nui1o0t Amrrian di\>
I.NOEX

CU$1tr, Ci
1>.1. G.lm.l, \';tMO, 20(nup), l5 D.l.koc-.l Sioux l.ndi.Ul,, 38J. SIT <~f~~> Sioux lndi.m' D.llty, Rkh.lrd, 694, 695 D.llrymplt, Oli...u, 398 D.uru. SIT H)'iitadtttrit d.uru ~~~bwry 1-Uttme'OI~ (1908), 494 D.u!dng ;wd du.no b.llb, 276, 436, 711 O.Urow',
D.urmou th Uniwn:i1y, 87 D.uwin, Cll.ult:S, 423, .1.'*", Willi.lm, JJ3 D.l'*" SC'1o0U;U1y An ( 1881), J86, 399, 580 D.lylighr JO!vin~ 1im.:, 517 D.lyton A«onb (199S), 747 O.D.lf(l944h 601 DOT (m:s«1icidth S98, 649 ~.ln, Haw.-rd, 768 ~.ln,j.unt:S, 659, 686 ~.ln,John, 706 ~;uh c.tmpi, WorldW.lrll, 611- 612 ~.llh nn": in col.oni.ll Vi.rgini-1,35: from tpidtmk diM".lM", 244; :d.l'I'C',272 ~bs, Eugr:no: v., 423, 500: tltmon of 1912 md, 494: World Wu I ;wd, 521-Sll ~b1, 16!:af c.-nk r.mcheu, 397: col.oni.ll, 80, 95: corn.merd.ll f.umi.ng, 199:Con. ftd:rut, 356, 357, 364: tre'dir unb ;n.d, 650:dtfen$t $ptnding .lnd, 647: Em. b;wgo Act o:~nd, 180: f.lrmtr, 22l; Ho:~mi1. wn o:~nd, 172: Lmdaantnhrp md, 75: tnO.tll:')' .mppl}• .md, 455: plomltr, 261: t;tilro.ld, 406, 40!1: d!omaopper, 369- 370: oCl tx.u, 31)4; oft.extik mill •urk~rs, 4IS. SIT <1fS1> C~di1: W'u dtbl ~d.ln.rion of lndq~C"rWnce (1776), 112, JJS-116, 128, 129: btrlund, 130: doxutnC'm, A1- 3: frM blulcs o:~nd, 167 ~d.ln.rion ofllurpwe'-' ( 19611 6n ~dan.rion ofStncimtnu, 233 ~dan.mry lin ( 1766), 100

• r:>eep 1llrou• (MMk Fdth 706 I:Xtrc-,John, 2J8 n~ D«n1?"(Coopn), l49 I:XftnM" l>ey.lmw:m, 624, 727 J:XftnM" ~OO.ing: Cold Wu, 618,627, 644, 6!17,648: Ktnnt>:ly and, 664: W'o rid War II, 596. SIT $hi> Miliury: s.."«ijic •·u I:Xficit spmdi.ng, 702, 703, 74~ u.ndnG.W. Su'h, 766, 767, 780, 783; Nt1>· ONl o:~nd, 56& Rugo:~n m , 723, 724, 725, 739 I:Xfilfl:'~n, roloni;U tr;a,SJ, 7S-76 I:Xindwui .lli:wion, 717 I:Xi$1:$,86 lX 1.. Cn.u:,}tlli:'lt, 786 Od..w.an-,57, 59 Odawue Indian£, 5!1, 79, 80, 93,95, 109: Lmd c-.llen from, 136 lXUy, 1hm, 782 lX Milk, Ctril 8., 544 J:Xmoa;IC)': <:~5 mob rule', 132, 133, 157: in Rwli;t, 730: WiiJIIOn o:~nd, SIS, 769 /.kltllli'I"A)'- P..olwdtims (~wey), 480 /.klti<~I'I"A)' .rM P.l6KJ (Add.tm5), 480 /.klti<~I'I"A)' in A-ril'" (lbrqut'Oilk), 193, 226 J:Xmoa.ltic I.C'Wn:hip Council, 728 J:Xmoa.ltic No:~1iotul Conwnrion, 670, 695 J:Xmoa.ltic p.uty, 312, 7S3; Sud utw.n ;wd, 316; Civil Wu ;wd, 330, 345-346: Copptrhtad, 345, 349: tnd o(Rt.:on· muetion and, 375 ; up.u~ion ;tnd,l91: ffl:'r.R.Ivtr .u!Yaale'-' in, 373: im.mignnl:$ and, 223, 279, 283, 454;J.ld:JIIOn o:~nd, 222,283: 1\.m'.u..Ntbr.u.ka k t and, 310: Mi.ui.uippi Fll'ledom, 670: NC'w York City, 371: Pbpulim and, 452, 467: R.e. C'otl$fruetion and, 356, 357, 358,360, 362,364: lkdemplion of,376: s«tional ~ir in,318, 320: sl.tvery .:~nd, 297; in South, 454, 46l: Sou:rhem )'C'Of.tll:'n and, 264: l ';un.nuny Ho:~ll ;tnd, 4.36; Whip and, 289: WOller.~ o:~nd, 502. Su ~w f.:J«rioru J:Xmoer;~.tic p>~$lime'-', l46-248

J:Xmoa.ltic $0
=•<

I:Xp.u1mtnt not<£, 434-435, 535 J:Xpreuion, 224, 225, 291, 372,419: of 1893- 1897, 408, 412,464-466: in C'oloni.ll Cllt5o1puk~. 43; in Mow.lcl!u~ U7: P.lniro( 1857 and, 319-320; l~nk of 1873 ;n.d, 392,422. &r <~f~~>Gfl:'.ll Otprt5$ion lX Pri~5e, O$ur, S!ll ~....gula1ion, 766: u:ndtr Rtag.m, 723, 739 lXM"rt Llnd An ( 1877), 391

1-9

Ot Soto, Hertundo, 30,31 Oi ttmC', Cold Wu, 6.'116,696.697, 699,

roo Otttait, 79, 95, 20'\ 482: ;turo indwuy in, 534; immignnn in, 280: fXC' ri!K in (1943), 607: in WuoCI812, 184, 185 Ot'Oil (5.1.r.m),22, 46, Sl,53 0 t'l>'ey, Ciq·,)ohn, 480, 506, S20, 521 Ot1>q·, Thoma' E., 60l, 63l Ot Win, John, 609 0 t'I>._., Molly, 571 0.\t/(nu.g.u.ino:), 235 Oi.1phr..pn, Y.lgitul, 576,692 Oi.u, IUn olomtU, lO(mo:~ph 25 Oiou, lldolfo,SIO Oiou, Pam rio, SJJ Oidciruon, Emily, 252 Oidciruon,John, 103, 112, 113, 134 Oi~m, Ngo Dinh, 64.5, 680 Oitnbie.nfu, BOI.Uk of, 645 Oi~t. SIT Food (diet) Oi11i.nger,}ohn, 582 Oi.ngkr To:~riiT( 1897), 468 Oi plomuy: cn.il W.u, 337...J38:txp.:~rui on. i.sm o:~nd, 469; I.C'wi ~ ;md Cl.ul txpe'dirion o:~nd, 177; Nixon .lnd, 697: P2n.lm.l Utw.l o:~nd, S08-S09: po$t·W<:~1trp1t, 719-722; sllurtk, 700: World Wu u, 60.l St.e ~w l 'rucit:S Oi.rtC'I prim.uy, 4112, 48.} l)i$C'I,}Unt dl.lin$, 709-710, 773 Oi$C'r'imil\il.tion: affil'm.lci\'C' urion md, 717: o:~pin$1 btrl~397, 400,426- 427, 44l, 463,570, 607, 616: ;a,go:~in$f !Ttt ~!btl~ 20~273: i.n );tbor unioru, 537: po•'C'rt)' o:~nd, 208: skin rolor and, 417, 431. SIT <~f~~> R.aoe and rx:ism Oi.sta~, 244-245: ;tnthru: se.uc-, 762: i.n U ribbun, 54; in w al mining. 4 17: in roloni.ll citie'-', 76; dyM"nttr}', 42, 27J, 272, 346t immignnn and, 4.30: m..X.Ui"> 42, 56, 27J, 3!16, 472, S98; No:~1i~ AmtOOn$ o:~nd, 80; $l.l\'C'5 ;wd d~ ll'.ldt, 74, 27J- 272:,ma1Jpox, 28- 29, 57, 95: ~rnaling.rrbltd and, 710, 751: in SpM~h.Amtriun Wo:~r, 472: 1htorie:t:of, 144,346,485: wotl.rrb1t>:l, 411-t )~llow fn'l'r, 472,508. Set ~w Epidtmiu Oi.sno:y, W.alr, 544 Oi, uin ofColumbia. SIT W.uhing:ron,

D.C. Oivn~iry; ;~erepunoe

or, 757; .uncng Pl.lin$

fndi.:~ru, 381- 382: roloni.ll, 71- 75; in

i.mmign1ion, 675, 775: N.uiw Amniun, 5- 11: in Ntw Ntlhtrio:~nd, S6-57; Worid Wu II and, 607- 608 Oivl$ion oCLWor, by gmdt r, 195 Oivomo, 164- 165, 447-448, 577, 605.5«~/M M..tfl'i;a,gt

Oix, Oorndlu, 234, 346

1-10

IN:OEX

Dixiter;I.U, 631

E;tglt Forum, 714

Domon,J;~.mt.i, 769

1!.$f!t (lun.u l.u~duh 701

Dodgr,Jrurphinc, 491 Dotg fOOi.u~, 43 Dolt , Bob, 751 Dollu dtv;llualion, 703. Stl' $In> P.1prr rum-ney Domt,;ridry, n~h of, 433-434, 67& •umrn in 1950!;,639, 652 Domtlric ~nicle, 483: womm in, 4 18, 489 Dominiun Rt public-, 509, 510, 511, 5SS Dominion of New Engl;md, 66,68 Domioo dlwt}·, 645, 679, 68l Donntlly, lgnaril.t', 461 Donner l);my, t.mnibaiUm .U'ld, lS!I [)o, I~J$1(15, john, 56 I Dougl.u, A;~.ron, 547 Dougl.u, Sttphtn A,JO~ 315, 316, 313: dd ),l «:J with l.ino:oln, 316-318: KMIJoU· Ntbc'a.da k r .u~d, 30!1- 309, 310 Dougl.us, Frtderi(k, 131, l 7l, li6,361, 377, 463; bWd: soldim .u~d,340: on blu k 5UITUgt, 361; ff'Ndom o(,l73; phoro of, 306 Do\~5, 6!13, 694. Ser ~114 1~dfi~m. [X,u,• Chtmicoll Comp.u1y, 688 Drm (ron$tr'ipcion): in Civil W...r, 315-317, 345: in \'iem;~.m W;u, 6118., 690, 705: in Wodd Wul, 515, 511 Or;al:r, Edwin L. 409 Or;al:r, Frmd 5, 33 Or;wu. Ser l'hutt r ;~.00 dnrn.1. UmiStntt dtcision (1857), 314-315, 31~310; nulli6ution o(, 357 DttDer, l'heodon", 445, 481, 546 OriloOetll, o f Jl.l\'<5, 169 Drough t,f.ltrnl:'n md, 391,460. Sclt ..W Ou,;~; Bau.·l Drug .lbuM, 487, 691, 776: innt r city bld, md, 717. Ser ~1111 Akohol Drug n-affid:ing, 736 Du BaD, W. E. B., 432, 44~552: N"'~gn MO\~mtnl ;and, 490--491: World W;u I md, 5l6 Dud 5,ll0: Burr.Harn.il.ron, 1 78;J;~.ehan md, 116,218, 267: in Old South, 266-267 Out pnxt.iJ of l;~.w, 707 Duk;~.kiJ, Mith;wl, 735- 736 Dullt.i,}ohn FMftr, 643- 6!14, 646 Dull Knife",J85 Dun mon",IArd, Ill Durmd, /\$her, 253 Dur;mc, Willi.un ~ 483 [)u$f Bowl, 399, 565-566, 571, 572, 574, 582, 58J Durth. Ser Ntmtrbnds (1ht Outdt) o,tut, Bob, 419 D,namk ton$UV;~.ti~rn, 639- 640 l)y.uo~lllk Sotillf~ (W.U'd), <11<1 o,~mrry, 41, 344X ''"'~' ;md, 111,ln

E;tgll!lon, 1llom.lJ, 705 E.d:i.nJ, l bom.u, <146 E.ul, JUiph, 219 E.uly,Jubill A.. J48 E.uth D.ly (1970), 701 E~1 Bt rlin, 734 E~1ern Eumpt:, 630:colbp5t of oommu. n ~m in, 736;immigrann from, 389, <117, <119, 487, 4SS, 548: SaYitl domirw.cion of, 603, 610, 611, 621- 612, 625 and m;~.p, 730 E~1ern Woodlands, N;~.ci\>< ptaplt.i or, 7- 9, 1 1(m;~.p) E~1 Aotid;~.,

128, l91

E~1 Gtrm.u~y, 61 ~ 644, 73!1 E~l l ndi.t5,15

E~rm;~.n, G~"'t"•
&.louis r;~er rio1 (1917), S2<1 (U.S.), C'roil W'.lr in,332-J34,34l(m;~.p) E;awn, John H., 110 EbbeD, Bt m.lrd, 766 Ed Jbrd, Eli:tab«h, 6!12 l!d.:P'f (~«.tmbaat), 201 Erooomirglob.Uix.uion, 746- 747 ErooomirgiVI> I>t-pn-Pion.; Grt".u Otptt~ion: l~nir,;; A.tct.ilian Edison, l'harn.u ~ 404., 4 10- <111 Edmund~l'ud:er An (18!17), 393 Eduution, 653: Afl"kMM..Am~ritosn, 367: da"" eonllit l in, 448.-449; in to klnW M.lJ$UhWC"lU, 46-47: fot fttt bbd:J, 208: for lndUnthild.rtn, 379, 386: n;~.. rian;~.l Jt(U rily md, 658; Projtn Ht;~d E~1 E~1

Sun , 67-t Pnnt$l.U!Wm md, 23: sdtaol n"lbrm, 130-231; in Sourh,l60, 413-<114: YIJU(het 5}':umu for, 767: •'Omen ;~.00, l65, 6Sl . Stl' ~ls11 Sd .,ols; Un i" 'nitit.i ;~.ndrolkS'"' Edw;~.nh, John, 78!1 Edw;~.nh, Jon.lth.:~n, 86 EdW'.lrd VI (Engbnd), 24 Eg.llk.ui;~.ni5m: lk vohn:ion.u'}' ,....... .Uld, 128-Jl9, 131..5« >tW Equ.llity Egrpc:-, 337, 721,717: Sut:t CrisiJ in, 645- 6!16 Ehdidmun, John, 706 Eiglul'!endl Ammdmtnl, 503, 52<1- 515, 551- 553, AI3 Eighth llrntndmem, 147, AI I Eight.Jlour wod:~Ry, 420, <12), 483, 502, 525 Eirutl"in, Albtrt, 598 WtnhQU'
8.3~4.132

Ell'!etot.ll Calltgt, 162, 215, 7SJ., 769 Ell'!etot.ll rornmi~ion (1871), 377 Ell'!etot.ll n"lbrm, 482,483

I.NOEX

Eltttridty, 410, <186, 5.\3, 542, 568, 647: Franklin md, 85: harnt produtu ;md, 543. Str <~(so Hydrod«ttit d.uru Eltvendl Ammdmtm, lA~ A II Eli«, Clwll'$ W., 436 Eli1n: Afrian.Amtrian, 368: upiul{$1, 44.5: rolonia1,69- 70, 78, 91, 100: tduu. cion ;md, 435, 449; k.u o(dtmoa;IC)', 132; li«DIUIT ;md, 444; poli1i0 ;md, 8l, 84; rdOtmJ ;md, 4l7: Rt\!Oltn:ion.u'}'""'M, 119, J28-J29; World W'.u I ;md, 516. SN $hP Jl'b mtN ;~.00 p{.lm-;~.cion.s; Upper d.uJ Elir..WI!I.b I (EngJ.uld), 24,33 Ellington, Ou~, 547, 583 ElliJ l.d;n.d, 430 Elliwn, IWph, 6Sl, 654 Ellsl'~h4 Fll'!edmtn Em;mdp.uion llorod.lma.rieln ( 1862), 334, 337-338,339 Emb.liJoAn (1807).1S0-18J, 187, 204 Emtrvrq B.ankingAct (1933), 563 Emtrp:'nty Commintt fur EmpiO)mtm,

""

Emtrvrq RditfAppropri.ttion An (1935), 567 Emmon, IWph W';~.ldo, l3~ 249- 250, 25J, 252, 302; l)'l"leUm IWUIT$ of,l.Sl, 2Sl n-t P.~t~(g~a.ut's GlliJe ro tl
Endo:lurt mowmtm (Engl;md), 21 bstolllir.IUW, 28, 61 Erterp• roJUumprion, 774-775. SIT $lw0il ;md o il indu.my Erterp• ~p.urmtnl, n2 Erterp• pbn, 767 Enfum<mmr Acu ( 1870- 1871), 36S, 373, 374 bsgh l'tt$lt( 196l). 715 Engl;md. SIT Stir;Un (Engf.;tnd) English l;mgu.l~, 77, 777; pidgin, 274-275 ENIAC compu«r, 598, 648 Enlighltnrntnt, SJ, 84-86, 101, 116: .lnli· ~1.:~\W}' mOVI'mtnl md, 130: Ft;~.nklin .md, 65,85 bsal.! Ci.1)•(bamber).613 Enrollrntnt Act ( 1863), 326- 327 Ennm Corpor;~.cion, 766 Emeruinmtm, S4J- S44. SIT IIIIo Spons.:

sprrlfotfo'mu oftiJtf'TMi-RIIImJ Emrqwtnl"ll.n:, 434, 7Jl: bbd:, 432: r.UI. w.ld, 406- 407: wod:m aploi1td by,
indu.mi.ll growth ;md, 412-413, ~h4 Pullution Environrntnullloroltclion ~my, 70J, 740 EpilkmiN, 2<14: AIDS, 691, 710,713: in.flu. tnu ( 1918), 519, 522, 524; N.ltiVI' Ameri. uru .lnd, 28-19, 35, SO, 57, 9S, J53-J54: ydlov.• k •'tr, 167. SIT <~fso Of:st..ut Squ.ll E:mploofmtnl Opporn mii}•Comm.U. ,;ion (EEOq, 670, 6~ 740 Squ.llil}' ;md ifuoqu.Uity, 206- 209, 232, 263: (ot bl.rl~ )30-UJ, 265, 367- 36."1: Otd.union of lnckpmdtn.:e ~h4 $ptdfr tlhnkgroup Eugmk5 movrmtm, 488 Europt
1:\•mgd.ic.W, l30, 275, 449, 544,690, 743; G.W. Bwh .lOO, 768, 769: mi\•;1], ;md, 227, 229: Sou1htrn, 266, 267: 1dtv.inp:-· li~a, 715- 716,756 E\•m5, W;~.l~r, 557, 5113 1:\'tf'J, Mtdgu, 670 1:\\)lution, <123, <180, 550 E»:i.st t.lX pt'Cit:SI, 152 Exuu1iw Order 8801 (Rarut\'tlt), 606 Exuu1iw Order 98JS (1hun.u1), 6l3 Exp.m,;ion md eqwu:ionism, US, 469-<174: br:yund App>II;Khi;m~ 95-96: Briti.dl N!w1h Amel"iel, 73(nup), 80- 81: dul. kng-."-JW, IS4;0!uapt.tl:t,40(m;tp):

1-1 1

coloni.ll Ntv.• Engl;md, S0-52; toonomk, SOS(SIT $hP Sronomk gnno't.h): Euro. pt"M1, 39: Gtrrn..m,5Jl, SS!I- 589, 591: immign1ion
..w

~.lt~6S~701

f.xXilfl V~ (oil unkn ), 740

F.lttion.r, 132, 158,171, 2 17. 5N>~Cs4 Politia l p;tnitJ F.lnoM, 416-41& tfficienl)' "ud.it:l in, <183: fin"·WI}' in, 476-<177, 484: lutdihips in, <116-<117: immig:r;um; in, 417: mu(kuktn: .lnd, 481:in Sou1h, 259: untmpiO)mtnt, i.n 1890s, 465: womm in, 416,418, <176-477. SIT $lw M;muf.
F.litchil.:l Semicondunor, 6411 F.lir Ou l (l'rum.ln),632 F.lir Employmtm PtiKri:C'$ Commi.uion (FEIIC),606, 630 F.lir Ho~i ng An ( 1968), 704 F.lir Uboc Sund.u-d;s An (1938), 575, 576, 578 F.li.tfi.B.lll:'d wd Community lniti.lt:i\'t~ 767 F.lll,Aiben, SJS F.llkn Timber.~, B.ltd t of, J56 F.llwd~Jerry, 715, 716, nJ F.lmilit,.; ;unomobik .lnd, 541: bbd:, 269-271, 366: challtngt ro .lUihority of, 210...112; Cht:S~pe.l~ poor, 4l; in wla. ni;J.! Ntv.• Engl.lnd, 4~ 49: eronomk polil)' md, 4.53; toonomic produttion .lnd, 163: (;trm, 262- 263, 516,716: Grt.lt Dtpl'l'.i.r:ion .lnd, 576-Sn: high birthr;~.t.e .lnd, 211- 213: nunufawni.ng .lnd, 2D4: N;ui'V't lltnl:riun, JJ, 382: nonttWicion.ll, n5: nudur, 22: S.lltm wiuha;Ul ;md, Sl; in JC'Uitmtlll o(We"o 389, 391: i.n Southtm ttxrik milb, 41S; 'W'ut Afriun, 18: wotling. 48l F.lmil}• A»i~anc<: llf.ut, 701-701 F.lmil}• tum, 262- 263, 576, 716 F.lmitu': in Europ.-.21:in lr<:bOO,l81 A F.unrdt ro tlr111s (Htming-"'y). 546

1-12

IN:OEX

F.um Crtdit Admini.su-u ion, 564 F.umers' Alli.uKr mtwl'men t, 460 F.umeu .lnd fuming.ll9, 209, 309; un.W ;wd, 202 ;in C.uolin.l pi.edmont, 73: coloni.ll ddbrr:sution ;~_nd, 75- 76: com.. p>ltl:'d 1o ul'Nn •'Orlten;,241; ronon, l57; crN.it/ dtiK of,lOO, 201, 222, SOl, 534, 541:d.Ury pmducu, liil: Oougl.u.md, 316: t..:onomic produnion .lnd, 163: Em~--o h.t ;md, 181: ap;wxion .md, 291: fotulwul'l'$ on, 561: g-:'ndl:t diiliion ofl.lboton, 195: Gt.lng-:' ;md, 459-<160: in Gtul Pb in5,391-J92, 454: howing of, 75: incre.ui.ng sixt of, 716- 717:}rfth. $00 ;md, 164,172,176, 199,279: l;~_nd .specul.liOts .lnd, 199- 200: m;~_rlten ;md, 194: mteluninrion o(, 428; migr;~m •urk~~Si4, sn, 655, 677, nz: N~ Amnian, 5, 6,8, 9, 182, 196: in Nt10· Engbnd, 46, 49, SO, Sl, 75: NtwOriuru, 174; in Oregon, 287: P;~nicof 1819 ;~00, ISS: poli ~;aJ ;~ffili;~_rion of, 223: uilro.lds ;wd, l4l, 407-408, 454, 460; R«o~rruc. cion ;md, 363: ridl.poor g;~_p, 207: 1930!;, 576: :d!MC"cmpptn, 368-370 .lnd m;~_p; Sh.l}~·, trl-·0ul;~_nd, 565, 575; Worid W.u I boom ;wd, Sll-523 F.um ~curity Admini,;u;~.tion,Si4-575 F.um 1tn;~_ncy An (1937), 574 F.ufNui Germ.ln}' F.wbw, Otul, 642-6!13 F.wtkntr, WiJIUm, 583, 653 FBI (Ft.:ftnl 6urt:~u ofl.n~rig.uion), 529, 606, 703, 705, 707; Nixon ;wd, 703, iOS: 9/ll ttrrori~rn wd, 763, 764 FOR. SerRowtwlt, Fnnklin D. ~der.ll t'lru Pmjen, 568 ~der.ll Cornmunk;~.tionx Comm.UAon, 654, 724 ~der.ll ~p0$i tln~r;mcf: Corpontion (FOIQ,S63 ~der.ll Emtrw:-ney M;nugemtm Agent)', 727, 763, 780 ~der.ll Emtrw:-ney Rditf An (193Jh564 ~der.ll EmpiO)~t Lor.lll}· l>rogum, 6l3 ~der.ll Fum Bo.utd,5S5 ~der.ll Fum lo.ul ht(l916), 501

FC'>Ikl'>ll gO'VI'mmtnt. Ser Governmmc; s;.v:apbt;~ndl

FC'>Ikl'>ll Higtw.·;~yht(l916), 501 FC'>Ikl'>ll Howi.ng Admin ~rmion, 650 FC'>Ikl'>lli~rn, in Comrirntion, 140 Fdmllill I»J!C'n. 143 FC'>Ikl'>lli~a, 14l(map). lSI, I S7:roll.l~ 171, 186, 187: Conllliturion wd, 141- J43: d«tiun of 1800 ;md, 162.: tl~nion of 1808 ;wd. 181 ;Jttktwn ;md, 172, 173- 174:1.md ~trul.lcion ;md, 199; louUi.ma purdla.st ;md, 176t plot with Burr, 177-178: Rrpubliuru .lnd, ISS, J59, 160, 115; in Suptrmt Court, 173- 174 FC'>Ikl'>ll Mu..:ir Projut, 568 FC'>Ikl'>ll R.ulio Commi.uion, 540 FC'>Ikl'>ll Rc-pubtirofGtrm.u~y. 5« Yll'$r

or,

'"'=""

FC'>Ikl'>ll lk,...rvr An (1913), SOJ-502 FC'>Ikl'>ll Rc-,...rvr Bo.ud, 502, 569, 746; i.nt.er· (Jf n«'5 ;md, 559, 574, 719, 724, 766 FC'>Ikl'>ll Stru.ritiJ:xAn (19H).565 FC'>Ikl'>ll 1butrt Pmjl'l:t, 568., 572, 575 FC'>Ikl'>ll nw Cornmi~ion, SOl FC'>Ikl'>ll W;~_l'l'.hau,... Act (1916), SOl FC'>Ikl'>ll Wri1er.~ Pmjt..:r, 568 Ftinguld, Ru.udl, 768 Fdt, Muk (Dec'p Uero;~t). 706 FEMA.S« Ftdtr Womtn's righn Ftrdin.:~nd ;wd lgbdl;~_ (Sp;~_i.n), ll, l7, 28 Fttr.lto, Gtnldi.nt, 728 Flft.etmh Amtnd.ment, 360-JGI, 362, 37'\ 462,AI3 Frft.hAmtndmmt,315,AII Filibwrn (u~ruion). 310 Fillrnol'l'-, Mill.ud,248, 305, 31 1: in dution of 1856, 313-JI4 Fm.mtt, 134: 6tiWh, 103: fbr Civil W;~_r, 327-328; H;~_milnm ;md, I!I& l);jnk of 1819, 188, 200-201: poliriul ump.lign5, 767-768: nilro.:ub ;md, 241: Wo rld Wu I, 520. SN ..W Econom,-: P;m iu (fin;~_nci.tl) The' flll~lf>.'.iu (l>rti.srr), 481 Fm.k, Mikt, U6 Fm.nty, Cluriu G~;~ndi-son, 227, 132 FuN".lt.en, 305, 318, 312 FunAmmdmtnt, 147, 522,703, 71S, AIO Fun World W...r. SIT W'«ki Wu I FDheril'$, 469; in Nt10foundl.Uld, l7, 32, 190 FDk,jim, 370 FDk Un.i\~r.r:ity, 367,489 Ftngetakl, F. Stou,54S, 5!16 Fmllugh. G
Fl.1.ppeu , in 1910s, 545 Florid.l, 94, 175,365, 377: ronon in, 256: tltt Cui"' l.i11t (ll.1.ku). 489 Fonda,J..tnt, 71J, 713 Food Administration, S17 Food (di«): in Civil W;~_r, 326, 336, ~4;in Columbi:;~ntnh.mg-:', 29; htahh wd, l4S; N.ltiw Ameritan, 3, S, 10: prites, ll4. 344; sl;~w,l7 1 : urb..tn, 243; West Mriu.n, 18 Foorb.UI, 435, 7J I Fod~<:5, Clurll'$, 538 Fottt Bill (18J3), 220-U I Fotd, G<Wd R., 706, 707, 719, 720 Fotd, Hen.ry, 486, SH, 5~-SlS, 536, 537, 58<~; ;mri.~miri:un of, 549: union' ;md, 578 Fotdism, 534 Fotd Mmor ComF"'"y, 533, 534-5lS, 579, 717,778 Fotdnty.McCumber 1U ifr( 1911), 53!1 Forrign polity; ;m ti.ronununi~rn ;wd, 633: unW:rCiinmn, 747- 750: ap;w..:ionUr, 469: undtr Gnm, 371; under G.W. Bud!, 769- 775: Luin AmtOO and, 509-510, 511: under Montot, 190-191: Nt«ORSU· uri~rn, 764; ne'\l' •'Orld orW:r md, 750: ,;rudt.nt prott$1:$ .lnd, 6S9: 'W'.uhi.ng:wn .lnd, IS'\ 157, I59. SN .WD Diplom;~_cy Form: ttwurt~. 390, 497, Sil; r olani.ll dtfott:n.uion, 51, 75-76t tumbotring ;~nd logging. !114, 71& Pf'C'"'"I'Y.lrian, 498, 499 Form: Strvice, 543 Tlw41M P.lro•.lld (Do, P:uw,), 561 Forrr:st, N;uhan Btdfurd, 340, 365 Fort Duql)tllnt, 91- 93,94 Fort Uumit1'muy(l868), 38!1 Fort Mdknq·, fbtdt of, 187 Fort Mi;~_mi, 156 Fort Pid:e~ (l-l arid.t), 3ll Fort Pillow M.uJiKrt, 340, 365 Fort Robiruon(Ndlr.uh) Ma.u.lert,385 Fort S.ln Fem.tndo, 156 Fort Sc.mwix, ll3, ll4;T~;ucy of( I76S), 109 Fort Sumter, .lttadl on, 3ll Fort1Kondtrog0l, B;~_rdt of, 115 Fort 'W'.:~ync, TIUI)'Of (1805), 181-183 F0$1U, Sitpht:n,147 FO$tU, ViMI:'m, 743 Fou.rCorntn: MC'.l, l>tltbiCI$ of, 7

I.NOEX

n-t 41'11d IWo~fln'(D~ P.w~), 561 fou.uen l>oinn (Wibon), 515- 516 fou.uenth Amtndtw:nf, 357-35~361 ,374. 462,641: Supn'mt Court .u~d, 367, 373: tenor, All fourth Amend rw:nt, l!17, AIO fowln , 01"1110n ;md l.oJTnm, 245 Fox,G~-.e. ss

Ffttdom ridtr:c, 66S Fftt l:.bar, 297 Ffttm:.n, M.U'}· Wilkin'> <1!18 • fll'!C'pon donri.nt " (Dougl.u), 318 Fftt silwr, 373,466-467. Sl'l" sin> Silwr

(oin:.gr: Fftt.~IOilm;,

298-299, 30l.-303, 319: K:.IU.l5

.u~d,30S, 309, 310,312

Ft.untofGO\
59

Ft:.n.:t, l 4, 5~. 539, 624: lld:.m':c ~gufi.:a. cion • i rh, 162; Algtri.l ;wd, 64&: Ameri. RC"roourion md, llO, l l l.-123, 124, 116, 117;CUI;ul:. :.00,3J-J2,57(m:.ph 60..61, S J(nup), 93- 94: Clril:tlt..Ul (O)Onit:$, 55;Conreder;KJ :.nd, 337; uplo reu rrom, l7(m.lp):gr:.in upon' w, 198-199:fndodUtu :.00,594,626, 628- 629: l.ouioli;m:. :.nd, 79, 81, l i-t, 175- 176; N:.pokon ;md, 180: N;~.ci\>< Am(rican:c .u~d, 79-80; O hio V;l.]lcy :.nd, 79, 9l;Qu;u:i W01rwi th, 160, 162: n-:.dt •irh, 181- 181: V"..em:.m .u~d, 64.5: wu •irh Engl.u~d, 92-94. 155, 179: Wo rld W'.u I in, 511, 514, 515 , 516,517-519: W'odd W'.u ptae<: md, 526-527: World W'u II in, 592, 599, 601: XYZ Atr:.it ;wd, 160.S«IIho-'trFI'<:c ;wd, 78, Ill. Sl'l" o~f14 EnuOOp.uion Ft
cr.

Fftt Sptt(h Ma""'mtnt, 687- 688 Fftlingshuystn, lbtodoc'<, 86, 290 FWmont, Jo hn <;195, 3J3- 3t4 Fftndl md foo.i.ln 'W':.r, \'C'Itr.m:c of, 119. Sl'l" o~fl4 Stwn ~'un' W'.u Fftndl-Cm;Wi.uu, 429, 549. Sl'l" o~f~~> C;an:.d.t Fftndl Rt\\)luri an, 1115, 153, 154-155: Amtrk:.n lkYolucion .u~d, 91: mob rnlt in, ISS, 157 Fftndl W't:cf lnditJ, 71, 9!1• 96, 97, 156. Sl'l" o~fl4 S:.i.nt Oomingut Fftn uu,Philip, l5l Fftud,Sig mund, 5!15 md:, lknt}· (by, 424 Fnt>:l.u~, B(n}', 663, 678 Fromicr: App:.ladU:.n, 95, 109, 15
Lunk ,726 Fumillm",ro(CCO, 243 Fut u ;adt, 57, 71, 28!1: roror ;wd, 195, 207: buVI'J, 32, 51, 79, 285: Jndi:.n:c ;and,36, 51, 57, 60, 61, 79, 195: Ru.ui.u~, l53

G:.btid S: ftbd.lic n, 168 G:.dsdm Purr.h~310 G:.ge,1 bom.u, Ill, I ll G:.gruk ;ag:.inR ;abolirio n, 232- 233 G:.lbnidt,John Ken.ntrh, 647 G:.ll, Fto~nx. J.. 245 G:.ILltin, Albnt, 171 G:.IJ.ow..y, Jo.~~:ph, 112,113 G:.lt Wibon, &lilh, 517 G:.mbli.ng c-;u:if'l!)l:, 71a, n6 G:.np«n,5Sl,582 G:.ng ~)':cftm, 368; in slaVI' !:.bar, n, 168. 2()9 G:.rut\"OOt, Mnt H:.rmt", 65 GAR. Sl'l" Gnnd Army of tht Rtpublic

Gufidd,J;~.m(J, 4.56; ;a$.u5in.uion

1-13 o r,

451-452, <157 G:.m tr, Joh.n N:.~, 562 GurUon, Willi.un Uoyd, 220, 2.31-232, 307: womtn':c tight:~~ md, 2.32,133 G:.r.ory, M.U'(UJ,54~ 5Sl G:.rn, Honrio, 124, 116, 127 G:.di.ng (rn.uhint)gun, 331 Wyfibtr;arian, 691 G..y rw:n and ll'$bi:.ru, 714: AIDS :.00, 713: i.n Mmt>:l (O«I'$, 60~ i42; m:.ITi:.ge oC, 768: 'ioltmt :.g:.in~ 756 Gu.1.. S« Wl'$t Bank ;md G.u.l Gmdtr: in wklni.ll Cht5.1pukt, 42; di~icn ofbbct, 195: tqu:.li ty, 54.5, 712: N;uM Amffie.m:c ;lnci, 3, II: RC"roourion.uy ··u :.nd, 129. Srr o~(~~> Mtn: W'omtn Gm(r-:.1AgJTen)tm o n l '.uitr:c ;wd l 'r:.dt,. 619 Gm(r-:.1Coun (M~xh u5C'm), <16, 47, 49 Gmml EkmK (GE), 53<1,725 Gm(r-:.1 Ftdtraric n ofW'omtn':c CluW, 447 Gm(r-:.1 Moten: (G.M), 483, 560, 717. 739, n9: Furunma o:hibit, 58!1: Hum . m(r, 7S4.-755::cuikt u , S77-578 Gmh, Edmond (Citixen), I.SS - 156, 157 Gmt'\';l (On~ITil.:C' ( 1955), 64<1, 6!15, 772 Gmt"';l I~ AcrofdJ, 6!15

.s.n.

nr Gr~~.\lu ofU"it-T'<"UU F.~t~o~'ll(i,t\fliM (Lumtr). 131 Gmocidt: i.n tht Bal.kan5, 747: in Umbodi:., 699; in Rw H alora.u5f Gmfe'd rrad iric n, 444-446 Gmtr)·, 78,83, 102; & iti:!.h, 120: SkYolu. ric n:.ry w:.r :.nd, 128 - 129. Sl'l" o~f~~> IILI.m. t u ;and pbnurioru Gto~, H enry, 424 Gto~ fU (Engl.md ), 95, 102, 106, ))3; OtdMWan o rl.ndtpendt.n(t ;wd,II.S, IIIXOii\>< Brm(h l>trition :.nd, I 14 GtorgU, I 19, 363, 668: in CiYil W'u, 326, 319: nnon in, 168, 256: rounding 80~ 1 : Jndi:.n l.u~ds in, 137, 15!1• 197- 198: Kl01n in, 365: kgid..trurt, J33: ruial viokn(<: in, 630: mulmintd ro Union, 356, 375: tutw.~· slaw:s in, 116: Khool Mgttguion in, 414: j«JeJ$ion ;md, 321: Shtmu.n•:c m:.reh UI'WJ, 3!17, 349: ~ry in, 77: oocrik milk in, 415: Ynoo U nd MM~d:.l .u~d, 178 GtorgU plufurm, 305 Gtrm:.n lkmoa;lci( lkpubl.ic. SN E.ut G(mu.ny Gtrm:.n immigr;wu, 73, 280. 181, 389, 4 29, 431: :.IW.f'(hi.sl:$ :.nd, 422, 4! 4; lkma. n .ark p.ul)' ;md, 283,
or,

1-14

IN:OEX

Gtrmany (MIIti11.-l) ttp;ar.uio ru and, SU , 539. SIT slw Wt Germ.lll)'; Germ;an inunig:r;anl:$; N u i Germ.lll)'; W'e~1 Gnmany Gtrm thtory ofd iM.uc-• 485 Gtnmimo,384 Gtnhwin. G
"»'"""

n>t

Gk.l50n, j;~tkit, 6S4

Glob.ll trooorny, 405, 560, 750, 774 Glob.lli:urio n , 746.-74 7, 773, 778-779 Glob.ll w;arming, 740. 774-77S Gloriou.s ltt"'Oiurion (Eng land), 6 7 -69, 8J Godkin, E. L, 44~ 4 58, 473 ClflJ's IWilin (W'
25; in Califbrni.\, 180, 199, 395: in Can;ad~

w d AbJb,396; in ROC'ky Mounuin5, JSO. Jll~ .sptcul;ari an , 344 Gold m;an , Emnu, 493. 519 Gold nand~rd, \. 28, 372,45 5,465-466, 496: fttt sih'C'r and, 466, <1611; Rtpubfiuru ;wd , 451 Goldv.·~f.C'r, Bart}'• 6 !11, 681. 686, i43; d tc· cion of 1964 ;wd , 674--675. 714 Goli.ul m.us;am ( 18J6), 287 GomptB, Samud. 411- 421. 4i~ Sl 2 C..mt s.•.i!6 t6r V1i!NI (MiKh tll), l61• 584 Gonuln:, Alberto, 1n Goodbird, 387 CI<)QI;!b,w; CdM111bws (Rorh). 653 Goodman, Btnny, 583 Good Ntigh bor palir)', 588 Gorb.lthtv, Milth.UI, 730, 736 Gordon , lbom;a5, 101 Gort, AI, Jr., 728, i41; tknion o(2000 ~00. 7SJ..-75!1 Lu Gorru Bl;an c.u (Whrr.t Up$).394 Gwpd ofSU«t:~5, 418..419 • Ga$ptl of Wt.Urh" (U m tgit). 4 23 Gww;ald, B;ardlolo mt'l>·, 16 C"' Tto'l ll M t~ Ml'lffn!"i-tt (6 ;l!dv.in). 6 53 Gould, J;ay. 370. 406,41 1. 412 GO'o'C'mmt n r, 13 2- 13 7; British , 95: rol~.s ;wd , 60S: in tolonill Plymou1h, 36: toloni;al Virgini.\,3~39-40, 4J;dtug u .ldt ;and, 487;tco nom ic drvd opmmt

and, 454; eeooomy ;and, in WWl. 516-517, 525; G.W. 6~.t~h np;an lion or, 763: i.mmig:r.tnu ;and, 4 30; ln d i.ul policy and,380, 381. 38~ .\85, 386: lndi.ul n-m0\•;1] ~nd. l65, 197- 198:}tfftDon'll vit w of, 172: Klan ~nd. 365: na..rutal righn a.nd, 101: Nt10· Ot.U;and, S69: pro~$/\i~rn ;md• 480: Purfun, 4 &; Q u.tktn: and, 58; Rtpubl~an vit w of, JS7; ,;ca.f.C' b.mb;wd, lli;WI'$t;and, 196. SITillht!Suf.C'.s GOVI'm on:, rolo ni;d ~r;a, 83 GOVI'mot's Coundl(Virgini.l}, 39. 46 G r;ad}•, Htnl)·W'. ,4 14,4 IS G r;ah;am, Billy. 652 G r;ah;am, Syl\'C'I«r, 145 G r;ain prirw:-s. SIT Farm produ n prioe.s G r;and Army of d W: Rtpt.~bl ic (GAR), 454, 4 55, 4 59 TI't Gu 11d C.t".DJ411 ofll.>t li'IJC>s.'.Umst (Mo r;w),

'"'

G r;angt mtwl'mtn t, 4 59-460 G r;ant, M.ultlon, 488 G r;anr, Ulyun S., 359. 3 72, 373; ;u Civil W';ar ~nu~1, 335. 340. 348, 350: sund;d
"'

Gru1 A•·;!.}:ming. 86~ S«ond, 2 10,

226.-227 Gru1 6 ;uin ln d ian5, 10 , 79 Gru1 Brfuin , ISS. Ser "114 Britain (Eng:bOO) Gru1 Ot prt:Uio n , S.SS- 581 : di ~~~ton~.em and pnn.e$1: in, 560- 561: HI}()¥U's n-~on:st ro, 560: lab!w miWl'mtm in, S77-S79: p.syr.hologia l ;wd wci;al imp;an or, Si'6- 577; wx.k mat\tl cr;ash and, 558-560; ~dd W;ar II ~nd• .SS7. 5« >1W

G~ttnb.ltk

p.my, 373,455

G~ttnb.ltlu (p;~-ptr C'UITI':nt)') . 343,370, 372,

45S; in C'MI W;u-. 327-32~351 G~ttnt, N;ad unid, 126. 127 G~ttnland, Nof101!' in. JO, II G~ttn Moun n in Bays. 109 G~ttn p.ury. 753 G~ttnptau. 713 G~ttnWoro (North Urolin;a) sit-in. 661 G~ttn~;an, Al.m, 746 G~ttmilk, Trul)•oC( I79S), 156

Grt:g!W)·, lbom;a.sW.,51 1 Gren.:ub , U.S. inf.tn'C'mion in, 71.6 Grenvillt, Gto~, 98, 100 G riffith, D. W'. ,489, S5l G riml:f:, An gtlin.:.,lJl G riml:f:, Sarah. l32,233 G~U~U, 5.unud Ebotriy. 431 G~U~U darntmc prod!Kt, o f Chin.:., 774 G~U~Uhtn.ny. Frand, X., 39!1 G~U~Uman, P~tdint, 476 G~U~U n ;ario!Ul pro:lun (GNII), 560, 597: 1911),;, Sl3, 5 34: 1950s, 647. 6 53 Gu.ul...u!w.l, B;au lt for. 601 G u.ulalupt.Hid;alga. 1'rui)'Of ( 1848), 196,

299 Gu.un,473 n ;ro•;l.) b.uc-, 4 73: pli$on in, 763,771. 772 GUolf.tmaU, O A coup in, 645 GueniO;a w;u: Apaeht, 38!1; in llhilippint:~, 473- 474 Gue$l•urkt r p rognm. 781 Guint";a,I7- 18. U GuitNU, Ch ;arlt 5, 451-451 Gulf oC10 nlin Rt:solution, 681-681 Gun.1: in Civil W'.u, 331: inf.C'tw:h;mgtabl~ jUm for, 205, 239- 240; Na..ti\'C' t\mtri. e.m.s ~00. 61. 71, 79• .\81: r~voh'C'B, 237, 140: u rtun ' iakntt ;wd, 756, 776 G~~oU~C.in.una

Ntwlkal Gru~.er E.u1 A5U Co.ll'ro~uiry Sphtrr:, 594 TI't GrrsW~ Getsrnrtiv!ll (llrok.\10·), 75S

Gru1 F;amiM. in lrd a.nd , l81 TI't Grr.tt C.sbby (Fiu ger;dd). 546 Gru1 Llle~ rt:gion, 190: Ang lo.Frr:Mh w;an in, 69: un;l!.s in, .202: ririe'$ or, 204; N.uiw Amu iu ru or,3Z. 61 Gru1 llbim;: ~.uian pi'Of.C'$1: in, !159-461; u nit n ndling in, 39&; dwr bowl in, 399, S65-S66, S71. 5il,Si'4, SIU, 583: f;arming in, 391- 391. 4 54: homl'$tt.uling on,390- 391: lndian.s, 10, 12(nup), 79, 28~ 379...J87;:stnkrntn r or, 238, 18!1, JS0• .\89 Gru1 Socitly Oohruon). 663. 674, 675- 676., 681, 70.2 G~t, 613, 629 Grffl.ty, Ho r.toe. 147. 2 S0.371-37l: in d «tion o f 1872, 371-371

H;abt;a.s totp ll', • •rit o f,330, 345 H;airi,216, 511, SS!I; U.S. im erwmion in, 726(m;ap). 74 9. SIT "114 S;aim Domingut H;ald t man, H. R., 706 H;alty. Rill, 6 59 11:/1/f>1 Mo111 (0\inpon), 489 H;alf.W'.lf COVI'N.nt, 50 H;alif.lx. N au&otU,97, 1lJ H;all, llrinoe. IJJ H;am.u (h l.u nic group). 1n H;amt r, Fannit lou, 670. 671 H;amilwn, Ait.undt r, ll5, 138, 172,4110; Coru rirurion a.nd , l!13;d o ml'$tk polit iC'$ of, 148- 152: duel •i1h BuiT, 178: dttrio n of 1800 ~00. 161: Fr.tMI!' ;and, 154--JSS: p romarian ofiOOum-y by, 164; W'.uhing. ton ;wd , l!IS, IS I, ISS, IS9;Whisk.ey Rtbdlion ;an d, 152 H;amilwn, Alitt, 484

I.NOEX

H.unilron, lto:-, 764 H.unmond, j.tmo:":S Henry, 269 H.unpron, l.fund, SSJ H.unpron l.n$!ltult, 367,463 H.mcc:d,John, 1 0~ 106, 110 H.mco.:l, Winlidd Swn, 456 H.mdwmo:- Ukt, 166 H.mdy, w: c., 486 H.mn.:., M.trk, 467-468, 495 H.uding, W.lrnm G., 519, 536, 537: .sr.md;ll.s ;md, 538 H.ultm, S&l, 655, 656 H.ultm lkn.li.I:UMW:", Sll, 547- 548 H.umon.iou.s Righ1tow Fl$1:$ (Chi.n.l), 51)7

H.upen: FtiT}' !.lid (1859), 301-302,314, 318- 319 llllr;.w-'1 ~ 4J7

H.uri.ngwn, Micllul, 655,674 H.uri.s, K.nhtriM, 753 H.uri.s, Wilti.lm 10tuy, 4411 H.uri$01'1, fknj.lmin, 458,459, 464. 497 H.uri$01'1, Willi.un Ht nry, 182, 183: .u pt"tlitmion, l86- 187 H.udt)', Robff1 M., 437 H.uv.lrd Collt~, 47 H.uv.lrd Uniwn:il}'• 4.36, 444 H.uch /Itt (1939), 575 H.lW'.lii: .lll.ntulion of, 471: j;~.p.u~ut in, 428(nup), 429, 430, 608- 609. Sl'l" 11f14 l>e.trt H.ubar H.lwlu (voumongm:). 682, 68J, 69!1 H.lwthomt, N.lllunid, 2JS, l49, 252 H.ly,John, 469,472: Optn DOIW w Chin.l ;wd, 506-508 H.lyt'$, Lucy, 455 H.lyt'$, Ruthtrfurd 8.,377, 455,456 H.lym.uktt riot (1886), 411 H.lywood, W'illi.lm D. "Big 8111,.. 494 H.e.ld righ1 .syatm, 42, 54 H.e.ld Sc.u1 progt.lm, 674 H.e.llth ;wd hul1h r.ut,l4S, 780;Ciimon olutrnpl 10 ttfOrm, 74!: Ml'diu.rt/ Mtdiuid, 675, 715,739, 742,751,780: publk , 48S, 524;of d.l¥1'$, Vl -272.: •urk.-r .s.t.li!ty ;wd, 417, 779. Ser 11f14 J)f:lt.l:SI':;MtdiciM H.e.lm, W'illi.un R.tndolph, 471 H.elpo:'r, Hinwn, 26!1 H.eminp.S.llly, 171 H.emingw")', Errn.:"-519, 546 H.enritn.l M.l!U (EngbOO), <W Henry, P;~.uid,, 99, 10!1, Ill, 1.43 Henry tht N.lviguor (Porrng.U), 25 Henry VU(Engl.md), 27 H.enryVUI (Engl;md).24 H.enwn, Joli.Ut, 273 Hepburn, K.uhtrino:, 581 Hepburn An (1906). 496 H.eriugt FouOO.nion, 743

Htroi,;m, W'odd W'u II, 755 Htm.ln mtmmuits, 120, 112 Htlh,JOJ>tt, 248 Htv.•lm..Pd.lrd Corporuion, 648 Htyv.·.lf'd, Du~547

Huboll.lh miliunu, 772 Hid:ock,J.lme'$ B. "Wild Rill," 397 Hid.us1 lndi.m.s, 379-380,387 Hitroglntlu, M..l'J'Ml, 6 Higgi.n$01'1, Thom.u W'emwonh,l40 Hill, Aniu, 740 Hiii,Joh.n W'illi.un, 203 Hillrn..m, Sidney, sn Hill.sborough, lord, 104 Hino:, Lt-ai:s,481 Hippits,690, 691 Hirmhim.:.,.l1omk bombing of, 613 HUp1nic:s, 656- 657, 675, 712, n5: in U li. forni.:~, 299, 393-J9~d"l righn of, 6n: in Congfl:'li5, 741: Gmu Dtpr~ion 1nd, S79, 580:jobltJ$ t11t for, 746: )>!J'o'UI}'Of, 657, 718, n7: upw1rd mobili1y of, 776-777; in urb.m .slums,6S5; •umtn, 540. SN ..W Mn:it.m..Atlll:'rit.m.s: llumo Riuru HUp1niob, 28 HUs,Algtr,634, 6lS 71:r fli11t#J ii{IW St111Nbn1 o.;; CA.I:IJ,tW!J (1'1 rttll), 481 Hi lin , Adolph, 488, 595, 603, 6 10: up.ul· ,;ion ;wd, S9J,593;Jtws .lnd, SS9, 591-592, 611; S~;~lin 1nd, 583 Hmong ptoplt, 71~ 759- 760, 777 Ho Oli Minh, 64.5, 681 Hog r.Wiing. 258,263 Hohol.lm cuiiUIT:, 6- 7 Holl)wood. Ser Movies (mo1ion pirn~.rt.s) Holrw:s, Oliwr Wendtll, Jr., 480-481, 521 Holrw:s, Oliwr Wendtll, Sr.,l44 Holox;w.st, 61 l - 612, 630, 632 Homtl.lnd Suu.rity. Dtp.ulmtm of, 76l Homt O.ntn: LNn Corpor;~.tion, 564 Homn, W'i~lov.·, 446 Home'$11'.1d k.t ( 1862), 343, JSO, 390 Homu11'.1d Su ikt, 412-413, 46!1 Homrut.n~.ili. Sl'l" G1y mm .lnd IC'$bi.ln5 HoOOur;u,liJibw1m itt, 310 Hooortodt, i.n wfli ft South, 266-267 Hood,}ohn 8.,3~3!19 Hool:tr,JO$tph, 341,34l Hll!Wel', Htrbtrt,517, SJS: di'Crion of 1928 .lnd, 553-554 ~ G.rt;u-Jkpro:'mon .md, 558,559, 560, S6J, 574: sori..\11hought of, S$4-555 Hll!Wel', j. Edg.lr, Sl9, 667, 703 Hll!Wel' (Bouldtf) [);un, 555, 572 Hoped.llt wmmunil}·, lJS Hopewdl cuiiUJT:,S, ll Hopi fOOi.tru, 154, 677 Hopkin.s, H.u ry, 566 Hopptr, 6d•'Md, 546

1-15

Horixonulr1. ...eniu l .llkgi.lllC!eS,l12 Hor.st !"Xing. 442 Horsu, fOOi.t~ .lnd, 62, 79,380, 382, 3!13. Sl'l" $lw CtV.llq· Hot.se'$hoe fknd, !Unit of, ISS, 186 "HoulC' Dividtd'' S)>t!eeh (linroln).3l7 Hou.'ld!old produnion, 163 HouM: of Bu~~' (Virgi.ni.l). 35, 39, 99: W'.uhinpon in, 111- 122 HouM: ofR.epiT$tnucive.s, 189:ConsliiU· 1ion.ll pc.m1'1l of, 140: in tknion of 182'\ 216;ducion of 11!00 ;md, 162:Judki;uy Cornmitttt, iil6- 707, 752 1lt llllffll' tJ{Stf.ntG!lbl'rs (H;~wlhorM), LSI

HouM: Un.t\tnl:rir.m Acri\itie'$ Commim't (Hl1AC),63l, 6l3, 636• 641, 660 Hou.sing, lll: An.u.lXi, F.roloni.ll tn, 78: c~it trili:l (2007) .lnd, 784; f.lrmtr, 75: immig~nl, 432: hm·.inrome-, 632,655: i.n PI.Uru frontier, 391: pl.lmtr d ito:", Uil : subu.tb.ln "tid:y.cuky," 650- 651: ltd molop· .llld, l4W4l; u.tb.ln ltl'lf:· mtnu, l 42, l4l, 431-4.32, 4115; fur WWI wotleu, SlS Hou.sing Act ( 1937), 575 HouSJon, S»n, 287 HouSJon rauriou (1917), 516 Hc.m'atd University,l67, 489 Hc.m1', Ridl.lrd lord, 122, Ill Hc.m1', Wilti.lm, ll2, 123, l24 Hc.m1'11.s, Wilti.lm Ik.m, 445 fkrw.f (Gimilt'J), 660 HUAC. 5« Houll:' Un.AmtOOn 11t1ivitit:s Cornmitt« fl.wkldiiT1J Firm (l"W-.lin),l99- <WO Hu.hon, Htn.ry, 36 Hu.hon, RCKk, 713 Hu.hon 8")' rtgj.on, 69 Hu.hon Rivn School, l$3 Hu.hon); 111}• Comp.my. l84, 285 Hutru, lXllol'l'$, 677 Hutru, Vinori;mo, SJ I Hutt, Htn.ri, 6SS Hugt.C'$, Clv.do:":S Eu:n.s, 503, 514, S.\!1, 539 Hugt.C'$, Ungnon,547, 548 Hugutnols,3J, 32 Hull, W'illi.lm, 184 Hull Howt, 440, 480, 484, 505 Hum.ln righ1s, 720 Humtlll:'r (vehide), 754-755 Humphrq, Hubtrl,675, 69~ 696 Hung.lry, 610, 621, 741k S!witt Union 1nd, 624,644. Sl'l" 11f14 A~.t~ui;a..Hu.ng.uy Hum, E. Hovo;ud, 703, 705 Huming,b}· N.llivt peopks, l, 3. S« lllhtl Buff.llo hunting Humingoon, Colli, P., 406 Huron lndi.m.s, 13,36 Hurrir.mt K.llrin.l (2005). 780- 781 Hunron, Zor;~. Nult, SSJ

1-16

IN:OEX

Hu.urin, Sadd.tm, 726- 727, 748, i 60, 768; i~Wa.J:ion of Ku•'ait b y, 73S, 737- 7.\!1; 1>'e.'lpon.s o f, 764, i 6S H u$Wn Pl.ln, 703 H uochinw n, Annt, 47-<18, 87 H urchinw n, 1llom.u, 99, I ~, 110 Hydl'l.lt&Ktrit: d.lm£, SS.S, S65, S72-573 Hydrogen bomb, 626, 644 flyl(l)ll 11 Uw.':nl St.tlr'S ( 1794). 1<18

IBM (lnttm.ltiotui Bu..:iMSS M.xh~.s), S91, S9~71 2

l«tW,2,21 ldn:, HMnld , S63, S71; I'W'A .lnd, 564, S66, 568, S73 ld.lho, 392, 454: mil'lf:N in, 422, 464; Sn.lkt Rhn pm; m, 498 ldtolop·, IS7- ISS • J H.lw .l Ortarn"' ~t«h (King), 670 llliooi:s, 79, 198, 238; inunig:r.lnl:$ in, 279: Mormo~ in, 228; $Utthood Mr, ISIO, 194 Uliooi:s Umnl IWiro.ld, 241 IIJJS'C' l.Nlj (lV dl010·), Mll- 639, 6S4 lmmignnn.u~d inunig mion, 72- 73, IS9, 428-432; t\rnl:ric.miution o f, 437; in C.:.n.l.b, 60..61;dl.lnging p.utc"m.s in, 718: in d rin, 428,437, <184. 487: Oemocr;uic p.lny .lnd, 279; up.lruion .lnd, 73(m.:.p). 273-279; Hull Howt ;md, 4110; i..ert.lling d iWNity in, 775; I.Wot of, <116_, 4 17, S78; n.lrivi.sm .lnd, 283, 31 1: ptNOO.U bdwvior o f, 485; quou S)'Rtm .lnd, 635- 636, 675; refotm o f, 782- 78J; ocm-krionon, S4S, 591- S9 2: $!:boob ;wd, 231: sencimtnt IJI&.lin"> 4118:; in ~nr o f W'e:st, 389: Sp>snish, in Lui:n Amt rit.l, 71: ttnemtnt howing ;wd, 432: upvoud rnobilil}' o(, <119: \';IUdtvillt .lnd, 44.3; worntn wotlen:, 418, 4n, 483. SIT .rhP ~ tdusir- <1.1' 11.r.QQ.u.f ~~p

I mmignti on .lOO N.ltunliution Serviu , i63 lmmigmi on Rt!Orm llcr ( 196S), 675, 718,

m

lmmigntio n Rt!Orm .lnd Conu ol Acr ( 1986). 718, 729 lmpe.lthmtn.r, 174:o f A.Jolm$00, l59-360; o fCiin ron, 7Sl:ofNixon, 706 lmptriW m, 25, 469-474, S06: eritia «, 473, 474; Eu.rope-;an .lndj-'lp.lnt$1:, 469; tow.ltd Chin.:., 506-508. Set >~h4 Ellp.lsuio n lmpon dutit.s. J34. S« 4llltl 1'ui.f&: lban.shtnddurit:S lmptt~mtnt,oCJililots, 156, 179 lmptt~mtm An (1863).326 lro.:o. o fPttu, 6, 28- 29 lno:omt, 242; rolo ni;d, 71: pbmer dirt, 261; rich.poor g;a.p, 7<16, 766; in Sourh, 260. Sc'C'>~WW.l~.s

Income ux, 466,567, S69, 650: RNg.ln':l cuu in, 724, 72S, 729; Si.uttnth Amtnd. rntnr .lnd, 503, SlO, AU: World 'W'.lr II, 597 lndtnrnocd $i:IY.Im.s.3S, <12, S
lS6 lndi;an Rrorg.miution k.t ( 1934), SSI lndi;an Sdf. Dt«rminuion An ( 1974), 717- 718 lndi;an Territory, 197, 198, 381,398. SIT .siSI.I Llnd, N.ltiYI' AmtOOn: Okl.lhom.:. lndi;an Tradt .lnd lnmrouf1'C' /len (17901796), 165 lndividuai:Um, 209, 279, 285. &r .siSI.I Sd(. m.ult mtn lnde
-,."'ft

lnici.uiw, Vl)«'r, 482 Inner cirit.i, 65S, 717, 74S, 776. S« 4llltl Slum.s md ghtn o.s l~trt0ri'.!'S (l89Jh
ln5.Ult .uylum ttCotm, 23<1 lmrirutional dl urch mOVI'men t, 439 lnsull, Samuel, 534 lmtlltnu.ili, lSO: Mlti.w.u pm«,;~; and, 6&2; Enlightenrntnr, 85~6: progoc~ivi:un .lnd, 480-48J::IOdaJ 1hink.en, 4 23-424; u mpi.ul communitile.s Vld, lJS: World Wu l .u~d,S2l

lmtlligrmt lt:Sring. in Min}', 516 lnmdl.u~gabk.p.uu m.muf~rt, lOS,

l.\!1, 239- 240 lnmromintnul lnllink mi:!.liles, 65.11 lnttrt$1 r.llt:S, 214. SIT .rlw Ftde'tal lk$i:I'VI' llo.ud lmn.Gowmrntnr.ll Commin « on Rt JU. Sffll• S92 lnmmtdi.ltN'Ml~ N"udur Fo«es (IN F) 1'rul}', 730 lmtm.ll imptO'o'trntrm: bill, ISS, 216, 21S-2 19, 123, 289, 297 lmtm.ll R~nue Servk<: (IRS), 703, 707 lmtm.lriotul Cornmit«t of tht Rtd Cro$$,

m lmtm.ltiotul Congrrss ofW'omtn, SOS lmtm.ltiotul H.l.tvt:s!tr Comp;wy. 483 lmtm.ltiotuli.sm, S88, 750: indq!C'ndl:nr, 5.\!1- 539 lmtm.ltiotul Ud..it:S' G;umm t WorleN' Union,494 lmt m.ltiotul Montury Fund (IM F), 619 lmtmtt.b.utd i.nitiariW$, 769 lmtDl
....

lmtDl~.o:ion o fKuw.ait b)·, 73S, 737- 738: s«t.UiMI vio ltMJ:> in, 765, 770;

I.NOEX

u.s.

wu in, 764- 76S, no, n1, 784: wu •i1h lr.m, 726 - 727,737 ltd.\00,33, 114 fri.sh imm.igr;um:,l31,290, 419,485, SIJ; in C;ililbrnil gold rush, 396: C.uholki:un o(, 73, 107, 159, 1~. 223, 281, 455; in cities, 279-280, 4JJ;dn!t prolt:ll by, 345: u~ruion ;n.d, 191: in Nt10· YOfl Ci1y, 429, <131: VO"""Y o(,207-l~. 2&2; .u r.til.ro.td "'Orl.eN, 388: 1enemem hou$1ng fut,l4J Iron md iromo'Oiiting. 71, 158- 159,344; Afrian, 17. SN .. S1td indum-y Iron rnrnin, in Eumpc", 622, 625 ;md m.tp, 630 Iroquois Conrt>:ler.tcy, 36,60, 80 Iroquois fndi;nu, 13,57: .u: Brirish .tllil'$, 69, 92, 126; in Ctn.td.t, 166: Ft.lllef: .tnd, 79: )O$II.tnds of, JJ~popul..tcion d tdint,

w

165 frrig.t1ion, 6, 7, 398 IRS. SIT lmern.tl R.t-vr:nut Sttvkf: Irving. W.uhing:ron, 248, 253 b l.unir fund.tmenul{$m, 716, 749 bob1ioni:un, 590-591, 593 brul, 630, 6 46, 76'\ 773 bruli.P.tll'$1ini.ul conili«, 739(m.tp), 752: I)J.O .tnd, 700, 727, 748: Wt,;c B.mk .tOO G.tU in, 700, 711, 731, 74~7n luly, 14, 539:txploun rrom,l& f.uci.sm in, 58J: imm igr;um: from, 4 19, 419, 431, 431, 549-550: Wo rtd Wu I .tnd, Sll: Wodd W.u I pe.tef: .Uld, 526- 527; 'lh\Jrld W.ufl.t:nd, 600, 601 fv.'O Jim;a, &udt o r, 611

t xp;m.sion o(, 590, 595; n.tv;~dt de6cil wi lh, 737, 7<16; W
418(m.lp), 429, 430, 471, 608- 609: riglm o r, 548, 580 JaWONk.i , Lton, 706- 707 Jay, John, I 12, 113, 118: Comrirntion .tnd, l4J: 11'1'..uynego1i.t1io n by, 137, 156 - 157 Jay.G.ttdoqui l'tt-.uy ( 1786), 137 Jay's Trul)• ( l79S), I56-157, I.SII J..xx Ag<:, S4S, S46 J..xx muliri..u~. 52.5, 546- 547, 5113, 660 JttTtNon, Thom.u, 1 0~ U3, l5S, ISS, 183, JSO;on un.ili,ZOI:dtath or,l J4; I:Xd.t· f
J;acbon, And.rtw, 137, 191, 116-11'\ 183: b.tnk tonu twersy .tOO,l22- l2J; .tl B.tult o(New Otlt.Ul.s, 186, l87, 1 16;dueb of, 116, 11~167; lndi;m n<moval .t:nd, 197, 198,116: n ullilioeuion ni.sis .tnd, ll0- l 2l, ll3; ri~ o r,1J6- 118;Sptde C'mul.u .tnd, ll3, 21~ 225; spoil5 $}~Iem .tnd, 21& utiff5.Uld, 219-211 }.ldson, Hden Hunt, 385- 386,394 J;acbon, JI'$~, 728 }.ldson, l~r, 441 J;acbon, Thorn.t." J. "Swn t1>...ti,• 167,3l3, 341, 346 }.ldsoni.tru, 297, 356, 460 J;acbon 5tolrt Colkgt, 689 J;uner;, Henry, 444 j.unt:S, Willitm, 473, 4SO J;uner; I (Eng:l.tnd),14,33, JS, 39, 45 J;uner; U (EngJ.md ), 68;toloni.tl Nt-a·Yorl .tnd, 57-58.,66 J;uner;rown,34, 39, 43 J;~.p.u~, SIt, 626: ;uomit bombing o(, 613, 756; ;wro indw1ry 717, 739; Chin.t .tnd, S0~52~tronomit nis i5 in, 747;

or,

nz

Jt5Uil mi ~ioiU.fits, 60, 61 Jt5UsChrist,ll, 23. 5N >lh4 Chti.sli.tni ty Jews, ll, 72, 73(m.tph SO, 431,. 488; .tnti. Semi ~m ;snd, 549, 567, 611, 634; Holo. uwt, 611 -612, 630, 631; lu~J .tnd, 630: Nu:i Germ.u~y .tnd, 5!19, 591-592; in Nt-a·Yorl Cil)·, 4l9;in l>ak$1lnt,517, 611: in Supl'l'mt Court, SOl. S« 4lllo

b r.11:l f~..tng j itshi, 626, 618., 643

fung Zt min, 7<16 Jilwd (hol}·•'U), 731 Jim Cmw'l.tws, 489, 606, 64.3, 669: in mili. f.lt}', 471- 473. SIT~~$~ Stgn
1-17

John$00, Hugh, 564 John$00, )n, <189 John$00, L)'Udon B., 664, 667, 670; tknion o r 1964 and, 674-675: Gn<.tt Sorinyor, 663,674, 67~7~68 1, 701: \'iem.tm .tnd,679- 68J, 688, 693-694 John$00, Ricll.ud M., 18:! John$00, WiOi;un Tikr, l71 John.sron, ~ph, 3411 Jo int-.5m.tul;a, 743, 751, 752 Jol'll:5, S.tmutl M. "Golden Ruk ," 4&2 Joplin, Sron, 426-427 Jotd.m,73 J Josqlh, d Utr o r Ntx ~«h, 385 Journ.tli.sm, muckr.t.keu in, 481,496- 497. SIT $hP Ntv.•sp.tpen:; sptr9ir Mlf'Sp.#ptn Jud id.tl ftvitv.·, 173 Jud id.tryAer:. (1789), 1<16; ( 1801), 172- 174 Judson, EdW:l Su.ndinr), 400 1k}t~ltJ/r (Sind..tir), 496-497 Julri:e ~p.tnmenr, 703, 763: Rtd SalT .tnd, 529, 634, 635 Juwn iltdtlinqumcy, 6S9

K;Wer, Hen.ry J.,596 K;unp5villt, Uliool:$, 3 K.tn5.U, 391, <160; bbd: migr;uion 10,311, 376,463: erim in ( 185S- 18S6).3ll- 313: Leeompron ronJtirnrion, 314, 315- 316: m~.tert in, 301, 301,313: sndemtm o r, 380.391 K.tn5.U·Ntbr.tsl.t 11<1 ( 1854). 309- 310, 3ll D.n K~pitA (Man), 414 Kuni, H.tmid, 763 K;a:ukb.sun, 736, 7411, n4 Kun, Thorn.u, 764 Kt..lnlJ', Sftphen,19S Kuling.Owr:n Aer ( 1916), 502 Ku)nt, Rolloert, 49 Kfflbo.tu, lOJ Kt:idl, George, 59 Kt:llty, Abb}·, 2.32, 133 Kt:llty, Flol'l'~, 440, 411~ 563 Kt:llogg.Bri.tnd l>.tc1 ( 1928), 539 Kt:nn.m, Ci
1-18

IN:OEX

~nnt>:ly, Robotrt,66~ 682, 6~: ;w;win.l·

cion of, 695 ~nr (Ohio) Sut.e UniVI'nily, 68!1- 689 ~mud:y, 109, 13~ 264: ~bol itionim in,

265; in Civil Wu, 332, HS: ro.1l mini'$ in, 405: lkvatution.ll)'•'Min, 126: sutt· hood of, IS~ 194 ~mud:y R.e$Oiurion.s ( J79S.J799), 161, 119 ~l'lf;L.,tmb.u..ybombing in, 749 ~noruky, llltx;mder, SJ7 ~roux,J.ld:, 660 ~rry,)ohn, 768- 769 ~y. FrM!ds Soon, 187 ~ynt:S. John ~b.yn~rd. 568, 665 ~yne:si~n l'l:ooomiN, 574, 703 Khmn Rougt (Umbadi.l), 698, 699 Khomtini,Ay;uoll.lh Ruldbh, nl-722, 726-727 Kh.rwhehtv, Nikita, 6!1~ 666- 667 Kid:.1poo foo.i.tru, 79 Kid'ft, Will~m, S7 Kim )ong II, 773 King. Clw.tlt:~ Bi.td, ZZO King. M..utin lUJher, Jr.,676, 6!12, 728: ;w~mnuion o(, 672, 694, 69S: bw boyra« ;md, 656: civil tigho: nruWt ;wd, 668, 669-670 King. Rufus, 176, 181 King. Willi.1m It, 181 King Gtorgt'.s W;uo, 82, 91, ~ King Philip'.s ow·~r. 52 King's Colltgt.S« Columbi.t UniWNity King WiDi..rn'.s ow·~r. 69 Kiruhip: N01.ci\~ Ameriuru ;n.d, 11: sl.lYI', 271: Wt,;t Aftiun, 18,27J. Set o~Cs4 F~miliu

KiOW'.l foo.i.tru, 383, 384 Kimnger, Hrnry, 697,698, 700, 720

KiY;a:s, 7 Kbm~th fndi.tru, 657 Knighn ofl.Wor, 419, 410-411 1\.n(IU·.Nomi.ng patty, 30S, 31l-312, 313; ;mri.C~dmlkiJm ~nd, 282, 31 I, 31 2 1\.n(ll(, F;o;wk, 593 1\.n(ll(, Henry, liS Kongo,l7, 26 Koru,J.lJI.:~n ~oo.sto

Korun Wu,627-628, 629, 6lS, 636;.umi. .sti(f: ending. 643 K~~ttllf$/JW v. C..WitrJ St~ts ( 1944), 609 l\ort$h, O;aYid, 756 Kow-.u a i.sis ( l99S.l999). 752 Ko.dtno'.lki, Otnnis, 766 Krin.t!JJ!Mhl, Gmn.m)t1>'.1 ~00. 591 Krugm;m, P~ul, 766 Ku Klu• Kl;m, 489, 540, SSI- SSZ,642,670: Rtrorutrunion er;a, 364- 365 ~nd illw. Ku Klu• Kl;m An of l87l, 373, 374 Kurds, in luq, 727, 770, 77l Ku~it, lto~qi im~!Wn of, 735,737 K)'OCO A«on.U ( l997),

ns

Lilic)f; oCt\fi'ie.m Amnian womc'n, 366: (hiJd, ll, 205, 242; Cmw.1:11111111Y.ll/.f6 dtWion ~00. 282: tnromiendtrm, 28: futorp;J'.IItrn wd, 416-418:g~ng. 36!1; gtndn'eddivil'ion of, 195: immig:rvu:, 416,417, 578: indwui.tli:.to~rion ~nd, 413, 416-419: pMt·induwi~l, 778; supply or, in Som:h. SN o~Cs4 Child LWor: fndtmu~ stt'\'mo;; Ubcw union,;; Sl.:~•'t:S ~nd :sl.:ro~ry: Wonll:'n, •'Oft of. War!cing d;w l..lhottont~XU,368, 422: fi'Ndmtn ~00. 356,357,376 l..ilior u.n.ian.s, 419- 424. 56~ Afrian. Ameriuru in, 606; bluk:l t.ttludt>:l from, 420, 489:<1.-din mg mtmbtr.ship in, 649-650, 717, 779: fMm wclfler, 580; G.tnt OqM'tJSion ;wd, 577-579: Mt.riun../ltnl:riu.n,6S7: Nt10· DNl ~00. 569: in 19205, S36-Sl7: .sc:ci.lli$11) ~00. 494: W.ti..M.an ;wd, 709: womm ;md, 282, 420, 421, 494, 577, 578; World W;u I ;md, 52.5: World w..r II ~nd, 597 Wits' lloH~t}
Lu~, 626, 666, 667,679, 759 Llntn, Ndl.t, 547 Ll S.tllt, Sltutdt, 61 T6t I4lf ofll.'t Mcl:ito~m (Cooptr),l49 T6t Lllr Grr.!r Pl<~~ttt &rtb (lindlt}•). 716 Llti.nru, 656-6S7.5« o~Cs4 Hi ~ks Llti.n (South) Amt00,l7, 469- 470: /u;bm.s ~nd, 216: Britidl m.uktu in, l80: Good Neighbor palil)' ;wd, SSS; immignnu from, 549, 7ltl: loc;a or,6: ~l.lgdbn ~nd, 21k Mon.rot Oomint .:~00, 191: pw.oert}' in, 736: Sp>~i.n ;md, 71: US. h~"'tn!OI'l)' in, 509-SIO; US. in\'tmnellt in, 533; Wihon .t.nd, SIO, 511-512. SNillls~t Hi~~nia: 'P«ifr nNIJlf? LlfYia, 527, 736 Llugfli.ngg.u (nitrow oxidl:), 244 U..•m~(t, Amru A, 306

ns.

U..•m~(t, Jounts, ISO U..•m~(t (K~nJiU), g,:k o(,

313

l.l}·, Kenntlh, 766 lBJ. SITJoh.n$00, l)'tldon 6. lugut ofN.lrian.s, 519, 525, 527-52~529,

"'

lugut of Unit«! Lui.n AmtOOn Citiuru, 657 lugut of Women Vottr.s, S<W lury, Timod'ly, 691 leur, M.ll'}· E., 461

W1w 11fGun(Whimw1), 251 ltbiulon, 727, 729,772 ltrompwn, K~ru~s, 312- 313 ltrompton (an$1lmtion, 31 ~ 315-31 6, 320 lt [)u( lllo, 698 l~ Mother Ann, 228-129 l~Ridutd Htnry, 108, 112- ll3, 143 l~ Rabm E.: Ci\>il W.u ~00,322, 326, 333-.U~ 3!1l-34l: H~rper'5 fmy t.tid ~nd, 302; $Un'tll!krof,35(1; W01r wft.h Mtnro, 296 Ltfl lkJiM ntwl'.ls, 757 ltg~l Tender lin ( 1862), 327-328 ltgi.sl~tufr:!i: .ustmbl ~5, 39, 66, 8J~4; biu.mer.tl, 132, 133: rolonial, 43, 46, 47, 92, 99, 103; J~mu II ~nd, 66; M~JJ.1.. chu.stto:, 137, US. Stt 4lllo Cong:tt,;:,:; P.uli.lt'lll:nf lthi, Mcwmani:lm .tnd, 228 ltidtr's Rtbtllian, 68- 69 ltisutt, urb.ul •urking d.us ;wd, 441- 443, 486. Stt 1/1/JIJ lknt-.ltion; Sparu "Und.kast" p.rogum, 593 ltnin, Vl.ldimir, 517 ltMon,John, 691 Lt~~r'Unl (ship), l79 - l80 ltopold,Aido, 543, 572 ll'$bi~ru. SIT~ mm .tnd IC'$bi~ns Ltrt.mfr- >I Nrmtr i!J Pt11'11~'Rillli111d tl.~ l!~JN>~Tity oftl:t St:w (G.rirn.kt), 232

I.NOEX

l.dtm tt1 Cttl.;.rri"t 1!. Bt'ldft- (G.riml:i), 231 Ul Pr.litt F..lltl'M ;md, 6i9; youtb rnavtm~:nt ;md, 687 not t.m.tror, 210, 231-232 l iberty, popul;tr vim~~e .u~d, In l iberty lNn.s, SlO l.il7tnJ (merdl;tnt doop), 106 l ibertyp;tny,231, 290, 291, .H2 l iby.l, 731 Liddy, G. Gordon, 70J. 705 lift txpteumy. in roloni;tl AmtriQ, 71., 76: in rolcniaJ Nf1l• Engl;tOO, 49; of sl;sw:s, 271 lift$1)it: on t.udt fromitr,396- 397: f.xrory •urkcor,ll16- 417:onGrul Pl;tin~ 39 1 , 395- 397: homl:fron1, W'odd Wu II, 6D4- 606: i.mmigQnl, 431: oflndi.m.s, 1, 10, 382: middk-d.us. 619: in mining wwm,39S- 396: on pbm.•uio~t~, 16l-262: rich 111.. poor, 207; in 1950:r;,647: .sl.:s•'tf'}' wd, U7-li4; w:hoology .:~nd (l8!10.J860), 24Wll~ u.tb;m, <127- 432 light bulb, 410, 411 l ikud p;tny (lmt.l), 748 l ilioohlani (J.ba'ai:i), 471 l imNugh, Ru.dl, 743, 783 l inw l.n,Abr;W.un, 200,3V, 360: ;tu.usi. n;stion of, 351, 355: Civil w,.r kadmhip of, 328, 319-330,332, ll3, 341- 3<12, 345- H6: dtb;tlt:S v.•ilh DougJ..tc!;,316- 318: rknion of 1860 ;wd, 319-310, 321: rknion of 1864 ;md• 347: tm;tncip.u:ion ;wd, 33
Us"'""'

Lilhll.lni.l, sv, 736 Liulr Bigham, &mk cf,38S Liulr lu Ago:, ll Liulr Rod: (Atl.:~ru;tJ) Khool dl'$tgn"g;ttion in,64l- 643 li\'tw:d:, 51, 55, 62,171: unit, 29, 79, 391, 396..397: rov.tiO)~ ;wd, ltl, 396- 397, 400 li\ing Nrw,p;tptr, li\ingw.m, ltob

56' 5n

1-19

Lynming,JIS, 345: ofbLKiu, 462,489, 490, 51~551., 579;cfGtrm.lll~ in WWl, SlO: NMCParnp;tign ;tg;tin"> 490, 571 Lynd. ltOOm ;tnd Hdtn, S4l-5!11

MuAnbur, Doup, 561, 601., 616, 6lS: in Kotun W;tr, 627- 628 M.uhint politie:s,l!SS. Srt $lw Tvn.nuny

H.;tll

lord Dunmon"'s Wu, 109 L.o, Angdt:S, 572; ;tummobile:s in, 651: Hi$p>lllk m.lyof o(, 777;J;tp;t!'lf:~ in,609; Muiun.s in, 432, 657; r;~er ricin in, 671, 740; 1>';1!C't b.ndt in,ll98 lo,;~;C;twt m)1:h,413 •~.o.s, Colony," 33

M.ulun, Annie, 445 Maron'' Bill No.2 (1810), 181 Mar~.~m, Cl\iltlt$ W., 460 Maq·, Rol.md, 434• 4JS Madero, FQMsro, Sil Madilll()n,lX!Iky, 181, 186 Madilll()n, J;um:s, 155,15~ 171: Bill ofRighu ;tnd, 147• 148: Camrirntion and, 138, 139, 141: d«tion of I80S and, 181: Frdtr.slhr p;tptN ;tOO, 14J: H.t.milwn's ddlr plan ;tnd, ISO; narionaiUm of, 187- 188: pt;tCJeablt roerrion and, 181- 18l.;$Uit:S' righu .:~00, 161: Wuof 1812 ;tOO, 181--186 M.d nug.ttint, 659 Mapxi.nrs. 4114, 445, 481, S4J. Srt $lw ~ritlu M~IJ.m, Ferdin.md. l8 M$$1i'r: ..t Girl ofll.ot Sll'n'b(Cnnt), <145 Mah;tn, Alfi'td 1ll.l)'tr, <169 M.:U.nr,~a.r.ehood fur, 190, 194 M$,:»r (lxutltship), 471

loui ~ Jot. 59 1

M$,;1J Sbwl (ltwi ~), 546

loui..tlou:rg. B.lulr ;tt, 82, 91., 94 loui..:i.:~IU, 61, 363, 364. 377: Ujuru in, 94: cotron in, lS6: Fl:l ro Union, 355, 375: ~tel$icn ;tOO, 321: $l;r.'t popul.uion in, 72: Spilin ;md, 153: $U!.ehood foc, l7
M.:Uu.b;tl~Nl f.uming.5. Str ~114Cotn M.al.ni;t, <11, 56,171, 346, 472, 598 Malcolm X, 672- 673 Mali,l7, 18 Mallon, "'lyPho«<. M;uy," 485 M$» .s11d N.ltwn (M.lNh}, 4.01-401 M01n;tJ$.U, B;tUIC'$ ar,332,3H , 33-t M;snr.hu Chi'ing emphr (Chin;t}, 506 M..nr.huri;t, SI0-511, 610,6U; J;tp>~n ;tOO,

Cn'di!;~bl

Lobbyi~~U, in Wuhingmn,

781 lod:t, Alain, 5!17 Lod:r,John,5S, 8S, 86, 101 lodgt, Htnty C.Wot, 469, SV, 528 Logubin eunp;tign.l15, 2U Logubiru, z.tl London, ZI; bo.mbingof, 591 7k tWJr!Y Cm~t'ol (Ril'$mMI), 649 Long. Cf.l\lfutd, 144 Long. H uey, 567, 568, 569 l.Dctin$,Bd1Nni(BdLuny),
..

,

60'

590 M;sndtb, Ndwn, 736 M..nh.uun, 36,143. Str ~114Nt-a·Yorl Cil)' M01nh.uun Pro;en, 598,613, 634 M;snifl'$t ~mny, 278, 288, 291 - 291, 310,

....

M..nirou, 13 M;snn, H oru~. ZJO.lJI, 1.34, 4!18 M01nn llc1 (1910), 486- 487 M..nn.Eiki~t~ llcr (1910), 499 M;snneu,433 Thr Mn ~J K""" (&nun),536 M01not synrm, in coklnPe5, 40, 55 M;smtidd, WiUi;tm. JJJ nr .u~Mo" (F;tulk.n~r). 653 M..nwn, O.W~ 691 M;snufururing, I81: drit:S ;wd, 10J.l04: in«rdl.m~;tblt p.uu, 10S, l J ' 1.39-140; Mo:iun, 185: in South r1.

1-20

IN:OEX

M.mufunuing (rolltinMnl) Nonh, 258; ~tri.lli:ution in, 41~c-.uiff, ;wd,119, 458:w~.1l inttgr;uion in, 4~.

Ser <~(SI1 F.letoM

M.w Ztdong, 626,618, 679,699 M31fllr N•» (Hawd.arnt), 251 M..rilli'J 11 M~11 (1803), 173 M.t«o.u, ~tdi.n;md, 700 M.uijuan;a, 691, 705 M.uitimt r
n>r

~hipping

M.uktt:ing. 412. Ser ,.64 Adverti..:ing M.uktu ;aOO nurktl economy, 22, 163- 164, 199:thild.rtn and, 212: f.lrmtN ;a00,l94; Nt'a·Orftan,;and, 137;W't$1 Afritoul, 18 M.mjum.e,J.-cque5, 61 M.uri.lge: in Chl'$;aptah r
or

or

M~

ndtull', 5111- 544, 778: M".TU.tl rtwlu. rion ;and,692. SIT <~IS11 l>opt.ll.u rultu.f< M;w mtdi;a, 659, 755. SIT <~fSI1 Movin: NI"V>~· p;aptN: R.ulio: 1tkvi~ion M.tdlrr, l.ncre.ut, 53 M.:urilint.tl kin~hip, II M"-)'.t,6 M#)Vp«:; (Jhip), 71.9 -720 M41)~Comp.:~rr,36

M;aysvillt RoM! BiD (1830), 219 Mc-Adoo, WiOi.trn Gabbs, 520, 54.0 MrC.Un, John, 75 I, 753, 768; tlurion o( 2008 ;and, 784- 785 MeC!&IIS nug;axint, 651 MrC.unn fnr.em.ll ~ru:rity llrr ( 1950), 6l5 MrC.unn.W;ahtr lmmigr.uion ;md Nuion. .ilityAn (1952),635- 636 MrC.udlf, Eugr:no:, 693, 694 MrC.u1hy,jo~ph, 654,675 MrC.udl)ism, 616,635, 6-«1-641,654, 664 Mc-Otll;m, Gtotgt 6., 332- 333, 349 MeONIT's m;ap:rino:, 444,481 Mc-Cotd,j.unt:S, 705,706 Mc-Cormick, Cyru~238, 344 Mc-Cormi(k tt.lper, 2J8 Mc-Coy,)~qlh G.,396 MeC.({<)(b l'. M.IUJLIIIJ(I81.9),. 188 Md>owdl, frvin,331 Mc-Gilliw;ay, Alt undtr, 137 Mc-GO\'C'm, Ci
run. 538

454: mounuin me-n, 195- 196: R.e-.olu. tionuy wu ;and, 128- 12.9: ..'Ort of, l95. SIT $hll G.l}' mt:n; Ci.ttl (Nt1>· Jrrwy) L.aOOr;a.rory, 41 1 Mtnomi~ fndilru, 6.l7 Mtnul i.nmwrioru, 23!1 Mtrt'Mitili$11), 60,70-71 Mmh;mr m.uint, 70, 156. S« 1/1/JIJ Ship$ ;and ~hipping Mtrdl;mt~l5, 137: Miwni~ingb}·, 4J
wloni.tl, 70, 71: erop.Jirn economy .:~00, 369-370, 413: Our.eh, 5
746 Mnrill Lyndl (lirm), 766 MI'Tl'ilout (•'at'dlip), 336-J37

Mt$o.unetiu,5, 7, 8 Ml'$qu.llit fndb~, 79 Mturom "King Philip." 52 Ml!lhodi$1:$, 87,226- 227, 266, 267; Artiun (A.M.E. Ourch). 167, 275, 366, 489 Mt~.t~r.Afgonnt ofkruivt, 518(m;ap), 519 Muiun.Amtrie.m~. 656- 657, 775, 786: in Ulifomi;a, 393-394, 5!19; in Ccmg:rtS$, 677; .u roa~OOf5. 397; d~eriminuion ;ag;ain~ 400; ;u r.tilro.ul wotktr,.388;in 1e~r.~5, 393: u-.-ditioru or, 5!14; in u!'Nn b.urio~ 5110, 655: in Wolid Wu II, 608 Muiun.Amtrie.m W'u(l846- 1848), 1.93- 299; b;aulu 295- 296(m;ap)t otigiru 293- 294; 1erriwryg.Untd in,

or,

or,

302

MrPheBOn, Aimtt Semple, 550. 55 I Mc-Vtigh, 1 imodly, 756 Mud:, Ci<'OIJI" G.,342 Mur fruptction An (1906), 497 Mrrh;mi:urion, of.tgrieulrntt,138, 391, 597 Mtdi;a, Sp.u~i~h l;angu;agr:, 7BJ Mtdiuid, 675, 715, 739, 742,751 Mtdieut, 675, 739, 742, 751: pl't:Sn'iption drug btnttit in, 780 Mtdirint: .mt!dll'$i.l ;wd,l44: ;authority 210: in Civil W'u, 346; tduurion in, 436: N.uivt Ameriun, 13: p;au,ln no,;uu.nu, 497;Ju:rgery, 244, ]4.6; Wolid Wu II, 598. S«lllhtiOi5USt Mtdidnt lodgt Trt;aty ( 1867). 384 Mct$t, &!win, 730 Mdkln, Andmo·, 53~ 5110, 558 Mdlmg A!r (Z.tnpoi ll), 777-778 Mdvillt, Albn, 209 Mtlvillt, Hrrm.m, 209, 249, 25 I, 252 Mrmphi~33~ 362 Mrn:dutlling;md honor rodt, 266- 267; fronritl3mtn, 399-400: rn..ueulinity ;and,

or,

Muie.m CI'$Aorl, 393;Jl.:roYry in, 302- 3011 Muie.m ltt"'Oiu tion, l84,5ll Muiro, ~, 153, 310, 487; .lbolition of d..lvtry in, 286: br.lm'O ~ from, 608, 656- 657: C;alifomi.t ;and, 284, 28& wnllirt with Ameriuru, 285; Gtrm.my ;and, 515: immigt;anl:$ from, 718, 781; lo.:~n 10, 746- 747: mignm Labor, 5119, 677: NAFI'A ;wd, 742, 746; oil n.uion;al. ixation by, 588: lil.-erfrom, 29: U.S. inr.er. vtntion in,.Sll MuiroCity, 28; in Mtlfian.Amnian W;ar, 1.94, 295, 296 Mkhig.m. 1.94, 238; tltnion in, 214 Mkhig.tn Smt Uni.-enity, 3!1l Middlt Atl.un:it, 155; wotktr pmct~n in,

"''

Middlt d.u5, 24. 129, 21 I, 4 19, 465, 751: ;au1omobilt ;and, 542; Bu1 revoir ;and, 660: bl;ad,, 447,491, 776: rokwai.tl, n, 95: dtpiT.Uion o( (893.(896 ;and, 466; trooomir ~upmion ;and, 766: G I Rill ;and, 619: hippit$ and, 691; howi.ng o(,

I.NOEX

242, 24.3: IWrvioknt<: ;wd, 422; Mt.ri. Qn..AmcOOn, 657: mOO.:rnUm ;and, 446; N.uion.tli.~l dub,: ;wd, 424; pro~$l\i~rn .tnd, 481, 4&2, 48S, 486: ~fomu 427, 438, 44S, 4118: 1950s,6Sl;$()(itl)' .tnd culrnr<, 4J3- 4J6;,:uburb.ln mignrion of, 432: roler.tnu in, 757: ·~lf.uT ri'IUrm ;wd, 744; •'Omen, n, S40, S42 ;womc"n'5 :t:pht~ ;n.d, 4H, 440, 446,448: •'Omen's 5u1Tug<: ;wd, 491,492;WorldW.trll ;and, 587, S97: ~·uppil'$, 710 Middk colonies, S6. 59, 1U: in Rtwlurion. uy •·u , 115. SIT llfll1 Nr-· Yotl: ~muyl. Y.lllia Middk E.ur: Inn ha~age crisi5 wd, 721- 722; ln;~~:l:i.l>.tlc>lrini.tn ronftin in, 700, 7V, 73l, 739(m;ap), i411, 752, n2: SuucrUi5 in, 64S- 6116:5WJ>I"'ttd r.error. iw: from, 763. SIT $hP Ar.lb •'Orld:sptcifr

or,

~"'?

Middk Pu.ugr, 74 Mildrttl'll'ffl (l)'nd « Lynd), 541-S4l Middling d~es. 209 Midvo;ay,IUnlc> oC, 601, 602(m.tp) Midv.~,;c colle'8J'$ in, 3113; f.u'mer.~ in, 23~ 241, 459, 460; r.tilro.tds in,241; !Tfarm in, 229. SIT Mwsprtifit lf;ftC' Migt;mr f.um •'Orktn;, 574, SSO, 65S, 782, 786: union for,6n Migration: ro Atnl:'rit.u, 4(m.tp): b}• blulu ro NorthC'rn citit:S, 489, Sl3- S24. 541, 579,607: Engli:!.h,3s..J9, 42, 45: by ftw: blulu, c>m.tOOp;arion ;md,366: IOO.i.tn b..W .tOO, 109: of pbnr.erditt,261: tunl.u,.urb.ut, 428--429,484: ro Sunb,2D4: immigr.tnu in, 280,283, 431, 760 Mingo lndi.ul5, 93, 109 Minimum ...,.gc-, 573, S75, S76, 632 Mining. in Wes!,395- 396, 422. S« 4lllo Unittd Mine Worktrs; s;vap llft.t.ICs Minnt";apoli5, 241, 677 Min~ JS~ 460; Sundi~Wvi.ul5 in, 429; lll'nkmtm 380 Minar1:'15haws, l47- 24S, 442 Minuit,Putr,36 MinUiemm, IIJ- 114, 783

or,

Mir.rn.h 1'. Ari;- (1966), 676 MUlill'$, 727, 729: n i5i5 in Cub.l, 666- 667; ddi.-nliC' <'g.tin~ 728,773: lr;aqi, 738; Kaftan, 749; U'(;ui.e,: ro limit, 773; in •·u in lr;aq. 765 MU!Wnarit:S: in C.tlifomia, 153, 286: in C.tnMI.l, 60: N.u:ive AmeriuiU ;and, 51: Nt-.·Lighu ;u, 87: Shaktr,ll9: ro slaves, 275: Sp.u~i5h, 30, 31, 61- 62, 82, 286 MU!islippi F~t>:lom Summc>r Pmjt.:t, 67(1, 687 MU!islippi pUn, 376, 461 MU!islippi lti""r ;and rtgion,6J, 112, 194. 241; in Civil Wat, 33l, l3S, 3111, 342: Odu, 261: llaod.ing. SJII, S39, 541, SS4, 5.82: Louili.l~W llurdu.sc> .tnd, I96: N.ttive Ameriuru in, 7- 9: ~«.tmba;u,; an, 201: u;idc> on, 137, J57, l74:.u ""-~«'m batdn,

125 MU!islippi (sure), 631, 704:Croil W;u in, 335:con:an in,199, 1S6; F.tulkntr ;md, 6S3; KLln in, 365: fl'.ldmintd ro Union, 3S6, 375: ~f~ion .tnd, 321: ~.uthood for, l90, 194:5rndc>nt pnKt.m in, 6S9 Missouri, 279; in Ci\il W.u, 330, 332,3lS: sur.ehood for, 189- 190, 194 Missouri CompmrniliC' ( 1820.1821), 189- 1.90, 297, 298,302, 309, 312: Drtd S
Mobile' t\uxili.trySurgiie;ll Hwpitod, 596 Mabtulc>, 132: in Fr.tnn", ISS, 157 M«?yDJ.:t (Mehilk), liJ, 2S2 Madtrni,;rn, in ur ;and ;a.rdli r.enut~ 446 Mog;utidm, 749 Malva·}: fndi.:~ru, 32,36, 60, 184: St;mt, 126, 136 Mala.~:St:S Act of 1733 (lk"it.lin), 70, 97,99 Malouw, V. M.,611 Mand.llt, W'.llrer, 728 Mantt.uy regubrion,3n..J73, 4SS-..4S6, .SOl. SIT ;f{w Cul'f'(nl)•: Gold 5und.ud; Specie' ((oin) M«tiror (•·uship), 337 Monk, MW, 2&2 Monmom:hCourtHouliC', B.:udt 123, 124-125 Monopoly, 406, 496: smc>·ITgulartd,201; utb.:~n utilitil'$, 482 Monroe,]~ml'$, 143, 171, 188: ~ diplom.tt ro Ft.uKc>, 175: d«tion of 1816 ;md, 1117; forrign pol:ityunder, 190-191 Monroe Oattrine(IIU3),191, 509-SIO Monupui5 lndi.ul,;, 32 Mom.tn.l, suu·.hood fur, 392 Momt Vtrdt, Chik , 2 Momgomery, AI.tb.mu,3ll, 668: buJ boyrort in, 6S6

or,

1-21

Monuta1,94 Moon, Sun Myung. 710 Moon Lmding (1969), 701 Moon', Micllul, 769 Monlny: dtdinc> oC, 756- 757: m.:~nl'lf:N .tnd, 4.33: pro$1T.i$l\i~rn md, 48S-486; pro.ni. rurion .tOO, 438..439; sla""' bmily, 271: of ~ry, 309, 313: Vietari..ut, 4H, 44S Monl M.tjotity, 71S, 723 Monn,1 bom.u, 401 Mo~J.tn, J . Pierpon1, 439, 46S- 466, 46~ 499: u.s. Sud .tOO, 408, 48J, 496 Mo~J.tn, Willi.tm, ll3 MOIJ.ln Bank, 565 M~" ~~ l'trp.vi.! (1946), 631 Mo'JC'm.hau, Henty, Jr., 563 Mormoru, 2.28, 278, 392-393 Momtro, )7, 600 Morrill Anri.Bip.my k.t (1862), 393 Morrill I..Uid Gnm ht ( 1862), 343 Morris, Rol-en, ll4-llS, ll8 MoDe', Samud F. 6., 240 Mon;~lil)'. SIT De.uh r.uc> Monon, Ferdinwd "Jdl}• Roll," S47 Monon, Willi.un 1". G ., 2411 Mwconc>, Gto~, 715 Mwl'$, llnn.l ~Gnnd.nu,,. 5.84 Mothw f..m6 momh!)·, 493 Mon:, Lumri..l, 233 Mound.buildingculru!T$, 8-9 .tnd illu,;. Mounuin mc>n, 195- 196 Mordffl.~769

Movi.t5 (mmian pinutn). 486,543-544: Nam~ Ameriu~ in, 718: rxism in, 489, n7; lttd SC'.ll't .u~d, 633- 6.\
677 Mu(kr~

(jour!Wlim). 481, 496- 497 Mugwumps (lkpubliun fution). 4S8 Muit, John, 402,498,499 Mul.uros, U I- 2&2, 273 M.atn~ Or.:JM ( I90S), SOl Muh:itdmkil:y, n6-m Muh:in.tcion.ll rorpotuio~. 649 Mulcin.tcion.ll nt~:work,:, 750 Munith Put( I9.\S), 590, S9J MIIJI~t 1~ l.lli'11oiJ (1877), 460 Murdath, Rupm, 744 MuiT;ay, Judith Sugtnt, J6S Murrov.·, Edw.ltd It , 611,6511 Munb;a,pd:, n1 Mulk bla(k,247,276: blul'$, <186: j;~..U, 52.5, S46- 547, 583, 660: min~rd sbows,247; NtwDtal md, S61k popul.u, 44J, 605: ngtimc>, 426-427, 443, 486: t'OC'k .tnd roll, 6S9: 19605,419: 197()$, 712

1-22

IN:OEX

Mu$linu, 17, 22, 25, 727, 775: Afi'ie.m $law tr.-:lt and, 2&: bl...:k,673;in Knnwu, 747; Shiill", 727, 73~ 770, 771: Sunni, 76S, 770, 771: in 1ertwi$1 ;~.nrl, (2001), 762 Mu.uolini, Benita, S83, 589, 590, 591, 601 Murnal ;Ud soritrie5, 208 My Lli m.uJi~ert, 697 Myrdal,Gun.nar, 607

tireruurt md .lrt,248-2S3; Vir~ 645 N.lrion.ll Llbor R.d.uio~ llc1 (1935), 569 N.lrion.ll Llbor R.d.uio~ Bo~rd, 569,578 N.lrion.ll Llbor Union, 419, 420 N.lrion.lllibet.ltion From (V'itmam), 645, 693 N.lrion.ll Org;mi:.wion fM Worntn (NOW), 67~ 713-714

NMCP. Ser N.ltional M:w!cia.tion fM 1he Ach-..n~fflltnr ofColor...:! Pmplt Nader, lb lph, 663, 676, 753 NAFrA (Norm Ameriun F~r Tr.-:lt Agrl'!e· mtllt), 742,746 N~g.u~ki, ;~.wmk bombing of, 613 N;tpolton Botu~, 174, 180: Stir.Un ;wd, 183, 184; louUi.Ula and, 175- 176 N;uw:oOOAn (1914),487 N~dlvUit Conwmian (1850), lD4- 30S Mririlk (movie), 712 N~,;:su, G.mul Abdd, 645-646 N;m, Thorn.u, l7l, 412,437 Nucht:t, 79, 261, 172 N;ud (JM';;.ying town), 51 Nuian.ll Ad..Uory Commi»ion on Civil Oi.sordrn. 672 Nuian.ll Aeron.luria and Sp.l~<: Admini$. tr.lcion (NASA), 6$8 N;uion.ll Amrrian Wom.ln Sutrn~ A.uo. ci.lcion, 491 Nuian.ll Aisoci.ltion lbr dlt Adv;mcrmetn ofeolo~d l~pk (NAIICP), 523, 52~ 547, 571, 580, 630:civil righn leldmhip, 656, 670: rounding or, 4S9, 491; Wrwy ;wd, 552 N;uion.ll Aisoci.lrion oCColor
N;uion.ll b.lnk, 150-151,343, l5l.i«41ho lbnk oflhe United Sut.e5 Nuian.ll B.m.k lin (1863), 318 N;uion.ll Colortd F.umrrT All:i.u~, 460 N;uion.ll Congt'l'.i5 of Arnt!Y.m lndi.ln~ 657 N;uion.ll Co~umm' LNgut, 484,563 N;uion.ll Council on lndi.ln Opponunity, 6n N;uion.ll dtbt, 780. S« 4lllo Ddicit $ptnd. ing;Wardt!K Nuian.ll Dtliml't EdiKOllion /let (195.11), 658 N;uion.ll Endoamtnr We the Arn and Humanicit:s, 675 Nuian.ll G;ty .md Lnlli.ul Tnk Fo«e, 714 J'UillllolfW;t.:rt; 152 N;uion.ll Gu.ud, 423,511,688- 689 Nuian.ll idtnrity, 777. S« 4lllo Nariona!Um N~rion.lllndwuUI Rt..:OVI'ry llc1 (NIRA), 564, 569 Nuian.lllmdtigeno:t Elrim.ut, 773 N~rion.llism, 187- 191, 4:U, SOO: llrW, 646: rnltur;d, 546, 584: tronornk, 534: in

N.lrion.ll Origin' An (1924), 548 N.lrion.ll p.lrb, 401-402, 498-499, 542,572,

.,.

N.lrion.ll R.td.una.cion An (1902), 497-498 N.lrion.ll R«~ry lldminiw-;arion (NRA), 564, 565, S70-S7J, S7l, Si6 N.lrion.ll R.t-publiutu, 218,221 -222,223 N.lrion.ll R.t$CJt,m:~ Pbnning &.lrd, 573 NMitm:JJ Rt<Jil<.Y:~71A N.lrion.ll R.illt A»od ouian, 743 N.lrion.ll R.o.ad, 196 N.lrion.ll Strurity An (1947), 624 N.lrion.ll St..:urily Agency (NSA), 771- 772 N.lrion.ll Strurity Cou:tKil, 624, 729 N.lrion.ll St..:urity Lugur, 514 N.lrion.ll $l'lf.dtrrrmin.u:ion, 621 N.lrion.ll Sodali,;c p.lny. Set N.W Germatl}' N.lrion.ll Union ofSoci.ll Ju$ti~<:", 567 N.lrion.ll Union p.ury, 349, 358 N.lrion.ll Wu l.abcw Bo.ud, 596, 597 N.lrion.ll Wom..n', P2ny. 492, 524, 540 N.lrion.ll Woman Su:trr;~.gr ruwci.lrion, 361 N.lrion.ll Womrn'$ lllli.mn; 461 N.lrion.ll Womrn·s l.oy.ll lNgut, 347 N.lrion.ll Womrn'$ Pol:iriul C.luru5, 714 N.lrion.ll Youth lldmit!Umuion, 568, 571 N.lrion of l.d.lm, 673 Tk N.iti«t (..'rddy), 444 N.ltiYI' Am~riem~ 1- 15, 311-39,91, 335: anivi.rm, 677, 717: .lkoholi$m .lnd, 51, 79, 165, 166, 183,386; ArclJ.UCptoplc>~ 2-J, S; Stiti:lh .l00,33, 80, Ill, 183, 18-t c>.Ui.no' of, 77~ Carlin's JX!fU.l)'Oib of, 253;rnl.rutal di\'<'n:iry oe, 5.-11: dii'C'.ut and, 28.-29, 35, 39, SO, 57, 95, 153- 154: ofE.urem Woodl..mh, 7-9, 12(tn.lp): ttulavrmtm of, 52, 56, 62, 79: Euf"O}!Un ..Uian(~ ..;,h, 81: r..rming by, 76: m FmKh .lnd lndi.m Wu, 93: i.n Frr:no:h C;m~32, S7; fu.r rDC!t and, 36, 51, 57, 60, 61, 71, 79, 1.95: homd.lncb of, 12(m.lp);honc-5 and, 62, 79, 380, 382, 383: Ltv.is .md a ..tt uptdition ;wd, 177: m.UA!Jn.uit:s ~00, 87, 286; Mor. moni.rm .lnd, 228: Nrv.· Oul and, 572, 5.110-S!II: itl Nt10· EngbOO, 13, SO-Sl; Penn and, 59; lli..Utu lndi.ltu, IO, 79, 284, 379-387:popuLuion,UI-29, 131, 165: Pudtlo m'Dit, 61-62.: ~~iproo:il:y .u~d, 2, 10, lA, 34: moov
or,

125- 126, 128, Ill: 5thool.r fur, 379, 386: UI-29, 137, 196, 296: in urb.l.n $l um~ 655, 657, 677; itl Wild War Shov.·, 400;in WorldW.lrl, Sl6: i.n ~rl.i War II, 607. S«4111o Und, N.lriw Ameri. r.m; Raervuio~: lfl«ifo: triNIgrw~p N<~t;J't Sol! (Wright), Si7 N.lrivi$!U, 282, 183, 3li...JI2, 428, 4JJ, 549. SIT $hll Kn010·.Norhing p.uty Nt\10 (Nonh 1\.r;Unci~ Trlin ;wd, 31, 61 N.wig.lrion Mu (Briuin), 70-71,94,97, 105, 106 N.wy, 508, SIO, 681: B.ub.lry pir;au, and, 172: Britisll impr<~ment ;wd, 179-180: in Civil w...., 335, 336-337; up;w.rion .lnd, 469, 470: Fr.-ndt, 124, 117; Gum.ln ~bm.lrino::t: (U·bo.ln), 513, 514--515, 517: in Qu.ui Wu ..·idl F~MI:', 160: Sp.lnid!llrntriun Wu, 472:Sp.mUh Arm.l.U, 33, 124: 5Ubm.uinn:, 337; in ow·,.r of 1812, 184, IS.S(nup): worntn itt, 51~ Wodd War II, 593, 596,601-601. SN4111o Block. .ldt: Stiti:lh (Royal) N.l\y Nv:i Gtrrn.u!y, 599- 601, 603, 604, 613: r.qwu:ion of, S88-SS9, S9J:jtw5 and, 591-592, 611-612: Dd~rn in, SS!I, 591, 607. S« 4lllo Gtrrn.u!y NBC (N.lrion.ll Bro..&...mng Comp>~tl}'). Sot3, 621, 653, 762 Ntbrnh, 308, 392, 460 Nto~on$l't'Y.I..Ii:!.m, 764 Ntolin,9S N«btrl.llld5(lht Du~~:h). 24, 69, 124, 731: C.uibl'C'.ln roloni~s. SS(m.lp)t rnttw:h.un5/ tndt from, 54, 70: Nrv.· SWl'>:!tn .lOO, 56: in Ncwrh Amr00,32, 36: Purito~n5 in, 36 Neuu;;.Jity, in Wotld ow·,.r I, 512-514 Nt'uu;;.lity lien (1935.1937), 590-591, 592 Ntv.id.l, 296, 392, 774; mining in, 395-396, <56 Nt-wo· Am~«rd.un, 36, 57-58 Nt-wobu!Jh Con$pif.wy, 135 Nt-wo· Con.stn•;;.ci~rn, 690 Nt-wo· Ot.ll, S&- 573, 599: dw.IItnF to, 566-567, 575; rtwimnrntnr .lnd, 571-572: Fim,558, 561, 562-567: Hund.rtd 0")'5, S63- 56S; Nui""' Amrrian' and, 572, SS0-581: rui.ll j~rk<: md, 570-571: ~cond, S511, 567-SiO; Suptffllt Coun .lnd, 565, S68- S69, SJJ: 1·ruman and, Sp.u~i:!.h .lnd,

I.NOEX

630, 6l2; Wt.n .lnd, Sn-573;•umen in, 563, 571. S« 4lhtl ~~I t, F~nklin D. Ntw I:Xmoeruir Co.llirion, 741 Ntw Ecl!ou,l'rt-.uy or (1835).19S Ntw Eronomy, n8-n9 Ntw Engl.lnd, 69,82, ISS, li7, 4l 9, 534: ;unUI.lver)' stnrimt m in, lJl; colonir.;a.. cion cr,3W~commi rtel'$ orCOf "-'p!Wl· dcrtCJe in, lOS; cocmn no:C'olb of,lSS; Dominion or, 6~ 68: tlttrion or 1800 md, 162: Emlntgo An md, lSI ; f.uming in,4~49, 50, Sl, 75; FC'dl:todi~Uin, 159: gmder ~rio in, 42: Grur Aw.lkcningin, 87: H.urrot'd Conwmion ;md, 186- 187: indu.srri.lJ popul.lrion of, 199: lmokr;rhk An:l.l..d, lll : ll'i$h in, l79: lirer;K)' in, 84: migt.lcion Wt$t rrom, 19t Nuiw AmcOOn:c in, 13, SO-Sl; prohibition in, 130: l>ur ir-;m:c cr,3~ 45- 53, 66: rdbrm in, l 29; in Rt'VI.llurion.uy wu, liS: to:rilt indu.srry in, lO'\ 205-106; Unir.uitru in, ll7; l>'U dcbr or, ISI: We~ lndic>:c tndc> ;md, 7J, us, J.\7 "NtlO· Engbnd W.ly,• 46- 48 Ntwlbundbnd, 10,31,69: fi.dltM off,l7, 32,190 Ntw Ft.uKC', 57(m.lp), 60. S« 4lhtl Ul\ild.l, .l5 Fnondl colony Ntw Fronrit r (Ktnnt>:ly), 663, 66!1 Ntw H.unpdlirt, 6~ U'\ 18!1: G.rttn Moun. u in 80)'1' a(, 109; Sc-.unp h.t prort$l in,

••

Ntw Humony,235 Ntw Jttsty, 16'\l79;coloni.tl, 57, 58,59: Rt"'Ciurion.lryW'.lr in, 119, Ill, I l l , ll4; vuringrighn in, 16'\ 167; wu dtbr or,. lSI Ntw Jttsty Pl.ln, 139 Ntw Ltrc,686-688, 690, 710 Ntw Lighr ~w, 87-88 Ntw MuKo, 153,178,305,391, SIS; AmtOOn ~ultn: in, 287; .lrcmj( bomb Tt$1:$ in, 598; in CMI W..r, 33S; Muir.m. AmtOOn W..r ;md, l93, 29!1• 295, 196, 197: tw.cive pi'Oplu or, 7. 383, J87, SSI; llutblo lndi.ln5 or, 61- 62, 81' 82; Sp.lin md, 31, 81482; Sp.mUh ~ukm in, 393, 394: 1ex;u ;r.nd, 303, 304; u ;adc> wi th, 285 Ntw Mabil.iucion,688 Ntw Nt rberbnd, 36, 47, Sl: diVI'Dt soritcy in, 56-57 Ntw Orlt.Ul.s, 175, 241,427, Sl S: B.utk or, ISS, I S~ 187. 116: CMI Wu ;r.nd, 335: tpidc>miu in, 244: r..um u;u;IC' in, 151, ISl: ITtc> bl.xl:c in, 172: Frr:ndr .lnd, 79; gi'O'I>UI or, l 03, lOti: hurrif.Ull:' d.tm.lgt w, 780-781: pbnrntl:irt in, l 61;Sp.uUdl in, 9'\ 137, 15'\ )74--175 Nrw Rt'(!Wb.'k nug.lxinc>, 480, SlO Ntw Scurh, 4l4. SIT $lw Sourh (US.)

N""'l'p;r.ptn_ 8!1• 490: Cheroll'!t, 196: Cuatr'":c Lur ~;md .lnd, 385: ~dn';rli$t, 141: Gno.lr ~P"-'Iion ;md, 561, 56~ "living,• 568,572: p>~rtypolirin: md, IS.S: pc>nny prt:S:c.l46-.l47,191: St>:lition An .lnd, 161: ~om .lnd, 44l ; )'dl010· journ.lJ. u m. 471 N""· Swtdc>n, 56, 57 & ..-s..wk m.lpxinc>, 711 N""·w n, b.l.lr,8S N""• Wonu:n, 445,446-448 N""• World Ordtr, 750 7k Ntw "'brW Ordu(Robp.rt~ioncf IS91k in, 465: E.ur Vill.l~, 69J;tkttritiarion in, 411: f.rtrory 6rt in, 476-477, 484:g;tt• liber.lrion in, 691, 7L4: H.ulem, SlJ, 5!17-548, 655,656: immigr;r.nu in, lOS, 280,190-191. 4l 9, 431: moral puril)· ump.tigns in, 438- 439: Mwc>um of Modc>m Art, 58!1; NMCP protl'$1 in, 514; tlC'WSp.1ptf'5, .\71, 442, 471; pDpuJ;a.. rion or,20J, 427, <18!1: Puerro Riuru in, 65~ 677: rkh .pocwg~p in, l 07: $.lloons in, 441; Scci.ll Gruptl in, 439: Sump h.t Congrt:SS in, 100: T.lmtn.Uly full, 284,436, 4.\7, 48l , 484; u ;adc> uniolt'l in, 206: Tv.wd Ring in, 37J .lnd ill u.s., .\77: wulrh}• in, 4.\2: World's F.lir (1939), 5114; World Tudc> Ctnfe'r in, 749, 760, 761- 762 N""· York (rolonr), S7-S~59, 70, 73: rron. ritr dtlpu:fe':c, 109: lroquoi:c in, 80: lddtr's Rtbdlion Ut,68-69; libd t.UC' in, 8!1: povrn y in, 7~in Rt'\'Oiurion.lry•'M, US, 119, Ill, 115: royal cc>nu.lli:arian ;md, 66-67; :d.:ro'C' popul.uion in, 78: SwpmdingAn in, 102 &w )iri fk......W,l47, 347, 44l &w )iri}rba(ktn:. 4fll N""· York Sadc>l)' fur thc> Suppre:uion or Vitt. CUI;II ;r.nd, lOl-103; lndi.ln I.Uld:c in, 13~ lr idl in, IS9, 179:0nrilhrom. munil}' in, llS: mi\•;r.li$11) in, ll7: warn. t n's 5Uffr;a~ in, 492,524: Woodsrcd rl'$riV.ll,419 N""· Yo.rk Sm
1-23

Nt.t Yori UlorlJ, 471 Nt10· lt;rl;and, 6l8 Nn l>erd fndi.llt'l, 383, 385 Ni;agf.l Mawnle'nr, 490-491 Niaragu.l,SIO: US. infl:'rvmcion in, 310, 725-726, 729, 736 Nid:ml.u II, l 'u r or Rum.l, SI.S Nighcing.llt, Flo.rmc"> 3!16 Ni.mitx, Ouur, 602 Ninc>ri'!C'm h lltne'ndmc>nr, 503, 514, 540, AIJ. SIT $hP ~nun .suffuge Nimb Amendtnc'nr, 1!17-148, All N1RA (N.lriotul fndu.srri.lJ lkrowt'}· An), 56'\569 Ni.\UO, ltkh.lrd M., 6!1~ 67~ 689: doml'$ric i.uut:~ .:~00, 701 - ~ tkttion of 1960 .lnd, 664: tli'!C'ric n or 1968 .lnd, 695: tlttrion or 197l.lnd, 7D4- 705: Ford's p.1tdan of, 719: Rtd Sratt .lnd,634, 6.\6: wurbern nratc>grof, 703, 704,723: \'itm.lm W;u w d, 6S~ 690, 697- 698: W'" -ff:'rp«" .:~nd ft,;ign.lrion of, 705- 707, 710: W!lf'ld policies .lnd, 696- 700 Ni.\Un Doetrinc>, 697 "No Child Ltft lkhind '' progt.un, 767 Nonconsumprian .lgri'!C'mtnr, 105 Nonimpotucion ;r.gtl'!tmtm, 104, 105 Non-fnTt«OU.Dt An (1809), 181 Nonvic!C'm civil di:'lobtdimct, 656, 668 No.ritg.l, M.mutl, 7l6(m.lp), 736 No.rm.lndy i~W>Uion (19!14). 601 No.rri.s, F;-;wk, <181 No.rri.s, Gtotgc, 499 NO.t'llt, in North Ameriu, 10-11, 16, 27{nup) No.rrh,lard (FI'WC'rid:), 108, 111, 127 No.rrh, Oliwr, 719, 730 No.rrh Arrira: pir;IC)' in, l7l: Wo.rld W.lr II in, 595, 599- 600 No.rrh Atnc'riec Ourdr in, 3l: Europe.ln rood~ in, 30- 36; lndi;m homtbncb in, l l(m.lp~ Sp.mUh l;md:c in, 71- 71, 81481, 95(m.lp}. S« 4lhtl Briri.dl Amtrk.l;

"'""''

No.rrh Atnc'rieul Ffflt Trade' Agftc>mc>m (NAFI'A), 741, 746 No.rrh Ad.mric Tft.ll}' Org~ni.urion (NATO), 61S, 747- 7.u!, 748 No.rrh Ct.rolitu, SS, 1IS, I fl.\, 167, 363, 649:in Ci\il Wu, 3!19: ftadmined ro Union, 356, 375; Rc>gul.uoD in, 109: ~(~ion oC, 322; ,;ir.in, 662: tc>Xcilt mills i.n,537 No.rrh D~oc..,J9l;bon;m:u r.•ums in, 397, 398 No.rrht-.ur, 163, 123. SN 4lhtl Ntw Engl.md No.rrhern Alli.lntt (Mghani.sun). 763 No.rrhern Conrederxy. 177 No.rrbern Pacific R..lilro.ld, 372,397,401 No.rrh Koru, 627~28, 643, 764: nu&.u .lrms or, 749, n3

1-24

IN:OEX

North (U.S.): bbd: migr;uian to, 489, 579, 607: Compromill:' of 1850 ;and, 304, 305- 306: d iuem in, 3!15-.346: fi~WKr in, 328: f~r bbeh in, 208: imp;an oCCivil Wu on, 3!13-J<14: MiJ$0uri Compromi.ll:' ;wd, I 90: Jkvuhniotw.ty 'W';ar in, 111--I 25: Mhool rdbrmJ in, 230-23 I: sl;~.very ;and, 190,325: SoUih romp;arrd ro, 329, 331: u.tb;~.ni:ution in, 258. S« IIIIo Union North Vitm.un,645,681..6!12,693, 719; bombing of, 682, 688, 694, 698. SIT $hr.> Vi!!m.un W';~.r Northwt$1 Co.l,;t lndi;~.ns_ 10 Northwt$1 Ordin.mcr( l787), llS- 136, 1!10,

,,.

Northwt$1 1~1Tinny, 135- 13~ 198

NoiWn, Ch.lrii'J Elior, 44!1 NO\'.l Srori.l, Il, 69, 94, 177 NOW. Ser N.u:ion.ll ~;ani.ution fur

"'-·

NO)><s.Joh.n Humphrey, 235 NRA. SN N.lrion.ll lttro\'
·=

Ob;~.m;~.,B;u-uk,

769, 77l, 777:drnion o f

2008 .1.nd, 784- 785 Omrp>lrioeul S.lfl'ly .lnd Hu lth Admini~ tr< Ckl!lfWI (Norri,), 481 Officf: o f Economic Opponunity, 674 Officf: o f Prkr Admintlrmion (OPA), 596, 597,620 Officf: o f Sciemi.fk Jk.JIC'.ll'
Ohio Riwr, l74, 194,101 Ohio R.iYtr Vatky, 135: F1'.llKr md, 79, 91: in Fn-ndl.1.nd fndi;an Wu, 93, 9!1: N;~.til.>< Ameriuru in, S.,80, 109, 156: Qutbtc'J d .litru to, I 12: Rt'V1.1Iution;~.ry w;~.r in, 126; .ll:'nlrn: in, 136- 137 Ohio Surf: Un iwnil)•, 343, 688-6119 Oil;~.nd oil indwny, 647- 648, 716: AI;~..d;m, 720, 740, 767; Anb.hruli hominy md, 700, 717: ;md llrW, in Mi>ddk E.lst,622, 613, 630: ;auwmobilr .and, 5!12; H;~.rdi ng .JIC'Oin.UI ;~.nd, 538: lnni.ln, 622, 644; lr;l()i, 765, 770: Kuv.·.liri, 737: n u iol\illixrd,in Mr.riro, S81k O PEC r mb;trgo, 719, 712: p!i«5 in, 724;$peCUI.ltian in, 784; U'LtSU in, 409-410: i.n Wort.:! W;u 11, 595. SN o~W Sund.udOil Ojibw.l fndi.u~, 677 O 'KtdTt, G< lkuKh ~ti cion, 114 Oliver, Andmo·, 99 Olmtc ptapll'$ (Muieo), 8 Olmen, Ehud, Olnut~ Frffil'rid: U.·, 249, 153, 274,485 Ot.nry, Ridurd, 413 Olyrnpkg.unr,; Btrlin ( 1936), 591; MoKOW' (1980), 711 Om.nibuJ Aet ( 1868), 374 On.ltr, Ju.ln dt,31 Onri.U rommu.nil)•, 235 Onri.U indi.m,, 120, 126 O'Ne-ill, Eug>~ngkd 8.ln ner, 311 Ordm in Council (Briuin), 183

7n

m

Ordin.lnae of 1785, 135- 136, 199 0JTgon,291, 5Sl: Bc-iri'h d..limJra, l78, lS
Odo AcrordJ ( 1993), 748 O~«nd M;mifio.no, 310, 314 O'S.ulli•·om,)ohn L., 191 o~W'.lld, ~.ee H.Mvry, 667 T6r0tli'f'f A111C'rie.! (H;mingron),655, 674 O tiJ, J.unrs. 96, 97, 99 Ou.w.·;~. lndi.lllJ, 95 O u onun Empirr, l3, 5Jl, S26, 527 OYed..tnd n.liiJ, ro YIC'$r, 285(m~), l87-l88 O vingron, M.ll)• Whfrr, 489 OWffl, Robert, l lS 0WfflJ, jl'.i.JIC', 591 Y. lhlitd 51.sto ( 1922),5!18

cr.,......,.

~cific Co.ut: Sp.u~i'h mi.uioru on, I 54;

U.S.d.Umto,l91 ~cific Oct.lll~"
B.llbO AmiW'.lr tna\" VtN
I.NOEX

P.uk5, ltOI!o.l, 656 P.ulian~~:nt (Britidl), 90- 91, 101, 113: ~Xc;un.. ~rn a.unpk, IJl: Bill ofR.ighn .u~d, 67; toloni.1l prm.e$1:$ .100,106: G
"""'~

P.ul}' JX!Iitio . SIT l>oliried p>U"tit:S n-t Awi"S4f'IW Grur R«.t (Gnnt), 488 P;aunt m~dkint:S, 497 P.lt.ef':lleln, WiDiarn, 139 n-t P.tll\ft!M'u(Coopc'r),249 P;aui;mh.ll f..tmilil'$, 212 P.ltMI'l.lgt', 437, 4.l7 P.lrnXI:'I lndi.ul$, 36 P;aul, Al.icJe, 492, 52~ 5!10 P.lUpc'ti$m,107. S« 4lllo Povtny(lht poor} P;awntf: lndian'-JIII- 382 Pa.non !loy$, 109 Paynr.Aldrkh 1'uiff, 499 1\o.lci" CO!ps, 665-666 J\o.1ci" Drmcx~ 345, 349 J\o.1lt, Nornu:n Vinctm, 652 J\-.1 R.idgt, Bmlt o(, 335 J\o.1rl Harbor, 471; J ;~.p.u~l'$t utxl on, 594-595 J\o.1Jilllf5, 21. &r.o1W Fumtn ;wd btming 1\ololi, Nancy, 765, 783- 784 1\ondlnon Civil Sttvkt An ( 1883), 457 1\onin$\llt Cunp>Ugn. 333 1\onn, Willi.1m, SS, 59 J\onns;yiV.lni.:.,S8- S9, 73, 177, 241, 713: .Wonion righu in, 740: Gil W'.u in, 342: to.ll mil'lf:' in, 405, 423: Con$1ltution o(, 132: lndiom Lmd' in, 109, 136; ltidl in, 159, 279: ltgiduure, 133; N.ttivt Amrri. Qll5 in, 80: oil ind~uy in, 409; pl.mt ttuh in, 762: ltt\'Oiution.lryW'.lr in, 122, 113, 124; Whisky Rtbtllion in, 152 n-t P...vii~'R~~~~i.l}wrns$~ 106 1\omuyiV.lnia R.1ilm.:.d, 408 1\oml}' pt":! S1.1tt:S. SIT l>opuli,;t P.any 1\oopk'll !«public oCChin-1. SIT China 1\oquot fndi.u~, S I 1\orlin'- FnllC!e5,563, 564, 568, 569 1\orot, H. R~, 741,751 1\orty, linroln (S1tpin Ftldlit), S82 1\orty, O iivtr»xurd, l&l, 184, ISS

l>tnhing,john J.,517, SIS l>tni.1n GulfWu ( 1991), 737- 738 l>t~n.1l wrnputrr, 71 1- 712, 745 l>tru, 139: lnu o(, ~ 28-29 l>ttf.lt'U$, o..vid, 770 l>ttrok-urn. SN Oil and oil indUm')' Phil.1ddphU, 59, 70, 109, II~ 247, 318: AM E thurcll in, 366: Biblt R.iou in, 182: bl..ck ghetto in, 432: Conmrurional Convmtion in, 138.-J4l;Cominrnul Congrt:SJ in, I ll: immignnu in, 73(m.1ph 431: influenZ~ in, 524; l.1bar mavtmtnt in, 420; populuiono(, 4Z7; ptwtn y in, 76: Rt\\)lution.1ry W'.lr in, 12~ u;Wt union' in, 106: W'.lter syurm in, 24~ 1>\)tk.ing d.1u in, 241: )'tliOlO'frvtr in, 167 Phil.1ddphU ;md Rr.uli:ng 1Wiro.1d, 464-465 7k P61T.Jn'pm.! Nrg,ro (Du Bois), 4l2, 445 Phil.1mhropy, 367,409, 413--41-t Philippint Otg.1nir An ( 1902), 474 Phili ppinl'$, 28, 645: gutrriiLl•'M in, 473- 474,616: immig:r;wo: frorn,SSO, 718: M.lttru in, 700; SJ»nidl Ameriun W;u .1nd, 472, 473: U.S. nav.al b.ul'$ in, 736; Wart.:! W;u U in, 595, 60 2 Phillip,;, O:wid G r;W.un, 48l Phillip,;, Kevin, 703 Phip,;, Willi.lm, 53 Photnix, Arimn-1, 498, 657 Phooogr.aph,4ll Pho10gr.aphy, 4ll, 481, 583: in 1930s, S7~

575 Phrtnolop•, l4S-246 Physkal fimt.u, 710-711 Physici.ul$ (dl}(ll.}n;),liO;d~.ut thtO!iu ;md, 24~3!16. SN .o1W 1-kahh: M~dkint l>khring.John, 173 l>kltu, Giecno'Oiit (ourv.'Orkh 206 l>itdmam n-gion, 73, 76 l>ier;wklin, 248, 306,310, 311;in dution of 1852, 308; KMIJil$ ailis .1nd, JIJ Pikt, Zcilulon, 195 Pilgtiln$, 36 1 bt Jlill, 679, 692 PiMhot, G if'IOrd, 498--499, 499-SOO Pi!dnty,Chatk,C.,I7~ 181 Pi!dnty,1 bom.u, 156, 157 Pint b.111'1:'ru ptapl~. 260,163 Pingm-, Hum, 481 Pinktnon Dl"ttttiw Agtn.:y. 412-423 Pianters, 194- 195, 18!1. S« $h" Stultn 7k Pi<1111Tn (Cooptr),l49 • PioMf:'n'" (politiu l danon), 768 Pippin, Ho~, 58!1 Pirxy, I06 Pin, Wilti.1m, 94, 98, 101, 107, I 14 Pitubu:rgh, 9~ 203, 20 4, 543, 577

1-25

llf.Uru fndi.tru, 10, ll(maph 79, 284, 379- 387. S« 4lllo Grut Pl.1i.n' P{,nmrd Rlrt»t6ual« Cury ( 1992), 740 llf.ulrtn ;wd plam01tion'> l56, 376: Civil Wu ;wd, 34~ 3!15; in w lonial n;a, 40, 41, 43, 44, 78:dtb' oC,Ul: Enlighrm. mtm .:~00,8S:i:n H.w.·;tii,430, 471:}ahn· wn .:~00, 356: nuturing of 5YJ!tm, US; Rt'rolutiol\ilt)' ··u .1nd, 12& $.1\ut(roppi ng.u~d, 368-369: d;r.-< f..tmilil'$ .1nd, 171: slaw bOOr tm, 26, 20~258, 260, 3l~"l;svt rtlisunct and, 274: ,;t.uc" ltgisla.tui'I:'J ;md, 263, U' nu.g.u;inr, 692 A't'SJ}' f( 1'tJpwiiDI (IS96), 462- 463, 6!11 1~0. SN Pa.lt:Stint L.ib
n,n.

SSl llfu.mbo.:-ah.llll.l'> 34 l>cd:tt 1o0tro, oC lintoln, 355 l>t:<, Edp Alltn, 249, 252-253 l>t:oindtxur,John, 729 l>oim Plt.U.lnl, 8mlt u, 109 l>ob00,527, SSJ, 74S;N.u;i inv;uian of, 59 I, 592; S!witt Union .1nd, 601, 610, 621, 621; WWU du1h t.unp5 in, 611 l>obruki, Rom;m, 712 l>olict bruuliry, 412, 688, 695, 740: bLack civil righu .100,669, 670, 672 l>oliried oliried bo.u5t'> 43~ 437, 4&2. SIT "fll) 1'--:l l>oliried lrgirimxy, 14 1 l>oliried m.ll'.hil'lf:5, 436-437,458. SIT $lw l'.1mmany Ha.ll l>oliried pllttit:S, 157- 161,452-457: <:nil WM, 32S-330;~mtrgtllC!e ot;. ISJ- 152: f..wrion5, 131, IS~ 171, 217: monty ~pply .100, 455--456: stroOO.J»n )' ~m. 225- 226, 308- 3 L4: •'Ofling. mtn's, l06. S« $h
P"rlJ'· S« iJIJIJifl«ifo: patty

l>olirin;: ;agnrU:n populilll, 461: of.mri. cornmuni~rn, 632- 636: colonial ~1'01, 8J~4; dtmoauintion o(( 1824-1832), 115- 212: ofup;w,ion, 288- 293: irnmi. gt.un, 283: in Old South, 264: penn}' ptt:U and, 246: Rtwnm'IKrian, 354-362: 1960$ uphuv.ll of,693.696: 1tkvi:lion .1nd, 654, 664, 722, 735: .1fter W.1terg.1tt, 719- nl: •'Omtn .:~00, 5!10. 541: World WM II, S99

1-26

IN:OEX

Polk, J;unt'$ """178; d«t:ion of 1844, 290-29!: On-gon md, 292-293;•'M • i rh Mo:ko md, 293- 29'\ l9S, 296 Polk, Ltonid.u, 461 Po lkKk,Juk.-., 653 Pollution, 415, 48S, S54- .SSS, 774: Kooomic gn.noU.. .u~d, 412--413: o:wne b)Yr ;md, 740: Supc'rfund $iru, 7 20 Pol l>ot (Umbadi.t), 699 Polyg;uny, Mormoru .tnd, 228, 392- 393 PortCJe dt 1.1:-0n,Ju.:~n, 30 Pomdw flurt(ll'dty), 653 Pomiu's n-botllion, 95-96 Poolt, Elij.th, 673 l'oo! peoplt. S« i'~II.U:, 8S

not

Popt,J.:~m~, 334

Popt mtalt, 61 Popn: ;and p;ap.w:y,lJ, 24. S« $h
Popul.uion: ~· boonll:'r, 65l ~S2: Clli. fumi.:~ ga!.:l t~h ;and, 199; toloni.tl t~, 49, 59, 71- 75: Europun, 21: inci'I'..ICSing di~nit}' in, n5: lndi;m l.;tnd$ wd, l09: M~o.umeriu, S: N.lcive Ameriun, 28-29, lll, 16S, .\!1 7; $1.:~"1', 74-75, lll, lS7, 268; ;md ,;c.t«"hood, in Wt"ol92; Sunbotl t, 6S I: urb.tn, 203,427-428: urb.ul Afriun. Amtrian, 366: in u tb.tn Midv.Y"o141; l>l'$tw.trd mcwrmtnt of, 194 Populi$! l);my, 452, 454. 466, 468,503: tknion o( 1891 ;md, 461, 464; rx:Um ;md, 462 All3)• ~INIIkn (optu), 547, Sill Port Huron Smtment, 686~87 Porumoud1, Trut}'of( I90S), SIO Pom~g;aJ, 24, 29(m.:.p): Afrk.t .tnd, lO(m.:.p): Angob .:~00, iilO; Bm:il ;md, 17:uplor. tn from, Z7(m.tp)t $);roy mtdt .md, lS- 26 Pouro f.unine, 281 Po tl.tuht$, 10 Poto~ Ri...u, 43 Pond.tm Oed.u;r.tion,61J, 613, 624 Pou.w.·.:~wmie M.tuun-,lOJ, JJl l~l'rty Point, Loui..:i.uu, 7- 8 l~l'rty (tht poor). 466, 746; birth row:rol ;md, 493: in Btmon, 99: in w loni.tl Ch~.tpe~kc-, 43; in tolonUI citic-5, 76- 7F. d~.l~ in ( 1960s),676: t Xp.ul$iOn wd, 191: Fnn« .u~d, 72.:inGrur ~prt:Uion, Hap.m.K, 6S7, 718, 77F.offri:!.h immigi'Mi t5, 207-2~. 282: in Luin Amtrk.t, 736: Mtdiaid .tnd, 67S: in

sn:

19SOs dtie~~; 6S5;$Iu~ttropptn md, 370: SOO.tl Gocspd ;and, 4.39; of Southern dl.uuroppers, 370, 4 IS; untmpiO)'t'll:nt .u~d, 207: urb.ul howing fur, 241, 243; utb.ln rdbrmtn md, 437-440: l/l)f.C'J of, in 2000 dtction, 753: W'uon Poa'dtrly, lh.-,nct V., 420-421 l>o.Yil, Co lin, 76), 76S l>u.Yil,john W't:~lt}·, <WI )>,;n.yll, ltv.·i~ 704 l>oan. Ser Ekmidry; Entrs,y: H)'d.roeltro'k d.tm$ l>oa·h;at;~n, W'.ln: with Engli$h, 34,3S, 4J Pr..pou.tiSitl (J;t.mt:~}. 480 J>uguo:, 591 llr;tirie, 446. SN ,.(!J) G~.tt Plain' llr;tirit~~; lll'ltknll:'nt of, 238 llr.tn, Rklurd Htnry, .\!16 llr.tying tawru, Sl, Sl llre'dt:lrin.trion, 23, 14. 226 llre'tmption r igh t5, 200 llre'tmpt:i\Y w.tr, 764 llre'gn.u~q·, 111. Ser ~(14 B.irthrUC" llre'judkt, 339: bC.lcL .u~d,JJ9, 391: Mtxi. uru .tnd, 608. Ser ~fl4 Oi$C'r'imil\iltion; R.tci" .u~d r.td~rn llre'W,uri.tru, 73, 87, 117, 266, 267 llre'lidtmy. Corutirution.tl p01>Yn: of, 140: d «tion of (Sclt Eltnion$): Nt10· Ot.ll .tnd, 569-570 llre'lidtmi.tl Comrn.U..:ion on 1ht SutuJ of Womtn,678 llre'lidtmi.tl wto, l40, 357, 487; Fotd, 719: Jx.hon, 119, 221, 222: lincoln,JS5: M.tdiwn ;and, 188; Pulk .tnd, 297: R.C'.:~g;an, 736: Trum.:~n, 610, 619, 63S: 1)·1er, 289 llre'lidtnt'5Commiutc" on Civil Right5, 63~3 1

llre'sky, EIYi5, 6S9 llre'u, frudom of, 84. Ser,.(!J) ~ers I~Gtafll:', 184, 186 !Iori(~ tonr:rol.s on, Wand W'.u II, 596, S97, 620: gnin, in W't 5t, 391: n~u .tnd, 409; W;t.l.M.trt .u~d, 709- 710. 5« ,.(!J) F.um produn prit~ l>rin«ton, &mlt of, 112, Ill l>rin«ton Uniwr.r.:ity. 87, SOJ Tht Pri»rip(rufXit11tifr Mo~ll~g'ltlnJJ

(1'.,.,.), 483 l>riwru .tnd romieu, 74; blxl mtn in, n6: in C'rvil Wu, 347; d cilrol3, 81: k.uing of, in Sourh, 376, 414. 462.: ufMm o(,ll~ W'.lr of «"mw ;md, 763, nl - 772: in World Wu U, 61l ~ l2

llriuttc"n, ISS llfod.tm;uion or 1763, 9S-96, 109 llfod.tm;uion orAmn~l}' ;and Rtwruuuc. rion ( 1863),354, 356

Pnxttr .u~d Gambit , h\)f}'Su.lp .tnd, 4 11 ProfeJ$iol\ill Ai! l hffit Conuoller.l Org.:~ni. :urion, 724 ProfeJ$io~. ul..ld: on, 210 Prog1'1:'55,8S: d.trk $ide o(, m: 1bofl'.lu on,

250 ~gmillld Am-~ (Gc-otgr), 424

Progl'l:'uive P:my, 500,501, 503, 540,631 Progl'l:'uiYi~rn, 476- 503: ton$u:mel' prottction ;and, 496-497: trwironmem wd, 497-499: immigntion .tnd c-uSI:'nia , 487-481k inr.eOI'I:tu.tl$ wd .uti~U, <180-481: rui~rn wd, 488--491: Roost'\Yit .tnd, 495-496: w.l.fC' ;and klal ufMm, 481-490: urb.ul UC'.U md, <182, 484-4117; Wil.-. .u~d, SOJ-503: •'<~mtn .:~nd, 477, 478, 491--493: wofltN ;and $()(i;ili~rn, 494 ~ 'lh\Jrld Wu I md, S20, Sl4-525 Prohibition, 487: Eigh«"tmhAmtndmtnt, S03, 524-525, SS2-553, AU: R'pe.tl of, S53 Prohibition ;and Homt llfotl'l:tion p;tny.

'-''

Promi.st Kttpm, 757

T6r Ph>111M II{A1Rtrk~ll Lift (Cro1r), 480, 500 Promontaf}' Point (Uuh) r;tilroMb lin.kt>:l .ll, J8!l Prop;ag;and;c NtwDetl, 568: pto..d.t...uy. US; World W;u 1, 519, S20: World Wu U, S94, 59W99, 6()4, 605 Property .tnd proptny righu, 41, 75: in roloni.ll Nt'V>' England, 48.: dtniw offino .tnd,SJ-84, U2, 1Jl: in South,3S8...JS9, 364; voting .tnd, 68, 132, Ul, U6, 208. Sl'l'$lw I..Uid Prwperity, 141. Ser ~64 We.tlth Prw~r, Gabritl,l73

Prwtirnrion, 111,4311-439: l.tWJ: prohibit. ing. 486-487, SlS: in W't 5f, 397 Prott.:tioniJm. 5« 1'.trif& Prott:n.ml A5$0d.ttion, 69 Prott:n.mcism, 101, 208: ;abolition ;md, 2.32 ~ .tmi.imm.igr;mr $()(itti~ .tnd, 2&2, 311: in Engbnd, 67: tv.lllgdied, 227, 229, 230, 166, 267, 275: fund.untm.Ui~rn, 5S0-551, 652- 653: immignnn md, 487: M.uy. l.u~d Urhotic:s ;and, 40-41, 69: Mnieln$ .tnd, 285: mi.uionuitJ in O in;a,508: MormonUm .u~d, 228, 278; progrt:Uiv. i$m .tnd, 482; public doob .:~nd, 4 49: .u rdbm~~:n:, 223,437, 439, 449: Rtpubliem p;tfl)' ;and, 4S5: UYh'.l! of, 65,86-8!1, 210, 226-229;$l:rol't}' ;md, 266, 215; W'hig p;tny ;and, 290. SN ,.(!J) Puri un': ~ ~a

Prott:n.ml Rdbrm.lcion,ll- 14 Prott:n$: .-g rui.tn, 4S9-461: ;mci.dnft, in Union,l45: ;anti.M.t$01lf}', 223: .tmi. nutk.u, 727-728: boyroru, 677, 6!19, 71l, 7S6: Coxty', Mm}' ;md, 46S: .u Jkmo. auk romYmion, 670, 69S: )bym.uktt

I.NOEX

rio1 ;tnd• 4 22.: o f inunig r u ion ttform, 783: N;triVI' Amtl"ieln, 677, 717: rop1 unu-.tlinrion ;md, 66; Sump An, 9& .srrikt:S, 206, 282: m~dtm sit-in~662:of Vitnw.m W;tr, 663, 678, 682, 6.'113, 6!18, 695, 698: ~-~. 80: llf )'C!Uth, 660. S« $lw Boyrou s.:Civil righu tna\'trnc-m: Sui ke"$ Pnwi dtn.:t, fbunding or,. 47 Pllbl.ic Cn-dit Act or 1869, 372 Pllbl.ic huld1, 48S, 524. Sero~Cs';1.«'! ;tnd s;tnitolrion, 243- 244 Pllbl.ic Wotl, Adminim u ion (PWA), S6~ 566, S6S, 572, 573, S74 Pllbl.ic •urk.s prognm~ 364: Gmu Otptt:S· .sion, S60 Pueblo l.ndi.ln,;, 7. 31, 81, 82, 581: muir b}·, 6 1- 62,79 Puerto R.iu.n,;, 30, 473, 580, 6 56, 677, 775 Pulio:n, Jrutph. 442, 47l Pullm.m P21au Car Comp.u1y, 4 23 Pun.k nd mu,.X, 71.2 Purd ue Uni~o0er.~ity, 343 Purt Food ;tOO Drug An ( 1906), 497 Purir;m,;, 24, 68: Church or Entbnd ;wd, 36, 4S: "city upon ;t hilf' ;tnd, 4S- 46, SO, 66;tronomk .:~00 tdigiou' r.emion~ 49-50: up.uu:ion ;wd Naci\'t Ameriu~t~, 45, 50-Sl: in H.iaTbom t', M"rkll.m", lS I -252.: in Nt'V>' Englomd, 36,45 -53, 66: Salem witdlcnfl ;tnd, 5 2- S3: rowru, f.unili.e,; ;wd (;ttn!$, 48--49 Pm:in, Vladimir, 74~ 773 Pur.i.n.B.l)·, Boutk o f, 184, 18S Pum.un, RobtlbiK Wofl, Admini m;~.tion

AJ Q;ltda, 762 Quaker.!, 58,87, 109, 130, 5 21: ;tbalirion ;wd, 166, 231 QuarrtringAn ( 176.>).102 QuarrtringAn ( ln4), lll Qu.ui.Wu, with Fnnu, l60 Quaylt,J. Oanfon.h, Ill, 7l5 Quebec, 60,94 Quebec Acr ( 1774), Ill QuttnAm..-,':1 'W';tr, 69 Quttn'll Colkge (RurgtBh87

Qu~$Wn, B.ud t or,. IS~ ISS Qui>:b(poliriell furio nh 178 Quinn, AnthOil}'>657 Quimun, John A., 310 Quor.u, on immigr;lriem, 635 -636,675 Quor.u, D t i;tl, 717

R"66it RM (Updik.e), 653 Rabin, Yi W!ak, 748 Run nd rOici.sm, 26, 166, l9F..mrid.rug cru.s.ule'$ and, 487: Asil~t~ ;tnd,SlO: black$ ;tnd, 400, 44.3, 472-473,488- 491, 571: d nfr, in Wo rld War I and, Sll: txp.m.sioni~rn ;md, 469: fl'teowikB ;tnd, 309;Wrvryma~nr ;md, SSl: Muiu.n.t\mtrie.m.s ;tOO, 400; in militu}', 51~ min!UI:'I .shows ;md, 247- 248: Na.:l:i, 588,607: oonvioltnr d irtcr.acric n p m«'IU, 6 56: progtt~ivi,;m ;tnd, 488-491; Rt>:l Sutt ;md, Sl8- S29: :d;t\>try ;md, 4~ 265; in Sou1h Ct.tolin;t, 77- 78; Sp.u1Uh. ,;puk.en: ;wd, 393, 395:1: Rc!o.ut">tlr ;wd, 490,497: in woflpboe, 579: i.n World W;u U, 604, 606- 607. S« $lw Disnim in;t. rion:Jim Cnno.· l.w.'ll: Lyncllinp; R;ttf: r iOI:!i; Stg:rtprion Rut riou: ( 1964-1968), 67t 4672,694: Arl;tnu, 489: Chiugo, 694: Otm!i1 (19!13), 607: E.ut St. loui-s ( 1917), Sl4: H;trlt m ( 1935), 580: LO$ Mgdt~ 608, 671, 740; Tt~J.Stc" ( 1 ~6), 630:1tx;u, 395; W'.uhingron, O.C., 694 Racial tqtuli ry, 232 Racial mi.Ung, 29, 77, 79:Jdfei"JJ((n ;tnd, 171- 112: mul;trtm, 261 - 262,273 Racial stgn-g;trion. SIT Stgfl't;uion Radical Rtpublkan~32 1 , 328, .13~339: dution o f 1864 ;md, 348- 349:Joh.n$0n imptadmW:m md, 359-360: Rl'l:o~t~rrur. rion and, 354, 355, 357, 358,375 Radical$, S18- Sl9, S67: in 1 9~ 679, 6!17; Worfd W;u I, 520-Sll Radio, S40, 54J.544, 581-582,606, 621: blu kli!U in, 6l3- 63tf:'llm drw:uit ;md, 252: rate'$, f..umtn: md,

J-27

<107-408, 4S ~ 460: nit$ of, 49~rtfriger· ;trtd an:, 398:.snder.l ;tnd, .\!18- 389: " 'ik,e, in, 620- 621: rnruronri.nt nul, 34J. 372, 380, 3118, .\!19(nup): Wllfltt Jilfnyin, 4 17 ltainf.lll, in Grt;tr Plain.s, 392. Sl'l' "f14 Droughr ltain.sfbrd, Wilti;tm S., 439 ltakigh, 'W:tlr.er, 33 R.lltl<~ll" (J.rlwnh 394 ltandolph. A. Philip, 606 lt;mdolph.Joh.n, 178- 179 ltandolph.Macon rolk~, 267 lb.rifiario n: oCArridtJ of Ccnfedtruion, 134: U.S.Coruriru tion, 1!11- 143 lbuKhenbwd-. W';tlrn , 439 1lt R.!u't'n (l>ot), 253 ltay, J;tme'$ E.ut, 6~ 14 R"~ lhtid>l (politiul p.uryh 677 Rt.dtr's D:ifu, 543 ltt..ldmiuion, of Sou1hern sure'$, lSS, 356, 375 ltug;tn, lto1Wld,641, 675, 690, 715, 731: Contra W;tT ;md, n5- 7Ui: ff.ln.co ntn K;tndal.:~OO, 729 - 730; miliurybuildup ulllkr, 727- 71:8, 730, 739: "rt..olurionor,. 721.-728 ltug;toomiN, n4-ns ltu!poliril , Nixon and, 696, 700 lttbotltion. S« I«-Yoou ;tnd ttbdlions.:SI.:~•"t: n-botllio~t~

lttelll ptrition, 482 ltt«uiott, 76, 533, 784; ( 180!1-1810), 182, 183: 1990, 739- 740, 741: colonial er;a, 96, 99: fbUowi.ng l>ank of 1857, 319-320: G.W. Su.sh ;md, 766- 767: Roo5nT.!r ;tnd, S73- S74;in 19705,719, 720: in 1 980~ 724 ltMproriry. SN Soci;tl rtcipro:iry lttrorurrunion, 353- 377: rong:rtuional, 35S-3S9, 362, 364: Ccmritm:ion md: t m;tncipa.tion ;md, 356, 366- 370: tOO o f, 375- 3n, 461; Frft.etmh Amtnd.mt:m ;md, 360-361: fouJUtn th AmtOOmmt and, 357-35~36 1 , 367. 373: l inrot.n'll pbn fot, 354-3SS; poli tiN of, lStnon, 677

1-28

IN:OEX

lkd R.i\'<'r Valky, •·hut in, 397, 398 lkd R.i\'<'r W'.lr, 38!1 lkd Sarr:: (1919-1920), Sl8- 529;(19!15195l), 632- fil6. SIT sin> Cold Wu lkd (Somt) Armr, 621: in World Wu ll, 595, 600, 601, 610 lkdv.~ Narion.ll P.uk, 676 lktd, W.llter, 508 lkfertndum, 316, 482, 491 lkfMmarion, in Europe', 23-24 lkfMms.21W15, 2l3, 2l9-235:Qmpaign fi.nanc>~, 767- 768: ei\il $tt'\io:, 4.53, 4S6AS7: htahh md, l4S; lndian l.U1d5 and, SSt: middle' d.u5 and, 427: nariw. born t\rnl:riun5 ~,<128: of~ni unriaM and as;yfu.nu, 23!1: public tduucion, 448- 449; 5tnknll:'nt hou~ mavtmc"nr, 439-44.0; urban diu", 437: urban poor and, Abalirion: N!"Vo' Ou t: Progrr:uiilim lkfriger;~.cion,398

lkfup,;: in Balkaru, 747;)"'"· from Nui Germany, S91-S92, Gil , 632; Palt.n i.nUn, 727;Vitmarn W'.u, 7S9- 760 lkg;m, Donald, 729 lkguLlcion: bwi.nc>u, 479, 483-48!1: ron. 5umer prntted, 566. Srr "/so W'df.ut lkligian: aurhariryof, 210:culrnrt wan: md, 756- 757; Enlighunmc>nr a:nd, 8S- 86: GI'C'ar AW'.lk.-ning md, 86~ NariVI' Amtrt.:..n, 13.,382; in Ntw Eng. land, 47: RC'futmarion, 23- 2<1; ri~ or popubr, 226-l29: Stope5 trial and, 350: 5la•'C':l, 275-276: ~tr:sr Af~.U'I, 18.5« sin> Chrilri.ulil}': ~· ;md mini~«n; spm'fot~tr

lkligiau5 Right, 743, 768,769 lkligiau5 roltmion, 41, 47, 59, 87, l34 lkmingwn, Frt>:lc>ric, 400 lknai.liunn",I9, 2J lkpamioru, World Wu I, S2~539 lkpon on MaufutUIT$ (H;unil.ronh 150 RI'(Nrl Oft dlt U!JdJ oftbt Arill Rqjrms q{dlt liis.':llll Swa(PtY.ffll), 401 lkpon on dlt Narianal Bank (H.unil ronh ISO-lSI lkpon on dlt Publit: Crtdir (H;unil.ron),. 149 lkprC':SI'lluci\'<' gcn'<'mmtm, ll2, 119: in U.S. Conlrirution, J39

ltc>publit:.UIDm. IJl, 151: Sour.htm tlitC':S and, 157- IS8 ltc>publit:.U'I marherhaod, 16S ltc>publit:.U'I pany, JS I, 15S- IS9,453: ami. Carholici:un and. Uil: Ctinran'l im. pNChmtm and, 752: Con~t'\';~.cism in, 6Sl, 67~ 756, 779; Drol Srm u.st 315: furionali5m witbin, 171, 17& f.um. u'J .U'Id, 199: ~derali5u and, 160, )76, 215: l ~urgr:nu, 499, SOO: !ITC'cand!.Wits. 528.; Kan5.U a im and, 312-313: Kn~N·· Naminp and, 311: land l.w.·s and, 390: linroln Eltcrians.: Radia l Rt-publicaru ltc>publit:.U'I dltotim, 101 ltc>publit: of Koru. Srr Sourh Korc>a ltc>publit: Stt!el Company, S78 lte'$ardl uniVI'nir:y, 436, 658 lte'$C'IV.Uioru (Indi.m), 380, 382-.383, 384, 386, .\!17, 399, S81: suppan withduwn from, 657 lte'$ttrltme~n Admini5uuion, 568, S74 lte'$idc>nria1 Mg~Uion, 432,439 )tC'$totUiontoJoniC':S, S~ 57 ltc>uikr.c: dtp.urmtnr srott~~; 434-435, SlS: di$(1.}Unt dlai.n5, 709- 710, 773 R.n~f1rll )$»!('$ (dC'$lnJ)'<'r), S93 ltc>ur,At-c, 481 ltc>urhtr, W;~htr, S77, 5~579 ltt"'<'nut An of 1767. SIT l'a-n.d!c>nd duM Jtt'\'C'nUC' An of 1942, 597 ltt"'<'n", Po~.ul, 107, Ill ltt"iuli5m, PnK~.nmr, 65, 210, 226-229: G.rtat A•'ak.-ning,86-Sik SKond G.t'C'.nAW'.lk.-ning, 226- 217: Shaken: and, 228.-229: Unitari..ul5 and,227 ltt"'Oiu and f'C'bdlian,.; B.uon•~~; 43-44; in Cub.&, 471: Ltisltr'5,6~9: N.lcive Amer. icoln, 95- 96: llutbeo, 61~1 79: Slw)'l''ll, 137- 138: WhisltyRtbdlian, 152- 153: by youd1, 6S9~60. Srr.o1Cw Slaw: f'C'bdlian5 ltt"'Oiurianary Wu, 118- 131: black$ and. l19-120, 12~ 130-UJ: n$U.Utie'$ in, llari5 and, 127- 128: $0dal changr md. 128.-UJ: in Saurh, 126-l27; in Wr:sr, 12.5- 126;whiu mal~ tqual:iry in, 128- 129: whiu wome'n in, 129 ltt"'Oiurian,;: Fn"ndl, 91, 14.5, 153, 154- 155, 157; in Muico,511; in N~.u;~.gu;a, 725;

in Rw!U,S l7, 527;~xual, S4S, 69 1 -692, 710; in 1~us.286-l87 Rhindand, 51!8-589 Rhadt b land, 66, 6~ 115, 134: Comrirution and, 143; founding of, 47 Rhad~,J.unt:S, 688,689 Ric"> Condoltt:tU, 761, 764 Ric"oJosqlh M.l)'<'r, 448.-449 Rice-: tl.d ci\•;~.tion,.iS-S6, 71, 81, 369 Ridurdian, EDiou, 706 Richmond. Vi!JinU:.u Conftdtmc-: Qpit;l), 329, l3l,Jl4, 3SO: iron •'OIL in, lSS-259, 316;5law f'C'bdlian in. l68 Rich.poor p.p, l07, 746, 766. SIT ~fso Eqmt. iry and intq\lalil}' Rit.un.U'I, Ih'id, 649 Rifle'$, in Civil w,.r, 33J. !iN Mill Gun5 Rig.u, John 1".,. 766 Righu. Srr Civil righu: N.uur.ll righu: Voting righu "'Right to l.ifio'' IOO'o'C':mtnt,715 Rii:l,j;Kob, 437 Rio Gr.llldt, 31, 82,293., 294 Riou: ami.dr;Ut in Nonh, l4S: in colonial Bruton, 99: lkmatnric Conwmion (1968), 69S: r.Uiw")'wotktr, 413: in wurhern riti~, 362. SIT sin> Rut lion nr Ri.»T(dornmtnury), S&l Rivers and HMbors Bill of 1846, 297 Ro.u!J ;md high•'il)'S, 196, 10l(map),219, SOl, 650, 6S I: inunco~.t.e 5)'$tc'm. 6!10: Wttypro~ fbr, 676 Ro.mokc> rololl}'• 33 Ro.uing 1V.'<'nrits.533 Robards, R.xhd, 218 Robtn~)ohn G., Jr., 781 Robtnwn, Pat, 715, 757, 767; Chri.srian Co.ilirionof, 741, 7<1l, 769 Rob~on, Paul, 547 Robin$0n, Edv.·ud G., 582 Robin$0n,Jxlit, 616,630 Rothr:srer, NtwYarlt, 217 Rotlwnd.roll mu5ic,6S9 Rotk.eklltr,John D., 409, 413, 4J.S, 46!1 Rotk.eklltr,John o.•Jr.. 486 Rotkingham. MarquD of, 100 Rotk-..l'U, Norman, 6311 Rotky Mounr..Uru. gold and silwr in, 380, 382 Rotoro furnirun", 243 Rot.: W.sdr(l973), 691, 7ll, 71~ 740, 768,

782 Rolfe,}alln, 34 Rolling 5roi'IC'5C'Onn"rt, 691 Ronun Cuholici5m. SIT Catholic Chu.f'C'h; CarhaticdlUrdl Ronunia, Sll, 601, 610, 621 Ronuncici~rn, 2SO Ronuncic lovr:, 210 Romt-Btrlin.Tok)oo AxiJ. SIT Axi5 l>ov.'<'n, WorldW'u ll

1-29

I.NOEX

Roocst'vdt. Ekanor, .SSS, 562, 563, 57J, 5!18: $0i th GetmMI}'• 517: •·.u v.ith }-"p.ut, SIO: W'orid W'u I md, 511. Su <~(111 Sovt.er Union (USSR)

Ru~ian R.eYO!ution, 517, 527 Rur~n: Uniwn:il}'• 87

Rurh, Bah.-, 544 Rwand.l, 747:gmocidt in, 750

or

S.abint Riwr, 191 Sauj..,.·u, ln S..«<, Nioo1~5!19-550 EI.Sad.u, Amt.·u, 721 S..ftly, •urlt-pb:t, 48!1• 701 S..g>::'l'$ from, 159; :d.:ro-.. JTb
or, ar,

~,

!ffllmg ~54]

•suurd~y

Nighr M.usacJT.. (Nixun), 706 S..udi Aubi.l, 727, 731, 762: bombinp in,

749

S.:ro·ag.-. Augu,u, 547 S.:ro•;mnah, Gtorgia, 78: in Civil War,l49; rounding so S.:ro•;mnah (gra~land). 17- 18 S.:ro-.. dlt Whak$ eunpaign, 713 S.:roinp-.:~00-loan indwrry, n4, 729, 739 S.:roio, Mario, 687-6118 Sra.bv.·.w, l62- 36l,376 Su.lia,Anronin, 729, 740 Sr.mdal: Oiman and, 750, 751 - 752,755, 757: Harding md, 53S;Ni:ron md. 705- 706; Rug.:~n ;and, 729- 730 Sr.mdi.navian~ 429, 43l, 513 1lt Sr11rkJ LtlrtT (H.w.1harm"), 25l, 253 Sr.httltr, Charlt s, 5!16 Sdmtk ·~ UnitrJ Sl.oltt'l ( 1919),522 Sr.hbB}·, PhyUi~ 714- 175 Sr.hmding. M.u, 591 Sr.hool~ S77; dl'$tgrrgarion, 641- 643, 656, 660, 704.:t-.olution uught in, 550: (Of' ftw: bla(k$, 20!1: Frttdom s~haol~ 670; fM Indian rhildtl:'n,l86: reform or, 230-131, 283: ll:'grrprian or, 414,463, 510: 'hooting in, 756: YOUdlU plt~ fur, 767. SIT $hP 6duurion Sr.hudwn, Mir.hul,247

or,

Sr.hu~Carl,47l

Sr.h•·;ud:apr, Norman, 7311 ScierKr: Enlight.enmtm ;a00,85: phmwlog.y and, 245- 246: rrligion ;md,550: Watt.:! Wu 11, 598. S« Mstl 1edmolog.y Sciencili<: firming. 76,260, 549 Sropt:S rrial, 550 Soor5-lri'h stnlers, 73 Soon, 10m, 408 Soon, W'alt.er, l49, 152 Soon, Winfidd, 295, 296: in dtrtion of 1852,308,3ll Sooui'h immig:r;um:, 429 Sooruboro Bays, 579, 580 S«t.iJion,319: Gt«gia plarfMm and, 305: ar Kurlbtd Con•mtian, 186: mOVC"mtnr fM, 321(map), 322. SNMstl Conrtdtnrt Sur.e,:o(Amtriu Stw00Amtndrw:nr, I47,AIO S«oOO B;m.k ofUnittd Surt:S, 188,200 S«oOO Grut A•·;il;ening, 210, l26-l27 StwOO p.uty ~'$f.em: rollapll:' of( 18531856), 308- 314; intknion aC 18!10, 225- 226 StwOO W'orid W'u. SN World W,.r II SI'Crionalism: Mtxir.m W'.u ;and,l97.,1a.-et}' and, ISS, 189- 190; Tariff aC 1828 .md, 118-219 S«uritie'$ and Exdlangt Cammi»ion, 565 StditionAn ( 1798), 16l Stdition Amtnd.mmt ( 1918). 521 S!'!e~r, ALut,520

Stgrrgarion,l67- l68, 374,443,490, 6JJ, 669; bw bayron ;and, 65~ r.hutdlt:S, l75;d.:ll:'gttg.uion and, 641- 643, 656,

ar

1-JQ

IN:OEX

~g~g.ufun (tMtiwJ~nl)

660, 764: in miliury, 340, 518, 607, 616: of nilro.ul p.u~np:'n.240; ~,:Kkmi.ll, 432, 489; of$dloob, 20!1, 2JJ, 414,463, 510: S.upl'l'mt Courr ;md, 462-463, 489, 616- 617 ~ltniw Servit<: An ( 1917), SIS, 68!1 ~lf.emplaymrnt, 209 ~lf.gO'o'l'mmrm, 9~ 102, 103: cok!ni.ll, 83;

in colonial Ma~xhuM"u~ 4.5, <16: natt· hood and, 136 ~lf.madt rn.:n, 129, 207,211, 227 ~lf.rdianc~ 209 ~lf•.mi'IKiffiC}', lOO: in rolonial Nonh

Amtrka, 36: Gtrman immgtmt, 281: mercamili~rn md, 70: in South, 25~ 260.

261, 262, 263 ~lnu, Alah.tma, 670 ~btu m Montgomc'ry nuteh ( 1965), 662 ~minale Jndiaru, 191: r~l of, 196, 197 ~n;ue, U.S.: MOOn Ameriuru in, 363: crruurt o ( McCarthy by, 640- 641: ChaM"

impt;tehment md, 174; Clinron impe.Jdl. mtm and, 752; Corutirnrional J!O"'l'n: of, 140: dirut tknion or, 503, A 1.3; lmd. lip:'noe Comminct rtpOrr, n1:Johnwn impe~chment md, 360:Judici.uy Com. miu re, 740; league of Narioru and, 527, 528; Panama C;m.tl and, no: papular election of, 503: tn'al}' .tppnn•;d by, 140, 290, 293, 310: m'.ll}' ~lt>:l b)•, 371; W.:~t~.tlt M"M~d.tl and, 706: Wolid War I itwuriguion md, 590 ~ni'O F.tlb Conwmion, 233 ~ni'O Jndiaru, 166 ~ntg.tmbi.t, l 7, 26, 72(nup) ~nM"nbtl'nner,J.:~mC$, 783

doo:uint, 463_, 642 ~p.tmt $phtl'l', fbr womm, l09, 211- 21l, 251, 447, 493, 71.4 ~p.tr.nion orpown~, 140 ~pttmbtr II (2001) mroti,m, 760- 765 ~rbia, 512,747 ~IY.Illl5. S« lndcmortd M"tY.lll ~ SlaloOI':I ;md d.mory ~rvi«men'$ Rcadjuwncnr lin ( 1944), 618- 619 ~rvi« M"ctor, 710, 717, ns ~ulcmem Howr mO'o'l'mtnt, 439-440,
·~but equal•

So: .tnd MXualil)', 493;Ciinmn Janda.J, 750, 751- 752, 755, 757; i .:IJ' ;wd lt,bian, 608,692, 713, 714, 742, 756, 768; health and, 24.5; pmnitution,397, 4.\!1- 4.39, 486-4117, 525; lt.ICIUI m'Oiurion, 545, 691- 692, 710 Tht Stx Silr"{Lifo (I:Xnntt), !193 So:IUI h.:~nmnem, 740, 75 I So:IUI inequality, 233. SN Mlo Gtndtr; Womtn's righn So:IUIIy.u.m,mincddiM".UC$, 153- 154, 296, >t30;AIDS, 691, 710, 713 Sqmour, H on tio, 3i'O Sh.:~kcn, 228- 229 Sh.:~kc5pe.trt, Willi.un, 247 Tht SIM"l'.Rt uft6t Ciliu(Std'ft:ru), 481 Sh.:~rMrnpping. 3611-370 and m.:~p, !liS, 489, S77;Nt1>· Otal ;n.cl, 565,568, 574. 583 "Sh.uc Our Walth" progr;un, 567 Sh.:~ron,Ariel, 727,772 Sh.w.•no:t lndi.m,, 79, 93, 109, 156: la.ndJ of, U6: li-rumM"h .:~nd, 183 Sh.:IJ'$'5 Rlfltll::ion, 137- 138 Shttn, Fulton J., 652 Sl.'t'lltJ 1'. Kr.ttlllltr( l948), Gll ShtiW..tldo.th Vatlry, Civil Wu in, 348 Shtp.ud,M.•mhtw, 756 Shtpp>~rd.lm.•no:r An (1921), 540 Shtridan, Philip..3!18, 350 Shtrman,}oh n, 372- 373 Shtrman, WiDi.un 1'«unudt,3!17-3!18, 349, 36~..\85

Shtrman Anci.lfwt /Ia ( 1890), !109-410, 423, 453, !194, !196, 502 Shtrman Silvn l>tuch.:~M' llct ( 1890), 456, 465 n1 Shiite Mudinl.$, 727, 738, Shiloh, &udt of,3l5 Ship$ ;wd dlippmg, 25, 156; C.:~mb!!di;a ;wd, 719-720: e.m.ili .:~nd, 200- 202; in Civil Wu, 337: N.wiguionllct .md, i0- 71; pl'i\•;autD, I .iS; d..lw shi p5, 7>t$tt.un. p0Wl'rtd, l01, 203; Wolid w..r 1, 513; World W;u 11, 593, 596; :\'YZ AIT;tir .:~nd,

no,

l60.SI'l'MWN.n>J' Shoe indum-y, 163, 416, 481 Sho.dmnt ptOplt, 177 Shulo:, Gtotgt. 731 Shuult diplom.tq, 700 SKil}·, i.n ~rid W..tr iJ, 601 Sitm 000, 402,497,499, 54J, 713 "Tht Signifianoe of 1ht Frontier in t\mtri. un History• (1Urno:r), 399 Silent Gentntion, 653, 686 Silent Majorily, 695 SaklltS}.Iri!ls(c.r-t), 649, 665 Silico n \hlky, 648, 712,75 4, 765- 766 Sihl'r, 29- 30. 224; roin~, 372, 373, 455, 456_, 466-467; Mexian, 28!1; mining in Wt$1, 3&2, 395 Simp$011, 0. J., 755

or,

Simpson, • SocJdr:si' jeiT}', 461 Sinclai.r, Upton, 496-497, 522 Singo:-r Stwing Muhint Comp.tny, !110 Siow: l.ndi.ul$, 79, .\82, 38J, 677, 718; Ghocst ~>.mer mO'o'l'mtnt md, 386-J87: rcm. r.moe b)•, 384-J85 Sitflan Sitfl.:~n, 695 Siriu,John, 705- 706 Sister Gtrr.it (On-iM"r), 445 Sit.dawn nrikt, Sn-578, 579. Ser .tf~~> Stikn: Sir.in mO\'I'mtnt, 662 Si.tring Bull, 385,386- 387 Six~th Amtndrn.:nt, 503, 520, A 13 Sixth Amendrn.:nt, /111 Skilling. }tfrnor, 766 Skin color, dUcrimin.:~tion .tOO, 417, 4Jl Sla.dl •.:~nd.bu.rn ;a,grieuhurc-, 9 Slartr, 5..unud, l04, 205 S/$NJ}trrhti's4 Planlv-n, 311,313, 314. 315-316 Slaw ~btllion~ 78, 219, 302; lhror, 11 1, 126, 155, 219- 220, 272, 297; H.upen: ~ny nid .:~nd, 302,318; N;at Turmtr'll, 119, 255- 256, 272, 173, 275, 302; in S..Um Oamingue, ISS, 168, 174d n Virginia, 168 Slavn: .tnd $l;rol'ry, 18, 267-274 ;Alfie.m origiru 26_, JII, 45, 56, 72(miip), 74; llrntric.m.bom, 75; in Chtgpuke n"gion, 44-45: Civil Wu ;wd, 331, 336, 3..\S- .139; in roloni.:~l cicit:s, 77;confl.ict O'o'l'r, in Old Sooth, 264- 265; Con$1lto. tion .tl.d,l40, 29!; eo«on .:~nd, 23~ 257, 16!1; dim-ibotionof, 159: up.u~~on of, 297, 299, 302,309, 310, 315; f.unilin, 269-271: in Gonug.:~l

or,

or,

I.NOEX

md, 25- 26: We~1 Afl"ieln, 26, 38, 4S, 56, 72(m;tp), 74,79 Sltdg-:o, E. 8., S87- SS!I Slidtli,John, 294, 337 Slu.u, Joh.n 0 ., 29S SlomJ ;md ghnw,.; howi.ng in, 431-432, 48.5: Mt xian Curt~ 393, 394, SSO, 65S; vtoknu: in, 717, 756, 776 Snull B~.t~i nuJ Adminim .uion, 703 Snullpox, lndi;m, ;and, 28- 29, 57, 9S Smith, Alfrtd E., S40, S53-5S~ 5S7 Smith,}tdidi.l.h, l9S- 196 Smith,}ohn, 34 Smith,~ph, 228 Smith, l illi..n, 464 Smith An ( 1940), 634, 642 Smithwni;m hutirnrion, 756 S111.i!61~ 11f1Miri?}<~ ( 1944), 606 Smith & W't:Uon comp;wy, 240 Smolt lln'vemia n lu:'loci.ltion, 4SS Smoo1-H.w.·ky T..riiT (1930), 534 Smuggling. in colooni.ll el'&, 96, lOS, JlO, 135 Sc01p optr.u, S81-582 Scti.ll d~. SIT Cl01$ ; Middk d .l.U; Upper d.t.u: Working d.l5$ Scd.ll (Otltr;Kt,Oflod:t, 101 Scri.l!O.l,...tnism, 423-424, illS, <169 Scd01l tqu.llity. S« Squ.llil}' 01nd ii'IC'qll.llity Scd.ll GMpc-1, 439, 480 , 4&2 Scri.llism, 49~ 521 Scri.llisr pmy, 500, 5<10 Scd01l ttdprodty; in rolo ni.ll Nt1>· E.ngbnd, 4~ 50; i.n Europt, 22, 23: N":ui\'C' t\mtri. Qll5 01nd, 2, 10 , 14, 34: We~1 Afrieln, 18 Scd01l ttform. SIT Rdbrm Scti.ll M(Urily, 632, 779 Scti.ll SI'I:Uril}' An ( 1935). 569 Scd01l 1>1'-lf.•ue 5N Wdf..tll' $ynem Sctil!ty; ;Uilutno:t of, 19S~, 647- 651:ron. fl.ieu in, 1920:!;, S48- 553; d iversity 01nd mobility in, 775- 778; Europe01n, 19, 21- 22: ll'Vi\..Ui~rn md,87: lkYolution.u'}' ,....,. md, 128- Ul: rnulution in, 209-212: ukvi..:ion md, 654: we~1tm cul«!m5 ;and, 194- 195: whitt Old South, 260- 267 Scd!!tf for d:W: Encouugemtm of lhcful M.u~uf..wwtl:'~ 163- 164 Scti!!tf o f Fric..W. Su Ql.lol.ktD Soft morwy, 2ll, 767. SIT ~l111 l>,.per monty Soil ronll:'rv.ui an, 370, S6S, S7J, sn Soil ero,:ion, 76, 198, 238, 370 Scld~n:. See Armt>:l fum>,.; Milir.~ry Sala mon b l;mds, 602 Scm.ll:i.l, UN mi$ ion 10,749, 750 Scmcn:tt,J;unt$, 111 Scmou, An.uulio, 72S, 726 Scngh01i, 17 Sen, ofl.ibtny, 100, 103, 10S, 106 ~n:, in Old.lhom.l, 399 n'<' StNih ofBI~ti filii (Du BaD), 490

Soond.mono:y 01d\uutt5; 372 Soo1tr, nMd, 740 Soo1h, lttron~U~Jni an el'.l.See Re.:on. mU
151 St.wt6 Glmli'11~ b:pdlititm """ Awru ( 1828), 219 Soo1h O:!kor.a,392; Siow: o(, 38S, J87 Soo1hta.st Ali.l, 679 Soo1hta.st Asi.l Ttt.lty Org01ni:ution, 645 Sood wrn AIIi.lnae, 460.461 Sood wrn !Upri.n Con\'C't'IOOn, 756 Sood wrn Ho mt.nt.UI k.t (1866), 368 Sood wrn M.u~ikno (J9S6), 642 Sood wrn $U;utg)', of Nixon, 703, 704, 723 Soo1h Kotl'.l; 627~28, 643, 700, 718,747: .lim'.-ft $haf down, 725 Soo1h (U.S.), liS: Mriu.n-t\tnl:riu.n vm.en: in, 6 70, 671(m.lp): btrlJiewing,607; d M in, n: I:Xmoer;~.tir p.uty w it o(, 4S4, 463: lhr o f $(.lvt: rtbd.li an in, 155: hourly "'"S"' in, 534: indwui.l.ti:utian in, 2S8- 260, 413- 416; J.lt k.son', popuLuity in, 219: Pl.u~ttr d.u.s in, 204: R.epubliun. Um in, 1 S7-15~ 159: l'l:'lisunae todl:'lC'g· rtprian i.n,642;$l.l•'tf'}' in, 135, 190, 304: whitt 5Uprr:m.ll)' in, 463. SIT ~I~~> Civil W;u (U.S.~ Conkd:tUC' Sur.e.s oft\mtr. iel; O ld South: R.ecanmlKrian: Sl.l\'C'll ;md d.lVI'ty: Sur.e.s' righu Soo1h Vitnum, 64S, 69~ 719. Srt .tlw Vitm.un Wu Soolh•'C'">39J...J95: t xplo r.uion of, 195: Hi.sp.u~iu in, S80: Mtxk.ul wod:eu in, 6S6.6S7; N01ti..,. peopk$ o(, 6-7: Sp;mUho$pe.lken: in, 393- 39S. S« lllhtl Sun Btlr &nitt lklian (USSR), 643; ;um, t;Kt .-oo, 699; .-wmk Wl'.lporu or, 6 22.623, fi2S, 6 26,644: Bcrtin .-irlifl .-nd, &4; C01rur 01nd, nl:coll.lpll:' of, 73S, 736:conuin. rn.:nt or, 6 17, 622-624;Cub.w miu ilt (fisi.s ;md, 666-667; d i ll':tlft .lnd, 686, 696.697, 699: E011«m Europe 01nd, 603, 610 , fil l, 621.622, 644: cOO o f Cold W;u 01nd, 730: Karu .-nd, 627: p01n •i1h Nni G
1-31

Sj'llltJSit ur.ellitt 01nd, 658; W.li"JiiW P~t

01nd,62S .-00 nup;in ~rki W01tfl, S93, 600, 601 s~~. 65~701 Sp.tin, 24, fi9, 1JS: Amt riunlkYolution 01nd, 124, 126: llr~ {n.lV)') or,33; rolanitJ o f, 29(m.lp), 30, SS: Columbw 01nd, 16, 26- 27: c:xplor;~.tion b y, J0-31, 32: Flo rid" 01nd, 30, 8 2, Jl~ 178, 191, 210: lou..:i.ln1 .-nd, 153, 174; Nuiw Amtri· c.\~ .-00,28-29, 31, 61, 137, 196,296: Nonh Amttianl;mds or, 71 - 72,81 - &2, 95(nup): PintkntJ''.s1'rt-.uy with, 157: Putblo rf'VI,J(t ;md, 79:.silwr 01nd inll.u ion i.n,29- 30: sl;~.very 0100,26: l tx.u .-nd, 284; T ruty oCP.ui$ .-oo, 94: unifiution or,21: v.·u•i th Fr.-no:t, I S5:Wt:~!etn JC"td~mcm .-nd, 153- l54, 19S Sp.tnidi..Amcl"ieln Wu ( 1898), 469, 471- 473 Sp.tnidl Lu!gu;~.g-:-, 28S, 286, 783 Sp.tnidl $pUktn.549; in Soo1h•'<'"> 393-39S. SN ..W Hi5p>~niu Sp td.llix.uion, 2D4: in prod union, 4 11,416 Spteit Cirw l01r ( 1836), 223, ll4, 22S Spteit (roin), 200, lll, 2ll: sih'tr, 372, 373 Spteit Rt$Umprian lin of 1875, 372 Spteul.l.rian, 386, 390, 397; r.-ilro01ds 01nd, 372: mxl m01r!ter rr.uh 01nd, 5S8-559. SIT $liP I..Uld ~trul.uan: St:«dt, fl'l:'t>:lom of, 161, 634 Spmcer, Herbotn, 413 Spinning b~.s, lOS Spirinub <""""'songs), 276 SpcKk, Bmj.unin, 652 Spoil' 5}'$1tm, 218, 456 Sparu, 194, 246: b.udl.lll, 426,442,4119, S4~ 616,630: b.ukl!tb.lll, 447: bicydi.ng, 447: balling, 442, 489: footb.UI, 4JS, 711: O lympir:s, S91, 721: proku:ion;d, 441: rui01l im tgmion of, 616,630;an ttlt · vi:r:ion,71 1 Sp!Xffii T.UI, 38S Spri.n~ueen, Brutt, 712 ~.~ (ur.ellitt),6S8 Squ.u~to,36

Sugfl.ltia n, 702, 722, 723 Sulin, Jrutph.S.Sl, 6 11,624;dl:';uh or, 643: E011«m Europe ;md, 621, 6 22: Ko tt.l ;and, 627: Wo rld Wu l101nd, S99, 610, 613 Sulingl'.ld, 601tdt of, 600 Sump At1 ( 176S), 97- 100: tn:i!Qllt<: w, 98- 100, 101, 1()4 Sump At1 Cang:reu, 100 Sund.udiution: rn..l:U mtdi.l 0100, 5<14, S81: l'.lilro.ub md, 407 Sund.ud O il, 409-410, 413,481, 483,496 Sunlbrd, ltLu!d, 4JS Sunlbrd UniloOttsity, 435, 6411 Sum an, Edwin, 359, 360 Sum an, Elinbt1h Culy, 233, 234, 347, 361, 420

1-32

IN:OEX

Sc.mron, Htnry, 338 Sc.ur, Ktni'IC'dl, 7Sl -152 "Sur.Sp.u~gkd &nntr,• 187 • sur W.m" initiari"", 728, 3 Sc.u.e b.m.k5, 200, 221, 22S, lS I: P.miro( 1837 ;md,ll
n

1 47- l!l&dtit:~ .:~nd, 4S~ Conftder;~.t.e

""'trVl$ wd, 414; convention~ 3S6:

lndi;m LmdJ ;wd, 197: monopolitJ ;md, 201: progn'$$/vi~rn ;md, 481, <183- 48!1: t .Uiro;~.d n1t:s ;~.nd, 407-4~; Rtron~c. tion,3S6, 362- 365: RC'Yolm:ion.lt}' W.u dtbu of, J49, ISO, ISI; $1Cwtrdgmyof, 188-189: U.S. CoJUrirnrion .:~nd, IA2 Sc.lt.es' right5, 172, 289, 373: C;~.lhoun ;wd, 219, l20;Conftd.etuy ;~.nd, 32~ 327,329, 345;JdTtNOn ;md, 161- 162, 189,216 Sc.lt.es' ltighu lkmoauir P.uty, 631 Sc;~.rnu filr Rtligiou' ~C'dom ( 1786), 134 Scumbo.;u$, 201, 203, 379 Scum pown, 242 Stt;~.m.d!ip$, in Civil Wu, 336, 337 Sttd indw~ry, 41<1, S60, 717: Marg.m ;md, 4~. 48.3, 4-96: ,;uik.e, in, S78 Sttd plo-'5, 238, 391 SttfTm~ Lincoln, 481 Sttinbtck,John, 58J Sttmo«U rtM-.t.«h, 767

sn,

Sttphens. Aitnnd~r.329 Sttphens. Uri;~.h H., 420

Sttphenwn, O;~.vid, 552 Stt•'C'ns.Judirh S.Ugmt, 14.5, 165 Stt•'C'ns. l'l'!d, 780 Sttvens. 1'h¥1dr~t~,328, 3SS, 375 Stt•'C'nwn, Adlai E, 636, 640, 65!1 Srill, Willf.unGr.lll t,S47 Srimwn, Htmy, 593 Srod: m.uktt, 747, 762:drop in (2001 ), 76S- 766; ~tg'C' in, 74.5- 746 Srod: m.ultt toll.:~pll:', 372: in 1873, 372: in 1929, S58- 560:in 1987, 723, 72S Srod:.quourion printer, 4 10 Sronr, luq, 233 Sronr, Wi11f.un, 41 Srono Rcildtion, 78 Snno'C', H.urier 8C'I'ther, 249,306- 30!1 Su;~.t.eg:K Arm' limk;~.tion l';~.lb (SAL1'),. 699,nl, 748 Su;~.t.eg)c Oefi-IUt I nitiari"" (SOl). 72~

m

Su;~.u~, l...evi,280

Snumlining. in dl'$ign, 584 Sn~urs. 432,486 Snwu, tt(rution in, <141 Sniet coJUuunion, CoJUtirurian, IS l , 176,

..

,

Srrike'-', 206,282, 494, 629; ;~.i ru;Uficcon. troU.r t:s, n4; in Grtar- J:kpn'Pion,566, 577-579, 580; inlhrion ;wd, 702; Knigho: of Llbar and, <121; by M.exian (;~.m~~:r wotktn. 580, 6n; minrn ;md, 49S-496; oo4trikr pltdg-:', Sl2, S97; r;ailroMl, 620-611; in 1nrilr mills. 494, 537, 57& vioknoe in, 422-413, 464. SSO: wi.kkou-, 420.421 Sn'Ung. 1 llom.l5 299 Stu.lrt, Gilber1, 136 Stu.lrt dyrucsl)' (Engbnd), SO, 66,67 Srudrm rnaven~~:nr, 6SS-690;dvil righu ,;i,. 6&2: tll'l:rian of 1968 .lnd,694; Virm.un Wu pnKc'.n s. 682, 688- 6S9. SIT ~fl4 Youth rulrurr S1udtm Nanvioltm Cootdil'lilting Commit· ttt(SNCC),668,670, 673 Srudtno: fur .l Dernorntk Sociti)'(SOS),

w..

m,,

......,

SIU)"'C'Jilllt, Putr, S7 Sulmurin.es.593, 595; in Civil Wu, 337; in World W;u 1,5l3, SIA- SIS, 517 Su~idi.es. ro fumrn. 56~ 57S Subtrr;uu.ty pbn, <161 Subu.tb5, 6S4; ;~.uromobilr ;~.nd,541,6SO. 651 Sud.ln, 1>'e.'lpan5 m.u~uf~trutt in, 749 Sudttcnland, Naxi G.mer, 13, 381 Sund.ly, Billy, 520, 5SO S..llll~y (Hopptr), S46 Sunkia- (Cili filrni;~. Fruit G.f'OWUs Eulw.ng-:'). S49, sso Sunni Mwtim~ 76S, 770, 77l Sun P)'t.unid, S, 6(ill u,.) Superfund P1t:s, 720 Suppltmtnt.lt}' Ffttdm.:n'' Bu.rtau lin (1866), »7, 373, 374

Suprtm~: Coun, 148; aban:ion righo: wd,

692, 740; AfriQn Amerie.u~ on, 740; ;~.mi trU$1 l.w.· ;~.nd, 410: bl.ltk ci\il righn ;~.nd, 462-463, 606: Con~t"·Wm in, 71)4, 729, 740; D.rnlu.ry H~nrn r.ast (190!1), 49!1; DrrJ Stllftd.eriliian (1857), 31A- 31S, 311k dtrtion of 1000 ;wd, 7 3S, 754; b: Rm.t Mii,'iJ)Iw (1866),. 330,373: fi'C't· darn a(5JW«h .:~nd, 634; Holrw:J an, 481: fndi.tn rem~W.ll ;md, 197- 198: inltlll".lte' rom.mtrtt ;and, 40~ 460;J.:~p.lllt:* t\tnl:riun' ;and, 609; juri.sdkrion or,. 147; libornl ;~.send.\ in, 676: undtr M.tnh;~.ll, 173, 174, 188- 189, 201; Nt-a·Ouhnd, S6S, 568-569, 573; Nixon ;and, 704,707: palyg.uny ;md, 393; rui;~.l qoor.u ;~.nd, 717; Rug;~.n ;tppoinltt:s m, 728, 729: R.ero nmuetion ;md, 362, 367, 373: l111r 0tt.t1 (189-% 423;:1d!ool Pf.l)'C'f ;~.nd, 71S: ll:'gt"<prian and, 489, 616- 617,631: W;u-r
l';~.ft,

Willi.un Ho-'Md, 49S, 499, 500,510 620, &29, 632, 724 fndi.tru, 16 l';~.i •'Ml, 6.26 l';~lib.ul (Mghani:oun),. 762 l';~lkyr;and, Ol.uk:s &:, 160 l';~.mm.u~y llill,284, 436, 4l7, 482, 484 l';~nry, Ro~r 8., liS, 330 l';~n.uni;~., embil.l:i}' bombing in, 749 l';~.rbtll, ld.l, 481 l';~riff.s, 70, 71, 10!1, 283, 4SJ, 468; ofAbomi. n;~.rioru, 119-2ll ; in <:nil Wu, 3!13; Clt\'tl;md .:~nd, 4S8-4S9, 466: Confrd. rmr prohibirian on,329;doml'$1k m;muf..tm~ring ;~.nd, ISO;Juk.ion and, 119- 211;an molas.st:s, 97; RrpublianJ ;~.nd, 4S2, <153- 45!1, 4.59: l';~.ft ;~.nd, 499; Whip ;wd, 189; Wihon ;wd, SOl l';u;u-ion, 135, 739, 7&1; ll.:utc, 6; Britid!, 95, 97; roloni;~.l kgid..uurt:s wd, 92; rolani;d pf1l«w:af, 98, 99- 100, 119; in roklni.ll Virgini.t.. 39, 40; rorpomr, 4S2-453, 66S: r.xt.emal, 103; RtronJu-urrion eu , 364; Sp.u~i:!.h, 30; l'oandl~nd dutile~ 101.-106: l';~ff.H;mky h.t (1948), l';~.ino

I.NOEX

1>'M d tbt ;wd,

137- 138: .,yaJ.th di.srribu. cion md, 424: Whid:ry Rcildtion Mid, 1Sl: •id- . t n<prt:stm.ufun, 103. SIT ;f{w lntome t.u: T.uiiTs 1'~, Frtdtrkk W., 48J 1'~, M.uv.YII, 681 1'~, Zadu ty, l96, 303- 3011, 30S: d «t:ion o( 1848 ;wd, 298, 299: in Mt xiun Arntr· ira.n W'.u, 294., 295, 296 1'~Gr.u:ing ht ( 1934), S71-57l 1ta An( tn3), 110 1tad~n:. 448; womtn as.367, 760 1tapcK Dome ('lh'roming}K.Uidal,538 1ta t;~Xprott~ 103, 1011. 107, 110-1 11 1td mology, 237..J.J;, 653- 654: 1961),;, 691: 19705,711: 1991),; tlt'Oipi:un, 755; Vitm.un ow·ar and, 693- 694 1t0er, Htn.ry M., 472 1t0er Amtndmtm ( 1898), 1171-471 1trnptr~no:t, 248,290, 312 1trnpmno:t 50citrit:s, 212,229-230,437, 447 1tnam f..umtn. 415,489. SIT ;f{w Shan"· cropping 1tnt mtn t bowing, 2112, 243,431-431, 485 1tnntn t, G ilbnt, 87 1tnntn t, William, 86 1tnnt:U«,3S8: in Civil W'u, 326, 331, HS, 341: eon on in, lS6; KLln in, 3611: JUd. mitffii to Uni on, 355, 375: Stop!'$ trill in, SSO: Jtoe~ion of, 322:$Utthood of, 154., 194 1tnnt:U« Vatky Au t.horil)', S6S, 572 1tnod ui tl.in, 6, 28 1tmlwaunw';l (Prophtt), ISJ 1tnrh Amtndmtnt, L47- 148, All 1tnun" oCOffict An ( 1867).3S9, 360, 374 1tocihux:in, S~

1tnirotial stlf~nmtnt, J36 1tnirotial .dalo0Uy, 297, 320 1tnarum: KIMI .u~d, 36!1-36S .u~d illus.: Stpr.ember 2001, 760,761- 762 1h offioruM-, 693 and map

1 i':xas.l53, 31S, SIS: ~Jl.whi rt ptim.uy in, 606: Amt rian Jtultn in, 285-286: annu.uion of, 288, 289-290, 291, 293; unit randling in, 396; in Ci\il Wa.r, 3!14: connn in, 256,389, 393,460: Mtxian5 in, 393, 395: Ntw Mtxiro ~nd,J03, J04: f'C'admim"d to Un ion, 356, 375: st«uion .u~d, 321: ;1$ davt" natt, 303: Spani.dl in, 6 2, &2, 2811 1i":xa5 Rt-vnlurio n ( 1836), 286- 287 Tt:w •~ V'lu'tt ( 1869), 373 1i":xrik mills, 181, 193, 142,429: Britisll, 168, 256, 337: child labor in, lOS, 415, 417: Ci\il W;u wd, 343; in N""' England, 204,205- 206: in Soud!,2SS, 413, 414-415: wikt in, 49~537, 578; •umtn in, lOS, 2&2 11uit.md, 747, 759 1 baml'$, Ba.ttk 184 1 b uttr .u~d dnma, 247, 307: Aftiun Amtriuru in, 547: Ntw Ikal ~nd, 568, 572, 575: uudt"ilk, 442-443 Th•oftl:t O$n(Vcflltn), 44S,

or,

n"'

uu.m

481 1 bit u (Virmoun),698 1 bitd Ammdmt m , 147, A IO 1 bitd Reich. S« Nui Gtrnuny 1 bitd 'lh\Jrld, 644., 6<16, 665- 666, 697, 736 1 binetmh Arntndmtn t, 2H, 349, 356, 361, A ll 1 bom.u, Oarr:no:t, 740 1 bonuon,Samud, 210 1 bottau, Htnty o~vid, 249, 250, 2.S2,2Sl 1brN>fifdto~ dawt, L40, 187, M 1b~W: Mik l.dand dUa~«t, 713 1 burmond,Srrom, 6ll 1 iMIMimtn mau..:no ( 1989, Bdjing), 736 1 ildtn, SamudJ., 377 1illm.u~, "Jiitdi!Od: Btn,• 462,490 1 i.mb'f'r Cultutt An ( 1873), 390 1 i.mb'f'rbkt, 1\o:gg)' O'Ntak, 220 1 i.mbukru, 17 T.:~:~~tmag.uint,

1n

1i.mt.W'amtr, 746 1 i.mt xono:,;, tailro.u is and, 240,407 1 i.n P:m AOry, 486 1ipt:>~"Qnoe, Ba.ttk of, 183, 18S, 225 T!Ut~k (mavit}, 755 1 iro, Jolip 6~ 601 1irnb.l, Sl 1bbw:ro, 76, lS6, lS8, 263, 389, 41~ 49~ in Chc:s~peakt f'C'gion, 4l-4~di:'lt.Ut linktd ro, 71o. 751: g~ng Jabot .symm fbr, n: monopoly on, 71: in Virginil, 3WS, 4J: in W't:sl l.ndie,;, 511 100qmvillt, Ak:ri:s d:, 193, 19'\106-207, 226,2S2 10jo, HMdci, S94, S9S 1bkyo, bombing or, 602 1b1Mo, Ohio, 482, S60

1-33

1bmplin,;, Sail)•, 346 1bpt!Y, !Ttt·$Utt pYrn.mrm in, Jll, 313, 315 1bt
Wt5t,33S, 379, 380. SN

,.(!.)We~

Tr;w$J!OIUrion, 193:u1Wh, 201- 20l, 203; m'Oiurion in ( 1815.1840). 201-203, 206: Jtgrtg:.ufun in, 668. 5« ,.(!.) Aum mobilt i.ndu5U); R.Uiro.-cb: RoW ~nd high ..·ays Tr;w$J!OIUrion S«urity Admini.mu ion,

71>3 Trtawn,oCBun, 178 Trut411 o{ll.'f' St1Wt (PhilliJl"}, 481 Trta5Uty Ot pa.rrmtn t, JJS;undtr H;unil. ron, 148, 149: indtptndt m , 224- llS, 289, 197 Trtatit,.; /\d;un$.Qni J (lhnJtont:inmtod). 191, 196,184: Br~.n.J.itavsk ( 1918), Sl7: ofGhtm(l814), 186, 196: on global warming, 740:ofGua.Wupe.Hidalgo ( 1848), l99: J~·Gardoqui, 137; J ;~.y's ( 179S), IS6- I.S7, IS8: Nativt" Arntrieu!J and, 109, 136, 182- 183, 38~517, 718,

1-34

IN:OEX

((l)lllill.wl} 776; Nt-.· Edl!IC;a ( 183S), 198: of Nt10· York ( 1790), ISot nudur ~.lfiOJ\!;, 667, 730, 749, nl: ofPMi, (1763), 94, 9S(m;ap);ofPui5 (J783), 12S, J27- J28: of P.ui5 ( J89lfh 473, 474; of Pon::smouth ( 191h).510: Rudl-B;ago1 (1817), 190;S;m lkkfon$1(1 ( 1800), 174; S;an lorenxo ( 179S), IS7: oflbtcltlill.u (1494), 27, 19(m;ap):of\'er.r..ti0t$ ( 1918), S89-590:

1'rt-.l~

Wtb~«t·Mhbun:on, 289

1 'rt-;atyrWtio:;uion, ~n.tlt .tnd, 140, 290, 193,310 1 'rffitg;ar Iron Wotk5, lS8- 2S9, 326 Trtt'mWJi!JM (open.), 426- 427 1 'rendutd,Jolm, 101 1 'rench ..·uf.uc-, World W;u 1, 51'\ 519 TIT.ut ;Ur;air, 337 1 'renron, Bmlt of, J22, 123 1'~o,jl.loUl Fr;mdKo,62 1 'ri;mgk Shin: W.ti$t F;anory ~i.rt, 476-4n 1'ti p>~rcilt l);an, 594 1't i poli, pun' UUI)'1>i lh, In 1'mu.ky, Lmn,517 1 'rum;m, H.ury S, S93, 610-611, 6J7; .twmk bomb .tnd, 613, 756: domt$rk prog:r.tm of, 620..621, 629-6l2, 633: d «tion of 1948 ;and, 631, 634: F.tir ONl of, 632.: Kottan W;u .tnd, 627-62~ 629, 635, 636; ""ro 620, 629, 6JS 1 'rum;an Oacuino:, 623-624 1 'rumbuii,John, potu-;aiu by, I IS, 149 1'ru~a, 409-410, 496. S« iJIJIJ Monopoly: Sherm;an t\nri.lfwr llcr 1 'tulh, Sajoumer, J07 1 Uberculolis,
or,

TN'I"R!,1 Yt.~rs •tr JIM.If Jlotut (Add.un.!.), 480 l'WO.)Utl}' S)'UI"m, 217 Tyro C«por.uion, 766 Tyltr, john, 22.5, 248, 2.89: Ttx.U ;anno:nrian ;and, 289-290 TyphaW, 41, 346, 48S

u.ba.m:. 5« Subm.uint:S Ukr.tiM• 736,748, 774 UN. S« Unirtd N;arioru Ullck T~~m$ Gi!W11 (Snno«), 249, 306- ](18 Undtrground r.til.ro;ad, 273 Undttwoad.Sim.mans TuifT, SOl ~mplormmt, 76,207, 371: .turo i.ndU!UJ', 739, 779; bluk, S70, 717, 746: in Su.dl ~oe~ion, 766; f.lll in ( 19905h 745; G~.1.1 Ik-pn'Pion,560•.S61, S73, S76; NAnA ;and, 742;in I890'-46S:in 19205,5H:in l970s, 702, 717, 719:in 19805, n4 Unk.untr.tl ltgisl.ltuiT:, I33 Union (Nortb), 32S; colbpst of, 319-JlJ: d «tion of 1860 ;and, 319-320: popuU. rian ;and tt:SOU«t$ or, 329: seet.ufun ;and, 323-JH: 'ietory for, 3!17-JS I. Sl'l" "f~~> Civil W;ar (U.S.): Nortb (U.S.) Union of &nitr Sori..tli$t lttpubl.iN. &r S!witr Union (USSR) Union P:u:ifk lbilroMI,343, 371, 382, 38~

...,.

Union£. 5« Ubor uniof\!; Union $01di.m;, ;u urpttb.lggtn. 363 Uniuri.uls, 227, 234, 2JS Uni1td Aummobilt WotktD, S78, S79 Uni1td Fum Wafltn, 6n Uni1td Fruir Comp.my, .S33, 64S Uni1td Mint Worktn: (UMW). 423, 620 49S-A96, Uni1td N.trions (U.N.), 744, 775, 78S; ;a.romk mttg:r ;and, 622, 64-t Chi.n;a ;and, 699; fuu:ndingo(, 610, 611: l.r.-q;md, 738, 748, 764, 76S; Kottan Wu .tnd, 627: pt.l(t kttping by, 747• 749, 750; U.S. due,: IN'
sn,

552 Un.il.«niliu ;md w lkgt5.87, 267, 4lS- 436; Afriun.Ameriun, 367, <163, 489, 689, 717, n6: .tnci.10'U p«
66S, 669: f'(J<".ltch .tt, 436, 658: 19505, 638, 652,653: 1960s: yom:h mcwrmmt in, 68S-690: •umm in, 435,493, S3~ 605, 61~6Sl. 5« .els4 s}-Yitijlt inmrurion Un i""n:il)•of Ablxun.1,669 Univtn:il}' of C.tliforni.:., 678, 687, 717 Un i""n:il}' of Chiugo, 43S, 480, 493 Un i""n:il)•ofMi(hig;m, 682 Univtn:ii}'OfMi~i~ippi, 668 Un i""n:il}' of Piusburgfl, 48S Un i""n:il}' of1tx.u, 685- 686 Univtn:il}'ofWiKon,in, 436, 483, 6!19 Un i""n:il)•ofW)'oming, 7S6 Updike,}ohn, 653 Up Fro• Sl.t.m;Y (Wuhinpon), 463 Upperd.us, 419, S42; p.riV.lll" sr.hoob ;and, 449; :l()(itl}' .t.nd CUIIUIT:, 433-436; won~~:n', $UJ'IT.tge ;and, 492. Sl'l" .thP Elilt5; Gmtty UpwCi ~ ;and lQWIU Urb;ani:u1ion, 70, 203- 21)4, 54 I: in North,

258 Urb;an L:;agut, SSO Unuli.nt nuru, in C.tnMb, 60 u.2$py pl;me'$, 646 Uuh, 285,296, lOS, 361, 4S4; Mormon' in, 278, 392- 393; 5Urthood for, ](13, 392, 393 Ur.e lndi;aru, IU Uwpi;an rommu:nirie'$, Zl9, 13S Uwpi;anJT:Ibl'ml:n:, 424

V;altmino, Rudalph.5ll,.S43 V;alky i'ot)."'~'. l24 V;an Burtn, M.an:in, 217, 289,298; dt.erion of 1836 .tncl,l2J. 224: l.ndtpendl'm 1'1l'.Uuty ;and, 224- 22.5 V;anoe, C)'I'W, 720 V;and:rbih, Comdrus, 406 V;an \fom, M.ui;a, 481 V;anuui, lbnolomro, S49 V;anhm;an, J;unt$ K., 490 V;arg.u, Diego dt,62 V;au.u Col~, 43S V;aud:villt, 442- 443 V;aux, Clh'C'rt,lS3 Vrbkn, 1'hon«in, 445,480 Vtnioe, 25: !Ddt of, 20(m;ap) Vm C:tw:, 295, 296 Vnmon1, 109, IS'\ 194 VtD;aille'$ Ptut ConfeR':~, S26- 527 Vm;aille'$ tff.ll)', Hirkr ;and, S89-S90 Vtnial inr.egr;a1ion, 4~, 409 Val'}', Denmoui:, 273 Vupurd . Ameriga, 28 Vl'ltl'.lll.~t: Civil War, 453, 4S4....4S5, 4S9; \'iem;am Wu, 699, 768; World W;u I, 561; Wotid War II, 618.619

I.NOEX

\'t«r.mslldminiw-arion, 650 \'t«~n's BtMVU!t:tn AJ$0d.uion, fiOS \'tto.S« Prr:siden ti.tl woo \'kt.;ufmir.tll)' COUrt, 96, 97, 98, 105 \'iduburg: &nit or, 341, 342 ~ tn.l.U.tat in ( 1Si4).Ji6 \'inorian rnor;ility, 4.33, 434, 44S, 446,447 \'inory in Europe (V.E) D.l}', 610 \'ittoong. 680, 697 \'ittminh narion.tlin~ 6!15 \'itm.tm, 6.2fi, 62~29,667~ Bong Son, 685~ F;-;wct wd, 6!1S; immigr;mn from,

'"

\'itm.tml'$t·Ameriuru, 709 \'itm.tmi:l:l ro Union, 3S5, 375: RC'VO!ution.uy wu in, 12fi-J27; tUIU'I>'il)' slaVC':S in, U9; St«Pion o r, 322: slosw t'('btlli an in, ll9, 255- l5fi, 273: slosYC':f'}' in, 44-45;sutC' ;wd thl.tf'C'h in, 39..40: tobilt«~ in,3!1-35, 43; •flu1 f.U'ming.l39 \'i.rgini.l Ciry, Nt .,.M!.1, 39S...J96 \'i.rgini.l Comp.my orl.ondon, 34, 3S \'i.rgini.l Comp.my or Jllyrnoulh, 34

or

or,

n'C' v~ (Wi~«r), 400

\'i.rgini.l llf.ut, J39 \'i.rgini.l Rl'$olutioru, 161, 219 l'up..U. (..'aNhip).336-J37 \'iniUII'I'p.r<~n~rion, 96, 99 \'lst'A (Vol un~ in St:rvit<: 10 llrntriu),

674 \~h1tad lln( I919).SS3 \~tum-ariJm, Hll!Wef .tnd, 554, 555

212 S!.eubm, Ftitdril'h, 124 \~ti.ng ltighu lin ( 196S), fi70, 704 \~tum-.lt}' ;~~~.wci.uio~, \~n

\\Jting rigfltl' (su.ffi';age): Ml.ul1 ••hitt nult, in Sou1h, 264; dt.etor.tl l'l'lbrnu, 482 ~ i.n KanJi!~ 312 ~ lau~ring .tV of, 701: Na.til.~ Ameriun, S81; in l"l)mauth tokmy, 4fi; property ~quitW)I'm ror, 68, 84, 132, l36, 208; .md ~l igion, in M.uyland, fi9: ror •'Omtn, Ifi~ 361-362, 447, 454, 491-493. S« lllhtl Mrit.m Ameriun voting righu \\Judltr plan~ ror sdlool~ 767

W.tb.l$h lb.ilroMI, 421 W.tb.l$h lti\'C't, J82 W.o~b.uh f( IU.:nWI ( 188fi), 460 Wxo, 1tx;u, 756 WW, Btnj.tmin, 360 ow·w.lh'li.s BiD, 35!1-35S W.tjl'$, 368, 369, 417; in Ci.,.iJ Wu, 344; disaiminou:ion in, 57fi: drop in ( 18J6-18!12).l2-t inert.utJ in, 4 19, 483, 536, 649; minimum, S73, S15, 576,632.: r ill:' in,l4l: :d.:~\Oe I.Wor .:~00, 264; 1nrilt workn, 206, 241: wotnl:'n .tnd, 4 18, S3fi, 6Sl, 7J2,714;Wo rki Wufl,597 W.tgner, Robtrt F., 484, S64, S69, S76 'W".tgner lin ( J 9l5),573,5~629 W.tgon tr.tin~UI~ 281- 288 W.tkt fofi:'Jt rnllrgt, 267 W.o~rJnJ ( fharuu).lSO 'W".tlktr, DMcl,l31 W.tlktr, WiOi.un, 3JO 'W".tll.ltr:, Gtotgc, 641, fi69, 675, fi76, 723; in dution 1968., 69~ 696; shooting o r, 704- 705 'W".tll.ltt, Ht nry A., 593, fi03; in dution 1.948, fill, 634 W.tlkt, Fu.s, S47 'W".tlli~).tme'$, 7VJ 'W".tU Stmoc, 241- 242, 4fiS--466, 754; boom in, i4S-746;ttuh ( 1Si3), 422 ~ msh (1987), 7lS: i.n.sider trMiing in, 766: Sen.ut i.nw:stiprian or, 565. &r.o~Cs 380,382, 38J, 38!1- 3SS, 387, 388: N~rM Ameriuru .tnd, 12, 39, 4.3; N:u:i bliu. lritg,59l; JH'C'C'mptil.~, 764: tl'l'n.:h, Wart.:! W;u I, 514,519. Stt shPI(I«ifo: ~ W.trd, LC'~«r Fnnk, 424,480 'W".tt dtbt: All it~ 539; British, 90, 94-9S, 120; Con~dtt.lfC', 35fi, l57, 364; mot.tro· r ium on, 560; RC'Yolm:ion.lt}' Wu, Jl4, US, U7- 138, l49- JSO. S«.o~Cs4Coki Wu, dt~n~ spending in

or

or

1-35

W.u ~p.tnmtm, Sl4, S2S W.ur f( ftv.'Jtm ( 1794), 148 W.u h.l'l>i~ 182, 682,683, 694 W.u lndu..uie'$ Bo.trd, 516-517 Wu L..Wor Bo.ud, S2S W.u M.mpown Commi»ion, 596 W.uner, Clulie'$ DOO.ky, 37l W.uner, Sw.tn, 252 Wuof181 2, 17J, 182-18fi, l9fi: tonJIC'. qutnoe.sor, 187, 203: n.l'Y in. 170 Wu ofthe lww'i.tn S.ucoe~ion,82 W.u ofrilt Ltague ofAupburg. 69 W.u on Pweny. 674, fi75, 6n Wu on urror, 764, i68., 769 W.u Pau~r.s An (l941), S9S-S96 W.u Produetion Bo.trd, S9fi Wu Rtrup Bo.trd, fi ll W'.ul'l'n, E.uJ, 641~42, 676, 7()4 W.uren, Jwtph.10J Wus.w.· Pur, fi2S and m.tp W.tcShburn, Htnry D., 401 W'.tcShingron, Booker T., <163, 490--491, 497 W;~~~.hingron, D.C., 232, 48S; Bannd:tr .tnd, 130, 167; r.IC'C' riou in,694;slos\Oet'}' in,303, 304, 305; in W;uof18J2, 185,

...

D.C. m.trdlu: in 1941, 606; in 19fil, 6®; in 19fi9, 688; g.l}' pride ( 1979), 714: Ku Klux Khn, 5SI; WWI \'C'IU.lU.S,

W;~~~.hingron,

561 W;~~~.hingron,

D.C. m.trdlt.son: in 1894, 4fi5

W;~~~.hingron,Gto~, 84, 91, 141, L43:.u .trmyromm.:~OOC'r,

114, 115, 121- 124,

12S, l 27:uConrino:ma.I Con~~ 1JJ;

r..trt'I>T-11 meu.tgr: oC, J5.8-IS9: rot'C'ign palil)' ;wd, 154, 157, 159; H.unilwn .tnd, 148, lSI, 158: Ntwburgh Corupir.~ty .tnd, IJS; P.u:wn 80)~ .tnd, 109: portnit IIS:seit.nrilk inrti'I:'Jt5 or, 85; in SC'Yt.n ~'ui"J'W'u, 93: Whi.d:l"}' Rtboellion ;wd, 152- 153 W';~~~.hingron N~.,.a.l AfmJ Conkrmtr:, S39 W,uo\i~o11 Pwr, 706 W;~~~.hingron ($l..llt), 3SS, 392 W'.tcShingron 1tmper.tntC' Socitty, 230 W'.lrtrrnre (hydrop.tdl}·), l4S W'.lrttg.trt JIC'Oind.tl, 70S- i07, 710, 720 W'.lfC'f t'('$0UI"'lt~ 498 W'.lrtr supply, in (itit~l43, 244 W'.lDOO, Tom, 461, 462,464 W'.ltt, JMIIC'~ 724,730 W'.l)Tlt, "MMI. Ambony," 156 WCJ'U. SttWatnl:'n's Chris ri.tn 1tmprnn« Union Wnlrh ;wd W'Nldl}', 343, 7<16; in oolonial dtit~76;ofcoloonWdi ru, 78, 129; tduution.tl i.n$1:itutioru .tnd, 435; inheri. r.u~t<: and, 75: inYI'.nmtnu of, 70l:o( Soulhtm d..m-OOL:Itn;, 264; tu.uion .tnd, 424; urb.ul ho~.t~ing o r, 4l2 Wnlrh Tu- An(l935), 569

or,

1-36

IN:OEX

Wuporu: U.U ;~_nd CLuk apedirion .1.nd, 177:of m.lJ$'e.'lpon5 W~r.J;un.:5 6, 456,461, 464 Wdmer, D.m.id, 238, 289 Wtlmer..Asilbunon TR'.ll)', l89 WdumMht, 592. Ser <~(so N.u:i Gtrrn..my Wddl, jrutph. 6!10 Wdl:'h immigr01m5, 429 Wdf..tll': Qpit
Wdty, Eudon, 653 Wt.n: Civil Wu in, l3S, 3!12:college5 in, 343: Conlhitntion .u~d, 135- 137; dl:'fenll:' induJuiu in, 647:environmenul di~ pull'$ in, 497-498: F.1.r We$f, 195- 196, 284-285: ftdtnl p-ernmtm .u~d, 196: LC'v.i5 .1.nd Cl;~_rk npt>:lition in, 175, 176- ln: oCtife .u~d IC'gt00,399--402: mounr.Un mm in, 195-196: n.ttion.U p>U'\5 in, 401 -4.02.: N;~_riYI' Aml:'00n5 ;wd, 156, 379-38!1; New Dell prog:t.uru in, S72-.57~lll'ldtml:nt 388- 393: "losvtr}' in, 299; tr;uk of, 28!1- lSS: W'.lr induJUiu in, 597: • u m.ln ~ffng>:> in, 4$4,491. S« t/11111 Wl'$lW.lrd mcwrmtm Wl'$t, Mu, S82 Wl'$t Mriu, 17- 19:ki.ndlip in, 1 ~17 1: "losYC' tndl:' ;~_00,26, 38, 45, 56, 72(m.lp}, 7>t,79 'W'I'$t 8;mk ;md G.1:n, 700, 721, 731, 748, 77l. Set ~(!.) luul Wl'$t 81:'1iin, 666, 7J.t Wl'$tel'n Europe', economy o(,624. Set ~w spm'jttoMmriN Wl'$t Florid;~_, 128, 178, 191 Wl'$t Gerrn..my, 624, 6l8 Wm fnd.it:l (C;~_ribbt.Ul), 29, 43, 59, 124, 580: Britilii, SS(m;~_p), 181: Engli"h immigr.um: in, 39, 4S(m.:.p): Fn:'nch, 5S(m.:.p), 71, 94, 96, 156, 175, 179: Mol.u. $.nAn ;~_nd, 70, 71: N"'· Engbnd u.ldl:' • ·ilh, 71, 135, 137;,.1.1.•'«}' wd $.!;ro-e tndt in, 74, 79,310: Sp>mi"h, 5S(m.:.p),.l79: "'g;~_r pl.1.nr.uian5 ;md sl.tvny in, JS, 53-54, 55, 56: U.S. llt:gmwn}' in, 509-.510, 726(m.lp) Wl'$tinghowl:' Ccmp;~_ny, 404, 534 Wl'$tmorrb00, Wi11i.un, 693 Wl'$t \lirgini.t: cO.U mii'IC'II in, 405, 414, 562; $.1..lldlood for, 330 'W'I'$tW.lrd mowmmt, 193-19
or,

287-2.88: Sp.tin .1.nd, ll7, 153-IS'\ 156. S« lllllll Exp.m,ion W~r, \';~_lni;mo, 471 Wl\fl S(l(i.t/ Omcs 011:r ~ I!.d Ot6tr (S.urn.. nl:'r),4ll What, 76, 7'9, 199, 202, 139, 258,263: f;~_lling prin-5 for, 459, 460: in Gre.lr Pl.lin.:, 389, 391,397, 398; i.n Mid~1. 23~241

Whudt)', Ph)iliJ, JJO Whigs, l33, 134,304, 320,3S6,364;.UI~I;~_v. ery .1.nd, 28.3, 297: Compromi.se Union, 306; di-linttgnrian or, 310- 3 II: di'Crion of 1836 ;~_nd,lll-224: d«rian of 18.W Mid, 22.5, 289: dtrnan of 1844 md, 290-291: el«tion of 1848 Mid, 298- 299: d«tion of 1852 M1d,30S: Mnk;m. Ameriun 'W';~_r .lnd,l94, 295: pl.1.mer d.l~ ;~_00,264: lttromaunion .lnd, 356, 36-t in lkYolucion.lt)'•"M, II9, Ill, 125 "Whip fnlt.lcion Now,.. 719 Whi-lk.-y lkl-
54l,5n Wilder~ Sadl'lf, 572 Wild Wl'$t Sbcv.·, 400 Wilhd m II (Gel'm.lll}'),512, 526 Wilk.e5, j0hn, 106- 107, 114 Wilkinwn, J;un.:'> 15.svid, 297 Wilmo1 Pnwl$0, 297-29~ 30l, 31)4 Wilw n, 1~ddy, 583 Wilw n, Woodroa·, 487, 490, 511....515: deerian of 1912 ;~_nd, 495, 500-SOI;d u tion of 1916 md, S03, Sl4 ~ F«!l:'~l Reserw .1.nd, SOI-502: Lltin Amel'iel .1.nd, SIO,

Sl 1-512: lngul:' of N.ltioru .1.nd, 525, 527- 528, 529: US. MUtnlity .lnd, Sll-.514; Wotld 'W';~_r I .1.nd, 505, 515, 517, SI9, 520,Sll Wihon.Gorrn..m T.uifTof 1894, 466 nr U.'i.o~tsi»J; ofdtt u.·a~ (Roo5nT.It), 400 Wi.ntbrop,John, 47, 49; "ril}' upon" hiU.. or, 46,50 Wi.sroruin,l41, 21"'9, 429, 483 Wi$.1tr, 0..-en, 400, <WI Witcheull, 26, 166: i.n S;~_km, Sl-Sl Wid.o t6t O(J IJrml (SII'>:Ig>:>). SS7-SSS Wabblil'$ (IWW), 494 Walk, Al.m, 757 T6r U/Qm.rts Rd>djoum;~_l, 493 Wam.UI'l: l>uct P.ul}·, sos Wam.UI $U.ffi'Oit,"C' (\OOti.ng righu), 16!1. 361- 36.2, 447, 491-493: Ninl:'lttmh t\rnl:ndmtm ;~_nd, 503, 524,540,AIJ: in We.n, 4.5!1• 491 Women, 418, 4!10, 713: .u Wolitioni:lu,lll; Mriu.n-Atnl:riu.n, 77, 269, 366, 447, 489, 540: .lminomiMli:lm .u~d, 47-48; .1.um. mobile' ;lOO. Sill: buulf p;~_gunu .lnd, S44;d ty tift Mid, 541: Civil Wu md, 344; in O inton .ulmini,;n;~_tion, 742: wO"l.""' edueuion foe, 4JS, 493,536, 605, 61~6Sl;coloni.ll en, 7S, 77, 104--IOS: ~mcil}' w d, 4.33-43'\ 639, 6Sl: ~me $pbl:'re of, 244; ftminUr, 133- .23'\ lSI, 44~ 493,536, 678, 714; lbppen,in 19205, 5!1S: in Gn:'.ll Pl.1.in5, 391: immigr;wt, 418, 4n, 483: Irish, 282 ~ jobkss, in G.te.u lkpn'Pion,576: m;u. !Ugt ;wd, 576: middlt d.u5, 77, 5!10, 5!12: mo~l impt0¥l'ml'flt ;md, 4l3: in rnavil'$, S82 ~ N.lti•'C' Amel'iun,3, S, U : in Ntw light 5tcu, 87: NC'\0' Wonun, 44.5, 446-448: ;u novl'-li,.u, l49, .2.52,282, 448, 46t plosn tc"r ditc", Ul - 26.2; potitiu .lnd, 540-541: po,;~;W'.lr tronomy md, 617-618: Progrr:slivism .u~d, 4n. 478, 491-493: ptopc'ny righu 75: lkpubliuni~rn .lnd, 16t n'YiV.lli:lm .1.nd, 227, 229: Revo. lution.lryW'.lr Mid, 130: runl.to.urb.ul migr;uian of, 428-429: in 1920$, 536: s..Jem v.•iu~hcr.lft .u~d, Sl-.53: 5tpel'.llt ~hel't of, 209, 211-212, 251, 447, 493, 71t $hopping .1.nd, 435: in tt mpei'Mlct: wcittit:s, 230: • -ei.f;;m modwr~~, 745; whitt, 129, 164, 344 ~ World Wu l .1.nd, Sll, 524: Wotld W';~_r II .:~00, 604- f;OS; xin Congr~, 741, 76S, 783-784 Women, •-orl of: childruri.ng. 163, 6Sl: Civil Wu nuning, ]4.6; d(l(bing m.lnu. f..ww«, 411, 418;d.li.rym;~_idJ, 163: domeak J, 418, 489; f.xrory wock, 416, 418, 476-4n: indmrurM $.ei'Y.lnu, 42: bbar unio~ .1.nd, 282,420,422, 494. 577, S78: in n.lV}', 516: .1.nd pl.l}•of, 194- 195: pi"1XStirution,397, 4JS.439, 486-487:

or,

I.NOEX

M"'ing, 237, 240: wci;sl wod:, 439-440; in Southern indwtrie,;, 4 14,415: Su. JH"<mC' Court, 728, i4l, 781: t.e.uhtN, 231, 367 .u~d iOw.: tt..dling, 367, 760: t.eni.lt nunuf.lcuu"> 77, 105, 163, lOS, 2&2: ..·;sge,;, 4 18, 536, 652,71 2, 714: •urkd;sy limit !Or, 48~ 502: "'Or!cing d.l.u,l42. S« lllhtl ~mini~m; Gendn: M.arri;sg:o um.s(!ll ~w.~ f.(l)flllfll.ia (Gilm;sn), 493 um.st.ll t6t Ni!tt.tttmdt CmiWIJ (F'ulkr), 2.S J Women '5 Ot.rilri.ulli-mpei'Miu: Union, 447, 454,455,486, 487 Women's dub,;, 447,485, 491,493 Women '\!: Emt~ Brigadt,S77 Women's lnt.em.uion;sl Lup fur ~u<: ;md F~ttdom, 506 Women '\!: Joim Congrr:uion;sl Committ.et,

m

'"'

Women's li btr.uion, 6~79. 690 Women '\!: mO'o'l'mmt, 7ll- 714 Women's Nuion;sllndi;sn Righn Aisocia. cion,385 Women's tight$, 164- J6S, lH- 234, 361-362,691: ;tholi cion .u~d, 232, 233: Civil Wu md, 347: in coloni.tl Ntw Engl;snd, 48,49: to propett}', 75: Qu;sk.-n md, SS. Sl'l' ~f~~> Abortion: ~\Jm.u~ $UITugt Women's Saik.- fM &Jmlity, 679 Woods. T igtr, 777 Woodwxl muliic kniV.ll, 419 Woodward, Bob, 706 Wookn milb, 193. Sl'l' ~f~~> Tenilt milb UinnontTI~ WRgi.l ( 1832), 198 Wotkd.:cr, t ight-hour, 420, 4.21, 483, 502,

SlS Wotk cthk, 433 Wotking d.u$ ;md workers, 7~24~ ;l.}rohol md, 2.30: child I.Wor ;snd, 449: in Civil Wu, 344: ndtull': of, 416: dnft pro«,;~; by, 3!15;tknionofl984 ;snd, 728;tthnir ;md tdigiow ft~ion in, 282- l83;txploi. t.uion of, 413, 415: furoty 5YJ«m .u~d, 4 16-II IS>incomto(, in 1950s, 647:hUh immignm,;, 281-Uil: M;srxism md, 424: McC.UthyUm .u~d, 6lS: mi~nd sho:no~. 2!17: politia, <136- 437: rdbrm wd, 437-440; ~otu and, 442; upvoud rna.

bility ;snd, 419: whitNolbr, 649-650: Wort.:! W;u I boom md, 522. S« lllhtl

...,,,,

1-37

Wrir of ;sl$1~an(<:, 96-97 Wy.ut, ft'md,;, 35 Wyoming. 36J, 392: ..umtn'$ righu in, 491

~tking ..umtn. 5« Womtn, •urk of ~tkmtn's

Cornptnmion An ( 1916), 502

~tkplar<: nli.-1')'•
X'I'Z Aff.lir, 160

~tk wnp. Zi6 ~tb llrogtt~ Admi.ninmion (WPA),

567-568, 572,574, 575; ;tholi cion of, 599 ~dd Ami~l)' Conwmion (london),

m ~dd

B;snk, 619 ~dd economy. S« Glob.lll'l:ooorny ~dd politia, Nixon and, 696- 700 ~dd":: F.Ur: Chiugo(IS92), 40!1• 4115: Nt10· Yorl ( 1939), 584 ~dd li'W Cffitc/ltnl:riu.n$ in, 6~-609: mobili:ation fM, 595- 599: in l>uifk n-gion, 587--588, 595, 601- 602, 604, 6 12: r;~ei$m in, 60'\ 606-607: soritly during, 603- 609: triumph ;md n'>~g:od}· of, 609-613: U.S. tmr'}' imo,59W95: womt.n in,6D4- 60S. Sl'l' $hP F.l$cl$m ~dd 'W';sr I •oettf".lru, 561 ~ndt>:l Knl'!e M.l5$.lCn', 387 ~.:.,386 ~i.tl:, ST.ephtn, 711

WI¥.. S« ~b llrogtt~ A$1Uini~mion Wrighr, Ft.m.k lloyd, 446 Wrighr, Ridl.ud, 577, 5110

Y~lf".l co

nfermc<: (19!15).610, 61 I, 621-611

Y~m.l~'« l ndi.u~,;,80

Yuoo I..Uid sund.1.1, 178 Yd loa·dog romruu, 422 Yd loa·(t\n, 56, 167, 244, 271, 472, 508 Yd low joumali~rn, 471 Yd loa'$lont N;stion;sl P.uk, 401 Ydui.n, Boris, 736, 748 Ytomtn, in South, 262- 263,264 Yippile$(Youth fntn-tw.cional l);my), 695 Yom Kippur w;sr, 700 Yotl, Duh of, 57-58, 66 Yotltown, surrtndtra.t, 126--127 YO$emitt N;stiotul Puk, 402,498,499 Young. & igharn, 392 YoungAmeriuru fM Fm'!dom, 686, 7J4 Young lonb, lin Young Mtn'll OuiWn AJ$0d.ltion, 4311 Young Womtn's Chri$ti;sn lwocia.cion, 43S Youth: ;su1omobik .u~d, 542: t.lJ'<'tr prm. pl'l:f5 fur, 778: count.e«ulrui"C' ;sod, 690-692.: rnl.rutl:' of, 658-660: Grut Otp!T.iAon and, 568, 57l:Jux Ago: ;snd, S4S; m.U'riagoe and, 2UJ- 211; rock md roll md, 659. S« 1/1/JIJ Oildrr:n Youm M;srr.hu for lnt.egt;sttd Sthoob, 660 Youth nla\'ttnl:'nr, 685- 690: Mi.u~ Ameriun anivi:un, 678: Prohibition and, SS3. Sl'l' .o1W SnM.-nr mO\oemtnt YU«a Mounr.U.n,Ntv.u.U, n4 YugQ!.I;svia, 527, 601, 610, & 1 Yuma, IS4 Yuppfle$()0Ung urb;sn profl'.uional$), 710,

711

Zulgv.ill, bOO, n1 Ztngn,John l~ter, 8!'1 Zimtnl:'tnun t.ekgt;sm, 51S Zoot suit r iou (1943),608 Zu.ni lndi.ul$, 30

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Index llben.l.ki Indians. 36 llbolition .lnd .lbolitionUts.166, ll9, 131-133, 145,163,30!1; Mrir.m. AmtOOn, 232, 307, 338; G.lrriwn .u, 220, 231-131,133,307; fri.sh .lnd, l83; li""oln .lnd, 317, 318.,339: in Muiw, 186; in O ld SoUih, 265; R.etonmuetion ;md, JSik 'lh'hi~ ;u, 297. SN 4htl Broum, John: Thimtnrh Amtndmtm llbonion wd .lb.nintf'ICie, 111 1\Qd.U, 69, 94. S« 1/1/JrJ NO\'.l ScoW. llco nu l ndi;m~ 31 llcr fbr Rtligiou.s 1blmtio n ( 1649). 4 1 llobms. Abig.lil, 129 llobms. Ch.lrlu Fnncis..U7 llobms.John, ll1, 114, 128, 129, I 58; o n Arri:k.soCCont«
160 llobms.John Quin'-)·, 190-191, 291, 192; tknion oC 1824 ;wd, 115- 116: dtcrion of 1818 .lOO,liS llobms.S.lmutl, 107, 108, 110, lll: l lnon.shtnddurit:s .lnd, 103- 10 4 llobm~Onu (lhrucontimnul) l 'rury, 191, 196,184 lldmini.srnrion, in coloni.lJ Nt10· Engl.lnd, 48 lldminisu'.lrion ofJu~ /let, 11 2 Mrk.l,12:cok!ninrian or, 131, 172,131, 165: Eumpe.tn''O)'.lgc'.S.Uld, 20, 15:.sl.l"f trW widl, l8, 45. Su ~fl4 W't$t Artia:

sprtifot ''""'%?'

Mrkan Amtriuru, 91, JJ I ; .u .lbolicionUts. 131,307, 331k Chri:lti.lniry .lnd,166, 366- 367: ndturt: o r, 174- 276: rroe-M!iltr txism .lnd,309; in K.lnJOI~ 311, 376: M>~$01lic lod~ Ill: min.strd shOW"J ;wd, 147- 1<18: stgl'l:'ptio n ot;240; vuting tighu,354,l.SS, 358, 36()..361, 362, 364- 365, 376. Set,.(!;, Ffl'le bl.l( k$; Sl.lVI'$ .Uld .sl.l\'Cf)' Mrkan F~W: Sr.hool,10!1 Mrkan Mnhodi.sr EpDoop.tl Churdl, 167, 108,366 Agticulrul't': MiY.lll(n in, 138-2J9: boom in, 198- I99: np.lrniem .lnd, 191: N.uiw: AmtOOn, ~ U . Sl'l' ~f14 F.lm~~:n: .lnd btmin~ Pl.lnfC'n: .lnd pl.lnutio rn ALW.lm;a, 363: corwn in, 199, 2.56: Klan in, 365: rt:.ulrn.Us:ion ro Union, 356,375: .s«t.u fun and,321 : .suu~hood for, J90, 194

At.l(l,llf
Al.un.mct C:tttk, &mk o r, 109 Al.uno, Ptge or,l86- 287 Al.uk;a,l0,184: Ru~i.l and,371 Alb.lnyCongl'l'.i5 ( 1754), 92, 100 Alb.lny llf.ul o r Union, 92 Alcohol ;wd .lkoho1Um, 123; Indian' md, 51, 79, 165, 1 6~ 183: Whi.skt}' lttbdlion, 152-153. S« Mltllernptn""t Altuts.lO Algonquin lndi.ul.s,ll Al.im .lnd SC'dition lien (1798), 160- 161, 173- 174 Al.im Entmie.sAn ( 1798), 160 Al.im Friend, Act(I79S), I60, 161 Alkn, Rid\Oa.td, 167, 108 Alli.lnoe,;: Bri.Wh .lndian, 1&2, ISJ, 184: Europran.lndi.m,l8, 31,36, 57, 61, 61, 79, 81; FtTMh..Amtriem, I54-15S: lndi.ln, 95: lroqootl Ccmrtdtrxy,3~

60, 80 Alnuhou.sn, 134 Amtnd.menu m Con.sr:itution, A 10- 15: propo~d, 187.$« ,.(!;, $].'<0fr ..IIIC'.JJIIICW( Amtn.:..n Anri.SI>~•'ff}' Soritly, l31 Amtrican Cok!ninrion Socitl}'• 2J I Amtn.:..n (Knou.• Nothing) p.ul)·, 181, 308, 311...Jl1, 313,314 Amtrican Mwtum,1<18 Amtn.:..n Philowphiul Sodl!t)', 85, I71 Amtn.:..n Rtd C1"1.'11U, 346 Amtrican Rw.li'l5illl(~149 Amtn.:..n S)'$1tm (CI.ly), 187- 18!1, 211, 123,

l98 Amtrican lernpen llC!e Sodtl)', lJO Amtn.:..n Wo m.ln Suffr.lgc' M wci.ltion, 361 Amtl"ie;u, 16, 19. Sl'l" $lw Nonh llrntriu: Luin (South) Amtl"iee Amnt.nyM1 ( 1871), 372, 374,376 An.lb.lpti.su, 23 Anxomh pbn, 331 An.u;u:i culrun", 7 Andtan ptaplc>$, S AndtNonviOt priw n ump, 3!17 Andm.s, Edmond, 66.67, 6!1 Aneslht:si.l, 144 Angl~anDm. Sl'l'Chu~hoCEngJ.md

Anglo.l>tnot.;u;m W;u:r;, 34, 3S, 43 Anglo.S!»nisll Wu, 8 2 Angol.l, U Ann~poiU, 1311 Anllt'K.ltion, orli':u s.l8S.l89-190,191,

m

u..

Amhony, Su5illl 347, 361-362 Ami.C.nholirum. 231, 2&2, 183, 311, 311

Antin.un, B.ltdt .lt, 333, 334,339, 346 Antirtdt niDu, 152: Con.sr:itution md, 141- 143 Anti.M;I$Qnry, 223 Antinomi.lni.rom, 47-411 Anti~ry m0\'C'mtm, l 30, 1 6&chikl.te'n',

tO),;, 133: fugitivt" sl.l""' l.w.· ;wd, 306: K.l1U.l5-Nebt;ulu An ;md• 309; KnOW'· Nothin~ .l00,311: lelr.l.s ;wmution .lnd, 190: (}lfl(k T(lltl 's Glbils md, 307- 3011. Sl'l" $In> Abolitio n .lOO WolirionDu Ap;Kht l ndian~ l, 61, 81, &2, 153 App>ll;Khian Moum.UM, 73, 194; ;u b.urit r in Chil W'at, 331 ~ lndi.ln lands we~s of, 95, 109: n itro;ubdlrough, l41;sm.l0 r.•umtn: in,345 Appom.lU(I(I{, lt~e); sum-ndl:t .U. 350 Arehilt.:turr; An.u.lxi, 7; l.lnd.snpt, l$3 Arguin, .sl.:roing ,;c;a.tion .lfo 2.S AriwJU,l96: n.ltiw ptoplt5 or, 7, 154 Ark;m.s.u, 173,363: Civil W'u in, 33S: c~J«Un in,156; KLm in, 365: rt:.ulrn.Us:ion or, m Union,3SS, 375;.s«t.u ion 311 Armtd fb~n: blulu in, 130: & iti:lh, 96, 113- 114, 120, 111- 124, 126. 117; in Ci\il Wat, 31S- 327, 349: Comintnt.tl .lrmy, 114, 120-127, UO:up.lruian of, 160: in Ftl'll(h Cln.ld.l, 60: lndi;m W'.ln: ;wd, l98;. Mt'.tieln, l86-l87: in Mt xian..Amtrian Wat, 194- l96: Qu.lruring An wd, 102: in Teu:s R.eYO!ution, 186- 287: in W'u or 1812, 184- 186. Ser ~(14 Militi.l Army llppropri.ltioru llcr, 374 Army of Nonbern Virgini,..316,342, 345,

or,

>SO Armyoftht Poromx,332,3<18 Atr .lnd uti.su, 153,188 Anidt5 o r Conrtdtr.uion, I34- llS, 196 Ani.s.lM, 76, 8 4, 119, 2()9; Englidl immi. gt.mu, 163: iOOumi.ll:i.ution ;wd, 104, 205, 206; poli t:k.tl.lffilia.rian or, 123: ~. 169,172: Wc>$t Mriun, 17, 18,16 Asi;m u ;Wt, 25 AiW$$ina.rian, oflin(oln,351, 35S Ai~mbly, colonill, 39, 66,83-84. S« 1/1/JrJ Ltgid ..uurn, coloni.ll Aitot, John j.l(ob, 195, 107 Aurol.lbe• 2.S Adup.unn $pe.tktn:.1 Ad.lnu, l41: in Civil W'.lt, 3<18, 349 Ad.lnu University,367 Ad.lmic O:an:uo nomy, l.\11; European up.u~$lon in, 16- 17, 15- 28 AulKls. Cri:lpu.s, 108 Augwu Po....W:t ~rls. 316

1-1

1-2

IN:OEX

Aulrin, Srt-phtn F., 286 Aurhority, tnuian o(,liO Awfw/ o.:mwwmoftl'C' fkrtd /Jirw NIDitw;f i11 M4W4rr!ll (Monk). 282 A:utc~~ o(Mniro, 6: Sp.u~ish ronqut,;c of,

lS-29

B.llxod:, Orvi0t,371 B.lcllt, S.Uiy Funklin, 129 B.lron, N.l.th.U'I id, 43-44 B.lron', Rcildl.ion, 43- 44 B.llbo;a, V.lKO NUflt:t dt,l8 B.lU g.lm~, N01.ci\'C' Ameriun, 7 B.llrimor~ J20 B.llrimor~ Lotd (CtdliuJ C.llvert). 40,

41,69 B.lnk ofEngi.Uid, 7l, ISO, 151, 224 B.lnk oftht Unittd Sure:s, IS0- 1.51, 283: J.uk.-. .u~d, 221, 222-223: P.Uiic of 1819 .md, 200, 201 B.lnk.s .lOO b.lnlcing. 16l: l.lnd 'pteul;ucion ;wd, 200, 201: IQU', 200, lll, 2ll, 224, 225, lSI B.lnntker, fknj;unin, 130, 167 B.lpcilrn, 13, 50 B.lpti~U, 87, 266, 167, 275; Ntgro, 366 B.ll'b.W1~ 56

B.l!Wry pil".l.te'.i, 172 B.lmum, P. 1:, !46,248, lS2 B.lrur, 7S B.lrwn, O.U1, 346 B.ltdu. S« 'W'.lr .lnd ··ufMt; ~ N.ttks But A.lg Rt-public, 29S Buumom , Gu.n.modt, l93 Bt.1"tr fur u'.ldt, 32, Sl, 79, 28S Bt«her, I-Jttu)• W'.ltd, 313 Bt«her, L)'m.ln, 230, ll2 Btlkn01.p, WiDi..rn E,J71 Btii,Joh.n,320 Btnin, uti.un$ of, 17, 26 Btnntn, j;a..mt:S Gordon, 246, ! 47 Btting bOO brid~, 2 Bnkdt}·, WiDi;un, 3!1, 43 Bi blt , 23, 86; Mormoni:un 1nd, l28 Bi blt lliou (llflilWiphi.l), 282, .283 Biamml kgid .•Ull.f'C'5, Ill, 133 Bkk.erdykt, Molt}' Ann, 346 Biddlt, Nidlol.u, 121, 222 Bill ofRighu ( 1791), )47- 1.48, 16J, A- 10-Il Bill of Righu (Engl.lnd, 1689). 67, 83 Bi.nh.co n.rrol mtdlll!b, 212 Bi.nhmt, 164: inci'U$t in, 207, 21l -113 Bluk .Woli cionDu, 2.32. S« IIIIo Oaugl.l:U, FI'C'dtrid: Bluk codt5, 3S6, 3S7, 368, 374 Bluk H.lwk, 198 Blulu. SIT Aftiun Amtrieul.s: Ftw: blub: FI'Ndtnl:'n Bl.ldtttSbutg, B.ltdt of, 18S, l86 BI.Uid.AIIiwn An (IS78), 373

Blod:.ldt: Ameriun Rtvalllcion, llO, 12-t of South, in Civil Wu, 331, 336, 337: w,.r of 1812, IS'\ ISS, 186 Bo.ud ofCu$U,}m$ Commisliontn. IOS- l06 Bo.ud ofTudt (Briuin),83 Boone, Robttr, 42 Booth, John Wilkt:s, 3Sl Botdtn. S« Bound.lrydi$l)Utc'5 Botdtr ~au~ in C'rvil Wu, 330, 332 BMI:on, 70, 87, 106,209: Woli cionDu in, 311: And~ .lnd, 6!1; .lmi,l.:ro'C'ty vioknct: in, 306: merch.lnu of, 184: pavtny in, 76, 77, 207; lluriuru in, 66: in Rt'VI.llution.lry W.lr, 114, ll5: SottS ofli btny in, 103, 104, 106: Sump An prott:St in, 99;vicJe. .ldmil'1lty rourt in, 96; voting righu !Or fmo: blulu in, 2(18; •-omen); sufTf.lgt group' in, 361 BMI:on Hou~ ofl ndUIU)', 2.34 BMI:on M.tnu.bcruting Comp.my, lOS BMI:on M..UJOU:IT (1770). 107- lOS BMI:on Pon Bill (1774), ll2 BMI:on lta P2ny, 107, 110- lll Bounduy di$l)Utc'$: Utwd,. .lnd, 186, 190, 289: Mo:ico .u~d, 293, 294, 296; On"gon .u~d, 292: Sp>lin ;wd, l57, l9l: 1 i':u5-NC'\O' Mt.riro, 304 Bourbon,, 376 ~u~ lOS, llJ;coloni.ll, 100, 101, 104 Boyd, Btllt, 346 Bf.lddod:, Edw;ud, 92- 93, 121 Bf.ldy, M.mhtw, 328 Bf.lnd•i no: Ctwl, B.ud t or,.llJ, ll4 Bf.lm,joKph, 126, 1.36 Bf.lxil: ~tug.ll .u~d, 27;$).l\'C' n-adt in, 74, 271 Bnd:inridge,}ohn C., 320 Btfled's Hill, B.ltdt or, ll4 Briuin (Engl.lnd): ..Ui.u~cc>: with l ndi.U'I~ 182, 183, 196: AtntriC.Ul t
public lift in, SJ~ triumph 100 Ttn· lion$ in, 90...9 6. S« IIIIo Colonit ,;; JP«ijjt

"'""

StiWh.Amttiun Convention of ISIS, l90 StiWh (Royal) N.l\y, 70, 71, 124, l91: in lltntriC.Ul Rt\\)lurion, ll9- 120: impl'l".i5o mtm o f$.lllon: h}·, l56, l79- l80: in Wu ofl812, 184, 186 Stook F.lrm, 235 Stooh, Pf'<$fOn, 313 Stown, John, 313, 311, 3JS, 340: H.ttper.~ Feny f.lid, 301- 302, 314, 318-.31.9 Stown UniWNity, 87 Sty1nt, Oan, 247 Sty1nt, WiliUm Culltn, 253 Such.lJUn,j..mt~ 31J-l14, 319: K.lnJOU eti$i5 .u~d, 31S- 316 Su~n.l V'~:~u, B.ltdt of,29~ 296 Su.ff.llo (bison) huming, 10, 284 Su.ff.llo (cirr), 204 Bull Run, B1tdt:S .lr, 332, 333, 334 Su.mpo, Nmy, 149 Bunker Hill, &mlt of, ll4 Su.tgDYOt, john, 124 Su.d:,}ohn D.tly, l61 Su.rkt, Edmund, Ill, l14 Su.rntd.01o0er Dimi:t, l27, 228,232 Su.rru, llmhony, 306 Su.rruidt, Amb~t, 334 Su.rr, A.lron, 162,176, ln - 178, 179 Su,inu~ JSS: induwi.llir.uion .u~d, 163; joinr4t()(k comp.u~y, ll. S« IIIIo Mn. cll.mo:: lhdt Sutkr, Andnow, 3JJ Suder, fknjounin, 335

C.ll-lin ;wd, l53, 286: $UTthood fur, 303, 30
oe,

I.NOEX

lndi.U'I Wu, 9 2, 93, 9~.u Ft'il)' slot~ in, 30~ u ;Wt v.•idl, 181: W.uof i812.U1d, 184, 185 Cl.n.lls, 194, 201- 202, 203, 2.53:6n.tncing of, 224: iniguion, 7: nihu.ub md, 241 c:.tM R.idgt rtvival, 226,229 Cl.nning, GI'Ot),-.e, 191 U.pc- ofGood Hope, 25 C.U.wd (ship), 25 C.Uibb<.tn. &rWe,;t lndie'$ (C.Uibb<.tn) C.uotin.t, 54---56, 80, &2: piedmont of, J 19; Rtgul;uonin, 109- JlO C.Upednggm, 362-363, 376 C.U$00, Kit, 195 C.Uticr,Juque'$, 31 C.uh.rrop rronoln}', 200, 2.5~ 260; Sourh. trn )'ffinll:n, 262-263. SN >Al111tr"«ific erop e.us. Ltwi:l, 298 U.ua~ lndi.Uls, 80 U.thtrine of llr;agan, 24 U.thol.irum, l4. 7 J, 94. 311: .U'Iti. Cuholicism, !31, 282, l8J, 311, 311: in Cililbrnil, I.Sl, 286; in C.tl\ild;a, 60, Ill; in rolc niod Nf""' Yo rk, 66- 67; Oemoa.tu ;md, 290: 1rUh .tnd, 33, 73, 107, 159, 208, 223, 281; in M.uyi.U'Id, 40-41, 69; in MuKo, 285; Putblo lndi.Uls .tnd, 6 1- 62,82 U.din, Gtorgt, lSl U.nlt, 29, 79 C.l.Y.II.ty, in Crvil Wu, lll, 349 G:nu'.ll l>uifir IWiro.td, 343 Chuo CUlycn lndi.tru, 7 Ch.unpl.t.in, 5.unud d t, 32 Ch.mrdlon.villt, B.tult of, 3!11 Ch.uboiUU'.tu, 1buu.Unt, 176- ln Ch.uk:s I (Engl.tOO), 24, 39, 40, 45, 50 Ch.uk:s II (EngJ..lnd), SO, S'\57, 66, 67 Ch.uk:s II (Sp.Un), 8 2 Ch.uk:s10n, 70, 273,313, 320 Ch.uk:s 1 (Jv.·n,5S, 69, 73; pen'<'rtyin, 77: in Rt"'CiurioeuryW'.lr, 126: d..mo rode! in, 78 Ch.ut,S.tlrnon P., 328, 349, 375 Ch.ut,S.tmud, 173 Ch.nu.noog.t, 241 Ch.tUilC}'• Clulie'$, 87 Chtrks .tnd b.tl.tnrn, 140, 161 Chtroktt l ndi.U1~8~ 109, 165: fl'm!W.ll of, 196- 198: in Jkwlution.uy 125- 126 Grmhr~titlfs.: C~( 1 831 ), 198

··u,

Grmktr~P:(~), 196

Ga.tpr.tlt.t inddtm, 179- 180 Chtgpukt nogion, 39-45; B.:u:on•,: rtbdlion in, 4.l-4~ dulh,gmdtr .tnd Hnship in, 41: up.msion in, 40: lhr of5la"':' rtbtl· lion in, lll;,:l;r.'<'ry in, 44-45, 77: 5Ut.e ;md rhu.rdl in,39- 41: rob.lcroin, 42- 43, 76, Str .thP MU)·bOO: Virgini.t Chtmu r;c, M.uy Borkin, 262

n.

Chicolga, 20!1. 238; immigr;mn in, 280; r.tilro.ldi.tnd,l41 Chid..u.w.· lndi.Ul5, 79, 154; f'(m0\•;1.} of, 196, 197 Chiefdonu: M~.U1, 17; Mtw.tmniu, S. S« 4lllo NW'<' Amn'ie.m5 Childrtn, lH - 212; .U1li$la"'tf'}' roys and, lH; d u 1h of, 76: uonomk v.tlut of, 212; Llhor or, 22, 205, 242, 212, 3!14; mulauo, of pl.tnltrditt, 261-26l:5dlool stgl'l'g~· rion and, 23l:,:l;r.'<', 269-271, 272 Chioa u.tdt, 153: sih'<'rin, 2!4 Chim~ I.WortN, in C.tliforni;a, 299 ~~~~ Y. Gtorpt ( J193), 1<18 Ch<Xt.lwlndi.tru, 79, I54; ll'm!W.ll of, 196, 197 Choltn, 24'\271 Chrilri.ulirr, 21, 22- 24; .tbolit:ionisn md, 232: in Afriroa,l6: Columbu5 md, 26; Enligflt.enmenr md, 86: Nari"<' Atnl:'ri· uru .tnd, 16, Sl, 196: d..mory .tnd, 266, 269, 275 -276: UniurU~ .tnd, 227 Ch ul'<'h: Afrian lltnl:riun, 366-.367: .llld ,:ur.e, in Nt10· Engbnd, 47; .tnd 5utt, ~p.tr.uicn of, J34. S« 4lllo Jkligjon Ch ul'<'h, f'f(dtrir, 253 Ch ul'<'h oCEngJ.md (llnglie.mUm), ! 4, 59, 69: Puriun5 .tnd. 36, 45: rtvi,•;di~m .tnd, 87: in Virgini.t, 40 Ch ul'<'h oC}t5w Chri$1 cfl..tu n.lby S.Unu. S« Mar mon.r Ondnnari, 203, 20!1: immignnu in,280 O tiC'$ .tnd rowru: bbd: mign.rion to, 366: inroloni.tl Nt-a· EngJ.tnd, 411: ffl'le bl.uh in, 27l-273, 27~ gnnoUI of, 203-204. 242: haUling in, ! 42- 243: immigr;mn in, 219-280; Nati"<' Atni:'~.U1, 8·9 .tnd i ll u.s., 5J, 52; popuLu:ion in, 21: pw.oeTI}' in, 76- 77, 207; public health in, 244; r.tilro.ldi .tnd, 241: n u;l.} migr.ui an to, l(l6: •';lttr .tnd St'a'<'r.l~ in, 243- 244 O tiXffi5hip, 161: lbr bl..r k5, 130, Il l, 373 (Str .thP Foun ttnrh Amendmt nt) Cil)' upon ligru of, 347- 351; financing or,JV.Jl 8:

1-3

ludm.hip in, 32S-330; Ltt'll ~rrtnder in, 350: mtdkint in, 3!1~ mabilixing for, 325- 330; naV.ll &udt:S in, 335, 336-337; Shernun'll m.trdl in, 347- 348, 349; ~ in,l6~ 271, 331, 338, 339, 340-341: 1umiog paint of, 341..343: in 'W't$r, 335, 342; women md, 34S, 347. 5«41ho eon. ftdtnlt Srate'$ ofAmtOO Civil wu, in England, SO O.uk, Gtorgt Rot,~, 126, 128, 155 O.uk, WiOiarn, 175, 176-177 O.ukt, Eli.dl.1, J5S O;w: rolonial, 78: R.t-vnlutionuy wu .tnd, 12S-J29; in ··hitr Somh, 260- 263. Str .o~Cs4 flit!:'$, rolc nial: Gent!)·: Middk d~: Working d.tJJ Oay, Ca~iu.r M.trcd lu5,l6S Oay, Htnry. 182, 190, 216, 221 - 222; Am~r. ian Sy$f.em of, 1 87- 18~ 223, 298; Comprom tit of 1850 and, 30!1. 305: in dt
1-4

IN:OEX

Colt, S;~.mutl, 240 Colurnbi.ln ~xeh;mg-:', 16-)7, 29 Colurnbi.l lthn, 195,292, 293 Colurnbi.l Uniwn:ity, 87 Col urnbu~ Chrl$10pher, 16, 20, 26- 17, 28 Com;md~ lndi;~.n~ 79, 81, 82, 153, 196 Commiut~e:HI(Cotfnpondl:m~~ 10!1, J10 C111t1llf<m Se11st (P.Iil'lf:), llfl- 115 Cllltl*"'-l'llrth« u~m~ (1842), 282 Communitil'$: Sh.1-ku, l28.-l29: mopi;~.n, 235,299

Comp.uJ,2S

or 1850, 302- JOS,JOS(m.tp), 309,311. Ser ~f111 l)opul.u $twl'reigmy Compromi~ or 1877, 377 Compromi~

Compromi~ T;~.riiTo( 1833, l20-l21

Conootd, &ul~ .lt, Ill Cont:SuiS.l lndi;mJ, 109 Conrtder.ut offici.tl~ ~,;~;y ror, 372, 374.

"'

Sutl'$ ofAmttio:-.l: ;~.rmy or,. 325- 326, H2, 333-33S; bluk $okiiers ;wd, 324. 340, 3!11: blod:;~.de or, 332, H6, 337: Congl'l'.i~ 326, 3!'11, 34S: Constim. cion or, 329: diplom;~.cyor, 337--JJS: di:!.~n1 in, 34S-3t16; fin;mcn o(, 328; furm;~.rion or,. 321, 322; imp;~n orCMI Wu on,3M- 34.S, lSI: lt.ldtnllipor, 328, 329- 330: popul;ucion;~.nd ttsOU~n oC, 329: Shtmw1'11 m.mh in, 3fi7-Jtls4 Civil W';~.r Conrtdtr.ut •'M Vl!l.ei'MIJ, 364, 365 Conrtdtr.uion, 135.-137. SN ..W Auide'$ or Conrtder.u~

Confi:odtr;~.tion

•confio.uiani' (li.lrntr), 256 ConfucuionAcu (1861.1862), 3lll-339 Congr<primulin~ 87 Con~S$, Conreder.u~, 326, 3!11, 34S Cong:r<S$io!Wl Jkwn.mucrion, 3SS-3S9, 362,364 Cong:r<S$ (U.S.)t .Wolirionis1 g;~.g tult ;wd, 232- 233: llrtidt:S ofCon.fi:o.ckl'
Conl'lf:nkut, 134, 1 39:roloni;~.J,.SJ, 66, 68 Co~WJuisi.M!on, lS-19 Corudtnu W'hip.l98, 310 Coruniption An, 32.5. SIT >~fsll Or.Ut (oon. $i:ription) Corutirution, U.S.,. 137- Ilh4 Sill orRigt.n (179 1~ spm'fir Amendment

Co!WI':ntion, US-141 lklion p.tn y, 320 Corutirution~JUr.e, 132- J33 Coruumtr m'Oiution, 71, 9S Conugian thtotyor dill:'.lll:', 24!'1 Conrinenuhrmy, 114, ll0- ll7, 130 Conrinenullwoci.ltion, 113 Conrinenul Cong:r<S$, llfl, 122 ~ First, 112-113 Conrinenub (p.tper money), 134 Co!WI':n:ion: of lndi;mJ, 31: of luther, l3: n'YiV.tlll .Uld, 217 Convieu .tnd prisol'lf:n:, 74, 81: lu ling or, 376 Coodt, John, 69 Corutirution;~.l Corutirution;~.l

Cookt, J;~.y, 372

Cooper,Ambany ll.dlky, S4,55 Coopc-r,j;untJ Ftnnimore,lfl9, 250 Copley, john Singlt1an, I6S Coppc-rhNdJ, 345, 3!'19 Corinth, &mk or, 33S Com (m;~.iu). 199, 262, 271;hogi'Uoling ;~.nd, 258, 263~ N.lcive Ameriuru ;~.00,5 Cormo.•.Uiis, Ch.uk:d..otd, 126-127 Corruption, 36!'1, 377: i.n Civil War, 343~ in Gunr ;Wmini m-;~.r:ion,370-37 1 , 375 Cord$, HtrN..n,28, 29 Corugt ind~uy, 205: dtdi.n~ of, l I I Conan cultiY.Ilian, 199; CiYil W.u ;~.00, 337, 3!'14, 345: ren:iliun: fur, 239: P.mk or 1837 ;md, 22!'1; pl;~.merdtb1 .t00,261: llh.uuropping ;wd, 36!1, 369, 370: lll.:ro~ry ;md, 168,231, 2J8, 257, 268: in South, lS6-2S8, 259, 260, 262 ~ tuiiTs ;md, 219. S« 4lhtl 1~:uik mitls Conan g:in, 168,199, 2'05, 238 Counr.er.Rdbrnur:ion, lfl Counry.oourt S}'$1tnl, 40 Gwn:NN Jr bllit, 6l TkCmtnrofEm,:irt (Church), 253 Coun,.; tROibli:!.hmenr or, lt16-147: M.l:!.Jil· ch~nu, !'16, 47, 49: Yke.;~.dmit.UI)·, 97, 98, lOS. SIT >~1111 Judici;uy. Supremt Cou.n

Cou.ruhip, 210. SN ..W M.uri.lgt CO'V!':IWlt,SO CO'V!':IWlrCh;~.in,SO

C010buy5.82

Cnwlbrd, Will:i;~.m, ZI5-l l 6 Cn'dit, 135,222, 12!'1, 372: oouon pW.nt.er, 261: r.umers .lnd, 200, 201: H.unilron ;~.nd, 149-150: P.tnico( 1819 ;~.00, 188, 200-201: dl;~.~ping;md, 369. SIT >1f111 D
J);~. Garn..1, V.lKO, l'O, lS O.llll'!e, bbd:,; ;wd, 276 D.lrl1t14Mtb
nr Dtmf>~]tr(Cooper), 249 Odbrr:surion, roloni;~.l ~l';l, 75- 76 Ori~U, 86

Od.w.·uc, S7, 59 Od.w.·uc lndi;~.ru, SS, 79, 80, 93, 95, 109: loR Llnd11 or, 136 01'm1Kn4)', .l5 mab rul~, 132, Ill, 157 Dtmi)(T,Uj i,.A111C'rir.ol (lhcqutVill~), 193,226

I.NOEX

~rnoa.uk p.ul)', 311: Buth;ma.n a.OO, 316:

Civil Wu md, 330, 345-346: Copper. bud, 34.5, 349: tOO oflkron.mucrion ;md, 375: npa.rnio n a.OO, 191: f~.lil\ter ;advt:OU'$ i.n,373: i.mmignnu a.OO, 223, 279, 28J;j;~eluon .md, 122, 283; Ka.nJ<~$. Ntbr;a:ska k.t ;md,liO: New~'orlt City, 371; A.eeotl$HUrtion ;wd, JS6, l57, 358, 360,3&, 364: R.tdtmption of,l76: Mrtiona.l ~ir in,318,310: sl.tvery a.OO, 297; Soud~n)l'omtn ;md, 264: Whip ;wd, !89. S« 4llo Eltrtion' ~rnornrk p.urimc-s.l46-148 ~rnoa.uk soritrie~~; ISS ~rnoa.uiurion, liS ~rnogta.phio, 71. Srr .o~W Pbpul.uion ~pl'l'.ilieln, 124. 225, 291, 372: in rok!ni.ll Olt$.lpt.lkc<, 43: foll010ing P.mk of llb7, 319-320: in M~xhU$l'US. U7 ~ Soro, Hc-mando,lO, 31 ~rroi c,79, 95, 2D4: im.mig:ta.nl:$ in, !SO: in Wuof i812,184. 18S ~vii (Sa.un), 22. 46, 52, Sl Di.olf (ma.gaxint).llS Di.u, Banolomtu, 20, 25 Did:i.n$00, Emity. 1S2 Did:i.n$00,}olm, 103, 11 2, 113, l34 Oii!L S« Food (ditt) Diplo.m.w:y. Civil W'M, 337- HII: Uwi:'I.:~OO CLuk C'JCpc'dirion ;md, tn. Str ~fl4 Tno.uitJ DiKrimina.rio n: .-ga.imt fTu bWds, lO~ 273; J!O'ol'"Y a.nd, 2~ OiJU.St, 244- 145; in Caribbun, 54: in rolonia.l d rin, 76: d~ll'ry, 42, 271, 272, 346: ma.laria, 42, 56, 271, 346: Na.cive AmtOOnJ .:~nd, 80: Jl.l•'t:l a.nd Jl.:rol' tr.~dt, 74, 271-272: $!lUll pox, 28-29, 57,95: rheoritJ of, 244. 34&. SN ..W Epidemiu Diwiet of Colu.m!U 5« Wa.dlinpun, D.C. Oi\teBity: rolonial, 71- 75: Na.riw AmtOOn, 5- 11: in Nt'Vt' Nl!lhed.md,S6-S7 Oivi!Wn ofla.bor, 195 Divon:t>, 164- 165. Str ~~14 M.utiag-:" Dix, Donnhe.:., 2J.uty, u.nn ibidism ;wd, lS8 Doup.u, S«phtn 11.,305, 315, 316, 313; dd»li'J •irh L.inroln, 316-318; K;m.s.u. Ntbr;a:ska k.t .:~nd,lOII-309, 310 Dougku, Fttdnkk, 232, 271, 276, ln: bLKk soldim and,l<W: on bluk Juf. fragc-. 361: ffl'ledo.m 273: photo of, 306 Ot.Ut (ton:sn-iprion) in C'rvil Wu: Confed. c-tuy. 32S...J27: prortm: of, 345: in Union, 326- 327 Dta.kt, F;-;wd~~; 33 Ota.ma, 247, 307 Dml Stottdtcilieln ( 1857), 314-315, 31~320: nulliiiution 357

oe.

oe.

OrivtN, o{5i.l'l'S. 269 Dud~~; 110: BuJT.H.:~milnm, 178;pdwn and, 216, 218, 267; in O ld Sourh, 266. 267 Ounmol'l", Lord, Ill Outand, A.dltr, 253 Ourch.S« Ntdltrbnds (rht Oureh) l)y$l'may, 42, 271,272,346

&rt, JUiph, 219 Euly, Jub.ll A., 34S Wt, Civii•'Min, 331- 3.}4 Wran Woodl;mds, Na.r:i\l' pi'Oplt$ 7- 9 E.ur Florida, 128, 191 Wr fndit:s, 25 &mn,}ohn H., 220 &liJIIr(~mbu.u), 201 Bronorny, 222: Civil Wu a.nd, 343- 345, lSI; to.mmmi.tli:.wion of,l10: indu.mi.1J. ir.nion ;md, 16J. I6
or,

oe

Elt(Wni Collc-~, 1 62,115

Elt(Wnl ro.mmi.uion (I lin), 3n Eltm'irity, Fnnklin and, liS Elt'
1-5

RtvU!uriotw.f)'•·u, 11.9, 128-J29. S«..&o Plamtll and pbnutio~ Eli:ubeth I (Engla.nd), l4, 33 Enuno:ip>uion, 189, 354, 356, 366-370: Civil W.u ;wd, 336: impur o(,338..J4J: $l'ntimtnr for, in South, 256,264- 265. Str $lw Ffttdmm Enuno:ip>lrion Pn:d.un.uion ( 1862), l3'\ 337- 3.\S, l39 Emlmgokt(l807), 180- 181, 187, 204 ETntNon, Ra.lph Waldo, HS, 249-250, lS I, 252,302.: l)nu.m l«n~r<J of, 252, 253

1lr ~lit) Gllilk Ill t6t Gdol MinCI) 299 P.mproo~rkff.

286

E.ndo~l'l' mll'ol'mtnr (E.ng:bOO), 2l ~lld.l.\28,61

E.nfot«mtnr Aru ( 1870.1871), 36S, 3i4 E.ng:bnd. S« Briuin (Engl.:~nd) E.nglidl Llngmgr, 77; pidgin, 274-275 E.nJighll'nmtnr,83, 84-86, 1 01, 1l~;mri. ~ry nla\l'rntnr a.nd, I30; Franklin a.nd,6S, 8S Enrollmtm An ( 186l), 326-J27 E.nvironmrnr,dtfor<,;c.uion and, Sl, 75 - 76 Epi.:lc-mkll, 144: N uiw Amtriu.n' a.nd, lS- 29, 35, 50, 57, 95, IS3- IS4: )'C'Ibo.t fe"VV'r, 167 &Jua.li l}' ;md intqualil}·, l06-209, 26l: fUr blad:~~; ll0-131, 265, 367- 361k Ol'd.u;a.. tion of lndq!C'ndtn« and, 116: l incoln on, 3JJ, 318: Rtvohn:ion.u'}'10'U ;wd, 12S-J29; tkh.poor g;ap, 107: womm a.nd,3<17 E:ra.ofGood F«linp.187- 188, 189 Erioon,ltif, 10 Eric- Culal, 202- 203, 10'\253 f.U~J Cmsl'l'TII~ lllfm.olll liisJmJ$..Jill8 (IA(kt).8S P.urxta$l' (1805), 179 Europt .md Europea.n,.; Afriu wd, 20: Atbnr:iruplontion a.nd,lS -28: rulruff: a.nd society, 19, 21-12: immignnu from, 21""8- 21"'9 (Srr ~fl4 1m.migtwD}; Mollf'OC' Docui.nt and, 191: Nrwrh Amc-rieln da.im5 or, 95 E,-..n~l il:·ab, 217, 229, 230, 266,267, 275 Exci~ (;I){ proll'$t, 152 Exp>sn!Wn, 135: boe)Ond Appa.luhia.ru, 95- 96: Brir:islr Nonh Amtrka, 80-BI: dw.IItngt:S ro, 154: roklni.ll New Eng. l;md, SO-Sl: Eu.ropt.m,39: i.mmigntion a.nd, 2i8-2i9; Louiliwa purw:~t ;wd, 174: Ma.ni~r ~lri.ny and, 278,288, 291- 292, 310;Muiun.t\mn'iun W.u a.nd, 294- 295: pol:itiu of, 288- 293: ~ry and, 297, 299, 302,309, 315: ~....·ud,l94- 199 P.x Rmt Mlllijill ( 1866), HO, 373 Explora.rion: Colu.mbu~~; 26- 17: Eumpun, l5- 28:ofFu ow·ur, 195: ltwi5 a.nd Cl.:~r\ C'JCpedition, 17S(m.:.p), 176- tn

1-6

IN:OEX

Futioru, 132, ISS, 17l, 217. SIT $lw l>oli ~.ll

""""'

Futotit-', i.n South,lS9. SN >~h4 Mlnuf.u:. ru.ring Futot)' v.'Or!ten:, 2()4, 205- 206: $l;ro~, comp;a.tc>Omtn brmm;, 262- 263 F.unine: in Eumpt, 21: i.n lrd;md, 281 F.umers ;~.nd f.uming. 129, 209, 309: r.u~.W md, 102: in C;arolin;a pi.edmont, 73: coloni;~.l ddbrt:Surion ;~.nd, 75- 76: corn. p.ut"d to utb.tn v.'Or!ter, 242: ro«on, 257: dairy prnduca, lt'il; dd>l of, 222: Oougt;~., ;and, 316: trooomic producrion md, lfil: Emb.ugoAn md, 181;t xp.tn. ~ion wd, 291: gtOOC'r divi~ion oCI.Wot on, 195: hou$1ng 75:}efferson md, 164, 172, 176, 199, 279: Llnd ~pecubrot:~ md, 199- 200: m.uktu ;~.00, 1.9<1-; N.uiw Amnian, 5, 6,8, 9, 182, 196: in Nt10· Engbnd, 46, 49, SO, Sl, 75: NtwOriuru, 174: in Orc-gon, 287: P;~.nicof 1819 ;~.00, ISS:poli ~;aJ ;~.ffiliati on of,l23: t.UI. ro;ub ;md, 241: Rtrorutrunion <'00,36.}; rich.poor g;a.p, 207: dl.utcroppers, 368- 370 ;~.nd m.lJY. Slu)'5'$ l'l'fl.coll:ion md, 138: Southern )>c>Omtn, 262-263: ~pecialiucion of, 20!1; \1/t,;t Afriun, IS: -~.ntm migration o(,206; 1>l'$tW.lrd mowmtm of, 238: WhUl.ey Rtbdlieln ;md, 152 F.ur;a,gur, David G.,335 F.u Wt$1, 195- 196, 284- 285. S« $h" Clli.

or,

fumi.:~; 0~--on

F>tder;l.) guwmmtnr. SITGw.oernmenr f:>tder;l.)i$11), in eonmun ion, 140 Fnl~rw p.tpen, 143 F>tder;l.)i=, 151, 157: rolbp:stof, 171, 186, IS7: Conmmrion .1nd, 141- 143: tltcrion of 1800 ;md, 162; dtcrion of 1&18 md, ISI:}efferson .md, 172, 173-174;bnd ~pecul;~.tion ;~.00, 199; Louili.m;a pur. ch.u t .:~00, 176: pl01:•il:h Burr, ln - 178; Rtpublinn' md, ISS, 159, 160, l iS: in SupremeCoun, 173-174 F>tmini~a, 133- 234, 251. S« IIIIo Womtn'll righo: F>trdinand ;~.nd IJ.lbtlla (Sp>tin), 21, 27, 28 Fifleemh lllntndmtnt, 360- 361, 362, 374,1.13 Fifth Arntndmt:nt, 315, AII Fil ibu~«r (txp.lnlion), 310

Fillman-, Mill.ud,248, 305,31 1: in dution of 1856, 313-JI4 Fm.mct, 134: British, 103: fbr Civil 'W';~.r, 327-328; H;~.milton ;md, 1!1& l>ank of 1819, 18~200-lOI; r;ailro.-cb ;~.00,

"'

Fm.k, Mikt, l66 Fm.nty, Ch;~.rit5 G~;~.ndi:lon, 227, 232 FltN-.u.en, 305, 318, 312 Fmrt\mtndmtnl, IA7, AIO Ftdletie'-', i.n Nt-.foundl;md, 27, 32, 190 FDk,jim, 370 FDk Un.i\~r.r:ity, 367 Fmllugh. G
n""

or,

Fox, r:nnlrl\·m.U).59 Ft.Ulc~ 14: Adam', ntgoti.:uion wi.th, l6.2: Ameriun Rtvolucion ;md, 120, 112- 113, 124, 126, 127;C;m
Engl.md, 92- 94, ISS, 179: x~·z Afbi.r ;~.nd, 160. S« tJ/111 •m.krFrtneh FnnciK.:~n mi.uionui.e5, 30, 31, 61 ~2, 286 Fnnklin, Btnj;~.mi.n, 1 0~ 159: .u Conmm. tion;~.l Con1o0t:nrion, JJ8, 139, 142: ;u diplom;~.r i.n Fnno:, ll
FI'Ndmtn's Buruu, 340, 356, 364,36~ 366, 367, 368 FI'Ndmtn's Khool.r, 367.100 illu~. FI'Ndom, sl;avr:s ;~.nd, 78, 111. S« IIIIo Em;m. cip.trion FI'Ndom due,;, 73 FI'Ndom of~petdl, l61 FI'Ndom oftht prt:U, 84 FrM Ltbor, 197 "Ffttport di}(Uinr" (Dougl.u).318 F~ih~r ad\'Oe.tlt$, 373 F~oiltn, 198- 299, 302- 303, 319: K.;m~;u ;~.nd,3~, 309, 310, 311 Frl'-li.n~hUf~tn, Thtodol'l', 86, 190 Frimont,Joh.n C., 29S, 313-JI4 Frr:no:h ;~.nd l.ndi.ul W.u, Vl"l.etan.rof, 119 Frr:no:h Revolution, 145, 153, 15!1-ISS: lllntrir.u~ Rt\ulution ;~.nd, 91: mobrult in, 157 Frr:no:h \1/t,;t lndie'-', 71, 94, 96, 97, 156.5« >1W S..inr Domingue Frr:ntau, Philip. 152 Frontier: App;~.behi.m, 95, 109, 154: mi\•;ili in, ll6; in Rtvolucionat}' Wu, 125- 126. SIT$Iw Wt$1 Fruifbncb wmmu.nil)', 2.35 Fugiti\>t Sl.:~•>t k.t (1850), 305-306,308 Fugiti\>t Sla•>c> L.w.· (1793). 167, 303 Fulkr, M.ugal'l'l, 149, 250-251 Ful.ron, ltofl.con, :WI Fund.lmmtoll Corutirurion.rofCuolin
I.NOEX

Gabrid's rdldlion, l68 Gad5den 1'-..n~h~t, 310 Gag>:", 1bomas. Jll, 113 Gag tulr ;a,gain.v: WoliOOn, 2Jl- lJ3

GaD, Ft;m:t. )., 145 GaD.uin, Al!M'rt, 172 G~·.}o$tph, Il l, 1ll Gatn~:J ;md ~ons. 1.94. 246

GangSJ'$1trn, 368: in ~ labcw, n , 168-269 Ganli:'"''!!t, Mr,;. Harmt, 6S GarrilliOn, William UO)'d,2lO,l31 -lJ2,307: •umrn'll righu and, 131, ll3 Ga.«'$, HIH'Ol.tio, ll
"'-·

Grntr;l.} Court (M..uJi~ehl.tltU:$}, 46, 47, 49 Grnk,Edmond(Cirir.tn), IS.S- IS6, IS7 not CttRiNS II{Vttil'm~l e-np.rtims (Lundy),

231 Grnuy, 78, 83, 101: Bririth, JlO; RtvUiu. tion.u'}' •·u .md, 128- Jl9. S« lllhtl Planr. ~n: ;and pl;mr.uion5 Gtotgt Ill (England). 9S, 102, 106, Ill: Otcbmion oC lndtprndtllC!e and, I IS, 116:0ii""' a~nm Pl'rition;wd, ll4 Gtotgia, 119, 163: in Civil W'ar, ll6, 319: conan in, 168, 2.56: !Ounding of, 80-81: lndi;m LmdJin, 137, 154, 197- 198: KLm in, 165: lrgild;uuno, 133: rr.ulmU!Wn ro Un.ion, lS6,375: rtm.w.·;a,y :d;a,'~' in, 126: Met.ilion ;md, l2J; Shnm;m', rn..1.«h ;~ernu, 347,149: sLlYI'ry in, 77: ~·uoo bnd K.mdal and, 178 Gtotgia pl.uMrm, lOS Gcrm.umno'n, B.udt of, 123, 124 Gctm.U'ly, l4: immig~nu from, 73, 180-281, 283 Gttl')'$burg, IUul~ of, 34l Ghrnt, Tt~ary of( l814), 186, 196 G.'bb:nw r. o,jm ( 1824), lOI not G.\Wcd lip' (lt...UU & w..rnrr), l7l GloriouJJkvotucion (Engi.Uld),67-69, 8J Gold, 16. 30, 33, l78,370:Afrkan, 17, 18, lS;in Califomit, 180, 299; ~Lltion,

''"'

Gold ~and;ard, 3l8, 172 Goli.ul m..l:Uaert ( 1836), l87 (';.,.( s.·il6 t6t U.'i!NI, l6l Gordon, 1bomas. 10J Gruw', 16 Gould,J;ay, J70 Gowmnll:'nt, 131- 137: BriWh, 95: in colonill Plymourh, 3~ coloni.ll \lifJinU, 3S, 39-40, 43: fndUn rtmavuri. un, 46; QIUktn: .Uld, S8; ltrpubl.iem

virw of, )57; ,;r,u.e b.mb ;wd, lll: Wr.n Mid, 196 GO'o'l'mots, rolonial tr;a,8l GO'o'l'mor', Council !,Virginia), 39, 46 Gnham, Srl\~~nr, l45 Gnnr, UIYJM$ 5., 359, 372, 373: .u Civil W'ar ~nrnl, 33S, 3!10, 3!18, lSO: sandals in .ldminim';lrion or, 370-J71, 175 Grur A•·;al:ening. 86~SrroOO,l10, 2l6-ll7 Gru1 B.uin lndiM1s. 10, 79 Grur Briuin, ISS. SIT ~~$1) Briuin Gru1 F.uninr, in lttl.uld, lSI Gru1 I.At$ n-gion, 190: Anglo.Fnonth W'.ln: in, 69: c;uuiJ in, lOl: cirie'$ or,lD4: N.uiw Amniaru or, 32,61 Gru1 Pl;a,in,.; Indian, of, 10, 79, l84: ~nkmenro(,2l8,l84

Gf'Nky, Honr.e, 247, lSO: in dl'l:rion of 1872,371- 372 GI'M'IhMl pmy, 37l GI'M'IhMlJ (p.11percum-ney), 341, 370, 372: in C'roil Wu, 3l7-3l~ 3SI GI'M'I~, NiUhanid, J26, ll7 GrM1Lmd, No~ in, 10, It GrM1 Moum-.Un 60'J'5. 109 GrM1viDt, Tttat)' of( I79S), 156 Gnonvillr , Gtotgr. 98, 100 Grimk.e, Angd in;a, 132 Grimk.e, S.U.tlt, ll2, 233 GuMWupe.Hidalgo, Tttaryof(l848), 296, 299 Guinu, 17- 1~16 Guru: in Civil w,.r, 331; imer
Habt.u rorpw, writ o(, 330, 3!1S Haiti, ll6. S« f/1/JrJ S.Um Domingue Half.W.:ct• Cown;a,nr, SO Halif..u, NO'>-.. Sroria, 97, Ill HaD, Prine~ 131 Harn.ilron,Aitund.er, llS, 138, 172:Coruri. rurion and, 141; domm:ic pol~ o(, 148- 152: dud •irh BuiT, 178: d«rion of 1800 ;a,nd, 16l: Fum~
ISS Hanford CoJM<mion, 186-187 Hat'\·;ud Coll~gr. 47 H;swlhornr, N.ulw.n.itl, llS, 249, 252

1-7

H.:ct~S. Rurhtr!Urd B., 177 Hud right~r.em, 4l, 54 Hulrh, of5l.l\~s. 27 1-l7l Hulrh mowmcnu, l4S Htlper, Hinton, 164 Hrmin~, Siltl}•, l71 Hrnrirru Mui;s (Engl;md), 40 Hrnry, P:urid, 99, 1~ Ill, 143 Htnty rht N.lloip.ror, lS Htnty VII (EngbOO), l7 Htnty VIII (Engbnd), 14 Hti\SOtt,)ocsi;sh, 173 Ht.ili.m mer
Hi.eroglyphos, M;syan, 6 Higgin.~~e~n, 1bomaJ Wenrwon:h, 340 Hill,}ohn WiOi;un, lOJ Hilldlorough.lotd, 104 Hi.s~ in CalifOrnia, 299 Hi.sp.miol;a, l8 Hog ni.sing. 25~263 Hoholum ndrure, 6- 7 Holme'$, Oli""r WcnckD, 5.-., 144 Homt$1tad lln( l86l), 143 Hondun5, filib~.t~letll in, 310 Honor cOOt, in whir.e Sou1h, 166- 267 Hood, john 8., 348, 349 Hooktr,}o$tph, 341, 34l Hopc"d.tlr rommunily, 23S Hopc"~D ndrure,8, l l Hopi lndi.ul.s, 154 Horixonulr1. ...erriu l alkgiallC!es.212 Hots~'$, NW~ Amtriun.s ;and, 6l, 79 HorsuhOC' lknd, IUulr oC, ISS, 186 "Houll:' Oividtd" ~)>t!eth (linco ln),3l7 Hou.sdlold produnion, 161 Hou.st of 8u'19-'-ue.s (Virgin.U), JS, 39, 99: Wuhinpon in, 121- ll2 Hou.st of lkpiT$et~Uci\~5, 189; Con.sriru. rional poa1'D of, 140: in ~knion oC 1824, Zl~ drttionof1800.u~d, 162 Tht Jl.,.srrfSr.nt G~Mts (H;sw1hornt), lil Hou.sing. 211: An.uaxi, 7;colonial ~l'.l, 78: f.•umcr, 75: pi.Ulttr d iu , l61: r.echoolog.y and, l4l- l4l Hou.swn, s.un, 187 Hoa'atd Univnsity, 167 Hoa1', Ridlard lord, I ll, Ill Hoa1', Wiltiam, Ill, Jl3, ll4 Hudson, Hen.ry. 36 Hudson B;a,y r
1-8

IN:OEX

~~~.2,1 1

lckolop·, l57- ISS llliooi:s, 79, 198,238: inunig:t.tnl:$ in, m : Mormo~ in, 228; $Utthood Mr, ISIO, 194 Uliooi:s Umnl R.Uiro.ld, 141 I mmignms. 72- 73, I 59; in Cu..ad.t, 60-61: Otmocnric p.tny and, 279; English, 3S-39, 42, 45,53, 54. 119: np.truion .tnd, l78-l79:Gtrnun, 73, 280-281, 283; n.ui\ism .tnd, 283, Jil;Mhools .tnd, 131: Sp.tnidl, in Luin AmtriQ, 71. Stt $h" !tid! immignnn lmpeadunent, 174:of Mdmo· Jolm$00, 359- 360 I mperi.ll{$m, 25 Impon r.u, 134. SN 1'uitr~ lbwnd!tnd duritJ l mptt~mtnr,ofJililots, 156, 179 l mptt~mtm Att (1863).326 Ioca of ~ru, 6, 28- 29 ln.:omt, 242; rolonial, 71: pbmer dirt, 261: in SoUih, 260. SIT $lw W"'F lndtmutffi ~n·mt5, 35, 54, 56, 60,84;in O.u.tpe~kt, 42; fi'Ndom dutJ of, 73: s l01\ln computd ro, 77 I ndtpmdentt, Missouri, 287 I ndtpmdetn Trco.t~t'}' An ( 1840), 224--225,

289,297 lndi-&, 25, 337 I ndi.m.t, 182, 23~ 241: $Utthood filr, 190, 194: uropi.tn rommu.nil}' in, 2lS I ndi.m Rtmtwal An (1830), 1.97- 1.98, 21.9,

256 I ndi.m lhriiOt)', 197, 1.98 lndi.m lhdt .tnd l nurrou~ An,: ( 1790-1796).165 lndi\idualiJ>m, 109, 279, 285. SIT $hP Sdf. m.ldt mtn I ndul8fflt~. s.tlt of, 23 I nduJui.tl.iution, 204-206; nu~,: of, lD4-lOS; Civil W.u .tnd, 351: C'JCp.ulJion .tnd, 2.91: Hunilmn'll uriiT pl.tn .tnd, ISO; in Ntv.• England, 49; in South, 258-260; rKhnologt• and, 239-240: ttxrik induJuy, 204, 205- 206 lntquality. SN Equality .tnd intqtuli l)' lnfl.u:ion, J34: in Conlhitr;IC)', 328,344 l nhtriu~, 75 ! ~.tnt u,·lum rt!Urm, 23-t lntt01'1:tuai5,2SO: Enlighttnmtnt, S5~6; uropian rommuniriu and,235

I ntttdungt;~blt.paru manuf;~eruno, 205, 238, 239-240 lnttrco,;tn.tts.224 lnttmal imp~mtnu bill, I ~ 216,

218- 219,223,289, 297 lnttrn.ttt commtme, 201 lntcltnbltAru ( 1774), 111- 112 ltwl'$tmtnr, r.tilro.a•b and,Z41 - l42 low;a Sc.ut Univeuii)',34J ltd.tnd, 124: C.uholic rtb
lti.dl immigranrs.207- 208,231, 290: Catbolki:un of, 73, 107, 159,208, 223, 281: in drit5,279-180;dtaft protest bf, 345: tllp.t~ion .and, 291: p!Wl"''l}' c{, 207- 208,2&2; rentmtm houPng for, 243 Iron and irotvaurking, 71, 25S-2S9, 344; Mriun, 17 Iroquois Ccn~dtr.wy, 36, 60, 80 Iroquois Indians, 13, 57: ;u Htirish allin:,69, 92, 116: in Cana.U, 166: Fraf'ICie and, 79; lo$l l.tncb of, 136: population dtdint, 165: ~ntn, 166 lnig.ltiott, 6, 7 ltving. W;ahinpon, 248,253 IW,·, l4; txpklrtn: from, 28

J>~(k.son,Andmo·, 137, 1.91, 28J: b.ulkcon.

tro\'tn)' md, 222- 223;.u &mlt of Ne-w Orluru, 186, 187, ZI6;dud.s or,l16, 218, 267; Indian rtmtwal ;md, 1.97, 1.9~2 16: nullifiution .tnd, 220-221, 223; rUt o(, 216-liS: SptcitCirruJ.u .tnd, 223, 224, 2ZS:spoih ~'5ftm and, 218:c-.uitrJ and, 21.9-Zll J.ukson, Thom.uJ. "Srontwall," 267, 333, 341,346 J.uk.soni.ms, 297, 356 Jatn~:s. Duke- ofYotl, 57-5~ 66 jatn~:J I (England), 2~ 33, 35, 39,45 jatn~:J II (Eng land). 6~ 68 Jatn~:w:nr.-n, 34. 39, 43 jOiy, Jolm, ll Z, 113, 128: Ccmrinn:ion and, 14.3: tll'.ll)' ntgutiarion bf. 137, 156-157 )")'·G.atdoquilftaty ( 1786), 1.37 j01y's l 'rui)' ( I79S), 156- 157, 158 JdkNon, l 'hom.u, IOS, 133, 1SS, l.SS, 183: on canaL!, 201;duth of,214; Dtd..trarion ofl.ndtpc-ndtnct .tnd, 115- 116: dtcrion of 1796 and, IS9;tknion of 1800 .tnd, 1&: dl'l:riem of 18()4 and, 176: Emb.ugo k.t and, ISO- lS I: Enlightt:ntn~:nr and, 85, 86: txpamion and, 291: f.srmtr ideal of, 1 6~ 172, 176, 199, 279: France-: md, 154: H.tmihon and, 1.49, 151, 152, 1 6~ 172: inaugtal .lddrt~ of, 170: }efftrsoni. anism and, 171- IJZ:judiciary and, 172- 174: Lt-ai:s and CLule C'JCpedirion and, 176- 177: loui:liana purdla~ and, 170-171, 174-176: race-: and, 17t- 172: rcoligiow fi'Ndom and, 134;s la•'tt'}' .tnd, 168, 190: ~auJ'rigtm:.tnd, 161- 1&, 189,

216 Jc-~i t mi~iot\ill'il:'-', 60, Gl Jc-~' O.rUr, 22, 23. SN ..W Chti5tianity

Jtv.•s, 22, 72, 80 Joh~on, Andrtw, 349, 35 I: impeadlmtm of, 35.9- 360: Rtconmun:ion and, 3SS...JS8,371 Joh~on, Ritlutd M., 1&2 Joh~on, William 1 ikr, l7Z

John:non, ~ph, 348 Joint·StcC'le tompMy, 22, 33 )olit t, louiJ, 6 1 Jonts. Abu lom, 167 Judidal rtYitv.·, 173 Judiciary hr. (1789), 1.46;(1801), 172-174

K.unp5villt, ntioots,3 KanJOU: bl.ulu i.n,3ll, 376;crisis in ( ISSS18.56), 31Z-JI3: Lttompron rorurirurion, 314. 315...JI6: m.ugcrt in, 301, 302, 313 KanJ.u.Ntbrasla An, 309-310, 311 Kt.ll'n}', Sttphm, l9S KU)Tlt, Roll'l'n, 49 Ktdbo.tu, 201 Kt irh, Gmtgt, .S9 Ktllty, Abb)', 2.32, 233 Ktnrucky, 109, 238, 264; abolirioni $1:$ in, US; in Civil War, 33l,335; lko~nJ, 79 KitiTr, Wil.km, 57 King, O.arltJ 8ird,ll0 King. Ruf~, 17~ 181 King. Willi.lm ~ 182 King Gto~) Wu, sz. 91, 94 King: Philip', Wu, 52 King's Cclltgc, 87 King Will.i.tm's Wu, 69 Kin.dlip: NatiYI' Amc-OOnJ md, II: $1.l\'t, 271: West Afrinn, l8 Kivas. 7 KnOW'.Nothing pany, 308, 311- 31Z. 313: ami.C.uholici:lm and, 282, 311, l i Z Knoor, lknt)·, II.S Kongo, l7, 26 Ku Klux Klln, 364- 365 and illw. Ku Klux Kl.tnAttcCI871, 373,374

Labar. of African Amtriun •
I.NOEX

Und .u~d l.u~downeuhip: C.uhal.ic churdt, 71: in Cht:upe.lk.e, 42, 4l: roloni.ll d itn: md, 91; Engli.dl endocsurt o(, II: ftdcr.ll policy, 199-lOO: held right 5YJttm, S4: Jd~BOO .lnd, 164; in M.uyl.lnd, 40; mong.lgt ckbt .lnd, 75: in Ncw Engl.lnd, 4~49; i.n Nt10·Muko,8l 48l;in Nt'>l' Ymk, SS: Prnd.lrn.ltion of 176l md, 9S: in Wt.n Mriu, 18: in We,;t lndie'$, S4. Ser $lw Ll.nd, Not.t:i\-e 1\mn'ie.m Und gnnu,lS,llO, 343: ( Of' &etdmtn, 340,358- 359, 364, 368: in 1e...~ 286 Undlll:.lpt U(hiruu, 253 Und ~rnbtON, 138, LS-l, lll,l24: f..um. en: .lnd, 199-200; immigrM~n md, IJ""9; t.lil.roads ;md,24L Ung~Ugc-, of slot.~. 174-175 U S;dk, Situr dt, 61 n-t Lut 11frk M1!6K..uss (Cooptr}, 249 Ucin (South) Amtriu, 17: /\dan!.$ .lnd, 216: BriWh matktu in, 180: l.tlQ of,6: M;a.. gdbn .lnd, 28; Monroe Dottrine .ll.d, 191: Sp.Un .lnd, 7J l;.wnof'I(J(, t\mo5 A., 306 l;.wnof'I(J(,J~mn:, 180 l;.wnof'I(J( (K;m,.u), s.ld: 313 IJst-TS II(Gr;US (Whirm.ln). 2S I Ltcompron, K.m.s.u,l1W13 Ltcompron roruriruOOn, 314, 31S...JI6,

or,

""

~. Morhtr Ann, 228- Il9 ~. RichanOkmy,

108, Ill-Ill, 143

~. Roben E.; Civil Wu and, l22, 32~ 333- 334, 341- 341: H.uper'$ ~ny n id

and, 302; su.rrwdtr of, 3SO; W.u v.•irh Muiro, l96 Ltg.1llCondtr Aet ( 1862), 327-328 Ltgid.lrn.re,;: a~emb-lie'$, 39, 66,83-84: bieou.nml, 131, 133: coloni.tl, 43, 46, 47, 91, 99, 103;j..unt:S II md, 66: M;w.ldlu. $1'U$, 137, 138. 5« o~Cs4 Congreu: P.uli;a..

_,

Lthi, Mormoni:rm ;and, 218 Lmlt r's l«bellion, 68-69 JJ,p.rrJ(ship), l794180 /Jnmfnmr $ f$17f1er its ~'"'V(I\IIW (Dkk. iruon), 10l /Jnm an tl:r Ctmditims of11/QWII $Rtl t6r l!'l'f$1N]II{dlt Saw (Grimkt),lJI /Jnm to Cttl.;.rritst 1!. Bt'ldft- (G.riml:i), 231 Ltwi,, Mtriv.-ethtr, 17S, 176- 177 Ltwi' ;and Clark upedition, 175(m.:.p), li6- ln, l96 Lningwn, B.:utk .u. I JJ n-t l.itltr.tun; zzo, HI - 232 l iberty, popul.lr vinue .u~d, In Lil1mJ (mtrdl.lnt sloop), 106 l ibertyp.lny,l32, 290, 291,312 life upteumy. in roloni.ll AmtriQ, 71,76: in rolonial Nt'>l' Engl.lnd, 49; of sl.1.w:s,

271

L.ife,;tylt: of lndi.u~~ I, 10: on pl.una.tion,, 261- U l :ridl n. poor, 207;, 1.:ro-ery.md, 267-274; teehnok!gy .u~d ( 184.0-1860),

242-246 L.inroln, Abrah.lm, lOO, 327,360: . u -ina. riDn or,JSI, J.SS: Civil 'W'.lr kadmhip of,ll8, 329-330.331, 333,341...342, 345-Jlrion .u~d, ll4, 337- 3JS, l39; on eqmli ty, 311, 318: in.lugunl addrt:U 338: phou)l: o(, 317,328: R.eron,:uuetion pl.m of, 3SWSS: SI'I:C'$.Qon .u~d, l22 L.iOOntux, Robd:, SI, SS, 62,271: uulc-, 29, 79: cowboyJ: and, 82 li\inpron, ltobU.n .md, JSJ; 5Ufl'hood fM, I7'\ 190 loui..:i.liU l>urd:wt, 186, 190, 196;JdTtNOn and, l70- 171, 174- 176 loui..:i.liU 1trrirory, J78 louiwille,l0l, 204 loui' XIV (Fnn.:t), 60, 61, 69 la\-ejO)·, Eiij.lh, 23l lau-ell ltxcilt mill~ 193,205, 106 Loplim (lbfiu), 113, 119, Ill, I IS, l26, 136 L.a,·.ll Nint, 99 Lundy, Btnj.lmin, 231 Lurhtr, Marrin, lJ LurhtDru, 73 Luxury goo&. 104 LYTtum kcturt:S, 151, 153 lyndling. 318, 3!1S

or,

Macon'1: BiD No. 1 ( 1810). 181 ~bdi$0tl, Dolll')', 181, 186 Madi$011,J~me'$, ISS, ISS, 171: Sill oCRighn and, 147, 148; Conmrurion md, IJS, 139, l41;durionoC1808md, 181;

1-9

Frder.11Nr p.lptN ;and,l4J: H.unilwn's dtbf plan .lnd, ISO; narionaiUm of, 187- 188; pe.lte.lblt rotrrion and, 1814182:5Uit:t:' righu .ll.d, 161: Wa.rof 1812 .lnd, 182-186 M~ll.m, Ftrdin.md, 28 Mai.nt,!Qtthood fUr, 190, 194 Maiu.b.lll:'d f.uming.5. Ser II(SI.ICorn Mal.ui.l, 42, S6, 271, 346 Mali, 17, 18 Man.lu.u, B.lule'$ .u,332,3H, 334 M;mh.uun,l~ 243. Ser II(SI.INI'1o·Yotl City Manif($t ~mny, 278, 288, 29l- 29l,ll0 Manirou, 13 Mosnn, Horue-, 230- 231, 134 Manor syntm, in Urolin.ls.SS Manor syntm, in M.lryl.l.tld, 40 Mosmt idd, Willi.lm, Ill Manufacturing, 181: drit5 a.nd, lOJ,204: in«'rdl.l.tl~.lblt paru, lOS, lJ~

139-240; Ma iun,l85; in Saurh rl. Non.h, 2S& u.ritr:t: ;wd, 219 1lr M.srb.'t ~~~ {H.l1o: in Cht5a.puke n"gion, 4~divnroe .lnd, 164--16S: ofelf41a-"t:S,l66: Monoon polyg~ny, 22& in New Engl.u~d, 4& proptny righu and, 75: of' los•'e5, 269-271: in utopUncommuni tit:s, I J.S: Wt,;t Mtiun, 18: )'Oung ptrson); romrol or,II0- 211 MM'dlall,}llhn, 173, 174, 178, 188-189, 201 Mary I (Engl.md), 24 MM)tmd, 73, 134: in Civil w·.lr,lU, 330, 33'\3!'11: ~ry in, 44-
M.uon, John, S I M.uonic lodgn:, 131, 123 M;wxhullttu, 108, Ill, U4. 14J; binhr.ltt in, 16!1; rolonial poliria in, 84: co nmtu. tion of, 133: td~w.~ti on filrgirb in, 165: Emb.lrgo Act ;a00,181: frnntiJ:rd~puTts. 109; indwtry in, lS8: Knov.·.Nothin~ in, 311: l.llbor unio~ in, lSI; N.uiw Amt ri. u~. 16: Plymouth llt.una.cion,36: p~ing I O'I>TIJ in, Sl: .u ror.ll rolon}', 66: Slw)T's rdltllion in, 137- J.\!1; :rmuggling in, 96: f.ll( pfOfl',;t in, 103-104. S«. Puri = M.:wxhUli'IU !by Wloll}·. 45- 46

1-10

IN:OEX

~b.u;~.dluMtUGovemmtni An, ~b.u;~.wit, 36,

112

Sl

M.u.htr, f~.lll:', S3 M;~.ui tint".ll k.i ruhip, II

MK!dk roklnie5, 56-59, 113; in lkYolution. .lf}'""'U• IIi. Set >1W Ntw York: l>t-nn. ~';Uii.l

~b)'.l,6

M-~AJil'*'~'~' Comp;Kt, 36 ~bys.vUit Ro;~.d Bill (1830), 219 Mo:Cid !.m, Gtorp:- B., 332- 33J.3!19 Mo:Cormkk, Cyru.s, l 38, 34!1 Mo:Cormir k rnpn, 138 MrCt~l.'d 1'. Mo~IJI'oiiNI (18 1 9), 188 Md) owdl, lrvin,332 M o:Giltiv~·. llkxou1dtr, 137 Mo:Gu.ffio)• f't.ldtrs, lJJ Md mm.h, W'illi.tm, 196 Mt:ldt, GtoT' G•• 342 Muluniucion, of ;a,grinlhuu. 238 Mtdkint: ;a,mharil)' o(, 210; in Ci\il W'.u, 346: Nati~ Atni:'~.Ul> J3 Me-lville-, lllb n, 209 Me-lville-, Htrnun, 209, 249, 251, 252 Mtrnphi.s, 335, 361 Me-n: dutlling .md honor r odc-, 266-167; mounl
or,

Moni'QC' Oanri.nt (1823), 191 MonugJUiJ indi.U'l~ 32 Mon~t

MK!dk P.u~, dM'ry .and, 74 MKi•T.n: .lgtitullurt in, B 8: roU~"'t:S in, 3!13; r;tilro;~.ds i.n,241: rdbrm in, 229; whu1 in, B 8, 241.5« >1W J].'«lfit sutt Migr;uian: English, 38- 39, 41, 4S; byfrtt bl.uk.s, trn.mcip.uian ;u.d, 366: lndi;w Lmd.s;wd, 109: ofpi.U'l!t( tli ~e, 261: 10 We"> 193-194, 206,238, 261. Stl' llfJI> lmmigr;um; Miliuty,JI'ft
Minuit, ~rer, 36 M inu~emtn, 113-114 Mis!Wnarit:s: in Ulifomi;a, 153, 186: in C.:~n~ 60: N.1.ci\'t Ameriu~ .lnd, 51: Ntw light$ ;u, 87: Sh.lktr, 229; to .d .lw:s, 275: Sp>~ni.sh, 30, 31, 61-61, 82, 286 Mislislippi plm. 3i'6 Mislislippi lthn .:~00 region, 61, 112, 19!1, 241, 261 ; in cn.il W'.u, 332, 335, 341, 3!12: louisi.lll.l Purdl.ut .U'ld, 196: Nouiw Ameriuru in, 7-9: ~mba;~.n on, 201: tndt an, U7, 157, 17i IOO.i.tru, 32, 36,60, 184: Br.llll, 126, 136 Moi.:~.~:St:S An a( )733 (!k'itai.n), 70, 97,99 MontUt}' ronrroveuy, 3i'2- 373. Stl' ;f{w P2per nuwney;Sptd t (roin) Mt.Witar(..·u .ship), 337 Monk,M.lrU,l&Z Monmouth Court Houle', 801tde 123, 124-125 Monopoly, SUit·rtgUbltd, 201 Monroe, J~me:s, 143, 171, 188;;a, diplom.1.1 ro Ft.l!Kt, 175: tlt
or,

Vtrdt, Chilc-, 2

Montgun~tf')', Ablxun.1,321

Monun],94 Mol.llity. .sl.:ro't f.lmilr, l71: oC.sl.:roTry, 309,

"'

MOIJ.ln, Willi.lm, ll3 Mormoru, 228, l78 Momero, Songh.li sutt in, 17 Morrill Llnd GI'.U'lr llct (1862), 34.3 Morris, Robe'n, 134-llS, 138 MoDt, Sarnud F. B., 240 Moru lil)'. Stl' Oa 1h nrt Mon on, Willi.lm 1: G., 244 Mon, Luntm, 233 Mou:nd .building eultul'l'$, 8-9 ;and ill u.s. Mou:nuin mtn, 195-196 Mula.mu, 261- 262, 273 MuiT.ly.Judith S.l!Jtlll> 165 Mu!K, 247, 176: bbd:, l76: min.strd :1~ 147 Mud im.s, 17, 22, 25: Mr'all dM' n-;adt .lnd,l6 Mutu;al ;lid $0d t ril'.i, l08

Nlpaleon Ban;ap.ln t, 174, 180: Briuin .lnd, IIIJ, 184: louixi.lnund, 175- 176 N.uhvilk CoiWC'nrion (1850), 304-305 N.ur, 1bom.l~ 37 1 Nlld!U, 79, 261, 272 Nltir k (pr.l)ing toan), Sl Nltio!Wl b.lnk, ISO- ISI, 343, 3SI Stl' o~fSI1 B;mk aCrht Unittd Sm e:s Nltio!Wl & nk Att ( 186l), 318 No~titm.tiGo~~tr, 152 NltioiWli.sm, 187- 191: in li ~emurt .md art, 248- 253 Nltio!Wl Rtpubliu~. 21~ 221- 222, 223 Nltio!Wl Ro;~.d, 196 Nltio!Wl Union p.ul)', 349, lS8 Nltio!Wl Wom.ln S.uffr;a~ Auori.ltion, 361 Nltio!Wl Womm '$ lo)·.ll U.;aguc-, 347 Nltiw: Amn io:aru, I - IS, 38- 39,91, 3lS: .1.k ohoiUm ;md, Sl, 79, 165, 166, 183: llreh.lk people:s, 2- J, 5: Briri.sh md, 33, 80, 182, 183, 184; C.1.din".s p!M'tuy>ll!; of, 153: eo nuol of WC'$ttrn lands and, 156: rul1unl di~Dily of, S-11; d~.ut md, 28- 29, 3S, 39, SO, 57, 95, 1SJ..- IS4; E.1.1«m 'lh\JodLmd.s pe'Qpk5, 7- 9: trulos"t· mt m o£,52, S6, 62,79: Europt;U~.aiJi . .lrtae5 • i rh,81: f..uming mtr.hods 76: in Freno:h .1.nd l.ndi;w Wu, 93: i.n Fn-Mh U.n.ul;a, 31, S7; fur u ;Wc- .:~00, 36, 5l, S7, 60, 61, 71, 79, 195: in Gtnt PI.U~, 284 : hot:~t:S .:~00, 79: lt10U .1.nd O.uk t xptdi. 1ion ;and, 177: mimon.uie:s .1.nd, 87, 286: Mormonism ;md, 228: Nc<w Engl;md .lnd, 50-52: North•T.n Ordin;mcc- ;and,

or,

I.NOEX

136; l>r:nn md, 59: popul.u ion, 28-l9, Ill, 165; lludllot't'YOit, 6 1- 62: u d procil)' .md,l, 10, 1 4,34: ~1 of, 196- 198, 116: lkvolm:ion.lt}' ··u md, 119, 120, 125- 126, 128, 1Jl: Sp.tnidl ;md, 28- 29, 137, 196,196. Su ~fl4 Llnd, N.uiVI' AmtOOn NWism,282, 283, 31 1-lll. 5« ~rs., Kf'IOW'. Nor.hing p.tny N:uunl ;ui$lOC'rx)', 129, I!! I N:uunlinrion An ( J798), 160- 161 N:nunl l.w-·, 85, 86 N:uunl righu, 101 N:uuJT: Cooptr ;md, 249: l;mdJapt a~Thi. r.ecu and, 253 Na~j~, l, 31, 6J, l53

Navip.cion Mu (B.tk.Un), 70-7l, 94, 97, lOS, 106 Navy: Frtnd -, 124, 127: Spani dl Armada, 33, 124. SN >~Cs4 Blodudt : Britidl (Ra)•
Ntw Anurtf'dam, 36, 57-58 NtwburghCorupiruy, U S Ntw Ecllou, 1'tt-.uy of (l835).19S Ntw England, 69,82, ISS, J77: .u~ti.si.:~•'C'r}' $C'llcimtnr in, 232: wkmi:ution of, 35- 36: cornmittff:S ofcotte~pondtnu in, 108:corron nttdJ of, 258: Dominion of, 66, 68;denionof 11!00 ;md, 162: Enbarga lin and, 181: f..uming in, <16, !19, SO, SJ, 75: F'C'derali.su in, 159: ~ndtr urio in, 4l:Grur A•·a.kming i.n,87: Hartford Co!M'nrion md, 186- 187: indu.suiaJ population or. 199: lmokrlilbk An:! and, U l : h'i$h in, 279: lilet;KY in, 84: migr;~.cion W'ff! from, 19<1; Nuiw: American, 13: prohibition of ;rlrobol in, 130: J>ur ir-anJ of, 36,45- 53, 66: reform in, 229; in Rtvnlutionary w;u, I IS: oocrile indu.stry in, lO'\ 205- 206: Unir.ui.tru in, 22F. •'U dtbt of, ISI: We~ lnditJ tndt ;md, 71, us. 137 "NtlO' England W;~.y,• 46- <18 Ntwlbundbnd, 10, 69: fi.shtril'$ of,l7, 31, 190 Ntw Ft.uKt, 60. SN ..W UI\Oida, .u F~Tndl colony Ntw Harnpdli~T, 66, 13'\ 18!1: Gm'll Moun. uin Bays of, 109: Sump hr ptOlt$1 in, 98

Nt'Vt' H.umony, 235 Nt'Vt' jti"5C')', lSI, 16'\l79;colon.i.tl, 57, 58, 59: Rn'U!uriorw.ty ··u in, 119, Ill, 123, l l ar!t, 253: immigranu in, 2~. 21!0, 290-291: population or,. 203; rich.poor p.p in, 207: Sr.unp lin Congrr:s' in, 100: Sr«k Exdungr: in, 241- 242; Tamtn.Uly Hall,l84; trW uni on' in, 106: 1Wr.ed Ring i.n,371 .:~nd ill u.s-, 377 Nt'Vt' York (rololl)'), S7-5~59, 70, 73: fron. ritr dtlpu:r.e.s, 109: lroquoiJ in, 80: ltidtr's Rtbdlion in,68-69: libd c.ut in, 8!1: povrny in, 71Xin 1«-\'0iurianary•'U, US, 119, 122, 125: royal ctntrali:arian ;md, 66-67: :d.:ro'C' popul.ufun in, 78: Swpmdi.ngAn in, 101 Ntw )iri fk......W,1!17, 347 Nt'Vt' York (sra.tt}, 201, 208, 141: Erie Canal and, 202- 203: Indian lands in, 136; !rid! in, IS9, 179:0nti.Urommunnyin,135: fe'Yi~li:!.m in, 227 Nt'Vt· York Smrk Exdurv, 16!1, 141- 242 Ntw )iri Tn't-t, 247, 371 Nk ar;agu.1,fil:ibu.sltN in, 310 Nighrinplc, FlofmC't, 3!16 NinttM'IIh Amtndmt m , AU Ninth Amend.mmt, l!17- 148, AII Non.:oruumpcion ;~.gn'lenll:'nr, 105 NonimpMurion ;~.gi'Nnl(nl, ID4, 105 Non.lm ercouDtAn (1809), 181 NoDt, in North Amnka, 11)..11, 16,27 Nonh, l.otd (Fftderick), 108, Ill, ll7 Nonh Mriu, p«.wy in, 172 Nonh 1\mtrir.t.: Outcll in, ll: Eu.ropt-a..n footholds in, 30- 36: Spani.dllanW

1-1 1

in, 1- 72. S« lllhtl Briri dl Amnia:

"'""''

Notrh Cuoliru, SS, I 15, 1!13, 167, 36l: in Civil War, 349: mulmimon ro Union, 356, 375: lkguLuon in, 109: .SI'I:C'.islon of, 322 Notrlw-.ut, 163, ll3. SN lllhtl Ntw Engla..nd Notrhern Confederxy, 177 Notrhern J>adfk ~!road, Jn Notrh (U.S.): Compromi~ of 1850 and, 30~ 305-306: dU~nt in, 3!15--3!16; fin.tn« in, 318: frtt blulu in, 10& imp>IC'I ofCivil War on, 34.3- 344: Mi.s. wuri Compromill:' and, 190; ltt"'Oiulian. aryW;u in, 122- llS: ~~ehool ufotmJ in, 230-131: d.lmy and, 190,325: Sourh romparM to, 319, .131: urb.mir.u:ion in, 258. S« lllhtl Union Notrh•'C'~Co.ur l ndi.lll.s, 10 Notrh•'C'~ Ordinanae (1787), 135.-136, 140,

,..

Notrh•'C'~ Terriwry,

198 Nova Sroria, 27, 69, 9
Ogklhotpc-,Jaml'$, 1!0~11, 82 Ohio, B8, 141: C'Miab in, 202; immigrann in, l79; $Utehood fllf', 190, 19!1 Ohio R.i\moo (MC'Ivi11~), 15 I o nare,Juandt, 31 Onti.U rommunil)', 235 Onti.U lndi.m.s, 120, 126 OptdUOOC'.lnough.3S Oral uMI.irio~, in A!Tiu, 18

1-12

IN:OEX

Otdtr or d~ Sur.Sp.u~gkd B.annn, 311 Otdtn in Council (Briuin), 183 Otdil\iUltt oC 1785, US- l36, l99 <mgan, 291: British dainu to, 2~ 284: fu.r tr.-:lt in, 1.95: PtJ.Ik ;and, 292-293;5tttkn in, 287, l8!l
PMi.fit Co.uc Sp.tnish m.U..:ionJ on, 154: U.S. d.:~i m to, 191 P.Ki.fit O.:un,lillbu.l in, 28 PMi.fit R..titro.ad llc1 (1862), 343 P.line, Tham.u, 114- IIS, 116, 134 P.llto.lndiomJ, l P.m.un.1, inhmuJcr, 28 P.min: (financi.:~l): or 1819, ISS, 200-201, 111, 221: or 1837,2!4, no: or 1857, 320: cr 1873, 372- 373 P.lptr tutmlt)', 222-llJ, ll.S, 373: fbr Civil W'u, JV-328: romintnuls. Uti: gucn. b.:~tkJ,372: P2nk or 1837 ;wd, Zl4 Pucloru, fbr Cont«ki'Oltts.lS6, 357 P.ui5, Tl'l:'.:~lyof: (1763). 9!1, 95: (1783). l lS, 127- 128 P.uliatnc'nt(British), 101, 113: ~raJ tumplt, 131: Bill orRighu .:~nd,67: colonill pror.e= .:~nd, 106: rok!nitJ ;wd, 80.81, 90-91:GiorieluJ Rt'V1.1Iu1icn .:~nd, 83; N.wig.:~tion Atu .:~nd, 70, 71: my.:~! ctnu-..linrion .:~nd, 66; S1.:~mp An .:~nd, 91k Sug.:~r An .:~nd, 97: wriu or ;tUi$UM!e ;wd, 96- 97 P.uti5olll.dlip. ISl- 151. SIT ~fs1> llnli ~al

""""'

P.~-r.enon, Willi.:~m, J39

n'( Mmtfi"d" (Cooptr), 149 r..tmil:it:$, 212 P.~-rnul lndi.ulJ, 36 P.1.upni.sm, 201. S« 4lllo Po.-eny(tht poor) P.uwn B0)'5. 109 l'ta« Oemo~h4 Fumtn ;wd r.•uming l'cnin$Ub Cunp>~ign, 333 l'cniumi;uy r
l~um lndi.lllJ, 51 l'crry, Oliver Huomi, 180, 1 8~ ISS l'cru: bird gu.:~~.u rrom, 239; lnu or; 6, 28-29 Jlhibddpha, 59, 70, 109, IIS, lfl7,318: AME chureh in, 366: Biblt llioo: in, 282: Con$1i1utiorul ConwnOOn in, US-141; ConciMntoll Congfi:'J$ in, 11 2: J!O"'C'ny in, 76: Rt'\'Oiurionary•'ilr in, 124: tr<'~k unicru in,l06:•'>lUr ~m in,l4J: wotking d..u, in, 242: )'C'Ibo.> rtver in, 167 Jlhibmhropy, 367 Jlhilippinl'$, Sp>lin ;wd, 28 llhrp,;, W'illilm, 53 llflr<noklgy, 245-246 llflysid.m.s (doro.Jn),ZIO;di.st.ut tbtoty and, 24!1. S« 411/11 H e.:~l th.:Mtdicirw: llid:ering.}obn, 173 llid:tu, G
lion, 28S-293; immigranr, 283; in OJ.:! Sau1h, 26!1: penny prt:U and, 246: Rtwn. ~nion, l54-36l PWk,J.:~mt5 K., 218: t&K1ion or 1844, 290-291: Oregan .:~nd,l92-l93: wu with

Mtnro .:~00, 293-294, 295, 296 PW)'g)'ny, Mormoru and, 228 Plmtt cL: Lt6n, Juan, 30 ~$ rtbdlion, 95- 96 1\>or RkiMnl's A!JOM.-; 85 ~.j.unt5,334 ~mul t, &l

·-

~and p.t.pw.)', lJ, 24. Ser ~($1.1C.l!holi . ~l.ucul rnrt, 211, 252 ~l.u .sovrreigmy, 298; Compromist or

IS.SOand, 302- lOJ.JOS, 308, 309: Doug. I.:~J .md,317, 318, 320: r.:~ifu.tt or, in K.:~ru.:~s. 313, 315, 316 ~1.~-tion: California geld t~.t~h .:~00, 299;

ci1iu and towns. 203;colonill tra, !19, 59,71- 75: Europt..ut,ll: lndi.ul b...W .:~nd, 109;MI'$o.unetiu, 5: N.1-ci\l' Amtri. r.m, 28- 29, IJl, 165: d.tvr:, 74- 75, 2.31, 2.57, 268; urb.:~n M~.m-t\tnl:~a..n, 366; in utb.:~n Midv.'C'"-241: wt$1'10'Md mO\l'· mtm of, 1.9!1 1,_,nug.:~J,24; M~.1. ;wd, 20; Br.u:il md, 17, 29: nplcl'l':n rrom, 27: .slaw u;adt .:~nd, 2.5-26 Pm.l-10 r..tmint, in fl'l':l.lnd, 181 Pmludle'$,10 Pmnm.u IU\n, 43 Pt-.ruW'.ltomit Mow.:~at,JOI, 313 Ptwt-ny !>oin t, Louisian.:., 7-8 Ptwt-ny (tbe poor): in Bo.non, 99: in colonill Chegpukt, 4~ in rolcnial cil:it:$, 76- 77: up.ul..:ion and, 291: F'r;ance: ;wd, 72: oC fri:!.h immigr;wu, 207-20!1, 282:d!Mt· eroppen: .:~nd, 370; untmploymtnr .:~nd, 207: urb.tn haUli ng fbr, 242, 243; whir.e, in Soud!,260, 16l, 263: \O'C'IrlhaulC'5 rw.

'-"

Puwh.:~un, w.:~u witb

Englidt,3fi, JS, 4J Prairies.JC'nltmtnl of, 238 Praying rov.'tl.s, Sl, 52 PrWtmn.:~tion, 11, 24, 226 ~n rights.lOO Prtpurq, 21:Z. SN ..W Binhrou:t Prtjudi« , l39: blub .:~00, 339.5« >~h4 R.:~ce: .:~nd t.-rism PlT.d~'JUI"Urti, 73, 87, 227, 266, 267 ~idtm: Comrirntional pov.Yn:or; 1!10; elec:rion or(S« El«tion.s) ~idtnti.:~l Vl!to, 1<10, 3S7:juluon,219, lll,lll: Linroln, lSS : M.:~di llll(ln .:~nd, 188: Polk .:~nd, 197: Tyltr, 289 ~s.r"'Mom or,st~. SN4111o New~.:~pm; Jlm'O"> Ci
I.NOEX

Pti$01'1J ;wd ronvku, 74 ~ in Civil W;u-, 347; drbl:on,S I ~ le.ui.ng of, 374X r
134 Priv.uttn, ISS Pmdarn.1.tion of 176l, 9S- 96, 109 Pmdarn.1.tion of Amm,;~;y .:md RtoonRTUt· cion(IS63), 354. l56 Pmfr.u ions,.m-.uk on,ZIO Pmgtt:U, S.S~d.uk ,:ide of,l37; 1~.lU on,

250 Pmp.ltpn.U, pro..slavuy. US Pmpmy .lOO property r ight5, 42, 75~ in coloni.ll Ntw EngJ.lnd, 48~ dl'l:ri"" offit<: ;wd, 8J~4. 132, I H~ in South,lSII- 359, 364~\'0ting ;wd, 68, 131, 133, 136, 208 PmJperity,l42. S« lllhtl Wuldl PR!$$er, G.lbrid, 273 Pnmitution,lll PRK«tionism. S« liuifT, PnKc•.n-..nt Auori.lcion, 69 Pm«M"M~ti.sm, 101, 208; Wolition .lnd,l31~ ;wci.immignnf 50citrit5 .lnd, Uil, 3Jl~ in England, 6F. tonngdiu l, ll7. ll9, l30, 166, 267, 275~ Ma.t}'l.lnd C;uholiu.llld, 40-41. 69: Mt.riun.s .lnd, UIS; Mormon. i~rn ;wd, ll~ 278; .lJ r'01.«'f .lnd s.lnitolrian,l43- l44 Publlt: •urk.s prognms. 364 Pueblo l.ndi.Ul.s, 7, 31, 81. 82 ~ fl:'o,OQlt by, 6 1- 62,79 Puerto R.iro, 30 Purd ue- UniloOt:fllity, 343 Putitans, 24 ~ Churdl of England .lnd, 36, 4S; "'r il}' upon ;a hill• and, 45-4~50, 66: u o nomk and rd ig:iou.s ltru:ions, 49....50; up;aruion .lOO N.ltiYI' Amtrkans, 4S, 50-.52 ~ G kwio~.t~lkYolucion ;wd, 68~ in Hawd.arno:',: !kdrltt Ltlto; lS 1- 252; in N""· Engbnd, 3~ 4S- S3, 6~ Salt m ,.;,mcnft .lnd,SZ- 53: towns_f.lmiliu ;wd (.lm!.$, 48-49 Pm.i.n.B.:I)·, Boutk of, 184, ISS

QuakeD, S8,87, 109, J30, 166,2JJ QuamringAn: ( 1 76.>).102 ~ (1774), lll Qu.ui W..r, 160

Qudl'tr,60, 9!1 Qucbotr An (1774), 112 Quttt~ Anmo',: Wu. 69 Quttt~'I:Colkg-:" (Ru ~n), 87 Quttt~$1on, & ult or, 18~ ISS

Quid.s(poliried f;aclion),. 178 Quimun,John A., 310

1-13

lttligion: d u lkngc'$ ro ;au:rharil)' o(, 210: Enligluenmtm and, 85-8&: G.rnr A•'Oil. ening and, 86-88; N.lti\'C' Ameriun, 13: i.n Puriun Nev.· Engl.lnd, 47; Rd'Orma. tion, Z3- 2<1: t iJt ofpopubr,Z16....Zl9~ ~. 275-27&: We$1 Aftiun, 18. S« o~Cs4 Chrl$1ianity; Clrrs.v and minis1ers~

fr"«ifo S«t R.lct ;and r;aci.sm, 26, 164X frtt.$1(1ikfll.lnd, 309; Mako md, Z97~ mi~1rd dl010'5 and, 247- 148; ~ry and, 4S, l65~ in Soutb C.lroli.na, 77- 78. Str ~64 Afriun Ameriuru~ Sl.l\'C'5 and d..m-ry lUcia] tq.uli ty, 231. SIT ~fs11 &!u.llity R.lcial miling, Z9, 79, 19~cfl:'ok:s, 77; Jeffioi"J((n .lnd, 171 - 17l~mul.lm~, 161- 162, 273 R.lcial srgnog.ltion. SIT Stgfl't;uion R.ulical Rt publielns,311, 328, .13~339; dution of 1864 and, 348- 349:JolmJQn impeadunent md,l59-360: Rl'l:o~n\lr· rian and,3S4,35S, 357. 3S~ 375 R.lp.to-tidW5 smtie'$, 207 R.tilro.ldi, 203, 140-142, 309~ brid~ lbr, 137; in Croil Wu, 331,343, 344:t xp.m. ,;ion ;wd,Z9 1 ~ 1)-«Um r irw it .lnd,ZSZ~ u;m$ieontinenul, 343, 372 R.1ltigh, W.ll«"r, H R.tndolph,John, 178- 179 R.tndolph.Mxon rolkgt.l67 R.lcilkarian: ofAtriek:t: of Conftdtmion, 134: U.S. Comrirucian, l
3S8..JS9,362, 364~ Con$1lm1ion ;md~ t maneipu ion ;md, 35~ 366..370; end o(, 375-377~ Fif1eemh Amtndmtm ;and, 360..361: Foun.etmh Amtndment ;wd, 3S7..JSS, 361, 367, 373: lincoln'll pl.ln for, 3SWS5~ poli1ia or,JSW62~ ptt,;i. denr:i.ll,lSS...JS~ lttpublieul.s ;wd, 362..J6l,364; IQ.fC' p'C'mmtm5 during, 362..J65~ SupmntCOUff .lnd, 362,367,

l73 RtronRTUnion Act of 1867, J5.8, 360, 37<1 Rtdtmption, ofdlt South, 376 Rt~fl:'ndu.m, in K;aru.ls_316 Rtfilmu1ion, 23- 24 Rtlbrm mO'o'l'mt:nl$, 214-215 Rtlbmu, ll3, ll9....Zl5;of pmi«'mi.u ie'$ and .uylutn$,134: papuluhulth and, 145: uropi.ln rommu.nilie'$,l3S. S« f/1/JII Aboli1ionim Rtgul.uorm0\'C'mt m , I09- 110 Rtig:n of1error(Fnnn"), IS4 Rtinh.lrt, fkn jamin F., 288

lttligiou.s Jokr;~.tion, 41• 47, 59, 87, 134 lte.w.iu.mer, 19, 11 ltrpart on M.lllufutu.rt:t: (lttmillon), 150 lttpart on 1ht N.ltiotu18ank (H.lmilton), 150-151 ltrpart on 1ht llublk Crffiir (J.bmilmn),

149 lttptt5enmi"" gO'VI'mmtnt, Ill, 11 9~ i.n US. Comrirution, J39 lttpublil:-..ni.sm, 133, ISI;Soutbtm tlir.e:t: .lnd, IS7- IS8 ltrpublkan mo1herhood, l6S lttpublil:-..n pmy, l51, I.S8- IS9~ ;wci. U!halici~rn ;wd, ZSZ; DrtJ Sultl r.ut .lnd, 31S~ f.•wrimuiUm •irhin, 17l, l78~ f.•um~n ;wd, 199~ Ftdtnli.su .lnd,l60, 176, liS~ K.lru.l5 cri.si.s ;and, 311- 313: Koow.N!Kbings and,31 1; l inrol.n md, 316, 330; lttroruu'\lnion ;and, 36W6l, 36~373, 376~ SI'I:C'$$iGn and, 3ll~ Jtr. tion.ll fution.s in, ZI7;5Uit 50'o'eR'igt'll}' .lnd, 188-189. S« lllhtl Elrrtion.s~ R.ulical Rtpubliuru ltrpublkan dltori~a, 101 ltt.imr;~.cion colon.it:s, S~57 ltt\'C'Ilut An of 1767. SIT 10wndlt00 dutit5 ltt\'C'I'C', I>aul, 107, 113 lttarU .lnd, 1 27- 128~ wci.ll d ungr md, IUI- 131; in Sou1h, 116-127: in W'"~t, 125- 126: whi1r m.llt tq\l.llil}' in, 128- 129: whi rt "'Omt n in,

129 lthadt bland, 66,6~ ll5, 134: Comrilu:r:ion .lnd, 143; fOunding of, 47

1-14

IN:OEX

Rin' wlriv.uion, 55-.S~ 7J, 8 1, 369 Richmond, Virginia: .u Confio.W:til W.u, 331. SIT.slse~Guru Right5. Sl'l'Croil righu.: N.uur.tl right,;; Voringrighu RioGnOO.:, 31, ltl, 293, 29!1 Riou: .mri.dnft in Nonh, 345: in cok!ni.ll Beman, 99: in wurhn-ncitit:S,362 IU\~n: ;wd H.uban: Bill of 1846, 297 RoW, 196,202, 219 Ro~oolt colony, 33 Rob.ud~~;. ltuhtl, 218 Rocht~«r, Nt'V>' Yod:, l27 Rod:inglw.m, M.uqui.r of, 100 Romeo furniture-, 1!13 Rolft,John, 3!1 Roman C.trholici~rn. 5« C.u.hollt: Churdl Romamki.rm, 250 Romamk la\~. 210

Roo.st'VI'-It, Fnnktin 0 .,308 Ro!ili, )Ohn, 197 Ror.U oemraliucion, 66- 67 Ror.U rolony: MM)·bOO ;a,, 69; Nt10· Eng. l.tOO ;a,, 66: Nt10· Franoe u, 60: Ntw Mo:iro ;a, 31: New Yo rk a~~;. 5~ 66-67: VirginiH s.35 Ror.U Navy. SIT Bricist. (Ror.U) N~yt· Ror.U Sodl!ty (London), s.s Ruk of 1756 (Brk.Un). 179 Run,...•.l)'d.l\~S. 78, S:Z, 273. 174, 301- 301: in Aorid~. 191; ltgi.rl.uion, 167: Rt'/1). lurion.uy · ·u .tnd, 119- 120. SIT slw Fugiriw :d;r.~ Llw Rur;d .ut-.u: haUling in, l43; doob in, 230. Str .s(so F~trnl:'n:.md f~mting Rur;d d irt, in South. SIT l~r d;w Ru.dl.Bagor 1'rt-aty(l817), 190 Ru~i.:., 284; Alad:~ ~00. 371: fur rradt o(, 153 Ruwn: Un.i\~r.r:iry. 87

S.Winc IU\~r, 191 So1uj,...~a,

In

St. Aug~ri nt, 30, 82 S.Um Dumingut, 174: Ffl':!Kh rtl'ugee'$ from, 159;.rla•
Som FnMsro, 299: immignnu in, 180: ~ Sp;wish mi:'llieln, 286 San flddbruo, Trtary of(l800), 174 Sanir.uy Comrn.U..:ion, U.S., 346 Sanitation ;md -~1'01~,243-244 San JMinro, 801td t or,l81 San L«tnro, Tre.tl)'of(l795), 157 San s..h•Oidor, 16 Sam~ Ann.:., Anronio Lilpn d t, 286- 287,

l96 Sam~ Fe-, 62, 285 Sam~ fc. Tr.UI, 284 Samo Oominga, 174. 175,371. SIT slw Saim Oomingut Sar;uog~. B~rdt or, ln. 124 Saunn.lh, G
225- 226 S«tionali~rn: Mo:iun W.u ~nd, 197:.rla\!U}' ~nd, l 88, 1 89- 190;1'ui1Tof182hnd,

218- 219 Stdirion An (179S), 161 Stgn'pion, Dci~l,367-368, 374: of churthe'$, 275: oCmili uty, 340; of n il. road p;wengm;,240: of$dlool.s, lOS,

lll Sdf.trnpiO)'tnl':m, 2()9 Sdf.gw.oernmtnt, 9~ 102, 103: roloni;d,83; in coloni~l M~Uol(hwcus, 45, 46;.rutt-· hood ~nd, ll6 Sdf~ men, 129, 207, 211, 127 Sdf4uffkitmy, 200, 209: incoloni~l Ncwrh Amuiu, 36: Germ~n immig:t.tnt, 181: rw:tunriiUm ;md, 70: in Saurh,2S.S, UO. 261,262,263 Scminolt fOOi.u~, 191; rtrnoY;ai or, 196, 197 Scnue, U.S; Afrian lltlll:riunJ in, 363: Ch.ut imptuhmcm .tOO, 174: Co~ri ru. rion~l poal'n: of, L40:John:son impe~ch.

mcm .t00,360; ttt.uy ~pproul by, 140, 290, 293, 310,371 Stmu F.db Con..-mcion, l33 Stmu lndi.u!J, 166 Sentg;unbi.lo 11, 26, Sqmt.ut ~here-, for •umcn, 209, 211 -212, lSI Sqmr;ui.on of pou~t~~, 140 StrY~ntlll. SIT lndtmul'l'd strv.tnu: Sl.t\l'J ~nd .rla\!U}' Snfler.l: in C.tlifumi.:.,287, 188: Nari"" lltlll:riun l.tncb .tnd,SO: in Ncwrh•l',;t mritoty, 136- 137 s~n o~ys> &mlt:S, Hl, 333 S~n Goldm CiM oCCiboU, 30 S~nttc"mh t\tlll:ndmtnt,A I3

n

S~mhAmcndmen t, A II S~n Yt.tl3' Wu, 9J, 92- 94 s~m Riwr, Boutk of, 41 St10'Md, Willi~m H., 30 4. 310, 318, 320, 322 St10ing m~dUnt, 237, 140 SI'XU.lJ intqu~lity, 233 SI'XU.lliry, hulm ;md, 245 S!'XU.1Jiy.u;an$!Uirttd dis~t:S. 153- 154, 296 Srynwur, H or.uio, 370 Sluktn. 228-129 Sluke'$pl'.lrt, Willi;un, 147 Slutttropping, 36.'11- 370 ~nd nup Slurpsburg. SIT Ancitt.1.m, B~ult of Slwo'tltt l ndi;m~~;. 79, 93, 109, 156: l;mds or, 136: 1ecumJth .t00,183 Sluyll:'s Rtbdlion, 137- 138 Shen;mdNh V~lky, <:nil W;u in, 348

Shuid~n. Phili p, 34~350 Shum~n. John, 372-373

,.,

Shum~n. Willi~m TKumJth, 347-34~349,

Shiloh, 801td t or, 335 Ship.r ;md shipping.25, 156: utwh ~nd, 200-202: in <:nil Wu, 337; N.wig~rion Act ~00. 70-71: priuttc"l'll, under Frtnch lbg. 155: ~shi P~~, 7-t.rrtatn.powertd, 201,103: X'YZAIT..tir ~nd, 160 Shot indUW)', 16l ShaJhant people. 177 Silwr: Chin~ tDdt ;wd, ll4; wi.wgt,372, 373: Mu ian,284: from Sp.u~i.rh Amcr. iu , 29- 30 Siow: lndi.u!J, 79 Siufftn.h Amtndrw:nt, AU Si:uh Amendrw:nr, AI I Sla.dl.~nd.bu.m ;a,grieuhurt-, 9 SIOUC'r,5.unutl,2~105

SlsNJ}ttrl:tnon, J1 1,313, 3l11, 31~316 Sl~w rtbd.lions. 78, 219, 302: !hr or, 11 1, 116, 155, 219- 220, 272, 297: H.upen: Feny n id ~nd, 301, 318: N~u Turner'"~~;.

I.NOEX

219, lSS-lS6,l7l, 273,275, 302 ~ in Saint Domingue-, ISS, 168, 174~ in \lir. g ini.1,l68 Sl.l"C'5 and d.1.VI'ry, 28, 167-li'4~ African origin5 o(, 26, 38, 45, 56, 72, 74~ Amc-OOn.bom, 75~ in Chuape~kt re-gion, 44-45~ Civil War and, .HI, 33~ 338-339~ in coklnial ririe-~ 77~ rontlkt o•w , in O ld Soud1, 264--265~ Conniru. cion and, l!10,29S~ ronon and, 238, 257, 268~dinribu00n or,lS9~ nparuion of, 297, 299, 302,309, 310,3 15~ familit-', 269-271; in Gtotgia, 80~ I ~ indtnrn.r< romp.utd, n~ languav of, li4-l75~ lon8C'vity, health ;wd d irt, 271 -272 ~ in l.ouirit~ 72 ~ Midd lt P.usagt and, 74; Missouri Compromi51C' ;n.d, 189- 190: montury valut of, 261 ~ mulic and da:ntt of, 276: NatiVI' Amr00n5 n, 52, 56, 62~ N""· Ligh1 a00,87~ off'pl;l.nta.cion£, 272; popularion, 74- 75, 231, 257, 268~ Porn~. guest and, 25-26: prwlavery argumrm ;wd, 265- 166: r;~e~m and, 26, 45~ rdi. g ion o(, l75- 276t tl:'linartCJe or,273-l74~ Rt"'Oiurionarywar and, 128, 130~ Scorn. $ion and, 319~ st';1.)' $ )01\'4'$

Sl.tw rrosde: banning of,268,30S~ Br.u:il ;wd, 74, 271:Couon Btlr md, 199; imenul ( 1810- 1860), 270(nup): Pottugal ;wd, 25- 26; W't$1 African, 26, 38, 45, 56,

72, 7'\79 Sliddi,John, Z9~337

S!u.u,John 0 ., 295 Snullpox, 28- 29, 57,95 Smith,}tdidi.lb, 195- 196 Smith, John, 34 Smith, ~ph, 228

Smith & W't:Uon rompany, 240 Smuggling. in ooloni.ll er.t,96, lOS, 110, 135 Social d~. SIT Cia~ Social ronu;~ec, ofl.od:t, 101 Social e-quality. S« Equalil}' .tnd intqUollity Social t'tciprodry; in colonial Nt10· Engl.:n.d, 4~ 50; in Europt, l2, ZJ; N":ui\'C' t\mtri. t;~n5 and, 2, 10, 14, 34: Wt$1 Afrieln, l8 Social t'tlacion.dli)l<', rrvnlution in, l09 -112 Soril!ty; Eu.ropt".ut, 19, 20- 22.: f'tvivalism ;wd, 87; Rt\!Qtucionat}'•'U and, 128- 131; •'<'5ttm Cl.tllonl.$ .:~00, 194--195: •ililt 01.:1 Soudt,l60-267 Sori!!tf for d lt Encou~~t of lhrful Manuf.•wnu,-~ 163- 164 Sori!!tf of FrirOOi. Ser Ql.loll:tD Soft morwy, 2ll. SIT "f111 l>osper monty

Soil c-rolion, 76, 19~ 238,370 Sommrt,Jan~~:~ I ll Songlui, l7 Soru of l.ibrny, 100, 103, 105, 106 Sound.monty .ufw11~at.e5, 372 Sou!h, lttron~UUni on er.t.S« Rt.:on$trur. rion 7k Scwdl Af
151 St.w-.!6 G!mll11" &pdtititm !lllld Plwru ( 1828), 219 Soud wrn Homt.ntad kt (1866), 368 Sou1h (U.S.). 115: cirit5 in, 77:furof$l.:ro'C' t'tl- land sp«ul.uoD Spinning bft:s, 105 Spir itual.11($l.:ro'C' wnp), l76 Spoiluyuem, 218 Squa.nro, 36 Snmp An ( 1765), 97- 100: rt:Si.na.tKt 10, 98- 100, 101, 10!1

1-15

Sump A1'1 Congr<5$, 100 Sumon, Edwin, 359, 360 Sumon, flinll<1h Cady, 233, 234, 347, 361 Sumon, l-knt)·. 338 "Scu.Spangltd BanMr" (Kty). 187 Smt bimlu, lOO, lll, 22.5, 351: PM!ic of 1837 and, 214; .u pl'l bank$, 222 Stalt·rhuuh 51C'p.tntion, 47, 134 Smthood,=danb for, 136 Statt ltgi$1aturt:S, 133: dt.:tion o f $tt'l.llots by, 140; Kan$;Uaim , 312-.313: Southtm plamer d i!C' .t00,164 Smt:S, 140-141, 376: Bill ofRighu and, 147- J48; ronllrirurio!t', l31- 133, 316- 317: t«L:tod u51.1mption ofdcilt or, 149, ISO, I.SI: fndi.:~n l.:~nds and, 197: monopolit5 and, 201: Rtron~UUnion, 356,362-365; SO'o'l'reigmyof, ISS- 189; U.S. CorutiruOOn and, 142 Smt:S' righu, l7l, 289, 373; C.U00..1n and, 119, 220; Conftdtracy and, 314, 327, 329, 34S;JdTtncn .:~00, 161- 162,189, 116 Smu1c- fur R.el:igiou5 Frr:tdom ( 1786), 134 StNmb..uu, lOI, 203 StNm poWC"r, 141 Stl'.li!Uhip~ in C'roil Wu, l3~ 337 Stqlhrru, t\kxander, 329 St~ru, Judil:hS~nr, l!l~ 165 St~ru, 111.ldW:u5,328, 358,37$ Smrk mark.-1 w lbp:st ( 1873), 372 Smnt, Lucy, 2H Smnt, William, 41 Smno R.ebd.li on, 78 Smwt, Harril'l &erher, 149, J06-J08 Strau55, l.t'\i, 280 Sni:t ronmuetion, of Corutirnrion, 151, 176, 188 SnU:t-', 206, 181 Strong, 1 bom.u W., 299 Sruut, Gilbert, I36 Stuut d)'II.UI)', in England, SO, 66, 67 SIU)""'·unr, J\ottr, 57 Subnurint-', in Civil Wu, 337 SuiThU: R~, 113 Suffragr:.S« Fiftt~enth Amendmrm: Voting and \\)ting r igh r,:: W'orn.:n'5 $11_ffr;a8C' Sugar kt (1764), 97, 98, 99, lOS Sugar plan l
1-16

IN:OEX

S.upiTmt Court (c.wJiiftJ~nl) Rtroruu-union <'00,362, 367, 373. Ser $hPI(Itrifoc Qll.'-5 S.u~-.er}', 34&: .mr.nhl':lia .md, 2411 S.u$Cjuth.umod: I..diu~, Ill S.urur,John, 2811 S.•'rdish cok!ny, 56, 57

1' 103, 10!1, 107, 110-lll 1~dmology, 237-3116: economic gtowth ;wd, 23!1-142.: iOOum-ialiution a.nd, lOS, 239-l<W: penl'l}' pte'~ <'00,24~qu.ll fly or lire .lnd, 2<12- 246 1~cunueh, 181.-183, 18<1 1~hu.-c.in, 5 1~1tgt<'ph, 240, 247,291 1~mprun.:e, 248,290, 312 1~mpmn.:t soritrie5, 21 2,229-230 1~nemtt~l

howi.ng, 2<12, 24.3

1~nf'ltllt, Gilben, 87 1~nnen ~o Wi11i.un, 86 1~m·tt:u~3S&inei\til

W'.u, 326,332, HS, 3<12: ronan in, 256: KLm in, 36!1; rud.. mi~ion of, 10 Un.ian, lSS, 375: ~«~e~ion or, 312: ,;c.udmodaC, l54, 1911 l~no.:h1id.in, 6, 28 1~mh·;~.u.nW'.l (Prophtt), ISJ 1~mh /ltnl:ndmtnt, 147- l!\8, All 1~nurt aCOffkt An (18671359, 360, 374 1~otihu..-c:in, s~ 1~rtinnial stlf.gavtrnmenc, 136 1~rtinnial slalo0Uy, l97, 320 1~rrorUm, Kl.m .md, 364- 365 .md iOw. 1~x;u, 153, 318:Amt00n JC"nlen: in, 285- 286: .:~nno:lr.lrian or,l88, 289-290,

291, 293: inCroil Wu, 344; ronan itt, 256: Nrv.· Muito ;md,303, 30-t tradmts. ' ion m Union, 356, 375: stct.u:ion and,

321: ;1.5 Jl.:ro'C' $1C,u.e, 303: Sp.mish in, 61, 82,28<1 l'o:.u Rtwlu1ion (1836).286- 287 TtxM 1~ U•1Urt( l869), 373 l'o:rik milb, 181, l93, 24l:in Briuin, 168, 256, 337; Civil W'u md, 343: i.n Nt10· Engl.tnd, l04, 205- 206: in Sauth, 251k women in, 205, 282 llumu, &nit or, 184 l'Jlt.a.r.er .md dnm.l, 247, 307 Third Amtndmtnl, IA7, Al0 Thirntmh Amend.mt.nt,l3l.,J49, 356, 361,

All Thonuon, S;~.mutl, 210 lbot'C'au, Jknf}' O.:roid, 249, 250, 252,253 Thfl'!e.fifd~ d;~.wr, 140, 187, M Tikkn,5.unutiJ., 377 Tirnbtrbl.c, l\o:gg)' O'Ntak, 220 Tirnbuluu, 17 Time' x~5,n.il ro.ldi ;~.nd, 240 Tipptalli!C', Ba.ttk or, 183, J8S, l2S Tirulu, SZ lblmc«~, 76,156, 258, 263: in Cbl':l~pe;~.ke rtg:ion, <12-4~ g;~.ng Iabar fur, 77: monopoly on, 71: in Virgi.nil, 3WS, 43; i.n We,;c lndie'$, S4 lbcqutvillt, Akxi,dl:, l93, l94, 206.107, 226,252 lbmpkin:~, SaD}·. 346 lbpelu, ft'C't·SUit ga\wnmt.nt in, 312, 313, 315 lbrdt,;iiJ.u, 1'reuy of( J494), 27, 29 1brit5. S« Lay.lli= (lbrit5) lbuuainr L'OuloOUrur~Fnn('Qi', l74 lim'll.dltnd, Ch.uk5, 102,105, 108 lim'll.dltnd Durin, JOl.-106: n'.lttion ro,

..

,

lhcl~: Britidt, i'0-71,

US, 179, 181- 182, 181:Civil Wu, 34S: Embiu).--oAct and, 180- 181: Fu We,;c md, 284- .285; FJTno:h rok!nia.l, 79: M.MI.Uon ;md, 181- 182.: Mi.ui.uippi Ri1o0er, 137, 157, 174; Nui""' Amnian, S, 7, 10, 12, 16,32, &2: Ntw Engl.md, 71, US, 137: Pom~gut5C', 25: Sp;~.ni .dl colo. nia.l, 82; tr.m:~porucian md, 193: W'CO$f Mriun, 17: with We,;c lndie'$, 71, 94, 135, 137, 156, 181. SNMso Fur r101~ Slos-"t 124; C;~.n.l.W ;wd, 60,

u ..,

Tudt unio~, 206 Tuil oflhn, lndi.m ITmO'>'al .md, 1.97-198 lhil:~ m We">l8S(ma.p), 287-28!1 Tt.mMJendtnto~l:i~a, 235, 250- 251 Tt.m:100minrnul (Ad.tmJ.Onis) 1'ttaty (l819), 191, 196,284 Tt.m:100minrnul n ilf'O.ld,311J.,3n Tt.m:~.Mi.ui.uippi We"-335.. SN .rW We,;c Tt.m:spoiTa.cian, 193; UIUI~lOl -202,203: n
Truwn,oCBurr, 178 Tru~f}' Otp.u-tmenl, US: under H;unil. ron, J48, 149: in!L:pmdtnt, 224- 215, 289, 297 Trurie,.; Adam:~.Oni5 (lhnKonrinrmal), 191, 196,284:aCGhtnr(l8l4), 186,196: ofGU.ldaJupe.Hidalgo ( l848), 299: IOO.i.tn l;~.nds ;~.nd, 109, J36, 182- 183:]-")'· Gatdoqui, 137:}~ (179S), I56- l57, 158: Ntw Edlou (1835), 198:aCNtwYark (1790), JS4:ofP.ui:~ (1763), 9'\ 9S:of P.ui:~ (1783), 125, 127-128: ltwh.B<'got (1817), 190: Sa.n IJ.:I~funw (1800), 174: Sa.n Lorenxo (1795). 157: Sen.ue r;uifiarion of, l<W, 290, 293, 310, 371: oflbtde'lill.u (1494), 27, 29: Wlil~«r· ll.thburwn, 289 TI'C'dtg.u Iron Warlu, 258- 2.59, 326 TI'C'nehatd,}ahn, 101 Tn11t ;~.IT.Ur, 337 TI'C'man, &udtof, Ill, 123 TI'C'Yiflo_,ju;~.n Fr;~.n.:i:lro, 62 Tripoli, peac<: tt'C'.UY with, 172 TrumbuO,John, portr.Un b}•, II~ 149 Truth, SojautiU'r, 307 Tubm..m,H;~.rritt,l73

Turner, 302

N;~.1, 219,

255- 256, 272, 27l., 275,

Twe.uor;~. lndi.m~SO, I20. J26 lV.•.Un, M.uk, 3il lV.'C'td, W'iliUm M.,l71 and iOw., 377 lV.'C'tfth AmtOOmtn t, l59, 176,Ail- U lV.'C'nritrh /ltnl:ndmtnt, A13. 14 lV.'C'nry..finl Amendmen~oAIA lV.'C'nry-Meond Amendmtm, A1<1 lV.'C'nry.third AmtOOmtm, Al4 lV.'C'nry.fou:r1h Atnl:'ndmen~o A14-15 lV.'C'nry..fifdl Amendtnl:'nr, t\15 lV.'C'nry-llixrh Amtndmtnt, Al5 lV.'C'nry..snT:nth Amt00mtn t, Al6 lV.'O·p.ut}' '}~ltm, 2l7 Tyln, John, 225, 248, 289: ltx.u .m.neurion ;~.nd, 289- 290 l)pno(MtJYiJk), 251 Typhoid, <12, 346

Undt T111011 ~ Crb.;n (Snno'C') , 249, 306- 308 Underground t.Ui ro~ 273 Untmployrn.:nt, 76,207,3n Unil:ountnl1tgiduure, J33 Union (North), 32.5: w lbp$t of, 319-323: tltcrian of 1860 ;~.nd, 319-320: popu. !arion and rt:SOU«I':I of, 329: $1'Ct.ufun ;~.nd, 323- 323: YkiOC}' fur, 3!17-JSI. Stl' .rW Civil W;~.r (U.S.): Nardi (U.S.) Union P.-rilk R;~.ilro.ul, 343, 37 1 UnionJ. S« l.Wot union5 Union w lditn, ;u r.uperb.tggeu, 363. Stl' .rW Armtd fume5, in <:nil W;u Unn.tri.m5, 227, 234, 235

1-17

I.NOEX

U.S. S;milolt)•CommU!Wn, 346 Unit«~

Sr.u:l'$ orAmtrkol, 115 UnitrJ St~n r. CnuU\fJUl ( 1876), 373 UnitrJ St~n r. R«n- ( 1876), 373 Uni¥er.~irit5 ;md rollt~, 87, 267: Arrk.Ul· AmtOOn, 367: pubtir land fUr, 343. SIT $hr.> l(ltrifo: iJUtirnrion Urb.Uliution, 70, 203-l~ in North, lSS Unul:int nun~ in C.u..ada, 60 Urah, 285, 296,30~ 36l; MotmoiU in, lJ"'8; ,u, dlood ror, J03 Utt lndi.ul,, 81 Utopi.m tommunitit:s, 229, 235

\'illty Forgco, ll4 \';w Burm , Mmin, l17, 189, 29& in tknion o( 18J6,l2J. ll4: lndtpendtnt Tru~ry BiD al.d, l24- ll5 \';u-gas. Ditgo dt, 62 \'aux, Calven, 253 \'trike', 20(m.lp), 25 Vtra Crux, 295, l96 \'ttmom, 109, 154, 194 \~y. Otnmark, l73 \~tci, Amtrigo, 28 \~ pou~r. SIT Prelidtmi;d VC'to \"itr.;Wmiralty court, 96, 97, 98, 105 \'iduburg: & nit or, 341, 342: tn.l.Uaert in ( 1Si4),Ji6 \'igil.mtt groups, 36!1- 365, 3i'6. SIT $ls" Ku Kfux KJ.m \'illago:-s.N.ltive' American, 7-~ 10 \'inUnd, NDNC' in, 10-11 \'ioltnoe, in O ld South, Ui6 \'i.rgin i-1, 104.109, l15, 133, 264: !Inti. kd:r;di~U in, 1113: Bxon'$ Jkbdlion in, 43-44;in 0\il Wu, 326, 332- 333, 341, 34l, 348, l50; colonixolrion or,33-3S: tommin «J rom:'~ondt..n' in, JOB: dd>T pLm .md, 150: Houle' of Burgt:UI'$1 35, 39, 99: rr.ulmi»ion o(, to Union, liS, 375: RC'VU!urion.uy wu in, 126- 1l7; I'UIWO'ilY $)aves in, U9: St«Pion o r, 3l2: ' I01W: I"C'bdli an in, ll9, 255- 2.56, 273: ' I01•'C't}' in, !14-45:,utr .md thurdl in, 39..4(); tObilc«< in,J4- JS, 4~ l>fltal f.U'ming.ll9 \'i.rgin i.l Comp.my or London, 34, 35 \'i.rgini.l Comp.my or ll$yrnoulh, 34 l'!f!i.W (iron.dad), 336-337 \'i.rgin i.l llf.ut, J39 \'i.rgini.l Rl'$olutioru, 161, 219 \'i.nualrrpttll:'nr.~rian, 96, 99 \~funUt}' ;t~.wci.uioJU, 212 \~n ST.eubm, Fritdrieh, Ill! \~ting righu ($tdfr~gr:): adulr whi fe' malt, in South, 26!1: Mriun Amt rian, 354, 355, 358, 360-361, 362, 36!1-365, 376: fbr frtt blxls. UJ, 16'\ J67, 20S;in K.ulu:s, 312: in ll$yrnouth rololl}·, 46: pmpmy

or

f'tquimntm for, 68, 8!1, 132, 136, lOll; and l'l'ligion, in M.vrbnd, 69: for womtn, 16!1, 361- 362

'W'ab.uh ltiVC'r, 181 WW, Btnjamin, 360 WW.IJ:svi5 BiD, 35!1-JSS 'W'ag.'$, 368, 369; in C'nil Wu, 3!14; drop in (18.36-1842), 224:rUt in, l42 ;51aw l.lbot and, 26!1: tu tilt wod:er, l06, 242 'W'agon tr.tins.284, 287- 288 Wakt fofi:'Jt colltgr, 267 WS!rJnt ( l'horuu),l SO 'W'alktr, DMcl,lll Walker, WiOi.un, 310 Wall SnTtt, llll- l4l 'W'alth.un, u nik mills in, lOS Wamp.moag Indians. 16,36,52 War and v.·ur.li'C': Anglo-Frtnd-, 69; N.ltiw Ameriraru and, 12, 39, 43. Sl'l" ~fl4 tprrifot ~~

War dtbt: Briri.dt, 90, 94- 95, 120: Conrtdn. .ue", 356, 357, 36-t ltt"'OiurionaryWu, 134, US, U7- IJS, l!19- JSO W..ri'YII ll)bt>11(1794), 14S 'W'ar h.w.·k~ 181 Wamn, CharltJ Oudlq·, 371 Wamn, Su5illl, 2.52 'W'ar of 1812, 171, 18!- 186, 191Xton:se. ql)tnt~ or, J87, 20J: naV}' in, 170, JSS(map) 'W'ar oftht Au5trian Suo:ti':Uian, 8l 'W'ar of tht lug~~~e Augd!urg. 69 WatTI'n,joliC'ph, 101 'W'.uhingron, D.C., 232: Banntktt and, 130, 167: d..m-ry in,303, 304, 305: in Wuo( 1812, 185, 186 'W'.uhing:ron, Gm~, 8!1, 91, l4l, l!13;.u .umytommandtr, lJ
or

1 2 ~ I ZF..uConcilll'm.llCongrt~. ll3:

fai'I'Vol'll mt.Uil-g' of, 15S..159;Corrign polity .t00,1S!I. 1S7, 159: H.tmilwn and, 148, lSI, 158;NtwburghCon~i.r;aqand, US: P:m on Bays and, 109: ponni t US: sdtnci!X intert!U or,S.S: in Stven Yean:' War, 93; Whi:!kty Rtl-Uhy), 245 'W'ater suppl}·, in d rin, 243, 24!1 'W'.:I)'tlt, "Mad Anlhony,•1S6 Wuhh, 34.3: in toloni.tl cirits. 76;o(roloni.ll d ius. 78, 119: inhtti uncr .tnd, 75; Southern slalodloldtl3, 264 Wuporu, LtwiJ .tnd Clark upeditio n and, 177. SN ..W Gun5 Wlil~«r, Dmid, 238, 289

or,

or

Wcil~«r·Mhbu.non 1'1'1'-.ll)', 289

Wt$t: Ci\>il Wu in, 33S, 34l;tolltgl'$ in,3!13: Con.fe'.dtl'ilrian and, 135- 137; Fu WtJt,

195- 196, 284-28.5: fi.odtr.tl gOVC"mmt m and, 196: ltwiJ ;wd Clarli"Xptdition in, 17~ 176- tn: moun uin mtn in, 195- 196: N.lcive Ameriuru in, 156: ~ty in,l99: trW or,l84-lS.S. SIT ~~14 \1/t,;(W'.ltd m OVC'm t:!H Wt$l Afria, 17- 19: lciJUhipin,Z7 1:~ U';ldt ;wd, Ui, 38, !IS, 56, 72, 74, 79 Wt$l l-"lori.U, 128, I~ 191 Wt$l lnditJ (C.tri bl-<ean), 29, 43, 59, Ill!: BririJh, 181: EngiUh immigr.tnu in,39, 45: Frtnth, 71, 9'\ 96, 156, 175, 179; MC!Wli:'J k.t and, 70, 71: Ntw Engi.U'ld mldt•ilh, 71, llS, 137: sla1o0ery .tnd Jl.:ro~ U';ldt in, 74, 79, 310: Sp.uti,h, 179:Jugu plamatio nJ and sl.tvery in, 38, 53-S Exp.uu.:ion Whut, 76, 79, 199,202, 139, lS~l63;in Midwt$f, 238,241 Whurlry, Phylli ~ 130 Whigs, 133, 134, 30!1. 320;anti:!l01\tl't}' .md, ZSJ.l97:Comprom.Ur Union, 306: di5imtgmion or, 3li)..JJ 1: tknion or 1836 ;wd, 2l3- l24: tlution 1840 md, 225, 289; tltnion o( 1844 .tnd, 290-191: 18411 and, 298- 299: rl«rian tlt
or

or

1·18

IHOill'

'W'orntn..:&J .IIOONUl(tcll........)

-

It•

Jphcr-c o(, l<W. &mm.itt, llJ..lJ.l, lSI; .~;~ indt:ntuftd Mrwanu. .U,

!&!; laboc-and.lll; N'~ AnMnan,

J, S. U; ..{'Wwl.ipl.cl,l7;.uNM&. ll!lb.,l.f9.lS1.l&l. pbnlt"l' ct•,., N1 ~1Q;

.......,............

.&ad, It-t fft'IY..U.. - ' . U7, Ut; R.-. ...._,. •.. . , - . Ul; ..,..... ..,._

b , 109, lll-l.11.1SI,__,br, 1l1, 240; ~ ~- lJI, 361 MWil i11ua~ 1n krllpl'l"&ntt ~ ll0.1n ea'riltf dc:.h .-nufat:ttu-.:, n. lOS. JC.,lOi, lll; •t.•, 119, 164, J.4<1: 'lt'lltheDn and., 52-SJ: ~ 11\!1 pt.r or, 19<1- 195; •oatitinJ d:ua, l •U WOIIIOI ifll(l, ,VIIJI'Itrlldt CI'AI""' ("UI~). 251 Won1en'l rish t•. JM. l tl~, lll .U<1; ;abQ!ic-oo :~nd,2ll,2Jl: Civil \lhr and, Jtf7; in CCII(IniJI NC'w ..~1!111•~ <1, <19;

Qluh-rund, 58; $UITn!.p (wotmJn,..ti). 16-\ J6J.J62 WooLen mills., 19l. St!r M 1't.rtlk ..tb ...-mttr c ~ (Wl). 191 'fo"'tri:.n..ud ~c:b:sa.. ~ 1Al;. akold md.,l..l);in.Cirii ..-..-• .M*cbft prVInl bf; 145: tdmic .-.1m..-~ .... m.~Jmk ..-~111-lll.. mimud...,.,.,247; ~..tdll!.

........... ......,.

dim in. tcmk milf., lOS.--~

~am~l76 ~ Am:i~--ery C«tvmtMXI (l.gnclon),

m Wri1 of;w;isn.nct, 96.-97 Wy:m, Ft.mcia, 35 W)'Olning. 361

XYl AIT.Ur, 160

Y.am:l'l« lndi;ans, 80 YUC~Gloandte;llnd;;a.J, 171 Ylfklw &wr, $'-, 1&1, 144, 271

y"*-' In South..Ml-UJ, 264 Yodl, Dub ol, 51-51," YodltR'ft, ~ .u, lM-ID

._ ...

.....,..,... ~ud.,ll0-211

Index MA. S« Agriwltunl Adjturmt:tn An llbb.u, M.lhrnoud, 772 llbiknt, K.Ul$.U, 396, 397 llbolitioni,u, Jkconm-IKrion and,358 llbonion,679, 742; RM.: W..Jr and, 692, 712,715, 740, 76~ 782;$1tm-Cd) IT$Urdl md, 767: liolt:mr and, 756 t1br.th.tltl Unnal11 (airw:nft r.urier), 765 llbramoiT, Jack, 781 11~ Abs.t...,_! (Faulk.nu), 584 llbu Ghraib pli$ontr ab~.t~t, 77l llcoouming5J~Itrn$, 406, 408 llcht:son, De.:.n, 624. 635, 69>t llcquirw:d fmmunt lk6cimcy S)ndromt. SN AIDS tp«kmk llcrivi,m: Cold Wu, 665~66: ftminUr, 678-679: HUp.tnit, 6n- 678: Nari"" Amrrican, 677, 717. Srw: $In> Ci\il right:~~ mcwemtm; Nt10· Otal lld.:.ms, Hen.ry. 451 lld.:~mwn llcr (1916), 502 lldd.uru,J..tno:, 4.39-440,473,480, 540: World Wu I and,SOS-506, 514, 521 lldt!phia Corpomion, 766 t111't-TII.!II11'1 ufHldJrbory Fin11 (1Vo;tin). 445 lld\Oen:isi.ng, SJS, 619, 650: nurkrringand, 412; poliried, 654: on to~dio, S>t3: won~~:n ;md, S36t World W;u I ;md, 519-520 A.EF. Ser Ameriun Eq!tdirion.:~ry l'o«l'$ Affirm.a.ci\'t .:.crion, 717, 740 Amuencr, 647- 65 I. S« 411/11 Wulrh n'<' Affb.rm Sll(.it!;1 (Galbraith), 647 Mghani,un, 721, 771, 776: t.emwi~n in, 760, 762- 763 AFt. Ser Ameriun F<"'kl't63; l.:~bor unioru .:~nd, 420, 489, Sl7, 578: middlt dali5, 447, 491, 776; in movin .:~nd tdtYiAon, SSl, 716: Nrv.• Dul .:.nd, 570-571; Nt10· Orluns, 780, 781: u uilroad •'Orltn;, 388: Rtpubtiu.n p.uty and, 455: i.n sparu, 441, 591, 616, 630: urhlm migr;arion or, 366, 4l4, 432, 52.3-524, 541, 579, 607: in Wt.n , 390: •umtn, 366,447, 489, 5!10; •urk or, Sl!l; World Wul.:~nd,SI~Worid Wull wd, 606- 607. Str $In> Ml!dtT BlaciG FI'Ndmrn: Rut and r;acism: Stgtrg;arion

Mri:om.Amtri:om YOring righu, 461-462, 606,670: lkmo.:ntic p.uty a.nd, 723: in dution or 2000,753: RKorurrucrion tra, JS4. JSS, 3SS, 360- 361, 362, 364-J6S,376t f'<'gisrrarion drivr:s, 630, 670, 671(m;tp): lt-wll .:~nd,570 Mri:om Mttbodi,;t Epi.srop;ll chun:h,366, 489 Ap,Jame'$, 583 Agnrv.·, Spiro 1:, 704, i'il6 Agtib~.t~int.is, 397-398, 597, 649 Agriwlrunl AdjtmmenT An ( l9H).564, 568,575 Agricultural AdjtmmenT Admini"nrion (MA), 564, 565, 573 Agticulru~ Mtxiun Iabar for, 656-657: Nt-.· Otal.:~nd,56& r.:~ilroa.U and, 389, 39& Wodd War I boom .:~nd, 52l....S23. S« 411/11 F.umtD ;md r.umi.ng: Shan"· cropping Agriwlrurr, U.S. Depal'mll:'nt of, 571 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 474 Ahmadinrjad, M.lhmoud, 773 AIDS tpidtmit, 691, 710,713 Ai.rc....tt-, 584, 6!18; 6.52 bombarion ( 1969), 677, 717 Alcohol a..nd akohoiUm, 748: Nari"" Ameriuru .:~nd, 386: salcon' .:~nd, 43~ 441, 487. 5«41/11 Prohibirion; li-mper.

Alger, Hor.uio, 418,463, 582 Algeria, 600, 646 Alito, S.:~mutl, Jt., 781 - 782 Alkndt, Salvadac, 700

All::it:s .:~nd ;Uiia..ncr:s: Cold Wu, 62S(map): r..trmtn, 459-461: World W;u I, 512, Sl4• SIS, 517-519, 526,539: World War II, S9S, 599..t.OI, 603, 611 AIS;~CI' and lotraint, 526 Al mw~, Robert, 712 Amalg.mu1td Clo1hing Wor!ten;,577 Amtndtnl:'nrs, ro Ccmrirntion, A10-A 15: propwtd, 714, 715, 744. 768. Str ~1111 ~ .:~mtndtnl:'nr

Amrriun Adtm, 399 Amrriun Btll Ttltphont, 404 Amtriun CiYil l.ibtnirs Union, 550 A11 Amrrk$n Dlltmlllol (Myrdod), 607 Amtriun Expeditionary Fot«s (A.EF), 517-519 Amtriun ~der.:~cion orUbor (AFL), 420, 421-422, 494. 502,522,537, sn, 649 Amrriun I ndUn OrrrnJt A.uoci.ltion, 5111 Amrriun lndi..tn MO\>tmtm, 6n, 717 Amrriun ltg:ion, 506 A~t~ni'.,us Mnr1117 m..g.uint, 546 Amrriun OnJint (AOL). 746 Amrriun l~)"rhiarric A»oci.uion, 692 Amrriun Soria! Hygitnt Aiwriarion, 486 Amrriuru witb ))i,~bi.liM An (1990), 740 Amrriun 10b.l«o Comp;wy, 496 Amrriun Wom.:~n Suffng>:" A.uoci.ltion, 361,492 Amnt:SI}' An ( ISn), 372,374, 376 AmuJC'mtnr p.uks, 443,486 AIW'dli,u, 422, 414, 493, 549-SSO Ancknon, M.uia.n, 571 Anglo soritly, in Sou1l:w.~"> 393..J94. 5« .o~h4•..JrrWhi t.e

Angola, 700 Antw..n, Kofi, 748, 785 Anno:Jr.~rian, ot" H.wo;tii, 471 AHKI:l~~n (union), 590 Anrhony, Swan 8., 361-J6l, 420, 492 Anrhru: sutt, 762 Anri.6.:~11Urk Mi~ik Trul)•( l972), 773 Anri.communi,m, 528- 529, 6!11; politics or, 632-636. SN ..W Cold War Anri.lmptri.tli$t Lugur, 473 Anri.Salcon Lugur, 487 Anri.StmiWm, 549, 567, 61 1, 6l!l Anriwu mowmtnr: Vitnum War, 678, 682, 683, 6118., 690, 695, 698: Wortd War pxifi.sm, SOS- 506,514, 5ll Ap;Kht lndia.nJ, 382,38J, 384 Ap;u1hrid, in Sou1h Ml"iel, 736 Apouly)Xk ficrion, 757 Appt.utmtm, or Nui Germall}', 590 Appk computer, 711- 712

1-1

1-2

IN:OEX

Arab oil tmb.ugo (1973), 719 Arab world. 6U. 731: n.uioiWli:un in, 64&: o il "~alth of, 630. Stl' $hP bl;un.:Middlt

......

Atafar, ~·a..:ir, 7V, 74~ 1n Ar..paho lndi;m~ .\!II, 382. 383. 3!14 Atl'hittcrutl:': modtmist, 4-46; utban sky. ~;~.ptn, 5!16; Vkrori;m, 434 An:tic N~al W'ild li.k Rtfugr:, 767 A~mi.n;a,5.n. 747 Arilridt, Jun.Btttund. 749 Ariwna, 392. 515: .w.m~ ptoplt$ of, 38J, 387; Sp;i_nidl..$pt-,J..keu i.n,393, 394 Atl.:nu.u. 363, 365; rtadmU!Wn ro Union, 3S5, 375: dool dutg:rtprion in, 642- 643 Arnw:, ))C'$1, 63~ 6S4 Armtd IO«t$, 393: in Chi.n;a,507;di.saimi. n.ufun in, 63 I: prs ;md IC'$bian' in, 608, 742; Gl Sill md, 61~19; foo.i.tn "';ltll md, 380, 382, 383, 384- 38S, 387, 38& in lt;aq, 738, 765,770, nl, 784: in Kortan W'u, 627~28; labaf violtnoe .u~d, 422, 423; in Mniro, Sll: NA10,6l5; Naxi German, S9l, S95, 599.600, 601: P:m. ;mu Cmal md, SO!k i.n Philippines w.u, 474; Rough R.idtN, in Cuba, 472, 49S: i.n Saudi AtWi-1, 73 I: sthaol dt:Stgnoguion md, 642, 6!13:,uil:es and, 464; U.S. nuri.ntJ,510, 511,612, 727; \'«C'I".ln bonu, mardltn: wd,561: in Vklnam W'u, 682, 697: in World War 1, 515-516, 517-519; Wart.:l W;u U, 596,599- 600, 602, 6D4. Stl' Mw Bl.uk $01dim:: Rtd {S!witt) Army: Vl!ltranJ Armmi.m immig~'<~nt5, 429 Armnrong,Louis, 547 Arnutrong, Nti1, 701 Army Appropri.ufuns An, 374 An ;md artistJ, 5114, 6S3: Ashun Stbool, 481: frontitr, 400; modtml$m in, 446; 1920J,546 Arthur, Cht:Srtf A , 456, 457 An:iun5o 416 Ashan Sthool, 481 A..:ia: Cold Wu in, 626- 629: tornmuni~rn in, 645: economk trisis in ( 1997. 1998), 747.

no.

SN >1W JP«ifr trJMJ~f¥] A..:ian Am~rieul Pulitia l Altia~, 678 A..:ian AmtOOn~ upw.atd mobility of, 777 A..:i;m im migtmu, 675, 718, in Ameri. t.lJo 428(nu.p):diKrimination ;a,gai.n~

ns:

510 727: of F;o;an:t Ftroin;md, S 12: ofGarlidd, 451-4Sl, 457: of)oh.n Ktn. ntd}•, 667, 6!10: o(King. 672, 694, 695; of l.itKoln, 355: of long. S67: of M.:lkolm X, 673: of MtKinltJ'• 49S; of IW!in, 748; of Rol-en Ktnntdy, 695;ofs.ut;u,7ll A,;:sembly, in lr..q, 770 Ad.J.m-.1; 551: n tf: rior in ( 1906), 489 A~.uliJUtion,

Ad.lltt" Cllflnibdivm, 414 AdMII~hoNIKku wr..1JlOIU AOO..ioupt$; Clinron ;and, 75J ; Nixon ;and, 706-707 Aug wr.a, G~otgi;a, 415 Awclu•iudu1h t.unp, 61l Awtni.U, 628 Awt!U, 610: Gtrrn.U1f .:~00, 590 Awuia.Hung.uy, 516, S27; Wotld w·ar I ;md, Sll Alli•V"J'l6J#{M.:JJu/Jm ~ 673 Aomrn.nion, of ind~rry. 649 Aommobilt i.ndUIU)', <183, 534-..53~ 648, 778-779: boom in, Sl2, S33; Ford'$ Modd T, 486,534; foreign shan' of, 717, 739, 77J!.; fud tffi.:ienl)' md, 719, 754-755, 767-. ro;ub .u~d, SOl; Jilfttyof, 663, 676: $0tial imp;Kt or,541-54l: $Ubulb and, 6SO, 651: untmployrntnt in, 739, 779 Tk All\lin.i"llg(Chopin), 448 Axis 1\no~n, Wart.:l W;u U, 59l, 594, S96, 603. SN ..W fuly:).ap.m; Nui Gtrmu.r

B.ub«i 1>irt, 391 B.uton, lkuet, S36, SJS, 540 B.ulKh, lkmatd, 517 B.udlaU, 426,489, S44, 6S7, 709: inttgn.· tion of, 616,630: proft:Uion~l, 442 B.uit, Count, SSJ B.ukttbidl, 4-47 &n.u..n, IIC'igtof, S9S nr <b (Dcuan), 446

&bbitl (ltwi.s), 546 B~!Ko.:k, O!'\ilk . 371 &b)• ~IWIO.VU Glrr(Spod), 6S2 B~by boom, 651~Sl, 653: agi.ngof, n5, 780:tounrtiTUlmre md, 686: IIC'Xual lil-er.ufun and, 691 !Ughdul. bombing of, 7 .\!I, 765 IUktr,jMllt5, 736 IUktr, JwtphiM• 547 B~ktr, R.ly Su.n.n.ud, 489 IUkku, Jim ;md Tammy, 716 <krr ''· U»irtnii;J!Jf~.:$, 717 B;a,h.f"•in, J;unt$, 6S3 IUifour Dtd..u.uion( 1917), S17 IUik...m~, in,;c.Wility in, 747 B~ll, Lucilk, 63~39, 654 IUIIinp, Ritlutd A , 499-SOO IUitit tl:'publ.iN, 736 B~ltimot"< and Ohio Railm.ad, 422 IUnkingAn (1935),569 IUnks wd b.tnktn, 588; tUm'nty $Upply .u~d, 455; Fedrul Rtstn~ and, 501...501: gold ti:'IIC'I'VI' ~nd, 465--466: Ntv.• Dul and, S63: nilro.ulton$OI:i&.tion u.d, 408:,.winp.;tnd.lo~n indu,u y, 724, 725, 729, 739; World W;u I, 514,590 BM) Xi ang. 759-760, B~prist churd:w:s, 366, 756 IU~. U.td.l, 486 IUnk, Ehud, 748

lktltky Fll'!e Spetth Mtwl'mtnt, 6!17.6118 lkttin, 610: .:~idift ro ( 1948), 6!4; 01)'1n~ prot' in (1936),591 lkttin Wall, 666, 730: ope-ning of, 734- 735,

&u:isr.a,Fui~Mo,58S

&mk of tht But~, 601 &y ofJiip: iwo.u:iun, 666 lkadtmani.l, 4 19 lkan, 660 lkauty p;agtan t5, 5!14 lkgin, Mtn.-d!tm. 72 I lkijing. S07; m.um:rt in( 1989), 736 lkl.uw, 736, 748 lkfgium. m Wodd W'.ul, SIS lkfgndt, 747 lktknap, Wiii.Um E., 371 lkD, Akxander Graham, 410 lkD, Dmid, 778 lkDamy, Edw.atd, 424,480 lkD l.¥15, 6<18 lklmont, Augtm. 466 lknnm, HalT}', S78 lkmon, l'horn.u H.ut, 546, S8!1 lkntKn, UIJ'fd, 735 lk~n.lkhtnto~mntion t.unp. 611 lk~'· \f'Kror,

m

'"

529

em,

lkm"rin, 706 lkli:Stmtl', 1-Jtm)•, 408 lkdmnt,Mary M(ltod,S71 lk...uidgt, Albtn, 499 Siblt, 716: Fundamtnuli''" and, 5SO B.icydi.ng, 1>l11ntn ;md, 4!17 Sigbwine'$~ 410,411, 496: agrib~ine'$5,. 397.39~597, 649: fnOO .1.nd $Qnd.ll in, 766: Ntv.• Dul ;md, S66; n"gularian or, 483. S« tJ/J111'ruw: Sin Lultn, O.s.mu, 749, 760, 762- 76l Birmingham, Abbiun.l, 414,571: r.uial violtno:t in, 669, 670 Birth tontrol,576, 679: wntnttpri~. 493, 691- 691 Birlll#f• Nslitm (film), 489, 490, 551 B.irthrartJ, 60S, 112 ~ unmarril'd m()(btn and,74S,n6 Siwn.S« Buffalo (bi.son) hunting Bbd: ~bi.ntt, S71 Wrl (ode'$, 356, 357, 368, 374 Wrl wlturt, 547. 5!18 Wrl f..umtrs, 460. 5« .. Sluu.:roppi.ng WrliUtJ,inCold W.u-, 633- 634 Wrlmun, H.ury, 7D4

w

1-3

l.NOEX

Bluk Pamhn p.uty, 673, 703 Bluk l>c.~r. 671- 673 Blulu. SIT Mw AfOOn.AmtOOnJ Bluk soldim ,l64, 490.497, 607: in Span. idl Ameriun W.u, 471-473; in World W'.ul, 516, 5 1 ~519 Bluk Seu Stunuhip lint, 552 Bluk 1hund.:~J• (1929), 559 Bla.iM,j~ml'$ G., 458 Bla.nd.AIIiwn Ac1 of 18~ 373 Blittkritg (lighming ..·.u'), 591 Blotko.dr: of Cub.:., 47l, 666: ofJ"P~n. 611; of\'eraCru~511

BoMd of fOOi.tn Comm.Usiontn, 384 Botsky, l~n.

ns

Boldlt'\'ik rtwlurion, 517, 527 Boldlt'\'ilm, fe.u of, 528 Bombs ~nd bombing. 731;ofblxl church, 670: rolk~ umpusn: md, 689:improvUtd t xplruiVI' dtvk"> 765, 772:. in I~.-q, 738,770: in br;l('l, 748: in lcilanon, 727, 77l; by NAlO, cf~tbia,747; cfNordl Kott-~ 62& Ok.l~honu Cily, 756: R.ed Sure and, 528; $Uirick bombtn, 727, i4S, nO; ofVitm~m, 682, 68~ 69& W'odd Tt;adt Umtr, 749: 'lh\Jrld Wu 11, 592, 594, 601, 613. SIT ;f{w Nudt.U -~~pan'

Bona.nn f~rrn,,397-398 Bo~y, William H. "Billy dlt Kid," 397 Bool.of.dlt.Mcnth Club, 543 Bood!, WiOi.un, 438 Botdtr P:urol, 549, 783 Botk, Robtrt, 706, 7l9 &mia,747 &mia.Htn:~"'U¥i.na,511

&no.n,SSO:rnl.rutal d itt of, 444: immi. grann in, 431: -a.llhy in, 431: •'Omtn's 5Uift.lRt group$ in,361 Bouldtr{H!Kn~r) D.un, 572 Boundaryd~put.e,;: wirh Bri uin, 470: v.irh Mtxiro, 7S3 Boutboru,376 Boutot, Randolph, 52 I &..fi11g Afrust (Punw.m), 75!1 ~r Rdltllion (Olitu), 507-508 Boxing. 442, 489 Bo)'!.:ocu: Co~trvativt; 756: f~rm •urktr, 6n: MoK01>'01ympit$, 711: nu!L:nt,

...

BoySoo1u~497 Brat"> Ch~rlu loring. 437-438 ~ prograrn,608, 656- 657 Brain ttwr, 562 Branth Davidian~ 756 Brandtis, Louis, 502 Brand tumt:S, 412 Braxil, 700, 747 BITmtt, L P2ul, 765 BIT.n·Lilwsk, l"reuy of( l918), 517 BITncn 'lh\Jodll agrNn~~:nr ( 1944), 619

Btl"'.ffnt'\', Uonid, 711 Brfuin, B~nlt of,59l....S93 Brfuin (Engl~nd), 624,763: bound~ry dillpurt ~nd., 470; dtptt:Uion of 189~ and, 465: 6dli.ng dUpuit whh, 469; immignnnfrom, <119, 43l:Jtwi.dl homt· Lmd and, 527, 611: naY}' o(, 513, 539: .dlijiluilding or, 371: Sutx erillis and, 6!16:•umtn'll sutrnv in, <191: World W;u I and, 511, 513- 514,515,517: World Wu U md, 592- 593, 599; W'odd W'.ul p~t ;n.d, 526 Britidl Gui.uw, 470 Bro.ule.uti.ng ~twotl~ 543 Brokaw, Tom, 755 Btor.htb, 438-4l9, 443. SN ..W PI1.1CSrirution Br010n,}olln, SSnwillt,1~JW, 39~ bluk soldim in, 490,497 Bn.rwr11 .: &.lnl of&l~t<>~t;., ofTtl(ltb ( 1954), 642,656 Br~n, Willi~mjtn.ning,,
of 1896 and, 466-468: dtmon of I908 and, 499: Scopt:t: trial and, 550 Br~nr, Aniu, 715 Bryn M.u>T Colk~, <135 BIKhan~n. P.u, 7<11 Bldlty, William F.,}f.,6!11, 674,714 Budgtt b.tl~ncing. 744 Budgtt ddkh. SN I:X6tir ~tnding &If: Kitt~ Pfdw B
&lffo'"

"""

Buffalo Bird Wonun,379-.380,387 Bulfalo(biwn) hunti.ng,379,380,383, 385, 386: r.Uiroa.U ~nd,31U,388 Bulfalo(t ity), 427 Bulp ia, 512,601, 610, 621 Bull Moo.se P2ny, 500 Bun~u.VuiDa, Phili ppt,S~

Bundint, Ntd, 400 Butt-au oflndi.m AIT..Un, 717 Butt-au ofU,.~r Rid: huunnr-:, 525 Burgtr, W'.ttiTn, 7()4, 707, 719 Buriav, Ooro1hy, 685- 686 Burie'$on,Aibtr1 5., 522 Burma,602 Bumlum, Dm.itl, 485 Bwh, Gtotgt H. W. (ddtr), 7l5- 73S: dtc· rion of 198!1 and, 735- 736: l~n:i;m Gulf wu ~oo. 7J7- 738: u.s. u.ldt ~nd., 736-737: .u vi.:C'·J!"'$idtm, 723, 728, 735 Bwh, Gtotgt w., 753- 754, nl-772: ~,:. tk policy ~nd, 779- 783: d«tion of1004 and, 768-769;tmil't'IIUI)t:lU"al~ttotd of, 774- n5: rr:sponll:' to t.el'f'Ori~rn by, 760-764: war in Iraq ~nd, 76!1-765, 768, 769 Bwi.nt$$:; bluk..owntd, n6: boom .:~00 bu,;t q'tk,: in, 405: rnl1 of, 534X dtttgul~tion, 723, 72<1, 766: ma.na~mtm in, <106:

Na.m~ Ameriun, 718: Ntw ~al and, 56W6S; rtg~~luiono(, <179, <183- 484: 1990$ boom, 745. SN 4111o Big bu.rint:S5

c~gnt}·,J.amt:S, 582 C~lilbmia, 65l, 690: Ccn5ti'Y.Itillm i.n,

71<1-715: dtftnst indu,u y in, 6!17: dwr. bowl R'fup:t: in, 572,574: tlt~,pp\t~ incidtm and, 719- 720 C~mp D.lvid Aucml$( 1978), 721, 727, 772 c~n.td.l, 633, 763; gOO! in Klondike, 396: NAFl"A and, 742, 7<16: N.lri\~ t\tnl:riu.nll i.n,385 C~n~l,;; l~n~m.:., 50!1-509, 720; Su~599, 645- 6!16 c~pi tai:i,;rn, 406,445: 1.w..x.r~itt idtoklgy,
,..,.,tr

c~n:on,llxhd, 649, 665 C~ntr,Jimmy, 719,

720-722,723, 725

C~l')'. Willi~m dt Ia Mcnto~.F,379

C.t501blanea ml'leti.ng ( 1943), 593 C.tdl trop,:, railroad$ and,389. SIT <~f~~>

'~'«if<"""

C.tlioo,:, Nuiw Amtti an, 71~ 776 C.tu, Gto~ W.,397, 398 c~u~n, Mat)·, 446 C.two, Fidd, 588, 646, 715: CIA plou .:~nd, 66~667 C~tholid.~m: ~borrion righn and, 715: Al Smith ~nd, 553, 554: im.mig:mion

ITibrm ;mel, 783: lrUh ~nd., 45S: Ktnntdy ~nd,663, 66!1; M~..t\n~~:rir-an, 549; J»nxhial school~ 449; in S.upiTmt Coun, 781 c~n. Curie Clupnun, 491, 514 c~ult ranching.39J,396- 397

1-4

IN:OEX

LlCaug,0/7 Ctonlt'}•: lndi.ul 1>'at'J md, JS5, .\!17; Rough Ridm inCuN, 472,495 CBS (Colu.mbiot Bro.uk.uting SyJttm), 543, 584-SSS, 653, 6'93, 1n CCC. SIT Civilian Con~t"·;ufun Cotp$ ~kbri tyrultul'l':, 544 ~D phon!'$, 759 ~nwrdlip. 486,596 ~n~5, 399, 541, 718, n7. S« tJ/111 Popu. Inion ~nu-a1 Amrrieol, U.S. imtt"'Cntion in, 725-726 otnd m.lp ~nu-allmdl:i~~ ~ni)• (CL\), 596, 646, 703, 705, 725, 765: Bwh in, 735: C.utro ;wd, 666, 667;Chik ;md, 700: rovtrl ;action' of,644-645; Hmong .um, 759; Norirp and, 736:9/11 1errwi:un otOO, 763, 764; tOUUil' u:scd b}•, n1 ~nu-al l>o!cifir IWiro.ld, 388,406 ~nu-al l>o;n.'Cn. Wort.:! W;u 1,512 Cm!llf')' nug;u;int, 445 A Cmt"'] u(l)fslwnarQubon), 385 O.Unno r<£,535 O.unbrrbin, NMIIc, 590 O.unbrn. Whitnler, 634 CM~t~picw Si'llglrStw.'h (E.tk.iru), 446 0.1pl.in, Owtit, 486, 543 O.uity Org;mi:mion Socitly, 438 O.u!Nmn, 547 0~50\lmon P., 375 O.i~ c.;;su E,;u;Wa, 677 Ou.hnya, Ru~ian wu in, 748 Ott\n,John, 653 Ocmiell ind~uy, 647, no Orney, Rkh.ud "0kk,• 754, 760, 764,765, 784 Otvroltt, loui~ 533 Ot)'ffint lndi.ul,,38l, J82, .\!13, 384, 385 Ok;~.go: blaeh in, 432, 463, 523: H.l)'m.U· ktr tiol (1886). 422: Hull H oull:', 440, 480: immig;mn in, 43l: O'lflniud rrimc in, 553: pal:ioe brur.~lil}' in, 695: popula. cion of, 427, <184: Pullnun nrikt in, 423: tll(t rion in, 528, 694: stu.nu in,655; 5uburlu of, 432: World'$ F;Ur, 41)/J, 485 Clii-dJP DtftNu (nrw~aptr), 523 Ok;mru, 60~ 677. &r 111$1) Hi5F""'iu Oild laboc, 449, 48l, 483: banning of, 564, 575: tl:'wietion5 on, 48'\ 540-54l: in tt:uik milh , 4l5,417 Oildrm: baby boom ( l950:1). 65 l -652; in rivil rights' m..urh, 669: hulth in5ut.mer fur, 751: ofimmignm~ 656: Indian, 383: u.tban d iM'aM' and, 432: utb.ul poor, 437--438,440, 655: wi.kkmt5$ otnd, 497: ,.,Jrk.ing modWN otOO, 605. SN <~W Youth Oilc, 470, 5l3, 720 Oinz C.uttr ;md, no. nJ;dilentt and, 686: j01pan a00,526,590: Korun W'.u ;wd, 6.27- 6.28: Open Door to, 506-508,

n'(

or,

594: Proplc', Republic 626, 699: l'ian;anmen m.uJilrll' in, 736: u~dt • i rh, 746, n3- n4, 780. 5« ,.h4 Chinm immignnn a..•..urown (lilm), 7l2 ChintM' Exdwion llr1 (IW), 42l Chintll:' i.mmigr.tnu, 397, 41.9, 487: in Cali:fumi;a gaM rwh, 396: in H.w.·;aii, 471: a5 totilroad "'Ori:tN, 388: ll':Su icrion on, 420-42 l: in San Ftotnd:<~ro, 432: in W'e<~1,

390 Chippt1>-a Indian~ 677 Chi:'lholm 1hi1, 396 Chiving1on, )obn M., 383 Choltr.t,485 Chopin, K.ltt, 448 Chrini.m Anti.Communi51 o~w. 641 Chrini.m CNiirion, 741, 743, 75~ 769 Chrini.m Fai rh.;and.l.i~ Communiry, 685 Chrini.mity, 656, 727: in China, 507: C'JCp;ul,:ion md, 469, 474: li.md.tmtnuli~ .iS0-55l, 652- 653; N.uiw Amrriraru ;md, 384, 38!1. S« tJIJrJiptri{x $1'11:( ChrJ'$Itr rorpomion, 717 Churd~,;: Afriran Arntrk.ut, 366-367; .md $0dal ;activity, in We"-392 ChurdUII, W'irtuon, 592,598,59.9, 603, 610, 62l;;~.r W'odd W'.u II tonfiol'l':ntl'$, 593, 611, 613,621 Chu~hoC}t$~ Qui ~ ofUrttr.d;ay S.Unu. S« Mormoni5m CIA. &r Wu;!.) ln ttDi~noe Agrnry Cincinnati, 520 Cincinnati Red Srod:inp, 442 Citil'$ and rcwru, 427- 432: blad: migr;ufun ro,366, 414, 523-524; bombing of, in Per.li;m GulfW'u, 738: bombing of, in World W;u 11, 592,601, 602,613: immi. gr.tnu in, 419, 487; inftucnn tpW~mic m, 524: Mexican !wT~ 393, 394, 5SO, 655: Nt10· Dul and, 570; politiul m;a. rhinr:s in, 4.36-437: popuLuio n growth, 427-42&. 484, 54l; pO'o'Cny in, l950s, 655: prog:rc5$ivi:un otnd, 482,484-487: r;acr riou in ( 1.96S).694:5lum5 ;md ghrum in, 431-432,485: Southtm u nik milb and, 4)4-415: suburb!, 542, 650, 65l, 654; violt~ in, 717, 756, 767: wotking d..uJ
~·'

Civil R.ighn Art: of 1866, 357, 373, 374;of l87S, 374, 462; of 1957, 643;of l960, 643; of 196'\ 670, 674, 678 Ci~il Couts (l883), 367, 462 Civil righu nla\'Crntnt, 668- 673, 685- 686, 7l7; M. L King and,656, 668, 669-670: ,;rudent 5if.ill~ 662-663 Civilll:'rvicr reform, 453,456-457, 692 Civil w;au: in China,6.26: in Laru, 666: in Sonulia, 749; in Spain, 5.83 Civil Wu(U.S.), 353; Soudlrm cronomy and, 4)3; W((r.tru, 453, 454-45~ 459 Civil Work$ Administration (CWA). 566,

RiJim

'"

Cl.ul, Did:, 659 Cl.uk, Jim. 670 Cl.uk, William, JSO Cl;w: manners and, 433: sdloob ;md, 448--449. SIT 11f111 Middle da$$; Upper da$$; Watling d;w Cl;ayton Antiuu5r An ( 1.914).502 Clun Air An (1963), 665, 676 Clun Wou:rr llr1 (1963), 676 Cltl;md, 1 bomaJ Maid.md, 616 Clcmrf'I(IC'au, G~"'C'£, 526 Clcmrru, Sounud Llnghom. S« 1 Wain, M.uk Clcmrmt, ROOrno, 657 Clergy: Aftiun Amrriem, 367: Mlti.wu prro',;t ;md, 682 CIC\d.md, 485, 523;eknion of 18!14 md, 457: we-;ahhy in, 432 CIC\d.md, G.rovtr, 40'\ 470, 49 7; eknion o( l884 ;wd, 457, 45&dcrtion of l8SS md, 459: d«tion of 1892 and, 464: gold ~andard ;and, 465, 466-467: H;aw;aii .md, 471: u rif& md, 458-459, 466 Cl.inmn, Hilluy Radium, 734, 741, 75l: dtU'do~ i~utd b)•, 754; sex se.mdal ;wd, 750, 751- 752, 755, 757; "'Cihn' reform under, 743, 744- 745 Clo1hing nunuf;anwc-, 410: •umrn in, 411, 4l8.5«4111111txrilrmill5 CNl indwuy, 417, 54~ black minen: in, 4l4: m-ik.e m, 495-496: unioniution of, 423: in W't$1" Virginia, 405, 41~ 562 Co.ur Guard, 763 Cobb,1 )', 544 Cody, Willi.lm F. "'Bulf.tlo Bill,'" 382,400 Coitugt, 5ilwr, 372, 373, 4.55, 456, 466-467 Cold W'ar, 617, 621- 619: in Ali.l, 626- 61.9: brinkmanship in, 643- 644: rontolinmrm polil)', 6.22-6:2~626, 628- 629, 643: diumt in, 686, 696- 697, 699, 700: end of, 730, 734.-73~ 736: Kr mwdy otOO,

I.NOEX

665- 667: 1'rum;m Oocnino: ;md, 62.3- 625. SIT .fl'wCommunl$m; $(,.,.it,

""""

c~ (ck!UOJ~r), 749 Colf.lx. Sdmyltr, .\70 Cotkcri"" b.u);.tining.569 Cotltgts. 5« Univeui ~ .tnd collt8J'$ CoOitr, John, 581 Co.Uirr'1 m.:ag.u~. 481 Colombi;J, P.m;mu .lnd, 508 Color;uto, 392,454 Cotumbi.l Un.i\~n:i1y. 6118 Cotumbim high .sehoul llloorings, 756 Conwld W: lndi;m~JIIl, 383, 384 Com.i( book supn'htrot5, 606

,.

n-t C~~.~:~~i"S#{PIW-tlld..m-i.tl ~J (lkO), Corn..mtfft, Chin;a ;and, 50 7. S« 4lhtl 1'r.l!k Commiu ion en 1hining Cunp Amvitie'$, 516 Commiutf: fot lnduJUi.ll Org;anir.ufun. S77 Commiutf: on l>ubl.ic lnfOtm.llion, 520 Commiutf: ro ~fmd Amuiu Finc,S93 Commiutf: ro Jk.Eira tht Prr:sidm1 (CREEII), 705. 706 n-t C11.1:11111<m Llw(Holmt$), 480-481 Commum5, 710 Commun.ic.uion.s Otcemy .An, 744 CommunUm. 527: ;mti.cornmunia- poli ~ 632- 636: in ksi;, 6:26,6!15: in Cunbcdi.l, 698: rolllp5t of, 736: ronuinnll:'nr of, 617. 6.22-624,626, 628- 629. 643;Grt-.u Otpt~ion .tnd• 566. SN ..W Bol.sh('Vi:un: Soviet Union Communist p.my, 580,632, 6l4, 642; in Soviet Union, 730 Cornpn:irion, 412; tvalurion ;and, 42.3: 1ru~n ;md, 409 Cornpromi.st of 1877. 377 Cornpuu.,u , 648- 6!19; pcnon.tl, 711- 712, i4S; World Wu 11. 598. S« 4lhtl Silkon V;allq Conurcd ,, Anrhanr. 4.38 Comslod,, Henry, 39S Conurork l.o!k, 395 Condon!$, 576,692 Coney• l.sl;md ;a.mwtmml p>U'l, 443. 486 Conftdtrxi6n dt Uni~s dt Cunptlinos y Obi'UO$ Mtxiuno.s, 580 Conftdrnrt cffici.tl5,;unma-y !Or. 372, 374.

"'

Conftdtnlt •'MVI!I.erm.s, 364, 365,
3S8..JS9: Soud wrn Home'$tt.ld k.t ;md, 36& l'nmun Ooruint .tnd, 623-6!4: Trum.m'll F.U:r lk;al md, 6l2:tru= ;and, 409-410: Wadt.D.lvi
Congfi:'Pion;d lkronJUIKrion,l.SII-359. 362,364 Congn
492 Congfl:'uoCfndu$ui;d ~.tni.ucion.s (ClO). 57~579. 6!19

Congfl:'uoCR.x:i.tl EqU.lliry (CORE). 606, 668,673 Conoor, Eu~nt "BuD," 669 Corurrv.uion m~mtnt, 401. <197-499 Corunv.ui1m, 641, 674: O inron md, 743- 744; EiSIC'nhown md. 639-6!10:goki $1,Uld;ud ;and, 466:gt;~u.rocm, 714-715: Ntoronsco-..ri:lm. 764: Nixon ;md, 695-696, 701- 702: lk;ag;m m, 690, 71~ 723; Republkoln, 651, 674, n9: in su. piTmt Court, 70<1, 729, i40 Coruoli d;~~icn. SIT Mt'JI"l'S ;md roruoli d;a.

"""'

Corupicoou.s co~umption, 4110 Corutirnrion, U.S., 357, A4--IO: Aflll:'nd. flll:'flls to, A10 - 1S Coruumcr good.s, 405-406, 410. 4110, S84; ;ad\'«'l:iling of, 412: dl:p.lrtmc'lltl«ltt:S ;md, 4.\<1-4.35: d«tronk~ 6!17 Coruumcr pro~tnion ln.·, <196- 497 Coruumtn. 492, 75 CoJUumtr

goO405>406: ~ in, 483, 517. 725. 7<16: modcmi:urion 534,: pt'Qg:rtJ$iYil'ln .tnd, 496:K.Uld.tl md fr;aud in. 766: a-rikts ;md, 578: unrion of, 569: riC'$ with miliury, 646: tru= and, 40 9- <110, 496: uniwn:il}' tt:Stat'(h and, 6411- 649. S« 4lhtl Big bu$int:U

or.

1-5

Corruption, 364, 377. 45~ 4S7;congrr:s. lion;d IOObie'$ ;and, 782: in Gram ad. mini~U<~rion, 370-371, 375: in H.ttding .ldmininntion, 538: in Ku Klw: KLtn, 551: politiu l muhine'$ ;and, 437: pro. gt"<J$ivi$m ;and, 482 Conin;,Ju.m, 393 Cruby, Bill, 717 CtnH!opdil./11 nug.uint, 4<14 Conan rnlriv.uion: Nt'V<' lk;al ;md, 565: sll.:maopping ;md, 368, 369. 370: in 1W.s, 389, 393, <160 Conan tucilt mill.s. 5« 1txrilt mills Coughlin, Clurle'$• 567, 568, 569 Council of &onomK Advi.soN, 620, 640 Counttrculturt, 686, 690- 692 Couru. mili u.ry u ibun;al.s, i63. i72. S« 4lhtl Supn'mt Court Couruhip. 54S Ca-bers. 396-.397, <100 Cox, Ardlib.:ald• i06 Cox,J;ame'$ M., 519. 537 COXJ:'y'.s ;army, 465 Cnnt, S«phcn, 445 Cn'dit, 372, 535, S.\6, 650: ctl$i.s in (2007), 784: f.tl'ml:'n: md. 534; .slw.turopping ;and, 369. &r ~fl4 0t!K Clidit Mobil:itr sund;d, .\71)..J71 Crffi, G~"'<. 520

Crimt: juwni!t ddinquen(}', 659: orpniu-d (g.tng~«n), 553. 5112

Crimu,595 Crimin;d rodt.s, 3i'6 Cnuri.l, 747 Croly, Htrb C.UU0, Fidd Cult ofdon~~:lririrr, <133- 4.3!1 Cul.rur;d N.cion;diJm, 5<16, 584 Cul.run": bbd:, $47- 5411: rdtbril:y, 544: ron~rv.uism ;md, 72.3: immigtmt, 428: midd!t ;md uppc'r d;au_ 433-436: popu. lar. 652,769. n& 1920s. S41-544: 1930$, $81-585; 1971):r;, 710-716: 1960!:counttr· wlturt, 686: 1tkvi.sion, 653- 654: n md.s in 1990~ 754- 757:•utking d;au_ 416. &r >1h,An ;and uri=: Liter;~.rn.tt: Mwk Cul.run" w.ln..SSO, 756- 757. 777 Cum'ncy. ChintSIC', i73: p.lpc'r (gfl:'mb.lek.s). 370, 372, 373,455,465: ri'IUrm, 468, SOL SIT $In> Coin;a~ Cum'ncy Aa of 1900. 468 CulT}', }ohn Sttw;an, SS
1-6

IN:OEX

Cu.ner, Gtotgt Arrn.:suong, 384, 385 CU$Wtn$ Strviet, 430, 763 Cuchod!J.,>
Siow: l.ndi.ul$, 38J. SIT <~f~~> Siow: lndi;m$ D.llty, Rieh (lkwq•), 480 IN•~ .tl)4/ l!lAia(Add
immignnn ;md, 454: Mimmppi Frtt. dom, 670: Ntw York Cil)', 371 : ~1im :ltmpriono(, 376: in South, 454. 463: Tamm.my H.
=•<

Dtp.urmtnr no rt$; 434-435, 5l5 Dtpu~ion, 372,419: of 1893. 1897, 40!1, 421,464-466: P.mk of 1873 ;and, 392, 421. 5N ..W Grtar-fk ptT.uion Dt Prit "> O$ur, 5!11 Dt.-..gul;arion, 766: u.ndtt Rupn, 7l3, 739 Dm rt UOO An ( l877), 391 Dt1enu, Cold Wu, 686, 696- 697, 699, 700 Dtuo il, 482: ;au1oindum-y in, 53!'1 ~ ri!K in (l943), 607 Dtv.T)', George', 472,474 Dtv.Ty,Joh.n, 480,506, 520, 521 Dtv.T)', Thom.u E., 603, 631 Dt Win, }ohn, 609 Dtvo'$tm, Molly. 57l Di.lphragm, ''
Pbrlitio, 511 Ngo Dinh, 645, 6SO l)~nbitnfu, B.udt of, 645 Dillingtr,)ohn, 581 Dinghy l'.uifT ( 1891). 468 Oipklrn.lcy: tKp>U~..:ionism ~roum ch.lil\'1, 709- 7l0, 773 Di:lerimiturion: .lffirnuriw urion ;and, 717: ;and I)~

l)~m,

r;~ei.rm

Di:lc.ue: ;mrhralt ~. 761: in ro;al mining, 417:germ rhi'Ot}·of, <185: i.mmigrlftd ;and, 710, iS I: woti;•.,.l;artd, 484: )'l'llov.• ki.Tr, !172, 50!1 Di:lnty, W;aJ.t,544 Oi'Tnil}': ~J~CtqK;~ntf: of, 757: ;unong PI.Uru Jndi;ans, JSJ -382 ~ in immigr;uion, 675, 775; 'lh\Jrld Wu II ;md, 607- 60!1 Oi'VI,}me, 447-448, 5n, 605 DixiKI'OIU, 631 Dob$on, J~mt:S, 769 Dodgt,JC«phi.nt , 492 Dolt, BOO, 751

Oollu dt"•;tlu.uion, 703. 5« o~Cs4 Montury l'l'gularion: P-<tptr rutl'l'no:y Oomt:Sririry, culr of, 433-43!1, 678: womtn in 195lli, 639, 652 Oomt:Srir strvict, 483: ..umtn in, 41~ 4119 Oominian Rtpublir, 509, 510, 511, 588 Domino thtory, 64.5, 679, 681 Oon.ntlly, Ignuius, 461 00$ P.l:Uru,John, 561 Oougl.u, A.uon, 547 Dougl.u$; Fl'l'-dtrid:, 36J, Jn, 463 OO'o'l'$, 683, 694. S« lllhtl P.uifi'm DOW" Chemiu l Cornp>lll}'• 688 Onft (milil
E.lgk Forum, 714 I!<~»l.t (lutw.t l;andtr), 701

E.lJtkron, l bo.m.u, 705 E.liins, Thorn.l:s, 446 Euth lby (1970), 701 E.ur Berlin, 73!'1 E.ur.em Europe, 630:toll.lp$t of rommu. ni$11) in, 736: i.mmigr
1-7

I.NOEX

413- 414. 415-416: 1950:1 ;tffiutnile. 647- 651: utb;m, 428 Eronomk mobili ty, 418- 419,427 Eronomk Opponunity An, 674 Eronomk Jilllnion,, 749; .:~g.Unn 1~, 738: on fDq. i
cion md, ns- n9;indu.mialiution ;md, 4 10- 413; Nixon "nd• 701-703: J>ank or 1873 wd. J72: po$t·Wotld W.u II boom,

6 19-6.20:under Rug.ln, n<~-725: 197(),;, 7 1 6-717; J~ttVkt5Ktutmd, 710: 192(),; inoov.uioru, .Bl- 5.\7: 'W't.ntm Euro. pun, 624: World W'01r I ;md, 516-517,

525; World W.u II, 596- 597. S« lllhtl Otpu~ion: l.nil;uion; GI"C'.u l>tp!T$siorl; R~J$ion

Ediwn, l bom.u A., 4()4, 410-4 U Edmuncb.1Utkt r Act ( 1887). 393

EdiiQrion, 653: M iun.t\mtriun, 367; d;w wnnin in, 4<18-449: !Or lndi.m thi.ld.n-n, 379, 386: n.uion.tl $\'C'Urity ;md, 658: Pro;en Hud Sntt, 674: in South, 4 13- 414: YOUdlU :~ynenu !Or, 767: •umtn md, 652. S« lllhtl Schoob: Uni. ""niril'$ .lnd rolk~' Edv.·.ud$;)olm, 784 Egypt. 721,727 Egypt, Suu Crisi:s in, 645- 6!16 Ehrtidlm.ut, )ohn, 706 Eight.etmh Amtndmtm, .SOl, 524-SlS, 552-553, t\13 Eighth AmtOOm.tm, AII Eight-hour •urkd;ay, 420, 421, 483, 502, 525 Ein$t.ei.U, Alben, 598 Ei$tnhoal'r, Dwighr 0., 657, 65& Cold W';ar u.ndn, 643- 646: dt:ltgrt:g.uion ;wd, 642.: dyn;amic con~t'\';acism of, 6.W-640: tkcrion of 1.952 ;lnd, 636;tltcrion of 1956 ;md, 640: in World W;u U, 600, 601, 6 10,612 Ei$tnhoal'r Docui.nt, 646 El C;lnty Hill, 801tdt 472,473 Eltttion,, A- 16-19: of 1866, 358: of 1868, 370, 373; of 1872, 371-372: of 1876,377: o( 1878, 456: of 18&1, 456: of 1884, 457, 4S8:of 1~ 409, !IS9:of 1892, 464; of 1894, !166, 46!1; of 1896, 452, 466-468; o( 1900, 468; of 1904, !196; of 1908, !199: o( 1912, 49!1, 495, 500-SOI:of 1916, 514; of 1918, 525; of 1920, 519, 537;of 1914, 540: of 1928, S53-554;of 1932, 561-56l:of 1936,567, 570; of 1938, 575 ; o( 19!10, 593;o( 19!14, 603: of 1948, 631, 634: o{ 1950, 635: of 1952, 636: of 1960, 664: of 1964, 674-675, 714: of 196~ 695- 696: of 1976, 720:of 1980, 723, 72-t o( 1984, 728;o( 1988,735- 736: of 1992, 734, 741; o{ 1996, 751: of 2000, 735, 753-75!1: of 2004. 7611-769: of2006,

or,

783-78-tC<~mp;lig.n fin.utcf: ~form ;lnd, 767- 768: fnud in, 454 Elt(ll,}n l Collt~, 753,769 Elt(ll,}n l commi.uion (18n), 3n Elt(ll,}n l ~form, 482, 483 Elt«Ticity, 410,486, 533, 542, 568, 647; homt produeu ;lnd, 543. S« lllhtl Hydro. tluuicd.uru Elrwmh t\tnl:ndmrm, AII Eliot, Ch.uk:l W., 436 Eli te,.; Aftiun.Ameriun, 368: c.1pi uli~ 445; tduucion md, 435, 4!19; li«r.uun' ;md, 444; rd0tm5 ;md, 437: Wotld W;lr 1 ;md, 5 16. SIT $ffl, Pbnt.en: ;lnd pl;mr;a. rion.s; l..'pper d..tcl.5 Ellington, Dukt, 547, 583 Ellis ld..md, immignnu ill, 430 Ellison, R;Uph, 653, 654 Elbboe'rg. D.:cnid, 703 El !Wudor, 725 Em;lncip.lcion, 35'\ 356, 366- 370 Emb.ugo. S« 1'00.: tmlntgo Emergmcr &nking Act ( 1933), 563 Emergmcr Conuniutt: fot Employrnc'nt, 560 Emergmcr R.d.id'Appropria.rion Aet ( 1935), 567 P.mptrw]tmtl (O'Nrill), 5!17 EmplO'flllent. SIT Untmployrnc'nt EmplO'flllentllct ( 1946), 620 Eno:tgr co~umpciun, 774- n5. Srr d(so O il ;md oil indUJU}' Eno:tgr Orp;a.nmmt, 722 Eno:tgr pLut. 767 Enfurttnle'ntllcu (187().1871), 365, 373, 374 P.»(!l 11. Vttd(r(l962), 715 Engl;lnd. 5« Briui.n (Engl.md) Engli.~h l;lngt•;lSt", n1 ENlAC rornpurer, 598, 648 f.»tJ/3 c..., (bombtr), 613 Enron Cotponrion, 766 Enr.etuinmrnr, 543-544. SIT $hP l(ltrifoc fo'mu ofrntrrtdi'ttmmt Enutpn'MUN, 434, 712: bl.ld:, 432: nil. R!;ld, 406-407; wotieD uplaif.ed by, 415 EnvironmC"nt, 55!1-555, 598, 676, 701: .:ccrivi'm in, 7l3:glob.ll ..·uming, 740, 774- n5: indu.nri.1l g:rou.·rh ;lnd, 412- 413, 415: mining .:c00,39~ progtt~ivi$11) .:cOO, 497-499: 19705, 720; •ildtrno:~ ;loo, 5!11-5!13. 5« >1W Pullution EnvironmC"null>roreetion ~my, 701, 740 Epilkm.iN: AIDS, 691, 710, 7J3; inllutt~:u (1918),519, 522, 5:2 4 Squ;~.l E:mpklfmrnr Oppcwnmii)•Comm.U. ,;ion, 670,678,740 Squ;~.lil}' ;a.nd intqu;dity: filr bl;c(k$, 367-J68:gmdn, 5!15 Squ;~.l Righu ArnC'ndmmt (ElL\), 714, 715 Ervin, S.lm, 706

&pion.:c~ Act ( 1917), 521- 512 &wni.:c,527, 736 Eth.iopi.:c, ltodi;~.n inv.uiono£,590 Eth.nk d urui.ng, 747. S« $h.n!Wn .:end np;~.nlioni,m, 469-474: rronamic, 508 (5« >1W Economk growrh~ Gtrm.:cn, 512,5118. 589, 591: J~p.mt-'t, SOB, 510, 590, 594: LuinAmtt· ia ;~.nd, 511: ~kKinlty .:cOO, 452; in P.-rilk nogion, 470-471: mou 469-470: S!witt Union, 612, 696, 699; U.S. twnomic, 508 P.x llmr Ml/6~ ( 1866), 373 P.xXilfl VAlek; (oilunktr), 740

or,

F;~.noM, 4 16-41& tfficienl)' 'rudit:s in, 483:

fin'·WI}' in, 476-477, 484; lutdihips in, 416-417: imrn.igr;a.nn: in, 417: muckuktn: ;~.nd, 481:u;w,ition ro, 416: u.ntmplor· mtm, in IS9J):r;, 465; "'Omtn in, 416,418, 476-<~n

F.li«hild Semicondunor, 6411 F;~.ir Du l (l'rum;~.n),632 F;~.ir Employmtnr Pucriee'-' Commi.uion, 60~630 F;~.ir Ho~.t~ingAtt ( 1968), 7(M F;~.ir

l..lhar Sund.\rd$ An ( 1938), 575, 576, 578 wd Community fniti.lt:i\l'~ 767

F;~.i.r;h.6;~.5C'd F;~.ll,Aiben,

538

716, n3 .:curomabik .:end, 541; l'l:ooom.i( palit}' ;md, 453: u., (;roy, J66; (;~.I'm$, 576, 7l4X G tt".lt Drp.r.-~ion ;lnd, 576-Sn: nonu;adicion.1l, 775; in ~ulrmmt of W't5t, 389, 391: Sioux lndi;m, 382; in Sou.thtm rut:ilt mill,, 4 15: wod:i.ng. 483 F;~.mil)• A»i5&1ncf: llf.ut, 701-701 A FoltT'ft!dt t~ Arms (Hrminpo'.ly), 5!16 F;~.rm Cnoditlldminiw-Won, 564 F.ll'me'n:' Alli.lnlle ma•'tml:'nt, 460 F;~.lwd~Jerry, 715, F;~.milit,.;

1-8

IN:OEX

F.umeu ;~.nd f.uming: dtbtflo.m' fbr, 502, 541: f.unily, 576, 71~ furedo~.U'I:'J on, 561: G~.mgt ;md, 459- 460: in Grur llf.Uru, 391- 392, 454: ilKIU.$ing,iu o(, 716- 717;rw:duni.urion of, 428; migr;mr •urk~~Si4, 5n, 655, 677, 7&2; n il.mld ur.e,: .md, 407-4.0~ 454, 460: lkron. 'rruttion .md, 363: l930s, 576.,ub5idie'$ fur, 564, 575; r.uitrJ ;wd, 45.8. S« $hP Sb.l~TCropping

F.umers' Holidq Aiwci;~.rion, 561 F.um pmdun pri~~. 465, 534, 53!1, 555, 620: Grur I:Xptt:Uion, 560, 561: Nt'>l' Oul ;~.nd, 565, 575 ; Wodd Wu I boom ;wd, 522- 523 F.um ~~uriry Admini,;u;~.tion,Si4-575 F.um 1en;~.my An (1937), 574 F.urism, 583:in lul)', 589, 591 SIT~fs~Nui Germ.ln}' F.wbw, Orv;~.l, 642-643 F.wtlmn, W'iliUm, 583, 653 FBI (Ft>:ltnl Burt:~u ofln~rig.uion), 529, 6~. 703, 705, 707: Nillon ;wd, 703, 705; 9fJ1 rtmM'ilrn .md, 763, 764 FO R. SrrRowt"O~It, Fnnklin D. ~der;r.l t\n:l Pmjen, 568 ~der;r.l Cornmunk;ation:t:Comm.Uiiion (FCq, 654, 714 ~der;r.l ~p0$i t ln~I'Mle<: Corpontion (FOIQ, 563 ~der;r.J Emtrw:'IWJ' M;~..ugemmt Agtn~Y (FEM.A), 7V, 76l, 780 ~der;r.l Emtfw:'IW}' Rditf An (193Jh564 ~der;r.J EmpiO)~t Lor.lll}' Pwgr.un, 6l3 ~der;r.l Fum Bo;~.td, 555 ~der;r.l Fum Lo.m kt(l916), 502 ~der;r.l guwmnll:'nr. SITGw.oernmem; spm'fo bnneh ~der;r.) HighW.l}' An (1916). 501 ~der;r.l Ho1.ui ng lldminUrn.rion, 650 ~der;r.J M~k Pm;en, 56S ~der;r.l Jbdio Commiu ion, 54.0 ~der;r.l Jkpublit ofG:ltnl Emefgm(}' M;m;as-emtnl Agtn.:y n~ Frtt~.:nillr M.,.'ll1iqfrr(Fried;~.n). 663,678 ~mini" n~lll, 4<18 ~mini~n, 493, 536: stoond..w;aw, 678, 71!1 ~rtuo, G
Flfutmh Amtllll.met!t, 360-.361, 362, 374, 462,A I3 FifthAmtOOmm t, All Fm.mcr; politiul r.unp>~igru, 767- 76& World Wu I, 520. Set >~h4 Economy: P::mia (fin.utci;d) nr Fm~w.iu (DrriStr), 481 Fll'n Ammdmtnr, 522, 703, 715, AIO Fll'n World W';ar. SIT W'odd Wu I FDhi ngrigflt~~,469

FDk,jim,370 FDk Un.i\~r.r.:iry, 367,4S9 Fnxgerud, F. Stou,5!15, 5!16 Fiw Civiliud 1'ribe'$, 381, 398 J.l.lgg,}..tmes Monrgomtry, 505 J.l orid.l, 365,3n: dtcrion of2000 ;~.nd, 753- 754; rr.ulm.U.sion ro Union, 356,375 J.l ourmills, 469: under Gr.tnr, 371: u:ndtr G.W. Suxh, 769- n5: Utin /ltnl:~;a ;wd, 509 -510, 51 J; NI'O(OU$et'\';uUm, 764: nt'l>' •urid order ;wd, 750: nud:m prtn.e$1:$ ;~.nd, 689 Fore~u ;~.nd IUn·.n pmdutu, 390, <197, 572; tum!M'ring ;~.00 Jogging. 414,718: prt:Ser· v.uion, 498, 499 Fott:~r &om, U.S., 543 nr <~1M Rlutrrl (Do,: l>;wo,:), 561 ForiT$t, N;ath;m Srdfbrd, 365 Forr Unmie Tre.tl)' ( 1868), 384 Forr Pi DOW' M.lU.l(n',365 Fort Robinwn (Ntbc'uk.l) M.ugcrr, 38.5 Frurn, Vinllenl, 743 nr <~1M Rlutrrl (Do,: l>;wo,:), 561 Fount~en Puinu (Wilw n). 525-526 Fount~enrh Amendmt m ,3Si- 358, 361, 462, 641: All: S.upn'mt Courr ;md, 367, 373 Founh /ltnl:ndmtnt,AIO FI'Mlt~ 508,539, 624; lllgeri;a .tnd, 646: lnd!Khin.t ;~.nd, 594,626, 628-629: Vitm.un ;wd, 645: World Wu I in, 512, 51!1,515, 516, 517-519: Wotld W';~.r pNCt

n8.

;~.nd,

526-SV: Wotld W;~.r II in, 592, 599,

''"

Fnnro, FnMsro, 583 Fnnk, lbmry, 714 Fnnk.en~ Ridw.td, Si9 Fnm: ~rdi n;~.nd, ;w;win;~.rion of, 5ll FI'Nd, lll..tn, 659 FI'Ndmtn,353, 354: bl.td: wde'$ ;~.nd, 356, 357: r ivil righu uf, l57, 362,3n: l;~.nd 010ntnhip fot, 364, 368: migmion by. 366: in Rtpublieln p;~.ny, 363: sJure. eropping.tnd, 368-369 .tnd m.:.p: ••hirt vigil.tmes ;~.nd, 364. Srr ~($1.1 Afriun /ltnl:riun' FI'Ndmtn's Buruu.,356,36!1. 365, 36~ 367,

,..

FI'Ndmtn's Khoolx, 367 ;~.00 iltus. FI'Ndom of.spetdl, 63<1 FI'Ndom l"ickn, 668 F~M;~.ryWilkiru, <148 FrM :t:ilver, 373, 466-467. SIT ~l$1.1 Silwr roi.n;age FrM Spttdl M~mtnr, 687- 688 Fn'n.:h .C;m.tdi;~.n~ <119, 5!19 Fn'OO, Sigmund, 545 Frid:, H enryCI;~.y, 424 Frito;bn, Berty, 663, 678 Frontier: r.udt ;md rowbo}'5, 396-397, 400: mining on, 395- 396: myrh I'$. ruliry in, 399-400; in Sourh•~"> 393-395: Tum. tr'J tbtlis of,399 Fucll:t:, KUus, 634 Fud lldminUrn.rion, 517 Fund.unmt:lli~rn,550-551, 65U53: Js. Iamie, 726

G..llbuirh,John Kmntth, 6!17 G..llr Wibon, Edidt, 517 G..lmbli ngulino~ 718, n6 G..mg labor, 36!1 G..mgners, 553, 5.81 G.AR. 5« Gr;wd Arln}' ofdlt lkpubtir G..trlidd,}.lme'$, 456: .t~.ulin;~.tion of, 451-451, 457 G..trner, John N.u~, 562 G..trvty, M.ttw:u~54~ 552 G.q lit-el'.lrion, 692 G.qrw:n ;~.nd IC'$bi.:~ru, 714; AIDS ;~.nd, 713: in ;armtd forte'$, 608, 7<12; m.lrri.tgt of, 768:,iolt:mr ~;~.i n"> 756 G~ S« Wesr B;~.nk ;wd G.u.. Gmder tqU.tli ty, 545, 712 Gmtnl Agn'tn)tm on 1 'uiffJ md 1'ndt, 619 Gmml flt.:rric (G E), 534, 725 Gmtnl Ft>:ltnrion ofWotnl:'n's Clul», <147 Gmtnl Moron: (G.M), <183, 533, 560, 717, 739, n 9; Furunm.t exhibit, 584: Hum. mC'r, 754-755: ,:uikt ;u,Si7-578 Gmt'\'.l tOnftn'n.:C' ( 1955), 64!1>6!15, 771

I.NOEX

Gt~

Petct: A«otdi, 64.5

Gtooddt:: in tht: lb lk...u~. 747; in C.:~mbodi.l, 699: in R•·;md.:~, 750.5« >1W Hok!awr Gtmtd uWition, 444-446 Gtotgt. Ht:tuy, 424 Gtotgi.:~, 363, 66& cotton milts in, li iS; KLln in, 365: r.lci.ll violtnoe in, 630: rtadmi:!.lion to Union,356, .\75: Khool Mgnog.u ion in, 4111 Gtmw~ immignm~389, 429,431: .u~.u·. thi.su .lnd, 4ll,lll4: ~rnoemic p.ul)' ;wd, 455 Gtmw~y, 470, 506: p>ll'titioning of, 60.\, 610, 624;ptut u t;uywith Ru~. 517: ttuni.fiution oC, 7.\6: World Wu I ;wd, 512, 513,514, S17- SI9;Wodd Wul ttp.lntions .u~d, 526, 5.\9. S« $hll Naxi Getm.ln}' Gtmw~y ~rnorr.ltic lkpubtic, 615 Gmn thtory ofd~.uc-. 4115 Gtronimo, .\84 Gtnhwi.n, G
"se·

Gk.:~$10n, J;~ekit:,654

Glob.tl tronorny,liOS, 560, 750, n4 Glob.tli:.t:~tion, 7ll6.-i47, n3, nS-7i9 Glob.tl w.lrming, 740, 774- 775 Godkin, E. L, 44~ 458,473 eM's Pdilin (W'.lllis), 769 Gold, 370: in Uli.fomi.:~,J9S ;inC;m.nb .lnd Al.:~.d.:~, 396; in Rod.}' M ounui n~JSO,

""

Goldm.:~n, Emm.1, 493,519 Gold 5&1nd.ud, .\72, 455,465-466, 496: frw: .silwr .lnd, 466,468: Rtpubliu~ ;n.d, 452 Goldw.lr.er, B.ury, 6!11, 681, 686, 743; d«· cioo of 1964 ;wd, 6iU7S, 714 Gompen, 5.unutl, 421- 422, 4i4, 511 c.- s.·il6 t6t U.'i!NI (Mi«htll), 584 Gotu'..1lt:s, Albuto, 772 Goodbird, 387 G4aeUI,w, CA'Niflbws (Roth}. 653 Goodm.u~, Btnny, 583 Good Nrighbor policy, 588 Gorb.lchtv, Mikb.UI, 730, 7 36 Gorr, AI, Jr., 728, i41: tltnion oC2000 ;n.d, 753-75!1 (.,tcS Gorru Bl.:~nc.u (White C.lp!<), 394 Gwptl ofSU«u~ 418-419

• Go5pd ofWt.Uth.. (C.Untgit}. 423 Tn'llt iMI t6t .\!OIIIJt.lill (1l.lld•in), 653 Gould,Jay, 3i'O, 406,421, 422 GO'o'l'mmtnt: rol~s ;wd, 605: drug u.-:!t .u~d,ll87; «onomic de"1W Sutt guvetnmt.nt Gnd}', Htn'}' W., 414,111.5 Gnh.lm, Billy,652 Gni.n prioe~ 391. S« $lw Farm prod1Kt prioes Gnnd Army of tht lttpublk (GAR), <154,

r,.,

455,459 Gnnd C.U.yon, 401 Gnnd Caul« D..m, S72 Gnngr:, 459-460 Conlll.':r-C.n""'}oumul, 484 Gnnt, Madison, 488 Gnnt, UIYJM$ 5., 359, 372, 373: sandals and, 370- 371, 375 7k Gupu ofWu/6 (S«inb«k), 5.113 Gnu.root:$ eunp>ligns, 492, 668: ro.n5\'t'\';a.. rum, 714--715: prog!T.ili\ism md, 477,

481 Gt"Ut I:Xprt:Uion: diKon«'m .lnd prolt:St in, 560-561; Hoel\'tr's !T.ipo.n5\' ro, 560; !..thor mO\'C'mtnt in, 577-579; ps)dlo. ~al .lnd $()(iaJ imp.let of, 576.-Sn: $10~k m.uk!!t tn.dl ;wd, 558-560; Worid W;u U md, 587. S« 4lllo Ntw I:X.ll Gt"Uitr E.ut AN Co.llro5ptrity Sphtno, 594

nlll, Abn, i46 Gt'l'goty, Thom.u W., 511 Gnotwd.:~, U.S. imervmtion in, 726 Griffith, 0 . W., liS9, SSJ Grw~~mud El-edy,lll2 Grws domt:Stic ptoduet, of Chitu, 774 Grwdltnny, "';wds X., 394 Grw5tll.Ut, P2uli.nt, 476

1-9

Gnm n.ltiotul pro:lutl (GNII), 560, 597; 1920$, Sl3, 534; 1950s, 647, 65l Gu.ui.:~Utul, &nit for, 601 Gu.un,ll73 Gu,un.i.n.una n.:~v.ll hut, 473; prisoo in, 763,771,772 Gu,u.etll.lU, CJA (OUp in, 645 GueniD.l wu: t\p.ldlt, 384; in llhilippinu, 473- 474 Gue$1 •urktr prognm, 781 GuitNU, Ch.lrlt~ 451-452 Gulfo fTookin Rnolution, 6!11-682 Gun.s: l.ndi.Ul.s .lnd, Jill: urb.ln violeno:t .lnd,

756, n6

H.liri, 51 I, SSS: U.S. in1trwmion in, 726(m.lp}. i49 H.lldtm.ln, H. R., 706 H.llty. Sill, 659 fi.:Jif >1 Mo111 (O.inpoo), 489 H.lm.u (hUmic group). 772 H.lmtr, Fannit Lou, 6i0, 671 H.lmilton,Aitnnd~r. 4&1 H.lmilton, Ali cr:, 484 H.lmilton, ltc-, 764 H.lmpton,lionti,SSJ H.lmpton ltutirnu, 367, 46l H.lnrork, Wi.nfitld Scmt, 456 H.lndy, W. C., 486 H.lntu, Marl, 467-<16~ 495 H.lrding. W;um~ G ., 519, 536,537: 5\'".lnd.lls .lnd,S38 H.lrltm, 5.110, 655, 656 H.lrl.em Rma.U5.llltt:, SH, 547--5<18 H.lrmoniow RighM)U5 Fin~S07 fi$1Jlrr's VW:ifY, 437 H.lrrinpon, Mich.ld, 655, 6i4 H.lrri~ K.lthnint, 75.\ H.lrri~ William lbrnor, 448 H.lrriwn, Bmjunin, 458, 459, 464,1197 H.lnky, ltob
1-10

IN:OEX

Hemingv.·;ay, ErmC'"-519, 546 Hepburn, K.uhel'im, 582 Hepburn An (1906). 496 Heriugt Fouoo.uion, 74l Heroi:un, World W;ar II, 755 HewiC'n.Pxhrd Corponrion, 6<18 Heyv.·Md, Du8ocse, 5!17 He:dX!Ilth milit;am~ 7n H iduck,j..n~~:J 8. "Wi!.i Bill,• 397 Hid.lu;a lndi.m,, 379- 380, 387 Hiii,Anit;a,740 Hill.nun,Sidnt)', 577 Hine, Lt10is, 481 Hippen, 690, 691 HifCC!,him;a, .uomic bombing of, 613 HUp;ania, 656- 657, 675, 7JZ, n5: civil righo: o(, 677: in Con~'> 741; Grt".lf Oep«~ion ;and, 579, SilO; joble'$$ t ;ar.e fur, 746; p!Wl"l'l}' o(, 657. 718, n7: up. •'aid mobililyof, n6-7n: in urb.tn ' lum'> 655: •'Omen, 540. Sl'l" 11f14 Mo:iun.Ameriuru: PuC'tro R.iun' H U'>AI~r, 6l4, 6l5 not HislWJ fl{tlw St$whnl Oil Ccnllp.:.ut) (T;arbtll), 481 HidC'r, Adolph, 48~59~ 603, 610: t.Kp.ul· ' ion wd,591, 593:}tw5 ;md, 589, 591-592,611: &.din ;and, SSJ Hmong peopk, 718, 759- 760, 7n Ha Chi Minh, 645, 6."11 Hall)..uad. Sl'l" Movin (film') Halmt5, Oliver ~nddi,Jr., 480-481. 522 Halouu$t,611- 61Z, 630, 631 HamC' O..'UC'n: L.un Corpotuion, 564 HamC'r, Wirulov.·, 4116 H amC'~ An (1861), 380, 390 H amC'~ Strike', 422- 413, 464 Hamwo:u;ab. S« G.l}' mm ;md IC'Jbi.U'IJ H ~r. HC'rben, 517, 5J8; d«tian of 1928 ;and, 553-554; G.ttat Dqw<~ion ;and, 558, 559, 560, 561,574: 50ci.tl dloughr of, 554- 555 H ~r.J. Edpr, 519, 667. 703 H ~r (Boukkr) D.un, 555, 572 Hapi lndi;aru, 677 H apki~, Hury. 566 Hopper, Edv.·ud, 546 H a~ r.u~ing, 441 H a~'> Nui~o0e AmnianJ .:md, 3&1, 382, 383. Str 11(14 C.:ro•;alry Houle' Judici.uy Comm.iut~e, 706-707, 752 Houle' Un.Ameriun AnivirinCommiul'!l' (HUAq, 631, 633• 636,641, 660 HaUling: n-
H010YII.s, Willi;am Dun, 445 fl~~~~of(Gin,boe'rg), 660 HUAC. Str !-Joule' Un..AmC'rieul Anivitit:S Comminet fllldl~ fftu1(l'-ain), 399-400 Hu.Uon, Red, 713 Hum.., Oalan-~ 677 Hutrl
Hunr, E. How;atd, 703,705 Humingron, Colli~ 1>., 406 Hurriuno: K;atriru(2005), 780- 781 Humon, Zot;a NuiC', 583 Hus.srin, S;add.un, 726-7V, 74~ 760, 768: inv.uian ofKuw;ai r b)•, 735, 737- 738: Wl'.lporu or, 764, 765 Hu~«~n Pbn, 703 Hydrodtmk d.tm~ 555, 565, 572-573 Hyd~~n bamb, 62~ 6!14

IBM (lmern;ar:ion;r.l Bulint~ Muhine'$), 591, 598, 712 kke~ H;arold, 563, 56!1. 56~56~ 571, 573 Idaho, 392,454: minC'n: in, 4ll, <16!1 ~ Sn.t.kt Ri1o0er projC'n, 496 ''I Ha.VI" .;a lm;am" Spl'!l'th(Xing). 670 lllifttolC)', 4!19.5« ..w Lirti'M}' 1 Lcu't Lw;J (l'V show), 6l8- 6l9, 6S4 lmmignnu ;and imm.igr;ar:ian, 4.28--431: Ameriuniurion o(, 437: changing p;auerru in, 718: in dtile'> 428,437, 48!1, 487; Hull Howe wd, 4110: inert.u:ing diYI'Dity in, 775: bbor or, 416, 417, 578;. persorw.J beh.:roiot of, 485: qool
m

lmmignrion RC'filnn ;and Control An (1986), 718, 729 lmpuehrw:m: ofA. }ahn$1(1n,359-360: of Clinron, 752: ofNixon, 706 lmpe'ri.lli$!U, 469-474,506:eriria or, 473, 474: Europi".Ul. .md J.;ap.u~CO$C', 469: lOW'.lrd Chin;a, 506- 508. S« 4lho Exp;a~ion

lrnpott dutit:S. Sl'l" T;arif& lneomt, rich-paorg;ap, 74~ 766 lneomt to~x, 46~567, 569, 650: Rtag.m'~ rnu in, 724. 725, 729; Sixt«mh Ammd. mC'm ;and.,50l,520,AI3:Worki Wufl,

,.,

India, nueku•Y;apon5 of, 749 Indian Cl;ainu Cornmi ~ion, 718 Indian Rtorpninrian /let (1934), 581 Indian ~lf.Omrmil\ilr:ion Att (1974), 717- 718 Indian 1tnirory, 381, 398. 5«4lho N01.tii.Y llrntriun': Oll;rhom;a lndaehin;a, 626: wmmuni!U in, 645: FnMI:' ;and, 594, 626, 628-629: immignnu from, 711kJ;ap.mtlC' in, 594. S« 4lho Umbadia: ~ Vitm.un lndanC'Ii.l, 747 lndwtri.ll dt$ign, 584 lndwuUJ WorkC'n: of tht Worki (JWWJ,

..,

lndwtry ;and indwuUJi:ution, 404-414; d!.u;acrtr of, 405-406: dtdinC' of, 778; trooorny and, 410-413: gcwernmttn tok in, 466,647: Gfl'.lr Otp«~ion ;and, 559-560;l;abor ;and, 4 13, 416-419: mt!J· m and roruolidonion, 406-40~ 49~ 534 ~ NtwSaurh, 413-416: poliriu of, 45J. 451-453: progreui~m ;and, 48J: n"building. in Europe, 634;$ugn;ation in, 717; in Sunbdt, 651 ; u~u, 409-410: urb.m r.entmmu ;and, 43l: Wodd Wu II, 596- 597, 605 lnf.;anr motulily, 431, 485 lnlbtion, 620,712,739: (1965..2006), 702: in 1970s, 719: sugflation, 702, 722, 723: Worid Wu II, 596, 597 T6r 111jllft'IW,tfi{Se, ~IIJ"lll Jlisrcry (~b~n). 469

lnlluen:u C'pid:mit( l918), 519, 522,524 lnfomurion rt.:hoology(O), 746 lnir:i.ui\11', vor.er, <182 Inner cirie'$, 655, 717, 745, 776. S« 4lho Slum' ;and ghC'nm: lit rt /)rfls( l895). 423 lnlrirution.ll murw:h mOVI"mtn r, 439 lnsull, 5.t.muel, 534 lmtlluru.ili: ;ami-•·u protl"$t ;and, 682: progrt:Siivism .:md, 4810-481: sori;al thinhN, 423-414 ~ ~Urld Wu l ;md,

"'

lmtlligmet lt$ting. in .umr, 516 lnmromintnul b.lllink mi:!.lilt:S, 65.11 lmtr.Gowrnrw:nr.ll Comminl'!l' on RC'Ii.l· g«:S. 592 lnmmC'di;atN'Ml~ Nudur Fc!«t:S (INF)

1'fl'.lty, 730 lmem;al Rtv'tnue Strvief: (IRS), 703, 707 lnrem;ariorul Cornmirt« of tht Rtd Cro5$,

m

lmem;atiorul Congrt:U ofW'omtn, 505

I.NOEX

fnttm.u:ion;d H.u'\'C'I«r Cornp.lll}'• 483 fmtm.u:ion.ui~rn, S!l8, 750: inckpendtm, 538-539 fmtm.u:ion;d Lldits'Gumtm WorktrT Un.ion, 494 fnrtm.ltion.ll Monte.u'}' Fund, 619 fmtmtr.b.uiC'd inici.ui\Otll:, 769 fnrtNurt Commtme Aet (1887), 408,453, 460 fmtNurt Commtme Commi$ ion (ICC). 408,417, 460,496,499, 668 fmtNUft Higlva"')' llcr (1956), 640 fmttwmion, U.S., SOik in Clribbt..ut, 726(m.lp), 749: in CIC'mnl AmtriQ, 725-726 ;and m.1.p, 736t Wtnhav.'C't Ooeuint md, 6!14X n. iwlatiani$!U, 590-591 fnrif~ P:aluti.ni.m, 748 IIM'nrion ;md inve~nan;, 410-411 SIT $lw l«hnology: lfl«ifo: in\'C'mioru /JJrisit\'t M~~m (Eitiwnh 653, 654 Jow;t, 390, 460: $l'Uitmtm of, 380 f~n. 700, 764: CJA.sporuoud roup in, 644-64S : hw~eri..:i5(1979), 7ll -nl:

nudur wt-.lpO~ of, 773: a il •'C';tltb af, 622, 644; W;tt witb lr;aq, 726- 727, 737 f~n·tot!U';t K.U'ld;al, 729- 730 1~, 748: inv.uionofKuv.·;tir by, 7J.S, 737- 738:Mturi.tn,iokntt in, 76~ 770: u.s. w.u in, 764- 765, 770, n l, 784: w;u •irh lr.m, 726-727,737 h i.sh imm.ig:r;um:, 4 19, 485, 513: in U ti. fumi.1. pi r~.t~h, 396: C.uhol.icism af, 455: in ritit~ 431: in NtwYark Cirr, 419, 431: u uilro;ad •'Otit!C'n:, 388 Iron ;and l«'d produn:ion, 408,414. &t.o~W su~d ind~.t~uy

Iron rnrnin, in Eumpc", 622, 625 ;md m;ap, 630

hrig;ation, in U lifomi.:.,39S IRS. SIT lmtrn;al R.t-vr:nut Sttvitt b l.unir fund;amrnul{$m, 716, 749 bobtioniJm, prior to ~rt.:l W;u U, 590-591, 593 brut, 630, 6!16, 76'\ 773 bruli.P;alt.nini.m tonili«, 739(m.:.p), 752: 1)).0 ;and, 700, 727, 748: W't51: B.mk ;aOO Gu.1. in, 700,711, 731, 74~772 fuli.m immignnr~ 419: ;nurd!Du, 549-SSO: in NtwYork Ot}', 419, 431, 432 fuly, S39:f.uWm in,.SSJ; World W.uf ;and, Sll: World W;u U ;md, 600, 601: Wotld W.u I pe.:.tt ;md, 526- 527 fv.'O Jim.:., &udt of, 611

}.ldson, Hdtn Hunt, 38S- J86,394 J;acbon,)C'$$l'1 728 }.ldson, l~r, <141 J;acboni.:.ru, 356, 460

Jubon SmtColk~, 639 J.U'l!IC'5, Htnry, 4<14 J.U'l!IC'5, Willi.un, 473,480 J.:.p.:.n, 511, 626: .:.tomit bombing of, 613, 756: ;uno indu.srry of, 7J7, 739: Chin.:. .:.nd, SOli, 526: toonomit eri!iU in, 747: t xp.m.sion o(, 590, 595; n.:.v
J.:.p
J.:.p
1-1 1

)U!ri:t ~p.mmtnt, 703, 763: RIC'd St-
KU!tr, Htn.ry J,.596 K;mJoU, 460: bbtl migmian ro, 376, 463: $l'ldtmtnt o(, 380, 391: JC.udlOOd fbr,

391 D.n K<~pitA (M.an), 414 K.:.n:U, Hatt (1928), 539 Kt.nn.m, Ci
Kqmli.m twnomit~Si4, 703 Khmtr RouSe' (C.unbodUh 69~ 699 Khomeini, Ay.m!ll
1-12

IN:OEX

or

Ku Klu• Kl;m An 1871, 373, 374 Kutd5,in luq, 7l7, 770, 771 Ku~it, lto~qi inv.ufun 735,737 K)'OOO N«~nh ( 1997), 775

or,

L..Wor: rurory s;yJ«m ;md, 416- 41& g.mg, 368: immigr;mt, 416,417, 578: i.nduwi\1. iucion .tnd, 413, 416-419; p0$1-indu$in Saulh. SIT slw u i;d, 778: JUpply Child bbar. Llbar uniaru: Womtn, •urk of: Working d.u.r L..Wor romDcu, 3611; fi'Ndmtn ;n.d, 356, 357,376 L..Wor unionJ, 419 -424, 564: Arrieln. Amnk~n.r in, 606: bl.1cL o:dudtd from, 420, 439; d.-dining mtmber.lhip in, 649- 650, 717, 779; r..um wotker, 580: Gmu Ot)m~ion ~nd, S77-579; Mo:iun.Ameriun,657: Ntv.• Oa l ;md, 569: in 192()$, 536- 537: wci.tliJm ;wd, 494; \1/;d.M~rt ;md, 709; wonll:'n ;wd, 420, 412,494,577, 578: Wotld W'.u I ~nd,525 ; W'orid W'.u II ;wd, 597 Lldin' 1/0fllt Jmrrn~~ 444 U F'olltnt, Rob
or,

Lmdon,Aif~ 570

Lmge, l>orolhN, 574 l.mJing. Raben, 5V Lw5,626,666, 667, 6i9, 759 Lusm, Ndl;t, 547 n't t.~~rt Cort.lll PLmtt P..mll (L.incbty), 716 Ucin Anll:'~-1, 469...470; Good Ntighbot policy ~nd, 588: immigr;wo: from, 549, 775, 781.: JKA'C'R)' itt, 736t U.S. ~mOll}' in, 509-510: U.S. im'twn.:nr in,5H; W'llwn ;and, 510, 51 1-Si l. SN ~Cf4 Hi$p.u~k,;; $J.'tdfo tllllllllJ'

Ucif'l!)5, 656- 657. SIT $hP HUp.tnies

U.tm,5V,736 Uy, KtnMlh, 766 LBJ. SN Johruon, Lyndon B. Ltagut or N~rioru, 519, 525, 5V-Sl8, 529,

538 u~gut orUniltd l..llin 1\mn'iu:n C'n:ixnu,

657 U~gut orWomtn Voctn.540 U.uy, 11mC~:.hy, 69 1 u~~. M.uy E., 461 Ub.loon, 727, 729, 772 ))!)( 1'00, 698

u

Lrfl8dillll nO\'C'I~ 757 Ui.rurt, urb.tn ..ur!cing d~5$ .tnd, 4111-4113, 4116. SN ..W Rt(n•.uion;Sp~~tU " l.tnd.JNM" prognm, 593 Unin, \'Lidimir, 517 Unoon, }ahn, 69J Uopold, Aldo, 54.3, 572 UJbiMIJ. S« G.l}' men .tnd lt sbi;m.r Ltt Us/WNN Pr..liJt F$_, M~.11 (Agu), 5S3 UYin, Alfrtd ~nd Wilti~m. G.SO W..·insl}·, Moniel, 751 -751 W..•i5,)oh.n L , 577 W..•i5,Mtri•1!1her, JSO W..•i5, Sind~i.r, 546 Uwi.r ;wd Cl~rk nptdi1ion, 380 Uy1t Gulf, B~ult or, 601 ;wd m;ap lifloconiUm: tl«tion 196S;md, 695-69& lmerntt-b.utd, 769;Johruon ;wd, 673-676: Kmntdy ;md, 663: V'~Jem~m ~r ~nd, 679: )'C'IUih mO\'tmtm .tnd, 637 liflocony lo;m~ 520 liby.\, 731 Uddy, G. Gordon, 703, 705 Lifio:Rylt: on ault fnmcier, 396-J97; f.ltmry wotkn, 416-417: onGmu Jlh in5,391, 395-397; homtfront, War\:! Wu IJ, 604-606: immigr;l.llt, 431: or lndiM15, 3111.: middlt·d~55, 619: in mining lOUo'll', 395-396: in 195()$, 647; urb.ln, 417-4.31 Lighl bulb, 410,411 Likud p.u1y (ll'l'.wl}, 748 Lili uolu.bni (H ;~.~ii), 471 Limb.lugh, Rwh, 7113,783 Lino:oln, Abnh~m. 360; ii$.U..:inuion or, 355; lttroru1runion pbn af, 354- JS5 Lindbergh, a.utn, 544, 593 Lind~y, Hal, 716 Lippnw1, W;~htr, 520 Liltr;IC)', 367, 449, 487. SN ..W Ed~X.ufun Littr;~rurt: Mriun Amniun, 547-548: ;tpOQlyplit, 757: Bt.u-, 660: d ime' nO'o'C'I~ 400; potU}', 547, 548., 660; ttgion.uiR ;md IUIItuliJl, 444- 445: in 192()$, 546: in 1950s,653; umpi~n,4211; orw~ 399..400: ..umtn'$ ll!Wd5, 4118 Lilhii.Uli.t, 5V, 736 Liult Bighorn, B.udt of,385 Liult Rod: (Arhru~.r) Khool dl'$tgl'l'g~1ion in,642- 64J Lning Ntw~~ptr, 56~572 L.uru: lO ;Ui j,e'> W'orid W'u f; m (~trnc'n, 502, 5111; 10 Mtxiro, 746-747. SIT $hP Cl'l'dit:Otb1 Lobbyi~U, in 'W'~shingmn, 782 Lod:t, Alain, 547 lo-\,"'1', Hen.ry CWot, 469, 5V, 528 London, bombing or, 592 Tht LM~ Cm~toJ (R.il'$mMI), 649 Long. Huty, 567, 56S, 569 tllllti.ll~ &KkiNnl (BtiLuny), 424

or

losllngdt5,572: ~u1omabi!.n in, 651; Hi~~nk m~)'Otof, 777;J;ap;anl'$t in, 609: MnkMI.r in, 431, 60!, 6.57: rut riou in, 671,740: ~let biutk i.n,498 los1 C.luM: tn)UI, 413 loui~)at, 591 louililn;a,363, 364,377: rt-.ulmiutd ro Union,355, 375 louiMIIt, Ktnndy Otrby, 441 l~ Cu!al n-ilis, 710 l010'tii, Jrutp.hi!'lf: Sh110·, 438 loyaltyU~t5, R.td Se!rt ~nd,631-636 LSD (drug), 691, 695 U.j/IN{j (Nui .lir lbrtt ), 592 !.luit.lll,:$ di:l.u1n, 51 3- 5 Ill Lynmi.ng:ofbbd:'> 462,489, 490, 528, 552, 579: e.unp.Ugn ~p.n~ 490, 571;or Gtrrn.lfl.r:, in WW'I, 520 lynd. ROOm ~nd Hdtn, 541....5111

M~Mn.hur, Oaugf;u, 561, 602,626, 635: in Kofe.ln W~r. 627- 628 M~cllint

....,, poli tiN,II58. SIT

~f111 T;unnuny

M~cu~n. Annit , 445 M~tum, Ch.ules W., 460 M~l)', Rol;md , 434, 4.35 M~dtro, Fr.tno:i:lw, 511 M.t~lm.lg.uint,659

,\bpxint5, 444,1145, 481, 54.3. SIT ~f111 fr"«ifr ritltl M~ t1 Girl oftl.'t S!rmrJ (Cnnt), 445 M~h~n. Almd l b.lJ'tr, 469 M.tiM (biutk$hip), 471 M.ti.11 S!nw (UwiJ), 546 M~l;u-i~, 472, 598 M~kolm X, 672- 673 M~lkln, "lyPOOid M~ry," 485 Mn~~J~J N.ltwn (M;m.hh 401- <Wl M~ncllu Chi ~.ng trnpire', 506 M~nclluri~, 510-511, 610, 616; J ;ap~n ~nd,

590 M~ndeLa, Ntlwn, 736 M~nh.uun Projen, 598, 613, 634 M~nifes1

Otlriny, 469

M~nn, HoDc~, 448

M~nn An (1910), 486- 487 M~nn.flkill'

Ac1 (1910), 499

M~nlltl'll, 433

T6r M~" ~ K11mr.r (B~nunh 536 T6t M.sMirus (F;~ulkntr), 653 M~nwn, Chark~ 691

or,

M~nufuturing: fulot)' SYJltm 416-418;. ~tci.lli:u1i an in, 416; u.ritr.r ~nd, 4$.8;

vtn:iul in ttgr;ufun in, 408. See ~w IOOum-y M~o Ztdong. 626, 628, 679, 699 M~rco.r;, Ftrdin.tOO, 700 M~rijii.Ul;a,69 1 , 705 M~rke1i.ng. 412

I.NOEX

M.uri.lgt: .u~d couruhip, in 19105,545: d iwuu .u~d, 447- 448., 5n, 60S: of~x. "los•-n, 366: intnr..riosl, 7n: Mormon polygosmy, 39W93: sosmNtx, 768: •urking.d.us ~n osnd, 418, 604 M.ush, Gmtge l>etkin,, 401-402 M.ushosll, Gto~ C., 623 t.Uuhosll, ltob~p.lpc'n> Radio: Tdtvi!Wn M"J-Wi~ ($hip), 719-720 McAdoo, Willi.un GobW, SlJ>. 540 M.eCain, }ohn, 751, 753, 768: dt.etion of Mid, 784- 78S MrCo~fl's mapxi.nc, 651 Md:.u nn lmem;a,l ~urity An ( 19SO),

zoos

6>5 Md:;siT.lli.W'.llttr lmmigr..tion ;snd N;stion;a,li ty h.t ( 19S1), 63S- 636 M.eC;stthy, Eug.-nt, 693, 694 M.eC;stthy, Jocstph, 654, 675 M.eC;stthyiJm,616, filS, 640-641, 654, 664 MrCftmo~ nugv;int, 444, 481 M.eCotd, J;sml'$, 70S, 706 M.eCoy, jolC'ph G.,396 McGovtrn, Gto~, 70S McK;sy, Claudt, 5!17 McKinley, Willi.un F., 4.51, 474; U5il~i n;s. cion of, 495: dtcrion of 1896 ;snd, 467-468; WM v.•ith Sp>lin ;md, 471 McKinkyl'uiff, 4S9, 464 McN.uy.H;sugr:n BiD, Slll Mdlheuon,Aimu S<mplt, SS0-551 McVeigh, l'imothy, 756 M~.u ln~t
w

M~nlo P.uk (New J~n;ty) I..WotUOt)',
413

M~l'l'dilh,J~668 M~~n ;wd roruol.id.nion, 483, 517, 715,

' "'

M~ITill l )Tirh(tinn). 766 Meuli:'.Argonno: olfenli\'C', Sl8(m01p), 519 M~xiun.Amniuru, 656-6S7, 775, 786: in C;sli!Omi.l, 393-J~. S49: in Congreu, 677: ;a, cou.·bo)~. 397;dill:'rimin;stion ag.Urur, 400:015 r;tilro.ld •\)fktn, 3!18: in Tu.u, 393: tnditionJ o(, S44: in utb;sn b.urio~SS0, 6S5; in Wotld 'W';sr II, 608 M~xiun oeuion, 393 Mexiun lkYolution,5l1 M~xko, 487, S I.S: imlur'll •'Orktn: from, 6~. 6S6~S7; immigranflll from, 718, 7&2: bm to, 746- 747; migt.un bbor, S49, 677; NAn A ;and, 741, 746;oi1 n.ltional. ir.ed in, SSik U.S. im~rion in,5JJ M.iddk da~. 419, 46~ 751: ;a,urornobilt ;snd, 54!: Bnt n-volT ;wd. 660: bluk, 447,491, 776: dtpn"mon of IS93.1896 and, 466: ~ronomic ~ngnarion and, 766; G l BiD .u~d, 6 19: hippi~5 ;wd, 691: l;sbonioltnoe .u~d, 412: Mnieln..Ame00n, 657: mod. eml$m and, 446: N01.tion;di,;t dubs ;snd, 41-t prog:r
m.

710 M.iddk EaJC lr;w ho~nge n iJi5 ;and, 721 -722: Suu eri..:is in, 645- 646: ~J. pt(Ud ltmlf'i!U from, 763. S« $lw Arab wotld; bntJi.Jl'm riniMI wn0kr. JP«ijjt Mlllf.!?'

MJdJJttolf'IJ (l )Tid &.lt•nd), 541-542 M.id,..,.y, &nk of, 60 J, 602(nup) M.id•'C'.n, f.•umen in, 4S9, 460 Migrant f;srm •urkt~S74, S&l, 655, 782, 786; union foc,677 Mignrion: byblu kJ 10 Not1hern ritil'$, 489, 523-514, S41, 579, 607: by flff blu k,, em.mcip>l-rion ;snd, 366: rur;sl.to. utb;sn, 428- 419, <184; ro Sunbd1, 651. S« ~fl4 1m.migntion

Mili uty buildup, under Rupn, 717, 730, 739. S« IIIIJII Armtd fom-,;; lkferut Jpc'nding Mili uty.indum'ial tompln, 646, 658 Mili uty tul~, i.n R«oruu'\lnion, 3S4, 3SS, 3S9(m.lp) Mili uty u lbun;siJ; 763, 7n

1-13

Militi.u, Afrieln Ameriu~ in, l64 Milk, H;srvq·, 715 Milv.·.lu.ktc, immignnu i.n, 431, 760 Minimum W'.lgt, S73, 575, 576, Gl2 Mining. in We"-39S...J96, 4ll. Srr ~fl4 Uniud Mint ~tlrn::.tprrij.>: mrt.:lh Min.nupoli'-677 Min.nuou, 388, <160; Selndin;svi;sn5 in, 419: Jtultm~m o(, 380 Min.md sh~ 441 Minuuman Projt.:t, 783 Mi:r.llo:kdru~,S98

M.7.J1W v. Ari~$ ( 1966). 676 MWik:s, 7V, 729:eri:r:is in Culn, 666- 667: dtkrut ;a,g;a,in"> 72~ 773;Jraqi, 73~ 76S: Korun, 749; UUlit5 ro limit, n3 MWi.uippi Fl'l'tdom Summtr Projm,670,

..,

MWi.uippi pl.m,376, 46l MWi.uippi River lloo!ii, SJS, 539, 541, S54,

,.,

MWi.uippi (,;t.uc"),63l, 704: F;sulkno:r ;and, 653: Kl.u~ in,365: rtadmDiion to Union, 35~375: nudtm pror.e= in, 689 Mflchd~Joh.n, 705

Mflchdi,M;srg;mt, S84 Mobile Auxil.i.uy Surgiul H~piul,598 ModtmUm. m .u1 ;and uthit«tUr<, 446 Mog;~.didlu, 749 Molotov, V. M., 6U Mondak. W;~.ller, 728 Mono:IOU'}' ~guluion, 372- 373, 45S-456, 501. &e ..rl4 Cul'l'l'ney: GoL:I $l.lndMd Monopol}•, 406, 496; urb;sn util:itit~ <182 Moi\UIC' Oocui.nt, Roocs~l t CotaU;sry to, 509-510 Monr..ti\OI.;JUithood f0r, 391 Momgomtt}'• Al~biun.l, 668: b u5 bO)'C'on in,

.,.

Moon, Su.n Myung. 710 Moon Lmding (1969), 701 MilOt'<, Micllul, 769 Monlity; dtdint of,756-757; m;snno:N ;snd, 33; prog"'mviJm ;and•
1-14

IN:OEX

Mewie'$ (motion pKru~). 486, 543- 54 4; N.uiVI' Amtrk.1, 531-533: in 1930s, 582: in 1 950~ 652, 6Sl: in 1971>.1, 711, 712, 713; in 1990-£, 755 ; 196(1j ~xual n'\'Oiution md, 692: Vakmi.no, Sl2: wu propag;md;l, 599, 605: )'OUih nfldl.ion in, 659 P.l MNimil'flll> l!nw./,;$1Jtil 0...i($M Jt AU{.s~

6n Mut k n ktn. jemmalim .u, 481, 496-497 Mugv.'Ump~C (fution), 458 Muir, Jo h n, 402,498, 499 M11fltr 1~ Ortplll ( 1908). 502 MuJrina1ion;ll rorparation~ 649 MuJrina1io n1l nl!l'I>'Orb, 750 Mu.nkh P.-et ( 1938),590, 591 MllfW r. If,'iW/ ( 1877), 460 Mu.rdoeh, Ru~rt, 744 Mu.tiVI'I", Seh•'Md R.,6U, 654 Munlu, Jark, 771 Mu$k: btuu, 4116:~525, 546. 547, 583, 660: Ntv.• Dul .u~d, 56S: papula.r, 443, 605: npime, 4 26-427,443, 486: rod: ;wd ro11,659: 19605,419: 1970:r;, 711 Mu$linu, 727, 775: bbd:, 673: i.n K(I$(M), 747: Shii1t, 727, 738, 770, 771: Su.nni, 765, 770, 771; in rtrRM'i,;~; .m-adu (2001), 762 Mu.uolini, Benim, 583, 5119, 590, 591, 601 My Lli m.uJO!nt, 697 Myrdal,Gun.na.r, 607

NMCP. Ser N.ltionaJ M:w!ciarian fM 1he Ach'ilnrm~tnr ofCo lo.-.-.:1 Pmplt N~der, lblph, 663, 676, 753 NAFrA (No rrh Ameriun F'~t Tudt Agrl'!e· mtm), 742,746 N~g.u1ki, 1wmK bombing of, 613 N m:oOOAn ( 1914), 487 Mririlk (lilm), 711 N~,;:su, G.mul Abdd, 645-646 N ut, Tharn.u,37l, 412,437 N~rianal Advi:lo.ry Commi»ion o n Civil Oi.sotdtn. 672 N uianal Aeronauria and Spar<: Admini.s. tr1tion (NASA), 658 N arianal Amni a n Woman Sutrn~ A.uo. d.u:ian, 491 N arianal Aiwciation lbr rilt AdviUKrment of eo&a~d Peapk, 523, 5 24,547, 552, 571, 580, 630:civil righu ltadmhip, 656, 670: IOuOOing of, 4119, 491: G.uvty and,

552 N uianal Aiwciation oCCokH"td Women'$ ctub~ 447

N uianal Co lo.rtd F.umtrT Alliu~, <160 N uianal Cong~$ of Arntrkan Indian~

657 N arianal Co~umm' lNg...-_ 484,563

Natio n1l Cound l on Indian Oppo.rwniry,

677 Natio n1l d cilr, 7810. Stl' $hi> t:X6cit ~tnding Natio n1l lkfrrut Eduurion An (1958), 658 Natio n1l Endowmtm lbr tbt Aru and Humani tile'> 675 Natio n1l G.ly and LtJbi.u~ Tasl fon"<:, 714 Natio n1l Guard, 4l3,5JJ, 688-6S9 Natio n1l idtmi ty, 777. Stl' $hi> Nnio nali:lm Nation11 lnd~uiallkrO'o'U)' An (NIRA), 564.,569 Natio n1l lmtlligtnrt Enim.u.t, 773 Natio n1li:lm, 414 ~ AT~b, 6!16; rnlrur;d, 546, 5.11-ttwnomk, 534 ~ Vitl:narnt~, 645 Natio n1l Llbor Rd.uio~ llr1 ( 1935), 569 Natio n1l Llbor Rd.uio~ Bo1rd, 569,578 Natio n1l Llbor Union, 419, 4 20 Natio n1l libet1tion From (V'itmarn), 645, 693 Natio n1l Org;mi:.wio n fM W'omtn (NOW), 67~713-71!1

Natio n1l Origin' An (1924), 548 Natio n1l parb, !101-401, 498-499, 542,572,

076 Natio n1l Rtd.una.tion An ( 1902), 497-498 Natio n1l R«~ry Adminiwolrian (NRA), 564,565, 570-S7J, S73, 576 Natio n1l Rnaun:~ Plan ning Board, 573 NMitm:JJ RtoJil-.11:1714 Natio n1l Rillt A»orialion, 7113 Natio n1l Strurity An ( 1947), 6l4 Natio n1l Stcurily Agr:ncr (NSA), 771- 771 Natio n1l Strurity Council, 624, 729 Natio n1l Stcurity Lugu.; 514 Natio n1l ~lf.dtmmin.ltion, 622 Natio n1l Sodal:i,;~; pany. 5« Nv.i Germall}· Natio n1l Union ofSocial Ju.itir~, 567 Natio n1l Union p.uty, l58 Natio n1l Wu l.abew Ba.ud, 596, 597 Natio n1l Woman'$ P:any, 492, 524, S40 Natio n1l Wom.u~ Suffr1ge /uwciarion, 361 Natio n1l Womtn'$ Alli;l.ll(t, 461 Natio n1l Womtn'$ Pol:iriu l Cauru5, 714 Natio n1l Youth Admin.im-arian, 568, 571 Natio n of bl1m, 673 Tk N.sti«t (•-rddy), 444 NatiVI' AmtrielnJ:: uti'li$m, 677, 717: r.ui. nos or, 776:. in Cody',: Wild Utm Shav.·, 400; Nta· Dul and, 572, 580 -581; Okb. homa and, 371, 384, 398-399; llf..Uru lndian~ 379 -387; ~~ehoob lbr, 379,386: in u.rban d u:nu, 6S5, 657, 677: in World W;u f umr, 516;in ~dd Wadi, 607. Stl' .sfl4 Ranvu ioru: Sr"«i{K trib.llgnwp NMi•~ St.w (Wrighl}, 577 Nativl$m, 428, 431,549 NATO (North Adamir l'tt-.uy 0.-pni:.to~· rian), 625, 764: in Mghani:lun, 763; Rw!Uwd, n3 Natunl l.l'l>·, 424 N.:ro•1jo lndian~ JS3, 387, 607, 677

N.wy; blo ehdt:s, 472, 51I, 6 12, 666; British, 513, 539: nparuion and, 469,470: Gtrm.m $obm.uint:S (U.ba;lu),513, Sl4- 515, 517: Sp>~ni$1\.Ameriun W'.u, 472: U.S.., 50~ 510 , 681: •umtn in, 516: World Wa.r II, 593, 596,601-601 Nv:i Gtrm.my, 599- 601, 603, 604, 613: up.u~..:ion of, 588-589, 591:Jew5 .u~d, S9J-S9l, 611-612: Olympit: g1mt:S in ( 1936), 591: rxism in, 588, 607. Stl' $hi> Gtrm.my NBC (Natio n1l Broa&.~mng Cornp>~ll}'), 543, 621,653, 762 Ntbrnl:a, 392, 460 Ntoran~I'Y.I..Ii:lm, 764. Stl' $hi> Corunva. ti$m N«btrland~ 731 Neuu;l.}ity, in Wotld ~tar I, 511-514 Neuu;l.}ity llrn (1935.1937), 590-591, 592 Ntv.lda,39l: mining in,395...J96, 456 Nt-a· DNI, 5&2- 573, 599: dvlltngt:S ro, 566-567, 575; tnvironrntnr and, 571 -572 ~ Fim,SSS, 561, 562-567: Hund.ttd O.l)~ 563- 565: Nui""' Amn ia n5 .u~d, 572, 580-581: racial j~rk<: md, 570-571: ~rond, 5511, 567-570; Suprm~t Coun and, 565, 568- 569, 573: 1'ruman .u~d, 630, 632: ~511nd, 572- 573: •'Omen in, 563, 571 Nt-a· OtmeKntk Co.Uiti on, 741 Nt-a· Economy, 778. 779 Nt-a· Engbnd, 4 29, 534 Nt-a· Frontier (Ktnntdr), 663, 664 Nt-a· ldt, 686- 688, 690, 7 IO Nt-a· Muiro, 392,515: ;llomic bomb l.t$1:$ in, 598: Nui""' pMpk$ of, 383, 387, 5.11 I: Sp.u~i:lh Spt"akeD in, 393, 394 Nt-a· MOOili:utio n, 688 Nt-a· N.ltioiWli:un, 500 Nt-a· O rluru, 427, 525 ; huniunt dama~ 10,780-781 Nt., Rtp.b(it mag.uint, 480, 520 Nt-a· Soud1, 414. SN..&o Saurh (U.S.) Nt-a~ers, 490: Cw1er'5 Lut lalld and, 385: G.rt.u ikpn':Pion ;wd, 561, 566: "living." 56!1, 572 ~ ~m .u~d, 44 2; ytllov.• joum al{$m, 471 NtJJ'UI-Tf>lt nug~xint, 712 Nt-a· Woman, 44S, 446- 448 Nt-a· World Ordtr, 750 T6r Nt• VWM OrJtT (ROOtnwn), 757 Nt-a· Yofl Oildrm'$ Aid SOO.tt)', 4J7-4.38 Nt-a·Yofl Cil)'• 759: art in, 653: bombing dtatb$ in ( I 920), 5 19: Conty b land, 443, 486: co rruption in, 456: euhoul diu or. 444; ~rnorntk madl.int in, 458: dtp~..:ion of 189115 in, 465: E.ur Villa.ge, 691: dtcui lioeuion in, 411: f..rror}' li.tt in, 476-477, 484;g;ay til-eta.rian in,692, 71<~; Harl~m, 5l3, 547-54~655,656:

immigr.tnu in, 419, 431: moral puril)'

I.NOEX

Q mp.ligtl' in, 4.\!I-4J9;Mu,.,.um o r MOO.:rn Att, 584; NMCP p m«,;t in, 524; tu'wsp.lpen:, 371, 442,471: popul.ufun or, 427, 48!1; Puma Rie.m' in, 65~ fi77; n loon' in, 441: Soci.ll Go~tl in, 439: Tvn.nuny H.lll, 436,437, <182, 484: Twud Ring in, 371 ;md ill u~ 377: W'Nldl}' in, 432: World'$ F;Ur ( 1939), 58!1: Wo rld Tr;Wt Umtr in, 749, 760, i61- 762 Nrw lwt Hm~rJ, 442 "'"" lWk]411m.l~ 471 Ntw Yo rk Knkkcorbotkcon, 442 Ntw Yo rk (R".ut), 430, 485: won~~:n'5 $11[. rr.lgt in, 492, 514: Woodwxk rt$!lul,

4 19 Ntw Yo rk Swtk f:x.:h.lngt, 565. Ser ~64 Suxl m.lrk.er Nrw lwt Tlltlt\ 561, 592.: l>r:nf..lgon l~per.~ ;md, 703 Nrw lwt Tritwnr, 37J "'"" liNk Wilrl~ 471 Ntw Zubnd, 6 28 Ntx ~~i lnd iMIJ, Jill, 385 Ni.lgr.l M~mtnt, 490-49) Niut.lgtu, 510, 736: ronu'.l W'.lr in, 725- 726, 729,736 Nithol..., 11, TJoUor Ru.ui-1,515 Nim~ Cht:l1tr, 602 Nilll'«tnth Amtndrw:m, 503, 52~ 5!10, A ll. SN U Wo mtn'$ ~rr~ Nim hAtw:nd mtnt, A II N IRA. SN N.;~.rioeullndwui..tl RtcO'VI'ty An Nixon, R.ith.ud M., M6, 6i6, 689: domt~ im~tJ md, 701- 704: decrion o r 1960 m d , 664:d ution o r 1968.md, 695: tknion of l9n md, 704-705; Ford's p>ltdon o r, 719: Rtd Surr md, 63~ 636; $0\ltbtm m-.lugyor, 703, 704. 723: Vitmun 'W'.lr .lnd, 688, 690, 697-698: w.uerg.llt md IT$ipw.tion o r, 705-707, 720: •utid poli1io: md, 696-700 Nixon l)o(ni nc, &97 'No Child un Bt.himf' prognm, 767 Nomiokm d vil d iwbtditnn", 656. 668 Noritg;&, M;mud, 7U(nup), 736 Norm.u~dy inv;uion ( 1944), 601 Norri5, Fnnk, 481 Norri5, G
..

,

Northrm Alli.uKr (Argluni~an), 763 Northrm P.-cilk R.Ulto.ld, 372, 397, 401

No nh Kofu, 627- 628, 643, 76!1: n utk.u .mru i49, n3 No nh \'iem .lm, 6!15, 68 1-682, 693, 719: bombing of, 682,688,694, 698. SIT <1f11> Vitm.un Wu No n on, Ch.ltiu fliOt, 444 NOW. 5« N01.tion.ll Org.miucion fur Womr n Nli.A. S« N ;uion.ll Rtro\'C'ry Admini m-.l.cion NSC68 (d rrm,.,. rrpon), &7, 6 28 Nudt.u Nonprolirer;ucic n 1'rr.uy, 749, 773 Nudt.u pou'C'rpl.um;, 647, 713: • .,.$Toe d i.spog), ;40, n4 Nudt.u "'~'.lporlJ, 675: ;uomk bomb, 598, 613, 64~ 756: b uild up o(, u ndtr Rug.ln, 727- 728; in Cu b.m mi ~ik rrl$iJ, 666-ti67:d.Upm..ll Att fur, 774: rtaror, 6 21, 643: lr..q .lnd, 737: SALT u llu on, 699, 721, 74& Sovitc,6ll-62l, 625, 626, 644: u utit:s, 6fi7, 730, 749, 773 Nurrmbttg Law, (1935), 59 1 Nyr, Ger.1ld, 590

or,

ObOlm.l, Bal';l(k, i69, 771, n7: d «tion or lOOS .lnd, 784- 785 Otrnp>!fion.ll s...re1y .lnd Hul1h lldmini'" tntion (OSHA), 701 Otho;a,Stvrro, 657 O'Conno r, S.lndn O.ly, 728, 781 n-r<>n~1 (Norri,), 1181 Offirt o r Bronomk Oppom mity. (i'/4 Offirt o r l>rirt Admini.s1n tion (OPA), 596, 597,620 Offirt o r Sd r mi fk Rt,.,..lrdl ;wd Dtvrloprw:n r, 598 Offirt o r Su.utgic Servke:s (OSS), 596 Offirt o r w ...r lnlbr nution, 599 Offirt wotk, W"Oll)ttl ;md, 418 O'H.ut, K.ut R.im.udJ, 5 21 Ohio, in dution o r 2004, 769 Oil .lnd oil induary, 647-64~ 716: Al.l.~ohn, 720, 740, 767: AJ'.lb.Jw;~tli hoscilil}· ;wd, 700, 727:;md llrW, in M.iddk Ea$t, 6 21, 6 23, 630: >lUiomobilt .l00,5!12.: H.lrding $Qll.UI .lnd, 538: lnni.ln, 622, 644: lt ;l(ji,. 765, nO; Kuv.·;titi, 737: n.ltion.llixtd, in Muiro, 581k OPEC t mb.ltgo, 719, 722: pf'i«5 in, 724; SptcUI.lliem in, 784; nJ.tSU in, 409-410 (SIT <1f11> Sr.m.Utd Oi~ in Wort.:! W;u 11, 595 Ojibw.l foo.i.lru, 677 O'"KeefTt, Gto~ 5!16 otin.w.·~ !Unit o(, 587, 612 otl.lhom.l, 392: dJ.tSI 00..·1i.n,399, 565: ~ lnd i.ln mritot}', 37J, J84, 398: l;md rudl in,398- 399 otl.lhom.l City bombing ( 1995), 756 Olmm, Ehud, 7n Olma~ Frffie'rid: U.·, 485 Qll'l(y, Ridutd, 423

1-15

O lympic prot" Btrtin ( 1936), 591; Mrurow (1980), 711 O mnibu J An ( 1868), 374 O 'Ntill, Eu p:-ne. 547 o.t J'h.ti11n AJl" NI(Wo lrt), 757 <Mt WorM(Willkit), 606 0, t6t R4>ld (1\troiUC), 660 OPEC (Orpninrion or l>m-o&tum Exporr. ingCounuiu ), 719, n2 Open Door, 10 Chin;a, 506-508, 5~ Oper.ltion Blt:ui.ng, 767 Oper;~.tion Ol'$ttf Storm, 738 Oper.ltion Totdl, 599-600 Oper.ltion We1bd, 657 O pium ;md rouint, 487

0n"gon,552 Org.mir.td t:rimt (g.lnpun:), 55.1,582 Or~ill oftl.
region: t:qwu:ion in, 470..471: Wo tid Wu II in,587-S!I8, 595, 601- 602 .lnd m.lp. 6()4 l~ri6r R.UiroMi At:r ( 1861), 388 l~d6~rn,Add>~m' .lnd, 505- 506, 514, 521. SIT .thll AmiW'.lr ma•'C'rntn r l~go P.lgo. 470 l~hl.lvi, Sh.lh lta.1; 644 l~i.nring, 546, 58 !1: A.iheul ,.,.hool, 481: l;mdK.lpe, 401. SIT Arf .llld U ti$!:$ l~d6r Ort-;m

l~ki!Qll, 749, l~lrlrint

i63

libmtion Org.miution (PLO ), 700, 727, 748 l~lrlri.nilru, 711, 727, 731: fntir.Mi.l o r, 74&, n 2:)t'ai:lh homtLmd .lnd, 527, 611. SIT ~ff4lu;~tl:i.l~ltlriniln ronftin l~lmtr, A. Mitdld l, 528, 529 l~n.lm.l, u.s. iiWOIJion o r, 736 l~n.lm.l C...Nl, 508-509, 720 l~niu (fiiUnci.ll)t or 1873, 372- 37.1,392, 39~ 397, 45 5: o{ 1893,465 l~ptrtur«nl)', 373,465: g:rttnb.uh , 370, 372, 455 l~rdt.e, Gror~ 498 l~rdon.~.: by O in1on, 75!1: fOr !Utrntr Con. rtdtnlt:~, 356, 357: oi" Nixon, 719 l~ris, 1'rr.uyor(1898). 473, 4i4. Ser~b4 \'er.r..li01':$ I IUI)' l~ris Acronb(l973), 698 l~rk.er, Alton B., 496 l~rk.er, Ely S., 383 l~r!u, Ro5.1, 656 l~ny politiu.. SN Politiu l pmitJ Tht P.tni»! oftl:r Grt.tl R<~« (G.r;w1), 488

1-16

IN:OEX

P.u.ent medicines, 497 P.ltron.lS!:', 437, 457 P.ml,AI~, 492, 524,5!10

P.lwnl'!e lndi;ans_3SI- 382 P.~-ynr.Aidrkh 1'u itr, 499 P~;at~e Cor~, 66S- 666 l~;alt, Norm.u~ Vint~enr,

652

H;arb!w, 47J; j ;~.p>~nt:St .1-rf.Xi on, 594-595 l~loli, N;amy, 765,783- 784 l~ndll!lon Civil Servkr An ( 1883), 4S7 l~muyiV.lni.l, 713: ;i!onion righu in, 740: ro.tl mil'lf:,: in, !lOS, 423: oil iOOum-y in, 409: pl;al'lf: rr.uh in, 761 l~nruyiV.lni;a R;ail.ro.ld, 408 l~mion5, 567. Ser <~(SI1 Sc:ci.ll stn~rity l~nugon, 7V: «"rrorin .ltloputi,;c P:my l~opk's RtpubtirofChin;a. SIT Chin;a l~ritins_ FnllC!es_563, 564, S6S, S69 l~rot, H. R~. 741,751 I~IT}·, Linraln(Srr-pin Fl!ldlit), S82 l~rdling.John J .. 517, SIS l~n:i;an GulfWu ( l.991), 737- 738 l~non;al rompu«"r, 711 -712, 745 l~tl'.lt~ti, O;aYid,770 l~trolnan. Ser Oil ;and oil iOOu.my Phil;adtlphi.l: AME rhuiTh in, 366: bl.uk ghmo in, 431: i.mmignnu in, 431: inftuo:n:u in, S14: LWor m<:M'mtm in, 420: papubtion af, 417 Phil;adtlphi.l;aOO Rt..Wng R..lil.ro.:.d, 464-465 n~ni.sh Amtricoan War .md, 472, 473: US. n~'al b.u<5 in, 736: ~dd W';ar ll in,595,60l Phillips, D.lvid Gulw.m, 481 Phillips, KtYin, i'03 Photnix, Ariwn;a, 498, 657 Phonognph, 4 1I Phomgnphy,412,4111, S83: in 1930s.S74, l~;arl

"'

Ph)'Jied lirmS$, 710-7ll U.t Pill, 679, 691 Pinehot, Gitrotd, 498-499, 499-SOO Pin~t, Haun, 481 Pink~rwn ~reetiVI' AS!:'ney, 411- 413 PiOIU'tD. SIT Srult D, in We,:r • Piolll'!ets" (pal:iriul donon), 768 Pippin, Hont~e. S84 Pimburgh, S43, S77

Jlt.Un5 lndi;ans. 379-387. SN 4htl Gt"C'.lf Pl.lil'd Pi
"''

l>.xltt Yl!tO, of l.inroln,355 l>otu ;and pom)', S47, S48, 660 l>oindtxtc-r,John, 72.9 l>ol;and, 527, S83, 74& Nui inv.uion or, 591, 592: Sovi.-r Union ;and, 601, 610, 611, 622: WWJI duth t.1...tnp$ in, 611 l>ol;amli, Rarn.ut, 711 l>olkt bmulil)', 411, 63!l, 69S, 740: bbtl r iYil righu ;and, 669, 670, 672 l>oli t-"-;rl ~groups_ 744 l>oli t-"-;rl bo~,:, 436,437,481. SIT .t"ffl> 1V.~td

l>oli t-"-;rl m;arhint:S, 436-437, 45.8. S« .t"ffl> l';amtn.Uly )b)I l>oli t-"-;rl p.uril'$, 451- 4S7; money $Opply ;md, 455- 456. S« .t"ffl> El«tionJ; sprrlfot

fM'"lJ

l>oliOO: .-gnNn papoli$1, 461: of ;anti. r ommuni5m, 631- 636: Jkro nmuer:ian, 3SW62: 196(),: uphNY.II of, 693- 696: tdtvi!Wn ;and, 654, 66!'1, 722, 73S: ;afrtr W;a«"rg.t«', 719- nl: •'Omrn ;and, 540-.5!11; Wortd War II, S.99 l>ollt, Uonidu, 461 l>ollo(k,Jx.hon, 653 l>oll urian, 415,485, S54- SSS, n4: eeonomk growth ;and, 4 l1- 413;mOIU' Llyn ;and, 740: Superfund ,;ltes, 720 l>ol Ptlc (Cunbodi;a), 699 l>olyg;amy, Mormol'd .:~nd, 391-393 Tk PwJrr Ht.m ('Y/dty), 653 l>ook, flij;ah, 673 l>o!w peopk. SIT ~ny (tht pOOf') l>opul.u euhuu, 6SZ, 769. S« 4htl Movil'$; l i*vision l>opuLu F.ronr, S83 l>opuLu mulit, 443, 605 l>opuUrion: b;abyboomrr, 65l-6Sl: inm".l5ing di\~n:ity in, 775: Pl;ain$ lndi.ua, 387: ;and sntdW!Od, in Wt$r, 391: Sunbdr, 6SJ: urb.ut, 417-42& urb;an Mrir.mAmeriun, 366 l>opuli,;c P2ny, 4Sl, 454, <166, 46~503: dution of I891 ;md, 461, 464: t .t~eDm ;and,4&l ~,.,.J Jfm(opel'ort Huron Swemtm. 6."16-687 l>orurnoulh, 1'rt.ll)'of(190S), SJO l>onutp!, Angol.t ;and, 700

Pm:wLun ~d;amion, 61 1, 613, 614

Ptwt-n y (tht poor), 466, 746: bi.nh romrol ;and, 493:<1tn e.ur in (1.96lli), 676: in Gt"C'.lf DtprT.uoian, 577; Hi$p>lllk>657, 718, 7n: in Luin Ameriu, 736: Mtdia id and, 675; in 1950!: ririu, 655: Soda! GaJpel ;and, 439: ofSomhem dl;meroppm;,370, 415: urb.tn refurmrn ;and, 437-440: \'Ott:S or, in 1000 dtrr:ion, 753: W;ar on Powny and, 674, 675 Puwderl}·, l ertn(e V., 410- 411 Puwr.ll, Colin, 76t, 765 Puwr.I~John We$1ry, 401 Puwr.l~ lt10is, 704 Puwr.r. SN Eltruidty: Ent'J)': Hydtl.ll'll'!errK

"'m•

Prolptf.t"liml Q;un.:,:),
bl.uks ;and, 391: Mrxieans ;and, 60!1. S« 1/1/JrJ Disrri.min;ation Proidtney, Nt'V<' Ot;al ;md, S69-S70 Proidtnti;al CommDiian on rhe Sutw of Womtn,678 Proidtnri;al dtniol'd. SIT flt.:tioru Proidtnti;al Vl!fo, 357, 487; Fotd, 719: l inwtn,JSS: Rug;an, 736: 1'ruman, 6.20, 619, 63S Proidtnt'5 Co.mminet an CiYil Righu, 6.10-631 Prolty, Ehis. 659 PM,.; romrob an, World Wu 11, 596,597, 6.20; gt;ain, in We"> 391: tru$1$ ;and, 409: Wal.M.m ;and, 709- 710. S« 4htl F.um product p.tire:s Prin«tan UniVI'nit)', SOl nr Priw.i;Nu ofScioltifo: M_,Umt": (1-:aytor), 1183 Prisol'd: bbtl mrn in, n6: romiet lr.uing. in South, 376, 4 L4, <161: w.u of «"rror ;and, 763, 771- 772. S« 4htl Holout.t~r Prod.tm;ation a(Amnt:Sl)' ;and Reeonmuc. tion (1863), 3S4,3S6 Proettr ;md Gambit, h\)f)' Sa;.p ;and, 4 12 ProftJ$ioiWl Ai.t 1hffir ConU'l(lller.l Organi. :ution, 714 Progmdlld ~~ (Gtorgr), 414 Progi"C'm\OC' P2ny, soo, 501, 503, 5!'10, 631 Progi"C'Pivi~rn, 476- S03: (Otl$mnel' p.rotl'!e· tion ;and, 496..497: mvironmtnr ;and, 497-499:immigntion ;and tuSI:'niu , 487-49S-496:$UII' ;and lou! rdbrm, 481-490: urb;an ;amu .:~nd, 481, 484-487:Wihon ;md,50J- S03: womm .~.oo, 4n, 478,491-493: ..\)r~ten: ;am~ wci.tiDm, 4911: World Wu I ;and, Sl(l, Sl4- 52S PlTjudit~e:

I.NOEX

Prohibition, 487; Eightt~endl Amendmtm, 503, 524- 525, 5Sl-.iB, A13; tC'pNl of,

"'

Qui.n.n,AnthOil}', 657 Quoi..U, on immigr;uieln, 635-636,675 Quoi..U, Dtial, il7

Prohibition ;and Han~~: Ptm.enion p.:my, 454

PmmilC' K«pm;, 757 n't PrtmWrof""'"'~Lifo (Croly), 480, 500 Pmmom«y Point (UWI) n iho.ub linked .u, .\!18 Pmpapnda: Nt'>l' Dul, 56& Wort.:! W;u I, 519, 520: Wort.:! W;u U, 59~ 598-599, 61)4, 605 Pmpmy righu, in Sou.th, lSS-.359, 364. Sl'l" $lw l.Uld Pnmitution, 438-4.}9; lawJ prohibiting. 486-487, 525; i.n W't:~t, 397 Pm«M~h4 EV.lngdiu l.s Pm«M~£ .:~g:nri.m, 459...461: .:~mi .nutk.u, 727- 728; boyrocu, 6n, 689, 721, 75& Cf,)X(y"s army ;md, 465: .ll ~rnoeruic to!M'ntion, 670,695: H.:~ym.ltltl riot .md, 422; of immig:r;~.tion f'C'fa.-m, 783: NatiYI' AmtOOn, 677, 717: ,;rudtm .sit. iru, 66l; ofVitnum W.u, 663, 678, 6Sl, 68J, 6SS, 695, 69&b}')l1Uih, 660. Sl'l" ~~14 CMI righn n~ntm: Suih:s Public Cl'l:'dit Act of 1869,372 Public huld1, 485, 524. Ser>~h<> HNl1h Ute' Public Iandi, 368 Public opinion: ofCiinron, 747, 752; t«pa· t .lit $(Mid.\l, ;wd, 766: ··u pta!»gand.l ;wd, 59S..599 Public Mhoob: dautonltin ;md, 448..449; middlt.cl;w,•;l.(!)t$ in, 445; f'C'fa.-m of, 480: in South, 367, 413-414 Public Utilitie'$ Holding Compan}' An ( l93.S). 569 Public Wotl, Adminimuion (PWA), 56~ 566, 56.'11, 572, 573, 574 Public •urk.s prognm~364:Gmu Otptt:l· .sion, 560 Pueblo lndi.ln$, 581 Puerto R.ir.tn$, 473, 580, 656, 677, 775 Pulio:n, Jrutph. 442,471 Pulltn.Ul P21ut C.u Comp.u1y, 423 Pun.k nd mu,.X, ill PIU'C' Food aOO DrugAn (1906), 497 Pm:in, VJ.ldimir, 74~ 773 Pum.un, RobubiK Wofl, Adminim;~.cion

Ill Q;IM.l, i62. S« lllhtl Bin l..lden, OJilrn.l Qu.ller.l, 521 Qu;aylt,J. Dosnfon.h, Ill, 7l5

R~66it RM(Updik.e), 653 IW!in, YiW!ak, 748 Rut and rui.sm: antidrug tru.s.ultJ ;md, 487; Asi;m$ ;wd, 510; blades and, 400, 443,472-473, 488-491, 571: dnft, in Wort.:! W;u I ;md, Sll: txp.U~Iionl$m .:~nd, 469: GM"'C')' mO'o'C'mtnl .llld, 552.: Muiun.t\mtrie.m.s and, 400; in militu}', 51~ Nui, 58!, 607;no!Moknt dif'C'C'I· anion prnte'$t~ 656; progl'l:'mvi~rn .llld, 488..491: Rt>:l Sut'C' ;md, 528-529: Sp.u~Uh..spe.:~keN and, 393, 395: T. Rorut"O'C'It ;md, 490, 497; in •urk pi;Kt, S79;in W«ld War II, 61)4, 606-607. SN ~f14 0i 608, 671, 740; Tt~J.Stc" ( 1 ~6), 6». 1tx.u, 395; W.uhing:ron, D.C., 694 R.ulicoll RtpubiKMI~ RKonnrunion md, 354, 355,357,l.S8, 375: impe-uhmtnl

.:~nd,359-360

R.ulicolb, 528-529, 567; in 19605.679, 6!7; Wort.:! W;u I, 520-521 R.ulia, 540, 543, 544, 581-582, 606, 621: blu kli!U in, 6l3- 63 398; $1'ltkN ;mod, 388-389: nrike'$ in, 62~21: trMI$. tontiMntod, 372,380,388, 389(map): wotktr JO!ftly in, 417 R.tinf;dl, in Grnt PI.Uru, 392. Sl'l" $lw Drough1 R.Urufotd, William S., 439 R~llf41M Qad:$10n), 3~ R.tndolph, A. Philip. 606 ltlu.dltnbuKh, 'W"al«r, 4l9 ltly, J;unt5 E.ul, 694 l.o~ Rr...,.. Unr.l~ (political pany),677 Rr.Jrr'1 Dl~ 543

1-17

ltmmimon, of Sou1htrn nate'$, l.SS, 356, 375 ltugan, ltollilld, 641, 675, 690, 115, 731: ConffOI w;sr ;md, 725- 726: fnn.ronrr;a K.lnd.ll ;n.d, 729- 730; miliurybuildup undtr, 727- n:B, 730, 739: "·tC'-.olution" or, 722..-728 ltugan I:Xmoew:$, 753 ltugaoomiN, n4- i25 ltulpol:itik, of Nixon, 696, 700 lttblrion .:~nd, 356.366..J70:tnd a(, 375-Jn, 461; Fiftttn.th Amendmtm ;n.d, 360-.361: FounetnlhAmtOO.mtnt ;md,3S7- 35.8, 361,367,373: L.inroln'l: pl.1.n for, 354- l55: poli tiN oC, 354-362.: pn'lidmtUI,l.SS-35& Rq~Ublk;an, ;md, 362-363, 364: scl!ooiJ ;md,367, 413: ,;c.ut guwrnn~~:nn during,36l- 365: Supn'mt Court ;and, 362, 367, 373 lttrorutrunion An oC 1867,358,360, 374 lttrorutrunion Fin.l:!Kt Corpontion, 560, 564

lttrn"ation, fbr urb.tn dlild.rm, 4.38, 440 lttd Ooud, 385 lttd l>tnon, 677 lttd ltiver V;UIC'}•' wflt.;ar in, 397, 398 lttd ltiver ··u, 384 lttd Suu: (1919.1920), 528-529: ( 1~5 1952), 63U36.5« >~h4 Cold War lttd (Scwiti) Army,6ll;in W«ld w·ar II, 595, 600, 601, 610 lttd•'OI!d N;~.cion;d l>vi, 676 ltttd, Walr.er, 50!1 ltdi.-!'l'ndurn., 4&2, 492 ltdUI'm$: tarnp.lign finMIC'"> i67- 76S: civil JC'om, 453, 456-457: middk d.us and, 427: natiYI'·bom Amtrit".lll5 .l~ 428: N;aci\'C' Indian l;mds .:~nd, 581; publiC' tduution, 448-449; ~nr hotut mowmtm, 439-440: urban d ifl', 437: urhm poor .llld, 4.37-440: uropian, 424. Sl'l" $lw Nt'>l' I:Xal; ProgiT.ililism lttftig>:
1-18

IN:OEX

lkguLu:ion (nmtinMnl) uun (SrrShtmun Ami-Tro'' An (1890)): urilirie"$, 569. S« 4illos.."«iF Lw1 lkhnqul$1, Will:i.lm. 704, 729• 752,781 !kid. H.ury, 7BJ lkl.itfprogl"';U"': ;md• 756- 757: Sco pe'$ tti.ll ;wd, 350: Sioux, 382 lkligiauJ Right, 743, 768,769 lkmingwn. Frt>:lrric. 400 lkp.tmioru, World Wu 1. Sl~ 539 Rlf'Nrl mt t6t l..tndJ oft~ Arill Rqjtms t{t6t Ul!.td St.t":a (Ptvwdl), 401 lkpublie.m p.uty, 453: Clinron'll impext~. mtm ;md, 752: Conmv.ui.rom in. 6SI. 675. 756. n 9; Jn~~"'<'nl5. 499. soo: lnt.:oncibbfn, 528: l.lnd l.w.·s .lnd, 390: Ntoeon~n·.lci\'<'5 in, 764; p.:utrmJ of ' u eng:1h in, 454- 455: Reeon,rruttion ;wd, 362- 363. 364, 373. 376. SIT ;f{w EIKrian,;;R.ldiul Rtpubliuru lkpubliroCKotu. SITSoutb Kou:~ lkpublir Sud Comp;my, 578 lk5<".lrdl uni,'C'r.r:il}'• 436, 658 lk5<"1'Y.lrianJ (lndi;m),380. 3&2- 383, 384. 386, 387, 399. 581: ~ppan •irhdt.r.wn trom. 6S7 lk5<"1dtmrm Admininr.uion, S6S, 574 lkAW:mi;d srgn-g.l1ian, 431, 439 lkuikrll: !L:p.lmntnr ~«~rr:s, 434- 435. 535; dtlroum r.h.U~, 709- 710.773 Rrwbol ):Jmtl (IL:!UOJ-rr), 593 lkuf, Abt, 482 lku1her, W'.AJ1er, Sn, 578, 579 1«-\mur An oC 1942, 597 lkYolution: in Mtxito,511: in Niut.lgu.t, 725; in lhu:~i~517, 527: st.n~.1l, 545, 691-692,710 Rh~LI.nd, 588- 589 Rh00.:5, j.lmr~ 6S~ 6!19 ~. Condal.l'l::u..1, 761, 764 ~. )a$l'ph M.tyer, 448-449 ~ pl.tm.lliaru, 369 Rkh.ltdwn, Ell.iau, 706 Rinm.:~n, l>.svid, 649 Rig.l~}ohn T., 766 "Right ro l ifr-" mO'o'C'mrnt, 715 Rii~J.lrob, 437 Riou: Ormoo:nrk Convmtian (1968), 695: t.Uiq· ..'O~r, 423. S« .t"hP R.lcr rian RoW .lnd highw")'5,501, 650, 651: imer. $Wt '}~lem,640: gftly pn:>gr.lm5 fUr, 676 Ro.lring 1We!n:ie:s, Sll Rol'<'JU, John G., }f., 781 Robrt~:WW~, P.u, 715, 757. 767: Chrim.tn C..ulician of, 741, 743, 769 Rol'<'$10n, P.tul, 547 Robinson, &IW'.lrd G., 582 Robiruon, j.ltki.t, 616,630

ltod: .:~00 toll mu~ 6S9 ltod:dillr r,Jahn D., 409,413, 435, 468 ltod:dillr r,Jahn D.,Jr., 486 ltod:wrD, Norm..m, 638 ltod:y M aunuin~ ga!.:l ;md lilvrr in, 380,

..,,

Rll( •~ U'onir(1.973), 692,712, 7JS, 740, 768, 782. S« 4lllo Abonion !tolling Swnt:S ronoen, 691 ltom.ln C.nholirum. S« Cuholk rhurdl ltom.lni.:~, 512, 601, 610,621 ltomr.Brrlin.lbkyo AxiJ. 5« II.W PowrN, Warld Wu U lt00$l''.otll, Eluoor, 55!1, 562, 563, 571, 588; $()fi.ll j~.t~lirf: ;wd, 56!1 lt00$l''.otll, Ft;w.ldin D. (FOR). 51.9, 515: Alli-t:S
ltorh, Philip, 653 !tough Ridtn, 472,495 ltummld, Oan.lld, 761, 764, 783 ltul'.ll uru: .wromobik .wd, 542: tom. munu in, 710: dtpn'.i!i:ion (189].1897) in, 465: mig~rion from, 428-42.9,4811: povmy, in 195(),;,6S5.5«.o~Cs4 Fumrn: .tnd fuming ltul'.ll EIKuilk.uion Adminim.ltian,568 ltusl, O.:an, 666 ltu$$1.l, 506, 748; Ala.d.:~ .:~nd, 37l, 396; Bobhrvik nogirw: in, 517, 517: dtmar~q in, SIS: M.mthuri.t ;wd, SI0, 5JJ: NATO .:~nd, n3: n!Kkar•uparu of, 774: pNtt UUI)' "ilh Grrm.my. 517; "'.U "ilh }.lp.m,510: World 'W".lr I .lnd, S12. SIT .t"hP S!witr Union (USSR) ltu$$1.ln lkYolution,5l7, 527 ltu1h, &bt, 54-t ltw.:~00-1, 747:genocidt in, 750

SUh nol'ugre"$ on, S9l S.lloonJ, 436,441, 487 SALT .lgrrtmenu, 699, 721, 748 S.llv.uion Army, 438 S.lm~470 S.:~n Amon.io, 655, 6S7;Aiamo in,.SS4

(Color.ldo) M.lu.l(n", 383 (Niar.tgUa), 725, 726 S.:~n Fr.mci.sro, 485, 499, 611; Chi.nt5<" in, 1120-411,432: rorruprion in, 481:g.dty k.t (2002), 766 S.t":.a.111.o!J b't'Rill8 Pout, 543 "'S.UUtd.l}' Nighl ~b.u.ltre" Nixon .:~nd, 706 S.ludi llrWi~ 727. 731, 762;bo.mbing$ in, 749 S.:ro·.lgr. Aupm
S.:~OOini,;c.u

Sr.hu~C.lrf.473

Sr.hW.ln:kopr, Notman, 738 Scit:~Kt: f.uming md, 549: noligion ;mel, 550; World W;u U, 598. 5« 4lllo Com. pUII'tll Srope:s rri.ll, SSO Soon, lbm, 4.08 SrouiJh immig:rmf5, 429 Sromburo &,~, 579, SSO Stwnd Amtndrw:nr, t\10 SKond ~rt.:l W.u. 5« World w·.lr II SKuririe"$ .lnd Exch.lngt CommUJioo, 565 Stdirion AmrOOmm t,Sll Sttgn, ALm, 520

I.NOEX

~g~ption, 367-368,.\74, 441, 490, 611,

669: bu.s boyw:O « ;md, 656: dtstgrt:g.uion md, 64l-6!1.\,6S6, 660, 70.m.am.a C;nul .and, 720: FOPUbr tltmon of, SOl; IIUI)' rcjetltd b}•, 371: W'.a1erg.a1t K.md.al md, 706; Wortd Wu I i!M'$1ig-" cion md, 590

or

~nll:'nb~nner,J.am~, 78l

"Sqw-UC' bul tqu.ll• domint, 46.\, 642 ~!»f.llt .sphttl:', fbr W'Oml'n, 4!17, 714 ~p1tmbtr It (2001) u rromm, 760-765 ~rbi.:t,SI2, 747 ~rvicJemtn's Rtadju~nr lltt ( 1944), 618- 619 ~fVic,e l('(tQt, 710, 717, 778 ~ultmtm H oule' m~mtnl, 439-440, 480 ~llltn,in We:s1: lndi.m l.andi .and,380, 3!14, .\98- 199: nilro.ul.s md, 38!1- 389 StYt:n«en!.h Amtndt~~~:nr, 50J.All StYtnth Amendt~~~:nr, A11 ~wingmrli.nt, 410, 418 ~x .and st.~n~.lli ty: Cli.nron sund.U, 750, 751 - 752, 755,757: pro.niru1ion, 397, 438-4.\9, <186- 487, 525: st.ru.ll ~lu. cion,S!IS, 691-692,710. SIT slwG.l}' men ;md lt,f,i.m.s ~x tduu1ion, 493 Sa Sidtoflift (~nntt), 493 ~xu.al h~mtnl, 74.0, 751 ~xu.aJiy.rnrumintd dilC'.alC'J, 430:AIDS, 691, 710,713 ~ymou:r, Hotuio,.\70 ~r 6ftl·, 756 Shtpp.ud.10wner An (J911), S40 Shtrm.m,John,372- 373 Shtrm.m, Willi.un 1~tunuth, 368, 385 Shtrm.m Anri.lh.l.st An ( 1890), 409-410, 413,453, 49!1, 49~502 Shtrm.m Sihn Pureh.a.st k.t (1890), 456,

n'C'

n'C'

465 Shii1t Muslims, 727, 738, no, 771

Ship.s md .shipping: Cunbodi.tn ho,Uii ~ ;md, 719-720: W'odd W'u I, Sll: World W;u U, 59J. 596. &r "($1) N.l'\f Shot indum-y, 416,481 Shuln, Gtorgt, 731 Shuult diplom.aq·, 700 Sitil)·, in W'odd W'u ll,601 Sitn.a Oub, 402,497,499, S4J, 713 0 Tht Signilkosntt d W: Frontier in t\mtri. un H inory• (1U.rnn), 399 Silen1 Gentl'.lfion, 651, 686 Silen1 M..,rily, 69S Ssk111 Sprittl (ClNon), 649, 66S Si.liton V.alky, 648, 712, 754, 76S- 766 Si.l\'tt toiiUgt, 372, 371, 4SS, 4S6, 466-467 Si.l\'C'r mine:s, in Wt"-382,395 Simpson, 0. J.. 755 Simpson, "Soxlltw" }trry, 461 Si.nti.Ur, Upwn, 496-497, S22 Si.n~ St1>ing M.xhi.nt Cornp>~ll)', 410 Sioux lndi.lru, 381, 383, 677, 711k Gho,;~; O.artCJe mO\
or

Worlingd~

Soci.ll O.uwintlm, 423-414,435,469 Soci.ll Go~tl. 439, 480, 481 Soci.llism, 494, S21 Soci.lliSI p;ltl)', SOO, 540 Soci.ll R'fbrm. !kr Rtfotm Soci.ll .stturity,632, 779 Soci.ll ~urity An (19lS), 569 Soci.ll wrlr.ut. Stt wtJr.ut SJ'$1tm Socitly: .affluenttof, 19SI).r;, 647- fiSJ ;ton. tlktlll in, 1920.1, 5<18-SS3;divtNily .and rnobilil}' in, 775- 778: 1dtvision .a00,6S4

1-19

Sol'! monty, in tltnionarnp.aign,, 767 Soil ton.str\';l.cion, 370, 56~ 571, S7l Soldim. Stt Al'ml:'d fbrw:n Solomon ld.and.s, 602 Sonuli.1, U N mUAon ro, 749, 750 Somon, A.n.a.n.uio, ns, 726 Soonm, i.n Okl.ahorn.1, 399 nr SlJMfs rJ{fiU(k Fo.'k (Ou 8oi5), 490 Sou.nd.monty Mivor-.a«'-', 372 Sou1tr, D.lvid, 740 Sou!.h Arriu, 700, 720, 736 Sou!.h Amtrk.a. SIT Lui.n Ameriu Sou!.h C.arol i.n;~.,36J. 364, 3n: rt-.ulmUAon 10 Un.ion,3S6, 37S: I>:'.a i.tl.andi,l68: ltrrorism in, 376 Sou!.h D.akou, 391: Sioux or, 385,387 Sou!.hu,;~; lui.:., 679. Stt lllhtl Sr"«ifr rounu y Sou!.hu,;~; Mi01 Tl't.ll}' Ort.aniucion, 6!1S Sou!.htrn Alli.tnu, 460, 461 Sou!.htrn &ptiSI Con\'C'mion, 756 Sou!.htrn Homt:Sit:~d Atr ( 1866), 368 Sou!.htrn M.anire:s1o ( 19S6), 6!11 Sou!.htrn m-.altg:r,of'Nixon, 703, 704, 721 Sou!.h Korea, 617-6:2~ 643, 700, 71~ 747; .aiur.aft .sho1 dawn, Sou!.h (U.S.): Mriun.AmeriunVI,}ItN in, 670, 671(m.ap)t bl01(ks lu,ing. 607: Dtmotmit p.u1y rult of, 4S4, 46.\: hou.rt}'•'.lg"t in,Sl4; indusui.aliurion in, 413-416: rt:~i.n.mtt 1o d~tgl'l'g.a1ion in, 641.: whi1t ~pl'l'm.aq in, 463. Stt "f$1) Rtton,rrun:ion Sou!.h Vii'Ul.un,645, 698, 719. SIT "f$1) \'itm.amW;u Sou!.h•T.n, 39l- 39S; Hi.sp.u~inl in, S80: M~.m wod:m in, 6S6-6S7; Sp.anidl5pUktn: in, 393- 395. SIT "f$1) Sun Bdr Sovi.-r Union (USSR): .ll'm$ l".ltt ;md, 699: .a1omit •'C'.apon.s o(, 622- 623, 625,616, 64 .and, 6Sik W.l.tll.w.' l>u1 .a00,62S md m.a.p: i.n Wortd Wu U, S9J. 600, 601. SIT shP

ns

or,

or

or

Russi;~.

s~~rion, 6S~701

S!»nid!..Amtl"ieln Wu ( 1898), 469, 471- 473 S1»nid! $pe.tktn.549, 783; in Soud t•'C'"> 393-39S. SN ..W Hi~niu Sptti.aliurion, in produetion, 4U, 416 Spttit Rt$Umprion Atr or 1875, 372 Spttul.a.rion, 386, 390, 397: r;tilro.ads .and, 372: ned: m.ar!ttr rr.uh .and, SSS-SS9 Spttdt, !«Mum 634 Spmtn, Herb'l'rt, 413

or,

1-20

IN:OEX

S}Kd, lknj.tmi.n, 651 Spoib syRtm, 456 Sporn: b.uebidl, <116, <142, 489, 5<14, 616, 630: bii.d:l"!b;~.U, 4<17: bit:yrli.ng, 4<17: boxing. 442,489: ~II, 43~ 711: Olympic~ 591, n1: pro&~iotul, <142.: t..:W in fe'gn.rion or,616, 630: on fe'lt· vUion,711 Sporfe'd 1';~.il, .\!15 Sprin~U.nKJe, 711

SpMtn!l (s.lttllitt), Mil Sc;~.gft.ltion, 702, 722, 723 Sc.llin, ~ph, 583, 611, 624:duth of, 643:

E.u1trn Europe md, 621, 622: Kcru ;wd, 627: World Wu ll;~.nd, 599, 610, 613 Sc.llingrW, &udt of, 600 Sc.Uld.lrdiurion: m.uJ mtdi;~. ;wd, 54<1, 58 I: t .Uiro;~.ds ;~.nd, 407 Sc.Uld.lrd Oil, <109-<110, 413, '5, .\91 S«ITms, l.imoln, 481 S«inbtck,John, SSJ S«m-«11 ttM-.uth, 767 S«phens, Uri;~.h H., <120 S«phenwn, O;~.vid,SSZ 5«•-<ns, Tl'!d, 780 S«vens, Th¥1dt~t~, J5.8, 375 5«•-
sn,

ns,n3

Strike'$, <194, 619;.Ur tnf'IX conU'Ollm , 714: in Grt.lt Dtpr~ion, 566, 577- 579: inil.ufun ;md, 702: Knighn of l..Wot .1.00, <111: by Muie.m f.umer,.ur!ten, 580, 677; miners ;~.nd, 495-496: no.wik.e p ltdgt, 522, 597: nil.ro.ld, 620-621: in ttxrik indu..u'}·, S.\7: violtMI:' in, <1Zl-4H, 464; wildeu, 420, 422 Student rnaverntnt, 6SS-690;tivil righu ,;it. ins, 662: dl'l:rian of 1968 ;~.nd,694: Vitm.un Wu pto«·.n~ 682, 688- 6S9. SIT ~fl4 Youth cultun< Student Nonvioltnr Cootdil\ilcing Commit· ttt(SNCC),66~670, 673 Studenu fur .1. Dernocr.trit Sccitty(SDS),

......,

SubnutimJ (U.bo;~.u), 59.\, 595: in W'odd W;u 1,51.\, SL4- SIS, 517 Su~idits, ro f.umen. 56<1, 575 Subttt;UU.ty pbn, 461 Subu.tbs, 65-t: ;~.uromobilt ;~.00,542,650, 651 Sud.u-, 7<19 Sudtttnl;~.nd, N..xi G
471 Suitidt bombs, 717, 748,770 Sulliv.m, John ~ 442 Sulliv.m, Louis, 446 Sumntr, Ch.uks, .\75 Sumntr, Willi.tm G.t.lh.un, 42..\-414 Tht S.US Abo Riw (Htmingw;,r). 546 Sun Bd r, S97, 651, 67<1, 723. SN ..W South: South~!

Sun D.uKe, 3&2 Sun.by, Billy, 520, 5SO S..IIII~J (Hopptr), 546 SunkiR (CllifOtni.l Fruit Growers Ex. dunge), S>t9, SSO Sunni Mwtims, 765, 770, 771 Superfund liilt:S, 720 Supplemt.nt.u}' Ffttdmtn'J Bu.ttau /let (1866), »7, 37.\, 374 Supmnt Coutr: ;~.barrion righn ;md, 692, 7<10: Afriem Ameriutt~ on, 7<10: ;~.nritru5t Ltw ;md, 410; bl;~.d: civil righu ;~.nd, >t6l-46l, 606: CcnJC"IY.Ili.sm in, 70-t ~w~Nry 1/~t.tm u:st (19~ <19-t durion of 2000 ;md, 7lS, 754; fttc>darn of ~ttth ;~.nd, 634: Hol.mt:S on, lne'$t· Ameriuru .1.nd, 609: li ber.tl ~nd.l in, 676: Ntw De;~.l ;wd, S6S, 56S-569, 573; Nixon ;wd, 70<1, 707; polyg;~.my ;~.nd, 393; r;~ei;d quor.u .1.00, 717: R.e.1.p11;tppai.n· ttt:S to, 72~ 729: lteroruu'\lttion ;~.nd, 362, .\67,373; Ill IT Drt1J (1895), 423; $i:hool pr;~.yer ;~.nd, 715: stgnoprieln .1.nd, 4119, 616- 617, 631: 'W';~.rrtn on, 6!'11-6!'12; W'.lrtimt disll:'m .1.00, 522; ..umen in,

7211, 742,781: WO.tklb}' fur worntn .1.nd, SOl s.na. Anking oC,SI!'I Sw.-gg;~.rt,jitnm}•, 716 Sylvi 5, Willi.un H~ <110 Synthetic rubbtr, 596 Syri-1, br;ati .Uld, 700

T;~.ft,

Willi.un Hoa'Md, <195, <199, 500, 510 6.20, 629, 632,714

T;~.ft.H;mky k.t (1948),

.,.n, 626

T;~.i ..

(Mgh;m tmn). 762 T.lmtn.Uly full, 436,437, 4&2, <18!'1 Tan.uni;~., embil.l:i)' bombing in, 7>t9 T;~.rbdl, Jd;~., 481 T;~.riff.s, 453, 461k Cltvel.md ;md, 458- 459, 466: R.t-publiuru ;~.nd, 452, 453- 45!'1• 459: T;~.ft ;~.nd, 499; Willleln ;~.nd, SOl T;u;ucion, 739, 780: rorponu", 452-45.\, 665: R.eeott~truttion tn,l6<1: ..u lth d i,;uibu cion ;and, 414. SIT $lw l.ncomt ru:1'uif& Taylor, FI'Mtrid: W., <183 T;~.ylor, M;uwdl, 681 T;~.ylor Gr.u:i.ng An ( 1934). 571-572 TNChers, 448.; ..umen ;u, 367 ;~.nd ill~.ti., 760 Tupo1 Oomt (Wyoming) suOO.ll., 538 Ttdmolop•, indwtri.tl tronomy ;md, <11()...41J Tth.tw (lr;m): ha~;~.se crisis (1979),. 721 -nl: ml'!eti.ng (1943). 593 Ttj.too mu.sic, 712 Tdtgr;sph, 406, 410 TdtphoM, <110 , 418, 759; Ma$i:o-.·hodi.nt, T;~.lib.m

..,

Tdt'o'MlgdUt~ 715, 716, 756

TdMsion, 652, 659, 68l:bluk.s on, 717: t.Wic, 7ll; 1 fm.or LwJ. 638- fil9, 65!'1: palitio: ;and, 65!'1, 66<1, 722, 7.\S; in 19505, 653- 65<1; in 19605,692: 1970s. 711: in 19905 t:S('.l~m, 755: Vitm.lm Wu ;wd, 693- 694 Ttlltr, Henry M., 472 Ttll~r Amt.ndmtm (1898). 471-<172 Tempenn(~ 5atittie'$, <137, 447 Ten.mt (.lrmtN, .':t(l869), 373

I.NOEX

1t:uik mitts. 419:.mti.union,ioknct in, 53F.chikl bbor in, 415,417: in South, 413, 414- 415: nrikt in, 494. S78 111ailu.d, 747, 759 1be.utr ;md drama: AITiunAmtrican.s in, 547; Nt1>·Dul and, 568, S7l, S75 ;vaudt-

villt, 442-443

n-& ~~ Ultrr W.otdi11g God (Human), 584

n>t n-;~ oftl.>t l.tiu.rr a.n (Vebkn), 44S,

481 111ieu (Yitm~m),698 111ird Amendrntnr, A10 111ird Reid!. SN Nui Germ~ll}' 111ird ~tt.:l. 644, 646, 66S-666, 697, 736 111ineemh lltntndment, 3S6,361, A I2 111om~s. Clan-f'ICie, 740 111ru Milt bl.mddi5i1Sftr, 713 111urmond, Saum, 631 1\..ma.nrntn ma$¥rt ( 1989, lkijing), 736 1'ildtn, S~muel J.,377 1'illm.ut, "PitddOrk lkn," 462,490 1'iml-an Alit}·. 486 Tif.slfie (mcwit), 75S 1U:o, }m:ip Bro:, 601 10b.lco:o, J89, 4 )4;d.Uust linked to, 710,

751 10jo, H idtli, S94, 59S 10k}~. bombing of, 602 10ltdo, Ohio, 48.:2, S60

T(l Senwt TI'f'lr Riy}>ll, 630~31 10urUm, automobik .md, S4l Twaw (F~ultuwr), 653 1m.·~md, FnOO.S E., S67, 568,569 10)'01<1 Moron. 779 1hd:, 724-72S ;whh Chin-1, 736,773, 780; •ith Jap;m, 737, 74~ multinarion~l ntlwotl.s in, 750 1hd: tmb.ugo, 700: Arab oil (1973), 719:

n>t

oCJ~pan, S94

1hd: unions. 410, 411-411. S« lllhtll.abor u.nion.s 1hditi an~l valuu, 723- 724. Stl' $lw CanJtr.

Y.Ui<m 1hJUromintnul railroad, 372,J80, 388, 389(nup) 1hJU.Mislislippi Wt$t, 379, 380 1h1Upcmuion,.seg~uion in, 668. Stl' $lw Aurornobilt indwtry: lbil~.s 1h1Upcmuion S«urity lldmi.ninra.rian, 763 TrmM (lft#K St-Ro~te(PhiOip.s), 481 1'rta.tit:s: BIT.n.lil:aYsk ( 1918), SJ7: on g lobal •'Mllling. 740: N~ lltntriu.n.s, 384, 517, 718, 776; nudur weapon.s, 667, 730, 749, 773: of Paris (1898), 473,474: of l>orurnoulh ( I 90S), S I 0: of Vergjlk.s ( 1.918), S89-S90

T~ (opc'ra), 426-427 1ftneh ··ufare, World War 1, 514, 519 1fiangk Shirt W,U,;t F~ry Fin", 476.477 1fiparrif.t Pxt, 594 1fatd:y. ltoo, 517 1fuman, H u ry 5.,593, 610-61l, 617;.uomit bomb .md, 6 13, 756: domm:ir program of, 620- 621, 629- 631, €ill: eltmon of 1.9118 ~00,63 1, 634: Fair Ded o(, 632: Kottan War a.nd, 627- 62.8, &9, 63~ 636: Vl!lO of, 610 ,619, 6lS 1fuman Oanri.ne, 623- 624 1fwts. 496. SN ..W Shernun Ami.l'ru$l An 1 Ubtffulwi.s, 485 1 Uaon, Ariwtu, 39-t 1 Ur!c.ey, 517, 623, 629: U.S. mi$ ilt.s in, 666~67

1Urn~r. Frtderiek jaehon, 399 1 Urner,Joe,6S9 1U~ Uni...euity, 463 1VA.5« 1tnnt.iltt 'hilt}' Autharil)' n'GMiJc; 653 1Wain, M.uk, 371, 399- 400, 444: ;u ami. imperi.tl{$t, 473,474: on bulintJ$ sUO:c<$5, 4l8-419:phcro o(,445 1Wr.ed, William M., 37l ;md illu.s.,377, 437 1Welflh Arntndmt:tn, A 11 - 11 1Wmtitdl Ammdrntnr, AU- 14 1Wmty.6Dr Amtndmtnl, Al4 1Wmty.stro00 Ame..d.mrm, A Jot 1Wmty-third lltntndmem, Al4 1Wmty.fuurdl Ame.ndmem, A14-15 1Wmty.6ft:hAme..d.mrm, .SlS.,AIS 1Wmty.sinb Amendrntnr, Al5 1Wmty.st\'tmh Arntndment, A I6 Ts.'t»!)' YNN •tr fl.~~o/f lltnm (Add.mu), 480 1)'ro C«poratian, 766 1yPOOid, 48S

U.bNt.s. Ser Subm.uint$ Ukraine, 736,748, UN. SN Unittd Natioru Und~I'WOQd.Sirnmon.s 1Uitr; SOl Uno:rnplO)'mt:llt, 372: aum iOOum-y, 739, 779; bLlck, S70, 717, 746: in Su.sh tKt$· ,;ion, 766: fall in ( 19905), 745:Grut Oqwt5$ion,560 -S6l, 573, S76; NAFl'A .md, 742;in 1890s. 465: in 19205,533: in l970s, 702, 717,719: in t9aJ>:r;, n4 Union of b il!l Sori..lli.sr Rc-publir'.s. Ser SCNi~r Union (USSR) Union J>aci6r ltailroMl, 371, 382, 388, 406 Union.s. 5« Ubor unioru Union .sald..im;, ;u u rpttbawn. 363 Unitt>:l Automobile WotktD, 578, Si9 Unitt>:l F.um Wotier.~, 677 Unitt>:l Fruit Comp.my, S33, 64S Unitt>:l Mim Work~n (UMW). 423, 495--496, 6.20

not

sn,

1-2 1

Unittd Na.tion.s (U.N.), 744• 775, 78S: atomic ent'lY .md, 612, 644:China and, 699: founding of, 610, 611; lr;l() and, 738, 748,764, 76S: Korean War .md, 627: ptut ktepi.ng llf, 747, 749, 750; U.S.dut.s oa'td, 744 U.S. S«d Corporation, 40!1, 483, 496, 560; ,;uikt.s a.nd, S77, 578 USA.Purim llct (1001), 763, 768 Unittd Sur.t.s Howi.ng Corpaw:ion,515 fltsitd St.sta 11 Crw.~11k ( 18i6), 373 Utsitd St.sta 11 C K11if}>1 Coltlp.!ll] ( IS9S),

e.

410 UtsitdSt.sta11 Rmr ( l876), 373 Utsitd St.sta 11 Rt]lll/Ms ( 1879), 393 Uniwn;;d Ntg:ro fmpnwrment Aiwciation, S5l Uni\'tniria and rol~s. >tlS--436: Aff"ieen. Amttie.m, 367,463, 489, 6."19, 717, 776: ami ...·;u prott.it in, 6Sl:cotponrion.s and, 648- 649; G I Sill wd, 618: udal i.nug:ration o(, 668, 669: IT$Urdl .u, 4.36, 651k 19SOs, 63!, 6Sl, 653: 1960!:yumh mowmem in, 68S- 690; •~mm in, 493, S3~ 60S, 618, 651. Stl' $lwlfl«iF

illstN.Iiotitnt Uni\'tnii)'O(Abbiun.l, 669

Uniwnil}•oCUiifomia, 678, 717: lkd:dty,

''"

Uni\'tnil}' oCChieago, >tl~ 480, 493 Uni\'tnii}'O(Mithipn, 682 Uniwnil}' o(Mi$i ~ippi, 668 Uni\'tnil}' oCPitoilurgh, 48S Uni\'tnil}· on~. 685- 6&6 Uniwnil}' oCWiJto~in, 43~ 483, 689 Uni\'tnil}•oCW)'omi.ng, 756 t:pdikr-, John, 653 li)'l ITintf Sl.lU"')'(W;a:dUngron), 463 t:pperd..t!.s. 41.9, S4l; private sr.hoob .md, 449:.socitl}' ~nd culrun", 4l3- 4J6: womtn'.s suffr;age .md, 491. Stl' $lw Eli r.t l.'pward mobility, 4 )8-419 l.'tban btautifiearion, 485 l.'tbani:ution, S41. S« lllhtl Citk.s .md mwn.s l.'tban Ltague, SSO U.l spy plana, 646 Uuh, 361, 454: Mormon.s in, 392- 393: ,;t.uc"hood fbr, 392, 393 Utopian n-fbrmtn, 414

Valemino, Rudolph, 532, 543

v..not, C)'tw, 720 'hndttbilt, Camdru.s, 406 'hn \font, Maria, 481 'hnxeui, lb n olomro, S49 'hrdtman, J;amr,: K.., 490 V;wu Cal.kge, 4JS 'hudtville, 442- 443 Vebkn, Thom.ein, 445,480 Vtf501.illu Ptut Canfen-f'ICie, 526- 527

1-22

IN:OEX

Veno.UI!.n ut-.uy, Hidtr ;n.d, 589-590 Ve~.ll intrgnrieln, <WB, 409 Vem-.tru: Civil W'.u, 453,454- 455, 459: Vitm.un W.u, 699, 768: World W.u I, 561; W'odd W'.ufl,618- 619 Vettnru lldmini~, 650 Vettnn'll BtMVO!ttH Associ.uion, 608 Veto. SN Ptt:~idtmitl wro Vidubu.rg m;w.~ (1874), 376 Victorian rnoralil}'• 4.33, 43'\ 445, 446,447 Vinory in Europe (V.E) Ihy, 610 Vieuxmg. 6SO, 697 Vittminh nariemaiUt~ 6!15 Viemam, 626, 628-629, 667: Bong Son,6S.S: Fran(f: and, 645: immignnu from, 718 Viemaml'$t·Ameriu~, 709 Viemami:.tation, 697 Viemam s;yndromt, 73~ 747 Viemam War, 6i6, 694(map): tOO of, 686: Joh~n and., 679-683, 68~ 69~94; Nixon and, 6118., 690,697- 698: pmu~n against, 663, 67~ 682,683, 688, 695, 698; \'C'teUn$ of, 76,'11 Vigilante' grouP<', 36!1- 365, 376, 394. SIT .tlw KuKiux Kbn Villa, Pano:ho, 511 Vill~,.; Nu:i\'< Amtriun, 380: Viemaml'$t, 680, 688, 697 Villar;Ugm;1, Amonio, n7 VioltrtCJe: in Amtriu n euhur~ 755 -756: in innndtit:s, 717, 756,776: mial, 630, 669, 670 (See o~Cs4lyno:hing: ltau riou): ~n. in fr;tq, 765, 770; $Uike~ 1nd, 422-42.3, 46!1 Vi.cgini.1, 415: rt.ldm.U..:ion ro Union, 355,

"'

Vi.tginia Cil:y, NtY~~ 395-396 not v•u... (Wiatt), 400 VJSl'A (Vol umter.~ in Strvi(f: ro t\rnl:riu), 674 Vobttad lln(l919h 553 Vol umari~rn, Hll0¥tr wd, 554, 555 Voting tighu: d«rot.ll ri'IUI'm$, 482: J.:,..'
'W'ab.uh Railroad, 42l W.sb-.uh 11 INinPiJ (1886), 460 Wa(o, l tx.u, 756 'W'adt, Btnj.unin, 360 'W'adt.D.tri:s Bili, JS!I- 355 Wav-', 36~369, 417:dimimination in, 576: inmoaKJ in, 4 19, 483, 536,649: mini. mum, 573, 575, 576, 632; womtn and, 4 18, 536, 652, 712, 714:Worl.i W;u U, 597 'W'agner, Roll'C'rt F., 484, 56!1. 569, Si6 'W'agner kr (1935), 573, 578, 629

W'.tiLKt, Gto~, 641, 669, 675,676, 723:in tl«tion of 1 96~ 69~ 696: shooting of, 704.-705 W'.tiLKt, Henry A., 593, 603: in tl«tion of 1.9!18, 63l, 634 W'.tlkr, F1u, 547 W'.tii:U,J.tml'$, 769 W.tll Srm"C, 465--466, 754;boom in, 745- 74& msh (1873), 4ll;er.~CSh (1987), 725: i~idtr u~dingin, 766: Stn.uc" invr.nip.tion of, 565. SIT .sf~~> Su:d:

=•~

W'.ti.Marr (ITtaikr), 709- 710, n3 W.t~W~Uktr, John, 434- 435 W.tpthat Cbro11irlt1 (Ot~r). 653 W'.tr and •'al'f.lt't: gutrrill.1,384, 473..474: Indian w.tD, 380.382, .\!13, 384- 385, 387, 388:; N.u:i blio:ktieg.59l: p«tmpri\'<, 764: on umw, 764, 768, 769: trtndt, World W;u I, 51~ 519. SIT $hPI(ItriF•'ar W'.ttd, Lt~«r Ft1nk, 414,480 W'.tr dtbt: llllit J,539; Con~dtnu, 356, 357, 364: dd~n5t 5ptnding and, 647; mot1l0· rium on, 560. &r .sf~~> Cold 'W'ar,dtkn$1': 5ptnding in W.tr ~pamntnr, 524. 525 W'.tr fOOu.miu Board, 516- 517 W'.tr Ubor Bo1td, 525 Wu M.tnpo"''
Weld!, )o$eph, 640 Weld! immigranu, 419 Wdf.ut upiull$m, 537 Welf.ut Rtform Aet ( 1996), 744- 745 Welf.ut s;y'llltm, 701- 702: ttlbnn of, undtr Clinron, 743, 744- 745 WeOt:S, <>Don, 5114-585 WeO~ H.G., 58!1 WeOJ.Bamen , ld;l, 490 Welry, Eudon, 653 We$C tnYironmtnul di~urt:S in, 497-498; oflitf: ;md kg>end, 399-402: nuiotwl p1rh in, 401-402: Naci\'< Amtriun$ and, 379....\!18: Nt'V>' Oa l program$ in, 572- 573; stnltmtnt of, 388-393: war induarit:l in, 597, 6!17; •uman sutrrav in, 454,491 We~Mat,SIU

Wt$l lbnk and Gau, 700, nJ, 731, 748, n2. SIT $hP bratl We$l Btrlin, 666, 734 We:nern Eurol"'. tronomy of, 624. SIT $hP fr"«ifr Wollllrriu We$l German}', 624. 628 We$1lnghou$C' Company, 404, 534 Wemoot'tland, William, 693 We$l Virginia, roal mini'$ in, 4.05, 414,562 Weyltr, VOOiano, 471 Ulh.lt S«fuf 0:mtJ CJwot (D i!«b Ol/....,. (Sumntr), 42.3 Whut: falling prioe$ fur, 459, 460; in Gtt-.u Plain$; 389, 391, 397, 398 Whi~, 356, 364 "Whip ln.fl;ufun Now,~ 719 Whiu, llndrt10· 0., 436 Whiu, William Allen, 566 Whiu Citiuru Coun(ib, 642 "Whirr flighr," ro suburb!, 654, n7 Whiuman, P1td, 546 Whiu ~prtm.tty, 365, 462: in CalilbrnU, 393- 394;in South, 463: in South A!Tiu, 700. S« 1/1/JD Ku Klux Klan Whiuw.t~.er Ot\'
I.NOEX

;md, SI2-SI4; Wotld W.u l;~.nd, 505, SIS,

517, Sl9,520,S22 Wi)$00.Gotm.ln 1'uiffof 1894, 466 Will~tillgo{lh< Wtst(Rooa"> 4S
n-t

n-t

M.ani;~.g:-

Womm, •urk of, 418, 440,713: Afrie.m American, 366: d Uid turing. 6S2: dod!. ing m;mufxrnre, 4 47, 48S, 491,493 Women); Emt~Je!~C)' Brig.ldt, 577 Women '\!: lnt.ern;uion;~.l Lugut fur ~.le<: ;wd Freedom, S06

~mm'ljoinr Congr~iotul Cornmitt«,

540 ~mm'lliber;~.t:ion, 673-679,

690

~mm'l mn¥~"mtnt, 713- 714

fndi.tn Righu Au-xU. rion, 38S ~mm'l righo:, 36l-362, 692. Ser.o~W Aboniem: Wom;~.n ~ITn~ ~mm'l Strike fbr Eql.lo1.fity,679 ~w. 11ger. 1n ~dsuxk mwkfe:sriu l, <119 ~dvoud, Bob, 706 ~tkd.l)', tighr.Jlour, 420, <121, 48J, SOl, ~mm'l N;~.riotul

525 "'Or!cing d;w: dlild l;~.bor ;md, 449: eultun' o{, <116: dut:ion of 198<1 ;md, 728: txploiut:ion of, 413, 415: futory ~'$tem ;~.nd, 416--418: inc0011: of, in 19SOs, 647: M.uxi:un ;~.00, 42-t MeCut~m and, 635: politia , >t36--437; tt!Orm ;~.00, 437-440: ~otu ;md, 442; upvoud mobility ;~.nd, 419: wflit.e.eoiJ.u, 64USO: Wotld W;~.r I boom ;md, S22. SIT $hP I..Wot ~tk tthic, 433 ~rking ..umen. 5« Women, •urk of ~rkmen's Cornptru.ltion An (1916), SOl ~tkplau $~li.-t}', 484,701 ~rb llorogtt~ Admi.ninmion (WPA), 567-568, S72, 574, S75; lilboli r:ion of, S99 ~dd lilnk, 619 ~dd teonomy. S« Glob.ll l'l:ooorny ~dd poliria, Nixon ;md, 696- 700 ~dd"s Fair: Oliugo. <1.04, 485: Nt'V>' Yotk (1939), 58<1 ~dd 1i'W Cffitc'r (NYC): bombmgoC (1993), 7<19: rtmlf'i,;~; ;unck on (2001 ), 76), 762 ~dd 1hde OIJ.lni:ution, 773 ~dd 'W";~.r 1: Afriem..Atnl:'rieuls in, Sl6, 518, SJ9, 5l3-524;AIIit-', 512,514, SIS, 517--519, 526, 539; umi" ic<: .Uur, 525-52F. eoming of, S I ~ eorpont.e int.ei'I:"IU in, S90: l'l:ooorny during. 516.-517, Sll- 523; mobilintion fur, 515-516: oppontnn of, SOS-506, 520-522: prornarion s19--520: soritly during, S24- 52S: U.S.entry inro, 514-515: U.S. neutf.llity ;md, S12-514; Vl!tti'MIJ of, S61; W't$t.ern F'ront, S17- SI9 ~dd 'W";~.r fl, 755; AII:ie:s, S9S, S99-601, 603, 6U: baulefront in, SS7-SS!I, S99-603: ~rkers ;~.nd

m.

1-23

beginning of, 592-593: ~nu pll'l:td. ing, 588-S9l;J.lp>lllt-'e·Ameriuru in, 60S-609; mobilintion fur, 595-599: in P.-rilk n-gion, 587-S8~59S, 60l-60l, 604, 612: rui:un in, 604. 606-607; $()(itt)' duri.ng. 603- 609: triumph ;md tf.lgtdy or, 609-613: U.S. entry into, 594- 59S: \lttc'f.lru 618- 619: •umen in, 604-60S.

or,

SIT $hP F.t$cl$m ~undtd KMC" M.uJiletr, 387 ~"'!ll.l,386 ~xniak, Stc'phen, 71l

WPA. SIT ~fl;, Pmg"<JJ Alrniniw-;~.t:ion Wright, F'rmk UO'fd, 446 Wright, Rkh;~.rd, S77, S80 Wyoming. 36J, 392: ..umen'' righu in, 491

Yal101 ronferme<: (1945).610, 61 1, 621-612 Yd ltno·dog rontruu, 422 Yd ltno·ft"On, 472,508 Yd low jaumali5ro, 471 Yd ltno'$tone N;~.tion;~.l P.trk, 401 Yd u in, Boris, 736, 748 Yippi.e, (Youth fntn-1\ilt:ian;d Party), 695 Yom Kippur W'.lr, 700 Y~mire N;~.tiotul Puk, 402,498,499 Yoong. Brigham, 392 YoongAmeriuru fM F'n-tdom, 686, 7J~:u A~ ;~.nd, S4S; rod: and roll ;md, 659. SIT ~1111 Children: Srudtm rnaYm~~:nt; Youth mowmem Yooth M;~.rd!eJ fot lnt.eg:r;~.ttd Sdloob, 660 Yooth nla\'~n Ameriun .lnivi:un, 678: Prohibition .lnd, SS3 YIKU Moonr-ain,Ntv.uh, n
711 bngv.iU, bOO, n1 Zimtnl:'rnun t.ekgr;~.m, SIS Zoot suit r iou (194.3),608

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